{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_74236/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_74236","id":"gutenberg_74236","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/74236","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Philosophy, English -- 17th century"],"text":"------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note:\n\nThis version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.\nThe many instances of italic text are delimited with the \u2018_\u2019 character\nas _italic_. Title page use of blackletter text uses the \u2018=\u2019 as a\ndelimiter.\n\nMarginal sidenotes which spanned multiple pages were often repeated on\neach page. These have been removed.\n\nMinor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please\nsee the transcriber\u2019s note at the end of this text for details regarding\nthe handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation.\n\n THE\n ENGLISH WORKS\n OF\n THOMAS HOBBES.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n THE\n\n ENGLISH WORKS\n\n OF\n\n THOMAS HOBBES\n\n OF MALMESBURY;\n\n NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED\n\n BY\n\n SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART.\n\n ---\n\n VOL. IV.\n\n ---\n\n\n\n\n LONDON:\n JOHN BOHN,\n HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.\n\n ---\n\n MDCCCXL.\n\n\n LONDON:\n C. RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN'S LANE.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n CONTENTS OF VOL. IV.\n\n -------\n\n PAGE\n\n TRIPOS; in Three Discourses:\n\n I. Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy 1\n\n II. De Corpore Politico, or the Elements of Law 77\n\n III. Of Liberty and Necessity 229\n\n\n An Answer to Bishop Bramhall\u2019s Book, called \u201cThe Catching of the\n Leviathan\u201d 279\n\n\n An Historical Narration concerning Heresy, and the Punishment\n thereof 385\n\n\n Considerations upon the Reputation, Loyalty, Manners, and\n Religion of Thomas Hobbes 409\n\n\n Answer to Sir William Davenant\u2019s Preface before \u201cGondibert\u201d 441\n\n\n Letter to the Right Honourable Edward Howard 458\n\n\n\n\n HOBBES' TRIPOS\n\n IN\n\n =Three Discourses.=\n\n THE FIRST,\n HUMAN NATURE:\n\n THE SECOND,\n DE CORPORE POLITICO:\n\n THE THIRD,\n OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.\n\n ---\n\n BY\n THOMAS HOBBES\n OF MALMESBURY.\n\n\n\n\n HUMAN NATURE,\n OR THE\n FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS\n OF\n POLICY.\n\n BEING A DISCOVERY OF\n\n THE FACULTIES, ACTS, AND PASSIONS,\n\n OF\n\n THE SOUL OF MAN,\n\n FROM THEIR ORIGINAL CAUSES;\n\n ACCORDING TO SUCH\n\n PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES,\n\n AS ARE NOT COMMONLY KNOWN OR ASSERTED.\n\n BY\n\n THOMAS HOBBES\n\n OF MALMESBURY.\n\n TO THE READER.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n READER,\n\nIt was thought good to let you know that _Mr. Hobbes_ hath written a\nbody of philosophy, upon such principles and in such order as are used\nby men conversant in demonstration: this he hath distinguished into\nthree parts; _De Corpore_, _De Homine_, _De Cive_; each of the\nconsequents beginning at the end of the antecedent, and insisting\nthereupon, as the later Books of _Euclid_ upon the former. The last of\nthese he hath already published in Latin beyond the seas; the second is\nthis now presented: and if these two receive justice in the world, there\nis hope we may obtain the first. He whose care it is, and labour, to\nsatisfy the _judgment_ and _reason_ of mankind, will condescend so far,\nwe hope, to satisfy the _desire_ of those learned men whom these shall\neither have found or made; which cannot be, until they shall\nanalytically have followed the grand _ph\u00e6nomena_ of states and kingdoms\nthrough the passions of particular men, into the elemental principles of\nnatural and corporeal motions. The former work was published by the\nAuthor, and so is out of danger; this by a friend, with leave from him:\nand to secure this, you are intreated to consider the relations wherein\nit stands, especially to the book _de Cive_. It was thought a part of\nreligion, not to make any change without the author\u2019s advice, which\ncould not suddenly be obtained; and so it comes forth innocently,\nsupposing nothing to have happened since the Dedication of it; which if\nit seem a solecism to some, it may to others give satisfaction, in\ncalling to mind those times and opportunities to which we are indebted\nfor these admirable compositions.\n\n F. B.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n -------\n\n\n\n\n TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE\n\n WILLIAM, EARL OF NEWCASTLE,\n\n GOVERNOR TO THE PRINCE HIS HIGHNESS,\n\n ONE OF HIS MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL.\n\n ---\n\n MY MOST HONOURED LORD,\n\nFrom the principal parts of Nature, Reason and Passion, have proceeded\ntwo kinds of learning, _mathematical_ and _dogmatical_: the former is\nfree from controversy and dispute, because it consisteth in comparing\nfigure and motion only; in which things, _truth_, and _the interest of\nmen_, oppose not each other: but in the other there is nothing\nundisputable, because it compareth men, and meddleth with their right\nand profit; in which, as oft as reason is against a man, so oft will a\nman be against reason. And from hence it cometh, that they who have\nwritten of justice and policy in general, do all invade each other and\nthemselves with contradictions. To reduce this doctrine to the rules and\ninfallibility of reason, there is no way, but, first, put such\nprinciples down for a foundation, as passion, not mistrusting, may not\nseek to displace; and afterwards to build thereon the truth of cases in\nthe law of nature (which hitherto have been built in the air) by\ndegrees, till the whole have been inexpugnable. Now, my Lord, the\nprinciples fit for such a foundation, are those which heretofore I have\nacquainted your Lordship withal in private discourse, and which by your\ncommand I have here put into a method. To examine cases thereby between\n_sovereign_ and _sovereign_, or between _sovereign_ and _subject_, I\nleave to them that shall find leisure and encouragement thereto. For my\npart, I present this to your Lordship for the true and only foundation\nof such science. For the style, it is therefore the worse, because,\nwhilst I was writing, I consulted more with logic than with rhetoric:\nbut for the doctrine, it is not slightly proved; and the conclusions\nthereof of such nature, as, for want of them, government and peace have\nbeen nothing else, to this day, but mutual fears; and it would be an\nincomparable benefit to commonwealth, that every one held the opinion\nconcerning _law_ and _policy_ here delivered. The ambition therefore of\nthis book, in seeking by your Lordship\u2019s countenance to insinuate itself\nwith those whom the matter it containeth most nearly concerneth, is to\nbe excused. For myself, I desire no greater honour than I enjoy already\nin your Lordship\u2019s favour, unless it be that you would be pleased, in\ncontinuance thereof, to give me more exercise in your commands; which,\nas I am bound by your many great favours, I shall obey, being,\n\n My most honoured Lord,\n Your most humble and most obliged Servant,\n THOMAS HOBBES.\n\n_May 9, 1640._\n\n\n\n\n IN LIBELLUM PR\u00c6STANTISSIMI\n\n THOM\u00c6 HOBBII,\n\n VIRI VERE PHILOSOPHI,\n\n \u201cDE NATURA HOMINIS.\u201d\n\n Qu\u00e6 magna c\u0153li m\u0153nia, et tractus maris\n Terr\u00e6que fines, siquid aut ultra est, capit,\n Mens ipsa tandem capitur: omnia hactenus\n Qu\u00e6 nosse potuit, nota jam primum est sibi.\n\n Accede, Lector, disce quis demum sies;\n Et inquilinam jecoris agnoscas tui,\n Qua propius h\u00e6ret nil tibi, et nil tam procul.\n\n Non hic scholarum frivola, aut cassi logi,\n Quales per annos forte plus septem legit;\n Ut folle pleno prodeat, rix\u00e6 artifex;\n Vanasque merces futili lingua crepet:\n Sed sancta rerum pondera, et sensus graves,\n Quales parari decuit, ipsa cum fuit\n Pingenda ratio, et vindici suo adstitit.\n\n Panduntur omnes machin\u00e6 gyri tu\u00e6,\n Anim\u00e6que vectes, trochle\u00e6, cunei, rot\u00e6;\n Qua concitetur arte, quo sufflamine\n Sistatur illa rursus, et constet sibi:\n Nec, si fenestram pectori humano suam\n Aptasset ipse Momus, inspiceret magis.\n Hic cerno levia affectuum vestigia,\n Gracilesque sensus lineas; video quibus\n Vehantur alis blanduli cupidines,\n Quibusque stimulis urgeant ir\u00e6 graves.\n Hic et dolores, et voluptates suos\n Produnt recessus; ipse nec timor latet.\n\n Has norit artes, quisquis in foro velit\n Animorum habenas flectere, et populos cupit\n Aptis ligatos nexibus jungi sibi.\n Hic Archimedes publicus figat pedem,\n Siquando regna machinis politicis\n Urgere satagit, et feras gentes ciet,\n Imisque motum sedibus mundum quatit:\n Facile domabit cuncta, qui menti imperat.\n\n Consultor audax, et Promethei potens\n Facinoris anime! quis tibi dedit Deus\n H\u00e6c intueri s\u00e6culis longe abdita,\n Oculosque luce tinxit ambrosia tuos?\n Tu mentis omnis, at tu\u00e6 nulla est capax.\n Hac laude solus fruere: divinum est opus\n Animam creare; proximum huic, ostendere.\n\n RAD. BATHURST, A.M.\n COL. TRIN. OXON.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n HUMAN NATURE:\n\n OR THE\n\n FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS\n\n OF POLICY.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n\n[Sidenote: Introduction.]\n\n1. The true and perspicuous explication of the elements of _laws\nnatural and politic_ (_which is my present scope_) dependeth upon\nthe knowledge of what is _human nature_, what is _body politic_, and\nwhat it is we call a _law_; concerning which points, as the\n_writings_ of men from antiquity downwards have still increased, so\nalso have the _doubts_ and _controversies_ concerning the same: and\nseeing that true knowledge begetteth not doubt nor controversy, but\nknowledge, it is manifest from the present controversies, that they,\nwhich have _heretofore_ written thereof, have not well understood\ntheir own subject.\n\n2. _Harm_ I can do none, though I err no less than they; for I shall\nleave men but as they are, in doubt and dispute: but, intending not\nto take any principle upon _trust_, but only to put men in mind of\nwhat they _know already_, or _may know_ by their own experience, I\nhope to err the less; and when I do, it must proceed from too _hasty\nconcluding_, which I will endeavour as much as I can to avoid.\n\n3. On the other side, if _reasoning aright_ win not _consent_, which\nmay very easily happen, from them that being confident of their own\nknowledge weigh not what is said, the _fault_ is not mine, but\ntheirs; for as it is my part to _shew_ my reasons, so it is theirs\nto bring _attention_.\n\n4. Man\u2019s _nature_ is the _sum of his natural faculties and powers_,\nas the faculties of _nutrition_, _motion_, _generation_, _sense_,\n_reason_, _&c._ These powers we do unanimously call _natural_, and\nare contained in the definition of man, under these words, _animal_\nand _rational_.\n\n5. According to the two principal parts of man, I divide his\nfaculties into two sorts, faculties of the _body_, and faculties of\nthe _mind_.\n\n6. Since the minute and distinct anatomy of the powers of the _body_\nis nothing necessary to the present purpose, I will only sum them up\nin these three heads, power _nutritive_, power _motive_, and power\n_generative_.\n\n7. Of the powers of the _mind_ there be two sorts, _cognitive_,\n_imaginative_, or _conceptive_ and _motive_; and first of\n_cognitive_.\n\nFor the understanding of what I mean by the power _cognitive_, we\nmust remember and acknowledge that there be in our minds continually\ncertain _images_ or conceptions of the things without us, insomuch\nthat if a man could be alive, and all the rest of the world\nannihilated, he should nevertheless retain the _image_ thereof, and\nall those things which he had before seen or perceived in it; every\none by his own experience knowing, that the _absence_ or\n_destruction_ of things once imagined doth not cause the _absence_\nor _destruction_ of the _imagination_ itself. This _imagery_ and\n_representations_ of the qualities of the thing without, is that we\ncall our _conception_, _imagination_, _ideas_, _notice_ or\n_knowledge_ of them; and the _faculty_ or power by which we are\ncapable of such knowledge, is that I here call _cognitive power_, or\n_conceptive_, the power of knowing or conceiving.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n\n2. Definition of sense. 4. Four propositions concerning the nature\n of conceptions. 5. The first proved. 6. The second proved. 7, 8.\n The third proved. 9. The fourth proved. 10. The main deception\n of sense.\n\n\n1. Having declared what I mean by the word _conception_, and other\nwords equivalent thereunto, I come to the _conceptions_ themselves,\nto shew their _differences_, their _causes_, and the _manner of the\nproduction_, so far as is necessary for this place.\n\n[Sidenote: Definition of sense.]\n\n2. Originally all _conceptions_ proceed from the _action_ of the\nthing itself, whereof it is the conception: now when the action is\n_present_, the conception it produceth is also called _sense_; and\nthe thing by whose action the same is produced, is called the\n_object of the sense_.\n\n3. By our several _organs_ we have several _conceptions_ of several\nqualities in the objects; for by _sight_ we have a conception or\nimage composed of _colour_ and _figure_, which is all the notice and\nknowledge the object imparteth to us of its nature by the eye. By\n_hearing_ we have a conception called _sound_, which is all the\nknowledge we have of the quality of the object from the ear. And so\nthe rest of the senses are also conceptions of several qualities, or\nnatures of their objects.\n\n[Sidenote: Four propositions concerning the nature of conceptions.]\n\n4. Because the _image_ in vision consisting of _colour_ and _shape_\nis the knowledge we have of the qualities of the object of that\nsense; it is no hard matter for a man to fall into this opinion,\nthat the same _colour_ and _shape_ are the _very qualities\nthemselves_; and for the same cause, that _sound_ and _noise_ are\nthe _qualities of the bell_, or of the air. And this opinion hath\nbeen so long received, that the _contrary_ must needs appear a great\nparadox; and yet the introduction of _species visible_ and\n_intelligible_ (which is necessary for the maintenance of that\nopinion) passing to and fro from the _object_, is _worse_ than any\nparadox, as being a plain _impossibility_. I shall therefore\nendeavour to make plain these points:\n\nThat the subject wherein colour and image are inherent, is _not_ the\n_object_ or thing seen.\n\nThat there is nothing _without us_ (really) which we call an _image_\nor colour.\n\nThat the said image or colour is but an _apparition_ unto us of the\n_motion_, agitation, or alteration, which the _object_ worketh in\nthe _brain_, or spirits, or some internal substance of the head.\n\nThat as in _vision_, so also in conceptions that arise from the\n_other senses_, the subject of their _inherence_ is not the\n_object_, but the _sentient_.\n\n[Sidenote: The first proved]\n\n5. Every man hath so much experience as to have seen the _sun_ and\nthe other visible objects by reflection in the _water_ and\n_glasses_; and this alone is sufficient for this conclusion, that\n_colour_ and _image_ may be there where the _thing seen_ is _not_.\nBut because it may be said that notwithstanding the _image_ in the\nwater be not in the object, but a thing merely _phantastical_, yet\nthere may be _colour_ really in the thing itself: I will urge\nfurther this experience, that divers times men see directly the\n_same_ object _double_, as _two candles_ for _one_, which may happen\nfrom distemper, or otherwise without distemper if a man will, the\norgans being either in their right temper, or equally distempered;\nthe _colours_ and _figures_ in two such images of the same thing\n_cannot be inherent_ therein, because the thing seen cannot be in\n_two places_.\n\n_One_ of these images therefore is _not inherent_ in the object: but\nseeing the organs of the sight are then in equal temper or\ndistemper, the _one_ of them is no more inherent than the _other_;\nand consequently _neither_ of them both are in the object; which is\nthe first proposition, mentioned in the precedent number.\n\n[Sidenote: The second proved.]\n\n6. Secondly, that the image of any thing by _reflection_ in a\n_glass_ or _water_ or the like, is _not_ any thing _in_ or _behind_\nthe glass, or _in_ or _under_ the water, every man may grant to\nhimself; which is the second proposition.\n\n[Sidenote: The third proved.]\n\n7. For the third, we are to consider, first that upon every _great\nagitation_ or _concussion_ of the _brain_ (as it happeneth from a\nstroke, especially if the stroke be upon the eye) whereby the optic\nnerve suffereth any great violence, there _appeareth_ before the\n_eyes_ a certain light, which light is _nothing without_, but an\napparition only, all that is real being the concussion or motion of\nthe parts of that nerve; from which experience we may conclude, that\n_apparition of light is really nothing but motion_ within. If\ntherefore from _lucid bodies_ there can be derived _motion_, so as\nto affect the optic nerve in such manner as is proper thereunto,\nthere will follow an _image_ of light somewhere in that line by\nwhich the motion was last derived to the eye; that is to say, in the\nobject, if we look directly on it, and in the glass or water, when\nwe look upon it in the line of reflection, which in effect is the\nthird proposition; namely, that image and colour is but an\napparition to us of that motion, agitation, or alteration which the\nobject worketh in the brain or spirits, or some _internal_ substance\nin the head.\n\n8. But that _from all lucid_, shining and illuminate bodies, there\nis a _motion produced_ to the eye, and, through the eye, to the\n_optic_ nerve, and so into the _brain_, by which that apparition of\n_light_ or _colour_ is affected, is not hard to prove. And first, it\nis evident that the _fire_, the only lucid body here upon earth,\nworketh by _motion_ equally every way; insomuch as the motion\nthereof _stopped_ or inclosed, it is presently _extinguished_, and\nno more fire. And further, that that motion, whereby the fire\nworketh, is _dilation_, and _contraction_ of itself _alternately_,\ncommonly called _scintillation_ or glowing, is manifest also by\nexperience. From such _motion_ in the fire must needs arise a\n_rejection_ or casting from itself of that part of the _medium_\nwhich is _contiguous_ to it, whereby that part also rejecteth the\n_next_, and so successively one part beateth back another to the\nvery _eye_; and in the same manner the _exterior_ part of the eye\npresseth the _interior_, (the laws of refraction still observed).\nNow the interior coat of the eye is nothing else but a piece of the\n_optic_ nerve; and therefore the motion is still continued thereby\ninto the _brain_, and by _resistance_ or reaction of the brain, is\nalso a _rebound_ into the optic nerve again; which we _not\nconceiving_ as motion or rebound from _within_, do think it is\n_without_, and call it _light_; as hath been already shewed by the\nexperience of a stroke. We have no reason to doubt, that the\nfountain of light, the _sun_, worketh by any other ways than the\n_fire_, at least in this matter. And thus all _vision_ hath its\noriginal from such _motion_ as is here described: for where there is\nno light, there is no sight; and therefore _colour_ also must be the\nsame thing with _light_, as being the effect of the lucid bodies:\ntheir _difference_ being only this, that when the light cometh\n_directly_ from the fountain to the eye, or _indirectly_ by\nreflection from _clean_ and _polite_ bodies, and such as have _not_\nany particular motion internal to alter it, we call it _light_; but\nwhen it cometh to the eye by reflection from _uneven_, _rough_, and\ncoarse bodies, or such as are affected with internal motion of their\nown that may alter it, then we call it _colour_; colour and light\ndiffering only in this, that the one is _pure_, and the other\n_perturbed_ light. By that which hath been said, not only the truth\nof the third proposition, but also the whole manner of producing\nlight and colour, is apparent.\n\n[Sidenote: The fourth proved.]\n\n9. As colour is not inherent in the object, but an effect thereof\nupon us, caused by such motion in the object, as hath been\ndescribed: so neither is _sound_ in the thing we hear, but in\nourselves. One manifest sign thereof is, that as a man may _see_, so\nalso he may _hear double_ or _treble_, by multiplication of\n_echoes_, which echoes are sounds as well as the original; and _not_\nbeing in one and the _same place_, cannot be _inherent_ in the body\nthat maketh them. Nothing can make any thing which is not in itself:\nthe _clapper_ hath no _sound_ in it, but _motion_, and maketh motion\nin the internal parts of the bell; so the _bell_ hath motion, and\nnot sound, that imparteth _motion_ to the _air_; and the _air_ hath\nmotion, but not sound; the _air_ imparteth motion by the _ear_ and\n_nerve_ unto the _brain_; and the brain hath motion but not sound;\nfrom the _brain_, it reboundeth back into the nerves _outward_, and\nthence it becometh an _apparition without_, which we call _sound_.\nAnd to proceed to the _rest_ of the _senses_, it is apparent enough,\nthat the _smell_ and _taste_ of the _same thing_, are _not_ the\n_same_ to _every man_; and therefore are not in the thing _smelt_ or\n_tasted_, but in the men. So likewise the _heat_ we feel from the\nfire is manifestly in _us_, and is quite _different_ from the heat\nwhich is in the _fire_: for _our_ heat is _pleasure_ or _pain_,\naccording as it is _great_ or _moderate_; but in the _coal_ there is\nno such thing. By this the fourth and last proposition is proved,\n_viz._ that as in vision, so also in conceptions that arise from\n_other_ senses, the subject of their inherence is not in the object,\nbut in the sentient.\n\n[Sidenote: The main deception of sense.]\n\n10. And from hence also it followeth, that _whatsoever accidents_ or\nqualities our senses make us think there be in the _world_, they be\n_not_ there, but are _seeming_ and _apparitions_ only: the things\nthat really _are_ in the world without us, are those _motions_ by\nwhich these seemings are caused. And this is the _great deception of\nsense_, which also is to be by sense _corrected_: for as sense\ntelleth me, when I see _directly_, that the colour seemeth to _be_\nin the object; so also sense telleth me, when I see by _reflection_,\nthat colour is not in the object.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\n1. Imagination defined. 2. Sleep and dreams defined. 3. Causes of\n dreams. 4. Fiction defined. 5. Phantasms defined. 6. Remembrance\n defined. 7. Wherein remembrance consisteth. 8. Why in a dream a\n man never thinks he dreams. 9. Why few things seem strange in\n dreams. 10. That a dream may be taken for reality and vision.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Imagination defined.]\n\n1. As standing water put into motion by the stroke of a _stone_, or\nblast of wind, doth _not presently_ give over moving as soon as the\nwind ceaseth, or the stone settleth: so _neither_ doth the _effect_\ncease which the _object_ hath wrought upon the _brain_, so soon as\never by turning aside of the organs the _object ceaseth_ to work;\nthat is to say, though the _sense_ be _past_, the _image_ or\n_conception_ remaineth; but more _obscure_ while we are _awake_,\nbecause some _object_ or other continually _plieth_ and soliciteth\nour eyes, and ears, _keeping_ the mind in a _stronger_ motion,\nwhereby the _weaker_ doth not easily _appear_. And this obscure\nconception is that we call _phantasy_, or _imagination_:\n_imagination_ being, to define it, _conception remaining, and by\nlittle and little decaying from and after the act of sense_.\n\n[Sidenote: Sleep and dreams defined.]\n\n2. But when _present_ sense is _not_, as in _sleep_, there the\n_images_ remaining after sense, when there be many, as in dreams,\nare _not obscure_, but _strong_ and _clear_, as in sense itself. The\nreason is, that which obscured and made the conceptions weak, namely\nsense, and present _operation_ of the object, is _removed_: for\n_sleep_ is the _privation of the act of sense_, (the power\nremaining) and _dreams_ are the _imagination_ of them that _sleep_.\n\n[Sidenote: Causes of dreams.]\n\n3. The _causes_ of dreams, if they be natural, are the _actions_ or\nviolence of the _inward_ parts of a man upon his _brain_, by which\nthe _passages_ of sense by sleep _benumbed_, are _restored_ to their\nmotion. The signs by which this appeareth to be so, are the\n_differences_ of dreams (old men commonly dream oftener, and have\ntheir dreams more painful than young) proceeding from the\n_different_ accidents of man\u2019s body, as dreams of _lust_, as dreams\nof _anger_, according as the heart, or other parts within, work more\nor less upon the brain, by more or less _heat_; so also the descents\nof different _sorts of phlegm_ maketh us a dream of different tastes\nof meats and drinks; and I believe there is a _reciprocation_ of\nmotion from the brain to the vital parts, and back from the vital\nparts to the brain; whereby not only _imagination_ begetteth\n_motion_ in those parts; but also motion in those parts begetteth\nimagination like to that by which it was begotten. If this be true,\nand that _sad_ imaginations nourish the _spleen_, then we see also a\ncause, why a strong _spleen_ reciprocally causeth _fearful dreams_,\nand why the effects of _lasciviousness_ may in a dream produce the\nimage of some person that had _caused_ them. Another sign that\ndreams are caused by the action of the inward parts, is the\n_disorder_ and casual consequence of one conception or image to\nanother: for when we are _waking_, the _antecedent_ thought or\nconception introduceth, and is cause of the _consequent_, as the\nwater followeth a man\u2019s finger upon a dry and level table; but in\n_dreams_ there is commonly _no coherence_, and when there is, it is\nby chance, which must needs proceed from this, that the _brain_ in\ndreams is _not restored_ to its motion in every part alike; whereby\nit cometh to pass, that our thoughts appear like the stars between\nthe flying clouds, not in the order which a man would choose to\nobserve them, but as the uncertain flight of broken clouds permits.\n\n[Sidenote: Fiction defined.]\n\n4. As when the _water_, or any liquid thing moved at once by\n_divers_ movents, receiveth _one_ motion compounded of them all; so\nalso the _brain_ or spirit therein, having been stirred by _divers_\nobjects, composeth an imagination of _divers_ conceptions that\nappeared single to the sense. As for example, the sense sheweth at\none time the figure of a _mountain_, and at another time the colour\nof _gold_; but the imagination afterwards hath them both at once in\na _golden mountain_. From the same cause it is, there appear unto us\n_castles_ in the _air_, _chimeras_, and other monsters which are\n_not_ in _rerum natura_, _but_ have been conceived by the sense in\npieces at several times. And this composition is that which we\ncommonly call _fiction_ of the mind.\n\n[Sidenote: Phantasms defined.]\n\n5. There is yet another kind of imagination, which for _clearness\ncontendeth_ with _sense_, as well as a _dream_; and that is, when\nthe _action_ of sense hath been _long_ or _vehement_: and the\nexperience thereof is more frequent in the sense of seeing, than the\nrest. An example whereof is, the _image_ remaining before the _eye_\nafter looking upon the _sun_. Also, those little images that appear\nbefore the eyes in the _dark_ (whereof I think every man hath\nexperience, but they most of all, who are _timorous_ or\nsuperstitious) are examples of the same. And these, for\ndistinction-sake, may be called _phantasms_.\n\n[Sidenote: Remembrance defined.]\n\n6. By the _senses_, which are numbered according to the _organs_ to\nbe _five_, we take notice (as hath been said already) of the objects\n_without_ us; and that _notice_ is our _conception_ thereof: but we\ntake _notice_ also some way or other _of our conceptions_: for when\nthe conception of the same thing cometh _again_, we take notice that\nit is _again_; that is to say, that we have had the same conception\n_before_; which is as much as to imagine a thing _past_; which is\nimpossible to the _sense_, which is only of things _present_. This\ntherefore may be accounted a _sixth sense_, but _internal_, (not\n_external_, as the rest) and is commonly called _remembrance_.\n\n[Sidenote: Wherein remembrance consisteth.]\n\n7. For the _manner_ by which we take notice of a conception _past_,\nwe are to remember, that in the _definition_ of _imagination_, it is\nsaid to be a conception by _little_ and _little decaying_, or\ngrowing more _obscure_. An _obscure_ conception is that which\nrepresenteth the _whole object_ together, but _none_ of the _smaller\nparts_ by themselves; and as _more_ or _fewer_ parts be represented,\nso is the conception or representation said to be _more_ or _less\nclear_. Seeing then the _conception_, which when it was _first_\nproduced by sense, was _clear_, and represented the _parts_ of the\nobject _distinctly_; and when it cometh _again_ is _obscure_, we\nfind _missing_ somewhat that we expected; by which we judge it\n_past_ and _decayed_. For example, a man that is present in a\nforeign _city_, seeth not only _whole_ streets, but can also\ndistinguish particular _houses_, and _parts_ of houses; but departed\nthence, he cannot distinguish them so particularly in his mind as he\ndid, some _house_ or turning escaping him; yet is this to\n_remember_: when _afterwards_ there escape him _more_ particulars,\nthis is also to _remember_, but _not_ so well. In process of time,\nthe _image_ of the city _returneth_ but as a _mass_ of building\n_only_, which is _almost_ to have _forgotten_ it. Seeing then\nremembrance is _more_ or _less_, as we find more or less\n_obscurity_, why may not we well think _remembrance_ to be nothing\nelse but the _missing of parts_, which every man expecteth should\nsucceed after they have a conception of the whole? To see at a great\ndistance of place, and to remember at a great distance of time, is\nto have like conceptions of the thing: for there wanteth distinction\nof parts in both; the one conception being weak by operation at\ndistance, the other by decay.\n\n[Sidenote: Why in a dream a man never thinks he dreams.]\n\n8. And from this that hath been said, there followeth, that a man\ncan _never know_ he _dreameth_; he _may_ dream he _doubteth_,\nwhether it be a dream or no: but the clearness of the imagination\nrepresenteth every thing with as many parts as doth sense itself,\nand consequently, he can take notice of nothing but as present;\nwhereas to think he dreameth, is to think those his conceptions,\nthat is to say dreams, obscurer than they were in the sense: so that\nhe must think them both as clear, and not as clear as sense; which\nis impossible.\n\n[Sidenote: Why few things seem strange in dreams.]\n\n9. From the same ground it proceedeth, that men _wonder not_ in\ntheir dreams at place and persons, as they would do waking: for\nwaking, a man would think it strange to be in a place where he never\nwas before, and remember nothing of how he came there; but in a\ndream, there cometh little of that kind into consideration. The\n_clearness_ of conception in a dream, taketh away _distrust_, unless\nthe _strangeness_ be _excessive_, as to think himself fallen from on\nhigh without hurt, and then most commonly he _waketh_.\n\n[Sidenote: That a dream may be taken for reality and vision.]\n\n10. Nor is it _impossible_ for a man to be so far deceived, as when\nhis dream is _past_, to think it real: for if he dream of such\nthings as are ordinarily in his mind, and in such order as he useth\nto do waking, and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the place\nwhere he findeth himself when he awaketh; all which may happen: I\nknow no \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd or mark by which he can discern whether it were a\ndream or not, and therefore do the less wonder to hear a man\nsometimes to tell his dream for a truth, or to take it for a vision.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\n1. Discourse. 2. The cause of coherence of thoughts. 3. Ranging. 4.\n Sagacity. 5. Reminiscence. 6. Experience. 7. Expectation. 8.\n Conjecture. 9. Signs. 10. Prudence. 11. Caveats of concluding\n from experience.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Discourse.]\n\n1. The _succession_ of conceptions in the mind, series or\nconsequence of one after another, may be _casual_ and incoherent, as\nin dreams for the most part; and it may be _orderly_, as when the\nformer thought introduceth the latter; and this is _discourse_ of\nthe mind. But because the word discourse is commonly taken for the\n_coherence_ and consequence of words, I will, to avoid equivocation,\ncall it _discursion_.\n\n[Sidenote: The cause of coherence of thoughts.]\n\n2. The _cause_ of the _coherence_ or consequence of one conception\nto another, is their first _coherence_ or consequence at that _time_\nwhen they are produced by sense: as for example, from St. Andrew the\nmind runneth to St. Peter, because their names are read together;\nfrom St. Peter to a _stone_, for the same cause; from _stone_ to\n_foundation_, because we see them together; and for the same cause,\nfrom foundation to _church_, and from church to _people_, and from\npeople to _tumult_: and according to this example, the mind may run\nalmost from anything to anything. But as in the _sense_ the\nconception of cause and effect may succeed one another; so may they\nafter sense in the _imagination_: and for the most part they do so;\nthe _cause_ whereof is the _appetite_ of them, who, having a\nconception of the _end_, have next unto it a conception of the next\n_means_ to that end: as, when a man, from a thought of _honour_ to\nwhich he hath an appetite, cometh to the thought of _wisdom_, which\nis the next means thereunto; and from thence to the thought of\n_study_, which is the next means to wisdom.\n\n[Sidenote: Ranging.]\n\n3. To omit that kind of discursion by which we proceed from anything\nto anything, there are of the _other_ kind _divers_ sorts: as first,\nin the _senses_ there are certain coherences of conceptions, which\nwe may call _ranging_; examples whereof are; a man casteth his _eye_\nupon the _ground_, to look about for some _small_ thing lost; the\n_hounds_ casting about at a fault in hunting; and the _ranging_ of\nspaniels: and herein we take a beginning arbitrary.\n\n[Sidenote: Sagacity.]\n\n4. Another sort of discursion is, when the _appetite_ giveth a man\nhis beginning, as in the example before, where honour to which a man\nhath appetite, maketh him think upon the next means of attaining it,\nand that again of the next, &c. And this the Latins call\n_sagacitas_, and we may call _hunting_ or _tracing_, as dogs trace\nbeasts by the smell, and men hunt them by their footsteps; or as men\nhunt after riches, place, or knowledge.\n\n[Sidenote: Reminiscence.]\n\n5. There is yet another kind of discursion beginning with the\nappetite to _recover_ something lost, proceeding from the _present\nbackward_, from thought of the place where we _miss_ at, to the\nthought of the place from whence we came _last_; and from the\nthought of that, to the thought of a place _before_, till we have in\nour mind some place, wherein we had the thing we miss: and this is\ncalled _reminiscence_.\n\n[Sidenote: Experience.]\n\n6. The _remembrance_ of succession of one thing to another, that is,\nof what was _antecedent_, and what _consequent_, and what\n_concomitant_, is called an _experiment_; whether the same be made\nby us _voluntarily_, as when a man putteth any thing into the fire,\nto see what effect the fire will produce upon it: or _not_ made by\nus, as when we remember a fair morning after a red evening. To have\nhad many _experiments_, is that we call _experience_, which is\nnothing else but _remembrance_ of what antecedents have been\nfollowed by what consequents.\n\n[Sidenote: Expectation.]\n\n7. No man can have in his mind a conception of the _future_, for the\nfuture is _not yet_: but of our conceptions of the _past_, we make a\n_future_; or rather, call _past_, _future_ relatively. Thus after a\nman hath been accustomed to see like antecedents followed by like\nconsequents, whensoever he seeth the like come to pass to any thing\nhe had seen before, he looks there should follow it the same that\nfollowed then: as for example, because a man hath often seen\noffences followed by punishment, when he seeth an offence in\npresent, he thinketh punishment to be consequent thereto; but\nconsequent unto that which is present, men call future; and thus we\nmake _remembrance_ to be the _prevision_ of things to come, or\n_expectation_ or presumption of the future.\n\n[Sidenote: Conjecture.]\n\n8. In the same manner, if a man seeth in present that which he hath\nseen before, he thinks that that which was antecedent to that which\nhe saw before, is also antecedent to that he presently seeth: as for\nexample, he that hath seen the ashes remain after the fire, and now\nagain seeth ashes, concludeth again there hath been fire: and this\nis called again _conjecture_ of the past, or presumption of the\nfact.\n\n[Sidenote: Signs.]\n\n9. When a man hath _so often_ observed like antecedents to be\nfollowed by like consequents, that _whensoever_ he seeth the\nantecedent, he looketh again for the consequent; or when he seeth\nthe consequent, maketh account there hath been the like antecedent;\nthen he calleth both the antecedent and the consequent, _signs_ one\nof another, as clouds are signs of rain to come, and rain of clouds\npast.\n\n[Sidenote: Prudence.]\n\n10. This taking of signs by _experience_, is that wherein men do\nordinarily think, the difference stands between man and man in\n_wisdom_, by which they commonly understand a man\u2019s whole ability or\n_power cognitive_; but this is an _error_: for the signs are but\n_conjectural_; and according as they have often or seldom failed, so\ntheir _assurance_ is more or less; but _never full_ and _evident_:\nfor though a man have always seen the day and night to follow one\nanother hitherto; yet can he not thence conclude they shall do so,\nor that they have done so eternally: _experience concludeth nothing\nuniversally_. If the signs hit twenty times for one missing, a man\nmay lay a wager of twenty to one of the event; but may not conclude\nit for a truth. But by this it is plain, that they shall _conjecture\nbest_, that have _most experience_, because they have most signs to\nconjecture by: which is the reason _old men_ are _more prudent_,\nthat is, conjecture better, _c\u00e6teris paribus_, than young: for,\nbeing old, they remember more; and experience is but remembrance.\nAnd _men_ of _quick_ imagination, _c\u00e6teris paribus_, are more\n_prudent_ than those whose imaginations are slow: for they observe\n_more_ in _less_ time. Prudence is nothing but conjecture from\nexperience, or taking of signs from experience warily, that is, that\nthe experiments from which he taketh such signs be all remembered;\nfor else the cases are not alike that seem so.\n\n[Sidenote: Caveats of concluding from experience.]\n\n11. As in conjecture concerning things past and future, it is\nprudence to conclude from experience, what is like to come to pass,\nor to have passed already; so it is an error to conclude from it,\nthat _it is_ so or so _called_; that is to say, we cannot from\nexperience conclude, that any thing is to be called _just_ or\n_unjust_, _true_ or _false_, or any proposition _universal_\nwhatsoever, except it be from remembrance of the use of names\nimposed arbitrarily by men: for example, to have heard a sentence\ngiven in the like case, the like sentence a thousand times is not\nenough to conclude that the sentence is just; though most men have\nno other means to conclude by: but it is _necessary_, for the\ndrawing of such conclusion, to _trace_ and _find out_, by many\nexperiences, what men do mean by calling things just and unjust.\nFurther, there is another _caveat_ to be taken in concluding by\nexperience, from the tenth section of the second chapter; that is,\nthat we conclude such things to be without, that are within us.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n\n1. Of marks. 2. Names or appellations. 3. Names positive and\n privative. 4. Advantage of names maketh us capable of science.\n 5. Names universal and singular. 6. Universals not in _rerum\n natura_. 7. Equivocal names. 8. Understanding. 9. Affirmation,\n negation, proposition. 10. Truth, falsity. 11. Ratiocination.\n 12. According to reason, against reason. 13. Names causes of\n knowledge, so of error. 14. Translation of the discourse of the\n mind into the discourse of the tongue, and of the errors thence\n proceeding.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Of marks.]\n\n1. Seeing the _succession_ of conceptions in the _mind_ are caused,\nas hath been said before, by the succession they _had_ one to\nanother when they were produced by the _senses_, and that there is\nno conception that hath not been produced immediately before or\nafter innumerable others, by the innumerable acts of sense; it must\nneeds follow, that one _conception_ followeth _not_ another,\naccording to our election, and the need we have of them, _but_ as it\n_chanceth_ us to hear or see such things as shall bring them to our\nmind. The experience we have hereof, is in such brute beasts, which,\nhaving the providence to hide the remains and superfluity of their\nmeat, do nevertheless want the remembrance of the place where they\nhid it, and thereby make no benefit thereof in their hunger: but\nman, who in this point beginneth to rank himself somewhat above the\nnature of beasts, hath observed and remembered the cause of this\ndefect, and to amend the same, hath imagined or devised to set up a\nvisible or other sensible mark, the which, when he seeth it again,\nmay bring to his mind the thought he had when he set it up. A _mark_\ntherefore is a _sensible object_ which a man erecteth voluntarily to\nhimself, to the end to _remember_ thereby somewhat past, when the\nsame is objected to his sense again: as men that have passed by a\nrock at sea, set up some mark, thereby to remember their former\ndanger, and avoid it.\n\n[Sidenote: Names or appellations.]\n\n2. In the number of these _marks_, are those _human voices_, which\nwe call the _names_ or appellations of things sensible by the ear,\nby which we recall into our mind some conceptions of the things to\nwhich we gave those names or appellations; as the appellation\n_white_ bringeth to remembrance the quality of such objects as\nproduce that colour or conception in us. A _name_ or appellation\ntherefore is the _voice_ of a man _arbitrary_, imposed for a _mark_\nto bring into his mind some conception concerning the thing on which\nit is imposed.\n\n[Sidenote: Names positive and privative.]\n\n3. Things named, are either the _objects_ themselves, as a man; or\nthe _conception_ itself that we have of man, as shape and motion: or\nsome privation, which is when we conceive that there is something\nwhich we conceive, not in him; as when we conceive he is not just,\nnot finite, we give him the name of unjust, of infinite, which\nsignify privation or defect; and to the privations themselves we\ngive the names of injustice and infiniteness: so that here be _two\nsorts_ of names; one of _things_, in which we conceive something; or\nof the conceptions themselves, which are called _positive_: the\nother of things wherein we conceive _privation_ or defect, and those\nnames are called _privative_.\n\n[Sidenote: Advantage of names maketh us capable of science.]\n\n4. By the advantage of _names_ it is that we are capable of\n_science_, which beasts, for want of them are not; nor man, without\nthe use of them: for as a beast misseth not one or two out of many\nher young ones, for want of those names of order, one, two, and\nthree, and which we call _number_; so neither would a man, without\nrepeating orally or mentally the words of number, know how many\npieces of money or other things lie before him.\n\n[Sidenote: Names universal and singular.]\n\n5. Seeing there be _many_ conceptions of _one_ and the same thing,\nand for _every_ conception we give it a _several_ name; it followeth\nthat for one and the same thing, we have many names or attributes;\nas to the same man we give the appellations of _just_, _valiant_,\n&c. for divers _virtues_; of _strong_, _comely_, &c. for divers\n_qualities_ of the _body_. And again, because from divers things we\nreceive like conceptions, many things must needs have the same\nappellation: as to all things we _see_, we give the same name of\n_visible_; and to all things we _see moveable_, we give the\nappellation of _moveable_: and those names we give to _many_, are\ncalled _universal_ to them all; as the name of man to every\nparticular of mankind: such appellation as we give to _one_ only\nthing, we call _individual_, or singular; as Socrates, and other\nproper names: or, by circumlocution, he that writ the _Iliads_, for\nHomer.\n\n[Sidenote: Universals not in _rerum natura_.]\n\n6. The universality of _one name_ to many things, hath been the\ncause that men think the _things_ are themselves universal; and so\nseriously contend, that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of\nthe men that are, have been, or shall be in the world, there is yet\nsomething else that we call _man_, viz. _man in general_, deceiving\nthemselves, by taking the universal, or general appellation, for the\nthing it signifieth: for if one should desire the painter to make\nhim the picture of a man, which is as much as to say, of a man in\ngeneral; he meaneth no more, but that the painter should choose what\nman he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are,\nor have been, or may be, none of which are _universal_. But when he\nwould have him to draw the picture of the king, or any particular\nperson, he limiteth the painter to that one person he chooseth. It\nis plain therefore, that there is _nothing universal_ but _names_;\nwhich are therefore called _indefinite_; because we limit them not\nourselves, but leave them to be applied by the hearer: whereas a\nsingular name is limited and restrained to one of the many things it\nsignifieth; as when we say, this man, pointing to him, or giving him\nhis proper name, or by some such other way.\n\n[Sidenote: Equivocal names.]\n\n7. The appellations that be _universal_, and common to many\nthings, are _not_ always given to all the _particulars_, (as they\nought to be) for like conceptions, and like considerations in them\nall; which is the cause that many of them are _not_ of _constant_\nsignification, but bring into our mind other thoughts than those\nfor which they were ordained, and these are called equivocal. As\nfor example, the word faith signifieth the same with belief;\nsometimes it signifieth particularly that belief which maketh a\nChristian; and sometime it signifieth the keeping of a promise.\nAlso all _metaphors_ are by profession _equivocal_: and there is\nscarce any word that is not made _equivocal_ by divers contextures\nof speech, or by diversity of pronunciation and gesture.\n\n[Sidenote: Understanding.]\n\n8. This _equivocation_ of names maketh it _difficult_ to recover\nthose conceptions for which the name was ordained; and that not only\nin the language of other men, wherein we are to consider the\n_drift_, and _occasion_, and _contexture_ of the speech, as well as\nthe _words_ themselves; but also in our discourse, which being\nderived from the custom and common use of speech, representeth unto\nus not our own conceptions. It is therefore a great ability in a\nman, out of the words, contexture, and other circumstances of\nlanguage, to deliver himself from _equivocation_, and to find out\nthe true meaning of what is said: and this is it we call\n_understanding_.\n\n[Sidenote: Affirmation, negation, proposition.]\n\n9. Of two _appellations_, by the help of this little verb _is_, or\nsomething equivalent, we make an _affirmation_ or _negation_, either\nof which in the Schools we call also a _proposition_, and consisteth\nof two appellations joined together by the said verb _is_: as for\nexample, man is a living creature; or thus, man is not righteous:\nwhereof the former is called an _affirmation_, because the\nappellation, living creature, is _positive_; the latter a\n_negative_, because not righteous is _privative_.\n\n[Sidenote: Truth, falsity.]\n\n10. In _every proposition_, be it affirmative or negative, the\nlatter appellation either comprehendeth the former, as in this\nproposition, charity is a virtue, the name of virtue comprehendeth\nthe name of charity, and many other virtues beside; and then is the\nproposition said to be _true_, or _truth_: for, _truth_, and a _true\nproposition_, is all one. Or _else_ the _latter_ appellation\ncomprehendeth _not_ the former; as in this proposition, every man is\njust; the name of just comprehendeth not every man; for unjust is\nthe name of the far greater part of men: and the proposition is said\nto be _false_, or falsity: _falsity_ and a _false proposition_ being\nalso the same thing.\n\n[Sidenote: Ratiocination.]\n\n11. In what manner of two propositions, whether _both_ affirmative,\nor _one_ affirmative, the _other_ negative, is made a _syllogism_, I\nforbear to write. All this that hath been said of names or\npropositions, though _necessary_, is but _dry_ discourse: and this\nplace is not for the whole art of logic, which if I enter further\ninto, I ought to pursue: besides, it is not needful; for there be\nfew men which have not so much natural logic, as thereby to discern\nwell enough, whether any conclusion I shall make in this discourse\nhereafter, be well or ill collected: only thus much I say in this\nplace, that _making of syllogisms_ is that we call _ratiocination_\nor _reasoning_.\n\n[Sidenote: According to reason, against reason.]\n\n12. Now when a man _reasoneth_ from _principles_ that are _found_\nindubitable by experience, all deceptions of sense and equivocation\nof words avoided, the conclusion he maketh is said to be _according\nto right reason_: but when from his conclusion a man may, by good\nratiocination, derive that which is _contradictory_ to any evident\ntruth whatsoever, then he is said to have concluded _against\nreason_: and such a conclusion is called _absurdity_.\n\n[Sidenote: Names causes of knowledge, so of error.]\n\n13. As the _invention_ of _names_ hath been _necessary_ for the\ndrawing men _out of_ ignorance, by calling to their remembrance the\nnecessary _coherence_ of one conception to another; so also hath it\non the other side precipitated men into _error_: insomuch, that\nwhereas by the benefit of _words_ and ratiocination they exceed\n_brute beasts_ in knowledge, and the commodities that accompany the\nsame; so they exceed them also in _error_: for _true_ and _false_\nare things not incident to beasts, because they adhere not to\npropositions and language; nor have they ratiocination, whereby to\nmultiply one untruth by another, as men have.\n\n[Sidenote: Translation of the discourse of the mind into the\n discourse of the tongue, and of the errors thence\n proceeding.]\n\n14. It is the _nature_ almost of every _corporal_ thing, being\n_often moved_ in one and the same manner, to receive continually a\n_greater_ and _greater easiness_ and aptitude to the _same_ motion,\ninsomuch as in time the same becometh so _habitual_, that, to\n_beget_ it, there needs no more than to _begin_ it. The _passions_\nof man, as they are the beginning of _voluntary_ motions; so are\nthey the beginning of _speech_, which is the motion of the tongue.\nAnd men desiring to shew others the knowledge, opinions,\nconceptions, and passions which are in themselves, and to that end\nhaving invented _language_, have by that means transferred all that\n_discursion_ of their _mind_ mentioned in the former chapter, by the\n_motion_ of their _tongues_, into _discourse_ of _words_: and\n_ratio_ now is but _oratio_, for the most part, wherein custom hath\nso great a power, that the mind suggesteth only the first word; the\nrest follow _habitually_, and are not followed by the mind; as it is\nwith beggars, when they say their _paternoster_, putting together\nsuch words, and in such manner, as in their education they have\nlearned from their nurses, from their companies, or from their\nteachers, having _no images_ or _conceptions_ in their mind,\nanswering to the words they speak: and as they have learned\nthemselves, so they teach posterity. Now, if we consider the power\nof those _deceptions_ of the sense, mentioned chapter II. section\n10, and also how _unconstantly_ names have been settled, and how\nsubject they are to _equivocation_, and how _diversified_ by\n_passion_, (scarce two men agreeing what is to be called good, and\nwhat evil; what liberality, what prodigality; what valour, what\ntemerity) and how subject men are to paralogism or fallacy in\nreasoning, I may in a manner conclude, that it is impossible to\n_rectify_ so many errors of any one man, as must needs proceed from\nthose causes, without beginning _anew_ from the very first grounds\nof all our knowledge and sense; and instead of books, reading over\norderly one\u2019s own conceptions: in which meaning, I take _nosce te\nipsum_ for a precept worthy the reputation it hath gotten.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n\n1. Of the two kinds of knowledge. 2. Truth and evidence necessary to\n knowledge. 3. Evidence defined. 4. Science defined. 5.\n Supposition defined. 6. Opinion defined. 7. Belief defined. 8.\n Conscience defined. 9. Belief, in some cases, no less from doubt\n than knowledge.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Of the two kinds of knowledge.]\n\n1. There is a story somewhere, of one that pretends to have been\nmiraculously cured of blindness, wherewith he was born, by St. Alban\nor other Saints, at the town of St. Alban\u2019s; and that the Duke of\nGloucester being there, to be satisfied of the truth of the miracle,\nasked the man, What colour is this? who, by answering, it was green,\ndiscovered himself, and was punished for a counterfeit: for though\nby his sight newly received he might distinguish between green, and\nred, and all other colours, as well as any that should interrogate\nhim, yet he could not possibly know at first sight which of them was\ncalled green, or red, or by any other name. By this we may\nunderstand, there be _two kinds_ of knowledge, whereof the _one_ is\nnothing else but _sense_, or knowledge _original_, as I have said in\nthe beginning of the second chapter, and _remembrance_ of the same;\nthe _other_ is called _science_ or knowledge of the _truth of\npropositions_, and how things are called, and is derived from\n_understanding_. Both of these sorts are but _experience_; the\nformer being the experience of the effects of things that work upon\nus from _without_; and the latter experience men have from the\nproper use of _names_ in language: and all experience being, as I\nhave said, but remembrance, all knowledge is remembrance: and of the\n_former_, the register we keep in books, is called _history_; but\nthe registers of the _latter_ are called the _sciences_.\n\n[Sidenote: Truth and evidence necessary to knowledge.]\n\n2. There are _two things_ necessarily implied in this word\n_knowledge_; the one is _truth_, the other _evidence_; for what is\nnot truth, can never be known. For, let a man say he knoweth a thing\nnever so well, if the same shall afterwards appear false, he is\ndriven to confession, that it was not knowledge, but opinion.\nLikewise, if the truth be not evident, though a man holdeth it, yet\nis his knowledge thereof no more than theirs who hold the contrary:\nfor if truth were enough to make it knowledge, all truth were known;\nwhich is not so.\n\n[Sidenote: Evidence defined.]\n\n3. What _truth_ is, hath been defined in the precedent chapter; what\n_evidence_ is, I _now_ set down: and it is the concomitance of a\nman\u2019s _conception_ with the _words_ that signify such conception in\nthe act of ratiocination: for when a man reasoneth with his lips\nonly, to which the mind suggesteth only the beginning, and followeth\nnot the words of his mouth with the conceptions of his mind, out of\ncustom of so speaking; though he begin his ratiocination with true\npropositions, and proceed with certain syllogisms, and thereby make\nalways true conclusions; yet are not his conclusions _evident_ to\nhim, for want of the _concomitance of conception_ with his words:\nfor if the words alone were sufficient, a _parrot_ might be taught\nas well to know truth, as to speak it. Evidence is to truth, as the\nsap to the tree, which, so far as it creepeth along with the body\nand branches, keepeth them alive; where it forsaketh them, they die:\nfor this evidence, which is meaning with our words, is the life of\ntruth.\n\n[Sidenote: Science defined.]\n\n4. Knowledge thereof, which we call _science_, I define to be\n_evidence of truth_, from some beginning or principle of _sense_:\nfor the truth of a proposition is never evident, until we conceive\nthe meaning of the words or terms whereof it consisteth, which are\nalways conceptions of the mind: nor can we remember those\nconceptions, without the thing that produced the same by our senses.\nThe _first_ principle of knowledge is, that we have such and such\n_conceptions_; the _second_, that we have thus and thus _named_ the\nthings whereof they are conceptions; the _third_ is, that we have\n_joined_ those _names_ in such manner as to make true propositions;\nthe _fourth_ and last is, that we have _joined_ those _propositions_\nin such manner as they be concluding, and the truth of the\nconclusion said to be known. And of these two kinds of knowledge,\nwhereof the former is _experience of fact_, and the latter _evidence\nof truth_; as the _former_, if it be great, is called _prudence_; so\nthe _latter_, if it be much, hath usually been called, both by\nancient and modern writers, _sapience_ or wisdom: and of this\n_latter_, _man_ only is capable; of the _former_, _brute beasts_\nalso participate.\n\n[Sidenote: Supposition defined.]\n\n5. A proposition is said to be _supposed_, when, being _not\nevident_, it is nevertheless _admitted for a time_, to the end,\nthat, joining to it other propositions, we may _conclude_ something;\nand to _proceed_ from conclusion to conclusion, for a _trial_\nwhether the same will lead us into any _absurd_ or impossible\nconclusion; which if it _do_, then we know such supposition to have\nbeen false.\n\n[Sidenote: Opinion defined.]\n\n6. But if running through _many_ conclusions, we come to _none_ that\nare _absurd_, then we think the proposition _probable_; likewise we\nthink probable whatsoever proposition we _admit_ for truth by error\nof reasoning, or from trusting to other men: and all such\npropositions as are admitted by _trust_ or error, we are not said to\n_know_, but to _think_ them to be true; and the admittance of them\nis called _opinion_.\n\n[Sidenote: Belief defined.]\n\n7. And particularly, when the opinion is admitted out of _trust_ to\n_other_ men, they are said to _believe_ it; and their admittance of\nit is called _belief_, and sometimes _faith_.\n\n[Sidenote: Conscience defined.]\n\n8. It is either _science_ or _opinion_ which we commonly mean by the\nword _conscience_: for men say that such and such a thing is true in\nor upon their conscience; which they _never_ do, when they think it\n_doubtful_; and therefore they _know_, or _think_ they know it to be\ntrue. But men, when they say things upon their conscience, are not\ntherefore presumed certainly to know the truth of what they say; it\nremaineth then, that that word is used by them that have an\n_opinion_, _not_ only of the _truth_ of the thing, _but_ also of\ntheir _knowledge_ of it, to which the _truth_ of the proposition is\nconsequent. _Conscience_ I therefore define to be _opinion of\nevidence_.\n\n[Sidenote: Belief, in some cases, no less from doubt than\n knowledge.]\n\n9. _Belief_, which is the admitting of propositions upon _trust_, in\nmany cases is no less free from _doubt_, than perfect and manifest\n_knowledge_: for as there is nothing whereof there is not some\ncause; so, when there is doubt, there must be some cause thereof\nconceived. Now there be many things which we receive from _report of\nothers_, of which it is impossible to imagine any cause of _doubt_:\nfor what can be opposed against the consent of all men, in things\nthey can know, and have no cause to report otherwise than they are,\nsuch as is a great part of our _histories_, unless a man would say\nthat all the world had _conspired_ to deceive him.\n\nAnd thus much of _sense_, _imagination_, _discursion_,\n_ratiocination_, and _knowledge_, which are the acts of our _power\ncognitive_, or _conceptive_. That power of the _mind_ which we call\n_motive_, differeth from the power _motive_ of the _body_; for the\npower _motive_ of the _body_ is that by which it _moveth other_\nbodies, and we call _strength_: but the power motive of the _mind_,\nis that by which the mind giveth _animal motion_ to that _body_\nwherein it existeth; the acts hereof are our _affections_ and\n_passions_, of which I am to speak in general.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n\n1. Of delight, pain, love, hatred. 2. Appetite, aversion, fear. 3.\n Good, evil, pulchritude, turpitude. 4. End, fruition. 5.\n Profitable, use, vain. 6. Felicity. 7. Good and evil mixed. 8.\n Sensual delight, and pain; joy and grief.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Of delight, pain, love, hatred.]\n\n1. In the eighth section of the second chapter is shewed, _that\nconceptions_ and _apparitions_ are nothing _really_, but _motion_ in\nsome internal substance of the _head_; which motion _not stopping_\nthere, but proceeding to the _heart_, of necessity must there either\n_help_ or _hinder_ the motion which is called _vital_; when it\n_helpeth_, it is called _delight_, _contentment_, or _pleasure_,\nwhich is nothing really but motion about the heart, as conception is\nnothing but motion in the head: and the _objects_ that cause it are\ncalled _pleasant_ or _delightful_, or by some name equivalent; the\nLatins have _jucundum_, _a juvando_, from helping; and the same\ndelight, with reference to the object, is called _love_: but when\nsuch motion _weakeneth_ or hindereth the vital motion, then it is\ncalled _pain_; and in relation to that which causeth it, hatred,\nwhich the Latins express sometimes by _odium_, and sometimes by\n_t\u00e6dium_.\n\n[Sidenote: Appetite, aversion, fear.]\n\n2. This motion, in which consisteth _pleasure_ or _pain_, is also a\n_solicitation_ or provocation either to draw _near_ to the thing\nthat pleaseth, or to _retire_ from the thing that displeaseth; and\nthis solicitation is the _endeavour_ or internal beginning of\n_animal_ motion, which when the object _delighteth_, is called\n_appetite_; when it _displeaseth_, it is called _aversion_, in\nrespect of the displeasure _present_; but in respect of the\ndispleasure _expected_, _fear_. So that _pleasure_, _love_, and\n_appetite_, which is also called desire, are _divers names_ for\ndivers considerations of the _same thing_.\n\n[Sidenote: Good, evil, pulchritude, turpitude.]\n\n3. Every man, for his own part, calleth that which _pleaseth_, and\nis delightful to himself, _good_; and that _evil_ which\n_displeaseth_ him: insomuch that while every man _differeth_ from\nanother in _constitution_, they differ also from one another\nconcerning the common distinction of good and evil. Nor is there any\nsuch thing as absolute goodness, considered without relation: for\neven the goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty, is _his\ngoodness to us_. And as we call _good_ and _evil_ the _things_ that\nplease and displease; so call we _goodness_ and _badness_, the\n_qualities_ or powers whereby they do it: and the signs of that\ngoodness are called by the Latins in one word _pulchritudo_, and the\nsigns of evil, _turpitudo_; to which we have no words precisely\nanswerable.\n\nAs all conceptions we have immediately by the _sense_, are,\n_delight_, or _pain_, or _appetite_, or _fear_; so are all the\n_imaginations_ after sense. But as they are weaker imaginations, so\nare they also weaker pleasures, or weaker pain.\n\n[Sidenote: End, fruition.]\n\n4. As _appetite_ is the beginning of _animal_ motion towards\nsomething that pleaseth us; so is the _attaining_ thereof, the _end_\nof that motion, which we also call the _scope_, and aim, and final\ncause of the same: and when we attain that end, the delight we have\nthereby is called the _fruition_: so that _bonum_ and _finis_ are\ndifferent names, but for different considerations of the same thing.\n\n[Sidenote: Profitable, use, vain.]\n\n5. And of _ends_, some of them are called _propinqui_, that is, near\nat hand; others _remoti_, far off: but when the ends that be nearer\nattaining, be compared with those that be further off, they are\ncalled not ends, but _means_, and the _way_ to those. But for an\n_utmost_ end, in which the ancient _philosophers_ have placed\n_felicity_, and disputed much concerning the way thereto, there is\nno such thing in this world, nor way to it, more than to Utopia: for\nwhile we live, we have desires, and desire presupposeth a further\nend. Those things which please us, as the way or _means_ to a\nfurther end, we call _profitable_; and the _fruition_ of them,\n_use_; and those things that profit not, _vain_.\n\n[Sidenote: Felicity.]\n\n6. Seeing all _delight_ is _appetite_, and presupposeth a _further_\nend, there can be _no contentment_ but in _proceeding_: and\ntherefore we are not to marvel, when we see, that as men attain to\nmore riches, honour, or other power; so their appetite continually\ngroweth more and more; and when they are come to the utmost degree\nof some kind of power, they pursue some other, as long as in any\nkind they think themselves behind any other: of those therefore that\nhave attained to the highest degree of honour and riches, some have\naffected mastery in some art; as Nero in music and poetry, Commodus\nin the art of a gladiator; and such as affect not some such thing,\nmust find diversion and recreation of their thoughts in the\ncontention either of play or business: and men justly complain of a\ngreat grief, that they know not what to do. _Felicity_, therefore,\nby which we mean continual delight, consisteth _not_ in _having_\nprospered, but in _prospering_.\n\n[Sidenote: Good and evil mixed.]\n\n7. There are few things in this world, but _either_ have _mixture_\nof good and evil, _or_ there is a chain of them so necessarily\nlinked together, that the one cannot be taken without the other: as\nfor example, the pleasures of sin, and the bitterness of punishment,\nare inseparable; as is also labour and honour, for the most part.\nNow when in the _whole chain_, the _greater part_ is good, the\n_whole_ is called _good_; and when the _evil_ over-weigheth, the\n_whole_ is called _evil_.\n\n[Sidenote: Sensual delight, and pain; joy and grief.]\n\n8. There are two sorts of pleasure, whereof the _one_ seemeth to\naffect the _corporeal_ organ of the sense, and that I call\n_sensual_; the _greatest_ part whereof, is that by which we are\ninvited to give continuance to our _species_; and the _next_, by\nwhich a man is invited to meat, for the preservation of his\n_individual_ person: the _other sort_ of delight is not particular\nto any part of the body, and is called the delight of the _mind_,\nand is that which we call _joy_. Likewise of _pains_, some affect\nthe _body_, and are therefore called the _pains_ of the body; and\nsome _not_, and those are called _grief_.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n\n1, 2. Wherein consist the pleasures of sense. 3, 4. Of the\n imagination, or conception of power in man. 5. Honour,\n honourable, worth. 6. Signs of honour. 7. Reverence. 8.\n Passions.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Wherein consist the pleasures of sense.]\n\n1. Having in the first section of the precedent chapter presupposed,\nthat motion and _agitation of the brain_ which we call conception,\nto be continued _to the heart_, and there to be called _passion_; I\nhave therefore obliged myself, as far forth as I am able, to search\nout and declare _from what_ conception _proceedeth_ every one of\nthose _passions_ which we commonly take notice of: for, seeing the\nthings that please and displease, are innumerable, and work\ninnumerable ways, men have not taken notice but of a very few, which\nalso are many of them without name.\n\n2. And first, we are to consider, that of conceptions there are\n_three sorts_, whereof one is of that which is _present_, which is\n_sense_; another, of that which is _past_, which is _remembrance_;\nand the third, of that which is _future_, which we call\n_expectation_: all which have been manifestly declared in the second\nand third chapters; and every of these conceptions is _pleasure_ or\n_pain_ _present_. And first for the pleasures of the _body_ which\naffect the sense of _touch_ and _taste_, as far forth as they be\n_organical_, their conceptions are _sense_: so also is the pleasure\nof all _exonerations_ of nature: all which passions I have before\nnamed, _sensual pleasures_; and their contrary, _sensual pains_: to\nwhich also may be added the pleasures and displeasures of _odours_,\nif any of them shall be found organical, which for the most part\nthey are not, as appeareth by this experience which every man hath,\nthat the same smells, when they seem to proceed from others,\ndisplease, though they proceed from ourselves; but when we think\nthey proceed from ourselves, they displease not, though they come\nfrom others: the displeasure of this is a conception of hurt thereby\nfrom those odours, as being unwholesome, and is therefore a\nconception of evil to come, and not present. Concerning the delight\nof _hearing_, it is diverse, and the organ itself not affected\nthereby: _simple sounds_ please by _equality_, as the sound of a\nbell or lute: insomuch as it seems, an equality continued by the\npercussion of the object upon the ear, is pleasure; the contrary is\ncalled _harshness_, such as is grating, and some other sounds, which\ndo not always affect the body, but only sometime, and that with a\nkind of horror beginning at the teeth. _Harmony_, or many sounds\ntogether agreeing, please by the same reason as the _unison_, which\nis the sound of equal strings equally stretched. Sounds that differ\nin any _height_, please by _inequality and equality alternate_, that\nis to say, the higher note striketh twice, for one stroke of the\nother, whereby they strike together every second time; as is well\nproved by Galileo, in the first dialogue concerning local motion:\nwhere he also sheweth, that two sounds differing a _fifth_, delight\nthe ear by an _equality_ of striking _after two inequalities_; for\nthe higher note striketh the ear thrice, while the other strikes but\ntwice. In like manner he sheweth wherein consisteth the pleasure of\nconcord, and the displeasure of discord, in other difference of\nnotes. There is yet _another_ pleasure and displeasure of sounds,\nwhich consisteth in _consequence of one note after another,\ndiversified_ both by _accent_ and _measure_; whereof that which\npleaseth is called an _air_; but for what reason one succession in\ntone and measure is a more pleasing air than another, I confess I\nknow not; but I conjecture the reason to be, for that some of them\nimitate and revive some passion which otherwise we take no notice\nof, and the other not; for _no air pleaseth but for a time_, no more\ndoth imitation. Also the pleasures of the _eye_ consist in a certain\n_equality_ of _colour_: for _light_, the most glorious of all\ncolours, is made by _equal_ operation of the object; whereas\n_colour_ is _perturbed_, that is to say, unequal light, as hath been\nsaid, chapter II. section 8. And therefore colours, the more\nequality is in them, the more resplendent they are; and as _harmony_\nis pleasure to the _ear_, which consisteth of _divers sounds_; so\nperhaps may some mixture of _divers colours_ be _harmony_ to the\n_eye_, more than another mixture. There is yet another delight by\nthe _ear_, which happeneth only to men of skill in music, which is\nof another nature, and not, as these, conception of the present, but\nrejoicing of their own skill; of which nature are the passions of\nwhich I am to speak next.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the imagination, or conception of power in man.]\n\n3. Conception of the _future_, is but a _supposition_ of the _same_,\nproceeding from _remembrance_ of what is past; and we so far\n_conceive_ that anything _will be hereafter_, as we _know_ there is\n_something at the present_ that hath power to produce it: and that\nanything hath power now to produce another thing hereafter, we\ncannot conceive, but by remembrance that it hath produced the like\nheretofore. Wherefore all conception of future, is conception of\npower able to produce something. Whosoever therefore expecteth\npleasure to come, must conceive withal some power in himself by\nwhich the same may be attained. And because the passions, whereof I\nam to speak next, consist in conception of the future, that is to\nsay, in conception of power past, and the act to come; before I go\nany further, I must in the next place speak somewhat concerning this\npower.\n\n4. By this power I mean the same with the faculties of the _body_,\n_nutritive_, _generative_, _motive_, and of the _mind_, _knowledge_;\nand besides these, such _further_ power as by them is acquired,\n_viz._ _riches_, _place_ of authority, _friendship_ or _favour_, and\n_good fortune_; _which_ last is really nothing else but the favour\nof God Almighty. The _contraries_ of these are _impotencies_,\n_infirmities_, or _defects_ of the said powers respectively. And\nbecause the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of\nthe power of another, _power_ simply is no more, but the _excess_ of\nthe power of one above that of another: for equal powers opposed,\ndestroy one another; and such their opposition is called contention.\n\n[Sidenote: Honour, honourable, worth.]\n\n5. _signs_ by which we know our own _power_, are those _actions_\nwhich proceed from the same; and the signs by which _other men_ know\nit, are such _actions_, _gesture_, _countenance_ and _speech_, as\nusually such powers produce: and the _acknowledgment_ of power is\ncalled _honour_; and to honour a man inwardly, is to conceive or\nacknowledge that that man hath the odds or excess of that power\nabove him with whom he contendeth or compareth himself. And\nhonourable are those signs for which one man acknowledgeth power or\nexcess above his concurrent in another: as for example, _beauty_ of\nperson, consisting in a lively aspect of the countenance, and other\n_signs_ of _natural heat_, are honourable, being signs precedent of\npower _generative_, and much issue; as also, general reputation\namong those of the other sex, because signs consequent of the same.\nAnd actions proceeding from _strength of body_, and open force, are\nhonourable, as signs consequent of power _motive_, such as are\nvictory in battle or duel; _a d\u2019avoir tu\u00e9 son homme_. Also to\nadventure upon great exploits and danger, as being a sign consequent\nof opinion of our own strength, and that opinion a sign of the\nstrength itself. And to teach or persuade are honourable, because\nthey be signs of _knowledge_. And riches are honourable; as signs of\nthe power that acquired them: and gifts, cost, and magnificence of\nhouses, apparel, and the like, are honourable, as signs of riches.\nAnd _nobility_ is honourable by reflection, as a sign of power in\nthe ancestors: and _authority_, because a sign of the strength,\nwisdom, favour or riches by which it is attained. And _good fortune_\nor casual prosperity is honourable, because a sign of the favour of\nGod, to whom is to be ascribed all that cometh to us by fortune, no\nless than that we attain unto by industry. And the contraries and\ndefects of these signs are dishonourable; and according to the signs\nof honour and dishonour, so we estimate and make the value or worth\nof a man: for so much worth is every thing, as a man will give for\nthe use of all it can do.\n\n[Sidenote: Signs of honour.]\n\n6. The _signs_ of _honour_ are those by which we perceive that one\nman acknowledgeth the power and worth of another; such as these, to\n_praise_, to _magnify_, to _bless_, to call happy, to pray or\nsupplicate to, to thank, to offer unto or present, to obey, to\nhearken unto with attention, to speak to with consideration, to\napproach unto in decent manner, to keep distance from, to give way\nto, and the like, which are the honour the inferior giveth to the\nsuperior.\n\nBut the _signs of honour_ from the superior to the inferior, are\nsuch as these; to _praise_ or prefer him before his concurrent, to\nhear more willingly, to speak to him more familiarly, to admit him\nnearer, to employ him rather, to ask his advice rather, to take his\nopinions, and to give him _any gifts rather than money_; or if\nmoney, so much as may _not_ imply his _need_ of a _little_: for need\nof a little is greater poverty than need of much. And this is enough\nfor examples of the signs of honour and power.\n\n[Sidenote: Reverence.]\n\n7. _Reverence_ is the conception we have concerning another, that he\nhath the _power_ to do unto us both _good_ and _hurt_, but _not_ the\n_will_ to do us _hurt_.\n\n[Sidenote: Passions.]\n\n8. In the pleasure men have, or displeasure from the signs of honour\nor dishonour done unto them, consisteth the nature of the passions,\nwhereof we are to speak in the next chapter.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER IX.\n\n1. Glory aspiring, false glory, vain glory. 2. Humility and\n dejection. 3. Shame. 4. Courage. 5. Anger. 6. Revengefulness. 7.\n Repentance. 8. Hope, despair, diffidence. 9. Trust. 10. Pity and\n hardness of heart. 11. Indignation. 12. Emulation and envy. 13.\n Laughter. 14. Weeping. 15. Lust. 16. Love. 17. Charity. 18.\n Admiration and curiosity. 19. Of the passion of them that flock\n to see danger. 20. Of magnanimity and pusillanimity. 21. A view\n of the passions represented in a race.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Glory aspiring, false glory, vain glory.]\n\n1. Glory, or internal gloriation or triumph of the mind, is the\npassion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our\n_own power_ above the power of him that contendeth with us; the\n_signs_ whereof, besides those in the countenance, and other\ngestures of the body which cannot be described, are, _ostentation_\nin words, and _insolency_ in actions: and this passion, of them whom\nit displeaseth, is called _pride_; by them whom it pleaseth, it is\ntermed a _just valuation_ of himself. This imagination of our power\nor worth, may be from an assured and certain _experience_ of our own\nactions; and then is that glory _just_, and well grounded, and\nbegetteth an opinion of _increasing_ the same by other actions to\nfollow; in which consisteth the appetite which we call _aspiring_,\nor proceeding from one degree of power to another. The same passion\nmay proceed _not_ from any _conscience_ of our own actions, but from\nfame and trust of _others_, whereby one may think well of himself,\nand yet be deceived; and this is _false glory_, and the aspiring\nconsequent thereto procureth ill success. Further, the _fiction_,\nwhich is also imagination, of actions done by ourselves, which never\nwere done, is _glorying_; but because it begetteth no appetite nor\nendeavour to any further attempt, it is merely _vain_ and\nunprofitable; as when a man imagineth himself to do the actions\nwhereof he readeth in some _romance_, or to be like unto some other\nman whose acts he admireth: and this is called _vain glory_; and is\nexemplified in the fable, by the fly sitting on the axletree, and\nsaying to himself, What a dust do I make rise! The expression of\n_vain glory_ is that wish, which some of the Schools mistaking for\nsome appetite distinct from all the rest, have called _velleity_,\nmaking a new word, as they made a new passion which was not before.\n_Signs_ of _vain glory_ in the _gesture_ are, _imitation_ of others,\ncounterfeiting and usurping the signs of virtue they have not,\naffectation of fashions, captation of honour from their dreams, and\nother little stories of themselves, from their country, from their\nnames, and from the like.\n\n[Sidenote: Humility and dejection.]\n\n2. The passion _contrary to glory_, proceeding from apprehension of\nour own infirmity, is called _humility_ by those by whom it is\napproved; by the rest, _dejection_ and poorness: which conception\nmay be well or ill grounded; if well, it produceth fear to attempt\nany thing rashly; if ill, it utterly cows a man, that he neither\ndares speak publicly, nor expect good success in any action.\n\n[Sidenote: Shame.]\n\n3. It happeneth sometimes, that he that hath a _good_ opinion of\nhimself, and upon good ground, may nevertheless, by reason of the\n_frowardness_ which that passion begetteth, discover in himself some\n_defect_ or infirmity, the remembrance whereof dejecteth him; and\nthis passion is called _shame_; by which being cooled and checked in\nhis frowardness, he is more wary for the time to come. This passion,\nas it is a sign of _infirmity_, which is _dishonour_; so also it is\na sign of _knowledge_, which is _honour_. The sign of it is\n_blushing_, which appeareth less in men conscious of their own\ndefect, because they less betray the infirmities they acknowledge.\n\n[Sidenote: Courage.]\n\n4. _Courage_, in a _large_ signification, is the _absence_ of _fear_\nin the presence of any evil whatsoever: but in a _strict_ and more\ncommon meaning, it is _contempt_ of _wounds_ and _death_, when they\noppose a man in the way to his end.\n\n[Sidenote: Anger.]\n\n5. _Anger_ or sudden courage is nothing but the _appetite_ or desire\nof _overcoming present_ opposition. It hath been defined commonly to\nbe grief proceeding from an opinion of contempt; which is confuted\nby the often experience which we have of being moved to anger by\nthings inanimate, and without sense, and consequently incapable of\ncontemning us.\n\n[Sidenote: Revengefulness.]\n\n6. _Revengefulness_ is that passion which ariseth from an\nexpectation or _imagination_ of _making_ him that hath _hurt_ us,\n_find_ his _own action hurtful_ to himself, and to _acknowledge_ the\nsame; and this is the height of revenge: for though it be not hard,\nby returning evil for evil, to make one\u2019s adversary displeased with\nhis own fact; yet to make him acknowledge the same, is so difficult,\nthat many a man had rather die than do it. Revenge aimeth not at the\ndeath, but at the captivity or subjection of an enemy; which was\nwell expressed in the exclamation of Tiberius C\u00e6sar, concerning one,\nthat, to frustrate his revenge, had killed himself in prison; _Hath\nhe escaped me?_ To _kill_, is the aim of them that _hate_, to _rid_\nthemselves out of fear: _revenge_ aimeth at _triumph_, which over\nthe dead is not.\n\n[Sidenote: Repentance.]\n\n7. _Repentance_ is the passion which proceedeth from _opinion_ or\nknowledge that the _action_ they have done is _out of the way_ to\nthe _end_ they would attain: the effect whereof is, to pursue that\nway no longer, but, by the consideration of the end, to direct\nthemselves into a better. The first motion therefore in this passion\nis _grief_; but the expectation or conception of returning again\ninto the way, is _joy_; and consequently, the passion of\n_repentance_ is compounded and allayed of both: but the\n_predominant_ is _joy_; else were the whole grief, which cannot be,\nforasmuch as he that proceedeth towards the end, he conceiveth good,\nproceedeth with appetite; and appetite is joy, as hath been said,\nchapter VII. section 2.\n\n[Sidenote: Hope, despair, diffidence.]\n\n8. _Hope_ is _expectation_ of _good_ to come, as fear is the\nexpectation of evil: but when there be causes, some that make us\nexpect good, and some that make us expect evil, alternately working\nin our mind; if the causes that make us expect good, be greater than\nthose that make us expect evil, the whole passion is hope; if\ncontrarily, the whole is fear. Absolute _privation_ of hope is\n_despair_, a degree whereof is _diffidence_.\n\n[Sidenote: Trust.]\n\n9. _Trust_ is a passion proceeding from the _belief of_ him from\nwhom we _expect_ or _hope_ for good, so _free_ from _doubt_ that\nupon the same we pursue no other way to attain the same good; as\n_distrust_ or diffidence is _doubt_ that maketh him endeavour to\nprovide himself by other means. And that this is the meaning of the\nwords trust and distrust, is manifest from this, that a man never\nprovideth himself by a second way, but when he mistrusteth that the\nfirst will not hold.\n\n[Sidenote: Pity and hardness of heart.]\n\n10. _Pity_ is _imagination_ or _fiction_ of _future_ calamity to\n_ourselves_, proceeding from the sense of _another_ man\u2019s calamity.\nBut when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same,\nthe compassion is greater, because then there appeareth more\nprobability that the same may happen to us: for, the evil that\nhappeneth to an innocent man, may happen to every man. But when we\nsee a man suffer for great crimes, which we cannot easily think will\nfall upon ourselves, the pity is the less. And therefore men are apt\nto pity those whom they love: for, whom they love, they think worthy\nof good, and therefore not worthy of calamity. Thence it is also,\nthat men pity the vices of some persons at the first sight only, out\nof love to their aspect. The contrary of pity is _hardness of\nheart_, proceeding either from _slowness_ of imagination, or some\nextreme great _opinion_ of their own _exemption_ from the like\ncalamity, or from hatred of all or most men.\n\n[Sidenote: Indignation.]\n\n11. _Indignation_ is that _grief_ which consisteth in the conception\nof _good success_ happening to them whom they think _unworthy_\nthereof. Seeing therefore men think all those unworthy whom they\nhate, they think them not only unworthy of the good fortune they\nhave, but also of their own virtues. And of all the passions of the\nmind, these two, indignation and pity, are most raised and increased\nby eloquence: for, the _aggravation_ of _the calamity_, and\n_extenuation_ of the _fault_, augmenteth _pity_; and the\n_extenuation_ of the _worth_ of the person, together with the\nmagnifying of his success, which are the parts of an orator, are\nable to turn these two passions into _fury_.\n\n[Sidenote: Emulation and envy.]\n\n12. _Emulation_ is _grief_ arising from seeing _one\u2019s self exceeded_\nor excelled by his _concurrent_, together with _hope_ to _equal_ or\nexceed him in time to come, by his own ability. But, _envy_ is the\nsame _grief_ joined with _pleasure_ conceived in the imagination of\nsome _ill_ fortune that may befall him.\n\n[Sidenote: Laughter.]\n\n13. There is a passion that hath _no name_; but the sign of it is\nthat distortion of the countenance which we call _laughter_, which\nis always _joy_: but what joy, what we think, and wherein we triumph\nwhen we laugh, is not hitherto declared by any. That it consisteth\nin _wit_, or, as they call it, in the _jest_, experience\n_confuteth_: for men laugh at mischances and indecencies, wherein\nthere lieth no wit nor jest at all. And forasmuch as the same thing\nis no more ridiculous when it groweth stale or usual, whatsoever it\nbe that moveth laughter, it must be _new_ and _unexpected_. Men\nlaugh often, especially such as are greedy of applause from every\nthing they do well, at their own actions performed never so little\nbeyond their own expectations; as also at their own _jests_: and in\nthis case it is manifest, that the passion of laughter proceedeth\nfrom a _sudden conception_ of some _ability_ in himself that\nlaugheth. Also men laugh at the _infirmities_ of others, by\ncomparison wherewith their own abilities are set off and\nillustrated. Also men laugh at _jests_, the _wit_ whereof always\nconsisteth in the elegant _discovering_ and conveying to our minds\nsome _absurdity_ of _another_: and in this case also the passion of\nlaughter proceedeth from the _sudden_ imagination of our own odds\nand eminency: for what is else the recommending of ourselves to our\nown good opinion, by comparison with another man\u2019s infirmity or\nabsurdity? For when a jest is broken upon ourselves, or friends of\nwhose dishonour we participate, we never laugh thereat. I may\ntherefore conclude, that the passion of laughter is nothing else but\n_sudden glory_ arising from some sudden _conception_ of some\n_eminency_ in ourselves, by _comparison_ with the _infirmity_ of\nothers, or with our own formerly: for men laugh at the follies of\nthemselves past, when they come suddenly to remembrance, except they\nbring with them any present dishonour. It is no wonder therefore\nthat men take heinously to be laughed at or derided, that is,\ntriumphed over. Laughter _without offence_, must be at _absurdities_\nand infirmities _abstracted_ from persons, and when all the company\nmay laugh together: for laughing to one\u2019s-self putteth all the rest\ninto jealousy and examination of themselves. Besides, it is vain\nglory, and an argument of little worth, to think the infirmity of\nanother, sufficient matter for his triumph.\n\n[Sidenote: Weeping.]\n\n14. The passion opposite hereunto, whose signs are another\ndistortion of the face with tears, called _weeping_, is the _sudden\nfalling out with_ ourselves, or sudden conception of defect; and\ntherefore _children_ weep often; for seeing they think that every\nthing ought to be given them which they desire, of necessity every\nrepulse must be a check of their expectation, and puts them in mind\nof their too much weakness to make themselves masters of all they\nlook for. For the same cause _women_ are more apt to weep than men,\nas being not only more accustomed to have their wills, but also to\nmeasure their powers by the power and love of others that protect\nthem. Men are apt to weep that prosecute revenge, when the revenge\nis suddenly stopped or frustrated by the repentance of their\nadversary; and such are the tears of _reconciliation_. Also\nrevengeful men are subject to this passion upon the beholding those\nmen they pity, and suddenly remember they cannot help. Other weeping\nin men proceedeth for the most part from the same cause it\nproceedeth from in women and children.\n\n[Sidenote: Lust.]\n\n15. The appetite which men call _lust_, and the fruition that\nappertaineth thereunto, is a _sensual_ pleasure, but _not only_\nthat; there is in it also a delight of the mind: for it consisteth\nof two appetites together, to _please_, and to _be pleased_; and the\ndelight men take in delighting, is not sensual, but a pleasure or\njoy of the mind consisting in the imagination of the power they have\nso much to please. But the name _lust_ is used where it is\ncondemned; otherwise it is called by the general word _love_: for\nthe passion is one and the same indefinite desire of different sex,\nas natural as hunger.\n\n[Sidenote: Love.]\n\n16. Of _love_, by which is understood the joy man taketh in the\nfruition of any _present_ good, hath been already spoken of in the\nfirst section, chapter VII. under which is contained the _love_ men\nbear to one _another_, or pleasure they take in one another\u2019s\ncompany; and by which nature, men are said to be sociable. But there\nis another kind of love, which the Greeks call \u1f1c\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2, and is that\nwhich we mean, when we say that a man is in love: forasmuch as this\npassion cannot be without diversity of sex, it cannot be denied but\nthat it _participateth_ of that indefinite _love_ mentioned in the\nformer section. But there is a great difference betwixt the desire\nof a man _indefinite_, and the same desire _limited ad hunc_; and\nthis is that _love_ which is the great theme of poets: but\nnotwithstanding their praises, it must be defined by the word\n_need_: for it is a conception a man hath of his need of _that one\nperson_ desired. The cause of this passion is _not_ always _nor_ for\nthe most part _beauty_, or other quality in the beloved, unless\nthere be withal _hope_ in the person that loveth: which may be\ngathered from this, that in great difference of persons, the\n_greater_ have often fallen in love with the _meaner_; but not\ncontrary. And from hence it is, that for the most part they have\nmuch better fortune in love, whose hopes are built upon something\n_in_ _their person_, than those that trust to their _expressions_\nand _service_; and they that _care less_, than they that _care\nmore_: which not perceiving, many men cast away their services, as\none arrow after another, till, in the end, together with their\nhopes, they lose their wits.\n\n[Sidenote: Charity.]\n\n17. There is yet another passion sometimes called _love_, but more\nproperly _good will_ or _charity_. There can be no greater argument\nto a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to\naccomplish his own desires, but also to _assist_ other men in\ntheirs: and this is that conception wherein consisteth _charity_. In\nwhich, first, is contained that _natural affection_ of parents to\ntheir children, which the Greeks call \u03a3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b3\u1f74, as _also_, that\naffection wherewith men seek to _assist_ those that adhere unto\nthem. But the affection wherewith men many times bestow their\nbenefits on _strangers_, is not to be called charity, but either\n_contract_, whereby they seek to purchase friendship; or _fear_,\nwhich maketh them to purchase peace. The opinion of Plato concerning\nhonourable love, delivered according to his custom in the person of\nSocrates, in the dialogue intituled _Convivium_, is this, that a man\nfull and pregnant with wisdom and other virtues, naturally seeketh\nout some beautiful person, of age and capacity to conceive, in whom\nhe may, without sensual respects, engender and produce the like. And\nthis is the _idea_ of the then noted _love_ of Socrates wise and\ncontinent, to Alcibiades young and beautiful: in which, love is not\nthe sought honour, but the issue of his knowledge; contrary to the\ncommon love, to which though issue sometimes follows, yet men seek\nnot that, but to please, and to be pleased. It should be therefore\nthis charity, or desire to assist and advance others. But why then\nshould the wise seek the ignorant, or be more charitable to the\nbeautiful than to others? There is something in it savouring of the\nuse of that time: in which matter though Socrates be acknowledged\nfor continent, yet the _continent_ have the passion they _contain_,\nas _much_ and more than they that _satiate_ the appetite; which\nmaketh me suspect this _platonic_ love for merely sensual; but with\nan honourable pretence for the old to haunt the company of the young\nand beautiful.\n\n[Sidenote: Admiration and curiosity.]\n\n18. Forasmuch as all _knowledge_ beginneth from _experience_,\ntherefore also _new experience_ is the beginning of _new knowledge_,\nand the increase of experience the beginning of the increase of\nknowledge. Whatsoever therefore happeneth new to a man, giveth him\nmatter of _hope_ of _knowing_ somewhat that he knew _not before_.\nAnd this hope and expectation of future knowledge from anything that\nhappeneth new and strange, is that passion which we commonly call\n_admiration_; and the same considered as appetite, is called\n_curiosity_, which is appetite of knowledge. As in the discerning of\nfaculties, _man leaveth_ all community with _beasts_ at the faculty\nof _imposing names_; so also doth he surmount their nature at this\n_passion_ of _curiosity_. For when a beast seeth anything new and\nstrange to him, he considereth it so far only as to discern whether\nit be likely to serve his turn, or hurt him, and accordingly\napproacheth nearer to it, or fleeth from it: whereas man, who in\nmost events remembereth in what manner they were caused and begun,\nlooketh for the cause and beginning of everything that ariseth new\nunto him. And from this passion of admiration and curiosity, have\narisen not only the invention of names, but also supposition of such\ncauses of all things as they thought might produce them. And from\nthis beginning is derived all _philosophy_; as _astronomy_ from the\nadmiration of the course of heaven; _natural philosophy_ from the\nstrange effects of the elements and other bodies. And from the\ndegrees of curiosity, proceed also the degrees of knowledge amongst\nmen: for, to a man in the chase of riches or authority, (which in\nrespect of knowledge are but sensuality) it is a diversity of little\npleasure, whether it be the motion of the sun or the earth that\nmaketh the day, or to enter into other contemplations of any strange\naccident, otherwise than whether it conduce or not to the end he\npursueth. Because _curiosity_ is _delight_, therefore also _novelty_\nis so, but especially that novelty from which a man conceiveth an\n_opinion_ true or false of _bettering_ his own estate; for, in such\ncase, they stand affected with the hope that all gamesters have\nwhile the cards are shuffling.