{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_75232/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_75232","id":"gutenberg_75232","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/75232","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Category: Science - Physics","Immortality","Religion and science"],"text":"TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE\n\n Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.\n\n Bold text is denoted by =equal signs=.\n\n A subscript x is denoted by _{x}, for example H_{2}O.\n\n Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have\n been placed at the end of the book.\n\n Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book.\n\n\n\n\nTHE UNSEEN UNIVERSE\n\n ... \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b2\u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b2\u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f70\n \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b2\u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b1\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b2\u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, \u03b1\u1f30\u03ce\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1. \u03a0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n \u039a\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd\u03b8\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u0392\u02b9. \u03b4\u02b9.\n\n Animula! vagula, blandula,\n Hospes comesque corporis,\n Quae nunc abibis in loca,\u2014\n Pallidula, rigida, nudula....\n HADRIAN.\n\n \u2018God hath endowed us with different faculties, suitable and\n proportional to the different objects that engage them. We\n discover sensible things by our senses, rational things by our\n reason, things intellectual by understanding; but divine and\n celestial things he has reserved for the exercise of our faith,\n which is a kind of divine and superior sense in the soul. Our\n reason and understanding may at some times snatch a glimpse,\n but cannot take a steady and adequate prospect of things so\n far above their reach and sphere. Thus, by the help of natural\n reason, I may know there is a God, the first cause and original\n of all things; but his essence, attributes, and will, are hid\n within the veil of inaccessible light, and cannot be discerned\n by us but through faith in his divine revelation. He that walks\n without this light, walks in darkness, though he may strike out\n some faint and glimmering sparkles of his own. And he that, out\n of the gross and wooden dictates of his natural reason, carves\n out a religion to himself, is but a more refined idolater than\n those who worship stocks and stones, hammering an idol out of his\n fancy, and adoring the works of his own imagination. For this\n reason God is nowhere said to be jealous, but upon the account of\n his worship.\u2019\u2014_Pilgrims Progress_, Part III.\n\n \u2018To die,\u2014to sleep;\u2014\n To sleep! perchance to dream;\u2014ay, there\u2019s the rub;\n For in that sleep of death what dreams may come,\n When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,\n Must give us pause.\u2019\u2014SHAKESPEARE, _Hamlet_, Act iii. Scene 1.\n\n\n\n\n [Illustration: (decorative icon)]\n\n THE\n\n UNSEEN UNIVERSE\n\n OR\n\n PHYSICAL SPECULATIONS\n\n ON A\n\n FUTURE STATE\n\n BY\n\n B. STEWART AND P. G. TAIT.\n\n\n \u2014\u2014the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are\n not seen are eternal.\n\n\n _SEVENTH EDITION_\n (_Revised, and Enlarged._)\n\n\n London\n MACMILLAN AND CO\n 1878.\n\n [_All Rights reserved._]\n\n\n\n\n Blessed Lord, who hast caused all holy Scriptures to be written\n for our learning; Grant that we may in such wise hear them, read,\n mark, learn, and inwardly digest them, that by patience, and\n comfort of thy holy Word, we may embrace, and ever hold fast _the\n blessed hope of everlasting life_, which thou hast given us in\n our Saviour Jesus Christ.\u2014_Amen._\n\n\n Edinburgh University Press:\n T. AND A. CONSTABLE, PRINTERS TO HER MAJESTY.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n [_The following was prefixed to our Sixth Edition. Though many\n changes, some of importance, have since been made in the text, we\n do not think it necessary to call attention to them here._]\n\n\nOur readers will find near the end of our work the following\nparagraph, which has appeared in every edition:\u2014\u2018We are in hopes that\nwhen this region of thought comes to be further examined, it may\nlead to some common ground on which followers of science on the one\nhand, and of revealed religion on the other, may meet together and\nrecognise each other\u2019s claims without any sacrifice of the spirit\nof independence, or any diminution of self-respect. Entertaining\nthese views, we shall welcome with sincere pleasure any remarks or\ncriticism on these speculations of ours, whether by the leaders of\nscientific thought, or by those of religious inquiry.\u2019\n\nA work like ours, containing a challenge of this sort, has naturally\ncalled forth a great amount of criticism. Bearing in mind the\nexistence of the \u2018_odium theologicum_,\u2019 we are bound to confess\nthat at first we were disposed to tremble on opening any review of\nour work in a theological journal of repute. We were soon however\ndelightfully perplexed at finding that the leaders of religious\ninquiry were disposed to treat us with the utmost courtesy,\nagreeing with us in very many points, and stating when necessary\nany difference of opinion in a manner calculated alike to preserve\ntheir independence and to conciliate our self-respect. We feel much\ngratified and encouraged by this treatment, and we think that if our\nfourth edition be compared with our first, it will be found that we\npossess some plasticity and have learned to make some use of the\ncriticism so faithfully and courteously bestowed upon us.\n\n * * * * *\n\nHere we would wish to take an opportunity of stating that the\nPrinciple of Continuity as upheld by us has reference solely to the\nintellectual faculties. We are led, for instance, by this principle\nto assert that the process of production of the visible universe must\nhave been of such a nature as to be comprehensible more or less to\nthe higher intelligences of the universe.\n\nBut we are not led to assert the eternity of stuff or matter, for\nthat would denote an unauthorised application to the invisible\nuniverse of the experimental law of the conservation of matter which\nbelongs entirely to the present system of things.\n\nNor are we led to assert that the ether must play some important\npart in our future bodies, for our knowledge of things is vastly too\nlimited to enable us to come to any such conclusion.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNotwithstanding these remarks, if any theologian of repute thinks\nthat our fourth and subsequent editions savour too much of ideas\nof this nature, we will gladly amend our language when a suitable\nopportunity occurs. It is probably due to misconception of our\nwords, possibly to a difficulty, which we have all along felt, of\nfinding words exactly fitted to express some of the more novel of\nthe conceptions to which we have been led, that we have been spoken\nof, to a certain extent even by some friendly critics, as \u2018subtly\nmaterialistic\u2019 or as \u2018loose Positivists.\u2019 Unless we were to coin new\nterms (which we may yet find it necessary to do), it will probably be\nfound all but impossible to escape such charges when writing on such\nmatters.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWhile the treatment we have experienced from the true leaders of\nreligious thought has been all that we could wish, and while some of\nthem have come forward as our champions rather than our critics, we\nregret to think that certain of their following have not invariably\nimitated the good example thus set them. All are not Bayards, whether\nwe regard the temper of the blade or that of the individual who\nwields it.\n\nPages of so-called \u2018extracts\u2019 from our book have been strung\ntogether, now by some writers of the High Church school, anon by\nwriters of the very lowest Evangelical type, in each case with\nabsolute disregard of their original collocation and surroundings,\nand the result is of course as utterly unfair a representation of\nour meaning as could possibly be given. These \u2018extracts,\u2019 which\nare always scrupulously enclosed in inverted commas, are not\nmerely altered in meaning by being arbitrarily detached from the\ncontext\u2014they are often altered by the insertion of terms (_e.g.\nluminiferous force!_) which we, as scientific men, could not possibly\nhave employed.\n\nPeople who adopt a system like this deserve to have, once for all,\nthoroughly brought home to them the bitter rebuke administered to\ntheir analogues long ago by a witty if semi-profane divine, who\nproposed to choose his text on their principle, and gave out, to the\nastonishment of his audience, _part_ only of a verse, viz., \u2018Hang all\nthe law and the prophets\u2019!\n\nWe have placed at the commencement of this Preface the only words of\nours which appear to commit us to controversy, and we trust that a\nstudy of them will convince our readers, as it has convinced us, that\nwe do not stand committed to the hopeless task of entering the lists\nagainst _this species of controversialist_.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt is with reluctance that we have felt ourselves compelled to allude\nto a method of controversy, in our opinion, as deficient in Christian\ncourtesy as it is powerful to stifle the interests of truth.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe attacks which have been made on our work since the sixth edition\nwas published, are (all at least that we have seen) completely met by\nthe _Introduction_. Their basis, when such exists, has usually been\nsome short passage, arbitrarily detached from its context, and thus\nmade susceptible of any gloss desired.\n\n _November 1877._\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.\n\n\nForgetful of the splendid example shown by intellectual giants like\nNewton and Faraday, and aghast at the materialistic statements\nnow-a-days freely made (often professedly in the name of science),\nthe orthodox in religion are in somewhat evil case.\n\nAs a natural consequence of their too hastily reached conclusion,\nthat modern science is incompatible with Christian doctrine, not a\nfew of them have raised an outcry against science itself. This result\nis doubly to be deplored; for there cannot be a doubt that it is\ncalculated to do mischief, not merely to science but to religion.\n\nOur object, in the present work, is to endeavour to show that the\npresumed incompatibility of Science and Religion does not exist.\nThis, indeed, ought to be self-evident to all who believe that the\nCreator of the Universe is Himself the Author of Revelation. But it\nis strangely impressive to note how very little often suffices to\nalarm even the firmest of human faith.\n\nOf course we cannot, in this small volume, enter upon the whole of\nso vast a subject, and we have therefore contented ourselves with\na brief, though, we hope, sufficiently developed discussion of one\nvery important\u2014even fundamental\u2014point. We endeavour to show, in\nfact, that immortality is strictly in accordance with the principle\nof Continuity (rightly viewed); that principle which has been the\nguide of all modern scientific advance. As one result of this inquiry\nwe are led, by strict reasoning on purely scientific grounds, to\nthe probable conclusion that \u2018a life _for_ the unseen, _through_\nthe unseen, is to be regarded as the only perfect life.\u2019 (See Chap.\nVII.) We need not point out here the bearing of this on religion.\nIncidentally, the reader will find many remarks and trains of\nreasoning which (by the alteration of a word or two) can be made to\napply to other points of almost equal importance.\n\nWe may state that the ideas here developed\u2014very imperfectly of\ncourse, as must always be the case in matters of the kind\u2014are not\nthe result of hasty guessing, but have been pressed on us by the\nreflections and discussions of several years.\n\nWe have to thank many of our friends, theological as well as\nscientific, for ready and valuable assistance. The matter of our work\nhas certainly gained by this, though it is likely that the manner may\nhave suffered by the introduction, here and there, of peculiarities\nof style which could not easily be removed without damage to the\nsense.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.\n\n\nAs a preface to our Second Edition, we cannot do better than record\nthe experience derived from our first. It is indeed gratifying to\nfind a wonderful want of unanimity among the critics who assail\nus, and it is probably owing to this cause that we have been able\nto preserve a kind of kinetic stability, just as a man does in\nconsequence of being equally belaboured on all sides by the myriad\npetty impacts of little particles of air.\n\nSome call us infidels, while others represent us as very much too\northodoxly credulous; some call us pantheists, some materialists,\nothers spiritualists. As we cannot belong at once to _all_ these\nvaried categories, the presumption is that we belong to none of them.\nThis, by the way, is our own opinion.\n\nVenturing to classify our critics, we would divide them into three\ngroups:\u2014\n\n (1.) There are those who have doubtless faith in revelation;\n but more especially, sometimes solely, in _their own_ method of\n interpreting it; none, however, in the method according to which\n really scientific men with a wonderful unanimity have been led\n to interpret the works of nature. These critics call us, some\n infidels, some pantheists, some dangerously subtle materialists,\n etc.\n\n (2.) There are those who have faith in the methods according\n to which men of science interpret the laws of nature, but\n none whatever in revelation or theology. These consider us as\n orthodoxly credulous and superstitious, or as writers of \u2018the\n most hardened and impenitent nonsense that ever called itself\n original speculation.\u2019\n\n (3.) There are those who have a profound belief that the\n true principles of science will be found in accordance with\n revelation, and who welcome any work whose object is to endeavour\n to reconcile these two fields of thought. Such men believe that\n the Author of revelation is likewise the Author of nature, and\n that these works of His will ultimately be found to be in perfect\n accord. Such of this school as have yet spoken have approved of\n our work.\n\nOur readers may judge for themselves which of these three classes of\nbelief represents most nearly the true Catholic Faith.\n\nMany of our critics seem to fancy that we presume to attempt such\nan absurdity as a demonstration of Christian truth from a mere\nphysical basis! We simply confute those who (in the outraged name of\nscience) have asserted that science is incompatible with religion.\nSurely it is not _we_ who are dogmatists, but those who assert that\nthe principles and well-ascertained conclusions of science are\nantagonistic to Christianity and immortality. If in the course of our\ndiscussion we are to some extent constructors, and find analogies\nin nature which seem to us to throw light upon the doctrines of\nChristianity, yet in the main our object is rather to break down\nunfounded objections than to construct apologetic arguments. These we\nleave to the Theologian. The Bishop of Manchester has very clearly\ndescribed our position by stating that [_from a purely physical point\nof view_, \u00a7 204] we \u2018contend for the possibility of immortality and\nof a personal God.\u2019\n\nTo vary the metaphor, we have merely stripped off the hideous mask\nwith which materialism has covered the face of nature to find\nunderneath (what every one with faith in anything at all must expect\nto find) something of surpassing beauty, but yet of inscrutable\ndepth. For indeed we are entire believers in the infinite depth of\nnature, and hold that just as we must imagine space and duration to\nbe infinite, so must we imagine the structural complexity of the\nuniverse to be infinite also. To our minds it appears no less false\nto pronounce eternal _that aggregation we call the atom_, than it\nwould be to pronounce eternal _that aggregation we call the Sun_. All\nthis follows from the principle of Continuity, in virtue of which\nwe make scientific progress in the knowledge of things, and which\nleads us, whatever state of things we contemplate, to look for its\nantecedent in some previous state of things also in the Universe.\nThis principle represents the path from the known to the unknown,\nor to speak more precisely, our conviction that there is a path.\nNevertheless it does not authorise us to dogmatise regarding the\nproperties of the unknown lying beyond or at the boundary of our\nlittle \u2018clearing.\u2019 We must go up to it and examine it often, with\nlong continued labour, under great difficulties, before we can at all\nsay what its properties are.\n\nAmong those who recognise us as orthodox, and for that reason attack\nus, there is one of deservedly high authority. Our \u2018brother,\u2019\nProfessor W. K. Clifford, has published a lively attack on our\nspeculations in a recent number of the _Fortnightly Review_. We are\nbound respectfully to consider the arguments of an adversary of his\ncalibre.\n\nHe appears to be unable to conceive the possibility of a spiritual\nbody which shall not die with the natural body. Or rather, he\nconceives that he is in a position to assert, from his knowledge of\nthe universe, that such a thing cannot be. We join issue with him\nat once, for the depth of our ignorance with regard to the unseen\nuniverse forbids us to come to any such conclusion with regard to a\npossible spiritual body.\n\nOur critic begins his article by summoning up or constructing a\nmost grotesque and ludicrous figure, which he calls _our argument_,\nand forthwith proceeds to demolish; and he ends by summoning up a\nhorrible and awful phantom, against which he feelingly warns us.\nThis phantom has already, it seems, destroyed two civilisations, and\nis capable of even worse things, though it is merely the \u2018sifted\nsediment of a residuum.\u2019 He does not tell us whether he means\nReligion in general, or only that particularly objectionable form of\nit called Christianity.\n\nOur critic shows that he has not read our work,\u2014has, in fact, merely\nglanced into it here and there. This is proved by what he says of\nStruve\u2019s notions, on which we lay no stress whatever, while he puts\nthem forward as the mainstay of our argument. We are also made out to\nbe the assertors of a peculiar molecular constitution of the unseen\nuniverse, although with reference to this we say in our work, page\n217, \u2018_for the sake of bringing our ideas in a concrete form before\nthe reader, and for this purpose only_, we will now adopt a definite\nhypothesis.\u2019 Of course it is too much to expect a critic now-a-days\nto read every word of a book which he is content to demolish, _but we\ndid hope he might have noticed the italics_.\n\nOur critic too commits several singular mistakes due to imperfections\nof memory. Why speak of the negative as universal, which appears in\nsuch words as _im_mortality, end_less_ existence, etc., when the\nmost common of all expressions connected with the subject are the\nphrases, \u2018_eternal_ life,\u2019 \u2018_everlasting_ life,\u2019 etc., none of which\ninvolve the negative?\n\nHow the sun could go down upon \u2018Gideon\u2019 is not obvious. Had it done\nso it would certainly have occasioned personal inconvenience (to\nsay the least) to that hero. But what\u2019s in a name? Our critic was\nevidently thinking of Joshua and \u2018Gibeon,\u2019 and why should a critic\ncare about the difference between Amorites and Amalekites? It is a\nmere matter of spelling,\u2014a trifle. Similar mistakes in a previous\narticle are apologised for in a footnote appended to that on the\n\u2018Unseen Universe.\u2019 Probably the author designed the apology to\nextend to it also, but forgot to say so; again a trifle. But it is\nof straws, some even weaker than these, that the imposing article is\nbuilt; so that when we come forth to battle we find nothing to reply\nto.\n\nTo reduce matters to order, we may confidently assert that the\nonly reasonable and defensible alternative to our hypothesis (or,\nat least, something similar to it) is, the stupendous pair of\nassumptions that visible matter is _eternal_, and that IT IS ALIVE.\n(See \u00a7 240.) If any one can be found to uphold notions like these\n(from a scientific point of view), we shall be most happy to enter\nthe lists with him.\n\nWe have made numerous small though sometimes important changes in the\ntext, but none of them at all modify the general tenor of the work as\nit first appeared two months ago.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.\n\n\nWe have reason to think that notwithstanding all we have said,\nthe position we take is not yet clearly understood, and we would\ntherefore utilise the Preface to our Third Edition to put ourselves\nright with the public on this vital point.\n\nTo begin with the scientific side of our argument, we must once more\nmake the statement that it is not we who are the dogmatists, but\nrather that school of scientific men who assert the incompatibility\nof science with Christianity.\n\nPersistent as they have been in their endeavours to close the door\nleading from the seen to the unseen, we as resolutely maintain that\nit must be left open.\n\nThis class take credit to themselves for having thus barred the\nentrance to a throng of superstitious fancies which would inevitably\nrush through an open avenue\u2014forgetting that they have by the same act\nbarred the way to all the higher aspirations of man.\n\nBut though we have founded no argument for immortality on the\nexistence of these higher aspirations, we cannot allow our\nadversaries to bar the way upon the plea that it would inevitably be\nthe resort of unworthy passengers.\n\nIf it be the King\u2019s highway it must be left open; if the unseen\nuniverse be a reality, surely we are not to dismiss it from our minds\nlest some people might entertain absurd views regarding its relation\nto the present visible universe. Such fancies are no new thing in\nthe progress of knowledge. When two things are known to exist, we\nmay have ten thousand erroneous hypotheses regarding their mutual\nrelations, but only one true theory.\n\nIn the next place, we would say one word to that religious school\nwhich is more particularly affected by our present inquiry,\u2014we mean\nthe school who assert the resurrection of our material bodies, and a\ngrossly material future state.\n\nWe have endeavoured to explain to this class of men that their belief\nis inconsistent with the integrity of that Principle of Continuity\nwhich underlies not only all scientific inquiry, but all action of\nany kind in this world of ours.\n\nUnder these circumstances such men have three honest alternatives\nbefore them.\n\nIn the first place they may acknowledge the truth of our position\nand change their views; or, secondly, they may combat our argument\nregarding the alleged incompatibility of their position with the\nPrinciple of Continuity; or, lastly, they may decline to accept this\nscientific principle in matters which concern their faith. What we\ncomplain of is, that the members of this school have chosen none of\nthese alternatives, but have rather attempted to brand us as infidels\nand materialists, apparently forgetting (as usual) that such a method\nof conducting a discussion is neither Christ-like nor convincing.\n\nBut while one class of religious men have tried to brand us with\nthese names, those of another school consider our theology narrow\nand gloomy. We reply to these men that we do not pretend to be\ntheologians in any sense of the word. Our position in this respect\nhas been greatly misunderstood. We are, no doubt, endeavouring to\nbring about a reconciliation between science and religion. In order\nto accomplish this we must first find out what is the fundamental\nprinciple of science, next what is the fundamental creed of the great\nmajority of Christians, and then endeavour to show that the two are\nnot incompatible with each other. In carrying out this process we\nhave been led to regard the Principle of Continuity as the great law\nwhich regulates scientific inquiry, and there cannot be a doubt that\nthe Old and New Testaments are regarded as authoritative expositions\nof religious truth by the great majority of the Church of Christ.\n\nNow we find that the expressions in the Scriptures regarding the\nfuture of man and the constitution of the unseen world, taken\nin their obvious, if not absolutely literal meaning, are not\ninconsistent with scientific deductions from the Principle of\nContinuity.\n\nWe know very well that, especially of late years, a multitude of\nreligious schools have risen up who take many of these expressions in\na non-literal and far from obvious acceptation, and who, perhaps, do\nnot accord the same authority to the writers as was formerly done.\nInto the disputes between these various religious schools we do not\npretend to enter, nor do we see that the Shibboleths of such schools\ncan be affected by our arguments, inasmuch as their discussions have,\nin the great majority of cases, nothing whatever to do with Physical\nprinciples. They are rather founded on historical, or moral, or\nmetaphysical considerations, all of which are foreign to our argument.\n\nHaving no pretensions to a title which we certainly do not covet, we\ntrust that we shall no longer be regarded as theologians either of a\nnarrow and gloomy, or a lax and heretical school, or indeed of any\nschool whatsoever.\n\n _September 1875._\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE FOURTH AND FIFTH EDITIONS.\n\n\nIn consequence of misapprehensions into which several of our critics\nhave fallen, we have prefixed to this edition an Introduction wherein\nthe objects of our work, and the mode in which we seek to attain\nthem, are fully but compactly explained. We need therefore say\nnothing on these matters here. The work has been greatly enlarged,\nand in many parts almost rewritten; but we have nowhere found it\nnecessary to alter or recall any of the statements hitherto made by\nus.\n\nAs we now give our names, we can at length complain of the conduct of\na London \u2018Weekly,\u2019 which, only a few days after the first appearance\nof our book, took the (we hope) very unusual course of stating the\nauthorship as a matter of absolute fact, not of conjecture. It was,\nof course, not authorised to do so, either by ourselves or by our\nPublisher:\u2014and we regret to find that the exigencies of competition\nfor public favour can be thought capable of justifying, in the eyes\nof any one, such a course of conduct.\n\nAs Professors of Natural Philosophy we have one sad remark to make.\nThe great majority of our critics have exhibited almost absolute\nignorance as to the proper use of the term _Force_, which has had\none, and only one, definite scientific sense since the publication\nof the _Principia_. As such men are usually among the exceptionally\nwell educated, ignorance of this important question must be all but\nuniversal. In addition to what we have said on the subject in the\ntext (\u00a7 97), we would now only mention that the sole recorded case\nof true Persistency or Indestructibility of Force which we recollect\nhaving ever met with, occurs in connection with Baron Munchausen\u2019s\nremarkable descent from the moon. It is, no doubt, a very striking\ncase; but it is apparently unique, and it was not subjected to\nscientific scrutiny.\n\n B. STEWART. P. G. TAIT.\n\n _April 1876._\n\n\n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS.\n\n\n Page\n INTRODUCTION, 1\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n\n INTRODUCTORY SKETCH.\n Article\n Object of the Book, 1 22\n Two classes of speculators, 2 24\n Why doubters of immortality have lately increased, 3 26\n\n _Belief of the Ancient Egyptians_\u2014\n Separation between priests and people, 4 26\n The abode of the dead, 5 27\n Transmigration of souls, 6 28\n Embalming of the body, 7 28\n\n _Belief of the Ancient Hebrews_\u2014\n Position of Moses, 8-9 28\n His task, 10 29\n Belief of the Jews in an unseen world, 11 30\n Their belief in a future state, 12 31\n Their belief in a resurrection, 13 32\n\n _Belief of the Ancient Greeks and Romans_\u2014\n Unsubstantial nature of Elysium, 14 33\n Transmigration introduced, 15 34\n Rise of the Epicurean school, 16 36\n Uncertainty of philosophic opinion, 17 37\n\n _Belief of the Eastern Aryans_\u2014\n The Rig-Veda, 18 37\n It inculcates immortality, 19 39\n Double source of corruption, 20 40\n Zoroastrian reformation and tenets, 21-22 40\n Reformation of Buddha, 23 41\n Meaning of Nirv\u00e2_n_a, 24 42\n\n Observations on ancient beliefs, 25-29 43\n\n _Belief of the Disciples of Christ_\u2014\n The resurrection of Christ, 30 47\n Future state taught by Christ, 31-32 49\n Perishable nature of that which is seen, 33 50\n The Christian Heaven and Hell, 34 51\n General opinion regarding the person of Christ, 35 52\n General opinion regarding the position of Christ, 36 53\n\n Spread of the Christian religion, 37 54\n\n Rise of Mohammed, 38 55\n\n Materialistic conceptions of the dark ages, 39 57\n\n Extreme scientific school, 40-41 59\n\n Points of similarity between this school and Christians, 42 60\n\n Varieties of opinions among Christians, 43-44 60\n\n Believers in a new revelation, 45 62\n\n Swedenborg and his doctrines, 46 63\n\n Remarks on Swedenborg, 47 65\n\n Modern spiritualists, 48-49 67\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n\n POSITION TAKEN BY THE AUTHORS\u2014PHYSICAL AXIOMS.\n\n Class of readers to whom the Authors appeal, 50-53 69\n\n _Position assumed by the Authors_\u2014\n Laws of the universe defined, 54 72\n Embodiment of some sort essential, 55 73\n Materialistic position described, 55 74\n Unjustifiable assumptions of materialists, 56-58 74\n Intimacy of connection between mind and matter, 59 77\n\n _Essential requisites for continued existence_\u2014\n An organ of memory, 60 78\n Possibility of action in the present, 61 78\n\n _Principle of Continuity_\u2014\n Illustrated by reference to astronomy, 62-75 79\n Breach of the principle illustrated, 76 87\n Extension to other faculties of man, 77 88\n\n _Application of this principle to Christian miracles_\u2014\n Erroneous position of old divines, 78 89\n Such opposed to the genius of Christianity, 79 90\n New method of explanation, 80-82 90\n\n _Application of this principle to the doctrines of the\n extreme scientific school_\u2014\n The visible universe will probably come to an end\n in transformable energy, 83-84 92\n It must have been developed out of the invisible, 85 94\n\n THE UNIVERSE,\u2014 86 95\n Similar errors committed by the extreme schools of\n theology and science, 87 96\n\n _Application of this principle to Immortality_\u2014\n Three conceivable suppositions, 88 96\n These reduced to two, 89 97\n Future course of our argument, 90 97\n The problem may be profitably discussed, 91 98\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\n THE PRESENT PHYSICAL UNIVERSE.\n\n Definition of the term \u2018Physical Universe\u2019, 92 99\n\n It contains something else besides _matter_ or _stuff_, 93 100\n\n Grounds of our belief in an external universe, 94 101\n\n These in accordance with our definition of the laws of\n the universe (Art. 54), 95 102\n\n Meaning of conservation, 96 103\n\n [Use and Abuse of the Term _Force_,] 97 104\n\n Conservation of _Momentum_, 97 105\n\n Conservation of _Moment of Momentum_, 97 106\n\n Conservation of _Vis Viva_, 97 107\n\n Definition of _Energy_, 98-99 108\n\n Newton\u2019s second interpretation of his Third Law, 99-100 108\n\n Friction changes work into heat, 101 110\n\n Historical sketch of the theory of energy, 102-103 112\n\n Transformability of energy constitutes its use, 104 115\n\n Case where energy is useless, 105 116\n\n _Historical Sketch of Second Law of Thermodynamics_\u2014\n *Carnot\u2019s perfect heat-engine, *106 117\n *Sir W. Thomson\u2019s definition of absolute\n temperature, *107 118\n *Melting point of ice lowered by pressure, *108 120\n *Sir W. Thomson\u2019s rectification of Carnot\u2019s\n reasoning, *109-*110 120\n *Professor J. Clerk-Maxwell\u2019s demons, *111-*113 122\n\n Degradation of energy, 114 126\n\n Future of the physical universe, 114-115 126\n\n Past of the physical universe, 116 128\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\n MATTER AND ETHER.\n\n Inquiry regarding structure and material of the universe, 117 129\n\n _Various hypotheses regarding matter_\u2014\n (1.) Greek notion of the _Atom_, 118 130\n Speculations of Lucretius, 119-130 131\n (2.) Theory of Boscovich (centres of force), 131 137\n (3.) Theory of infinite divisibility, 132 138\n (4.) Vortex-atom theory, 133-134 139\n Remarks on these theories, 135-136 141\n\n Relative quantity of matter associated with energy, 137-138 142\n\n _Universal gravitation_\u2014\n Is a weak force, 139 144\n Two ways of accounting for it, 140 145\n Le Sage\u2019s hypothesis, 141-142 146\n\n _The Ethereal medium_\u2014\n Its principal properties apparently incongruous, 143 148\n Analogy of Professor Stokes, 144 149\n Distortion and displacement of ether, 145 149\n Inferior limit of its density, 146 150\n Its supposed imperfect transparency, 147 151\n Remarks on ether, 148 153\n\n Remarks on the speculations of this chapter, 149-150 154\n\n Modification of the vortex-ring hypothesis, 151-152 155\n\n Possible disappearance of the visible universe, 153 157\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n\n DEVELOPMENT.\n\n Nature of inquiry stated, 154 158\n\n _Chemical development_\u2014\n Changes in lists of elementary substances, 155 159\n Prout\u2019s speculations, 156 160\n Experiments of M. Stas, 156 160\n Family groups, 157 161\n Mr. Lockyer\u2019s speculations, 158-159 161\n\n _Globe development_\u2014\n Hypothesis of Kant and Laplace, 160 163\n Tendency to aggregation of mass, 161-162 164\n Process cannot have been going on for ever, 163 166\n Peculiarity of products developed inorganically, 164 167\n\n _Life development_\u2014\n Morphological and physiological species, 165 168\n Species regarded physiologically, 166 170\n Position of a certain class of theologians, 167 171\n Tendency to minor variations, 168 172\n Artificial selection, 169 174\n Natural selection, 170 175\n Unproved point in the Darwinian hypothesis, 171 175\n Remarks of Mr. Darwin, 172 177\n Development of the Darwinian hypothesis, 173 177\n Mr. Wallace\u2019s views, 174 178\n Professor Huxley\u2019s remarks, 175 178\n Position assumed by the authors, 176 179\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n\n SPECULATIONS AS TO POSSIBILITY OF SUPERIOR INTELLIGENCES\n IN THE VISIBLE UNIVERSE.\n\n Position of life in the present physical universe, 177 180\n\n Two kinds of equilibrium, 178 181\n\n Two kinds of machines or material systems, 179 182\n\n Two respects in which a living being resembles a machine, 180 183\n\n A living being resembles a delicately constructed machine, 181 185\n\n The delicacy is due to chemical instability, 182 186\n\n Delicacy of construction derived from the sun\u2019s rays, 183 186\n\n Delicacy of construction in atmospheric changes, 184 187\n\n Worship of powers of nature\u2014medi\u00e6val superstitions, 185 189\n\n Theory which attributes a soul to the universe, 186 190\n\n Real point at issue stated, 187 190\n\n Man presents the highest order of the present visible\n universe, 188 191\n\n The same idea pervades the Old Testament, 189 192\n\n And it likewise pervades the New Testament, 190-191 193\n\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n\n THE UNSEEN UNIVERSE.\n\n Decadence of the visible universe, 192-193 195\n\n Its arrangements apparently wasteful, 194 197\n\n Explanation of this, 195 197\n\n Memory of the universe, 196-197 198\n\n Connection between seen and unseen, 197-198 198\n\n Physical explanation of a future state, 199-201 199\n\n Dr. Thomas Young\u2019s conception of the unseen, 202 200\n\n _Objections to the proposed theory of a future state\n replied to_\u2014\n Religious, 203 202\n Theological, 204-207 202\n Scientific, 208-212 206\n Quasi-scientific, 213 210\n\n _Miracles and the Resurrection of Christ_\u2014\n Objections of extreme school stated, 214 211\n How these are to be met, 215 212\n Development has produced the visible universe, 216 214\n Its atoms resemble manufactured articles, 217 215\n Development through intelligence, 218-219 215\n Idea presented in concrete form, 220 218\n Christian theory of the development of the\n universe, 221-227 223\n Life development\u2014Biogenesis, 228-229 228\n Life comes from the Unseen Universe, 230 230\n Christian theory of life development, 231 232\n Position of life in the universe discussed, 232-238 233\n Meteoric hypothesis implies Discontinuity, 239 240\n Discussion of the notion that all matter is, in\n some simple sense, alive, 240-241 242\n Life, as well as matter, comes to us from the\n Unseen Universe, 242-243 243\n Position reviewed, 244 246\n Miracles possible without breach of Continuity, 245 247\n\n Peculiar communication with the unseen in the case of\n Christ, 246 248\n\n Apparent breaks are concealed avenues leading to the\n unseen, 247 249\n\n Probable nature of present connection between seen and\n unseen. Efficacy of Prayer, 248 250\n\n Angelic intelligences, 249 251\n\n Remarks on God\u2019s providential government, 250-252 253\n\n Our argument may be very much detached from all\n conceptions of the Divine essence, 253 257\n\n Christian conceptions of Heaven, 254 258\n\n Two ideas in all Christian hymns, 255 259\n\n Possible glimpse into the conditions of the future\n life, 256-257 260\n\n Darker side of the future, 258 262\n\n Plato on the markings of the soul, 259 263\n\n Christian Gehenna, 260 264\n\n Medi\u00e6val idea of Hell, 261 265\n\n The _process_ in the Gehenna of the New Testament\n apparently an enduring one, 262 267\n\n Personality of the Evil One asserted by Scripture, 263 269\n\n Brief statement of the results of this discussion, 264 270\n\n The scientific conclusion is directly against the\n opponents of Christianity, 265 271\n\n Criticism invited from leaders of scientific thought\n or of religious inquiry, 266 272\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nThe present age is one of very rapid progress in almost all branches\nof knowledge.\n\nLike a wave swelling as it advances shoreward, this progress has\nviolently transformed whole regions of thought, while it has\nrepeatedly invaded others not heretofore deemed accessible to such\ncatastrophes.\n\nPresuming upon a soil of great natural richness, the inhabitants of\nthese latter regions had for a long series of years given themselves\nup to a species of husbandry which was beginning at length to be\ndetrimental in its effects.\n\nIt thus came to pass that while the immediate result of each\ninundation was a sudden alarm and consequent confusion, yet\nnevertheless a fertilising residuum was always left behind,\ntogether with a very plain intimation that no region of thought\ncan permanently flourish if it be entirely cut off from any of the\nintellectual influences around it.\n\nSuchlike, we take it, have been the results of the recent great\nfloods of intellectual energy, much of them seemingly subversive,\nwhich have repeatedly invaded the region occupied by the followers\nof Christianity. At present there is no book more read than the\nBible, no life more deeply studied and discussed than the life of\nChrist. There is probably a greater amount of earnest attention\ndevoted to these subjects than to any other branch of human inquiry.\nNevertheless there is great confusion, and an almost despairing\noutcry from many of the inhabitants of the Christian region. It is\nimagined that fences and landmarks have disappeared, and that at\nlength the rising tide is about to attack, as it has long threatened,\nthe very lives and holdings of the community.\n\nIt will be our endeavour to reassure these somewhat over-timid\npeople. Being students of physical science, we will try to gauge the\nstrength of the tide, and more especially of the forces which give\nit motion, and endeavour to convince those who are sufficiently calm\nto receive conviction, that there neither is nor can be any real\ndanger to their lives and holdings from the violence of the waters;\nbut that, on the contrary, they will ultimately receive a blessing\nfrom that which will remain behind after the present confusion has\ndisappeared.\n\n\u2018Skin for skin,\u2019 said a certain evil one, \u2018yea all that a man\nhath will he give for his life,\u2019 and the proverb is true (with\na modification) as regards the life of the soul, no less than\nas regards that of the body. Take away all hope of a future\nstate,\u2014appear to demonstrate, if not with absolute certainty,\nyet with an approach to it, that such a condition of things is\nantagonistic to well-understood scientific principles, and we feel\ncertain that the effect upon humanity would be simply disastrous.\n\nAt any rate, those who propound an argument of this kind must\nreasonably expect determined opposition from the followers of\nreligion.\n\nLet us here, before proceeding further, take the opportunity of\nstating that we discuss only the _physical_ aspects of the argument\nregarding a future state. Being neither metaphysicians nor moral\nphilosophers, we leave to others more competent than we can be the\nargument which may be based upon the universal craving among the\nintelligent races of mankind for a life beyond the grave.\n\nIn the fourth and following editions of our work, while we have not\nmaterially altered our argument, we have recast to some extent the\nshape in which it was first put before the reader, and this recasting\nhas taken a more definite form in our present edition.\n\nThe large amount of friendly criticism which our work has called\nforth has convinced us that we did not at first sufficiently\nseparate between certain conclusions which inevitably flowed from\nour argument, and certain others which, while deriving their strength\nfrom a totally different quarter, were yet not inconsistent with the\nformer, but even, it might be, supported by them. The consequence\nhas been that we have found ourselves credited with attempts\nwhich were very far from our thoughts, such, for instance, as the\nendeavour to deduce Christian theological doctrine from mere physical\nconsiderations.\n\nWe have therefore thought it desirable to bring in review before the\nreader, in this introductory chapter, the fundamental points of our\nargument, more especially as in what follows we may not always be\nable without an undesirable formality to keep separate the foundation\nand the superstructure.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn his justly renowned _Analogy_, Bishop Butler begins with a chapter\non a future life. He says with great truth that if there is an idea\nthat death will be the destruction of living powers, that idea must\narise either from _the reason of the thing_ or _the analogy of\nnature_. \u2018But it does not arise (he proceeds to say) from _the reason\nof the thing_; for we do not know what death is. Again, we do not\nknow on what the existence of our living powers depends; for we see\nthem suspended in sleep, for example, or in a swoon, and still not\nextinguished. Neither does it arise from _the analogy of nature_; for\ndeath removes all sensible proof, and precludes us consequently from\ntracing out any analogy which would warrant us in inferring their\ndestruction.\u2019 Now, it is well known that since the days of Bishop\nButler a school has arisen, the members of which assert that they\nhave at length learned what Death is, and that in virtue of their\nknowledge they are in a position to tell us that life is impossible\nafter death. It is one of the main objects of this volume to\ndemonstrate the fallacy which underlies the argument brought forward\nby this school. We attempt to show that we are absolutely driven\nby scientific principles to acknowledge the existence of an Unseen\nUniverse, and by scientific analogy to conclude that it is full of\nlife and intelligence\u2014that it is in fact a spiritual universe and not\na dead one.\n\nBut while we are fully justified by scientific considerations in\nasserting the existence of such an unseen universe, we are not\njustified in assuming that we have yet attained, or can easily or\nperhaps ever attain, to more than a very slight knowledge of its\nnature. Thus we do not believe that we can really ascertain what\ndeath is.\n\nTo those, therefore, who assert that there is no spiritual unseen\nworld, and that death is an end of the existence of the individual,\nwe reply by simply denying their first statement, and in consequence\nof this denial, insisting that none of us know anything whatever\nabout death. Indeed, it is at once apparent that a scientific denial\nof the possibility of life after death must be linked with at least\nsomething like a scientific proof of the non-existence of a spiritual\nunseen world. For if scientific analogy be against a spiritual\nUnseen, then evidently it is equally against the likelihood of life\nafter death.\n\nBut if, on the other hand, we feel constrained to believe in a\nspiritual universe, then though it does not follow that life is\ncertain after death, inasmuch as we do not know whether any provision\nhas been made in this unseen world for our reception, yet it does\nfollow that we cannot deny the possibility of a future life. For to\ndo so would imply on our part such an exhaustive knowledge of the\nUnseen as would justify us in believing that no arrangement had been\nmade in it for our transference thither. Now, our almost absolute\nignorance with regard to the Unseen must prevent us from coming to\nany such conclusion.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWe have been accused by some of our critics of being dogmatists.\nSo far is this from being true that in the first part of our\nargument\u2014namely, that which relates to a spiritual unseen:\u2014we\nare content to develop from the present recognised condition of\nthings. We take the world as we find it, and are forced by a purely\nscientific process to recognise the existence of an Unseen Universe.\n\nWe are likewise led to regard the Unseen as having given birth to the\npresent universe, a conclusion to which one of our leading critics\nhas apparently given his assent.\n\nHere, however, we join issue with the materialistic school. They\ncontinue to insist\u2014against all analogy as we take it\u2014that this Unseen\nUniverse is a dead one, having no life worthy of the name, although\nit must have existed for inconceivable ages before the present\nUniverse arose.\n\nLet our readers remark that in all this we introduce no dogma\u2014we do\nnot require to assert or even assume the existence of God. We are\ncontent to develop our argument from a position which is common to\nour adversaries and to ourselves.\n\nAn objection has been raised that our argument tends to the\nSwedenborgian doctrine of a spiritual body. Now, the same principles\nwhich guide us from the continuous existence of the outer world\nto acknowledge an Unseen, lead us on the assumption of our own\nexistence after death to acknowledge what we may term a spiritual\nbody. In other words, our conception of something which retains at\nonce a hold upon the past and a possibility of future life assumes\nthe form which we clothe in this or similar language.[1] But why\nSwedenborgian? Why not Pauline? Was it not the great Apostle who\nfirst gave utterance to his belief in these very words? If it be said\nto us that the way in which we regard the spiritual body is decidedly\nSwedenborgian, we would reply by asking our critics to tell us in\nwhat way we regard it.\n\nWe certainly hold that if we are to accept scientific principles,\none of the necessary conditions of immortality is a frame surviving\ndeath, but we as resolutely maintain that of the nature of this frame\nwe are and must probably remain profoundly ignorant.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt has likewise been objected that we do not sufficiently allow for\nthe possibility that the present universe may be infinite, and that\nthus it might last for ever and continue, although spasmodically,\nto be the residence of living beings even in spite of the constant\ndegradation of its energy. Unquestionably we cannot prove that the\npresent visible universe is not infinite; this we have acknowledged\nin our work. But our chief argument is derived rather from the past\nthan from the future. We maintain that the visible universe\u2014that is\nto say the universe of atoms\u2014must have had its origin in time, and\nthat while THE UNIVERSE is, in its widest sense, alike eternal and\ninfinite, the universe of atoms certainly cannot have existed from\nall eternity.\n\nWhile we freely confess that we cannot prove the finite magnitude of\nthe universe of atoms, inasmuch as we cannot be sure that the stars\nwhich we see represent more than a small portion of this universe,\nwe are unable to perceive any scientific principle which leads us to\nconclude that the number of such atoms must necessarily be infinite.\n\nBut whether it be finite or infinite, we have very great difficulty\nin imagining this universe to be eternal. Regarding the atom as\nsomething that has been developed from a previously existing unseen\nuniverse, we cannot readily believe it capable of lasting for ever.\nBut if there be any element of decay in the material substance of the\nvisible universe, the assumption of its present infinity will not\nenable us to predicate its future eternity.\n\nHaving thus defined our position, we may allow that in our earlier\neditions we have possibly given undue prominence to the particular\nargument in favour of an Unseen, which is derived from the future\ndegradation of the energy of the present visible universe.\n\nWe come now to the second part of our subject. All that we have yet\nendeavoured to show is that the theory of a future life is not in any\nway whatever in contradiction to any ascertained facts or principles\nof science. But we have not succeeded in finding any proof that\narrangements have been made in the Unseen world for our translation\nthither after death.\n\nIt has been shown that there is nothing in the whole range of\nscience to lead us to suppose that life is impossible after death;\nbut we have yet to inquire what evidence, if any, exists in favour\nof a future state. Now it is well known that the followers of\nChristianity believe they have received such evidence in virtue of\nthe resurrection of Christ, and it is equally well known that of late\nyears a school of scientific men have arisen who reject such an event\nas one impossible to be believed.\n\nIt is not, however, rejected mainly because it is an uncommon event,\nor one unconfirmed by modern experience, for it is sufficiently well\nknown that uncommon events have a recognised place in the universe.\nThus, for instance, there are certain conjunctions of the planets\nwhich are very uncommon, and have not occurred in modern experience,\nbut we do not hesitate for a moment to believe in the possibility of\ntheir occurrence. Nay, we are in a position to go further, and to\nassert that at particular epochs of time, which we are capable of\ndefining with greater or less precision, such uncommon conjunctions\ntook place in the past, and will again take place in the future.\nAn absolutely new comet, one which (from the fact that its orbit\nis hyperbolic) was probably never in the solar system before, and\nprobably cannot again return to it, is by no means a rarity.\n\nNow we believe that an extension of purely scientific logic drives us\nto receive as quite certain the occurrence of two events which are\nas incomprehensible as any miracle; these are:\u2014the introduction of\nvisible matter and its energy, and of visible living things into the\nuniverse. Furthermore, we are led by scientific analogy to regard the\nagency in virtue of which these two astounding events were brought\nabout as an intelligent agency, an agency whose choice of the time\nfor action is determined by considerations similar in their nature to\nthose which influence a human being when he chooses the proper moment\nfor the accomplishment of his purpose.\n\nIf this be true, the discussion regarding miracles must be removed\naltogether from the domain of science, and this for the very good\nreason that scientific logic admits the occurrence of events at least\nas astounding. The question is now rather one for the historian and\nthe moral philosopher to decide. The first of these is clearly bound\nto examine the evidence in favour of the life and resurrection of\nChrist, while the latter is bound to look around and ask what moral\nnecessity there was for the interference of this peculiar intelligent\nagency, and also whether, as a matter of fact, the interference has\nproved beneficial.\n\nBut neither of these two ways of regarding the subject is at all\ncognate to our inquiry.\n\nWe simply show that a reception of the miracles of Christ leads to no\nintellectual confusion. Meanwhile, there are some who regard such a\nreception as tending to historical confusion, or to moral confusion,\nor to both; but with these sources of doubt we have nothing whatever\nto do. It may be thought by some of our readers that here our\ndiscussion ought to end; but, as it appears to us, there yet remains\nanother point vitally connected with our inquiry. There is, perhaps,\nhardly a human being who seriously questions the moral beauty of the\ncharacter of Christ; there are many who question the truth of the\nmiracles recorded as having been wrought by Him; while still more, it\nmay be, question the truth of certain of His sayings, especially such\nas have reference to the constitution of the Unseen world.\n\nEntertaining the most profound reverence for Christ Himself, many\nof the latter class, rather than believe that Christ enuntiated the\ndoctrine to which they object, maintain that it may have been a late\nhuman fiction which grew up with and finally incrusted itself around\nthe true sayings of Christ: some again maintain that the sayings were\nreally those of Christ, but insist that the common interpretation\nof them is erroneous. On this account we conceive that in order\nto complete our programme we should extend our inquiry beyond the\nmiracles of Christ so as to embrace those of His sayings which have\nreference to Himself and to the constitution of the Unseen world. We\nare thus led to the consideration of another subject, which is, we\nventure to think, intimately connected with that which appears on our\ntitle-page; and in this respect the Bishop of Manchester has very\nclearly defined our position by stating that (_from a purely physical\npoint of view_) we contend for the possibility of immortality and of\na personal God.\n\nWe must now, however, start from a new basis and assume the existence\nof a Deity who is the Creator and Upholder of all things. It is not\nour intention to enter into the argument by which the existence of\na Deity may be derived from a consideration of His works. Here,\ntherefore, we must necessarily part company with our materialistic\nfriends, for while they may have been content to go along with us\nin our first argument to a greater or less length, they will most\nassuredly not even set foot upon the second stage of our journey. We\ncannot help it.\n\nAssuming therefore the existence of a Deity, who is the Creator\nand Upholder of all things, we further look upon the laws of the\nuniverse as those laws according to which the beings in the universe\nare conditioned by the Governor thereof, as regards time, place, and\nsensation.\n\nNothing whatever lies, or can be even conceived to lie, outside of\nthis sovereign and paramount influence. There is no impression made\nupon the bodily senses\u2014no thought or other mental operation which\ndoes not take place under conditions imposed by the will of God.\n\nIf it be asked how we can imagine any free-will or moral\nresponsibility to exist consistently with this doctrine, we may\nreply that we cannot tell in virtue of what peculiar constitution\nof things the sovereignty of God is consistent with our moral\nresponsibility, nor can we even conceive the possibility of our\nobtaining the knowledge requisite to reply to this question. But it\nmay, we think, be shown that the doctrine of the sovereign power of\nGod as above defined is not inconsistent with moral responsibility.\nFor in the statement made three things are spoken of. _In the first\nplace_, there is God, the source of power; _secondly_, there are the\nconditions which He imposes; and _thirdly_, there is the Ego, the\nbeing who is thus conditioned. Now, the laws of thought absolutely\nforbid our dismissing this Ego. It may possibly be argued that we\nconsist of a bundle of sensations bound together, just as a bundle\nof threads are, by something which is no less a sensation, namely,\nthe impression that we have an individual existence and moral\nresponsibility; to which we would reply that even if this be granted\nwe must submit to impressions from which there is no escape.\n\nNow, it appears to us that we cannot possibly have any impression\nmore deeply seated or more impossible to uproot than this:\u2014that\nwe ourselves exist and are responsible; it is something which we\ncontinually carry about with us, even into the grotesque regions\nof thought, where all individuality is denied. It is into these\nregions that the materialists invite us to accompany them in order\nto perform, or rather to delude ourselves with the idea that we have\nperformed, this singularly unhappy despatch! But, just as we cannot\nconceive of a man swallowing up himself, so neither can we conceive\nof his getting rid of his own individuality by any legitimate\nprocess of thought. Can we conceive of consciousness without a\nbeing who is conscious? or of sensation without a being who feels?\nWe may perhaps take it for granted that the statements we have now\nmade, acknowledging at once a Sovereign Power and our own moral\nresponsibility, will commend themselves to a large body of thinkers\nwho will virtually agree with our conclusions. It is to these we\nwould now address ourselves, inviting them to accompany us upon the\nsecond stage of our journey.\n\nLet us here, therefore, regarding ourselves as moral and intellectual\nbeings, bear in mind that there are various avenues through which we\nreceive instruction. We do not, of course, mean that these avenues\nare absolutely separate from each other, inasmuch as they must all\nsomehow or other merge into the one grand avenue through which we\nperceive the Sovereign Power of God. Such avenues are,\u2014the study of\nmatter and its laws,\u2014communion with our fellows, and\u2014example.\n\nNow why should not all these various avenues be filled with the\nknowledge of God, thus effecting the displacement of a vast throng of\nmean and loathsome influences which would otherwise run riot there?\n\nSurely that must be a singular process of reasoning by which the\nMost High is altogether banished from these avenues into which it\nis alleged He cannot possibly condescend to enter. We are confident\nthere is some misapprehension here; let us therefore try to point out\nits probable nature.\n\nWe have assumed that a study of creation leads us up to some\nconception of God\u2014that we are driven by the faculties which He has\ngiven us to acknowledge the existence of a Paramount Power, and\ninasmuch as scientific thought leads us to regard THE UNIVERSE as\nboth infinite and eternal, so are we driven to regard this Power\nwhich underlies all phenomena as infinite and eternal also.\n\nThis at least appears to us to be the conclusion to which we are\ndriven if we endeavour to reduce mental confusion to a minimum. It\nis, however, manifestly absurd to imagine that by means of this\nprocess we can ever comprehend the essential nature of God. We can\nno more comprehend His essential nature by this means than we can\nthe essential nature of matter or of life. But surely we can judge\nof His character by the various modes in which He influences us, and\nindeed all scientific generalisations\u2014even the simple conclusion\nthat the sun will rise to-morrow\u2014are in a sense expressions of our\nfaith in the unchanging character of God. Now if we examine the\nprocess by which we have obtained this conception of God it will be\nseen that we start with a single intellectual being who is applying\nhimself to a scientific study of the works of nature. The idea of our\nneighbour does not enter into it, and we agree to regard ourselves\nas intellectual rather than as moral or social beings. The result\nis that having voluntarily confined our argument to one channel,\nwe obtain a knowledge of God\u2019s character\u2014that is to say, of His\nmanifested relations towards us\u2014which is necessarily incomplete. But\nare we therefore entitled to say:\u2014Because we obtain a very imperfect\nconception of God by this method, we will not believe there is any\nother method by which this conception may be rendered more complete?\n\nSound argument, it appears to us, leads the other way altogether.