{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_73957/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_73957","id":"gutenberg_73957","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/73957","summary":null,"tags":["Category: British Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Philosophy, English -- 17th century"],"text":"------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note:\n\nThis version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.\nItalics are delimited with the \u2018_\u2019 character as _italic_.\n\nFootnotes have been moved to follow the paragraphs in which they are\nreferenced.\n\nMarginal sidenotes which span multiple pages were often repeated on each\npage. These have been removed.\n\nMinor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please\nsee the transcriber\u2019s note at the end of this text for details regarding\nthe handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation.\n\n LEVIATHAN,\n\n OR\n\n THE MATTER, FORM, AND POWER\n\n OF A\n\n COMMONWEALTH\n\n ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL.\n\n[Illustration: _Non est potestas Super Terram qu\u00e6 Comparetur ei._]\n\n\n\n\n THE\n ENGLISH WORKS\n OF\n THOMAS HOBBES\n\n OF MALMESBURY;\n\n NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED\n\n BY\n\n SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART.\n\n ---\n\n VOL III.\n\n ---\n\n\n LONDON:\n JOHN BOHN,\n HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.\n\n ---\n\n MDCCCXXXIX.\n\n\n\n\n LONDON:\n C. RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN\u2019S LANE.\n\n\n\n\n TO MY MOST HONOR\u2019D FRIEND\n\n MR. FRANCIS GODOLPHIN,\n\n OF GODOLPHIN.\n\n -------\n\nHONOR\u2019D SIR,\n\nYour most worthy brother, Mr. SIDNEY GODOLPHIN, when he lived, was\npleased to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as\nyou know, with real testimonies of his good opinion, great in\nthemselves, and the greater for the worthiness of his person. For there\nis not any virtue that disposeth a man, either to the service of God, or\nto the service of his country, to civil society, or private friendship,\nthat did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by\nnecessity, or affected upon occasion, but inherent, and shining in a\ngenerous constitution of his nature. Therefore, in honour and gratitude\nto him, and with devotion to yourself, I humbly dedicate unto you this\nmy discourse of Commonwealth. I know not how the world will receive it,\nnor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a\nway beset with those that contend, on one side for too great liberty,\nand on the other side for too much authority, \u2019tis hard to pass between\nthe points of both unwounded. But yet, methinks, the endeavour to\nadvance the civil power, should not be by the civil power condemned; nor\nprivate men, by reprehending it, declare they think that power too\ngreat. Besides, I speak not of the men, but, in the abstract, of the\nseat of power, (like to those simple and unpartial creatures in the\nRoman Capitol, that with their noise defended those within it, not\nbecause they were they, but there), offending none, I think, but those\nwithout, or such within, if there be any such, as favour them. That\nwhich perhaps may most offend, are certain texts of Holy Scripture,\nalleged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they use to be by others.\nBut I have done it with due submission, and also, in order to my\nsubject, necessarily; for they are the outworks of the enemy, from\nwhence they impugn the civil power. If notwithstanding this, you find my\nlabour generally decried, you may be pleased to excuse yourself, and\nsay, I am a man that love my own opinions, and think all true I say,\nthat I honoured your brother, and honour you, and have presumed on that,\nto assume the title, without your knowledge, of being, as I am,\n\n SIR,\n Your most humble,\n and most obedient Servant,\n THOMAS HOBBES.\n\n_Paris, April 15/25, 1651._\n\n\n\n\n THE CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS.\n\n -------\n\n THE FIRST PART.--OF MAN.\n\n CHAP. PAGE.\n\n Introduction ix\n\n 1. Of Sense 1\n\n 2. Of Imagination 3\n\n 3. Of the Consequence or Train of Imaginations 11\n\n 4. Of Speech 18\n\n 5. Of Reason and Science 29\n\n 6. Of the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Motions,\n commonly called the Passions; and the Speeches\n by which they are expressed 38\n\n 7. Of the Ends or Resolutions of Discourse 51\n\n 8. Of the Virtues, commonly called Intellectual; and\n their contrary Defects 56\n\n 9. Of the Several Subjects of Knowledge 71\n\n 10. Of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, and Worthiness 74\n\n 11. Of the Difference of Manners 85\n\n 12. Of Religion 94\n\n 13. Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as concerning\n their Felicity and Misery 110\n\n 14. Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of\n Contract 116\n\n 15. Of other Laws of Nature 130\n\n 16. Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated 147\n\n\n THE SECOND PART.--OF COMMONWEALTH.\n\n\n 17. Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a\n Commonwealth 153\n\n 18. Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution 159\n\n 19. Of the several kinds of Commonwealth by\n Institution; and of Succession to the Sovereign\n Power 171\n\n 20. Of Dominion Paternal, and Despotical 185\n\n 21. Of the Liberty of Subjects 196\n\n 22. Of Systems Subject, Political, and Private 210\n\n 23. Of the Public Ministers of Sovereign Power 226\n\n 24. Of the Nutrition, and Procreation of a\n Commonwealth 232\n\n 25. Of Counsel 240\n\n 26. Of Civil Laws 250\n\n 27. Of Crimes, Excuses, and Extenuations 277\n\n 28. Of Punishments, and Rewards 297\n\n 29. Of those things that weaken, or tend to the\n Dissolution of a Commonwealth 308\n\n 30. Of the Office of the Sovereign Representative 322\n\n 31. Of the Kingdom of God by Nature 343\n\n\n THE THIRD PART.--OF A CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH.\n\n\n 32. Of the Principles of Christian Politics 359\n\n 33. Of the Number, Antiquity, Scope, Authority, and\n Interpreters of the Books of Holy Scripture 366\n\n 34. Of the Signification of Spirit, Angel, and\n Inspiration, in the Books of Holy Scripture 380\n\n 35. Of the Signification in Scripture of the Kingdom\n of God, of Holy, Sacred, and Sacrament 396\n\n 36. Of the Word of God, and of Prophets 407\n\n 37. Of Miracles, and their Use 427\n\n 38. Of the Signification in Scripture of Eternal Life,\n Hell, Salvation, the World to Come, and\n Redemption 437\n\n 39. Of the Signification in Scripture of the word\n Church 458\n\n 40. Of the Rights of the Kingdom of God, in Abraham,\n Moses, the High-Priests, and the Kings of Judah 461\n\n 41. Of the Office of Our Blessed Saviour 475\n\n 42. Of Power Ecclesiastical 485\n\n 43. Of what is Necessary for a Man\u2019s Reception into\n the Kingdom of Heaven 584\n\n\n THE FOURTH PART.--OF THE KINGDOM OF DARKNESS.\n\n\n 44. Of Spiritual Darkness, from Misinterpretation of\n Scripture 603\n\n 45. Of Demonology, and other Relics of the Religion of\n the Gentiles 637\n\n 46. Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy, and Fabulous\n Traditions 664\n\n 47. Of the Benefit proceeding from such Darkness; and\n to whom it accrueth 688\n\n A Review and Conclusion 701\n\n\n\n\n THE\n INTRODUCTION.\n\n -------\n\n\nNature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the\n_art_ of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it\ncan make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs,\nthe beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may we not\nsay, that all _automata_ (engines that move themselves by springs and\nwheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the\n_heart_, but a _spring_; and the _nerves_, but so many _strings_; and\nthe _joints_, but so many _wheels_, giving motion to the whole body,\nsuch as was intended by the artificer? _Art_ goes yet further, imitating\nthat rational and most excellent work of nature, _man_. For by art is\ncreated that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE, in Latin\nCIVITAS, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and\nstrength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was\nintended; and in which the _sovereignty_ is an artificial _soul_, as\ngiving life and motion to the whole body; the _magistrates_, and other\n_officers_ of judicature and execution, artificial _joints_; _reward_\nand _punishment_, by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty every\njoint and member is moved to perform his duty, are the _nerves_, that do\nthe same in the body natural; the _wealth_ and _riches_ of all the\nparticular members, are the _strength_; _salus populi_, the _people\u2019s\nsafety_, its _business_; _counsellors_, by whom all things needful for\nit to know are suggested unto it, are the _memory_; _equity_, and\n_laws_, an artificial _reason_ and _will_; _concord_, _health_;\n_sedition_, _sickness_; and _civil war_, _death_. Lastly, the _pacts_\nand _covenants_, by which the parts of this body politic were at first\nmade, set together, and united, resemble that _fiat_, or the _let us\nmake man_, pronounced by God in the creation.\n\nTo describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider\n\nFirst, the _matter_ thereof, and the _artificer_; both which is _man_.\n\nSecondly, _how_, and by what _covenants_ it is made; what are the\n_rights_ and just _power_ or _authority_ of a _sovereign_; and what it\nis that _preserveth_ or _dissolveth_ it.\n\nThirdly, what is a _Christian commonwealth_.\n\nLastly, what is the _kingdom of darkness_.\n\nConcerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, that\n_wisdom_ is acquired, not by reading of _books_, but of _men_.\nConsequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give\nno other proof of being wise, take great delight to show what they think\nthey have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind\ntheir backs. But there is another saying not of late understood, by\nwhich they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the\npains; that is, _nosce teipsum_, _read thyself_: which was not meant, as\nit is now used, to countenance, either the barbarous state of men in\npower, towards their inferiors; or to encourage men of low degree, to a\nsaucy behaviour towards their betters; but to teach us, that for the\nsimilitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and\npassions of another, whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth\nwhat he doth, when he does _think_, _opine_, _reason_, _hope_, _fear_,\n&c. and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, what are the\nthoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I say\nthe similitude of _passions_, which are the same in all men, _desire_,\n_fear_, _hope_, &c.; not the similitude of the _objects_ of the\npassions, which are the things _desired_, _feared_, _hoped_, &c.: for\nthese the constitution individual, and particular education, do so vary,\nand they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters\nof man\u2019s heart, blotted and confounded as they are with dissembling,\nlying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him\nthat searcheth hearts. And though by men\u2019s actions we do discover their\ndesign sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and\ndistinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be\naltered, is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part\ndeceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that\nreads, is himself a good or evil man.\n\nBut let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it\nserves him only with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to\ngovern a whole nation, must read in himself, not this or that particular\nman; but mankind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn\nany language or science; yet when I shall have set down my own reading\norderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be only to\nconsider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of\ndoctrine admitteth no other demonstration.\n\n\n\n\n PART I.\n\n OF MAN.\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n\n OF SENSE.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Sense.]\n\nConcerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and\nafterwards in train, or dependence upon one another. Singly, they are\nevery one a _representation_ or _appearance_, of some quality, or other\naccident of a body without us, which is commonly called an _object_.\nWhich object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man\u2019s body;\nand by diversity of working, produceth diversity of appearances.\n\nThe original of them all, is that which we call SENSE, for there is no\nconception in a man\u2019s mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by\nparts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from\nthat original.\n\nTo know the natural cause of sense, is not very necessary to the\nbusiness now in hand; and I have elsewhere written of the same at large.\nNevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly\ndeliver the same in this place.\n\nThe cause of sense, is the external body, or object, which presseth the\norgan proper to each sense, either immediately, as in the taste and\ntouch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which\npressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings and\nmembranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, causeth\nthere a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart to\ndeliver itself, which endeavour, because _outward_, seemeth to be some\nmatter without. And this _seeming_, or _fancy_, is that which men call\n_sense_; and consisteth, as to the eye, in a _light_, or _colour\nfigured_; to the ear, in a _sound_; to the nostril, in an _odour_; to\nthe tongue and palate, in a _savour_; and to the rest of the body, in\n_heat_, _cold_, _hardness_, _softness_, and such other qualities as we\ndiscern by _feeling_. All which qualities, called _sensible_, are in the\nobject, that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by\nwhich it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed,\nare they any thing else, but divers motions; for motion produceth\nnothing but motion. But their appearance to us is fancy, the same\nwaking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye,\nmakes us fancy a light; and pressing the ear, produceth a din; so do the\nbodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though\nunobserved action. For if those colours and sounds were in the bodies,\nor objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by\nglasses, and in echoes by reflection, we see they are; where we know the\nthing we see is in one place, the appearance in another. And though at\nsome certain distance, the real and very object seem invested with the\nfancy it begets in us; yet still the object is one thing, the image or\nfancy is another. So that sense, in all cases, is nothing else but\noriginal fancy, caused, as I have said, by the pressure, that is, by the\nmotion, of external things upon our eyes, ears, and other organs\nthereunto ordained.\n\nBut the philosophy-schools, through all the universities of Christendom,\ngrounded upon certain texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine, and\nsay, for the cause of _vision_, that the thing seen, sendeth forth on\nevery side a _visible species_, in English, a _visible show_,\n_apparition_, or _aspect_, or _a being seen_; the receiving whereof into\nthe eye, is _seeing_. And for the cause of _hearing_, that the thing\nheard, sendeth forth an _audible species_, that is an _audible aspect_,\nor _audible being seen_; which entering at the ear, maketh _hearing_.\nNay, for the cause of _understanding_ also, they say the thing\nunderstood, sendeth forth an _intelligible species_, that is, an\n_intelligible being seen_; which, coming into the understanding, makes\nus understand. I say not this, as disproving the use of universities;\nbut because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a commonwealth, I\nmust let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be\namended in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is\none.\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n\n OF IMAGINATION.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Imagination.]\n\nThat when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie\nstill for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing\nis in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay\nit, though the reason be the same, namely, that nothing can change\nitself, is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not only other\nmen, but all other things, by themselves; and because they find\nthemselves subject after motion to pain, and lassitude, think every\nthing else grows weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord;\nlittle considering, whether it be not some other motion, wherein that\ndesire of rest they find in themselves, consisteth. From hence it is,\nthat the schools say, heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to\nrest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper\nfor them; ascribing appetite, and knowledge of what is good for their\nconservation, which is more than man has, to things inanimate, absurdly.\n\nWhen a body is once in motion, it moveth, unless something else hinder\nit, eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in\ntime, and by degrees, quite extinguish it; and as we see in the water,\nthough the wind cease, the waves give not over rolling for a long time\nafter: so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the\ninternal parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams, &c. For after the\nobject is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the\nthing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the\nLatins call _imagination_, from the image made in seeing; and apply the\nsame, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it\n_fancy_; which signifies _appearance_, and is as proper to one sense, as\nto another. IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but _decaying sense_; and\nis found in men, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping, as\nwaking.\n\nThe decay of sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in\nsense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner as the light of the sun\nobscureth the light of the stars; which stars do no less exercise their\nvirtue, by which they are visible, in the day than in the night. But\nbecause amongst many strokes, which our eyes, ears, and other organs\nreceive from external bodies, the predominant only is sensible;\ntherefore, the light of the sun being predominant, we are not affected\nwith the action of the stars. And any object being removed from our\neyes, though the impression it made in us remain, yet other objects more\npresent succeeding, and working on us, the imagination of the past is\nobscured, and made weak, as the voice of a man is in the noise of the\nday. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the\nsight or sense of any object, the weaker is the imagination. For the\ncontinual change of man\u2019s body destroys in time the parts which in sense\nwere moved: so that distance of time, and of place, hath one and the\nsame effect in us. For as at a great distance of place, that which we\nlook at appears dim, and without distinction of the smaller parts; and\nas voices grow weak, and inarticulate; so also, after great distance of\ntime, our imagination of the past is weak; and we lose, for example, of\ncities we have seen, many particular streets, and of actions, many\nparticular circumstances. This _decaying sense_, when we would express\nthe thing itself, I mean _fancy_ itself, we call _imagination_, as I\nsaid before: but when we would express the decay, and signify that the\nsense is fading, old, and past, it is called _memory_. So that\nimagination and memory are but one thing, which for divers\nconsiderations hath divers names.\n\n[Sidenote: Memory.]\n\nMuch memory, or memory of many things, is called _experience_. Again,\nimagination being only of those things which have been formerly\nperceived by sense, either all at once, or by parts at several times;\nthe former, which is the imagining the whole object as it was presented\nto the sense, is _simple_ imagination, as when one imagineth a man, or\nhorse, which he hath seen before. The other is _compounded_; as when,\nfrom the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we\nconceive in our mind a Centaur. So when a man compoundeth the image of\nhis own person with the image of the actions of another man, as when a\nman imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander, which happeneth often\nto them that are much taken with reading of romances, it is a compound\nimagination, and properly but a fiction of the mind. There be also other\nimaginations that rise in men, though waking, from the great impression\nmade in sense: as from gazing upon the sun, the impression leaves an\nimage of the sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long\nand vehemently attent upon geometrical figures, a man shall in the dark,\nthough awake, have the images of lines and angles before his eyes; which\nkind of fancy hath no particular name, as being a thing that doth not\ncommonly fall into men\u2019s discourse.\n\n[Sidenote: Dreams.]\n\nThe imaginations of them that sleep are those we call _dreams_. And\nthese also, as all other imaginations, have been before, either totally\nor by parcels, in the sense. And because in sense, the brain and nerves,\nwhich are the necessary organs of sense, are so benumbed in sleep, as\nnot easily to be moved by the action of external objects, there can\nhappen in sleep no imagination, and therefore no dream, but what\nproceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of man\u2019s body; which\ninward parts, for the connexion they have with the brain, and other\norgans, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby\nthe imaginations there formerly made, appear as if a man were waking;\nsaving that the organs of sense being now benumbed, so as there is no\nnew object, which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous\nimpression, a dream must needs be more clear, in this silence of sense,\nthan our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to pass, that it is a hard\nmatter, and by many thought impossible, to distinguish exactly between\nsense and dreaming. For my part, when I consider that in dreams I do not\noften nor constantly think of the same persons, places, objects, and\nactions, that I do waking; nor remember so long a train of coherent\nthoughts, dreaming, as at other times; and because waking I often\nobserve the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of\nmy waking thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I\ndream not, though when I dream I think myself awake.\n\nAnd seeing dreams are caused by the distemper of some of the inward\nparts of the body, divers distempers must needs cause different dreams.\nAnd hence it is that lying cold breedeth dreams of fear, and raiseth the\nthought and image of some fearful object, the motion from the brain to\nthe inner parts and from the inner parts to the brain being reciprocal;\nand that as anger causeth heat in some parts of the body when we are\nawake, so when we sleep the overheating of the same parts causeth anger,\nand raiseth up in the brain the imagination of an enemy. In the same\nmanner, as natural kindness, when we are awake, causeth desire, and\ndesire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also too much\nheat in those parts, while we sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination\nof some kindness shown. In sum, our dreams are the reverse of our waking\nimaginations; the motion when we are awake beginning at one end, and\nwhen we dream at another.\n\n[Sidenote: Apparitions or visions.]\n\nThe most difficult discerning of a man\u2019s dream, from his waking\nthoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have\nslept: which is easy to happen to a man full of fearful thoughts, and\nwhose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the\ncircumstances of going to bed or putting off his clothes, as one that\nnoddeth in a chair. For he that taketh pains, and industriously lays\nhimself to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto\nhim, cannot easily think it other than a dream. We read of Marcus\nBrutus, (one that had his life given him by Julius C\u00e6sar, and was also\nhis favourite, and notwithstanding murdered him), how at Philippi, the\nnight before he gave battle to Augustus C\u00e6sar, he saw a fearful\napparition, which is commonly related by historians as a vision; but\nconsidering the circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a\nshort dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the\nhorror of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold,\nto dream of that which most affrighted him; which fear, as by degrees it\nmade him wake, so also it must needs make the apparition by degrees to\nvanish; and having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to\nthink it a dream, or any thing but a vision. And this is no very rare\naccident; for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous and\nsuperstitious, possessed with fearful tales, and alone in the dark, are\nsubject to the like fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead men\u2019s\nghosts walking in churchyards; whereas it is either their fancy only, or\nelse the knavery of such persons as make use of such superstitious fear,\nto pass disguised in the night, to places they would not be known to\nhaunt.\n\nFrom this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams, and other strong\nfancies, from vision and sense, did arise the greatest part of the\nreligion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped satyrs, fawns,\nnymphs, and the like; and now-a-days the opinion that rude people have\nof fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and of the power of witches. For as for\nwitches, I think not that their witchcraft is any real power; but yet\nthat they are justly punished, for the false belief they have that they\ncan do such mischief, joined with their purpose to do it if they can;\ntheir trade being nearer to a new religion than to a craft or science.\nAnd for fairies, and walking ghosts, the opinion of them has, I think,\nbeen on purpose either taught or not confuted, to keep in credit the use\nof exorcism, of crosses, of holy water, and other such inventions of\nghostly men. Nevertheless, there is no doubt, but God can make unnatural\napparitions; but that he does it so often, as men need to fear such\nthings, more than they fear the stay or change of the course of nature,\nwhich he also can stay, and change, is no point of Christian faith. But\nevil men under pretext that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say\nany thing when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; it is\nthe part of a wise man, to believe them no farther, than right reason\nmakes that which they say, appear credible. If this superstitious fear\nof spirits were taken away, and with it, prognostics from dreams, false\nprophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which crafty\nambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted\nthan they are for civil obedience.\n\nAnd this ought to be the work of the schools: but they rather nourish\nsuch doctrine. For, not knowing what imagination or the senses are, what\nthey receive, they teach: some saying, that imaginations rise of\nthemselves, and have no cause; others, that they rise most commonly from\nthe will; and that good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man by God,\nand evil thoughts by the Devil; or that good thoughts are poured\n(infused) into a man by God, and evil ones by the Devil. Some say the\nsenses receive the species of things, and deliver them to the common\nsense; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy, and the\nfancy to the memory, and the memory to the judgment, like handing of\nthings from one to another, with many words making nothing understood.\n\n[Sidenote: Understanding.]\n\nThe imagination that is raised in man, or any other creature indued with\nthe faculty of imagining, by words, or other voluntary signs, is that we\ngenerally call _understanding_; and is common to man and beast. For a\ndog by custom will understand the call, or the rating of his master; and\nso will many other beasts. That understanding which is peculiar to man,\nis the understanding not only his will, but his conceptions and\nthoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into\naffirmations, negations, and other forms of speech; and of this kind of\nunderstanding I shall speak hereafter.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\n OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAIN OF IMAGINATIONS.\n\n\nBy _Consequence_, or TRAIN of thoughts, I understand that succession of\none thought to another, which is called, to distinguish it from\ndiscourse in words, _mental discourse_.\n\nWhen a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, his next thought after, is\nnot altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every\nthought succeeds indifferently. But as we have no imagination, whereof\nwe have not formerly had sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no\ntransition from one imagination to another, whereof we never had the\nlike before in our senses. The reason whereof is this. All fancies are\nmotions within us, relics of those made in the sense: and those motions\nthat immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue also\ntogether after sense: insomuch as the former coming again to take place,\nand be predominant, the latter followeth, by coherence of the matter\nmoved, in such manner, as water upon a plane table is drawn which way\nany one part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one\nand the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another\nsucceedeth, it comes to pass in time, that in the imagining of any\nthing, there is no certainty what we shall imagine next; only this is\ncertain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one\ntime or another.\n\n[Sidenote: Train of thoughts unguided.]\n\nThis train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first\nis _unguided_, _without design_, and inconstant; wherein there is no\npassionate thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to itself,\nas the end and scope of some desire, or other passion: in which case the\nthoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in\na dream. Such are commonly the thoughts of men, that are not only\nwithout company, but also without care of any thing; though even then\ntheir thoughts are as busy as at other times, but without harmony; as\nthe sound which a lute out of tune would yield to any man; or in tune,\nto one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a\nman may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one\nthought upon another. For in a discourse of our present civil war, what\ncould seem more impertinent, than to ask, as one did, what was the value\nof a Roman penny? Yet the coherence to me was manifest enough. For the\nthought of the war, introduced the thought of the delivering up the king\nto his enemies; the thought of that, brought in the thought of the\ndelivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the thirty pence,\nwhich was the price of that treason; and thence easily followed that\nmalicious question, and all this in a moment of time; for thought is\nquick.\n\n[Sidenote: Train of thoughts regulated.]\n\nThe second is more constant; as being _regulated_ by some desire, and\ndesign. For the impression made by such things as we desire, or fear, is\nstrong, and permanent, or, if it cease for a time, of quick return: so\nstrong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From desire,\nariseth the thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that\nwhich we aim at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to\nthat mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our\nown power. And because the end, by the greatness of the impression,\ncomes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are\nquickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of the seven\nwise men, made him give men this precept, which is now worn out,\n_Respice finem_; that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon\nwhat you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the\nway to attain it.\n\nThe train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds; one, when of an effect\nimagined we seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is\ncommon to man and beast. The other is, when imagining any thing\nwhatsoever, we seek all the possible effects, that can by it be\nproduced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we\nhave it. Of which I have not at any time seen any sign, but in man only;\nfor this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living\ncreature that has no other passion but sensual, such as are hunger,\nthirst, lust, and anger. In sum, the discourse of the mind, when it is\ngoverned by design, is nothing but _seeking_, or the faculty of\ninvention, which the Latins called _sagacitas_, and _solertia_; a\nhunting out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the\neffects, of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he\nhath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein he misses it, his mind\nruns back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and\nwhen he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time\nand place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence,\nhis thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or\nother occasion might make him lose it. [Sidenote: Remembrance.] This we\ncall _remembrance_, or calling to mind: the Latins call it\n_reminiscentia_, as it were a _re-conning_ of our former actions.\n\n[Sidenote: Prudence.]\n\nSometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof he\nis to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the\nsame manner as one would sweep a room, to find a jewel; or as a spaniel\nranges the field, till he find a scent; or as a man should run over the\nalphabet, to start a rhyme.\n\nSometimes a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he\nthinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after\nanother; supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that\nforesees what will become of a criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow\non the like crime before; having this order of thoughts, the crime, the\nofficer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows. Which kind of thoughts,\nis called _foresight_, and _prudence_, or _providence_; and sometimes\n_wisdom_; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing\nall circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by how much\none man has more experience of things past, than another, by so much\nalso he is more prudent, and his expectations the seldomer fail him. The\n_present_ only has a being in nature; things _past_ have a being in the\nmemory only, but things _to come_ have no being at all; the _future_\nbeing but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past,\nto the actions that are present; which with most certainty is done by\nhim that has most experience, but not with certainty enough. And though\nit be called prudence, when the event answereth our expectation; yet in\nits own nature, it is but presumption. For the foresight of things to\ncome, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to\ncome. From him only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. The best\nprophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is\nmost versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most\n_signs_ to guess by.\n\n[Sidenote: Signs.]\n\nA _sign_ is the evident antecedent of the consequent; and contrarily,\nthe consequent of the antecedent, when the like consequences have been\nobserved, before: and the oftener they have been observed, the less\nuncertain is the sign. And therefore he that has most experience in any\nkind of business, has most signs, whereby to guess at the future time;\nand consequently is the most prudent: and so much more prudent than he\nthat is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any\nadvantage of natural and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young men\nthink the contrary.\n\nNevertheless it is not prudence that distinguisheth man from beast.\nThere be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which\nis for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.\n\n[Sidenote: Conjecture of the time past.]\n\nAs prudence is a _presumption_ of the _future_, contracted from the\n_experience_ of time _past_: so there is a presumption of things past\ntaken from other things, not future, but past also. For he that hath\nseen by what courses and degrees a flourishing state hath first come\ninto civil war, and then to ruin; upon the sight of the ruins of any\nother state, will guess, the like war, and the like courses have been\nthere also. But this conjecture, has the same uncertainty almost with\nthe conjecture of the future; both being grounded only upon experience.\n\nThere is no other act of man\u2019s mind, that I can remember, naturally\nplanted in him, so as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but\nto be born a man, and live with the use of his five senses. Those other\nfaculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to\nman only, are acquired and increased by study and industry; and of most\nmen learned by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the\ninvention of words, and speech. For besides sense, and thoughts, and the\ntrain of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the\nhelp of speech, and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a\nheight, as to distinguish men from all other living creatures.\n\n[Sidenote: Infinite.]\n\nWhatsoever we imagine is _finite_. Therefore there is no idea, or\nconception of any thing we call _infinite_. No man can have in his mind\nan image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness,\ninfinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any\nthing is infinite, we signify only, that we are not able to conceive the\nends, and bounds of the things named; having no conception of the thing,\nbut of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used, not to\nmake us conceive him, for he is incomprehensible; and his greatness, and\npower are unconceivable; but that we may honour him. Also because,\nwhatsoever, as I said before, we conceive, has been perceived first by\nsense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought,\nrepresenting any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can\nconceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued\nwith some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts;\nnor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the\nsame time; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same\nplace at once: for none of these things ever have, nor can be incident\nto sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit, without any\nsignification at all, from deceived philosophers, and deceived, or\ndeceiving schoolmen.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\n OF SPEECH.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Original of speech.]\n\nThe invention of _printing_, though ingenious, compared with the\ninvention of _letters_, is no great matter. But who was the first that\nfound the use of letters, is not known. He that first brought them into\nGreece, men say was Cadmus, the son of Agenor, king of Ph\u0153nicia. A\nprofitable invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the\nconjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of\nthe earth; and withal difficult, as proceeding from a watchful\nobservation of the divers motions of the tongue, palate, lips, and other\norgans of speech; whereby to make as many differences of characters, to\nremember them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all other,\nwas that of SPEECH, consisting of _names_ or _appellations_, and their\nconnexion; whereby men register their thoughts; recall them when they\nare past; and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and\nconversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither\ncommonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst\nlions, bears, and wolves. The first author of _speech_ was God himself,\nthat instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his\nsight; for the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was\nsufficient to direct him to add more names, as the experience and use of\nthe creatures should give him occasion; and to join them in such manner\nby degrees, as to make himself understood; and so by succession of time,\nso much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so\ncopious, as an orator or philosopher has need of: for I do not find any\nthing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence, can be\ngathered, that Adam was taught the names of all figures, numbers,\nmeasures, colours, sounds, fancies, relations; much less the names of\nwords and speech, as _general_, _special_, _affirmative_, _negative_,\n_interrogative_, _optative_, _infinitive_, all which are useful; and\nleast of all, of _entity_, _intentionality_, _quiddity_, and other\ninsignificant words of the school.\n\nBut all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity,\nwas again lost at the Tower of Babel, when, by the hand of God, every\nman was stricken, for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former\nlanguage. And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into several\nparts of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of tongues that\nnow is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need, the\nmother of all inventions, taught them; and in tract of time grew\neverywhere more copious.\n\n[Sidenote: The use of speech.]\n\nThe general use of speech, is to transfer our mental discourse, into\nverbal; or the train of our thoughts, into a train of words; and that\nfor two commodities, whereof one is the registering of the consequences\nof our thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us\nto a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were\nmarked by. So that the first use of names is to serve for _marks_, or\n_notes_ of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to\nsignify, by their connexion and order, one to another, what they\nconceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, fear, or\nhave any other passion for. And for this use they are called _signs_.\nSpecial uses of speech are these; first, to register, what by\ncogitation, we find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and\nwhat we find things present or past may produce, or effect; which in\nsum, is acquiring of arts. Secondly, to show to others that knowledge\nwhich we have attained, which is, to counsel and teach one another.\nThirdly, to make known to others our wills and purposes, that we may\nhave the mutual help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight\nourselves and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or\nornament, innocently.\n\n[Sidenote: Abuses of speech.]\n\nTo these uses, there are also four correspondent abuses. First, when men\nregister their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification\nof their words; by which they register for their conception, that which\nthey never conceived, and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use\nwords metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are\nordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, by words, when they\ndeclare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use\nthem to grieve one another; for seeing nature hath armed living\ncreatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to\ngrieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of speech, to grieve him with the\ntongue, unless it be one whom we are obliged to govern; and then it is\nnot to grieve, but to correct and amend.\n\nThe manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of\ncauses and effects, consisteth in the imposing of _names_, and the\n_connexion_ of them.\n\n[Sidenote: Names, proper and common.]\n\nOf names, some are _proper_, and singular to one only thing, as _Peter_,\n_John_, _this man_, _this tree_; and some are _common_ to many things,\n_man_, _horse_, _tree_; every of which, though but one name, is\nnevertheless the name of divers particular things; [Sidenote:\nUniversal.] in respect of all which together, it is called an\n_universal_; there being nothing in the world universal but names; for\nthe things named are every one of them individual and singular.\n\nOne universal name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in\nsome quality, or other accident; and whereas a proper name bringeth to\nmind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many.\n\nAnd of names universal, some are of more, and some of less extent; the\nlarger comprehending the less large; and some again of equal extent,\ncomprehending each other reciprocally. As for example: the name _body_\nis of larger signification than the word _man_, and comprehendeth it;\nand the names _man_ and _rational_, are of equal extent, comprehending\nmutually one another. But here we must take notice, that by a name is\nnot always understood, as in grammar, one only word; but sometimes, by\ncircumlocution, many words together. For all these words, _he that in\nhis actions observeth the laws of his country_, make but one name,\nequivalent to this one word, _just_.\n\nBy this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter\nsignification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things\nimagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of\nappellations. For example: a man that hath no use of speech at all, such\nas is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb, if he set before his\neyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, such as are the corners of\na square figure, he may, by meditation, compare and find, that the three\nangles of that triangle, are equal to those two right angles that stand\nby it. But if another triangle be shown him, different in shape from the\nformer, he cannot know, without a new labour, whether the three angles\nof that also be equal to the same. But he that hath the use of words,\nwhen he observes, that such equality was consequent, not to the length\nof the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle; but\nonly to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and\nthat that was all, for which he named it a triangle; will boldly\nconclude universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles\nwhatsoever; and register his invention in these general terms, _every\ntriangle hath its three angles equal to two right angles_. And thus the\nconsequence found in one particular, comes to be registered and\nremembered, as a universal rule, and discharges our mental reckoning, of\ntime and place, and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the\nfirst, and makes that which was found true _here_, and _now_, to be true\nin _all times_ and _places_.\n\nBut the use of words in registering our thoughts is in nothing so\nevident as in numbering. A natural fool that could never learn by heart\nthe order of numeral words, as _one_, _two_, and _three_, may observe\nevery stroke of the clock, and nod to it, or say _one_, _one_, _one_,\nbut can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems, there was a time\nwhen those names of number were not in use; and men were fain to apply\ntheir fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep\naccount of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numeral words are\nbut ten, in any nation, and in some but five; and then they begin again.\nAnd he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose\nhimself, and not know when he has done. Much less will he be able to\nadd, and subtract, and perform all other operations of arithmetic. So\nthat without words there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers; much\nless of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things, the\nreckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being of mankind.\n\nWhen two names are joined together into a consequence, or affirmation,\nas thus, _a man is a living creature_; or thus, _if he be a man, he is a\nliving creature_; if the latter name, _living creature_, signify all\nthat the former name _man_ signifieth, then the affirmation, or\nconsequence, is _true_; otherwise _false_. For _true_ and _false_ are\nattributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is\nneither _truth_ nor _falsehood_; _error_ there may be, as when we expect\nthat which shall not be, or suspect what has not been; but in neither\ncase can a man be charged with untruth.\n\n[Sidenote: Necessity of definitions.]\n\nSeeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our\naffirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth had need to remember what\nevery name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly, or else he\nwill find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime twigs, the more\nhe struggles the more belimed. And therefore in geometry, which is the\nonly science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind, men\nbegin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of\nsignifications they call _definitions_, and place them in the beginning\nof their reckoning.\n\nBy this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true\nknowledge, to examine the definitions of former authors; and either to\ncorrect them, where they are negligently set down, or to make them\nhimself. For the errors of definitions multiply themselves according as\nthe reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last\nthey see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning,\nin which lies the foundation of their errors. From whence it happens,\nthat they which trust to books do as they that cast up many little sums\ninto a greater, without considering whether those little sums were\nrightly cast up or not; and at last finding the error visible, and not\nmistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to clear themselves,\nbut spend time in fluttering over their books; as birds that entering by\nthe chimney, and finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at\nthe false light of a glass window, for want of wit to consider which way\nthey came in. So that in the right definition of names lies the first\nuse of speech; which is the acquisition of science: and in wrong, or no\ndefinitions, lies the first abuse; from which proceed all false and\nsenseless tenets; which make those men that take their instruction from\nthe authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much\nbelow the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true science are\nabove it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines, ignorance is\nin the middle. Natural sense and imagination are not subject to\nabsurdity. Nature itself cannot err; and as men abound in copiousness of\nlanguage, so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it\npossible without letters for any man to become either excellently wise,\nor, unless his memory be hurt by disease or ill constitution of organs,\nexcellently foolish. For words are wise men\u2019s counters, they do but\nreckon by them; but they are the money of fools, that value them by the\nauthority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor\nwhatsoever, if but a man.\n\n[Sidenote: Subject to names.]\n\n_Subject to names_, is whatsoever can enter into or be considered in an\naccount, and be added one to another to make a sum, or subtracted one\nfrom another and leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts of money\n_rationes_, and accounting _ratiocinatio_; and that which we in bills or\nbooks of account call _items_, they call _nomina_, that is _names_; and\nthence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word _ratio_ to the\nfaculty of reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word,\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, for both _speech_ and _reason_; not that they thought there was\nno speech without reason, but no reasoning without speech: and the act\nof reasoning they called _syllogism_, which signifieth summing up of the\nconsequences of one saying to another. And because the same thing may\nenter into account for divers accidents, their names are, to show that\ndiversity, diversly wrested and diversified. This diversity of names may\nbe reduced to four general heads.\n\n[Sidenote: Names.]\n\nFirst, a thing may enter into account for _matter_ or _body_; as\n_living_, _sensible_, _rational_, _hot_, _cold_, _moved_, _quiet_; with\nall which names the word _matter_, or _body_, is understood; all such\nbeing names of matter.\n\nSecondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident\nor quality which we conceive to be in it; as for _being moved_, for\n_being so long_, for _being hot_, &c.; and then, of the name of the\nthing itself, by a little change or wresting, we make a name for that\naccident, which we consider; and for _living_ put into the account\n_life_; for _moved_, _motion_; for _hot_, _heat_; for _long_, _length_,\nand the like: and all such names are the names of the accidents and\nproperties by which one matter and body is distinguished from another.\nThese are called _names abstract_, because severed, not from matter, but\nfrom the account of matter.\n\nThirdly, we bring into account the properties of our own bodies, whereby\nwe make such distinction; as when anything is seen by us, we reckon not\nthe thing itself, but the sight, the colour, the idea of it in the\nfancy: and when anything is heard, we reckon it not, but the hearing or\nsound only, which is our fancy or conception of it by the ear; and such\nare names of fancies.\n\n[Sidenote: Use of names positive.]\n\nFourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to _names_\nthemselves, and to _speeches_: for _general_, _universal_, _special_,\n_equivocal_, are names of names. And _affirmation_, _interrogation_,\n_commandment_, _narration_, _syllogism_, _sermon_, _oration_, and many\nother such, are names of speeches. And this is all the variety of names\n_positive_; which are put to mark somewhat which is in nature, or may be\nfeigned by the mind of man, as bodies that are, or may be conceived to\nbe; or of bodies, the properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or\nwords and speech.\n\n[Sidenote: Negative names, with their uses.]\n\nThere be also other names, called _negative_, which are notes to signify\nthat a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words,\n_nothing_, _no man_, _infinite_, _indocible_, _three want four_, and the\nlike; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of\nreckoning, and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not\nnames of any thing, because they make us refuse to admit of names not\nrightly used.\n\n[Sidenote: Words insignificant.]\n\nAll other names are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts.\nOne when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by\ndefinition; whereof there have been abundance coined by schoolmen, and\npuzzled philosophers.\n\nAnother, when men make a name of two names, whose significations are\ncontradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an _incorporeal body_, or,\nwhich is all one, an _incorporeal substance_, and a great number more.\nFor whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is\ncomposed, put together and made one, signify nothing at all. For\nexample, if it be a false affirmation to say _a quadrangle is round_,\nthe word _round quadrangle_ signifies nothing, but is a mere sound. So\nlikewise, if it be false to say that virtue can be poured, or blown up\nand down, the words _in-poured virtue_, _inblown virtue_, are as absurd\nand insignificant as a _round quadrangle_. And therefore you shall\nhardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word, that is not made up\nof some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldom hears our Saviour\ncalled by the name of _parole_, but by the name of _verbe_ often; yet\n_verbe_ and _parole_ differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other\nFrench.\n\n[Sidenote: Understanding.]\n\nWhen a man, upon the hearing of any speech, hath those thoughts which\nthe words of that speech and their connexion were ordained and\nconstituted to signify, then he is said to understand it;\n_understanding_ being nothing else but conception caused by speech. And\ntherefore if speech be peculiar to man, as for aught I know it is, then\nis understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false\naffirmations, in case they be universal, there can be no understanding;\nthough many think they understand then, when they do but repeat the\nwords softly, or con them in their mind.\n\nWhat kinds of speeches signify the appetites, aversions, and passions of\nman\u2019s mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken\nof the passions.\n\n[Sidenote: Inconstant names.]\n\nThe names of such things as affect us, that is, which please and\ndisplease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing,\nnor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men of\n_inconstant_ signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify\nour conceptions, and all our affections are but conceptions, when we\nconceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoid different\nnaming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same;\nyet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different\nconstitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a\ntincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning a man\nmust take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we\nimagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature,\ndisposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of\nvirtues and vices; for one man calleth _wisdom_, what another calleth\n_fear_; and one _cruelty_, what another _justice_; one _prodigality_,\nwhat another _magnanimity_; and one _gravity_, what another _stupidity_,\n&c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any\nratiocination. No more can metaphors, and tropes of speech; but these\nare less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the\nother do not.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n\n OF REASON AND SCIENCE.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Reason, what it is.]\n\nWhen a man _reasoneth_, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total,\nfrom _addition_ of parcels; or conceive a remainder, from _subtraction_\nof one sum from another; which, if it be done by words, is conceiving of\nthe consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole;\nor from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other\npart. And though in some things, as in numbers, besides adding and\nsubtracting, men name other operations, as _multiplying_ and _dividing_,\nyet they are the same; for multiplication, is but adding together of\nthings equal; and division, but subtracting of one thing, as often as we\ncan. These operations are not incident to numbers only, but to all\nmanner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of\nanother. For as arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in _numbers_;\nso the geometricians teach the same in _lines_, _figures_, solid and\nsuperficial, _angles_, _proportions_, _times_, degrees of _swiftness_,\n_force_, _power_, and the like; the logicians teach the same in\n_consequences of words_; adding together two _names_ to make an\n_affirmation_, and two _affirmations_ to make a _syllogism_; and _many\nsyllogisms_ to make a _demonstration_; and from the _sum_, or\n_conclusion_ of a _syllogism_, they subtract one _proposition_ to find\nthe other. Writers of politics add together _pactions_ to find men\u2019s\n_duties_; and lawyers, _laws_ and _facts_, to find what is _right_ and\n_wrong_ in the actions of private men. In sum, in what matter soever\nthere is place for _addition_ and _subtraction_, there also is place for\n_reason_; and where these have no place, there _reason_ has nothing at\nall to do.\n\n[Sidenote: Reason defined.]\n\nOut of all which we may define, that is to say determine, what that is,\nwhich is meant by this word _reason_, when we reckon it amongst the\nfaculties of the mind. For REASON, in this sense, is nothing but\n_reckoning_, that is adding and subtracting, of the consequences of\ngeneral names agreed upon for the _marking_ and _signifying_ of our\nthoughts; I say _marking_ them when we reckon by ourselves, and\n_signifying_, when we demonstrate or approve our reckonings to other\nmen.\n\n[Sidenote: Right reason, where.]\n\nAnd, as in arithmetic, unpractised men must, and professors themselves\nmay often, err, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of\nreasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men may\ndeceive themselves, and infer false conclusions; not but that reason\nitself is always right reason, as well as arithmetic is a certain and\ninfallible art: but no one man\u2019s reason, nor the reason of any one\nnumber of men, makes the certainty; no more than an account is therefore\nwell cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And\ntherefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties\nmust by their own accord, set up, for right reason, the reason of some\narbitrator, or judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their\ncontroversy must either come to blows, or be undecided, for want of a\nright reason constituted by nature; so is it also in all debates of what\nkind soever. And when men that think themselves wiser than all others,\nclamour and demand right reason for judge, yet seek no more, but that\nthings should be determined, by no other men\u2019s reason but their own, it\nis as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is\nturned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have\nmost in their hand. For they do nothing else, that will have every of\ntheir passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right\nreason, and that in their own controversies bewraying their want of\nright reason, by the claim they lay to it.\n\n[Sidenote: The use of reason.]\n\nThe use and end of reason, is not the finding of the sum and truth of\none, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and\nsettled significations of names, but to begin at these, and proceed from\none consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last\nconclusion, without a certainty of all those affirmations and negations,\non which it was grounded and inferred. As when a master of a family, in\ntaking an account, casteth up the sums of all the bills of expense into\none sum, and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that\ngive them in account; nor what it is he pays for; he advantages himself\nno more, than if he allowed the account in gross, trusting to every of\nthe accountants\u2019 skill and honesty: so also in reasoning of all other\nthings, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of authors, and doth\nnot fetch them from the first items in every reckoning, which are the\nsignifications of names settled by definitions, loses his labour; and\ndoes not know anything, but only believeth.\n\n[Sidenote: Of error and absurdity.]\n\nWhen a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in\nparticular things, as when upon the sight of any one thing, we\nconjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon\nit; if that which he thought likely to follow, follows not, or that\nwhich he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this\nis called _error_; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But\nwhen we reason in words of general signification, and fall upon a\ngeneral inference which is false, though it be commonly called _error_,\nit is indeed an _absurdity_, or senseless speech. For error is but a\ndeception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which,\nthough it were not past, or not to come, yet there was no impossibility\ndiscoverable. But when we make a general assertion, unless it be a true\none, the possibility of it is inconceivable. And words whereby we\nconceive nothing but the sound, are those we call _absurd_,\n_insignificant_, and _nonsense_. And therefore if a man should talk to\nme of a _round quadrangle_; or, _accidents of bread in cheese_; or,\n_immaterial substances_; or of _a free subject_; _a free will_; or any\n_free_, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he\nwere in an error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to\nsay, absurd.\n\nI have said before, in the second chapter, that a man did excel all\nother animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing\nwhatsoever, he was apt to inquire the consequences of it, and what\neffects he could do with it. And now I add this other degree of the same\nexcellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he finds to\ngeneral rules, called _theorems_, or _aphorisms_; that is, he can\nreason, or reckon, not only in number, but in all other things, whereof\none may be added unto, or subtracted from another.\n\nBut this privilege is allayed by another; and that is, by the privilege\nof absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man only. And\nof men, those are of all most subject to it, that profess philosophy.\nFor it is most true that Cicero saith of them somewhere; that there can\nbe nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of philosophers. And\nthe reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his\nratiocination from the definitions, or explications of the names they\nare to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry;\nwhose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.\n\n[Sidenote: Causes of absurdity.]\n\nI. The first cause of absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of\nmethod; in that they begin not their ratiocination from definitions;\nthat is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could\ncast account, without knowing the value of the numeral words, _one_,\n_two_, and _three_. And whereas all bodies enter into account upon\ndivers considerations, which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;\nthese considerations being diversely named, divers absurdities proceed\nfrom the confusion, and unfit connexion of their names into assertions.\nAnd therefore,\n\nII. The second cause of absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of\nnames of _bodies_ to _accidents_; or of _accidents_ to _bodies_; as they\ndo, that say, _faith is infused_, or _inspired_; when nothing can be\n_poured_, or _breathed_ into anything, but body; and that, _extension_\nis _body_; that _phantasms_ are _spirits_, &c.\n\nIII. The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the _accidents_\nof _bodies without us_, to the _accidents_ of our _own bodies_; as they\ndo that say, the _colour is in the body_; _the sound is in the air_, &c.\n\nIV. The fourth, to the giving of the names of _bodies_ to _names_, or\n_speeches_; as they do that say, that _there be things universal_; that\n_a living creature is genus_, or _a general thing_, &c.\n\nV. The fifth, to the giving of the names of _accidents_ to _names_ and\n_speeches_; as they do that say, _the nature of a thing is its\ndefinition_; _a man\u2019s command is his will_; and the like.\n\nVI. The sixth, to the use of metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical\nfigures, instead of words proper. For though it be lawful to say, for\nexample, in common speech, _the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or\nthither_; _the proverb says this or that_, whereas ways cannot go, nor\nproverbs speak; yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches\nare not to be admitted.\n\nVII. The seventh, to names that signify nothing; but are taken up, and\nlearned by rote from the schools, as _hypostatical_, _transubstantiate_,\n_consubstantiate_, _eternal-now_, and the like canting of schoolmen.\n\nTo him that can avoid these things it is not easy to fall into any\nabsurdity, unless it be by the length of an account; wherein he may\nperhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and\nwell, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to\nmistake in geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his\nerror to him?\n\n[Sidenote: Science.]\n\nBy this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, born with\nus; nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is; but attained by\nindustry; first in apt imposing of names; and secondly by getting a good\nand orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to\nassertions made by connexion of one of them to another; and so to\nsyllogisms, which are the connexions of one assertion to another, till\nwe come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to\nthe subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas sense\nand memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and\nirrevocable. _Science_ is the knowledge of consequences, and dependance\nof one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we\nknow how to do something else when we will, or the like another time;\nbecause when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by\nwhat manner; when the like causes come into our power, we see how to\nmake it produce the like effects.\n\nChildren therefore are not endued with reason at all, till they have\nattained the use of speech; but are called reasonable creatures, for the\npossibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come. And\nthe most part of men, though they have the use of reasoning a little\nway, as in numbering to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in\ncommon life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse,\naccording to their differences of experience, quickness of memory, and\ninclinations to several ends; but specially according to good or evil\nfortune, and the errors of one another. For as for _science_, or certain\nrules of their actions, they are so far from it, that they know not what\nit is. Geometry they have thought conjuring: but for other sciences,\nthey who have not been taught the beginnings and some progress in them,\nthat they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point\nlike children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by\nthe women that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the\ngarden.\n\nBut yet they that have no _science_, are in better, and nobler\ncondition, with their natural prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning,\nor by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd\ngeneral rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men\nso far out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for\ncauses of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes\nof the contrary.\n\nTo conclude, the light of human minds is perspicuous words, but by exact\ndefinitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; _reason_ is the\n_pace_; increase of _science_, the _way_; and the benefit of mankind,\nthe _end_. And, on the contrary, metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous\nwords, are like _ignes fatui_; and reasoning upon them is wandering\namongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention and sedition,\nor contempt.\n\n[Sidenote: Prudence and sapience, with their difference.]\n\nAs much experience, is _prudence_; so, is much science _sapience_. For\nthough we usually have one name of wisdom for them both, yet the Latins\ndid always distinguish between _prudentia_ and _sapientia_; ascribing\nthe former to experience, the latter to science. But to make their\ndifference appear more clearly, let us suppose one man endued with an\nexcellent natural use and dexterity in handling his arms; and another to\nhave added to that dexterity, an acquired science, of where he can\noffend, or be offended by his adversary, in every possible posture or\nguard: the ability of the former, would be to the ability of the latter,\nas prudence to sapience; both useful; but the latter infallible. But\nthey that trusting only to the authority of books, follow the blind\nblindly, are like him that, trusting to the false rules of a master of\nfence, ventures presumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills or\ndisgraces him.\n\n[Sidenote: Signs of science.]\n\nThe signs of science are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain.\nCertain, when he that pretendeth the science of any thing, can teach the\nsame; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to\nanother; uncertain, when only some particular events answer to his\npretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he says they must. Signs\nof prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and\nremember all circumstances that may alter the success, is impossible.\nBut in any business, whereof a man has not infallible science to proceed\nby; to forsake his own natural judgment, and be guided by general\nsentences read in authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a sign of\nfolly, and generally scorned by the name of pedantry. And even of those\nmen themselves, that in councils of the commonwealth love to show their\nreading of politics and history, very few do it in their domestic\naffairs, where their particular interest is concerned; having prudence\nenough for their private affairs: but in public they study more the\nreputation of their own wit, than the success of another\u2019s business.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n\nOF THE INTERIOR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS; COMMONLY CALLED THE\n PASSIONS; AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Motion, vital and animal.]\n\nThere be in animals, two sorts of _motions_ peculiar to them: one called\n_vital_; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through\ntheir whole life; such as are the _course_ of the _blood_, the _pulse_,\nthe _breathing_, the _concoction_, _nutrition_, _excretion_, &c. to\nwhich motions there needs no help of imagination: the other is _animal\nmotion_, otherwise called _voluntary motion_; as to _go_, to _speak_, to\n_move_ any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our\nminds. That sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of man\u2019s\nbody, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, &c.; and that\nfancy is but the relics of the same motion, remaining after sense, has\nbeen already said in the first and second chapters. And because _going_,\n_speaking_, and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon a\nprecedent thought of _whither_, _which way_, and _what_; it is evident,\nthat the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary\nmotion. And although unstudied men do not conceive any motion at all to\nbe there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved\nin is, for the shortness of it, insensible; yet that doth not hinder,\nbut that such motions are. For let a space be never so little, that\nwhich is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part,\nmust first be moved over that. [Sidenote: Endeavour.] These small\nbeginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in\nwalking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly\ncalled ENDEAVOUR.\n\n[Sidenote: Appetite. Desire.]\n\nThis endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called\nAPPETITE, or DESIRE; the latter, being the general name; [Sidenote:\nHunger. Thirst.] and the other oftentimes restrained to signify the\ndesire of food, namely _hunger_ and _thirst_. [Sidenote: Aversion.] And\nwhen the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called\nAVERSION. These words, _appetite_ and _aversion_, we have from the\nLatins; and they both of them signify the motions, one of approaching,\nthe other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which\nare \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74 and \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74. For nature itself does often press upon men those\ntruths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond nature,\nthey stumble at. For the Schools find in mere appetite to go, or move,\nno actual motion at all: but because some motion they must acknowledge,\nthey call it metaphorical motion; which is but an absurd speech: for\nthough words may be called metaphorical; bodies and motions can not.\n\n[Sidenote: Love. Hate.]\n\nThat which men desire, they are also said to LOVE: and to HATE those\nthings for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the\nsame thing; save that by desire, we always signify the absence of the\nobject; by love, most commonly the presence of the same. So also by\naversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the\nobject.\n\nOf appetites and aversions, some are born with men; as appetite of food,\nappetite of excretion, and exoneration, which may also and more properly\nbe called aversions, from somewhat they feel in their bodies; and some\nother appetites, not many. The rest, which are appetites of particular\nthings, proceed from experience, and trial of their effects upon\nthemselves or other men. For of things we know not at all, or believe\nnot to be, we can have no further desire, than to taste and try. But\naversion we have for things, not only which we know have hurt us, but\nalso that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.\n\n[Sidenote: Contempt.]\n\nThose things which we neither desire, nor hate, we are said to\n_contemn_; CONTEMPT being nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy\nof the heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding\nfrom that the heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent\nobjects; or from want of experience of them.\n\nAnd because the constitution of a man\u2019s body is in continual mutation,\nit is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the\nsame appetites, and aversions: much less can all men consent, in the\ndesire of almost any one and the same object.\n\n[Sidenote: Good.]\n\nBut whatsoever is the object of any man\u2019s appetite or desire, that is it\nwhich he for his part calleth _good_: [Sidenote: Evil.] and the object\nof his hate and aversion, _evil_; and of his contempt, _vile_ and\n_inconsiderable_. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are\never used with relation to the person that useth them: there being\nnothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil,\nto be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the\nperson of the man, where there is no commonwealth; or, in a\ncommonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an\narbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and\nmake his sentence the rule thereof.\n\n[Sidenote: Pulchrum.]\n\n[Sidenote: Turpe.]\n\nThe Latin tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those\nof good and evil; but are not precisely the same; and those are\n_pulchrum_ and _turpe_. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some\napparent signs promiseth good; and the latter, that which promiseth\nevil. But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by.\nBut for _pulchrum_ we say in some things, _fair_; in others,\n_beautiful_, or _handsome_, or _gallant_, or _honourable_, or _comely_,\nor _amiable_; and for _turpe_, _foul_, _deformed_, _ugly_, _base_,\n_nauseous_, and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words,\nin their proper places, signify nothing else but the _mien_, or\ncountenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of good there be\nthree kinds; good in the promise, that is _pulchrum_; good in effect, as\nthe end desired, which is called _jucundum_, [Sidenote: Delightful.\nProfitable. Unpleasant. Unprofitable.] _delightful_; and good as the\nmeans, which is called _utile_, _profitable_; and as many of evil: for\n_evil_ in promise, is that they call _turpe_; evil in effect, and end,\nis _molestum_, _unpleasant_, _troublesome_; and evil in the means,\n_inutile_, _unprofitable_, _hurtful_.\n\n[Sidenote: Delight. Displeasure.]\n\nAs, in sense, that which is really within us, is, as I have said before,\nonly motion, caused by the action of external objects, but in apparence;\nto the sight, light and colour; to the ear, sound; to the nostril,\nodour, &c.: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the\neyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is\nnothing but motion, or endeavour; which consisteth in appetite, or\naversion, to or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of\nthat motion, is that we either call _delight_, or _trouble of mind_.\n\n[Sidenote: Pleasure.]\n\nThis motion, which is called appetite, and for the apparence of it\n_delight_, and _pleasure_, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital\nmotion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused\ndelight, were not improperly called _jucunda_, _\u00e0 juvando_, from helping\nor fortifying; [Sidenote: Offence.] and the contrary, _molesta_,\n_offensive_, from hindering, and troubling the motion vital.\n\n_Pleasure_ therefore, or _delight_, is the apparence, or sense of good;\nand _molestation_, or _displeasure_, the apparence, or sense of evil.\nAnd consequently all appetite, desire, and love, is accompanied with\nsome delight more or less; and all hatred and aversion, with more or\nless displeasure and offence.\n\n[Sidenote: Pleasures of sense.]\n\nOf pleasures or delights, some arise from the sense of an object\npresent; and those may be called _pleasure of sense_; the word\n_sensual_, as it is used by those only that condemn them, having no\nplace till there be laws. Of this kind are all onerations and\nexonerations of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the _sight_,\n_hearing_, _smell_, _taste_, or _touch_. Others arise from the\nexpectation, that proceeds from foresight of the end, or consequence of\nthings; whether those things in the sense please or displease.\n[Sidenote: Pleasures of the mind.] And these are _pleasures of the mind_\nof him that draweth those consequences, [Sidenote: Joy.] and are\ngenerally called JOY. In the like manner, displeasures are some in the\nsense, [Sidenote: Pain.] and called PAIN; others in the expectation of\nconsequences, [Sidenote: Grief.] and are called GRIEF.\n\nThese simple passions called _appetite_, _desire_, _love_, _aversion_,\n_hate_, _joy_, and _grief_, have their names for divers considerations\ndiversified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely\ncalled from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what\nthey desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the\nconsideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the alteration or\nsuccession itself.\n\n[Sidenote: Hope.]\n\nFor _appetite_, with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.\n\n[Sidenote: Despair.]\n\nThe same, without such opinion, DESPAIR.\n\n[Sidenote: Fear.]\n\n_Aversion_, with opinion of HURT from the object, FEAR.\n\n[Sidenote: Courage.]\n\nThe same, with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance, COURAGE.\n\n[Sidenote: Anger.]\n\nSudden _courage_, ANGER.\n\n[Sidenote: Confidence.]\n\nConstant _hope_, CONFIDENCE of ourselves.\n\n[Sidenote: Diffidence.]\n\nConstant _despair_, DIFFIDENCE of ourselves.\n\n[Sidenote: Indignation.]\n\n_Anger_ for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be\ndone by injury, INDIGNATION.\n\n[Sidenote: Benevolence.]\n\n_Desire_ of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. [Sidenote:\nGood nature.] If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.\n\n[Sidenote: Covetousness.]\n\n_Desire_ of riches, COVETOUSNESS; a name used always in signification of\nblame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one another\nattaining them; though the desire in itself, be to be blamed, or\nallowed, according to the means by which these riches are sought.\n\n[Sidenote: Ambition.]\n\n_Desire_ of office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also in the\nworse sense, for the reason before mentioned.\n\n[Sidenote: Pusillanimity.]\n\n_Desire_ of things that conduce but a little to our ends, and fear of\nthings that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.\n\n[Sidenote: Magnanimity.]\n\n_Contempt_ of little helps and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.\n\n[Sidenote: Valour.]\n\n_Magnanimity_, in danger of death or wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.\n\n[Sidenote: Liberality.]\n\n_Magnanimity_ in the use of riches, LIBERALITY.\n\n[Sidenote: Miserableness.]\n\n_Pusillanimity_ in the same, WRETCHEDNESS, MISERABLENESS, or PARSIMONY;\nas it is liked or disliked.\n\n[Sidenote: Kindness.]\n\n_Love_ of persons for society, KINDNESS.\n\n[Sidenote: Natural lust.]\n\n_Love_ of persons for pleasing the sense only, NATURAL LUST.\n\n[Sidenote: Luxury.]\n\n_Love_ of the same, acquired from rumination, that is, imagination of\npleasure past, LUXURY.\n\n[Sidenote: The passion of love.]\n\n[Sidenote: Jealousy.]\n\n_Love_ of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, THE\nPASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not mutual,\nJEALOUSY.\n\n[Sidenote: Revengefulness.]\n\n_Desire_, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his\nown, REVENGEFULNESS.\n\n[Sidenote: Curiosity.]\n\n_Desire_ to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living\ncreature but _man_: so that man is distinguished, not only by his\nreason, but also by this singular passion from other _animals_; in whom\nthe appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by predominance,\ntake away the care of knowing causes; which is a lust of the mind, that\nby a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable\ngeneration of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal\npleasure.\n\n[Sidenote: Religion.]\n\n[Sidenote: Superstition.]\n\n[Sidenote: True religion.]\n\n_Fear_ of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales\npublicly allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when the\npower imagined, is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.\n\n[Sidenote: Panic terror.]\n\n_Fear_, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIC TERROR, called\nso from the fables, that make Pan the author of them; whereas, in truth,\nthere is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the\ncause, though the rest run away by example, every one supposing his\nfellow to know why. And therefore this passion happens to none but in a\nthrong, or multitude of people.\n\n[Sidenote: Admiration.]\n\n_Joy_, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to man, because\nit excites the appetite of knowing the cause.\n\n[Sidenote: Glory.]\n\n_Joy_, arising from imagination of a man\u2019s own power and ability, is\nthat exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING: which if grounded\nupon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with\n_confidence_: [Sidenote: Vain-glory.] but if grounded on the flattery of\nothers; or only supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of\nit, is called VAIN-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a well\ngrounded _confidence_ begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of power\ndoes not, and is therefore rightly called _vain_.\n\n[Sidenote: Dejection.]\n\n_Grief_, from opinion of want of power, is called DEJECTION of mind.\n\nThe _vain-glory_ which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of\nabilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young\nmen, and nourished by the histories, or fictions of gallant persons; and\nis corrected oftentimes by age, and employment.\n\n[Sidenote: Sudden glory.]\n\n[Sidenote: Laughter.]\n\n_Sudden glory_, is the passion which maketh those _grimaces_ called\nLAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that\npleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another,\nby comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is\nincident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in\nthemselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by\nobserving the imperfections of other men. And therefore much laughter at\nthe defects of others, is a sign of pusillanimity. For of great minds,\none of the proper works is, to help and free others from scorn; and\ncompare themselves only with the most able.\n\n[Sidenote: Sudden dejection.]\n\n[Sidenote: Weeping.]\n\nOn the contrary, _sudden dejection_, is the passion that causeth\nWEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some\nvehement hope, or some prop of their power: and they are most subject to\nit, that rely principally on helps external, such as are women, and\nchildren. Therefore some weep for the loss of friends; others for their\nunkindness; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of\nrevenge, by reconciliation. But in all cases, both laughter, and\nweeping, are sudden motions; custom taking them both away. For no man\nlaughs at old jests; or weeps for an old calamity.\n\n[Sidenote: Shame.\n Blushing.]\n\n_Grief_, for the discovery of some defect of ability, is SHAME, or the\npassion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING; and consisteth in the\napprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a sign of\nthe love of good reputation, and commendable: in old men it is a sign of\nthe same; but because it comes too late, not commendable.\n\n[Sidenote: Impudence.]\n\nThe _contempt_ of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.\n\n[Sidenote: Pity.]\n\n_Grief_, for the calamity of another, is PITY; and ariseth from the\nimagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is\ncalled also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a\nFELLOW-FEELING: and therefore for calamity arriving from great\nwickedness, the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity,\nthose hate pity, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.\n\n[Sidenote: Cruelty.]\n\n_Contempt_, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men\ncall CRUELTY; proceeding from security of their own fortune. For, that\nany man should take pleasure in other men\u2019s great harms; without other\nend of his own, I do not conceive it possible.\n\n[Sidenote: Emulation.]\n\n[Sidenote: Envy.]\n\n_Grief_, for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other\ngood, if it be joined with endeavour to enforce our own abilities to\nequal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joined with endeavour to\nsupplant, or hinder a competitor, ENVY.\n\n[Sidenote: Deliberation.]\n\nWhen in the mind of man, appetites, and aversions, hopes, and fears,\nconcerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good\nand evil consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded,\ncome successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an\nappetite to it; sometimes an aversion from it; sometimes hope to be able\nto do it; sometimes despair, or fear to attempt it; the whole sum of\ndesires, aversions, hopes and fears continued till the thing be either\ndone, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.\n\nTherefore of things past, there is no _deliberation_; because manifestly\nimpossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or\nthought so; because men know, or think such deliberation vain. But of\nthings impossible, which we think possible, we may deliberate; not\nknowing it is in vain. And it is called _deliberation_; because it is a\nputting an end to the _liberty_ we had of doing, or omitting, according\nto our own appetite, or aversion.\n\nThis alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes and fears, is\nno less in other living creatures than in man: and therefore beasts also\ndeliberate.\n\nEvery _deliberation_ is then said to _end_, when that whereof they\ndeliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then we\nretain the liberty of doing, or omitting; according to our appetite, or\naversion.\n\n[Sidenote: The will.]\n\nIn _deliberation_, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering\nto the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the WILL; the\nact, not the faculty, of _willing_. And beasts that have _deliberation_,\nmust necessarily also have _will_. The definition of the _will_, given\ncommonly by the Schools, that it is a _rational appetite_, is not good.\nFor if it were, then could there be no voluntary act against reason. For\na _voluntary act_ is that, which proceedeth from the _will_, and no\nother. But if instead of a rational appetite, we shall say an appetite\nresulting from a precedent deliberation, then the definition is the same\nthat I have given here. _Will_ therefore _is the last appetite in\ndeliberating_. And though we say in common discourse, a man had a will\nonce to do a thing, that nevertheless he forbore to do; yet that is\nproperly but an inclination, which makes no action voluntary; because\nthe action depends not of it, but of the last inclination, or appetite.\nFor if the intervenient appetites, make any action voluntary; then by\nthe same reason all intervenient aversions, should make the same action\ninvoluntary; and so one and the same action, should be both voluntary\nand involuntary.\n\nBy this it is manifest, that not only actions that have their beginning\nfrom covetousness, ambition, lust, or other appetites to the thing\npropounded; but also those that have their beginning from aversion, or\nfear of those consequences that follow the omission, are _voluntary\nactions_.\n\n[Sidenote: Forms of speech, in passion.]\n\nThe forms of speech by which the passions are expressed, are partly the\nsame, and partly different from those, by which we express our thoughts.\nAnd first, generally all passions may be expressed _indicatively_; as _I\nlove_, _I fear_, _I joy_, _I deliberate_, _I will_, _I command_: but\nsome of them have particular expressions by themselves, which\nnevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make\nother inferences, besides that of the passion they proceed from.\nDeliberation is expressed _subjunctively_; which is a speech proper to\nsignify suppositions, with their consequences; as, _if this be done,\nthen this will follow_; and differs not from the language of reasoning,\nsave that reasoning is in general words; but deliberation for the most\npart is of particulars. The language of desire, and aversion, is\n_imperative_; as _do this_, _forbear that_; which when the party is\nobliged to do, or forbear, is _command_; otherwise _prayer_; or else\n_counsel_. The language of vain-glory, of indignation, pity and\nrevengefulness, _optative_: but of the desire to know, there is a\npeculiar expression, called _interrogative_; as, _what is it_, _when\nshall it_, _how is it done_, and _why so?_ other language of the\npassions I find none: for cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like, do\nnot signify as speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.\n\nThese forms of speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary\nsignifications of our passions: but certain signs they be not; because\nthey may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such\npassions or not. The best signs of passions present, are either in the\ncountenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we\notherwise know the man to have.\n\n[Sidenote: Good and evil apparent.]\n\nAnd because in deliberation, the appetites, and aversions, are raised by\nforesight of the good and evil consequences, and sequels of the action\nwhereof we deliberate; the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the\nforesight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man\nis able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in\nthose consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that\nwhich writers call _apparent_, or _seeming good_. And contrarily, when\nthe evil exceedeth the good, the whole is _apparent_, or _seeming evil_:\nso that he who hath by experience, or reason, the greatest and surest\nprospect of consequences, deliberates best himself; and is able when he\nwill, to give the best counsel unto others.\n\n[Sidenote: Felicity.]\n\n_Continual success_ in obtaining those things which a man from time to\ntime desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call\nFELICITY; I mean the felicity of this life. For there is no such thing\nas perpetual tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because life\nitself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without fear,\nno more than without sense. What kind of felicity God hath ordained to\nthem that devoutly honour Him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy;\nbeing joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of school-men\n_beatifical vision_ is unintelligible.\n\n[Sidenote: Praise.]\n\nThe form of speech whereby men signify their opinion of the goodness of\nany thing, is PRAISE. [Sidenote: Magnification.] That whereby they\nsignify the power and greatness of any thing, is MAGNIFYING. [Sidenote:\n\u039c\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2.] And that whereby they signify the opinion they have of a\nman\u2019s felicity, is by the Greeks called \u039c\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2, for which we have no\nname in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose,\nto have been said of the PASSIONS.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n\n OF THE ENDS, OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE.\n\n\nOf all _discourse_, governed by desire of knowledge, there is at last an\n_end_, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of\ndiscourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an end for that time.\n\nIf the discourse be merely mental, it consisteth of thoughts that the\nthing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been,\nalternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chain of a man\u2019s\ndiscourse, you leave him in a presumption of _it will be_, or, _it will\nnot be_; or, _it has been_, or, _has not been_. All which is _opinion_.\nAnd that which is alternate appetite, in deliberating concerning good\nand evil; the same is alternate opinion, in the enquiry of the truth of\n_past_, and _future_. [Sidenote: Judgment, or sentence final.] And as\nthe last appetite in deliberation, is called the _will_; so the last\nopinion in search of the truth of past, and future, is called the\nJUDGMENT, or _resolute_ and _final sentence_ of him that _discourseth_.\nAnd as the whole chain of appetites alternate, in the question of good,\nor bad, is called _deliberation_; [Sidenote: Doubt.] so the whole chain\nof opinions alternate, in the question of true, or false, is called\nDOUBT.\n\nNo discourse whatsoever, can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past, or\nto come. For, as for the knowledge of fact, it is originally, sense; and\never after, memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have\nsaid before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No\nman can know by discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be;\nwhich is to know absolutely: but only, that if this be, that is; if this\nhas been, that has been; if this shall be, that shall be: which is to\nknow conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to\nanother; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.\n\n[Sidenote: Science.]\n\nAnd therefore, when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with\nthe definitions of words, and proceeds by connexion of the same into\ngeneral affirmations, and of these again into syllogisms; the end or\nlast sum is called the conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it\nsignified, is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the\nconsequence of words, which is commonly called SCIENCE. [Sidenote:\nOpinion.] But if the first ground of such discourse, be not definitions;\nor if the definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms,\nthen the end or conclusion, is again OPINION, namely of the truth of\nsomewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without\npossibility of being understood. [Sidenote: Conscious.] When two, or\nmore men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS\nof it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And\nbecause such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a\nthird; it was, and ever will be reputed a very evil act, for any man to\nspeak against his _conscience_: or to corrupt or force another so to do:\ninsomuch that the plea of conscience, has been always hearkened unto\nvery diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word\nmetaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret\nthoughts; and therefore it is rhetorically said, that the conscience is\na thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in love with\ntheir own new opinions, though never so absurd, and obstinately bent to\nmaintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of\nconscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak\nagainst them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at\nmost, but that they think so.\n\nWhen a man\u2019s discourse beginneth not at definitions, it beginneth either\nat some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called\nopinion; or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to\nknow the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not;\nand then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing, as the\nperson; [Sidenote: Belief. Faith.] and the resolution is called BELIEF,\nand FAITH: _faith_, _in_ the man; _belief_, both _of_ the man, and _of_\nthe truth of what he says. So that in belief are two opinions; one of\nthe saying of the man; the other of his virtue. To _have faith in_, or\n_trust to_, or _believe a man_, signify the same thing; namely, an\nopinion of the veracity of the man: but to _believe what is said_,\nsignifieth only an opinion of the truth of the saying. But we are to\nobserve that this phrase, _I believe in_; as also the Latin, _credo in_;\nand the Greek, \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c5\u03c9 \u1f10\u03b9\u03c2, are never used but in the writings of\ndivines. Instead of them, in other writings are put, _I believe him_; _I\ntrust him_; _I have faith in him_; _I rely on him_: and in Latin, _credo\nilli_: _fido illi_: and in Greek, \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c5\u03c9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03c9: and that this\nsingularity of the ecclesiastic use of the word hath raised many\ndisputes about the right object of the Christian faith.\n\nBut by _believing in_, as it is in the creed, is meant, not trust in the\nperson; but confession and acknowledgment of the doctrine. For not only\nChristians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all\nfor truth they hear him say, whether they understand it, or not; which\nis all the faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever:\nbut they do not all believe the doctrine of the creed.\n\nFrom whence we may infer, that when we believe any saying whatsoever it\nbe, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing itself, or from\nthe principles of natural reason, but from the authority, and good\nopinion we have, of him that hath said it; then is the speaker, or\nperson we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of\nour faith; and the honour done in believing, is done to him only. And\nconsequently, when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God,\nhaving no immediate revelation from God himself, our belief, faith, and\ntrust is in the church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And\nthey that believe that which a prophet relates unto them in the name of\nGod, take the word of the prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust,\nand believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a\ntrue, or a false prophet. And so it is also with all other history. For\nif I should not believe all that is written by historians, of the\nglorious acts of _Alexander_, or _C\u00e6sar_; I do not think the ghost of\n_Alexander_, or _C\u00e6sar_, had any just cause to be offended; or any body\nelse, but the historian. If _Livy_ say the Gods made once a cow speak,\nand we believe it not; we distrust not God therein, but _Livy_. So that\nit is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, than\nwhat is drawn from authority of men only, and their writings; whether\nthey be sent from God or not, is faith in men only.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n\n OF THE VIRTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL;\n AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Intellectual virtue defined.]\n\nVIRTUE generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued\nfor eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equal\nin all men, nothing would be prized. And by _virtues intellectual_, are\nalways understood such abilities of the mind, as men praise, value, and\ndesire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a\n_good wit_; though the same word _wit_, be used also, to distinguish one\ncertain ability from the rest.\n\n[Sidenote: Wit, natural, or acquired.]\n\nThese _virtues_ are of two sorts; _natural_, and _acquired_. By natural,\nI mean not, that which a man hath from his birth: for that is nothing\nelse but sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from\nbrute beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst virtues. [Sidenote:\nNatural wit.] But I mean, that _wit_, which is gotten by use only, and\nexperience; without method, culture, or instruction. This NATURAL WIT,\nconsisteth principally in two things; _celerity of imagining_, that is,\nswift succession of one thought to another; and _steady direction_ to\nsome approved end. On the contrary a slow imagination, maketh that\ndefect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly called DULLNESS,\n_stupidity_, and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of\nmotion, or difficulty to be moved.\n\n[Sidenote: Good wit, or fancy.]\n\nAnd this difference of quickness, is caused by the difference of men\u2019s\npassions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and\ntherefore some men\u2019s thoughts run one way, some another; and are held\nto, and observe differently the things that pass through their\nimagination. And whereas in this succession of men\u2019s thoughts, there is\nnothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they\nbe _like one another_, or in what they be _unlike_, or _what they serve\nfor_, or _how they serve to such a purpose_; those that observe their\nsimilitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others,\nare said to have a _good wit_; by which, in this occasion, is meant a\n_good fancy_. But they that observe their differences, and\ndissimilitudes; which is called _distinguishing_, and _discerning_,\n[Sidenote: Good judgment.] and _judging_ between thing and thing; in\ncase, such discerning be not easy, are said to have a _good judgment_:\nand particularly in matter of conversation and business; wherein, times,\nplaces, and persons are to be discerned, [Sidenote: Discretion.] this\nvirtue is called DISCRETION. The former, that is, fancy, without the\nhelp of judgment, is not commended as a virtue: but the latter which is\njudgment, and discretion, is commended for itself, without the help of\nfancy. Besides the discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary\nto a good fancy, there is required also an often application of his\nthoughts to their end; that is to say, to some use to be made of them.\nThis done; he that hath this virtue, will be easily fitted with\nsimilitudes, that will please, not only by illustrations of his\ndiscourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the\nrarity of their invention. But without steadiness, and direction to some\nend, a great fancy is one kind of madness; such as they have, that\nentering into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by every\nthing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long\ndigressions, and parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves: which\nkind of folly, I know no particular name for: but the cause of it is,\nsometimes want of experience; whereby that seemeth to a man new and\nrare, which doth not so to others: sometimes pusillanimity; by which\nthat seems great to him, which other men think a trifle: and whatsoever\nis new, or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdraws a man\nby degrees from the intended way of his discourse.\n\nIn a good poem, whether it be _epic_, or _dramatic_; as also in\n_sonnets_, _epigrams_, and other pieces, both judgment and fancy are\nrequired: but the fancy must be more eminent; because they please for\nthe extravagancy; but ought not to displease by indiscretion.\n\nIn a good history, the judgment must be eminent; because the goodness\nconsisteth, in the method, in the truth, and in the choice of the\nactions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but\nonly in adorning the style.\n\nIn orations of praise, and in invectives, the fancy is predominant;\nbecause the design is not truth, but to honour or dishonour; which is\ndone by noble, or by vile comparisons. The judgment does but suggest\nwhat circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.\n\nIn hortatives, and pleadings, as truth, or disguise serveth best to the\ndesign in hand; so is the judgment, or the fancy most required.\n\n[Sidenote: Discretion.]\n\nIn demonstration, in counsel, and all rigorous search of truth, judgment\ndoes all, except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by\nsome apt similitude; and then there is so much use of fancy. But for\nmetaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they\nopenly profess deceit; to admit them into counsel, or reasoning, were\nmanifest folly.\n\nAnd in any discourse whatsoever, if the defect of discretion be\napparent, how extravagant soever the fancy be, the whole discourse will\nbe taken for a sign of want of wit; and so will it never when the\ndiscretion is manifest, though the fancy be never so ordinary.\n\nThe secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, profane, clean,\nobscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verbal\ndiscourse cannot do, farther than the judgment shall approve of the\ntime, place, and persons. An anatomist, or a physician may speak, or\nwrite his judgment of unclean things; because it is not to please, but\nprofit: but for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant\nfancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt,\nshould come and present himself before good company. And it is the want\nof discretion that makes the difference. Again, in professed remissness\nof mind, and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds, and\nequivocal significations of words; and that many times with encounters\nof extraordinary fancy: but in a sermon, or in public, or before persons\nunknown, or whom we ought to reverence; there is no gingling of words\nthat will not be accounted folly: and the difference is only in the want\nof discretion. So that where wit is wanting, it is not fancy that is\nwanting, but discretion. Judgment therefore without fancy is wit, but\nfancy without judgment, not.\n\n[Sidenote: Prudence.]\n\nWhen the thoughts of a man, that has a design in hand, running over a\nmultitude of things, observes how they conduce to that design; or what\ndesign they may conduce unto; if his observations be such as are not\neasy, or usual, this wit of his is called PRUDENCE; and depends on much\nexperience, and memory of the like things, and their consequences\nheretofore. In which there is not so much difference of men; as there is\nin their fancies and judgment; because the experience of men equal in\nage, is not much unequal, as to the quantity; but lies in different\noccasions; every one having his private designs. To govern well a\nfamily, and a kingdom, are not different degrees of prudence; but\ndifferent sorts of business; no more than to draw a picture in little,\nor as great, or greater than the life, are different degrees of art. A\nplain husbandman is more prudent in affairs of his own house, than a\nprivy-councillor in the affairs of another man.\n\n[Sidenote: Craft.]\n\nTo prudence, if you add the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as\nusually are prompted to men by fear, or want; you have that crooked\nwisdom, which is called CRAFT; which is a sign of pusillanimity. For\nmagnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which\nthe Latins call _versutia_, translated into English, _shifting_, and is\na putting off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a\ngreater, as when a man robs one to pay another, is but a shorter-sighted\ncraft, called _versutia_, from _versura_, which signifies taking money\nat usury for the present payment of interest.\n\n[Sidenote: Acquired wit.]\n\nAs for _acquired wit_, I mean acquired by method and instruction, there\nis none but reason; which is grounded on the right use of speech, and\nproduceth the sciences. But of reason and science I have already spoken,\nin the fifth and sixth chapters.\n\nThe causes of this difference of wits, are in the passions; and the\ndifference of passions proceedeth, partly from the different\nconstitution of the body, and partly from different education. For if\nthe difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of\nsense, either exterior or interior, there would be no less difference of\nmen in their sight, hearing, or other senses, than in their fancies and\ndiscretions. It proceeds therefore from the passions; which are\ndifferent, not only from the difference of mens\u2019 complexions; but also\nfrom their difference of customs, and education.\n\nThe passions that most of all cause the difference of wit, are\nprincipally, the more or less desire of power, of riches, of knowledge,\nand of honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is, desire of\npower. For riches, knowledge, and honour, are but several sorts of\npower.\n\nAnd therefore, a man who has no great passion for any of these things;\nbut is, as men term it, indifferent; though he may be so far a good man,\nas to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a\ngreat fancy, or much judgment. For the thoughts are to the desires, as\nscouts, and spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things\ndesired: all steadiness of the mind\u2019s motion, and all quickness of the\nsame, proceeding from thence: for as to have no desire, is to be dead:\n[Sidenote: Giddiness.] so to have weak passions, is dullness; and to\nhave passions indifferently for everything, GIDDINESS, and\n_distraction_; [Sidenote: Madness.] and to have stronger and more\nvehement passions for anything, than is ordinarily seen in others, is\nthat which men call MADNESS.\n\nWhereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the passions themselves.\nSometimes the extraordinary and extravagant passion, proceedeth from the\nevil constitution of the organs of the body, or harm done them; and\nsometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the organs, is caused by the\nvehemence, or long continuance of the passion. But in both cases the\nmadness is of one and the same nature.\n\nThe passion, whose violence, or continuance, maketh madness, is either\ngreat _vain-glory_; which is commonly called _pride_, and\n_self-conceit_; or great _dejection_ of mind.\n\n[Sidenote: Rage.]\n\nPride, subjecteth a man to anger, the excess whereof, is the madness\ncalled RAGE and FURY. And thus it comes to pass that excessive desire of\nrevenge, when it becomes habitual, hurteth the organs, and becomes rage:\nthat excessive love, with jealousy, becomes also rage: excessive opinion\nof a man\u2019s own self, for divine inspiration, for wisdom, learning, form\nand the like, becomes distraction and giddiness: the same, joined with\nenvy, rage: vehement opinion of the truth of anything, contradicted by\nothers, rage.\n\n[Sidenote: Melancholy.]\n\nDejection subjects a man to causeless fears; which is a madness,\ncommonly called MELANCHOLY; apparent also in divers manners as in\nhaunting of solitudes and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in\nfearing, some one, some another particular thing. In sum, all passions\nthat produce strange and unusual behaviour, are called by the general\nname of madness. But of the several kinds of madness, he that would take\nthe pains, might enrol a legion. [Sidenote: Madness.] And if the\nexcesses be madness, there is no doubt but the passions themselves, when\nthey tend to evil, are degrees of the same.\n\nFor example, though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of\nan opinion of being inspired, be not visible always in one man, by any\nvery extravagant action, that proceedeth from such passion; yet, when\nmany of them conspire together, the rage of the whole multitude is\nvisible enough. For what argument of madness can there be greater, than\nto clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is\nsomewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour,\nfight against, and destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before,\nthey have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be\nmadness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For as\nin the midst of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of\nthe water next him, yet he is well assured, that part contributes as\nmuch to the roaring of the sea, as any other part of the same quantity;\nso also, though we perceive no great unquietness in one or two men, yet\nwe may be well assured, that their singular passions, are parts of the\nseditious roaring of a troubled nation. And if there were nothing else\nthat bewrayed their madness; yet that very arrogating such inspiration\nto themselves, is argument enough. If some man in Bedlam should\nentertain you with sober discourse; and you desire in taking leave, to\nknow what he were, that you might another time requite his civility; and\nhe should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need expect no\nextravagant action for argument of his madness.\n\nThis opinion of inspiration, called commonly, private spirit, begins\nvery often, from some lucky finding of an error generally held by\nothers; and not knowing, or not remembering, by what conduct of reason,\nthey came to so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many\ntimes an untruth they light on) they presently admire themselves, as\nbeing in the special grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same\nto them supernaturally, by his Spirit.\n\nAgain, that madness is nothing else, but too much appearing passion, may\nbe gathered out of the effects of wine, which are the same with those of\nthe evil disposition of the organs. For the variety of behaviour in men\nthat have drunk too much, is the same with that of madmen: some of them\nraging, others loving, others laughing, all extravagantly, but according\nto their several domineering passions: for the effect of the wine, does\nbut remove dissimulation, and take from them the sight of the deformity\nof their passions. For, I believe, the most sober men, when they walk\nalone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the\nvanity and extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be\npublicly seen; which is a confession, that passions unguided, are for\nthe most part mere madness.\n\nThe opinions of the world, both in ancient and later ages, concerning\nthe cause of madness, have been two. Some deriving them from the\npassions; some, from demons, or spirits, either good or bad, which they\nthought might enter into a man, possess him, and move his organs in such\nstrange and uncouth manner, as madmen use to do. The former sort\ntherefore, called such men, madmen: but the latter, called them\nsometimes _demoniacs_, that is, possessed with spirits; sometimes\n_enurgumeni_, that is, agitated or moved with spirits; and now in Italy\nthey are called, not only _pazzi_, madmen; but also _spiritati_, men\npossessed.\n\nThere was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a city of the\nGreeks, at the acting of the tragedy of _Andromeda_, upon an extreme hot\nday; whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into fevers, had\nthis accident from the heat, and from the tragedy together, that they\ndid nothing but pronounce iambics, with the names of Perseus and\nAndromeda; which, together with the fever, was cured by the coming on of\nwinter; and this madness was thought to proceed from the passion\nimprinted by the tragedy. Likewise there reigned a fit of madness in\nanother Grecian city, which seized only the young maidens; and caused\nmany of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of\nthe Devil. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them, might\nproceed from some passion of the mind, and supposing that they did not\ncontemn also their honour, gave counsel to the magistrates, to strip\nsuch as so hanged themselves, and let them hang out naked. This, the\nstory says, cured that madness. But on the other side, the same\nGrecians, did often ascribe madness to the operation of Eumenides, or\nFuries; and sometimes of Ceres, Ph\u0153bus, and other gods; so much did men\nattribute to phantasms, as to think them a\u00ebreal living bodies; and\ngenerally to call them spirits. And as the Romans in this, held the same\nopinion with the Greeks, so also did the Jews; for they called madmen\nprophets, or, according as they thought the spirits good or bad,\ndemoniacs: and some of them called both prophets and demoniacs, madmen;\nand some called the same man both demoniac, and madman. But for the\nGentiles it is no wonder, because diseases and health, vices and\nvirtues, and many natural accidents, were with them termed, and\nworshipped as demons. So that a man was to understand by demon, as well,\nsometimes an ague, as a devil. But for the Jews to have such opinion, is\nsomewhat strange. For neither Moses nor Abraham pretended to prophecy by\npossession of a spirit; but from the voice of God; or by a vision or\ndream: nor is there anything in his law, moral or ceremonial, by which\nthey were taught, there was any such enthusiasm, or any possession. When\nGod is said, (_Numb._ xi. 25) to take from the spirit that was in Moses,\nand give to the seventy elders, the Spirit of God (taking it for the\nsubstance of God) is not divided. The Scriptures, by the Spirit of God\nin man, mean a man\u2019s spirit, inclined to godliness. And where it is\nsaid, (_Exod._ xxiii. 8) \u201cwhom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom\nto make garments for Aaron,\u201d is not meant a spirit put into them, that\ncan make garments, but the wisdom of their own spirits in that kind of\nwork. In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth unclean\nactions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit, and so other spirits,\nthough not always, yet as often as the virtue or vice so styled, is\nextraordinary, and eminent. Neither did the other prophets of the old\nTestament pretend enthusiasm; or, that God spake in them; but to them,\nby voice, vision, or dream; and the _burthen of the Lord_ was not\npossession, but command. How then could the Jews fall into this opinion\nof possession? I can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all\nmen; namely, the want of curiosity to search natural causes: and their\nplacing felicity in the acquisition of the gross pleasures of the\nsenses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto. For they\nthat see any strange, and unusual ability, or defect, in a man\u2019s mind;\nunless they see withal, from what cause it may probably proceed, can\nhardly think it natural; and if not natural, they must needs think it\nsupernatural; and then what can it be, but that either God or the Devil\nis in him? And hence it came to pass, when our Saviour (_Mark_ iii. 21)\nwas compassed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted he\nwas mad, and went out to hold him: but the Scribes said he had\nBeelzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out devils; as if the\ngreater madman had awed the lesser: and that (_John_ x. 20) some said,\n_he hath a devil, and is mad_; whereas others holding him for a prophet,\nsaid, _these are not the words of one that hath a devil_. So in the old\nTestament he that came to anoint Jehu, (_2 Kings_ ix. 11) was a prophet;\nbut some of the company asked Jehu, _what came that madman for?_ So that\nin sum, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himself in extraordinary\nmanner, was thought by the Jews to be possessed either with a good, or\nevil spirit; except by the Sadducees, who erred so far on the other\nhand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits, which is very\nnear to direct atheism; and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to\nterm such men demoniacs, rather than madmen.\n\nBut why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they\nwere possessed; and not as if they were mad? To which I can give no\nother kind of answer, but that which is given to those that urge the\nScripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the earth.\nThe Scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdom of God, and to\nprepare their minds to become his obedient subjects; leaving the world,\nand the philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the\nexercising of their natural reason. Whether the earth\u2019s, or sun\u2019s motion\nmake the day, and night; or whether the exorbitant actions of men,\nproceed from passion, or from the devil, so we worship him not, it is\nall one, as to our obedience, and subjection to God Almighty; which is\nthe thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour\nspeaketh to the disease, as to a person; it is the usual phrase of all\nthat cure by words only, as Christ did, and enchanters pretend to do,\nwhether they speak to a devil or not. For is not Christ also said\n(_Matt._ viii. 26) to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said also\n(_Luke_ iv. 39) to rebuke a fever? Yet this does not argue that a fever\nis a devil. And whereas many of the devils are said to confess Christ;\nit is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those\nmadmen confessed him. And whereas our Saviour (_Matt._ xii. 43) speaketh\nof an unclean spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandereth through\ndry places, seeking rest, and finding none, and returning into the same\nman, with seven other spirits worse than himself; it is manifestly a\nparable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his\nlusts, is vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven times\nworse than he was. So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that\nrequireth a belief, that demoniacs were any other thing but madmen.\n\n[Sidenote: Insignificant speech.]\n\nThere is yet another fault in the discourses of some men; which may also\nbe numbered amongst the sorts of madness; namely, that abuse of words,\nwhereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the name of\nabsurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have\nin them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through\nmisunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by\nothers from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to\nnone but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible,\nas the School-men; or in questions of abstruse philosophy. The common\nsort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are therefore, by those\nother egregious persons counted idiots. But to be assured their words\nare without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would\nneed some examples; which if any man require, let him take a School-man\nin his hands and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any\ndifficult point, as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ;\ntransubstantiation; free-will, &c. into any of the modern tongues, so as\nto make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latin, such as they\nwere acquainted withal, that lived when the Latin tongue was vulgar.\nWhat is the meaning of these words, _The first cause does not\nnecessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the essential\nsubordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to work_?\nThey are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of _Suarez\u2019_\nfirst book, _Of the concourse, motion, and help of God_. When men write\nwhole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intend to make others\nso? And particularly, in the question of transubstantiation; where after\ncertain words spoken; they that say, the white_ness_, round_ness_,\nmagni_tude_, quali_ty_, corruptibili_ty_, all which are incorporeal, &c.\ngo out of the wafer, into the body of our blessed Saviour, do they not\nmake those _nesses_, _tudes_, and _ties_, to be so many spirits\npossessing his body? For by spirits, they mean always things, that being\nincorporeal, are nevertheless moveable from one place to another. So\nthat this kind of absurdity, may rightly be numbered amongst the many\nsorts of madness; and all the time that guided by clear thoughts of\ntheir worldly lust, they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but lucid\nintervals. And thus much of the virtues and defects intellectual.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER IX.\n\n OF THE SEVERAL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Knowledge.]\n\nThere are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is _knowledge of fact_:\nthe other _knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation to another_.\nThe former is nothing else, but sense and memory, and is _absolute\nknowledge_; as when we see a fact doing, or remember it done: and this\nis the knowledge required in a witness. The latter is called _science_;\nand is _conditional_; as when we know, that, _if the figure shown be a\ncircle, then any straight line through the centre shall divide it into\ntwo equal parts_. And this is the knowledge required in a philosopher;\nthat is to say, of him that pretends to reasoning.\n\nThe register of _knowledge of fact_ is called _history_. Whereof there\nbe two sorts: one called _natural history_; which is the history of such\nfacts, or effects of nature, as have no dependence on man\u2019s _will_; such\nas are the histories of _metals_, _plants_, _animals_, _regions_, and\nthe like. The other, is _civil history_; which is the history of the\nvoluntary actions of men in commonwealths.\n\nThe registers of science, are such _books_ as contain the\n_demonstrations_ of consequences of one affirmation, to another; and are\ncommonly called _books of philosophy_; whereof the sorts are many,\naccording to the diversity of the matter; and may be divided in such\nmanner as I have divided them in the following table.\n\n { Consequences from the accidents\n { common to all bodies natural;\n { which are _quantity_, and _motion_.\n {\n { Consequences { { Consequences from the\n { from the { { qualities of bodies\n { accidents { { _transient_, such as\n { of bodies { { sometimes appear,\n { natural; { { sometimes vanish,\n { which is { { _Meteorology_.\n { called { {\n { NATURAL { { { Consequences\n { PHILOSOPHY. { Physics or { { from the\n { { consequences { { qualities of\n { { from { { the _stars_.\n { { _qualities_. { {\n { { { Consequences\n { { { of the\n { { { qualities\n { { { from\n { { { _liquid_\n SCIENCE, { { Consequences { bodies,\n that is, { { from the { that fill\n knowledge of { { qualities of { the space\n consequences; { { bodies { between the\n which is { { _permanent_. { stars; such\n called also { { as are the\n PHILOSOPHY. { { _air_, or\n { { substances\n { { ethereal.\n { {\n { { Consequences\n { { from the\n { { qualities of\n { { _bodies\n { { terrestrial_.\n { Consequences {\n { from the { 1. Of consequences from the _institution_\n { accidents of { of COMMONWEALTHS, to the _rights_, and\n { _politic_ { _duties_ of the _body politic_ or\n { bodies; { _sovereign_.\n { which is {\n { called {\n { POLITICS, { 2. Of consequences from the same, to the\n { and CIVIL { _duty_ and _right_ of the _subjects_.\n { PHILOSOPHY. {\n\n Consequences from quantity, and motion _indeterminate_; { PHILOSOPHIA\n which being the principles or first foundation of { PRIMA.\n philosophy, is called _Philosophia Prima_. {\n\n { Consequences { By Figure. } { GEOMETRY.\n { from quanti- { } _Mathematics._ {\n { ty and motion { } {\n Consequences { determined. { By Number. } { ARITHMETIC.\n from motion {\n and quantity { { Consequences }\n _determined_. { Consequences { from the }\n { from the { motion and }\n { motion, and { quantity of } { ASTRONOMY.\n { quantity of { the greater } _Cosmography._ {\n { bodies in { parts of the } { GEOGRAPHY.\n { _special_. { world, as }\n { the _earth_ }\n { and _stars_. }\n {\n { Consequences }\n { from the } { _Science_ of\n { motions of } _Mechanics._ { ENGINEERS.\n { special } Doctrine of {\n { kinds, and } _weight_. { ARCHITECTURE.\n { figures of } { NAVIGATION.\n { body. }\n METEOROLOGY.\n\n { Consequences from the _light_ of the stars. Out of } SCIOGRAPHY.\n { this, and the motion of the sun, is made the science of }\n {\n { Consequences from the _influences_ of the stars } ASTROLOGY.\n\n { Consequences { Consequences from the qualities of\n { from the { _minerals_, as _stones_, _metals_, &c.\n { parts of the {\n { earth, that {\n { are _without {\n { sense_. { Consequences from the qualities of\n { { _vegetables_.\n {\n { { Consequences { Consequences from _vision_ OPTICS.\n { { from the { Consequences from _sounds_ MUSIC.\n { { qualities of {\n { { _animals { Consequences from the rest\n { Consequences { in general_. { of the _senses._\n { from the {\n { qualities of { { Consequences from the { ETHICS.\n { _animals_. { { _passions_ of men {\n { {\n { { { In _magnifying_, } POETRY.\n { Consequences { { _vilifying_, &c. }\n { from the { Consequences { In _persuading_, RHETORIC.\n { qualities of { from { In _reasoning_, LOGIC.\n { _men in { _speech_. { In _contracting_, The _Science_\n special_. { of JUST and\n { UNJUST.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER X.\n\n OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR, AND\n WORTHINESS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Power.]\n\nThe POWER _of a man_, to take it universally, is his present means; to\nobtain some future apparent good; and is either _original_ or\n_instrumental_.\n\n_Natural power_, is the eminence of the faculties of body, or mind: as\nextraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality,\nnobility. _Instrumental_ are those powers, which acquired by these, or\nby fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more: as riches,\nreputation, friends, and the secret working of God, which men call good\nluck. For the nature of power, is in this point, like to fame,\nincreasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the\nfurther they go, make still the more haste.\n\nThe greatest of human powers, is that which is compounded of the powers\nof most men, united by consent, in one person, natural, or civil, that\nhas the use of all their powers depending on his will; such as is the\npower of a common-wealth: or depending on the wills of each particular;\nsuch as is the power of a faction or of divers factions leagued.\nTherefore to have servants, is power; to have friends, is power: for\nthey are strengths united.\n\nAlso riches joined with liberality, is power; because it procureth\nfriends, and servants: without liberality, not so; because in this case\nthey defend not; but expose men to envy, as a prey.\n\nReputation of power, is power; because it draweth with it the adherence\nof those that need protection.\n\nSo is reputation of love of a man\u2019s country, called popularity, for the\nsame reason.\n\nAlso, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or\nthe reputation of such quality, is power; because it is a means to have\nthe assistance, and service of many.\n\nGood success is power; because it maketh reputation of wisdom, or good\nfortune; which makes men either fear him, or rely on him.\n\nAffability of men already in power, is increase of power; because it\ngaineth love.\n\nReputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war, is power; because\nto prudent men, we commit the government of ourselves, more willingly\nthan to others.\n\nNobility is power, not in all places, but only in those commonwealths,\nwhere it has privileges: for in such privileges, consisteth their power.\n\nEloquence is power, because it is seeming prudence.\n\nForm is power; because being a promise of good, it recommendeth men to\nthe favour of women and strangers.\n\nThe sciences, are small power; because not eminent; and therefore, not\nacknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few, and in them, but\nof a few things. For science is of that nature, as none can understand\nit to be, but such as in a good measure have attained it.\n\nArts of public use, as fortification, making of engines, and other\ninstruments of war; because they confer to defence, and victory, are\npower: and though the true mother of them, be science, namely the\nmathematics; yet, because they are brought into the light, by the hand\nof the artificer, they be esteemed, the midwife passing with the vulgar\nfor the mother, as his issue.\n\n[Sidenote: Worth.]\n\nThe _value_, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his price;\nthat is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power: and\ntherefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and\njudgment of another. An able conductor of soldiers, is of great price in\ntime of war present, or imminent; but in peace not so. A learned and\nuncorrupt judge, is much worth in time of peace; but not so much in war.\nAnd as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer\ndetermines the price. For let a man, as most men do, rate themselves at\nthe highest value they can; yet their true value is no more than it is\nesteemed by others.\n\nThe manifestation of the value we set on one another, is that which is\ncommonly called honouring, and dishonouring. To value a man at a high\nrate, is to _honour_ him; at a low rate, is to _dishonour_ him. But\nhigh, and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the\nrate that each man setteth on himself.\n\n[Sidenote: Dignity.]\n\nThe public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the\ncommonwealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this value of\nhim by the commonwealth, is understood, by offices of command,\njudicature, public employment; or by names and titles, introduced for\ndistinction of such value.\n\nTo pray to another, for aid of any kind, is _to_ HONOUR; because a sign\nwe have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the aid\nis, the more is the honour.\n\n[Sidenote: To honour and dishonour.]\n\nTo obey, is to honour, because no man obeys them, whom they think have\nno power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to\n_dishonour_.\n\nTo give great gifts to a man, is to honour him; because it is buying of\nprotection, and acknowledging of power. To give little gifts, is to\ndishonour; because it is but alms, and signifies an opinion of the need\nof small helps.\n\nTo be sedulous in promoting another\u2019s good; also to flatter, is to\nhonour; as a sign we seek his protection or aid. To neglect, is to\ndishonour.\n\nTo give way, or place to another, in any commodity, is to honour; being\na confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to dishonour.\n\nTo show any sign of love, or fear of another, is to honour; for both to\nlove, and to fear, is to value. To contemn, or less to love or fear,\nthan he expects, is to dishonour; for it is undervaluing.\n\nTo praise, magnify, or call happy, is to honour; because nothing but\ngoodness, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pity, is to\ndishonour.\n\nTo speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with\ndecency, and humility, is to honour him; as signs of fear to offend. To\nspeak to him rashly, to do any thing before him obscenely, slovenly,\nimpudently, is to dishonour.\n\nTo believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to honour him; sign of\nopinion of his virtue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to\ndishonour.\n\nTo hearken to a man\u2019s counsel, or discourse of what kind soever is to\nhonour; as a sign we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or\ngo forth, or talk the while, is to dishonour.\n\nTo do those things to another, which he takes for signs of honour, or\nwhich the law or custom makes so, is to honour; because in approving the\nhonour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others\nacknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to dishonour.\n\nTo agree with in opinion, is to honour; as being a sign of approving his\njudgment, and wisdom. To dissent, is dishonour, and an upbraiding of\nerror; and, if the dissent be in many things, of folly.\n\nTo imitate, is to honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate\none\u2019s enemy, is to dishonour.\n\nTo honour those another honours, is to honour him; as a sign of\napprobation of his judgment. To honour his enemies, is to dishonour him.\n\nTo employ in counsel, or in actions of difficulty, is to honour; as a\nsign of opinion of his wisdom, or other power. To deny employment in the\nsame cases, to those that seek it, is to dishonour.\n\nAll these ways of honouring, are natural; and as well within, as without\ncommonwealths. But in commonwealths, where he, or they that have the\nsupreme authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand for signs\nof honour, there be other honours.\n\nA sovereign doth honour a subject, with whatsoever title, or office, or\nemployment, or action, that he himself will have taken for a sign of his\nwill to honour him.\n\nThe king of Persia, honoured Mordecai, when he appointed he should be\nconducted through the streets in the king\u2019s garment, upon one of the\nking\u2019s horses, with a crown on his head, and a prince before him,\nproclaiming, _thus shall it be done to him that the king will honour_.\nAnd yet another king of Persia, or the same another time, to one that\ndemanded for some great service, to wear one of the king\u2019s robes, gave\nhim leave so to do; but with this addition, that he should wear it as\nthe king\u2019s fool; and then it was dishonour. So that of civil honour, the\nfountain is in the person of the commonwealth, and dependeth on the will\nof the sovereign; and is therefore temporary, and called _civil honour_;\nsuch as magistracy, offices, titles; and in some places coats and\nscutcheons painted: and men honour such as have them, as having so many\nsigns of favour in the commonwealth; which favour is power.\n\n[Sidenote: Honourable.]\n\n_Honourable_ is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an\nargument and sign of power.\n\n[Sidenote: Dishonourable.]\n\nAnd therefore to be honoured, loved, or feared of many, is honourable;\nas arguments of power. To be honoured of few or none, _dishonourable_.\n\nDominion, and victory is honourable; because acquired by power; and\nservitude, for need, or fear, is dishonourable.\n\nGood fortune, if lasting, honourable; as a sign of the favour of God.\nIll fortune, and losses, dishonourable. Riches, are honourable; for they\nare power. Poverty, dishonourable. Magnanimity, liberality, hope,\ncourage, confidence, are honourable; for they proceed from the\nconscience of power. Pusillanimity, parsimony, fear, diffidence, are\ndishonourable.\n\nTimely resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is\nhonourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers.\nAnd irresolution, dishonourable; as a sign of too much valuing of little\nimpediments, and little advantages: for when a man has weighed things as\nlong as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is\nbut little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little\nthings, which is pusillanimity.\n\n[Sidenote: Honourable & Dishonourable.]\n\nAll actions, and speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed, from much\nexperience, science, discretion, or wit, are honourable; for all these\nare powers. Actions, or words that proceed from error, ignorance, or\nfolly, dishonourable.\n\nGravity, as far forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on\nsomething else, is honourable; because employment is a sign of power.\nBut if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is\ndishonourable. For the gravity of the former, is like the steadiness of\na ship laden with merchandize; but of the latter, like the steadiness of\na ship ballasted with sand, and other trash.\n\nTo be conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for wealth, office,\ngreat actions, or any eminent good, is honourable; as a sign of the\npower for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, obscurity, is\ndishonourable.\n\nTo be descended from conspicuous parents, is honourable; because they\nthe more easily attain the aids, and friends of their ancestors. On the\ncontrary, to be descended from obscure parentage, is dishonourable.\n\nActions proceeding from equity, joined with loss, are honourable; as\nsigns of magnanimity: for magnanimity is a sign of power. On the\ncontrary, craft, shifting, neglect of equity, is dishonourable.\n\nCovetousness of great riches, and ambition of great honours, are\nhonourable; as signs of power to obtain them. Covetousness, and\nambition, of little gains, or preferments, is dishonourable.\n\nNor does it alter the case of honour, whether an action, so it be great\nand difficult, and consequently a sign of much power, be just or unjust:\nfor honour consisteth only in the opinion of power. Therefore the\nancient heathen did not think they dishonoured, but greatly honoured the\nGods, when they introduced them in their poems, committing rapes,\nthefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: insomuch as\nnothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his adulteries; nor in\nMercury, as his frauds, and thefts: of whose praises, in a hymn of\nHomer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had\ninvented music at noon, and before night, stolen away the cattle of\nApollo, from his herdsmen.\n\nAlso amongst men, till there were constituted great commonwealths, it\nwas thought no dishonour to be a pirate, or a highway thief; but rather\na lawful trade, not only amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other\nnations; as is manifest by the histories of ancient time. And at this\nday, in this part of the world, private duels are, and always will be\nhonourable, though unlawful, till such time as there shall be honour\nordained for them that refuse, and ignominy for them that make the\nchallenge. For duels also are many times effects of courage; and the\nground of courage is always strength or skill, which are power; though\nfor the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of\ndishonour, in one, or both the combatants; who engaged by rashness, are\ndriven into the lists to avoid disgrace.\n\n[Sidenote: Coats of arms.]\n\nScutcheons, and coats of arms hereditary, where they have any eminent\nprivileges, are honourable; otherwise not: for their power consisteth\neither in such privileges, or in riches, or some such thing as is\nequally honoured in other men. This kind of honour, commonly called\ngentry, hath been derived from the ancient Germans. For there never was\nany such thing known, where the German customs were unknown. Nor is it\nnow any where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The ancient\nGreek commanders, when they went to war, had their shields painted with\nsuch devices as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted buckler was a\nsign of poverty, and of a common soldier; but they transmitted not the\ninheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the marks of their families:\nbut they were the images, not the devices of their ancestors. Amongst\nthe people of Asia, Africa, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any\nsuch thing. The Germans only had that custom; from whom it has been\nderived into England, France, Spain, and Italy, when in great numbers\nthey either aided the Romans, or made their own conquests in these\nwestern parts of the world.\n\nFor Germany, being anciently, as all other countries, in their\nbeginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little lords, or\nmasters of families, that continually had wars one with another; those\nmasters, or lords, principally to the end they might, when they were\ncovered with arms, be known by their followers; and partly for ornament,\nboth painted their armour, or their scutcheon, or coat, with the picture\nof some beast, or other thing; and also put some eminent and visible\nmark upon the crest of their helmets. And this ornament both of the\narms, and crest, descended by inheritance to their children; to the\neldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the\nold master, that is to say in Dutch, the _Here-alt_ thought fit. But\nwhen many such families, joined together, made a greater monarchy, this\nduty of the Herealt, to distinguish scutcheons, was made a private\noffice apart. And the issue of these lords, is the great and ancient\ngentry; which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for\ncourage, and rapine; or castles, battlements, belts, weapons, bars,\npalisadoes, and other notes of war; nothing being then in honour, but\nvirtue military. Afterwards, not only kings, but popular commonwealths,\ngave divers manners of scutcheons, to such as went forth to the war, or\nreturned from it, for encouragement, or recompense to their service. All\nwhich, by an observing reader, may be found in such ancient histories,\nGreek and Latin, as make mention of the German nation and manners, in\ntheir times.\n\n[Sidenote: Titles of honour.]\n\nTitles of _honour_, such as are duke, count, marquis, and baron, are\nhonourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the sovereign power\nof the commonwealth: which titles, were in old time titles of office,\nand command, derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans and\nFrench: dukes, in Latin _duces_, being generals in war: counts,\n_comites_, such as bear the general company out of friendship, and were\nleft to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified: marquises,\n_marchiones_, were counts that governed the marches, or bounds of the\nempire. Which titles of duke, count, and marquis, came into the empire,\nabout the time of Constantine the Great, from the customs of the German\n_militia_. But baron, seems to have been a title of the Gauls, and\nsignifies a great man; such as were the king\u2019s, or prince\u2019s men, whom\nthey employed in war about their persons; and seems to be derived from\n_vir_, to _ber_, and _bar_, that signified the same in the language of\nthe Gauls, that _vir_ in Latin; and thence to _bero_, and _baro_: so\nthat such men were called _berones_, and after _barones_; and, in\nSpanish, _varones_. But he that would know more particularly the\noriginal of titles of honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr.\nSelden\u2019s most excellent treatise of that subject. In process of time\nthese offices of honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good\nand peaceable government, were turned into mere titles; serving for the\nmost part, to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects\nin the commonwealth: and men were made dukes, counts, marquises, and\nbarons of places, wherein they had neither possession, nor command: and\nother titles also, were devised to the same end.\n\n[Sidenote: Worthiness.]\n\nWORTHINESS, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; and\nalso from his merit, or desert, and consisteth in a particular power, or\nability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: [Sidenote: Fitness.]\nwhich particular ability, is usually named FITNESS, or _aptitude_.\n\nFor he is worthiest to be a commander, to be a judge, or to have any\nother charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the\nwell discharging of it; and worthiest of riches, that has the qualities\nmost requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being\nabsent, one may nevertheless be a worthy man, and valuable for something\nelse. Again, a man may be worthy of riches, office, and employment, that\nnevertheless, can plead no right to have it before another; and\ntherefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For merit presupposeth\na right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: of which I shall\nsay more hereafter, when I shall speak of contracts.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XI.\n\n OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: What is here meant by manners.]\n\nBy MANNERS, I mean not here, decency of behaviour; as how one should\nsalute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth\nbefore company, and such other points of the _small morals_; but those\nqualities of mankind, that concern their living together in peace, and\nunity. To which end we are to consider, that the felicity of this life,\nconsisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such\n_finis ultimus_, utmost aim, nor _summum bonum_, greatest good, as is\nspoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers. Nor can a man any\nmore live, whose desires are at an end, than he, whose senses and\nimaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the\ndesire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being\nstill but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is, that the object\nof man\u2019s desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time;\nbut to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the\nvoluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the\nprocuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ only\nin the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in\ndivers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion\neach one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.\n\n[Sidenote: A restless desire of power in all men.]\n\nSo that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all\nmankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that\nceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man\nhopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or\nthat he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot\nassure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without\nthe acquisition of more. And from hence it is, that kings, whose power\nis greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by laws,\nor abroad by wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire;\nin some, of fame from new conquest; in others, of ease and sensual\npleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in\nsome art, or other ability of the mind.\n\n[Sidenote: Love of contention from competition.]