{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_75243/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_75243","id":"gutenberg_75243","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/75243","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: History - Warfare","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Category: Science - Physics","Hydrogen bomb"],"text":"THE\n                               HELL BOMB\n\n\n                                   BY\n\n                         _William L. Laurence_\n\n[Illustration: [Logo]]\n\n                           1951      NEW YORK\n\n                            ALFRED A. KNOPF\n\n\n\n\n[Illustration: THIS IS A BORZOI BOOK, PUBLISHED BY ALFRED A. KNOPF,\nINC.]\n\n_Copyright 1950 by The Curtis Publishing Co. Copyright 1950 by William\nL. Laurence. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced\nin any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by\na reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review to be printed in a\nmagazine or newspaper. Manufactured in the United States of America.\nPublished simultaneously in Canada by McClelland & Stewart Limited._\n\n                       FIRST AND SECOND PRINTINGS\n                           BEFORE PUBLICATION\n                      THIRD PRINTING, JANUARY 1951\n\n\n\n\n                             To _FLORENCE_\n\n\n\n\n                                FOREWORD\n\n\nThe material in this book falls into two categories: (1) a popular\nversion in terms understandable to the layman of technical data\npublished in scientific literature in this country and abroad, and\nwidely known among scientists everywhere; and (2) technical conclusions\nreached by deduction based on these published facts and theory, for\nwhich I assume the sole responsibility. In doing so, I wish to make it\nemphatically clear that I have had no access to any classified\ninformation on the current hydrogen-bomb program, and also that whatever\naccess I had to H-bomb information during my stay at Los Alamos in the\nspring and summer of 1945 was strictly limited to the somewhat vague and\ngeneral discussions carried on there in 1945 and earlier.\n\nI hereby take the opportunity to express my profound appreciation to Dr.\nJames G. Beckerley, Director of Classification, Atomic Energy\nCommission, Washington, D. C., and to Mr. Corbin Allardice, Director,\nPublic Information Service, of the AEC\u2019s New York Operations Office, for\ntheir generous cooperation in clearing this manuscript for publication.\nIt must be strictly understood that any such clearance merely means that\nthe AEC has \u201cno objection to publication\u201d on the grounds of security. It\ndoes not in any way vouch for the accuracy or correctness of the book\u2019s\ncontents.\n\n                                                     WILLIAM L. LAURENCE\n\n  _New York City\n  July 30, 1950_\n\n\n\n\n                                CONTENTS\n\n\n I    The Truth about the Hydrogen Bomb                                3\n\n II   The Real Secret of the Hydrogen Bomb                            29\n\n III  Shall We Renounce the Use of the H-bomb?                        57\n\n IV   Korea Cleared the Air                                           88\n\n V    A Primer of Atomic Energy                                      114\n\n APPENDIX: The Hydrogen Bomb and International Control               149\n      A.   _Significant Events in the History of International\n             Control of Atomic Weapons_                              151\n      B.   _The International Control of Atomic Weapons: a Brief\n             History of Proposals and Negotiations_                  155\n      C.   _The Atomic Impasse_                                      168\n      D.   _Possible Questions Regarding H-bombs and International\n             Control_                                                171\n\n\n\n\n                              INTRODUCTION\n\n             \u201cDemocracy Depends on an Informed Electorate\u201d\n\n\n\u201c_It is most important in our democracy that our government be frank and\nopen with the citizens. In a democracy it is only possible to have good\ngovernment when the citizens are well informed. It is difficult enough\nfor them to become well informed when the information is easily\navailable. When that information is not available, it is impossible.\nWhile there may be some cases in which the information which the citizen\nneeds, in order to make an intelligent judgment of national policy, must\nbe kept secret, so that military potential will not be jeopardized, the\npresent use of secrecy far exceeds this minimum limit. These are the\nmethods of an authoritarian government and should be vigorously opposed\nin our democracy...._\n\n\u201c_The citizen must choose insofar as that is possible. Today, if he\ntries to come to some conclusion about what should be done to increase\nthe national security, the citizen runs up against a high wall of\nsecrecy. He can, of course, take the easy solution and say that these\nare questions which should be left to the upper echelons of the military\nestablishment to decide. But these questions are so important today,\nthat to leave them to the military men to decide is for the citizen\nessentially to abrogate his basic responsibility. If, in time of peace,\nquestions on which the future of our country depends are left to any\nsmall group, not representative of the people, to decide, we have gone a\nlong way toward authoritarian government._\n\n\u201c_The United States has grown to be a strong nation under a constitution\nwhich wisely has laid great emphasis upon the importance of free and\nopen discussion. Urged by a large number of people who have fallen for\nthe fallacy that in secrecy there is security, and, I regret, encouraged\nby many, including eminent scientists, to prophesy doom just around the\ncorner, we are dangerously close to abandoning those principles of free\nspeech and open discussion which have made our country great. The\ndemocratic system depends on making intelligent decisions by the\nelectorate. Our democratic heritage can only be carried on if the\ncitizen has the information with which to make an intelligent\ndecision._\u201d\n\n  (From a talk on the hydrogen bomb, March 27, 1950, at Town Hall, Los\n  Angeles, by PROFESSOR ROBERT F. BACHER, head of the Physics\n  Department, California Institute of Technology. Professor Bacher\n  served as the first scientific member of the Atomic Energy Commission\n  and was one of the major architects of the atomic bomb at Los Alamos,\n  New Mexico.)\n\n\n\n\n                             THE HELL BOMB\n\n\n\n\n                                   I\n                   THE TRUTH ABOUT THE HYDROGEN BOMB\n\n\nI first heard about the hydrogen bomb in the spring of 1945 in Los\nAlamos, New Mexico, where our scientists were putting the finishing\ntouches on the model-T uranium, or plutonium, fission bomb. I learned to\nmy astonishment that, in addition to this work, they were already\nconsidering preliminary designs for a hydrogen-fusion bomb, which in\ntheir lighter moments they called the \u201cSuperduper\u201d or just the \u201cSuper.\u201d\n\nI can still remember my shock and incredulity when I first heard about\nit from one of the scientists assigned to me by Dr. J. Robert\nOppenheimer as guides in the Dantesque world that was Los Alamos, where\nthe very atmosphere gave one the sense of being in the presence of the\nsupernatural. It seemed so fantastic to talk of a superatomic bomb even\nbefore the uranium, or the plutonium, bomb had been completed and\ntested\u2014in fact, even before anybody knew that it would work at all\u2014that\nI was inclined at first to disbelieve it. Could anything be more\npowerful, I found myself thinking, than a weapon that, on paper at\nleast, promised to release an explosive force of 20,000 tons of TNT? It\nwas a screwball world, this world of Los Alamos, I kept saying to\nmyself, and this was just a screwball notion of my younger scientific\nmentors.\n\nSo at the first opportunity I put the question to Professor Hans A.\nBethe, of Cornell University, one of the world\u2019s top atomic scientists,\nwho headed the elite circle of theoretical physicists at Los Alamos. Dr.\nBethe, I knew, was the outstanding authority in the world qualified to\ntalk about the subject, since he was the very man who first succeeded in\nexplaining how the fusion of hydrogen in the sun is the source of energy\nthat will make it possible for life to continue on earth for billions of\nyears.\n\n\u201cIs it true about the superbomb?\u201d I asked him. \u201cWill it really be as\nmuch as fifty times as powerful as the uranium or plutonium bomb?\u201d\n\nI shall never forget the impact on me of his quiet answer as he looked\naway toward the Sangre de Cristo (Blood of Christ) mountain range, their\npeaks turning blood-red in the New Mexico twilight. \u201cYes,\u201d he said, \u201cit\ncould be made to equal a million tons of TNT.\u201d Then, after a pause:\n\u201cEven more than a million.\u201d\n\nThe tops of the mountains seemed to catch fire as he spoke.\n\nLong before it was discovered that vast amounts of energy could be\nliberated by the fission (splitting) of the nuclei of a twin of the\nheaviest element in nature\u2014namely, uranium of atomic mass 235 (235 times\nthe mass of the hydrogen atom, lightest of all the elements)\u2014scientists\nhad known that truly staggering amounts of energy would be released if\none could fuse together four atoms of hydrogen, the first element on the\natomic table, into one atom of helium, element number two on that table,\nwhich weighs about four times as much as hydrogen. In December\n1938\u2014three weeks before the discovery of uranium fission was announced\nin Germany\u2014Dr. Bethe had published his famous hypothesis about the\nfusion of four hydrogen atoms in the sun to form helium. This provided\nthe first satisfactory explanation of the mechanism that enables the sun\nto radiate away in space every second a quantity of light and heat\nequivalent to the energy content of nearly fifteen quadrillion tons of\ncoal. And while Dr. Bethe was the first to work out the fine details of\nthe process, scientists had been speculating for more than twenty years\non the likelihood of hydrogen fusion in the sun as source of the sun\u2019s\neternal radiance.\n\nAmerican audiences first heard about hydrogen as the solar fuel in a\nlecture, on March 10, 1922, at the Franklin Institute, Philadelphia, by\nProfessor Francis William Aston, famous British Nobel-Prize-winning\nchemist, who even at that early date warned mankind against what he\ncalled \u201ctinkering with the angry atoms.\u201d His words on that occasion have\na strange prophetic ring, though most of what he said is now known to be\nwrong. \u201cShould the research worker of the future discover some means of\nreleasing this energy [from hydrogen] in a form which could be\nemployed,\u201d he predicted, \u201cthe human race will have at its command powers\nbeyond the dreams of scientific fiction, but the remote possibility must\nalways be considered that the energy, once liberated, will be completely\nuncontrollable and by its violence detonate a neighboring substance. If\nthis happens, all of the hydrogen on earth might be transformed [into\nhelium] at once, and this most successful experiment might be published\nto the rest of the universe in the form of a new star of extraordinary\nbrilliance, as the earth blew up in one vast explosion.\u201d\n\nBy 1945 we had learned that many things were wrong in Professor Aston\u2019s\nprophecy. It had been definitely established, for example, that it would\nbe impossible to \u201ctransform all the hydrogen on earth at once,\u201d no\nmatter how many superduper hydrogen bombs were to be exploded. In fact,\nwe had learned that, under conditions as they exist on earth, we could\nnever use common hydrogen, the element that makes up one ninth by weight\nof all water, either in a superduper bomb or as an atomic fuel for\npower. On the other hand, ten years after Dr. Aston\u2019s lecture a new type\nof hydrogen was discovered to exist in nature. It was found to\nconstitute one five-thousandth part of the earth\u2019s waters, including the\nwater in the tissues of plants and animals. It was shown to have an\natomic weight of two\u2014double the weight of common hydrogen\u2014and was named\ndeuterium. The nucleus, or center, of the deuterium atom was named the\ndeuteron, to distinguish it from the nucleus of common hydrogen, known\nas the proton. Deuterium also became popularly known as \u201cheavy\nhydrogen.\u201d Water containing two deuterium atoms in place of the two\natoms of light hydrogen became known as \u201cheavy water.\u201d\n\nThe most startling fact learned about deuterium soon after its discovery\nin 1932 was that it offered potentialities as an atomic fuel, or an\nexplosive, of tremendous energy, provided one condition could be met.\nThis condition was a \u201cmatch\u201d to light it with. And here was the catch.\nThe flame of this match, it was found, would have to have a temperature\nof the order of 50,000,000 degrees centigrade, two and a half times the\ntemperature in the interior of the sun.\n\nOddly enough, the discovery of the principle that made the atomic bomb\npossible also brought with it the promise that a \u201cdeuterium fire\u201d might,\nafter all, be lighted on earth. Early studies had revealed that the\nexplosion of an atomic bomb, if it lived up to expectations, would\ngenerate a central temperature of about 50,000,000 degrees centigrade.\nHere, at last, was the promise of realization of the impossible\u2014the\n50,000,000 degree match.\n\nThe men of Los Alamos thus knew that if the atomic bomb they were just\ncompleting for its first test worked as they hoped it would, it could be\nused as the match to light the deuterium fire. They could build a\nsuperduper bomb of a thousand times the power of the atomic bomb by\nincorporating deuterium in the A-bomb, the explosion of which would act\nas the trigger for the superexplosion. And they also knew that the\ndeuterium bomb held such additional potentialities of terror, beyond its\nvastly greater blasting and burning power, that the step from the duper\nto the super would be just as great as the step from TNT to the duper.\n\nThe hydrogen bomb, H-bomb, or hell bomb, as the fusion bomb had become\npopularly known, thus became a reality in the flash of the explosion of\nthe first atomic bomb at 5:30 of the morning of July 16, 1945, on the\nNew Mexico desert. As the men of Los Alamos, of whom I was at that time\na privileged member, watched the supramundane light and the apocalyptic\nmushroom-topped mountain of nuclear fire rising to a height of more than\neight miles through the clouds, they did not have to wait until they\nchecked with their measuring instruments to know that a match sparking a\nflame of about 50,000,000 degrees centigrade had been lighted on earth\nfor the first time. The size of the fire mountain and the\nend-of-the-world-like thunder that reverberated all around, told the\ntale better than any puny man-made instruments.\n\nAnd there in our midst, as we learned only recently, stood a Judas,\nKlaus Fuchs, a name that \u201cwill live in infamy\u201d along with that of other\narchtraitors of history. By the greatest of ironies, there he was, this\nspy, standing right in the center of what we believed at the time to be\nthe world\u2019s greatest secret, waiting at that very moment to tell the\nRussians of our success and how we achieved it. As he confessed five\nyears later, he betrayed to them the most intimate details not only\nabout the A-bomb but about the H-bomb as well\u2014details that he learned as\na member of the innermost of inner circles. For, alas, he was a trusted\nmember of the theoretical division, the sanctum sanctorum of Los Alamos.\nThis select group of scientists, behind doubly and triply locked doors,\ndiscussed in whispers their ideas about the superduper.\n\nHis associates at Los Alamos, who should know, sadly admit that Fuchs\nmade it possible for Russia to develop her A-bomb at least a year ahead\nof time. It is my own conviction that the information he gave the\nRussians made it possible for their scientists to attain their goal at\nleast three, and possibly as much as ten, years sooner than they could\nhave done it on their own. Yet, though Fuchs confessed everything he\ntold the Russians, the content of his confession is still kept a top\nsecret from the American people, who sadly need information on one of\nthe greatest problems facing mankind. The reason given is that we cannot\nactually be sure that Fuchs told the Russians all that he says he did,\nand, if published, his confession might, by his tricky design, give the\nRussians additional information. Of course, anything is possible for a\nwarped mind such as that of Fuchs. Nevertheless, it seems highly\nimplausible that this traitor, who went to the Russians voluntarily,\nshould withhold any vital information from them for as long as five\nyears. The best evidence that he didn\u2019t is the Russian A-bomb.\n\nYet some good comes even of the greatest evil. All the circumstantial\nevidence points to the fact that during the five-year period following\nthe end of the war our work on the hydrogen bomb had stopped completely.\nThe A-bomb was the mightiest weapon in the world, we seem to have\nreasoned, and it would take Russia many years before she would get an\nA-bomb of her own. Why spend great efforts on a superbomb?\n\nThe shock when Russia exploded her first A-bomb much sooner than we\nexpected, topped by the second shock that Fuchs had handed Moscow all\nour major secrets on a platter\u2014including, as must be surmised, those of\nthe H-bomb\u2014awakened us to the facts of life. It is no accident that\nPresident Truman\u2019s official announcement of the order to build \u201cthe\nso-called hydrogen bomb or superbomb\u201d came within three days of the\nannouncement of Fuchs\u2019s arrest and confession. The President gave his\norder with full knowledge of Fuchs\u2019s confession, which made it evident\nthat the Russians were already at work on the hydrogen bomb and had\nprobably been working on it uninterruptedly since 1945. The tragic\nprospect is that instead of the Russians catching up with us, it is we\nwho may have to catch up with them.\n\nFive years after the first announcement of the explosion of the A-bomb\nover Hiroshima, even the most intelligent Americans still have only the\nvaguest idea about the facts. Yet these facts are within the\nunderstanding of the average man. If we keep the earlier analogy of the\nmatch in mind, it becomes simple to understand the principles underlying\nboth the A-bomb, now more correctly identified as the \u201cfission bomb,\u201d\nand the hydrogen bomb, more properly described as the \u201cfusion bomb.\u201d\n\nOur principal fuel is coal, which, as everyone knows, is \u201cbottled\nsunshine,\u201d stored up in plants that grew about two hundred million years\nago. When we apply the small amount of heat energy from a match, the\nbottled energy is released in the form of light and heat, which we can\nuse in a great variety of ways. The point here is that it requires only\nthe application of a very small amount of energy from a match to release\na very large amount of energy that has been stored for millions of years\nin the ancient plants we know as coal.\n\nNow, during the past half century we discovered that the nuclei, or\ncenters, of the smallest units of which the ninety-odd elements of the\nmaterial universe are made up\u2014units we know as atoms\u2014had stored up\nwithin them since the beginning of creation amounts of energy millions\nof times greater than is stored up by the sun in coal. But we had no\nmatch with which to start an atomic fire burning.\n\nThen, in January 1939, came the world-shaking discovery of the\nphenomenon known as uranium fission. In simple language, we had found a\nproper \u201cmatch\u201d for lighting a fire with a twin of uranium, the\nninety-second, and last, natural element. This twin is a rare form of\nuranium known as uranium 235\u2014the figure signifying that it is 235 times\nheavier than common hydrogen. Doubly phenomenal, the discovery of\nuranium fission meant that to light the atomic fire, with the release of\nstored-up energy three million times greater than that of coal and\ntwenty million times that of TNT (on an equal-weight basis) would\nrequire no match at all. When proper conditions are met, the atomic fire\nwould be lighted automatically by spontaneous combustion.\n\nWhat are these proper conditions? In the presence of certain chemical\nagencies, spontaneous combustion will take place when an easily burning\nsubstance, such as sawdust, for example, accumulates heat until it\nreaches the kindling temperature at which it ignites. The chemical\nagencies here are the equivalent of a match.\n\nThe requirement to start the spontaneous combustion of uranium 235, and\nalso of two man-made elements named plutonium and uranium 233 (all three\nknown as fissionable materials or nuclear fuels), is just as simple. In\nthis operation you do not need a critical temperature, but what is known\nas a critical mass. This simply means that spontaneous combustion of any\none of the three atomic fuels takes place as soon as you assemble a lump\nof a certain weight. The actual critical mass is a top secret. But the\nnoted British physicist, Dr. M. L. E. Oliphant, of radar fame, published\nin 1946 his own estimate, which places its weight between ten and thirty\nkilograms. If so, this would mean that a lump of uranium 235 (U-235),\nplutonium, or U-233, weighing ten or thirty kilograms, as the case may\nbe, would explode automatically by spontaneous combustion and release an\nexplosive force of 20,000 tons of TNT for each kilogram undergoing\ncomplete combustion. In the conventional A-bomb a critical mass is\nassembled in the last split second by a timing mechanism that brings\ntogether, let us say, one tenth and nine tenths of a critical mass. The\nspontaneous combustion that followed such a consummation on August 6 and\n9, 1945 destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.\n\nThus, if we substitute the familiar phrase \u201cspontaneous combustion\u201d for\nthe less familiar word \u201cfission,\u201d we get a clear understanding of what\nis known in scientific jargon as the \u201cfission process,\u201d a\n\u201cself-multiplying chain reaction with neutrons,\u201d and similar technical\nmumbo-jumbo. These terms simply mean the lighting of an atomic fire and\nthe release of great amounts of the energy stored in the nuclei of U-235\nsince the beginning of the universe. The two so-called man-made elements\nare not really created. They are merely transformed out of two natural\nheavy elements in such a way that their stored energy is liberated by\nthe process of spontaneous combustion.\n\nWhy, one may ask, does not spontaneous combustion of U-235 take place in\nnature? Why, indeed, has not all the U-235 in nature caught fire\nautomatically long ago? To this also there is a simple answer. Just as\nin the spontaneous combustion of sawdust the material must be dry enough\nto burn, so must the U-235. Only in place of the word \u201cdry\u201d we must use\nthe word \u201cconcentrated.\u201d The U-235 found in nature is very much diluted\nwith another element that makes it \u201cwet.\u201d It therefore must be separated\nfirst, by a very laborious and costly process, from the nonfissionable,\nor \u201cwetting,\u201d element. Even then it won\u2019t catch fire, and could not be\nmade to burn by any means, until the amount separated (\u201cdried\u201d) reaches\nthe critical mass. When these two conditions\u2014conditions that do not\nexist in nature\u2014are met, the U-235 catches fire just as sawdust does\nwhen it reaches the critical temperature.\n\nThe fact that as soon as a critical mass is assembled the three\nelemental atomic fuels burst into flame automatically thus puts a\ndefinite limit to the amount of material that can be used in the\nconventional A-bomb. The best you can do is to incorporate into a bomb\ntwo fragments, let us say, of nine tenths of a critical mass each. To\nenclose more than two such fragments would present difficulties that\nappear impossible to overcome. It is this limitation of size, an\ninsurmountable roadblock put there by mother nature, that makes the\nbasic difference between the A-bomb and the H-bomb.\n\nFor, as we have already seen, to light an atomic fire with deuterium it\nis necessary to strike a match generating a flame with a temperature of\nabout 50,000,000 degrees centigrade. As long as no such match is\napplied, no fire can start. It thus becomes obvious that deuterium is\nnot limited by nature to a critical mass. A quantity of deuterium a\nthousand times the amount of the U-235, and hence a thousand times more\npowerful, can therefore be incorporated in an ordinary A-bomb, where it\nwould remain quiescent until the A-bomb match is struck. Weight for\nweight, deuterium has only a little more energy content than U-235, so\nthat a bomb incorporating a 1,000 kilograms (one ton) of deuterium would\nthus have an energy of 20,000,000 tons of TNT.\n\nHere must be mentioned another form of hydrogen, named tritium. It has\nlong ago disappeared from nature but it is now being re-created in\nponderable amounts in our atomic furnaces. Tritium, the nucleus of which\nis known as a triton, weighs three times as much as the lightest form of\nhydrogen. It has an energy content nearly twice that of deuterium. But\nit is very difficult to make and is extremely expensive. Its cost per\nkilogram at present AEC prices is close to a billion dollars, as\ncompared with no more than $4,500 for a kilogram of deuterium. A\ncombination of deuterons and tritons would release the greatest energy\nof all, 3.5 times the energy of deuterons alone. It would reduce the\namount of tritons required to half the volume and three fifths of the\nweight required in a pure triton bomb, thus making the cost considerably\nlower.\n\nBut why bother with such fantastically costly tritons when we can get\nall the deuterium we want at no more than $4,500 a kilogram, while we\ncan make up the difference in energy by merely incorporating two to\nthree and a half times as much deuterium? Here we are dealing with what\nis probably the most ticklish question in the design of the H-bomb.\n\nTo light a fire successfully, it is not enough merely to have a match.\nThe match must burn for a time long enough for its flame to act. If you\ntry to light a cigarette in a strong wind, the wind may blow out your\nmatch so fast that your cigarette will not light. The same question\npresents itself here, but on a much greater scale. The match for\nlighting deuterium\u2014namely, the A-bomb\u2014burns only for about a hundred\nbillionths of a second. Is this time long enough to light the\n\u201ccigarette\u201d with this one and only \u201cmatch\u201d?\n\nIt is known that the time is much too slow for lighting deuterium in its\ngaseous form. But it is also known that the inflammability is much\nfaster when the gas is compressed to its liquid form, at which its\ndensity is 790 times greater. At this density it would take only seven\nliters (about 7.4 quarts) per one kilogram (2.2 pounds), as compared\nwith 5,555 liters for gaseous deuterium. And it catches fire in a much\nshorter time.\n\nIs this time long enough? On the answer to this question will depend\nwhether the hydrogen bomb will consist of deuterium alone or of\ndeuterium and tritium, for it is known that the deuteron-triton\ncombination catches fire much faster than deuterons or tritons alone.\n\nWe were already working with tritium in Los Alamos as far back as 1945.\nI remember the time when Dr. Oppenheimer, wartime scientific director of\nLos Alamos, went to a large safe and brought out a small vial of a clear\nliquid that looked like water. It was the first highly diluted minute\nsample of superheavy water, composed of tritium and oxygen, ever to\nexist in the world, or anywhere in the universe, for that matter. We\nboth looked at it in silent, rapt admiration. Though we did not speak,\neach of us knew what the other was thinking. Here was something, our\nthoughts ran, that existed on earth in gaseous form some two billion\nyears ago, long before there were any waters or any forms of life. Here\nwas something with the power to return the earth to its lifeless state\nof two billion years ago.\n\nThe question of what type of hydrogen is to be used in the H-bomb\ntherefore hangs on the question of which one of the possible\ncombinations will catch fire by the light of a match that is blown out\nafter an interval of about a hundred billionths of a second. On the\nanswer to this question will also depend the time it will take us to\ncomplete the H-bomb and its cost. To make a bomb of a thousand times the\npower of the A-bomb would require a 1,000 kilograms of deuterium at a\ncost of $4,500,000, or 171 kilograms of tritium and 114 kilograms of\ndeuterium at a total cost of more than $166,000,000,000 at current\nprices, not counting the cost of the A-bomb trigger. Large-scale\nproduction of tritium, however, will most certainly reduce its cost\nenormously, possibly by a factor of ten thousand or more, while, as will\nbe indicated later, the amount of tritium, if required, may turn out to\nbe much smaller.\n\n[Illustration: MAP BY DANIEL BROWNSTEIN]\n\nWe can thus see that if deuterium alone is found to be all that is\nrequired to set off an H-bomb it will be cheap and relatively easy to\nmake in a short time\u2014both for us and for Russia. Furthermore, such a\ndeuterium bomb would be practically limitless in size. One of a million\ntimes the power of the Hiroshima bomb is possible, since deuterium can\nbe extracted in limitless amounts from plain water. On the other hand,\nif sizable amounts of tritium are found necessary, the cost will be much\nhigher and it will take a considerably longer time, since the production\nof tritium is very slow and costly. This, in turn, will place a definite\nlimit on the power of the H-bomb, since, unlike deuterium, the amounts\nof tritium will necessarily always be limited. As will be shown later,\nwe are at present in a much more advantageous position to produce\ntritium than is Russia, so that if tritium is found necessary, we have a\nhead start on her in H-bomb development.\n\nThe radius of destructiveness by the blast of a bomb with a thousand\ntimes the energy of the A-bomb will be only ten times greater, since the\nincrease goes by the cube root of the energy. The radius of total\ndestruction by blast in Hiroshima was one mile. Therefore the radius of\na superbomb a thousand times more powerful will be ten miles, or a total\narea of 314 square miles. A bomb a million times the power of the\nHiroshima bomb would require 1,000 tons of deuterium. Such a\nsuper-superduper could be exploded at a distance from an abandoned,\ninnocent-looking tramp ship. It would have a radius of destruction by\nblast of 100 miles and a destructive area of more than 30,000 square\nmiles. The time may come when we shall have to search every vessel\nseveral hundred miles off shore. And the time may be nearer than we\nthink.\n\nThe radius over which the tremendous heat generated by a bomb of a\nthousandfold the energy would produce fatal burns would be as far as\ntwenty miles from the center of the explosion. This radius increases as\nthe square root, instead of the cube root, of the power. The Hiroshima\nbomb caused fatal burns at a radius of two thirds of a mile.\n\nThe effects of the radiations from a hydrogen bomb are so terrifying\nthat by describing them I run the risk of being branded a fearmonger.\nYet facts are facts, and they have been known to scientists for a long\ntime. It would be a disservice to the people if the facts were further\ndenied to them. We have already paid too high a price for a secrecy that\nnow turns out never to have been secret at all.\n\nI can do no better than quote Albert Einstein. \u201cThe hydrogen bomb,\u201d he\nsaid, \u201cappears on the public horizon as a probably attainable goal....\nIf successful, radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere, and hence\nannihilation of any life on earth, has been brought within the range of\ntechnical possibilities.\u201d\n\nWhat Dr. Einstein meant by \u201cradioactive poisoning of the atmosphere, and\nhence the annihilation of any life on earth,\u201d was explained in realistic\ndetail by such eminent physicists as Dr. Bethe, Dr. Leo Szilard, Dr.\nEdward Teller, and others. All of them may even now be engaged on work\non the hydrogen bomb.\n\nHere is how \u201cpoisoning of the atmosphere\u201d may result from the explosion\nof a hydrogen bomb: Tremendous quantities of neutrons, which can enter\nany substance in nature and make it radioactive, are liberated. In the\ncase of a deuterium bomb, one eighth of the mass used\u2014125 grams per\nkilogram\u2014is liberated. In the case of a deuteron-tritium bomb, fully one\nfifth of the mass\u2014200 grams per kilogram\u2014is released, while in a bomb\nusing pure tritium, fully one third of the mass\u2014333 grams per\nkilogram\u2014is liberated as free neutrons. There are 600,000 billion\nbillion neutrons in each gram, each capable of producing a radioactive\natom in its environment. The neutron is one of the two building blocks\nof the nuclei of all atoms.\n\nThese neutrons can be used to make any element radioactive, Professor\nSzilard and his colleagues point out. It follows that the casing of the\nbomb could be selected with a view to producing, after the neutrons\nenter it, an especially powerful radioactive substance. Since each\nartificially made, radioactive element gives out a specific type of\nradiation and has a definite life span, after which it decays to one\nhalf of its radioactivity, the designer of the bomb could rig it in such\na way that its explosion would spread into the air a tremendous cloud of\nspecially selected radioactive substances that would give off lethal\nradiations for a definite period of time. In such a way a large area\ncould be made unfit for human or animal habitation for a definite period\nof time, months or years.\n\nTake, for example, the very common element cobalt. When bombarded with\nneutrons, it turns into an intensely radioactive element, 320 times more\npowerful than radium. Any given quantity of neutrons would produce sixty\ntimes its weight in radioactive cobalt. If the bomb contains a ton of\ndeuterium, 250 pounds would come out as neutrons. On the assumption that\nevery neutron enters a cobalt atom, this would produce 7.5 tons of\nradioactive cobalt. That quantity would give out as much radioactivity\nas 2,400 tons of radium.\n\nNow, this radioactive cobalt has a half-life of five years, meaning that\nit loses half of its radioactive power at every five-year period. So\nafter a lapse of that period of time its radioactivity would be equal to\n1,200 tons of radium, in ten years to 600 tons, and so on. If used as a\nbomb-casing it would be pulverized and converted into a gigantic\nradioactive cloud that would kill everything in the area it blankets.