\nFor if we assume that the knowledge of God derived from one source\nis incomplete, ought we not to try whether it can be supplemented\nby knowledge derived from other sources? Undoubtedly if other\nsources furnish, or seem to furnish, conceptions of God which are\nfundamentally inconsistent with that which we have derived through\nthe scientific channel, we are entitled to sit in intellectual\njudgment upon them until the source of confusion is in some way\nremoved.\n\nBut does this inconsistency as a matter of fact exist? We do not\nthink it does. The statements in the New Testament scriptures\nregarding God are necessarily mysterious, but mystery can be no test\nof their truth or falsehood, inasmuch as it must in such regions be\nthe almost inevitable accompaniment of truth.\n\nThe question is not whether they are mysterious, but whether they are\nconsistent with themselves, and with the knowledge we derive from\nother sources. We therefore devote considerable portions of this\nvolume to a proof that the conception of God which the majority of\nChristians derive from the New Testament is in no way inconsistent\nwith that deduced from scientific principles.\n\nMeanwhile, and in conclusion, we must be allowed to express our\nconviction that much evil has been wrought by a certain class of\nsincere and well-meaning men in the various churches of Christ. By\ndint of contemplating lofty truths from one point of view, and only\none, and by dint of developing excessively, and in one direction\nonly, those analogies by which the mysterious has been rendered\nthinkable, they have produced a result for which they themselves are\nmainly to blame. With a strange reversal of the process by which\nSatan transforms himself into an Angel of Light, we have the noble,\nthe beautiful, and the true presented to us by these men in a form\nwhich is fit only to inspire aversion or to create disgust.\n\nIt is in such terms that we reply to those of our critics, on the one\nhand, who attack us for adopting what they call a narrow and gloomy\ntheology; and to those, on the other hand, who regard as dangerous\nthe method of discussion we have pursued. We have tried honestly to\nview things with two eyes,\u2014the eye of knowledge and the eye of faith:\nfirst with one, then with the other, finally with both. To what\nextent we have succeeded is, after all, a matter of minor importance\nif only the lawfulness of this mode of vision be ultimately allowed.\nAnd just as we have a better appretiation of the form and distance of\nnatural objects when we view them with both our physical eyes, so, we\nventure to think, must it prove with the truths of which we now speak.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWe have explained that the first part of our argument is altogether\nindependent of revelation; proceeding as it does solely upon\nscientific data, and the conclusions which these seem to render\ninevitable. In the second part, however, we feel that we ought not\nto deprive ourselves of the overwhelming additional evidence which\nwe derive from Christian records. Here, therefore, we shall neither\ngratify one class of our critics by starting from a point which\nignores what we regard as the fully warranted belief of the great\nmajority of Christians, nor shall we be overruled by the excessive\ntimidity of another class who apparently regard a two-eyed man as a\nmonster in those regions where truths of really vital importance are\nconcerned.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe horrors and blasphemies of Materialism are at least every first\nday of the week so fully treated by many theologians that it is\nalmost unnecessary for us to say anything on their view of the\nsubject, especially as we could not compete with the great majority\nof them in strength and happy audacity of language. We would\ntherefore content ourselves with mildly inquiring what sort of regard\nfor the image of the Divine in humanity is shown by those whose creed\nlevels us all with \u2018the beasts that _perish_.\u2019 Even the antient\nPagans were less disposed to such monstrosities:\u2014\n\n \u2018. . . . . . . . .\n finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.\n pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram,\n os homini sublime dedit: c\u0153lumque tueri\n jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.\n sic, modo quae fuerat rudis et sine imagine, tellus\n induit ignotas hominum conversa figuras.\u2019\n\nIt is well for the human race that such sophistical doctrines as\nthose of Materialism are as yet received by a small minority only.\n\u2018If in this life alone we have hope,\u2019 we should be led by common\nsense and prudence to make the best of it, our neighbour\u2019s sufferings\nnotwithstanding. At least we should listen to him only as did the\njudge \u2018who neither feared God, nor regarded man,\u2019 when he said, \u2018This\nwidow troubleth me; I will avenge her, lest by her continual coming\nshe weary me.\u2019\n\nWe would conclude by observing that the natural disinclination to\nreceive as true a religion whose very first effect is \u2018to convict\nthe world of sin,\u2019 is admirably set forth in the striking words of\nPeter[2]: \u2018Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord.\u2019\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nINTRODUCTORY SKETCH.\n\n \u2018L\u2019immortalit\u00e9 de l\u2019\u00e2me est une chose qui nous importe si fort,\n et qui nous touche si profond\u00e9ment, qu\u2019il faut avoir perdu tout\n sentiment pour \u00eatre dans l\u2019indiff\u00e9rence de savoir ce qui en\n est.\u2019\u2014PASCAL.\n\n \u2018For he should persevere until he has attained one of two things;\n either he should discover or learn the truth about them, or,\n if this is impossible, I would have him take the best and most\n irrefragable of human notions, and let this be the raft upon\n which he sails through life\u2014not without risk, as I admit, if he\n cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely\n carry him.\u2019\u2014PLATO\u2019S _Ph\u00e6do_; translated by JOWETT.\n\n\n1. The great majority of mankind have always believed in some fashion\nin a life after death; many in the essential immortality of the soul;\nbut it is certain that we find many disbelievers in such doctrines\nwho yet retain the nobler attributes of humanity. It may, however, be\nquestioned whether it be possible even to imagine the great bulk of\nour race to have lost their belief in a future state of existence,\nand yet to have retained the virtues of civilised and well-ordered\ncommunities.\n\nWe have said that the disbelievers in such doctrines form a minority\nof the race; but at the same time it must be acknowledged that the\nstrength of this minority has of late years greatly increased, so\nmuch so that at the present moment it numbers in its ranks not a few\nof the most intelligent, the most earnest, and the most virtuous of\nmen.\n\nIt is, however, possible that, could we examine these, we should find\nthem to be unwilling disbelievers, compelled by the working of their\nintellects to abandon the desire of their hearts, only after many\nstruggles, and with much bitterness of spirit.\n\nOthers, again, without absolutely abandoning all hope of a future\nexistence, are yet full of doubt regarding it, and have settled down\ninto the belief that we cannot come to any reasonable conclusion\nupon the subject. Now, these men can have had nothing to gain, but\nrather much to lose, in arriving at this result. It has been reached\nby them with reluctance, with misgivings, not without a certain kind\nof persecution, nor without the loss of friends and the stirring up\nof strife; still they have fearlessly looked things in the face, and\nhave followed whithersoever they imagined they were led by facts,\neven to the brink of an abyss.\n\nIt is the object of the present volume to examine the intellectual\nprocess which has brought about such results, and we hope to be able\nto show not only that the conclusion at which these men have arrived\nis not justified by what we know of the physical universe, but that\non the other hand there are many lines of thought which point very\nstrongly towards an opposite conclusion.\n\n2. A division as old as Aristotle separates[3] speculators into two\ngreat classes,\u2014those who study the How of the Universe, and those\nwho study the Why. All men of science are embraced in the former\nof these, all men of religion in the latter. The former regard the\nUniverse as a huge machine, and their object is to study the laws\nwhich regulate its working; the latter again speculate about the\nobject of the machine, and what sort of work it is intended to\nproduce. The disciples of How are accused by their adversaries of\nbeing willing to sacrifice the individual to the system; while the\ndisciples of Why are accused by _their_ adversaries of being willing\nto sacrifice the system to the individual.\n\nWe may compare the Universe to a great steamer plying between two\nwell-known ports, and carrying two sets of passengers. The one\nset remain on deck and try to make out, as well as they can, the\nmind of the Captain regarding the future of their voyage after\nthey have reached the port to which they know they are all fast\nhastening, while the other set remain below and examine the engines.\nOccasionally there is much wrangling at the top of the ladder where\nthe two sets meet, some of those who have examined the engines\nand the ship asserting that the passengers will all be inevitably\nwrecked at the next port, it being physically impossible that the\ngood ship can carry them further. To whom those on deck reply,\nthat they have perfect confidence in the Captain, who has informed\nsome of those nearest him that the passengers will not be wrecked,\nbut will be carried in safety past the port to an unknown land of\nfelicity. And so the altercation goes on; some who have been on deck\nbeing unwilling or unable to examine the engines, and some who have\nexamined the engines preferring to remain below.\n\n3. Our readers will perceive from what we have said, that\ndifficulties regarding the possibility of a future state of existence\nare most likely to arise amidst the disciples of How or those who\nstudy the machinery of the Universe, and inasmuch as this class has\ngreatly increased of late, it follows that the disbelievers in or\ndoubters of the future state have increased likewise. The disciples\nof Why have, on the other hand, existed from time immemorial,\nand have, in the plenitude of their power, frequently carried\nthemselves with much violence towards the disciples of How, who are\nof comparatively modern origin. It must not, however, be inferred\nthat this old and venerable family have always been at peace amongst\nthemselves, for there have been numerous contentions among their\nvarious sections, not the less acrimonious because the contending\nmembers have been to some extent supporters of a common cause,\nbelieving in some fashion in the reality of a world to come. We shall\ntherefore begin by giving our readers a sketch, necessarily and\npurposely a very meagre one, of the various beliefs on these subjects\nheld by the different branches of this great family.\n\n4. Let us begin with the Egyptians, who are perhaps the most antient\npeople of whom we have historical records. The manners and customs\nof this nation have been very minutely described by Sir Gardner\nWilkinson, to whose work we are chiefly indebted for the following\naccount. In the first place it appears that we must separate between\nwhat the priests believed and what was held by the great body of the\npeople. The bulk of the nation were left by the priests to believe in\na multiplicity of deities, and even to reverence animals as divine,\nwhile on the other hand the higher orders of the priesthood, who\nwere initiated into the greater mysteries of their religion, appear\nto have acknowledged the unity of God. These believed in one Eternal\nGod, from whom all other deities were produced, and whom they did\nnot permit themselves even to name, far less to represent under any\nvisible form. The Egyptians likewise believed in the existence of\nD\u00e6mons or Genii, who were present unseen amongst mankind.\n\n5. The earliest Egyptian records attest the belief of this nation in\nthe immortality of the soul:\u2014\u2018Dissolution, according to them, is only\nthe cause of reproduction\u2014nothing perishes which has once existed,\nand things which appear to be destroyed only change their natures and\npass into another form.\u2019[4]\n\nAnubis held in Egypt an office similar to that of Mercury among\nthe Greeks, being the usher of souls in their passage to the\nfuture state. Amenti was the region to which the souls of men were\nsupposed to go after death, and Sir Gardner Wilkinson notices the\nresemblance between this name and that of Ement \u2018the West\u2019\u2014the west,\nwhere the sun was seen to sink, being looked upon as the end of the\nworld. The guardian of the lower regions was called Ouom-n-Amenti,\nor the Devourer of Amenti. It had frequently the appearance of a\nhippopotamus, but was drawn sometimes with the head of a fanciful\ncreature something between the hippopotamus and the crocodile.\n\n\u2018The judgment of the soul was conducted by Osiris, aided by forty-two\nassessors, supposed to represent the forty-two crimes from which a\nvirtuous man was expected to be free when judged in a future state,\nor rather the accusing spirits, each of whom examined if the deceased\nwas guilty of the peculiar crime which it was his province to\navenge.\u2019[5]\n\n6. As regards the fate of the soul when once the judgment had been\npassed upon it,\u2014the Egyptians considered the souls of men to be\nemanations of the Divine soul, and each was supposed to return to\nits Divine origin when sufficiently pure to unite with the Deity. On\nthe other hand, those who had been guilty of sin were doomed to pass\nthrough a series of torments ending in the second death.\n\n7. It is considered probable by some that the Egyptian custom of\nembalming the body had relation to this religious doctrine, and\nbefore the mummy was allowed burial it had to be judged and acquitted\nby terrestrial authorities. Diodorus gives a detailed account of the\nceremonies which then took place, in which forty-two judges were\nsummoned to act as assessors and determine the fate of the body. If\nit could be proved that the deceased had led an evil life, his body\nwas deprived of the accustomed burial, and on such occasions the\ngrief and shame felt by the family were excessive. Diodorus considers\nthat this was in itself a strong inducement to every one to abstain\nfrom crime, and praises very strongly the authors of so wise an\ninstitution.\n\n8. Let us next consider the antient belief of the Hebrew nation.\n\nReferring to the records of this nation, we find that at an early\nperiod they had been slaves or serfs to the Egyptians, from whom\nthey were delivered by Moses, who became afterwards their lawgiver.\nMoses had by a species of adoption obtained a very prominent position\namong the Egyptians, and had probably been initiated into their\nsacred mysteries, for we read that he was \u2018learned in all the wisdom\nof the Egyptians.\u2019 Without discussing the question of inspiration,\nwe may readily imagine that, himself a believer in the unity of\nGod, this sagacious leader must have perceived the deficiency of a\nreligious system in which the truth was confined to a few, while the\nmany were allowed to remain in the most degrading idolatry.\n\nHe was thus in a fit state to recognise the paramount importance of\nthe whole mind and mass of the nation being pervaded with a belief\nin one invisible, ever-present, ever-living God. We do not, however,\nmean to assert that Moses got his religious notions from Egypt, but\nwe think it possible that his mind may have been prepared by the\nfailure of the Egyptian system to receive a better one.\n\n9. In the Egyptian system there were two peculiarities which were\nprobably connected together. We have seen (Art. 4) that amongst the\nhigher orders of the priesthood there was a profound, but at the same\ntime a superstitious, reverence for the name of God, who was unnamed\nand unapproachable, unless under some deified attribute. At the\nsame time there was, and probably in consequence of the former, an\nignorance of the unity of God amongst the great mass of the people,\nand a worship of the various deified attributes of one supreme being\nas so many separate divinities.\n\n10. Now the task which Moses believed himself divinely commissioned\nto accomplish was the revelation of this one living and ruling God\nto the whole body of his countrymen. Thus we find God, in the sacred\nwritings of the Jews, saying to Moses, \u2018I am the LORD (Jehovah),\nand I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the\nname of God Almighty (El Shaddai); but by my name Jehovah was I\nnot known to them.\u2019[6] We do not however intend to discuss the\nprecise meaning of the two names of God, which we find in the Hebrew\nScriptures\u2014sufficient for us that Moses endeavoured to impress upon\nhis people the unity and ever-living presence of the Divine Being.\n\n11. Again, it would appear that the Jews, in addition to their belief\nas a nation in the unity of God, believed also in the reality of an\ninvisible world containing spiritual intelligences, some of whom were\nthe loyal servants and messengers of God, while others delighted in\nthe endeavour to thwart His counsels, and were in rebellion against\nHim. Apparently both orders of these were supposed to have very\nconsiderable power, not only over the minds and bodies of men, but\nalso over the operations of nature. Thus two angels were commissioned\nby God to destroy Sodom;[7] and again, in the poem of Job, when Satan\nreceived power over the Patriarch, he overwhelmed him by at once\ninciting robbers who plundered his substance, killing his children\nby a wind from the wilderness, and finally smiting the body of Job\nhimself with a loathsome disease.\n\nIt is perhaps worthy of note that while we read in these records of\nvarious appearances of good spirits in the human form, we have no\ncertain account of any such manifestation of evil spirits. It may\neven be supposed that a good deal of the Demonology of Scripture\nbelongs to poetic or semi-parabolic representation of spiritual\ntruths. Thus Coleridge and others have thought that the Satan of Job\nis only the dramatic accuser or adversary imagined by the poet.\n\n12. Very little is said about man\u2019s future state in the Scriptures of\nthe Jews. The Hebrews, like the Assyrians and Chaldeans, believed in\nSheol (Hades), a dark and gloomy abode peopled by the shades of the\ndead. But the continued existence of the \u2018pithless\u2019 shades (Rephaim)\nin this land of powerlessness and forgetfulness was not thought of as\nconstituting immortality, but rather as the essence of death itself.\nThe religious hope of immortality which appears in some passages of\nthe Old Testament takes the form of a victory over or rescue from the\nfear of Sheol. But this higher hope was not brought before the mind\nof the Hebrew nation in the same way as was the presence and unity\nof God. It seems to us that Dean Stanley\u2019s conjecture is probably\ncorrect where he says, with reference to this omission, \u2018Not from\nwant of religion, but (if we might use the expression) from excess\nof religion, was this void left in the Jewish mind. The future life\nwas not denied or contradicted, but it was overlooked, set aside,\novershadowed by the consciousness of the living, actual presence of\nGod Himself. That truth, at least in the limited conceptions of the\nyouthful nation, was too vast to admit of any rival truth, however\nprecious. When David or Hezekiah shrank from the gloomy vacancy of\nthe grave, it was because they feared lest, when death closed their\neyes in the present world, they should lose their hold on that Divine\nfriend with whose being and communion the present world had in their\nminds been so closely interwoven.\u2019[8]\n\n13. As the nation grew older we find frequent and distinct allusions\nindicating a belief in a resurrection of some kind. Thus we find the\nangel saying to Daniel, \u2018And many of them which sleep in the dust of\nthe earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame\nand everlasting contempt. And they that be wise shall shine as the\nbrightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness\nas the stars for ever and ever.\u2019[9] And again: \u2018Go thy way till the\nend be; for thou shalt rest and stand in thy lot at the end of the\ndays.\u2019[10] Again, in the Apocrypha, we find one of seven brethren who\nwere put to death by Antiochus, saying to that tyrant,\u2014\u2018It is good,\nbeing put to death by men, to look for hope from God, to be raised\nup again by Him; as for thee, thou shalt have no resurrection to\nlife,\u2019[11] and the other brethren spoke in like manner. Here it is\nevident from the whole chapter that the hope expressed was rather the\nresult of perfect trust in God than derived from any process of their\nown reason, or even from any revelation on the subject which they\nimagined to have been made.\n\nWe have likewise the testimony of Josephus as well as of the\nNew Testament that the Pharisees believed in a resurrection.\nJosephus tells us,\u2014\u2018They [the Pharisees] say that all souls are\nincorruptible, but that the souls of good men only are removed into\nother bodies, but that the souls of bad men are subject to eternal\npunishment.\u2019[12] Again, we learn from the same two authorities that\nthe Sadducees held sceptical notions on the subject, and Josephus\nsays\u2014\u2018They take away the belief of the immortal duration of the soul,\nand the punishments and rewards in Hades.\u2019\n\n14. If we next turn to the Greek and Roman mythologies we find ideas\nof a future state very similar to those entertained by the Egyptians,\nfrom whom probably the Greek notions were originally largely derived.\n\nThey called by the name of Elysium the abode appropriated to the\nsouls of the good, while those of the wicked suffered punishment in\nTartarus. It has been well remarked by Archbishop Whately that these\nregions were supposed to be of the most dreamy and unsubstantial\nnature:\u2014\n\n\u2018The poet [remarks Whately] from whom so many were content to derive\ntheir creed [meaning Homer] represents Achilles among the shades as\ndeclaring that the life of the meanest drudge on earth is preferable\nto the very highest of the unsubstantial glories of Elysium:\u2014\n\n \u0392\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03af\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03ba\u2019 \u1f10\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u1f7c\u03bd \u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u03c5\u03ad\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u1ff3,\n \u1f08\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bb\u03ae\u03c1\u1ff3, \u1fa7 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b7,\n \u1f2a \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03cd\u03b5\u03c3\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u03b8\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd.\n\nIt is remarkable too that the same poet seems plainly to regard the\n_body_ not the _soul_ as being properly \u201cthe man\u201d after death has\nseparated them. _We_ should be apt to say that such a one\u2019s body is\nhere, and that _he_, properly the person himself, is departed to the\nother world; but Homer uses the very opposite language in speaking of\nthe heroes slain before Troy: viz., that their souls were despatched\nto the shades, and that THEY themselves were left a prey to dogs and\nbirds:\u2014\n\n \u03a0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f30\u03c6\u03b8\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03a8\u03a5\u03a7\u0391\u03a3 \u1f0c\u03ca\u03b4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u0390\u03b1\u03c8\u03b5\u03bd\n \u1f29\u03c1\u03ce\u03c9\u03bd, \u0391\u03a5\u03a4\u039f\u03a5\u03a3 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f11\u03bb\u03ce\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b5\u1fe6\u03c7\u03b5 \u03ba\u03cd\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\u2019[13]\n\nWe agree with this writer that the belief in an unsubstantial\nregion of this description can have had no real influence either in\ndeterring men from vice, or in encouraging them to virtue. Indeed\nits inevitable tendency must have been to foster an undue regard for\nthe pleasures of this present life to the absolute discouragement\nof goodness and virtue. For while we of the present day regard the\nfuture life as in some sense the reward of piety and goodness, the\nantients looked upon Hades rather as a penalty which inexorable fate\nhad reserved for all men, and from which even piety and goodness were\npowerless to exempt their possessors.\n\n Cum semel occideris, et de te splendida Minos\n Fecerit arbitria;\n Non, Torquate, genus, non te facundia, non te\n Restituet pietas.\n Infernis neque enim tenebris Diana pudicum\n Liberat Hippolytum;\n Nec Leth\u00e6a valet Theseus abrumpere caro\n Vincula Pirith\u00f6o.\n\n15. The active-minded as well as the gross-minded members of\nthe community could hardly be expected to care much for such an\nunsubstantial future, and this consideration may probably have\nled to the readier acceptance of the doctrine of some of the Greek\nphilosophers who introduced a bodily state after death. But these,\nin so doing, rather favoured the doctrine of transmigration than\nthat of a resurrection of the body which was seen to die, and which,\nafter being devoured by dogs, or destroyed in some other manner,\nthey could hardly conceive to rise again. It is well known that\nPythagoras taught the doctrine of transmigration, although as none of\nhis writings have come down to us we are not sure of the exact manner\nin which he held it. Plato also alludes to a similar doctrine, in a\npassage which refers no doubt to the doctrine of the pre-existence of\nsouls, and to the view that it is a punishment to become corporeal\nat all. He tells us:\u2014\u2018If any one\u2019s life has been virtuous he shall\nobtain a better fate hereafter; if wicked a worse. But no soul will\nreturn to its pristine condition till the expiration of ten thousand\nyears, since it will not recover the use of its wings until that\nperiod, except it be the soul of one who has philosophised sincerely\nor together with philosophy has loved beautiful forms. These indeed\nin the third period of a thousand years, if they have thrice chosen\nthis mode of life in succession, ... shall in the three thousandth\nyear fly away to their pristine abode, but other souls, being arrived\nat the end of their first life, shall be judged. And of those who are\njudged, some, proceeding to a subterraneous place of judgment, shall\nthere sustain the punishments they have deserved; but others, in\nconsequence of a favourable judgment, being elevated into a certain\ncelestial place, shall pass their time in a manner becoming the\nlife they have lived in a human shape. And in the thousandth year\nboth the kinds of those who have been judged, returning to the lot\nand election of a second life, shall each of them receive a life\nagreeable to his desire. Here also the human soul shall pass into the\nlife of a beast, and from that of a beast again into a man if it has\nfirst been the soul of a man. For the soul which has never perceived\nthe truth cannot pass into the human form.\u2019[14] A certain degree of\nchoice is here supposed to be left to the soul, and those who cannot\nattain to the more ethereal and refined existence, have to choose a\nbodily one, returning, after they have become sufficiently purified,\nonce more into human shape.\n\n16. As a matter of course, a dim belief of this nature gave rise\nto a class of philosophers who denied the possibility of a future\nstate altogether. The advent of this school of thought was probably\nhastened by outward events. In the golden age of Greece a vigorous\nrepublic served to concentrate upon itself the energies of the\ncitizens, and under these circumstances their minds were not likely\nto question the truth of the national creed. While the gods smiled\nupon them they were content to acknowledge their active existence.\nIt has been remarked by Schmitz, that the unfavourable political\ncircumstances of the time may have been concerned in the rise of\nthe Epicurean school\u2014\u2018thinking men were led to seek within for that\nwhich they could not find without.\u2019 The gods of Epicurus, this writer\ngoes on to remark, \u2018consisted of atoms, and were in the enjoyment of\nperfect happiness, which had not been disturbed by the laborious\nbusiness of creating the world, and as the government of the world\nwould interfere with their happiness, Epicurus conceived them as\nexercising no influence whatever upon the world or man.\u2019\n\nIt is of such gods the poet speaks when he says:\u2014\n\n \u2018For they lie beside their nectar, and the bolts are hurl\u2019d\n Far below them in the valleys, and the clouds are lightly curl\u2019d\n Round their golden houses, girdled with the gleaming world\n Where they smile in secret, looking over wasted lands,\n Blight and famine, plague and earthquake, roaring deeps and\n fiery sands,\n Clanging fights, and flaming towns, and sinking ships and\n praying hands.\u2019\n\nThe antient Roman poet Lucretius, in his well-known poem \u2018De Rerum\nNatura,\u2019 has beautifully interpreted the Epicurean philosophy.\nAdopting like Epicurus the atomic or corpuscular theory of things, he\ntells his readers that the soul of man perishes along with the body,\nand that it is the height of folly for man to be afraid of that which\nmay happen to him after death.\n\n17. It is unnecessary to discuss in detail the tenets of the various\nGreek and Roman philosophers. A number of indefinite and sometimes\ncontradictory expressions sufficiently betrays the uncertainty of\ntheir opinions. Desirous, it may be, themselves to believe\u2014desirous\nat least that the body of their countrymen should believe\u2014in a future\nstate, it is yet not wonderful that they should have felt strongly\nthe difficulty of believing, or have expressed their doubts in\nwritings which were not intended to be read by the great mass of the\npeople.\n\n18. Proceeding now to the extreme east, it is well known that of late\nyears very great light has been thrown upon the antient religions\nof the Brahmans, the Magians, and the Buddhists. In an admirable\ncollection of essays by Professor Max M\u00fcller,[15] we have a good\nepitome of what has been accomplished by the laborious investigations\nof oriental scholars. We learn from these that the most antient\ndocument is the Rig-Veda, or Sacred Hymns of the Brahmans, in which\nwe have the religious belief of a large section of the Indo-Germanic\nrace at a period supposed to be from 1200 to 2000 years before the\nChristian era. In these hymns the gods are called Deva, a word which\nis conjectured to be the same with the Latin Deus. \u2018It would be\neasy,\u2019 says Max M\u00fcller, \u2018to find in the numerous hymns of the Veda\npassages in which every important deity is represented as supreme\nand absolute. Thus in one hymn, Agni (fire) is called \u201cthe ruler of\nthe universe.\u201d... In another hymn, another god, Indra, is said to be\ngreater than all. \u201cThe gods,\u201d it is said, \u201cdo not reach thee, Indra,\nnor men,\u2014thou overcomest all creatures in strength.\u201d... Another\ngod, Soma, is called the king of the world, the king of heaven and\nearth, the conqueror of all.... Another poet says of another god,\nVaru_n_a, \u201cThou art lord of all, of heaven and earth; thou art the\nking of all, of those who are gods, and of those who are men.\u201d...\nThis surely,\u2019 remarks Max M\u00fcller, \u2018is not what is commonly understood\nby Polytheism. Yet it would be equally wrong to call it Monotheism.\nIf we must have a name for it, I should call it Kathenotheism.\nThe consciousness that all the deities are but different names of\none and the same godhead, breaks forth indeed here and there in\nthe Veda. But it is far from being general. One poet for instance\nsays, \u201cThey call him Indra, Mitra, Varu_n_a, Agni; then he is the\nbeautiful-winged heavenly Garutmat\u2014that which is one, the wise call\nit, in divers manners; they call it Agni, Yama, M\u00e2tari_s_van.\u201d\u2019\n\n19. We learn from the same author that \u2018there is in the Veda no trace\nof metempsychosis, or that transmigration of souls from human to\nanimal bodies, which is generally supposed to be a distinguishing\nfeature of Indian religion. Instead of this we find what is really\nthe _sine qu\u00e2 non_ of all real religion, a belief in immortality and\nin personal immortality.... Thus we read, He who gives alms goes to\nthe highest place in heaven; he goes to the gods.... Again we find\nthis prayer addressed to Soma:\u2014\n\n\u2018Where there is eternal light, in the world where the sun is placed,\nin that immortal, imperishable world place me, O Soma!\n\n\u2018Where King Vaivasvata reigns, where the secret place of heaven is,\nwhere these mighty waters are, there make me immortal!\n\n\u2018Where there is happiness and delight, where joy and pleasure reside,\nwhere the desires of our desire are attained, there make me immortal!\u2019\n\nMax M\u00fcller further remarks, that the Rig-Veda contains allusions,\nalthough vague, to a place of punishment for the wicked. \u2018The dogs\nof Yama, the king of the departed, present some terrible aspects,\nand Yama is asked to protect the departed from them. Again, a pit is\nmentioned, into which the lawless are said to be hurled down, and\ninto which Indra casts those who offer no sacrifices.\u2019\n\n20. A religion like this, however pure at its commencement, was\nlikely soon to become corrupted. It speedily merged into idolatry\nand polytheism, as far at least as the main body of the worshippers\nwere concerned, while at the same time the rule of the Brahmans\nor officiating priests became strengthened into an insupportable\nsocial tyranny. Thus a double reformation was to be apprehended,\ncorresponding on the one hand to the religious, and on the other to\nthe ceremonial and social, development of the system.\n\n21. The first reformation was that attributed to Zoroaster and his\ndisciples, whose belief is contained in the Zend-Avesta. In his\nconfession of faith, the disciple of the Eranian or Zoroastrian\nreligion declares, \u2018I cease to be a worshipper of the da\u00eavas.\u2019\n\nIt must however be remembered that in this religion _daeva_ means\n_devil_, or evil spirit. Thus the earliest forms of the Zoroastrian\nreligion need not have excluded, and apparently did not exclude, the\nworship of good spirits.\n\nWhilst the Zoroastrian disciples believed in a supreme God who rules\nthe world, they yet gave a prominent place to a spirit of evil, which\nafterwards received the name of Ahriman, and was supposed to exercise\nvery considerable influence over the order of nature and the minds\nof men. Indeed, Ahriman is apparently an independent power so strong\nthat but for the fact that he acts before he thinks, while Ormuzd\n(the good spirit) thinks before he acts, the victory of good would\nbe doubtful. The whole system hinges on this and on the fact that\neverything noxious and evil in creation is the work of Ahriman.\n\nMax M\u00fcller is of opinion that \u2018the Zoroastrian religion was founded\non a solemn protest against the whole worship of the powers of\nnature involved in the Vedas;\u2019 and again the same writer says, \u2018The\ncharacteristic change that has taken place between the Veda and\nAvesta is, that the battle is no longer a conflict of gods and demons\nfor cows (alluding to a Vaidik myth), nor of light and darkness for\nrain. It is the battle of a pious man against the power of evil.\u2019\n\n22. The disciples of the Zoroastrian religion believed in a future\nstate; the ill-speaker (the devil), we are told in the Zend-Avesta,\nshall not destroy the second life.\n\nThe following extracts given by Max M\u00fcller from a catechism of the\nmodern Parsis or disciples of Zoroaster give us a very good idea of\ntheir present creed:\u2014\n\n\u2018Q. Whom do we of the Zarthosti community believe in?\n\n\u2018A. We believe in only one God, and we do not believe in any besides\nHim.\n\n\u2018Q. Do we not believe in any other God?\n\n\u2018A. Whoever believes in any other God but this is an infidel, and\nshall suffer the punishment of hell.\u2019\n\nIn another extract the disciples are told that in the world to come\nthey shall receive the return according to their actions.\n\n23. The next reform of the Brahminical system had reference to its\nsocial characteristics, and was occasioned by the insupportable\ntyranny of the priesthood. The reformer, a young prince, was born\nabout 500 years B.C., and from his life and doctrines received the\nname of Buddha, or the Enlightened. After having learned from\nvarious famous Brahmans, he came to the conclusion that their\nausterities and doctrines could neither free men from the miseries of\nthis life nor from the fear of death. From this stage Buddha passed\ninto the belief that all we see is vanity\u2014a delusion, a dream\u2014and\nthat the highest wisdom consists in perceiving this, and in desiring\nto enter into Nirv\u00e2_n_a, or, in other words, to be blown out like a\nflame.\n\nIt would seem from these words that Buddha himself regarded\nannihilation rather than immortality as the _summum bonum_; but no\naccount of Buddhism would be satisfactory which did not pay special\nregard to the notion so widely diffused in heathenism, that matter\nis the source of all evil. To be liberated from _matter_ is to be\nliberated from _evil_; and this would seem to be the fundamental\nthought in the Nirv\u00e2_n_a in all its different senses. But however\nthis may be, we know that, allied to these extreme metaphysical\nopinions, Buddha inculcated a moral code which is one of the purest\nthe world has ever known. M. Laboulaye says, \u2018It is difficult to\ncomprehend how men not assisted by revelation could have soared so\nhigh;\u2019 and M. Barth\u00e9lemy Saint-Hilaire does not hesitate to assert\nthat \u2018with the sole exception of Christ, there is not amongst the\nfounders of religion a more pure or touching figure than that of\nBuddha.\u2019\n\n24. In process of time, among the followers of the Buddhist religion,\nthe word Nirv\u00e2_n_a came to have a very different meaning from that\nwhich it had at first. Buddha was himself worshipped as a divinity,\nand his Nirv\u00e2_n_a came to denote a state in which there was a total\nabsence of pain, or in other words an Elysium.\n\nIn illustration of this we may quote the account given by Max M\u00fcller\nof the dying words of Hiouen-Thsang, a famous pilgrim from China to\nthe shrine of Buddha, who died in the year of our era 664:\u2014\n\n\u2018I desire,\u2019 he said, \u2018that whatever merits I may have gained by good\nworks may fall upon other people. May I be born again with them in\nthe heaven of the blessed, be admitted to the family of Mi-le, and\nserve the Buddha of the future who is full of kindness and affection.\nWhen I descend again upon earth, to pass through other forms of\nexistence, I desire at every new birth to fulfil my duties towards\nBuddha, and arrive at the last at the highest and most perfect\nintelligence.\u2019\n\n25. Having thus surveyed, however imperfectly, the belief regarding\na future state held by the greater nations both of the East and West\nbefore the advent of Christianity, let us now make a few observations.\n\nIn the first place, there are manifestly two ways in which such a\nbelief may be held. In one of these it becomes the natural result\nof an implicit faith in God and his goodness, which will not suffer\nhim to disappoint the natural and innate longings of his intelligent\ncreatures. And such a belief is most likely to arise amongst a nation\nwhich has already vividly realised the living presence and goodness\nof God. Now the ancient Jews were such a nation, and the belief that\neven death cannot break the fellowship of the believer with God\ncomes out clearly enough in several of the Psalms. Moreover, the\nnotion of some sort of future life lies clearly in what is said of\nEnoch. All this goes beyond the mere notion of Sheol, which is not\nthought of as a happy place. But in the time of the Maccabees this\nhad grown into a definite belief in the resurrection, and without\ninsisting on the truthfulness of the Second Book of Maccabees as an\nhistorical document, we may yet be sure that it embodies the feelings\nof the Jewish nation at the time when it was written. It is of little\nconsequence whether a mother and seven brethren were actually put\nto death because they would not transgress what they believed to be\nthe laws of God, or whether in dying they expressed their belief\nthat they would be continued in a bodily existence by the Creator.\nFor it is manifest from what we know of the Jews, that not merely\none family but many would under similar circumstances have acted in\nthe manner described by the historian, dying with the same fortitude\nand encouraged by the same hope. We have here a region in which\nthere is no thought of the How\u2014this troublesome question has not yet\narisen, nor is it likely to arise. No doubt has yet been entertained\nregarding the power of God, nor would such a doubt be likely to\nreceive much encouragement here.\n\n26. But the human mind will not refrain from speculation, and\nthis brings us to the second method in which a belief regarding a\nfuture state may be held. It may be held after a mode determined by\nspeculations regarding the possible conditions of a future state.\nSuch speculations may of course take every variety of form, but yet\nthere are three well-defined classes into which they naturally group\nthemselves:\u2014\n\n_In the first place_, we have the doctrine of an ethereal state,\nwhich may or may not be eternal;\n\n_Secondly_, we have the doctrine of a bodily existence, which may or\nmay not be eternal; and,\n\n_In the third place_, we have the doctrine that a future state is\ninconceivable or impossible.\n\n27. The first of these beliefs was probably held by a portion of\nthe Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans, and by most of the Jews. It was\nlikewise held by many amongst the eastern nations. It formed indeed\none of the two ways of imagining a future state, but it was of a\nvery vague and dreary nature; and from the passage of Homer already\nquoted (Art. 14), we realise the longing supposed to be felt by the\ninhabitants of such a place to escape into a more substantial region.\nUnquestionably it was not a place in which practical men like the\nJews, for instance, would wish to dwell, and yet no doubt it had\ngreat attraction for minds of a visionary and ecstatic nature, who\nheld matter to be the source of evil.\n\nThe return of the soul to its divine original, an Egyptian doctrine,\nthe entrance into Nirv\u00e2_n_a, proclaimed by Buddha, and the absorption\ninto Buddha himself, proclaimed by some of his followers, are all\nproofs that a doctrine of this nature has peculiar fascinations for\na dreamy order of minds. Nor must we analyse too rigidly the exact\nmeaning and tendency of such doctrines, inasmuch as we cannot easily\nenter into the real feelings of those who propounded them, and who\nprobably entertained conceptions which cannot adequately be expressed\nin words.\n\n28. Coming now to the belief in a bodily future existence, it is\nremarkable that the doctrine of a transmigration of souls was\nextensively prevalent among all the nations we have named, if we\nexcept the Jews. It was believed in, as we have seen, by a large\nclass of the Egyptians; it was introduced into Greece by Pythagoras\nand his followers; it is considered to have been from time immemorial\na common property of the various religions of the extreme East;\nand it is recorded by C\u00e6sar that the Druids believed in the same\ndoctrine, although they confined the transmigration to human bodies.\n\nIt will perhaps surprise many of our readers to learn the extensive\nprevalence of such a doctrine, wondering as they must how it is\npossible to attach certainty to an existence which passes through\nthe body of various men and animals\u2014something perhaps like a draught\nof Lethe being administered at the moment of passage. But the\nantients, being unable to rise to a higher conception of a bodily\nfuture, were compelled to admit either this doctrine or one yet more\nabsurd, namely, that the _very same body_ which was laid in the tomb\nwill once more be animated by the spirit which formerly possessed\nit. It does not therefore surprise us that the antients, with the\nexception probably of a portion of the inhabitants of Egypt, and some\nof the Jews, should have preferred the doctrine of transmigration;\nbut we are exceedingly surprised that the alternative doctrine, of\nmanifestly Egyptian parentage, should have come to be accepted by the\nmodern nations of Europe under the garb of Christianity. We shall\nreturn again to this subject, but meanwhile let us observe that,\nwhen men first began to ask the How of a future state, the reply was\nsomething extremely vague and unsatisfying. No wonder, then, that a\nclass of men who had not unlimited confidence in God, and who could\nnot believe in either of the doctrines of a future state, should\nhave lapsed into philosophical infidelity and denied altogether the\npossibility of a future state.\n\n29. We have thus arrived at a stage of development in which we may\nimagine the next step to be one which will throw some light upon this\nquestion of How\u2014that is, which will give, or at any rate profess to\ngive, some information regarding the conditions of a future life. The\nintellect of man had attempted to obtain such knowledge for itself,\nbut the result was a conspicuous failure; the sword was not sharp\nenough, nor the arm which wielded it powerful enough, to hew down the\nthick and seemingly impenetrable barrier which closes the avenue to\nthe world of spirits.\n\n\u2018We cannot go to them,\u2019 was the unanimous wail of the antient\nphilosophers; till some of the more hopeful of them suggested as\nan alternative that they might come to us. For clearly, if A and B\nare separated from each other by a barrier, and there yet remains\ngood-will between them, two courses are possible, and only two, if\nthey are to be made acquainted with each other. One or other must\nsurmount the barrier. If A be so weak as to be unable to do so, and\nif at the same time it would be a matter of importance to him to\nbecome better acquainted with B, then B may be expected to surmount\nthe barrier if it be surmountable, and exhibit himself to A.\n\n30. As a matter of history, it appears that about the time of the\nbirth of Christ there was an expectation, however vague, that\nsomething of this nature was about to take place. And when Christ\nmade His appearance, and gathered round Him a little band of\ndisciples, there can be no doubt that He claimed to be the bearer of\nintelligence from the world of spirits. All who accept the gospel\nnarratives, however much they may differ from one another as to\nthe light in which they regard His person and doctrine, will yet,\nwe think, agree in this. The claim made by His disciples for His\ngospel was that it \u2018had brought life and immortality to light\u2019 (2\nTim. i. 10), and that Christ had by his resurrection \u2018abolished\ndeath.\u2019 The grounds of the claim were built upon the belief that He\nshowed Himself after His resurrection to a body of men who had not\npreviously believed that the Messiah Himself was to die and rise\nagain.\n\nHis disciples in short took His resurrection for a proof that life is\npossible after death. Christ was believed to be the first-fruits of a\nsystem which was destined ultimately to enfold in the same glorious\nimmortality all those of His disciples who were united to their\nMaster by a sincere and living faith. Evidently Paul attached the\nutmost importance to the fact of Christ\u2019s resurrection, for he says\n(1 Cor. xv. 14), \u2018If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain,\nand your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of\nGod: because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ; whom\nhe raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not. For if the dead\nrise not, then is not Christ raised: and if Christ be not raised,\nyour faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins.\u2019\n\n31. Let us now try to ascertain what sort of future state was taught\nby Christ. In the first place, it was a bodily state\u2014a state which\ncould even adapt itself with some modification to the views of the\nPharisees who believed in the resurrection of the body. But the\nmodification introduced is sufficiently important. The occasion of\nits announcement was a disputation with the Sadducees, who attempted\nto perplex Christ by stating to Him the case of a woman who had\nbeen married in this life to seven brethren in succession, and then\nasking Him whose wife she should be in the resurrection. We are told\n(Matthew xxii. 29) that in reply to this question, \u2018Jesus answered\nand said unto them, Ye do err, not knowing the scriptures, nor the\npower of God. For in the resurrection they neither marry nor are\ngiven in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven.\u2019 We may\ngather by implication from this narrative, that the question would\nhave puzzled the Pharisees, who had certainly not arrived at this\nidea of the resurrection state.\n\nThey must evidently have thought that the resurrection body was to\nbe similar to the present one, and although they believed in the\nexistence of angels, and their occasional appearance to human beings,\nthey cannot have risen to the idea that it was possible for man to\nreach a similar state after death.\n\n32. It may perhaps be said that many of Christ\u2019s sayings would seem\nto lead towards the doctrine of a resurrection of the very same\nmaterial particles which are laid in the grave. To this, however, it\nmay be replied that Christ undoubtedly wished to impress upon His\nhearers, who were for the most part unlearned and ignorant men, the\nsubstantial and bodily reality of the future state, and therefore\nspoke in plain language without entering into scientific minuti\u00e6,\nwhich would only have perplexed them, and diminished the impression\nwhich His words were otherwise calculated to produce. Few of His\nhearers would trouble themselves about the mode, nor was it until\nan objection was started by the learned Sadducees that Christ took\noccasion to develop His doctrine. In accordance with this view we\nsee that a similar difficulty must have occurred more than once in\nthe life of Paul, who was brought into contact with the philosophy\nof Greece and Rome. For in one of his Epistles[16] he asks the\nquestion,\u2014How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they\ncome? He then replies to the supposed objector in the following noble\nand beautiful language:\u2014\u2018There is one glory of the sun, and another\nglory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for one star\ndiffereth from another star in glory. So also is the resurrection of\nthe dead; it is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption: it\nis sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness,\nit is raised in power: it is sown a natural body, it is raised a\nspiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual\nbody.\u2019\n\n33. In the next place we remark, that this conception of a spiritual\nbody similar to that of the angels is accompanied in the religious\nsystem of Christ by a conviction that the present visible universe\nwill assuredly pass away. This is expressed in both divisions of the\nwritings acknowledged as sacred by the disciples of Christ. Thus it\nis said:\u2014\u2018Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth; and the\nheavens are the works of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt\nendure; yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment: as a vesture\nshalt thou change them, and they shall be changed.\u2019[17] Again, Paul\ntells us that \u2018the things which are seen are temporal, but the things\nwhich are not seen are eternal.\u2019[18] Likewise also Peter says\u2014\u2018The\nday of the Lord will come as a thief in the night; in the which\nthe heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements\nshall melt with fervent heat; the earth also, and the works that\nare therein, shall be burned up.... Nevertheless we, according to\nhis promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth\nrighteousness.\u2019[19] In like manner John tells us that he saw in a\nvision \u2018a great white throne, and him that sat on it, from whose face\nthe earth and the heaven fled away; and there was found no place for\nthem.\u2019[20]\n\nFrom all this we may conclude that the more advanced disciples of\nChrist supposed the resurrection body to be angelic in its nature,\nand similar to that which they believed Christ had himself assumed;\nand further, that they supposed this body would remain when the\npresent visible universe had passed away.\n\n34. We have already remarked that it was the object of Christ to\nbring the future state in a very vivid manner before His disciples,\nso that they might realise its substantial existence, and He has\naccordingly given them on the one hand exalted descriptions of the\njoys of heaven, and on the other awful accounts of the fate of the\nlost. Heaven was variously described by Him as a banqueting house,\nas a beautiful city, as Abraham\u2019s bosom, and, when speaking to His\nimmediate disciples, as a place where they shall dwell together\nwith their Master. On the other hand, it is believed that Christ\u2019s\ndescription of hell was borrowed from the valley of Hinnom, a place\nnear Jerusalem, which formed the receptacle for every species\nof filth, the combustible parts of which were consumed by fire.\nPutrefaction, or the worm, was always busy there, and the fire was\nalways burning, and this may have given rise to the expression:\n\u2018Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.\u2019 There\ncan be no doubt, we think, that such descriptions were meant to be\nallegorical, the intention being by forcible earthly images to convey\nan idea of what could not otherwise be conveyed.\n\n35. It is well known that many varieties of opinion have been\nentertained regarding the person of Christ even by those who profess\nto be His disciples. It is not however here our object to enter\ninto theological controversies; our treatment of this subject is at\npresent historical, and we will therefore bring before our readers\nonly those views regarding the person of Christ and the constitution\nof the invisible world, which are held by the large majority of those\nwho call themselves Christians.\n\nWhilst all the Christian Churches believe in one God, yet by most\nof them the Godhead is believed to consist of three persons, the\nFather, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The first of these appears to\nbe regarded as the Being or Essence in virtue of whom the Universe\nexists. Thus in reciting the Apostles\u2019 Creed the Christian disciple\nsays:\u2014\u2018I believe in God, the Father Almighty, maker of Heaven and\nEarth;\u2019 and the laws of the Universe are regarded by Christian\ntheologians as being expressions of the will acting in conformity\nwith the character of this Being. Thus Nature (according to Whately)\nis the course in which the Author and Governor of all things proceeds\nin His works.\n\nBut the majority of Christian Churches virtually assert that\nthere are two other Divine Persons, who work through and by the\nUniverse.[21] One great object of the second Person of the Trinity\nis held to be the manifestation of God to man, and possibly to other\nbeings, in a manner and to an extent which could not be accomplished\nby finite intelligences. One great object of the third Person is to\nenter, as Lord and giver of life, into the souls of men, and possibly\nof other beings, and to dwell there in such a manner as to fit them\nfor the position which they are destined ultimately to occupy in the\nuniverse of God.\n\n36. In Christ it is supposed that we have an incarnation of the\nsecond Person of the Trinity, and the work which He accomplished\nis regarded as done not in violation of the order of things as\nestablished by God the Father, but rather in strict obedience to it.\nBut while this is generally accepted by the Church of Christ, yet the\ndoctrine of the submission of Christ to law has been held by some as\nnot inconsistent with a view which regards the miraculous works of\nChrist as manifestations of His divine nature, so changing the order\nof things as to denote something wrought upon the universe rather\nthan something wrought through it and by its means. We do not think\nthat this theory is borne out by the words of Christ himself. He\nsays: \u2018I seek not mine own will, but the will of the Father who sent\nme.\u2019[22] Again, we are told by Paul, that \u2018when the fulness of the\ntime was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under\nthe law, to redeem them that were under the law, that they might\nreceive the adoption of sons.\u2019[23]\n\nChrist also frequently represents His works as wrought by the\nFather, as for instance when he says:\u2014\u2018I do nothing of myself; but\nas the Father hath taught me, I speak these things.\u2019[24] In fine,\nthe whole genius of Christianity would appear to point towards a\ntotal submission of Christ in every respect to all the laws of the\nuniverse: for these, indeed, as we shall soon have occasion to show,\nform but another expression for the will of God acting in conformity\nwith His character. To make our meaning clear, we may say that the\nwill of man is accomplished in conformity with the laws of the\nuniverse, while on the other hand the will of God, as above defined,\nconstitutes in itself the laws of the universe. Now it appears to us\nfrom what we find contained in the books of the Christian religion,\nthat Christ must in this sense be regarded as similar to man; but,\ninasmuch as the relation of Christ to the universe is there asserted\nto have been different from that of any mere man, so the works of\nChrist are to be regarded as different from those which any mere man\ncan accomplish.\n\n37. The Christian system, of which we have thus briefly described\nthe peculiarities, was soon called upon to do battle, on the one\nhand with the antient philosophies of Greece and Rome, and on the\nother with the semi-savage creeds of those less civilised races of\nman which were destined ultimately to overpower the Roman Empire.\nBut it was chiefly when the apostolic pioneers came into contact\nwith the acute minds of the antient philosophers that we have light\nstruck regarding what may be termed the philosophical system of\nChristianity; thus we have already remarked (Art. 32), that the\nnature of the glorified body is most clearly indicated to us by the\nApostle Paul. As respects the more barbarous nations which afterwards\nembraced Christianity, _they_ were not likely to puzzle themselves\nabout the physical possibilities of a future state, nor even to\ncontest the reality of a place of eternal physical torment. And so\nit happened that, when dealing with a lower class of converts, some\nprominent Christians in post-apostolic periods appealed more to their\nfears than to their hopes, bringing vividly before them awful ideas\nof the nature of hell; while on the other hand, the higher class of\nconverts, if they had not a very clear idea of heaven, were yet drawn\nwith intense longing to a future which they were to spend in the\ncompany of Christ.\n\n38. In the course of a few hundred years we find the whole Roman\nEmpire converted to Christianity, while, however, in Arabia and the\nEast it appears either to have made very little progress, or to have\nbecome corrupted into something very different from that which we\nread of in the New Testament. It had not become the national religion\nof the Arabs; and we can well imagine that this nation, with their\npretensions to be regarded as the most antient representatives of\nthe Semitic race, would not look kindly upon a religion which took\nits origin in a rival branch of the same family. We can further\nimagine that, with such a feeling, they would be very ready to\nwelcome any skilfully devised religious system which should spring\nup amongst themselves. Such an opportunity was afforded them by\nMohammed. Acknowledging in some measure the claims of Moses and\nof Christ, Mohammed yet claimed for himself and his religion a\nsuperiority over his rivals, flattering by this means the vanity\nof his own countrymen, who considered themselves the elder branch\nof the Semitic race. The heaven which was promised by Mohammed was\naltogether of a sensuous character, and well calculated to strike\nthe imagination of his countrymen. He succeeded equally well in\ndescribing hell as a place of physical torture reserved for those\nwho did not believe in his religion. He further commissioned his\nfollowers to propagate his tenets by the sword, so that men became\nconverts from dread of earthly punishment, and were retained in his\nranks by the success which attended his arms, and by the promise of\na paradise full of earthly delights, as well as by the threat of a\nhorrible material hell which was reserved for unbelievers. We could\nnot possibly have a better or more graphic description of such a\nsystem than that which is given us by Byron:\u2014\n\n \u2018But him the maids of paradise\n Impatient to their halls invite,\n And the dark Heaven of Houris\u2019 eyes\n On him shall shine for ever bright;\n They come\u2014their kerchiefs green they wave,\n And welcome with a kiss the brave!