\n\nCompetition of riches, honour, command, or other power, inclineth to\ncontention, enmity, and war: because the way of one competitor, to the\nattaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the\nother. Particularly, competition of praise, inclineth to a reverence of\nantiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these\nascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.\n\n[Sidenote: Civil obedience from love of ease.]\n\nDesire of ease, and sensual delight, disposeth men to obey a common\npower: because by such desires, a man doth abandon the protection that\nmight be hoped for from his own industry, and labour. [Sidenote: From\nfear of death, or wounds.] Fear of death, and wounds, disposeth to the\nsame; and for the same reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy,\nnot contented with their present condition; as also, all men that are\nambitious of military command, are inclined to continue the causes of\nwar; and to stir up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour\nmilitary but by war; nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by\ncausing a new shuffle.\n\n[Sidenote: And from love of arts.]\n\nDesire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclineth men to obey a common\npower: for such desire, containeth a desire of leisure; and consequently\nprotection from some other power than their own.\n\n[Sidenote: Love of virtue from love of praise.]\n\nDesire of praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them\nwhose judgment they value; for of those men whom we contemn, we contemn\nalso the praises. Desire of fame after death does the same. And though\nafter death, there be no sense of the praise given us on earth, as being\njoys, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joys of Heaven, or\nextinguished in the extreme torments of hell: yet is not such fame vain;\nbecause men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it,\nand of the benefit that may redound thereby to their posterity: which\nthough they now see not, yet they imagine; and anything that is pleasure\nto the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.\n\n[Sidenote: Hate, from difficulty of requiting great benefits.]\n\nTo have received from one, to whom we think ourselves equal, greater\nbenefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth to counterfeit love;\nbut really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate\ndebtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him\nthere, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige, and\nobligation is thraldom; and unrequitable obligation perpetual thraldom;\nwhich is to one\u2019s equal, hateful. But to have received benefits from\none, whom we acknowledge for superior, inclines to love; because the\nobligation is no new depression: and cheerful acceptation, which men\ncall _gratitude_, is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken\ngenerally for retribution. Also to receive benefits, though from an\nequal, or inferior, as long as there is hope of requital, disposeth to\nlove: for in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of aid and\nservice mutual; from whence proceedeth an emulation of who shall exceed\nin benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention possible;\nwherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged\nby confessing it.\n\n[Sidenote: And from conscience of deserving to be hated.]\n\nTo have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate,\ninclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge, or\nforgiveness; both which are hateful.\n\n[Sidenote: Promptness to hurt, from fear.]\n\nFear of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek aid by\nsociety: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life\nand liberty.\n\n[Sidenote: And from distrust of their own wit.]\n\nMen that distrust their own subtlety, are, in tumult and sedition,\nbetter disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise, or\ncrafty. For these love to consult, the other, fearing to be\ncircumvented, to strike first. And in sedition, men being always in the\nprecincts of battle, to hold together, and use all advantages of force,\nis a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtlety of wit.\n\n[Sidenote: Vain undertaking from vain-glory.]\n\nVain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of\ngreat sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are\ninclined only to ostentation; but not to attempt: because when danger or\ndifficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their\ninsufficiency discovered.\n\nVain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of\nother men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured\nground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are inclined to\nrash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire\nif they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather\nhazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their\nlives, for which no salve is sufficient.\n\n[Sidenote: Ambition, from opinion of sufficiency.]\n\nMen that have a strong opinion of their own wisdom in matter of\ngovernment, are disposed to ambition. Because without public employment\nin council or magistracy, the honour of their wisdom is lost. And\ntherefore eloquent speakers are inclined to ambition; for eloquence\nseemeth wisdom, both to themselves and others.\n\n[Sidenote: Irresolution, from too great valuing of small matters.]\n\nPusillanimity disposeth men to irresolution, and consequently to lose\nthe occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have\nbeen in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then\nmanifest what is best to be done, it is a sign, the difference of\nmotives, the one way and the other, are not great: therefore not to\nresolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; which is\npusillanimity.\n\nFrugality, though in poor men a virtue, maketh a man unapt to atchieve\nsuch actions, as require the strength of many men at once: for it\nweakeneth their endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigour\nby reward.\n\n[Sidenote: Confidence in others, from ignorance of the marks of wisdom\n and kindness.]\n\nEloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have it;\nbecause the former is seeming wisdom, the latter seeming kindness. Add\nto them military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhere, and subject\nthemselves to those men that have them. The two former having given them\ncaution against danger from him; the latter gives them caution against\ndanger from others.\n\n[Sidenote: And from ignorance of natural causes.]\n\nWant of science, that is, ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather\nconstraineth a man to rely on the advice, and authority of others. For\nall men whom the truth concerns, if they rely not on their own, must\nrely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than\nthemselves, and see not why he should deceive them.\n\n[Sidenote: And from want of understanding.]\n\nIgnorance of the signification of words, which is want of understanding,\ndisposeth men to take on trust, not only the truth they know not; but\nalso the errors; and which is more, the nonsense of them they trust: for\nneither error nor nonsense, can without a perfect understanding of\nwords, be detected.\n\nFrom the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and\nthe same thing, from the difference of their own passions: as they that\napprove a private opinion, call it opinion; but they that mislike it,\nheresy: and yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion; but has\nonly a greater tincture of choler.\n\nFrom the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without\nstudy and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many\nactions of one multitude; as for example, between one action of all the\nsenators of Rome in killing Cataline, and the many actions of a number\nof senators in killing C\u00e6sar; and therefore are disposed to take for the\naction of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done by a\nmultitude of men, led perhaps by the persuasion of one.\n\n[Sidenote: Adherence to custom, from ignorance of the nature of right\n and wrong.]\n\nIgnorance of the causes, and original constitution of right, equity,\nlaw, and justice, disposeth a man to make custom and example the rule of\nhis actions; in such manner, as to think that unjust which it hath been\nthe custom to punish; and that just, of the impunity and approbation\nwhereof they can produce an example, or, as the lawyers which only use\nthis false measure of justice barbarously call it, a precedent; like\nlittle children, that have no other rule of good and evil manners, but\nthe correction they receive from their parents and masters; save that\nchildren are constant to their rule, whereas, men are not so; because\ngrown old, and stubborn, they appeal from custom to reason, and from\nreason to custom, as it serves their turn; receding from custom when\ntheir interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as\noft as reason is against them: which is the cause, that the doctrine of\nright and wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the pen and the sword:\nwhereas the doctrine of lines, and figures, is not so; because men care\nnot, in that subject, what be truth, as a thing that crosses no man\u2019s\nambition, profit or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing\ncontrary to any man\u2019s right of dominion, or to the interest of men that\nhave dominion, _that the three angles of a triangle, should be equal to\ntwo angles of a square_; that doctrine should have been, if not\ndisputed, yet by the burning of all books of geometry, suppressed, as\nfar as he whom it concerned was able.\n\n[Sidenote: Adherence to private men, from ignorance of the causes of\n peace.]\n\nIgnorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events, to\nthe causes immediate, and instrumental: for these are all the causes\nthey perceive. And hence it comes to pass, that in all places, men that\nare grieved with payments to the public, discharge their anger upon the\npublicans, that is to say, farmers, collectors, and other officers of\nthe public revenue; and adhere to such as find fault with the public\ngovernment; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond hope\nof justification, fall also upon the supreme authority, for fear of\npunishment, or shame of receiving pardon.\n\n[Sidenote: Credulity, from ignorance of nature.]\n\nIgnorance of natural causes, disposeth a man to credulity, so as to\nbelieve many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to the\ncontrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the\nimpossibility. And credulity, because men like to be hearkened unto in\ncompany, disposeth them to lying: so that ignorance itself without\nmalice, is able to make a man both to believe lies, and tell them; and\nsometimes also to invent them.\n\n[Sidenote: Curiosity to know, from care of future time.]\n\nAnxiety for the future time, disposeth men to inquire into the causes of\nthings: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to\norder the present to their best advantage.\n\n[Sidenote: Natural religion from the same.]\n\nCuriosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from the\nconsideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of\nthat cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that\nthere is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal;\nwhich is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound\ninquiry into natural causes, without being inclined thereby to believe\nthere is one God eternal; though they cannot have any idea of him in\ntheir mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind,\nhearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to\nwarm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himself, there\nis somewhat there, which men call _fire_, and is the cause of the heat\nhe feels; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an idea of it in\nhis mind, such as they have that see it: so also by the visible things\nin this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a\ncause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an idea, or image of\nhim in his mind.\n\nAnd they that make little, or no inquiry into the natural causes of\nthings, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance itself, of\nwhat it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are\ninclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of powers\ninvisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of\ndistress to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good\nsuccess, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy,\ntheir gods. By which means it hath come to pass, that from the\ninnumerable variety of fancy, men have created in the world innumerable\nsorts of gods. And this fear of things invisible, is the natural seed of\nthat, which every one in himself calleth religion; and in them that\nworship, or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition.\n\nAnd this seed of religion, having been observed by many; some of those\nthat have observed it, have been inclined thereby to nourish, dress, and\nform it into laws; and to add to it of their own invention, any opinion\nof the causes of future events, by which they thought they should be\nbest able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of\ntheir powers.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XII.\n\n OF RELIGION.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Religion in man only.]\n\nSeeing there are no signs, nor fruit of _religion_, but in man only;\nthere it no cause to doubt, but that the seed of _religion_, is also\nonly in man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in\nsome eminent degree thereof, not to be found in any other living\ncreatures.\n\n[Sidenote: First, from his desire of knowing causes.]\n\nAnd first, it is peculiar to the nature of man, to be inquisitive into\nthe causes of the events they see, some more, some less; but all men so\nmuch, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and\nevil fortune.\n\n[Sidenote: From the consideration of the beginning of things.]\n\nSecondly, upon the sight of anything that hath a beginning, to think\nalso it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it\ndid, rather than sooner or later.\n\n[Sidenote: From his observation of the sequel of things.]\n\nThirdly, whereas there is no other felicity of beasts, but the enjoying\nof their quotidian food, ease, and lusts; as having little or no\nforesight of the time to come, for want of observation, and memory of\nthe order, consequence, and dependence of the things they see; man\nobserveth how one event hath been produced by another; and remembereth\nin them antecedence and consequence; and when he cannot assure himself\nof the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evil fortune\nfor the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either\nsuch as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth the authority of other\nmen, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himself.\n\n[Sidenote: The natural cause of religion, the anxiety of the time to\n come.]\n\nThe two first, make anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of\nall things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is\nimpossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himself\nagainst the evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be\nin a perpetual solicitude of the time to come; so that every man,\nespecially those that are over provident, are in a state like to that of\nPrometheus. For as Prometheus, which interpreted, is, _the prudent man_,\nwas bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where, an\neagle feeding on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was repaired\nin the night: so that man, which looks too far before him, in the care\nof future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by fear of\ndeath, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his\nanxiety, but in sleep.\n\n[Sidenote: Which makes them fear the power of invisible things.]\n\nThis perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of\ncauses, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something.\nAnd therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to\naccuse, either of their good, or evil fortune, but some _power_, or\nagent _invisible_: in which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old\npoets said, that the gods were at first created by human fear: which\nspoken of the gods, that is to say, of the many gods of the Gentiles, is\nvery true. But the acknowledging of one God, eternal, infinite, and\nomnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know\nthe causes of natural bodies, and their several virtues, and operations;\nthan from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come. For he\nthat from any effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next\nand immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause,\nand plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last\ncome to this, that there must be, as even the heathen philosophers\nconfessed, one first mover; that is, a first, and an eternal cause of\nall things; which is that which men mean by the name of God: and all\nthis without thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both\ninclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of\nother things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many gods, as\nthere be men that feign them.\n\n[Sidenote: And suppose them incorporeal.]\n\nAnd for the matter, or substance of the invisible agents, so fancied;\nthey could not by natural cogitation, fall upon any other conceit, but\nthat it was the same with that of the soul of man; and that the soul of\nman, was of the same substance, with that which appeareth in a dream, to\none that sleepeth; or in a looking-glass, to one that is awake; which,\nmen not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of\nthe fancy, think to be real, and external substances; and therefore call\nthem ghosts; as the Latins called them _imagines_, and _umbr\u00e6_; and\nthought them spirits, that is, thin aerial bodies; and those invisible\nagents, which they feared, to be like them; save that they appear, and\nvanish when they please. But the opinion that such spirits were\nincorporeal, or immaterial, could never enter into the mind of any man\nby nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory\nsignification, as _spirit_, and _incorporeal_; yet they can never have\nthe imagination of any thing answering to them: and therefore, men that\nby their own meditation, arrive to the acknowledgment of one infinite,\nomnipotent, and eternal God, chose rather to confess he is\nincomprehensible, and above their understanding, than to define his\nnature by _spirit incorporeal_, and then confess their definition to be\nunintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not\n_dogmatically_, with intention to make the divine nature understood; but\n_piously_, to honour him with attributes, of significations, as remote\nas they can from the grossness of bodies visible.\n\n[Sidenote: But know not the way how they effect anything.]\n\nThen, for the way by which they think these invisible agents wrought\ntheir effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in\nbringing things to pass, men that know not what it is that we call\n_causing_, that is, almost all men, have no other rule to guess by, but\nby observing, and remembering what they have seen to precede the like\neffect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the\nantecedent and subsequent event, any dependence or connexion at all: and\ntherefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to\ncome; and hope for good or evil luck, superstitiously, from things that\nhave no part at all in the causing of it: as the Athenians did for their\nwar at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; the Pompeian faction for their\nwar in Africa, another Scipio; and others have done in divers other\noccasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a\nstander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if\nthe name of God be amongst them; as charming and conjuring, the liturgy\nof witches; insomuch as to believe, they have power to turn a stone into\nbread, bread into a man, or any thing into any thing.\n\n[Sidenote: But honour them as they honour men.]\n\nThirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibit to powers\ninvisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence,\nas they would use towards men; gifts, petitions, thanks, submission of\nbody, considerate addresses, sober behaviour, premeditated words,\nswearing, that is, assuring one another of their promises, by invoking\nthem. Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to\nrest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to\nbe wiser than themselves.\n\n[Sidenote: And attribute to them all extraordinary events.]\n\nLastly, concerning how these invisible powers declare to men the things\nwhich shall hereafter come to pass, especially concerning their good or\nevil fortune in general, or good or ill success in any particular\nundertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture\nof the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not only to\ntake casual things, after one or two encounters, for prognostics of the\nlike encounter ever after, but also to believe the like prognostics from\nother men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.\n\n[Sidenote: Four things, natural seeds of religion.]\n\nAnd in these four things, opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes,\ndevotion towards what men fear, and taking of things casual for\nprognostics, consisteth the natural seed of _religion_; which by reason\nof the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men, hath\ngrown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one\nman, are for the most part ridiculous to another.\n\n[Sidenote: Made different by culture.]\n\nFor these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort\nhave been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to\ntheir own invention. The other have done it, by God\u2019s commandment, and\ndirection: but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men\nthat relied on them, the more apt to obedience, laws, peace, charity,\nand civil society. So that the religion of the former sort, is a part of\nhuman politics; and teacheth part of the duty which earthly kings\nrequire of their subjects. And the religion of the latter sort is divine\npolitics; and containeth precepts to those that have yielded themselves\nsubjects in the kingdom of God. Of the former sort, were all the\nfounders of common-wealths, and the lawgivers of the Gentiles: of the\nlatter sort, were Abraham, Moses, and our blessed Saviour; by whom have\nbeen derived unto us the laws of the kingdom of God.\n\n[Sidenote: The absurd opinion of Gentilism.]\n\nAnd for that part of religion, which consisteth in opinions concerning\nthe nature of powers invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name,\nthat has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or\nanother, a god, or devil; or by their poets feigned to be inanimated,\ninhabited, or possessed by some spirit or other.\n\nThe unformed matter of the world, was a god, by the name of Chaos.\n\nThe heaven, the ocean, the planets, the fire, the earth, the winds, were\nso many gods.\n\n[Sidenote: The absurd opinion of Gentilism.]\n\nMen, women, a bird, a crocodile, a calf, a dog, a snake, an onion, a\nleek, were deified. Besides that, they filled almost all places, with\nspirits called _demons_: the plains, with Pan, and Panises, or Satyrs;\nthe woods, with Fawns, and Nymphs; the sea, with Tritons, and other\nNymphs; every river, and fountain, with a ghost of his name, and with\nNymphs; every house with its _Lares_, or familiars; every man with his\n_Genius_; hell with ghosts, and spiritual officers, as Charon, Cerberus,\nand the Furies; and in the night time, all places with _larv\u00e6_,\n_lemures_, ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdom of fairies and\nbugbears. They have also ascribed divinity, and built temples to meer\naccidents, and qualities; such as are time, night, day, peace, concord,\nlove, contention, virtue, honour, health, rust, fever, and the like;\nwhich when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were\nghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or\nwithholding that good, or evil, for, or against which they prayed. They\ninvoked also their own wit, by the name of Muses; their own ignorance,\nby the name of Fortune; their own lusts by the name of Cupid; their own\nrage, by the name of Furies; their own privy members, by the name of\nPriapus; and attributed their pollutions, to Incubi, and Succub\u00e6:\ninsomuch as there was nothing, which a poet could introduce as a person\nin his poem, which they did not make either a _god_, or a _devil_.\n\nThe same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, observing the second\nground for religion, which is men\u2019s ignorance of causes; and thereby\ntheir aptness to attribute their fortune to causes, on which there was\nno dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their\nignorance, instead of second causes, a kind of second and ministerial\ngods; ascribing the cause of fecundity, to Venus; the cause of arts, to\nApollo; of subtlety and craft, to Mercury; of tempests and storms, to\n\u00c6olus; and of other effects, to other gods; insomuch as there was\namongst the heathen almost as great variety of gods, as of business.\n\nAnd to the worship, which naturally men conceived fit to be used towards\ntheir gods, namely, oblations, prayers, thanks, and the rest formerly\nnamed; the same legislators of the Gentiles have added their images,\nboth in picture, and sculpture; that the more ignorant sort, that is to\nsay, the most part or generality of the people, thinking the gods for\nwhose representation they were made, were really included, and as it\nwere housed within them, might so much the more stand in fear of them:\nand endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set\napart from all other human uses; that is, consecrated, and made holy to\nthose their idols; as caverns, groves, woods, mountains, and whole\nislands; and have attributed to them, not only the shapes, some of men,\nsome of beasts, some of monsters; but also the faculties, and passions\nof men and beasts: as sense, speech, sex, lust, generation, and this not\nonly by mixing one with another, to propagate the kind of gods; but also\nby mixing with men, and women, to beget mongrel gods, and but inmates of\nheaven, as Bacchus, Hercules, and others; besides anger, revenge, and\nother passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from\nthem, as fraud, theft, adultery, sodomy, and any vice that may be taken\nfor an effect of power, or a cause of pleasure; and all such vices, as\namongst men are taken to be against law, rather than against honour.\n\nLastly, to the prognostics of time to come; which are naturally, but\nconjectures upon experience of time past; and supernaturally, divine\nrevelation; the same authors of the religion of the Gentiles, partly\nupon pretended experience, partly upon pretended revelation, have added\ninnumerable other superstitious ways of divination; and made men believe\nthey should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or senseless\nanswers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous\noracles; which answers, were made ambiguous by design, to own the event\nboth ways; or absurd, by the intoxicating vapour of the place, which is\nvery frequent in sulphurous caverns: sometimes in the leaves of the\nSybils; of whose prophecies, like those perhaps of Nostradamus (for the\nfragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times), there\nwere some books in reputation in the time of the Roman republic:\nsometimes in the insignificant speeches of madmen, supposed to be\npossessed with a divine spirit, which possession they called enthusiasm;\nand these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted theomancy, or\nprophecy: sometimes in the aspect of the stars at their nativity; which\nwas called horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary astrology:\nsometimes in their own hopes and fears, called thumomancy, or presage:\nsometimes in the prediction of witches, that pretended conference with\nthe dead; which is called necromancy, conjuring, and witchcraft; and is\nbut juggling and confederate knavery: sometimes in the casual flight, or\nfeeding of birds; called augury: sometimes in the entrails of a\nsacrificed beast; which was _aruspicina_: sometimes in dreams: sometimes\nin croaking of ravens, or chattering of birds: sometimes in the\nlineaments of the face; which was called metoposcopy; or by palmistry in\nthe lines of the hand; in casual words, called _omina_: sometimes in\nmonsters, or unusual accidents; as eclipses, comets, rare meteors,\nearthquakes, inundations, uncouth births, and the like, which they\ncalled _portenta_, and _ostenta_, because they thought them to portend,\nor foreshow some great calamity to come; sometimes, in mere lottery, as\ncross and pile; counting holes in a sieve; dipping of verses in Homer,\nand Virgil; and innumerable other such vain conceits. So easy are men to\nbe drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with\nthem; and can with gentleness, and dexterity, take hold of their fear,\nand ignorance.\n\n[Sidenote: The designs of the authors of the religion of the heathen.]\n\nAnd therefore the first founders, and legislators of commonwealths among\nthe Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and\npeace, have in all places taken care; first, to imprint in their minds a\nbelief, that those precepts which they gave concerning religion, might\nnot be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates\nof some god, or other spirit; or else that they themselves were of a\nhigher nature than mere mortals, that their laws might the more easily\nbe received: so Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the ceremonies he\ninstituted amongst the Romans, from the nymph Egeria: and the first king\nand founder of the kingdom of Peru, pretended himself and his wife to be\nthe children of the Sun; and Mahomet, to set up his new religion,\npretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in form of a dove.\nSecondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same\nthings were displeasing to the gods, which were forbidden by the laws.\nThirdly, to prescribe ceremonies, supplications, sacrifices, and\nfestivals, by which they were to believe, the anger of the gods might be\nappeased; and that ill success in war, great contagions of sickness,\nearthquakes, and each man\u2019s private misery, came from the anger of the\ngods, and their anger from the neglect of their worship, or the\nforgetting, or mistaking some point of the ceremonies required. And\nthough amongst the ancient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that\nwhich in the poets is written of the pains, and pleasures after this\nlife: which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have in\ntheir harangues openly derided; yet that belief was always more\ncherished, than the contrary.\n\nAnd by these, and such other institutions, they obtained in order to\ntheir end, which was the peace of the commonwealth, that the common\npeople in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or error in\ntheir ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the laws, were the\nless apt to mutiny against their governors; and being entertained with\nthe pomp, and pastime of festivals, and public games, made in honour of\nthe gods, needed nothing else but bread to keep them from discontent,\nmurmuring, and commotion against the state. And therefore the Romans,\nthat had conquered the greatest part of the then known world, made no\nscruple of tolerating any religion whatsoever in the city of Rome\nitself; unless it had something in it, that could not consist with their\ncivil government; nor do we read, that any religion was there forbidden,\nbut that of the Jews; who, being the peculiar kingdom of God, thought it\nunlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal king or state\nwhatsoever. And thus you see how the religion of the Gentiles was a part\nof their policy.\n\n[Sidenote: The true religion and the laws of God\u2019s kingdom the same.]\n\nBut where God himself, by supernatural revelation, planted religion;\nthere he also made to himself a peculiar kingdom: and gave laws, not\nonly of behaviour towards himself, but also towards one another; and\nthereby in the kingdom of God, the policy, and laws civil, are a part of\nreligion; and therefore the distinction of temporal, and spiritual\ndomination, hath there no place. It is true, that God is king of all the\nearth: yet may he be king of a peculiar, and chosen nation. For there is\nno more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the general command\nof the whole army, should have withal a peculiar regiment, or company of\nhis own. God is king of all the earth by his power: but of his chosen\npeople, he is king by covenant. But to speak more largely of the kingdom\nof God, both by nature, and covenant, I have in the following discourse\nassigned another place (chapter XXXV.)\n\nFrom the propagation of religion, it is not hard to understand the\ncauses of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or\nprinciples; which are only an opinion of a deity, and powers invisible,\nand supernatural; that can never be so abolished out of human nature,\nbut that new religions may again be made to spring out of them, by the\nculture of such men, as for such purpose are in reputation.\n\n[Sidenote: The causes of change in religion.]\n\nFor seeing all formed religion, is founded at first, upon the faith\nwhich a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to\nbe a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be\na holy man, to whom God himself vouchsafeth to declare his will\nsupernaturally; it followeth necessarily, when they that have the\ngovernment of religion, shall come to have either the wisdom of those\nmen, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or when they shall be\nunable to show any probable token of divine revelation; that the\nreligion which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise; and,\nwithout the fear of the civil sword, contradicted and rejected.\n\n[Sidenote: Enjoining belief of impossibilities.]\n\nThat which taketh away the reputation of wisdom, in him that formeth a\nreligion, or addeth to it when it is already formed, is the enjoining of\na belief of contradictories: for both parts of a contradiction cannot\npossibly be true: and therefore to enjoin the belief of them, is an\nargument of ignorance; which detects the author in that; and discredits\nhim in all things else he shall propound as from revelation\nsupernatural: which revelation a man may indeed have of many things\nabove, but of nothing against natural reason.\n\n[Sidenote: Doing contrary to the religion they establish.]\n\nThat which taketh away the reputation of sincerity, is the doing or\nsaying of such things, as appear to be signs, that what they require\nother men to believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings,\nor sayings are therefore called scandalous, because they be stumbling\nblocks, that make men to fall in the way of religion; as injustice,\ncruelty, profaneness, avarice, and luxury. For who can believe, that he\nthat doth ordinarily such actions as proceed from any of these roots,\nbelieveth there is any such invisible power to be feared, as he\naffrighteth other men withal, for lesser faults?\n\nThat which taketh away the reputation of love, is the being detected of\nprivate ends: as when the belief they require of others, conduceth or\nseemeth to conduce to the acquiring of dominion, riches, dignity, or\nsecure pleasure, to themselves only, or specially. For that which men\nreap benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own\nsakes, and not for love of others.\n\n[Sidenote: Want of the testimony of miracles.]\n\nLastly, the testimony that men can render of divine calling, can be no\nother, than the operation of miracles; or true prophecy, which also is a\nmiracle; or extraordinary felicity. And therefore, to those points of\nreligion, which have been received from them that did such miracles;\nthose that are added by such, as approve not their calling by some\nmiracle, obtain no greater belief, than what the custom and laws of the\nplaces, in which they be educated, have wrought into them. For as in\nnatural things, men of judgment require natural signs, and arguments; so\nin supernatural things, they require signs supernatural, which are\nmiracles, before they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.\n\nAll which causes of the weakening of men\u2019s faith, do manifestly appear\nin the examples following. First, we have the example of the children of\nIsrael; who when Moses, that had approved his calling to them by\nmiracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but\nforty days, revolted from the worship of the true God, recommended to\nthem by him; and setting up (_Exod._ xxxiii. 1, 2) a golden calf for\ntheir god, relapsed into the idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they\nhad been so lately delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and\nthat generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel,\n(_Judges_ ii. 11) were dead; another generation arose, and served Baal.\nSo that miracles failing, faith also failed.\n\nAgain, when the sons of Samuel, (_1 Sam._ viii. 3) being constituted by\ntheir father judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly,\nthe people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their king, in\nother manner than he was king of other people; and therefore cried out\nto Samuel, to choose them a king after the manner of the nations. So\nthat justice failing, faith also failed: insomuch, as they deposed their\nGod, from reigning over them.\n\nAnd whereas in the planting of Christian religion, the oracles ceased in\nall parts of the Roman empire, and the number of Christians increased\nwonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the\nApostles, and Evangelists; a great part of that success, may reasonably\nbe attributed, to the contempt, into which the priests of the Gentiles\nof that time, had brought themselves, by their uncleanness, avarice, and\njuggling between princes. Also the religion of the church of Rome, was\npartly, for the same cause abolished in England, and many other parts of\nChristendom; insomuch, as the failing of virtue in the pastors, maketh\nfaith fail in the people: and partly from bringing of the philosophy,\nand doctrine of Aristotle into religion, by the Schoolmen; from whence\nthere arose so many contradictions, and absurdities, as brought the\nclergy into a reputation both of ignorance, and of fraudulent intention;\nand inclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of\ntheir own princes, as in France and Holland; or with their will, as in\nEngland.\n\nLastly, amongst the points by the church of Rome declared necessary for\nsalvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pope,\nand of his spiritual subjects, residing in the territories of other\nChristian princes, that were it not for the mutual emulation of those\nprinces, they might without war, or trouble, exclude all foreign\nauthority, as easily as it has been excluded in England. For who is\nthere that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth, to have it\nbelieved, that a king hath not his authority from Christ, unless a\nbishop crown him? That a king, if he be a priest, cannot marry? That\nwhether a prince be born in lawful marriage, or not, must be judged by\nauthority from Rome? That subjects may be freed from their allegiance,\nif by the court of Rome, the king be judged an heretic? That a king, as\nChilperic of France, may be deposed by a pope, as Pope Zachary, for no\ncause; and his kingdom given to one of his subjects? That the clergy and\nregulars, in what country soever, shall be exempt from the jurisdiction\nof their king in cases criminal? Or who does not see, to whose profit\nredound the fees of private masses, and vales of purgatory; with other\nsigns of private interest, enough to mortify the most lively faith, if,\nas I said, the civil magistrate, and custom did not more sustain it,\nthan any opinion they have of the sanctity, wisdom, or probity of their\nteachers? So that I may attribute all the changes of religion in the\nworld, to one and the same cause; and that is, unpleasing priests; and\nthose not only amongst Catholics, but even in that church that hath\npresumed most of reformation.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XIII.\n\n OF THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND AS\n CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Men by nature equal.]\n\nNature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind;\nas that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in\nbody, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned\ntogether, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable,\nas that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which\nanother may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body,\nthe weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret\nmachination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger\nwith himself.\n\nAnd as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded\nupon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general, and\ninfallible rules, called science; which very few have, and but in few\nthings; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, as\nprudence, while we look after somewhat else, I find yet a greater\nequality amongst men, than that of strength. For prudence, is but\nexperience; which equal time, equally bestows on all men, in those\nthings they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make\nsuch equality incredible, is but a vain conceit of one\u2019s own wisdom,\nwhich almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the\nvulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by\nfame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the\nnature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be\nmore witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; yet they will hardly\nbelieve there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit\nat hand, and other men\u2019s at a distance. But this proveth rather that men\nare in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a\ngreater sign of the equal distribution of any thing, than that every man\nis contented with his share.\n\n[Sidenote: From equality proceeds diffidence.]\n\nFrom this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining\nof our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which\nnevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way\nto their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes\ntheir delectation only, endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another. And\nfrom hence it comes to pass, that where an invader hath no more to fear,\nthan another man\u2019s single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a\nconvenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with\nforces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of\nhis labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the invader again is\nin the like danger of another.\n\n[Sidenote: From diffidence war.]\n\nAnd from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to\nsecure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or\nwiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no\nother power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his\nown conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there\nbe some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the\nacts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security\nrequires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within\nmodest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would\nnot be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist.\nAnd by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men being\nnecessary to a man\u2019s conservation, it ought to be allowed him.\n\nAgain, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief,\nin keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all.\nFor every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same\nrate he sets upon himself: and upon all signs of contempt, or\nundervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares, (which amongst\nthem that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to\nmake them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his\ncontemners, by damage; and from others, by the example.\n\nSo that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel.\nFirst, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.\n\nThe first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the\nthird, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves\nmasters of other men\u2019s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second,\nto defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different\nopinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their\npersons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation,\ntheir profession, or their name.\n\n[Sidenote: Out of civil states, there is always war of every one against\n every one.]\n\nHereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common\npower to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is\ncalled war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man. For\nWAR, consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a\ntract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently\nknown: and therefore the notion of _time_, is to be considered in the\nnature of war; as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of\nfoul weather, lieth not in a shower or two of rain; but in an\ninclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war,\nconsisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto,\nduring all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other\ntime is PEACE.\n\n[Sidenote: The incommodities of such a war.]\n\nWhatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is\nenemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live\nwithout other security, than what their own strength, and their own\ninvention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no\nplace for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and\nconsequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the\ncommodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no\ninstruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force;\nno knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no\nletters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and\ndanger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty,\nbrutish, and short.\n\nIt may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things;\nthat nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and\ndestroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this\ninference, made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same\nconfirmed by experience. Let him therefore consider with himself, when\ntaking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied;\nwhen going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house he locks\nhis chests; and this when he knows there be laws, and public officers,\narmed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of\nhis fellow-subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when\nhe locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his\nchests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do\nby my words? But neither of us accuse man\u2019s nature in it. The desires,\nand other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the\nactions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that\nforbids them: which till laws be made they cannot know: nor can any law\nbe made, till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.\n\nIt may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor\ncondition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over\nall the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For\nthe savage people in many places of America, except the government of\nsmall families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no\ngovernment at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I\nsaid before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there\nwould be, where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of\nlife, which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government,\nuse to degenerate into, in a civil war.\n\nBut though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in\na condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings, and\npersons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in\ncontinual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having\ntheir weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is,\ntheir forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms;\nand continual spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of war.\nBut because they uphold thereby, the industry of their subjects; there\ndoes not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the liberty of\nparticular men.\n\n[Sidenote: In such a war nothing is unjust.]\n\nTo this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent;\nthat nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and\ninjustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is\nno law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two\ncardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of the faculties\nneither of the body, nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that\nwere alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are\nqualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is\nconsequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no\ndominion, no _mine_ and _thine_ distinct; but only that to be every\nman\u2019s, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus\nmuch for the ill condition, which man by mere nature is actually placed\nin; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in\nthe passions, partly in his reason.\n\n[Sidenote: The passions that incline men to peace.]\n\nThe passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of\nsuch things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their\nindustry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of\npeace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are\nthey, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature: whereof I shall\nspeak more particularly, in the two following chapters.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XIV.\n\n OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURAL LAWS, AND\n OF CONTRACTS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Right of nature what.]\n\nThe RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call _jus naturale_, is the\nliberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the\npreservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and\nconsequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgment, and reason,\nhe shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.\n\n[Sidenote: Liberty what.]\n\nBy LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the\nword, the absence of external impediments: which impediments, may oft\ntake away part of a man\u2019s power to do what he would; but cannot hinder\nhim from using the power left him, according as his judgment, and reason\nshall dictate to him.\n\n[Sidenote: A law of nature what.]\n\nA LAW OF NATURE, _lex naturalis_, is a precept or general rule, found\nout by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is\ndestructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the\nsame; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.\nFor though they that speak of this subject, use to confound _jus_, and\n_lex_, _right_ and _law_: [Sidenote: Difference of right and law.] yet\nthey ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to\ndo, or to forbear; whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them:\nso that law, and right, differ as much, as obligation, and liberty;\nwhich in one and the same matter are inconsistent.\n\n[Sidenote: Naturally every man has right to every thing.]\n\nAnd because the condition of man, as hath been declared in the precedent\nchapter, is a condition of war of every one against every one; in which\ncase every one is governed by his own reason; and there is nothing he\ncan make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life\nagainst his enemies; it followeth, that in such a condition, every man\nhas a right to every thing; even to one another\u2019s body. And therefore,\nas long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth,\nthere can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of\nliving out the time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live.\n[Sidenote: The fundamental law of nature.] And consequently it is a\nprecept, or general rule of reason, _that every man, ought to endeavour\npeace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain\nit, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war_. The\nfirst branch of which rule, containeth the first, and fundamental law of\nnature; which is, _to seek peace, and follow it_. The second, the sum of\nthe right of nature; which is, _by all means we can, to defend\nourselves_.\n\n[Sidenote: The second law of nature.]\n\nFrom this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to\nendeavour peace, is derived this second law; _that a man be willing,\nwhen others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defence of\nhimself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all\nthings; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he\nwould allow other men against himself_. For as long as every man holdeth\nthis right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the\ncondition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as\nwell as he; then there is no reason for any one, to divest himself of\nhis: for that were to expose himself to prey, which no man is bound to,\nrather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the Gospel;\n_whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to\nthem_. And that law of all men, _quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne\nfeceris_.\n\n[Sidenote: What it is to lay down a right.]\n\nTo _lay down_ a man\u2019s _right_ to any thing, is to _divest_ himself of\nthe _liberty_, of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to\nthe same. For he that renounceth, or passeth away his right, giveth not\nto any other man a right which he had not before; because there is\nnothing to which every man had not right by nature: but only standeth\nout of his way, that he may enjoy his own original right, without\nhindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the\neffect which redoundeth to one man, by another man\u2019s defect of right, is\nbut so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right\noriginal.\n\n[Sidenote: Renouncing a right, what it is.]\n\nRight is laid aside, either by simply renouncing it; or by transferring\nit to another. By _simply_ RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the\nbenefit thereof redoundeth. [Sidenote: Transferring right what.\nObligation.] By TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the benefit thereof to\nsome certain person, or persons. And when a man hath in either manner\nabandoned, or granted away his right; then is he said to be OBLIGED, or\nBOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such right is granted, or abandoned,\nfrom the benefit of it: and that he _ought_, [Sidenote: Duty.] and it is\nhis DUTY, not to make void that voluntary act of his own: [Sidenote:\nInjustice.] and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being\n_sine jure_; the right being before renounced, or transferred. So that\n_injury_, or _injustice_, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat\nlike to that, which in the disputations of scholars is called\n_absurdity_. For as it is there called an absurdity, to contradict what\none maintained in the beginning: so in the world, it is called\ninjustice, and injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the\nbeginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply\nrenounceth, or transferreth his right, is a declaration, or\nsignification, by some voluntary and sufficient sign, or signs, that he\ndoth so renounce, or transfer; or hath so renounced, or transferred the\nsame, to him that accepteth it. And these signs are either words only,\nor actions only; or, as it happeneth most often, both words, and\nactions. And the same are the BONDS, by which men are bound, and\nobliged: bonds, that have their strength, not from their own nature, for\nnothing is more easily broken than a man\u2019s word, but from fear of some\nevil consequence upon the rupture.\n\n[Sidenote: Not all rights are alienable.]\n\nWhensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it; it is either\nin consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or\nfor some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act:\nand of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some _good to\nhimself_. And therefore there be some rights, which no man can be\nunderstood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned, or\ntransferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them,\nthat assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be\nunderstood to aim thereby, at any good to himself. The same may be said\nof wounds, and chains, and imprisonment; both because there is no\nbenefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of\nsuffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man\ncannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether\nthey intend his death or not. And lastly the motive, and end for which\nthis renouncing, and transferring of right is introduced, is nothing\nelse but the security of a man\u2019s person, in his life, and in the means\nof so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man\nby words, or other signs, seem to despoil himself of the end, for which\nthose signs were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it,\nor that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and\nactions were to be interpreted.\n\n[Sidenote: Contract what.]\n\nThe mutual transferring of right, is that which men call CONTRACT.\n\nThere is difference between transferring of right to the thing; and\ntransferring, or tradition, that is delivery of the thing itself. For\nthe thing may be delivered together with the translation of the right;\nas in buying and selling with ready-money; or exchange of goods, or\nlands: and it may be delivered some time after.\n\n[Sidenote: Covenant what.]\n\nAgain, one of the contractors, may deliver the thing contracted for on\nhis part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate\ntime after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the contract on\nhis part, is called PACT, or COVENANT: or both parts may contract now,\nto perform hereafter: in which cases, he that is to perform in time to\ncome, being trusted, his performance is called _keeping of promise_, or\nfaith; and the failing of performance, if it be voluntary, _violation of\nfaith_.\n\n[Sidenote: Free-gift.]\n\nWhen the transferring of right, is not mutual: but one of the parties\ntransferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from\nanother, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of\ncharity, or magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of\ncompassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; this is not contract, but\nGIFT, FREE-GIFT, GRACE: which words signify one and the same thing.\n\n[Sidenote: Signs of contract express.]\n\nSigns of contract, are either _express_, or _by inference_. Express, are\nwords spoken with understanding of what they signify: and such words are\neither of the time _present_, or _past_; as, _I give_, _I grant_, _I\nhave given_, _I have granted_, _I will that this be yours_: or of the\nfuture; as, _I will give_, _I will grant_: [Sidenote: Promise.] which\nwords of the future are called PROMISE.\n\n[Sidenote: Signs of contract by inference.]\n\nSigns by inference, are sometimes the consequence of words; sometimes\nthe consequence of silence; sometimes the consequence of actions;\nsometimes the consequence of forbearing an action: and generally a sign\nby inference, of any contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the\nwill of the contractor.\n\n[Sidenote: Free gift passeth by words of the present or past.]\n\nWords alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise,\nare an insufficient sign of a free-gift, and therefore not obligatory.\nFor if they be of the time to come, as _to-morrow I will give_, they are\na sign I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not\ntransferred, but remaineth till I transfer it by some other act. But if\nthe words be of the time present, or past, as, _I have given_, or, _do\ngive to be delivered to-morrow_, then is my to-morrow\u2019s right given away\nto day; and that by the virtue of the words, though there were no other\nargument of my will. And there is a great difference in the\nsignification of these words, _volo hoc tuum esse cras_, and _cras\ndabo_; that is, between _I will that this be thine to-morrow_, and, _I\nwill give it thee to-morrow_: for the word _I will_, in the former\nmanner of speech, signifies an act of the will present; but in the\nlatter, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to come: and\ntherefore the former words, being of the present, transfer a future\nright; the latter, that be of the future, transfer nothing. But if there\nbe other signs of the will to transfer a right, besides words; then,\nthough the gift be free, yet may the right be understood to pass by\nwords of the future: as if a man propound a prize to him that comes\nfirst to the end of a race, the gift is free; and though the words be of\nthe future, yet the right passeth: for if he would not have his words so\nbe understood, he should not have let them run.\n\n[Sidenote: Signs of contract are words both of the past, present, and\n future.]\n\nIn contracts, the right passeth, not only where the words are of the\ntime present, or past, but also where they are of the future: because\nall contract is mutual translation, or change of right; and therefore he\nthat promiseth only, because he hath already received the benefit for\nwhich he promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the right\nshould pass: for unless he had been content to have his words so\nunderstood, the other would not have performed his part first. And for\nthat cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of contract, a\npromise is equivalent to a covenant; and therefore obligatory.\n\n[Sidenote: Merit what.]\n\nHe that performeth first in the case of a contract, is said to MERIT\nthat which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath\nit as _due_. Also when a prize is propounded to many, which is to be\ngiven to him only that winneth; or money is thrown amongst many, to be\nenjoyed by them that catch it; though this be a free gift; yet so to\nwin, or so to catch, is to _merit_, and to have it as DUE. For the right\nis transferred in the propounding of the prize, and in throwing down the\nmoney; though it be not determined to whom, but by the event of the\ncontention. But there is between these two sorts of merit, this\ndifference, that in contract, I merit by virtue of my own power, and the\ncontractor\u2019s need; but in this case of free gift, I am enabled to merit\nonly by the benignity of the giver: in contract, I merit at the\ncontractor\u2019s hand that he should depart with his right; in this case of\ngift, I merit not that the giver should part with his right; but that\nwhen he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than another\u2019s.\nAnd this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the Schools,\nbetween _meritum congrui_, and _meritum condigni_. For God Almighty,\nhaving promised Paradise to those men, hoodwinked with carnal desires,\nthat can walk through this world according to the precepts, and limits\nprescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall merit Paradise\n_ex congruo_. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his own\nrighteousness, or any other power in himself, but by the free grace of\nGod only; they say, no man can merit Paradise _ex condigno_. This I say,\nI think is the meaning of that distinction; but because disputers do not\nagree upon the signification of their own terms of art, longer than it\nserves their turn; I will not affirm any thing of their meaning: only\nthis I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be\ncontended for, he that winneth meriteth, and may claim the prize as due.\n\n[Sidenote: Covenants of mutual trust, when invalid.]\n\nIf a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform presently,\nbut trust one another; in the condition of mere nature, which is a\ncondition of war of every man against every man, upon any reasonable\nsuspicion, it is void: but if there be a common power set over them\nboth, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not\nvoid. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will\nperform after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men\u2019s\nambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some\ncoercive power; which in the condition of mere nature, where all men are\nequal, and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be\nsupposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does but betray\nhimself to his enemy; contrary to the right, he can never abandon, of\ndefending his life, and means of living.\n\nBut in a civil estate, where there is a power set up to constrain those\nthat would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more\nreasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform\nfirst, is obliged so to do.\n\nThe cause of fear, which maketh such a covenant invalid, must be always\nsomething arising after the covenant made; as some new fact, or other\nsign of the will not to perform: else it cannot make the covenant void.\nFor that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be\nadmitted as a hindrance of performing.\n\n[Sidenote: Right to the end, containeth right to the means.]\n\nHe that transferreth any right, transferreth the means of enjoying it,\nas far as lieth in his power. As he that selleth land, is understood to\ntransfer the herbage, and whatsoever grows upon it: nor can he that\nsells a mill turn away the stream that drives it. And they that give to\na man the right of government in sovereignty, are understood to give him\nthe right of levying money to maintain soldiers; and of appointing\nmagistrates for the administration of justice.\n\n[Sidenote: No covenant with beasts.]\n\nTo make covenants with brute beasts, is impossible; because not\nunderstanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any\ntranslation of right; nor can translate any right to another: and\nwithout mutual acceptation, there is no covenant.\n\n[Sidenote: Nor with God without special revelation.]\n\nTo make covenant with God, is impossible, but by mediation of such as\nGod speaketh to, either by revelation supernatural, or by his\nlieutenants that govern under him, and in his name: for otherwise we\nknow not whether our covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they\nthat vow anything contrary to any law of nature, vow in vain; as being a\nthing unjust to pay such vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the law\nof nature, it is not the vow, but the law that binds them.\n\n[Sidenote: No covenant, but of possible and future.]\n\nThe matter, or subject of a covenant, is always something that falleth\nunder deliberation; for to covenant, is an act of the will; that is to\nsay, an act, and the last act of deliberation; and is therefore always\nunderstood to be something to come; and which is judged possible for him\nthat covenanteth, to perform.\n\nAnd therefore, to promise that which is known to be impossible, is no\ncovenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was\nthought possible, the covenant is valid, and bindeth, though not to the\nthing itself, yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the\nunfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible: for to more no\nman can be obliged.\n\n[Sidenote: Covenants how made void.]\n\nMen are freed of their covenants two ways; by performing; or by being\nforgiven. For performance, is the natural end of obligation; and\nforgiveness, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of\nthat right, in which the obligation consisted.\n\n[Sidenote: Covenants extorted by fear are valid.]\n\nCovenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere nature, are\nobligatory. For example, if I covenant to pay a ransom, or service for\nmy life, to an enemy; I am bound by it: for it is a contract, wherein\none receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive money, or\nservice for it; and consequently, where no other law, as in the\ncondition of mere nature, forbiddeth the performance, the covenant is\nvalid. Therefore prisoners of war, if trusted with the payment of their\nransom, are obliged to pay it: and if a weaker prince, make a\ndisadvantageous peace with a stronger, for fear; he is bound to keep it;\nunless, as hath been said before, there ariseth some new, and just cause\nof fear, to renew the war. And even in commonwealths, if I be forced to\nredeem myself from a thief by promising him money, I am bound to pay it,\ntill the civil law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do\nwithout obligation, the same I may lawfully covenant to do through fear:\nand what I lawfully covenant, I cannot lawfully break.\n\n[Sidenote: The former covenant to one, makes void the later to another.]\n\nA former covenant, makes void a later. For a man that hath passed away\nhis right to one man to-day, hath it not to pass to-morrow to another:\nand therefore the later promise passeth no right, but is null.\n\n[Sidenote: A man\u2019s covenant not to defend himself is void.]\n\nA covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is always void.\nFor, as I have showed before, no man can transfer, or lay down his right\nto save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment, the avoiding\nwhereof is the only end of laying down any right; and therefore the\npromise of not resisting force, in no covenant transferreth any right;\nnor is obliging. For though a man may covenant thus, _unless I do so, or\nso, kill me_; he cannot covenant thus, _unless I do so, or so, I will\nnot resist you, when you come to kill me_. For man by nature chooseth\nthe lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the\ngreater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this\nis granted to be true by all men, in that they lead criminals to\nexecution, and prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such\ncriminals have consented to the law, by which they are condemned.\n\n[Sidenote: No man obliged to accuse himself.]\n\nA covenant to accuse oneself, without assurance of pardon, is likewise\ninvalid. For in the condition of nature, where every man is judge, there\nis no place for accusation: and in the civil state, the accusation is\nfollowed with punishment; which being force, a man is not obliged not to\nresist. The same is also true, of the accusation of those, by whose\ncondemnation a man falls into misery; as of a father, wife, or\nbenefactor. For the testimony of such an accuser, if it be not willingly\ngiven, is presumed to be corrupted by nature; and therefore not to be\nreceived: and where a man\u2019s testimony is not to be credited, he is not\nbound to give it. Also accusations upon torture, are not to be reputed\nas testimonies. For torture is to be used but as means of conjecture,\nand light, in the further examination, and search of truth: and what is\nin that case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is tortured; not\nto the informing of the torturers: and therefore ought not to have the\ncredit of a sufficient testimony: for whether he deliver himself by\ntrue, or false accusation, he does it by the right of preserving his own\nlife.\n\n[Sidenote: The end of an oath.]\n\nThe force of words, being, as I have formerly noted, too weak to hold\nmen to the performance of their covenants; there are in man\u2019s nature,\nbut two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a fear\nof the consequence of breaking their word; or a glory, or pride in\nappearing not to need to break it. This latter is a generosity too\nrarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of wealth,\ncommand, or sensual pleasure; which are the greatest part of mankind.\nThe passion to be reckoned upon, is fear; whereof there be two very\ngeneral objects: one, the power of spirits invisible; the other, the\npower of those men they shall therein offend. Of these two, though the\nformer be the greater power, yet the fear of the latter is commonly the\ngreater fear. The fear of the former is in every man, his own religion:\nwhich hath place in the nature of man before civil society. The latter\nhath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their promises;\nbecause in the condition of mere nature, the inequality of power is not\ndiscerned, but by the event of battle. So that before the time of civil\nsociety, or in the interruption thereof by war, there is nothing can\nstrengthen a covenant of peace agreed on, against the temptations of\navarice, ambition, lust, or other strong desire, but the fear of that\ninvisible power, which they every one worship as God; and fear as a\nrevenger of their perfidy. All therefore that can be done between two\nmen not subject to civil power, is to put one another to swear by the\nGod he feareth: [Sidenote: The form of an oath.] which _swearing_, or\nOATH, is a _form of speech, added to a promise; by which he that\npromiseth, signifieth, that unless he perform, he renounceth the mercy\nof his God, or calleth to him for vengeance on himself_. Such was the\nheathen form, _Let_ Jupiter _kill me else, as I kill this beast_. So is\nour form, _I shall do thus, and thus, so help me God_. And this, with\nthe rites and ceremonies, which every one useth in his own religion,\nthat the fear of breaking faith might be the greater.\n\n[Sidenote: No oath but by God.]\n\nBy this it appears, that an oath taken according to any other form, or\nrite, than his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no oath: and that there\nis no swearing by any thing which the swearer thinks not God. For though\nmen have sometimes used to swear by their kings, for fear, or flattery;\nyet they would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them\ndivine honour. And that swearing unnecessarily by God, is but prophaning\nof his name: and swearing by other things, as men do in common\ndiscourse, is not swearing, but an impious custom, gotten by too much\nvehemence of talking.\n\n[Sidenote: An oath adds nothing to the obligation.]\n\nIt appears also, that the oath adds nothing to the obligation. For a\ncovenant, if lawful, binds in the sight of God, without the oath, as\nmuch as with it: if unlawful, bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed\nwith an oath.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XV.\n\n OF OTHER LAWS OF NATURE.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The third law of nature, justice.]\n\nFrom that law of nature, by which we are obliged to transfer to another,\nsuch rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there\nfolloweth a third; which is this, _that men perform their covenants\nmade_: without which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and\nthe right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the\ncondition of war.\n\n[Sidenote: Justice and injustice what.]\n\nAnd in this law of nature, consisteth the fountain and original of\nJUSTICE. For where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been\ntransferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently,\nno action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it\nis _unjust_: and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than _the not\nperformance of covenant_. And whatsoever is not unjust, is _just_.\n\n[Sidenote: Justice and propriety begin with the constitution of\n commonwealth.]\n\nBut because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not\nperformance on either part, as hath been said in the former chapter, are\ninvalid; though the original of justice be the making of covenants; yet\ninjustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such fear be\ntaken away; which while men are in the natural condition of war, cannot\nbe done. Therefore before the names of just, and unjust can have place,\nthere must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the\nperformance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment,\ngreater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant;\nand to make good that propriety, which by mutual contract men acquire,\nin recompense of the universal right they abandon: and such power there\nis none before the erection of a commonwealth. And this is also to be\ngathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the Schools: for\nthey say, that _justice is the constant will of giving to every man his\nown_. And therefore where there is no _own_, that is no propriety, there\nis no injustice; and where there is no coercive power erected, that is,\nwhere there is no commonwealth, there is no propriety; all men having\nright to all things: therefore where there is no commonwealth, there\nnothing is unjust. So that the nature of justice, consisteth in keeping\nof valid covenants: but the validity of covenants begins not but with\nthe constitution of a civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep\nthem: and then it is also that propriety begins.\n\n[Sidenote: Justice not contrary to reason.]\n\nThe fool hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice; and\nsometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleging, that every man\u2019s\nconservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there\ncould be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced\nthereunto: and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep\ncovenants, was not against reason, when it conduced to one\u2019s benefit. He\ndoes not therein deny, that there be covenants; and that they are\nsometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be\ncalled injustice, and the observance of them justice: but he\nquestioneth, whether injustice, taking away the fear of God, for the\nsame fool hath said in his heart there is no God, may not sometimes\nstand with that reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and\nparticularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a\nman in a condition, to neglect not only the dispraise, and revilings,\nbut also the power of other men. The kingdom of God is gotten by\nviolence: but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? were it\nagainst reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by\nit? and if it be not against reason, it is not against justice; or else\njustice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this,\nsuccessful wickedness hath obtained the name of virtue: and some that in\nall other things have disallowed the violation of faith; yet have\nallowed it, when it is for the getting of a kingdom. And the heathen\nthat believed, that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed\nnevertheless the same Jupiter to be the avenger of injustice: somewhat\nlike to a piece of law in Coke\u2019s _Commentaries on Littleton_; where he\nsays, if the right heir of the crown be attainted of treason; yet the\ncrown shall descend to him, and _eo instante_ the attainder be void:\nfrom which instances a man will be very prone to infer; that when the\nheir apparent of a kingdom, shall kill him that is in possession, though\nhis father; you may call it injustice, or by what other name you will;\nyet it can never be against reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of\nmen tend to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most\nreasonable, that conduce most to their ends. This specious reasoning is\nnevertheless false.\n\nFor the question is not of promises mutual, where there is no security\nof performance on either side; as when there is no civil power erected\nover the parties promising; for such promises are no covenants: but\neither where one of the parties has performed already; or where there is\na power to make him perform; there is the question whether it be against\nreason, that is, against the benefit of the other to perform, or not.\nAnd I say it is not against reason. For the manifestation whereof, we\nare to consider; first, that when a man doth a thing, which\nnotwithstanding any thing can be foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to\nhis own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not expect,\narriving may turn it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it\nreasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of war, wherein\nevery man to every man, for want of a common power to keep them all in\nawe, is an enemy, there is no man who can hope by his own strength, or\nwit, to defend himself from destruction, without the help of\nconfederates; where every one expects the same defence by the\nconfederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares\nhe thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect\nno other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single\npower. He therefore that breaketh his covenant, and consequently\ndeclareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received\ninto any society, that unite themselves for peace and defence, but by\nthe error of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retained\nin it, without seeing the danger of their error; which errors a man\ncannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security: and\ntherefore if he be left, or cast out of society, he perisheth; and if he\nlive in society, it is by the errors of other men, which he could not\nforesee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his\npreservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction,\nforbear him only out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.\n\nAs for the instance of gaining the secure and perpetual felicity of\nheaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable;\nand that is not breaking, but keeping of covenant.\n\nAnd for the other instance of attaining sovereignty by rebellion; it is\nmanifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably\nbe expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so,\nothers are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof\nis against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, keeping of\ncovenant, is a rule of reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing\ndestructive to our life; and consequently a law of nature.\n\nThere be some that proceed further; and will not have the law of nature,\nto be those rules which conduce to the preservation of man\u2019s life on\nearth; but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death; to which\nthey think the breach of covenant may conduce; and consequently be just\nand reasonable; such are they that think it a work of merit to kill, or\ndepose, or rebel against, the sovereign power constituted over them by\ntheir own consent. But because there is no natural knowledge of man\u2019s\nestate after death; much less of the reward that is then to be given to\nbreach of faith; but only a belief grounded upon other men\u2019s saying,\nthat they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew\nthem, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally; breach of faith\ncannot be called a precept of reason, or nature.\n\n[Sidenote: Covenants not discharged by the vice of the person to whom\n they are made.]\n\nOthers, that allow for a law of nature, the keeping of faith, do\nnevertheless make exception of certain persons; as heretics, and such as\nuse not to perform their covenant to others: and this also is against\nreason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our\ncovenant made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have\nhindered the making of it.\n\n[Sidenote: Justice of men and justice of actions what.]\n\nThe names of just, and injust, when they are attributed to men, signify\none thing; and when they are attributed to actions, another. When they\nare attributed to men, they signify conformity, or inconformity of\nmanners, to reason. But when they are attributed to actions, they\nsignify the conformity, or inconformity to reason, not of manners, or\nmanner of life, but of particular actions. A just man therefore, is he\nthat taketh all the care he can, that his actions may be all just: and\nan unjust man, is he that neglecteth it. And such men are more often in\nour language styled by the names of righteous, and unrighteous; than\njust, and unjust; though the meaning be the same. Therefore a righteous\nman, does not lose that title, by one, or a few unjust actions, that\nproceed from sudden passion, or mistake of things, or persons: nor does\nan unrighteous man, lose his character, for such actions, as he does, or\nforbears to do, for fear; because his will is not framed by the justice,\nbut by the apparent benefit of what he is to do. That which gives to\nhuman actions the relish of justice, is a certain nobleness or\ngallantness of courage, rarely found, by which a man scorns to be\nbeholden for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of\npromise. This justice of the manners, is that which is meant, where\njustice is called a virtue; and injustice a vice.\n\nBut the justice of actions denominates men, not just, but _guiltless_:\nand the injustice of the same, which is also called injury, gives them\nbut the name of _guilty_.\n\n[Sidenote: Justice of manners, and justice of actions.]\n\nAgain, the injustice of manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to do\ninjury; and is injustice before it proceed to act; and without supposing\nany individual person injured. But the injustice of an action, that is\nto say injury, supposeth an individual person injured; namely him, to\nwhom the covenant was made: and therefore many times the injury is\nreceived by one man, when the damage redoundeth to another. As when the\nmaster commandeth his servant to give money to a stranger; if it be not\ndone, the injury is done to the master, whom he had before covenanted to\nobey; but the damage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no\nobligation; and therefore could not injure him. And so also in\ncommonwealths, private men may remit to one another their debts; but not\nrobberies or other violences, whereby they are endamaged; because the\ndetaining of debt, is an injury to themselves; but robbery and violence,\nare injuries to the person of the commonwealth.\n\n[Sidenote: Nothing done to a man by his own consent can be injury.]\n\nWhatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own will signified to\nthe doer, is no injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed\naway his original right to do what he please, by some antecedent\ncovenant, there is no breach of covenant; and therefore no injury done\nhim. And if he have; then his will to have it done being signified, is a\nrelease of that covenant: and so again there is no injury done him.\n\n[Sidenote: Justice commutative and distributive.]\n\nJustice of actions, is by writers divided into _commutative_, and\n_distributive_: and the former they say consisteth in proportion\narithmetical; the latter in proportion geometrical. Commutative\ntherefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted\nfor; and distributive, in the distribution of equal benefit, to men of\nequal merit. As if it were injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to\ngive more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted\nfor, is measured by the appetite of the contractors: and therefore the\njust value, is that which they be contented to give. And merit, besides\nthat which is by covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth\nthe performance of the other part, and falls under justice commutative,\nnot distributive, is not due by justice; but is rewarded of grace only.\nAnd therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be\nexpounded, is not right. To speak properly, commutative justice, is the\njustice, of a contractor; that is, a performance of covenant, in buying,\nand selling; hiring, and letting to hire; lending, and borrowing;\nexchanging, bartering, and other acts of contract.\n\nAnd distributive justice, the justice of an arbitrator; that is to say,\nthe act of defining what is just. Wherein, being trusted by them that\nmake him arbitrator, if he perform his trust, he is said to distribute\nto every man his own: and this is indeed just distribution, and may be\ncalled, though improperly, distributive justice; but more properly\nequity; which also is a law of nature, as shall be shown in due place.\n\n[Sidenote: The fourth law of nature, gratitude.]\n\nAs justice dependeth on antecedent covenant; so does GRATITUDE depend on\nantecedent grace; that is to say, antecedent free gift: and is the\nfourth law of nature; which may be conceived in this form, _that a man\nwhich receiveth benefit from another of mere grace, endeavour that he\nwhich giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good\nwill_. For no man giveth, but with intention of good to himself; because\ngift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man\nhis own good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will\nbe no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutual\nhelp; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they\nare to remain still in the condition of _war_; which is contrary to the\nfirst and fundamental law of nature, which commandeth men to _seek\npeace_. The breach of this law, is called _ingratitude_; and hath the\nsame relation to grace, that injustice hath to obligation by covenant.\n\n[Sidenote: The fifth mutual accommodation, or complaisance.]\n\nA fifth law of nature, is COMPLAISANCE; that is to say, _that every man\nstrive to accommodate himself to the rest_. For the understanding\nwhereof, we may consider, that there is in men\u2019s aptness to society, a\ndiversity of nature, rising from their diversity of affections; not\nunlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an\nedifice. For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of\nfigure, takes more room from others, than itself fills; and for the\nhardness, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the\nbuilding, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome:\nso also, a man that by asperity of nature, will strive to retain those\nthings which to himself are superfluous, and to others necessary; and\nfor the stubbornness of his passions, cannot be corrected, is to be\nleft, or cast out of society, as cumbersome thereunto. For seeing every\nman, not only by right, but also by necessity of nature, is supposed to\nendeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his\nconservation; he that shall oppose himself against it, for things\nsuperfluous, is guilty of the war that thereupon is to follow; and\ntherefore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamental law of nature,\nwhich commandeth _to seek peace_. The observers of this law, may be\ncalled SOCIABLE, the Latins call them _commodi_; the contrary,\n_stubborn_, _insociable_, _froward_, _intractable_.\n\n[Sidenote: The sixth, facility to pardon.]\n\nA sixth law of nature, is this, _that upon caution of the future time, a\nman ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire\nit_. For PARDON, is nothing but granting of peace; which though granted\nto them that persevere in their hostility, be not peace, but fear; yet\nnot granted to them that give caution of the future time, is sign of an\naversion to peace; and therefore contrary to the law of nature.\n\n[Sidenote: The seventh, that in revenges, men respect only the future\n good.]\n\nA seventh is, _that in revenges_, that is, retribution of evil for evil,\n_men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of\nthe good to follow_. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with\nany other design, than for correction of the offender, or direction of\nothers. For this law is consequent to the next before it, that\ncommandeth pardon, upon security of the future time. Besides, revenge\nwithout respect to the example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or\nglorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end; for the end is\nalways somewhat to come; and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and\ncontrary to reason, and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the\nintroduction of war; which is against the law of nature; and is commonly\nstyled by the name of _cruelty_.\n\n[Sidenote: The eighth, against contumely.]\n\nAnd because all signs of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight; insomuch\nas most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged;\nwe may in the eighth place, for a law of nature, set down this precept,\n_that no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare hatred, or\ncontempt of another_. The breach of which law, is commonly called\n_contumely_.\n\n[Sidenote: The ninth, against pride.]\n\nThe question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of\nmere nature; where, as has been shewn before, all men are equal. The\ninequality that now is, has been introduced by the laws civil. I know\nthat Aristotle in the first book of his _Politics_, for a foundation of\nhis doctrine, maketh men by nature, some more worthy to command, meaning\nthe wiser sort, such as he thought himself to be for his philosophy;\nothers to serve, meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not\nphilosophers as he; as if master and servant were not introduced by\nconsent of men, but by difference of wit: which is not only against\nreason; but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish,\nthat had not rather govern themselves, than be governed by others: nor\nwhen the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who\ndistrust their own wisdom, do they always, or often, or almost at any\ntime, get the victory. If nature therefore have made men equal, that\nequality is to be acknowledged: or if nature have made men unequal; yet\nbecause men that think themselves equal, will not enter into conditions\nof peace, but upon equal terms, such equality must be admitted. And\ntherefore for the ninth law of nature, I put this, _that every man\nacknowledge another for his equal by nature_. The breach of this precept\nis _pride_.\n\n[Sidenote: The tenth, against arrogance.]\n\nOn this law, dependeth another, _that at the entrance into conditions of\npeace_, _no man require to reserve to himself any right_, _which he is\nnot content should be reserved to every one of the rest_. As it is\nnecessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certain rights of\nnature; that is to say, not to have liberty to do all they list: so is\nit necessary for man\u2019s life, to retain some; as right to govern their\nown bodies; enjoy air, water, motion, ways to go from place to place;\nand all things else, without which a man cannot live, or not live well.\nIf in this case, at the making of peace, men require for themselves,\nthat which they would not have to be granted to others, they do contrary\nto the precedent law, that commandeth the acknowledgment of natural\nequality, and therefore also against the law of nature. The observers of\nthis law, are those we call _modest_, and the breakers _arrogant_ men.\nThe Greeks call the violation of this law \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03be\u03af\u03b1; that is, a desire\nof more than their share.\n\n[Sidenote: The eleventh, equity.]\n\nAlso if _a man be trusted to judge between man and man_, it is a precept\nof the law of nature, _that he deal equally between them_. For without\nthat, the controversies of men cannot be determined but by war. He\ntherefore that is partial in judgment, doth what in him lies, to deter\nmen from the use of judges, and arbitrators; and consequently, against\nthe fundamental law of nature, is the cause of war.\n\nThe observance of this law, from the equal distribution to each man, of\nthat which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY, and, as I have\nsaid before, distributive justice: the violation, _acception of\npersons_, \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03af\u03b1.\n\n[Sidenote: The twelfth, equal use of things common.]\n\nAnd from this followeth another law, _that such things as cannot be\ndivided, be enjoyed in common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the\nthing permit, without stint; otherwise proportionably to the number of\nthem that have right_. For otherwise the distribution is unequal, and\ncontrary to equity.\n\n[Sidenote: The thirteenth, of lot.]\n\nBut some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in\ncommon. Then, the law of nature, which prescribeth equity, requireth,\n_that the entire right; or else, making the use alternate, the first\npossession, be determined by lot_. For equal distribution, is of the law\nof nature; and other means of equal distribution cannot be imagined.\n\n[Sidenote: The fourteenth, of primogeniture, and first seizing.]\n\nOf _lots_ there be two sorts, _arbitrary_, and _natural_. Arbitrary, is\nthat which is agreed on by the competitors: natural, is either\n_primogeniture_, which the Greek calls \u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1, which signifies,\n_given by lot_; or _first seizure_.\n\nAnd therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor\ndivided, ought to be adjudged to the first possessor; and in some cases\nto the first born, as acquired by lot.\n\n[Sidenote: The fifteenth, of mediators.]\n\nIt is also a law of nature, _that all men that mediate peace, be allowed\nsafe conduct_. For the law that commandeth peace, as the _end_,\ncommandeth intercession, as the _means_; and to intercession the means\nis safe conduct.\n\n[Illustration: The sixteenth, of submission to arbitrement.]\n\nAnd because, though men be never so willing to observe these laws, there\nmay nevertheless arise questions concerning a man\u2019s action; first,\nwhether it were done, or not done; secondly, if done, whether against\nthe law, or not against the law; the former whereof, is called a\nquestion _of fact_; the latter a question _of right_, therefore unless\nthe parties to the question, covenant mutually to stand to the sentence\nof another, they are as far from peace as ever. This other to whose\nsentence they submit is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the\nlaw of nature, _that they that are at controversy, submit their right to\nthe judgment of an arbitrator_.\n\n[Sidenote: The seventeenth, no man is his own judge.]\n\nAnd seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own\nbenefit, no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause; and if he were\nnever so fit; yet equity allowing to each party equal benefit, if one be\nadmitted to be judge, the other is to be admitted also; and so the\ncontroversy, that is, the cause of war, remains, against the law of\nnature.\n\n[Sidenote: The eighteenth, no man to be judge, that has in him a natural\n cause of partiality.]\n\nFor the same reason no man in any cause ought to be received for\narbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently\nariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other: for he hath\ntaken, though an unavoidable bribe, yet a bribe; and no man can be\nobliged to trust him. And thus also the controversy, and the condition\nof war remaineth, contrary to the law of nature.\n\n[Sidenote: The nineteenth of witnesses.]\n\nAnd in a controversy of _fact_, the judge being to give no more credit\nto one, than to the other, if there be no other arguments, must give\ncredit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: for else the\nquestion is undecided, and left to force, contrary to the law of nature.\n\nThese are the laws of nature, dictating peace, for a means of the\nconservation of men in multitudes; and which only concern the doctrine\nof civil society. There be other things tending to the destruction of\nparticular men; as drunkenness, and all other parts of intemperance;\nwhich may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the law\nof nature hath forbidden; but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are\npertinent enough to this place.\n\n[Sidenote: A rule, by which the laws of nature may easily be examined.]\n\nAnd though this may seem too subtle a deduction of the laws of nature,\nto be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busy in\ngetting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all\nmen inexcusable, they have been contracted into one easy sum,\nintelligible even to the meanest capacity; and that is, _Do not that to\nanother, which thou wouldest not have done to thyself_; which sheweth\nhim, that he has no more to do in learning the laws of nature, but, when\nweighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to\nput them into the other part of the balance, and his own into their\nplace, that his own passions, and self-love, may add nothing to the\nweight; and then there is none of these laws of nature that will not\nappear unto him very reasonable.\n\n[Sidenote: The laws of nature oblige in conscience always, but in effect\n then only when there is security.]\n\nThe laws of nature oblige _in foro interno_; that is to say, they bind\nto a desire they should take place: but _in foro externo_; that is, to\nthe putting them in act, not always. For he that should be modest, and\ntractable, and perform all he promises, in such time, and place, where\nno man else should do so, should but make himself a prey to others, and\nprocure his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of\nnature, which tend to nature\u2019s preservation. And again, he that having\nsufficient security, that others shall observe the same laws towards\nhim, observes them not himself, seeketh not peace, but war; and\nconsequently the destruction of his nature by violence.\n\nAnd whatsoever laws bind _in foro interno_, may be broken, not only by a\nfact contrary to the law, but also by a fact according to it, in case a\nman think it contrary. For though his action in this case, be according\nto the law; yet his purpose was against the law; which, where the\nobligation is _in foro interno_, is a breach.\n\n[Sidenote: The laws of nature are eternal.]\n\nThe laws of nature are immutable and eternal; for injustice,\ningratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons, and the\nrest, can never be made lawful. For it can never be that war shall\npreserve life, and peace destroy it.\n\n[Sidenote: And yet easy.]\n\nThe same laws, because they oblige only to a desire, and endeavour, I\nmean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easy to be observed. For\nin that they require nothing but endeavour, he that endeavoureth their\nperformance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the law, is just.\n\n[Sidenote: The science of these laws, is the true moral philosophy.]\n\nAnd the science of them, is the true and only moral philosophy. For\nmoral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is _good_, and\n_evil_, in the conversation, and society of mankind. _Good_, and _evil_,\nare names that signify our appetites, and aversions; which in different\ntempers, customs, and doctrines of men, are different: and divers men,\ndiffer not only in their judgment, on the senses of what is pleasant,\nand unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also\nof what is conformable, or disagreeable to reason, in the actions of\ncommon life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himself;\nand one time praiseth, that is, calleth good, what another time he\ndispraiseth, and calleth evil: from whence arise disputes,\ncontroversies, and at last war. And therefore so long as a man is in the\ncondition of mere nature, which is a condition of war, as private\nappetite is the measure of good, and evil: and consequently all men\nagree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way, or means\nof peace, which, as I have shewed before, are _justice_, _gratitude_,\n_modesty_, _equity_, _mercy_, and the rest of the laws of nature, are\ngood; that is to say; _moral virtues_; and their contrary _vices_, evil.\nNow the science of virtue and vice, is moral philosophy; and therefore\nthe true doctrine of the laws of nature, is the true moral philosophy.\nBut the writers of moral philosophy, though they acknowledge the same\nvirtues and vices; yet not seeing wherein consisted their goodness; nor\nthat they come to be praised, as the means of peaceable, sociable, and\ncomfortable living, place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not\nthe cause, but the degree of daring, made fortitude; or not the cause,\nbut the quantity of a gift, made liberality.\n\nThese dictates of reason, men used to call by the name of laws, but\nimproperly: for they are but conclusions, or theorems concerning what\nconduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas law,\nproperly, is the word of him, that by right hath command over others.\nBut yet if we consider the same theorems, as delivered in the word of\nGod, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called\nlaws.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XVI.\n\n OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS\n PERSONATED.\n\n\n[Sidenote: A person what.]\n\nA PERSON, is he, _whose words or actions are considered, either as his\nown, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any\nother thing, to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction_.\n\n[Sidenote: Person natural, and artificial.]\n\nWhen they are considered as his own, then is he called a _natural\nperson_: and when they are considered as representing the words and\nactions of another, then is he a _feigned_ or _artificial person_.\n\n[Sidenote: The word person, whence.]\n\nThe word person is Latin: instead whereof the Greeks have \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd,\nwhich signifies the _face_, as _persona_ in Latin signifies the\ndisguise, or _outward appearance_ of a man, counterfeited on the stage;\nand sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the\nface, as a mask or vizard: and from the stage, hath been translated to\nany representer of speech and action, as well in tribunals, as theatres.\nSo that a _person_, is the same that an _actor_ is, both on the stage\nand in common conversation; and to _personate_, is to _act_, or\n_represent_ himself, or another; and he that acteth another, is said to\nbear his person, or act in his name; in which sense Cicero useth it\nwhere he says, _Unus sustineo tres personas; mei, adversarii, et\njudicis_: I bear three persons; my own, my adversary\u2019s, and the judge\u2019s;\nand is called in divers occasions, diversly; as a _representer_, or\n_representative_, a _lieutenant_, a _vicar_, an _attorney_, a _deputy_,\na _procurator_, an _actor_, and the like.\n\nOf persons artificial, some have their words and actions _owned_ by\nthose whom they represent. [Sidenote: Actor.] And then the person is the\n_actor_; [Sidenote: Author.] and he that owneth his words and actions,\nis the AUTHOR: in which case the actor acteth by authority. For that\nwhich in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an _owner_, and in\nLatin _dominus_, in Greek \u03ba\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 speaking of actions, is called author.\nAnd as the right of possession, is called dominion; [Sidenote:\nAuthority.] so the right of doing any action, is called AUTHORITY. So\nthat by authority, is always understood a right of doing any act; and\n_done by authority_, done by commission, or licence from him whose right\nit is.\n\n[Sidenote: Covenants by authority, bind the author.]\n\nFrom hence it followeth, that when the actor maketh a covenant by\nauthority, he bindeth thereby the author, no less than if he had made it\nhimself; and no less subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same.\nAnd therefore all that hath been said formerly, (chap. XIV) of the\nnature of covenants between man and man in their natural capacity, is\ntrue also when they are made by their actors, representers, or\nprocurators, that have authority from them, so far forth as is in their\ncommission, but no further.\n\nAnd therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor, or representer,\nnot knowing the authority he hath, doth it at his own peril. For no man\nis obliged by a covenant, whereof he is not author; nor consequently by\na covenant made against, or beside the authority he gave.\n\n[Sidenote: But not the actor.]\n\nWhen the actor doth anything against the law of nature by command of the\nauthor, if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him, not he, but the\nauthor breaketh the law of nature; for though the action be against the\nlaw of nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily, to refuse to do it, is\nagainst the law of nature, that forbiddeth breach of covenant.\n\n[Sidenote: The authority is to be shown.]\n\nAnd he that maketh a covenant with the author, by mediation of the\nactor, not knowing what authority he hath, but only takes his word; in\ncase such authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no\nlonger obliged: for the covenant made with the author, is not valid,\nwithout his counter-assurance. But if he that so covenanteth, knew\nbeforehand he was to expect no other assurance, than the actor\u2019s word;\nthen is the covenant valid; because the actor in this case maketh\nhimself the author. And therefore, as when the authority is evident, the\ncovenant obligeth the author, not the actor; so when the authority is\nfeigned, it obligeth the actor only; there being no author but himself.\n\n[Sidenote: Things personated, inanimate.]\n\nThere are few things, that are incapable of being represented by\nfiction. Inanimate things, as a church, an hospital, a bridge, may be\npersonated by a rector, master, or overseer. But things inanimate,\ncannot be authors, nor therefore give authority to their actors: yet the\nactors may have authority to procure their maintenance, given them by\nthose that are owners, or governors of those things. And therefore, such\nthings cannot be personated, before there be some state of civil\ngovernment.\n\n[Sidenote: Irrational.]\n\nLikewise children, fools, and madmen that have no use of reason, may be\npersonated by guardians, or curators; but can be no authors, during that\ntime, of any action done by them, longer than, when they shall recover\nthe use of reason, they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet during the\nfolly, he that hath right of governing them, may give authority to the\nguardian. But this again has no place but in a state civil, because\nbefore such estate, there is no dominion of persons.\n\n[Sidenote: False gods.]\n\nAn idol, or mere figment of the brain, may be personated; as were the\ngods of the heathen: which by such officers as the state appointed, were\npersonated, and held possessions, and other goods, and rights, which men\nfrom time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot\nbe authors: for an idol is nothing. The authority proceeded from the\nstate: and therefore before introduction of civil government, the gods\nof the heathen could not be personated.\n\n[Sidenote: The true God.]\n\nThe true God may be personated. As he was; first, by Moses; who governed\nthe Israelites, that were not his, but God\u2019s people, not in his own\nname, with _hoc dicit Moses_; but in God\u2019s name, with _hoc dicit\nDominus_. Secondly, by the Son of man, his own Son, our blessed Saviour\nJesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jews, and induce all nations into\nthe kingdom of his father; not as of himself, but as sent from his\nfather. And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and\nworking in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came not\nof himself; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.\n\n[Sidenote: A multitude of men, how one person.]\n\nA multitude of men, are made one person, when they are by one man, or\none person, represented; so that it be done with the consent of every\none of that multitude in particular. For it is the _unity_ of the\nrepresenter, not the _unity_ of the represented, that maketh the person\n_one_. And it is the representer that beareth the person, and but one\nperson: and _unity_, cannot otherwise be understood in multitude.\n\n[Sidenote: Every one is author.]\n\nAnd because the multitude naturally is not _one_, but _many_; they\ncannot be understood for one; but many authors, of every thing their\nrepresentative saith, or doth in their name; every man giving their\ncommon representer, authority from himself in particular; and owning all\nthe actions the representer doth, in case they give him authority\nwithout stint: otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how far he\nshall represent them, none of them owneth more than they gave him\ncommission to act.\n\n[Sidenote: An actor may be many men made one by plurality of voices.]\n\nAnd if the representative consist of many men, the voice of the greater\nnumber, must be considered as the voice of them all. For if the lesser\nnumber pronounce, for example, in the affirmative, and the greater in\nthe negative, there will be negatives more than enough to destroy the\naffirmatives; and thereby the excess of negatives, standing\nuncontradicted, are the only voice the representative hath.\n\n[Sidenote: Representatives, when the number is even, unprofitable.]\n\nAnd a representative of even number, especially when the number is not\ngreat, whereby the contradictory voices are oftentimes equal, is\ntherefore oftentimes mute, and incapable of action. Yet in some cases\ncontradictory voices equal in number, may determine a question; as in\ncondemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemn\nnot, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemn, in that they absolve\nnot. For when a cause is heard; not to condemn, is to absolve: but on\nthe contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The\nlike it is in a deliberation of executing presently, or deferring till\nanother time: for when the voices are equal, the not decreeing\nexecution, is a decree of dilation.\n\n[Sidenote: Negative voice.]\n\nOr if the number be odd, as three, or more, men or assemblies; whereof\nevery one has by a negative voice, authority to take away the effect of\nall the affirmative voices of the rest, this number is no\nrepresentative; because by the diversity of opinions, and interests of\nmen, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a\nmute person, and unapt, as for many things else, so for the government\nof a multitude, especially in time of war.\n\nOf authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have\nbefore defined to be him, that owneth the action of another simply. The\nsecond is he, that owneth an action, or covenant of another\nconditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other\ndoth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these authors\nconditional, are generally called SURETIES, in Latin, _fidejussores_,\nand _sponsores_; and particularly for debt, _pr\u00e6des_; and for appearance\nbefore a judge, or magistrate, _vades_.\n\n\n\n\n PART II.\n\n OF COMMONWEALTH.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XVII.\n\n OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION\n OF A COMMONWEALTH.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The end of commonwealth, particular security:]\n\nThe final cause, end, or design of men, who naturally love liberty, and\ndominion over others, in the introduction of that restraint upon\nthemselves, in which we see them live in commonwealths, is the foresight\nof their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is\nto say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war,\nwhich is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown in chapter XIII, to\nthe natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them\nin awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their\ncovenants, and observation of those laws of nature set down in the\nfourteenth and fifteenth chapters.\n\n[Sidenote: Which is not to be had from the law of nature:]\n\nFor the laws of nature, as _justice_, _equity_, _modesty_, _mercy_, and,\nin sum, _doing to others, as we would be done to_, of themselves,\nwithout the terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are\ncontrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride,\nrevenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words,\nand of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the\nlaws of nature, which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to\nkeep them, when he can do it safely, if there be no power erected, or\nnot great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely\non his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in\nall places, where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one\nanother, has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law\nof nature, that the greater spoils they gained, the greater was their\nhonour; and men observed no other laws therein, but the laws of honour;\nthat is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and\ninstruments of husbandry. And as small families did then; so now do\ncities and kingdoms which are but greater families, for their own\nsecurity, enlarge their dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and\nfear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders, and\nendeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by\nopen force, and secret arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are\nremembered for it in after ages with honour.\n\n[Sidenote: Nor from the conjunction of a few men or families:]\n\nNor is it the joining together of a small number of men, that gives them\nthis security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side\nor the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient\nto carry the victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion.\nThe multitude sufficient to confide in for our security, is not\ndetermined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy we\nfear; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the enemy is not of so\nvisible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of war, as to\nmove him to attempt.\n\n[Sidenote: Nor from a great multitude, unless directed by one judgment:]\n\nAnd be there never so great a multitude; yet if their actions be\ndirected according to their particular judgments, and particular\nappetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither\nagainst a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For\nbeing distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of\ntheir strength, they do not help but hinder one another; and reduce\ntheir strength by mutual opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily,\nnot only subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there\nis no common enemy, they make war upon each other, for their particular\ninterests. For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent\nin the observation of justice, and other laws of nature, without a\ncommon power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all\nmankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be\nany civil government, or Commonwealth at all; because there would be\npeace without subjection.\n\n[Sidenote: And that continually.]\n\nNor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the\ntime of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgment,\nfor a limited time; as in one battle, or one war. For though they obtain\na victory by their unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy; yet\nafterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one\npart is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they\nmust needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again\ninto a war amongst themselves.\n\n[Sidenote: Why certain creatures without reason, or speech, do\n nevertheless live in society, without any coercive power.]\n\nIt is true, that certain living creatures, as bees, and ants, live\nsociably one with another, which are therefore by Aristotle numbered\namongst political creatures; and yet have no other direction, than their\nparticular judgments and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can\nsignify to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and\ntherefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why mankind cannot do the\nsame. To which I answer,\n\nFirst, that men are continually in competition for honour and dignity,\nwhich these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there\nariseth on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally war; but amongst\nthese not so.\n\nSecondly, that amongst these creatures, the common good differeth not\nfrom the private; and being by nature inclined to their private, they\nprocure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose joy consisteth in\ncomparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is\neminent.\n\nThirdly, that these creatures, having not, as man, the use of reason, do\nnot see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their\ncommon business; whereas amongst men, there are very many, that think\nthemselves wiser, and abler to govern the public, better than the rest;\nand these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way;\nand thereby bring it into distraction and civil war.\n\nFourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in\nmaking known to one another their desires, and other affections; yet\nthey want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others,\nthat which is good, in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness\nof good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatness of good and\nevil; discontenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure.\n\nFifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between _injury_ and\n_damage_; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not\noffended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome, when\nhe is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his wisdom, and\ncontrol the actions of them that govern the commonwealth.\n\nLastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men, is by\ncovenant only, which is artificial: and therefore it is no wonder if\nthere be somewhat else required, besides covenant, to make their\nagreement constant and lasting; which is a common power, to keep them in\nawe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit.\n\n[Sidenote: The generation of a commonwealth.]\n\nThe only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them\nfrom the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and\nthereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and\nby the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live\ncontentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or\nupon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality\nof voices, unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one\nman, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and\nacknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their\nperson, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern\nthe common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every\none to his will, and their judgments, to his judgment. This is more than\nconsent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same\nperson, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as\nif every man should say to every man, _I authorise and give up my right\nof governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this\ncondition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his\nactions in like manner_. This done, the multitude so united in one\nperson, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the\ngeneration of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently,\nof that _mortal god_, to which we owe under the _immortal God_, our\npeace and defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular\nman in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength\nconferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to perform the\nwills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their\nenemies abroad. [Sidenote: The definition of a commonwealth.] And in him\nconsisteth the essence of the commonwealth; which, to define it, is _one\nperson, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with\nanother, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may\nuse the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for\ntheir peace and common defence_.\n\n[Sidenote: Sovereign, and subject, what.]\n\nAnd he that carrieth this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have\n_sovereign power_; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.\n\nThe attaining to this sovereign power, is by two ways. One, by natural\nforce; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and\ntheir children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they\nrefuse; or by war subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their\nlives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst\nthemselves, to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on\nconfidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter, may\nbe called a political commonwealth, or commonwealth by _institution_;\nand the former, a commonwealth by _acquisition_. And first, I shall\nspeak of a commonwealth by institution.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XVIII.\n\n OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS BY INSTITUTION.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The act of instituting a commonwealth, what.]\n\nA _commonwealth_ is said to be _instituted_, when a _multitude_ of men\ndo agree; and _covenant, every one, with every one_, that to whatsoever\n_man_, or _assembly of men_, shall be given by the major part, the\n_right_ to _present_ the person of them all, that is to say, to be their\n_representative_; every one, as well he that _voted for it_, as he that\n_voted against it_, shall _authorize_ all the actions and judgments, of\nthat man, or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his\nown, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected\nagainst other men.\n\n[Sidenote: The consequences to such institution, are.]\n\nFrom this institution of a commonwealth are derived all the _rights_,\nand _faculties_ of him, or them, on whom sovereign power is conferred by\nthe consent of the people assembled.\n\n[Sidenote: 1. The subjects cannot change the form of government.]\n\nFirst, because they covenant, it is to be understood, they are not\nobliged by former covenant to anything repugnant hereunto. And\nconsequently they that have already instituted a commonwealth, being\nthereby bound by covenant, to own the actions, and judgments of one,\ncannot lawfully make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient\nto any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And\ntherefore, they that are subjects to a monarch, cannot without his leave\ncast off monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude;\nnor transfer their person from him that beareth it, to another man, or\nother assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to\nown, and be reputed author of all, that he that already is their\nsovereign, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man\ndissenting, all the rest should break their covenant made to that man,\nwhich is injustice: and they have also every man given the sovereignty\nto him that beareth their person; and therefore if they depose him, they\ntake from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice.\nBesides, if he that attempteth to depose his sovereign, be killed, or\npunished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as\nbeing by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do: and\nbecause it is injustice for a man to do anything, for which he may be\npunished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And\nwhereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their\nsovereign, a new covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also\nis unjust: for there is no covenant with God, but by mediation of\nsomebody that representeth God\u2019s person; which none doth but God\u2019s\nlieutenant, who hath the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of\ncovenant with God, is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders\u2019 own\nconsciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a\nvile, and unmanly disposition.\n\n[Sidenote: 2. Sovereign power cannot be forfeited.]\n\nSecondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all, is given\nto him they make sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not\nof him to any of them; there can happen no breach of covenant on the\npart of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any\npretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. That he which\nis made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand, is\nmanifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as\none party to the covenant; or he must make a several covenant with every\nman. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they\nare not one person: and if he make so many several covenants as there be\nmen, those covenants after he hath the sovereignty are void; because\nwhat act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof,\nis the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the\nperson, and by the right of every one of them in particular. Besides, if\nany one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the covenant made by the\nsovereign at his institution; and others, or one other of his subjects,\nor himself alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this\ncase, no judge to decide the controversy; it returns therefore to the\nsword again; and every man recovereth the right of protecting himself by\nhis own strength, contrary to the design they had in the institution. It\nis therefore in vain to grant sovereignty by way of precedent covenant.\nThe opinion that any monarch receiveth his power by covenant, that is to\nsay, on condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easy\ntruth, that covenants being but words and breath, have no force to\noblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the\npublic sword; that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of\nmen that hath the sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them\nall, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when\nan assembly of men is made sovereign; then no man imagineth any such\ncovenant to have passed in the institution; for no man is so dull as to\nsay, for example, the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans, to\nhold the sovereignty on such or such conditions; which not performed,\nthe Romans might lawfully depose the Roman people. That men see not the\nreason to be alike in a monarchy, and in a popular government,\nproceedeth from the ambition of some, that are kinder to the government\nof an assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of monarchy,\nwhich they despair to enjoy.\n\n[Sidenote: 3. No man can without injustice protest against the\n institution of the sovereign declared by the major part.]\n\nThirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a\nsovereign; he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be\ncontented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be\ndestroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the\ncongregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared\nthereby his will, and therefore tacitly covenanted, to stand to what the\nmajor part should ordain: and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto,\nor make protestation against any of their decrees, he does contrary to\nhis covenant, and therefore unjustly. And whether he be of the\ncongregation, or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must\neither submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of war he\nwas in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any\nman whatsoever.\n\n[Sidenote: 4. The sovereign\u2019s actions cannot be justly accused by the\n subject.]\n\nFourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all the\nactions, and judgments of the sovereign instituted; it follows, that\nwhatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his subjects; nor\nought he to be by any of them accused of injustice. For he that doth\nanything by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by\nwhose authority he acteth: but by this institution of a commonwealth,\nevery particular man is author of all the sovereign doth: and\nconsequently he that complaineth of injury from his sovereign,\ncomplaineth of that whereof he himself is author; and therefore ought\nnot to accuse any man but himself; no nor himself of injury; because to\ndo injury to one\u2019s self, is impossible. It is true that they that have\nsovereign power may commit iniquity; but not injustice, or injury in the\nproper signification.\n\n[Sidenote: 5. Whatsoever the sovereign doth is unpunishable by the\n subject.]\n\nFifthly, and consequently to that which was said last, no man that hath\nsovereign power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner\nby his subjects punished. For seeing every subject is author of the\nactions of his sovereign; he punisheth another for the actions committed\nby himself.\n\n[Sidenote: 6. The sovereign is judge of what is necessary for the peace\n and defence of his subjects.]\n\nAnd because the end of this institution, is the peace and defence of\nthem all; and whosoever has right to the end, has right to the means; it\nbelongeth of right, to whatsoever man, or assembly that hath the\nsovereignty, to be judge both of the means of peace and defence, and\nalso of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do\nwhatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the\npreserving of peace and security, by prevention of discord at home, and\nhostility from abroad; and, when peace and security are lost, for the\nrecovery of the same. And therefore,\n\n[Sidenote: And judge of what doctrines are fit to be taught them.]\n\nSixthly, it is annexed to the sovereignty, to be judge of what opinions\nand doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and consequently,\non what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal, in\nspeaking to multitudes of people; and who shall examine the doctrines of\nall books before they be published. For the actions of men proceed from\ntheir opinions; and in the well-governing of opinions, consisteth the\nwell-governing of men\u2019s actions, in order to their peace, and concord.\nAnd though in matter of doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but the\ntruth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating the same by peace. For\ndoctrine repugnant to peace, can no more be true, than peace and concord\ncan be against the law of nature. It is true, that in a commonwealth,\nwhere by the negligence, or unskilfulness of governors, and teachers,\nfalse doctrines are by time generally received; the contrary truths may\nbe generally offensive. Yet the most sudden, and rough bursting in of a\nnew truth, that can be, does never break the peace, but only sometimes\nawake the war. For those men that are so remissly governed, that they\ndare take up arms to defend, or introduce an opinion, are still in war;\nand their condition not peace, but only a cessation of arms for fear of\none another; and they live, as it were, in the precincts of battle\ncontinually. It belongeth therefore to him that hath the sovereign\npower, to be judge, or constitute all judges of opinions and doctrines,\nas a thing necessary to peace; thereby to prevent discord and civil war.\n\n[Sidenote: 7. The right of making rules; whereby the subjects may every\n man know what is so his own, as no other subject can without\n injustice take it from him.]\n\nSeventhly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the whole power of prescribing\nthe rules, whereby every man may know, what goods he may enjoy, and what\nactions he may do, without being molested by any of his fellow-subjects;\nand this is it men call _propriety_. For before constitution of\nsovereign power, as hath already been shown, all men had right to all\nthings; which necessarily causeth war: and therefore this propriety,\nbeing necessary to peace, and depending on sovereign power, is the act\nof that power, in order to the public peace. These rules of propriety,\nor _meum_ and _tuum_, and of _good_, _evil_, _lawful_, and _unlawful_ in\nthe actions of subjects, are the civil laws; that is to say, the laws of\neach commonwealth in particular; though the name of civil law be now\nrestrained to the ancient civil laws of the city of Rome; which being\nthe head of a great part of the world, her laws at that time were in\nthese parts the civil law.\n\n[Sidenote: 8. To him also belongeth the right of judicature and decision\n of controversy.]\n\nEighthly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the right of judicature; that\nis to say, of hearing and deciding all controversies, which may arise\nconcerning law, either civil, or natural; or concerning fact. For\nwithout the decision of controversies, there is no protection of one\nsubject, against the injuries of another; the laws concerning _meum_ and\n_tuum_ are in vain; and to every man remaineth, from the natural and\nnecessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting\nhimself by his private strength, which is the condition of war, and\ncontrary to the end for which every commonwealth is instituted.\n\n[Sidenote: 9. And of making war, and peace, as he shall think best.]\n\nNinthly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the right of making war and\npeace with other nations, and commonwealths; that is to say, of judging\nwhen it is for the public good, and how great forces are to be\nassembled, armed, and paid for that end; and to levy money upon the\nsubjects, to defray the expenses thereof. For the power by which the\npeople are to be defended, consisteth in their armies; and the strength\nof an army, in the union of their strength under one command; which\ncommand the sovereign instituted, therefore hath; because the command of\nthe _militia_, without other institution, maketh him that hath it\nsovereign. And therefore whosoever is made general of an army, he that\nhath the sovereign power is always generalissimo.\n\n[Sidenote: 10. And of choosing all counsellors and ministers, both of\n peace & war.]\n\nTenthly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the choosing of all counsellors,\nministers, magistrates, and officers, both in peace, and war. For seeing\nthe sovereign is charged with the end, which is the common peace and\ndefence, he is understood to have power to use such means, as he shall\nthink most fit for his discharge.\n\n[Sidenote: 11. And of rewarding and punishing, and that (where no former\n law hath determined the measure of it) arbitrarily.]\n\nEleventhly, to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with\nriches, or honour, and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary\npunishment, or with ignominy, every subject according to the law he hath\nformerly made; or if there be no law made, according as he shall judge\nmost to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the commonwealth, or\ndeterring of them from doing disservice to the same.\n\n[Sidenote: 12. And of honour and order.]\n\nLastly, considering what value men are naturally apt to set upon\nthemselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they\nvalue other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, emulation,\nquarrels, factions, and at last war, to the destroying of one another,\nand diminution of their strength against a common enemy; it is necessary\nthat there be laws of honour, and a public rate of the worth of such men\nas have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the commonwealth; and\nthat there be force in the hands of some or other, to put those laws in\nexecution. But it hath already been shown, that not only the whole\n_militia_, or forces of the commonwealth; but also the judicature of all\ncontroversies, is annexed to the sovereignty. To the sovereign therefore\nit belongeth also to give titles of honour; and to appoint what order of\nplace, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what signs of respect, in\npublic or private meetings, they shall give to one another.\n\n[Sidenote: These rights are indivisible.]\n\nThese are the rights, which make the essence of sovereignty; and which\nare the marks, whereby a man may discern in what man, or assembly of\nmen, the sovereign power is placed, and resideth. For these are\nincommunicable, and inseparable. The power to coin money; to dispose of\nthe estate and persons of infant heirs; to have pr\u00e6emption in markets;\nand all other statute prerogatives, may be transferred by the sovereign;\nand yet the power to protect his subjects be retained. But if he\ntransfer the _militia_, he retains the judicature in vain, for want of\nexecution of the laws: or if he grant away the power of raising money;\nthe _militia_ is in vain; or if he give away the government of\ndoctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the fear of spirits.\nAnd so if we consider any one of the said rights, we shall presently\nsee, that the holding of all the rest will produce no effect, in the\nconservation of peace and justice, the end for which all commonwealths\nare instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is said, _a kingdom\ndivided in itself cannot stand_: for unless this division precede,\ndivision into opposite armies can never happen. If there had not first\nbeen an opinion received of the greatest part of England, that these\npowers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of\nCommons, the people had never been divided and fallen into this civil\nwar; first between those that disagreed in politics; and after between\nthe dissenters about the liberty of religion; which have so instructed\nmen in this point of sovereign right, that there be few now in England\nthat do not see, that these rights are inseparable, and will be so\ngenerally acknowledged at the next return of peace; and so continue,\ntill their miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be\nbetter taught than they have hitherto been.\n\n[Sidenote: And can by no grant pass away without direct renouncing of\n the sovereign power.]\n\nAnd because they are essential and inseparable rights, it follows\nnecessarily, that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted\naway, yet if the sovereign power itself be not in direct terms\nrenounced, and the name of sovereign no more given by the grantees to\nhim that grants them, the grant is void: for when he has granted all he\ncan, if we grant back the sovereignty, all is restored, as inseparably\nannexed thereunto.\n\n[Sidenote: The power and honour of subjects vanisheth in the presence of\n the power sovereign.]\n\nThis great authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the\nsovereignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of\nsovereign kings, though they be _singulis majores_, of greater power\nthan every one of their subjects, yet they be _universis minores_, of\nless power than them all together. For if by _all together_, they mean\nnot the collective body as one person, then _all together_, and _every\none_, signify the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by _all\ntogether_, they understand them as one person, which person the\nsovereign bears, then the power of all together, is the same with the\nsovereign\u2019s power; and so again the speech is absurd: which absurdity\nthey see well enough, when the sovereignty is in an assembly of the\npeople; but in a monarch they see it not; and yet the power of\nsovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.\n\nAnd as the power, so also the honour of the sovereign, ought to be\ngreater, than that of any, or all the subjects. For in the sovereignty\nis the fountain of honour. The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince\nare his creatures. As in the presence of the master, the servants are\nequal, and without any honour at all; so are the subjects, in the\npresence of the sovereign. And though they shine some more, some less,\nwhen they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more\nthan the stars in the presence of the sun.\n\n[Sidenote: Sovereign power not so hurtful as the want of it, and the\n hurt proceeds for the greatest part from not submitting\n readily to a less.]\n\nBut a man may here object, that the condition of subjects is very\nmiserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions\nof him, or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands. And\ncommonly they that live under a monarch, think it the fault of monarchy;\nand they that live under the government of democracy, or other sovereign\nassembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that form of commonwealth;\nwhereas the power in all forms, if they be perfect enough to protect\nthem, is the same: not considering that the state of man can never be\nwithout some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any\nform of government can possibly happen to the people in general, is\nscarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities,\nthat accompany a civil war, or that dissolute condition of masterless\nmen, without subjection to laws, and a coercive power to tie their hands\nfrom rapine and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of\nsovereign governors, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can\nexpect in the damage or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigour,\nconsisteth their own strength and glory; but in the restiveness of\nthemselves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it\nnecessary for their governors to draw from them what they can in time of\npeace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden\nneed, to resist, or take advantage on their enemies. For all men are by\nnature provided of notable multiplying glasses, that is their passions\nand self-love, through which, every little payment appeareth a great\ngrievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, namely moral\nand civil science, to see afar off the miseries that hang over them, and\ncannot without such payments be avoided.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XIX.\n\n OF THE SEVERAL KINDS OF COMMONWEALTH BY\n INSTITUTION, AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE\n SOVEREIGN POWER.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The different forms of commonwealths but three.]\n\nThe difference of commonwealths, consisteth in the difference of the\nsovereign, or the person representative of all and every one of the\nmultitude. And because the sovereignty is either in one man, or in an\nassembly of more than one; and into that assembly either every man hath\nright to enter, or not every one, but certain men distinguished from the\nrest; it is manifest, there can be but three kinds of commonwealth. For\nthe representative must needs be one man, or more: and if more, then it\nis the assembly of all, or but of a part. When the representative is one\nman, then is the commonwealth a MONARCHY: when an assembly of all that\nwill come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or popular commonwealth:\nwhen an assembly of a a part only, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY.\nOther kind of commonwealth there can be none: for either one, or more,\nor all, must have the sovereign power, which I have shown to be\nindivisible, entire.\n\n[Sidenote: Tyranny and oligarchy, but different names of monarchy, and\n aristocracy.]\n\nThere be other names of government, in the histories, and books of\npolicy; as _tyranny_, and _oligarchy_: but they are not the names of\nother forms of government, but of the same forms misliked. For they that\nare discontented under _monarchy_, call it _tyranny_; and they that are\ndispleased with _aristocracy_, call it _oligarchy_: so also, they which\nfind themselves grieved under a _democracy_, call it _anarchy_, which\nsignifies want of government; and yet I think no man believes, that want\nof government, is any new kind of government: nor by the same reason\nought they to believe, that the government is of one kind, when they\nlike it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the\ngovernors.\n\n[Sidenote: Subordinate representatives dangerous.]\n\nIt is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they\nplease, give authority to one man, to represent them every one; as well\nas give such authority to any assembly of men whatsoever; and\nconsequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a monarch,\nas absolutely, as to any other representative. Therefore, where there is\nalready erected a sovereign power, there can be no other representative\nof the same people, but only to certain particular ends, by the\nsovereign limited. For that were to erect two sovereigns; and every man\nto have his person represented by two actors, that by opposing one\nanother, must needs divide that power, which, if men will live in peace,\nis indivisible; and thereby reduce the multitude into the condition of\nwar, contrary to the end for which all sovereignty is instituted. And\ntherefore as it is absurd, to think that a sovereign assembly, inviting\nthe people of their dominion, to send up their deputies, with power to\nmake known their advice, or desires, should therefore hold such\ndeputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute representatives of\nthe people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a monarchy. And I\nknow not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little\nobserved; that in a monarchy, he that had the sovereignty from a descent\nof six hundred years, was alone called sovereign, had the title of\nMajesty from every one of his subjects, and was unquestionably taken by\nthem for their king, was notwithstanding never considered as their\nrepresentative; the name without contradiction passing for the title of\nthose men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry\ntheir petitions, and give him, if he permitted it, their advice. Which\nmay serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute\nrepresentative of a people, to instruct men in the nature of that\noffice, and to take heed how they admit of any other general\nrepresentation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge\nthe trust committed to them.\n\n[Sidenote: Comparison of monarchy, with sovereign assemblies.]\n\nThe difference between these three kinds of commonwealth, consisteth not\nin the difference of power; but in the difference of convenience, or\naptitude to produce the peace, and security of the people; for which end\nthey were instituted. And to compare monarchy with the other two, we may\nobserve; first, that whosoever beareth the person of the people, or is\none of that assembly that bears it, beareth also his own natural person.\nAnd though he be careful in his politic person to procure the common\ninterest; yet he is more, or no less careful to procure the private good\nof himself, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if\nthe public interest chance to cross the private, he prefers the private:\nfor the passions of men, are commonly more potent than their reason.\nFrom whence it follows, that where the public and private interest are\nmost closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy,\nthe private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and\nhonour of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength and reputation\nof his subjects. For no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure,\nwhose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through\nwant or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: whereas in\na democracy, or aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much\nto the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth\nmany times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a civil war.\n\nSecondly, that a monarch receiveth counsel of whom, when, and where he\npleaseth; and consequently may hear the opinion of men versed in the\nmatter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and\nas long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will.\nBut when a sovereign assembly has need of counsel, none are admitted but\nsuch as have a right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part\nare of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than\nof knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which\nmay, and do commonly excite men to action, but not govern them in it.\nFor the _understanding_ is by the flame of the passions, never\nenlightened, but dazzled. Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an\nassembly can receive counsel with secrecy, because of their own\nmultitude.\n\nThirdly, that the resolutions of a monarch, are subject to no other\ninconstancy, than that of human nature; but in assemblies, besides that\nof nature, there ariseth an inconstancy from the number. For the absence\nof a few, that would have the resolution once taken, continue firm,\nwhich may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments, or the\ndiligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to-day, all\nthat was concluded yesterday.\n\nFourthly, that a monarch cannot disagree with himself, out of envy, or\ninterest; but an assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce\na civil war.\n\nFifthly, that in monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any subject,\nby the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer,\nmay be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confess is a great and\ninevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the\nsovereign power is in an assembly: for their power is the same; and they\nare as subject to evil counsel, and to be seduced by orators, as a\nmonarch by flatterers; and becoming one another\u2019s flatterers, serve one\nanother\u2019s covetousness and ambition by turns. And whereas the favourites\nof monarchs, are few, and they have none else to advance but their own\nkindred; the favourites of an assembly, are many; and the kindred much\nmore numerous, than of any monarch. Besides, there is no favourite of a\nmonarch, which cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies:\nbut orators, that is to say, favourites of sovereign assemblies, though\nthey have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse,\nrequires less eloquence, such is man\u2019s nature, than to excuse; and\ncondemnation, than absolution more resembles justice.