\n\n[Sidenote: Of the passion of them that flock to see danger.]\n\n19. Divers other passions there be, but they want names: whereof\nsome nevertheless have been by most men observed: for example; from\nwhat passion proceedeth it, that men take _pleasure_ to _behold_\nfrom the shore the _danger_ of them that are at sea in a tempest, or\nin fight, or from a safe castle to behold two armies charge one\nanother in the field? It is certainly, in the whole sum, _joy_; else\nmen would never flock to such a spectacle. Nevertheless there is in\nit both _joy_ and _grief_: for as there is novelty and remembrance\nof our own security present, which is _delight_; so there is also\n_pity_, which is grief; but the delight is so far predominant, that\nmen usually are content in such a case to be spectators of the\nmisery of their friends.\n\n[Sidenote: Of magnanimity and pusillanimity.]\n\n20. _Magnanimity_ is no more than _glory_, of the which I have\nspoken in the first section; but _glory well grounded_ upon certain\nexperience of a power sufficient to attain his end in open manner.\nAnd _pusillanimity_ is the _doubt_ of that. Whatsoever therefore is\na sign of _vain glory_, the same is also a sign of _pusillanimity_:\nfor sufficient power maketh glory a spur to one\u2019s end. To be\n_pleased_ or _displeased_ with _fame true_ or _false_, is a _sign_\nof that same, because he that relieth on fame hath not his success\nin his own power. Likewise _art_ and _fallacy_ are signs of\npusillanimity, because they depend not upon our own power, but the\nignorance of others. Also _proneness_ to _anger_, because it argueth\ndifficulty of proceeding. Also _ostentation_ of _ancestors_, because\nall men are more inclined to make shew of their own power when they\nhave it, than of another\u2019s. To be at _enmity_ and contention with\n_inferiors_, is a sign of the same, because it proceedeth from want\nof power to end the war. To _laugh_ at others, because it is an\naffectation of glory from other men\u2019s infirmities, and not from any\nability of their own. Also _irresolution_, which proceedeth from\nwant of power enough to contemn the little difficulties that make\ndeliberations hard.\n\n[Sidenote: A view of the passions represented in a race.]\n\n21. The comparison of the life of man to a race, though it hold not\nin every part, yet it holdeth so well for this our purpose, that we\nmay thereby both see and remember almost all the passions before\nmentioned. But this _race_ we must suppose to have no other _goal_,\nnor other _garland_, but being foremost, and in it:\n\n To endeavour, is _appetite_.\n To be remiss, is _sensuality_.\n To consider them behind, is _glory_.\n To consider them before, is _humility_.\n To lose ground with looking back, _vain glory_.\n To be holden, _hatred_.\n To turn back, _repentance_.\n To be in breath, _hope_.\n To be weary, _despair_.\n To endeavour to overtake the next, _emulation_.\n To supplant or overthrow, _envy_.\n To resolve to break through a stop foreseen, _courage_.\n To break through a sudden stop, _anger_.\n To break through with ease, _magnanimity_.\n To lose ground by little hindrances, _pusillanimity_.\n To fall on the sudden, is disposition to _weep_.\n To see another fall, is disposition to _laugh_.\n To see one out-gone whom we would not, is _pity_.\n To see one out-go whom we would not, is _indignation_.\n To hold fast by another, is to _love_.\n To carry him on that so holdeth, is _charity_.\n To hurt one\u2019s-self for haste, is _shame_.\n Continually to be out-gone, is _misery_.\n Continually to out-go the next before, is _felicity_.\n And to forsake the course, is to _die_.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER X.\n\n1. Having shewed in the precedent chapters, that sense proceedeth\nfrom the action of external objects upon the _brain_, or some\ninternal _substance_ of the _head_; and that the _passions_ proceed\nfrom the alteration there made, and continued to the _heart_: it is\nconsequent in the next place, seeing the diversity of degrees in\nknowledge in divers men, to be greater than may be ascribed to the\ndivers _tempers_ of their brain, to declare _what other causes_ may\nproduce such _odds_, and excess of _capacity_, as we daily observe\nin one man above another. As for that difference which ariseth from\n_sickness_, and such accidental distempers, I omit the same, as\nimpertinent to this place, and consider it only in such as have\ntheir _health_, and _organs_ well disposed. If the difference were\nin the natural temper of the brain, I can imagine no reason why the\nsame should not appear first and most of all in the senses, which\nbeing equal both in the wise and less wise, infer an equal temper in\nthe common organ (namely the brain) of all the senses.\n\n2. But we see by experience, that _joy_ and _grief_ proceed _not_ in\n_all_ men from the same _causes_, and that men differ very much in\nthe constitution of the body; whereby, that which helpeth and\nfurthereth _vital constitution_ in one, and is therefore delightful,\nhindereth it and crosseth it in another, and therefore causeth\ngrief. The _difference_ therefore of _wits_ hath its original _from_\nthe _different passions_, and from the _ends_ to which the appetite\nleadeth them.\n\n3. And first, those men whose ends are _sensual_ delight, and\ngenerally are addicted to _ease_, _food_, _onerations_ and\n_exonerations_ of the body, must needs be the _less_ thereby\ndelighted with those _imaginations_ that _conduce not_ to those\nends, such as are imaginations of _honour_ and _glory_, which, as I\nhave said before, have respect to the future: for sensuality\nconsisteth in the pleasure of the senses, which please only for the\npresent, and take away the inclination to observe such things as\nconduce to honour, and consequently maketh men less curious, and\nless ambitious, whereby they less consider the way either to\nknowledge or other power; in which two consisteth all the excellency\nof power cognitive. And this is it which men call _dulness_, and\nproceedeth from the appetite of sensual or bodily delight. And it\nmay well be conjectured, that such passion hath its beginning from a\n_grossness_ and _difficulty_ of the _motion_ of the _spirit_ about\nthe _heart_.\n\n4. The contrary hereunto, is that _quick ranging_ of mind described,\nchapter IV. section 3, which is joined with _curiosity_ of comparing\nthe things that come into the mind, one with another: in which\ncomparison, a man delighteth himself either with finding unexpected\n_similitude_ of things, otherwise much unlike, in which men place\nthe excellency of _fancy_, and from whence proceed those grateful\nsimilies, metaphors, and other tropes, by which both _poets_ and\n_orators_ have it in their power to make things please or displease,\nand shew well or ill to others, as they like themselves; or else in\ndiscerning suddenly _dissimilitude_ in things that otherwise appear\nthe same. And this virtue of the mind is that by which men attain to\nexact and perfect _knowledge_; and the pleasure thereof consisteth\nin continual instruction, and in distinction of places, persons, and\nseasons, and is commonly termed by the name of _judgment_: for, to\njudge is nothing else, but to distinguish or discern: and both\n_fancy_ and _judgment_ are commonly comprehended under the name of\n_wit_, which seemeth to be a tenuity and agility of spirits,\ncontrary to that restiness of the spirits supposed in those that are\ndull.\n\n5. There is another defect of the mind, which men call _levity_,\nwhich betrayeth also _mobility_ in the spirits, but in excess. An\nexample whereof is in them that in the midst of any serious\ndiscourse, have their minds diverted to every little jest or witty\nobservation; which maketh them depart from their discourse by a\nparenthesis, and from that parenthesis by another, till at length\nthey either lose themselves, or make their narration like a dream,\nor some studied nonsense. The passion from whence this proceedeth,\nis _curiosity_, but with _too much equality_ and indifference: for\nwhen all things make equal impression and delight, they equally\nthrong to be expressed.\n\n6. The virtue opposite to this defect is _gravity_, or steadiness;\nin which the end being the great and master-delight, directeth and\nkeepeth in the way thereto all other thoughts.\n\n7. The _extremity_ of dullness is that _natural folly_ which may be\ncalled _stolidity_: but the extreme of _levity_, though it be\nnatural folly distinct from the other, and obvious to every man\u2019s\nobservation, I know _not_ how to call it.\n\n8. There is a fault of the mind called by the Greeks \u1f08\u03bc\u03b1\u03d1\u03b9\u03b1, which\nis _indocibility_, or _difficulty_ of being taught; the which must\nneeds arise from a _false opinion_ that they _know already_ the\ntruth of that is called in question: for certainly men are not\notherwise so unequal in capacity as the _evidence_ is unequal\nbetween what is taught by the mathematicians, and what is commonly\ndiscoursed of in other books: and therefore if the minds of men were\nall of white paper, they would almost equally be disposed to\nacknowledge whatsoever should be in right method, and by right\nratiocination delivered to them: but when men have once acquiesced\nin untrue opinions, and registered them as authentical records in\ntheir minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such\nmen, than to write legibly upon a paper already scribbled over. The\nimmediate _cause_ therefore of _indocibility_, is _prejudice_; and\nof prejudice, false opinion of our own knowledge.\n\n9. Another, and a principal defect of the mind, is that which men\ncall _madness_, which appeareth to be nothing else but some\n_imagination_ of some such _predominancy_ above the _rest_, that we\nhave _no passion but from it_; and this conception is nothing else\nbut excessive _vain glory_, or _vain dejection_; which is most\nprobable by these examples following, which proceed in appearance\nevery one of them from _pride_, or some _dejection_ of mind. As\nfirst, we have had the example of one that preached in Cheapside\nfrom a cart there, instead of a pulpit, that he himself was Christ,\nwhich was _spiritual_ pride or madness. We have had also divers\nexamples of learned madness, in which men have manifestly been\ndistracted upon any occasion that hath put them in remembrance of\ntheir own ability. Amongst the learned men, may be remembered, I\nthink also, those that determine of the time of the world\u2019s end, and\nother such the points of prophecy. And the gallant madness of Don\nQuixote is nothing else but an expression of such height of vain\nglory as reading of _romance_ may produce in pusillanimous men. Also\nrage and madness of love, are but great indignations of them in\nwhose brains is predominant contempt from their enemies, or their\nmistresses. And the _pride_ taken in _form_ and _behaviour_, hath\nmade divers men run mad, and to be so accounted, under the name of\nfantastic.\n\n10. And as these are the examples of extremities, so also are there\nexamples too many of the degrees, which may therefore be well\naccounted follies; as it is a degree of the _first_, for a man,\nwithout certain evidence, to think himself to be _inspired_, or to\nhave any other effect of God\u2019s holy spirit than other godly men\nhave. Of the _second_, for a man continually to speak his mind in a\n_cento_ of other men\u2019s Greek or Latin sentences. Of the _third_,\nmuch of the present gallantry in love and duel. Of _rage_, a degree\nis _malice_; and of _fantastic_ madness, _affectation_.\n\n11. As the former examples exhibit to us madness, and the degrees\nthereof, proceeding from the excess of self-opinion; so also there\nbe other examples of madness, and the degrees thereof, proceeding\nfrom _too much vain fear_ and _dejection_; as in those melancholy\nmen that have imagined themselves brittle as glass, or have had some\nother like imagination: and degrees hereof are all those exorbitant\nand causeless fears, which we commonly observe in melancholy\npersons.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XI.\n\n\n1. Hitherto of the knowledge of things _natural_, and of the\npassions that arise naturally from them. Now forasmuch as we give\nnames not only to things natural, but also to _supernatural_; and by\nall names we ought to have some meaning and conception: it followeth\nin the next place, to consider what thoughts and imaginations of the\nmind we have, when we take into our mouths the most blessed name of\nGOD, and the names of those _virtues_ we attribute unto him; as\nalso, what _image_ cometh into the mind at hearing the name of\n_spirit_, or the name of _angel_, good or bad.\n\n2. And forasmuch as God Almighty is _incomprehensible_, it\nfolloweth, that we can have _no_ conception or _image_ of the\n_Deity_, and consequently, all _his attributes_ signify our\n_inability_ and defect of power to _conceive_ any thing concerning\nhis nature, and not any conception of the same, excepting only this,\nthat _there is a God_: for the effects we acknowledge naturally, do\ninclude a power of their producing, before they were produced; and\nthat power presupposeth something existent that hath such power: and\nthe thing so existing with power to produce, if it were not eternal,\nmust needs have been produced by somewhat before it, and that again\nby something else before that, till we come to an eternal, that is\nto say, the first power of all powers, and first cause of all\ncauses: and this is it which all men conceive by the name of GOD,\nimplying eternity, incomprehensibility, and omnipotency. And thus\nall that will consider, may know _that_ God is, though not _what_ he\nis: even a man that is born blind, though it be not possible for him\nto have any imagination what kind of thing fire is; yet he cannot\nbut know that somewhat there is that men call fire, because it\nwarmeth him.\n\n3. And whereas we attribute to God Almighty, _seeing_, _hearing_,\n_speaking_, _knowing_, _loving_, and the like, by which names we\nunderstand something in _men_ to whom we attribute them, we\nunderstand _nothing_ by them in the nature of God: for, as it is\nwell reasoned, _Shall not the God that made the_ _eye, see; and the\near, hear?_ So it is also, if we say, shall God, which made the eye,\nnot see without the eye; or that made the ear, not hear without the\near; or that made the brain, not know without the brain; or that\nmade the heart, not love without the heart? The _attributes_\ntherefore given unto the _Deity_, are such as _signify_ either _our\nincapacity_ or our _reverence_: our incapacity, when we say\nincomprehensible and infinite; our reverence, when we give him those\nnames, which amongst us are the names of those things we most\nmagnify and commend, as omnipotent, omniscient, just, merciful, &c.\nAnd when God Almighty giveth those names to himself in the\nScriptures, it is but \u1f00\u03bd\u03d1\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c2, that is to say, by descending to\nour manner of speaking; without which we are not capable of\nunderstanding him.\n\n4. By the name of _spirit_, we understand a _body natural_, but of\nsuch _subtilty_, that it worketh not upon the senses; but that\nfilleth up the place which the image of a visible body might fill\nup. Our conception therefore of spirit consisteth of _figure without\ncolour_; and in figure is understood dimension, and consequently, to\nconceive a spirit, is to conceive something that hath dimension. But\n_spirits supernatural_ commonly signify some _substance without_\ndimension; which two words do flatly contradict one another: and\ntherefore when we attribute the name of spirit unto God, we\nattribute it not as the name of anything we conceive, no more than\nwe ascribe unto him sense and understanding; but as a signification\nof our reverence, we desire to abstract from him all corporal\ngrossness.\n\n5. Concerning other things, which some men call _spirits\nincorporeal_, and some _corporeal_, it is not _possible_ by\n_natural_ means only, to come to _knowledge_ of so much, as that\n_there are such_ things. We that are Christians _acknowledge_ that\nthere be angels good and evil, and that there are spirits, and that\nthe soul of a man is a spirit, and that those spirits are immortal:\n_but_, to _know_ it, that is to say, to have natural evidence of the\nsame, it is _impossible_: for, all _evidence_ is _conception_, as it\nis said, chap. VI. sect. 3, and all conception is imagination, and\nproceedeth from _sense_, chap. III. sect. 1. And _spirits_ we\nsuppose to be those substances which work _not_ upon the _sense_,\nand therefore not conceptible. But though the Scripture acknowledges\nspirits, yet doth it nowhere say, that they are incorporeal, meaning\nthereby, without dimension and quality; nor, I think, is that word\nincorporeal at all in the Bible; but it is said of the spirit, that\nit abideth in men; sometimes that it dwelleth in them, sometimes\nthat it cometh on them, that it descendeth, and goeth, and cometh;\nand that spirits are angels, that is to say messengers: all which\nwords do imply _locality_; and locality is _dimension_; and\nwhatsoever hath dimension, is _body_, be it never so subtile. To me\ntherefore it seemeth, that the Scripture favoureth them more, that\nhold angels and spirits corporeal, than them that hold the contrary.\nAnd it is a plain _contradiction_ in natural discourse, to say of\nthe soul of man, that it is _tota in toto, et tota in qualibet parte\ncorporis_, grounded neither upon reason nor revelation, but\nproceeding from the ignorance of what those things are which are\ncalled _spectra_, images, that appear in the dark to children, and\nsuch as have strong fears, and other strange imaginations, as hath\nbeen said, chapter III. sect. 5, where I call them phantasms: for,\ntaking them to be things real, without us, like bodies, and seeing\nthem to come and vanish so strangely as they do, unlike to _bodies_;\nwhat could they call them else, but _incorporeal bodies_? which is\nnot a name, but an absurdity of speech.\n\n6. It is true, that the heathens, and all nations of the world, have\nacknowledged that there be _spirits_, which for the most part they\nhold to be incorporeal; whereby it might be thought, that a man by\nnatural reason, may arrive, without the Scriptures, to the knowledge\nof this, _that spirits are_: but the erroneous collection thereof by\nthe heathens, may proceed, as I have said before, from the ignorance\nof the cause of ghosts and phantasms, and such other apparitions.\nAnd from thence had the Grecians their number of gods, their number\nof _d\u00e6mons_ good or bad, and for every man his _genius_; which is\nnot the acknowledging of this truth, _that spirits are_; but a false\nopinion concerning the force of imagination.\n\n7. And seeing the _knowledge_ we have of _spirits_, is _not natural_\nknowledge, but _faith_ from supernatural revelation given to the\nholy writers of the Scriptures; it followeth, that of inspirations\nalso, which is the operation of spirit in us, the knowledge which we\nhave, must all proceed from Scripture. The _signs_ there set down of\n_inspiration_, are _miracles_, when they be great, and manifestly\nabove the power of men to do by imposture: as for example, the\ninspiration of Elias was known by the miraculous burning of the\nsacrifice. But the _signs_ to _distinguish_ whether a _spirit_ be\n_good_ or _evil_, are the same by which we distinguish whether a man\nor a tree be good or evil, namely, _actions_ and _fruit_: for there\nare _lying_ spirits, wherewith men are inspired sometimes, as well\nas with _spirits_ of _truth_. And we are commanded in Scripture, to\njudge of the spirits by their doctrine, and not of the doctrine by\nthe spirits. For miracles, our Saviour (_Matth._ xxiv. 24) hath\nforbidden us to rule our faith by them. And Saint Paul saith,\n(_Gal._ i. 8): _Though an angel from heaven preach to you\notherwise_, &c. _let him be accursed_. Where it is plain, that we\nare not to judge whether the doctrine be true or not, by the angel;\nbut whether the angel say true or no, by the doctrine. So likewise,\n(_1 Joh._ iv. 1): _Believe not every spirit: for false prophets are\ngone out into the world_. Verse 2: _Hereby shall ye know the spirit\nof God_. Verse 3: _Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus\nChrist is come in the flesh, is not of God: and this is the spirit\nof Antichrist_. Verse 15: _Whosoever confesseth that Jesus is the\nSon of God, in him dwelleth God, and he in God_. The _knowledge_\ntherefore we have of _good_ and _evil_ inspiration, cometh _not_ by\n_vision_ of an angel that may teach it, _nor_ by a _miracle_ that\nmay seem to confirm it; _but_ by _conformity_ of doctrine with this\narticle and fundamental point of Christian faith, which also Saint\nPaul (_1 Cor._ iii. 11) saith is the sole foundation, _That Jesus\nChrist is come in the flesh_.\n\n8. But if _inspiration_ be discerned by _this_ point, and _this_\npoint be acknowledged and believed upon the _authority_ of the\n_Scriptures_; _how_ (may some men ask) know we that the _Scripture\ndeserveth_ so great _authority_, which must be no less than that of\nthe lively voice of God; that is, how do we know the _Scriptures_ to\nbe the _word of God_? And first, it is manifest, that if by\nknowledge we understand science infallible and natural, as is\ndefined, chap. VI. sect. 4, proceeding from sense, we cannot be said\nto know it, because it proceedeth not from the conceptions\nengendered by sense. And if we understand knowledge as supernatural,\nwe cannot have it but by inspiration: and of that _inspiration_ we\ncannot judge, but by the _doctrine_: it followeth, that we have not\nany way, natural or supernatural, of the _knowledge_ thereof, which\ncan properly be called _infallible science_ and _evidence_. It\nremaineth, that the knowledge that we have that the Scriptures are\nthe word of God, is only _faith_, which faith therefore is also by\nSaint Paul (_Heb._ xi. 1) defined to be _the evidence of things not\nseen_; that is to say, not otherwise evident but by faith: for,\nwhatsoever either is evident by natural reason, or revelation\nsupernatural, is not called faith; else should not faith cease, no\nmore than charity, when we are in heaven; which is contrary to the\ndoctrine of the Scripture. And, we are _not_ said to _believe_,\n_but_ to _know_ those things that be _evident_.\n\n9. Seeing then the acknowledgment of Scriptures to be the word of\nGod, is not evidence, but faith, and faith (chapter VI. sect. 7)\nconsisteth in the trust we have of other men, it appeareth plain,\nthat the men so trusted, are the holy men of God\u2019s church succeeding\none another from the time of those that saw the wondrous works of\nGod Almighty in the flesh. Nor doth this imply that God is not the\nworker or efficient cause of faith, or that faith is begotten in man\nwithout the spirit of God: for, all those good opinions which we\nadmit and believe, though they proceed from hearing, and hearing\nfrom teaching, both which are natural, yet they are the work of God:\nfor, all the works of nature are his, and they are attributed to the\nSpirit of God: as for example, _Exod._ xxviii. 3: _Thou shalt speak\nunto all cunning men, whom I have filled with the_ SPIRIT _of\nwisdom, that they may make Aaron\u2019s garments for his consecration,\nthat he may serve me in the priest\u2019s office_. Faith therefore,\nwherewith we believe, is the work of the Spirit of God in that\nsense, by which the Spirit of God giveth to one man wisdom and\ncunning in workmanship more than another; and by which he effecteth\nalso in other points pertaining to our ordinary life, that one man\nbelieveth that, which, upon the same grounds, another doth not; and\none man reverenceth the opinion, and obeyeth the commands of his\nsuperior, and others not.\n\n10. And seeing our faith, that the Scriptures are the word of God,\nbegan from the confidence and trust we repose in the _church_; there\ncan be no doubt but that their _interpretation_ of the same\nScriptures (when any doubt or controversy shall arise, by which this\nfundamental point, _that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh_, may be\ncalled in question) is _safer_ for any man to trust to, than his\n_own_, whether _reasoning_ or _spirit_, that is to say, his own\n_opinion_.\n\n11. Now concerning men\u2019s _affections_ to _Godward_, they are not the\nsame always that are described in the chapter concerning passions.\nThere, for to love, is to be delighted with the image or conception\nof the thing loved; but God is unconceivable: _to love God_\ntherefore, in the Scripture, is to _obey his commandments_, and to\n_love one another_. Also to _trust God_, is different from our\n_trusting_ one _another_: for, when a man trusteth a man, (chap. IX.\nsect. 9) he layeth aside his own endeavours: but if we do so in our\ntrust to God Almighty, we disobey him; and how shall we trust to him\nwhom we know we disobey? To _trust_ to _God Almighty_ therefore, is\nto _refer_ to his _good pleasure_ all that is _above our_ own power\nto effect: and this is _all one_ with _acknowledging one_ only God,\nwhich is the first commandment. And to trust _in Christ_, is no more\nbut to acknowledge him for God; which is the fundamental article of\nour Christian faith: and consequently, to trust, rely, or, as some\nexpress it, to cast and roll ourselves on Christ, is the same thing\nwith the fundamental point of faith, namely, that _Jesus Christ is\nthe son of the living God_.\n\n12. To _honour_ God internally in the heart, is the same thing with\nthat we ordinarily call honour amongst men: for it is nothing but\nthe _acknowledging_ of his _power_; and the signs thereof, the same\nwith the signs of the honour due to our superiors, mentioned chapter\nVIII. section 6, viz. to _praise_, to _magnify_, to _bless_, to pray\nto him, to thank him, to give oblations and sacrifices to him, to\ngive attention to his word, to speak to him in prayer with\nconsideration, to come into his presence with humble gesture, and in\ndecent manner, and to adorn his worship with magnificence and cost:\nand these are natural signs of our honouring him internally: and\ntherefore the contrary hereof, to neglect prayer, to speak to him\n_extempore_, to come to church slovenly, to adorn the place of his\nworship worse than our own houses, to take up his name in every idle\ndiscourse, are the manifest signs of contempt of the Divine Majesty.\nThere be other signs which are arbitrary; as, to be uncovered, as we\nbe here, to put off their shoes, as Moses at the fiery bush, and\nsome other of that kind, which in their own nature are indifferent,\ntill, to avoid indecency and discord, it be otherwise determined by\ncommon consent.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XII.\n\n\n1. It hath been declared already, how _external_ objects cause\n_conceptions_, and conceptions, _appetite_ and _fear_, which are the\n_first unperceived beginnings of our actions_: for _either_ the\nactions immediately follow the first appetite, as when we do\nanything upon a sudden; _or else_ to our first appetite there\nsucceedeth some conception of evil to happen to us by such actions,\nwhich is fear, and which holdeth us from proceeding. And to that\nfear may succeed a new appetite, and to that appetite another fear\nalternately, till the action be either done, or some accident come\nbetween, to make it impossible; and so this alternate appetite and\nfear ceaseth. This _alternate succession of appetite and fear_\nduring all the time the action is in our power to do or not to do,\nis that we call _deliberation_; which name hath been given it for\nthat part of the definition wherein it is said that it lasteth so\nlong as the action, whereof we deliberate, is in our power: for, so\nlong we have liberty to do or not to do; and deliberation signifieth\na taking away of our own liberty.\n\n2. _Deliberation_ therefore requireth in the action deliberated _two\nconditions_; one, that it be _future_; the other, that there be\n_hope_ of doing it, or possibility of not doing it; for, _appetite_\nand _fear_ are _expectations_ of the future; and there is no\nexpectation of good, without hope; or of evil, without possibility:\nof _necessaries_ therefore there is _no deliberation_. In\ndeliberation, the last appetite, as also the last fear, is called\n_will_, viz. the last appetite, will to do, or will to omit. It is\nall one therefore to say _will_ and _last will_: for, though a man\nexpress his present inclination and appetite concerning the\ndisposing of his goods, by words or writings; yet shall it not be\ncounted his will, because he hath still liberty to dispose of them\notherways: but when death taketh away that liberty, then it is his\nwill.\n\n3. _Voluntary_ actions and omissions are such as have beginning in\nthe _will_; all other are _involuntary_, or _mixed voluntary_;\n_involuntary_, such as he doth by necessity of nature, as when he is\npushed, or falleth, and thereby doth good or hurt to another:\n_mixed_, such as participate of both; as when a man is carried to\nprison, going is voluntary, to the prison, is involuntary: the\nexample of him that throweth his goods out of a ship into the sea,\nto save his person, is of an action altogether voluntary: for, there\nis nothing therein involuntary, but the hardness of the choice,\nwhich is not his action, but the action of the winds: what he\nhimself doth, is no more against his will, than to flee from danger\nis against the will of him that seeth no other means to preserve\nhimself.\n\n4. _Voluntary_ also are the actions that proceed from sudden\n_anger_, or _other_ sudden _appetite_ in such men as can discern\ngood or evil: for, in them the time precedent _is_ to be judged\ndeliberation: for then also he deliberateth in what cases it is good\nto strike, deride, or do any other action proceeding from anger or\nother such sudden passion.\n\n5. _Appetite_, _fear_, _hope_, and the rest of the passions are\n_not_ called _voluntary_; for they proceed _not from, but are the\nwill_; and the will is not voluntary: for, a man can no more say he\nwill will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite\nrepetition of the word [_will_]; which is absurd, and insignificant.\n\n6. Forasmuch as _will to do_ is _appetite_, and _will to omit_,\n_fear_; the _cause_ of _appetite_ and _fear_ is the _cause_ also of\nour _will_: but the propounding of the benefits and of harms, that\nis to say, of reward and punishment, is the cause of our appetite,\nand of our fears, and therefore also of our wills, so far forth as\nwe believe that such rewards and benefits as are propounded, shall\narrive unto us; and consequently, our _wills_ follow our _opinions_,\nas our _actions_ follow our _wills_; in which sense they say truly,\nand properly, that say the world is governed by opinion.\n\n7. When the wills of many concur to one and the same action and\neffect, this _concourse_ of their _wills_ is called _consent_; by\nwhich we must not understand one will of many men, for every man\nhath his several will, but many wills to the producing of one\neffect: but when the _wills_ of two divers men _produce_ such\nactions as are reciprocally _resistant_ one to the other, this is\ncalled _contention_; and, being upon the persons one of another,\n_battle_: whereas actions proceeding from _consent_, are mutual\n_aid_.\n\n8. When many wills are involved or included in the will of one or\nmore consenting, (which how it may be, shall be hereafter declared)\nthen is that involving of many wills in one or more, called _union_.\n\n9. In _deliberations_ interrupted, as they may be by _diversion_ of\nother business, or by _sleep_, the last _appetite_ of such part of\nthe deliberation is called _intention_, or _purpose_.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER XIII.\n\n\n1. Having spoken of the powers and acts of the mind, both cognitive\nand motive, considered in every man by _himself, without relation to\nothers_; it will fall fitly into _this_ chapter, to speak of the\neffects of the same power _one upon another_; which effects are also\nthe signs, by which one taketh notice what another conceiveth and\nintendeth. Of these signs, _some_ are such as _cannot_ easily be\n_counterfeited_; as actions and gestures, especially if they be\nsudden, whereof I have mentioned some; (for example, look in chapter\nIX.) with the several passions whereof they are signs: _others_\nthere are which _may_ be _counterfeited_; and those are _words_ or\n_speech_; of the use and effects whereof, I am to speak in this\nplace.\n\n2. The first use of language, is the _expression_ of our\n_conceptions_, that is, the begetting in one another the same\nconceptions that we have in ourselves; and this is called\n_teaching_; wherein, if the _conception_ of him that teacheth\ncontinually accompany his words, _beginning_ at something true in\n_experience_, then it begetteth the like evidence in the hearer that\nunderstandeth them, and maketh him to _know_ something, which he is\ntherefore said to _learn_: but if there be _not such evidence_, then\nsuch teaching is called _persuasion_, and begetteth no more in the\nhearer, than what is in the speaker\u2019s bare _opinion_. And the\n_signs_ of two opinions contradictory one to another; namely,\n_affirmation_ and _negation_ of the same thing, is called\n_controversy_: but _both affirmations_, or both _negations, consent\nin opinion_.\n\n3. The _infallible_ sign of _teaching exactly_, and without error,\nis this, that _no man_ hath _ever taught_ the _contrary_: not that\nfew, how few soever, if any; for commonly truth is on the side of\na few, rather than of the multitude: but when in opinions and\nquestions considered and discussed by many, it happeneth that not\nany one of the men that so discussed them differ from another,\nthen it may be justly inferred, they know what they teach, and\nthat otherwise they do not. And this appears most manifestly to\nthem that have considered the divers subjects wherein they have\nexercised their pens, and the divers ways in which they have\nproceeded, together with the diversity of the success thereof:\nfor, those men who have taken in hand to consider nothing else but\nthe comparison of _magnitudes_, _numbers_, _times_, and _motions_,\nand how their proportions are to one another, have thereby been\nthe authors of all those excellencies by which we differ from such\nsavage people as now inhabit divers places in America; and as have\nbeen the inhabitants heretofore of those countries where at this\nday arts and sciences do most flourish: for, from the studies of\nthese men, have proceeded whatsoever cometh to us for ornament by\n_navigation_, and whatsover we have beneficial to human society by\nthe _division_, _distinction_, and _portraiting the face of the\nearth_; whatsoever also we have by the _account of times_, and\n_foresight of the course of heaven_; whatsoever by _measuring\ndistances_, _planes_, and _solids_ of all sorts; and whatsoever\neither _elegant_ or _defensible_ in _building_: all which supposed\naway, what do we differ from the wildest of the Indians? Yet to\nthis day was it never heard of, that there was any _controversy_\nconcerning any conclusion in this subject; the science whereof\nhath nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched by the\nconclusions of most difficult and profound speculation. The\n_reason_ whereof is apparent to every man that looketh into their\nwritings; for they proceed from most _low_ and _humble_\nprinciples, evident even to the meanest capacity; going on\n_slowly_, and with most _scrupulous ratiocination_; viz. from the\nimposition of names, they infer the truth of their _first_\npropositions; and from two of the first, a _third_; and from any\ntwo of the three, a _fourth_; and so on, according to the steps of\nscience, mentioned chapter VI. section 4. On the other side, those\nmen who have written concerning the faculties, passions, and\nmanners of men, that is to say, of _moral philosophy_, and of\n_policy_, _government_, and _laws_, whereof there be infinite\nvolumes, have been so _far from removing doubt_ and controversy in\nthe questions they have handled, _that_ they have very much\n_multiplied the same_: _nor_ doth any man at this day so much as\npretend to _know_ more than hath been delivered two thousand years\nago by Aristotle: and yet every man thinks that in this subject he\nknoweth as much as any other; supposing there needeth thereunto no\nstudy but that accrueth unto them by natural wit; though they\nplay, or employ their mind otherwise in the purchase of wealth or\nplace. The reason whereof is no other, than that in their writings\nand discourses they take for principles those opinions which are\nalready vulgarly received, whether true or false; being for the\nmost part false. There is therefore a great deal of _difference_\nbetween _teaching_ and _persuading_; the sign of _this_ being\n_controversy_; the sign of the _former_, _no controversy_.\n\n4. There be _two sorts_ of men that commonly be called _learned_:\none is that sort that proceedeth _evidently_ from humble principles,\nas is described in the last section; and those men are called\n_mathematici_: _the other_ are they that _take up_ maxims from their\n_education_, and from the _authority_ of men, or of custom, and\n_take the habitual discourse of the tongue for ratiocination_; and\nthese are called _dogmatici_. Now seeing in the last section those\nwe call _mathematici_ are absolved of the crime of breeding\ncontroversy, and they that pretend not to learning cannot be\naccused, the fault lieth altogether in the _dogmatics_, that is to\nsay, those that are imperfectly learned, and with passion press to\nhave their opinions pass everywhere for truth, without any evident\ndemonstration either from experience, or from places of Scripture of\nuncontroverted interpretation.\n\n5. The expression of those conceptions which _cause_ in us the\n_experience_ of good while we deliberate, as also of those which\ncause our expectation of evil, is that which we call _counselling_,\nand is the internal deliberation of the mind concerning what we\nourselves are to do or not to do. The _consequences_ of our actions\nare our _counsellors_, by _alternate succession_ in the mind. So in\nthe counsel which a man taketh from _other_ men, the _counsellors\nalternately_ do _make appear the consequences_ of the action, and do\nnot any of them deliberate, but furnish among them all, him that is\ncounselled with arguments whereupon to deliberate with himself.\n\n6. Another use of speech is _expression_ of _appetite_, _intention_,\nand _will_; as the appetite of knowledge by _interrogation_;\nappetite to have a thing done by another, as _request_, _prayer_,\n_petition_: expressions of our purpose or intention, as _promise_,\nwhich is the affirmation or negation of some action to be done in\nthe future: _threatening_, which is the promise of evil; and\n_commanding_, which is that speech by which we signify to another\nour _appetite_ or desire _to have_ any _thing done_, or _left\nundone_, for reasons contained in the will itself: for it is not\nproperly said, _Sic volo, sic jubeo_, without that other clause,\n_Stet pro ratione voluntas_: and when the command is a sufficient\nreason to move us to action, then is that command called a _law_.\n\n7. Another use of speech is _instigation_ and appeasing, by which we\nincrease or diminish one another\u2019s passion: it is the same thing\nwith _persuasion_; the difference not being real; for, the begetting\nof _opinion_ and _passion_ is the _same_. But whereas in\n_persuasion_ we aim at _getting opinion from passion_; _here_, the\nend is, _to raise passion from opinion_. And as in raising an\nopinion from passion, any premises are good enough to enforce the\ndesired conclusion; so, in raising passion from opinion, it is no\nmatter whether the opinion be true or false, or the narration\nhistorical or fabulous; for, _not_ the _truth_, but the _image_,\nmaketh passion: and a tragedy, well acted, affecteth no less than a\nmurder.\n\n8. Though words be the _signs_ we have of one another\u2019s _opinions_\nand intentions, because the _equivocation_ of them is so _frequent\naccording_ to the _diversity of contexture_, and of the company\nwherewith they go, which, the presence of him that speaketh, our\n_sight_ of his _actions_, and _conjecture_ of his _intentions_, must\nhelp to discharge us of; it must therefore be _extremely hard_ to\nfind the _opinions_ and meaning of those _men_ that are _gone from\nus long ago_, and have left us no other signification thereof than\ntheir books, which cannot possibly be understood without _history_,\nto discover those aforementioned circumstances, and also without\ngreat prudence to _observe_ them.\n\n9. When it happeneth that a man signifieth unto two _contradictory_\nopinions, whereof the _one_ is _clearly_ and directly _signified_,\nand the _other_ either _drawn_ from that by _consequence_, or not\nknown to be contradictory to it; then, when he is not present to\nexplicate himself better, we are to take the _former_ for his\nopinion; for that is clearly signified to be his, and directly;\nwhereas the other might proceed from error in the deduction, or\nignorance of the repugnancy. The like also is to be held in two\ncontradictory expressions of a man\u2019s intention and will, for the\nsame reason.\n\n10. Forasmuch as whosoever _speaketh_ to another, intendeth thereby\nto _make_ him _understand_ what he saith, if he speak unto him\neither in a language which he that heareth understandeth not, or use\nany word in other sense than he believeth is the sense of him that\nheareth, he _intendeth also not_ to make him understand what he\nsaith; which is a _contradiction_ of himself. It is therefore always\nto be supposed, that he which intendeth not to deceive, alloweth the\nprivate interpretation of his speech to him to whom it is addressed.\n\n11. _Silence_, in him that _believeth_ that the same shall be taken\nfor a _sign of his intent_, _is_ a sign thereof indeed: for, if he\ndid not consent, the labour of speaking so much as to declare the\nsame, is so little, as it is to be presumed he would have done it.\n\n\n CONCLUSION.\n\nThus have we considered the nature of man so far as was requisite\nfor the finding out the first and most simple elements wherein the\ncompositions of politic rules and laws are lastly resolved; which\nwas my present purpose.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n DE CORPORE POLITICO:\n\n OR THE\n\n ELEMENTS OF LAW,\n\n MORAL AND POLITIC,\n\n WITH DISCOURSES UPON SEVERAL HEADS:\n\n AS\n\n OF THE LAW OF NATURE; OF OATHS AND COVENANTS;\n OF SEVERAL KINDS OF GOVERNMENT;\n\n WITH\n\n THE CHANGES AND REVOLUTIONS OF THEM.\n\n\n\n\n TO THE READER.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n READER,\n\nYou may be pleased to take notice, that the first part of this work\ndepends upon a former treatise of Human Nature, written by Mr.\nHobbes, and by a friend of his committed to the press for the\nbenefit of mankind. It was thought fit, that nothing of so worthy an\nauthor should be left unprinted, especially considering, that this\npiece is most useful for the society of reasonable creatures, being\nthe grounds and principles of policy, without which there would be\nnothing but confusion in the world. I am confident, if men\u2019s minds\nwere but truly fixed upon the centre of this discourse, they would\nnot prove such weathercocks, to be turned about with the wind of\nevery false doctrine, and vain opinion. We should then be free from\nthose disorders which threaten distraction to the soul, and\ndestruction to the commonwealth. But let others write never so well,\nif our practice do not second their instructions, we may be wise\nenough to foresee our misery, but never know how to prevent it. What\npity is it, that such rare conclusions as these are, should produce\nno other effect, to inform our knowledge, and confute our\nconversation, whilst we neglect the truth that is apprehended. Yet\nthere is some hope, that such observers, whose wisdom hath received\nthe stamp of goodness, will improve their skill to a real\nadvancement of those benefits, which lie hoarded up in this curious\ncabinet. To whose use and behoof, these excellent notions are\ncommended, as the best that ever were writ in this kind, and may\nserve for a general ground and foundation to all regular\nconceptions, that concern the essence and existence of man, the\ngovernment of kingdoms and commonwealths, and by consequence our\neternal salvation.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n DE CORPORE POLITICO.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n\n\n PART THE FIRST.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n\n\n1, 2. Men by nature equal. 3. By vain glory indisposed to allow\n equality with themselves, to others. 4. Apt to provoke another\n by comparisons. 5. Apt to encroach one upon another. 6. Right\n defined. 7. Right to the end, implieth right to the means. 8.\n Every man his own judge by nature. 9. Every man\u2019s strength and\n knowledge for his own use. 10. Every man by nature hath right to\n all things. 11. War and peace defined. 12. Men by nature in the\n state of war. 13. In manifest inequality might is right. 14.\n Reason dictateth peace.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Men by nature equal.]\n\n1. In a former treatise of human nature already printed, hath been\nset forth the whole nature of man, consisting in the powers natural\nof his body and mind, and may all be comprehended in these four,\n_strength of body_, _experience_, _reason_, and _passion_.\n\n2. In this, it will be expedient to consider in what estate of\nsecurity this our nature hath placed us, and what probability it\nhath left us, of continuing and preserving ourselves against the\nviolence of one another. And first, if we consider how little odds\nthere is of strength or knowledge, between men of mature age, and\nwith how great facility he that is the weaker in strength or in wit,\nor in both, may utterly destroy the power of the stronger; since\nthere needeth but little force to the taking away of a man\u2019s life,\nwe may conclude, that men considered in mere nature, ought to admit\namongst themselves equality; and that he that claimeth no more, may\nbe esteemed moderate.\n\n[Sidenote: By vain glory indisposed to allow equality with\n themselves, to others.]\n\n3. On the other side, considering the great difference there is in\nmen, from the diversity of their passions, how some are vainly\nglorious, and hope for precedency and superiority above their\nfellows, not only when they are equal in power, but also when they\nare inferior; we must needs acknowledge that it must necessarily\nfollow, that those men who are moderate, and look for no more but\nequality of nature, shall be obnoxious to the force of others, that\nwill attempt to subdue them. And from hence shall proceed a general\ndiffidence in mankind, and mutual fear one of another.\n\n[Sidenote: Apt to provoke another by comparisons.]\n\n4. Further, since men by natural passion are divers ways offensive\none to another, every man thinking well of himself, and hating to\nsee the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by\nwords, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to\nall comparison, till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by\nstrength and force of body.\n\n[Sidenote: Apt to encroach one upon another.]\n\n5. Moreover, considering that many men\u2019s appetites carry them to one\nand the same end; which end sometimes can neither be enjoyed in\ncommon, nor divided, it followeth, that the stronger must enjoy it\nalone, and that it be decided by battle who is the stronger. And\nthus the greatest part of men, upon no assurance of odds, do\nnevertheless, through vanity, or comparison, or appetite, provoke\nthe rest, that otherwise would be contented with equality.\n\n[Sidenote: Right defined.]\n\n6. And forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and\ndesire _bonum sibi_, that which is good for themselves, and to avoid\nthat which is hurtful; but most of all, the terrible enemy of\nnature, death, from whom we expect both the loss of all power, and\nalso the greatest of bodily pains in the losing; it is not against\nreason, that a man doth all he can to preserve his own body and\nlimbs both from death and pain. And that which is not against\nreason, men call _right_, or _jus_, or _blameless liberty_ of using\nour own natural power and ability. It is therefore a right of\nnature, that every man may preserve his own life and limbs, with all\nthe power he hath.\n\n[Sidenote: Right to the end, implieth right to the means.]\n\n7. And because where a man hath right to the end, and the end cannot\nbe attained without the means, that is, without such things as are\nnecessary to the end, it is consequent that it is not against\nreason, and therefore right, for a man to use all means, and do\nwhatsoever action is necessary for the preservation of his body.\n\n[Sidenote: Every man his own judge by nature.]\n\n8. Also, every man by right of nature, is judge himself of the\nnecessity of the means, and of the greatness of the danger. For if\nit be against reason, that I be judge of mine own danger myself,\nthen it is reason, that another man be judge thereof. But the same\nreason that maketh another man judge of those things that concern\nme, maketh me also judge of that that concerneth him. And therefore\nI have reason to judge of his sentence, whether it be for my\nbenefit, or not.\n\n[Sidenote: Every man\u2019s strength and knowledge for his own use.]\n\n9. As a man\u2019s judgment in right of nature is to be employed for his\nown benefit, so also the strength, knowledge, and art, of every man\nis then rightly employed, when he useth it for himself; else must\nnot a man have right to preserve himself.\n\n[Sidenote: Every man by nature hath right to all things.]\n\n10. Every man by nature hath right to all things, that is to say, to\ndo whatsoever he listeth to whom he listeth, to possess, use, and\nenjoy all things he will and can. For seeing all things he willeth,\nmust therefore be good unto him in his own judgment, because he\nwilleth them, and may tend to his preservation some time or other,\nor he may judge so, and we have made him judge thereof, section 8,\nit followeth, that all things may rightly also be done by him. And\nfor this cause it is rightly said, _Natura dedit omnia omnibus_,\nthat Nature hath given all things to all men; insomuch, that _jus_\nand _utile_, right and profit, is the same thing. But that right of\nall men to all things, is in effect no better than if no man had\nright to any thing. For there is little use and benefit of the right\na man hath, when another as strong, or stronger than himself, hath\nright to the same.\n\n[Sidenote: War and peace defined.]\n\n11. Seeing then to the offensiveness of man\u2019s nature one to another,\nthere is added a right of every man to every thing, whereby one man\ninvadeth with right, and another man with right resisteth, and men\nlive thereby in perpetual diffidence, and study how to preoccupate\neach other; the estate of men in this natural liberty, is the estate\nof war. For _war_ is nothing else but that time wherein the will and\ncontention of contending by force, is either by words or actions\nsufficiently declared; and the time which is not war, is _peace_.\n\n[Sidenote: Men by nature in the state of war.]\n\n12. The estate of hostility and war being such, as thereby nature\nitself is destroyed, and men kill one another, (as we know also that\nit is, both by the experience of savage nations that live at this\nday, and by the histories of our ancestors the old inhabitants of\nGermany, and other now civil countries, where we find the people\nfew, and short lived, and without the ornaments and comforts of\nlife, which by peace and society are usually invented and procured)\nhe therefore that desireth to live in such an estate as is the\nestate of liberty and right of all to all, contradicteth himself.\nFor every man by natural necessity desireth his own good, to which\nthis estate is contrary, wherein we suppose contention between men\nby nature equal, and able to destroy one another.\n\n[Sidenote: In manifest inequality might is right.]\n\n13. Seeing this right of protecting ourselves by our own discretion\nand force, proceedeth from danger, and that danger from the equality\nbetween men\u2019s forces, much more reason is there, that a man prevent\nsuch equality before the danger cometh, and before the necessity of\nbattle. A man therefore that hath another man in his power to rule\nor govern, to do good to, or harm, hath right, by the advantage of\nthis his present power, to take caution at his pleasure, for his\nsecurity against that other in time to come. He therefore that hath\nalready subdued his adversary, or gotten into his power any other,\nthat either by infancy, or weakness, is unable to resist him, by\nright of nature may take the best caution, that such infant, or such\nfeeble and subdued person can give him, of being ruled and governed\nby him for the time to come. For seeing we intend always our own\nsafety and preservation, we manifestly contradict that our\nintention, if we willingly dismiss such a one, and suffer him at\nonce to gather strength and be our enemy. Out of which may also be\ncollected, that irresistible might, in the state of nature, is\nright.\n\n[Sidenote: Reason dictateth peace.]\n\n14. But since it is supposed by the equality of strength, and other\nnatural faculties of men, that no man is of might sufficient, to\nassure himself for any long time, of preserving himself thereby,\nwhilst he remaineth in the state of hostility and war; reason\ntherefore dictateth to every man for his own good, to seek after\npeace, as far forth as there is hope to attain the same; and\nstrengthen himself with all the help he can procure, for his own\ndefence against those, from whom such peace cannot be obtained; and\nto do all those things which necessarily conduce thereunto.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n\n1. The law of nature consisteth not in consent of men, but reason.\n 2. That every man divest himself of the right he hath to all\n things, is one precept of nature. 3. What it is to relinquish\n and transfer one\u2019s right. 4. The will to transfer, and the will\n to accept, both necessary to the passing away of right. 5. Right\n not transferred by words _de futuro_ only. 6. Words _de futuro_,\n together with other signs of the will, may transfer right. 7.\n Free gift defined. 8. Contract, and the sorts of it. 9. Covenant\n defined. 10. Contract of mutual trust, is of no validity in the\n estate of hostility. 11. No covenant of men but with one\n another. 12. Covenant how dissolved. 13. Covenant extorted by\n fear, in the law of nature valid. 14. Covenant contrary to\n former covenant, void. 15. An oath defined. 16. Oath to be\n administered to every man in his own religion. 17. Oath addeth\n not to the obligation. 18. Covenants bind but to endeavour.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The law of nature consisteth not in consent of men, but\n reason.]\n\n1. What it is we call the law of nature, is not agreed upon by\nthose, that have hitherto written. For the most part, such writers\nas have occasion to affirm, that anything is against the law of\nnature, do allege no more than this, that it is against the consent\nof all nations, or the wisest and most civil nations. But it is not\nagreed upon, who shall judge which nations are the wisest. Others\nmake that against the law of nature, which is contrary to the\nconsent of all mankind; which definition cannot be allowed, because\nthen no man could offend against the law of nature; for the nature\nof every man is contained under the nature of mankind. But forasmuch\nas all men are carried away by the violence of their passion, and by\nevil customs do those things which are commonly said to be against\nthe law of nature; it is not the consent of passions, or consent in\nsome error gotten by custom, that makes the law of nature. Reason is\nno less of the nature of man than passion, and is the same in all\nmen, because all men agree in the will to be directed and governed\nin the way to that which they desire to attain, namely, their own\ngood, which is the work of reason: there can therefore be no other\nlaw of nature than reason, nor no other precepts of _natural law_,\nthan those which declare unto us the ways of peace, where the same\nmay be obtained, and of defence where it may not.\n\n[Sidenote: That every man divest himself of the right he hath to all\n things, is one precept of nature.]\n\n2. One precept of the law of nature therefore is this, _that every\nman divest himself of the right he hath to all things by nature_.\nFor when divers men having right not only to all things else, but to\none another\u2019s persons, if they use the same, there ariseth thereby\ninvasion on the one part, and resistance on the other, which is\n_war_, and therefore contrary to the law of nature, the sum whereof\nconsisteth in making peace.\n\n[Sidenote: What it is to relinquish and transfer one\u2019s right.]\n\n3. When a man divesteth and putteth from himself his right, he\neither simply relinquisheth it, or transferreth the same to another\nman. To _relinquish_ it, is by sufficient signs to declare, that it\nis his will no more to do that action, which of right he might have\ndone before. To _transfer_ right to another, is by sufficient signs\nto declare to that other accepting thereof, that it is his will not\nto resist, or hinder him, according to that right he had thereto\nbefore he transferred it. For seeing that by nature every man hath\nright to every thing, it is impossible for a man to transfer unto\nanother any right that he had not before. And therefore all that a\nman doth in transferring of right, is no more but a declaring of the\nwill, to suffer him, to whom he hath so transferred his right, to\nmake benefit of the same, without molestation. As for example, when\na man giveth his lands or goods to another, he taketh from himself\nthe right to enter into, and make use of the said lands or goods, or\notherwise to hinder him of the use of what he hath given.\n\n[Sidenote: The will to transfer, and the will to accept, both\n necessary to the passing away of right.]\n\n4. In transferring of right, two things therefore are required: one\non the part of him that transferreth, which is a sufficient\nsignification of his will therein; the other, on the part of him to\nwhom it is transferred, which is a sufficient signification of his\nacceptation thereof. Either of these failing, the right remaineth\nwhere it was: nor is it to be supposed, that he which giveth his\nright to one that accepteth it not, doth thereby simply relinquish\nit, and transfer it to whomsoever will receive it: inasmuch as the\ncause of transferring the same to one, rather than to another, is in\nthe one, rather than in the rest.\n\n[Sidenote: Right not transferred by words _de futuro_ only.]\n\n5. When there appear no other signs that a man hath relinquished, or\ntransferred his right, but only words, it behoveth that the same be\ndone in words, that signify the present time, or the time past, and\nnot only the time to come. For he that saith of the time to come, as\nfor example, to-morrow I will give, declareth evidently, that he\nhath not yet given. The right, therefore, remaineth in him to-day,\nand so continues, till he have given actually. But he that saith, I\ngive, presently, or have given to another anything, to have and\nenjoy the same to-morrow, or any other time further, hath now\nactually transferred the said right, which otherwise he should have\nhad at the time that the other is to enjoy it.\n\n[Sidenote: Words _de futuro_, together with other signs of the will,\n may transfer right.]\n\n6. But because words alone are not a sufficient declaration of the\nmind, as hath been shown chapter XIII. section 8, words spoken _de\nfuturo_, when the will of him that speaketh them may be gathered by\nother signs, may be taken very often as if they were meant _de\npr\u00e6senti_: for when it appeareth, that he that giveth, would have\nhis words so understood by him to whom he giveth, as if he did\nactually transfer his right, then he must needs be understood to\nwill all that is necessary to the same.\n\n[Sidenote: Free gift defined.]\n\n7. When a man transferreth any right of his to another, without\nconsideration of reciprocal benefit, past, present, or to come, this\nis called _free gift_. And in free gift, no other words can be\nbinding, but those which are _de pr\u00e6senti_, or _de pr\u00e6terito_: for\nbeing _de futuro_ only, they transfer nothing, nor can they be\nunderstood, as if they proceeded from the will of the giver; because\nbeing a free gift, it carrieth with it no obligation greater than\nthat which is enforced by the words. For he that promiseth to give,\nwithout any other consideration but his own affection, so long as he\nhath not given, deliberateth still, according as the causes of his\naffections continue, or diminish; and he that deliberateth, hath not\nyet willed, because the will is the last act of his deliberation. He\nthat promiseth therefore, is not thereby a _donor_, but _doson_;\nwhich name was given to that Antiochus, that promised often, but\nseldom gave.\n\n[Sidenote: Contract, and the sorts of it.]\n\n8. When a man transferreth his right upon consideration of\nreciprocal benefit, this is not free gift, but mutual _donation_,\nand is called _contract_. And in all contracts, either both parties\npresently perform, and put each other into a certainty and assurance\nof enjoying what they contract for, as when men buy or sell, or\nbarter; or one party performeth presently, and the other promiseth,\nas when one selleth upon trust; or else neither party performeth\npresently, but trust one another. And it is impossible there should\nbe any kind of contract besides these three. For either both the\ncontractors trust, or neither; or else one trusteth, and the other\nnot.\n\n[Sidenote: Covenant defined.]\n\n9. In all contracts where there is trust, the promise of him that is\ntrusted, is called a _covenant_. And this, though it be a promise,\nand of the time to come, yet it doth transfer the right, when that\ntime cometh, no less than an actual donation. For it is a manifest\nsign, that he which did perform, understood it was the will of him\nthat was trusted, to perform also. Promises therefore, upon\nconsideration of reciprocal benefit, are covenants and signs of the\nwill, or last act of deliberation, whereby the liberty of\nperforming, or not performing, is taken away, and consequently are\nobligatory. For where liberty ceaseth, there beginneth obligation.\n\n[Sidenote: Contract of mutual trust, is of no validity in the estate\n of hostility.]\n\n10. Nevertheless, in contracts that consist of such mutual trust, as\nthat nothing be by either party performed for the present, when the\ncontract is between such as are not compellable, he that performeth\nfirst, considering the disposition of men to take advantage of every\nthing for their benefit, doth but betray himself thereby to the\ncovetousness, or other passion of him with whom he contracteth. And\ntherefore such covenants are of none effect. For there is no reason\nwhy the one should perform first, if the other be likely not to\nperform afterward. And whether he be likely or not, he that\ndoubteth, shall be judge himself, as hath been said chap. I. sect.\n8, as long as they remain in the estate and liberty of nature. But\nwhen there shall be such power coercive over both the parties, as\nshall deprive them of their private judgments in this point, then\nmay such covenants be effectual, seeing he that performeth first\nshall have no reasonable cause to doubt of the performance of the\nother, that may be compelled thereunto.\n\n[Sidenote: No covenant of men but with one another.]\n\n11. And forasmuch as in all covenants, and contracts, and donations,\nthe acceptance of him to whom the right is transferred, is necessary\nto the essence of those covenants, donations, &c., it is impossible\nto make a covenant or donation to any, that by nature, or absence,\nare unable, or if able, do not actually declare their acceptation of\nthe same. First of all, therefore, it is impossible for any man to\nmake a covenant with God Almighty, further than it hath pleased him\nto declare who shall receive and accept of the said covenant in his\nname. Also it is impossible to make covenant with those living\ncreatures, of whose wills we have no sufficient sign, for want of\ncommon language.\n\n[Sidenote: Covenant how dissolved.]\n\n12. A covenant to do any action at a certain time and place, is then\ndissolved by the covenanter, when that time cometh, either by the\nperformance, or by the violation. For a covenant is void that is\nonce impossible. But a covenant not to do, without time limited,\nwhich is as much as to say, a covenant never to do, is dissolved by\nthe covenanter then only, when he violateth it, or dieth. And\ngenerally, all covenants are dischargeable by the covenantee, to\nwhose benefit, and by whose right, he that maketh the covenant is\nobliged. This right therefore of the covenantee relinquished, is a\nrelease of the covenant. And universally, for the same reason, all\nobligations are determinable at the will of the obliger.\n\n[Sidenote: Covenant extorted by fear, in the law of nature valid.]\n\n13. It is a question often moved, whether such covenants oblige, as\nare extorted from men by fear. As for example, whether if a man for\nfear of death, hath promised to give a thief an hundred pounds the\nnext day, and not discover him; whether such covenant be obligatory,\nor not. And though in some cases such covenant may be void, yet it\nis not therefore void, because extorted by fear. For there appeareth\nno reason, why that which we do upon fear, should be less firm than\nthat which we do for covetousness. For both the one and the other\nmaketh the action voluntary. And if no covenant should be good, that\nproceedeth from fear of death, no conditions of peace between\nenemies, nor any laws, could be of force, which are all consented to\nfrom that fear. For who would lose the liberty that nature hath\ngiven him, of governing himself by his own will and power, if they\nfeared not death in the retaining of it? What prisoner in war might\nbe trusted to seek his ransom, and ought not rather to be killed, if\nhe were not tied by the grant of his life, to perform his promise?\nBut after the introduction of policy and laws, the case may alter;\nfor if by the law the performance of such a covenant be forbidden,\nthen he that promiseth anything to a thief, not only may, but must\nrefuse to perform it. But if the law forbid not the performance, but\nleave it to the will of the promiser, then is the performance still\nlawful: and the covenant of things lawful is obligatory, even\ntowards a thief.\n\n[Sidenote: Covenant contrary to former covenant, void.]\n\n14. He that giveth, promiseth or covenanteth to one, and after,\ngiveth, promiseth, or covenanteth the same to another, maketh void\nthe latter act. For it is impossible for a man to transfer that\nright which he himself hath not; and that right he hath not, which\nhe himself hath before transferred.\n\n[Sidenote: An oath defined.]\n\n15. An _oath_ is a clause annexed to a promise, containing a\nrenunciation of God\u2019s mercy by him that promiseth, in case he\nperform not as far as is lawful and possible for him to do. And this\nappeareth by the words which make the essence of the oath, _so help\nme God_. So also was it amongst the heathen. And the form of the\nRomans was, _Thou Jupiter kill him that breaketh, as I kill this\nbeast_. The intention therefore of an oath being to provoke\nvengeance upon the _breakers_ of covenant; it is to no purpose to\nswear by men, be they never so great, because their punishment by\ndivers accidents may be avoided, whether they will, or no, but God\u2019s\npunishment not. Though it were a custom of many nations, to swear by\nthe life of their princes; yet those princes being ambitious of\ndivine honour, give sufficient testimony, that they believed,\nnothing ought to be sworn by, but the Deity.\n\n[Sidenote: Oath to be administered to every man in his own\n religion.]\n\n16. And seeing men cannot be afraid of the power they believe not,\nand an oath is to no purpose, without fear of him they swear by, it\nis necessary that he that sweareth, do it in that form which himself\nadmitteth in his own religion, and not in that form which he useth,\nthat putteth him to the oath. For though all men may know by nature,\nthat there is an Almighty power, nevertheless they believe not, that\nthey swear by him in any other form or name, than what their own,\nwhich they think the true, religion teacheth them.\n\n[Sidenote: Oath addeth not to the obligation.]\n\n17. And by the definition of an oath, it appeareth that it addeth\nnot a greater obligation to perform the covenant sworn, than the\ncovenant carrieth in itself, but it putteth a man into a greater\ndanger, and of greater punishment.\n\n[Sidenote: Covenants bind but to endeavour.]\n\n18. Covenants and oaths are _de voluntariis_, that is, _de\npossibilibus_. Nor can the covenantee understand the covenanter to\npromise _impossibles_; for they fall not under deliberation: and\nconsequently, (by chap. XIII. sect. 10 of the _Treatise of Human\nNature_, which maketh the covenantee interpreter) no covenant is\nunderstood to bind further, than to our best endeavour, either in\nperformance of the thing promised, or in something equivalent.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\n1. That men stand to their covenants. 2. Injury defined. 3. That\n injury is done only to the covenantee. 4. The signification of\n those names, just, unjust. 5. Justice not rightly divided into\n commutative, and distributive. 6. It is a law of nature, that he\n that is trusted, turn not that trust to the damage of him that\n trusteth. 7. Ingratitude defined. 8. It is a law of nature, to\n endeavour to accommodate one another: 9. And that man forgive\n upon caution for the future: 10. And that revenge ought to\n respect the future only: 11. That reproach and contempt\n declared, is against the law of nature: 12. That indifference of\n commerce is of the law of nature: 13. That messengers employed\n to procure or maintain peace, ought to be safe by the law of\n nature.\n\n\n[Sidenote: That men stand to their covenants.]\n\n1. It is a common saying that nature maketh nothing in vain. And it\nis most certain, that as the truth of a conclusion, is no more but\nthe truth of the premises that make it; so the force of the command,\nor law of nature, is no more than the force of the reasons inducing\nthereunto. Therefore the law of nature mentioned in the former\nchapter, section 2, namely, _That every man should divest himself of\nthe right_, &c. were utterly vain, and of none effect, if this also\nwere not a law of the same nature, _That every man is obliged to\nstand to, and perform, those covenants he maketh_. For what benefit\nis it to a man, that any thing be promised, or given unto him, if he\nthat giveth, or promiseth, performeth not, or retaineth still the\nright of taking back what he hath given?\n\n[Sidenote: Injury defined.]\n\n2. The breach or violation of covenant, is that which men call\n_injury_, consisting in some action or omission, which is therefore\ncalled _unjust_. For it is action or omission, without _jus_, or\nright, which was transferred or relinquished before. There is a\ngreat similitude between that we call _injury_, or _injustice_ in\nthe actions and conversations of men in the world, and that which is\ncalled _absurd_ in the arguments and disputations of the Schools.\nFor as he, which is driven to contradict an assertion by him before\nmaintained, is said to be reduced to an absurdity; so he that\nthrough passion doth, or omitteth that which before by covenant he\npromised to do, or not to omit, is said to commit injustice; and\nthere is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so\ncalled. For he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the time\nto come. And he that doth any action, willeth it in that present,\nwhich is part of the future time contained in the covenant. And\ntherefore he that violateth a covenant, willeth the doing and the\nnot doing of the same thing, at the same time, which is a plain\ncontradiction. And so _injury_ is an _absurdity_ of conversation, as\nabsurdity is a kind of injustice in disputation.\n\n[Sidenote: That injury is done only to the covenantee.]\n\n3. In all violation of covenant, (to whomsoever accrueth the damage)\nthe injury is done only to him to whom the covenant was made. For\nexample, if a man covenant to obey his master, and the master\ncommand him to give money to a third, which he promiseth to do, and\ndoth not, though this be to the damage of the third, yet the injury\nis done to the master only. For he could violate no covenant with\nhim, with whom none was made, and therefore doth him no injury. For\ninjury consisteth in violation of covenant by the definition\nthereof.\n\n[Sidenote: The signification of those names, just and unjust.]\n\n4. The names of _just_, _unjust_, _justice_, _injustice_, are\nequivocal, and signify diversly. For justice and injustice, when\nthey be attributed to actions, signify the same thing with _no\ninjury_, and _injury_, and denominate the action _just_, or\n_unjust_, but not the man so. For they denominate him _guilty_, or\n_not guilty_. But when justice or injustice, are attributed to men,\nthey signify _proneness_, and affection and inclination of nature,\nthat is to say, passions of the mind, apt to produce just and unjust\nactions. So that when a man is said to be just, or unjust; not the\naction, but the passion and aptitude, to do such actions, is\nconsidered. And therefore a just man may have committed an unjust\nact; and an unjust man may have done justly, not only one, but most\nof his actions. For there is an _oderunt peccare_ in the unjust, as\nwell as in the just, but from different causes. For the unjust man\nwho abstaineth from injuries for fear of punishment, declareth\nplainly, that the justice of his actions dependeth upon civil\nconstitution, from whence punishments proceed, which would otherwise\nin the estate of nature be unjust, according to the fountain from\nwhence they spring. This distinction therefore of _justice_, and\n_injustice_, ought to be remembered, that when injustice is taken\nfor guilty, the action is unjust, but not therefore the man; and\nwhen justice is taken for _guiltlessness_, the actions are just, and\nyet not always the man. Likewise when justice and injustice are\ntaken for habits of the mind, the man may be just, or unjust, and\nyet not all his actions so.\n\n[Sidenote: Justice not rightly divided into commutative, and\n distributive.]\n\n5. Concerning the justice of actions, the same is usually divided\ninto two kinds, whereof men call the one _commutative_, and the\nother _distributive_; and are said to consist, the one in proportion\n_arithmetical_; the other in _geometrical_: and _commutative_\njustice, they place in permutation, as buying, selling, and\nbartering; _distributive_, in giving to every man according to their\ndeserts. Which distinction is not well made, inasmuch as injury,\nwhich is the injustice of action, consisteth not in the inequality\nof the things changed, or distributed, but in the inequality that\nmen, contrary to nature and reason, assume unto themselves above\ntheir fellows. Of which inequality, shall be spoken hereafter. And\nfor _commutative_ justice placed in buying and selling, though the\nthing bought be unequal to the price given for it, yet forasmuch as\nboth the buyer and the seller are made judges of the value, and are\nthereby both satisfied, there can be no injury done on either side,\nneither party having trusted, or covenanted with the other. And for\n_distributive_ justice, which consisteth in the distribution of our\nown benefits, seeing a thing is therefore said to be our own,\nbecause we may dispose of it at our own pleasure, it can be no\ninjury to any man, though our liberality be farther extended towards\nanother, than towards him; unless we be thereto obliged by covenant:\nand then the injustice consisteth in the violation of that covenant,\nand not in the inequality of distribution.\n\n[Sidenote: It is a law of nature, that he that is trusted, turn not\n that trust to the damage of him that trusteth]\n\n6. It happeneth many times that man benefitteth, or contributeth, to\nthe power of another, without any covenant, but only upon confidence\nand trust of obtaining the grace and favour of that other, whereby\nhe may procure a greater, or no less benefit, and assistance to\nhimself. For by necessity of nature, every man doth in all his\nvoluntary actions intend some good unto himself. In this case it is\na law of nature, _That no man suffer him, that thus trusteth to his\ncharity, or good affection towards him, to be in the worse estate\nfor his trusting_. For if he shall so do, men will not dare to\nconfer mutually to each other\u2019s defence, nor put themselves into\neach other\u2019s mercy upon any terms whatsoever, but rather abide the\nutmost and worst event of hostility; by which general diffidence,\nmen will not only be enforced to war, but also afraid to come so\nmuch within the danger of one another, as to make any overture of\npeace. But this is to be understood of those only, that confer their\nbenefits (as I have said) upon trust only, and not for triumph or\nostentation. For as when they do it upon trust, the end they aimed\nat, namely to be well used, is the reward; so also when they do it\nfor ostentation, they have the reward in themselves.\n\n[Sidenote: Ingratitude defined.]\n\n7. But seeing in this case there passeth no covenant, the breach of\nthis law of nature is not to be called _injury_. It hath another\nname, to wit, _ingratitude_.\n\n[Sidenote: It is a law of nature, to endeavour to accommodate one\n another.]\n\n8. It is also a law of nature, _That every man do help and endeavour\nto accommodate each other as far as may be, without danger of their\npersons, and loss of their means, to maintain and defend\nthemselves_. For seeing the causes of war and desolation proceed\nfrom those passions, by which we strive to accommodate ourselves,\nand to leave others as far as we can behind us, it followeth, that\nthat passion by which we strive mutually to accommodate each other,\nmust be the cause of peace. And this passion is that charity defined\nchapter IX. section 17.\n\n[Sidenote: And that man forgive, upon caution for the future.]\n\n9. And in this precept of nature, is included and comprehended also\nthis, _That a man forgive and pardon him that hath done him wrong,\nupon his repentance and caution for the future_. For _pardon_ is\npeace granted to him, that, having provoked to war, demandeth it. It\nis not therefore charity, but fear, when a man giveth peace to him\nthat repenteth not, nor giveth caution for maintaining thereof in\nthe time to come. For he that repenteth not, remaineth with the\naffection of an enemy; as also doth he that refuseth to give\ncaution, and consequently, is presumed not to seek after peace, but\nadvantage. And therefore to forgive him is not commanded in this law\nof nature, nor is charity, but may sometime be prudence. Otherwise,\nnot to pardon upon repentance and caution, considering men cannot\nabstain from provoking one another, is never to give _peace_. And\nthat is against the general definition of the law of nature.\n\n[Sidenote: And that revenge ought to respect the future only.]\n\n10. And seeing the law of nature commandeth pardon, when there is\nrepentance and caution for the future, it followeth, that the same\nlaw ordaineth, _That no revenge be taken upon the consideration only\nof the offence past, but of the benefit to come_; that is to say,\nthat all revenge ought to tend to amendment, either of the person\noffending, or of others, by the example of his punishment; which is\nsufficiently apparent, in that the law of nature commandeth pardon,\nwhere the future time is secured. The same is also apparent by this,\nthat revenge when it considereth the offence past, is nothing else,\nbut present triumph and glory, and directeth to no end: and what is\ndirected to no end, is therefore unprofitable; and consequently the\ntriumph of revenge, is vain glory: and whatsoever is vain, is\nagainst reason; and to hurt one another without reason, is contrary\nto that, which by supposition is every man\u2019s benefit, namely peace;\nand what is contrary to peace, is contrary to the law of nature.\n\n[Sidenote: That reproach and contempt declared is against the law of\n nature.]\n\n11. And because all signs which we shew to one another of hatred and\ncontempt, provoke in the highest degree to quarrel and battle,\n(inasmuch as life itself, with the condition of enduring scorn, is\nnot esteemed worth the enjoying, much less peace) it must\nnecessarily be implied as a law of nature, _That no man reproach,\nrevile, deride, or any otherwise declare his hatred, contempt, or\ndisesteem of any other_. But this law is very little practised. For\nwhat is more ordinary than reproaches of those that are rich,\ntowards them that are not? or of those that sit in place of\njudicature, towards those that are accused at the bar? although to\ngrieve them in that manner, be no part of the punishment for their\ncrime, nor contained in their office. But use hath prevailed, that\nwhat was lawful in the lord towards the servant whom he maintaineth,\nis also practised as lawful in the more mighty towards the less;\nthough they contribute nothing towards their maintenance.\n\n[Sidenote: That indifference of commerce is of the law of nature.]\n\n12. It is also a law of nature, _That one man allow commerce and\ntraffic indifferently to one another_. For he that alloweth that to\none man, which he denieth to another, declareth his hatred to him,\nto whom he denieth. And to declare hatred is war. And upon this\ntitle was grounded the great war between the Athenians and the\nPeloponnesians. For would the Athenians have condescended to suffer\nthe Megareans, their neighbours, to traffic in their ports and\nmarkets, that war had not begun.\n\n[Sidenote: That messengers employed to procure or maintain peace,\n ought to be safe by the law of nature.]\n\n13. And this also is a law of nature, _That all messengers of peace,\nand such as are employed to procure and maintain amity between man\nand man, may safely come and go_. For seeing peace is the general\nlaw of nature, the means thereto, such as are these men, must in the\nsame law be comprehended.\n\nsp 2\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\n1. A law of nature, that every man acknowledge other for his equal.\n 2. Another, that men allow _\u00e6qualia \u00e6qualibus_. 3. Another, that\n those things which cannot be divided, be used in common. 4.\n Another, that things indivisible and incommunicable, be divided\n by lot. 5. Natural lot, primogeniture, and first possession. 6.\n That men submit to arbitration. 7. Of an arbitrator. 8. That no\n man press his counsel upon any man against his will. 9. How to\n know suddenly what is the law of nature. 10. That the law of\n nature taketh place after security from others to observe the\n same. 11. The right of nature not to be taken away by custom,\n nor the law of nature abrogated by any act. 12. Why the dictates\n of nature are called laws. 13. Whatsoever is against conscience\n in a man that is his own judge, is against the law of nature.\n 14. Of _malum p\u0153n\u00e6, malum culp\u00e6_; virtue and vice. 15. Aptitude\n to society fulfilleth the law of nature.\n\n\n[Sidenote: A law of nature, that every man acknowledge other for his\n equal.]\n\n1. The question, which is the better man, is determinable only in\nthe estate of government and policy, though it be mistaken for a\nquestion of nature, not only by ignorant men, that think one man\u2019s\nblood better than another\u2019s by nature, but also by him, whose\nopinions are at this day, and in these parts, of greater authority\nthan any other human writings. For he putteth so much difference\nbetween the powers of men by nature, that he doubteth not to set\ndown, as the ground of all his politics, that some men are by nature\nworthy to govern, and others by nature ought to serve. Which\nfoundation hath not only weakened the whole frame of his politics,\nbut hath also given men colour and pretences, whereby to disturb and\nhinder the peace of one another. For though there were such a\ndifference of nature, that master and servant were not by consent of\nmen, but by inherent virtue; yet who hath that eminency of virtue,\nabove others, and who is so stupid, as not to govern himself, shall\nnever be agreed upon amongst men, who do every one naturally think\nhimself, as able, at the least, to govern another, as another to\ngovern him. And when there was any contention between the finer and\nthe courser wits, (as there hath been often in times of sedition and\ncivil war) for the most part, these latter carried away the victory;\nand as long as men arrogate to themselves more honour than they give\nto others, it cannot be imagined, how they can possibly live in\npeace: and consequently we are to suppose, that for peace sake,\nnature hath ordained this law, _That every man acknowledge other for\nhis equal_. And the breach of this law, is that we call _pride_.\n\n[Sidenote: Another, that men allow _\u00e6qualia \u00e6qualibus_.]\n\n2. As it was necessary that a man should not retain his right to\nevery thing, so also was it, that he should retain his right to\nsome things; to his own body, for example, the right of\ndefending, whereof he could not transfer; to the use of fire,\nwater, free air, and place to live in, and to all things\nnecessary for life. Nor doth the law of nature command any\ndivesting of other rights, than of those only which cannot be\nretained without the loss of peace. Seeing then many rights are\nretained, when we enter into peace one with another, reason and\nthe law of nature dictateth, _Whatsoever right any man requireth\nto retain, he allow every other man to retain the same_. For he\nthat doth not so, alloweth not the equality mentioned in the\nformer section. For there is no acknowledgment of worth, without\nattribution of the equality of benefit and respect. And this\nallowance of _\u00e6qualia \u00e6qualibus_, is the same thing with the\nallowing of _proportionalia proportionalibus_. For when a man\nalloweth to every man alike, the allowance he maketh, will be in\nthe same proportion, in which are the numbers of men to whom\nthey are made. And this is it men mean by _distributive\njustice_, and is properly termed _equity_. The breach of the law\nis that which the Greeks call \u03a0\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03be\u03af\u03b1, which is commonly\nrendered _covetousness_, but seemeth to be more precisely\nexpressed by the word _encroaching_.\n\n[Sidenote: Another, that those things which cannot be divided, be\n used in common.]\n\n3. If there pass no other covenant, the law of nature is, _That such\nthings as cannot be divided, be used in common, proportionably to\nthe numbers of them that are to use the same, or without limitation,\nwhen the quantity thereof sufficeth_. For first supposing the thing\nto be used in common, not sufficient for them that are to use it\nwithout limitation, if a few shall make more use thereof than the\nrest, that equality is not observed, which is required in the second\nsection. And this is to be understood, as all the rest of the laws\nof nature, without any other covenant antecedent: for a man may have\ngiven away his right of common, and so the case be altered.\n\n[Sidenote: Another, that things indivisible and incommunicable, be\n divided by lot.]\n\n4. In those things which neither can be divided, nor used in common,\nthe rule of nature must needs be one of these, _lot_, or _alternate\nuse_: for besides these two ways, there can no other equality be\nimagined; and for alternate use, he that beginneth, hath the\nadvantage; and to reduce that advantage to equality, there is no\nother way but lot, in things, therefore indivisible and\nincommunicable, it is the law of nature, _That the use be alternate,\nor the advantage given away by lot_; because there is no other way\nof equality. And equality is the law of nature.\n\n[Sidenote: Natural lot, primogeniture, and first possession.]\n\n5. There be two sorts of lots; one arbitrary, made by men, and\ncommonly known by the names of _lot_, _chance_, _hazard_, and the\nlike; and there is _natural lot_, such as is _primogeniture_, which\nis no more but the chance, or lot, of being first born, which it\nseemeth they considered, that call inheritance by the name of\n\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b1, which signifieth _distribution_ by lot. Secondly, _prima\noccupatio_, first seizing, or finding of a thing, whereof no man\nmade use before, which for the most part also is merely _chance_.\n\n[Sidenote: That men submit to arbitration.]\n\n6. Although men agree upon these laws of nature, and endeavour to\nobserve the same; yet considering the passions of men, that make it\ndifficult to understand by what actions, and circumstances of\nactions, those laws are broken, there must needs arise many great\ncontroversies about the interpretation thereof, by which the peace\nmust needs be dissolved, and men return again to their former estate\nof hostility. For the taking away of which controversies, it is\nnecessary that there be some common _arbitrator_ and _judge_, to\nwhose sentence both the parties in the controversies ought to stand.\nAnd therefore it is a law of nature, _That in every controversy, the\nparties thereto ought mutually to agree upon an arbitrator, whom\nthey both trust; and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence\nhe shall give therein_. For where every man is his own _judge_,\nthere properly is no judge at all; as where every man carveth out\nhis own right, it hath the same effect, as if there were no right at\nall: and where is no judge, there is no end of controversy: and\ntherefore the right of hostility remaineth.\n\n[Sidenote: Of an arbitrator.]\n\n7. An _arbitrator_ therefore, or he that is judge, is trusted by the\nparties to any controversy, to determine the same by the declaration\nof his own judgment therein. Out of which followeth first, that the\njudge ought not to be concerned in the controversy he endeth; for in\nthat case he is a party, and ought by the same reason to be judged\nby another. Secondly, that he maketh no covenant with either of the\nparties, to pronounce sentence for the one, more than for the other.\nNor doth he covenant so much, as that his sentence shall be just;\nfor that were to make the parties judges of the sentence, whereby\nthe controversy would remain still undecided. Nevertheless for the\ntrust reposed in him, and for the equality which the law of nature\nrequireth him to consider in the parties, he violateth that law, if\nfor favour, or hatred to either party, he give other sentence than\nhe thinketh right. And thirdly, that no man ought to make himself\njudge in any controversy between others, unless they consent and\nagree thereto.\n\n[Sidenote: That no man press his counsel upon any man against his\n will.]\n\n8. It is also the law of nature, _That no man obtrude or press his\nadvice or counsel to any man, that declareth himself unwilling to\nhear the same_. For seeing a man taketh counsel concerning what is\ngood or hurt of himself only, and not of his counsellor, and that\ncounsel is a voluntary action, and therefore tendeth also to the\ngood of the counsellor, there may be often just cause to suspect the\ncounsellor: and though there be none, yet seeing counsel unwillingly\nheard, is a needless offence to him that is not willing to hear it,\nand offences tend all to the breach of peace, it is therefore\nagainst the law of nature to obtrude it.\n\n[Sidenote: How to know suddenly what is the law of nature.]\n\n9. A man that shall see these laws of nature set down and inferred\nwith so many words, and so much ado, may think there is yet much\nmore difficulty and subtlety required to acknowledge and do\naccording to the said laws in every sudden occasion, when a man hath\nbut a little time to consider. And while we consider man in most\npassions, as of _anger_, _ambition_, _covetousness_, _vain glory_,\nand the like, that tend to the excluding of natural equality, it is\ntrue. But without these passions, there is an easy rule to know upon\na sudden, whether the action I be to do, be against the law of\nnature, or not. And it is but this: _That a man imagine himself in\nplace of the party with whom he hath to do, and reciprocally him in\nhis_. Which is no more but a changing, as it were, of the scales.\nFor every man\u2019s passion weigheth heavy in his own scale, but not in\nthe scale of his neighbour. And this rule is very well known and\nexpressed in this old dictate, _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne\nfeceris_.\n\n[Sidenote: That the law of nature taketh place after security from\n others to observe the same.]\n\n10. These laws of nature, the sum whereof consisteth in forbidding\nus to be our own judges, and our own carvers, and in commanding us\nto accommodate one another, in case they should be observed by some,\nand not by others, would make the observers but a prey to them that\nshould neglect them, leaving the good both without defence against\nthe wicked, and also with a charge to assist them: which is against\nthe scope of the said laws, that are made only for the protection\nand defence of them that keep them. Reason therefore, and the law of\nnature over and above all these particular laws, doth dictate this\nlaw in general, _That those particular laws be so far observed, as\nthey subject us not to any incommodity, that in our own judgments\nmay arise, by the neglect thereof in those towards whom we observe\nthem_; and consequently requireth no more but the desire and\nconstant intention to endeavour and be ready to observe them, unless\nthere be cause to the contrary in other men\u2019s refusal to observe\nthem towards us. The force therefore of the law of nature, is not\n_in foro externo_, till there be security for men to obey it, but is\nalways _in foro interno_, wherein the action of obedience being\nunsafe, the will and readiness to perform, is taken for the\nperformance.\n\n[Sidenote: The right of nature not to be taken away by custom, nor\n the law of nature abrogated by any act.]\n\n11. Amongst the laws of nature, customs and prescriptions are not\nnumbered. For whatsoever action is against reason, though it be\nreiterated never so often, or that there be never so many\nprecedents thereof, is still against reason, and therefore not a\nlaw of nature, but contrary to it. But consent and covenant may so\nalter the cases, which in the law of nature may be put, by\nchanging the circumstances, that that which was reason before, may\nafterwards be against it; and yet is reason still the law. For\nthough every man be bound to allow equality to another, yet if\nthat other shall see cause to renounce the same, and make himself\ninferior, then, if from thenceforth he consider him as inferior,\nhe breaketh not thereby that law of nature that commandeth to\nallow equality. In sum, _a mans own consent may abridge him of the\nliberty which the law of nature leaveth him, but custom not_; nor\ncan either of them abrogate either these, or or any other law of\nnature.\n\n[Sidenote: Why the dictates of nature are called laws.]\n\n12. And forasmuch as law, to speak properly, is a command, and these\ndictates, as they proceed from nature, are not commands, they are\nnot therefore called laws, in respect of nature, but in respect of\nthe author of nature, God Almighty.\n\n[Sidenote: Whatsoever is against conscience in a man, that is his\n own judge, is against the law of nature.]\n\n13. And seeing the laws of nature concern the conscience, not he\nonly breaketh them that doth any action contrary, but also he whose\naction is conformable to them, in case he think it contrary. For\nthough the action chance to be right, yet in his judgment he\ndespiseth the law.\n\n[Sidenote: Of _malum p\u0153n\u00e6, malum culp\u00e6_; virtue and vice.]