\n Who falls in battle \u2019gainst the Giaour\n Is worthiest an immortal bower.\n But thou, false Infidel! shalt writhe\n Beneath avenging Monkir\u2019s scythe;\n And from its torment \u2019scape alone\n To wander round lost Eblis\u2019 throne,\n And fire unquench\u2019d, unquenchable,\n Around, within, thy heart shall dwell;\n Nor ear can hear nor tongue can tell\n The tortures of that inward hell!\u2019\n\nThe disciples of Mohammed believed in the unity of God, but it is\nevident that they had not a very exalted conception of His character.\nTheir trust in Him could infuse zeal into their hearts and vigour\ninto their arms when they went to make proselytes by the sword,\nbut could not produce that lofty type of character which has so\nfrequently appeared amongst the followers of Christ.\n\n39. We have now reached in the history of our problem the period\nknown as the dark ages, during which the spirit of scientific inquiry\nwas well-nigh extinct. At length, however, there arrived a time when\nthe human mind, from a variety of causes, suddenly awoke from the\nlethargy into which it had sunk.\n\nWhen scientific thought was once more directed to the subject of\nimmortality it was easily seen that the doctrine of the resurrection\nin its vulgar acceptation could not possibly be true, since a case\nmight easily be imagined in which there might be a contention between\nrival claimants for the same body. We might, for instance, imagine\na Christian missionary to be killed and eaten by a savage, who was\nafterwards killed himself. It is indeed both curious and instructive\nto note the reluctance with which various sections of the Christian\nChurch have been driven from their old erroneous conceptions on\nthis subject; and the expedients, always grotesque, and sometimes\npositively loathsome, with which they have attempted to buttress up\nthe tottering edifice. Some deem it necessary that a single material\ngerm or organised particle of the body at death should survive until\nthe resurrection, forgetting that under such a hypothesis it would\nbe easy to deprive a man of the somewhat doubtful benefits of such a\nresurrection, by sealing him up (while yet alive) in a strong iron\ncoffin, and by appropriate means reducing his whole physical body\ninto an inorganic mass. Boston, again, in his _Fourfold State_, goes\nstill further, adopting the idea that a single particle of insensible\nperspiration which has escaped from a man during his life, will\nbe sufficient to serve as a nucleus for the resurrection body. So\nthat according to the disciples of this school, the resurrection\nwill be preceded by a gigantic manufacture of shoddy, the effete\nand loathsome rags of what was once the body being worked up along\nwith a large quantity of new material into a glorious and immortal\ngarment, to form the clothing of a being who is to live for ever!\nUnquestionably we have continuity in this hypothesis, but it is\nthe continuity of the Irishman\u2019s coat in the story, the owner of\nwhich always made a point of retaining as many as possible of the\nrags which were present on the last occasion, those only which had\nabsolutely fallen to pieces being replaced by something new! We have\nonly to compare this grotesquely hideous conception with the noble\nand beautiful language of Paul, to recognise the depth of abasement\ninto which the Church had sunk through the materialistic conceptions\nof the Dark Ages.\n\n40. But it is needless to say that this offer of a certain class of\ntheologians to surrender everything except a single shred of the\nworn-out body, liberal as it may appear, was nevertheless at once\nrejected by the school of scientific men. Death, they replied, must\nbe regarded as a total and complete destruction of the visible body,\nso far at least as the individual life is concerned. At the same\ntime professing themselves unable to conceive such an existence as a\ndisembodied spirit, they were forced to conclude like Priestley,[25]\nthat the soul is not in its nature immortal. At this point, however,\nthe scientific school splits up into two or even three sections, one\nbelieving with Priestley and others that immortality is a fresh and\nmiraculous gift conferred upon man at the resurrection; another,\nunable to conceive the possibility of a miracle in the case of each\nindividual, denying a future state altogether; while a third section\nmaintains that there is no use in discussing the subject, because man\nafter death has passed beyond the sphere of human inquiry.\n\n41. Regarding the existence and nature of the Deity, various opinions\nhave been entertained by the disciples of what we may term the\nextreme school of science. Some have maintained that we have no\nevidence of the existence of any such Being, others that we have no\nevidence of His personality, while others argue that although we\nmay become convinced of His great power and wisdom from the works\nof creation, there are other attributes of His character which are\nnot so revealed. We cannot, for instance, say they, maintain the\nbenevolence of the Deity in the way in which we understand the word\nbenevolence, nor have we any evidence that He is just in the way in\nwhich we understand the word justice. It is well known that the late\nJohn Stuart Mill would have regarded the claims of Christianity with\nmore favour had its character been more Manich\u00e6an, that is to say,\nhad the spirit of evil been allowed a position more nearly equal to\nthat of the spirit of good in the government of the universe.\n\n42. Let us here pause to indicate two points of similarity between\nthis scientific school and the system of Christianity. Both, we\nconceive, maintain in some sense the supremacy of law or the\ninvariability of the procedure adopted by the Deity in the government\nof the universe (Art. 36); both maintain likewise that the outer\nworks of the visible universe are insufficient to manifest certain\nattributes of the Deity. Here, however, the likeness ends; this\nscientific school conceive they have no information beyond the\nvisible universe, while the Christian system asserts the existence of\nan invisible order of things, and the fact of communications having\ntaken place between the two for the double purpose of revealing God\nto man, and of raising man towards God.\n\n43. Leaving now the views of those who may be said to constitute\nthe extreme left, let us shortly consider the various opinions held\nregarding a future state by those who, though often differing widely\nfrom one another, yet rank themselves within the pale of Christianity.\n\nNot a few who revere the sacred writings, believe nevertheless that\nthe descriptions of the unseen world contained therein are purely\nallegorical. These do not believe in the existence of evil spirits\nexercising an influence over the mind of man. Satan is regarded by\nthem as a personification of evil (\u0394\u03b9\u03b1\u03b2\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, the accuser, Devil\u2019s\nadvocate) rather than as possessing a real objective existence. The\nworst half of the unseen world having thus been got rid of, the other\nhalf follows in due course. Such men do not believe in the unseen\npresence of angels (\u1f04\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, messenger); in fine they conceive that\nthere is nothing above man but the Deity, and that He always acts\naccording to rigid law. It is an immediate step from this to believe\nin the futility of prayer, which is looked upon as necessarily\ndevoid of any objective influence, although the practice of it may\nbe regarded as possessing a beneficial subjective effect. A future\nlife is believed to be conceivable, but only under conditions and in\na universe about which we know and can know nothing. At this point,\nhowever, the views of what may be called the left centre come into\ncontact with those of the extreme left.\n\n44. But there are others quite disposed to believe in the existence\nof the unseen world, who yet regard as figurative a large part of the\nBiblical descriptions. Some, like the Church of Rome, consider the\nseparation of the souls of men after death into two categories, and\nonly two, as insufficient and unsupported by the spirit of Scripture;\nwhile others cannot admit the eternity of misery, but believe that\nthe most reprobate will ultimately be reclaimed and elevated into the\nregions of bliss.\n\nOthers again, arguing from some expressions in the Bible, regard\nimmortality as a boon reserved for the good alone, believing that the\nwicked will be annihilated, both soul and body, in hell. No doubt by\nan energetic nature such a fate would be regarded as even worse than\nendless misery:\n\n Sad cure! for who would lose,\n Though full of pain, this intellectual being?\n Those thoughts that wander through eternity\n To perish rather, swallowed up and lost\n In the wide womb of uncreated night,\n Devoid of sense and motion.\n\nSo speaks Milton, putting the idea into the mouth of Belial, the\nfallen spirit, when addressing his peers.\n\n45. Such are a few of the ways in which the statements of Christ and\nhis Apostles regarding immortality have been interpreted by those\nwho call themselves Christians. But amid this great diversity there\nis yet one principle common to all. It is imagined that something\npeculiar in the history of the world took place at the coming of\nChrist, which has not since been repeated. Communications were then\nmade to mankind which are regarded as unique, and the truth of which\nit is held will only be verified in the case of each individual when\nhe has passed into that country from which we receive no travellers\u2019\ntales.\n\nNotwithstanding this general belief, not a few have arisen pretending\nto have received a new and supplementary revelation. In most of these\ncases the scientific historian may at once come to a conclusion\nwithout any violation of his impartiality,\u2014they are so manifestly the\nproducts of delusion if not of imposture. There is however one system\nwhich merits fuller treatment, inasmuch as it has led to a mode of\nviewing the spiritual world which has many followers even at the\npresent day.\n\n46. Emanuel Swedenborg, the apostle of this system, was in many\nrespects a remarkable man. Living more than a century ago, and during\nthe time when Science was pausing for the spring she has since made,\nhe seems to have foreshadowed, if he did not anticipate, many of the\ndoctrines now current. We are not however now concerned with his\npurely physical speculations.\n\nSwedenborg has written at great length regarding the nature and\ndestiny of man, and the constitution of the unseen world into which\nhe asserts he had the power of entering.\n\nHe assumes the existence of a human or semi-human race before Adam,\nof which he remarks that they lived as beasts. \u2018Man,\u2019 he tells us,\n\u2018considered in himself, is nothing but a beast.... Man\u2019s peculiarity\nover animals\u2014a peculiarity they neither have nor can have\u2014consists\nin the presence of the Lord in his will and understanding. It is in\nconsequence of this conjunction with the Lord that man lives after\ndeath; and although he should exist like a beast, caring for nothing\nbut himself and his relations, yet the Lord\u2019s mercy is so great,\nbeing Divine and Infinite, that He never leaves him, but continually\nbreathes into him His own life, whereby he is enabled to recognise\nwhat is good and evil and true and false.\u2019\n\nRegarding man\u2019s mortal nature we are told by Swedenborg that \u2018man at\nbirth puts on the grosser substances of nature, his body consisting\nof such. These grosser substances by death he puts off, but retains\nthe purer substances of nature, which are next to those that are\nspiritual. These purer substances serve thereafter as his body, the\ncontinent and expression of his mind.\u2019[26]\n\n\u2018A man at death,\u2019 he tells us again, \u2018escapes from his material body\nas from a rent or worn-out vesture, carrying with him every member,\nfaculty, and function complete, with not one wanting, yet the corpse\nis as heavy as when he dwelt therein.\u2019\n\nRegarding the spiritual world, he tells us \u2018that the whole natural\nworld corresponds to the spiritual world collectively and in every\npart; for the natural world exists and subsists from the spiritual\nworld, just as an effect does from its cause.\u2019 He also tells us\n\u2018that if in the spiritual world two desire intensely to see each\nother, that desire at once brings about a meeting. When any angel\ngoes from one place to another, whether it is in his own city, or\nin the courts, or the gardens, or to others out of his own city, he\narrives sooner or later, just as he is ardent or indifferent, the\nway itself being shortened or lengthened in proportion.... Change of\nplace being only change of state, it is evident that approximations\nin the spiritual world arise from similitudes of mind and removals\nfrom dissimilitudes; and thus spaces are merely signs of inner\ndifferences.... From that cause alone the hells are altogether\nseparated from the heavens.\u2019\n\nOf God he says: \u2018The Divine is incomprehensible even by the angels,\nfor there is no ratio between the finite and the infinite.\n\n\u2018No man or angel can ever approach the Father and immediately\nworship Him; for He is invisible, and being invisible can neither be\nthought of nor loved.\u2019\n\nOf God\u2019s Providence he says: \u2018As in the Lord we are and act, His\nProvidence is over us from birth to death, and even to eternity....\nTo talk of the Lord\u2019s Providence as universal, and to separate it\nfrom particulars, is like talking of a whole in which there are no\nparts, or of something in which there is nothing. Consequently it\nis most false, a mere picture of the imagination, and downright\nstupidity, to say that the Lord\u2019s Providence is universal, and not at\nthe same time in the minutest particulars; for to provide and rule in\nthe universal, and not at the same time in the minutest particulars,\nis not to rule at all.\u2019\n\nSwedenborg likewise believed in an intermediate state analogous to\npurgatory, although he objected to the name. This was called by him\nthe world of spirits, after staying in which, for a longer or shorter\ntime, the souls of the departed were drafted off to heaven on the one\nside, and to hell on the other.\n\n47. We have now said enough to give our readers some idea of\nSwedenborg\u2019s spiritual system. Unquestionably it is the system of a\nprofound thinker, and many great men have not hesitated to express\ntheir admiration of Swedenborg and his works. It is one thing however\nto admit the beauty, the philosophical completeness, and even the\npossible truth of many of his statements, and another thing to\nbelieve that he actually conversed with the inhabitants of another\nworld in the way in which one man converses with another.\n\nBut, after all, suppose that the every-day experience of men is that\nonly he who lives in the world as not of the world lives a true life,\nand this is the Bible teaching,\u2014whose then is the true doctrine?\nSwedenborg errs if he claims this as his _exclusive personal_\nexperience. Paul claimed it as belonging to all men. Surely men of\nscience should of all men claim this likewise.\n\nNow, when a man unquestionably honest makes an assertion such as\nSwedenborg made, there are only two possible conclusions to which we\ncan come, unless we choose to remain in a state of mental suspense.\nWe must either believe that he really saw what he professes to have\nseen, or that he was the victim of some strange hallucination, in\nvirtue of which his subjective impressions became transferred into\nthe realms of objective realities. We know very well that the human\nmind is extremely prone to such delusions, and that the nature\nof the case is frequently betrayed by some indiscreet admission\nwhich we have external grounds for believing to be incorrect. Had\nSwedenborg confined himself to the invisible world it would have been\nvery difficult to prove him the subject of a delusion, but when he\nconverses with angels from the planets, and thus comes to describe\ntheir inhabitants, he enters at once upon dangerous ground.\n\nConcerning his description of the various planets it has been\nremarked that his information relates only to those, the existence\nof which was known when he wrote, Uranus and Neptune being passed\nover. This of itself is a suspicious circumstance. Again, he peoples\nthe planets Jupiter and Saturn with inhabitants as well as our own\nMoon; now, scientific analogy is strongly against either of these two\nplanets being inhabited, while it is next to certain that our moon\nis entirely without inhabitants.\n\nIn fine, there is no reason to suppose that the speculations of\nSwedenborg were anything else than the product of his own mind, in\nthe same sense as that in which the speculations of this volume may\nbe regarded as the product of the minds of its authors.\n\n48. Before concluding this historical sketch let us say a few words\nabout modern spiritualists in so far as their pretensions have\nreference to our subject. They assert the presence among them of the\nspirits of the departed, assuming sometimes a visible shape, and\nthey compare these appearances to those which are recorded in the\nSacred writings. But there is this prominent distinction between the\ntwo: the spiritual communications recorded in the Scriptures are\nrepresented as made to those who were unprepared to receive them, and\nalso for the most part as taking place in open daylight, or, to speak\nmore properly, having no sort of reference to light or darkness.\nWhatever be their explanation they have an open-air look about them.\nOn the other hand, the manifestations recorded by the spiritualists\ntake place as a rule in insufficient light, if not in total darkness,\nand in presence of those who are in a state of mental excitement.\n\nNow, for our own part, we should not be disposed to credit any\ncommunication from the world of spirits that was not made openly, and\nto those unprepared to receive it, and therefore unprejudiced.\n\nThe man of science must be perfectly recipient, but he must in the\ninterests of truth guard himself against the possibility of delusion.\nWe know the almost infinite power of the mind not only to delude\nitself, but to propagate its delusions to other minds, and, as\nwe have already remarked, the conditions of these manifestations\nare specially favourable to the spread of such delusions. We do\nnot therefore hesitate to choose between the two alternative\nexplanations, and to regard these pretended manifestations as having\nno objective reality.\n\n49. But while we altogether deny the reality of these appearances, we\nthink it likely that the spiritualists have enlarged our knowledge of\nthe power which one mind has of influencing another, and this is in\nitself a valuable subject of inquiry. We agree too in the position\nassumed by Swedenborg, and by the spiritualists, according to which\nthey look upon the invisible world not as something absolutely\ndistinct from the visible universe, and absolutely unconnected with\nit, as is frequently thought to be the case, but rather as a universe\nwhich has some bond of union with the present.\n\nThis line of argument will be developed in the following chapters of\nour book.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nPOSITION TAKEN BY THE AUTHORS\u2014PHYSICAL AXIOMS.\n\n \u2018Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the\n word of God; so that things which are seen were not made of\n things which do appear.\u2019\u2014HEBREWS XI. 3.\n\n\n50. In the preceding chapter we have given a very brief epitome of\nthe various beliefs regarding immortality and the invisible world\nheld by the civilised nations of the earth, from the earliest dawn\nof history to the present day. Our object has been not so much to\nenter even into general details as to present boldly those particular\nfeatures of each system of belief which are most closely concerned\nwith the subject of our work. Thus our account of each separate\nsystem is intentionally incomplete, even as a simple sketch. It is\nnow time to say something about the object of this book, as well as\nto define the position from which we mean to start in pursuance of\nthat object. We shall therefore commence by dividing those who at all\nconcern themselves about our theme into three great classes.\n\nFirst, we have those who are so absolutely certain of the truth of\ntheir views of religion, and of the immortality which they believe\nit teaches, that they are not qualified to entertain or even to\nperceive any scientific objection. They acknowledge that certain\ndeductions made by men of science appear to contradict or to be\nincompatible with certain truths of their religion. But these they\nregard as premature conclusions, averring that when the laws of\nnature have been more deeply investigated, there will be found a\nperfect concord between science and revelation. Certain scientific\ntruths they readily assent to, and it is only the altogether human\nsuperstructure of speculation built upon these that they profess\nto question. \u2018You have built,\u2019 they say, \u2018upon the rock of truth a\nstructure of wood, hay, stubble, and you would persuade us that it is\nthe very temple of God. We will not enter it, but will patiently wait\nin the expectation of seeing it speedily consumed with fire.\u2019\n\nNow, whatever be the merits or demerits of such men, it is not for\nthem we write. Their merit may consist in having made a perfectly\ntrue charge against certain classes of scientific men\u2014their demerit\nprobably in having themselves treated religion precisely as they\naccuse their adversaries of having treated scientific truth. We\nmust let them alone\u2014they will not be influenced by anything that we\ncan say. We may perhaps be praised by them in a certain measure if\nit be thought that we have helped to overthrow the superstructure\nbuilt by their adversaries; we shall certainly be condemned by them\nif it be thought that we have helped to weaken any portion of the\nsuperstructure which they themselves have reared.\n\n51. In the next place, and occupying a middle position, we have those\nwho see strong grounds for believing in a future life for man and in\nthe existence of an invisible world, but who at the same time are\nforced to acknowledge the strength of the objections urged against\nthese doctrines by certain men of science. Some of this class attach\nmuch weight to the evidence in favour of these doctrines derived\nfrom the Christian records; others again, unable to believe in these\nrecords, are yet powerfully impressed by the universal longing for\nimmortality which civilised man has always shown, while others attach\nnearly equal importance to both kinds of evidence. Nevertheless, all\nof the class of which we now speak have deeply studied the scientific\nobjections, and do not well see how to surmount them. It is to this\nclass that we shall especially address ourselves in the following\nchapters.\n\n52. The third class of men are those of the extreme materialistic\nschool. All human history, including the life of Christ and that\nwhich took place in connection with it, all yearnings of man for\nimmortality, all life, from that of the noblest of human beings to\nthat of the primordial animated germ, are explained by this class as\nthe result of the interaction of material atoms guided by certain\nmeasurable physical forces. They consider that they have no reason\nto believe that there is anything beyond or beside the visible\nuniverse, and in consequence they decline entering into any argument\nupon the subject. Their premiss may be wrong, but their conclusion\nfollows from it as a matter of course. We have examined (say they)\nall the evidence in favour of another universe, and find it utterly\nworthless, why then should we discuss the subject?\u2014it is one of those\ndelusions that are common in man. When a traveller pretends to have\nreceived information about some strange and distant country, our\nfirst step is to inquire whether he is a trustworthy and sane man,\nand if we find he is otherwise, it is quite unnecessary for us to\ndiscuss either the information which he brings, or the objections\nto that information. You pretend to show the scientific possibility\nthat this information may be correct, but why should we study your\nargument since there is no evidence for supposing that there is any\nsuch place?\n\n53. To these men we would reply that, even assuming their own point\nof view, our scheme will, we venture to suggest, be found to give\na more complete and continuous explanation of the visible order of\nthings than one which proceeds upon the assumption that there is\nnothing else. In this respect we may liken it to the hypothesis of\natoms, or that of an ethereal medium, for neither of which have we\nthe direct evidence of our senses, both of which have nevertheless\nbeen adopted as affording the best explanations of the phenomena of\nthe visible universe.\n\n54. Our readers being thus classed will now be anxious to learn\nour position. Let us begin by stating at once that we assume, as\nabsolutely self-evident, the existence of a Deity who is the Creator\nand Upholder of all things. (Romans i. 19-21.)\n\nWe further look upon the laws of the universe as those laws according\nto which the beings in the universe are conditioned by the Governor\nthereof, as regards time, place, and sensation.\n\nIt is for instance on account of these laws that we cannot be present\nin different places at the same time; or move over more than a\ncertain space in a certain time, or think more than a certain number\nof thoughts; or feel more than a certain number of sensations in a\ncertain given time.\n\nAnd hence while we can very easily imagine an intelligence superior\nto ourselves, but yet finite, to be very differently conditioned,\nwe cannot imagine any finite intelligence to be absolutely without\nconditions. At any rate, if finite intelligences unconditioned with\nrespect to time and space be conceivable existences, they must of\nnecessity be so absolutely unconnected with the present universe,\nwhich has reference to time and space, that their existence need not\nbe contemplated so far at least as our argument is concerned.\n\n55. It will thus be seen that we cannot conceive of finite\nintelligences existing in the universe without being in some way\nconditioned; but we now come to a point which deserves a somewhat\nfuller discussion. We can imagine the materialists saying to us:\n\n\u2018You are right in asserting the inconceivability of such intelligence\nas that of man existing without being conditioned, which to our mind\nimplies some sort of association with matter\u2014that is precisely the\nview we ourselves take. But, on the other hand, _we_ can very well\nconceive of matter existing without intelligence, as for instance\na block of wood, or a bar of iron.[27] Thus the connection between\nthese two things, matter and mind, is of such a nature, that mind\ncannot exist without matter, while matter can and does exist without\nmind. Is there not therefore a reality about matter which there is\nnot about mind?[28] Can we conceive a single particle of matter to\ngo out of the universe for six or eight hours and then to return\nto it; but do we not every day see our consciousness disappearing\nin the case of deep sleep, or in a swoon, and then returning to us\nagain? Far be it from us to deny that we have something which is\ncalled consciousness, and is utterly distinct from matter and the\nproperties of matter, as these are regarded in Physics. But may not\nthe connection between the two be of this nature?\u2014When a certain\nnumber of material particles consisting of phosphorus, carbon,\noxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and perhaps some other elements, are,\nin consequence of the operations of their mutual forces, in certain\npositions with respect to each other, and in certain states of\nmotion, consciousness is the result, but whenever this relative state\nis brought to an end, there is also an end of consciousness and\nthe sense of individual existence, while however the particles of\nphosphorus, carbon, etc., remain as truly as ever.\u2019\n\n56. Now this means that matter must be looked upon as mistress of the\nhouse, and individual consciousness as an occasional visitor whom\nshe permits to partake of her hospitality, turning him out of doors\nwhenever the larder is empty. It is worth while to investigate the\nprocess of thought which gives rise to this curious conception of the\neconomy of the universe.\n\nIn the first place, it is clear that certain arrangements are made\nin the universe, in virtue of which corresponding sensations are\nproduced simultaneously in different individuals, while in other\narrangements the sensations produced are the peculiar property\nof some one individual. The one set have come to be associated\nwith objective realities, while the other set are concerned with\nsubjective impressions. I am affected by a pain in my head, and I\nam also affected by the sun, but the one affection is the peculiar\nproduct of my brain, and I carry it about with me, while experience\nhas shown me that I cannot appropriate the other; yet it also becomes\nmine so soon as it has reached my brain.\n\nIt will further be allowed, that there are certain material particles\nwhich may become vehicles for either or both of these kinds of\nsensations, while there are others which have the power of producing\none only. Gold, silver, and platinum are substances which may become\nthe vehicle of common impressions, but not of peculiar impressions,\nsince they do not occur in our brains. Phosphorus, on the other hand,\nis a substance which may become the vehicle of either kind. When\nwe burn a piece of phosphorus in a lecture-room it is the vehicle\nof a common impression, while the phosphorus in our brain is the\nvehicle of a peculiar impression. Now there is a very noteworthy\ndifference between portions of phosphorus playing these two parts.\nWhen phosphorus is in the common state, we can experiment upon it\nand investigate its properties, but this we cannot do when it exists\nin the brain in its peculiar state. The assertion, therefore, that\nphosphorus and its allied particles, whose motions and positions\nare accompanied by individual consciousness, are nevertheless, when\nin this state, essentially the same as they are in the ordinary\nstate, appears to us to be altogether without foundation. We have no\nright thus to argue from the one state to the other. For that most\npeculiar and interesting condition of phosphorus and other matter in\nwhich it is intimately connected with the production of individual\nconsciousness, and where some peculiarity of properties or behaviour\ndue to this connection might most warrantably be expected, is the\nvery thing which we cannot investigate. To say therefore that the\nliving brain consists of particles of phosphorus, carbon, etc., _such\nas we know them in the common state_, and that when the particles of\nthe brain have, in consequence of the operation of physical forces, a\ncertain position and motion, then individual consciousness follows,\nis to assign a peculiar relation between the brain-particles and such\nconsciousness for which we have no scientific warrant.\n\n57. Allied to this assumption there is another in the materialistic\nargument as we have stated it. If in the body there be no other\nmaterial than the visible particles, and in the brain no other\nmaterial than a certain quantity of phosphorus and other things, such\nas we know them in the common state, and if individual consciousness\ndepends upon the structural presence of these substances in the\nbody and brain, then when this structure falls to pieces there are\nof course reasonable grounds for supposing that such consciousness\nhas entirely ceased. But it is the object of this volume to exhibit\nvarious scientific reasons for believing that there is something\nbeyond that which we call the visible universe; and that individual\nconsciousness is in some mysterious manner related to, or dependent\nupon, the interaction of the seen and unseen.\n\n58. There remains yet that part of the argument which hints that\nindividual consciousness is less permanent than matter, inasmuch\nas such consciousness frequently departs from the universe for six\nor eight hours and then returns to it again. In one sense this\nis unquestionably true, while, however, there is a potential or\nlatent consciousness or possibility of consciousness that remains\nbehind.[29] It will be seen in the sequel that this fact of latent\nconsciousness will be used by us to strengthen our argument in favour\nof a future state.\n\n59. We may conclude, as the result of this discussion, that the\nconnection between mind and matter is a very intimate one, although\nwe are in profound ignorance as to its exact nature.\n\nThe intimacy of this connection is a doctrine almost universally held\nby modern physiologists. Just as no single action of the body takes\nplace without the waste of some muscular tissue, so, it is believed,\nno thought takes place without some waste of the brain. Nay,\nphysiologists go even further, and assert that each specific thought\ndenotes some specific waste of brain matter, so that there is some\nmysterious and obscure connection between the nature of the thought\nand the nature of the waste which it occasions. In like manner memory\nis looked upon as dependent upon traces, left behind in the brain,\nof the state in which it was when the sensation remembered took\nplace. Thus Professor Huxley in his Belfast address (1874) tells\nus: \u2018It is not to be doubted that those motions which give rise to\nsensation leave on the brain changes of its substance which answer\nto what Haller called \u201c_vestigia rerum_,\u201d and to what that great\nthinker David Hartley termed \u201cVibratiuncules.\u201d The sensation which\nhas passed away leaves behind molecules of the brain competent to its\nreproduction\u2014\u201csensigenous molecules,\u201d so to speak\u2014which constitute\nthe physical foundation of memory.\u2019\n\n60. It will be inferred from what we have said that one of the\nessential requisites of continued existence of the individual is\nthe capability of retaining some sort of hold upon the past: and,\ninasmuch as we are unable to contemplate such a thing as a finite\ndisembodied spirit, or, to speak more precisely, an unconditioned\nfinite spirit, it is further evident that this hold implies an organ\nof some sort. This we conceive to be a perfectly general proposition.\nWe do not limit ourselves in making it to any particular arrangement\nof bodily form, or to any particular rank of finite organised\nintelligence. From the archangel to the brute we conceive that\nsomething analogous to an organ of memory must be possessed by each.\nThis is, in fact, merely a corollary to what has been stated in Art.\n54 above, and does not require any further discussion.\n\n61. But if one general requisite of independent and responsible life\nbe a connection with the past, another is the possibility of action\nin the present. A living being must have in his frame the capacity of\nvaried movement. He must possess an organisation in which there is\nthe power of calling internal forces into play at irregular intervals\ndependent on his will. We cannot imagine life to be associated with a\nmotionless mass or with a mass which moves in an invariable manner.\n\nThe living being need not always be in motion, but he must retain\nthe capacity of moving. He need not always be thinking, but he must\nretain the capacity of thought. He need not always be conscious, but\nhe must retain the capacity of consciousness.\n\nTo sum up\u2014it thus appears that there are two general conditions of\norganised life. There must in the first place be an organ connecting\nthe individual with the past, and in the next place there must be\nsuch a frame and such a universe that he has the power of varied\naction in the present. We particularly request our readers to keep\nwell in mind these two propositions, since it is upon them that our\nargument will ultimately in great part be built.\n\n62. We come now to a very important part of our inquiry. It will\nbe necessary to discuss that which we term the _Principle of\nContinuity_, and desirable to begin by defining exactly what is meant\nby us when these words are used.[30] Let us introduce our definition\nby one or two illustrative examples.\n\nTake a particular problem of astronomy, for instance, and, beginning\nat the very commencement, let us suppose an early Egyptian or\nChaldean astronomer to be observing the sun in the middle of summer.\nDay after day, for perhaps a week, he has noticed that this luminary\nrises over a certain place and sets over a certain other place,\nand he conceives that he has now obtained some definite information\nregarding the sun. His idea is, that the sun will go on always doing\nthe same thing, and he therefore predicts to his fellows, who are\nless observant than himself, exactly where it will rise and where\nit will set. They join him in observing the luminary for a week or\nmore, and the sagacity of our primeval astronomer is triumphantly\nvindicated: the sun is found doing as nearly as possible that which\nhad been predicted of it.\n\n63. These men have now got hold of the idea that the sun will always\nrise and set at the same places, that in fact his daily journey is\nalways the same, and that he performs it in the same time. But in the\ncourse of six months they suspect they are mistaken. Discredit is\nthrown upon the sagacity of our astronomer, and he broods over his\ndisgrace for six months longer. At the end of this time, on turning\nhis eyes towards the sun, what is his surprise and delight to find\nthat luminary doing the very thing that he had all along predicted,\nreturning once more to his old points of rising and setting,\u2014places,\nwe may presume, which could be easily remembered on account of some\npeculiarity of landscape. He is not yet prepared however for a\nhigher generalisation, but again calls for his fellows, and while he\nsuspects a certain amount of irregularity in the sun, yet succeeds in\nconvincing them that his guess was after all not far from the truth.\nOnce again he is reinstated in their good opinion.\n\n64. However, six months after, precisely the same thing recurs once\nmore; the rising and setting points are now considerably different\nfrom those predicted. Our astronomer again loses credit, and regains\nit only partially six months afterwards, when the points are once\nmore right. But he has now learned a lesson. He perceives a method\nin all this, and ultimately rises, by means of the difficulty, to a\nhigher generalisation. He sees that the rising and setting points of\nthe sun go through the complete series of their changes of position\nin about 365 days; and he has thus learned, in a rude way, that the\nsun has two motions, one of which he accomplishes in 24 hours, or one\nday, while the other has a period of 365 days, or one year.\n\n65. While these things are in progress, a portentous and wholly\nunexpected event takes place: the sun for four minutes is totally\nextinguished. Our astronomer meditates much on this strange\nphenomenon, and is inclined to regard it as a triumph of the powers\nof Darkness, in personal conflict with those of Light. Nevertheless\nhe does not neglect to keep a record of the precise day on which it\ntook place.\n\n66. Years pass away, and our astronomer has passed away with them\u2014he\nand all his generation; but a regular record is now kept of celestial\noccurrences, and especially of eclipses. At length it comes to\nbe perceived that there is a periodicity even in such untoward\nphenomena, and an attempt is ultimately made, by means of this\nknowledge, to predict when the next eclipse will take place. It is\nperfectly successful, and the event loses from thenceforth much of\nits portentous significance.\n\n67. Centuries roll on, and the apparent motions of the heavenly\nbodies have now been gradually reduced to system. The stars in\nparticular are found to move, just as if they were attached to\nthe roof of a great hollow vault which revolves round the earth\nonce in twenty-four hours. But even amongst them there are five\nexceptions\u2014namely, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn\u2014which\nperform a sort of wandering or zigzag motion in the midst of their\nstationary brethren, and have in consequence received the name of\nplanets. All, however, are supposed to move round the earth, which\nforms the centre of the universe.\n\n68. In process of time, this superiority of the earth over the\nheavenly bodies comes to be questioned. There is a rising tendency\nto regard our earth as a somewhat insignificant member of a great\nsystem, rather than as something apart by itself. These tendencies\nare, however, strongly opposed by the authorities of a large section\nof the Christian Church, on the ground that the language employed\nin the Jewish Scriptures is against such a method of regarding the\nuniverse. Nevertheless the Copernican system ultimately prevails,\nand the planets and the earth are associated together as stars which\ntravel round the sun; while the diurnal motion of the heavenly bodies\nis attributed to a motion of the earth round its axis. And we cannot\nhelp thinking that philosophers of the present day are too much\ndisposed to undervalue the absolutely enormous stride that was made\nwhen the Copernican system was fully established.\n\n69. But the planets are still supposed to move in perfect circles\nround the sun; for besides the fact that this hypothesis agrees\nvery well with observation, there is a simplicity in the circle\nwhich leads philosophers to believe that nature would adopt it in\npreference to any more complicated curve. Has it not been found that\nall apparent deviation from simplicity was in reality due to the fact\nthat our point of view is a movable one, and does not this lead us to\nbelieve that the truth will be found in a circular orbit?\n\n70. While such speculations are indulged in, Tycho Brahe is busy with\nhis instruments. He is a thoroughly accurate man of science, and\nmakes most excellent observations of the various planets. These are\nultimately discussed by Kepler, who finds that the planets do not\nmove round the sun in circles, but in ellipses, having the sun in one\nfocus. He finds too that any one planet describes areas which are\nproportional to the times of description; while the squares of the\nperiodic times of the various planets are proportional to the cubes\nof their mean distances from the sun. These are Kepler\u2019s laws; they\nare yet, however, only empirical. We know them to be true, but we\ncannot tell why they should be as they are and not otherwise.\n\n71. It was reserved for the genius of Newton to show us why the\nplanets should obey these laws, and to reduce the planetary system\nunder the domain of ordinary mechanics. He succeeded in showing that\nevery mass of matter attracts every other mass with a force which is\ndirectly proportional to the product of the masses, and inversely\nproportional to the square of the distance, and that this universal\nforce accounts, not only for Kepler\u2019s laws of planetary motion but,\nfor the orbit of the moon, as well as for that of a projectile\ndischarged near the surface of the earth.\n\n72. If we now pause for a moment, and review the progress of this\ninvestigation, we shall see that it began with a disposition to\nregard simplicity of motion as the test of truth, and when the\nCopernican system showed that our point of view is a movable one,\nit was at first thought that this would explain all departures from\nabsolute simplicity. But Tycho Brahe and Kepler soon showed that the\nplanets do not move in circles, and we now know that their motions,\nas well as that of the moon, can only be represented by curves of\nextreme complexity. Simplicity of motion has disappeared, but it has\nbeen replaced by simplicity of inter-relation between the various\nmembers of the system which are supposed to attract each other\naccording to a simple and definite law. This law may be supposed\nto contain in itself implicitly all the various and complicated\nmotions of the solar system. If applied to the past it will enable\nus to ascertain the exact date of the antient historical eclipses;\nif applied to the future it will enable us to foretell all but\ncatastrophic astronomical occurrences.\n\n73. Let us now turn to another branch of the same subject. When\nGalileo first applied his telescope to the sun, he discovered the\nexistence of sun-spots. Their solar origin was however for some time\ndisputed, the schoolmen of that day, holding resolutely to the dicta\nof Aristotle, being indisposed to believe that there could possibly\nbe any imperfection in the sun. The telescope alone was in fault.\nThere was even a sermon preached on Galileo, the text of which was\n\u2018Viri Galil\u00e6i, quid statis in coelum spectantes?\u2019\n\nHowever, as time went on, observation showed that spots were\nunmistakably solar phenomena, and these very imperfections are made\nuse of by modern science to obtain for us information regarding the\nchemical and physical structure of our luminary. It also appears that\nthe position and size of these spots depend upon the positions of\nthe planets Mercury and Venus, and this as well as other phenomena\nindicate the existence of some mysterious bond between the sun and\nthe various members of his system, possibly other than the law of\ngravitation, as we now understand it, can express.[31] In fine,\nsimplicity of relation threatens to disappear, just as simplicity of\nmotion disappeared before it.\n\n74. Nevertheless in this triumphal march the progress has always\nbeen from the less to the more perfect, from the glimmering of\nearly dawn to the clear morning light, if not to the bright beams\nof the noon-day sun. Temporary obstacles have appeared only to be\nsurmounted, and like Augustine\u2019s ladder to constitute a platform\nfrom which a higher and more comprehensive view might be obtained.\nDifficulties too, other than physical,\u2014struggles, weariness,\nopposition\u2014have been encountered and overcome, nor has there been\nanything like a grave defeat, or the production of permanent\nconfusion. The concluding words of the _Te Deum_ have been abundantly\nfulfilled in the experience of the astronomer. He has trusted in God,\nand he has never been confounded.\n\n75. Here then we have an instance of what is meant by Continuity.\nIt does not imply an easy progress, or a smooth level road; it is\nconsistent with a temporary halt, perhaps not even inconsistent with\na temporary break-down, or with momentary despair. We are met by\ndifficulties of many kinds\u2014the rock, the tangled growth, the swamp,\nthe thick darkness, but never by the abyss. Nothing has occurred to\nconvince us that our path has been absolutely wrong from the very\ncommencement, and that we must altogether retrace our steps; and\nthe same thing holds in other problems besides those of astronomy.\nOnce we have accumulated sufficient trustworthy evidence to show us\nthat we are in the right way, we are never afterwards irretrievably\ndefeated.\n\nBefore proceeding further, let us here notice a peculiarity which, if\nit be clearly exhibited in the progress of astronomy, is yet by no\nmeans confined to that science, but appears to be characteristic of\nall physical knowledge.\n\nThings are so arranged and the intellect of man is so constituted\nthat we are led in the progress of science to recognise certain laws\nwhich appear at first sight to hold exactly, or which, in other\nwords, have the appearance of absolute truths. As time passes on, and\nour instruments become more delicate, while our observations with\nthem are multiplied, signs begin to show themselves of very slight\ndeviations from exactitude in these laws.\n\nMeanwhile, these approximate expressions of truth during the long\nages (it may be) through which they have been believed, have taken\nsuch a hold upon the minds of men that all signs of their imperfect\nexactitude are at first utterly discredited. Ultimately, however, it\nis by means of these slight discrepancies that we are led forward\nto higher generalisations. This was well pointed out by Sir J.\nHerschel in his _Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy_. In\nfine, does not something analogous to the principle of continuity\nprevent us from supposing that we can ever arrive at the ultimate\nexpression of truth on any, however limited, subject? Whenever,\ntherefore, the language in which any scientific truth is embodied\nappears to us to savour too much of the absolute, is it not a proper\nand hopeful task to endeavour to break this down? It is on this\naccount that we welcome all attempts to modify the expression of the\nlaw of gravitation, which, as our knowledge of it stands at present,\nseems to present too much of the appearance of an absolute and final\ntruth.[32]\n\n76. Our readers will now perhaps wish to have an example of what\nwe should term a breach of Continuity,\u2014this is easily given. Let\nus suppose for instance that the sun, moon, and stars were to move\nabout in strange and fantastic orbits during one day, after which\nthey returned to their previous courses. Here we should have an\nexcellent example of a breach of Continuity, for even if things were\nso arranged as to prevent physical disaster, it is evident that the\nwhole intelligent universe would be plunged into irretrievable mental\nconfusion. Never again could it be said that astronomy is competent\nto explain the varied motions of the heavenly bodies. The observers\nwould lay down their instruments, and the mathematicians their\ncalculations, and the science would come to an end.\n\nOther examples of a breach of Continuity may be as easily imagined.\nSuppose for instance that the gold of the world were to disappear for\nsix hours and then return to it again,\u2014should we not have all the\nsocial relations of men as well as their conceptions of matter thrown\ninto irretrievable confusion? This would not, however, be due to the\nmere fact that something had disappeared from the visible universe.\nIndividual consciousness we have seen is seemingly in the habit of\ndoing so and again reappearing, and we do not trouble ourselves much\nabout it.\n\nContinuity, in fine, does not preclude the occurrence of strange,\nabrupt, unforeseen events in the history of the universe, but only\nof such events as must finally and for ever put to confusion the\nintelligent beings who regard them.\n\n77. It thus appears that, assuming the existence of a Supreme\nGovernor of the universe, the principle of Continuity may be said to\nbe the definite expression in words of our trust that He will not put\nus to permanent intellectual confusion, and we can easily conceive\nsimilar expressions of trust with reference to the other faculties\nof man. Our subject may therefore be approached from other points\nof view, and other arguments may be used founded on the principle\nthat of two or more alternatives that one is to be selected which\nputs our faculties to the least confusion. But it is dangerous to\nspeculate much further upon such subjects; the path is so easy, like\nthe \u2018pleasant, green lane\u2019 spoken of by Ignorance in the _Pilgrim\u2019s\nProgress_, that it cannot but soon lead us into certain hopeless\nrealms.[33]\n\n78. Let us now endeavour to apply this principle to a preliminary\ndiscussion of the miraculous events which are alleged to have taken\nplace in connection with the life of Christ. We may certainly begin\nby assuming that had these events been ordinary ones no doubt would\nhave been entertained regarding their actual occurrence; it is not,\nhowever, our province to discuss the historical evidence in favour of\nChristianity.\n\nNow, until of late years, the divines who have asserted the actual\noccurrence of these events have for the most part attached to this\nassertion a hypothesis of their own, representing the events in\nquestion as due to absolute interferences of the Divine Governor with\nhis usual physical procedure. Each was thus supposed to represent in\nits physical aspect something which could not possibly be deduced\nfrom that which went before or that which followed after.\n\nIt was not exactly asserted that they were arbitrary events, or that\nthey were not the results of purpose, but only that the purpose of\nwhich they were the accomplishment could not be carried out without\nsome physical break. In fine, with the view of removing spiritual\nconfusion, intellectual confusion was introduced, as being the\nlesser evil of the two. Thus, if he submits to be guided by such\ninterpreters, each intelligent being will for ever continue to be\nbaffled in any attempt to explain these phenomena, because they are\nsaid to have no physical relation to anything that went before or\nthat followed after. In fine, they are made to form a universe within\na universe, a portion cut off by an insurmountable barrier from the\ndomain of scientific inquiry.\n\n79. It is not enough to say that we cannot see any foundation for\nthis hypothesis introduced by certain theologians regarding these\nevents. It is certainly necessary to add, as we have already done\n(Art. 36), that such a method of regarding them is essentially\nopposed to the genius of Christianity. Whatever may be thought of the\nperson of Christ, it cannot for a moment be said that He was above\nlaw. He speaks of himself, and is spoken of by the apostles, as bound\nin all respects by the laws of the universe. Nor will it suffice to\nsay that He obeyed the moral and spiritual, but broke occasionally\nthe physical, laws of the universe, or had them broken for Him. In\nfine, we conceive that the New Testament plainly asserts that what\nChrist accomplished was not in defiance of law, but in fulfilment of\nit; and that His ability to do so much was simply due to the fact\nthat His position with reference to the universe was different from\nthat of any other man.\n\n80. Of late years, however, a vastly better method of explanation\nhas been introduced. Charles Babbage, the designer of the well-known\ncalculating engine, showed (in a very remarkable book which he\ncalled a ninth Bridgewater treatise) that it would be possible to\ndesign and construct a machine which, after having worked for a long\ntime according to a particular method of procedure, should suddenly\nmanifest a single breach in its method, and then resume and for ever\nafterwards keep to its original law. He argued from this that an\napparent breach in the physical procedure of the universe is quite\nconsistent with the fundamental idea of law. Jevons also, commenting\nupon these speculations of Babbage, remarks thus in his _Principles\nof Science_ (vol. ii. p. 438), \u2018If such occurrences can be designed\nand foreseen by a human artist, it is surely within the capacity\nof the Divine artist to provide for similar changes of law in the\nmechanism of the atom, or the construction of the heavens.\u2019\n\n81. While we think that this is a very distinct and important advance\nupon the old idea, we venture to pronounce it altogether incomplete\nwithout some further explanation and modification.\n\nThe power of the Divine Being is surely unlimited, but, nevertheless,\nwe have perfect trust that God, whom we believe to have given us\nintelligence, will work in such a way as not to put us to permanent\nintellectual confusion. Yet even on this hypothesis, and with this\ntrust, a single apparent exception to the usual procedure may be\nsupposed to occur, if it be allowed that this may be made use of\nin order to deduce from it the great general law of working which\nincludes both the usual course and the apparent exception. But it\nappears obvious to us that if the exception be of such a nature that\nit must for ever confound all the intelligences of the universe\nwho regard it, then we gain nothing by the supposition that it was\nallowed for in the secret counsels of God.\n\n82. Undoubtedly we cannot permit certain events to be set aside\nby merely human authority as questions into which it is deemed\nirreligious, unprofitable, or useless for our reason to pry; nay, we\nare tempted to advance even further than this, and to assert that\nit constitutes our duty as well as our privilege to do our best to\ngrasp the meaning of all events which come before us. Does not the\nmaterial upon which the intellect of man is intended to work include\nall occurrences, of whatever nature, upon earth\u2014that earth which man\nis commanded to subdue\u2014a command equivalent to victory?\n\n83. We have now indicated with sufficient clearness the fault we have\nto find with the theological position as it stood until recently,\u2014let\nus next briefly allude to the position of the extreme school of\nscience. Ignoring all but the visible universe, and applying the\nprinciple of Continuity to its phenomena, the members of this school\nwere indubitably led to most important generalisations regarding the\nmethod of working of that great system. They even drove back with\nmuch success, and very properly, certain detachments of theologians\nwho had occupied portions of the field in an unwarrantable manner.\nSo far the Genius whom they had summoned up appeared to be the very\nprinciple of order. But things wore a different complexion as time\nwent on. It was fancied that historical Christianity must disappear,\nand that the belief in the reality of a future state must follow\nafter it. They were surrendered. But it was extremely startling when\nthe Genius invoked, not content with what he had already devoured,\nbroadly hinted that the whole visible universe would furnish an\nacceptable sacrifice,\u2014_then_ even the most extreme partisans of\nthe school began at length to be alarmed. It was too much to be\nborne, that a Genius summoned up in the very name of order should\nturn out to be a demon so insatiate as this! Must the whole visible\nuniverse, indeed, arrive at such a state as to be totally unfit for\nthe habitation of living beings? The individual they were content to\nsacrifice, perhaps even the race, but they would spare the universe.\nUndoubtedly, if it be possible to pity men who could so easily\ndispense with Christianity and immortality, they had at length got\nthemselves into a deplorable dilemma. For the principle they had\ninvoked was absolutely without pity, and in the most heartless manner\ncontinued to point towards the sacrifice of the visible universe.\nThis, they were told, was only a huge fire, and must ultimately\nburn itself out. Nothing would be left but the ashes,\u2014the dead and\nworthless body of the present system.\n\n84. No wonder, then, that these men should be startled at their\nconclusion, and try somehow to evade it. Such an attempt was actually\nmade, and a gleam of lurid light seemed for a moment to illuminate\nthe thick darkness conjured up by the hypothesis. It was conjectured\nthat the visible universe might in reality be infinite, even if\nthe number of stars be not so, and that such a universe might last\nfrom eternity to eternity, and if it might not be supposed that\nsuch a system could continuously and without interruption afford a\nhabitation for animated beings, yet it might do so discontinuously\nand by fits and starts, its available energy being recruited by\nrepeated collisions, extending in a series from eternity to eternity.\nThe life of whole systems, perhaps even of whole galaxies, would\nthus disappear, to be replaced after myriads of ages by the feeble\nbeginnings of an entirely new order of things.\n\nSuch a hypothesis no doubt contemplates a ceaseless change, and\nsatisfies so far the requirements of energy. But while the structures\nbuilt are perishable, the stones out of which they are built\u2014the\natoms\u2014are supposed to be eternal. It is this eternity of the atom\nwhich vitiates the hypothesis, for we shall show in the sequel that\nthis is a doctrine which can only be held by ignoring the fundamental\nprinciples of scientific inquiry. Indeed we can hardly escape from\nthe conclusion that the visible universe must in matter, as well\nas in transformable energy, come to an end. But the principle of\nContinuity upon which all such arguments are based still demanding\na continuance of the universe, we are forced to believe that there\nis something beyond that which is visible, or that, to use the words\nof an old writer (which we have inscribed on our title-page),\u2014\u2018the\nthings which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen\nare eternal.\u2019\n\n85. Looking back instead of forward\u2014to the origin of this visible\nuniverse, rather than to its end, we are brought even more definitely\nto a similar conclusion. It is perfectly certain, as we shall\nafterwards see, that the visible universe must have had a beginning\nin time; but if it be all that exists, then the first abrupt\nmanifestation of it is as truly a break of continuity as its final\noverthrow.