\n\nSixthly, that it is an inconvenience in monarchy, that the sovereignty\nmay descend upon an infant, or one that cannot discern between good and\nevil: and consisteth in this, that the use of his power, must be in the\nhand of another man, or of some assembly of men, which are to govern by\nhis right, and in his name; as curators, and protectors of his person,\nand authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of\nthe sovereign power, into the hand of a man, or an assembly of men; is\nto say that all government is more inconvenient, than confusion, and\ncivil war. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must\narise from the contention of those, that for an office of so great\nhonour, and profit, may become competitors. To make it appear, that this\ninconvenience, proceedeth not from that form of government we call\nmonarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent monarch hath appointed\nwho shall have the tuition of his infant successor, either expressly by\ntestament, or tacitly, by not controlling the custom in that case\nreceived: and then such inconvenience, if it happen, is to be\nattributed, not to the monarchy, but to the ambition, and injustice of\nthe subjects; which in all kinds of government, where the people are not\nwell instructed in their duty, and the rights of sovereignty, is the\nsame. Or else the precedent monarch hath not at all taken order for such\ntuition; and then the law of nature hath provided this sufficient rule,\nthat the tuition shall be in him, that hath by nature most interest in\nthe preservation of the authority of the infant, and to whom least\nbenefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing every man by\nnature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an infant into the\npower of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction, or\ndamage, is not tuition, but treachery. So that sufficient provision\nbeing taken, against all just quarrel, about the government under a\nchild, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the public peace,\nit is not to be attributed to the form of monarchy, but to the ambition\nof subjects, and ignorance of their duty. On the other side, there is no\ngreat commonwealth, the sovereignty whereof is in a great assembly,\nwhich is not, as to consultations of peace, and war, and making of laws,\nin the same condition, as if the government were in a child. For as a\nchild wants the judgment to dissent from counsel given him, and is\nthereby necessitated to take the advice of them, or him, to whom he is\ncommitted: so an assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the\ncounsel of the major part, be it good, or bad. And as a child has need\nof a tutor, or protector, to preserve his person and authority: so also,\nin great commonwealths, the sovereign assembly, in all great dangers and\ntroubles, have need of _custodes libertatis_; that is of dictators, or\nprotectors of their authority; which are as much as temporary monarchs,\nto whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their power;\nand have, at the end of that time, been oftener deprived thereof, than\ninfant kings, by their protectors, regents, or any other tutors.\n\n[Sidenote: Definition of monarchy, and other forms.]\n\nThough the kinds of sovereignty be, as I have now shown, but three; that\nis to say, monarchy, where one man has it; or democracy, where the\ngeneral assembly of subjects hath it; or aristocracy, where it is in an\nassembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from\nthe rest: yet he that shall consider the particular commonwealths that\nhave been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce them to\nthree, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other forms,\narising from these mingled together. As for example, elective kingdoms;\nwhere kings have the sovereign power put into their hands for a time; or\nkingdoms, wherein the king hath a power limited: which governments, are\nnevertheless by most writers called monarchy. Likewise if a popular, or\naristocratical commonwealth, subdue an enemy\u2019s country, and govern the\nsame, by a president, procurator, or other magistrate; this may seem\nperhaps at first sight, to be a democratical, or aristocratical\ngovernment. But it is not so. For elective kings, are not sovereigns,\nbut ministers of the sovereign; nor limited kings, sovereigns, but\nministers of them that have the sovereign power: nor are those provinces\nwhich are in subjection to a democracy, or aristocracy of another\ncommonwealth, democratically or aristocratically governed, but\nmonarchically.\n\nAnd first, concerning an elective king, whose power is limited to his\nlife, as it is in many places of Christendom at this day; or to certain\nyears or months, as the dictator\u2019s power amongst the Romans; if he have\nright to appoint his successor, he is no more elective but hereditary.\nBut if he have no power to elect his successor, then there is some other\nman, or assembly known, which after his decease may elect anew, or else\nthe commonwealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the\ncondition of war. If it be known who have the power to give the\nsovereignty after his death, it is known also that the sovereignty was\nin them before: for none have right to give that which they have not\nright to possess, and keep to themselves, if they think good. But if\nthere be none that can give the sovereignty, after the decease of him\nthat was first elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the law\nof nature, to provide, by establishing his successor, to keep those that\nhad trusted him with the government, from relapsing into the miserable\ncondition of civil war. And consequently he was, when elected, a\nsovereign absolute.\n\nSecondly, that king whose power is limited, is not superior to him, or\nthem that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superior, is\nnot supreme; that is to say not sovereign. The sovereignty therefore was\nalways in that assembly which had the right to limit him; and by\nconsequence the government not monarchy, but either democracy, or\naristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the kings had a privilege\nto lead their armies; but the sovereignty was in the Ephori.\n\nThirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman people governed the land of Judea,\nfor example, by a president; yet was not Judea therefore a democracy;\nbecause they were not governed by any assembly, into the which, any of\nthem, had right to enter; nor an aristocracy; because they were not\ngoverned by any assembly, into which, any man could enter by their\nelection: but they were governed by one person, which, though as to the\npeople of Rome, was an assembly of the people, or democracy; yet as to\nthe people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the\ngovernment, was a monarch. For though where the people are governed by\nan assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the\ngovernment is called a democracy, or aristocracy; yet when they are\ngoverned by an assembly, not of their own choosing, it is a monarchy;\nnot of _one_ man, over another man; but of one people, over another\npeople.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the right of succession.]\n\nOf all these forms of government, the matter being mortal, so that not\nonly monarchs, but also whole assemblies die, it is necessary for the\nconservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an\nartificial man, so there be order also taken, for an artificial eternity\nof life; without which, men that are governed by an assembly, should\nreturn into the condition of war in every age; and they that are\ngoverned by one man, as soon as their governor dieth. This artificial\neternity, is that which men call the right of _succession_.\n\nThere is no perfect form of government, where the disposing of the\nsuccession is not in the present sovereign. For if it be in any other\nparticular man, or private assembly, it is in a person subject and may\nbe assumed by the sovereign at his pleasure; and consequently the right\nis in himself. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new\nchoice; then is the commonwealth dissolved; and the right is in him that\ncan get it; contrary to the intention of them that did institute the\ncommonwealth, for their perpetual, and not temporary security.\n\nIn a democracy, the whole assembly cannot fail, unless the multitude\nthat are to be governed fail. And therefore questions of the right of\nsuccession, have in that form of government no place at all.\n\nIn an aristocracy, when any of the assembly dieth, the election of\nanother into his room belongeth to the assembly, as the sovereign, to\nwhom belongeth the choosing of all counsellors and officers. For that\nwhich the representative doth, as actor, every one of the subjects doth,\nas author. And though the sovereign assembly may give power to others,\nto elect new men, for supply of their court; yet it is still by their\nauthority, that the election is made; and by the same it may, when the\npublic shall require it, be recalled.\n\n[Sidenote: The present monarch hath right to dispose of the succession.]\n\nThe greatest difficulty about the right of succession, is in monarchy:\nand the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not\nmanifest who is to appoint the successor; nor many times, who it is whom\nhe hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more\nexact ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use. As to the\nquestion, who shall appoint the successor, of a monarch that hath the\nsovereign authority; that is to say, who shall determine of the right of\ninheritance, (for elective kings and princes have not the sovereign\npower in propriety, but in use only), we are to consider, that either he\nthat is in possession, has right to dispose of the succession, or else\nthat right is again in the dissolved multitude. For the death of him\nthat hath the sovereign power in propriety, leaves the multitude without\nany sovereign at all; that is, without any representative in whom they\nshould be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all: and\ntherefore they are incapable of election of any new monarch; every man\nhaving equal right to submit himself to such as he thinks best able to\nprotect him; or if he can, protect himself by his own sword; which is a\nreturn to confusion, and to the condition of a war of every man against\nevery man, contrary to the end for which monarchy had its first\ninstitution. Therefore it is manifest, that by the institution of\nmonarchy, the disposing of the successor, is always left to the judgment\nand will of the present possessor.\n\nAnd for the question, which may arise sometimes, who it is that the\nmonarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance\nof his power; it is determined by his express words, and testament; or\nby other tacit signs sufficient.\n\n[Sidenote: Succession passeth by express words;]\n\nBy express words, or testament, when it is declared by him in his\nlifetime, _viva voce_, or by writing; as the first emperors of Rome\ndeclared who should be their heirs. For the word heir does not of itself\nimply the children, or nearest kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man\nshall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his estate. If\ntherefore a monarch declare expressly, that such a man shall be his\nheir, either by word or writing, then is that man immediately after the\ndecease of his predecessor, invested in the right of being monarch.\n\n[Sidenote: Or, by not controlling a custom;]\n\nBut where testament, and express words are wanting, other natural signs\nof the will are to be followed: whereof the one is custom. And therefore\nwhere the custom is, that the next of kindred absolutely succeedeth,\nthere also the next of kindred hath right to the succession; for that,\nif the will of him that was in possession had been otherwise, he might\neasily have declared the same in his life-time. And likewise where the\ncustom is, that the next of the male kindred succeedeth, there also the\nright of succession is in the next of the kindred male, for the same\nreason. And so it is if the custom were to advance the female. For\nwhatsoever custom a man may by a word control, and does not, it is a\nnatural sign he would have that custom stand.\n\n[Sidenote: Or, by presumption of natural affection.]\n\nBut where neither custom, nor testament hath preceded, there it is to be\nunderstood, first, that a monarch\u2019s will is, that the government remain\nmonarchical; because he hath approved that government in himself.\nSecondly, that a child of his own, male, or female, be preferred before\nany other; because men are presumed to be more inclined by nature, to\nadvance their own children, than the children of other men; and of their\nown, rather a male than a female; because men, are naturally fitter than\nwomen, for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly, where his own issue\nfaileth, rather a brother than a stranger; and so still the nearer in\nblood, rather than the more remote; because it is always presumed that\nthe nearer of kin, is the nearer in affection; and it is evident that a\nman receives always, by reflection, the most honour from the greatness\nof his nearest kindred.\n\n[Sidenote: To dispose of the succession, though to a king of another\n nation, not unlawful.]\n\nBut if it be lawful for a monarch to dispose of the succession by words\nof contract, or testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience:\nfor he may sell, or give his right of governing to a stranger; which,\nbecause strangers, that is, men not used to live under the same\ngovernment, nor speaking the same language, do commonly undervalue one\nanother, may turn to the oppression of his subjects; which is indeed a\ngreat inconvenience: but it proceedeth not necessarily from the\nsubjection to a stranger\u2019s government, but from the unskilfulness of the\ngovernors, ignorant of the true rules of politics. And therefore the\nRomans when they had subdued many nations, to make their government\ndigestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they\nthought necessary, by giving sometimes to whole nations, and sometimes\nto principal men of every nation they conquered, not only the\nprivileges, but also the name of Romans; and took many of them into the\nsenate, and offices of charge, even in the Roman city. And this was it\nour most wise king, king James, aimed at, in endeavouring the union of\nhis two realms of England and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained,\nhad in all likelihood prevented the civil wars, which make both those\nkingdoms, at this present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to\nthe people, for a monarch to dispose of the succession by will; though\nby the fault of many princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient.\nOf the lawfulness of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever\ninconvenience can arrive by giving a kingdom to a stranger, may arrive\nalso by so marrying with strangers, as the right of succession may\ndescend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawful.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XX.\n\n OF DOMINION PATERNAL, AND DESPOTICAL.\n\n\n[Sidenote: A commonwealth by acquisition.]\n\nA COMMONWEALTH _by acquisition_, is that, where the sovereign power is\nacquired by force; and it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many\ntogether by plurality of voices, for fear of death, or bonds, do\nauthorize all the actions of that man, or assembly, that hath their\nlives and liberty in his power.\n\n[Sidenote: Wherein different from a commonwealth by institution.]\n\nAnd this kind of dominion, or sovereignty, differeth from sovereignty by\ninstitution, only in this, that men who choose their sovereign, do it\nfor fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute: but in this\ncase, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases\nthey do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such\ncovenants, as proceed from fear of death or violence, void: which if it\nwere true, no man, in any kind of commonwealth, could be obliged to\nobedience. It is true, that in a commonwealth once instituted, or\nacquired, promises proceeding from fear of death or violence, are no\ncovenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the\nlaws; but the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because\nhe that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he\nmay lawfully perform, and doth not, it is not the invalidity of the\ncovenant, that absolveth him, but the sentence of the sovereign.\nOtherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh:\nbut when the sovereign, who is the actor, acquitteth him, then he is\nacquitted by him that extorted the promise, as by the author of such\nabsolution.\n\n[Sidenote: The rights of sovereignty the same in both.]\n\nBut the rights, and consequences of sovereignty, are the same in both.\nHis power cannot, without his consent, be transferred to another: he\ncannot forfeit it: he cannot be accused by any of his subjects, of\ninjury: he cannot be punished by them: he is judge of what is necessary\nfor peace; and judge of doctrines: he is sole legislator; and supreme\njudge of controversies; and of the times, and occasions of war, and\npeace: to him it belongeth to choose magistrates, counsellors,\ncommanders, and all other officers, and ministers; and to determine of\nrewards, and punishments, honour, and order. The reasons whereof, are\nthe same which are alleged in the precedent chapter, for the same\nrights, and consequences of sovereignty by institution.\n\n[Sidenote: Dominion paternal how attained.]\n\nDominion is acquired two ways; by generation, and by conquest. The right\nof dominion by generation, is that, which the parent hath over his\nchildren; and is called PATERNAL. [Sidenote: Not by generation, but by\ncontract;] And is not so derived from the generation, as if therefore\nthe parent had dominion over his child because he begat him; but from\nthe child\u2019s consent, either express, or by other sufficient arguments\ndeclared. For as to the generation, God hath ordained to man a helper;\nand there be always two that are equally parents: the dominion therefore\nover the child, should belong equally to both; and he be equally subject\nto both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two masters. And\nwhereas some have attributed the dominion to the man only, as being of\nthe more excellent sex; they misreckon in it. For there is not always\nthat difference of strength, or prudence between the man and the woman,\nas that the right can be determined without war. In commonwealths, this\ncontroversy is decided by the civil law; and for the most part, but not\nalways, the sentence is in favour of the father; because for the most\npart commonwealths have been erected by the fathers, not by the mothers\nof families. But the question lieth now in the state of mere nature;\nwhere there are supposed no laws of matrimony; no laws for the education\nof children; but the law of nature, and the natural inclination of the\nsexes, one to another, and to their children. In this condition of mere\nnature, either the parents between themselves dispose of the dominion\nover the child by contract; or do not dispose thereof at all. If they\ndispose thereof, the right passeth according to the contract. We find in\nhistory that the Amazons contracted with the men of the neighbouring\ncountries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue male\nshould be sent back, but the female remain with themselves: so that the\ndominion of the females was in the mother.\n\n[Sidenote: Or education;]\n\nIf there be no contract, the dominion is in the mother. For in the\ncondition of mere nature, where there are no matrimonial laws, it cannot\nbe known who is the father, unless it be declared by the mother: and\ntherefore the right of dominion over the child dependeth on her will,\nand is consequently hers. Again, seeing the infant is first in the power\nof the mother, so as she may either nourish, or expose it; if she\nnourish it, it oweth its life to the mother; and is therefore obliged to\nobey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the dominion over it\nis hers. But if she expose it, and another find and nourish it, the\ndominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom\nit is preserved; because preservation of life being the end, for which\none man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise\nobedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him.\n\n[Sidenote: Or precedent subjection of one of the parents to the other.]\n\nIf the mother be the father\u2019s subject, the child, is in the father\u2019s\npower: and if the father be the mother\u2019s subject, as when a sovereign\nqueen marrieth one of her subjects, the child is subject to the mother;\nbecause the father also is her subject.\n\nIf a man and woman, monarchs of two several kingdoms, have a child, and\ncontract concerning who shall have the dominion of him, the right of the\ndominion passeth by the contract. If they contract not, the dominion\nfolloweth the dominion of the place of his residence. For the sovereign\nof each country hath dominion over all that reside therein.\n\nHe that hath the dominion over the child, hath dominion also over the\nchildren of the child; and over their children\u2019s children. For he that\nhath dominion over the person of a man, hath dominion over all that is\nhis; without which, dominion were but a title, without the effect.\n\n[Sidenote: The right of succession followeth the rules of the right of\n possession.]\n\nThe right of succession to paternal dominion, proceedeth in the same\nmanner, as doth the right of succession of monarchy; of which I have\nalready sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.\n\n[Sidenote: Despotical dominion attained.]\n\nDominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is that which some\nwriters call DESPOTICAL, from \u0394\u03b5\u03c3\u03c0\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, which signifieth a _lord_, or\n_master_; and is the dominion of the master over his servant. And this\ndominion is then acquired to the victor, when the vanquished, to avoid\nthe present stroke of death, covenanteth either in express words, or by\nother sufficient signs of the will, that so long as his life, and the\nliberty of his body is allowed him, the victor shall have the use\nthereof, at his pleasure. And after such covenant made, the vanquished\nis a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word _servant_, whether it be\nderived from _servire_, to serve, or from _servare_, to save, which I\nleave to grammarians to dispute, is not meant a captive, which is kept\nin prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him\nof one that did, shall consider what to do with him: for such men,\ncommonly called slaves, have no obligation at all; but may break their\nbonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their master,\njustly: but one, that being taken, hath corporal liberty allowed him;\nand upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his master, is\ntrusted by him.\n\n[Sidenote: Not by the victory, but by the consent of the vanquished.]\n\nIt is not therefore the victory, that giveth the right of dominion over\nthe vanquished, but his own covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is\nconquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but\nbecause he cometh in, and submitteth to the victor; nor is the victor\nobliged by an enemy\u2019s rendering himself, without promise of life, to\nspare him for this his yielding to discretion; which obliges not the\nvictor longer, than in his own discretion he shall think fit.\n\nAnd that which men do, when they demand, as it is now called, _quarter_,\nwhich the Greeks called \u0396\u03c9\u03b3\u03c1\u03af\u03b1, _taking alive_, is to evade the present\nfury of the victor, by submission, and to compound for their life, with\nransom, or service: and therefore he that hath quarter, hath not his\nlife given, but deferred till farther deliberation; for it is not a\nyielding on condition of life, but to discretion. And then only is his\nlife in security, and his service due, when the victor hath trusted him\nwith his corporal liberty. For slaves that work in prisons; or fetters,\ndo it not of duty, but to avoid the cruelty of their task-masters.\n\nThe master of the servant, is master also of all he hath: and may exact\nthe use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his\nservants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he\nholdeth his life of his master, by the covenant of obedience; that is,\nof owning, and authorizing whatsoever the master shall do. And in case\nthe master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise\npunish him for his disobedience, he is himself the author of the same;\nand cannot accuse him of injury.\n\nIn sum, the rights and consequences of both _paternal_ and _despotical_\ndominion, are the very same with those of a sovereign by institution;\nand for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent\nchapter. So that for a man that is monarch of divers nations, whereof he\nhath, in one the sovereignty by institution of the people assembled, and\nin another by conquest, that is by the submission of each particular, to\navoid death or bonds; to demand of one nation more than of the other,\nfrom the title of conquest, as being a conquered nation, is an act of\nignorance of the rights of sovereignty; for the sovereign is absolute\nover both alike; or else there is no sovereignty at all; and so every\nman may lawfully protect himself, if he can, with his own sword, which\nis the condition of war.\n\n[Sidenote: Difference between a family and a kingdom.]\n\nBy this it appears; that a great family, if it be not part of some\ncommonwealth, is of itself, as to the rights of sovereignty, a little\nmonarchy: whether that family consist of a man and his children; or of a\nman and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants\ntogether: wherein the father or master is the sovereign. But yet a\nfamily is not properly a commonwealth; unless it be of that power by its\nown number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without the\nhazard of war. For where a number of men are manifestly too weak to\ndefend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of\ndanger, to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to the\nenemy, as he shall think best; in the same manner as a very small\ncompany of soldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their arms, and\ndemand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And thus\nmuch shall suffice, concerning what I find by speculation, and\ndeduction, of sovereign rights, from the nature, need, and designs of\nmen, in erecting of commonwealths, and putting themselves under\nmonarchs, or assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their\nprotection.\n\n[Sidenote: The rights of monarchy from Scripture.]\n\nLet us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To\nMoses, the children of Israel say thus: _Speak thou to us, and we will\nhear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die_. (_Exod._ xx. 19.)\nThis is absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the right of kings, God\nhimself by the mouth of Samuel, saith, (_1 Sam._ viii. 11, 12, &c.)\n_This shall be the right of the king you will have to reign over you. He\nshall take your sons, and set them to drive his chariots, and to be his\nhorsemen, and to run before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and\nto make his engines of war, and instruments of his chariots; and shall\ntake your daughters to make perfumes, to be his cooks, and bakers. He\nshall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give\nthem to his servants. He shall take the tithe of your corn and wine, and\ngive it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants. He shall\ntake your man-servants, and your maid-servants, and the choice of your\nyouth, and employ them in his business. He shall take the tithe of your\nflocks; and you shall be his servants._ This is absolute power, and\nsummed up in the last words, _you shall be his servants_. Again, when\nthe people heard what power their king was to have, yet they consented\nthereto, and say thus, (_verse_ 10) _we will be as all other nations,\nand our king shall judge our causes, and go before us, to conduct our\nwars_. Here is confirmed the right that sovereigns have, both to the\n_militia_, and to all _judicature_; in which is contained as absolute\npower, as one man can possibly transfer to another. Again, the prayer of\nking Solomon to God, was this (_1 Kings_, iii. 9): _Give to thy servant\nunderstanding, to judge thy people, and to discern between good and\nevil_. It belongeth therefore to the sovereign to be _judge_, and to\nprescribe the rules of _discerning good_ and _evil_: which rules are\nlaws; and therefore in him is the legislative power. Saul sought the\nlife of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his\nservants would have done it, David forbad them, saying, (_1 Sam._ xxiv.\n6) _God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anointed of\nGod_. For obedience of servants St. Paul saith; (_Col._ iii. 22)\n_Servants obey your masters in all things_; and, (_Col._ iii. 20)\n_children obey your parents in all things_. There is simple obedience in\nthose that are subject to paternal, or despotical dominion. Again,\n(_Matt._ xxiii. 2, 3) _The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses\u2019 chair,\nand therefore all that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do_.\nThere again is simple obedience. And St. Paul, (_Titus_ iii. 2) _Warn\nthem that they subject themselves to princes, and to those that are in\nauthority, and obey them_. This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our\nSaviour himself acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by\nkings imposed, where he says, _give to C\u00e6sar that which is C\u00e6sar\u2019s_; and\npaid such taxes himself. And that the king\u2019s word, is sufficient to take\nanything from any subject, when there is need; and that the king is\njudge of that need: for he himself, as king of the Jews, commanded his\ndisciples to take the ass, and ass\u2019s colt to carry him into Jerusalem,\nsaying, (_Matth._ xxi. 2, 3) _Go into the village over against you, and\nyou shall find a she ass tied, and her colt with her, untie them, and\nbring them to me. And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, say the\nLord hath need of them: and they will let them go._ They will not ask\nwhether his necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of\nthat necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.\n\nTo these places may be added also that of _Genesis_, (iii. 5) _Ye shall\nbe as gods, knowing good and evil_. And (_verse_ 11) _Who told thee that\nthou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee\nthou shouldest not eat?_ For the cognizance or judicature of _good_ and\n_evil_, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of\nknowledge, as a trial of Adam\u2019s obedience; the devil to inflame the\nambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautiful, told\nher that by tasting it, they should be as gods, knowing _good_ and\n_evil_. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them\nGod\u2019s office, which is judicature of good and evil; but acquired no new\nability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is said, that\nhaving eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that\nplace, as if they had been formerly blind, and saw not their own skins:\nthe meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their\nnakedness, wherein it was God\u2019s will to create them, to be uncomely; and\nby being ashamed, did tacitly censure God himself. And thereupon God\nsaith; _Hast thou eaten, &c._ as if he should say, doest thou that owest\nme obedience, take upon thee to judge of my commandments? Whereby it is\nclearly, though allegorically, signified, that the commands of them that\nhave the right to command, are not by their subjects to be censured, nor\ndisputed.\n\n[Sidenote: Sovereign power ought in all commonwealths to be absolute.]\n\nSo that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from reason, and\nScripture, that the sovereign power, whether placed in one man, as in\nmonarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in popular, and aristocratical\ncommonwealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it.\nAnd though of so unlimited a power, men may fancy many evil\nconsequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual\nwar of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The condition of\nman in this life shall never be without inconveniences; but there\nhappeneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience, but what proceeds\nfrom the subject\u2019s disobedience, and breach of those covenants, from\nwhich the commonwealth hath its being. And whosoever thinking sovereign\npower too great, will seek to make it less, must subject himself, to the\npower, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.\n\nThe greatest objection is, that of the practice; when men ask, where,\nand when, such power has by subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask\nthem again, when, or where has there been a kingdom long free from\nsedition and civil war. In those nations, whose commonwealths have been\nlong-lived, and not been destroyed but by foreign war, the subjects\nnever did dispute of the sovereign power. But howsoever, an argument\nfrom the practice of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with\nexact reason weighed the causes, and nature of commonwealths, and suffer\ndaily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is\ninvalid. For though in all places of the world, men should lay the\nfoundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred,\nthat so it ought to be. The skill of making, and maintaining\ncommonwealths, consisteth in certain rules, as doth arithmetic and\ngeometry; not, as tennis-play, on practice only: which rules, neither\npoor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have\nhitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXI.\n\n OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Liberty what.]\n\nLIBERTY, or FREEDOM, signifieth, properly, the absence of opposition; by\nopposition, I mean external impediments of motion; and may be applied no\nless to irrational, and inanimate creatures, than to rational. For\nwhatsoever is so tied, or environed, as it cannot move but within a\ncertain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some\nexternal body, we say it hath not liberty to go further. And so of all\nliving creatures, whilst they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls,\nor chains; and of the water whilst it is kept in by banks, or vessels,\nthat otherwise would spread itself into a larger space, we use to say,\nthey are not at liberty, to move in such manner, as without those\nexternal impediments they would. But when the impediment of motion, is\nin the constitution of the thing itself, we use not to say; it wants the\nliberty; but the power to move; as when a stone lieth still, or a man is\nfastened to his bed by sickness.\n\n[Sidenote: What it is to be free.]\n\nAnd according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the\nword, a FREEMAN, _is he, that in those things, which by his strength and\nwit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to_. But\nwhen the words _free_, and _liberty_, are applied to any thing but\n_bodies_, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion, is\nnot subject to impediment: and therefore, when it is said, for example,\nthe way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that\nwalk in it without stop. And when we say a gift is free, there is not\nmeant any liberty of the gift, but of the giver, that was not bound by\nany law or covenant to give it. So when we _speak freely_, it is not the\nliberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath\nobliged to speak otherwise than he did. Lastly, from the use of the word\n_free-will_, no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or\ninclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that\nhe finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination\nto do.\n\n[Sidenote: Fear and liberty are consistent.]\n\nFear and liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into\nthe sea for _fear_ the ship should sink, he doth it nevertheless very\nwillingly, and may refuse to do it if he will: it is therefore the\naction of one that was _free_: so a man sometimes pays his debt, only\nfor _fear_ of imprisonment, which because nobody hindered him from\ndetaining, was the action of a man at _liberty_. And generally all\nactions which men do in commonwealths, for _fear_ of the law, are\nactions, which the doers had _liberty_ to omit.\n\n[Sidenote: Liberty and necessity consistent.]\n\n_Liberty_, and _necessity_ are consistent: as in the water, that hath\nnot only _liberty_, but a _necessity_ of descending by the channel; so\nlikewise in the actions which men voluntarily do: which, because they\nproceed from their will, proceed from _liberty_; and yet, because every\nact of man\u2019s will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from\nsome cause, and that from another cause, in a continual chain, whose\nfirst link is in the hand of God the first of all causes, proceed from\n_necessity_. So that to him that could see the connexion of those\ncauses, the _necessity_ of all men\u2019s voluntary actions, would appear\nmanifest. And therefore God, that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth\nalso that the _liberty_ of man in doing what he will, is accompanied\nwith the _necessity_ of doing that which God will, and no more, nor\nless. For though men may do many things, which God does not command, nor\nis therefore author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite\nto anything, of which appetite God\u2019s will is not the cause. And did not\nhis will assure the _necessity_ of man\u2019s will, and consequently of all\nthat on man\u2019s will dependeth, the _liberty_ of men would be a\ncontradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and _liberty_ of God.\nAnd this shall suffice, as to the matter in hand, of that natural\n_liberty_, which only is properly called _liberty_.\n\n[Sidenote: Artificial bonds, or covenants.]\n\nBut as men, for the attaining of peace, and conservation of themselves\nthereby, have made an artificial man, which we call a commonwealth; so\nalso have they made artificial chains, called _civil laws_, which they\nthemselves, by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end, to the lips\nof that man, or assembly, to whom they have given the sovereign power;\nand at the other end to their own ears. These bonds, in their own nature\nbut weak, may nevertheless be made to hold, by the danger, though not by\nthe difficulty of breaking them.\n\n[Sidenote: Liberty of subjects consisteth in liberty from covenants.]\n\nIn relation to these bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the\n_liberty_ of _subjects_. For seeing there is no commonwealth in the\nworld, wherein there be rules enough set down, for the regulating of all\nthe actions, and words of men; as being a thing impossible: it followeth\nnecessarily, that in all kinds of actions by the laws pr\u00e6termitted, men\nhave the liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the\nmost profitable to themselves. For if we take liberty in the proper\nsense, for corporal liberty; that is to say, freedom from chains and\nprison; it were very absurd for men to clamour as they do, for the\nliberty they so manifestly enjoy. Again, if we take liberty, for an\nexemption from laws, it is it no less absurd, for men to demand as they\ndo, that liberty, by which all other men may be masters of their lives.\nAnd yet, as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not knowing that\nthe laws are of no power to protect them, without a sword in the hands\nof a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution. The\nliberty of a subject, lieth therefore only in those things, which in\nregulating their actions, the sovereign hath pr\u00e6termitted: such as is\nthe liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another;\nto choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life, and\ninstitute their children as they themselves think fit; and the like.\n\n[Sidenote: Liberty of the subject consistent with the unlimited power of\n the sovereign.]\n\nNevertheless we are not to understand, that by such liberty, the\nsovereign power of life and death, is either abolished, or limited. For\nit has been already shown, that nothing the sovereign representative can\ndo to a subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called\ninjustice, or injury; because every subject is author of every act the\nsovereign doth; so that he never wanteth right to anything, otherwise,\nthan as he himself is the subject of God, and bound thereby to observe\nthe laws of nature. And therefore it may, and doth often happen in\ncommonwealths, that a subject may be put to death, by the command of the\nsovereign power; and yet neither do the other wrong: as when Jephtha\ncaused his daughter to be sacrificed: in which, and the like cases, he\nthat so dieth, had liberty to do the action, for which he is\nnevertheless, without injury put to death. And the same holdeth also in\na sovereign prince, that putteth to death an innocent subject. For\nthough the action be against the law of nature, as being contrary to\nequity, as was the killing of Uriah, by David; yet it was not an injury\nto Uriah, but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to do what he\npleased was given him by Uriah himself: and yet to God, because David\nwas God\u2019s subject, and prohibited all iniquity by the law of nature:\nwhich distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact, evidently\nconfirmed, saying, _To thee only have I sinned_. In the same manner, the\npeople of Athens, when they banished the most potent of their\ncommonwealth for ten years, thought they committed no injustice; and yet\nthey never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he would do:\nnay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and every\ncitizen bringing his oystershell into the market place, written with the\nname of him he desired should be banished, without actually accusing\nhim, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of justice; and\nsometimes a scurrilous jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a jest of it. And\nyet a man cannot say, the sovereign people of Athens wanted right to\nbanish them; or an Athenian the liberty to jest, or to be just.\n\n[Sidenote: The liberty which writers praise, is the liberty of\n sovereigns; not of private men.]\n\nThe liberty, whereof there is so frequent and honourable mention, in the\nhistories, and philosophy of the ancient Greeks, and Romans, and in the\nwritings, and discourse of those that from them have received all their\nlearning in the politics, is not the liberty of particular men; but the\nliberty of the commonwealth: which is the same with that which every man\nthen should have, if there were no civil laws, nor commonwealth at all.\nAnd the effects of it also be the same. For as amongst masterless men,\nthere is perpetual war, of every man against his neighbour; no\ninheritance, to transmit to the son, nor to expect from the father; no\npropriety of goods, or lands; no security; but a full and absolute\nliberty in every particular man: so in states, and commonwealths not\ndependent on one another, every commonwealth, not every man, has an\nabsolute liberty, to do what it shall judge, that is to say, what that\nman, or assembly that representeth it, shall judge most conducing to\ntheir benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of a perpetual\nwar, and upon the confines of battle, with their frontiers armed, and\ncannons planted against their neighbours round about. The Athenians, and\nRomans were free; that is, free commonwealths: not that any particular\nmen had the liberty to resist their own representative; but that their\nrepresentative had the liberty to resist, or invade other people. There\nis written on the turrets of the city of Lucca in great characters at\nthis day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence infer, that a\nparticular man has more liberty, or immunity from the service of the\ncommonwealth there, than in Constantinople. Whether a commonwealth be\nmonarchical, or popular, the freedom is still the same.\n\nBut it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of\nliberty; and for want of judgment to distinguish, mistake that for their\nprivate inheritance, and birth-right, which is the right of the public\nonly. And when the same error is confirmed by the authority of men in\nreputation for their writings on this subject, it is no wonder if it\nproduce sedition, and change of government. In these western parts of\nthe world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the\ninstitution, and rights of commonwealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and\nother men, Greeks and Romans, that living under popular states, derived\nthose rights, not from the principles of nature, but transcribed them\ninto their books, out of the practice of their own commonwealths, which\nwere popular; as the grammarians describe the rules of language, out of\nthe practice of the time; or the rules of poetry, out of the poems of\nHomer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught, to keep them\nfrom desire of changing their government, that they were freemen, and\nall that lived under monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristotle puts it\ndown in his _Politics_, (_lib._ 6. _cap._ ii.) _In democracy_, LIBERTY\n_is to be supposed: for it is commonly held, that no man is_ FREE _in\nany other government_. And as Aristotle; so Cicero, and other writers\nhave grounded their civil doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans, who\nwere taught to hate monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed\ntheir sovereign, shared amongst them the sovereignty of Rome; and\nafterwards by their successors. And by reading of these Greek, and Latin\nauthors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit, under a false\nshow of liberty, of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the\nactions of their sovereigns, and again of controlling those controllers;\nwith the effusion of so much blood, as I think I may truly say, there\nwas never any thing so dearly bought, as these western parts have bought\nthe learning of the Greek and Latin tongues.\n\n[Sidenote: Liberty of subjects how to be measured.]\n\nTo come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a subject; that is\nto say, what are the things, which though commanded by the sovereign, he\nmay nevertheless, without injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider,\nwhat rights we pass away, when we make a commonwealth; or, which is all\none, what liberty we deny ourselves, by owning all the actions, without\nexception, of the man, or assembly we make our sovereign. For in the act\nof our _submission_, consisteth both our _obligation_, and our\n_liberty_; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from\nthence; there being no obligation on any man, which ariseth not from\nsome act of his own; for all men equally, are by nature free. And\nbecause such arguments, must either be drawn from the express words, _I\nauthorize all his actions_, or from the intention of him that submitteth\nhimself to his power, which intention is to be understood by the end for\nwhich he so submitteth; the obligation, and liberty of the subject, is\nto be derived, either from those words, or others equivalent; or else\nfrom the end of the institution of sovereignty, namely, the peace of the\nsubjects within themselves, and their defence against a common enemy.\n\n[Sidenote: Subjects have liberty to defend their own bodies, even\n against them that lawfully invade them.]\n\nFirst therefore, seeing sovereignty by institution, is by covenant of\nevery one to every one; and sovereignty by acquisition, by covenants of\nthe vanquished to the victor, or child to the parent; it is manifest,\nthat every subject has liberty in all those things, the right whereof\ncannot by covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14th\nchapter, that covenants, not to defend a man\u2019s own body, are void.\nTherefore,\n\n[Sidenote: Are not bound to hurt themselves.]\n\nIf the sovereign command a man, though justly condemned, to kill, wound,\nor maim himself; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain\nfrom the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing, without which\nhe cannot live; yet hath that man the liberty to disobey.\n\nIf a man be interrogated by the sovereign, or his authority, concerning\na crime done by himself, he is not bound, without assurance of pardon,\nto confess it; because no man, as I have shown in the same chapter, can\nbe obliged by covenant to accuse himself.\n\nAgain, the consent of a subject to sovereign power, is contained in\nthese words, _I authorize, or take upon me, all his actions_; in which\nthere is no restriction at all, of his own former natural liberty: for\nby allowing him to _kill me_, I am not bound to kill myself when he\ncommands me. It is one thing to say, _kill me, or my fellow, if you\nplease_; another thing to say, _I will kill myself, or my fellow_. It\nfolloweth therefore, that\n\nNo man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himself, or any\nother man; and consequently, that the obligation a man may sometimes\nhave, upon the command of the sovereign to execute any dangerous, or\ndishonourable office, dependeth not on the words of our submission; but\non the intention, which is to be understood by the end thereof. When\ntherefore our refusal to obey, frustrates the end for which the\nsovereignty was ordained; then there is no liberty to refuse: otherwise\nthere is.\n\n[Sidenote: Nor to warfare, unless they voluntarily undertake it.]\n\nUpon this ground, a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against\nthe enemy, though his sovereign have right enough to punish his refusal\nwith death, may nevertheless in many cases refuse, without injustice; as\nwhen he substituteth a sufficient soldier in his place: for in this case\nhe deserteth not the service of the commonwealth. And there is allowance\nto be made for natural timorousness; not only to women, of whom no such\ndangerous duty is expected, but also to men of feminine courage. When\narmies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when\nthey do it not out of treachery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do\nit unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoid battle, is\nnot injustice, but cowardice. But he that inrolleth himself a soldier,\nor taketh imprest money, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature;\nand is obliged, not only to go to the battle, but also not to run from\nit, without his captain\u2019s leave. And when the defence of the\ncommonwealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear\narms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the institution of the\ncommonwealth, which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve,\nwas in vain.\n\nTo resist the sword of the commonwealth, in defence of another man,\nguilty, or innocent, no man hath liberty; because such liberty, takes\naway from the sovereign, the means of protecting us; and is therefore\ndestructive of the very essence of government. But in case a great many\nmen together, have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly, or\ncommitted some capital crime, for which every one of them expecteth\ndeath, whether have they not the liberty then to join together, and\nassist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: for they but defend\ntheir lives, which the guilty man may as well do, as the innocent. There\nwas indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; their bearing of\narms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is\nno new unjust act. And if it be only to defend their persons, it is not\nunjust at all. But the offer of pardon taketh from them, to whom it is\noffered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in\nassisting, or defending the rest, unlawful.\n\n[Sidenote: The greatest liberty of subjects, dependeth on the silence of\n the law.]\n\nAs for other liberties, they depend on the silence of the law. In cases\nwhere the sovereign has prescribed no rule, there the subject hath the\nliberty to do, or forbear, according to his own discretion. And\ntherefore such liberty is in some places more, and in some less; and in\nsome times more, in other times less, according as they that have the\nsovereignty shall think most convenient. As for example, there was a\ntime, when in England a man might enter into his own land, and\ndispossess such as wrongfully possessed it, by force. But in aftertimes,\nthat liberty of forcible entry, was taken away by a statute made, by the\nking, in parliament. And in some places of the world, men have the\nliberty of many wives: in other places, such liberty is not allowed.\n\nIf a subject have a controversy with his sovereign, of debt, or of right\nof possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service required at\nhis hands, or concerning any penalty, corporal, or pecuniary, grounded\non a precedent law; he hath the same liberty to sue for his right, as if\nit were against a subject; and before such judges, as are appointed by\nthe sovereign. For seeing the sovereign demandeth by force of a former\nlaw, and not by virtue of his power; he declareth thereby, that he\nrequireth no more, than shall appear to be due by that law. The suit\ntherefore is not contrary to the will of the sovereign; and consequently\nthe subject hath the liberty to demand the hearing of his cause; and\nsentence, according to that law. But if he demand, or take anything by\npretence of his power; there lieth, in that case, no action of law; for\nall that is done by him in virtue of his power, is done by the authority\nof every subject, and consequently he that brings an action against the\nsovereign, brings it against himself.\n\nIf a monarch, or sovereign assembly, grant a liberty to all, or any of\nhis subjects, which grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their\nsafety, the grant is void; unless he directly renounce, or transfer the\nsovereignty to another. For in that he might openly, if it had been his\nwill, and in plain terms, have renounced, or transferred it, and did\nnot; it is to be understood it was not his will, but that the grant\nproceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a liberty and\nthe sovereign power; and therefore the sovereignty is still retained;\nand consequently all those powers, which are necessary to the exercising\nthereof; such as are the power of war, and peace, of judicature, of\nappointing officers, and councillors, of levying money, and the rest\nnamed in the 18th chapter.\n\n[Sidenote: In what cases subjects are absolved of their obedience to\n their sovereign.]\n\nThe obligation of subjects to the sovereign, is understood to last as\nlong, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to\nprotect them. For the right men have by nature to protect themselves,\nwhen none else can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished. The\nsovereignty is the soul of the commonwealth; which once departed from\nthe body, the members do no more receive their motion from it. The end\nof obedience is protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in\nhis own, or in another\u2019s sword, nature applieth his obedience to it, and\nhis endeavour to maintain it. And though sovereignty, in the intention\nof them that make it, be immortal; yet is it in its own nature, not only\nsubject to violent death, by foreign war; but also through the\nignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very\ninstitution, many seeds of a natural mortality, by intestine discord.\n\n[Sidenote: In case of captivity.]\n\nIf a subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of\nlife be within the guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporal\nliberty given him, on condition to be subject to the victor, he hath\nliberty to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject\nof him that took him; because he had no other way to preserve himself.\nThe case is the same, if he be detained on the same terms, in a foreign\ncountry. But if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted\nwith the liberty of his body; he cannot be understood to be bound by\ncovenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by\nany means whatsoever.\n\n[Sidenote: In case the sovereign cast off the government from himself\n and his heirs.]\n\nIf a monarch shall relinquish the sovereignty, both for himself, and his\nheirs; his subjects return to the absolute liberty of nature; because,\nthough nature may declare who are his sons, and who are the nearest of\nhis kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, as hath been said in the\nprecedent chapter, who shall be his heir. If therefore he will have no\nheir, there is no sovereignty, nor subjection. The case is the same, if\nhe die without known kindred, and without declaration of his heir. For\nthen there can no heir be known, and consequently no subjection be due.\n\n[Sidenote: In case of banishment.]\n\nIf the sovereign banish his subject; during the banishment, he is not\nsubject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travel, is\nstill subject; but it is, by contract between sovereigns, not by virtue\nof the covenant of subjection. For whosoever entereth into another\u2019s\ndominion, is subject to all the laws thereof; unless he have a privilege\nby the amity of the sovereigns, or by special licence.\n\n[Sidenote: In case the sovereign render himself subject to another.]\n\nIf a monarch subdued by war, render himself subject to the victor; his\nsubjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged\nto the victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty of\nhis own body; he is not understood to have given away the right of\nsovereignty; and therefore his subjects are obliged to yield obedience\nto the magistrates formerly placed, governing not in their own name, but\nin his. For, his right remaining, the question is only of the\nadministration; that is to say, of the magistrates and officers; which,\nif he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those, which he\nhimself had formerly appointed.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXII.\n\n OF SYSTEMS SUBJECT, POLITICAL, AND PRIVATE.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The divers sorts of systems of people.]\n\nHaving spoken of the generation, form, and power of a commonwealth, I am\nin order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of systems, which\nresemble the similar parts, or muscles of a body natural. By SYSTEMS, I\nunderstand any numbers of men joined in one interest, or one business.\nOf which, some are _regular_, and some _irregular_. _Regular_ are those,\nwhere one man, or assembly of men, is constituted representative of the\nwhole number. All other are _irregular_.\n\nOf regular, some are _absolute_, and _independent_, subject to none but\ntheir own representative: such are only commonwealths; of which I have\nspoken already in the five last precedent chapters. Others are\ndependent; that is to say, subordinate to some sovereign power, to which\nevery one, as also their representative is _subject_.\n\nOf systems subordinate, some are _political_, and some _private_.\n_Political_, otherwise called _bodies politic_, and _persons in law_,\nare those, which are made by authority from the sovereign power of the\ncommonwealth. _Private_, are those, which are constituted by subjects\namongst themselves, or by authority from a stranger. For no authority\nderived from foreign power, within the dominion of another, is public\nthere, but private.\n\nAnd of private systems, some are _lawful_; some _unlawful_. _Lawful_,\nare those which are allowed by the commonwealth: all other are\n_unlawful_. _Irregular_ systems, are those which having no\nrepresentative, consist only in concourse of people; which if not\nforbidden by the commonwealth, nor made on evil design, such as are\nconflux of people to markets, or shows, or any other harmless end, are\nlawful. But when the intention is evil, or (if the number be\nconsiderable), unknown, they are unlawful.\n\n[Sidenote: In all bodies politic the power of the representative is\n limited.]\n\nIn bodies politic, the power of the representative is always limited:\nand that which prescribeth the limits thereof, is the power sovereign.\nFor power unlimited, is absolute sovereignty. And the sovereign in every\ncommonwealth, is the absolute representative of all the subjects; and\ntherefore no other can be representative of any part of them, but so far\nforth, as he shall give leave. And to give leave to a body politic of\nsubjects, to have an absolute representative to all intents and\npurposes, were to abandon the government of so much of the commonwealth,\nand to divide the dominion, contrary to their peace and defence; which\nthe sovereign cannot be understood to do, by any grant, that does not\nplainly, and directly discharge them of their subjection. For\nconsequences of words, are not the signs of his will, when other\nconsequences are signs of the contrary; but rather signs of error, and\nmisreckoning; to which all mankind is too prone.\n\nThe bounds of that power, which is given to the representative of a body\npolitic, are to be taken notice of, from two things. One is their writ,\nor letters from the sovereign: the other is the law of the commonwealth.\n\n[Sidenote: By letters patent:]\n\nFor though in the institution or acquisition of a commonwealth, which is\nindependent, there needs no writing, because the power of the\nrepresentative has there no other bounds, but such as are set out by the\nunwritten law of nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such\ndiversities of limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times,\nand places, as can neither be remembered without letters, nor taken\nnotice of, unless such letters be patent, that they may be read to them,\nand withal sealed, or testified, with the seals, or other permanent\nsigns of the authority sovereign.\n\n[Sidenote: And the laws.]\n\nAnd because such limitation is not always easy, or perhaps possible to\nbe described in writing; the ordinary laws, common to all subjects, must\ndetermine what the representative may lawfully do, in all cases, where\nthe letters themselves are silent. And therefore,\n\n[Sidenote: When the representative is one man, his unwarranted acts are\n his own only.]\n\nIn a body politic, if the representative be one man, whatsoever he does\nin the person of the body, which is not warranted in his letters, nor by\nthe laws, is his own act, and not the act of the body, nor of any other\nmember thereof besides himself: because further than his letters, or the\nlaws limit, he representeth no man\u2019s person, but his own. But what he\ndoes according to these, is the act of every one: for of the act of the\nsovereign every one is author, because he is their representative\nunlimited; and the act of him that recedes not from the letters of the\nsovereign, is the act of the sovereign, and therefore every member of\nthe body is author of it.\n\n[Sidenote: When it is an assembly, it is the act of them that assented\n only.]\n\nBut if the representative be an assembly; whatsoever that assembly shall\ndecree, not warranted by their letters, or the laws, is the act of the\nassembly, or body politic, and the act of every one by whose vote the\ndecree was made; but not the act of any man that being present voted to\nthe contrary; nor of any man absent, unless he voted it by procuration.\nIt is the act of the assembly, because voted by the major part; and if\nit be a crime, the assembly may be punished, as far forth as it is\ncapable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of their letters (which is to\nsuch artificial, and fictitious bodies, capital) or, if the assembly\nhave a common stock, wherein none of the innocent members have\npropriety, by pecuniary mulct. For from corporal penalties nature hath\nexempted all bodies politic. But they that gave not their vote, are\ntherefore innocent, because the assembly cannot represent any man in\nthings unwarranted by their letters, and consequently are not involved\nin their votes.\n\n[Sidenote: When the representative is one man, if he borrow money, or\n owe it, by contract, he is liable only, the members not.]\n\nIf the person of the body politic being in one man, borrow money of a\nstranger, that is, of one that is not of the same body, (for no letters\nneed limit borrowing, seeing it is left to men\u2019s own inclinations to\nlimit lending), the debt is the representative\u2019s. For if he should have\nauthority from his letters, to make the members pay what he borroweth,\nhe should have by consequence the sovereignty of them; and therefore the\ngrant were either void, as proceeding from error, commonly incident to\nhuman nature, and an insufficient sign of the will of the granter; or if\nit be avowed by him, then is the representer sovereign, and falleth not\nunder the present question, which is only of bodies subordinate. No\nmember therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the\nrepresentative himself: because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to\nthe letters, and to the qualification of the body, understandeth those\nonly for his debtors, that are engaged: and seeing the representer can\nengage himself, and none else, has him only for debtor; who must\ntherefore pay him, out of the common stock, if there be any, or, if\nthere be none, out of his own estate.\n\nIf he come into debt by contract, or mulct, the case is the same.\n\n[Sidenote: When it is an assembly, they only are liable that have\n assented.]\n\nBut when the representative is an assembly, and the debt to a stranger;\nall they, and only they are responsible for the debt, that gave their\nvotes to the borrowing of it, or to the contract that made it due, or to\nthe fact for which the mulct was imposed; because every one of those in\nvoting did engage himself for the payment: for he that is author of the\nborrowing, is obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt; though\nwhen paid by any one, he be discharged.\n\n[Sidenote: If the debt be to one of the assembly, the body only is\n obliged.]\n\nBut if the debt be to one of the assembly, the assembly only is obliged\nto the payment, out of their common stock, if they have any: for having\nliberty of vote, if he vote the money shall be borrowed, he votes it\nshall be paid; if he vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet\nbecause in lending, he voteth the borrowing, he contradicteth his former\nvote, and is obliged by the latter, and becomes both borrower and\nlender, and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man,\nbut from the common treasure only; which failing he hath no remedy, nor\ncomplaint, but against himself, that being privy to the acts of the\nassembly, and to their means to pay, and not being enforced, did\nnevertheless through his own folly lend his money.\n\n[Sidenote: Protestation against the decrees of bodies politic\n sometimes lawful, but against sovereign power never.]\n\nIt is manifest by this, that in bodies politic subordinate, and subject\nto a sovereign power, it is sometimes not only lawful, but expedient,\nfor a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of\nthe representative assembly, and cause their dissent to be registered,\nor to take witness of it; because otherwise they may be obliged to pay\ndebts contracted, and be responsible for crimes committed by other men.\nBut in a sovereign assembly, that liberty is taken away, both because he\nthat protesteth there, denies their sovereignty; and also because\nwhatsoever is commanded by the sovereign power, is as to the subject,\nthough not so always in the sight of God, justified by the command: for\nof such command every subject is the author.\n\n[Sidenote: Bodies politic for government of a province, colony, or town]\n\nThe variety of bodies politic, is almost infinite: for they are not only\ndistinguished by the several affairs, for which they are constituted,\nwherein there is an unspeakable diversity; but also by the times,\nplaces, and numbers, subject to many limitations. And as to their\naffairs, some are ordained for government; as first, the government of a\nprovince may be committed to an assembly of men, wherein all resolutions\nshall depend on the votes of the major part; and then this assembly is a\nbody politic, and their power limited by commission. This word province\nsignifies a charge, or care of business, which he whose business it is,\ncommitteth to another man, to be administered for, and under him; and\ntherefore when in one commonwealth there be divers countries, that have\ntheir laws distinct one from another, or are far distant in place, the\nadministration of the government being committed to divers persons,\nthose countries where the sovereign is not resident, but governs by\ncommission, are called provinces. But of the government of a province,\nby an assembly residing in the province itself, there be few examples.\nThe Romans who had the sovereignty of many provinces; yet governed them\nalways by presidents, and pr\u00e6tors; and not by assemblies, as they\ngoverned the city of Rome, and territories adjacent. In like manner,\nwhen there were colonies sent from England, to plant Virginia, and\nSommer-islands; though the governments of them here, were committed to\nassemblies in London, yet did those assemblies never commit the\ngovernment under them to any assembly there, but did to each plantation\nsend one governor. For though every man, where he can be present by\nnature, desires to participate of government; yet where they cannot be\npresent, they are by nature also inclined, to commit the government of\ntheir common interest rather to a monarchical, than a popular form of\ngovernment: which is also evident in those men that have great private\nestates; who when they are unwilling to take the pains of administering\nthe business that belongs to them, chuse rather to trust one servant,\nthan an assembly either of their friends or servants. But howsoever it\nbe in fact, yet we may suppose the government of a province, or colony\ncommitted to an assembly: and when it is, that which in this place I\nhave to say, is this; that whatsoever debt is by that assembly\ncontracted; or whatsoever unlawful act is decreed, is the act only of\nthose that assented, and not of any that dissented, or were absent, for\nthe reasons before alleged. Also that an assembly residing out of the\nbounds of that colony whereof they have the government, cannot execute\nany power over the persons, or goods of any of the colony, to seize on\nthem for debt, or other duty, in any place without the colony itself, as\nhaving no jurisdiction, nor authority elsewhere, but are left to the\nremedy, which the law of the place alloweth them. And though the\nassembly have right, to impose a mulct upon any of their members, that\nshall break the laws they make; yet out of the colony itself, they have\nno right to execute the same. And that which is said here, of the rights\nof an assembly, for the government of a province, or a colony, is\nappliable also to an assembly for the government of a town, an\nuniversity, or a college, or a church, or for any other government over\nthe persons of men.\n\nAnd generally, in all bodies politic, if any particular member conceive\nhimself injured by the body itself, the cognizance of his cause\nbelongeth to the sovereign, and those the sovereign hath ordained for\njudges in such causes, or shall ordain for that particular cause; and\nnot to the body itself. For the whole body is in this case his\nfellow-subject, which in a sovereign assembly, is otherwise: for there,\nif the sovereign be not judge, though in his own cause, there can be no\njudge at all.\n\n[Sidenote: Bodies politic for ordering of trade.]\n\nIn a body politic, for the well ordering of foreign traffic, the most\ncommodious representative is an assembly of all the members; that is to\nsay, such a one, as every one that adventureth his money, may be present\nat all the deliberations, and resolutions of the body, if they will\nthemselves. For proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for which men\nthat are merchants, and may buy and sell, export, and import their\nmerchandize, according to their own discretions, do nevertheless bind\nthemselves up in one corporation. It is true, there be few merchants,\nthat with the merchandize they buy at home, can freight a ship, to\nexport it; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home; and have\ntherefore need to join together in one society; where every man may\neither participate of the gain, according to the proportion of his\nadventure; or take his own, and sell what he transports, or imports, at\nsuch prices as he thinks fit. But this is no body politic, there being\nno common representative to oblige them to any other law, than that\nwhich is common to all other subjects. The end of their incorporating,\nis to make their gain the greater; which is done two ways; by sole\nbuying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad. So that to grant to\na company of merchants to be a corporation, or body politic, is to grant\nthem a double monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers; another to be\nsole sellers. For when there is a company incorporate for any particular\nforeign country, they only export the commodities vendible in that\ncountry; which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad. For at\nhome there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth: both which\nis gainful to the merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower,\nand sell abroad at higher rates: and abroad there is but one buyer of\nforeign merchandize, and but one that sells them at home; both which\nagain are gainful to the adventurers.\n\nOf this double monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at\nhome, the other to foreigners. For at home by their sole exportation\nthey set what price they please on the husbandry, and handy-works of the\npeople; and by the sole importation, what price they please on all\nforeign commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the\npeople. On the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities\nabroad, and sole buying the foreign commodities upon the place, they\nraise the price of those, and abate the price of these, to the\ndisadvantage of the foreigner: for where but one selleth, the\nmerchandize is the dearer; and where but one buyeth, the cheaper. Such\ncorporations therefore are no other than monopolies; though they would\nbe very profitable for a commonwealth, if being bound up into one body\nin foreign markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and\nsell at what price he could.\n\nThe end then of these bodies of merchants, being not a common benefit to\nthe whole body, which have in this case no common stock, but what is\ndeducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying,\nvictualling and manning of ships, but the particular gain of every\nadventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted with the\nemployment of his own; that is, that every one be of the assembly, that\nshall have the power to order the same; and be acquainted with their\naccounts. And therefore the representative of such a body must be an\nassembly, where every member of the body may be present at the\nconsultations, if he will.\n\nIf a body politic of merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the act\nof their representative assembly, every member is liable by himself for\nthe whole. For a stranger can take no notice of their private laws, but\nconsidereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the\nwhole payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest: but if\nthe debt be to one of the company, the creditor is debtor for the whole\nto himself, and cannot therefore demand his debt, but only from the\ncommon stock, if there be any.\n\nIf the commonwealth impose a tax upon the body, it is understood to be\nlaid upon every member proportionably to his particular adventure in the\ncompany. For there is in this case no other common stock, but what is\nmade of their particular adventures.\n\nIf a mulct be laid upon the body for some unlawful act, they only are\nliable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was\nexecuted; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of\nthe body; which if a crime, because the body was ordained by the\nauthority of the commonwealth, is not his.\n\nIf one of the members be indebted to the body, he may be sued by the\nbody; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the\nauthority of the body; but only by authority of the commonwealth: for if\nthey can do it by their own authority, they can by their own authority\ngive judgment that the debt is due; which is as much as to be judge in\ntheir own cause.\n\n[Sidenote: A body politic for counsel to be given to the sovereign.]\n\nThose bodies made for the government of men, or of traffic, be either\nperpetual, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be bodies also\nwhose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their business.\nFor example, if a sovereign monarch, or a sovereign assembly, shall\nthink fit to give command to the towns, and other several parts of their\nterritory, to send to him their deputies, to inform him of the\ncondition, and necessities of the subjects, or to advise with him for\nthe making of good laws, or for any other cause, as with one person\nrepresenting the whole country, such deputies, having a place and time\nof meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time, a body politic,\nrepresenting every subject of that dominion; but it is only for such\nmatters as shall be propounded unto them by that man, or assembly, that\nby the sovereign authority sent for them; and when it shall be declared\nthat nothing more shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the body is\ndissolved. For if they were the absolute representatives of the people,\nthen were it the sovereign assembly; and so there would be two sovereign\nassemblies, or two sovereigns, over the same people; which cannot\nconsist with their peace. And therefore where there is once a\nsovereignty, there can be no absolute representation of the people, but\nby it. And for the limits of how far such a body shall represent the\nwhole people, they are set forth in the writing by which they were sent\nfor. For the people cannot choose their deputies to other intent, than\nis in the writing directed to them from their sovereign expressed.\n\n[Sidenote: A regular private body, lawful as a family.]\n\nPrivate bodies regular, and lawful, are those that are constituted\nwithout letters, or other written authority, saving the laws common to\nall other subjects. And because they be united in one person\nrepresentative, they are held for regular; such as are all families, in\nwhich the father, or master ordereth the whole family. For he obligeth\nhis children, and servants, as far as the law permitteth, though not\nfurther, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions,\nwhich the law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during\nthe time they are under domestic government, they are subject to their\nfathers, and masters, as to their immediate sovereigns. For the father\nand master, being before the institution of commonwealth, absolute\nsovereigns in their own families, they lose afterward no more of their\nauthority, than the law of the commonwealth taketh from them.\n\n[Sidenote: Private bodies regular, but unlawful.]\n\nPrivate bodies regular, but unlawful, are those that unite themselves\ninto one person representative, without any public authority at all;\nsuch as are the corporations of beggars, thieves and gipsies, the better\nto order their trade of begging and stealing; and the corporations of\nmen, that by authority from any foreign person, unite themselves in\nanother\u2019s dominion, for the easier propagation of doctrines, and for\nmaking a party, against the power of the commonwealth.\n\n[Sidenote: Systems irregular, such as are private leagues.]\n\nIrregular systems, in their nature but leagues, or sometimes mere\nconcourse of people, without union to any particular design, not by\nobligation of one to another, but proceeding only from a similitude of\nwills and inclinations, become lawful, or unlawful, according to the\nlawfulness, or unlawfulness of every particular man\u2019s design therein:\nand his design is to be understood by the occasion.\n\nThe leagues of subjects, because leagues are commonly made for mutual\ndefence, are in a commonwealth, which is no more than a league of all\nthe subjects together, for the most part unnecessary, and savour of\nunlawful design; and are for that cause unlawful, and go commonly by the\nname of factions, or conspiracies. For a league being a connexion of men\nby covenants, if there be no power given to any one man or assembly, as\nin the condition of mere nature, to compel them to performance, is so\nlong only valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and\ntherefore leagues between commonwealths, over whom there is no human\npower established, to keep them all in awe, are not only lawful, but\nalso profitable for the time they last. But leagues of the subjects of\none and the same commonwealth, where every one may obtain his right by\nmeans of the sovereign power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of\npeace and justice, and, in case the design of them be evil or unknown to\nthe commonwealth, unlawful. For all uniting of strength by private men,\nis, if for evil intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the\npublic, and unjustly concealed.\n\n[Sidenote: Secret cabals.]\n\nIf the sovereign power be in a great assembly, and a number of men, part\nof the assembly, without authority, consult apart, to contrive the\nguidance of the rest; this is a faction, or conspiracy unlawful, as\nbeing a fraudulent seducing of the assembly for their particular\ninterest. But if he, whose private interest is to be debated and judged\nin the assembly, make as many friends as he can; in him it is no\ninjustice; because in this case he is no part of the assembly. And\nthough he hire such friends with money, unless there be an express law\nagainst it, yet it is not injustice. For sometimes, as men\u2019s manners\nare, justice cannot be had without money; and every man may think his\nown cause just, till it be heard, and judged.\n\n[Sidenote: Feuds of private families.]\n\nIn all commonwealths, if private men entertain more servants, than the\ngovernment of his estate, and lawful employment he has for them\nrequires, it is faction, and unlawful. For having the protection of the\ncommonwealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas\nin nations not thoroughly civilized, several numerous families have\nlived in continual hostility, and invaded one another with private\nforce; yet it is evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else\nthey had no commonwealth.\n\n[Sidenote: Factions for government.]\n\nAnd as factions for kindred, so also factions for government of\nreligion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of state, as patricians,\nand plebeians of old time in Rome, and of aristocraticals and\ndemocraticals of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to\nthe peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the sword out of the\nhand of the sovereign.\n\n[Sidenote: Concourse of people.]\n\nConcourse of people is an irregular system, the lawfulness, or\nunlawfulness, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of\nthem that are assembled. If the occasion be lawful, and manifest, the\nconcourse is lawful; as the usual meeting of men at church, or at a\npublic show, in usual numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily\ngreat, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot\nrender a particular and good account of his being amongst them, is to be\njudged conscious of an unlawful, and tumultuous design. It may be lawful\nfor a thousand men, to join to a petition to be delivered to a judge, or\nmagistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous\nassembly; because there needs but one or two for that purpose. But in\nsuch cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the assembly\nunlawful, but such a number, as the present officers are not able to\nsuppress, and bring to justice.\n\n[Sidenote: Concourse of people.]\n\nWhen an unusual number of men, assemble against a man whom they accuse;\nthe assembly is an unlawful tumult; because they may deliver their\naccusation to the magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the case\nof St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius and a great number of other men,\nbrought two of Paul\u2019s companions before the magistrate, saying with one\nvoice, _Great is Diana of the Ephesians_; which was their way of\ndemanding justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine, as\nwas against their religion, and trade. The occasion here, considering\nthe laws of that people, was just; yet was their assembly judged\nunlawful, and the magistrate reprehended them for it in these words\n(_Acts_ xix. 38-40.) _If Demetrius and the other workmen can accuse any\nman, of any thing, there be pleas, and deputies, let them accuse one\nanother. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may be\njudged in an assembly lawfully called. For we are in danger to be\naccused for this day\u2019s sedition; because there is no cause by which any\nman can render any reason of this concourse of people._ Where he calleth\nan assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a sedition, and such\nas they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say concerning\n_systems_, and assemblies of people, which may be compared, as I said,\nto the similar parts of man\u2019s body; such as be lawful, to the muscles;\nsuch as are unlawful, to wens, biles, and apostems, engendered by the\nunnatural conflux of evil humours.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXIII.\n\n OF THE PUBLIC MINISTERS OF SOVEREIGN\n POWER.\n\n\nIn the last chapter I have spoken of the similar parts of a\ncommonwealth: in this I shall speak of the parts organical, which are\npublic ministers.\n\n[Sidenote: Public minister who.]\n\nA PUBLIC MINISTER, is he, that by the sovereign, whether a monarch or an\nassembly, is employed in any affairs, with authority to represent in\nthat employment, the person of the commonwealth. And whereas every man,\nor assembly that hath sovereignty, representeth two persons, or, as the\nmore common phrase is, has two capacities, one natural, and another\npolitic: as a monarch, hath the person not only of the commonwealth, but\nalso of a man; and a sovereign assembly hath the person not only of the\ncommonwealth, but also of the assembly: they that be servants to them in\ntheir natural capacity, are not public ministers; but those only that\nserve them in the administration of the public business. And therefore\nneither ushers, nor sergeants, nor other officers that wait on the\nassembly, for no other purpose, but for the commodity of the men\nassembled, in an aristocracy, or democracy; nor stewards, chamberlains,\ncofferers, or any other officers of the household of a monarch, are\npublic ministers in a monarchy.\n\n[Sidenote: Ministers for the general administration.]\n\nOf public ministers, some have charge committed to them of a general\nadministration, either of the whole dominion, or of a part thereof. Of\nthe whole, as to a protector, or regent, may be committed by the\npredecessor of an infant king, during his minority, the whole\nadministration of his kingdom. In which case, every subject is so far\nobliged to obedience, as the ordinances he shall make, and the commands\nhe shall give be in the king\u2019s name, and not inconsistent with his\nsovereign power. Of a part, or province; as when either a monarch, or a\nsovereign assembly, shall give the general charge thereof to a governor,\nlieutenant, pr\u00e6fect, or viceroy: and in this case also, every one of\nthat province is obliged to all he shall do in the name of the\nsovereign, and that not incompatible with the sovereign\u2019s right. For\nsuch protectors, viceroys, and governors, have no other right, but what\ndepends on the sovereign\u2019s will; and no commission that can be given\nthem, can be interpreted for a declaration of the will to transfer the\nsovereignty, without express and perspicuous words to that purpose. And\nthis kind of public ministers resembleth the nerves, and tendons that\nmove the several limbs of a body natural.\n\n[Sidenote: For special administration, as for economy.]\n\nOthers have special administration; that is to say, charges of some\nspecial business, either at home, or abroad: as at home, first, for the\neconomy of a commonwealth, they that have authority concerning the\n_treasure_, as tributes, impositions, rents, fines, or whatsoever public\nrevenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the accounts thereof, are\npublic ministers: ministers, because they serve the person\nrepresentative, and can do nothing against his command, nor without his\nauthority: public, because they serve him in his political capacity.\n\nSecondly, they that have authority concerning the _militia_; to have the\ncustody of arms, forts, ports; to levy, pay, or conduct soldiers; or to\nprovide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by land or\nsea, are public ministers. But a soldier without command, though he\nfight for the commonwealth, does not therefore represent the person of\nit; because there is none to represent it to. For every one that hath\ncommand, represents it to them only whom he commandeth.\n\n[Sidenote: For instruction of the people.]\n\nThey also that have authority to teach, or to enable others to teach the\npeople their duty to the sovereign power, and instruct them in the\nknowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt\nto live in godliness, and in peace amongst themselves, and resist the\npublic enemy, are public ministers: ministers, in that they do it not by\ntheir own authority, but by another\u2019s; and public, because they do it,\nor should do it, by no authority but that of the sovereign. The monarch,\nor the sovereign assembly only hath immediate authority from God, to\nteach and instruct the people; and no man but the sovereign, receiveth\nhis power _Dei grati\u00e2_ simply; that is to say, from the favour of none\nbut God: all other, receive theirs from the favour and providence of\nGod, and their sovereigns; as in a monarchy _Dei grati\u00e2 et regis_; or\n_Dei providenti\u00e2 et voluntate regis_.\n\n[Sidenote: For judicature.]\n\nThey also to whom jurisdiction is given, are public ministers. For in\ntheir seats of justice they represent the person of the sovereign; and\ntheir sentence, is his sentence: for, as hath been before declared, all\njudicature is essentially annexed to the sovereignty; and therefore all\nother judges are but ministers of him or them that have the sovereign\npower. And as controversies are of two sorts, namely of _fact_, and of\n_law_; so are judgments, some of fact, some of law: and consequently in\nthe same controversy, there may be two judges, one of fact, another of\nlaw.\n\nAnd in both these controversies, there may arise a controversy between\nthe party judged, and the judge; which because they be both subjects to\nthe sovereign, ought in equity to be judged by men agreed on by consent\nof both; for no man can be judge in his own cause. But the sovereign is\nalready agreed on for judge by them both, and is therefore either to\nhear the cause, and determine it himself, or appoint for judge such as\nthey shall both agree on. And this agreement is then understood to be\nmade between them divers ways; as first, if the defendant be allowed to\nexcept against such of his judges, whose interest maketh him suspect\nthem, (for as to the complainant, he hath already chosen his own judge),\nthose which he excepteth not against, are judges he himself agrees on.\nSecondly, if he appeal to any other judge, he can appeal no further; for\nhis appeal is his choice. Thirdly, if he appeal to the sovereign\nhimself, and he by himself, or by delegates which the parties shall\nagree on, give sentence; that sentence is final: for the defendant is\njudged by his own judges, that is to say, by himself.\n\nThese properties of just and rational judicature considered, I cannot\nforbear to observe the excellent constitution of the courts of justice,\nestablished both for Common, and also for Public Pleas in England. By\nCommon Pleas, I mean those, where both the complainant and defendant are\nsubjects: and by public, which are also called Pleas of the Crown, those\nwhere the complainant is the sovereign. For whereas there were two\norders of men, whereof one was Lords, the other Commons; the Lords had\nthis privilege, to have for judges in all capital crimes, none but\nLords; and of them, as many as would be present; which being ever\nacknowledged as a privilege of favour, their judges were none but such\nas they had themselves desired. And in all controversies, every subject,\n(as also in civil controversies the Lords), had for judges, men of the\ncountry where the matter in controversy lay; against which he might make\nhis exceptions, till at last twelve men without exception being agreed\non, they were judged by those twelve. So that having his own judges,\nthere could be nothing alleged by the party, why the sentence should not\nbe final. These public persons, with authority from the sovereign power,\neither to instruct, or judge the people, are such members of the\ncommonwealth, as may fitly be compared to the organs of voice in a body\nnatural.\n\n[Sidenote: For execution.]\n\nPublic ministers are also all those, that have authority from the\nsovereign, to procure the execution of judgments given; to publish the\nsovereign\u2019s commands; to suppress tumults; to apprehend, and imprison\nmalefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the peace.\nFor every act they do by such authority, is the act of the commonwealth;\nand their service, answerable to that of the hands, in a body natural.\n\nPublic ministers abroad, are those that represent the person of their\nown sovereign, to foreign states. Such are ambassadors, messengers,\nagents, and heralds, sent by public authority, and on public business.\n\nBut such as are sent by authority only of some private party of a\ntroubled state, though they be received, are neither public, nor private\nministers of the commonwealth; because none of their actions have the\ncommonwealth for author. Likewise, an ambassador sent from a prince, to\ncongratulate, condole, or to assist at a solemnity; though the authority\nbe public; yet because the business is private, and belonging to him in\nhis natural capacity; is a private person. Also if a man be sent into\nanother country, secretly to explore their counsels, and strength;\nthough both the authority, and the business be public; yet because there\nis none to take notice of any person in him, but his own; he is but a\nprivate minister; but yet a minister of the commonwealth; and may be\ncompared to an eye in the body natural. And those that are appointed to\nreceive the petitions or other informations of the people, and are as it\nwere the public ear, are public ministers, and represent their sovereign\nin that office.\n\n[Sidenote: Councillors without other employment than to advise are not\n public ministers.]\n\nNeither a councillor, nor a council of state, if we consider it with no\nauthority of judicature or command, but only of giving advice to the\nsovereign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not\nrequired, is a public person. For the advice is addressed to the\nsovereign only, whose person cannot in his own presence, be represented\nto him, by another. But a body of councillors, are never without some\nother authority, either of judicature, or of immediate administration:\nas in a monarchy, they represent the monarch, in delivering his commands\nto the public ministers: in a democracy, the council, or senate\npropounds the result of their deliberations to the people, as a council;\nbut when they appoint judges, or hear causes, or give audience to\nambassadors, it is in the quality of a minister of the people: and in an\naristocracy, the council of state is the sovereign assembly itself; and\ngives counsel to none but themselves.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXIV.\n\n OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A\n COMMONWEALTH.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The nourishment of a commonwealth consisteth in the\n commodities of sea and land.]\n\nThe NUTRITION of a commonwealth consisteth, in the _plenty_, and\n_distribution_ of _materials_ conducing to life: in _concoction_, or\n_preparation_; and, when concocted, in the _conveyance_ of it, by\nconvenient conduits, to the public use.\n\nAs for the plenty of matter, it is a thing limited by nature, to those\ncommodities, which from the two breasts of our common mother, land and\nsea, God usually either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to mankind.\n\nFor the matter of this nutriment, consisting in animals, vegetals, and\nminerals, God hath freely laid them before us, in or near to the face of\nthe earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry of\nreceiving them. Insomuch as plenty dependeth, next to God\u2019s favour,\nmerely on the labour and industry of men.\n\nThis matter, commonly called commodities, is partly _native_, and partly\n_foreign_: _native_, that which is to be had within the territory of the\ncommonwealth: _foreign_, that which is imported from without. And\nbecause there is no territory under the dominion of one commonwealth,\nexcept it be of very vast extent, that produceth all things needful for\nthe maintenance, and motion of the whole body; and few that produce not\nsome thing more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had\nwithin, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by\nimportation of that which may be had abroad, either by exchange, or by\njust war, or by labour. For a man\u2019s labour also, is a commodity\nexchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing: and there have\nbeen commonwealths that having no more territory, than hath served them\nfor habitation, have nevertheless, not only maintained, but also\nencreased their power, partly by the labour of trading from one place to\nanother, and partly by selling the manufactures whereof the materials\nwere brought in from other places.\n\n[Sidenote: And the right distribution of them.]\n\nThe distribution of the materials of this nourishment, is the\nconstitution of _mine_, and _thine_, and _his_; that is to say, in one\nword _propriety_; and belongeth in all kinds of commonwealth to the\nsovereign power. For where there is no commonwealth, there is, as hath\nbeen already shown, a perpetual war of every man against his neighbour;\nand therefore every thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by\nforce; which is neither _propriety_, nor _community_; but _uncertainty_.\nWhich is so evident, that even Cicero, a passionate defender of liberty,\nin a public pleading, attributeth all propriety to the law civil. _Let\nthe civil law_, saith he, _be once abandoned, or but negligently\nguarded, not to say oppressed, and there is nothing, that any man can be\nsure to receive from his ancestor, or leave to his children_. And again;\n_Take away the civil law, and no man knows what is his own, and what\nanother man\u2019s_. Seeing therefore the introduction of _propriety_ is an\neffect of commonwealth, which can do nothing but by the person that\nrepresents it, it is the act only of the sovereign; and consisteth in\nthe laws, which none can make that have not the sovereign power. And\nthis they well knew of old, who called that \u039d\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, that is to say,\n_distribution_, which we call law; and defined justice, by\n_distributing_ to every man _his own_.\n\n[Sidenote: All private estates of land proceed originally from the\n arbitrary distribution of the sovereign.]\n\nIn this distribution, the first law, is for division of the land itself:\nwherein the sovereign assigneth to every man a portion, according as he,\nand not according as any subject, or any number of them, shall judge\nagreeable to equity, and the common good. The children of Israel, were a\ncommonwealth in the wilderness; but wanted the commodities of the earth,\ntill they were masters of the Land of Promise; which afterward was\ndivided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion\nof Eleazar the Priest, and Joshua their General, who, when there were\ntwelve tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of the tribe of\nJoseph, made nevertheless but twelve portions of the land; and ordained\nfor the tribe of Levi no land; but assigned them the tenth part of the\nwhole fruits; which division was therefore arbitrary. And though a\npeople coming into possession of a land by war, do not always\nexterminate the ancient inhabitants, as did the Jews, but leave to many,\nor most, or all of them their estates; yet it is manifest they hold them\nafterwards, as of the victors\u2019 distribution; as the people of England\nheld all theirs of William the Conqueror.\n\n[Sidenote: Propriety of subject excludes not the dominion of the\n sovereign, but only of another subject.]\n\nFrom whence we may collect, that the propriety which a subject hath in\nhis lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the\nuse of them; and not to exclude their sovereign, be it an assembly, or a\nmonarch. For seeing the sovereign, that is to say, the commonwealth,\nwhose person he representeth, is understood to do nothing but in order\nto the common peace and security, this distribution of lands, is to be\nunderstood as done in order to the same: and consequently, whatsoever\ndistribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will\nof every subject, that committed his peace, and safety to his\ndiscretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of\nthem, is to be reputed void. It is true, that a sovereign monarch, or\nthe greater part of a sovereign assembly, may ordain the doing of many\nthings in pursuit of their passions, contrary to their own consciences,\nwhich is a breach of trust, and of the law of nature; but this is not\nenough to authorize any subject, either to make war upon, or so much as\nto accuse of injustice, or any way to speak evil of their sovereign;\nbecause they have authorized all his actions, and in bestowing the\nsovereign power, made them their own. But in what cases the commands of\nsovereigns are contrary to equity, and the law of nature, is to be\nconsidered hereafter in another place.\n\n[Sidenote: The public is not to be dieted.]\n\nIn the distribution of land, the commonwealth itself, may be conceived\nto have a portion, and possess, and improve the same by their\nrepresentative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to sustain\nthe whole expense to the common peace, and defence necessarily required.\nWhich were very true, if there could be any representative conceived\nfree from human passions, and infirmities. But the nature of men being\nas it is, the setting forth of public land, or of any certain revenue\nfor the commonwealth, is in vain; and tendeth to the dissolution of\ngovernment, and to the condition of mere nature, and war, as soon as\never the sovereign power falleth into the hands of a monarch, or of an\nassembly, that are either too negligent of money, or too hazardous in\nengaging the public stock into a long or costly war. Commonwealths can\nendure no diet: for seeing their expense is not limited by their own\nappetite, but by external accidents, and the appetites of their\nneighbours, the public riches cannot be limited by other limits, than\nthose which the emergent occasions shall require. And whereas in\nEngland, there were by the Conqueror, divers lands reserved to his own\nuse, besides forests and chases, either for his recreation, or\npreservation of woods, and divers services reserved on the land he gave\nhis subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved for his maintenance in\nhis public, but in his natural capacity. For he, and his successors did\nfor all that, lay arbitrary taxes on all subjects\u2019 land, when they\njudged it necessary. Or if those public lands, and services, were\nordained as a sufficient maintenance of the commonwealth, it was\ncontrary to the scope of the institution; being, as it appeared by those\nensuing taxes, insufficient, and, as it appears by the late small\nrevenue of the crown, subject to alienation and diminution. It is\ntherefore in vain, to assign a portion to the commonwealth; which may\nsell, or give it away; and does sell and give it away, when it is done\nby their representative.\n\n[Sidenote: The places and matter of traffic depend, as their\n distribution, on the sovereign.]\n\nAs the distribution of lands at home; so also to assign in what places,\nand for what commodities, the subject shall traffic abroad, belongeth to\nthe sovereign. For if it did belong to private persons to use their own\ndiscretion therein, some of them would be drawn for gain, both to\nfurnish the enemy with means to hurt the commonwealth, and hurt it\nthemselves, by importing such things, as pleasing men\u2019s appetites, be\nnevertheless noxious, or at least unprofitable to them. And therefore it\nbelongeth to the commonwealth, that is, to the sovereign only, to\napprove, or disapprove both of the places, and matter of foreign\ntraffic.\n\n[Sidenote: The laws of transferring propriety belong also to the\n sovereign.]\n\nFurther, seeing it is not enough to the sustentation of a commonwealth,\nthat every man have a propriety in a portion of land, or in some few\ncommodities, or a natural property in some useful art, and there is no\nart in the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being\nalmost of every particular man; it is necessary, that men distribute\nthat which they can spare, and transfer their propriety therein,\nmutually one to another, by exchange, and mutual contract. And therefore\nit belongeth to the commonwealth, that is to say, to the sovereign, to\nappoint in what manner all kinds of contract between subjects, as\nbuying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to\nhire, are to be made; and by what words and signs they shall be\nunderstood for valid. And for the matter, and distribution of the\nnourishment, to the several members of the commonwealth, thus much,\nconsidering the model of the whole work, is sufficient.\n\n[Sidenote: Money the blood of a commonwealth.]\n\nBy concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities, which are\nnot presently consumed, but reserved for nourishment in time to come, to\nsomething of equal value, and withal so portable, as not to hinder the\nmotion of men from place to place; to the end a man may have in what\nplace soever, such nourishment as the place affordeth. And this is\nnothing else but gold, and silver, and money. For gold and silver,\nbeing, as it happens, almost in all countries of the world highly\nvalued, is a commodious measure of the value of all things else between\nnations; and money, of what matter soever coined by the sovereign of a\ncommonwealth, is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else,\nbetween the subjects of that commonwealth. By the means of which\nmeasures, all commodities, moveable and immoveable, are made to\naccompany a man to all places of his resort, within and without the\nplace of his ordinary residence; and the same passeth from man to man,\nwithin the commonwealth; and goes round about, nourishing, as it\npasseth, every part thereof; in so much as this concoction, is as it\nwere the sanguification of the commonwealth: for natural blood is in\nlike manner made of the fruits of the earth; and circulating, nourisheth\nby the way every member of the body of man.\n\nAnd because silver and gold have their value from the matter itself;\nthey have first this privilege, that the value of them cannot be altered\nby the power of one, nor of a few commonwealths; as being a common\nmeasure of the commodities of all places. But base money, may easily be\nenhanced, or abased. Secondly, they have the privilege to make\ncommonwealths move, and stretch out their arms, when need is, into\nforeign countries: and supply, not only private subjects that travel,\nbut also whole armies with provision. But that coin, which is not\nconsiderable for the matter, but for the stamp of the place, being\nunable to endure change of air, hath its effect at home only; where also\nit is subject to the change of laws, and thereby to have the value\ndiminished, to the prejudice many times of those that have it.\n\n[Sidenote: The conduits and way of money to the public use.]\n\nThe conduits, and ways by which it is conveyed to the public use, are of\ntwo sorts: one, that conveyeth it to the public coffers; the other, that\nissueth the same out again for public payments. Of the first sort, are\ncollectors, receivers, and treasurers; of the second, are the treasurers\nagain, and the officers appointed for payment of several public or\nprivate ministers. And in this also, the artificial man maintains his\nresemblance with the natural; whose veins receiving the blood from the\nseveral parts of the body, carry it to the heart; where being made\nvital, the heart by the arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and\nenable for motion all the members of the same.\n\n[Sidenote: The children of a commonwealth colonies.]\n\nThe procreation or children of a commonwealth, are those we call\n_plantations_, or _colonies_; which are numbers of men sent out from the\ncommonwealth, under a conductor, or governor, to inhabit a foreign\ncountry, either formerly void of inhabitants, or made void then by war.\nAnd when a colony is settled, they are either a commonwealth of\nthemselves, discharged of their subjection to their sovereign that sent\nthem, as hath been done by many commonwealths, of ancient time, in which\ncase the commonwealth from which they went, was called their metropolis\nor mother, and requires no more of them, than fathers require of the\nchildren, whom they emancipate and make free from their domestic\ngovernment, which is honour, and friendship; or else they remain united\nto their metropolis, as were the colonies of the people of Rome; and\nthen they are no commonwealths themselves, but provinces, and parts of\nthe commonwealth that sent them. So that the right of colonies, saving\nhonour and league with their metropolis, dependeth wholly on their\nlicence or letters, by which their sovereign authorized them to plant.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXV.\n\n OF COUNSEL.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Counsel what.]\n\nHow fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things by the ordinary\nand inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the\nconfusion of counsels, and commands, arising from the imperative manner\nof speaking in them both, and in many other occasions besides. For the\nwords _do this_, are the words not only of him that commandeth; but also\nof him that giveth counsel; and of him that exhorteth; and yet there are\nbut few, that see not that these are very different things, or that\ncannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it is that\nspeaketh, and to whom the speech is directed, and upon what occasion.\nBut finding those phrases in men\u2019s writings, and being not able, or not\nwilling to enter into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake\nsometimes the precepts of counsellors, for the precepts of them that\ncommand; and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with\nthe conclusions they would infer, or the actions they approve. To avoid\nwhich mistakes, and render to those terms of commanding, counselling and\nexhorting, their proper and distinct significations, I define them thus.\n\n[Sidenote: Differences between command and counsel.]\n\nCOMMAND is, where a man saith, _do this_, or _do not this_, without\nexpecting other reason than the will of him that says it. From this it\nfolloweth manifestly, that he that commandeth, pretendeth thereby his\nown benefit: for the reason of his command is his own will only, and the\nproper object of every man\u2019s will, is some good to himself.\n\nCOUNSEL, is where a man saith, _do_, or _do not this_, and deduceth his\nreasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it.\nAnd from this it is evident, that he that giveth counsel, pretendeth\nonly, whatsoever he intendeth, the good of him, to whom he giveth it.\n\nTherefore between counsel and command, one great difference is, that\ncommand is directed to a man\u2019s own benefit; and counsel to the benefit\nof another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man may\nbe obliged to do what he is commanded; as when he hath covenanted to\nobey: but he cannot be obliged to do as he is counselled, because the\nhurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow\nit, then is the counsel turned into the nature of a command. A third\ndifference between them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of\nanother man\u2019s counsel; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to\nhimself: but to demand right to counsel another, argues a will to know\nhis designs, or to gain some other good to himself: which, as I said\nbefore, is of every man\u2019s will the proper object.\n\nThis also is incident to the nature of counsel; that whatsoever it be,\nhe that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: for to ask\ncounsel of another, is to permit him to give such counsel as he shall\nthink best; and consequently, he that giveth counsel to his sovereign,\nwhether a monarch, or an assembly, when he asketh it, cannot in equity\nbe punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of\nthe most, or not, so it be to the proposition in debate. For if the\nsense of the assembly can be taken notice of, before the debate be\nended, they should neither ask, nor take any further counsel; for the\nsense of the assembly, is the resolution of the debate, and end of all\ndeliberation. And generally he that demandeth counsel, is author of it;\nand therefore cannot punish it; and what the sovereign cannot, no man\nelse can. But if one subject giveth counsel to another, to do anything\ncontrary to the laws, whether that counsel proceed from evil intention,\nor from ignorance only, it is punishable by the commonwealth; because\nignorance of the law is no good excuse, where every man is bound to take\nnotice of the laws to which he is subject.\n\n[Sidenote: Exhortation and dehortation what.]\n\nEXHORTATION and DEHORTATION is counsel, accompanied with signs in him\nthat giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed: or to say it\nmore briefly, _counsel vehemently pressed_. For he that exhorteth, doth\nnot deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tie\nhimself therein to the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him he\ncounselleth to action: as he that dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And,\ntherefore, they have in their speeches, a regard to the common passions\nand opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of\nsimilitudes, metaphors, examples, and other tools of oratory, to\npersuade their hearers of the utility, honour, or justice of following\ntheir advice.\n\nFrom whence may be inferred, first, that exhortation and dehortation is\ndirected to the good of him that giveth the counsel, not of him that\nasketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a counsellor; who, by the\ndefinition of counsel, ought to regard not his own benefit, but his whom\nhe adviseth. And that he directeth his counsel to his own benefit, is\nmanifest enough, by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificial\ngiving thereof; which being not required of him, and consequently\nproceeding from his own occasions, is directed principally to his own\nbenefit, and but accidentally to the good of him that is counselled, or\nnot at all.\n\nSecondly, that the use of exhortation and dehortation lieth only where a\nman is to speak to a multitude; because when the speech is addressed to\none, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously than\ncan be done in a multitude; which are too many to enter into dispute,\nand dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once.\n\nThirdly, that they that exhort and dehort, where they are required to\ngive counsel, are corrupt counsellors, and as it were bribed by their\nown interest. For though the counsel they give be never so good; yet he\nthat gives it, is no more a good counsellor, than he that giveth a just\nsentence for a reward, is a just judge. But where a man may lawfully\ncommand, as a father in his family, or a leader in an army, his\nexhortations and dehortations, are not only lawful, but also necessary,\nand laudable. But then they are no more counsels, but commands; which\nwhen they are for execution of sour labour, sometimes necessity, and\nalways humanity requireth to be sweetened in the delivery, by\nencouragement, and in the tune and phrase of counsel, rather than in\nharsher language of command.\n\nExamples of the difference between command and counsel, we may take from\nthe forms of speech that express them in Holy Scripture. _Have no other\nGods but me; make to thyself no graven image; take not God\u2019s name in\nvain; sanctify the sabbath; honour thy parents; kill not; steal not,\n&c._ are commands; because the reason for which we are to obey them, is\ndrawn from the will of God our king, whom we are obliged to obey. But\nthese words, _Sell all thou hast; give it to the poor; and follow me_,\nare counsel; because the reason for which we are to do so, is drawn from\nour own benefit; which is this, that we shall have _treasure in Heaven_.\nThese words, _Go into the village over against you, and you shall find\nan ass tied, and her colt; loose her, and bring her to me_, are a\ncommand: for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their\nMaster: but these words, _Repent and be baptized in the name of Jesus_,\nare counsel; because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any\nbenefit of God Almighty, who shall still be king in what manner soever\nwe rebel; but of ourselves, who have no other means of avoiding the\npunishment hanging over us for our sins.\n\n[Sidenote: Differences of fit and unfit counsellors.]\n\nAs the difference of counsel from command, hath been now deduced from\nthe nature of counsel, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or hurt\nthat may arise to him that is to be counselled, by the necessary or\nprobable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the\ndifferences between _apt_ and _inept_ counsellors be derived from the\nsame. For experience, being but memory of the consequences of like\nactions formerly observed, and counsel but the speech whereby that\nexperience is made known to another; the virtues, and defects of\ncounsel, are the same with the virtues, and defects intellectual: and to\nthe person of a commonwealth, his counsellors serve him in the place of\nmemory, and mental discourse. But with this resemblance of the\ncommonwealth, to a natural man, there is one dissimilitude joined, of\ngreat importance; which is, that a natural man receiveth his experience,\nfrom the natural objects of sense, which work upon him without passion,\nor interest of their own; whereas they that give counsel to the\nrepresentative person of a commonwealth, may have, and have often their\nparticular ends and passions, that render their counsels always\nsuspected, and many times unfaithful. And therefore we may set down for\nthe first condition of a good counsellor, _that his ends, and interests,\nbe not inconsistent with the ends and interests of him he counselleth_.\n\nSecondly, because the office of a counsellor, when an action comes into\ndeliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such\nmanner, as he that is counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he\nought to propound his advice, in such form of speech, as may make the\ntruth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firm ratiocination,\nas significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will\npermit. And therefore _rash and unevident inferences_, such as are\nfetched only from examples, or authority of books, and are not arguments\nof what is good, or evil, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion;\n_obscure, confused, and ambiguous expressions, also all metaphorical\nspeeches, tending to the stirring up of passion_, (because such\nreasoning, and such expressions, are useful only to deceive, or to lead\nhim we counsel towards other ends than his own) _are repugnant to the\noffice of a counsellor_.\n\nThirdly, because the ability of counselling proceedeth from experience,\nand long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those\nthings that to the administration of a great commonwealth are necessary\nto be known, _no man is presumed to be a good counsellor, but in such\nbusiness, as he hath not only been much versed in, but hath also much\nmeditated on, and considered_. For seeing the business of a commonwealth\nis this, to preserve the people in peace at home, and defend them\nagainst foreign invasion, we shall find, it requires great knowledge of\nthe disposition of mankind, of the rights of government, and of the\nnature of equity, law, justice, and honour, not to be attained without\nstudy; and of the strength, commodities, places, both of their own\ncountry, and their neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designs\nof all nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to,\nwithout much experience. Of which things, not only the whole sum, but\nevery one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a man\nin years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for counsel,\nas I have said before (chap. VIII.) is judgment. And the differences of\nmen in that point come from different education, of some to one kind of\nstudy or business, and of others to another. When for the doing of any\nthing, there be infallible rules, as in engines and edifices, the rules\nof geometry, all the experience of the world cannot equal his counsel,\nthat has learnt, or found out the rule. And when there is no such rule,\nhe that hath most experience in that particular kind of business, has\ntherein the best judgment, and is the best counsellor.\n\nFourthly, to be able to give counsel to a commonwealth, in a business\nthat hath reference to another commonwealth, _it is necessary to be\nacquainted with the intelligences, and letters_ that come from thence,\n_and with all the records of treaties, and other transactions of state_\nbetween them; which none can do, but such as the representative shall\nthink fit. By which we may see, that they who are not called to counsel,\ncan have no good counsel in such cases to obtrude.\n\nFifthly, supposing the number of counsellors equal, a man is better\ncounselled by hearing them apart, than in an assembly; and that for many\ncauses. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man;\nbut in an assembly many of them deliver their advice with _aye_, or\n_no_, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by\nthe eloquence of another, or for fear of displeasing some that have\nspoken, or the whole assembly, by contradiction; or for fear of\nappearing duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded the\ncontrary opinion. Secondly, in an assembly of many, there cannot choose\nbut be some whose interests are contrary to that of the public; and\nthese their interests make passionate, and passion eloquent, and\neloquence draws others into the same advice. For the passions of men,\nwhich asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in an assembly are\nlike many brands, that inflame one another, especially when they blow\none another with orations, to the setting of the commonwealth on fire,\nunder pretence of counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart,\none may examine, when there is need, the truth, or probability of his\nreasons, and of the grounds of the advice he gives, by frequent\ninterruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an assembly,\nwhere, in every difficult question, a man is rather astonied, and\ndazzled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the\ncourse he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an assembly of many,\ncalled together for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the\nambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the politics; and\ngive not their advice with care of the business propounded, but of the\napplause of their motley orations, made of the divers coloured threds,\nor shreads of authors; which is an impertinence at least, that takes\naway the time of serious consultation, and in the secret way of\ncounselling apart, is easily avoided. Fourthly, in deliberations that\nought to be kept secret, whereof there be many occasions in public\nbusiness, the counsels of many, and especially in assemblies, are\ndangerous; and therefore great assemblies are necessitated to commit\nsuch affairs to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed,\nand in whose fidelity they have most confidence.\n\nTo conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of counsel\nfrom a great assembly of counsellors, that wisheth for, or would accept\nof their pains, when there is a question of marrying his children,\ndisposing of his lands, governing his household, or managing his private\nestate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his\nprosperity? A man that doth his business by the help of many and prudent\ncounsellors, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does\nit best, as he that useth able seconds at tennis play, placed in their\nproper stations. He does next best, that useth his own judgment only; as\nhe that has no second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his\nbusiness in a framed counsel, which cannot move but by the plurality of\nconsenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly, out of envy or\ninterest, retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and\nlike one that is carried to the ball, though by good players, yet in a\nwheel-barrow, or other frame, heavy of itself, and retarded also by the\ninconcurrent judgments, and endeavours of them that drive it; and so\nmuch the more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of\nall, when there is one, or more amongst them, that desire to have him\nlose. And though it be true, that many eyes see more than one; yet it is\nnot to be understood of many counsellors; but then only, when the final\nresolution is in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same\nthing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private\nbenefit; they that desire not to miss their mark, though they look about\nwith two eyes, yet they never aim but with one; and therefore no great\npopular commonwealth was ever kept up, but either by a foreign enemy\nthat united them; or by the reputation of some eminent man amongst them;\nor by the secret counsel of a few; or by the mutual fear of equal\nfactions; and not by the open consultations of the assembly. And as for\nvery little commonwealths, be they popular, or monarchical, there is no\nhuman wisdom can uphold them, longer than the jealousy lasteth of their\npotent neighbours.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXVI.\n\n OF CIVIL LAWS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Civil law what.]\n\nBy CIVIL LAWS, I understand the laws, that men are therefore bound to\nobserve, because they are members, not of this, or that commonwealth in\nparticular, but of a commonwealth. For the knowledge of particular laws\nbelongeth to them, that profess the study of the laws of their several\ncountries; but the knowledge of civil law in general, to any man. The\nancient law of Rome was called their _civil law_, from the word\n_civitas_, which signifies a commonwealth: and those countries, which\nhaving been under the Roman empire, and governed by that law, retain\nstill such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the civil law,\nto distinguish it from the rest of their own civil laws. But that is not\nit I intend to speak of here; my design being not to show what is law\nhere, and there; but what is law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and\ndivers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of the\nstudy of the law.\n\nAnd first it is manifest, that law in general, is not counsel, but\ncommand; nor a command of any man to any man; but only of him, whose\ncommand is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. And as for\ncivil law, it addeth only the name of the person commanding, which is\n_persona civitatis_, the person of the commonwealth.\n\nWhich considered, I define civil law in this manner. CIVIL LAW, _is to\nevery subject, those rules, which the commonwealth hath commanded him,\nby word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of,\nfor the distinction of right, and wrong; that is to say, of what is\ncontrary, and what is not contrary to the rule_.\n\nIn which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight\nevident. For every man seeth, that some laws are addressed to all the\nsubjects in general; some to particular provinces; some to particular\nvocations; and some to particular men; and are therefore laws, to every\nof those to whom the command is directed, and to none else. As also,\nthat laws are the rules of just, and unjust; nothing being reputed\nunjust, that is not contrary to some law. Likewise, that none can make\nlaws but the commonwealth; because our subjection is to the commonwealth\nonly: and that commands, are to be signified by sufficient signs;\nbecause a man knows not otherwise how to obey them. And therefore,\nwhatsoever can from this definition by necessary consequence be deduced,\nought to be acknowledged for truth. Now I deduce from it this that\nfolloweth.\n\n[Sidenote: The sovereign is legislator.]\n\n1. The legislator in all commonwealths, is only the sovereign, be he one\nman, as in a monarchy, or one assembly of men, as in a democracy, or\naristocracy. For the legislator is he that maketh the law. And the\ncommonwealth only prescribes, and commandeth the observation of those\nrules, which we call law: therefore the commonwealth is the legislator.\nBut the commonwealth is no person, nor has capacity to do anything, but\nby the representative, that is, the sovereign; and therefore the\nsovereign is the sole legislator. For the same reason, none can abrogate\na law made, but the sovereign; because a law is not abrogated, but by\nanother law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execution.\n\n[Sidenote: And not subject to civil law.]\n\n2. The sovereign of a commonwealth, be it an assembly, or one man, is\nnot subject to the civil laws. For having power to make, and repeal\nlaws, he may when he pleaseth, free himself from that subjection, by\nrepealing those laws that trouble him, and making of new; and\nconsequently he was free before. For he is free, that can be free when\nhe will: nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself;\nbecause he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is bound to\nhimself only, is not bound.\n\n[Sidenote: Use, a law not by virtue of time, but of the sovereign\u2019s\n consent.]\n\n3. When long use obtaineth the authority of a law, it is not the length\nof time that maketh the authority, but the will of the sovereign\nsignified by his silence, for silence is sometimes an argument of\nconsent; and it is no longer law, than the sovereign shall be silent\ntherein. And therefore if the sovereign shall have a question of right\ngrounded, not upon his present will, but upon the laws formerly made;\nthe length of time shall bring no prejudice to his right; but the\nquestion shall be judged by equity. For many unjust actions, and unjust\nsentences, go uncontrolled a longer time than any man can remember. And\nour lawyers account no customs law, but such as are reasonable, and that\nevil customs are to be abolished. But the judgment of what is\nreasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh\nthe law, which is the sovereign assembly, or monarch.\n\n[Sidenote: The law of nature, and the civil law contain each other.]\n\n4. The law of nature, and the civil law, contain each other, and are of\nequal extent. For the laws of nature, which consist in equity, justice,\ngratitude, and other moral virtues on these depending, in the condition\nof mere nature, as I have said before in the end of the fifteenth\nchapter, are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace\nand obedience. When a commonwealth is once settled, then are they\nactually laws, and not before; as being then the commands of the\ncommonwealth; and therefore also civil laws: for it is the sovereign\npower that obliges men to obey them. For in the differences of private\nmen, to declare, what is equity, what is justice, and what is moral\nvirtue, and to make them binding, there is need of the ordinances of\nsovereign power, and punishments to be ordained for such as shall break\nthem; which ordinances are therefore part of the civil law. The law of\nnature therefore is a part of the civil law in all commonwealths of the\nworld. Reciprocally also, the civil law is a part of the dictates of\nnature. For justice, that is to say, performance of covenant, and giving\nto every man his own, is a dictate of the law of nature. But every\nsubject in a commonwealth, hath convenanted to obey the civil law;\neither one with another, as when they assemble to make a common\nrepresentative, or with the representative itself one by one, when\nsubdued by the sword they promise obedience, that they may receive life;\nand therefore obedience to the civil law is part also of the law of\nnature. Civil, and natural law are not different kinds, but different\nparts of law; whereof one part being written, is called civil, the other\nunwritten, natural. But the right of nature, that is, the natural\nliberty of man, may by the civil law be abridged, and restrained: nay,\nthe end of making laws, is no other, but such restraint; without the\nwhich there cannot possibly be any peace. And law was brought into the\nworld for nothing else, but to limit the natural liberty of particular\nmen, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and\njoin together against a common enemy.\n\n[Sidenote: Provincial laws are not made by custom, but by the sovereign\n power.]\n\n5. If the sovereign of one commonwealth, subdue a people that have lived\nunder other written laws, and afterwards govern them by the same laws,\nby which they were governed before; yet those laws are the civil laws of\nthe victor, and not of the vanquished commonwealth. For the legislator\nis he, not by whose authority the laws were first made, but by whose\nauthority they now continue to be laws. And therefore where there be\ndivers provinces, within the dominion of a commonwealth, and in those\nprovinces diversity of laws, which commonly are called the customs of\neach several province, we are not to understand that such customs have\ntheir force, only from length of time; but that they were anciently laws\nwritten, or otherwise made known, for the constitutions, and statutes of\ntheir sovereigns; and are now laws, not by virtue of the prescription of\ntime, but by the constitutions of their present sovereigns. But if an\nunwritten law, in all the provinces of a dominion, shall be generally\nobserved, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that law can be no\nother but a law of nature, equally obliging all mankind.\n\n[Sidenote: Some foolish opinions of lawyers concerning the making of\n laws.]\n\n6. Seeing then all laws, written and unwritten, have their authority and\nforce, from the will of the commonwealth; that is to say, from the will\nof the representative; which in a monarchy is the monarch, and in other\ncommonwealths the sovereign assembly; a man may wonder from whence\nproceed such opinions, as are found in the books of lawyers of eminence\nin several commonwealths, directly, or by consequence making the\nlegislative power depend on private men, or subordinate judges. As for\nexample, _that the common law, hath no controller but the parliament_;\nwhich is true only where a parliament has the sovereign power, and\ncannot be assembled, nor dissolved, but by their own discretion. For if\nthere be a right in any else to dissolve them, there is a right also to\ncontrol them, and consequently to control their controllings. And if\nthere be no such right, then the controller of laws is not\n_parliamentum_, but _rex in parliamento_. And where a parliament is\nsovereign, if it should assemble never so many, or so wise men, from the\ncountries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there is no man\nwill believe, that such an assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves\na legislative power. _Item_, that the two arms of a commonwealth, are\n_force and justice; the first whereof is in the king; the other\ndeposited in the hands of the parliament_. As if a commonwealth could\nconsist, where the force were in any hand, which justice had not the\nauthority to command and govern.\n\n[Sidenote: Sir Edw. Coke upon Littleton, lib. 2, ch. 6, fol. 97, b.]\n\n7. That law can never be against reason, our lawyers are agreed; and\nthat not the letter, that is every construction of it, but that which is\naccording to the intention of the legislator, is the law. And it is\ntrue: but the doubt is of whose reason it is, that shall be received for\nlaw. It is not meant of any private reason; for then there would be as\nmuch contradiction in the laws, as there is in the Schools; nor yet, as\nSir Edward Coke makes it, an _artificial perfection of reason, gotten by\nlong study, observation, and experience_, as his was. For it is possible\nlong study may increase, and confirm erroneous sentences: and where men\nbuild on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruin:\nand of those that study, and observe with equal time and diligence, the\nreasons and resolutions are, and must remain discordant: and therefore\nit is not that _juris prudentia_, or wisdom of subordinate judges; but\nthe reason of this our artificial man the commonwealth, and his command,\nthat maketh law: and the commonwealth being in their representative but\none person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the laws; and\nwhen there doth, the same reason is able, by interpretation, or\nalteration, to take it away. In all courts of justice, the sovereign,\nwhich is the person of the commonwealth, is he that judgeth: the\nsubordinate judge, ought to have regard to the reason, which moved his\nsovereign to make such law, that his sentence may be according\nthereunto; which then is his sovereign\u2019s sentence; otherwise it is his\nown, and an unjust one.\n\n[Sidenote: Law made, if not also made known, is no law.]\n\n8. From this, that the law is a command, and a command consisteth in\ndeclaration, or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth, by\nvoice, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may\nunderstand, that the command of the commonwealth is law only to those,\nthat have means to take notice of it. Over natural fools, children, or\nmadmen, there is no law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are they\ncapable of the title of just, or unjust; because they had never power to\nmake any covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and\nconsequently never took upon them to authorize the actions of any\nsovereign, as they must do that make to themselves a commonwealth. And\nas those from whom nature or accident hath taken away the notice of all\nlaws in general; so also every man, from whom any accident, not\nproceeding from his own default, hath taken away the means to take\nnotice of any particular law, is excused, if he observe it not: and to\nspeak properly, that law is no law to him. It is therefore necessary, to\nconsider in this place, what arguments, and signs be sufficient for the\nknowledge of what is the law; that is to say, what is the will of the\nsovereign, as well in monarchies, as in other forms of government.\n\n[Sidenote: Unwritten laws are all of them laws of nature.]\n\nAnd first, if it be a law that obliges all the subjects without\nexception, and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as\nthey may take notice thereof, it is a law of nature. For whatsoever men\nare to take knowledge of for law, not upon other men\u2019s words, but every\none from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the reason of\nall men; which no law can be, but the law of nature. The laws of nature\ntherefore need not any publishing, nor proclamation; as being contained\nin this one sentence, approved by all the world, _Do not that to\nanother, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to\nthyself_.\n\nSecondly, if it be a law that obliges only some condition of men, or one\nparticular man, and be not written, nor published by word, then also it\nis a law of nature; and known by the same arguments, and signs, that\ndistinguish those in such a condition, from other subjects. For\nwhatsoever law is not written, or some way published by him that makes\nit law, can be known no way, but by the reason of him that is to obey\nit; and is therefore also a law not only civil, but natural. For\nexample, if the sovereign employ a public minister, without written\ninstructions what to do; he is obliged to take for instructions the\ndictates of reason; as if he make a judge, the judge is to take notice,\nthat his sentence ought to be according to the reason of his sovereign,\nwhich being always understood to be equity, he is bound to it by the law\nof nature: or if an ambassador, he is, in all things not contained in\nhis written instructions, to take for instruction that which reason\ndictates to be most conducing to his sovereign\u2019s interest; and so of all\nother ministers of the sovereignty, public and private. All which\ninstructions of natural reason may be comprehended under one name of\n_fidelity_; which is a branch of natural justice.\n\nThe law of nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all other\nlaws, to be made known, to every man that shall be obliged to obey them,\neither by word, or writing, or some other act, known to proceed from the\nsovereign authority. For the will of another cannot be understood, but\nby his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from his scope and\npurpose; which in the person of the commonwealth, is to be supposed\nalways consonant to equity and reason. And in ancient time, before\nletters were in common use, the laws were many times put into verse;\nthat the rude people taking pleasure in singing, or reciting them, might\nthe more easily retain them in memory. And for the same reason Solomon\n(_Prov._ vii. 3) adviseth a man, to bind the ten commandments upon his\nten fingers. And for the law which Moses gave to the people of Israel at\nthe renewing of the covenant (_Deut._ xi. 19), he biddeth them to teach\nit their children, by discoursing of it both at home, and upon the way;\nat going to bed, and at rising from bed; and to write it upon the posts,\nand doors of their houses; and (_Deut._ xxxi. 12) to assemble the\npeople, man, woman, and child, to hear it read.\n\n[Sidenote: Nothing is law where the legislator cannot be known.]\n\nNor is it enough the law be written, and published; but also that there\nbe manifest signs, that it proceedeth from the will of the sovereign.\nFor private men, when they have, or think they have force enough to\nsecure their unjust designs, and convoy them safely to their ambitious\nends, may publish for laws what they please, without, or against the\nlegislative authority. There is therefore requisite, not only a\ndeclaration of the law, but also sufficient signs of the author and\nauthority. The author, or legislator is supposed in every commonwealth\nto be evident, because he is the sovereign, who having been constituted\nby the consent of every one, is supposed by every one to be sufficiently\nknown. And though the ignorance and security of men be such, for the\nmost part, as that when the memory of the first constitution of their\ncommonwealth is worn out, they do not consider, by whose power they used\nto be defended against their enemies, and to have their industry\nprotected, and to be righted when injury is done them; yet because no\nman that considers, can make question of it, no excuse can be derived\nfrom the ignorance of where the sovereignty is placed. And it is a\ndictate of natural reason, and consequently an evident law of nature,\nthat no man ought to weaken that power, the protection whereof he hath\nhimself demanded, or wittingly received against others. Therefore of who\nis sovereign, no man, but by his own fault, (whatsoever evil men\nsuggest,) can make any doubt. [Sidenote: Difference between verifying &\nauthorizing.] The difficulty consisteth in the evidence of the authority\nderived from him; the removing whereof, dependeth on the knowledge of\nthe public registers, public counsels, public ministers, and public\nseals; by which all laws are sufficiently verified; verified, I say, not\nauthorized: for the verification, is but the testimony and record, not\nthe authority of the law; which consisteth in the command of the\nsovereign only.\n\n[Sidenote: The law verified by the subordinate judge.]\n\nIf therefore a man have a question of injury, depending on the law of\nnature; that is to say, on common equity; the sentence of the judge,\nthat by commission hath authority to take cognizance of such causes, is\na sufficient verification of the law of nature in that individual case.\nFor though the advice of one that professeth the study of the law, be\nuseful for the avoiding of contention; yet it is but advice: it is the\njudge must tell men what is law, upon the hearing of the controversy.\n\n[Sidenote: By the public registers.]\n\nBut when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a written law; every\nman by recourse to the registers, by himself or others, may, if he will,\nbe sufficiently informed, before he do such injury, or commit the crime,\nwhether it be an injury, or not: nay he ought to do so: for when a man\ndoubts whether the act he goeth about, be just, or unjust; and may\ninform himself, if he will; the doing is unlawful. In like manner, he\nthat supposeth himself injured, in a case determined by the written law,\nwhich he may, by himself or others, see and consider; if he complain\nbefore he consults with the law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth a\ndisposition rather to vex other men, than to demand his own right.\n\n[Sidenote: By letters patent and public seal.]\n\nIf the question be of obedience to a public officer; to have seen his\ncommission, with the public seal, and heard it read; or to have had the\nmeans to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient verification\nof his authority. For every man is obliged to do his best endeavour, to\ninform himself of all written laws, that may concern his own future\nactions.\n\n[Sidenote: The interpretation of the law dependeth on the sovereign\n power.]\n\nThe legislator known; and the laws, either by writing, or by the light\nof nature, sufficiently published; there wanteth yet another very\nmaterial circumstance to make them obligatory. For it is not the letter,\nbut the intendment, or meaning, that is to say, the authentic\ninterpretation of the law (which is the sense of the legislator), in\nwhich the nature of the law consisteth; and therefore the interpretation\nof all laws dependeth on the authority sovereign; and the interpreters\ncan be none but those, which the sovereign, to whom only the subject\noweth obedience, shall appoint. For else, by the craft of an\ninterpreter, the law may be made to bear a sense, contrary to that of\nthe sovereign: by which means the interpreter becomes the legislator.\n\n[Sidenote: All laws need interpretation.]\n\nAll laws, written, and unwritten, have need of interpretation. The\nunwritten law of nature, though it be easy to such, as without\npartiality and passion, make use of their natural reason, and therefore\nleaves the violators thereof without excuse; yet considering there be\nvery few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self-love,\nor some other passion; it is now become of all laws the most obscure,\nand has consequently the greatest need of able interpreters. The written\nlaws, if they be short, are easily misinterpreted, from the divers\nsignifications of a word, or two: if long, they be more obscure by the\ndivers significations of many words: insomuch as no written law,\ndelivered in few, or many words, can be well understood, without a\nperfect understanding of the final causes, for which the law was made;\nthe knowledge of which final causes is in the legislator. To him\ntherefore there cannot be any knot in the law, insoluble; either by\nfinding out the ends, to undo it by; or else by making what ends he\nwill, as Alexander did with his sword in the Gordian knot, by the\nlegislative power; which no other interpreter can do.\n\n[Sidenote: The authentical interpretation of law is not that of\n writers.]\n\nThe interpretation of the laws of nature, in a commonwealth, dependeth\nnot on the books of moral philosophy. The authority of writers, without\nthe authority of the commonwealth, maketh not their opinions law, be\nthey never so true. That which I have written in this treatise,\nconcerning the moral virtues, and of their necessity for the procuring,\nand maintaining peace, though it be evident truth, is not therefore\npresently law; but because in all commonwealths in the world, it is part\nof the civil law. For though it be naturally reasonable; yet it is by\nthe sovereign power that it is law: otherwise, it were a great error, to\ncall the laws of nature unwritten law; whereof we see so many volumes\npublished, and in them so many contradictions of one another, and of\nthemselves.\n\n[Sidenote: The interpreter of the law is the judge giving sentence viva\n voce in every particular case.]\n\nThe interpretation of the law of nature, is the sentence of the judge\nconstituted by the sovereign authority, to hear and determine such\ncontroversies, as depend thereon; and consisteth in the application of\nthe law to the present case. For in the act of judicature, the judge\ndoth no more but consider, whether the demand of the party, be consonant\nto natural reason, and equity; and the sentence he giveth, is therefore\nthe interpretation of the law of nature; which interpretation is\nauthentic; not because it is his private sentence; but because he giveth\nit by authority of the sovereign, whereby it becomes the sovereign\u2019s\nsentence; which is law for that time, to the parties pleading.\n\n[Sidenote: The sentence of a judge does not bind him, or another judge\n to give like sentence in like cases ever after.]\n\nBut because there is no judge subordinate, nor sovereign, but may err in\na judgment of equity; if afterward in another like case he find it more\nconsonant to equity to give a contrary sentence, he is obliged to do it.\nNo man\u2019s error becomes his own law; nor obliges him to persist in it.\nNeither, for the same reason, becomes it a law to other judges, though\nsworn to follow it. For though a wrong sentence given by authority of\nthe sovereign, if he know and allow it, in such laws as are mutable, be\na constitution of a new law, in cases, in which every little\ncircumstance is the same; yet in laws immutable, such as are the laws of\nnature, they are no laws to the same or other judges, in the like cases\nfor ever after. Princes succeed one another; and one judge passeth,\nanother cometh; nay, heaven and earth shall pass; but not one tittle of\nthe law of nature shall pass; for it is the eternal law of God.\nTherefore all the sentences of precedent judges that have ever been,\ncannot altogether make a law contrary to natural equity: nor any\nexamples of former judges, can warrant an unreasonable sentence, or\ndischarge the present judge of the trouble of studying what is equity,\nin the case he is to judge, from the principles of his own natural\nreason. For example sake, it is against the law of nature, _to punish\nthe innocent_; and innocent is he that acquitteth himself judicially,\nand is acknowledged for innocent by the judge. Put the case now, that a\nman is accused of a capital crime, and seeing the power and malice of\nsome enemy, and the frequent corruption and partiality of judges,\nrunneth away for fear of the event, and afterwards is taken, and brought\nto a legal trial, and maketh it sufficiently appear, he was not guilty\nof the crime, and being thereof acquitted, is nevertheless condemned to\nlose his goods; this is a manifest condemnation of the innocent. I say\ntherefore, that there is no place in the world, where this can be an\ninterpretation of a law of nature, or be made a law by the sentences of\nprecedent judges, that had done the same. For he that judged it first,\njudged unjustly; and no injustice can be a pattern of judgment to\nsucceeding judges. A written law may forbid innocent men to fly, and\nthey may be punished for flying: but that flying for fear of injury,\nshould be taken for presumption of guilt, after a man is already\nabsolved of the crime judicially, is contrary to the nature of a\npresumption, which hath no place after judgment given. Yet this is set\ndown by a great lawyer for the common law of England. _If a man_, saith\nhe, _that is innocent, be accused of felony, and for fear flyeth for the\nsame; albeit he judicially acquitteth himself of the felony; yet if it\nbe found that he fled for the felony, he shall notwithstanding his\ninnocency, forfeit all his goods, chattels, debts, and duties. For as to\nthe forfeiture of them, the law will admit no proof against the\npresumption in law, grounded upon his flight._ Here you see, _an\ninnocent man judicially acquitted, notwithstanding his innocency_, when\nno written law forbad him to fly, after his acquittal, _upon a\npresumption in law_, condemned to lose all the goods he hath. If the law\nground upon his flight a presumption of the fact, which was capital, the\nsentence ought to have been capital: if the presumption were not of the\nfact, for what then ought he to lose his goods? This therefore is no law\nof England; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a presumption of law,\nbut upon the presumption of the judges. It is also against law, to say\nthat no proof shall be admitted against a presumption of law. For all\njudges, sovereign and subordinate, if they refuse to hear proof, refuse\nto do justice: for though the sentence be just, yet the judges that\ncondemn without hearing the proofs offered, are unjust judges; and their\npresumption is but prejudice; which no man ought to bring with him to\nthe seat of justice, whatsoever precedent judgments, or examples he\nshall pretend to follow. There be other things of this nature, wherein\nmen\u2019s judgments have been perverted, by trusting to precedents: but this\nis enough to show, that though the sentence of the judge, be a law to\nthe party pleading, yet it is no law to any judge, that shall succeed\nhim in that office.