\n\n14. Every man by natural passion, calleth that good which pleaseth\nhim for the present, or so far forth as he can foresee; and in like\nmanner, that which displeaseth him, evil. And therefore he that\nforeseeth the whole way to his preservation, which is the end that\nevery one by nature aimeth at, must also call it good, and the\ncontrary evil. And this is that good and evil, which not every man\nin passion calleth so, but all men by reason. And therefore the\nfulfilling of all these laws is good in reason, and the breaking of\nthem evil. And so also the habit, or disposition, or intention to\nfulfil them good; and the neglect of them evil. And from hence\ncometh that distinction of _malum p\u0153n\u00e6_, and _malum culp\u00e6_; for\n_malum p\u0153n\u00e6_ is any pain or molestation of the mind whatsoever; but\n_malum culp\u00e6_ is that action which is contrary to reason and the law\nof nature: as also the habit of doing according to these and other\nlaws of nature, that tend to our preservation, is that we call\n_virtue_; and the habit of doing the contrary, _vice_. As for\nexample, justice is that habit by which we stand to covenants,\ninjustice the contrary vice; equity that habit by which we allow\nequality of nature, arrogancy the contrary vice; gratitude the habit\nwhereby we requite the benefit and trust of others, ingratitude the\ncontrary vice; temperance the habit by which we abstain from all\nthings that tend to our destruction, intemperance the contrary vice;\nprudence, the same with virtue in general. As for the common\nopinion, that virtue consisteth in mediocrity, and vice in extremes,\nI see no ground for it, nor can find any such mediocrity. Courage\nmay be virtue, when the daring is extreme, if the cause be good, and\nextreme fear no vice when the danger is extreme. To give a man more\nthan his due, is no injustice, though it be to give him less: and in\ngifts it is not the sum that maketh liberality, but the reason. And\nso in all other virtues and vices. I know that this doctrine of\nmediocrity is Aristotle\u2019s, but his opinions concerning virtue and\nvice, are no other than those, which were received then, and are\nstill by the generality of men unstudied, and therefore not very\nlikely to be accurate.\n\n[Sidenote: Aptitude to society, fulfilleth the law of nature.]\n\n15. The sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be\nsociable, and formidable to them that will not. And the same is the\nsum of the law of nature: for in being sociable, the law of nature\ntaketh place by way of peace and society; and to be formidable, is\nthe law of nature in war, where to be feared is a protection a man\nhath from his own power: and as the former consisteth in actions of\nequity and justice, the latter consisteth in actions of honour. And\nequity, justice, and honour, contain all virtues whatsoever.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n\nA Confirmation out of Holy Scripture of the principal points\n mentioned in the two last Chapters concerning the Law of Nature.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Confirmation out of Scripture, &c.]\n\n1. The laws mentioned in the former chapters, as they are called the\nlaws of nature, for that they are the dictates of natural reason,\nand also moral laws, because they concern the manners and\nconversation of men, one towards another; so are they also divine\nlaws in respect of the author thereof, God Almighty; and ought\ntherefore to agree, or at least, not to be repugnant to the word of\nGod revealed in Holy Scripture. In this chapter therefore, I shall\nproduce such places of Scripture, as appear to be most consonant to\nthe said laws.\n\n2. And first, the word of God seemeth to place the divine law in\nreason, by all such texts as ascribe the same to the heart and\nunderstanding; as Psalm xl. 8: _Thy law is in my heart_. Heb. viii.\n10: _After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my laws in their\nmind_: and Heb. x. 16, the same. Psalm xxxvii. 31, speaking of the\nrighteous man, he saith, _The law of God is in his heart_. Psalm\nxix. 7, 8: _The law of God is perfect, converting the soul. It\ngiveth wisdom to the simple, and, light unto the eyes_. Jer. xxxi.\n33: _I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their\nhearts_. And (John i.) the lawgiver himself, God Almighty, is called\nby the name of \u039b\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, which is also called (verse 4) _The light of\nmen_; and (verse 9) _The light which lighteth every man, which\ncometh into the world_. All which are descriptions of natural\nreason.\n\n3. And that the law divine, for so much as is moral, are those\nprecepts which tend to peace, seemeth to be much confirmed by such\nplaces of Scripture as these: Rom. iii. 17, righteousness which is\nthe fulfilling of the law, is called _The way of peace_. And Psalm\nlxxxv. 10: _Righteousness and peace shall kiss each other_. And\nMatth. v. 9: _Blessed are the peace-makers_. And Heb. vii. 2,\n_Melchisedec king of Salem_ is interpreted _king of righteousness_,\nand _king of peace_. And (verse 21) our Saviour Christ is said to be\n_a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec_: out of which may\nbe inferred, that the doctrine of our Saviour Christ annexeth the\nfulfilling of the law to peace.\n\n4. That the law of nature is unalterable, is intimated by this, that\nthe priesthood of Melchisedec is everlasting; and by the words of\nour Saviour, (Matth. v. 18): _Heaven and earth shall pass away, but\none jot or tittle of the law shall not pass till all things be\nfulfilled_.\n\n5. That men ought to stand to their covenants, is taught Psalm xv,\nwhere the question being asked (verse 1), _Lord who shall dwell in\nthy tabernacle_, &c. It is answered (verse 4), _He that sweareth to\nhis own hindrance, and yet changeth not_. And that men ought to be\ngratified, where no covenant passeth, Deut. xxv. 4: _Thou shalt not\nmuzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn_, which St. Paul (1 Cor.\nix. 9) interpreteth not of oxen but of men.\n\n6. That men content themselves with equality, as it is the\nfoundation of natural law, so also is it of the second table, of the\ndivine law, Matth. xxii. 39, 40: _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as\nthyself. On these two laws depend the whole law and the prophets_;\nwhich is not so to be understood, as that a man should study so much\nhis neighbour\u2019s profit as his own, or that he should divide his\ngoods amongst his neighbours; but that he should esteem his\nneighbour worthy all rights and privileges that himself enjoyeth;\nand attribute unto him, whatsoever he looketh should be attributed\nunto himself: which is no more, but that he should be humble, meek,\nand content with equality.\n\n7. And that in distributing of right amongst equals, that\ndistribution is to be made according to the proportions of\nthe numbers, which is the giving of _\u00e6qualia \u00e6qualibus, et\nproportionalia proportionalibus_; we have Numb. xxvi. 53, 54, the\ncommandment of God to Moses: _Thou shalt divide the land according\nto the number of names; to many thou shalt give more, to few thou\nshalt give less, to every one according to his number_. That\ndecision by lot is a means of peace, Prov. xviii. 18: _The lot\ncauseth contention to cease, and maketh partition among the mighty_.\n\n8. That the accommodation and forgiveness of one another, which have\nbefore been put for laws of nature, are also law divine, there is no\nquestion. For they are the essence of charity, which is the scope of\nthe whole law. That we ought not to reproach, or reprehend one\nanother, is the doctrine of our Saviour, Matth. vii. 1: _Judge not,\nthat ye be not judged_: (verse 3): _Why seest thou the mote that is\nin thy brother\u2019s eye, and seest not the beam that is in thine own\neye?_ Also the law that forbiddeth us to press our counsel upon\nothers further than they admit, is a divine law. For after our\ncharity and desire to rectify one another is rejected, to press it\nfurther, is to reprehend him, and condemn him, which is forbidden in\nthe text last recited; as also Rom. xiv. 12, 13: _Every one of us\nshall give account of himself to God. Let us not therefore judge one\nanother any more, but use your judgment rather in this, that no man\nput an occasion to fall, or a stumbling block before his brother._\n\n9. Further, the rule of men concerning the law of nature, _Quod tibi\nfieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_, is confirmed by the like, Matth.\nvii. 12: _Whatsoever therefore you would have men do unto you, that\ndo you unto them: for this is the law and the prophets_. And Rom.\nii. 1: _In that thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself_, &c.\n\n10. It is also manifest by the Scriptures, that these laws concern\nonly the tribunal of our conscience; and that the actions contrary\nto them, shall be no further punished by God Almighty, than as they\nproceed from negligence, or contempt. And first, that these laws are\nmade to the conscience, appeareth, Matth. v. 20: _For I say unto\nyou, except your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the\nScribes and Pharisees, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of\nheaven._ Now the Pharisees were the most exact amongst the Jews in\nthe external performance; they therefore must want the sincerity of\nconscience; else could not our Saviour have required a greater\nrighteousness than theirs. For the same reason our Saviour Christ\nsaith (Luke, xviii. 14): _The publican departed from the temple\njustified, rather than the Pharisee_. And Christ saith, (Matth. xi.\n30): _My yoke is easy, and my burthen light_; which proceedeth from\nthis, that Christ required no more than our best endeavour. And Rom.\nxiv. 23: _He that doubteth, is condemned, if he eat_. And in\ninnumerable places both in the Old and New Testament, God Almighty\ndeclareth, that he taketh the will for the deed, both in good and\nevil actions. By all which it plainly appears, that the divine law\nis dictated to the conscience. On the other side it is no less\nplain, that how many and heinous actions soever a man commit through\ninfirmity, he shall nevertheless, whensoever he shall condemn the\nsame in his own conscience, be freed from the punishments that to\nsuch actions otherwise belong. For, _At what time soever a sinner\ndoth repent him of his sins from the bottom of his heart, I will put\nall his iniquities out of my remembrance, saith the Lord_.\n\n11. Concerning revenge, which by the law of nature ought not to aim,\nas I have said chapter III. section 10, at present delight, but\nfuture profit, there is some difficulty made, as if the same\naccorded not with the law divine, by such as object the continuance\nof punishment after the day of judgment, when there shall be no\nplace, neither for amendment, nor for example. This objection had\nbeen of some force, if such punishment had been ordained after all\nsins were past; but considering the punishment was instituted before\nsin, it serveth to the benefit of mankind, because it keepeth men in\npeaceable and virtuous conversation by the terror. And therefore\nsuch revenge was directed to the future only.\n\n12. Finally, there is no law of natural reason, that can be against\nthe law divine: for God Almighty hath given reason to a man to be a\nlight unto him. And I hope it is no impiety to think, that God\nAlmighty will require a strict account thereof, at the day of\njudgment, as of the instructions which we were to follow in our\nperegrination here, notwithstanding the opposition and affronts of\nsupernaturalists now a-days, to rational and moral conversation.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n\n1. That men, notwithstanding these laws, are still in the state of\n war, till they have security one against another. 2. The law of\n nature in war, is nothing but honour. 3. No security without the\n concord of many. 4. That concord of many cannot be maintained\n without power to keep them all in awe. 5. The cause why concord\n remaineth in a multitude of some irrational creatures, and not\n of men. 6. That union is necessary for the maintaining of\n concord. 7. How union is made. 8. Body politic defined. 9.\n Corporation defined. 10. Sovereign and subject defined. 11. Two\n sorts of bodies politic, patrimonial and commonwealth.\n\n\n[Sidenote: That men, notwithstanding these laws, are still in the\n state of war, till they have security one against\n another.]\n\n1. In chapter XII. section 6, of the _Treatise of Human Nature_, it\nhath been shewed, that the opinions men have of the rewards and\npunishments which are to follow their actions, are the causes that\nmake and govern the will to those actions. In this estate of man\ntherefore, wherein all men are equal, and every man allowed to be\nhis own judge, the fears they have one of another are equal, and\nevery man\u2019s hopes consist in his own sleight and strength: and\nconsequently when any man by his natural passion, is provoked to\nbreak these laws of nature, there is no security in any other man of\nhis own defence but _anticipation_. And for this cause, every man\u2019s\nright, howsoever he be inclined to peace, of doing whatsoever\nseemeth good in his own eyes, remaineth with him still, as the\nnecessary means of his preservation. And therefore till there be\nsecurity amongst men for the keeping of the law of nature one\ntowards another, men are still in the estate of war, and nothing is\nunlawful to any man that tendeth to his own safety or commodity: and\nthis safety and commodity consisteth in the mutual aid and help of\none another, whereby also followeth the mutual fear of one another.\n\n[Sidenote: The law of nature in war, is nothing but honour.]\n\n2. It is a proverbial saying, _inter arma silent leges_. There is a\nlittle therefore to be said concerning the laws that men are to\nobserve one towards another in time of war, wherein every man\u2019s\nbeing and well-being is the rule of his actions. Yet thus much the\nlaw of nature commandeth in war, that men satiate not the cruelty of\ntheir present passions, whereby in their own conscience they foresee\nno benefit to come. For that betrayeth not a necessity, but a\ndisposition of the mind to war, which is against the law of nature.\nAnd in old time we read, that rapine was a trade of life, wherein\nnevertheless many of them that used it, did not only spare the lives\nof those they invaded, but left them also such things, as were\nnecessary to preserve that life which they had given them; as namely\ntheir oxen and instruments for tillage, though they carried away all\ntheir other cattle and substance. And as the rapine itself was\nwarranted in the law of nature, by the want of security otherwise to\nmaintain themselves, so the exercise of cruelty was forbidden by the\nsame law of nature, unless fear suggested anything to the contrary.\nFor nothing but fear can justify the taking away of another\u2019s life.\nAnd because fear can hardly be made manifest, but by some action\ndishonourable, that bewrayeth the conscience of one\u2019s own weakness,\nall men, in whom the passion of courage or magnanimity hath been\npredominant, have abstained from cruelty; insomuch, that though\nthere be in war no law, the breach whereof is injury, yet there are\nin war those laws, the breach whereof is dishonour. In one word,\ntherefore, the only law of actions in war, is _honour_; and the\nright of war, _providence_.\n\n[Sidenote: No security without the concord of many.]\n\n3. And seeing natural aid is necessary for defence, as mutual fear\nis necessary for peace, we are to consider how great aids are\nrequired for such defence, and for the causing of such mutual fear,\nas men may not easily adventure on one another. And first, it is\nevident, that the mutual aid of two or three men is of very little\nsecurity. For the odds on the other side, of a man or two, giveth\nsufficient encouragement to an assault. And therefore before men\nhave sufficient security in the help of one another, their number\nmust be so great, that the odds of a few which the enemy may have,\nbe no certain and sensible advantage.\n\n[Sidenote: That concord of many cannot be maintained without power\n to keep them all in awe.]\n\n4. And supposing how great a number soever of men assembled together\nfor their mutual defence, yet shall not the effect follow, unless\nthey all direct their actions to one and the same end; which\ndirection to one and the same end is that which, chap. XII. sect. 7,\nis called _consent_. This _consent_, or concord, amongst so many\nmen, though it may be made by the fear of a present invader, or by\nthe hope of a present conquest, or booty, and endure as long as that\naction endureth, nevertheless, by the diversity of judgments and\npassions in so many men contending naturally for honour and\nadvantage one above another, it is impossible, not only that their\nconsent to aid each other against an enemy, but also that the peace\nshould last between themselves, without some mutual and common fear\nto rule them.\n\n[Sidenote: The cause why concord remaineth in a multitude of some\n irrational creatures, and not of men.]\n\n5. But contrary hereunto may be objected, the experience we have of\ncertain living creatures irrational, that nevertheless continually\nlive in such good order and government for their common benefit, and\nare so free from sedition and war amongst themselves, that for\npeace, profit, and defence, nothing more can be imaginable. And the\nexperience we have in this, is in that little creature the bee,\nwhich is therefore reckoned amongst _animalia politica_. Why\ntherefore may not men, that foresee the benefit of concord,\ncontinually maintain the same without compulsion, as well as they?\nTo which I answer, that amongst other living creatures, there is no\nquestion of precedence in their own species, nor strife about\nhonour, or acknowledgment of one another\u2019s wisdom, as there is\namongst men, from whence arise envy and hatred of one towards\nanother, and from thence sedition and war. Secondly, those living\ncreatures aim every one at peace and food common to them all; men\naim at dominion, superiority, and private wealth, which are distinct\nin every man, and breed contention. Thirdly, those living creatures\nthat are without reason, have not learning enough to espy, or to\nthink they espy, any defect in the government; and therefore are\ncontented therewith. But in a multitude of men, there are always\nsome that think themselves wiser than the rest, and strive to alter\nwhat they think amiss, and divers of them strive to alter divers\nways, and that causeth war. Fourthly, they want speech, and are\ntherefore unable to instigate one another to faction, which men want\nnot. Fifthly, they have no conception of right and wrong, but only\nof pleasure and pain, and therefore also no censure of one another,\nnor of their commander, as long as they are themselves at ease;\nwhereas men that make themselves judges of right and wrong, are then\nleast at quiet, when they are most at ease. Lastly, natural concord,\nsuch as is amongst those creatures, is the work of God by the way of\nnature; but concord amongst men is artificial, and by way of\ncovenant. And therefore no wonder, if such irrational creatures as\ngovern themselves in multitude, do it much more firmly than mankind,\nthat do it by arbitrary institution.\n\n[Sidenote: That union is necessary for the maintaining of concord.]\n\n6. It remaineth therefore still, that consent, by which I understand\nthe concurrence of many men\u2019s wills to one action, is not sufficient\nsecurity for their common peace, without the erection of some common\npower, by the fear whereof they may be compelled both to keep the\npeace amongst themselves, and to join their strengths together,\nagainst a common enemy. And that this may be done, there is no way\nimaginable, but only union, which is defined, chapter XII. section\n8, to be the involving, or including the wills of many in the will\nof one man, or in the will of the greatest part of any one number of\nmen, that is to say, in the will of one man, or of one _council_.\nFor a council is nothing else but an _assembly_ of men deliberating\nconcerning something common to them all.\n\n[Sidenote: How union is made.]\n\n7. The making of union consisteth in this, that every man by\ncovenant oblige himself to some one and the same man, or to some one\nand the same council, by them all named and determined, to do those\nactions, which the said man or council shall command them to do, and\nto do no action, which he or they shall forbid, or command them not\nto do. And further, in case it be a council, whose commands they\ncovenant to obey, that then also they covenant, that every man shall\nhold that for the command of the whole council, which is the command\nof the greater part of those men, whereof such council consisteth.\nAnd though the will of man being not voluntary, but the beginning of\nvoluntary actions, is not subject to deliberation and covenant; yet\nwhen a man covenanteth to subject his will to the command of\nanother, he obligeth himself to this, that he resign his strength\nand means to him, whom he covenanteth to obey. And hereby he that is\nto command, may by the use of all their means and strength, be able\nby the terror thereof, to frame the will of them all to unity and\nconcord, amongst themselves.\n\n[Sidenote: Body politic defined.]\n\n8. This union so made, is that which men call now a-days, a _body\npolitic_, or civil society; and the Greeks call it \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2, that is to\nsay, a city, which may be defined to be a multitude of men, united\nas one person, by a common power, for their common peace, defence,\nand benefit.\n\n[Sidenote: Corporation defined.]\n\n9. And as this union into a city or body politic, is instituted with\ncommon power over all the particular persons, or members thereof, to\nthe common good of them all; so also may there be amongst a\nmultitude of those members instituted, a subordinate union of\ncertain men, for certain common actions to be done by those men for\nsome common benefit of theirs, or of the whole city; as for\nsubordinate government, for counsel, for trade, and the like. And\nthese subordinate bodies politic are usually called _corporations_;\nand their power such over the particulars of their own society, as\nthe whole city, whereof they are members, have allowed them.\n\n[Sidenote: Sovereign and subject defined.]\n\n10. In all cities, or bodies politic not subordinate, but\nindependent, that one man, or one council, to whom the particular\nmembers have given that common power, is called their _sovereign_,\nand his power, the sovereign power; which consisteth in the power\nand the strength, that every of the members have transferrred to him\nfrom themselves by covenant. And because it is impossible for any\nman really to transfer his own strength to another, or for that\nother to receive it; it is to be understood, that to transfer a\nman\u2019s power and strength, is no more but to lay by, or relinquish\nhis own right of resisting him to whom he so transferreth it. And\nevery member of the body politic, is called a _subject_, to wit, to\nthe _sovereign_.\n\n[Sidenote: Two sorts of bodies politic, patrimonial and\n commonwealth.]\n\n11. The cause in general, which moveth a man to become subject to\nanother, is (as I have said already) the fear of not otherwise\npreserving himself. And a man may subject himself to him that\ninvadeth, or may invade him, for fear of him; or men may join\namongst themselves, to subject themselves to such as they shall\nagree upon for fear of others. And when many men subject themselves\nthe former way, there ariseth thence a body politic, as it were\nnaturally. From whence proceedeth _dominion_, _paternal_ and\n_despotic_. And when they subject themselves the other way, by\nmutual agreement amongst many, the body politic they make, is for\nthe most part, called a _commonwealth_, in distinction from the\nformer, though the name be the general name for them both. And I\nshall speak in the first place of commonwealths, and afterwards of\nbodies politic, patrimonial, and despotical.\n\n\n\n\n THE SECOND PART.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n\n1. Introduction. 2. A multitude before their union, &c. 3.\n Express consent of every particular, &c. 4. Democratical,\n aristocratical, and monarchical union may be instituted for\n ever, or, &c. 5. Without security no private right relinquished.\n 6. Covenants of government, without power of coercion, are no\n security. 7. Power coercive, &c. 8. The sword of war, &c. 9.\n Decision in all debates, &c. annexed to the sword. 10. Laws\n civil, &c. 11. Appointment of magistrates, &c. 12. Sovereign\n power includeth impunity. 13. A supposed commonwealth, where\n laws are made first, and the commonwealth after. 14. The same\n refelled. 15. Mixed forms of government supposed in sovereignty.\n 16. That refelled. 17. Mixed government, &c. 18. Reason and\n experience to prove absolute sovereignty somewhere in all\n commonwealths. 19. Some principal, &c. marks of sovereignty.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Introduction.]\n\n1. That _Treatise of Human Nature_, which was formerly printed, hath\nbeen wholly spent in the consideration of the natural power, and the\nnatural estate of man, namely, of his cognition and passions in the\nfirst eleven chapters, and how from thence proceed his actions; in\nthe twelfth, how men know one another\u2019s minds: in the last, in what\nestate men\u2019s passions set them. In the first, second, third, fourth,\nand fifth chapters of the former Part of this Treatise is showed,\nwhat estate they are directed unto by the dictates of reason, that\nis to say, what be the principal articles of the law of nature. And\nlastly, how a multitude of persons natural, are united by covenants\ninto one person civil, or body politic. In this part therefore shall\nbe considered, the nature of a body politic, and the laws thereof,\notherwise called civil laws. And whereas it hath been said in the\nlast chapter, and last section of the former part, that there be two\nways of erecting a body politic; one by arbitrary institution of\nmany men assembled together, which is like a creation out of nothing\nby human wit; the other by compulsion, which is as it were a\ngeneration thereof out of natural force; I shall first speak of such\nerection of a body politic, as proceedeth from the assembly and\nconsent of a multitude.\n\n[Sidenote: A multitude before their union, &c.]\n\n2. Having in this place to consider, a multitude of men about to\nunite themselves into a body politic, for their security, both\nagainst one another, and against common enemies, and that by\ncovenants; the knowledge of what covenants they must needs make,\ndependeth on the knowledge of the persons, and the knowledge of\ntheir end. First, for their persons they are many, and (as yet) not\none; nor can any action done in a multitude of people met together,\nbe attributed to the multitude, or truly called the action of the\nmultitude, unless every man\u2019s hand, and every man\u2019s will, (not so\nmuch as one excepted) have concurred thereto. For multitude, though\nin their persons they run together, yet they concur not always in\ntheir designs. For even at that time when men are in tumult, though\nthey agree a number of them to one mischief, and a number of them to\nanother; yet, in the whole, they are amongst themselves in the state\nof hostility, and not of peace; like the seditious Jews besieged in\nJerusalem, that could join against their enemies, and fight amongst\nthemselves. Whensoever therefore any man saith, that a number of men\nhath done any act, it is to be understood, that every particular man\nin that number hath consented thereunto, and not the greatest part\nonly. Secondly, though thus assembled with intention to unite\nthemselves, they are yet in that estate in which every man hath\nright to everything, and consequently, as hath been said, chapter I.\nsection 10, in an estate of enjoying nothing. And therefore _meum_\nand _tuum_ hath no place amongst them.\n\n[Sidenote: Express consent of every particular, &c.]\n\n3. The first thing therefore they are to do, is expressly every man\nto consent to something, by which they may come near to their ends,\nwhich can be nothing else imaginable, but this, that they allow the\nwills of the major part of their whole number, or the wills of the\nmajor part of some certain number of men by them determined and\nnamed; or lastly, the will of some one man, to involve and be taken\nfor the wills of every man. And this done, they are united, and a\n_body politic_. And if the major part of their whole number be\nsupposed to involve the wills of all the particulars, then are they\nsaid to be a _democracy_, that is to say, a government wherein the\nwhole number, or so many of them as please, being assembled\ntogether, are the sovereign, and every particular man a subject. If\nthe major part of a certain number of men named or distinguished\nfrom the rest, be supposed to involve the wills of every one of the\nparticulars, then are they said to be an _oligarchy_, or\n_aristocracy_, which two words signify the same thing, together with\nthe divers passions of those that use them. For when the men that be\nin that office please, they are called an aristocracy, or otherwise\nan oligarchy, wherein those, the major part of which declare the\nwills of the whole multitude being assembled, are the sovereign, and\nevery man severally a subject. Lastly, if their consent be such,\nthat the will of one man, whom they name, shall stand for the wills\nof them all, then is their government or union called a _monarchy_,\nand that one man a sovereign, and every of the rest a subject.\n\n[Sidenote: Democratical, aristocratical, and monarchical union may\n be instituted for ever.]\n\n4. And those several sorts of unions, governments, and subjections\nof man\u2019s will, may be understood to be made, either absolutely, that\nis to say, for all future time, or for a time limited only. But\nforasmuch as we speak here of a body politic, instituted for the\nperpetual benefit and defence of them that make it; which therefore\nmen desire should last for ever, I will omit to speak of those that\nbe temporary, and consider of those that be for ever.\n\n[Sidenote: Without security no private right relinquished.]\n\n5. The end for which one man giveth up, and relinquisheth to\nanother, or others, the right of protecting and defending himself by\nhis own power, is the security which he expecteth thereby, of\nprotection and defence from those to whom he doth so relinquish it;\nand a man may then account himself in the estate of security, when\nhe can foresee no violence to be done unto him, from which the doer\nmay not be deterred by the power of that sovereign, to whom they\nhave every one subjected themselves: and without that security,\nthere is no reason for a man to deprive himself of his own\nadvantages, and make himself a prey to others. And therefore when\nthere is not such a sovereign power erected, as may afford this\nsecurity, it is to be understood, that every man\u2019s right of doing\nwhatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, remaineth still with him;\nand contrariwise, where any subject hath right by his own judgment\nand discretion, to make use of his force, it is to be understood,\nthat every man hath the like, and consequently, that there is no\ncommonwealth at all established. How far therefore in the making of\na commonwealth, man subjecteth his will to the power of others, must\nappear from the end, namely, security. For whatsoever is necessary\nto be by covenant transferred, for the attaining thereof, so much is\ntransferred, or else every man is in his natural liberty to secure\nhimself.\n\n[Sidenote: Covenants of government without power of coercion, are no\n security.]\n\n6. Covenants agreed upon by every man assembled for the making of a\ncommonwealth, and put in writing without erecting of a power of\ncoercion, are no reasonable security for any of them that so\ncovenant, nor are to be called laws, and leave men still in the\nestate of nature and hostility. For seeing the wills of most men are\ngoverned only by fear, and where there is no power of coercion,\nthere is no fear, the wills of most men will follow their passions\nof covetousness, lust, anger, and the like, to the breaking of those\ncovenants, whereby the rest, also, who otherwise would keep them,\nare set at liberty, and have no law, but from themselves.\n\n[Sidenote: Power coercive, &c.]\n\n7. This power of coercion, as hath been said, chap. II. sect. 3, of\nthe former part, consisteth in the transferring of every man\u2019s right\nof resistance against him, to whom he hath transferred the power of\ncoercion. It followeth therefore, that no man in any commonwealth\nwhatsoever, hath right to resist him, or them, to whom they have\ntransferred this power coercive, or (as men use to call it) the\nsword of justice, supposing the not-resistance possible. For, Part\nI. chapter II. sect. 18, covenants bind but to the utmost of our\nendeavour.\n\n[Sidenote: The sword of war, &c.]\n\n8. And forasmuch as they who are amongst themselves in security, by\nthe means of this sword of justice, that keeps them all in awe, are\nnevertheless in danger of enemies from without, if there be not some\nmeans found, to unite their strengths and natural forces, in the\nresistance of such enemies, their peace amongst themselves is but in\nvain. And therefore it is to be understood as a covenant of every\nmember to contribute their several forces for the defence of the\nwhole, whereby to make one power as sufficient, as is possible for\ntheir defence. Now seeing that every man hath already transferred\nthe use of his strength to him, or them, that have the sword of\njustice, it followeth, that the power of defence, that is to say,\nthe sword of war, be in the same hands wherein is the sword of\njustice; and consequently those two swords are but one, and that\ninseparably and essentially annexed to the sovereign power.\n\n[Sidenote: Decision in all debates, &c. annexed to the sword.]\n\n9. Moreover, seeing to have the right of the sword, is nothing else\nbut to have the use thereof depending only on the judgment and\ndiscretion of him or them that have it, it followeth, that the power\nof indenture in all controversies, wherein the sword of justice is\nto be used; and in all deliberations concerning war, wherein the use\nof that sword is required, the right of resolving and determining\nwhat is to be done, belong to the same sovereign.\n\n[Sidenote: Laws civil, &c.]\n\n10. Further, considering it is no less, but much more necessary to\nprevent violence and rapine, than to punish the same when it is\ncommitted, and all violence proceedeth from controversies that arise\nbetween men concerning _meum_ and _tuum_, right and wrong, good and\nbad, and the like, which men use every one to measure by their own\njudgments, it belongeth also to the judgment of the same sovereign\npower, to set forth and make known the common measure by which every\nman is to know what is his, and what another\u2019s; what is good, and\nwhat bad, and what he ought to do, and what not, and to command the\nsame to be observed. And these measures of the actions of the\nsubjects are those, which men call _laws politic_, or civil: the\nmaking whereof, must of right belong to him that hath the power of\nthe sword, by which men are compelled to observe them; for otherwise\nthey should be made in vain.\n\n[Sidenote: Appointment of magistrates, &c.]\n\n11. Furthermore, seeing it is impossible that any one man that hath\nsuch sovereign power, can be able, in person, to hear and determine\nall controversies, to be present at all deliberations concerning\ncommon good, and to execute and perform all those common actions\nthat belong thereunto, whereby there will be necessity of\nmagistrates and ministers of public affairs; it is consequent, that\nthe appointment, nomination, and limitation of the same be\nunderstood, as an inseparable part of the same sovereignty, to which\nthe sum of all judicature, and execution, hath been already annexed.\n\n[Sidenote: Sovereign power includeth impunity.]\n\n12. And forasmuch, as the right to use the forces of every\nparticular member, is transferred from themselves, to their\nsovereign, a man will easily fall upon this conclusion of himself,\nthat to sovereign power, whatsoever it doth, there belongeth\nimpunity.\n\n[Sidenote: A supposed commonwealth where laws are made first, and\n the commonwealth after.]\n\n13. The sum of these rights of sovereignty; namely, the absolute use\nof the sword in peace and war, the making and abrogating of laws,\n_supreme judicature, and decision_, in all debates judicial and\ndeliberative, the nomination of all magistrates and ministers, with\nother rights contained in the same, make the sovereign power no less\nabsolute in the commonwealth, than before commonwealth every man was\nabsolute in himself, to do, or not to do, what he thought good;\nwhich men, that have not had the experience of that miserable\nestate, to which men are reduced by long war, think so hard a\ncondition, that they cannot easily acknowledge such covenants, and\nsubjection on their parts, as are here set down, to have been ever\nnecessary to their peace. And therefore some have imagined, that a\ncommonwealth may be constituted in such manner, as the sovereign\npower may be so limited, and moderated, as they shall think fit\nthemselves. For example: they suppose a multitude of men to have\nagreed upon certain articles, which they presently call laws,\ndeclaring how they will be governed, and that done, to agree further\nupon some man, or number of men, to see the same articles performed,\nand put in execution; and to enable him, or them, thereunto, they\nallot unto them a provision limited, as of certain lands, taxes,\npenalties, and the like, than which, if mispent, they shall have no\nmore, without a new consent of the same men that allowed the former.\nAnd thus they think they have made a commonwealth, in which it is\nunlawful for any private man to make use of his own sword for his\nsecurity; wherein they deceive themselves.\n\n[Sidenote: The same refelled.]\n\n14. For first, if to the revenue, it did necessarily follow, that\nthere might be forces raised and procured at the will of him that\nhath such revenue; yet since the revenue is limited, so must also\nthe forces: but limited forces against the power of an enemy, which\nwe cannot limit, are unsufficient. Whensoever therefore there\nhappeneth an invasion greater than those forces are able to resist,\nand there be no other right to levy more, then is every man, by\nnecessity of nature, allowed to make the best provision he can for\nhimself; and thus is the private sword, and the estate of war again\nreduced. But seeing revenue, without the right of commanding men, is\nof no use, neither in peace, nor war, it is necessary to be\nsupposed, that he that hath the administration of those articles,\nwhich are in the former section supposed, must have also right to\nmake use of the strengths of particular men. And what reason soever\ngiveth him that right over any one, giveth him the same over all.\nAnd then is his right absolute. For he that hath right to all their\nforces, hath right to dispose of the same. Again, supposing those\nlimited forces and revenue, either by the necessary, or negligent\nuse of them, to fail, and that for a supply, the same multitude be\nagain to be assembled, who shall have power to assemble them, that\nis to compel them to come together? If he that demandeth the supply\nhath that right, to wit, the right to compel them all, then is his\nsovereignty absolute; if not, then is every particular man at\nliberty to come or not; to frame a new commonwealth, or not, and so\nthe right of the private sword returneth. But suppose them\nwillingly, and of their own accord, assembled to consider of this\nsupply, if now it be still in their choice, whether they shall give\nit, or not, it is also in their choice, whether the commonwealth\nshall stand or not. And therefore there lieth not upon any of them\nany civil obligation that may hinder them from using force, in case\nthey think it tend to their defence. This device therefore of them\nthat will make civil laws first, and then a civil body afterwards,\n(as if policy made a body politic, and not a body politic made\npolicy) is of no effect.\n\n[Sidenote: Mixed forms of government supposed in sovereignty.]\n\n15. Others, to avoid the hard condition, as they take it, of\nabsolute subjection, which, in hatred thereto, they also call\nslavery, have devised a government, as they think, mixed of the\nthree sorts of sovereignty. As for example: they suppose the power\nof making laws, given to some great assembly democratical, the power\nof judicature to some other assembly, and the administration of the\nlaws to a third, or to some one man; and this policy they call mixed\nmonarchy, or mixed aristocracy, or mixed democracy, according as any\nof these three sorts do most visibly predominate. And in this estate\nof government, they think the use of the private sword excluded.\n\n[Sidenote: That refelled.]\n\n16. And supposing it were so, how were this condition, which they\ncall _slavery_, eased thereby. For in this estate they would have no\nman allowed, either to be his own judge, or own carver, or to make\nany laws unto himself; and as long as these three agree, they are as\nabsolutely subject to them, as is a child to the father, or a slave\nto the master, in the state of nature. The ease therefore of this\nsubjection, must consist in the disagreement of those amongst whom\nthey have distributed the rights of sovereign power. But the same\ndisagreement is war. The division therefore of the sovereignty,\neither worketh no effect to the taking away of simple subjection, or\nintroduceth war, wherein the private sword hath place again. But the\ntruth is, as hath been already showed in the seventh, eighth, ninth,\ntenth, eleventh, and twelfth precedent sections, the sovereignty is\nindivisible. And that seeming mixture of several kinds of\ngovernment, is not mixture of the things themselves, but confusion\nin our understandings, that cannot find out readily to whom we have\nsubjected ourselves.\n\n[Sidenote: Mixed government, &c.]\n\n17. But though the sovereignty be not mixed, but be always either\nsimple democracy, or simple aristocracy, or pure monarchy,\nnevertheless in the administration thereof, all those sorts of\ngovernment may have place subordinate. For suppose the sovereign\npower be democracy, as it was sometimes in Rome, yet at the same\ntime they may have a council aristocratical, such as was the senate;\nand at the same time they may have a subordinate monarch, such as\nwas their dictator, who had, for a time, the exercise of the whole\nsovereignty, and such as are all generals in war. So also in\nmonarchy there may be a council aristocratical of men, chosen by the\nmonarch; or democratical of men, chosen by the consent, the monarch\npermitting, of all the particular men of the commonwealth. And this\nmixture is it that imposeth, as if it were the mixture of\nsovereignty. As if a man should think, because the great council of\nVenice doth nothing ordinarily but choose magistrates, ministers of\nstate, captains, and governors of towns, ambassadors, counsellors,\nand the like, that therefore their part of the sovereignty is only\nchoosing of magistrates; and that the making of war, and peace, and\nlaws, were not theirs, but the part of such counsellors as they\nappointed thereto: whereas it is the part of _these_ to do it but\nsubordinately, the supreme authority thereof being in the great\ncouncil that choose them.\n\n[Sidenote: Reason and experience to prove absolute sovereignty\n somewhere in all commonwealths.]\n\n18. And as reason teacheth us, that a man, considered out of\nsubjection to laws, and out of all covenants obligatory to others,\nis free to do and undo, and deliberate as long as he listeth, every\nmember being obedient to the will of the whole man, that liberty\nbeing nothing else but his natural power, without which he is no\nbetter than an inanimate creature, not able to help himself; so also\nit teacheth us, that a body politic, of what kind soever, not\nsubject to another, nor obliged by covenants, ought to be free, and\nin all actions to be assisted by the members, every one in their\nplace, or at least, not resisted by them. For otherwise, the power\nof a body politic, the essence whereof is the not-resistance of the\nmembers, is none, nor a body politic of any benefit. And the same is\nconfirmed by the use of all nations and commonwealths, wherein that\nman or council, which is virtually the whole, hath any absolute\npower over every particular member; or what nation or commonwealth\nis there, that hath not power and right to constitute a general in\ntheir wars? But the power of a general is absolute; and consequently\nthere was absolute power in the commonwealth, from whom it was\nderived. For no person, natural or civil, can transfer unto another\nmore power than himself hath.\n\n[Sidenote: Some principal, &c. marks of sovereignty.]\n\n19. In every commonwealth, where particular men are deprived of\ntheir right to protect themselves, there resideth an absolute\nsovereignty, as I have already showed. But in what man, or in what\nassembly of men the same is placed, is not so manifest, as not to\nneed some marks, whereby it may be discerned. And first, it is an\ninfallible mark of absolute sovereignty in a man, or in an assembly\nof men, if there be no right in any other person, natural or civil,\nto punish that man, or to dissolve that assembly. For he that cannot\nof right be punished, cannot of right be resisted; and he that\ncannot of right be resisted, hath coercive power over all the rest,\nand thereby can frame and govern their actions at his pleasure,\nwhich is absolute sovereignty. Contrariwise, he that in a\ncommonwealth is punishable by any, or that assembly that is\ndissolvable, is not sovereign. For a greater power is always\nrequired to punish and dissolve, than theirs who are punished or\ndissolved; and that power cannot be called sovereign, than which\nthere is a greater. Secondly, that man or assembly, that by their\nown right not derived from the present right of any other, may make\nlaws, or abrogate them at his or their pleasure, have the\nsovereignty absolute. For seeing the laws they make, are supposed to\nbe made by right, the members of the commonwealth, to whom they are\nmade, are obliged to obey them, and consequently not resist the\nexecution of them; which not-resistance, maketh the power absolute\nof him that ordaineth them. It is likewise a mark of this\nsovereignty, to have the right original of appointing magistrates,\njudges, counsellors, and ministers of state. For without that power,\nno act of sovereignty, or government, can be performed. Lastly, and\ngenerally, whosoever by his own authority independent, can do any\nact, which another of the same commonwealth may not, must needs be\nunderstood to have the sovereign power. For by nature men have equal\nright. This inequality therefore must proceed from the power of the\ncommonwealth. He therefore that doth any act lawfully by his own\nauthority, which another may not, doth it by the power of the\ncommonwealth in himself, which is absolute sovereignty.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n\n1. Democracy precedeth all other, &c. 2.. The sovereign people\n covenanteth not with the subjects. 3. The sovereign, &c. cannot,\n &c. do injury, &c. 4. The faults of the sovereign people, &c. 5.\n Democracy, &c. an aristocracy of orators. 6. Aristocracy how\n made. 7. The body of the _optimates_ not properly said to injure\n the subjects. 8. The election of the _optimates_, &c. 9. An\n elective king, &c. 10. A conditional king, &c. 11. The word\n people equivocal. 12. Obedience discharged by release, &c. 13.\n How such releases are to be understood. 14. Obedience discharged\n by exile: 15. By conquest: 16. By ignorance of the right of\n succession.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Democracy precedeth all other, &c.]\n\n1. Having spoken in general concerning instituted policy in the\nformer chapter, I come in this, to speak of the sorts thereof in\nspecial, how every of them is instituted. The first in order of time\nof these three sorts, is democracy; and it must be so of necessity,\nbecause an aristocracy and a monarchy, require nomination of persons\nagreed upon, which agreement in a great multitude of men, must\nconsist in the consent of the major part; and where the votes of the\nmajor part involve the votes of the rest, there is actually a\ndemocracy.\n\n[Sidenote: The sovereign people covenanteth not with the subjects.]\n\n2. In the making of a democracy, there passeth no covenant between\nthe sovereign, and any subject. For while the democracy is a making,\nthere is no sovereign with whom to contract. For it cannot be\nimagined, that the multitude should contract with itself, or with\nany one man, or number of men, parcel of itself, to make itself\nsovereign; nor that a multitude, considered as one aggregate, can\ngive itself anything which before it had not. Seeing then that\nsovereignty democratical is not conferred by the covenant of any\nmultitude, which supposeth union and sovereignty already made, it\nresteth, that the same be conferred by the particular covenants of\nevery several man; that is to say, every man with every man, for and\nin consideration of the benefit of his own peace and defence,\ncovenanteth to stand to and obey whatsoever the major part of their\nwhole number, or the major part of such a number of them, as shall\nbe pleased to assemble at a certain time and place, shall determine\nand command. And this is that which giveth being to a democracy,\nwherein the sovereign assembly was called of the Greeks, by the name\nof _Demus_, that is, the people, from whence cometh democracy. So\nthat, where to the supreme and independent court, every man may come\nthat will, and give his vote, there the sovereign is called the\npeople.\n\n[Sidenote: The sovereign, &c. cannot, &c. do injury, &c.]\n\n3. Out of this that hath been said, may readily be drawn, that\nwhatsoever the people doth to any one particular member or subject\nof the commonwealth, the same by him ought not to be styled injury.\nFor first, injury, by the definition, Part I. chap. III. sect. 2, is\nbreach of covenant; but covenants, as hath been said in the\nprecedent section, there passed none from the people to any private\nman; and consequently it, to wit, the people, can do him no injury.\nSecondly, how unjust soever the action be, that this sovereign\n_demus_ shall do, is done by the will of every particular man\nsubject to him, who are therefore guilty of the same. If therefore\nthey style it _injury_, they but accuse themselves. And it is\nagainst reason for the same man, both to do and complain; implying\nthis contradiction, that whereas he first ratified the people\u2019s acts\nin general, he now disalloweth the same of them in particular. It is\ntherefore said truly, _volenti non fit injuria_. Nevertheless\nnothing doth hinder, but that divers actions done by the people, may\nbe unjust before God Almighty, as breaches of the laws of nature.\n\n[Sidenote: The faults of the sovereign people, &c.]\n\n4. And when it happeneth, that the people by plurality of voices,\ndecree or command anything contrary to the law of God or nature,\nthough the decree and command be the act of every man, not only\npresent in the assembly, but also absent from it; yet is not the\ninjustice of the decree, the injustice of every particular man, but\nonly of those men, by whose express suffrages, the decree or command\nwas passed. For a body politic, as it is a fictitious body, so are\nthe faculties and will thereof fictitious also. But to make a\nparticular man unjust, which consisteth of a body and soul natural,\nthere is required a natural and very will.\n\n[Sidenote: Democracy, &c. an aristocracy of orators.]\n\n5. In all democracies, though the right of sovereignty be in the\nassembly, which is virtually the whole body; yet the use thereof is\nalways in one, or a few particular men. For in such great\nassemblies, as those must be, whereinto every man may enter at his\npleasure, there is no means any ways to deliberate and give counsel\nwhat to do, but by long and set orations, whereby to every man there\nis more or less hope given, to incline and sway the assembly to\ntheir own ends. In a multitude of speakers therefore, where always\neither one is eminent alone, or a few being equal amongst\nthemselves, are eminent above the rest, that one or few must of\nnecessity sway the whole. Insomuch, that a democracy, in effect, is\nno more than an aristocracy of orators, interrupted sometimes with\nthe temporary monarchy of one orator.\n\n[Sidenote: Aristocracy how made.]\n\n6. And seeing a democracy is by institution, the beginning both of\naristocracy and monarchy, we are to consider next, how aristocracy\nis derived from it. When the particular members of the commonwealth\ngrowing weary of attendance at public courts, as dwelling far off,\nor being attentive to their private businesses, and withal,\ndispleased with the government of the people, assemble themselves to\nmake an aristocracy, there is no more required to the making thereof\nbut putting to the question one by one, the names of such men as it\nshall consist of, and assenting to their election; and by plurality\nof vote, to transfer that power, which before the people had, to the\nnumber of men so named and chosen.\n\n[Sidenote: The body of the _optimates_ not properly said to injure\n the subjects.]\n\n7. And from this manner of erecting an aristocracy, it is manifest,\nthat the few, or _optimates_, have entered into no covenant with any\nof the particular members of the commonwealth, whereof they are\nsovereign; and consequently cannot do any thing to any private man,\nthat can be called _injury_ to him, howsoever their act be wicked\nbefore Almighty God, according to that which hath been said before,\nsection 3. Further, it is impossible, that the people, as one body\npolitic, should covenant with the aristocracy or _optimates_, on\nwhom they intend to transfer their sovereignty. For no sooner is the\naristocracy erected, but the democracy is annihilated, and the\ncovenants made unto them void.\n\n[Sidenote: The election of the _optimates_, &c.]\n\n8. In all aristocracies, the admission of such, as are from time to\ntime to have vote in the sovereign assembly, dependeth on the will\nand decree of the present _optimates_. For they being the sovereign,\nhave the nomination, by the eleventh section of the former chapter,\nof all magistrates, ministers, and counsellors of state whatsoever,\nand may therefore choose either to make them elective, or\nhereditary, at their pleasure.\n\n[Sidenote: An elective king, &c.]\n\n9. Out of the same democracy, the institution of a political monarch\nproceedeth in the same manner, as did the institution of the\naristocracy, to wit, by a decree of the sovereign people, to pass\nthe sovereignty to one man named and approved by plurality of\nsuffrage. And if this sovereignty be truly and indeed transferred,\nthe estate or commonwealth is an absolute monarchy, wherein the\nmonarch is at liberty, to dispose as well of the succession, as of\nthe possession, and not an elective kingdom. For suppose a decree be\nmade first in this manner, that such a one shall have the\nsovereignty for his life, and that afterward they will choose a-new.\nIn this case, the power of the people is dissolved, or not; if\ndissolved, then after the death of him that is chosen, there is no\nman bound to stand to the decrees of them that shall, as private\nmen, run together to make a new election; and consequently, if there\nbe any man, who by the advantage of the reign of him that is dead,\nhath strength enough to hold the multitude in peace and obedience,\nhe may lawfully, or rather is by the law of nature obliged so to do:\nif this power of the people were not dissolved at the choosing of\ntheir king for life, then is the people sovereign still, and the\nking a minister thereof only, but so, as to put the whole\nsovereignty in execution; a great minister, but no otherwise for his\ntime, than a dictator was in Rome. In this case, at the death of him\nthat was chosen, they that meet for a new election, have no new, but\ntheir old authority for the same. For they were the sovereign all\nthe time, as appeareth by the acts of those elective kings, that\nhave procured from the people, that their children might succeed\nthem. For it is to be understood, when a man receiveth any thing\nfrom the authority of the people, he receiveth it not from the\npeople his subjects, but from the people his sovereign. And further,\nthough in the election of a king for his life, the people grant him\nthe exercise of their sovereignty for that time; yet if they see\ncause, they may recall the same before the time. As a prince that\nconferreth an office for life, may nevertheless, upon suspicion of\nabuse thereof, recall it at his pleasure; inasmuch as offices that\nrequire labour and care, are understood to pass from him that giveth\nthem, as _onera_, _burthens_, to them that have them; the recalling\nwhereof are therefore not _injury_, but _favour_. Nevertheless, if\nin making an elective king, with intention to reserve the\nsovereignty, they reserve not a power at certain known and\ndetermined times and places to assemble themselves, the reservation\nof their sovereignty is of no effect, inasmuch as no man is bound to\nstand to the decrees and determinations of those that assemble\nthemselves without the sovereign authority.\n\n[Sidenote: A conditional king, &c.]\n\n10. In the former section is showed, that elective kings that\nexercise their sovereignty for a time, which determines with their\nlife, either are subjects, or not sovereigns; and that it is, when\nthe people in election of them, reserve unto themselves the right of\nassembling at certain times and places limited and made known; or\nelse absolute sovereigns, to dispose of the succession at their\npleasure, and that is, when the people in their election have\ndeclared no time nor place of their meeting, or have left it to the\npower of the elected king, to assemble and dissolve them at such\ntimes, as he himself shall think good. There is another kind of\nlimitation of time, to him that shall be elected to use the\nsovereign power, which whether it hath been practised anywhere, or\nnot, I know not, but it may be imagined, and hath been objected\nagainst the rigour of sovereign power; and it is this, that the\npeople transfer their sovereignty upon conditions. As for example,\nfor so long as he shall observe such and such laws, as they then\nprescribe him. And here as before in elected kings, the question is\nto be made, whether in the electing of such a sovereign, they\nreserved to themselves a right of assembling at times and places\nlimited and known, or not; if not, then is the sovereignty of the\npeople dissolved, and they have neither power to judge of the breach\nof the conditions given him, nor to command any forces for the\ndeposing of him, whom on that condition they had set up, but are in\nthe estate of war amongst themselves, as they were before they made\nthemselves a democracy: and consequently, if he that is elected by\nthe advantage of the possession he hath of the public means, be able\nto compel them to unity and obedience, he hath not only the right of\nnature to warrant him, but the law of nature to oblige him\nthereunto. But if in electing him, they reserved to themselves a\nright of assembling, and appointed certain times and places to that\npurpose, then are they sovereign still, and may call their\nconditional king to account at their pleasure, and deprive him of\nhis government, if they judge he deserve it, either by breach of the\ncondition set him, or otherwise. For the sovereign power can by no\ncovenant with a subject be bound to continue him in the charge he\nundergoeth by their command, as a burden imposed not particularly\nfor his good, but for the good of the sovereign people.\n\n[Sidenote: The word people equivocal]\n\n11. The controversies that arise concerning the right of the people,\nproceed from the equivocation of the word. For the word people hath\na double signification. In one sense it signifieth only a number of\nmen, distinguished by the place of their habitation; as the _people_\nof England, or the _people_ of France, which is no more, but the\nmultitude of those particular persons that inhabit those regions,\nwithout consideration of any contracts or covenants amongst them, by\nwhich any one of them is obliged to the rest. In another sense, it\nsignifieth a person civil, that is to say, either one man, or one\ncouncil, in the will whereof, is included and involved the will of\nevery one in particular. As for example, in this latter sense, the\nlower house of parliament is all the commons, as long as they sit\nthere with authority and right thereto; but after they be dissolved,\nthough they remain, they be no more the people, nor the commons, but\nonly the aggregate, or multitude of the particular men there\nsitting, how well soever they agree, or concur, in opinions amongst\nthemselves; whereupon, they that do not distinguish between these\ntwo significations, do usually attribute such rights to a dissolved\nmultitude, as belong only to the people virtually contained in the\nbody of the commonwealth or sovereignty. And when a great number of\ntheir own authority flock together in any nation, they usually give\nthem the name of the whole nation. In which sense they say the\npeople rebelleth, or the people demandeth, when it is no more than a\ndissolved multitude, of which though any one man may be said to\ndemand or have right to something, yet the heap, or multitude,\ncannot be said to demand or have right to anything. For where every\nman hath his right distinct, there is nothing left for the multitude\nto have right unto: and when the particulars say, this is mine, this\nis thine, and this is his, and have shared all amongst them, there\ncan be nothing whereof the multitude can say, this is mine; nor are\nthey one body, as behoveth them to be, that demand anything under\nthe name of mine, or his: and when they say ours, every man is\nunderstood to pretend in several, and not the multitude. On the\nother side, when the multitude is united into a body politic, and\nthereby are a people in the other signification, and their wills\nvirtually in the sovereign, there the rights and demands of the\nparticulars do cease; and he or they that have the sovereign power,\ndoth for them all, demand, and vindicate under the name of his, that\nwhich before they called in the plural, theirs.\n\n[Sidenote: Obedience discharged by release, &c.]\n\n12. We have seen how particular men enter into subjection, by\ntransferring their rights; it followeth to consider, how such\nsubjection may be discharged. And first, if he or they that have the\nsovereign power, shall relinquish the same voluntarily, there is no\ndoubt, but every man is again at liberty to obey, or not. Likewise,\nif he or they retaining the sovereignty over the rest, do\nnevertheless exempt some one or more, from their subjection, every\nman so exempted, is discharged. For he or they to whom any man is\nobliged, hath the power to release him.\n\n[Sidenote: How such releases are to be understood.]\n\n13. And here it is to be understood, that when he or they that have\nthe sovereign power, give such exemption, or privilege, to a\nsubject, as is not separable from the sovereignty, and nevertheless\ndirectly retaineth the sovereign power, not knowing the consequence\nof the privilege they grant, the person or persons exempted or\nprivileged, are not thereby released. For in contradictory\nsignifications of the will (_Human Nature_, chap. XIII. sect. 9),\nthat which is directly signified, is to be understood for the will,\nbefore that which is drawn from it by consequence.\n\n[Sidenote: Obedience discharged by exile.]\n\n14. Also exile perpetual, is a release of subjection, forasmuch, as\nbeing out of the protection of the sovereignty that expelled him, he\nhath no means of subsisting but from himself. Now every man may\nlawfully defend himself, that hath no other defence; else there had\nbeen no necessity that any man should enter into voluntary\nsubjection, as they do in commonwealths.\n\n[Sidenote: By conquest.]\n\n15. Likewise a man is released of his subjection by conquest. For\nwhen it cometh to pass, that the power of a commonwealth is\noverthrown, and any particular man thereby lying under the sword of\nhis enemy, yieldeth himself captive, he is thereby bound to serve\nhim that taketh him, and consequently discharged of his obligation\nto the former. For no man can serve two masters.\n\n[Sidenote: By ignorance of the right of succession.]\n\n16. Lastly, ignorance of the succession dischargeth obedience. For\nno man can be understood to be obliged to obey he knoweth not whom.\n\n\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\n1, 2. Titles to dominion: master and servant, &c. 3. Chains and\n other, &c. Bonds, &c. Slave defined. 4. Servants have no\n property against their lord, &c. 5. The master hath right to\n alienate his servant. 6. The servant of the servant, &c. 7. How\n servitude is discharged. 8. The middle lord, &c. 9. The title of\n man, &c. over beasts.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Titles to dominion; master and servant, &c.]\n\n1. Having set forth in the two preceding chapters, the nature of a\ncommonwealth _institutive_ by the consent of many men together, I\ncome now to speak of dominion, or a body politic by acquisition,\nwhich is commonly called a _patrimonial_ kingdom. But before I enter\nthereinto, it is necessary to make known upon what title one man may\nacquire right, that is to say, property or dominion, over the person\nof another. For when one man hath dominion over another, there is a\nlittle kingdom. And to be a king by acquisition, is nothing else,\nbut to have acquired a right or dominion over many.\n\n2. Considering men therefore again in the state of nature, without\ncovenants or subjection one to another, as if they were but even now\nall at once created male and female, there be three titles only, by\nwhich one man may have right and dominion over another; whereof two\nmay take place presently, and those are, voluntary offer of\nsubjection, and yielding by compulsion: the third is to take place,\nupon the supposition of children begotten amongst them. Concerning\nthe first of these three titles, it is handled before in the two\nlast chapters. For from thence cometh the right of sovereigns over\ntheir subjects in a commonwealth institutive. Concerning the second\ntitle, which is when a man submitteth to an assailant for fear of\ndeath, thereby accrueth a right of dominion. For where every man, as\nit happeneth in this case, hath right to all things, there needs no\nmore for the making of the said right effectual, but a covenant from\nhim that is overcome, not to resist him that overcometh. And thus\ncometh the victor to have right of absolute dominion over the\nconquered. By which there is presently constituted a little body\npolitic, which consisteth of two persons, the one sovereign, which\nis called the _master_, or lord; the other subject, which is called\nthe _servant_. And when a man hath acquired right over a number of\nservants so considerable, as they cannot by their neighbours be\nsecurely invaded, this body politic is a kingdom despotical.\n\n[Sidenote: Chains and other, &c. bonds, &c. slave defined.]\n\n3. And it is to be understood, that when a servant taken in the\nwars, is kept bound in natural bonds, as chains, and the like, or in\nprison, there hath passed no covenant from the servant to his\nmaster. For those natural bonds have no need of strengthening by the\nverbal bonds of covenant, and they show that the servant is not\ntrusted. But covenant, (Part I. chapter II. section 9,) supposeth\ntrust. There remaineth therefore in the servant thus kept bound, or\nin prison, a right of delivering himself, if he can, by what means\nsoever. This kind of servant is that which ordinarily and without\npassion, is called a _slave_. The Romans had no such distinct name,\nbut comprehended all under the name of _servus_; whereof such as\nthey loved and durst trust, were suffered to go at liberty, and\nadmitted to places of office, both near to their persons, and in\ntheir affairs abroad; the rest were kept chained, or otherwise\nrestrained with natural impediments to their resistance. And as it\nwas amongst the Romans, so it was amongst other nations, the former\nsort having no other bond but a supposed covenant, without which the\nmaster had no reason to trust them; the latter being without\ncovenant, and no otherwise tied to obedience, but by chains, or\nother like forcible custody.\n\n[Sidenote: Servants have no property against their lord, &c.]\n\n4. A master therefore is to be supposed to have no less right over\nthose, whose bodies he leaveth at liberty, than over those he\nkeepeth in bonds and imprisonment, and hath absolute dominion over\nboth, and may say of his servant, that he is his, as he may of any\nother thing. And whatsoever the servant had, and might call his, is\nnow the master\u2019s; for he that disposeth of the person, disposeth of\nall the person could dispose of: insomuch, as though there be _meum_\nand _tuum_ amongst servants distinct from one another by the\ndispensation, and for the benefit of their master; yet there is no\n_meum_ and _tuum_ belonging to any of them against the master\nhimself, whom they are not to resist, but to obey all his commands\nas law.\n\n[Sidenote: The master hath right to alienate his servant.]\n\n5. And seeing both the servant and all that is committed to him, is\nthe property of the master, and every man may dispose of his own,\nand transfer the same at his pleasure, the master may therefore\nalienate his dominion over them, or give the same by his last will\nto whom he list.\n\n[Sidenote: The servant of the servant, &c.]\n\n6. And if it happen, that the master himself by captivity or\nvoluntary subjection, become servant to another, then is that other\nmaster _paramount_; and those servants of him that becometh servant,\nare no further obliged, than their master paramount shall think\ngood; forasmuch as he disposing of the master subordinate, disposeth\nof all he hath, and consequently of his servants, so that the\nrestriction of absolute power in masters, proceedeth not from the\nlaw of nature, but from the political law of him that is their\nmaster supreme or sovereign.\n\n[Sidenote: How servitude is discharged.]\n\n7. Servants immediate to the supreme master, are discharged of their\nservitude, or subjection, in the same manner that subjects are\nreleased of their allegiance in a commonwealth institutive. As\nfirst, by release. For he that captiveth, which is done by accepting\nwhat the captive transferreth to him, setteth again at liberty, by\ntransferring back the same. And this kind of release is called\n_manumission_. Secondly, by exile. For that is no more but\nmanumission given to a servant, not in the way of benefit, but\npunishment. Thirdly, by a new captivity, where the servant having\ndone his endeavour to defend himself, hath thereby performed his\ncovenant to his former master, and for the safety of his life,\nentering into new covenant with the conqueror, is bound to do his\nbest endeavour to keep that likewise. Fourthly, ignorance of who is\nsuccessor to his deceased master, dischargeth him of obedience: for\nno covenant holdeth longer than a man knoweth to whom he is to\nperform it. And lastly, that servant that is no longer trusted, but\ncommitted to his chains and custody, is thereby discharged of the\nobligation _in foro interno_, and therefore if he can get loose, may\nlawfully go his way.\n\n[Sidenote: The middle lord, &c.]\n\n8. But servants subordinate, though manumitted by their immediate\nlord, are not thereby discharged of their subjection to their lord\nparamount. For the immediate master hath no property in them, having\ntransferred his right before to another, namely, to his own and\nsupreme master. Nor if the chief lord should manumit his immediate\nservant, doth he thereby release his servants of their obligation to\nhim that is so manumitted. For by this manumission, he recovereth\nagain the absolute dominion he had over them before. For after a\nrelease, which is the discharge of a covenant, the right standeth as\nit did before the covenant was made.\n\n[Sidenote: The title of man, &c. over beasts.]\n\n9. This right of conquest, as it maketh one man master over another,\nso also maketh it a man to be master of the irrational creatures.\nFor if a man in the state of nature be in hostility with men, and\nthereby have lawful title to subdue or kill, according as his own\nconscience and discretion shall suggest unto him for his safety and\nbenefit, much more may he do the same to beasts; that is to say,\nsave and preserve for his own service, according to his discretion,\nsuch as are of nature apt to obey, and commodious for use; and to\nkill and destroy, with perpetual war, all other, as fierce, and\nnoisome to him. And this dominion is therefore of the law of nature,\nand not of the divine law positive. For if there had been no such\nright before the revealing of God\u2019s will in the Scripture, then\nshould no man, to whom the Scripture hath not come, have right to\nmake use of those his creatures, either for his food or sustenance.\nAnd it were a hard condition of mankind, that a fierce and savage\nbeast should with more right kill a man, than a man a beast.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\n1. The dominion over the child, &c. 2. Pre-eminence of sex giveth\n not the child to the father, rather than to the mother. 3. The\n title of the father or mother, &c. 4. The child of a\n woman-servant, &c. 5. The right to the child given from the\n mother, &c. 6. The child of the concubine, &c. 7. The child of\n the husband and the wife, &c. 8. The father, or he or she that\n bringeth up the child, have absolute power over him. 9. Freedom\n in subjects what it is. 10. A great family is a patrimonial\n kingdom. 11. Succession of the sovereign power, &c. 12. Though\n the successor be not declared, yet there is always one to be\n presumed. 13. The children preferred to the succession, &c. 14.\n The males before the females. 15. The eldest before the rest of\n the brothers. 16. The brother next to the children. 17. The\n succession of the possessor, &c.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The dominion over the child, &c.]\n\n1. Of three ways by which a man becometh subject to another,\nmentioned section 2, chapter the last, namely, voluntary offer,\ncaptivity and birth, the former two have been spoken of, under the\nname of subjects, and servants. In the next place, we are to set\ndown the third way of subjection, under the name of children, and by\nwhat title one man cometh to have propriety in a child, that\nproceedeth from the common generation of two; to wit, of male and\nfemale. And considering men again dissolved from all covenants one\nwith another, and that (Part I. chap. IV. sect. 2) every man by the\nlaw of nature, hath right or propriety to his own body, the child\nought rather to be the propriety of the mother, of whose body it is\npart, till the time of separation, than of the father. For the\nunderstanding therefore of the right that a man or woman hath to his\nor their child, two things are to be considered; first, what title\nthe mother, or any other, originally hath, to a child new born:\nsecondly, how the father, or any other man, pretendeth by the\nmother.\n\n[Sidenote: Pre-eminence of sex giveth not the child to the father,\n rather than to the mother.]\n\n2. For the first, they that have written of this subject, have made\ngeneration to be a title of dominion over persons, as well as the\nconsent of the persons themselves. And because generation giveth\ntitle to two, namely, father and mother, whereas dominion is\nindivisible, they therefore ascribe dominion over the child to the\nfather only, _ob pr\u00e6stantiam sex\u00fbs_; but they show not, neither can\nI find out by what coherence, either generation inferreth dominion,\nor advantage of so much strength, which, for the most part, a man\nhath more than a woman, should generally and universally entitle the\nfather to a propriety in the child, and take it away from the\nmother.\n\n[Sidenote: The title of the father or mother, &c.]\n\n3. The title to dominion over a child, proceedeth not from the\ngeneration, but from the preservation of it; and therefore in the\nestate of nature, the mother, in whose power it is to save or\ndestroy it, hath right thereto by that power, according to that\nwhich hath been said, Part I. chapter I. sect. 13. And if the mother\nshall think fit to abandon, or expose her child to death, whatsoever\nman or woman shall find the child so exposed, shall have the same\nright which the mother had before; and for this same reason, namely,\nfor the power not of generating, but preserving. And though the\nchild thus preserved, do in time acquire strength, whereby he might\npretend equality with him or her that hath preserved him, yet shall\nthat pretence be thought unreasonable, both because his strength was\nthe gift of him, against whom he pretendeth, and also because it is\nto be presumed, that he which giveth sustenance to another, whereby\nto strengthen him, hath received a promise of obedience in\nconsideration thereof. For else it would be wisdom in men, rather to\nlet their children perish, while they are infants, than to live in\ntheir danger or subjection, when they are grown.\n\n[Sidenote: The child of a woman servant, &c.]\n\n4. For the pretences which a man may have to dominion over a child\nby the right of the mother, they be of divers kinds. One by the\nabsolute subjection of the mother; another, by some particular\ncovenant from her, which is less than a covenant of such subjection.\nBy absolute subjection, the master of the mother, hath right to her\nchild, according to section 6, chapter III, whether he be the father\nthereof, or not. And thus the children of the servant are the goods\nof the master _in perpetuum_.\n\n[Sidenote: The right to the child given from the mother, &c.]\n\n5. Of covenants that amount not to subjection between a man and\nwoman, there be some which are made for a time; they are covenants\nof cohabitation, or else of copulation only. And in this latter\ncase, the children pass by covenants particular. And thus in the\ncopulation of the Amazons with their neighbours, the fathers by\ncovenant had the male children only, the mothers retaining the\nfemales.\n\n[Sidenote: The child of the concubine, &c.]\n\n6. And covenants of cohabitation are either for society of bed, or\nfor society of all things; if for society of bed only, then is the\nwoman called _a concubine_. And here also the child shall be his or\nhers, as they shall agree particularly by covenant. For although for\nthe most part, a concubine is supposed to yield up the right of her\nchildren to the father, yet doth not concubinate enforce so much.\n\n[Sidenote: The child of the husband and the wife, &c.]\n\n7. But if the covenants of cohabitation be for society of all\nthings, it is necessary that but one of them govern and dispose of\nall that is common to them both; without which, as hath been often\nsaid before, society cannot last. And therefore the man, to whom for\nthe most part the woman yieldeth the government, hath for the most\npart, also, the sole right and dominion over the children. And the\nman is called the husband, and the woman the wife. But because\nsometimes the government may belong to the wife only, sometimes also\nthe dominion over the children shall be in her only. As in the case\nof a sovereign queen, there is no reason that her marriage should\ntake from her the dominion over her children.\n\n[Sidenote: The father, or he or she that bringeth up the child, have\n absolute power over him.]\n\n8. Children therefore, whether they be brought up and preserved by\nthe father, or by the mother, or by whomsoever, are in most absolute\nsubjection to him or her, that so bringeth them up, or preserveth\nthem. And they may alienate them, that is, assign his or her\ndominion, by selling, or giving them, in adoption or servitude to\nothers; or may pawn them for hostages, kill them for rebellion, or\nsacrifice them for peace, by the law of nature, when he or she, in\nhis or her conscience, think it to be necessary.\n\n[Sidenote: Freedom in subjects what it is.]\n\n9. The subjection of them who institute a commonwealth amongst\nthemselves, is no less absolute, than the subjection of servants.\nAnd therein they are in equal estate. But the hope of those is\ngreater than the hope of these. For he that subjecteth himself\nuncompelled, thinketh there is reason he should be better used, than\nhe that doth it upon compulsion; and coming in freely, calleth\nhimself, though in subjection, a _freeman_; whereby it appeareth,\nthat liberty is not any exemption from subjection and obedience to\nthe sovereign power, but a state of better hope than theirs, that\nhave been subjected by force and conquest. And this was the reason,\nthat the name which signifieth children in the Latin tongue, is\n_liberi_, which also signifieth _freemen_. And yet in Rome, nothing\nat that time was so obnoxious to the power of others, as children in\nthe family of their fathers. For both the state had power over their\nlife without consent of their fathers, and the father might kill his\nson by his own authority, without any warrant from the state.\nFreedom therefore in commonwealths is nothing but the honour of\nequality of favour with other subjects, and servitude the estate of\nthe rest. A freeman therefore may expect employments of honour,\nrather than a servant. And this is all that can be understood by the\nliberty of the subject. For in all other senses, liberty is the\nstate of him that is not subject.\n\n[Sidenote: A great family is a patrimonial kingdom.]\n\n10. Now when a father that hath children, hath servants also, the\nchildren, not by the right of the child, but by the natural\nindulgence of the parents, are such freemen. And the whole,\nconsisting of the father or mother, or both, and of the children,\nand of the servants, is called a _family_, wherein the father or\nmother of the family is sovereign of the same, and the rest, both\nchildren and servants equally, subjects. The same family, if it grow\nby multiplication of children, either by generation, or adoption; or\nof servants, either by generation, conquest, or voluntary\nsubmission, to be so great and numerous, as in probability it may\nprotect itself, then is that family called a _patrimonial kingdom_,\nor monarchy by acquisition, wherein the sovereignty is in one man,\nas it is in a monarch made by _political institution_. So that\nwhatsoever rights be in the one, the same also be in the other. And\ntherefore I shall no more speak of them as distinct, but of monarchy\nin general.\n\n[Sidenote: Succession of the sovereign power, &c.]\n\n11. Having showed by what right the several sorts of commonwealths,\ndemocracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, are erected, it followeth, to\nshow by what right they are continued. The right by which they are\ncontinued, is called the right of succession to the sovereign power;\nwhereof there is nothing to be said in a democracy, because the\nsovereign dieth not, as long as there be subjects alive: nor in an\naristocracy, because it cannot easily fall out, that the _optimates_\nshould every one fail at once; and if it should so fall out, there\nis no question, but the commonwealth is thereby dissolved. It is\ntherefore in a monarchy only, that there can happen a question\nconcerning the succession. And first, forasmuch as a monarch, which\nis absolute sovereign, hath the dominion in his own right, he may\ndispose thereof at his own will. If therefore by his last will, he\nshall name his successor, the right passeth by that will.\n\n[Sidenote: Though the successor be not declared, yet there is always\n one to be presumed.]\n\n12. Nor if the monarch die without any will concerning the\nsuccession declared, it is not therefore to be presumed, it was his\nwill, his subjects, which are to him as his children and servants,\nshould return again to the state of anarchy, that is, to war and\nhostility. For that were expressly against the law of nature, which\ncommandeth to procure peace, and to maintain the same. It is\ntherefore to be conjectured with reason, that it was his intention\nto bequeath them peace, that is to say, a power coercive, whereby to\nkeep them from sedition amongst themselves; and rather in the form\nof a monarchy, than any other government; forasmuch as he, by the\nexercise thereof in his own person, hath declared, that he approveth\nthe same.\n\n[Sidenote: The children preferred to the succession, &c.]\n\n13. Further, it is to be supposed, his intention was, that his own\nchildren should be preferred in the succession, when nothing to the\ncontrary is expressly declared, before any other. For men naturally\nseek their own honour, and that consisteth in the honour of their\nchildren after them.\n\n[Sidenote: The males before the females.]\n\n14. Again, seeing every monarch is supposed to desire to continue\nthe government in his successors, as long as he may; and that\ngenerally men are endued with greater parts of wisdom and courage,\nby which all monarchies are kept from dissolution, than women are;\nit is to be presumed, where no express will is extant to the\ncontrary, he preferreth his male children before the female. Not but\nthat women may govern, and have in divers ages and places governed\nwisely, but are not so apt thereto in general, as men.\n\n[Sidenote: The eldest before the rest of the brothers.]\n\n15. Because the sovereign power is indivisible, it cannot be\nsupposed, that he intended the same should be divided, but that it\nshould descend entirely upon one of them, which is to be presumed,\nshould be the eldest, assigned thereto by the lot of nature, because\nhe appointed no other lot for the decision thereof. Besides, what\ndifference of ability soever there may be amongst the brethren, the\nodds shall be adjudged to the elder, because no subject hath\nauthority otherwise to judge thereof.\n\n[Sidenote: The brother next to the children.]\n\n16. And for want of issue in the possessor, the brother shall be\npresumed successor. For by the judgment of nature, next in blood is\nnext in love; and next in love is next to preferment.\n\n[Sidenote: The succession of the possessor, &c.]\n\n17. And as the succession followeth the first monarch, so also it\nfolloweth him or her that is in possession; and consequently, the\nchildren of him in possession, shall be preferred before the\nchildren of his father, or predecessor.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n\n1. The utility of the commonwealth, &c. 2. The loss of liberty, &c.\n 3. Monarchy approved by, &c. 4. Monarchy less subject to\n passion, &c. 5, 6. Subjects in monarchy, &c. 7. Laws in monarchy\n less changeable, &c. 8. Monarchies less subject to dissolution.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The utility of the commonwealth, &c.]\n\n1. Having set forth the nature of a Body Politic, and the three\nsorts thereof, democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy; in this chapter\nshall be declared, the _conveniences_, and _inconveniences_, that\narise from the same, both in general, and of the said several sorts\nin particular. And first, seeing a body politic is erected only for\nthe ruling and governing of particular men, the benefit and damage\nthereof, consisteth in the benefit or damage of being ruled. The\nbenefit is that for which a body politic was instituted, namely, the\npeace and preservation of every particular man, than which it is not\npossible there can be a greater, as hath been touched before, Part\nI. chapter I. section 12. And this benefit extendeth equally both to\nthe _sovereign_, and to the _subjects_. For he or they that have the\nsovereign power, have but the defence of their persons, by the\nassistance of the particulars; and every particular man hath his\ndefence by their union in the sovereign. As for other benefits,\nwhich pertain not to their safety and sufficiency, but to their well\nand delightful being, such as are superfluous riches, they so belong\nto the sovereign, as they must also be in the subject; and so to the\nsubject, as they must also be in the sovereign. For the riches and\ntreasure of the sovereign, is the dominion he hath over the riches\nof his subjects. If therefore the sovereign provide not so as that\nparticular men may have means, both to preserve themselves, and also\nto preserve the public; the common or sovereign treasure can be\nnone. And on the other side, if it were not for a common and public\ntreasure belonging to the sovereign power, men\u2019s private riches\nwould sooner serve to put them into confusion and war, than to\nsecure and maintain them. Insomuch, as the profit of the sovereign\nand subject goeth always together. That distinction therefore of\ngovernment, that there is one government for the good of him that\ngoverneth, and another for the good of them that be governed;\nwhereof the former is _despotical_, that is lordly; the other, a\ngovernment of _freemen_, is not right. No more is the opinion of\nthem that hold it to be no city, which consisteth of a master and\nhis servants. They might as well say, it were no city, that\nconsisted in a father and his own issue, how numerous soever they\nwere. For to a master that hath no children, the servants have in\nthem all those respects, for which men love their children. For they\nare his strength and his honour. And his power is no greater over\nthem, than over his children.\n\n[Sidenote: The loss of liberty, &c.]\n\n2. The inconvenience arising from government in general to him that\ngoverneth, consisteth partly in the continual care and trouble about\nthe business of other men, that are his subjects; and partly, in the\ndanger of his person. For the head always is that part, not only\nwhere the care resideth, but also against which the stroke of an\nenemy most commonly is directed. To balance this incommodity, the\nsovereignty, together with the necessity of this care and danger,\ncomprehendeth so much honour, riches, and means, whereby to delight\nthe mind, as no private man\u2019s wealth can attain unto. The\ninconveniences of government in general to a subject are none at\nall, if well considered, but in appearance. There be two things that\nmay trouble his mind, or two general grievances; the one is, loss of\nliberty; the other, the uncertainty of _meum_ and _tuum_. For the\nfirst, it consisteth in this, that a subject may no more govern his\nown actions according to his own discretion and judgment, or, which\nis all one, conscience, as the present occasions from time to time\nshall dictate to him; but must be tied to do according to that will\nonly, which once for all he had long ago laid up, and involved in\nthe wills of the major part of an assembly, or in the will of some\none man. But this is really no inconvenience. For, as it hath been\nshowed before, it is the only means, by which we have any\npossibility of preserving ourselves. For if every man were allowed\nthis liberty of following his conscience, in such difference of\nconsciences, they would not live together in peace an hour. But it\nappeareth a great inconvenience to every man in particular, to be\ndebarred of this liberty, because every one apart considereth it as\nin himself, and not as in the rest; by which means, liberty\nappeareth in the likeness of rule and government over others. For\nwhere one man is at liberty, and the rest bound, there that one hath\ngovernment; which honour, he that understandeth not so much,\ndemanding by the name simply of liberty, thinketh it a great\ngrievance and injury to be denied it. For the second grievance\nconcerning _meum_ and _tuum_, it is also none, but in appearance\nonly; it consisteth in this, that the sovereign power taketh from\nhim that which he used to enjoy, knowing no other propriety, but use\nand custom. But without such sovereign power, the right of men is\nnot propriety to anything, but a community, no better than to have\nno right at all, as hath been showed, Part I. chapter I. section 10.\nPropriety therefore being derived from the sovereign power, is not\nto be pretended against the same, especially, when by it every\nsubject hath his propriety against every other subject, which when\nsovereignty ceaseth, he hath not, because in that case they return\nto war amongst themselves. Those levies therefore which are made\nupon men\u2019s estates, by the sovereign authority, are no more but the\nprice of that peace and defence which the sovereignty maintaineth\nfor them. If this were not so, no money nor forces for the wars, nor\nany other public occasion, could justly be levied in the world. For\nneither king, nor democracy, nor aristocracy, nor the estates of any\nland, could do it, if the sovereignty could not. For in all those\ncases, it is levied by virtue of the sovereignty. Nay more, by the\nthree estates here, the land of one man may be transferred to\nanother, without crime of him from whom it was taken, and without\npretence of public benefit, as hath been done; and this without\ninjury, because done by the sovereign power. For the power whereby\nit is done, is no less than sovereign, and cannot be greater.\nTherefore this grievance for _meum_ and _tuum_ is not real, unless\nmore be exacted than is necessary; but it seemeth a grievance,\nbecause to them that either know not the right of sovereignty, or to\nwhom that right belongeth, it seemeth an injury; and injury, how\nlittle soever the damage, is always grievous, as putting us in mind\nof our disability to help ourselves, and into envy of the power to\ndo us wrong.\n\n[Sidenote: Monarchy approved by, &c.]\n\n3. Having spoken of the inconveniences of the subject, by government\nin general, let us consider the same in the three several sorts\nthereof, namely, _democracy_, _aristocracy_ and _monarchy_; whereof\nthe two former are in effect but one. For, as I have showed before,\ndemocracy is but the government of a few orators. The comparison\ntherefore will be between monarchy and aristocracy: and to omit that\nthe world, as it was created, so also it is governed by one God\nAlmighty; and that all the ancients have preferred monarchy before\nother governments, both in opinion, because they feigned a\nmonarchical government amongst their gods, and also by their custom;\nfor that in the most ancient times all people were so governed: and\nthat paternal government, which is monarchy, was instituted in the\nbeginning from the creation; and that other governments have\nproceeded from the dissolution thereof, caused by the rebellious\nnature of mankind, and be but pieces of broken monarchies cemented\nby human wit, I will insist only on this comparison, upon the\ninconveniences that may happen to the subjects in consequence to\neach of these governments.\n\n[Sidenote: Monarchy less subject to passion, &c.]\n\n4. And first, it seemeth inconvenient there should be committed so\ngreat a power to one man, as that it might be lawful to no other man\nor men to resist the same; and some think it inconvenient _eo\nnomine_, because he hath the power. But this reason we may not by\nany means admit, for it maketh it inconvenient to be ruled by\nAlmighty God, who without question hath more power over every man,\nthan can be conferred upon any monarch. This inconvenience therefore\nmust be derived not from the power, but from the affections and\npassions which reign in every one, as well monarch as subject, by\nwhich the monarch may be swayed to use that power amiss: and because\nan aristocracy consisteth of men, if the passions of many men be\nmore violent when they are assembled together, than the passions of\none man alone, it will follow, that the inconvenience arising from\npassions will be greater in an _aristocracy_, than a _monarchy_. But\nthere is no doubt, when things are debated in great assemblies, but\nevery man delivering his opinion at large without interruption,\nendeavoureth to make whatsoever he is to set forth for good, better;\nand what he would have apprehended as evil, worse, as much as is\npossible, to the end his counsel may take place; which counsel also\nis never without aim at his own benefit, or honour; every man\u2019s end\nbeing some good to himself. Now this cannot be done without working\non the passions of the rest. And thus the passions of these that are\nsingly moderate, are altogether vehement; even as a great many\ncoals, though but warm asunder, being put together, inflame one\nanother.\n\n[Sidenote: Subjects in monarchy, &c.]\n\n5. Another inconvenience of monarchy, is this, that the monarch,\nbesides the riches necessary for the defence of the commonwealth,\nmay take so much more from the subjects, as may enrich his children,\nkindred and favourites, to what degree he pleaseth; which though it\nbe indeed an inconvenience, if he should so do, yet is the same both\ngreater in an aristocracy, and also more likely to come to pass, for\nthere not one only, but many have children, kindred, and friends to\nraise. And in that point they are as twenty monarchs for one, and\nlikely to set forward one another\u2019s designs mutually, to the\noppression of all the rest. The same also happeneth in a democracy,\nif they all do agree; otherwise they bring a worse inconvenience; to\nwit, sedition.