\n\nIt may sound strange to some of our readers to be told that it is the\nduty of the man of science to push back the Great First Cause in time\nas far as possible; nevertheless, this accurately represents the part\nin the universe which he is called upon to play.\n\nWe dig into the crust of the earth and find therein stratified\ndeposits containing fossil forms, and we may either suppose that\nGod created these as they are, or that they came into their place\nthrough the operation of natural forces, and represent the relics\nof an antient world of life; the latter of these is undoubtedly the\nscientific hypothesis. The only other hypothesis is that of certain\nwriters belonging to the Church of Rome, who asserted that the devil\nput the fossils there.\n\nOr, again, we may suppose that God created the sun, placed the earth\nand the other planets in their present orbits, and gave them the\nrequisite velocities, all at once, or that the solar system gradually\ncondensed into its present state from a chaotic mass of nebulous\nmaterial; certainly, again, the latter is the scientific hypothesis.\n\nIn like manner, if we can suppose any phenomenon, any conditioned\norder of things, antecedent to the appearance of the visible\nuniverse, we have gained a step. In fact, we conceive it to be the\nduty of the man of science to treat the original production of\nthe visible universe just in the same way as he would any other\nphenomenon. It is no doubt a very large thing, but we must not be\nterrified at mere bigness,\u2014we must mete out the same scientific\nmeasure to all events, whether they be great or small. We therefore\nwelcome a hypothesis like that of Sir W. Thomson,[34] which regards\nthe primordial atoms of the visible universe as vortices somehow\nproduced in a pre-existing perfect fluid, provided that such a\nhypothesis is otherwise tenable.\n\n86. Let not any of our readers regard this process as an attempt\nto drive the Creator out of the field altogether, for this is most\nassuredly not the case. Is it less reverent to regard the universe\nas an illimitable avenue which leads up to God, than to look upon\nit as a limited area bounded by an impenetrable wall, which, if we\ncould only pierce it, would admit us at once into the presence of the\nEternal?\n\nIn fine, we do not hesitate to assert that the visible universe\ncannot comprehend the whole works of God, because it had its\nbeginning in time, and will also come to an end. Perhaps, indeed, it\nforms only an infinitesimal portion of that stupendous whole which is\nalone entitled to be called THE UNIVERSE.\n\n87. We thus see that the extreme scientific school, as well as the\nold theological school, have erred in their conclusions, because they\nhave neither of them loyally followed the principle of Continuity.\nThe theologians, regarding (like the antient philosopher) matter\nand its laws with contempt, have without scruple assumed that\nfrequent invasions of these laws could be consistent with a tenable\nhypothesis. On the other hand, the extreme scientific school, when\nthey were brought by the principle of Continuity into such a position\nthat their next logical step should have been the realisation of\nthe unseen, failed to take it, and have suffered grievously in\nconsequence.\n\n88. It remains now, before concluding this chapter, to sketch briefly\nthe application of the principle of Continuity to the problem we have\nin hand.\n\nThere are three conceivable suppositions with reference to individual\nexistence after death. It may be regarded as the result of a\ntransference from one grade of being to another in the present\nvisible universe; or secondly, of a transference from the visible\nuniverse to some other order of things intimately connected with\nit; or lastly, we may conceive it to represent the result of a\ntransference from the present visible universe to an order of things\nentirely unconnected with it.\n\n89. This last hypothesis may however be very speedily disposed of if\nwe are to maintain the principle of Continuity. We have seen that\none of the requisites for conscious individual existence is an organ\nconnecting the individual with the past. Now, were we to suppose a\ntransference of living beings from the present visible universe to an\norder of things otherwise entirely unconnected with it, this would\nbe a manifest breach of the law of Continuity. Imagine the utter\nconfusion into which this present universe would be plunged, if a set\nof inhabitants were transferred into it having organs connecting them\nwith a past existence in an entirely different universe. A confusion\nprecisely similar would be occasioned by carrying out a transfer\naccording to the hypothesis in question; so that we are able at once\nto reduce our suppositions to two: the first involving a transference\nfrom one grade to another of the visible universe, and the second a\ntransference from the visible universe to some other order of things\nintimately connected with it.\n\n90. In what precedes, we have argued by anticipation that the present\nvisible universe will become effete; but in the following chapters it\nwill be necessary to maintain this assertion by a minute examination\nof those laws which represent the course of things observed in\nthe present universe. In other words, we must settle the fitness\nor unfitness of the present visible universe before we proceed to\ndiscuss our second hypothesis.\n\n91. But whether the transfer be supposed to take place in the visible\nuniverse, or from it to another intimately connected with it, the\nsubject in either case is certainly one on which we may legitimately\nemploy our reasoning faculties. So far indeed is the subject from\nbeing one which it will be utterly and for ever useless to discuss,\nthat it has become our duty as well as our privilege to make the\nattempt, in the perfect trust that time will inevitably bring truth\nwith it. We think that this fact has been too much overlooked by\nthose whom we may term the moderate school of scientific thinkers.\nNot denying the possibility of a future state, they have yet shrunk\nfrom all attempts to investigate its conditions. We are in hopes that\na perusal of this volume will lead these writers to see that the\nsubject is one which may be profitably discussed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nTHE PRESENT PHYSICAL UNIVERSE.\n\n ... \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u1f76 \u1fe5\u03bf\u03b9\u03b6\u03b7\u03b4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c5\u03c3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\n \u03bb\u03c5\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\u2014\u03a0\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd \u0392\u02b9.\n \u03b3\u02b9.\n\n \u2018The cloud-capp\u2019d towers, the gorgeous palaces,\n The solemn temples, the great globe itself,\n Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve;\n And, like this insubstantial pageant, faded,\n Leave not a rack behind.\u2019\u2014SHAKESPEARE, _Tempest_.\n\n \u2018All worldly shapes shall melt in gloom,\n The sun himself must die\n Before this mortal shall assume\n His immortality.\u2019\u2014CAMPBELL.\n\n\n92. Having in the last chapter briefly indicated the nature of the\nproposition which we intend to bring forward, we must next study, as\na preliminary to further discussion, what science tells us about the\npresent physical universe: what are the general laws to which it is\nnow subject; when and what must have been its beginning; when and\nwhat will be its inevitable end.\n\nWe have been driven into becoming accustomed to the phrase, \u2018the\nmaterial universe,\u2019 which is generally used in a sense absolutely\nidentical with that which we have chosen as the title of this\nchapter. We shall soon see that the term is a very inapt one,\ninasmuch as matter is (though it may sound paradoxical to say so) the\nless important half of the material of the physical universe.\n\nIn the present chapter we shall still further restrict ourselves by\nomitting, as far as possible, any reference to life (even in its\nlowest aspect), and we likewise defer to a future chapter our account\nof the more reasonable speculations which have been advanced with\nregard to the intimate structure of matter and ether.\n\n93. It is only within the last thirty or forty years that there has\ngradually dawned upon the minds of scientific men the conviction that\nthere is something besides matter or stuff in the physical universe,\nsomething which has at least as much claim as matter to recognition\nas an objective reality, though, of course, far less directly\nobvious to our senses as such, and therefore much later in being\ndetected. So long as men spoke of light, heat, electricity, etc., as\nimponderables, they merely avoided or put aside the difficulty.\n\nWhen they attempted to rank them as matter,\u2014heat, for instance, as\ncaloric,\u2014they at once fell into errors, from which a closer scrutiny\nof experimental results would assuredly have saved them. The idea\nof _substance_ or _stuff_ as necessary to objective existence very\nnaturally arises from ordinary observations on matter; and as there\ncould be little doubt of the physical reality of heat, light, etc.,\nthese were in early times at once set down as matter. Fire, in fact\n(including, it is to be presumed, everything which involved either\nheat or flame, real or apparent), was in early times one of the four\nso-called _elements_.\n\nIn those days the sun was supposed to be only a great fire; a\nlightning-flash, an aurora, or a comet, was merely a flame; in other\nwords, the essence of all these was the element fire, or, as it\nwas later called, caloric. The sun, except when he appeared as the\nspreader of pestilence, was the beneficent fire, as were also some of\nthe planets; the lightning, the comet, even the moon and Saturn, were\nbaleful fires.\n\nThis endeavour to assign a substantive existence to every phenomenon\nis, of course, perfectly natural; but on that very account\nexcessively likely to be wrong.\n\n_Humanum est errare_ comes with quite as much heart-felt conviction\nof its truth from the lips of the honest Pagan as from those of the\nChristian believer; though perhaps its meaning may be considerably\nless extended in the former than in the latter case.\n\n94. But, before discussing what is that _something else_ besides\nstuff which has an _objective_ though not a _substantive_[35]\nexistence, let us in the first place inquire into the grounds of our\nbelief, that matter itself has a real existence external to us; that,\nin fact, the so-called evidence of our senses is not a mere delusion.\n\nThere is a strong temptation to be metaphysical here, but we will\nendeavour to resist it.\n\nNow physical science furnishes us with the following among many other\narguments in proof of the reality of the external universe:\u2014\n\n_Experience of the most varied kind consistently shows us that we\ncannot produce or destroy even the smallest quantity of matter._\n\nExercise our greatest powers of imagination, do with it what\nwe please, we cannot make our senses indicate to us an increase\nor diminution in a given quantity of what we call matter. We\nfind it so far amenable to our control that we can alter its\narrangement, form, density, state of aggregation, temperature,\netc.; nay, by so approximating it to other matter as to produce a\nchemical combination, we may entirely transform its appearance and\nproperties,\u2014_all but one_: its mass or quantity is completely beyond\nour control. Measure it by what process we please, by the \u2018muscular\nsense,\u2019 by weight, anyhow, there it is, altogether independent of us,\nlaughing our efforts to scorn! Can this be a mere mental idea which\nthe mind that conceived it (or, at all events, in some way received\nthe conception of it) is unable to destroy?\n\nBut there is one other argument on this point which must be\nmentioned. Not only do our own senses invariably indicate to us the\nimpossibility of altering the quantity of matter, but the senses of\nall men alike point to the same quantity, quality, and collocation\nof matter in the earth and external to the earth. Whence this\nextraordinary agreement between the evidences of the senses in\ndifferent men, when the minds are so different?\n\nOur conviction then of the objective reality of matter (at least\nfrom the point of view of the Natural Philosopher) is based upon the\nexperimental truth that we can neither increase nor diminish its\nquantity, in fact on what we may conveniently for our present purpose\ncall the _Conservation of Matter_.\n\n95. Here let us pause for a moment to compare together this view of\nmatter and the definition of the laws of the universe, which we have\nalready given. The laws of the universe we defined (Art. 54) to be\nthe laws according to which the beings in the universe are trammelled\nby the Governor thereof as regards time, space, and sensation. Now,\nit may be asked, is this definition consistent with a belief in the\nobjective reality of matter? Our reply is, that to our minds the two\nare in perfect accordance.\n\nWe do not here intend to enter into any metaphysical discussion. It\nis enough for us to say that our practical working certainty of the\nreality of matter depends upon the facts, _firstly_, that it offers\nresistance to our imagination and our will, and, _secondly_, that in\nparticular it offers _absolute_ resistance to all attempts to change\nits quantity. We shall soon see that experiment teaches us that both\nproperties belong to something else.\n\n96. Returning from this digression let us therefore assume that the\nobjective reality of the external universe has been proved, and\nthat this reality is strongly impressed upon us in virtue of that\nprinciple which we have called the conservation of matter.\n\nBut as soon as we grant this, we are obliged by our reason, however\nlittle our senses may incline us to it, or rather however much they\nmay dispose us against it, to allow objective reality to whatever\nelse may be found to be _in the same sense_ conserved. (We have\nhere italicised these four words for a reason which will afterwards\nappear.) This is a question which deserves and must secure careful\nconsideration.\n\n97. In abstract dynamics several things are said and mathematically\nproved by deductions from experiment to be conserved, but one\nonly of these in the strict sense in which we have spoken of the\nconservation of matter. We will examine them briefly, and our\nnon-mathematical readers must pardon us if we make use of certain\ntechnical expressions belonging to the domain of mathematical physics.\n\n[It is absolutely essential that the reader should have clear notions\non these points, for there is widespread confusion and error as to\nthe meaning even of so simple and elementary a term as \u2018_force_.\u2019\nHe will often find it used indifferently in either of two senses\nwhich have no connection whatever with one another; and unless he\ncompletely gets over this abuse of language he need not hope to be\nable to follow the present portion of our preliminary argument. Force\nproper is a pull, push, weight, pressure, etc., and can be measured,\nin the vernacular of engineers, as equivalent to so many pounds\nweight; but the unjustifiable use of the word applies it to _work\ndone by a force_, so many pounds raised so many feet, _i.e. force\novercome through a space_. Two such things are of different kinds,\nand cannot possibly be compared together. They differ in fact in\nprecisely the same way as length or breadth differs from superficial\narea, _i.e._ as a linear foot differs from a square foot! And the\nmodern abuse of the word is more outrageous, alike to science and\nto common sense, than would be the attempt to assign the height of\na mountain in acres! For the absurdity does not end even here. We\nhave, as yet, absolutely no proof whatever that force proper has\nobjective existence. In all probability there is no such _thing_ as\nforce (which is suggested to us by the impressions of our _muscular_\nsense), any more than there is such a _thing_ as Sound, or Light,\nwhich are mere names for physical impressions produced upon special\nnerves by the energy of undulatory motions of certain media. The\nterm, however, is a very convenient one for the rate of transference\nor transformation of energy per unit of length in a given direction.]\n\n(1.) _Conservation of Momentum._\u2014What is understood by this is a\nmere direct consequence of Newton\u2019s _first_ interpretation of his\nThird Law of Motion, viz., that _Action and Reaction are equal and\nopposite_. In this _first_ interpretation Newton tells us to consider\nactions and reactions as forces proper, or (their equivalents)\nquantities of motion. This is the term employed by Newton; but we\nnow designate it _momentum_, and measure it by the product of the\nmass and the velocity of a body. Stated in its simplest form, this\nlaw asserts that the momentum of a system of bodies, measured in any\ndirection whatever, is not altered by their mutual action, whether\nthat action be of the nature of traction, attraction, repulsion, or\nimpact. And we see at once from this third law of motion that it must\nbe so, because the change of momentum, in any direction, of any one\npart of the system, per unit of time, is the measure of the force\nacting on that part in that direction. Whatever momentum in this\nparticular direction is gained by one member of the system must have\nbeen lost by other members, but not from their whole momentum, merely\nfrom the part of it in this direction. It thus appears that the\n(algebraic) sum of the momenta generated by the mutual actions of the\nsystem is zero.\n\nThese momenta are in fact _directed magnitudes_ (like the forces of\nwhich they are the measure), and are therefore capable of _cancelling\none another_ when their numerical amounts are equal and their\ndirections are opposite. In this sense the conservation is of the\nsame nature as that of the imagined electric or magnetic fluids,\nwhere no portion whatever of one kind can be produced without the\nsimultaneous appearance of an equal quantity of the other, a quantity\njust capable of neutralising it. This is obviously not in any sense\nanalogous to the Conservation of Matter of which we have just spoken.\n\nAs an illustration take a loaded cannon. Before firing, neither\ncannon nor ball had momentum. After firing, the ball has a certain\nmomentum, the cannon (in virtue of its recoil) an _equal_ and\nopposite momentum. If we could exactly reverse the motions of the\ncannon and ball just as they separate, the impact between them would\njust reduce each to rest, and no momentum would be left. Considered\nseparately after the discharge, each has momentum, but _in the\ncomplete system_ of cannon and ball there is no momentum\u2014there being\nequal quantities of positive and negative, in the same line. In fact\nmomentum cannot be produced or destroyed _in any system as a whole_.\nThis is the Conservation referred to. It is as if a man always when\nhe received a sum of money fell to the same amount in debt\u2014the state\nof his affairs, as shown by his books, would of course not be altered.\n\n(2.) _Conservation of Moment of Momentum_.\u2014Here we deal with\nquantities of the order of the moments of forces about an axis, _i.e.\ncouples_ in Poinsot\u2019s sense. These also are directed magnitudes\ndepending for their conservation upon the first interpretation of\nNewton\u2019s third law, and therefore the same remarks apply to them as\nto the preceding.\n\n(3.) _Conservation of Vis Viva_.\u2014_Vis viva_ is the old name for\nenergy of motion or the consequent power of doing work. We now deal\nwith quantities which cannot possess direction, because they are\nessentially _products of pairs of quantities similarly directed_,\nand are therefore all to be treated as of the same algebraic sign,\nor rather (to adopt the language of Sir W. R. Hamilton) as signless\nquantities. With such there can of course be no cancelling.\n\nTo make our meaning clear, let us consider upon what _vis viva_\ndepends. It depends upon and is proportional to the product of\nthe mass into the _square_ of the velocity. Compare, or rather\ncontrast, this with the definition of momentum given above, and it\nwill be seen that _vis viva_ is the product of the momentum and the\nvelocity. Now mass is of course a signless quantity; evidently we\ncannot have negative mass. Then with regard to the square of the\nvelocity, this will be positive whether the velocity be positive\nor negative, whether it be in one direction or the opposite. _Vis\nviva_, therefore, or energy of motion, is something which is not\naffected with the sign of direction, or, as we have already said,\nit is a signless quantity. It is found to be convenient to measure\nit as _half_ the product of the moving mass into the square of its\nvelocity. So measured, it is now called (see \u00a7 99) _kinetic energy_.\n\nNow to our cannon again. Before firing there is no _vis viva_ of\neither cannon or ball. After firing each has _vis viva_, but that\nof the ball is greater than that of the cannon in the proportion in\nwhich the cannon\u2019s mass exceeds that of the ball. And the system as\na whole has _vis viva_ though it has no momentum. If, as before, we\ncould reverse the motions of cannon and ball, then, even when they\nimpinged, the _vis viva_ would _not_ be lost. As will presently be\nseen, it would be employed in heating both the impinging bodies.\n\n98. We have said that the energy which a body contains\u2014its _vis\nviva_\u2014its power of doing work, is independent of the direction in\nwhich it is moving; and, further, that while the mass is the same, it\nis proportional to the square of the velocity. For instance, we may\nmeasure the energy of a cannon-ball or of an arrow by the distance\nit will carry itself up against the force of gravity, represented by\nits own weight, when shot vertically upwards, and we find that with\na double velocity it will go four times as high. Or we may point the\ncannon horizontally, and measure the energy of the same ball by the\nnumber of planks of oak wood which it can penetrate, and we shall\nfind that a ball with double the velocity will penetrate nearly four\ntimes as many as one with the single velocity. All such experiments\nconcur together in convincing us that the energy of the ball is\nindependent of the direction in which the cannon is pointed, and is\nproportional to the square of the velocity, so that a double velocity\nwill give a fourfold energy.\n\n99. We have just now spoken about a cannon-ball fired into the\nair against the force of gravity. Such a ball, as it mounts, will\neach moment lose part of its velocity, until it finally comes to\na standstill, after which it will begin to descend. When it is\njust turning it is perfectly harmless, and if we were standing on\nthe top of a cliff to which it had just reached, we might without\ndanger catch it in our arms and lodge it on the cliff. Its energy\nhas apparently disappeared. Let us, however, see whether this is\nreally true or not. It was fired up at us, let us say, by a foe at\nthe bottom of the cliff, and the thought occurs to us to drop it down\nupon him again, which we do with great success, for he is smashed to\npieces by the ball.\n\nIn truth, dynamics informs us that such a ball will again strike the\nground with a velocity, and therefore with an energy precisely equal\nto that with which it was originally projected upwards. Now, when at\nthe top of the cliff, if it had not the energy due to actual motion,\nit had nevertheless some sort of energy due to its elevated position,\nfor it had obviously the power of doing work. A pond of still water,\nunless it can fall, _i.e._ unless it has what is technically called\na \u2018_head_,\u2019 is of no use in driving a water-wheel. The head, or\nthe power of descending, gives it a store of dormant energy, which\nbecomes active as the water gradually descends. And the same amount\nof work may be obtained (by means of a turbine for instance) from\na small quantity of water, provided it has a great \u2018head,\u2019 as can\nbe obtained (by means of an ordinary overshot or breast wheel) from\nwater with far less head, provided it be supplied in proportionally\ngreater quantity. _We thus recognise two forms of energy which change\ninto one another, the one due to actual motion and the other to\nposition; the former of these is generally called kinetic, and the\nlatter potential energy._\n\nAll this appears to have been clearly perceived by Newton,\nwho gave it as a _second_ interpretation of his Third Law of\nMotion. His statement is equivalent, in modern language, to\nthe following:[36]\u2014_Work done on any system of bodies has its\nequivalent in the form of work done against friction, molecular\nforces, or gravity, if there be no acceleration; but if there be\nacceleration, part of the work is expended in overcoming resistance\nto acceleration, and the additional kinetic energy developed is\nequivalent to the work so spent._\n\n100. Thus Newton expressly tells us (though not in these words) that\nwe are to include in the same category work done by or against a\nforce\u2014whether that force be due to gravity, friction, or molecular\naction (such as elasticity, for instance), or even to acceleration.\n\n(_a._) When work is done against gravity, as in lifting a mass from\nthe ground, we have just seen that it is (as it were) stored up\nin the raised mass; we can recover it at any time by letting the\nmass descend. Thus it is that we furnish a clock with motive power\nsufficient to keep it going for a week in spite of friction and other\nresistance, by simply winding up its weights.\n\n(_b._) When work is done against molecular forces, we have a similar\nstoring up, as, for instance, in drawing a bow or in winding up a\nwatch.\n\n(_c._) When work is done against the inertia of a body, _i.e._\nto accelerate its velocity, Newton\u2019s definitions show that the\nadditional kinetic energy so produced is equal to the work so spent.\n\n(_d._) In abstract dynamics we simply consider as lost the work spent\nagainst friction. In Newton\u2019s time it was not known what became of it.\n\n101. Leaving out, then, for the present, the fourth alternative,\nwe see that whatever work is spent, we must, according to Newton,\neven in abstract dynamics recognise that _it is not lost, but only\ntransformed_ into an equivalent quantity stored up for future use,\neither in a quiescent form (as, for instance, the potential energy of\na raised weight or bent spring), or in an active form (as the kinetic\nenergy of a moving mass). Here, then, at last, we recognise the\nsame sort of conservation as that which we found in matter. But the\nstatement so far is defective, as we have seen, in one particular.\nWhat becomes of work spent in overcoming friction? or what becomes of\nthe energy of the blacksmith\u2019s hammer after it has struck the anvil?\nTo this experiment alone can give the answer. Let us see what it has\ntold us.\n\nMan has been called a reasoning animal, a laughing animal, etc.,\naccording to the momentary whim or humour of the classifier; but he\nis perhaps still more definitely separated from all other animals\nwhen specified as _the_ \u2018cooking animal.\u2019 Now, it has always appeared\nto us as something little short of marvellous that, even for the high\npurpose of cooking his food, or of inflicting exquisite torture on a\nvanquished foe, savage man should ever have hit upon the process of\nprocuring fire by friction. Considering his condition, and comparing\nhis opportunities and his success with those of even our greatest\nmodern physicists, we cannot but look upon this as one of the very\ngreatest and most notable discoveries ever made in physics. All the\nmore notable, too, from the fact that a man like Newton, though of\ncourse aware of it, absolutely missed its significance even at the\nvery moment when it alone was wanted to fill a serious _lacuna_ in\none of his grandest and most important practical generalisations.\n\nThe missing link was all but supplied by Rumford and Davy at the\nvery end of last century. Rumford\u2019s boiling of water by the heat\ngenerated in the boring of a cannon, and Davy\u2019s melting of ice by\nfriction _in vacuo_, were each conclusively demonstrative alike of\nthe non-materiality of heat and of the ultimate fate of work spent in\nfriction, which is thus seen to be converted into heat; or at least\nthese experiments could easily have been made demonstrative by very\nslight additions to, or modifications of, their author\u2019s methods or\nreasoning. But the exact and formal enuntiation of the equivalence of\nheat and work required to fill the _lacuna_ in Newton\u2019s statement was\nfirst given by Davy in 1812.\n\n102. Let us here pause for a moment and contemplate the position to\nwhich the solution of our problem had even then attained. Visible\nkinetic energy, such as that of a cannon-ball shot upwards, is\ntransformed as it rises into visible potential energy. As the ball\ndescends its energy is retransformed from the potential into the\nkinetic variety until, when it is about to strike the earth, it has,\nor rather would have if there were no atmosphere, as much kinetic\nenergy as it had when it was first shot upwards.\n\nWhen the ball has once struck the earth its kinetic energy of visible\nmotion is changed by impact into that kinetic energy of invisible\nmotion of its particles which is called heat; and, generally\nspeaking, in all cases of friction, percussion, and atmospheric\nresistance we have a change of visible energy into heat, as for\ninstance when a railway train is stopped by the action of the\nbrake, when a blacksmith strikes the anvil with his hammer, when a\ncannon-ball moves through and heats the air, or when a meteorite or\nfalling-star is rendered incandescent by the resistance it meets with\neven in the higher and rarer strata of the atmosphere.\n\nWe had thus come to the stage of regarding heat as a species of\nmolecular energy into which visible energy is often transformed, and\nvery soon afterwards it came to be perceived that there were other\nforms of molecular energy besides heat\u2014some of these being potential\nand some kinetic. Thus two substances may possess mutual chemical\naffinity when separated from each other, just as a raised stone\ntends to fall again to the earth, and we obtain a form of potential\nenergy in the one case as truly as in the other. When, for instance,\nwe have carbon or coal in our cellars or our mines, and oxygen in\nthe air, we are in possession of a store of chemical potential\nenergy upon which we can draw at any moment and change it during the\nprocess of combustion from the potential to the kinetic form. Again,\nin a current of electricity we have no doubt a species of kinetic\nenergy, although it still puzzles men of science to say what form of\ninvisible motion such a current implies. From all this, without being\nfurther perplexed with scientific details, our readers will perceive\nthat there are many different forms, some of them potential, and\nothers of them kinetic, in which energy may appear.\n\nWhile we were thus grasping the fact that energy can appear under\nvarious forms, we were also beginning to perceive that it had great\npowers of transmutation\u2014going about from one form to another, and Sir\nW. R. Grove did good work at this stage of the inquiry in bringing\ntogether the various cases of such transmutations in his work on the\nCorrelation of the Physical Forces.\n\nIn spite of this, it was left for Joule and Colding, who worked\nalmost simultaneously and by well-devised experimental methods from\nabout the year 1840, independently to discover, and by degrees to\nenuntiate, by means of arguments founded on _the only admissible\nbasis\u2014experiment_, the grand law of the _Conservation of Energy_. In\nits most general form, the statement of the conservation of energy\nis merely a completed version of the passage we have already quoted\nfrom Newton; and the experimental discoveries of Rumford and Davy,\nextended and completed by Joule and Colding, allow us now to put\nNewton\u2019s second or alternative interpretation of his _Third Law of\nMotion_ into the modern statement of the _Conservation of Energy_.\n\n_In any system of bodies whatever, to which no energy is communicated\nby external bodies, and which parts with no energy to external\nbodies, the sum of the various potential and kinetic energies remains\nfor ever unaltered._\n\nIn other words, while the one form of energy becomes changed into\nthe other,\u2014potential into kinetic and kinetic into potential, or\none species of either into another;\u2014yet each change represents at\nonce a creation of one kind of energy and a simultaneous and equal\nannihilation of another, the total energy present, as we have already\nsaid, remaining for ever unaltered.\n\n103. Taking as our \u2018system of bodies\u2019 the whole physical universe,\nwe now see that, according to the test we have already laid down,\nenergy has as much claim to be regarded as an objective reality as\nmatter itself. But the forms of statement are most markedly different\nfor the two. We before spoke of the quantity of matter without\nqualification, but we now speak of _the sum of the two kinds_ of\nenergy. Let us think for a moment of this, and we see that whereas\n(to our present knowledge, at least) matter is always the same,\nthough it may be masked in various combinations, energy is constantly\nchanging the form in which it presents itself. The one is like the\neternal, unchangeable Fate or _Necessitas_ of the antients; the other\nis Proteus himself in the variety and rapidity of its transformations.\n\n \u03a6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b4\u03cc\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c7\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1, \u03a0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03ad\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03bd,\n \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f45\u03c3\u2019 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b9\u03bb\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2\u00b7\n \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f56\u03c4\u2019 \u1f08\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2,\n \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f01\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u2019 \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76\n \u03b2\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03c1\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7.[37]\n\n104. And again, _energy is of use to us solely because it is\nconstantly being transformed_. When the sluice is shut, or the fire\nput out, the machinery stops; when a man cannot digest his food,\nhe breaks down altogether. Coal in itself, except on account of an\noccasional fossil it may contain, or its still somewhat uncertain\nmode of formation, or (to take a lower point of view) as a material\nfor ornament, is a very useless thing indeed: its grand value\nconsists in its chemical affinity, in virtue of which it possesses\ngreat potential energy as regards the oxygen of the air, which\ncan very easily be transformed into its equivalent in heat. \u2018Keep\nyour powder dry\u2019 is merely one way of saying \u2018preserve the ready\ntransformability of your energy.\u2019 In fact, if we think for a moment\nover what has just been said, to the effect that the only real things\nin the physical universe are matter and energy, and that of these\nmatter is simply passive, it is obvious that all the physical changes\nwhich take place, including those which are inseparably associated\nwith the thoughts as well as the actions of living beings, are merely\ntransformations of energy. Thus it is an inquiry of the very utmost\nimportance as regards the present universe: _Are all forms of energy\nequally susceptible of transformation?_ To see the importance of this\nquestion, the reader has only to reflect that if there be any one\nform of energy less readily or less completely transformable than the\nothers, and if transformations constantly go on, more and more of the\nwhole energy of the universe will inevitably sink into this lower\ngrade as time advances. Hence the whole possibility of transformation\nmust steadily grow less and less; in scientific language, though the\n_quantity_ of energy remains for ever unchanged, its _availability_\nsteadily decreases.\n\n105. Now, every one knows a case in which there may be an unlimited\namount of energy present, no part of which is available for\ntransformation. It is the simple one of heat in a number of bodies,\n_when all are at the same temperature_. To obtain work from heat we\nmust have hotter and colder bodies, to correspond, as it were, with\nthe boiler and condenser of a heat-engine; and just as we can get no\nwork from still water if it be all at the same level, _i.e._ if no\npart of it can fall, so in like manner we can get no work from heat\nunless part of it can fall from a higher to a lower temperature.\nThis is a remark of the very utmost consequence to our argument,\nand must therefore be fully elucidated. Unfortunately it is not as\nyet possible to do this without introducing a good many scientific\ntechnicalities which are unsuited to the great majority of readers.\nIn the next eight sections we endeavour to explain it as simply as we\ncan. The reader who cannot easily follow us may pass, without break\nof continuity in the argument, at once to Art. 114.\n\n* 106. The first step in the investigation of the transformation of\nheat into work was taken by Sadi Carnot in 1824: a step which has\nrecently been found of inestimable value in every branch of modern\nphysical science. He devised a method of startling originality for\nthe purpose of attacking this special question of the production of\nwork from heat. His inferences from its application were not all\ncorrect; this was due however to no fault of the method, but to the\nfact that he unfortunately assumed (though with caution, and under\na protest almost amounting to an assertion of the opposite) the\nmateriality of heat. His method embraces two perfectly new ideas:\u2014\n\n(1.) That, at least with our present knowledge, no inference is\npossible as to the relation between heat and work, until the heated\nor working substance is brought back, after a complete _Cycle_ of\noperations, to its initial physical state.\n\nObvious as this statement, once made, is, it was altogether ignored\n(twenty years after Carnot) by S\u00e9guin and Mayer, whom some authors\nstill persist in setting forth as the founders of the dynamical\ntheory of heat. Their speculations were entirely vitiated by their\nviolation of this principle.\n\n(2.) That an engine whose cycle of operations is reversible is a\nperfect engine, that is to say, gives the greatest possible amount of\nwork from a given quantity of heat with any assigned temperatures of\nboiler and condenser.\n\nThe term reversible is not here used in the popular sense in\nwhich a mere reversal of the direction of motion of each part is\ncontemplated, _i.e._ what would be more properly termed \u2018backing,\u2019\nit is used in the higher sense of taking an engine which converts a\ncertain quantity of the heat spent on it into work, while it lets the\nrest down from the boiler to the condenser, and then spending upon\nit the same amount of work with the result of taking back the heat\nfrom the condenser, adding thereto the heat-equivalent of the work so\nspent, and thus restoring the whole of its original loss in heat to\nthe boiler; simply in fact reversing all the results of the direct\naction.[38]\n\n* 107. Sir W. Thomson, in 1848, was the first to recall attention\nto the work of Carnot, after Colding and Joule had published their\nexperimental discoveries; and he pointed out that the action of\nthe reversible engine gave what had been up to that time vainly\nsought, an absolute definition of temperature\u2014a definition, that is,\naltogether independent of the properties of any particular species of\nmatter. In fact it is obvious that as reversibility in the sense we\nhave just explained is the stamp of perfection in a heat-engine, all\nreversible engines, whatever be the working substance, will, under\nthe same circumstances, that is to say, _with the same temperatures\nof boiler and condenser_, convert the same fraction of the heat spent\non them into work. This, of course, still leaves wide scope for\nchoice of a definition of temperature: but that finally determined\non by Thomson was chosen (in consequence of a hint from some\nexperimental results of Joule) so as to make the absolute measurement\nagree nearly with that of the long-familiar air-thermometer. It\ntherefore stands as follows:\u2014\n\n_The heat taken in by a perfect engine is to the heat given out by it\nin the same proportion as the absolute temperature of the boiler to\nthat of the condenser._\n\nOf course it is hardly necessary to state that it is only the excess\nof the heat taken in over that given out by any engine that can have\nbeen converted into available work. This follows at once from the\nconservation of energy.\n\nExperiments carried on by Joule and Thomson[39] together have shown\nthat the absolute zero of temperature is nearly 274\u00b0 below zero of\nthe centigrade scale; so that on the absolute scale the temperature\nof melting ice is 274\u00b0, while that of water boiling under the\nstandard pressure is 374\u00b0.\n\n* 108. In 1849 James Thomson made a very remarkable application of\nCarnot\u2019s reasoning, the first of a series of such applications which\nhave since done immense service in the extension of almost every\nbranch of physics. He showed in fact that, because water expands in\nthe act of freezing, _the melting point of ice must be lowered by\npressure_. Sir W. Thomson in the same year verified this deduction,\nto its numerical details, by direct experiment. Trifling as the\npredicted and measured effect appears (one degree centigrade for each\n2000 lbs. additional pressure per square inch), there can now be no\ndoubt that it goes at least very far to explain the varied effects of\nthe extraordinary plasticity of glacier-ice so beautifully made out\nby the direct measurements of Forbes.\n\n* 109. We have said that Carnot unfortunately based his reasoning on\nthe assumed materiality (and therefore indestructibility) of heat. It\ntherefore became a question of great importance to find how properly\nto adapt his methods to the true theory. James Thomson\u2019s verified\nprediction had already given a correct and absolutely new physical\nresult from Carnot\u2019s principles. How then must we get rid of his\nfalse assumption?\n\nClausius attempted this in 1850, but his method is based solely upon\nthe observed fact that in general heat tends from hotter to colder\nbodies. This we know is not always the case, for a fine wire may\nbe made red-hot by the current from a thermo-electric battery (of\na sufficient number of pairs) where ice and boiling water alone are\nused to cool and heat the alternate junctions. Here heat certainly\npasses from colder bodies to a hotter one. Clausius, no doubt,\nseveral years later, extended his original statement, so as to make\nit stand thus:\u2014Heat cannot _of itself_ pass from a colder to a hotter\nbody. We do not consider even this sufficiently obvious for an axiom,\nwere it certainly true, but, as will be seen presently, it is not. In\nfact the so-called axiom is constantly being violated, though on a\nvery small scale, in every mass of gas.\n\n* 110. It was Sir W. Thomson[40] who (in 1851) first correctly\nadapted Carnot\u2019s magnificently original methods to the true theory\nof heat; and it is especially noteworthy to remark how, even at that\nearly time, he saw the full danger of attempting to lay down anything\ntoo definite on the subject. The following is the axiom he gives:\u2014\n\n\u2018_It is impossible by means of inanimate material agency to derive\nmechanical effect from any portion of matter by cooling it below the\ntemperature of the coldest of the surrounding objects._\u2019\n\nBut he appends the following guarded note:\u2014\n\n\u2018If this axiom be denied for all temperatures, it would have to be\nadmitted that a self-acting machine might be set to work and produce\nmechanical effect by cooling the sea or earth, with no limit but the\ntotal loss of heat from the earth and sea, or, in reality, from the\nwhole material world.\u2019\n\nThe full importance of this will appear presently.\n\nTo those who can accept Thomson\u2019s axiom with the explanation appended\nto it, Carnot\u2019s proposition that a reversible engine is perfect (in\nthe sense of being the best possible) is demonstrated at once, as\nfollows, _ex absurdo_.\n\nSuppose there could be an engine, M, more perfect than a reversible\nengine, N. Set the two to work together as a compound engine, M\nletting down heat from boiler to condenser, and doing work; N\nspending work in pumping back again the heat to the boiler. If N\nbe made to restore to the boiler at every stroke exactly what M\ntakes from it, the compound engine will do external work, for, by\nhypothesis, M is more perfect than N. Whence does the work come?\nNot from the boiler, for it remains as it was. Hence N must take\nmore heat from the condenser than M gives it; _i.e._ you get work by\ncooling the condenser.\n\nCarry the reasoning a little further, and we see that if the excess\nof work given by M were spent upon N, and thus no work on the whole\neither spent or given out, the condenser would be still further\ncooled, and the boiler heated! This, to most people, would seem to\nimply an ample _reductio ad absurdum_. But Clerk-Maxwell has shown\nit to be physically possible, and has thus thoroughly justified\nThomson\u2019s caution about his axiom. As this is a point of very great\nimportance, we offer no excuse for treating it pretty fully.\n\n* 111. Clerk-Maxwell\u2019s reasoning is given as depending upon the\nmolecular theory of gases, but the only necessity for so restricting\nit appears to be that we thereby connect the reasoning more directly\nwith _Heat_, which, on this theory, is supposed to be the energy\nof motion of the molecules of the gas. The illustration, however,\nis more general, and at the same time more simple, if we do not\nat first refer either to heat or to the molecular hypothesis of\nthe constitution of gases, but treat the question simply as one\nconcerning the possible motions of a number of little material\nparticles.\n\nAssume, then, that a great number of small equal spherical particles\nof matter are enclosed in a vessel of any form, and assume further\nthat (either by collision or by repulsive force) each of these\nhas the power of rebounding from another or from the wall of the\nvessel, as if it were elastic, and had unit _co-efficient of\nrestitution_,[41] as defined in treatises on natural philosophy.\nThen it can be shown, as a matter of direct calculation, that\u2014start\nthese particles as we please, in all sorts of directions, and with\nvelocities as varied as we please\u2014after a time, which will be\nshorter as the number of particles is greater, a sort of permanent\nstate will be arrived at in which a certain law of distribution of\nvelocity prevails among the particles (the same law as that of the\n_Probability of Error_, as it is technically called), the greater\nnumber of them having nearly the mean square velocity, and those\nwhich have much less or more than that being fewer and fewer as\nthe defect or excess is greater. The tendency is to an average\ndistribution of these varieties of velocity throughout the vessel,\nand the impacts on the sides will thus be nearly the same on every\nsquare inch of its surface. After this there is\u2014_always provided\nthe particles be sufficiently numerous_\u2014no perceptible change in the\nstatistics of the group, except in so far as concerns _individual_\nparticles, which may sometimes be moving with great, sometimes with\nvery small, velocity, but which, in the long-run, will far more\noften be moving with the mean square velocity, or at least some\nvelocity very near it. Hence, in no part of the vessel will the\naverage energy be sensibly greater than in another, and therefore\n(so far as the contents of the vessel alone are concerned) there is\nno possibility of getting work from them. But by enlisting in our\nservice conceivable finite beings (imagined by Clerk-Maxwell, and\ncalled demons by Thomson), it would be possible materially to alter\nthis state of things, even although these beings should do absolutely\nno work.\n\n* 112. For suppose a firm partition, full of little doors (themselves\nwithout mass) to be placed so as to divide the vessel into two,\nand set a demon at each door, with instructions to open it for an\ninstant whenever he sees he can thereby let a quick-moving particle\nescape from the first compartment to the second, or a slow-moving\nparticle from the second into the first. Then, _because the tendency\nis not to a uniform distribution of velocity_ among the particles,\nbut to a distribution which involves quicker and slower in certain\nproportions, we may imagine this process to be carried on long enough\nto make a considerable difference in the average velocities of the\nparticles in the two compartments, though the numbers of particles in\neach compartment may remain almost unchanged. The consequence will\nof course be a greater pressure per square inch on the walls of the\nsecond compartment than of the first; and thus, if the partition wall\nwere moveable, a certain amount of work might be obtained by allowing\nit to move. Thus a group of particles originally incapable, without\nexternal assistance, of doing work, may be rendered capable of doing\nwork by mere _guidance_ applied by finite intelligence.\n\n* 113. Now let us refer for a moment to the molecular theory of\ngases, and we see that what the demons (without any expenditure of\nwork, each being, so far as he is required, virtually a combination\nof two intelligent perfect engines, one working direct, the other\nreversed) have guided the gas to do, is to transfer heat from a\ncolder to a hotter portion of the gas.\n\nThe only reason why this does not occur without the assistance of\ndemons (at least to an extent, or for a length of time, sufficient to\nproduce a sensible effect) lies in the enormous number of particles\nper cubic inch in even the most rarefied gas. Hence, _solely because\nof the excessive numbers and minuteness of the particles of matter_,\nthe one chance of escape from Carnot\u2019s proposition is denied us, and\ntherefore we must allow that, so far as the physical universe is\nconcerned, a reversible heat-engine is the best possible.\n\nBut if a reversible heat-engine be the best possible, then the\nprinciple which we have italicised in Art. 107 must hold good, and\nfrom this it follows that only a portion of the heat passing through\na perfect engine can be transformed into useful work unless the\ncondenser of the engine be at the absolute zero of temperature\u2014a\ncondition which can never be attained.\n\n114. It thus appears that at each transformation of heat-energy into\nwork a large portion is degraded, while only a small portion is\ntransformed into work. So that while it is very easy to change all\nof our mechanical or useful energy into heat, it is only possible\nto transform a portion of this heat-energy back again into work.\nAfter each change too the heat becomes more and more dissipated\nor degraded, that is, less and less available for any future\ntransformation.\n\nIn other words, the tendency of heat is towards equalisation; heat is\n_par excellence_ the communist of our universe, and it will no doubt\nultimately bring the present system to an end. The visible universe\nmay with perfect truth be compared to a vast heat-engine, and this is\nthe reason why we have brought such engines so prominently before our\nreaders. The sun is the furnace or source of high-temperature heat of\nour system, just as the stars are for other systems, and the energy\nwhich is essential to our existence is derived from the heat which\nthe sun radiates, and represents only an excessively minute portion\nof that heat. But while the sun thus supplies us with energy he is\nhimself getting colder, and must ultimately, by radiation into space,\npart with the life-sustaining power which he at present possesses.\nBesides the inevitable cooling of the sun we must also suppose that\nowing to something analogous to ethereal friction[42] the earth\nand the other planets of our system will be drawn spirally nearer\nand nearer to the sun, and will at length be engulfed in his mass.\nIn each case there will be, as the result of the collision, the\nconversion of visible energy into heat, and a partial and temporary\nrestoration of the power of the sun. At length, however, this\nprocess will have come to an end, and he will be extinguished until,\nafter long but not immeasurable ages, by means of the same ethereal\nfriction his black mass is brought into contact with that of one or\nmore of his nearer neighbours.\n\n115. Not much further need we dilate on this. It is absolutely\ncertain that life, so far as it is physical, depends essentially upon\ntransformations of energy; it is also absolutely certain that age\nafter age the possibility of such transformations is becoming less\nand less; and, so far as we yet know, the final state of the present\nuniverse must be an aggregation (into one mass) of all the matter it\ncontains, _i.e._ the potential energy gone, and a practically useless\nstate of kinetic energy, _i.e._ uniform temperature throughout that\nmass.\n\nBut the present potential energy of the solar system is so enormous,\napproaching in fact possibly to what in our helplessness we call\ninfinite, that it may supply for absolutely incalculable future ages\nwhat is required for the physical existence of life. Again, the fall\ntogether, from the distance of Sirius let us say, of the sun and an\nequal star would at once supply the sun with at least as much energy\nfor future radiation to possible planets as could possibly have been\nacquired by his own materials in their original falling together\nfrom practically infinite diffusion as a cloud of stones or dust, or\na nebula; so that it is certain that, if the present physical laws\nremain long enough in operation, there will be (at immense intervals\nof time) mighty catastrophes due to the crashing together of\ndefunct suns\u2014the smashing of the greater part of each into nebulous\ndust surrounding the remainder, which will form an intensely heated\nnucleus\u2014then, possibly, the formation of a new and larger set of\nplanets with a proportionately larger and hotter sun, a solar system\non a far grander scale than the present. And so on, growing in\ngrandeur but diminishing in number till the exhaustion of energy is\ncomplete, and after that eternal rest, so far at least as visible\nmotion is concerned.[43]\n\n116. The study of the necessary future has prepared us for an inquiry\ninto the long remote past. Just as the present discrete stellar\nsystems must finally come together, so the materials which now form\nthem must have originally been widely separate. Our modern knowledge\nenables us to look back with almost certitude to the time when\nthere was nothing but gravitating matter and its potential energy\nthroughout the expanse of space\u2014ready, as slight local differences\nof distribution predisposed it, to break up into portions, each\nconverging to one or more nuclei of its own, and thus forming in time\nseparate solar or stellar systems. We have thus reached the beginning\nas well as the end of the present visible universe, and have come to\nthe conclusion that it began in time and will in time come to an end.\nImmortality is therefore impossible in such a universe.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nMATTER AND ETHER.\n\n \u2018Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,\n atque metus omnis et inexorabile fatum\n subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.\u2019\n VERGIL.\n\n \u2018Who shall tempt with wandering feet\n The dark, unbottomed, infinite abyss,\n And through the palpable obscure find out\n His uncouth way; or spread his airy flight\n Over the vast abrupt, ere he arrive\n The happy isle?\u2019\u2014MILTON, _Paradise Lost_.\n\n\n117. The next portion of the preliminary inquiry necessary to our\nconcluding argument is that which relates to the intimate nature of\nmatter; and more especially of that very wonderful form of matter\nwhich is the vehicle of all the energy we receive from the sun, as it\nis that of all the information we obtain about the position, motion,\nnature, mass, condition, and properties of the almost infinitely more\ndistant bodies, which are scattered through cosmical space. In other\nwords, we have hitherto spoken only of the laws of working of the\nmachine called the physical universe; let us now endeavour to study\nthe structure of the materials of which it is composed.\n\n118. Various hypotheses have been proposed as to the ultimate nature\nof matter. To give even a general account of all the less absurd of\nthese would require a large volume, so we content ourselves with a\nfew of the more reasonable or historically more important.\n\n(1.) The foremost place must of course be taken by the old Greek\nnotion of the _Atom_. The outlines of the atomic theory were laid\ndown very precisely by Democritus and Leukippus (_circa_ 400 B.C.),\nwho taught that the whole universe is made up of empty space and\neternal atoms, differing only in form (as =\u0391= and =\u039d=), order (as\n=\u0391\u039d= and =\u039d\u0391=), and posture (as =\u0396= and =\u039d=). The atoms are endued\nwith a primitive motion in virtue of their weight, and, clashing\ntogether, produce vortices from which the world is formed. The\ngradual progress of this whirl of atoms brings similar elements\ntogether, as in the sifting of grain, and so the atoms are sorted\ninto homogeneous groups.\n\nThe great weakness of this theory lay in the very false ideas then\nheld as to the nature of motion by weight, which was supposed to\nbe necessarily in parallel lines, and with a velocity greater for\nheavy than for light bodies. The difficulty which arose from this\nnotion led Epicurus to give to the atoms a perfectly arbitrary and\ncapricious side movement, as well as the rectilineal motion due to\ntheir weight, and thus, in his school, the theory became really a\nmetaphysical one, reducing the order of the universe to pure chance.\n\nIt is such a medley of physical speculations, with metaphysical\nnotions, that we find in the greatest exponent of the system, the\n\u2018poet philosopher\u2019 Lucretius. With the help of Munro\u2019s splendid\nedition of the text of Lucretius, and his very valuable translation\nand notes, it is now a comparatively easy matter to give a concise\nsummary of the principal points of this most remarkable early\nphysical speculation. In attempting to do so we will endeavour, so\nfar as we can, to bear in mind the awful but too often disregarded\nwarning given by the poet himself:\u2014\n\n \u2018Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque,\n inversis qu\u00e6 sub verbis latitantia cernunt,\n veraque constituunt qu\u00e6 belle tangere possunt\n auris et lepido qu\u00e6 sunt fucata sonore.\u2019[44]\n\n119. As the purpose of the poem of Lucretius is the establishment\nof the very opposite of our present theme, we must consider a good\ndeal more of his work than the mere properties of atoms. Lucretius\ntells us that his object is to dispel the fear of the gods, which he\nsupposes to arise simply from the fact that there are so many things\nwhich men do not yet understand, and therefore imagine to be effected\nby divine power.\n\nReligion, which crushes human life prostrate upon earth, is, he says,\nnow put under foot; and the great victory achieved by his Greek\ninstructor over the immeasurable universe (in finding what can and\nwhat cannot come into being) brings us level with heaven.\n\nHis followers are not to fancy that there is any sin in this; on the\ncontrary, religion has perpetually been the cause of sinful deeds.\nThere is, however, danger of their relapse, for the terror-speaking\nseers may once more overcome them. But if men could only be convinced\nthat the soul is born and perishes with us, then they would be able\nto take their ease, and withstand alike religious scruples and\nthreatenings of the seers. For this purpose we must find out what\nmind and soul consist of, and how everything on earth proceeds; and\nif we can do this, we may, of course, dispense with the gods.\n\n120. FIRST, then, _nothing comes from nothing_, which seems to be\nmeant in the sense that there is a physical cause for everything; at\nleast all the examples which are adduced in proof of the statement\nare mere instances of what might be conceived to happen if there were\nno fixed determining physical law or cause. But the author is obscure\non this point, for he sometimes makes us inclined to think that he is\nvirtually only asserting the eternal, unchangeable, existence of the\natom,\u2014the \u2018first beginning of things.