\n\nIn like manner, when question is of the meaning of written laws, he is\nnot the interpreter of them, that writeth a commentary upon them. For\ncommentaries are commonly more subject to cavil, than the text; and\ntherefore need other commentaries; and so there will be no end of such\ninterpretation. And therefore unless there be an interpreter authorized\nby the sovereign, from which the subordinate judges are not to recede,\nthe interpreter can be no other than the ordinary judges, in the same\nmanner, as they are in cases of the unwritten law; and their sentences\nare to be taken by them that plead, for laws in that particular case;\nbut not to bind other judges, in like cases to give like judgments. For\na judge may err in the interpretation even of written laws; but no error\nof a subordinate judge, can change the law, which is the general\nsentence of the sovereign.\n\n[Sidenote: The difference between the letter and sentence of the law.]\n\nIn written laws, men use to make a difference between the letter, and\nthe sentence of the law: and when by the letter, is meant whatsoever can\nbe gathered from the bare words, it is well distinguished. For the\nsignifications of almost all words, are either in themselves, or in the\nmetaphorical use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in argument, to\nmake many senses; but there is only one sense of the law. But if by the\nletter, be meant the literal sense, then the letter, and the sentence or\nintention of the law, is all one. For the literal sense is that, which\nthe legislator intended, should by the letter of the law be signified.\nNow the intention of the legislator is always supposed to be equity: for\nit were a great contumely for a judge to think otherwise of the\nsovereign. He ought therefore, if the word of the law do not fully\nauthorize a reasonable sentence, to supply it with the law of nature; or\nif the case be difficult, to respite judgment till he have received more\nample authority. For example, a written law ordaineth, that he which is\nthrust out of his house by force, shall be restored by force: it happens\nthat a man by negligence leaves his house empty, and returning is kept\nout by force, in which case there is no special law ordained. It is\nevident that this case is contained in the same law: for else there is\nno remedy for him at all; which is to be supposed against the intention\nof the legislator. Again, the word of the law commandeth to judge\naccording to the evidence: a man is accused falsely of a fact, which the\njudge himself saw done by another, and not by him that is accused. In\nthis case neither shall the letter of the law be followed to the\ncondemnation of the innocent, nor shall the judge give sentence against\nthe evidence of the witnesses; because the letter of the law is to the\ncontrary: but procure of the sovereign that another be made judge, and\nhimself witness. So that the incommodity that follows the bare words of\na written law, may lead him to the intention of the law, whereby to\ninterpret the same the better; though no incommodity can warrant a\nsentence against the law. For every judge of right, and wrong, is not\njudge of what is commodious, or incommodious to the commonwealth.\n\n[Sidenote: The abilities required in a judge.]\n\nThe abilities required in a good interpreter of the law, that is to say,\nin a good judge, are not the same with those of an advocate; namely the\nstudy of the laws. For a judge, as he ought to take notice of the fact,\nfrom none but the witnesses; so also he ought to take notice of the law\nfrom nothing but the statutes, and constitutions of the sovereign,\nalleged in the pleading, or declared to him by some that have authority\nfrom the sovereign power to declare them; and need not take care\nbeforehand, what he shall judge; for it shall be given him what he shall\nsay concerning the fact, by witnesses; and what he shall say in point of\nlaw, from those that shall in their pleadings show it, and by authority\ninterpret it upon the place. The Lords of parliament in England were\njudges, and most difficult causes have been heard and determined by\nthem; yet few of them were much versed in the study of the laws, and\nfewer had made profession of them: and though they consulted with\nlawyers, that were appointed to be present there for that purpose; yet\nthey alone had the authority of giving sentence. In like manner, in the\nordinary trials of right, twelve men of the common people, are the\njudges, and give sentence, not only of the fact, but of the right; and\npronounce simply for the complainant, or for the defendant; that is to\nsay, are judges, not only of the fact, but also of the right: and in a\nquestion of crime, not only determine whether done, or not done; but\nalso whether it be _murder_, _homicide_, _felony_, _assault_, and the\nlike, which are determinations of law: but because they are not supposed\nto know the law of themselves, there is one that hath authority to\ninform them of it, in the particular case they are to judge of. But yet\nif they judge not according to that he tells them, they are not subject\nthereby to any penalty; unless it be made appear, that they did it\nagainst their consciences, or had been corrupted by reward.\n\nThe things that make a good judge, or good interpreter of the laws, are,\nfirst, _a right understanding_ of that principal law of nature called\n_equity_; which depending not on the reading of other men\u2019s writings,\nbut on the goodness of a man\u2019s own natural reason, and meditation, is\npresumed to be in those most, that have had most leisure, and had the\nmost inclination to meditate thereon. Secondly, _contempt of unnecessary\nriches, and preferments_. Thirdly, _to be able in judgment to divest\nhimself of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and compassion_. Fourthly, and\nlastly, _patience to hear; diligent attention in hearing; and memory to\nretain, digest and apply what he hath heard_.\n\n[Sidenote: Divisions of law.]\n\nThe difference and division of the laws, has been made in divers\nmanners, according to the different methods, of those men that have\nwritten of them. For it is a thing that dependeth not on nature, but on\nthe scope of the writer; and is subservient to every man\u2019s proper\nmethod. In the Institutions of Justinian, we find seven sorts of civil\nlaws:\n\n1. The _edicts_, _constitutions_, and _epistles of the prince_, that is,\nof the emperor; because the whole power of the people was in him. Like\nthese, are the proclamations of the kings of England.\n\n2. _The decrees of the whole people of Rome_, comprehending the senate,\nwhen they were put to the question by the _senate_. These were laws, at\nfirst, by the virtue of the sovereign power residing in the people; and\nsuch of them as by the emperors were not abrogated, remained laws, by\nthe authority imperial. For all laws that bind, are understood to be\nlaws by his authority that has power to repeal them. Somewhat like to\nthese laws, are the acts of parliament in England.\n\n3. _The decrees of the common people_, excluding the senate, when they\nwere put to the question by the _tribune_ of the people. For such of\nthem as were not abrogated by the emperors, remained laws by the\nauthority imperial. Like to these, were the orders of the House of\nCommons in England.\n\n4. _Senatus consulta_, the _orders of the senate_; because when the\npeople of Rome grew so numerous, as it was inconvenient to assemble\nthem; it was thought fit by the emperor, that men should consult the\nsenate, instead of the people; and these have some resemblance with the\nacts of council.\n\n5. _The edicts of pr\u00e6tors_, and in some cases of _\u00e6diles_: such as are\nthe chief justices in the courts of England.\n\n6. _Responsa prudentum_; which were the sentences, and opinion of those\nlawyers, to whom the emperor gave authority to interpret the law, and to\ngive answer to such as in matter of law demanded their advice; which\nanswers, the judges in giving judgment were obliged by the constitutions\nof the emperor to observe: and should be like the reports of cases\njudged, if other judges be by the law of England bound to observe them.\nFor the judges of the common law of England, are not properly judges,\nbut _juris consulti_; of whom the judges, who are either the lords, or\ntwelve men of the country, are in point of law to ask advice.\n\n7. Also, _unwritten customs_, which in their own nature are an imitation\nof law, by the tacit consent of the emperor, in case they be not\ncontrary to the law of nature, are very laws.\n\n[Sidenote: Another division of law.]\n\nAnother division of laws, is into _natural_ and _positive_. _Natural_\nare those which have been laws from all eternity; and are called not\nonly _natural_, but also _moral_ laws; consisting in the moral virtues,\nas justice, equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to peace,\nand charity; of which I have already spoken in the fourteenth and\nfifteenth chapters.\n\n_Positive_, are those which have not been from eternity; but have been\nmade laws by the will of those that have had the sovereign power over\nothers; and are either written, or made known to men, by some other\nargument of the will of their legislator.\n\nAgain, of positive laws some are _human_, some _divine_; and of human\npositive laws, some are _distributive_, some _penal_. _Distributive_ are\nthose that determine the rights of the subjects, declaring to every man\nwhat it is, by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands, or\ngoods, and a right or liberty of action: and these speak to all the\nsubjects. _Penal_ are those, which declare, what penalty shall be\ninflicted on those that violate the law; and speak to the ministers and\nofficers ordained for execution. For though every one ought to be\ninformed of the punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression;\nnevertheless the command is not addressed to the delinquent, who cannot\nbe supposed will faithfully punish himself, but to public ministers\nappointed to see the penalty executed. And these penal laws are for the\nmost part written together with the laws distributive; and are sometimes\ncalled judgments. For all laws are general judgments, or sentences of\nthe legislator; as also every particular judgment, is a law to him,\nwhose case is judged.\n\n[Sidenote: Divine positive law how made known to be law.]\n\n_Divine positive laws_ (for natural laws being eternal, and universal,\nare all divine), are those, which being the commandments of God, not\nfrom all eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but only to a\ncertain people, or to certain persons, are declared for such, by those\nwhom God hath authorized to declare them. But this authority of man to\ndeclare what be these positive laws of God, how can it be known? God may\ncommand a man by a supernatural way, to deliver laws to other men. But\nbecause it is of the essence of law, that he who is to be obliged, be\nassured of the authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot\nnaturally take notice to be from God, _how can a man without\nsupernatural revelation be assured of the revelation received by the\ndeclarer?_ and _how can he be bound to obey them?_ For the first\nquestion, how a man can be assured of the revelation of another, without\na revelation particularly to himself, it is evidently impossible. For\nthough a man may be induced to believe such revelation, from the\nmiracles they see him do, or from seeing the extraordinary sanctity of\nhis life, or from seeing the extraordinary wisdom, or extraordinary\nfelicity of his actions, all which are marks of God\u2019s extraordinary\nfavour; yet they are not assured evidences of special revelation.\nMiracles are marvellous works: but that which is marvellous to one, may\nnot be so to another. Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible\nfelicities of this world, are most often the work of God by natural, and\nordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural\nreason, that another has had a supernatural revelation of God\u2019s will;\nbut only a belief; every one, as the signs thereof shall appear greater\nor lesser, a firmer or a weaker belief.\n\nBut for the second, how can he be bound to obey them; it is not so hard.\nFor if the law declared, be not against the law of nature, which is\nundoubtedly God\u2019s law, and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his\nown act; bound I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it: for men\u2019s\nbelief, and interior cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but\nonly to the operation of God, ordinary, or extraordinary. Faith of\nsupernatural law, is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the\nsame; and not a duty that we exhibit to God, but a gift which God freely\ngiveth to whom he pleaseth; as also unbelief is not a breach of any of\nhis laws; but a rejection of them all, except the laws natural. But this\nthat I say, will be made yet clearer, by the examples and testimonies\nconcerning this point in holy Scripture. The covenant God made with\nAbraham, in a supernatural manner, was thus, (_Gen._ xvii. 10) _This is\nthe covenant which thou shalt observe between me and thee and thy seed\nafter thee_. Abraham\u2019s seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in\nbeing; yet they are a party to the covenant, and bound to obey what\nAbraham should declare to them for God\u2019s law; which they could not be,\nbut in virtue of the obedience they owed to their parents; who, if they\nbe subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham,\nhave sovereign power over their children and servants. Again, where God\nsaith to Abraham, _In thee shall all nations of the earth be blessed;\nfor I know thou wilt command thy children, and thy house after thee to\nkeep the way of the Lord, and to observe righteousness and judgment_, it\nis manifest, the obedience of his family, who had no revelation,\ndepended on their former obligation to obey their sovereign. At Mount\nSinai Moses only went up to God; the people were forbidden to approach\non pain of death; yet they were bound to obey all that Moses declared to\nthem for God\u2019s law. Upon what ground, but on this submission of their\nown, _Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to\nus, lest we die_? By which two places it sufficiently appeareth, that in\na commonwealth, a subject that has no certain and assured revelation\nparticularly to himself concerning the will of God, is to obey for such,\nthe command of the commonwealth: for if men were at liberty, to take for\nGod\u2019s commandments, their own dreams and fancies, or the dreams and\nfancies of private men; scarce two men would agree upon what is God\u2019s\ncommandment; and yet in respect of them, every man would despise the\ncommandments of the commonwealth. I conclude therefore, that in all\nthings not contrary to the moral law, that is to say, to the law of\nnature, all subjects are bound to obey that for divine law, which is\ndeclared to be so, by the laws of the commonwealth. Which also is\nevident to any man\u2019s reason; for whatsoever is not against the law of\nnature, may be made law in the name of them that have the sovereign\npower; and there is no reason men should be the less obliged by it, when\nit is propounded in the name of God. Besides, there is no place in the\nworld where men are permitted to pretend other commandments of God, than\nare declared for such by the commonwealth. Christian states punish those\nthat revolt from the Christian religion, and all other states, those\nthat set up any religion by them forbidden. For in whatsoever is not\nregulated by the commonwealth, it is equity, which is the law of nature,\nand therefore an eternal law of God, that every man equally enjoy his\nliberty.\n\n[Sidenote: Another division of laws.]\n\nThere is also another distinction of laws, into _fundamental_ and _not\nfundamental_; but I could never see in any author, what a fundamental\nlaw signifieth. Nevertheless one may very reasonably distinguish laws in\nthat manner.\n\n[Sidenote: A fundamental law, what.]\n\nFor a fundamental law in every commonwealth is that, which being taken\naway, the commonwealth faileth, and is utterly dissolved; as a building\nwhose foundation is destroyed. And therefore a fundamental law is that,\nby which subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the\nsovereign, whether a monarch, or a sovereign assembly, without which the\ncommonwealth cannot stand; such as is the power of war and peace, of\njudicature, of election of officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall\nthink necessary for the public good. Not fundamental is that, the\nabrogating whereof, draweth not with it the dissolution of the\ncommonwealth; such as are the laws concerning controversies between\nsubject and subject. Thus much of the division of laws.\n\n[Sidenote: Difference between law and right.]\n\nI find the words _lex civilis_, and _jus civile_, that is to say _law_\nand _right civil_, promiscuously used for the same thing, even in the\nmost learned authors; which nevertheless ought not to be so. For _right_\nis _liberty_, namely that liberty which the civil law leaves us: but\n_civil law_ is an _obligation_, and takes from us the liberty which the\nlaw of nature gave us. Nature gave a right to every man to secure\nhimself by his own strength, and to invade a suspected neighbour, by way\nof prevention: but the civil law takes away that liberty, in all cases\nwhere the protection of the law may be safely stayed for. Insomuch as\n_lex_ and _jus_, are as different as _obligation_ and _liberty_.\n\n[Sidenote: And between a law and a charter.]\n\nLikewise _laws_ and _charters_ are taken promiscuously for the same\nthing. Yet charters are donations of the sovereign; and not laws, but\nexemptions from law. The phrase of a law is, _jubeo_, _injungo_, _I\ncommand_ and _enjoin_: the phrase of a charter is, _dedi_, _concessi_,\n_I have given_, _I have granted_: but what is given or granted, to a\nman, is not forced upon him, by a law. A law may be made to bind all the\nsubjects of a commonwealth: a liberty, or charter is only to one man, or\nsome one part of the people. For to say all the people of a\ncommonwealth, have liberty in any case whatsoever, is to say, that in\nsuch case, there hath been no law made; or else having been made, is now\nabrogated.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXVII.\n\n OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Sin, what.]\n\nA SIN, is not only a transgression of a law, but also any contempt of\nthe legislator. For such contempt, is a breach of all his laws at once.\nAnd therefore may consist, not only in the _commission_ of a fact, or in\nspeaking of words by the laws forbidden, or in the _omission_ of what\nthe law commandeth, but also in the _intention_, or purpose to\ntransgress. For the purpose to break the law, is some degree of contempt\nof him, to whom it belongeth to see it executed. To be delighted in the\nimagination only, of being possessed of another man\u2019s goods, servants,\nor wife, without any intention to take them from him by force or fraud,\nis no breach of the law, that saith, _Thou shalt not covet_: nor is the\npleasure a man may have in imagining or dreaming of the death of him,\nfrom whose life he expecteth nothing but damage, and displeasure, a sin;\nbut the resolving to put some act in execution, that tendeth thereto.\nFor to be pleased in the fiction of that, which would please a man if it\nwere real, is a passion so adherent to the nature both of man, and every\nother living creature, as to make it a sin, were to make sin of being a\nman. The consideration of this, has made me think them too severe, both\nto themselves, and others, that maintain, that the first motions of the\nmind, though checked with the fear of God, be sins. But I confess it is\nsafer to err on that hand, than on the other.\n\n[Sidenote: A crime, what.]\n\nA CRIME, is a sin, consisting in the committing, by deed or word, of\nthat which the law forbiddeth, or the omission of what it hath\ncommanded. So that every crime is a sin; but not every sin a crime. To\nintend to steal, or kill, is a sin, though it never appear in word, or\nfact: for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge:\nbut till it appear by something done, or said, by which the intention\nmay be argued by a human judge, it hath not the name of crime: which\ndistinction the Greeks observed, in the word \u1f01\u03bc\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, and \u1f14\u03b3\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1, or\n\u1f00\u03b9\u03c4\u03af\u03b1; whereof the former, which is translated _sin_, signifieth any\nswerving from the law whatsoever; but the two latter, which are\ntranslated _crime_, signify that sin only, whereof one man may accuse\nanother. But of intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there\nis no place for human accusation. In like manner the Latins by\n_peccatum_, which is _sin_, signify all manner of deviation from the\nlaw; but by _crimen_, which word they derive from _cerno_, which\nsignifies _to perceive_, they mean only such sins, as may be made appear\nbefore a judge; and therefore are not mere intentions.\n\n[Sidenote: Where no civil law is, there is no crime.]\n\nFrom this relation of sin to the law, and of crime to the civil law, may\nbe inferred, first, that where law ceaseth, sin ceaseth. But because the\nlaw of nature is eternal, violation of covenants, ingratitude,\narrogance, and all facts contrary to any moral virtue, can never cease\nto be sin. Secondly, that the civil law ceasing, crimes cease: for there\nbeing no other law remaining, but that of nature, there is no place for\naccusation; every man being his own judge, and accused only by his own\nconscience, and cleared by the uprightness of his own intention. When\ntherefore his intention is right, his fact is no sin: if otherwise, his\nfact is sin; but not crime. Thirdly, that when the sovereign power\nceaseth, crime also ceaseth; for where there is no such power, there is\nno protection to be had from the law; and therefore every one may\nprotect himself by his own power: for no man in the institution of\nsovereign power can be supposed to give away the right of preserving his\nown body; for the safety whereof all sovereignty was ordained. But this\nis to be understood only of those, that have not themselves contributed\nto the taking away of the power that protected them; for that was a\ncrime from the beginning.\n\n[Sidenote: Ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man.]\n\nThe source of every crime, is some defect of the understanding; or some\nerror in reasoning; or some sudden force of the passions. Defect in the\nunderstanding, is _ignorance_; in reasoning, _erroneous opinion_. Again,\nignorance is of three sorts; of the _law_, and of the _sovereign_, and\nof the _penalty_. Ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man;\nbecause every man that hath attained to the use of reason, is supposed\nto know, he ought not to do to another, what he would not have done to\nhimself. Therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do\nanything contrary to that law, it is a crime. If a man come from the\nIndies hither, and persuade men here to receive a new religion, or teach\nthem anything that tendeth to disobedience of the laws of this country,\nthough he be never so well persuaded of the truth of what he teacheth,\nhe commits a crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not only\nbecause his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he\nwould not approve in another, namely, that coming from hence, he should\nendeavour to alter the religion there. But ignorance of the civil law,\nshall excuse a man in a strange country, till it be declared to him;\nbecause, till then no civil law is binding.\n\n[Sidenote: Ignorance of the civil law excuseth sometimes.]\n\nIn the like manner, if the civil law of a man\u2019s own country, be not so\nsufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the action\nagainst the law of nature; the ignorance is a good excuse: in other\ncases ignorance of the civil law, excuseth not.\n\n[Sidenote: Ignorance of the sovereign excuseth not.]\n\nIgnorance of the sovereign power, in the place of a man\u2019s ordinary\nresidence, excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of the\npower, by which he hath been protected there.\n\n[Sidenote: Ignorance of the penalty excuseth not.]\n\nIgnorance of the penalty, where the law is declared, excuseth no man:\nfor in breaking the law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were\nnot a law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not\nwhat it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth\nall the known consequences of it; but punishment is a known consequence\nof the violation of the laws, in every commonwealth; which punishment,\nif it be determined already by the law, he is subject to that; if not,\nthen he is subject to arbitrary punishment. For it is reason, that he\nwhich does injury, without other limitation than that of his own will,\nshould suffer punishment without other limitation, than that of his will\nwhose law is thereby violated.\n\n[Sidenote: Punishments declared before the fact, excuse from greater\n punishments after it.]\n\nBut when a penalty, is either annexed to the crime in the law itself, or\nhath been usually inflicted in the like cases; there the delinquent is\nexcused from a greater penalty. For the punishment foreknown, if not\ngreat enough to deter men from the action, is an invitement to it:\nbecause when men compare the benefit of their injustice, with the harm\nof their punishment, by necessity of nature they chuse that which\nappeareth best for themselves: and therefore when they are punished more\nthan the law had formerly determined, or more than others were punished\nfor the same crime; it is the law that tempted, and deceiveth them.\n\n[Sidenote: Nothing can be made a crime by a law made after the fact.]\n\nNo law, made after a fact done, can make it a crime: because if the fact\nbe against the law of nature, the law was before the fact; and a\npositive law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore\ncannot be obligatory. But when the law that forbiddeth a fact, is made\nbefore the fact be done; yet he that doth the fact, is liable to the\npenalty ordained after, in case no lesser penalty were made known\nbefore, neither by writing, nor by example, for the reason immediately\nbefore alleged.\n\n[Sidenote: False principles of right & wrong causes of crime.]\n\nFrom defect in reasoning, that is to say, from error, men are prone to\nviolate the laws, three ways. First, by presumption of false principles:\nas when men, from having observed how in all places, and in all ages,\nunjust actions have been authorized, by the force, and victories of\nthose who have committed them; and that potent men, breaking through the\ncobweb laws of their country, the weaker sort, and those that have\nfailed in their enterprises, have been esteemed the only criminals; have\nthereupon taken for principles, and grounds of their reasoning, _that\njustice is but a vain word_: _that whatsoever a man can get by his own\nindustry, and hazard, is his own_: _that the practice of all nations\ncannot be unjust_: _that examples of former times are good arguments of\ndoing the like again_; and many more of that kind: which being granted,\nno act in itself can be a crime, but must be made so, not by the law,\nbut by the success of them that commit it; and the same fact be\nvirtuous, or vicious, as fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a\ncrime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and C\u00e6sar, the same laws standing,\nturn again into a crime, to the perpetual disturbance of the peace of\nthe commonwealth.\n\n[Sidenote: False teachers mis-interpreting the law of nature.]\n\nSecondly, by false teachers, that either misinterpret the law of nature,\nmaking it thereby repugnant to the law civil; or by teaching for laws,\nsuch doctrines of their own, or traditions of former times, as are\ninconsistent with the duty of a subject.\n\n[Sidenote: And false inferences from true principles, by teachers.]\n\nThirdly, by erroneous inferences from true principles; which happens\ncommonly to men that are hasty, and precipitate in concluding, and\nresolving what to do; such as are they, that have both a great opinion\nof their own understanding, and believe that things of this nature\nrequire not time and study, but only common experience, and a good\nnatural wit; whereof no man thinks himself unprovided: whereas the\nknowledge, of right and wrong, which is no less difficult, there is no\nman will pretend to, without great and long study. And of those defects\nin reasoning, there is none that can excuse, though some of them may\nextenuate, a crime in any man, that pretendeth to the administration of\nhis own private business; much less in them that undertake a public\ncharge; because they pretend to the reason, upon the want whereof they\nwould ground their excuse.\n\n[Sidenote: By their passions.]\n\nOf the passions that most frequently are the causes of crime, one, is\nvain glory, or a foolish overrating of their own worth; as if difference\nof worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches, or blood, or some\nother natural quality, not depending on the will of those that have the\nsovereign authority. From whence proceedeth a presumption that the\npunishments ordained by the laws, and extended generally to all\nsubjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with the same rigour they\nare inflicted on poor, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the\nname of the _vulgar_.\n\n[Sidenote: Presumption of riches,]\n\nTherefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselves by the\ngreatness of their wealth, adventure on crimes, upon hope of escaping\npunishment, by corrupting public justice, or obtaining pardon by money,\nor other rewards.\n\n[Sidenote: And friends.]\n\nAnd that such as have multitude of potent kindred; and popular men, that\nhave gained reputation amongst the multitude, take courage to violate\nthe laws, from a hope of oppressing the power, to whom it belongeth to\nput them in execution.\n\n[Sidenote: Wisdom.]\n\nAnd that such as have a great, and false opinion of their own wisdom,\ntake upon them to reprehend the actions, and call in question the\nauthority of them that govern, and so to unsettle the laws with their\npublic discourse, as that nothing shall be a crime, but what their own\ndesigns require should be so. It happeneth also to the same men, to be\nprone to all such crimes, as consist in craft, and in deceiving of their\nneighbours; because they think their designs are too subtle to be\nperceived. These I say are effects of a false presumption of their own\nwisdom. For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of\ncommonwealth, which can never happen without a civil war, very few are\nleft alive long enough, to see their new designs established: so that\nthe benefit of their crimes redoundeth to posterity, and such as would\nleast have wished it: which argues they were not so wise, as they\nthought they were. And those that deceive upon hope of not being\nobserved, do commonly deceive themselves, the darkness in which they\nbelieve they lie hidden, being nothing else but their own blindness; and\nare no wiser than children, that think all hid, by hiding their own\neyes.\n\nAnd generally all vain-glorious men, unless they be withal timorous, are\nsubject to anger; as being more prone than others to interpret for\ncontempt, the ordinary liberty of conversation: and there are few crimes\nthat may not be produced by anger.\n\n[Sidenote: Hatred, lust, ambition, covetousness, causes of crime]\n\nAs for the passions, of hate, lust, ambition, and covetousness, what\ncrimes they are apt to produce, is so obvious to every man\u2019s experience\nand understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving\nthat they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and\nall other living creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindered,\nbut by extraordinary use of reason, or a constant severity in punishing\nthem. For in those things men hate, they find a continual, and\nunavoidable molestation; whereby either a man\u2019s patience must be\neverlasting, or he must be eased by removing the power of that which\nmolesteth him. The former is difficult; the latter is many times\nimpossible, without some violation of the law. Ambition, and\ncovetousness are passions also that are perpetually incumbent, and\npressing; whereas reason is not perpetually present, to resist them: and\ntherefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects\nproceed. And for lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the\nvehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easy,\nor uncertain punishments.\n\n[Sidenote: Fear sometimes cause of crime, as when the danger is neither\n present nor corporeal.]\n\nOf all passions, that which inclineth men least to break the laws, is\nfear. Nay, excepting some generous natures, it is the only thing, when\nthere is apparence of profit or pleasure by breaking the laws, that\nmakes men keep them. And yet in many cases a crime may be committed\nthrough fear.\n\nFor not every fear justifies the action it produceth, but the fear only\nof corporeal hurt, which we call _bodily fear_, and from which a man\ncannot see how to be delivered, but by the action. A man is assaulted,\nfears present death, from which he sees not how to escape, but by\nwounding him that assaulteth him: if he wound him to death, this is no\ncrime; because no man is supposed at the making of a commonwealth, to\nhave abandoned the defence of his life, or limbs, where the law cannot\narrive time enough to his assistance. But to kill a man, because from\nhis actions, or his threatenings, I may argue he will kill me when he\ncan, seeing I have time, and means to demand protection, from the\nsovereign power, is a crime. Again, a man receives words of disgrace or\nsome little injuries, for which they that made the laws, had assigned no\npunishment, nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of reason,\nto take notice of, and is afraid, unless he revenge it, he shall fall\ninto contempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like injuries from\nothers; and to avoid this, breaks the law, and protects himself for the\nfuture, by the terror of his private revenge. This is a crime: for the\nhurt is not corporeal, but phantastical, and, though in this corner of\nthe world, made sensible by a custom not many years since begun, amongst\nyoung and vain men, so light, as a gallant man, and one that is assured\nof his own courage, cannot take notice of. Also a man may stand in fear\nof spirits, either through his own superstition, or through too much\ncredit given to other men, that tell him of strange dreams and visions;\nand thereby be made believe they will hurt him, for doing, or omitting\ndivers things, which nevertheless, to do, or omit, is contrary to the\nlaws; and that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be excused by\nthis fear; but is a crime. For, as I have shown before in the second\nchapter, dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep, after\nthe impressions our senses had formerly received waking; and when men\nare by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be real visions;\nand therefore he that presumes to break the law upon his own, or\nanother\u2019s dream, or pretended vision, or upon other fancy of the power\nof invisible spirits, than is permitted by the commonwealth, leaveth the\nlaw of nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of\nhis own, or another private man\u2019s brain, which he can never know whether\nit signifieth any thing or nothing, nor whether he that tells his dream,\nsay true, or lie; which if every private man should have leave to do, as\nthey must by the law of nature, if any one have it, there could no law\nbe made to hold, and so all commonwealth would be dissolved.\n\n[Sidenote: Crimes not equal.]\n\nFrom these different sources of crimes, it appears already, that all\ncrimes are not, as the Stoics of old time maintained, of the same allay.\nThere is place, not only for EXCUSE, by which that which seemed a crime,\nis proved to be none at all; but also for EXTENUATION, by which the\ncrime, that seemed great, is made less. For though all crimes do equally\ndeserve the name of injustice, as all deviation from a straight line is\nequally crookedness, which the Stoics rightly observed: yet it does not\nfollow that all crimes are equally unjust, no more than that all crooked\nlines are equally crooked; which the Stoics not observing, held it as\ngreat a crime, to kill a hen, against the law, as to kill one\u2019s father.\n\n[Sidenote: Total excuses.]\n\nThat which totally excuseth a fact, and takes away from it the nature of\na crime, can be none but that, which at the same time, taketh away the\nobligation of the law. For the fact committed once against the law, if\nhe that committed it be obliged to the law, can be no other than a\ncrime.\n\nThe want of means to know the law, totally excuseth. For the law whereof\na man has no means to inform himself, is not obligatory. But the want of\ndiligence to inquire, shall not be considered as a want of means; nor\nshall any man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the government of\nhis own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the laws of nature;\nbecause they are known by the reason he pretends to: only children, and\nmadmen are excused from offences against the law natural.\n\nWhere a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy (and he is then in\nthe power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is so),\nif it be without his own fault, the obligation of the law ceaseth;\nbecause he must obey the enemy, or die; and consequently such obedience\nis no crime: for no man is obliged, when the protection of the law\nfaileth, not to protect himself, by the best means he can.\n\nIf a man, by the terror of present death, be compelled to do a fact\nagainst the law, he is totally excused; because no law can oblige a man\nto abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a law were\nobligatory; yet a man would reason thus, _If I do it not, I die\npresently; if I do it, I die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there is\ntime of life gained_; nature therefore compels him to the fact.\n\nWhen a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life,\nand cannot preserve himself any other way, but by some fact against the\nlaw; as if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth,\nwhich he cannot obtain for money nor charity; or in defence of his life,\nsnatch away another man\u2019s sword; he is totally excused, for the reason\nnext before alleged.\n\n[Sidenote: Excuses against the author.]\n\nAgain, facts done against the law by the authority of another, are by\nthat authority excused against the author; because no man ought to\naccuse his own fact in another, that is but his instrument: but it is\nnot excused against a third person thereby injured; because in the\nviolation of the law, both the author and actor are criminals. From\nhence it followeth that when that man, or assembly, that hath the\nsovereign power, commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a\nformer law, the doing of it is totally excused: for he ought not to\ncondemn it himself, because he is the author; and what cannot justly be\ncondemned by the sovereign, cannot justly be punished by any other.\nBesides, when the sovereign commandeth anything to be done against his\nown former law, the command, as to that particular fact, is an\nabrogation of the law.\n\nIf that man, or assembly, that hath the sovereign power, disclaim any\nright essential to the sovereignty, whereby there accrueth to the\nsubject, any liberty inconsistent with the sovereign power, that is to\nsay, with the very being of a commonwealth, if the subject shall refuse\nto obey the command in anything contrary to the liberty granted, this is\nnevertheless a sin, and contrary to the duty of the subject: for he\nought to take notice of what is inconsistent with the sovereignty,\nbecause it was erected by his own consent and for his own defence; and\nthat such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was granted through\nignorance of the evil consequence thereof. But if he not only disobey,\nbut also resist a public minister in the execution of it, then it is a\ncrime; because he might have been righted, without any breach of the\npeace, upon complaint.\n\nThe degrees of crime are taken on divers scales, and measured, first, by\nthe malignity of the source, or cause; secondly, by the contagion of the\nexample; thirdly, by the mischief of the effect; and fourthly, by the\nconcurrence of times, places, and persons.\n\n[Sidenote: Presumption of power aggravateth.]\n\nThe same fact done against the law, if it proceed from presumption of\nstrength, riches, or friends to resist those that are to execute the\nlaw, is a greater crime than if it proceed from hope of not being\ndiscovered, or of escape by flight: for presumption of impunity by\nforce, is a root, from whence springeth, at all times, and upon all\ntemptations, a contempt of all laws; whereas in the latter case, the\napprehension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders him more obedient\nfor the future. A crime which we know to be so, is greater than the same\ncrime proceeding from a false persuasion that it is lawful; for he that\ncommitteth it against his own conscience, presumeth on his force, or\nother power, which encourages him to commit the same again: but he that\ndoth it by error, after the error is shewn him, is conformable to the\nlaw.\n\n[Sidenote: Evil teachers extenuate.]\n\nHe, whose error proceeds from the authority of a teacher, or an\ninterpreter of the law publicly authorized, is not so faulty as he whose\nerror proceedeth from a peremptory pursuit of his own principles and\nreasoning: for what is taught by one that teacheth by public authority,\nthe commonwealth teacheth, and hath a resemblance of law, till the same\nauthority controlleth it; and in all crimes that contain not in them a\ndenial of the sovereign power, nor are against an evident law, excuseth\ntotally: whereas he that groundeth his actions on his private judgment,\nought, according to the rectitude, or error thereof, to stand or fall.\n\n[Sidenote: Examples of impunity extenuate.]\n\nThe same fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, is a\ngreater crime, than if there have been many precedent examples of\nimpunity. For those examples are so many hopes of impunity, given by the\nsovereign himself: and because he which furnishes a man with such a hope\nand presumption of mercy, as encourageth him to offend, hath his part in\nthe offence; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole.\n\n[Sidenote: Premeditation aggravateth.]\n\nA crime arising from a sudden passion, is not so great, as when the same\nariseth from long meditation: for in the former case there is a place\nfor extenuation, in the common infirmity of human nature: but he that\ndoth it with premeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye on\nthe law, on the punishment, and on the consequence thereof to human\nsociety; all which, in committing the crime, he hath contemned and\npostposed to his own appetite. But there is no suddenness of passion\nsufficient for a total excuse: for all the time between the first\nknowing of the law, and the commission of the fact, shall be taken for a\ntime of deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the law, to\nrectify the irregularity of his passions.\n\nWhere the law is publicly, and with assiduity, before all the people\nread and interpreted, a fact done against it, is a greater crime, than\nwhere men are left without such instruction, to enquire of it with\ndifficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their callings, and be\ninformed by private men: for in this case, part of the fault is\ndischarged upon common infirmity; but, in the former, there is apparent\nnegligence, which is not without some contempt of the sovereign power.\n\n[Sidenote: Tacit approbation of the sovereign extenuates.]\n\nThose facts which the law expressly condemneth, but the law-maker by\nother manifest signs of his will tacitly approveth, are less crimes,\nthan the same facts, condemned both by the law and law-maker. For seeing\nthe will of the law-maker is a law, there appear in this case two\ncontradictory laws; which would totally excuse, if men were bound to\ntake notice of the sovereign\u2019s approbation, by other arguments than are\nexpressed by his command. But because there are punishments consequent,\nnot only to the transgression of his law, but also to the observing of\nit, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot\nreasonably impute the whole crime to the delinquent. For example, the\nlaw condemneth duels; the punishment is made capital: on the contrary\npart, he that refuseth duel, is subject to contempt and scorn, without\nremedy; and sometimes by the sovereign himself thought unworthy to have\nany charge, or preferment in war. If thereupon he accept duel,\nconsidering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of\nthem that have the sovereign power, he ought not in reason to be\nrigorously punished; seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the\npunisher: which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges, or\nany other kind of disobedience; but a care in governors, not to\ncountenance anything obliquely, which directly they forbid. The examples\nof princes, to those that see them, are, and ever have been, more potent\nto govern their actions, than the laws themselves. And though it be our\nduty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet will that duty\nnever be performed, till it please God to give men an extraordinary, and\nsupernatural grace to follow that precept.\n\n[Sidenote: Comparison of crimes from their effects.]\n\nAgain, if we compare crimes by the mischief of their effects; first, the\nsame fact, when it redounds to the damage of many, is greater, than when\nit redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore, when a fact hurteth, not\nonly in the present, but also, by example, in the future, it is a\ngreater crime, than if it hurt only in the present: for the former, is a\nfertile crime, and multiplies to the hurt of many; the latter is barren.\nTo maintain doctrines contrary to the religion established in the\ncommonwealth, is a greater fault, in an authorized preacher, than in a\nprivate person: so also is it, to live profanely, incontinently, or do\nany irreligious act whatsoever. Likewise in a professor of the law, to\nmaintain any point, or do any act, that tendeth to the weakening of the\nsovereign power, is a greater crime, than in another man: also in a man\nthat hath such reputation for wisdom, as that his counsels are followed,\nor his actions imitated by many, his fact against the law, is a greater\ncrime, than the same fact in another: for such men not only commit\ncrime, but teach it for law to all other men. And generally all crimes\nare the greater, by the scandal they give; that is to say, by becoming\nstumbling-blocks to the weak, that look not so much upon the way they go\nin, as upon the light that other man carry before them.\n\n[Sidenote: L\u00e6sa Majestas.]\n\nAlso facts of hostility against the present state of the commonwealth,\nare greater crimes, than the same acts done to private men: for the\ndamage extends itself to all: such are the betraying of the strengths,\nor revealing of the secrets of the commonwealth to an enemy; also all\nattempts upon the representative of the commonwealth, be it a monarch,\nor an assembly; and all endeavours by word, or deed, to diminish the\nauthority of the same, either in the present time, or in succession:\nwhich crimes the Latins understand by _crimina l\u00e6s\u00e6 majestatis_, and\nconsist in design, or act, contrary to a fundamental law.\n\n[Sidenote: Bribery and false testimony.]\n\nLikewise those crimes, which render judgments of no effect, are greater\ncrimes, than injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to receive money\nto give false judgment, or testimony, is a greater crime, than otherwise\nto deceive a man of the like, or a greater sum; because not only he has\nwrong, that falls by such judgments; but all judgments are rendered\nuseless, and occasion ministered to force, and private revenges.\n\n[Sidenote: Depeculation.]\n\nAlso robbery, and depeculation of the public treasure, or revenues, is a\ngreater crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a private man; because\nto rob the public, is to rob many at once.\n\n[Sidenote: Counterfeiting authority.]\n\nAlso the counterfeit usurpation of public ministry, the counterfeiting\nof public seals or public coin, than counterfeiting of a private man\u2019s\nperson, or his seal; because the fraud thereof, extendeth to the damage\nof many.\n\n[Sidenote: Crimes against private men compared.]\n\nOf facts against the law, done to private men, the greater crime, is\nthat, where the damage in the common opinion of men, is most sensible.\nAnd therefore\n\nTo kill against the law, is a greater crime, than any other injury, life\npreserved.\n\nAnd to kill with torment, greater, than simply to kill.\n\nAnd mutilation of a limb, greater, than the spoiling a man of his goods.\n\nAnd the spoiling a man of his goods, by terror of death, or wounds, than\nby clandestine surreption.\n\nAnd by clandestine surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained.\n\nAnd the violation of chastity by force, greater, than by flattery.\n\nAnd of a woman married, than of a woman not married.\n\nFor all these things are commonly so valued: though some men are more,\nand some less sensible of the same offence. But the law regardeth not\nthe particular, but the general inclination of mankind.\n\nAnd therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in words, or\ngesture, when they produce no other harm, than the present grief of him\nthat is reproached, hath been neglected in the laws of the Greeks,\nRomans, and other both ancient and modern commonwealths; supposing the\ntrue cause of such grief to consist, not in the contumely, which takes\nno hold upon men conscious of their own virtue, but in the pusillanimity\nof him that is offended by it.\n\nAlso a crime against a private man, is much aggravated by the person,\ntime, and place. For to kill one\u2019s parent, is a greater crime, than to\nkill another: for the parent ought to have the honour of a sovereign,\nthough he surrendered his power to the civil law; because he had it\noriginally by nature. And to rob a poor man, is a greater crime, than to\nrob a rich man; because it is to the poor a more sensible damage.\n\nAnd a crime committed in the time or place appointed for devotion, is\ngreater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds\nfrom a greater contempt of the law.\n\nMany other cases of aggravation, and extenuation might be added: but by\nthese I have set down, it is obvious to every man, to take the altitude\nof any other crime proposed.\n\n[Sidenote: Public crimes what.]\n\nLastly, because in almost all crimes there is an injury done, not only\nto some private men, but also to the commonwealth; the same crime, when\nthe accusation is in the name of the commonwealth, is called public\ncrime: and when in the name of a private man, a private crime; and the\npleas according thereunto called public, _judicia publica_, Pleas of the\nCrown; or Private Pleas. As in an accusation of murder, if the accuser\nbe a private man, the plea is a Private Plea; if the accuser be the\nsovereign, the plea is a Public Plea.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXVIII.\n\n OF PUNISHMENTS AND REWARDS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The definition of punishment.]\n\nA PUNISHMENT, _is an evil inflicted by public authority, on him that\nhath done, or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a\ntransgression of the law; to the end that the will of men may thereby\nthe better be disposed to obedience_.\n\n[Sidenote: Right to punish whence derived:]\n\nBefore I infer any thing from this definition, there is a question to be\nanswered, of much importance; which is, by what door the right or\nauthority of punishing in any case, came in. For by that which has been\nsaid before, no man is supposed bound by covenant, not to resist\nviolence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right\nto another to lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a\ncommonwealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another; but\nnot of defending himself. Also he obligeth himself, to assist him that\nhath the sovereignty, in the punishing of another; but of himself not.\nBut to covenant to assist the sovereign, in doing hurt to another,\nunless he that so covenanteth have a right to do it himself, is not to\ngive him a right to punish. It is manifest therefore that the right\nwhich the commonwealth, that is, he, or they that represent it, hath to\npunish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the subjects. But\nI have also showed formerly, that before the institution of\ncommonwealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do whatsoever\nhe thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or\nkilling any man in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that\nright of punishing, which is exercised in every commonwealth. For the\nsubjects did not give the sovereign that right; but only in laying down\ntheirs, strengthened him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the\npreservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and\nto him only; and (excepting the limits set him by natural law) as\nentire, as in the condition of mere nature, and of war of every one\nagainst his neighbour.\n\n[Sidenote: Private injuries & revenges no punishments:]\n\nFrom the definition of punishment, I infer, first, that neither private\nrevenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be styled\npunishment; because they proceed not from public authority.\n\n[Sidenote: Nor denial of preferment:]\n\nSecondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the public favour, is\nnot a punishment; because no new evil is thereby on any man inflicted;\nhe is only left in the estate he was in before.\n\n[Sidenote: Nor pain inflicted without public hearing;]\n\nThirdly, that the evil inflicted by public authority, without precedent\npublic condemnation, is not to be styled by the name of punishment; but\nof an hostile act; because the fact for which a man is punished, ought\nfirst to be judged by public authority, to be a transgression of the\nlaw.\n\n[Sidenote: Nor pain inflicted by usurped power;]\n\nFourthly, that the evil inflicted by usurped power, and judges without\nauthority from the sovereign, is not punishment; but an act of\nhostility; because the acts of power usurped, have not for author, the\nperson condemned; and therefore are not acts of public authority.\n\n[Sidenote: Nor pain inflicted without respect to the future good.]\n\nFifthly, that all evil which is inflicted without intention, or\npossibility of disposing the delinquent, or, by his example, other men,\nto obey the laws, is not punishment; but an act of hostility: because\nwithout such an end, no hurt done is contained under that name.\n\n[Sidenote: Natural evil consequences no punishments.]\n\nSixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by nature, divers\nhurtful consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himself\nslain, or wounded; or when he falleth into sickness by the doing of some\nunlawful act; such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author of\nnature, it may be said to be inflicted, and therefore a punishment\ndivine; yet it is not contained in the name of punishment in respect of\nmen, because it is not inflicted by the authority of man.\n\n[Sidenote: Hurt inflicted, if less than the benefit of transgressing, is\n not punishment.]\n\nSeventhly, if the harm inflicted be less than the benefit, or\ncontentment that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is\nnot within the definition; and is rather the price, or redemption, than\nthe punishment of a crime: because it is of the nature of punishment, to\nhave for end, the disposing of men to obey the law; which end, if it be\nless than the benefit of the transgression, it attaineth not, but\nworketh a contrary effect.\n\n[Sidenote: Where the punishment is annexed to the law, a greater hurt is\n not punishment, but hostility.]\n\nEighthly, if a punishment be determined and prescribed in the law\nitself, and after the crime committed, there be a greater punishment\ninflicted, the excess is not punishment, but an act of hostility. For\nseeing the aim of punishment is not a revenge, but terror; and the\nterror of a great punishment unknown, is taken away by the declaration\nof a less, the unexpected addition is no part of the punishment. But\nwhere there is no punishment at all determined by the law, there\nwhatsoever is inflicted, hath the nature of punishment. For he that goes\nabout the violation of a law, wherein no penalty is determined,\nexpecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an arbitrary punishment.\n\n[Sidenote: Hurt inflicted for a fact done before the law, no\n punishment.]\n\nNinthly, harm inflicted for a fact done before there was a law that\nforbade it, is not punishment, but an act of hostility: for before the\nlaw, there is no transgression of the law: but punishment supposeth a\nfact judged, to have been a transgression of the law; therefore harm\ninflicted before the law made, is not punishment, but an act of\nhostility.\n\n[Sidenote: The representative of the commonwealth unpunishable.]\n\nTenthly, hurt inflicted on the representative of the commonwealth, is\nnot punishment, but an act of hostility: because it is of the nature of\npunishment, to be inflicted by public authority, which is the authority\nonly of the representative itself.\n\n[Sidenote: Hurt to revolted subjects is done by right of war, not by way\n of punishment.]\n\nLastly, harm inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, falls not\nunder the name of punishment: because seeing they were either never\nsubject to the law, and therefore cannot transgress it; or having been\nsubject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny\nthey can transgress it, all the harms that can be done them, must be\ntaken as acts of hostility. But in declared hostility, all infliction of\nevil is lawful. From whence it followeth, that if a subject shall by\nfact, or word, wittingly, and deliberately deny the authority of the\nrepresentative of the commonwealth (whatsoever penalty hath been\nformerly ordained for treason) he may lawfully be made to suffer\nwhatsoever the representative will. For in denying subjection, he denies\nsuch punishment as by the law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers\nas an enemy of the commonwealth; that is, according to the will of the\nrepresentative. For the punishments set down in the law, are to\nsubjects, not to enemies; such as are they, that having been by their\nown acts subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the sovereign power.\n\nThe first, and most general distribution of punishments, is into\n_divine_, and _human_. Of the former I shall have occasion to speak, in\na more convenient place hereafter.\n\n_Human_, are those punishments that be inflicted by the commandment of\nman; and are either _corporal_, or _pecuniary_, or _ignominy_, or\n_imprisonment_, or _exile_, or mixed of these.\n\n[Sidenote: Punishments corporal.]\n\n_Corporal punishment_ is that, which is inflicted on the body directly,\nand according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as are\nstripes, or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body, as\nwere before lawfully enjoyed.\n\n[Sidenote: Capital.]\n\nAnd of these, some be _capital_, some _less_ than _capital_. Capital, is\nthe infliction of death; and that either simply, or with torment. Less\nthan capital, are stripes, wounds, chains, and any other corporal pain,\nnot in its own nature mortal. For if upon the infliction of a punishment\ndeath follow not in the intention of the inflictor, the punishment is\nnot to be esteemed capital, though the harm prove mortal by an accident\nnot to be foreseen; in which case death is not inflicted, but hastened.\n\n_Pecuniary punishment_, is that which consisteth not only in the\ndeprivation of a sum of money, but also of lands, or any other goods\nwhich are usually bought and sold for money. And in case the law, that\nordaineth such a punishment, be made with design to gather money, from\nsuch as shall transgress the same, it is not properly a punishment, but\nthe price of privilege and exemption from the law, which doth not\nabsolutely forbid the fact, but only to those that are not able to pay\nthe money: except where the law is natural, or part of religion; for in\nthat case it is not an exemption from the law, but a transgression of\nit. As where a law exacteth a pecuniary mulct, of them that take the\nname of God in vain, the payment of the mulct, is not the price of a\ndispensation to swear, but the punishment of the transgression of a law\nindispensable. In like manner if the law impose a sum of money to be\npaid, to him that has been injured; this is but a satisfaction for the\nhurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured,\nnot the crime of the offender.\n\n[Sidenote: Ignominy.]\n\n_Ignominy_, is the infliction of such evil, as is made dishonourable; or\nthe deprivation of such good, as is made honourable by the commonwealth.\nFor there be some things honourable by nature; as the effects of\ncourage, magnanimity, strength, wisdom, and other abilities of body and\nmind: others made honourable by the commonwealth; as badges, titles,\noffices, or any other singular mark of the sovereign\u2019s favour. The\nformer, though they may fail by nature, or accident, cannot be taken\naway by a law; and therefore the loss of them is not punishment. But the\nlatter, may be taken away by the public authority that made them\nhonourable, and are properly punishments: such are degrading men\ncondemned, of their badges, titles, and offices; or declaring them\nincapable of the like in time to come.\n\n[Sidenote: Imprisonment.]\n\n_Imprisonment_, is when a man is by public authority deprived of\nliberty; and may happen from two divers ends; whereof one is the safe\ncustody of a man accused; the other is the inflicting of pain on a man\ncondemned. The former is not punishment; because no man is supposed to\nbe punished, before he be judicially heard, and declared guilty. And\ntherefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds, or\nrestraint, before his cause be heard, over and above that which is\nnecessary to assure his custody, is against the law of nature. But the\nlatter is punishment, because evil, and inflicted by public authority,\nfor somewhat that has by the same authority been judged a transgression\nof the law. Under this word imprisonment, I comprehend all restraint of\nmotion, caused by an external obstacle, be it a house, which is called\nby the general name of a prison; or an island, as when men are said to\nbe confined to it; or a place where men are set to work, as in old time\nmen have been condemned to quarries, and in these times to galleys; or\nbe it a chain, or any other such impediment.\n\n[Sidenote: Exile.]\n\n_Exile_ (banishment) is when a man is for a crime, condemned to depart\nout of the dominion of the commonwealth, or out of a certain part\nthereof: and during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it:\nand seemeth not in its own nature, without other circumstances, to be a\npunishment; but rather an escape, or a public commandment to avoid\npunishment by flight. And Cicero says, there was never any such\npunishment ordained in the city of Rome; but calls it a refuge of men in\ndanger. For if a man banished, be nevertheless permitted to enjoy his\ngoods, and the revenue of his lands, the mere change of air is no\npunishment, nor does it tend to that benefit of the commonwealth, for\nwhich all punishments are ordained, that is to say, to the forming of\nmen\u2019s wills to the observation of the law; but many times to the damage\nof the commonwealth. For a banished man, is a lawful enemy of the\ncommonwealth that banished him; as being no more a member of the same.\nBut if he be withal deprived of his lands, or goods, then the punishment\nlieth not in the exile, but is to be reckoned amongst punishments\npecuniary.\n\n[Sidenote: The punishment of innocent subjects is contrary to the law of\n nature.]\n\nAll punishments of innocent subjects, be they great or little, are\nagainst the law of nature; for punishment is only for transgression of\nthe law, and therefore there can be no punishment of the innocent. It is\ntherefore a violation, first, of that law of nature, which forbiddeth\nall men, in their revenges, to look at anything but some future good:\nfor there can arrive no good to the commonwealth, by punishing the\ninnocent. Secondly, of that, which forbiddeth ingratitude: for seeing\nall sovereign power, is originally given by the consent of every one of\nthe subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient, be\nprotected thereby; the punishment of the innocent, is a rendering of\nevil for good. And thirdly, of the law that commandeth equity; that is\nto say, an equal distribution of justice; which in punishing the\ninnocent is not observed.\n\n[Sidenote: But the harm done to innocents in war not so.]\n\nBut the infliction of what evil soever, on an innocent man, that is not\na subject, if it be for the benefit of the commonwealth, and without\nviolation of any former covenant, is no breach of the law of nature. For\nall men that are not subjects, are either enemies, or else they have\nceased from being so by some precedent covenants. But against enemies,\nwhom the commonwealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawful by\nthe original right of nature to make war; wherein the sword judgeth not,\nnor doth the victor make distinction of nocent, and innocent, as to the\ntime past nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to the\ngood of his own people. [Sidenote: Nor that which is done to declared\nrebels.] And upon this ground it is, that also in subjects, who\ndeliberately deny the authority of the commonwealth established, the\nvengeance is lawfully extended, not only to the fathers, but also to the\nthird and fourth generation not yet in being, and consequently innocent\nof the fact, for which they are afflicted: because the nature of this\noffence, consisteth in the renouncing of subjection; which is a relapse\ninto the condition of war, commonly called rebellion; and they that so\noffend, suffer not as subjects, but as enemies. For _rebellion_, is but\nwar renewed.\n\n[Sidenote: Reward is either salary or grace.]\n\nREWARD, is either of _gift_, or by _contract_. When by contract, it is\ncalled _salary_, and _wages_; which is benefit due for service\nperformed, or promised. When of gift, it is benefit proceeding from the\n_grace_ of them that bestow it, to encourage, or enable men to do them\nservice. And therefore when the sovereign of a commonwealth appointeth a\nsalary to any public office, he that receiveth it, is bound in justice\nto perform his office; otherwise, he is bound only in honour, to\nacknowledgment, and an endeavour of requital. For though men have no\nlawful remedy, when they be commanded to quit their private business, to\nserve the public, without reward or salary; yet they are not bound\nthereto, by the law of nature, nor by the institution of the\ncommonwealth, unless the service cannot otherwise be done; because it is\nsupposed the sovereign may make use of all their means, insomuch as the\nmost common soldier, may demand the wages of his warfare, as a debt.\n\n[Sidenote: Benefits bestowed for fear are not rewards.]\n\nThe benefit which a sovereign bestoweth on a subject, for fear of some\npower and ability he hath to do hurt to the commonwealth, are not\nproperly rewards; for they are not salaries; because there is in this\ncase no contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the\ncommonwealth disservice: nor are they graces; because they be extorted\nby fear, which ought not to be incident to the sovereign power: but are\nrather sacrifices, which the sovereign, considered in his natural\nperson, and not in the person of the commonwealth, makes, for the\nappeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himself; and\nencourage not to obedience, but on the contrary, to the continuance, and\nincreasing of further extortion.\n\n[Sidenote: Salaries certain and casual.]\n\nAnd whereas some salaries are certain, and proceed from the public\ntreasure; and others uncertain, and casual, proceeding from the\nexecution of the office for which the salary is ordained; the latter is\nin some cases hurtful to the commonwealth; as in the case of judicature.\nFor where the benefit of the judges, and ministers of a court of justice\nariseth from the multitude of causes that are brought to their\ncognizance, there must needs follow two inconveniences: one, is the\nnourishing of suits; for the more suits, the greater benefit: and\nanother that depends on that, which is contention about jurisdiction;\neach court drawing to itself, as many causes as it can. But in offices\nof execution there are not those inconveniences; because their\nemployment cannot be increased by any endeavour of their own. And thus\nmuch shall suffice for the nature of punishment and reward; which are,\nas it were, the nerves and tendons, that move the limbs and joints of a\ncommonwealth.\n\nHitherto I have set forth the nature of man, whose pride and other\npassions have compelled him to submit himself to government: together\nwith the great power of his governor, whom I compared to _Leviathan_,\ntaking that comparison out of the two last verses of the\none-and-fortieth of _Job_; where God having set forth the great power of\n_Leviathan_, calleth him king of the proud. _There is nothing_, saith\nhe, _on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be\nafraid. He seeth every high thing below him; and is king of all the\nchildren of pride._ But because he is mortal, and subject to decay, as\nall other earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven,\nthough not on earth, that he should stand in fear of, and whose laws he\nought to obey; I shall in the next following chapters speak of his\ndiseases, and the causes of his mortality; and of what laws of nature he\nis bound to obey.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXIX.\n\n OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN, OR TEND TO\n THE DISSOLUTION OF A COMMONWEALTH.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Dissolution of commonwealths proceedeth from their imperfect\n institution.]\n\nThough nothing can be immortal, which mortals make; yet, if men had the\nuse of reason they pretend to, their commonwealths might be secured, at\nleast from perishing by internal diseases. For by the nature of their\ninstitution, they are designed to live, as long as mankind, or as the\nlaws of nature, or as justice itself, which gives them life. Therefore\nwhen they come to be dissolved, not by external violence, but intestine\ndisorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the _matter_; but as they\nare the _makers_, and orderers of them. For men, as they become at last\nweary of irregular jostling, and hewing one another, and desire with all\ntheir hearts, to conform themselves into one firm and lasting edifice:\nso for want, both of the art of making fit laws, to square their actions\nby, and also of humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and\ncumbersome points of their present greatness to be taken off, they\ncannot without the help of a very able architect, be compiled into any\nother than a crazy building, such as hardly lasting out their own time,\nmust assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity.\n\nAmongst the _infirmities_ therefore of a commonwealth, I will reckon in\nthe first place, those that arise from an imperfect institution, and\nresemble the diseases of a natural body, which proceed from a defectuous\nprocreation.\n\n[Sidenote: Want of absolute power.]\n\nOf which, this is one, _that a man to obtain a kingdom, is sometimes\ncontent with less power, than to the peace, and defence of the\ncommonwealth is necessarily required_. From whence it cometh to pass,\nthat when the exercise of the power laid by, is for the public safety to\nbe resumed, it hath the resemblance of an unjust act; which disposeth\ngreat numbers of men, when occasion is presented, to rebel; in the same\nmanner as the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents, are\nsubject either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality, derived\nfrom their vicious conception, by breaking out into biles and scabs. And\nwhen kings deny themselves some such necessary power, it is not always,\nthough sometimes, out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office\nthey undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover the same again\nat their pleasure. Wherein they reason not well; because such as will\nhold them to their promises, shall be maintained against them by foreign\ncommonwealths; who in order to the good of their own subjects let slip\nfew occasions to _weaken_ the estate of their neighbours. So was Thomas\nBecket, archbishop of Canterbury, supported against Henry the Second, by\nthe Pope; the subjection of ecclesiastics to the commonwealth, having\nbeen dispensed with by William the Conqueror at his reception, when he\ntook an oath, not to infringe the liberty of the church. And so were the\nbarons, whose power was by William Rufus, to have their help in\ntransferring the succession from his elder brother to himself, increased\nto a degree inconsistent with the sovereign power, maintained in their\nrebellion against king John, by the French.\n\nNor does this happen in monarchy only. For whereas the style of the\nancient Roman commonwealth, was, _the senate and people of Rome_;\nneither senate, nor people pretended to the whole power; which first\ncaused the seditions, of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius\nSaturninus, and others; and afterwards the wars between the senate and\nthe people, under Marius and Sylla; and again under Pompey and C\u00e6sar, to\nthe extinction of their democracy, and the setting up of monarchy.\n\nThe people of Athens bound themselves but from one only action; which\nwas, that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the\nwar for the island of Salamis; and yet thereby, if Solon had not caused\nto be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit of a\nmadman, and in verse, propounded it to the people that flocked about\nhim, they had had an enemy perpetually in readiness, even at the gates\nof their city; such damage, or shifts, are all commonwealths forced to,\nthat have their power never so little limited.\n\n[Sidenote: Private judgment of good and evil.]\n\nIn the second place, I observe the _diseases_ of a commonwealth, that\nproceed from the poison of seditious doctrines, whereof one is, _That\nevery private man is judge of good and evil actions_. This is true in\nthe condition of mere nature, where there are no civil laws; and also\nunder civil government, in such cases as are not determined by the law.\nBut otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of good and evil\nactions, is the civil law; and the judge the legislator, who is always\nrepresentative of the commonwealth. From this false doctrine, men are\ndisposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the\ncommonwealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their\nprivate judgments they shall think fit; whereby the commonwealth is\ndistracted and _weakened_.\n\n[Sidenote: Erroneous conscience.]\n\nAnother doctrine repugnant to civil society, is, that _whatsoever a man\ndoes against his conscience, is sin_; and it dependeth on the\npresumption of making himself judge of good and evil. For a man\u2019s\nconscience, and his judgment is the same thing, and as the judgment, so\nalso the conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is\nsubject to no civil law, sinneth in all he does against his conscience,\nbecause he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not\nso with him that lives in a commonwealth; because the law is the public\nconscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise\nin such diversity, as there is of private consciences, which are but\nprivate opinions, the commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man\ndare to obey the sovereign power, further than it shall seem good in his\nown eyes.\n\n[Sidenote: Pretence of inspiration.]\n\nIt hath been also commonly taught, _that faith and sanctity, are not to\nbe attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration, or\ninfusion_. Which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason\nof his faith; or why every Christian should not be also a prophet; or\nwhy any man should take the law of his country, rather than his own\ninspiration, for the rule of his action. And thus we fall again in the\nfault of taking upon us to judge of good and evil; or to make judges of\nit, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally inspired, to the\ndissolution of all civil government. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing\nby those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them that speak\nto us; which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty; and yet are\nnot supernatural, but only, for the great number of them that concur to\nevery effect, unobservable. Faith and sanctity, are indeed not very\nfrequent; but yet they are not miracles, but brought to pass by\neducation, discipline, correction, and other natural ways, by which God\nworketh them in his elect, at such times as he thinketh fit. And these\nthree opinions, pernicious to peace and government, have in this part of\nthe world, proceeded chiefly from the tongues, and pens of unlearned\ndivines, who joining the words of Holy Scripture together, otherwise\nthan is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men think, that\nsanctity and natural reason, cannot stand together.\n\n[Sidenote: Subjecting the sovereign power to civil laws.]\n\nA fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth, is this,\n_that he that hath the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws_. It\nis true, that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature; because\nsuch laws be divine, and cannot by any man, or commonwealth be\nabrogated. But to those laws which the sovereign himself, that is, which\nthe commonwealth maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to laws,\nis to be subject to the commonwealth, that is to the sovereign\nrepresentative, that is to himself; which is not subjection, but freedom\nfrom the laws. Which error, because it setteth the laws above the\nsovereign, setteth also a judge above him, and a power to punish him;\nwhich is to make a new sovereign; and again for the same reason a third,\nto punish the second; and so continually without end, to the confusion,\nand dissolution of the commonwealth.\n\n[Sidenote: Attributing of absolute propriety to subjects.]\n\nA fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the dissolution of a commonwealth, is,\n_that every private man has an absolute propriety in his goods; such, as\nexcludeth the right of the sovereign_. Every man has indeed a propriety\nthat excludes the right of every other subject: and he has it only from\nthe sovereign power; without the protection whereof, every other man\nshould have equal right to the same. But if the right of the sovereign\nalso be excluded, he cannot perform the office they have put him into;\nwhich is, to defend them both from foreign enemies, and from the\ninjuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a\ncommonwealth.\n\nAnd if the propriety of subjects, exclude not the right of the sovereign\nrepresentative to their goods; much less to their offices of judicature,\nor execution, in which they represent the sovereign himself.\n\n[Sidenote: Dividing of the sovereign power.]\n\nThere is a sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence of\na commonwealth; and it is this, _that the sovereign power may be\ndivided_. For what is it to divide the power of a commonwealth, but to\ndissolve it; for powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for\nthese doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making\nprofession of the laws, endeavour to make them depend upon their own\nlearning, and not upon the legislative power.\n\n[Sidenote: Imitation of neighbour nations.]\n\nAnd as false doctrine, so also oftentimes the example of different\ngovernment in a neighbouring nation, disposeth men to alteration of the\nform already settled. So the people of the Jews were stirred up to\nreject God, and to call upon the prophet Samuel, for a king after the\nmanner of the nations: so also the lesser cities of Greece, were\ncontinually disturbed, with seditions of the aristocratical, and\ndemocratical factions; one part of almost every commonwealth, desiring\nto imitate the Lacedemonians; the other, the Athenians. And I doubt not,\nbut many men have been contented to see the late troubles in England,\nout of an imitation of the Low Countries; supposing there needed no more\nto grow rich, than to change, as they had done, the form of their\ngovernment. For the constitution of man\u2019s nature, is of itself subject\nto desire novelty. When therefore they are provoked to the same, by the\nneighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost\nimpossible for them, not to be content with those that solicit them to\nchange; and love the first beginnings, though they be grieved with the\ncontinuance of disorder; like hot bloods, that having gotten the itch,\ntear themselves with their own nails, till they can endure the smart no\nlonger.\n\n[Sidenote: Imitation of the Greeks and Romans.]\n\nAnd as to rebellion in particular against monarchy; one of the most\nfrequent causes of it, is the reading of the books of policy, and\nhistories of the ancient Greeks, and Romans; from which, young men, and\nall others that are unprovided of the antidote of solid reason,\nreceiving a strong, and delightful impression, of the great exploits of\nwar, achieved by the conductors of their armies, receive withal a\npleasing idea, of all they have done besides; and imagine their great\nprosperity, not to have proceeded from the emulation of particular men,\nbut from the virtue of their popular form of government: not considering\nthe frequent seditions, and civil wars, produced by the imperfection of\ntheir policy. From the reading, I say, of such books, men have\nundertaken to kill their kings, because the Greek and Latin writers, in\ntheir books, and discourses of policy, make it lawful, and laudable, for\nany man so to do; provided, before he do it, he call him tyrant. For\nthey say not _regicide_, that is, killing a king, but _tyrannicide_,\nthat is, killing of a tyrant is lawful. From the same books, they that\nlive under a monarch conceive an opinion, that the subjects in a popular\ncommonwealth enjoy liberty; but that in a monarchy they are all slaves.\nI say, they that live under a monarchy conceive such an opinion; not\nthey that live under a popular government: for they find no such matter.\nIn sum, I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudicial to a\nmonarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publicly read, without\npresent applying such correctives of discreet masters, as are fit to\ntake away their venom: which venom I will not doubt to compare to the\nbiting of a mad dog, which is a disease the physicians call\n_hydrophobia_, or _fear of water_. For as he that is so bitten, has a\ncontinual torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such an\nestate, as if the poison endeavoured to convert him into a dog: so when\na monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those democratical writers,\nthat continually snarl at that estate; it wanteth nothing more than a\nstrong monarch, which nevertheless out of a certain _tyrannophobia_, or\nfear of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhor.\n\n[Sidenote: The opinion that there be more sovereigns than one in the\n commonwealth.]\n\nAs there have been doctors, that hold there be three souls in a man; so\nthere be also that think there may be more souls, that is, more\nsovereigns, than one, in a commonwealth; and set up a _supremacy_\nagainst the _sovereignty_; _canons_ against _laws_; and a _ghostly\nauthority_ against the _civil_; working on men\u2019s minds, with words and\ndistinctions, that of themselves signify nothing, but bewray by their\nobscurity; that there walketh, as some think, invisibly another kingdom,\nas it were a kingdom of fairies, in the dark. Now seeing it is manifest,\nthat the civil power, and the power of the commonwealth is the same\nthing; and that supremacy, and the power of making canons, and granting\nfaculties, implieth a commonwealth; it followeth, that where one is\nsovereign, another supreme; where one can make laws, and another make\ncanons; there must needs be two commonwealths, of one and the same\nsubjects; which is a kingdom divided in itself, and cannot stand. For\nnotwithstanding the insignificant distinction of _temporal_, and\n_ghostly_, they are still two kingdoms, and every subject is subject to\ntwo masters. For seeing the _ghostly_ power challengeth the right to\ndeclare what is sin, it challengeth by consequence to declare what is\nlaw, sin being nothing but the transgression of the law; and again, the\ncivil power challenging to declare what is law, every subject must obey\ntwo masters, who both will have their commands be observed as law; which\nis impossible. Or, if it be but one kingdom, either the _civil_, which\nis the power of the commonwealth, must be subordinate to the _ghostly_,\nand then there is no sovereignty but the _ghostly_; or the _ghostly_\nmust be subordinate to the _temporal_, and then there is no _supremacy_\nbut the _temporal_. When therefore these two powers oppose one another,\nthe commonwealth cannot but be in great danger of civil war and\ndissolution. For the _civil_ authority being more visible, and standing\nin the clearer light of natural reason, cannot choose but draw to it in\nall times a very considerable part of the people: and the _spiritual_,\nthough it stand in the darkness of School distinctions, and hard words,\nyet because the fear of darkness and ghosts, is greater than other\nfears, cannot want a party sufficient to trouble, and sometimes to\ndestroy a commonwealth. And this is a disease which not unfitly may be\ncompared to the epilepsy, or falling sickness, which the Jews took to be\none kind of possession by spirits, in the body natural. For as in this\ndisease, there is an unnatural spirit, or wind in the head that\nobstructeth the roots of the nerves, and moving them violently, taketh\naway the motion which naturally they should have from the power of the\nsoul in the brain, and thereby causeth violent, and irregular motions,\nwhich men call convulsions, in the parts; insomuch as he that is seized\ntherewith, falleth down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into the\nfire, as a man deprived of his senses; so also in the body politic, when\nthe spiritual power, moveth the members of a commonwealth, by the terror\nof punishments, and hope of rewards, which are the nerves of it,\notherwise than by the civil power, which is the soul of the\ncommonwealth, they ought to be moved; and by strange, and hard words\nsuffocates their understanding, it must needs thereby distract the\npeople, and either overwhelm the commonwealth with oppression, or cast\nit into the fire of a civil war.\n\n[Sidenote: Mixed government.]\n\nSometimes also in the merely civil government, there be more than one\nsoul; as when the power of levying money, which is the nutritive\nfaculty, has depended on a general assembly; the power of conduct and\ncommand, which is the motive faculty, on one man; and the power of\nmaking laws, which is the rational faculty, on the accidental consent,\nnot only of those two, but also of a third; this endangereth the\ncommonwealth, sometimes for want of consent to good laws; but most often\nfor want of such nourishment, as is necessary to life, and motion. For\nalthough few perceive, that such government, is not government, but\ndivision of the commonwealth into three factions, and call it mixed\nmonarchy; yet the truth is, that it is not one independent commonwealth,\nbut three independent factions; nor one representative person, but\nthree. In the kingdom of God, there may be three persons independent,\nwithout breach of unity in God that reigneth; but where men reign, that\nbe subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. And therefore if\nthe king bear the person of the people, and the general assembly bear\nalso the person of the people, and another assembly bear the person of a\npart of the people, they are not one person, nor one sovereign, but\nthree persons, and three sovereigns.\n\nTo what disease in the natural body of man, I may exactly compare this\nirregularity of a commonwealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that\nhad another man growing out of his side, with a head, arms, breast, and\nstomach, of his own: if he had had another man growing out of his other\nside, the comparison might then have been exact.\n\n[Sidenote: Want of money.]\n\nHitherto I have named such diseases of a commonwealth, as are of the\ngreatest, and most present danger. There be other not so great; which\nnevertheless are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of\nraising money, for the necessary uses of the commonwealth; especially in\nthe approach of war. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that\nevery subject hath a propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of the\nsovereign\u2019s right to the use of the same. From whence it cometh to pass,\nthat the sovereign power, which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of\nthe commonwealth, finding the passage of money to the public treasury\nobstructed, by the tenacity of the people, whereas it ought to extend\nitself, to encounter, and prevent such dangers in their beginnings,\ncontracteth itself as long as it can, and when it cannot longer,\nstruggles with the people by stratagems of law, to obtain little sums,\nwhich not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for\npresent supply, or perish; and being put often to these extremities, at\nlast reduceth the people to their due temper; or else the commonwealth\nmust perish. Insomuch as we may compare this distemper very aptly to an\nague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter\nobstructed, the veins which by their natural course empty themselves\ninto the heart, are not, as they ought to be, supplied from the\narteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction, and\ntrembling of the limbs; and afterward a hot, and strong endeavour of the\nheart, to force a passage for the blood; and before it can do that,\ncontenteth itself with the small refreshments of such things as cool for\na time, till, if nature be strong enough, it break at last the contumacy\nof the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venom into sweat; or, if\nnature be too weak, the patient dieth.\n\n[Sidenote: Monopolies, and abuses of publicans.]\n\nAgain, there is sometimes in a commonwealth, a disease, which resembleth\nthe pleurisy; and that is, when the treasure of the commonwealth,\nflowing out of its due course, is gathered together in too much\nabundance, in one, or a few private men, by monopolies, or by farms of\nthe public revenues; in the same manner as the blood in a pleurisy,\ngetting into the membrane of the breast, breedeth there an inflammation,\naccompanied with a fever, and painful stitches.\n\n[Sidenote: Popular men.]\n\nAlso the popularity of a potent subject, unless the commonwealth have\nvery good caution of his fidelity, is a dangerous disease; because the\npeople, which should receive their motion from the authority of the\nsovereign, by the flattery and by the reputation of an ambitious man are\ndrawn away from their obedience to the laws, to follow a man, of whose\nvirtues, and designs they have no knowledge. And this is commonly of\nmore danger in a popular government, than in a monarchy; because an army\nis of so great force, and multitude, as it may easily be made believe,\nthey are the people. By this means it was, that Julius C\u00e6sar, who was\nset up by the people against the senate, having won to himself the\naffections of his army, made himself master both of senate and people.\nAnd this proceeding of popular, and ambitious men, is plain rebellion;\nand may be resembled to the effects of witchcraft.\n\n[Sidenote: Excessive greatness of a town, multitude of corporations.]\n\nAnother infirmity of a commonwealth, is the immoderate greatness of a\ntown, when it is able to furnish out of its own circuit, the number, and\nexpense of a great army: as also the great number of corporations; which\nare as it were many lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater,\nlike worms in the entrails of a natural man. [Sidenote: Liberty of\ndisputing against sovereign power.] To which may be added, the liberty\nof disputing against absolute power, by pretenders to political\nprudence; which though bred for the most part in the lees of the people,\nyet animated by false doctrines, are perpetually meddling with the\nfundamental laws, to the molestation of the commonwealth; like the\nlittle worms, which physicians call _ascarides_.\n\nWe may further add, the insatiable appetite, or \u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b9\u03bc\u03b9\u03b1, of enlarging\ndominion; with the incurable _wounds_ thereby many times received from\nthe enemy; and the _wens_, of ununited conquests, which are many times a\nburthen, and with less danger lost, than kept; as also the _lethargy_ of\nease, and _consumption_ of riot and vain expense.\n\n[Sidenote: Dissolution of the commonwealth.]\n\nLastly, when in a war, foreign or intestine, the enemies get a final\nvictory; so as, the forces of the commonwealth keeping the field no\nlonger, there is no further protection of subjects in their loyalty;\nthen is the commonwealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect\nhimself by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him.\nFor the sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion to the\ncommonwealth; which expiring, the members are governed by it no more,\nthan the carcase of a man, by his departed, though immortal, soul. For\nthough the right of a sovereign monarch cannot be extinguished by the\nact of another; yet the obligation of the members may. For he that wants\nprotection, may seek it any where; and when he hath it, is obliged,\nwithout fraudulent pretence of having submitted himself out of fear, to\nprotect his protection as long as he is able. But when the power of an\nassembly is once suppressed, the right of the same perisheth utterly;\nbecause the assembly itself is extinct; and consequently, there is no\npossibility for the sovereignty to re-enter.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXX.\n\n OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVEREIGN\n REPRESENTATIVE.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The procuration of the good of the people.]\n\nThe office of the sovereign, be it a monarch or an assembly, consisteth\nin the end, for which he was trusted with the sovereign power, namely\nthe procuration of _the safety of the people_; to which he is obliged by\nthe law of nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the author\nof that law, and to none but him. But by safety here, is not meant a\nbare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every\nman by lawful industry, without danger, or hurt to the commonwealth,\nshall acquire to himself.\n\n[Sidenote: By instruction and laws.]\n\nAnd this is intended should be done, not by care applied to individuals,\nfurther than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain;\nbut by a general providence, contained in public instruction, both of\ndoctrine, and example; and in the making and executing of good laws, to\nwhich individual persons may apply their own cases.\n\n[Sidenote: Against the duty of a sovereign to relinquish any essential\n right of sovereignty.]\n\nAnd because, if the essential rights of sovereignty, specified before in\nthe eighteenth chapter, be taken away, the commonwealth is thereby\ndissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a\nwar with every other man, which is the greatest evil that can happen in\nthis life; it is the office of the sovereign, to maintain those rights\nentire; and consequently against his duty, first, to transfer to\nanother, or to lay from himself any of them. For he that deserteth the\nmeans, deserteth the ends; and he deserteth the means, that being the\nsovereign, acknowledgeth himself subject to the civil laws; and\nrenounceth the power of supreme judicature; or of making war, or peace\nby his own authority; or of judging of the necessities of the\ncommonwealth; or of levying money and soldiers, when, and as much as in\nhis own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making officers, and\nministers both of war and peace; or of appointing teachers, and\nexamining what doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the defence,\npeace, and good of the people. [Sidenote: Or not to see the people\ntaught the grounds of them.] Secondly, it is against his duty, to let\nthe people be ignorant, or misinformed of the grounds, and reasons of\nthose his essential rights; because thereby men are easy to be seduced,\nand drawn to resist him, when the commonwealth shall require their use\nand exercise.\n\nAnd the grounds of these rights, have the rather need to be diligently,\nand truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any civil law, or\nterror of legal punishment. For a civil law, that shall forbid\nrebellion, (and such is all resistance to the essential rights of the\nsovereignty), is not, as a civil law, any obligation, but by virtue only\nof the law of nature, that forbiddeth the violation of faith; which\nnatural obligation, if men know not, they cannot know the right of any\nlaw the sovereign maketh. And for the punishment, they take it but for\nan act of hostility; which when they think they have strength enough,\nthey will endeavour by acts of hostility, to avoid.\n\n[Sidenote: Objection of those that say there are no principles of reason\n for absolute sovereignty.]\n\nAs I have heard some say, that justice is but a word, without substance;\nand that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himself, not\nonly in the condition of war, but also in a commonwealth, is his own,\nwhich I have already showed to be false: so there be also that maintain,\nthat there are no grounds, nor principles of reason, to sustain those\nessential rights, which make sovereignty absolute. For if there were,\nthey would have been found out in some place, or other; whereas we see,\nthere has not hitherto been any commonwealth, where those rights have\nbeen acknowledged, or challenged. Wherein they argue as ill, as if the\nsavage people of America, should deny there were any grounds, or\nprinciples of reason, so to build a house, as to last as long as the\nmaterials, because they never yet saw any so well built. Time, and\nindustry, produce every day new knowledge. And as the art of well\nbuilding is derived from principles of reason, observed by industrious\nmen, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the divers\neffects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind began, though\npoorly, to build: so, long time after men have begun to constitute\ncommonwealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there may\nprinciples of reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make\ntheir constitution, excepting by external violence, everlasting. And\nsuch are those which I have in this discourse set forth: which whether\nthey come not into the sight of those that have power to make use of\nthem, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular\ninterests, at this day, very little. But supposing that these of mine\nare not such principles of reason; yet I am sure they are principles\nfrom authority of Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when I shall\ncome to speak of the kingdom of God, administered by Moses, over the\nJews, his peculiar people by covenant.\n\n[Sidenote: Objection from the incapacity of the vulgar.]\n\nBut they say again, that though the principles be right, yet common\npeople are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. I\nshould be glad, that the rich and potent subjects of a kingdom, or those\nthat are accounted the most learned, were no less incapable than they.\nBut all men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine,\nproceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the\ninterest of them that are to learn. Potent men, digest hardly any thing\nthat setteth up a power to bridle their affections; and learned men, any\nthing that discovereth their errors, and thereby lesseneth their\nauthority: whereas the common people\u2019s minds, unless they be tainted\nwith dependance on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of\ntheir doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by public\nauthority shall be imprinted in them. Shall whole nations be brought to\n_acquiesce_ in the great mysteries of the Christian religion, which are\nabove reason, and millions of men be made believe, that the same body\nmay be in innumerable places at one and the same time, which is against\nreason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching, and preaching,\nprotected by the law, to make that received, which is so consonant to\nreason, that any unprejudicated man, needs no more to learn it, than to\nhear it? I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in\nthe essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of\nsovereignty, there is no difficulty, whilst a sovereign has his power\nentire, but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom\nhe trusteth in the administration of the commonwealth; and consequently,\nit is his duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not only his\nduty, but his benefit also, and security against the danger that may\narrive to himself in his natural person from rebellion.\n\n[Sidenote: Subjects are to be taught not to affect change of\n government.]\n\nAnd, to descend to particulars, the people are to be taught, first, that\nthey ought not to be in love with any form of government they see in\ntheir neighbour nations, more than with their own, nor, whatsoever\npresent prosperity they behold in nations that are otherwise governed\nthan they, to desire change. For the prosperity of a people ruled by an\naristocratical, or democratical assembly, cometh not from aristocracy,\nnor from democracy, but from the obedience, and concord of the subjects:\nnor do the people flourish in a monarchy, because one man has the right\nto rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of state,\nthe obedience, and consequently the concord of the people, and they\nshall not only not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they\nthat go about by disobedience, to do no more than reform the\ncommonwealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish\ndaughters of Peleus, in the fable; which desiring to renew the youth of\ntheir decrepid father, did by the counsel of Medea, cut him in pieces,\nand boil him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new\nman. This desire of change, is like the breach of the first of God\u2019s\ncommandments: for there God says, _Non habebis Deos alienos_; Thou shalt\nnot have the Gods of other nations; and in another place concerning\n_kings_, that they are _Gods_.\n\n[Sidenote: Nor adhere, against the sovereign, to popular men.]\n\nSecondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with\nadmiration of the virtue of any of their fellow-subjects, how high\nsoever he stand, or how conspicuously soever he shine in the\ncommonwealth; nor of any assembly, except the sovereign assembly, so as\nto defer to them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the sovereign\nonly, whom, in their particular stations, they represent; nor to receive\nany influence from them, but such as is conveyed by them from the\nsovereign authority. For that sovereign cannot be imagined to love his\npeople as he ought, that is not jealous of them, but suffers them by the\nflattery of popular men, to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have\noften been, not only secretly, but openly, so as to proclaim marriage\nwith them _in facie ecclesi\u00e6_ by preachers, and by publishing the same\nin the open streets: which may fitly be compared to the violation of the\nsecond of the ten commandments.\n\n[Sidenote: Nor to dispute the sovereign power.]\n\nThirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how great a\nfault it is, to speak evil of the sovereign representative, whether one\nman, or an assembly of men; or to argue and dispute his power; or any\nway to use his name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into\ncontempt with his people, and their obedience, in which the safety of\nthe commonwealth consisteth, slackened. Which doctrine the third\ncommandment by resemblance pointeth to.\n\n[Sidenote: And to have days set apart to learn their duty.]\n\nFourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when it is taught,\nremember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the\nsovereign power is placed, without setting apart from their ordinary\nlabour, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are\nappointed to instruct them; it is necessary that some such times be\ndetermined, wherein they may assemble together, and, after prayers and\npraises given to God, the sovereign of sovereigns, hear those their\nduties told them, and the positive laws, such as generally concern them\nall, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the authority that maketh\nthem laws. To this end had the Jews every seventh day, a sabbath, in\nwhich the law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they\nwere put in mind, that their king was God; that having created the world\nin six days, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from\ntheir labour, that that God was their king, which redeemed them from\ntheir servile, and painful labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after\nthey had rejoiced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawful\nrecreation. So that the first table of the commandments, is spent all in\nsetting down the sum of God\u2019s absolute power; not only as God, but as\nking by pact, in peculiar, of the Jews; and may therefore give light, to\nthose that have sovereign power conferred on them by the consent of men,\nto see what doctrine they ought to teach their subjects.\n\n[Sidenote: And to honour their parents.]\n\nAnd because the first instruction of children, dependeth on the care of\ntheir parents, it is necessary that they should be obedient to them,\nwhilst they are under their tuition; and not only so, but that also\nafterwards, as gratitude requireth, they acknowledge the benefit of\ntheir education, by external signs of honour. To which end they are to\nbe taught, that originally the father of every man was also his\nsovereign lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the\nfathers of families, when by instituting a commonwealth, they resigned\nthat absolute power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the\nhonour due unto them for their education. For to relinquish such right,\nwas not necessary to the institution of sovereign power; nor would there\nbe any reason, why any man should desire to have children, or take the\ncare to nourish and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no\nother benefit from them, than from other men. And this accordeth with\nthe fifth commandment.\n\n[Sidenote: And to avoid doing of injury.]\n\nAgain, every sovereign ought to cause justice to be taught, which,\nconsisting in taking from no man what is his, is as much as to say, to\ncause men to be taught not to deprive their neighbours, by violence or\nfraud, of any thing which by the sovereign authority is theirs. Of\nthings held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own\nlife, and limbs; and in the next degree, in most men, those that concern\nconjugal affection; and after them, riches and means of living.\nTherefore the people are to be taught, to abstain from violence to one\nanother\u2019s person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugal\nhonour; and from forcible rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one\nanother\u2019s goods. For which purpose also it is necessary they be showed\nthe evil consequences of false judgment, by corruption either of judges\nor witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and\njustice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the\nsixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth commandments.\n\n[Sidenote: And to do all this sincerely from the heart.]\n\nLastly, they are to be taught, that not only the unjust facts, but the\ndesigns and intentions to do them, though by accident hindered, are\ninjustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in\nthe irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth\ncommandment, and the sum of the second table; which is reduced all to\nthis one commandment of mutual charity, _thou shalt love thy neighbour\nas thyself_: as the sum of the first table is reduced to _the love of\nGod_; whom they had then newly received as their king.\n\n[Sidenote: The use of universities.]\n\nAs for the means, and conduits, by which the people may receive this\ninstruction, we are to search, by what means so many opinions, contrary\nto the peace of mankind, upon weak and false principles, have\nnevertheless been so deeply rooted in them. I mean those, which I have\nin the precedent chapter specified: as that men shall judge of what is\nlawful and unlawful, not by the law itself, but by their own\nconsciences; that is to say, by their own private judgments: that\nsubjects sin in obeying the commands of the commonwealth, unless they\nthemselves have first judged them to be lawful: that their propriety in\ntheir riches is such, as to exclude the dominion, which the commonwealth\nhath over the same: that it is lawful for subjects to kill such, as they\ncall tyrants: that the sovereign power may be divided, and the like;\nwhich come to be instilled into the people by this means. They whom\nnecessity, or covetousness keepeth attent on their trades, and labour;\nand they, on the other side, whom superfluity, or sloth carrieth after\ntheir sensual pleasures; which two sorts of men take up the greatest\npart of mankind; being diverted from the deep meditation, which the\nlearning of truth, not only in the matter of natural justice, but also\nof all other sciences necessarily requireth, receive the notions of\ntheir duty, chiefly from divines in the pulpit, and partly from such of\ntheir neighbours or familiar acquaintance, as having the faculty of\ndiscoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser and better learned in\ncases of law and conscience, than themselves. And the divines, and such\nothers as make show of learning, derive their knowledge from the\nuniversities, and from the schools of law, or from the books, which by\nmen, eminent in those schools and universities, have been published. It\nis therefore manifest, that the instruction of the people, dependeth\nwholly, on the right teaching of youth in the universities. But are not,\nmay some man say, the universities of England learned enough already to\ndo that? or is it you, will undertake to teach the universities? Hard\nquestions. Yet to the first, I doubt not to answer; that till towards\nthe latter end of Henry the Eighth, the power of the Pope, was always\nupheld against the power of the commonwealth, principally by the\nuniversities; and that the doctrines maintained by so many preachers,\nagainst the sovereign power of the king, and by so many lawyers, and\nothers, that had their education there, is a sufficient argument, that\nthough the universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet\nthey knew not how to plant the true. For in such a contradiction of\nopinions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently\ninstructed; and it is no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that\nsubtle liquor, wherewith they were first seasoned, against the civil\nauthority. But to the latter question, it is not fit, nor needful for me\nto say either aye, or no: for any man that sees what I am doing, may\neasily perceive what I think.\n\nThe safety of the people, requireth further, from him, or them that have\nthe sovereign power, that justice be equally administered to all degrees\nof people; that is, that as well the rich and mighty, as poor and\nobscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the\ngreat, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they do violence,\ndishonour, or any injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these,\ndoes the like to one of them: for in this consisteth equity; to which,\nas being a precept of the law of nature, a sovereign is as much subject,\nas any of the meanest of his people. All breaches of the law, are\noffences against the commonwealth: but there be some, that are also\nagainst private persons. Those that concern the commonwealth only, may\nwithout breach of equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is\ndone against himself, according to his own discretion. But an offence\nagainst a private man, cannot in equity be pardoned, without the consent\nof him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.\n\nThe inequality of subjects, proceedeth from the acts of sovereign power;\nand therefore has no more place in the presence of the sovereign, that\nis to say, in a court of justice, than the inequality between kings and\ntheir subjects, in the presence of the King of kings. The honour of\ngreat persons, is to be valued for their beneficence and the aids they\ngive to men of inferior rank, or not at all. And the violences,\noppressions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by\nthe greatness of their persons; because they have least need to commit\nthem. The consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in\nthis manner. Impunity maketh insolence; insolence, hatred; and hatred,\nan endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatness,\nthough with the ruin of the commonwealth.\n\n[Sidenote: Equal taxes.]\n\nTo equal justice, appertaineth also the equal imposition of taxes; the\nequality whereof dependeth not on the equality of riches, but on the\nequality of the debt that every man oweth to the commonwealth for his\ndefence. It is not enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance of\nhis life; but also to fight, if need be, for the securing of his labour.\nThey must either do as the Jews did after their return from captivity,\nin re-edifying the temple, build with one hand, and hold the sword in\nthe other; or else they must hire others to fight for them. For the\nimpositions, that are laid on the people by the sovereign power, are\nnothing else but the wages, due to them that hold the public sword, to\ndefend private men in the exercise of their several trades, and\ncallings. Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is\nthe enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor and rich; the debt\nwhich a poor man oweth them that defend his life, is the same which a\nrich man oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who have\nthe service of the poor, may be debtors not only for their own persons\nbut for many more. Which considered, the equality of imposition,\nconsisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed, than of the\nriches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there,\nthat he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour,\nconsumeth little, should be more charged, than he that living idly,\ngetteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more\nprotection from the commonwealth, than the other? But when the\nimpositions, are laid upon those things which men consume, every man\npayeth equally for what he useth: nor is the commonwealth defrauded by\nthe luxurious waste of private men.\n\n[Sidenote: Public charity.]\n\nAnd whereas many men, by accident inevitable, become unable to maintain\nthemselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the charity of\nprivate persons; but to be provided for, as far forth as the necessities\nof nature require, by the laws of the commonwealth. For as it is\nuncharitableness in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it is in the\nsovereign of a commonwealth, to expose them to the hazard of such\nuncertain charity.\n\n[Sidenote: Prevention of idleness.]\n\nBut for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: they are to\nbe forced to work; and to avoid the excuse of not finding employment,\nthere ought to be such laws, as may encourage all manner of arts; as\nnavigation, agriculture, fishing, and all manner of manufacture that\nrequires labour. The multitude of poor, and yet strong people still\nincreasing, they are to be transplanted into countries not sufficiently\ninhabited: where nevertheless, they are not to exterminate those they\nfind there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not to\nrange a great deal of ground, to snatch what they find; but to court\neach little plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in\ndue season. And when all the world is overcharged with inhabitants, then\nthe last remedy of all is war; which provideth for every man, by\nvictory, or death.\n\n[Sidenote: Good laws, what.]\n\nTo the care of the sovereign, belongeth the making of good laws. But\nwhat is a good law? By a good law, I mean not a just law: for no law can\nbe unjust. The law is made by the sovereign power, and all that is done\nby such power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people; and\nthat which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in\nthe laws of a commonwealth, as in the laws of gaming: whatsoever the\ngamesters all agree on, is injustice to none of them. A good law is\nthat, which is _needful_, for the _good of the people_, and withal\n_perspicuous_.\n\n[Sidenote: Such as are necessary.]\n\nFor the use of laws, which are but rules authorized, is not to bind the\npeople from all voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a\nmotion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires,\nrashness or indiscretion; as hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but\nto keep them in their way. And therefore a law that is not needful,\nhaving not the true end of a law, is not good. A law may be conceived to\nbe good, when it is for the benefit of the sovereign; though it be not\nnecessary for the people; but it is not so. For the good of the\nsovereign and people, cannot be separated. It is a weak sovereign, that\nhas weak subjects; and a weak people, whose sovereign wanteth power to\nrule them at his will. Unnecessary laws are not good laws; but traps for\nmoney: which where the right of sovereign power is acknowledged, are\nsuperfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, insufficient to defend\nthe people.\n\n[Sidenote: Such as are perspicuous.]\n\nThe perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the law itself,\nas in a declaration of the causes, and motives for which it was made.\nThat is it, that shows us the meaning of the legislator; and the meaning\nof the legislator known, the law is more easily understood by few, than\nmany words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity; and therefore\nmultiplication of words in the body of the law, is multiplication of\nambiguity: besides it seems to imply, by too much diligence, that\nwhosoever can evade the words, is without the compass of the law. And\nthis is a cause of many unnecessary processes. For when I consider how\nshort were the laws of ancient times; and how they grew by degrees still\nlonger; methinks I see a contention between the penners, and pleaders of\nthe law; the former seeking to circumscribe the latter; and the latter\nto evade their circumscriptions; and that the pleaders have got the\nvictory. It belongeth therefore to the office of a legislator, (such as\nis in all commonwealths the supreme representative, be it one man, or an\nassembly), to make the reason perspicuous, why the law was made; and the\nbody of the law itself, as short, but in as proper, and significant\nterms, as may be.\n\n[Sidenote: Punishments.]\n\nIt belongeth also to the office of the sovereign, to make a right\napplication of punishments, and rewards. And seeing the end of punishing\nis not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the\noffender, or of others by his example; the severest punishments are to\nbe inflicted for those crimes, that are of most danger to the public;\nsuch as are those which proceed from malice to the government\nestablished; those that spring from contempt of justice; those that\nprovoke indignation in the multitude; and those, which unpunished, seem\nauthorized, as when they are committed by sons, servants, or favourites\nof men in authority. For indignation carrieth men, not only against the\nactors, and authors of injustice; but against all power that is likely\nto protect them; as in the case of Tarquin; when for the insolent act of\none of his sons, he was driven out of Rome, and the monarchy itself\ndissolved. But crimes of infirmity; such as are those which proceed from\ngreat provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance\nwhether the fact be a great crime, or not, there is place many times for\nlenity, without prejudice to the commonwealth; and lenity, when there is\nsuch place for it, is required by the law of nature. The punishment of\nthe leaders and teachers in a commotion, not the poor seduced people,\nwhen they are punished, can profit the commonwealth by their example. To\nbe severe to the people, is to punish that ignorance, which may in great\npart be imputed to the sovereign, whose fault it was, that they were no\nbetter instructed.\n\n[Sidenote: Rewards.]\n\nIn like manner it belongeth to the office, and duty of the sovereign, to\napply his rewards always so, as there may arise from them benefit to the\ncommonwealth; wherein consisteth their use, and end; and is then done,\nwhen they that have well served the commonwealth, are with as little\nexpense of the common treasure, as is possible, so well recompensed, as\nothers thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully\nas they can, and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it\nbetter. To buy with money, or preferment, from a popular ambitious\nsubject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions in the\nminds of the people, has nothing of the nature of reward; (which is\nordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a sign of\ngratitude, but of fear; nor does it tend to the benefit, but to the\ndamage of the public. It is a contention with ambition, like that of\nHercules with the monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one\nthat was vanquished, there grew up three. For in like manner, when the\nstubbornness of one popular man, is overcome with reward, there arise\nmany more, by the example, that do the same mischief, in hope of like\nbenefit: and as all sorts of manufacture, so also malice encreaseth by\nbeing vendible. And though sometimes a civil war, may be deferred by\nsuch ways as that, yet the danger grows still the greater, and the\npublic ruin more assured. It is therefore against the duty of the\nsovereign, to whom the public safety is committed, to reward those that\naspire to greatness by disturbing the peace of their country, and not\nrather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger, than\nafter a longer time with greater.\n\n[Sidenote: Counsellors.]\n\nAnother business of the sovereign, is to choose good counsellors; I mean\nsuch, whose advice he is to take in the government of the commonwealth.\nFor this word counsel, _consilium_, corrupted from _considium_, is of a\nlarge signification, and comprehendeth all assemblies of men that sit\ntogether, not only to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, but also\nto judge of facts past, and of law for the present. I take it here in\nthe first sense only: and in this sense, there is no choice of counsel,\nneither in a democracy, nor aristocracy; because the persons counselling\nare members of the person counselled. The choice of counsellors\ntherefore is proper to monarchy; in which, the sovereign that\nendeavoureth not to make choice of those, that in every kind are the\nmost able, dischargeth not his office as he ought to do. The most able\ncounsellors, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evil\ncounsel, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the peace,\nand defence of the commonwealth. It is a hard matter to know who\nexpecteth benefit from public troubles; but the signs that guide to a\njust suspicion, is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable, or\nirremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to\ndischarge their accustomed expenses, and may easily be observed by any\none whom it concerns to know it. But to know, who has most knowledge of\nthe public affairs, is yet harder; and they that know them, need them a\ngreat deal the less. For to know, who knows the rules almost of any art,\nis a great degree of the knowledge of the same art; because no man can\nbe assured of the truth of another\u2019s rules, but he that is first taught\nto understand them. But the best signs of knowledge of any art, are,\nmuch conversing in it, and constant good effects of it. Good counsel\ncomes not by lot, nor by inheritance; and therefore there is no more\nreason to expect good advice from the rich or noble, in matter of state,\nthan in delineating the dimensions of a fortress; unless we shall think\nthere needs no method in the study of the politics, as there does in the\nstudy of geometry, but only to be lookers on; which is not so. For the\npolitics is the harder study of the two. Whereas in these parts of\nEurope, it hath been taken for a right of certain persons, to have place\nin the highest council of state by inheritance; it is derived from the\nconquests of the ancient Germans; wherein many absolute lords joining\ntogether to conquer other nations, would not enter into the confederacy,\nwithout such privileges, as might be marks of difference in time\nfollowing, between their posterity, and the posterity of their subjects;\nwhich privileges being inconsistent with the sovereign power, by the\nfavour of the sovereign, they may seem to keep; but contending for them\nas their right, they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last\nno further honour, than adhereth naturally to their abilities.\n\nAnd how able soever be the counsellors in any affair, the benefit of\ntheir counsel is greater, when they give every one his advice, and the\nreasons of it apart, than when they do it in an assembly, by way of\norations; and when they have premeditated, than when they speak on the\nsudden; both because they have more time, to survey the consequences of\naction; and are less subject to be carried away to contradiction,\nthrough envy, emulation, or other passions arising from the difference\nof opinion.\n\nThe best counsel, in those things that concern not other nations, but\nonly the ease and benefit the subjects may enjoy, by laws that look only\ninward, is to be taken from the general informations, and complaints of\nthe people of each province, who are best acquainted with their own\nwants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in derogation of\nthe essential rights of sovereignty, to be diligently taken notice of.\nFor without those essential rights, as I have often before said, the\ncommonwealth cannot at all subsist.\n\n[Sidenote: Commanders.]\n\nA commander of an army in chief, if he be not popular, shall not be\nbeloved nor feared as he ought to be by his army; and consequently,\ncannot perform that office with good success. He must therefore be\nindustrious, valiant, affable, liberal and fortunate, that he may gain\nan opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his soldiers. This is\npopularity, and breeds in the soldiers both desire, and courage, to\nrecommend themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of the\ngeneral in punishing, when need is, the mutinous, or negligent soldiers.\nBut this love of soldiers, if caution be not given of the commander\u2019s\nfidelity, is a dangerous thing to sovereign power; especially when it is\nin the hands of an assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the\nsafety of the people, both that they be good conductors, and faithful\nsubjects, to whom the sovereign commits his armies.\n\nBut when the sovereign himself is popular; that is, reverenced and\nbeloved of his people, there is no danger at all from the popularity of\na subject. For soldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with\ntheir captain though they love him, against their sovereign, when they\nlove not only his person, but also his cause. And therefore those, who\nby violence have at any time suppressed the power of their lawful\nsovereign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been\nalways put to the trouble of contriving their titles, to save the people\nfrom the shame of receiving them. To have a known right to sovereign\npower, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his\nown part, to turn the hearts of his subjects to him, but that they see\nhim able absolutely to govern his own family: nor, on the part of his\nenemies, but a disbanding of their armies. For the greatest and most\nactive part of mankind, has never hitherto been well contented with the\npresent.\n\nConcerning the offices of one sovereign to another, which are\ncomprehended in that law, which is commonly called the _law of nations_,\nI need not say anything in this place; because the law of nations, and\nthe law of nature, is the same thing. And every sovereign hath the same\nright, in procuring the safety of his people, that any particular man\ncan have, in procuring the safety of his own body. And the same law,\nthat dictateth to men that have no civil government, what they ought to\ndo, and what to avoid in regard of one another, dictateth the same to\ncommonwealths, that is, to the consciences of sovereign princes and\nsovereign assemblies; there being no court of natural justice, but in\nthe conscience only; where not man, but God reigneth; whose laws, such\nof them as oblige all mankind, in respect of God, as he is the author of\nnature, are _natural_; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of\nkings, are _laws_. But of the kingdom of God, as King of kings, and as\nKing also of a peculiar people, I shall speak in the rest of this\ndiscourse.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXXI.\n\n OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY NATURE.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The scope of the following chapters.]\n\nThat the condition of mere nature, that is to say, of absolute liberty,\nsuch as is theirs, that neither are sovereigns, nor subjects, is\nanarchy, and the condition of war: that the precepts, by which men are\nguided to avoid that condition, are the laws of nature: that a\ncommonwealth, without sovereign power, is but a word without substance,\nand cannot stand: that subjects owe to sovereigns, simple obedience, in\nall things wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the laws of God,\nI have sufficiently proved, in that which I have already written. There\nwants only, for the entire knowledge of civil duty, to know what are\nthose laws of God. For without that, a man knows not, when he is\ncommanded any thing by the civil power, whether it be contrary to the\nlaw of God, or not: and so, either by too much civil obedience, offends\nthe Divine Majesty; or through fear of offending God, transgresses the\ncommandments of the commonwealth. To avoid both these rocks, it is\nnecessary to know what are the laws divine. And seeing the knowledge of\nall law, dependeth on the knowledge of the sovereign power, I shall say\nsomething in that which followeth, of the KINGDOM OF GOD.\n\n[Sidenote: Who are subjects in the kingdom of God.]\n\n_God is king, let the earth rejoice_, saith the psalmist, (xcvii. 1).\nAnd again, (_Psalm_ xcix. 1) _God is king, though the nations be angry;\nand he that sitteth on the cherubims, though the earth be moved_.\nWhether men will or not, they must be subject always to the divine\npower. By denying the existence, or providence of God, men may shake off\ntheir ease, but not their yoke. But to call this power of God, which\nextendeth itself not only to man, but also to beasts, and plants, and\nbodies inanimate, by the name of kingdom, is but a metaphorical use of\nthe word. For he only is properly said to reign, that governs his\nsubjects by his word, and by promise of rewards to those that obey it,\nand by threatening them with punishment that obey it not. Subjects\ntherefore in the kingdom of God, are not bodies inanimate, nor creatures\nirrational; because they understand no precepts as his: nor atheists,\nnor they that believe not that God has any care of the actions of\nmankind; because they acknowledge no word for his, nor have hope of his\nrewards or fear of his threatenings. They therefore that believe there\nis a God that governeth the world, and hath given precepts, and\npropounded rewards, and punishments to mankind, are God\u2019s subjects; all\nthe rest, are to be understood as enemies.\n\n[Sidenote: A threefold word of God, reason, revelation, prophecy.]\n\nTo rule by words, requires that such words be manifestly made known; for\nelse they are no laws: for to the nature of laws belongeth a sufficient,\nand clear promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of ignorance;\nwhich in the laws of men is but of one only kind, and that is,\nproclamation, or promulgation by the voice of man. But God declareth his\nlaws three ways; by the dictates of _natural reason_, by _revelation_,\nand by the _voice_ of some _man_, to whom by the operation of miracles,\nhe procureth credit with the rest. From hence there ariseth a triple\nword of God, _rational_, _sensible_, and _prophetic_: to which\ncorrespondeth a triple hearing; _right reason_, _sense supernatural_,\nand _faith_. As for sense supernatural, which consisteth in revelation\nor inspiration, there have not been any universal laws so given, because\nGod speaketh not in that manner but to particular persons, and to divers\nmen divers things.\n\n[Sidenote: A twofold kingdom of God, natural and prophetic.]\n\nFrom the difference between the other two kinds of God\u2019s word,\n_rational_, and _prophetic_, there may be attributed to God, a twofold\nkingdom, _natural_, and _prophetic_: natural, wherein he governeth as\nmany of mankind as acknowledge his providence, by the natural dictates\nof right reason; and prophetic, wherein having chosen out one peculiar\nnation, the Jews, for his subjects, he governed them, and none but them,\nnot only by natural reason, but by positive laws, which he gave them by\nthe mouths of his holy prophets. Of the natural kingdom of God I intend\nto speak in this chapter.\n\n[Sidenote: The right of God\u2019s sovereignty is derived from his\n omnipotence.]\n\nThe right of nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those\nthat break his laws, is to be derived, not from his creating them, as if\nhe required obedience as of gratitude for his benefits; but from his\n_irresistible power_. I have formerly shown, how the sovereign right\nariseth from pact: to show how the same right may arise from nature,\nrequires no more, but to show in what case it is never taken away.\nSeeing all men by nature had right to all things, they had right every\none to reign over all the rest. But because this right could not be\nobtained by force, it concerned the safety of every one, laying by that\nright, to set up men, with sovereign authority, by common consent, to\nrule and defend them: whereas if there had been any man of power\nirresistible, there had been no reason, why he should not by that power\nhave ruled and defended both himself, and them, according to his own\ndiscretion. To those therefore whose power is irresistible, the dominion\nof all men adhereth naturally by their excellence of power; and\nconsequently it is from that power, that the kingdom over men, and the\nright of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth naturally to God\nAlmighty; not as Creator, and gracious; but as omnipotent. And though\npunishment be due for sin only, because by that word is understood\naffliction for sin; yet the right of afflicting, is not always derived\nfrom men\u2019s sin, but from God\u2019s power.\n\n[Sidenote: Sin not the cause of all affliction.]\n\nThis question, _why evil men often prosper, and good men suffer\nadversity_, has been much disputed by the ancient, and is the same with\nthis of ours, _by what right God dispenseth the prosperities and\nadversities of this life_; and is of that difficulty, as it hath shaken\nthe faith, not only of the vulgar, but of philosophers, and which is\nmore, of the Saints, concerning the Divine Providence. _How good_, saith\nDavid, (_Psalm_ lxxiii. 1, 2, 3) _is the God of Israel to those that are\nupright in heart; and yet my feet were almost gone, my treadings had\nwell-nigh slipt; for I was grieved at the wicked, when I saw the ungodly\nin such prosperity_. And Job, how earnestly does he expostulate with\nGod, for the many afflictions he suffered, notwithstanding his\nrighteousness? This question in the case of Job, is decided by God\nhimself, not by arguments derived from Job\u2019s sin, but his own power. For\nwhereas the friends of Job drew their arguments from his affliction to\nhis sin, and he defended himself by the conscience of his innocence, God\nhimself taketh up the matter, and having justified the affliction by\narguments drawn from his power, such as this, (_Job_ xxxviii. 4) _Where\nwast thou, when I laid the foundations of the earth?_ and the like, both\napproved Job\u2019s innocence, and reproved the erroneous doctrine of his\nfriends. Conformable to this doctrine is the sentence of our Saviour,\nconcerning the man that was born blind, in these words, _Neither hath\nthis man sinned, nor his fathers; but that the works of God might be\nmade manifest in him_. And though it be said, _that death entered into\nthe world by sin_, (by which is meant, that if Adam had never sinned, he\nhad never died, that is, never suffered any separation of his soul from\nhis body,) it follows not thence, that God could not justly have\nafflicted him, though he had not sinned, as well as he afflicteth other\nliving creatures, that cannot sin.\n\n[Sidenote: Divine laws.]\n\nHaving spoken of the right of God\u2019s sovereignty, as grounded only on\nnature; we are to consider next, what are the Divine laws, or dictates\nof natural reason; which laws concern either the natural duties of one\nman to another, or the honour naturally due to our Divine Sovereign. The\nfirst are the same laws of nature, of which I have spoken already in the\nfourteenth and fifteenth chapters of this treatise; namely, equity,\njustice, mercy, humility, and the rest of the moral virtues. It\nremaineth therefore that we consider, what precepts are dictated to men,\nby their natural reason only, without other word of God, touching the\nhonour and worship of the Divine Majesty.\n\n[Sidenote: Honour and worship, what.]\n\nHonour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of the power, and\ngoodness of another; and therefore to honour God, is to think as highly\nof his power and goodness, as is possible. And of that opinion, the\nexternal signs appearing in the words and actions of men, are called\n_worship_; which is one part of that which the Latins understand by the\nword _cultus_. For _cultus_ signifieth properly, and constantly, that\nlabour which a man bestows on anything, with a purpose to make benefit\nby it. Now those things whereof we make benefit, are either subject to\nus, and the profit they yield, followeth the labour we bestow upon them,\nas a natural effect; or they are not subject to us, but answer our\nlabour, according to their own wills. In the first sense the labour\nbestowed on the earth, is called _culture_; and the education of\nchildren, a _culture_ of their minds. In the second sense, where men\u2019s\nwills are to be wrought to our purpose, not by force, but by\ncomplaisance, it signifieth as much as courting, that is, a winning of\nfavour by good offices; as by praises, by acknowledging their power, and\nby whatsoever is pleasing to them from whom we look for any benefit. And\nthis is properly _worship_: in which sense _Publicola_, is understood\nfor a worshipper of the people; and _cultus Dei_, for the worship of\nGod.\n\n[Sidenote: Several signs of honour.]\n\nFrom internal honour, consisting in the opinion of power and goodness,\narise three passions; _love_, which hath reference to goodness; and\n_hope_, and _fear_, that relate to power: and three parts of external\nworship; _praise_, _magnifying_, and _blessing_: the subject of praise,\nbeing goodness; the subject of magnifying and blessing, being power, and\nthe effect thereof felicity. Praise, and magnifying are signified both\nby words, and actions: by words, when we say a man is good, or great: by\nactions, when we thank him for his bounty, and obey his power. The\nopinion of the happiness of another, can only be expressed by words.\n\n[Sidenote: Worship natural and arbitrary.]\n\nThere be some signs of honour, both in attributes and actions, that be\nnaturally so; as amongst attributes, _good_, _just_, _liberal_, and the\nlike; and amongst actions, _prayers_, _thanks_, and _obedience_. Others\nare so by institution, or custom of men; and in some times and places\nare honourable; in others, dishonourable; in others, indifferent: such\nas are the gestures in salutation, prayer, and thanksgiving, in\ndifferent times and places, differently used. The former is _natural_;\nthe latter _arbitrary_ worship.\n\n[Sidenote: Worship commanded and free.]\n\nAnd of arbitrary worship, there be two differences: for sometimes it is\na _commanded_, sometimes _voluntary_ worship: commanded, when it is such\nas he requireth, who is worshipped: free, when it is such as the\nworshipper thinks fit. When it is commanded, not the words, or gesture,\nbut the obedience is the worship. But when free, the worship consists in\nthe opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words, or actions by\nwhich we intend honour, seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely, they\nare no worship, because no signs of honour; and no signs of honour,\nbecause a sign is not a sign to him that giveth it, but to him to whom\nit is made, that is, to the spectator.\n\n[Sidenote: Worship public and private.]\n\nAgain, there is a _public_, and a _private_ worship. Public, is the\nworship that a commonwealth performeth, as one person. Private, is that\nwhich a private person exhibiteth. Public, in respect of the whole\ncommonwealth, is free; but in respect of particular men, it is not so.\nPrivate, is in secret free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is\nnever without some restraint, either from the laws, or from the opinion\nof men; which is contrary to the nature of liberty.\n\n[Sidenote: The end of worship.]\n\nThe end of worship amongst men, is power. For where a man seeth another\nworshipped, he supposeth him powerful, and is the readier to obey him;\nwhich makes his power greater. But God has no ends: the worship we do\nhim, proceeds from our duty, and is directed according to our capacity,\nby those rules of honour, that reason dictateth to be done by the weak\nto the more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of damage, or in\nthankfulness for good already received from them.\n\n[Sidenote: Attributes of divine honour.]\n\nThat we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light of\nnature, I will begin with his attributes. Where, first, it is manifest,\nwe ought to attribute to him _existence_. For no man can have the will\nto honour that, which he thinks not to have any being.\n\nSecondly, that those philosophers, who said the world, or the soul of\nthe world was God, spake unworthily of him; and denied his existence.\nFor by God, is understood the cause of the world; and to say the world\nis God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God.\n\nThirdly, to say the world was not created, but eternal, seeing that\nwhich is eternal has no cause, is to deny there is a God.\n\nFourthly, that they who attributing, as they think, ease to God, take\nfrom him the care of mankind; take from him his honour: for it takes\naway men\u2019s love, and fear of him; which is the root of honour.\n\nFifthly, in those things that signify greatness, and power; to say he is\n_finite_, is not to honour him: for it is not a sign of the will to\nhonour God, to attribute to him less than we can; and finite, is less\nthan we can; because to finite, it is easy to add more.\n\nTherefore to attribute _figure_ to him, is not honour; for all figure is\nfinite:\n\nNor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an _idea_ of him, in our\nmind: for whatsoever we conceive is finite:\n\nNor to attribute to him _parts_, or _totality_; which are the attributes\nonly of things finite:\n\nNor to say he is in this, or that _place_: for whatsoever is in place,\nis bounded, and finite: Nor that he is _moved_, or _resteth_: for both\nthese attributes ascribe to him place:\n\nNor that there be more Gods than one; because it implies them all\nfinite: for there cannot be more than one infinite:\n\nNor to ascribe to him, (unless metaphorically, meaning not the passion\nbut the effect,) passions that partake of grief; as _repentance_,\n_anger_, _mercy_: or of want; as _appetite_, _hope_, _desire_; or of any\npassive faculty: for passion, is power limited by somewhat else.\n\nAnd therefore when we ascribe to God a _will_, it is not to be\nunderstood, as that of man, for a _rational appetite_; but as the power,\nby which he effecteth every thing.\n\nLikewise when we attribute to him _sight_, and other acts of sense; as\nalso _knowledge_, and _understanding_; which in us is nothing else, but\na tumult of the mind, raised by external things that press the organical\nparts of man\u2019s body: for there is no such thing in God; and being things\nthat depend on natural causes, cannot be attributed to him.\n\nHe that will attribute to God, nothing but what is warranted by natural\nreason, must either use such negative attributes, as _infinite_,\n_eternal_, _incomprehensible_; or superlatives, as _most high_, _most\ngreat_, and the like; or indefinite, as _good_, _just_, _holy_,\n_creator_; and in such sense, as if he meant not to declare what he is,\n(for that were to circumscribe him within the limits of our fancy,) but\nhow much we admire him, and how ready we would be to obey him; which is\na sign of humility, and of a will to honour him as much as we can. For\nthere is but one name to signify our conception of his nature, and that\nis, I AM: and but one name of his relation to us, and that is, _God_; in\nwhich is contained Father, King, and Lord.\n\n[Sidenote: Actions that are signs of divine honour.]\n\nConcerning the actions of divine worship, it is a most general precept\nof reason, that they be signs of the intention to honour God; such as\nare, first, _prayers_. For not the carvers, when they made images, were\nthought to make them gods; but the people that _prayed_ to them.\n\nSecondly, _thanksgiving_; which differeth from prayer in divine worship,\nno otherwise, than that prayers precede, and thanks succeed the benefit;\nthe end, both of the one and the other, being to acknowledge God, for\nauthor of all benefits, as well past, as future.\n\nThirdly, _gifts_, that is to say, _sacrifices_ and _oblations_, if they\nbe of the best, are signs of honour: for they are thanksgivings.\n\nFourthly, _not to swear by any but God_, is naturally a sign of honour:\nfor it is a confession that God only knoweth the heart; and that no\nman\u2019s wit or strength can protect a man against God\u2019s vengeance on the\nperjured.\n\nFifthly, it is a part of rational worship, to speak considerately of\nGod; for it argues a fear of him, and fear is a confession of his power.\nHence followeth, that the name of God is not to be used rashly, and to\nno purpose; for that is as much, as in vain: and it is to no purpose,\nunless it be by way of oath, and by order of the commonwealth, to make\njudgments certain; or between commonwealths, to avoid war. And that\ndisputing of God\u2019s nature is contrary to his honour: for it is supposed,\nthat in this natural kingdom of God, there is no other way to know\nanything, but by natural reason, that is, from the principles of natural\nscience; which are so far from teaching us any thing of God\u2019s nature, as\nthey cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the smallest\ncreature living. And therefore, when men out of the principles of\nnatural reason, dispute of the attributes of God, they but dishonour\nhim: for in the attributes which we give to God, we are not to consider\nthe signification of philosophical truth; but the signification of pious\nintention, to do him the greatest honour we are able. From the want of\nwhich consideration, have proceeded the volumes of disputation about the\nnature of God, that tend not to his honour, but to the honour of our own\nwits and learning; and are nothing else but inconsiderate and vain\nabuses of his sacred name.\n\nSixthly, in _prayers_, _thanksgivings_, _offerings_, and _sacrifices_,\nit is a dictate of natural reason, that they be every one in his kind\nthe best, and most significant of honour. As for example, that prayers\nand thanksgiving, be made in words and phrases, not sudden, nor light,\nnor plebeian; but beautiful, and well composed. For else we do not God\nas much honour as we can. And therefore the heathens did absurdly, to\nworship images for gods: but their doing it in verse, and with music,\nboth of voice and instruments, was reasonable. Also that the beasts they\noffered in sacrifice, and the gifts they offered, and their actions in\nworshipping, were full of submission, and commemorative of benefits\nreceived, was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to\nhonour him.\n\nSeventhly, reason directeth not only to worship God in secret; but also,\nand especially, in public, and in the sight of men. For without that,\nthat which in honour is most acceptable, the procuring others to honour\nhim, is lost.\n\nLastly, obedience to his laws, that is, in this case to the laws of\nnature, is the greatest worship of all. For as obedience is more\nacceptable to God than sacrifice; so also to set light by his\ncommandments, is the greatest of all contumelies. And these are the laws\nof that divine worship, which natural reason dictateth to private men.\n\n[Sidenote: Public worship consisteth in uniformity.]\n\nBut seeing a commonwealth is but one person, it ought also to exhibit to\nGod but one worship; which then it doth, when it commandeth it to be\nexhibited by private men, publicly. And this is public worship; the\nproperty whereof, is to be _uniform_: for those actions that are done\ndifferently, by different men, cannot be said to be a public worship.\nAnd therefore, where many sorts of worship be allowed, proceeding from\nthe different religions of private men, it cannot be said there is any\npublic worship, nor that the commonwealth is of any religion at all.\n\n[Sidenote: All attributes depend on the laws civil.]\n\nAnd because words, and consequently the attributes of God, have their\nsignification by agreement and constitution of men, those attributes are\nto be held significative of honour, that men intend shall so be; and\nwhatsoever may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no\nlaw but reason, may be done by the will of the commonwealth, by laws\ncivil. And because a commonwealth hath no will, nor makes no laws, but\nthose that are made by the will of him, or them that have the sovereign\npower; it followeth that those attributes which the sovereign ordaineth,\nin the worship of God, for signs of honour, ought to be taken and used\nfor such, by private men in their public worship.\n\n[Sidenote: Not all actions.]\n\nBut because not all actions are signs by constitution, but some are\nnaturally signs of honour, others of contumely; these latter, which are\nthose that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reverence,\ncannot be made by human power a part of Divine worship; nor the former,\nsuch as are decent, modest, humble behaviour, ever be separated from it.\nBut whereas there be an infinite number of actions and gestures of an\nindifferent nature; such of them as the commonwealth shall ordain to be\npublicly and universally in use, as signs of honour, and part of God\u2019s\nworship, are to be taken and used for such by the subjects. And that\nwhich is said in the Scripture, _It is better to obey God than man_,\nhath place in the kingdom of God by pact, and not by nature.\n\n[Sidenote: Natural punishments.]