\n\n6. Another inconvenience of monarchy, is the power of dispensing\nwith the execution of justice, whereby the family and friends of the\nmonarch, may, with impunity, commit outrages upon the people, or\noppress them with extortion. But in aristocracies, not only one, but\nmany have power of taking men out of the hands of justice, and no\nman is willing his kindred or friends should be punished according\nto their demerits. And therefore they understand amongst themselves\nwithout further speaking, as a tacit covenant, _hodie mihi, cras\ntibi_.\n\n[Sidenote: Laws in monarchy less changeable, &c.]\n\n7. Another inconvenience of monarchy, is the power of altering laws.\nConcerning which, it is necessary that such a power be, that laws\nmay be altered, according as men\u2019s manners change, or as the\nconjuncture of all circumstances within and without the commonwealth\nshall require; the change of law being then inconvenient, when it\nproceedeth from the change, not of the occasion, but of the minds of\nhim or them, by whose authority the laws are made. Now it is\nmanifest enough of itself, that the mind of one man is not so\nvariable in that point, as are the decrees of an assembly. For not\nonly they have all their natural changes, but the change of any one\nman may be enough, with eloquence and reputation, or by solicitation\nand faction, to make that law to-day, which another by the very same\nmeans, shall abrogate to-morrow.\n\n[Sidenote: Monarchies less subject to dissolution.]\n\n8. Lastly, the greatest inconvenience that can happen to a\ncommonwealth, is the aptitude to dissolve into civil war; and to\nthis are monarchies much less subject, than any other governments.\nFor where the union, or band of a commonwealth, is one man, there is\nno distraction; whereas in assemblies, those that are of different\nopinions, and give different counsel, are apt to fall out amongst\nthemselves, and to cross the designs of the commonwealth for one\nanother\u2019s sake: and when they cannot have the honour of making good\ntheir own devices, they yet seek the honour to make the counsels of\ntheir adversaries prove vain. And in this contention, when the\nopposite factions happen to be anything equal in strength, they\npresently fall to war. Wherein necessity teacheth both sides, that\nan absolute monarch, to wit, a general, is necessary both for their\ndefence against one another, and also for the peace of each faction\nwithin itself. But this aptitude to dissolution, is to be understood\nfor an inconvenience in such aristocracies only where the affairs of\nstate are debated in great and numerous assemblies, as they were\nanciently in Athens, and in Rome; and not in such as do nothing else\nin great assemblies, but choose magistrates and counsellors, and\ncommit the handling of state affairs to a few; such as is the\naristocracy of Venice at this day. For these are no more apt to\ndissolve from this occasion, than monarchies, the counsel of state\nbeing both in the one and the other alike.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n\n1. A difficulty concerning absolute subjection to man, arising\n from our absolute subjection to God Almighty, propounded. 2.\n That this difficulty is only amongst those Christians that\n deny the interpretation of the Scripture to depend upon the\n sovereign authority of the commonwealth. 3. That human laws\n are not made to govern the consciences of men, but their words\n and actions. 4. Places of Scripture to prove obedience due\n from Christians to their sovereign in all things. 5. A\n distinction propounded between a fundamental point of faith,\n and a superstruction. 6. An explication of the points of\n faith, that be fundamental. 7. That the belief of those\n fundamental points, is all that is required to salvation, as\n of faith. 8. That other points not fundamental, are not\n necessary to salvation as matter of faith; and that no more is\n required by way of faith to the salvation of one man, than to\n the salvation of another. 9. That superstructions are not\n points of the faith necessary to a Christian. 10. How faith\n and justice concur to salvation. 11. That in Christian\n commonwealths, obedience to God and man stand well together.\n 12. This tenet, whatsoever is against the conscience, is sin,\n interpreted. 13. That all men do confess the necessity of\n submitting of controversies to some human authority. 14. That\n Christians under an infidel are discharged of the injustice of\n disobeying him, in that which concerneth the faith necessary\n to salvation, by not resisting.\n\n\n[Sidenote: A difficulty concerning absolute subjection to man,\n arising from our absolute subjection to God Almighty,\n propounded.]\n\n1. Having showed, that in all commonwealths whatsoever, the\nnecessity of peace and government requireth, that there be existent\nsome power, either in one man, or in one assembly of men, by the\nname of the power sovereign, which it is not lawful for any member\nof the same commonwealth to disobey; there occurreth now a\ndifficulty, which, if it be not removed, maketh it unlawful for a\nman to put himself under the command of such absolute sovereignty as\nis required thereto. And the difficulty is this; we have amongst us\nthe Word of God for the rule of our actions: now if we shall subject\nourselves to men also, obliging ourselves to do such actions as\nshall be by them commanded, when the commands of God and man shall\ndiffer, we are to obey God, rather than man; and consequently, the\ncovenant of general obedience to man is unlawful.\n\n[Sidenote: That this difficulty is only amongst those Christians\n that deny the interpretation of Scripture to depend upon\n the sovereign authority of the commonwealth.]\n\n2. This difficulty hath not been of very great antiquity in the\nworld. There was no such _dilemma_ amongst the Jews; for their civil\nlaw, and divine law, was one and the same law of Moses; the\ninterpreters whereof were the priests, whose power was subordinate\nto the power of the king; as was the power of Aaron, to the power of\nMoses. Nor is it a controversy that was ever taken notice of amongst\nthe Grecians, Romans, or other Gentiles: for amongst these their\nseveral civil laws were the rules whereby not only righteousness and\nvirtue, but also religion, and the external worship of God, was\nordered and approved; that being esteemed the true worship of God,\nwhich was \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1, according to the laws civil. Also those\nChristians that dwell under the temporal dominion of the bishop of\nRome, are free from this question; for that they allow unto him,\ntheir sovereign, to interpret the Scriptures, which are the law of\nGod, as he in his own judgment shall think right. This difficulty\ntherefore remaineth amongst, and troubleth those Christians only, to\nwhom it is allowed, to take for the sense of the Scripture, that\nwhich they make thereof, either by their own private interpretation,\nor by the interpretation of such as are not called thereunto by\npublic authority; they that follow their own interpretation\ncontinually, demanding liberty of conscience; and those that follow\nthe interpretation of others not ordained thereunto by the sovereign\nof the commonwealth, requiring a power in matters of religion either\nabove the power civil, or at least not depending on it.\n\n[Sidenote: That human laws are not made to govern the consciences of\n men, but their words & actions.]\n\n3. To take away this scruple of conscience, concerning obedience to\nhuman laws, amongst those that interpret to themselves the word of\nGod in the Holy Scriptures, I propound to their consideration,\nfirst, that no human law is intended to oblige the conscience of a\nman, unless it break out into action, either of the tongue, or other\npart of the body. The law made thereupon would be of none effect,\nbecause no man is able to discern, but by word or other action\nwhether such law be kept or broken. Nor did the apostles themselves\npretend dominion over men\u2019s consciences, concerning the faith they\npreached, but only persuasion and instruction. And therefore St.\nPaul saith (2 Cor. i. 24), writing to the Corinthians, concerning\ntheir controversies, that he and the rest of the apostles had no\ndominion over their faith, but were helpers of their joy.\n\n[Sidenote: Places of Scripture to prove obedience due from\n Christians to their sovereign in all things.]\n\n4. And for the actions of men which proceed from their consciences,\nthe regulating of which actions is the only means of peace, if they\nmight not stand with justice, it were impossible that justice\ntowards God, and peace amongst men, should stand together in that\nreligion that teacheth us, that _justice and peace shall kiss each\nother_, and in which we have so many precepts of absolute obedience\nto human authority; as Matth. xxiii. 2, 3, we have this precept:\n_The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat; all therefore\nwhatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do_. And yet were\nthe Scribes and Pharisees not priests, but men of temporal\nauthority. Again Luke xi. 17: _Every kingdom divided against itself\nshall be desolate_; and is not that kingdom divided against itself,\nwhere the actions of every one shall be ruled by his private\nopinion, or conscience, and yet those actions such as give occasion\nof offence and breach of peace? Again Rom. xiii. 5: _Wherefore you\nmust be subject, not because of wrath only, but also for conscience\nsake_. Titus iii. 1: _Put them in remembrance, that they be subject\nto principalities and powers_. 1 Peter ii. 13, 14: _Submit\nyourselves unto all manner of ordinance of man, for the Lord\u2019s sake,\nwhether it be unto the king, as unto the superior, or unto\ngovernors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of\nevil doers_. Jude, verse 8: _These dreamers also that defile the\nflesh, and despise government, and speak evil of them that are in\nauthority_. And forasmuch as all subjects in commonwealths are in\nthe nature of children and servants, that which is a command to\nthem, is a command to all subjects. But to these St. Paul saith\n(Colos. iii. 20, 22): _Children, obey your parents in all things;\nservants, be obedient to your masters according to the flesh in all\nthings_. And verse 23: _Do it heartily as to the Lord_. These places\nconsidered, it seemeth strange to me, that any man in a Christian\ncommonwealth, should have any occasion to deny his obedience to\npublic authority, upon this ground, that _it is better to obey God\nthan man_. For though St. Peter and the apostles did so answer the\ncouncil of the Jews, that forbad them to preach Christ, there\nappeareth no reason that Christians should allege the same against\ntheir Christian governors, that command them to preach Christ. To\nreconcile this seeming contradiction of simple obedience to God, and\nsimple obedience to man, we are to consider a Christian subject, as\nunder a Christian sovereign, or under an infidel.\n\n[Sidenote: A distinction propounded between a fundamental point of\n faith and a superstruction.]\n\n5. And under a Christian sovereign we are to consider, what actions\nwe are forbidden by God Almighty to obey them in, and what not. The\nactions we are forbidden to obey them in, are such only, as imply a\ndenial of that faith which is necessary to our salvation: for\notherwise there can be no pretence of disobedience; for why should a\nman incur the danger of a temporal death, by displeasing of his\nsuperior, if it were not for fear of eternal death hereafter? It\nmust therefore be enquired, what those propositions and articles be,\nthe belief whereof our Saviour or his apostles have declared to be\nsuch, as without believing them, a man cannot be saved; and then all\nother points, that are now controverted, and made distinction of\nsects, Papists, Lutherans, Calvinists, Arminians, &c. (as in old\ntime, the like made Paulists, Apollonians, and Cephasians), must\nneeds be such, as a man needeth not for the holding thereof, deny\nobedience to his superiors. And for the points of faith necessary to\nsalvation, I shall call them _fundamental_, and every other point a\n_superstruction_.\n\n[Sidenote: An explication of the points of faith, that be\n fundamental.]\n\n6. And without all controversy, there is not any more necessary\npoint to be believed for man\u2019s salvation than this, that _Jesus is\nthe Messiah_, that is, _the Christ_; which proposition is explicated\nin sundry sorts, but still the same in effect; as, that _he is God\u2019s\nanointed_; for that is signified by the word Christ: that _he was\nthe true and lawful king of Israel, the son of David, the Saviour of\nthe world, the redeemer of Israel, the salvation of God, he that\nshould come into the world, the son of God_, and, which I desire by\nthe way to have noted, against the now sect of Arians, _the begotten\nSon of God_, Acts iii. 13; Heb. v. 5: _The only begotten Son of\nGod_, John i. 14, 18; John iii. 16, 18; 1 John iv. 9: _That he was\nGod_, John i. 1; John xx. 28: _That the fulness of the Godhead dwelt\nin him bodily_, Coloss. ii. 9: Moreover, _the Holy One, the Holy One\nof God, the forgiver of sins, that he is risen from the dead_. These\nare explications, and parts of that general article, that _Jesus is\nthe Christ_. This point therefore, and all the explications thereof\nare fundamental: as also all such as be evidently inferred from\nthence; as, BELIEF IN GOD THE FATHER: John xii. 44: _He that\nbelieveth in me, believeth not in me, but in him that sent me_; 1\nJohn ii. 23: _He that denieth the Son, hath not the Father_: BELIEF\nIN GOD THE HOLY GHOST, of whom Christ saith, John xiv. 26: _But the\nComforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my\nname_: and John xv. 26: _But when the Comforter shall come, whom I\nwill send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth_:\nBELIEF OF THE SCRIPTURES, by which we believe those points and of\nthe immortality of the soul, without which we cannot believe he is a\nSaviour.\n\n[Sidenote: That the belief of those fundamental points, is all that\n is required to salvation, as of faith.]\n\n7. And as these are the fundamental points of faith necessary to\nsalvation; so also are they only necessary as matter of faith, and\nonly essential to the calling of a Christian; as may appear by many\nevident places of Holy Scripture: John v. 39: _Search the\nScriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are\nthey which testify of me_. Now, forasmuch as by the _Scripture_, is\nmeant there the Old Testament (the New being then not written), the\nbelief of that which was written concerning our Saviour in the Old\nTestament, was sufficient belief for the obtaining of eternal life:\nbut in the Old Testament, there is nothing revealed concerning\nChrist, but that he is the Messiah, and such things as belong to the\nfundamental points thereupon depending. And therefore those\n_fundamental_ points are sufficient to salvation as of faith. And\nJohn vi. 28, 29: _Then said they unto him, What shall we do, that we\nmight work the works of God? Jesus answered and said unto them. This\nis the work of God, that ye believe in him, whom he hath sent._ So\nthat the point to be believed is, _That Jesus Christ came forth from\nGod, and he which believeth it, worketh the works of God_. John xi.\n26, 27: _Whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die.\nBelievest thou this? She said unto him, Yea, Lord, I believe that\nthou art the Christ, the Son of God, which should come into the\nworld._ Hence followeth, _He that believeth this, shall never die_.\nJohn xx. 31: _But these things are written, that ye might believe,\nthat Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing, ye\nmight have life through his name_. By which appeareth, that this\n_fundamental_ point is all that is required, as of faith to our\nsalvation. 1 John iv. 2: _Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus\nChrist is come in the flesh, is of God_: 1 John v. 1: _Whosoever\nbelieveth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God_; and (verse 5)\n_Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth, that\nJesus is the Son of God_: and verse 13: _These things have I written\nunto you that believe in the name of the Son of God, that ye may\nknow that ye have eternal life_. Acts, viii. 36, 37: _The eunuch\nsaid, Here is water, what doth hinder me to be baptized? And Philip\nsaid unto him, If thou believest with all thy heart, thou mayest. He\nanswered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God._\nThis point therefore was sufficient for the reception of man into\nbaptism, that is to say, to Christianity. And Acts, xvi. 29-31: _The\nkeeper of the prison fell down before Paul and Silas, and said,\nSirs, what shall I do to be saved? And they said, Believe in the\nLord Jesus Christ._ And the sermon of St. Peter, upon the day of\nPentecost, was nothing else but an explication, that _Jesus was the\nChrist. And when they had heard him, they asked him, What shall we\ndo? He said unto them_, (Acts, ii. 38): _Amend your lives, and be\nbaptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the\nremission of sins_. Rom. x. 9: _If thou shalt confess with thy mouth\nthe Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thy heart, that God raised him\nup from the dead, thou shalt be saved_. To these places may be\nadded, that wheresoever our Saviour Christ doth approve the faith of\nany man, the proposition believed, if the same be to be collected\nout of the text, is always some of these fundamental points before\nmentioned, or something equivalent: as the faith of the centurion\n(Matth. viii. 8): _Speak the word only, and my servant shall be\nhealed_; believing he was omnipotent: the faith of the woman, which\nhad an issue of blood, (Matth. ix. 21): _If I may but touch the hem\nof his garment_; implying, he was the Messiah: the faith required of\nthe blind men, (Matth. ix. 28): _Believe you that I am able to do\nthis?_ the faith of the Canaanitish woman, (Matth. xv. 22), that he\nwas the _Son of David_, implying the same. And so it is in every one\nof those places, none excepted, where our Saviour commendeth any\nman\u2019s faith, which because they are too many to insert here, I omit,\nand refer them to his inquisition that is not otherwise satisfied.\nAnd as there is no other faith required, so there was no other\npreaching: for the prophets of the Old Testament preached no other;\nand John the Baptist preached only the approach of the kingdom of\nheaven, that is to say, of the kingdom of Christ. The same was the\ncommission of the apostles (Matth. x. 7): _Go preach, saying, The\nkingdom of heaven is at hand_. And Paul preaching amongst the Jews,\n(Acts, xviii. 5), did but testify unto the Jews, that _Jesus was the\nChrist_. And the heathens took notice of Christians no otherwise,\nbut by this name, that they believed _Jesus to be a king_, crying\nout, (Acts, xvii. 6, 7): _These are they that have subverted the\nstate of the world, and here they are, whom Jason hath received. And\nthese all do against the decrees of C\u00e6sar, saying, that there is\nanother king, one Jesus._ And this was the sum of the predictions,\nthe sum of the confessions of them that believed, as well men as\ndevils. This was the title of his cross, _Jesus of Nazareth, king of\nthe Jews_; this the occasion of the crown of thorns, sceptre of\nreed, and a man to carry his cross; this was the subject of the\n_Hosannas_; and this was the title, by which our Saviour, commanding\nto take another man\u2019s goods, bade them say, _The Lord hath need_;\nand by this title he purged the temple of the profane market kept\nthere. Nor did the apostles themselves believe any more than that\n_Jesus was the Messiah_, nor understand so much; for they understood\nthe Messiah to be no more than a temporal king, till after our\nSaviour\u2019s resurrection. Furthermore, this point, that _Christ is the\nMessiah_, is particularly set forth for _fundamental_ by that word,\nor some other equivalent thereunto in divers places. Upon the\nconfession of Peter (Matth. xvi. 16): _Thou art the Christ, the son\nof the living God_, our Saviour (verse 18) saith, _Upon this rock\nwill I build my church_. This point therefore is the whole\nfoundation of Christ\u2019s church. St. Paul saith, (Rom. xv. 20) _I so\nenforced myself to preach the Gospel, not where Christ was named,\nlest I should have built upon another man\u2019s foundation_. St. Paul,\n(1 Cor. iii. 10) when he had reprehended the Corinthians for their\nsects, and curious doctrines and questions, he distinguisheth\nbetween _fundamental_ points, and _superstruction_; and saith, _I\nhave laid the foundation, and another buildeth thereupon; but let\nevery man take heed how he buildeth upon it. For other foundation\ncan no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ._\nColoss. ii. 6, 7: _As you have received Christ Jesus the Lord, so\nwalk in him, rooted and builded in him, and stablished in the\nfaith_.\n\n[Sidenote: That other points not fundamental, are not necessary to\n salvation as matters of faith; and that no more is\n required by way of faith to the salvation of one man than\n to the salvation of another.]\n\n8. Having showed this proposition, _Jesus is the Christ_, to be the\nonly fundamental and necessary point of faith, I shall set down a\nfew places more, to show, that other points, though they may be\ntrue, are not so necessary to be believed, as that a man may not be\nsaved, though he believe them not. And first, if a man could not be\nsaved without assent of the heart to the truth of all controversies,\nwhich are now in agitation concerning religion, I cannot see, how\nany man living can be saved; so full of subtilty, and curious\nknowledge it is to be so great a divine. Why therefore should a man\nthink that our Saviour, who (Matth. xi. 30), saith, that his _yoke\nis easy_, should require a matter of that difficulty? or how are\nlittle children said to believe, (Matth. xviii. 6); or how could the\ngood thief be thought sufficiently catechised upon the cross? or St.\nPaul so perfect a Christian presently upon his conversion? and\nthough there may be more obedience required in him that hath the\nfundamental points explicated unto him, than in him that hath\nreceived the same but implicitly; yet there is no more faith\nrequired for salvation in one man, than another. For if it be true,\nthat _Whosoever shall confess with his mouth the Lord Jesus, and\nbelieve in his heart, that God raised him from the dead, shall be\nsaved_; as it is, Rom. x. 9, and that _Whosoever believeth that\nJesus is the Christ, is born of God_; the belief of that point is\nsufficient for the salvation of any man whosoever he be, forasmuch\nas concerneth faith. And seeing he that believeth not that _Jesus is\nthe Christ_, whatsoever he believe else, cannot be saved; it\nfolloweth, that there is no more required of the salvation of one\nman, than another, in matter of faith.\n\n[Sidenote: That superstructions are not points of the faith\n necessary to a Christian.]\n\n9. About these points fundamental, there is little controversy\namongst Christians, though otherwise of different sects amongst\nthemselves. And therefore the controversies of religion, are\naltogether about points unnecessary to salvation; whereof some are\ndoctrines raised by human ratiocination, from the points\n_fundamental_. As for example; such doctrines as concern the manner\nof the real presence, wherein are mingled tenets of faith concerning\nthe omnipotency and divinity of Christ, with the tenets of Aristotle\nand the Peripatetics concerning substance and accidents, species,\nhypostasis, and the subsistence and migration of accidents from\nplace to place; words some of them without meaning, and nothing but\nthe canting of Grecian sophisters. And these doctrines are condemned\nexpressly, Col. ii. 8, where after St. Paul had exhorted them to _be\nrooted and builded in Christ_, he giveth them this further caveat:\n_Beware lest there be any man that spoil you through philosophy and\nvain deceits, through the traditions of men, according to the\nrudiments of the world_. And such are such doctrines, as are raised\nout of such places of the Scriptures, as concern not the foundation,\nby men\u2019s natural reason; as about the concatenation of causes, and\nthe manner of God\u2019s predestination; which are also mingled with\nphilosophy: as if it were possible for men that know not in what\nmanner God seeth, heareth, or speaketh, to know nevertheless the\nmanner how he intendeth, and predestinateth. A man therefore ought\nnot to examine by reason any point, or draw any consequence out of\nScripture by reason, concerning the nature of God Almighty, of which\nreason is not capable. And therefore St. Paul, (Rom. xii. 3) giveth\na good rule, _That no man presume to understand above that which is\nmeet to understand, but that he understand according to sobriety_:\nwhich they do not, who presume out of Scripture, by their own\ninterpretation, to raise any doctrine to the understanding,\nconcerning those things which are incomprehensible. And this whole\ncontroversy concerning the predestination of God, and the free-will\nof man, is not peculiar to Christian men. For we have huge volumes\nof this subject, under the name of _fate_ and _contingency_,\ndisputed between the Epicureans and the Stoics, and consequently it\nis not matter of faith, but of philosophy: and so are also all the\nquestions concerning any other point, but the foundation before\nnamed; and God receiveth a man, which part of the question soever he\nholdeth. It was a controversy in St. Paul\u2019s time, whether a\nChristian Gentile might eat freely of any thing which the Christian\nJews did not; and the Jew condemned the Gentile that he did eat, to\nwhom St. Paul saith, (Rom. xiv. 3): _Let not him that eateth not,\njudge him that eateth; for God hath received him_. And verse 6, in\nthe question concerning the observing of holy days, wherein the\nGentiles and Jews differed, he saith unto them, _He that observeth\nthe day, observeth it to the Lord; and he that observeth not the\nday, observeth it not to the Lord_. And they who strive concerning\nsuch questions, and divide themselves into sects, are not therefore\nto be accounted zealous of the faith, their strife being but carnal,\nwhich is confirmed by St. Paul (1 Cor. iii. 4): _When one saith, I\nam of Paul, and another, I am of Appollos, are ye not carnal?_ For\nthey are not questions of faith, but of wit, wherein, carnally, men\nare inclined to seek the mastery one of another. For nothing is\ntruly a point of faith, but that _Jesus is the Christ_; as St. Paul\ntestifieth, (1 Cor. ii. 2): _For I esteemed not the knowledge of any\nthing amongst you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified_. And 1 Tim.\nvi. 20, 21: _O Timotheus, keep that which is committed unto thee,\nand avoid profane and vain babblings, and opposition of science\nfalsely so called, which while some profess, they have erred\nconcerning the faith_. 2 Tim. ii. 16: _Shun profane and vain\nbabblings, &c._ Verse 17, 18: _Of which sort is Hymen\u00e6us and\nPhiletus, which as concerning the truth, have erred, saying, that\nthe resurrection is past already_. Whereby St. Paul showed, that the\nraising of questions by human ratiocination, though it be from the\nfundamental points themselves, is not only not necessary, but most\ndangerous to the faith of a Christian. Out of all these places, I\ndraw only this conclusion in general, that neither the points now in\ncontroversy amongst Christians of different sects, or in any point\nthat ever shall be in controversy, excepting only those that are\ncontained in this article, _Jesus is the Christ_, are necessary to\nsalvation, as of faith; though in matter of obedience, a man may be\nbound not to oppose the same.\n\n[Sidenote: How faith and justice concur to salvation.]\n\n10. Although to the obtaining of salvation, there be required no\nmore, as hath been already declared, out of the Holy Scriptures, as\nmatter of faith, but the belief of those fundamental articles before\nset forth; nevertheless, there are required other things, as matter\nof obedience. For, as it is not enough in temporal kingdoms, to\navoid the punishment which kings may inflict, to acknowledge the\nright and title of the king, without obedience also to his laws: so\nalso it is not enough, to acknowledge our Saviour Christ to be the\nking of heaven, in which consisteth Christian faith, unless also we\nendeavour to obey his laws, which are the laws of the kingdom of\nheaven, in which consisteth Christian obedience. And forasmuch as\nthe laws of the kingdom of heaven, are the laws of nature, as hath\nbeen showed, Part I. chapter V., not only faith, but also the\nobservation of the law of nature, (which is that for which a man is\ncalled just or righteous, in that sense, in which justice is taken\nnot for the absence of guilt, but for the endeavour and constant\nwill to do that which is just) not only faith, but this justice,\nwhich also from the effect thereof, is called repentance, and\nsometimes works, is necessary to salvation. So that faith and\njustice do both concur thereto; and in the several acceptation of\nthis word (justification) are properly said both of them to justify;\nand the want of either of them is properly said to condemn. For not\nonly he that resisteth a king upon doubt of his title, but also he\nthat doth it upon the inordinateness of his passions, deserveth\npunishment. And when faith and works are separated, not only the\nfaith is called dead without works, but also works are called dead\nworks without faith. And therefore St. James, (chapter ii. 17),\nsaith, _Even so the faith, if it have no works, is dead in itself_;\nand verse 26: _For as the body without the spirit is dead, even so\nfaith without works is dead_. And St. Paul, (Heb. vi. 1), calleth\nworks without faith, _dead works_, where he saith, _Not laying again\nthe foundation of repentance from dead works_. And by these dead\nworks, is understood not the obedience and justice of the inward\nman, but the _opus operatum_, or external action, proceeding from\nfear of punishment, or from vain-glory, and desire to be honoured of\nmen: and these may be separated from faith, and conduce no way to a\nman\u2019s justification. And for that cause, St. Paul, (Rom. iv.)\nexcludeth the righteousness of the law, from having part in the\njustification of a sinner. For by the law of Moses, which is applied\nto men\u2019s actions, and requireth the absence of guilt, all men living\nare liable to damnation; and therefore no man is justified by works,\nbut by faith only. But if works be taken for the endeavour to do\nthem, that is, if the will be taken for the deed, or internal for\nexternal righteousness, then do works contribute to salvation. And\nthen taketh place that of St. James, (chap. ii. 24): _Ye see then,\nhow that of works a man is justified, and not of faith only_. And\nboth of these are joined to salvation, as in St. Mark i. 15: _Repent\nand believe the gospel_. And Luke xviii. 18-22, when a certain ruler\nasked our Saviour, what he ought to do to inherit eternal life, he\npropounded to him the keeping of the commandments; which when the\nruler said he had kept, he propounded to him the faith, _Sell all\nthat thou hast, and follow me_. And John iii. 36: _He that believeth\nin the Son, hath everlasting life_. And _He that obeyeth not the\nSon, shall not see life_. Where he manifestly joineth obedience and\nfaith together. And Rom. i. 17: _The just shall live by faith_; not\nevery one, but _the just_. For also _the devils believe and\ntremble_. But though both faith and justice (meaning still by\njustice, not absence of guilt, but the good intentions of the mind,\nwhich is called righteousness by God, that taketh the will for the\ndeed) be both of them said to justify, yet are their parts in the\nact of justification to be distinguished. For justice is said to\njustify, not because it absolveth, but because it denominates him\njust, and setteth him in an estate, or capacity of salvation,\nwhensoever he shall have faith. But faith is said to justify, that\nis, to absolve, because by it a just man is absolved of, and\nforgiven his unjust actions. And thus are reconciled the places of\nSt. Paul and St. James, that _Faith only justifieth_, and _a man is\nnot justified by faith only_; and showed how faith and repentance\nmust concur to salvation.\n\n[Sidenote: That in Christian commonwealths, obedience to God and man\n stand well together.]\n\n11. These things considered, it will easily appear, that under the\nsovereign power of a Christian commonwealth, there is no danger of\ndamnation from simple obedience to human laws; for in that the\nsovereign alloweth Christianity, no man is compelled to renounce\nthat faith, which is enough for his salvation, that is to say, the\nfundamental points. And for other points, seeing they are not\nnecessary to salvation, if we conform our actions to the laws, we do\nnot only what we are allowed, but also what we are commanded by the\nlaw of nature, which is the moral law taught by our Saviour himself.\nAnd it is part of that obedience which must concur to our salvation.\n\n[Sidenote: This tenet, whatsoever is against the conscience is sin,\n interpreted.]\n\n12. And though it be true, whatsoever a man doth against his\nconscience, is sin; yet the obedience in these cases, is neither\nsin, nor against the conscience. For the conscience being nothing\nelse but a man\u2019s settled judgment and opinion, when he hath once\ntransferred his right of judging to another, that which shall be\ncommanded, is no less his judgment, than the judgment of that other.\nSo that in obedience to laws, a man doth still according to his own\nconscience, but not his private conscience. And whatsoever is done\ncontrary to private conscience, is then a sin, when the laws have\nleft him to his own liberty, and never else. And then whatsoever a\nman doth, not only believing it is ill done, but doubting whether it\nbe ill or not, is done ill, in case he may lawfully omit the doing.\n\n[Sidenote: That all men do confess the necessity of submitting of\n controversies to some human authority.]\n\n13. And as it hath been proved, that a man must submit his opinions\nin matter of controversy to the authority of the commonwealth; so\nalso is the same confessed by the practice of every one of them that\notherwise deny it. For who is there differing in opinion from\nanother, and thinking himself to be in the right, and the other in\nthe wrong, that would not think it reasonable, if he be of the same\nopinion that the whole state alloweth, that the other should submit\nhis opinion also thereunto; or that would not be content, if not\nthat one or a few men, yet all the divines of a whole nation, or at\nleast an assembly of all those he liketh, should have the power to\ndetermine all the controversies of religion? or, who is there that\nwould not be content, to submit his opinions, either to the pope, or\nto a general council, or to a provincial council, or to a presbytery\nof his own nation? And yet in all these cases he submitteth himself\nto no greater than human authority. Nor can a man be said to submit\nhimself to Holy Scripture, that doth not submit himself to some or\nother for the interpretation thereof. Or, why should there be any\nchurch government at all instituted, if the Scripture itself could\ndo the office of a judge in controversies of faith? But the truth is\napparent, by continual experience, that men seek not only liberty of\nconscience, but of their actions; nor that only, but a further\nliberty of persuading others to their opinions; nor that only, for\nevery man desireth, that the sovereign authority should admit no\nother opinions to be maintained, but such as he himself holdeth.\n\n[Sidenote: That Christians under an infidel are discharged of the\n injustice of disobeying him, in that which concerneth the\n faith necessary to salvation, by not resisting.]\n\n14. The difficulty therefore of obeying both God and man in a\nChristian commonwealth is none: all the difficulty resteth in this\npoint, whether he that hath received the faith of Christ, having\nbefore subjected himself to the authority of an infidel, be\ndischarged of his obedience thereby, or not, in matters of religion.\nIn which case it seemeth reasonable to think, that since all\ncovenants of obedience are entered into for the preservation of a\nman\u2019s life, if a man be content without resistance to lay down his\nlife, rather than obey the commands of an infidel, in so hard a case\nhe hath sufficiently discharged himself thereof. For no covenant\nbindeth further than to endeavour; and if a man cannot assure\nhimself to perform a just duty, when thereby he is assured of\npresent death, much less can it be expected that a man should\nperform that, for which he believeth in his heart he shall be damned\neternally. And thus much concerning the scruple of conscience, that\nmay arise concerning obedience to human laws, in them that interpret\nthe law of God to themselves. It remaineth, to remove the same\nscruple from them, that submit their controversies to others not\nordained thereunto by the sovereign authority. And this I refer to\nthe chapter following.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n\n1. The question propounded, who are the magistrates in the kingdom\n of Christ. 2. The question exemplified, in the controversies\n between Moses and Aaron, and between Moses and Corah. 3. Amongst\n the Jews, the power temporal and spiritual in the same hand. 4.\n Parallel of the twelve princes of Israel, and the twelve\n apostles. 5. Parallel of seventy elders, and seventy disciples.\n 6. The hierarchy of the church in our Saviour\u2019s time, consisted\n in the twelve, and in the seventy. 7. Why Christ ordained no\n priests for sacrifices, as Moses did. 8. The hierarchy of the\n church in the apostles' time, apostles, bishops, and priests. 9.\n The preaching of the gospel was not commanding, but persuading.\n 10. Excommunication. Sovereigns immediate rulers ecclesiastical\n under Christ. 11. That no man hath any just pretence of religion\n against obedience to commonwealth. God speaketh to man by his\n vicegerents.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The question propounded, who are the magistrates in the\n kingdom of Christ.]\n\n1. In the former chapter have been removed those difficulties\nopposing our obedience to human authority, which arise from\nmisunderstanding of our Saviour\u2019s title and laws: in the former\nwhereof, namely, his title, consisteth our faith; and in the latter,\nour justice. Now they who differ not amongst themselves concerning\nhis title and laws, may nevertheless have different opinions\nconcerning his magistrates, and the authority he hath given them.\nAnd this is the cause, why many Christians have denied obedience to\ntheir princes, pretending that our Saviour Christ hath not given\nthis magistracy to them, but to others. As for example: some say, to\nthe pope universally; some, to a synod aristocratical; some, to a\nsynod democratical in every several commonwealth; and the\nmagistrates of Christ being they by whom he speaketh, the question\nis, whether he speak unto us by the pope, or by convocations of\nbishops and ministers, or by them that have the sovereign power in\nevery commonwealth.\n\n[Sidenote: The question exemplified, in the controversies between\n Moses and Aaron, and between Moses and Corah.]\n\n2. This controversy was the cause of those two mutinies, that\nhappened against Moses in the wilderness. The first by Aaron and his\nsister Miriam, who took upon them to censure Moses, for marrying an\nEthiopian woman. And the state of the question between them and\nMoses, they set forth (Numb. xii. 2) in these words: _What hath the\nLord spoken but only by Moses? hath he not spoken also by us? And\nthe Lord heard this_, &c., and punished the same in Miriam,\nforgiving Aaron upon his repentance. And this is the case of all\nthem that set up the priesthood against the sovereignty. The other\nwas of Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, who with two hundred and fifty\ncaptains gathered themselves together against Moses, and against\nAaron. The state of their controversy was this, whether God were not\nwith the multitude, as well as with Moses, and every man as holy as\nhe. For (Numb. xvi. 3) thus they say, _You take too much upon you,\nseeing all the congregation is holy; every one of them, and the Lord\nis amongst them: wherefore then lift ye yourselves above the\ncongregation of the Lord?_ And this is the case of them that set up\ntheir private consciences, and unite themselves to take the\ngovernment of religion out of the hands of him or them, that have\nthe sovereign power of the commonwealth: which how well it pleaseth\nGod, may appear by the hideous punishment of Corah and his\naccomplices.\n\n[Sidenote: Amongst the Jews, the power temporal and spiritual in the\n same hand.]\n\n3. In the government therefore of Moses there was no power, neither\ncivil, nor spiritual, that was not derived from him. Nor in the\nstate of Israel under kings, was there any earthly power, by which\nthose kings were compellable to any thing, or any subject allowed to\nresist them in any case whatsoever. For though the prophets by\nextraordinary calling, did often admonish and threaten them, yet\nthey had no authority over them. And therefore amongst the Jews, the\npower spiritual and temporal, was always in the same hand.\n\n[Sidenote: Parallel of the twelve princes of Israel, and the twelve\n apostles.]\n\n4. Our Saviour Christ, as he was the rightful king of the Jews in\nparticular, as well as king of the kingdom of Heaven, in the\nordaining of magistrates, received that form of policy which was\nused by Moses. According to the number of the children of Jacob,\nMoses took unto him by the appointment of God (Numb. i. 4) twelve\nmen, every one of the chief of their tribe, which were to assist him\nin the muster of Israel. And these twelve, verse 44, are called the\n_princes of Israel, twelve men, every one for the house of their\nfathers_; which are said also (Numb. vii. 2), _to be heads over the\nhouses of their fathers, and princes of the tribes, and over them\nthat were numbered_. And these were every one equal amongst\nthemselves. In like manner our Saviour took unto him twelve\napostles, to be next unto him in authority, of whom he saith (Matth.\nxix. 28), _When the Son of Man shall sit in the throne of his\nmajesty, ye which follow me in the regeneration, shall sit also upon\ntwelve thrones, and judge the twelve tribes of Israel_. And\nconcerning the equality of the twelve apostles amongst themselves,\nour Saviour saith (Matth. xx. 25), _Ye know that the Lords of the\nGentiles have domination over them, &c._ Verse 26: _But it shall not\nbe so amongst you; but whosoever will be greatest among you, let him\nbe your servant_. And Matth. xxiii. 11: _He that is greatest among\nyou, let him be your servant_. And a little before, verse 8, _Be not\ncalled Rabbi; for one is your doctor, Christ, and all ye are\nbrethren_. And Acts i. in choosing of Matthias to be an apostle,\nthough St. Peter used the part of a _prolocutor_, yet did no man\ntake upon him the authority of election, but referred the same to\nlot.\n\n[Sidenote: Parallel of the seventy elders & seventy disciples.]\n\n5. Again, Moses had the command of God, Numb. xi. 16: _Gather to me\nseventy men of the elders of Israel, whom thou knowest that they are\nthe elders of the people, and governors over them, and bring them\nunto the tabernacle, &c._ And Moses, verse 24, did accordingly. And\nthese were chosen to help Moses in bearing the burthen of the\ngovernment, as appeareth, verse 17 of the same chapter. And as the\ntwelve princes of the tribes were according to the number of Jacob\u2019s\nchildren; so were the seventy elders according to the number of the\npersons that went down with Jacob into Egypt. In like manner our\nSaviour in his kingdom of Heaven, the church, out of the whole\nnumber of those that believed in him, ordained seventy persons,\nwhich peculiarly were called the seventy disciples, to whom he gave\npower to preach the Gospel and baptize.\n\n[Sidenote: The hierarchy of the church in our Saviour\u2019s time,\n consisted in the twelve, and in the seventy.]\n\n6. In our Saviour\u2019s time therefore, the hierarchy of the church\nconsisted, besides himself that was the head, of twelve apostles,\nwho were equal amongst themselves, but ordained over others, as were\nthe twelve heads of the tribes, and seventy disciples, who had every\none of them power to baptize and teach, and help to govern the whole\nflock.\n\n[Sidenote: Why Christ ordained no priests for sacrifices, as Moses\n did.]\n\n7. And whereas in the commonwealth instituted by Moses, there was\nnot only a high-priest for the present, but also a succession and\norder of priests; it may be demanded, why our Saviour Christ did not\nordain the like? To which may be answered, that the high-priesthood,\nforasmuch as concerneth the authority thereof, was in the person of\nChrist, as he was Christ, that is king. So also was it in Moses,\nAaron having the ministerial part only. For notwithstanding that\nAaron was the high-priest, yet the consecration of him belonged\n(Exod. xxix. 1) to Moses. All the utensils of sacrifice, and other\nholy things, were ordered by Moses; and in sum, the whole Levitical\nlaw was delivered by God by the hand of Moses, who was to Aaron a\nGod, and Aaron to him a mouth. And for the ministerial part, there\ncould no high-priest be ordained but himself; for seeing our Saviour\nwas himself the sacrifice, who but himself could offer him up? And\nfor the celebration of that sacrifice for ever after, our Saviour\nannexed the priesthood to those whom he had appointed to govern in\nthe church.\n\n[Sidenote: The hierarchy of the church, in the apostles' time,\n apostles, bishops, and priests.]\n\n8. After the ascension of our Saviour, the apostles dispersed\nthemselves for the spreading of the Gospel, and continually as they\nconverted any number of men, in any city or region, to the faith,\nthey chose out such as they thought fittest, to direct them in\nmatter of conversation and life, according to Christ\u2019s law, and to\nexplicate unto them, that mystery of Christ come in the flesh, that\nis to say, to unfold unto them at large the office of the Messiah.\nAnd of those elders, some were subordinate to others, according as\nthe apostles, who ordained them, thought meet. So St. Paul gave\npower unto Titus, to ordain elders in Crete, and to redress things\nthat were amiss. So that Titus was both an elder, and ordained\nelders (Tit. i. 5): _For this cause I left thee in Crete, that thou\nshouldest continue to redress the things that remain, and ordain\nelders in every city_; where the word is \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c3\u03c1\u03c2, that is\nconstitute; whereby it appeareth, that in the apostles' times, one\nelder had authority over another, to ordain and rule them. For 1\nTim. v. 19, Timothy an elder, is made judge of accusations against\nother elders. And Acts xiv. 23, the disciples are said to ordain\nelders, for all the congregations of the cities they had preached\nin. And though the word there be \u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, yet it signifieth\nnot election by holding up of hands, but simply and absolutely\nordination. For the ordinary choosing of magistrates amongst the\nGrecians, which were all either popularly governed, or else by\n_oligarchy_, being performed by holding up of hands, made that word\nbe taken simply, for an election or ordination, howsoever made. And\nthus in the primitive church, the hierarchy of the church, was\napostles, elders that governed other elders, and elders that ruled\nnot, but their office was to preach, to administer the sacraments,\nto offer up prayers and thanksgiving in the name of the people. But\nat that time there appeared no distinction between the names of\nbishop and elder. But immediately after the apostles' time, the word\nbishop was taken to signify such an elder as had the government of\nelders, and other elders were called by the name of priests, which\nsignifieth the same that elder doth. And thus the government of\nbishops hath a divine pattern in the twelve rulers, and seventy\nelders of Israel, in the twelve apostles and seventy disciples of\nour Saviour, in the ruling elders, and not ruling elders, in the\ntime of the apostles.\n\n[Sidenote: The preaching of the gospel was not commanding, but\n persuading.]\n\n9. And thus much of the magistrates over Christ\u2019s flock in the\nprimitive church. For the office of a minister, or ministress, was\nto be subject to the flock, and to serve them in those things which\nappertain to their temporal business. The next thing to be\nconsidered is the authority which our Saviour gave them, either over\nthose whom they had converted, or those whom they were about to\nconvert. And for these latter, which as yet were without the church,\nthe authority which our Saviour gave to his apostles was no more but\nthis, to preach unto them that Jesus was the Christ, and to\nexplicate the same in all points, that concern the kingdom of\nheaven, and to persuade men to embrace our Saviour\u2019s doctrine, but\nby no means to compel any man to be subject to them: for seeing the\nlaws of the kingdom of heaven, as hath been showed, Part I, chap. V.\nsect. 10, are dictated to the conscience only, which is not subject\nto compulsion and constraint, it was not congruent to the style of\nthe King of Heaven to constrain men to submit their actions to him,\nbut to advise them only; nor for him that professeth the sum of his\nlaw to be love, to extort any duty from us with fear of temporal\npunishment. And therefore as the mighty men in the world, that hold\nothers in subjection by force, are called in Scripture by the name\nof hunters; so our Saviour calleth those whom he appointed to draw\nthe world unto him, by subduing their affections, _fishers_. And\ntherefore he saith to Peter and Andrew, (Matth. iv. 19): _Follow me,\nand I will make ye fishers of men_. And Luke x. 3: _Behold_, saith\nChrist, _I send ye forth as lambs amongst wolves_. And it were to no\nend to give them the right of compelling, without strengthening the\nsame with greater power than of _lambs_ amongst _wolves_. Moreover,\nMatth. x, where our Saviour giveth a commission to his apostles, to\ngo forth and convert the nations to the faith, he giveth them no\nauthority of _coercion_ and punishment, but only saith, (verse 14,\n15) _Whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, when ye\ndepart out of that house, or that city, shake off the dust of your\nfeet. It shall be easier for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah in the\nday of judgment, than for that city._ Whereby it is manifest, that\nall that the apostles could do by their authority, was no more than\nto renounce communion with them, and leave their punishment to God\nAlmighty, in the day of judgment. Likewise the comparisons of the\nkingdom of heaven to the seed, Matth. xiii. 3, and to the leaven,\nMatth. xiii. 33, doth intimate unto us that the increase thereof\nought to proceed from internal operation of God\u2019s word preached, and\nnot from any law or compulsion of them that preach it. Moreover our\nSaviour himself saith (John xviii. 36), _That_ his _kingdom is not\nof this world_; and consequently his magistrates derive not from him\nany authority of punishing men in this world. And therefore also,\nMatth. xxvi. 52, after St. Peter had drawn his sword in his defence,\nour Saviour saith, _Put up thy sword into his place. For all that\ntake the sword, shall perish by the sword._ And, verse 54, _How then\nshall the Scriptures be fulfilled, which say, that it must be so?_\nshowing out of the Scriptures, that the kingdom of Christ was not to\nbe defended by the sword.\n\n[Sidenote: Excommunication. Sovereigns immediate rulers\n ecclesiastical under Christ.]\n\n10. But concerning the authority of the apostles or bishops over\nthose who were already converted and within the church, there be\nthat think it greater than over them without. For some have said,\n(Bellarmin. _Lib. de Rom. Pont._ cap. 29,) _Though the law of Christ\ndeprive no prince of his dominion, and Paul did rightly appeal unto\nC\u00e6sar, whilst kings were infidels and out of the church; yet when\nthey became Christians, and of their own accord underwent the laws\nof the gospel, presently as sheep to a shepherd, and as members to\nthe head, they became subject to the prelate of the ecclesiastical\nhierarchy_. Which, whether it be true or not, is to be considered by\nthat light which we have from the Holy Scripture, concerning the\npower of our Saviour and his apostles, over such as they had\nconverted. But our Saviour, as he imitated the commonwealth of the\nJews in his magistrates, the twelve and the seventy; so did he also\nin the censure of the church, which was _excommunication_; but\namongst the Jews, the church did put the excommunicated persons from\nthe congregation, which they might do by their power temporal; but\nour Saviour and his apostles, who took upon them no such power,\ncould not forbid the excommunicated person to enter into any place\nand congregation, into which he was permitted to enter, by the\nprince, or sovereign of the place. For that had been to deprive the\nsovereign of his authority. And therefore the excommunication of a\nperson subject to an earthly power, was but a declaration of the\nchurch, which did excommunicate, that the person so excommunicated\nwas to be reputed still as an infidel, but not to be driven by their\nauthority, out of any company, he might otherwise lawfully come\ninto. And this is it our Saviour saith (Matth. xviii. 17): _If he\nrefuse to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man\nand a publican_. So that the whole effect of excommunicating a\nChristian prince, is no more than he or they that so excommunicate\nhim depart and banish themselves out of his dominion. Nor can they\nthereupon discharge any of his subjects of their obedience to him;\nfor that were to deprive him of his dominion; which they may not do,\nfor being out of the church. It is confessed by them that make this\nobjection, and proved in the former section, that our Saviour gave\nno authority to his apostles to be judges over them. And therefore\nin no case can the sovereign power of a commonwealth be subject to\nany authority ecclesiastical, besides that of Christ himself. And\nthough he be informed concerning the kingdom of heaven, and subject\nhimself thereto at the persuasions of persons ecclesiastical, yet is\nhe not thereby subject to their government and rule. For if it were\nby their authority he took that yoke upon him, and not by their\npersuasion, then by the same authority he might cast it off. But\nthis is unlawful. For if all the churches in the world should\nrenounce the Christian faith, yet is not this sufficient authority\nfor any of the members to do the same. It is manifest therefore,\nthat they who have sovereign power, are immediate rulers of the\nchurch under Christ, and all other but subordinate to them. If that\nwere not, but kings should command one thing upon pain of death, and\npriests another, upon pain of damnation, it would be impossible that\npeace and religion should stand together.\n\n[Sidenote: That no man hath any just pretence of religion against\n obedience to commonwealth. God speaketh to man by his\n vicegerents.]\n\n11. And therefore there is no just cause for any man to withdraw his\nobedience from the sovereign state, upon pretence that Christ hath\nordained any state ecclesiastical above it. And though kings take\nnot upon them the ministerial priesthood, yet are they not so merely\nlaic, as not to have sacerdotal jurisdiction. To conclude this\nchapter, since God speaketh not in these days to any man by his\nprivate interpretation of the Scriptures, nor by the interpretation\nof any power above, or not depending on the sovereign power of every\ncommonwealth, it remaineth, that he speaketh by his vice-gods, or\nlieutenants here on earth, that is to say, by sovereign kings, or\nsuch as have sovereign authority as well as they.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n\n1. The things that dispose to rebellion, discontent, pretence, and\n hope of success. 2. Discontent that disposeth to sedition,\n consisteth partly in fear of want, or punishment: 3. Partly in\n ambition. 4. Six heads of pretences to rebellion. 5. The first\n of them, that men ought to do nothing against conscience,\n confuted. 6. The second, that sovereigns are subject to their\n own laws, confuted. 7. The third, that the sovereignty is\n divisible, confuted. 8. The fourth, that subjects have a\n propriety distinct from the dominion of the sovereign, confuted.\n 9. The fifth, that the people is a person distinct from the\n sovereign, confuted. 10. The sixth, that tyrannicide is lawful,\n confuted. 11. Four heads of hope of success in rebellion. 12.\n Two things necessary to an author of rebellion, much eloquence,\n and little wisdom. 13. That the authors of rebellion necessarily\n are to be men of little wisdom. 14. That the same are\n necessarily eloquent. 15. In what manner they concur to their\n common effects.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The things that dispose to rebellion, discontent,\n pretence, and hope of success.]\n\n1. Hitherto of the causes why, and the manner how, men have made\ncommonwealth. In this chapter I shall show briefly by what causes,\nand in what manner, they be again destroyed; not meaning to say\nanything concerning the dissolution of a commonwealth, from foreign\ninvasions, which is as it were the violent death thereof. I shall\nspeak only of sedition, which is also the death of the commonwealth,\nbut like to that which happeneth to a man from sickness and\ndistemper. To dispose men to sedition, three things concur. The\nfirst is discontent; for as long as a man thinketh himself well, and\nthat the present government standeth not in his way to hinder his\nproceeding from well to better, it is impossible for him to desire\nthe change thereof. The second is pretence of right; for though a\nman be discontent, yet if in his own opinion there be no just cause\nof stirring against, or resisting the government established, nor\nany pretence to justify his resistance, and to procure aid, he will\nnever show it. The third is hope of success; for it were madness to\nattempt without hope, when to fail, is to die the death of a\ntraitor. Without these three, discontent, pretence, and hope, there\ncan be no rebellion: and when the same are all together, there\nwanteth nothing thereto, but a man of credit to set up the standard,\nand to blow the trumpet.\n\n[Sidenote: Discontent that disposeth to sedition, consisteth partly\n in fear of want, or punishment:]\n\n2. And as for discontent, it is of two sorts: for it consisteth\neither in bodily pain present or expected, or else in trouble of the\nmind; which is the general division of pleasure and pain, _Human\nNature_, chap. VII. sect. 8. The presence of bodily pain disposeth\nnot to sedition; the fear of it doth. As for example; when a great\nmultitude, or heap of people, have concurred to a crime worthy of\ndeath, they join together, and take arms to defend themselves for\nfear thereof. So also the fear of want, or in present want, the fear\nof arrests and imprisonment dispose to sedition. And therefore great\nexactions, though the right thereof be acknowledged, have caused\ngreat seditions. As in the time of Henry VII. the seditions of the\nCornish men, that refused to pay a subsidy, and, under the conduct\nof the Lord Audley, gave the King battle upon Blackheath; and that\nof the northern people, who in the same king\u2019s time, for demanding a\nsubsidy granted in parliament, murdered the Earl of Northumberland\nin his house.\n\n[Sidenote: Partly in ambition.]\n\n3. Thirdly, the other sort of discontent, which troubleth the mind\nof them who otherwise live at ease, without fear of want, or danger\nof violence, ariseth only from a sense of their want of that power,\nand that honour and testimony thereof, which they think is due unto\nthem. For all joy and grief of mind consisting (as hath been said,\n_Human Nature_, chap. IX. sect. 21) in a contention for precedence\nto them with whom they compare themselves; such men must needs take\nit ill, and be grieved with the state, as find themselves postposed\nto those in honour, whom they think they excel in virtue and ability\nto govern. And this is it for which they think themselves regarded\nbut as slaves. Now seeing freedom cannot stand together with\nsubjection, liberty in a commonwealth is nothing but government and\nrule, which because it cannot be divided, men must expect in common;\nand that can be no where but in the popular state, or democracy. And\nAristotle saith well, (lib. VI. cap. 2 of his _Politics_), _The\nground or intention of a democracy, is liberty_. Which he confirmeth\nin these words: _For men ordinarily say this, that no man can\npartake of liberty, but only in a popular commonwealth_. Whosoever\ntherefore in a monarchical estate, where the sovereign power is\nabsolutely in one man, claimeth liberty, claimeth (if the hardest\nconstruction should be made thereof) either to have the sovereignty\nin his turn, or to be colleague with him that hath it, or to have\nthe monarchy changed into a democracy. But if the same be construed,\nwith pardon of that unskilful expression, according to the intention\nof him that claimeth, then doth he thereby claim no more but this,\nthat the sovereign should take notice of his ability and deserving,\nand put him into employment and place of subordinate government,\nrather than others that deserve less. And as one claimeth, so doth\nanother, every man esteeming his own desert greatest. Amongst all\nthose that pretend to, or are ambitious of such honour, a few only\ncan be served, unless it be in a _democracy_; the rest therefore\nmust be discontent. And so much of the first thing that disposeth to\nrebellion, namely, discontent, consisting in fear and ambition.\n\n[Sidenote: Six heads of pretences to rebellion.]\n\n4. The second thing that disposeth to rebellion, is _pretence of\nright_. And that is when men have an opinion, or pretend to have an\nopinion, that in certain cases they may lawfully resist him or them\nthat have the sovereign power, or deprive him or them of the means\nto execute the same. Of which pretences, there be six special cases.\nOne is, when the command is against their conscience, and they\nbelieve it is unlawful for a subject at the command of the sovereign\npower to do any action, which he thinketh in his own conscience not\nlawful for him to do, or to omit any action, which he thinketh not\nlawful for him to omit. Another is, when the command is against the\nlaws, and they think the sovereign power in such sort obliged to his\nown laws, as the subject is; and that when he performeth not his\nduty, they may resist his power. A third is, when they receive\ncommands from some man or men, and a _supersedeas_ to the same from\nothers, and think the authority is equal, as if the sovereign power\nwere divided. A fourth is, when they are commanded to contribute\ntheir persons or money to the public service, and think they have a\npropriety in the same distinct from the dominion of the sovereign\npower; and that therefore they are not bound to contribute their\ngoods and persons, no more than every man shall of himself think\nfit. A fifth, when the commands seem hurtful to the people; and they\nthink, every one of them, that the opinion and sense of the people,\nis the same with the opinion of himself, and those that consent with\nhim; calling by the name of people, any multitude of his own\nfaction. The sixth is, when the commands are grievous; and they\naccount him that commandeth grievous things a tyrant; and\ntyrannicide, that is, the killing of a tyrant, not only lawful, but\nalso laudable.\n\n[Sidenote: The first of them, that men ought to do nothing against\n conscience, confuted.]\n\n5. All these opinions are maintained in the books of the\n_dogmatics_, and divers of them taught in public chairs, and\nnevertheless are most incompatible with peace and government, and\ncontradictory to the necessary and demonstrable rules of the same.\nAnd for the first, namely, that a man may lawfully do or omit any\nthing against his conscience, and from whence arise all seditions\nconcerning religion and ecclesiastical government, it hath been\nplainly declared in the two last chapters, that such opinion is\nerroneous. For those two chapters have been wholly spent, to prove,\nthat Christian religion not only forbiddeth not, but also\ncommandeth, that in every commonwealth, every subject should in all\nthings to the uttermost of his power obey the commands of him or\nthem that is the sovereign thereof, and that a man in so obeying,\ndoth according to his conscience and judgment, as having deposited\nhis judgment in all controversies in the hands of the sovereign\npower; and that this error proceedeth from the ignorance of what and\nby whom God Almighty speaketh.\n\n[Sidenote: The second, that sovereigns are subject to their own\n laws, confuted.]\n\n6. As for the second opinion, which is this, that the sovereign is\nin such sort obliged to his own laws, as the subject is; the\ncontrary thereof hath been showed, Part II. chapter I. sections\n7-12, by which it appeareth, that the sovereign power is not to be\nresisted; that it carrieth the sword both of war and justice; that\nit hath the right of deciding all controversies, both judicial and\ndeliberative; that it hath the making of all the laws civil; that it\nappointeth magistrates and public ministers, and that it implieth an\nuniversal impunity. How then can he or they be said to be subject to\nthe laws which they may abrogate at their pleasure, or break without\nfear of punishment? And this error seemeth to proceed from this,\nthat men ordinarily understand not aright, what is meant by this\nword law, confounding law and covenant, as if they signify the same\nthing. But law implieth a command; covenant is but a promise. And\nnot every command is a law, but only (_Human Nature_, chap. XIII.\nsect. 6) when the command is the reason we have of doing the action\ncommanded. And then only is the reason of our actions in the\ncommand, when the omitting is therefore hurtful, because the action\nwas commanded, not because it was hurtful of itself; and doing\ncontrary to a command, were not at all hurtful, if there were not a\nright in him that commandeth to punish him that so doth. He or they\nthat have all punishments in their own disposing, cannot be so\ncommanded, as to receive hurt for disobeying, and consequently no\ncommand can be a law unto them. It is an error therefore to think,\nthat the power which is virtually the whole power of the\ncommonwealth, and which in whomsoever it resideth, is usually called\nsupreme or sovereign, can be subject to any law but that of God\nAlmighty.\n\n[Sidenote: The third, that the sovereignty is divisible, confuted.]\n\n7. The third opinion, _that the sovereign power may be divided_, is\nno less an error than the former, as hath been proved, Part II.\nchapter I. sect. 15. And if there were a commonwealth, wherein the\nrights of sovereignty were divided, we must confess with Bodin, Lib.\nII. chap. I. _De Republica_, that they are not rightly to be called\ncommonwealths, but the corruption of commonwealths. For if one part\nshould have power to make the laws for all, they would by their laws\nat their pleasure, forbid others, to make peace or war, to levy\ntaxes, or to yield fealty and homage without their leave; and they\nthat had the right to make peace and war, and command the _militia_,\nwould forbid the making of other laws, than what themselves liked.\nAnd though monarchies stand long, wherein the right of sovereignty\nhath seemed so divided, because monarchy of itself is a durable kind\nof government, yet monarchs have been thereby divers times thrust\nout of their possession. But the truth is, that the right of\nsovereignty is such, as he or they that have it, cannot, though they\nwould, give away any part thereof, and retain the rest. As for\nexample; if we should suppose the people of Rome to have had the\nabsolute sovereignty of the Roman state, and to have chosen them a\ncouncil by the name of the senate, and that to this senate they had\ngiven the supreme power of making laws, reserving nevertheless to\nthemselves, in direct and express terms, the whole right and title\nof the sovereignty; which may easily happen amongst them that see\nnot the inseparable connexion between the sovereign power, and the\npower of making laws: I say, this grant of the people to the senate\nis of no effect, and the power of making laws is in the people\nstill. For the senate understanding it to be the will and intention\nof the people, to retain the sovereignty, ought not to take that for\ngranted, which was contradictory thereto, and passed by error. For\n(_Human Nature_, chap. XIII. sect. 9) in contradictory promises,\nthat which is directly promised, is preferred before that which is\nopposite thereunto by consequence; because the consequence of a\nthing is not always obscured, as is the thing itself. The error\nconcerning mixed government hath proceeded from want of\nunderstanding of what is meant by this word _body politic_, and how\nit signifieth not the concord, but the union of many men. And though\nin the chapters of subordinate corporations, a corporation being\ndeclared to be one person in law, yet the same hath not been taken\nnotice of in the body of a commonwealth or city, nor have any of\nthose innumerable writers of politics, observed any such union.\n\n[Sidenote: The fourth, that subjects have a propriety distinct from\n the dominion of the sovereign, confuted.]\n\n8. The fourth opinion, to wit, that subjects have their _meum_,\n_tuum_, and _suum_, in property, not only by virtue of the sovereign\npower over them all, distinct from one another, but also against the\nsovereign himself, by which they would pretend to contribute nothing\nto the public, but what they please, hath been already confuted, by\nproving the absoluteness of the sovereignty, and more particularly,\nPart II. chapter V. sect. 2; and ariseth from this, that they\nunderstand not ordinarily that before the institution of sovereign\npower, _meum_ and _tuum_, implied no propriety, but a community,\nwhere every man had right to every thing, and was in state of war\nwith every man.\n\n[Sidenote: The fifth, that the people is a person distinct from the\n sovereign, confuted.]\n\n9. The fifth opinion, _That the people is a distinct body from him\nor them that have the sovereignty over them_, is an error already\nconfuted, Part II. chap. II. sect 11, where it is showed, that when\nmen say, _the people rebelleth_, it is to be understood of those\nparticular persons only, and not of the whole nation. And when the\npeople claimeth any thing otherwise than by the voice of the\nsovereign power, it is not the claim of the people, but only of\nthose particular men, that claim in their own persons; and this\nerror ariseth from the equivocation of the word _people_.\n\n[Sidenote: The sixth, that tyrannicide is lawful, confuted.]\n\n10. Lastly, for the opinion, _that tyrannicide is lawful_, meaning\nby a tyrant any man in whom resideth the right of sovereignty, is no\nless false and pernicious to human society, than frequent in the\nwritings of those moral philosophers, Seneca and others, so greatly\nesteemed amongst us. For when a man hath the right of sovereignty,\nhe cannot justly be punished, as hath been often showed already, and\ntherefore much less deposed, or put to death. And howsoever he might\ndeserve punishment, yet punishment is unjust without judgment\npreceding, and judgment unjust without power of judicature, which a\nsubject hath not over a sovereign. But this doctrine proceedeth from\nthe Schools of Greece, and from those that writ in the Roman state,\nin which not only the name of a tyrant, but of a king, was hateful.\n\n[Sidenote: Four heads of hope of success in rebellion.]\n\n11. Besides _discontent_, to the disposing of a man to rebellion,\nand pretence, there is required, in the third place, _hope of\nsuccess_, which consisteth in four points: I. That the discontented\nhave mutual intelligence; II. That they have sufficient number; III.\nThat they have arms; IV. That they agree upon a head. For these four\nmust concur to the making of one body of rebellion, in which\nintelligence is the life, number the limbs, arms the strength, and a\nhead the unity, by which they are directed to one and the same\naction.\n\n[Sidenote: Two things necessary to an author of rebellion, much\n eloquence, and little wisdom.]\n\n12. The authors of rebellion, that is, the men that breed these\ndispositions to rebel in others, of necessity must have in them\nthese three qualities: I. To be discontented themselves; II. To be\nmen of mean judgment and capacity; and, III. To be eloquent men, or\ngood orators. And as for their discontent, from whence it may\nproceed, hath been already declared. And for the second and third, I\nam to show now, first, how they may stand together; for it seemeth a\ncontradiction, to place small judgment and great eloquence, or, as\nthey call it, powerful speaking, in the same man: and then in what\nmanner they concur, to dispose other men to sedition.\n\n[Sidenote: That the authors of rebellion necessarily, are to be men\n of little wisdom.]\n\n13. It was noted by Sallust, that in Catiline, who was author of the\ngreatest sedition that ever was in Rome, there was _Eloquenti\u00e6\nsatis, sapienti\u00e6 parum_; _eloquence sufficient_, but _little\nwisdom_. And perhaps this was said of Catiline, as he was Catiline:\nbut it was true of him as an author of sedition. For the conjunction\nof these two qualities made him not Catiline, but seditious. And\nthat it may be understood, how want of _wisdom_, and store of\n_eloquence_, may stand together, we are to consider, what it is we\ncall wisdom, and what eloquence. And therefore I shall here again\nremember some things, that have been said already, _Human Nature_,\nchap. V. VI. It is manifest that wisdom consisteth in knowledge. Now\nof knowledge there are two kinds; whereof the one is the remembrance\nof such things, as we have conceived by our senses, and of the order\nin which they follow one another. And this _knowledge_ is called\n_experience_; and the wisdom that proceedeth from it, is that\nability to conjecture by the present, of what is past, and to come,\nwhich men call _prudence_. This being so, it is manifest presently,\nthat the author of sedition, whosoever he be, must not be prudent.\nFor if he consider and take his experiences aright, concerning the\nsuccess which they have had, who have been the movers and authors of\nsedition, either in this or any other state, he shall find, that for\none man that hath thereby advanced himself to honour, twenty have\ncome to a reproachful end. The other kind of knowledge, is the\nremembrance of the names or appellations of things, and how every\nthing is called, which is, in matters of common conversation, a\nremembrance of pacts and covenants of men made amongst themselves,\nconcerning how to be understood of one another. And this kind of\nknowledge is generally called science, and the conclusions thereof\ntruth. But when men remember not how things are named, by general\nagreement, but either mistake and misname things, or name them\naright by chance, they are not said to have science, but opinion,\nand the conclusions thence proceeding, are uncertain, and for the\nmost part erroneous. Now that science in particular, from which\nproceed the true and evident conclusions of what is right and wrong,\nand what is good and hurtful to the being, and well-being of\nmankind, the Latins call _sapientia_, and we by the general name of\nwisdom. For generally, not he that hath skill in geometry, or any\nother science speculative, but only he that understandeth what\nconduceth to the good and government of the people, is called a wise\nman. Now that no author of sedition can be wise in this acceptation\nof the word, is sufficiently proved, in that it hath been already\ndemonstrated, that no pretence of sedition can be right or just. And\ntherefore the authors of sedition must be ignorant of the right of\nstate, that is to say, unwise. It remaineth therefore, that they be\nsuch, as name things, not according to their true and generally\nagreed upon names, but call right and wrong, good and bad, according\nto their passions, or according to the authorities of such as they\nadmire, as Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and others of like authority,\nwho have given the names of right and wrong, as their passions have\ndictated; or have followed the authority of other men, as we do\ntheirs. It is required therefore in an author of sedition, that he\nthink right, that which is wrong; and profitable, that which is\npernicious; and consequently that there be in him _sapienti\u00e6 parum_,\nlittle wisdom.\n\n[Sidenote: That the same are necessarily eloquent.]\n\n14. Eloquence is nothing else but the power of winning belief of\nwhat we say. And to that end we must have aid from the passions of\nthe hearer. Now to demonstration and teaching of the truth, there\nare required long deductions, and great attention, which is\nunpleasant to the hearer. Therefore they which seek not truth, but\nbelief, must take another way, and not only derive what they would\nhave to be believed, from somewhat believed already, but also, by\naggravations and extenuations, make good and bad, right and wrong,\nappear great or less, according as shall serve their turns. And such\nis the power of eloquence, as many times a man is made to believe\nthereby, that he sensibly feeleth smart and damage, when he feeleth\nnone, and to enter into rage and indignation, without any other\ncause, than what is in the words and passion of the speaker. This\nconsidered, together with the business that he hath to do, who is\nthe author of rebellion, namely, to make men believe that their\nrebellion is just, their discontents grounded upon great injuries,\nand their hopes great; there needeth no more to prove, there can be\nno author of rebellion, that is not an eloquent and powerful\nspeaker, and withal, as hath been said before, a man of little\nwisdom. For the faculty of speaking powerfully, consisteth in a\nhabit gotten of putting together passionate words, and applying them\nto the present passions of the hearer. are not able to effect.\n\n[Sidenote: In what manner they concur to their common effects.]\n\n15. Seeing then eloquence and want of discretion concur to the\nstirring of rebellion, it may be demanded, what part each of these\nacteth therein? The daughters of Pelias, king of Thessaly, desiring\nto restore their old decrepit father to the vigour of his youth, by\nthe counsel of Medea, chopped him in pieces, and set him a boiling\nwith I know not what herbs in a cauldron, but could not revive him\nagain. So when eloquence and want of judgment go together, want of\njudgment, like the daughters of Pelias, consenteth, through\neloquence, which is as the witchcraft of Medea, to cut the\ncommonwealth in pieces, upon pretence or hope of reformation, which\nwhen things are in combustion, they are not able to effect.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER IX.\n\n1. The law over sovereigns, _salus populi_. 2. That sovereigns ought\n to establish the religion they hold for best. 3. That to forbid\n unnatural copulation, promiscuous use of women, &c. is the law\n of nature. 4. That to leave man as much liberty as may be, &c.\n is the duty of a sovereign by the law of nature. 5. _Meum_ and\n _tuum_, to be set out to the subjects, distinct from one\n another, &c. a duty of sovereigns by the law of nature. 6. An\n extraordinary power for judging the abuses of magistrates,\n necessary, &c. 7. The suppressing of popularity, &c. necessary,\n &c. 8. The instruction of youth, &c. necessary, &c. 9. Avoiding\n of unnecessary war, a necessary duty of the sovereign, &c.\n\n\n[Sidenote: The law over sovereigns _salus populi_.]\n\n1. Having hitherto set forth how a body politic is made, and how it\nmay be destroyed, this place requireth to say something concerning\nthe preservation of the same, not purposing to enter into the\nparticulars of the art of government, but to sum up the general\nheads, wherein such art is to be employed, and in which consisteth\nthe duty of him or them that have the sovereign power. For the duty\nof a sovereign consisteth in the good government of the people. And\nalthough the acts of sovereign power be no injuries to the subjects\nwho have consented to the same by their implicit wills, yet when\nthey tend to the hurt of the people in general, they be breaches of\nthe law of nature, and of the divine law; and consequently, the\ncontrary acts are the duties of sovereigns, and required at their\nhands to the utmost of their endeavour, by God Almighty, under the\npain of eternal death. And as the art and duty of sovereigns consist\nin the same acts, so also doth their profit. For the end of art, is\nprofit; and governing to the profit of the subjects, is governing to\nthe profit of the sovereign, as hath been showed Part II. chapter V.\nsection 1. And these three: 1. The law over them that have sovereign\npower: 2. Their duty: 3. Their profit: are one and the same thing\ncontained in this sentence, _Salus populi suprema lex_. By which\nmust be understood, not the mere preservation of their lives, but\ngenerally their benefit and good. So that this is the general law\nfor sovereigns, _That they procure, to the uttermost of their\nendeavour, the good of the people_.\n\n[Sidenote: That sovereigns ought to establish the religion they hold\n for best.]\n\n2. And forasmuch as eternal is better than temporal good, it is\nevident, that they who are in sovereign authority, are by the law of\nnature obliged to further the establishing of all such doctrines and\nrule, and the commanding of all such actions, as in their conscience\nthey believe to be the true way thereunto. For unless they do so, it\ncannot be said truly, that they have done the uttermost of their\nendeavour.\n\n[Sidenote: That to forbid unnatural copulation, promiscuous use of\n women, &c. is the law of nature.]\n\n3. For the temporal good of the people, it consisteth in four\npoints: 1. Multitude: 2. Commodity of living: 3. Peace amongst\nthemselves: 4. Defence against foreign power. Concerning multitude,\nit is the duty of them that are in sovereign authority, to increase\nthe people, in as much as they are governors of mankind under God\nAlmighty, who having created but one man, and one woman, declared,\nthat it was his will they should be multiplied and increased\nafterwards. And seeing this is to be done by ordinances concerning\ncopulation, they are by the law of nature bound to make such\nordinances concerning the same, as may tend to the increase of\nmankind. And hence it cometh, that in them who have sovereign\nauthority, not to forbid such copulations as are against the use of\nnature; not to forbid the promiscuous use of women, not to forbid\none woman to have many husbands, not to forbid marriages within\ncertain degrees of kindred and affinity, are against the law of\nnature. For though it be not evident, that a private man living\nunder the law of natural reason only, doth break the same, by doing\nany of the things aforesaid; yet it is manifestly apparent, that\nbeing so prejudicial as they are to the improvement of mankind, that\nnot to forbid the same, is against the law of natural reason in him,\nthat hath taken into his hands any portion of mankind to improve.\n\n[Sidenote: That to leave man as much liberty as may be, &c. is the\n duty of a sovereign by the law of nature.]\n\n4. The commodity of living consisteth in liberty and wealth. By\nliberty, I mean, that there be no prohibition without necessity of\nany thing to any man, which was lawful to him in the law of nature;\nthat is to say, that there be no restraint of natural liberty, but\nwhat is necessary for the good of the commonwealth, and that\nwell-meaning men may not fall into the danger of laws, as into\nsnares, before they be aware. It appertaineth also to this liberty,\nthat a man may have commodious passage from place to place, and not\nbe imprisoned or confined with the difficulty of ways, and want of\nmeans for transportation of things necessary. And for the wealth of\npeople, it consisteth in three things, the well ordering of trade,\nprocuring of labour, and forbidding the superfluous consuming of\nfood and apparel. All those therefore that are in sovereign\nauthority, and have taken upon them the government of people, are\nbound by the law of nature to make ordinances consisting in the\npoints afore named, as being contrary to the law of nature,\nunnecessarily, either for one\u2019s own fancy, to enthral, or tie men\nso, as they cannot move without danger; or to suffer them whose\nmaintenance is our benefit, to want anything necessary for them, by\nour negligence.\n\n[Sidenote: _Meum_ and _tuum_, to be set out to the subjects,\n distinct from one another, &c. a duty of sovereigns by\n the law of nature.]\n\n5. For maintaining of peace at home, there be so many things\nnecessarily to be considered, and taken order in, as there be\nseveral causes concurring to sedition. And first, it is necessary to\nset out to every subject, his propriety, and distinct lands and\ngoods, upon which he may exercise and have the benefit of his own\nindustry, and without which men would fall out amongst themselves,\nas did the herdsmen of Abraham and Lot, every man encroaching and\nusurping as much of the common benefit as he can, which tendeth to\nquarrel and sedition. Secondly, to divide the burthens and charges\nof the commonwealth proportionably. Now there is a _proportionably_\nto every man\u2019s ability, and there is a _proportionably_ to his\nbenefit by commonwealth: and this latter is it, which is according\nto the law of nature. For the burdens of the commonwealth being the\nprice that we pay for the benefit thereof, they ought to be measured\nthereby. And there is no reason, when two men equally enjoying, by\nthe benefit of the commonwealth, their peace and liberty, to use\ntheir industry to get their livings, whereof one spareth, and layeth\nup somewhat, the other spendeth all he gets, why they should not\nequally contribute to the common charge. That seemeth therefore to\nbe the most equal way of dividing the burden of public charge, when\nevery man shall contribute according to what he spendeth, and not\naccording to what he gets. And this is then done, when men pay the\ncommonwealth\u2019s part in the payments they make for their own\nprovision. And this seemeth not only most equal, but also least\nsensible, and least to trouble the mind of them that pay it. For\nthere is nothing so aggravateth the grief of parting with money to\nthe public, as to think they are over-rated, and that their\nneighbours whom they envy, do thereupon insult over them, and this\ndisposeth them to resistance, and, after that such resistance hath\nproduced a mischief, to rebellion.\n\n[Sidenote: An extraordinary power for judging the abuses of\n magistrates, necessary, &c.]\n\n6. Another thing necessary for the maintaining of peace, is the due\nexecution of justice, which consisteth principally in the right\nperformance of their duties, which are the magistrates, ordained for\nthe same by and under the authority of the sovereign power, which\nbeing private men in respect of the sovereign, and consequently such\nas may have private ends, whereby they may be corrupted with gifts,\nor intercession of friends, ought to be kept in awe by an higher\npower, lest people, grieved by their injustice, should take upon\nthem to make their own revenges, to the disturbance of the common\npeace; which can by no way be avoided in the principal and immediate\nmagistrates, without the judicature of the sovereign himself, or\nsome extraordinary power delegated by him. It is therefore\nnecessary, that there be a power extraordinary, as there shall be\noccasion from time to time, for the syndication of judges and other\nmagistrates, that shall abuse their authority, to the wrong and\ndiscontent of the people; and a free and open way for the presenting\nof grievances to him or them that have the sovereign authority.\n\n[Sidenote: The suppressing of popularity, &c. necessary, &c.]\n\n7. Besides these considerations, by which are prevented the\ndiscontents that arise from oppression, there ought to be some means\nfor the keeping under of those, that are disposed to rebellion by\nambition; which consist principally in the constancy of him that\nhath the sovereign power, who ought therefore constantly to grace\nand encourage such, as being able to serve the commonwealth, do\nnevertheless contain themselves within the bounds of modesty,\nwithout repining at the authority of such as are employed, and\nwithout aggravating the errors, which, as men, they may commit,\nespecially when they suffer not in their own particular; and\nconstantly to show displeasure, and dislike of the contrary. And not\nonly so, but also to ordain severe punishments for such, as shall by\nreprehension of public actions, affect popularity and applause\namongst the multitude, by which they may be enabled to have a\nfaction in the commonwealth at their devotion.\n\n[Sidenote: The instruction of youth, &c. necessary, &c.]\n\n8. Another thing necessary, is the rooting out of the consciences of\nmen, all those opinions which seem to justify and give pretence of\nright to rebellious actions; such as are the opinions, that a man\ncan do nothing lawfully against his private conscience; that they\nwho have the sovereignty, are subject to the civil laws; that there\nis any authority of subjects, whose negative may hinder the\naffirmative of the sovereign power; that any subject hath a\npropriety distinct from the dominion of the commonwealth; that there\nis a body of the people without him or them that have the sovereign\npower; and that any lawful sovereign may be resisted under the name\nof a tyrant; which opinions are they, which, Part II. chap. VIII.\nsect. 5-10, have been declared to dispose men to rebellion. And\nbecause opinions which are gotten by education, and in length of\ntime, are made habitual, cannot be taken away by force, and upon the\nsudden; they must therefore be taken away also by time and\neducation. And seeing the said opinions have proceeded from private\nand public teaching, and those teachers have received them from\ngrounds and principles, which they have learned in the Universities,\nfrom the doctrine of Aristotle, and others, who have delivered\nnothing concerning morality and policy demonstratively; but being\npassionately addicted to popular government, have insinuated their\nopinions by eloquent sophistry. There is no doubt, if the true\ndoctrine concerning the law of nature, and the properties of a body\npolitic, and the nature of law in general, were perspicuously set\ndown and taught in the Universities, but that young men, who come\nthither void of prejudice, and whose minds are as white paper,\ncapable of any instruction, would more easily receive the same, and\nafterward teach it to the people, both in books and otherwise, than\nnow they do the contrary.\n\n[Sidenote: Avoiding of unnecessary war, a necessary duty of the\n sovereign, &c.]\n\n9. The last thing contained in that supreme law, _salus populi_, is\ntheir defence; and consisteth partly in the obedience and unity of\nthe subjects, of which hath been already spoken, and in which\nconsisteth the means of levying soldiers, and of having money, arms,\nships, and fortified places in readiness for defence; and partly, in\nthe avoiding of unnecessary wars. For such commonwealths, or such\nmonarchs, as affect war for itself, that is to say, out of ambition,\nor of vain-glory, or that make account to revenge every little\ninjury, or disgrace done by their neighbours, if they ruin not\nthemselves, their fortune must be better than they have reason to\nexpect.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CHAPTER X.\n\n1. All expressions, &c. concerning future actions, are either\n covenant, counsel, or command. 2. The difference between a law\n and a covenant. 3. The command of him whose command is law in\n one thing, is law in every thing. 4. The difference between law\n and counsel. 5. The difference between _jus_ and _lex_. 6. The\n division of laws, &c. 7. That the divine moral law, and the law\n of nature, is the same. 8. That the civil laws are the common\n measure of right and wrong, &c. 9. Martial law is civil law. 10.\n Written laws, &c. Unwritten, &c. Customs and opinions, &c.\n\n\n[Sidenote: All expressions, &c. concerning future actions, are\n either covenant, counsel, or command.]\n\n1. Thus far concerning the Nature of Man, and the constitution and\nproperties of a Body Politic. There remaineth only for the last\nchapter, to speak of the nature and sorts of law. And first it is\nmanifest, that all laws are declarations of the mind, concerning\nsome action future to be done, or omitted. And all declarations and\nexpressions of the mind concerning future actions and omissions, are\neither _promissive_, as _I will do, or not do_; or _provisive_, as\nfor example, _If this be done or not done, this will follow_; or\n_imperative_, as _Do this, or do it not_. In the first sort of these\nexpressions, consisteth the nature of a covenant; in the second,\nconsisteth counsel; in the third, command.\n\n[Sidenote: The difference between a law and a covenant.]\n\n2. It is evident when a man doth, or forbeareth to do any action, if\nhe be moved thereto by this only consideration, that the same is\ngood or evil in itself; and that there be no reason why the will or\npleasure of another, should be of any weight in his deliberation,\nthat then neither to do nor omit the action deliberated, is any\nbreach of law. And consequently, whatsoever is a law to a man,\nrespecteth the will of another, and the declaration thereof. But a\ncovenant is a declaration of a man\u2019s own will. And therefore a law\nand a covenant differ: and though they be both obligatory, and a law\nobligeth no otherwise than by virtue of some covenant made by him\nwho is subject thereunto, yet they oblige by several sorts of\npromises. For a covenant obligeth by promise of an action, or\nomission especially named and limited; but a law bindeth by a\npromise of obedience in general, whereby the action to be done, or\nleft undone, is referred to the determination of him, to whom the\ncovenant is made. So that the difference between a covenant and a\nlaw, standeth thus: in simple covenant, the action to be done, or\nnot done, is first limited and made known, and then followeth the\npromise to do or not do; but in a law, the obligation to do or not\nto do, precedeth, and the declaration what is to be done, or not\ndone, followeth after.\n\n[Sidenote: The command of him whose command is law in one thing, is\n law in every thing.]\n\n3. And from this may be deduced, that which to some may seem a\n_paradox, That the command of him, whose command is a law in one\nthing, is a law in every thing_. For seeing a man is obliged to\nobedience before what he is to do be known, he is obliged to obey in\ngeneral, that is to say, in every thing.\n\n[Sidenote: The difference between law and counsel.]\n\n4. That the counsel of a man is no law to him that is counselled,\nand that he who alloweth another to give him counsel, doth not\nthereby oblige himself to follow the same, is manifest enough. And\nyet men usually call counselling, by the name of governing; not that\nthey are not able to distinguish between them, but because they envy\nmany times those men that are called to counsel, and are therefore\nangry with them that they are counselled. But if to counsellors\nthere should be given a right to have their counsel followed, then\nare they no more counsellors, but masters of them whom they counsel;\nand their counsels no more counsels, but laws. For the difference\nbetween a law and a counsel being no more but this, that in counsel\nthe expression is, _Do, because it is best_; in a law, _Do, because\nI have a right to compel you_; or _Do, because I say, do_; when\ncounsel should give the reason of the action it adviseth to, because\nthe reason thereof itself is no more counsel, but a law.\n\n[Sidenote: The difference between _jus_ & _lex_.]