\u2019\n\nAs a corollary to this, of course, _nature does not annihilate\nthings_, but dissolves them back into their first bodies. The same\nnegative proof is here attempted. Nothing is lost, but nature can\nbeget nothing till she is recruited by the death of something else.\nThen, to reconcile the reader to the invisibility of these first\nbodies, he is shown how nature works by invisible things, as wind\nand moisture; how marriage-rings and paving-stones, ploughshares and\nstatues, are worn away without the loss of any visible particles.\nNature, therefore, works by unseen bodies. Smell, heat, cold, etc.,\nmust consist of a bodily nature, because they affect the senses; for\nnothing but body can touch and be touched.\n\n121. But, SECONDLY, _there is also void in things_, else they would\nbe jammed together, and unable to move. It is false to say that\nthings may move in a _plenum_: as, when a fish presses on, it leaves\nroom behind it, into which the water may stream; for on what side\ncan the scaly creature move forwards unless the waters have first\nmade room; and on what side can the waters give place so long as the\nfish cannot move? (This of course is metaphysics, and is altogether\nabsurd. It is the old story of the immovable body receiving the\nirresistible blow.) Hence there cannot be motion unless there be void\nto allow of a start. Dripping of water in caves, the passage of food\nthroughout the whole of the body of an animal, the fact that buds\nand fruit of trees are nourished from the root, voices heard through\nwalls, cold penetrating the very bones, all are proofs that there is\nvoid as well as body. Also when one thing is as large as another, but\nyet lighter, there must be more void in it.\n\n122. THIRD. _There can be no third thing besides body and void._ For\nif it be to the smallest extent tangible, it is body; if not, it is\nvoid.\n\n123. FOURTH. _Bodies are either first beginnings of things_ (atoms),\n_or a union of such_. Any thing which can be broken or crushed, or\nwhich can transmit heat or electricity, is partly body and partly\nvoid. Hence body cannot be crushed, and \u2018therefore first beginnings\nare of solid singleness, and in no other way can they have been\npreserved through ages during infinite time past, in order to\nreproduce things.\u2019\n\n124. FIFTH. If there be no limit to breakage, nothing could be\nreproduced; for reproduction is slower than decay, and therefore the\nbreaking of infinite past ages would have produced a state of things\nincompatible with the reproduction of anything within finite time.\n_Hence there exists a least in things._ This cannot be soft, else it\nwould consist partly of void, and be therefore breakable.\n\n_First beginnings, then, are strong in solid singleness._ Hence the\nunreason of those who held fire to be the matter of things, for what\nsurer test can we have than the senses whereby to note truth and\nfalsehood!\n\nThe doctrine called that of Hom\u0153omeria by Anaxagoras is folly,\u2014his\nnotion, to wit, that everything is made up of little parts the same\nas itself\u2014bones of little bones, flesh of little fleshes, etc. For\nthus corn and other food, which go to nourish our blood, must be in\npart composed of blood, and must therefore bleed when crushed by the\nformidable force of the millstone!\n\n125. SIXTH. _Are the atoms infinite in number, and is the void in\nwhich they move unlimited?_ Both questions are answered in the\naffirmative, but the proof given is metaphysical and altogether\nridiculous, though it contains a fragmentary passage of real merit,\nhinting at Le Sage\u2019s explanation (presently to be given) of the cause\nof gravity. One illustration of it must suffice:\u2014\u2018Nature keeps the\nsum of things from setting any limit to itself, since she compels\nbody to be ended by void, and void in turn by body;\u2019 so that either\nby the alternation of the two, or by the infinite extension of one\nif the other do not bound it, immeasurable space must be filled. If,\nfor instance, body were finite, and void infinite, matter would in a\nvery short time be scattered and borne along in the mighty void; or,\nrather, could never have been brought together.\n\nThis agrees with an idea which is propounded in the second book, as\nto the velocity which the atoms have given them (he does not say how\nor whence), and which enables them to cohere for a time and then to\nbreak up again, as everything wanes. Those whose close-tangled shapes\nhold them fast together form enduring stone and unyielding iron,\nothers spring far off and rebound, leaving great spaces between;\n\u2018these furnish us with thin air and bright sunlight.\u2019 Shortly\nafterwards, we are told that the velocity of the first beginnings\nwhen passing through empty void must be greater than that of sunlight!\n\nWe need not trouble ourselves here with Lucretius\u2019s speculations\nas to the formation of tangible bodies from a vertical downpour of\natoms, which, unlike drops of rain, now and then swerve from their\ncourses so as to clash together, save to mention that he affirms\nthat, even if he did not know what atoms are, he could be sure, from\nits defects, that the world was not made for us by divine power.\n\n126. SEVENTH. This, one of the most important points of the whole\ntheory, is entirely ignored by some good commentators, and by others\nwho have more or less closely followed them:\u2014_The first beginnings of\nthings have different shapes, but the number of shapes is finite_.\n\n127. EIGHTH. _The first beginnings which have a like shape, one with\nanother, are infinite in number._\n\nThat is, there is a finite number of kinds of atoms, but an infinite\nnumber of each kind.\n\n128. NINTH. _Nothing whose nature is apparent to sense consists of\none kind of first beginnings_ (only).\n\n129. We need not trouble ourselves with his notion of the smallness,\nsmoothness, and roundness of the atoms which make up the mind,\nqualities which he arrives at from the rapidity with which the\nmind originates and works out a suggestion, contrasting here the\nmobility of water with the viscosity of honey. Nor his proof (by the\nnon-diminution of the weight and dimensions of the body at death),\nthat the whole mass of the mind must be exceedingly small. But we\nmay quote, in two of its many forms, his constant reiteration of the\nunreasonableness of the fear of death, and his philosophic mode of\novercoming it:\u2014\n\n\u2018Some wear themselves to death for the sake of statues and a name.\nAnd often to such a degree, through dread of death, does hate of life\nand of the sight of daylight seize upon mortals, that they consider\nself-murder with a sorrowing heart, quite forgetting that this fear\nis the source of their cares (this fear which urges men to every\nsin), prompts this one to put all shame to rout, another to burst\nasunder the bonds of friendship; and, in fine, to overturn duty from\nits very base, since often ere now men have betrayed country and\ndear parents in seeking to shun the Acherusian quarters. For, even\nas children are flurried and dread all things in the thick darkness,\nthus we in the daylight fear at times things not a whit more to be\ndreaded than what children shudder at in the dark, and fancy sure to\nbe. This terror, therefore, and darkness of mind must be dispelled,\nnot by the rays of the sun and glittering shafts of day, but by the\naspect and law of nature.\u2019 Book III. 78.\n\n\u2018Now no more shall thy house admit thee with glad welcome, nor a\nmost virtuous wife and sweet children run to be the first to snatch\nkisses, and touch thy heart with silent joy. No more mayest thou be\nprosperous in thy doings, a safeguard to thine own. One disastrous\nday has taken from thee, luckless man, in luckless wise, all the\nmany prizes of life. This do men say; but add not thereto: \u201cAnd now\nno longer does any craving for these things beset thee withal.\u201d For\nif they could rightly perceive this in thought, and follow up the\nthought in words, they would release themselves from great distress\nand apprehension of mind. Thou, even as now thou art, sunk in the\nsleep of death, shalt continue so to be in all time to come, freed\nfrom all distressing pains; but we, with a sorrow that would not be\nsated, wept for thee, when close by thou didst turn to an ashen hue\non thy appalling funeral pile, and no length of days shall pluck from\nour hearts our ever-enduring grief. This question, therefore, should\nbe asked of this speaker, what there is in it so passing bitter, if\nit come in the end to sleep and rest, that any one should pine in\nnever-ending sorrow.\u2019 Book III. 894.\n\n130. To conclude, there is a great deal in Lucretius (whether his\nown or derived from others does not matter to us) which is of\nconsiderable value, even from a modern scientific point of view,\nthough, of course, of far greater value from the point of view of the\nstudent of development. But his attempted proofs are for the most\npart absurd, based, as they generally are, upon mere metaphysical\nspeculations and altogether preposterous analogies.\n\n131. (2.) Boscovich and others endeavoured to dispense with the\natom altogether, substituting in its place the conception (which\nmathematicians often find useful) of a mere geometrical point, which\nis a _centre of force_, as it is called. Here we get rid of the idea\nof _substance_ entirely, but we preserve (all but inertia) those\nexternal relations by which alone the atom is capable of making\nknown its presence. Even so great an experimental philosopher as\nFaraday may be quoted as, to some extent at least, agreeing with this\nnotion. It seems to us, however, that this is the embodiment of an\nover-refinement of speculation, surrounded on almost all sides by\nthe gravest difficulties. It may suffice merely to mention again the\nproperty of mass, or inertia, which Faraday himself seemed to look\nupon as the _one_ essential characteristic of matter, and which we\ncan hardly bring ourselves to associate with the absence of what we\nunderstand by substance.\n\n132. (3.) Another speculation leads us to imagine matter as not\nultimately atomic\u2014as, in fact, infinitely divisible. But, if it\nbe so, it must (in order that various elementary physical facts\nmay be capable of explanation) be practically continuous but\nintensely heterogeneous. That solid or liquid matter has a grained\nstructure of not infinitely small dimensions is proved by many\nsimple and generally known facts; among others by the separation\nof white light into its constituent colours when refracted through\na prism, by the phenomena of capillarity, and by those of contact\nelectricity. If such heterogeneity were only pronounced enough, it\nappears that the law of gravitation would be capable of accounting\nfor at least the greater number of effects at present attributed\nto the so-called molecular forces and the force of chemical\naffinity. Here, however, we are met by the grand difficulty, that of\naccounting for gravitation. And the only attempt at explanation of\ngravitation-attraction, which can be called even plausible, can only,\nwith very great straining, be made compatible with this idea of the\nnature of matter.\n\n133. (4.) The fourth and most recent speculation revives the atom (in\nthe literal sense of the word), but not \u2018strong in solid singleness\u2019\nlike those contemplated by Lucretius,\u2014much rather yielding to the\nleast external force, and thus escaping from the knife or wriggling\nround it, so that it cannot be cut,\u2014not, however, on account of its\nhardness, but on account of its mobility, which makes it impossible\nfor the knife to get at it.\n\nThis is the vortex-atom theory of Sir W. Thomson, dimly foreshadowed\nin the writings of Hobbes, Malebranche, and others, but only made\ndistinctly conceivable in very recent times by the hydrokinetic\nresearches of Helmholtz. Helmholtz, in 1858, first successfully\nattacked the equations of motion of an incompressible frictionless\nfluid, without introducing the great simplification which had been\nadopted by his predecessors, and which consisted in supposing the\nmotion to be non-rotational. He proved, among other valuable results,\nthat those portions of the fluid which at any time possess rotation\npreserve it for ever, and are thus as it were marked off from the\nothers; also that these portions must be arranged in filaments\nwhose direction is at each point the axis of rotation, and that the\nfilaments are either endless, _i.e._ form closed curves (whether\nknotted or not), or terminate in the free surface of the fluid.\n\nHence Sir William Thomson\u2019s idea that what we call matter may consist\nof the rotating portions of a perfect fluid, which continuously fills\nspace. This definition involves the necessity of a creative act for\nthe production or destruction of the smallest portion of matter,\nbecause rotation can only be produced or destroyed by us in a fluid\nin virtue of its viscosity (or internal friction), and in a perfect\nfluid there is nothing of the kind.\n\n134. Of course it may be objected to this theory that it merely\nshifts the difficulty one step further back,\u2014after all, explaining\nwhat we call matter by certain motions of something which, as it\nmust have inertia, it would appear we are bound to call matter\nalso. We have been careful to mention this (latest) speculation as\nto the nature of matter for three reasons: 1st, because we shall\nhave to make considerable use of it in the course of our argument,\nfor purposes of illustration; 2d, because it shows one way of at\nonce thoroughly accounting for the conservation of tangible matter;\n3d, because it shows the possibility of forming an idea of a true\natom which shall not require, even for perfect elasticity, the\ninconceivable quality of perfect hardness necessary to the atom of\nLucretius. In fact, the few words which we have given above about\nHelmholtz\u2019s investigations show that, to cut a vortex-atom, it would\nbe necessary to give a free surface to the perfect fluid which on\nthis theory is supposed to fill space, _i.e._ virtually to sever\nspace itself! This suggestion of Thomson\u2019s promises to be very\nvaluable from one point of view at least, viz., the extension and\nimprovement of mathematical methods; for in the treatment of its\nvery elements it requires the application of the most powerful of\nhitherto invented processes, and even with their aid, the mutual\naction of two ring-vortices (the simplest possible space-form) has\nnot yet been investigated except in the special cases of symmetrical\ndisposition about an axis. Hence we are at present altogether unable\nto decide or even to guess whether this idea will or will not pass\nwith credit some of the most elementary examinations to which a\ntheory of the ultimate nature of matter must of course be subjected.\n\n135. Take them for what they are worth. The four forms of speculation\nwe have just sketched represent the most plausible guesses yet\npropounded as to the ultimate nature of matter, the second being\nprobably because the most artificial and the most arbitrary, the most\ncompletely developed. For in it the representation is self-contained\nas it were; it does not base itself upon extraneous postulates, as\nof ultimate hard particles (of what?), nor upon vortex motion (of\nwhat? again), nor, finally, upon mere intense heterogeneity (of what?\nonce more), as do the other three. But we naturally object to it as\nrefining away altogether the idea of _stuff_ or _substance_ which the\nmind seems to require as something underlying the notion of anything\nwhich is found to be directly capable of affecting our senses.\n\n136. The reader who has followed us so far, must now see that our\nnotions of the nature of matter are, at best, but hazy. We know, it\nis true, a great many of its properties very exactly, so much so\nindeed, as to be able to deduce from them mathematically an immense\nvariety of consequences which subsequent experiment shows to be\ncorrect, at least within the limits of accuracy of our methods of\nobservation and measurement. But as to _what it is_ we know no more\nthan Democritus or Lucretius did, though as to what it may be or may\nnot be we are perhaps considerably better prepared with an opinion\nthan they could possibly be.\n\n137. We have seen in the preceding chapter that energy is never found\nseparate from matter, so that we might, with perfect propriety,\ndefine matter as the seat or vehicle of energy\u2014that which is\nessential to the existence of the known forms of energy, without\nwhich, therefore, there could be no transformations of energy, and\ntherefore no _life_ such as we now know it.\n\n138. The transformability of a given amount of energy, or, at\nleast, the mode of its transformation, often depends in a very\ncurious manner upon the relative quantity of matter with which it\nis associated. We have already seen this in the case of heat. For,\nwhen a given quantity of heat is associated with a small quantity of\nmatter, it is at a high temperature, and has great availability, but\nits temperature, and therefore its availability, become lower as the\nquantity of matter with which it is associated is increased. It is\npossible that radiant heat and light owe their high availability to\nthe very small density of the luminiferous ether.\n\nBut it is not of heat alone that this statement is true. The same\nthing holds with regard to other forms of energy, even the very\nsimplest forms of visible kinetic energy for instance. A pillow or\nbolster (stuffed with eider-down, let us say) of 30 lbs. weight,\nand moving at 10 feet per second\u2014_i.e._ as if it had fallen from a\nheight of considerably _less than two feet_,\u2014has nearly the same\nenergy as a pellet of No. 1 shot when it leaves the muzzle of a\nfowling-piece. How different the quality of these equal quantities\neven of energy of the same kind! For, delivered horizontally, the\none would correspond to a staggering push which few men could resist\nif it came unexpectedly; while the other would scarcely affect one\u2019s\nequilibrium, though it might easily kill by penetrating a vital\norgan. [In the brutal pastimes of the last generation, as we now\nin our advanced humanitarianism call them, this was well known as\nthe difference between the effects of a slow knock-down blow by a\nheavy-weight, and a \u2018punishing facer\u2019 from a feather-weight. Alas for\nthe good old times! for our comparison, apt as it is, is too probably\nthrown away on the degenerate inhabitants of (once) merry England,\nerewhile the home of the \u2018Miller,\u2019 with his honest quarterstaff, of\njolly and chivalrous wrestlers, boxers, and bowmen, now the hell of\nrunning-kicks, garrotting, gouging,[45] and stabbing.\n\n Aetas parentum, pejor avis, tulit\n nos nequiores, mox daturos\n progeniem vitiosiorem.\n\nThe dissipation of energy is a great fact in a moral as well as\nin a physical sense. In those good old times _men_ fought with\n_men_,\u2014irrepressible energy, rather than any sordid passion or\nuncontrolled vice, constantly pulling the trigger! _Now_ creatures\nin the likeness of men vent their despicable passions in murderous\nassaults upon women and children. But science hints at an effectual\ncure. It is probable that before many years have passed, electricity,\nwhich by some mysterious means enables our nerves to call our muscles\ninto play, will be called upon by an enlightened legislature to solve\nthis desperate social problem. Imprisonment has been tried in vain,\nand, besides, it involves great and needless expense. The \u2018cat,\u2019\nthough thoroughly appropriate, is objected to as tending to brutalise\n(!) the patient, and render murder not unlikely. No such objections\ncan be urged against the use of electricity in any of its many forms.\nFor it can easily be applied so as to produce for the requisite time,\n_and for that only_, and under the direction of skilled physicists\nand physiologists, absolutely indescribable torture (unaccompanied by\nwound or even bruise), thrilling through every fibre of the frame of\nsuch miscreants.]\n\n139. After inertia, which is not accounted for by any of the\nhypotheses as to the ultimate nature of matter which we have just\ngiven, the most general property of matter which we recognise is that\nof universal gravitation, in virtue of which portions of matter, if\nsituated at a distance from one another, are possessed of potential\nenergy. We are apt to hold exaggerated notions of the immense power\nof gravity; but a little consideration will show us that it is in\nreality one of the most trivial of the forces to which matter is\ndirectly or indirectly subject.\n\nThink for a moment of the fundamental experiments in electricity and\nmagnetism, known to men for far more than 2000 years,\u2014the lifting of\nlight bodies in general by rubbed amber, and of iron filings by a\nloadstone. To produce the same effects by gravitation-attraction,\u2014at\nleast if the attracting body had the moderate dimensions of a\nhand-specimen of amber or loadstone,\u2014we should require it to be of so\ndense a material as to weigh at the very least 1,000,000,000 lbs.,\ninstead of (as usual) a mere fraction of a pound. Hence it is at once\nobvious that the imposing nature of the force of gravity, as usually\ncompared with other attractive forces, is due not to its superior\nqualitative magnitude, but to the enormous masses of the bodies which\nexercise it.\n\nIn fact, the excessively delicate Torsion-balance of Michell was\nabsolutely requisite to demonstrate, much more to measure, the mutual\nattraction between a large and a small leaden sphere. And (unless\nthe third of the hypotheses as to the nature of matter above given\nbe correct, in which case the _form_ of our statement would require\nmodification) small or even moderately large pieces of matter are\nheld together entirely by cohesion, gravitation being absolutely\ninsensible; though in a huge mass like the earth, the force exerted\nby one hemisphere on the other (_i.e._ the force which would be\ncalled into play to prevent its being split in two) depends mainly\nupon gravitation, in comparison with whose enormous amount even a\ncohesive force of 500 lbs. weight per square inch over a circular\nsurface of 4000 miles radius sinks into utter insignificance![46]\n\n140. One only of the many hypotheses which have been advanced to\nexplain the cause of gravitation has succeeded in passing the first\npreliminary tests. Of course, the assumption of action at a distance\nmay be made to account for anything; but it is impossible (as Newton\nlong ago pointed out in his celebrated letters to Bentley) for\nany one \u2018who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of\nthinking\u2019 for a moment to admit the possibility of such action.\n\nHence we have but two ways of accounting for gravitation:\u2014either it\nis due to differences of pressure in a substance continuously filling\nall space, except where matter displaces it (?), or it is due to\nimpacts, in some respects analogous to those of the particles of a\ngas which have been found to be capable of accounting for gaseous\npressure.\n\nNow, all attempts as yet made to connect it with the luminiferous\nether, or the medium required to explain electric and magnetic\ndistance-action, have completely failed; so that we are apparently\ndriven to the impact theory as the only tenable one.\n\n141. To this theory Le Sage of Geneva devoted a singularly acute mind\nduring the whole of his exceptionally long life; but, for all that,\nhis posthumous tract on the subject is but little in advance of the\nresults he had arrived at in his eighteenth year.\n\nHe assumes the existence of ultra-mundane corpuscles; in infinite\nnumbers, even compared with those of the particles of matter; of\ndimensions excessively small, but flying about in all directions\nwith velocities enormously great. Portions of gross matter virtually\nscreen one another to a certain extent from the pressure due to this\nperpetual rain of corpuscles; but only on the sides turned towards\none another. Hence a lone body would be equally battered on all\nsides; but the introduction of a second mass interferes with this\narrangement, and diminishes the pressure on the side next it. It is\neasy to show that the amount of this diminution, for _given small\nmasses_, is inversely as the square of their relative distance. But\nwhen larger masses are taken account of, this diminution of pressure\nwill not be (as gravity is) directly as the quantities of matter\npresent, unless the further assumption is made that matter, whether\nby the great distance between its particles, or by the cage-like form\nof these particles, is almost perfectly permeable to the corpuscles;\nso that, practically, the corpuscles rain upon each of the interior\nparticles of a mass as freely as if it had been alone in space.\n\nSome of the postulates of this theory are hard to grant, and there is\nadditional difficulty as to the mode in which the supply of energy\nof the corpuscles is to be kept up. To enter into details on this\nsubject is not in accordance with our plan. We therefore refer the\nreader to Sir W. Thomson\u2019s account of Le Sage\u2019s theory (Proc. R.S.E.,\n1871), and his suggestions for its improvement, based upon his theory\nof vortex-atoms.[47]\n\n142. But we must make one remark. If Le Sage\u2019s theory, or anything\nof a similar nature, be at all a representation of the mechanism of\ngravitation, a fatal blow is dealt to the notion of the tranquil\nform of power we have called _potential_ energy. Not that there will\ncease to be a profound difference in kind between it and ordinary\n_kinetic_ energy; but that BOTH must come henceforth to be regarded\nas kinetic. What we now call kinetic energy is that of visible\nmotions, also of motions of the smaller parts of bodies, and of the\nluminiferous ether, etc., each of these being more refined, as it\nwere, than the preceding. But if Le Sage\u2019s theory be true, potential\nenergy of gravitation is a kinetic form still further refined than\nany of these. And the conservation of energy may perhaps once\nmore be completely and accurately expressed as the conservation\nof _vis viva_, though the term will of course have then a meaning\nincomparably more extensive than its original one.\n\n143. But, in speculations like these, we have soared far beyond that\nwhich may be called the first refinement on ordinary gross matter;\n_i.e._ the luminiferous, probably also the electric and magnetic,\nmedium, provisionally the _Ether_.\n\nTo the consideration of its principal properties we now turn our\nattention.\n\nThese are, at first sight at least, of an apparently incongruous\ncharacter; for, from one point of view, the ether appears as a\nfluid, from another as an elastic solid. Nothing is more certainly\nestablished in physical astronomy than the excessive minuteness\nof the resistance offered by the ether to the planetary motions,\nif, indeed, there be such a resistance at all appretiable, even\nwhen the velocity is, as in the case of the earth, somewhere about\n100,000 feet per second! On the other hand, we learn from physical\noptics that light, transmitted with a velocity of 188,000 miles per\nsecond, depends upon transverse disturbances of some kind or other;\nwhile several optical phenomena indicate that a disturbance of the\nnature of compression (if such be possible) would be transmitted\nwith velocity almost infinitely great, in comparison even with this\nenormous velocity.\n\n144. Stokes, however, has given a very ingenious illustration\nwhich enables us to see that such an extraordinary combination of\napparently irreconcilable properties is by no means without analogy,\neven in common matter. He takes the case of a solution of glue, or\nisinglass, or jelly, in different relative amounts of water. When\nthe quantity of water is small, we have the elastic solid; when\nlarge, a liquid little different from water. And Stokes shows that\nit is excessively improbable that there is any definite intermediate\nstage which we could assign as that at which the transition from the\nsolid to the liquid takes place. Of course, any such analogy must\nnecessarily be excessively imperfect; but a great deal is gained by\nour being able to trace even a very imperfect analogy in a case like\nthis.\n\n145. The ether, in fact, must be distorted as well as displaced by\nmatter passing through it; but any distortion of the nature of a\nshear, such as would give rise in water to vortex-motion accompanied\nby friction (the whole energy being thus ultimately frittered down\ninto heat), would in the ether be handed on at once, as vibratory\nmotion, with the velocity of light. Thus vortex-motion of the ether\nmay be conceived to be impossible, simply in consequence of the\nminuteness of its density in comparison with the great tangential\nforce called into play by a shear; and a body moving in it with a\nvelocity not so great as that of light would thus not have eddies in\nits wake, as in an ordinary fluid, but, on the contrary, would be a\nsource of radiation, even although there may have been no heating\neither of the body or of the medium it is displacing, paradoxical as\nthis result may appear. In this connection it is hardly possible to\navoid quoting Milton\u2014though there may be a suspicion of something\nanalogous to a pun:\u2014\n\n \u2018The grinding sword with discontinuous wound\n Passed through him\u2014but the ethereal substance closed\n Not long divisible.\u2019\n\n146. Sir William Thomson has endeavoured to obtain at least an\ninferior limit to the density of the ether in planetary space. His\nmethod is based upon the measurements by Pouillet and Herschel\nof the whole amount of radiant energy received from the sun by a\ngiven amount of terrestrial surface in a given time, and upon an\nassumption that the extreme amplitude of distortion of the ether\nin any radiation is small compared with the length of a wave. In\nthis way he finds that, as a cubic mile of the ether near the earth\ncontains about 12,000 foot-pounds of radiant solar energy, the mass\nof the ether in that cubic mile must be at least 1/1,000,000,000 of\na pound.[48] To show that this is not by any means a surprisingly\nsmall quantity he compares it with the mass of a cubic mile of air at\na distance of only a few radii from the earth\u2019s surface (supposing\nthat the atmosphere extends so far; which, by the way, the recent\ncalculations of the velocities of the particles of a gas render\nexceedingly improbable). This, he finds, will be probably represented\nby a fraction of a pound having unit for a numerator and 329 places\nof figures in the denominator!!!\n\n147. In a very remarkable paper by Struve,[49] an attempt was made to\nsettle the question, _Is the ether perfectly transparent?_ or, as we\nmay now put it, Is any radiant energy absorbed by the ether, whether\nto produce other forms of energy, or to be dissipated by radiation\nin all directions? Long ago it had been pointed out by Olbers and\nothers, that if the stars be infinite in number, and be distributed\nwith anything roughly approximating to an average density through\ninfinite space, the sky ought, night and day, to be all over of a\nbrightness of the same order as that of the sun. Is the number of\nstars, then, finite; or does the ether absorb their light? Now, it\nneed not in the least surprise us to find that the number of stars is\n_finite_, even though matter be infinite in quantity, and distributed\nwith something like uniformity through infinite space. For only a\nfinite portion of it may yet have fallen together so as to produce\nincandescent bodies; or, the other extreme, only a finite portion of\nit may be left incandescent. Either of these altogether different\nhypotheses is perfectly reasonable and scientifically justifiable;\nso that, from this point of view, we are not at present likely to\nobtain any information. Struve\u2019s reasoning, which, by the way, is\nnot accepted by Sir J. Herschel, introduces another consideration,\nviz., _the number of stars of each visible magnitude_. To apply\nthis: suppose for a moment we make the assumption (actually measured\nvalues of annual parallax show it is certainly at best a very rough\none) that the brighter stars are the nearer, and that a set of\nstars, on the average one-fourth as bright as another set, are on\nthe average twice as far off, etc. A great deal of what we know to\nbe certainly false is here assumed as true, but it is possible that\nthe general accuracy of the results of the reasoning from it may\nnot be thereby much affected. On the supposition of a sort of rough\nuniformity of distribution through space, we can easily calculate\napproximately what ought to be the relative numbers of the stars,\nclassed by astronomers as of the various different magnitudes,\nonce we have obtained (as it is not difficult to do) an estimate\nof the relative brightness of typical stars of these (arbitrary)\nmagnitudes. From their brightness we calculate at once their relative\ndistances, and thence (according to our hypothesis of approximately\nuniform distribution) what ought to be _the relative numbers of each\nmagnitude_. When this is done, it appears that there is a great\nexcess of the calculated over the observed numbers, at least for\ntelescopic stars, and the greater the smaller the magnitude. This is\nthe gist of Struve\u2019s method, and he arrives at the result that the\nlight of stars of the sixth magnitude (the smallest visible to an\nordinary unaided eye, and whose average distance from us is supposed\nto be somewhere about ninefold that of stars of the first magnitude)\nloses about eight per cent. in its passage to the earth. Thus the\nlight of stars of the first magnitude does not lose so much as one\nper cent.; but, on the other hand, stars of the ninth magnitude are\nenfeebled to the extent of about 30 per cent. Struve shows that, if\nhis result is to be accepted, W. Herschel\u2019s idea that his 40-foot\ntelescope would show him stars seven times farther off than those\nvisible with the 10-foot, was erroneous. He would, in fact, have been\nable to see little more than _twice_ as far.\n\nIt will be obvious now that an enormous increase of the so-called\n_space-penetrating_ power of a telescope gives it in reality but\na very feeble additional advantage, in fact, that, if there be\nabsorption by the ether, we have already instruments capable of\nshowing us, at the very least, half of the whole number of stars\nwhich any conceivable improvement of telescopes would enable us to\nsee.\n\n148. It would be out of place here to speculate on what becomes\nof the light thus supposed to be absorbed, for we have as yet no\nexperimental bases on which to reason. We have not the least idea,\nfor instance, what is the effect of change of temperature in the\nluminiferous ether. That it is practically incompressible we know; it\nis quite probable that it may not be sensibly compressed (if it be\nsubject to gravity, of which we have no proof) even by the attraction\nof the mass of the whole earth\u2014though, so great is the intensity of\nmolecular or cohesive attraction, we may easily conceive that in\nthe interior of bodies the ether may be considerably compressed.\nAnd it is not improbable that the ether, as a whole, may have, in\nvirtue of its internal forces, a property (akin, as it were, to a\nliquid film) such that the gravitation action, which appears to be\nbetween particles of matter, may merely be the visible result of a\ntendency to a minimum of some affection of the fluid in which they\nare immersed.\n\nRegard the ether as we please, there can be no doubt that its\nproperties are of a much higher order in the arcana of nature than\nthose of tangible matter. And as even the high-priests of science\nstill find the latter far beyond their comprehension, except in\nnumerous but minute and often isolated particulars, it would not\nbecome us to speculate further. It is sufficient for our purpose to\nknow from what the ether certainly does that it is capable of vastly\nmore than any one has yet ventured to guess.\n\n149. If we review the attempts recorded in this chapter we see how\nthe scientific mind is led from the visible and tangible to the\ninvisible and intangible.\n\nIn the first place, we know that one body, such as the sun, can\npart with its radiant energy to another body, such as the earth,\nand observation and experiment alike lead us to acknowledge a stage\nin which the energy has left the one body and has not yet arrived\nat the other. But we have already seen that energy is always found\nassociated with matter, never by itself. In fact we have spoken of\nmatter as the \u2018vehicle of energy.\u2019 Hence it necessarily follows\nthat there is something between the sun and earth capable of moving\nand transmitting energy, and therefore, from the very conception of\nenergy, possessing mass\u2014this something we agree to call the ethereal\nmedium.\n\nAgain, we know that different masses of visible matter attract one\nanother apparently at a distance. Our first attempt to analyse the\nnature of this force leads to the question:\u2014Does it proceed from\nthe surfaces of the attracting bodies, or does it penetrate their\nentire mass? This question was answered by Newton, who came to\nthe conclusion that every particle of matter attracts every other\nparticle with a force proportional to the product of their masses,\nand inversely proportional to the square of their distances.\n\nBut this drives the mystery of gravitation only from the mass to the\nparticle, and here the same sort of questions again occur. A particle\nas truly as a mass occupies space, and we wish to know whether\ngravitation force proceeds from the surface of the particle or from\nits interior.\n\n150. We likewise wish to know how this force is communicated between\none particle and another? Before we can solve these questions we\nmust have some definite conception of the nature of a particle and\nof the constitution of the surrounding medium. Sir W. Thomson, as we\nhave seen, has attempted to advance towards the nature of an atom or\nparticle in his supposition that atoms are vortex-rings generated out\nof a perfect fluid filling all space. While, however, this conception\naccounts for some of the properties of an atom it does not at all\ndirectly account for anything like gravitation, and hence he adopts\nin addition the hypothesis of ultra-mundane corpuscles, which he\nsupposes to be only a finer form of vortices.\n\n151. There is, however, one objection to the precise form of\nvortex-ring hypothesis introduced by Thomson which from our point\nof view is very strong. The act by which the atom was produced must\nsurely on this hypothesis have been an act of creation in time\n(Art. 133), that is to say, an act impressed upon the universe from\nwithout, and it must therefore have denoted a breach of continuity\n(Art. 85); for if the antecedent of the visible universe be nothing\nbut a perfect fluid, can we imagine it capable of originating such a\ndevelopment in virtue of its own inherent properties, and without\nsome external act implying a breach of continuity?\u2014we think most\nassuredly not. In the production of the vortex-atom from a perfect\nfluid we are driven at once to the unconditioned\u2014to the Great First\nCause; it is, in fine, an act of creation and not of development.\nBut from our point of view (Art. 86) creation belongs to eternity\nand development to time, and we are therefore induced at least to\nmodify the hypothesis so as to make it consistent with this view. We\ncannot, in fact, if we agree to hold at the same time the principle\nof unbroken continuity and the vortex-ring theory of formation of\nthe visible universe, regard the material whose rotating parts are\nordinary matter as an absolutely perfect fluid.\n\n152. This way of regarding this supposed material is strengthened\nby the fact that the hypothesis which seems most likely to account\nfor gravitation presumes the existence of ultra-mundane corpuscles:\nand the observations of Struve upon the extinction of starlight\ntend (whatever they are worth) towards the same conclusion, since\nthe absorption of light is more compatible with a corpuscular\nconstitution than with that of a perfect fluid. Finally, the mere\nfact that the velocity of light is finite, tends also in the same\ndirection. But if the visible universe be developed from a material\nwhich is not a perfect fluid, then the argument deduced by Sir W.\nThomson in favour of the eternity of ordinary matter disappears,\nsince this eternity depends upon the perfect fluidity of that out of\nwhich it was developed. In fine, if we suppose the material universe\nto be composed of a series of vortex-rings developed from something\nwhich is not a perfect fluid, it will be ephemeral, just as the\nsmoke-ring which we develop from air, or that which we develop from\nwater, is ephemeral, the only difference being in duration, these\nlasting only for a few seconds, and the others it may be for billions\nof years.\n\n153. In our last chapter, we came to the conclusion that the\navailable energy of the visible universe will ultimately be\nappropriated by the ether, and we may now perhaps imagine, that as\na separate existence itself the visible universe will ultimately\ndisappear, so that we shall have no huge useless inert mass existing\nin far remote ages to remind the passer-by of a species of matter\nwhich will then have become long since out of date and functionally\neffete. Why should not the universe bury its dead out of sight?[50]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nDEVELOPMENT.\n\n \u2018Are God and Nature then at strife,\n That Nature lends such evil dreams?\n So careful of the type she seems,\n So careless of the single life;\n\n * * * * *\n\n \u2018\u201cSo careful of the type\u201d? but no,\n From scarped cliff and quarried stone\n She cries, \u201cA thousand types are gone:\n I care for nothing, all shall go.\u201d\u2019\u2014TENNYSON.\n\n \u2018_All nature is but art_, unknown to thee;\n _All chance, direction_, which thou canst not see,\n All discord, harmony not understood;\n All partial evil, universal good;\n And spite of pride, in erring reason\u2019s spite,\n One truth is clear, whatever is, is right.\u2019\u2014POPE.\n\n\n154. In the two preceding Chapters we have dwelt upon the laws of\nenergy and the ultimate constitution of matter; in other words,\nwe have discussed the laws according to which the machine called\nthe visible universe works, as well as the probable nature of the\nmaterial of which it is composed. We have in this process (Arts.\n86, 151) come to the conclusion that the visible universe has been\ndeveloped out of the invisible. Once developed, it has its own laws\nof action which we may discover,\u2014laws which at present appear to\nbe invariably followed, as far at least as our strictly scientific\nexperience can inform us.\n\nIn fine, the visible universe is that which we are in a position to\nobserve; gaining an insight into its present method of working, and\ntrying also to reply to the very interesting question, Has it always\nworked in its present manner, or has there ever been any apparent\nbreak?\n\nLet us therefore consider this visible universe immediately after its\nproduction, and endeavour to become acquainted with the course of its\ndevelopment. What did it do? Was it, or was it not, entirely left to\nitself, and to what may be termed the natural laws impressed upon\nit when it was produced? Or, if the results of our inquiry seem to\nshow that it was not entirely left to itself, when, to what extent,\nand for what purposes, has there been and is there interference\nproceeding from the unseen?\n\nIn replying to these questions, let us, for the sake of convenience,\nconsider development under the three following heads, viz., (\u03b1)\nChemical or Stuff Development, (\u03b2) Globe Development, (\u03b3) Life\nDevelopment.\n\n155. Beginning with chemical or stuff development, we come at once to\na very interesting and important question. Assuming that the atoms\nof the present universe were developed from the invisible, were\ndifferent kinds of atoms thus developed, or were they all of one kind?\n\nTo this question the chemist of last century would have replied, that\nundoubtedly there were many kinds of primeval atoms, and then would\nfollow a formidable list of all these various substances which he\nwas unable to decompose.\n\nThe chemist of thirty or forty years later would still have replied\nto the question in the same way, but he would probably have furnished\na different list of primeval elements less formidable in number.\n\nIf the chemist of forty years ago had been asked, he would have\nfurnished a list of perhaps fifty simple substances; but then,\nprobably, the minimum would have been reached; for ask the chemist of\nto-day, and he will furnish a list of sixty-four so-called elements.\n\n156. But while the number of as yet undecomposed bodies is slowly\nincreasing by fresh discoveries, chemists are beginning to speculate\nas to the possibility that these so-called elements may be in reality\nnothing more than combinations differing in numbers and in tactical\narrangement, of some one kind of primordial atoms.\n\nThis idea was first entertained by Dr. Prout, the well-known\nphysician and chemist. He pointed out that the atomic weights of the\nvarious so-called elements are very nearly all multiples of the half\nof that of hydrogen, so that the various elements may possibly be\nlooked upon as formed by a grouping together of certain atoms of half\nthe mass of the hydrogen atom.\n\nM. Stas, the distinguished Belgian chemist, instituted a laborious\nseries of experiments with the view of testing this doctrine. He came\nto the conclusion that the atomic weights of the various elements\nwere not precisely multiples of the half of that of hydrogen, there\nbeing greater differences than could possibly be accounted for by\nerrors of experiment. His researches, however, seemed to show that\nin many cases there was a very near approach to Prout\u2019s imagined\nlaw. But in no case does the discrepance appear to us greatly to\nexceed what may easily be attributed to unavoidable impurities in the\nsubstances operated on; say only those due to the condensation of\ngases in the pores of solids, which (in certain cases at least) is\nknown to amount to a very considerable quantity.\n\n157. From another point of view there appears to be evidence in\nfavour of the so-called elementary bodies being built up, as more or\nless complex arrangements of one, or at most a few, simpler kinds of\nmatter.\n\nThere are certain groups or families amongst these elements of such a\nnature that the various members of one family appear to be related to\neach other, in the same way as the corresponding members of another\nfamily.\n\nThis clearly points to some sort of community of origin, and\nthus favours the idea that the elements are in reality composite\nstructures. But the great difficulty felt by those who have favoured\nthis idea has been the apparent impossibility of decomposing such\nfamily groups. Thus fluorine, chlorine, bromine, and iodine, while\nthey appear to be related to one another in some peculiar manner,\nhave yet apparently resisted all attempts at decomposition, and there\nare other similar instances which might easily be named.\n\n158. It has, however, at the same time, come to be recognised, that\nheat of high temperature is a very powerful decomposing agent, and\nthat its office is by no means limited to causing the separation\nfrom one another of the molecules of a substance, as, for instance,\nwhen it separates the molecules of water-substance or H_{2}O from\none another, as in forming water from ice, or steam from water. It\nis now understood that high-temperature heat has also the power of\nseparating the atomic constituents of a single molecule from each\nother, so that at an extremely high temperature not only would water\nbe driven into steam, but steam driven into oxygen and hydrogen. We\nare already familiar with many instances of this power possessed by\nhigh-temperature heat; thus we see carbonate of lime decomposed by\nthe heat of the kiln into lime and carbonic-acid gas. We see also\nthat at the high temperatures which accompany the electric spark\nalmost all compounds are momentarily decomposed, if we may judge\nby the spectrum of the light which is given out. Carrying on this\nline of thought, we are led to imagine that, could we obtain higher\ntemperatures than those now at our disposal, we might decompose some\nof those substances which at present seem to be elements.\n\n159. Lockyer, in his astronomical researches, has recently started\nthis question. He argues that in the sun and stars, and more\nespecially in the whiter stars, there are temperatures very much\nhigher than any which have been here produced. He assumes too\nthat simplicity of constitution accompanies a simple spectrum, an\nhypothesis which is consistent with the fact that compounds as a rule\ngive spectra much more complicated than those of simple substances.\nNow it is a curious circumstance that the atmospheres of some of\nthe whiter stars, such as Sirius, do not appear to contain anything\nbut hydrogen; at least we have no indication that they do; other\nstars, again, of less whiteness, in addition to hydrogen, have such\nsubstances as iron, sodium, etc., while yellow, orange, and blood-red\nstars and variable stars, appear to contain in their atmospheres\nsubstances which are compounds. If then it be true that as a rule the\natmospheres of the whiter stars contain the fewer elements and those\nof smallest atomic weight, and that as stars diminish in whiteness\ntheir atmospheres rise in complexity of structure, in fine, if we\nhave reason to associate together whiteness and simplicity, this\nundoubtedly tells in favour of the power of high-temperature heat to\nsplit up the so-called elements.\n\nWe conclude the whiter stars to be the hotter stars, from the\nfact that their spectra contain a greater proportion of the more\nrefrangible rays than do those of yellow or red stars.\n\nIn fine, a speculation of this nature is not to be summarily\ndismissed, but ought to be retained as a working hypothesis which\nmay in time throw great light on the ultimate constitution of the\nchemical elements. Is it fanciful to suppose that the passage\nprefixed to Chapter III. may refer to this, since (literally\ntranslated) it stands\u2014\u2018... the elements, intensely heated, shall be\nbroken up....\u2019?\n\n160. Let us now turn to globe development. We have alluded to this\nalready while discussing the energy of the universe. In doing so\nwe came to the conclusion that the original state of the visible\nuniverse was a diffused or chaotic state, in which the various\nparticles were widely separated from one another, but exerting on\none another gravitating force, and therefore possessed of potential\nenergy. As these particles came together, impinged on one another, or\ngathered into groups, this potential energy was gradually transformed\ninto the energy of heat and into that of visible motion. We may\nthus imagine the cooling and (except under very strict conditions\nof original distribution) _necessarily_ revolving matter in course\nof time to have thrown off certain parts of itself which would\nthereafter form satellites or planetary attendants, while the central\nmass would form the sun. We have here, in fact, the development\nhypothesis of Kant and Laplace, and it is greatly in favour of the\ntruth of this hypothesis that all the planetary motions of the solar\nsystem are nearly in one plane, and also that, looking down on the\nsystem from above that plane, all these motions are seen to be in one\nand the same direction.\n\n161. Assuming, therefore, that the solar system and, _pari passu_,\nthe other sidereal systems have been formed in this way, it is very\neasy to see why the central mass should be so much hotter than its\nattendants. Two causes would conduce to this. In the first place,\nassuming that the heat of a mass is due to the rushing together\nof its particles under the force of gravitation, the velocities\nwould be much greater for the central mass, and hence the amount of\nheat (per unit of mass, _i.e._ the temperature) developed would be\ngreater also. In the next place, the body being a large one would\ncool less rapidly than its attendant planets. These two causes thus\ncombine to render the largest bodies of the universe ever since their\naggregation (and still more now) the hottest, so that the same\nbody which forms the gravitating centre of the system becomes, when\nrequired, also the dispenser of light and heat.\n\n162. Now, without speculating about the nature or extent of the\nethereal medium, we may be sure of two things. In the first place,\nall but an exceedingly small fraction of the light and heat of\nthe sun and stars goes out into space and does not return to them\nagain, or in other words, the sun and stars are slowly cooling. To\nrestore to the sun every instant its losses by radiation, the whole\ncelestial vault would have to radiate as powerfully as the sun\ndoes\u2014in which case the earth and planets would very soon acquire (at\ntheir surfaces) the sun\u2019s temperature. In the next place, the visible\nmotion of the large bodies of the universe is gradually being stopped\nby something which may be denominated ethereal friction. It follows\nfrom this that our own sun will gradually lose his brilliancy, and\nthat our earth will gradually lose its orbital energy and approach\nthe sun in a path of slowly contracting spiral convolutions. At last\nit will become entangled with the sun, and the result will be the\nconversion of the remaining orbital energy into heat, after which the\ntwo bodies will remain one.\n\nThus the tendency is that the sun shall ultimately absorb the\nvarious planets of the system, his heat and energy being recruited\nby the process. Now, let us imagine that the same processes are\nsimultaneously going on in one of the nearer fixed stars, say for\ninstance in Sirius.\n\nAfter unimaginable ages these two stars, the Sun and Sirius, having\neach long since swallowed up his attendants, but being nevertheless\nexhausted in heat-energy on account of radiation into space, may be\nimagined to be travelling towards one another, slowly at first, but\nafterwards with an accelerated motion.\n\nThey will at last approach each other with a great velocity, and\nfinally form one system. Ultimately the two will rush together and\nform one mass, the orbital energy of each (or rather that portion of\nthis energy which remains after ethereal friction) being converted\ninto heat, and the matter being, in consequence, probably partly\nsmashed into mere dust, and partly evaporated and transformed into\na gaseous, nebulous condition. Ages pass away, and the large double\nmass ultimately shares the same fate that long since overtook the\nsingle masses which composed it; that is to say, it shrinks and\nthrows off planets, but gives out the greater part of its light\nand heat into space and gradually becomes cold and dark, until at\nlength it comes to form one of the constituents of a still more\nstupendous collision, and has its temperature raised once again by\nthe conversion of visible energy into heat.\n\n163. Our readers will remark how, by a process of this kind, the\nprimordial potential energy of the visible universe is gradually\nconverted into light and heat, and how this light and heat are\nultimately dissipated into space. They will also remark that, as the\nprocess goes on, the masses of the universe become larger and larger.\nIn fine, the dissipation of the energy of the visible universe\nproceeds, _pari passu_, with the aggregation of mass.\n\nThe very fact, therefore, that the large masses of the visible\nuniverse are of finite size, is sufficient to assure us that the\nprocess cannot have been going on for ever; or, in other words, that\nthe visible universe must have had its origin in time, and we may\nconclude that if the visible universe be finite in mass the process\nwill ultimately come to an end. All this is what would take place,\nprovided we allow the indestructibility of ordinary matter; but we\nmay perhaps suppose (Art. 153) that the very material of the visible\nuniverse will ultimately vanish into the invisible.\n\n164. There is one peculiarity of the process of development just\ndescribed, which we beg our readers to note. We have supposed the\nvisible universe, after its production, to have been left to its\nown laws; that is to say, to certain so-called inorganic agencies,\nwhich for want of better knowledge we for the present call forces,\nin virtue of which its development took place.[51] At the very first\nthere may have been only one kind of primordial atom, or, to use\nanother expression, absolute simplicity of material. As, however, the\nvarious atoms approached each other, in virtue of the forces with\nwhich they were endowed, other and more complicated structures took\nthe place of the perfectly simple primordial stuff. Various kinds of\nmolecules were produced at various temperatures, and these ultimately\ncame together to produce globes or worlds, some of them comparatively\nsmall, others very large. Thus the progress is from the regular to\nthe irregular. And we find a similar progress when we consider the\ninorganic development of our own world. The action of water rounds\npebbles, but it rounds them irregularly; it produces soil, but\nthe soil is irregular in the size of its grains, and variable in\nconstitution. Wherever what may be termed the brute forces of nature\nare left to themselves, this is always the result: not so, however,\nwhen organisms are concerned in the development. Two living things\nof the same family are more like each other than two grains of sand\nor than two particles of soil. The eggs of birds of the same family,\nthe corresponding feathers of similar birds, the ants from the same\nant-hill, all form groups whose members have a very strong likeness\nto each other.\n\nWe find this likeness still more marked when we regard certain\nproducts of human industry. Let us take, for instance, coins from the\nsame die, or bullets from the same mould, or impressions from the\nsame engraved plate, and we at once perceive the striking difference\nbetween products developed through inorganic means and those\ndeveloped through an intelligent agent designing uniformity.\n\n165. Let us now proceed to consider life development. Let us imagine\nthat the primeval atoms have long since come together, various\nchemical substances being the result. And let us further imagine\nthat these various substances have long since gathered themselves\ninto worlds, of various sizes at first; but that these worlds have\ngradually cooled down, until one of them, the Earth, let us say, has\nat length reached conditions under which life (such as we know it)\nbecomes possible. Accordingly life makes its appearance; not the life\nthat now is, but something much ruder and simpler. But in process of\ntime we find quite a different order of organised beings; a higher\nand more complete type has appeared, and the type continues to rise\nuntil it culminates in the production of man, a being endowed with\nintelligence, and capable of reasoning upon the phenomena around him.\nNow, if man reviews these organised forms which exist on the earth\nside by side with himself, he perceives at once that a number of\nindividuals possess certain characteristics in common, and he gives\nexpression to this experience by saying that these individuals are\nall of one species. \u2018When we call a group of animals or of plants a\nspecies,\u2019 says Professor Huxley,[52] \u2018we may imply thereby, either\nthat all these animals or plants have some common peculiarity of form\nor structure; or we may mean that they possess some common functional\ncharacter. That part of biological science which deals with form\nand structure is called Morphology; that which concerns itself with\nfunction, Physiology. So that we may conveniently speak of these\ntwo senses, or aspects, of \u201cspecies\u201d\u2014the one as morphological, the\nother as physiological.... Thus horses form a species, because the\ngroup of animals to which that name is applied is distinguished\nfrom all others in the world by the following constantly associated\ncharacters:\u2014They have, 1. a vertebral column; 2. mammae; 3. a\nplacental embryo; 4. four legs; 5. a single well-developed toe in\neach foot, provided with a hoof; 6. a bushy tail; and 7. callosities\non the inner sides of both the fore and the hind legs. The asses,\nagain, form a distinct species, because, with the same characters, as\nfar as the fifth in the above list, all asses have tufted tails, and\nhave callosities only on the inner side of the fore legs.\u2019\n\nBut very often the morphological peculiarities of a species are\nmore easily recognised than expressed. No one, for instance, would\nfail to rank the horse as one species and the ass as another, even\nwhile ignorant of some of those specific peculiarities which the\nnaturalist selects as conveying the best scientific account of their\ndifference.\n\n166. Let us now regard the question of species from its physiological\npoint of view. Suppose that two individuals, A and B, of different\nsexes, breed freely together, producing offspring, and that two\nindividuals, C and D, do the like.\n\nNow, if the offspring of A and B is capable of breeding freely with\nthat of C and D, producing offspring, generation after generation,\nthen A, B, C, and D may be said to belong to the same physiological\nspecies.