\nNor would it be confined to a particular area, since the winds would\ntake it thousands of miles, carrying death to distant places.\n\nThe radioactivity produced by the Bikini bombs was detected within one\nweek in the United States. In that short time the westerly winds swept\nthe radioactive air mass from Bikini, 4,150 miles away, to San\nFrancisco. When it reached our shores, the activity was weak and\ncompletely harmless, but it was still detectable. That, by the way, was\nhow we learned that the Russians had exploded their first atomic bomb.\n\nBut, in the words of Professor Teller, one of the Los Alamos men who\nmade the preliminary studies on the hydrogen bomb, \u201cif the activity\nliberated at Bikini were multiplied by a factor of a hundred thousand or\na million, and if it were to be released off our Pacific Coast, the\nwhole of the United States would be endangered.\u201d He added that \u201cif such\na quantity of radioactivity should become available, an enemy could make\nlife hard or even impossible for us without delivering a single bomb\ninto our territory.\u201d\n\nOne limitation to such an attack, Professor Teller points out, is the\nboomerang effect of these gases on the attacker himself. The radioactive\ngases would eventually drift over his own country, too. He adds,\nhowever, that since these gases have different rates of decay\u2014some\nfaster, some slower\u2014the attacker is in a position to choose those\nradioactive products best suited to his attack. \u201cWith the proper choice\nhe could ensure that his victim would be seriously damaged by them, and\nthat they would have decayed by the time they reached his own country.\u201d\n\n\u201cIt is not even impossible to imagine,\u201d in the words of Professor\nTeller, \u201cthat the effects of an atomic war fought with greatly perfected\nweapons and pushed by utmost determination will endanger the survival of\nman.... This specific possibility of destruction may help us realize\nmore clearly the probable consequences of an atomic war for our\ncivilization and the possible consequences for the whole human race.\u201d\n\nOn this point Professor Szilard is much more specific. \u201cLet us assume,\u201d\nhe said at a University of Chicago Round Table, \u201cthat we make a\nradioactive element which will live for five years and that we just let\nit go into the air. During the following years it will gradually settle\nout and cover the whole earth with dust. I have asked myself, \u2018How many\nneutrons or how much heavy hydrogen do we have to detonate to kill\neverybody on earth by this particular method?\u2019 I come up with about\nfifty tons of neutrons as being plenty to kill everybody, which means\nabout 400 tons of heavy hydrogen\u201d (deuterium).\n\nNow, obviously Professor Szilard was stating the extreme case. He merely\ncalled attention to the scientific fact that man now has at his\ndisposal, or soon will have, means that not only could wipe out all life\non earth, but could also make the earth itself unfit for life for many\ngenerations to come, if not forever. Here we have indeed what is\nprobably the greatest example of irony in man\u2019s history. The very\nprocess in the sun that made life possible on earth, and is responsible\nfor its being maintained here, can now be used by man to wipe out that\nvery life and to ruin the earth for good.\n\nIt is inconceivable that any leaders of men today, or in the near\nfuture, would resort to such an extreme measure. But the fact remains\nthat such a measure is possible. And it is by no means unthinkable that\na Hitler, faced with certain defeat, would not choose to die in a great\nG\u00f6tterd\u00e4mmerung in which he would pull down the whole of humanity with\nhim to destruction. And who can be bold enough to guarantee that another\nHitler might not arise sometime, somewhere, possibly in a rejuvenated\nGermany making another bid for world domination or total annihilation?\n\nIt is more likely, of course, that an attacker, particularly if he is\notherwise faced with certain defeat, might choose the less drastic\nmethod outlined by Professor Teller, selecting for his weapon a\nshort-lived radioactive element that would have spent itself by the time\nit reached his shores. If he is the sole possessor of the hydrogen bomb,\nhe may not even have to use it, a threat of its use being sufficient to\nend the war on terms to his liking. In the face of such a threat, as\nProfessor Szilard pointed out, who would dare take the responsibility of\nrefusing?\n\nThese are the stark, unvarnished facts about the \u201cso-called hydrogen\nbomb.\u201d They raise many questions to which the American people as a whole\nwill have to find the answer. It is possible, and the odds here are more\nthan even, that the very possession of the hydrogen bomb by both\nourselves and Russia will make war unthinkable, since neither side could\nbe the winner. This would be a near certainty if we had the answer to\nRussia\u2019s Trojan Horse method of taking over nations by first taking over\ntheir governments, as was done in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and\nthe Balkan countries. Suppose the Communists take over Italy, then\nGermany, by the same method. What would we do then? The answer is, of\ncourse, that if we wait until \u201cthen,\u201d everything would be lost, no\nmatter what we did. It therefore becomes obvious that our very existence\nmay depend on what we do _here_ and _now_ to prevent such an\neventuality.\n\nNow that the hydrogen bomb has come out into the open after five years\nas a super-top secret, the authorities, and particularly the Atomic\nEnergy Commission, may be called upon to answer some embarrassing\nquestions. \u201cWhy,\u201d we may ask, \u201cwas the work on the hydrogen bomb\napparently dropped altogether during the past five years?\u201d According to\nProfessor Bethe, it would take about three years to develop it. This\nmeans that, had we continued working on it in 1945 and thereafter, we\nwould have had it as far back as 1948. We have thus lost five precious\nyears, our loss being Russia\u2019s gain.\n\nSome scientists and others contend that, because of our great harbor and\nindustrial cities, the hydrogen bomb would be a greater threat to us\nthan to the Soviet, because most Russian cities are much smaller than\nours, while her industries are much more dispersed. There may be some\ntruth in this. But on the other hand there are some great advantages on\nour side. With a strong Navy and good submarine-detecting devices we may\nhave control of the seas and be able to prevent the delivery of the\nhydrogen bomb by ship or submarine. With a strong Air Force and radar\nsystem we could prevent the delivery of hydrogen bombs from the air.\n\nBy far the most important advantage the possession of the hydrogen bomb\nwould give us against Russia is its possible use as a tactical weapon\nagainst huge land armies. Since they can devastate such large areas, one\nor two hydrogen bombs, depending on their size, could wipe out entire\narmies on the march, even before they succeeded in crossing the border\nof an intended victim. The H-bomb would thus counterbalance, if not\ncompletely nullify, the one great advantage Russia possesses\u2014huge land\narmies capable of overrunning western Europe. The bomb might thus serve\nas the final deterrent to any temptation the Kremlin\u2019s rulers may have\nto invade the Atlantic Pact countries.\n\nYet no matter how one looks at it, the advent of the H-bomb constitutes\nthe greatest threat to the survival of the human race since the Black\nDeath.\n\nOne is reminded of a dinner conversation in Paris in 1869, recorded in\nthe _Journal_ of the Goncourt brothers. Some of the famous savants of\nthe day were crystal-gazing into the scientific future a hundred years\naway. The great chemist Pierre Berthelot predicted that by 1969 \u201cman\nwould know of what the atom is constituted and would be able, at will,\nto moderate, extinguish, and light up the sun as if it were a gas lamp.\u201d\n(This prophecy has almost come true.) Claude Bernard, the greatest\nphysiologist of the day, saw a future in which \u201cman would be so\ncompletely the master of organic law that he would create life\n[artificially] in competition with God.\u201d\n\nTo which the Goncourt brothers added the postscript: \u201cTo all of this we\nraised no objection. But we have the feeling that when this time comes\nto science, God with His white beard will come down to earth, swinging a\nbunch of keys, and will say to humanity, the way they say at five\no\u2019clock at the salon: \u2018Closing time, gentlemen!\u2019\u201d\n\n\n\n\n                                   II\n                  THE REAL SECRET OF THE HYDROGEN BOMB\n\n\nCan the hydrogen bomb actually be made? If so, how soon? How much will\nit cost in money and vital materials? Above all, will it, if made, add\nenough to our security to make the effort worth while?\n\nAs was pointed out by Prof. Robert F. Bacher of the California Institute\nof Technology, one of the chief architects of the wartime atomic bomb\nand the first scientific member of the Atomic Energy Commission, \u201csince\nthe President has directed the AEC to continue with the development [\u2018of\nthe so-called hydrogen, or super bomb\u2019] we can assume that this\ndevelopment is regarded as both possible and feasible.\u201d Many eminent\nphysicists believe that it can be made, and the use by the President of\nthe word \u201ccontinue\u201d suggests that this belief is based on more than\ntheory. No less an authority than Albert Einstein has stated publicly\nthat he regards the H-bomb as \u201ca probably attainable goal.\u201d\n\nOn the other hand, there are scientists of high eminence, such as Dr.\nRobert A. Millikan, our oldest living Nobel-Prize-winner in physics, who\ndoubt whether the H-bomb can be made at all. And there are also those\nwho express the view that, while it probably could be made, it would not\noffer advantages great enough, if any, to justify the cost in vital\nstrategic materials necessary for our security.\n\nFortunately, facts mostly buried in technical literature make it\npossible for us to go behind the scientific curtain and look intimately\nat the reasons for these differences in opinion. More important still,\nthese facts not only provide us with a clearer picture of the nature of\nthe problem but also enable us to make some reasonable deductions or\nspeculations. The scientists directly involved do not feel free to\ndiscuss these matters openly, not because they would be violating\nsecurity, but because of the jittery atmosphere that acts as a damper on\nopen discussion even of subjects known to be non-secret.\n\nWe already know that the so-called hydrogen bomb, if it is to be made at\nall, cannot be made of the abundant common hydrogen of atomic mass one,\nand that there are only two possible materials that could be used for\nsuch a purpose: deuterium, a hydrogen twin twice the weight of common\nhydrogen, which constitutes two hundredths of one per cent of the\nhydrogen in all waters; and a man-made variety of hydrogen, three times\nthe weight of the lightest variety, known as tritium. We also know that\nto explode either deuterium or tritium (also known, respectively, as\nheavy and superheavy hydrogen) a temperature measured in millions of\ndegrees is required. This is attainable on earth only in the explosion\nof an A-bomb, and therefore the A-bomb would have to serve as the fuse\nto set off an explosion of deuterium, tritium, or a mixture of the two.\n\nThese facts, fundamental as they are, merely give us a general idea of\nthe conditions required to make the H-bomb. All concerned, including Dr.\nMillikan, fully accept the validity of these facts. But there is one\nother factor at the very heart of the problem\u2014the extremely short time\nat our disposal in which to kindle the hydrogen bomb with the A-bomb\nmatch. According to statements attributed to him in the press, Dr.\nMillikan believes that the time is too short; in other words, he seems\nto be convinced that the A-bomb match will be blown out before we have\ntime to light the fire. Those of opposite view believe that methods can\nbe devised for \u201cshielding the match against the wind\u201d for just long\nenough to light the fire. As we shall presently see, it is these methods\nfor shielding the match that lead some to doubt whether the game would\nbe worth the candle, or the match, if you will. These honest doubts are\nbased on the possibility that, even if successful, the shielding might\nexact too high a price in terms of vital materials, particularly the\nstuff out of which A-bombs are made\u2014plutonium. According to this view,\nwe may at best be getting but a very small return for our investment in\nmaterials vitally important in war as well as in peace. Even though the\nprice in dollars were to be brought down to a negligible amount.\n\nA closer look at the details of the problem may enable us to penetrate\nthe thick fog that now envelops the subject. We may begin with a\nquotation from Dr. Bacher, who outlined the principle involved with\nremarkable clarity. \u201cThe real problem in developing and constructing a\nhydrogen bomb,\u201d he said in a notable address before the Los Angeles Town\nHall,\n\n\n  is, \u201cHow do you get it going?\u201d The heavy hydrogens, deuterium and\n  tritium, are suitable substances if somehow they could be heated hot\n  enough and kept hot. This problem is a little bit like the job of\n  making a fire at 20 degrees below zero in the mountains with green\n  wood which is covered with ice and with very little kindling. Today,\n  scientists tell us that such a fire can probably be kindled.\n\n  Once you get the fire going, of course, you can pile on the wood and\n  make a very sizeable conflagration. In the same way with the hydrogen\n  bomb, more heavy hydrogen can be used and a bigger explosion obtained.\n  It has been called an open-ended weapon, meaning that more materials\n  can be added and a bigger explosion obtained.\n\n\nThe phrase that goes to the very heart of the problem is \u201cvery little\nkindling,\u201d which is another way of illustrating the difficulty of\nlighting a fire in a high wind when you have only one match. We know\nthat to ignite deuterium, by far the cheaper and more abundant of the\ntwo H-bomb elements, a temperature comparable to those existing in the\ninterior of the sun, some 20,000,000 degrees centigrade, is necessary.\nThis temperature can be realized on earth only in the explosion of an\nA-bomb. We also know that the wartime model A-bombs generated a\ntemperature of about 50,000,000 degrees, more than enough to light a\ndeuterium fire. The trouble lies in the extremely short time interval,\nof the order of a millionth of a second (microsecond), and a fraction\nthereof, during which the A-bomb is held together before it flies apart.\nIn the words of Professor Bacher, we must make our green, ice-covered\nwood catch fire in the subzero mountain weather before the \u201cvery little\nkindling\u201d we have is burned up.\n\nThe times at which deuterium will ignite at any given temperature, in\nboth its gaseous and its liquid form, are widely known among nuclear\nscientists everywhere, including Russia, through publication in official\nscientific literature of a well-known formula, originally worked out by\ntwo European scientists as far back as 1929, and more recently improved\nupon by Professor George Gamow and Professor Teller. By this formula,\nderived from actual experiments, it is known that deuterium in its\ngaseous form will require as long as 128 seconds to ignite at a\ntemperature of 50,000,000 degrees centigrade, well above 100,000,000\ntimes longer than the time in which our little kindling is used up. This\nobviously rules out deuterium in its natural gaseous form as material\nfor an H-bomb.\n\nHow about liquid deuterium? We know that the more atoms there are per\nunit volume (namely, the greater the density), the faster is the time of\nthe reaction. The increase in the speed of the reaction (in this case\nthe ignition of the deuterium) is directly proportional to the square of\nthe density. For example, if the density, (that is, the number of atoms\nper unit volume) is increased by a factor of 10, the time of ignition\nwill be speeded up by the square of 10, or 100 times faster. Since\nliquid deuterium has a density nearly 800 times that of gaseous\ndeuterium, this means that liquid deuterium (which must be maintained at\na temperature of 423 degrees below zero Fahrenheit at a pressure above\none atmosphere) would ignite 640,000 times faster (namely, in\n1/640,000th part of the time) than its gaseous form. Arithmetic shows\nthat the ignition time for liquid deuterium at 50,000,000 degrees\ncentigrade will be 200 microseconds, still 200 times longer than the\nperiod in which our kindling is consumed.\n\nThe same formula also reveals the time it would take liquid deuterium to\nignite at higher temperatures, the increase of which shortens the\nignition time. These figures show that the ignition time for liquid\ndeuterium at 75,000,000 degrees centigrade is 40 microseconds. At\n100,000,000 degrees the time is 30 microseconds; at 150,000,000 degrees,\n15 microseconds; and at 200,000,000 degrees on the centigrade scale,\nabout 4.8 millionths of a second. Doubling the temperature speeds up the\nignition time for liquid deuterium by a factor of about six.\n\nThe problem thus is a dual one: to raise the temperature at which the\nA-bomb explodes, and to extend the time before the A-bomb flies apart.\nIt is also obvious that if the liquid deuterium is to be ignited at all,\nit must be done before the bomb has disintegrated\u2014that is, during the\nincredibly short time interval before it expands into a cloud of vapor\nand gas, since by then the deuterium would no longer be liquid.\n\nCan we increase the A-bomb\u2019s temperature fourfold to 200,000,000 degrees\nand literally make time stand still while it holds together for nearly\nfive millionths of a second? To get a better understanding of the\nproblem we must take a closer look at what takes place inside the A-bomb\nduring the infinitesimal interval in which it comes to life.\n\nThis life history of the A-bomb is an incredible tale, from the time its\ninner mechanisms are set in motion until its metamorphosis into a great\nball of fire. As explained earlier, the A-bomb\u2019s explosion takes place\nthrough a process akin to spontaneous combustion as soon as a certain\nminimum amount (critical mass) of either one of two fissionable\n(combustible) elements\u2014uranium 235 or plutonium\u2014is assembled in one\nunit. The most obvious way it takes place is by bringing together two\npieces of uranium 235 (U-235), or plutonium, each less than a critical\nmass, firing one of these into the other with a gun mechanism, thus\ncreating a critical mass at the last minute. If, for example, the\ncritical mass at which spontaneous combustion takes place is ten\nkilograms (the actual figure is a top secret), then the firing of a\npiece of one kilogram into another of nine kilograms would bring\ntogether a critical mass that would explode faster than the eye could\nwink\u2014in fact, some thousands of times faster than TNT.\n\nJust as an ordinary fire needs oxygen, so does an atomic fire require\nthe tremendously powerful atomic particles known as neutrons. Unlike\noxygen, however, neutrons do not exist in a free state in nature. Their\nhabitat is the nuclei, or hearts, of the atoms. How, then, does the\nspontaneous combustion of the critical mass of U-235 or plutonium begin?\nAll we need is a single neutron to start things going, and this one\nneutron may be supplied in one of several ways. It can come from the\nnucleus of an atom in the atmosphere, or inside the bomb, shattered by a\npowerful cosmic ray that comes from outside the earth. Or the emanation\nfrom some radioactive element in the atmosphere, or from one introduced\ninto the body of the bomb, may split the first U-235 or plutonium atom,\nknock out two neutrons, and thus start a chain reaction of\nself-multiplying neutrons.\n\nTo understand the chain reaction requires only a little arithmetic. The\nfirst atom split releases, on the average, two neutrons, which split two\natoms, which release four neutrons, which split four atoms, which\nrelease eight neutrons, and so on, in a geometric progression that, as\ncan be seen, doubles itself at each successive step. Arithmetic shows\nthat anything that is multiplied by two at every step will reach a 1,000\n(in round numbers) in the first ten steps, and will multiply itself by a\n1,000 at every ten steps thereafter, reaching a million in twenty steps,\na billion in thirty, a trillion in forty, and so on. It can thus be seen\nthat after seventy generations of self-multiplying neutrons the\nastronomical figure of two billion trillion (2 followed by 21 zeros)\natoms have been split.\n\nAt this point let us hold our breath and get set to believe what at\nfirst glance may appear to be unbelievable. The time it takes to split\nthese two billion trillion atoms is no more than one millionth of a\nsecond (one microsecond). If we keep this time element in mind we can\narrive at a clear understanding of the tremendous problem involved in\nexploding an A- or an H-bomb.\n\nAnd while we are recovering from the first shock we may as well get set\nfor another. That unimaginable figure of two billion trillion atoms\nrepresents the splitting (explosion) of no more than one gram (1/28th of\nan ounce) of U-235, or plutonium.\n\nNow, the energy released in the splitting of one gram of U-235 is\nequivalent in power to the explosive force of 20 tons of TNT, or two\nold-fashioned blockbusters. Since we know from President Truman\u2019s\nannouncement following the bombing of Hiroshima that the wartime A-bomb\n\u201chad more power than 20,000 tons of TNT,\u201d it means that the atoms in an\nentire kilogram (1,000 grams) of U-235 or plutonium must have been\nsplit. In other words, after the A-bomb had reached a power of 20 tons\nof TNT, it had to be kept together long enough to increase its power a\nthousandfold to 20,000 tons. This, as we have seen, requires only ten\nmore steps. It can also be seen that it is these ten final crucial steps\nthat make all the difference between a bomb equal to only two\nblockbusters, which would have been a most miserable two-billion-dollar\nfiasco, and an atomic bomb equal in power to two thousand blockbusters.\n\nWith the aid of these facts we are at last in a position to grasp the\nenormousness of the problem that confronted our A-bomb designers at Los\nAlamos and is confronting them again today. It can be seen that for a\nbomb to multiply itself from 20 to 20,000 tons in ten steps by doubling\nits power at every step, it has to pass successively the stages of 40,\n80, 160, 320, and so on, until it reaches an explosive power of 2,500\ntons at the seventh step. Yet it still has to be held together for three\nmore steps, during which it reaches the enormous power of 5,000 and\n10,000 tons of TNT, without exploding.\n\nHere was an irresistible force, and the problem was to surround it with\nan immovable body, or at least a body that would remain immovable long\nenough for the chain reaction to take just ten additional steps\nfollowing the first seventy. There is only one fact of nature that makes\nthis possible, or even thinkable\u2014the last ten steps from 20 to 20,000\ntons take only one tenth of a millionth of a second. The problem thus\nwas to find a body that would remain immovable against an irresistible\nforce for no longer than one tenth of a microsecond, 100 billionths of a\nsecond.\n\nThis immovable body is known technically as a \u201ctamper,\u201d which pits\ninertia against an irresistible force that builds up in 100 billionths\nof a second from an explosive power of 20 tons of TNT to 20,000 tons.\nThe very inertia of the tamper delays the expansion of the active\nsubstance and makes for a longer-lasting, more energetic, and more\nefficient explosion. The tamper, which also serves as a reflector of\nneutrons, must be a material of very high density. Since gold has the\nfifth highest density of all the elements (next only to osmium, iridium,\nplatinum, and rhenium), at one time the use of part of our huge gold\nhoard at Fort Knox was seriously considered.\n\nWith these facts and figures in mind, it becomes clear that an H-bomb\nmade of deuterium alone is not feasible. It is certainly out of the\nquestion with an A-bomb of the Hiroshima or Nagasaki types, which\ngenerate a temperature of about 50,000,000 degrees, since, as we have\nseen, it would take fully 200 microseconds to ignite it at that\ntemperature. It is one thing to devise a tamper that would hold back a\nforce of 20 tons for 100 billionths of a second, and thus allow it to\nbuild up to 20,000 tons. It is quite another matter to devise an\nimmovable body that would hold back an irresistible force of 20,000 tons\nfor a time interval 2,000 times larger, particularly if one remembers\nthat in another tenth of a microsecond the irresistible force would\nincrease again by 1,000 to 20,000,000 tons. Obviously this is\nimpossible, for if it were possible we would have a superbomb without\nany need for hydrogen of any kind.\n\nIt is known that we have developed a much more efficient A-bomb, which,\nas Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado has inadvertently blurted out,\n\u201chas six times the effectiveness of the bomb that was dropped over\nNagasaki.\u201d We are further informed by Dr. Bacher that \u201csignificant\nimprovements\u201d in atomic bombs since the war \u201chave resulted in more\npowerful bombs and in a more efficient use of the valuable fissionable\nmaterial.\u201d It is conceivable and even probable that the improvements,\namong other things, include better tampers that delay the new A-bombs\nlong enough to fission two, four, or even eight times as many atoms as\nin the wartime models. But since, as we have seen, the ten steps of the\nfinal stages require only an average of 10 billionths of a second per\nstep, increasing the power of the new models even to 160,000 tons (eight\ntimes the power of the Hiroshima type) would take only three steps, in\nan elapsed time of no more than 30 billionths of a second. And even if\nwe assume that the improved bomb generates a temperature of 200,000,000\ndegrees, it would still be too cold to ignite the deuterium during the\ninterval of its brief existence, since, as we have seen, it would take\n4.8 microseconds to ignite it at that temperature. In fact, calculations\nindicate that it would require a temperature in the neighborhood of\n400,000,000 degrees to ignite deuterium in the time interval during\nwhich the assembly of the improved A-bomb appears to be held together,\nwhich, as may be surmised from the known data, is within the range of\n1.2 microseconds.\n\nFrom all this it may be concluded with practical certainty that an\nH-bomb of deuterium only is out of the question. Equally good, though\nentirely different, reasons also rule out an H-bomb using only tritium\nas its explosive element.\n\nThere are several important reasons why an H-bomb made of tritium alone\nis not feasible. The most important by far, which alone excludes it from\nany serious consideration, is the staggering cost we would have to pay\nin terms of priceless A-bomb material, as each kilogram of tritium\nproduced would exact the sacrifice of eighty times that amount in\nplutonium. The reason for this is simple. Both plutonium and tritium\nhave to be created with the neutrons released in the splitting of U-235,\neach atom of plutonium and each atom of tritium made requiring one\nneutron. Since an atom of plutonium has a weight of 239 atomic mass\nunits, whereas an atom of tritium has an atomic weight of only three, it\ncan be seen that a kilogram, or any given weight, of tritium would\ncontain eighty times as many atoms as a corresponding weight of\nplutonium, and hence would require eighty times as many neutrons to\nproduce. In other words, we would be buying each kilogram of tritium at\na sacrifice of eighty kilograms of plutonium, which, of course, would\nmean a considerable reduction in our potential stockpile of plutonium\nbombs.\n\nWe would cut this loss by more than half because a kilogram of tritium\nwould yield about two and a half times the explosive power of plutonium.\nBut even this advantage would soon be lost, since tritium decays at the\nrate of fifty per cent every twelve years, so that a kilogram produced\nin 1951 would decay to only half a kilogram by 1963. Plutonium, on the\nother hand, can be stored indefinitely without any significant loss,\nsince it changes slowly (at the rate of fifty per cent every twenty-five\nthousand years) into the other fissionable element, U-235, which in turn\ndecays to one half in no less than nine hundred million years. What is\nmore, plutonium, if the day comes when we can beat our swords into\nplowshares, will become one of the most valuable fuels for industrial\npower, the propulsion of ships, globe-circling airplanes, and even,\nsomeday, interplanetary rockets. It holds enormous potentialities as one\nof the major power sources of the twenty-first century. Tritium, on the\nother hand, can be used only as an agent of terrible destruction. It\nwill yield its energy in a fraction of a millionth of a second or not at\nall. The only other possible uses it may have would be as a research\ntool for probing the structure of the atom, and as a potential new agent\nin medicine, in which it may be used for its radiations.\n\nHow much tritium would it take to make an H-bomb 1,000 times the power\nof the wartime model A-bombs? Since tritium has about 2.5 times the\npower per given weight of U-235 or plutonium, it would take 400\nkilograms (about 1,880 quarts of the liquid form) of tritium to make a\nbomb that would equal the power of 1,000 kilograms of plutonium. Such a\nbomb, we can see, would have to be made at the sacrifice of 32,000\nkilograms of plutonium. In other words, we would be getting a return, in\nterms of energy content, of 1,000 kilograms for an investment of 32,000.\nAnd we would be losing fully half of even this small return every twelve\nyears.\n\nHow many A-bombs would we be sacrificing through this investment? On the\nbasis of Professor Oliphant\u2019s estimate that the critical mass of an\nA-bomb is between 10 and 30 kilograms, we would sacrifice at least\n1,066, and possibly as many as 3,200, if we take the lower figure. And\nwe must not forget that a bomb a thousand times the power will produce\nonly ten times the destructiveness by blast and thirty times the damage\nby fire of an A-bomb of the old-fashioned variety.\n\nThese cold facts make it clear that a tritium bomb, particularly one a\nthousand times the power of the A-bomb, is completely out of the\npicture.\n\nBut, one may ask, if a deuterium bomb is not possible and a tritium bomb\nis not feasible, and these are the only two substances that can possibly\nbe used at all, isn\u2019t all this talk about a superbomb sheer moonshine?\nAnd if so, how explain President Truman\u2019s directive \u201cto continue\u201d work\non it?\n\nTo find the answer let us go back for a moment to Dr. Bacher\u2019s man in\nthe mountains, confronted with the problem of lighting a fire with\ngreen, ice-covered wood at twenty degrees below zero with \u201cvery little\nkindling.\u201d Obviously the poor fellow would be doomed to freeze to death\nwere it not for one little item he had almost forgotten. Somewhere in\nhis belongings he discovers a container filled with gasoline, which\nincreases the inflammability of the wet wood to the point at which it\nwill catch fire with a quantity of kindling that would otherwise be much\ntoo small.\n\nSomething closely analogous is true with the H-bomb. It so happens that\na mixture of deuterium and tritium is the most highly inflammable atomic\nfuel on earth. It yields 3.5 times the energy of deuterium and about\ntwice the energy of tritium when they are burned individually. Most\nimportant of all, the deuterium-tritium mixture, known as D-T, ignites\nmuch faster than either deuterium or tritium by themselves. For example,\nthe D-T combination ignites 25 times faster than deuterium alone at a\ntemperature of 100,000,000 degrees, and the ignition time is fully 37.5\ntimes faster than for deuterium at 150,000,000 degrees.\n\nThe published technical data show that at a temperature of 50 million\ndegrees the D-T mixture ignites in only 10 microseconds, or 20 times\nfaster than deuterium alone. At 75 million degrees it takes only 3\nmicroseconds, as against 40 for deuterium, while at 100 million degrees\nit needs only 1.2 microseconds to catch fire, a time, as we have seen,\nonly 0.1 microsecond longer than it took the wartime A-bomb to fly\napart. Since the latter held together for 1.1 microseconds at a\ntemperature of about 50 million degrees, it is reasonable to assume that\nthe improved and more efficient models generate a temperature at least\ntwice as high, and that this is done by holding them together for about\n1.2 microseconds.\n\nIt can thus be deduced that the only feasible H-bomb is one in which a\nrelatively small amount of a deuterium-tritium mixture will serve as\nadditional superkindling, to boost the kindling supplied by the improved\nmodel A-bomb, for lighting a fire with a vast quantity of deuterium.\nThis, it appears, is the real secret of the H-bomb, which is really no\nsecret at all, since all the deductions here presented are arrived at on\nthe basis of data widely known to scientists everywhere, including\nRussia. And since it is no secret from the Russians, whom the\narch-traitor Fuchs has supplied with the details still classified top\nsecret, the American people are certainly entitled to the known facts,\nso vitally necessary for an intelligent understanding of one of the most\nimportant problems facing them today.\n\nA deuterium bomb with a D-T booster would become a certainty if the\ntemperature of the A-bomb trigger could be raised to 150 million or,\nbetter still, to 200 million degrees. At the former temperature the D-T\nsuperkindling ignites in 0.38 microseconds; at the higher temperature\nthe ignition time goes down to as low as 0.28 microseconds. Now, the D-T\nmixture releases four times as much energy as plutonium, and the faster\nthe time in which energy is released, the higher goes the temperature.\nSince four times as much energy is released at a rate four times faster\nthan in the wartime model A-bomb, it is not unreasonable to assume that\nthe temperature generated would be high enough to ignite the green wood\nin the bomb\u2014its load of deuterium.\n\nHow much tritium would be required for the kindling mixture? On this we\ncan only speculate at present. Since the D-T kindling calls for the\nfusion of one atom of tritium with one atom of deuterium, and the atomic\nweight of tritium is three as compared with two for deuterium, the\nweight of the two substances will be in the ratio of 3 for tritium to 2\nfor deuterium. Thus if the amount to be used for the kindling mixture is\nto be one kilogram, it will be made up of 600 grams of tritium and 400\ngrams of deuterium. Since, as we have seen, it would take eighty\nkilograms of plutonium to produce one kilogram of tritium, we would have\nto use up only 48 kilograms of plutonium to create the 600 grams, or the\nequivalent of one and a half to about five A-bombs, according to Dr.