\n\n5. The names _lex_ and _jus_, that is to say, law and right, are\noften confounded, and yet scarce are there any two words of more\ncontrary signification. For right is that liberty which law leaveth\nus, and laws those restraints by which we agree mutually to abridge\none another\u2019s liberty. Law and right therefore are no less different\nthan restraint and liberty, which are contrary; and whatsoever a man\ndoth, that liveth in a commonwealth _jure_, he doth it _jure\ncivili_, _jure natur\u00e6_, and _jure divino_. For whatsoever is against\nany of these laws, cannot be said to be _jure_. For the civil law\ncannot make that to be done _jure_, which is against the law\n_divine_, or of _nature_. And therefore whatsoever any subject doth,\nif it be not contrary to the civil law, and whatsoever a sovereign\ndoth, if it be not against the law of nature, he doth it _jure\ndivino_, by _divine right_. But to say, _lege divin\u00e2_, by _divine\nlaw_, is another thing. For the laws of God and nature allowing\ngreater liberty than is allowed by the law civil; for subordinate\nlaws do still bind more than superior laws, the essence of law being\nnot to loose, but to bind, a man may be commanded that by a law\ncivil, which is not commanded by the law of nature, nor by the law\ndivine. So that of things done _lege_, that is to say, by command of\nthe law, there is some place for a distinction between _lege\ndivin\u00e2_, and _lege civili_. As when a man giveth an alms, or helpeth\nhim that is in need, he doth it not _lege civili_, but _lege\ndivin\u00e2_, by the divine law, the precept whereof is _charity_. But\nfor things that are done _jure_, nothing can be said to be done\n_jure divino_, that is not also _jure civili_, unless it be done by\nthem that having sovereign power, are not subject to the civil law.\n\n[Sidenote: The division of laws, &c.]\n\n6. The differences of laws, are according to the differences, either\nof the authors and lawmakers, or of the promulgation, or of those\nthat are subject to them. From the difference of the authors, or\nlawmakers, cometh the division of law into _divine_, _natural_, and\n_civil_. From the difference of promulgation, proceedeth the\ndivision of laws into _written_ and _unwritten_. And from the\ndifference of the persons to whom the law appertaineth, it\nproceedeth, that some laws are called simply laws, and some penal.\nAs for example, _thou shalt not steal_, is simply a law; but this,\n_he that stealeth an ox, shall restore four-fold_, is a penal, or as\nothers call it, a judicial law. Now in those laws, which are simply\nlaws, the commandment is addressed to every man; but in penal laws\nthe commandment is addressed to the magistrate, who is only guilty\nof the breach of it, when the penalties ordained, are not inflicted;\nto the rest appertained nothing, but to take notice of their danger.\n\n[Sidenote: That the divine moral law, and the law of nature, is the\n same.]\n\n7. As for the first division of law into _divine_, _natural_, and\n_civil_, the first two branches are one and the same law. For the\nlaw of nature, which is also the moral law, is the law of the author\nof nature, God Almighty; and the law of God taught by our Saviour\nChrist, is the moral law. For the sum of God\u2019s law is, _Thou shalt\nlove God above all, and thy neighbour as thyself_; and the same is\nthe sum of the law of nature, as hath been showed, Part I. chap. V.\nAnd although the doctrine of our Saviour be of three parts, _moral_,\n_theological_, and _ecclesiastical_; the former part only, which is\nthe moral, is of the nature of a law universal; the latter part is a\nbranch of the law civil; and the theological, which containeth those\narticles concerning the divinity and kingdom of our Saviour, without\nwhich there is no salvation, is not delivered in the nature of laws,\nbut of counsel and direction, how to avoid the punishment, which by\nthe violation of the moral law, men are subject to. For it is not\ninfidelity that condemneth, though it be faith that saveth, but the\nbreach of the law and commandments of God, written first in man\u2019s\nheart, and afterwards in tables, and delivered to the Jews by the\nhands of Moses.\n\n[Sidenote: That the civil laws are the common measure of right and\n wrong, &c.]\n\n8. In the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and\ndiffereth from other concerning the names and appellations of\nthings, and from those differences arise quarrels and breach of\npeace, it was necessary there should be a common measure of all\nthings, that might fall in controversy. As for example; of what is\nto be called right, what good, what virtue, what much, what little,\nwhat _meum_ and _tuum_, what a pound, what a quart, &c. For in these\nthings private judgments may differ, and beget controversy. This\ncommon measure, some say, is _right reason_: with whom I should\nconsent, if there were any such thing to be found or known _in rerum\nnatur\u00e2_. But commonly they that call for _right reason_ to decide\nany controversy, do mean their own. But this is certain, seeing\n_right reason_ is not existent, the reason of some man or men must\nsupply the place thereof; and that man or men, is he or they, that\nhave the sovereign power, as hath been already proved; and\nconsequently the civil laws are to all subjects the measures of\ntheir actions, whereby to determine, whether they be right or wrong,\nprofitable or unprofitable, virtuous or vicious; and by them the use\nand definition of all names not agreed upon, and tending to\ncontroversy, shall be established. As for example, when upon\noccasion of some strange and deformed birth, it shall not be decided\nby Aristotle, or the philosophers, whether the same be a man, or no,\nbut by the laws; the civil law containing in it the ecclesiastical,\nas a part thereof, proceeding from the power of ecclesiastical\ngovernment, given by our Saviour to all Christian sovereigns, as his\nimmediate vicars, as hath been said Part II. chap. VII. sect. 10.\n\n[Sidenote: Martial law is civil law.]\n\n9. But seeing it hath been said, that all laws are either natural or\ncivil, it may be demanded, to which of these shall be referred that\nlaw, which is called martial law, and by the Romans, _disciplina\nmilitaris_? And it may seem to be the same with the law of nature;\nbecause the laws by which a multitude of soldiers are governed in an\narmy are not constant, but continually changing with the occasion;\nand that is still a law, which is reason for the present, and reason\nis the law of nature. It is nevertheless true, that martial law is\ncivil law, because an army is a body politic, the whole power\nwhereof is in the General, and the laws thereof made by him; and\nthough they still follow and change as reason requireth, yet it is\nnot, as the reason of every private man, but as the reason of the\nGeneral requireth.\n\n[Sidenote: Written laws, Unwritten, &c. Customs, and Opinions, &c.]\n\n10. When he or they in whom is the sovereign power of a\ncommonwealth, are to ordain laws for the government and good order\nof the people, it is not possible they should comprehend all cases\nof controversy that may fall out, or perhaps any considerable\ndiversity of them: but as time shall instruct them by the rising of\nnew occasions, so are also laws from time to time to be ordained:\nand in such cases where no special law is made, the law of nature\nkeepeth its place, and the magistrates ought to give sentence\naccording thereunto, that is to say, according to natural reason.\nThe constitutions therefore of the sovereign power, by which the\nliberty of nature is abridged, are written, because there is no\nother way to take notice of them; whereas the laws of nature are\nsupposed to be written in men\u2019s hearts. Written laws therefore are\nthe constitutions of a commonwealth expressed; and unwritten, are\nthe laws of natural reason. Custom of itself maketh no laws.\nNevertheless when a sentence hath been once given, by them that\njudge by their natural reason, whether the same be right or wrong,\nit may attain to the vigour of a law; not because the like sentence\nhath of custom been given in the like case, but because the\nsovereign power is supposed tacitly to have approved such sentence\nfor right, and thereby it cometh to be a law, and numbered amongst\nthe written laws of the commonwealth. For if custom were sufficient\nto introduce a law, then it would be in the power of every one that\nis deputed to hear a cause, to make his errors laws. In the like\nmanner, those laws that go under the title of _responsa prudentum_,\nthat is to say, the opinions of lawyers, are not therefore laws,\nbecause _responsa prudentum_, but because they are admitted by the\nsovereign. And from this may be collected, that when there is a case\nof private contract between the sovereign and the subject, a\nprecedent against reason shall not prejudice the cause of the\nsovereign; no precedent being made a law, but upon supposition that\nthe same was reasonable from the beginning.\n\nAnd thus much concerning the elements and general grounds of laws\nnatural and politic. As for the law of nations, it is the same with\nthe law of nature. For that which is the law of nature between man\nand man, before the constitution of commonwealth, is the law of\nnations between sovereign and sovereign, after.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n OF\n LIBERTY AND NECESSITY:\n\n A TREATISE,\n\n WHEREIN ALL CONTROVERSY CONCERNING\n\n PREDESTINATION, ELECTION, FREE-WILL, GRACE,\n MERITS, REPROBATION, &c.\n\n IS FULLY DECIDED AND CLEARED.\n\n IN ANSWER TO A TREATISE\n WRITTEN BY THE BISHOP OF LONDONDERRY,\n ON THE SAME SUBJECT.\n\n TO THE\n SOBER AND DISCREET READER.\n\n\nIt made St. Chrysostom tremble whenever he reflected on the\nproportion, which those that went the _narrow_ way, bore to those\nwhich marched in the _broad_, how _many_ were the called, and how\n_few_ the chosen, how many they were that were created for and in a\ncapacity of eternal beatitude, and how few attained it. This\nconsideration certainly would make a man look upon the Holy\nScriptures, among Christians, as the greatest indulgence of heaven,\nbeing all the directions it hath been pleased to afford poor _man_\nin so difficult a journey as that of his eternal bliss or misery.\nBut when a man cometh to look into those transcendant writings, he\nfinds them to be the works of a sort of innocent harmless men, that\nhad little acquaintance or familiarity with the world, and\nconsequently not much interested in the troubles and quarrels of\nseveral countries; that though they are all but necessary, yet were\nthey written occasionally, rather than out of design; and lastly,\nthat their main business is, to abstract man from this world, and to\npersuade him to prefer the bare hope of what he can neither _see_,\n_hear_, nor _conceive_, before all the present enjoyments this world\ncan afford. This begat a reverence and esteem to them in all those\nwho endeavour to work out their salvation out of them. But if a man,\nnot weighing them in themselves, shall consider the practices of\nthose, who pretend to be the interpreters of them, and to make them\nfit meat for the people; how that instead of renouncing the world,\nthey endeavour to raise themselves into the greatest promotions,\nleisure, and luxury; that they make them the decoys of the people,\nto carry on designs and intrigues of state, and study the enjoyments\nof this world more than any other people: he will find some grounds\nto conclude, the practices of such men to be the greatest\ndisturbance, burden, and vexation of the Christian part of the\nworld. The complaint is as true as sad; instead of acquainting the\ncredulous vulgar, with the main end of their functions, and the\ngreat business of their embassy, what a great measure of felicity is\nprepared for them, and how easily it may be forfeited; they involve\ntheir consciences in the briars of a thousand needless scruples,\nthey spin out volumes out of half sentences, nay, out of points and\naccents, and raise endless controversies about things, (were men\nfree from passion and prejudice), in themselves clear enough: and\nwhen they have canvassed their questions, till they are weary\nthemselves, and have wearied hearers and readers, and all they have\nto do with, every one sits down under his own vine, and hugs his own\napprehensions; so that after all their pains, bandings, and\nimplacable adhesion to parties, the inconvenience remains still, and\nwe as far from any solid conviction, as at first setting out.\n\nThe controversies betwixt _Rome_ and the _Reformation_ are long\nsince beaten out of the pit, by other combatants of their own brood;\nso that if we speak of _Protestant_ and _Catholic_, they are in a\nmanner content to sit down with their present acquests: for as to\nconviction, he certainly is a rare _proselyte_, at whose conversion,\n_interest_, _humour_, _discontent_, _inclination_, are not admitted\nto the debate.\n\nBut to come yet nearer our purpose, let us consider our own\nfractions of fractions of _religion_ here in England, where if that\nsaying, that _it is better to live where nothing is lawful, than\nwhere all things_, be as true in _religion_ as _policy_, posterity\nmay haply feel the sad consequence of it. What, I pray, is the\neffect of so many _sermons_, _teachings_, _preachings_,\n_exercises_, and _exercising of gifts_, _meetings_, _disputations_,\n_conferences_, _conventicles_, _printed books_, written with so much\ndistraction and presumption upon God Almighty, and abuse of his Holy\nWord? Marry this: it is the seminary of many vexatious, endless, and\nfruitless controversies, the consequence whereof are jealousies,\nheart-burnings, exasperation of parties, the introduction of\nfactions and national quarrels into matters of religion, and\nconsequently all the calamities of war and devastation. Besides,\nthey are good lawful diversions for the duller sort of _citizens_,\nwho contract diseases for want of motion; they supply the building\nof pyramids among the Egyptians, by diverting the thoughts of the\npeople from matters of state, and consequently from rebellion.\n\nThey find work for _printers_, &c. if the parties interested are\ntroubled with the itch of popularity, and will suffer themselves to\nbe scratched out of somewhat by way of contribution to the\nimpression. Hence is the _stationer\u2019s_ shop furnished, and thence\nthe _minister\u2019s_ study in the country, who having found out the\nhumour of his auditory, consults with his stationer, on what books\nhis money is best bestowed; who very gravely, it may be, will\ncommend _Cole upon the Philippians_ before the excellent, but\nborrowed, _Caryl upon Job_. But as to any matter of conviction, we\nsee every one _acquiesces_ in his own sentiments, every one hears\nthe teacher who is most to his humour; and when he hath been at\nchurch, and pretends to have sat at his feet, comes home and\ncensures him as he pleases.\n\nTo be yet a little more particular, what shall we think of those\nvast and involuble volumes concerning _predestination_, _free-will_,\n_free-grace_, _election_, _reprobation_, &c., which fill not only\nour libraries, but the world with their noise and disturbance,\nwhereof the least thing we are to expect is _conviction_; every side\nendeavouring to make good their own grounds, and keep the cudgels in\ntheir hands as long as they can? What stir is there between the\nMolinists and Jansenists about _grace_ and _merits_; and yet both\npretend St. Augustin!\n\nMust we not expect, that the Jesuits will, were it for no other end\nbut to vindicate that reputation of learning they have obtained in\nthe world, endeavour to make good their tenets, though the other\nwere the truer opinion? Is truth then retired to that inaccessible\nrock that admits no approaches? Or are we all turned Ixions, and\ninstead of enjoying that Juno, entertain ourselves with the _clouds_\nof our own persuasions; of which unnatural coition, what other issue\ncan there be but Centaurs and monstrous opinions? To these questions\nI shall not presume to answer, but in the words of this great\nauthor, who answering the charge of _impiety_ laid upon the holding\nof necessity, says thus; _If we consider the greatest part of\nmankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is as men,\nwhom either the study of acquiring wealth and preferment, or whom\nthe appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating,\nor the rash embracing of wrong principles, have made unapt to\ndiscuss the truth of things, I must confess, &c._\n\nCertainly we have some reason to expect an effectual cure from this\nman, since he hath so fortunately found out the disease. Now if he\nin so few sheets hath performed more than all the voluminous\nworks of the _priests and ministers_, and that in points of\nsoul-concernment and Christian interest, as _predestination_,\n_free-will_, _grace_, _merits_, _election_, _reprobation_,\n_necessity_, and _liberty_ of actions, and others, the main hinges\nof human _salvation_; and to do this, being a person, whom not only\nthe averseness of his nature to engage himself in matters\nof controversy of this kind, but his severer study of the\n_mathematics_, might justly exempt from any such skirmishes; we may\nnot stick to infer, that the _black-coats_, generally taken, are a\nsort of ignorant _tinkers_, who in matters of their own profession,\nsuch as is the _mending_ and _soldering_ of men\u2019s _consciences_,\nhave made more _holes_ than they found; nay, what makes them more\nimpardonable, they have neither the gratitude nor ingenuity to\nacknowledge this repairer of their breaches, and assertor of their\nreputation, who hath now effected what they all this while have been\ntampering about. I know this author is little beholden to the\n_ministers_, and they make a great part of the nation; and besides\nthem, I know there are many illiterate, obstinate, and inconvincible\nspirits: yet I dare advance this proposition, how bold soever it may\nseem to some; that this book, how little and contemptible soever it\nmay seem, contains more evidence and conviction in the matters it\ntreats of, than all the volumes, nay libraries, which the _priests_,\n_jesuits_, and _ministers_ have, to our great charge, distraction,\nand loss of precious time, furnished us with. Which if so, I shall\nundertake for any rational man, that all the controversial labours\nconcerning religion in the world, all the polemical treatises of the\nmost ancient or modern, shall never breed any maggots of scruples,\nor dissatisfactions in his brains, nor shall his eyes or head ever\nache with turning them over; but he shall be so resolved in mind, as\nnever to importune God Almighty with impertinent addresses, nor ever\nbecome any of those enthusiastical _spiritati_, who, as the most\nlearned Mr. White says, _expound Scripture without sense or reason_,\nand are not to be disputed with but with the same success as men\nwrite on sand, and trouble their neighbours with their dreams,\nrevelations, and spiritual whimsies. No! here is solid conviction,\nat least so far as the metaphysical mysteries of our religion will\nadmit. If God be _omnipotent_, he is _irresistible_; if so, _just_\nin all his actions, though we, who have as much capacity to measure\nthe justice of God\u2019s actions as a man born blind to judge of\ncolours, haply may not discern it. What then need any man trouble\nhis head, whether he be predestinated or no? Let him live justly and\nhonestly according to the _religion_ of his _country_, and refer\nhimself to God for the rest, since he is the potter, and may do what\nhe please with the vessel. But I leave the reader to find his\nsatisfaction in the treatise itself, since it may be I derogate from\nit by saying so much before it. This book, I doubt not, will find no\nworse entertainment than the _Leviathan_, both in regard of its\nbulk, and that it doth not strike so home at the _ministers_ and\n_Catholic_ party as that did. And yet here we must complain of want\nof sufficiency or ingenuity to acknowledge the truths or confute the\nerrors of that book; which till it is done, we shall not count the\nauthor an heretic. On this side the sea, besides the dirt and\nslander cast on him in _sermons_ and private meetings, none hath put\nanything in print against him, but Mr. Rosse; one who may be said to\nhave had so much learning, as to have been perpetually barking at\nthe works of the most learned. How he hath been received beyond seas\nI know not, but certainly, not without the regret of the\n_Catholics_; who building their _church_ on other foundations than\nthose of the _Scriptures_, and pretending _infallibility_,\n_certitude_, and _unity_ in _religion_, cannot but be discontented\nthat these prerogatives of religion are taken away, not only from\n_tradition_, that is to say, from the _church_, but also from the\n_Scriptures_, and are invested in the _supreme power_ of the nation,\nbe it of what persuasion it will.\n\nThus much, Reader, I have thought fit to acquaint thee with, that\nthou mightest know what a jewel thou hast in thy hands, which thou\nmust accordingly value, not by the bulk, but the preciousness. Thou\nhast here in a few sheets what might prove work enough for many\nthousand sermons and exercises; and more than the _catechisms_ and\n_confessions_ of a thousand _assemblies_ could furnish thee with:\nthou hast what will cast an eternal blemish on all the _cornered_\ncaps of _priests_ and _jesuits_, and all the _black and white_ caps\nof the _canting tribe_; to be short, thou art now acquainted with\nthat man, who, in matters of so great importance as those of thy\nsalvation, furnishes thee with better instructions, than any thou\nhast ever yet been acquainted with, what _profession_, _persuasion_,\n_opinion_, or _church_ soever thou art of; of whom and his works\nmake the best use thou canst. Farewell.\n\n\n\n\npm hrdbl\n\n\n\n\n TO THE\n LORD MARQUIS OF NEWCASTLE.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n RIGHT HONOURABLE,\n\nI had once resolved to answer my Lord Bishop\u2019s objections to my book\nDE CIVE in the first place, as that which concerns me most; and\nafterwards to examine his Discourse of LIBERTY and NECESSITY, which,\nbecause I had never uttered my opinion of it, concerned me the less.\nBut seeing it was your Lordship\u2019s and my Lord Bishop\u2019s desire that I\nshould begin with the _latter_, I was contented so to do, and here I\npresent and submit it to your Lordship\u2019s judgment.\n\nAnd first I assure your Lordship I find in it no new argument\nneither from _Scripture_ nor from _reason_, that I have not often\nheard before, which is as much as to say, I am not surprised.\n\nThe _preface_ is a handsome one, but it appeareth even in that, that\nhe hath mistaken the question. For whereas he says thus, _If I be\nfree to write this Discourse, I have obtained the cause_: I deny\nthat to be true, for it is enough to his freedom of writing, that he\nhad not written it, unless he would himself. If he will obtain the\ncause, he must prove that before he writ it, it was not necessary he\nshould prove it afterward. It may be his Lordship thinks it all one\nto say, _I was free_ to write it, and, _It was not necessary_ I\nshould write it. But I think otherwise. For he is _free_ to do a\nthing, that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear,\nif he have the will to forbear. And yet if there be a _necessity_\nthat he shall have the _will_ to do it, the action is necessarily to\nfollow: and if there be a _necessity_ that he shall have the _will_\nto forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The question\ntherefore is not, whether a man be a _free agent_, that is to say,\nwhether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to\nhis _will_; but, whether the _will_ to write, and the _will_ to\nforbear, come upon him according to his _will_, or according to\nanything else in his own power. I acknowledge this _liberty_, that I\n_can_ do if I _will_; but to say, I can _will_ if I _will_, I take\nto be an absurd speech. Wherefore I cannot grant my Lord the cause\nupon his _preface_.\n\nIn the next place, he maketh certain distinctions of _liberty_, and\nsays he meaneth not _liberty_ from sin, nor from _servitude_, nor\nfrom _violence_; but, from _necessity_, _necessitation_,\n_inevitability_, and _determination to one_.\n\nIt had been better to _define_ liberty, than thus to _distinguish_.\nFor I understand never the more what he means by _liberty_; and\nthough he say he means _liberty_ from _necessitation_, yet I\nunderstand not how such a _liberty_ can be, and it is a taking of\nthe question without proof. For what is else the question between\nus, but whether _such_ a liberty be possible or not?\n\nThere are in the same place other distinctions: as a liberty of\n_exercise only_, which he calls a _liberty of contradiction_, namely\nof doing not good, or evil _simply_, but of doing this or that good,\nor this or that evil _respectively_, and a _liberty of specification\nand exercise also_, which he calls a liberty of _contrariety_,\nnamely a liberty not only to do good or evil, but also to do or not\ndo this or that good or evil.\n\nAnd with these _distinctions_ his Lordship says he _clears the\ncoast_, whereas in truth, he darkeneth his own meaning and\nthe question, not only with the jargon of _exercise only_,\n_specification also_, _contradiction_, _contrariety_, but also with\npretending distinction where none is: for how is it possible that\nthe _liberty_ of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, can\nconsist, as he says it does in God and good angels, without a\nliberty of doing or not doing good or evil?\n\nThe next thing his Lordship does, after clearing of the coast, is\nthe dividing of his forces, as he calls them, into _two_ squadrons,\n_one_ of places _of Scriptures_, the _other_ of _reasons_, which\nallegory he useth, I suppose, because he addresseth the discourse to\nyour Lordship, who is a military man. All that I have to say\ntouching this, is, that I observe a great part of those his _forces_\ndo look and _march_ another way, and some of them _fight_ amongst\nthemselves.\n\nAnd the first place of _Scripture_, taken from Numb. xxx. 13, is one\nof those that look another way; the words are, _If a wife make a\nvow, it is left to her husband\u2019s choice either to establish it or\nmake it void_. For it proves no more but that the husband is a\n_free_ and _voluntary agent_, but not that his _choice_ therein is\nnot _necessitated_ or not _determined_ to what he shall choose, by\nprecedent _necessary_ causes.\n\nFor if there come into the husband\u2019s mind greater good by\nestablishing than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will\nfollow necessarily; and if the evil that will follow in the\nhusband\u2019s opinion outweigh the good, the contrary must needs follow:\nand yet in this following of one\u2019s _hopes_ and _fears_, consisteth\nthe nature of _election_. So that a man may both choose this, and\ncannot but choose this, and consequently _choosing_ and _necessity_\nare joined together.\n\nThe second place of Scripture is Joshua, xxiv. 15. The third is 2\nSam. xxiv. 12, whereby it is clearly proved, that there is\n_election_ in _man_, but not proved that such _election_ was not\n_necessitated_ by the _hopes_, and _fears_, and considerations of\n_good_ and _bad_ to follow, which depend not on the _will_, nor are\nsubject to _election_. And therefore one answer serves all such\nplaces, if there were a thousand.\n\nBut his Lordship supposing, it seems, I might answer, as I have\ndone, that _necessity_ and _election_ might stand together, and\ninstance in the actions of _children_, _fools_, or _brute beasts_,\nwhose _fancies_, I might say, are _necessitated_ and _determined_ to\n_one_; before these his proofs out of Scripture, desires to prevent\nthat instance, and therefore says that the actions of _children_,\n_fools_, _madmen_, and _beasts_, are indeed _determined_, but that\nthey proceed not from _election_, nor from _free_, but from\n_spontaneous agents_. As for example, that the _bee_, when it maketh\nhoney, does it _spontaneously_; and when the _spider_ makes his web,\nhe does it _spontaneously_, but not by _election_.\n\nThough I never meant to ground my answer upon the experience of what\n_children_, _fools_, _madmen_, and _beasts_ do; yet that your\nLordship may understand what can be meant by _spontaneous_, and how\nit differeth from _voluntary_, I will answer that _distinction_, and\nshow that it _fighteth_ against its fellow arguments.\n\nYour Lordship therefore is to consider, that all _voluntary_\nactions, where the thing that induceth the _will_ is not _fear_, are\ncalled also _spontaneous_, and said to be done by a man\u2019s _own_\naccord. As when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for\nmerchandise, or out of affection, he is said to do it of his own\naccord, which in Latin is _sponte_, and therefore the action is\n_spontaneous_; though to give one\u2019s money willingly to a thief to\navoid killing, or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning, where the\nmotive is _fear_, be not called _spontaneous_. But every\n_spontaneous_ action is not therefore _voluntary_, for _voluntary_\npresupposes some precedent _deliberation_, that is to say, some\n_consideration_, and _meditation_, of what is likely to _follow_,\nboth upon the doing, and abstaining from the action deliberated of;\nwhereas many actions are done of our _own_ accord, and are therefore\n_spontaneous_, for which nevertheless, as my Lord thinks, we never\n_consulted_ nor _deliberated_ in ourselves. As when making no\nquestion nor any the least doubt in the world, but the thing we are\nabout is good, we _eat_ and _walk_, or in anger _strike_ or\n_revile_, which my Lord thinks spontaneous, but not voluntary nor\nelective actions, and with _such_ kind of actions, he says\n_necessitation_ may stand, but not with such as are _voluntary_, and\nproceed upon _election_ and _deliberation_. Now if I make it appear\nto your Lordship, that those actions, which, he says, proceed from\n_spontaneity_, and which he ascribes to _children_, _fools_,\n_madmen_, and _beasts_, proceed from _election_ and _deliberation_,\nand that actions _inconsiderate_, _rash_, and _spontaneous_, are\nordinarily found in those, that are by themselves and many more\nthought as _wise_, or wiser than ordinarily men are, then my Lord\nBishop\u2019s argument concludeth, that _necessity_ and _election_ may\nstand together, which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all\nthe rest of his arguments to prove.\n\nAnd first your Lordship\u2019s own experience furnishes you with proof\nenough, that _horses_, _dogs_, and other brute _beasts_, do _demur_\noftentimes upon the way they are to take, the horse retiring from\nsome strange figure that he sees, and coming on again to avoid the\nspur. And what else doth a man that _deliberateth_, but one while\n_proceed_ toward action, another while _retire_ from it, as the\n_hope_ of greater _good_ draws him, or the _fear_ of greater evil\n_drives_ him away.\n\nA _child_ may be so young as to do what it does without all\n_deliberation_, but that is but till it have the chance to be hurt\nby doing of somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod:\nfor the actions, wherein he hath once had a check, shall be\n_deliberated_ on the second time.\n\n_Fools_ and _madmen_ manifestly _deliberate_ no less than the\n_wisest_ men, though they make not so good a _choice_, the images of\nthings being by disease altered.\n\nFor _bees_ and _spiders_, if my Lord Bishop had had so little to do\nas to be a spectator of their actions, he would have confessed not\nonly _election_, but _art_, _prudence_, and _policy_, in them, very\nnear equal to that of mankind. Of _bees_, Aristotle says, _their\nlife is civil_.\n\nAgain, his Lordship is deceived, if he think any _spontaneous_\naction, after once being checked in it, differs from an action\n_voluntary_ and _elective_: for even the setting of a man\u2019s foot, in\nthe posture for _walking_, and the action of ordinary _eating_, was\nonce _deliberated_ of how and when it should be done, and though\nafterward it became _easy_ and _habitual_, so as to be done without\n_forethought_; yet that does not hinder but that the act is\n_voluntary_, and proceedeth from _election_. So also are the\n_rashest_ actions of _choleric_ persons _voluntary_ and upon\n_deliberation_: for who is there but very young children, that hath\nnot _considered_ when and how far he _ought_, or safely _may_ strike\nor revile? Seeing then his Lordship agrees with me, that such\nactions are _necessitated_, and the _fancy_ of those that do them\n_determined_ to the action they do, it follows out of his Lordship\u2019s\nown doctrine, that the liberty of _election_ does not take away the\n_necessity_ of _electing_ this or that _individual_ thing. And thus\none of his arguments fights against another.\n\nThe second argument from Scripture, consisteth in histories of men\nthat did one thing, when if they would, they might have done\nanother; the places are two: one is 1 Kings iii. 10, where the\nhistory says, God was pleased that Solomon, who might, if he would,\nhave asked _riches_, or _revenge_, did nevertheless ask _wisdom_ at\nGod\u2019s hands: the other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, Acts v.\n4: _After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?_\n\nTo which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former\nplaces, that they prove there is _election_, but do not disprove the\n_necessity_, which I maintain, of what they so elect.\n\nThe fourth argument (for to the third and fifth I shall make but one\nanswer) is to this effect; _If the decrees of God, or his\nforeknowledge, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation\nof causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of causes, or the last\ndictate of the understanding, or whatsoever it be, do take away true\nliberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. Quicquid\nostendes mihi sic incredulus odi._\n\n_That_ which I say _necessitateth and determinateth every action_,\nthat his Lordship may no longer doubt of my meaning, _is the sum of\nall things, which being now existent, conduce and concur to the\nproduction of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now\nwere wanting, the effect could not be produced_. This _concourse_ of\n_causes_, whereof every one is _determined_ to be such as it is by a\nlike concourse of _former_ causes, may well be called (in respect\nthey were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things,\nGod Almighty) the _decree_ of God.\n\nBut that the _foreknowledge_ of God should be a cause of any thing,\ncannot be truly said, seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and\nknowledge depends on the existence of the things known, and not they\non it.\n\nThe _influence of the stars_ is but a small part of the whole cause,\nconsisting of the concourse of all agents.\n\nNor does the _concourse of all causes_ make one simple _chain_ or\nconcatenation, but an innumerable number of chains, joined together,\nnot in all parts, but in the first link God Almighty; and\nconsequently the whole cause of an event, doth not always depend on\none single chain, but on many together.\n\n_Natural_ efficacy of _objects_ does _determine voluntary_ agents,\nand _necessitates_ the _will_, and consequently the _action_; but\nfor _moral_ efficacy, I understand not what he means.\n\n_The last dictate of the judgment_, concerning the good or bad, that\nmay follow on any action, is not properly the _whole cause_, but the\nlast part of it, and yet may be said to produce the effect\n_necessarily_, in such manner as the last feather may be said to\nbreak a horse\u2019s back, when there were so many laid on before as\nthere wanted but that one to do it.\n\nNow for his _argument_, that _if the concourse of all the causes\nnecessitate the effect, that then it follows, Adam had no true\nliberty_: I deny the consequence; for I make not only the _effect_,\nbut also the _election_, of that particular effect _necessary_,\ninasmuch as the will itself, and each propension of a man during his\ndeliberation, is as much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient\ncause, as any thing else whatsoever. As for example, it is no more\nnecessary that fire should burn, than that a man or other creature,\nwhose limbs be moved by fancy, should have _election_, that is\n_liberty_, to do what he hath a fancy to do, though it be not in his\n_will_ or _power_ to _choose_ his _fancy_, or choose his _election_\nand _will_.\n\nThis doctrine, because my Lord Bishop says he hates, I doubt had\nbetter been suppressed, as it should have been, if both your\nLordship and he had not pressed me to an answer.\n\nThe arguments of greatest consequence, are the third and the fifth,\nand they fall both into one, namely: _If there be a necessity of all\nevents, that it will follow, that praise and reprehension, and\nreward and punishment, are all vain and unjust; and that if God\nshould openly forbid, and secretly necessitate the same action,\npunishing men for what they could not avoid, there would be no\nbelief among them of heaven and hell_.\n\nTo oppose hereunto I must borrow an answer from St. Paul, Rom. ix.\n20, 21. From the eleventh verse of the chapter to the eighteenth, is\nlaid down the very same objection in these words: _When they_,\nmeaning Esau and Jacob, _were yet unborn, and had done neither good\nnor evil, that the purpose of God according to election, not by\nworks, but by him that calleth, might remain firm, it was said unto\nher_ (_viz._ Rebecca) _that the elder should serve the younger_, &c.\n_What then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. It\nis not therefore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but\nin God that showeth mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I\nhave stirred thee up that I might show my power in thee, and that my\nname might be set forth in all the earth. Therefore whom God\nwilleth, he hath mercy on, and whom he willeth he hardeneth._ Thus\nyou see the case put by St. Paul, is the same with that of my Lord\nBishop, and the same objection in these words following:\n\n_Thou wilt ask me then, why does God yet complain, for who hath\nresisted his will?_\n\nTo this therefore the Apostle answers, not by denying it was God\u2019s\n_will_, or that the decree of God concerning Esau was not before he\nhad sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what he did; but\nthus: _Who art thou, O man, that interrogatest God? Shall the work\nsay to the workman, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter\npower over the clay, of the same stuff to make one vessel to honour,\nanother to dishonour?_ According therefore to this answer of St.\nPaul, I answer my Lord\u2019s objection, and say, the _power_ of God\nalone without other helps is sufficient _justification_ of any\naction he doth. That which men make amongst themselves here by pacts\nand covenants, and call by the name of justice, and according\nwhereunto men are accounted and termed rightly _just_ or _unjust_,\nis not that by which God Almighty\u2019s actions are to be measured or\ncalled just, no more than his counsels are to be measured by human\nwisdom. That which he does, is made just by his doing it; just, I\nsay, in him, though not always just in us.\n\nFor a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the\nhindrance of the same, if he punish him that he so commandeth, for\nnot doing it, it is unjust. So also, his counsels are therefore not\nin vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not.\nWhen God afflicted Job, he did object no sin unto him, but justified\nhis afflicting of him, by telling him of his _power_: (Job xl. 9:)\n_Hast thou, saith God, an arm like mine?_ (Job xxviii. 4): _Where\nwert thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?_ and the like.\nSo our Saviour, (John ix. 3) concerning the man that was born blind,\nsaid, it was not for his sin, or for his parents' sin, but that the\npower of God might be shown in him. _Beasts_ are subject to death\nand torments, yet they cannot sin: it was God\u2019s will they should be\nso. _Power irresistible justifies all actions, really and properly_,\nin whomsoever it be found; less power does not, and because such\npower is in God only, he must needs be just in all actions, and we,\nthat not comprehending his counsels, call him to the bar, commit\ninjustice in it.\n\nI am not ignorant of the usual reply to his answer, by\ndistinguishing between _will_ and _permission_, as that God Almighty\ndoes indeed sometimes _permit_ sins, and that he also foreknoweth\nthat the sin he permitteth, shall be committed, but does not _will_\nit, nor _necessitate_ it.\n\nI know also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action,\nsaying, that God Almighty does indeed cause the _action_, whatsoever\naction it be, but not the _sinfulness_ or _irregularity_ of it, that\nis, the _discordance_ between the _action_ and the _law_. Such\ndistinctions as these dazzle my understanding; I find no difference\nbetween the _will_ to have a thing done, and the _permission_ to do\nit, when he that permitteth can hinder it, and knows that it will be\ndone unless he hinder it. Nor find I any difference between an\n_action_ and the _sin_ of that action; as for example, between the\nkilling of Uriah, and the sin of David in killing Uriah, nor when\n_one_ is _cause_ both of the _action_ and of the _law_, how\n_another_ can be cause of the _disagreement_ between them, no more\nthan how one man making a longer and a shorter garment, another can\nmake the inequality that is between them. This I know; God cannot\nsin, because his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently, no\nsin; as also because whatsoever can sin, is subject to another\u2019s\nlaw, which God is not. And therefore it is blasphemy to say, God can\nsin; but to say, that God can so order the world, as a sin may be\nnecessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any\ndishonour to him. Howsoever, if such or other _distinctions_ can\nmake it clear, that St. Paul did not think Esau\u2019s or Pharaoh\u2019s\nactions proceeded from the _will_ and _purpose_ of God, or that\nproceeding from his will, could not therefore without injustice be\nblamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto\nmy Lord\u2019s opinion: for I now hold nothing in all this question\nbetwixt us, but what seemeth to me, not obscurely, but most\nexpressly said in this place by St. Paul. And thus much in answer to\nhis places of Scripture.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n TO THE ARGUMENTS FROM REASON.\n\nOf the arguments from _reason_, the first is that which his Lordship\nsaith is drawn from Zeno\u2019s beating of his man, which is therefore\ncalled _argumentum baculinum_, that is to say, a wooden argument.\nThe story is this; Zeno held, that all actions were necessary; his\nman therefore being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the\nnecessity of it: to avoid this excuse, his master pleaded likewise\nthe necessity of beating him. So that not he that maintained, but he\nthat derided the necessity, was beaten, contrary to that his\nLordship would infer. And the argument was rather withdrawn than\ndrawn from the story.\n\nThe second argument is taken from certain inconveniences which his\nLordship thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true that ill\nuse might be made of it, and therefore your Lordship and my Lord\nBishop ought, at my request, to keep private what I say here of it.\nBut the inconveniences are indeed none, and what use soever be made\nof truth, yet truth is truth, and now the question is not, what is\nfit to be preached, but, what is true.\n\nThe first inconvenience he says, is this; _That the laws, which\nprohibit any action, will be unjust_.\n\n2. _That all consultations are vain._\n\n3. _That admonitions to men of understanding, are of no more use,\nthan to children, fools, and madmen._\n\n4. _That, praise, dispraise, reward and punishment, are in vain._\n\n5, 6. _That counsels, acts, arms, books, instruments, study, tutors,\nmedicines, are in vain._\n\nTo which arguments his Lordship expecting I should answer, by\nsaying, the ignorance of the event were enough to make us use the\nmeans, adds, as it were a reply to my answer foreseen, these words:\n_Alas! how should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive\nto make us use the means?_ Wherein his Lordship says right, but my\nanswer is not that which he expecteth: I answer,\n\nFirst, that the _necessity_ of an _action_ doth not make the _laws_,\nthat prohibit it, _unjust_. To let pass, that not the _necessity_,\nbut the _will_ to break the _law_, maketh the action _unjust_,\nbecause the _law_ regardeth the _will_, and no other precedent\ncauses of action. And to let pass, that no _law_ can possibly be\n_unjust_, inasmuch as every man maketh, by his consent, the law he\nis bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man\ncan be unjust to himself. I say, what _necessary_ cause soever\nprecede an _action_, yet if the action be _forbidden_, he that doth\nit _willingly_ may justly be punished. For instance, suppose the law\non pain of death prohibit stealing, and that there be a man, who by\nthe strength of temptation is _necessitated_ to steal, and is\nthereupon put to death, does not this punishment deter others from\ntheft? Is it not a cause that others steal not? Doth it not frame\nand make their wills to justice?\n\nTo make the _law_, is therefore to make a _cause_ of _justice_, and\nto _necessitate_ justice; and consequently, it is no injustice to\nmake such a law.\n\nThe intention of the _law_ is not to grieve the _delinquent_, for\nthat which is past, and not to be undone; but to make him and others\n_just_, that else would not be so, and respecteth not the evil act\n_past_, but the _good to come_; insomuch as without the good\nintention for the future, no past act of a delinquent could justify\nhis killing in the sight of God. But you will say, how is it just to\nkill one man to amend another, if what were done were _necessary_?\nTo this I answer, that men are justly killed, not for that their\n_actions_ are not _necessitated_, but because they are _noxious_,\nand they are spared and preserved whose actions are not noxious. For\nwhere there is no law, there no killing nor anything else can be\nunjust; and by the right of nature, we destroy, without being\nunjust, all that is noxious, both beasts and men; and for beasts we\nkill them justly, when we do it in order to our own preservation,\nand yet my Lord himself confesseth, that their actions, as being\nonly _spontaneous_, and not _free_, are all _necessitated_ and\ndetermined to that one thing they shall do. For men, when we make\nsocieties or commonwealths, we lay not down our right to kill,\nexcepting in certain cases, as murder, theft or other offensive\naction; so that the right, which the _commonwealth_ hath to put a\nman to death for crimes, is not created by the _law_, but remains\nfrom the first right of _nature_, which every man hath to preserve\nhimself; for that the law doth not take the right away in the case\nof criminals, who were by the law excepted. Men are not therefore\nput to death, or punished, for that their theft proceedeth from\n_election_; but because it was _noxious_ and contrary to men\u2019s\npreservation, and the punishment conducing to the preservation of\nthe rest, inasmuch as to punish those that do voluntary hurt, and\nnone else, frameth and maketh men\u2019s _wills_ such as men would have\nthem. And thus it is plain, that from the _necessity_ of a\n_voluntary_ action, cannot be inferred the _injustice_ of the _law_\nthat forbiddeth it, or the magistrate that punisheth it.\n\nSecondly, I deny that it maketh _consultations_ to be in _vain_; it\nis the _consultation_ that _causeth_ a man, and _necessitateth_ him\nto _choose_ to do one thing rather than another: so that unless a\nman say that that cause is in vain which necessitateth the effect,\nhe cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation out of the\nnecessity of the election proceeding from it. But it seemeth his\nLordship reasons thus: If I must do this rather than that, I shall\ndo this rather than that, though I consult not at all; which is a\nfalse proposition and a false consequence, and no better than this:\nIf I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though\nI run myself through with a sword to-day. If there be a _necessity_\nthat an action shall be done, or that any effect shall be brought to\npass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing\nnecessarily requisite as a means to bring it to pass; and therefore\nwhen it is determined, that one thing shall be chosen before\nanother, it is determined also for what _cause_ it shall so be\nchosen, which cause, for the most part, is _deliberation_ or\n_consultation_, and therefore consultation is not in vain, and\nindeed the less in vain by how much the election is more\nnecessitated, if _more_ and _less_ had any place in _necessity_.\n\nThe same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience,\nnamely, that _admonitions_ are in _vain_; for the admonitions are\nparts of consultation, the admonitor being a counsellor for the time\nto him that is admonished.\n\nThe fourth pretended inconvenience is, that _praise_, _dispraise_,\n_reward_, and _punishment_ will be in _vain_. To which I answer,\nthat for _praise_ and _dispraise_, they depend not at all on the\n_necessity_ of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else\nto _praise_, but to say a thing is good? Good, I say, for me, or for\nsomebody else, or for the state and commonwealth? And what is it to\nsay an action is good, but to say it is as I would wish? or as\nanother would have it, or according to the will of the state? that\nis to say, according to the law. Does my Lord think that no action\ncan please me, or him, or the commonwealth, that should proceed from\n_necessity_? Things may be therefore _necessary_, and yet\n_praise-worthy_, as also _necessary_, and yet _dispraised_, and\nneither of them both in vain, because _praise_ and _dispraise_, and\nlikewise _reward_ and _punishment_, do by example make and conform\nthe will to good and evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion,\nthat Velleius Paterculus (Lib. ii. 35) gives Cato, where he says\nthat he was good by _nature_, _et quia aliter esse non potuit_.\n\nTo the fifth and sixth inconveniences, that _counsels_, _arts_,\n_arms_, _instruments_, _books_, _study_, _medicines_, and the like,\nwould be _superfluous_, the same answer serves as to the former,\nthat is to say, that this consequence, _if the effect shall\nnecessarily come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its\ncauses_, is a false one, and those things named counsels, arts,\narms, &c. are the causes of these effects.\n\nHis Lordship\u2019s _third_ argument consisteth in other\n_inconveniences_, which he saith will follow, namely, _impiety_ and\n_negligence_ of religious duties, as repentance, and _zeal_ to God\u2019s\nservice, &c.\n\nTo which I answer as to the rest, that they follow not. I must\nconfess, if we consider the greatest part of mankind, not as they\nshould be, but as they are, that is, as men, whom either the study\nof acquiring wealth, or preferment, or whom the appetite of sensual\ndelights, or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of\nwrong principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth of things: I\nmust, I say, confess that the dispute of this question will rather\nhurt than help their piety; and therefore if his Lordship had not\ndesired this answer, I should not have written it, nor do I write it\nbut in hopes your Lordship and his will keep it private.\nNevertheless in very truth, the _necessity_ of events does not of\nitself draw with it any _impiety_ at all. For _piety_ consisteth\nonly in _two_ things; one, that we honour God in our hearts, which\nis, that we think as highly of his _power_ as we can, for to honour\nanything is nothing else but to think it to be of great power; the\nother is, that we signify that honour and esteem by our words and\nactions, which is called _cultus_, or _worship of God_. He therefore\nthat thinketh that all things proceed from God\u2019s _eternal will_, and\nconsequently are _necessary_, does he not think God _omnipotent_?\nDoes he not esteem of his _power_ as highly as is possible? which is\nto honour God as much as may be in his heart. Again, he that\nthinketh so, is he not more apt by _external_ acts and words to\nacknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? yet is this\nexternal acknowledgment the same thing which we call _worship_. So\nthat this opinion fortifies _piety_ in both kinds, external and\ninternal; therefore is far from destroying it. And for _repentance_,\nwhich is nothing else but a glad returning into the right way, after\nthe grief of being out of the way; though the cause that made him go\nastray were necessary, yet there is no reason why he should not\ngrieve; and, again though the cause why he returned into the way\nwere necessary, there remained still the causes of joy. So that the\n_necessity_ of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of\n_repentance_, grief for the error, and joy for returning.\n\nAnd for _prayer_, whereas he saith that the _necessity_ of things\ndestroy _prayer_, I deny it; for though _prayer_ be none of the\n_causes_ that _move_ God\u2019s _will_, his will being unchangeable, yet\nsince we find in God\u2019s word, he will not give his blessings but to\nthose that ask, the motive of prayer is the same. _Prayer_ is the\ngift of God no less than the _blessing_, and the prayer is decreed\ntogether in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed. It is\nmanifest that _thanksgiving_ is no cause of the blessing past, and\nthat which is past is sure and necessary, yet even amongst men\nthanks is in use as an acknowledgment of the benefit past, though we\nshould expect no new benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God\nAlmighty is but thanksgiving for God\u2019s blessings in general, and\nthough it precede the particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause\nor means of it, but a signification that we expect nothing but from\nGod, in such manner, as he, not as we, will; and our Saviour by word\nof mouth bids us pray, _thy will_, not our will, _be done_, and by\nexample teaches us the same; for he prayed thus, _Father if it be\nthy will, let this cup pass_, &c. The end of prayer, as of\nthanksgiving, is not to _move_ but to _honour_ God Almighty, in\nacknowledging that what we ask can be effected by him only.\n\n_The fourth argument from reason is this: the order, beauty, and\nperfection of the world requireth that in the universe should be\nagents of all sorts; some necessary, some free, some contingent. He\nthat shall make all things necessary, or all things free, or all\nthings contingent, doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the\nworld._\n\nIn which argument I observe, first a _contradiction_; for seeing he\nthat _maketh_ anything, in that he maketh it, maketh it to be\n_necessary_; it followeth that he that maketh all things, maketh all\nthings necessarily to be: as if a workman make a garment, the\ngarment must necessarily be; so if God make every thing, every thing\nmust necessarily be. Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth,\nthough we know it not, that some agents should work without\ndeliberation (which his lordship calls _necessary_ agents) and some\nagents with deliberation (and those both he and I call _free_\nagents) and that some agents should work, and we not know how (and\ntheir effects we both call _contingents_); but this hinders not but\nthat he that electeth may have his _election_ necessarily determined\nto _one_ by _former_ causes, and that which is _contingent_, and\nimputed to fortune, be nevertheless _necessary_ and depend on\n_precedent_ necessary causes. For by _contingent_, men do not mean\nthat which hath _no_ cause, but that which hath not for cause\nanything that we perceive; as for example, when a traveller meets\nwith a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause\nsufficient to produce it; but because the journey caused not the\nrain, nor the rain the journey, we say they were contingent one to\nanother. And thus you see that though there be three sorts of\nevents, _necessary_, _contingent_, and _free_, yet they may be _all_\nnecessary without destruction of the beauty or perfection of the\nuniverse.\n\nTo the first argument from reason, which is, _That if liberty be\ntaken away, the nature and formal reason of sin is taken away_; I\nanswer by denying the consequence: the nature of sin consisteth in\nthis, that the _action_ done proceed from our _will_ and be against\nthe _law_. A judge in judging whether it be sin or no, which is done\nagainst the law, looks at no higher cause of the action, than the\nwill of the doer. Now when I say the action was _necessary_, I do\nnot say it was done _against_ the will of the doer, but _with_ his\nwill, and _necessarily_, because man\u2019s will, that is every volition\nor act of the will and purpose of man had a _sufficient_, and\ntherefore a _necessary_ cause, and consequently every _voluntary_\naction was _necessitated_. An action therefore may be _voluntary_\nand a _sin_, and nevertheless be _necessary_; and because God may\nafflict by a right derived from his _omnipotence_, though sin were\nnot, and because the example of punishment on voluntary sinners, is\nthe cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less frequent, for\nGod to punish such sinners, as I have said before, is no injustice.\nAnd thus you have my answer to his Lordship\u2019s objections both out of\nScripture, and from reason.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS, WHICH HIS LORDSHIP SUPPOSING\n MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO EVADE HIS\n ARGUMENTS, ARE BY HIM REMOVED.\n\nHe says a man may perhaps answer, that the _necessity_ of things\nheld by him, is not a _stoical_ necessity, but a _Christian_\nnecessity, &c. But this _distinction_ I have not used, nor indeed\never heard before, nor could I think any man could make _stoical_\nand _Christian_ two kinds of _necessity_, though they may be two\nkinds of _doctrine_. Nor have I drawn my answer to his Lordship\u2019s\narguments from the authority of any sect, but from the nature of the\nthings themselves.\n\nBut here I must take notice of certain words of his Lordship\u2019s in\nthis place, as making against his own tenet. _Where all the causes_,\nsaith he, _being joined together, and subordinate one to another, do\nmake but one total cause, if any one cause, much more the first, in\nthe whole series or subordination of causes, be necessary, it\ndetermines the rest, and without doubt maketh the effect necessary_.\nFor that which I call the _necessary_ cause of any effect, is the\n_joining_ together of all causes subordinate to the first, into one\ntotal cause. _If any of these_, saith he, _especially the first,\nproduce its effect necessarily, then all the rest_ are determined.\nNow it is manifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all\nthe effects that are next and immediate to it, and therefore by his\nLordship\u2019s own reason all effects are necessary.\n\nNor is that distinction of necessary in respect of the _first\ncause_, and necessary in respect of _second causes_, mine; it does,\nas his Lordship well notes, imply a contradiction. But the\ndistinction of _free_ into _free from compulsion_, and _free from\nnecessitation_, I acknowledge. For to be _free from compulsion_ is\nto do a thing so as _terror_ be not the cause of his _will_ to do\nit; for a man is then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him\nwilling to it: as when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea\nto save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed.\nThus all men that do anything for _love_, or _revenge_, or _lust_,\nare _free from compulsion_, and yet their actions may be as\nnecessary as those that are done by compulsion; for sometimes other\npassions work as forcibly as fear. But _free from necessitation_, I\nsay, no man can be, and it is that which his Lordship undertook to\ndisprove.\n\nThis _distinction_, his Lordship says, uses to be _fortified_ by two\nreasons, but they are not mine. The first he says, is, that it is\ngranted by all divines, that an _hypothetical necessity_, or\nnecessity upon supposition, may stand with _liberty_. That you may\nunderstand this, I will give you an example of _hypothetical\nnecessity_. If _I shall live, I shall eat_. This is an _hypothetical\nnecessity_. Indeed it is a necessary proposition, that is to say, it\nis necessary that that proposition should be true whensoever\nuttered, but it is not the necessity of the thing, nor is it\ntherefore necessary that the man should live, nor that the man\nshould eat. I do not use to _fortify_ my distinctions with such\nreasons; let his Lordship confute them how he will, it contents me;\nbut I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how easy and\nplain a thing, but withal false, with the grave usage of such terms\nas _hypothetical necessity_, and _necessity_ upon _supposition_, and\nsuch like terms of Schoolmen, may be obscured and made to seem\n_profound learning_.\n\nThe second reason that may confirm the distinction of _free from\ncompulsion_, and _free from necessitation_, he says is, that God and\ngood angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we. This\nreason, though I had no need of, yet I think it so far forth good,\nas it is true that God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet\nare free; but because I find not in the articles of our faith, nor\nin the decrees of our church, set down in what manner I am to\nconceive God and good angels to work by necessity, or in what sense\nthey work _freely_, I suspend my sentence in that point, and am\ncontent that there be a _freedom from compulsion_, and yet no\n_freedom from necessitation_, as hath been proved, in that a man may\nbe necessitated to some action without threats and without fear of\ndanger. But how my Lord can avoid the consisting together of\n_freedom_ and _necessity_, supposing God and good angels are freer\nthan men, and yet do good necessarily, that we must examine: _I\nconfess_, saith he, _that God and good angels are more free than we,\nthat is, intensively in degree of freedom, not extensively in the\nlatitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise not of\nspecification_.\n\nAgain, we have here two distinctions that are no distinctions, but\nmade to seem so by terms invented by I know not whom to cover\nignorance, and blind the understanding of the reader: for it cannot\nbe conceived that there is any liberty greater, than for a man to do\nwhat he will. One heat may be more intensive than another, but not\none liberty than another; he that can do what he will, hath all\nliberty possible, and he that cannot, hath none at all. Also\n_liberty_, as his Lordship says the Schools call it, of _exercise_,\nwhich is as I have said before, a liberty to do or not to do, cannot\nbe without a _liberty_, which they call, of _specification_, that is\nto say, a liberty to do, or not to do this or that in particular.\nFor how can a man conceive he hath liberty to do anything, that hath\nnot liberty to do this, or that, or somewhat in particular? If a man\nbe forbidden in Lent to eat this, and that, and every other\nparticular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a liberty\nto eat flesh, more than he that hath no licence at all? You may by\nthis again see the vanity of distinctions used in the _Schools_, and\nI do not doubt but that the imposing of them, by authority of\n_doctors_ in the _Church_, hath been a great cause that men have\nlaboured, though by sedition and evil courses, to shake them off;\nfor nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannizing over\nmen\u2019s reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by\nthe Scriptures, but by the pretence of learning, and more judgment\nthan that of other men.\n\nIn the next place his Lordship bringeth two arguments against\ndistinguishing between _free from compulsion_ and _free from\nnecessitation_.\n\nThe first is, that _election_ is opposite not only to _coaction_ or\n_compulsion_, but also _necessitation_ or determination to one. This\nis it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no\nnew argument to prove it; and to those brought formerly, I have\nalready answered. And in this place I deny again, that election is\nopposite to either; for when a man is compelled, for example, to\nsubject himself to an enemy or to die, he hath still election left\nhim, and a deliberation to bethink which of the two he can better\nendure. And he that is led to prison by force, hath election, and\nmay deliberate whether he will be hauled and trained on the ground,\nor make use of his own feet: likewise when there is no _compulsion_,\nbut the strength of _temptation_ to do an evil action, being greater\nthan the motives to _abstain_, it necessarily determines him to the\ndoing of it; yet he deliberates while sometimes the motives to do,\nsometimes the motives to forbear, are working on him, and\nconsequently he _electeth_ which he will. But commonly when we see\nand know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge _necessity_; but\nwhen we see not, or mark not the force that moves us, we then think\nthere is none, and that it is not _causes_ but _liberty_ that\nproduceth the action. Hence it is that they think he does not choose\nthis, that of necessity chooses it; but they might as well say, fire\ndoth not burn, because it burns of necessity.\n\nThe second argument is not so much an argument as a distinction, to\nshow in what sense it may be said that _voluntary_ actions are\n_necessitated_, and in what sense not. And therefore his Lordship\nallegeth, as from the authority of the _Schools_, and that which\nrippeth up the bottom of the _question_, that there is a double act\nof the _will_. The one, he says, is _actus imperatus_, an act done\nat the command of the will, by some inferior faculty of the soul; as\nto open or shut one\u2019s eyes; and this act may be compelled: the\nother, he says, is _actus elicitus_, an act allured or drawn forth\nby allurement out of the will, as to _will_, to _choose_, to\n_elect_; this he says cannot be compelled. Wherein, letting pass\nthat metaphorical speech of attributing command and subjection to\nthe faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family\nwithin themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very\nimproper in searching the truth of a question, you may observe,\nfirst, that to compel a _voluntary_ act, is nothing else but to will\nit; for it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of my\neyes, or the doing of any other action; and to say, I have the will\nto shut my eyes: so that _actus imperatus_, here, might as easily\nhave been said in English a _voluntary action_, but that they that\ninvented the term, understood not anything it signified.\n\nSecondly, you may observe, that _actus elicitus_, is exemplified by\nthese words, to _will_, to _elect_, to _choose_, which are all one,\nand so to will is here made an act of the will; and indeed as the\nwill is a faculty or power in a man\u2019s soul, so to will is an act of\nit according to that power; but as it is absurdly said, that to\ndance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to\ndance; so is it also to say, that to will is an act allured or drawn\nout of the power to will, which power is commonly called the will.\nHowsoever it be, the sum of his Lordship\u2019s distinction is, that a\n_voluntary_ act may be done by _compulsion_, that is to say, by foul\nmeans, but to will that, or any act, cannot be but by _allurement_,\nor fair means. Now seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements,\nproduce the action which they do produce, as _necessarily_ as foul\nmeans and threatening; it follows, that to _will_ may be made as\n_necessary_ as anything that is done by _compulsion_. So that\ndistinction of _actus imperatus_ and _actus elicitus_ are but words,\nand of no effect against necessity.\n\nHis Lordship in the rest of his discourse, reckoneth up the opinion\nof certain professions of men, touching the causes wherein the\nnecessity of things, which they maintain, consisteth. And first he\nsaith, the _astrologer_ deriveth his _necessity_ from the _stars_;\nsecondly, that the _physician_ attributeth it to the _temper_ of the\nbody. For my part, I am not of their opinion, because, neither the\nstars alone, nor the temperature of the patient alone, is able to\nproduce any effect, without the concurrence of all other agents. For\nthere is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the\ncausing whereof concur not whatsoever is _in rerum natur\u00e2_, which\nbecause it is a great paradox, and depends on many antecedent\nspeculations, I do not press in this place. Thirdly, he disputeth\nagainst the opinion of them that say, _external objects_ presented\nto men of such and such temperatures, do make their actions\n_necessary_; and says, the power such objections have over us,\nproceeds from our own fault: but that is nothing to the purpose, if\nsuch fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power, and\ntherefore that opinion may hold true for all that answer.\n\nFurther he says, _prayer_, _fasting_, &c. may alter our _habits_;\nit is true, but when they do so, they are _causes_ of the contrary\n_habit_, and make it _necessary_, as the former habit had been\nnecessary, if _prayer_, _fasting_, &c. had not been. Besides, we\nare not moved or disposed to prayer or any other action, but by\noutward objects, as pious company, godly preachers, or something\nequivalent. Fourthly, he says a resolved mind is not easily\nsurprised, as the mind of Ulysses, who when others wept, alone\nwept not; and of the philosopher, that abstained from striking,\nbecause he found himself angry; and of him that poured out the\nwater when he was thirsty, and the like. Such things I confess\nhave, or may have been done, and do prove only that it was not\nnecessary for Ulysses then to weep, nor for that philosopher to\nstrike, nor for that other man to drink; but it does not prove\nthat it was not necessary for Ulysses then to abstain, as he did,\nfrom weeping, nor for the philosopher to abstain, as he did, from\nstriking, nor for the other man to forbear drinking, and yet that\nwas the thing his Lordship ought to have proved. Lastly his\nLordship confesses, that the _dispositions_ of objects may be\n_dangerous_ to _liberty_, but cannot be _destructive_. To which I\nanswer, it is impossible: for _liberty_ is never in any other\ndanger than to be lost; and if it cannot be lost, which he\nconfesses, I may infer, it can be in no danger at all.\n\nThe fourth opinion his Lordship rejecteth, is of them that make the\nwill necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding;\nbut it seems his Lordship understands that tenet in another sense\nthan I do; for he speaketh as if they that held it, did suppose men\nmust dispute the sequel of every action they do, great and small, to\nthe least grain; which is a thing his Lordship, with reason, thinks\nuntrue. But I understand it to signify, that the _will_ follows the\n_last_ opinion or _judgment_ immediately preceding the _action_,\nconcerning whether it be good to do it or not, whether he have\nweighed it long before, or not at all, and that I take to be the\nmeaning of them that hold it. As for example, when a man strikes,\nhis will to strike follows necessarily that thought he had of the\nsequel of his stroke, immediately before the lifting up of his hand.\nNow if it be understood in that sense, the _last_ dictate of the\nunderstanding does _necessitate_ the _action_, though not as the\nwhole cause, yet as the last cause, as the last feather necessitates\nthe breaking of a horse\u2019s back, when there are so many laid on\nbefore, as there needed but the addition of one to make the weight\nsufficient.\n\nThat which his Lordship allegeth against this, is first, out of a\npoet, who in the person of Medea says,\n\n \u201cVideo meliora, proboque,\n Deteriora sequor.\u201d\n\nBut that saying, as pretty as it is, is not true; for though Medea\nsaw many reasons to forbear killing her children, yet the last\ndictate of her judgment was, that the present revenge on her husband\noutweighed them all, and thereupon the wicked action _necessarily_\nfollowed. Then the story of the Roman, who of two competitors, said,\none had the better reason, but the other must have the office. This\nalso maketh against his Lordship, for the last dictate of his\njudgment that had the bestowing of the office, was this, that it was\nbetter to take a great bribe, than reward a great merit.\n\nThirdly, he objects that things nearer the sense, move more\npowerfully than reason; what followeth thence but this, the sense of\nthe present good is commonly more immediate to the action, than the\nforesight of the evil consequence to come? Fourthly, whereas his\nLordship says, that do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the\ndeath of his son than for the sin of his soul, makes nothing to the\nlast dictate of the understanding; but it argues plainly, that\nsorrow for sin is not _voluntary_, and by consequence, that\n_repentance_ proceedeth from causes.\n\nThe last part of this discourse containeth his Lordship\u2019s opinions\nabout reconciling _liberty_ with the _prescience_ and _decrees_ of\nGod, otherwise than some _divines_ have done, against whom, he says,\nhe had formerly written a treatise, out of which he repeateth only\ntwo things: one is, _That we ought not to desert a certain truth,\nfor not being able to comprehend the certain manner of it_. And I\nsay the same, as for example, that his Lordship ought not to desert\nthis certain truth, _that there are certain and_ necessary causes\n_which make every man to_ will _what he willeth, though he do not_\nyet conceive in what manner the _will_ of man is _caused_. And yet I\nthink the manner of it is not very hard to conceive, seeing we see\ndaily, that _praise_, _dispraise_, _reward_, and _punishment_,\n_good_ and _evil_, sequels of men\u2019s _actions_ retained in _memory_,\ndo frame and make us to the _election_ of whatsoever it be that we\nelect, and that the memory of such things proceeds from the\n_senses_, and _sense_ from the operation of the objects of sense,\nwhich are external to us, and governed only by God Almighty; and by\nconsequence all _actions_, even of _free_ and _voluntary_ agents,\nare necessary.\n\nThe other thing that he repeateth, is, that the best way to\nreconcile _contingence_ and _liberty_ with _prescience_ and the\n_decrees_ of _God_, is to subject future _contingencies_ to the\n_aspect of God_. The same is also my opinion, but contrary to what\nhis Lordship all this while laboured to prove. For hitherto he held\n_liberty_ and _necessity_, that is to say, _liberty_ and the\n_decrees_ of _God_, irreconcileable, unless the _aspect of God_,\nwhich word appeareth now the first time in this discourse, signify\nsomewhat else besides _God\u2019s will_ and _decree_, which I cannot\nunderstand. But he adds that we must subject them, according to that\n_presentiality_ which they have in eternity, which he says cannot be\ndone by them that conceive _eternity_ to be an _everlasting\nsuccession_, but only by them that conceive it as an _indivisible\npoint_. To which I answer, that as soon as I can conceive _eternity_\nto be an _indivisible point_, or anything but an _everlasting\nsuccession_, I will renounce all that I have written on this\nsubject. I know St. Thomas Aquinas calls _eternity_, _nunc stans_,\nan _ever-abiding now_; which is easy enough to say, but though I\nfain would, yet I could never conceive it: they that can, are more\nhappy than I. But in the mean time his Lordship alloweth all men to\nbe of my opinion, save only those that can conceive in their minds a\n_nunc stans_, which I think are none. I understand as little how it\ncan be true his Lordship says, that God is not _just_, but _justice_\nitself; not _wise_, but _wisdom_ itself; not _eternal_, but\n_eternity_ itself; nor how he concludes thence, that _eternity_ is a\n_point indivisible_, and not a _succession_, nor in what sense it\ncan be said, that an _infinite point_, and wherein is no\n_succession_, can comprehend all _time_, though time be\n_successive_. These phrases I find not in the Scripture; I wonder\ntherefore what was the design of the Schoolmen to bring them up,\nunless they thought a man could not be a true Christian unless his\nunderstanding be first strangled with such hard sayings. And thus\nmuch for answer to his Lordship\u2019s discourse, wherein I think not\nonly his _squadrons of arguments_, but also his _reserve of\ndistinctions_, are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have my\ndoctrine concerning the same question, with my _reasons_ for it,\npositively, and as briefly as I can, without any terms of _art_, in\nplain English.\n\n\n MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.\n\n\nFirst I conceive, that when it cometh into a man\u2019s mind to do or not\nto do some certain action, if he have no time to _deliberate_, the\ndoing it or abstaining _necessarily_ follow the _present_ thought he\nhath of the _good_ or _evil_ consequence thereof to himself. As for\nexample, in sudden _anger_, the _action_ shall follow the thought of\n_revenge_; in sudden _fear_, the thought of _escape_. Also when a\nman hath time to _deliberate_, but deliberates not, because never\nanything appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the\n_action_ follows his opinion of the _goodness_ or _harm_ of it.\nThese actions I call VOLUNTARY, my Lord, if I understand him aright\nthat calls them SPONTANEOUS. I call them _voluntary_, because those\n_actions_ that follow immediately the _last_ appetite, are\n_voluntary_, and here where is one only appetite, that one is the\nlast. Besides, I see it is reasonable to punish a _rash_ action,\nwhich could not be justly done by man to man, unless the same were\n_voluntary_. For no _action_ of a man can be said to be without\n_deliberation_, though never so sudden, because it is supposed he\nhad time to _deliberate_ all the precedent time of his life, whether\nhe should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he\nthat killeth in a sudden passion of _anger_, shall nevertheless be\njustly put to _death_, because all the time, wherein he was able to\nconsider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one\ncontinual _deliberation_, and consequently the killing shall be\njudged to proceed from _election_.\n\nSecondly, I conceive when a man _deliberates_ whether he shall do a\nthing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether\nit be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to _consider_\nan action, is to imagine the _consequences_ of it, both _good_ and\n_evil_. From whence is to be inferred, that _deliberation_ is\nnothing else but _alternate_ imagination of the _good_ and _evil_\nsequels of an _action_, or, which is the same thing, alternate\n_hope_ and _fear_, or alternate _appetite_ to do or quit the action\nof which he _deliberateth_.\n\nThirdly, I conceive that in all _deliberations_, that is to say, in\nall alternate _succession_ of contrary _appetites_, the last is that\nwhich we call the WILL, and is immediately next before the doing of\nthe action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All\nother _appetites_ to do, and to quit, that come upon a man during\nhis deliberations, are called _intentions_ and _inclinations_, but\nnot _wills_, there being but one _will_, which also in this case may\nbe called the _last will_, though the _intentions_ change often.\n\nFourthly, I conceive that those _actions_, which a man is said to do\nupon _deliberation_, are said to be _voluntary_, and done upon\n_choice_ and _election_, so that _voluntary_ action, and action\nproceeding from _election_ is the same thing; and that of a\n_voluntary agent_, it is all one to say, he is _free_, and to say,\nhe hath not made an end of _deliberating_.\n\nFifthly, I conceive _liberty_ to be rightly defined in this manner:\n_Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are\nnot contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent_.\nAs for example, the water is said to descend _freely_, or to have\n_liberty_ to descend by the channel of the river, because there is\nno impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are\nimpediments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say\nit wants the _liberty_ to ascend, but the _faculty_ or _power_,\nbecause the impediment is in the nature of the water, and\nintrinsical. So also we say, he that is tied, wants the _liberty_ to\ngo, because the impediment is not in him, but in his bands; whereas\nwe say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impediment is\nin himself.\n\nSixthly, I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from _itself_, but\nfrom the _action_ of some other immediate _agent_ without itself.\nAnd that therefore, when first a man hath an _appetite_ or _will_ to\nsomething, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will,\nthe _cause_ of his _will_, is not the _will_ itself, but _something_\nelse not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of\ncontroversy, that of _voluntary_ actions the _will_ is the\n_necessary_ cause, and by this which is said, the _will_ is also\n_caused_ by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth,\nthat _voluntary_ actions have all of them _necessary_ causes, and\ntherefore are _necessitated_.\n\nSeventhly, I hold that to be a _sufficient cause_, to which nothing\nis wanting that is needful to the producing of the _effect_. The\nsame also is a _necessary_ cause. For if it be possible that a\n_sufficient_ cause shall not bring forth the _effect_, then there\nwanteth somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so\nthe _cause_ was not _sufficient_; but if it be impossible that a\n_sufficient_ cause should not produce the _effect_, then is a\n_sufficient_ cause a _necessary_ cause, for that is said to produce\nan effect _necessarily_ that cannot but produce it. Hence it is\nmanifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced _necessarily_;\nfor whatsoever is produced hath had a _sufficient_ cause to produce\nit, or else it had not been; and therefore also _voluntary_ actions\nare _necessitated_.\n\nLastly, that ordinary _definition_ of a _free agent_, namely, _that\na_ free agent _is that, which, when all things are present which are\nneedful to produce the_ effect, _can nevertheless not produce it_,\nimplies a contradiction, and is nonsense; being as much as to say,\nthe cause may be _sufficient_, that is to say, _necessary_, and yet\nthe _effect_ shall not follow.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n MY REASONS.\n\nFor the first five points, wherein it is explicated I, what\n_spontaneity_ is; II, what _deliberation_ is; III, what _will_,\n_propension_, and _appetite_ are; IV, what a _free agent_ is: V,\nwhat _liberty_ is; there can no other proof be offered but every\nman\u2019s own experience, by reflection on himself, and remembering what\nhe useth in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth when he saith\nan action is _spontaneous_, a man _deliberates_; such is his _will_,\nthat _agent_ or that _action_ is _free_. Now he that reflecteth so\non himself, cannot but be satisfied, that _deliberation_ is the\n_consideration of the good and evil sequels of an action to come_;\nthat by _spontaneity_ is meant _inconsiderate action_, or else\nnothing is meant by it; that _will_ is the _last act of our\ndeliberation_; that a _free agent_ is he _that can do if he will_,\nand _forbear if he will_; and that _liberty is the absence of\nexternal impediments_. But to those that out of custom speak not\nwhat they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able, or will\nnot take the pains to consider what they think when they hear such\nwords, no argument can be sufficient, because _experience_ and\n_matter of fact_ are not verified by other men\u2019s arguments, but by\nevery man\u2019s own _sense_ and _memory_. For example, how can it be\nproved that to _love_ a thing and to think it _good_ is all one, to\na man that doth not mark his own meaning by those words? Or how can\nit be proved that _eternity_ is not _nunc stans_, to a man that says\nthose words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the\nthing in his mind?\n\nAlso the sixth point, that a man cannot imagine anything to begin\n_without a cause_, can no other way be made known, but by trying how\nhe can imagine it; but if he try, he shall find as much reason, if\nthere be no cause of the thing, to conceive it should begin at one\ntime as another, that he hath equal reason to think it should begin\nat all times, which is impossible, and therefore he must think there\nwas some special cause why it began then, rather than sooner or\nlater; or else that it began never, but was _eternal_.\n\nFor the seventh point, which is, that all _events_ have _necessary_\ncauses, it is there proved, in that they have _sufficient_ causes.\nFurther let us in this place also suppose any event never so casual,\nas the throwing, for example, _ames ace_ upon a pair of dice, and\nsee, if it must not have been _necessary_ before it was thrown. For\nseeing it was thrown, it had a _beginning_, and consequently a\n_sufficient_ cause to produce it, consisting partly in the _dice_,\npartly in outward things, as the posture of the parts of the _hand_,\nthe measure of _force_ applied by the caster, the posture of the\nparts of the _table_, and the like. In sum, there was nothing\nwanting which was necessarily requisite to the producing of that\nparticular cast, and consequently the cast was necessarily thrown;\nfor if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite\nto the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been _sufficient_.\nIn the like manner it may be proved that every other accident, how\n_contingent_ soever it seem, or how _voluntary_ soever it be, is\nproduced _necessarily_, which is that that my Lord Bishop disputes\nagainst. The same may be proved also in this manner. Let the case be\nput, for example, of the weather. _It is necessary that to-morrow it\nshall rain or not rain._ If therefore it be not _necessary_ it shall\nrain, it is _necessary_ it shall not rain, otherwise there is no\nnecessity that the proposition, _it shall rain or not rain_, should\nbe true. I know there be some that say, it may necessarily be true\nthat one of the two shall come to pass, but not, singly that it\nshall rain, or that it shall not rain, which is as much to say,\n_one_ of them is _necessary_, yet neither of them is _necessary_;\nand therefore to seem to avoid that absurdity, they make a\ndistinction, that neither of them is true _determinate_, but\n_indeterminate_; which distinction either signifies no more but\nthis, one of them is true, but we know not which, and so the\nnecessity remains, though we know it not; or if the meaning of the\ndistinction be not that, it hath no meaning, and they might as well\nhave said, one of them is true _Titirice_, but neither of them, _Tu\npatulice_.\n\nThe last thing, in which also consisteth the whole controversy,\nnamely that there is no such thing as an agent, _which when all\nthings requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to\nproduce it_; or, which is all one, that there is no such thing as\n_freedom from necessity_, is easily inferred from that which hath\nbeen before alleged. For if it be an _agent_, it can _work_; and if\nit _work_, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce\nthe _action_, and consequently the cause of the action is\n_sufficient_; and if _sufficient_, then also _necessary_, as hath\nbeen proved before.\n\nAnd thus you see how the _inconveniences_, which his Lordship\nobjecteth must follow upon the holding of _necessity_, are avoided,\nand the _necessity_ itself _demonstratively_ proved. To which I\ncould add, if I thought it good logic, the _inconvenience_ of\ndenying _necessity_, as that it destroyeth both the _decrees_ and\nthe _prescience_ of God Almighty; for whatsoever God hath _purposed_\nto bring to pass by _man_, as an instrument, or foreseeth shall come\nto pass; a man, if he have _liberty_, such as his Lordship\naffirmeth, from _necessitation_, might frustrate, and make not to\ncome to pass, and God should either not _foreknow_ it, and not\n_decree_ it, or he should _foreknow_ such things shall be, as shall\nnever be, and _decree_ that which shall never _come to pass_.\n\nThis is all that hath come into my mind touching this question since\nI last considered it. And I humbly beseech your Lordship to\ncommunicate it only to my Lord Bishop. And so praying God to prosper\nyour Lordship in all your designs, I take leave, and am,\n\n My most noble and most obliging Lord,\n Your most humble servant,\n THOMAS HOBBES.\n\nRouen, _Aug. 20, 1652_.[A]\n\nFootnote A:\n\n In the first edition of 1654 this date is 1646.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n AN\n ANSWER\n TO A BOOK PUBLISHED BY\n DR. BRAMHALL,\n\n LATE BISHOP OF DERRY;\n\n CALLED THE\n\n \u201cCATCHING OF THE LEVIATHAN.\u201d\n\n\n TOGETHER WITH AN\n\n HISTORICAL NARRATION CONCERNING\n\n HERESY,\n\n AND THE PUNISHMENT THEREOF.\n\n TO THE READER.\n\n\n -------\n\n\nAs in all things which I have written, so also in this piece, I have\nendeavoured all I can to be perspicuous; but yet your own attention\nis always necessary. The late Lord Bishop of Derry published a book\ncalled _The Catching of the Leviathan_, in which he hath put\ntogether divers sentences picked out of my _Leviathan_, which stand\nthere plainly and firmly proved, and sets them down without their\nproofs, and without the order of their dependance one upon another;\nand calls them atheism, blasphemy, impiety, subversion of religion,\nand by other names of that kind. My request unto you is, that when\nhe cites my words for erroneous, you will be pleased to turn to the\nplace itself, and see whether they be well proved, and how to be\nunderstood. Which labour his Lordship might have saved you, if he\nwould have vouchsafed as well to have weighed my arguments before\nyou, as to have shown you my conclusions. His book containeth two\nchapters, the one concerning Religion, the other concerning\nPolitics. Because he does not so much as offer any refutation of any\nthing in my _Leviathan_ concluded, I needed not to have answered\neither of them. Yet to the first I here answer, because the words\n_atheism_, _impiety_, and the like, are words of the greatest\ndefamation possible. And this I had done sooner, if I had sooner\nknown that such a book was extant. He wrote it ten years since, and\nyet I never heard of it till about three months since; so little\ntalk there was of his Lordship\u2019s writings. If you want leisure or\ncare of the questions between us, I pray you condemn me not upon\nreport. To judge and not examine is not just.\n\n Farewell.\n T. HOBBES.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n AN ANSWER,\n ETC.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n THAT THE HOBBIAN PRINCIPLES ARE DESTRUCTIVE TO CHRISTIANITY AND ALL\n RELIGION.\n\n_J. D._ The image of God is not altogether defaced by the fall of\nman, but that there will remain some practical notions of God and\ngoodness; which when the mind is free from vagrant desires, and\nviolent passions, do shine as clearly in the heart, as other\nspeculative notions do in the head. Hence it is, that there was\nnever any nation so barbarous or savage throughout the whole world,\nwhich had not their God. They who did never wear clothes upon their\nbacks, who did never know magistrate but their father, yet have\ntheir God, and their religious rights and devotions to him. Hence it\nis, that the greatest atheists in any sudden danger do unwittingly\ncast their eyes up to heaven, as craving aid from thence, and in a\nthunder creep into some hole to hide themselves. And they who are\nconscious to themselves of any secret crimes, though they be secure\nenough from the justice of men, do yet feel the blind blows of a\nguilty conscience, and fear Divine vengeance. This is acknowledged\nby T. H. himself in his lucid intervals. _That we may know what\nworship of God natural reason doth assign, let us begin with his\nattributes, where it is manifest in the first place, that existency\nis to be attributed to him._ To which he addeth, _infiniteness_,\n_incomprehensibility_, _unity_, _ubiquity_. Thus for attributes;\nnext for actions. _Concerning external actions, wherewith God is to\nbe worshipped, the most general precept of reason is, that they be\nsigns of honour_; under which are contained _prayers, thanksgivings,\noblations, and sacrifices_.\n\n_T. H._ Hitherto his Lordship discharges me of atheism. What need he\nto say that _all nations, how barbarous soever, yet have their Gods\nand religious rites, and atheists are frighted with thunder, and\nfeel the blind blows of conscience_? It might have been as apt a\npreface to any other of his discourses as this. I expect therefore\nin the next place to be told, that I deny again my afore-recited\ndoctrine.\n\n_J. D._ Yet, to let us see how inconsistent and irreconcileable he\nis with himself, elsewhere reckoning up all the laws of nature at\nlarge, even twenty in number, he hath not one word that concerneth\nreligion, or hath the least relation in the world to God. As if a\nman were like the colt of a wild ass in the wilderness, without any\nowner or obligation. Thus in describing the laws of nature, this\ngreat clerk forgetteth the God of nature, and the main and principal\nlaws of nature, which contain a man\u2019s duty to his God, and the\nprincipal end of his creation.\n\n_T. H._ After I had ended the discourse he mentions of the laws of\nnature, I thought it fittest in the last place, once for all, to say\nthey were the laws of God, then when they were delivered in the word\nof God; but before, being not known by men for any thing but their\nown natural reason, they were but theorems, tending to peace, and\nthose uncertain, as being but conclusions of particular men, and\ntherefore not properly laws. Besides, I had formerly in my book _De\nCive_, cap. IV, proved them severally, one by one, out of the\nScriptures: which his Lordship had read and knew. It was therefore\nan unjust charge of his to say, I had not one word in them that\nconcerns religion, or that hath the least relation in the world to\nGod; and this upon no other ground than that I added not to every\narticle, _this law is in the Scripture_. But why he should call me\n(ironically) a great clerk, I cannot tell. I suppose he would make\nmen believe, I arrogated to myself all the learning of a great\nclerk, bishop, or other inferior minister. A learned bishop, is that\nbishop that can interpret all parts of Scripture truly, and\ncongruently to the harmony of the whole; that has learnt the history\nand laws of the Church, down from the apostles' time to his own; and\nknows what is the nature of a law civil, divine, natural, and\npositive; and how to govern well the parochial ministers of his\ndiocese, so that they may both by doctrine and example keep the\npeople in the belief of all articles of faith necessary to\nsalvation, and in obedience to the laws of their country. This is a\nlearned bishop. A learned minister, is he that hath learned the way\nby which men may be drawn from avarice, pride, sensuality,\nprofaneness, rebellious principles, and all other vices, by eloquent\nand powerful disgracing of them, both from Scripture and from\nreason; and can terrify men from vice, by discreet uttering of the\npunishments denounced against wicked men, and by deducing,\nrationally, the damage they receive by it in the end. In one word,\nhe is a learned minister that can preach such sermons as St.\nChrysostom preached to the Antiochians, when he was presbyter in\nthat city. Could his Lordship find in my book, that I arrogated to\nmyself the eloquence or wisdom of St. Chrysostom, or the ability of\ngoverning the church? It is one thing to know what is to be done,\nanother thing to know how to do it. But his Lordship was pleased to\nuse any artifice to disgrace me in any kind whatsoever.\n\n_J. D._ Perhaps he will say that he handleth the laws of nature\nthere, only so far as may serve to the constitution or settlement of\na commonwealth. In good time, let it be so. He hath devised us a\ntrim commonwealth, which is founded neither upon religion towards\nGod, nor justice towards man; but merely upon self-interest, and\nself-preservation. Those rays of heavenly light, those natural seeds\nof religion, which God himself hath imprinted in the heart of man,\nare more efficacious towards preservation of a society, whether we\nregard the nature of the thing, or the blessing of God, than all his\n_pacts_, and _surrenders_, and _translations of power_. He who\nunteacheth men their duty to God, may make them eye-servants, so\nlong as their interest doth oblige them to obey; but is no fit\nmaster to teach men conscience and fidelity.