\n\nTo take an illustration borrowed from Professor Huxley: let us\nimagine that A is an Arab, and B a dray-horse; also that C is a\ndray-horse, and D an Arab. Now the progeny of these two pairs will\nall be mongrels, holding a position intermediate between that of the\nArab and the dray-horse; but they will be perfectly fertile amongst\nthemselves when matched together. We therefore conclude that the\ndray-horse and the Arab are not distinct physiological species, but\nonly varieties of the same species. Again, let A be a horse and B an\nass, also let C be an ass and D a horse. The pairs will still have\noffspring, and these will be mules, having a character intermediate\nbetween that of the horse and that of the ass; but, on the other\nhand, these mules will not be able to breed together amongst\nthemselves so as to produce offspring. We are therefore justified\nin asserting that a horse and an ass are of different physiological\nspecies.\n\nIf we should ever attempt to pair together animals much more unlike\neach other than the horse and the ass, we should simply fail. They\nwill not come together, and we cannot tell whether, if they did, they\nwould be capable of producing progeny. We may therefore conclude\nthat, as matter of fact, there are certain well-marked physiological\nspecies that will not breed with each other at all, while there are\nother species also physiologically distinct, but not so markedly\nseparated from each other, that may be brought to breed together,\ntheir offspring being infertile.\n\n167. The most apparent conclusion to be deduced from these\nfacts would be that of the invariability of species, and of the\nimpossibility of its transmutation\u2014the infertility of hybrids being\nthe law which prevents any such transmutation from taking place. And\nas the physiological species cannot be made different the apparent\nconclusion is that in times past they have been always the same as\nthey are now. If this be allowed, it follows that inasmuch as they\ntook their origin in time, they must have originally been produced\nvery much as they are at the present moment,\u2014a separate act of\nproduction being required for each species, or rather two separate\nacts for each species. This position has always been regarded as\na stronghold by a certain class of theological thinkers, and they\nhave resented the attempts of men of science to obtain any other\nexplanation of the origin of species.\n\nMen of science have, on the other hand, asserted their right to\ndiscuss this question with the same freedom as any other. Our\npoint of view is somewhat different from that of either of these\ntwo parties. We think it is not so much the right or privilege as\nthe bounden duty of the man of science to put back the direct\ninterference of the Great First Cause\u2014the unconditioned\u2014as far as he\npossibly can in time. This is the intellectual or rather theoretical\nwork which he is called upon to do\u2014the post that has been assigned to\nhim in the economy of the universe.\n\nIf, then, two possible theories of the production of any phenomenon\nare presented to the man of science, one of these implying the\nimmediate operation of the unconditioned, and the other the operation\nof some cause existing in the universe, we conceive that he is called\nupon by the most profound obligations of his nature and work to\nchoose the second in preference to the first. But we have already\nsufficiently discussed this question in a previous part of this book\n(Art. 85).\n\n168. When we examine closely into the phenomena of life we find that\nside by side with the general law, that like produces like, there is\na tendency to minor variations.\n\nThus we have already agreed to consider dray-horses and Arabs as\nvarieties of the species horse; and in like manner pouters, carriers,\nfan-tails, and tumblers are all varieties of the species rock-pigeon.\nWe are therefore led to ask how such varieties were originally\nproduced, and how they become perpetuated after their production.\n\nNow it is well known that there occurs occasionally an accountable\nvariation, so marked in its nature as to be worthy of historical\nrecord. Two very interesting and instructive instances of this are\ngiven by Professor Huxley, and we take the liberty of quoting these\nin the Professor\u2019s own words:\u2014\n\n \u2018The first of them is that of the \u201cAncon,\u201d or \u201cOtter\u201d sheep,\n of which a careful account is given by Colonel David Humphreys,\n F.R.S., in a letter to Sir Joseph Banks, published in the\n _Philosophical Transactions_ for 1813. It appears that one Seth\n Wright, the proprietor of a farm on the banks of the Charles\n River in Massachusetts, possessed a flock of fifteen ewes and\n a ram of the ordinary kind. In the year 1791, one of the ewes\n presented her owner with a male lamb differing, for no assignable\n reason, from its parents by a proportionally long body and\n short bandy legs, whence it was unable to emulate its relatives\n in those sportive leaps over the neighbours\u2019 fences, in which\n they were in the habit of indulging, much to the good farmer\u2019s\n vexation.\n\n * * * * *\n\n \u2018With the \u2019cuteness characteristic of their nation, the\n neighbours of the Massachusetts farmer imagined it would be\n an excellent thing if all his sheep were imbued with the\n stay-at-home tendencies enforced by nature upon the newly\n arrived ram, and they advised Wright to kill the old patriarch\n of his fold, and install the Ancon ram in his place. The result\n justified their sagacious anticipations.... The young lambs were\n almost always either pure Ancons or pure ordinary sheep. But\n when sufficient Ancon sheep were obtained to interbreed with one\n another it was found that the offspring was always pure Ancon.\u2019\n\n \u2018The second case is that detailed by a no less unexceptionable\n authority than R\u00e9aumur, in his _Art de faire \u00e9clore les Poulets_.\n A Maltese couple named Kelleia, whose hands and feet were\n constructed upon the ordinary human model, had born to them\n a son, Gratio, who possessed six perfectly moveable fingers\n on each hand, and six toes, not quite so well formed, on each\n foot. No cause could be assigned for the appearance of this\n unusual variety of the human species. But however they may have\n arisen, what especially interests us is to remark that, once in\n existence, varieties obey the fundamental law of reproduction,\n that like tends to produce like, and their offspring exemplify\n it by tending to exhibit the same deviation from the parental\n stock as themselves. Indeed, there seems to be in many instances\n a prepotent influence about a newly arisen variety which\n gives it what we may call an unfair advantage over the normal\n descendants from the same stock. This is strikingly exemplified\n by the case of Gratio Kelleia, who married a woman with the\n ordinary pentadactyle extremities and had by her four children,\n Salvator, George, Andr\u00e9, and Marie. Of these children Salvator,\n the eldest boy, had six fingers and six toes, like his father;\n the second and third, also boys, had five fingers and five toes,\n like their mother, though the hands and feet of George were\n slightly deformed; the last, a girl, had five fingers and five\n toes, but the thumbs were slightly deformed. The variety thus\n reproduced itself purely in the eldest, while the normal type\n reproduced itself purely in the third, and almost purely in the\n second and last; so that it would seem, at first, as if the\n normal type were more powerful than the variety. But all these\n children grew up and intermarried with normal wives and husbands,\n and then note what took place\u2014Salvator had four children, three\n of whom exhibited the hexadactyle members of their grandfather\n and father, while the youngest had the pentadactyle limbs of the\n mother and grandmother; so that here, notwithstanding a double\n pentadactyle dilution of the blood the hexadactyle variety had\n the best of it. The same prepotency of the variety was still more\n markedly exemplified in the progeny of two of the other children,\n Marie and George. Marie (whose thumbs only were deformed) gave\n birth to a boy with six toes, and three other normally formed\n children; but George, who was not quite so pure a pentadactyle,\n begot, first, two girls, each of whom had six fingers and toes;\n then a girl with six fingers on each hand, and six toes on\n the right foot, but only five toes on the left; and lastly,\n a boy with only five fingers and toes. In these instances,\n therefore, the variety, as it were, leaped over one generation to\n reproduce itself in full force in the next. Finally, the purely\n pentadactyle Andr\u00e9 was the father of many children, not one of\n whom departed from the normal parental type.\u2019\n\n169. The instances now quoted illustrate two things. Both tell us\nhow varieties arise, we may say spontaneously, or in other words\nwe cannot tell how; and the former instance, that of the Ancon\nbreed, shows us moreover that such varieties when they do occur\nmay be rendered permanent by means of artificial selection. If\nthe six-fingered descendants of Gratio Kelleia had been forced to\nintermarry amongst themselves it is highly probable that we should\nhave had a permanent hexadactyle variety of the human race. It has\nlikewise been shown by Charles Darwin that the pouter, the fan-tail,\nthe carrier, and the tumbler are all varieties of the common\nrock-pigeon.\n\n170. It thus appears that permanent varieties may be produced by\nartificial selection. Now Darwin and Wallace have brought before us\nthe very great fact that similar changes can also be produced by\nnatural selection.\n\nTo illustrate this, let us imagine a slight variety to arise\nspontaneously, we do not know how. Having arisen there is a\n\u2018prepotent influence\u2019 about it which enables it to secure a\nconsiderable proportion of offspring having its own characteristics.\nNow, suppose that the characteristics are such as to adapt the\nindividuals possessing them more perfectly to the conditions of\nnature which surround them. When, by breeding amongst themselves,\nthe new variety is rendered permanent, the members of this variety\nwill, therefore, have an advantage over their elder brethren so far\nas certain conditions of nature are concerned, will in fact succeed\nbetter in the struggle for existence, and will ultimately displace\nthe elder branches. Thus the struggle for existence bears to natural\nselection the same relation as man bears to artificial selection.\n\n171. We now come to the real point of difficulty, or at least the\nunproved point, in the Darwinian hypothesis. We may cross one\nrace with another, but we do not obtain, so far as we know, those\nphenomena of infertility which are exhibited when we cross distinct\nspecies with each other. The Ancon sheep were perfectly fertile when\nmatched with their elder brethren, and the dray-horse and the Arab,\nor the pouter and the tumbler, breed together as easily as if they\nwere of the same race. But if we cannot produce infertility, how\ncan we apply the results of artificial selection to account for the\norigin of species?\n\nThis difficulty is met by Darwin and his followers in this way:\u2014\u2018It\nis not as yet proved,\u2019 says Professor Huxley, \u2018that a race ever\nexhibits, when crossed with another race of the same species, those\nphenomena of hybridisation which are exhibited by many species when\ncrossed with other species. On the other hand, not only is it not\nproved that all species give rise to hybrids infertile _inter se_,\nbut there is much reason to believe that, in crossing, species\nexhibit every gradation from perfect sterility to perfect fertility.\u2019\nThis appears to carry weight; the old theory went with a leap from\nperfect fertility to perfect sterility, and did not contemplate the\npossibility of a continuous gradation from the one extreme to the\nother; at least its argument was founded upon the neglect of such\na gradation. But if there be a gradation of this kind, it follows\nthat infertility will merely represent the results of crossing two\nspecies whose functional characteristics are very different from each\nother; and, on the other hand, the reason why artificially produced\nvarieties are not infertile when crossed with one another may only\nbe that the experiment has not been continued long enough.\n\nTime, in fact, is the essential requisite in all such attempts to\nimitate nature.\n\n172. In connection with this subject, Mr. Darwin has remarked that\ncertain plants are more fertile with the pollen of another species\nthan with their own; and Professor Huxley tells us that there are\ncertain _fuci_ whose male element will fertilise the ovule of a\nplant of distinct species, while the males of the latter species are\nineffective with the females of the first. So obscure in some of its\nbranches is the working of the reproductive system.\n\nAgain, the following remark by Mr. Darwin is very suggestive:\u2014\n\n\u2018First crosses between forms known to be varieties, or sufficiently\nalike to be considered as varieties, and their mongrel offspring,\nare very generally, but not quite universally, fertile. Nor is this\nnearly general and perfect fertility surprising, when we remember\nhow liable we are to argue in a circle with respect to varieties in\na state of nature; and when we remember that the greater number of\nvarieties have been produced under domestication, by the selection of\nmere external differences, and not of differences in the reproductive\nsystem. In all other respects, excluding fertility, there is a close\ngeneral resemblance between hybrids and mongrels.\u2019\n\n173. The result of all these speculations is to render it probable\nthat there may be in nature, give it time enough, a process which\nleads to the transmutation of species.\n\nThe accumulation of successive differences, each representing some\nelement of success in the struggle for life, may easily be imagined\nto be capable of producing, in the course of ages, a very great\nchange.\n\nReasoning out this hypothesis, the more advanced followers of Mr.\nDarwin do not hesitate to describe all the varieties of living\nthings, including man, as the results of development from some\nprimordial germ taking place throughout the course of immeasurable\nages. And Mr. Darwin himself, in his work on the Descent of Man,\nlays great stress on the occurrence of homologous structures in\nman and the lower animals, as well as on the development in man\nof rudimentary structures, which are either absolutely useless to\ntheir possessor, or of very slight service indeed, but which appear\nto serve as an index of the various stages through which the human\nspecies has passed in its progress upwards from lower forms of life.\n\n174. Mr. Wallace, however, sees in the production of man the\nintervention of an external will.\n\nHe remarks that the lowest types of savages are in possession of a\nbrain, and of capacities far beyond any use to which they could apply\nthem in their present condition, and that therefore they could not\nhave been evolved from the mere necessities of their environments.\n\n175. Finally, Professor Huxley imagines the possibility of the\nDarwinian hypothesis requiring modification. Alluding to the assumed\ncircularity of the planetary orbits which followed the establishment\nof the Copernican hypothesis (Art. 69), he remarks:\u2014\n\n\u2018But the planetary orbits turned out to be not quite circular after\nall, and, grand as was the service Copernicus rendered to science,\nKepler and Newton had to come after him. What if the orbit of\nDarwinism should be a little too circular? What if species should\noffer residual phenomena, here and there, not explicable by natural\nselection? Twenty years hence naturalists may be in a position to\nsay whether this is, or is not, the case; but in either event they\nwill owe the author of \u201cThe Origin of Species\u201d an immense debt of\ngratitude.\u2019\n\n176. We will defer to our last chapter some further remarks on Mr.\nDarwin\u2019s hypothesis. Meanwhile, before concluding, let us briefly\nallude to the original production of living things on our globe.\nIt may, perhaps, eventually be possible by means of a hypothesis\nof evolution, to account for the great variety of living forms on\nthe supposition of a single primordial germ to begin with; but the\ndifficulty still remains how to account for this germ.\n\nIt is against all true scientific experience that life can appear\nwithout the intervention of a living antecedent. How then are we to\nexplain the production of the primordial germ?\n\nThe difficulty of doing so from our point of view would appear to\nbe unusually great, for we have come to the conclusion that, as a\nmatter of scientific principle, we cannot admit any such breach of\ncontinuity as a pure act of creation in time would imply.\n\nIf, then, a pure act of creation in time be an inadmissible\nhypothesis, and if the hypothesis of Abiogenesis be equally\ninadmissible, our readers may well ask how are we to surmount the\ndifficulty. For our reply to this question, we must once more beg to\nrefer them to our concluding chapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nSPECULATIONS AS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SUPERIOR INTELLIGENCES TN THE\nVISIBLE UNIVERSE.\n\n \u2018The earth hath bubbles, as the water has,\n And these are of them.\u2019\u2014SHAKESPEARE, _Macbeth_.\n\n\n177. Our readers are now aware from what we have said in Chapter\nII. that the two great requisites for organised existence are, in\nthe first place, an organ of memory, giving the individual a hold\nupon the past, and secondly, the possibility of varied action in\nthe present, and that unless these two things are fulfilled life is\nsimply inconceivable.\n\nAgain, in Chapters III., IV., and V. we have sufficiently discussed\nthe visible universe and its potentialities. We have seen that\nalthough at present it contains the essential requisites for\norganised existence, yet, in the remote future, a time will\nnecessarily arrive when, through a degradation of the Energy of this\nuniverse, or at least of one part of it, that variety of motion which\nis essential to life will be unattainable. Immortality is, therefore,\nimpossible or hardly possible in such a universe; but even allowing\nall this to be the case, it is at least conceivable that man may be\nat death drafted off into some superior rank of being connected with\nthe present universe, and thence ultimately removed into a new order\nof things when the present universe shall have become effete.\n\nLet us now, therefore, very briefly discuss the question as to the\npossibility of intelligences superior to man existing in the present\nvisible universe. And, in order to commence this inquiry, let us\nanalyse with some minuteness the physical source of that peculiarity\nwhich the present universe possesses, in virtue of which it affords\nliving beings the means of a varied existence. Whence is all this\npower derived? How comes it about that a living being possesses that\nabruptness and spontaneity of action which peculiarly characterise\nit? In fine, let us consider the exact position of life in the\npresent physical universe.\n\n178. Now, in the first place, it is well known that equilibrium may\nbe of two kinds, stable and unstable, and if we take an egg balanced\non its end at the edge of a table as an example of mechanical\ninstability, we shall see that it \u2018depends upon some external impulse\nso infinitesimally small as to elude our observation whether the egg\nshall fall upon the floor and give rise to a comparatively large\ntransmutation of energy, or whether it shall fall upon the table and\ngive rise to a transmutation comparatively small.\u2019[53]\n\nBut, just as there are other forces besides gravity, so there are\nother varieties of instability besides that which we treat of in\nmechanics.\n\nWe may, for instance, have molecular instability, such as\ncharacterises water cooled below the freezing point, or a\nsupersaturated solution of Glauber\u2019s salt, where the advent of the\nsmallest possible crystal of ice or of Glauber\u2019s salt is sufficient\nto bring about a marked molecular change in the liquid, which\nimmediately becomes thick with deposited crystals; or again, we may\nhave chemical instability in which the slightest impulse of any kind\nmay determine a chemical change, just as in mechanical instability\nthe slightest possible impulse may determine a mechanical change.\nThus fulminating silver or nitroglycerine are familiar examples of\nchemical instability in which the slightest blow or the smallest\nspark may be sufficient to bring about an instantaneous and violent\ngeneration of heated gas.\n\n179. Again, all machines\u2014that is to say, all material systems\u2014must\nnecessarily be of two kinds, one of which makes use of the stable\nforces of nature and the other of the unstable. The following\nquotation from a work on Energy, by one of the authors of this book,\nwill sufficiently explain what is meant:[54]\u2014\n\n \u2018When we speak of a structure, or a machine, or a system, we\n simply mean a number of individual particles associated together\n in producing some definite result. Thus, the solar system, a\n timepiece, a rifle, are examples of inanimate machines; while\n an animal, a human being, an army, are examples of animated\n structures or machines. Now, such machines or structures are of\n two kinds, which differ from one another not only in the object\n sought, but also in the means of attaining that object.\n\n \u2018In the first place, we have structures or machines in which\n systematic action is the object aimed at, and in which all\n the arrangements are of a conservative nature, the element\n of instability being avoided as much as possible. The solar\n system, a timepiece, a steam-engine at work, are examples of\n such machines, and the characteristic of all such is their\n _calculability_. Thus the skilled astronomer can tell, with the\n utmost precision, in what place the moon or the planet Venus\n will be found this time next year. Or again, the excellence of\n a timepiece consists in its various hands pointing accurately in\n a certain direction after a certain interval of time. In like\n manner we may safely count upon a steamship making so many knots\n an hour, at least while the outward conditions remain the same.\n In all these cases we make our calculations, and we are not\n deceived\u2014the end sought is regularity of action, and the means\n employed is a stable arrangement of the forces of nature.\n\n \u2018Now, the characteristics of the other class of machines are\n precisely the reverse.\n\n \u2018Here the object aimed at is not a regular, but a sudden and\n violent, transmutation of energy, while the means employed are\n unstable arrangements of natural forces. A rifle at full-cock,\n with a delicate hair-trigger, is a very good instance of such a\n machine, where the slightest touch from without may bring about\n the explosion of the gunpowder, and the propulsion of the ball\n with a very great velocity. Now, such machines are eminently\n characterised by their _incalculability_.\n\n \u2018It is thus apparent that, as regards energy, structures are of\n two kinds. In one of these, the object sought is regularity of\n action, and the means employed, a stable arrangement of natural\n forces; while in the other, the end sought is freedom of action,\n and a sudden transmutation of energy, the means employed being an\n unstable arrangement of natural forces.\n\n \u2018The one set of machines are characterised by their\n calculability\u2014the other by their incalculability. The one set,\n when at work, are not easily put wrong, while the other set are\n characterised by great delicacy of construction.\u2019\n\n180. Having thus defined the two kinds of machines, let us now see to\nwhat extent a living being may be regarded as a machine, and also to\nwhich of these two categories he belongs.\n\nWhat our machines enable us to do is merely to transform energy. Our\nreaders are well aware, by what we have already said (Art. 102), that\nit is just as impossible to create energy as it is to create matter.\n\nThus a clock has to be wound up before it will go; an engine has to\nbe stoked with coal; a rifle or cannon has to be charged with powder;\nand in short, all machines, whether delicately constructed or not,\nwhether calculable or incalculable, are merely transmuters of energy\nand not creators of it.\n\nTo this law the living being is no exception. The creatures of\nthis world (and it is of such we are now speaking) are certainly\nnot creators of energy; but in respect of the great law of the\nconservation of energy, such beings must be regarded in the very same\nlight as any other machines.\n\nBut there is yet another analogy between living beings and inanimate\nmachines. When we study the working of any machine, we find that each\ntransformation of energy brought about has a material antecedent; the\neffect produced has a cause from which it springs, and this cause is\none which we are probably able to recognise from our knowledge of the\nlaws of matter. To take an example: in a steam-engine the amount of\nwork produced depends upon the amount of heat carried from the boiler\nto the condenser; and this amount depends in its turn upon the amount\nof coal which is burned in the furnace of the engine. In like manner,\nthe velocity of the bullet which issues from a rifle depends upon the\ntransformation of the energy of the powder; this in its turn depends\nupon the explosion of the percussion cap; this again upon the fall of\nthe trigger; and lastly this upon the finger of the man who fires the\nrifle.\n\nNow, without attempting to define what life is, and leaving all\nspeculations regarding it to our last chapter, we yet think it may\nsafely be said that a living being is analogous to a machine in this\nparticular also.\n\nLet us take the man who fires the rifle. We can trace back the motion\nof his forefinger to the contraction of a muscle; and we can go even\nfurther back and connect this contraction with a stimulus sent along\nthe nerves from the brain, so that a material effect is here seen\nto be brought about by a material antecedent, just as truly as in\nan inanimate machine. Indeed, we may generalise, and say that, _so\nfar as we can physically investigate a living being_, we may take\nit for granted that a material effect is due to a strictly material\nantecedent in his case also.\n\n181. We have thus discussed two respects in which a living being is\nanalogous to a machine, and the next point is to determine which of\nthe two classes of machines most resembles the living being. Is he\nanalogous to the solar system, a steam-engine, or a clock? or is\nhe rather analogous to some delicately constructed machine, such,\nfor instance, as a rifle? There can, we think, be no doubt that a\nliving being most resembles a delicately constructed machine. For\nwhat is the characteristic of such a machine? It is that in it a\ncomparatively great transformation of energy may be brought about\nby a comparatively small physical antecedent. Thus a slight breath\nof air may determine the fall of the egg off the table, or a slight\ntap the explosion of a large quantity of fulminating silver. So in\nthe human being, a very small and obscure transmutation of energy\nin the mysterious brain-chamber may determine some very violent\nmotion. \u2018Life is not a bully who swaggers out into the open universe,\nupsetting the laws of energy in all directions, but rather a\nconsummate strategist, who, sitting in his secret chamber over his\nwires, directs the movements of a great army.\u2019[55]\n\n182. Granting then that a living being is a delicately constructed\nmachine, the next point is to determine what process of delicacy,\nwhat peculiar arrangement of unstable forces, is employed in his\nconstruction? Now it is very easy to perceive that the delicacy in\nthis case is brought about by an unstable arrangement of chemical\nforces. It is plain that the body of an animal is a chemically\nunstable product, and if, as one consequence of this, great freedom\nof action and delicacy are possessed during life, it is another\nconsequence that the extinction of life is very speedily followed by\ndecay.\n\nThe body then owes its delicacy to its chemically unstable nature;\nto a peculiar collocation of particles which certainly would not, in\nvirtue of their own merely physical forces, have united themselves\ntogether as we find them in the body.\n\n183. To what, then, is due this peculiar grouping of particles in the\nliving body?\n\nWe reply that it is, in one sense at least, derived from the food\nwhich is eaten. If animal food is eaten, it is of course derived\nfrom the body of the animal which is consumed. That animal may\npossibly have derived it from another animal, but more probably\nit has been derived in this case direct from the vegetable world.\nUltimately, therefore, it is to this world that we must look as the\nsource of that delicately constructed substance which plays such a\nwonderful and important part in the animal economy. If we go one\nlink further back in the chain of causation, we shall be carried from\nthe vegetable world to the sun as the great and ultimate physical\nsource of that high-class energy and delicacy of construction which\ncharacterise vegetable products. It is, in truth, owing to the\nactinic rays of our luminary that vegetable tissue is manufactured in\nthe leaves of plants, the carbonic acid of the air being decomposed,\nand oxygen given out, while the carbon, united with other substances,\nand modified thereby, is retained by the plant to form part of its\nsubstance, or perchance to become the food of animals.\n\n184. We have therefore now arrived at the conclusion that the\ndelicacy of construction which our frames require is ultimately\nderived from the sun, so far at least as the visible universe is\nconcerned. If then we would reply to the question of this chapter,\nwhether or not there may be beings superior to man connected with\nthis present universe, let us look abroad and endeavour to ascertain\nwhether there be in this universe any other obvious process of\ndelicacy besides that which characterises the bodies of animals like\nourselves.\n\nNow, it has been pointed out that, in the atmospheric changes of this\nworld, and more particularly of the sun, we have processes of great\ndelicacy. It is believed that the positions of the planets Mercury\nand Venus affect the behaviour of sun-spots, and thus determine the\nconditions of atmospheric changes on the surface of our luminary\nthat are absolutely overwhelming in their magnitude. We have only to\nreflect that a large sun-spot might swallow up fifty planets like our\nearth, and that some of the currents connected with it move at the\nrate of 100 miles per second, in order to realise the enormous scale\nof these solar outbreaks. Again, it is believed that the state of\nthe solar surface with regard to spots determines the storms of our\nearth, so that hurricanes are most numerous in the Indian Ocean as\nwell as on the coast of America during years of maximum sun-spots.[56]\n\nBut if such results are brought about by the relative positions of\nthe planets of our system, it is evident that the cause is more\nanalogous to the pulling of the trigger of a cannon ready to go off\nthan to a downright blow. In fact, a vast transformation of energy\nin the sun is brought about by some obscure and ill-understood but\ncomparatively trivial cause connected with the position of the nearer\nplanets of our system. We have here a case where the magnitude of the\neffect is out of all proportion to that of the antecedent; now this\nis, in other words, the definition of delicacy already given (Art.\n179).\n\nBut, again, if delicacy of construction characterise the\nmeteorological changes in the various members of our system, it is\nentirely absent from the orbital motions of these bodies. These want\nthat great characteristic of delicacy, _incalculability_; for they\nare not only pre-eminently calculable, but are now calculated years\nbeforehand as part of the regular business of the world. On the\nother hand, the meteorological changes of our earth and of the sun\ncome upon us with all the abruptness characteristic of delicacy, and\nare eminently incalculable. The hurricane and the lightning-flash\nare processes of Nature which man has in every age been prone\nto associate with personal intelligences. He has instinctively\nrecognised the similarity between these abrupt and startling\nphenomena and the actions of an angry and powerful being.\n\n185. It may no doubt be long since there has been anything like an\nextensive worship of the powers of nature amongst the civilised\nnations of the earth, but there may yet be found, even at the\npresent day, especially amongst imaginative races, and in wild and\nmountainous regions, a lingering belief that personal agents are\nconcerned in the more startling natural phenomena.\n\nSuch a belief was extensively prevalent during the middle ages, and\nwhole volumes might easily be filled with an account of medi\u00e6val\nsuperstitions and legends relating to this subject, sometimes dark\nand terrible, and at other times possessing a peculiar and pathetic\nbeauty which does not belong to anything else. The air, the earth,\nand the water have all been peopled with spirits; some of them\nfriendly to man, some of them his deadly enemies. They are powerful,\nand conscious of their power, but at the same time profoundly and\nmournfully aware that they are without a soul. Their life depends, it\nmay be, upon the continuance of some natural object, and hence for\nthem there is no immortality. Sometimes, however, an elemental spirit\nprocures a soul by means of a loving union with one of the human\nrace, and the beautiful romance of Undine is built upon this fancy.\n\nAt other times the reverse happens, and the soul of the mortal is\nlost who, leaving the haunts of men, associates with these soulless\nbut often amiable and affectionate beings. \u2018The Forsaken Merman,\u2019 by\nMatthew Arnold, expresses this fancy in a very beautiful and touching\nmanner:\u2014\n\n \u2018Children dear, was it yesterday\n (Call once more) that she went away?\n Once she sate with you and me\n On a red gold throne in the heart of the sea,\n And the youngest sate on her knee.\n She comb\u2019d its bright hair, and she tended it well,\n When down swung the sound of the far-off bell.\n She sigh\u2019d, she look\u2019d up through the clear green sea;\n She said, \u201cI must go, for my kinsfolk pray\n In the little grey church on the shore to-day.\n \u2019Twill be Easter time in the world\u2014ah me!\n And I lose my poor soul, Merman, here with thee.\u201d\n I said, \u201cGo up, dear heart, through the waves;\n Say thy prayers and come back to the kind sea-caves.\u201d\n She smiled, she went up through the surf in the bay.\n Children dear, was it yesterday?\u2019\n\n186. A conception, in some respects analogous to that now mentioned,\nbut in other respects very different from it, is that which\nattributes a soul to the universe; and it has even been imagined that\nthe whole visible universe forms, as it were, one gigantic brain.\n\nOthers again appear inclined to believe that there may be many\ncosmical intelligences, each embracing the whole universe, and\ntherefore interpenetrating one another, and at the same time taking\npart in its government by means of such processes of delicacy as\nthose we have mentioned.\n\n187. Now, before proceeding further in the discussion of these\nspeculations, let us here state more definitely than we have yet done\nwhat is the real point in question.\n\nIt is not so much the possibility of the delicate processes of nature\nbeing directed by an intelligent agency; this is in reality a\ndifferent question, and one which will be discussed in our concluding\nchapter. But the question now before us is, whether any such agency\nmay be said to belong to the present visible universe?\n\nTo make our meaning clear: we know that we ourselves belong to the\npresent visible universe. Again, there are many of us who believe\nthat angelic intelligences are the ministers of God\u2019s providence.\nNow, whether this doctrine be true or not (and we are not now\nconcerned about its truth), it is evident that such intelligences\ncannot be said to belong to the present physical universe. The\norganisation which they possess, and without which (Art. 61) we\ncannot imagine a finite intelligence to exist, is most assuredly\nnothing that can be perceived by our bodily senses, nor can we\nimagine that their existence is at all dependent on the fate of the\nvisible universe; in fine, they do not belong to it.\n\nOur present question, therefore, is whether we can associate the\ndelicate cosmical processes of the visible universe with the\noperations of intelligences residing in this universe and belonging\nto it, and to this question we must assuredly give a negative reply.\n\n188. We entertain no doubt that man and beings at least analogous to\nman represent the highest order of living things connected with the\npresent visible universe.\n\nFor, in the first place, although there is abundant evidence\nof delicacy of construction in the cosmical processes of this\nuniverse, there is no evidence of an organisation such as that which\nobservation leads us to associate with the presence of life.\n\nIn the next place, whatever view we may entertain of the Darwinian\nhypothesis and the relation of man to the lower animals, there can\nbe no doubt that they are all of a similar physical construction.\nWhat physiologists term the matter of life is very much the same in\nall, so that the body of any one animal may in general afford food\nfor any other. Now, is it likely that there are two living systems,\nabsolutely distinct and as different from one another as we can well\nimagine, both connected with the visible universe?\n\nWe think this view would imply such a want of unity in the plan of\ndevelopment as to be absolutely fatal to its reception, even as a\nworking hypothesis. On these accounts, therefore, we do not hesitate\nto dismiss the conception of a superior order of beings connected\nwith the present physical universe as one which is altogether\nuntenable.\n\n189. If we now turn from the verdict of science to the sacred\nwritings of the Jews, we find that one grand idea which pervades\nthe whole of the Old Testament is man\u2019s absolute superiority and\npractical sovereignty over all created beings whom he can perceive\notherwise than with the _mind\u2019s eye_.\n\nHe is supreme, or it is part of his work on earth to become supreme,\nover all that can be perceived by his senses, _i.e._ all the visible\nand tangible world. Thus we read in Gen. i. 28: \u2018And God blessed\nthem: and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and\nreplenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish\nof the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing\nthat moveth upon the earth.\u2019\n\nAgain, we read (Psalm viii. 5, 6): \u2018For thou hast made him a little\nlower than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and honour.\nThou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou\nhast put all things under his feet.\u2019 [It appears that the correct\nreading of the first part of this is, \u2018Thou hast made him little less\nthan divine,\u2019 etc.]\n\n190. It is worthy of note that the same idea is still more fully\ndeveloped in the New Testament, where it is confessed that, in one\nvery important respect, this superiority of man is seen to fail.\n\nHe has greatly enlarged his powers over nature, and has by these\nmeans much ameliorated the condition of his race; yet death overtakes\nhim just as remorselessly and as ruthlessly as if he were a savage\nof no account. He may meet death fearlessly, conscious that he has\nat least done something for the good of his fellows. But what does\nit all amount to? Death will ultimately overtake the race just as\nremorselessly as the individual. Now it is this fearful enemy, this\nterrible exception to the domination of man, which Christ, as the Son\nand type of man, is commissioned to destroy. Thus we read (1 Cor. xv.\n25): \u2018For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet.\nThe last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. For he hath put all\nthings under his feet.\u2019 And presently (verse 54) the apostle breaks\nforth into the following triumphant and beautiful language:\u2014\u2018So when\nthis corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal\nshall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the\nsaying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory.\u2019 Again we\nread (Heb. ii. 8): \u2018For in that he put all in subjection under him,\nhe left nothing that is not put under him. But now we see not yet\nall things put under him: but we see Jesus, who was made a little\nlower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory\nand honour; that he by the grace of God should taste death for every\nman. For it became him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all\nthings, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Captain of\ntheir salvation perfect through sufferings.\u2019 [Here again it appears\nthat instead of the phrase \u2018made a little lower than the angels,\u2019 we\nshould read, \u2018made for a little time lower than the angels\u2019\u2014_i.e._\nan idea identical in meaning with the phrase \u2018made under the law,\u2019\nthe Old Testament law being viewed as administered by angels. From\nthis dispensation, in which cosmical powers come between man and God,\nChrist frees us, by himself for a little time entering into it, and\neven under it meeting death.]\n\n191. From all this we may conclude that both science and religion\ntell us the same tale. They inform us that man, and beings similar\nto man, are at the head of the visible universe. No doubt religion\ninforms us, in addition to this, that there are other beings above\nman, but these do not live in the visible universe, but in that which\nis unseen and eternal.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nTHE UNSEEN UNIVERSE.\n\n \u2018For I reckon, that the sufferings of this present time are not\n worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in\n us. For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the\n manifestation of the sons of God.\u2019\u2014ST. PAUL (Rom. viii. 18, 19).\n\n \u2018Rabbi Jacob said, \u201cThis world is as it were the anteroom of\n the world to come. Prepare thyself in the anteroom so that thou\n mayest be fit to enter the banquet-room.\u201d\u2019\u2014_Mishna_, _Pirke\n Aboth_, chap. iv. par. 16.\n\n \u2018Eternal process moving on\n From state to state the spirit walks,\n And these are but the shatter\u2019d stalks,\n Or ruin\u2019d chrysalis of one.\u2019\u2014TENNYSON.\n\n\n192. In the preceding chapters we have examined by the light of\nour present knowledge the possibilities contained in the visible\nuniverse. What is it good for in the way of possible immortality? is\nthe question we have tried to answer. It will have been seen that\nthe reply is eminently unfavourable. If we take the individual man\nto begin with, we find that he lives his short tale of years, and\nthat then the visible machinery which connects him with the past, as\nwell as that which enables him to act in the present, falls into ruin\nand is brought to an end. If any germ or potentiality remains, it is\ncertainly not connected with the visible order of things.\n\nIf we next consider the human race we find that the state of\nadvancement to which they have attained is in many respects greatly\ndue to their physical surroundings. Coal and iron have been as\ninstrumental in promoting knowledge as Galileo and Newton, but our\nwhole stock of these materials will come to an end. By economy it\nmay be possible to lengthen out the period during which they can be\nsupplied, but is it not manifest that we are year by year exhausting\nthem as sources of available energy?\n\nAre we not inevitably led to conclude that our present state cannot\nlast even for a lengthened period, but will be brought to an end long\nbefore the inevitable dissipation of energy shall have rendered our\nearth unfit for habitation?\n\n193. But even supposing that man, in some form, is permitted to\nremain on the earth for a long series of years, we merely lengthen\nout the period, but we cannot escape the final catastrophe. The\nearth will gradually lose its energy of rotation, as well as that\nof revolution round the sun. The sun himself will wax dim and\nbecome useless as a source of energy, until at last the favourable\nconditions of the present solar system will have quite disappeared.\n\nBut what happens to our system will happen likewise to the whole\nvisible universe (Art. 116), which will, if finite, become in time\na lifeless mass, if indeed it be not doomed to utter dissolution.\nIn fine, it will become old and effete, no less truly than the\nindividual\u2014it is a glorious garment this visible universe, but not\nan immortal one\u2014we must look elsewhere if we are to be clothed with\nimmortality as with a garment.\n\n194. Now, if we regard the dissipation of energy which is constantly\ngoing on, we are at first sight forcibly struck with the apparently\nwasteful character of the arrangements of the visible universe. All\nbut a very small portion of the sun\u2019s heat goes day by day into what\nwe call empty space, and it is only this very small remainder which\ncan be made use of by the various planets for purposes of their\nown. Could anything be more perplexing than this seemingly prodigal\nexpenditure of the very life and essence of our system? That all but\na petty fraction of this vast store of high-class energy should be\ndoing nothing but travelling outwards in space at the rate of 188,000\nmiles per second is hardly conceivable, especially when the result of\nit is the inevitable destruction of the visible universe, unless we\nimagine this to be infinite, and so capable of endless degradation.\n\n195. If, however, we continue to dwell upon this astounding\nphenomenon, we begin to perceive that we are not entitled to assert\nthat this luminous energy does nothing but continue to travel\noutwards. It is perhaps too much to say that Struve\u2019s speculations\nprove an ethereal absorption, but they must be taken in connection\nwith other considerations. We have already maintained (Art. 151),\nthat we cannot regard the ether as a perfect fluid. Now it is not\neasy to suppose that in such a substance all vibratory motion should\npass outwards without in the smallest degree becoming absorbed or\nchanging its type.\n\nWe are prepared doubtless to expect a great difference between the\nether and visible matter in this respect, but can hardly imagine that\nit is absolutely free from the capacity of altering the type of the\nenergy which passes through it. Such a hypothesis appears to us to\nviolate the principle of continuity.\n\n196. But we may go even further than luminiferous vibrations which\ntake their rise chiefly at the surfaces of bodies, and extend our\nspeculations into the interior of substances, since the law of\ngravitation assures us that any displacement which takes place in\nthe very heart of the earth will be felt throughout the universe,\nand we may even imagine that the same thing will hold true of those\nmolecular motions (Art. 56) which accompany thought. For every\nthought we think is accompanied by a displacement and motion of\nthe particles of the brain, and we may imagine that somehow these\nmotions are propagated throughout the universe. Views of this nature\nwere long ago entertained by Babbage, and they have since commended\nthemselves to several men of science, and amongst others to Jevons.\n\u2018Mr. Babbage,\u2019 says this author,[57] \u2018has pointed out[58] that\nif we had power to follow and detect the minutest effects of any\ndisturbance, each particle of existing matter must be a register of\nall that has happened.\u2019\n\n197. But again, we are compelled to imagine (Art. 215) that what we\nsee has originated in the unseen, and in using this term, we desire\nto go back even further than the ether, which, according to one\nhypothesis (Art. 152), has given rise to the visible order of things.\nAnd again, we must resort to the unseen not only for the origin of\nthe molecules of the visible universe, but also for an explanation\nof the forces which animate these molecules (Art. 150), and not\nonly so, but we are always carried back from one order of the unseen\nto another (Art. 220). Now if this be the case\u2014if THE UNIVERSE be\nconstructed with successive orders of this description connected with\none another\u2014it is manifest that no event whatever, whether we regard\nits antecedent or its consequent, can possibly be confined to one\norder only, but must spread throughout THE ENTIRE UNIVERSE.\n\n198. To conclude: we are thus led to believe that there exists now\nan invisible order of things intimately connected with the present,\nand capable of acting energetically upon it\u2014for, in truth, the energy\nof the present system is to be looked upon as originally derived\nfrom the invisible universe, while the forces which give rise to\ntransmutations of energy probably take their origin in the same\nregion.\n\nAnd it appears to us to be more natural to imagine that a universe of\nthis nature, which we have reason to think exists, and is connected\nby bonds of energy with the visible universe, is also capable of\nreceiving energy from it, and of transforming the energy so received.\nIn fine, it appears to us less likely that by far the larger portion\nof the high-class energy of the present universe is travelling\noutwards into space with an immense velocity, than that it is being\ngradually transferred into an invisible order of things. This last\nconclusion is, however, more of the nature of a speculation, and is\nby no means essential to our argument.\n\n199. If we now turn to thought, we find, (Art. 59) that, inasmuch\nas it affects the substance of the present visible universe, it\nproduces a material organ of memory. But the motions which accompany\nthought must originate in and also affect the invisible order of\nthings, because in the first place the forces which cause those\nmotions are derived from the unseen, and because, secondly, the\nmotions themselves must act upon the unseen, and thus it follows,\nthat \u2018_Thought conceived to affect the matter of another universe\nsimultaneously with this may explain a future state_\u2019 (see Anagram,\n_Nature_, October 15, 1874).\n\n200. This idea, however, requires further development and\nexplanation. Let us therefore begin by supposing that we possess a\nframe, or the rudiments of a frame, connecting us with the invisible\nuniverse, which we may call the soul.\n\nNow each thought we think is accompanied by certain molecular motions\nand displacements in the brain, and parts of these, let us allow, are\nin some way stored up in that organ, so as to produce what may be\ntermed our material or physical memory. Other parts of these motions\nare, however, communicated to the invisible body, and are there\nstored up, forming a memory which may be made use of when that body\nis free to exercise its functions.\n\n201. Again, one of the arguments (Art. 84) which proves the existence\nof the invisible universe, demands that it shall be full of energy\nwhen the present universe is defunct. We can therefore very well\nimagine that after death, when the soul is free to exercise its\nfunctions, it may be replete with energy, and have eminently the\npower of action in the present, retaining also, as we have shown\nabove, a hold upon the past, inasmuch as the memory of past events\nhas been stored up in it, and thus preserving the two essential\nrequisites (Art. 61) of a continuous intelligent existence.\n\n202. The conception of an unseen universe is not a new one, even\namong men of science. The deservedly famous Dr. Thomas Young has the\nfollowing passage in his lectures on Natural Philosophy:\u2014\u2018Besides\nthis porosity, there is still room for the supposition, that even\nthe ultimate particles of matter may be permeable to the causes\nof attractions of various kinds, especially if those causes are\nimmaterial: nor is there anything in the unprejudiced study of\nphysical philosophy that can induce us to doubt the existence of\nimmaterial substances; on the contrary, we see analogies that lead\nus almost directly to such an opinion. The electrical fluid is\nsupposed to be essentially different from common matter; the general\nmedium of light and heat, according to some, or the principle of\ncaloric, according to others, is equally distinct from it. We see\nforms of matter, differing in subtility and mobility, under the names\nof solids, liquids, and gases; above these are the semi-material\nexistences, which produce the phenomena of electricity and magnetism,\nand either caloric or a universal ether. Higher still, perhaps, are\nthe causes of gravitation, and the immediate agents in attractions\nof all kinds, which exhibit some phenomena apparently still more\nremote from all that is compatible with material bodies. And of these\ndifferent orders of beings, the more refined and immaterial appear\nto pervade freely the grosser. It seems therefore natural to believe\nthat the analogy may be continued still further, until it rises into\nexistences absolutely immaterial and spiritual. We know not but that\nthousands of spiritual worlds may exist unseen for ever by human\neyes; nor have we any reason to suppose that even the presence of\nmatter, in a given spot, necessarily excludes these existences from\nit. Those who maintain that nature always teems with life, wherever\nliving beings can be placed, may therefore speculate with freedom on\nthe possibility of independent worlds; some existing in different\nparts of space, others pervading each other unseen and unknown,\nin the same space, and others again to which space may not be a\nnecessary mode of existence.\u2019\n\n203. It may now be desirable to reply by anticipation to certain\nobjections which are likely to be made to the theory we have\nproposed. Let us divide these into three categories\u2014religious,\ntheological, and scientific.\n\n_Objection First (Religious)._\u2014It may be said to us, \u2018Who are you who\nare wise beyond what is written? Are ye of them to whom it was said\nof old, \u201cEritis sicut Deus scientes bonum et malum\u201d? Beware of the\nwords of the great Apostle of the Gentiles:\u2014\u03a6\u03ac\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u1f76\n\u1f10\u03bc\u03c9\u03c1\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd.\u2019\n\n_Reply._\u2014As we have already said (Art. 50), we do not write for\nthose who are so assured of the truth of their religion that they\nare unable to entertain the smallest objection to it. We write for\nhonest inquirers\u2014for honest doubters, it may be;\u2014who desire to know\nwhat science, when allowed perfect liberty of thought, and loyally\nfollowed, has to say upon those points which so much concern us all.\nWe are content in this work to view the universe from the physical\nstandpoint; you may therefore perchance esteem us of the earth\nearthy; nevertheless we think that our strength lies in keeping up a\ncommunication with those verities which we all acknowledge.\n\n204. _Objection Second (Theological)._\u2014Your idea of the spiritual\nuniverse is analogous to that of Swedenborg, and we must therefore\ndismiss it as untrue, inasmuch as we cannot recognise the assumption\nof the spiritual body until after the resurrection.\n\n_Reply._\u2014All that we have done is to remove the scientific objection\nto a future state, supposed to be furnished by the principle of\nContinuity. We know nothing about the laws of this state, and\nconceive it to be quite possible, if otherwise likely, that the soul\nmay remain veiled or in abeyance until the resurrection. We maintain\nonly that we are logically constrained to admit the existence of\nsome frame or organ which is not of this earth, and which survives\ndissolution\u2014if we regard the principle of Continuity and the doctrine\nof a future state as both true. Besides, the analogy of Paul, in\nwhich the body of the believer at death is compared to a seed put\ninto the ground, not only implies some sort of continuity, but also\nexpresses his belief in a present spiritual body. _There is_, says\nthe apostle (observe, not _there shall be_), a spiritual body. Again\nthe same apostle tells us (2 Corinthians v. 1), \u2018That if our earthly\nhouse of this tabernacle were dissolved, we _have_ a building of God,\na house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens.\u2019\n\n205. _Objection Third (Theological)._\u2014Your argument will apply to\nthe brute creation as well as to man; now we cannot recognise the\nimmortality of the brutes.\n\n_Reply._\u2014As before stated, we know nothing about the laws of the\ninvisible universe, except that it is related by bonds of some kind,\npossibly of energy, to the present. All we have attempted has been\nto remove an objection to the doctrine of immortality which has\nbeen wrongly put forth as scientific, or at least as consistent with\nscientific knowledge.\n\n206. _Objection Fourth (Theological)._\u2014The reasoning you adopt being\nfounded on the law of continuity, seems to imply the development of\nman\u2019s frame from those of the inferior animals, and therefore by\nimplication contradicts the scriptural account of the creation and\nfall of man.\n\n_Reply._\u2014We cannot perceive that our reasoning is in the least degree\ninconsistent with the account of man\u2019s origin given in Scripture.\nThis account implies no doubt a peculiar operation of the invisible\nuniverse, but our reasoning compels us to look in this direction for\nthe origin of certain occurrences. Whether the production of man has\nbeen the occasion for a peculiar interposition of the unseen it is\nnot within our province to discuss. We can only say that we see no\nreason from our principles to question the view which asserts that\nman was made by a peculiar operation out of a pre-existent universe.\n\n207. _Objection Fifth (Theological)._\u2014The resurrection consistent\nwith your theory could not be a resurrection of the same particles as\nwere laid in the grave, and in this respect it would be dissimilar to\nthat of Christ.\n\n_Reply._\u2014A dissimilarity between the two exists under any theory, for\nthe body of Christ did not experience corruption, while the bodies of\nbelievers in Christ are manifestly dissolved by death.\n\n[We make the following suggestion with much hesitation.\n\nWhat we have to say is founded upon an exceedingly able work by\nEdward White, entitled _Life in Christ_, which has recently been\npublished, and from which we extract the following passage (page\n263):\u2014\n\n \u2018But the Saviour was Divine. As man, identified with human\n nature, He died, and His death became a sin-offering; as God He\n could not die. As man He was made \u201cunder the law;\u201d as God He was\n above the law laid on creatures.... He arose, therefore, as the\n Divine Conqueror of death, \u201cGod over all, blessed for evermore,\u201d\n and was thus \u201cdeclared to be the Son of God with power, according\n to the Spirit of holiness, by _His resurrection_ from the\n dead.\u201d\u2014Rom. i. 4. He rose, not \u201cin the likeness of sinful flesh;\u201d\n not \u201cunder the law,\u201d but in the character of the \u201cLord from\n heaven,\u201d \u201cour Lord and our God:\u201d\u2014not in the image of the \u201cson of\n Adam,\u201d but as the \u201cSon of the Highest,\u201d having delivered us from\n wrath by the death of His humanity, to endow us with immortality\n through the life of His Divinity. He was no longer \u201cthe man of\n sorrows,\u201d but The First and The Last and The Living One; no\n longer crowned with thorns, and clothed in a peasant\u2019s robe, but\n wearing the diadem of the Lord of the Universe, and shining with\n the supereminent splendours of the Godhead.\u2019\n\nIf then Christ died as man, and was reanimated in virtue of His\ndivinity, the analogy between Christ, who is the head, and believers,\nwho are His body, will be complete if we suppose that each believer\ndies as a man, but is raised up by virtue of the divinity of Christ,\nand inasmuch as the Head is not present here in His glorified bodily\nform, so it cannot be supposed that His members should at present\nassume that form.\n\nBut when Christ appears again upon earth we are told that His members\nbeing raised in what is termed the first resurrection will then\naccompany Him.\n\nAnd judging from S. Matthew (chap. xxvii. verse 52), something of\nthis kind, but of a partial nature, took place when Christ locally\nappeared, after His resurrection, in Jerusalem.\n\nIn fine, the true analogy between Christ and the believer should\nprevent us from supposing that while Christ is absent in His\nglorified body believers should nevertheless assume theirs.\n\nNow this delay implies the corruption of the believer\u2019s body, and\nrenders us unable to believe that the very same particles will be\nraised again as in the case of Christ. But surely no one can suppose,\nthat if moral and spiritual identity is secured, the mere material\nparticles can be of any consequence.]