\nOliphant\u2019s estimate.\n\nBut would we need as much as 600 grams of tritium? Such an amount, mixed\nwith 400 grams of deuterium, would yield an explosive power equal to\n80,000 tons of TNT, an energy equivalent of 100 million kilowatt-hours.\nA twentieth part of this amount would still be equal in power to 4,000\ntons of TNT, equivalent in terms of energy to 5,000,000 kilowatt-hours.\nNow one twentieth of 600 grams, just 30 grams of tritium, could be made\nat a cost of no more than 2.4 kilograms of plutonium. Thus we would be\npaying only one twelfth to one fourth of an A-bomb (in addition to the\none used as the trigger) to get the equivalent of ten A-bombs in\nblasting power and of thirty times the incendiary power, which would\ntotally devastate an area of more than 300 square miles by blast and of\nmore than 1,200 square miles by fire.\n\nWould 30 grams of tritium be enough to serve as the superkindling for\nexploding, let\u2019s say, 1,000 kilograms (one ton) of deuterium? We shall\nprobably not know until we actually try it. It will largely depend on\nthe temperature generated by our more powerful A-bomb models. If it is\ntrue, as Senator Johnson informed his television audience, that they\nhave \u201csix times the effectiveness of the bomb that was dropped over\nNagasaki\u201d (which, by the way, had more than twice the effectiveness of\nthe Hiroshima model), it is quite possible that their temperature is as\nhigh as 150 million, or even 200 million, degrees. In that case, the\nextra kindling of a 20\u201330 gram D-T mixture, with its tremendous burst of\n5,000,000 kilowatt-hours of energy in 0.28 to 0.38 microseconds (added\nto the vast quantity already being liberated by the exploding plutonium,\nor U-235), might well heat the deuterium to the proper ignition\ntemperature and keep it hot long enough for its mass to explode well\nwithin 1.2 microseconds. In any case it would appear logical to expect\nthat a mixture of 150 grams of tritium and 100 grams of deuterium, which\nwould release an energy equal to that of the Hiroshima bomb, should be\nable to do the job with plenty of time to spare.\n\nWe thus have a threefold answer to the question: Can the H-bomb\n_actually_ be made? As we have seen, the deuterium bomb is definitely\nnot possible. The tritium bomb is theoretically possible, but definitely\nnot practicable. But a large deuterium bomb using a reasonably small\namount of a deuterium and tritium mixture as extra kindling is both\npossible and feasible.\n\nWe now also stand on solid ground in dealing with the questions of cost\nand of the time it would take us to get into production. With these\nquestions answered, we can then decide whether the H-bomb, if made, will\nadd enough to our security to make the effort worth while.\n\nWe know at this stage that the H-bomb requires three essential\ningredients. It needs, first of all, an A-bomb to set if off. We have a\nsizable stockpile of them. It needs large quantities of deuterium. We\nhave built several deuterium plants during the war, and they should be\nlarge enough to supply our needs. Since it is extracted from water, the\nraw material will cost us nothing. The only item of cost will be the\nelectric power required for the concentration process, and this should\nnot be above $100 per kilogram, and probably less. The third vital\ningredient, tritium, can be made in the giant plutonium plants at\nHanford, Washington. Thus it can be seen that all the essential\ningredients of the H-bomb, the costliest and those that would take\nlongest to produce, as well as the multimillion-dollar plants required\nfor their production, are already at hand.\n\nThis means that as far as the essential materials are concerned, we are\nready to go right now. And as for the cost, it would appear to require\nhardly any new appropriations by Congress, or, at any rate, only\nappropriations that would be mere chicken feed compared with the five\nbillion we have already invested in our A-bomb program.\n\nThe raw material out of which tritium is made is the common, cheap light\nmetal lithium, the lightest, in fact, of all the metals. It has an\natomic weight of six, its nucleus consisting of three protons and three\nneutrons. When an extra neutron invades its nucleus, it becomes unstable\nand breaks up into two lighter elements, helium (two protons and two\nneutrons) and tritium (one proton and two neutrons). They are both gases\nand they are readily separated. And while lithium of atomic weight six\nconstitutes only 7.5 per cent of the element as found in nature (it\ncomes mixed with 92.5 per cent of lithium of atomic weight seven), there\nis no need to separate it from its heavier twin, since the latter has no\naffinity for neutrons and nearly all of them are gobbled up by the\nlighter element.\n\nThe production of tritium, even in small amounts, will nevertheless be a\nformidable process. As we have seen, it takes eighty times as many\nneutrons to produce any given amount of tritium as to produce a\ncorresponding amount of plutonium. Since the lithium will have to\ncompete with uranium 238 (parent of plutonium) for the available supply\nof neutrons, and since the number of atoms of U-238 per given volume is\nnearly forty times greater than the number of lithium atoms, the rate of\ntritium production would be very much slower than that of plutonium. On\nthe other hand, even if it took as much as two hundred times as long to\nproduce a given quantity of tritium, the handicap would be considerably\novercome because of the relatively small amounts that may be required.\nIf, for example, we should need only 30 to 150 grams of tritium per\nbomb, it would take our present plutonium plants only six to thirty\ntimes longer to produce these quantities than it takes them to produce\none kilogram of plutonium. A hypothetical plant such as the one\nmentioned in the official Smyth Report, designed to produce one kilogram\nof plutonium per day, would thus yield 30 grams of tritium in six days.\n\nHow much tritium would be needed for an adequate stockpile of H-bombs?\nSince our primary reasons for building it are to deter aggression, to\nprevent its use against us or our allies, and as a tactical weapon\nagainst large land armies, it would appear that as few as twenty-five,\nor fifty at the most, would be adequate for the purpose. On the basis of\nthe larger figure (assuming 30 to 150 grams of tritium per bomb), it\nwould mean an initial stockpile of only 1.5 to 7.5 kilograms of tritium,\nwhich would entail the sacrifice of about 120 to 600 kilograms of\nplutonium. Once this initial outlay had been made, however, our\nplutonium sacrifice would be reduced annually to only one twenty-fourth\nof the original respective amounts\u2014namely, 5 to 25 kilograms a year\u2014just\nenough to make up for the decay of the tritium at the rate of fifty per\ncent every twelve years.\n\nOne of the major problems to be solved, in addition to the main problem\nof designing the assembly, arises from the fact that the deuterium and\nthe tritium booster will have to be in liquid form. Liquid hydrogen\nboils (that is, reverts to gas) at a temperature of 423 degrees below\nzero Fahrenheit under a pressure of one atmosphere (fifteen pounds per\nsquare inch). To liquefy it, it is necessary to cool it in liquid air\n(at 313.96 below zero F.) while keeping it at the same time under a\npressure of 180 atmospheres. To transport it, it must be placed in a\nvacuum vessel surrounded by an outer vessel of liquid air. This would\npoint to the need of giant refrigeration and storage plants, as well as\nof refrigerator planes for transporting large quantities of liquid\ndeuterium and its tritium spark plug.\n\nWill the H-bomb, if made, add enough to our security to make the effort\nworth while? We have seen that the required effort may, after all, not\nbe very great. In fact, it may turn out to be a relatively small one, in\nview of the fact that all the basic ingredients and plants are already\nat hand and fully paid for. But supposing even that the effort turns out\nto be much more costly than it now appears? The question we must then\nask ourselves is: Can we afford not to make the effort?\n\nIt is true, of course, as some have pointed out, that ten or even fewer\nA-bombs could destroy the heart of any metropolitan city, while only one\nwould be quite enough, as we know, for cities the size of Hiroshima or\nNagasaki. But that neglects to take into consideration the fact that one\nH-bomb concentrates within itself the power of thirty A-bombs to destroy\nby fire and by burns an area of more than 1,200 square miles at one\nblow. Nor does it take into consideration the military advantage of\ndelivering the power of a combination of ten and thirty A-bombs in one\nconcentrated package, which would make it a tremendous tactical weapon\nagainst a huge land army scattered over many miles, or its possible\nenormous psychological effect against such an army.\n\nMost important of all, this view grossly minimizes the apocalyptic\npotentialities of the H-bomb for poisoning large areas with deadly\nclouds of radioactive particles. It is a monstrous fact that an H-bomb\nincorporating one ton of deuterium, encased in a shell of cobalt, would\nliberate 250 pounds of neutrons, which would create 15,000 pounds of\nhighly radioactive cobalt, equivalent in their deadliness to 4,800,000\npounds of radium. Such bombs, according to Professor Harrison Brown,\nUniversity of Chicago nuclear chemist, could be set on a north-south\nline in the Pacific approximately a thousand miles west of California.\n\u201cThe radioactive dust would reach California in about a day, and New\nYork in four or five days, killing most life as it traverses the\ncontinent.\u201d\n\n\u201cSimilarly,\u201d Professor Brown stated in the _American Scholar_, \u201cthe\nWestern powers could explode H-bombs on a north-south line about the\nlongitude of Prague which would destroy all life within a strip 1,500\nmiles wide, extending from Leningrad to Odessa, and 3,000 miles deep,\nfrom Prague to the Ural Mountains. Such an attack would produce a\n\u2018scorched earth\u2019 of an extent unprecedented in history.\u201d\n\nProfessor Szilard, one of the principal architects of the A-bomb, has\nestimated, as already stated, that four hundred one-ton deuterium bombs\nwould release enough radioactivity to extinguish all life on earth.\nProfessor Einstein, as we have seen, has publicly stated that the\nH-bomb, if successful, will bring the annihilation of all life on earth\nwithin the range of technical possibilities. The question we must\ntherefore ask ourselves is: Can we allow Russia to be the sole possessor\nof such a weapon?\n\nThere can be no question that Russia is already at work on an H-bomb.\nLike ourselves, she already has the plutonium plants for producing both\nA-bombs and tritium. She can produce deuterium in the same quantities as\nwe can. In Professor Peter Kapitza she has the world\u2019s greatest\nauthority on liquid hydrogen.\n\nFurthermore, she has great incentives to produce H-bombs. Since she is\nstill behind us in her A-bomb stockpile, she can, in a sense, catch up\nwith us much more quickly by converting her fewer A-bombs into H-bombs\nthat would be the equivalents of ten to thirty A-bombs each, thus\nincreasing the power of her stockpile ten to thirty times. Equally if\nnot more important from Russia\u2019s point of view is the stark fact that an\nH-bomb could be much more easily exploded near a coastal city from a\nsubmarine or innocent-looking tramp steamer, since most of our great\ncities are on the seacoast, whereas Russia practically has no coastal\ncities.\n\nEven if we openly announced that we would not make any H-bombs, it would\nnot deter Russia from making them as fast as she could, not only because\nshe would not believe us but also because her sole possession would\ngreatly weight the scales in her favor. If, God forbid, she finds\nherself one day with a stockpile of H-bombs when we have none, she would\nbe in a position to send us an ultimatum similar to the one we sent to\nthe Japanese after Hiroshima: \u201cSurrender or be destroyed!\u201d\n\nValuing their liberty more than their lives, the American people will\nnever surrender. But while there is time, would anyone advocate that we\nrun the risk of ever facing such a choice?\n\n\n\n\n                                  III\n                SHALL WE RENOUNCE THE USE OF THE H-BOMB?\n\n\nA few days after President Truman announced that he had directed work\n\u201cto continue\u201d on \u201cthe so-called hydrogen, or super bomb,\u201d a group of\ntwelve eminent physicists, including half a dozen of the major\narchitects of the atomic bomb at Los Alamos, who, no doubt, are playing\na similar role in the development of the H-bomb, issued a statement\nurging the United States to make \u201ca solemn declaration that we shall\nnever use the bomb first,\u201d and \u201cthat the only circumstances which might\nforce us to use it would be if we or our allies were attacked by _this_\nbomb.\u201d They added that \u201cthere can be only one justification for our\ndevelopment of the hydrogen bomb, and that is to prevent its use.\u201d\n\nSigners of the statement, unprecedented in the annals of science (with\nthe possible exception of a secret memorandum submitted to the\ngovernment just before the A-bomb was used), included such outstanding\nphysicists as Hans A. Bethe of Cornell; Kenneth T. Bainbridge of\nHarvard; Samuel K. Allison, University of Chicago; Dean George B.\nPegram, Columbia; C. C. Lauritsen, California Institute of Technology;\nBruno Rossi and Victor F. Weisskopf, Massachusetts Institute of\nTechnology; F. W. Loomis and Frederick Seitz, University of Illinois;\nMerle A. Tuve, Carnegie Institution of Washington; R. B. Brode,\nUniversity of California; and M. G. White, Princeton\u2014all, with the\nexception of Dr. Tuve, professors of physics at their respective\nuniversities. Those among them who did not directly participate in the\ndevelopment of the A-bomb played major parts in other scientific wartime\nprojects, such as radar and the proximity fuse.\n\nImplicit in their statement was the first confirmation\u2014indeed, the most\nauthoritative we have had so far from scientists with first-hand\nknowledge of the subject\u2014that a hydrogen bomb of a thousand times the\npower of the A-bomb could be made. More than that, they informed us that\nRussia may complete the H-bomb in less than four years, meaning, of\ncourse, that we too could achieve the same goal in the same period. We\nwere thus provided by the experts with a time-table on which we must act\nif we are not to run the risk of Russia\u2019s getting the H-bomb ahead of\nus, and so being in a position to use it, or threaten its use, against\nthe nations of western Europe, as the greatest blackmail weapon in\nhistory.\n\nThe statement summarizes in essence the principal points of view that\nhave been advanced so far on what policy we should adopt on the H-bomb,\nand since it was promulgated by men known to have definite inside\nknowledge of the subject, it deserves closer scrutiny than it has\nhitherto received.\n\n\u201cIt was stated correctly,\u201d they inform us at the outset,\n\n\n  that a hydrogen bomb, if it can be made, would be capable of\n  developing a power 1,000 times greater than the present atomic bomb.\n  New York, or any of the greatest cities of the world, could be\n  destroyed by a single hydrogen bomb.\n\n  We believe that no nation has the right to use such a bomb, no matter\n  how righteous its cause. The bomb is no longer a weapon of war, but a\n  means of extermination of whole populations. Its use would be a\n  betrayal of morality and of Christian civilization itself.\n\n  Senator Brien McMahon has pointed out to the American people that the\n  possession of the hydrogen bomb will not give positive security to\n  this country. We shall not have a monopoly of this bomb, but it is\n  certain that the Russians will be able to make one, too. In the case\n  of the fission bomb the Russians required four years to parallel our\n  development. _In the case of the hydrogen bomb they will probably need\n  a shorter time._\n\n  We must remember that we do not possess the bomb but are only\n  developing it, and Russia has received, through indiscretion, _the\n  most valuable hint that our experts believe the development possible_.\n  Perhaps the development of the hydrogen bomb has already been under\n  way in Russia for some time. But if it was not, our decision to\n  develop it must have started the Russians on the same program. If they\n  had already a going program, they will redouble their efforts.\n\n  Statements in the press have given the power of the H-bomb as between\n  two and 1,000 times that of the present fission bomb. Actually, the\n  thermonuclear reaction on which the H-bomb is based is limited in its\n  power only by the amount of hydrogen which can be carried in the bomb.\n  Even if the power were limited to 1,000 times that of a present atomic\n  bomb, the step from an A-bomb to an H-bomb would be as great as that\n  from an ordinary TNT bomb to the atom bomb.\n\n  To create such an ever-present danger for all the nations of the world\n  is against the vital interests of both Russia and the United States.\n  Three prominent Senators have called for renewed efforts to eliminate\n  this weapon and other weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of\n  all nations. Such efforts should be made, and made in all sincerity\n  from both sides.\n\n  In the meantime, we urge that the United States, through its elected\n  government, make a solemn declaration that we shall never use this\n  bomb first.\n\n\nBefore discussing in detail the merits of the proposal that the United\nStates renounce the use of the H-bomb, \u201cno matter how righteous its\ncause,\u201d except in retaliation for its use against us or our allies, it\nbehooves us to examine the effect of our decisions to proceed with the\ndevelopment of the H-bomb on Russia\u2019s A-bomb progress.\n\nWe know that the H-bomb requires an A-bomb for its trigger. We also have\nstrong grounds for assuming that, in addition to the A-bomb, an H-bomb\nwill require certain quantities of tripleweight hydrogen, or tritium, as\nextra superkindling to boost the A-bomb. We know, furthermore, that it\ntakes eighty times as many neutrons to make a given quantity of tritium\nas it does to make a corresponding amount of plutonium, which, of\ncourse, means a reduction in A-bombs.\n\nHence, should Russia decide to embark on an H-bomb program of her own,\nor to \u201credouble her efforts,\u201d it would lead inevitably to a serious\ncurtailment in her stockpile of A-bombs. While we would have to make the\nsame sacrifice of plutonium, it is obvious that we can afford the\nsacrifice much better than Russia, since we already have a sizable\nstockpile of both plutonium and uranium bombs, whereas she has just\nbegun building her stockpile. The situation for her would be much worse\nif she has put all her atomic eggs in the plutonium basket without\nbothering to build the much more complicated and costly uranium\nseparation plants, as the incomplete evidence available would seem to\nindicate. In that case she would be faced with a serious dilemma indeed,\nfor you cannot have H-bombs without A-bombs, and you cannot have A-bombs\nwithout plutonium, and if, as the evidence indicates, she has built her\nA-bomb program exclusively around plutonium, she would have to sacrifice\nquantities she could ill afford to spare, at this stage of her\ndevelopment, of the only element she desperately needs for building up\nher A-bomb stockpile.\n\nHow do we know that Russia\u2019s A-bomb is made of plutonium? We have the\ntestimony of Senator Johnson of Colorado, who assured us in his famous\ntelevision broadcast of November 1, 1949 that \u201cthere\u2019s no question at\nall that the Russians have a bomb more or less similar to the bomb that\nwe dropped at Nagasaki, a plutonium bomb.\u201d In this single sentence the\nSenator from Colorado, who as a member of the Joint Congressional\nCommittee on Atomic Energy has access to such information, inadvertently\nlet at least three cats out of the bag. He confirmed that the Nagasaki\nbomb was made of plutonium (though, in fairness, it must be said that\nthis had been known unofficially for some time); he told us that we had\nfound out not only that \u201can atomic explosion had occurred in the\nU.S.S.R.,\u201d as the President had announced in carefully chosen words, but\nthat the explosion was that of an atomic bomb and that, more important\nstill, the bomb was made of plutonium. And in doing so he, furthermore,\ngave away the secret of how we had obtained that information, something\nthe Russians very much wanted to know. Not being a scientist, Senator\nJohnson obviously did not realize that the split fragments (fission\nproducts) of a plutonium bomb differ from those given off by the\nexplosion of a uranium bomb, so that in revealing that we knew what the\nbomb was made of he would also be revealing at the same time that we\nfound it out by examining radioactive air samples and finding them to\ncontain fission fragments of plutonium, as well as whole plutonium atoms\nthat escaped fission.\n\nThere is thus no doubt that the Russians have built nuclear reactors for\nproducing plutonium from nonfissionable uranium 238. We cannot, of\ncourse, be sure that they have not at the same time also built plants\nfor concentrating uranium 235, but the odds favor the negative. We built\nuranium separation plants at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and plutonium plants\nat Hanford, Washington, during the war because we didn\u2019t know at the\ntime which method would work, and we gambled on the chance that, by\nbuilding plants for producing fissionable materials by four different\nmethods, at least one of them might work. Had we known at the time that\nthe plutonium plants were practical, it is quite likely that we would\nnot have invested a billion dollars in building the uranium separation\nplants. Since the Russians have obviously decided on plutonium plants as\nthe simplest and cheapest (three plutonium plants cost us a total of\n$400,000,000, whereas a single large uranium separation plant cost half\na billion), it is hardly likely that they would consider it worth while\nto invest in the much more costly uranium separation plants.\n\nAs Senator Johnson said in the same broadcast: \u201cWe tried out four\ndifferent methods of making a bomb and all of them succeeded, but one of\nthese methods was superior to all the others in simplicity and\neffectiveness, and we told the Russians and we told the world that fact.\nOf course, they didn\u2019t have to make the experiments that we had to make\nto find out by elimination which method was the most effective and which\nthe one that they should follow.\u201d\n\nThe evidence is thus strongly in favor of the assumption that Russia has\nonly plutonium plants as her sole source of A-bomb material, whereas we\nhave both plutonium plants and gigantic uranium plants in full\noperation. If that is so, then our forcing Russia to embark on an H-bomb\nprogram, at a time when her A-bomb program is barely started, will place\nher under a double handicap in her race to catch up with us in A-bombs,\nand at least to keep abreast of us, if not ahead, in H-bombs. For in\nthis grim race we have a dual if not a triple advantage: our much\nsuperior stockpile, both in numbers and no doubt in quality, and our\ngigantic plants for concentrating U-235, the production of which would\nnot have to be curtailed at all, since tritium can be made only in\nplutonium plants. In fact, we are now in the process of construction of\ntwo great additions to the uranium plant at Oak Ridge.\n\nOne may visualize the masters of the Kremlin gnashing their teeth in\nimpotent rage at what they no doubt regard as a diabolical plot on our\npart to sabotage their A-bomb effort. Indeed, there can be no question\nthat our decision to proceed with the H-bomb was an answer to Russia\u2019s\nchallenge to our atomic supremacy, and it appears quite plausible that\none of the motives behind the decision was the knowledge that it would\nforce Russia either to build great additions to her atomic plants, at\ngreat expense in money and materials and at the loss of considerable\nprecious time, or to curtail her production of A-bomb material. And\nwhile any such motive could not possibly have been the determining\nfactor, the ultimate effect of our decision was the same as though we\nhad succeeded in getting a team of expert saboteurs behind the Iron\nCurtain to plant a good-sized monkey wrench in the Soviet atomic\nmachinery.\n\nWith this in mind we begin to appreciate how dangerous a move it would\nbe, to ourselves and to world peace, if we were to make a solemn\ndeclaration at the outset, even before we have a single H-bomb, that we\nwill never use it, \u201cno matter how righteous our cause,\u201d unless it is\nused first against us or our allies. By making such a unilateral\ndeclaration, without even making it conditional upon Russia issuing a\nsimilar solemn renunciation, we would, in effect, be saying to Russia:\n\u201cWe humbly beg your pardon. We did not realize that we would be putting\na nasty monkey wrench in the machinery of your vital A-bomb program. We\nshall remove the wrench at once so that you may proceed with your\nprogram unhindered by us in any way.\u201d\n\nThe masters of the Kremlin would, indeed, have every right to laugh long\nand loud, and to take such foolhardy action on our part as further\nevidence of what they call \u201cthe decadence of the bourgeois democracies.\u201d\nFor, once we make such a magnanimous unilateral solemn renunciation of\nthe one weapon that promises to become the greatest single deterrent\nagainst war, without even bothering to ask Russia publicly to do\nlikewise, Russia could then proceed calmly at her leisure to build up\nher A-bomb stockpile, with the complete assurance from us that she need\nnot worry about our H-bomb as long as she does not use one against us or\nour allies. After she has accumulated an adequate A-bomb stockpile\u2014and\nfifty to one hundred would be adequate from her standpoint\u2014she would\nthen be in a position, already attained by us now, to proceed with her\nH-bomb program, knowing full well that we would never use H-bombs\nagainst her while she is still without them. And while she obviously\ncould not use anything she does not have, she could well afford to make\naggressive war even before she has an H-bomb, or to bide her time until\nshe does, the choice being entirely hers. And if she waits until she has\nthe H-bomb, the decision whether to use it or not would still be\nentirely hers, so that she could use it whenever she decides it is to\nher advantage to do so, whereas we should have to wait on her pleasure,\nhaving morally bound ourselves, without qualification, not to use it\nfirst, even if our very existence depended on it.\n\nIt can thus be easily seen that this \u201cafter you, my dear Alphonse\u201d\ngesture on our part in a matter that may involve our very existence\nwould be more than quixotic. It is likely to prove suicidal. It will not\nimprove the prospects of world peace; on the contrary it will weaken\nthem. It will not enhance our moral stature, since the world does not\nhave much respect for starry-eyed dreamers with their heads in the\nclouds.\n\nBut while we must keep our feet planted on the ground, we need not lose\nsight of the stars. Our refusal to expose ourselves by giving Russia the\ngreat advantages mentioned, does not mean that we retain the right to\nuse the H-bomb indiscriminately as though it were just another weapon.\nThere are, I shall presently show, both legitimate and illegitimate uses\nto which the H-bomb can be put, and it is the failure so far, even by\neminent scientists, to distinguish between these two types of possible\nuses that is responsible for a great deal, if not all, of the confusion\nand much futile debate that have followed the President\u2019s announcement\nof his directive to continue work on the hydrogen bomb, and for the\nflood of verbiage that will continue to plague and bewilder us until we\ntake time to acquaint ourselves with the facts about the H-bomb.\n\nOne of the major difficulties in our approach to the subject stems from\nthe general tendency to talk about the H-bomb as though it were just one\nweapon, which obviously it is not. As we know, it is several weapons in\none package, which can be designed for various uses, depending on the\nintent of its designer. It is, on the one hand, a weapon that can cause\ntotal destruction by blast over a radius of ten miles, or an area of\nmore than 300 square miles, with graduated lesser damage over a much\nlarger area. Secondly, it is a weapon that can produce fires and severe\nflash burns over a radius of twenty miles\u2014that is, over an area of more\nthan 1,200 square miles. These two functions, destruction by blast and\nby fire, go together. They are inseparable as far as the bomb itself is\nconcerned, though their relative effects can be regulated by the height\nfrom which the bomb is dropped, by the terrain over which it is used,\nand by its mode of delivery other than by air.\n\nThen, of course, there is the third weapon of terror, the tremendous\nquantities of deadly radioactive particles that the H-bomb may release\nin the atmosphere, which, as Dr. Einstein said, would bring within the\nrange of technical possibilities \u201cthe annihilation of life on earth.\u201d\nThis, however, would depend on the choice and purpose of the designer.\nIf he so chooses, he can design an H-bomb that would produce only\nslightly greater radioactivity than its A-bomb trigger. Or he can rig it\nin such a manner that one bomb would release into the atmosphere the\nequivalent of nearly five million pounds of radium that would poison the\natmosphere for thousands of miles, killing all life wherever it goes.\nThe catchword here is \u201crig,\u201d and the rigging depends entirely, not on\nthe contents of the bomb itself, but on the material of which its outer\nshell is composed. If, for example, the casing chosen is a material such\nas steel, the radioactivity produced would be practically harmless. If\nthe shell is made of cobalt, the radiations released would cause untold\nhavoc. The reason for the vast difference is not difficult to\nunderstand. The H-bomb, when it explodes, releases tremendous quantities\nof neutrons, the most penetrating particles in nature. As soon as it is\nliberated, a neutron enters the nucleus of the nearest element at hand.\nThis may produce a wide variety of changes in the nature of the element\npenetrated by the neutron, the changes depending on the element. Some\nelements, such as cobalt, become intensely radioactive, others only\nmildly so, and still others not at all. Furthermore, each element thus\nmade radioactive has its own characteristic decay period, lasting from\nseconds to many years, so that the designer of the bomb has a great\nvariety to choose from.\n\nFrom this it can be seen that, instead of one, there are actually two\ntypes of H-bombs\u2014the non-rigged and the rigged. With this vital\ndistinction in mind the problem of its use becomes much more simplified.\nWe are in a position to reach full agreement with the scientists that no\nnation has the right to use such a \u201crigged\u201d bomb, no matter how\nrighteous its cause. For the rigged H-bomb would add nothing to the\nmilitary value of the non-rigged H-bomb, which is already more than\nenough to achieve any military objective. It would merely be piling\nhorror upon horror for no purpose beyond wanton destruction for its own\nsake. Its use even in small numbers would ruin large segments of the\nearth for years. It would, as the scientists said, \u201cbe a betrayal of\nmorality and of Christian civilization itself.\u201d There can therefore be\nno question that when this distinction between the non-rigged and the\nrigged H-bomb is made clear to the American people\u2014something the\nscientists failed to do\u2014they would overwhelmingly lend their support to\na move on the part of our government solemnly declaring that we would\nnever use the rigged H-bomb first; that our only aim in building it is\nto prevent its use, and that the only circumstances under which we would\nfind ourselves forced to use it would be in retaliation for its use\nagainst us or our allies.\n\nWe can, and should, make such a solemn declaration unilaterally,\nregardless of whether Russia makes a similar declaration. We would lose\nnothing by doing so from a military or strategic point of view, and we\nwould gain enormously in moral stature and on the battlefront of ideas\nif we were to do it now. Otherwise we run the risk that Russia might do\nit first. If she takes advantage of this lost opportunity of ours, we\nshall have handed her a great moral victory. In fact, the law of nations\ncompels us to make such a declaration. Unlike the A-bomb, in which the\nradioactivity is part and parcel of the bomb itself, the rigged H-bomb\nis purposely designed to produce radioactive poisoning in the\natmosphere. Since it has to be specially incorporated into the casing of\nthe bomb, it comes under the international convention outlawing the use\nof poison gas. For there can be no question that a radioactive cloud\nthat may lay waste to whole areas is the most diabolical and deadly\npoison gas so far invented.\n\nBut the twelve scientists do not seem to be satisfied with the mere\nrenunciation of the rigged H-bomb. They ask us to declare that we would\nnot be the first to use even the non-rigged bomb, on the grounds that it\n\u201cis no longer a weapon of war, but a means of extermination of whole\npopulations.\u201d This requires closer scrutiny.\n\nIt has become customary to think of the A-bomb, and now of the H-bomb,\nas purely strategic weapons for destroying industrial centers producing\nwar materials, thus depriving the armies at the front of the vital\nsinews of war. It is also regarded as a weapon of superterror to bring a\nnation to its knees, as the A-bomb did in Japan. Since industrial\ncenters, particularly in the United States, are densely populated areas,\nand since, conversely, all large cities are also important industrial\ncenters, it has become almost axiomatic that the A-bomb and the H-bomb\ncould be used only in strategic bombing of large centers of population,\nwhich, of course, means the wholesale slaughter of millions of civilians\nand the wiping out of cities with populations of more than 200,000.