\n\n_T. H._ He has not yet found the place where I contradict either the\nexistence, or infiniteness, or incomprehensibility, or unity, or\nubiquity of God. I am therefore yet absolved of atheism. But I am,\nhe says, inconsistent and irreconcileable with myself; that is, I am\n(though he says not so) he thinks, a forgetful blockhead. I cannot\nhelp that: but my forgetfulness appears not here. Even his Lordship,\nwhere he says, \u201cthose rays of heavenly light, those seeds of\nreligion, which God himself hath imprinted in the heart of man\n(meaning natural reason), are more efficacious to the preservation\nof society, than all the _pacts, surrenders_, and _translating of\npower_,\u201d had forgotten to except the old pact of the Jews, and the\nnew pact of Christians. But pardoning that, did he hope to make any\nwise man believe, that when this nation very lately was an anarchy,\nand dissolute multitude of men, doing every one what his own reason\nor imprinted light suggested, they did again out of the same light\ncall in the king, and peace again, and ask pardon for the faults,\nwhich that their illumination had brought them into, rather than out\nof fear of perpetual danger and hope of preservation?\n\n_J. D._ Without religion, societies are like but soapy bubbles,\nquickly dissolved. It was the judgment of as wise a man as T. H.\nhimself, though perhaps he will hardly be persuaded to it, that Rome\nowed more of its grandeur to religion, than either to strength or\nstratagems. _We have not exceeded the Spaniards in number, nor the\nGauls in strength, nor the Carthaginians in craft, nor the Grecians\nin art, &c. but we have overcome all nations by our piety and\nreligion._\n\n_T. H._ Did not his Lordship forget himself here again, in approving\nthis sentence of Tully, which makes the idolatry of the Romans, not\nonly better than the idolatry of other nations; but also better than\nthe religion of the Jews, whose law Christ himself says he came not\nto destroy but to fulfil? And that the Romans overcame both them and\nother nations by their piety, when it is manifest that the Romans\noverran the world by injustice and cruelty, and that their victories\nought not to be ascribed to the piety of the Romans, but to the\nimpiety as well of the Jews as of other nations? But what meant he\nby saying \u201cTully was as wise a man as T. H. himself, though perhaps\nhe will hardly be persuaded to it?\u201d Was that any part of the\ncontroversy? No: then it was out of his way. God promiseth to assist\ngood men in their way, but not out of their way. It is therefore the\nless wonder that his Lordship was in this place deserted of the\nlight, which God imprints in the hearts of rudest savages.\n\n_J. D._ Among his laws he inserteth _gratitude_ to men as the third\nprecept of the law of nature; but of the gratitude of mankind to\ntheir Creator, there is a deep silence. If men had sprung up from\nthe earth in a night, like mushrooms or excrescences, without all\nsense of honour, justice, conscience, or gratitude, he could not\nhave vilified the human nature more than he doth.\n\n_T. H._ My Lord discovers here an ignorance of such method as is\nnecessary for lawful and strict reasoning, and explication of the\ntruth in controversy. And not only that, but also how little able he\nis to fix his mind upon what he reads in other men\u2019s writings. When\nI had defined ingratitude universally, he finds fault that I do not\nmention ingratitude towards God, as if his Lordship knew not that an\nuniversal comprehends all the particulars. When I had defined equity\nuniversally, why did he not as well blame me for not telling what\nthat equity is in God? He is grateful to the man of whom he receives\na good turn, that confesseth, or maketh appear he is pleased with\nthe benefit he receiveth. So also gratitude towards God is to\nconfess his benefits. There is also, in gratitude towards men, a\ndesire to requite their benefits; so there is in our gratitude\ntowards God, so far to requite them, as to be kind to God\u2019s\nministers, which I acknowledged in making sacrifices a part of\nnatural divine worship; and the benefit of those sacrifices is the\nnourishment of God\u2019s ministers. It appears therefore, that the\nbishop\u2019s attention in reading my writings, was either weak in\nitself, or weakened by prejudice.\n\n_J. D._ From this shameful omission or preterition of the main duty\nof mankind, a man might easily take the height of T. H. his\nreligion. But he himself putteth it past all conjectures. His\nprinciples are brim full of prodigious impiety. _In these four\nthings, opinions of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion to\nwhat men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics,\nconsisteth the natural seed of religion_; the culture and\nimprovement whereof, he referreth only to _policy_. Human and divine\npolitics, are but politics. And again, _mankind hath this from the\nconscience of their own weakness, and the admiration of natural\nevents, that the most part of men believe that there is an invisible\nGod, the maker of all visible things_. And a little after he telleth\nus, that _superstition proceedeth from fear without right reason,\nand atheism from an opinion of reason without fear_; making atheism\nto be more reasonable than superstition. What is now become of that\ndivine worship which natural reason did assign unto God, the honour\nof existence, infiniteness, incomprehensibility, unity, ubiquity?\nWhat is now become of that dictate or precept of reason, concerning\n_prayers_, _thanksgivings_, _oblations_, _sacrifices_, if uncertain\nopinions, ignorance, fear, mistakes, the conscience of our own\nweakness, and the admiration of natural events, be the only seeds of\nreligion?\n\nHe proceedeth further, that _atheism itself, though it be an\nerroneous opinion, and therefore a sin, yet it ought to be numbered\namong the sins of imprudence or ignorance_. He addeth, that _an\natheist is punished not as a subject is punished by his king,\nbecause he did not observe laws: but as an enemy, by an enemy,\nbecause he would not accept laws_. His reason is, because _the\natheist never submitted his will to the will of God, whom he never\nthought to be_. And he concludeth that man\u2019s obligation to obey God\nproceedeth from his weakness, (De Cive, XV. 7: vol. II. p. 336):\n_Manifestum est obligationem ad prestandam ipsi_ (Deo) _obedientiam,\nincumbere hominibus propter imbecilitatem_. First, it is impossible\nthat should be a sin of mere ignorance or imprudence, which is\ndirectly contrary to the light of natural reason. The laws of nature\nneed no new promulgation, being imprinted naturally by God in the\nheart of man. _The law of nature was written in our hearts by the\nfinger of God, without our assent_; or rather, _the law of nature is\nthe assent itself_. Then if nature dictate to us that there is a\nGod, and that this God is to be worshipped in such and such a\nmanner, it is not possible that atheism should be a sin of mere\nignorance.\n\nSecondly, a rebellious subject is still a subject _de jure_, though\nnot _de facto_; by right, though not by deed: and so the most cursed\natheist that is, ought by right to be the subject of God, and ought\nto be punished not as a just enemy, but as a disloyal traitor. Which\nis confessed by himself: _this fourth sin_ (that is, of those who do\nnot by word and deed confess one God, the supreme King of Kings) _in\nthe natural kingdom of God is the crime of high treason, for it is a\ndenial of Divine power, or atheism_. Then an atheist is a traitor to\nGod, and punishable as a disloyal subject, not as an enemy.\n\nLastly, it is an absurd and dishonourable assertion, to make our\nobedience to God to depend upon our weakness, because we cannot help\nit, and not upon our gratitude, because we owe our being and\npreservation to him. _Who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the\nfruit thereof? And who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk\nof the flock?_ And again, _Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive\nglory, and honour and power; for thou hast created all things, and\nfor thy pleasure they are and were created_. But it were much\nbetter, or at least not so ill, to be a downright atheist, than to\nmake God to be such a thing as he doth, and at last thrust him into\nthe Devil\u2019s office, to be the cause of all sin.\n\n_T. H._ Though this bishop, as I said, had but a weak attention in\nreading, and little skill in examining the force of an argument, yet\nhe knew men, and the art, without troubling their judgments, to win\ntheir assents by exciting their passions. One rule of his art was to\ngive his reader what he would have him swallow, a part by itself,\nand in the nature of news, whether true or not. Knowing that the\nunlearned, that is most men, are content to believe, rather than be\ntroubled with examining, therefore, a little before, he put these\nwords, _T. H. no friend to religion_, in the margin. And in this\nplace, before he offer at any confutation, he says my principles are\nbrim full of _prodigious impieties_. And at the next paragraph, in\nthe margin, he puts that _I excuse atheism_. This behaviour becomes\nneither a bishop, nor a Christian, nor any man that pretends to good\neducation. Fear of invisible powers, what is it else in savage\npeople, but the fear of somewhat they think a God? What invisible\npower does the reason of a savage man suggest unto him, but those\nphantasms of his sleep, or his distemper, which we frequently call\nghosts, and the savages thought gods; so that the fear of a God,\nthough not of the true one, to them was the beginning of religion,\nas the fear of the true God was the beginning of wisdom to the Jews\nand Christians? Ignorance of second causes made men fly to some\nfirst cause, the fear of which bred devotion and worship. The\nignorance of what that power might do, made them observe the order\nof what he had done; that they might guess by the like order, what\nhe was to do another time. This was their prognostication. What\nprodigious impiety is here? How confutes he it? Must it be taken for\nimpiety upon his bare calumny? I said superstition was fear without\nreason. Is not the fear of a false God, or fancied demon, contrary\nto right reason? And is not atheism boldness grounded on false\nreasoning, such as is this, _the wicked prosper, therefore there is\nno God_? He offers no proof against any of this; but says only I\nmake atheism to be more reasonable than superstition; which is not\ntrue: for I deny that there is any reason either in the atheist or\nin the superstitious. And because the atheist thinks he has reason,\nwhere he has none, I think him the more irrational of the two. But\nall this while he argues not against any of this; but enquires only,\nwhat is become of my natural worship of God, and of his existency;\ninfiniteness, incomprehensibility, unity, and ubiquity. As if\nwhatsoever reason can suggest, must be suggested all at once. First,\nall men by nature had an opinion of God\u2019s existency; but of his\nother attributes not so soon, but by reasoning, and by degrees. And\nfor the attributes of the true God, they were never suggested but by\nthe Word of God written. In that I say atheism is a sin of\nignorance, he says I excuse it. The prophet David says, _the fool\nhath said in his heart, there is no God_. Is it not then a sin of\nfolly? It is agreed between us, that right reason dictates, there is\na God. Does it not follow, that denying of God is a sin proceeding\nfrom misreasoning. If it be not a sin of ignorance, it must be a sin\nof malice. Can a man malice that which he thinks has no being? But\nmay not one think there is a God, and yet maliciously deny him? If\nhe think there is a God, he is no atheist; and so the question is\nchanged into this, whether any man that thinks there is a God, dares\ndeliberately deny it? For my part I think not. For upon what\nconfidence dares any man, deliberately I say, oppose the Omnipotent?\nDavid saith of himself, _My feet were ready to slip when I saw the\nprosperity of the wicked_. Therefore it is likely the feet of men\nless holy slip oftener. But I think no man living is so daring,\nbeing out of passion, as to hold it as his opinion. Those wicked men\nthat for a long time proceeded so successfully in the late horrid\nrebellion, may perhaps make some think they were constant and\nresolved atheists: but I think rather that they forgot God, than\nbelieved there was none. He that believes there is such an atheist,\ncomes a little too near that opinion himself; nevertheless if words\nspoken in passion signify a denial of a God, no punishment\npreordained by law, can be too great for such an insolence; because\nthere is no living in a commonwealth with men, to whose oaths we\ncannot reasonably give credit. As to that I say, _an atheist is\npunished by God not as a subject by his king, but as an enemy_; and\nto my argument for it, namely, _because he never acknowledged\nhimself God\u2019s subject_, he opposeth, that if nature dictate that\nthere is a God, and to be worshipped in such and such manner, then\natheism is not a sin of mere ignorance: as if either I or he did\nhold that nature dictates the manner of God\u2019s worship, or any\narticle of our creed, or whether to worship with or without a\nsurplice. Secondly, he answers that a rebel is still a subject _de\njure_, though not _de facto_: and it is granted. But though the king\nlose none of his right by the traitor\u2019s act, yet the traitor loseth\nthe privilege of being punished by a precedent law; and therefore\nmay be punished at the king\u2019s will, as Ravaillac was for murdering\nHenry IV of France. An open enemy and a perfidious traitor are both\nenemies. Had not his Lordship read in the Roman story, how Perseus\nand other just enemies of that state were wont to be punished? But\nwhat is this trifling question to my _excusing of atheism_? In the\nseventh paragraph of chapter XV. of my book _De Cive_, he found the\nwords in Latin, which he here citeth. And to the same sense I have\nsaid in my _Leviathan_, that the right of nature whereby God\nreigneth over men, is to be derived not from his creating them, as\nif he required obedience, as of gratitude; but from his irresistible\npower. This he says is absurd and dishonourable. Whereas first all\npower is honourable, and the greatest power is most honourable. Is\nit not a more noble tenure for a king to hold his kingdom, and the\nright to punish those that transgress his laws, from his power, than\nfrom the gratitude or gift of the transgressor. There is nothing\ntherefore here of dishonour to God Almighty. But see the subtilty of\nhis disputing. He saw he could not catch _Leviathan_ in this place,\nhe looks for him in my book _De Cive_, which is Latin, to try what\nhe could fish out of that: and says I make our obedience to God,\ndepend upon our weakness; as if these words signified the\n_dependence_, and not the _necessity_ of our submission, or that\n_incumbere_ and _dependere_ were all one.\n\n_J. D._ For T. H. his God is not the God of Christians, nor of any\nrational men. Our God is every where, and seeing he hath no parts,\nhe must be wholly here, and wholly there, and wholly every where.\nSo nature itself dictateth. _It cannot be said honourably of God\nthat he is in a place; for nothing is in a place, but that which\nhath proper bounds of its greatness._ But T. H. his God is not\nwholly every where. _No man can conceive that any thing is all in\nthis place, and all in another place at the same time, for none of\nthese things ever have or can be incident to sense._ So far well,\nif by _conceiving_ he mean _comprehending_; but then follows,\n_That these are absurd speeches taken upon credit, without any\nsignification at all, from deceived philosophers, and deceived or\ndeceiving Schoolmen_. Thus he denieth the ubiquity of God. A\n_circumscriptive_, a definitive, and a repletive being in a place,\nis some heathen language to him.\n\n_T. H._ Though I believe the omnipotence of God, and that he can do\nwhat he will, yet I dare not say how every thing is done, because I\ncannot conceive nor comprehend either the Divine substance, or the\nway of its operation. And I think it impiety to speak concerning God\nany thing of my own head, or upon the authority of philosophers or\nSchoolmen, which I understand not, without warrant in the Scripture:\nand what I say of omnipotence, I say also of ubiquity. But his\nLordship is more valiant in this place, telling us that God is\n_wholly here_, and _wholly there_, and _wholly every where_; because\nhe has no parts. I cannot comprehend nor conceive this. For methinks\nit implies also that the whole world is also in the whole God, and\nin every part of God. Nor can I conceive how any thing can be called\n_whole_, which has no parts, nor can I find anything of this in the\nScripture. If I could find it there, I could believe it; and if I\ncould find it in the public doctrine of the Church, I could easily\nabstain from contradicting it. The Schoolmen say also, that the soul\nof man (meaning his upper soul, which they call the rational soul)\nis also _wholly_ in _the whole man_, and _wholly_ in _every part_ of\nthe man. What is this, but to make the human soul the same thing in\nrespect of man\u2019s body, that God is in respect of the world? These\nhis Lordship calls here rational men, and some of them which applaud\nthis doctrine, would have the high court of parliament corroborate\nsuch doctrines with a law. I said in my _Leviathan_, that it is no\nhonourable attribute to God, to say he is _in a place_, because\ninfinite is not confined within a place. To which he replies, _T. H.\nhis God is not wholly every where_. I confess the consequence. For I\nunderstand in _English_, he that says any thing to be _all here_,\nmeans that _neither all nor any of the same thing is elsewhere_. He\nsays further, I take a _circumscriptive, a definitive, and a\nrepletive_ being in a place to be heathen language. Truly, if this\ndispute were at the bar, I should go near to crave the assistance of\nthe court, lest some trick might be put upon me in such obscurity.\nFor though I know what these Latin words singly signify, yet I\nunderstand not how any thing is in a _place definitively_ and not\n_circumscriptively_. For _definitively_ comes from _definio_, which\nis to set bounds. And therefore to be in a place definitively, is\nwhen the bounds of the _place_ are every way marked out. But to be\nin a place circumscriptively, is when the bounds of the place are\ndescribed round about. To be in a place repletively, is to fill a\nplace. Who does not see that this distinction is canting and fraud?\nIf any man will call it pious fraud, he is to prove the piety as\nclearly as I have here explained the fraud. Besides, no fraud can be\npious in any man, but him that hath a lawful right to govern him\nwhom he beguileth; whom the Bishop pretends to govern, I cannot\ntell. Besides, his Lordship ought to have considered, that every\nBishop is one of the great Council, trusted by the King to give\ntheir advice with the Lords temporal, for the making of good laws,\ncivil and ecclesiastical, and not to offer them such obscure\ndoctrines, as if, because they are not versed in School-divinity,\ntherefore they had no learning at all, nor understood the English\ntongue. Why did the divines of England contend so much heretofore to\nhave the Bible translated into English, if they never meant any but\nthemselves should read it? If a lay-man be publicly encouraged to\nsearch the Scriptures for his own salvation, what has a divine to do\nto impose upon him any strange interpretation, unless, if he make\nhim err to damnation, he will be damned in his stead?\n\n_J. D._ Our God is immutable without any shadow of turning by\nchange, to whom all things are present, nothing past, nothing to\ncome. But T. H. his God is measured by time, losing something that\nis past, and acquiring something that doth come every minute. That\nis as much as to say, that our God is infinite, and his God is\nfinite; for unto that which is actually infinite, nothing can be\nadded, neither time nor parts. Hear himself: _Nor do I understand\nwhat derogation it can be to the Divine perfection, to attribute to\nit potentiality, that is in English, power_ (so little doth he\nunderstand what potentiality is) _and successive duration_. And he\nchargeth it upon us as a fault, that we will not have eternity to be\nan _endless succession of time_. How, _successive duration, and an\nendless succession of time in God_? Then God is not infinite, then\nGod is older to-day than he was yesterday. Away with blasphemies!\nBefore, he destroyed the ubiquity of God, and now he destroyeth his\neternity.\n\n_T. H._ I shall omit both here and henceforth his preambulatory,\nimpertinent, and uncivil calumnies. The thing he pretends to prove\nis this. That it is a derogation to the Divine power to attribute to\nit potentiality (that is in English power) and successive duration.\nOne of his reasons is, God is infinite, and nothing can be added to\ninfinite, neither of time nor of parts: it is true. And therefore I\nsaid, God is infinite and eternal, without beginning or end, either\nof time or place; which he has not here confuted, but confirmed. He\ndenies potentiality and power to be all one, and says I little\nunderstand what potentiality is. He ought therefore in this place to\nhave defined what potentiality is: for I understand it to be the\nsame with _potentia_, which is in English power. There is no such\nword as potentiality in the Scriptures, nor in any author of the\nLatin tongue. It is found only in School-divinity, as a word of art,\nor rather as a word of craft, to amaze and puzzle the laity. And\ntherefore I no sooner read than interpreted it. In the next place he\nsays, as wondering: _How, an endless succession of time in God_! Why\nnot? _God\u2019s mercy endureth for ever_, and surely God endureth as\nlong as his mercy; therefore there is duration in God, and\nconsequently endless succession of time. _God who in sundry times\nand divers manners spake in time past_, &c. But in a former dispute\nwith me about free-will, he hath defined eternity to be _nunc\nstans_, that is an _ever standing now_, or _everlasting instant_.\nThis he thinks himself bound in honour to defend. What reasonable\nsoul can digest this? We read in Scripture, that a thousand years\nwith God, is but as yesterday. And why? but because he sees as\nclearly to the end of a thousand years, as to the end of a day. But\nhis Lordship affirms, that both a thousand years and a day are but\none instant, the same _standing now_, or eternity. If he had showed\nan holy text for this doctrine, or any text of the book of _Common\nPrayer_ (in the Scripture and book of _Common Prayer_ is contained\nall our religion), I had yielded to him; but School-divinity I value\nlittle or nothing at all. Though in this he contradict also the\nSchool-men, who say the soul is eternal only _a parte post_, but God\nis eternal both _a parte post_, and _a parte ante_. Thus there are\nparts in eternity; and eternity being, as his Lordship says, the\nDivine substance, the Divine substance has parts, and _nunc stans_\nhas parts. Is not this darkness? I take it to be the kingdom of\ndarkness, and the teachers of it (especially of this doctrine, that\nGod, who is not only _optimus_, but also _maximus_, is no greater\nthan to be wholly contained in the least atom of earth, or other\nbody, and that his whole duration is but an instant of time) to be\neither grossly ignorant or ungodly deceivers.\n\n_J. D._ Our God is a perfect, pure, simple, indivisible, infinite\nessence; free from all composition of matter and form, of\nsubstance and accidents. All matter is finite, and he who acteth\nby his infinite essence, needeth neither organs nor faculties (_id\nest_, _no power, note that_), nor accidents, to render him more\ncomplete. But T. H. his God is a divisible God, a compounded God,\nthat hath matter, or qualities, or accidents. Hear himself. I\nargue thus: _The Divine substance is indivisible; but eternity is\nthe Divine substance. The major is evident, because God is_ actus\nsimplicissimus; _the minor is confessed by all men, that\nwhatsoever is attributed to God, is God_. Now listen to his\nanswer: _The major is so far from being evident, that_ actus\nsimplicissimus _signifieth nothing. The minor is said by some men,\nthought by no man; whatsoever is thought is understood._ The major\nwas this, _the Divine substance is indivisible_. Is this far from\nbeing evident? Either it is indivisible, or divisible. If it be\nnot indivisible, then it is divisible, then it is materiate, then\nit is corporeal, then it hath parts, then it is finite by his own\nconfession. _Habere partes, aut esse totum aliquid, sunt attributa\nfinitorum._ Upon this silly conceit he chargeth me for saying,\nthat _God is not just_, but justice itself; not eternal, but\neternity itself; which he calleth _unseemly words to be said of\nGod_. And he thinketh he doth me a great courtesy in not adding\n_blasphemous and atheistical_. But his bolts are so soon shot, and\nhis reasons are such vain imaginations, and such drowsy\nphantasies, that no sober man doth much regard them. Thus he hath\nalready destroyed the ubiquity, the eternity, and the simplicity\nof God. I wish he had considered better with himself, before he\nhad desperately cast himself upon these rocks.\n\nBut _paulo majora canamus_. My next charge is, that he destroys the\nvery being of God, and leaves nothing in his place, but an empty\nname. For by taking away all incorporeal substances, he taketh away\nGod himself. The very name, saith he, of an incorporeal substance,\nis a _contradiction_. And _to say that an angel or spirit, is an\nincorporeal substance, is to say in effect, that there is no angel\nor spirit at all_. By the same reason to say, that God is an\nincorporeal substance, is to say there is no God at all. Either God\nis incorporeal; or he is finite, and consists of parts, and\nconsequently is no God. This, that there is no incorporeal spirit,\nis that main root of atheism, from which so many lesser branches are\ndaily sprouting up.\n\n_T. H._ God is indeed a perfect, pure, simple, infinite substance;\nand his name incommunicable, that is to say, not divisible into this\nand that individual God, in such manner as the name of man is\ndivisible into Peter and John. And therefore God is individual;\nwhich word amongst the Greeks is expressed by the word indivisible.\nCertain heretics in the primitive church, because special and\nindividual are called particulars, maintained that Christ was a\nparticular God, differing in number from God the Father. And this\nwas the doctrine that was condemned for heresy in the first council\nof Nice, by these words, _God hath no parts_. And yet many of the\nLatin fathers, in their explications of the Nicene creed, have\nexpounded the word _consubstantial_, by the community of\nnature, which different species have in their genus, and\ndifferent individuals in the species; as if Peter and John were\n_consubstantial_, because they agree in one human nature; which is\ncontrary, I confess, to the meaning of the Nice fathers. But that in\na substance infinitely great, it should be impossible to consider\nany thing as not infinite, I do not see it there condemned. For\ncertainly he that thinks God is in every part of the church, does\nnot exclude him out of the churchyard. And is not this a considering\nof him by parts? For dividing a thing which we cannot reach nor\nseparate one part thereof from another, is nothing else but\nconsidering of the same by parts. So much concerning indivisibility\nfrom natural reason; for I will wade no further, but rely upon the\nScriptures. God is nowhere said in the Scriptures to be indivisible,\nunless his Lordship meant division to consist only in separation of\nparts, which I think he did not. St. Paul indeed saith (1 Cor. i.\n13): _Is Christ divided?_ Not that the followers of Paul, Apollos,\nand Cephas, followed some one part, some another of Christ; but that\nthinking differently of his nature, they made as it were different\nkinds of him. Secondly, his Lordship expounds simplicity, by not\nbeing compounded of matter and form, or of substance and accidents,\nunlearnedly. For nothing can be so compounded. The matter of a\n_chair_ is _wood_; the form is the figure it hath, apt for the\nintended use. Does his Lordship think the chair compounded of the\nwood and the figure? A man is rational: does it therefore follow\nthat reason is a part of the man? It was Aristotle deceived him, who\ntold him that _a rational living creature_, is the definition of a\nman, and that the definition of a man was his essence; and therefore\nthe Bishop and other Schoolmen, from this that the word rational is\na part of these words, _man is a rational living creature_,\nconcluded that the essence of man was a part of the man, and a\n_rational man_ the same thing with a rational soul. I should wonder\nhow any man, much more a doctor of divinity, should be so grossly\ndeceived, but that I know naturally the generality of men speak the\nwords of their masters by rote, without having any ideas of the\nthings, which the words signify. Lastly, he calls God an _essence_.\nIf he mean by _essence_ the same with _ens_, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd, I approve it.\nOtherwise, what is _essence_? There is no such word in the Old\nTestament. The Hebrew language, which has no word answerable to the\ncopulative _est_, will not bear it. The New Testament hath \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1,\nbut never for _essence_, nor for _substance_, but only for riches. I\ncome now to his argument in mood and figure, which is this, _the\nDivine substance is indivisible_. That is the _major_. _Eternity is\nthe Divine substance._ That is the _minor_. _Ergo_, the Divine\nsubstance is indivisible. The major, he says, is evident, because\nGod is _actus simplicissimus_. The minor is confessed, he thinks, by\nall men, because whatsoever is attributed to God, is God. To this I\nanswered, that the major was so far from being evident, that _actus\nsimplicissimus_ signifieth nothing, and that the minor was\nunderstood by no man. First, what is _actus_ in the _major_? Does\nany man understand _actus_ for a substance, that is, for a thing\nsubsisting by itself? Is not _actus_, in English, either an _act_ or\nan _action_, or nothing? Or is any of these _substance_? If it be\nevident, why did he not explain _actus_ by a definition? And as to\nthe minor, though all men in the world understand that the _Eternal_\nis God, yet no man can understand that the _eternity_ is God.\nPerhaps he and the Schoolmen mean by _actus_, the same that they do\nby _essentia_. What is the _essence_ of a _man_, but his _humanity_;\nor of God, but his _Deity_; of _great_, but _greatness_; and so of\nall other denominating attributes? And the words, God and Deity, are\nof different signification. John Damascene, a father of the church,\nexpounding the Nicene creed, denies plainly that the Deity was\nincarnate; but all true Christians hold that God was incarnate.\nTherefore God and the Deity signify divers things; and therefore\n_eternal_ and _eternity_ are not the same, no more than a wise man\nand his wisdom are the same; nor God and his justice the same thing:\nand universally it is false, that the attribute in the abstract is\nthe same with the substance, to which it is attributed. Also it is\nuniversally true of God, that the attribute in the concrete, and the\nsubstance to which it is attributed, is not the same thing.\n\nI come now to his next period or paragraph, wherein he would fain\nprove, that by denying incorporeal substance, I take away God\u2019s\nexistence. The words he cites here are mine: _to say an angel or\nspirit is an incorporeal substance, is to say in effect there is no\nangel nor spirit at all_. It is true also, that to say that God is\nan incorporeal substance, is to say in effect there is no God at\nall. What alleges he against it, but the School-divinity which I\nhave already answered? Scripture he can bring none, because the word\nincorporeal is not found in Scripture. But the Bishop, trusting to\nhis Aristotelian and Scholastic learning, hath hitherto made no use\nof Scripture, save only of these texts: 1 Cor. ix. 7: _Who hath\nplanted a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof; or who\nfeedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?_ and Rev.\niv. 11: _Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, honour, and\npower: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they\nwere created_: thereby to prove that the right of God to govern and\npunish mankind is not derived from his omnipotence. Let us now see\nhow he proves incorporeity by his own reason without Scripture.\n_Either God_, he saith, _is incorporeal or finite_. He knows I deny\nboth, and say he is _corporeal_ and _infinite_: against which he\noffers no proof, but only, according to his custom of disputing,\ncalls it the root of atheism; and interrogates me, what real thing\nis left in the world, if God be incorporeal, but body and accidents?\nI say there is nothing left but corporeal substance. For I have\ndenied, as he knew, that there is any reality in accidents; and\nnevertheless maintain God\u2019s existence, and that he is a most pure,\nand most simple corporeal spirit. Here his Lordship catching\nnothing, removes to the eternity of the Trinity, which these my\ngrounds, he says, destroy. How so? I say the Trinity, and the\npersons thereof, are that one pure, simple, and eternal corporeal\nspirit; and why does this destroy the Trinity, more than if I had\ncalled it incorporeal? He labours here and seeketh somewhat to\nrefresh himself in the word _person_; _by the same grounds_, he\nsaith, _every king hath as many persons as there be justices of\npeace in his kingdom, and God Almighty hath as many persons as there\nbe kings_. Why not? For I never said that all those kings were that\nGod; and yet God giveth that name to the kings of the earth. For the\nsignification of the word _person_, I shall expound it by and by in\nanother place. Here ends his Lordship\u2019s School-argument; now let me\ncome with my Scripture-argument. St. Paul, concerning Christ (Col.\nii. 9) saith thus: _In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead\nbodily_. This place Athanasius, a great and zealous doctor in the\nNicene Council, and vehement enemy of Arius the heretic, who allowed\nChrist to be no otherwise God, than as men of excellent piety were\nso called, expoundeth thus: _The fulness of the Godhead dwelleth in\nhim bodily_, (Greek \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2), _id est_ \u03b8\u03b5\u03ca\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2, _id est, realiter_.\nSo there is one Father for corporality, and that God was in Christ\nin such manner as body is in body. Again, there were in the\nprimitive church a sort of heretics who maintained that Jesus Christ\nhad not a true real body, but was only a phantasm or spright, such\nas the Latins call _spectra_. Against the head of this sect, whose\nname I think was Apelles, Tertullian wrote a book, now extant\namongst his other works, intituled _De Carne Christi_; wherein after\nhe had spoken of the nature of phantasms, and showed that they had\nnothing of reality in them, he concludeth with these words,\n\u201cwhatsoever is not _body_, is _nothing_.\u201d So here is on my side a\nplain text of Scripture, and two ancient and learned Fathers. Nor\nwas this doctrine of Tertullian condemned in the Council of Nice;\nbut the division of the divine substance into God the Father, God\nthe Son, and God the Holy Ghost. For these words, _God has no\nparts_, were added, for explication of the word _consubstantial_, at\nthe request of the dissenting Fathers, and are further explained\nboth in Athanasius his creed, in these words, _not three Gods but\none God_, and by the constant attribute ever since of the\n_individual_ Trinity. The same words nevertheless do condemn the\nAnthropomorphites also; for though there appeared no Christians that\nprofessed that God had an organical body, and consequently that the\npersons were three individuals, yet the Gentiles were all\nAnthropomorphites, and there condemned by these words, _God has no\nparts_.\n\nAnd thus I have answered his accusation concerning the eternity and\nexistence of the Divine substance, and made it appear that in truth,\nthe question between us, is whether God be a phantasm (_id est_, an\nidol of the fancy, which St. Paul saith is nothing) or a corporeal\nspirit, that is to say, something that has magnitude.\n\nIn this place I think it not amiss, leaving for a little while this\ntheological dispute, to examine the signification of those words\nwhich have occasioned so much diversity of opinion in this kind of\ndoctrine.\n\nThe word _substance_, in Greek \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd, \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd,\nsignify the same thing, namely, a ground, a base, any thing that has\nexistence or subsistence _in itself_, anything that upholdeth that\nwhich else would fall, in which sense God is properly the\nhypostasis, base, and substance that upholdeth all the world, having\nsubsistence not only _in himself_, but _from himself_; whereas other\nsubstances have their subsistence only in themselves, not from\nthemselves. But metaphorically, faith is called (Heb. xi. 1) a\nsubstance, because it is the foundation or base of our hope; for\nfaith failing, our hope falls. And (2 Cor. ix. 4) St. Paul having\nboasted of the liberal promise of the Corinthians towards the\nMacedonians, calls that promise the ground, the hypostasis of that\nhis boasting. And (Heb. i. 3) Christ is called the image of the\nsubstance (the hypostasis) of his Father, and for the proper and\nadequate signification of the word hypostasis, the Greek Fathers did\nalways oppose it to apparition or phantasm; as when a man seeth his\nface in the water, his real face is called the hypostasis of the\nphantastic face in the water. So also in speaking, the thing\nunderstood or named is called hypostasis, in respect of the name; so\nalso a body coloured is the hypostasis, substance and subject of the\ncolour; and in like manner of all its other accidents. Essence and\nall other abstract names, are words artificial belonging to the art\nof logic, and signify only the manner how we consider the substance\nitself. And of this I have spoken sufficiently in my _Leviathan_\n(vol. III. page 672). _Body_ (Latin, _corpus_, \u03c3\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b1) is that\nsubstance which hath magnitude indeterminate, and is the same with\ncorporeal substance; but _a body_ is that which hath magnitude\ndeterminate, and consequently is understood to be _totum_ or\n_integrum aliquid_. _Pure_ and _simple body_, is body of one and the\nsame kind, in every part throughout; and if mingled with body of\nanother kind, though the total be compounded or mixed, the parts\nnevertheless retain their simplicity, as when water and wine are\nmixed, the parts of both kinds retain their simplicity. For water\nand wine can not both be in one and the same place at once.\n\n_Matter_ is the same with _body_; but never without respect to a\nbody which is made thereof. _Form_ is the aggregate of all accidents\ntogether, for which we give the matter a new name; so _albedo_,\n_whiteness_, is the form of _album_, or _white body_. So also\nhumanity is the essence of man, and Deity the essence of Deus.\n\nSpirit is thin, fluid, transparent, invisible body. The word in\nLatin signifies breath, air, wind, and the like. In Greek \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe1\u03bc\u03b1\nfrom \u03c0\u03bd\u03ad\u03c9, _spiro_, _flo_.\n\nI have seen, and so have many more, two waters, one of the river,\nthe other a mineral water, so like that no man could discern the one\nfrom the other by his sight; yet when they have been both put\ntogether, the whole substance could not by the eye be distinguished\nfrom milk. Yet we know that the one was not mixed with the other, so\nas every part of the one to be in every part of the other, for that\nis impossible, unless two bodies can be in the same place. How then\ncould the change be made in every part, but only by the activity of\nthe mineral water, changing it every where to the sense, and yet not\nbeing every where, and in every part of the water? If then such\ngross bodies have so great activity, what shall we think of spirits,\nwhose kinds be as many as there be kinds of liquor, and activity\ngreater? Can it then be doubted, but that God, who is an infinitely\nfine Spirit, and withal intelligent, can make and change all species\nand kinds of body as he pleaseth? But I dare not say, that this is\nthe way by which God Almighty worketh, because it is past my\napprehension: yet it serves very well to demonstrate, that the\nomnipotence of God implieth no contradiction; and is better than by\npretence of magnifying the fineness of the Divine substance, to\nreduce it to a spright or phantasm, which is nothing.\n\nA _person_ (Latin, _persona_) signifies an intelligent substance,\nthat acteth any thing in his own or another\u2019s name, or by his own or\nanother\u2019s authority. Of this definition there can be no other proof\nthan from the use of that word, in such Latin authors as were\nesteemed the most skilful in their own language, of which number was\nCicero. But Cicero, in an epistle to Atticus, saith thus: _Unus\nsustineo tres personas, mei, adversarii, et judicis_: that is, \u201cI\nthat am but one man, sustain three persons; mine own person, the\nperson of my adversary, and the person of the judge.\u201d Cicero was\nhere the substance intelligent, one man; and because he pleaded for\nhimself, he calls himself his own person: and again, because he\npleaded for his adversary, he says, he sustained the person of his\nadversary: and lastly, because he himself gave the sentence, he\nsays, he sustained the person of the judge. In the same sense we use\nthe word in English vulgarly, calling him that acteth by his own\nauthority, his own person, and him that acteth by the authority of\nanother, the person of that other. And thus we have the exact\nmeaning of the word _person_. The Greek tongue cannot render it; for\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd is properly a face, and, metaphorically, a vizard of an\nactor upon the stage. How then did the Greek Fathers render the word\n_person_, as it is in the blessed Trinity? Not well. Instead of the\nword _person_ they put _hypostasis_, which signifies substance; from\nwhence it might be inferred, that the three persons in the Trinity\nare three Divine substances, that is, three Gods. The word \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\nthey could not use, because face and vizard are neither of them\nhonourable attributes of God, nor explicative of the meaning of the\nGreek church. Therefore the Latin (and consequently the English)\nchurch, renders _hypostasis_ every where in Athanasius his creed by\n_person_. But the word _hypostatical union_ is rightly retained and\nused by divines, as being the union of two hypostases, that is, of\ntwo substances or natures in the person of Christ. But seeing they\nalso hold the soul of our Saviour to be a substance, which, though\nseparated from his body, subsisted nevertheless in itself, and\nconsequently, before it was separated from his body upon the cross,\nwas a distinct nature from his body, how will they avoid this\nobjection, that then Christ had three natures, three hypostases,\nwithout granting, that _his resurrection was a new vivification, and\nnot a return of his soul out of Heaven into the grave_? The contrary\nis not determined by the church. Thus far in explication of the\nwords that occur in this controversy. Now I return again to his\nLordship\u2019s discourse.\n\n_J. D._ When they have taken away all incorporeal spirits, what do\nthey leave God himself to be? He who is the fountain of all being,\nfrom whom and in whom all creatures have their being, must needs\nhave a real being of his own. And what real being can God have among\nbodies and accidents? For they have left nothing else in the\nuniverse. Then T. H. may move the same question of God, which he did\nof devils. _I would gladly know in what classes of entities, the\nBishop ranketh God?_ Infinite being and participated being are not\nof the same nature. Yet to speak according to human apprehension,\n(apprehension and comprehension differ much: T. H. confesseth that\nnatural reason doth dictate to us, that God is infinite, yet natural\nreason cannot comprehend the infiniteness of God) I place him among\nincorporeal substances or spirits, because he hath been pleased to\nplace himself in that rank, _God is a Spirit_. Of which place T. H.\ngiveth his opinion, that it is unintelligible, and all others of the\nsame nature, _and fall not under human understanding_.\n\nThey who deny all incorporeal substances, can understand nothing by\nGod, but either nature, (not _naturam naturantem_, that is, a real\nauthor of nature, but _naturam naturatam_, that is, the orderly\nconcourse of natural causes, as T. H. seemeth to intimate,) or a\nfiction of the brain, without real being, cherished for advantage\nand politic ends, as a profitable error, howsoever dignified with\nthe glorious title of _the eternal cause of all things_.\n\n_T. H._ To his Lordship\u2019s question here: _What I leave God to be?_\nI answer, I leave him to be a most pure, simple, invisible spirit\ncorporeal. By corporeal I mean a substance that has magnitude, and\nso mean all learned men, divines and others, though perhaps there\nbe some common people so rude as to call nothing body, but what\nthey can see and feel. To his second question: _What real being He\ncan have amongst bodies and accidents?_ I answer, the being of a\nspirit, not of a spright. If I should ask any the most subtile\ndistinguisher, what middle nature there were between an infinitely\nsubtile substance, and a mere thought or phantasm, by what name\ncould he call it? He might call it perhaps an incorporeal\nsubstance; and so _incorporeal_ shall pass for a middle nature\nbetween _infinitely subtile_ and _nothing_, and be less subtile\nthan infinitely subtile, and yet more subtile than a thought. It\nis granted, he says, that the nature of God is incomprehensible.\nDoth it therefore follow, that we may give to the Divine substance\nwhat negative name we please? Because he says, the whole Divine\nsubstance is here and there and every where throughout the world,\nand that the soul of a man is here and there and every where\nthroughout man\u2019s body; must we therefore take it for a mystery of\nChristian religion, upon his or any other Schoolman\u2019s word,\nwithout the Scripture, which calls nothing a mystery but the\nincarnation of the eternal God? Or is incorporeal a mystery, when\nnot at all mentioned in the Bible, but to the contrary it is\nwritten, _That the fulness of the Deity was bodily in Christ_?\nWhen the nature of the thing is incomprehensible, I can acquiesce\nin the Scripture: but when the signification of words is\nincomprehensible, I cannot acquiesce in the authority of a\nSchoolman.\n\n_J. D._ We have seen what his principles are concerning the Deity,\nthey are full as bad or worse concerning the Trinity. Hear himself:\n_A person is he that is represented as often as he is represented.\nAnd therefore God who has been represented, that is personated\nthrice, may properly enough be said to be three persons, though\nneither the word Person nor Trinity be ascribed to him in the\nBible._ And a little after: _To conclude, the doctrine of the\nTrinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the Scripture, is\nin substance this, that the God who is always one and the same, was\nthe person represented by Moses, the person represented by his Son\nincarnate, and the person represented by the apostles. As\nrepresented by the apostles, the holy spirit by which they spake is\nGod. As represented by his Son, that was God and man, the Son is\nthat God. As represented by Moses and the High-priests, the Father,\nthat is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God.\nFrom whence we may gather the reason why those names, Father, Son,\nand Holy Ghost, in the signification of the Godhead, are never used\nin the Old Testament. For they are persons, that is, they have their\nnames from representing, which could not be till divers persons had\nrepresented God, in ruling or in directing under him._\n\nWho is so bold as blind Bayard? The emblem of a little boy\nattempting to lade all the water out of the sea with a cockle-shell,\ndoth fit T. H. as exactly as if it had been shaped for him, who\nthinketh to measure the profound and inscrutable mysteries of\nreligion, by his own silly, shallow conceits. What is now become of\nthe great adorable mystery of the blessed undivided Trinity? It is\nshrunk into nothing. Upon his grounds there was a time when there\nwas no Trinity: and we must blot these words out of our creed, _the\nFather eternal, the Son eternal, and the Holy Ghost eternal_: and\nthese other words out of our Bibles, _Let us make man after our\nimage_: unless we mean that this was a consultation of God with\nMoses and the apostles. What is now become of the eternal generation\nof the Son of God, if this sonship did not begin until about four\nthousand years after the creation were expired? Upon these grounds\nevery king hath as many _persons_, as there be justices of peace and\npetty constables in his kingdom. Upon this account God Almighty hath\nas many _persons_, as there have been sovereign princes in the world\nsince Adam. According to this reckoning each one of us, like so many\nGeryons, may have as many _persons_ as we please to make\nprocurations. Such bold presumption requireth another manner of\nconfutation.\n\n_T. H._ As for the words recited, I confess there is a fault in the\nratiocination, which nevertheless his Lordship hath not discovered,\nbut no impiety. All that he objecteth is, that it followeth\nhereupon, that there be as many persons of a king, as there be petty\nconstables in his kingdom. And so there are, or else he cannot be\nobeyed. But I never said that a king, and every one of his persons,\nare the same substance. The fault I here made, and saw not, was\nthis; I was to prove that it is no contradiction, as Lucian and\nheathen scoffers would have it, to say of God, he was one and three.\nI saw the true definition of the word _person_ would serve my turn\nin this manner; God, in his own person, both created the world, and\ninstituted a church in Israel, using therein the ministry of Moses:\nthe same God, in the person of his Son God and man, redeemed the\nsame world, and the same church; the same God, in the person of the\nHoly Ghost, sanctified the same church, and all the faithful men in\nthe world. Is not this a clear proof that it is no contradiction to\nsay that God is three persons and one substance? And doth not the\nchurch distinguish the persons in the same manner? See the words of\nour catechism. Question. _What dost thou chiefly learn in these\narticles of thy belief?_ Answer. _First, I learn to believe in God\nthe Father, that hath made me and all the world; Secondly, in God\nthe Son, who hath redeemed me and all mankind; Thirdly, in God the\nHoly Ghost, that hath sanctified me and all the elect people of\nGod._ But at what time was the church sanctified? Was it not on the\nday of Pentecost, in the descending of the Holy Ghost upon the\napostles? His Lordship all this while hath catched nothing. It is I\nthat catched myself, for saying, instead of _by the ministry of\nMoses_, in the person of Moses. But this error I no sooner saw, than\nI no less publicly corrected than I had committed it, in my\n_Leviathan_ converted into Latin, which by this time I think is\nprinted beyond the seas with this alteration, and also with the\nomission of some such passages as strangers are not concerned in.\nAnd I had corrected this error sooner, if I had sooner found it. For\nthough I was told by Dr. Cosins, now Bishop of Durham, that the\nplace above-cited was not applicable enough to the doctrine of the\nTrinity, yet I could not in reviewing the same espy the defect, till\nof late, when being solicited from beyond sea, to translate the book\ninto Latin, and fearing some other man might do it not to my liking,\nI examined this passage and others of the like sense more narrowly.\nBut how concludes his Lordship out of this, that I put out of the\ncreed these words, _the Father eternal, the Son eternal, the Holy\nGhost eternal_? Or these words, _let us make man after our image_,\nout of the Bible? Which last words neither I nor Bellarmine put out\nof the Bible, but we both put them out of the number of good\narguments to prove the Trinity; for it is no unusual thing in the\nHebrew, as may be seen by Bellarmine\u2019s quotations, to join a noun of\nthe plural number with a verb of the singular. And we may say also\nof many other texts of Scripture alleged to prove the Trinity, that\nthey are not so firm as that high article requireth. But mark his\nLordship\u2019s Scholastic charity in the last words of this period:\n_such bold presumption requireth another manner of confutation_.\nThis bishop, and others of his opinion, had been in their element,\nif they had been bishops in Queen Mary\u2019s time.\n\n_J. D._ Concerning God the Son, forgetting what he had said\nelsewhere, where he calleth him _God and man_, and _the Son of God\nincarnate_, he doubteth not to say, that _the word_ hypostatical _is\ncanting_. As if the same person could be both God and man without a\npersonal, that is, an hypostatical union of the two natures of God\nand man.\n\n_T. H._ If Christian profession be (as certainly it is in England) a\nlaw; and if it be of the nature of a law to be made known to all men\nthat are to obey it, in such manner as they may have no excuse for\ndisobedience from their ignorance; then, without doubt, all words\nunknown to the people, and as to them insignificant, are canting.\nThe word _substance_ is understood by the vulgar well enough, when\nit is said of a body, but in other sense not at all, except for\ntheir riches. But the word _hypostatical_ is understood only by\nthose, and but few of those that are learned in the Greek tongue,\nand is properly used, as I have said before, of the union of the two\nnatures of Christ in one person. So likewise _consubstantial_ in the\nNicene creed, is properly said of the Trinity. But to an Englishman\nthat understands neither Greek nor Latin, and yet is as much\nconcerned as his Lordship was, the word _hypostatical_ is no less\ncanting than _eternal now_.\n\n_J. D._ He alloweth every man who is commanded by his lawful\nsovereign, _to deny Christ with his tongue before men_.\n\n_T. H._ I allow it in some cases, and to some men, which his\nLordship knew well enough, but would not mention. I alleged for it,\nin the place cited, both reason and Scripture, though his Lordship\nthought it not expedient to take notice of either. If it be true\nthat I have said, why does he blame it? If false, why offers he no\nargument against it, neither from Scripture nor from reason? Or why\ndoes he not show that the text I cite is not applicable to the\nquestion, or not well interpreted by me? First, he barely cites it,\nbecause he thought the words would sound harshly, and make a reader\nadmire them for impiety. But I hope I shall so well instruct my\nreader ere I leave this place, that this his petty art will have no\neffect. Secondly, the cause why he omitted my arguments was, that he\ncould not answer them. Lastly, the cause why he urgeth neither\nScripture nor reason against it was, that he saw none sufficient. My\nargument from Scripture was this, (_Leviathan_, vol. III. p. 493)\ntaken out of 2 Kings v. 17-19, where Naaman the Syrian saith to\nElisha the prophet: _Thy servant will henceforth offer neither\nburnt-offering nor sacrifice to other Gods, but unto the Lord. In\nthis thing the Lord pardon thy servant, that when my master goeth\ninto the house of Rimmon to worship there, and he leaneth on my\nhand, and I bow myself in the house of Rimmon: when I bow myself in\nthe house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon thy servant in this thing. And\nhe said unto him, Go in peace._ What can be said to this? Did not\nElisha say it from God? Or is not this answer of the prophet a\npermission? When St. Paul and St. Peter commanded the Christians of\ntheir time to obey their princes, which then were heathens and\nenemies of Christ, did they mean they should lose their lives for\ndisobedience? Did they not rather mean they should preserve both\ntheir lives and their faith, believing in Christ as they did, by\nthis denial of the tongue, having no command to the contrary? If in\nthis kingdom a Mahometan should be made by terror to deny Mahomet\nand go to church with us, would any man condemn this Mahometan? A\ndenial with the mouth may perhaps be prejudicial to the power of the\nchurch; but to retain the faith of Christ stedfastly in his heart,\ncannot be prejudicial to his soul that hath undertaken no charge to\npreach to wolves, whom they know will destroy them. About the time\nof the Council of Nice, there was a canon made (which is extant in\nthe history of the Nicene Council) concerning those that being\nChristians had been seduced, not terrified, to a denial of Christ,\nand again repenting, desired to be readmitted into the church; in\nwhich canon it was ordained, that those men should be no otherwise\nreadmitted than to be in the number of the cathechised, and not to\nbe admitted to the communion till a great many years' penitence.\nSurely the church then would have been more merciful to them that\ndid the same upon terror of present death and torments.\n\nLet us now see what his Lordship might, though but colourably, have\nalleged from Scripture against it. There be three places only that\nseem to favour his Lordship\u2019s opinion. The first is where Peter\ndenied Christ, and weepeth. The second is, Acts v. 29: _Then Peter\nand the other Apostles answered and said, we ought to obey God\nrather than men_. The third is, Luke xii. 9: _But he that denieth me\nbefore men, shall be denied before the angels of God_.\n\nFor answer to these texts, I must repeat what what I have written,\nand his Lordship read in my _Leviathan_, p. 656. _For an unlearned\nman that is in the power of an idolatrous king, or state, if\ncommanded on pain of death to worship before an idol, doing it, he\ndetesteth the idol in his heart, he doth well; though if he had the\nfortitude to suffer death, rather than worship it, he should do\nbetter. But if a pastor, who, as Christ\u2019s messenger, has undertaken\nto teach Christ\u2019s doctrine to all nations, should do the same, it\nwere not only a sinful scandal in respect of other Christian men\u2019s\nconsciences, but a perfidious forsaking of his charge._ In which\nwords I distinguish between a pastor and one of the sheep of his\nflock. St. Peter sinned in denying Christ; and so does every pastor,\nthat denieth Christ, having undertaken the charge of preaching the\ngospel in the kingdom of an infidel, where he could expect at the\nundertaking of his charge no less than death. And why, but because\nhe violates his trust in doing contrary to his commission. St. Peter\nwas an apostle of Christ, and bound by his voluntary undertaking of\nthat office not only to confess Christ, but also to preach him\nbefore those infidels who, he knew, would like wolves devour him.\nAnd therefore, when Paul and the rest of the apostles were forbidden\nto preach Christ, they gave this answer, _We ought to obey God\nrather than men_. And it was to his disciples only which had\nundertaken that office, that Christ saith, _he that denieth me\nbefore men, shall be denied before the angels of God_. And so I\nthink I have sufficiently answered this place, and showed that I do\nnot allow the denying of Christ, upon any colour of torments, to his\nLordship, nor to any other that has undertaken the office of a\npreacher. Which if he think right, he will perhaps in this case put\nhimself into the number of those whom he calls merciful doctors:\nwhereas now he extends his severity beyond the bounds of common\nequity. He has read Cicero, and perhaps this story in him. The\nsenate of Rome would have sent Cicero to treat of peace with Marcus\nAntonius; but when Cicero had showed them the just fear he had of\nbeing killed by him, he was excused; and if they had forced him to\nit, and he by terror turned enemy to them, he had in equity been\nexcusable. But his Lordship, I believe, did write this more\nvaliantly than he would have acted it.\n\n_J. D._ He deposeth Christ from his true kingly office, making his\n_kingdom not to commence or begin before the day of judgment_. And\n_the regimen, wherewith Christ governeth his faithful in this life,\nis not properly a kingdom, but a pastoral office, or a right to\nteach_. And a little after, _Christ had not kingly authority\ncommitted to him by his Father in this world, but only consiliary\nand doctrinal_.\n\n_T. H._ How do I take away Christ\u2019s kingly office? He neither draws\nit by consequence from my words, nor offers any argument at all\nagainst my doctrine. The words he cites are in the contents of chap.\nXVII. De Cive (vol. II). In the body of the chapter it is thus: _The\ntime of Christ\u2019s being upon the earth is called, in Scripture, the\nregeneration often, but the kingdom never. When the Son of God comes\nin majesty, and all the angels with him, then he shall sit on the\nseat of majesty. My kingdom is not of this world. God sent not his\nSon that he should judge the world. I came not to judge the world,\nbut to save the world. Man, who made me a judge or divider amongst\nyou? Let thy kingdom come._ And other words to the same purpose. Out\nof which it is clear that Christ took upon him no regal power upon\nearth before his assumption. But at his assumption his Apostles\nasked him if he would then restore the kingdom to Israel, and he\nanswered, it was not for them to know. So that hitherto Christ had\nnot taken that office upon him, unless his Lordship think that the\nkingdom of God, and the kingdom of Christ, be two distinct kingdoms.\nFrom the Assumption ever since, all true Christians say daily in\ntheir prayers, _Thy kingdom come_. But his Lordship had perhaps\nforgot that. But when then beginneth Christ to be a king? I say it\nshall be then, when he comes again in majesty with all the angels.\nAnd even then he shall reign (as he is man) under his Father. For\nSt. Paul saith (1 Cor. xv. 25, 26): _He must reign till he hath put\nall enemies under his feet; the last enemy that shall be destroyed,\nis death_. But when shall God the Father reign again? St. Paul saith\nin the same chapter, verse 28: _When all things shall be subdued\nunto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that\nput all things under him, that God may be all in all_. And verse 24:\n_Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to\nGod, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule,\nauthority, and power_. This is at the resurrection. And by this it\nis manifest, that his Lordship was not so well versed in Scripture\nas he ought to have been.\n\n_J. D._ He taketh away his priestly or propitiatory office. _And\nalthough this act of our redemption be not always in Scripture\ncalled a sacrifice and oblation, but sometimes a price; yet by price\nwe are not to understand anything, by the value whereof he could\nclaim right to a pardon for us from his offended Father, but that\nprice which God the Father was pleased in mercy to demand._ And\nagain: _Not that the death of one man, though without sin, can\nsatisfy for the offences of all men in the rigour of justice, but in\nthe mercy of God, that ordained such sacrifices for sin, as he was\npleased in mercy to accept_. He knoweth no difference between one\nwho is mere man, and one who was both God and man; between a\nLevitical sacrifice, and the all-sufficient sacrifice of the cross;\nbetween the blood of a calf, and the precious blood of the Son of\nGod.\n\n_T. H._ Yes, I know there is a difference between blood and blood,\nbut not any such as can make a difference in the case here\nquestioned. Our Saviour\u2019s blood was most precious, but still it was\nhuman blood; and I hope his Lordship did never think otherwise, or\nthat it was not accepted by his Father for our redemption.\n\n_J. D._ And touching the prophetical office of Christ, I do much\ndoubt whether he do believe in earnest, that there is any such thing\nas prophecy in the world. He maketh very little difference between a\n_prophet_ and a _madman_, and a _demoniac_. _And if there were\nnothing else_, says he, _that bewrayed their madness, yet that very\narrogating such inspiration to themselves is argument enough_. He\nmaketh the pretence of inspiration in any man to be, and always to\nhave been, _an opinion pernicious to peace, and tending to the\ndissolution of all civil government_. He subjecteth all prophetical\nrevelations from God, to the sole pleasure and censure of the\nsovereign prince, either to authorize them, or to exauctorate them.\nSo as two prophets prophecying the same thing at the same time, in\nthe dominions of two different princes, the one shall be a true\nprophet, the other a false. And Christ, who had the approbation of\nno sovereign prince, upon his grounds, was to be reputed a false\nprophet everywhere. _Every man therefore ought to consider who is\nthe sovereign prophet; that is to say, who it is that is God\u2019s\nvicegerent upon earth, and hath next under God the authority of\ngoverning Christian men; and to observe for a rule that doctrine,\nwhich in the name of God he hath commanded to be taught, and thereby\nto examine and try out the truth of those doctrines which pretended\nprophets, with miracle or without, shall at any time advance_, &c.\n_And if he disavow them, then no more to obey their voice; or if he\napprove them, then to obey them as men, to whom God hath given a\npart of the Spirit of their sovereign._ Upon his principles the case\nholdeth as well among Jews and Turks and Heathens, as Christians.\nThen he that teacheth transubstantiation in France, is a true\nprophet; he that teacheth it in England, a false prophet; he that\nblasphemeth Christ in Constantinople, a true prophet; he that doth\nthe same in Italy, a false prophet. Then Samuel was a false prophet\nto contest with Saul, a sovereign prophet: so was the man of God,\nwho submitted not to the more Divine and prophetic spirit of\nJeroboam. And Elijah for reproving Ahab. Then Micaiah had but his\ndeserts, to be clapped up in prison, and fed with bread of\naffliction, and water of affliction, for daring to contradict _God\u2019s\nvicegerent upon earth_. And Jeremiah was justly thrown into a\ndungeon, for prophecying against Zedekiah his liege lord. If his\nprinciples were true, it were strange indeed, that none of all these\nprinces, nor any other that ever was in the world, should understand\ntheir own privileges. And yet more strange, that God Almighty should\ntake the part of such rebellious prophets, and justify their\nprophesies by the event, if it were true that _none but the\nsovereign in a Christian_ (the reason is the same for Jewish)\n_commonwealth, can take notice, what is or what is not the word of\nGod_.\n\n_T. H._ To remove his Lordship\u2019s doubt in the first place, I confess\nthere was true prophesy and true prophets in the church of God, from\nAbraham down to our Saviour, the greatest prophet of all, and the\nlast of the Old Testament, and first of the New. After our Saviour\u2019s\ntime, till the death of St. John the apostle, there were true\nprophets in the church of Christ, prophets to whom God spake\nsupernaturally, and testified the truth of their mission by\nmiracles. Of those that in the Scripture are called prophets without\nmiracles, (and for this cause only, that they spake in the name of\nGod to men, and in the name of men to God), there are, have been,\nand shall be in the church, innumerable. Such a prophet was his\nLordship, and such are all pastors in the Christian church. But the\nquestion here is of those prophets that from the mouth of God\nforetell things future, or do other miracle. Of this kind I deny\nthere has been any since the death of St. John the Evangelist. If\nany man find fault with this, he ought to name some man or other,\nwhom we are bound to acknowledge that they have done a miracle, cast\nout a devil, or cured any disease by the sole invocation of the\nDivine Majesty. We are not bound to trust to the legend of the Roman\nsaints, nor to the history written by Sulpitius of the life of St.\nMartin, or to any other fables of the Roman clergy, nor to such\nthings as were pretended to be done by some divines here in the time\nof king James. Secondly, he says I make little difference between a\n_prophet_, and a _madman_ or _demoniac_; to which I say, he accuses\nme falsely. I say only thus much, _that I see nothing at all in the\nScripture that requireth a belief, that demoniacs were any other\nthing than madmen_. And this is also made very probable out of\nScripture, by a worthy divine, Mr. Mede. But concerning prophets, I\nsay only that the Jews, both under the Old Testament and under the\nNew, took them to be all one with _madmen_ and _demoniacs_; and\nprove it out of Scripture by many places, both of the Old and New\nTestament. Thirdly, that the pretence or arrogating to one\u2019s-self\nDivine inspiration, is argument enough to show a man is _mad_, is my\nopinion; but his Lordship understands not _inspiration_ in the same\nsense that I do. He understands it properly of God\u2019s breathing into\na man, or pouring into him the Divine substance, or Divine graces.\nAnd in that sense, he that arrogateth inspiration unto himself,\nneither understands what he saith, nor makes others to understand\nhim: which is properly madness in some degree. But I understand\n_inspiration_ in the Scripture metaphorically, for God\u2019s guidance of\nour minds to truth and piety. Fourthly, whereas he says, I make the\npretence of _inspiration_ to be pernicious to peace; I answer, that\nI think his Lordship was of my opinion; for he called those men,\nwhich in the late civil war pretended the spirit, and new light, and\nto be the only faithful men, _fanatics_; for he called them in his\nbook, and did call them in his life-time, _fanatics_. And what is a\n_fanatic_ but a _madman_? And what can be more pernicious to peace,\nthan the revelations that were by these _fanatics_ pretended? I do\nnot say there were not doctrines of other men, not called\n_fanatics_, as pernicious to peace as their\u2019s were, and in great\npart a cause of those troubles. Fifthly, from that I make\nprophetical revelations subject to the examination of the lawful\nsovereign, he inferreth, that two prophets prophecying the same\nthing at the same time, in the dominions of two different princes,\nthe one shall be a true prophet, the other a false. This consequence\nis not good: for seeing they teach different doctrines, they cannot\nboth of them confirm their doctrine with miracles. But this I prove,\nin the place (vol. iii. p. 426) he citeth, that whether either of\ntheir doctrines shall be taught publicly or not, it is in the power\nof the sovereign of the place only to determine. Nay, I say now\nfurther, if a prophet come to any private man in the name of God,\nthat man shall be judge whether he be a true prophet or not, before\nhe obey him. See 1 John, iv. 1. Sixthly, whereas he says that, upon\nmy grounds, Christ was to be reputed a false prophet every where,\nbecause his doctrine was received no where; his Lordship had read my\nbook more negligently, than was fit for one that would confute it.\nMy ground is this; that Christ in right of his Father was king of\nthe Jews, and consequently supreme prophet, and judge of all\nprophets. What other princes thought of his prophesies, is nothing\nto the purpose. I never said that princes can make doctrines or\nprophesies true or false; but I say every sovereign prince has a\nright to prohibit the public teaching of them, whether false or\ntrue. But what an oversight is it in a divine, to say that Christ\nhad the approbation of no sovereign prince, when he had the\napprobation of God, who was king of the Jews, and Christ his\nviceroy, and the whole Scripture written (John, xx. 31) to prove it;\nwhen his miracles declared it; when Pilate confessed it; and when\nthe apostles' office was to proclaim it? Seventhly, if we must not\nconsider, in points of Christian faith, who is the sovereign\nprophet, that is, who is next under Christ our supreme head and\ngovernor, I wish his Lordship would have cleared, ere he died, these\nfew questions. Is there not need of some judge of controverted\ndoctrines? I think no man can deny it, that has seen the rebellion\nthat followed the controversy here between Gomar and Arminius. There\nmust therefore be a judge of doctrines. But, says the Bishop, not\nthe king. Who then? Shall Dr. Bramhall be this judge? As profitable\nan office as it is, he was more modest than to say that. Shall a\nprivate layman have it? No man ever thought that. Shall it be given\nto a Presbyterian minister? No; it is unreasonable. Shall a synod of\nPresbyterians have it? No; for most of the Presbyters in the\nprimitive church were undoubtedly subordinate to bishops, and the\nrest were bishops. Who then? A synod of bishops? Very well. His\nLordship being too modest to undertake the whole power, would have\nbeen contented with the six-and-twentieth part. But, suppose it in a\nsynod of bishops, who shall call them together? The king. What if he\nwill not? Who should excommunicate him, or if he despise your\nexcommunication, who shall send forth a writ of _significavit_? No;\nall this was far from his Lordship\u2019s thoughts. The power of the\nclergy, unless it be upheld legally by the king, or illegally by the\nmultitude, amounts to nothing. But for the multitude, Suarez and the\nSchoolmen will never gain them, because they are not understood.\nBesides there be very few bishops that can act a sermon, which is a\npuissant part of _rhetoric_, so well as divers Presbyterians, and\nfanatic preachers can do. I conclude therefore, that his Lordship\ncould not possibly believe that the supreme judicature in matter of\nreligion could any where be so well placed as in the head of the\nchurch, which is the king. And so his Lordship and I think the same\nthing; but because his Lordship knew not how to deduce it, he was\nangry with me because I did it. He says, further, that _by my\nprinciples, he that blasphemeth Christ at Constantinople, is a true\nprophet_: as if a man that blasphemeth Christ, to approve his\nblasphemy can procure a miracle. For by my principles, no man is a\nprophet whose prophesy is not confirmed by God with a miracle. In\nthe last place, out of this, that the lawful sovereign is the judge\nof prophesy, he deduces that then Samuel and other prophets were\nfalse prophets, that contested with their sovereigns. As for Samuel,\nhe was at that time the judge, that is to say, the sovereign prince\nin Israel, and so acknowledged by Saul. For Saul received the\nkingdom from God himself, who had right to give and take it, by the\nhands of Samuel. And God gave it to himself only, and not to his\nseed; though if he had obeyed God, he would have settled it also\nupon his seed. The commandment of God was, that he should not spare\nAgag. Saul obeyed not. God therefore sent to Samuel to tell him that\nhe was rejected. For all this, Samuel went not about to resist Saul.\nThat he caused Agag to be slain, was with Saul\u2019s consent. Lastly,\nSaul confesses his sin. Where is this contesting with Saul? After\nthis God sent Samuel to anoint David, not that he should depose\nSaul, but succeed him, the sons of Saul having never had a right of\nsuccession. Nor did ever David make war on Saul, or so much as\nresist him, but fled from his persecution. But when Saul was dead,\nthen indeed he claimed his right against the house of Saul. What\nrebellion or resistance could his Lordship find here, either in\nSamuel or in David? Besides, all these transactions are\nsupernatural, and oblige not to imitation. Is there any prophet or\npriest now, that can set up in England, Scotland, or Ireland,\nanother king by pretence of prophecy or religion? What did Jeroboam\nto the man of God (1 Kings xiii.) that prophesied against the altar\nin Bethel without first doing a miracle, but offer to seize him for\nspeaking, as he thought, rashly of the king\u2019s act; and after the\nmiraculous withering of his hand, desire the prophet to pray for\nhim? The sin of Jeroboam was not his distrust of the prophet, but\nhis idolatry. He was the sole judge of the truth which the man of\nGod uttered against the altar, and the process agreeable to equity.\nWhat is the story of Elijah and Ahab (1 Kings xviii.), but a\nconfirmation of the right even of Ahab to be judge of prophecy?\nElijah told Ahab, he had transgressed the commandment of God. So may\nany minister now tell his sovereign, so he do it with sincerity and\ndiscretion. Ahab told Elijah he troubled Israel. Upon this\ncontroversy Elijah desired trial. Send, saith he, and assemble all\nIsrael; assemble also the prophets of Baal, four hundred and fifty.\nAhab did so. The question is stated before the people thus: if the\nLord be God, follow him; but if Baal, follow him. Then upon the\naltars of God and Baal were laid the wood and the bullocks; and the\ncause was to be judged by fire from heaven, to burn the sacrifices;\nwhich Elijah procured, the prophets of Baal could not procure. Was\nnot this cause here pleaded before Ahab? The sentence of Ahab is not\nrequired; for Elijah from that time forward was no more persecuted\nby Ahab, but only by his wife, Jezabel. The story of Micaiah (2\nChron. xviii.) is this. Ahab King of Israel consulted the prophets,\nfour hundred in number, whether he should prosper or not, in case he\nwent with Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, to fight against the Syrians\nat Ramoth-gilead. The prophet Micaiah was also called, and both the\nkings, Ahab and Jehoshaphat, sat together to hear what they should\nprophecy. There was no miracle done. The four hundred pronounced\nvictory; Micaiah alone the contrary. The king was judge, and most\nconcerned in the event; nor had he received any revelation in the\nbusiness. What could he do more discreetly than to follow the\ncounsel of four hundred, rather than of one man? But the event was\ncontrary; for he was slain; but not for following the counsel of the\nfour hundred, but for his murder of Naboth, and his idolatry. It was\nalso a sin in him, that he afflicted Micaiah in prison. But an\nunjust judgment does not take away from any king his right of\njudicature. Besides, what is all this, or that of Jeremiah which he\ncites last, to the question of who is judge of Christian doctrine?\n\n_J. D._ Neither doth he use God the Holy Ghost, more favourably\nthan God the Son. Where St. Peter saith, holy men of God spake as\nthey were moved by the Holy Spirit; he saith, _By the spirit, is\nmeant the voice of God in a dream or vision supernatural_; which\ndreams or visions, he maketh to be no more than _imaginations\nwhich they had in their sleep, or in an extasy, which in every\ntrue prophet were supernatural, but in false prophets were either\nnatural or feigned_, and more likely to be false than true. To\nsay, _God hath spoken to him in a dream, is no more than to say,\nhe dreamed that God spake to him, &c. To say, he hath seen a\nvision or heard a voice, is to say, that he hath dreamed between\nsleeping and waking._ So St. Peter\u2019s Holy Ghost, is come to be\ntheir own imaginations, which might be either feigned, or\nmistaken, or true. As if the Holy Ghost did enter only at their\neyes, and at their ears, not into their understandings, nor into\ntheir minds; or as if the Holy Ghost did not seal unto their\nhearts the truth and assurance of their prophecies. Whether a new\nlight be infused into their understandings, or new graces be\ninspired into their heart, they are wrought, or caused, or created\nimmediately by the Holy Ghost; and so are his _imaginations_, if\nthey be supernatural.\n\n_T. H._ For the places of my _Leviathan_ he cites, they are all,\nas they stand, both true and clearly proved. The setting of them\ndown by fragments is no refutation; nor offers he any arguments\nagainst them. His consequences are not deduced. I never said that\nthe Holy Ghost was an imagination, or a dream, or a vision, but\nthat the Holy Ghost spake most often in the Scripture by dreams\nand visions supernatural. The next words of his, _as if the Holy\nGhost did enter only at their eyes, and at their ears, not into\ntheir understandings, nor into their minds_, I let pass, because I\ncannot understand them. His last words, _Whether new light, &c._ I\nunderstand and approve.\n\n_J. D._ But he must needs fall into these absurdities, who maketh\nbut a jest of inspiration. _They who pretend Divine inspiration to\nbe a supernatural entering of the Holy Ghost into a man, are_, as he\nthinks, _in a very dangerous dilemma; for if they worship not the\nmen whom they conceive to be inspired, they fall into impiety; and\nif they worship them, they commit idolatry_. So mistaking the Holy\nGhost to be corporeal, something that is blown into a man, and the\ngraces of the Holy Ghost to be corporeal graces. And the words,\n_inpoured or infused virtue_, and, _inblown or inspired virtue, are\nas absurd and as insignificant, as a round quadrangle_. He reckons\nit as a common error, that _faith and sanctity are not attained by\nstudy and reason, but by supernatural inspiration or infusion_. And\nlayeth this for a firm ground; _faith and sanctity are indeed not\nvery frequent, but yet they are not miracles, but brought to pass by\neducation, discipline, correction, and other natural ways_. I would\nsee the greatest Pelagian of them all, fly higher.\n\n_T. H._ I make here no jest of inspiration. Seriously, I say, that\nin the proper signification of the words _inspiration_ and\n_infusion_, to say virtue is inspired, or infused, is as absurd as\nto say a quadrangle is round. But metaphorically, for God\u2019s\nbestowing of faith, grace, or other virtue, those words are\nintelligible enough.\n\n_J. D._ Why should he trouble himself about the Holy Spirit, who\nacknowledgeth no spirit, but either a subtle fluid body, or a ghost,\nor other idol or phantasm of the imagination; who knoweth no inward\ngrace or intrinsical holiness? _Holy is a word which in God\u2019s\nkingdom answereth to that, which men in their kingdoms use to call\npublic, or the king\u2019s._ And again, _wheresoever the word, holy, is\ntaken properly, there is still something signified of propriety\ngotten by consent_. His holiness is a relation, not a quality; for\ninward sanctification, or real infused holiness, (in respect whereof\nthe third person is called the Holy Ghost, because he is not only\nholy in himself, but also maketh us holy), he is so great a stranger\nto it, that he doth altogether deny it, and disclaim it.\n\n_T. H._ The word _holy_ I had defined in the words which his\nLordship here sets down, and by the use thereof in the Scripture\nmade it manifest, that that was the true signification of the word.\nThere is nothing in learning more difficult than to determine the\nsignification of words. That difficulty excuses him. He says that\n_holiness_, in my sense, is a relation, not a quality. All the\nlearned agree that quality is an accident: so that in attributing to\nGod _holiness_, as a quality, he contradicts himself. For he has in\nthe beginning of this his discourse denied, and rightly, that any\naccident is in God; saying, whatsoever is in God is the Divine\nsubstance. He affirms also, that to attribute any accident to God,\nis to deny the simplicity of the Divine substance. And thus his\nLordship makes God, as I do, a corporeal spirit. Both here, and\nthroughout, he discovers so much ignorance, as had he charged me\nwith error only, and not with atheism, I should not have thought it\nnecessary to answer him.\n\n_J. D._ We are taught in our creed to believe the catholic or\nuniversal church. But T. H. teacheth us the contrary: _That if there\nbe more Christian churches than one, all of them together are not\none church personally_. And more plainly: _Now if the whole number\nof Christians be not contained in one commonwealth, they are not one\nperson, nor is there an universal church, that hath any authority\nover them_. And again: _The universal church is not one person, of\nwhich it can be said, that it hath done, or decreed, or ordained, or\nexcommunicated, or absolved_. This doth quite overthrow all the\nauthority of general councils.\n\nAll other men distinguish between the church and the commonwealth;\nonly T. H. maketh them to be one and the same thing. _The\ncommonwealth of Christian men, and the church of the same, are\naltogether the same thing, called by two names for two reasons. For\nthe matter of the church and of the commonwealth is the same,\nnamely, the same Christian men; and the form is the same, which\nconsisteth in the lawful power of convocating them._ And hence he\nconcludeth, that _every Christian commonwealth is a church endowed\nwith all spiritual authority_. And yet more fully: _The church if it\nbe one person, is the same thing with the commonwealth of\nChristians; called a commonwealth, because it consisteth of men\nunited in one person their sovereign; and a church, because it\nconsisteth in Christian men united in one Christian sovereign_. Upon\nwhich account there was no Christian church in these parts of the\nworld, for some hundreds of years after Christ, because there was no\nChristian sovereign.\n\n_T. H._ For answer to this period, I say only this; that taking the\nchurch, as I do, in all those places, for a company of Christian men\non earth incorporated into one person, that can speak, command, or\ndo any act of a person, all that he citeth out of what I have\nwritten is true; and that all private conventicles, though their\nbelief be right, are not properly called churches; and that there is\nnot any one universal church here on earth, which is a person indued\nwith authority universal to govern all Christian men on earth, no\nmore than there is one universal sovereign prince or state on earth,\nthat hath right to govern all mankind. I deny also that the whole\nclergy of a Christian kingdom or state being assembled, are the\nrepresentative of that church further than the civil laws permit; or\ncan lawfully assemble themselves, unless by the command or by the\nleave of the sovereign civil power. I say further, that the denial\nof this point tendeth in England towards the taking away of the\nking\u2019s supremacy in causes ecclesiastical. But his Lordship has not\nhere denied any thing of mine, because he has done no more but set\ndown my words. He says further, that this doctrine destroys the\nauthority of all general councils; which I confess. Nor hath any\ngeneral council at this day in this kingdom the force of a law, nor\never had, but by the authority of the king.\n\n_J. D._ Neither is he more orthodox concerning the holy Scriptures:\n_hitherto_, that is, for the books of Moses, _the power of making\nthe Scripture canonical, was in the civil sovereign_. The like he\nsaith of the Old Testament, made canonical by Esdras. And of the New\nTestament, that _it was not the apostles which made their own\nwritings canonical, but every convert made them so to himself_: yet\nwith this restriction, that _until the sovereign ruler had\nprescribed them, they were but counsel and advice, which whether\ngood or bad, he that was counselled might without injustice refuse\nto observe, and being contrary to the laws established, could not\nwithout injustice observe_. He maketh the primitive Christians to\nhave been in a pretty condition. Certainly the gospel was contrary\nto the laws then established. But most plainly, _The word of the\ninterpreter of the Scripture is the word of God_. And the _same is\nthe interpreter of the Scripture, and the sovereign judge of all\ndoctrines_, that is, the sovereign magistrate, _to whose authority\nwe must stand no less, than to theirs, who at first did commend the\nScripture to us for the canon of faith_. Thus if Christian\nsovereigns, of different communications, do clash one with another,\nin their interpretation, or misinterpretation of Scripture, as they\ndo daily, then the word of God is contradictory to itself; or that\nis the word of God in one commonwealth, which is the word of the\nDevil in another commonwealth. And the same thing may be true, and\nnot true at the same time: which is the peculiar privilege of T. H.\nto make contradictories to be true together.\n\n_T. H._ There is no doubt but by what authority the Scripture or\nany other writing is made a law, by the same authority the\nScriptures are to be interpreted, or else they are made law in\nvain. But to obey is one thing, to believe is another; which\ndistinction perhaps his Lordship never heard of. To obey is to do\nor forbear as one is commanded, and depends on the will; but to\nbelieve, depends not on the will, but on the providence and\nguidance of our hearts that are in the hands of God Almighty. Laws\nonly require obedience; belief requires teachers and arguments\ndrawn either from reason, or from some thing already believed.\nWhere there is no reason for our belief, there is no reason we\nshould believe. The reason why men believe, is drawn from the\nauthority of those men whom we have no just cause to mistrust,\nthat is, of such men to whom no profit accrues by their deceiving\nus, and of such men as never used to lie, or else from the\nauthority of such men whose promises, threats, and affirmations,\nwe have seen confirmed by God with miracles. If it be not from the\nking\u2019s authority that the Scripture is law, what other authority\nmakes it law? Here some man being of his Lordship\u2019s judgment, will\nperhaps laugh and say, it is the authority of God that makes them\nlaw. I grant that. But my question is, on what authority they\nbelieve that God is the author of them? Here his Lordship would\nhave been at a nonplus, and turning round, would have said the\nauthority of the Scripture makes good that God is their author. If\nit be said we are to believe the Scripture upon the authority of\nthe universal church, why are not the books we call Apocrypha the\nword of God as well as the rest? If this authority be in the\nchurch of England, then it is not any other than the authority of\nthe head of the church, which is the king. For without the head\nthe church is mute. The authority therefore is in the king; which\nis all that I contended for in this point. As to the laws of the\nGentiles, concerning religion in the primitive times of the\nchurch, I confess they were contrary to Christian faith. But none\nof their laws, nor terrors, nor a man\u2019s own will, are able to take\naway faith, though they can compel to an external obedience; and\nthough I may blame the _Ethnic_ princes for compelling men to\nspeak what they thought not, yet I absolve not all those that have\nhad the power in Christian churches from the same fault. For I\nbelieve, since the time of the first four general councils, there\nhave been more Christians burnt and killed in the Christian church\nby ecclesiastical authority, than by the heathen emperors' laws,\nfor religion only without sedition. All that the Bishop does in\nthis argument is but a heaving at the King\u2019s supremacy. Oh, but,\nsays he, if two kings interpret a place of Scripture in contrary\nsenses, it will follow that both senses are true. It does not\nfollow. For the interpretation, though it be made by just\nauthority, must not therefore always be true. If the doctrine in\nthe one sense be necessary to salvation, then they that hold the\nother must die in their sins, and be damned. But if the doctrine\nin neither sense be necessary to salvation, then all is well,\nexcept perhaps that they will call one another atheists, and fight\nabout it.\n\n_J. D._ All the power, virtue, use, and efficacy, which he ascribeth\nto the holy sacraments, is to be _signs or commemorations_. As for\nany sealing, or confirming, or conferring of grace, he acknowledged!\nnothing. The same he saith particularly of baptism: upon which\ngrounds a cardinal\u2019s red hat, or a serjeant-at-arms his mace, may be\ncalled sacraments as well as baptism, or the holy eucharist, if they\nbe only signs and commemorations of a benefit. If he except, that\nbaptism and the eucharist are of Divine institution; but a\ncardinal\u2019s red hat or a serjeant-at-arms his mace are not: he saith\ntruly, but nothing to his advantage or purpose, seeing he deriveth\nall the authority of the word and sacraments, in respect of\nsubjects, and all our obligation to them, from the authority of the\nsovereign magistrate, without which these words, _Repent and be\nbaptized in the name of Jesus_, are but counsel, no command. And so\na serjeant-at-arms his mace, and baptism, proceed both from the same\nauthority. And this he saith upon this silly ground, _that nothing\nis a command, the performance whereof tendeth to our own benefit_.\nHe might as well deny the Ten Commandments to be commands, because\nthey have an advantageous promise annexed to them, _Do this and thou\nshalt live_; and _cursed is every one that continueth not in all the\nwords of this law to do them_.\n\n_T. H._ Of the sacraments I said no more, than that they are _signs_\nor _commemorations_. He finds fault that I add not _seals_,\n_confirmations_, and that they _confer grace_. First, I would have\nasked him, if a seal be any thing else besides a sign, whereby to\nremember somewhat, as that we have promised, accepted, acknowledged,\ngiven, undertaken somewhat. Are not other _signs_, though without a\n_seal_, of force sufficient to convince me or oblige me? A writing\nobligatory, or release, signed only with a man\u2019s name, is as\nobligatory as a bond signed and sealed, if it be sufficiently\nproved, though peradventure it may require a longer process to\nobtain a sentence; but his Lordship I think knew better than I do\nthe force of bonds and bills; yet I know this, that in the court of\nheaven there is no such difference between saying, signing, and\nsealing, as his Lordship seemeth here to pretend. I am baptized for\na commemoration that I have enrolled myself. I take the sacrament of\nthe Lord\u2019s Supper to commemorate that Christ\u2019s body was broken, and\nhis blood shed for my redemption. What is there more intimated\nconcerning the nature of these sacraments, either in the Scripture\nor in the book of Common Prayer? Have bread and wine and water in\ntheir own nature, any other quality than they had before the\nconsecration? It is true that the consecration gives these bodies a\nnew relation, as being a giving and dedicating of them to God, that\nis to say a making of them holy, not a changing of their quality.\nBut as some silly young men returning from France affect a broken\nEnglish, to be thought perfect in the French language; so his\nLordship, I think, to seem a perfect understander of the\nunintelligible language of the Schoolmen, pretends an ignorance of\nhis mother-tongue. He talks here of _command_ and _counsel_, as if\nhe were no Englishman, nor knew any difference between their\nsignifications. What Englishman, when he commandeth, says more than,\n_Do this_; yet he looks to be obeyed, if obedience be due unto him.\nBut when he says, _Do this, and thou shalt have such or such a\nreward_, he encourages him, or advises him, or bargains with him;\nbut commands him not. Oh, the understanding of a Schoolman!\n\n_J. D._ Sometimes he is for holy orders, and giveth to the pastors\nof the church the right of ordination and absolution, and\ninfallibility, too much for a particular pastor, or the pastors of\none particular church. _It is manifest, that the consecration of the\nchiefest doctors in every church, and imposition of hands, doth\npertain to the doctors of the same church._ And, _it cannot be\ndoubted of, but the power of binding and loosing was given by Christ\nto the future pastors, after the same manner as to his present\napostles_. And, _our Saviour hath promised this infallibility in\nthose things which are necessary to salvation, to his apostles,\nuntil the day of judgment, that is to say, to the apostles, and\npastors to be consecrated by the apostles successively, by the\nimposition of hands_.\n\nBut at other times he casteth all this meal down with his foot.\n_Christian sovereigns are the supreme pastors, and the only persons\nwhom Christians now hear speak from God, except such as God speaketh\nto in these days supernaturally._ What is now become of the promised\ninfallibility? And, _it is from the civil sovereign that all other\npastors derive their right of teaching, preaching, and all other\nfunctions pertaining to that office; and they are but his ministers\nin the same manner as the magistrates of towns, or judges in courts\nof justice, and commanders of armies_. What is now become of their\nordination? Magistrates, judges, and generals, need no precedent\nqualifications. He maketh _the pastoral authority of sovereigns to\nbe_ jure divino, _of all other pastors_ jure civili: he addeth,\n_neither is there any judge of heresy among subjects, but their own\ncivil sovereign_.