\n\nHaving thus briefly spoken of the natural kingdom of God, and his\nnatural laws, I will add only to this chapter a short declaration of his\nnatural punishments. There is no action of man in this life, that is not\nthe beginning of so long a chain of consequences, as no human providence\nis high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end. And in this chain,\nthere are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such\nmanner, as he that will do anything for his pleasure, must engage\nhimself to suffer all the pains annexed to it; and these pains, are the\nnatural punishments of those actions, which are the beginning of more\nharm than good. And hereby it comes to pass, that intemperance is\nnaturally punished with diseases; rashness, with mischances; injustice,\nwith the violence of enemies; pride, with ruin; cowardice, with\noppression; negligent government of princes, with rebellion; and\nrebellion, with slaughter. For seeing punishments are consequent to the\nbreach of laws; natural punishments must be naturally consequent to the\nbreach of the laws of nature; and therefore follow them as their\nnatural, not arbitrary effects.\n\n[Sidenote: The conclusion of the second part.]\n\nAnd thus far concerning the constitution, nature, and right of\nsovereigns, and concerning the duty of subjects, derived from the\nprinciples of natural reason. And now, considering how different this\ndoctrine is, from the practice of the greatest part of the world,\nespecially of these western parts, that have received their moral\nlearning from Rome and Athens; and how much depth of moral philosophy is\nrequired, in them that have the administration of the sovereign power; I\nam at the point of believing this my labour, as useless, as the\ncommonwealth of Plato. For he also is of opinion that it is impossible\nfor the disorders of state, and change of governments by civil war, ever\nto be taken away, till sovereigns be philosophers. But when I consider\nagain, that the science of natural justice, is the only science\nnecessary for sovereigns and their principal ministers; and that they\nneed not be charged with the sciences mathematical, as by Plato they\nare, farther than by good laws to encourage men to the study of them;\nand that neither Plato, nor any other philosopher hitherto, hath put\ninto order, and sufficiently or probably proved all the theorems of\nmoral doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how\nto obey; I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of\nmine may fall into the hands of a sovereign, who will consider it\nhimself, (for it is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any\ninterested, or envious interpreter; and by the exercise of entire\nsovereignty, in protecting the public teaching of it, convert this truth\nof speculation, into the utility of practice.\n\n\n\n\n PART III.\n\n OF A\n CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXXII.\n\n OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN POLITICS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The word of God delivered by prophets is the main principle\n of Christian politics.]\n\nI have derived the rights of sovereign power, and the duty of subjects,\nhitherto from the principles of nature only; such as experience has\nfound true, or consent concerning the use of words has made so; that is\nto say, from the nature of men, known to us by experience, and from\ndefinitions of such words as are essential to all political reasoning,\nuniversally agreed on. But in that I am next to handle, which is the\nnature and rights of a CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH, whereof there dependeth\nmuch upon supernatural revelations of the will of God; the ground of my\ndiscourse must be, not only the natural word of God, but also the\nprophetical.\n\n[Sidenote: Yet is not natural reason to be renounced.]\n\nNevertheless, we are not to renounce our senses, and experience; nor,\nthat which is the undoubted word of God, our natural reason. For they\nare the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the\ncoming again of our blessed Saviour; and therefore not to be folded up\nin the napkin of an implicit faith, but employed in the purchase of\njustice, peace, and true religion. For though there be many things in\nGod\u2019s word above reason; that it is to say, which cannot by natural\nreason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing\ncontrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our\nunskilful interpretation, or erroneous ratiocination.\n\nTherefore, when anything therein written is too hard for our\nexamination, we are bidden to captivate our understanding to the words;\nand not to labour in sifting out a philosophical truth by logic, of such\nmysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of natural\nscience. For it is with the mysteries of our religion, as with wholesome\npills for the sick; which swallowed whole, have the virtue to cure; but\nchewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect.\n\n[Sidenote: What it is to captivate the understanding.]\n\nBut by the captivity of our understanding, is not meant a submission of\nthe intellectual faculty to the opinion of any other man; but of the\nwill to obedience, where obedience is due. For sense, memory,\nunderstanding, reason, and opinion are not in our power to change; but\nalways, and necessarily such, as the things we see, hear, and consider\nsuggest unto us; and therefore are not effects of our will, but our will\nof them. We then captivate our understanding and reason, when we forbear\ncontradiction; when we so speak, as by lawful authority we are\ncommanded; and when we live accordingly; which, in sum, is trust and\nfaith reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any\nnotion at all from the words spoken.\n\n[Sidenote: How God speaketh to men.]\n\nWhen God speaketh to man, it must be either immediately; or by mediation\nof another man, to whom he had formerly spoken by himself immediately.\nHow God speaketh to a man immediately, may be understood by those well\nenough, to whom he hath so spoken; but how the same should be understood\nby another, is hard, if not impossible to know. For if a man pretend to\nme, that God hath spoken to him supernaturally and immediately, and I\nmake doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce,\nto oblige me to believe it. It is true, that if he be my sovereign, he\nmay oblige me to obedience, so, as not by act or word to declare I\nbelieve him not; but not to think any otherwise than my reason persuades\nme. But if one that hath not such authority over me, should pretend the\nsame, there is nothing that exacteth either belief, or obedience.\n\nFor to say that God hath spoken to him in the Holy Scripture, is not to\nsay God hath spoken to him immediately, but by mediation of the\nprophets, or of the apostles, or of the church, in such manner as he\nspeaks to all other Christian men. To say he hath spoken to him in a\ndream, is no more than to say he dreamed that God spake to him; which is\nnot of force to win belief from any man, that knows dreams are for the\nmost part natural, and may proceed from former thoughts; and such dreams\nas that, from self-conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of\na man\u2019s own godliness, or other virtue, by which he thinks he hath\nmerited the favour of extraordinary revelation. To say he hath seen a\nvision, or heard a voice, is to say, that he hath dreamed between\nsleeping and waking: for in such manner a man doth many times naturally\ntake his dream for a vision, as not having well observed his own\nslumbering. To say he speaks by supernatural inspiration, is to say he\nfinds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for\nwhich he can allege no natural and sufficient reason. So that though God\nAlmighty can speak to a man by dreams, visions, voice, and inspiration;\nyet he obliges no man to believe he hath so done to him that pretends\nit; who, being a man, may err, and, which is more, may lie.\n\n[Sidenote: By what marks prophets are known.]\n\nHow then can he, to whom God hath never revealed his will immediately,\nsaving by the way of natural reason, know when he is to obey, or not to\nobey his word, delivered by him that says he is a prophet? Of four\nhundred prophets, of whom the king of Israel asked counsel, concerning\nthe war he made against Ramoth Gilead, (_1 Kings_, xxii.) only Micaiah\nwas a true one. The prophet that was sent to prophecy against the altar\nset up by Jeroboam, (_1 Kings_, xiii.) though a true prophet, and that\nby two miracles done in his presence, appears to be a prophet sent from\nGod, was yet deceived by another old prophet, that persuaded him as from\nthe mouth of God, to eat and drink with him. If one prophet deceive\nanother, what certainty is there of knowing the will of God, by other\nway than that of reason? To which I answer out of the Holy Scripture,\nthat there be two marks, by which together, not asunder, a true prophet\nis to be known. One is the doing of miracles; the other is the not\nteaching any other religion than that which is already established.\nAsunder, I say, neither of these is sufficient. _If a prophet rise\namongst you, or a dreamer of dreams, and shall pretend the doing of a\nmiracle and the miracle come to pass; if he say, Let us follow strange\nGods, which thou hast not known, thou shalt not hearken to him, &c. But\nthat prophet and dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he\nhath spoken to you to revolt from the Lord your God._ (_Deut._ xiii.\n1-5.) In which words two things are to be observed; first, that God will\nnot have miracles alone serve for arguments, to approve the prophet\u2019s\ncalling; but, as it is in the third verse, for an experiment of the\nconstancy of our adherence to himself. For the works of the Egyptian\nsorcerers, though not so great as those of Moses, yet were great\nmiracles. Secondly, that how great soever the miracle be, yet if it tend\nto stir up revolt against the king, or him that governeth by the king\u2019s\nauthority, he that doth such miracle, is not to be considered otherwise\nthan as sent to make trial of their allegiance. For these words, _revolt\nfrom the Lord your God_, are in this place equivalent to _revolt from\nyour king_. For they had made God their king by pact at the foot of\nMount Sinai; who ruled them by Moses only; for he only spake with God,\nand from time to time declared God\u2019s commandments to the people. In like\nmanner, after our Saviour Christ had made his disciples acknowledge him\nfor the Messiah, (that is to say, for God\u2019s anointed, whom the nation of\nthe Jews daily expected for their king, but refused when he came,) he\nomitted not to advertise them of the danger of miracles. _There shall\narise_, saith he, _false Christs, and false prophets, and shall do great\nwonders and miracles, even to the seducing, if it were possible, of the\nvery elect_. (_Matt._ xxiv. 24.) By which it appears, that false\nprophets may have the power of miracles; yet are we not to take their\ndoctrine for God\u2019s word. St. Paul says farther to the Galatians, (_Gal._\ni. 8.) that _if himself, or an angel from heaven preach another gospel\nto them, than he had preached, let him be accursed_. That gospel was,\nthat Christ was King; so that all preaching against the power of the\nking received, in consequence to these words, is by St. Paul accursed.\nFor his speech is addressed to those, who by his preaching had already\nreceived Jesus for the Christ, that is to say, for King of the Jews.\n\n[Sidenote: The marks of a prophet in the old law, miracles, and doctrine\n comformable to the law.]\n\nAnd as miracles, without preaching that doctrine which God hath\nestablished; so preaching the true doctrine, without the doing of\nmiracles, is an insufficient argument of immediate revelation. For if a\nman that teacheth not false doctrine, should pretend to be a prophet\nwithout showing any miracle, he is never the more to be regarded for his\npretence, as is evident by _Deut._ xviii. v. 21, 22, _If thou say in thy\nheart, How shall we know that the word_ (of the prophet) _is not that\nwhich the Lord hath spoken? when the prophet shall have spoken in the\nname of the Lord, that which shall not come to pass, that is the word\nwhich the Lord hath not spoken, but the prophet has spoken it out of the\npride of his own heart, fear him not._ But a man may here again ask,\nwhen the prophet hath foretold a thing, how shall we know whether it\nwill come to pass or not? For he may foretell it as a thing to arrive\nafter a certain long time, longer than the time of man\u2019s life; or\nindefinitely, that it will come to pass one time or other: in which case\nthis mark of a prophet is unuseful; and therefore the miracles that\noblige us to believe a prophet, ought to be confirmed by an immediate,\nor a not long deferred event. So that it is manifest, that the teaching\nof the religion which God hath established, and the showing of a present\nmiracle, joined together, were the only marks whereby the Scripture\nwould have a true prophet, that is to say, immediate revelation, to be\nacknowledged; neither of them being singly sufficient to oblige any\nother man to regard what he saith.\n\n[Sidenote: Miracles ceasing, prophets cease, and the Scripture supplies\n their place.]\n\nSeeing therefore miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to\nacknowledge the pretended revelations or inspirations of any private\nman; nor obligation to give ear to any doctrine, farther than it is\nconformable to the Holy Scriptures, which since the time of our Saviour,\nsupply the place, and sufficiently recompense the want of all other\nprophecy; and from which, by wise and learned interpretation, and\ncareful ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge\nof our duty both to God and man, without enthusiasm or supernatural\ninspiration, may easily be deduced. And this Scripture is it, out of\nwhich I am to take the principles of my discourse, concerning the rights\nof those that are the supreme governors on earth of Christian\ncommonwealths; and of the duty of Christian subjects towards their\nsovereigns. And to that end, I shall speak in the next chapter, of the\nbooks, writers, scope and authority of the Bible.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXXIII.\n\n OF THE NUMBER, ANTIQUITY, SCOPE, AUTHORITY\n AND INTERPRETERS OF THE BOOKS OF\n HOLY SCRIPTURE.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Of the books of Holy Scripture.]\n\nBy the Books of Holy SCRIPTURE, are understood those, which ought to be\nthe _canon_, that is to say, the rules of Christian life.\n\nAnd because all rules of life, which men are in conscience bound to\nobserve, are laws; the question of the Scripture, is the question of\nwhat is law throughout all Christendom, both natural and civil. For\nthough it be not determined in Scripture, what laws every Christian king\nshall constitute in his own dominions; yet it is determined what laws he\nshall not constitute. Seeing therefore I have already proved, that\nsovereigns in their own dominions are the sole legislators; those books\nonly are canonical, that is, law, in every nation, which are established\nfor such by the sovereign authority. It is true, that God is the\nsovereign of all sovereigns; and therefore, when he speaks to any\nsubject, he ought to be obeyed, whatsoever any earthly potentate command\nto the contrary. But the question is not of obedience to God, but of\n_when_ and _what_ God hath said; which to subjects that have no\nsupernatural revelation, cannot be known, but by that natural reason,\nwhich guideth them, for the obtaining of peace and justice, to obey the\nauthority of their several commonwealths, that is to say, of their\nlawful sovereigns. According to this obligation, I can acknowledge no\nother books of the Old Testament, to be Holy Scripture, but those which\nhave been commanded to be acknowledged for such, by the authority of the\nChurch of England. What books these are, is sufficiently known, without\na catalogue of them here; and they are the same that are acknowledged by\nSt. Jerome, who holdeth the rest, namely, the _Wisdom of Solomon_,\n_Ecclesiasticus_, _Judith_, _Tobias_, the first and the second of\n_Maccabees_, (though he had seen the first in Hebrew,) and the third and\nfourth of _Esdras_, for _Apocrypha_. Of the canonical, Josephus, a\nlearned Jew, that wrote in the time of the emperor Domitian, reckoneth\n_twenty-two_, making the number agree with the Hebrew alphabet. St.\nJerome does the same, though they reckon them in different manner. For\nJosephus numbers _five_ Books of _Moses_, _thirteen_ of _Prophets_ that\nwrit the history of their own times, (which how it agrees with the\nprophets\u2019 writings contained in the Bible we shall see hereafter,) and\n_four_ of _hymns_ and moral precepts. But St. Jerome reckons _five_\nbooks of _Moses_, _eight_ of _Prophets_, and _nine_ of other Holy Writ,\nwhich he calls of \u1f01\u03b3\u03b9\u03cc\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03b1. The Septuagint, who were seventy learned\nmen of the Jews, sent for by Ptolemy, king of Egypt, to translate the\nJewish law out of the Hebrew into the Greek, have left us no other for\nHoly Scripture in the Greek tongue, but the same that are received in\nthe Church of England.\n\n[Sidenote: Their antiquity.]\n\nAs for the Books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged for\ncanon by all Christian churches, and by all sects of Christians, that\nadmit any books at all for canonical.\n\nWho were the original writers of the several Books of Holy Scripture,\nhas not been made evident by any sufficient testimony of other history,\nwhich is the only proof of matter of fact; nor can be, by any arguments\nof natural reason: for reason serves only to convince the truth, not of\nfact, but, of consequence. The light therefore that must guide us in\nthis question, must be that which is held out unto us from the books\nthemselves: and this light, though it show us not the writer of every\nbook, yet it is not unuseful to give us knowledge of the time, wherein\nthey were written.\n\n[Sidenote: The Pentateuch not written by Moses.]\n\nAnd first, for the _Pentateuch_, it is not argument enough that they\nwere written by Moses, because they are called the five Books of\n_Moses_; no more than these titles, the Book of _Joshua_, the Book of\n_Judges_, the Book of _Ruth_, and the Books of the _Kings_, are\narguments sufficient to prove, that they were written by _Joshua_, by\nthe _Judges_, by _Ruth_, and by the _Kings_. For in titles of books, the\nsubject is marked, as often as the writer. The history of Livy, denotes\nthe writer; but the history of Scanderberg, is denominated from the\nsubject. We read in the last chapter of _Deuteronomy_, verse 6th,\nconcerning the sepulchre of Moses, _that no man knoweth of his sepulchre\nto this day_, that is, to to the day wherein those words were written.\nIt is therefore manifest, that those words were written after his\ninterment. For it were a strange interpretation, to say Moses spake of\nhis own sepulchre, though by prophecy, that it was not found to that\nday, wherein he was yet living. But it may perhaps be alleged, that the\nlast chapter only, not the whole Pentateuch, was written by some other\nman, but the rest not. Let us therefore consider that which we find in\nthe book of Genesis, (xii. 6.) _And Abraham passed through the land to\nthe place of Sichem, unto the plain of Moreh, and the_ Canaanite _was\nthen in the land_; which must needs be the words of one that wrote when\nthe Canaanite was not in the land; and consequently, not of Moses, who\ndied before he came into it. Likewise _Numbers_, xxi. 14, the writer\nciteth another more ancient book, entitled, _The Book of the Wars of the\nLord_, wherein were registered the acts of Moses, at the Red Sea, and at\nthe brook of Arnon. It is therefore sufficiently evident, that the five\nBooks of Moses were written after his time, though how long after it be\nnot so manifest.\n\nBut though Moses did not compile those books entirely, and in the form\nwe have them; yet he wrote all that which he is there said to have\nwritten: as for example, the Volume of the Law, which is contained, as\nit seemeth, in the xith. of _Deuteronomy_, and the following chapters to\nthe xxviith. which was also commanded to be written on stones, in their\nentry into the land of Canaan. And this also did Moses himself write,\n(_Deut._ xxxi. 9, 10) and delivered to the priests and elders of Israel,\nto be read every seventh year to all Israel, at their assembling in the\nFeast of Tabernacles. And this is that law which God commanded, that\ntheir kings, when they should have established that form of government,\nshould take a copy of from the priests and Levites: and which Moses\ncommanded the priests and Levites to lay in the side of the ark,\n(_Deut._ xxxi. 26); and the same which having been lost, was long time\nafter found again by Hilkiah, and sent to king Josias (_2 Kings_ xxii.\n8) who causing it to be read to the people, (_2 Kings_ xxiii. 1, 2, 3)\nrenewed the covenant between God and them.\n\n[Sidenote: The book of Joshua written after his time.]\n\nThat the book of _Joshua_ was also written long after the time of\nJoshua, may be gathered out of many places of the book itself. Joshua\nhad set up twelve stones in the midst of Jordan, for a monument of their\npassage; of which the writer saith thus, _They are there unto this day_\n(_Josh._ iv. 9); for _unto this day_, is a phrase that signifieth a time\npast, beyond the memory of man. In like manner, upon the saying of the\nLord, that he had rolled off from the people the reproach of Egypt, the\nwriter saith, _The place is called Gilgal unto this day_ (_Josh._ v. 9);\nwhich to have said in the time of Joshua had been improper. So also the\nname of the valley of Achor, from the trouble that Achan raised in the\ncamp, the writer saith, _remaineth unto this day_ (_Josh._ vii. 26);\nwhich must needs be therefore long after the time of Joshua. Arguments\nof this kind there be many other; as _Josh._ viii. 29, xiii. 13, xiv.\n14, xv. 63.\n\n[Sidenote: The books of Judges and Ruth written long after the\n captivity.]\n\nThe same is manifest by like arguments of the book of _Judges_, chap. i.\n21, 26, vi. 24, x. 4, xv. 19, xvii. 6, and _Ruth_ i. 1; but especially\n_Judg._ xviii. 30, where it is said, that _Jonathan and his sons were\npriests to the tribe of Dan, until the day of the captivity of the\nland_.\n\n[Sidenote: The like of the books of Samuel.]\n\nThat the books of _Samuel_ were also written after his own time, there\nare the like arguments, _1 Sam._ v. 5, vii. 13, 15; xxvii, 6, and xxx.\n25, where, after David had adjudged equal part of the spoils, to them\nthat guarded the ammunition, with them that fought, the writer saith,\n_He made it a statute and an ordinance to Israel to this day_. Again,\nwhen David, displeased, that the Lord had slain Uzzah, for putting out\nhis hand to sustain the ark, called the place Perez-Uzzah, the writer\nsaith, (_2 Sam._ vi. 8) it is called so _to this day_: the time\ntherefore of the writing of that book, must be long after the time of\nthe fact; that is, long after the time of David.\n\n[Sidenote: The books of the Kings, and the Chronicles.]\n\nAs for the two books of the _Kings_, and the two books of the\n_Chronicles_, besides the places which mention such monuments, as the\nwriter saith, remained till his own days; such as are _1 Kings_ ix. 13,\nix. 21, x. 12, xii. 19. _2 Kings_ ii. 22, viii. 22, x. 27, xiv. 7, xvi.\n6, xvii. 23, xvii. 34, xvii. 41, and _1 Chron._ iv. 41, v. 26: it is\nargument sufficient they were written after the captivity in Babylon,\nthat the history of them is continued till that time. For the facts\nregistered are always more ancient than the register; and much more\nancient than such books as make mention of, and quote the register; as\nthese books do in divers places, referring the reader to the Chronicles\nof the Kings of Judah, to the Chronicles of the Kings of Israel, to the\nBooks of the prophet Samuel, of the prophet Nathan, of the prophet\nAhijah; to the Vision of Jehdo, to the books of the prophet Serveiah,\nand of the prophet Addo.\n\n[Sidenote: Ezra and Nehemiah.]\n\nThe books of _Ezra_ and _Nehemiah_ were written certainly after their\nreturn from captivity; because their return, the re-edification of the\nwalls and houses of Jerusalem, the renovation of the covenant, and\nordination of their policy, are therein contained.\n\n[Sidenote: Esther.]\n\nThe history of _Queen Esther_ is of the time of the captivity; and\ntherefore the writer must have been of the same time, or after it.\n\n[Sidenote: Job.]\n\nThe book of _Job_ hath no mark in it of the time wherein it was written;\nand though it appear sufficiently (_Ezekiel_ xiv. 14, and _James_ v. 11)\nthat he was no feigned person; yet the book itself seemeth not to be a\nhistory, but a treatise concerning a question in ancient time much\ndisputed, _why wicked men have often prospered in this world, and good\nmen have been afflicted_; and this is the more probable, because from\nthe beginning, to the third verse of the third chapter, where the\ncomplaint of Job beginneth, the Hebrew is, as St. Jerome testifies, in\nprose; and from thence to the sixth verse of the last chapter, in\nhexameter verses; and the rest of that chapter again in prose. So that\nthe dispute is all in verse; and the prose is added, but as a preface in\nthe beginning, and an epilogue in the end. But verse is no usual style\nof such, as either are themselves in great pain, as Job; or of such as\ncome to comfort them, as his friends; but in philosophy, especially\nmoral philosophy, in ancient time frequent.\n\n[Sidenote: The Psalter.]\n\nThe _Psalms_ were written the most part by David, for the use of the\nquire. To these are added some songs of Moses, and other holy men; and\nsome of them after the return from the captivity, as the 137th and the\n126th, whereby it is manifest that the Psalter was compiled, and put\ninto the form it now hath, after the return of the Jews from Babylon.\n\n[Sidenote: The Proverbs.]\n\nThe _Proverbs_, being a collection of wise and godly sayings, partly of\nSolomon, partly of Agur, the son of Jakeh, and partly of the mother of\nking Lemuel, cannot probably be thought to have been collected by\nSolomon, rather than by Agur, or the mother of Lemuel; and that, though\nthe sentences be theirs, yet the collection or compiling them into this\none book, was the work of some other godly man, that lived after them\nall.\n\n[Sidenote: Ecclesiastes and the Canticles.]\n\nThe books of _Ecclesiastes_ and the _Canticles_ have nothing that was\nnot Solomon\u2019s, except it be the titles, or inscriptions. For _The Words\nof the Preacher, the son of David, king in Jerusalem_; and, _The Song of\nSongs_, which is Solomon\u2019s, seem to have been made for distinction\u2019s\nsake, then, when the Books of Scripture were gathered into one body of\nthe law; to the end, that not the doctrine only, but the authors also\nmight be extant.\n\n[Sidenote: Prophets.]\n\nOf the prophets, the most ancient, are Zephaniah, Jonah, Amos, Hosea,\nIsaiah, and Michah, who lived in the time of Amaziah and Azariah,\notherwise Ozias, kings of Judah. But the book of Jonah is not properly a\nregister of his prophecy; for that is contained in these few words,\n_Forty days and Niniveh shall be destroyed_; but a history or narration\nof his frowardness and disputing God\u2019s commandments; so that there is\nsmall probability he should be the author, seeing he is the subject of\nit. But the book of _Amos_ is his prophecy.\n\nJeremiah, Obadiah, Nahum, and Habakkuk prophecied in the time of Josiah.\n\nEzekiel, Daniel, Haggai, and Zechariah, in the captivity.\n\nWhen Joel and Malachi prophecied, is not evident by their writings. But\nconsidering the inscriptions, or titles of their books, it is manifest\nenough, that the whole Scripture of the Old Testament, was set forth in\nthe form we have it, after the return of the Jews from their captivity\nin Babylon, and before the time of Ptolom\u00e6us Philadelphus, that caused\nit to be translated into Greek by seventy men, which were sent him out\nof Judea for that purpose. And if the books of Apocrypha, which are\nrecommended to us by the church, though not for canonical, yet for\nprofitable books for our instruction, may in this point be credited, the\nScripture was set forth in the form we have it in, by Esdras: as may\nappear by that which he himself saith, in the second book, (chapter xiv.\nverse 21, 22, &c.) where speaking to God, he saith thus, _Thy law is\nburnt; therefore no man knoweth the things which thou hast done, or the\nworks that are to begin. But if I have found grace before thee, send\ndown the holy spirit into me, and I shall write all that hath been done\nin the world, since the beginning, which were written in thy law, that\nmen may find thy path, and that they which will live in the latter day,\nmay live._ And verse 45: _And it came to pass when the forty days were\nfulfilled, that the highest spake, saying, The first that thou hast\nwritten, publish openly, that the worthy and unworthy may read it; but\nkeep the seventy last, that thou mayest deliver them only to such as be\nwise among the people_. And thus much concerning the time of the writing\nof the books of the Old Testament.\n\n[Sidenote: The New Testament.]\n\nThe writers of the New Testament lived all in less than an age after\nChrist\u2019s ascension, and had all of them seen our Saviour, or been his\ndisciples, except St. Paul, and St. Luke; and consequently whatsoever\nwas written by them, is as ancient as the time of the apostles. But the\ntime wherein the books of the New Testament were received, and\nacknowledged by the church to be of their writing, is not altogether so\nancient. For, as the books of the Old Testament are derived to us, from\nno other time than that of Esdras, who by the direction of God\u2019s spirit\nretrieved them, when they were lost: those of the New Testament, of\nwhich the copies were not many, nor could easily be all in any one\nprivate man\u2019s hand, cannot be derived from a higher time, than that\nwherein the governors of the church collected, approved, and recommended\nthem to us, as the writings of those apostles and disciples, under whose\nnames they go. The first enumeration of all the books, both of the Old\nand New Testament, is in the canons of the apostles, supposed to be\ncollected by Clement, the first (after St. Peter) bishop of Rome. But\nbecause that is but supposed, and by many questioned, the Council of\nLaodicea is the first we know, that recommended the Bible to the then\nChristian churches, for the writings of the prophets and apostles: and\nthis Council was held in the 364th year after Christ. At which time,\nthough ambition had so far prevailed on the great doctors of the church,\nas no more to esteem emperors, though Christian, for the shepherds of\nthe people, but for sheep; and emperors not Christian, for wolves; and\nendeavoured to pass their doctrine, not for counsel and information, as\npreachers; but for laws, as absolute governors; and thought such frauds\nas tended to make the people the more obedient to Christian doctrine, to\nbe pious; yet I am persuaded they did not therefore falsify the\nScriptures, though the copies of the books of the New Testament, were in\nthe hands only of the ecclesiastics; because if they had had an\nintention so to do, they would surely have made them more favourable to\ntheir power over Christian princes, and civil sovereignty, than they\nare. I see not therefore any reason to doubt but that the Old and New\nTestament, as we have them now, are the true registers of those things,\nwhich were done and said by the prophets and apostles. And so perhaps\nare some of those books which are called apocrypha, and left out of the\ncanon, not for inconformity of doctrine with the rest, but only because\nthey are not found in the Hebrew. For after the conquest of Asia by\nAlexander the Great, there were few learned Jews, that were not perfect\nin the Greek tongue. For the seventy interpreters that converted the\nBible into Greek, were all of them Hebrews; and we have extant the works\nof Philo and Josephus, both Jews, written by them eloquently in Greek.\n[Sidenote: Their scope.] But it is not the writer, but the authority of\nthe church, that maketh the book canonical. And although these books\nwere written by divers men, yet it is manifest the writers were all\nindued with one and the same spirit, in that they conspire to one and\nthe same end, which is setting forth of the rights of the kingdom of\nGod, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. For the book of _Genesis_,\nderiveth the genealogy of God\u2019s people, from the creation of the world,\nto the going into Egypt: the other four books of Moses contain the\nelection of God for their king, and the laws which he prescribed for\ntheir government: the books of _Joshua_, _Judges_, _Ruth_, and _Samuel_,\nto the time of Saul, describe the acts of God\u2019s people, till the time\nthey cast off God\u2019s yoke, and called for a king, after the manner of\ntheir neighbour nations. The rest of the history of the Old Testament\nderives the succession of the line of David, to the captivity, out of\nwhich line was to spring the restorer of the kingdom of God, even our\nblessed Saviour God the Son, whose coming was foretold in the books of\nthe prophets, after whom the Evangelists write his life, and actions,\nand his claim to the kingdom, whilst he lived on earth: and lastly, the\n_Acts_, and _Epistles_ of the Apostles, declare the coming of God the\nHoly Ghost, and the authority he left with them and their successors,\nfor the direction of the Jews, and for the invitation of the Gentiles.\nIn sum, the histories and the prophecies of the Old Testament, and the\ngospels and epistles of the New Testament, have had one and the same\nscope, to convert men to the obedience of God; I., in Moses, and the\nPriests; II., in the man Christ; and III., in the Apostles and the\nsuccessors to apostolical power. For these three at several times did\nrepresent the person of God: Moses, and his successors the High Priests,\nand Kings of Judah, in the Old Testament: Christ himself, in the time he\nlived on earth: and the Apostles, and their successors, from the day of\nPentecost, when the Holy Ghost descended on them, to this day.\n\n[Sidenote: The question of the authority of the Scriptures stated.]\n\nIt is a question much disputed between the divers sects of Christian\nreligion, _from whence the Scriptures derive their authority_; which\nquestion is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, _how we know\nthem to be the word of God_, or, _why we believe them to be so_: and the\ndifficulty of resolving it, ariseth chiefly from the improperness of the\nwords wherein the question itself is couched. For it is believed on all\nhands, that the first and original _author_ of them is God; and\nconsequently the question disputed, is not that. Again, it is manifest,\nthat none can know they are God\u2019s word, (though all true Christians\nbelieve it,) but those to whom God himself hath revealed it\nsupernaturally; and therefore the question is not rightly moved, of our\n_knowledge_ of it. Lastly, when the question is propounded of our\n_belief_; because some are moved to believe for one, and others for\nother reasons; there can be rendered no one general answer for them all.\nThe question truly stated is, _by what authority they are made law_.\n\n[Sidenote: Their authority and interpretation.]\n\nAs far as they differ not from the laws of nature, there is no doubt,\nbut they are the law of God, and carry their authority with them,\nlegible to all men that have the use of natural reason: but this is no\nother authority, than that of all other moral doctrine consonant to\nreason; the dictates whereof are laws, not _made_, but _eternal_.\n\nIf they be made law by God himself, they are of the nature of written\nlaw, which are laws to them only to whom God hath so sufficiently\npublished them, as no man can excuse himself, by saying, he knew not\nthey were his.\n\nHe therefore to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed that they are\nhis, nor that those that published them, were sent by him, is not\nobliged to obey them, by any authority, but his, whose commands have\nalready the force of laws; that is to say, by any other authority, than\nthat of the commonwealth, residing in the sovereign, who only has the\nlegislative power. Again, if it be not the legislative authority of the\ncommonwealth, that giveth them the force of laws, it must be some other\nauthority derived from God, either private, or public: if private, it\nobliges only him, to whom in particular God hath been pleased to reveal\nit. For if every man should be obliged, to take for God\u2019s law, what\nparticular men, on pretence of private inspiration, or revelation,\nshould obtrude upon him, in such a number of men, that out of pride and\nignorance, take their own dreams, and extravagant fancies, and madness,\nfor testimonies of God\u2019s spirit; or out of ambition, pretend to such\ndivine testimonies, falsely, and contrary to their own consciences, it\nwere impossible that any divine law should be acknowledged. If public,\nit is the authority of the _commonwealth_, or of the _church_. But the\nchurch, if it be one person, is the same thing with a commonwealth of\nChristians; called a _commonwealth_, because it consisteth of men united\nin one person, their sovereign; and a _church_, because it consisteth in\nChristian men, united in one Christian sovereign. But if the church be\nnot one person, then it hath no authority at all: it can neither\ncommand, nor do any action at all; nor is capable of having any power,\nor right to anything: nor has any will, reason nor voice; for all these\nqualities are personal. Now if the whole number of Christians be not\ncontained in one commonwealth, they are not one person; nor is there an\nuniversal church that hath any authority over them; and therefore the\nScriptures are not made laws, by the universal church: or if it be one\ncommonwealth, then all Christian monarchs and states are private\npersons, and subject to be judged, deposed, and punished by an universal\nsovereign of all Christendom. So that the question of the authority of\nthe Scriptures, is reduced to this, _whether Christian kings, and the\nsovereign assemblies in Christian commonwealths, be absolute in their\nown territories, immediately under God; or subject to one vicar of\nChrist, constituted of the universal church; to be judged, condemned,\ndeposed, and put to death, as he shall think expedient, or necessary for\nthe common good_.\n\nWhich question cannot be resolved, without a more particular\nconsideration of the Kingdom of God; from whence also, we are to judge\nof the authority of interpreting the Scripture. For, whosoever hath a\nlawful power over any writing, to make it law, hath the power also to\napprove, or disapprove the interpretation of the same.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXXIV.\n\n OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF SPIRIT, ANGEL,\n AND INSPIRATION IN THE BOOKS OF\n HOLY SCRIPTURE.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Body and spirit how taken in the Scripture.]\n\nSeeing the foundation of all true ratiocination, is the constant\nsignification of words; which in the doctrine following, dependeth not,\nas in natural science, on the will of the writer, nor, as in common\nconversation, on vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in the\nScripture; it is necessary, before I proceed any further, to determine,\nout of the Bible, the meaning of such words, as by their ambiguity, may\nrender what I am to infer upon them, obscure, or disputable. I will\nbegin with the words BODY and SPIRIT, which in the language of the\nSchools are termed, _substances_, _corporeal_, and _incorporeal_.\n\n[Sidenote: Body and spirit how taken in the Scripture.]\n\nThe word _body_, in the most general acceptation, signifieth that which\nfilleth, or occupieth some certain room, or imagined place; and\ndependeth not on the imagination, but is a real part of that we call the\n_universe_. For the _universe_, being the aggregate of all bodies, there\nis no real part thereof that is not also _body_; nor any thing properly\na _body_, that is not also part of that aggregate of all _bodies_, the\n_universe_. The same also, because bodies are subject to change, that is\nto say, to variety of apparence to the sense of living creatures, is\ncalled _substance_, that is to say, _subject_ to various accidents: as\nsometimes to be moved; sometimes to stand still; and to seem to our\nsenses sometimes hot, sometimes cold, sometimes of one colour, smell,\ntaste, or sound, sometimes of another. And this diversity of seeming,\nproduced by the diversity of the operation of bodies on the organs of\nour sense, we attribute to alterations of the bodies that operate, and\ncall them _accidents_ of those bodies. And according to this acceptation\nof the word, _substance_ and _body_ signify the same thing; and\ntherefore _substance incorporeal_ are words, which when they are joined\ntogether, destroy one another, as if a man should say, an _incorporeal\nbody_.\n\nBut in the sense of common people, not all the universe is called body,\nbut only such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of feeling,\nto resist their force, or by the sense of their eyes, to hinder them\nfrom a farther prospect. Therefore in the common language of men, _air_,\nand _aerial substances_, use not to be taken for _bodies_, but (as often\nas men are sensible of their effects) are called _wind_, or _breath_, or\n(because the same are called in the Latin _spiritus_) _spirits_; as when\nthey call that aerial substance, which in the body of any living\ncreature gives it life and motion, _vital_ and _animal spirits_. But for\nthose idols of the brain, which represent bodies to us, where they are\nnot, as in a looking-glass, in a dream, or to a distempered brain\nwaking, they are, as the apostle saith generally of all idols, nothing;\nnothing at all, I say, there where they seem to be; and in the brain\nitself, nothing but tumult, proceeding either from the action of the\nobjects, or from the disorderly agitation of the organs of our sense.\nAnd men, that are otherwise employed, than to search into their causes,\nknow not of themselves, what to call them; and may therefore easily be\npersuaded, by those whose knowledge they much reverence, some to call\nthem _bodies_, and think them made of air compacted by a power\nsupernatural, because the sight judges them corporeal; and some to call\nthem _spirits_, because the sense of touch discerneth nothing in the\nplace where they appear, to resist their fingers: so that the proper\nsignification of _spirit_ in common speech, is either a subtle, fluid,\nand invisible body, or a ghost, or other idol or phantasm of the\nimagination. But for metaphorical significations, there be many: for\nsometimes it is taken for disposition or inclination of the mind; as\nwhen for the disposition to controul the sayings of other men, we say,\n_a spirit of contradiction_; for _a disposition to uncleanness_, _an\nunclean spirit_; for _perverseness_, _a froward spirit_; for\n_sullenness_, _a dumb spirit_; and for _inclination to godliness and\nGod\u2019s service_, _the Spirit of God_: sometimes for any eminent ability\nor extraordinary passion, or disease of the mind, as when _great wisdom_\nis called _the spirit of wisdom_; and _madmen_ are said to be _possessed\nwith a spirit_.\n\nOther signification of _spirit_ I find nowhere any; and where none of\nthese can satisfy the sense of that word in Scripture, the place falleth\nnot under human understanding; and our faith therein consisteth not in\nour opinion, but in our submission; as in all places where God is said\nto be a _Spirit_; or where by the _Spirit of God_, is meant God himself.\nFor the nature of God is incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand\nnothing of _what he is_, but only _that he is_; and therefore the\nattributes we give him, are not to tell one another, _what he is_, nor\nto signify our opinion of his nature, but our desire to honour him with\nsuch names as we conceive most honourable amongst ourselves.\n\n[Sidenote: The spirit of God taken in the Scripture sometimes for a\n wind, or breath.]\n\n_Gen._ i. 2. _The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters._ Here\nif by the _Spirit of God_ be meant God himself, then is _motion_\nattributed to God, and consequently _place_, which are intelligible only\nof bodies, and not of substances incorporeal; and so the place is above\nour understanding, that can conceive nothing moved that changes not\nplace, or that has not dimension; and whatsoever has dimension, is body.\nBut the meaning of those words is best understood by the like place,\n(_Gen._ viii. 1.) where when the earth was covered with waters, as in\nthe beginning, God intending to abate them, and again to discover the\ndry land, useth the like words, _I will bring my Spirit upon the earth,\nand the waters shall be diminished_: in which place, by _Spirit_ is\nunderstood a wind, that is an air or _spirit moved_, which might be\ncalled, as in the former place, the _Spirit of God_, because it was\nGod\u2019s work.\n\n[Sidenote: Secondly, for extraordinary gifts of the understanding.]\n\nGen. xli. 38, Pharoah calleth the Wisdom of Joseph, the _Spirit of God_.\nFor Joseph having advised him to look out a wise and discreet man, and\nto set him over the land of Egypt, he saith thus, _Can we find such a\nman as this is, in whom is the Spirit of God?_ And _Exod._ xxviii. 3,\n_Thou shalt speak_, saith God, _to all the wise hearted, whom I have\nfilled with the spirit of wisdom, to make Aaron garments, to consecrate\nhim_: where extraordinary understanding, though but in making garments,\nas being the _gift_ of God, is called the _Spirit of God_. The same is\nfound again, _Exod._ xxxi. 3, 4, 5, 6, _and_ xxxv. 31. And _Isaiah_ xi.\n2, 3, where the prophet speaking of the Messiah, saith, _the Spirit of\nthe Lord shall abide upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding,\nthe spirit of counsel and fortitude, and the spirit of the fear of the\nLord_. Where manifestly is meant, not so many ghosts, but so many\neminent graces that God would give him.\n\n[Sidenote: Thirdly, for extraordinary affections.]\n\nIn the book of _Judges_, an extraordinary zeal and courage in the\ndefence of God\u2019s people, is called the _Spirit_ of God; as when it\nexcited Othniel, Gideon, Jephtha, and Sampson to deliver them from\nservitude, _Judges_, iii. 10, vi. 34, xi. 29, xiii. 25, xiv. 6, 19. And\nof Saul, upon the news of the insolence of the Ammonites towards the men\nof Jabesh Gilead, it is said, (_1 Sam._ xi. 6) that _the Spirit of God\ncame upon Saul, and his anger_, (or, as it is in the Latin, _his fury_),\n_was kindled greatly_. Where it is not probable was meant a ghost, but\nan extraordinary _zeal_ to punish the cruelty of the Ammonites. In like\nmanner by the _Spirit_ of God, that came upon Saul, when he was amongst\nthe prophets that praised God in songs and music, (_1 Sam._ xix. 23), is\nto be understood, not a ghost, but an unexpected and sudden _zeal_ to\njoin with them in their devotion.\n\n[Sidenote: Fourthly, for the gift of prediction by dreams and visions.]\n\nThe false prophet Zedekiah saith to Micaiah (_1 Kings_ xxii. 24), _which\nway went the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak to thee?_ Which can not\nbe understood of a ghost; for Micaiah declared before the kings of\nIsrael and Judah, the event of the battle, as from a _vision_, and not\nas from a _spirit_ speaking in him.\n\nIn the same manner it appeareth in the books of the Prophets, that\nthough they spake by the _spirit_ of God, that is to say, by a special\ngrace of prediction; yet their knowledge of the future, was not by a\nghost within them, but by some supernatural _dream_ or _vision_.\n\n[Sidenote: Fifthly, for life.]\n\n_Gen._ ii. 7, it is said, _God made man of the dust of the earth, and\nbreathed into his nostrils_ (spiraculum vit\u00e6) _the breath of life, and\nman was made a living soul_. There the _breath of life_ inspired by God,\nsignifies no more, but that God gave him life; and (_Job_ xxvii. 3) _as\nlong as the Spirit of God is in my nostrils_, is no more than to say,\n_as long as I live_. So in _Ezek._ i. 20, _the spirit of life was in the\nwheels_, is equivalent to, _the wheels were alive_. And, (_Ezek._ ii. 2)\n_the Spirit entered into me, and set me on my feet_, that is, _I\nrecovered my vital strength_; not that any ghost or incorporeal\nsubstance entered into, and possessed his body.\n\n[Sidenote: Sixthly, for a subordination to authority.]\n\nIn the xith chap. of _Numbers_, v. 17, _I will take_, saith God, _of the\nSpirit, which is upon thee, and will put it upon them, and they shall\nbear the burthen of the people with thee_; that is, upon the seventy\nelders: whereupon two of the seventy are said to prophecy in the camp;\nof whom some complained, and Joshua desired Moses to forbid them; which\nMoses would not do. Whereby it appears, that Joshua knew not that they\nhad received authority so to do, and prophecied according to the mind of\nMoses, that is to say, by a _spirit_, or _authority_ subordinate to his\nown.\n\nIn the like sense we read, (_Deut._ xxxiv. 9) that _Joshua was full of\nthe spirit of wisdom, because Moses had laid his hands upon him_: that\nis because he was _ordained_ by Moses, to prosecute the work he had\nhimself begun, namely the bringing of God\u2019s people into the promised\nland, but prevented by death, could not finish.\n\nIn the like sense it is said, (_Rom._ viii. 9) _If any man have not the\nSpirit of Christ, he is none of his_: not meaning thereby the _ghost_ of\nChrist, but a _submission_ to his doctrine. As also, (_1 John_ iv. 2)\n_Hereby you shall know the Spirit of God; every spirit that confesseth\nthat Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God_; by which is meant\nthe spirit of unfeigned Christianity, or _submission_ to that main\narticle of Christian faith, that Jesus is the Christ; which cannot be\ninterpreted of a ghost.\n\nLikewise these words, (_Luke_ iv. 1) _And Jesus full of the Holy Ghost_,\n(that is, as it is expressed, _Matt._ iv. 1, and _Mark_ i. 12, _of the\nHoly Spirit_,) may be understood, for _zeal_ to do the work for which he\nwas sent by God the Father: but to interpret it of a ghost, is to say,\nthat God himself, for so our Saviour was, was filled with God; which is\nvery improper and insignificant. How we came to translate _spirits_, by\nthe word _ghosts_, which signifieth nothing, neither in heaven, nor\nearth, but the imaginary inhabitants of man\u2019s brain, I examine not: but\nthis I say, the word _spirit_ in the text signifieth no such thing; but\neither properly a real _substance_, or metaphorically, some\nextraordinary _ability_ or _affection_ of the mind, or of the body.\n\n[Sidenote: Seventhly, for aerial bodies.]\n\nThe disciples of Christ, seeing him walking upon the sea, (_Matt._ xiv.\n26, and _Mark_ vi. 49) supposed him to be a _Spirit_, meaning thereby an\naerial _body_, and not a phantasm; for it is said, they all saw him;\nwhich cannot be understood of the delusions of the brain, (which are not\ncommon to many at once, as visible bodies are; but singular, because of\nthe differences of fancies,) but of bodies only. In like manner, where\nhe was taken for a _spirit_, by the same apostles, (_Luke_ xxiv. 37): so\nalso (_Acts_ xii. 15) when St. Peter was delivered out of prison, it\nwould not be believed; but when the maid said he was at the door, they\nsaid it was his _angel_; by which must be meant a corporeal substance,\nor we must say, the disciples themselves did follow the common opinion\nof both Jews and Gentiles, that some such apparitions were not\nimaginary, but real, and such as needed not the fancy of man for their\nexistence. These the Jews called _spirits_, and _angels_, good or bad;\nas the Greeks called the same by the name of _demons_. And some such\napparitions may be real, and substantial; that is to say, subtle bodies,\nwhich God can form by the same power, by which he formed all things, and\nmake use of, as of ministers, and messengers, that is to say, angels, to\ndeclare his will, and execute the same when he pleaseth, in\nextraordinary and supernatural manner. But when he hath so formed them,\nthey are substances, endued with dimensions, and take up room, and can\nbe moved from place to place, which is peculiar to bodies; and therefore\nare not ghosts _incorporeal_, that is to say, ghosts that are in _no\nplace_; that is to say, that are _no where_; that is to say, that\nseeming to be _somewhat_, are _nothing_. But if corporeal be taken in\nthe most vulgar manner, for such substances as are perceptible by our\nexternal senses; then is substance incorporeal, a thing not imaginary,\nbut real; namely, a thin substance invisible, but that hath the same\ndimensions that are in grosser bodies.\n\n[Sidenote: Angel, what.]\n\nBy the name of ANGEL, is signified generally, a _messenger_; and most\noften, a _messenger of God_; and by a messenger of God, is signified,\nany thing that makes known his extraordinary presence; that is to say,\nthe extraordinary manifestation of his power, especially by a dream or\nvision.\n\nConcerning the creation of _angels_, there is nothing delivered in the\nScriptures. That they are spirits, is often repeated: but by the name of\nspirit, is signified both in Scripture, and vulgarly, both amongst Jews\nand Gentiles, sometimes thin bodies: as the air, the wind, the spirits\nvital and animal of living creatures; and sometimes the images that rise\nin the fancy in dreams and visions; which are not real substances, nor\nlast any longer than the dream, or vision they appear in; which\napparitions, though no real substances, but accidents of the brain; yet\nwhen God raiseth them supernaturally, to signify his will, they are not\nimproperly termed God\u2019s messengers, that is to say, his _angels_.\n\nAnd as the Gentiles did vulgarly conceive the imagery of the brain, for\nthings really subsistent without them, and not dependent on the fancy;\nand out of them framed their opinions of _demons_, good and evil; which\nbecause they seemed to subsist really, they called _substances_; and,\nbecause they could not feel them with their hands, _incorporeal_: so\nalso the Jews, upon the same ground, without any thing in the Old\nTestament that constrained them thereunto, had generally an opinion,\nexcept the sect of the Sadducees, that those apparitions, which it\npleased God sometimes to produce in the fancy of men, for his own\nservice, and therefore called them his _angels_, were substances, not\ndependent on the fancy, but permanent creatures of God; whereof those\nwhich they thought were good to them, they esteemed the _angels of God_,\nand those they thought would hurt them, they called _evil angels_, or\nevil spirits; such as was the spirit of Python, and the spirits of\nmadmen, of lunatics and epileptics: for they esteemed such as were\ntroubled with such diseases, _demoniacs_.\n\nBut if we consider the places of the Old Testament where angels are\nmentioned, we shall find, that in most of them, there can nothing else\nbe understood by the word _angel_, but some image raised,\nsupernaturally, in the fancy, to signify the presence of God in the\nexecution of some supernatural work; and therefore in the rest, where\ntheir nature is not expressed, it may be understood in the same manner.\n\nFor we read, (_Gen._ xvi.) that the same apparition is called, not only\nan _angel_, but _God_; where that which (verse 7) is called the _angel_\nof the Lord, in the tenth verse, saith to Agar, _I will multiply thy\nseed exceedingly_; that is, speaketh in the person of God. Neither was\nthis apparition a fancy figured, but a voice. By which it is manifest,\nthat _angel_ signifieth there, nothing but _God_ himself, that caused\nAgar supernaturally to apprehend a voice from heaven; or rather, nothing\nelse but a voice supernatural, testifying God\u2019s special presence there.\nWhy therefore may not the angels that appeared to Lot, and are called\n(_Gen._ xix. 12) _men_; and to whom, though they were two, Lot speaketh\n(verse 18) as but to one, and that one, as God, (for the words are, _Lot\nsaid unto them, Oh not so my Lord_), be understood of images of men,\nsupernaturally formed in the fancy; as well as before by angel was\nunderstood a fancied voice? When the angel called to Abraham out of\nheaven, to stay his hand (_Gen._ xxii. 11) from slaying Isaac, there was\nno apparition, but a voice; which nevertheless was called properly\nenough a messenger or _angel_ of God, because it declared God\u2019s will\nsupernaturally, and saves the labour of supposing any permanent ghosts.\nThe angels which Jacob saw on the ladder of Heaven, (_Gen._ xxviii. 12)\nwere a vision of his sleep; therefore only fancy, and a dream; yet being\nsupernatural, and signs of God\u2019s special presence, those apparitions are\nnot improperly called _angels_. The same is to be understood, (_Gen._\nxxxi. 11) where Jacob saith thus, _The Angel of the Lord appeared to me\nin my sleep_. For an apparition made to a man in his sleep, is that\nwhich all men call a dream, whether such dream be natural, or\nsupernatural: and that which there Jacob calleth an _angel_, was God\nhimself; for the same angel saith, verse 13, _I am the God of Bethel_.\n\nAlso (_Exod._ xiv. 19) the angel that went before the army of Israel to\nthe Red Sea, and then came behind it, is, (verse 24) the Lord himself;\nand he appeared, not in the form of a beautiful man, but in form,\n(_Exod._ xiii. 21) by day, of a _pillar of cloud_, and, by night, in\nform of a _pillar of fire_; and yet this pillar was all the apparition\nand _angel_ promised to Moses, (_Exod._ xxxiii. 2) for the army\u2019s guide:\nfor this cloudy pillar (_Exod._ xxxiii. 9) is said to have descended,\nand stood at the door of the Tabernacle, and to have talked with Moses.\n\nThere you see motion and speech, which are commonly attributed to\nangels, attributed to a cloud, because the cloud served as a sign of\nGod\u2019s presence; and was no less an angel, than if it had had the form of\na man, or child of never so great beauty; or wings, as usually they are\npainted, for the false instruction of common people. For it is not the\nshape; but their use that makes them angels. But their use is to be\nsignifications of God\u2019s presence in supernatural operations; as when\nMoses (_Exod._ xxxiii. 14) had desired God to go along with the camp, as\nhe had done always before the making of the golden calf, God did not\nanswer, _I will go_, nor, _I will send an angel in my stead_; but thus,\n_My presence shall go with thee_.\n\nTo mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name of angel\nis found, would be too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at once, I\nsay, there is no text in that part of the Old Testament, which the\nChurch of England holdeth for canonical, from which we can conclude,\nthere is, or hath been created, any permanent thing, understood by the\nname of _spirit_ or _angel_, that hath not quantity; and that may not be\nby the understanding divided; that is to say, considered by parts; so as\none part may be in one place, and the next part in the next place to it;\nand, in sum, which is not (taking body for that, which is somewhat or\nsome where,) corporeal; but in every place, the sense will bear the\ninterpretation of angel, for messenger; as John Baptist is called an\nangel, and Christ the Angel of the Covenant; and as, according to the\nsame analogy, the dove and the fiery tongues, in that they were signs of\nGod\u2019s special presence, might also be called angels. Though we find in\n_Daniel_ two names of angels, Gabriel and Michael; yet it is clear out\nof the text itself, (_Dan._ xii. 1) that by Michael is meant Christ, not\nas an angel, but as a prince: and that Gabriel, as the like apparitions\nmade to other holy men in their sleep, was nothing but a supernatural\nphantasm, by which it seemed to Daniel, in his dream, that two saints\nbeing in talk, one of them said to the other, _Gabriel, Let us make this\nman understand his vision_: for God needeth not to distinguish his\ncelestial servants by names, which are useful only to the short memories\nof mortals. Nor in the New Testament is there any place, out of which it\ncan be proved, that angels, except when they are put for such men as God\nhath made the messengers and ministers of his word or works, are things\npermanent, and withal incorporeal. That they are permanent, may be\ngathered from the words of our Saviour himself, (_Matt._ xxv. 41) where\nhe saith, it shall be said to the wicked in the last day, _Go ye cursed\ninto everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his angels_: which\nplace is manifest for the permanence of evil angels, (unless we might\nthink the name of Devil and his angels may be understood of the Church\u2019s\nadversaries and their ministers); but then it is repugnant to their\nimmateriality; because everlasting fire is no punishment to impatible\nsubstances, such as are all things incorporeal. Angels therefore are not\nthence proved to be incorporeal. In like manner where St. Paul says, (_1\nCor._ vi. 3) _Know ye not that we shall judge the angels?_ and _2 Pet._\nii. 4, _For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down\ninto hell_: and (_Jude_ i. 6) _And the angels that kept not their first\nestate, but left their own habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting\nchains under darkness unto the judgment of the last day_: though it\nprove the permanence of angelical nature, it confirmeth also their\nmateriality. And (_Matt._ xxii. 30) _In the resurrection men do neither\nmarry nor give in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven_: but\nin the resurrection men shall be permanent, and not incorporeal; so\ntherefore also are the angels.\n\nThere be divers other places out of which may be drawn the like\nconclusion. To men that understand the signification of these words,\n_substance_, and _incorporeal_; as _incorporeal_ is taken, not for\nsubtle body, but for _not body_; they imply a contradiction: insomuch as\nto say, an angel or spirit is in that sense an incorporeal substance, is\nto say in effect, there is no angel nor spirit at all. Considering\ntherefore the signification of the word _angel_ in the Old Testament,\nand the nature of dreams and visions that happen to men by the ordinary\nway of nature; I was inclined to this opinion, that angels were nothing\nbut supernatural apparitions of the fancy, raised by the special and\nextraordinary operation of God, thereby to make his presence and\ncommandments known to mankind, and chiefly to his own people. But the\nmany places of the New Testament, and our Saviour\u2019s own words, and in\nsuch texts, wherein is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have\nextorted from my feeble reason, an acknowledgment and belief, that there\nbe also angels substantial, and permanent. But to believe they be in no\nplace, that is to say, no where, that is to say, nothing, as they,\nthough indirectly, say, that will have them incorporeal, cannot by\nScripture be evinced.\n\n[Sidenote: Inspiration, what.]\n\nOn the signification of the word _spirit_, dependeth that of the word\nINSPIRATION; which must either be taken properly; and then it is nothing\nbut the blowing into a man some thin and subtle air or wind, in such\nmanner as a man filleth a bladder with his breath; or if spirits be not\ncorporeal, but have their existence only in the fancy, it is nothing but\nthe blowing in of a phantasm; which is improper to say, and impossible;\nfor phantasms are not, but only seem to be, somewhat. That word\ntherefore is used in the Scripture metaphorically only: as (_Gen._ ii.\n7) where it is said that God _inspired_ into man the breath of life, no\nmore is meant, than that God gave unto him vital motion. For we are not\nto think that God made first a living breath and then blew it into Adam\nafter he was made, whether that breath were real, or seeming; but only\nas it is, (_Acts_ xvii. 25) _that he gave him life, and breath_; that\nis, made him a living creature. And where it is said, (_2 Tim._ iii. 16)\n_all Scripture is given by inspiration from God_, speaking there of the\nScripture of the Old Testament, it is an easy metaphor, to signify, that\nGod inclined the spirit or mind of those writers, to write that which\nshould be useful, in teaching, reproving, correcting, and instructing\nmen in the way of righteous living. But where St. Peter, (_2 Pet._ i.\n21) saith, that _Prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but\nthe holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit_, by the\nHoly Spirit is meant the voice of God in a dream or vision supernatural,\nwhich is not _inspiration_. Nor, when our Saviour breathing on his\ndisciples, said, _Receive the Holy Spirit_, was that breath the Spirit,\nbut a sign of the spiritual graces he gave unto them. And though it be\nsaid of many, and of our Saviour himself, that he was full of the Holy\nSpirit; yet that fulness is not to be understood for _infusion_ of the\nsubstance of God, but for accumulation of his gifts, such as are the\ngift of sanctity of life, of tongues, and the like, whether attained\nsupernaturally, or by study and industry; for in all cases they are the\ngifts of God. So likewise where God says (_Joel_ ii. 28) _I will pour\nout my Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall\nprophecy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see\nvisions_, we are not to understand it in the proper sense, as if his\n_Spirit_ were like water, subject to effusion or infusion; but as if God\nhad promised to give them prophetical dreams, and visions. For the\nproper use of the word _infused_, in speaking of the graces of God, is\nan abuse of it; for those graces are virtues, not bodies to be carried\nhither and thither, and to be poured into men as into barrels.\n\nIn the same manner, to take _inspiration_ in the proper sense, or to say\nthat good _spirits_ entered into men to make them prophecy, or evil\n_spirits_ into those that became phrenetic, lunatic, or epileptic, is\nnot to take the word in the sense of the Scripture; for the Spirit there\nis taken for the power of God, working by causes to us unknown. As also\n(_Acts_ ii. 2) the wind, that is there said to fill the house wherein\nthe apostles were assembled on the day of Pentecost, is not to be\nunderstood for the _Holy Spirit_, which is the Deity itself; but for an\nexternal sign of God\u2019s special working on their hearts, to effect in\nthem the internal graces, and holy virtues he thought requisite for the\nperformance of their apostleship.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXXV.\n\n OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF\n KINGDOM OF GOD, OF HOLY, SACRED,\n AND SACRAMENT.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The kingdom of God taken by divines metaphorically, but in\n the Scriptures properly.]\n\nThe _Kingdom of God_ in the writings of divines, and specially in\nsermons and treatises of devotion, is taken most commonly for eternal\nfelicity, after this life, in the highest heaven, which they also call\nthe kingdom of glory; and sometimes for the earnest of that felicity,\nsanctification, which they term the kingdom of grace; but never for the\nmonarchy, that is to say, the sovereign power of God over any subjects\nacquired by their own consent, which is the proper signification of\nkingdom.\n\nTo the contrary, I find the KINGDOM OF GOD to signify, in most places of\nScripture, a _kingdom properly so named_, constituted by the votes of\nthe people of Israel in peculiar manner; wherein they chose God for\ntheir king by covenant made with him, upon God\u2019s promising them the\npossession of the land of Canaan; and but seldom metaphorically; and\nthen it is taken for _dominion over sin_; (and only in the New\nTestament;) because such a dominion as that, every subject shall have in\nthe kingdom of God, and without prejudice to the sovereign.\n\nFrom the very creation, God not only reigned over all men _naturally_ by\nhis might; but also had _peculiar_ subjects, whom he commanded by a\nvoice, as one man speaketh to another. In which manner he _reigned_ over\nAdam, and gave him commandment to abstain from the tree of cognizance of\ngood and evil; which when he obeyed not, but tasting thereof, took upon\nhim to be as God, judging between good and evil, not by his creator\u2019s\ncommandment, but by his own sense, his punishment was a privation of the\nestate of eternal life, wherein God had at first created him: and\nafterwards God punished his posterity for their vices, all but eight\npersons, with an universal deluge; and in these eight did consist the\nthen _kingdom of God_.\n\n[Sidenote: The original of the kingdom of God.]\n\nAfter this it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and (_Gen._ xvii. 7, 8)\nto make a covenant with him in these words, _I will establish my\ncovenant between me, and thee, and thy seed after thee in their\ngenerations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God to thee, and to\nthy seed after thee; and I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after\nthee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan for\nan everlasting possession_. In this covenant _Abraham promiseth for\nhimself and his posterity, to obey as God, the Lord that spake to him;\nand God on his part promiseth to Abraham the land of Canaan for an\neverlasting possession_. And for a memorial, and a token of this\ncovenant, he ordaineth (_Gen._ xvii. 11) the _sacrament of\ncircumcision_. This is it which is called the _old covenant_ or\n_testament_; and containeth a contract between God and Abraham; by which\nAbraham obligeth himself, and his posterity, in a peculiar manner to be\nsubject to God\u2019s positive law; for to the law moral he was obliged\nbefore, as by an oath of allegiance. And though the name of _King_ be\nnot yet given to God, nor of _kingdom_ to Abraham and his seed: yet the\nthing is the same; namely, an institution by pact, of God\u2019s peculiar\nsovereignty over the seed of Abraham; which in the renewing of the same\ncovenant by Moses, at Mount Sinai, is expressly called a peculiar\n_kingdom of God_ over the Jews: and it is of Abraham, not of Moses, St.\nPaul saith (_Rom._ iv. 11) that he is the _father of the faithful_; that\nis, of those that are loyal, and do not violate their allegiance sworn\nto God, then by circumcision, and afterwards in the _new covenant_ by\nbaptism.\n\n[Sidenote: That the kingdom of God is properly his civil sovereignty\n over a peculiar people by pact.]\n\nThis covenant, at the foot of Mount Sinai, was renewed by Moses,\n(_Exod._ xix. 5) where the Lord commandeth Moses to speak to the people\nin this manner, _If you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant,\nthen ye shall be a peculiar people to me, for all the earth is mine; and\nye shall be unto me a sacerdotal kingdom, and an holy nation_. For a\n_peculiar people_, the vulgar Latin hath _peculium de cunctis populis_:\nthe English translation, made in the beginning of the reign of King\nJames, hath a _peculiar treasure unto me above all nations_; and the\nGeneva French, _the most precious jewel of all nations_. But the truest\ntranslation is the first, because it is confirmed by St. Paul himself\n(_Tit._ ii. 14) where he saith, alluding to that place, that our blessed\nSaviour _gave himself for us, that he might purify us to himself, a\npeculiar_, that is, an extraordinary, _people_: for the word is in the\nGreek \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, which is opposed commonly to the word \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2: and\nas this signifieth _ordinary_, _quotidian_, or, as in the Lord\u2019s Prayer,\n_of daily use_; so the other signifieth that which is _overplus_, and\n_stored up_, and _enjoyed in a special manner_; which the Latins call\n_peculium_: and this meaning of the place is confirmed by the reason God\nrendereth of it, which followeth immediately, in that he addeth, _For\nall the earth is mine_, as if he should say, _All the nations of the\nworld are mine_; but it is not so that you are mine, but in a _special\nmanner_: for they are all mine, by reason of my power; but you shall be\nmine, by your own consent, and covenant; which is an addition to his\nordinary title, to all nations.\n\nThe same is again confirmed in express words in the same text, _Ye shall\nbe to me a sacerdotal kingdom, and an holy nation_. The vulgar Latin\nhath it, _regnum sacerdotale_, to which agreeth the translation of that\nplace (_1 Pet._ ii. 9) _Sacerdotium regale_, _a regal priesthood_; as\nalso the institution itself, by which no man might enter into the\n_Sanctum Sanctorum_, that is to say, no man might enquire God\u2019s will\nimmediately of God himself, but only the high-priest. The English\ntranslation before mentioned, following that of Geneva, has, _a kingdom\nof priests_; which is either meant of the succession of one high-priest\nafter another, or else it accordeth not with St. Peter, nor with the\nexercise of the high-priesthood: for there was never any but the\nhigh-priest only, that was to inform the people of God\u2019s will; nor any\nconvocation of priests ever allowed to enter into the _Sanctum\nSanctorum_.\n\nAgain, the title of a _holy nation_ confirms the same: for _holy_\nsignifies, that which is God\u2019s by special, not by general right. All the\nearth, as is said in the text, is God\u2019s; but all the earth is not called\n_holy_, but that only which is set apart for his especial service, as\nwas the nation of the Jews. It is therefore manifest enough by this one\nplace, that by the _kingdom of God_, is properly meant a commonwealth,\ninstituted, by the consent of those which were to be subject thereto,\nfor their civil government, and the regulating of their behaviour, not\nonly towards God their king, but also towards one another in point of\njustice, and towards other nations both in peace and war; which properly\nwas a kingdom wherein God was king, and the high-priest was to be, after\nthe death of Moses, his sole viceroy or lieutenant.\n\nBut there be many other places that clearly prove the same. As first (_1\nSamuel_, viii. 7) when the Elders of Israel, grieved with the corruption\nof the sons of Samuel, demanded a king, Samuel displeased therewith,\nprayed unto the Lord, and the Lord answering said unto him, _Hearken\nunto the voice of the people, for they have not rejected thee, but they\nhave rejected me, that I should not reign over them_. Out of which it is\nevident, that God himself was then their king; and Samuel did not\ncommand the people, but only delivered to them that which God from time\nto time appointed him.\n\nAgain, (_1 Sam._ xii. 12) where Samuel saith to the people, _When ye saw\nthat Nahash, king of the children of Ammon, came against you, ye said\nunto me, Nay, but a king shall reign over us; when the Lord your God was\nyour king_. It is manifest that God was their king, and governed the\ncivil state of their commonwealth.\n\nAnd after the Israelites had rejected God, the prophets did foretell his\nrestitution; as (_Isaiah_, xxiv. 23) _Then the moon shall be confounded,\nand the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts shall reign in Mount Zion,\nand in Jerusalem_; where he speaketh expressly of his reign in Zion and\nJerusalem; that is, on earth. And (_Micah_, iv. 7) _And the Lord shall\nreign over them in Mount Zion_: this Mount Zion is in Jerusalem, upon\nthe earth. And (_Ezek._ xx. 33) _As I live, saith the Lord God, surely\nwith a mighty hand, and a stretched out arm, and with fury poured out, I\nwill rule over you_; and (verse 37) _I will cause you to pass under the\nrod, and I will bring you into the bond of the covenant_; that is, I\nwill reign over you, and make you to stand to that covenant which you\nmade with me by Moses, and brake in your rebellion against me in the\ndays of Samuel, and in your election of another king.\n\nAnd in the New Testament, the angel Gabriel saith of our Saviour (_Luke_\ni. 32, 33) _He shall be great, and be called the Son of the most High,\nand the Lord shall give unto him the throne of his father David; and he\nshall reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and of his kingdom there\nshall be no end_. This is also a kingdom upon earth; for the claim\nwhereof, as an enemy to C\u00e6sar, he was put to death; the title of his\ncross, was, _Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews_; he was crowned in\nscorn with a crown of thorns; and for the proclaiming of him, it is said\nof the disciples (_Acts_ xvii. 7) _That they did all of them contrary to\nthe decrees of C\u00e6sar, saying there was another king, one Jesus_. The\nkingdom therefore of God is a real, not a metaphorical kingdom; and so\ntaken, not only in the Old Testament, but in the New; when we say, _For\nthine is the kingdom, the power, and glory_, it is to be understood of\nGod\u2019s kingdom, by force of our covenant, not by the right of God\u2019s\npower; for such a kingdom God always hath; so that it were superfluous\nto say in our prayer, _Thy kingdom come_, unless it be meant of the\nrestoration of that kingdom of God by Christ, which by revolt of the\nIsraelites had been interrupted in the election of Saul. Nor had it been\nproper to say, _The kingdom of heaven is at hand_; or to pray, _Thy\nkingdom come_, if it had still continued.\n\nThere be so many other places that confirm this interpretation, that it\nwere a wonder there is no greater notice taken of it, but that it gives\ntoo much light to Christian kings to see their right of ecclesiastical\ngovernment. This they have observed, that instead of a _sacerdotal\nkingdom_, translate, _a kingdom of priests_; for they may as well\ntranslate a _royal priesthood_, as it is in St. Peter, into a\n_priesthood of kings_. And whereas, for a _peculiar people_, they put a\n_precious jewel_, or _treasure_, a man might as well call the special\nregiment, or company of a general, the general\u2019s precious jewel, or his\ntreasure.\n\nIn short, the kingdom of God is a civil kingdom; which consisted, first,\nin the obligation of the people of Israel to those laws, which Moses\nshould bring unto them from Mount Sinai; and which afterwards the\nhigh-priest for the time being, should deliver to them from before the\ncherubims in the _sanctum sanctorum_; and which kingdom having been cast\noff in the election of Saul, the prophets foretold, should be restored\nby Christ; and the restoration whereof we daily pray for, when we say in\nthe Lord\u2019s Prayer, _Thy kingdom come_; and the right whereof we\nacknowledge, when we add, _For thine is the kingdom, the power, and\nglory, for ever and ever, Amen_; and the proclaiming whereof, was the\npreaching of the apostles; and to which men are prepared, by the\nteachers of the Gospel; to embrace which Gospel, that is to say, to\npromise obedience to God\u2019s government, is to be in the _kingdom of\ngrace_, because God hath _gratis_ given to such the power to be the\nsubjects, that is children, of God hereafter, when Christ shall come in\nmajesty to judge the world, and actually to govern his own people, which\nis called _the kingdom of glory_. If the kingdom of God, called also the\nkingdom of heaven, from the gloriousness and admirable height of that\nthrone, were not a kingdom which God by his lieutenants, or vicars, who\ndeliver his commandments to the people, did exercise on earth; there\nwould not have been so much contention, and war, about who it is, by\nwhom God speaketh to us; neither would many priests have troubled\nthemselves with spiritual jurisdiction, nor any king have denied it\nthem.\n\n[Sidenote: Holy, what.]\n\nOut of this literal interpretation of the _kingdom of God_, ariseth also\nthe true interpretation of the word HOLY. For it is a word, which in\nGod\u2019s kingdom answereth to that, which men in their kingdoms use to call\n_public_, or the _king\u2019s_.\n\nThe king of any country is the _public_ person, or representative of all\nhis own subjects. And God the king of Israel was the _Holy One_ of\nIsrael. The nation which is subject to one earthly sovereign, is the\nnation of that sovereign, that is, of the public person. So the Jews,\nwho were God\u2019s nation, were called (_Exod._ xix. 6) _a holy nation_. For\nby _holy_, is always understood either God himself, or that which is\nGod\u2019s in propriety; as by public is always meant, either the person of\nthe commonwealth itself, or something that is so the commonwealth\u2019s, as\nno private person can claim any propriety therein.\n\nTherefore the Sabbath, God\u2019s day, is a _holy day_; the temple, God\u2019s\nhouse, _a holy house_; sacrifices, tithes, and offerings, God\u2019s tribute,\n_holy duties_; priests, prophets, and anointed kings, under Christ,\nGod\u2019s ministers, _holy men_; the celestial ministering spirits, God\u2019s\nmessengers, _holy angels_; and the like: and wheresoever the word _holy_\nis taken properly, there is still something signified of propriety,\ngotten by consent. In saying, _Hallowed be thy name_, we do but pray to\nGod for grace to keep the first commandment, of _having no other Gods\nbut him_. Mankind is God\u2019s nation in propriety: but the Jews only were a\n_holy nation_. Why, but because they became his propriety by covenant?\n\n[Sidenote: Sacred, what.]\n\nAnd the word _profane_, is usually taken in the Scripture for the same\nwith _common_; and consequently their contraries, _holy_ and _proper_,\nin the kingdom of God, must be the same also. But figuratively, those\nmen also are called _holy_, that led such godly lives, as if they had\nforsaken all worldly designs, and wholly devoted and given themselves to\nGod. In the proper sense, that which is made _holy_ by God\u2019s\nappropriating or separating it to his own use, is said to be\n_sanctified_ by God, as the seventh day in the fourth commandment; and\nas the elect in the New Testament were said to be _sanctified_, when\nthey were endued with the spirit of godliness. And that which is made\n_holy_ by the dedication of men, and given to God, so as to be used only\nin his public service, is called also SACRED, and said to be\nconsecrated, as temples, and other houses of public prayer, and their\nutensils, priests, and ministers, victims, offerings, and the external\nmatter of sacraments.\n\n[Sidenote: Degrees of sanctity.]\n\nOf _holiness_ there be degrees: for of those things that are set apart\nfor the service of God, there may be some set apart again, for a nearer\nand more especial service. The whole nation of the Israelites were a\npeople holy to God; yet the tribe of Levi was amongst the Israelites a\nholy tribe; and amongst the Levites, the priests were yet more holy; and\namongst the priests, the high-priest was the most holy. So the land of\nJudea was the Holy Land; but the holy city wherein God was to be\nworshipped, was more holy; and again the Temple more holy than the city,\nand the _sanctum sanctorum_ more holy than the rest of the Temple.\n\n[Sidenote: Sacrament.]\n\nA SACRAMENT, is a separation of some visible thing from common use; and\na consecration of it to God\u2019s service, for a sign either of our\nadmission into the kingdom of God, to be of the number of his peculiar\npeople, or for a commemoration of the same. In the Old Testament, the\nsign of admission was _circumcision_; in the New Testament, _baptism_.\nThe commemoration of it in the Old Testament, was the _eating_, at a\ncertain time which was anniversary, of the _Paschal Lamb_; by which they\nwere put in mind of the night wherein they were delivered out of their\nbondage in Egypt; and in the New Testament, the celebrating of the\n_Lord\u2019s Supper_; by which, we are put in mind of our deliverance from\nthe bondage of sin, by our blessed Saviour\u2019s death upon the cross. The\nsacraments of _admission_, are but once to be used, because there needs\nbut one _admission_; but because we have need of being often put in mind\nof our deliverance, and of our allegiance, the sacraments of\n_commemoration_ have need to be reiterated. And these are the principal\nsacraments, and as it were the solemn oaths we make of our allegiance.\nThere be also other consecrations, that may be called sacraments, as the\nword implieth only consecration to God\u2019s service; but as it implies an\noath, or promise of allegiance to God, there were no other in the Old\nTestament, but _circumcision_, and the _passover_; nor are there any\nother in the New Testament, but _baptism_ and the _Lord\u2019s Supper_.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXXVI.\n\n OF THE WORD OF GOD, AND OF PROPHETS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Word, what.]\n\nWhen there is mention of the _word of God_, or of _man_, it doth not\nsignify a part of speech, such as grammarians call a noun, or a verb, or\nany simple voice, without a contexture with other words to make it\nsignificative; but a perfect speech or discourse, whereby the speaker\n_affirmeth_, _denieth_, _commandeth_, _promiseth_, _threateneth_,\n_wisheth_, or _interrogateth_. In which sense it is not _vocabulum_,\nthat signifies a _word_; but _sermo_, (in Greek \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) that is, some\n_speech_, _discourse_, or _saying_.\n\n[Sidenote: The words spoken by God, and concerning God, both are called\n God\u2019s word in Scripture.]\n\nAgain, if we say the _word of God_, or of _man_, it may be understood\nsometimes of the speaker: as the words that God hath spoken, or that a\nman hath spoken; in which sense, when we say, the Gospel of St. Matthew,\nwe understand St. Matthew to be the writer of it: and sometimes of the\nsubject; in which sense, when we read in the Bible, _the words of the\ndays of the kings of Israel, or Judah_, it is meant, that the acts that\nwere done in those days, were the subject of those words; and in the\nGreek, which, in the Scripture, retaineth many Hebraisms, by the word of\nGod is oftentimes meant, not that which is spoken by God, but concerning\nGod, and his government; that is to say, the doctrine of religion:\ninsomuch, as it is all one, to say \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6, and _theologia_; which\nis, that doctrine which we usually call _divinity_, as is manifest by\nthe places following, (_Acts_ xiii. 46) _Then Paul and Barnabas waxed\nbold, and said, it was necessary that the word of God should first have\nbeen spoken to you, but seeing you put it from you, and judge yourselves\nunworthy of everlasting life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles_. That which\nis here called the word of God, was the doctrine of Christian religion;\nas it appears evidently by that which goes before. And (_Acts_ v. 20)\nwhere it is said to the apostles by an angel, _Go stand and speak in the\nTemple, all the words of this life_; by the words of this life, is\nmeant, the doctrine of the Gospel; as is evident by what they did in the\nTemple, and is expressed in the last verse of the same chapter, _Daily\nin the Temple, and in every house they ceased not to teach and preach\nChrist Jesus_: in which place it is manifest, that Jesus Christ was the\nsubject of this _word of life_; or, which is all one, the subject of the\n_words of this life eternal_, that our Saviour offered them. So (_Acts_\nxv. 7) the word of God, is called _the word of the Gospel_, because it\ncontaineth the doctrine of the kingdom of Christ; and the same word\n(_Rom._ x. 8, 9) is called _the word of faith_; that is, as is there\nexpressed, the doctrine of Christ come, and raised from the dead. Also\n(_Matth._ xiii. 19) _When any one heareth the word of the kingdom_; that\nis, the doctrine of the kingdom taught by Christ. Again, the same word,\nis said (_Acts_ xii. 24) _to grow and to be multiplied_; which to\nunderstand of the evangelical doctrine is easy, but of the voice or\nspeech of God, hard and strange. In the same sense (_1 Tim._ iv. 1) the\n_doctrine of devils_ signifieth not the words of any devil, but the\ndoctrine of heathen men concerning _demons_, and those phantasms which\nthey worshipped as gods.\n\n[Sidenote: The word of God metaphorically used, first, for the decrees\n and power of God.]\n\nConsidering these two significations of the WORD OF GOD, as it is taken\nin Scripture, it is manifest in this latter sense, where it is taken for\nthe doctrine of Christian religion, that the whole Scripture is the word\nof God: but in the former sense, not so. For example, though these\nwords, _I am the Lord thy God, &c._ to the end of the Ten Commandments,\nwere spoken by God to Moses; yet the preface, _God spake these words and\nsaid_, is to be understood for the words of him that wrote the holy\nhistory. The _word of God_, as it is taken for that which he hath\nspoken, is understood sometimes _properly_, sometimes _metaphorically_.\n_Properly_, as the words he hath spoken to his prophets:\n_metaphorically_, for his wisdom, power, and eternal decree, in making\nthe world; in which sense, those fiats, _Let there be light_, _Let there\nbe a firmament_, _Let us make man, &c._ (_Gen._ i.) are the word of God.\nAnd in the same sense it is said (_John_ i. 3) _All things were made by\nit, and without it was nothing made that was made_: and (_Heb._ i. 3)\n_He upholdeth all things by the word of his power_; that is, by the\npower of his word; that is, by his power: and (_Heb._ xi. 3) _The worlds\nwere framed by the word of God_; and many other places to the same\nsense: as also amongst the Latins, the name of _fate_, which signified\nproperly _the word spoken_, is taken in the same sense.\n\n[Sidenote: Secondly, for the effect of his word.]\n\nSecondly, for the effect of his word; that is to say, for the thing\nitself, which by his word is affirmed, commanded, threatened, or\npromised; as (_Psalm_ cv. 19) where Joseph is said to have been kept in\nprison, _till his word was come_; that is, till that was come to pass\nwhich he had foretold to Pharaoh\u2019s butler (_Gen._ xl. 13) concerning his\nbeing restored to his office: for there, by _his word was come_, is\nmeant, the thing itself was come to pass. So also (_1 Kings_ xviii. 36)\nElijah saith to God, _I have done all these thy words_, instead of _I\nhave done all these things at thy word_, or commandment; and (_Jer._\nxvii. 15) _Where is the word of the Lord_, is put for, _Where is the\nevil he threatened_. And (_Ezek._ xii. 28) _There shall none of my words\nbe prolonged any more_: by _words_ are understood those _things_, which\nGod promised to his people. And in the New Testament (_Matth._ xxiv. 35)\n_heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away_;\nthat is, there is nothing that I have promised or foretold, that shall\nnot come to pass. And in this sense it is, that St. John the Evangelist,\nand, I think, St. John only, calleth our Saviour himself as in the flesh\n_the word of God_, as (_John_ i. 14) _the word was made flesh_; that is\nto say, the word, or promise that Christ should come into the world;\n_who in the beginning was with God_; that is to say, it was in the\npurpose of God the Father, to send God the Son into the world, to\nenlighten men in the way of eternal life; but it was not till then put\nin execution, and actually incarnate. So that our Saviour is there\ncalled the _word_, not because he was the promise, but the thing\npromised. They that taking occasion from this place, do commonly call\nhim the verb of God, do but render the text more obscure. They might as\nwell term him the noun of God: for as by _noun_, so also by _verb_, men\nunderstand nothing but a part of speech, a voice, a sound, that neither\naffirms, nor denies, nor commands, nor promiseth, nor is any substance\ncorporeal, or spiritual; and therefore it cannot be said to be either\nGod, or man; whereas our Saviour is both. And this _word_, which St.\nJohn in his gospel saith was with God, is (in his _first Epistle_, verse\n1) called the _word of life_; and (verse 2) _the eternal life, which was\nwith the Father_. So that he can be in no other sense called the _word_,\nthan in that, wherein he is called eternal life; that is, _he that hath\nprocured us eternal life_, by his coming in the flesh. So also\n(_Apocalypse_ xix. 13) the apostle speaking of Christ, clothed in a\ngarment dipped in blood, saith, his name is _the word of God_; which is\nto be understood, as if he had said his name had been, _He that was come\naccording to the purpose of God from the beginning, and according to his\nword and promises delivered by the prophets_. So that there is nothing\nhere of the incarnation of a word, but of the incarnation of God the\nSon, therefore called _the word_, because his incarnation was the\nperformance of the promise; in like manner as the Holy Ghost is called\n(_Acts_ i. 4; _Luke_ xxiv. 49) _the promise_.\n\n[Sidenote: Thirdly, for the words of reason and equity.]\n\nThere are also places of the Scripture, where, by the _word of God_, is\nsignified such words as are consonant to reason and equity, though\nspoken sometimes neither by prophet, nor by a holy man. For\nPharaoh-Necho was an idolater; yet his words to the good king Josiah, in\nwhich he advised him by messengers, not to oppose him in his march\nagainst Charchemish, are said to have proceeded from the mouth of God;\nand that Josiah, not hearkening to them, was slain in the battle; as is\nto be read (_2 Chron._ xxxv. 21, 22, 23.) It is true, that as the same\nhistory is related in the first book of Esdras, not Pharaoh, but\nJeremiah, spake these words to Josiah, from the mouth of the Lord. But\nwe are to give credit to the canonical Scripture, whatsoever be written\nin the Apocrypha.\n\nThe _word of God_, is then also to be taken for the dictates of reason\nand equity, when the same is said in the Scriptures to be written in\nman\u2019s heart; as _Psalm_ xxxvii. 31; _Jer._ xxxi. 33; _Deut._ xxx. 11,\n14, and many other like places.\n\n[Sidenote: Divers acceptions of the word prophet.]\n\nThe name of PROPHET signifieth in Scripture, sometimes _prolocutor_;\nthat is, he that speaketh from God to man, or from man to God: and\nsometimes _predictor_, or a foreteller of things to come: and sometimes\none that speaketh incoherently, as men that are distracted. It is most\nfrequently used in the sense of speaking from God to the people. So\nMoses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others were _prophets_. And\nin this sense the high-priest was a _prophet_, for he only went into the\n_sanctum sanctorum_, to enquire of God; and was to declare his answer to\nthe people. And therefore when Caiphas said, it was expedient that one\nman should die for the people, St. John saith (chapter xi. 51) that _He\nspake not this of himself, but being high-priest that year, he\nprophesied that one man should die for the nation_. Also they that in\nChristian congregations taught the people, (_1 Cor._ xiv. 3) are said to\nprophecy. In the like sense it is, that God saith to Moses (_Exod._ iv.\n16) concerning Aaron, _He shall be thy spokesman to the people; and he\nshall be to thee a mouth, and thou shalt be to him instead of God_: that\nwhich here is _spokesman_, is (_Exod._ vii. 1) interpreted prophet;\n_See_, saith God, _I have made thee a God to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy\nbrother shall be thy prophet_. In the sense of speaking from man to God,\nAbraham is called a prophet (_Gen._ xx. 7) where God in a dream speaketh\nto Abimelech in this manner, _Now therefore restore the man his wife,\nfor he is a prophet, and shall pray for thee_; whereby may be also\ngathered, that the name of prophet may be given, not unproperly, to them\nthat in Christian churches, have a calling to say public prayers for the\ncongregation. In the same sense, the prophets that came down from the\nhigh place, or hill of God, with a psaltery, and a tabret, and a pipe,\nand a harp (_1 Sam._ x. 5, 6, and 10), Saul amongst them, are said to\nprophecy, in that they praised God in that manner publicly. In the like\nsense, is Miriam (_Exod._ xv. 20) called a prophetess. So is it also to\nbe taken (_1 Cor._ xi. 4, 5), where St. Paul saith, _Every man that\nprayeth or prophecieth with his head covered, &c., and every woman that\nprayeth or prophecieth with her head uncovered_: for prophecy, in that\nplace, signifieth no more, but praising God in psalms and holy songs;\nwhich women might do in the church, though it were not lawful for them\nto speak to the congregation. And in this signification it is, that the\npoets of the heathen, that composed hymns and other sorts of poems in\nthe honour of their gods, were called _vates_, prophets; as is well\nenough known by all that are versed in the books of the Gentiles, and as\nis evident (_Tit._ i. 12), where St. Paul saith of the Cretians, that a\nprophet of their own said, they were liars; not that St. Paul held their\npoets for prophets, but acknowledgeth that the word prophet was commonly\nused to signify them that celebrated the honour of God in verse.\n\n[Sidenote: Prediction of future contingents, not always prophecy.]\n\nWhen by prophecy is meant prediction, or foretelling of future\ncontingents; not only they were prophets, who were God\u2019s spokesmen, and\nforetold those things to others, which God had foretold to them; but\nalso all those impostors, that pretend, by help of familiar spirits, or\nby superstitious divination of events past, from false causes, to\nforetel the like events in time to come: of which, as I have declared\nalready in the twelfth chapter of this discourse, there be many kinds,\nwho gain in the opinion of the common sort of men, a greater reputation\nof prophecy, by one casual event that may be but wrested to their\npurpose, than can be lost again by never so many failings. Prophecy is\nnot an art, nor, when it is taken for prediction, a constant vocation;\nbut an extraordinary, and temporary employment from God, most often of\ngood men, but sometimes also of the wicked. The woman of Endor, who is\nsaid to have had a familiar spirit, and thereby to have raised a\nphantasm of Samuel, and foretold Saul his death, was not therefore a\nprophetess; for neither had she any science, whereby she could raise\nsuch a phantasm; nor does it appear that God commanded the raising of\nit; but only guided that imposture to be a means of Saul\u2019s terror and\ndiscouragement, and by consequent, of the discomfiture by which he fell.\nAnd for incoherent speech, it was amongst the Gentiles taken for one\nsort of prophecy, because the prophets of their oracles, intoxicated\nwith a spirit or vapour from the cave of the Pythian oracle at Delphi,\nwere for the time really mad, and spake like madmen; of whose loose\nwords a sense might be made to fit any event, in such sort, as all\nbodies are said to be made of _materia prima_. In Scripture I find it\nalso so taken (_1 Sam._ xviii. 10) in these words, _And the evil spirit\ncame upon Saul, and he prophecied in the midst of the house_.\n\n[Sidenote: The manner how God hath spoken to the prophets.]\n\nAnd although there be so many significations in Scripture of the word\n_prophet_; yet is that the most frequent, in which it is taken for him,\nto whom God speaketh immediately that which the prophet is to say from\nhim, to some other man, or to the people. And hereupon a question may be\nasked, in what manner God speaketh to such a prophet. Can it, may some\nsay, be properly said, that God hath voice and language, when it cannot\nbe properly said, he hath a tongue, or other organs, as a man? The\nprophet David argueth thus, (_Psalm_ xciv. 9) _Shall he that made the\neye, not see? or he that made the ear, not hear?_ But this may be\nspoken, not as usually, to signify God\u2019s nature, but to signify our\nintention to honour him. For to _see_, and _hear_, are honourable\nattributes, and may be given to God, to declare, as far as our capacity\ncan conceive, his almighty power. But if it were to be taken in the\nstrict and proper sense, one might argue from his making of all other\nparts of man\u2019s body, that he had also the same use of them which we\nhave; which would be many of them so uncomely, as it would be the\ngreatest contumely in the world to ascribe them to him. Therefore we are\nto interpret God\u2019s speaking to men immediately, for that way, whatsoever\nit be, by which God makes them understand his will. And the ways whereby\nhe doth this, are many, and to be sought only in the Holy Scripture:\nwhere though many times it be said, that God spake to this, and that\nperson, without declaring in what manner; yet there be again many\nplaces, that deliver also the signs by which they were to acknowledge\nhis presence, and commandment; and by these may be understood, how he\nspake to many of the rest.\n\n[Sidenote: To the extraordinary prophets of the Old Testament he spake\n by dreams, or visions.]\n\nIn what manner God spake to Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and Noah, is not\nexpressed; nor how he spake to Abraham, till such time as he came out of\nhis own country to Sichem in the land of Canaan; and then (_Gen._ xii.\n7) God is said to have _appeared_ to him. So there is one way, whereby\nGod made his presence manifest; that is, by an _apparition_, or\n_vision_. And again, (_Gen._ xv. 1) _the word of the Lord came to\nAbraham in a vision_; that is to say, somewhat, as a sign of God\u2019s\npresence, appeared as God\u2019s messenger, to speak to him. Again, the Lord\nappeared to Abraham (_Gen._ xviii. 1) by an apparition of three angels;\nand to Abimelech (Gen. xx. 3) in a dream: to Lot (_Gen._ xix. 1) by an\napparition of two angels: and to Agar (_Gen._ xxi. 17) by the apparition\nof one angel: and to Abraham again (_Gen._ xxii. 11) by the apparition\nof a voice from heaven: and (_Gen._ xxvi. 24) to Isaac in the night,\nthat is, in his sleep, or by dream: and to Jacob (_Gen._ xxviii. 12) in\na dream; that is to say, as are the words of the text, _Jacob dreamed\nthat he saw a ladder, &c._: and (_Gen._ xxxii. 1) in a vision of angels:\nand to Moses (_Exod._ iii. 2) in the apparition of a flame of fire out\nof the midst of a bush. And after the time of Moses, where the manner\nhow God spake immediately to man in the Old Testament is expressed, he\nspake always by a vision, or by a dream; as to Gideon, Samuel, Eliah,\nElisha, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the rest of the prophets; and often in the\nNew Testament, as to Joseph, to St. Peter, to St. Paul, and to St. John\nthe Evangelist in the Apocalypse.\n\nOnly to Moses he spake in a more extraordinary manner in Mount Sinai,\nand in the Tabernacle; and to the high-priest in the Tabernacle, and in\nthe _sanctum sanctorum_ of the Temple. But Moses, and after him the\nhigh-priests, were prophets of a more eminent place and degree in God\u2019s\nfavour; and God himself in express words declareth, that to other\nprophets he spake in dreams and visions, but to his servant Moses, in\nsuch manner as a man speaketh to his friend. The words are these\n(_Numb._ xii. 6, 7, 8) _If there be a prophet among you, I the Lord will\nmake myself known to him in a vision, and will speak unto him in a\ndream. My servant Moses is not so, who is faithful in all my house; with\nhim I will speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, not in dark speeches;\nand the similitude of the Lord shall he behold._ And (_Exod._ xxxiii.\n11) _The Lord spake to Moses face to face, as a man speaketh to his\nfriend_. And yet this speaking of God to Moses, was by mediation of an\nangel, or angels, as appears expressly, _Acts_ vii. 35 and 53, and\n_Gal._ iii. 19; and was therefore a vision, though a more clear vision\nthan was given to other prophets. And conformable hereunto, where God\nsaith (_Deut._ xiii. 1) _If there arise amongst you a prophet, or\ndreamer of dreams_, the latter word is but the interpretation of the\nformer. And (_Joel_, ii. 28) _Your sons and your daughters shall\nprophecy; your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see\nvisions_; where again, the word _prophecy_ is expounded by _dream_, and\n_vision_. And in the same manner it was, that God spake to Solomon,\npromising him wisdom, riches, and honour; for the text saith, (_1 Kings_\niii. 15) _And Solomon awoke, and behold it was a dream_; so that\ngenerally the prophets extraordinary in the Old Testament took notice of\nthe word of God no otherwise than from their dreams, or visions; that is\nto say, from the imaginations which they had in their sleep, or in an\nextasy: which imaginations in every true prophet were supernatural; but\nin false prophets were either natural or feigned.\n\nThe same prophets were nevertheless said to speak by the spirit; as\n(_Zech._ vii. 12); where the prophet speaking of the Jews, saith, _They\nmade their hearts hard as adamant, lest they should hear the law, and\nthe words which the Lord of Hosts hath sent in his Spirit by the former\nprophets_. By which it is manifest, that speaking by the _spirit_, or\n_inspiration_, was not a particular manner of God\u2019s speaking, different\nfrom vision, when they, that were said to speak by the Spirit, were\nextraordinary prophets, such as for every new message, were to have a\npeculiar commission, or, which is all one, a new dream, or vision.\n\n[Sidenote: To prophets of perpetual calling, and supreme, God spake in\n the Old Testament from the mercy seat, in a manner not\n expressed in the Scripture.]\n\nOf prophets, that were so by a perpetual calling in the Old Testament,\nsome were _supreme_, and some _subordinate_: supreme were first Moses;\nand after him the high-priests, every one for his time, as long as the\npriesthood was royal; and after the people of the Jews had rejected God,\nthat he should no more reign over them, those kings which submitted\nthemselves to God\u2019s government, were also his chief prophets; and the\nhigh-priest\u2019s office became ministerial. And when God was to be\nconsulted, they put on the holy vestments, and enquired of the Lord, as\nthe king commanded them, and were deprived of their office, when the\nking thought fit. For king Saul (_1 Sam._ xiii. 9) commanded the burnt\noffering to be brought, and (_1 Sam._ xiv. 18) he commands the priests\nto bring the ark near him; and (v. 19) again to let it alone, because he\nsaw an advantage upon his enemies. And in the same chapter (v. 37) Saul\nasketh counsel of God. In like manner king David, after his being\nanointed, though before he had possession of the kingdom, is said to\n_enquire of the Lord_ (_1 Sam._ xxiii. 2) whether he should fight\nagainst the Philistines at Keilah; and (verse 9) David commandeth the\npriest to bring him the ephod, to enquire whether he should stay in\nKeilah, or not. And king Solomon (_1 Kings_ ii. 27) took the priesthood\nfrom Abiathar, and gave it (verse 35) to Zadok. Therefore Moses, and the\nhigh-priests, and the pious kings, who enquired of God on all\nextraordinary occasions, how they were to carry themselves, or what\nevent they were to have, were all sovereign prophets. But in what manner\nGod spake unto them is not manifest. To say that when Moses went up to\nGod in Mount Sinai, it was a dream or vision, such as other prophets\nhad, is contrary to that distinction which God made between Moses and\nother prophets (_Numb._ xii. 6, 7, 8). To say God spake or appeared as\nhe is in his own nature, is to deny his infiniteness, invisibility,\nincomprehensibility. To say he spake by inspiration, or infusion of the\nHoly Spirit, as the Holy Spirit signifieth the Deity, is to make Moses\nequal with Christ, in whom only the Godhead (as St. Paul speaketh,\n_Col._ ii. 9) dwelleth bodily. And lastly, to say he spake by the Holy\nSpirit, as it signifieth the graces or gifts of the Holy Spirit, is to\nattribute nothing to him supernatural. For God disposeth men to piety,\njustice, mercy, truth, faith, and all manner of virtue, both moral and\nintellectual, by doctrine, example, and by several occasions, natural\nand ordinary.\n\nAnd as these ways cannot be applied to God in his speaking to Moses, at\nMount Sinai; so also, they cannot be applied to him, in his speaking to\nthe high-priests, from the mercy-seat. Therefore in what manner God\nspake to those sovereign prophets of the Old Testament, whose office it\nwas to enquire of him, is not intelligible. In the time of the New\nTestament, there was no sovereign prophet, but our Saviour; who was both\nGod that spake, and the prophet to whom he spake.\n\n[Sidenote: To prophets of perpetual calling, but subordinate, God spake\n by the spirit.]\n\nTo subordinate prophets of perpetual calling, I find not any place that\nproveth God spake to them supernaturally; but only in such manner, as\nnaturally he inclineth men to piety, to belief, to righteousness, and to\nother virtues all other Christian men. Which way, though it consist in\nconstitution, instruction, education, and the occasions and invitements\nmen have to Christian virtues; yet it is truly attributed to the\noperation of the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit, which we in our language\ncall the Holy Ghost: for there is no good inclination, that is not of\nthe operation of God. But these operations are not always supernatural.\nWhen therefore a prophet is said to speak in the spirit, or by the\nspirit of God, we are to understand no more, but that he speaks\naccording to God\u2019s will, declared by the supreme prophet. For the most\ncommon acceptation of the word spirit, is in the signification of a\nman\u2019s intention, mind, or disposition.\n\nIn the time of Moses, there were seventy men besides himself, that\n_prophecied_ in the camp of the Israelites. In what manner God spake to\nthem, is declared in _Numbers_, chap. xi. verse 25. _The Lord came down\nin a cloud, and spake unto Moses, and took of the spirit that was upon\nhim, and gave it to the seventy elders. And it came to pass, when the\nspirit rested upon them, they prophecied and did not cease._ By which it\nis manifest, first, that their prophecying to the people was subservient\nand subordinate to the prophecying of Moses; for that God took of the\nspirit of Moses, to put upon them; so that they prophecied as Moses\nwould have them: otherwise they had not been suffered to prophecy at\nall. For there was (verse 27) a complaint made against them to Moses;\nand Joshua would have Moses to have forbidden them; which he did not,\nbut said to Joshua, _be not jealous in my behalf_. Secondly, that the\nspirit of God in that place signifieth nothing but the mind and\ndisposition to obey and assist Moses in the administration of the\ngovernment. For if it were meant they had the substantial spirit of God;\nthat is, the divine nature, inspired into them, then they had it in no\nless manner than Christ himself, in whom only the spirit of God dwelt\nbodily. It is meant therefore of the gift and grace of God, that guided\nthem to cooperate with Moses; from whom their spirit was derived. And it\nappeareth (_Numb._ xi. 16) that they were such as Moses himself should\nappoint for elders and officers of the people: for the words are,\n_Gather unto me seventy men, whom thou knowest to be elders and officers\nof the people_: where, _thou knowest_, is the same with _thou\nappointest_, or _hast appointed to be such_. For we are told before\n(_Exod._ xviii. 24) that Moses following the counsel of Jethro, his\nfather-in-law, did appoint judges and officers over the people, such as\nfeared God; and of these were those seventy, whom God, by putting upon\nthem Moses\u2019 spirit, inclined to aid Moses in the administration of the\nkingdom: and in this sense the spirit of God is said (_1 Sam._ xvi. 13,\n14) presently upon the anointing of David, to have come upon David, and\nleft Saul; God giving his graces to him he chose to govern his people,\nand taking them away from him he rejected. So that by the spirit is\nmeant inclination to God\u2019s service; and not any supernatural revelation.\n\n[Sidenote: God sometimes also spake by lots.]\n\nGod spake also many times by the event of lots; which were ordered by\nsuch as he had put in authority over his people. So we read that God\nmanifested by the lots which Saul caused to be drawn (_1 Sam._ xiv. 43)\nthe fault that Jonathan had committed, in eating a honey-comb, contrary\nto the oath taken by the people. And (_Josh._ xviii. 10) God divided the\nland of Canaan amongst the Israelites, by the _lots that Joshua did cast\nbefore the Lord in Shiloh_. In the same manner it seemeth to be, that\nGod discovered (_Joshua_ vii. 16, &c.) the crime of Achan. And these are\nthe ways whereby God declared his will in the Old Testament.\n\nAll which ways he used also in the New Testament. To the Virgin Mary, by\na vision of an angel: to Joseph in a dream: again, to Paul, in the way\nto Damascus, in a vision of our Saviour: and to Peter in the vision of a\nsheet let down from heaven, with divers sorts of flesh; of clean, and\nunclean beasts; and in prison, by vision of an angel: and to all the\napostles, and writers of the New Testament, by the graces of his spirit;\nand to the apostles again, at the choosing of Matthias in the place of\nJudas Iscariot, by lot.\n\n[Sidenote: Every man ought to examine the probability of a pretended\n prophet\u2019s calling.]\n\nSeeing then, all prophecy supposeth vision, or dream, (which two, when\nthey be natural, are the same), or some especial gift of God so rarely\nobserved in mankind as to be admired where observed; and seeing as well\nsuch gifts, as the most extraordinary dreams and visions, may proceed\nfrom God, not only by his supernatural, and immediate, but also by his\nnatural operation, and by mediation of second causes; there is need of\nreason and judgment to discern between natural, and supernatural gifts,\nand between natural, and supernatural visions or dreams. And\nconsequently men had need to be very circumspect and wary, in obeying\nthe voice of man, that pretending himself to be a prophet, requires us\nto obey God in that way, which he in God\u2019s name telleth us to be the way\nto happiness. For he that pretends to teach men the way of so great\nfelicity, pretends to govern them; that is to say, to rule and reign\nover them; which is a thing, that all men naturally desire, and is\ntherefore worthy to be suspected of ambition and imposture; and\nconsequently, ought to be examined and tried by every man, before he\nyield them obedience; unless he have yielded it them already, in the\ninstitution of a commonwealth; as when the prophet is the civil\nsovereign, or by the civil sovereign authorized. And if this examination\nof prophets and spirits, were not allowed to every one of the people, it\nhad been to no purpose to set out the marks, by which every man might be\nable to distinguish between those, whom they ought, and those whom they\nought not to follow. Seeing therefore such marks are set out (_Deut._\nxiii. 1, &c.) to know a prophet by; and (_1 John_ iv. 1, &c.) to know a\nspirit by: and seeing there is so much prophecying in the Old Testament,\nand so much preaching in the New Testament, against prophets; and so\nmuch greater a number ordinarily of false prophets, than of true; every\none is to beware of obeying their directions, at their own peril. And\nfirst, that there were many more false than true prophets, appears by\nthis, that when Ahab (_1 Kings_ xxii.) consulted four hundred prophets,\nthey were all false impostors, but only one Micaiah. And a little before\nthe time of the captivity, the prophets were generally liars. _The\nprophets_, (saith the Lord, by _Jeremiah_, chapter xiv. 14) _prophecy\nlies in my name. I sent them not, neither have I commanded them, nor\nspake unto them; they prophecy to you a false vision, a thing of nought,\nand the deceit of their heart._ Insomuch as God commanded the people by\nthe mouth of the prophet Jeremiah (chapter xxiii. 16) not to obey them:\n_Thus saith the Lord of hosts, hearken not unto the words of the\nprophets, that prophecy to you. They make you vain, they speak a vision\nof their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord._\n\n[Sidenote: All prophecy but of the sovereign prophet, is to be examined\n by every subject.]\n\nSeeing then there was in the time of the Old Testament, such quarrels\namongst the visionary prophets, one contesting with another, and asking,\n_when departed the Spirit from me, to go to thee?_ as between Micaiah\nand the rest of the four hundred; and such giving of the lie to one\nanother, (as in _Jerem._ xiv. 14) and such controversies in the New\nTestament at this day, amongst the spiritual prophets; every man then\nwas, and now is bound to make use of his natural reason, to apply to all\nprophecy those rules which God hath given us, to discern the true from\nfalse. Of which rules, in the Old Testament, one was, conformable\ndoctrine to that which Moses the sovereign prophet had taught them; and\nthe other, the miraculous power of foretelling what God would bring to\npass, as I have already showed out of _Deut._ xiii. 1, &c. And in the\nNew Testament there was but one only mark; and that was the preaching of\nthis doctrine, _that Jesus is the Christ_, that is, king of the Jews,\npromised in the Old Testament. Whosoever denied that article, he was a\nfalse prophet, whatsoever miracles he might seem to work; and he that\ntaught it was a true prophet. For St. John (_1 Epist._ iv. 2, &c.)\nspeaking expressly of the means to examine spirits, whether they be of\nGod, or not; after he had told them that there would arise false\nprophets, saith thus, _Hereby know ye the Spirit of God. Every spirit\nthat confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God_; that\nis, is approved and allowed as a prophet of God: not that he is a godly\nman, or one of the elect, for this, that he confesseth, professeth, or\npreacheth Jesus to be the Christ; but for that he is a prophet avowed.\nFor God sometimes speaketh by prophets, whose persons he hath not\naccepted; as he did by Balaam; and as he foretold Saul of his death, by\nthe Witch of Endor. Again in the next verse, _Every spirit that\nconfesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of Christ;\nand this is the spirit of Anti-Christ_. So that the rule is perfect on\nboth sides; that he is a true prophet, which preacheth the Messiah\nalready come, in the person of Jesus; and he a false one that denieth\nhim come, and looketh for him in some future impostor, that shall take\nupon him that honour falsely, whom the apostle there properly calleth\nAnti-Christ. Every man therefore ought to consider who is the sovereign\nprophet; that is to say, who it is, that is God\u2019s vicegerent on earth;\nand hath next under God, the authority of governing Christian men; and\nto observe for a rule, that doctrine, which in the name of God, he hath\ncommanded to be taught; and thereby to examine and try out the truth of\nthose doctrines, which pretended prophets with miracle, or without,\nshall at any time advance: and if they find it contrary to that rule, to\ndo as they did, that came to Moses, and complained that there were some\nthat prophecied in the camp, whose authority so to do they doubted of;\nand leave to the sovereign, as they did to Moses, to uphold, or to\nforbid them, as he should see cause; and if he disavow them, then no\nmore to obey their voice; or if he approve them, then to obey them, as\nmen to whom God hath given a part of the spirit of their sovereign. For\nwhen Christian men, take not their Christian sovereign, for God\u2019s\nprophet; they must either take their own dreams, for the prophecy they\nmean to be governed by, and the tumor of their own hearts for the Spirit\nof God; or they must suffer themselves to be led by some strange prince;\nor by some of their fellow-subjects, that can bewitch them, by slander\nof the government, into rebellion, without other miracle to confirm\ntheir calling, than sometimes an extraordinary success and impunity; and\nby this means destroying all laws, both divine and human, reduce all\norder, government, and society, to the first chaos of violence and civil\nwar.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXXVII.\n\n OF MIRACLES, AND THEIR USE.\n\n\n[Sidenote: A miracle is a work that causeth admiration.]\n\nBy _miracles_ are signified the admirable works of God: and therefore\nthey are also called _wonders_. And because they are for the most part,\ndone, for a signification of his commandment, in such occasions, as\nwithout them, men are apt to doubt, (following their private natural\nreasoning,) what he hath commanded, and what not, they are commonly, in\nholy Scripture, called _signs_, in the same sense, as they are called by\nthe Latins, _ostenta_, and _portenta_, from showing and fore-signifying\nthat, which the Almighty is about to bring to pass.\n\n[Sidenote: And must therefore be rare, and whereof there is no natural\n cause known.]\n\nTo understand therefore what is a miracle, we must first understand what\nworks they are, which men wonder at, and call admirable. And there be\nbut two things which make men wonder at any event: the one is, if it be\nstrange, that is to say, such as the like of it hath never, or very\nrarely been produced: the other is, if when it is produced, we cannot\nimagine it to have been done by natural means, but only by the immediate\nhand of God. But when we see some possible, natural cause of it, how\nrarely soever the like has been done, or if the like have been often\ndone, how impossible soever it be to imagine a natural means thereof, we\nno more wonder, nor esteem it for a miracle.\n\nTherefore, if a horse or cow should speak, it were a miracle; because\nboth the thing is strange, and the natural cause difficult to imagine.\nSo also were it to see a strange deviation of nature, in the production\nof some new shape of a living creature. But when a man, or other animal,\nengenders his like, though we know no more how this is done, than the\nother; yet because it is usual, it is no miracle. In like manner, if a\nman be metamorphosed into a stone, or into a pillar, it is a miracle;\nbecause strange: but if a piece of wood be so changed; because we see it\noften, it is no miracle: and yet we know no more by what operation of\nGod, the one is brought to pass, than the other.\n\nThe first rainbow that was seen in the world, was a miracle, because the\nfirst; and consequently strange; and served for a sign from God, placed\nin heaven, to assure his people, there should be no more any universal\ndestruction of the world by water. But at this day, because they are\nfrequent, they are not miracles, neither to them that know their natural\ncauses, nor to them who know them not. Again, there be many rare works\nproduced by the art of man: yet when we know they are done; because\nthereby we know also the means how they are done, we count them not for\nmiracles, because not wrought by the immediate hand of God, but of human\nindustry.\n\n[Sidenote: That which seemeth a miracle to one man, may seem otherwise\n to another.]\n\nFurthermore, seeing admiration and wonder are consequent to the\nknowledge and experience, wherewith men are endued, some more, some\nless; it followeth, that the same thing may be a miracle to one, and not\nto another. And thence it is, that ignorant and superstitious men make\ngreat wonders of those works, which other men, knowing to proceed from\nnature, (which is not the immediate, but the ordinary work of God),\nadmire not at all: as when eclipses of the sun and moon have been taken\nfor supernatural works, by the common people; when nevertheless, there\nwere others, who could from their natural causes have foretold the very\nhour they should arrive: or, as when a man, by confederacy and secret\nintelligence, getting knowledge of the private actions of an ignorant,\nunwary man, thereby tells him what he has done in former time; it seems\nto him a miraculous thing; but amongst wise, and cautelous men, such\nmiracles as those, cannot easily be done.\n\n[Sidenote: The end of miracles.]\n\nAgain, it belongeth to the nature of a miracle, that it be wrought for\nthe procuring of credit to God\u2019s messengers, ministers, and prophets,\nthat thereby men may know, they are called, sent, and employed by God,\nand thereby be the better inclined to obey them. And therefore, though\nthe creation of the world, and after that the destruction of all living\ncreatures in the universal deluge, were admirable works; yet because\nthey were not done to procure credit to any prophet, or other minister\nof God, they use not to be called miracles. For how admirable soever any\nwork be, the admiration consisteth not in that it could be done; because\nmen naturally believe the Almighty can do all things; but because he\ndoes it at the prayer or word of a man. But the works of God in Egypt,\nby the hand of Moses, were properly miracles; because they were done\nwith intention to make the people of Israel believe, that Moses came\nunto them, not out of any design of his own interest, but as sent from\nGod. Therefore, after God had commanded him to deliver the Israelites\nfrom the Egyptian bondage, when he said (_Exod._ iv. 1) _They will not\nbelieve me, but will say, the Lord hath not appeared unto me_, God gave\nhim power, to turn the rod he had in his hand into a serpent, and again\nto return it into a rod; and by putting his hand into his bosom, to make\nit leprous; and again by putting it out, to make it whole; to make the\nchildren of Israel believe (as it is in verse 5) that the God of their\nfathers had appeared unto him: and if that were not enough, he gave him\npower to turn their waters into blood. And when he had done these\nmiracles before the people, it is said (verse 31) that _they believed\nhim_. Nevertheless, for fear of Pharaoh, they durst not yet obey him.\nTherefore the other works which were done to plague Pharaoh and the\nEgyptians, tended all to make the Israelites believe in Moses, and were\nproperly miracles. In like manner if we consider all the miracles done\nby the hand of Moses, and all the rest of the prophets, till the\ncaptivity; and those of our Saviour, and his apostles afterwards; we\nshall find, their end was always to beget or confirm belief, that they\ncame not of their own motion, but were sent by God. We may farther\nobserve in Scripture, that the end of miracles, was to beget belief, not\nuniversally in all men, elect and reprobate; but in the elect only; that\nis to say, in such as God had determined should become his subjects. For\nthose miraculous plagues of Egypt, had not for their end, the conversion\nof Pharaoh; for God had told Moses before, that he would harden the\nheart of Pharoah, that he should not let the people go: and when he let\nthem go at last, not the miracles persuaded him, but the plagues forced\nhim to it. So also of our Saviour, it is written (_Matth._ xiii. 58),\nthat he wrought not many miracles in his own country, because of their\nunbelief; and (in _Mark_ vi. 5) instead of, _He wrought not many_, it\nis, _He could work none_. It was not because he wanted power; which to\nsay, were blasphemy against God; nor that the end of miracles was not to\nconvert incredulous men to Christ; for the end of all the miracles of\nMoses, of the prophets, of our Saviour, and of his apostles was to add\nmen to the church: but it was, because the end of their miracles, was to\nadd to the church, not all men, but such as should be saved; that is to\nsay, such as God had elected. Seeing therefore our Saviour was sent from\nhis Father, he could not use his power in the conversion of those, whom\nhis Father had rejected. They that expounding this place of _St. Mark_,\nsay, that this word, _He could not_, is put for, _He would not_, do it\nwithout example in the Greek tongue: where _would not_, is put sometimes\nfor _could not_, in things inanimate, that have no will; but _could\nnot_, for _would not_ never: and thereby lay a stumbling block before\nweak Christians; as if Christ could do no miracles, but amongst the\ncredulous.\n\n[Sidenote: The definition of a miracle.]\n\nFrom that which I have here set down, of the nature and use of a\nmiracle, we may define it thus: A MIRACLE _is a work of God, (besides\nhis operation by the way of nature, ordained in the creation) done, for\nthe making manifest to his elect, the mission of an extraordinary\nminister for their salvation_.\n\nAnd from this definition, we may infer; first, that in all miracles, the\nwork done, is not the effect of any virtue in the prophet; because it is\nthe effect of the immediate hand of God; that is to say God hath done\nit, without using the prophet therein, as a subordinate cause.\n\nSecondly, that no devil, angel, or other created spirit, can do a\nmiracle. For it must either be by virtue of some natural science, or by\nincantation, that is, by virtue of words. For if the enchanters do it by\ntheir own power independent, there is some power that proceedeth not\nfrom God; which all men deny: and if they do it by power given them,\nthen is the work not from the immediate hand of God, but natural, and\nconsequently no miracle.\n\nThere be some texts of Scripture, that seem to attribute the power of\nworking wonders, equal to some of those immediate miracles wrought by\nGod himself, to certain arts of magic and incantation. As for example,\nwhen we read that after the rod of Moses being cast on the ground became\na serpent, (_Exod._ vii. 11) _the magicians of Egypt did the like by\ntheir enchantments_; and that after Moses had turned the waters of the\nEgyptian streams, rivers, ponds, and pools of water into blood, (_Exod._\nvii. 22) _the magicians did so likewise with their enchantments_; and\nthat after Moses had by the power of God brought frogs upon the land,\n(_Exod._ viii. 7) _the magicians also did so with their enchantments,\nand brought up frogs upon the land of Egypt_; will not a man be apt to\nattribute miracles to enchantments; that is to say, to the efficacy of\nthe sound of words; and think the same very well proved out of this, and\nother such places? And yet there is no place of Scripture, that telleth\nus what an enchantment is. If therefore enchantment be not, as many\nthink it, a working of strange effects by spells and words; but\nimposture and delusion, wrought by ordinary means; and so far from\nsupernatural, as the impostors need not the study so much as of natural\ncauses, but the ordinary ignorance, stupidity, and superstition of\nmankind, to do them; those texts that seem to countenance the power of\nmagic, witchcraft, and enchantment, must needs have another sense, than\nat first sight they seem to bear.\n\nFor it is evident enough, that words have no effect, but on those that\nunderstand them; and then they have no other, but to signify the\nintentions or passions of them that speak; and thereby produce hope,\nfear, or other passions or conceptions in the hearer. Therefore when a\nrod seemeth a serpent, or the waters blood, or any other miracle seemeth\ndone by enchantment; if it be not to the edification of God\u2019s people,\nnot the rod, nor the water, nor any other thing is enchanted; that is to\nsay, wrought upon by the words, but the spectator. So that all the\nmiracle consisteth in this, that the enchanter has deceived a man; which\nis no miracle, but a very easy matter to do.\n\n[Sidenote: That men are apt to be deceived by false miracles.]\n\nFor such is the ignorance and aptitude to error generally of all men,\nbut especially of them that have not much knowledge of natural causes,\nand of the nature and interests of men; as by innumerable and easy\ntricks to be abused. What opinion of miraculous power, before it was\nknown there was a science of the course of the stars, might a man have\ngained, that should have told the people, this hour or day the sun\nshould be darkened? A juggler by the handling of his goblets and other\ntrinkets, if it were not now ordinarily practised, would be thought to\ndo his wonders by the power at least of the devil. A man that hath\npractised to speak by drawing in of his breath, (which kind of men in\nancient time were called _ventriloqui_), and so make the weakness of his\nvoice seem to proceed, not from the weak impulsion of the organs of\nspeech, but from distance of place, is able to make very many men\nbelieve it is a voice from Heaven, whatsoever he please to tell them.\nAnd for a crafty man, that hath enquired into the secrets, and familiar\nconfessions that one man ordinarily maketh to another of his actions and\nadventures past, to tell them him again is no hard matter; and yet there\nbe many, that by such means as that obtain the reputation of being\nconjurers. But it is too long a business, to reckon up the several sorts\nof those men, which the Greeks called \u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9, that is to say,\nworkers of things wonderful: and yet these do all they do, by their own\nsingle dexterity. But if we look upon the impostures wrought by\nconfederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be done, that is\nimpossible to be believed. For two men conspiring, one to seem lame, the\nother to cure him with a charm, will deceive many: but many conspiring,\none to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest to bear\nwitness, will deceive many more.\n\n[Sidenote: Cautions against the imposture of miracles.]\n\nIn this aptitude of mankind, to give too hasty belief to pretended\nmiracles, there can be no better, nor I think any other caution, than\nthat which God hath prescribed, first by Moses, as I have said before in\nthe precedent chapter, in the beginning of the xiiith and end of the\nxviiith of _Deuteronomy_; that we take not any for prophets, that teach\nany other religion, than that which God\u2019s lieutenant, which at that time\nwas Moses, hath established; nor any, though he teach the same religion,\nwhose prediction we do not see come to pass. Moses therefore in his\ntime, and Aaron and his successors in their times, and the sovereign\ngovernor of God\u2019s people, next under God himself, that is to say, the\nhead of the Church, in all times, are to be consulted, what doctrine he\nhath established, before we give credit to a pretended miracle or\nprophet. And when that is done, the thing they pretend to be a miracle,\nwe must both see it done, and use all means possible to consider,\nwhether it be really done; and not only so, but whether it be such, as\nno man can do the like by his natural power, but that it requires the\nimmediate hand of God. And in this also we must have recourse to God\u2019s\nlieutenant, to whom in all doubtful cases, we have submitted our private\njudgments. For example; if a man pretend, after certain words spoken\nover a piece of bread, that presently God hath made it not bread, but a\ngod, or a man, or both, and nevertheless it looketh still as like bread\nas ever it did; there is no reason for any man to think it really done,\nnor consequently to fear him, till he enquire of God, by his vicar or\nlieutenant, whether it be done, or not. If he say, not, then followeth\nthat which Moses saith (_Deut._ xviii. 22) _he hath spoken it\npresumptuously, thou shalt not fear him_. If he say, it is done, then he\nis not to contradict it. So also if we see not, but only hear tell of a\nmiracle, we are to consult the lawful Church; that is to say, the lawful\nhead thereof, how far we are to give credit to the relators of it. And\nthis is chiefly the case of men, that in these days live under Christian\nsovereigns. For in these times, I do not know one man, that ever saw any\nsuch wonderous work, done by the charm, or at the word, or prayer of a\nman, that a man endued but with a mediocrity of reason would think\nsupernatural: and the question is no more, whether what we see done, be\na miracle; whether the miracle we hear, or read of, were a real work,\nand not the act of a tongue, or pen; but in plain terms, whether the\nreport be true, or a lie. In which question we are not every one, to\nmake our own private reason, or conscience, but the public reason, that\nis, the reason of God\u2019s supreme lieutenant, judge; and indeed we have\nmade him judge already, if we have given him a sovereign power, to do\nall that is necessary for our peace and defence. A private man has\nalways the liberty, because thought is free, to believe or not believe\nin his heart those acts that have been given out for miracles, according\nas he shall see what benefit can accrue by men\u2019s belief, to those that\npretend or countenance them, and thereby conjecture whether they be\nmiracles or lies. But when it comes to confession of that faith, the\nprivate reason must submit to the public; that is to say, to God\u2019s\nlieutenant. But who is this lieutenant of God, and head of the Church,\nshall be considered in its proper place hereafter.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXXVIII.\n\n OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF ETERNAL\n LIFE, HELL, SALVATION, THE WORLD\n TO COME, AND REDEMPTION.\n\n\nThe maintenance of civil society depending on justice, and justice on\nthe power of life and death, and other less rewards and punishments,\nresiding in them that have the sovereignty of the commonwealth; it is\nimpossible a commonwealth should stand, where any other than the\nsovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than life, and of\ninflicting greater punishments than death. Now seeing _eternal life_ is\na greater reward than the _life present_; and _eternal torment_ a\ngreater punishment than the _death of nature_; it is a thing worthy to\nbe well considered of all men that desire, by obeying authority, to\navoid the calamities of confusion and civil war, what is meant in Holy\nScripture, by _life eternal_, and _torment eternal_; and for what\noffences, and against whom committed, men are to be _eternally\ntormented_; and for what actions they are to obtain _eternal life_.\n\n[Sidenote: The place of Adam\u2019s eternity, if he had not sinned, had been\n the terrestrial Paradise.]\n\nAnd first we find that Adam was created in such a condition of life, as\nhad he not broken the commandment of God, he had enjoyed it in the\nparadise of Eden everlastingly. For there was the _tree of life_,\nwhereof he was so long allowed to eat, as he should forbear to eat of\nthe tree of knowledge of good and evil; which was not allowed him. And\ntherefore as soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out of Paradise,\n(_Gen._ iii. 22) _lest he should put forth his hand, and take also of\nthe tree of life and live for ever_. By which it seemeth to me, (with\nsubmission nevertheless both in this, and in all questions whereof the\ndetermination dependeth on the Scriptures, to the interpretation of the\nBible authorized by the commonwealth, whose subject I am), that Adam, if\nhe had not sinned, had had an eternal life on earth, and that mortality\nentered upon himself and his posterity by his first sin. Not that actual\ndeath then entered; for Adam then could never have had children; whereas\nhe lived long after, and saw a numerous posterity ere he died. But where\nit is said, (_Gen._ ii. 17) _In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou\nshalt surely die_, it must needs be meant of his mortality, and\ncertitude of death. Seeing then eternal life was lost by Adam\u2019s\nforfeiture in committing sin, he that should cancel that forfeiture, was\nto recover thereby that life again. Now Jesus Christ hath satisfied for\nthe sins of all that believe in him; and therefore recovered to all\nbelievers, that eternal life which was lost by the sin of Adam. And in\nthis sense it is that the comparison of St. Paul holdeth, (_Rom._ v. 18,\n19) _As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to\ncondemnation, even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came\nupon all men to justification of life_; which is again (_1 Cor._ xv. 21,\n22) more perspicuously delivered in these words, _For since by man came\ndeath, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all\ndie, even so in Christ shall all be made alive._\n\n[Sidenote: Texts concerning the place of life eternal, for believers.]\n\nConcerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that eternal life which\nChrist hath obtained for them, the texts next before alleged seem to\nmake it on earth. For if as in Adam all die, that is, have forfeited\nparadise and eternal life on earth, even so in Christ all shall be made\nalive; then all men shall be made to live on earth; for else the\ncomparison were not proper. Hereunto seemeth to agree that of the\npsalmist (_Psalm_. cxxxiii. 3) _upon Zion God commanded the blessing,\neven life for evermore_: for Zion is in Jerusalem upon earth: as also\nthat of St. John (_Rev._ ii. 7) _To him that overcometh I will give to\neat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of God_.\nThis was the tree of Adam\u2019s eternal life; but his life was to have been\non earth. The same seemeth to be confirmed again by St. John (_Rev._\nxxi. 2), where he saith, _I John saw the holy city, new Jerusalem,\ncoming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her\nhusband_: and again (verse 10) to the same effect: as if he should say,\nthe new _Jerusalem_, the paradise of God, at the coming again of Christ,\nshould come down to God\u2019s people from heaven, and not they go up to it\nfrom earth. And this differs nothing from that, which the two men in\nwhite clothing, that is the two angels, said to the apostles that were\nlooking upon Christ ascending (_Acts_ i. 11) _This same Jesus, who is\ntaken up from you into heaven, shall so come, as you have seen him go up\ninto heaven_. Which soundeth as if they had said he should come down to\ngovern them under his Father eternally here, and not take them up to\ngovern them in heaven; and is conformable to the restoration of the\nkingdom of God instituted under Moses, which was a political government\nof the Jews on earth. Again, that saying of our Saviour (_Matth._ xxii.\n30), _that in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in\nmarriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven_, is a description of\nan eternal life, resembling that which we lost in Adam in the point of\nmarriage. For seeing Adam and Eve, if they had not sinned, had lived on\nearth eternally in their individual persons; it is manifest, they should\nnot continually have procreated their kind; for if immortals should have\ngenerated as mankind doth now, the earth in a small time would not have\nbeen able to afford them place to stand on. The Jews that asked our\nSaviour the question, whose wife the woman that had married many\nbrothers should be in the resurrection, knew not what were the\nconsequences of life eternal: and therefore our Saviour puts them in\nmind of this consequence of immortality; that there shall be no\ngeneration, and consequently no marriage, no more than there is marriage\nor generation among the angels. The comparison between that eternal life\nwhich Adam lost, and our Saviour by his victory over death hath\nrecovered, holdeth also in this; that as Adam lost eternal life by his\nsin, and yet lived after it for a time, so the faithful Christian hath\nrecovered eternal life by Christ\u2019s passion, though he die a natural\ndeath, and remain dead for a time, namely, till the resurrection. For as\ndeath is reckoned from the condemnation of Adam, not from the execution;\nso life is reckoned from the absolution, not from the resurrection of\nthem that are elected in Christ.\n\n[Sidenote: Ascension into heaven.]\n\nThat the place wherein men are to live eternally, after the\nresurrection, is the heavens, (meaning by heaven, those parts of the\nworld, which are the most remote from earth, as where the stars are, or\nabove the stars, in another higher heaven, called _c\u0153lum empyreum_,\nwhereof there is no mention in Scripture, nor ground in reason), is not\neasily to be drawn from any text that I can find. By the Kingdom of\nHeaven, is meant the kingdom of the King that dwelleth in heaven; and\nhis kingdom was the people of Israel, whom he ruled by the prophets, his\nlieutenants; first Moses, and after him Eleazar, and the sovereign\npriests, till in the days of Samuel they rebelled, and would have a\nmortal man for their king, after the manner of other nations. And when\nour Saviour Christ, by the preaching of his ministers, shall have\npersuaded the Jews to return, and called the Gentiles to his obedience,\nthen shall there be a new kingdom of heaven; because our king shall then\nbe God, whose _throne_ is heaven: without any necessity evident in the\nScripture, that man shall ascend to his happiness any higher than God\u2019s\n_footstool_ the earth. On the contrary, we find written (_John_ iii. 13)\nthat _no man hath ascended into heaven, but he that came down from\nheaven, even the son of man, that is in heaven_. Where I observe by the\nway, that these words are not, as those which go immediately before, the\nwords of our Saviour, but of St. John himself; for Christ was then not\nin heaven, but upon the earth. The like is said of David (_Acts_ ii. 34)\nwhere St. Peter, to prove the ascension of Christ, using the words of\nthe Psalmist (_Psalm_ xvi. 10), _Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell,\nnor suffer thine holy one to see corruption_, saith, they were spoken,\nnot of David, but of Christ; and to prove it, addeth this reason, _For\nDavid is not ascended into heaven_. But to this a man may easily answer,\nand say, that though their bodies were not to ascend till the general\nday of judgment, yet their souls were in heaven as soon as they were\ndeparted from their bodies; which also seemeth to be confirmed by the\nwords of our Saviour (_Luke_ xx. 37, 38), who proving the resurrection\nout of the words of Moses, saith thus, _That the dead are raised, even\nMoses shewed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord, the God of Abraham,\nand the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the\ndead, but of the living; for they all live to him._ But if these words\nbe to be understood only of the immortality of the soul, they prove not\nat all that which our Saviour intended to prove, which was the\nresurrection of the body, that is to say, the immortality of the man.\nTherefore our Saviour meaneth, that those patriarchs were immortal; not\nby a property consequent to the essence and nature of mankind; but by\nthe will of God, that was pleased of his mere grace, to bestow _eternal\nlife_ upon the faithful. And though at that time the patriarchs and many\nother faithful men were _dead_, yet as it is in the text, they _lived to\nGod_; that is, they were written in the Book of Life with them that were\nabsolved of their sins, and ordained to life eternal at the\nresurrection. That the soul of man is in its own nature eternal, and a\nliving creature independent on the body, or that any mere man is\nimmortal, otherwise than by the resurrection in the last day, except\nEnoch and Elias, is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture. The whole of\nthe xivth chapter of _Job_, which is the speech not of his friends, but\nof himself, is a complaint of this mortality of nature; and yet no\ncontradiction of the immortality at the resurrection. _There is hope of\na tree_, saith he, (verse 7) _if it be cast down. Though the root\nthereof wax old, and the stock thereof die in the ground, yet when it\nscenteth the water it will bud, and bring forth boughs like a plant. But\nman dieth and wasteth away, yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is\nhe?_ And (verse 12) _Man lieth down, and riseth not, till the heavens be\nno more_. But when is it, that the heavens shall be no more? St. Peter\ntells us, that it is at the general resurrection. For in his 2nd\n_Epistle_, chap. iii. verse 7, he saith, _that the heavens and the earth\nthat are now, are reserved unto fire against the day of judgment, and\nperdition of ungodly men_, and (v. 12) _looking for, and hasting to the\ncoming of God, wherein the heavens shall be on fire and shall be\ndissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat. Nevertheless,\nwe according to the promise look for new heavens, and a new earth,\nwherein dwelleth righteousness._ Therefore where Job saith, _man riseth\nnot till the heavens be no more_; it is all one, as if he had said, the\nimmortal life, (and soul and life in the Scripture do usually signify\nthe same thing,) beginneth not in man, till the resurrection and day of\njudgment; and hath for cause, not his specifical nature and generation,\nbut the promise. For St. Peter says, not _We look for new heavens and a\nnew earth, from nature_, but _from promise_.\n\nLastly, seeing it hath been already proved out of divers evident places\nof Scripture, in chap. xxxv. of this book, that the kingdom of God is a\ncivil commonwealth, where God himself is sovereign, by virtue first of\nthe _old_, and since of the _new_ covenant, wherein he reigneth by his\nvicar or lieutenant; the same places do therefore also prove, that after\nthe coming again of our Saviour in his majesty and glory, to reign\nactually and eternally, the kingdom of God is to be on earth. But\nbecause this doctrine, though proved out of places of Scripture not few\nnor obscure, will appear to most men a novelty, I do but propound it;\nmaintaining nothing in this, or any other paradox of religion; but\nattending the end of that dispute of the sword, concerning the\nauthority, not yet amongst my countrymen decided, by which all sorts of\ndoctrine are to be approved or rejected; and whose commands, both in\nspeech and writing, whatsoever be the opinions of private men, must by\nall men, that mean to be protected by their laws, be obeyed. For the\npoints of doctrine concerning the kingdom of God, have so great\ninfluence on the kingdom of man, as not to be determined, but by them,\nthat under God have the sovereign power.\n\n[Sidenote: The place after judgment of those who were never in the\n kingdom of God, or having been in, are cast out.]\n\nAs the kingdom of God, and eternal life, so also God\u2019s enemies, and\ntheir torments after judgment, appear by the Scripture to have their\nplace on earth. The name of the place, where all men remain till the\nresurrection, that were either buried, or swallowed up of the earth, is\nusually called in Scripture, by words that signify _under ground_; which\nthe Latins read generally _infernus_, and _inferi_, and the Greek \u1f03\u03b4\u03b7\u03c2,\nthat is to say, a place where men cannot see; and containeth as well the\ngrave, as any any other deeper place. But for the place of the damned\nafter the resurrection, it is not determined, neither in the Old nor New\nTestament, by any note of situation; but only by the company: as that it\nshall be, where such wicked men were, as God in former times, in\nextraordinary and miraculous manner, had destroyed from off the face of\nthe earth: [Sidenote: Tartarus.] as for example, that they are _in\nInferno_, in _Tartarus_, or in the bottomless pit; because Corah,\nDathan, and Abiron, were swallowed up alive into the earth. Not that the\nwriters of the Scripture would have us believe, there could be in the\nglobe of the earth, which is not only finite, but also, compared to the\nheight of the stars, of no considerable magnitude, a pit without a\nbottom, that is, a hole of infinite depth, such as the Greeks in their\n_demonology_, (that is to say, in their doctrine concerning _demons_),\nand after them the Romans, called _Tartarus_; of which Virgil (_\u00c6n._ vi.\n578, 579) says,\n\n Bis patet in pr\u00e6ceps tantum, tenditque sub umbras,\n Quantus ad \u00e6therium c\u0153li suspectus Olympum:\n\nfor that is a thing the proportion of earth to heaven cannot bear: but\nthat we should believe them there, indefinitely, where those men are, on\nwhom God inflicted that exemplary punishment.\n\n[Sidenote: The congregation of giants.]\n\nAgain, because those mighty men of the earth, that lived in the time of\nNoah, before the flood, (which the Greeks call _heroes_, and the\nScripture _giants_, and both say were begotten by copulation of the\nchildren of God with the children of men,) were for their wicked life\ndestroyed by the general deluge; the place of the damned, is therefore\nalso sometimes marked out, by the company of those deceased giants; as\n_Proverbs_ xxi. 16, _The man that wandereth out of the way of\nunderstanding, shall remain in the congregation of the giants_; and\n_Job_ xxvi. 5, _Behold the giants groan under water, and they that dwell\nwith them_. Here the place of the damned is under the water. And\n_Isaiah_ xiv. 9, _Hell is troubled how to meet thee_ (that is, the King\nof Babylon) _and will displace the giants for thee_: and here again the\nplace of the damned, if the sense be literal, is to be under water.\n[Sidenote: Lake of fire.] Thirdly, because the cities of Sodom and\nGomorrah, by the extraordinary wrath of God, were consumed for their\nwickedness with fire and brimstone, and together with them the country\nabout made a stinking bituminous lake: the place of the damned is\nsometimes expressed by fire, and a fiery lake, as in the _Apocalypse_,\nxxi. 8, _But the timorous, incredulous, and abominable, and murderers,\nand whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall\nhave their part in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone; which\nis the second death_. So that it is manifest, that hell fire, which is\nhere expressed by metaphor from the real fire of Sodom, signifieth not\nany certain kind or place of torment; but is to be taken indefinitely,\nfor destruction, as it is in _Rev._ xx. 14, where it is said, that\n_death and hell were cast into the lake of fire_; that is to say, were\nabolished and destroyed; as if after the day of judgment, there shall be\nno more dying, nor no more going into hell; that is, no more going to\n_Hades_, (from which word perhaps our word Hell is derived,) which is\nthe same with no more dying.\n\n[Sidenote: Utter darkness.]\n\nFourthly, from the plague of darkness inflicted on the Egyptians, of\nwhich it is written (_Exod._ x. 23) _They saw not one another, neither\nrose any man from his place for three days; but all the children of\nIsrael had light in their dwellings_; the place of the wicked after\njudgment, is called _utter darkness_, or, as it is in the original,\n_darkness without_. And so it is expressed (_Matth._ xxii. 13) where the\nking commanded his servants, _to bind hand and foot the man that had not\non his wedding garment, and to cast him out_, \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03be\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd,\n_into external darkness_, or _darkness without_: which though translated\n_utter darkness_, does not signify _how great_, but _where_ that\ndarkness is to be; namely, _without the habitation_ of God\u2019s elect.\n\n[Sidenote: Gehenna, and Tophet.]\n\nLastly, whereas there was a place near Jerusalem, called the _Valley of\nthe Children of Hinnon_; in a part whereof, called _Tophet_, the Jews\nhad committed most grievous idolatry, sacrificing their children to the\nidol Moloch; and wherein also God had afflicted his enemies with most\ngrievous punishments; and wherein Josiah had burned the priests of\nMoloch upon their own altars, as appeareth at large in the 2nd of\n_Kings_, chap. xxiii.: the place served afterwards to receive the filth\nand garbage which was carried thither out of the city; and there used to\nbe fires made from time to time, to purify the air, and take away the\nstench of carrion. From this abominable place, the Jews used ever after\nto call the place of the damned, by the name of _Gehenna_, or _Valley of\nHinnon_. And this _Gehenna_, is that word which is usually now\ntranslated HELL; and from the fires from time to time there burning, we\nhave the notion of _everlasting_ and _unquenchable fire_.