\n\nBut to think along such lines would be thinking of World War III, which\nwe must do our utmost to prevent, in terms of World War II, which would\nbe just as fatal as thinking in terms of World War I was to the French\nin World War II. For even a cursory examination of the situation should\nreveal that strategic bombing of cities may, and very likely would be,\nas obsolete in the next war as trench warfare was in the last. One does\nnot have to be a military expert to know the reason why. In the last war\nstrategic bombing was resorted to in order to deprive the army at the\nfront of weapons and supplies. Obviously, if you had a superweapon that\ncould wipe out an entire army in the field or on the march at one blow,\nthere would be no further need of depriving an army that was no longer\nin being.\n\nThat is exactly what the non-rigged H-bomb is. As a blast weapon, we\nhave seen, it can cause total destruction of everything within an area\nof more than 300 square miles. As an incinerator it would severely burn\neverything within an area of more than 1,200 square miles. It is thus\nthe tactical weapon par excellence. No army in the field or on the march\ncould stand up against it. Had we possessed it at the Battle of the\nBulge, just one could have wiped out the entire Bulge. If the Nazis had\nhad it before D-Day, one would have been enough to wipe out our entire\ninvasion army even before it landed; or they could have waited and wiped\nout our entire Normandy beachhead. In a word, the non-rigged H-bomb has\nproduced a major revolution in tactics and strategy. It has made\nstrategic bombing of cities as obsolete as the trench of World War I,\nexcept as a weapon of pure terror and wanton wholesale destruction of\nlife and property. It would be absolutely useless to the victor as well\nas to the vanquished, as the victor would have no spoils of victory left\nand would have to rebuild what he had needlessly destroyed.\n\nViewed in this light, the non-rigged H-bomb, just because it is the\nweapon for the annihilation of armies, becomes vis-\u00e0-vis Russia, the\ngreatest deterrent against war that could possibly be devised in the\npresent state of affairs. For, after all, the only great advantage\nRussia has over us today is her land army and her great reserve of\nmanpower. The non-rigged H-bomb, supported by a large and up-to-date air\nforce capable of delivering it either by air or from a seized airhead\nbehind the lines, could nullify that advantage in a few hours. At least\nthe threat of such a possibility will always be there. It is therefore\ndoubtful, to say the least, that any group of men would willingly take\nsuch a risk.\n\nSince the greatest and most effective use of the non-rigged H-bomb would\nthus be as a tactical weapon against armies in the field, while its\nstrategic use against civilian populations would be simple wanton\ndestruction from the point of view of both victor and vanquished, then\nnot only morality and Christian civilization but plain common sense\nwould dictate the wisdom of our solemnly declaring right now that we\nwill never be the first to use either the non-rigged H-bomb or even the\nA-bomb against civilian populations, and that the only circumstance that\nwould compel us to use them so would be in retaliation for their use\nagainst us or our allies. In fact, we could renounce strategic bombing\naltogether. By doing so we would gain one of the greatest moral\nvictories, for then if Russia failed to make a similar declaration, as\nshe most likely would, she would stand before the world as a nation bent\non wholesale slaughter of civilian populations. We have nothing to lose\nand everything to gain by such a declaration, and the sooner we make it\nthe better.\n\nShould we make such a declaration, it would place Russia in an\nembarrassing position indeed. For while as a tactical weapon the\nnon-rigged H-bomb offers us great advantages as a counterforce to\nneutralize her huge army, she can use the H-bomb, both the rigged and\nthe non-rigged, as a constant threat against our densely populated\ncities. As Senator Brien McMahon, of Connecticut, chairman of the Joint\nCongressional Committee on Atomic Energy, has warned, an H-bomb attack\n\u201cmight incinerate 50,000,000 Americans\u2014not in the space of an evening\nbut in the space of a few minutes.\u201d We have eleven cities of one million\nor more inhabitants, whereas Russia has only three or four. We have\nforty cities of 200,000 and over, inhabited by 40,000,000, or 27 per\ncent of our population, whereas Russia has only twenty cities of 200,000\nand over, inhabited by only 20,000,000, or 10 per cent of her\npopulation. Furthermore, her industries are now largely dispersed,\nwhereas our industries are highly centralized. Russia would thus get\nmuch the worse of the bargain if she were to accept our challenge to\nrenounce the use of strategic bombing, particularly that of the A- and\nH-bombs, while we still retain the right to use them in tactical bombing\nagainst her armies.\n\nSuppose Russia in this dilemma, and recognizing the need to avoid the\nmoral opprobrium of the peoples of the world that her refusal to meet\nour renunciation would entail, comes forth with a counterproposal to\nrenounce the use of both A- and H-bombs altogether, as strategic as well\nas tactical weapons, thus exchanging the elimination of the threat of\nthe annihilation of our teeming cities and industries, for the removal\nof the threat of destruction to her armies. Suppose that at the same\ntime she repeats her demand, frequently voiced by her in the United\nNations, that all stockpiles of A- and H-bombs be destroyed and a\nconvention signed to outlaw their uses. The world already knows the\nanswer, for we have already made it again and again.\n\nImmediately after the close of the last war we declared our readiness to\ngive up the A-bomb. In 1946, at a time when we were the sole possessor\nof the bomb, when we had every reason to believe that our monopoly would\nlast for a number of years, we submitted a far-reaching plan for the\ninternational control of atomic energy, the most generous offer by far\never made by any nation in history. In this historic plan we not only\ndeclared our readiness to give up our stockpile of A-bombs and to agree\nto refrain from further production; we even offered to give up our\nsovereignty over our multibillion-dollar atomic plants to an\ninternational agency. We further agreed to submit to unhindered, free\ninspection by such an agency to assure the world, and Russia in\nparticular, that we were not manufacturing A-bombs, or A-bomb materials,\nin secret. No nation in history had ever gone so far in its desire to\nshow its goodwill and its peaceful intentions as to make a voluntary\noffer to surrender the world\u2019s most powerful weapon of war, and an\nimportant part of its sovereignty to boot. The offer still stands. It\nhas been enthusiastically endorsed by all the members of the United\nNations except Russia and her satellites. After three years of futile\nnegotiations and discussions Russia still insists that she would not\nsurrender any part of her sovereignty or submit to the only kind of\ninspection that could assure the world against clandestine production of\natomic bombs and materials.\n\nHence, should Russia demand that we renounce the right to use the A- and\nH-bombs not only as strategic but also as tactical weapons against her\narmies in exchange for a similar offer on her part, it would on the face\nof it be a mere repetition of her earlier efforts to trick us into\ngiving up our greatest weapons while she remained free to produce them\nin secret, since she insists upon her right to retain ownership of the\natomic plants and materials and upon the inspection of only those plants\nshe acknowledges to exist, thus making it impossible to find plants\nwhose existence she does not admit. To accept such an offer would be\ntantamount to surrender, since our giving up the right to use the H-bomb\nas a tactical weapon against her armies would leave her free to march\ninto the countries of western Europe. It would then be too late to stop\nher, for we could not drop the H-bomb on the cities of western Europe.\nThe only time to stop Russia\u2019s armies is before they cross into the\nterritory of our allies, during the crucial period when they are\nmobilized in large numbers and on the march.\n\nThe American people, and the other free peoples of the world, could not\nagree to such a scheme to disarm them in advance and thus give the\nmasters of the Kremlin a free hand. To do so would not prevent war, it\nwould encourage it. It would not even delay it, it would hasten it.\nInstead of being preventable, it would become inevitable. We wouldn\u2019t\neven save our cities from the fate of strategic bombing with A- and\nH-bombs, since the Kremlin has never kept its promises when they did not\nsuit its purposes. When we had lost our greatest chance to wipe out her\narmies in one mighty blow, Russia would be in a position to trade our\nindustries and cities for her dispersed and still primitive industrial\nplants and cities. If at that stage she should offer us, as well as our\nneighbors to the south and Britain and her Dominions, independence and\ncomplete sovereignty, while she assumed hegemony over all of Europe and\nAsia, could we then refuse, at the risk of the lives of our millions?\nSupposing the nations of western Europe, overrun by the Red Army, become\n\u201cpeople\u2019s democracies,\u201d Russian style, would we risk our millions to\nliberate nations whose governments would by then have joined the ranks\nof our enemy?\n\nThese are the brutal facts that would confront us were we to renounce\nthe right to use A- and H-bombs as tactical weapons against armies in\nthe field. As long as we retain that right, the chances are good that we\ncould prevent global war, for no nation would be likely to risk such a\nwar in the face of the possibility that the main bulk of its armies\nmight be wiped out at the outset. If we give up that right, we would\nalso prevent war\u2014by surrendering in advance. Russia, of course, might\nfigure that she could still make war, when she decides the time is ripe,\ntaking the calculated risk that we would not use the A- and H-bombs\nagainst her armies for fear of her retaliation against our cities and\nindustries. But whether she would consider that calculated risk worth\ntaking would depend on how good our defenses were. Senator McMahon\u2019s\nwarning that an H-bomb attack \u201cmight incinerate 50,000,000 Americans ...\nin the space of a few minutes\u201d would become a possibility only if we\nallowed ourselves to be surprised for a second time by a \u201csuper Pearl\nHarbor,\u201d which, of course, is inconceivable. While it is generally\nagreed that it is impossible to decentralize our cities and industries,\nbecause of the tremendous cost (estimated at $300 billion) and the short\ntime at our disposal between now and the ultimate showdown, when Russia\nis expected to be ready to make major moves at the risk of \u201caccepting\u201d\nwar, we have many advantages not possessed by Britain and Germany during\nthe last war as far as defenses against strategic bombing were\nconcerned. Britain, as well as Poland, Holland, and Belgium\u2014little,\ndensely populated countries\u2014were within very short range of Germany\u2019s\nairfields. So was Germany, in her turn, within easy range from Britain.\nRadar, as compared with its modern types, was primitive in quality and\ninadequate in quantity. Automatic antiaircraft guns, interceptor planes,\nand night fighters were either nonexistent in the early days of the\nblitz or in a crude stage of development compared with present\nequivalents.\n\nHow vastly different is our situation today vis-\u00e0-vis Russia! Instead of\na short hop across the English Channel she would have to cross the\nAtlantic or the Pacific to reach our continent, whereas we can reach her\nheartland from bases all around her borders. It is unthinkable that any\nof her bombers can cross either ocean without being detected hundreds of\nmiles before they reach our shores. With modern radar devices, which are\nconstantly being improved, and fleets of fast interceptors far in\nadvance of anything Russia could develop, we would destroy them long\nbefore they would do us any harm. If she attempts to fly over the North\nPole, she will still have to cross all of Canada before she can reach\nus, and if we and our Canadian friends are on the alert, as we must and\nshall be, any hostile planes could be detected and destroyed over the\nArctic.\n\nThere is, of course, the possibility of exploding an H-bomb some\ndistance off shore from a submarine or from a tramp steamer, but here,\ntoo, eternal vigilance will be the price of our liberties and our lives.\nThere can be no question that we shall succeed in finding the answer to\nthe detection of the Snorkel-type submarine and master it just as we\nmastered the earlier types. American ingenuity and superior technology\nhave never failed yet in the face of an emergency, and it is unthinkable\nthat they should fail now.\n\nWe often hear it said that an enemy could smuggle an A-bomb in small\nparts into this country and assemble it here. While such an operation is\npossible, its successful execution against a nation fully on guard is\nhighly improbable. As for the H-bomb, it requires large quantities of\nliquefied gas, which must be kept in a vacuum surrounded by large\nvessels of liquid air. In addition it must have its A-bomb trigger and\nother complicated devices. All this makes its surreptitious smuggling\ninto a country such as ours even more improbable.\n\nWe have had it dinned into our ears for so long that there is no defense\nagainst the atomic bomb, and that the only choice confronting us is \u201cone\nworld or none,\u201d without anyone taking the trouble to challenge these two\npernicious catch-phrases, that we have accepted them as gospel truth,\nparticularly since they were uttered by some of our more articulate\natomic scientists. That scientists should at last step out from their\nlaboratories and classrooms to take an active interest in public affairs\nis highly commendable and welcome. But that does not give them the right\nto take advantage of the great respect and confidence the public has for\nthem with utterances that serve only to create fear and hysteria and a\nsense of helplessness, while at the same time offering remedies they\nknow to be unattainable.\n\nThe truth of the matter is that there can be and there is a defense\nagainst atomic weapons, as against any other weapon. Basically it is the\nsame as the defense against submarines or enemy bombers: detect them and\ndestroy them before they reach you. The difference is largely a matter\nof degree. Since the atomic-bomb carrier can do greater damage, the\nmeasures of defense against it must be correspondingly greater. With the\naid of the vast stretches of the Atlantic and the Pacific, augmented by\nan effective radar and interceptor system, on the one hand; and with\neffective counter-submarine measures on the other, the odds would be\nagainst a single A- or H-bomb reaching our shores.\n\nFaced with such an impregnable system of defense, and with a threat of\nthe swift annihilation of its armies as soon as they begin marching for\nwar, the Kremlin could no longer, unless its masters went completely\nberserk, regard war, or even a challenge to war, a risk worth taking.\nThe cold war may get warmer, as it did in Korea, but as long as we keep\nour heads and don\u2019t give way to fear and hysteria, trusting in God and\nkeeping our H-bombs \u201cwet,\u201d it may never reach the boilingpoint.\n\nAnd we have in addition a weapon even more powerful than the H-bomb or\nany other physical weapon, which instead of bringing misery and death\nwould bring new life and new hope to hundreds of millions now enslaved.\nWe have not yet even begun to fight on the battlefield of ideas, in\nwhich we can match freedom against tyranny, friendship against class\nhatred, truth against lies, a society based on the respect and dignity\nof the individual and the giving of full scope to human aspirations\nagainst a society modeled after the beehive and the ant-heap.\n\n\u201cReal peace,\u201d former Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,\nsaid in the _New Leader_, \u201cis deeper than absence of war. That will be\nwon in the realm of philosophy and ideas. Indeed, the great reason for\npreventing war is to permit ideas to meet ideas on their own merits....\nThe statesman\u2019s business is to keep the conflagration at bay and give\nideas their chance, relying on the moral strength of the ideals he\nrepresents to bring to their support the masses throughout the world.\u201d\nIn such a war of ideas, he adds, there could be no doubt about the\noutcome, as the West can oppose all its positives against Moscow\u2019s\nnegatives. We meet \u201ca betrayed revolution, in a decadent, imperialist,\ndictatorial phase, building an empire on the negatives of human\nbehavior. Such empires engage no permanent loyalties; they invariably\nbreak up. War would defeat this empire in any case. First rate\nstatesmanship can avoid that war.\u201d\n\nIn the words of General George C. Marshall, \u201cthe most important thing\nfor the world today is a spiritual regeneration.... We must present\ndemocracy as a force holding within itself the seeds of unlimited\nprogress for the human race. We should make it clear that it is a means\nto a better way of life within nations and to a better understanding\namong nations. Tyranny inevitably must fall back before the tremendous\nmoral strength of the gospel of freedom and self-respect for the\nindividual.\u201d\n\nAs an advance army in this war of ideas we already have a fifth column\nof millions waiting for our signal to march, the millions of the\nenslaved satellite countries\u2014Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic\ncountries, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania\u2014as well as millions upon millions\nbehind the Iron Curtain in Russia itself. The greatest mistake made by\nHitler was his failure to utilize the readiness and eagerness of a large\npercentage of the Russian masses to turn against their oppressors. When\nthe Nazi armies marched into the Ukraine, large numbers of Ukrainians,\nwho had been longing for independence for centuries, greeted them as\ntheir liberators with the traditional bread and salt, symbol of welcome.\nRussian soldiers surrendered by the thousands and they, along with the\nmen of the villages, volunteered in great numbers to fight against their\nenslavers. In the hearts of millions of Russians behind the front, the\nlonging for liberty, never extinguished, was given its greatest stimulus\nsince the days when they overthrew the Czarist regime. They, too, were\nwaiting for the Germans to give them back the revolution the Communists\nhad stolen from them with lies and deceit.\n\nWith the stupidity characteristic of all criminals, Hitler and Himmler\nproclaimed that the Russians were to be treated as an \u201cinferior race.\u201d\nEverywhere their armies went they burned and pillaged and raped. Instead\nof liberators they turned out to be most savage barbarians, who behaved\neven worse than the commissars. It was this inconceivable folly of\nHitler, as well as our Lend-Lease, that played a major role in enabling\nthe Kremlin to win the war.\n\nThe Russian masses and those of the enslaved satellite countries are\nstill waiting for their liberators. The masters of the Kremlin know it,\nbut they hope that, like the Nazis, we will be too stupid to take\nadvantage of it. If a war ever breaks out, we shall have millions\njoining our ranks provided we do not destroy these millions, those not\nin uniform, with A- or H-bombs in the strategic bombing of their cities.\nBut we should not wait until a war breaks out. We must begin mobilizing\nthem right now for the war of ideas.\n\nThe so-called Iron Curtain is a fake, like the rest of the Communist\nset-up. It is made of tinsel and is full of thousands of holes, through\nwhich we can pass if we will. Those thousands of miles of border ringing\nthe vast Russian Empire could be utilized as great thoroughfares of\nideas, to be smuggled to the millions waiting for them. There isn\u2019t a\nguard on those borders who couldn\u2019t, with the proper approach and\ninducements, be enlisted in our army of ideas. In addition to flooding\nthe air over Russia with tiny balloons, each carrying a message of\nfreedom and hope, we could also smuggle into the country small radio\nreceiving sets by the millions to bring the Voice of America to millions\nof Russian homes. We could attach to those balloons small loaves of\nbread, packages of cigarettes, little trinkets for babies, nylon\nstockings for women, on a scale that no police could cope with. Nor\ncould the Kremlin risk forbidding it, as that would place it in the\nposition of further depriving its starved and hungry people of things\nthey badly need and want.\n\nWith these weapons on the battlefront in the war of ideas, and with the\nA- and H-bomb to give the Kremlin pause, we would be well on the way to\nwin any war, cold or hot. Our justification for building the hydrogen\nbomb is thus not merely to prevent its use, but to prevent World War\nIII, and to win it if it comes. We are not building it to bring Russia\nto her knees. We are building it to bring her to her senses. We must\nmake the Kremlin realize with General Marshall that \u201ctyranny inevitably\nmust fall back before the tremendous moral strength of the gospel of\nfreedom and self-respect for the individual.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n                                   IV\n                         KOREA CLEARED THE AIR\n\n\nAs this is being written, the Korean war is just one month old. By the\ntime these lines appear in print we may know whether the naked Communist\naggression on the Republic of South Korea was an episode, a prelude, or\nthe first act of World War III. But whatever history records, the first\nflash of the Communist guns, supplied by the Kremlin, has revealed to\nthe free world at last the face of the enemy in all its hideousness. It\nbrought the first phase of the so-called cold war to a definite end. It\naroused freedom-loving peoples everywhere and put them on the alert. It\nserved as a powerful headlight in the night, revealing many dangerous\ncurves on the road ahead. It has given the United Nations its first\ngreat opportunity to display its vitality for all the world to see.\n\nAmong other things, the flash of the North Korean guns has illumined for\nus more clearly than ever before the path we must follow in our policy\non atomic weapons, both the A-bomb and the H-bomb. It has revealed the\nextreme danger lurking in any plan to outlaw production and use of\natomic weapons in a world constantly threatened by a savage\ndictatorship, ready to pounce on it at the first sign of weakening in\nits armor.\n\nThe flash of the Red guns, in the first place, made it clear to free men\neverywhere that to renounce our right to the production of atomic\nweapons as potentially the greatest deterrents against the further\nspread of Communist aggression, and as the most powerful defenders of\nthe spiritual and moral values without which our way of life would\nbecome meaningless, would allow the Red Army to overrun what remains of\nthe free world. Such a move on our part, for the present and the\nforeseeable future, may herald the last appearance of free men on the\nstage of history. It would be, as the Goncourt brothers feared, \u201cclosing\ntime, gentlemen!\u201d\n\nIn addition to warning us what we must not do, the Red guns also gave\nwarning of a more positive nature. They warned us to make all haste in\nthe construction of the hydrogen bomb, to get it ready as soon as\npossible, against the eventuality that Russia may decide it would be to\nher advantage to precipitate World War III before our H-bomb is ready.\nInstead of the estimated pre-Korea time-table of three years, it now\nbecomes a vital necessity for us to complete our H-bomb, and facilities\nfor its production at a speedy rate, within a year. And if the history\nof our development of the A-bomb may serve as an example, it almost\nbecomes a certainty that we shall do so. While we may not announce it to\nthe world, we have good reason to expect that the first H-bomb will be\nready for testing sometime in 1951, possibly in early summer.\n\nThis forecast is not based on merely guesswork. When we decided to go\nall out in developing the A-bomb\u2014and we didn\u2019t really go to work in\nearnest until May 1943\u2014nobody knew that it could be successfully made.\nThere were two enormous major problems to be solved, and solved in time\nto be of use in winning the war. One was to produce unheard-of\nquantities of fissionable materials (U-235 and plutonium), literally in\nquantities billions of times greater than had ever been produced before.\nNobody knew whether it could be done or how it could be done. Three\ngigantic plants were built, at a cost of $1,500,000,000, on the mere\nchance, \u201ccalculated risk\u201d we called it, that one of them would work. As\nit turned out, they all worked, some more efficiently than others,\nthough all contributed to the shortening of the war. The second major\nproblem, among a host of smaller ones, all important to the successful\nattainment of the goal, was how to assemble the materials produced in\nthe billion-dollar plants into a bomb that would live up to\nexpectations. Both major problems had to be solved simultaneously. The\ndesigning of the bomb went on for more than two years with only trickles\nof the active material.\n\nYet despite all these enormous difficulties the A-bomb was completed for\ntesting in about two years and three months after the beginning of the\nlarge-scale effort. Compared with the enormousness of the problems that\nhad to be solved, and were solved successfully in this remarkably short\ntime, the problems still to be solved for building the hydrogen bomb\nappear relatively simple, since all the materials required and the\nplants to produce them are already built, paid for, and operating\nsuccessfully. As already pointed out, we have the A-bombs to serve as\ntriggers, large stockpiles of deuterium, and the refrigeration equipment\nand techniques to liquefy it. We have an adequate supply of lithium for\nthe production of tritium, which, as explained earlier, would be used as\nthe extra kindling to the A-bomb match. And we have, of course, our\ngigantic plutonium factories at Hanford, Washington, in which the\nlithium could be converted into tritium in the desired amounts.\n\nThus, instead of having to start from scratch as we were forced to do\nwith the A-bomb, we have at hand all the necessary ingredients for the\nH-bomb with the possible exception of sufficient tritium, and since we\nhave the plutonium plants, greatly expanded and improved since the end\nof the war, it is reasonable to make a \u201cguestimate,\u201d to use a word\npopular in wartime, that a few months should suffice for them, if they\nare employed exclusively for that purpose, to produce tritium in proper\namounts.\n\nThat we have decided to complete the construction of the H-bomb in the\nshortest possible time was made clear on July 7, two weeks following the\nCommunist attack on South Korea, when President Truman asked Congress to\nfurnish $260,000,000 in cash \u201cto build additional and more efficient\nplants and related facilities\u201d for materials that can be used either for\nweapons or for fuels potentially useful for power purposes. The\nappropriation, he said, was required \u201cin furtherance of my directive of\nJanuary 31, 1950,\u201d in which he had ordered the Atomic Energy Commission\n\u201cto continue its work on the so-called hydrogen bomb\u201d; and this was\nfurther clarified in a letter to the President by the Budget Director,\nFrederick J. Lawton, recommending the money request, to the effect that\nthe materials to be produced in the proposed plants could be used for\neither atomic bombs or hydrogen bombs. Since the only type of plant that\ncould produce materials for both the A-bomb and the H-bomb is a nuclear\nreactor for producing plutonium, and since tritium is the only H-bomb\nelement that could be produced in a plutonium plant, the request by the\nPresident may be interpreted as the first, though indirect, official\nconfirmation that tritium is looked upon as one of the ingredients\nnecessary for a successful H-bomb. We were given a hint of a possible\ntime-table when it was revealed that the all-cash request would have to\nbe obligated in one year though its actual disbursal could be spread\nover four years. This suggests the possibility that the nuclear reactors\nfor the large-scale production of tritium might be rushed to completion\nwithin one year.\n\nWhile these new reactors for the production of tritium are being built,\nwe can convert all our Hanford reactors for that purpose so that no time\nneed be lost. Whatever amounts of plutonium would have to be sacrificed\nby diverting the Hanford plants from plutonium to tritium would be\noffset by the new uranium concentration plants at Oak Ridge, and by the\nfact that we already have a large stockpile of both U-235 and plutonium\naccumulated over a period of five years.\n\nThe one and only major problem to be solved is how to assemble into an\nefficient H-bomb the materials we already have at hand or will have in a\nfew months. Here, too, we are much farther advanced than we were at the\ntime we decided to build the A-bomb, as we are not called upon to start\nfrom scratch. For whereas in the early days of the A-bomb development\nscientists were doubtful whether it could be made at all and were\nactually hoping that their investigations would prove that it was\nimpossible, for the Nazis as well as for us, no such doubts seem to\nexist in the minds of those most intimately associated with the problem.\nOn this score we have had more than hints from a number of those in the\nknow, among them Senator McMahon. \u201cThe scientists,\u201d he said in a\nhistoric address to the United States Senate on February 2, 1950, \u201cfeel\nmore confident that this most horrible of armaments [the hydrogen bomb]\ncan be developed successfully than they felt in 1940 when the original\nbomb was under consideration. The hydrogen development will be cheaper\nthan its uranium forerunner. Theoretically, it is without limit in\ndestructive capacity. A weapon made of such material would destroy any\nmilitary or other target, including the largest city on earth.\u201d\n\nWhat is this confidence based on? Scientists are a very conservative\nlot, not given to jumping to conclusions without experimental evidence\non which to base them. I remember well the agonizing hours preceding the\ntest of the first A-bomb in New Mexico, when everyone present,\nparticularly the intellectual hierarchy that was most responsible, was\nbeset by grave doubts whether the A-bomb would go off at all, and if it\ndid, whether it would live up to expectations or turn out to be no more\nthan an improved blockbuster. Very few, if any, felt confident that it\nwould be as good as it finally turned out to be. For example, in a pool\nin which everyone bet a dollar to guess the ultimate power of the bomb\nin terms of TNT, Dr. Oppenheimer placed his bet on 300 tons. This makes\nit evident that the scientists were not very confident even as late as\n1945, up to the very last minute, when \u201cthe brain child of many minds\ncame forth in physical shape and performed as it was supposed to do.\u201d\n\nIf the scientists are more confident today than they were in 1940, and\neven, it would seem, in 1945, when the bomb stood on its steel tower\nready for its first test, it can only mean that their confidence is\nbased on innumerable experiments carried out during the five years that\nhave elapsed since Hiroshima. By the semiannual reports to Congress by\nthe Atomic Energy Commission, and reports presented before the American\nPhysical Society, or published in official publications, by members of\nthe Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and other leading institutions, we\nhave been officially informed of many experiments that have been carried\nout on nuclear reactions between deuterons and deuterons, tritons and\ntritons, and deuterons and tritons\u2014namely, the very reactions to be\nexpected in an H-bomb using deuterium, tritium, or a mixture of the two.\nThis makes it obvious that during the five years since Hiroshima we have\naccumulated a vast body of knowledge about the reactions necessary for a\nsuccessful H-bomb. Furthermore, this gives us the assurance that we are\nfive years ahead of Russia on the H-bomb as well as the A-bomb, since we\nhave had plutonium plants in which to make tritium for at least five\nyears, whereas she has just placed her plutonium plants in operation\nand, as we have seen, can ill afford to sacrifice the vital plutonium\nshe needs for building up her A-bomb stockpile to begin experiments we\nhad most likely carried out five years ago.\n\nThe best evidence so far that we have made much progress during the past\nfive years on the design of the H-bomb\u2014evidence strongly indicating that\nit had passed the blueprint stage and was ready for construction\u2014was\nsupplied recently by Lewis L. Strauss, a member of the original Atomic\nEnergy Commission, when he revealed that \u201cthe greatest issue of\ndivision\u201d (between himself and other members of the AEC) \u201cwas whether or\nnot to proceed with the hydrogen bomb, as for some time I had strongly\nurged to do.\u201d Now, Strauss, who went into the Navy in World War II as a\nlieutenant commander and rose to be a rear admiral, is a leading\nfinancier of wide experience, so it may be taken for granted that if for\nsome time he had \u201cstrongly urged\u201d proceeding with the hydrogen bomb, it\nmust have been because he had been assured by the scientific experts\nthat it was feasible. Men of his background and experience do not\n\u201cstrongly urge\u201d the diversion of resources to projects unless they are\nstrongly convinced that the project is both practical and feasible. His\nwords, when read in the light of statements by other members of the AEC,\nsuggest that the division of opinion on this score among the members of\nthe Commission was not over the feasibility of the H-bomb but over the\nbelief that the A-bomb was good enough as long as we were its sole\npossessors and that we could maintain our advantage for a long time by\nbuilding more and better A-bombs.\n\nOn the other hand, the fact that the majority of the AEC did not agree\nwith Strauss on the necessity of proceeding with the hydrogen bomb must\ncertainly not be interpreted to mean that they halted all studies on the\nsubject, for that would be charging them with gross negligence. It is\nmuch more reasonable to assume that the \u201cgreatest issue of division\u201d\n(mark the use of the word \u201cgreatest,\u201d which indicates many a heated\ndebate) was whether or not to proceed at once with the actual building\nof the bomb, after it had been fully designed and shown to be feasible\nin a host of painstaking studies over a period of at least four years.