\n\nLastly, _the church excommunicateth no man but whom she\nexcommunicateth by the authority of the prince_. And, _the effect of\nexcommunication hath nothing in it, neither of damage in this world,\nnor terror upon an apostate, if the civil power did persecute or not\nassist the church: and in the world to come, leaves them in no worse\nestate, than those who never believed. The damage rather redoundeth\nto the church. Neither is the excommunication of a Christian\nsubject, that obeyeth the laws of his own sovereign, of any effect._\nWhere is now their power of binding and loosing?\n\n_T. H._ Here his Lordship condemneth, first my too much kindness to\nthe pastors of the church; as if I ascribed infallibility to every\nparticular minister, or at least to the assembly of the pastors of a\nparticular church. But he mistakes me; I never meant to flatter them\nso much. I say only that the ceremony of consecration, and\nimposition of hands, belongs to them; and that also no otherwise\nthan as given them by the laws of the commonwealth. The bishop\nconsecrates, but the king both makes him bishop and gives him his\nauthority. The head of the church not only gives the power of\nconsecration, dedication, and benediction, but may also exercise the\nact himself if he please. Solomon did it; and the book of canons\nsays, that the King of England has all the right that any good king\nof Israel had; it might have added, that any other king or sovereign\nassembly had in their own dominions. I deny that any pastor or any\nassembly of pastors in any particular church, or all the churches on\nearth though united, are infallible: yet I say, the pastors of a\nChristian church assembled are, in all such points as are _necessary\nto salvation_. But about what points are _necessary to salvation_,\nhe and I differ. For I, in the forty-third chapter of my\n_Leviathan_, have proved that this article, _Jesus is the Christ_,\nis the _unum necessarium_, _the only article necessary to\nsalvation_; to which his Lordship hath not offered any objection.\nAnd he, it seems, would have necessary to salvation every doctrine\nhe himself thought so. Doubtless in this article, _Jesus is the\nChrist_, every church is infallible; for else it were no church.\nThen he says, I overthrow this again by saying that Christian\nsovereigns are the _supreme pastors_, that is, heads of their own\nchurches; _That they have their authority jure divino; that all\nother pastors have it jure civili_. How came any Bishop to have\nauthority over me, but by letters patent from the king? I remember a\nparliament wherein a bishop, who was both a good preacher and a good\nman, was blamed for a book he had a little before published in\nmaintenance of the _jus divinum_ of bishops; a thing which before\nthe reformation here, was never allowed them by the pope. Two _jus\ndivinums_ cannot stand together in one kingdom. In the last place he\nmislikes that the church should excommunicate by authority of the\nking, that is to say, by authority of the head of the church. But he\ntells not why. He might as well mislike that the magistrates of the\nrealm should execute their offices by the authority of the head of\nthe realm. His Lordship was in a great error, if he thought such\nencroachments would add any thing to the wealth, dignity, reverence,\nor continuance of his order. They are pastors of pastors, but yet\nthey are the sheep of him that is on earth their sovereign pastor,\nand he again a sheep of that supreme pastor which is in heaven. And\nif they did their pastoral office, both by life and doctrine, as\nthey ought to do, there could never arise any dangerous rebellion in\nthe land. But if the people see once any ambition in their teachers,\nthey will sooner learn that, than any other doctrine; and from\nambition proceeds rebellion.\n\n_J. D._ It may be some of T. H. his disciples desire to know what\nhopes of heavenly joys they have upon their master\u2019s principles.\nThey may hear them without any great contentment: _There is no\nmention in Scripture, nor ground in reason, of the c\u0153lum empyr\u00e6um_,\nthat is, the heaven of the blessed, where the saints shall live\neternally with God. And again, _I have not found any text that can\nprobably be drawn to prove any ascension of the saints into heaven,\nthat is to say, into any c\u0153lum empyr\u00e6um_. But he concludeth\npositively, that _Salvation shall be upon earth, when God shall\nreign at the coming of Christ in Jerusalem_. And again, _In short,\nthe kingdom of God is a civil kingdom_, &c. called also _the kingdom\nof heaven, and the kingdom of glory_. All the Hobbians can hope for,\nis, to be restored to the same condition which Adam was in before\nhis fall. So saith T. H. himself: _From whence may be inferred, that\nthe elect, after the resurrection, shall be restored to the estate\nwherein Adam was before he had sinned_. As for the beatifical\nvision, he defineth it to be a word unintelligible.\n\n_T. H._ This _c\u0153lum empyr\u00e6um_ for which he pretendeth so much zeal,\nwhere is it in the Scripture, where in the book of Common Prayer,\nwhere in the canons, where in the homilies of the church of England,\nor in any part of our religion? What has a Christian to do with such\nlanguage? Nor do I remember it in Aristotle. Perhaps it may be in\nsome Schoolman or commentator on Aristotle, and his Lordship makes\nit in English the _heaven of the blessed_, as if _empyr\u00e6um_\nsignified _that which belongs to the blessed_. St. Austin says\nbetter; that after the day of judgment all that is not heaven shall\nbe hell. Then for _beatifical vision_, how can any man understand\nit, that knows from the Scripture that no man ever saw or can see\nGod. Perhaps his Lordship thinks that the happiness of the life to\ncome is not real, but a vision. As for that which I say\n(_Leviathan_, p. 625), I have answered to it already.\n\n_J. D._ But considering his other principles, I do not marvel much\nat his extravagance in this point. To what purpose should a _c\u0153lum\nempyr\u00e6um_, or heaven of the blessed, serve in his judgment, who\nmaketh the blessed angels that are the inhabitants of that happy\nmansion, to be either idols of the brain, that is in plain English,\nnothing, or thin, subtile, fluid bodies, destroying the angelical\nnature. _The universe being the aggregate of all bodies, there is no\nreal part thereof that is not also body._ And elsewhere, _Every part\nof the universe is body, and that which is not body, is no part of\nthe universe. And because the universe is all, that which is no part\nof it is nothing, and consequently nowhere._ How? By this doctrine\nhe maketh not only the angels, but God himself to be nothing.\nNeither doth he salve it at all, by supposing erroneously angels to\nbe corporeal spirits, and by attributing the name of incorporeal\nspirit to God, _as being a name of more honour, in whom we consider\nnot what attribute best expresseth his nature, which is\nincomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honour\nhim_. Though we be not able to comprehend perfectly what God is, yet\nwe are able perfectly to comprehend what God is not, that is, he is\nnot imperfect, and therefore he is not finite, and consequently he\nis not corporeal. This were a trim way to honour God indeed, to\nhonour him with a lie. If this that he says here be true, that\n_every part of the universe is a body, and whatsoever is not a body\nis nothing_, then, by this doctrine, if God be not a body, God is\nnothing: not an incorporeal spirit, but _one of the idols of the\nbrain_, a mere nothing, though they think they dance under a net,\nand have the blind of God\u2019s incomprehensibility between them and\ndiscovery.\n\n_T. H._ This of _incorporeal substance_ he urged before, and there I\nanswered it. I wonder he so often rolls the same stone. He is like\nSisyphus in the poet\u2019s hell, that there rolls a heavy stone up a\nhill, which no sooner he brings to day-light, than it slips down\nagain to the bottom, and serves him so perpetually. For so his\nLordship rolls this and other questions with much ado, till they\ncome to the light of Scripture, and then they vanish; and he vexing,\nsweating, and railing, goes to it again, to as little purpose as\nbefore. From that I say of the universe, he infers, that I make God\nto be nothing: but infers it absurdly. He might indeed have inferred\nthat I make him a corporeal, but yet a pure spirit. I mean by the\nuniverse, the aggregate of all things that have being in themselves;\nand so do all men else. And because God has a being, it follows that\nhe is either the whole universe, or part of it. Nor does his\nLordship go about to disprove it, but only seems to wonder at it.\n\n_J. D._ To what purpose should a _c\u0153lum empyr\u00e6um_ serve in his\njudgment, who denieth the immortality of the soul? _The doctrine is\nnow, and hath been a long time, far otherwise; namely, that every\nman hath eternity of life by nature, inasmuch as his soul is\nimmortal._ Who supposeth that _when a man dieth, there remaineth\nnothing of him but his carcase_? Who maketh the word _soul_ in Holy\nScripture to signify always either the life, or the living creature;\nand expoundeth the casting of body and soul into hell-fire, to be\n_the casting of body and life into hell-fire_? Who maketh this\northodox truth, that the souls of men are substances distinct from\ntheir bodies, to be _an error contracted by the contagion of the\ndemonology of the Greeks, and a window that gives entrance to the\ndark doctrine of eternal torments_? Who expoundeth these words of\nSolomon (_Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the\nspirit shall return to God that gave it_) thus, _God only knows what\nbecometh of a man\u2019s spirit when he expireth_? He will not\nacknowledge that there is a spirit, or any substance distinct from\nthe body. I wonder what they think doth keep their bodies from\nstinking.\n\n_T. H._ He comes here to that which is a great paradox in\nSchool-divinity. The grounds of my opinion are the canonical\nScripture, and the texts which I cited I must again recite, to which\nI shall also add some others. My doctrine is this: first, _that the\nelect in Christ, from the day of judgment forward, by virtue of\nChrist\u2019s passion and victory over death, shall enjoy eternal life,\nthat is, they shall be immortal_. Secondly, _that there is no living\nsoul separated in place from the body, more than there is a living\nbody separated from the soul_. Thirdly, _that the reprobate shall be\nrevived to judgment, and shall die a second death in torments, which\ndeath shall be everlasting_. Now let us consider what is said to\nthese points in the Scripture, and what is the harmony therein of\nthe Old and New Testament.\n\nAnd first, because the word _immortal soul_, is not found in the\nScriptures, the question is to be decided by evident consequences\nfrom the Scripture. The Scripture saith of God expressly (1 Tim. vi.\n16) that _He only hath immortality, and dwelleth in inaccessible\nlight_. Hence it followeth that the soul of man is not of its own\nnature immortal, but by grace, that is to say, by the gift of God.\nAnd then the question will be, whether this grace or gift of God\nwere bestowed on the soul in the creation and conception of the man,\nor afterwards by his redemption. Another question will be, in what\nsense immortality of torments can be called a gift, when all gifts\nsuppose the thing given to be grateful to the receiver. To the first\nof these, Christ himself saith (Luke xiv. 13, 14): _When thou makest\na feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind: and thou\nshalt be blessed, for they cannot recompense thee: for thou shalt be\nrecompensed at the resurrection of them that be just_. It follows\nhence that the reward of the elect is not before the resurrection.\nWhat reward then enjoys a separated soul in heaven, or any where\nelse, till that day come, or what has he to do there till the body\nrise again? Again, St. Paul says (Rom. ii. 6-8): _God will render to\nevery man according to his works. To them, who by patient\ncontinuance in well doing seek for honour, glory, and immortality,\neternal life. But unto them that be contentious, and do not obey the\ntruth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath._ Here it is\nplain that God gives eternal life only to well doers, and to them\nthat seek, not to them that have already, immortality. Again (2 Tim.\ni. 10): _Christ hath abolished death, and brought life and\nimmortality to light, through the Gospel_. Therefore before the\nGospel of Christ, nothing was immortal but God. And St. Paul,\nspeaking of the day of judgment (1 Cor. xv. 54), saith, that _this\nmortal shall put on immortality_, and _that then death is swallowed\nup in victory_. There was no immortality of any thing mortal till\ndeath was overcome, and that was at the resurrection. And John,\nviii. 51: _Verily, verily, if a man keep my sayings he shall never\nsee death_; that is to say, he shall be immortal. But it is nowhere\nsaid, that he which keeps not Christ\u2019s sayings shall never see\ndeath, nor be immortal: and yet they that say that the wicked, body\nand soul, shall be tormented everlastingly, do therein say they are\nimmortal. Matth. x. 28: _Fear not them that can kill the body, but\nare not able to kill the soul; but fear him that is able to destroy\nboth soul and body in hell_. Man cannot kill a soul; for the man\nkilled shall revive again. But God can destroy the soul and body in\nhell, as that it shall never return to life. In the Old Testament\n(Gen. vii. 4) we read: _I will destroy every living substance that I\nhave made, from off the face of the earth_; therefore, if the souls\nof them that perished in the Flood were substances, they were also\ndestroyed in the Flood, and were not immortal. Matth. xxv. 41:\n_Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the\ndevil and his angels_. These words are to be spoken in the day of\njudgment, which judgment is to be in the clouds. And there shall\nstand the men that are reprobated alive, where souls, according to\nhis Lordship\u2019s doctrine, were sent long before to hell. Therefore at\nthat present day of judgment they had one soul by which they were\nthere alive, and another soul in hell. How his Lordship could have\nmaintained this, I understand not. But by my doctrine, that the soul\nis not a separated substance, but that the man at his resurrection\nshall be revived by God, and raised to judgment, and afterwards body\nand soul destroyed in hell-fire, which is the second death, there is\nno such consequence or difficulty to be inferred. Besides, it avoids\nthe unnecessary disputes about where the soul of Lazarus was for\nfour days he lay dead. And the order of the divine process is made\ngood, of not inflicting torments before the condemnation pronounced.\n\nNow as to the harmony of the two Testaments, it is said in the Old\n(Gen. ii. 17): _In the day that thou eatest of the tree of\nknowledge, dying thou shalt die: moriendo morieris_: that is, when\nthou art dead thou shalt not revive; for so hath Athanasius\nexpounded it. Therefore Adam and Eve were not immortal by their\ncreation. Then (Gen. iii. 22): _Behold the man is become as one of\nus: now lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of\nlife, and eat, and live for ever, &c._ Here they had had an\nimmortality by the gift of God if they had not sinned. It was\ntherefore sin that lost them eternal life. He therefore that\nredeemed them from sin was the author of their immortality, which\nconsequently began in the day of judgment, when Adam and Eve were\nagain made alive by admission to the new tree of life, which was\nChrist.\n\nNow let us compare this with the New Testament; where we find these\nwords (1 Cor. xv. 21): _since by man came death, by man came also\nthe resurrection of the dead_. Therefore all the immortality of the\nsoul, that shall be after the resurrection, is by Christ, and not by\nthe nature of the soul. Verse 22: _As by Adam all die, even so in\nChrist shall all be made alive_. Therefore since we died by Adam\u2019s\nsin, so we shall live by Christ\u2019s redemption of us, that is, after\nthe resurrection. Again (verse 23): _But every man in his own order;\nChrist the first-fruits, afterwards they that are Christ\u2019s, at his\ncoming_. Therefore none shall be made alive till the coming of\nChrist. Lastly, as when God had said, _that day that thou eatest of\nthe tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt die_, though he\ncondemned him then, yet he suffered him to live a long time after;\nso when Christ had said to the thief on the cross, _this day thou\nshalt be with me in Paradise_, yet he suffered him to lie dead till\nthe general resurrection, for no man rose again from the dead before\nour Saviour\u2019s coming, and conquering death.\n\nIf God bestowed immortality on every man then when he made him, and\nhe made many to whom he never purposed to give his saving grace,\nwhat did his Lordship think that God gave any man immortality with\npurpose only to make him capable of immortal torments? It is a hard\nsaying, and I think cannot piously be believed. I am sure it can\nnever be proved by the canonical Scripture.\n\nBut though I have made it clear that it cannot be drawn by lawful\nconsequence from Scripture, that man was created with a soul\nimmortal, and that the elect only, by the grace of God in Christ,\nshall both bodies and souls from the resurrection forward be\nimmortal; yet there may be a consequence well drawn from some words\nin the rites of burial, that prove the contrary, as these:\n_Forasmuch as it hath pleased Almighty God of his great mercy, to\ntake unto himself the soul of our dear brother here departed_, &c.\nAnd these: _Almighty God, with whom do live the spirits of them that\ndepart hence in the Lord_: which are words authorised by the church.\nI wonder his Lordship, that had so often pronounced them, took no\nnotice of them here. But it often happens that men think of those\nthings least, which they have most perfectly learnt by rote. I am\nsorry I could not, without deserting the sense of Scripture and mine\nown conscience, say the same. But I see no just cause yet, why the\nchurch should be offended at it. For the church of England\npretendeth not, as doth the church of Rome, to be above the\nScripture; nor forbiddeth any man to read the Scripture; nor was I\nforbidden, when I wrote my _Leviathan_, to publish anything which\nthe Scriptures suggested. For when I wrote it, I may safely say\nthere was no lawful church in England, that could have maintained me\nin, or prohibited me from writing anything. There was no bishop; and\nthough there was preaching, such as it was, yet no common prayer.\nFor extemporary prayer, though made in the pulpit, is not common\nprayer. There was then no church in England, that any man living was\nbound to obey. What I write here at this present time I am forced to\nin my defence, not against the church, but against the accusations\nand arguments of my adversaries. For the church, though it\nexcommunicates for scandalous life, and for teaching false\ndoctrines, yet it professeth to impose nothing to be held as faith,\nbut what may be warranted by Scripture: and this the church itself\nsaith in the twentieth of the Thirty-nine Articles of religion. And\ntherefore I am permitted to allege Scripture at any time in the\ndefence of my belief.\n\n_J. D._ But they that in one case are grieved, in another must be\nrelieved. If perchance T. H. hath given his disciples any discontent\nin his doctrine of _heaven_ and the _holy angels_, and _the\nglorified souls of the saints_, he will make them amends in his\ndoctrine of _hell_, and the _devils_, and the _damned spirits_.\nFirst of the devils; he fancieth that all those devils which our\nSaviour did cast out, were phrenzies; and all _demoniacs_, or\npersons possessed, _no other than madmen_: and to justify _our\nSaviour\u2019s speaking to a disease as to a person_, produceth the\nexample of enchanters. But he declareth himself most clearly upon\nthis subject, in his animadversions upon my reply to his defence of\nfatal destiny. _There are in the Scripture two sorts of things which\nare in English translated devils. One is that which is called Satan,\nDiabolus Abaddon, which signifieth in English an enemy, an accuser,\nand a destroyer of the church of God; in which sense the devils are\nbut wicked men. The other sort of devils are called in the Scripture\nD\u00e6monia, which are the feigned Gods of the heathen, and are neither\nbodies nor spiritual substances, but mere fancies, and fictions of\nterrified hearts, feigned by the Greeks, and other heathen people,\nwhich St. Paul calleth nothings._ So T. H. hath killed the great\ninfernal Devil, and all his black angels, and left no devils to be\nfeared, but devils incarnate, that is, wicked men.\n\n_T. H._ As for the first words cited (_Leviathan_, vol. iii. p. 68)\nI refer the reader to the place itself; and for the words concerning\nSatan, I leave them to the judgment of the learned.\n\n_J. D._ And for _hell_, he describeth the _kingdom of Satan_, or the\n_kingdom of darkness_, to be _a confederacy of deceivers_. He\ntelleth us that the places, which set forth the torments of hell in\nholy Scripture, _do design metaphorically a grief and discontent of\nmind, from the sight of that eternal felicity in others, which they\nthemselves, through their own incredulity and disobedience, have\nlost_. As if metaphorical descriptions did not bear sad truths in\nthem, as well as literal; as if final desperation were no more than\na little fit of grief or discontent; and a guilty conscience were no\nmore than a transitory passion; as if it were a loss so easily to be\nborne, to be deprived for evermore of the beatifical vision; and\nlastly, as if the damned, besides that unspeakable loss, did not\nlikewise suffer actual torments, proportionable in some measure to\ntheir own sins, and God\u2019s justice.\n\n_T. H._ That metaphors bear sad truths in them, I deny not. It is a\nsad thing to lose this present life untimely. Is it not therefore\nmuch more a sad thing to lose an eternal happy life? And I believe\nthat he which will venture upon sin, with such danger, will not\nstick to do the same notwithstanding the doctrine of eternal\ntorture. Is it not also a sad truth, that the kingdom of darkness\nshould be a confederacy of deceivers?\n\n_J. D._ Lastly, for the damned spirits, he declareth himself every\nwhere, that their sufferings are not eternal. _The fire shall be\nunquenchable, and the torments everlasting; but it cannot be thence\ninferred, that he who shall be cast into that fire, or_ _be\ntormented with those torments, shall endure and resist them, so as\nto be eternally burnt and tortured, and yet never be destroyed nor\ndie. And though there be many places, that affirm everlasting fire,\ninto which men may be cast successively one after another for ever;\nyet I find none that affirm that there shall be an everlasting life\ntherein of any individual person._ If he had said, and said only,\nthat the pains of the damned may be lessened, as to the degree of\nthem, or that they endure not for ever, but that after they are\npurged by long torments from their dross and corruptions, as gold in\nthe fire, both the damned spirits and the devils themselves should\nbe restored to a better condition; he might have found some ancients\n(who are therefore called _the merciful doctors_) to have joined\nwith him; though still he should have wanted the suffrage of the\nCatholic church.\n\n_T. H._ Why does not his Lordship cite some place of Scripture here\nto prove, that all the reprobates which are dead, live eternally in\ntorment? We read indeed, that everlasting torments were prepared for\nthe Devil and his angels, whose natures also are everlasting; and\nthat the _Beast_ and the _false prophet_ shall be tormented\neverlastingly; but not that every reprobate shall be so. They shall\nindeed be cast into the same fire; but the Scripture says plainly\nenough, that they shall be both body and soul destroyed there. If I\nhad said that the devils themselves should be restored to a better\ncondition, his Lordship would have been so kind as to have put me\ninto the number of the _merciful doctors_. Truly, if I had had any\nwarrant for the possibility of their being less enemies to the\nchurch of God than they have been, I would have been as merciful to\nthem as any doctor of them all. As it is, I am more merciful than\nthe Bishop.\n\n_J. D._ But his shooting is not at rovers, but altogether at random,\nwithout either precedent or partner. All that _eternal fire_, all\nthose torments which he acknowledgeth, is but this, that _after the\nresurrection, the reprobate shall be in the estate that Adam and his\nposterity were in, after the sin committed, saving that God promised\na redeemer to Adam and not to them_: adding, _that they shall live\nas they did formerly, marry and give in marriage; and consequently\nengender children perpetually after the resurrection, as they did\nbefore_: which he calleth _an immortality of the kind, but not of\nthe persons of men_. It is to be presumed, that in those their\nsecond lives, knowing certainly from T. H. that there is no hope of\nredemption for them from corporal death upon their well-doing, nor\nfear of any torments after death for their ill-doing, they will pass\ntheir times here as pleasantly as they can. This is all the\ndamnation which T. H. fancieth.\n\n_T. H._ This he has urged once before, and I answered to it, that\nthe whole paragraph was to prove, that for any text of Scripture to\nthe contrary, men might, after the resurrection, live as Adam did on\nearth; and that, notwithstanding the text of St. Luke, (chap. xx.\n34-36), _Marry and propagate_. But that they shall do so, is no\nassertion of mine. His Lordship knew I held, that after the\nresurrection there shall be at all no wicked men; but the elect (all\nthat are, have been, and hereafter shall be) shall live on earth.\nBut St. Peter (2 Epist. iii. 13) says, there shall then be _a new\nheaven and a new earth_.\n\n_J. D._ In sum I leave it to the free judgment of the understanding\nreader, by these few instances which follow, to judge what the\nHobbian principles are in point of religion. _Ex ungue leonem._\n\nFirst, that no man needs to put himself to any hazard for his faith,\nbut may safely comply with the times. _And for their faith it is\ninternal and invisible. They have the licence that Naaman had, and\nneed not put themselves into danger for it._\n\nSecondly, he alloweth subjects, being commanded by their sovereign,\nto deny Christ. _Profession with the tongue is but an external\nthing, and no more than any other gesture, whereby we signify our\nobedience: and wherein a Christian, holding firmly in his heart the\nfaith of Christ, hath the same liberty which the prophet Elisha\nallowed to Naaman, &c. who by bowing before the idol Rimmon, denied\nthe true God as much in effect, as if he had done it with his lips._\nAlas, why did St. Peter weep so bitterly for denying his master, out\nof fear of his life or members? It seems he was not acquainted with\nthese Hobbian principles. And in the same place he layeth down this\ngeneral conclusion: _This we may say, that whatsoever a subject is\ncompelled to, in obedience to his sovereign, and doth it not in\norder to his own mind, but in order to the laws of his country, that\naction is not his, but his sovereign\u2019s; nor is it he, that in this\ncase denieth Christ before men, but his governor and the law of his\ncountry_. His instance, in a Mahometan commanded by a Christian\nprince to be present at divine service, is a weak mistake, springing\nfrom his gross ignorance in case-divinity, not knowing to\ndistinguish between an erroneous conscience, as the Mahometan\u2019s is,\nand a conscience rightly informed.\n\n_T. H._ In these his two first instances, I confess his Lordship\ndoes not much belie me. But neither does he confute me. Also I\nconfess my ignorance in his case-divinity, which is grounded upon\nthe doctrine of the Schoolmen; who to decide cases of conscience,\ntake in, not only the Scriptures, but also the decrees of the popes\nof Rome, for the advancing of the dominion of the Roman church over\nconsciences; whereas the true decision of cases of consciences ought\nto be grounded only on Scripture, or natural equity. I never allowed\nthe denying of Christ with the tongue in all men, but expressly say\nthe contrary (_Leviathan_, vol. iii. p. 656) in these words: _For an\nunlearned man that is in the power of an idolatrous king or state,\nif commanded on pain of death to worship before an idol, he\ndetesteth the idol in his heart, he doth well; though if he had the\nfortitude to suffer death rather than worship it, he should do\nbetter. But if a pastor, who as Christ\u2019s messenger has undertaken to\nteach Christ\u2019s doctrine to all nations, should do the same, it were\nnot only a sinful scandal in respect of other Christian men\u2019s\nconsciences, but a perfidious forsaking of his charge._ Therefore\nSt. Peter, in denying Christ, sinned, as being an apostle. And it is\nsin in every man that should now take upon him to preach against the\npower of the Pope, to leave his commission unexecuted for fear of\nthe fire; but in a mere traveller, not so. The three children and\nDaniel were worthy champions of the true religion. But God requireth\nnot of every man to be a champion. As for his Lordship\u2019s words of\n_complying with the times_, they are not mine, but his own spiteful\nparaphrase.\n\n_J. D._ Thirdly, if this be not enough, he giveth licence to a\nChristian to commit idolatry, or at least to do an idolatrous act,\nfor fear of death or corporal danger. _To pray unto a king\nvoluntarily for fair weather, or for anything which God only can do\nfor us, is Divine worship, and idolatry. On the other side, if a\nking compel a man to it by the terror of death, or other great\ncorporal punishment, it is not idolatry._ His reason is, because _it\nis not a sign, that he doth inwardly honour him as a God, but that\nhe is desirous to save himself from death, or from a miserable\nlife_. It seemeth T. H. thinketh there is no Divine worship but\ninternal: and that it is lawful for a man to value his own life or\nhis limbs more than his God. How much is he wiser than the three\nchildren, or Daniel himself, who were thrown, the first into a fiery\nfurnace, the last into the lions' den, because they refused to\ncomply with the idolatrous decree of their sovereign prince?\n\n_T. H._ Here also my words are truly cited. But his Lordship\nunderstood not what the word _worship_ signifies; and yet he knew\nwhat I meant by it. To think highly of God, as I had defined it, is\nto honour him. But _to think_ is internal. To worship, is to signify\nthat honour, which we inwardly give, by signs _external_. This\nunderstood, as by his Lordship it was, all he says to it, is but a\ncavil.\n\n_J. D._ A fourth aphorism may be this, _that, which is said in the\nScripture, it is better to obey God than man, hath place in the\nkingdom of God by pact, and not by nature_. Why? Nature itself doth\nteach us it is better to obey God than men. Neither can he say that\nhe intended this only of obedience in the use of indifferent actions\nand gestures, in the service of God, commanded by the commonwealth:\nfor that is to obey both God and man. But if Divine law and human\nlaw clash one with another, without doubt it is evermore better to\nobey God than man.\n\n_T. H._ Here again appears his unskilfulness in reasoning. Who\ndenies, but it is always, and in all cases, better to obey God than\nman? But there is no law, neither Divine nor human, that ought to be\ntaken for a law, till we know what it is; and if a Divine law, till\nwe know that God hath commanded it to be kept. We agree that the\nScriptures are the word of God. But they are a law by pact, that is,\nto us who have been baptized into the covenant. To all others it is\nan invitation only to their own benefit. It is true that even nature\nsuggesteth to us that the law of God is to be obeyed rather than the\nlaw of man. But nature does not suggest to us that the Scripture is\nthe law of God, much less how every text of it ought to be\ninterpreted. But who then shall suggest this? Dr. Bramhall? I deny\nit. Who then? The stream of divines? Why so? Am I, that have the\nScripture itself before my eyes, obliged to venture my eternal life\nupon their interpretation, how learned soever they pretend to be,\nwhen no counter-security, that they can give me, will save me\nharmless? If not the stream of divines, who then? The lawful\nassembly of pastors, or of bishops? But there can be no lawful\nassembly in England without the authority of the King. The\nScripture, therefore, what it is, and how to be interpreted, is made\nknown unto us here, by no other way than the authority of our\nsovereign lord both in temporals and spirituals, the King\u2019s Majesty.\nAnd where he has set forth no interpretation, there I am allowed to\nfollow my own, as well as any other man, bishop or not bishop. For\nmy own part, all that know me, know also it is my opinion, that the\nbest government in religion is by episcopacy, but in the King\u2019s\nright, not in their own. But my Lord of Derry, not contented with\nthis, would have the utmost resolution of our faith to be into the\ndoctrine of the Schools. I do not think that all the bishops be of\nhis mind. If they were, I would wish them to stand in fear of that\ndreadful sentence, _all covet, all lose_. I must not let pass these\nwords of his Lordship, _if Divine law and human law clash one with\nanother, without doubt it is better evermore to obey God than man_.\nWhere the king is a Christian, believes the Scripture, and hath the\nlegislative power both in church and state, and maketh no laws\nconcerning Christian faith, or Divine worship, but by the counsel of\nhis bishops whom he trusteth in that behalf; if the bishops counsel\nhim aright, what clashing can there be between the Divine and human\nlaws? For if the civil law be against God\u2019s law, and the bishops\nmake it clearly appear to the king that it clasheth with Divine law,\nno doubt he will mend it by himself, or by the advice of his\nparliament; for else he is no professor of Christ\u2019s doctrine, and so\nthe clashing is at an end. But if they think that every opinion they\nhold, though obscure and unnecessary to salvation, ought presently\nto be law, then there will be clashings innumerable, not only of\nlaws, but also of swords, as we have found it too true by late\nexperience. But his Lordship is still at this, that there ought to\nbe, for the Divine laws, that is to say for the interpretation of\nScripture, a legislative power in the church, distinct from that of\nthe King, which under him they enjoy already. This I deny. Then for\nclashing between the civil laws of infidels with the law of God, the\napostles teach that those their civil laws are to be obeyed, but so\nas to keep their faith in Christ entirely in their hearts; which is\nan obedience easily performed. But I do not believe that Augustus\nC\u00e6sar or Nero was bound to make the holy Scripture law; and yet\nunless they did so, they could not attain to eternal life.\n\n_J. D._ His fifth conclusion may be, that the sharpest and most\nsuccessful sword, in any war whatsoever, doth give sovereign power\nand authority to him that hath it, to approve or reject all sorts of\ntheological doctrines, concerning the kingdom of God, not according\nto their truth or falsehood, but according to that influence which\nthey have upon political affairs. Hear him: _but because this\ndoctrine will appear to most men a novelty, I do but propound it,\nmaintaining nothing in this or any other paradox of religion, but\nattending the end of that dispute of the sword concerning the\nauthority (not yet amongst my countrymen decided) by which all sorts\nof doctrine are to be approved or rejected_, &c. _For, the points of\ndoctrine concerning the kingdom of God, have so great influence upon\nthe kingdom of man, as not to be determined, but by them that under\nGod have the sovereign power._\n\n \u201c\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014 Careat successibus opto,\n Quisquis ab eventu facta notanda putat.\u201d\n\nLet him evermore want success who thinketh actions are to be judged\nby their events. This doctrine may be plausible to those who desire\nto fish in troubled waters. But it is justly hated by those which\nare in authority, and all those who are lovers of peace and\ntranquillity.\n\nThe last part of this conclusion smelleth rankly of Jeroboam (1\nKings xii. 26-28): _Now shall the kingdom return to the house of\nDavid, if this people go up to do sacrifice in the house of the Lord\nat Jerusalem; whereupon the king took counsel, and made two calves\nof gold, and said unto them, it is too much for you to go up to\nJerusalem, behold thy Gods, O Israel, which brought thee out of the\nland of Egypt_. But by the just disposition of Almighty God, this\npolicy turned to a sin, and was the utter destruction of Jeroboam\nand his family. It is not good jesting with edge-tools, nor playing\nwith holy things: where men make their greatest fastness, many times\nthey find most danger.\n\n_T. H._ His Lordship either had a strange conscience, or understood\nnot English. Being at Paris when there was no bishop nor church in\nEngland, and every man writ what he pleased, I resolved (when it\nshould please God to restore the authority ecclesiastical) to submit\nto that authority, in whatsoever it should determine. This his\nLordship construes for a temporizing and too much indifferency in\nreligion; and says further, that the last part of my words do smell\nof Jeroboam. To the contrary, I say my words were modest, and such\nas in duty I ought to use. And I profess still, that whatsoever the\nchurch of England (the church, I say, not every doctor) shall forbid\nme to say in matter of faith, I shall abstain from saying it,\nexcepting this point, _that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, died for\nmy sins_. As for other doctrines, I think it unlawful, if the church\ndefine them, for any member of the church to contradict them.\n\n_J. D._ His sixth paradox is a rapper: _The civil laws are the rules\nof good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; and\ntherefore what the lawgiver commands, that is to be accounted good,\nwhat he forbids, bad_. And a little after: _Before empires were,\njust and unjust were not, as whose nature is relative to a command,\nevery action in its own nature is indifferent_. That is, _just or\nunjust proceedeth from the right of him that commandeth. Therefore\nlawful kings make those things which they command just, by\ncommanding them, and those things which they forbid, unjust by\nforbidding them._ To this add his definition of a sin, _that which\none doth, or omitteth, saith, or willeth, contrary to the reason of\nthe commonwealth, that is, the (civil) laws_. Where by the laws he\ndoth not understand the written laws, elected and approved by the\nwhole commonwealth, but the verbal commands or mandates of him that\nhath the sovereign power, as we find in many places of his writings.\n_The civil laws are nothing else but the commands of him, that is\nendowed with sovereign power in the commonwealth, concerning the\nfuture actions of his subjects. And the civil laws are fastened to\nthe lips of that man who hath the sovereign power._\n\nWhere are we? In Europe? or in Asia, where they ascribed a divinity\nto their kings, and, to use his own phrase, made _them mortal gods;\nO king, live for ever_? Flatterers are the common moths of great\npalaces, where Alexander\u2019s friends are more numerous than the king\u2019s\nfriends. But such gross, palpable, pernicious flattery as this is, I\ndid never meet with, so derogatory both to piety and policy. What\ndeserveth he who should do his uttermost endeavour to poison a\ncommon fountain, whereof all the commonwealth must drink? He doth\nthe same who poisoneth the mind of a sovereign prince.\n\nAre _the civil laws the rules of good and bad, just and unjust,\nhonest and dishonest_? And what, I pray you, are the rules of the\ncivil law itself? Even the law of God and Nature. If the civil laws\nswerve from these more authentic laws, they are Lesbian rules. _What\nthe lawgiver commands is to be accounted good, what he forbids,\nbad._ This was just the garb of the Athenian sophisters, as they are\ndescribed by Plato. Whatsoever pleased the great beast, the\nmultitude, they call holy, and just, and good. And whatsoever the\ngreat beast disliked, they called evil, unjust, profane. But he is\nnot yet arrived at the height of his flattery. _Lawful kings make\nthose things, which they command, just by commanding them._ At other\ntimes, when he is in his right wits, he talketh of sufferings, and\n_expecting their reward in heaven. And going to Christ by martyrdom.\nAnd if he had the fortitude to suffer death he should do better._\nBut I fear all this was but said in jest. How should they expect\ntheir reward in heaven, if his doctrine be true, _that there is no\nreward in heaven_? Or how should they be martyrs, if his doctrine be\ntrue, that _none can be martyrs, but those who conversed with Christ\nupon earth_? He addeth, _before empires were, just and unjust were\nnot_. Nothing could be written more false in his sense, more\ndishonourable to God, more inglorious to the human nature; than that\nGod should create man, and leave him presently without any rules, to\nhis own ordering of himself, as the ostrich leaveth her eggs in the\nsand. But in truth there have been empires in the world ever since\nAdam. And Adam had a law written in his heart by the finger of God,\nbefore there was any civil law. Thus they do endeavour to make\ngoodness, and justice, and honesty, and conscience, and God himself,\nto be empty names, without any reality, which signify nothing,\nfurther than they conduce to a man\u2019s interest. Otherwise he would\nnot, he could not, say, that _every action as it is invested with\nits circumstances, is indifferent in its own nature_.\n\n_T. H._ My sixth paradox he calls a rapper. A rapper, a swapper, and\nsuch like terms, are his Lordship\u2019s elegancies. But let us see what\nthis rapper is: it is this; the civil laws are the rules of good and\nevil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest. Truly, I see no other\nrules they have. The Scriptures themselves were made law to us here,\nby the authority of the commonwealth, and are therefore part of the\nlaw civil. If they were laws in their own nature, then were they\nlaws over all the world, and men were obliged to obey them in\nAmerica, as soon as they should be shown there, though without a\nmiracle, by a friar. What is unjust, but the transgression of a law?\n_Law_ therefore was before unjust: and the law was made known by\nsovereign power before it was a law: therefore _sovereign power_ was\nantecedent both to _law_ and _injustice_. Who then made unjust but\nsovereign kings or sovereign assemblies? Where is now the wonder of\nthis rapper, _that lawful kings make those things which they command\njust, by commanding them, and those things which they forbid unjust,\nby forbidding them_? Just and unjust were surely made. If the king\nmade them not, who made them else? For certainly the breach of a\ncivil law is a sin against God. Another calumny which he would fix\nupon me, is, that I make the King\u2019s verbal commands to be laws. How\nso? Because I say, _the civil laws are nothing else but the commands\nof him that hath the sovereign power, concerning the future actions\nof his subjects_. What verbal command of a king can arrive at the\nears of all his subjects, which it must do ere it be a law, without\nthe seal of the person of the commonwealth, which is here the Great\nSeal of England? Who, but his Lordship, ever denied that the command\nof England was a law to Englishmen? Or that any but the King had\nauthority to affix the Great Seal of England to any writing? And who\ndid ever doubt to call our laws, though made in Parliament, the\nKing\u2019s laws? What was ever called a law, which the King did not\nassent to? Because the King has granted in divers cases not to make\na law without the advice and assent of the lords and commons,\ntherefore when there is no parliament in being, shall the Great Seal\nof England stand for nothing? What was more unjustly maintained\nduring the Long Parliament, besides the resisting and murdering of\nthe King, than this doctrine of his Lordship\u2019s? But the Bishop\nendeavoured here to make the multitude believe I maintain, that the\nKing sinneth not, though he bid hang a man for making his apparel\notherwise than he appointed, or his servant for negligent\nattendance. And yet he knew I distinguished always between the\nKing\u2019s natural and politic capacity. What name should I give to this\nwilful slander? But here his Lordship enters into passion, and\nexclaims: _Where are we, in Europe or in Asia? Gross, palpable,\npernicious flattery, poisoning of a commonwealth, poisoning the\nKing\u2019s mind._ But where was his Lordship when he wrote this? One\nwould not think he was in France, nor that this doctrine was written\nin the year 1658, but rather in the year 1648, in some cabal of the\nKing\u2019s enemies. But what did put him into this fit of choler?\nPartly, this very thing, that he could not answer my reasons; but\nchiefly, that he had lost upon me so much School-learning in our\ncontroversy touching _Liberty and Necessity_: wherein he was to\nblame himself, for believing that the obscure and barbarous language\nof School-divinity, could satisfy an ingenuous reader, as well as\nplain and perspicuous English. Do I flatter the King? Why am I not\nrich? I confess his Lordship has not flattered him here.\n\n_J. D._ Something there is which he hath a confused glimmering of,\nas the blind man sees _men walking like trees_, which he is not able\nto apprehend and express clearly. We acknowledge, that though the\nlaws or commands of a sovereign prince be erroneous, or unjust, or\ninjurious, such as a subject cannot approve for good in themselves;\nyet he is bound to acquiesce, and may not oppose or resist,\notherwise than by prayers and tears, and at the most by flight. We\nacknowledge that the civil laws have power to bind the conscience of\na Christian, in themselves, but not from themselves, but from him\nwho hath said, _Let every soul be subject to the higher powers_.\nEither they bind Christian subjects to do their sovereign\u2019s\ncommands, or to suffer for the testimony of a good conscience. We\nacknowledge that in doubtful cases, _semper pr\u00e6sumitur pro rege et\nlege_, the sovereign and the law are always presumed to be in the\nright. But in plain evident cases, which admit no doubt, it is\nalways better to obey God than man. Blunderers, whilst they think to\nmend one imaginary hole, make two or three real ones. They who\nderive the authority of the Scriptures or God\u2019s law from the civil\nlaws of men, are like those who seek to underprop the heavens from\nfalling, with a bulrush. Nay, they derive not only the authority of\nthe Scripture, but even the law of nature itself, from the civil\nlaw. _The laws of nature_ (which need no promulgation) _in the\ncondition of nature are not properly laws, but qualities which\ndispose men to peace and obedience. When a commonwealth is once\nsettled, then are they actually laws, and not before._ God help us,\ninto what times are we fallen, when the immutable laws of God and\nnature are made to depend upon the mutable laws of mortal men, just\nas one should go about to control the sun by the authority of the\nclock.\n\n_T. H._ Hitherto he never offered to mend any of the doctrines he\ninveighs against; but here he does. He says I have a glimmering of\nsomething I was not able to apprehend and express clearly. Let us\nsee his Lordship\u2019s more clear expression. _We acknowledge_, saith\nhe, _that though the laws or commands of a sovereign prince be\nerroneous, or unjust, or injurious, such as a subject cannot approve\nfor good in themselves, yet he is bound to acquiesce, and may not\noppose or resist otherwise than by prayers and tears, and at the\nmost by flight_. Hence it follows clearly, that when a sovereign has\nmade a law, though erroneous, then, if his subject oppose it, it is\na sin. Therefore I would fain know, when a man has broken that law\nby doing what it forbad, or by refusing to do what it commanded,\nwhether he have opposed this law or not. If to break the law be to\noppose it, he granteth it. Therefore his Lordship has not here\nexpressed himself so clearly, as to make men understand the\ndifference between breaking a law and opposing it. Though there be\nsome difference between breaking of a law, and opposing those that\nare sent with force to see it executed; yet between breaking and\nopposing the law itself, there is no difference. Also, though the\nsubject think the law just, as when a thief is by law condemned to\ndie, yet he may lawfully oppose the execution, not only by prayers,\ntears, and flight, but also (as I think) any way he can. For though\nhis fault were never so great, yet his endeavour to save his own\nlife is not a fault. For the law expects it, and for that cause\nappointeth felons to be carried bound and encompassed with armed men\nto execution. Nothing is opposite to law, but sin: nothing opposite\nto the sheriff, but force. So that his Lordship\u2019s sight was not\nsharp enough to see the difference between the law and the officer.\nAgain, _We acknowledge_, says he, _that the laws have power to bind\nthe conscience of a Christian in themselves, but not from\nthemselves_. Neither do the Scriptures bind the conscience because\nthey are Scriptures, but because they were from God. So also the\nbook of English Statutes bindeth our consciences in itself, but not\nfrom itself, but from the authority of the king, who only in the\nright of God has the legislative powers. Again he saith, _We\nacknowledge that in doubtful cases, the sovereign and the law are\nalways presumed to be in the right_. If he presume they are in the\nright, how dare he presume that the cases they determine are\ndoubtful? _But_, saith he, _in evident cases which admit no doubt,\nit is always better to obey God than man_. Yes, and in doubtful\ncases also, say I. But not always better to obey the inferior\npastors than the supreme pastor, which is the king. But what are\nthose cases that admit no doubt? I know but very few, and those are\nsuch as his Lordship was not much acquainted with.\n\n_J. D._ But it is not worthy of my labour, nor any part of my\nintention, to pursue every shadow of a question which he springeth.\nIt shall suffice to gather a posy of flowers (or rather a bundle of\nweeds) out of his writings, and present them to the reader, who will\neasily distinguish them from healthful plants by the rankness of\ntheir smell. Such are these which follow.\n\n_T. H._ As for the following posy of flowers, there wants no more to\nmake them sweet, than to wipe off the venom blown upon some of them\nby his Lordship\u2019s breath.\n\n_J. D._ 1. _To be delighted in the imagination only of being\npossessed of another man\u2019s goods, servants, or wife, without any\nintention to take them from him by force or fraud, is no breach of\nthe law which saith: Thou shalt not covet._\n\n_T. H._ What man was there ever, whose imagination of anything he\nthought would please him, was not some delight? Or what sin is\nthere, where there is not so much as an intention to do injustice?\nBut his Lordship would not distinguish between delight and purpose,\nnor between a wish and a will. This was venom. I believe that his\nLordship himself, even before he was married, took some delight in\nthe thought of it, and yet the woman then was not his own. All love\nis delight, but all love is not sin. Without this love of that which\nis not yet a man\u2019s own, the world had not been peopled.\n\n_J. D._ 2. _If a man by the terror of present death be compelled to\ndo a fact against the law, he is totally excused, because no law can\noblige a man to abandon his own preservation; nature compelleth him\nto the fact._ The like doctrine he hath elsewhere. _When the actor\ndoth anything against the law of nature by the command of the\nauthor, if he be obliged by former covenants to obey him, not he,\nbut the author breaketh the law of nature._\n\n_T. H._ The second flower is both sweet and wholesome.\n\n_J. D._ 3. _It is a doctrine repugnant to civil society, that\nwhatsoever a man does against his conscience, is sin._\n\n_T. H._ It is plain, that to do what a man thinks in his own\nconscience to be sin, is sin; for it is a contempt of the law\nitself; and from thence ignorant men, out of an erroneous\nconscience, disobey the law, which is pernicious to all government.\n\n_J. D._ 4. _The kingdom of God is not shut but to them that sin,\nthat is, to them who have not performed due obedience to the laws of\nGod; nor to them, if they believe the necessary articles of the\nChristian faith._\n\n5. _We must know that the true acknowledging of sin is repentance\nitself._\n\n6. _An opinion publicly appointed to be taught cannot be heresy; nor\nthe sovereign princes that authorized the same, heretics._\n\n_T. H._ The fourth, fifth, and sixth smell well. But to say, that\nthe sovereign prince in England is a heretic, or that an act of\nparliament is heretical, stinks abominably; as it was thought _primo\nElizabeth\u00e6_.\n\n_J. D._ 7. _Temporal and spiritual government are but two words to\nmake men see double, and mistake their lawful sovereign, &c. There\nis no other government in this life, neither of state nor religion,\nbut temporal._\n\n8. _It is manifest, that they, who permit a contrary doctrine to\nthat which themselves believe and think necessary_ (to salvation),\n_do against their consciences, and will, as much as in them lieth,\nthe eternal destruction of their subjects_.\n\n_T. H._ The seventh and eighth are roses and jessamine. But his\nleaving out the words (_to salvation_) was venom.\n\n_J. D._ 9. _Subjects sin if they do not worship God according to the\nlaws of the commonwealth._\n\n_T. H._ The ninth he hath poisoned, and made it not mine. He quotes\nmy book _De Cive_, cap. XV. 19, where I say, _regnante Deo per solam\nrationem naturalem_, that is, _before the Scripture was given_, they\nsinned that refused to worship God, according to the rites and\nceremonies of the country; which hath no ill scent, but to undutiful\nsubjects.\n\n_J. D._ 10. _To believe in Jesus (in Jesum), is the same as to\nbelieve that Jesus is Christ._\n\n_T. H._ And so it is always in the Scripture.\n\n_J. D._ 11. _There can be no contradiction between the laws of God,\nand the laws of a Christian commonwealth._ Yet, we see Christian\ncommonwealths daily contradict one another.\n\n_T. H._ The eleventh is also good. But his Lordship\u2019s instance,\n_that Christian commonwealths contradict one another_, has nothing\nto do here. Their laws do indeed contradict one another, but\ncontradict not the law of God. For God commands their subjects to\nobey them in all things, and his Lordship himself confesseth that\ntheir laws, though erroneous, bind the conscience. But Christian\ncommonwealths would seldom contradict one another, if they made no\ndoctrine law, but such as were necessary to salvation.\n\n_J. D._ 12. _No man giveth but with intention of some good to\nhimself. Of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own\ngood._ Moses, St. Paul, and the Decii were not of his mind.\n\n_T. H._ That which his Lordship adds to the twelfth, namely, that\nMoses, St. Paul, and the Decii were not of my mind, is false. For\nthe two former did what they did for a good to themselves, which was\neternal life; and the Decii for a good fame after death. And his\nLordship also, if he had believed there is an eternal happiness to\ncome, or thought a good fame after death to be anything worth, would\nhave directed all his actions towards them, and have despised the\nwealth and titles of the present world.\n\n_J. D._ 13. _There is no natural knowledge of man\u2019s estate after\ndeath, much less of reward which is then to be given to breach of\nfaith, but only a belief grounded upon other men\u2019s saying, that they\nknow it supernaturally, or that they know those that knew them that\nknew others that knew it supernaturally._\n\n_T. H._ The thirteenth is good and fresh.\n\n_J. D._ 14. _David\u2019s killing of Uriah was no injury to Uriah;\nbecause the right to do what he pleased, was given him by Uriah\nhimself._\n\n_T. H._ David himself makes this good, in saying, _to thee only have\nI sinned_.\n\n_J. D._ 15. _To whom it belongeth to determine controversies which\nmay arise from the divers interpretations of Scripture, he hath an\nimperial power over all men, which acknowledge the Scripture to be\nthe word of God._\n\n16. _What is theft, what is murder, what is adultery, and\nuniversally what is an injury, is known by the civil law, that is,\nby the commands of the sovereign._\n\n_T. H._ For the fifteenth, he should have disputed it with the head\nof the church. And as to the sixteenth, I would have asked him by\nwhat other law his Lordship would have it determined what is theft,\nor what is injury, than by the laws made in parliament, or by the\nlaws which distinguish between _meum_ and _tuum_? His Lordship\u2019s\nignorance smells rankly ('tis his own phrase in this and many other\nplaces, which I have let pass) of his own interest. The King tells\nus what is sin, in that he tells us what is law. He hath authorized\nthe clergy to dehort the people from sin, and to exhort them, by\ngood motives both from Scripture and reason, to obey the laws; and\nsupposeth them (though under forty years old), by the help they have\nin the university, able, in case the law be not written, to teach\nthe people, old and young, what they ought to follow in doubtful\ncases of conscience; that is to say, they are authorized to expound\nthe laws of nature; but not so as to make it a doubtful case,\nwhether the King\u2019s laws be to be obeyed or not. All they ought to\ndo, is from the King\u2019s authority. And therefore this my doctrine is\nno weed.\n\n_J. D._ 17. He admitteth incestuous _copulations_ of the heathens,\n_according to their heathenish laws, to have been lawful marriages_.\nThough the Scripture teach us (Levit. xviii. 28) expressly, that for\nthose abominations the land of Canaan spued out her inhabitants.\n\n_T. H._ The seventeenth he hath corrupted with a false\ninterpretation of the text. For in that chapter, from the beginning\nto verse twenty, are forbidden marriages in certain degrees of\nkindred. From verse twenty, which begins with _Moreover_, to the\ntwenty-eighth, are forbidden sacrificing of children to Moloch, and\nprofaning of God\u2019s name, and buggery with man and beast, with this\ncause expressed, (_For all these abominations have the men of the\nland done which were before you, and the land is defiled_,) _that\nthe land spue not you out also_. As for marriages within the degrees\nprohibited, they are not referred to the abominations of the\nheathen. Besides, for some time after Adam, such marriages were\nnecessary.\n\n_J. D._ 18. _I say that no other article of faith besides this, that\nJesus is Christ, is necessary to a Christian man for salvation._\n\n19. _Because Christ\u2019s kingdom is not of this world, therefore\nneither can his ministers, unless they be kings, require obedience\nin his name. They have no right of commanding, no power to make\nlaws._\n\n_T. H._ These two smell comfortably, and of Scripture. The contrary\ndoctrine smells of ambition and encroachment of jurisdiction, or\nrump of the Roman tyranny.\n\n_J. D._ 20. I pass by his errors about oaths, about vows, about the\nresurrection, about the kingdom of Christ, about the power of the\nkeys, binding, loosing, excommunication, &c., his ignorant mistakes\nof _meritum congrui_ and _condigni_, active and passive obedience,\nand many more, for fear of being tedious to the reader.\n\n_T. H._ The terms of School divinity, of which number are _meritum\ncongrui_, _meritum condigni_, and _passive obedience_, are so\nobscure, as no man living can tell what they mean; so that they that\nuse them may admit or deny their meaning, as it shall serve their\nturns. I said not that this was their meaning, but that I thought it\nwas so. For no man living can tell what a Schoolman means by his\nwords. Therefore I expounded them according to their true\nsignification. Merit _ex condigno_, is when a thing is deserved by\npact; as when I say the labourer is worthy of his hire, I mean\n_meritum ex condigno_. But when a man of his own grace throweth\nmoney among the people, with an intention that what part soever of\nit any of them could catch he should have, he that catcheth merits\nit, not by pact, nor by precedent merit, as a labourer, but because\nit was congruent to the purpose of him that cast it amongst them. In\nall other meaning these words are but jargon, which his Lordship had\nlearnt by rote. Also _passive obedience_ signifies nothing, except\nit may be called _passive obedience_ when a man refraineth himself\nfrom doing what the law hath forbidden. For in his Lordship\u2019s sense,\nthe thief that is hanged for stealing, hath fulfilled the law; which\nI think is absurd.\n\n_J. D._ His whole works are a heap of mis-shapen errors, and absurd\nparadoxes, vented with the confidence of a juggler, the brags of a\nmountebank, and the authority of some Pythagoras, or third Cato,\nlately dropped down from heaven.\n\nThus we have seen how the Hobbian principles do destroy the\nexistence, the simplicity, the ubiquity, the eternity, and\ninfiniteness of God, the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, the\nhypostatical union, the kingly, sacerdotal, and prophetical office\nof Christ, the being and operation of the Holy Ghost, heaven, hell,\nangels, devils, the immortality of the soul, the Catholic and all\nnational churches; the holy Scriptures, holy orders, the holy\nsacraments, the whole frame of religion, and the worship of God; the\nlaws of nature, the reality of goodness, justice, piety, honesty,\nconscience, and all that is sacred. If his disciples have such an\nimplicit faith, that they can digest all these things, they may feed\nwith _ostriches_.\n\n_T. H._ He here concludes his first chapter with bitter reproaches,\nto leave in his reader, as he thought, a sting; supposing perhaps\nthat he will read nothing but the beginning and end of his book, as\nis the custom of many men. But to make him lose that petty piece of\ncunning, I must desire of the reader one of these two things. Either\nthat he would read with it the places of my _Leviathan_ which he\ncites, and see not only how he answers my arguments, but also what\nthe arguments are which he produceth against them; or else, that he\nwould forbear to condemn me, so much as in his thought: for\notherwise he is unjust. The name of Bishop is of great authority;\nbut these words are not the words of a bishop, but of a passionate\nSchoolman, too fierce and unseemly in any man whatsoever. Besides,\nthey are untrue. Who that knows me, will say that I have the\nconfidence of a juggler, or that I use to brag of anything, much\nless that I play the mountebank? What my works are, he was no fit\njudge. But now he has provoked me, I will say thus much of them,\nthat neither he, (if he had lived), nor I, if I would, could\nextinguish the light which is set up in the world by the greatest\npart of them: and for these doctrines which he impugneth, I have few\nopposers, but such whose profit, or whose fame in learning is\nconcerned in them. He accuses me first of destroying the existence\nof God; that is to say, he would make the world believe I were an\natheist. But upon what ground? Because I say, that God is a spirit,\nbut _corporeal_. But to say that, is allowed me by St. Paul, that\nsays (1 Cor. xv. 44): _There is a spiritual body, and there is an\nanimal body_. He that holds there is a God, and that God is really\nsomewhat, (for _body_ is doubtlessly a _real substance_), is as far\nfrom being an atheist, as it is possible to be. But he that says God\nis an _incorporeal substance_, no man can be sure whether he be an\natheist or not. For no man living can tell whether there be any\n_substance_ at all, that is not also _corporeal_. For neither the\nword _incorporeal_, nor _immaterial_, nor any word equivalent to it,\nis to be found in Scripture, or in reason. But on the contrary, that\n_the Godhead dwelleth bodily in Christ_, is found in Colos. ii. 9;\nand Tertullian maintains that God is either a _corporeal substance_\nor _nothing_. Nor was he ever condemned for it by the church. For\nwhy? Not only Tertullian, but all the learned, call _body_, not only\nthat which one can see, but also whatsoever has magnitude, or that\nis somewhere; for they had greater reverence for the divine\nsubstance, than that they durst think it had no _magnitude_, or was\n_nowhere_. But they that hold God to be a phantasm, as did the\nexorcists in the Church of Rome, that is, such a thing as were at\nthat time thought to be the sprights, that were said to walk in\nchurchyards and to be the souls of men buried, do absolutely make\nGod to be nothing at all. But how? Were they atheists? No. For\nthough by ignorance of the consequence they said that which was\nequivalent to atheism, yet in their hearts they thought God a\nsubstance, and would also, if they had known what _substance_ and\nwhat _corporeal_ meant, have said he was a corporeal substance. So\nthat this _atheism by consequence_ is a very easy thing to be fallen\ninto, even by the most godly men of the church. He also that says\nthat God is _wholly here_, and _wholly there_, and _wholly every\nwhere_, destroys by consequence the unity of God, and the\ninfiniteness of God, and the simplicity of God. And this the\nSchoolmen do, and are therefore _atheists by consequence_, and yet\nthey do not all say in their hearts that there is no God. So also\nhis Lordship by exempting the will of man from being subject to the\nnecessity of God\u2019s will or decree, denies by _consequence_ the\nDivine prescience, which also will amount to _atheism by\nconsequence_. But out of this, that God is a _spirit corporeal_ and\n_infinitely pure_, there can no unworthy or dishonourable\nconsequence be drawn.\n\nThus far to his Lordships first chapter, in justification of my\n_Leviathan_ as to matter of religion; and especially to wipe off\nthat unjust slander cast upon me by the Bishop of Derry. As for the\nsecond chapter, which concerns my civil doctrines, since my errors\nthere, if there be any, will not tend very much to my disgrace, I\nwill not take the pains to answer it.\n\nWhereas his Lordship has talked in his discourse here and there\nignorantly of heresy, and some others have not doubted to say\npublicly, that there be many heresies in my _Leviathan_; I will add\nhereunto, for a general answer, an historical relation concerning\nthe word Heresy, from the first use of it amongst the Grecians till\nthis present time.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n AN\n HISTORICAL NARRATION\n CONCERNING\n HERESY,\n\n AND\n\n THE PUNISHMENT THEREOF.\n\n -------\n\n \u201cNam veluti pueri trepidant, atque omnia c\u00e6cis\n In tenebris metuunt: sic nos in luce timemus\n Interdum, nihilo qu\u00e6 sunt metuenda magis, quam\n Qu\u00e6 pueri in tenebris pavitant, finguntque futura.\u201d\n LUCRETIUS, Lib. II. 54-57.\n\n\n\n\n H\u00c6RESE\u0277S LARVAS, SECTARUM IMMANIA MONSTRA\n HOBBIUS INVICTO DISPULIT INGENIO.\n\n\n\n\n CONCERNING HERESY,\n AND\n\n THE PUNISHMENT THEREOF.\n\n --------------\n\nThe word _heresy_ is Greek, and signifies a taking of any thing, and\nparticularly the taking of an opinion. After the study of philosophy\nbegan in Greece, and the philosophers, disagreeing amongst\nthemselves, had started many questions, not only about things\nnatural, but also moral and civil; because every man took what\nopinion he pleased, each several opinion was called a _heresy_;\nwhich signified no more than a private opinion, without reference to\ntruth or falsehood. The beginners of these heresies were chiefly\nPythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Zeno; men, who as they held\nmany errors, so also found they out many true and useful doctrines,\nin all kinds of learning: and for that cause were well esteemed of\nby the greatest personages of their own times; and so also were some\nfew of their followers.\n\nBut the rest, ignorant men, and very often needy knaves, having\nlearned by heart the opinions of these admired philosophers, and\npretending to take after them, made use thereof to get their living\nby the teaching of rich men\u2019s children that happened to be in love\nwith those great names: though by their impertinent discourse,\nsordid and ridiculous manners, they were generally despised, of what\nsect or heresy soever; whether they were Pythagoreans; or Academics,\nfollowers of Plato; or Peripatetics, followers of Aristotle;\nEpicureans; or Stoics, followers of Zeno. For these were the names\nof heresies, or, as the Latins call them, _sects, a sequendo_, so\nmuch talked of from after the time of Alexander till this present\nday, and that have perpetually troubled or deceived the people with\nwhom they lived, and were never more numerous than in the time of\nthe primitive church.\n\nThe heresy of Aristotle, by the revolutions of time, has had the\ngood fortune to be predominant over the rest. However, originally\nthe name of _heresy_ was no disgrace, nor the word _heretic_ at all\nin use: though the several sects, especially the Epicureans and the\nStoics, hated one another; and the Stoics, being the fiercer men,\nused to revile those that differed from them, with the most\ndespiteful words they could invent.\n\nIt cannot be doubted, but that, by the preaching of the apostles and\ndisciples of Christ, in Greece and other parts of the Roman empire\nfull of these philosophers, many thousands of men were converted to\nthe Christian faith, some really, and some feignedly, for factious\nends, or for need; for Christians lived then in common, and were\ncharitable. And because most of these philosophers had better skill\nin disputing and oratory than the common people, and thereby were\nbetter qualified both to defend and propagate the Gospel, there is\nno doubt, I say, but most of the pastors of the primitive church\nwere for that reason chosen out of the number of these philosophers;\nwho retaining still many doctrines which they had taken up on the\nauthority of their former masters, whom they had in reverence,\nendeavoured many of them to draw the Scriptures every one to his own\nheresy. And thus at first entered heresy into the church of Christ.\nYet these men were all of them Christians; as they were, when they\nwere first baptized. Nor did they deny the authority of those\nwritings which were left them by the Apostles and Evangelists,\nthough they interpreted them, many times, with a bias to their\nformer philosophy. And this dissention amongst themselves, was a\ngreat scandal to the unbelievers, and which not only obstructed the\nway of the Gospel, but also drew scorn and greater persecution upon\nthe church.\n\nFor remedy whereof, the chief pastors of churches did use, at the\nrising of any new opinion, to assemble themselves for the examining\nand determining of the same. Wherein, if the author of the opinion\nwere convinced of his error, and subscribed to the sentence of the\nchurch assembled, then all was well again: but if he still persisted\nin it, they laid him aside, and considered him but as an heathen\nman; which to an unfeigned Christian, was a great ignominy, and of\nforce to make him consider better of his own doctrine; and sometimes\nbrought him to the acknowledgment of the truth. But other punishment\nthey could inflict none; that being a right appropriated to the\ncivil power. So that all the punishment the church could inflict,\nwas only ignominy; and that among the faithful, consisting in this,\nthat his company was by all the godly avoided, and he himself\nbranded with the name of _heretic_, in opposition to the whole\nchurch, that condemned his doctrine. So that _catholic_ and\n_heretic_ were terms relative; and here it was that _heretic_ came\nto be a name, and a name of disgrace, both together.\n\nThe first and most troublesome heresies of the primitive church,\nwere about the Trinity. For, according to the usual curiosity of\nnatural philosophers, they could not abstain from disputing the very\nfirst principles of Christianity, into which they were baptized, _in\nthe name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost_. Some there\nwere that made them allegorical. Others would make one creator of\ngood, and another of evil; which was in effect to set up two Gods,\none contrary to another; supposing that causation of evil could not\nbe attributed to God, without impiety. From which doctrine they are\nnot far distant, that now make the first cause of sinful actions to\nbe every man as to his own sin. Others there were, that would have\nGod to be a body with parts organical, as face, hands, fore-parts,\nand back-parts. Others, that Christ had no real body, but was a mere\nphantasm: for phantasms were taken then, and have been ever since,\nby unlearned and superstitious men, for things real and subsistent.\nOthers denied the divinity of Christ. Others, that Christ, being God\nand man, was two persons. Others confessed he was one person, and\nwithal that he had but one nature. And a great many other heresies\narose from the too much adherence to the philosophy of those times:\nwhereof some were suppressed for a time by St. John\u2019s publishing his\nGospel, and some by their own unreasonableness vanished, and some\nlasted till the time of Constantine the Great, and after.\n\nWhen Constantine the Great, made so by the assistance and valour of\nthe Christian soldiers, had attained to be the only Roman Emperor,\nhe also himself became a Christian, and caused the temples of the\nheathen gods to be demolished, and authorised Christian religion\nonly to be public. But towards the latter end of his time, there\narose a dispute in the city of Alexandria, between Alexander the\nBishop, and Arius, a presbyter of the same city; wherein Arius\nmaintained, first, that Christ was inferior to his Father; and\nafterwards, that he was no God, alleging the words of Christ, _my\nFather is greater than I_: the bishop, on the contrary, alleging the\nwords of St. John, _and the word was God_; and the words of St.\nThomas, _my Lord and my God_. This controversy presently, amongst\nthe inhabitants and soldiers of Alexandria, became a quarrel, and\nwas the cause of much bloodshed in and about the city; and was\nlikely then to spread further, as afterwards it did. This so far\nconcerned the Emperor\u2019s civil government, that he thought it\nnecessary to call a general council of all the bishops and other\neminent divines throughout the Roman Empire, to meet at the city of\nNice. When they were assembled, they presented the Emperor with\nlibels of accusation one against another. When he had received these\nlibels into his hands, he made an oration to the fathers assembled,\nexhorting them to agree, and to fall in hand with the settlement of\nthe articles of faith, for which cause he had assembled them;\nsaying, whatsoever they should decree therein, he would cause to be\nobserved. This may perhaps seem a greater indifferency, than would\nin these days be approved of. But so it is in the history; and the\narticles of faith necessary to salvation, were not thought then to\nbe so many as afterwards they were defined to be by the Church of\nRome.\n\nWhen Constantine had ended his oration, he caused the aforesaid\nlibels to be cast into the fire, as became a wise king and a\ncharitable Christian. This done, the fathers fell in hand with their\nbusiness, and following the method of a former creed, now commonly\ncalled _the Apostles' Creed_, made a confession of faith, _viz._: I\nBELIEVE IN ONE GOD, THE FATHER ALMIGHTY, MAKER OF HEAVEN AND EARTH,\nAND OF ALL THINGS VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE: in which is condemned the\npolytheism of the Gentiles: AND IN ONE LORD JESUS CHRIST, THE ONLY\nBEGOTTEN SON OF GOD: against the many sons of the many Gods of the\nheathen: BEGOTTEN OF HIS FATHER BEFORE ALL WORLDS, GOD OF GOD:\nagainst the Arians: VERY GOD OF VERY GOD: against the Valentinians,\nand against the heresy of Apelles and others, who made Christ a mere\nphantasm: LIGHT OF LIGHT: this was put in for explication, and used\nbefore to that purpose by Tertullian: BEGOTTEN, NOT MADE, BEING OF\nONE SUBSTANCE WITH THE FATHER: in this again they condemn the\ndoctrine of Arius. For this word, _of one substance_, in Latin\n_consubstantialis_, but in Greek \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, that is, _of one\nessence_, was put as a touchstone to discern an Arian from a\nCatholic; and much ado there was about it. Constantine himself, at\nthe passing of this creed, took notice of it for a hard word; but\nyet approved of it, saying, that in a divine mystery it was fit to\nuse _divina et arcana verba_; that is, divine words, and hidden from\nhuman understanding: calling that word \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, divine, not\nbecause it was in the divine Scripture, (for it is not there) but\nbecause it was to him _arcanum_, that is, not sufficiently\nunderstood. _And in this again appeared the indifferency of the\nEmperor, and that he had for his end, in the calling of the Synod,\nnot so much the truth, as the uniformity of the doctrine, and peace\nof his people that depended on it._ The cause of the obscurity of\nthis word \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, proceeded chiefly from the difference between\nthe Greek and Roman dialect, in the philosophy of the Peripatetics.\nThe first principle of religion in all nations, is, _that God is_,\nthat is to say, that God really is something, and not a mere fancy;\nbut that which is really something, is considerable alone by itself,\nas being _somewhere_. In which sense a man is a thing real; for I\ncan consider him _to be_, without considering any other thing _to\nbe_ besides him. And for the same reason, the earth, the air, the\nstars, heaven, and their parts, are all of them things real. And\nbecause whatsoever is real here, or there, or in any place, has\ndimensions, that is to say, magnitude; that which hath magnitude,\nwhether it be visible or invisible, finite or infinite, is called by\nall the learned a _body_. It followeth, that all real things, in\nthat they are _somewhere_, are corporeal. On the contrary, essence,\ndeity, humanity, and such like names, signify nothing that can be\nconsidered, without first considering there is an _ens_, a god, a\nman, &c. So also if there be any real thing that is _white_ or\n_black_, _hot_ or _cold_, the same may be considered by itself; but\nwhiteness, blackness, heat, coldness, cannot be considered, unless\nit be first supposed that there is some real thing to which they are\nattributed. These real things are called by the Latin philosophers,\n_entia_, _subjecta_, _substanti\u00e6_; and by the Greek philosophers, \u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1. The other, which are incorporeal, are\ncalled by the Greek philosophers, \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03c7\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1, \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1; but\nmost of the Latin philosophers used to convert \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 into\n_substantia_, and so confound real and corporeal things with\nincorporeal: which is not well; for essence and substance signify\ndivers things. And this mistake is received, and continues still in\nthese parts, in all disputes, both of philosophy and divinity; for\nin truth _essentia_ signifies no more, than if we should talk\nridiculously of the _isness_ of the thing that is. BY WHOM ALL\nTHINGS WERE MADE. This is proved out of St. John i. 1, 2, 3, and\nHeb. i. 3, and that again out of Gen. i. where God is said to create\nevery thing by his sole word, as when he said: _Let there be light,\nand there was light_. And then, that Christ was that Word, and in\nthe beginning with God, may be gathered out of divers places of\nMoses, David, and other of the prophets. Nor was it ever questioned\namongst Christians, except by the Arians, but that Christ was God\neternal, and his incarnation eternally decreed. But the Fathers, all\nthat write expositions on this creed, could not forbear to\nphilosophize upon it, and most of them out of the principles of\nAristotle; which are the same the Schoolmen now use; as may partly\nappear by this, that many of them, amongst their treatises of\nreligion, have affected to publish principles of logic and physics\naccording to the sense of Aristotle; as Athanasius, and Damascene.\nAnd so some later divines of note, still confound the concrete with\nthe abstract, _deus_ with _deitas_, _ens_ with _essentia_, _sapiens_\nwith _sapientia_, _\u00e6ternus_ with _\u00e6ternitas_. If it be for exact and\nrigid truth sake, why do they not say also, that holiness is a holy\nman, covetousness a covetous man, hypocrisy an hypocrite, and\ndrunkenness a drunkard, and the like, but that it is an error? The\nFathers agree that the Wisdom of God is the eternal Son of God, by\nwhom all things were made, and that he was incarnate by the Holy\nGhost, if they meant it in the abstract: for if _deitas_ abstracted\nbe _deus_, we make two Gods of one. This was well understood by John\nDamascene, in his treatise _De Fide Orthodoxa_, which is an\nexposition of the Nicene creed; where he denies absolutely that\n_deitas_ is _deus_, lest seeing God was made man, it should follow,\nthe Deity was made man; which is contrary to the doctrine of all the\nNicene Fathers. The attributes therefore of God in the abstract,\nwhen they are put for God, are put _metonymically_; which is a\ncommon thing in Scripture; for example, Prov. viii. 25, where it is\nsaid: _before the mountains were settled, before the hills, was I\nbrought forth_; the wisdom there spoken of, being the wisdom of God,\nsignifies the same with the wise God. This kind of speaking is also\nordinary in all languages. This considered, such abstracted words\nought not to be used in arguing, and especially in the deducing the\narticles of our faith; though in the language of God\u2019s eternal\nworship, and in all godly discourses, they cannot be avoided; and\nthe creed itself is less difficult to be assented to in its own\nwords, than in all such expositions of the Fathers. WHO FOR US MEN\nAND OUR SALVATION CAME DOWN FROM HEAVEN, AND WAS INCARNATE BY THE\nHOLY GHOST OF THE VIRGIN MARY, AND WAS MADE MAN. I have not read of\nany exception to this; for where Athanasius in his creed says of the\nSon, _He was not made, but begotten_, it is to be understood of the\nSon as he was God eternal; whereas here it is spoken of the Son as\nhe is man. And of the Son, also as he was man, it may be said he was\nbegotten of the Holy Ghost; for a woman conceiveth not, but of him\nthat begetteth; which is also confirmed, (Matth. i. xx): _That which\nis begotten in her_, (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd), _is of the Holy Ghost_. AND WAS\nALSO CRUCIFIED FOR US UNDER PONTIUS PILATE: HE SUFFERED AND WAS\nBURIED: AND THE THIRD DAY HE ROSE AGAIN ACCORDING TO THE SCRIPTURES,\nAND ASCENDED INTO HEAVEN, AND SITTETH ON THE RIGHT HAND OF THE\nFATHER: AND HE SHALL COME AGAIN WITH GLORY TO JUDGE BOTH THE QUICK\nAND THE DEAD. WHOSE KINGDOM SHALL HAVE NO END. Of this part of the\ncreed I have not met with any doubt made by any Christian. Hither\nthe Council of Nice proceeded in their general confession of faith,\nand no further.\n\nThis finished, some of the bishops present at the Council\n(seventeen or eighteen, whereof Eusebius Bishop of C\u00e6sarea was\none) not sufficiently satisfied, refused to subscribe till this\ndoctrine of \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 should be better explained. Thereupon the\nCouncil decreed, that whosoever shall say that God hath parts,\nshall be anathematized; to which the said bishops subscribed. And\nEusebius, by order of the Council, wrote a letter, the copies\nwhereof were sent to every absent bishop, that being satisfied\nwith the reason of their subscribing, they also should subscribe.\nThe reason they gave of their subscription was this, _that they\nhad now a form of words prescribed, by which, as a rule, they\nmight guide themselves so, as not to violate the peace of the\nchurch_. By this it is manifest, that no man was an heretic, but\nhe that in plain and direct words contradicted that form by the\nchurch prescribed, and that no man could be made _an heretic by\nconsequence_. And because the said form was not put into the body\nof the creed, but directed only to the bishops, there was no\nreason to punish any lay-person that should speak to the contrary.\n\nBut what was the meaning of this doctrine, _that God has no parts_?\nWas it made heresy to say, that God, who is a real substance, cannot\nbe considered or spoken of as _here_ or _there_, or any where, which\nare parts of places? Or that there is any real thing without length\nevery way, that is to say, which hath no magnitude at all, finite,\nnor infinite? Or is there any whole substance, whose two halves or\nthree thirds are not the same with that whole? Or did they mean to\ncondemn the argument of Tertullian, by which he confuted Apelles and\nother heretics of his time, namely, _whatsoever was not corporeal,\nwas nothing but phantasm, and not corporeal_, for heretical? No,\ncertainly, no divines say that. They went to establish the doctrine\nof _one individual God in Trinity_; to abolish the diversity of\nspecies in God, not the distinction of _here_ and _there_ in\nsubstance. When St. Paul asked the Corinthians, _Is Christ divided_,\nhe did not think they thought him impossible to be considered as\nhaving hands and feet, but that they might think him, according to\nthe manner of the Gentiles, one of the sons of God, as Arius did;\nbut not the only-begotten Son of God. And thus also it is expounded\nin the Creed of Athanasius, who was present in that council, by\nthese words, _not confounding the persons, nor dividing the\nsubstances_; that is to say, that God is not divided into three\npersons, as man is divided into Peter, James, and John; nor are the\nthree persons one and the same person. But Aristotle, and from him\nall the Greek Fathers, and other learned men, when they distinguish\nthe general latitude of a word, they call it division; as when they\ndivide _animal_ into man and beast, they call these \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b7, _species_;\nand when they again divide the _species_ man into Peter and John,\nthey call these \u03bc\u03af\u03c1\u03b7, _partes individu\u00e6_. And by this confounding\nthe division of the substance with the distinction of words, divers\nmen have been led into the error of attributing to God a name, which\nis not the name of any substance at all, _viz._ _incorporeal_.\n\nBy these words, _God has no parts_, thus explained, together with\nthe part of the _creed_ which was at that time agreed on, many of\nthose heresies which were antecedent to that first general Council,\nwere condemned; as that of Manes, who appeared about thirty years\nbefore the reign of Constantine, by the first article, _I believe in\none God_; though in other words it seems to me to remain still in\nthe doctrine of the church of Rome, which so ascribeth a liberty of\nthe will to men, as that their will and purpose to commit sin,\nshould not proceed from the cause of all things, God; but originally\nfrom themselves or from the Devil. It may seem perhaps to some, that\nby the same words the Anthropomorphites also were then condemned:\nand certainly, if by parts were meant not persons individual, but\npieces, they were condemned: for face, arms, feet, and the like, are\npieces. But this cannot be, for the Anthropomorphites appeared not\ntill the time of Valens the Emperor, which was after the Council of\nNice between forty and fifty years; and were not condemned till the\nsecond general Council at Constantinople.\n\nNow for the punishment of heretics ordained by Constantine, we read\nof none; but that ecclesiastical officers, bishops and other\npreachers, if they refused to subscribe to this faith, or taught the\ncontrary doctrine, were for the first fault deprived of their\noffices, and for the second banished. And thus did heresy, which at\nfirst was the name of private opinion, and no crime, by virtue of a\nlaw of the Emperor, made only for the peace of the church, become a\ncrime in a pastor, and punishable with deprivation first, and next\nwith banishment.\n\nAfter this part of the creed was thus established, there arose\npresently many new heresies, partly about the interpretation of it,\nand partly about the Holy Ghost, of which the Nicene Council had not\ndetermined. Concerning the part established, there arose disputes\nabout the nature of Christ, and the word _hypostasis_, _id est_,\nsubstance; for of persons there was yet no mention made, the creed\nbeing written in Greek, in which language there is no word that\nanswereth to the Latin word _persona_. And the union, as the Fathers\ncalled it, of the human and Divine nature in Christ, _hypostatical_,\ncaused Eutyches, and after him Dioscorus, to affirm, there was but\none nature in Christ; thinking that whensoever two things are\nunited, they are one: and this was condemned as Arianism in the\nCouncils of Constantinople and Ephesus. Others, because they thought\ntwo living and rational substances, such as are God and man, must\nneeds be also two _hypostases_, maintained that Christ had two\n_hypostases_: but these were two heresies condemned together. Then\nconcerning the Holy Ghost, Nestorius Bishop of Constantinople, and\nsome others, denied the divinity thereof. And whereas about seventy\nyears before the Nicene Council, there had been holden a provincial\nCouncil at Carthage, wherein it was decreed, that those Christians\nwhich in the persecutions had denied the faith of Christ, should not\nbe received again into the church unless they were again baptized:\nthis also was condemned, though the President in that Council was\nthat most sincere and pious Christian, Cyprian. And at last the\ncreed was made up entire as we have it, in the Chalcedonian Council,\nby addition of these words: AND I BELIEVE IN THE HOLY GHOST, THE\nLORD AND GIVER OF LIFE, WHO PROCEEDETH FROM THE FATHER AND THE SON.\nWHO WITH THE FATHER AND THE SON TOGETHER IS WORSHIPPED AND\nGLORIFIED. WHO SPAKE BY THE PROPHETS. AND I BELIEVE ONE CATHOLIC AND\nAPOSTOLIC CHURCH. I ACKNOWLEDGE ONE BAPTISM FOR THE REMISSION OF\nSINS. AND I LOOK FOR THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD, AND THE LIFE OF\nTHE WORLD TO COME. In this addition are condemned, first the\nNestorians and others, in these words: WHO WITH THE FATHER AND THE\nSON TOGETHER IS WORSHIPPED AND GLORIFIED: and secondly, the doctrine\nof the Council of Carthage, in these words: I BELIEVE ONE BAPTISM\nFOR THE REMISSION OF SINS. For one baptism is not there put as\nopposite to several sorts or manners of baptism, but to the\niteration of it. St. Cyprian was a better Christian than to allow\nany baptism that was not in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy\nGhost. In the general confession of faith contained in the creed\ncalled the Nicene Creed, there is no mention of _hypostasis_, nor of\nhypostatical union, nor of corporeal, nor of incorporeal, nor of\nparts; the understanding of which words being not required of the\nvulgar, but only of the pastors, whose disagreement else might\ntrouble the church; nor were such points necessary to salvation, but\nset abroach for ostentation of learning, or else to dazzle men, with\ndesign to lead them towards some ends of their own. The changes of\nprevalence in the empire between the Catholics and the Arians, and\nhow the great Athanasius, the most fierce of the Catholics, was\nbanished by Constantine, and afterwards restored, and again\nbanished, I let pass; only it is to be remembered, that Athanasius\nis supposed to have made his creed then, when (banished) he was in\nRome, Liberius being pope; by whom, as is most likely, the word\n_hypostasis_, as it was in Athanasius\u2019s Creed, was disliked. For the\nRoman church could never be brought to receive it, but instead\nthereof used their own word _persona_. But the first and last words\nof that creed the church of Rome refused not: for they make every\narticle, not only those of the body of the creed, but all the\ndefinitions of the Nicene Fathers to be such, as a man cannot be\nsaved, unless he believe them all stedfastly; though made only for\npeace sake, and to unite the minds of the clergy, whose disputes\nwere like to trouble the peace of the empire. After these four first\ngeneral Councils, the power of the Roman church grew up apace; and,\neither by the negligence or weakness of the succeeding Emperors, the\nPope did what he pleased in religion. _There was no doctrine which\ntended to the power ecclesiastical, or to the reverence of the\nclergy, the contradiction whereof was not by one Council or another\nmade heresy, and punished arbitrarily by the Emperors with\nbanishment or death._ And at last kings themselves, and\ncommonwealths, unless they purged their dominions of heretics, were\nexcommunicated, interdicted, and their subjects let loose upon them\nby the Pope; insomuch as to an ingenuous and serious Christian,\nthere was nothing so dangerous as to enquire concerning his own\nsalvation, of the Holy Scripture; the careless cold Christian was\nsafe, and the skilful hypocrite a saint. But this is a story so well\nknown, as I need not insist upon it any longer, but proceed to the\nheretics here in England, and what punishments were ordained for\nthem by acts of parliament. All this while the penal laws against\nheretics were such, as the several princes and states, in their own\ndominions, thought fit to enact. The edicts of the emperors made\ntheir punishments capital, but for the manner of the execution, left\nit to the prefects of provinces: and when other kings and states\nintended, according to the laws of the Roman church, to extirpate\nheretics, they ordained such punishment as they pleased. The first\nlaw that was here made for the punishment of heretics, called\nLollards and mentioned in the Statutes, was in the fifth year of the\nreign of Richard the Second, occasioned by the doctrine of John\nWickliff and his followers; which Wickliff, because no law was yet\nordained for his punishment in parliament, by the favour of John of\nGaunt, the King\u2019s son, during the reign of Edward the Third, had\nescaped. But in the fifth year of the next king, which was Richard\nthe Second, there passed an act of parliament to this effect: that\nsheriffs and some others should have commissions to apprehend such\nas were certified by the prelates to be preachers of heresy, their\nfautors, maintainers, and abettors, and to hold them in strong\nprison, till they should justify themselves, according to the law of\nholy church. So that hitherto there was no law in England, by which\na heretic could be put to death, or otherways punished, than by\nimprisoning him till he was reconciled to the church. After this, in\nthe next king\u2019s reign, which was Henry the Fourth, son of John of\nGaunt, by whom Wickliff had been favoured, _and who in his aspiring\nto the crown had needed the good will of the bishops_, was made a\nlaw, in the second year of his reign, wherein it was enacted, that\nevery ordinary may convene before him, and imprison any person\nsuspected of heresy; and that an obstinate heretic shall be burnt\nbefore the people.\n\nIn the next king\u2019s reign, which was Henry the Fifth, in his second\nyear, was made an act of parliament, wherein it is declared, that\nthe intent of heretics, called Lollards, was to subvert the\nChristian faith, the law of God, the church, and the realm: and that\nan heretic convict should forfeit all his fee-simple lands, goods,\nand chattels, besides the punishment of burning. Again, in the\nfive-and-twentieth year of King Henry the Eighth, it was enacted,\nthat an heretic convict shall abjure his heresies, and refusing so\nto do, or relapsing, shall be burnt in open place, for example of\nothers. This act was made after the putting down of the Pope\u2019s\nauthority: and by this it appears, that King Henry the Eighth\nintended no farther alteration in religion, than the recovering of\nhis own right ecclesiastical. But in the first year of his son, King\nEdward the Sixth, was made an act, by which were repealed not only\nthis act, but also all former acts concerning doctrines, or matters\nof religion; so that at this time there was no law at all for the\npunishment of heretics.