\n\n208. _Objection Sixth (Scientific)._\u2014If the general principles on\nwhich all material organisms are constructed are the same throughout\nthe world, is not this an argument by analogy that all such organisms\nhave a similar relation to the universe? On what principle then can\nimmortality be assumed to be possible for men while it is denied to\nbrutes?\n\n_Reply._\u2014When we speak of the general principles on which all\norganisms are constructed being the same, we mean that certain\nchemical and physical laws apply both to man and the brute creation.\nGravitation and chemical affinity are the same for both. There must\nalso be a similarity in tangible substance, inasmuch as both co-exist\nin the same visible world. In fine, there must be many points in\nwhich man is very similar in construction to the lower animals.\nThus each possesses nerves\u2014each has what may be termed delicacy of\nconstruction\u2014the frame of each possesses materials which will burn in\nthe fire. In fine, not only do strong similarities exist between all\nanimals, but there are also strong similarities between animals and\nvegetables. But what are the points of dissimilarity between man and\nthe lower animals? Is it not that the latter are utterly incapable\nof thinking thoughts such as those which form the present subject\nof discussion? In fine, the greatest difference between man and the\nlower animals is not so much in bodily structure as in style of\nthought. But each thought has no doubt (Art. 59) a concomitant in the\nbrain. Inasmuch therefore as the style of thought is very different\nin man and in the lower animals, the physical concomitants of thought\nmust be very different in the two cases. But this is the very region\ninto which science has been as yet utterly unable to penetrate. We\nhave, however, strong reason for supposing that in such a region the\nconcomitants of thought would prove to be very different in man and\nin the brutes. Thus the argument tells quite the other way; and we\nare entitled to say, that inasmuch as there are enormous practical\ndifferences in thought and the higher kinds of power between man and\nthe lower animals, so the scientifically perceivable concomitants of\nthese differences would (if we were able to examine them) be found\nextremely different in the two cases.\n\n209. _Objection Seventh (Scientific)._\u2014If there be, as you say,\nthis duality in the present human frame, how can the spiritual part\nremain latent so long as it does? Even if trammelled by the grosser\nsubstance, we might expect that at least on rare occasions it should\nsomehow manifest itself.\n\n_Reply._\u2014As a matter of fact we know that ordinary consciousness can\nremain latent or inactive for hours, if not for days, and then return\nto us again. There would be force in this objection if it were not\ntrue that consciousness is capable of entering into the dormant or\nquiescent state.\n\nAgain, it is possible that there have been and that there are\noccasional manifestations of this spiritual nature.\n\nFor, in the Christian records visible manifestations of the spiritual\nelement, even in this life, are asserted to have taken place on\nrare occasions. But if you have dismissed these manifestations as\ninconceivable, you cannot now bring their absence forward as an\nobjection.\n\n210. _Objection Eighth, (Scientific)._\u2014Your doctrine of immortality\ndoes violence to that great principle, the conservation of energy.\nFor it is manifest that if energy is transferred from the visible\ninto the invisible universe, its constancy in the present universe\ncan no longer be maintained.\n\n_Reply._\u2014In reply to this objection we may state that when we\nassert the conservation of energy it is as a principle applicable\nunder special limitations. For instance, it is only by assuming the\ncontinual passage through ether of a large portion of the energy of\nthe visible universe that the doctrine as at present held can be\nmaintained. Now the only addition that our theory suggests is the\ngradual carriage into the invisible universe of some part at least of\nthe energy of gross matter which is associated with thought. But is\neven this necessary? for this supposes thought to originate through\nthe matter of the visible universe, and then to affect the invisible.\n\nBut the reverse order of occurrences is quite as tenable, especially\nif we suppose with Le Sage that the forces which set in motion the\nmolecules of visible matter are derived from the unseen universe. It\nmay safely be said that our hypothesis is not upset, and never can be\nupset, by any experimental conclusion with regard to energy.\n\n211. _Objection Ninth (Scientific)._\u2014We cannot understand how\nindividuality is to be preserved in the spiritual world.\n\n_Reply._\u2014This is no new difficulty. We are as much puzzled by what\ntakes place in our present body as we can be with respect to the\nspiritual. Thus, let us allow that impressions are stored up in\nour brains, which thus form an order connecting us with the past\nof the visible universe. Now thousands, perhaps even millions, of\nsuch impressions pass into the same organ, and yet, by the operation\nof our will, we can concentrate our recollection upon a certain\nevent, and rummage out its details, along with all its collateral\ncircumstances, to the exclusion of everything else. But if the brain\nor something else plays such a wonderful part in the present economy,\nis it impossible to imagine that the universe of the future may\nhave even greater individualising powers? Is it not very hazardous\nto assert this or that mode of existence to be impossible in such a\nwonderful whole as we feel sure the universe must be?\n\n212. _Objection Tenth (Scientific)._\u2014Even if it be allowed that the\ninvisible universe receives energy from the present, so that the\nconservation of energy holds true as a principle, yet the dissipation\nof energy must hold true also, and although the process of decay may\nbe delayed by the storing up of energy in the invisible universe, it\ncannot be permanently arrested. Ultimately we must believe that every\npart of the whole universe will be equally supplied with energy, and\nin consequence all abrupt living motion will come to an end.\n\n_Reply._\u2014Perhaps the best reply to this objection is to say that the\nlaws of energy are rather generalisations derived from our experience\nthan scientific principles, like that which we call the _Principle\nof Continuity_. There would be no permanent confusion of thought\nintroduced if these laws should be found not to hold, or to hold in a\ndifferent way, in the unseen universe. Nor can we regard the law of\nthe Dissipation as equally fundamental with that of the Conservation\nof Energy. What is to prove it in the unseen? We have shown\n(Art. 112) how Clerk-Maxwell\u2019s demons (though essentially finite\nintelligences) could be made to restore energy even in the present\nuniverse without spending work. Much more may of course be expected\nin a universe free from gross matter.\n\n213. _Objection Eleventh (Quasi-Scientific.)_\u2014You speak of energy\nbeing transferred to the unseen, so as to store up for each\nindividual a record of his every thought. You have not shown, as you\nwere bound to do, how such transferred energy could be definitely\nlocalised in the unseen.\n\n_Reply._\u2014The obligation is entirely the other way. It is you\nwho are bound to show that such localisation is impossible. You\nquasi-scientific men assert that science disproves all such\nthings. We have shown that Continuity demands an infinite series\nof developments. These _may_ be either living or dead. But\nscientific analogy shows that they bear all the marks of intelligent\ndevelopments. How can there be any doubt or difficulty about our\nchoice under these circumstances? Obviously we cannot accept dead\nand yet intelligent developments. And although our evidence from\nanalogy may not amount to proof, it is very strong. Yet you objectors\nvirtually assert that you can show its impossibility. Do so, if you\ncan. Give us any proof of the impossibility of an organ connecting\nus with the unseen universe, or any analogy even apparently against\nit, and we shall be glad to receive and consider it. We have no doubt\nthat you will thus help us to strengthen our case. You forget that it\nis you who are the dogmatists\u2014you who assert that these things are\nincompatible with scientific knowledge, but who, strangely, do not\nbring forward any proofs of the truth of your assertions.\n\nBut in the present case, it so happens that, even with ordinary\nmatter, an infinitely extended medium could be constructed (as\nClerk-Maxwell has shown), such that all rays diverging from any\npoint of it whatever shall be brought accurately to a focus at\nanother definite point; every point of space having thus its definite\nconjugate.\n\n214. Having replied to these objections, let us now endeavour to\nrealise our present position. It is briefly as follows:\u2014What we have\ndone is to show that a future state is possible, and to demolish any\nso-called scientific objection that might be raised against it. The\nevidence in favour of the doctrine is not derived from us. It comes\nto us from two sources: in the first place, from the statements\nmade concerning Christ; and, in the second place, from that intense\nlonging for immortality which civilised man has invariably possessed.\nThe case stands thus: certain evidence from these two sources in\nfavour of our doctrine has been adduced, but scientific objections\nhave been raised against the possibility of the doctrine itself,\nand these we have attempted to overcome. But while we may suppose\nthe scientific objections to the doctrine itself surmounted, there\nyet remains an equally strong scientific objection to that portion\nof the evidence in favour of the doctrine which is derived from\nthe Christian records. \u2018Granting,\u2019 it may be said to us, \u2018that\nimmortality is possible, what reason have we, beyond certain vague\nyearnings, for believing it likely? No doubt, if Christ rose from the\ndead, the probability in favour of it would be very strong; but we\nhave an objection to the assumed fact of the resurrection of Christ\nno less formidable than that which you have overcome with regard to\nthe doctrine of immortality itself.\u2019\n\n215. We must now proceed to examine the validity of this objection,\nand in so doing we find it convenient to approach the problem of the\nuniverse not from the side of the future but from that of the past.\n\nWe have already (Art. 85) defined the principle of Continuity, in\nvirtue of which we believe ourselves entitled to discuss every event\nwhich occurs in the universe, without one single exception, and to\ndeduce from it, if we can, the condition of things that preceded the\nevent\u2014this being also in the universe. We have likewise given reasons\nfor believing that the visible universe must have had a beginning in\ntime, and it may be desirable to recapitulate these here. In the\nfirst place, it is generally allowed by men of science that atoms\nform the stuff or substance out of which the visible universe is\nbuilt. Why, then, it is asked by the materialists, cannot we suppose\nthese atoms to be infinite in number, in which case, as far as\nenergy is concerned, we may very well suppose this universe to last\nfrom eternity to eternity; and if in addition we may conceive these\neternally existing atoms to be in some sense alive, have we not here\na hypothesis which will explain the continuous life of the universe\nas well as its continuous energy?\n\nLet us in the meantime reply to the first statement in the\nhypothesis, reserving that part of it which concerns life for a\nfuture occasion (Art. 240).\n\nOur objection to regarding the visible universe as having endured\nfrom eternity is threefold. In the first place, this hypothesis,\nto be tenable, assumes the infinity of the visible universe.\nThis, however, is a pure assumption. We may not be able to prove\nthe contrary, but we perceive no reason why the visible universe\nshould be regarded as infinite. No doubt, if scientific principle\nimperatively demanded the eternity of the present visible universe,\nwe should be compelled to acknowledge its infinity as a consequence;\nbut we shall see presently that scientific principle leads quite in\nthe opposite direction. So that the weakness of the hypothesis in\nquestion is, that while it is contrary to scientific principle it\nlikewise assumes the infinity of the visible universe, which is a\npure assumption.\n\nOur second objection is that, in virtue of the principle of\nContinuity, we are compelled to believe in the infinite depth of\nnature, and hold that, just as we must imagine space and duration\nto be infinite, so must we imagine the structural complexity of the\nuniverse to be infinite also. To our minds it appears no less false\nto pronounce eternal _that aggregation we call the atom_, than it\nwould be to pronounce eternal (Art. 85) _that aggregation we call the\nsun_. All this follows from the principle of Continuity, in virtue\nof which we make scientific progress in the knowledge of things, and\nwhich leads us, whatever state of things we contemplate, to look for\nits antecedent in some previous state of things also in the Universe.\n\nOur third objection is that which we have stated in Art. 163. It\narises from the belief that the dissipation of the energy of the\nvisible universe proceeds _pari passu_ with the aggregation of mass,\nand therefore that since the large masses of the visible universe are\nof finite size, we are sure that the process cannot have been going\non for ever, or, in other words, the visible universe must have had\nits origin in time.\n\n216. Let us therefore apply to that stupendous event, the production\nof the visible universe, not irreverently, but in hopeful trust, the\nprinciple of Continuity, and ask ourselves the question, What state\nof things also in the universe, what conceivable antecedent can have\ngiven rise to this unparalleled phenomenon\u2014an antecedent, we need\nhardly say, which must have operated from the invisible universe?\nIt is a great and awful phenomenon, but we must not shrink before\nsize; we must not be terrified by the magnitude of the event out of\nreliance upon our principles of discussion.\n\nNow, if we regard the appearance of the visible universe, and\napproach it as we would any other phenomenon, we have only two\nalternatives before us. Creation is not one of these, inasmuch as we\nare carried by such an act out of the universe altogether. We are,\ntherefore, driven to look to some kind of development as the cause of\nthe appearance of the visible universe. This development may either\nhave been through the living or through the dead; either it was the\nresult of a natural operation of the invisible universe, or it was\nbrought about by means of intelligence residing in that universe\nand working through its laws. To determine which of these two\nalternatives is the more admissible, we must bear in mind the nature\nof the production, and argue about it just as we should argue about\nanything else.\n\n217. Now, this production was, as far as we can judge, a sporadic\nor abrupt act, and the substance produced, that is to say the atoms\nwhich form the material substratum of the present universe, bear (as\nHerschel and Clerk-Maxwell have well said) from their uniformity of\nconstitution all the marks of being manufactured articles.\n\nWhether we regard the various elementary atoms as separate\nproductions, or (according to Prout and Lockyer) view them as\nproduced by the coming together of some smaller kind of primordial\natom\u2014in either case, and even specially so in the latter case, we\nthink that they look like manufactured articles. Indeed, we have\nalready shown (Art. 164) that development without life, that is\nto say dead development, does not tend to produce uniformity of\nstructure in the products which it gives rise to.\n\n218. Thus the argument is in favour of the production of the visible\nuniverse by means of an intelligent agency residing in the invisible\nuniverse.\n\nBut again let us realise the position in which we are placed by the\nprinciple of Continuity\u2014we are led by it not only to regard the\ninvisible universe as having existed before the present one, but the\nsame principle drives us to acknowledge its existence in some form as\na universe from all eternity. Now we can readily conceive a universe\ncontaining conditioned intelligent beings to have existed before the\npresent; nay, to have existed for a time greater than any assignable\ntime, which is the only way in which our thoughts can approach the\neternal. But is it equally easy to conceive a dead universe to have\nexisted in the same way during immeasurable ages? Is a dead universe\na fully conditioned universe? For, regarding the laws of the universe\nas those laws according to which the intelligences of the universe\nare conditioned by the Governor thereof, can we conceive a dead\nuniverse to exist permanently without some being to be conditioned?\nIs not this something without meaning, an unreality\u2014a make-believe?\nAnd if it be said that under these circumstances the conception in\nany form of immeasurable ages of time is unreal, we may reply by\ngranting it, and asserting that in such a case we are driven not\nmerely from the fully conditioned to the partially conditioned,\nbut even to the unconditioned; in other words, the hypothesis of\na permanently dead universe would hardly appear to satisfy the\nprinciple of Continuity, which prefers to proceed from one form of\nthe fully conditioned to another. Nor is the difficulty removed by\nthe hypothesis that the matter of the unseen universe was always in\nsome simple sense alive, and that the motions of its various elements\nwere always accompanied with a very simple species of consciousness,\nmuch more simple and rudimentary than any life that we know of here.\nFor to this it may be replied, how is it possible to conceive that\nlife has remained in this rudimentary form through a past eternity,\nand only developed into intelligence since the production of the\nvisible universe?\n\n219. For the benefit of our readers we shall now endeavour to review\nas clearly as we can the point at which we have arrived, and the\nsteps which have brought us to it.\n\nIt will be remembered that in our definition (Art. 54) we agreed to\nlook upon the Creator\u2014the Absolute One, as conditioning the universe,\nconfining the term universe to that which is conditioned. Thus we\nconceive a stone to be in the universe, we conceive a man to be in\nthe universe, and to work in it, but we conceive Absolute Deity to\nbe above the universe rather than to work in it in any way analogous\nto that in which a man works in it. Would there not be a confusion\nof thought if we regarded the same Person as conditioning and yet\nconditioned? Now, what the principle of Continuity demands is an\nendless development of the conditioned. We claim it as the heritage\nof intelligence that there shall be an endless vista, reaching from\neternity to eternity, in each link of which we shall be led only from\none form of the conditioned to another, never from the conditioned to\nthe unconditioned or absolute, which would be to us no better than\nan impenetrable intellectual barrier. It has also been seen that in\nthis endless chain of conditioned existence we cannot be satisfied\nwith a make-believe universe, or one consisting only of dead matter,\nbut prefer a living intelligent universe, in other words, one\nfully conditioned. Finally, our argument has led us to regard the\nproduction of the visible universe as brought about by an intelligent\nagency residing in the unseen.\n\n220. We have arrived at this result from general principles, and\nwithout any definite theory as to the _modus operandi_ of the\nintelligent developing agency which resides in the unseen universe.\nWhen we keep to well-ascertained principles we are on solid ground,\nbut when we speculate on the method by which the development is\naccomplished we enter a very different region, where the chances are\ngreatly against our particular hypothesis representing the truth.\nNevertheless, _for the sake of bringing our ideas in a concrete form\nbefore the reader, and for this purpose only_, we will now adopt a\ndefinite hypothesis.[59] Let us begin by supposing an intelligent\nagent in the present visible universe,\u2014that is to say a man\u2014to be\ndeveloping vortex-rings\u2014smoke-rings, let us imagine. Now, these\nsmoke-rings are found to act upon one another, just as if they were\nthings or existences; nevertheless their existence is ephemeral, they\nlast only a few seconds. But let us imagine them to constitute the\ngrossest possible form of material existence. Now, each smoke-ring\nhas in it a multitude of smaller particles of air and smoke, each of\nthese particles being the molecules of which the present visible\nuniverse is composed. These molecules are of a vastly more refined\nand delicate organisation than the large smoke-ring; they have lasted\nmany millions of years, and will perhaps last many millions more.\nNevertheless, let us imagine that they had a beginning, and that they\nwill also come to an end similar to that of the smoke-ring. In fact,\njust as the smoke-ring was developed out of ordinary molecules, so\nlet us imagine ordinary molecules to be developed as vortex-rings\nout of something much finer and more subtle than themselves, which\nwe have agreed to call the invisible universe. But we may pursue the\nsame train of thought still further back, and imagine the entities\nwhich constitute the invisible universe immediately preceding ours to\nbe in themselves ephemeral, although not nearly to the same extent as\nthe atoms of our universe, and to have been formed in their turn as\nvortex-rings out of some still subtler and more enduring substance.\nIn fine, there is no end to such a process, but we are led on from\nrank to rank of the order imagined by Dr. Thomas Young, or by\nProfessor Jevons, when he says that \u2018the smallest particle of solid\nsubstance may consist of a vast number of systems united in regular\norder, each bounded by the other, communicating with it in some\nmanner yet wholly incomprehensible.\u2019 Our meaning will be made clear\nby the following diagram.\n\nHere (0) denotes the evanescent smoke-ring, (1) the visible universe,\n(2) the invisible universe immediately anterior to the present, (3)\nthat of the next order, and so on.\n\nAgain, (0) is developed out of (1); (1) is developed out of (2); (2)\nout of (3); (3) out of (4), and so on. Further, (1) both precedes and\nfollows (0) in point of duration, while (2) bears a similar relation\nto (1), (3) to (2), and so on.\n\n[Illustration: (Five concentric rings marked 0 to 4)]\n\nAgain, the material substance of (0) is a phenomenon of that of (1),\nthat of (1) a phenomenon of that of (2), and so on. Go back as far\nas we choose, we are only led from one phenomenon to another; so\nthat, as far as their essential nature is concerned, all are equally\nphenomenal, and the mind cannot repose in any order as its ultimate\nhaven of thought, but is driven inexorably forward to look for\nsomething different.\n\nWe see too, that, as far as energy is concerned, that of (1) is\ngreater than that of (0), inasmuch as (1) develops (0), that of\n(2) greater than that of (1), inasmuch as (2) develops (1), and so\non. Therefore, if we go infinitely far back, we shall be led to a\nuniverse possessing infinite energy, and of which the intelligent\ndeveloping agency possesses infinite energy.\n\nIt will also be seen that, inasmuch as all these various orders exist\ntogether at the present moment, the energy of their sum must be\ninfinite, and this energy will never come to an end. In other words,\nthe Great Whole is infinite in energy, and will last from eternity to\neternity.\n\n[If merely to prevent, in future, the possibility of a mistake\nwhich has already been made by some of our critics, including even\nProfessor Clifford, it may be well to sketch here very briefly\nanother and quite different concrete illustration of our idea.\n\nJust as points are the terminations of lines, lines the boundaries of\nsurfaces, and surfaces the boundaries of portions of space of three\ndimensions:\u2014so we may suppose our (essentially three-dimensional)\nmatter to be the mere skin or boundary of an Unseen whose matter\nhas _four_ dimensions. And, just as there is a peculiar molecular\ndifference between the surface-film and the rest of a mass of\nliquid\u2014wherever such a surface-film exists, even in the smallest\nair-bubble\u2014so the matter of our present universe may be regarded as\nproduced by mere rents or cracks in that of the Unseen. But this may\nitself consist of four-dimension boundaries of the five-dimensional\nmatter of a higher Unseen, and so on. We might even try to explain\nby this how it is that so very little of the nature of definite\ndescription of the Unseen is given, even by a learned man like\nPaul\u2014for the notion of four dimensions would have been totally\nunintelligible to any one eighteen hundred years ago. And just as\nhe says he heard in the third heaven \u2018unspeakable words which it is\nnot possible for a man to utter,\u2019 so he may have seen things which\nlanguage was incompetent to describe. But on this hypothesis, as\non the former, reflection leads us to the ultimate conception of\nan infinite series of Universes, each depending on another, and\npossessing of course among them an infinite store of energy.]\n\nBefore concluding this article we would desire to reply to two\nobjections which have been made to our book. It has been alleged by\nsome that we advocate the doctrine of the past eternity of stuff or\nmaterial. We therefore take this opportunity of stating that the\nPrinciple of Continuity as upheld by us has reference solely to the\nintellectual faculties. We are led, for instance, by this principle\nto assert that the process of production of the visible universe must\nhave been of such a nature as to be comprehensible more or less to\nthe higher intelligences of the universe.\n\nBut we are not led to assert the eternity of stuff or matter, for\nthat would denote an unauthorised application to the invisible\nuniverse of the experimental law of the conservation of matter, which\nbelongs entirely to the present system of things. Again, it has been\nobjected that we advocate an ethereal future state. To this we reply\nthat our principles do not lead us to assert that the ether must\nplay some important part in our future bodies, for our knowledge\nof things is vastly too limited to enable us to come to any such\nconclusion.\n\n221. Let us here pause for a moment and consider the position into\nwhich science has brought us. We are led by scientific logic to an\nunseen, and by scientific analogy to the spirituality of this unseen.\nIn fine, our conclusion is, that the visible universe has been\ndeveloped by an intelligence resident in the Unseen.\n\nOf the nature of this intelligent agency we are profoundly ignorant\nas far as Science is concerned. So far as Science can inform us, it\nmay consist of a multitude of beings, as the Gnostics have supposed,\nor of one Supreme Intelligence, as is generally believed by the\nfollowers of Christ. As scientific men we are absolutely ignorant of\nthe subject. Nor can we easily conceive information to be attainable\nexcept by means of some trustworthy communication between the beings\nresident in the Unseen and ourselves. It is absolutely and utterly\nhopeless to expect any light on this point from mere scientific\nreasoning. Can scientific reasoning tell us what kind of life we\nshall find in the interior of Africa, or in New Guinea, or at the\nNorth Pole, before explorers have been there, and if this be so, is\nit not utterly absurd to imagine that we can know anything regarding\nthe spiritual inhabitants of the unseen, unless we either go to them\nor they come to us?\n\nIt is therefore of supreme importance for us to know whether there\nhas been any such communication. It would be affectation in us not to\nsay that if there be any such trustworthy communication, we believe\nit will be found in the Christian records.\n\nIt has been said to us by our critics, \u2018What have you to do with\nthese records?\u2019 To this we reply, Not perhaps so much as a professed\ntheologian, but still something.\n\nThere is a well-known record, which claims to give us the history\nof a communication with the spiritual intelligences of the unseen.\nIf true, it must of course teach us many things which science is\nutterly incompetent to reveal. Nevertheless it is the object of\nthis book to prove that science alone gives us by logic and analogy\ncombined a certain insight into this most interesting and mysterious\nregion. Working our way upwards, we have reached by the principle\nof Continuity certain regions. Working their way downwards, the\nChristian records have reached these same regions of thought. Now\nif our scientific logic be correct, and if the Christian records be\ntrustworthy, we should expect the two accounts of this common region\nto be consistent with one another.\n\nLet us here therefore inquire what the Christian records say\nregarding this mysterious, infinitely energetic, intelligent\ndeveloping agency residing _in_ the universe, and therefore in some\nsense conditioned, to which we have been led by scientific analogy.\n\n222. These records, as they are interpreted by the majority of the\ndisciples of Christ, are believed to lead to a conception of the\nGodhead, in which there is a plurality of persons but a unity of\nsubstance. It ought, however, to be remembered that here the word\n_person_ does not mean the same thing as it does when applied to\nourselves, but only denotes some distinction which may be regarded as\nbest expressed by this word. _Our_ idea of person or individual is\nderived solely from our experience in the position which we occupy in\nthe universe.\n\nThe first Person in this Trinity, God the Father, is represented as\nthe unapproachable Creator\u2014the Being in virtue of whom all things\nexist.\n\nThus it is said (John i. 18), \u2018No man hath seen God at any time;\nthe only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath\ndeclared him.\u2019\n\nAgain, Paul tells us (Rom. xi. 36), \u2018For of him and through him and\nto him are all things.\u2019 Also (1 Cor. viii. 6), \u2018But to us there is\nbut one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we to him (\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd); and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by\nhim.\u2019\n\nAlso (Eph. iv. 6), \u2018One God and Father of all, who is above all, and\nthrough all, and in all.\u2019 Also (1 Timothy vi. 16), \u2018Who only hath\nimmortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto;\nwhom no man hath seen, nor can see.\u2019\n\n223. Again, of the second Person of the Trinity we are told, in\naddition to what we gather from the expressions just quoted (John i.\n1), \u2018In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and\nthe Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things\nwere made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was\nmade.\u2019\n\nAgain (2 Cor. v. 10): \u2018For we must all appear before the judgment\nseat of Christ.\u2019\n\nAgain (Col. i. 15): \u2018Who is the image of the invisible God, the\nfirst-born of every creature: for in him were all things created that\nare in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether\nthey be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers.\u2019\n\nAgain (Heb. i. 1): \u2018God, who at sundry times, and in divers manners,\nspoke in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these\nlast days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of\nall things, by whom also he made the worlds.\u2019\n\n224. It is, we believe, a prevalent idea among theologians that\nthese passages indicate, in the first place, the existence of an\nunapproachable Creator\u2014the unconditioned One who is spoken of as God\nthe Father; and that they also indicate the existence of another\nBeing of the same substance as the Father, but different in person,\nwho has agreed to develop the will of the Father, and thus in some\nmysterious sense to submit to conditions and to enter into the\nuniverse.[60] The relation of this Being to the Father is expressed\nin Hebrews[61] in the words of the Psalmist, \u2018Then said I, Lo, I\ncome: in the volume of the book it is written of me, I delight to do\nthy will, O my God: yea, thy law is within my heart.\u2019 In fine, such\na Being would represent that conditioned, yet infinitely powerful\ndeveloping agent, to which the universe, objectively considered,\nappears to lead up. His work is twofold, for, in the first place, he\ndevelops the various universes or orders of being; and secondly, in\nsome mysterious way He becomes Himself the type and pattern of each\norder, the representative of Deity, so far as the beings of that\norder can comprehend, especially manifesting such divine qualities as\ncould not otherwise be intelligibly presented to their minds.\n\nSuch a being is therefore, in virtue of His office, the King of\nangels and ruler of the invisible universe, and to him the term Lord\nin the poem of Job is supposed to apply (Job i. 6): \u2018Now there was a\nday when the Sons of God came to present themselves before the Lord,\nand Satan came also among them.\u2019\n\n225. It would thus appear that what may be termed the Christian\ntheory of development has a twofold aspect, a descent and an\nascent; the descent of the Son of God through the various grades of\nexistence, and the consequent ascent of the intelligences of each led\nup by him to a higher level,\u2014a stooping on the part of the developing\nBeing, in order that there may be a mounting up on the part of the\ndeveloped. Thus it is said (John iii. 13), \u2018And no man hath ascended\nup to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man\nwhich is in heaven.\u2019 Again (Eph. iv. 9): \u2018Now that he ascended, what\nis it but that he also descended first into the lower parts of the\nearth? He that descended is the same also that ascended up far above\nall heavens, that he might fill all things.\u2019\n\n226. It is naturally in accordance with these views that the Angelic\nHost should be represented as taking an intelligent interest, even\nif they did not, as the Gnostics thought, take an active part, in\nthe creation of the visible universe. Thus the Lord is represented\nas asking Job (Job xxxviii. 4), \u2018Where wast thou when I laid the\nfoundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding.\nWho hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who\nhath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations\nthereof fastened? or who laid the corner-stone thereof, when the\nmorning-stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?\u2019\n\n227. It is also in accordance with these views that the same\nhierarchy should take an intelligent interest in the life of Christ.\nThus we read (Luke ii. 13), \u2018And suddenly there was with the angel a\nmultitude of the heavenly host praising God, and saying, Glory to God\nin the highest, and on earth peace, good-will toward men.\u2019 And again\n(1 Timothy iii. 16): \u2018And without controversy great is the mystery of\ngodliness: God was manifest in the flesh, justified in the Spirit,\nseen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the world,\nreceived up into glory.\u2019\n\n228. It will be remarked that the views which we have now put before\nour readers have been developed more especially from the objective\npoint of view, and that our reasoning has been founded on the\nprinciple of Continuity as applied to the outward universe. In truth\nwe seem to get a much firmer and more tangible hold on the objective\nelement of the universe, that is to say, on energy (Art. 103), than\nwe can on intelligence and life. For if we approach our individual\nconsciousness it is very manifest that we have no well-founded\nprinciple wherewith to guide our speculations similar to the\nprinciple of Continuity; for this, if we had it, would at once inform\nus whether the doctrine of immortality is true or false.\n\nWe know very well that the universe will remain after we are laid\nin the grave, but some of us are not equally certain whether we\nourselves shall then continue to exist.\n\nThus there appears to be a difficulty which we see at present no\nmeans of surmounting in dealing with individual consciousness. But\nwhile the continuance of individual life is enveloped in mystery,\nit is believed that we have obtained hold of a general principle\nregarding the distribution of life not greatly inferior in breadth\nand generality to the law of Continuity. We mean the principle\nthat life proceeds from life, or, to speak more accurately, that a\nconditioned living thing proceeds only from a conditioned living\nthing. That dead matter cannot produce a living organism is the\nuniversal experience of the most eminent physiologists.[62] In\nfact, the law of Biogenesis is justly regarded by Professor Huxley\nand others as the great principle underlying all the phenomena of\norganised existence.\n\nProfessor Roscoe, again, approaching the subject from the chemical\npoint of view, says, speaking of red blood corpuscles, \u2018We have not\nbeen able, and the evidence at present rather goes to show that there\nis not much hope of our being able, to construct these granules\nartificially; and the question is in this position, that so far as\nscience has progressed at present we have not been able to obtain\nany organism without the intervention of some sort of previously\nexisting germ.\u2019\n\n229. If we assume the truth of this principle it appears to lead us\ndirectly to infer that life is not merely a species of energy, or\na phenomenon of matter. For we have seen (Art. 103) that the great\ncharacteristic of all energy is its transmutability\u2014its Protean power\nof passing from one form to another. We may no doubt produce large\nquantities of electricity by means of an electrified nucleus, but we\ncan do the same without any such nucleus\u2014we can make unlimited steel\nmagnets by the help of one piece of loadstone, but we can do this\neven more effectually by means of a galvanic battery\u2014we may produce\nfire from a spark, but we can obtain it without a spark.\n\nLife, however, can be produced from life only, and this law would\nseem to give an indication that the solution of the mystery is not\nto be found by considering life as merely a species of energy. It is\nsome time since we gave up the idea that life could generate energy;\nit now seems that we must give up the idea that energy can generate\nlife.\n\n230. In preceding chapters we have given our readers a sketch of the\nmethods according to which men of science imagine that evolution has\nbeen carried out in the universe of energy and in that of life. In\nboth worlds the principle of Continuity requires that in endeavouring\nto account for the origin of phenomena we shall not resort to the\nhypothesis of separate creations, that we shall not pass over from\nthe conditioned to the unconditioned; and Darwin, Wallace, and\ntheir followers have, as we have shown, endeavoured to prove that\nprocesses still pursued by nature are sufficient in a great measure,\nif not entirely, to account for the present development of organised\nexistence without the necessity of resorting to separate creations.\nDarwin especially imagines that all the present organisms, including\nman, may have been derived by the process of natural selection from\na single primordial germ. When, however, the backward process has\nreached this germ, an insuperable difficulty presents itself. How was\nthis germ produced? All really scientific experience tells us that\nlife can be produced from a living antecedent only; what then was the\nantecedent of this germ? Hypotheses have no doubt been started, but\nwe cannot regard them in any other light than as an acknowledgment of\na difficulty which cannot be overcome. We appear to have reached an\nimpenetrable barrier similar to that which stood in our way when we\ncontemplated the production of the visible universe. And precisely\nas we felt compelled by the logic of scientific process to deal with\nthis first barrier, so we must likewise assert for ourselves with\nbecoming reverence a similar freedom of action in dealing with the\nsecond. Therefore, if life be one of the things of the universe,\nif the assumption of a creation of life in time be inadmissible,\nand if it be contrary to all experience to allow the possibility\nof the production of life from antecedents not possessing life,\nwe are entitled, even in such a case as the present, to make use\nof this conclusion derived from experience, and are thus forced\nto contemplate an antecedent possessing life and giving life to\nthis primordial germ,\u2014an antecedent in the universe, not out of\nit,\u2014conditioned, not unconditioned. Now, what is the meaning of this\nconclusion? In the first place, it does not mean that the antecedent\nto the primordial germ must be a like germ, for we know from\nexperience that while life is always produced from life, like is by\nno means always produced from like. In this case more especially the\nliving antecedent must be in the invisible universe, and therefore\naltogether different from the germ.\n\n231. If we now turn once more to the Christian system, we find that\nit recognises such an antecedent as an agent in the universe. He is\nstyled the Lord, and Giver of Life. The third Person of the Trinity\nis regarded in this system as working in the universe, and therefore\nin some sense as conditioned. One of His functions consists in\ndistributing and developing this principle of life, which we are\nforced to regard as one of the things of the universe; just as the\nsecond Person of the Trinity is regarded as developing the objective\nphenomena of the universe. Thus one has entered from everlasting into\nthe universe, in order to develop it objectively, while the other has\nalso entered from everlasting into the universe, in order to develop\nits subjective elements, life and intelligence.\n\nThus we read (Gen. i. 2), \u2018And the earth was without form, and void;\nand darkness was upon the face of the deep: and the Spirit of God\nmoved upon the face of the waters;\u2019 implying, we may imagine, a\npeculiar operation of this Spirit preceding the advent of life into\nthe world. Again, when in the fulness of time, Christ, the developing\nagent, made His appearance here, and submitted to the trammels of\na human nature, this appearance was preceded by an operation of the\nsame Spirit.\n\n232. It may here be desirable to discuss somewhat fully the position\nof life in the universe, as we are constrained to view it in virtue\nof the scientifically established principles of biogenesis.\n\nIf then the matter of this present visible universe be not capable of\nitself, that is to say, in virtue of the forces and qualities with\nwhich it has been endowed, of generating life; but if we must look\nto the unseen universe for the origin of life, this would appear to\nshow that the peculiar collocation of matter which accompanies the\noperations of life is not a mere grouping of particles of the visible\nuniverse, but implies likewise some peculiarity in the connection\nof these with the unseen universe. May it not denote in fact some\npeculiarity of structure extending to the unseen?\n\nIn fine, to go a step further, may not life denote a peculiarity\nof structure which is handed over not merely from one stage to\nanother\u2014from the invisible to the visible\u2014but which rises upwards\nfrom the very lowest structural depths of the material of the\nuniverse, this material being regarded as possessed of an infinitely\ncomplex structure such as we have pictured to our readers in a\nprevious part of this chapter (Art. 220).\n\nIf we suppose any such peculiarity to accompany life we cannot fail\nat once to see the impossibility of its originating in the visible\nuniverse alone.\n\n233. Again, it is well known to many of our readers that discussions\nhave frequently arisen regarding the peculiar place and function of\nlife in the universe. What is its relation to energy? it certainly\ndoes not create energy\u2014what then does it do?\n\nOne way of replying to this question is indicated in the following\npassage, which we quote at length from an article on \u2018The Atomic\nTheory of Lucretius,\u2019 in the _North British Review_ for March 1868:\u2014\n\n \u2018It is a principle of mechanics that a force acting at right\n angles to the direction in which a body is moving does no work,\n although it may continually and continuously alter the direction\n in which the body moves. No power, no energy, is required to\n deflect a bullet from its path, provided the deflecting force\n acts always at right angles to that path....\n\n \u2018If you believe in free-will and in atoms, you have two courses\n open to you. The first alternative may be put as follows:\n Something which is not atoms must be allowed an existence, and\n must be supposed capable of acting on the atoms. The atoms may,\n as Democritus believed, build up a huge mechanical structure,\n each wheel of which drives its neighbour in one long inevitable\n sequence of causation; but you may assume that beyond this\n ever-grinding wheelwork there exists a power not subject to but\n partly master of the machine; you may believe that man possesses\n such a power, and if so, no better conception of the manner of\n its action could be devised than the idea of its deflecting the\n atoms in their onward path to the right or left of that line in\n which they would naturally move. The will, if it so acted, would\n add nothing sensible to nor take anything sensible from the\n energy of the universe. The modern believer in free-will will\n probably adopt this view, which is certainly consistent with\n observation, although not proved by it. Such a power of moulding\n circumstances, of turning the torrent to the right, where it\n shall fertilise, or to the left, where it shall overwhelm, but\n in nowise of arresting the torrent, adding nothing to it, taking\n nothing from it,\u2014such is precisely the apparent action of man\u2019s\n will; and though we must allow that possibly the deflecting\n action does but result from some smaller subtler stream of\n circumstance, yet if we may trust to our direct perception of\n free-will, the above theory, involving a power in man beyond that\n of atoms, would probably be our choice....\n\n \u2018We cannot hope that natural science will ever lend the least\n assistance towards answering the Free-will and Necessity\n question. The doctrines of the indestructibility of matter and\n of the conservation of energy seem at first sight to help the\n Necessitarians, for they might argue that if free-will acts\n it must add something to or take something from the physical\n universe, and if experiment shows that nothing of the kind\n occurs, away goes free-will; but this argument is worthless,\n for if mind or will simply deflects matter as it moves, it may\n produce all the consequences claimed by the Wilful school, and\n yet it will neither add energy nor matter to the universe.\u2019\n\n234. Now there appears to us to be a very serious objection to\nthis mode of regarding the position of life, unless it be somewhat\nmodified. Let us take one of the visible masses of this present\nuniverse, such as a planet. Suppose for a moment that instead of\nbeing attracted to a fixed and visible centre of force such as\nthe sun, it is bound to an invisible and vagrant centre, the only\ncondition imposed upon whose irregularities is that it shall always\nmove in such a manner that there shall be neither creation nor\ndestruction of energy.\n\nWe have only to imagine for a moment such a universe in order to\nrealise the inextricable confusion into which its intelligent\ninhabitants would be plunged by the operation of a viewless and\nunaccountable agency of this nature. No doubt the hypothesis\nregarding life, which we have quoted above, limits this mode of\naction to the molecular motions of matter, but if our line of\nargument has been followed throughout, the reader will probably\nacknowledge that the superior intelligences of the universe may\nhave the same appretiation of molecular motions that we have of\nthose of large masses. Now they would in turn be put to inextricable\nconfusion by the advent of an unperceivable, and, from the nature of\nthe case, irresponsible force entitled _will_ operating towards the\ndeflection of these molecular motions, even although the energy of\nthe universe should remain the same. We think that Professor Huxley\nand some others who have opposed this mode of regarding the position\nof life have been somewhat unjustly blamed. They have driven the\noperation of the mystery called life or will out of the objective\nuniverse, out of that portion of things which is capable of being\nscientifically studied by intelligence, and in so doing they have\nmost assuredly done right. The mistake made (whether by this party or\nby their adversaries) lies in imagining that by such a process they\ncompletely get rid of a thing so driven before them, and that it thus\ndisappears from the universe altogether. It does no such thing. It\nmerely disappears from that small circle of light which we may call\nthe universe of scientific perception.\n\nBut the greater the circle of light (to adopt the words of Dr.\nChalmers), the greater the circumference of darkness, and the mystery\nwhich has been driven before us looms in the darkness that surrounds\nthis circle, growing more mysterious and more tremendous as the\ncircumference is increased. In fine, we have already remarked that\nthe position of the scientific man is to clear a space before him\nfrom which all mystery shall be driven away, and in which there shall\nbe nothing but matter and energy subject to certain definite laws\nwhich he can comprehend. There are however three great mysteries\n(a trinity of mysteries) which elude, and will for ever elude, his\ngrasp, and these will persistently hover around the border of this\ncleared and illuminated circle,\u2014they are the mystery of the soul\u2019s\ndomicile, in other words, of the universe objectively viewed; the\nmystery of life and intelligence; and the mystery of God,\u2014and these\nthree are one.\n\n235. But in this latter statement we have transgressed the limits of\nour inquiry, and are content to be driven back. Suffice it to say\nthat these three gigantic mysteries will persistently hover around\nthe illuminated circle, or, to speak more properly, the illuminated\nsphere of scientific thought, of which duration, extension, and\nstructural complexity may be regarded as the three independent\nco-ordinates in terms of each of which the process of development\ngoes on simultaneously as the boundary of the sphere is enlarged.\n\nWithin this sphere we have only that which can be grasped by Physical\nScience, but we are not therefore to infer that matter and the laws\nof matter have a reality and a permanence denied to intelligence.\n\nIt is rather because they are at the bottom of the list\u2014are in fact\nthe simplest and lowest of the three\u2014that they are capable of being\nmost readily grasped by the finite intelligences of the universe.\nThe following words of Professor Stokes, in his presidential address\nto the British Association at Exeter, occur to us as very clearly\nembodying this thought:\u2014\n\n \u2018Admitting to the full as highly probable, though not completely\n demonstrated, the applicability to living beings of the laws\n which have been ascertained with reference to dead matter, I\n feel constrained at the same time to admit the existence of a\n mysterious _something_ lying beyond, a something _sui generis_,\n which I regard, not as balancing and suspending the ordinary\n physical laws, but as working with them and through them to the\n attainment of a designed end. What this _something_ which we call\n life may be is a profound mystery.... When from the phenomena\n of life we pass on to those of mind, we enter a region still\n more profoundly mysterious. We can readily imagine that we _may_\n here be dealing with phenomena altogether transcending those\n of mere life, in some such way as those of life transcend, as\n I have endeavoured to infer, those of chemistry and molecular\n attractions, or as the laws of chemical affinity in their turn\n transcend those of mere mechanics. Science can be expected to do\n but little to aid us here, since the instrument of research is\n itself the object of investigation. It can but enlighten us as to\n the depths of our ignorance, and lead us to look to a higher aid\n for that which most nearly concerns our well-being.\u2019\n\n236. In fine, the physical properties of matter form the alphabet\nwhich is put into our hands by God, the study of which will, if\nproperly conducted, enable us more perfectly to read that Great Book\nwhich we call the Universe.\n\nWe have begun to recognise some of the chief letters of this\nalphabet, and even to put them two and two together; and, like an\nintelligent but somewhat conceited child, we are very proud of our\nachievement. Like such a child we have not yet, however, completely\ngrasped the fact that these letters are only symbols, but look upon\nthem with intense awe as the great thing in the world, meaning of\ncourse our world. We look with a sort of adoration towards those\npages in which there are words of two syllables, and are ready\nto fall down at the feet of that older and wiser child who has\npenetrated into the depths of such profound mysteries. Our belief\nis that all knowledge is made for the alphabet just as the little\nmusician believes that all music is made for the piano.\n\n237. Life, then, whatever be its nature, may be supposed to penetrate\ninto the structural depths of the universe. Its seat is in a region\ninaccessible to human inquiry, and equally inaccessible, we may\nwell suppose, to the inquiries of the higher created intelligences.\nIntimations of its presence are no doubt constantly emerging from\nthis region of thick darkness into the objective universe, but when\nthey have reached it they obey the ordinary laws of phenomena,\naccording to which a material effect implies a material antecedent.\n\nNotwithstanding all this, life exists just as surely as the Deity\nexists. For we have subjected both these mysteries to the same\nprocess, and have found it as difficult to rid ourselves of the one\nas of the other.\n\nWe have driven the creative operation of the Great First Cause into\nthe durational depths of the universe,\u2014into the eternity of the\npast,\u2014but for all that we have not got rid of God. In like manner we\nhave driven the mystery of life into the structural depths of the\nuniverse,\u2014that region of thick darkness which no created eye is able\nto pierce,\u2014but we have not got rid of life, nor are we likely to do\nso. Before concluding this digression upon the place of life, let us\nbriefly review the attempts made to account for the origin of life by\nthose who have yet fallen short of the scientific conception of an\nUnseen Universe.\n\n238. Sir W. Thomson has gone further than any one else in such\ninquiries. We have already alluded to his attempt to explain the\norigin of the material universe by the vortex-ring hypothesis, and\nalso to his other attempt to explain gravitation by the modification\nof the hypothesis of ultra-mundane corpuscles. If we add to these his\nattempt to explain the origin of life as consistently as possible\nwith the principle of Continuity, we think it must be acknowledged\nthat he is a true pioneer in such inquiries as those of this volume\nas well as in the more ordinary branches of Physical Science.\n\nThe explanation of the origin of life proposed by Sir W. Thomson\nhad also occurred independently to Professor Helmholtz. This latter\nphysicist, in an article on the use and abuse of the deductive method\nin Physical Science,[63] tells us very clearly what led himself, and\nno doubt Sir W. Thomson likewise, to suggest the meteoric hypothesis\nas a possible way of accounting for the origin of terrestrial\nlife:\u2014\u2018If failure attends all our efforts to obtain a generation\nof organisms from lifeless matter, it seems to me (says Professor\nHelmholtz) a thoroughly correct procedure to inquire whether there\nhas ever been an origination of life, or whether it is not as old as\nmatter, and whether its germs, borne from one world to another, have\nnot been developed wherever they have found a favourable soil.\u2019\n\n239. We have already sufficiently pointed out that the man of science\nobjects to separate creations, and that, in consequence, he tries to\nexplain the present terrestrial life by means of a single primordial\ngerm. But the difficulty still remains regarding the original\nappearance of this germ.\n\nNow, according to the meteoric hypothesis, this germ may have been\nwafted to us from some other world, or its fragments, and thus one\nact of creation of life might possibly serve for many worlds. If\ntherefore this hypothesis were otherwise tenable it would diminish\nthe difficulty implied by separate creations, but would it entirely\nremove it? We doubt this very much.\n\nFor, in the first place, as far as we can judge (Art. 163) the\nvisible universe\u2014the universe of worlds\u2014is not eternal, while however\nthe invisible universe, or that which we may for illustration at\nleast associate with the ethereal medium, is necessarily eternal.\nThe visible universe must have had its origin in time (Art. 116),\nno doubt from a nebulous condition. But in this condition it can\nhardly have been fit for the reception of life. Life must therefore\nhave been created afterwards. We have thus at least two separate\ncreations, both taking place in time\u2014the one of matter and the other\nof life. And even if it were possible, which it is not, to get over\none of the difficulties attending this hypothesis, that of creation\nin time, by regarding the visible universe as eternal; yet even then\nwe must regard matter and life as implying two separate creative acts\nif we assume the nebulous hypothesis to be true. For if _x_ denote\nthe date of the advent of life, and _x_ + _a_ that of the advent of\nmatter, _a_ being a constant quantity, the two operations cannot\nbe made simultaneous by merely increasing the value of _x_ without\nlimit. Now this is what we mean by eternity, and therefore we cannot\nhelp thinking that this want of simultaneity implies a defect in this\nmode of viewing the origin of things.\n\n240. Yet another hypothesis has been produced, which starts with the\nassumption that all matter is in some simple sense alive. Looking\nupon the atom as the essential thing in the universe, the various\nmotions of the atom are by this school supposed to be accompanied\nby a species of consciousness inconceivably simple. Under certain\ncircumstances this eternal and immortal consciousness is supposed to\nbe consistent with that which we call the life of the individual,\nwhile under other circumstances these two lives are not consistent\nwith one another. The individual then dies, but nevertheless the\nsimple immortal lives of the atoms which compose his body remain\nattached to them as truly as before.\n\nThere is no disappearance of anything from the universe, only the\nmode in which the simple immortal life becomes manifested has\nundergone a change of expression, just as energy may be supposed to\nundergo a change without disappearing. It is thought by the members\nof this school that such a hypothesis satisfies the Principle of\nContinuity more fully than any other. For, looking at things from\nthe old point of view, we see that certain atoms are concerned in\nthe manifestation of consciousness, as for instance the particles of\nour brains, while certain other atoms are not so concerned, as for\ninstance the inorganic matter we see around us.\n\nHere then, it is argued, we have a breach of the Principle\nof Continuity, inasmuch as certain things of the universe\n(brain-particles) have a function assigned to them in their\nassociation with consciousness, which other things (gold, silver,\netc.) do not possess in any measure, if the distinction between\norganic and inorganic be an essential one. To avert this breach, it\nis essential that all matter should be considered as in some sense\nalive. It is furthermore argued, that by this hypothesis there is no\ndifficulty in accounting for the introduction of life, inasmuch as\nlife always accompanies matter, the mode of manifestation of the one\nbeing regulated by the mode of collocation of the other.\n\n241. Now it appears to us that this school of thought is justified\nin declining to accept a hypothesis which attributes to certain\nsubstances of the universe a power which is entirely wanting in\nothers, or that gives to the same substance at one time a fundamental\npower or property that is entirely wanting at another. It is not so\nmuch the premiss as the conclusion of this school to which we object.\nFor let us consider for a moment what is implied in the astounding\ninference that the atom is the true abode of immortal life in the\nuniverse, and that its life is of an extremely simple kind.\n\nIt implies, in the first place, that the atom is eternal, and to this\nwe object. It implies, in the next place, that the atom is extremely\nsimple in its constitution, and to this we object. It implies,\nthirdly, that for the antecedents of the motions of the atom it is\nunnecessary to resort to anything beyond the atom itself, and to this\nwe object.