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the literal sense of the Scripture concerning hell.]\n\nSeeing now there is none, that so interprets the Scripture, as that\nafter the day of judgment, the wicked are all eternally to be punished\nin the Valley of Hinnon; or that they shall so rise again, as to be ever\nafter under ground or under water; or that after the resurrection, they\nshall no more see one another, nor stir from one place to another: it\nfolloweth, methinks, very necessarily, that that which is thus said\nconcerning hell fire, is spoken metaphorically; and that therefore there\nis a proper sense to be enquired after, (for of all metaphors there is\nsome real ground, that may be expressed in proper words,) both of the\n_place_ of _hell_, and the nature of _hellish torments_, and\n_tormenters_.\n\n[Sidenote: Satan, Devil, not proper names, but appellatives.]\n\nAnd first for the tormenters, we have their nature and properties,\nexactly and properly delivered by the names of, _the Enemy_, or _Satan_;\n_the Accuser_, or _Diabolus_; _the Destroyer_, or _Abaddon_. Which\nsignificant names, _Satan_, _Devil_, _Abaddon_, set not forth to us any\nindividual person, as proper names use to do; but only an office, or\nquality; and are therefore appellatives; which ought not to have been\nleft untranslated, as they are in the Latin and modern Bibles; because\nthereby they seem to be proper names of _demons_; and men are the more\neasily seduced to believe the doctrine of devils; which at that time was\nthe religion of the Gentiles, and contrary to that of Moses and of\nChrist.\n\nAnd because by the _Enemy_, the _Accuser_, and _Destroyer_, is meant the\nenemy of them that shall be in the kingdom of God; therefore if the\nkingdom of God after the resurrection, be upon the earth, as in the\nformer chapter I have shown by Scripture it seems to be, the Enemy and\nhis kingdom must be on earth also. For so also was it, in the time\nbefore the Jews had deposed God. For God\u2019s kingdom was in Palestine; and\nthe nations round about, were the kingdoms of the Enemy; and\nconsequently by _Satan_, is meant any earthly enemy of the Church.\n\n[Sidenote: Torments of hell.]\n\nThe torments of hell, are expressed sometimes, by _weeping_, and\n_gnashing of teeth_, as _Matth._ viii. 12. Sometimes by _the worm of\nconscience_; as _Isaiah_ lxvi. 24, and _Mark_ ix. 44, 46, 48: sometimes,\nby fire, as in the place now quoted, _where the worm dieth not, and the\nfire is not quenched_, and many places beside: sometimes by _shame and\ncontempt_, as _Dan._ xii. 2, _And many of them that sleep in the dust of\nthe earth, shall awake; some to everlasting life; and some to shame, and\neverlasting contempt_. All which places design metaphorically a grief\nand discontent of mind, from the sight of that eternal felicity in\nothers, which they themselves through their own incredulity and\ndisobedience have lost. And because such felicity in others, is not\nsensible but by comparison with their own actual miseries; it followeth\nthat they are to suffer such bodily pains, and calamities, as are\nincident to those, who not only live under evil and cruel governors, but\nhave also for enemy the eternal king of the saints, God Almighty. And\namongst these bodily pains, is to be reckoned also to every one of the\nwicked a second death. For though the Scripture be clear for an\nuniversal resurrection; yet we do not read, that to any of the reprobate\nis promised an eternal life. For whereas St. Paul (_1 Cor._ xv. 42, 43)\nto the question concerning what bodies men shall rise with again, saith,\nthat _The body is sown in corruption, and is raised in incorruption; it\nis sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it\nis raised in power_. Glory and power cannot be applied to the bodies of\nthe wicked: nor can the name of _second death_ be applied to those that\ncan never die but once: and although in metaphorical speech, a\ncalamitous life everlasting, may be called an everlasting death, yet it\ncannot well be understood of a _second death_.\n\nThe fire prepared for the wicked, is an everlasting fire: that is to\nsay, the estate wherein no man can be without torture, both of body and\nmind, after the resurrection, shall endure for ever; and in that sense\nthe fire shall be unquenchable, and the torments everlasting: but it\ncannot thence be inferred, that he who shall be cast into that fire, or\nbe tormented with those torments, shall endure and resist them so as to\nbe eternally burnt, and tortured, and yet never be destroyed, nor die.\nAnd though there be many places that affirm everlasting fire and\ntorments, into which men may be cast successively one after another as\nlong as the world lasts, yet I find none that affirm there shall be an\neternal life therein of any individual person; but to the contrary, an\neverlasting death, which is the second death: (_Rev._ xx. 13, 14) _For\nafter death and the grave shall have delivered up the dead which were in\nthem, and every man be judged according to his works; death and the\ngrave shall also be cast into the lake of fire. This is the second\ndeath._ Whereby it is evident that there is to be a second death of\nevery one that shall be condemned at the day of judgment, after which he\nshall die no more.\n\n[Sidenote: The joys of life eternal, and salvation, the same thing.]\n\n[Sidenote: Salvation from sin, and from misery, all one.]\n\nThe joys of life eternal, are in Scripture comprehended all under the\nname of SALVATION, or _being saved_. To be saved, is to be secured,\neither respectively, against special evils, or absolutely, against all\nevils, comprehending want, sickness, and death itself. And because man\nwas created in a condition immortal, not subject to corruption, and\nconsequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature;\nand fell from that happiness by the sin of Adam; it followeth, that to\nbe _saved_ from sin, is to be saved from all the evil and calamities\nthat sin hath brought upon us. And therefore in the holy Scripture,\nremission of sin, and salvation from death and misery, is the same\nthing, as it appears by the words of our Saviour, who having cured a man\nsick of the palsy, by saying, (_Matth._ ix. 2) _Son be of good cheer,\nthy sins be forgiven thee_; and knowing that the Scribes took for\nblasphemy, that a man should pretend to forgive sins, asked them (verse\n5) _whether it were easier to say, Thy sins be forgiven thee, or, Arise\nand walk_; signifying thereby, that it was all one, as to the saving of\nthe sick, to say, _Thy sins are forgiven_, and _Arise and walk_; and\nthat he used that form of speech, only to shew he had power to forgive\nsins. And it is besides evident in reason, that since death and misery\nwere the punishments of sin, the discharge of sin must also be a\ndischarge of death and misery; that is to say, salvation absolute, such\nas the faithful are to enjoy after the day of judgment, by the power and\nfavour of Jesus Christ, who for that cause is called our SAVIOUR.\n\nConcerning particular salvations, such as are understood, (_1 Sam._ xiv.\n39) as the _Lord liveth that saveth Israel_, that is, from their\ntemporary enemies, and (_2 Sam._ xxii. 3) _Thou art my Saviour, thou\nsavest me from violence_; and, (_2 Kings_ xiii. 5) _God gave the\nIsraelites a Saviour, and so they were delivered from the hand of the\nAssyrians_, and the like, I need say nothing; there being neither\ndifficulty, nor interest to corrupt the interpretation of texts of that\nkind.\n\n[Sidenote: The place of eternal salvation.]\n\nBut concerning the general salvation, because it must be in the kingdom\nof heaven, there is great difficulty concerning the place. On one side,\nby _kingdom_, which is an estate ordained by men for their perpetual\nsecurity against enemies and want, it seemeth that this salvation should\nbe on earth. For by salvation is set forth unto us, a glorious reign of\nour king, by conquest; not a safety by escape: and therefore there where\nwe look for salvation, we must look also for triumph; and before\ntriumph, for victory; and before victory, for battle; which cannot well\nbe supposed, shall be in heaven. But how good soever this reason may be,\nI will not trust to it, without very evident places of Scripture. The\nstate of salvation is described at large, _Isaiah_ xxxiii. 20, 21, 22,\n23, 24:\n\n_Look upon Zion, the city of our solemnities; thine eyes shall see\nJerusalem a quiet habitation, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down;\nnot one of the stakes thereof shall ever be removed, neither shall any\nof the cords thereof be broken._\n\n_But there the glorious Lord will be unto us a place of broad rivers and\nstreams; wherein shall go no galley with oars, neither shall gallant\nship pass thereby._\n\n_For the Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our law-giver, the Lord is our\nking, he will save us._\n\n_Thy tacklings are loosed; they could not well strengthen their mast;\nthey could not spread the sail: then is the prey of a great spoil\ndivided; the lame take the prey:_\n\n_And the inhabitant shall not say, I am sick; the people that shall\ndwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity._\n\nIn which words we have the place from whence salvation is to proceed,\n_Jerusalem, a quiet habitation_; the eternity of it, _a tabernacle that\nshall not be taken down, &c_; the Saviour of it, _the Lord, their judge,\ntheir law-giver, their king, he will save us; the salvation, the Lord\nshall be to them as a broad moat of swift waters, &c_; the condition of\ntheir enemies, _their tacklings are loose, their masts weak, the lame\nshall take the spoil of them_; the condition of the saved, _the\ninhabitant shall not say, I am sick_: and lastly, all this is\ncomprehended in forgiveness of sin, _the people that dwell therein shall\nbe forgiven their iniquity_. By which it is evident, that salvation\nshall be on earth, then, when God shall reign, at the coming again of\nChrist, in Jerusalem; and from Jerusalem shall proceed the salvation of\nthe Gentiles that shall be received into God\u2019s kingdom: as is also more\nexpressly declared by the same prophet, (_Isaiah_ lxvi. 20, 21), _And\nthey_ (that is the Gentiles who had any Jew in bondage) _shall bring all\nyour brethren, for an offering to the Lord, out of all nations, upon\nhorses, and in chariots, and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift\nbeasts, to my holy mountain, Jerusalem, saith the Lord, as the children\nof Israel bring an offering in a clean vessel into the house of the\nLord. And I will also take of them for priests and for Levites, saith\nthe Lord._ Whereby it is manifest, that the chief seat of God\u2019s kingdom,\nwhich is the place from whence the salvation of us that were Gentiles\nshall proceed, shall be Jerusalem: and the same is also confirmed by our\nSaviour in his discourse with the woman of Samaria, concerning the place\nof God\u2019s worship; to whom he saith (_John_ iv. 22) that the Samaritans\nworshipped they knew not what, but the Jews worshipped what they knew,\n_for salvation is of the Jews_ (_ex Jud\u00e6is_, that is, begins at the\nJews): as if he should say, you worship God, but know not by whom he\nwill save you, as we do, that know it shall be by one of the tribe of\nJudah; a Jew, not a Samaritan. And therefore also the woman not\nimpertinently answered him again, _We know the Messias shall come_. So\nthat which our Saviour saith, _Salvation is from the Jews_, is the same\nthat Paul says (_Rom._ i. 16, 17) _The Gospel is the power of God to\nsalvation to every one that believeth: to the Jew first, and also to the\nGreek. For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to\nfaith_; from the faith of the Jew to the faith of the Gentile. In the\nlike sense the prophet Joel describing the day of Judgment, (chap. ii.\n30, 31) that God would _shew wonders in heaven, and in earth, blood, and\nfire, and pillars of smoke; the sun shall be turned to darkness, and the\nmoon into blood, before the great and terrible day of the Lord come_: he\naddeth, (verse 32) _and it shall come to pass, that whosoever shall call\nupon the name of the Lord shall be saved. For in Mount Zion and in\nJerusalem shall be salvation._ And _Obadiah_, (verse 17) saith the same,\n_Upon Mount Zion shall be deliverance; and there shall be holiness, and\nthe house of Jacob shall possess their possessions_, that is the\npossessions of the _heathen_, which _possessions_, he expresseth more\nparticularly in the following verses, by the _mount of Esau_, the _Land\nof the Philistines_, the _fields of Ephraim_, of _Samaria_, _Gilead_,\nand the _cities of the south_, and concludes with these words, _the\nkingdom shall be the Lord\u2019s_. All these places are for salvation, and\nthe kingdom of God, after the day of judgment, upon earth. On the other\nside, I have not found any text that can probably be drawn, to prove any\nascension of the saints into heaven; that is to say, into any _c\u0153lum\nempyreum_, or other \u00e6therial region; saving that it is called the\nkingdom of Heaven: which name it may have, because God, that was king of\nthe Jews, governed them by his commands, sent to Moses by angels from\nheaven; and after the revolt, sent his Son from heaven to reduce them to\ntheir obedience; and shall send him thence again to rule both them, and\nall other faithful men, from the day of judgment, everlastingly: or from\nthat, that the throne of this our great king is in heaven; whereas the\nearth is but his footstool. But that the subjects of God should have any\nplace as high as his throne, or higher than his footstool, it seemeth\nnot suitable to the dignity of a king, nor can I find any evident text\nfor it in Holy Scripture.\n\n[Sidenote: The world to come.]\n\nFrom this that hath been said of the kingdom of God, and of salvation,\nit is not hard to interpret what is meant by the WORLD TO COME. There\nare three worlds mentioned in Scripture, the _old world_, the _present\nworld_, and the _world to come_. Of the first, St. Peter speaks, (_2\nPet._ ii. 5) _If God spared not the old world, but saved Noah the eighth\nperson, a preacher of righteousness, bringing the flood upon the world\nof the ungodly, &c._ So the _first world_, was from Adam to the general\nflood. Of the present world, our Saviour speaks (_John_ xviii. 36) _My\nkingdom is not of this world_. For he came only to teach men the way of\nsalvation, and to renew the kingdom of his Father, by his doctrine. Of\nthe world to come, St. Peter speaks (_2 Pet._ iii. 13) _Nevertheless we\naccording to his promise look for new heavens, and a new earth_. This is\nthat WORLD, wherein Christ coming down from heaven in the clouds, with\ngreat power, and glory, shall send his angels, and shall gather together\nhis elect, from the four winds, and from the uttermost parts of the\nearth, and thenceforth reign over them, under his Father, everlastingly.\n\n[Sidenote: Redemption.]\n\n_Salvation_ of a sinner, supposeth a precedent REDEMPTION; for he that\nis once guilty of sin, is obnoxious to the penalty of the same; and must\npay, or some other for him, such ransom as he that is offended, and has\nhim in his power, shall require. And seeing the person offended, is\nAlmighty God, in whose power are all things; such ransom is to be paid\nbefore salvation can be acquired, as God hath been pleased to require.\nBy this ransom, is not intended a satisfaction for sin, equivalent to\nthe offence; which no sinner for himself, nor righteous man can ever be\nable to make for another: the damage a man does to another, he may make\namends for by restitution or recompense; but sin cannot be taken away by\nrecompense; for that were to make the liberty to sin, a thing vendible.\nBut sins may be pardoned to the repentant, either _gratis_, or upon such\npenalty as God is pleased to accept. That which God usually accepted in\nthe Old Testament, was some sacrifice or oblation. To forgive sin is not\nan act of injustice, though the punishment have been threatened. Even\namongst men, though the promise of good, bind the promiser; yet threats,\nthat is to say, promises of evil, bind them not; much less shall they\nbind God, who is infinitely more merciful than men. Our Saviour Christ\ntherefore to _redeem_ us, did not in that sense satisfy for the sins of\nmen, as that his death, of its own virtue, could make it unjust in God\nto punish sinners with eternal death; but did make that sacrifice and\noblation of himself, at his first coming, which God was pleased to\nrequire for the salvation, at his second coming, of such as in the\nmeantime should repent, and believe in him. And though this act of our\n_redemption_, be not always in Scripture called a _sacrifice_, and\n_oblation_, but sometimes a _price_; yet by _price_ we are not to\nunderstand anything, by the value whereof, he could claim right to a\npardon for us, from his offended Father; but that price which God the\nFather was pleased in mercy to demand.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XXXIX.\n\n OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF\n THE WORD CHURCH.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Church the Lord\u2019s house.]\n\nThe word Church, (_Ecclesia_) signifieth in the books of Holy Scripture\ndivers things. Sometimes, though not often, it is taken for _God\u2019s\nhouse_, that is to say, for a temple, wherein Christians assembled to\nperform holy duties, publicly, as (_1 Cor._ xiv. 34) _Let your women\nkeep silence in the Churches_: but this is metaphorically put for the\ncongregation there assembled; and hath been since used for the edifice\nitself, to distinguish between the temples of Christians and idolaters.\nThe Temple of Jerusalem was _God\u2019s house_, and the house of prayer; and\nso is any edifice dedicated by Christians to the worship of Christ,\n_Christ\u2019s house_: and therefore the Greek fathers call it \u039a\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u1f74, _the\nLord\u2019s house_: and thence in our language it came to be called _kyrke_,\nand _church_.\n\n[Sidenote: _Ecclesia_, properly what.]\n\nChurch, when not taken for a house, signifieth the same that _ecclesia_\nsignified in the Grecian commonwealth, that is to say, a congregation,\nor an assembly of citizens, called forth to hear the magistrate speak\nunto them; and which in the commonwealth of Rome was called _concio_: as\nhe that spake was called _ecclesiastes_, and _concionator_. And when\nthey were called forth by lawful authority, (_Acts_ xix. 39) it was\n_Ecclesia legitima_, a _lawful Church_, \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1. But when they\nwere excited by tumultuous and seditious clamour, then it was a Confused\nChurch, \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7.\n\nIt is taken also sometimes for the men that have right to be of the\ncongregation, though not actually assembled, that is to say, for the\nwhole multitude of Christian men, how far soever they be dispersed: as\n(_Acts_ viii. 3) where it is said, that _Saul made havoc of the Church_:\nand in this sense is Christ said to be the head of the Church. And\nsometimes for a certain part of Christians, as (_Col._ iv. 15) _Salute\nthe Church that is in his house_. Sometimes also for the elect only; as\n(_Eph._ v. 27) _A glorious Church, without spot, or wrinkle, holy, and\nwithout blemish_; which is meant of the _Church triumphant_, or _Church\nto come_. Sometimes, for a congregation assembled of professors of\nChristianity, whether their profession be true or counterfeit; as it is\nunderstood, (_Matth._ xviii. 17) where it is said, _Tell it to the\nChurch; and if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be to thee as a\nGentile, or publican_.\n\n[Sidenote: In what sense the church is one person.]\n\n[Sidenote: Church defined.]\n\nAnd in this last sense only it is that the _Church_ can be taken for one\nperson; that is to say, that it can be said to have power to will, to\npronounce, to command, to be obeyed, to make laws, or to do any other\naction whatsoever. For without authority from a lawful congregation,\nwhatsoever act be done in a concourse of people, it is the particular\nact of every one of those that were present, and gave their aid to the\nperformance of it; and not the act of them all in gross, as of one body;\nmuch less the act of them that were absent, or that being present, were\nnot willing it should be done. According to this sense, I define a\nCHURCH to be, _a company of men professing Christian religion, united in\nthe person of one sovereign, at whose command they ought to assemble,\nand without whose authority they ought not to assemble_. And because in\nall commonwealths, that assembly, which is without warrant from the\ncivil sovereign, is unlawful; that Church also, which is assembled in\nany commonwealth that hath forbidden them to assemble, is an unlawful\nassembly.\n\n[Sidenote: A Christian commonwealth and a church all one.]\n\nIt followeth also, that there is on earth, no such universal Church, as\nall Christians are bound to obey; because there is no power on earth, to\nwhich all other commonwealths are subject. There are Christians, in the\ndominions of several princes and states; but every one of them is\nsubject to that commonwealth, whereof he is himself a member; and\nconsequently, cannot be subject to the commands of any other person. And\ntherefore a Church, such a one as is capable to command, to judge,\nabsolve, condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with a civil\ncommonwealth, consisting of Christian men; and is called a _civil\nstate_, for that the subjects of it are _men_; and a _Church_, for that\nthe subjects thereof are _Christians_. _Temporal_ and _spiritual_\ngovernment, are but two words brought into the world, to make men see\ndouble, and mistake their _lawful sovereign_. It is true, that the\nbodies of the faithful, after the resurrection, shall be not only\nspiritual, but eternal; but in this life they are gross, and\ncorruptible. There is therefore no other government in this life,\nneither of state, nor religion, but temporal; nor teaching of any\ndoctrine, lawful to any subject, which the governor both of the state,\nand of the religion forbiddeth to be taught. And that governor must be\none; or else there must needs follow faction and civil war in the\ncommonwealth, between the _Church_ and _State_; between _spiritualists_\nand _temporalists_; between the _sword of justice_, and the _shield of\nfaith_: and, which is more, in every Christian man\u2019s own breast, between\nthe _Christian_, and the _man_. The doctors of the Church, are called\npastors; so also are civil sovereigns. But if pastors be not subordinate\none to another, so as that there may be one chief pastor, men will be\ntaught contrary doctrines; whereof both may be, and one must be false.\nWho that one chief pastor is, according to the law of nature, hath been\nalready shown; namely, that it is the civil sovereign: and to whom the\nScripture hath assigned that office, we shall see in the chapters\nfollowing.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XL.\n\n OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD, IN\n ABRAHAM, MOSES, THE HIGH-PRIESTS, AND\n THE KINGS OF JUDAH.\n\n\n\n[Sidenote: The sovereign right of Abraham.]\n\nThe father of the faithful, and first in the kingdom of God by covenant,\nwas Abraham. For with him was the covenant first made; wherein he\nobliged himself, and his seed after him, to acknowledge and obey the\ncommands of God; not only such, as he could take notice of, (as moral\nlaws,) by the light of nature; but also such, as God should in special\nmanner deliver to him by dreams and visions. For as to the moral law,\nthey were already obliged, and needed not have been contracted withal,\nby promise of the land of Canaan. Nor was there any contract, that could\nadd to, or strengthen the obligation, by which both they, and all men\nelse were bound naturally to obey God Almighty: and therefore the\ncovenant which Abraham made with God, was to take for the commandment of\nGod, that which in the name of God was commanded him in a dream, or\nvision; and to deliver it to his family, and cause them to observe the\nsame.\n\n[Sidenote: Abraham had the sole power of ordering the religion of his\n own people.]\n\nIn this contract of God with Abraham, we may observe three points of\nimportant consequence in the government of God\u2019s people. First, that at\nthe making of this covenant, God spake only to Abraham; and therefore\ncontracted not with any of his family, or seed, otherwise than as their\nwills, which make the essence of all covenants, were before the contract\ninvolved in the will of Abraham; who was therefore supposed to have had\na lawful power, to make them perform all that he covenanted for them.\nAccording whereunto (_Gen._ xviii. 18, 19) God saith, _All the nations\nof the earth shall be blessed in him; for I know him that he will\ncommand his children and his household after him, and they shall keep\nthe way of the Lord_. From whence may be concluded this first point,\nthat they to whom God hath not spoken immediately, are to receive the\npositive commandments of God, from their sovereign; as the family and\nseed of Abraham did from Abraham their father, and Lord, and civil\nsovereign. And consequently in every commonwealth, they who have no\nsupernatural revelation to the contrary, ought to obey the laws of their\nown sovereign, in the external acts and profession of religion. As for\nthe inward _thought_, and _belief_ of men, which human governors can\ntake no notice of, (for God only knoweth the heart), they are not\nvoluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will and of\nthe power of God; and consequently fall not under obligation.\n\n[Sidenote: No pretence of private spirit against the religion of\n Abraham.]\n\nFrom whence proceedeth another point, that it was not unlawful for\nAbraham, when any of his subjects should pretend private vision or\nspirit, or other revelation from God, for the countenancing of any\ndoctrine which Abraham should forbid, or when they followed or adhered\nto any such pretender, to punish them; and consequently that it is\nlawful now for the sovereign to punish any man that shall oppose his\nprivate spirit against the laws: for he hath the same place in the\ncommonwealth, that Abraham had in his own family.\n\n[Sidenote: Abraham sole judge and interpreter of what God spake.]\n\nThere ariseth also from the same, a third point; that as none but\nAbraham in his family, so none but the sovereign in a Christian\ncommonwealth, can take notice what is, or what is not the word of God.\nFor God spake only to Abraham; and it was he only, that was able to know\nwhat God said, and to interpret the same to his family: and therefore\nalso, they that have the place of Abraham in a commonwealth, are the\nonly interpreters of what God hath spoken.\n\n[Sidenote: The authority of Moses whereon grounded.]\n\nThe same covenant was renewed with Isaac; and afterwards with Jacob; but\nafterwards no more, till the Israelites were freed from the Egyptians,\nand arrived at the foot of Mount Sinai: and then it was renewed by\nMoses, (as I have said before, chap. xxxv.) in such manner, as they\nbecame from that time forward the peculiar kingdom of God; whose\nlieutenant was Moses, for his own time: and the succession to that\noffice was settled upon Aaron, and his heirs after him, to be to God a a\nsacerdotal kingdom for ever.\n\nBy this constitution, a kingdom is acquired to God. But seeing Moses had\nno authority to govern the Israelites, as a successor to the right of\nAbraham, because he could not claim it by inheritance; it appeareth not\nas yet, that the people were obliged to take him for God\u2019s lieutenant,\nlonger than they believed that God spake unto him. And therefore his\nauthority, notwithstanding the covenant they made with God, depended yet\nmerely upon the opinion they had of his sanctity, and of the reality of\nhis conferences with God, and the verity of his miracles; which opinion\ncoming to change, they were no more obliged to take anything for the law\nof God, which he propounded to them in God\u2019s name. We are therefore to\nconsider, what other ground there was, of their obligation to obey him.\nFor it could not be the commandment of God that could oblige them;\nbecause God spake not to them immediately, but by the mediation of Moses\nhimself: and our Saviour saith of himself, (_John_ v. 31) _If I bear\nwitness of myself, my witness is not true_; much less if Moses bear\nwitness of himself, especially in a claim of kingly power over God\u2019s\npeople, ought his testimony to be received. His authority therefore, as\nthe authority of all other princes, must be grounded on the consent of\nthe people, and their promise to obey him. And so it was: for _the\npeople_ (_Exod._ xx. 18, 19) _when they saw the thunderings, and the\nlightenings, and the noise of the trumpets, and the mountain smoking,\nremoved, and stood afar off. And they said unto Moses, speak thou with\nus, and we will hear, but let not God speak with us lest we die._ Here\nwas their promise of obedience; and by this it was they obliged\nthemselves to obey whatsoever he should deliver unto them for the\ncommandment of God.\n\n[Sidenote: Moses was, under God, sovereign of the Jews all his own time,\n though Aaron had the priesthood.]\n\nAnd notwithstanding the covenant constituted a sacerdotal kingdom, that\nis to say, a kingdom hereditary to Aaron; yet that is to be understood\nof the succession after Moses should be dead. For whosoever ordereth and\nestablisheth the policy, as first founder of a commonwealth, be it\nmonarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, must needs have sovereign power\nover the people all the while he is doing of it. And that Moses had that\npower all his own time, is evidently affirmed in the Scripture. First,\nin the text last before cited, because the people promised obedience,\nnot to Aaron, but to him. Secondly, (_Exod._ xxiv. 1, 2) _And God said\nunto Moses, Come up unto the Lord, thou and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and\nseventy of the Elders of Israel. And Moses alone shall come near the\nLord, but they shall not come nigh, neither shall the people go up with\nhim._ By which it is plain, that Moses, who was alone called up to God,\n(and not Aaron, nor the other priests, nor the seventy elders, nor the\npeople who were forbidden to come up,) was alone he, that represented to\nthe Israelites the person of God, that is to say, was their sole\nsovereign under God. And though afterwards it be said (verses 9, 10)\n_Then went up Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the\nelders of Israel, and they saw the God of Israel, and there was under\nhis feet, as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone &c_; yet this was\nnot till after Moses had been with God before, and had brought to the\npeople the words which God had said to him. He only went for the\nbusiness of the people; the others, as the nobles of his retinue, were\nadmitted for honour to that special grace, which was not allowed to the\npeople; which was, as in the verse after appeareth, to see God and live,\n_God laid not his hand upon them, they saw God and did eat and drink_,\nthat is, did live: but did not carry any commandment from him to the\npeople. Again, it is everywhere said, _the Lord spake unto Moses_, as in\nall other occasions of government, so also in the ordering of the\nceremonies of religion, contained in chapters xxv. xxvi. xxvii. xxviii.\nxxix. xxx. and xxxi. of _Exodus_, and throughout _Leviticus_: to Aaron\nseldom. The calf that Aaron made, Moses threw into the fire. Lastly, the\nquestion of the authority of Aaron, by occasion of his and Miriam\u2019s\nmutiny against Moses, was (_Numb._ xii.) judged by God himself for\nMoses. So also in the question between Moses and the people, who had the\nright of governing the people, when Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, and two\nhundred and fifty princes of the assembly, _gathered themselves\ntogether_ (_Numb._ xvi. 3) _against Moses, and against Aaron, and said\nunto them, ye take too much upon you, seeing all the congregation are\nholy, every one of them, and the Lord is amongst them, why lift you up\nyourselves above the congregation of the Lord?_ God caused the earth to\nswallow Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, with their wives and children, alive,\nand consumed those two hundred and fifty princes with fire. Therefore\nneither Aaron, nor the people, nor any aristocracy of the chief princes\nof the people, but Moses alone had next under God the sovereignty over\nthe Israelites: and that not only in causes of civil policy, but also of\nreligion: for Moses only spake with God, and therefore only could tell\nthe people what it was that God required at their hands. No man upon\npain of death might be so presumptuous as to approach the mountain where\nGod talked with Moses. _Thou shalt set bounds_ (saith the Lord, _Exod._\nxix. 12) _to the people round about, and say, Take heed to yourselves\nthat you go not up into the Mount, or touch the border of it; whosoever\ntoucheth the Mount shall surely be put to death_. And again (verse 21)\n_Go down, charge the people, lest they break through unto the Lord to\ngaze_. Out of which we may conclude, that whosoever in a Christian\ncommonwealth holdeth the place of Moses, is the sole messenger of God,\nand interpreter of his commandments. And according hereunto, no man\nought in the interpretation of the Scripture to proceed further than the\nbounds which are set by their several sovereigns. For the Scriptures,\nsince God now speaketh in them, are the Mount Sinai; the bounds whereof\nare the laws of them that represent God\u2019s person on earth. To look upon\nthem, and therein to behold the wondrous works of God, and learn to fear\nhim, is allowed; but to interpret them, that is, to pry into what God\nsaith to him whom he appointeth to govern under him, and make themselves\njudges whether he govern as God commandeth him, or not, is to transgress\nthe bounds God hath set us, and to gaze upon God irreverently.\n\n[Sidenote: All spirits were subordinate to the spirit of Moses.]\n\nThere was no prophet in the time of Moses, nor pretender to the spirit\nof God, but such as Moses had approved and authorized. For there were in\nhis time but seventy men, that are said to prophecy by the spirit of\nGod, and these were all of Moses his election; concerning whom God said\nto Moses, (_Numb._ xi. 16) _Gather to me seventy of the elders of\nIsrael, whom thou knowest to be the elders of the people_. To these God\nimparted his spirit; but it was not a different spirit from that of\nMoses; for it is said (verse 25) _God came down in a cloud, and took of\nthe spirit that was upon Moses, and gave it to the seventy elders_. But\nas I have shown before (chap. XXXVI.) by _spirit_, is understood the\n_mind_; so that the sense of the place is no other than this, that God\nendued them with a mind conformable and subordinate to that of Moses,\nthat they might prophecy, that is to say, speak to the people in God\u2019s\nname, in such manner, as to set forward, as ministers of Moses and by\nhis authority, such doctrine as was agreeable to Moses his doctrine. For\nthey were but ministers; and when two of them prophecied in the camp, it\nwas thought a new and unlawful thing; and as it is in verses 27 and 28\nof the same chapter, they were accused of it, and Joshua advised Moses\nto forbid them, as not knowing that it was by Moses his spirit that they\nprophecied. By which it is manifest, that no subject ought to pretend to\nprophecy, or to the spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established by\nhim whom God hath set in the place of Moses.\n\n[Sidenote: After Moses the sovereignty was in the high priest.]\n\nAaron being dead, and after him also Moses, the kingdom, as being a\nsacerdotal kingdom, descended by virtue of the covenant, to Aaron\u2019s son\nEleazar the high-priest: and God declared him, next under himself, for\nsovereign, at the same time that he appointed Joshua for the General of\ntheir army. For thus God saith expressly (_Numb._ xxvii. 21) concerning\nJoshua: _He shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask counsel\nfor him before the Lord; at his word shall they go out, and at his word\nthey shall come in, both he, and all the children of Israel with him_.\nTherefore the supreme power of making war and peace, was in the priest.\nThe supreme power of judicature belonged also to the high-priest: for\nthe book of the law was in their keeping; and the priests and Levites\nonly were the subordinate judges in causes civil, as appears in _Deut._\nxvii. 8, 9, 10. And for the manner of God\u2019s worship, there was never\ndoubt made, but that the high-priest till the time of Saul, had the\nsupreme authority. Therefore the civil and ecclesiastical power were\nboth joined together in one and the same person, the high-priest; and\nought to be so, in whosoever governeth by divine right, that is, by\nauthority immediate from God.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the sovereign power between the time of Joshua and of\n Saul.]\n\nAfter the death of Joshua, till the time of Saul, the time between is\nnoted frequently in the Book of _Judges_, _That there was in those days\nno king in Israel_; and sometimes with this addition, that _every man\ndid that which was right in his own eyes_. By which is to be understood,\nthat where it is said, _there was no king_, is meant, _there was no\nsovereign power_ in Israel. And so it was, if we consider the act and\nexercise of such power. For after the death of Joshua and Eleazar,\n_there arose another generation_ (_Judges_ ii. 10, 11) _that knew not\nthe Lord, nor the works which he had done for Israel, but did evil in\nthe sight of the Lord, and served Baalim_. And the Jews had that quality\nwhich St. Paul noteth, _to look for a sign_, not only before they would\nsubmit themselves to the government of Moses, but also after they had\nobliged themselves by their submission. Whereas signs and miracles had\nfor end to procure faith, not to keep men from violating it, when they\nhave once given it; for to that men are obliged by the law of nature.\nBut if we consider not the exercise, but the right of governing, the\nsovereign power was still in the high-priest. Therefore whatsoever\nobedience was yielded to any of the judges, who were men chosen by God\nextraordinarily to save his rebellious subjects out of the hands of the\nenemy, it cannot be drawn into argument against the right the\nhigh-priest had to the sovereign power, in all matters both of policy\nand religion. And neither the judges nor Samuel himself had an ordinary,\nbut an extraordinary calling to the government; and were obeyed by the\nIsraelites, not out of duty, but out of reverence to their favour with\nGod, appearing in their wisdom, courage, or felicity. Hitherto therefore\nthe right of regulating both the policy, and the religion, were\ninseparable.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the rights of the kings of Israel.]\n\nTo the judges succeeded kings: and whereas before, all authority, both\nin religion and policy, was in the high-priest; so now it was all in the\nking. For the sovereignty over the people, which was before, not only by\nvirtue of the divine power, but also by a particular pact of the\nIsraelites, in God, and next under him, in the high-priest, as his\nvicegerent on earth, was cast off by the people, with the consent of God\nhimself. For when they said to Samuel (_1 Sam._ viii. 5) _Make us a king\nto judge us like all the nations_, they signified that they would no\nmore be governed by the commands that should be laid upon them by the\npriest, in the name of God; but by one that should command them in the\nsame manner that all other nations were commanded; and consequently in\ndeposing the high-priest of royal authority, they deposed that peculiar\ngovernment of God. And yet God consented to it, saying to Samuel (_1\nSam._ viii. 7) _Hearken unto the voice of the people, in all that they\nshall say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have\nrejected me, that I should not reign over them_. Having therefore\nrejected God, in whose right the priests governed, there was no\nauthority left to the priests, but such as the king was pleased to allow\nthem; which was more or less, according as the kings were good or evil.\nAnd for the government of civil affairs, it is manifest, it was all in\nthe hands of the king. For in the same chapter, (verse 20), they say\n_they will be like all the nations; that their king shall be their\njudge, and go before them, and fight their battles_; that is, he shall\nhave the whole authority, both in peace and war. In which is contained\nalso the ordering of religion: for there was no other word of God in\nthat time, by which to regulate religion, but the law of Moses, which\nwas their civil law. Besides, we read (_1 Kings_ ii. 27) that _Solomon\nthrust out Abiathar from being priest before the Lord_: he had therefore\nauthority over the high-priest, as over any other subject; which is a\ngreat mark of supremacy in religion. And we read also, (_1 Kings_ viii.)\nthat he dedicated the Temple; that he blessed the people; and that he\nhimself in person made that excellent prayer, used in the consecration\nof all churches and houses of prayer; which is another great mark of\nsupremacy in religion. Again, we read (_2 Kings_ xxii.) that when there\nwas question concerning the Book of the Law found in the Temple, the\nsame was not decided by the high-priest, but Josiah sent both him and\nothers to enquire concerning it, of Huldah, the prophetess; which is\nanother mark of supremacy in religion. Lastly, we read (_1 Chron._ xxvi.\n30) that David made Hashabiah and his brethren, Hebronites, officers of\nIsrael among them westward, _in all their business of the Lord, and in\nthe service of the king_. Likewise (verse 32) that he made other\nHebronites, _rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the half tribe\nof Manasseh_ (these were the rest of Israel that dwelt beyond Jordan)\n_for every matter pertaining to God, and affairs of the king_. Is not\nthis full power, both _temporal_ and _spiritual_, as they call it that\nwould divide it? To conclude; from the first institution of God\u2019s\nkingdom, to the captivity, the supremacy of religion was in the same\nhand with that of the civil sovereignty; and the priest\u2019s office after\nthe election of Saul, was not magisterial, but ministerial.\n\n[Sidenote: The practice of supremacy in religion was not, in the time of\n the kings, according to the right thereof.]\n\nNotwithstanding the government both in policy and religion, were joined,\nfirst in the high-priests, and afterwards in the kings, so far forth as\nconcerned the right; yet it appeareth by the same holy history, that the\npeople understood it not: but there being amongst them a great part, and\nprobably the greatest part, that no longer than they saw great miracles,\nor, what is equivalent to a miracle, great abilities, or great felicity\nin the enterprises of their governors, gave sufficient credit either to\nthe fame of Moses or to the colloquies between God and the priests; they\ntook occasion, as oft as their governors displeased them, by blaming\nsometimes the policy, sometimes the religion, to change the government\nor revolt from their obedience at their pleasure: and from thence\nproceeded from time to time the civil troubles, divisions, and\ncalamities of the nation. As for example, after the death of Eleazar and\nJoshua, the next generation which had not seen the wonders of God, but\nwere left to their own weak reason, not knowing themselves obliged by\nthe covenant of a sacerdotal kingdom, regarded no more the commandment\nof the priest nor any law of Moses, but did every man that which was\nright in his own eyes, and obeyed in civil affairs such men, as from\ntime to time they thought able to deliver them from the neighbour\nnations that oppressed them; and consulted not with God, as they ought\nto do, but with such men or women, as they guessed to be prophets by\ntheir predictions of things to come; and though they had an idol in\ntheir chapel, yet if they had a Levite for their chaplain, they made\naccount they worshipped the God of Israel.\n\nAnd afterwards when they demanded a king after the manner of the\nnations; yet it was not with a design to depart from the worship of God\ntheir king; but despairing of the justice of the sons of Samuel, they\nwould have a king to judge them in civil actions; but not that they\nwould allow their king to change the religion which they thought was\nrecommended to them by Moses. So that they always kept in store a\npretext, either of justice or religion, to discharge themselves of their\nobedience, whensoever they had hope to prevail. Samuel was displeased\nwith the people, for that they desired a king; for God was their king\nalready, and Samuel had but an authority under him; yet did Samuel, when\nSaul observed not his counsel, in destroying Agag as God had commanded,\nanoint another king, namely David, to take the succession from his\nheirs. Rehoboam was no idolater; but when the people thought him an\noppressor, that civil pretence carried from him ten tribes to Jeroboam\nan idolater. And generally through the whole history of the kings, as\nwell of Judah as of Israel, there were prophets that always controlled\nthe kings, for transgressing the religion; and sometimes also for errors\nof state; as Jehosaphat was reproved (_2 Chron._ xix. 2) by the prophet\nJehu, for aiding the king of Israel against the Syrians; and Hezekiah,\nby Isaiah, (xxxix. 3-7) for shewing his treasures to the ambassadors of\nBabylon. By all which it appeareth, that though the power both of state\nand religion were in the kings; yet none of them were uncontrolled in\nthe use of it, but such as were gracious for their own natural abilities\nor felicities. So that from the practise of those times, there can no\nargument be drawn, that the right of supremacy in religion was not in\nthe kings, unless we place it in the prophets, and conclude, that\nbecause Hezekiah praying to the Lord before the cherubims, was not\nanswered from thence, nor then, but afterwards by the prophet Isaiah,\ntherefore Isaiah was supreme head of the church; or because Josiah\nconsulted Huldah the prophetess, concerning the Book of the Law, that\ntherefore neither he nor the high-priest, but Huldah the prophetess, had\nthe supreme authority in matter of religion; which I think is not the\nopinion of any doctor.\n\n[Sidenote: After the captivity, the Jews had no settled commonwealth.]\n\nDuring the captivity, the Jews had no commonwealth at all: and after\ntheir return, though they renewed their covenant with God, yet there was\nno promise made of obedience, neither to Esdras, nor to any other: and\npresently after, they became subjects to the Greeks, from whose customs\nand demonology, and from the doctrine of the Cabalists, their religion\nbecame much corrupted: in such sort as nothing can be gathered from\ntheir confusion, both in state and religion, concerning the supremacy in\neither. And therefore so far forth as concerneth the Old Testament, we\nmay conclude, that whosoever had the sovereignty of the commonwealth\namongst the Jews, the same had also the supreme authority in matter of\nGod\u2019s external worship, and represented God\u2019s person; that is, the\nperson of God the Father; though he were not called by the name of\nFather, till such time as he sent into the world his son Jesus Christ,\nto redeem mankind from their sins, and bring them into his everlasting\nkingdom, to be saved for evermore. Of which we are to speak in the\nchapter following.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XLI.\n\n OF THE OFFICE OF OUR BLESSED SAVIOUR.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Three parts of the office of Christ.]\n\nWe find in Holy Scripture three parts of the office of the Messiah: the\nfirst of a _Redeemer_ or _Saviour_; the second of a _pastor_,\n_counsellor_, or _teacher_, that is, of a prophet sent from God to\nconvert such as God hath elected to salvation: the third of a _king_, an\n_eternal king_, but under his Father, as Moses and the high-priests were\nin their several times. And to these three parts are correspondent three\ntimes. For our redemption he wrought at his first coming, by the\nsacrifice wherein he offered up himself for our sins upon the cross: our\nconversion he wrought partly then in his own person, and partly worketh\nnow by his ministers, and will continue to work till his coming again.\nAnd after his coming again, shall begin that his glorious reign over his\nelect, which is to last eternally.\n\n[Sidenote: His office as a Redeemer.]\n\nTo the office of a Redeemer, that is, of one that payeth the ransom of\nsin, which ransom is death, it appertaineth, that he was sacrificed, and\nthereby bare upon his own head and carried away from us our iniquities,\nin such sort as God had required. Not that the death of one man, though\nwithout sin, can satisfy for the offences of all men, in the rigour of\njustice, but in the mercy of God, that ordained such sacrifices for sin,\nas he was pleased in his mercy to accept. In the old law (as we may\nread, _Levit._ xvi.) the Lord required that there should, every year\nonce, be made an atonement for the sins of all Israel, both priests and\nothers; for the doing whereof, Aaron alone was to sacrifice for himself\nand the priests a young bullock; and for the rest of the people, he was\nto receive from them two young goats, of which he was to _sacrifice_\none; but as for the other, which was the _scape-goat_, he was to lay his\nhands on the head thereof, and by a confession of the iniquities of the\npeople, to lay them all on that head, and then by some opportune man, to\ncause the goat to be led into the wilderness, and there to _escape_, and\ncarry away with him the iniquities of the people. As the sacrifice of\nthe one goat was a sufficient, because an acceptable, price for the\nransom of all Israel; so the death of the Messiah, is a sufficient price\nfor the sins of all mankind, because there was no more required. Our\nSaviour Christ\u2019s sufferings seem to be here figured, as clearly as in\nthe oblation of Isaac, or in any other type of him in the Old Testament.\nHe was both the sacrificed goat, and the scapegoat; _he was oppressed,\nand he was afflicted_ (_Isaiah_ liii. 7); _he opened not his mouth; he\nis brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep is dumb before the\nshearer, so he opened not his mouth_: here he is the _sacrificed goat_.\n_He hath borne our griefs_ (verse 4), _and carried our sorrows_: and\nagain, (verse 6), _the Lord hath laid upon him the iniquities of us\nall_: and so he is the _scape-goat_. _He was cut off from the land of\nthe living_ (ver. 8) _for the transgression of my people_: there again\nhe is the _sacrificed goat_. And again, (verse 11) _he shall bear their\nsins_: he is the _scape goat_. Thus is the lamb of God equivalent to\nboth those goats; sacrificed, in that he died; and escaping, in his\nresurrection; being raised opportunely by his Father, and removed from\nthe habitation of men in his ascension.\n\n[Sidenote: Christ\u2019s kingdom not of this world.]\n\nFor as much therefore, as he that _redeemeth_ hath no title to the\n_thing redeemed_, before _the redemption_, and ransom paid; and this\nransom was the death of the Redeemer; it is manifest, that our Saviour,\nas man, was not king of those that he redeemed, before he suffered\ndeath; that is, during that time he conversed bodily on the earth. I\nsay, he was not then king in present, by virtue of the pact, which the\nfaithful make with him in baptism. Nevertheless, by the renewing of\ntheir pact with God in baptism, they were obliged to obey him for king,\nunder his Father, whensoever he should be pleased to take the kingdom\nupon him. According whereunto, our Saviour himself expressly saith,\n(_John_ xviii. 36) _My kingdom is not of this world_. Now seeing the\nScripture maketh mention but of two worlds; this that is now, and shall\nremain unto the day of judgment, which is therefore also called the\n_last day_; and that which shall be after the day of judgment, when\nthere shall be a new heaven, and a new earth: the kingdom of Christ is\nnot to begin till the general resurrection. And that is it which our\nSaviour saith, (_Matth._ xvi. 27) _The Son of man shall come in the\nglory of his Father, with his angels; and then he shall reward every man\naccording to his works_. To reward every man according to his works, is\nto execute the office of a king; and this is not to be till he come in\nthe glory of his Father, with his angels. When our Saviour saith,\n(_Matth._ xxiii. 2, 3) _The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses\u2019 seat;\nall therefore whatsoever they bid you do, that observe and do_; he\ndeclared plainly, that he ascribed kingly power, for that time, not to\nhimself, but to them. And so he doth also, where he saith (_Luke_ xii.\n14) _Who made me a judge or divider over you?_ And (_John_ xii. 47) _I\ncame not to judge the world, but to save the world_. And yet our Saviour\ncame into this world that he might be a king and a judge in the world to\ncome: for he was the Messiah, that is, the Christ, that is, the anointed\npriest, and the sovereign prophet of God; that is to say, he was to have\nall the power that was in Moses the prophet, in the high-priests that\nsucceeded Moses, and in the kings that succeeded the priests. And St.\nJohn says expressly (chap. v. verse 22) _the Father judgeth no man, but\nhath committed all judgment to the Son_. And this is not repugnant to\nthat other place, _I came not to judge the world_: for this is spoken of\nthe world present, the other of the world to come; as also where it is\nsaid, that at the second coming of Christ, (_Matth._ xix. 28) _Ye that\nhave followed me in the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit in\nthe throne of his glory, ye shall also sit on twelve thrones, judging\nthe twelve tribes of Israel_.\n\n[Sidenote: The end of Christ\u2019s coming was to renew the covenant of the\n kingdom of God, and to persuade the elect to embrace it,\n which was the second part of his office.]\n\nIf then Christ, whilst he was on earth, had no kingdom in this world, to\nwhat end was his first coming? It was to restore unto God, by a new\ncovenant, the kingdom, which being his by the old covenant, had been cut\noff by the rebellion of the Israelites in the election of Saul. Which to\ndo, he was to preach unto them, that he was the _Messiah_, that is, the\nking promised to them by the prophets; and to offer himself in sacrifice\nfor the sins of them that should by faith submit themselves thereto; and\nin case the nation generally should refuse him, to call to his obedience\nsuch as should believe in him amongst the Gentiles. So that there are\ntwo parts of our Saviour\u2019s office during his abode upon the earth: one\nto proclaim himself the Christ; and another by teaching, and by working\nof miracles, to persuade and prepare men to live so, as to be worthy of\nthe immortality believers were to enjoy, at such time as he should come\nin majesty to take possession of his Father\u2019s kingdom. And therefore it\nis, that the time of his preaching is often by himself called the\n_regeneration_; which is not properly a kingdom, and thereby a warrant\nto deny obedience to the magistrates that then were; for he commanded to\nobey those that sat then in Moses\u2019 chair, and to pay tribute to C\u00e6sar;\nbut only an earnest of the kingdom of God that was to come, to those to\nwhom God had given the grace to be his disciples, and to believe in him;\nfor which cause the godly are said to be already in the _kingdom of\ngrace_, as naturalized in that heavenly kingdom.\n\n[Sidenote: The preaching of Christ not contrary to the then law of the\n Jews, nor of C\u00e6sar.]\n\nHitherto, therefore, there is nothing done or taught by Christ, that\ntendeth to the diminution of the civil right of the Jews or of C\u00e6sar.\nFor as touching the commonwealth which then was amongst the Jews, both\nthey that bare rule amongst them, and they that were governed, did all\nexpect the Messiah and kingdom of God; which they could not have done,\nif their laws had forbidden him, when he came, to manifest and declare\nhimself. Seeing therefore he did nothing, but by preaching and miracles\ngo about to prove himself to be that Messiah, he did therein nothing\nagainst their laws. The kingdom he claimed was to be in another world:\nhe taught all men to obey in the mean time them that sat in Moses\u2019 seat:\nhe allowed them to give C\u00e6sar his tribute, and refused to take upon\nhimself to be a judge. How then could his words or actions be seditious,\nor tend to the overthrow of their then civil government? But God having\ndetermined his sacrifice for the reduction of his elect to their former\ncovenanted obedience, for the means, whereby he would bring the same to\neffect, made use of their malice and ingratitude. Nor was it contrary to\nthe laws of C\u00e6sar. For though Pilate himself, to gratify the Jews,\ndelivered him to be crucified; yet before he did so, he pronounced\nopenly, that he found no fault in him: and put for title of his\ncondemnation, not as the Jews required, _that he pretended to be king_;\nbut simply, _that he was king of the Jews_; and notwithstanding their\nclamour, refused to alter it; saying, _What I have written, I have\nwritten_.\n\n[Sidenote: The third part of his office was to be king, under his\n Father, of the elect.]\n\nAs for the third part of his office, which was to be _king_, I have\nalready shewn that his kingdom was not to begin till the resurrection.\nBut then he shall be king, not only as God, in which sense he is king\nalready, and ever shall be, of all the earth, in virtue of his\nomnipotence; but also peculiarly of his own elect, by virtue of the pact\nthey make with him in their baptism. And therefore it is, that our\nSaviour saith (_Matth._ xix. 28) that his apostles should sit upon\ntwelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel, _When the Son of\nMan shall sit in the throne of his glory_: whereby he signified that he\nshould reign then in his human nature; and (_Matth._ xvi. 27) _The Son\nof Man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels, and then\nhe shall reward every man according to his works_. The same we may read,\n_Mark_ xiii. 26, and xiv. 62; and more expressly for the time, _Luke_\nxxii. 29, 30, _I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed\nto me, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on\nthrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel_. By which it is manifest,\nthat the kingdom of Christ appointed to him by his Father, is not to be\nbefore the Son of Man shall come in glory, and make his apostles judges\nof the twelve tribes of Israel. But a man may here ask, seeing there is\nno marriage in the kingdom of heaven, whether men shall then eat and\ndrink? What eating therefore is meant in this place? This is expounded\nby our Saviour (_John_ vi. 27), where he saith, _Labour not for the meat\nwhich perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life,\nwhich the Son of Man shall give you_. So that by eating at Christ\u2019s\ntable, is meant the eating of the tree of life; that is to say, the\nenjoying of immortality, in the kingdom of the Son of Man. By which\nplaces and many more, it is evident that our Saviour\u2019s kingdom is to be\nexercised by him in his human nature.\n\n[Sidenote: Christ\u2019s authority in the kingdom of God, subordinate to that\n of his Father.]\n\nAgain, he is to be king then, no otherwise than as subordinate or\nvicegerent of God the Father, as Moses was in the wilderness; and as the\nhigh-priests were before the reign of Saul; and as the kings were after\nit. For it is one of the prophecies concerning Christ, that he should be\nlike, in office, to Moses: _I will raise them up a prophet_, saith the\nLord (_Deut._ xviii. 18) _from amongst their brethren, like unto thee,\nand will put my words into his mouth_; and this similitude with Moses,\nis also apparent in the actions of our Saviour himself, whilst he was\nconversant on earth. For as Moses chose twelve princes of the tribes, to\ngovern under him; so did our Saviour choose twelve apostles, who shall\nsit on twelve thrones, and judge the twelve tribes of Israel. And as\nMoses authorized seventy elders, to receive the Spirit of God, and to\nprophecy to the people, that is, as I have said before, to speak unto\nthem in the name of God; so our Saviour also ordained seventy disciples,\nto preach his kingdom and salvation to all nations. And as when a\ncomplaint was made to Moses, against those of the seventy that\nprophecied in the camp of Israel, he justified them in it, as being\nsubservient therein to his government; so also our Saviour, when St.\nJohn complained to him of a certain man that cast out devils in his\nname, justified him therein, saying, (_Luke_ ix. 50) _Forbid him not,\nfor he that is not against us, is on our part_.\n\n[Sidenote: Christ\u2019s authority in the kingdom of God, subordinate to that\n of his Father.]\n\nAgain, our Saviour resembled Moses in the institution of _sacraments_,\nboth of _admission_ into the kingdom of God, and of _commemoration_ of\nhis deliverance of his elect from their miserable condition. As the\nchildren of Israel had for sacrament of their reception into the kingdom\nof God, before the time of Moses, the rite of _circumcision_, which rite\nhaving been omitted in the wilderness, was again restored as soon as\nthey came into the Land of Promise; so also the Jews, before the coming\nof our Saviour, had a rite of _baptizing_, that is, of washing with\nwater, all those that being Gentiles embraced the God of Israel. This\nrite St. John the Baptist used in the reception of all them that gave\ntheir names to the Christ, whom he preached to be already come into the\nworld; and our Saviour instituted the same for a sacrament to be taken\nby all that believed in him. From what cause the rite of baptism first\nproceeded, is not expressed formally in the Scripture; but it may be\nprobably thought to be an imitation of the law of Moses, concerning\nleprosy; wherein the leprous man was commanded to be kept out of the\ncamp of Israel for a certain time; after which time being judged by the\npriest to be clean, he was admitted into the camp after a solemn\nwashing. And this may therefore be a type of the washing in baptism;\nwherein such men as are cleansed of the leprosy of sin by faith, are\nreceived into the Church with the solemnity of baptism. There is another\nconjecture, drawn from the ceremonies of the Gentiles, in a certain case\nthat rarely happens: and that is, when a man that was thought dead\nchanced to recover, other men made scruple to converse with him, as they\nwould do to converse with a ghost, unless he were received again into\nthe number of men by washing, as children new-born were washed from the\nuncleanness of their nativity; which was a kind of new birth. This\nceremony of the Greeks, in the time that Judea was under the dominion of\nAlexander and the Greeks his successors, may probably enough have crept\ninto the religion of the Jews. But seeing it is not likely our Saviour\nwould countenance a heathen rite, it is most likely it proceeded from\nthe legal ceremony of washing after leprosy. And for the other sacrament\nof eating the _Paschal lamb_, it is manifestly imitated in the sacrament\nof the _Lord\u2019s Supper_; in which the breaking of the bread, and the\npouring out of the wine, do keep in memory our deliverance from the\nmisery of sin, by Christ\u2019s passion, as the eating of the Paschal lamb\nkept in memory the deliverance of the Jews out of the bondage of Egypt.\nSeeing therefore the authority of Moses was but subordinate, and he but\na lieutenant of God; it followeth that Christ, whose authority, as man,\nwas to be like that of Moses, was no more but subordinate to the\nauthority of his Father. The same is more expressly signified, by that\nthat he teacheth us to pray, _Our Father, let thy kingdom come_; and,\n_For thine is the kingdom, the power and the glory_; and by that it is\nsaid, that _He shall come in the glory of his Father_; and by that which\nSt. Paul saith, (_1 Cor._ xv. 24) _then cometh the end, when he shall\nhave delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father_; and by many\nother most express places.\n\n[Sidenote: One and the same God is the person represented by Moses and\n Christ.]\n\nOur Saviour, therefore, both in teaching and reigning, representeth, as\nMoses did, the person of God; which God from that time forward, but not\nbefore, is called the Father; and being still one and the same\nsubstance, is one person as represented by Moses, and another person as\nrepresented by his son the Christ. For _person_ being a relative to a\n_representer_, it is consequent to plurality of representers, that there\nbe a plurality of persons, though of one and the same substance.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XLII.\n\n OF POWER ECCLESIASTICAL.\n\n\nFor the understanding of POWER ECCLESIASTICAL, what, and in whom it is,\nwe are to distinguish the time from the ascension of our Saviour, into\ntwo parts; one before the conversion of kings, and men endued with\nsovereign civil power; the other after their conversion. For it was long\nafter the ascension, before any king or civil sovereign embraced and\npublicly allowed the teaching of Christian religion.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the holy spirit that fell on the apostles.]\n\nAnd for the time between, it is manifest, that the _power\necclesiastical_ was in the apostles; and after them in such as were by\nthem ordained to preach the gospel, and to convert men to Christianity,\nand to direct them that were converted in the way of salvation; and\nafter these, the power was delivered again to others by these ordained,\nand this was done by imposition of hands upon such as were ordained; by\nwhich was signified the giving of the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God, to\nthose whom they ordained ministers of God, to advance his kingdom. So\nthat imposition of hands was nothing else but the seal of their\ncommission to preach Christ, and teach his doctrine; and the giving of\nthe Holy Ghost by that ceremony of imposition of hands, was an imitation\nof that which Moses did. For Moses used the same ceremony to his\nminister Joshua, as we read (_Deut._ xxxiv. 9) _And Joshua the son of\nNun was full of the spirit of wisdom; for Moses had laid his hands upon\nhim_. Our Saviour therefore, between his resurrection and ascension,\ngave his spirit to the apostles; first, by _breathing on them, and\nsaying_, (_John_ xx. 22) _Receive ye the Holy Spirit_; and after his\nascension (_Acts_ ii. 2, 3) by sending down upon them _a mighty wind,\nand cloven tongues of fire_; and not by imposition of hands; as neither\ndid God lay his hands on Moses: and his apostles afterward transmitted\nthe same spirit by imposition of hands, as Moses did to Joshua. So that\nit is manifest hereby, in whom the power ecclesiastical continually\nremained, in those first times where there was not any Christian\ncommonwealth; namely, in them that received the same from the apostles,\nby successive laying on of hands.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the Trinity.]\n\nHere we have the person of God born now the third time. For as Moses,\nand the high-priests, were God\u2019s representative in the Old Testament;\nand our Saviour himself, as man, during his abode on earth: so the Holy\nGhost, that is to say the apostles and their successors, in the office\nof preaching and teaching, that had received the holy Spirit, have\nrepresented him ever since. But a person, as I have shown before, (chap.\nXIII.) is he that is represented, as often as he is represented; and\ntherefore God, who has been represented, that is personated, thrice, may\nproperly enough be said to be three persons; though neither the word\n_Person_, nor _Trinity_, be ascribed to him in the Bible. _St. John_,\nindeed (_1 Epist._ v. 7) saith, _There be three that bear witness in\nheaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are\nOne_. But this disagreeth not, but accordeth fitly with three persons in\nthe proper signification of persons; which is, that which is represented\nby another. For so God the Father, as represented by Moses, is one\nperson; and as represented by his Son, another person; and as\nrepresented by the apostles, and by the doctors that taught by authority\nfrom them derived, is a third person; and yet every person here, is the\nperson of one and the same God. But a man may here ask, what it was\nwhereof these three bear witness. _St. John_ therefore tells us (verse\n11) that they bear witness, that _God hath given us eternal life in his\nSon_. Again, if it should be asked, wherein that testimony appeareth,\nthe answer is easy; for he hath testified the same by the miracles he\nwrought, first by Moses; secondly, by his Son himself; and lastly by his\napostles, that had received the Holy Spirit; all which in their times\nrepresented the person of God, and either prophecied or preached Jesus\nChrist. And as for the apostles, it was the character of the\napostleship, in the twelve first and great apostles, to bear witness of\nhis resurrection; as appeareth expressly (_Acts_ i. 21, 22), where St.\nPeter, when a new apostle was to be chosen in the place of Judas\nIscariot, useth these words, _Of these men which have companied with us\nall the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning\nat the baptism of John, unto that same day that he was taken up from us,\nmust one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection_: which\nwords interpret the _bearing of witness_, mentioned by St. John. There\nis in the same place mentioned another Trinity of witnesses in earth.\nFor (_1 John_ v. 8) he saith, _there are three that bear witness in\nearth, the Spirit, and the water, and the blood, and these three agree\nin one_: that is to say, the graces of God\u2019s spirit, and the two\nsacraments, baptism, and the Lord\u2019s supper, which all agree in one\ntestimony to assure the consciences of believers, of eternal life; of\nwhich testimony he saith (verse 10) _He that believeth on the Son of man\nhath the witness in himself_. In this Trinity on earth, the unity is not\nof the thing; for the spirit, the water, and the blood, are not the same\nsubstance, though they give the same testimony: but in the Trinity of\nheaven, the persons are the persons of one and the same God, though\nrepresented in three different times and occasions. To conclude, the\ndoctrine of the Trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the\nScripture, is in substance this, that the God who is always one and the\nsame, was the person represented by Moses; the person represented by his\nSon incarnate; and the person represented by the apostles. As\nrepresented by the apostles, the Holy Spirit, by which they spake, is\nGod; as represented by his Son, that was God and man, the Son is that\nGod; as represented by Moses and the high-priests, the Father, that is\nto say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God. From whence we\nmay gather the reason why those names _Father_, _Son_, and _Holy\nSpirit_, in the signification of the Godhead, are never used in the Old\nTestament: for they are persons, that is, they have their names from\nrepresenting; which could not be, till divers men had represented God\u2019s\nperson in ruling or in directing under him.\n\nThus we see how the power ecclesiastical was left by our Saviour to the\napostles; and how they were, to the end they might the better exercise\nthat power, endued with the Holy Spirit, which is therefore called\nsometimes in the New Testament _paracletus_, which signifieth an\n_assister_, or one called to for help, though it be commonly translated\na _comforter_. Let us now consider the power itself, what it was, and\nover whom.\n\n[Sidenote: The power ecclesiastical is but the power to teach.]\n\nCardinal Bellarmine, in his third general controversy, hath handled a\ngreat many questions concerning the ecclesiastical power of the pope of\nRome; and begins with this, whether it ought to be monarchical,\naristocratical, or democratical: all which sorts of power are sovereign\nand coercive. If now it should appear, that there is no coercive power\nleft them by our Saviour, but only a power to proclaim the kingdom of\nChrist, and to persuade men to submit themselves thereunto; and by\nprecepts and good counsel, to teach them that have submitted, what they\nare to do, that they may be received into the kingdom of God when it\ncomes; and that the apostles, and other ministers of the Gospel, are our\nschoolmasters, and not our commanders, and their precepts not laws, but\nwholesome counsels: then were all that dispute in vain.\n\n[Sidenote: An argument thereof, the power of Christ himself.]\n\nI have shown already, in the last chapter, that the kingdom of Christ is\nnot of this world: therefore neither can his ministers, unless they be\nkings, require obedience in his name. For if the supreme king have not\nhis regal power in this world; by what authority can obedience be\nrequired to his officers? _As my Father sent me_, so saith our Saviour,\n(_John_ xx. 21) _I send you_. But our Saviour was sent to persuade the\nJews to return to, and to invite the Gentiles to receive, the kingdom of\nhis Father, and not to reign in majesty, no not as his Father\u2019s\nlieutenant, till the day of judgment.\n\n[Sidenote: From the name of regeneration.]\n\nThe time between the ascension and the general resurrection, is called,\nnot a reigning, but a regeneration; that is, a preparation of men for\nthe second and glorious coming of Christ, at the day of judgment; as\nappeareth by the words of our Saviour, (_Matth._ xix. 28,) _You that\nhave followed me in the regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in\nthe throne of his glory, you shall also sit upon twelve thrones_; and of\nSt. Paul (_Ephes._ vi. 15) _Having your feet shod with the preparation\nof the gospel of peace_.\n\n[Sidenote: From the comparison of it, with fishing, leaven, seed.]\n\nAnd is compared by our Saviour, to fishing, that is, to winning men to\nobedience, not by coercion and punishing, but by persuasion: and\ntherefore he said not to his apostles, he would make them so many\nNimrods, _hunters of men; but fishers of men_. It is compared also to\nleaven, to sowing of seed, and to the multiplication of a grain of\nmustard-seed; by all which compulsion is excluded; and consequently\nthere can in that time be no actual reigning. The work of Christ\u2019s\nministers, is evangelization; that is, a proclamation of Christ, and a\npreparation for his second coming, as the evangelization of John the\nBaptist was a preparation to his first coming.\n\n[Sidenote: From the nature of faith.]\n\nAgain, the office of Christ\u2019s ministers in this world, is to make men\nbelieve and have faith in Christ; but faith hath no relation to, nor\ndependance at all upon compulsion or commandment; but only upon\ncertainty or probability of arguments drawn from reason, or from\nsomething men believe already. Therefore the ministers of Christ in this\nworld, have no power, by that title, to punish any man for not believing\nor for contradicting what they say; they have I say no power by that\ntitle of Christ\u2019s ministers, to punish such; but if they have sovereign\ncivil power, by politic institution, then they may indeed lawfully\npunish any contradiction to their laws whatsoever: and St. Paul, of\nhimself and other the then preachers of the gospel, saith in express\nwords (_2 Cor._ i. 24), _We have no dominion over your faith, but are\nhelpers of your joy_.\n\n[Sidenote: From the authority Christ hath left to civil princes.]\n\nAnother argument, that the ministers of Christ in this present world\nhave no right of commanding, may be drawn from the lawful authority\nwhich Christ hath left to all princes, as well Christians as infidels.\nSt. Paul saith (_Col._ iii. 20) _Children obey your parents in all\nthings; for this is well pleasing to the Lord_: and (verse 22)\n_Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh; not\nwith eye-service, as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, as\nfearing the Lord_; this is spoken to them whose masters were infidels;\nand yet they are bidden to obey them _in all things_. And again,\nconcerning obedience to princes (_Rom._ xiii. the first six verses),\nexhorting _to be subject to the higher powers_, he saith, _that all\npower is ordained of God_; and _that we ought to be subject to them, not\nonly for fear of incurring their wrath, but also for conscience sake_.\nAnd _St. Peter_ (1 Epistle ii. 13, 14, 15), _Submit yourselves to every\nordinance of man, for the Lord\u2019s sake, whether it be to the king, as\nsupreme; or unto governors, as to them that be sent by him for the\npunishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well; for\nso is the will of God_. And again St. Paul (_Titus_ iii. 1), _Put men in\nmind to be subject to principalities and powers, and to obey\nmagistrates_. These princes and powers, whereof St. Peter and St. Paul\nhere speak, were all infidels: much more therefore we are to observe\nthose Christians, whom God hath ordained to have sovereign power over\nus. How then can we be obliged to obey any minister of Christ, if he\nshould command us to do anything contrary to the command of the king, or\nother sovereign representant of the commonwealth whereof we are members,\nand by whom we look to be protected? It is therefore manifest, that\nChrist hath not left to his ministers in this world, unless they be also\nendued with civil authority, any authority to command other men.\n\n[Sidenote: What Christians may do to avoid persecution.]\n\nBut what, may some object, if a king, or a senate, or other sovereign\nperson forbid us to believe in Christ? To this I answer, that such\nforbidding is of no effect; because belief and unbelief never follow\nmen\u2019s commands. Faith is a gift of God, which man can neither give, nor\ntake away by promise of rewards, or menaces of torture. And if it be\nfurther asked, what if we be commanded by our lawful prince to say with\nour tongue, we believe not; must we obey such command? Profession with\nthe tongue is but an external thing, and no more than any other gesture\nwhereby we signify our obedience; and wherein a Christian, holding\nfirmly in his heart the faith of Christ, hath the same liberty which the\nprophet Elisha allowed to Naaman the Syrian. Naaman was converted in his\nheart to the God of Israel; for he saith (_2 Kings_ v. 17, 18) _Thy\nservant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering nor sacrifice unto\nother gods, but unto the Lord. In this thing the Lord pardon thy\nservant, that when my master goeth into the house of Rimmon to worship\nthere, and he leaneth on my hand, and I bow myself in the house of\nRimmon: when I bow down myself in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon\nthy servant in this thing._ This the prophet approved, and bid him _Go\nin peace_. Here Naaman believed in his heart; but by bowing before the\nidol Rimmon, he denied the true God in effect, as much as if he had done\nit with his lips. But then what shall we answer to our Saviour\u2019s saying,\n(_Matth._ x. 33) _Whosoever denieth me before men, I will deny him\nbefore my Father which is in heaven_. This we may say, that whatsoever a\nsubject, as Naaman was, is compelled to do in obedience to his\nsovereign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in order to the\nlaws of his country, that action is not his, but his sovereign\u2019s; nor is\nit he that in this case denieth Christ before men, but his governor, and\nthe law of his country. If any man shall accuse this doctrine, as\nrepugnant to true and unfeigned Christianity; I ask him, in case there\nshould be a subject in any Christian commonwealth, that should be\ninwardly in his heart of the Mahomedan religion, whether if his\nsovereign command him to be present at the divine service of the\nChristian church, and that on pain of death, he think that Mahomedan\nobliged in conscience to suffer death for that cause, rather than obey\nthat command of his lawful prince. If he say, he ought rather to suffer\ndeath, then he authorizeth all private men to disobey their princes in\nmaintenance of their religion, true or false: if he say, he ought to be\nobedient, then he alloweth to himself that which he denieth to another,\ncontrary to the words of our Saviour, (_Luke_ vi. 31) _Whatsoever you\nwould that men should do unto you, that do ye unto them_; and contrary\nto the law of nature, which is the indubitable everlasting law of God,\n_Do not to another, that which thou wouldest not he should do unto\nthee_.\n\n[Sidenote: Of martyrs.]\n\nBut what then shall we say of all those martyrs we read of in the\nhistory of the Church, that they have needlessly cast away their lives?\nFor answer hereunto, we are to distinguish the persons that have been\nfor that cause put to death: whereof some have received a calling to\npreach, and profess the kingdom of Christ openly; others have had no\nsuch calling, nor more has been required of them than their own faith.\nThe former sort, if they have been put to death, for bearing witness to\nthis point, that Jesus Christ is risen from the dead, were true martyrs;\nfor a _martyr_ is, (to give the true definition of the word) a witness\nof the resurrection of Jesus the Messiah; which none can be but those\nthat conversed with him on earth, and saw him after he was risen: for a\nwitness must have seen what he testifieth, or else his testimony is not\ngood. And that none but such can properly be called martyrs of Christ,\nis manifest out of the words of St. Peter, (_Acts_ i. 21, 22) _Wherefore\nof these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord\nJesus went in and out amongst us, beginning from the baptism of John\nunto that same day he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a\nmartyr_ (that is a witness) _with us of his resurrection_: where we may\nobserve, that he which is to be a witness of the truth of the\nresurrection of Christ, that is to say, of the truth of this fundamental\narticle of Christian religion, that Jesus was the Christ, must be some\ndisciple that conversed with him, and saw him before and after his\nresurrection; and consequently must be one of his original disciples:\nwhereas they which were not so, can witness no more but that their\nantecessors said it, and are therefore but witnesses of other men\u2019s\ntestimony; and are but second martyrs, or martyrs of Christ\u2019s witnesses.\n\nHe, that to maintain every doctrine which he himself draweth out of the\nhistory of our Saviour\u2019s life, and of the Acts or Epistles of the\napostles, or which he believeth upon the authority of a private man,\nwill oppose the laws and authority of the civil state, is very far from\nbeing a martyr of Christ, or a martyr of his martyrs. It is one article\nonly, which to die for, meriteth so honourable a name; and that article\nis this, that _Jesus is the Christ_; that is to say, He that hath\nredeemed us, and shall come again to give us salvation, and eternal life\nin his glorious kingdom. To die for every tenet that serveth the\nambition or profit of the clergy, is not required; nor is it the death\nof the witness, but the testimony itself that makes the martyr: for the\nword signifieth nothing else, but the man that beareth witness, whether\nhe be put to death for his testimony, or not.\n\nAlso he that is not sent to preach this fundamental article, but taketh\nit upon him of his private authority, though he be a witness, and\nconsequently a martyr, either primary of Christ, or secondary of his\napostles, disciples, or their successors; yet is he not obliged to\nsuffer death for that cause; because being not called thereto, it is not\nrequired at his hands; nor ought he to complain, if he loseth the reward\nhe expecteth from those that never set him on work. None therefore can\nbe a martyr, neither of the first nor second degree, that have not a\nwarrant to preach Christ come in the flesh; that is to say, none, but\nsuch as are sent to the conversion of infidels. For no man is a witness\nto him that already believeth, and therefore needs no witness; but to\nthem that deny, or doubt, or have not heard it. Christ sent his\napostles, and his seventy disciples, with authority to preach; he sent\nnot all that believed. And he sent them to unbelievers; _I send you_,\nsaith he, (_Matth._ x. 16) _as sheep amongst wolves_; not as sheep to\nother sheep.\n\n[Sidenote: Argument from the points of their commission.]\n\nLastly, the points of their commission, as they are expressly set down\nin the gospel, contain, none of them, any authority over the\ncongregation.\n\n[Sidenote: To preach;]\n\nWe have first (_Matth._ x. 6, 7), that the twelve apostles were sent _to\nthe lost sheep of the house of Israel_, and commanded to preach _that\nthe kingdom of God was at hand_. Now preaching, in the original, is that\nact, which a crier, herald, or other officer useth to do publicly in\nproclaiming of a king. But a crier hath not right to command any man.\nAnd (_Luke_ x. 2) the seventy disciples are sent out as _Labourers, not\nas Lords of the harvest_; and are bidden (verse 9) to say, _The kingdom\nof God is come nigh unto you_; and by kingdom here is meant, not the\nkingdom of grace, but the kingdom of glory; for they are bidden (verse\n11, 12) to denounce it to those cities which shall not receive them, as\na threatening _that it shall be more tolerable in that day for Sodom,\nthan for such a city_. And (_Matth._ xx. 28) our Saviour telleth his\ndisciples, that sought priority of place, their office was to minister,\n_even as the son of man came, not to be ministered unto, but to\nminister_. Preachers therefore have not magisterial, but ministerial\npower: _Be not called masters_, saith our Saviour, (_Matth._ xxiii. 10)\n_for one is your master, even Christ_.\n\n[Sidenote: And teach;]\n\nAnother point of their commission, is, to _Teach all nations_; as it is\nin _St. Matth._ xxviii. 19, or as in _St. Mark_, xvi. 15; _Go into all\nthe world, and preach the gospel to every creature_. Teaching therefore,\nand preaching, is the same thing. For they that proclaim the coming of a\nking, must withal make known by what right he cometh, if they mean men\nshall submit themselves unto him: as St. Paul did to the Jews of\nThessalonica, when (_Acts_ xvii. 2, 3) _three Sabbath days he reasoned\nwith them out of the Scriptures, opening, and alleging that Christ must\nneeds have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus\nis Christ_. But to teach out of the Old Testament that Jesus was Christ,\nthat is to say, king, and risen from the dead, is not to say that men\nare bound, after they believe it, to obey those that tell them so,\nagainst the laws and commands of their sovereigns; but that they shall\ndo wisely, to expect the coming of Christ hereafter, in patience and\nfaith, with obedience to their present magistrates.\n\n[Sidenote: To baptize;]\n\nAnother point of their commission, is to _baptize, in the name of the\nFather, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost_. What is baptism? Dipping\ninto water. But what is it to dip a man into the water in the name of\nanything? The meaning of these words of baptism is this. He that is\nbaptized, is dipped or washed, as a sign of becoming a new man, and a\nloyal subject to that God, whose person was represented in old time by\nMoses, and the high-priests, when he reigned over the Jews; and to Jesus\nChrist his Son, God and Man, that hath redeemed us, and shall in his\nhuman nature represent his Father\u2019s person in his eternal kingdom after\nthe resurrection; and to acknowledge the doctrine of the apostles, who,\nassisted by the spirit of the Father and of the Son, were left for\nguides to bring us into that kingdom, to be the only and assured way\nthereunto. This being our promise in baptism; and the authority of\nearthly sovereigns being not to be put down till the day of judgment;\nfor that is expressly affirmed by St. Paul (_1 Cor._ xv. 22, 23, 24)\nwhere he saith, _As in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made\nalive. But every man in his own order, Christ the first fruits,\nafterward they that are Christ\u2019s at his coming; then cometh the end,\nwhen he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father,\nwhen he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power_: it\nis manifest, that we do not in baptism constitute over us another\nauthority, by which our external actions are to be governed in this\nlife; but promise to take the doctrine of the apostles for our direction\nin the way to life eternal.\n\n[Sidenote: And to forgive, and retain sins.]\n\nThe power of _remission and retention of sins_, called also the power of\n_loosing_ and _binding_, and sometimes the _keys of the kingdom of\nheaven_, is a consequence of the authority to baptize, or refuse to\nbaptize. For baptism is the sacrament of allegiance of them that are to\nbe received into the kingdom of God; that is to say, into eternal life;\nthat is to say, to remission of sin: for as eternal life was lost by the\ncommitting, so it is recovered by the remitting of men\u2019s sins. The end\nof baptism is remission of sins: and therefore St. Peter, when they that\nwere converted by his sermon on the day of Pentecost, asked what they\nwere to do, advised them (_Acts_ ii. 38) to _repent, and be baptized in\nthe name of Jesus, for the remission of sins_. And therefore, seeing to\nbaptize is to declare the reception of men into God\u2019s kingdom; and to\nrefuse to baptize is to declare their exclusion; it followeth, that the\npower to declare them cast out, or retained in it, was given to the same\napostles, and their substitutes and successors. And therefore after our\nSaviour had breathed upon them, saying (_John_ xx. 22) _Receive the Holy\nGhost_, he addeth in the next verse, _Whosesoever sins ye remit, they\nare remitted unto them; and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are\nretained_. By which words, is not granted an authority to forgive or\nretain sins, simply and absolutely, as God forgiveth or retaineth them,\nwho knoweth the heart of man, and truth of his penitence and conversion;\nbut conditionally, to the penitent: and this forgiveness, or absolution,\nin case the absolved have but a feigned repentance, is thereby, without\nother act, or sentence of the absolved, made void, and hath no effect at\nall to salvation, but on the contrary to the aggravation of his sin.\nTherefore the apostles, and their successors, are to follow but the\noutward marks of repentance; which appearing, they have no authority to\ndeny absolution; and if they appear not, they have no authority to\nabsolve. The same also is to be observed in baptism: for to a converted\nJew, or Gentile, the apostles had not the power to deny baptism; nor to\ngrant it to the unpenitent. But seeing no man is able to discern the\ntruth of another man\u2019s repentance, further than by external marks, taken\nfrom his words and actions, which are subject to hypocrisy; another\nquestion will arise, who it is that is constituted judge of those marks?\nAnd this question is decided by our Saviour himself; _If thy brother_,\nsaith he, (_Matth._ xviii. 15, 16, 17) _shall trespass against thee, go\nand tell him his fault, between thee and him alone; if he shall hear\nthee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then\ntake with thee one or two more. And if he shall neglect to hear them,\ntell it unto the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him\nbe unto thee as an heathen man and a publican._ By which it is manifest,\nthat the judgment concerning the truth of repentance, belonged not to\nany one man, but to the Church, that is, to the assembly of the\nfaithful, or to them that have authority to be their representant. But\nbesides the judgment, there is necessary also the pronouncing of\nsentence. And this belonged always to the apostle, or some pastor of the\nChurch, as prolocutor; and of this our Saviour speaketh in the 18th\nverse, _Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and\nwhatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven_. And\nconformable hereunto was the practise of St. Paul, (_1 Cor._ v. 3, 4, 5)\nwhere he saith, _For I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit,\nhave determined already, as though I were present, concerning him that\nhath so done this deed; in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when ye\nare gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus\nChrist, to deliver such a one to Satan_; that is to say, to cast him out\nof the Church, as a man whose sins are not forgiven. Paul here\npronounceth the sentence; but the assembly was first to hear the cause,\nfor St. Paul was absent, and by consequence to condemn him. But in the\nsame chapter (verses 11, 12), the judgment in such a case is more\nexpressly attributed to the assembly: _But now I have written unto you,\nnot to keep company, if any man that is called a brother be a\nfornicator, &c. with such a one, no not to eat. For what have I to do to\njudge them that are without? Do not ye judge them that are within?_ The\nsentence therefore by which a man was put out of the Church, was\npronounced by the apostle, or pastor; but the judgment concerning the\nmerit of the cause, was in the Church; that is to say, as the times were\nbefore the conversion of kings, and men that had sovereign authority in\nthe commonwealth, the assembly of the Christians dwelling in the same\ncity: as in Corinth, in the assembly of the Christians of Corinth.\n\n[Sidenote: Of excommunication.]\n\nThis part of the power of the keys, by which men were thrust out from\nthe kingdom of God, is that which is called _excommunication_; and to\n_excommunicate_, is in the original, \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, _to cast out\nof the synagogue_; that is, out of the place of divine service; a word\ndrawn from the custom of the Jews, to cast out of their synagogues such\nas they thought, in manners or doctrine, contagious, as lepers were by\nthe law of Moses separated from the congregation of Israel, till such\ntime as they should be by the priest pronounced clean.\n\n[Sidenote: The use of excommunication without civil power.]\n\nThe use and effect of excommunication, whilst it was not yet\nstrengthened with the civil power, was no more than that they, who were\nnot excommunicate, were to avoid the company of them that were. It was\nnot enough to repute them as heathen, that never had been Christians;\nfor with such they might eat and drink; which with excommunicate persons\nthey might not do; as appeareth by the words of St. Paul, (_1 Cor._ v.\n9, 10, &c.) where he telleth them, he had formerly forbidden them to\n_company with fornicators_; but, because that could not be without going\nout of the world, he restraineth it to such fornicators, and otherwise\nvicious persons, as were of the brethren; _with such a one_, he saith,\nthey ought not to keep company, _no not to eat_. And this is no more\nthan our Saviour saith (_Matth._ xviii. 17), _Let him be to thee as a\nheathen, and as a publican_. For publicans, which signifieth farmers and\nreceivers of the revenue of the commonwealth, were so hated and detested\nby the Jews that were to pay it, as that _publican_ and _sinner_ were\ntaken amongst them for the same thing: insomuch, as when our Saviour\naccepted the invitation of Zacch\u00e6us a publican; though it were to\nconvert him, yet it was objected to him as a crime. And therefore, when\nour Saviour to _heathen_ added _publican_, he did forbid them to eat\nwith a man excommunicate.\n\nAs for keeping them out of their synagogues, or places of assembly, they\nhad no power to do it, but that of the owner of the place, whether he\nwere Christian, or heathen. And because all places are by right in the\ndominion of the commonwealth; as well he that was excommunicated, as he\nthat never was baptized, might enter into them by commission from the\ncivil magistrate; as Paul before his conversion entered into their\nsynagogues at Damascus, (_Acts_ ix. 2) to apprehend Christians, men and\nwomen, and to carry them bound to Jerusalem, by commission from the\nhigh-priest.\n\n[Sidenote: Of no effect upon an apostate;]\n\nBy which it appears, that upon a Christian, that should become an\napostate, in a place where the civil power did persecute, or not assist\nthe Church, the effect of excommunication had nothing in it, neither of\ndamage in this world, nor of terror: not of terror, because of their\nunbelief; nor of damage, because they are returned thereby into the\nfavour of the world; and in the world to come were to be in no worse\nestate, than they which never had believed. The damage redounded rather\nto the Church, by provocation of them they cast out, to a freer\nexecution of their malice.\n\n[Sidenote: But upon the faithful only.]\n\nExcommunication therefore had its effect only upon those, that believed\nthat Jesus Christ was to come again in glory, to reign over and to judge\nboth the quick and the dead, and should therefore refuse entrance into\nhis kingdom to those whose sins were retained, that is, to those that\nwere excommunicated by the Church. And thence it is, that St. Paul\ncalleth excommunication, a delivery of the excommunicate person to\nSatan. For without the kingdom of Christ, all other kingdoms, after\njudgment, are comprehended in the kingdom of Satan. This is it that the\nfaithful stood in fear of, as long as they stood excommunicate, that is\nto say, in an estate wherein their sins were not forgiven. Whereby we\nmay understand, that excommunication, in the time that Christian\nreligion was not authorized by the civil power, was used only for a\ncorrection of manners, not of errors in opinion: for it is a punishment,\nwhereof none could be sensible but such as believed, and expected the\ncoming again of our Saviour to judge the world; and they who so\nbelieved, needed no other opinion, but only uprightness of life, to be\nsaved.\n\n[Sidenote: For what fault lieth excommunication.]\n\nThere lieth excommunication for injustice; as (_Matth._ xviii.), If thy\nbrother offend thee, tell it him privately; then with witnesses; lastly,\ntell the Church; and then if he obey not, _Let him be to thee as an\nheathen man and a publican_. And there lieth excommunication for a\nscandalous life, as (_1 Cor._ v. 11) _If any man that is called a\nbrother, be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a drunkard, or\nan extortioner, with such a one ye are not to eat_. But to excommunicate\na man that held this foundation, that _Jesus was the Christ_, for\ndifference of opinion in other points, by which that foundation was not\ndestroyed, there appeareth no authority in the Scripture, nor example in\nthe apostles. There is indeed in St. Paul (_Titus_ iii. 10) a text that\nseemeth to be to the contrary; _A man that is an heretic, after the\nfirst and second admonition, reject_. For an _heretic_, is he, that\nbeing a member of the Church, teacheth nevertheless some private\nopinion, which the Church has forbidden: and such a one, St. Paul\nadviseth Titus, after the first and second admonition, to _reject_. But\nto _reject_, in this place, is not to _excommunicate_ the man; but to\n_give over admonishing him, to let him alone, to set by disputing with\nhim_, as one that is to be convinced only by himself. The same apostle\nsaith (_2 Tim._ ii. 23) _Foolish and unlearned questions avoid_: the\nword _avoid_ in this place, and _reject_ in the former, is the same in\nthe original, \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6: but foolish questions may be set by without\nexcommunication. And again, (_Titus_ iii. 9) _Avoid foolish questions_,\nwhere the original \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u0390\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03bf (_set them by_) is equivalent to the\nformer word _reject_. There is no other place that can so much as\ncolourably be drawn, to countenance the casting out of the Church\nfaithful men, such as believed the foundation, only for a singular\nsuperstructure of their own, proceeding perhaps from a good and pious\nconscience. But on the contrary, all such places as command avoiding\nsuch disputes, are written for a lesson to pastors, such as Timothy and\nTitus were, not to make new articles of faith, by determining every\nsmall controversy, which oblige men to a needless burthen of conscience,\nor provoke them to break the union of the Church. Which lesson the\napostles themselves observed well. St. Peter and St. Paul, though their\ncontroversy were great, as we may read in _Gal._ ii. 11, yet they did\nnot cast one another out of the Church. Nevertheless, during the\napostles\u2019 times, there were other pastors that observed it not; as\nDiotrephes (_3 John_, 9, &c.) who cast out of the Church such as St.\nJohn himself thought fit to be received into it, out of a pride he took\nin preeminence. So early it was, that vain glory and ambition had found\nentrance into the Church of Christ.\n\n[Sidenote: Of persons liable to excommunication.]\n\nThat a man be liable to excommunication, there be many conditions\nrequisite; as first, that he be a member of some commonalty, that is to\nsay, of some lawful assembly, that is to say, of some Christian Church,\nthat hath power to judge of the cause for which he is to be\nexcommunicated. For where there is no community, there can be no\nexcommunication; nor where there is no power to judge, can there be any\npower to give sentence.\n\nFrom hence it followeth, that one Church cannot be excommunicated by\nanother: for either they have equal power to excommunicate each other,\nin which case excommunication is not discipline, nor an act of\nauthority, but schism, and dissolution of charity; or one is so\nsubordinate to the other, as that they both have but one voice; and then\nthey be but one Church; and the part excommunicated is no more a Church,\nbut a dissolute number of individual persons.\n\nAnd because the sentence of excommunication, importeth an advice, not to\nkeep company nor so much as to eat with him that is excommunicate, if a\nsovereign prince or assembly be excommunicate, the sentence is of no\neffect. For all subjects are bound to be in the company and presence of\ntheir own sovereign, when he requireth it, by the law of nature; nor can\nthey lawfully either expel him from any place of his own dominion,\nwhether profane or holy; nor go out of his dominion without his leave;\nmuch less, if he call them to that honour, refuse to eat with him. And\nas to other princes and states, because they are not parts of one and\nthe same congregation, they need not any other sentence to keep them\nfrom keeping company with the state excommunicate: for the very\ninstitution, as it uniteth many men into one community, so it\ndissociateth one community from another: so that excommunication is not\nneedful for keeping kings and states asunder; nor has any further effect\nthan is in the nature of policy itself, unless it be to instigate\nprinces to war upon one another.\n\nNor is the excommunication of a Christian subject, that obeyeth the laws\nof his own sovereign, whether Christian or heathen, of any effect. For\nif he believe that _Jesus is the Christ, he hath the Spirit of God_ (_1\nJohn_ v. 1): _and God dwelleth in him, and he in God_ (_1 John_ iv. 15.)\nBut he that hath the spirit of God; he that dwelleth in God; he in whom\nGod dwelleth, can receive no harm by the excommunication of men.\nTherefore, he that believeth Jesus to be the Christ, is free from all\nthe dangers threatened to persons excommunicate. He that believeth it\nnot, is no Christian. Therefore a true and unfeigned Christian is not\nliable to excommunication: nor he also that is a professed Christian,\ntill his hypocrisy appear in his manners, that is, till his behaviour be\ncontrary to the law of his sovereign, which is the rule of manners, and\nwhich Christ and his apostles have commanded us to be subject to. For\nthe Church cannot judge of manners but by external actions, which\nactions can never be unlawful, but when they are against the law of the\ncommonwealth.\n\nIf a man\u2019s father, or mother, or master, be excommunicate, yet are not\nthe children forbidden to keep them company, nor to eat with them: for\nthat were, for the most part, to oblige them not to eat at all, for want\nof means to get food; and to authorize them to disobey their parents and\nmasters, contrary to the precept of the apostles.\n\nIn sum, the power of excommunication cannot be extended further than to\nthe end for which the apostles and pastors of the Church have their\ncommission from our Saviour; which is not to rule by command and\nco-action, but by teaching and direction of men in the way of salvation\nin the world to come. And as a master in any science may abandon his\nscholar, when he obstinately neglecteth the practise of his rules; but\nnot accuse him of injustice, because he was never bound to obey him: so\na teacher of Christian doctrine may abandon his disciples that\nobstinately continue in an unchristian life; but he cannot say, they do\nhim wrong, because they are not obliged to obey him. For to a teacher\nthat shall so complain, may be applied the answer of God to Samuel in\nthe like place, (_1 Sam._ viii. 7) _They have not rejected thee, but\nme_. Excommunication therefore, when it wanteth the assistance of the\ncivil power, as it doth, when a Christian state or prince is\nexcommunicate by a foreign authority, is without effect; and\nconsequently ought to be without terror. The name of _Fulmen\nexcommunicationis_, that is, the _thunderbolt of excommunication_,\nproceeded from an imagination of the Bishop of Rome, which first used\nit, that he was king of kings; as the heathen made Jupiter king of the\ngods, and assigned him, in their poems, and pictures, a thunderbolt,\nwherewith to subdue and punish the giants, that should dare to deny his\npower. Which imagination was grounded on two errors; one, that the\nkingdom of Christ is of this world, contrary to our Saviour\u2019s own words,\n(_John_ xviii. 36) _My kingdom is not of this world_; the other, that he\nis Christ\u2019s vicar, not only over his own subjects, but over all the\nChristians of the world; whereof there is no ground in Scripture, and\nthe contrary shall be proved in its due place.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the interpreter of the Scriptures, before civil sovereigns\n became Christians.]\n\nSt. Paul coming to Thessalonica, where was a Synagogue of the Jews,\n(_Acts_, xvii. 2, 3) _as his manner was, went in unto them, and three\nSabbath days reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening and\nalleging, that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the\ndead; and that this Jesus whom he preached was the Christ_. The\nScriptures here mentioned were the Scriptures of the Jews, that is, the\nOld Testament. The men, to whom he was to prove that Jesus was the\nChrist and risen again from the dead, were also Jews, and did believe\nalready, that they were the word of God. Hereupon (as it is in verse 4)\nsome of them believed, and (as it is in verse 5) some believed not. What\nwas the reason, when they all believed the Scripture, that they did not\nall believe alike; but that some approved, others disapproved the\ninterpretation of St. Paul that cited them; and every one interpreted\nthem to himself? It was this; St. Paul came to them without any legal\ncommission, and in the manner of one that would not command, but\npersuade; which he must needs do, either by miracles, as Moses did to\nthe Israelites in Egypt, that they might see his authority in God\u2019s\nworks; or by reasoning from the already received Scripture, that they\nmight see the truth of his doctrine in God\u2019s word. But whosoever\npersuadeth by reasoning from principles written, maketh him to whom he\nspeaketh judge, both of the meaning of those principles, and also of the\nforce of his inferences upon them. If these Jews of Thessalonica were\nnot, who else was the judge of what St. Paul alleged out of Scripture?\nIf St. Paul, what needed he to quote any places to prove his doctrine?\nIt had been enough to have said, I find it so in Scripture, that is to\nsay, in your laws, of which I am interpreter, as sent by Christ. The\ninterpreter therefore of the Scripture, to whose interpretation the Jews\nof Thessalonica were bound to stand, could be none: every one might\nbelieve, or not believe, according as the allegation seemed to himself\nto be agreeable, or not agreeable to the meaning of the places alleged.\nAnd generally in all cases of the world, he that pretendeth any proof,\nmaketh judge of his proof him to whom he addresseth his speech. And as\nto the case of the Jews in particular, they were bound by express words\n(_Deut._ xvii.) to receive the determination of all hard questions, from\nthe priests and judges of Israel for the time being. But this is to be\nunderstood of the Jews that were yet unconverted.\n\nFor the conversion of the Gentiles, there was no use of alleging the\nScriptures, which they believed not. The apostles therefore laboured by\nreason to confute their idolatry; and that done, to persuade them to the\nfaith of Christ, by their testimony of his life and resurrection. So\nthat there could not yet be any controversy concerning the authority to\ninterpret Scripture; seeing no man was obliged, during his infidelity,\nto follow any man\u2019s interpretation of any Scripture, except his\nsovereign\u2019s interpretation of the laws of his country.\n\nLet us now consider the conversion itself, and see what there was\ntherein that could be cause of such an obligation. Men were converted to\nno other thing than to the belief of that which the apostles preached:\nand the apostles preached nothing, but that Jesus was the Christ, that\nis to say, the king that was to save them, and reign over them eternally\nin the world to come; and consequently that he was not dead, but risen\nagain from the dead, and gone up into heaven, and should come again one\nday to judge the world, (which also should rise again to be judged,) and\nreward every man according to his works. None of them preached that\nhimself, or any other apostle, was such an interpreter of the Scripture,\nas all that became Christians, ought to take their interpretation for\nlaw. For to interpret the laws, is part of the administration of a\npresent kingdom; which the apostles had not. They prayed then, and all\nother pastors ever since, _let thy kingdom come_; and exhorted their\nconverts to obey their then ethnic princes. The New Testament was not\nyet published in one body. Every of the evangelists was interpreter of\nhis own gospel; and every apostle of his own epistle; and of the Old\nTestament our Saviour himself saith to the Jews (_John_ v. 39) _Search\nthe Scriptures; for in them ye think to have eternal life, and they are\nthey that testify of me_. If he had not meant they should interpret\nthem, he would not have bidden them take thence the proof of his being\nthe Christ: he would either have interpreted them himself, or referred\nthem to the interpretation of the priests.\n\nWhen a difficulty arose, the apostles and elders of the Church assembled\nthemselves together, and determined what should be preached and taught,\nand how they should interpret the Scriptures to the people; but took not\nfrom the people the liberty to read and interpret them to themselves.\nThe apostles sent divers letters to the Churches, and other writings for\ntheir instruction; which had been in vain, if they had not allowed them\nto interpret, that is, to consider the meaning of them. And as it was in\nthe apostles\u2019 time, it must be till such time as there should be\npastors, that could authorize an interpreter, whose interpretation\nshould generally be stood to: but that could not be till kings were\npastors, or pastors kings.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the power to make Scripture, law.]\n\nThere be two senses, wherein a writing may be said to be _canonical_;\nfor _canon_, signifieth a _rule_; and a rule is a precept, by which a\nman is guided and directed in any action whatsoever. Such precepts,\nthough given by a teacher to his disciple, or a counsellor to his\nfriend, without power to compel him to observe them, are nevertheless\ncanons; because they are rules. But when they are given by one, whom he\nthat receiveth them is bound to obey, then are those canons, not only\nrules, but laws. The question therefore here, is of the power to make\nthe Scriptures, which are the rules of Christian faith, laws.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the ten commandments.]\n\nThat part of the Scripture, which was first law, was the Ten\nCommandments, written in two tables of stone, and delivered by God\nhimself to Moses; and by Moses made known to the people. Before that\ntime there was no written law of God, who as yet having not chosen any\npeople to be his peculiar kingdom, had given no law to men, but the law\nof nature, that is to say, the precepts of natural reason, written in\nevery man\u2019s own heart. Of these two tables, the first containeth the law\nof sovereignty; 1. That they should not obey, nor honour the gods of\nother nations, in these words, _Non habebis deos alienos coram me_, that\nis, _thou shalt not have for gods, the gods that other nations worship,\nbut only me_: whereby they were forbidden to obey, or honour, as their\nking and governor, any other God, than him that spake unto them then by\nMoses, and afterwards by the high-priest. 2. That they _should not make\nany image to represent him_; that is to say, they were not to choose to\nthemselves, neither in heaven, nor in earth, any representative of their\nown fancying, but obey Moses and Aaron, whom he had appointed to that\noffice. 3. That _they should not take the name of God in vain_; that is,\nthey should not speak rashly of their king, nor dispute his right, nor\nthe commissions of Moses and Aaron, his lieutenants. 4. That _they\nshould every seventh day abstain from their ordinary labour_, and employ\nthat time in doing him public honour. The second table containeth the\nduty of one man towards another, as _to honour parents_; _not to kill_;\n_not to commit adultery_; _not to steal_; _not to corrupt judgment by\nfalse witness_; and finally, _not so much as to design in their heart\nthe doing of any injury one to another_. The question now is, who it was\nthat gave to these written tables the obligatory force of laws. There is\nno doubt but they were made laws by God himself: but because a law\nobliges not, nor is law to any, but to them that acknowledge it to be\nthe act of the sovereign; how could the people of Israel, that were\nforbidden to approach the mountain to hear what God said to Moses, be\nobliged to obedience to all those laws which Moses propounded to them?\nSome of them were indeed the laws of nature, as all the second table;\nand therefore to be acknowledged for God\u2019s laws; not to the Israelites\nalone, but to all people: but of those that were peculiar to the\nIsraelites, as those of the first table, the question remains; saving\nthat they had obliged themselves, presently after the propounding of\nthem, to obey Moses, in these words (_Exod._ xx. 19), _Speak thou to us,\nand we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die_. It was\ntherefore only Moses then, and after him the high-priest, whom, by\nMoses, God declared should administer this his peculiar kingdom, that\nhad on earth the power to make this short Scripture of the Decalogue to\nbe law in the commonwealth of Israel. But Moses, and Aaron, and the\nsucceeding high-priests, were the civil sovereigns. Therefore hitherto,\nthe canonizing or making the Scripture law, belonged to the civil\nsovereign.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the judicial and Levitical law.]\n\nThe judicial law, that is to say, the laws that God prescribed to the\nmagistrates of Israel for the rule of their administration of justice,\nand of the sentences or judgments they should pronounce in pleas between\nman and man; and the Levitical law, that is to say, the rule that God\nprescribed touching the rites and ceremonies of the priests and Levites,\nwere all delivered to them by Moses only; and therefore also became\nlaws, by virtue of the same promise of obedience to Moses. Whether these\nlaws were then written, or not written, but dictated to the people by\nMoses, after his being forty days with God in the Mount, by word of\nmouth, is not expressed in the text; but they were all positive laws,\nand equivalent to holy Scripture, and made canonical by Moses the civil\nsovereign.\n\n[Sidenote: The second law.]\n\nAfter the Israelites were come into the plains of Moab over against\nJericho, and ready to enter into the land of promise, Moses to the\nformer laws added divers others; which therefore are called\n_Deuteronomy_; that is, _second laws_. And are, (as it is written\n_Deut._ xxix. 1) _the words of a covenant which the Lord commanded Moses\nto make with the children of Israel, besides the covenant which he made\nwith them in Horeb_. For having explained those former laws, in the\nbeginning of the book of _Deuteronomy_, he addeth others, that begin at\nthe xiith chapter, and continue to the end of the xxvith of the same\nbook. This law (_Deut._ xxvii. 3) they were commanded to write upon\ngreat stones plastered over, at their passing over Jordan: this law also\nwas written by Moses himself in a book, and delivered into the hands of\nthe _priests, and to the elders of Israel_ (_Deut._ xxxi. 9), and\ncommanded (verse 26) _to be put in the side of the ark_; for in the ark\nitself was nothing but the _ten commandments_. This was the law, which\nMoses (_Deut._ xvii. 18) commanded the kings of Israel should keep a\ncopy of: and this is the law, which having been long time lost, was\nfound again in the temple in the time of Josiah, and by his authority\nreceived for the law of God. But both Moses at the writing, and Josiah\nat the recovery thereof, had both of them the civil sovereignty.\nHitherto therefore the power of making Scripture canonical, was in the\ncivil sovereign.\n\nBesides this book of the law, there was no other book, from the time of\nMoses till after the Captivity, received amongst the Jews for the law of\nGod. For the prophets, except a few, lived in the time of the Captivity\nitself; and the rest lived but a little before it; and were so far from\nhaving their prophecies generally received for laws, as that their\npersons were persecuted, partly by false prophets, and partly by the\nkings which were seduced by them. And this book itself, which was\nconfirmed by Josiah for the law of God, and with it all the history of\nthe works of God, was lost in the captivity and sack of the city of\nJerusalem, as appears by that of _2 Esdras_, xiv. 21, _thy law is burnt;\ntherefore no man knoweth the things that are done of thee, or the works\nthat shall begin_. And before the captivity, between the time when the\nlaw was lost, (which is not mentioned in the Scripture, but may probably\nbe thought to be the time of Rehoboam, when (_1 Kings_ xiv. 26) Shishak,\nking of Egypt, took the spoil of the temple), and the time of Josiah\nwhen it was found again, they had no written word of God, but ruled\naccording to their own discretion, or by the direction of such as each\nof them esteemed prophets.\n\n[Sidenote: The Old Testament when made canonical.]\n\nFrom hence we may infer, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament, which\nwe have at this day, were not canonical nor a law unto the Jews, till\nthe renovation of their covenant with God at their return from the\ncaptivity, and restoration of their commonwealth under Esdras. But from\nthat time forward they were accounted the law of the Jews, and for such\ntranslated into Greek by seventy elders of Judea, and put into the\nlibrary of Ptolemy at Alexandria, and approved for the word of God. Now\nseeing Esdras was the high-priest, and the high-priest was their civil\nsovereign, it is manifest that the Scriptures were never made laws, but\nby the sovereign civil power.\n\n[Sidenote: The New Testament began to be canonical under Christian\n sovereigns.]\n\nBy the writings of the fathers that lived in the time before that the\nChristian religion was received, and authorized by Constantine the\nemperor, we may find, that the books we now have of the New Testament\nwere held by the Christians of that time, except a few, (in respect of\nwhose paucity the rest were called the Catholic Church, and others\nheretics), for the dictates of the Holy Ghost, and consequently for the\ncanon or rule of faith: such was the reverence and opinion they had of\ntheir teachers; as generally the reverence, that the disciples bear to\ntheir first masters in all manner of doctrine they receive from them, is\nnot small. Therefore there is no doubt, but when St. Paul wrote to the\nChurches he had converted; or any other apostle or disciple of Christ,\nto those which had then embraced Christ; they received those their\nwritings for the true Christian doctrine. But in that time, when not the\npower and authority of the teacher, but the faith of the hearer, caused\nthem to receive it, it was not the apostles that made their own writings\ncanonical, but every convert made them so to himself.\n\nBut the question here, is not what any Christian made a law or canon to\nhimself, which he might again reject by the same right he received it;\nbut what was so made a canon to them, as without injustice they could\nnot do any thing contrary thereunto. That the New Testament should in\nthis sense be canonical, that is to say a law, in any place where the\nlaw of the commonwealth had not made it so, is contrary to the nature of\na law. For a law, as has been already shown, is the commandment of that\nman or assembly, to whom we have given sovereign authority to make such\nrules for the direction of our actions as he shall think fit, and to\npunish us when we do any thing contrary to the same. When therefore any\nother man shall offer unto us any other rules, which the sovereign ruler\nhath not prescribed, they are but counsel and advice; which, whether\ngood or bad, he that is counselled, may without injustice refuse to\nobserve; and when contrary to the laws already established, without\ninjustice cannot observe, how good soever he conceiveth it to be. I say,\nhe cannot in this case observe the same in his actions, nor in his\ndiscourse with other men; though he may without blame believe his\nprivate teachers, and wish he had the liberty to practise their advice,\nand that it were publicly received for law. For internal faith is in its\nown nature invisible, and consequently exempted from all human\njurisdiction; whereas the words and actions that proceed from it, as\nbreaches of our civil obedience, are injustice both before God and man.\nSeeing then our Saviour hath denied his kingdom to be in this world,\nseeing he had said, he came not to judge, but to save the world, he hath\nnot subjected us to other laws than those of the commonwealth; that is,\nthe Jews to the law of Moses, which he saith (_Matth._ v. 17) he came\nnot to destroy, but to fulfil; and other nations to the laws of their\nseveral sovereigns, and all men to the laws of nature; the observing\nwhereof, both he himself, and his apostles, have in their teaching\nrecommended to us, as a necessary condition of being admitted by him in\nthe last day into his eternal kingdom, wherein shall be protection, and\nlife everlasting. Seeing then our Saviour, and his apostles, left not\nnew laws to oblige us in this world, but new doctrine to prepare us for\nthe next; the books of the New Testament, which contain that doctrine,\nuntil obedience to them was commanded by them that God had given power\nto on earth to be legislators, were not obligatory canons, that is,\nlaws, but only good and safe advice, for the direction of sinners in the\nway to salvation, which every man might take and refuse at his own\nperil, without injustice.\n\nAgain, our Saviour Christ\u2019s commission to his apostles and disciples,\nwas to proclaim his kingdom, not present, but to come; and to teach all\nnations, and to baptize them that should believe; and to enter into the\nhouses of them that should receive them, and where they were not\nreceived, to shake off the dust of their feet against them; but not to\ncall for fire from heaven to destroy them, nor to compel them to\nobedience by the sword. In all which there is nothing of power, but of\npersuasion. He sent them out as sheep unto wolves, not as kings to their\nsubjects. They had not in commission to make laws; but to obey, and\nteach obedience to laws made; and consequently they could not make their\nwritings obligatory canons, without the help of the sovereign civil\npower. And therefore the Scripture of the New Testament is there only\nlaw, where the lawful civil power hath made it so. And there also the\nking, or sovereign, maketh it a law to himself; by which he subjecteth\nhimself, not to the doctor or apostle that converted him, but to God\nhimself and his Son Jesus Christ, as immediately as did the apostles\nthemselves.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the power of councils to make the Scriptures law.]\n\nThat which may seem to give the New Testament, in respect of those that\nhave embraced Christian doctrine, the force of laws, in the times and\nplaces of persecution, is the decrees they made amongst themselves in\ntheir synod. For we read (_Acts_ xv. 28) the style of the council of the\napostles, the elders, and the whole Church, in this manner; _It seemed\ngood to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burthen\nthan these necessary things, &c_; which is a style that signifieth a\npower to lay a burthen on them that had received their doctrine. Now _to\nlay a burthen on another_, seemeth the same as _to oblige_; and\ntherefore the acts of that council were laws to the then Christians.\nNevertheless, they were no more laws than are these other precepts,\n_Repent; be baptized; keep the commandments; believe the gospel; come\nunto me; sell all that thou hast; give it to the poor_; and, _follow\nme_; which are not commands, but invitations, and callings of men to\nChristianity, like that of _Isaiah_ lv. 1; _Ho, every man that\nthirsteth, come ye to the waters, come, and buy wine and milk without\nmoney_. For first, the apostles\u2019 power was no other than that of our\nSaviour, to invite men to embrace the kingdom of God; which they\nthemselves acknowledged for a kingdom, not present, but to come; and\nthey that have no kingdom, can make no laws. And secondly, if their acts\nof council were laws, they could not without sin be disobeyed. But we\nread not any where, that they who received not the doctrine of Christ,\ndid therein sin; but that they died in their sins; that is, that their\nsins against the laws to which they owed obedience, were not pardoned.\nAnd those laws were the laws of nature, and the civil laws of the state,\nwhereto every Christian man had by pact submitted himself. And therefore\nby the burthen, which the apostles might lay on such as they had\nconverted, are not to be understood laws, but conditions proposed to\nthose that sought salvation; which they might accept or refuse at their\nown peril, without a new sin, though not without the hazard of being\ncondemned and excluded out of the kingdom of God for their sins past.\nAnd therefore of infidels, St. John saith not, the wrath of God shall\n_come_ upon them, but (_John_ iii. 36) _the wrath of God remaineth upon\nthem_; and not that they shall be condemned, but that (_John_ iii. 18)\n_they are condemned already_. Nor can it be conceived, that the benefit\nof faith _is remission of sins_, unless we conceive withal, that the\ndamage of infidelity _is the retention of the same sins_.\n\nBut to what end is it, may some man ask, that the apostles, and other\npastors of the Church after their time, should meet together to agree\nupon what doctrine should be taught, both for faith and manners, if no\nman were obliged to observe their decrees? To this may be answered, that\nthe apostles and elders of that council were obliged even by their\nentrance into it, to teach the doctrine therein concluded and decreed to\nbe taught, so far forth, as no precedent law, to which they were obliged\nto yield obedience, was to the contrary; but not that all other\nChristians should be obliged to observe what they taught. For though\nthey might deliberate what each of them should teach; yet they could not\ndeliberate what others should do, unless their assembly had had a\nlegislative power; which none could have but civil sovereigns. For\nthough God be the sovereign of all the world, we are not bound to take\nfor his law whatsoever is propounded by every man in his name; nor\nanything contrary to the civil law, which God hath expressly commanded\nus to obey.\n\nSeeing then the acts of council of the apostles, were then no laws, but\ncounsels; much less are laws the acts of any other doctors or council\nsince, if assembled without the authority of the civil sovereign. And\nconsequently, the Books of the New Testament, though most perfect rules\nof Christian doctrine, could not be made laws by any other authority\nthan that of kings or sovereign assemblies.\n\nThe first council, that made the Scriptures we now have canon, is not\nextant: for that collection of the canons of the apostles, attributed to\nClemens, the first bishop of Rome after St. Peter, is subject to\nquestion. For though the canonical books be there reckoned up; yet these\nwords, _sint vobis omnibus clericis et laicis libri venerandi, etc._\ncontain a distinction of clergy and laity, that was not in use so near\nSt. Peter\u2019s time. The first council for settling the canonical\nScripture, that is extant, is that of Laodicea, (_Can._ lix.) which\nforbids the reading of other books than those in the churches; which is\na mandate that is not addressed to every Christian, but to those only\nthat had authority to read any thing publicly in the church; that is, to\necclesiastics only.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the right of constituting ecclesiastical officers in the\n time of the apostles.]\n\nOf ecclesiastical officers in the time of the apostles, some were\nmagisterial, some ministerial. Magisterial were the offices of the\npreaching of the gospel of the kingdom of God to infidels; of\nadministering the sacraments, and divine service; and of teaching the\nrules of faith and manners to those that were converted. Ministerial was\nthe office of deacons, that is, of them that were appointed to the\nadministration of the secular necessities of the church, at such time as\nthey lived upon a common stock of money, raised out of the voluntary\ncontributions of the faithful.\n\nAmongst the officers magisterial, the first and principal were the\napostles; whereof there were at first but twelve; and these were chosen\nand constituted by our Saviour himself; and their office was not only to\npreach, teach, and baptize, but also to be martyrs, witnesses of our\nSaviour\u2019s resurrection. This testimony was the specifical and essential\nmark, whereby the apostleship was distinguished from other magistracy\necclesiastical; as being necessary for an apostle, either to have seen\nour Saviour after his resurrection, or to have conversed with him\nbefore, and seen his works, and other arguments of his divinity; whereby\nthey might be taken for sufficient witnesses. And therefore at the\nelection of a new apostle in the place of Judas Iscariot, St. Peter\nsaith (_Acts_ i. 21, 22) _Of these men that have companied with us, all\nthe time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning from\nthe baptism of John unto that same day that he was taken up from us_,\nmust _one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection_:\nwhere by this word _must_, is implied a necessary property of an\napostle, to have companied with the first and prime apostles, in the\ntime that our Saviour manifested himself in the flesh.\n\n[Sidenote: Matthias made apostle by the congregation.]\n\nThe first apostle, of those which were not constituted by Christ in the\ntime he was upon the earth, was Matthias, chosen in this manner. There\nwere assembled together in Jerusalem about one hundred and twenty\nChristians (_Acts_ i. 15). These (verse 23) appointed two, Joseph the\nJust and Matthias, and caused lots to be drawn; _and_ (verse 26) _the\nlot fell on Matthias, and he was numbered with the apostles_. So that\nhere we see the ordination of this apostle was the act of the\ncongregation, and not of St. Peter nor of the eleven, otherwise than as\nmembers of the assembly.\n\n[Sidenote: Paul and Barnabas made apostles by the Church of Antioch.]\n\nAfter him there was never any other apostle ordained, but Paul and\nBarnabas; which was done as we read (_Acts_ xiii. 1, 2, 3) in this\nmanner. _There were in the Church that was at Antioch, certain prophets\nand teachers; as Barnabas, and Simeon that was called Niger, and Lucius\nof Cyrene, and Manaen; which had been brought up with Herod the\nTetrarch, and Saul. As they ministered unto the Lord, and fasted, the\nHoly Ghost said, Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I\nhave called them. And when they had fasted and prayed, and laid their\nhands on them, they sent them away._\n\nBy which it is manifest, that though they were called by the Holy Ghost,\ntheir calling was declared unto them and their mission authorized by the\nparticular Church of Antioch. And that this their calling was to the\napostleship, is apparent by that, that they are both called (_Acts_ xiv.\n14) apostles: and that it was by virtue of this act of the Church of\nAntioch, that they were apostles, St. Paul declareth plainly (_Rom._ i.\n1), in that he useth the word, which the Holy Ghost used at his calling:\nfor he styleth himself, _An apostle separated unto the gospel of God_;\nalluding to the words of the Holy Ghost, _Separate me Barnabas and Saul,\n&c._ But seeing the work of an apostle, was to be a witness of the\nresurrection of Christ, a man may here ask, how St. Paul, that conversed\nnot with our Saviour before his passion, could know he was risen? To\nwhich is easily answered, that our Saviour himself appeared to him in\nthe way to Damascus, from heaven, after his ascension; _and chose him\nfor a vessel to bear his name before the Gentiles, and kings, and\nchildren of Israel_: and consequently, having seen the Lord after his\npassion, he was a competent witness of his resurrection. And as for\nBarnabas, he was a disciple before the passion. It is therefore evident\nthat Paul and Barnabas were apostles; and yet chosen and authorized, not\nby the first apostles alone, but by the Church of Antioch; as Matthias\nwas chosen and authorized by the Church of Jerusalem.\n\n[Sidenote: What offices in the church are magisterial.]\n\n_Bishop_, a word formed in our language out of the Greek \u0395\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2,\nsignifieth an overseer or superintendent of any business, and\nparticularly a pastor or shepherd; and thence by metaphor was taken, not\nonly amongst the Jews that were originally shepherds, but also amongst\nthe heathen, to signify the office of a king, or any other ruler or\nguide of people, whether he ruled by laws or doctrine. And so the\napostles were the first Christian bishops, instituted by Christ himself:\nin which sense the apostleship of Judas is called (_Acts_ i. 20) _his\nbishopric_. And afterwards, when there were constituted elders in the\nChristian Churches, with charge to guide Christ\u2019s flock by their\ndoctrine and advice; these elders were also called bishops. Timothy was\nan elder, (which word _elder_, in the New Testament, is a name of\noffice, as well as of age); yet he was also a bishop. And bishops were\nthen content with the title of elders. Nay St. John himself, the apostle\nbeloved of our Lord, beginneth his second Epistle with these words, _The\nelder to the elect lady_. By which it is evident, that _bishop_,\n_pastor_, _elder_, _doctor_, that is to say, _teacher_, were but so many\ndivers names of the same office in the time of the apostles; for there\nwas then no government by coercion, but only by doctrine and persuading.\nThe kingdom of God was yet to come, in a new world: so that there could\nbe no authority to compel in any Church, till the commonwealth had\nembraced the Christian faith: and consequently no diversity of\nauthority, though there were diversity of employments.\n\nBesides these magisterial employments in the Church, namely, apostles,\nbishops, elders, pastors, and doctors, whose calling was to proclaim\nChrist to the Jews and infidels, and to direct and to teach those that\nbelieved, we read in the New Testament of no other. For by the names of\n_evangelists_ and _prophets_, is not signified any office, but several\ngifts, by which several men were profitable to the Church: as\nevangelists, by writing the life and acts of our Saviour, such as were\nSt. Matthew and St. John apostles, and St. Mark and St. Luke disciples,\nand whosoever else wrote of that subject, (as St. Thomas, and St.\nBarnabas are said to have done, though the Church have not received the\nbooks that have gone under their names): and as prophets, by the gift of\ninterpreting the Old Testament, and sometimes by declaring their special\nrevelations to the Church. For neither these gifts, nor the gifts of\nlanguages, nor the gift of casting out devils, nor of curing other\ndiseases, nor any thing else, did make an officer in the Church, save\nonly the due calling and election to the charge of teaching.\n\n[Sidenote: Ordination of teachers.]\n\nAs the apostles, Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas, were not made by our\nSaviour himself, but were elected by the Church, that is, by the\nassembly of Christians; namely, Matthias by the Church of Jerusalem, and\nPaul and Barnabas by the Church of Antioch; so were also the\n_presbyters_ and _pastors_ in other cities, elected by the Churches of\nthose cities. For proof whereof let us consider, first, how St. Paul\nproceeded in the ordination of presbyters, in the cities where he had\nconverted men to the Christian faith, immediately after he and Barnabas\nhad received their apostleship. We read (_Acts_ xiv. 23) that _they\nordained elders in every Church_; which at first sight may be taken for\nan argument, that they themselves chose, and gave them their authority:\nbut if we consider the original text, it will be manifest that they were\nauthorized and chosen by the assembly of the Christians of each city.\nFor the words there are, \u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b2\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd, that is, _when they had ordained them elders by the holding\nup of hands in every congregation_. Now it is well enough known, that in\nall those cities the manner of choosing magistrates and officers, was by\nplurality of suffrages; and, because the ordinary way of distinguishing\nthe affirmative votes from the negatives, was by holding up of hands, to\nordain an officer in any of the cities, was no more but to bring the\npeople together, to elect them by plurality of votes, whether it were by\nplurality of elevated hands, or by plurality of voices, or plurality of\nballs, or beans, or small stones, of which every man cast in one, into a\nvessel marked for the affirmative or negative; for divers cities had\ndivers customs in that point. It was therefore the assembly that elected\ntheir own elders: the apostles were only presidents of the assembly, to\ncall them together for such election, and to pronounce them elected, and\nto give them the benediction which now is called consecration. And for\nthis cause, they that were presidents of the assemblies, as in the\nabsence of the apostles the elders were, were called \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, and in\nLatin _antistites_; which words signify the principal person of the\nassembly, whose office was to number the votes, and to declare thereby\nwho was chosen; and where the votes were equal, to decide the matter in\nquestion, by adding his own; which is the office of a president in\ncouncil. And, because all the Churches had their presbyters ordained in\nthe same manner, where the word is _constitute_, (as _Titus_ i. 5) \u1f35\u03bd\u03b1\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b2\u03c5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, _For this cause left I thee in\nCrete, that thou shouldest constitute elders in every city_, we are to\nunderstand the same thing, namely, that he should call the faithful\ntogether, and ordain them presbyters by plurality of suffrages. It had\nbeen a strange thing, if in a town, where men perhaps had never seen any\nmagistrate otherwise chosen than by an assembly, those of the town\nbecoming Christians should so much as have thought on any other way of\nelection of their teachers and guides, that is to say, of their\npresbyters, (otherwise called bishops) than this of plurality of\nsuffrages, intimated by St. Paul (_Acts_ xiv. 23) in the word\n\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2. Nor was there ever any choosing of bishops, before the\nemperors found it necessary to regulate them, in order to the keeping of\nthe peace amongst them, but by the assemblies of the Christians in every\nseveral town.\n\nThe same is also confirmed by the continual practice, even to this day,\nin the election of the bishops of Rome. For if the bishop of any place\nhad the right of choosing another, to the succession of the pastoral\noffice, in any city, at such times as he went from thence to plant the\nsame in another place; much more had he had the right to appoint his\nsuccessors in that place, in which he last resided and died: and we find\nnot that ever any bishop of Rome appointed his successor. For they were\na long time chosen by the people, as we may see by the sedition raised\nabout the election between _Damasus_ and _Ursicinus_; which Ammianus\nMarcellinus saith was so great, that _Juventius_ the pr\u00e6fect, unable to\nkeep the peace between them, was forced to go out of the city; and that\nthere were above an hundred men found dead upon that occasion in the\nchurch itself. And though they afterwards were chosen, first, by the\nwhole clergy of Rome, and afterwards by the cardinals; yet never any was\nappointed to the succession by his predecessor. If therefore they\npretended no right to appoint their own successors, I think I may\nreasonably conclude they had no right to appoint the successors of other\nbishops, without receiving some new power; which none could take from\nthe Church to bestow on them, but such as had a lawful authority, not\nonly to teach, but to command the Church; which none could do, but the\ncivil sovereign.\n\n[Sidenote: Ministers of the Church, what.]\n\nThe word _minister_, in the original \u0394\u03b9\u03ac\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, signifieth one that\nvoluntarily doth the business of another man; and differeth from a\nservant only in this, that servants are obliged by their condition, to\ndo what is commanded them; whereas ministers are obliged only by their\nundertaking, and bound therefore to no more than that they have\nundertaken: so that both they that teach the word of God, and they that\nadminister the secular affairs of the Church, are both ministers, but\nthey are ministers of different persons. For the pastors of the Church,\ncalled (_Acts_ vi. 4) _the ministers of the word_, are ministers of\nChrist, whose word it is: but the ministry of a deacon, which is called\n(verse 2 of the same chapter) _serving of tables_, is a service done to\nthe Church or congregation: so that neither any one man, nor the whole\nchurch, could ever of their pastor say, he was their minister: but of a\ndeacon, whether the charge he undertook were to serve tables, or\ndistribute maintenance to the Christians, when they lived in each city\non a common stock or upon collections, as in the first times, or to take\na care of the house of prayer, or of the revenue, or other worldly\nbusiness of the Church, the whole congregation might properly call him\ntheir minister.\n\nFor their employment, as deacons, was to serve the congregation; though\nupon occasion they omitted not to preach the gospel, and maintain the\ndoctrine of Christ, every one according to his gifts, as St. Stephen\ndid; and both to preach and baptize, as Philip did. For that Philip,\nwhich (_Acts_ viii. 5) preached the gospel at Samaria, and (verse 38)\nbaptized the Eunuch, was Philip the deacon, not Philip the apostle. For\nit is manifest (verse 1) that when Philip preached in Samaria, the\napostles were at Jerusalem, and (verse 14) _when they heard that Samaria\nhad received the word of God, sent Peter and John to them_; by\nimposition of whose hands, they that were baptized (verse 15), received,\nwhich before by the baptism of Philip they had not received, the Holy\nGhost. For it was necessary for the conferring of the Holy Ghost, that\ntheir baptism should be administered or confirmed by a minister of the\nword, not by a minister of the Church. And therefore to confirm the\nbaptism of those that Philip the deacon had baptized, the apostles sent\nout of their own number from Jerusalem to Samaria, Peter and John; who\nconferred on them that before were but baptized, those graces that were\nsigns of the Holy Spirit, which at that time did accompany all true\nbelievers; which what they were may be understood by that which St. Mark\nsaith (chap. xvi. 17), _these signs follow them that believe in my name;\nthey shall cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they\nshall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not\nhurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover_.\nThis to do, was it that Philip could not give; but the apostles could,\nand, as appears by this place, effectually did to every man that truly\nbelieved and was by a minister of Christ himself baptized: which power\neither Christ\u2019s ministers in this age cannot confer, or else there are\nvery few true believers, or Christ hath very few ministers.\n\n[Sidenote: And how chosen.]\n\nThat the first deacons were chosen, not by the apostles, but by a\ncongregation of the disciples, that is, of Christian men of all sorts,\nis manifest out of _Acts_ vi, where we read that the _Twelve_, after the\nnumber of disciples was multiplied, called them together, and having\ntold them, that it was not fit that the apostles should leave the word\nof God and serve tables, said unto them, (verse 3) _Brethren, look you\nout among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and of\nwisdom, whom we may appoint over this business_. Here it is manifest,\nthat though the apostles declared them elected; yet the congregation\nchose them; which also (verse 5) is more expressly said, where it is\nwritten, that _the saying pleased the whole multitude, and they chose\nseven, &c._\n\n[Sidenote: Of ecclesiastical revenue, under the law of Moses.]\n\nUnder the Old Testament, the tribe of Levi were only capable of the\npriesthood, and other inferior offices of the Church. The land was\ndivided amongst the other tribes, Levi excepted, which, by the\nsubdivision of the tribe of Joseph into Ephraim and Manasseh, were still\ntwelve. To the tribe of Levi were assigned certain cities for their\nhabitation, with the suburbs for their cattle: but for their portion,\nthey were to have the tenth of the fruits of the land of their brethren.\nAgain, the priests for their maintenance had the tenth of that tenth,\ntogether with part of the oblations and sacrifices. For God had said to\nAaron (_Numb._ xviii. 20) _Thou shalt have no inheritance in their land;\nneither shalt thou have any part amongst them; I am thy part and thine\ninheritance amongst the children of Israel_. For God being then king,\nand having constituted the tribe of Levi to be his public ministers, he\nallowed them for their maintenance the public revenue, that is to say,\nthe part that God had reserved to himself; which were tithes and\nofferings: and that is it which is meant, where God saith, _I am thine\ninheritance_. And therefore to the Levites might not unfitly be\nattributed the name of _clergy_, from \u03ba\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, which signifieth lot or\ninheritance; not that they were heirs of the kingdom of God, more than\nother; but that God\u2019s inheritance was their maintenance. Now, seeing in\nthis time God himself was their king, and Moses, Aaron, and the\nsucceeding high-priests, were his lieutenants; it is manifest, that the\nright of tithes and offerings was constituted by the civil power.\n\nAfter their rejection of God in the demanding of a king, they enjoyed\nstill the same revenue; but the right thereof was derived from that,\nthat the kings did never take it from them: for the public revenue was\nat the disposing of him that was the public person; and that, till the\nCaptivity, was the king. And again, after the return from the Captivity,\nthey paid their tithes as before to the priest. Hitherto therefore\nChurch livings were determined by the civil sovereign.\n\n[Sidenote: In our Saviour\u2019s time, and after.]\n\nOf the maintenance of our Saviour and his apostles, we read only they\nhad a purse, which was carried by Judas Iscariot; and that of the\napostles, such as were fishermen did sometimes use their trade; and that\nwhen our Saviour sent the twelve apostles to preach, he forbad them\n(_Matth._ x. 9, 10): _to carry gold, and silver, and brass in their\npurses, for that the workman is worthy of his hire_. By which it is\nprobable, their ordinary maintenance was not unsuitable to their\nemployment; for their employment was (verse 8) _freely to give, because\nthey had freely received_; and their maintenance was the _free gift_ of\nthose that believed the good tiding they carried about of the coming of\nthe Messiah their Saviour. To which we may add, that which was\ncontributed out of gratitude by such as our Saviour had healed of\ndiseases; of which are mentioned (_Luke_ viii. 2, 3) _Certain women\nwhich had been healed of evil spirits and infirmities; Mary Magdalen,\nout of whom went seven devils; and Joanna the wife of Chuza, Herod\u2019s\nsteward, and Susanna, and many others, which ministered unto him of\ntheir substance_.\n\nAfter our Saviour\u2019s ascension, the Christians of every city lived in\ncommon (_Acts_ iv. 34,35) upon the money which was made of the sale of\ntheir lands and possessions, and laid down at the feet of the apostles,\nof good will, not of duty; for, _whilst the land remained_, saith St.\nPeter to Ananias (_Acts_ v. 4), _was it not thine? and after it was\nsold, was it not in thy power?_ which sheweth he needed not have saved\nhis land nor his money by lying, as not being bound to contribute any\nthing at all, unless he had pleased. And as in the time of the apostles,\nso also all the time downward, till after Constantine the Great, we\nshall find that the maintenance of the bishops and pastors of the\nChristian Church was nothing but the voluntary contribution of them that\nhad embraced their doctrine. There was yet no mention of tithes: but\nsuch was in the time of Constantine and his sons the affection of\nChristians to their pastors, as Ammianus Marcellinus saith, describing\nthe sedition of Damasus and Ursicinus about the bishopric, that it was\nworth their contention, in that the bishops of those times, by the\nliberality of their flock, and especially of matrons, lived splendidly,\nwere carried in coaches, and were sumptuous in their fare and apparel.\n\n[Sidenote: The ministers of the Gospel lived on the benevolence of their\n flocks.]\n\nBut here may some ask, whether the pastors were then bound to live upon\nvoluntary contribution, as upon alms; _For who_, saith St. Paul (_1\nCor._ ix. 7) _goeth to war at his own charges? or who feedeth a flock,\nand eateth not of the milk of the flock?_ And again, (verse 13) _Do ye\nnot know that they which minister about holy things, live of the things\nof the temple; and they which wait at the altar, partake with the\naltar_; that is to say, have part of that which is offered at the altar\nfor their maintenance? And then he concludeth, (verse 14) _Even so hath\nthe Lord appointed, that they which preach the gospel should live of the\ngospel_. From which place may be inferred indeed, that the pastors of\nthe Church ought to be maintained by their flocks; but not that the\npastors were to determine, either the quantity, or the kind of their own\nallowance, and be, as it were, their own carvers. Their allowance must\nneeds therefore be determined, either by the gratitude and liberality of\nevery particular man of their flock, or by the whole congregation. By\nthe whole congregation it could not be, because their acts were then no\nlaws; therefore the maintenance of pastors before emperors and civil\nsovereigns had made laws to settle it, was nothing but benevolence. They\nthat served at the altar lived on what was offered. So may the pastors\nalso take what is offered them by their flock; but not exact what is not\noffered. In what court should they sue for it, who had no tribunals? Or,\nif they had arbitrators amongst themselves, who should execute their\njudgments, when they had no power to arm their officers? It remaineth,\ntherefore, that there could be no certain maintenance assigned to any\npastors of the Church, but by the whole congregation; and then only,\nwhen their decrees should have the force, not only of _canons_, but also\nof _laws_; which laws could not be made, but by emperors, kings, or\nother civil sovereigns. The right of tithes in Moses\u2019 law, could not be\napplied to the then ministers of the gospel; because Moses and the\nhigh-priests were the civil sovereigns of the people under God, whose\nkingdom amongst the Jews was present; whereas the kingdom of God by\nChrist is yet to come.\n\nHitherto hath been shewn what the pastors of the Church are; what are\nthe points of their commission, as that they were to preach, to teach,\nto baptize, to be presidents in their several congregations; what is\necclesiastical censure, viz. excommunication, that is to say, in those\nplaces where Christianity was forbidden by the civil laws, a putting of\nthemselves out of the company of the excommunicate, and where\nChristianity was by the civil law commanded, a putting the excommunicate\nout of the congregations of Christians; who elected the pastors and\nministers of the Church, that it was the congregation; who consecrated\nand blessed them, that it was the pastor; what was their due revenue,\nthat it was none but their own possessions, and their own labour, and\nthe voluntary contributions of devout and grateful Christians. We are to\nconsider now, what office in the Church those persons have, who being\ncivil sovereigns, have embraced also the Christian faith.\n\n[Sidenote: That the civil sovereign, being a Christian, hath the right\n of appointing pastors.]