\n\nAgain, in the Parliament of the first and second year of Queen Mary,\nthis act of 1 Edward VI was not repealed, but made useless, by\nreviving the statute of 25 Henry VIII, and freely putting it in\nexecution; insomuch as it was debated, whether or no they should\nproceed upon that statute against the Lady Elizabeth, the Queen\u2019s\nsister.\n\nThe Lady Elizabeth, not long after, by the death of Queen Mary,\ncoming to the crown, in the fifth year of her reign, by act of\nParliament repealed in the first place all the laws ecclesiastical\nof Queen Mary, with all other former laws concerning the punishments\nof heretics: nor did she enact any other punishments in their place.\nIn the second place it was enacted, that the Queen by her letters\npatents should give a commission to the bishops, with certain other\npersons, in her Majesty\u2019s name, to execute the power ecclesiastical;\nin which commission, the commissioners were forbidden to adjudge\nanything to be heresy, which was not declared to be heresy by some\nof the first four general Councils: but there was no mention made of\ngeneral Councils, but only in that branch of the act which\nauthorised that commission, commonly called _the High Commission_;\nnor was there in that commission anything concerning how heretics\nwere to be punished; but it was granted to them, that they might\ndeclare or not declare, as they pleased, to be heresy or not heresy,\nany of those doctrines which had been condemned for heresy in the\nfirst four general Councils. So that during the time that the said\nHigh Commission was in being, there was no statute by which a\nheretic could be punished otherways, than by the ordinary censures\nof the church; nor doctrine accounted heresy, unless the\ncommissioners had actually declared and published, that all that\nwhich was made heresy by those four Councils, should be heresy also\nnow: but I never heard that any such declaration was made either by\nproclamation, or by recording it in churches, or by public printing,\nas in penal laws is necessary; the breaches of it are excused by\nignorance. Besides, if heresy had been made capital, or otherwise\ncivilly punishable, either the four general Councils themselves, or\nat least the points condemned in them, ought to have been printed or\nput into parish churches in English, because without it, no man\ncould know how to beware of offending against them.\n\nSome men may perhaps ask, whether nobody were condemned and burnt\nfor heresy, during the time of the High Commission.\n\nI have heard there were: but they which approve such executions, may\nperadventure know better grounds for them than I do; but those\ngrounds are very well worthy to be enquired after.\n\nLastly, in the seventeenth year of the reign of King Charles the\nFirst, shortly after that the Scots had rebelliously put down the\nepiscopal government in Scotland, the Presbyterians in England\nendeavoured the same here. The king, though he saw the rebels ready\nto take the field, would not condescend to that; but yet in hope to\nappease them, was content to pass an act of parliament for the\nabolishing the High Commission. But though the High Commission was\ntaken away, yet the parliament having other ends besides the setting\nup of the Presbyterate, pursued the rebellion, and put down both\nepiscopacy and monarchy, erecting a power by them called _The\nCommonwealth_, by others _The Rump_, which men obeyed not out of\nduty, but for fear; nor were there any human laws left in force to\nrestrain any man from preaching or writing any doctrine concerning\nreligion that he pleased. And in this heat of the war, it was\nimpossible to disturb the peace of the state, which then was none.\n\nAnd in this time it was, that a book called _Leviathan_ was written\nin defence of the King\u2019s power, temporal and spiritual, without any\nword against episcopacy, or against any bishop, or against the\npublic doctrine of the church. It pleased God, about twelve years\nafter the usurpation of this _Rump_, to restore his most gracious\nMajesty that now is, to his father\u2019s throne, and presently, his\nMajesty restored the bishops, and pardoned the Presbyterians. But\nthen both the one and the other accused in Parliament this book of\nheresy, when neither the bishops before the war had declared what\nwas heresy; when if they had, it had been made void by the putting\ndown of the High Commission at the importunity of the Presbyterians.\nSo fierce are men, for the most part, in dispute, where either their\nlearning or power is debated, that they never think of the laws, but\nas soon as they are offended, they cry out, _crucifige_; forgetting\nwhat St. Paul (2 Tim. ii. 24, 25) saith, even in case of obstinate\nholding of an error: _the servant of the Lord must not strive, but\nbe gentle unto all men, apt to teach, patient, in meekness\ninstructing those that oppose themselves; if God peradventure will\ngive them repentance, to the acknowledging of the truth_: of which\ncounsel, such fierceness as hath appeared in the disputation of\ndivines, down from before the Council of Nice to this present time,\nis a violation.\n\n\n FINIS.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n CONSIDERATIONS\n UPON THE\n REPUTATION, LOYALTY, MANNERS,\n AND RELIGION,\n\n OF\n\n THOMAS HOBBES,\n\n OF MALMESBURY,\n\n WRITTEN BY HIMSELF,\n\n BY WAY OF\n\n LETTER TO A LEARNED PERSON\n\n (JOHN WALLIS, D.D.)\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n THE\n BOOKSELLER'S ADVERTISEMENT.\n TO THE READERS.\n\n\n -------\n\n\nI do here present you with a piece of Mr. Hobbes\u2019s writing; which is\nnot published from an imperfect MS. as his _Dialogue of the Civil\nWars of England_ was, by some that had got accidentally a copy of\nit, absolutely against his consent, as you may see by some passages\nout of some of his letters to me, which I have here inserted.\n\nIn his letter of June, 1679, he saith:\n\n\u201cI would fain have published my _Dialogue of the Civil Wars of\nEngland_, long ago; and to that end I presented it to his Majesty:\nand some days after, when I thought he had read it, I humbly\nbesought him to let me print it; but his Majesty, though he heard me\ngraciously, yet he flatly refused to have it published. Therefore I\nbrought away the book, and gave you leave to take a copy of it;\nwhich when you had done, I gave the original to an honourable and\nlearned friend, who about a year after died. The King knows better,\nand is more concerned in publishing of books than I am: therefore I\ndare not venture to appear in the business, lest it should offend\nhim. Therefore I pray you not to meddle in the business. Rather than\nto be thought any way to further or countenance the printing, I\nwould be content to lose twenty times the value of what you can\nexpect to get, &c. I pray do not take it ill; it may be I may live\nto send you somewhat else as vendible as that: and without offence,\nI rest Your very humble servant,\n\n THOMAS HOBBES.\u201d\n\n_Chatsworth, June 19, 1679._\n\n (Part of his letter in July, 1679.)\n\n\u201cIf I leave any MSS. worth printing, I will leave word you shall\nhave them, if you please. I am\n\n Your humble servant,\n THOMAS HOBBES.\u201d\n\n_Chatsworth, July 21, 1679._\n\n (Part of his letter, August, 1679.)\n\n\u201cSir,\u2014I thank you for taking my advice in not stirring about the\nprinting of my book concerning the civil wars of England, &c. I am\nwriting somewhat for you to print in English, &c. I am, Sir,\n\n Your humble servant,\n THOMAS HOBBES.\u201d\n\n_Chatsworth, Aug. 18, 1679._\n\nThat no spurious brats, for the time to come, be fathered upon the\ndeceased author, I have printed, _verbatim_, these passages out of\nhis letters written to me at several times; their original I have by\nme. I will be so just to his memory, that I will not print anything\nbut what is perfect, and fitted for the press. And if any book shall\nbe printed with his name to it, that hath not before been printed,\nyou may be confident it is not his, unless printed for\n\n WILLIAM CROOKE.\n\n\n\n\n CONSIDERATIONS\n\n UPON THE REPUTATION, &c.\n\n OF\n\n THOMAS HOBBES.\n\n -------\n\n SIR,\n\nI am one of them that admire your writings; and having read over\nyour _Hobbius Heauton-timorumenos_, I cannot hold from giving you\nsome account of the causes why I admire it. And first I considered\nhow you handle him for his disloyalty, in these words (page 5): _His\ngreat_ Leviathan, _wherein he placed his main strength, is now\nsomewhat out of season; which, upon deserting his royal master in\ndistress, (for he pretends to have been the King\u2019s tutor, though\nyet, from those who have most reason to know it, I can find but\nlittle ground for such a pretence), was written in defence of\nOliver\u2019s title, or whoever, by whatsoever means, can get to be\nupmost; placing the whole right of government merely in strength,\nand absolving all his Majesty\u2019s subjects from their allegiance,\nwhenever he is not in a present capacity to force obedience_.\n\nThat which I observe and admire here, first, is, that you left not\nthis passage out, for two reasons; one, because Mr. Hobbes could\nlong for nothing more than such an occasion to tell the world his\nown and your little stories, during the time of the late rebellion.\n\nWhen the Parliament sat, that began in April 1640, and was dissolved\nin May following, and in which many points of the regal power, which\nwere necessary for the peace of the kingdom, and the safety of his\nMajesty\u2019s person, were disputed and denied, Mr. Hobbes wrote a\nlittle treatise in English, wherein he did set forth and\ndemonstrate, that the said power and rights were inseparably annexed\nto the sovereignty; which sovereignty they did not then deny to be\nin the King; but it seems understood not, or would not understand\nthat inseparability. Of this treatise, though not printed, many\ngentlemen had copies, which occasioned much talk of the author; and\nhad not his Majesty dissolved the Parliament, it had brought him\ninto danger of his life.\n\nHe was the first that had ventured to write in the King\u2019s defence;\nand one, amongst very few, that upon no other ground but knowledge\nof his duty and principles of equity, without special interest, was\nin all points perfectly loyal.\n\nThe third of November following, there began a new Parliament,\nconsisting for the greatest part of such men as the people had\nelected only for their averseness to the King\u2019s interest. These\nproceeded so fiercely in the very beginning, against those that had\nwritten or preached in the defence of any part of that power, which\nthey also intended to take away, and in gracing those whom the King\nhad disgraced for sedition, that Mr. Hobbes, doubting how they would\nuse him, went over into France, the first of all that fled, and\nthere continued eleven years, to his damage some thousands of pounds\ndeep. This, Doctor, was your time of harvest: you were in their\nfavour, and that, as you have made it since appear, for no goodness.\n\nBeing at Paris, he wrote and published his book _De Cive_, in Latin,\nto the end that all nations which should hear what you and your\nCon-Covenanters were doing in England, might detest you, which I\nbelieve they do; for I know no book more magnified than this is\nbeyond the seas.\n\nWhen his Majesty, that now is, came to Paris, Mr. Hobbes had the\nhonour to initiate him in the mathematics; but never was so impudent\nor ignorant as to call, or to think himself the King\u2019s tutor, as\nyou, that understand not what that word, out of the University,\nsignifies, do falsely charge him with; or ever to say, that he was\none of his Majesty\u2019s domestic servants. While upon this occasion he\nstaid about Paris, and had neither encouragement nor desire to\nreturn into England, he wrote and published his _Leviathan_, far\nfrom the intention either of disadvantage to his Majesty, or to\nflatter Oliver, who was not made Protector till three or four years\nafter, on purpose to make way for his return. For there is scarce a\npage in it that does not upbraid both him, and you, and others such\nas you, with your abominable hypocrisy and villainy.\n\nNor did he desert his Majesty, as you falsely accuse him, as his\nMajesty himself knows. Nor was his Majesty, as you unmannerly term\nit, _in distress_. He had the title, right, and reverence of a King,\nand maintained his faithful servants with him. It is true that Mr.\nHobbes came home, but it was because he would not trust his safety\nwith the French clergy.\n\nDo you know that ever he sought any benefit either from Oliver, or\nfrom any of his party, or was any way familiar with any of his\nministers, before or after his return; or curried favour with any of\nthem, as you did by dedicating a book to his vice-chancellor, Owen?\n\nDid you ever hear that he took anything done to him by his Majesty\nin evil part, or spake of him otherwise than the best of his\nservants would do; or that he was sullen, silent, or sparing, in\npraising his Majesty in any company, upon any occasion?\n\nHe knew who were his enemies, and upon what ground they misconstrued\nhis writings.\n\nBut your indiscretion appears more manifestly in giving him occasion\nto repeat what you have done, and to _consider_ you, as you\nprofessedly have considered him. For with what equity can it be\ndenied him to repeat your manifest and horrible crimes, for all you\nhave been pardoned; when you publish falsely pretended faults of\nhis, and comprehended in the same pardon?\n\nIf he should say and publish, that you deciphered the letters of the\nKing and his party, and thereby delivered his Majesty\u2019s secrets to\nthe enemy, and his best friends to the scaffold, and boasted of it\nin your book of arithmetic, written in Latin, to all the world, as\nof a monument of your wit, worthy to be preserved in the University\nLibrary: how will you justify yourself, if you be reproached for\nhaving been a rebel and a traitor? It may be you, or some for you,\nwill now say, you deciphered those letters to the King\u2019s advantage:\nbut then you were unfaithful to your masters of the Parliament: a\nvery honest pretence, and full of gallantry, to excuse _treason_\nwith _treachery_, and to be a double spy. Besides, who will believe\nit? Who enabled you to do the King that favour? Why herded you with\nhis enemies? Who brought the King into a need of such a fellow\u2019s\nfavour, but they that first deserted him, and then made war upon\nhim, and which were your friends and Mr. Hobbes his enemies? Nay\nmore, I know not one enemy Mr. Hobbes then had, but such as were\nfirst the King\u2019s enemies, and, because the King\u2019s, therefore his.\nYour being of that party, without your deciphering, amounts to no\nmore than a desertion. Of the bishops that then were, and for whose\nsakes, in part, you raised the war, there was not one that followed\nthe King out of the land, though they loved him, but lived quietly\nunder the protection, first of the Parliament, and then of Oliver,\n(whose titles and actions were equally unjust) without treachery. Is\nnot this as bad as if they had gone over, and (which was Mr. Hobbes\nhis case) been driven back again? I hope you will not call them all\ndeserters, or, because by their stay here openly they accepted of\nthe Parliament\u2019s and of Oliver\u2019s protection, defenders either of\nOliver\u2019s or of the Parliament\u2019s title to the sovereign power.\n\nHow many were there in that Parliament at first that did indeed and\nvoluntarily desert the King, in consenting to many of their unjust\nactions? Many of these afterwards, either upon better judgment, or\nbecause they pleased not the faction, (for it was a hard matter for\nsuch as were not of Pym\u2019s cabal to please the Parliament), or for\nsome other private ends deserted the Parliament, and did some of\nthem more hurt to the King than if they had stayed where they were;\nfor they had been so affrighted by such as you, with a panic fear of\ntyranny, that seeking to help him by way of composition and sharing,\nthey abated the just and necessary indignation of his armies, by\nwhich only his right was to be recovered.\n\nThat very entering into the Covenant with the Scottish nation\nagainst the King, is by itself a very great crime, and you guilty of\nit. And so was the imposing of the Engagement, and you guilty of\nthat also, as being done by the then Parliament, whose democratical\nprinciples you approved of.\n\nYou were also assisting to the Assembly of Divines that made the\n_Directory_, and which were afterwards put down by Oliver for\ncounterfeiting themselves ambassadors. And this was when the King\nwas living, and at the head of an army, which with your own\nendeavour might have protected you. What crime it is, the King being\nhead of the Church of England, to make _Directories_, to alter the\n_Church-government_, and to set up new forms of God\u2019s service, upon\nyour own fancies, without the King\u2019s authority, the lawyers could\nhave told you; and what punishment you were to expect from it, you\nmight have seen in the statute printed before the _Book of Common\nPrayer_.\n\nFurther he may say, and truly, that you were guilty of all the\ntreasons, murders, and spoil committed by Oliver, or by any upon\nOliver\u2019s or the Parliament\u2019s authority: for, during the late\ntrouble, who made both Oliver and the people mad, but the preachers\nof your principles? But besides the wickedness, see the folly of it.\nYou thought to make them mad, but just to such a degree as should\nserve your own turn; that is to say, mad, and yet just as wise as\nyourselves. Were you not very imprudent to think to govern madness?\nPaul they knew, but who were you? You were they, that put the army\ninto Oliver\u2019s hands, who before, as mad as he was, was too weak, and\ntoo obscure to do any great mischief; with which army he executed\nupon such as you, both here and in Scotland, that which the justice\nof God required.\n\nTherefore of all the crimes, the great one not excepted, done in\nthat rebellion, you were guilty; you, I say, Doctor, how little\nforce or wit soever you contributed, for your good-will to their\ncause. The King was hunted as a partridge in the mountains; and\nthough the hounds have been hanged, yet the hunters were as guilty\nas they, and deserved no less punishment. And the decipherers, and\nall that blew the horn, are to be reckoned amongst the hunters.\nPerhaps you would not have had the prey killed, but rather have kept\nit tame. And yet who can tell? I have read of few kings deprived of\ntheir power by their own subjects, that have lived any long time\nafter it, for reasons that every man is able to conjecture.\n\nAll this is so manifest, as it needs no witnesses. In the meantime\nMr. Hobbes his behaviour was such, that of them who appeared in that\nscene, he was the only man I know, except a few that had the same\nprinciples with him, that has not something more or less to blush\nfor; as having either assisted that rebellious Parliament, without\nnecessity (when they might have had protection from the King, if\nthey had resorted to him for it in the field), by covenanting, or by\naction, or with money or plate, or by voting against his Majesty\u2019s\ninterest, in himself or his friends; though some of them have since\nby extraordinary service deserved to be received into favour; but\nwhat is that to you? You are none of them; and yet you dare to\nreproach the guiltless, as if after so ill fruits of your sermons,\nit were not impudence enough to preach.\n\nI admire further, that having been forgiven these so transcendant\ncrimes, so great a debt to the gallows, you take Mr. Hobbes by the\nthroat for a word in his _Leviathan_, made a fault by malicious or\nover-hasty construction: for you have thereby, like the unmerciful\ndebtor in the Gospel, in my opinion, forfeited your pardon, and so,\nwithout a new one, may be hanged yet.\n\nTo that other charge, _that he writ his Leviathan in defence of\nOliver\u2019s title_, he will say, that you in your own conscience know\nit is false. What was Oliver, when that book came forth? It was in\n1650, and Mr. Hobbes returned before 1651. Oliver was then but\nGeneral under your masters of the Parliament, nor had yet cheated\nthem of their usurped power. For that was not done till two or three\nyears after, in 1653, which neither he nor you could foresee. What\ntitle then of Oliver\u2019s could he pretend to justify? But you will\nsay, he placed the right of government there, wheresoever should be\nthe strength; and so by consequence he placed it in Oliver. Is that\nall? Then primarily his _Leviathan_ was intended for your masters of\nthe Parliament, because the strength was then in them. Why did they\nnot thank him for it, both they and Oliver in their turns? There,\nDoctor, you deciphered ill. For it was written in the behalf of\nthose many and faithful servants and subjects of his Majesty, that\nhad taken his part in the war, or otherwise done their utmost\nendeavour to defend his Majesty\u2019s right and person against the\nrebels: whereby, having no other means of protection, nor, for the\nmost part, of subsistence, they were forced to compound with your\nmasters, and to promise obedience for the saving of their lives and\nfortunes; which in his book he hath affirmed they might lawfully do,\nand consequently not lawfully bear arms against the victors. They\nthat had done their utmost endeavour to perform their obligation to\nthe King, had done all that they could be obliged unto; and were\nconsequently at liberty to seek the safety of their lives and\nlivelihood wheresoever, and without treachery. But there is nothing\nin that book to justify the submission of you, or such as you, to\nthe Parliament, after the King\u2019s being driven from them, or to\nOliver; for you were the King\u2019s enemies, and cannot pretend want of\nthat protection which you yourselves refused, denied, fought\nagainst, and destroyed. If a man owe you money, and you by robbing\nhim, or other injury, disable him to pay you, the fault is your own;\nnor needs this exception, _unless the creditor rob him_, be put into\nthe condition of the bond. Protection and obedience are relative. He\nthat says a man may submit to an enemy for want of protection, can\nnever be construed, but that he meant it of the obedient. But let us\nconsider his words, when he puts for a law of nature, (vol. iii. p.\n703) _that every man is bound, as much as in him lieth, to protect\nin war the authority by which he is himself protected in time of\npeace_; which I think is no ungodly or unreasonable principle. For\nconfirmation of it, he defines in what point of time it is, that a\nsubject becomes obliged to obey an unjust conqueror; and defines it\nthus: _it is that point wherein having liberty to submit to the\nconqueror, he consenteth either by express words, or by other\nsufficient signs, to be his subject_.\n\nI cannot see, Doctor, how a man can be at liberty to submit to his\nnew, that has not first done all he could for his old master: nor if\nhe have done all he could, why that liberty should be refused him.\nIf a man be taken by the Turk, and brought by terror to fight\nagainst his former master, I see how he may be killed for it as an\nenemy, but not as a criminal; nor can I see how he that hath liberty\nto submit, can at the same time be bound not to submit.\n\nBut you will say, perhaps, that he defines the time of that liberty\nto the advantage of Oliver, in that he says, _that for an ordinary\nsubject, it is then, when the means of his life are within the\nguards and garrisons of the enemy; for it is then, that he hath no\nprotection but from the enemy for his contribution_. It was not\nnecessary for him to explain it to men of so great understanding, as\nyou and other his enemies pretend to be, by putting in the\nexception, _unless they came into those guards and garrisons by\ntheir own treason_. Do you think that Oliver\u2019s party, for their\nsubmission to Oliver, could pretend the want of that protection?\n\nThe words therefore by themselves, without that exception, do\nsignify no more than this; _that whosoever had done as much as in\nhim did lie, to protect the King in war, had liberty afterwards to\nprovide themselves of such protection as they could get_; which to\nthose whose means of life were within the guards and garrisons of\nOliver, was Oliver\u2019s protection.\n\nDo you think, when a battle is lost, and you at the mercy of an\nenemy, it is unlawful to receive quarter with condition of\nobedience? Or if you receive it on that condition, do you think it\nhonesty to break promise, and treacherously murder him that gave you\nyour life? If that were good doctrine, he were a foolish enemy that\nwould give quarter to any man.\n\nYou see, then, that this submission to Oliver, or to your then\nmasters, is allowed by Mr. Hobbes his doctrine only to the King\u2019s\nfaithful party, and not to any that fought against him, howsoever\nthey coloured it, by saying they fought for the King and Parliament;\nnor to any that writ or preached against his cause, or encouraged\nhis adversaries; nor to any that betrayed his counsels, or that\nintercepted or deciphered any letters of his, or of his officers, or\nof any of his party; nor to any that by any way had contributed to\nthe diminution of his Majesty\u2019s power, ecclesiastical or civil; nor\ndoes it absolve any of them from their allegiance. You that make it\nso heinous a crime for a man to save himself from violent death, by\na forced submission to a usurper, should have considered what crime\nit was to submit voluntarily to the usurping Parliament.\n\nI can tell you besides, why those words were put into his last\nchapter, which he calls the review. It happened at that time that\nthere were many honourable persons, that having been faithful and\nunblemished servants to the King, and soldiers in his army, had\ntheir estates then sequestered; of whom some were fled, but the\nfortunes of them all were at the mercy, not of Oliver, but of the\nParliament. Some of these were admitted to composition, some not.\nThey that compounded, though they helped the Parliament less by\ntheir composition, than they should have done, if they had stood\nout, by their confiscation, yet they were ill-spoken of, especially\nby those that had no estates to lose, nor hope to compound. And it\nwas for this that he added to what he had written before, this\ncaution, that if they would compound, they were to do it _bona\nfide_, without intention of treachery. Wherein he justified their\nsubmission by their former obedience, and present necessity; but\ncondemned treachery. Whereas you that pretend to abhor atheism,\ncondemn that which was done upon necessity, and justify the\ntreachery: and you had reason for it, that cannot otherwise justify\nyourselves. Those strugglings which happened afterwards, lost his\nMajesty many a good and able subject, and strengthened Oliver with\nthe confiscation of their estates; which if they had attended the\ndiscord of their enemies, might have been saved.\n\nPerhaps you will take for a sign of Mr. Hobbes his ill meaning, that\nhis Majesty was displeased with him. And truly I believe he was\ndispleased for a while, but not very long. They that complained of,\nand misconstrued his writings, were his Majesty\u2019s good subjects, and\nreputed wise and learned men, and thereby obtained to have their\nmisconstruction believed for some little time: but the very next\nsummer after his coming away, two honourable persons of the Court,\nthat came over into England, assured him, that his Majesty had a\ngood opinion of him; and others since have told me, that his Majesty\nsaid openly, that he thought Mr. Hobbes never meant him hurt.\nBesides, his Majesty hath used him more graciously than is ordinary\nto so humble a person as he is, and so great a delinquent as you\nwould make him; and testified his esteem of him in his bounty. What\nargument now can you draw from hence more than this, that his\nMajesty understood his writings better than his accusers did?\n\nI admire in the next place, upon what ground you accuse him, and\nwith him all those that have approved his _Leviathan_, with atheism.\nI thought once, that that slander had had some, though not firm,\nground, in that you call his a new divinity: but for that point he\nwill allege these words of his Leviathan (p. 438): _By which it\nseemeth to me (with submission nevertheless, both in this and all\nother questions whereof the determination dependeth on the\nScriptures, to the interpretation of the Bible authorized by the\ncommonwealth, whose subject I am), that, &c._ What is there in these\nwords, but modesty and obedience? But you were at this time in\nactual rebellion. Mr. Hobbes, that holds religion to be a law, did\nin order thereto condemn the maintenance of any of his opinions\nagainst the law; and you that reproach him for them, upon your own\naccount should also have shown by your own learning, wherein the\nScripture, which was his sole proof, was miscited or misconstrued by\nhim; (for he submitted to the laws, that is to say, to the King\u2019s\ndoctrine, not to yours); and not have insulted for the victory won\nby the power of the law, to which you were then an enemy.\n\nAnother argument of atheism you take from his denying _immaterial_\nor _incorporeal substances_. Let any man impartially now compare his\nreligion with yours, by this very measure, and judge which of the\ntwo savours most of atheism.\n\nIt is by all Christians confessed, that God is _incomprehensible_;\nthat is to say, that there is nothing can arise in our fancy from\nthe naming of him, to resemble him either in _shape_, _colour_,\n_stature_, or _nature_; there is no idea of him; he is like nothing\nthat we can think on. What then ought we to say of him? What\nattributes are to be given him (not speaking otherwise than we\nthink, nor otherwise than is fit,) by those who mean to honour him?\nNone but such as Mr. Hobbes hath set down, namely, expressions of\nreverence, such as are in use amongst men for signs of honour, and\nconsequently signify _goodness_, _greatness_, and _happiness_; and\neither absolutely put, as _good_, _holy_, _mighty_, _blessed_,\n_just_, _wise_, _merciful_, &c., or superlative, as _most good_,\n_most great_, _most mighty_, _almighty_, _most holy_, &c., or\nnegative of whatsoever is not perfect, as _infinite_, _eternal_, and\nthe like: and not such as neither reason nor Scripture hath approved\nfor honourable. This is the doctrine that Mr. Hobbes hath written,\nboth in his _Leviathan_, and in his book _De Cive_, and when\noccasion serves, maintains. What kind of attribute, I pray you, is,\n_immaterial_, or _incorporeal substance_? Where do you find it in\nthe Scripture? Whence came it hither, but from Plato and Aristotle,\nheathens, who mistook those thin inhabitants of the brain they see\nin sleep, for so many _incorporeal_ men; and yet allowed them\nmotion, which is proper only to things _corporeal_? Do you think it\nan honour to God to be one of these? And would you learn\nChristianity from Plato and Aristotle? But seeing there is no such\nword in the Scripture, how will you warrant it from natural reason?\nNeither Plato nor Aristotle did ever write of, or mention, an\n_incorporeal spirit_. For they could not conceive how a spirit,\nwhich in their language was \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1, in ours _a wind_, could be\n_incorporeal_. Do you understand the connexion of _substance_ and\n_incorporeal_? If you do, explain it in English; for the words are\nLatin. It is something, you will say, that being _without body,\nstands under_\u2014\u2014. Stands under what? Will you say, _under accidents_?\nAlmost all the Fathers of the Church will be against you; and then\nyou are an atheist. Is not Mr. Hobbes his way of attributing to God,\nthat only which the Scriptures attribute to him, or what is never\nany where taken but for honour, much better than this bold\nundertaking of yours, to consider and decipher God\u2019s _nature_ to us?\n\nFor a third argument of atheism, you put, that he says: _besides the\ncreation of the world, there is no argument to prove a Deity_: and,\n_that it cannot be evinced by any argument that the world had a\nbeginning_; and, _that whether it had or no, is to be decided not by\nargument, but by the magistrate\u2019s authority_. That it may be decided\nby the Scriptures, he never denied; therefore in that also you\nslander him. And as for arguments from natural reason, neither you,\nnor any other, have hitherto brought any, except the creation, that\nhas not made it more doubtful to many men than it was before. That\nwhich he hath written concerning such arguments, in his book _De\nCorpore_: _opinions_, saith he (vol. I. p. 412), _concerning the\nnature of infinite and eternal, as the chiefest of the fruits of\nwisdom, God hath reserved to himself, and made judges of them those\nmen whose ministry he meant to use in the ordering of religion; and\ntherefore I cannot praise those men that brag of demonstration of\nthe beginning of the world from natural reason_: and again (vol. I.\np. 414), _wherefore I pass by those questions of infinite and\neternal, contenting myself with such doctrine concerning the\nbeginning and magnitude of the world, as I have learned from the\nScripture, confirmed by miracles, and from the use of my country,\nand from the reverence I owe to the law_. This, Doctor, is not ill\nsaid, and yet it is all you ground your slander on, which you make\nto sneak vilely under a crooked paraphrase.\n\nThese opinions, I said, were to be judged by those to whom God has\ncommitted the ordering of religion; that is, to the supreme\ngovernors of the church, that is, in England, to the King: by his\nauthority, I say, it ought to be decided, not what men shall think,\nbut what they shall say in those questions. And methinks you should\nnot dare to deny it; for it is a manifest relapse into your former\ncrimes.\n\nBut why do you style the King by the name of _magistrate_? Do you\nfind _magistrate_ to signify any where the person that hath the\nsovereign power, or not every where the sovereign\u2019s officers. And I\nthink you knew that; but you and your fellows (your fellows I call\nall those that are so besmeared all over with the filth of the same\ncrime, as not to be distinguished) meant to make your Assembly the\nsovereign, and the King your _magistrate_. I pray God you do not\nmean so still, if opportunity be presented.\n\nThere has hitherto appeared in Mr. Hobbes his doctrine, no sign of\natheism; and whatsoever can be inferred from the denying of\n_incorporeal substances_, makes Tertullian, one of the ancientest of\nthe Fathers, and most of the doctors of the Greek Church, as much\natheists as he. For Tertullian, in his treatise _De Carne Christi_,\nsays plainly: _omne quod est, corpus est sui generis. Nihil est\nincorporale, nisi quod non est_: that is to say, _whatsoever is\nanything, is a body of its kind. Nothing is incorporeal, but that\nwhich has no being._ There are many other places in him to the same\npurpose: for that doctrine served his turn to confute the heresy of\nthem that held that Christ had no body, but was a _ghost_; also of\nthe soul he speaks, as of an invisible body. And there is an epitome\nof the doctrine of the Eastern Church, wherein is this, that they\nthought angels and souls were _corporeal_, and only called\n_incorporeal_, because their bodies were not like ours. And I have\nheard that a Patriarch of Constantinople, in a Council held there,\ndid argue for the lawfulness of painting angels, from this, that\nthey were _corporeal_. You see what fellows in atheism you join with\nMr. Hobbes.\n\nHow unfeigned your own religion is, may be argued strongly,\ndemonstratively, from your behaviour, that I have already recited.\nDo you think, you that have committed so abominable sins, not\nthrough infirmity, or sudden transport of passion, but\npremeditately, wilfully, for twenty years together, that any\nrational man can think you believe yourselves, when you preach of\nheaven and hell, or that you do not believe one another to be cheats\nand impostors, and laugh at silly people in your sleeves for\nbelieving you; or that you applaud not your own wit for it; though\nfor my part I could never conceive that very much wit was requisite\nfor the making of a knave? And in the pulpit most of you have been a\nscandal to Christianity, by preaching up sedition, and crying down\nmoral virtue. You should have preached against unjust _ambition_,\n_covetousness_, _gluttony_, _malice_, _disobedience to government_,\n_fraud_, and _hypocrisy_: but for the most part you preached your\nown controversies, about who should be uppermost, or other fruitless\nand unedifying doctrines. When did any of you preach against\n_hypocrisy_? You dare not in the pulpit, I think, so much as name\nit, lest you set the church a laughing: and you in particular, when\nyou said in a sermon, that \u03c3\u03bf\u03c8\u03af\u03b7\u03c2 was not in Homer. What edification\ncould the people have from that, though it had been true, as it is\nfalse? For it is in his _Iliad_, XV. 412. Another I heard make half\nhis sermon of this doctrine, that _God never sent a great\ndeliverance, but in a great danger_: which is indeed true, because\nthe greatness of the danger makes the greatness of the deliverance,\nbut for the same cause ridiculous; and the other half he took to\nconstrue the Greek of his text: and yet such sermons are much\napplauded. But why? First, because they make not the people ashamed\nof any vice. Secondly, because they like the preacher, for using to\nfind fault with the government or governors. Thirdly, for their\nvehemence, which they mistake for zeal. Fourthly, for their zeal to\ntheir own ends, which they mistake for zeal to God\u2019s worship. I have\nheard besides divers sermons made by fanatics, young men, and whom,\nby that and their habit, I imagined to be apprentices; and found\nlittle difference between their sermons, and the sermons of such as\nyou, either in respect of wisdom, or eloquence, or vehemence, or\napplause of common people.\n\nTherefore, I wonder how you can pretend, as you do in your petition\nfor a dispensation from the ceremonies of the Church, to be either\nbetter preachers than those that conform, or to have tenderer\nconsciences than other men. You that have covered such black designs\nwith the sacred words of Scripture, why can you not as well find in\nyour hearts to cover a black gown with a white surplice? Or what\nidolatry do you find in making the sign of the cross, when the law\ncommands it? Though I think you may conform without sin, yet I think\nyou might have been also dispensed with without sin, if you had\ndispensed in like manner with other ministers that subscribed to the\narticles of the Church. And if tenderness of conscience be a good\nplea, you must give Mr. Hobbes also leave to plead tenderness of\nconscience to his new Divinity, as well as you. I should wonder\nalso, how any of you should dare to speak to a multitude met\ntogether, without being limited by his Majesty what they shall say,\nespecially now that we have felt the smart of it, but that it is a\nrelic of the ecclesiastical policy of the Popes, that found it\nnecessary for the disjoining of the people from their too close\nadherence to their Kings or other civil governors.\n\nBut it may be you will say, that the rest of the clergy, bishops,\nand episcopal men, no friends of yours, and against whose office Mr.\nHobbes never writ anything, speak no better of his religion than you\ndo.\n\nIt is true, he never wrote against episcopacy; and it is his private\nopinion, that such an episcopacy as is now in England, is the most\ncommodious that a Christian King can use for the governing of\nChrist\u2019s flock; the misgoverning whereof the King is to answer for\nto Christ, as the bishops are to answer for their misgovernment to\nthe King, and to God also. Nor ever spake he ill of any of them, as\nto their persons: therefore I should wonder the more at the\nuncharitable censure of some of them, but that I see a relic still\nremaining of the venom of popish ambition, lurking in that seditious\n_distinction_ and _division_ between the power _spiritual_ and\n_civil_; which they that are in love with a power to hurt all those\nthat stand in competition with them for learning, as the Roman\nclergy had to hurt Galileo, do not willingly forsake. All bishops\nare not in every point like one another. Some, it may be, are\ncontent to hold their authority from the King\u2019s letters patents; and\nthese have no cause to be angry with Mr. Hobbes. Others will needs\nhave somewhat more, they know not what, of divine right, to govern\nby virtue of _imposition of hands_, and _consecration_, not\nacknowledging their power from the King, but immediately from\nChrist. And these perhaps are they that are displeased with him,\nwhich he cannot help, nor has deserved; but will for all that\nbelieve the King only, and without sharers, to be the head of all\nthe Churches within his own dominions; and that he may dispense with\nceremonies, or with anything else that is not against the\nScriptures, nor against natural equity; and that the consent of the\nLords and Commons cannot now give him that power, but declare, for\nthe people, their advice and consent to it. Nor can he be made\nbelieve that the safety of a state depends upon the safety of the\nChurch, I mean of the clergy. For neither is a clergy essential to a\ncommonwealth; and those ministers that preached sedition, pretend to\nbe of the clergy, as well as the best. He believes rather that the\nsafety of the Church depends on the safety of the King, and the\nentireness of the sovereign power; and that the King is no part of\nthe flock of any minister or bishop, no more than the shepherd is of\nhis sheep, but of Christ only; and all the clergy, as well as the\npeople, the King\u2019s flock. Nor can that clamour of his adversaries\nmake Mr. Hobbes think himself a worse Christian than the best of\nthem. And how will you disprove it, either by his disobedience, to\nthe laws _civil_ or _ecclesiastical_, or by any ugly action? Or how\nwill you prove that the obedience, which springs from scorn of\ninjustice, is less acceptable to God, than that which proceeds from\nfear of punishment, or hope of benefit. Gravity and heaviness of\ncountenance are not so good marks of assurance of God\u2019s favour, as\ncheerful, charitable, and upright behaviour towards men, which are\nbetter signs of religion than the zealous maintaining of\ncontroverted doctrines. And therefore I am verily persuaded, it was\nnot his Divinity that displeased you or them, but somewhat else,\nwhich you are not willing to pretend. As for your party, that which\nangered you, I believe, was this passage of his _Leviathan_ (vol.\niii. p. 160); _Whereas some men have pretended for their\ndisobedience to their sovereign, a new covenant made, not with men,\nbut with God; this also is unjust. For there is no covenant with\nGod, but by mediation of somebody that represented God\u2019s person;\nwhich none doth but God\u2019s lieutenant, who hath the sovereignty under\nGod. But this pretence of covenant with God, is so evident a lie_,\n(this is it that angered you), _even in the pretenders' own\nconsciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a\nvile and unmanly disposition_.\n\nBesides, his making the King judge of doctrines to be preached or\npublished, hath offended you both; so has also his attributing to\nthe civil sovereign all power _sacerdotal_. But this perhaps may\nseem hard, when the sovereignty is in a Queen. But it is because you\nare not subtle enough to perceive, that though _man_ be _male_ and\n_female_, _authority_ is not. To please neither party is easy; but\nto please both, unless you could better agree amongst yourselves\nthan you do, is impossible. Your differences have troubled the\nkingdom, as if you were the houses revived of York and Lancaster. A\nman would wonder how a little Latin and Greek should work so\nmightily, when the Scriptures are in English, as that the King and\nParliament can hardly keep you quiet, especially in time of danger\nfrom abroad. If you will needs quarrel, decide it amongst\nyourselves, and draw not the people into your parties.\n\nYou were angry also for his blaming the scholastical philosophers,\nand denying such fine things as these: _that the species or\napparences of bodies come from the thing we look on, into the eye,\nand so make us see; and into the understanding, to make us\nunderstand; and into the memory, to make us remember: that a body\nmay be just the same it was, and yet bigger or lesser: that eternity\nis a permanent now_; and the like: and for detecting, further than\nyou thought fit, the fraud of the Roman clergy. Your dislike of his\ndivinity, was the least cause of your calling him atheist. But no\nmore of this now.\n\nThe next head of your contumelies is to make him contemptible, and\nto move Mr. Boyle to pity him. This is a way of railing too much\nbeaten to be thought witty. As for the thing itself, I doubt your\nintelligence is not good, and that you algebricians, and\nnon-conformists, do but feign it, to comfort one another. For your\nown part, you contemn him not, or else you did very foolishly to\nentitle the beginning of your book, _Mr. Hobbes considered_; which\nargues he is considerable enough to you. Besides, it is no argument\nof contempt, to spend upon him so many angry lines as would have\nfurnished you with a dozen of sermons. If you had in good earnest\ndespised him, you would have let him alone, as he does Dr. Ward, Mr.\nBaxter, Pike, and others, that have reviled him as you do. As for\nhis reputation beyond the seas, it fades not yet: and because\nperhaps you have no means to know it, I will cite you a passage of\nan Epistle, written by a learned Frenchman to an eminent person in\nFrance, a passage not impertinent to the point now in question. It\nis in a volume of Epistles, the fourth in order, and the words (page\n167) concerning chemists, are these: _Truly, Sir, as much as I\nadmire them, when I see them lute an alembic handsomely, filter a\nliquor, build an athanor, so much I dislike them when I hear them\ndiscourse upon the subject of their operations; and yet they think\nall they do, is nothing in respect of what they say. I wish they\nwould take less pains, and be at less charges; and whilst they wash\ntheir hands after their work, they would leave to those that attend\nto the polishing of their discourse, I mean, the Galileos, the\nDescarteses, the Hobbeses, the Bacons, and the Gassendis, to reason\nupon their work, and themselves to hear what the learned and\njudicious shall tell them, such as are used to discern the\ndifferences of things. Quam scit uterque libens censebo exerceat\nartem._ And more to the same purpose.\n\nWhat is here said of chymists, is applicable to all other mechanics.\n\nEvery man that hath spare money, can get furnaces, and buy coals.\nEvery man that hath spare money, can be at the charge of making\ngreat moulds, and hiring workmen to grind their glasses; and so may\nhave the best and greatest telescopes. They can get engines made,\nand apply them to the stars; recipients made, and try conclusions;\nbut they are never the more philosophers for all this. It is\nlaudable, I confess, to bestow money upon curious or useful\ndelights; but that is none of the praises of a philosopher. And yet,\nbecause the multitude cannot judge, they will pass with the\nunskilful, for skilful in all parts of natural philosophy. And I\nhear now, that Hugenius and Eustachio Divini are to be tried by\ntheir glasses, who is the more skilful in _optics_ of the two; but\nfor my part, before Mr. Hobbes his book _De Homine_ came forth, I\nnever saw any thing written on that subject intelligibly. Do not you\ntell me now, according to your wonted ingenuity, that I never saw\nEuclid\u2019s, Vitellio\u2019s, and many other men\u2019s _Optics_; as if I could\nnot distinguish between _geometry_ and _optics_.\n\nSo also of all other arts; not every one that brings from beyond\nseas a new gin, or other jaunty device, is therefore a philosopher.\nFor if you reckon that way, not only apothecaries and gardeners, but\nmany other sorts of workmen, will put in for, and get the prize.\nThen, when I see the gentlemen of Gresham College apply themselves\nto the doctrine of motion, (as Mr. Hobbes has done, and will be\nready to help them in it, if they please, and so long as they use\nhim civilly,) I will look to know some causes of natural events from\nthem, and their register, and not before: for nature does nothing\nbut by motion.\n\nI hear that the reason given by Mr. Hobbes, why the drop of glass so\nmuch wondered at, shivers into so many pieces, by breaking only one\nsmall part of it, is approved for probable, and registered in their\ncollege. But he has no reason to take it for a favour: because\nhereafter the invention may be taken, by that means, not for his,\nbut theirs.\n\nTo the rest of your calumnies the answers will be short, and such as\nyou might easily have foreseen. And first, for his boasting of his\nlearning, it is well summed up by you in these words: _It was a\nmotion made by one, whom I will not name, that some idle person\nshould read over all his books, and collecting together his arrogant\nand supercilious speeches, applauding himself, and despising all\nother men, set them forth in one synopsis, with this title_, Hobbius\nde se. _What a pretty piece of pageantry this would make, I shall\nleave to your own thoughts._\n\nThus say you: now says Mr. Hobbes, or I for him, let your idle\nperson do it, and set down no more than he has written, as high\npraises as they be, I will promise you he shall acknowledge them\nunder his hand, and be commended for it, and you scorned. A certain\nRoman senator having propounded something in the assembly of the\npeople, which they misliking made a noise at, boldly bade them hold\ntheir peace, and told them he knew better what was good for the\ncommonwealth than all they. And his words are transmitted to us as\nan argument of his virtue; so much do truth and vanity alter the\ncomplexion of self-praise. Besides, you can have very little skill\nin morality, that cannot see the justice of commending a man\u2019s self,\nas well as of anything else, in his own defence: and it was want of\nprudence in you, to constrain him to a thing that would so much\ndisplease you. That part of his self-praise which most offends you,\nis in the end of his _Leviathan_ (page 713), in these words:\n_Therefore I think it may be profitably printed, and more profitably\ntaught in the Universities, in case they also think so, to whom the\njudgment of the same belongeth_. Let any man consider the truth of\nit. Where did those ministers learn their seditious doctrine, and to\npreach it, but there? Where therefore should preachers learn to\nteach loyalty, but there? And if your principles produced civil war,\nmust not the contrary principles, which are his, produce peace? And\nconsequently his book, as far as it handles civil doctrine, deserves\nto be taught there. But when can this be done? When you shall have\nno longer an army ready to maintain the evil doctrine wherewith you\nhave infected the people. By a ready army, I mean arms, and money,\nand men enough, though not yet in pay, and put under officers, yet\ngathered together in one place or city, to be put under officers,\narmed, and paid on any sudden occasion; such as are the people of a\ngreat and populous town. Every great city is as a standing army,\nwhich if it be not under the sovereign\u2019s command, the people are\nmiserable; if they be, they may be taught their duties in the\nUniversities safely and easily, and be happy. I never read of any\nChristian king that was a tyrant, though the best of kings have been\ncalled so.\n\nThen for the _morosity_ and _peevishness_ you charge him with, all\nthat know him familiarly, know it is a false accusation. But you\nmean, it may be, only towards those that argue against his opinion;\nbut neither is that true. When vain and ignorant young scholars,\nunknown to him before, come to him on purpose to argue with him, and\nto extort applause for their foolish opinions; and, missing of their\nend, fall into indiscreet and uncivil expressions, and he then\nappear not very well contented: it is not his _morosity_, but their\n_vanity_ that should be blamed. But what humour, if not morosity and\npeevishness, was that of yours, whom he never had injured, or seen,\nor heard of, to use toward him such insolent, injurious, and\nclownish words, as you did in your absurd _Elenchus_?\n\nWas it not impatience of seeing any dissent from you in opinion? Mr.\nHobbes has been always far from provoking any man, though when he is\nprovoked, you find his pen as sharp as yours.\n\nAgain, when you make his age a reproach to him, and show no cause\nthat might impair the faculties of his mind, but only age, I admire\nhow you saw not that you reproached all old men in the world as much\nas him, and warranted all young men, at a certain time, which they\nthemselves shall define, to call you _fool_. Your dislike of old\nage, you have also otherwise sufficiently signified, in venturing so\nfairly as you have done to escape it. But that is no great matter to\none that hath so many marks upon him of much greater reproaches. By\nMr. Hobbes his calculation, that derives prudence from experience,\nand experience from age, you are a very young man; but by your own\nreckoning, you are older already than Methuselah.\n\nLastly, who told you that he writ against Mr. Boyle, whom in his\nwriting he never mentioned, and that it was, because Mr. Boyle was\nacquainted with you? I know the contrary. I have heard him wish it\nhad been some person of lower condition, that had been the author of\nthe doctrine which he opposed, and therefore opposed because it was\nfalse, and because his own could not otherwise be defended. But thus\nmuch I think is true, that he thought never the better of his\njudgment, for mistaking you for learned. This is all I thought fit\nto answer for him and his manners. The rest is of his geometry and\nphilosophy, concerning which, I say only this, that there is too\nmuch in your book to be confuted; almost every line may be\ndisproved, or ought to be reprehended. In sum, it is all error and\nrailing, that is, stinking wind; such as a jade lets fly, when he is\ntoo hard girt upon a full belly. I have done. I have considered you\nnow, but will not again, whatsoever preferment any of your friends\nshall procure you.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n THE ANSWER\n OF\n MR. HOBBES\n TO\n SIR WILLIAM DAVENANT\u2019S\n PREFACE BEFORE GONDIBERT.\n\n THE ANSWER\n\n TO THE PREFACE TO GONDIBERT.\n\n SIR,\n\nIf to commend your poem, I should only say, in general terms, that\nin the choice of your argument, the disposition of the parts, the\nmaintenance of the characters of your persons, the dignity and\nvigour of your expression, you have performed all the parts of\nvarious experience, ready memory, clear judgment, swift and\nwell-governed fancy: though it were enough for the truth, it were\ntoo little for the weight and credit of my testimony. For I lie open\nto two exceptions, one of an incompetent, the other of a corrupted\nwitness. Incompetent, because I am not a poet; and corrupted with\nthe honour done me by your preface. The former obliges me to say\nsomething, by the way, of the nature and differences of poesy.\n\nAs philosophers have divided the universe, their subject, into three\nregions, _celestial_, _aerial_, and _terrestial_; so the poets,\nwhose work it is, by imitating human life, in delightful and\nmeasured lines, to avert men from vice, and incline them to virtuous\nand honourable actions, have lodged themselves in the three regions\nof mankind, _court_, _city_, and _country_, correspondent, in some\nproportion, to those three regions of the world. For there is in\nprinces, and men of conspicuous power, anciently called _heroes_, a\nlustre and influence upon the rest of men, resembling that of the\nheavens; and an insincereness, inconstancy, and troublesome humour\nin those that dwell in populous cities, like the mobility,\nblustering, and impurity of the air; and a plainness, and, though\ndull, yet a nutritive faculty in rural people, that endures a\ncomparison with the earth they labour.\n\nFrom hence have proceeded three sorts of poesy, _heroic_,\n_scommatic_, and _pastoral_. Every one of these is distinguished\nagain in the manner of _representation_; which sometimes is\n_narrative_, wherein the poet himself relateth; and sometimes\n_dramatic_, as when the persons are every one adorned and brought\nupon the theatre, to speak and act their own parts. There is\ntherefore neither more nor less than six sorts of poesy. For the\nheroic poem narrative, such as is yours, is called an _epic_ poem;\nthe heroic poem dramatic, is _tragedy_. The scommatic narrative is\n_satire_; dramatic is _comedy_. The pastoral narrative, is called\nsimply _pastoral_, anciently _bucolic_; the same dramatic, _pastoral\ncomedy_. The figure therefore of an epic poem, and of a tragedy,\nought to be the same: for they differ no more but in that they are\npronounced by one, or many persons; which I insert to justify the\nfigure of yours, consisting of five books divided into songs, or\ncantos; as five acts divided into scenes, has ever been the approved\nfigure of a tragedy.\n\nThey that take for poesy whatsoever is writ in verse, will think\nthis division imperfect, and call in sonnets, epigrams, eclogues,\nand the like pieces, which are but essays, and parts of an entire\npoem; and reckon Empedocles and Lucretius, natural philosophers, for\npoets; and the moral precepts of Phocylides Theognis, and the\nquatrains of Pybrach, and the history of Lucan, and others of that\nkind, amongst poems: bestowing on such writers, for honour, the name\nof poets, rather than of historians or philosophers. But the subject\nof a poem is the manners of men, not natural causes; manners\npresented, not dictated; and manners feigned, as the name of poesy\nimports, not found in men. They that give entrance to fictions writ\nin prose, err not so much; but they err; for prose requireth\ndelightfulness, not only of fiction, but of style; in which if prose\ncontend with verse, it is with disadvantage and, as it were, on foot\nagainst the strength and wings of Pegasus.\n\nFor verse amongst the Greeks was appropriated anciently to the\nservice of their Gods, and was the holy style; the style of the\noracles; the style of the laws; and the style of the men that\npublicly recommended to their Gods the vows and thanks of the\npeople, which was done in their holy songs called hymns; and the\ncomposers of them were called prophets and priests, before the name\nof poet was known. When afterwards the majesty of that style was\nobserved, the poets chose it as best becoming their high invention.\nAnd for the antiquity of verse, it is greater than the antiquity of\nletters. For it is certain, Cadmus was the first that from Ph\u0153nicia,\na country that neighboureth Judea, brought the use of letters into\nGreece. But the service of the Gods, and the laws, which by measured\nsounds were easily committed to the memory, had been long time in\nuse before the arrival of Cadmus there.\n\nThere is, besides the grace of style, another cause why the ancient\npoets chose to write in measured language; which is this. Their\npoems were made at first with intention to have them sung, as well\nepic as dramatic (which custom hath been long time laid aside, but\nbegan to be revived in part, of late years, in Italy,) and could not\nbe made commensurable to the voice or instruments, in prose; the\nways and motions whereof are so uncertain and undistinguished, like\nthe way and motion of a ship in the sea, as not only to discompose\nthe best composers, but also to disappoint sometimes the most\nattentive reader, and put him to hunt counter for the sense. It was\ntherefore necessary for poets in those times to write in verse.\n\nThe verse which the Greeks and Latins, considering the nature of\ntheir own languages, found by experience most grave, and for an epic\npoem most decent, was their _hexameter_; a verse limited not only in\nthe length of the line, but also in the quantity of the syllables.\nInstead of which we use the line of ten syllables, recompensing the\nneglect of their quantity with the diligence of rhyme. And this\nmeasure is so proper to an heroic poem, as without some loss of\ngravity or dignity, it was never changed. A longer is not far from\nill prose; and a shorter, is a kind of whisking, you know, like the\nunlacing, rather than the singing of a muse. In an epigram or a\nsonnet, a man may vary his measures, and seek glory from a needless\ndifficulty; as he that contrived verses into the forms of an organ,\na hatchet, an egg, an altar, and a pair of wings; but in so great\nand noble a work as is an epic poem, for a man to obstruct his own\nway with unprofitable difficulties, is great imprudence. So likewise\nto choose a needless and difficult correspondence of rhyme, is but a\ndifficult toy, and forces a man sometimes, for the stopping of a\nchink, to say somewhat he did never think. I cannot therefore but\nvery much approve your _stanza_, wherein the syllables in every\nverse are ten, and the rhyme alternate.\n\nFor the choice of your subject you have sufficiently justified\nyourself in your preface. But because I have observed in Virgil,\nthat the honour done to \u00c6neas and his companions, has so bright a\nreflection upon Augustus C\u00e6sar, and other great Romans of that time,\nas a man may suspect him not constantly possessed with the noble\nspirit of those his heroes; and I believe you are not acquainted\nwith any great man of the race of Gondibert, I add to your\njustification the purity of your purpose, in having no other motive\nof your labour, but to adorn virtue, and procure her lovers; than\nwhich there cannot be a worthier design, and more becoming noble\npoesy.\n\nIn that you make so small account of the example of almost all the\napproved poets, ancient and modern, who thought fit in the\nbeginning, and sometimes also in the progress of their poems, to\ninvoke a Muse, or some other deity, that should dictate to them, or\nassist them in their writings; they that take not the laws of art,\nfrom any reason of their own, but from the fashion of precedent\ntimes, will perhaps accuse your singularity. For my part, I neither\nsubscribe to their accusation, nor yet condemn that heathen custom,\notherwise than as accessory to their false religion. For their poets\nwere their divines; had the name of prophets; exercised amongst the\npeople a kind of spiritual authority; would be thought to speak by a\ndivine spirit; have their works which they writ in verse (the divine\nstyle) pass for the word of God, and not of man, and to be hearkened\nto with reverence. Do not the divines, excepting the style, do the\nsame, and by us that are of the same religion cannot justly be\nreprehended for it? Besides, in the use of the spiritual calling of\ndivines, there is danger sometimes to be feared, from want of skill,\nsuch as is reported of unskilful conjurers, that mistaking the rites\nand ceremonious points of their art, call up such spirits, as they\ncannot at their pleasure allay again; by whom storms are raised,\nthat overthrow buildings, and are the cause of miserable wrecks at\nsea. Unskilful divines do oftentimes the like; for when they call\nunseasonably for _zeal_, there appears a spirit of _cruelty_; and by\nthe like error, instead of _truth_, they raise _discord_; instead of\n_wisdom_, _fraud_; instead of _reformation_, _tumult_; and\n_controversy_, instead of _religion_. Whereas in the heathen poets,\nat least in those whose works have lasted to the time we are in,\nthere are none of those indiscretions to be found, that tended to\nthe subversion, or disturbance of the commonwealths wherein they\nlived. But why a Christian should think it an ornament to his poem,\neither to profane the true God, or invoke a false one, I can imagine\nno cause, but a reasonless imitation of custom; of a foolish custom,\nby which a man enabled to speak wisely from the principles of\nnature, and his own meditation, loves rather to be thought to speak\nby inspiration, like a bagpipe.\n\nTime and education beget experience; experience begets memory;\nmemory begets judgment and fancy; judgment begets the strength and\nstructure, and fancy begets the ornaments of a poem. The ancients\ntherefore fabled not absurdly, in making Memory the mother of the\nMuses. For memory is the world, though not really, yet so as in a\nlooking-glass, in which the judgment, the severer sister, busieth\nherself in a grave and rigid examination of all the parts of nature,\nand in registering by letters their order, causes, uses,\ndifferences, and resemblances; whereby the fancy, when any work of\nart is to be performed, finds her materials at hand and prepared for\nuse, and needs no more than a swift motion over them, that what she\nwants, and is there to be had, may not lie too long unespied. So\nthat when she seemeth to fly from one Indies to the other, and from\nheaven to earth, and to penetrate into the hardest matter and\nobscurest places, into the future, and into herself, and all this in\na point of time, the voyage is not very great, herself being all she\nseeks. And her wonderful celerity, consisteth not so much in motion,\nas in copious imagery discreetly ordered, and perfectly registered\nin the memory; which most men under the name of philosophy have a\nglimpse of, and is pretended to by many, that grossly mistaking her,\nembrace contention in her place. But so far forth as the fancy of\nman has traced the ways of true philosophy, so far it hath produced\nvery marvellous effects to the benefit of mankind. All that is\nbeautiful or defensible in building; or marvellous in engines and\ninstruments of motion; whatsoever commodity men receive from the\nobservations of the heavens, from the description of the earth, from\nthe account of time, from walking on the seas; and whatsoever\ndistinguisheth the civility of Europe, from the barbarity of the\nAmerican savages; is the workmanship of fancy, but guided by the\nprecepts of true philosophy. But where these precepts fail, as they\nhave hitherto failed in the doctrine of moral virtue, there the\narchitect Fancy must take the philosopher\u2019s part upon herself. He,\ntherefore, who undertakes an heroic poem, which is to exhibit a\nvenerable and amiable image of heroic virtue, must not only be the\npoet, to place and connect, but also the philosopher, to furnish and\nsquare his matter; that is, to make both body and soul, colour and\nshadow of his poem out of his own store; which, how well you have\nperformed I am now considering.\n\nObserving how few the persons be you introduce in the beginning, and\nhow in the course of the actions of these, the number increasing,\nafter several confluences, they run all at last into the two\nprincipal streams of your poem, _Gondibert and Oswald_, methinks the\nfable is not much unlike the theatre. For so, from several and far\ndistant sources, do the lesser brooks of Lombardy, flowing into one\nanother, fall all at last into the two main rivers, the Po and the\nAdige. It hath the same resemblance also with a man\u2019s veins, which\nproceeding from different parts, after the like concourse, insert\nthemselves at last into the two principal veins of the body. But\nwhen I considered that also the actions of men, which singly are\ninconsiderable, after many conjunctures, grow at last either into\none great protecting power, or into two destroying factions, I could\nnot but approve the structure of your poem, which ought to be no\nother than such as an imitation of human life requireth.\n\nIn the streams themselves I find nothing but settled valour, clean\nhonour, calm counsel, learned diversion, and pure love; save only a\ntorrent or two of ambition, which, though a fault, has somewhat\nheroic in it, and therefore must have place in an heroic poem. To\nshew the reader in what place he shall find every excellent picture\nof virtue you have drawn, is too long. And to show him one, is to\nprejudice the rest; yet I cannot forbear to point him to the\ndescription of love in the person of Bertha, in the seventh canto of\nthe second book. There has nothing been said of that subject,\nneither by the ancient nor modern poets, comparable to it. Poets are\npainters; I would fain see another painter draw so true, perfect,\nand natural a love to the life, and make use of nothing but pure\nlines, without the help of any the least uncomely shadow, as you\nhave done. But let it be read as a piece by itself: for in the\nalmost equal height of the whole, the eminence of parts is lost.\n\nThere are some that are not pleased with fiction, unless it be bold;\nnot only to exceed the _work_, but also the _possibility_ of nature;\nthey would have impenetrable armours, enchanted castles,\ninvulnerable bodies, iron men, flying horses, and a thousand other\nsuch things, which are easily feigned by them that dare. Against\nsuch I defend you, without assenting to those that condemn either\nHomer or Virgil; by dissenting only from those that think the beauty\nof a poem consisteth in the exorbitancy of the fiction. For as truth\nis the bound of historical, so the resemblance of truth is the\nutmost limit of poetical liberty. In old time amongst the heathen,\nsuch strange fictions and metamorphoses were not so remote from the\narticles of their faith, as they are now from ours, and therefore\nwere not so unpleasant. Beyond the actual works of nature a poet may\nnow go; but beyond the conceived possibility of nature, never. I can\nallow a geographer to make in the sea, a fish or a ship, which by\nthe scale of his map would be two or three hundred miles long, and\nthink it done for ornament, because it is done without the precincts\nof his undertaking: but when he paints an elephant so, I presently\napprehend it as ignorance, and a plain confession of _terra\nincognita_.\n\nAs the description of great men and great actions is the constant\ndesign of a poet; so the descriptions of worthy circumstances are\nnecessary accessions to a poem, and being well performed, are the\njewels and most precious ornaments of poesy. Such in Virgil are the\nfuneral games of Anchises, the duel of \u00c6neas and Turnus, &c. And\nsuch in yours, are _the Hunting_, _the Battle_, _the City Mourning_,\n_the Funeral_, _the House of Astragon_, _the Library and the\nTemple_; equal to his, or those of Homer whom he imitated.\n\nThere remains now no more to be considered but the expression, in\nwhich consisteth the countenance and colour of a beautiful Muse; and\nis given her by the poet out of his own provision, or is borrowed\nfrom others. That which he hath of his own, is nothing but\nexperience and knowledge of nature, and specially human nature; and\nis the true and natural colour. But that which is taken out of\nbooks, the ordinary boxes of counterfeit complexion, shows well or\nill, as it hath more or less resemblance with the natural; and are\nnot to be used without examination unadvisedly. For in him that\nprofesses the imitation of nature, as all poets do, what greater\nfault can there be, than to betray an ignorance of nature in his\npoem; especially, having a liberty allowed him, if he meet with any\nthing he cannot master, to leave it out?\n\nThat which giveth a poem the true and natural colour, consisteth in\ntwo things; which are, _to know well_, that is, to have images of\nnature in the memory distinct and clear; and _to know much_. A sign\nof the first is perspicuity, propriety, and decency; which delight\nall sorts of men, either by instructing the ignorant, or soothing\nthe learned in their knowledge. A sign of the latter is novelty of\nexpression, and pleaseth by excitation of the mind; for novelty\ncauseth admiration, and admiration curiosity, which is a delightful\nappetite of knowledge.\n\nThere be so many words in use at this day in the English tongue,\nthat, though of magnific sound, yet like the windy blisters of\ntroubled waters, have no sense at all, and so many others that lose\ntheir meaning by being ill coupled; that it is a hard matter to\navoid them. For having been obtruded upon youth in the schools, by\nsuch as make it, I think, their business there, as it is expressed\nby the best poet\n\n \u201cWith terms to charm the weak and pose the wise,\u201d\n GONDIBERT, Book ii. Canto 5, verse 44.\n\nthey grow up with them, and gaining reputation with the ignorant,\nare not easily shaken off.\n\nTo this palpable darkness, I may also add the ambitious obscurity of\nexpressing more than is perfectly conceived; or perfect conception\nin fewer words than it requires. Which expressions, though they have\nhad the honour to be called strong lines, are indeed no better than\nriddles, and not only to the reader, but also after a little time to\nthe writer himself, dark and troublesome.\n\nTo the propriety of expression I refer that clearness of memory, by\nwhich a poet when he hath once introduced any person whatsoever,\nspeaking in his poem, maintaineth in him to the end the same\ncharacter he gave him in the beginning. The variation whereof, is a\nchange of pace, that argues the poet tired.\n\nOf the indecencies of an heroic poem, the most remarkable are those\nthat show disproportion either between the persons and their\nactions, or between the manners of the poet and the poem. Of the\nfirst kind, is the uncomeliness of representing in great persons the\ninhuman vice of cruelty, or the sordid vices of lust and\ndrunkenness. To such parts, as those the ancient approved poets\nthought it fit to suborn, not the persons of men, but of monsters\nand beastly giants, such as Polyphemus, Cacus, and the Centaurs. For\nit is supposed a Muse, when she is invoked to sing a song of that\nnature, should maidenly advise the poet to set such persons to sing\ntheir own vices upon the stage; for it is not so unseemly in a\n_tragedy_. Of the same kind it is to represent scurrility, or any\naction or language that moveth much laughter. The delight of an\n_epic_ poem consisteth not in mirth, but admiration. Mirth and\nlaughter are proper to _comedy_ and _satire_. Great persons, that\nhave their minds employed on great designs, have not leisure enough\nto laugh, and are pleased with the contemplation of their own power\nand virtues, so as they need not the infirmities and vices of other\nmen to recommend themselves to their own favour by comparison, as\nall men do when they laugh. Of the second kind, where the\ndisproportion is between the poet and the persons of his poem, one\nis in the dialect of the inferior sort of people, which is always\ndifferent from the language of the court. Another is, to derive the\nillustration of any thing from such metaphors or comparisons as\ncannot come into men\u2019s thoughts, but by mean conversation, and\nexperience of humble or evil arts, which the person of an epic poem\ncannot be thought acquainted with.\n\nFrom _knowing much_, proceedeth the admirable variety and novelty of\nmetaphors and similitudes, which are not possible to be lighted on\nin the compass of a narrow knowledge. And the want whereof\ncompelleth a writer to expressions that are either defaced by time,\nor sullied with vulgar or long use. For the phrases of poesy, as the\nairs of music, with often hearing become insipid; the reader having\nno more sense of their force, than our flesh is sensible of the\nbones that sustain it. As the sense we have of bodies, consisteth in\nchange of variety of impression, so also does the sense of language\nin the variety and changeable use of words. I mean not in the\naffectation of words newly brought home from travel, but in new, and\nwithal significant, translation to our purposes, of those that be\nalready received; and in far-fetched, but withal, apt, instructive,\nand comely similitudes.\n\nHaving thus, I hope, avoided the first exception, against the\nincompetency of my judgment, I am but little moved with the second,\nwhich is of being bribed by the honour you have done me, by\nattributing in your preface somewhat to my judgment. For I have used\nyour judgment no less in many things of mine, which coming to light\nwill thereby appear the better. And so you have your bribe again.\n\nHaving thus made way for the admission of my testimony, I give it\nbriefly thus. I never yet saw poem, that had so much shape of art,\nhealth of morality, and vigour and beauty of expression, as this of\nyours. And but for the clamour of the multitude, that hide their\nenvy of the present under a reverence of antiquity, I should say\nfurther, that it would last as long as either the _\u00c6neid_, or\n_Iliad_, but for one disadvantage; and the disadvantage is this; the\nlanguages of the Greeks and Romans, by their colonies and conquests,\nhave put off flesh and blood, and are become immutable, which none\nof the modern tongues are like to be. I honour antiquity; but that\nwhich is commonly called _old time_, is _young time_. The glory of\nantiquity is due, not to the dead, but to the aged.\n\nAnd now, whilst I think of it, give me leave with a short discord to\nsweeten the harmony of the approaching close. I have nothing to\nobject against your poem; but dissent only from something in your\npreface, sounding to the prejudice of age. It is commonly said, that\nold age is a return to childhood. Which methinks you insist on so\nlong, as if you desired it should be believed. That is the note I\nmean to shake a little. That saying, meant only of the weakness of\nbody, was wrested to the weakness of mind, by froward children,\nweary of the controlment of their parents, masters, and other\nadmonitors. Secondly, the dotage and childishness they ascribe to\nage, is never the effect of time, but sometimes of the excesses of\nyouth, and not a returning to, but a continual stay, with childhood.\nFor they that wanting the curiosity of furnishing their memories\nwith the rarities of nature in their youth, pass their time in\nmaking provision only for their ease and sensual delight, are\nchildren still at what years soever; as they that coming into a\npopulous city, never going out of their inn, are strangers still,\nhow long soever they have been there. Thirdly, there is no reason\nfor any man to think himself wiser to-day than yesterday, which does\nnot equally convince he shall be wiser to-morrow than to-day.\nFourthly, you will be forced to change your opinion hereafter when\nyou are old; and in the mean time you discredit all I have said\nbefore in your commendation, because I am old already. But no more\nof this.\n\nI believe, Sir, you have seen a curious kind of perspective, where\nhe that looks through a short hollow pipe upon a picture containing\ndivers figures, sees none of those that are there painted, but some\none person made up of their parts, conveyed to the eye by the\nartificial cutting of a glass. I find in my imagination an effect\nnot unlike it, from your poem. The virtues you distribute there\namongst so many noble persons, represent, in the reading, the image\nbut of one man\u2019s virtue to my fancy, which is your own; and that so\ndeeply imprinted, as to stay for ever there, and govern all the rest\nof my thoughts and affections in the way of honouring and serving\nyou to the utmost of my power, that am,\n\n Sir,\n Your most humble and obedient servant,\n THOMAS HOBBES.\n\n_Paris, Jan. 10, 1650._\n\n\n -------\n\n\n LETTER TO THE\n RIGHT HONOURABLE EDW. HOWARD.[B]\n\n TO THE RIGHT HON. MR. EDWARD HOWARD.\n\n SIR,\n\nMy judgment in poetry hath, you know, been once already censured by\nvery good wits, for commending _Gondibert_; but yet they have not, I\nthink, disabled my testimony. For what authority is there in wit? A\njester may have it; a man in drink may have it; be fluent over\nnight, and wise and dry in the morning. What is it? Or who can tell\nwhether it be better to have it or be without it, especially if it\nbe a pointed wit? I will take my liberty to praise what I like, as\nwell as they do to reprehend what they do not like. Your poem, Sir,\ncontains a well and judiciously contrived story, full of admirable\nand heroic actions, set forth in noble and perspicuous language,\nsuch as becomes the dignity of the persons you introduce: which two\nthings of themselves are the heighth of poetry. I know that variety\nof story, true or feigned, is the thing wherewith the reader is\nentertained most delightfully. And this also to the smallness of the\nvolume is not wanting. Yours is but one small piece; whereas the\npoets that are with us so much admired, have taken larger subjects.\nBut let an English reader, in Homer or Virgil in English, by\nwhomsoever translated, read one piece by itself, no greater than\nyours; I may make a question whether he will be less pleased with\nyours than his. I know you do not equal your poem to either of\ntheirs: the bulk of the work does not distinguish the art of the\nworkman. [The Battle of Mice and Frogs may be owned without\ndisparagement by Homer himself. Yet if Homer had written nothing\nelse, he never had had the reputation of so admirable a poet as he\nwas.][C] Ajax was a man of very great stature, and Teucer a very\nlittle person: yet he was brother to Ajax, both in blood and\nchivalry. I commend your poem for judgment, not for bulk; and am\nassured it will be welcome to the world with its own confidence;\nthough if it come forth armed with verses and epistles, I cannot\ntell what to think of it. For the great wits will think themselves\nthreatened, and rebel. Unusual fortifications upon the borders,\ncarry with them a suspicion of hostility. And poets will think such\nletters of commendation a kind of confederacy and league, tending to\nusurp upon their liberty. [I have told you my judgment, and you may\nmake use of it as you please. But I remember a line or two in your\npoem, that touched upon divinity, wherein we differed in opinion.\nBut since you say the book is licensed, I shall think no more upon\nit, but only reserve my liberty of dissenting, which I know you will\nallow me.][D] I rest,\n\n Sir,\n Your most humble and obedient servant,\n THOMAS HOBBES.\n\n _Chatsworth,\n October the 24th, 1668._\n\nFootnote B:\n\n This letter is here printed from the autograph of Mr. Hobbes, now\n in the possession of Rowland Eyles Egerton Warburton, Esq. of\n Arley Hall, Cheshire. The same letter, with the variations\n hereafter noticed, was prefixed to Mr. Howard\u2019s poem, \u201c_The\n British Princes_,\u201d published in 1669: it is there addressed \u201c_To\n the Honourable Edward Howard, Esq. on his intended impression of\n his poem of the 'British Princes,'_\u201d and is subscribed,\n\n \u201c_I need say no more, but rest,\n Your Honour\u2019s most humble and obedient servant_,\n THOMAS HOBBS.\n _Chatsworth, Nov. the 6th, 1668._\u201d\n\nFootnote C:\n\n The passage between brackets is omitted in the letter prefixed to\n the _British Princes_, and the following is substituted for it:\n \u201c_Besides 'tis a virtue in a poet to advance the honour of his\n remotest ancestors, especially when it has not been done before.\n What, though you out-go the limits of certain history? Do\n painters, when they paint the face of the earth, leave a blank\n beyond what they know? Do not they fill up the space with strange\n rocks, monsters, and other gallantry, to fix their work in the\n memory of men by the delight of fancy? So will your readers from\n this poem think honourably of their original, which is a kind of\n piety._\u201d\n\nFootnote D:\n\n This passage is omitted in the \u201c_British Princes_.\u201d\n\n END OF VOL. IV.\n\n\n\n\n ------------------------------------\n\n G. RICHARDS, PRINTER, 100, ST. MARTIN'S LANE.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n BOOKS PUBLISHED BY JOHN BOHN.\n\n -------\n\n _To be completed in 12 Vols. 8vo. each 12s. cloth lettered_,\n\n THE COMPLETE WORKS\n\n OF\n\n THOMAS HOBBES\n OF MALMESBURY,\n\n NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED\n\n BY\n SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART. M.P.\n\n\n -------\n\n\nAlthough the close reasoning of HOBBES, expressed in beautiful\nlanguage, has created a host of admirers, yet, owing to the\nexcessive rarity of his detached writings, many of which have never\nbeen reprinted, no complete set of his works is to be found in any\none of our public or private libraries. To remedy this evil, and to\npresent an edition worthy of the Author, the Editor has collected\ntogether the various pieces, and at his own cost has determined to\nreprint them uniformly, in the best style of modern typography. Five\nvolumes (I. II. of the Latin, and I. III. and IV. of the English\nworks) are already published, and the remainder will follow as\nspeedily as a due regard to correctness will allow.\n\nAs the impression is limited, and the price of each volume (between\n500 and 600 pages, with Engravings) is unusually low, the Publisher\nhas every reason to expect that within a short period the whole of\nthe copies will be subscribed for, and therefore would earnestly\nrecommend an early application, to prevent disappointment.\n\nAn excellent analysis of this author\u2019s writings will be found in Mr.\nHallam\u2019s able Introduction to the Literature of Europe, and the\nfollowing testimonies in favour of his style will convey some idea\nof the estimation in which his writings are held.\n\n\u201cHobbes\u2019 language is so lucid and concise that it would almost be as\nimproper to put an algebraical process in different terms as some of\nhis metaphysical paragraphs.\u201d\u2014HALLAM.\n\n\u201cA permanent foundation of his fame consists in his admirable style,\nwhich seems to be the very perfection of didactic language.\u201c\u2014SIR\nJAMES MACKINTOSH.\n\n\u201cHere let us do justice to that great man\u2019s memory, at a time his\nwritings seem to be entirely neglected, who, with all his errors, we\nmust allow to be one of the first men of his age, for a bright wit,\na deep penetration, and a cultivated understanding.\u201d\u2014BP. WARBURTON.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n -------\n\n In crown 8vo. price 8_s._ in extra boards,\n\n =An Apology=\n\n FOR\n\n =Cathedral Service.=\n\n \u201c_Apology for the Bible? I didn\u2019t know that the\n Bible wanted any apology._\u201d\u2014KING GEORGE III.\n\n\u201cThis is a very delightful work, and contains much more than its\ntitle implies. The style is quaint and original, and reminds us of\nthat of some of our older writers. It is throughout enriched with a\nnumber of curious and interesting quotations and illustrations,\nwhich display considerable information and research. It is full of\nthe 'spirit of antiquity,' if we may use such an expression, and is\ndeeply imbued with a love for those admirable and venerable\ninstitutions, which we owe to the wisdom of past ages. The defence\nof the practice of chanting, of the whole Cathedral Service, and,\nindeed, of Cathedral institutions altogether, is excellent, and will\nrepay an attentive perusal.\u201d\u2014CHURCHMAN.\n\n\u201cThis clever work is indeed still of the Spirit of Antiquity, and\nevinces great originality and freshness of thought, brilliancy of\nimagination, profound argument, strong feeling, and a thorough and\nhearted love of the cause so eloquently advocated.\u201d\u2014SALISBURY\nHERALD.\n\n -------\n\n In foolscap 8vo. price 8_s._ in cloth, lettered,\n\n THE DEATH OF DEMOSTHENES.\n =And other Original Poems:=\n WITH THE PROMETHEUS AND AGAMEMNON OF \u00c6SCHYLUS,\n TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK,\n BY GEORGE CROKER FOX, ESQ.\n\n\u201cWe hail the publication of this work as a valuable addition to our\nliterature. With an elegant and graceful dedication to our young and\ninteresting Queen, the volume consists of original Poems,\ndistinguished for beauty of thought, expressed in language classic\nand polished; and of translations rarely equalled for fidelity and\nvigour. The Death of Demosthenes is indeed a noble subject, nobly\nexecuted.\u201d... \u201cWe have now done our most arduous but pleasing task,\nto review the finest poems which have appeared for many years. In\nthis utilitarian age of steam and vapour, when, whilst we are going\non with our rail-roads, we are going back in our learning, it is\nrare to find a mind which can think with and emulate the\nancients\u2014give a new charm to classic literature\u2014call forth the\nmighty spirits of Greece\u2014bring them, with all their eloquence and\ngenius, before us\u2014create with them\u2014copy after them. Mr. Fox,\ntherefore, deserves our commendation, and merits our gratitude for\nhis classical volume of poems; for nothing perfect in eloquence,\nnothing perfect in poetry, can be produced, unless we love, study,\nand imitate the great masters of thought and taste\u2014the ancients\u2014\n\n \u201c\u2014\u2014 \u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014color che sanno.\u201d\u2014_Dante._\n\nThe classical is another name for the beautiful, and Mr. Fox\u2019s\nvolume must charm all, except the ignorant without learning, and the\nlearned without taste.\u201d\u2014DUBLIN REVIEW.\n\n -------\n\n In one volume, 8vo. price 16_s._ in cloth, lettered,\n\n A CLASSICAL & ARCH\u00c6OLOGICAL DICTIONARY\n OF THE MANNERS, CUSTOMS, LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, ARTS, &C. OF THE\n CELEBRATED NATIONS OF ANTIQUITY AND OF THE MIDDLE AGES.\n TO WHICH IS PREFIXED\n A SYNOPTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL VIEW OF ANCIENT HISTORY.\n BY P. A. NUTTALL, LL.D.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n In 15 vols. 8vo. price 7_l._ 17_s._ 6_d._ in boards,\n\n TAYLOR'S (BP. JEREMY) WORKS,\n\n With Life, by Bp. HEBER. Third Edition.\n\n -------\n\n ARRIAN ON COURSING,\n\nTranslated from the Greek, with Classical and Practical Annotations,\n and a brief Sketch of the Life of the Author. To which is added an\n Appendix, containing some Account of the Canes Venatici of\n Classical Antiquity; royal 8vo. _24 embellishments from the\n Antique, on India paper_, extra boards, 1_l._ 11_s._ 6_d._\n\n -------\n\n BRYDGES' (THE RT. HON. SIR HARFORD JONES)\n WORKS ON PERSIA.\n\nThe Dynasty of the Kajars, translated from the original Persian\n Manuscript presented by His Majesty Faty Aly Shah to Sir Harford\n Jones Brydges, Bart. K.C. LL.D. late Envoy Extraordinary and\n Minister Plenipotentiary from his Britannic Majesty to the Court\n of Teheran. To which is prefixed, a succinct Account of the\n History of Persia previous to that Period, 8vo. frontispiece and 3\n maps, boards, 1_l._ 4_s._\n\nAn Account of the Transactions of His Majesty\u2019s Mission to the Court\n of Persia in the Years 1807-11, by Sir Harford Jones Brydges,\n Bart. To which is added a brief History of the Wahauby, 2 vols.\n 8vo. plates, bds. 1_l._ 1_s._\n\n -------\n\n DANSEY (REV. W.) ON RURAL DEANS.\n\nHor\u00e6 Decanic\u00e6 Rurales, being an Attempt to illustrate, by a Series\n of Notes and Extracts, the Name and Title, the Origin,\n Appointment, and Functions of Rural Deans, &c. 2 vols. 4to.\n half-bound morocco, top edges gilt, 1_l._ 11_s._ 6_d._\n\nArchdeacon Goddard, in his recent charge, strongly recommends this\nexcellent work to the attentive perusal of every clergyman.\n\n -------\n\n HIGGINS' (G.) CELTIC DRUIDS;\n\nOr an Attempt to show that the Druids were the Priests of Oriental\n Colonies, who emigrated from India, and were the Introducers of\n the first or Cadmean System of Letters, and the builders of\n STONEHENGE, of Carnac, and of other Cyclopean Works in Asia and\n Europe, 4to. map and numerous plates, bds. 3_l._\n\n _Also, by the same Author._\n\n ANACALYPSIS,\n\nAn Attempt to draw aside the Veil of the Saitic Isis; or an Inquiry\n into the Origin of Languages, Nations and Religions, 2 vols. 4to.\n plates, bds. 5_l._\n\n -------\n\n WOODVILLE'S (DR. WM.) MEDICAL BOTANY;\n\nTHIRD EDITION, materially enlarged and improved by Professor Sir\n WILLIAM JACKSON HOOKER, LL.D. F.R.S. L.S. &c. and G. SPRATT, Esq.\n 5 vols. 4to. 310 plates, engraved by Sowerby and Spratt, boards,\n 5_l._ 15_s._ 6_d._ or with the plates finely coloured, 8_l._\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n _In the press, and shortly will be published, in 3 vols. 8vo._\n\n DR. FIELD'S\n BOOK OF THE CHURCH.\n\n =A New Edition, with Notes,=\n\n BY\n\n THE REV. JOHN S. BREWER. M.A.\n OF QUEEN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.\n\n\n -------\n\n\nAs Dr. Field\u2019s Book of the Church has become excessively rare, and,\nthough much in request, is not attainable at any price, the\nPublisher, at the suggestion of several eminent clergymen, has\nundertaken a new edition of this very valuable work. In order to\nrender it worthy of attention, and far superior to all preceding\nones, the Rev. J. S. Brewer (a Gentleman whose well-known diligence\nand accuracy guarantee its being executed in the best manner) has\nkindly offered his services to collate the various editions, to\nverify all the References, and to supply additional Notes where\nnecessary. He has likewise determined, on account of the extreme\nrarity of many of the Authors cited by Dr. Field, to give his\nquotations at full length at the bottom of each page; and at the end\nof every chapter a brief list of writers, especially of English\nDivines, who have treated on the same subject: thus rendering the\nwork a TEXT BOOK OF THEOLOGY.\n\nAs the rarity of this masterpiece of one of our most eminent Divines\nhas prevented its being so universally known as it deserves to be,\nthe Publisher may be pardoned for citing a few among the numerous\ncommendations in its favour.\n\nColeridge, the Poet, in a letter to his son, the Rev. Derwent\nColeridge, emphatically writes:\u2014\u201cTHIS ONE VOLUME, THOROUGHLY\nUNDERSTOOD AND APPROPRIATED, WILL PLACE YOU IN THE HIGHEST RANK OF\nDOCTRINAL CHURCH-OF-ENGLAND DIVINES, AND OF NO MEAN RANK AS A TRUE\nDOCTRINAL CHURCH HISTORIAN.\u201d\n\nKing James I. delighted to discourse with Field on points of\nDivinity, and, when he first preached before him, said: \u201cIs his name\nField? This is the FIELD for God to dwell in.\u201d On hearing of his\ndeath, the King expressed regret, and added, \u201cI should have done\nmore for that man!\u201d\n\nFuller, in the same punning age, calls him, \u201cThat learned Divine,\nwhose memory smelleth like a FIELD which the Lord hath blessed.\u201d\n\nAnthony a Wood tells us he was esteemed \u201cthe best disputant in the\nschools.\u201d\n\n\u201cField was well skilled in School Divinity, and a frequent preacher\nwhile he lived in Oxfordshire, and is said to have been very\ninstrumental in preventing the increase of nonconformity in the\nUniversity.\u201d\u2014GOUGH.\n\n\u201cWhen he first set about writing his book 'OF THE CHURCH,' his old\nacquaintance, Dr. Kettle, dissuaded him, telling him that when once\nhe was engaged in controversy he would never live quietly, but be\ncontinually troubled with answers and replies. To this Field\nanswered, 'I will so write that they shall have no great mind to\nanswer me;' which proved to be nearly the case, as his main\narguments were never refuted.\u201d\u2014CHALMERS.\n\nHeylin, in his \u201cLife of Laud,\u201d calls him, \u201cthe reverend right\nlearned Dr. Field, whose excellent works will keep his name alive to\nsucceeding ages.\u201d\n\n ---------------------\n\n SUBSCRIBERS' NAMES RECEIVED BY\n JOHN BOHN, 17, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note\n\nIn the table of contents, the page number for the final section\n(\u201cLetter to the Right Honourable Edward Howard\u201d) was incorrectly\ngiven as p. 459. The section begins at p. 458 and the correction was\nmade.\n\nAt 42.17, the word \u2018forwardness\u2019 appears. Several lines earlier,\n\u2018frowardness\u2019 is used. The discrepancy is probably a printer\u2019s\nerror. \u2018Froward\u2019 is also used elsewhere: \u2018_froward_ children, weary\nof the controlment of their parents\u2019 (p. 457). Since Hobbes is\ndiscussing a specific behavior, the former has been retained as less\nambiguous.\n\nThe chapter summary for Part II, Chapter II of DE CORPORE POLITICO,\non p. 138, misnumbered section 2 as \u20181\u2019.\n\nOn p. 117, a reference to section 16 of the XIIth chapter of _Human\nNature_ is incorrect. The 6th section of that chapter is the\nobviously correct reference.\n\nOn p. 201, a reference to section 9 of the VIIth chapter of the same\ntext is also incorrect. The 8th section seems to be the intended\nreference.\n\nOther errors deemed most likely to be the printer\u2019s have been\ncorrected, and are noted here. The references are to the page and\nline in the original.\n\n 26.21 I take _nosce t[ei/e i]psum_ for a precept Space added.\n 176.32 Jesus Christ is come in [t]he flesh Added.\n 183.18 is not only not necessa[a/r]y Replaced.\n 216.12 a duty of sovere[i]gns Inserted.\n 248.28 Thus you see the case[ ]put by St. Paul Inserted.\n 270.22 are necess[s]ary. Removed.\n 333.1 nor had he[ he] received Removed.","title":"The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 04 (of 11)","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":134090}