\n\n242. We have in other places sufficiently set forth our objection\nto regarding the atom either as eternal or as extremely simple in\nconstitution, let us now state our objection to regarding the motions\nof the atom (in this generalisation) apart from the surrounding\nuniverse.\n\nOur objection is, that in order to conceive the nature of the forces\nby which atoms act upon each other, we are driven at once, if not to\nthe very hypothesis of Le Sage, at least to something which implies\nthe existence and agency of the Unseen Universe.\n\nBut when once we have taken this step, we are not permitted to rest,\nfor another journey is before us, and after that another, and so on.\nIn fine, there is no end to the process, and no halting-place for the\nmind, except in the belief that the universe as a whole participates\nin every motion which takes place even in the smallest of atoms.[64]\n\nUndoubtedly as regards certain practical scientific results, it\nis allowable to regard the atom as a thing by itself, and to sum\nup the _apparent_ actions of the various atoms as if each were\nindependent of everything else. But when we come to a generalisation\nso fundamental as this hypothesis regarding life, we are forced to\nask whether the apparent and visible action of atoms on one another\nis really everything which takes place, and then we find, as we have\njust shown, that we are driven at once into the Unseen Universe, and\nthence into an endless complexity of antecedent.\n\nIn fine, we conclude that inasmuch as the universe in its various\norders participates in every conceivable motion, the consciousness\nwhich accompanies this motion cannot logically be confined to the\napparently moving body or atom, but must in some sense extend to the\nUnseen Universe in its various orders. But this is only another\nway of expressing the conclusions at which we have already arrived,\nfor (of course) if we imagine a Divine Agency to be resident in the\nuniverse, we cannot but suppose that every motion of any kind is\naccompanied with a consciousness of this Divine Agency.\n\nIn fine, we maintain that _what we are driven to is not an under-life\nresident in the atom, but rather_, to adopt the words of a recent\nwriter, _a Divine over-life in which we live and move and have our\nbeing_.\n\n243. Here it is desirable to consider what we gain by this\nhypothesis. Our gain is simply in the way in which we regard the\nfunctions of matter, and a little reflection will convince us that\nneither form of this hypothesis, whether we hold by an under- or an\nover-life, will enable us to explain the introduction of life into\nthe visible universe by natural laws alone, and without resorting to\nsome peculiar action of the unseen. As a matter of fact we are led by\nscience to receive the law of Biogenesis as expressing the present\norder of the world. But the introduction of life into the world does\nnot become more consistent with this law by virtue of an hypothesis\nwhich associates a consciousness of some sort with every motion of\nthe universe.\n\nIt still remains a fact as much as ever, that there is a marked\ndistinction between the living and the dead\u2014the organic and the\ninorganic. And it still remains true that, as a matter of universal\nscientific experience, a living thing can only be produced from a\nliving thing, and that the inorganic forces of the visible universe\ncan by no means generate life.\n\nIn fine, our hypothesis, in which the material as well as the life\nof the visible universe are regarded as having been developed from\nthe Unseen, in which they had existed from Eternity, appears to us to\npresent the only available method of avoiding a break of continuity,\nif at the same time we are to accept loyally the indications given by\nobservation and experiment. It may be said (just as anything else may\nbe said) that the visible universe is eternal, and that it has the\npower of originating life; but both statements are surely opposed to\nthe results of observation and experiment. Now we must be content in\nsuch matters as these to be guided by probabilities, and it certainly\nappears most probable that the visible universe is _not_ eternal, and\nthat it has _not_ the power of originating life. In fine, life as\nwell as matter comes to us from the Unseen Universe.\n\n244. Let us here again pause for a moment and review the position\nwhich we have reached. By taking the universe as we find it, and\nregarding each occurrence in it, without exception, as something upon\nwhich it was meant that we should exercise our intellects, we are led\nat once to the principle of Continuity, which asserts that we shall\nnever be carried from the conditioned to the unconditioned, but only\nfrom one order of the fully conditioned to another. Two great laws\ncome before us: the one of which is the Conservation of Mass and of\nEnergy; that is to say, conservation of the objective element of\nthe universe; while the other is the law of Biogenesis, in virtue\nof which the appearance of a living Being in the universe denotes\nthe existence of an antecedent possessing life. We are led from\nthese two great laws, as well as from the principle of Continuity,\nto regard, as at least the most probable solution, that there is an\nintelligent Agent operating in the universe, one of whose functions\nit is to develop the universe objectively considered; and also that\nthere is an intelligent Agent, one of whose functions it is to\ndevelop intelligence and life. Perhaps we ought rather to say that,\nif we are not driven to this very conclusion, it appears at least to\nbe that which most simply and naturally satisfies the principle of\nContinuity.\n\nBut this conclusion hardly differs from the Christian doctrine; or,\nto speak properly, the conclusion, so far as it goes, appears to\nagree with the Christian doctrine.\n\nIn fine, we are led to regard it as one of the great merits of\nthe Christian system, that its doctrine is pre-eminently one of\nintellectual liberty, and that while theologians on the one hand,\nand men of science on the other, have each erected their barriers to\ninquiry, the early Christian records acknowledge no such barrier, but\non the contrary assert the most perfect freedom for all the powers of\nman.\n\n245. We have now reached a stage from which we can very easily\ndispose of any scientific difficulty regarding miracles. For if the\ninvisible was able to produce the present visible universe with all\nits energy, it could of course, _a fortiori_, very easily produce\nsuch transmutations of energy from the one universe into the other\nas would account for the events which took place in Judea. Those\nevents are therefore no longer to be regarded as absolute breaks of\ncontinuity, a thing which we have agreed to consider impossible,\nbut only as the result of a peculiar action of the invisible upon\nthe visible universe. When we dig up an ant-hill, we perform an\noperation which, to the inhabitants of the hill, is mysteriously\nperplexing, far transcending their experience, but _we_ know very\nwell that the whole affair happens without any breach of continuity\nof the laws of the universe. In like manner, the scientific\ndifficulty with regard to miracles will, we think, entirely\ndisappear, if our view of the invisible universe be accepted, or\nindeed if any view be accepted which implies the presence in it of\nliving beings much more powerful than ourselves. It is of course\nassumed that the visible and invisible are and have been constantly\nin a state of intimate mutual relation.\n\n246. We have as yet only replied to the scientific objection, but\nthere are other objections which might be raised. Thus, for instance,\nit might be said, What occasion was there for the interference\nimplied in miracles? And again, Is the historical testimony in favour\nof their occurrence conclusive? We must leave the last objection to\nbe replied to by the historian; but with respect to the former, it\nappears to us as almost self-evident that Christ, if He came to us\nfrom the invisible world, could hardly (with reverence be it spoken)\nhave done so without some peculiar sort of communication being\nestablished between the two worlds. No doubt we may well imagine\nthat the acts of interference in virtue of this communication were\nstrictly limited; and in proof of this conclusion we may cite the\nfact that what did occur was sufficiently startling to have secured\nthe ear of humanity ever since, but not sufficiently overwhelming to\npreclude the exercise of individual faith. The very fact of there\nbeing sincere sceptics proves, we think, the limited extent of\nthese interferences.[65] And we must remember, on the other hand,\nthat it is quite possible to accept fully the truth of a statement\nwithout the slightest influence resulting as regards modification of\nour course of action. Perhaps the most terrible portion of the New\nTestament is the passage (James ii. 19), \u2018the demons also believe,\nand tremble.\u2019\n\n247. We have now considered miracles, or those apparent breaks of\ncontinuity which have been furnished by history, but our readers are\nalready well aware that equally formidable breaks are brought before\nus by science. There is, to begin with, that formidable phenomenon,\nthe production in time of the visible universe. Secondly, there is\na break hardly less formidable, the original production of life;\nand there is, thirdly, that break recognised by Wallace and his\nschool of natural history, which seems to have occurred at the first\nproduction of man. Greatly as we are indebted to Darwin, Huxley, and\nthose who have prominently advocated the possibility of the present\nsystem of things\u2019 having been developed by forces and operations\nsuch as we see before us, it must be regarded by us, and we think it\nis regarded by them, as a defect in their system, that these breaks\nremain unaccounted for. Our readers will now, however, if we mistake\nnot, perceive what is the real source of the perplexity felt by the\nschool of evolutionists. It is that they have been unable to regard\nan interference of the invisible universe in any other light than\nas an absolute break of continuity; and holding with justice to the\nprinciple of continuity, they have been unable to do more than\nacknowledge these difficulties and allow them to remain.\n\nBut from our point of view these difficulties are by no means\nimpenetrable barriers, barring for ever the progress of research. On\nthe contrary, we assert that, if approached with sufficient boldness,\nand examined with sufficient care, they will be found to contain\navenues leading up to the invisible universe, and directing our\ninquiries thitherwards. There may be possibly other apparent breaks\nor barriers, but these appear to be the best established; and, with\nthese exceptions, we may suppose that the visible universe, in so\nfar as we are capable of investigating it, has been left to develop\nitself in accordance with those laws of energy which we see in\noperation at the present day.\n\nIn fine, the visible universe was plainly intended to be something\nwhich we are capable of investigating, and the few apparent breaks\nare in reality so many partially concealed avenues leading up to the\nunseen.\n\n248. Our readers must not however infer from what we have now said,\nthat we do not recognise any present points of contact between us and\nthe invisible. There may possibly be (but even of this we are not\nquite sure) no points of _apparent interference_ between the two, so\nthat the man of science cannot say,\u2014Here is a break;\u2014but nevertheless\nthere may be _a close and vital union_ between the two universes,\nin those regions into which investigation cannot penetrate, and\nwho shall say that the laws of these regions do not admit of the\nobjective efficacy of prayer? There may be an action of the invisible\nworld upon the individual mind, and there is no reason why there\nshould not also be an action upon the visible universe, by means of\nthose processes of delicacy which, as we have already seen, obtain\nin that quarter (Art. 184). Neither the one action nor the other\nwould be detected by science, unless we except certain providential\noccurrences, which are generally, however, better recognised by\nthe individuals to whom they refer than by the world at large. And\njust as reversibility (Art. 113) is the stamp of perfection in the\ninanimate engine, so a similar reversibility may be the stamp of\nperfection in the living man. He ought to live for the unseen\u2014to\ncarry into it something which may not be wholly unacceptable. But, in\norder to enable him to do this, the unseen must also work upon him,\nand its influences must pervade his spiritual nature. Thus a life\n_for_ the unseen _through_ the unseen is to be regarded as the only\nperfect life.\n\n249. In fine, the unseen may have a very wide field of influence,\nbut from its very nature its working is not discernible, or at least\neasily discernible, by the eye of sense, and we are therefore led to\nconsult the Christian records for otherwise unattainable information\nregarding the reality of a present influence exercised by the\ninvisible universe upon ours.\n\nIn the first place, we have the following words of Christ himself\n(Matt. xiii. 41): \u2018The Son of man shall send forth his angels, and\nthey shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them\nwhich do iniquity, and shall cast them into a furnace of fire: there\nshall be wailing and gnashing of teeth.\u2019 Again (Matt. xxv. 31): \u2018When\nthe Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with\nhim, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory: and before him\nshall be gathered all nations; and he shall separate them one from\nanother, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats.\u2019 Again\n(Matt. xxvi. 53), speaking to Peter: \u2018Thinkest thou that I cannot now\npray to my Father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve\nlegions of angels?\u2019 Furthermore, we read (Heb. i. 14): \u2018Are they not\nall ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for them who shall be\nheirs of salvation?\u2019\n\nThese passages (and many more might be quoted) would appear to show\nthat, according to the Scriptures, the angels take a very prominent\npart in the administration of the universe under the direction of\nthe Son of God. They are his ministers, his messengers, who execute\nhis decrees and perform his errands, whether of mercy or of justice.\nTherefore it is said of Christ, \u2018Thou art the King of angels;\u2019 and\nof himself in his glorified state, speaking to his disciples, Christ\nsays (Matt. xxviii. 18): \u2018All power is given unto me in heaven and in\nearth. Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptising them in the\nname of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching\nthem to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and, lo,\nI am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.\u2019\n\nLet us close these quotations by one from the Old Testament\u20142 Kings\nvi. 15-17: \u2018And when the servant of the man of God was risen early,\nand gone forth, behold, an host encompassed the city both with horses\nand chariots: and his servant said unto him, Alas, my master! how\nshall we do? And he answered, Fear not; for they that be with us are\nmore than they that be with them. And Elisha prayed, and said, Lord,\nI pray thee, open his eyes, that he may see. And the Lord opened the\neyes of the young man: and he saw: and, behold, the mountain was full\nof horses and chariots of fire round about Elisha.\u2019\n\nFinally, it is the belief of a large portion of the Christian\nChurch that the Spirit of God dwells in and acts upon the souls of\nbelievers. This action represents the influence which reaches the\nsoul of man _from_ the unseen, enabling him to live _for_ the unseen.\n\n250. We have in our opening chapter quoted a very remarkable passage\nfrom Swedenborg upon the particular nature of God\u2019s providence.\nLet us now hear what the Scriptures say upon the same subject.\nChrist tells us (Luke xii. 6): \u2018Are not five sparrows sold for two\nfarthings, and not one of them is forgotten before God? But even the\nvery hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear not therefore: ye are\nof more value than many sparrows.\u2019 Again, St. Paul tells us (Rom.\nviii. 28): \u2018And we know that all things work together for good to\nthem that love God, to them who are called according to his purpose.\u2019\nAlso (Rom. viii. 38): \u2018For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor\nlife, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present,\nnor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature,\nshall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ\nJesus our Lord.\u2019\n\n251. We think it may be concluded from all these passages that the\ndoctrine of a particular providence is taught in the Scriptures.\nNevertheless it is one of the hardest things to understand how this\ndoctrine can be made consistent with the working out of general laws\nwhich, so far as we can study them, appear to have no reference\nwhatever to individuals. This was a difficulty intensely felt by the\nlate John Stuart Mill. He says, in a work published after his death:\u2014\n\n \u2018For how stands the fact? That, next to the greatness of these\n cosmic forces, the quality which most forcibly strikes every\n one who does not avert his eyes from it is their perfect and\n absolute recklessness. They go straight to their end without\n regarding what or whom they crush on the road. Optimists, in\n their attempts to prove that \u201cwhatever is, is right,\u201d are obliged\n to maintain, not that Nature ever turns one step from her path\n to avoid trampling us into destruction, but that it would be\n very unreasonable in us to expect that she should. Pope\u2019s \u201cShall\n gravitation cease when you go by?\u201d may be a just rebuke to any\n one who should be so silly as to expect common human morality\n from Nature. But if the question were between two men, instead\n of between a man and a natural phenomenon, that triumphant\n apostrophe would be thought a rare piece of impudence. A man who\n should persist in hurling stones or firing cannon when another\n man \u201cgoes by,\u201d and, having killed him, should urge a similar plea\n in exculpation, would very deservedly be found guilty of murder.\n In sober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged or\n imprisoned for doing to one another are Nature\u2019s every-day\n performances.\u2019\n\nThis objection to belief in the reality of the government of God has\nbeen clothed in very eloquent language in a sermon by the Rev. James\nMartineau:\u2014\u2018The battle of existence\u2019 (he tells us, putting himself\nfor the moment into the position of Mill and his school) \u2018rages\nthrough all time and in every field; and its rule is to give no\nquarter\u2014to despatch the maimed, to overtake the halt, to trip up the\nblind, and drive the fugitive host over the precipice into the sea.\u2019\n\nIn very beautiful language the poet Tennyson, after proposing the\nsame riddle, replies to it thus:\u2014\n\n \u2018Are God and Nature then at strife\n That Nature lends such evil dreams?\n So careful of the type she seems,\n So careless of the single life;\n\n * * * * *\n\n \u201cSo careful of the type\u201d? but no.\n From scarped cliff and quarried stone\n She cries, A thousand types are gone:\n I care for nothing: all shall go.\n\n * * * * *\n\n O life as futile, then, as frail!\n O for thy voice to soothe and bless!\n What hope of answer or redress?\n Behind the veil, behind the veil.\u2019\n\nIn another passage of equal beauty the same poet expresses his\nconviction\n\n \u2018That nothing walks with aimless feet:\n That not one life shall be destroy\u2019d\n Or cast as rubbish to the void,\n When God hath made the pile complete.\n\n That not a worm is cloven in vain;\n That not a moth with vain desire\n Is shrivel\u2019d in a fruitless fire,\n Or but subserves another\u2019s gain.\u2019\n\nProfessor Jevons, again, in his _Principles of Science_ (vol. ii.\np. 468) alludes in the following terms to this difficulty:\u2014\u2018The\nhypothesis, that there is a Creator, at once all-powerful and\nall-benevolent, is surrounded, as it must seem to every candid\ninvestigator, with difficulties verging closely upon logical\ncontradiction. The existence of the smallest amount of pain and evil\nwould seem to show that He is either not perfectly benevolent, or\nnot all-powerful. No one can have lived long without experiencing\nsorrowful events of which the significance is inexplicable. But\nif we cannot succeed in avoiding contradiction in our notions of\nelementary geometry, can we expect that the ultimate purposes of\nexistence shall present themselves to us with perfect clearness?\nI can see nothing to forbid the notion that in a higher state\nof intelligence much that is now obscure may become clear. We\nperpetually find ourselves in the position of finite minds attempting\ninfinite problems, and can we be sure that where we see contradiction\nan infinite intelligence might not discover perfect logical harmony?\u2019\n\n252. Before we leave this subject there is one consideration which\nought not to be forgotten. It is evident that the development of the\nvisible universe is of such a nature that we can understand it, and\nto a great extent explain it by means of laws and processes with\nwhich we are familiar: nay, the order of the universe is something\nwhich it is our very duty to investigate. But the result of our\ninquiry is, and can only be, the appretiation of general laws of\naction. The working out of these laws can have, from this point of\nview, no possible reference to individual interests. If gravity acted\nsometimes, and at other times refrained from acting, we could derive\nno certain information from our experience; we could not advance\nin art or science, and should infallibly be plunged into speedy\nconfusion. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that the occurrences\nwhich take place through the action of gravity may, after all, be so\narranged as to have reference to the real welfare of individuals,\nalthough this reference may not be apparent because we are not in\na position to recognise it, and it is not intended that we should\ndo so, at least in this life. The ability to do so would be a very\ndangerous gift, and would go far to upset the present economy.\nWe know very little about the bearings of events on our own best\ninterests, and nothing at all about their bearings on those of our\nneighbour. We may, however, believe with Jevons, that in a future\nstate the adaptation between the two may become apparent to us, even\nif we do not ourselves become instruments in bringing this adaptation\nabout.\n\n253. The outcome of all these speculations would thus lead us to\nregard the Christian system as affording a full scope for development\nin all respects, whether of the universe or of the individual. Its\nlaw is pre-eminently that of liberty, and it has conducted us to the\nconclusion that the doctrine of the Trinity, or something analogous\nto it, forms, as it were, the avenue through which the universe\nitself leads us up to the conception of the infinite and eternal One.\n\nNevertheless, not a few of our readers may be disinclined to\nentertain any precise conception of the Divine nature. Neither\natheists nor theists, they simply dismiss the Deity as being quite\nabove their comprehension, and all doctrines founded upon definite\nconceptions of the Deity, as superstructures without foundation.\n\nNow, the results regarding a future state at which we have arrived\nare, as we think, and as we have said in our introduction, capable of\nbeing very nearly, if not altogether, detached from all conceptions\nregarding the Divine essence.\n\nWe have merely to take the universe as it is, and, adopting the\nprinciple of Continuity, insist upon an endless chain of events, all\nfully conditioned, however far we go either backwards or forwards.\nThis process leads us at once to the conception of an invisible\nuniverse, and to see that immortality is possible without a break of\ncontinuity.\n\nWe have, however, no physical proof in favour of it, unless we allow\nthat Christ rose from the dead. But it will be admitted that, if\nChrist rose from the dead, a future state becomes more than possible;\nit becomes probable; and we do not see that this conclusion is, in\nitself, greatly modified by differences in our mode of regarding the\nexact nature of Christ.\n\nAgain, the production of the visible universe in time leads us,\nby the principle of Continuity, to the conception of a fully\nconditioned intelligent universe, existing prior to the production\nof the visible. And furthermore, we are induced by our argument\n(Art. 218) to regard the production of the visible universe as\nthe work of an intelligent agency residing in the invisible. If,\nthen, such an agency could produce the visible universe, it could\ncertainly accomplish the resurrection of Christ, without any break of\ncontinuity, so far as the whole universe is concerned.\n\n254. The joys of the Christian Heaven are celebrated in Hymns which\nare frequently very beautiful, even if they do not mount to the\nsublimity of the ancient Hebrew ode. One of the finest of these is\nthe free translation by Pope of the Latin (not originally Christian)\node standing at the commencement of this volume. It runs thus:\u2014\n\n \u2018Vital spark of heavenly flame!\n Quit, oh, quit this mortal frame!\n Trembling, hoping, ling\u2019ring, flying!\n Oh, the pain, the bliss of dying!\n Cease, fond Nature, cease thy strife,\n And let me languish into life!\n\n Hark! they whisper\u2014angels say,\n \u201cSister spirit, come away!\u201d\n What is this absorbs me quite;\n Steals my senses, shuts my sight;\n Drowns my spirits, draws my breath?\n Tell me, my soul, can this be\u2014death?\n\n The world recedes! it disappears!\n Heaven opens to my eyes!\u2014my ears\n With sounds seraphic ring:\n Lend, lend your wings! I mount! I fly!\n O Grave! where is thy victory?\n O Death! where is thy sting?\u2019\n\nMany specimens might be given if our object were to collect together\nthe Christian Hymns relating to Heaven. Sometimes, too, we have\nbeautiful descriptions not in verse, and Bunyan\u2019s account of the\nreception of Christian and Hopeful at the Celestial City will at once\noccur to the reader as not inferior in the claims of true poetry to\nanything that we have in verse.\n\n255. Now, if we analyse such hymns of joy, we find in them two\nprominent chords, one or other of which is always struck. The first\nexpresses the Christian\u2019s sense of relief from sorrow and death, and\nthe second his joy in the anticipated presence of Christ\u2014his intense\ndesire to behold the King in his beauty.\n\nThese chords are struck together by St. John, when he says (Rev.\nxxi. 3, 4), \u2018And I heard a great voice out of heaven saying, Behold,\nthe tabernacle of God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and\nthey shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, and be\ntheir God. And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and\nthere shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither\nshall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away.\u2019\nIn other respects the descriptions of the Christian heaven are no\ndoubt figurative. They are intended for Christians of all ages of the\nworld, and have hardly any reference to the material conditions of\nlife in a future state. These could not be apprehended by believers\n1800 years ago, inasmuch as we can hardly be said to grasp them now.\nNevertheless there is one direction in which _we do think_ we are\nable to obtain a glimpse into the conditions of this future life.\n\n256. One of the most prominent characteristics of even the\nwell-directed human mind is its insatiable curiosity. How intensely\nanxious we all are to realise the conditions of the life of our\nforefathers in the ruder and earlier times; how interested in every\nscrap of intelligence which reaches us from the dead old world!\nHow interested too in any light thrown upon the civilisation which\npreceded these old times! What would not any man give for half an\nhour with Socrates or Plato? what would he not give, be he Christian\nor unbeliever, to have pictured out vividly and truly before him some\nepisode in the life of Christ? In a tedious, toilsome, tantalising,\nroundabout way we do indeed get some passing glimpses into these\nancient historical ages.\n\nThe earth is not unlike the human brain, in that it contains in\nitself certain memories of the past: and, just as we rummage out\nand hunt up in our brains old memories, so do the historian and the\nantiquary search about in the earth for that memory which it retains\nof those distant but glorious ages. But the universe, no less than\nthe individual, has another memory besides the material one, and we\nhave endeavoured (Art. 196) to convince our readers that nothing is\nreally lost, the past being always present in the universe. If this\nbe the case, it may readily be conceived that this universal memory\nmay by some process of exaltation and intensification, or as it were\nby some relay battery of the universe, be occasionally quickened into\nsuch a life that the individual in the future and glorified state may\nbe enabled (through the power of the Lord) to realise scenes that\nhappened in the far distant past. For if so much can be accomplished\nwith a thing so little plastic as the material memory of the earth,\nwhat may not be done with that infinitely more plastic form of\nexistence which we term the world to come?\n\n257. Again, if in this present world we have great difficulty in\nrealising our own past, we have even greater difficulty in realising\nwhat is at this very moment taking place in remote parts of the\npresent visible universe. Astronomers and Physicists agree that\nlife is possible in the planet Mars, and it is quite likely that\nintelligent beings analogous to ourselves exist at the present moment\non the surface of that planet, but we shall never in this life know\nfor certain anything about them. There is an insurmountable barrier\nto physical inquiry as great as if Mars belonged to the unseen\nuniverse, instead of being, what he is in reality, our next-door\nneighbour in the present.\n\nNow, may not this barrier be removed in the future state? This has\nbeen a favourite topic with scientific theologians, and we believe\nthat all who have speculated on the conditions of a future life have\nunanimously agreed that we shall have much greater freedom of motion\nin the world to come. There can be no doubt that our relations to\ntime and space will then be greatly altered and enlarged. Men shall\nrun to and fro in the universe, and knowledge shall be increased.\n\n258. But yet the picture is not altogether one of intellectual\nbrightness and beauty. It wears also a moral aspect, and upon this\nalmost exclusively the Christian records dwell. We are told in these\nrecords that nothing is forgotten. Christ tells us (St. Luke viii.\n17), \u2018Nothing is secret, that shall not be made manifest; neither\nanything hid, that shall not be known and come abroad.\u2019 And again St.\nJohn tells us (Rev. xx. 12), \u2018I saw the dead, small and great, stand\nbefore God: and the books were opened; and another book was opened,\nwhich is the book of life: and the dead were judged out of those\nthings which were written in the books, according to their works.\u2019\nThis thought has been developed by the Rev. Alexander Macleod, D.D.,\nin a work entitled _Our own Lives the Books of Judgment_. This author\npoints out that in many cases it may not be even necessary to appeal\nto the universe for the record which is therein written, for this is\nsufficiently stamped upon the body itself, and he then draws a vivid\nand lurid picture of the sensual man in whom the mortal body is like\na parchment written within and without\u2014a truly mournful and terrible\nrecord of the deeds done in the body.\n\nBut if all this is possible with an organism possessing so little\nplasticity as the natural body, and where the wish of the individual\nis to preserve a respectable exterior, what must be the case in the\nsoul[66] of such a man?\u2014\u2018If they do these things in a green tree,\nwhat shall be done in the dry?\u2019 What a hideous and horrible likeness\nmust not that foul thing have that issues forth from the \u2018grave and\ngate of Death\u2019 into the presence of the Unseen and Eternal?\n\n259. It is extremely striking to read in this connection the\nfollowing extract from Plato\u2019s _Gorgias_. We quote from Jowett\u2019s\ntranslation. Socrates is the speaker:\u2014\n\n \u2018This is a tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, and\n from which I draw the following inferences: Death, if I am right,\n is in the first place the separation from one another of two\n things, soul and body;\u2014this, and nothing else. And after they\n are separated they retain their several characteristics, which\n are much the same as in life; the body has the same nature and\n ways and affections, all clearly discernible; for example, he\n who by nature or training, or both, was a tall man while he was\n alive, will remain as he was after he is dead; and the fat man\n will remain fat; and so on: and the dead man, who in life had a\n fancy to have flowing hair, will have flowing hair. And if he\n was marked with the whip and had the prints of the scourge, or\n of wounds in him while he was alive, you might see the same in\n the dead body; and if his limbs were broken or misshapen while\n he was alive, the same appearance would be visible in the dead.\n And, in a word, whatever was the habit of the body during life\n would be distinguishable after death, either perfectly or in a\n great measure and for a time. And I should infer that this is\n equally true of the soul, Callicles; when the man is stripped of\n the body all the natural or acquired affections of the soul are\n laid open to view. And when they come to the judge, as those from\n Asia came to Rhadamanthus, he places them near him and inspects\n them quite impartially, not knowing whose the soul is: perhaps\n he may lay hands on the soul of the great king, or of some other\n king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his soul is\n marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of\n perjuries, and of wrongs which have been plastered into him by\n each action, and he is all crooked with falsehood and imposture,\n because he has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds,\n full of all deformity and disproportion, which is caused by\n licence and luxury and insolence and incontinence, and despatches\n him ignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the\n punishment which he deserves.\u2019\n\n260. As, in Eastern monarchies, a veil was sometimes cast over the\nface of the guilty;[67] so in the New Testament the veil of darkness\nis drawn over the fate of the lost soul who falls into the hands of\nthe living God. \u2018And when the king came in to see the guests, he saw\nthere a man which had not on a wedding-garment: and he saith unto\nhim, Friend, how camest thou in hither, not having a wedding-garment?\nAnd he was speechless. Then said the king to the servants, Bind him\nhand and foot, and take him away, and cast him into outer darkness;\nthere shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.\u2019[68]\n\nWe greatly question whether any school of theologians have succeeded\nin throwing a single ray of real light into this mysterious\nregion.[69] Our readers are well aware that there are three such\nschools. One of these contemplates the eternity of punishment\nphysical, mental, or both; another the final salvation of all men;\nwhile a third expects the annihilation of the wicked in Gehenna.\nNow while it is entirely without our province to enter into these\ndiscussions, we may yet be permitted to point out that, as it appears\nto us, the principle of Continuity demands not merely one state, but\nrather an eternal and infinite succession of states, in order to\nconstitute true immortality.\n\nThe precise conditions of such an immortality it is not for us\nto discuss. Under any school of theological thought a glorious\nimmortality implies the ultimate union, morally and spiritually,\nof the individual with the Divine over-life, while the fate of the\nimpenitent must surely be something so awful that language fails to\nbring it fully before the mind.\n\n261. But this graphic and powerful picture of the fate of the lost\nfared as badly as other New Testament conceptions when it fell\ninto the hands of the materialists of the middle ages. Its meaning\nwas entirely altered, and the Christian Hell, instead of being the\nGehenna of the Universe, where all its garbage and filth is consumed,\nwas changed into a region shut in by adamantine walls and full of\nimpossible physical fires\u2014the Devil being the chief stoker.\n\nThe one idea is awful, while the other is simply grotesque. An\nantient Jew who had occasion to pass by the valley of Hinnom, and\nwhose senses were invaded by the sights and smells of that doleful\nregion, must have entertained a conception of the Hell described\nby Christ as different as possible from that which has reached us\nfrom the middle ages, and to which some even of the readers of this\nbook may have been accustomed in their earlier years. The reader who\ndesires to know something of the more than fiendish malignity with\nwhich human beings (mainly Christian ministers) have _improved upon_\nthe solemn but markedly reserved language of Scripture on such points\nhas only to refer to the _Inferno_. Perhaps the hideous realism of\nDor\u00e9\u2019s illustrations will of itself be enough for him. If not, a very\nfew lines of the original cannot fail to suffice.\n\n Perch\u2019 io dissi:\u2014Maestro, esti tormenti\n Cresceranno ei dopo la gran sentenza,\n O fien minori, o saran si cocenti?\n Ed egli a me:\u2014Ritorna a tua scienza,\n Che vuol, quanto la cosa \u00e8 pi\u00f9 perfetta,\n Pi\u00f9 senta \u2019l bene, e cos\u00ec la doglienza.\n Tutto che questa gente maledetta\n In vera perfezion giammai non vada,\n Di l\u00e0, pi\u00f9 che di qua, essere aspetta.[70]\n\nSince the time of Dante many attempts have been made, unsuccessfully,\nby men without his genius, to import additional horror.\n\nTo some extent no doubt Christ\u2019s description of the Universal\nGehenna must be regarded as figurative, but yet we do not think that\nthe sayings of Christ with regard to the unseen world ought to be\nlooked upon as nothing more than pure figures of speech. We feel\nassured that the principle of Continuity cries out against such an\ninterpretation\u2014may they not rather be descriptions of what takes\nplace in the unseen universe brought home to our minds by means of\nperfectly true comparisons with the processes and things of this\npresent universe which they most resemble? And just as, in the\nvisible universe, there is apparently an enormous and inexplicable\n_waste_ of germs, seeds, and eggs of all kinds, which die simply\nbecause they are useless\u2014analogy would lead us to conclude that\nsomething similar, and to at least as enormous an extent, happens\nin the Unseen with the germs of spiritual frames. The caterpillar\nwhich has not chosen a secure place of refuge in which to assume the\nchrysalis form does not live to become a perfect insect. The seeds\nthat fell by the wayside, though scattered by an intelligent sower,\nwere devoured by the birds of the air. \u2018Let every one of them pass\naway, like the untimely birth of a woman, that they may not see the\nsun.\u2019 \u2018For many are called, but few chosen.\u2019[71]\n\n262. Thus the Christian Gehenna bears to the Unseen Universe\nprecisely the same relation as the Gehenna of the Jews did to the\ncity of Jerusalem; and just as the fire was always kept up and the\nworm ever active in the one, so are we forced to contemplate an\nenduring process in the other.\n\nFor we cannot easily agree with those who would limit the existence\nof evil to the present world. We know now that the matter of the\nwhole of the visible universe is of a piece with that which we\nrecognise here, and the beings of other worlds must apparently be\nsubject to accidental occurrences from their relation with the outer\nuniverse in the same way as we are. But if there be accident, must\nthere not be pain and death? Now these are naturally associated in\nour minds with the presence of moral evil.\n\nWe are thus drawn, if not forced, to surmise that the dark thread\nknown as evil is one which is very deeply woven into that garment of\nGod which is called the Universe.\n\nIn fine, just as the arguments of this chapter lead us to regard\nthe whole Universe[72] as eternal, so in like manner are we led\nto surmise that evil is eternal, and therefore we cannot easily\nimagine the Universe without its Gehenna, where the worm dieth not,\nand the fire is not quenched. The _process_ at all events would\nseem to us to be most probably an enduring one. [Many passages of\nthe New Testament, however, seem to point to a continuity of moral\ndevelopment in the unseen universe, a development whose climax is to\nbe reached when the last enemy, death, is destroyed in Gehenna.]\n\n263. But it is fruitless to expect that Science should throw any\nlight upon that greatest of all mysteries\u2014the origin of evil. We\nhave now come to a region where we must suffer ourselves to be led\nsolely by the light which is given us in the Christian Records. And\nwhile here we would quote from a very remarkable work on the Lord\u2019s\nPrayer[73] by the Rev. Charles Parsons Reichel, B.D., which exhibits\nin a singularly clear light the testimony given by Scripture, as well\nas the fruitlessness of all attempts to obtain information from any\nother quarter. Our first extract relates to the personality of \u2018The\nEvil One:\u2019\u2014\n\n \u2018In refutation\u2019 (says the writer) \u2018of the objections that have\n been urged against the personal existence of the Adversary, this\n one observation is quite enough: that of the world of spirits we\n cannot possibly know anything save by direct revelation. It is\n beyond the domain of the senses; it is beyond the cognisance of\n reason. A man born blind might therefore as rationally attempt\n to disprove by a process of reasoning the existence of a sense\n of which he can know nothing except by testimony, as we attempt\n by a process of reasoning to disprove the existence of a spirit\n of whose existence we can know nothing save by testimony. The\n only point to be ascertained in either case is whether the\n testimony be sufficient. If the testimony of Scripture be deemed\n sufficient, then I cannot see that it is possible to deny the\n Personal existence of Satan any more than that of God. _How_\n Satan exists, or _where_ at the present time, or how his power\n _avails_, as we are told it does, to contrive and suggest\n temptations to the mind of man; and to what extent he is aware of\n what is passing in men\u2019s minds, so as to adapt his suggestions\n to their weakness, we are not told, and do not therefore know.\n But our not being told the manner in which his power is exercised\n and brought to bear, is no proof of the unreality of that fearful\n Being who is everywhere in the New Testament exhibited as the\n adversary of God and goodness, whether in the individual, or in\n the development of the human race.\u2019\n\nThe next passage is one which all of us may study with much\nadvantage. It refers to temptation:\u2014\n\n \u2018Every risk incurred unnecessarily for the sake of exhibiting\n our trust in God, every unusual or unnecessary act done merely\n or chiefly for the purpose of displaying our privileges or our\n conviction, or of attracting attention and admiration, every\n stepping out of the plain, unadorned, and _unadmired_ path of\n simple duty, is a phase of it.\u2019\n\n * * * * *\n\n \u2018Why God should permit any of his creatures to be tempted is\n a question we can no more answer than we can that question of\n which indeed it is but a case, why God should permit evil to\n exist at all. But we know that evil does exist; and we know too\n that temptation does exist. That evil was first introduced into\n the world by a Being who goes under the name of Satan or the\n Adversary (2 Cor. xi. 3) we are told: that this Being endeavoured\n first to seduce, and afterwards to menace our Saviour into evil;\n and that he is constantly engaged in tempting us as he tempted\n Christ, we are also told.\u2019\n\n * * * * *\n\n \u2018And the true rendering of the last clause in Christ\u2019s own prayer\n would seem to intimate that the same Being is also busy in\n suggesting temptations to every follower of Christ\u2014\u201cLead us not\n into temptation, but deliver us from the Evil One.\u201d\u2019\n\n264. But we must now draw to a close; first of all, however, let us\nbriefly sum up the results of our discussion.\n\nThe great scientific principle which we have made use of has been the\nLaw of Continuity. This simply means that the whole universe is of a\npiece; that it is something which an intelligent being is capable of\nunderstanding, not completely nor all at once, but better and better\nthe more he studies it.\n\nIn this great whole which we call the Universe there is no\nimpenetrable barrier to the intellectual development of the\nindividual. Death is not such a barrier, whether we contemplate\nit in others, or whether we experience it ourselves. And the\nsame continuity which has been insisted on with reference to our\nintellectual conceptions of the universe applies, we have little\ndoubt, to the other faculties of man, and to other regions of thought.\n\nWhen we regard the universe from this point of view we are led to\na scientific conception of it which is, we have seen, strikingly\nanalogous to the system which is presented to us in the Christian\nreligion. For not only are the nebulous beginning and fiery\ntermination of the present visible universe indicated in the\nChristian records, but a constitution and power are therein assigned\nto the Unseen Universe strikingly analogous to those at which we\narrive by a legitimate scientific process.\n\n265. Our readers are now in a position to perceive the result of\nquestioning science in this manner, and of abandoning ourselves\nwithout mistrust or hesitation to the guidance of legitimate\nprinciples. It is that science so developed, instead of appearing\nantagonistic to the claims of Christianity, is in reality its most\nefficient supporter; and that the burden of showing how the early\nChristians got hold of a constitution of the unseen universe,\naltogether different from any other cosmogony, but similar to that\nwhich modern science proclaims, is transferred to the shoulders of\nthe opponents of Christianity.\n\n266. For the present we would only add that the principle, of the aid\nof which we have availed ourselves, is not a mere theological weapon,\nbut will, we believe, ultimately prove a most powerful scientific\nauxiliary. Already we have used it in our endeavour to modify the\nmost probable hypothesis which has been formed concerning the\nultimate constitution of matter.\n\nThe truth is, that science and religion neither are nor can be two\nfields of knowledge with no possible communication between them. Such\na hypothesis is simply absurd.\n\nThere is undoubtedly an avenue leading from the one to the other, but\nthis avenue is through the unseen universe, and unfortunately it has\nbeen walled up and ticketed with \u2018_No road this way_,\u2019 professedly\nalike in the name of science at the one end, and in the name of\nreligion at the other.\n\nWe are in hopes that when this region of thought comes to be further\nexamined it may lead to some common ground on which followers of\nscience on the one hand, and of revealed religion on the other, may\nmeet together and recognise each other\u2019s claims without any sacrifice\nof the spirit of independence, or any diminution of self-respect.\nEntertaining these views we shall welcome with sincere pleasure any\nremarks or criticism on these speculations of ours, whether by the\nleaders of scientific thought or by those of religious inquiry.\n\nIt must never be forgotten that, whether we take the scientific\nor the religious point of view, one great object of our life in\nthe visible universe is obviously to _learn_; and that (as human\nbeings are constituted) advance in learning necessarily implies a\nhigh purpose kept steadily before us, and a continuous and arduous\npursuit. For, as we are told in the First Epistle of John, \u2018This is\nthe victory which overcometh the world, even our faith.\u2019\n\n\n \u03a4\u1ff7 \u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03ce\u03c3\u03c9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c6\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n \u03be\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b6\u03c9\u1fc6\u03c2 ...\n\n\n Edinburgh University Press:\n THOMAS AND ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE, PRINTERS TO HER MAJESTY\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] It will be seen from our last chapter that we have used by\npreference the word _Soul_ to represent that which survives death\nboth in the righteous and the wicked.\n\n[2] See also Job xxi. 14, 15.\n\n[3] See _Westminster Sermons_, by the Rev. Charles Kingsley.\n\n[4] Wilkinson.\n\n[5] Wilkinson.\n\n[6] Exod. vi. 2.\n\n[7] Gen. xix. 12.\n\n[8] _Lectures on the Jewish Church._\n\n[9] Dan. xii. 2.\n\n[10] Dan. xii. 13.\n\n[11] 2 Macc. vii. 14.\n\n[12] _Wars of the Jews_, II. viii. 14.\n\n[13] _Essays on some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion._\n\n[14] _Ph\u00e6drus_, quoted by Wilkinson.\n\n[15] _Chips from a German Workshop._\n\n[16] 1 Cor. xv. 35.\n\n[17] Ps. cii. 25.\n\n[18] 2 Cor. iv. 18.\n\n[19] 2 Pet. iii. 10.\n\n[20] Rev. xx. 11.\n\n[21] See footnote to Art. 224.\n\n[22] John v. 30.\n\n[23] Gal. iv. 4.\n\n[24] John viii. 28.\n\n[25] See Professor Huxley\u2019s Birmingham Lecture.\n\n[26] _Life and Writings of Swedenborg_ by William White.\n\n[27] We are aware that a certain class of thinkers regard all matter\nand combinations of matter as in some unexplained sense alive. We\nwill discuss this doctrine in another place; meanwhile it must be\nunderstood that we do not here allude to this peculiar life, which\nfrom its very conception must exist as truly in a dead body as\nin a living one; what we are discussing at present is individual\nconsciousness of the ordinary recognised type.\n\n[28] As will be seen in Chap. III., the more important half of the\nrealities of the physical world are forms of Energy, _which cannot\nexist_ except when associated with Matter. We mention this merely in\na footnote now, as we do not wish to diverge too far from our present\nline of argument.\n\n[29] A very striking analogy to this will be found in Chapter III.,\nwhere it is shown that energy of visible motion often disappears by\ntransformation into the dormant or latent energy of position.\n\n[30] See Essay on this subject by the Hon. Sir W. R. Grove, in his\nbook on _The Correlation of Physical Forces_.\n\n[31] See _Contributions to Solar Physics_, by De la Rue, Stewart, and\nLoewy.\n\n[32] In Chap. IV. the reader will see that the only attempt to\nexplain the mechanism of gravitation, which can be called even\n_hopeful_, does not give _rigorously_ the law of the inverse square\nof the distance.\n\n[33] \u2018I hope all will be well. And, as for the gate you talk of, all\nthe world knows that it is a great way off our country. I cannot\nthink that any man in all our parts doth so much as know the way to\nit; nor need they matter whether they do or no, since we have, as you\nsee, a fine, pleasant, green lane, that comes down from our country,\nthe next way into the way.\u2019\n\n[34] This is discussed in Chapter IV. below.\n\n[35] It is hardly needful to inform our readers that the word\n_substance_ is used in this chapter in the ordinary sense.\n\n[36] See Thomson and Tait\u2019s _Natural Philosophy_, \u00a7 269; or Tait\u2019s\n_Thermodynamics_, \u00a7 91.\n\n[37] Thus paraphrased for us:\u2014\n\n Nature, bewildering in diversity,\n Of marvels Marvel most inscrutable,\n Like Proteus, altereth her shape and mould;\n But Fate remaineth ever immovable,\n And, changeless in persistency, outwears\n The Time of men, the gods\u2019 Eternity.\n\n[38] For a more complete statement of Carnot\u2019s work see Tait, _Recent\nAdvances in Physical Science_, 1876.\n\n[39] They virtually showed that in a perfect steam-engine with\npressure equal to \u2018one atmosphere\u2019 in its boiler, and with its\ncondenser at the temperature of melting ice, the ratio of the heat\ntaken in to the heat given out is 1\u00b7365 to 1. Hence if the difference\nbetween the numbers is to be 100, these must be 374, 274.\u2014_Phil.\nTrans._, 1854.\n\n[40] See Tait, _Phil. Mag._, 1872, I. 338, 516; II. 240.\n\n[41] Thomson and Tait\u2019s _Natural Philosophy_, \u00a7 300; or Tait and\nSteele\u2019s _Dynamics of a Particle_, 3d ed. \u00a7 299.\n\n[42] Stewart and Tait _on the Heating of a Disk by Rotation_ in vacuo\n(_Proceedings of the Royal Society_). See also Stewart\u2019s _Elementary\nTreatise on Heat_, 3d edition, Art. 387 (Clarendon Press Series).\n\n[43] If the visible universe be imagined to be infinite, we should\nhave (following out our line of thought) infinitely large masses\nseparated from each other by infinite distances, appearing for\ninfinite ages in the liquid and solid states, and thence transformed\nby means of infinite collisions into the gaseous condition in which\nthey will remain for another infinite series of ages. Is there much\ngained by this conception?\n\n[44] i. 641. Thus rendered by Munro:\u2014\u2018For fools admire and like all\nthings the more which they perceive to be concealed under involved\nlanguage, and determine things to be true which can prettily tickle\nthe ears and are varnished over with finely sounding phrase.\u2019\n\n[45] This has been spoken of as an exaggeration. We hope it may be\nso; but when it was written (in the winter of 1874) the newspapers\nwere full of the sickening details of the gouging of an old man by\na gang of miners, who afterwards filled the sockets with quicklime!\nThese human fiends are probably already at liberty, having had their\nfew months of simple imprisonment!\n\n[46] Tait, _Proc. R.S.E._, 1874-5.\n\n[47] See also the extremely interesting article _Atom_, by\nClerk-Maxwell, in the 9th ed. of the _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_.\n\n[48] Here it is important to observe that the speculations of Sir\nW. Thomson with regard to the density of the Ether assign only the\ninferior limit of that density. The _real_ density may possibly be\nvery much greater.\n\n[49] _\u00c9tudes d\u2019Astronomie Stellaire_, 1847.\n\n[50] In Art. 148 we made a suggestion that gravitation might be the\nvisible result of a tendency to a minimum of some affection of the\nfluid in which atoms are immersed. The exertion of gravitating force\nmight thus be associated with a change in the constitution of visible\nthings, and might perhaps point to an ultimate dying out, just as the\nradiation from the sun, which obeys the same formal law as that of\ngravity, points to a dying out of our luminary.\n\nIf this be conceivable, the really trivial nature of gravitating\nforce (Art. 139) might come to be associated with the extraordinary\npersistence of the present state of things.\n\n[51] The words \u2018left to its own laws\u2019 must not be taken too\nliterally. We ought perhaps rather to say, the procedure of the\nGovernor of the visible universe is at present such as to indicate\nuniformity of physical laws, while, on the other hand, His procedure\nwhen producing the universe indicated an intelligent agent designing\nuniformity of product.\n\n[52] _Lay Sermons, Essays, and Reviews._\n\n[53] Stewart on the _Conservation of Energy_.\n\n[54] Stewart on the _Conservation of Energy_.\n\n[55] Stewart on the _Conservation of Energy_.\n\n[56] See Meldrum on the _Periodicity of Rainfall_.\n\n[57] _Principles of Science_, vol. ii. p. 455.\n\n[58] So-called Ninth Bridgewater Treatise.\n\n[59] It is surely unnecessary to inform our readers that we adopt\nthis hypothesis, not because we imagine it to have any inherent\nprobability, but simply as a concrete mode of bringing development\nbefore the understanding.\n\n[60] We are not here opposing the theological doctrine that _the\nUniverse is in the Son of God_. In fact, when we contemplate any past\nphase of the Universe, we are driven to look upon this as having been\npreviously developed by the Son of God, who doubtless also sustains\nit. This therefore represents the theological doctrine, nevertheless\nit will at once be acknowledged that we may speak of Christ as being\nin the Universe.\n\n[61] Heb. x. 7.\n\n[62] See a specially interesting and exhaustive paper by Lister\n(_Trans. R. S. E._, 1874-5). A very clear analysis of it is given by\nCrum Brown (_Proc. R. S. E._, 1875).\n\n[63] _Nature_, January 14, 1875.\n\n[64] The Rev. James Martineau has, we perceive, taken up a similar\nline of argument. (See Art. on \u2018Modern Materialism,\u2019 _Contemporary\nReview_, February 1876.)\n\n[65] See Sermon preached at Belfast by Dr. Reichel, August 23, 1874.\n\n[66] [Those who believe that the New Testament asserts the\nannihilation of the wicked in _Gehenna_, of course hold that only the\njust obtain the spiritual body. But we have no definite term for the\nbody as it shall be (in the _Hades_ of the New Testament) between\ndeath and the resurrection. It is probable that the want of such a\nterm is due to the fact that the authors of our recognised version\nhave unfortunately rendered both Hades and Gehenna indifferently by\nthe word Hell, itself a term from Scandinavian mythology.]\n\n[67] \u2018As the word went out of the king\u2019s mouth, they covered Haman\u2019s\nface.\u2019\u2014Esther vii. 8.\n\n[68] St. Matthew xxii. 11-13. [See, however, also Luke xiii. 28,\nwhere the true meaning obviously is \u2018_while ye are being cast out_.\u2019\nThere are other obvious mistranslations in our version; such as for\ninstance that of Mark ix. 43, where for \u2018the fire that cannot be\nput out\u2019 we have \u2018the fire that never shall be quenched.\u2019 It is to\nbe hoped that the revised version will be such as to give readers\nignorant of Greek a thoroughly correct idea of the meaning of the\noriginal, most especially on points of such awful importance as this.]\n\n[69] The extent of our knowledge, or rather of our ignorance, on this\nsubject has been happily rendered by the Rev. Dr. Irons, when he\nstates that all we are authorised to infer is that retribution will\nbe morally complete.\n\n[70] The sense is as follows:\u2014Master, said I, will these torments\nincrease after the great judgment, will they be less, or equally\nsevere? He replied\u2014Go back to your scholastic learning, which tells\nyou that the more perfect the being the more he feels both pleasure\nand pain. And, although these accursed ones can never reach full\nperfection, they expect to be more perfect after than before (the\njudgment).\n\n[71] [We ought perhaps to inform our readers that what we have here\nsaid refers to that particular state after the present\u2014the dying out\nof which, in consequence of voluntary separation from its centre of\nlife and energy, has been called the second death. Whether this dying\nout is equivalent to absolute annihilation is a point which we do not\npretend to discuss.]\n\n[72] Including in it _a state of things_ like the present physical\nuniverse; not, however, _the very things_ that now exist, these being\nevanescent in energy at least, if not also in material.\n\n[73] _Cambridge_, Macmillan, 1855.\n\n\n\n\n TRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTE\n\n Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been\n corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within\n the text and consultation of external sources.\n\n Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,\n when a predominant preference was found in the original book.\n\n Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,\n and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.\n\n Pg 78: \u2018tell us\u2019 replaced by \u2018tells us\u2019.\n Pg 115: \u2018\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03b9\u03c2\u2019 replaced by \u2018\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\u2019.\n Pg 118: \u2018first to recal\u2019 replaced by \u2018first to recall\u2019.\n Pg 150: \u2018The griding sword\u2019 replaced by \u2018The grinding sword\u2019.\n Pg 205: \u2018in the charracter\u2019 replaced by \u2018in the character\u2019.\n Pg 213: \u2018its continous energy\u2019 replaced by \u2018its continuous energy\u2019.\n Pg 227: \u2018John iii. 16\u2019 replaced by \u2018John iii. 13\u2019.\n Pg 243: \u2018school of thought are\u2019 replaced by \u2018school of thought is\u2019.\n Footnote 44, Pg 131: \u2018tickle the the ears\u2019 replaced by\n \u2018tickle the ears\u2019.","title":"The unseen universe : $b or, physical speculations on a future state","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":82329}