\n\nAnd first, we are to remember, that the right of judging what doctrines\nare fit for peace, and to be taught the subjects, is in all\ncommonwealths inseparably annexed, as hath been already proved (chapter\nXVIII.), to the sovereign power civil, whether it be in one man, or in\none assembly of men. For it is evident to the meanest capacity, that\nmen\u2019s actions are derived from the opinions they have of the good or\nevil, which from those actions redound unto themselves; and\nconsequently, men that are once possessed of an opinion, that their\nobedience to the sovereign power will be more hurtful to them than their\ndisobedience, will disobey the laws, and thereby overthrow the\ncommonwealth, and introduce confusion and civil war; for the avoiding\nwhereof, all civil government was ordained. And therefore in all\ncommonwealths of the heathen, the sovereigns have had the name of\npastors of the people, because there was no subject that could lawfully\nteach the people, but by their permission and authority.\n\nThis right of the heathen kings cannot be thought taken from them by\ntheir conversion to the faith of Christ; who never ordained that kings,\nfor believing in him, should be deposed, that is, subjected to any but\nhimself, or, which is all one, be deprived of the power necessary for\nthe conservation of peace amongst their subjects, and for their defence\nagainst foreign enemies. And therefore Christian kings are still the\nsupreme pastors of their people, and have power to ordain what pastors\nthey please, to teach the Church, that is, to teach the people committed\nto their charge.\n\nAgain, let the right of choosing them be, as before the conversion of\nkings, in the Church; for so it was in the time of the apostles\nthemselves, as hath been shown already in this chapter; even so also the\nright will be in the civil sovereign, Christian. For in that he is a\nChristian, he allows the teaching; and in that he is the sovereign,\nwhich is as much as to say, the Church by representation, the teachers\nhe elects are elected by the Church. And when an assembly of Christians\nchoose their pastor in a Christian commonwealth, it is the sovereign\nthat electeth him, because it is done by his authority; in the same\nmanner, as when a town choose their mayor, it is the act of him that\nhath the sovereign power: for every act done, is the act of him, without\nwhose consent it is invalid. And therefore whatsoever examples may be\ndrawn out of history, concerning the election of pastors by the people,\nor by the clergy, they are no arguments against the right of any civil\nsovereign, because they that elected them did it by his authority.\n\nSeeing then in every Christian commonwealth, the civil sovereign is the\nsupreme pastor, to whose charge the whole flock of his subjects is\ncommitted, and consequently that it is by his authority that all other\npastors are made, and have power to teach, and perform all other\npastoral offices; it followeth also, that it is from the civil sovereign\nthat all other pastors derive their right of teaching, preaching, and\nother functions pertaining to that office, and that they are but his\nministers; in the same manner as the magistrates of towns, judges in\ncourts of justice, and commanders of armies, are all but ministers of\nhim that is the magistrate of the whole commonwealth, judge of all\ncauses, and commander of the whole militia, which is always the civil\nsovereign. And the reason hereof, is not because they that teach, but\nbecause they that are to learn, are his subjects. For let it be\nsupposed, that a Christian king commit the authority of ordaining\npastors in his dominions to another king, as divers Christian kings\nallow that power to the Pope; he doth not thereby constitute a pastor\nover himself, nor a sovereign pastor over his people; for that were to\ndeprive himself of the civil power; which, depending on the opinion men\nhave of their duty to him and the fear they have of punishment in\nanother world, would depend also on the skill and loyalty of doctors,\nwho are no less subject, not only to ambition, but also to ignorance,\nthan any other sort of men. So that where a stranger hath authority to\nappoint teachers, it is given him by the sovereign in whose dominions he\nteacheth. Christian doctors are our schoolmasters to Christianity; but\nkings are fathers of families, and may receive schoolmasters for their\nsubjects from the recommendation of a stranger, but not from the\ncommand; especially when the ill teaching them shall redound to the\ngreat and manifest profit of him that recommends them: nor can they be\nobliged to retain them, longer than it is for the public good; the care\nof which they stand so long charged withal, as they retain any other\nessential right of the sovereignty.\n\n[Sidenote: The pastoral authority of sovereigns only is _jure divino_;\n that of other pastors is _jure civili_.]\n\nIf a man therefore should ask a pastor, in the execution of his office,\nas the chief-priests and elders of the people (_Matth._ xxi. 23) asked\nour Saviour, _By what authority doest thou these things, and who gave\nthee this authority?_ he can make no other just answer, but that he doth\nit by the authority of the commonwealth, given him by the king, or\nassembly that representeth it. All pastors, except the supreme, execute\ntheir charges in the right, that is by the authority of the civil\nsovereign, that is, _jure civili_. But the king, and every other\nsovereign, executeth his office of supreme pastor by immediate authority\nfrom God, that is to say, in _God\u2019s right_ or _jure divino_. And\ntherefore none but kings can put into their titles a mark of their\nsubmission to God only, _Dei grati\u00e2 rex_, &c. Bishops ought to say in\nthe beginning of their mandates, _By the favour of the King\u2019s Majesty,\nbishop of such a diocese_; or as civil ministers, _in His Majesty\u2019s\nname_. For in saying, _Divin\u00e2 providenti\u00e2_, which is the same with _Dei\ngrati\u00e2_, though disguised, they deny to have received their authority\nfrom the civil state; and slily slip off the collar of their civil\nsubjection, contrary to the unity and defence of the commonwealth.\n\n[Sidenote: Christian kings have power to execute all manner of pastoral\n function.]\n\nBut if every Christian sovereign be the supreme pastor of his own\nsubjects, it seemeth that he hath also the authority, not only to\npreach, which perhaps no man will deny, but also to baptize and to\nadminister the sacrament of the Lord\u2019s Supper: and to consecrate both\ntemples and pastors to God\u2019s service; which most men deny; partly\nbecause they use not to do it, and partly because the administration of\nsacraments, and consecration of persons and places to holy uses,\nrequireth the imposition of such men\u2019s hands, as by the like imposition\nsuccessively from the time of the apostles have been ordained to the\nlike ministry. For proof therefore that Christian kings have power to\nbaptize, and to consecrate, I am to render a reason, both why they use\nnot to do it, and how, without the ordinary ceremony of imposition of\nhands, they are made capable of doing it when they will.\n\nThere is no doubt but any king, in case he were skilful in the sciences,\nmight by the same right of his office read lectures of them himself, by\nwhich he authorizeth others to read them in the universities.\nNevertheless, because the care of the sum of the business of the\ncommonwealth taketh up his whole time, it were not convenient for him to\napply himself in person to that particular. A king may also, if he\nplease, sit in judgment to hear and determine all manner of causes, as\nwell as give others authority to do it in his name; but that the charge,\nthat lieth upon him of command and government, constrain him to be\ncontinually at the helm, and to commit the ministerial offices to others\nunder him. In the like manner our Saviour, who surely had power to\nbaptize, baptized none (_John_ iv. 2) himself, but sent his apostles and\ndisciples to baptize. So also St. Paul, by the necessity of preaching in\ndivers and far distant places, baptized few: amongst all the Corinthians\nhe baptized only (_1 Cor._ i. 14, 16,) Crispus, Gaius, and Stephanas;\nand the reason was, (_1 Cor._ i. 17) because his principal charge was to\npreach. Whereby it is manifest, that the greater charge, such as is the\ngovernment of the Church, is a dispensation for the less. The reason\ntherefore why Christian kings use not to baptize, is evident, and the\nsame for which at this day there are few baptized by bishops, and by the\nPope fewer.\n\nAnd as concerning imposition of hands, whether it be needful for the\nauthorising of a king to baptize and consecrate, we may consider thus:\n\nImposition of hands, was a most ancient public ceremony amongst the\nJews, by which was designed, and made certain, the person, or other\nthing intended in a man\u2019s prayer, blessing, sacrifice, consecration,\ncondemnation, or other speech. So Jacob, in blessing the children of\nJoseph (_Gen._ xlviii. 14), _Laid his right hand on Ephraim the younger,\nand his left hand on Manasseh the first born_; and this he did\n_wittingly_ (though they were so presented to him by Joseph, as he was\nforced in doing it to stretch out his arms across) to design to whom he\nintended the greater blessing. So also in the sacrificing of the burnt\noffering, Aaron is commanded (_Exod._ xxix. 10) _to lay his hands on the\nhead of the bullock_: and (verse 15) _to lay his hand on the head of the\nram_. The same is also said again _Levit._ i. 4, and viii. 14. Likewise\nMoses, when he ordained Joshua to be captain of the Israelites, that is,\nconsecrated him to God\u2019s service, (_Numb._ xxvii. 23) _Laid his hands\nupon him, and gave him his charge_, designing and rendering certain, who\nit was they were to obey in war. And in the consecration of the Levites\n(_Numb._ viii. 10), God commanded that _the children of Israel should\nput their hands upon the Levites_. And in the condemnation of him that\nhad blasphemed the Lord (_Levit._ xxiv. 14), God commanded that _all\nthat heard him should lay their hands on his head, and that all the\ncongregation should stone him_. And why should they only that heard him,\nlay their hands upon him, and not rather a priest, Levite, or other\nminister of justice, but that none else were able to design and to\ndemonstrate to the eyes of the congregation, who it was that had\nblasphemed and ought to die? And to design a man or any other thing, by\nthe hand to the eye, is less subject to mistake, than when it is done to\nthe ear by a name.\n\nAnd so much was this ceremony observed, that in blessing the whole\ncongregation at once, which cannot be done by laying on of hands, yet\nAaron (_Levit._ ix. 22) _did lift up his hands toward the people when he\nblessed them_. And we read also of the like ceremony of consecration of\ntemples amongst the heathen, as that the priest laid his hands on some\npost of the temple, all the while he was uttering the words of\nconsecration. So natural it is to design any individual thing, rather by\nthe hand, to assure the eyes, than by words to inform the ear, in\nmatters of God\u2019s public service.\n\nThis ceremony was not therefore new in our Saviour\u2019s time. For Jairus\n(_Mark_ v. 23), whose daughter was sick, besought our Saviour, not to\nheal her, but _to lay his hands upon her that she might be healed_. And\n(_Matthew_ xix. 13) _they brought unto him little children, that he\nshould put his hands on them, and pray_.\n\nAccording to this ancient rite, the apostles, and presbyters, and the\npresbytery itself, laid hands on them whom they ordained pastors, and\nwithal prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost; and that\nnot only once, but sometimes oftener, when a new occasion was presented:\nbut the end was still the same, namely a punctual and religious\ndesignation of the person, ordained either to the pastoral charge in\ngeneral, or to a particular mission. So (_Acts_ vi. 6) _The apostles\nprayed, and laid their hands_ on the seven deacons; which was done, not\nto give them the Holy Ghost, (for they were full of the Holy Ghost\nbefore they were chosen, as appeareth immediately before, verse 3) but\nto design them to that office. And after Philip the deacon had converted\ncertain persons in Samaria, Peter and John went down (_Acts_ viii. 17),\n_and laid their hands on them, and they received the Holy Ghost_. And\nnot only an apostle, but a presbyter had this power: for St. Paul\nadviseth Timothy (_1 Tim._ v. 22) _Lay hands suddenly on no man_; that\nis, design no man rashly to the office of a pastor. The whole presbytery\nlaid their hands on Timothy, as we read _1 Tim._ iv. 14: but this is to\nbe understood, as that some did it by the appointment of the presbytery,\nand most likely their \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u1f7c\u03c2, or prolocutor, which it may be was St.\nPaul himself. For in his second Epistle to _Timothy_, (chap. i. 6) he\nsaith to him, _Stir up the gift of God, which is in thee by the laying\non of my hands_: where note by the way, that by the Holy Ghost, is not\nmeant the third person in the Trinity, but the gifts necessary to the\npastoral office. We read also, that St. Paul had imposition of hands\ntwice; once from Ananias at Damascus, (_Acts_ ix. 17, 18) at the time of\nhis baptism; and again (_Acts_ xiii. 3) at Antioch, when he was first\nsent out to preach. The use then of this ceremony, considered in the\nordination of pastors, was to design the person to whom they gave such\npower. But if there had been then any Christian, that had had the power\nof teaching before; the baptizing of him, that is, the making him a\nChristian, had given him no new power, but had only caused him to preach\ntrue doctrine, that is, to use his power aright; and therefore the\nimposition of hands had been unnecessary; baptism itself had been\nsufficient. But every sovereign, before Christianity, had the power of\nteaching, and ordaining teachers; and therefore Christianity gave them\nno new right, but only directed them in the way of teaching truth; and\nconsequently they needed no imposition of hands, besides that which is\ndone in baptism, to authorize them to exercise any part of the pastoral\nfunction, as namely, to baptize and consecrate. And in the Old\nTestament, though the priest only had right to consecrate, during the\ntime that the sovereignty was in the high-priest; yet it was not so when\nthe sovereignty was in the king. For we read (_1 Kings_ viii.) that\nSolomon blessed the people, consecrated the Temple, and pronounced that\npublic prayer which is the pattern now for consecration of all Christian\nchurches and chapels: whereby it appears, he had not only the right of\necclesiastical government, but also of exercising ecclesiastical\nfunctions.\n\n[Sidenote: The civil sovereign, if a Christian, is head of the Church in\n his own dominions.]\n\nFrom this consolidation of the right politic and ecclesiastic in\nChristian sovereigns, it is evident, they have all manner of power over\ntheir subjects, that can be given to man, for the government of men\u2019s\nexternal actions, both in policy and religion; and may make such laws as\nthemselves shall judge fittest, for the government of their own\nsubjects, both as they are the commonwealth, and as they are the Church;\nfor both State and Church are the same men.\n\nIf they please, therefore, they may, as many Christian kings now do,\ncommit the government of their subjects in matters of religion to the\nPope; but then the Pope is in that point subordinate to them, and\nexerciseth that charge in another\u2019s dominion _jure civili_, in the right\nof the civil sovereign; not _jure divino_, in God\u2019s right; and may\ntherefore be discharged of that office, when the sovereign, for the good\nof his subjects, shall think it necessary. They may also, if they\nplease, commit the care of religion to one supreme pastor, or to an\nassembly of pastors; and give them what power over the Church, or one\nover another, they think most convenient; and what titles of honour, as\nof archbishops, bishops, priests, or presbyters, they will; and make\nsuch laws for their maintenance, either by tithes or otherwise, as they\nplease, so they do it out of a sincere conscience, of which God only is\nthe judge. It is the civil sovereign that is to appoint judges and\ninterpreters of the canonical Scriptures; for it is he that maketh them\nlaws. It is he also that giveth strength to excommunications; which but\nfor such laws and punishments, as may humble obstinate libertines, and\nreduce them to union with the rest of the Church, would be contemned. In\nsum, he hath the supreme power in all causes, as well ecclesiastical as\ncivil, as far as concerneth actions and words, for those only are known\nand may be accused; and of that which cannot be accused, there is no\njudge at all but God, that knoweth the heart. And these rights are\nincident to all sovereigns, whether monarchs or assemblies: for they\nthat are the representants of a Christian people, are representants of\nthe Church: for a Church, and a commonwealth of Christian people, are\nthe same thing.\n\n[Sidenote: Cardinal Bellarmine\u2019s books, _De Summo Pontifice_\n considered.]\n\nThough this that I have here said, and in other places of this book,\nseem clear enough for the asserting of the supreme ecclesiastical power\nto Christian sovereigns; yet because the Pope of Rome\u2019s challenge to\nthat power universally, hath been maintained chiefly, and I think, as\nstrongly as is possible, by Cardinal Bellarmine, in his controversy _De\nSummo Pontifice_; I have thought it necessary, as briefly as I can, to\nexamine the grounds and strength of his discourse.\n\n[Sidenote: The first book.]\n\nOf five books he hath written of this subject, the first containeth\nthree questions: one, which is simply the best government, _Monarchy_,\n_Aristocracy_, or _Democracy_; and concludeth for neither, but for a\ngovernment mixed of all three: another, which of these is the best\ngovernment of the Church; and concludeth for the mixed, but which should\nmost participate of monarchy: the third, whether in this mixed monarchy,\nSt. Peter had the place of monarch. Concerning his first conclusion, I\nhave already sufficiently proved (chapter XVIII.) that all governments\nwhich men are bound to obey, are simple and absolute. In monarchy there\nis but one man supreme; and all other men that have any kind of power in\nthe state, have it by his commission, during his pleasure, and execute\nit in his name: and in aristocracy and democracy, but one supreme\nassembly, with the same power that in monarchy belongeth to the monarch,\nwhich is not a mixed, but an absolute sovereignty. And of the three\nsorts, which is the best, is not to be disputed, where any one of them\nis already established; but the present ought always to be preferred,\nmaintained, and accounted best; because it is against both the law of\nnature, and the divine positive law, to do anything tending to the\nsubversion thereof. Besides, it maketh nothing to the power of any\npastor, unless he have the civil sovereignty, what kind of government is\nthe best; because their calling is not to govern men by commandment, but\nto teach them, and persuade them by arguments, and leave it to them to\nconsider whether they shall embrace, or reject the doctrine taught. For\nmonarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, do mark out unto us three sorts of\nsovereigns, not of pastors; or, as we may say, three sorts of masters of\nfamilies, not three sorts of schoolmasters for their children.\n\nAnd therefore the second conclusion, concerning the best form of\ngovernment of the Church, is nothing to the question of the Pope\u2019s power\nwithout his own dominions. For in all other commonwealths his power, if\nhe have any at all, is that of the schoolmaster only, and not of the\nmaster of the family.\n\nFor the third conclusion, which is, that St. Peter was monarch of the\nChurch, he bringeth for his chief argument the place of St. Matthew\n(chap. xvi. 18, 19) _Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my\nChurch, &c. And I will give thee the keys of heaven; whatsoever thou\nshalt bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt\nloose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven._ Which place, well\nconsidered, proveth no more, but that the Church of Christ hath for\nfoundation one only article; namely, that which Peter in the name of all\nthe apostles professing, gave occasion to our Saviour to speak the words\nhere cited. Which that we may clearly understand, we are to consider,\nthat our Saviour preached by himself, by John the Baptist, and by his\napostles, nothing but this article of faith, _that he was the Christ_;\nall other articles requiring faith no otherwise, than as founded on\nthat. John began first, (_Matth._ iii. 2) preaching only this, _the\nkingdom of God is at hand_. Then our Saviour himself (_Matth._ iv. 17)\npreached the same: and to his twelve apostles, when he gave them their\ncommission, (_Matth._ x. 7), there is no mention of preaching any other\narticle but that. This was the fundamental article, that is the\nfoundation of the Church\u2019s faith. Afterwards the apostles being returned\nto him, he (_Matth._ xvi. 13) asketh them all, not Peter only, _who men\nsaid he was_; and they answered, that _some said he was John the\nBaptist, some Elias, and others Jeremiah, or one of the Prophets_. Then\n(verse 15) he asked them all again, not Peter only, _whom say ye that I\nam?_ Therefore St. Peter answered for them all, _Thou art Christ, the\nSon of the living God_; which I said is the foundation of the faith of\nthe whole Church; from which our Saviour takes the occasion of saying,\n_upon this stone I will build my Church_: by which it is manifest, that\nby the foundation-stone of the Church, was meant the fundamental article\nof the Church\u2019s faith. But why then, will some object, doth our Saviour\ninterpose these words, _thou art Peter_? If the original of this text\nhad been rigidly translated, the reason would easily have appeared. We\nare therefore to consider, that the apostle Simon was surnamed _Stone_,\nwhich is the signification of the Syriac word _Cephas_, and of the Greek\nword \u03a0\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2. Our Saviour therefore, after the confession of that\nfundamental article, alluding to his name, said (as if it were in\nEnglish) thus, Thou art _Stone_, and upon this Stone I will build my\nChurch: which is as much as to say, this article, that _I am the\nChrist_, is the foundation of all the faith I require in those that are\nto be members of my Church. Neither is this allusion to a name, an\nunusual thing in common speech. But it had been a strange and obscure\nspeech, if our Saviour, intending to build his Church on the person of\nSt. Peter, had said, _thou art a stone, and upon this stone I will build\nmy Church_; when it was so obvious, without ambiguity, to have said, _I\nwill build my Church on thee_; and yet there had been still the same\nallusion to his name.\n\nAnd for the following words, _I will give thee the keys of heaven, &c._\nit is no more than what our Saviour gave also to all the rest of his\ndisciples, (_Matth._ xviii. 18), _Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth,\nshall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall\nbe loosed in heaven_. But howsoever this be interpreted, there is no\ndoubt but the power here granted belongs to all supreme pastors; such as\nare all Christian civil sovereigns in their own dominions. In so much,\nas if St. Peter, or our Saviour himself, had converted any of them to\nbelieve him, and to acknowledge his kingdom; yet, because his kingdom is\nnot of this world, he had left the supreme care of converting his\nsubjects to none but him; or else he must have deprived him of the\nsovereignty, to which the right of teaching is inseparably annexed. And\nthus much in refutation of his first book, wherein he would prove St.\nPeter to have been the monarch universal of the Church, that is to say,\nof all the Christians in the world.\n\n[Sidenote: The second book.]\n\nThe second book hath two conclusions: one, that St. Peter was bishop of\nRome, and there died: the other, that the Popes of Rome are his\nsuccessors. Both which have been disputed by others. But supposing them\ntrue; yet if by Bishop of Rome, be understood either the monarch of the\nChurch, or the supreme pastor of it; not Silvester, but Constantine, who\nwas the first Christian emperor, was that bishop; and as Constantine, so\nall other Christian emperors, were of right supreme bishops of the Roman\nempire: I say, of the Roman empire, not of all Christendom; for other\nChristian sovereigns had the same right in their several territories, as\nto an office essentially adherent to their sovereignty. Which shall\nserve for answer to his second book.\n\n[Sidenote: The third book.]\n\nIn the third book he handleth the question, whether the Pope be\nAntichrist? For my part, I see no argument that proves he is so, in that\nsense the Scripture useth the name: nor will I take any argument from\nthe quality of Antichrist, to contradict the authority he exerciseth, or\nhath heretofore exercised, in the dominions of any other prince or\nstate.\n\nIt is evident that the prophets of the Old Testament foretold, and the\nJews expected a Messiah, that is, a Christ, that should re-establish\namongst them the kingdom of God, which had been rejected by them in the\ntime of Samuel, when they required a king after the manner of other\nnations. This expectation of theirs made them obnoxious to the imposture\nof all such, as had both the ambition to attempt the attaining of the\nkingdom, and the art to deceive the people by counterfeit miracles, by\nhypocritical life, or by orations and doctrine plausible. Our Saviour\ntherefore, and his apostles, forewarned men of false prophets and of\nfalse Christs. False Christs are such as pretend to be the _Christ_, but\nare not, and are called properly _Antichrists_; in such sense, as when\nthere happeneth a schism in the Church, by the election of two Popes,\nthe one calleth the other _Antipapa_, or the false Pope. And therefore\nAntichrist in the proper signification hath two essential marks; one,\nthat he denieth Jesus to be Christ; and another that he professeth\nhimself to be Christ. The first mark is set down by St. John in his\nfirst Epistle, iv. 3, _Every Spirit that confesseth not that Jesus\nChrist is come in the flesh, is not of God; and this is the spirit of\nAntichrist_. The other mark is expressed in the words of our Saviour,\n(_Matth._ xxiv. 5) _many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ_;\nand again, (verse 23) _If any man shall say unto you, lo! here is\nChrist, there is Christ, believe it not_. And therefore Antichrist must\nbe a false Christ; that is, some one of them that shall pretend\nthemselves to be Christ. And out of these two marks, _to deny Jesus to\nbe the Christ_, and _to affirm himself to be the Christ_, it followeth,\nthat he must also be an _adversary of Jesus the true Christ_, which is\nanother usual signification of the word Antichrist. But of these many\nAntichrists, there is one special one, \u1f41 \u0391\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c7\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, _the Antichrist_,\nor _Antichrist_ definitely, as one certain person; not indefinitely _an\nAntichrist_. Now, seeing the Pope of Rome neither pretendeth himself,\nnor denieth Jesus to be the Christ, I perceive not how he can be called\nAntichrist; by which word is not meant, one that falsely pretendeth to\nbe _his lieutenant_ or _vicar-general_, but to be _He_. There is also\nsome mark of the time of this special Antichrist, as (_Matth._ xxiv.\n15), when that abominable destroyer, spoken of by Daniel (_Dan._ ix. 27)\nshall stand in the Holy place, and such tribulation as was not since the\nbeginning of the world, nor ever shall be again, insomuch as if it were\nto last long, (_Matth._ xxiv. 22) _no flesh could be saved; but for the\nelect\u2019s sake those days shall be shortened_, made fewer. But that\ntribulation is not yet come; for it is to be followed immediately (verse\n29) by a darkening of the sun and moon, a falling of the stars, a\nconcussion of the heavens, and the glorious coming again of our Saviour\nin the clouds. And therefore _the Antichrist_ is not yet come; whereas,\nmany Popes are both come and gone. It is true, the Pope, in taking upon\nhim to give laws to all Christian kings and nations, usurpeth a kingdom\nin this world, which Christ took not on him: but he doth it not _as\nChrist_, but as _for Christ_, wherein there is nothing of _the\nAntichrist_.\n\n[Sidenote: Fourth book.]\n\nIn the fourth book, to prove the Pope to be the supreme judge in all\nquestions of faith and manners, _which is as much as to be the absolute\nmonarch of all Christians in the world_, he bringeth three propositions:\nthe first, that his judgments are infallible: the second, that he can\nmake very laws, and punish those that observe them not: the third, that\nour Saviour conferred all jurisdiction ecclesiastical on the Pope of\nRome.\n\n[Sidenote: Texts for the infallibility of the Pope\u2019s judgment in points\n of faith.]\n\nFor the infallibility of his judgments, he allegeth the Scriptures: and\nfirst, that of Luke, xxii. 31, 32: _Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired\nyou, that he may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for thee, that thy\nfaith fail not; and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren_.\nThis, according to Bellarmine\u2019s exposition, is, that Christ gave here to\nSimon Peter two privileges: one, that neither his faith should fail, nor\nthe faith of any of his successors: the other, that neither he, nor any\nof his successors, should ever define any point concerning faith or\nmanners erroneously, or contrary to the definition of a former Pope:\nwhich is a strange, and very much strained interpretation. But he that\nwith attention readeth that chapter, shall find there is no place in the\nwhole Scripture that maketh more against the Pope\u2019s authority, than this\nvery place. The Priests and Scribes seeking to kill our Saviour at the\nPassover, and Judas possessed with a resolution to betray him, and the\nday of killing the Passover being come, our Saviour celebrated the same\nwith his apostles, which he said, till the kingdom of God was come he\nwould do no more; and withal told them, that one of them was to betray\nhim. Hereupon they questioned which of them it should be; and withal,\nseeing the next Passover their master would celebrate should be when he\nwas king, entered into a contention, who should then be the greatest\nman. Our Saviour therefore told them, that the kings of the nations had\ndominion over their subjects, and are called by a name in Hebrew, that\nsignifies bountiful; but I cannot be so to you, you must endeavour to\nserve one another; I ordain you a kingdom, but it is such as my Father\nhath ordained me; a kingdom that I am now to purchase with my blood, and\nnot to possess till my second coming; then ye shall eat and drink at my\ntable, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel. And then\naddressing himself to St. Peter, he saith; Simon, Simon, Satan seeks, by\nsuggesting a present domination, to weaken your faith of the future; but\nI have prayed for thee, that thy faith shall not fail; thou therefore\nnote this, being converted, and understanding my kingdom as of another\nworld, confirm the same faith in thy brethren. To which St. Peter\nanswered, as one that no more expected any authority in this world,\n_Lord, I am ready to go with thee, not only to prison, but to death_.\nWhereby it is manifest, St. Peter had not only no jurisdiction given him\nin this world, but a charge to teach all the other apostles, that they\nalso should have none. And for the infallibility of St. Peter\u2019s sentence\ndefinitive in matter of faith, there is no more to be attributed to it\nout of this text, than that Peter should continue in the belief of this\npoint, namely, that Christ should come again and possess the kingdom at\nthe day of judgment; which was not given by this text to all his\nsuccessors; for we see they claim it in the world that now is.\n\nThe second place is that of Matth. xvi. 18, _Thou art Peter, and upon\nthis rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not\nprevail against it_. By which, as I have already shown in this chapter,\nis proved no more, than that the gates of hell shall not prevail against\nthe confession of Peter, which gave occasion to that speech; namely\nthis, that _Jesus is Christ the Son of God_.\n\nThe third text is John xxi. 16, 17: _Feed my sheep_; which contains no\nmore but a commission of teaching. And if we grant the rest of the\napostles to be contained in that name of _sheep_; then it is the supreme\npower of teaching: but it was only for the time that there were no\nChristian sovereigns already possessed of that supremacy. But I have\nalready proved, that Christian sovereigns are in their own dominions the\nsupreme pastors, and instituted thereto, by virtue of their being\nbaptized, though without other imposition of hands. For such imposition,\nbeing a ceremony of designing the person, is needless, when he is\nalready designed to the power of teaching what doctrine he will, by his\ninstitution to an absolute power over his subjects. For as I have proved\nbefore, sovereigns are supreme teachers, in general, by their office;\nand therefore oblige themselves, by their baptism, to teach the doctrine\nof Christ: and when they suffer others to teach their people, they do it\nat the peril of their own souls; for it is at the hands of the heads of\nfamilies that God will require the account of the instruction of his\nchildren and servants. It is of Abraham himself, not of a hireling, that\nGod saith (_Gen._ xviii. 19) _I know him that he will command his\nchildren, and his household after him, that they keep the way of the\nLord, and do justice and judgment_.\n\nThe fourth place is that of _Exod._ xxviii. 30: _Thou shalt put in the\nbreast-plate of judgment, the Urim and the Thummim_: which he saith is\ninterpreted by the Septuagint \u03b4\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u1f70\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd; that is, _evidence_\nand _truth_: and thence concludeth, God hath given evidence and truth,\nwhich is almost infallibility, to the high-priest. But be it evidence\nand truth itself that was given; or be it but admonition to the priest\nto endeavour to inform himself clearly, and give judgment uprightly; yet\nin that it was given to the high-priest, it was given to the civil\nsovereign; (for such next under God was the high-priest in the\ncommonwealth of Israel); and is an argument for evidence and truth, that\nis, for the ecclesiastical supremacy of civil sovereigns over their own\nsubjects, against the pretended power of the Pope. These are all the\ntexts he bringeth for the infallibility of the judgment of the Pope in\npoint of faith.\n\n[Sidenote: Texts for the same, in point of manners.]\n\nFor the infallibility of his judgment concerning manners, he bringeth\none text, which is that of John xvi. 13: _When the Spirit of truth is\ncome, he will lead you into all truth_: where, saith he, by _all truth_,\nis meant, at least _all truth necessary to salvation_. But with this\nmitigation, he attributeth no more infallibility to the Pope, than to\nany man that professeth Christianity and is not to be damned. For if any\nman err in any point, wherein not to err is necessary to salvation, it\nis impossible he should be saved; for that only is necessary to\nsalvation, without which to be saved is impossible. What points these\nare, I shall declare out of the Scripture in the chapter following. In\nthis place I say no more, but that though it were granted, the Pope\ncould not possibly teach any error at all, yet doth not this entitle him\nto any jurisdiction in the dominions of another prince; unless we shall\nalso say, a man is obliged in conscience to set on work upon all\noccasions the best workman, even then also when he hath formerly\npromised his work to another.\n\nBesides the text, he argueth from reason, thus. If the Pope could err in\nnecessaries, then Christ hath not sufficiently provided for the Church\u2019s\nsalvation; because he hath commanded her to follow the Pope\u2019s\ndirections. But this reason is invalid, unless he shew when and where\nChrist commanded that, or took at all any notice of a Pope. Nay,\ngranting whatsoever was given to St. Peter, was given to the Pope; yet\nseeing there is in the Scripture no command to any man to obey St.\nPeter, no man can be just, that obeyeth him, when his commands are\ncontrary to those of his lawful sovereign.\n\nLastly, it hath not been declared by the Church, nor by the Pope\nhimself, that he is the civil sovereign of all the Christians in the\nworld; and therefore all Christians are not bound to acknowledge his\njurisdiction in point of manners. For the civil sovereignty, and supreme\njudicature in controversies of manners, are the same thing: and the\nmakers of civil laws, are not only declarers, but also makers of the\njustice and injustice of actions; there being nothing in men\u2019s manners\nthat makes them righteous or unrighteous, but their conformity with the\nlaw of the sovereign. And therefore, when the Pope challengeth supremacy\nin controversies of manners, he teacheth men to disobey the civil\nsovereign; which is an erroneous doctrine, contrary to the many precepts\nof our Saviour and his apostles, delivered to us in the Scripture.\n\nTo prove the Pope has power to make laws, he allegeth many places; as\nfirst, (_Deut._ xvii. 12), _The man that will do presumptuously, and\nwill not hearken unto the priest, that standeth to minister there before\nthe Lord thy God, or unto the judge, even that man shall die; and thou\nshalt put away the evil from Israel_. For answer whereunto, we are to\nremember that the high-priest, next and immediately under God, was the\ncivil sovereign; and all judges were to be constituted by him. The words\nalleged sound therefore thus: _The man that will presume to disobey the\ncivil sovereign for the time being, or any of his officers in the\nexecution of their places, that man shall die, &c._; which is clearly\nfor the civil sovereignty, against the universal power of the Pope.\n\nSecondly, he allegeth that of Matth. xvi. 19, _Whatsoever ye shall bind,\n&c._ and interpreteth it for such _binding_ as is attributed (_Matth._\nxxiii. 4) to the Scribes and Pharisees, _They bind heavy burthens, and\ngrievous to be borne, and lay them on men\u2019s shoulders_; by which is\nmeant, he says, making of laws; and concludes thence, that the Pope can\nmake laws. But this also maketh only for the legislative power of civil\nsovereigns. For the Scribes and Pharisees sat in Moses\u2019 chair; but Moses\nnext under God was sovereign of the people of Israel: and therefore our\nSaviour commanded them to do all that they should say, but not all that\nthey should do: that is, to obey their laws, but not follow their\nexample.\n\nThe third place is John xxi. 16, _Feed my sheep_; which is not a power\nto make laws, but a command to teach. Making laws belongs to the lord of\nthe family; who by his own discretion chooseth his chaplain, as also a\nschoolmaster to teach his children.\n\nThe fourth place (_John_ xx. 21) is against him. The words are, _As my\nfather sent me, so send I you_. But our Saviour was sent to redeem by\nhis death such as should believe, and by his own and his apostles\u2019\npreaching to prepare them for their entrance into his kingdom; which he\nhimself saith, is not of this world, and hath taught us to pray for the\ncoming of it hereafter, though he refused (_Acts_ i. 6, 7) to tell his\napostles when it should come; and in which, when it comes, the twelve\napostles shall sit on twelve thrones, every one perhaps as high as that\nof St. Peter, to judge the twelve tribes of Israel. Seeing then God the\nFather sent not our Saviour to make laws in this present world, we may\nconclude from the text, that neither did our Saviour send St. Peter to\nmake laws here, but to persuade men to expect his second coming with a\nsteadfast faith; and in the mean time, if subjects, to obey their\nprinces; and if princes, both to believe it themselves, and to do their\nbest to make their subjects do the same; which is the office of a\nbishop. Therefore this place maketh most strongly for the joining of the\necclesiastical supremacy to the civil sovereignty, contrary to that\nwhich Cardinal Bellarmine allegeth it for.\n\nThe fifth place is _Acts_ xv. 28, 29, _It hath seemed good to the Holy\nSpirit and to us, to lay upon you no greater burthen, than these\nnecessary things, that ye abstain from meats offered to idols, and from\nblood, and from things strangled, and from fornication_. Here he notes\nthe word _laying of burthens_ for the legislative power. But who is\nthere, that reading this text, can say, this style of the apostles may\nnot as properly be used in giving counsel, as in making laws? The style\nof a law is, _we command_: but, _we think good_, is the ordinary style\nof them, that but give advice; and they lay a burthen that give advice,\nthough it be conditional, that is, if they to whom they give it, will\nattain their ends: and such is the burthen of abstaining from things\nstrangled, and from blood; not absolute, but in case they will not err.\nI have shown before, (chapter XXV.) that law is distinguished from\ncounsel in this, that the reason of a law is taken from the design and\nbenefit of him that prescribeth it; but the reason of a counsel, from\nthe design and benefit of him to whom the counsel is given. But here,\nthe apostles aim only at the benefit of the converted Gentiles, namely\ntheir salvation; not at their own benefit; for having done their\nendeavour, they shall have their reward, whether they be obeyed or not.\nAnd therefore the acts of this council, were not laws, but counsels.\n\nThe sixth place is that of _Rom._ xiii, _Let every soul be subject to\nthe higher powers, for there is no power but of God_; which is meant, he\nsaith, not only of secular, but also of ecclesiastical princes. To which\nI answer, first, that there are no ecclesiastical princes but those that\nare also civil sovereigns; and their principalities exceed not the\ncompass of their civil sovereignty; without those bounds, though they\nmay be received for doctors, they cannot be acknowledged for princes.\nFor if the apostle had meant, we should be subject both to our own\nprinces, and also to the Pope, he had taught us a doctrine, which Christ\nhimself hath told us is impossible, namely, _to serve two masters_. And\nthough the apostle say in another place, (_2 Cor._ xiii. 10) _I write\nthese things being absent, lest being present I should use sharpness,\naccording to the power which the Lord hath given me_; it is not, that he\nchallenged a power either to put to death, imprison, banish, whip, or\nfine any of them, which are punishments; but only to excommunicate,\nwhich, without the civil power, is no more but a leaving of their\ncompany, and having no more to do with them than with a heathen man or a\npublican; which in many occasions might be a greater pain to the\nexcommunicant, than to the excommunicate.\n\nThe seventh place is _1 Cor._ iv. 21, _Shall I come unto you with a rod,\nor in love, and the spirit of lenity?_ But here again, it is not the\npower of a magistrate to punish offenders, that is meant by a rod; but\nonly the power of excommunication, which is not in its own nature a\npunishment, but only a denouncing of punishment, that Christ shall\ninflict when he shall be in possession of his kingdom, at the day of\njudgment. Nor then also shall it be properly a punishment, as upon a\nsubject that hath broken the law; but a revenge, as upon an enemy or\nrevolter, that denieth the right of our Saviour to the kingdom. And\ntherefore this proveth not the legislative power of any bishop, that has\nnot also the civil power.\n\nThe eighth place is _1 Timothy_, iii. 2; _A bishop must be the husband\nof but one wife, vigilant, sober, &c._: which he saith was a law. I\nthought that none could make a law in the Church, but the monarch of the\nChurch, St. Peter. But suppose this precept made by the authority of St.\nPeter; yet I see no reason why to call it a law, rather than an advice,\nseeing Timothy was not a subject, but a disciple of St. Paul; nor the\nflock under the charge of Timothy, his subjects in the kingdom, but his\nscholars in the school of Christ. If all the precepts he giveth Timothy\nbe laws, why is not this also a law, (_1 Tim._ v. 23) _Drink no longer\nwater, but use a little wine for thy health\u2019s sake_. And why are not\nalso the precepts of good physicians so many laws, but that it is not\nthe imperative manner of speaking, but an absolute subjection to a\nperson, that maketh his precepts laws?\n\nIn like manner, the ninth place, _1 Tim._ v. 19, _Against an elder\nreceive not an accusation, but before two or three witnesses_, is a wise\nprecept, but not a law.\n\nThe tenth place is _Luke_ x. 16, _He that heareth you, heareth me; and\nhe that despiseth you, despiseth me_. And there is no doubt, but he that\ndespiseth the counsel of those that are sent by Christ, despiseth the\ncounsel of Christ himself. But who are those now that are sent by\nChrist, but such as are ordained pastors by lawful authority? And who\nare lawfully ordained, that are not ordained by the sovereign pastor?\nAnd who is ordained by the sovereign pastor in a Christian commonwealth,\nthat is not ordained by the authority of the sovereign thereof? Out of\nthis place therefore it followeth, that he which heareth his sovereign,\nbeing a Christian, heareth Christ; and he that despiseth the doctrine\nwhich his king, being a Christian, authorizeth, despiseth the doctrine\nof Christ: which is not that which Bellarmine intendeth here to prove,\nbut the contrary. But all this is nothing to a law. Nay more, a\nChristian king, as a pastor and teacher of his subjects, makes not\nthereby his doctrines laws. He cannot oblige men to believe; though as a\ncivil sovereign he may make laws suitable to his doctrine, which may\noblige men to certain actions, and sometimes to such as they would not\notherwise do, and which he ought not to command; and yet when they are\ncommanded, they are laws; and the external actions done in obedience to\nthem, without the inward approbation, are the actions of the sovereign,\nand not of the subject, which is in that case but as an instrument,\nwithout any motion of his own at all; because God hath commanded to obey\nthem.\n\nThe eleventh is every place where the apostle for counsel putteth some\nword, by which men use to signify command; or calleth the following of\nhis counsel by the name of obedience. And therefore they are alleged out\nof _1 Cor._ xi. 2, _I commend you for keeping my precepts as I delivered\nthem to you_. The Greek is, _I commend you for keeping those things I\ndelivered to you, as I delivered them_. Which is far from signifying\nthat they were laws, or anything else, but good counsel. And that of _1\nThess._ iv. 2, _You know what commandments we gave you_: where the Greek\nword is \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03b4\u03ce\u03ba\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd, equivalent to \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03b4\u03ce\u03ba\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd, _what we\ndelivered to you_, as in the place next before alleged, which does not\nprove the traditions of the apostles to be any more than counsels;\nthough as is said in the 8th verse, _he that despiseth them, despiseth\nnot man, but God_. For our Saviour himself came not to judge, that is,\nto be king in this world; but to sacrifice himself for sinners, and\nleave doctors in his Church to lead, not to drive men to Christ, who\nnever accepteth forced actions, (which is all the law produceth,) but\nthe inward conversion of the heart; which is not the work of laws, but\nof counsel and doctrine.\n\nAnd that of _2 Thess._ iii. 14, _If any man obey not our word by this\nEpistle, note that man, and have no company with him, that he may be\nashamed_: where from the word _obey_, he would infer, that this epistle\nwas a law to the Thessalonians. The epistles of the emperors were indeed\nlaws. If therefore the epistle of St. Paul were also a law, they were to\nobey two masters. But the word _obey_, as it is in the Greek \u1f51\u03c0\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9,\nsignifieth _hearkening to_ or _putting in practice_, not only that which\nis commanded by him that has right to punish, but also that which is\ndelivered in a way of counsel for our good; and therefore St. Paul does\nnot bid kill him that disobeys; nor beat, nor imprison, nor amerce him,\nwhich legislators may all do; but avoid his company, that he may be\nashamed: whereby it is evident, it was not the empire of an apostle, but\nhis reputation amongst the faithful, which the Christians stood in awe\nof.\n\nThe last place is that of _Heb._ xiii. 17, _Obey your leaders, and\nsubmit yourselves to them; for they watch for your souls, as they that\nmust give account_: and here also is intended by obedience, a following\nof their counsel. For the reason of our obedience is not drawn from the\nwill and command of our pastors, but from our own benefit, as being the\nsalvation of our souls they watch for, and not for the exaltation of\ntheir own power and authority. If it were meant here, that all they\nteach were laws, then not only the Pope, but every pastor in his parish\nshould have legislative power. Again, they that are bound to obey their\npastors, have no power to examine their commands. What then shall we say\nto St. John, who bids us (_1 Epistle_ iv. 1) _Not to believe every\nspirit, but to try the spirits whether they are of God; because many\nfalse prophets are gone out into the world_? It is therefore manifest,\nthat we may dispute the doctrine of our pastors; but no man can dispute\na law. The commands of civil sovereigns are on all sides granted to be\nlaws: if any else can make a law besides himself, all commonwealth, and\nconsequently all peace and justice must cease; which is contrary to all\nlaws both divine and human. Nothing therefore can be drawn from these,\nor any other places of Scripture, to prove the decrees of the Pope,\nwhere he has not also the civil sovereignty, to be laws.\n\n[Sidenote: The question of superiority between the Pope and other\n bishops.]\n\nThe last point he would prove, is this, _That our Saviour Christ has\ncommitted ecclesiastical jurisdiction immediately to none but the Pope_.\nWherein he handleth not the question of supremacy between the Pope and\nChristian kings, but between the Pope and other bishops. And first, he\nsays, it is agreed that the jurisdiction of bishops is at least in the\ngeneral _de jure divino_, that is, in the right of God; for which he\nalleges St. Paul, _Eph._ iv. 11, where he says, that Christ after his\nascension into heaven, _gave gifts to men, some apostles, some prophets,\nand some evangelists, and some pastors, and some teachers_; and thence\ninfers, they have indeed their jurisdiction in God\u2019s right; but will not\ngrant they have it immediately from God, but derived through the Pope.\nBut if a man may be said to have his jurisdiction _de jure divino_, and\nyet not immediately; what lawful jurisdiction, though but civil, is\nthere in a Christian commonwealth, that is not also _de juro divino_?\nFor Christian kings have their civil power from God immediately; and the\nmagistrates under him exercise their several charges in virtue of his\ncommission; wherein that which they do, is no less _de jure divino\nmediato_, than that which the bishops do in virtue of the Pope\u2019s\nordination. All lawful power is of God, immediately in the Supreme\nGovernor, and mediately in those that have authority under him: so that\neither he must grant every constable in the state, to hold his office in\nthe right of God; or he must not hold that any bishop holds his so,\nbesides the Pope himself.\n\nBut this whole dispute, whether Christ left the jurisdiction to the Pope\nonly, or to other bishops also, if considered out of those places where\nthe Pope has the civil sovereignty, is a contention _de lana caprina_:\nfor none of them, where they are not sovereigns, has any jurisdiction at\nall. For jurisdiction is the power of hearing and determining causes\nbetween man and man; and can belong to none but him that hath the power\nto prescribe the rules of right and wrong; that is, to make laws; and\nwith the sword of justice to compel men to obey his decisions,\npronounced either by himself, or by the judges he ordaineth thereunto;\nwhich none can lawfully do but the civil sovereign.\n\nTherefore when he allegeth out of chapter vi. of _Luke_, that our\nSaviour called his disciples together, and chose twelve of them, which\nhe named apostles, he proveth that he elected them (all, except\nMatthias, Paul and Barnabas,) and gave them power and command to preach,\nbut not to judge of causes between man and man: for that is a power\nwhich he refused to take upon himself, saying, _Who made me a judge, or\na divider, amongst you?_ and in another place, _My kingdom is not of\nthis world_. But he that hath not the power to hear and determine causes\nbetween man and man, cannot be said to have any jurisdiction at all. And\nyet this hinders not, but that our Saviour gave them power to preach and\nbaptize in all parts of the world, supposing they were not by their own\nlawful sovereign forbidden: for to our own sovereigns Christ himself,\nand his apostles, have in sundry places expressly commanded us in all\nthings to be obedient.\n\nThe arguments by which he would prove, that bishops receive their\njurisdiction from the Pope (seeing the Pope in the dominions of other\nprinces hath no jurisdiction himself,) are all in vain. Yet because they\nprove, on the contrary, that all bishops receive jurisdiction, when they\nhave it, from their civil sovereigns, I will not omit the recital of\nthem.\n\nThe first is from chapter xi. of _Numbers_, where Moses not being able\nalone to undergo the whole burthen of administering the affairs of the\npeople of Israel, God commanded him to choose seventy elders, and took\npart of the spirit of Moses, to put it upon those seventy elders: by\nwhich is understood, not that God weakened the spirit of Moses; for that\nhad not eased him at all; but that they had all of them their authority\nfrom him; wherein he doth truly and ingenuously interpret that place.\nBut seeing Moses had the entire sovereignty in the commonwealth of the\nJews, it is manifest, that it is thereby signified, that they had their\nauthority from the civil sovereign: and therefore that place proveth\nthat bishops in every Christian commonwealth have their authority from\nthe civil sovereign; and from the Pope in his own territories only, and\nnot in the territories of any other state.\n\nThe second argument, is from the nature of monarchy; wherein all\nauthority is in one man, and in others by derivation from him. But the\ngovernment of the Church, he says, is monarchical. This also makes for\nChristian monarchs. For they are really monarchs of their own people;\nthat is, of their own Church; for the Church is the same thing with a\nChristian people; whereas the power of the Pope, though he were St.\nPeter, is neither monarchy, nor hath anything of _archical_, nor\n_cratical_, but only of _didactical_; for God accepteth not a forced,\nbut a willing obedience.\n\nThe third, is from that the _see_ of St. Peter is called by St. Cyprian,\nthe _head_, the _source_, the _root_, the _sun_, from whence the\nauthority of bishops is derived. But by the law of nature, which is a\nbetter principle of right and wrong than the word of any doctor that is\nbut a man, the civil sovereign in every commonwealth, is the _head_, the\n_source_, the _root_, and the _sun_, from which all jurisdiction is\nderived. And therefore the jurisdiction of bishops, is derived from the\ncivil sovereign.\n\nThe fourth, is taken from the inequality of their jurisdictions. For if\nGod, saith he, had given it them immediately, he had given as well\nequality of jurisdiction, as of order: but we see, some are bishops but\nof one town, some of a hundred towns, and some of many whole provinces;\nwhich differences were not determined by the command of God; their\njurisdiction therefore is not of God, but of man; and one has a greater,\nanother a less, as it pleaseth the Prince of the Church. Which argument,\nif he had proved before, that the Pope had an universal jurisdiction\nover all Christians, had been for his purpose. But seeing that hath not\nbeen proved, and that it is notoriously known, the large jurisdiction of\nthe Pope was given him by those that had it, that is, by the emperors of\nRome, (for the patriarch of Constantinople, upon the same title, namely\nof being bishop of the capital city of the empire, and seat of the\nemperor, claimed to be equal to him), it followeth, that all other\nbishops have their jurisdiction from the sovereigns of the place wherein\nthey exercise the same. And as for that cause they have not their\nauthority _de jure divino_; so neither hath the Pope his _de jure\ndivino_, except only where he is also the civil sovereign.\n\nHis fifth argument is this: _if bishops have their jurisdiction\nimmediately from God, the Pope could not take it from them, for he can\ndo nothing contrary to God\u2019s ordination_; and this consequence is good,\nand well proved. _But_, saith he, _the Pope can do this, and has done\nit_. This also is granted, so he do it in his own dominions, or in the\ndominions of any other prince that hath given him that power; but not\nuniversally, in right of the popedom: for that power belongeth to every\nChristian sovereign, within the bounds of his own empire, and is\ninseparable from the sovereignty. Before the people of Israel had, by\nthe commandment of God to Samuel, set over themselves a king, after the\nmanner of other nations, the high-priest had the civil government; and\nnone but he could make or depose an inferior priest. But that power was\nafterwards in the king, as may be proved by this same argument of\nBellarmine; for if the priest, be he the high-priest or any other, had\nhis jurisdiction immediately from God, then the king could not take it\nfrom him; _for he could do nothing contrary to God\u2019s ordinance_. But it\nis certain that king Solomon (_1 Kings_ ii. 26, 27) deprived Abiathar\nthe high-priest of his office, and placed Zadok (verse 35) in his room.\nKings therefore may in like manner ordain and deprive bishops, as they\nshall think fit for the well-governing of their subjects.\n\nHis sixth argument is this, if bishops have their jurisdiction _de jure\ndivino_, that is, _immediately from God_, they that maintain it, should\nbring some word of God to prove it: but they can bring none. The\nargument is good; I have therefore nothing to say against it. But it is\nan argument no less good, to prove the Pope himself to have no\njurisdiction in the dominion of any other prince.\n\nLastly, he bringeth for argument the testimony of two popes, Innocent\nand Leo; and I doubt not he might have alleged, with as good reason, the\ntestimonies of all the popes almost since St. Peter. For considering the\nlove of power naturally implanted in mankind, whosoever were made Pope,\nhe would be tempted to uphold the same opinion. Nevertheless, they\nshould therein but do, as Innocent and Leo did, bear witness of\nthemselves, and therefore their witness should not be good.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the Pope\u2019s temporal power.]\n\nIn the fifth book he hath four conclusions. The first is, _that the Pope\nis not lord of all the world_: the second, _that the Pope is not the\nlord of all the Christian world_: the third, _that the Pope, without his\nown territory, has not any temporal jurisdiction_ DIRECTLY. These three\nconclusions are easily granted. The fourth is, _that the Pope has, in\nthe dominions of other princes, the supreme temporal power_ INDIRECTLY:\nwhich is denied; unless he mean by _indirectly_, that he has gotten it\nby indirect means, then is that also granted. But I understand, that\nwhen he saith he hath it _indirectly_, he means, that such temporal\njurisdiction belongeth to him of right, but that this right is but a\nconsequence of his pastoral authority, the which he could not exercise\nunless he have the other with it: and therefore to the pastoral power,\nwhich he calls spiritual, the supreme power civil is necessarily\nannexed; and that thereby he hath a right to change kingdoms, giving\nthem to one and taking them from another, when he shall think it\nconduces to the salvation of souls.\n\nBefore I come to consider the arguments by which he would prove this\ndoctrine, it will not be amiss to lay open the consequences of it; that\nprinces and states, that have the civil sovereignty in their several\ncommonwealths, may bethink themselves, whether it be convenient for\nthem, and conducing to the good of their subjects, of whom they are to\ngive an account at the day of judgment, to admit the same.\n\nWhen it is said, the Pope hath not, in the territories of other states,\nthe supreme civil power _directly_; we are to understand, he doth not\nchallenge it, as other civil sovereigns do, from the original submission\nthereto of those that are to be governed. For it is evident, and has\nalready been sufficiently in this treatise demonstrated, that the right\nof all sovereigns is derived originally from the consent of every one of\nthose that are to be governed; whether they that choose him, do it for\ntheir common defence against an enemy, as when they agree amongst\nthemselves to appoint a man or an assembly of men to protect them; or\nwhether they do it, to save their lives, by submission to a conquering\nenemy. The Pope therefore, when he disclaimeth the supreme civil power\nover other states _directly_, denieth no more, but that his right cometh\nto him by that way; he ceaseth not for all that, to claim it another\nway; and that is, without the consent of them that are to be governed,\nby a right given him by God, which he calleth _indirectly_, in his\nassumption to the papacy. But by what way soever he pretend, the power\nis the same; and he may, if it be granted to be his right, depose\nprinces and states, as often as it is for the salvation of souls, that\nis, as often as he will; for he claimeth also the sole power to judge\nwhether it be to the salvation of men\u2019s souls or not. And this is the\ndoctrine, not only that Bellarmine here, and many other doctors, teach\nin their sermons and books, but also that some councils have decreed,\nand the Popes have accordingly, when the occasion hath served them, put\nin practice. For the fourth council of Lateran, held under Pope Innocent\nthe Third, in the third chapter _De H\u00e6reticis_, hath this canon: _If a\nking, at the Pope\u2019s admonition, do not purge his kingdom of heretics,\nand being excommunicate for the same, make not satisfaction within a\nyear, his subjects are absolved of their obedience_. And the practice\nhereof hath been seen on divers occasions; as in the deposing of\nChilperic, king of France; in the translation of the Roman empire to\nCharlemagne; in the oppression of John, king of England; in transferring\nthe kingdom of Navarre; and of late years, in the league against Henry\nthe Third of France, and in many more occurrences. I think there be few\nprinces that consider not this as unjust, and inconvenient; but I wish\nthey would all resolve to be kings or subjects. Men cannot serve two\nmasters. They ought therefore to ease them, either by holding the reins\nof government wholly in their own hands; or by wholly delivering them\ninto the hands of the Pope; that such men as are willing to be obedient,\nmay be protected in their obedience. For this distinction of temporal\nand spiritual power is but words. Power is as really divided, and as\ndangerously to all purposes, by sharing with another _indirect_ power,\nas with a _direct_ one. But to come now to his arguments.\n\nThe first is this, _The civil power is subject to the spiritual:\ntherefore he that hath the supreme power spiritual, hath right to\ncommand temporal princes, and dispose of their temporals in order to the\nspiritual_. As for the distinction of temporal and spiritual, let us\nconsider in what sense it may be said intelligibly, that the temporal or\ncivil power is subject to the spiritual. There be but two ways that\nthose words can be made sense. For when we say, one power is subject to\nanother power, the meaning either is, that he which hath the one, is\nsubject to him that hath the other; or that the one power is to the\nother, as the means to the end. For we cannot understand, that one power\nhath power over another power; or that one power can have right or\ncommand over another. For subjection, command, right, and power, are\naccidents, not of powers, but of persons. One power may be subordinate\nto another, as the art of a saddler to the art of a rider. If then it be\ngranted, that the civil government be ordained as a means to bring us to\na spiritual felicity; yet it does not follow, that if a king have the\ncivil power, and the Pope the spiritual, that therefore the king is\nbound to obey the Pope, more than every saddler is bound to obey every\nrider. Therefore as from subordination of an art, cannot be inferred the\nsubjection of the professor; so from the subordination of a government,\ncannot be inferred the subjection of the governor. When therefore he\nsaith, the civil power is subject to the spiritual, his meaning is, that\nthe civil sovereign is subject to the spiritual sovereign. And the\nargument stands thus, _The civil sovereign is subject to the spiritual;\ntherefore the spiritual prince may command temporal princes_. Where the\nconclusion is the same with the antecedent he should have proved. But to\nprove it, he allegeth first, this reason: _Kings and popes, clergy and\nlaity, make but one commonwealth; that is to say, but one Church: and in\nall bodies the members depend one upon another: but things spiritual\ndepend not of things temporal: therefore temporal depend on spiritual,\nand therefore are subject to them_. In which argumentation there be two\ngross errors: one is, that all Christian kings, popes, clergy, and all\nother Christian men, make but one commonwealth. For it is evident that\nFrance is one commonwealth, Spain another, and Venice a third, &c. And\nthese consist of Christians; and therefore also are several bodies of\nChristians; that is to say, several Churches: and their several\nsovereigns represent them, whereby they are capable of commanding and\nobeying, of doing and suffering, as a natural man; which no general or\nuniversal Church is, till it have a representant; which it hath not on\nearth: for if it had, there is no doubt but that all Christendom were\none commonwealth, whose sovereign were that representant, both in things\nspiritual and temporal. And the Pope, to make himself this representant,\nwanteth three things that our Saviour hath not given him, to _command_,\nand to _judge_, and to _punish_, otherwise than, by excommunication, to\nrun from those that will not learn of him. For though the Pope were\nChrist\u2019s only vicar, yet he cannot exercise his government, till our\nSaviour\u2019s second coming: and then also it is not the Pope, but St. Peter\nhimself with the other apostles, that are to be judges of the world.\n\nThe other error in this his first argument is, that he says, the members\nof every commonwealth, as of a natural body, depend one of another. It\nis true, they cohere together; but they depend only on the sovereign,\nwhich is the soul of the commonwealth; which failing, the commonwealth\nis dissolved into a civil war, no one man so much as cohering to\nanother, for want of a common dependance on a known sovereign; just as\nthe members of the natural body dissolve into earth, for want of a soul\nto hold them together. Therefore there is nothing in this similitude,\nfrom whence to infer a dependance of the laity on the clergy, or of the\ntemporal officers on the spiritual; but of both on the civil sovereign;\nwhich ought indeed to direct his civil commands to the salvation of\nsouls; but is not therefore subject to any but God himself. And thus you\nsee the laboured fallacy of the first argument, to deceive such men as\ndistinguish not between the subordination of actions in the way to the\nend; and the subjection of persons one to another in the administration\nof the means. For to every end, the means are determined by nature, or\nby God himself supernaturally: but the power to make men use the means,\nis in every nation resigned, by the law of nature, which forbiddeth men\nto violate their faith given, to the civil sovereign.\n\nHis second argument is this; _Every commonwealth, because it is supposed\nto be perfect and sufficient in itself, may command any other\ncommonwealth not subject to it, and force it to change the\nadministration of the government; nay, depose the prince, and set\nanother in his room, if it cannot otherwise defend itself against the\ninjuries he goes about to do them: much more may a spiritual\ncommonwealth command a temporal one to change the administration of\ntheir government, and may depose princes, and institute others, when\nthey cannot otherwise defend the spiritual good_.\n\nThat a commonwealth, to defend itself against injuries, may lawfully do\nall that he hath here said, is very true; and hath already in that which\nhath gone before been sufficiently demonstrated. And if it were also\ntrue, that there is now in this world a spiritual commonwealth, distinct\nfrom a civil commonwealth, then might the prince thereof, upon injury\ndone him, or upon want of caution that injury be not done him in time to\ncome, repair and secure himself by war; which is, in sum, deposing,\nkilling, or subduing, or doing any act of hostility. But by the same\nreason, it would be no less lawful for a civil sovereign, upon the like\ninjuries done, or feared, to make war upon the spiritual sovereign;\nwhich I believe is more than Cardinal Bellarmine would have inferred\nfrom his own proposition.\n\nBut spiritual commonwealth there is none in this world: for it is the\nsame thing with the kingdom of Christ, which he himself saith, is not of\nthis world; but shall be in the next world at the resurrection, when\nthey that have lived justly, and believed that he was the Christ, shall,\nthough they died _natural_ bodies, rise _spiritual_ bodies; and then it\nis, that our Saviour shall judge the world, and conquer his adversaries,\nand make a spiritual commonwealth. In the meantime, seeing there are no\nmen on earth whose bodies are spiritual, there can be no spiritual\ncommonwealth amongst men that are yet in the flesh; unless we call\npreachers, that have commission to teach, and prepare men for their\nreception into the kingdom of Christ at the resurrection, a\ncommonwealth; which I have proved already to be none.\n\nThe third argument is this; _It is not lawful for Christians to tolerate\nan infidel, or heretical king, in case he endeavour to draw them to his\nheresy or infidelity. But to judge whether a king draw his subjects to\nheresy or not, belongeth to the Pope. Therefore hath the Pope right to\ndetermine whether the prince be to be deposed, or not deposed._\n\nTo this I answer, that both these assertions are false. For Christians,\nor men of what religion soever, if they tolerate not their king,\nwhatsoever law he maketh, though it be concerning religion, do violate\ntheir faith, contrary to the divine law, both _natural_ and _positive_:\nnor is there any judge of heresy amongst subjects, but their own civil\nsovereign. For _heresy is nothing else but a private opinion obstinately\nmaintained, contrary to the opinion which the public person, that is to\nsay, the representant of the commonwealth, hath commanded to be taught_.\nBy which it is manifest, that an opinion publicly appointed to be\ntaught, cannot be heresy; nor the sovereign princes that authorize them,\nheretics. For heretics are none but private men, that stubbornly defend\nsome doctrine, prohibited by their lawful sovereigns.\n\nBut to prove that Christians are not to tolerate infidel or heretical\nkings, he allegeth a place in _Deut._ xvii. 15, where God forbiddeth the\nJews, when they shall set a king over themselves, to choose a stranger:\nand from thence inferreth, that it is unlawful for a Christian to choose\na king that is not a Christian. And it is true, that he that is a\nChristian, that is, he that hath already obliged himself to receive our\nSaviour, when he shall come, for his king, shall tempt God too much in\nchoosing for king in this world, one that he knoweth will endeavour,\nboth by terror and persuasion, to make him violate his faith. But it is,\nsaith he, the same danger, to choose one that is not a Christian, for\nking, and not to depose him when he is chosen. To this I say, the\nquestion is not of the danger of not deposing; but of the justice of\ndeposing him. To choose him, may in some cases be unjust; but to depose\nhim when he is chosen, is in no case just. For it is always violation of\nfaith, and consequently against the law of nature, which is the eternal\nlaw of God. Nor do we read that any such doctrine was accounted\nChristian in the time of the apostles; nor in the time of the Roman\nemperors, till the Popes had the civil sovereignty of Rome. But to this\nhe hath replied, that the Christians of old deposed not Nero, nor\nDioclesian, nor Julian, nor Valens an Arian, for this cause only, that\nthey wanted temporal forces. Perhaps so. But did our Saviour, who for\ncalling for, might have had twelve legions of immortal, invulnerable\nangels to assist him, want forces to depose C\u00e6sar, or at least Pilate,\nthat unjustly, without finding fault in him, delivered him to the Jews\nto be crucified? Or if the apostles wanted temporal forces to depose\nNero, was it therefore necessary for them, in their epistles to the new\nmade Christians, to teach them, as they did, to obey the powers\nconstituted over them, whereof Nero in that time was one, and that they\nought to obey them, not for fear of their wrath, but for conscience\nsake? Shall we say they did not only obey, but also teach what they\nmeant not, for want of strength? It is not therefore for want of\nstrength, but for conscience sake, that Christians are to tolerate their\nheathen princes, or princes (for I cannot call any one whose doctrine is\nthe public doctrine, an heretic) that authorize the teaching of an\nerror. And whereas for the temporal power of the Pope, he allegeth\nfurther, that St. Paul (_1 Cor._ vi.) appointed judges under the heathen\nprinces of those times, such as were not ordained by those princes; it\nis not true. For St. Paul does but advise them, to take some of their\nbrethren to compound their differences as arbitrators, rather than to go\nto law one with another before the heathen judges; which is a wholesome\nprecept, and full of charity, fit to be practised also in the best\nChristian commonwealths. And for the danger that may arise to religion,\nby the subjects tolerating of a heathen, or an erring prince, it is a\npoint of which a subject is no competent judge; or if he be, the Pope\u2019s\ntemporal subjects may judge also of the Pope\u2019s doctrine. For every\nChristian prince, as I have formerly proved, is no less supreme pastor\nof his own subjects, than the Pope of his.\n\nThe fourth argument, is taken from the baptism of kings; wherein, that\nthey may be made Christians, they submit their sceptres to Christ; and\npromise to keep and defend the Christian faith. This is true; for\nChristian kings are no more but Christ\u2019s subjects: but they may, for all\nthat, be the Pope\u2019s fellows; for they are supreme pastors of their own\nsubjects; and the Pope is no more but king and pastor, even in Rome\nitself.\n\nThe fifth argument, is drawn from the words spoken by our Saviour, _Feed\nmy sheep_; by which was given all power necessary for a pastor; as the\npower to chase away wolves, such as are heretics; the power to shut up\nrams, if they be mad, or push at the other sheep with their horns, such\nas are evil, though Christian, kings; and power to give the flock\nconvenient food. From whence he inferreth, that St. Peter had these\nthree powers given him by Christ. To which I answer, that the last of\nthese powers is no more than the power, or rather command, to teach. For\nthe first, which is to chase away wolves, that is, heretics, the place\nhe quoteth is (_Matth._ vii. 15) _Beware of false prophets, which come\nto you in sheep\u2019s clothing, but inwardly are ravening wolves_. But\nneither are heretics false prophets, or at all prophets: nor, admitting\nheretics for the wolves there meant, were the apostles commanded to kill\nthem, or if they were kings, to depose them; but to beware of, fly, and\navoid them: nor was it to St. Peter, nor to any of the apostles, but to\nthe multitude of the Jews that followed him into the mountain, men for\nthe most part not yet converted, that he gave this counsel, to beware of\nfalse prophets: which therefore, if it confer a power of chasing away\nkings, was given, not only to private men, but to men that were not at\nall Christians. And as to the power of separating, and shutting up of\nfurious rams, by which he meaneth Christian kings that refuse to submit\nthemselves to the Roman pastor, our Saviour refused to take upon him\nthat power in this world himself, but advised to let the corn and tares\ngrow up together till the day of judgment: much less did he give it to\nSt. Peter, or can St. Peter give it to the Popes. St. Peter, and all\nother pastors, are bidden to esteem those Christians that disobey the\nChurch, that is, that disobey the Christian sovereign, as heathen men,\nand as publicans. Seeing then, men challenge to the Pope no authority\nover heathen princes, they ought to challenge none over those that are\nto be esteemed as heathen.\n\nBut from the power to teach only, he inferreth also a coercive power in\nthe Pope over kings. The pastor, saith he, must give his flock\nconvenient food: therefore the Pope may, and ought to compel kings to do\ntheir duty. Out of which it followeth, that the Pope, as pastor of\nChristian men, is king of kings: which all Christian kings ought indeed\neither to confess, or else they ought to take upon themselves the\nsupreme pastoral charge, every one in his own dominion.\n\nHis sixth and last argument, is from examples. To which I answer, first,\nthat examples prove nothing: secondly, that the examples he allegeth\nmake not so much as a probability of right. The fact of Jehoiada, in\nkilling Athaliah, (_2 Kings_ xi.) was either by the authority of king\nJoash, or it was a horrible crime in the high-priest, which ever after\nthe election of king Saul was a mere subject. The fact of St. Ambrose,\nin excommunicating Theodosius the emperor, if it were true he did so,\nwas a capital crime. And for the Popes, Gregory I, Gregory II, Zachary,\nand Leo III, their judgments are void, as given in their own cause; and\nthe acts done by them conformably to this doctrine, are the greatest\ncrimes, especially that of Zachary, that are incident to human nature.\nAnd thus much of Power Ecclesiastical; wherein I had been more brief,\nforbearing to examine these arguments of Bellarmine, if they had been\nhis as a private man, and not as the champion of the Papacy against all\nother Christian Princes and States.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XLIII.\n\n OF WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR A MAN\u2019S RECEPTION\n INTO THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The difficulty of obeying God and man both at once;]\n\nThe most frequent pretext of sedition, and civil war, in Christian\ncommonwealths, hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet\nsufficiently resolved, of obeying at once both God and man, then when\ntheir commandments are one contrary to the other. It is manifest enough,\nthat when a man receiveth two contrary commands, and knows that one of\nthem is God\u2019s, he ought to obey that, and not the other, though it be\nthe command even of his lawful sovereign (whether a monarch, or a\nsovereign assembly), or the command of his father. The difficulty\ntherefore consisteth in this, that men, when they are commanded in the\nname of God, know not in divers cases, whether the command be from God,\nor whether he that commandeth do but abuse God\u2019s name for some private\nends of his own. For as there were in the Church of the Jews, many false\nprophets, that sought reputation with the people, by feigned dreams and\nvisions; so there have been in all times in the Church of Christ, false\nteachers, that seek reputation with the people, by fantastical and false\ndoctrines; and by such reputation, (as is the nature of ambition), to\ngovern them for their private benefit.\n\n[Sidenote: Is none to them that distinguish between what is, and what is\n not necessary to salvation.]\n\nBut this difficulty of obeying both God and the civil sovereign on\nearth, to those that can distinguish between what is _necessary_, and\nwhat is not _necessary for their reception into the kingdom of God_, is\nof no moment. For if the command of the civil sovereign be such, as that\nit may be obeyed without the forfeiture of life eternal; not to obey it\nis unjust; and the precept of the apostle takes place: _Servants obey\nyour masters in all things_; and _Children obey your parents in all\nthings_; and the precept of our Saviour, _The Scribes and Pharisees sit\nin Moses\u2019 chair; all therefore they shall say, that observe and do_. But\nif the command be such as cannot be obeyed, without being damned to\neternal death; then it were madness to obey it, and the council of our\nSaviour takes place, (_Matth._ x. 28), _Fear not those that kill the\nbody, but cannot kill the soul_. All men therefore that would avoid,\nboth the punishments that are to be in this world inflicted, for\ndisobedience to their earthly sovereign, and those that shall be\ninflicted in the world to come, for disobedience to God, have need be\ntaught to distinguish well between what is, and what is not necessary to\neternal salvation.\n\n[Sidenote: All that is necessary to salvation is contained in faith and\n obedience.]\n\nAll that is NECESSARY _to salvation_, is contained in two virtues,\n_faith in Christ_, and _obedience to laws_. The latter of these, if it\nwere perfect, were enough to us. But because we are all guilty of\ndisobedience to God\u2019s law, not only originally in Adam, but also\nactually by our own transgressions, there is required at our hands now,\nnot only _obedience_ for the rest of our time, but also a _remission of\nsins_ for the time past; which remission is the reward of our faith in\nChrist. That nothing else is necessarily required to salvation, is\nmanifest from this, that the kingdom of heaven is shut to none but to\nsinners; that is to say, to the disobedient, or transgressors of the\nlaw; nor to them, in case they repent, and believe all the articles of\nChristian faith necessary to salvation.\n\n[Sidenote: What obedience is necessary;]\n\nThe obedience required at our hands by God, that accepteth in all our\nactions the will for the deed, is a serious endeavour to obey him; and\nis called also by all such names as signify that endeavour. And\ntherefore obedience is sometimes called by the names of _charity_ and\n_love_, because they imply a will to obey; and our Saviour himself\nmaketh our love to God, and to one another, a fulfilling of the whole\nlaw: and sometimes by the name of _righteousness_; for righteousness is\nbut the will to give to every one his own; that is to say, the will to\nobey the laws: and sometimes by the name of _repentance_; because to\nrepent, implieth a turning away from sin, which is the same with the\nreturn of the will to obedience. Whosoever therefore unfeignedly\ndesireth to fulfil the commandments of God, or repenteth him truly of\nhis transgressions, or that loveth God with all his heart, and his\nneighbour as himself, hath all the obedience necessary to his reception\ninto the kingdom of God. For if God should require perfect innocence,\nthere could no flesh be saved.\n\n[Sidenote: And to what laws.]\n\nBut what commandments are those that God hath given us? Are all those\nlaws which were given to the Jews by the hand of Moses, the commandments\nof God? If they be, why are not Christians taught to obey them? If they\nbe not, what others are so, besides the law of nature? For our Saviour\nChrist hath not given us new laws, but counsel to observe those we are\nsubject to; that is to say, the laws of nature, and the laws of our\nseveral sovereigns: nor did he make any new law to the Jews in his\nsermon on the Mount, but only expounded the law of Moses, to which they\nwere subject before. The laws of God therefore are none but the laws of\nnature, whereof the principal is, that we should not violate our faith,\nthat is, a commandment to obey our civil sovereigns, which we\nconstituted over us by mutual pact one with another. And this law of\nGod, that commandeth obedience to the law civil, commandeth by\nconsequence obedience to all the precepts of the Bible; which, as I have\nproved in the precedent chapter, is there only law, where the civil\nsovereign hath made it so; and in other places, but counsel; which a man\nat his own peril may without injustice refuse to obey.\n\n[Sidenote: In the faith of a Christian, who is the person believed.]\n\nKnowing now what is the obedience necessary to salvation, and to whom it\nis due; we are to consider next concerning faith, whom, and why we\nbelieve; and what are the articles, or points necessary to be believed\nby them that shall be saved. And first, for the person whom we believe,\nbecause it is impossible to believe any person, before we know what he\nsaith, it is necessary he be one that we have heard speak. The person,\ntherefore, whom Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and the prophets,\nbelieved, was God himself, that spake unto them supernaturally: and the\nperson, whom the apostles and disciples that conversed with Christ\nbelieved, was our Saviour himself. But of them, to whom neither God the\nfather, nor our Saviour, ever spake, it cannot be said that the person\nwhom they believed, was God. They believed the apostles, and after them\nthe pastors and doctors of the Church, that recommended to their faith\nthe history of the Old and New Testament: so that the faith of\nChristians ever since our Saviour\u2019s time, hath had for foundation,\nfirst, the reputation of their pastors, and afterward, the authority of\nthose that made the Old and New Testament to be received for the rule of\nfaith; which none could do but Christian sovereigns; who are therefore\nthe supreme pastors, and the only persons whom Christians now hear speak\nfrom God; except such as God speaketh to in these days supernaturally.\nBut because there be many false prophets _gone out into the world_,\nother men are to examine such spirits, as St. John adviseth us, (1st\nEpistle iv. 1) _whether they be of God, or not_. And therefore, seeing\nthe examination of doctrines belongeth to the supreme pastor, the\nperson, which all they that have no special revelation are to believe,\nis, in every commonwealth, the supreme pastor, that is to say, the civil\nsovereign.\n\n[Sidenote: The causes of Christian faith.]\n\nThe causes why men believe any Christian doctrine, are various. For\nfaith is the gift of God; and he worketh it in each several man, by such\nways as it seemeth good unto himself. The most ordinary immediate cause\nof our belief, concerning any point of Christian faith, is, that we\nbelieve the Bible to be the word of God. But why we believe the Bible to\nbe the word of God, is much disputed, as all questions must needs be,\nthat are not well stated. For they make not the question to be, _why we\nbelieve it_, but, _how we know it_; as if _believing_ and _knowing_ were\nall one. And thence while one side ground their knowledge upon the\ninfallibility of the Church, and the other side, on the testimony of the\nprivate spirit, neither side concludeth what it pretends. For how shall\na man know the infallibility of the Church, but by knowing first the\ninfallibility of the Scripture? Or how shall a man know his own private\nspirit to be other than a belief, grounded upon the authority and\narguments of his teachers, or upon a presumption of his own gifts?\nBesides, there is nothing in the Scripture, from which can be inferred\nthe infallibility of the Church; much less, of any particular Church;\nand least of all, the infallibility of any particular man.\n\n[Sidenote: Faith comes by hearing.]\n\nIt is manifest therefore, that Christian men do not know, but only\nbelieve the Scripture to be the word of God; and that the means of\nmaking them believe, which God is pleased to afford men ordinarily, is\naccording to the way of nature, that is to say, from their teachers. It\nis the doctrine of St. Paul concerning Christian faith in general\n(_Rom._ x. 17), _Faith cometh by hearing_, that is, by hearing our\nlawful pastors. He saith also, (verses 14, 15, of the same chapter),\n_How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how\nshall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach, except\nthey be sent?_ Whereby it is evident, that the ordinary cause of\nbelieving that the Scriptures are the word of God, is the same with the\ncause of the believing of all other articles of our faith, namely, the\nhearing of those that are by the law allowed and appointed to teach us,\nas our parents in their houses, and our pastors in the churches. Which\nalso is made more manifest by experience. For what other cause can there\nbe assigned, why in Christian commonwealths all men either believe, or\nat least profess the Scripture to be the word of God, and in other\ncommonwealths scarce any; but that in Christian commonwealths they are\ntaught it from their infancy; and in other places they are taught\notherwise?\n\nBut if teaching be the cause of faith, why do not all believe? It is\ncertain therefore that faith is the gift of God, and he giveth it to\nwhom he will. Nevertheless, because to them to whom he giveth it, he\ngiveth it by the means of teachers, the immediate cause of faith is\nhearing. In a school, where many are taught, and some profit, others\nprofit not, the cause of learning in them that profit, is the master;\nyet it cannot be thence inferred, that learning is not the gift of God.\nAll good things proceed from God; yet cannot all that have them, say\nthey are inspired; for that implies a gift supernatural, and the\nimmediate hand of God; which he that pretends to, pretends to be a\nprophet, and is subject to the examination of the Church.\n\nBut whether men _know_, or _believe_, or _grant_ the Scriptures to be\nthe word of God; if out of such places of them, as are without\nobscurity, I shall show what articles of faith are necessary, and only\nnecessary for salvation, those men must needs _know_, _believe_, or\n_grant_ the same.\n\n[Sidenote: The only necessary article of Christian faith;]\n\nThe _unum necessarium_, only article of faith, which the Scripture\nmaketh simply necessary to salvation, is this, that JESUS IS THE CHRIST.\nBy the name of _Christ_ is understood the king, which God had before\npromised by the prophets of the Old Testament, to send into the world,\nto reign (over the Jews, and over such of other nations as should\nbelieve in him), under himself eternally; and to give them that eternal\nlife, which was lost by the sin of Adam. Which when I have proved out of\nScripture, I will further show when, and in what sense, some other\narticles may be also called _necessary_.\n\n[Sidenote: Proved from the scope of the Evangelists:]\n\nFor proof that the belief of this article, _Jesus is the Christ_, is all\nthe faith required to salvation, my first argument shall be from the\nscope of the Evangelists; which was by the description of the life of\nour Saviour, to establish that one article, _Jesus is the Christ_. The\nsum of St. Matthew\u2019s Gospel is this, that Jesus was of the stock of\nDavid, born of a Virgin; which are the marks of the true Christ: that\nthe Magi came to worship him as King of the Jews: that Herod for the\nsame cause sought to kill him: that John the Baptist proclaimed him:\nthat he preached by himself and his apostles that he was that king: that\nhe taught the law, not as a scribe, but as a man of authority: that he\ncured diseases by his word only, and did many other miracles, which were\nforetold the Christ should do: that he was saluted king when he entered\ninto Jerusalem: that he forewarned them to beware of all others that\nshould pretend to be Christ: that he was taken, accused, and put to\ndeath, for saying he was king: that the cause of his condemnation\nwritten on the cross was, JESUS OF NAZARETH, THE KING OF THE JEWS. All\nwhich tend to no other end than this, that men should believe that\n_Jesus is the Christ_. Such therefore was the scope of St. Matthew\u2019s\nGospel. But the scope of all the evangelists, as may appear by reading\nthem, was the same. Therefore the scope of the whole Gospel was the\nestablishing of that only article. And St. John expressly makes it his\nconclusion, (_John_ xx. 31), _These things are written, that you may\nknow that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God_.\n\n[Sidenote: From the sermons of the apostles:]\n\nMy second argument is taken from the subjects of the sermons of the\napostles, both whilst our Saviour lived on earth, and after his\nascension. The apostles, in our Saviour\u2019s time, were sent, (_Luke_ ix.\n2) _to preach the kingdom of God_. For neither there, nor, _Matth._ x.\n7, giveth he any commission to them other than this, _As ye go, preach,\nsaying, the kingdom of heaven is at hand_; that is, that Jesus is the\n_Messiah_, the _Christ_, the _King_ which was to come. That their\npreaching also after his ascension was the same, is manifest out of\n_Acts_ xvii. 6, 7, _They drew_, saith St. Luke, _Jason and certain\nbrethren unto the rulers of the city, crying, these that have turned the\nworld upside down are come hither also, whom Jason hath received: and\nthese all do contrary to the decrees of C\u00e6sar, saying, that there is\nanother king, one Jesus_. And out of the 2nd and 3rd verses of the same\nchapter, where it is said, that St. Paul, _as his manner was, went in\nunto them; and three sabbath days reasoned with them out of the\nScriptures; opening and alleging, that Christ must needs have suffered,\nand risen again from the dead, and that this Jesus, whom he preached, is\nChrist_.\n\n[Sidenote: From the easiness of the doctrine:]\n\nThe third argument is from those places of Scripture, by which all the\nfaith required to salvation is declared to be easy. For if an inward\nassent of the mind to all the doctrines concerning Christian faith now\ntaught, whereof the greatest part are disputed, were necessary to\nsalvation, there would be nothing in the world so hard as to be a\nChristian. The thief upon the cross, though repenting, could not have\nbeen saved for saying, _Lord remember me when thou comest into thy\nkingdom_; by which he testified no belief of any other article, but\nthis, that _Jesus was the king_. Nor could it be said (as it is,\n_Matth._ xi. 30), that _Christ\u2019s yoke is easy, and his burthen light_:\nnor that _little children believe in him_, as it is _Matth._ xviii. 6.\nNor could St. Paul have said, (_1 Cor._ i. 21), _It pleased God by the\nfoolishness of preaching, to save them that believe_. Nor could St. Paul\nhimself have been saved, much less have been so great a doctor of the\nChurch so suddenly, that never perhaps thought of transubstantiation nor\npurgatory, nor many other articles now obtruded.\n\n[Sidenote: From formal and clear texts.]\n\nThe fourth argument is taken from places express, and such as receive no\ncontroversy of interpretation; as first, _John_ v. 39; _Search the\nScriptures; for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they\nthat testify of me_. Our Saviour here speaketh of the Scriptures only of\nthe Old Testament; for the Jews at that time could not search the\nScriptures of the New Testament, which were not written. But the Old\nTestament hath nothing of Christ, but the marks by which men might know\nhim when he came; as that he should descend from David; be born at\nBethlehem, and of a Virgin; do great miracles, and the like. Therefore\nto believe that this Jesus was He, was sufficient to eternal life: but\nmore than sufficient is not necessary; and consequently no other article\nis required. Again, (_John_ xi. 26) _Whosoever liveth and believeth in\nme, shall not die eternally_. Therefore to believe in Christ, is faith\nsufficient to eternal life; and consequently no more faith than that is\nnecessary. But to believe in Jesus, and to believe that Jesus is the\nChrist, is all one, as appeareth in the verses immediately following.\nFor when our Saviour (verse 26) had said to Martha, _Believest thou\nthis?_ she answereth (verse 27), _Yea, Lord, I believe that thou art the\nChrist, the Son of God, which should come into the world_. Therefore\nthis article alone is faith sufficient to life eternal; and more than\nsufficient is not necessary. Thirdly, _John_ xx. 31: _These things are\nwritten that ye might believe, that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God,\nand that believing ye might have life through his name_. There, to\nbelieve that _Jesus is the Christ_, is faith sufficient to the obtaining\nof life; and therefore no other article is necessary. Fourthly, _1 John_\niv. 2: _Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the\nflesh, is of God_. And _1 John_ v. 1: _Whosoever believeth that Jesus is\nthe Christ, is born of God_. And verse 5, _Who is he that overcometh the\nworld, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God?_ Fifthly,\n_Acts_ viii. 36, 37: _See_, saith the Eunuch, _here is water, what doth\nhinder me to be baptized? And Philip said, if thou believest with all\nthy heart, thou mayst. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus\nChrist is the Son of God._ Therefore this article believed, _Jesus is\nthe Christ_, is sufficient to baptism, that is to say, to our reception\ninto the kingdom of God, and by consequence, only necessary. And\ngenerally in all places where our Saviour saith to any man, _Thy faith\nhath saved thee_, the cause he saith it, is some confession, which\ndirectly, or by consequence, implieth a belief, that _Jesus is the\nChrist_.\n\n[Sidenote: From that it is the foundation of all other articles.]\n\nThe last argument is from the places, where this article is made the\nfoundation of faith: for he that holdeth the foundation, shall be saved.\nWhich places are first, _Matth._ xxiv. 23, 24: _If any man shall say\nunto you, Lo here is Christ, or there, believe it not; for there shall\narise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall shew great signs and\nwonders, &c._ Here we see this article, _Jesus is the Christ_, must be\nheld, though he that shall teach the contrary should do great miracles.\nThe second place is, _Gal._ i. 8: _Though we, or an angel from heaven,\npreach any other gospel unto you, than that we have preached unto you,\nlet him be accursed_. But the gospel which Paul, and the other apostles,\npreached, was only this article, that _Jesus is the Christ_: therefore\nfor the belief of this article, we are to reject the authority of an\nangel from heaven; much more of any mortal man, if he teach the\ncontrary. This is therefore the fundamental article of Christian faith.\nA third place is, _1 John_, iv. 1, 2: _Beloved, believe not every\nspirit: hereby ye shall know the Spirit of God; every spirit that\nconfesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God_. By which\nit is evident, that this article, is the measure and rule, by which to\nestimate and examine all other articles; and is therefore only\nfundamental. A fourth is _Matth._ xvi. 16, 18, where after St. Peter had\nprofessed this article, saying to our Saviour, _Thou art Christ the Son\nof the living God_, our Saviour answered, _Thou art Peter, and upon this\nrock I will build my Church_; from whence I infer, that this article is\nthat, on which all other doctrines of the Church are built, as on their\nfoundation. A fifth is _1 Cor._ iii. 11, 12, &c. _Other foundation can\nno man lay, than that which is laid, Jesus is the Christ. Now if any man\nbuild upon this foundation, gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay,\nstubble; every man\u2019s work shall be made manifest; for the day shall\ndeclare it, because it shall be revealed by fire, and the fire shall try\nevery man\u2019s work of what sort it is. If any man\u2019s work abide, which he\nhath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward. If any man\u2019s work shall\nbe burnt, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as\nby fire._ Which words, being partly plain and easy to understand, and\npartly allegorical and difficult; out of that which is plain, maybe\ninferred, that pastors that teach this foundation, that _Jesus is the\nChrist_, though they draw from it false consequences, which all men are\nsometimes subject to, they may nevertheless be saved; much more that\nthey may be saved, who being no pastors, but hearers, believe that which\nis by their lawful pastors taught them. Therefore the belief of this\narticle is sufficient; and by consequence, there is no other article of\nfaith necessarily required to salvation.\n\nNow for the part which is allegorical, as _that the fire shall try every\nman\u2019s work_, and that _they shall be saved, but so as by fire_, or\n_through fire_, (for the original is \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2,) it maketh nothing\nagainst this conclusion which I have drawn from the other words, that\nare plain. Nevertheless, because upon this place there hath been an\nargument taken, to prove the fire of purgatory, I will also here offer\nyou my conjecture concerning the meaning of this trial of doctrines, and\nsaving of men as by fire. The apostle here seemeth to allude to the\nwords of the prophet _Zechariah_, (xiii. 8, 9), who speaking of the\nrestoration of the kingdom of God, saith thus; _Two parts therein shall\nbe cut off, and die, but the third shall be left therein; and I will\nbring the third part through the fire, and will refine them as silver is\nrefined, and will try them as gold is tried; they shall call on the name\nof the Lord, and I will hear them_. The day of judgment is the day of\nthe restoration of the kingdom of God; and at that day it is, that St.\nPeter tells us (_2 Pet._ iii. 7, 10, 12) shall be the conflagration of\nthe world, wherein the wicked shall perish; but the remnant which God\nwill save, shall pass through that fire unhurt, and be therein, (as\nsilver and gold are refined by the fire from their dross,) tried, and\nrefined from their idolatry, and be made to call upon the name of the\ntrue God. Alluding whereto, St. Paul here saith, that _the day_, that\nis, the day of judgment, the great day of our Saviour\u2019s coming to\nrestore the kingdom of God in Israel, shall try every man\u2019s doctrine, by\njudging which are gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble; and\nthen they that have built false consequences on the true foundation,\nshall see their doctrines condemned; nevertheless they themselves shall\nbe saved, and pass unhurt through this universal fire, and live\neternally, to call upon the name of the true and only God. In which\nsense there is nothing that accordeth not with the rest of Holy\nScripture, or any glimpse of the fire of purgatory.\n\n[Sidenote: In what sense other articles may be called necessary.]\n\nBut a man may here ask, whether it be not as necessary to salvation, to\nbelieve, that God is omnipotent; Creator of the world; that Jesus Christ\nis risen; and that all men else shall rise again from the dead at the\nlast day; as to believe that _Jesus is the Christ_. To which I answer,\nthey are; and so are many more articles: but they are such, as are\ncontained in this one, and may be deduced from it, with more or less\ndifficulty. For who is there that does not see, that they who believe\nJesus to be the Son of the God of Israel, and that the Israelites had\nfor God the Omnipotent Creator of all things, do therein also believe,\nthat God is the Omnipotent Creator of all things? Or how can a man\nbelieve, that Jesus is the king that shall reign eternally, unless he\nbelieve him also risen again from the dead? For a dead man cannot\nexercise the office of a king. In sum, he that holdeth this foundation,\n_Jesus is the Christ_, holdeth expressly all that he seeth rightly\ndeduced from it, and implicitly all that is consequent thereunto, though\nhe have not skill enough to discern the consequence. And therefore it\nholdeth still good, that the belief of this one article is sufficient\nfaith to obtain remission of sins to the _penitent_, and consequently to\nbring them into the kingdom of heaven.\n\n[Sidenote: That faith and obedience are both of them necessary to\n salvation.]\n\nNow that I have shown, that all the obedience required to salvation,\nconsisteth in the will to obey the law of God, that is to say, in\nrepentance; and all the faith required to the same, is comprehended in\nthe belief of this article, _Jesus is the Christ_; I will further allege\nthose places of the Gospel, that prove, that all that is necessary to\nsalvation is contained in both these joined together. The men to whom\nSt. Peter preached on the day of Pentecost, next after the ascension of\nour Saviour, asked him, and the rest of the apostles, saying, (_Acts_\nii. 37), _Men and brethren, what shall we do?_ To whom St. Peter\nanswered (in the next verse) _Repent, and be baptized every one of you,\nfor the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy\nGhost_. Therefore repentance, and baptism, that is, believing that\n_Jesus is the Christ_, is all that is necessary to salvation. Again, our\nSaviour being asked by a certain ruler (_Luke_ xviii. 18), _What shall I\ndo to inherit eternal life?_ answered, (verse 20) _Thou knowest the\ncommandments, do not commit adultery, do not kill, do not steal, do not\nbear false witness, honour thy father and thy mother_. Which when he\nsaid he had observed, our Saviour added, (verse 22) _Sell all thou hast,\ngive it to the poor, and come and follow me_: which was as much as to\nsay, rely on me that am the king. Therefore to fulfil the law, and to\nbelieve that Jesus is the king, is all that is required to bring a man\nto eternal life. Thirdly, St. Paul saith (_Rom._ i. 17), _The just shall\nlive by faith_; not every one, but the _just_; therefore _faith_ and\n_justice_ (that is, the _will to be just_, or _repentance_) are all that\nis necessary to life eternal. And (_Mark_ i. 15) our Saviour preached,\nsaying, _The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand,\nrepent and believe the evangile_, that is, the good news that the Christ\nwas come. Therefore, to repent, and to believe that Jesus is the Christ,\nis all that is required to salvation.\n\n[Sidenote: What each of them contributes thereunto]\n\nSeeing then it is necessary that faith and obedience, implied in the\nword repentance, do both concur to our salvation; the question by which\nof the two we are justified, is impertinently disputed. Nevertheless, it\nwill not be impertinent, to make manifest in what manner each of them\ncontributes thereunto; and in what sense it is said, that we are to be\njustified by the one, and by the other. And first, if by righteousness\nbe understood the justice of the works themselves, there is no man that\ncan be saved; for there is none that hath not transgressed the law of\nGod. And therefore when we are said to be justified by works, it is to\nbe understood of the will, which God doth always accept for the work\nitself, as well in good, as in evil men. And in this sense only it is,\nthat a man is called _just_, or _unjust_; and that his justice justifies\nhim, that is, gives him the title, in God\u2019s acceptation, of _just_; and\nrenders him capable of _living by his faith_, which before he was not.\nSo that justice justifies in that sense, in which to _justify_, is the\nsame as that to _denominate a man just_; and not in the signification of\ndischarging the law; whereby the punishment of his sins should be\nunjust.\n\nBut a man is then also said to be justified, when his plea, though in\nitself insufficient, is accepted; as when we plead our will, our\nendeavour to fulfil the law, and repent us of our failings, and God\naccepteth it for the performance itself. And because God accepteth not\nthe will for the deed, but only in the faithful; it is therefore faith\nthat makes good our plea; and in this sense it is, that faith only\njustifies. So that _faith_ and _obedience_ are both necessary to\nsalvation; yet in several senses each of them is said to justify.\n\n[Sidenote: Obedience to God and to the civil sovereign not inconsistent,\n whether Christian, or infidel.]\n\nHaving thus shown what is necessary to salvation; it is not hard to\nreconcile our obedience to God, with our obedience to the civil\nsovereign; who is either Christian, or infidel. If he be a Christian, he\nalloweth the belief of this article, that _Jesus is the Christ_; and of\nall the articles that are contained in, or are by evident consequence\ndeduced from it: which is all the faith necessary to salvation. And\nbecause he is a sovereign, he requireth obedience to all his own, that\nis, to all the civil laws; in which also are contained all the laws of\nnature, that is all the laws of God: for besides the laws of nature, and\nthe laws of the Church, which are part of the civil law, (for the Church\nthat can make laws is the commonwealth), there be no other laws divine.\nWhosoever therefore obeyeth his Christian sovereign, is not thereby\nhindered, neither from believing, nor from obeying God. But suppose that\na Christian king should from this foundation _Jesus is the Christ_, draw\nsome false consequences, that is to say, make some superstructions of\nhay or stubble, and command the teaching of the same; yet seeing St.\nPaul says he shall be saved; much more shall he be saved, that teacheth\nthem by his command; and much more yet, he that teaches not, but only\nbelieves his lawful teacher. And in case a subject be forbidden by the\ncivil sovereign to profess some of those his opinions, upon what just\nground can he disobey? Christian kings may err in deducing a\nconsequence, but who shall judge? Shall a private man judge, when the\nquestion is of his own obedience? Or shall any man judge but he that is\nappointed thereto by the Church, that is, by the civil sovereign that\nrepresenteth it? Or if the pope, or an apostle judge, may he not err in\ndeducing of a consequence? Did not one of the two, St. Peter or St.\nPaul, err in a superstructure, when St. Paul withstood St. Peter to his\nface? There can therefore be no contradiction between the laws of God,\nand the laws of a Christian commonwealth.\n\n[Sidenote: Or infidel.]\n\nAnd when the civil sovereign is an infidel, every one of his own\nsubjects that resisteth him, sinneth against the laws of God, (for such\nare the laws of nature), and rejecteth the counsel of the apostles, that\nadmonisheth all Christians to obey their princes, and all children and\nservants to obey their parents and masters in all things. And for their\n_faith_, it is internal, and invisible; they have the license that\nNaaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for it. But if they\ndo, they ought to expect their reward in heaven, and not complain of\ntheir lawful sovereign; much less make war upon him. For he that is not\nglad of any just occasion of martyrdom, has not the faith he professeth,\nbut pretends it only, to set some colour upon his own contumacy. But\nwhat infidel king is so unreasonable, as knowing he has a subject, that\nwaiteth for the second coming of Christ, after the present world shall\nbe burnt, and intendeth then to obey him, (which is the intent of\nbelieving that Jesus is the Christ,) and in the mean time thinketh\nhimself bound to obey the laws of that infidel king, (which all\nChristians are obliged in conscience to do), to put to death or to\npersecute such a subject?\n\n[Sidenote: Conclusion.]\n\nAnd thus much shall suffice, concerning the kingdom of God, and policy\necclesiastical. Wherein I pretend not to advance any position of my own,\nbut only to show what are the consequences that seem to me deducible\nfrom the principles of Christian politics, (which are the holy\nScriptures,) in confirmation of the power of civil sovereigns, and the\nduty of their subjects. And in the allegation of Scripture, I have\nendeavoured to avoid such texts as are of obscure or controverted\ninterpretation; and to allege none, but in such sense as is most plain,\nand agreeable to the harmony and scope of the whole Bible; which was\nwritten for the re-establishment of the kingdom of God in Christ. For it\nis not the bare words, but the scope of the writer, that giveth the true\nlight, by which any writing is to be interpreted; and they that insist\nupon single texts, without considering the main design, can derive\nnothing from them clearly; but rather by casting atoms of Scripture, as\ndust before men\u2019s eyes, make every thing more obscure than it is; an\nordinary artifice of those that seek not the truth, but their own\nadvantage.\n\n\n\n\n PART IV.\n\n OF\n THE KINGDOM OF DARKNESS.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XLIV.\n\n OF SPIRITUAL DARKNESS, FROM MISINTERPRETATION\n OF SCRIPTURE.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The kingdom of Darkness, what.]\n\nBesides these sovereign powers, _divine_, and _human_, of which I have\nhitherto discoursed, there is mention in Scripture of another power,\nnamely, (_Eph._ vi. 12) that of _the rulers of the darkness of this\nworld_; (_Matth._ xii. 26) _the kingdom of Satan_; and (_Matth._ ix. 34)\n_the principality of Beelzebub over demons_, that is to say, over\nphantasms that appear in the air: for which cause Satan is also called,\n(_Eph._ ii. 2) _the prince of the power of the air_; and, because he\nruleth in the darkness of this world, (_John_ xvi. 11) _the prince of\nthis world_: and in consequence hereunto, they who are under his\ndominion, in opposition to the faithful, (who are the _children of the\nlight_,) are called the _children of darkness_. For seeing Beelzebub is\nprince of phantasms, inhabitants of his dominion of air and darkness,\nthe children of darkness, and these demons, phantasms, or spirits of\nillusion, signify allegorically the same thing. This considered, the\nkingdom of darkness, as it is set forth in these and other places of the\nScripture, is nothing else but a _confederacy of deceivers, that to\nobtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavour by dark and\nerroneous doctrines, to extinguish in them the light, both of nature,\nand of the gospel; and so to disprepare them for the kingdom of God to\ncome_.\n\n[Sidenote: The Church not yet fully freed of darkness.]\n\nAs men that are utterly deprived from their nativity, of the light of\nthe bodily eye, have no idea at all of any such light; and no man\nconceives in his imagination any greater light, than he hath at some\ntime or other perceived by his outward senses: so also is it of the\nlight of the gospel, and of the light of the understanding, that no man\ncan conceive there is any greater degree of it, than that which he hath\nalready attained unto. And from hence it comes to pass, that men have no\nother means to acknowledge their own darkness, but only by reasoning\nfrom the unforeseen mischances, that befall them in their ways. The\ndarkest part of the kingdom of Satan, is that which is without the\nChurch of God; that is to say, amongst them that believe not in Jesus\nChrist. But we cannot say, that therefore the Church enjoyeth, as the\nland of Goshen, all the light, which to the performance of the work\nenjoined us by God, is necessary. Whence comes it, that in Christendom\nthere has been, almost from the time of the Apostles, such justling of\none another out of their places, both by foreign and civil war; such\nstumbling at every little asperity of their own fortune, and every\nlittle eminence of that of other men; and such diversity of ways in\nrunning to the same mark, _felicity_, if it be not night amongst us, or\nat least a mist? We are therefore yet in the dark.\n\n[Sidenote: Four causes of spiritual darkness.]\n\nThe enemy has been here in the night of our natural ignorance, and sown\nthe tares of spiritual errors; and that, first, by abusing, and putting\nout the light of the Scriptures: for we err, not knowing the Scriptures.\nSecondly, by introducing the demonology of the heathen poets, that is to\nsay, their fabulous doctrine concerning demons, which are but idols, or\nphantasms of the brain, without any real nature of their own, distinct\nfrom human fancy; such as are dead men\u2019s ghosts, and fairies, and other\nmatter of old wives\u2019 tales. Thirdly, by mixing with the Scripture divers\nrelics of the religion, and much of the vain and erroneous philosophy,\nof the Greeks, especially of Aristotle. Fourthly, by mingling with both\nthese, false, or uncertain traditions, and feigned, or uncertain\nhistory. And so we come to err, _by giving heed to seducing spirits_,\nand the demonology of such _as speak lies in hypocrisy_; or as it is in\nthe original, (_1 Tim._ iv. 1, 2) _of those that play the part of liars,\nwith a seared conscience_, that is, contrary to their own knowledge.\nConcerning the first of these, which is the seducing of men by abuse of\nScripture, I intend to speak briefly in this chapter.\n\n[Sidenote: Errors from misinterpreting the Scriptures, concerning the\n kingdom of God:]\n\nThe greatest and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all the\nrest are either consequent or subservient, is the wresting of it, to\nprove that the kingdom of God, mentioned so often in the Scripture, is\nthe present Church, or multitude of Christian men now living, or that\nbeing dead, are to rise again at the last day: whereas the kingdom of\nGod was first instituted by the ministry of Moses, over the Jews only;\nwho were therefore called his peculiar people; and ceased afterward, in\nthe election of Saul, when they refused to be governed by God any more,\nand demanded a king after the manner of the nations; which God himself\nconsented unto, as I have more at large proved before in chapter XXXV.\nAfter that time, there was no other kingdom of God in the world, by any\npact, or otherwise, than he ever was, is, and shall be king of all men,\nand of all creatures, as governing according to his will, by his\ninfinite power. Nevertheless, he promised by his prophets to restore\nthis his government to them again, when the time he hath in his secret\ncounsel appointed for it shall be fully come, and when they shall turn\nunto him by repentance and amendment of life. And not only so, but he\ninvited the Gentiles to come in, and enjoy the happiness of his reign,\non the same conditions of conversion and repentance; and he promised\nalso to send his Son into the world, to expiate the sins of them all by\nhis death, and to prepare them by his doctrine, to receive him at his\nsecond coming. Which second coming not yet being, the kingdom of God is\nnot yet come, and we are not now under any other kings by pact, but our\ncivil sovereigns; saving only, that Christian men are already in the\nkingdom of grace, in as much as they have already the promise of being\nreceived at his coming again.\n\n[Sidenote: As that the kingdom of God is the present Church]\n\nConsequent to this error, that the present Church is Christ\u2019s kingdom,\nthere ought to be some one man, or assembly, by whose mouth our Saviour,\nnow in heaven, speaketh, giveth law, and which representeth his person\nto all Christians; or divers men, or divers assemblies that do the same\nto divers parts of Christendom. This power regal under Christ, being\nchallenged, universally by the Pope, and in particular commonwealths by\nassemblies of the pastors of the place, (when the Scripture gives it to\nnone but to civil sovereigns,) comes to be so passionately disputed,\nthat it putteth out the light of nature, and causeth so great a darkness\nin men\u2019s understanding, that they see not who it is to whom they have\nengaged their obedience.\n\n[Sidenote: And that the Pope is his vicar general:]\n\nConsequent to this claim of the Pope to be vicar-general of Christ in\nthe present Church, (supposed to be that kingdom of his to which we are\naddressed in the gospel,) is the doctrine, that it is necessary for a\nChristian king to receive his crown by a bishop; as if it were from that\nceremony, that he derives the clause of _Dei gratia_ in his title; and\nthat then only he is made king by the favour of God, when he is crowned\nby the authority of God\u2019s universal vicegerent on earth; and that every\nbishop, whosoever be his sovereign, taketh at his consecration an oath\nof absolute obedience to the Pope. Consequent to the same, is the\ndoctrine of the fourth Council of Lateran, held under Pope Innocent the\nThird, (chap. III. _De Hereticis_), _that if a king at the Pope\u2019s\nadmonition, do not purge his kingdom of heresies, and being\nexcommunicate for the same, do not give satisfaction within a year, his\nsubjects are absolved of the bond of their obedience_. Where, by\nheresies are understood all opinions which the Church of Rome hath\nforbidden to be maintained. And by this means, as often as there is any\nrepugnancy between the political designs of the Pope, and other\nChristian princes, as there is very often, there ariseth such a mist\namongst their subjects, that they know not a stranger that thrusteth\nhimself into the throne of their lawful prince, from him whom they had\nthemselves placed there; and in this darkness of mind, are made to fight\none against another, without discerning their enemies from their\nfriends, under the conduct of another man\u2019s ambition.\n\n[Sidenote: And that the pastors are the clergy.]\n\nFrom the same opinion, that the present Church is the kingdom of God, it\nproceeds that pastors, deacons, and all other ministers of the Church,\ntake the name to themselves of the _clergy_; giving to other Christians\nthe name of _laity_, that is, simply _people_. For clergy signifies\nthose, whose maintenance is that revenue, which God having reserved to\nhimself during his reign over the Israelites, assigned to the tribe of\nLevi, (who were to be his public ministers, and had no portion of land\nset them out to live on, as their brethren,) to be their inheritance.\nThe Pope therefore, pretending the present Church to be, as the realm of\nIsrael, the kingdom of God, challenging to himself and his subordinate\nministers, the like revenue, as the inheritance of God, the name of\nclergy was suitable to that claim. And thence it is, that tithes, and\nother tributes paid to the Levites, as God\u2019s right, amongst the\nIsraelites, have a long time been demanded, and taken of Christians, by\necclesiastics, _jure divino_, that is, in God\u2019s right. By which means,\nthe people every where were obliged to a double tribute; one to the\nstate, another to the clergy; whereof, that to the clergy, being the\ntenth of their revenue, is double to that which a king of Athens, and\nesteemed a tyrant, exacted of his subjects for the defraying of all\npublic charges: for he demanded no more but the twentieth part, and yet\nabundantly maintained therewith the commonwealth. And in the kingdom of\nthe Jews, during the sacerdotal reign of God, the tithes and offerings\nwere the whole public revenue.\n\n[Sidenote: And that the pastors are the clergy.]\n\nFrom the same mistaking of the present Church for the kingdom of God,\ncame in the distinction between the _civil_ and the _canon_ laws: the\ncivil law being the acts of _sovereigns_ in their own dominions, and the\ncanon law being the acts of the _Pope_ in the same dominion. Which\ncanons, though they were but canons, that is, _rules propounded_, and\nbut voluntarily received by Christian princes, till the translation of\nthe empire to Charlemagne; yet afterwards, as the power of the Pope\nincreased, became _rules commanded_, and the emperors themselves, to\navoid greater mischiefs, which the people blinded might be led into,\nwere forced to let them pass for laws.\n\nFrom hence it is, that in all dominions where the Pope\u2019s ecclesiastical\npower is entirely received, Jews, Turks, and Gentiles, are in the Roman\nChurch tolerated in their religion, as far forth, as in the exercise and\nprofession thereof they offend not against the civil power: whereas in a\nChristian, though a stranger, not to be of the Roman religion, is\ncapital; because the Pope pretendeth, that all Christians, are his\nsubjects. For otherwise it were as much against the law of nations, to\npersecute a Christian stranger, for professing the religion of his own\ncountry, as an infidel; or rather more, in as much as they that are not\nagainst Christ, are with him.\n\nFrom the same it is, that in every Christian state there are certain\nmen, that are exempt, by ecclesiastical liberty, from the tributes, and\nfrom the tribunals of the civil state; for so are the secular clergy,\nbesides monks and friars, which in many places bear so great a\nproportion to the common people, as if need were, there might be raised\nout of them alone, an army, sufficient for any war the Church militant\nshould employ them in, against their own, or other princes.\n\n[Sidenote: Error from mistaking consecration for conjuration.]\n\nA second general abuse of Scripture, is the turning of consecration into\nconjuration, or enchantment. To _consecrate_, is, in Scripture, to\noffer, give, or dedicate, in pious and decent language and gesture, a\nman, or any other thing to God, by separating of it from common use;\nthat is to say, to sanctify, or make it God\u2019s, and to be used only by\nthose, whom God hath appointed to be his public ministers, (as I have\nalready proved at large in the XXXVth chapter,) and thereby to change,\nnot the thing consecrated, but only the use of it, from being profane\nand common, to be holy, and peculiar to God\u2019s service. But when by such\nwords, the nature or quality of the thing itself, is pretended to be\nchanged, it is not consecration, but either an extraordinary work of\nGod, or a vain and impious conjuration. But seeing, for the frequency of\npretending the change of nature in their consecrations, it cannot be\nesteemed a work extraordinary, it is no other than a _conjuration_ or\n_incantation_, whereby they would have men to believe an alteration of\nnature that is not, contrary to the testimony of man\u2019s sight, and of all\nthe rest of his senses. As for example, when the priest, instead of\nconsecrating bread and wine to God\u2019s peculiar service in the sacrament\nof the Lord\u2019s Supper, (which is but a separation of it from the common\nuse, to signify, that is, to put men in mind of their redemption, by the\npassion of Christ, whose body was broken, and blood shed upon the cross\nfor our transgressions,) pretends, that by saying of the words of our\nSaviour, _This is my body_, and _this is my blood_, the nature of bread\nis no more there, but his very body; notwithstanding there appeareth not\nto the sight, or other sense of the receiver, any thing that appeared\nnot before the consecration. The Egyptian conjurers, that are said to\nhave turned their rods to serpents, and the water into blood, are\nthought but to have deluded the senses of the spectators, by a false\nshow of things, yet are esteemed enchanters. But what should we have\nthought of them, if there had appeared in their rods nothing like a\nserpent, and in the water enchanted, nothing like blood, nor like any\nthing else but water, but that they had faced down the king, that they\nwere serpents that looked like rods, and that it was blood that seemed\nwater? That had been both enchantment, and lying. And yet in this daily\nact of the priest, they do the very same, by turning the holy words into\nthe manner of a charm, which produceth nothing new to the sense; but\nthey face us down, that it hath turned the bread into a man; nay more,\ninto a God; and require men to worship it, as if it were our Saviour\nhimself present God and man, and thereby to commit most gross idolatry.\nFor if it be enough to excuse it of idolatry, to say it is no more\nbread, but God; why should not the same excuse serve the Egyptians, in\ncase they had the faces to say, the leeks and onions they worshipped,\nwere not very leeks and onions, but a divinity under their _species_, or\nlikeness. The words, _This is my body_, are equivalent to these, _this\nsignifies_, or _represents my body_; and it is an ordinary figure of\nspeech: but to take it literally, is an abuse; nor though so taken, can\nit extend any further, than to the bread which Christ himself with his\nown hands consecrated. For he never said, that of what bread soever, any\npriest whatsoever, should say, _This is my body_, or, _this is Christ\u2019s\nbody_, the same should presently be transubstantiated. Nor did the\nChurch of Rome ever establish this transubstantiation, till the time of\nInnocent the Third; which was not above 500 years ago, when the power of\npopes was at the highest, and the darkness of the time grown so great,\nas men discerned not the bread that was given them to eat, especially\nwhen it was stamped with the figure of Christ upon the cross, as if they\nwould have men believe it were transubstantiated, not only into the body\nof Christ, but also into the wood of his cross, and that they did eat\nboth together in the sacrament.\n\n[Sidenote: Incantation in the ceremonies of baptism:]\n\nThe like incantation, instead of consecration, is used also in the\nsacrament of baptism: where the abuse of God\u2019s name in each several\nperson, and in the whole Trinity, with the sign of the cross at each\nname, maketh up the charm. As first, when they make the holy water, the\npriest saith, _I conjure thee, thou creature of water, in the name of\nGod the Father Almighty, and in the name of Jesus Christ his only Son\nour Lord, and in virtue of the Holy Ghost, that thou become conjured\nwater, to drive away all the powers of the enemy, and to eradicate, and\nsupplant the enemy, &c._ And the same in the benediction of the salt to\nbe mingled with it: _That thou become conjured salt, that all phantasms,\nand knavery of the devil\u2019s fraud may fly and depart from the place\nwherein thou art sprinkled; and every unclean spirit be conjured by Him\nthat shall come to judge the quick and the dead_. The same in the\nbenediction of the oil; _That all the power of the enemy, all the host\nof the devil, all assaults and phantasms of Satan, may be driven away by\nthis creature of oil_. And for the infant that is to be baptized, he is\nsubject to many charms: first, at the church door the priest blows\nthrice in the child\u2019s face, and says: _Go out of him unclean spirit, and\ngive place to the Holy Ghost the comforter_. As if all children, till\nblown on by the priest, were demoniacs. Again, before his entrance into\nthe church, he saith as before, _I conjure thee, &c. to go out, and\ndepart from this servant of God_. And again the same exorcism is\nrepeated once more before he be baptized. These, and some other\nincantations, are those that are used instead of benedictions, and\nconsecrations, in administration of the sacraments of baptism, and the\nLord\u2019s supper; wherein every thing that serveth to those holy uses,\nexcept the unhallowed spittle of the priest, hath some set form of\nexorcism.\n\n[Sidenote: And in marriage, in visitation of the sick, and in\n consecration of places.]\n\nNor are the other rites, as of marriage, of extreme unction, of\nvisitation of the sick, of consecrating churches and churchyards, and\nthe like, exempt from charms; inasmuch as there is in them the use of\nenchanted oil and water, with the abuse of the cross, and of the holy\nword of David, _asperges me Domine hyssopo_, as things of efficacy to\ndrive away phantasms, and imaginary spirits.\n\n[Sidenote: Errors from mistaking eternal life, and everlasting death:]\n\nAnother general error, is from the misinterpretation of the words\n_eternal life_, _everlasting death_, and the _second death_. For though\nwe read plainly in Holy Scripture, that God created Adam in an estate of\nliving for ever, which was conditional, that is to say, if he disobeyed\nnot his commandment; which was not essential to human nature, but\nconsequent to the virtue of the tree of life; whereof he had liberty to\neat, as long as he had not sinned; and that he was thrust out of\nParadise after he had sinned, lest he should eat thereof, and live for\never; and that Christ\u2019s Passion is a discharge of sin to all that\nbelieve on him; and by consequence, a restitution of eternal life to all\nthe faithful, and to them only: yet the doctrine is now, and hath been a\nlong time far otherwise; namely, that every man hath eternity of life by\nnature, inasmuch as his soul is immortal. So that the flaming sword at\nthe entrance of Paradise, though it hinder a man from coming to the tree\nof life, hinders him not from the immortality which God took from him\nfor his sin; nor makes him to need the sacrificing of Christ, for the\nrecovering of the same; and consequently, not only the faithful and\nrighteous, but also the wicked and the heathen, shall enjoy eternal\nlife, without any death at all; much less a second, and everlasting\ndeath. To salve this, it is said, that by second, and everlasting death,\nis meant a second, and everlasting life, but in torments; a figure never\nused but in this very case.\n\nAll which doctrine is founded only on some of the obscurer places of the\nNew Testament; which nevertheless, the whole scope of the Scripture\nconsidered, are clear enough in a different sense, and unnecessary to\nthe Christian faith. For supposing that when a man dies, there remaineth\nnothing of him but his carcass; cannot God, that raised inanimated dust\nand clay into a living creature by his word, as easily raise a dead\ncarcass to life again, and continue him alive for ever, or make him die\nagain, by another word? The _soul_ in Scripture, signifieth always,\neither the life, or the living creature; and the body and soul jointly,\nthe _body alive_. In the fifth day of the creation, God said: Let the\nwaters produce _reptile anim\u00e6 viventis_, the creeping thing that hath in\nit a living soul; the English translate it, _that hath life_. And again,\nGod created whales, _et omnem animam viventem_; which in the English is,\n_every living creature_. And likewise of man, God made him of the dust\nof the earth, and breathed in his face the breath of life, _et factus\nest homo in animam viventem_, that is, _and man was made a living\ncreature_. And after Noah came out of the ark, God saith, he will no\nmore smite _omnem animam viventem_, that is, _every living creature_.\nAnd (_Deut._ xii. 23), _Eat not the blood, for the blood is the soul_;\nthat is, _the life_. From which places, if by _soul_ were meant a\n_substance incorporeal_, with an existence separated from the body, it\nmight as well be inferred of any other living creature as of man. But\nthat the souls of the faithful, are not of their own nature, but by\nGod\u2019s special grace, to remain in their bodies, from the resurrection to\nall eternity, I have already, I think, sufficiently proved out of the\nScriptures, in chapter XXXVIII. And for the places of the New Testament,\nwhere it is said that any man shall be cast body and soul into hell\nfire, it is no more than body and life; that is to say, they shall be\ncast alive into the perpetual fire of Gehenna.\n\n[Sidenote: As the doctrine of purgatory, and exorcisms, and invocation\n of saints.]\n\nThis window it is, that gives entrance to the dark doctrine, first, of\neternal torments; and afterwards of purgatory, and consequently of the\nwalking abroad, especially in places consecrated, solitary, or dark, of\nthe ghosts of men deceased; and thereby to the pretences of exorcism and\nconjuration of phantasms; as also of invocation of men dead; and to the\ndoctrine of indulgences, that is to say, of exemption for a time, or for\never, from the fire of purgatory, wherein these incorporeal substances\nare pretended by burning to be cleansed, and made fit for heaven. For\nmen being generally possessed before the time of our Saviour, by\ncontagion of the demonology of the Greeks, of an opinion, that the souls\nof men were substances distinct from their bodies, and therefore that\nwhen the body was dead, the soul of every man, whether godly or wicked,\nmust subsist somewhere by virtue of its own nature, without\nacknowledging therein any supernatural gift of God; the doctors of the\nChurch doubted a long time, what was the place, which they were to abide\nin, till they should be reunited to their bodies in the resurrection;\nsupposing for a while, they lay under the altars; but afterward the\nChurch of Rome found it more profitable to build for them this place of\npurgatory; which by some other Churches in this latter age has been\ndemolished.\n\n[Sidenote: The texts alleged for the doctrines aforementioned have been\n answered before.]\n\nLet us now consider what texts of Scripture seem most to confirm these\nthree general errors, I have here touched. As for those which Cardinal\nBellarmine hath alleged, for the present kingdom of God administered by\nthe Pope, than which there are none that make a better show of proof; I\nhave already answered them; and made it evident, that the kingdom of\nGod, instituted by Moses, ended in the election of Saul; after which\ntime the priest of his own authority never deposed any king. That which\nthe high-priest did to Athaliah, was not done in his own right, but in\nthe right of the young king Joash her son: but Solomon in his own right\ndeposed the high-priest Abiathar, and set up another in his place. The\nmost difficult place to answer, of all those that can be brought to\nprove the kingdom of God by Christ is already in this world, is alleged,\nnot by Bellarmine, nor any other of the Church of Rome; but by Beza,\nthat will have it to begin from the resurrection of Christ. But whether\nhe intend thereby, to entitle the Presbytery to the supreme power\necclesiastical in the commonwealth of Geneva, and consequently to every\npresbytery in every other commonwealth, or to princes, and other civil\nsovereigns, I do not know. For the presbytery hath challenged the power\nto excommunicate their own kings, and to be the supreme moderators in\nreligion, in the places where they have that form of Church-government,\nno less than the Pope challengeth it universally.\n\n[Sidenote: Answer to the text on which Beza inferreth that the kingdom\n of Christ began at the resurrection.]\n\nThe words are (_Mark_ ix. 1), _Verily I say unto you, that there be some\nof them that stand here, which shall not taste of death, till they have\nseen the kingdom of God come with power_. Which words if taken\ngrammatically, make it certain, that either some of those men that stood\nby Christ at that time, are yet alive; or else, that the kingdom of God\nmust be now in this present world. And then there is another place more\ndifficult. For when the apostles, after our Saviour\u2019s resurrection, and\nimmediately before his ascension, asked our Saviour, saying, (_Acts_ i.\n6), _Wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel?_ he\nanswered them, _It is not for you to know the times and the seasons,\nwhich the Father hath put in his own power; but ye shall receive power\nby the coming of the Holy Ghost upon you, and ye shall be my (martyrs)\nwitnesses both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto\nthe uttermost part of the earth_. Which is as much as to say, My kingdom\nis not yet come, nor shall you foreknow when it shall come; for it shall\ncome as a thief in the night; but I will send you the Holy Ghost, and by\nhim you shall have power to bear witness to all the world, by your\npreaching, of my resurrection, and the works I have done, and the\ndoctrine I have taught, that they may believe in me, and expect eternal\nlife, at my coming again. How does this agree with the coming of\nChrist\u2019s kingdom at the resurrection? And that which St. Paul says (_1\nThess._ i. 9, 10), _That they turned from idols, to serve the living and\ntrue God, and to wait for his Son from heaven_; where to wait for his\nSon from heaven, is to wait for his coming to be king in power; which\nwere not necessary, if his kingdom had been then present. Again, if the\nkingdom of God began, as Beza on that place (_Mark_ ix. 1) would have\nit, at the resurrection; what reason is there for Christians ever since\nthe resurrection to say in their prayers, _Let thy kingdom come_? It is\ntherefore manifest, that the words of St. Mark are not so to be\ninterpreted. There be some of them that stand here, saith our Saviour,\nthat shall not taste of death till they have seen the kingdom of God\ncome in power. If then this kingdom were to come at the resurrection of\nChrist, why is it said, _some of them_, rather than _all_? For they all\nlived till after Christ was risen.\n\n[Sidenote: Explication of the place in Mark ix. 1.]\n\nBut they that require an exact interpretation of this text, let them\ninterpret first the like words of our Saviour to St. Peter, concerning\nSt. John, (chap. xxi. 22), _If I will that he tarry till I come, what is\nthat to thee?_ upon which was grounded a report that he should not die.\nNevertheless the truth of that report was neither confirmed, as well\ngrounded; nor refuted, as ill grounded on those words; but left as a\nsaying not understood. The same difficulty is also in the place of _St.\nMark_. And if it be lawful to conjecture at their meaning, by that which\nimmediately follows, both here, and in _St. Luke_, where the same is\nagain repeated, it is not improbable, to say they have relation to the\nTransfiguration, which is described in the verses immediately following:\nwhere it is said, that _after six days Jesus taketh with him Peter, and\nJames, and John_ (not all, but some of his disciples), _and leadeth them\nup into a high mountain apart by themselves, and was transfigured before\nthem: and his raiment became shining, exceeding white as snow; so as no\nfuller on earth can white them: and there appeared unto them, Elias with\nMoses, and they were talking with Jesus, &c._ So that they saw Christ in\nglory and majesty, as he is to come; insomuch as _they were sore\nafraid_. And thus the promise of our Saviour was accomplished by way of\n_vision_. For it was a vision, as may probably be inferred out of _St.\nLuke_, that reciteth the same story (chap. ix. 28, &c.), and saith, that\nPeter and they that were with him, were heavy with sleep: but most\ncertainly out of _Matth._ xvii. 9, where the same is again related; for\nour Saviour charged them, saying, _Tell no man the vision until the Son\nof Man be risen from the dead_. Howsoever it be, yet there can from\nthence be taken no argument, to prove that the kingdom of God taketh\nbeginning till the day of judgment.\n\n[Sidenote: Abuse of some other texts in defence of the power of the\n Pope.]\n\nAs for some other texts, to prove the Pope\u2019s power over civil\nsovereigns, (besides those of Bellarmine,) as that the two swords that\nChrist and his apostles had amongst them, were the spiritual and the\ntemporal sword, which they say St. Peter had given him by Christ: and,\nthat of the two luminaries, the greater signifies the Pope, and the\nlesser the King; one might as well infer out of the first verse of the\nBible, that by heaven is meant the Pope, and by earth the King. Which is\nnot arguing from Scripture, but a wanton insulting over princes, that\ncame in fashion after the time the Popes were grown so secure of their\ngreatness, as to contemn all Christian kings; and treading on the necks\nof emperors, to mock both them and the Scripture, in the words of Psalm\nXCI. 13, _Thou shalt tread upon the lion and the adder; the young lion\nand the dragon thou shalt trample under thy feet_.\n\n[Sidenote: The manner of consecrations in the Scripture, was without\n exorcisms.]\n\nAs for the rights of consecration, though they depend for the most part\nupon the discretion and judgment of the governors of the Church, and not\nupon the Scriptures; yet those governors are obliged to such direction,\nas the nature of the action itself requireth; as that the ceremonies,\nwords, and gestures, be both decent and significant, or at least\nconformable to the action. When Moses consecrated the tabernacle, the\naltar, and the vessels belonging to them, (_Exod._ xl. 9), he anointed\nthem with the oil which God had commanded to be made for that purpose:\nand they were holy: there was nothing exorcised, to drive away\nphantasms. The same Moses, the civil sovereign of Israel, when he\nconsecrated Aaron, the high-priest, and his sons, did wash them with\nwater, not exorcised water, put their garments upon them, and anointed\nthem with oil; and they were sanctified, to minister unto the Lord in\nthe priest\u2019s office; which was a simple and decent cleansing, and\nadorning them, before he presented them to God, to be his servants. When\nking Solomon, the civil sovereign of Israel, consecrated the temple he\nhad built, (_1 Kings_ viii.), he stood before all the congregation of\nIsrael; and having blessed them, he gave thanks to God, for putting into\nthe heart of his father to build it; and for giving to himself the grace\nto accomplish the same; and then prayed unto him, first, to accept that\nhouse, though it were not suitable to his infinite greatness; and to\nhear the prayers of his servants that should pray therein, or, if they\nwere absent, towards it; and lastly, he offered a sacrifice of\npeace-offering, and the house was dedicated. Here was no procession; the\nking stood still in his first place; no exorcised water; no _Asperges\nme_, nor other impertinent application of words spoken upon another\noccasion; but a decent and rational speech, and such as in making to God\na present of his new-built house, was most conformable to the occasion.\n\nWe read not that St. John did exorcise the water of Jordan; nor Philip\nthe water of the river wherein he baptized the Eunuch; nor that any\npastor in the time of the apostles, did take his spittle, and put it to\nthe nose of the person to be baptized, and say, _in odorem suavitatis_,\nthat is, _for a sweet savour unto the Lord_; wherein neither the\nceremony of spittle, for the uncleanness; nor the application of that\nScripture for the levity, can by any authority of man be justified.\n\n[Sidenote: The immortality of man\u2019s soul, not proved by Scripture to be\n of nature, but of grace.]\n\nTo prove that the soul separated from the body, liveth eternally, not\nonly the souls of the elect, by especial grace, and restoration of the\neternal life which Adam lost by sin, and our Saviour restored by the\nsacrifice of himself, to the faithful; but also the souls of reprobates,\nas a property naturally consequent to the essence of mankind, without\nother grace of God, but that which is universally given to all mankind;\nthere are divers places, which at the first sight seem sufficiently to\nserve the turn: but such, as when I compare them with that which I have\nbefore (chapter XXXVIII.) alleged out of the 14th of _Job_, seem to me\nmuch more subject to a diverse interpretation, than the words of Job.\n\nAnd first there are the words of Solomon (_Eccles._ xii. 7), _Then shall\nthe dust return to dust, as it was, and the spirit shall return to God\nthat gave it_. Which may bear well enough, if there be no other text\ndirectly against it, this interpretation, that God only knows, but man\nnot, what becomes of a man\u2019s spirit, when he expireth; and the same\nSolomon, in the same book, (chapter iii. 20, 21) delivereth the same\nsentence in the same sense I have given it. His words are: _All go_,\n(man and beast), _to the same place; all are of the dust, and all turn\nto dust again; who knoweth that the spirit of man goeth upward, and that\nthe spirit of the beast goeth downward to the earth?_ That is, none\nknows but God; nor is it an unusual phrase to say of things we\nunderstand not, _God knows what_, and, _God knows where_. That of\n(_Gen._ v. 24) _Enoch walked with God, and he was not; for God took\nhim_; which is expounded, (_Heb._ xi. 5), _He was translated, that he\nshould not die; and was not found, because God had translated him. For\nbefore his translation, he had this testimony, that he pleased God_;\nmaking as much for the immortality of the body, as of the soul, proveth,\nthat this his translation was peculiar to them that please God; not\ncommon to them with the wicked, and depending on grace, not on nature.\nBut on the contrary, what interpretation shall we give besides the\nliteral sense, of the words of Solomon (_Eccles._ iii. 19), _That which\nbefalleth the sons of men, befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth\nthem; as the one dieth, so doth the other; yea, they have all one\nbreath_, (one spirit); _so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a\nbeast, for all is vanity_. By the literal sense, here is no natural\nimmortality of the soul; nor yet any repugnancy with the life eternal,\nwhich the elect shall enjoy by grace. And (_Eccles._ chap. iv. 3)\n_Better is he that hath not yet been, than both they_; that is, than\nthey that live, or have lived; which, if the soul of all them that have\nlived, were immortal, were a hard saying; for then to have an immortal\nsoul, were worse than to have no soul at all. And again, (chapter ix.\n5), _The living know they shall die, but the dead know not any thing_;\nthat is, naturally, and before the resurrection of the body.\n\nAnother place which seems to make for a natural immortality of the soul,\nis that, where our Saviour saith, that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, are\nliving: but this is spoken of the promise of God, and of their certitude\nto rise again, not of a life then actual; and in the same sense that God\nsaid to Adam, that on the day he should eat of the forbidden fruit, he\nshould certainly die; from that time forward he was a dead man by\nsentence; but not by execution, till almost a thousand years after. So\nAbraham, Isaac, and Jacob were alive by promise, then, when Christ\nspake; but are not actually till the resurrection. And the history of\nDives and Lazarus, makes nothing against this, if we take it, as it is,\nfor a parable.\n\nBut there be other places of the New Testament, where an immortality\nseemeth to be directly attributed to the wicked. For it is evident that\nthey shall all rise to judgment. And it is said besides in many places,\nthat they shall go into _everlasting fire, everlasting torments,\neverlasting punishments; and that the worm of conscience never dieth_;\nand all this is comprehended in the word _everlasting death_, which is\nordinarily interpreted _everlasting life in torments_. And yet I can\nfind no where that any man shall live in torments everlastingly. Also,\nit seemeth hard, to say, that God who is the father of mercies; that\ndoth in heaven and earth all that he will; that hath the hearts of all\nmen in his disposing; that worketh in men both to do, and to will; and\nwithout whose free gift a man hath neither inclination to good, nor\nrepentance of evil, should punish men\u2019s transgressions without any end\nof time, and with all the extremity of torture, that men can imagine,\nand more. We are therefore to consider, what the meaning is, of\n_everlasting fire_, and other the like phrases of Scripture.\n\nI have showed already, that the kingdom of God by Christ beginneth at\nthe day of judgment: that in that day the faithful shall rise again,\nwith glorious and spiritual bodies, and be his subjects in that his\nkingdom, which shall be eternal: that they shall neither marry nor be\ngiven in marriage, nor eat and drink, as they did in their natural\nbodies; but live for ever in their individual persons, without the\nspecifical eternity of generation: and that the reprobates also shall\nrise again, to receive punishments for their sins: as also, that those\nof the elect, which shall be alive in their earthly bodies at that day,\nshall have their bodies suddenly changed, and made spiritual and\nimmortal. But that the bodies of the reprobate, who make the kingdom of\nSatan, shall also be glorious, or spiritual bodies, or that they shall\nbe as the angels of God, neither eating, nor drinking, nor engendering;\nor that their life shall be eternal in their individual persons, as the\nlife of every faithful man is, or as the life of Adam had been if he had\nnot sinned, there is no place of Scripture to prove it; save only these\nplaces concerning eternal torments; which may otherwise be interpreted.\n\nFrom whence may be inferred, that as the elect after the resurrection\nshall be restored to the estate, wherein Adam was before he had sinned;\nso the reprobate shall be in the estate, that Adam and his posterity\nwere in after the sin committed; saving that God promised a Redeemer to\nAdam, and such of his seed as should trust in him, and repent; but not\nto them that should die in their sins, as do the reprobate.\n\n[Sidenote: Eternal torments, what.]\n\nThese things considered, the texts that mention _eternal fire, eternal\ntorments, or the worm that never dieth_, contradict not the doctrine of\na second, and everlasting death, in the proper and natural sense of the\nword _death_. The fire, or torments prepared for the wicked in Gehenna,\nTophet, or in what place soever, may continue for ever; and there may\nnever want wicked men to be tormented in them; though not every, nor any\none eternally. For the wicked being left in the estate they were in\nafter Adam\u2019s sin, may at the resurrection live as they did, marry, and\ngive in marriage, and have gross and corruptible bodies, as all mankind\nnow have; and consequently may engender perpetually, after the\nresurrection, as they did before: for there is no place in Scripture to\nthe contrary. For St. Paul, speaking of the resurrection (_1 Cor._ xv.)\nunderstandeth it only of the resurrection to life eternal; and not the\nresurrection to punishment. And of the first, he saith, that the body is\n_sown in corruption, raised in incorruption; sown in dishonour, raised\nin honour; sown in weakness, raised in power; sown a natural body,\nraised a spiritual body_. There is no such thing can be said of the\nbodies of them that rise to punishment. So also our Saviour, when he\nspeaketh of the nature of man after the resurrection, meaneth the\nresurrection to life eternal, not to punishment. The text is, _Luke_ xx.\nverses 34, 35, 36, a fertile text: _The children of this world marry,\nand are given in marriage; but they that shall be counted worthy to\nobtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry,\nnor are given in marriage: neither can they die any more; for they are\nequal to the angels, and are the children of God, being the children of\nthe resurrection_. The children of this world, that are in the estate\nwhich Adam left them in, shall marry, and be given in marriage; that is,\ncorrupt, and generate successively; which is an immortality of the kind,\nbut not of the persons of men: they are not worthy to be counted amongst\nthem that shall obtain the next world, and an absolute resurrection from\nthe dead; but only a short time, as inmates of that world; and to the\nend only to receive condign punishment for their contumacy. The elect\nare the only children of the resurrection; that is to say, the sole\nheirs of eternal life: they only can die no more, it is they that are\nequal to the angels, and that are the children of God; and not the\nreprobate. To the reprobate there remaineth after the resurrection, a\n_second_ and _eternal_ death: between which resurrection, and their\nsecond and eternal death, is but a time of punishment and torment; and\nto last by succession of sinners thereunto, as long as the kind of man\nby propagation shall endure; which is eternally.