\n\nThere can therefore be no question that as soon as the President issued\nhis directive to the AEC \u201cto continue\u201d its work on the hydrogen bomb,\nthe first item on the program was to proceed at once with the production\nof tritium in sizable amounts, since all known facts point to the need\nof tritium as extra kindling for the A-bomb trigger. We can also be sure\nthat the production of whatever other auxiliary paraphernalia may be\nnecessary was at once placed on the top-priority list. By the end of\n1950, if not earlier, we should thus have all the necessary materials\nready in the desired amounts. Meantime, we can be sure that our top\nscientists have been putting the finishing touches on designs for\nassembling the materials\u2014the _finishing_ touches, since there can be no\ndoubt that the blueprints for a successful H-bomb have been completed\nfor at least a year and possibly for three or four. It would be\nunthinkable that we were so careless as to drop all work on such a vital\nmatter, which as far back as 1945 appeared to be a definite possibility.\n\nFor this we have no less an authority than Dr. Oppenheimer. In an\narticle in the book _One World or None_, published late in 1945,\ndiscussing atomic weapons of the future, he described bombs \u201cthat would\nreduce the cost of destruction per square mile probably by a factor of\n10 or more,\u201d which, as we now know, would be a bomb of a thousand times\nthe power that destroyed Hiroshima\u2014namely, a hydrogen bomb. \u201cPreliminary\ninvestigations\u201d of proposals for such a bomb, Dr. Oppenheimer wrote at\nthat early date, \u201cappeared sound.\u201d If the preliminary investigations\n\u201cappeared sound\u201d to scientists such as Dr. Oppenheimer in 1945, and\nbearing in mind President Truman\u2019s orders to the AEC in 1950 \u201cto\ncontinue its work,\u201d we can only conclude that the interim years produced\nresults far beyond the preliminary stage, when they merely \u201cappeared\u201d to\nbe sound. Judging by the reaction of some leading physicists to the\nPresident\u2019s order, the H-bomb appears to be an ominous reality, a\ncompleted architectural plan requiring only a few polishing touches. In\na word, we are almost ready to go.\n\nAnd while Dr. Bethe estimated that it would take three years to complete\nthe first H-bomb, we must remember that he spoke several months before\nthe guns of Korea gave the alarm. And we must not forget that had it not\nbeen for the threat of the Nazis we might not have had the A-bomb in\nless than twenty-five and possibly fifty years, according to the best\nestimates, though the present Communist threat might have reduced the\ntime considerably.\n\nFurthermore, we also have the word of Senator McMahon, who should know,\nthat \u201cthe hydrogen development will be cheaper than its uranium\nforerunner.\u201d This lends weight to the earlier deduction that only\nrelatively small amounts of tritium will be necessary, since, as we have\nseen, large amounts would be prohibitively costly in terms of vast\nquantities of plutonium. Small amounts of tritium, in turn, mean that it\nwould take a relatively short time to produce them. A reasonable\n\u201cguestimate,\u201d assuming that 150 to 300 grams of tritium would be\nrequired, is that such amounts could be produced within a few months,\nparticularly if we employ all our huge plutonium plants at Hanford on\nthe task of producing tritium.\n\nIt is therefore within the realm of possibility that when we carry out\nthe announced tests of the latest models of our A-bombs at Eniwetok,\nsometime in the spring or summer of 1951, one of them will be the first\nH-bomb. It may not be the best model, and it need not be the equal in\npower to a thousand wartime model A-bombs. In fact, it would be highly\ninadvisable to use such a bomb in a mere test. It will be an H-bomb,\nnevertheless, and from it we shall learn how to make bigger and better\nones, which is all that a test is supposed to do. For unlike the A-bomb,\nwhich cannot be made below or above a certain size, the H-bomb can be\nmade as small or as large as the designer wants it to be. As Professor\nBacher has pointed out, the H-bomb is \u201can open-ended weapon.\u201d\n\nOne of the major outcomes of the Korean aggression instigated by the\nKremlin has thus been to bring the H-bomb into being much sooner than it\nwould otherwise have been. And that is only one branch of the chain\nreaction that the Korean guns have set in motion.\n\nIn addition to unmasking completely the Kremlin\u2019s ultimate intentions to\nenslave mankind, and alerting the free nations of the world to the\ndanger facing them as they had not been alerted since Hitler\u2019s attack on\nPoland, the flash of the Korean guns has also shed new light on the\nPolitburo\u2019s strategy of conquest. The best-informed opinion in the\nsummer of 1950 holds that the Kremlin has decided on a series of little\nwars that would slowly drain our lifeblood and ruin our economy, and\nthus bring about the collapse and ruin of the rest of the world\u2019s free\nnations, rather than force a global war, German style. Among other\nreasons for such a strategy\u2014and there are many logical reasons for it\nfrom Russia\u2019s point of view\u2014is the fact, already become evident in\nKorea, that in such little wars, fought with Russian equipment and other\npeople\u2019s blood, we would not use atomic weapons of any kind, not only\nbecause there are no suitable targets, but because dictates of humanity\nmake the use of such weapons on little peoples, caught in the net of\nCommunism, wholly inconceivable. By deciding on a series of little wars,\nover a prolonged period, one following the other or coming\nsimultaneously, Russia may thus figure that she could gain her ultimate\nobjective in the cheapest possible way, while at the same time making\nsure that our atomic-bomb stockpile is wholly neutralized.\n\nIf this turns out to be true, we would at least escape atomic warfare,\nand since we, and the rest of the civilized world, fervently wish to\navoid being forced to use atomic weapons, this would be all to the good.\nBut we must also take into consideration the possibility that the very\ndecision on Russia\u2019s part to wage little wars and avoid a global war may\nhave been greatly influenced by the fact that we have a large stockpile\nof A-bombs while her stockpile is still negligible, forcing her to adopt\na strategy in which our superiority would be nullified. It is also\npossible that after her first experience with the production of A-bombs\nshe may have realized that it would be much too costly to try to catch\nup with us and have therefore decided on a strategy in which atomic\nweapons could not possibly play any part. On the other hand, it may also\nmean that she will not risk a global war until she has built up an\nadequate stockpile of her own, meantime softening us up with a series of\nlittle wars.\n\nWith all this in mind, it behooves us to take a closer look at our\nprogram for the outlawing of atomic weapons and the placing of atomic\nenergy under international control. It was a noble ideal, one of the\nnoblest conceived by man: the most powerful nation in the world\nvoluntarily offered to give up the right to produce or use the greatest\nweapon ever designed. Alas, it almost died at birth, and now, after four\nyears of nursing in an incubator, the Korean guns have given it a fatal\nblow. We might as well face the facts squarely: the majority plan for\nthe international control of atomic energy, the only acceptable plan\npossible, is dead, one of the first casualties of the Korean guns.\n\nWe still talk about trying to find ways for compromise between our plan,\naccepted by all the nations outside the Iron Curtain, and that of\nRussia. We are still talking, at least officially, as though somehow a\ncompromise can and will be found. The truth of the matter is that the\nplan as it stands today is completely out of tune with the times. As we\nlook on it by the light of the North Korean guns, it becomes clear that\nit is wholly visionary, without any relation to the realities.\n\nWe still talk as though our original offer still stands. The truth of\nthe matter is that even were the impossible to happen and Russia were to\nsay to the world: \u201cWe have been mistaken. We accept the American and the\nmajority plan _in toto_ without any reservations,\u201d we should be forced\nto say: \u201cSorry, it is too late, you have missed your chance. Your\nactions have made the plan unworkable, since it cannot possibly work in\nan atmosphere of mutual distrust and the constant threat of little\nwars!\u201d\n\nAnd even if wise diplomacy prevented us from saying it in such blunt\nlanguage, and though we may still find it expedient to pay lip service\nto the majority plan, so that Russia could not use it in her propaganda\nwar as evidence that we were insincere from the very beginning, we would\nhave to wriggle to get out of the very serious predicament in which\nRussia\u2019s acceptance would place us. And even if diplomacy dictated that\nwe sign a convention with Russia to outlaw production and use of all\natomic weapons, to destroy our stockpiles and hand over all our atomic\nplants to an international atomic authority, as our present plan calls\nfor, there can be no question that such a convention could never muster\nthe approval of even a majority of the Senate, and certainly not the\nrequired consent of two thirds of the Senate called for by the\nConstitution. What is more, such a rejection would have the overwhelming\napproval of American people, once the facts were made clear to them, and\nany administration daring to enter such a pact would be overwhelmingly\ndefeated.\n\nAll this has been so evident for more than two years that it is\nremarkable that the Russians have failed so far to take advantage of our\npotential embarrassment and thus win one of their greatest victories on\nthe propaganda front. In fact, their failure to do so, with the sure\nknowledge that they would risk nothing by accepting a plan that would\nmost certainly be rejected by our own people, not only reveals lack of\nsubtlety on their part, but appears on the surface as crass stupidity,\nthe same type of stupidity displayed by Hitler, which appears to be an\ninevitable trait of all monolithic dictatorships that must lead to their\nultimate undoing.\n\nThe time has come for us to stop talking about giving away our greatest\nweapons, the only ones, as President Truman and Winston Churchill have\ntold us, that have kept the Red Army hordes from overrunning the free\nworld. It is time for us to face reality and place the blame where it\nbelongs. The evil does not lie in weapons per se. It lies in war itself.\nIt is no evil to build and possess the most powerful weapons at our\ncommand with which to defend ourselves against a ruthless aggressor. On\nthe contrary, it would be an evil thing to throw away the principal\nweapon standing between us and possible defeat. It is no evil to use a\nweapon to destroy your enemy just because your weapon happens to be the\nmost powerful in existence. It is no greater evil to destroy thousands\nof your enemy in one great flash than to destroy them by goring them\nwith bayonets. The real evildoer is the nation that starts an aggressive\nwar. Those attacked have the right and duty to defend themselves by all\nmeans at their command.\n\nOur confusion has been the result of our first use of the A-bomb to\ndestroy a city with thousands of its civilian population. Let us admit\nthat the mass bombing of large populated cities (which, by the way, was\nstarted by the Nazis) is wholly inexcusable with any kind of weapons,\nand that we should never resort to such strategic bombing again. That\ndoes not mean that we should renounce our right to use A-bombs to\ndestroy an enemy\u2019s armies, navies, and airfields, his transportation\nfacilities and his oil wells\u2014in a word, his capacity to make war against\nus. And as long as we use the A-bomb and the H-bomb only as weapons of\ntremendous power to destroy by blast and by fire, they are no different\nfrom ordinary blockbusters or incendiaries except that they concentrate\ntheir power in a small package. Is there any difference, morally\nspeaking, between the use of thousands of blockbusters and tens of\nthousands of incendiaries and a weapon that concentrates all their power\nin one?\n\nProbably the main reason for the confused thinking that has singled out\natomic weapons as a greater evil than other weapons of mass destruction\nhas been their radioactivity. But even the A-bombs exploded over Japan\nwere purposely dropped from a height that carried most of the\nradioactivity away into the upper atmosphere. Nor will the H-bomb, as\nexplained earlier, release great quantities of radioactivity unless it\nis purposely rigged to do so. We should, therefore, lose nothing and\ngain much if we renounced the use of A- and H-bombs as radioactive\nweapons except in retaliation against the use of such weapons on us or\nour allies. But to renounce their use altogether would be tantamount not\nonly to physical but to spiritual suicide as well, for it would mean\ncondoning the advance of the Red Army.\n\nIt has become customary to talk about Russia\u2019s atom bomb as though she\nalready was, or soon will be, on a par with us. It is true that\neventually she will catch up with us in the development of a large\nstockpile of her own and in designing more efficient models. But that is\nonly one side of the picture. As of 1950, and for at least until 1952,\nyears that may well be crucial, our superiority in A-bombs will remain\nunchallenged, not only qualitatively but quantitatively. By that time we\nshall have greatly increased our lead by the possession of an effective\nstockpile of H-bombs. Since Russia cannot build H-bombs at the present\nstage without sacrificing quantities of plutonium she needs to build up\nher A-bomb stockpile, she will find herself compelled to build\nadditional plutonium plants, which not only will greatly strain her\nresources but, more important from our point of view, will gain us\nadditional time.\n\nHow many A-bombs can Russia make? Former Secretary of War Henry L.\nStimson has told us that the A-bombs we dropped on Japan \u201cwere the only\nones we had ready.\u201d Counting the test bomb at Alamogordo, we had thus\nproduced three bombs by mid-August 1945. This represented the total\noutput of a two-billion-dollar plant, employing three major methods of\nproduction, after the plants had been in operation for an average of\nabout six months. In other words, it took our two-billion-dollar plant\nabout six months to produce three A-bombs\u2014a rate of six A-bombs a year.\n\nNow all the evidence at hand, as already pointed out, indicates that,\ninstead of building three different types of plants for producing A-bomb\nmaterials, Russia is concentrating entirely on plutonium. Hence, if we\nassume that she built a plutonium plant equal in output to the total\ncapacity of our wartime uranium and plutonium plants, and further\nassuming that her methods for producing plutonium are as efficient as\nours, the best she could do at present would be at the rate of six\nplutonium bombs a year. At this rate she would have about eighteen by\nthe middle of 1952. This would be a sizable stockpile for a nation in\nsole possession of such a weapon. But would any nation with such a\nstockpile dare challenge a nation with a stockpile many times bigger,\nconsisting of bombs many times more powerful, and possessing a few\nhydrogen bombs to boot?\n\nRussia will, no doubt, improve her production methods. But to improve\nthem to the extent of producing, let us say, two bombs per month, she\nwould have to step up her production by four hundred per cent. It is\ndoubtful if such a step-up could be achieved in less than three years.\n\nThen there are other factors to be considered that greatly balance the\nscales in our favor. To produce plutonium bombs requires tremendous\nquantities of uranium, something that cannot be conjured up by just\ndialectic materialism. It so happens that we have access to the only two\nrich uranium deposits known in the world: the Belgian Congo, and the\nGreat Bear Lake area in Canada. There were no known rich uranium\ndeposits in Russia proper or in the territories of her satellites, with\nthe possible exception of Czechoslovakia. We know this from the fact\nthat she never competed for the world markets for radium, extracted\neconomically only from rich uranium ores, which sold before the war at\n$25,000 per gram, or at the rate of nearly $12,000,000 a pound. The best\nevidence, however, that she does not have at her command rich uranium\ndeposits either in Russia or elsewhere is her ruthless exploitation, at\nthe cost of thousands of human lives, of the depleted uranium mines in\nthe mountains of Saxony, which had long been abandoned by their German\nowners. The only other known source of pitchblende (the mineral richest\nin uranium) under Russian control is Joachimsthal (Jachymov) in Bohemia,\nfrom which came the first radium sample isolated by Mme Curie about\nfifty years ago. This mine, too, has been largely depleted, though much\nof its uranium may possibly be recoverable from the dump-heaps, if they\nhave not in the meantime been disposed of.\n\nNow, every ton of pure uranium metal contains just fourteen pounds of\nthe fissionable element uranium 235. The latter, when split, releases\nthe neutrons that create plutonium out of nonfissionable uranium 238. On\nthe basis of one hundred per cent efficiency, impossible in this\noperation, the yield of plutonium would thus be fourteen pounds per ton.\nSince the plutonium must be extracted long before all the U-235 atoms\nhave been split, however, the likelihood is that the yield would be no\nmore than two to four pounds per ton. Russia would thus need tens of\nthousands of tons of uranium ore to build up a sizable stockpile of\nA-bombs, and while she may be able to process low-grade ores, it would\ntake her much longer to produce a given quantity of plutonium than it\ntakes us to produce it from our much richer ores. For example, an ore\ncontaining fifty per cent uranium would yield a given quantity of\nplutonium ten times faster than an ore containing only five per cent,\nunless a refining plant ten times the size is built at ten times the\ncost of construction and of operation.\n\nIf we take Professor Oliphant\u2019s published estimate that the critical\nmass (that is, the minimum amount) needed for an A-bomb is between 10\nand 30 kilograms (22 and 66 pounds), we get a clear picture of the\nenormous difference there is between rich ores and poor ores for the\nbuilding up of an A-bomb stockpile, and a further concept of the\ndifficulties that Russia will face in trying to produce an H-bomb.\n\nAccording to the best available prewar information, the pitchblende of\nthe Belgian Congo has a uranium content as high as 60 to 80 per cent;\nthe Canadian ore yields from 30 to 40 per cent. A conservative estimate\nwould thus place the average uranium content of Belgian and Canadian\nores at somewhere around 50 per cent. This contrasts sharply with a\nprewar figure of around 3 per cent uranium for the pitchblende of\nCzechoslovakia, and the ore in the mountains of Saxony is of even lower\ngrade.\n\nHence on the basis of two to four pounds of plutonium per ton of uranium\nmetal, it would require the mining and processing of only 2 tons of\nBelgian and Canadian ore to obtain that amount as compared with 34 tons\nfor the ore from Czechoslovakia, and a larger amount for the Saxon ore.\nTo make a bomb containing 22 pounds of plutonium would thus require us\nto mine and process from 11 to 22 tons of ore, whereas Russia would need\nfrom 187 to 374 tons. For a bomb requiring 66 pounds, the amount, of\ncourse, would be correspondingly tripled, reaching a possible figure of\n1,122 tons of ore to produce one A-bomb, as compared with a maximum of\nno more than 66 tons of the ores available to us. In a state employing\nslave labor and heedless of the wastage of human lives, the production\ncost does not count. But even Russia\u2019s manpower is not unlimited, and\nworkers removed from other lines of production must inevitably hurt the\neconomy. This factor must put a definite limit to Russia\u2019s capacity to\nproduce A-bombs and will make it very difficult, if not impossible, for\nher to produce a large stockpile in a short time.\n\nWhen it comes to producing an H-bomb, the disparity between ourselves\nand Russia assumes astronomical proportions. It takes 80 pounds of\nuranium 235 to produce one pound of tritium. Since, as we have seen,\nthere are only 14 pounds of U-235 in a ton of natural uranium metal,\nthis means that 5.7 tons of uranium metal would be required, assuming\none hundred per cent efficiency of utilization, which is out of the\nquestion. On the basis of figures already given, it can be seen that we\nwould require the mining and processing of only 11.4 tons of ore whereas\nRussia would have to use as much as 194 tons to produce that single\npound of the element which, as the facts cited earlier appear to\ndemonstrate, is vital for the construction of a successful H-bomb.\n\nAll these basic facts, never presented before, should convince us that,\ndespite the fact that Russia has exploded her first A-bomb, we still\nhave tremendous advantages over her that she will find extremely\ndifficult to overcome. And we must not forget other advantages on our\nside that may prove decisive even after Russia succeeds in building up a\nsizable stockpile. Bombs can be delivered against us at present only by\nairplane or by submarine. A look at the map will show that whereas the\nAtlantic and Pacific Oceans stand between us and Russia\u2019s nearest bases,\nwe are in a much better position to deliver A-bombs to her vital\ncenters, such as the oil fields in the Caucasus, for example, from bases\nclose by. It is, furthermore, not unreasonable to assume that we, as the\nmost advanced industrial nation in the world, will manage to maintain\nour lead not only in methods of delivery by superior and faster\nairplanes, or by guided missiles, but also in the development of radar,\nsonar, and other detection devices, as well as of superior interceptors\nand other defensive measures, which would make delivery of A-bombs\nagainst us much more difficult than it would be for us to deliver them\nagainst Russia.\n\nFor the next three years, it can thus be seen, and possibly for a\nconsiderably longer period, the initiative, as far as atomic weapons are\nconcerned, will remain with us. Let us therefore be done with all\nvisionary plans for destroying the shield that now protects civilization\nas we know it, and proceed to build bigger and better shields, hoping\nthat by our very act of doing so we can prevent the ultimate cataclysm.\nRight now the outlook is not bright, but our strength, physical and\nspiritual, should give us faith that the forces of good will prevail in\nthe end over the forces of evil, as they have always done throughout\nhistory; that the four freedoms will triumph over the Four Horsemen of\nthe Apocalypse.\n\n\n\n\n                                   V\n                       A PRIMER OF ATOMIC ENERGY\n\n\nThe material universe, the earth and everything in it, all things living\nand non-living, the sun and its planets, the stars and the\nconstellations, the galaxies and the supergalaxies, the infinitely large\nand the infinitesimally small, manifests itself to our senses in two\nforms, matter and energy. We do not know, and probably never can know,\nhow the material universe began, and whether, indeed, it ever had a\nbeginning, but we do know that it is constantly changing and that it did\nnot always exist in its present form. We also know that in whatever form\nthe universe may have existed, matter and energy have always been\ninseparable, no energy being possible without matter, and no matter\nwithout energy, each being a form of the other.\n\nWhile we do not know how and when matter and energy came into being, or\nwhether they ever had a beginning in time as we perceive it, we do know\nthat while the relative amounts of matter and energy are constantly\nchanging, the total amount of both, in one form or the other, always\nremains the same. When a plant grows, energy from the sun, in the form\nof heat and light, is converted into matter, so that the total weight of\nthe plant is greater than that of the elementary material constituents,\nwater and carbon-dioxide gas, out of which its substance is built up.\nWhen the substance of the plant is again broken up into its original\nconstituents by burning, the residual ashes and gases weigh less than\nthe total weight of the intact plant, the difference corresponding to\nthe amount of matter that had been converted into energy, liberated once\nagain in the form of heat and light.\n\nAll energy as we know it manifests itself through motion or change in\nthe physical or chemical state of matter, or both, though these changes\nand motions may be so slow as to be imperceptible. As the ancient Greek\nphilosopher Heraclitus perceived more than two thousand years ago, all\nthings are in a constant state of flux, this flux being due to an\neverlasting conversion of matter into energy and energy into matter,\neverywhere over the vast stretches of the material universe, to its\noutermost and innermost limits, if any limits there be.\n\nEach manifestation of energy involves either matter in motion or a\nchange in its physical state, which we designate as physical energy; a\nchange in the chemical constitution of matter, which we know as chemical\nenergy; or a combination of the two. Physical energy can be converted\ninto chemical energy and vice versa. For example, heat and light are\nforms of physical energy, each consisting of a definite band of waves of\ndefinite wave lengths in violent, regular, rhythmic oscillations. A\nmysterious mechanism in the plant, known as photosynthesis, uses the\nheat and light energy from the sun to create complex substances, such as\nsugars, starches, and cellulose, out of simpler substances, such as\ncarbon dioxide and water, converting physical energy, heat, and light\ninto the chemical energy required to hold together the complex\nsubstances the plant produces. When we burn the cellulose in the form of\nwood or coal (coal is petrified wood), the chemical energy is once again\nconverted into physical energy in the form of the original heat and\nlight. As we have seen, the chemical energy stored in the plant\nmanifested itself by an increase in the plant\u2019s weight as compared with\nthat of its original constituents. Similarly, the release of the energy\nmanifests itself through a loss in the total weight of the plant\u2019s\nsubstance.\n\nIt can thus be seen that neither matter nor energy can be created. All\nwe can do is to manipulate certain types of matter in a way that\nliberates whatever energy had been in existence, in one form or another,\nsince the beginning of time. All the energy that we had been using on\nearth until the advent of the atomic age had originally come from the\nsun. Coal, as already said, is a petrified plant that had stored up the\nenergy of the sun in the form of chemical energy millions of years ago,\nbefore man made his appearance on the earth. Oil comes from organic\nmatter that also had stored up light and heat from the sun in the form\nof chemical energy. Water power and wind power are also made possible by\nthe sun\u2019s heat, since all water would freeze and no winds would blow\nwere it not for the sun\u2019s heat energy keeping the waters flowing and the\nair moving, the latter by creating differences in the temperature of air\nmasses.\n\nThere are two forms of energy that we take advantage of which are not\ndue directly to the sun\u2019s radiations\u2014gravitation and magnetism\u2014but the\nonly way we can utilize these is by employing energy derived from the\nsun\u2019s heat. In harnessing Niagara, or in the building of great dams, we\nutilize the fall of the water because of gravitation. But as I have\nalready pointed out, without the sun\u2019s heat water could not flow. To\nproduce electricity we begin with the chemical energy in coal or oil,\nwhich is first converted into heat energy, then to mechanical energy,\nand finally, through the agency of magnetism, into electrical energy.\n\nThe radiations of the sun, of the giant stars millions of times larger\nthan the sun, come from an entirely different source, the greatest\nsource of energy in the universe, known as atomic or, more correctly,\nnuclear energy. But even here the energy comes as the result of the\ntransformation of matter. The difference between nuclear energy and\nchemical energy is twofold. In chemical energy, such as the burning of\ncoal, the matter lost in the process comes from the outer shell of the\natoms, and the amount of matter lost is so small that it cannot be\nweighed directly by any human scale or other device. In nuclear energy,\non the other hand, the matter lost by being transformed into energy\ncomes from the nucleus, the heavy inner core, of the atom, and the\namount of matter lost is millions of times greater than in coal, great\nenough to be weighed.\n\nAn atom is the smallest unit of any of the elements of which the\nphysical universe is constituted. Atoms are so small that if a drop of\nwater were magnified to the size of the earth the atoms in the drop\nwould be smaller than oranges.\n\nThe structure of atoms is like that of a minuscule solar system, with a\nheavy nucleus in the center as the sun, and much smaller bodies\nrevolving around it as the planets. The nucleus is made up of two types\nof particles: protons, carrying a positive charge of electricity, and\nneutrons, electrically neutral. The planets revolving about the nucleus\nare electrons, units of negative electricity, which have a mass about\none two-thousandth the mass of the proton or the neutron. The number of\nprotons in the nucleus determines the chemical nature of the element,\nand also the number of planetary electrons, each proton being\nelectrically balanced by an electron in the atom\u2019s outer shells. The\ntotal number of protons and neutrons in the nucleus is known as the mass\nnumber, which is very close to the atomic weight of the element but not\nquite equal. Protons and neutrons are known under the common name\n\u201cnucleons.\u201d\n\nThere are two important facts to keep constantly in mind about protons\nand neutrons. The first is that the two are interchangeable. A proton,\nunder certain conditions, loses its positive charge by emitting a\npositive electron (positron) and thus becomes a neutron. Similarly, a\nneutron, when agitated, emits a negative electron and becomes a proton.\nAs we shall see, the latter process is taken advantage of in the\ntransmutation of nonfissionable uranium into plutonium, and of thorium\ninto fissionable uranium 233. The transmutation of all other elements,\nage-old dream of the alchemists, is made possible by the\ninterchangeability of protons into neutrons, and vice versa.\n\nThe second all-important fact about protons and neutrons, basic to the\nunderstanding of atomic energy, is that each proton and neutron in the\nnuclei of the elements weighs less than it does in the free state, the\nloss of weight being equal to the energy binding the nucleons. This loss\nbecomes progressively greater for the elements in the first half of the\nperiodic table, reaching its maximum in the nucleus of silver, element\n47. After that the loss gets progressively smaller. Hence, if we were to\ncombine (fuse) two elements in the first half of the periodic table, the\nprotons and the neutrons would lose weight if the newly formed nucleus\nis not heavier than that of silver, but would gain weight if the new\nnucleus thus formed is heavier than silver. The opposite is true with\nthe elements in the second half of the periodic table, the protons and\nneutrons losing weight when a heavy element is split into two lighter\nones, and gaining weight if two elements are fused into one.\n\nSince each loss of mass manifests itself by the release of energy, it\ncan be seen that to obtain energy from the atom\u2019s nucleus requires\neither the fusion of two elements in the first half of the periodic\ntable or the fission of an element in the second half. From a practical\npoint of view, however, fusion is possible only with two isotopes\n(twins) of hydrogen, at the beginning of the periodic table, while\nfission is possible only with twins of uranium, U-233 and U-235, and\nwith plutonium, at the lower end of the table.\n\nThe diameter of the atom is 100,000 times greater than the diameter of\nthe nucleus. This means that the atom is mostly empty space, the volume\nof the atom being 500,000 billion times the volume of the nucleus. It\ncan thus be seen that most of the matter in the universe is concentrated\nin the nuclei of the atoms. The density of matter in the nucleus is such\nthat a dime would weigh 600 million tons if its atoms were as tightly\npacked as are the protons and neutrons in the nucleus.\n\nThe atoms of the elements (of which there are ninety-two in nature, and\nsix more man-made elements) have twins, triplets, quadruplets, etc.,\nknown as isotopes. The nuclei of these twins all contain the same number\nof protons and hence all have the same chemical properties. They differ,\nhowever, in the number of neutrons in their nuclei and hence have\ndifferent atomic weights. For example, an ordinary hydrogen atom has a\nnucleus of one proton. The isotope of hydrogen, deuterium, has one\nproton plus one neutron in its nucleus. It is thus twice as heavy as\nordinary hydrogen. The second hydrogen isotope, tritium, has one proton\nand two neutrons in its nucleus and hence an atomic mass of three. On\nthe other hand, a nucleus containing two protons and one neutron is no\nlonger hydrogen but helium, also of atomic mass three.\n\nThere are hundreds of isotopes, some occurring in nature, others\nproduced artificially by shooting atomic bullets, such as neutrons, into\nthe nuclei of the atoms of various elements. A natural isotope of\nuranium, the ninety-second and last of the natural elements, contains 92\nprotons and 143 neutrons in its nucleus, hence its name U-235, one of\nthe two atomic-bomb elements. The most common isotope of uranium has 92\nprotons and 146 neutrons in its nucleus and hence is known as U-238. It\nis 140 times more plentiful than U-235, but cannot be used for the\nrelease of atomic energy.\n\nAtomic, or rather nuclear, energy is the cosmic force that binds\ntogether the protons and the neutrons in the nucleus. It is a force\nmillions of times greater than the electrical repulsion force existing\nin the nucleus because of the fact that the protons all have like\ncharges. This force, known as the coulomb force, is tremendous, varying\ninversely as the square of the distance separating the positively\ncharged particles. Professor Frederick Soddy, the noted English\nphysicist, has figured out that two grams (less than the weight of a\ndime) of protons placed at the opposite poles of the earth would repel\neach other with a force of twenty-six tons. Yet the nuclear force is\nmillions of times greater than the coulomb force. This force acts as the\ncosmic cement that holds the material universe together and is\nresponsible for the great density of matter in the nucleus.