\n\n[Sidenote: Answer of the texts alleged for purgatory.]\n\nUpon this doctrine of the natural eternity of separated souls, is\nfounded, as I said, the doctrine of purgatory. For supposing eternal\nlife by grace only, there is no life but the life of the body; and no\nimmortality till the resurrection. The texts for purgatory alleged by\nBellarmine out of the canonical Scripture of the Old Testament, are,\nfirst, the fasting of David for Saul and Jonathan, mentioned _2 Sam._ i.\n12, and again, _2 Sam._ iii. 35, for the death of Abner. This fasting of\nDavid, he saith, was for the obtaining of something for them at God\u2019s\nhands, after their death: because after he had fasted to procure the\nrecovery of his own child, as soon as he knew it was dead, he called for\nmeat. Seeing then the soul hath an existence separate from the body, and\nnothing can be obtained by men\u2019s fasting for the souls that are already\neither in heaven, or hell, it followeth that there be some souls of dead\nmen, that are neither in heaven, nor in hell; and therefore they must be\nin some third place, which must be purgatory. And thus with hard\nstraining, he has wrested those places to the proof of a purgatory:\nwhereas it is manifest, that the ceremonies of mourning, and fasting,\nwhen they are used for the death of men, whose life was not profitable\nto the mourners, they are used for honour\u2019s sake to their persons; and\nwhen it is done for the death of them by whose life the mourners had\nbenefit, it proceeds from their particular damage. And so David honoured\nSaul and Abner, with his fasting; and in the death of his own child,\nrecomforted himself, by receiving his ordinary food.\n\nIn the other places, which he allegeth out of the Old Testament, there\nis not so much as any show, or colour of proof. He brings in every text\nwherein there is the word _anger_, or _fire_, or _burning_, or\n_purging_, or _cleansing_, in case any of the fathers have but in a\nsermon rhetorically applied it to the doctrine of purgatory, already\nbelieved. The first verse of _Psalm_ xxxvii; _O Lord, rebuke me not in\nthy wrath, nor chasten me in thy hot displeasure_: what were this to\npurgatory, if Augustine had not applied the _wrath_ to the fire of hell,\nand the _displeasure_ to that of purgatory? And what is it to purgatory,\nthat of _Psalm_ lxvi. 12, _We went through fire and water, and thou\nbroughtest us to a moist place_; and other the like texts, with which\nthe doctors of those times intended to adorn, or extend their sermons,\nor commentaries, haled to their purposes by force of wit?\n\n[Sidenote: Places of the New Testament for purgatory answered.]\n\nBut he allegeth other places of the New Testament, that are not so easy\nto be answered. And first that of _Matth._ xii. 32: _Whosoever speaketh\na word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever\nspeaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him neither in\nthis world, nor in the world to come_: where he will have purgatory to\nbe the world to come, wherein some sins may be forgiven, which in this\nworld were not forgiven: notwithstanding that it is manifest, there are\nbut three worlds; one from the creation to the flood, which was\ndestroyed by water, and is called in Scripture _the old world_; another\nfrom the flood, to the day of judgment, which is _the present world_,\nand shall be destroyed by fire; and the third, which shall be from the\nday of judgment forward, everlasting, which is called _the world to\ncome_; and in which it is agreed by all, there shall be no purgatory:\nand therefore the world to come, and purgatory, are inconsistent. But\nwhat then can be the meaning of those our Saviour\u2019s words? I confess\nthey are very hardly to be reconciled with all the doctrines now\nunanimously received: nor is it any shame, to confess the profoundness\nof the Scripture to be too great to be sounded by the shortness of human\nunderstanding. Nevertheless, I may propound such things to the\nconsideration of more learned divines, as the text itself suggesteth.\nAnd first, seeing to speak against the Holy Ghost, as being the third\nperson of the Trinity, is to speak against the Church, in which the Holy\nGhost resideth; it seemeth the comparison is made, between the easiness\nof our Saviour, in bearing with offences done to him while he himself\ntaught the world, that is, when he was on earth, and the severity of the\npastors after him, against those which should deny their authority,\nwhich was from the Holy Ghost. As if he should say, you that deny my\npower; nay you that shall crucify me, shall be pardoned by me, as often\nas you turn unto me by repentance: but if you deny the power of them\nthat teach you hereafter, by virtue of the Holy Ghost, they shall be\ninexorable, and shall not forgive you, but persecute you in this world,\nand leave you without absolution, (though you turn to me, unless you\nturn also to them), to the punishments, as much as lies in them, of the\nworld to come. And so the words may be taken as a prophecy, or\nprediction concerning the times, as they have along been in the\nChristian Church. Or if this be not the meaning, (for I am not\nperemptory in such difficult places), perhaps there may be places left\nafter the resurrection, for the repentance of some sinners. And there is\nalso another place, that seemeth to agree therewith. For considering the\nwords of St. Paul (_1 Cor._ xv. 29), _What shall they do which are\nbaptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all?_ why also are they\nbaptized for the dead? a man may probably infer, as some have done, that\nin St. Paul\u2019s time, there was a custom, by receiving baptism for the\ndead, (as men that now believe, are sureties and undertakers for the\nfaith of infants, that are not capable of believing), to undertake for\nthe persons of their deceased friends, that they should be ready to\nobey, and receive our Saviour for their king, at his coming again; and\nthen the forgiveness of sins in the world to come, has no need of a\npurgatory. But in both these interpretations, there is so much of\nparadox, that I trust not to them; but propound them to those that are\nthoroughly versed in the Scripture, to inquire if there be no clearer\nplace that contradicts them. Only of thus much, I see evident Scripture,\nto persuade me, that there is neither the word, nor the thing of\npurgatory, neither in this, nor any other text; nor any thing that can\nprove a necessity of a place for the soul without the body; neither for\nthe soul of Lazarus during the four days he was dead; nor for the souls\nof them which the Roman Church pretend to be tormented now in purgatory.\nFor God, that could give a life to a piece of clay, hath the same power\nto give life again to a dead man, and renew his inanimate, and rotten\ncarcase, into a glorious, spiritual, and immortal body.\n\nAnother place is that of _1 Cor._ iii., where it is said, that they\nwhich build stubble, hay, &c. on the true foundation, their work shall\nperish; but _they themselves shall be saved, but as through fire_: this\nfire, he will have to be the fire of purgatory. The words, as I have\nsaid before, are an allusion to those of _Zech._ xiii. 9, where he\nsaith, _I will bring the third part through the fire, and refine them as\nsilver is refined, and will try them as gold is tried_: which is spoken\nof the coming of the Messiah in power and glory; that is, at the day of\njudgment, and conflagration of the present world; wherein the elect\nshall not be consumed, but be refined; that is, depose their erroneous\ndoctrines and traditions, and have them as it were singed off; and shall\nafterwards call upon the name of the true God. In like manner, the\napostle saith of them, that holding this foundation, _Jesus is the\nChrist_, shall build thereon some other doctrines that be erroneous,\nthat they shall not be consumed in that fire which reneweth the world,\nbut shall pass through it to salvation; but so as to see, and relinquish\ntheir former errors. The builders, are the _pastors_; the foundation,\nthat _Jesus is the Christ_; the stubble and hay, _false consequences\ndrawn from it through ignorance, or frailty_; the gold, silver, and\nprecious stones, are their _true doctrines_; and their refining or\npurging, the _relinquishing of their errors_. In all which there is no\ncolour at all for the burning of incorporeal, that is to say, impatible\nsouls.\n\n[Sidenote: Baptism for the dead, how understood.]\n\nA third place is that of _1 Cor._ xv. 29, before mentioned, concerning\nbaptism for the dead: out of which he concludeth, first, that prayers\nfor the dead are not unprofitable; and out of that, that there is a fire\nof purgatory: but neither of them rightly. For of many interpretations\nof the word baptism, he approveth this in the first place, that by\nbaptism is meant, metaphorically, a baptism of penance; and that men are\nin this sense baptized, when they fast, and pray, and give alms: and so,\nbaptism for the dead, and prayer for the dead, is the same thing. But\nthis is a metaphor, of which there is no example, neither in the\nScripture, nor in any other use of language; and which is also\ndiscordant to the harmony, and scope of the Scripture. The word baptism\nis used (_Mark_ x. 38, and _Luke_ xii. 50), for being dipped in one\u2019s\nown blood, as Christ was upon the cross, and as most of the apostles\nwere, for giving testimony of him. But it is hard to say, that prayer,\nfasting, and alms, have any similitude with dipping. The same is used\nalso _Matth._ iii. 11 (which seemeth to make somewhat for purgatory) for\na purging with fire. But it is evident the fire and purging here\nmentioned, is the same whereof the prophet Zechariah speaketh (chapter\nxiii. 9) _I will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine\nthem, &c._ And St. Peter after him (1 Epistle i. 7), _That the trial of\nyour faith, which is much more precious than of gold that perisheth,\nthough it be tried with fire, might be found unto praise, and honour,\nand glory at the appearing of Jesus Christ_; and St. Paul (_1 Cor._ iii.\n13), _The fire shall try every man\u2019s work of what sort it is_. But St.\nPeter and St. Paul speak of the fire that shall be at the second\nappearing of Christ; and the prophet Zechariah of the day of judgment.\nAnd therefore this place of St. Matthew may be interpreted of the same;\nand then there will be no necessity of the fire of purgatory.\n\nAnother interpretation of baptism for the dead, is that which I have\nbefore mentioned, which he preferreth to the second place of\nprobability: and thence also he inferreth the utility of prayer for the\ndead. For if after the resurrection, such as have not heard of Christ,\nor not believed in him, may be received into Christ\u2019s kingdom; it is not\nin vain, after their death, that their friends should pray for them,\ntill they should be risen. But granting that God, at the prayers of the\nfaithful, may convert unto him some of those that have not heard Christ\npreached, and consequently cannot have rejected Christ, and that the\ncharity of men in that point cannot be blamed; yet this concludeth\nnothing for purgatory; because to rise from death to life, is one thing;\nto rise from purgatory to life is another; as being a rising from life\nto life, from a life in torments to a life in joy.\n\nA fourth place is that of _Matth._ v. 25, 26: _Agree with thine\nadversary quickly, whilst thou art in the way with him, lest at any time\nthe adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to\nthe officer, and thou be cast into prison: verily I say unto thee, thou\nshalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost\nfarthing_. In which allegory, the offender is the _sinner_; both the\nadversary and the judge is _God_; the way is this _life_; the prison is\nthe _grave_; the officer, _death_; from which, the sinner shall not rise\nagain to life eternal, but to a second death, till he have paid the\nutmost farthing, or Christ pay it for him by his passion, which is a\nfull ransom for all manner of sins, as well lesser sins, as greater\ncrimes; both being made by the passion of Christ equally venial.\n\nThe fifth place, is that of _Matth._ v. 22: _Whosoever is angry with his\nbrother without a cause, shall be guilty in judgment: and whosoever\nshall say to his brother, Raca, shall be guilty in the council: but\nwhosoever shall say, thou fool, shall be guilty to hell fire_. From\nwhich words he inferreth three sorts of sins, and three sorts of\npunishments; and that none of those sins, but the last, shall be\npunished with hell fire; and consequently, that after this life, there\nis punishment of lesser sins in purgatory. Of which inference, there is\nno colour in any interpretation that hath yet been given of them. Shall\nthere be a distinction after this life of courts of justice, as there\nwas amongst the Jews in our Saviour\u2019s time, to hear, and determine\ndivers sorts of crimes, as the judges, and the council? Shall not all\njudicature appertain to Christ and his apostles? To understand therefore\nthis text, we are not to consider it solitarily, but jointly with the\nwords precedent, and subsequent. Our Saviour in this chapter\ninterpreteth the law of Moses; which the Jews thought was then\nfulfilled, when they had not transgressed the grammatical sense thereof,\nhowsoever they had transgressed against the sentence, or meaning of the\nlegislator. Therefore whereas they thought the sixth commandment was not\nbroken, but by killing a man: nor the seventh, but when a man lay with a\nwoman, not his wife; our Saviour tells them the inward anger of a man\nagainst his brother, if it be without just cause, is homicide. You have\nheard, saith he, the Law of Moses, _Thou shalt not kill_, and that\n_Whosoever shall kill, shall be condemned before the judges_, or before\nthe session of the Seventy: but I say unto you, to be angry with one\u2019s\nbrother without cause, or to say unto him _Raca_, or _Fool_, is\nhomicide, and shall be punished at the day of judgment, and session of\nChrist, and his apostles, with hell fire. So that those words were not\nused to distinguish between divers crimes, and divers courts of justice,\nand divers punishments; but to tax the distinction between sin and sin,\nwhich the Jews drew not from the difference of the will in obeying God,\nbut from the difference of their temporal courts of justice; and to show\nthem that he that had the will to hurt his brother, though the effect\nappear but in reviling, or not at all, shall be cast into hell fire, by\nthe judges, and by the session, which shall be the same, not different,\ncourts at the day of judgment. This considered, what can be drawn from\nthis text, to maintain purgatory, I cannot imagine.\n\nThe sixth place is _Luke_ xvi. 9: _Make ye friends of the unrighteous\nMammon; that when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting\ntabernacles_. This he alleges to prove invocation of saints departed.\nBut the sense is plain, that we should make friends with our riches, of\nthe poor; and thereby obtain their prayers whilst they live. _He that\ngiveth to the poor, lendeth to the Lord._\n\nThe seventh is _Luke_ xxiii. 42: _Lord, remember me, when thou comest\ninto thy kingdom_. Therefore, saith he, there is remission of sins after\nthis life. But the consequence is not good. Our Saviour then forgave\nhim; and at his coming again in glory, will remember to raise him again\nto life eternal.\n\nThe eighth is _Acts_ ii. 24, where St. Peter saith of Christ, _that God\nhad raised him up, and loosed the pains of death, because it was not\npossible he should be holden of it_: which he interprets to be a descent\nof Christ into purgatory, to loose some souls there from their torments:\nwhereas it is manifest, that it was Christ that was loosed; it was he\nthat could not be holden of death, or the grave; and not the souls in\npurgatory. But if that which Beza says, in his notes on this place, be\nwell observed, there is none that will not see, that instead of _pains_,\nit should be _bands_; and then there is no further cause to seek for\npurgatory in this text.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XLV.\n\n OF DEMONOLOGY, AND OTHER RELICS OF THE\n RELIGION OF THE GENTILES.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The original of demonology.]\n\nThe impression made on the organs of sight by lucid bodies, either in\none direct line, or in many lines, reflected from opaque, or refracted\nin the passage through diaphanous bodies, produceth in living creatures,\nin whom God hath placed such organs, an imagination of the object, from\nwhence the impression proceedeth; which imagination is called _sight_;\nand seemeth not to be a mere imagination, but the body itself without\nus; in the same manner, as when a man violently presseth his eye, there\nappears to him a light without, and before him, which no man perceiveth\nbut himself; because there is indeed no such thing without him, but only\na motion in the interior organs, pressing by resistance outward, that\nmakes him think so. And the motion made by this pressure, continuing\nafter the object which caused it is removed, is that we call\n_imagination_ and _memory_; and, in sleep, and sometimes in great\ndistemper of the organs by sickness or violence, a _dream_; of which\nthings I have already spoken briefly, in the second and third chapters.\n\nThis nature of sight having never been discovered by the ancient\npretenders to natural knowledge; much less by those that consider not\nthings so remote, as that knowledge is, from their present use; it was\nhard for men to conceive of those images in the fancy and in the sense,\notherwise, than of things really without us: which some, because they\nvanish away, they know not whither nor how, will have to be absolutely\nincorporeal, that is to say immaterial, or forms without matter; colour\nand figure, without any coloured or figured body; and that they can put\non airy bodies, as a garment, to make them visible when they will to our\nbodily eyes; and others say, are bodies and living creatures, but made\nof air, or other more subtle and ethereal matter, which is, then, when\nthey will be seen, condensed. But both of them agree on one general\nappellation of them, DEMONS. As if the dead of whom they dreamed, were\nnot inhabitants of their own brain, but of the air, or of heaven, or\nhell; not phantasms, but ghosts; with just as much reason as if one\nshould say, he saw his own ghost in a looking-glass, or the ghosts of\nthe stars in a river; or call the ordinary apparition of the sun, of the\nquantity of about a foot, the _demon_, or ghost of that great sun that\nenlighteneth the whole visible world: and by that means have feared\nthem, as things of an unknown, that is, of an unlimited power to do them\ngood or harm; and consequently, given occasion to the governors of the\nheathen commonwealths to regulate this their fear, by establishing that\nDEMONOLOGY, (in which the poets, as principal priests of the heathen\nreligion, were specially employed or reverenced,) to the public peace,\nand to the obedience of subjects necessary thereunto; and to make some\nof them good _demons_, and others evil; the one as a spur to the\nobservance, the other as reins to withhold them from violation of the\nlaws.\n\n[Sidenote: What were the demons of the ancients.]\n\nWhat kind of things they were, to whom they attributed the name of\n_demons_, appeareth partly in the genealogy of their gods, written by\nHesiod, one of the most ancient poets of the Grecians; and partly in\nother histories; of which I have observed some few before, in the\ntwelfth chapter of this discourse.\n\n[Sidenote: How that doctrine was spread.]\n\nThe Grecians, by their colonies and conquests, communicated their\nlanguage and writings into Asia, Egypt, and Italy; and therein, by\nnecessary consequence their _demonology_, or, as St. Paul calls it, (_1\nTim._ iv. 1) _their doctrines of devils_. And by that means the\ncontagion was derived also to the Jews, both of Judea and Alexandria,\nand other parts, whereinto they were dispersed. But the name of _demon_\nthey did not, as the Grecians, attribute to spirits both good and evil;\nbut to the evil only: and to the good _demons_ they gave the name of the\nspirit of God; and esteemed those into whose bodies they entered to be\nprophets. [Sidenote: How far received by the Jews.] In sum, all\nsingularity, if good, they attributed to the spirit of God; and if evil,\nto some _demon_, but a \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03b4\u03ac\u03b9\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd, an evil _demon_, that is a _devil_.\nAnd therefore, they called _demoniacs_, that is _possessed by the\ndevil_, such as we call madmen or lunatics; or such as had the falling\nsickness, or that spoke any thing which they, for want of understanding,\nthought absurd. As also of an unclean person in a notorious degree, they\nused to say he had an unclean spirit; of a dumb man, that he had a dumb\ndevil; and of John the Baptist (_Matt._ xi. 18), for the singularity of\nhis fasting, that he had a devil; and of our Saviour, because he said,\nhe that keepeth his sayings should not see death _in \u00e6ternum_, (_John_\nviii. 52), _Now we know thou hast a devil; Abraham is dead, and the\nprophets are dead_: and again, because he said (_John_ vii. 20), _They\nwent about to kill him_, the people answered, _Thou hast a devil; who\ngoeth about to kill thee?_ Whereby it is manifest, that the Jews had the\nsame opinions concerning phantasms, namely, that they were not\nphantasms, that is, idols of the brain, but things real, and independant\non the fancy.\n\n[Sidenote: Why our Saviour controlled it not.]\n\nWhich doctrine, if it be not true, why, may some say, did not our\nSaviour contradict it, and teach the contrary? Nay, why does he use on\ndivers occasions such forms of speech as seem to confirm it? To this I\nanswer, that first, where Christ saith, (_Luke_ xxiv. 39) _A spirit hath\nnot flesh and bone_, though he show that there be spirits, yet he denies\nnot that they are bodies. And where St. Paul says, (_1 Cor._ xv. 44) _we\nshall rise spiritual bodies_, he acknowledgeth the nature of spirits,\nbut that they are bodily spirits; which is not difficult to understand.\nFor air and many other things are bodies, though not flesh and bone, or\nany other gross body to be discerned by the eye. But when our Saviour\nspeaketh to the devil, and commandeth him to go out of a man, if by the\ndevil, he meant a disease, as phrensy, or lunacy, or a corporeal spirit,\nis not the speech improper? Can diseases hear? Or can there be a\ncorporeal spirit in a body of flesh and bone, full already of vital and\nanimal spirits? Are there not, therefore spirits, that neither have\nbodies, nor are mere imaginations? To the first I answer, that the\naddressing of our Saviour\u2019s command to the madness, or lunacy he cureth,\nis no more improper than was his rebuking of the fever, or of the wind\nand sea; for neither do these hear; or than was the command of God, to\nthe light, to the firmament, to the sun, and stars, when he commanded\nthem to be; for they could not hear before they had a being. But those\nspeeches are not improper, because they signify the power of God\u2019s word;\nno more therefore is it improper, to command madness, or lunacy, under\nthe appellation of devils by which they were then commonly understood,\nto depart out of a man\u2019s body. To the second, concerning their being\nincorporeal, I have not yet observed any place of Scripture, from whence\nit can be gathered, that any man was ever possessed with any other\ncorporeal spirit, but that of his own, by which his body is naturally\nmoved.\n\n[Sidenote: The Scriptures do not teach that spirits are incorporeal.]\n\nOur Saviour, immediately after the Holy Ghost descended upon him in the\nform of a dove, is said by St. Matthew (chapter iv. 1), to have been\n_led up by the Spirit into the wilderness_; and the same is recited\n(_Luke_ iv. 1) in these words, _Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost, was\nled in the Spirit into the wilderness_; whereby it is evident that by\n_spirit_ there, is meant the Holy Ghost. This cannot be interpreted for\na possession; for Christ, and the Holy Ghost, are but one and the same\nsubstance; which is no possession of one substance, or body, by another.\nAnd whereas in the verses following he is said _to have been taken up by\nthe devil into the holy city, and set upon a pinnacle of the temple_,\nshall we conclude thence that he was possessed of the devil, or carried\nthither by violence? And again, _carried thence by the devil into an\nexceeding high mountain, who showed him thence all the kingdoms of the\nworld_: wherein we are not to believe he was either possessed, or forced\nby the devil; nor that any mountain is high enough, according to the\nliteral sense, to show him one whole hemisphere. What then can be the\nmeaning of this place, other than that he went of himself into the\nwilderness; and that this carrying of him up and down from the\nwilderness to the city, and from thence into a mountain, was a vision?\nConformable whereunto, is also the phrase of St. Luke, that he was led\ninto the wilderness, not _by_, but _in_, the Spirit; whereas, concerning\nhis being taken up into the mountain, and unto the pinnacle of the\ntemple, he speaketh as St. Matthew doth: which suiteth with the nature\nof a vision.\n\nAgain, where St. Luke (chap. xxii. 3, 4) says of Judas Iscariot, that\n_Satan entered into him, and thereupon that he went and communed with\nthe chief priests, and captains, how he might betray Christ unto them_;\nit may be answered, that by the entering of Satan, that is the _enemy_,\ninto him, is meant, the hostile and traitorous intention of selling his\nLord and Master. For as by the Holy Ghost, is frequently in Scripture\nunderstood, the graces and good inclinations given by the Holy Ghost; so\nby the entering of Satan may be understood the wicked cogitations, and\ndesigns of the adversaries of Christ, and his disciples. For as it is\nhard to say, that the devil was entered into Judas, before he had any\nsuch hostile design; so it is impertinent to say, he was first Christ\u2019s\nenemy in his heart, and that the devil entered into him afterwards.\nTherefore the entering of Satan, and his wicked purpose, was one and the\nsame thing.\n\n[Sidenote: The Scriptures do not teach that spirits are incorporeal.]\n\nBut if there be no immaterial spirit, or any possession of men\u2019s bodies\nby any spirit corporeal, it may again be asked, why our Saviour and his\napostles did not teach the people so; and in such clear words, as they\nmight no more doubt thereof. But such questions as these, are more\ncurious, than necessary for a Christian man\u2019s salvation. Men may as well\nask why Christ, that could have given to all men faith, piety, and all\nmanner of moral virtues, gave it to some only, and not to all: and why\nhe left the search of natural causes, and sciences, to the natural\nreason and industry of men, and did not reveal it to all, or any man\nsupernaturally; and many other such questions. Of which nevertheless\nthere may be alleged probable and pious reasons. For as God, when he\nbrought the Israelites into the land of Promise, did not secure them\ntherein, by subduing all the nations round about them; but left many of\nthem, as thorns in their sides, to awaken from time to time their piety\nand industry: so our Saviour, in conducting us toward his heavenly\nkingdom, did not destroy all the difficulties of natural questions; but\nleft them to exercise our industry, and reason; the scope of his\npreaching, being only to show us this plain and direct way to salvation,\nnamely, the belief of this article, _that he was the Christ, the Son of\nthe living God, sent into the world to sacrifice himself for our sins,\nand at his coming again, gloriously to reign over his elect, and to save\nthem from their enemies eternally_. To which, the opinion of possession\nby spirits, or phantasms, is no impediment in the way; though it be to\nsome an occasion of going out of the way, and to follow their own\ninventions. If we require of the Scripture an account of all questions,\nwhich may be raised to trouble us in the performance of God\u2019s commands,\nwe may as well complain of Moses for not having set down the time of the\ncreation of such spirits, as well as of the creation of the earth and\nsea, and of men and beasts. To conclude; I find in Scripture that there\nbe angels, and spirits, good and evil; but not that they are\nincorporeal, as are the apparitions men see in the dark, or in a dream,\nor vision; which the Latins call _spectra_, and took for _demons_. And I\nfind that there are spirits corporeal, though subtle and invisible; but\nnot that any man\u2019s body was possessed or inhabited by them; and that the\nbodies of the saints shall be such, namely, spiritual bodies, as St.\nPaul calls them.\n\n[Sidenote: The power of casting out devils, not the same it was in the\n primitive church.]\n\nNevertheless, the contrary doctrine, namely, that there be incorporeal\nspirits, hath hitherto so prevailed in the Church, that the use of\nexorcism, that is to say, of ejection of devils by conjuration, is\nthereupon built; and, though rarely and faintly practised, is not yet\ntotally given over. That there were many demoniacs in the primitive\nChurch, and few madmen, and other such singular diseases; whereas in\nthese times we hear of, and see many madmen, and few demoniacs, proceeds\nnot from the change of nature, but of names. But how it comes to pass\nthat whereas heretofore the apostles, and after them for a time, the\npastors of the Church, did cure those singular diseases, which now they\nare not seen to do; as likewise, why it is not in the power of every\ntrue believer now, to do all that the faithful did then, that is to say,\nas we read (_Mark_ xvi. 17, 18), _in Christ\u2019s name to cast out devils,\nto speak with new tongues, to take up serpents, to drink deadly poison\nwithout harm-taking, and to cure the sick by the laying on of their\nhands_, and all this without other words, but _in the name of Jesus_, is\nanother question. And it is probable that those extraordinary gifts were\ngiven to the Church, for no longer a time, than men trusted wholly to\nChrist, and looked for their felicity only in his kingdom to come; and\nconsequently, that when they sought authority, and riches, and trusted\nto their own subtlety for a kingdom of this world, these supernatural\ngifts of God were again taken from them.\n\n[Sidenote: Another relic of Gentilism, worshipping of images, left in\n the Church, not brought into it.]\n\nAnother relic of Gentilism is, the _worship of images_, neither\ninstituted by Moses in the Old, nor by Christ in the New Testament; nor\nyet brought in from the Gentiles; but left amongst them after they had\ngiven their names to Christ. Before our Saviour preached, it was the\ngeneral religion of the Gentiles to worship for gods those apparences\nthat remain in the brain from the impression of external bodies upon the\norgans of their senses, which are commonly called _ideas_, _idols_,\n_phantasms_, _conceits_, as being representations of those external\nbodies which cause them, and have nothing in them of reality, no more\nthan there is in the things that seem to stand before us in a dream. And\nthis is the reason why St. Paul says, (1 Cor. viii. 4) _we know that an\nidol is nothing_; not that he thought that an image of metal, stone, or\nwood, was nothing; but that the thing which they honoured, or feared in\nthe image, and held for a god, was a mere figment, without place,\nhabitation, motion, or existence, but in the motions of the brain. And\nthe worship of these with divine honour, is that which is in the\nScripture called idolatry, and rebellion against God. For God being King\nof the Jews, and his lieutenant being first Moses, and afterward the\nhigh-priest; if the people had been permitted to worship, and pray to\nimages, which are representations of their own fancies, they had had no\nfurther dependance on the true God, of whom there can be no similitude;\nnor on his prime-ministers, Moses and the high-priests; but every man\nhad governed himself according to his own appetite, to the utter\neversion of the commonwealth, and their own destruction for want of\nunion. And therefore the first law of God was, _they should not take for\ngods_, ALIENOS DEOS, that is, _the gods of other nations, but that only\ntrue God, who vouchsafed to commune with Moses, and by him to give them\nlaws and directions, for their peace, and for their salvation from their\nenemies_. And the second was, that _they should not make to themselves\nany image to worship, of their own invention_. For it is the same\ndeposing of a king, to submit to another king, whether he be set up by a\nneighbour nation, or by ourselves.\n\n[Sidenote: Answer to certain seeming texts for images.]\n\nThe places of Scripture pretended to countenance the setting up of\nimages, to worship them; or to set them up at all in the places where\nGod is worshipped, are first, two examples; one of the cherubims over\nthe ark of God; the other of the brazen serpent. Secondly, some texts\nwhereby we are commanded to worship certain creatures for their relation\nto God; as to worship his footstool. And lastly, some other texts, by\nwhich is authorized a religious honouring of holy things. But before I\nexamine the force of those places, to prove that which is pretended, I\nmust first explain what is to be understood by _worshipping_, and what\nby _images_ and _idols_.\n\n[Sidenote: What is worship.]\n\nI have already shown in the XXTH chapter of this discourse, that to\nhonour, is to value highly the power of any person: and that such value\nis measured, by our comparing him with others. But because there is\nnothing to be compared with God in power; we honour him not, but\ndishonour him by any value less than infinite. And thus honour is\nproperly of its own nature, secret, and internal in the heart. But the\ninward thoughts of men, which appear outwardly in their words and\nactions, are the signs of our honouring, and these go by the name of\n_worship_; in Latin, _cultus_. Therefore, to pray to, to swear by, to\nobey, to be diligent and officious in serving: in sum, all words and\nactions that betoken fear to offend, or desire to please, is _worship_,\nwhether those words and actions be sincere, or feigned: and because they\nappear as signs of honouring, are ordinarily also called _honour_.\n\n[Sidenote: Distinction between divine and civil worship.]\n\nThe worship we exhibit to those we esteem to be but men, as to kings,\nand men in authority, is _civil worship_: but the worship we exhibit to\nthat which we think to be God, whatsoever the words, ceremonies,\ngestures or other actions be, is _divine worship_. To fall prostrate\nbefore a king, in him that thinks him but a man, is but civil worship:\nand he that putteth off his hat in the church, for this cause, that he\nthinketh it the house of God, worshippeth with divine worship. They that\nseek the distinction of divine and civil worship, not in the intention\nof the worshipper, but in the words \u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 and \u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, deceive\nthemselves. For whereas there be two sorts of servants: that sort, which\nis of those that are absolutely in the power of their masters, as slaves\ntaken in war, and their issue, whose bodies are not in their own power,\n(their lives depending on the will of their masters, in such manner as\nto forfeit them upon the least disobedience), and that are bought and\nsold as beasts, were called \u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9, that is, properly slaves, and their\nservice \u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1: the other, which is of those that serve (for hire, or\nin hope of benefit from their masters) voluntarily, are called \u03b8\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2;\nthat is, domestic servants, to whose service the masters have no further\nright, than is contained in the covenants made betwixt them. These two\nkinds of servants have thus much common to them both, that their labour\nis appointed them by another: and the word \u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2, is the general name\nof both, signifying him that worketh for another, whether as a slave, or\na voluntary servant. So that \u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 signifieth generally all service;\nbut \u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 the service of bondmen only, and the condition of slavery:\nand both are used in Scripture, (to signify our service of God)\npromiscuously; \u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, because we are God\u2019s slaves; \u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1, because we\nserve him. And in all kinds of service is contained, not only obedience,\nbut also worship; that is, such actions, gestures, and words, as signify\n_honour_.\n\n[Sidenote: An image, what.]\n\nAn _image_, in the most strict signification of the word, is the\nresemblance of something visible: [Sidenote: Phantasms.] in which sense\nthe phantastical forms, apparitions, or seemings of visible bodies to\nthe sight, are only _images_; such as are the show of a man, or other\nthing in the water, by reflection, or refraction; or of the sun, or\nstars by direct vision in the air; which are nothing real in the things\nseen, nor in the place where they seem to be; nor are their magnitudes\nand figures the same with that of the object; but changeable, by the\nvariation of the organs of sight, or by glasses, and are present\noftentimes in our imagination, and in our dreams, when the object is\nabsent; or changed into other colours and shapes, as things that depend\nonly upon the fancy. And these are the _images_, which are originally\nand most properly called _ideas_, and _idols_, and derived from the\nlanguage of the _Grecians_, with whom the word \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03c9 signifieth _to see_.\nThey also are called _phantasms_, which is in the same language,\n_apparitions_. And from these images it is, that one of the faculties of\nman\u2019s nature, is called the _imagination_. And from hence it is\nmanifest, that there neither is, nor can be, any image made of a thing\ninvisible.\n\nIt is also evident, that there can be, no image of a thing infinite: for\nall the images, and phantasms that are made by the impression of things\nvisible, are figured; but figure is a quantity every way determined. And\ntherefore there can be no image of God; nor of the soul of man; nor of\nspirits; but only of bodies visible; that is, bodies that have light in\nthemselves, or are by such enlightened.\n\n[Sidenote: Fictions.]\n\nAnd whereas a man can fancy shapes he never saw; making up a figure out\nof the parts of divers creatures; as the poets make their centaurs,\nchimeras, and other monsters never seen: so can he also give matter to\nthose shapes, and make them in wood, clay, or metal. [Sidenote: Material\nimages.] And these are also called images, not for the resemblance of\nany corporeal thing, but for the resemblance of some phantastical\ninhabitants of the brain of the maker. But in these idols, as they are\noriginally in the brain, and as they are painted, carved, moulded, or\nmoulten in matter, there is a similitude of the one to the other, for\nwhich the material body made by art, may be said to be the image of the\nfantastical idol made by nature.\n\nBut in a larger use of the word image, is contained also, any\nrepresentation of one thing by another. So an earthly sovereign may be\ncalled the image of God: and an inferior magistrate, the image of an\nearthly sovereign. And many times in the idolatry of the Gentiles there\nwas little regard to the similitude of their material idol to the idol\nin their fancy, and yet it was called the image of it. For a stone\nunhewn has been set up for Neptune, and divers other shapes far\ndifferent from the shapes they conceived of their gods. And at this day\nwe see many images of the Virgin Mary, and other saints, unlike one\nanother, and without correspondence to any one man\u2019s fancy; and yet\nserve well enough for the purpose they were erected for; which was no\nmore but by the names only, to represent the persons mentioned in the\nhistory; to which every man applieth a mental image of his own making,\nor none at all. And thus an image in the largest sense, is either the\nresemblance, or the representation of some thing visible; or both\ntogether, as it happeneth for the most part.\n\nBut the name of idol is extended yet further in Scripture, to signify\nalso the sun, or a star, or any other creature, visible or invisible,\nwhen they are worshipped for gods.\n\n[Sidenote: Idolatry, what.]\n\nHaving shown what is _worship_, and what an _image_; I will now put them\ntogether, and examine what that IDOLATRY is, which is forbidden in the\nsecond commandment, and other places of the Scripture.\n\nTo worship an image, is voluntarily to do those external acts, which are\nsigns of honouring either the matter of the image, which is wood, stone,\nmetal, or some other visible creature; or the phantasm of the brain, for\nthe resemblance, or representation whereof, the matter was formed and\nfigured; or both together, as one animate body, composed of the matter\nand the phantasm, as of a body and soul.\n\nTo be uncovered, before a man of power and authority, or before the\nthrone of a prince, or in such other places as he ordaineth to that\npurpose in his absence, is to worship that man, or prince with civil\nworship; as being a sign, not of honouring the stool or place, but the\nperson; and is not idolatry. But if he that doth it, should suppose the\nsoul of the prince to be in the stool, or should present a petition to\nthe stool, it were divine worship, and idolatry.\n\nTo pray to a king for such things, as he is able to do for us, though we\nprostrate ourselves before him, is but civil worship; because we\nacknowledge no other power in him, but human: but voluntarily to pray\nunto him for fair weather, or for any thing which God only can do for\nus, is divine worship, and idolatry. On the other side, if a king compel\na man to it by the terror of death, or other great corporal punishment,\nit is not idolatry: for the worship which the sovereign commandeth to be\ndone unto himself by the terror of his laws, is not a sign that he that\nobeyeth him, does inwardly honour him as a God, but that he is desirous\nto save himself from death, or from a miserable life; and that which is\nnot a sign of internal honour, is no worship; and therefore no idolatry.\nNeither can it be said, that he that does it, scandalizeth, or layeth\nany stumbling block before his brother; because how wise, or learned\nsoever he be that worshippeth in that manner, another man cannot from\nthence argue, that he approveth it; but that he doth it for fear; and\nthat it is not his act, but the act of his sovereign.\n\nTo worship God, in some peculiar place, or turning a man\u2019s face towards\nan image, or determinate place, is not to worship, or honour the place,\nor image; but to acknowledge it holy, that is to say, to acknowledge the\nimage, or the place to be set apart from common use. For that is the\nmeaning of the word _holy_; which implies no new quality in the place or\nimage, but only a new relation by appropriation to God; and therefore is\nnot idolatry; no more than it was idolatry to worship God before the\nbrazen serpent; or for the Jews, when they were out of their own\ncountry, to turn their faces, when they prayed, towards the temple of\nJerusalem; or for Moses to put off his shoes when he was before the\nflaming bush, the ground appertaining to Mount Sinai, which place God\nhad chosen to appear in, and to give his laws to the people of Israel,\nand was therefore holy ground, not by inherent sanctity, but by\nseparation to God\u2019s use; or for Christians to worship in the churches,\nwhich are once solemnly dedicated to God for that purpose, by the\nauthority of the king, or other true representant of the Church. But to\nworship God, as inanimating, or inhabiting such image, or place; that is\nto say, in infinite substance in a finite place, is idolatry: for such\nfinite gods, are but idols of the brain, nothing real; and are commonly\ncalled in the Scripture by the names of _vanity_, and _lies_, and\n_nothing_. Also to worship God, not as inanimating, or present in the\nplace, or image; but to the end to be put in mind of him, or of some\nworks of his, in case the place, or image be dedicated, or set up by\nprivate authority, and not by the authority of them that are our\nsovereign pastors, is idolatry. For the commandment is, _thou shalt not\nmake to thyself any graven image_. God commanded Moses to set up the\nbrazen serpent; he did not make it to himself; it was not therefore\nagainst the commandment. But the making of the golden calf by Aaron, and\nthe people, as being done without authority from God, was idolatry; not\nonly because they held it for God, but also because they made it for a\nreligious use, without warrant either from God their sovereign, or from\nMoses, that was his lieutenant.\n\nThe Gentiles worshipped for gods, Jupiter and others; that living, were\nmen perhaps that had done great and glorious acts: and for the children\nof God, divers men and women, supposing them gotten between an immortal\ndeity, and a mortal man. This was idolatry, because they made them so to\nthemselves, having no authority from God, neither in his eternal law of\nreason, nor in his positive and revealed will. But though our Saviour\nwas a man, whom we also believe to be God immortal, and the Son of God,\nyet this is no idolatry; because we build not that belief upon our own\nfancy, or judgment, but upon the Word of God revealed in the Scriptures.\nAnd for the adoration of the Eucharist, if the words of Christ, _this is\nmy body_, signify, _that he himself, and the seeming bread in his hand,\nand not only so, but that all the seeming morsels of bread that have\never since been, and any time hereafter shall be consecrated by priests,\nbe so many Christ\u2019s bodies, and yet all of them but one body_; then is\nthat no idolatry, because it is authorized by our Saviour: but if that\ntext do not signify that, (for there is no other that can be alleged for\nit) then, because it is a worship of human institution, it is idolatry.\nFor it is not enough to say, God can transubstantiate the bread into\nChrist\u2019s body: for the Gentiles also held God to be omnipotent, and\nmight upon that ground no less excuse their idolatry, by pretending, as\nwell as others, a transubstantiation of their wood, and stone into God\nAlmighty.\n\nWhereas there be, that pretend divine inspiration to be the supernatural\nentering of the Holy Ghost into a man, and not an acquisition of God\u2019s\ngraces, by doctrine, and study; I think they are in a very dangerous\ndilemma. For if they worship not the man whom they believe to be so\ninspired, they fall into impiety; as not adoring God\u2019s supernatural\npresence. And again, if they worship him, they commit idolatry; for the\napostles would never permit themselves to be so worshipped. Therefore\nthe safest way is to believe, that by the descending of the dove upon\nthe apostles; and by Christ\u2019s breathing on them, when he gave them the\nHoly Ghost; and by the giving of it by imposition of hands, are\nunderstood the signs which God has been pleased to use, or ordain to be\nused, of his promise to assist those persons in their study to preach\nhis kingdom, and in their conversation, that it might not be scandalous,\nbut edifying to others.\n\n[Sidenote: Scandalous worship of images.]\n\nBesides the idolatrous worship of images, there is also a scandalous\nworship of them; which is also a sin, but not idolatry. For _idolatry_\nis to worship by signs of an internal, and real honour: but _scandalous\nworship_, is but seeming worship, and may sometimes be joined with an\ninward, and hearty detestation, both of the image, and of the\nphantastical _demon_, or idol, to which it is dedicated; and proceed\nonly from the fear of death, or other grievous punishment; and is\nnevertheless a sin in them that so worship, in case they be men whose\nactions are looked at by others, as lights to guide them by; because\nfollowing their ways, they cannot but stumble, and fall in the way of\nreligion: whereas the example of those we regard not, works not on us at\nall, but leaves us to our own diligence and caution; and consequently\nare no causes of our falling.\n\nIf therefore a pastor lawfully called to teach and direct others, or any\nother, of whose knowledge there is a great opinion, do external honour\nto an idol for fear; unless he make his fear and unwillingness to it, as\nevident as the worship; he scandalizeth his brother, by seeming to\napprove idolatry. For his brother arguing from the action of his\nteacher, or of him whose knowledge he esteemeth great, concludes it to\nbe lawful in itself. And this scandal is sin, and a _scandal given_. But\nif one being no pastor, nor of eminent reputation for knowledge in\nChristian doctrine, do the same, and another follow him; this is no\nscandal given; for he had no cause to follow such example: but is a\npretence of scandal, which he taketh of himself for an excuse before\nmen. For an unlearned man, that is in the power of an idolatrous king,\nor state, if commanded on pain of death to worship before an idol, he\ndetesteth the idol in his heart, he doth well; though if he had the\nfortitude to suffer death, rather than worship it, he should do better.\nBut if a pastor, who as Christ\u2019s messenger, has undertaken to teach\nChrist\u2019s doctrine to all nations, should do the same, it were not only a\nsinful scandal, in respect of other Christian men\u2019s consciences, but a\nperfidious forsaking of his charge.\n\nThe sum of that which I have said hitherto, concerning the worship of\nimages, is this, that he that worshippeth in an image, or any creature,\neither the matter thereof, or any fancy of his own, which he thinketh to\ndwell in it; or both together; or believeth that such things hear his\nprayers, or see his devotions, without ears or eyes, committeth\nidolatry: and he that counterfeiteth such worship for fear of\npunishment, if he be a man whose example hath power amongst his\nbrethren, committeth a sin. But he that worshippeth the Creator of the\nworld before such an image, or in such a place as he hath not made, or\nchosen of himself, but taken from the commandment of God\u2019s word, as the\nJews did in worshipping God before the cherubims, and before the brazen\nserpent for a time, and in, or towards the Temple of Jerusalem, which\nwas also but for a time, committeth not idolatry.\n\nNow for the worship of saints, and images, and relics, and other things\nat this day practised in the Church of Rome, I say they are not allowed\nby the Word of God, nor brought into the Church of Rome, from the\ndoctrine there taught; but partly left in it at the first conversion of\nthe Gentiles; and afterwards countenanced, and confirmed, and augmented\nby the bishops of Rome.\n\n[Sidenote: Answer to the argument from the cherubims, and brazen\n serpent.]\n\nAs for the proofs alleged out of Scripture, namely, those examples of\nimages appointed by God to be set up; they were not set up for the\npeople, or any man to worship, but that they should worship God himself\nbefore them; as before the cherubims over the ark, and the brazen\nserpent. For we read not, that the priest, or any other did worship the\ncherubims; but contrarily we read (_2 Kings_ xviii. 4) that Hezekiah\nbrake in pieces the brazen serpent which Moses had set up, because the\npeople burnt incense to it. Besides, those examples are not put for our\nimitation, that we also should set up images, under pretence of\nworshipping God before them; because the words of the second\ncommandment, _thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image, &c._\ndistinguish between the images that God commanded to be set up, and\nthose which we set up to ourselves. And therefore from the cherubims or\nbrazen serpent, to the images of man\u2019s devising; and from the worship\ncommanded by God, to the will-worship of men, the argument is not good.\nThis also is to be considered, that as Hezekiah brake in pieces the\nbrazen serpent, because the Jews did worship it, to the end they should\ndo so no more; so also Christian sovereigns ought to break down the\nimages which their subjects have been accustomed to worship, that there\nbe no more occasion of such idolatry. For at this day, the ignorant\npeople, where images are worshipped, do really believe there is a divine\npower in the images; and are told by their pastors, that some of them\nhave spoken; and have bled; and that miracles have been done by them;\nwhich they apprehend as done by the saint, which they think either is\nthe image itself, or in it. The Israelites, when they worshipped the\ncalf, did think they worshipped the God that brought them out of Egypt;\nand yet it was idolatry, because they thought the calf either was that\nGod, or had him in his belly. And though some man may think it\nimpossible for people to be so stupid, as to think the image to be God,\nor a saint; or to worship it in that notion; yet it is manifest in\nScripture to the contrary; where when the golden calf was made, the\npeople said, (_Exod._ xxxii. 4) _These are thy gods, O Israel_; and\nwhere the images of Laban (_Gen._ xxxi. 30) are called his gods. And we\nsee daily by experience in all sorts of people, that such men as study\nnothing but their food and ease, are content to believe any absurdity,\nrather than to trouble themselves to examine it; holding their faith as\nit were by entail unalienable, except by an express and new law.\n\n[Sidenote: Painting of fancies no idolatry; but abusing them to\n religious worship is.]\n\nBut they infer from some other places, that it is lawful to paint\nangels, and also God himself: as from God\u2019s walking in the garden; from\nJacob\u2019s seeing God at the top of the ladder; and from other visions, and\ndreams. But visions, and dreams, whether natural, or supernatural, are\nbut phantasms: and he that painteth an image of any of them, maketh not\nan image of God, but of his own phantasm, which is making of an idol. I\nsay not, that to draw a picture after a fancy, is a sin; but when it is\ndrawn, to hold it for a representation of God, is against the second\ncommandment; and can be of no use, but to worship. And the same may be\nsaid of the images of angels, and of men dead; unless as monuments of\nfriends, or of men worthy remembrance. For such use of an image, is not\nworship of the image; but a civil honouring of the person, not that is,\nbut that was. But when it is done to the image which we make of a saint,\nfor no other reason, but that we think he heareth our prayers, and is\npleased with the honour we do him, when dead, and without sense, we\nattribute to him more than human power; and therefore it is idolatry.\n\nSeeing therefore there is no authority, neither in the law of Moses, nor\nin the Gospel, for the religious worship of images, or other\nrepresentations of God, which men set up to themselves; or for the\nworship of the image of any creature in heaven or earth, or under the\nearth: and whereas Christian kings, who are living representants of God,\nare not to be worshipped by their subjects, by any act that signifieth a\ngreater esteem of his power, than the nature of mortal man is capable\nof; it cannot be imagined, that the religious worship now in use, was\nbrought into the Church by misunderstanding of the Scripture. It resteth\ntherefore, that it was left in it, by not destroying the images\nthemselves, in the conversion of the Gentiles that worshipped them.\n\n[Sidenote: How idolatry was left in the Church.]\n\nThe cause whereof, was the immoderate esteem, and prices set upon the\nworkmanship of them, which made the owners, though converted from\nworshipping them as they had done religiously for demons, to retain them\nstill in their houses, upon pretence of doing it in the honour of\nChrist, of the Virgin Mary, and of the Apostles, and other the pastors\nof the primitive Church; as being easy, by giving them new names, to\nmake that an image of the Virgin Mary, and of her son our Saviour, which\nbefore perhaps was called the image of Venus, and Cupid; and so of a\nJupiter to make a Barnabas, and of Mercury a Paul, and the like. And as\nworldly ambition creeping by degrees into the pastors, drew them to an\nendeavour of pleasing the new-made Christians; and also to a liking of\nthis kind of honour, which they also might hope for after their decease,\nas well as those that had already gained it: so the worshipping of the\nimages of Christ and his apostles, grew more and more idolatrous; save\nthat somewhat after the time of Constantine, divers emperors, and\nbishops, and general councils, observed and opposed the unlawfulness\nthereof; but too late, or too weakly.\n\n[Sidenote: Canonizing of saints.]\n\nThe canonizing of saints, is another relic of Gentilism: it is neither a\nmisunderstanding of Scripture, nor a new invention of the Roman Church,\nbut a custom as ancient as the commonwealth of Rome itself. The first\nthat ever was canonized at Rome, was Romulus, and that upon the\nnarration of Julius Proculus, that swore before the senate, he spake\nwith him after his death, and was assured by him, he dwelt in heaven,\nand was there called _Quirinus_, and would be propitious to the state of\ntheir new city: and thereupon the senate gave _public testimony_ of his\nsanctity. Julius C\u00e6sar, and other emperors after him, had the like\n_testimony_; that is, were canonized for saints; for by such testimony\nis CANONIZATION now defined; and is the same with the \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 of the\nheathen.\n\n[Sidenote: The name of Pontifex.]\n\nIt is also from the Roman Heathen, that the Popes have received the\nname, and power of PONTIFEX MAXIMUS. This was the name of him that in\nthe ancient commonwealth of Rome, had the supreme authority under the\nsenate and people, of regulating all ceremonies and doctrines concerning\ntheir religion: and when Augustus C\u00e6sar changed the state into a\nmonarchy, he took to himself no more but this office, and that of\ntribune of the people, that is to say, the supreme power both in state,\nand religion; and the succeeding emperors enjoyed the same. But when the\nemperor Constantine lived, who was the first that professed and\nauthorized Christian religion, it was consonant to his profession, to\ncause religion to be regulated, under his authority, by the Bishop of\nRome: though it do not appear they had so soon the name of Pontifex; but\nrather, that the succeeding bishops took it of themselves, to\ncountenance the power they exercised over the bishops of the Roman\nprovinces. For it is not any privilege of St. Peter, but the privilege\nof the city of Rome, which the emperors were always willing to uphold,\nthat gave them such authority over other bishops; as may be evidently\nseen by that, that the bishop of Constantinople, when the emperor made\nthat city the seat of the empire, pretended to be equal to the bishop of\nRome; though at last, not without contention, the Pope carried it, and\nbecame the _Pontifex Maximus_; but in right only of the emperor; and not\nwithout the bounds of the empire; nor any where, after the emperor had\nlost his power in Rome; though it were the Pope himself that took his\npower from him. From whence we may by the way observe, that there is no\nplace for the superiority of the Pope over other bishops, except in the\nterritories whereof he is himself the civil sovereign, and where the\nemperor having sovereign power civil, hath expressly chosen the Pope for\nthe chief pastor under himself, of his Christian subjects.\n\n[Sidenote: Procession of images.]\n\nThe carrying about of images in _procession_, is another relic of the\nreligion of the Greeks, and Romans. For they also carried their idols\nfrom place to place, in a kind of chariot, which was peculiarly\ndedicated to that use, which the Latins called _thensa_, and _vehiculum\nDeorum_; and the image was placed in a frame, or shrine, which they\ncalled _ferculum_: and that which they called _pompa_, is the same that\nnow is named _procession_. According whereunto, amongst the divine\nhonours which were given to Julius C\u00e6sar by the senate, this was one,\nthat in the pomp, or procession, at the Circ\u00e6an games, he should have\n_thensam et ferculum_, a sacred chariot and a shrine; which was as much,\nas to be carried up and down as a god: just as at this day the Popes are\ncarried by Switzers under a canopy.\n\n[Sidenote: Wax candles, and torches lighted.]\n\nTo these processions also belonged the bearing of burning torches, and\ncandles, before the images of the gods, both amongst the Greeks, and\nRomans. For afterwards the emperors of Rome received the same honour; as\nwe read of Caligula, that at his reception to the empire, he was carried\nfrom Misenum to Rome, in the midst of a throng of people, the ways beset\nwith altars, and beasts for sacrifice, and burning _torches_: and of\nCaracalla, that was received into Alexandria with incense, and with\ncasting of flowers, and \u03b4\u03b1\u03b4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2, that is, with torches; for \u03b4\u03b1\u03b4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c7\u03bf\u03b9\nwere they that amongst the Greeks carried torches lighted in the\nprocessions of their gods. And in process of time, the devout, but\nignorant people, did many times honour their bishops with the like pomp\nof wax candles, and the images of our Saviour, and the saints,\nconstantly, in the church itself. And thus came in the use of wax\ncandles; and was also established by some of the ancient Councils.\n\nThe heathens had also their _aqua lustralis_, that is to say, _holy\nwater_. The Church of Rome imitates them also in their _holy days_. They\nhad their _bacchanalia_; and we have our _wakes_, answering to them:\nthey their _saturnalia_, and we our _carnivals_, and Shrove-Tuesday\u2019s\nliberty of servants: they their procession of _Priapus_; we our fetching\nin, erection, and dancing about _May-poles_; and dancing is one kind of\nworship: they had their procession called _Ambarvalia_; and we our\nprocession about the fields in the _Rogation-week_. Nor do I think that\nthese are all the ceremonies that have been left in the Church, from the\nfirst conversion of the Gentiles; but they are all that I can for the\npresent call to mind; and if a man would well observe that which is\ndelivered in the histories, concerning the religious rites of the Greeks\nand Romans, I doubt not but he might find many more of these old empty\nbottles of Gentilism, which the doctors of the Roman Church, either by\nnegligence or ambition, have filled up again with the new wine of\nChristianity, that will not fail in time to break them.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAP. XLVI.\n\n OF DARKNESS FROM VAIN PHILOSOPHY, AND\n FABULOUS TRADITIONS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: What philosophy is.]\n\nBy PHILOSOPHY is understood _the knowledge acquired by reasoning, from\nthe manner of the generation of any thing, to the properties: or from\nthe properties, to some possible way of generation of the same; to the\nend to be able to produce, as far as matter, and human force permit,\nsuch effects, as human life requireth_. So the geometrician, from the\nconstruction of figures, findeth out many properties thereof; and from\nthe properties, new ways of their construction, by reasoning; to the end\nto be able to measure land, and water; and for infinite other uses. So\nthe astronomer, from the rising, setting, and moving of the sun, and\nstars, in divers parts of the heavens, findeth out the causes of day,\nand night, and of the different seasons of the year; whereby he keepeth\nan account of time; and the like of other sciences.\n\n[Sidenote: Prudence no part of philosophy.]\n\nBy which definition it is evident, that we are not to account as any\npart thereof, that original knowledge called experience, in which\nconsisteth prudence; because it is not attained by reasoning, but found\nas well in brute beasts, as in man; and is but a memory of successions\nof events in times past, wherein the omission of every little\ncircumstance altering the effect, frustrateth the expectation of the\nmost prudent: whereas nothing is produced by reasoning aright, but\ngeneral, eternal, and immutable truth.\n\n[Sidenote: No false doctrine is part of philosophy.]\n\nNor are we therefore to give that name to any false conclusions: for he\nthat reasoneth aright in words he understandeth, can never conclude an\nerror:\n\n[Sidenote: No more is revelation supernatural.]\n\nNor to that which any man knows by supernatural revelation; because it\nis not acquired by reasoning:\n\n[Sidenote: Nor learning taken upon credit of authors.]\n\nNor that which is gotten by reasoning from the authority of books;\nbecause it is not by reasoning from the cause to the effect, nor from\nthe effect to the cause; and is not knowledge but faith.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the beginnings and progress of philosophy.]\n\nThe faculty of reasoning being consequent to the use of speech, it was\nnot possible, but that there should have been some general truths found\nout by reasoning, as ancient almost as language itself. The savages of\nAmerica, are not without some good moral sentences; also they have a\nlittle arithmetic, to add, and divide in numbers not too great: but they\nare not, therefore, philosophers. For as there were plants of corn and\nwine in small quantity dispersed in the fields and woods, before men\nknew their virtue, or made use of them for their nourishment, or planted\nthem apart in fields and vineyards; in which time they fed on acorns,\nand drank water: so also there have been divers true, general, and\nprofitable speculations from the beginning; as being the natural plants\nof human reason. But they were at first but few in number; men lived\nupon gross experience; there was no method; that is to say, no sowing,\nnor planting of knowledge by itself, apart from the weeds, and common\nplants of error and conjecture. And the cause of it being the want of\nleisure from procuring the necessities of life, and defending themselves\nagainst their neighbours, it was impossible, till the erecting of great\ncommonwealths, it should be otherwise. _Leisure_ is the mother of\n_philosophy_; and _Commonwealth_, the mother of _peace_ and _leisure_.\nWhere first were great and flourishing _cities_, there was first the\nstudy of _philosophy_. The _Gymnosophists_ of India, the _Magi_ of\nPersia, and the _Priests_ of Chaldea and Egypt, are counted the most\nancient philosophers; and those countries were the most ancient of\nkingdoms. _Philosophy_ was not risen to the Grecians, and other people\nof the west, whose _commonwealths_, no greater perhaps than Lucca or\nGeneva, had never _peace_, but when their fears of one another were\nequal; nor the _leisure_ to observe anything but one another. At length,\nwhen war had united many of these Grecian lesser cities, into fewer, and\ngreater; then began _seven men_, of several parts of Greece, to get the\nreputation of being _wise_; some of them for _moral_ and _politic_\nsentences; and others for the learning of the Chaldeans and Egyptians,\nwhich was _astronomy_, and _geometry_. But we hear not yet of any\n_schools_ of _philosophy_.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the schools of philosophy amongst the Athenians.]\n\nAfter the Athenians, by the overthrow of the Persian armies, had gotten\nthe dominion of the sea; and thereby, of all the islands, and maritime\ncities of the Archipelago, as well of Asia as Europe; and were grown\nwealthy; they that had no employment, neither at home nor abroad, had\nlittle else to employ themselves in, but either (as St. Luke says,\n_Acts_ xvii. 21), _in telling and hearing news_, or in discoursing of\n_philosophy_ publicly to the youth of the city. Every master took some\nplace for that purpose. Plato, in certain public walks called\n_Academia_, from one _Academus_: Aristotle in the walk of the temple of\nPan, called _Lyceum_: others in the _Stoa_, or covered walk, wherein the\nmerchants\u2019 goods were brought to land: others in other places; where\nthey spent the time of their leisure, in teaching or in disputing of\ntheir opinions: and some in any place, where they could get the youth of\nthe city together to hear them talk. And this was it which Carneades\nalso did at Rome, when he was ambassador: which caused Cato to advise\nthe senate to dispatch him quickly, for fear of corrupting the manners\nof the young men, that delighted to hear him speak, as they thought,\nfine things.\n\nFrom this it was, that the place where any of them taught, and disputed,\nwas called _schola_, which in their tongue signifieth _leisure_; and\ntheir disputations, _diatrib\u00e6_, that is to say, _passing of the time_.\nAlso the philosophers themselves had the name of their sects, some of\nthem from these their Schools: for they that followed Plato\u2019s doctrine,\nwere called _Academics_; the followers of Aristotle _Peripatetics_, from\nthe walk he taught in; and those that Zeno taught _Stoics_, from the\n_Stoa_; as if we should denominate men from _Moor-fields_, from _Paul\u2019s\nChurch_, and from the _Exchange_, because they meet there often, to\nprate and loiter.\n\nNevertheless, men were so much taken with this custom, that in time it\nspread itself over all Europe, and the best part of Afric; so as there\nwere schools publicly erected and maintained, for lectures and\ndisputations, almost in every commonwealth.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the schools of the Jews.]\n\nThere were also schools, anciently, both before and after the time of\nour Saviour, amongst the Jews; but they were schools of their law. For\nthough they were called _synagogues_, that is to say, congregations of\nthe people; yet, inasmuch as the law was every sabbath-day read,\nexpounded, and disputed in them, they differed not in nature, but in\nname only, from public schools; and were not only in Jerusalem, but in\nevery city of the Gentiles, where the Jews inhabited. There was such a\nschool at Damascus, whereinto Paul entered, to persecute. There were\nothers at Antioch, Iconium, and Thessalonica, whereinto he entered to\ndispute: and such was the synagogue of the _Libertines_, _Cyrenians_,\n_Alexandrians_, _Cilicians_, and those of Asia; that is to say, the\nschool of _Libertines_, and of _Jews_ that were strangers in Jerusalem;\nand of this school they were that disputed (_Acts_ vi. 9) with St.\nStephen.\n\n[Sidenote: The schools of the Grecians unprofitable.]\n\nBut what has been the utility of those schools? What science is there at\nthis day acquired by their readings and disputings? That we have of\ngeometry, which is the mother of all natural science, we are not\nindebted for it to the schools. Plato, that was the best philosopher of\nthe Greeks, forbad entrance into his school to all that were not already\nin some measure geometricians. There were many that studied that science\nto the great advantage of mankind: but there is no mention of their\nschools; nor was there any sect of geometricians; nor did they then pass\nunder the name of philosophers. The natural philosophy of those schools\nwas rather a dream than science, and set forth in senseless and\ninsignificant language; which cannot be avoided by those that will teach\nphilosophy, without having first attained great knowledge in geometry.\nFor nature worketh by motion; the ways and degrees whereof cannot be\nknown, without the knowledge of the proportions and properties of lines\nand figures. Their moral philosophy is but a description of their own\npassions. For the rule of manners, without civil government, is the law\nof nature; and in it, the law civil, that determineth what is _honest_\nand _dishonest_, what is _just_ and _unjust_, and generally what is\n_good_ and _evil_. Whereas they make the rules of _good_ and _bad_, by\ntheir own _liking_ and _disliking_: by which means, in so great\ndiversity of taste, there is nothing generally agreed on; but every one\ndoth, as far as he dares, whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, to\nthe subversion of commonwealth. Their _logic_, which should be the\nmethod of reasoning, is nothing else but captions of words, and\ninventions how to puzzle such as should go about to pose them. To\nconclude, there is nothing so absurd, that the old philosophers, as\nCicero saith, (who was one of them,) have not some of them maintained.\nAnd I believe that scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural\nphilosophy, than that which now is called _Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics_; nor\nmore repugnant to government, than much of that he hath said in his\n_Politics_; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his _Ethics_.\n\n[Sidenote: The schools of the Jews unprofitable.]\n\nThe school of the Jews was originally a school of the law of Moses; who\ncommanded (_Deut._ xxxi. 10) that at the end of every seventh year, at\nthe Feast of the Tabernacles, it should be read to all the people, that\nthey might hear and learn it. Therefore the reading of the law, which\nwas in use after the captivity, every Sabbath day, ought to have had no\nother end, but the acquainting of the people with the Commandments which\nthey were to obey, and to expound unto them the writings of the\nprophets. But it is manifest, by the many reprehensions of them by our\nSaviour, that they corrupted the text of the law with their false\ncommentaries, and vain traditions; and so little understood the\nprophets, that they did neither acknowledge Christ, nor the works he\ndid, of which the prophets prophesied. So that by their lectures and\ndisputations in their synagogues, they turned the doctrine of their law\ninto a fantastical kind of philosophy, concerning the incomprehensible\nnature of God, and of spirits; which they compounded of the vain\nphilosophy and theology of the Grecians, mingled with their own fancies,\ndrawn from the obscurer places of the Scripture, and which might most\neasily be wrested to their purpose; and from the fabulous traditions of\ntheir ancestors.\n\n[Sidenote: University, what it is.]\n\nThat which is now called an _University_, is a joining together, and an\nincorporation under one government, of many public schools, in one and\nthe same town or city. In which, the principal schools were ordained for\nthe three professions, that is to say, of the Roman religion, of the\nRoman law, and of the art of medicine. And for the study of philosophy,\nit hath no otherwise place, than as a hand-maid to the Roman religion:\nand since the authority of Aristotle is only current there, that study\nis not properly philosophy, (the nature whereof dependeth not on\nauthors,) but _Aristotelity_. And for geometry, till of very late times\nit had no place at all; as being subservient to nothing but rigid truth.\nAnd if any man by the ingenuity of his own nature, had attained to any\ndegree of perfection therein, he was commonly thought a magician, and\nhis art diabolical.\n\n[Sidenote: Errors brought into religion from Aristotle\u2019s metaphysics.]\n\nNow to descend to the particular tenets of vain philosophy, derived to\nthe Universities, and thence into the Church, partly from Aristotle,\npartly from blindness of understanding; I shall first consider their\nprinciples. There is a certain _philosophia prima_, on which all other\nphilosophy ought to depend; and consisteth principally, in right\nlimiting of the significations of such appellations, or names, as are of\nall others the most universal; which limitations serve to avoid\nambiguity and equivocation in reasoning; and are commonly called\ndefinitions; such as are the definitions of body, time, place, matter,\nform, essence, subject, substance, accident, power, act, finite,\ninfinite, quantity, quality, motion, action, passion, and divers others,\nnecessary to the explaining of a man\u2019s conceptions concerning the nature\nand generation of bodies. The explication, that is, the settling of the\nmeaning, of which, and the like terms, is commonly in the Schools called\n_metaphysics_; as being a part of the philosophy of Aristotle, which\nhath that for title. But it is in another sense; for there it signifieth\nas much as _books written or placed after his natural philosophy_: but\nthe schools take them for _books of supernatural philosophy_: for the\nword _metaphysics_ will bear both these senses. And indeed that which is\nthere written, is for the most part so far from the possibility of being\nunderstood, and so repugnant to natural reason, that whosoever thinketh\nthere is any thing to be understood by it, must needs think it\nsupernatural.\n\n[Sidenote: Errors concerning abstract essences.]\n\nFrom these metaphysics, which are mingled with the Scripture to make\nschool divinity, we are told, there be in the world certain essences\nseparated from bodies, which they call _abstract essences, and\nsubstantial forms_. For the interpreting of which jargon, there is need\nof somewhat more than ordinary attention in this place. Also I ask\npardon of those that are not used to this kind of discourse, for\napplying myself to those that are. The world, (I mean not the earth\nonly, that denominates the lovers of it _worldly men_, but the\n_universe_, that is, the whole mass of all things that are), is\ncorporeal, that is to say, body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude,\nnamely, length, breadth, and depth: also every part of body, is likewise\nbody, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the\nuniverse, is body, and that which is not body, is no part of the\nuniverse: and because the universe is all, that which is no part of it,\nis _nothing_; and consequently _no where_. Nor does it follow from\nhence, that spirits are _nothing_: for they have dimensions, and are\ntherefore really _bodies_; though that name in common speech be given to\nsuch bodies only, as are visible, or palpable; that is, that have some\ndegree of opacity. But for spirits, they call them incorporeal; which is\na name of more honour, and may therefore with more piety be attributed\nto God himself; in whom we consider not what attribute expresseth best\nhis nature, which is incomprehensible; but what best expresseth our\ndesire to honour Him.\n\nTo know now upon what grounds they say there be _essences abstract_, or\n_substantial forms_, we are to consider what those words do properly\nsignify. The use of words, is to register to ourselves, and make\nmanifest to others the thoughts and conceptions of our minds. Of which\nwords, some are the names of the things conceived; as the names of all\nsorts of bodies, that work upon the senses, and leave an impression in\nthe imagination. Others are the names of the imaginations themselves;\nthat is to say, of those ideas, or mental images we have of all things\nwe see, or remember. And others again are names of names; or of\ndifferent sorts of speech: as _universal_, _plural_, _singular_, are the\nnames of names; and _definition_, _affirmation_, _negation_, _true_,\n_false_, _syllogism_, _interrogation_, _promise_, _covenant_, are the\nnames of certain forms of speech. Others serve to show the consequence,\nor repugnance of one name to another; as when one saith, _a man is a\nbody_, he intendeth that the name of _body_ is necessarily consequent to\nthe name of _man_; as being but several names of the same thing, _man_;\nwhich consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word\n_is_. And as we use the verb _is_, so the Latins use their verb _est_,\nand the Greeks their \u1f1c\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 through all its declinations. Whether all\nother nations of the world have in their several languages a word that\nanswereth to it, or not, I cannot tell; but I am sure they have not need\nof it. For the placing of two names in order may serve to signify their\nconsequence, if it were the custom, (for custom is it, that gives words\ntheir force,) as well as the words _is_, or _be_, or _are_, and the\nlike.\n\nAnd if it were so, that there were a language without any verb\nanswerable to _est_, or _is_, or _be_; yet the men that used it would be\nnot a jot the less capable of inferring, concluding, and of all kind of\nreasoning, than were the Greeks, and Latins. But what then would become\nof these terms, of _entity_, _essence_, _essential_, _essentiality_,\nthat are derived from it, and of many more than depend on these, applied\nas most commonly they are? They are therefore no names of things; but\nsigns, by which we make known, that we conceive the consequence of one\nname or attribute to another: as when we say, _a man is a living body_,\nwe mean not that the _man_ is one thing, the _living body_ another, and\nthe _is_, or _being_ a third; but that the _man_, and the _living body_,\nis the same thing; because the consequence, _if he be a man, he is a\nliving body_, is a true consequence, signified by that word _is_.\nTherefore, _to be a body_, _to walk_, _to be speaking_, _to live_, _to\nsee_, and the like infinitives; also _corporeity_, _walking_,\n_speaking_, _life_, _sight_, and the like, that signify just the same,\nare the names of _nothing_; as I have elsewhere more amply expressed.\n\nBut to what purpose, may some man say, is such subtlety in a work of\nthis nature, where I pretend to nothing but what is necessary to the\ndoctrine of government and obedience? It is to this purpose, that men\nmay no longer suffer themselves to be abused, by them, that by this\ndoctrine of _separated essences_, built on the vain philosophy of\nAristotle, would fright them from obeying the laws of their country,\nwith empty names; as men fright birds from the corn with an empty\ndoublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. For it is upon this ground, that\nwhen a man is dead and buried, they say his soul, that is his life, can\nwalk separated from his body, and is seen by night amongst the graves.\nUpon the same ground they say, that the figure, and colour, and taste of\na piece of bread, has a being, there, where they say there is no bread.\nAnd upon the same ground they say, that faith, and wisdom, and other\nvirtues, are sometimes _poured_ into a man, sometimes _blown_ into him\nfrom Heaven, as if the virtuous and their virtues could be asunder; and\na great many other things that serve to lessen the dependance of\nsubjects on the sovereign power of their country. For who will endeavour\nto obey the laws, if he expect obedience to be poured or blown into him?\nOr who will not obey a priest, that can make God, rather than his\nsovereign, nay than God himself? Or who, that is in fear of ghosts, will\nnot bear great respect to those that can make the holy water, that\ndrives them from him? And this shall suffice for an example of the\nerrors, which are brought into the Church, from the _entities_ and\n_essences_ of Aristotle: which it may be he knew to be false philosophy;\nbut writ it as a thing consonant to, and corroborative of their\nreligion; and fearing the fate of Socrates.\n\nBeing once fallen into this error of _separated essences_, they are\nthereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it.\nFor seeing they will have these forms to be real, they are obliged to\nassign them _some place_. But because they hold them incorporeal,\nwithout all dimension of quantity, and all men know that place is\ndimension, and not to be filled, but by that which is corporeal; they\nare driven to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they are not\nindeed anywhere _circumscriptiv\u00e8_, but _definitiv\u00e8_; which terms being\nmere words, and in this occasion insignificant, pass only in Latin, that\nthe vanity of them may be concealed. For the circumscription of a thing,\nis nothing else but the determination, or defining of its place; and so\nboth the terms of the distinction are the same. And in particular, of\nthe essence of a man, which, they say, is his soul, they affirm it, to\nbe all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other part,\nhow small soever, of his body; and yet no more soul in the whole body,\nthan in any one of those parts. Can any man think that God is served\nwith such absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to believe, to\nthose that will believe the existence of an incorporeal soul, separated\nfrom the body.\n\nAnd when they come to give account how an incorporeal substance can be\ncapable of pain, and be tormented in the fire of hell or purgatory, they\nhave nothing at all to answer, but that it cannot be known how fire can\nburn souls.\n\nAgain, whereas motion is change of place, and incorporeal substances are\nnot capable of place, they are troubled to make it seem possible, how a\nsoul can go hence, without the body, to heaven, hell, or purgatory; and\nhow the ghosts of men, and I may add of their clothes which they appear\nin, can walk by night in churches, churchyards, and other places of\nsepulture. To which I know not what they can answer, unless they will\nsay, they walk _definitiv\u00e8_, not _circumscriptiv\u00e8_, or _spiritually_,\nnot _temporally_: for such egregious distinctions are equally applicable\nto any difficulty whatsoever.\n\n[Sidenote: Nunc-stans.]\n\nFor the meaning of _eternity_, they will not have it to be an endless\nsuccession of time; for then they should not be able to render a reason\nhow God\u2019s will, and preordaining of things to come, should not be before\nhis prescience of the same, as the efficient cause before the effect, or\nagent before the action; nor of many other their bold opinions\nconcerning the incomprehensible nature of God. But they will teach us,\nthat eternity is the standing still of the present time, a _nunc-stans_,\nas the Schools call it; which neither they, nor any else understand, no\nmore than they would a _hic-stans_ for an infinite greatness of place.\n\n[Sidenote: One body in many places, and many bodies in one place at\n once.]\n\nAnd whereas men divide a body in their thought, by numbering parts of\nit, and, in numbering those parts, number also the parts of the place it\nfilled; it cannot be, but in making many parts, we make also many places\nof those parts; whereby there cannot be conceived in the mind of any\nman, more, or fewer parts, than there are places for: yet they will have\nus believe, that by the Almighty power of God, one body may be at one\nand the same time in many places; and many bodies at one and the same\ntime in one place: as if it were an acknowledgment of the Divine Power\nto say, that which is, is not; or that which has been, has not been. And\nthese are but a small part of the incongruities they are forced to, from\ntheir disputing philosophically, instead of admiring, and adoring of the\ndivine and incomprehensible nature; whose attributes cannot signify what\nhe is, but ought to signify our desire to honour him, with the best\nappellations we can think on. But they that venture to reason of his\nnature, from these attributes of honour, losing their understanding in\nthe very first attempt, fall from one inconvenience into another,\nwithout end, and without number; in the same manner, as when a man\nignorant of the ceremonies of court, coming into the presence of a\ngreater person than he is used to speak to, and stumbling at his\nentrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak; to recover\nhis cloak, lets fall his hat; and with one disorder after another,\ndiscovers his astonishment and rusticity.\n\n[Sidenote: Absurdities in natural philosophy, as gravity the cause of\n heaviness.]\n\nThen for _physics_, that is, the knowledge of the subordinate and\nsecondary causes of natural events; they render none at all, but empty\nwords. If you desire to know why some kind of bodies sink naturally\ndownwards toward the earth, and others go naturally from it; the Schools\nwill tell you out of Aristotle, that the bodies that sink downwards, are\n_heavy_; and that this heaviness is it that causes them to descend. But\nif you ask what they mean by _heaviness_, they will define it to be an\nendeavour to go to the centre of the earth. So that the cause why things\nsink downward, is an endeavour to be below: which is as much as to say,\nthat bodies descend, or ascend, because they do. Or they will tell you\nthe centre of the earth is the place of rest, and conservation for heavy\nthings; and therefore they endeavour to be there: as if stones and\nmetals had a desire, or could discern the place they would be at, as man\ndoes; or loved rest, as man does not; or that a piece of glass were less\nsafe in the window, than falling into the street.\n\n[Sidenote: Quantity put into body already made.]\n\nIf we would know why the same body seems greater, without adding to it,\none time, than another; they say, when it seems less, it is _condensed_;\nwhen greater, _rarified_. What is that _condensed_, and _rarified_?\nCondensed, is when there is in the very same matter, less quantity than\nbefore; and rarified, when more. As if there could be matter, that had\nnot some determined quantity; when quantity is nothing else but the\ndetermination of matter; that is to say, of body, by which we say, one\nbody is greater or lesser than another, by thus, or thus much. Or as if\na body were made without any quantity at all, and that afterwards more\nor less were put into it, according as it is intended the body should be\nmore or less dense.\n\n[Sidenote: Pouring in of souls.]\n\nFor the cause of the soul of man, they say, _creatur infundendo_, and\n_creando infunditur_: that is, _it is created by pouring it in_, and\n_poured in by creation_.\n\n[Sidenote: Ubiquity of apparition.]\n\nFor the cause of sense, an ubiquity of _species_; that is, of the\n_shows_ or _apparitions_ of objects; which when they be apparitions to\nthe eye, is _sight_; when to the ear, _hearing_; to the palate, _taste_;\nto the nostril, _smelling_; and to the rest of the body, _feeling_.\n\n[Sidenote: Will, the cause of willing.]\n\nFor cause of the will, to do any particular action, which is called\n_volitio_, they assign the faculty, that is to say, the capacity in\ngeneral, that men have, to will sometimes one thing, sometimes another,\nwhich is called _voluntas_; making the _power_ the cause of the _act_.\nAs if one should assign for cause of the good or evil acts of men, their\nability to do them.\n\n[Sidenote: Ignorance an occult cause.]\n\nAnd in many occasions they put for cause of natural events, their own\nignorance; but disguised in other words: as when they say, fortune is\nthe cause of things contingent; that is, of things whereof they know no\ncause: and as when they attribute many effects to _occult qualities_;\nthat is, qualities not known to them; and therefore also, as they think,\nto no man else. And to _sympathy_, _antipathy_, _antiperistasis_,\n_specifical qualities_, and other like terms, which signify neither the\nagent that produceth them, nor the operation by which they are produced.\n\nIf such _metaphysics_, and _physics_ as this, be not _vain philosophy_,\nthere was never any; nor needed St. Paul to give us warning to avoid it.\n\n[Sidenote: One makes the things incongruent, another the incongruity.]\n\nAnd for their moral, and civil philosophy, it hath the same, or greater\nabsurdities. If a man do an action of injustice, that is to say, an\naction contrary to the law, God they say is the prime cause of the law,\nand also the prime cause of that, and all other actions; but no cause at\nall of the injustice; which is the inconformity of the action to the\nlaw. This is vain philosophy. A man might as well say, that one man\nmaketh both a straight line, and a crooked, and another maketh their\nincongruity. And such is the philosophy of all men that resolve of their\nconclusions, before they know their premises; pretending to comprehend,\nthat which is incomprehensible; and of attributes of honour to make\nattributes of nature; as this dictinction was made to maintain the\ndoctrine of free-will, that is, of a will of man, not subject to the\nwill of God.\n\n[Sidenote: Private appetite the rule of public good.]\n\nAristotle, and other heathen philosophers, define good and evil, by the\nappetite of men; and well enough, as long as we consider them governed\nevery one by his own law; for in the condition of men that have no other\nlaw but their own appetites, there can be no general rule of good, and\nevil actions. But in a commonwealth this measure is false: not the\nappetite of private men, but the law, which is the will and appetite of\nthe state, is the measure. And yet is this doctrine still practised; and\nmen judge the goodness or wickedness of their own, and of other men\u2019s\nactions, and of the actions of the commonwealth itself, by their own\npassions; and no man calleth good or evil, but that which is so in his\nown eyes, without any regard at all to the public laws; except only\nmonks, and friars, that are bound by vow to that simple obedience to\ntheir superior, to which every subject ought to think himself bound by\nthe law of nature to the civil sovereign. And this private measure of\ngood, is a doctrine, not only vain, but also pernicious to the public\nstate.\n\n[Sidenote: And that lawful marriage is unchastity.]\n\nIt is also vain and false philosophy, to say the work of marriage is\nrepugnant to chastity, or continence, and by consequence to make them\nmoral vices; as they do, that pretend chastity, and continence, for the\nground of denying marriage to the clergy. For they confess it is no\nmore, but a constitution of the Church, that requireth in those holy\norders that continually attend the altar and administration of the\neucharist, a continual abstinence from women, under the name of\ncontinual chastity, continence, and purity. Therefore they call the\nlawful use of wives, want of chastity and continence; and so make\nmarriage a sin, or at least a thing so impure, and unclean, as to render\na man unfit for the altar. If the law were made because the use of wives\nis incontinence, and contrary to chastity, then all marriage is vice: if\nbecause it is a thing too impure, and unclean, for a man consecrated to\nGod; much more should other natural, necessary, and daily works which\nall men do, render men unworthy to be priests, because they are more\nunclean.\n\nBut the secret foundation of this prohibition of marriage of priests, is\nnot likely to have been laid so slightly, as upon such errors in moral\nphilosophy; nor yet upon the preference of single life, to the estate of\nmatrimony; which proceeded from the wisdom of St. Paul, who perceived\nhow inconvenient a thing it was, for those that in those times of\npersecution were preachers of the gospel, and forced to fly from one\ncountry to another, to be clogged with the care of wife and children;\nbut upon the design of the Popes, and priests of after times, to make\nthemselves the clergy, that is to say, sole heirs of the kingdom of God\nin this world; to which it was necessary to take from them the use of\nmarriage; because our Saviour saith, that at the coming of his kingdom\nthe children of God _shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, but\nshall be as the angels in heaven_; that is to say, spiritual. Seeing\nthen they had taken on them the name of spiritual, to have allowed\nthemselves, when there was no need, the propriety of wives, had been an\nincongruity.\n\n[Sidenote: And that all government but popular is tyranny.]\n\nFrom Aristotle\u2019s civil philosophy, they have learned, to call all manner\nof commonwealths but the popular, (such as was at that time the state of\nAthens), _tyranny_. All kings they called tyrants; and the aristocracy\nof the thirty governors set up there by the Lacedemonians that subdued\nthem, the thirty tyrants. As also to call the condition of the people\nunder the democracy, _liberty_. _A tyrant_ originally signified no more\nsimply, but a _monarch_. But when afterwards in most part of Greece that\nkind of government was abolished, the name began to signify, not only\nthe thing it did before, but with it, the hatred which the popular\nstates bare towards it. As also the name of king became odious after the\ndeposing of the kings in Rome, as being a thing natural to all men, to\nconceive some great fault to be signified in any attribute, that is\ngiven in despite, and to a great enemy. And when the same men shall be\ndispleased with those that have the administration of the democracy, or\naristocracy, they are not to seek for disgraceful names to express their\nanger in; but call readily the one _anarchy_, and the other _oligarchy_,\nor the _tyranny of a few_. And that which offendeth the people, is no\nother thing, but that they are governed, not as every one of them would\nhimself, but as the public representant, be it one man, or an assembly\nof men, thinks fit; that is, by an arbitrary government: for which they\ngive evil names to their superiors; never knowing, till perhaps a little\nafter a civil war, that without such arbitrary government, such war must\nbe perpetual; and that it is men, and arms, not words and promises, that\nmake the force and power of the laws.\n\n[Sidenote: That not men, but law governs.]\n\nAnd therefore this is another error of Aristotle\u2019s politics, that in a\nwell-ordered commonwealth, not men should govern, but the laws. What\nman, that has his natural senses, though he can neither write nor read,\ndoes not find himself governed by them he fears, and believes can kill\nor hurt him when he obeyeth not? Or that believes the law can hurt him;\nthat is, words and paper, without the hands and swords of men? And this\nis of the number of pernicious errors: for they induce men, as oft as\nthey like not their governors, to adhere to those that call them\ntyrants, and to think it lawful to raise war against them: and yet they\nare many times cherished from the pulpit, by the clergy.\n\n[Sidenote: Laws over the conscience.]\n\nThere is another error in their civil philosophy, which they never\nlearned of Aristotle, nor Cicero, nor any other of the heathen, to\nextend the power of the law, which is the rule of actions only, to the\nvery thoughts and consciences of men, by examination, and _inquisition_\nof what they hold, notwithstanding the conformity of their speech and\nactions. By which, men are either punished for answering the truth of\ntheir thoughts, or constrained to answer an untruth for fear of\npunishment. It is true, that the civil magistrate, intending to employ a\nminister in the charge of teaching, may enquire of him, if he be content\nto preach such and such doctrines; and in case of refusal, may deny him\nthe employment. But to force him to accuse himself of opinions, when his\nactions are not by law forbidden, is against the law of nature; and\nespecially in them, who teach, that a man shall be damned to eternal and\nextreme torments, if he die in a false opinion concerning an article of\nthe Christian faith. For who is there, that knowing there is so great\ndanger in an error, whom the natural care of himself, compelleth not to\nhazard his soul upon his own judgment, rather than that of any other man\nthat is unconcerned in his damnation?\n\n[Sidenote: Private interpretation of law.]\n\nFor a private man, without the authority of the commonwealth, that is to\nsay, without permission from the representant thereof, to interpret the\nlaw by his own spirit, is another error in the politics: but not drawn\nfrom Aristotle, nor from any other of the heathen philosophers. For none\nof them deny, but that in the power of making laws, is comprehended also\nthe power of explaining them when there is need. And are not the\nScriptures, in all places where they are law, made law by the authority\nof the commonwealth, and consequently, a part of the civil law?\n\nOf the same kind it is also, when any but the sovereign restraineth in\nany man that power which the commonwealth hath not restrained; as they\ndo, that impropriate the preaching of the gospel to one certain order of\nmen, where the laws have left it free. If the state give me leave to\npreach, or teach; that is, if it forbid me not, no man can forbid me. If\nI find myself amongst the idolaters of America, shall I that am a\nChristian, though not in orders, think it a sin to preach Jesus Christ,\ntill I have received orders from Rome? Or when I have preached, shall\nnot I answer their doubts, and expound the Scriptures to them; that is,\nshall I not teach? But for this may some say, as also for administering\nto them the sacraments, the necessity shall be esteemed for a sufficient\nmission; which is true: but this is true also, that for whatsoever, a\ndispensation is due for the necessity, for the same there needs no\ndispensation, when there is no law that forbids it. Therefore to deny\nthese functions to those, to whom the civil sovereign hath not denied\nthem, is a taking away of a lawful liberty, which is contrary to the\ndoctrine of civil government.\n\n[Sidenote: Language of School divines.]\n\nMore examples of vain philosophy, brought into religion by the doctors\nof School-divinity, might be produced; but other men may if they please\nobserve them of themselves. I shall only add this, that the writings of\nSchool-divines, are nothing else for the most part, but insignificant\ntrains of strange and barbarous words, or words otherwise used, than in\nthe common use of the Latin tongue; such as would pose Cicero, and\nVarro, and all the grammarians of ancient Rome. Which if any man would\nsee proved, let him, as I have said once before, see whether he can\ntranslate any School-divine into any of the modern tongues, as French,\nEnglish, or any other copious language: for that which cannot in most of\nthese be made intelligible, is not intelligible in the Latin. Which\ninsignificancy of language, though I cannot note it for false\nphilosophy; yet it hath a quality, not only to hide the truth, but also\nto make men think they have it, and desist from further search.\n\n[Sidenote: Errors from tradition.]\n\nLastly, for the errors brought in from false, or uncertain history, what\nis all the legend of fictitious miracles, in the lives of the saints;\nand all the histories of apparitions, and ghosts, alleged by the doctors\nof the Roman Church, to make good their doctrines of hell, and\npurgatory, the power of exorcism, and other doctrines which have no\nwarrant, neither in reason, nor Scripture; as also all those traditions\nwhich they call the unwritten word of God: but old wives\u2019 fables?\nWhereof, though they find dispersed somewhat in the writings of the\nancient fathers; yet those fathers were men, that might too easily\nbelieve false reports; and the producing of their opinions for testimony\nof the truth of what they believed, hath no other force with them that,\naccording to the counsel of St. John (_1 Epist._ iv. 1), examine\nspirits, than in all things that concern the power of the Roman Church,\n(the abuse whereof either they suspected not, or had benefit by it), to\ndiscredit their testimony, in respect of too rash belief of reports;\nwhich the most sincere men, without great knowledge of natural causes,\nsuch as the fathers were, are commonly the most subject to. For\nnaturally, the best men are the least suspicious of fraudulent purposes.\nGregory the Pope, and St. Bernard have somewhat of apparitions of\nghosts, that said they were in purgatory; and so has our Bede: but no\nwhere, I believe, but by report from others. But if they, or any other,\nrelate any such stories of their own knowledge, they shall not thereby\nconfirm the more such vain reports; but discover their own infirmity, or\nfraud.\n\n[Sidenote: Suppression of reason.]\n\nWith the introduction of false, we may join also the suppression of true\nphilosophy, by such men, as neither by lawful authority, nor sufficient\nstudy, are competent judges of the truth. Our own navigations make\nmanifest, and all men learned in human sciences, now acknowledge there\nare antipodes: and every day it appeareth more and more, that years and\ndays are determined by motions of the earth. Nevertheless, men that have\nin their writings but supposed such doctrine, as an occasion to lay open\nthe reasons for, and against it, have been punished for it by authority\necclesiastical. But what reason is there for it? Is it because such\nopinions are contrary to true religion? That cannot be, if they be true.\nLet therefore the truth be first examined by competent judges, or\nconfuted by them that pretend to know the contrary. Is it because they\nbe contrary to the religion established? Let them be silenced by the\nlaws of those, to whom the teachers of them are subject; that is, by the\nlaws civil. For disobedience may lawfully be punished in them, that\nagainst the laws teach even true philosophy. Is it because they tend to\ndisorder in government, as countenancing rebellion, or sedition? Then\nlet them be silenced, and the teachers punished by virtue of his power\nto whom the care of the public quiet is committed; which is the\nauthority civil. For whatsoever power ecclesiastics take upon\nthemselves, (in any place where they are subject to the state), in their\nown right, though they call it God\u2019s right, is but usurpation.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XLVII.\n\n OF THE BENEFIT THAT PROCEEDETH FROM SUCH\n DARKNESS, AND TO WHOM IT ACCRUETH.\n\n\n[Sidenote: He that receiveth benefit by a fact, is presumed to be the\n author.]\n\nCicero maketh honourable mention of one of the Cassii, a severe judge\namongst the Romans, for a custom he had, in criminal causes, when the\ntestimony of the witnesses was not sufficient, to ask the accusers, _cui\nbono_; that is to say, what profit, honour, or other contentment, the\naccused obtained, or expected by the fact. For amongst presumptions,\nthere is none that so evidently declareth the author, as doth the\nbenefit of the action. By the same rule I intend in this place to\nexamine, who they may be that have possessed the people so long in this\npart of Christendom, with these doctrines, contrary to the peaceable\nsocieties of mankind.\n\n[Sidenote: That the Church militant is the kingdom of God, was first\n taught by the Church of Rome:]\n\nAnd first, to this error, _that the present Church now militant on\nearth, is the kingdom of God_, (that is, the kingdom of glory, or the\nland of promise; not the kingdom of grace, which is but a promise of the\nland), are annexed these worldly benefits; first, that the pastors and\nteachers of the Church, are entitled thereby, as God\u2019s public ministers,\nto a right of governing the Church; and consequently, because the Church\nand commonwealth are the same persons, to be rectors, and governors of\nthe commonwealth. By this title it is, that the Pope prevailed with the\nsubjects of all Christian princes, to believe, that to disobey him, was\nto disobey Christ himself; and in all differences between him and other\nprinces, (charmed with the word _power spiritual_), to abandon their\nlawful sovereigns; which is in effect an universal monarchy over all\nChristendom. For though they were first invested in the right of being\nsupreme teachers of Christian doctrine, by and under Christian emperors,\nwithin the limits of the Roman empire, as is acknowledged by themselves,\nby the title of _Pontifex Maximus_, who was an officer subject to the\ncivil state; yet after the empire was divided, and dissolved, it was not\nhard to obtrude upon the people already subjected to them, another\ntitle, namely, the right of St. Peter; not only to save entire their\npretended power; but also to extend the same over the same Christian\nprovinces, though no more united in the empire of Rome. This benefit of\nan universal monarchy, (considering the desire of men to bear rule), is\na sufficient presumption, that the Popes that pretended to it, and for a\nlong time enjoyed it, were the authors of the doctrine, by which it was\nobtained; namely, that the Church now on earth, is the kingdom of\nChrist. For that granted, it must be understood, that Christ hath some\nlieutenant amongst us, by whom we are to be told what are his\ncommandments.\n\nAfter that certain Churches had renounced this universal power of the\nPope, one would expect in reason, that the civil sovereigns in all those\nChurches, should have recovered so much of it, as before they had\nunadvisedly let it go, was their own right, and in their own hands. And\nin England it was so in effect; saving that they, by whom the kings\nadministered the government of religion, by maintaining their employment\nto be in God\u2019s right, seemed to usurp, if not a supremacy, yet an\nindependency on the civil power: and they but seemed to usurp it,\ninasmuch as they acknowledged a right in the king, to deprive them of\nthe exercise of their functions at his pleasure.\n\n[Sidenote: And maintained also by the Presbytery.]\n\nBut in those places where the presbytery took that office, though many\nother doctrines of the Church of Rome were forbidden to be taught; yet\nthis doctrine, that the kingdom of Christ is already come, and that it\nbegan at the resurrection of our Saviour, was still retained. But _cui\nbono_? What profit did they expect from it? The same which the Popes\nexpected: to have a sovereign power over the people. For what is it for\nmen to excommunicate their lawful king, but to keep him from all places\nof God\u2019s public service in his own kingdom; and with force to resist\nhim, when he with force endeavoureth to correct them? Or what is it,\nwithout authority from the civil sovereign, to excommunicate any person,\nbut to take from him his lawful liberty, that is, to usurp an unlawful\npower over their brethren? The authors therefore of this darkness in\nreligion, are the Roman, and the presbyterian clergy.\n\n[Sidenote: Infallibility.]\n\nTo this head, I refer also all those doctrines, that serve them to keep\nthe possession of this spiritual sovereignty after it is gotten, As\nfirst, that the _Pope in his public capacity cannot err_. For who is\nthere, that believing this to be true, will not readily obey him in\nwhatsoever he commands?\n\n[Sidenote: Subjection of bishops.]\n\nSecondly, that all other bishops, in what commonwealth soever, have not\ntheir right, neither immediately from God, nor mediately from their\ncivil sovereigns, but from the Pope, is a doctrine, by which there comes\nto be in every Christian commonwealth many potent men, (for so are\nbishops), that have their dependance on the Pope, and owe obedience to\nhim, though he be a foreign prince; by which means he is able, as he\nhath done many times, to raise a civil war against the state that\nsubmits not itself to be governed accordingly to his pleasure and\ninterest.\n\n[Sidenote: Exemptions of the clergy.]\n\nThirdly, the exemption of these, and of all other priests, and of all\nmonks, and friars, from the power of the civil laws. For by this means,\nthere is a great part of every commonwealth, that enjoy the benefit of\nthe laws, and are protected by the power of the civil state, which\nnevertheless pay no part of the public expense; nor are liable to the\npenalties, as other subjects, due to their crimes; and consequently,\nstand not in fear of any man, but the Pope; and adhere to him only, to\nuphold his universal monarchy.\n\n[Sidenote: The names of sacerdotes, and sacrificers.]\n\nFourthly, the giving to their priests, which is no more in the New\nTestament but presbyters, that is, elders, the name of _sacerdotes_,\nthat is, sacrificers, which was the title of the civil sovereign, and\nhis public ministers, amongst the Jews, whilst God was their king. Also,\nthe making the Lord\u2019s Supper a sacrifice, serveth to make the people\nbelieve the Pope hath the same power over all Christians, that Moses and\nAaron had over the Jews; that is to say, all power, both civil and\necclesiastical, as the high-priest then had.\n\n[Sidenote: The sacramentation of marriage.]\n\nFifthly, the teaching that matrimony is a sacrament, giveth to the\nclergy the judging of the lawfulness of marriages; and thereby, of what\nchildren are legitimate; and consequently, of the right of succession to\nhereditary kingdoms.\n\n[Sidenote: The single life of priests.]\n\nSixthly, the denial of marriage to priests, serveth to assure this power\nof the Pope over kings. For if a king be a priest, he cannot marry, and\ntransmit his kingdom to his posterity; if he be not a priest, then the\nPope pretendeth this authority ecclesiastical over him, and over his\npeople.\n\n[Sidenote: Auricular confession.]\n\nSeventhly, from auricular confession, they obtain, for the assurance of\ntheir power, better intelligence of the designs of princes, and great\npersons in the civil state, than these can have of the designs of the\nstate ecclesiastical.\n\n[Sidenote: Canonization of saints, and declaring of martyrs.]\n\nEighthly, by the canonization of saints, and declaring who are martyrs,\nthey assure their power, in that they induce simple men into an\nobstinacy against the laws and commands of their civil sovereigns even\nto death, if by the Pope\u2019s excommunication, they be declared heretics or\nenemies to the Church; that is, as they interpret it, to the Pope.\n\n[Sidenote: Transubstantiation, penance, absolution.]\n\nNinthly, they assure the same, by the power they ascribe to every\npriest, of making Christ; and by the power of ordaining penance; and of\nremitting, and retaining of sins.\n\n[Sidenote: Purgatory, indulgences, external works.]\n\nTenthly, by the doctrine of purgatory, of justification by external\nworks, and of indulgences, the clergy is enriched.\n\n[Sidenote: Demonology and exorcism.]\n\nEleventhly, by their demonology, and the use of exorcism, and other\nthings appertaining thereto, they keep, or think they keep, the people\nmore in awe of their power.\n\n[Sidenote: School divinity.]\n\nLastly, the metaphysics, ethics, and politics of Aristotle, the\nfrivolous distinctions, barbarous terms, and obscure language of the\nSchoolmen, taught in the universities, which have been all erected and\nregulated by the Pope\u2019s authority, serve them to keep these errors from\nbeing detected, and to make men mistake the _ignis fatuus_ of vain\nphilosophy, for the light of the Gospel.\n\n[Sidenote: The authors of spiritual darkness, who they be.]\n\nTo these, if they sufficed not, might be added other of their dark\ndoctrines, the profit whereof redoundeth manifestly, to the setting up\nof an unlawful power over the lawful sovereigns of Christian people; or\nfor the sustaining of the same, when it is set up; or to the worldly\nriches, honour, and authority of those that sustain it. And therefore by\nthe aforesaid rule, of _cui bono_, we may justly pronounce for the\nauthors of all this spiritual darkness, the Pope, and Roman clergy, and\nall those besides that endeavour to settle in the minds of men this\nerroneous doctrine, that the Church now on earth, is that kingdom of God\nmentioned in the Old and New Testament.\n\nBut the emperors, and other Christian sovereigns, under whose government\nthese errors, and the like encroachments of ecclesiastics upon their\noffice, at first crept in, to the disturbance of their possessions, and\nof the tranquillity of their subjects, though they suffered the same for\nwant of foresight of the sequel, and of insight into the designs of\ntheir teachers, may nevertheless be esteemed accessories to their own,\nand the public damage. For without their authority there could at first\nno seditious doctrine have been publicly preached. I say they might have\nhindered the same in the beginning: but when the people were once\npossessed by those spiritual men, there was no human remedy to be\napplied, that any man could invent. And for the remedies that God should\nprovide, who never faileth in his good time to destroy all the\nmachinations of men against the truth, we are to attend his good\npleasure, that suffereth many times the prosperity of his enemies,\ntogether with their ambition, to grow to such a height, as the violence\nthereof openeth the eyes, which the wariness of their predecessors had\nbefore sealed up, and makes men by too much grasping let go all, as\nPeter\u2019s net was broken, by the struggling of too great a multitude of\nfishes; whereas the impatience of those, that strive to resist such\nencroachment, before their subjects\u2019 eyes were opened, did but increase\nthe power they resisted. I do not therefore blame the emperor Frederick\nfor holding the stirrup to our countryman Pope Adrian; for such was the\ndisposition of his subjects then, as if he had not done it, he was not\nlikely to have succeeded in the empire. But I blame those, that in the\nbeginning, when their power was entire, by suffering such doctrines to\nbe forged in the universities of their own dominions, have holden the\nstirrup to all the succeeding Popes, whilst they mounted into the\nthrones of all Christian sovereigns, to ride, and tire, both them, and\ntheir people at their pleasure.\n\nBut as the inventions of men are woven, so also are they ravelled out;\nthe way is the same, but the order is inverted. The web begins at the\nfirst elements of power, which are wisdom, humility, sincerity, and\nother virtues of the Apostles, whom the people, converted, obeyed out of\nreverence, not by obligation. Their consciences were free, and their\nwords and actions subject to none but the civil power. Afterwards the\npresbyters, as the flocks of Christ increased, assembling to consider\nwhat they should teach, and thereby obliging themselves to teach nothing\nagainst the decrees of their assemblies, made it to be thought the\npeople were thereby obliged to follow their doctrine, and when they\nrefused, refused to keep them company, (that was then called\nexcommunication), not as being infidels, but as being disobedient: and\nthis was the first knot upon their liberty. And the number of presbyters\nincreasing, the presbyters of the chief city or province, got themselves\nan authority over the parochial presbyters, and appropriated to\nthemselves the names of bishops: and this was a second knot on Christian\nliberty. Lastly, the bishop of Rome, in regard of the imperial city,\ntook upon him an authority, (partly by the wills of the emperors\nthemselves, and by the title of _Pontifex Maximus_, and at last when the\nemperors were grown weak, by the privileges of St. Peter), over all\nother bishops of the empire: which was the third and last knot, and the\nwhole _synthesis_ and _construction_, of the pontificial power.\n\nAnd therefore the _analysis_, or _resolution_, is by the same way; but\nbeginneth with the knot that was last tied; as we may see in the\ndissolution of the pr\u00e6terpolitical Church government in England. First,\nthe power of the Popes was dissolved totally by Queen Elizabeth; and the\nbishops, who before exercised their functions in right of the Pope, did\nafterwards exercise the same in right of the Queen and her successors;\nthough by retaining the phrase of _jure divino_, they were thought to\ndemand it by immediate right from God: and so was untied the third knot.\nAfter this, the presbyterians lately in England obtained the putting\ndown of episcopacy: and so was the second knot dissolved. And almost at\nthe same time, the power was taken also from the presbyterians: and so\nwe are reduced to the independancy of the primitive Christians, to\nfollow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best: which,\nif it be without contention, and without measuring the doctrine of\nChrist, by our affection to the person of his minister, (the fault which\nthe apostle reprehended in the Corinthians), is perhaps the best. First,\nbecause there ought to be no power over the consciences of men, but of\nthe Word itself, working faith in every one, not always according to the\npurpose of them that plant and water, but of God himself, that giveth\nthe increase. And secondly, because it is unreasonable in them, who\nteach there is such danger in every little error, to require of a man\nendued with reason of his own, to follow the reason of any other man, or\nof the most voices of any other men, which is little better than to\nventure his salvation at cross and pile. Nor ought those teachers to be\ndispleased with this loss of their ancient authority. For there is none\nshould know better than they, that power is preserved by the same\nvirtues by which it is acquired; that is to say, by wisdom, humility,\nclearness of doctrine, and sincerity of conversation; and not by\nsuppression of the natural sciences, and of the morality of natural\nreason; nor by obscure language; nor by arrogating to themselves more\nknowledge than they make appear; nor by pious frauds; nor by such other\nfaults, as in the pastors of God\u2019s Church are not only faults, but also\nscandals, apt to make men stumble one time or other upon the suppression\nof their authority.\n\n[Sidenote: Comparison of the papacy with the kingdom of fairies.]\n\nBut after this doctrine, _that the Church now militant, is the kingdom\nof God spoken of in the Old and New Testament_, was received in the\nworld; the ambition, and canvassing for the offices that belong\nthereunto, and especially for that great office of being Christ\u2019s\nlieutenant, and the pomp of them that obtained therein the principal\npublic charges, became by degrees so evident, that they lost the inward\nreverence due to the pastoral function: insomuch as the wisest men, of\nthem that had any power in the civil state, needed nothing but the\nauthority of their princes, to deny them any further obedience. For,\nfrom the time that the Bishop of Rome had gotten to be acknowledged for\nbishop universal, by pretence of succession to St. Peter, their whole\nhierarchy, or kingdom of darkness, may be compared not unfitly to the\n_kingdom of fairies_; that is, to the old wives\u2019 _fables_ in England,\nconcerning _ghosts_ and _spirits_, and the feats they play in the night.\nAnd if a man consider the original of this great ecclesiastical\ndominion, he will easily perceive, that the Papacy is no other than the\n_ghost_ of the deceased _Roman empire_, sitting crowned upon the grave\nthereof. For so did the Papacy start up on a sudden out of the ruins of\nthat heathen power.\n\nThe _language_ also, which they use, both in the churches, and in their\npublic acts, being _Latin_, which is not commonly used by any nation now\nin the world, what is it but the _ghost_ of the old _Roman language_?\n\nThe _fairies_ in what nation soever they converse, have but one\nuniversal king, which some poets of ours call King Oberon; but the\nScripture calls Beelzebub, prince of _demons_. The _ecclesiastics_\nlikewise, in whose dominions soever they be found, acknowledge but one\nuniversal king, the _Pope_.\n\nThe _ecclesiastics_ are _spiritual_ men, and _ghostly_ fathers. The\nfairies are _spirits_, and _ghosts_. _Fairies_ and _ghosts_ inhabit\ndarkness, solitudes, and graves. The _ecclesiastics_ walk in obscurity\nof doctrine, in monasteries, churches, and church-yards.\n\nThe _ecclesiastics_ have their cathedral churches, which, in what town\nsoever they be erected, by virtue of holy water, and certain charms\ncalled exorcisms, have the power to make those towns, cities, that is to\nsay, seats of empire. The _fairies_ also have their enchanted castles,\nand certain gigantic ghosts, that domineer over the regions round about\nthem.\n\nThe _fairies_ are not to be seized on; and brought to answer for the\nhurt they do. So also the _ecclesiastics_ vanish away from the tribunals\nof civil justice.\n\nThe _ecclesiastics_ take from young men the use of reason, by certain\ncharms compounded of metaphysics, and miracles, and traditions, and\nabused Scripture, whereby they are good for nothing else, but to execute\nwhat they command them. The _fairies_ likewise are said to take young\nchildren out of their cradles, and to change them into natural fools,\nwhich common people do therefore call _elves_, and are apt to mischief.\n\nIn what shop, or operatory the fairies make their enchantment, the old\nwives have not determined. But the operatories of the _clergy_ are well\nenough known to be the universities, that received their discipline from\nauthority pontificial.\n\nWhen the _fairies_ are displeased with any body, they are said to send\ntheir elves, to pinch them. The _ecclesiastics_, when they are\ndispleased with any civil state, make also their elves, that is,\nsuperstitious, enchanted subjects, to pinch their princes, by preaching\nsedition; or one prince enchanted with promises, to pinch another.\n\nThe _fairies_ marry not; but there be amongst them _incubi_, that have\ncopulation with flesh and blood. The _priests_ also marry not.\n\nThe _ecclesiastics_ take the cream of the land, by donations of ignorant\nmen, that stand in awe of them, and by tithes. So also it is in the\nfable of _fairies_, that they enter into the dairies, and feast upon the\ncream, which they skim from the milk.\n\nWhat kind of money is current in the kingdom of _fairies_, is not\nrecorded in the story. But the _ecclesiastics_ in their receipts accept\nof the same money that we do; though when they are to make any payment,\nit is in canonizations, indulgencies, and masses.\n\nTo this, and such like resemblances between the _papacy_, and the\nkingdom of _fairies_, may be added this, that as the _fairies_ have no\nexistence, but in the fancies of ignorant people, rising from the\ntraditions of old wives, or old poets: so the spiritual power of the\n_Pope_, without the bounds of his own civil dominion, consisteth only in\nthe fear that seduced people stand in, of their excommunications; upon\nhearing of false miracles, false traditions, and false interpretations\nof the Scripture.\n\nIt was not therefore a very difficult matter, for Henry VIII by his\nexorcism; nor for queen Elizabeth by hers, to cast them out. But who\nknows that this spirit of Rome, now gone out, and walking by missions\nthrough the dry places of China, Japan, and the Indies, that yield him\nlittle fruit, may not return, or rather an assembly of spirits worse\nthan he, enter, and inhabit this clean swept house, and make the end\nthereof worse than the beginning? For it is not the Roman clergy only,\nthat pretends the kingdom of God to be of this world, and thereby to\nhave a power therein, distinct from that of the civil state. And this is\nall I had a design to say, concerning the doctrine of the POLITICS.\nWhich when I have reviewed, I shall willingly expose it to the censure\nof my country.\n\n\n A REVIEW, AND CONCLUSION.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Review, and conclusion.]\n\nFrom the contrariety of some of the natural faculties of the mind, one\nto another, as also of one passion to another, and from their reference\nto conversation, there has been an argument taken, to infer an\nimpossibility that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to all\nsorts of civil duty. The severity of judgment, they say, makes men\ncensorious, and unapt to pardon the errors and infirmities of other men:\nand on the other side, celerity of fancy, makes the thoughts less steady\nthan is necessary, to discern exactly between right and wrong. Again, in\nall deliberations, and in all pleadings, the faculty of solid reasoning\nis necessary: for without it, the resolutions of men are rash, and their\nsentences unjust: and yet if there be not powerful eloquence, which\nprocureth attention and consent, the effect of reason will be little.\nBut these are contrary faculties; the former being grounded upon\nprinciples of truth; the other upon opinions already received, true or\nfalse; and upon the passions and interests of men, which are different,\nand mutable.\n\nAnd amongst the passions, _courage_, (by which I mean the contempt of\nwounds, and violent death) inclineth men to private revenges, and\nsometimes to endeavour the unsettling of the public peace: and\n_timorousness_, many times disposeth to the desertion of the public\ndefence. Both these, they say, cannot stand together in the same person.\n\nAnd to consider the contrariety of men\u2019s opinions, and manners, in\ngeneral, it is, they say, impossible to entertain a constant civil amity\nwith all those, with whom the business of the world constrains us to\nconverse: which business consisteth almost in nothing else but a\nperpetual contention for honour, riches, and authority.\n\nTo which I answer, that these are indeed great difficulties, but not\nimpossibilities: for by education, and discipline, they may be, and are\nsometimes reconciled. Judgment and fancy may have place in the same man;\nbut by turns; as the end which he aimeth at requireth. As the Israelites\nin Egypt, were sometimes fastened to their labour of making bricks, and\nother times were ranging abroad to gather straw: so also may the\njudgment sometimes be fixed upon one certain consideration, and the\nfancy at another time wandering about the world. So also reason, and\neloquence, though not perhaps in the natural sciences, yet, in the\nmoral, may stand very well together. For wheresoever there is place for\nadorning and preferring of error, there is much more place for adorning\nand preferring of truth, if they have it to adorn. Nor is there any\nrepugnancy between fearing the laws, and not fearing a public enemy; nor\nbetween abstaining from injury, and pardoning it in others. There is\ntherefore no such inconsistence of human nature, with civil duties, as\nsome think. I have known clearness of judgment, and largeness of fancy;\nstrength of reason, and graceful elocution; a courage for the war, and a\nfear for the laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most\nnoble and honoured friend, Mr. Sidney Godolphin; who hating no man, nor\nhated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late civil\nwar, in the public quarrel, by an undiscerned and an undiscerning hand.\n\nTo the Laws of Nature, declared in Chapter XV., I would have this added,\n_that every man is bound by nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect\nin war the authority, by which he is himself protected in time of\npeace_. For he that pretendeth a right of nature to preserve his own\nbody, cannot pretend a right of nature to destroy him, by whose strength\nhe is preserved: it is a manifest contradiction of himself. And though\nthis law may be drawn by consequence, from some of those that are there\nalready mentioned; yet the times require to have it inculcated, and\nremembered.\n\nAnd because I find by divers English books lately printed, that the\ncivil wars have not yet sufficiently taught men in what point of time it\nis, that a subject becomes obliged to the conqueror; nor what is\nconquest; nor how it comes about, that it obliges men to obey his laws:\ntherefore for further satisfaction of men therein, I say, the point of\ntime, wherein a man becomes subject to a conqueror, is that point,\nwherein having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth, either by\nexpress words, or by other sufficient sign, to be his subject. When it\nis that a man hath the liberty to submit, I have showed before in the\nend of Chapter XXI.; namely, that for him that hath no obligation to his\nformer sovereign but that of an ordinary subject, it is then, when the\nmeans of his life are within the guards and garrisons of the enemy; for\nit is then, that he hath no longer protection from him, but is protected\nby the adverse party for his contribution. Seeing therefore such\ncontribution is every where, as a thing inevitable, notwithstanding it\nbe an assistance to the enemy, esteemed lawful; a total submission,\nwhich is but an assistance to the enemy, cannot be esteemed unlawful.\nBesides, if a man consider that they who submit, assist the enemy but\nwith part of their estates, whereas they that refuse, assist him with\nthe whole, there is no reason to call their submission, or composition,\nan assistance; but rather a detriment to the enemy. But if a man,\nbesides the obligation of a subject, hath taken upon him a new\nobligation of a soldier, then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new\npower, as long as the old one keeps the field, and giveth him means of\nsubsistence, either in his armies, or garrisons: for in this case, he\ncannot complain of want of protection, and means to live as a soldier.\nBut when that also fails, a soldier also may seek his protection\nwheresoever he has most hope to have it; and may lawfully submit himself\nto his new master. And so much for the time when he may do it lawfully,\nif he will. If therefore he do it, he is undoubtedly bound to be a true\nsubject: for a contract lawfully made, cannot lawfully be broken.\n\nBy this also a man may understand, when it is, that men may be said to\nbe conquered; and in what the nature of conquest, and the right of a\nconqueror consisteth: for this submission in itself implieth them all.\nConquest, is not the victory itself; but the acquisition, by victory, of\na right over the persons of men. He therefore that is slain, is\novercome, but not conquered: he that is taken, and put into prison, or\nchains, is not conquered, though overcome; for he is still an enemy, and\nmay save himself if he can: but he that upon promise of obedience, hath\nhis life and liberty allowed him, is then conquered, and a subject; and\nnot before. The Romans used to say, that their general had _pacified_\nsuch a _province_, that is to say, in English, _conquered_ it; and that\nthe country was _pacified_ by victory, when the people of it had\npromised _imperata facere_, that is, _to do what the Roman people\ncommanded them_: this was to be conquered. But this promise may be\neither express, or tacit: express, by promise: tacit, by other signs. As\nfor example, a man that hath not been called to make such an express\npromise, because he is one whose power perhaps is not considerable; yet\nif he live under their protection openly, he is understood to submit\nhimself to the government: but if he live there secretly, he is liable\nto anything that may be done to a spy, and enemy of the state. I say\nnot, he does any injustice; for acts of open hostility bear not that\nname; but that he may be justly put to death. Likewise, if a man, when\nhis country is conquered, be out of it, he is not conquered, nor\nsubject: but if at his return, he submit to the government, he is bound\nto obey it. So that _conquest_, to define it, is the acquiring of the\nright of sovereignty by victory. Which right, is acquired in the\npeople\u2019s submission, by which they contract with the victor, promising\nobedience, for life and liberty.\n\nIn Chapter XXIX., I have set down for one of the causes of the\ndissolutions of commonwealths, their imperfect generation, consisting in\nthe want of an absolute and arbitrary legislative power; for want\nwhereof, the civil sovereign is fain to handle the sword of justice\nunconstantly, and as if it were too hot for him to hold. One reason\nwhereof, which I have not there mentioned, is this, that they will all\nof them justify the war, by which their power was at first gotten, and\nwhereon, as they think, their right dependeth, and not on the\npossession. As if, for example, the right of the kings of England did\ndepend on the goodness of the cause of William the Conqueror, and upon\ntheir lineal, and directest descent from him; by which means, there\nwould perhaps be no tie of the subjects\u2019 obedience to their sovereign at\nthis day in all the world: wherein whilst they needlessly think to\njustify themselves, they justify all the successful rebellions that\nambition shall at any time raise against them, and their successors.\nTherefore I put down for one of the most effectual seeds of the death of\nany state, that the conquerors require not only a submission of men\u2019s\nactions to them for the future, but also an approbation of all their\nactions past; when there is scarce a commonwealth in the world, whose\nbeginnings can in conscience be justified.\n\nAnd because the name of tyranny, signifieth nothing more, nor less, than\nthe name of sovereignty, be it in one, or many men, saving that they\nthat use the former word, are understood to be angry with them they call\ntyrants; I think the toleration of a professed hatred of tyranny, is a\ntoleration of hatred to commonwealth in general, and another evil seed,\nnot differing much from the former. For to the justification of the\ncause of a conqueror, the reproach of the cause of the conquered, is for\nthe most part necessary: but neither of them necessary for the\nobligation of the conquered. And thus much I have thought fit to say\nupon the review of the first and second part of this discourse.\n\nIn Chapter XXXV., I have sufficiently declared out of the Scripture,\nthat in the commonwealth of the Jews, God himself was made the\nsovereign, by pact with the people; who were therefore called his\n_peculiar people_, to distinguish them from the rest of the world, over\nwhom God reigned not by their consent, but by his own power: and that in\nthis kingdom Moses was God\u2019s lieutenant on earth; and that it was he\nthat told them what laws God appointed them to be ruled by. But I have\nomitted to set down who were the officers appointed to do execution;\nespecially in capital punishments; not then thinking it a matter of so\nnecessary consideration, as I find it since. We know that generally in\nall commonwealths, the execution of corporal punishments, was either put\nupon the guards, or other soldiers of the sovereign power; or given to\nthose, in whom want of means, contempt of honour, and hardness of heart,\nconcurred, to make them sue for such an office. But amongst the\nIsraelites it was a positive law of God their sovereign, that he that\nwas convicted of a capital crime, should be stoned to death by the\npeople; and that the witnesses should cast the first stone, and after\nthe witnesses, then the rest of the people. This was a law that designed\nwho were to be the executioners; but not that any one should throw a\nstone at him before conviction and sentence, where the congregation was\njudge. The witnesses were nevertheless to be heard before they proceeded\nto execution, unless the fact were committed in the presence of the\ncongregation itself, or in sight of the lawful judges; for then there\nneeded no other witnesses but the judges themselves. Nevertheless, this\nmanner of proceeding being not thoroughly understood, hath given\noccasion to a dangerous opinion, that any man may kill another, in some\ncases, by a right of zeal; as if the executions done upon offenders in\nthe kingdom of God in old time, proceeded not from the sovereign\ncommand, but from the authority of private zeal: which, if we consider\nthe texts that seem to favour it, is quite contrary.\n\nFirst, where the Levites fell upon the people, that had made and\nworshipped the Golden Calf, and slew three thousand of them; it was by\nthe commandment of Moses, from the mouth of God; as is manifest, _Exod._\nxxxii. 27. And when the son of a woman of Israel had blasphemed God,\nthey that heard it, did not kill him, but brought him before Moses, who\nput him under custody, till God should give sentence against him; as\nappears, _Levit._ xxiv. 11, 12. Again, (_Numb._ xxv. 6, 7), when\nPhinehas killed Zimri and Cosbi, it was not by right of private zeal:\ntheir crime was committed in the sight of the assembly; there needed no\nwitness; the law was known, and he the heir-apparent to the sovereignty;\nand, which is the principal point, the lawfulness of his act depended\nwholly upon a subsequent ratification by Moses, whereof he had no cause\nto doubt. And this presumption of a future ratification, is sometimes\nnecessary to the safety of a commonwealth; as in a sudden rebellion, any\nman that can suppress it by his own power in the country where it\nbegins, without express law or commission, may lawfully do it, and\nprovide to have it ratified, or pardoned, whilst it is in doing, or\nafter it is done. Also _Numb._ xxxv. 30, it is expressly said,\n_Whosoever shall kill the murderer, shall kill him upon the word of\nwitnesses_: but witnesses suppose a formal judicature, and consequently\ncondemn that pretence of _jus zelotarum_. The law of Moses concerning\nhim that enticeth to idolatry, that is to say, in the kingdom of God to\na renouncing of his allegiance, (_Deut._ xiii. 8, 9), forbids to conceal\nhim, and commands the accuser to cause him to be put to death, and to\ncast the first stone at him; but not to kill him before he be condemned.\nAnd (_Deut._ xvii. 4, 5, 6, 7), the process against idolatry is exactly\nset down: for God there speaketh to the people, as judge, and commandeth\nthem, when a man is accused of idolatry, to enquire diligently of the\nfact, and finding it true, then to stone him; but still the hand of the\nwitness throweth the first stone. This is not private zeal, but public\ncondemnation. In like manner when a father hath a rebellious son, the\nlaw is, (_Deut._ xxi. 18-21), that he shall bring him before the judges\nof the town, and all the people of the town shall stone him. Lastly, by\npretence of these laws it was, that St. Stephen was stoned, and not by\npretence of private zeal: for before he was carried away to execution,\nhe had pleaded his cause before the high-priest. There is nothing in all\nthis, nor in any other part of the Bible, to countenance executions by\nprivate zeal; which being oftentimes but a conjunction of ignorance and\npassion, is against both the justice and peace of a commonwealth.\n\n[Sidenote: Review, and conclusion.]\n\nIn chapter XXXVI., I have said, that it is not declared in what manner\nGod spake supernaturally to Moses: nor that he spake not to him\nsometimes by dreams and visions, and by a supernatural voice, as to\nother prophets: for the manner how he spake unto him from the\nmercy-seat, is expressly set down, _Numbers_ vii. 89, in these words,\n_From that time forward, when Moses entered into the Tabernacle of the\ncongregation to speak with God, he heard a voice which spake unto him\nfrom over the mercy-seat, which is over the Ark of the testimony; from\nbetween the cherubims he spake unto him_. But it is not declared in what\nconsisteth the preeminence of the manner of God\u2019s speaking to Moses,\nabove that of his speaking to other prophets, as to Samuel, and to\nAbraham, to whom he also spake by a voice, (that is, by vision), unless\nthe difference consist in the clearness of the vision. For _face to\nface_, and _mouth to mouth_, cannot be literally understood of the\ninfiniteness, and incomprehensibility of the Divine nature.\n\nAnd as to the whole doctrine, I see not yet, but the principles of it\nare true and proper; and the ratiocination solid. For I ground the civil\nright of sovereigns, and both the duty and liberty of subjects, upon the\nknown natural inclinations of mankind, and upon the articles of the law\nof nature; of which no man, that pretends but reason enough to govern\nhis private family, ought to be ignorant. And for the power\necclesiastical of the same sovereigns, I ground it on such texts, as are\nboth evident in themselves, and consonant to the scope of the whole\nScripture. And therefore am persuaded, that he that shall read it with a\npurpose only to be informed, shall be informed by it. But for those that\nby writing, or public discourse, or by their eminent actions, have\nalready engaged themselves to the maintaining of contrary opinions, they\nwill not be so easily satisfied. For in such cases, it is natural for\nmen, at one and the same time, both to proceed in reading, and to lose\ntheir attention, in the search of objections to that they had read\nbefore. Of which in a time wherein the interests of men are changed,\n(seeing much of that doctrine, which serveth to the establishing of a\nnew government, must needs be contrary to that which conduced to the\ndissolution of the old), there cannot choose but be very many.\n\nIn that part which treateth of a Christian commonwealth, there are some\nnew doctrines, which, it may be, in a state where the contrary were\nalready fully determined, were a fault for a subject without leave to\ndivulge, as being an usurpation of the place of a teacher. But in this\ntime, that men call not only for peace, but also for truth, to offer\nsuch doctrines as I think true, and that manifestly tend to peace and\nloyalty, to the consideration of those that are yet in deliberation, is\nno more, but to offer new wine, to be put into new casks, that both may\nbe preserved together. And I suppose, that then, when novelty can breed\nno trouble nor disorder in a state, men are not generally so much\ninclined to the reverence of antiquity, as to prefer ancient errors,\nbefore new and well-proved truth.\n\nThere is nothing I distrust more than my elocution, which nevertheless I\nam confident, excepting the mischances of the press, is not obscure.\nThat I have neglected the ornament of quoting ancient poets, orators,\nand philosophers, contrary to the custom of late time, whether I have\ndone well or ill in it, proceedeth from my judgment, grounded on many\nreasons. For first, all truth of doctrine dependeth either upon\n_reason_, or upon _Scripture_; both which give credit to many, but never\nreceive it from any writer. Secondly, the matters in question are not of\n_fact_, but of _right_, wherein there is no place for _witnesses_. There\nis scarce any of those old writers, that contradicteth not sometimes\nboth himself and others; which makes their testimonies insufficient.\nFourthly, such opinions as are taken only upon credit of antiquity, are\nnot intrinsically the judgment of those that cite them, but words that\npass, like gaping, from mouth to mouth. Fifthly, it is many times with a\nfraudulent design that men stick their corrupt doctrine with the cloves\nof other men\u2019s wit. Sixthly, I find not that the ancients they cite,\ntook it for an ornament, to do the like with those that wrote before\nthem. Seventhly, it is an argument of indigestion, when Greek and Latin\nsentences unchewed come up again, as they use to do, unchanged. Lastly,\nthough I reverence those men of ancient time, that either have written\ntruth perspicuously, or set us in a better way to find it out ourselves;\nyet to the antiquity itself I think nothing due. For if we will\nreverence the age, the present is the oldest. If the antiquity of the\nwriter, I am not sure, that generally they to whom such honour is given,\nwere more ancient when they wrote, than I am that am writing. But if it\nbe well considered, the praise of ancient authors, proceeds not from the\nreverence of the dead, but from the competition, and mutual envy of the\nliving.\n\n[Sidenote: Review, and conclusion.]\n\nTo conclude, there is nothing in this whole discourse, nor in that I\nwrit before of the same subject in Latin, as far as I can perceive,\ncontrary either to the Word of God, or to good manners; or to the\ndisturbance of the public tranquillity. Therefore I think it may be\nprofitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities, in\ncase they also think so, to whom the judgment of the same belongeth. For\nseeing the Universities are the fountains of civil and moral doctrine,\nfrom whence the preachers, and the gentry, drawing such water as they\nfind, use to sprinkle the same (both from the pulpit and in their\nconversation), upon the people, there ought certainly to be great care\ntaken, to have it pure, both from the venom of heathen politicians, and\nfrom the incantation of deceiving spirits. And by that means the most\nmen, knowing their duties, will be the less subject to serve the\nambition of a few discontented persons, in their purposes against the\nstate; and be the less grieved with the contributions necessary for\ntheir peace, and defence; and the governors themselves have the less\ncause, to maintain at the common charge any greater army, than is\nnecessary to make good the public liberty, against the invasions and\nencroachments of foreign enemies.\n\nAnd thus I have brought to an end my Discourse of Civil and\nEcclesiastical Government, occasioned by the disorders of the present\ntime, without partiality, without application, and without other design\nthan to set before men\u2019s eyes the mutual relation between protection and\nobedience; of which the condition of human nature, and the laws divine,\nboth natural and positive, require an inviolable observation. And though\nin the revolution of states, there can be no very good constellation for\ntruths of this nature to be born under, (as having an angry aspect from\nthe dissolvers of an old government, and seeing but the backs of them\nthat erect a new), yet I cannot think it will be condemned at this time,\neither by the public judge of doctrine, or by any that desires the\ncontinuance of public peace. And in this hope I return to my interrupted\nspeculation of bodies natural; wherein, if God give me health to finish\nit, I hope the novelty will as much please, as in the doctrine of this\nartificial body it useth to offend. For such truth, as opposeth no man\u2019s\nprofit, nor pleasure, is to all men welcome.\n\n\n\n\n FINIS.\n\n\n\n\n C. RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN\u2019S LANE.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n BOOKS PUBLISHED BY JOHN BOHN.\n\n ---\n\n THE ENGLISH WORKS\n OF\n THOMAS HOBBES, OF MALMESBURY,\n NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED BY\n SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART. M. P.\n\n VOL I.\n\n CONTAINING\n\n LOGIC: THE FIRST GROUNDS OF PHILOSOPHY:\n THE PROPORTIONS OF MOTIONS AND MAGNITUDES:\n AND PHYSICS, OR THE PHENOMENA OF NATURE:\n\n ---\n\n ALSO,\n\n THOM\u00c6 HOBBES, MALMESBURIENSIS\n\n OPERA PHILOSOPHICA,\n QU\u00c6 LATINE SCRIPSIT,\n OMNIA.\n\n VOL. I.\n\n QUO CONTINENTUR\n AUCTORIS VITA: ET ELEMENTORUM PHILOSOPHI\u00c6.\n SECTIO PRIMA, DE CORPORE.\n\n \u201cThe philosophical Public are much indebted to SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH\n for this new edition.\u201d--SPECTATOR.\n\n -------\n\n IN THE PRESS.\n\n FIELD\u2019S BOOK OF THE CHURCH;\n A NEW EDITION, WITH NOTES,\n BY\n THE REV. JOHN S. BREWER.\n\n ---\n\n THE DEATH OF DEMOSTHENES;\n A DRAMATIC POEM;\n BY GEORGE CROKER FOX, ESQ.\n\n ---\n\n AN APOLOGY FOR CATHEDRAL SERVICE.\n\n ---\n\n ARRIAN ON COURSING.\n\nTranslated from the Greek, with Classical and Practical Annotations, and\n a brief Sketch of the Life of the Author. To which is added an\n Appendix, containing some Account of the Canes Venatici of Classical\n Antiquity, royal 8vo. _with 24 embellishments from the Antique, on\n India paper_, extra boards, 1_l._ 11_s._ 6_d._\n\n BRYDGES\u2019 (THE RIGHT HON. SIR HARFORD JONES)\n WORKS ON PERSIA.\n\nThe Dynasty of the Kajars, translated from the original Persian\n Manuscript presented by His Majesty Faty Aly Shah to Sir Harford\n Jones Brydges, Bart. K.C. LLD. late Envoy Extraordinary and Minister\n Plenipotentiary from his Britannic Majesty to the Court of Teheran.\n To which is prefixed, a succinct Account of the History of Persia\n previous to that Period, 8vo. with frontispiece and 3 maps, boards,\n 1_l._ 4_s._\n\nAn Account of the Transactions of His Majesty\u2019s Mission to the Court of\n Persia in the Years 1807-11, by Sir Harford Jones Brydges, Bart. To\n which is added a brief History of the Wahauby, 2 vols. 8vo. plates,\n bds. 1_l._ 1_s._\n\n DANSEY\u2019S (REV. WM.) WORK ON RURAL DEANS.\n\nHor\u00e6 Decanic\u00e6 Rurales, being an Attempt to illustrate, by a Series of\n Notes and Extracts, the Name and Title, the Origin, Appointment, and\n Functions of Rural Deans, &c. 2 vols. 4to. half-bound morocco,\n uncut, top edges gilt, 1_l._ 11_s._ 6_d._\n\n _Archdeacon Goddard, in his recent charge, strongly recommends this work\n to the attentive perusal of every clergyman._\n\n HIGGINS\u2019 (GODFREY) CELTIC DRUIDS;\n\nOr an Attempt to show that the Druids were the Priests of Oriental\n Colonies, who emigrated from India, and were the Introducers of the\n first or Cadmean System of Letters, and the Builders of STONEHENGE,\n of Carnac, and of other Cyclopean Works in Asia and Europe, 4to. map\n and numerous plates, bds. 3_l._\n\n _Also, by the same Author_,\n\n Anacalypsis, an Attempt to draw aside the Veil of the Saitic Isis; or an\n Inquiry\n into the Origin of Languages, Nations and Religions, 2 vols. 4to.\n plates, bds. 5_l._\n\n SEWELL\u2019S (REV. PROFESSOR) WORKS:\n\nEssay on the Cultivation of the Intellect, by the Study of Dead\n Languages, crown 8vo. canvas boards, 9_s._\n\nHora Philologica, or Conjectures of the Structure of the Greek Language,\n royal 8vo. boards, 7_s._\n\nSermons on the Application of Christianity to the Human Heart, royal\n 8vo. canvas boards, 12_s._\n\nParochial Sermons, 12mo. boards, 5_s._\n\n TAYLOR\u2019S (BP. JEREMY) WORKS,\n\n With Life by Bp. Heber, 15 vols. 8vo. bds. 7_l._ 17_s._ 6_d._\n\n THEATRE OF THE GREEKS.\n\nA Series of Papers relating to the History and Criticism of the Greek\n Drama, 4th edition, with a new Introduction and other Alterations by\n J. W. Donaldson, 8vo. boards, 15_s._\n\n WOODVILLE\u2019S (DR. WILLIAM) MEDICAL BOTANY;\n\nTHIRD EDITION, MATERIALLY ENLARGED AND IMPROVED by Professor SIR WILLIAM\n JACKSON HOOKER, LLD. F.R.S. L.S. &c. and G. SPRATT, ESQ. 5 vols.\n 4to. 310 plates, engraved by Sowerby and Spratt, boards, 5_l._\n 15_s._ 6_d._ or with the plates FINELY COLOURED, 8_l._.\n\n The impression is limited to 250 copies. A few of the additional\n volume have been taken off separately, to accommodate Subscribers\n to former editions, price 2_l._ 2_s._ _plain_, or 2_l._ 12_s._\n 6_d._ _coloured_.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note\n\n Other errors deemed most likely to be the printer\u2019s have been\n corrected, and are noted here. The references are to the page and\n line in the original.\n\n 34.7 I as[s]cribe to the giving of names Removed.\n\n 37.27 he that p[er/re]tendeth the science Transposed.\n\n 66.20 to[ to] take from the spirit Removed.\n\n 108.6 to cho[o]se them a king Inserted.\n\n 178.22 or arist[r]ocracy of another commonwealth Removed.\n\n 217.34 For [roo f/proof] whereof Replaced.\n\n 240.11 with[t h/ th]eir metropolis Move space.\n\n 323.3 rights of sov[e]reignty Inserted.\n\n 323.4 Against the[ the] duty of a sovereign Removed.\n\n 385.23 the _breath of life_ in[s]pired by God Inserted.\n\n 408.1 (_Acts_[,] xiii. 46) Removed.\n\n 430.22 (as it is[ in] verse 5) is \u2018said\u2019\n in?\n\n 447.15 \u03b5[\u1f30/\u1f76]\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 Replaced.\n\n 493.13 hold[i n/ing] firmly in his heart Replaced.\n\n 497.1 We have first (_Matth._ x. 6, 7[,)/)], that Transposed?\n\n 526.8 any other rule[r] Added.\n\n 527.11 St. Matthew and St. John apos[ /t]les Restored.\n\n 601.25 (verses 11, 12[,)/),] the judgment Tranposed.\n\n 704.34 He therefore that [i]s slain Added.","title":"The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 03 (of 11)","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":215856}