\n\nWe as yet know very little about the basic nature of this force, but we\ncan measure its magnitude by a famous mathematical equation originally\npresented by Dr. Einstein in his special theory of relativity in 1905.\nThis formula, one of the great intellectual achievements of man,\ntogether with the discovery of the radioactive elements by Henri\nBecquerel and Pierre and Marie Curie, provided the original clues as\nwell as the key to the discovery and the harnessing of nuclear energy.\n\nEinstein\u2019s formula, E = mc\u00b2, revealed that matter and energy are two\ndifferent manifestations of one and the same cosmic entity, instead of\nbeing two different entities, as had been generally believed. It led to\nthe revolutionary concept that matter, instead of being immutable, was\nenergy in a frozen state, while, conversely, energy was matter in a\nfluid state. The equation revealed that any one gram of matter was the\nequivalent in ergs (small units of energy) to the square of the velocity\nof light in centimeters per second\u2014namely, 900 billion billion ergs. In\nmore familiar terms, this means that one gram of matter represents\n25,000,000 kilowatt-hours of energy in the frozen state. This equals the\nenergy liberated in the burning of three billion grams (three thousand\ntons) of coal.\n\nThe liberation of energy in any form, chemical, electrical, or nuclear,\ninvolves the loss of an equivalent amount of mass, in accordance with\nthe Einstein formula. When 3,000 metric tons of coal are burned to\nashes, the residual ashes and the gaseous products weigh one gram less\nthan 3,000 tons; that is, one three-billionth part of the original mass\nwill have been converted into energy. The same is true with the\nliberation of nuclear energy by the splitting or fusing (as will be\nexplained later) of the nuclei of certain elements. The difference is\nmerely that of magnitude. In the liberation of chemical energy by the\nburning of coal, the energy comes from a very small loss of mass\nresulting from the rearrangement of electrons on the surface of the\natoms. The nucleus of the coal atoms is not involved in any way,\nremaining exactly the same as before. The amount of mass lost by the\nsurface electrons is one thirtieth of one millionth of one per cent.\n\nOn the other hand, nuclear energy involves vital changes in the atomic\nnucleus itself, with a consequent loss of as high as one tenth to nearly\neight tenths of one per cent in the original mass of the nuclei. This\nmeans that from one to nearly eight grams per thousand grams are\nliberated in the form of energy, as compared with only one gram in three\nbillion grams liberated in the burning of coal. In other words, the\namount of nuclear energy liberated in the transmutation of atomic nuclei\nis from 3,000,000 to 24,000,000 times as great as the chemical energy\nreleased by the burning of an equal amount of coal. In terms of TNT the\nfigure is seven times greater than for coal, as the energy from TNT,\nwhile liberated at an explosive rate, is about one seventh the total\nenergy content for an equivalent amount of coal. This means that the\nnuclear energy from one kilogram of uranium 235, or plutonium, when\nreleased at an explosive rate, is equal to the explosion of twenty\nthousand tons of TNT.\n\nNuclear energy can be utilized by two diametrically opposed methods. One\nis fission\u2014the splitting of the nuclei of the heaviest chemical elements\ninto two uneven fragments consisting of nuclei of two lighter elements.\nThe other is fusion\u2014combining, or fusing, two nuclei of the lightest\nelements into one nucleus of a heavier element. In both methods the\nresulting elements are lighter than the original nuclei. The loss of\nmass in each case manifests itself in the release of enormous amounts of\nnuclear energy.\n\nWhen two light atoms are combined to form a heavier atom, the weight of\nthe heavier is less than the total weight of the two light atoms. If the\nheavier atom could again be split into the two lighter ones, the latter\nwould resume their original weight. As explained before, however, this\nis true only with the light elements, such as hydrogen, deuterium, and\ntritium, in the first half of the periodic table of the elements. The\nopposite is true with the heavier elements of the second half of the\nperiodic table. For example, if krypton and barium, elements 36 and 56,\nwere to be combined to form uranium, element 92, the protons and the\nneutrons in the uranium nucleus would each weigh about 0.1 per cent more\nthan they weighed in the krypton and barium nuclei. It can thus be seen\nthat energy could be gained either through the loss of mass resulting\nfrom the fusion of two light elements, or from the similar loss of mass\nresulting from the fission of one heavy atom into two lighter ones.\n\nIn the fusion of two lighter atoms, the addition of one and one yields\nless than two, and yet half of two will be more than one. In the case of\nthe heavy elements the addition of one and one yields more than two, yet\nhalf of two makes less than one. This is the seeming paradox of atomic\nenergy.\n\nThree elements are known to be fissionable. Only one of these is found\nin nature: the uranium isotope 235 (U-235). The other two are man-made.\nOne is plutonium, transmuted by means of neutrons from the\nnonfissionable U-238, by the addition of one neutron to the 146 present\nin the nucleus, which leads to the conversion of two of the 147 neutrons\ninto protons, thus creating an element with a nucleus of 94 protons and\n145 neutrons. The second man-made element (not yet in wide use, as far\nas is known) is uranium isotope 233 (92 protons and 141 neutrons),\ncreated out of the element thorium (90 protons, 142 neutrons) by the\nsame method used in the production of plutonium.\n\nWhen the nucleus of any one of these elements is fissioned, each proton\nand neutron in the two resulting fragments weighs one tenth of one per\ncent less than it weighed in the original nucleus. For example, if U-235\natoms totaling 1,000 grams in weight are split, the total weight of the\nfragments will be 999 grams. The one missing gram is liberated in the\nform of 25,000,000 kilowatt-hours of energy, equivalent in explosive\nterms to 20,000 tons of TNT. But the original number of protons and\nneutrons in the 1,000 grams does not change.\n\nThe fission process, the equivalent of the \u201cburning\u201d of nuclear fuels,\nis maintained by what is known as a chain reaction. The bullets used for\nsplitting are neutrons, which, because they do not have an electric\ncharge, can penetrate the heavily fortified electrical wall surrounding\nthe positively charged nuclei. Just as a coal fire needs oxygen to keep\nit going, a nuclear fire needs the neutrons to maintain it.\n\nNeutrons do not exist free in nature, all being tightly locked up within\nthe nuclei of atoms. They are liberated, however, from the nuclei of the\nthree fissionable elements by a self-multiplication process in the chain\nreaction. The process begins when a cosmic ray from outer space, or a\nstray neutron, strikes one nucleus and splits it. The first atom thus\nsplit releases an average of two neutrons, which split two more nuclei,\nwhich in turn liberate four more neutrons, and so on. The reaction is so\nfast that in a short time trillions of neutrons are thus liberated to\nsplit trillions of nuclei. As each nucleus is split, it loses mass,\nwhich is converted into great energy.\n\nThere are two types of chain reactions: controlled and uncontrolled.\nThe controlled reaction is analogous to the burning of gasoline in an\nautomobile engine. The atom-splitting bullets\u2014the neutrons\u2014are first\nslowed down from speeds of more than ten thousand miles per second to\nless than one mile per second by being made to pass through a\nmoderator before they reach the atoms at which they are aimed.\nNeutron-\u201ckillers\u201d\u2014materials absorbing neutrons in great numbers\u2014keep\nthe neutrons liberated at any given time under complete control in a\nslow but steady nuclear fire.\n\nThe uncontrolled chain reaction is one in which there is no\nmoderator\u2014and no neutron-absorbers. It is analogous to the dropping of a\nmatch in a gasoline tank. In the uncontrolled chain reaction the fast\nneutrons, with nothing to slow them down or to devour them, build up by\nthe trillion and quadrillion in a fraction of a millionth of a second.\nThis leads to the splitting of a corresponding number of atoms,\nresulting in the release of unbelievable quantities of nuclear energy at\na tremendously explosive rate. One kilogram of atoms split releases\nenergy equivalent to that of 20,000,000 kilograms (20,000 metric tons)\nof TNT.\n\nIt is the uncontrolled reaction that is employed in the explosion of the\natomic bomb. The controlled reaction is expected to be used in the\nproduction of vast quantities of industrial power. It is now being\nemployed in the creation of radioactive isotopes, for use in medicine\nand as the most powerful research tool since the invention of the\nmicroscope for probing into the mysteries of nature, living and\nnon-living.\n\nIn the controlled reaction the material used is natural uranium, which\nconsists of a mixture of 99.3 per cent U-238 and 0.7 of the fissionable\nU-235. The neutrons from the U-235 are made to enter the nuclei of U-238\nand convert them to the fissionable element plutonium, for use in atomic\nbombs. The large quantities of energy liberated by the split U-235\nnuclei in the form of heat is at too low a temperature for efficient\nutilization as power, and is at present wasted. To be used for power,\nnuclear reactors capable of operating at high temperatures are now being\ndesigned.\n\nIn the atomic bomb only pure U-235, or plutonium, is used.\n\nIn both the controlled and the uncontrolled reactions a minimum amount\nof material, known as the \u201ccritical mass,\u201d must be used, as otherwise\ntoo many neutrons would escape and the nuclear fire would thus be\nextinguished, as would an ordinary fire for lack of oxygen. In the\natomic bomb two masses, each less than a critical mass, which together\nequal or exceed it, are brought in contact at a predetermined instant.\nThe uncontrolled reaction then comes automatically, since, in the\nabsence of any control, the neutrons, which cannot escape to the\noutside, build up at an unbelievable rate.\n\nWhereas the fission process for the release of nuclear energy entails\nmaking little ones out of big ones, the fusion process involves making\nbig ones out of little ones. In both processes the products weigh less\nthan the original materials, the loss of mass coming out in the form of\nenergy. According to the generally accepted hypothesis, the fusion\nprocess is the one operating in the sun and the stars of the same\nfamily. The radiant energy given off by them, it is believed, is the\nresult of the fusion of four hydrogen atoms into one atom of helium, two\nof the protons losing their positive charge, thus becoming neutrons.\nSince a helium atom weighs nearly eight tenths of one per cent less than\nthe total weight of the four hydrogen atoms, the loss of mass is thus\nnearly eight times that produced by fission, with a corresponding\neightfold increase in the amount of energy liberated. This process,\nusing light hydrogen, is not feasible on earth.\n\nThe nuclei of all atoms are thus vast storage depots of cosmic energy.\nWe must think of them as cosmic safe-deposit vaults, in which the\nCreator of the universe, if you will, deposited at the time of creation\nmost of the energy in the universe for safekeeping. The sun and the\nother giant stars that give light have, as it were, drawing accounts in\nthis \u201cFirst National Bank and Trust Company of the Universe,\u201d whereas we\non this little planet of ours in the cosmic hinterland are much too poor\nto have such a bank account. So we have been forced all these years we\nhave been on earth to subsist on small handouts from our close neighbor\nthe sun, which squanders millions all over space, but can spare us only\nnickels, dimes, and quarters (depending on the seasons of the year) for\na cup of coffee and a sandwich. We are thus in the true sense of the\nword cosmic beggars, living off the bounty of a distant relative.\n\nThe discovery of fission in 1939 meant that after a million years of\nexclusive dependence on the sun we had suddenly managed to open a modest\ndrawing account of our own in this bank of the cosmos. We were enabled\nto do it by stumbling upon two special master keys to five of the cosmic\nvaults. One of these keys we call fission; the other, which allows us\nentry into a much richer chamber of the vault, we call fusion. We can\nget a lot of the stored-up cosmic treasure by using the key to the\nfission vaults alone, but, as with our terrestrial bank vaults, which\ngenerally require two keys before they can be opened, it is not possible\nto use the key to the fusion vault unless we first use the fission key.\n\nExcept for the payment of our heat and light bill, the sun gives us\nnothing directly in cash. Instead it deposits a very small pittance in\nthe plants, which serve as its major terrestrial banks. The animals then\nrob the plants and we rob them both. When we eat the food we live by we\nthus actually eat sunshine.\n\nThe sun makes its deposits in the plant through an agent named\nchlorophyll, the stuff that makes the grass green. Chlorophyll has the\nuncanny ability to catch sunbeams and to hand them over to the plant. A\nchemical supergenius inside the plant changes the sunlight energy into\nchemical energy, just as a bank teller changes bills into silver. With\nthis chemical energy at their disposal, a great number of devilishly\nclever chemists in the plants\u2019 chemical factory go to work building up\nmany substances to serve as vaults in which to store up a large part of\nthe energy, using only part of it for their own subsistence.\n\nThe building materials used by these chemists inside the plants consist\nmainly of carbon-dioxide gas from the atmosphere, and water from the\nsoil, plus small amounts of minerals either supplied by the good earth\nor by fertilizers. Carbon dioxide, by the way, composed of one atom of\ncarbon and two atoms of oxygen, is the stuff you exhale. In solid form\nit is what we know as dry ice, used in efforts to make rain. It is\npresent in the atmosphere in large amounts.\n\nOut of the carbon dioxide and water the chemists in the plants build\ncellulose, starch, sugar, fat, proteins, vitamins, and scores of other\nsubstances, all of which serve as vaults for the sun\u2019s rays caught by\nthe chlorophyll. The biggest vaults of all, storing most of the energy,\nare the cellulose, sugars and starches, fats and proteins. There the\nstored energy remains until it is released by processes we call burning\nor digestion, both of which, as we shall see, are different terms for\nthe same chemical reaction. When we burn wood, or the petrified ancient\nwood we know as coal, we burn largely the cellulose, the chief component\nof the solid part of plants. When we eat the plants, or the animals in\nwhom the plant tissues are transformed into flesh by the solar energy\nstored within them, it is the sugars, starches, fats, and proteins that\ngive us the energy we live by.\n\nIn the process of burning wood or coal the large cellulose vaults,\ncomposed of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, are broken up, thus allowing\nthe original solar energy, stored up within them as chemical energy, to\nescape in the form of heat and light. This is the same heat and light\ndeposited there by the sun many years before\u2014in the case of coal, some\ntwo hundred million years back. The process of burning thus transforms\nthe chemical energy in the plants back to its original form of light and\nradiant heat energy. The complex carbon and hydrogen units in the\ncellulose are broken up, each freed carbon atom uniting within two\noxygen atoms in the air to form carbon dioxide again, while two hydrogen\natoms unite with one of oxygen to form water. Thus we see that the\ncellulose vaults are broken up once more into the original building\nbricks out of which the chemists in the plants had fashioned them.\n\nWhen we eat plant or animal food to get the energy to live by, exactly\nthe same process takes place except at a lower temperature. The sunlight\ndeposit vaults of sugar, starch, and fat, also composed, like cellulose,\nof carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, are broken up by the digestive system\ninto their component parts, thus allowing the original solar energy\nstored within them to get free in the form of chemical energy, which our\nbody uses in its essential processes. Here, too, the end products are\ncarbon dioxide, which we exhale, and water. About half the energy we\nthus obtain is used by us for the work we do. The other half is used by\nthe body for building up the tissues burned up as part of the regular\nwear and tear of life.\n\nWe thus burn food for our internal energy as we burn cellulose for our\nexternal energy. The interesting thing here is that, in both types of\nburning, fission as well as fusion processes take place. The fission is\nthe splitting of the cellulose, sugar, fats, starches, and proteins into\ncarbon and hydrogen atoms. The fusion part is the union of the carbon\nand the hydrogen with oxygen to form carbon dioxide and water. The\nfusion part is just as necessary to release the stored-up solar energy\nin the wood or coal as is the fission part, for, as everyone knows,\nunless there is oxygen for the carbon to fuse with, no combustion\n(burning) can take place and hence no release of energy. The plant\nvaults would remain closed absolutely tight.\n\nAt this point two things become clear. We see, in the first place, that\nwhenever we get any kind of energy in any form we do not in any way\ncreate any of it. All we do is merely draw on something that is already\nstored up; in the case of coal and wood by the sun, in the case of\nuranium and hydrogen by the same power that created the sun and all\nenergy. We draw water from the spring, but we do not make the water. On\nthe other hand, we cannot draw the water unless we first find the\nspring, and even then we cannot draw it unless we have a pitcher.\n\nAnd we also see, in the second place, that fission and fusion are common\neveryday phenomena that occur any time you burn anything. Both are\nessential whenever energy is released, whether it is the chemical energy\nfrom coal or the atomic energy from the nuclei of uranium, deuterium, or\ntritium. When you light a cigarette you employ both fission and fusion\nor you don\u2019t smoke. The first fission and fusion take place in the\nlighting of the match, the cellulose in the match (whether it is wood or\npaper) being fissioned (that is, split into its component atoms of\ncarbon and hydrogen). These atoms are then fusioned with the oxygen in\nthe air. The same thing happens when the tobacco catches fire. In each\ncase the fusion with the oxygen makes possible the fission of the\ncellulose. When we burn U-235, or plutonium, we again get both fission\nand fusion, except that, instead of oxygen, the nuclei of these elements\nfirst fuse with a neutron before they are split apart. Thus we see that\nthe process of burning U-235, or plutonium, requires not only fission\nbut fusion as well, without which they could not burn. This is true also\nin hydrogen fusion. When you burn deuterium by fusing two deuterons\n(nuclei of deuterium) to form helium of atomic weight three, plus a\nneutron, one of the two deuterons is split in half in the process.\nSimilarly, when you burn tritium by fusion two tritons (nuclei of\ntritium), one of the tritons splits into two neutrons and a proton, the\none proton joining the other triton to form helium of atomic weight\nfour.\n\nThus we see that fission and fusion are the cosmic firebrands that are\nalways present whenever a fire is lighted, chemical or atomic, whether\nthe fuel is wood, coal, or oil, or uranium, plutonium, deuterium, or\ntritium. Both, with some variations, are essential for opening the\ncosmic safe where the energy of the universe is kept in storage. The\nonly reason you get much more energy in the fission and fusion of atomic\nnuclei is that so much more had been stored in them than in the\ncellulose vaults on this planet.\n\nThe same reason that limits our ability to obtain stored chemical energy\nto a few fuels also limits our ability to obtain atomic energy. Coal,\noil, and wood are the only dividend-paying chemical-energy stocks.\nSimilarly only five elements, uranium 233 and 235, plutonium, deuterium,\nand tritium are the only dividend-paying atomic-energy stocks, and of\nthese only two (U-235 and deuterium) exist in nature. The other three\nare re-created from other elements by modern alchemical legerdemain.\nWhat is more, we know for a certainty that it will never be possible to\nobtain atomic energy from any other element, by either fission or\nfusion.\n\nThis should put to rest once and for all the notion of many, including\nsome self-styled scientists, that the explosion of a hydrogen bomb would\nset the hydrogen in the waters, and the oxygen and the nitrogen in the\nair, on fire and thus blow up the earth. The energy in common hydrogen\nis locked up in one of those cosmic vaults which only the sun and the\nstars that shine can open and which no number of H-bombs could blow\napart. Oxygen and nitrogen are locked even for the sun. As for the\ndeuterium in the water, it cannot catch fire unless it is highly\nconcentrated, condensed to its liquid form, and heated to a temperature\nof several hundred million degrees. Hence all this talk about blowing up\nthe earth is pure moonshine.\n\nBut while we know that we have reached the limit of what can be achieved\neither by fission or by fusion, that by no means justifies the\nconclusion that we have reached the ultimate in discovery and that\nfission and fusion are the only possible methods for tapping the energy\nlocked up in matter. We must remember that fifty years ago we did not\neven suspect that nuclear energy existed and that until 1939 no one,\nincluding Dr. Einstein, believed that it would ever become possible to\nuse it on a practical scale. We simply stumbled upon the phenomenon of\nfission, which in its turn opened the way to fusion.\n\nIf science tells us anything at all, it tells us that nature is infinite\nand that the human mind, driven by insatiable curiosity and probing ever\ndeeper into nature\u2019s mysteries, will inevitably find ever greater\ntreasures, treasures that are at present beyond the utmost stretches of\nthe imagination\u2014as far beyond fission and fusion as these are beyond\nman\u2019s first discovery of how to make a fire by striking a spark with a\nlaboriously made flint. The day may yet come, and past history makes it\npractically certain that it will come, when man will look upon the\ndiscovery of fission and fusion as we look today upon the crudest tools\nmade by primitive man.\n\nA great measure of man\u2019s progress has been the result of serendipity,\nthe faculty of making discoveries, by chance or sagacity, of things not\nsought for. Many an adventure has led man to stumble upon something much\nbetter than he originally set out to find. Like Columbus, many an\nexplorer into the realms of the unknown has set his sights on a shorter\nroute to the spices of India only to stumble upon a new continent.\nUnlike Columbus, however, the explorers in the field of science, instead\nof being confined to this tiny little earth of ours, have the whole\ninfinite universe as the domain of their adventures, and many a virgin\ncontinent, richer by far than any yet discovered, still awaits its\nColumbus.\n\nRoentgen and Becquerel were exploring what they thought was an untrodden\npath in the forest and came upon a new road that led their successors to\nthe very citadel of the material universe. Young Enrico Fermi was\ncurious to find out what would happen if he fired a neutron into the\nnucleus of uranium, hoping only to create a heavier isotope of uranium,\nor at best a new element. His rather modest goal led five years later to\nthe fission of uranium, and in another six years to the atomic bomb.\n\nYet, as we have seen, in both fission and fusion only a very small\nfraction of the mass of the protons and neutrons in the nuclei of the\nelements used is liberated in the form of energy, while 99.3 to 99.9 per\ncent of their substance remains in the form of matter. We know of no\nprocess in nature which converts 100 per cent of the matter in protons\nand neutrons into energy, but scientists are already talking about\nfinding means for bringing about such a conversion. They are seeking\nclues for such a process in the mysterious cosmic rays that bombard the\nearth from outer space with energies billions of times greater than\nthose released by fission or fusion, great enough to smash atoms of\noxygen or nitrogen, or whatever other atoms they happen to hit in the\nupper atmosphere, into their component protons and neutrons. Luckily,\ntheir number is small and most of their energy is spent long before they\nreach sea level.\n\nBut we have already learned how to create secondary cosmic-ray particles\nof relatively low energies (350,000,000 electron-volts) with our giant\ncyclotrons. The creation of these particles, known as mesons, which are\nbelieved to be the cosmic cement responsible for the nuclear forces,\nrepresents the actual conversion of energy into matter. This is the\nexact reverse of the process taking place in fission and fusion, in\nwhich, as we have seen, matter is converted into energy. And we are now\nabout to complete multibillion-volt atom-smashers that will hurl atomic\nbullets of energies of from three to ten billion volts at the nuclei of\natoms. With these gigantic machines, known as the cosmotron (at the\nBrookhaven National Laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission) and the\nbevatron (at the University of California), we shall be able to smash\nnuclei into their individual component protons and neutrons and thus get\na much more intimate glimpse of the forces that hold the nuclei\ntogether. What is more, instead of creating only mesons, particles with\nonly 300 electron masses, we shall be able for the first time to convert\nenergy into protons and neutrons, duplicating, as far as is known, an\nact of creation that has not taken place since the beginning of the\nuniverse. Man at last will be creating the very building blocks out of\nwhich the universe is made, as well as the cosmic cement that holds them\ntogether.\n\nWhat new continents will our first glimpse into the mechanism of the\nvery act of creation of matter out of energy reveal? What new secrets\nwill be uncovered before the dazzled eyes and mind of man when he takes\nthe nucleus of the atom completely apart at last? Not even Einstein\ncould tell us. But, as Omar Khayy\u00e1m divined, \u201ca single Alif\u201d may provide\n\u201cthe clue\u201d that, could we but find it, leads \u201cto the Treasure-House, and\nperadventure to the Master too.\u201d The fact is that we already have opened\nthe door to the anteroom of the treasure-house, and we are about to\nunlock the door to one of its inner chambers. What shall we find there?\nNo one as yet knows. But we do know that every door man has opened so\nfar has led to riches beyond his wildest dreams, each new door bringing\ngreater rewards than the one before. On the other hand, we also know\nthat the treasure-house has many mansions, and that no matter how many\nchambers he may enter, he will always find new doors to unlock. For we\nhave learned that the solution of any one secret always opens up a\nthousand new mysteries.\n\nWe also have learned, to our sorrow, that any new insight gained into\nnature\u2019s laws and forces can be used for great good and for equally\ngreat evil. The greater the insight, the greater the potentialities for\ngood or evil. The new knowledge he is about to gain by his deeper\ninsight into the heart of matter, and by his ability to create it out of\nenergy, may offer man the means to make himself complete master of the\nworld he lives in. It is equally true, alas, that he could use it to\ndestroy that world even more thoroughly than with the hydrogen bomb.\n\nAs already stated, scientists are even now discussing the possibility of\nfinding means for the complete annihilation of matter by the conversion\nof the entire mass of protons and neutrons into energy, instead of only\n0.1 to 0.7 per cent. And while the total annihilation of protons and\nneutrons still seems highly speculative, we already know that such a\nprocess actually does take place in the realm of the electron. This is\nthe phenomenon already achieved numerous times on a small scale in the\nlaboratory, in which a positive electron (positron) and an electron with\na negative charge completely destroy each other, their entire mass being\nconverted into energy. Luckily, this is at present only a laboratory\nexperiment, in which each positron must be individually produced, since\nthere are hardly any positive electrons in our part of the universe. But\nsuppose the new knowledge we are about to pry loose from the inner\ncitadel of matter reveals to us a new process, at present not even\nsuspected, that would release positrons in large numbers, just as the\nfission and fusion processes made possible for the first time the\nliberation of large quantities of neutrons. Such an eventuality, by no\nmeans beyond the realm of the possible, would open potentialities of\nhorror alongside which those of the H-bomb, even the rigged one, would\nbe puny. For any process that would release large numbers of positrons\nin the atmosphere, in a chain reaction similar to the one now liberating\nneutrons, may envelop the earth in one deadly flash of radioactive\nlightning that would instantly kill all sensate things. And although\nthis is admittedly purely speculative, no one dare say that such a\ndiscovery will not be made, not when one remembers how remote and\nunlikely a process such as fission seemed to be just before it was made.\n\nThough many of the great discoveries came about as the result of chance,\nthey came because, as Pasteur said, \u201cchance favors the prepared mind.\u201d\nActually they came largely through the intellectual synthesis of what\nhad originally appeared as unrelated phenomena or concepts. When Faraday\ndiscovered the principle of electromagnetic induction, he established\nfor the first time that electricity and magnetism, looked upon since\nprehistoric times as two separate and distinct phenomena, were actually\nonly two aspects of one basic natural force, which we know today as\nelectromagnetism. This great intellectual synthesis led directly to the\nage of electricity and all its wonders. About thirty years later the\ngreat Scottish physicist James Clerk Maxwell demonstrated that\nelectromagnetic action traveled through space in the form of transverse\nwaves similar to those of light and having the same velocity. This\nrevealed the existence in nature of electromagnetic waves, better known\nto us today as radio waves. About a quarter century later the great\nGerman-Jewish physicist Heinrich Hertz not only produced these\nelectromagnetic waves but showed that they are propagated just as waves\nof light are, possessing all other properties of light, such as\nreflection, refraction, and polarization. This led directly to wireless\ntelegraphy and telephony, radio and television, radiophotography and\nradar.\n\nWhen Einstein, in his special theory of relativity of 1905, united\nmatter and energy in one basic cosmic entity, the road was opened to the\natomic age. Yet Einstein was never satisfied and has devoted more than\nforty-five years of his life to the search for a greater, all-embracing\nunity underlying the great diversity of natural phenomena. In his\ngeneral theory of relativity of 1915 he formulated a concept that\nencompasses the universal law of gravitation in his earlier synthesis of\nspace and time, of which matter and energy were an integral part. This\nsynthesis, wrote Bertrand Russell in 1924, \u201cis probably the greatest\nsynthetic achievement of the human intellect up to the present time. It\nsums up the mathematical and physical labors of more than two thousand\nyears. Pure geometry from Pythagoras to Riemann, the dynamics and\nastronomy of Galileo and Newton, the theory of electromagnetism as it\nresulted from the researches of Faraday, Maxwell, and their successors,\nall are absorbed, with the necessary modifications, in the theories of\nEinstein, Weyl, and Eddington.\n\n\u201cSo comprehensive a synthesis,\u201d he continued, \u201cmight have represented a\ndead end, leading to no further progress for a long time. Fortunately,\nat this moment quantum theory [the theory applying to the forces within\nthe atom] has appeared, with a new set of facts outside the scope of\nrelativity physics [which applies to the forces governing the cosmos at\nlarge]. This has saved us, in the nick of time, from the danger of\nsupposing that we know everything.\u201d\n\nYet Einstein, working away in majestic solitude, has been trying all\nthese years to construct a vast intellectual edifice that would embrace\nall the laws of the cosmos known so far, including the quantum, in one\nfundamental concept, which he designates as a \u201cunified field theory.\u201d\nEarly in 1950 he published the results of his arduous labors since 1915.\nThis he regards as the crowning achievement of his life\u2019s work, a\nunified theory that bridges the vast gulf that had existed between\nrelativity and quantum, between the infinite universe of the stars and\ngalaxies and the equally infinite universe within the nucleus of the\natom. If he is right, and he has always been right before, his latest\ncontribution will prove to be a greater synthetic achievement of the\nhuman intellect than ever before, embracing space and time, matter and\nenergy, gravitation and electromagnetism, as well as the nuclear forces\nwithin the atom, in one all-encompassing concept. In due time this\nconcept should lead to new revelations of nature\u2019s mysteries, and to\ntriumphs even greater than those which followed as a direct consequence\nof all earlier intellectual syntheses.\n\nIf the synthesis of matter and energy led to the atomic age, what may we\nexpect of the latest, all-inclusive synthesis? When Einstein was asked\nabout it he replied: \u201cCome back in twenty years!\u201d which happens to\ncoincide with the end of the hundred-year period recorded by the\nbrothers Goncourt: God swinging a bunch of keys, and saying to humanity:\n\u201cClosing time, gentlemen!\u201d\n\nThe search for new intellectual syntheses goes on, and no doubt new\nrelationships between the diverse phenomena of nature will be found,\nregardless of whether Einstein\u2019s latest theory stands or falls in the\nlight of further discovery. Physicists, for example, are speculating\nabout a fundamental relationship between time and the electronic charge,\none of the most basic units of nature, and there are those who believe\nthat this relationship will turn out to be much more fundamental than\nthat between matter and energy. Should this be found to be true, then\nthe discovery of the relationship between time and charge may lead to\nfinding a way for starting a self-multiplying positron-electron chain\nreaction, just as the relationship between matter and energy led\ninevitably to the self-multiplying chain reaction with neutrons. If this\ncomes about, then closing time will come much closer.\n\nYet the sound of the swinging keys need not necessarily mean closing\ntime for man at the twilight of his day on this planet. It could also\nmean the opening of gates at a new dawn, to a new earth\u2014and a new\nheaven.\n\n\n\n\n                                APPENDIX\n\n\n              THE HYDROGEN BOMB AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL\n\n_In the fall of 1949 Senator McMahon directed the staff of the Joint\nCongressional Committee on Atomic Energy to study the hydrogen bomb in\nrelation to international control of atomic energy. The material in the\nfollowing pages, with the exception of the comments in Appendix D, was\nprepared by the staff at the chairman\u2019s request to assist the joint\ncommittee in considering the problem._\n\n_It is my belief that this valuable material, until now unavailable in\nsuch excellent summary form, will also assist Americans in general in\nconsidering this vital problem. Readers of this volume should find it\nhelpful in arriving at conclusions of their own, particularly in the\nlight of the facts and discussion presented in Chapters III and IV. I\nfurther believe that a careful perusal of the following material will\nlend strong support to my view that the international control of atomic\nweapons, as envisaged in the majority plan of the United Nations,\u2014the\nonly plan that may give assurance against a surprise atomic attack\u2014had\nbecome wholly impractical even before the entry of the H-bomb into the\npicture, and that the imminent development of the H-bomb has made it so\nunworkable that any further plan to revive it would be futile._\n\n_This material makes it clear (a) that Russia never had any intention of\nreaching any agreement on international control and had set out to\nsabotage any plan from the very beginning; and (b) that no plan, no\nmatter how foolproof, could hope to succeed in the absence of complete\nmutual trust and confidence. Events in Korea, I am convinced, have\ndriven the last nail into the coffin of the UN control plan._\n\n\n                                   A\n  SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC\n                                WEAPONS\n\n  May 1945: Secretary of War Stimson appoints interim Committee to study\n      problem of atomic energy.\n\n  August 6, 1945: Hiroshima.\n\n  October 3, 1945: President\u2019s message to Congress outlines necessity\n      for international control of atomic energy and proposes\n      conversations with Canada and United Kingdom.\n\n  November 15, 1945: Three-nation agreed declaration on atomic energy\n      (Truman-Attlee-King declaration). Calls for United Nations\n      Commission to make proposals for international control plan.\n      Proposals should provide safeguards \u201cby way of _inspection and\n      other means_.\u201d (Wherever used in the following pages, italics are\n      supplied.)\n\n  December 27, 1945: U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister communiqu\u00e9 on\n      results of Moscow Conference. Proposes that Canada, China, and\n      France join with Big Three in sponsoring resolution calling for\n      United Nations Atomic Energy Commission with terms of reference\n      stipulated in Truman-Attlee-King declaration.\n\n  January 24, 1946: General Assembly resolution establishing United\n      Nations Commission on Atomic Energy. Composed of members of\n      Security Council plus Canada.\n\n  March 28, 1946: Acheson-Lilienthal report. Urges that mines and\n      \u201cdangerous\u201d atomic-energy facilities be put under _international\n      ownership_ and _management_ of Atomic Development Authority.\n      Additional safeguards in the form of _inspection_. Nations to\n      operate \u201csafe\u201d plants under ADA license. Plants to be distributed\n      among nations in keeping with _strategic balance_. Control plan to\n      be implemented by stages.\n\n  June 14, 1946: Baruch proposals to United Nations. Closely follow\n      Acheson-Lilienthal recommendations. Ask \u201ccondign punishment,\u201d for\n      violations, and request agreement that UN Charter _veto_ clause\n      not apply to sanctions for stipulated violations of atomic-energy\n      treaty.\n\n  June 19, 1946: Soviet Union counterproposals. Demand prohibition of\n      atomic weapons and destruction of existing stockpiles _before_\n      international control plan is negotiated. Soviet proposals provide\n      no safeguards against evasion.\n\n  December 31, 1946: First Report of UNAEC. Incorporates essential\n      features of Baruch proposals into statement of principles for plan\n      for international control of atomic energy. Adopted 10 to 0, with\n      U.S.S.R. and Poland abstaining.\n\n  June 11, 1947: U.S.S.R. control proposals. Soviets assent to _periodic\n      inspection_, but this would apply only to _declared_ plants.\n\n  August 11, 1947: Soviets consent in principle to concept of _quotas_.\n\n  September 11, 1947: Second Report of UNAEC. Outlines powers,\n      functions, and limitations thereon of any international agency in\n      implementing effective control plan.\n\n  May 17, 1948: Third Report of UNAEC. Reports impasse because Soviets\n      refuse to accept majority plan and persist in refusing to put\n      forward effective proposals of their own. Concludes that further\n      work in UNAEC is fruitless until Soviet cooperation in broader\n      fields of policy is secured. Recommends that Commission\u2019s work be\n      suspended until sponsoring powers find that basis for agreement\n      exists.\n\n  September 25, 1948: Soviets modify position by asking that conventions\n      for prohibition of atomic weapons and for international control go\n      into effect simultaneously.\n\n  November 4, 1948: By vote of 40 to 6, UN General Assembly endorses\n      majority control plan. Calls upon UNAEC to continue work and\n      requests that sponsoring powers consult to explore possible basis\n      of agreement.\n\n  August 9, 1949: First meeting of sponsoring powers of UNAEC.\n\n  September 23, 1949: President Truman\u2019s announcement of Soviet atomic\n      explosion.\n\n  October 25, 1949: Canada, China, France, United Kingdom, United States\n      statement reveals Soviet attitude still prevents agreement.\n\n  November 23, 1949: General Assembly resolution calls upon sponsoring\n      powers to continue consultations.\n\n  November 23, 1949: Soviets reverse position on quotas, abandoning\n      previous assent in principle.\n\n  January 19, 1950: U.S.S.R. walks out of sponsoring powers\n      consultations over China recognition issue.\n\n  January 31, 1950: President Truman announces that United States will\n      proceed with development of hydrogen bomb.\n\n\n                                   B\n    THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF\n                       PROPOSALS AND NEGOTIATIONS\n\n_Early steps looking toward international control_\n\nEven before the test explosion at Alamogordo, N. Mex., had ushered in\nthe atomic age, the United States Government was studying methods of\nmaking atomic energy a socially constructive force.\n\nIn May 1945 an Interim Committee appointed by Secretary of War Stimson\ncommenced investigating the problem. The Committee recognized \u201cthat the\nmeans of producing the atomic bomb would not forever remain the\nexclusive property of the United States....\u201d Therefore, \u201cSecretary of\nWar Stimson was one of the first to recommend a policy of international\nsupervision and control of the entire field of atomic energy....\u201d\n\nWhen on August 6, 1945, President Truman made the first public statement\non the atomic bomb, he made clear that \u201cunder present circumstances it\nis not intended to divulge the technical process of production or all\nthe military application, pending further examination of possible\nmethods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of\nsudden destruction.\u201d He assured the American people that he would \u201cmake\nfurther recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic power can\nbecome a powerful and forceful influence toward the maintenance of world\npeace.\u201d\n\nThe President\u2019s recommendations were transmitted to the Congress on\nOctober 3, 1945. He spoke of the necessity for \u201cinternational\narrangements looking, if possible, to the renunciation of the use and\ndevelopment of the atomic bomb, and directing ... atomic energy ...\ntoward peaceful and humanitarian ends.\u201d So great a challenge could not\nawait the full development of the United Nations. The President,\ntherefore, proposed initiating discussions \u201cfirst with our associates in\nthis discovery, Great Britain and Canada, and then with other\nnations....\u201d\n\n\n_The Truman-Attlee-King declaration_\n\nIn the three nations agreed declaration of November 15, 1945\u2014frequently\ncalled the Truman-Attlee-King declaration\u2014was recorded the concerted\nobjectives of the three nations that had developed the atomic bomb.\n\nAccording to the declaration, any international arrangements should have\na dual goal: Preventing the use of atomic energy for destructive\npurposes, and promoting its use for peaceful and humanitarian ends. To\nreach these objectives, the signatory nations proposed a United Nations\nCommission empowered to make recommendations to the parent body. It was\nasked that the Commission make specific proposals \u201cfor effective\nsafeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect states\nagainst the hazards of violations and evasions.\u201d It was further\nsuggested that the Commission\u2019s work \u201cproceed by separate stages, the\nsuccessful completion of each of which will develop the necessary\nconfidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.\u201d\n\nContained in the agreed declaration was the genesis of the basic feature\nof the control proposals subsequently advanced by the United States, and\naccepted by a large majority of the United Nations: safeguards through\ninspection and _other means_. It was recognized even at this early date\nthat \u201ceffective, reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards\u201d against evasion\nrepresented the minimum prerequisite of a satisfactory international\narrangement.\n\nAt the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in\nDecember 1945, the Truman-Attlee-King proposals received the Soviet\nUnion\u2019s endorsement. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet\nUnion agreed to invite Canada, China, and France to join with them in\nsponsoring a resolution calling for a United Nations Atomic Energy\nCommission. Such a Commission would consist of the 11 members of the\nSecurity Council plus Canada when that state was not sitting on the\nCouncil. It is noteworthy that the Commission\u2019s proposed terms of\nreference were exactly those suggested by the Truman-Attlee-King\ndeclaration.\n\nIn its first substantive resolution, the United Nations General Assembly\nunanimously adopted the recommendations of the Moscow Conference and\nestablished the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy on January\n24, 1946.\n\n\n_The Acheson-Lilienthal report_\n\nIn order to inquire into the nature of the \u201ceffective, reciprocal, and\nenforceable safeguards\u201d called for in the Truman-Attlee-King\ndeclaration, Secretary of State Byrnes in January 1946 appointed a\nCommittee headed by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The Committee\nin turn enlisted the aid of a Board of Consultants under the\nchairmanship of David Lilienthal.\n\nThe findings of the two groups were made public on March 28, 1946, in\nthe Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, commonly\ncalled the Acheson-Lilienthal report. It was advanced \u201cnot as a final\nplan but as a place to begin, a foundation on which to build.\u201d\n\nThe report concluded that no security against atomic attack could be\nfound in an agreement that merely \u201coutlawed\u201d these weapons. Nor was it\nconsidered feasible to control atomic energy \u201conly by a system which\nrelies on inspection and similar police-like methods.\u201d Instead,\ninspection must be supplemented by _international ownership and\nmanagement_ of raw materials and key installations. \u201cDangerous\u201d\noperations\u2014those of potential military consequence\u2014would be carried out\nby an Atomic Development Authority, an international agency under the\nUnited Nations. Only \u201csafe\u201d activities\u2014those of no military\nimportance\u2014would be conducted by the individual nations, under licenses\nfrom the Atomic Development Authority. Any plan finally agreed upon\nwould be implemented by _stages_ with the United States progressively\ntransferring its fund of theoretical and technological knowledge to an\ninternational authority as safeguards were put into effect.\n\nThe report amplified the Truman-Attlee-King proposals in two important\nrespects.\n\nFirst, it stated that international ownership\u2014not specifically mentioned\nin the earlier declaration\u2014was a necessary adjunct of international\ninspection. Second, it advanced the concept of \u201cstrategic balance\u201d or\n\u201cquotas.\u201d The Report held that an acceptable plan must be \u201csuch that if\nit fails or the whole international situation collapses, any nations\nsuch as the United States will still be in a relatively secure position,\ncompared to any other nation.\u201d To help attain this end, it was proposed\nthat the Atomic Development Authority\u2019s stock piles and plants be well\ndistributed geographically.\n\n\n_The Baruch proposals to the United Nations_\n\nLess than 3 months after the publication of the Acheson-Lilienthal\nreport, the United States Government gave the world its proposals for\nthe international control of atomic energy. On June 14, 1946, Bernard\nBaruch presented them to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission \u201cas\na basis for beginning our discussion.\u201d\n\nMr. Baruch stated that:\n\n\n  When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the\n  renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put\n  into effective operation and condign punishments set up for violations\n  of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international\n  crimes, we propose that:\n\n  1. manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;\n\n  2. existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the\n  treaty; and\n\n  3. the Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the\n  know-how for the production of atomic energy.\n\n\nThe methods suggested for achieving international control were the\nfollowing:\n\n\n  The United States proposes the creation of an International Atomic\n  Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the\n  development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material\n  and including\u2014\n\n  1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities\n  potentially dangerous to world security.\n\n  2. Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.\n\n  3. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.\n\n  4. Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative\n  character intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic\n  knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend, and therefore to\n  detect\u2014misuse of atomic energy. To be effective, the Authority must\n  itself be the world\u2019s leader in the field of atomic knowledge and\n  development and thus supplement its legal authority with the great\n  power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge.\n\n\nThese proposals represented a broadening\u2014rather than essential\nmodification\u2014of the Acheson-Lilienthal recommendations. The additional\nfeatures concerned (1) _condign punishment_, and (2) the so-called power\nof veto of the United Nations Charter.\n\nWhereas the Acheson-Lilienthal report had not dealt with the subject of\nsanctions, Mr. Baruch held that a realistic agreement must provide for\npenalties \u201cof as severe a nature as the nations may wish and as\nimmediate and certain in their execution as possible....\u201d Such \u201ccondign\npunishment\u201d would be meted out if _previously stipulated_ violations of\na control plan occurred.\n\nThis problem, Mr. Baruch stated, was intimately related with the veto\nprovisions of the United Nations Charter. Under the Charter, sanctions\ncan be invoked only with the concurrence of the five permanent members\nof the Security Council, i.e., China, France, United Kingdom, United\nStates, and the Soviet Union. Mr. Baruch maintained, however, that\n\u201cthere must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn\nagreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive\npurposes.... The bomb does not wait on debate.\u201d He pointed out that the\nUnited States was \u201cconcerned here with the veto power only as it affects\nthis particular problem.\u201d\n\nA United States memorandum of July 12, 1946, stressed that \u201cVoluntary\nrelinquishment of the veto on questions relating to a specific weapon\npreviously outlawed by unanimous agreement because of its uniquely\ndestructive character, in no wise involves any compromise of the\nprinciple of unanimity of action as applied to general problems or to\nparticular situations not foreseeable and therefore not susceptible of\nadvance unanimous agreement.\u201d\n\n\n_The first Soviet proposals\u2014Gromyko\u2019s statement of June 19, 1946_\n\nA week after the American plans were put forward, the Soviet Union\nannounced its own proposals. They were marked chiefly by Soviet\ninsistence that the United States agree to stop the production of atomic\nweapons and destroy existing bombs _before_ international control\narrangements were negotiated.\n\nAlthough they called for \u201can international convention for outlawing\nweapons based on the use of atomic energy,\u201d the Soviet proposals did not\nprovide \u201ceffective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to\nprotect complying states against the hazards of violations and\nevasions.\u201d They proposed that the \u201crule of unanimity\u201d in the Security\nCouncil apply to atomic-energy matters. Hence if one of the permanent\nmembers of the Security Council or a friend violated a control scheme,\nthe other members of the United Nations would have no legal means, under\nthe Charter, of invoking sanctions against it.\n\nThroughout 1946 the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission continued\nits investigations of the control problem. On December 31, 1946, the\nCommission issued its _First Report_. It revealed that the essential\nfeatures of the Baruch proposals had won the support of all the members\nof the Commission except the Soviet Union and Poland.\n\n\n_The Soviet Proposals of June 11, 1947_\n\nA year after it suggested a convention for \u201coutlawing\u201d atomic weapons,\nthe Soviet Union came forward with a set of control proposals.\n\nA chief point of interest in the plan was the fact that the Soviets now\nassented to \u201c_periodic_ inspection of facilities for mining and\nproduction of atomic materials\u201d by an international inspectorate. In\nanswer to a United Kingdom inquiry, however, the Russians stated that\n\u201cnormally, inspectors will visit only _declared_ plants\u201d\u2014with this\nsupplemented by special investigations when there were \u201cgrounds for\nsuspicion\u201d of violation of the convention for the prohibition of atomic\nweapons. The power of the Control Commission would be further limited to\nmaking recommendations to governments and to the Security Council. On\nother matters that separated the Soviet Union from the majority\nposition\u2014such as international ownership and management, and the veto\nquestion\u2014there was no change in the Russian position.\n\nThe subsequent half-year brought one sign of a further modification of\nthe U.S.S.R. stand. On August 11, 1947, Mr. Gromyko seemingly brought\nthe Soviets closer to the majority position by agreeing that \u201cthe idea\nof quotas deserves attention and serious consideration by the Atomic\nEnergy Commission....\u201d\n\n\n_The Second and Third Reports of the United Nations Atomic Energy\nCommission\u2014September 11, 1947, and May 17, 1948_\n\nThe _Second Report_ of the Atomic Energy Commission spelled out in\ndetail the precise powers and functions and the limitations thereon of\nany international agency in implementing an effective control plan. When\nthe _Report_ was approved by the General Assembly by a vote of 40 to 6,\nthe plan developed in the UNAEC became a world plan\u2014to which only the\nSoviet Union and her satellites took exception.\n\nBy the spring of 1948 the UNAEC became convinced that the Soviet Union\u2019s\nrefusal to accept any plan that met the technical requirements of\ncontrolling atomic energy was symptomatic of broader differences which\nmade further negotiations on the Commission level fruitless.\n\nThe _Third Report_ stated that \u201cthe majority of the Commission has been\nunable to secure the agreement of the Soviet Union to even those\nelements of effective control from the technical point of view, let\nalone their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the\nworld community required of all nations in this field....\u201d\n\nIt appeared to the Commission that the atomic deadlock was but one\nmanifestation of the more widespread dispute between the Soviet Union\nand the rest of the world. In view of this, the Commission majority\nrecommended that negotiations in the Commission be suspended until the\npermanent members of the UNAEC found that \u201cthere exists a basis for\nagreement on the international control of atomic energy....\u201d\n\nThe following were regarded as the basic considerations which, even on a\ntechnical level, made the U.S.S.R. position untenable:\n\n\n  I. The powers provided for the International Control Commission by the\n  Soviet Union proposals, confined as they are to _periodic inspection_\n  and _special investigations_, are insufficient to guarantee against\n  the diversion of dangerous materials from known atomic facilities, and\n  do not provide the means to detect secret activities.\n\n  II. Except by recommendations to the Security Council of the United\n  Nations, the International Control Commission has no powers to enforce\n  either its own decisions or the terms of the convention or conventions\n  on control.\n\n  III. The Soviet Union Government insists that the convention\n  establishing a system of control, even so limited as that contained in\n  the Soviet Union proposals, can be concluded only _after_ a convention\n  providing for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the destruction of\n  existing atomic weapons has been \u201csigned, ratified, and put into\n  effect.\u201d [Italics in original.]\n\n\nThe Commission\u2019s work had come to a standstill.\n\n\n_Atomic energy negotiations since 1948_\n\nMeeting in Paris in the fall of 1948 the General Assembly, by a vote of\n40 to 6, approved the general findings and recommendations of the FIRST\nREPORT and the specific proposals of part II of the SECOND REPORT \u201cas\nconstituting the necessary basis for the establishing of an effective\nsystem of international control of atomic energy.\u201d However, it called\nupon the UNAEC to continue its work and to study such subjects as it\ndeemed \u201cpracticable and useful,\u201d and asked that the permanent members of\nthe Commission \u201cconsult in order to determine if there exists a basis\nfor agreement....\u201d The permanent members were requested to transmit the\nresults of their consultations to the General Assembly.\n\nIn the meanwhile, the Soviet Union had served notice of what appeared to\nbe a significant change in its position. In a draft resolution dated\nSeptember 25, 1948, the Soviets proposed\u2014\n\n\n  To elaborate draft conventions for the banning of atomic weapons and\n  conventions for the establishment of international effective control\n  over atomic energy, taking into account that the convention for the\n  banning of atomic weapons and the convention for the establishment of\n  international control over atomic energy must be signed and\n  implemented and entered into force _simultaneously_.\n\n\nIt was the last word of this resolution that marked a change in the\nU.S.S.R. stand. Previously, the Soviets had demanded that atomic weapons\nproduction be prohibited and stock piles be destroyed _before_ a control\nplan was discussed.\n\nNonetheless, the new Soviet proposal gave no indication that the Soviets\nwould accede to what the majority regard as an _effective_ control plan.\nFurthermore, the proposal for simultaneous prohibition and control was\nconsidered to be physically impossible to implement. \u201cThe development of\natomic energy is the world\u2019s newest industry, and already is one of the\nmost complicated. It would not be reasonable to assume that any\neffective system of control could be introduced and enforced overnight.\nControl and prohibition must, therefore, go into effect over a period of\ntime and by a series of stages.\u201d\n\nThe record of negotiations from the fall of 1948 to the present is\nlargely one of inaction.\n\nOn September 23, 1949, President Truman announced that an atomic\nexplosion had occurred in the Soviet Union. One month later, the\nsponsoring powers of the UNAEC revealed that the consultations between\nthem \u201chad not yet succeeded in bringing about agreement between the\nU.S.S.R. and the other five powers.\u201d\n\nDespite this, the General Assembly, on November 23, 1949, asked that the\npermanent members of the Commission continue their consultations and\nkeep the Commission and the General Assembly informed of their work. On\nthe same day, Vishinsky revealed that the Soviets no longer entertained\nfavorably the principle of quotas.\n\nOn January 19, 1950, consultations came to an end when the Soviet Union\nwithdrew from the discussions over the question of recognition of the\nChinese Government.\n\n\n                                   C\n                           THE ATOMIC IMPASSE\n\nRegarded in fundamental terms, the deadlock in international control\nnegotiations reflects diametrically opposed notions of the\nresponsibilities of individual nations in a world of atomic energy.\n\nAll nations except the Soviet Union and her satellites \u201cput world\nsecurity first, and are prepared to accept innovations in traditional\nconcepts of international cooperation, national sovereignty, and\neconomic organization where these are necessary for security. The\ngovernment of the U.S.S.R. puts its sovereignty first and is unwilling\nto accept measures which may impinge upon or interfere with its rigid\nexercise of unimpeded state sovereignty.\u201d\n\nThis basic variance in the objectives of the Soviet Union and the other\nmembers of the United Nations is mirrored in the majority and minority\ncontrol proposals.\n\nThe specific differences in the two plans may be summarized as follows:\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL INSPECTION\n\n  _United Nations._\u2014Complete and continuing inspection by international\n      personnel, including aerial and ground surveys, and inspection of\n      atomic facilities.\n\n  _Soviet Union._\u2014Periodic inspection of declared plants. Special\n      investigations when there exist \u201cgrounds for suspicion\u201d\u2014not that\n      the control agreement has been violated\u2014but that the convention\n      outlawing atomic weapons has been violated. (This could mean that\n      only if a nation were subjected to surprise atomic attack would\n      the necessary \u201cgrounds for suspicion\u201d enter into existence.)\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT\n\n  _United Nations._\u2014International ownership or management of dangerous\n      facilities and international ownership of source materials and\n      their fissionable derivatives\u2014in order to prevent diversion of\n      such material from existing plants.\n\n  _Soviet Union._\u2014Complete opposition to international ownership or\n      management provisions.\n\n\nSTRATEGIC BALANCE (QUOTAS)\n\n  _United Nations._\u2014National quotas to be incorporated into\n      international control treaty.\n\n  _Soviet Union._\u2014Sees in quotas an instrument for \u201cAmerican\n      domination.\u201d\n\n\nSANCTIONS\n\n  _United Nations._\u2014No veto to protect those who violate stipulated\n      provisions of international agreement.\n\n  _Soviet Union._\u2014All decisions require unanimous consent of permanent\n      members of Security Council.\n\nThe permanent members of the UNAEC have summarized the differences\nbetween the Soviet plan and the world plan in the following fashion:\n\n\u201cThe Soviet Union proposes that nations should continue to own explosive\natomic materials.\n\n  \u201cThe other five Powers feel that under such conditions there would be\n      no effective protection against the sudden use of these materials\n      as atomic weapons.\n\n\u201cThe Soviet Union proposes that nations continue, as at present, to own,\noperate, and manage facilities making or using dangerous quantities of\nsuch materials.\n\n  \u201cThe other five Powers believe that, under such conditions, it would\n      be impossible to detect or prevent the diversion of such materials\n      for use in atomic weapons.\n\n\u201cThe Soviet Union proposes a system of control depending on periodic\ninspection of facilities the existence of which the national government\nconcerned reports to the international agency, supplemented by special\ninvestigations on suspicion of treaty violations.\n\n  \u201cThe other five Powers believe that periodic inspection would not\n      prevent the diversion of dangerous materials and that the special\n      investigations envisaged would be wholly insufficient to prevent\n      clandestine activities.\u201d\n\n\n                                   D\n   POSSIBLE QUESTIONS REGARDING H-BOMBS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL[1]\n\n\n  _The answers to many of the questions which follow are obvious. The\n  answer to other questions are less obvious. Each question has been\n  selected to suggest and to illustrate the kind of problem which may be\n  involved, whether easy or difficult of solution. It should be\n  emphasized that the original United States proposals and the existing\n  United Nations plan foresee and carefully take into account the\n  possibility of an H-bomb, as evidenced by the language they contain.\n  The same is true of the McMahon Act for domestic control of atomic\n  energy within the United States._\n\n\nFootnote 1:\n\n  All material in this appendix, except those paragraphs headed\n  \u201cAuthor\u2019s Comments,\u201d has been prepared by the staff of the Joint\n  Committee on Atomic Energy.\n\n\n1. IS THE HYDROGEN BOMB A MORE OR LESS IMPORTANT WEAPON THAN THE ATOMIC\nBOMB? MIGHT HYDROGEN BOMBS PROVE TO BE DECISIVE IN WAR, OR HAS THEIR\nSIGNIFICANCE BEEN EXAGGERATED?\n\nDr. Harold Urey, a Nobel Prize winner in [chemistry], has suggested that\nthe H-bomb would be militarily decisive; Dr. Hans Bethe, [and other\nnoted physicists, have] indicated that the step from A-bombs to H-bombs\nis as great as the original step from conventional to atomic explosives.\nHowever, Dr. Robert F. Bacher, a former AEC Commissioner, states that\u2014\n\n\n  while it [the H-bomb] is a terrible weapon, its military effectiveness\n  seems to have been grossly overrated in the minds of laymen.\n\n\nSome of the questions which may bear upon this difference of opinion are\nas follows:\n\n(1) _Shock effect._\u2014To what extent do H-bombs excel A-bombs in\npermitting a highly destructive attack to be compressed in time?\n\n(2) _Comparative numbers._\u2014What quantity of A-bombs are required to do\nthe same job as a given number of H-bombs?\n\n(3) _Neutron economy._\u2014How much fissionable material for A-bombs is\nsacrificed by using the neutrons available in reactors for making H-bomb\nmaterials?\n\n(4) _Deliverability._\u2014Under various combat conditions, is the delivery\nof H-bombs cheaper and surer than delivery of an \u201cequivalent\u201d number of\nA-bombs?\n\n(5) _Aiming accuracy._\u2014How superior is a weapon which need strike only\nwithin a number of miles in order to destroy its target over one which\nmust strike within 1 or 2 miles?\n\n(6) _Psychology._\u2014As compared with the A-bomb, to what extent might the\nH-bomb impair an enemy\u2019s will to resist and accelerate recognition of\ndefeat?\n\n(7) _Tactical employment._\u2014What is the relative value of A-bombs and\nH-bombs in tactical situations\u2014when used against troops in the field,\nguerrilla fighters, forces preparing for amphibious invasion, a fleet, a\nstring of air strips or submarine bases, atomic facilities, underground\ninstallations, etc.?\n\n(8) _Definition of \u201cmilitary effectiveness.\u201d_\u2014Would the use of H-bombs\nto destroy large urban centers containing no armaments plants have no\n\u201cmilitary effectiveness,\u201d or would such destruction aid the attacker and\ntherefore represent \u201cmilitarily effective\u201d use of the weapon? Is it\npossible to distinguish, in an era of total war, between \u201cmilitary\u201d and\n\u201cnonmilitary\u201d targets?\n\n\n                            AUTHOR\u2019S COMMENT\n\nThe answer to (1) becomes obvious in light of the answers to (2), (3),\n(4), (5), and (6), all of which must be considered together. We know\nthat a standard H-bomb would be the equal to ten nominal A-bombs in its\npower to destroy by blast and to as many as thirty A-bombs in its\nincendiary effects. In terms of total area, the H-bomb can destroy by\nblast an area of more than 300 square miles, as compared with an area of\nonly ten square miles for the nominal A-bomb, and more than 1,200 square\nmiles by fire and burns, as compared with only four square miles for the\nearly A-bomb model. As for neutron economy, we have seen that this vast\nincrease in power could be achieved at a cost in fissionable A-bomb\nmaterial possibly as low as one twelfth, and no higher, at the most,\nthan the plutonium required (according to Professor Oliphant\u2019s estimate)\nfor just one A-bomb. It thus becomes obvious that such a weapon not only\nis much cheaper, in terms of destruction and cost of materials, than the\nconventional A-bomb, but is much more easily and safely delivered, since\nit would still be highly effective as a blasting weapon if exploded more\nthan five miles from its target, while as an incendiary it would still\nbe highly effective as far as fifteen miles away. Hence there can be no\nquestion that H-bombs vastly excel A-bombs in permitting a highly\ndestructive attack to be compressed in time, and that its psychological\neffect in impairing an enemy\u2019s will to resist is also incalculably\ngreater.\n\nIts vastly greater range of destructiveness, its economy of material,\nand its surer delivery also make the H-bomb vastly superior to the\nA-bomb as a tactical weapon. Neither the H-bomb nor the A-bomb appears\nto be practical for use against guerrilla fighters, except possibly as a\nthreat.\n\nAs already discussed at length in Chapter III, there could be no\npossible justification, on moral as well as military grounds, for using\nthe H-bomb as a strategic weapon to destroy large urban centers,\nespecially those containing no armaments plants, except in retaliation\nfor such use against us or our allies.\n\n\n2. IF THE H-BOMB IS DEEMED TO BE DECISIVE OR FAR MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE\nA-BOMB, SHOULD INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF HYDROGEN WEAPONS TAKE PRIORITY\nOVER CONTROL OF ORDINARY ATOMIC WEAPONS? SHOULD THE UNITED STATES\nPROPOSE A SEPARATE PLAN EXCLUSIVELY DESIGNED TO REGULATE H-BOMBS?\n\nThe official United Nations proposals for international control of\natomic energy apparently involve the assumption that A-bombs are so\nunique technically and so menacing as to set them apart from\nconventional weapons and to justify separate consideration in the United\nNations and a separate regulatory system. If the step from A-bombs to\nH-bombs is considered to be as great as the step from conventional\nweapons to A-bombs, does it follow that hydrogen warfare should become\nthe subject of a separate control proposal and should receive separate\nconsideration in the United Nations?\n\nAre the technical facts of atomic and hydrogen weapons so intimately\nrelated that both must be controlled if either is to be controlled? Are\nthe political facts such that the two problems must be regarded\ninseparably?\n\n\n                            AUTHOR\u2019S COMMENT\n\nSince the H-bomb requires the A-bomb as a trigger, it becomes obvious\nthat the two problems are inseparable.\n\n\n3. IS THE EXISTING UNITED NATIONS PLAN TECHNICALLY ADEQUATE TO CONTROL\nH-BOMBS?\n\nThe United Nations plan has been couched in such a manner that an\ninternational agency would possess discretionary authority in defining\nand controlling materials and processes that may be employed to\nmanufacture nuclear weapons of mass destruction.\n\nFor instance, the _Second Report_ of the United Nations Atomic Energy\nCommission defines \u201catomic energy\u201d as including \u201call forms of energy\nreleased in the course of, or as a result of, nuclear fission _or of\nother nuclear transformation_.\u201d \u201cSource material\u201d is taken to mean \u201cany\nmaterial containing one or more key substances in such concentration as\nthe international agency may by regulation determine.\u201d \u201cKey substance\u201d\nis defined to mean \u201curanium, thorium _and any other element from which\nnuclear fuel can be produced, as may be determined by the international\nagency_.\u201d (p. 71). Similarly, the report defines \u201cnuclear fuel\u201d as\n\u201cplutonium, U-233, U-235, uranium enriched in U-235, material containing\nthe foregoing, _and any other material which the international agency\ndetermines to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic\nenergy through nuclear chain reaction of the material_.\u201d (p. 71.) The\n_report_ likewise observes that: \u201cDangerous activities or facilities are\nthose which are of _military significance_ in the production of atomic\nweapons. The word \u201cdangerous\u201d is used in the sense of _potentially\ndangerous to world security_.\u201d (p. 70). [Italics supplied throughout.]\n\nDoes such breadth of phraseology mean that manufacturing processes and\nsource materials needed in the production of H-bombs could be properly\ncontrolled, through the existing UN plan?\n\nSince nearly 2 years of work were required to formulate the UN plan, can\nthis plan be regarded as adequate for hydrogen weapons so long as the\ncontrol measures for the atomic energy industry are not explicitly\nelaborated with the same detail as the arrangements evolved for\ncontrolling U-235 and plutonium?\n\nIt may also be pointed out that the existing UN plan contains no\nprovision for physically protecting informants who advise the\ninternational agency of violations. Might potential informants keep\nsilent for fear of being punished by their national governments? Is this\nfactor important if the existing UN plan were subjected to the added\nstrain of controlling hydrogen weapons as well as atomic weapons?\n\nWhat safeguards would assure that the employees of an international\ncontrol agency would be faithful and loyal to the objectives of the\nagency and that they would not work purely in the interests of some\nnational government\u2014perhaps a national government other than that of\ntheir own country?\n\n\n                            AUTHOR\u2019S COMMENT\n\nThe language makes it obvious that the United Nations plan \u201cforesees and\ncarefully takes into account the possibility of an H-bomb.\u201d In view of\nRussia\u2019s attitude, however, and to leave no room for future quibbling,\nthe present plan should be explicitly elaborated to include hydrogen\nweapons. On the other hand, since Russia will have none of the plan,\nsuch elaboration would at best be purely academic.\n\nAs for protecting informants, certainly no plan could contemplate that\ncitizens would act as spies against their own country, even if they find\nthat their country is violating an international agreement. The plan is\ndesigned so that such violations could be detected by the official\nemployees of the international control agency. Obviously, such official\nemployees stationed in any country should not be nationals of that\ncountry and should be protected by diplomatic immunity. Each country, in\nselecting its representatives to the control agency, would naturally\nsubject them to a most careful screening as to their character and\nloyalty, and would use all necessary checks to make certain that they\nare faithful and loyal to the objectives of the agency.\n\n\n4. IS CONTROL OVER FISSIONABLE MATERIALS SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT THE\nPRODUCTION OF HYDROGEN BOMBS? IF SO, IS THE EXISTING UN PLAN ADEQUATE TO\nTHIS TASK?\n\nThe technical facts suggest that H-bombs may be regulated in at least\ntwo ways: (1) Control over the fissionable material usable as a\n\u201ctrigger\u201d and (2) control over deuterium and tritium.\n\nPerhaps control over _all_ fissionable material would give effective\ncontrol over hydrogen weapons. However, by way of specific example, the\nintroduction to volume VI of the Scientific Information Transmitted to\nthe United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946-October 14,\n1946 (see State Department Publication 2661, pp. 151\u2013152), comments as\nfollows:\n\n\n  It is difficult to define the amount of activity in the illicit\n  production of atomic weapons which is significant. The illicit\n  construction of a single atomic bomb by means of a decade of\n  successful evasion would not provide an overwhelming advantage, if it\n  can be assumed that it would take another decade to produce a second\n  bomb. But the secret production of one bomb per year would create a\n  definite danger, and the secret production of five or more per year\n  would be disastrous. This report assumes arbitrarily that the minimum\n  unit of noncompliance is the secret production of one atomic bomb per\n  year or a total of five bombs over any period of time. [This example\n  is chosen because UN documents published later omit concrete\n  illustrations, although the stress which these documents place upon\n  international ownership, operation, and management clearly reflects a\n  determination to reduce to the rock-bottom minimum any illicit mining\n  or production.]\n\n\nConsidering that five illicit A-bombs might, under certain\ncircumstances, lead to five illicit H-bombs, what margin of\ninefficiency\u2014if any\u2014in controlling source and fissionable material is\npermissible? Is absolute protection against illegal diversion of source\nand fissionable material technically possible? Does the existing UN plan\nprovide absolute or near-absolute protection? Can greater technical\nprotection be secured than under the present UN plan?\n\n\n                            AUTHOR\u2019S COMMENT\n\nIt can be stated unequivocally that, in the absence of complete mutual\nfaith and goodwill on the part of all concerned, neither the existing UN\nplan nor any other technical plan that can be devised will provide\nabsolute or near-absolute protection. No plan could be devised that\nwould provide assurance against the diversion of enough material in any\none year to make at least one atomic bomb. In five years this would mean\nthe secret production of five hydrogen bombs.\n\n\n5. MUST H-BOMB CONTROLS RELATE TO DEUTERIUM AND TRITIUM AS WELL AS TO\nFISSIONABLE MATERIAL? IF THEY MUST, CAN THE PRESENT UN PLAN FULLY\nPROVIDE FOR THESE CONTROLS OR DOES IT REQUIRE REVISION OR CHANGES IN\nEMPHASIS?\n\nShould control over both fissionable material and deuterium and tritium\ncall for the same emphasis and consideration which the United Nations\nAtomic Energy Commission has already given to control of U-235 and\nplutonium? Would surveillance of deuterium and tritium manufacture\nfurnish better insurance against illicit H-bomb construction than\nsurveillance of U-235 and plutonium, or is the reverse more apt to be\ntrue? Are added safeguards necessary to regulate deuterium and tritium?\nOr is the UN plan, as now constituted, sufficiently flexible and\ncomprehensive to take care of light-element control?\n\n\n                            AUTHOR\u2019S COMMENT\n\nSince H-bombs require either U-235 or plutonium, as well as deuterium\nand tritium, and since absolute or near-absolute control of U-235 or\nplutonium is not possible, it becomes obvious that H-bomb controls must\nrelate to both deuterium and tritium as well as to fissionable material.\nSince the UN plan does not mention them by name, added safeguards are\nnecessary to regulate deuterium and tritium. No safeguards, however,\ncould be devised even in this respect to provide absolute or\nnear-absolute protection.\n\n\n6. IS IT TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE TO DETECT THE MANUFACTURE OF HEAVY WATER\nAND DEUTERIUM THROUGH INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION? WOULD AN INTERNATIONAL\nAGREEMENT FLATLY PROHIBITING PRODUCTION IN QUANTITY BE DESIRABLE?\n\nThe manufacture of heavy water and the separation of deuterium are\nrelatively simple processes. They may be carried out in small plants\nwhich can exist in a variety of locales.\n\nThe _Second Report_ of the UN Commission comments as follows:\n\n\n  The international agency shall have the authority to require periodic\n  reports from nations regarding the production, shipment, location, and\n  use of specialized equipment and supplies directly related to the\n  production and use of atomic energy, such as mass spectrometers,\n  diffusion barriers, gas centrifuges, electromagnetic isotope\n  separation units, very pure graphite in large amounts, heavy water,\n  and beryllium or beryllium compounds in large amounts. In addition,\n  the agency shall have authority to require reports as specified of\n  certain distinctive facilities and construction projects having\n  features of size and design, or construction or operation, which, in\n  combination with their location and/or production or consumption of\n  heat or electricity, are peculiarly comparable to those of known\n  atomic facilities of dangerous character (p. 54).\n\n\nWould inspectors possessing freedom of movement be able to locate\ndeuterium and heavy water plants? Would aerial surveys and aerial\nphotographs of industrial areas help detect processes which produce\nhydrogen as a byproduct and which might therefore be concerned with the\nmanufacture of heavy water or deuterium? Should quantity production of\ndeuterium be prohibited even though it is used in certain types of\npeacetime reactors such as the Canadian reactor at Chalk River, the\nFrench reactor at Chatillon, Swedish reactors under construction, and a\nresearch reactor at the Argonne National Laboratory? Is it possible on\ntechnical grounds to enforce such a prohibition?\n\n\n                            AUTHOR\u2019S COMMENT\n\nIt would not be desirable to prohibit production of heavy water and\ndeuterium in quantity since heavy water is the best moderator of\nneutrons in the large-scale production of atomic power for industrial\nuses. Furthermore, such a prohibition could never be enforced, since, as\nstated, the manufacture of heavy water and the separation of deuterium\nare relatively simple processes that \u201cmay be carried out in small plants\nwhich can exist in a variety of locales.\u201d What makes it even more\ndifficult, if not impossible, to detect any violation of such a\nprohibition is the fact that the raw material for heavy water or\ndeuterium is just plain water.\n\n\n7. SHOULD THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT UN PLAN RELATING TO INSPECTION,\nSURVEYS, AND EXPLORATIONS BE MODIFIED TO CONTROL HEAVY WATER AND\nDEUTERIUM PRODUCTION?\n\nThe United Nations plan assumes that the production of fissionable\nmaterial cannot be regulated without strict supervision over the mining\nof source materials such as uranium and thorium:\n\n\n  Without the control of raw materials, any other controls that might be\n  applied in the various processes of atomic energy production would be\n  inadequate because of the uncertainty as to whether or not the\n  international agency has knowledge of the disposition of _all_ raw\n  material. (_Second Report_, p. 30.)\n\n\nWhereas uranium and thorium are needed to produce U-235, [U-233] and\nplutonium, the production of deuterium is not subject to such limitation\nof source materials. Only water, the existence of power, and\ncomparatively simple plants are needed for the manufacture of heavy\nwater and deuterium. In view of these facts, can the existing United\nNations plan cope with the problem of regulating deuterium production?\n\nIn commenting upon spot aerial surveys, for example, the _Second Report_\nrecommends that \u201cthe [international] agency shall conduct spot aerial\nsurveys in each period of 2 years over areas not exceeding 5 percent of\nthe territory under the control of each nation or areas not to exceed\n2,000 square miles, whichever is the larger. (These area limitations\napply to spot aerial surveys only)\u201d (p. 68). If aerial surveys were to\nbe used not only in controlling raw materials but also to help in\nspotting deuterium and heavy water plants, must they be carried out more\nfrequently than is provided in the existing plan?\n\nThe _Second Report_ also indicates that a UN inspectorate should be\ncompelled to secure permission, through a warrant procedure, before\ninspecting \u201cprivate and restricted property not open to visitation by\nthe population in the locality, and in the case of certain ground\nsurveys and aerial surveys which are additional to others which the\nagency may conduct without warrant or other special authorization\u201d (p.\n60). Do the technical facts surrounding heavy water and deuterium\nproduction suggest that such a restriction on an international agency\u2019s\nauthority would have to be modified?\n\n\n                            AUTHOR\u2019S COMMENT\n\nSee comment on question 6.\n\n\n8. WHAT SAFEGUARDS ARE NECESSARY TO PREVENT CLANDESTINE PRODUCTION OF\nTRITIUM? WOULD AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FLATLY PROHIBITING PRODUCTION\nIN QUANTITY BE DESIRABLE?\n\nU-235 and plutonium may be used either in weapons or as fuels for\npeacetime reactors. Here is the reason most frequently cited for\nrequiring that international control include not only inspection but\nalso such further guaranties as United Nations ownership, operation, and\nmanagement of \u201cdangerous\u201d plants. The potentiality, both for good and\nevil, that characterizes fissionables does not appear to characterize\ntritium, which has no known peacetime uses except as a laboratory\nresearch tool. Is it therefore possible that the reason for requiring\ninspection plus other guaranties as regards U-235 and plutonium does not\napply to tritium and that inspection alone would answer?\n\nIf quantity production of tritium were altogether forbidden\u2014as having no\npeacetime purpose\u2014the mere act of preparing lithium (the tritium raw\nmaterial) for irradiation and the mere act of inserting it in a nuclear\nreactor might be considered a violation. Would such action be impossible\nto conceal from managers and inspectors stationed at each reactor\npermitted under the control agreement? Would an illegal reactor itself\nbe impossible to conceal from inspectors enjoying freedom of movement?\n\nA few private commentators have argued that the UN plan fundamentally\nerrs in assuming industrial power to be around the corner. They estimate\nthat this goal is actually a decade or two away and that meanwhile the\ncontrol problem would be simplified if all high-powered reactors were\ndismantled. Does the role of reactor-produced tritium in H-bomb\nproduction strengthen such an argument?\n\nThe UN plan distinguishes between atomic facilities which are\nsufficiently \u201cdangerous\u201d to require UN management and facilities which\nmay be operated by national governments and merely require international\ninspection. Since all reactors produce neutrons and hence might be\nuseful in some degree\u2014however small\u2014in manufacturing tritium, is it now\nnecessary to regard certain reactors formerly considered to be\n\u201cnon-dangerous\u201d as now being in the \u201cdangerous\u201d category?\n\nAre there other methods, apart from reactors, for producing tritium? If\nso, how can they be controlled? Would the right of the international\ncontrol agency to own, operate, and manage \u201cdangerous\u201d plants and to own\nand regulate both fissionable materials and \u201cfusionable materials\u201d meet\nsuch a situation?\n\n\n                            AUTHOR\u2019S COMMENT\n\nThe most efficient and rapid method for producing tritium is by\ninserting lithium metal into a large nuclear reactor, thus exposing it\nto irradiation by neutrons, which transmute the lithium into tritium and\nhelium. Tritium could also be produced in a similar manner in the\nsmaller nuclear reactors used for research purposes, and though these\nsmaller reactors would produce it at a considerably slower rate, the\nfact that the amounts of tritium required may be rather small would\ninevitably shift these reactors from the \u201cnon-dangerous\u201d to the\n\u201cdangerous\u201d category. Such small reactors are essential for research,\nand their prohibition would strike a vital blow at the progress of\nscience. Furthermore, they could be much more easily hidden than large\nreactors. This fact, therefore, weakens, rather than strengthens the\nargument for the dismantling of all high-powered reactors, as such\ndismantling would not prevent the production of tritium.\n\nThere are other, though less efficient, methods for producing tritium,\nhowever, that do not require any reactors at all. A good neutron source\ncan be provided by exposing beryllium to radium, radon, or polonium.\nThese neutrons could then be used to bombard lithium and convert it into\ntritium. Nor is lithium necessary, for at least four other elements,\nincluding deuterium, helium 3, boron, and nitrogen, can be transmuted by\nneutrons from the beryllium into tritium. What is more, even neutrons\nare not absolutely essential, since deuterons (nuclei of deuterium) and\nberyllium could be made to yield tritium by bombarding them with other\ndeuterons. The latter method, however, would require the use of giant\ncyclotrons and would be very slow.\n\nAll this would indicate that it would be extremely difficult, if not\nimpossible, to provide safeguards against the clandestine production of\ntritium.\n\n\n9. SHOULD A WORLD-WIDE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY COVER CONCENTRATED LITHIUM\nDEPOSITS?\n\nA key feature of the United Nations plan is the provision for a\nworld-wide geological survey of uranium and thorium\u2014the raw materials\npotentially usable in A-bombs. This survey is considered necessary in\norder to permit tracing of materials as they progress from the mines\nthrough various processing phases and finally enter a nuclear reactor.\nDoes the same kind of logic apply to lithium\u2014raw material for tritium?\nHow formidable is the technical problem of locating and controlling\ndeposits of lithium?\n\nPegmatite minerals constitute a principal source of lithium ores, which\nare currently produced as a byproduct of the nonmetallic mineral\nindustry. Commercial deposits of lithium are known to exist in the Black\nHills of North Dakota; northern New Mexico; Saskatchewan, Canada; and\nsouthwest Africa. Production of ores rose to about 900 tons of lithium\noxide in 1944 and is now about 200 tons. So long as requirements do not\nexceed byproduct production, supply does not appear to present a\nproblem. If requirements exceed byproduct supply, the cost of the excess\nmight be high. Lithium is now used commercially in glass, as a compound\nin welding fluxes, in storage batteries, in fluorescent light tubes, and\nas an alloying element.\n\nAre the quantities of lithium ore required on an order of magnitude that\nmakes control feasible?\n\n\n                            AUTHOR\u2019S COMMENT\n\nSuch a world-wide geological survey would be futile, as only a few\nhundred pounds of lithium would be necessary to produce enough tritium\nfor a relatively large H-bomb stockpile, and such amounts could be\nhidden right now from available stocks.\n\n\n10. DO THE TECHNICAL FACTS OF THE H-BOMB MEAN THAT NOW, MORE THAN EVER,\nTHE UNITED NATIONS PLAN IS THE CORRECT APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL\nCONTROL?\n\nVarious critics of the UN plan have denied that management control over\n\u201cdangerous\u201d plants is essential to protect against violations.\nHigh-power reactors are among the plants to be classified as \u201cdangerous\u201d\nunder the UN plan, and these same reactors are the ones which might\nproduce not merely plutonium but tritium in quantity. Likewise, an\ninternational agency would possess authority to check the design of any\nisotope separation unit and to assume the right of construction and\noperation if these fall into the \u201cdangerous\u201d category. Deuterium may be\nobtained through isotopic separation. Do such facts as these refute the\ncritics and demonstrate that managerial and material control by the\nUnited Nations, over and above inspection, is more than ever necessary\nin order to prevent diversion of nuclear fuel or illegal irradiation of\nlithium?\n\n\n                            AUTHOR\u2019S COMMENT\n\nIn the light of the technical facts about the H-bomb, the argument as to\nwhether managerial control over \u201cdangerous\u201d plants is essential to\nprotect against violations becomes wholly academic. We have seen that\neven managerial control would not offer either absolute or near-absolute\nprotection. No plan that does not offer at least near-absolute\nprotection against the clandestine production of even one H-bomb per\nyear could be trusted when a nation\u2019s very existence may be at stake.\n\n\n11. HOW DOES THE H-BOMB AFFECT THE PROBLEM OF \u201cSTAGES\u201d?\n\nThe United Nations plan would take effect by \u201cstages\u201d\u2014one stage to\ninclude, among other projects, a world-wide geological survey, another\nstage, to involve, among other projects, the taking over of atomic\ninstallations, and still another to bring about the disposition of\nfissionable materials.\n\nAt what point in some such progression would national stockpiles of\ndeuterium and tritium be placed under control? When this point was\nreached, would they be destroyed or be held in storage under United\nNations auspices? If a nation pretended to make known its entire\nstockpile of tritium and deuterium while actually it kept hidden a\nsubstantial portion, how would the international agency discover such a\nviolation?\n\n\n                            AUTHORS COMMENT\n\nSee comment on questions 12 and 13.\n\n\n12. HOW DOES THE H-BOMB BEAR UPON THE PROBLEM OF DISPOSITION OF EXISTING\nSTOCKS OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL?\n\nWhen a control plan takes effect, what should be done with supplies of\nU-235 and plutonium in excess of a quantity immediately usable for\npeacetime purposes? This problem has received relatively little\nconsideration in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. If excess\nstocks were destroyed, a valuable future source of energy and storehouse\nof neutrons would be lost. On the other hand, if the stocks were kept in\nexistence under UN guard, seizure by an aggressor state might rapidly\npermit it to attack with atomic bombs\u2014and innocent countries might have\nrelatively little warning.\n\nSuch seizures might quickly lead, under certain circumstances, to the\nconstruction of \u201ctriggers\u201d for H-bombs. Does this fact tip the balance\nin favor of destroying excess U-235 and plutonium? Or are these\nsubstances still too valuable and too difficult to replace to justify\ndestruction? Is there a third alternative\u2014possibly involving partial\ndestruction or the use of \u201cdenaturants\u201d or the construction of many\npower reactors, regardless of cost factors\u2014to keep excess stocks of\nfissionables contaminated with fission products?\n\n\n                            AUTHORS COMMENT\n\nThe problem of the disposition of existing stocks of fissionable\nmaterials was given little consideration because it was too hot to\nhandle. From the very beginning Russia insisted that all atomic bombs be\ndestroyed, and she left no doubt that she meant the destruction of the\nfissionable materials with which bombs could be quickly assembled. Even\nbefore the H-bomb, such destruction might have meant suicide to nations\nthat complied, since they would have been at the complete mercy of\nnoncomplying nations. The advent of the H-bomb makes all talk of such\ndestruction, wholly apart from the waste of a priceless, irreplaceable\nnatural resource, completely unrealistic, as any such act would be\ntantamount to abdication, a prelude to a super-Munich by the free\nnations. Denaturing, which makes fissionable materials temporarily\nuseless for bombs, is also out of the question, since it would take a\nlong time to reconcentrate them, giving nations with a hidden stock of\nnondenatured material a tremendous advantage that might well mean the\ndifference between survival and annihilation for a nation that acted in\ngood faith. All this also applies to the destruction of stocks of\ndeuterium and tritium.\n\n\n13. HOW DOES THE H-BOMB BEAR UPON \u201cQUOTAS\u201d?\n\nThe United Nations plan envisages that reactors and other atomic\nfacilities will be distributed among the nations according to \u201cquotas\u201d\nand a \u201cstrategic balance\u201d\u2014whereby no one nation, by seizing the plants\nwithin or near its borders, could gain an undue military advantage over\ninnocent nations. This \u201cquota\u201d feature has been criticized as\nunnecessary and as likely to hinder individual countries in developing\nthe peacetime uses of atomic energy to the maximum extent.\n\nDoes the fact that reactor fuels, if seized by an aggressor, might make\navailable H-bomb \u201ctriggers\u201d tend to render all the more desirable the\n\u201cquota\u201d idea? How long a time would an aggressor require to make enough\ndeuterium and tritium for H-bombs in seized plants? Could a world\ncontrol authority, by requiring that certain design features be\nincorporated in the plants under its control, extend this time period?\nWhat should be done with plants in existence at the time a control\nagreement takes effect and well suited to H-bomb production but poorly\nsuited to peacetime uses? How should such plants, if they were not\ndismantled, figure in \u201cquota\u201d allotments?\n\n\n                            AUTHOR\u2019S COMMENT\n\nFrom its very inception the quota system was totally impossible of\nrealization. Today it is likely to prove a snare and a delusion, giving\na false sense of security, since it could not guarantee against the\nclandestine production of at least one H-bomb a year. The plutonium for\nthe trigger could be produced in hidden small reactors, while the\ndeuterium and tritium could be produced in other small plants that could\nbe equally hidden. As we have seen, tritium production does not even\nrequire a nuclear reactor.\n\nLike the \u201cquota system,\u201d the system of \u201cstages\u201d has also become\ncompletely out of date, since it was predicated on the control system\ntaking effect before Russia developed her own atomic bombs or had built\nher own nuclear reactors. Today there is no longer any logical reason\nfor any stages, since any delay would make effective control more\ndifficult. Even today, if an international agency were to take over\nstockpiles, it could never be certain that considerable amounts had not\nbeen hidden away. In other words, even if the UN plan were to be adopted\ntoday, it would not give security against a surprise atomic attack,\nwhich is the very purpose of the plan.\n\n\n14. HOW DOES THE H-BOMB BEAR UPON RESEARCH TO BE PERFORMED BY THE UNITED\nNATIONS CONTROL AGENCY?\n\nUnder the United Nations plan, individual nations would be forbidden to\nengage in atomic weapons research, but such research would be performed\nby the world control agency itself, as a means of keeping it at the\nforefront of knowledge in this field and thereby enabling it to detect\nviolations which might otherwise pass unnoticed through ignorance. Is\nresearch upon H-bombs so dangerous that not even the world control\nagency should be allowed to undertake it?\n\n\n                            AUTHOR\u2019S COMMENT\n\nIf an international agency is ever established, it is obvious that it\nwould have to carry on research on H-bombs for the same reason that\nwould make it vital for it to carry on research on A-bombs\u2014\u201cto keep at\nthe forefront of knowledge\u201d so that it would be in a position to \u201cdetect\nviolations.\u201d This would become all the more imperative just because the\nH-bomb is so much more dangerous.\n\n\n15. SHOULD TECHNICAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE H-BOMB BE TRANSMITTED TO\nTHE UNITED NATIONS AS A BASIS FOR A DISCUSSION OF HYDROGEN CONTROL?\n\nIn 1946 the United States transmitted six volumes of technical\ninformation on atomic energy to the United Nations. This was one\nimportant means of providing members of the United Nations Atomic Energy\nCommission with sufficient basic data to discuss international control.\n\nNo similar body of material on hydrogen bombs has been transmitted to\nthe United Nations. Can the Commission now discuss the control of\nhydrogen warfare without further official information on its technical\naspects? If such information is to be provided, who should be the\nprovider, the United States or the Soviet Union, or both?\n\n\n                            AUTHOR\u2019S COMMENT\n\nAll the information so far has come from the United States. In fact, the\nSmyth Report, the six volumes of technical information submitted to the\nUN, the testimony by scientists at the Congressional hearings on the\nMcMahon Act, and much declassified information have been of invaluable\naid to Russia in developing her own atomic bomb. It is about time that\nthis one-way flow of information came to a stop. Not a trickle has so\nfar come out of Russia\u2014not even an official acknowledgment that she has\nexploded her first A-bomb\u2014and until she shows her willingness to\nco-operate fully, we must stop playing Santa Claus.\n\n\n16. SHOULD A NEW PANEL OF EXPERTS ANALOGOUS TO THE ACHESON-LILIENTHAL\nBOARD BE APPOINTED TO STUDY THE H-BOMB IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL\nCONTROL?\n\nIt is now more than 4 years since the Acheson-Lilienthal Board made its\nrecommendations on international control. Their findings have since been\nlargely incorporated into the UN plan.\n\nDo the events of the last 4 years make it desirable, for technical\nreasons, to rethink the control problem? Are the technical data of\nhydrogen bombs such, as to demand a recasting and change of emphasis in\nthe existing UN plan? Have the prospects of large-scale peacetime\napplications of atomic energy sufficiently changed that a different\norientation in control measures is desirable?\n\nIf re-examination of the control question is indicated, should this\ninquiry be undertaken in the first instance by a group of qualified\nAmericans? Or should the United States suggest that an internationally\nconstituted board initially take on this assignment?\n\nConsidering the strong Soviet opposition to the UN plan, is it useful to\nconsider the problem of control? Is the Soviet attitude at all likely to\nchange in the foreseeable future? Would a rethinking of the control\nproblem contribute to a solution unless Soviet representatives\nparticipated? Would the appointment of a new \u201cAcheson-Lilienthal Board\u201d\nraise false hopes?\n\n\n                            AUTHOR\u2019S COMMENT\n\nAs indicated in Chapter IV and in the preceding comments, the UN plan\nfor the international control of atomic energy is wholly out of date,\nand the sooner we realize it, the better for us and for the world. It\nwas at best a noble ideal, which did not have the slightest chance of\nrealization from the very start. A re-examination of the entire problem,\neven before the advent of the H-bomb, had been long overdue. Today it is\nall the more imperative. Since such a re-examination requires, or at\nleast implies, the withdrawal of the plan, originally sponsored by this\ncountry, it should be done by an international board, preferably at the\nsuggestion of some nation other than the United States.\n\nThe new board, in considering the whole problem anew, should avoid our\noriginal error of regarding control of atomic weapons as a problem\nwholly separate from that of other weapons of mass destruction. It\nshould recognize the facts of life and not aim at bringing the\nmillennium overnight. It should not seek absolute security, since the\nfacts show it to be unattainable. Rather should it accept as a wise\nmaxim that even partial security is better than none.\n\nIf the board set for itself certain limited objectives, they would have\na much better chance of universal acceptance than if its aims were too\nhigh, as they were in the original United States plan, now the plan of\nthe majority of United Nations. Its first limited objective should be a\ngeneral agreement to outlaw the use of all weapons of mass destruction\nagainst civilian populations. This would mean outlawing the use not only\nof A- and H-bombs against large urban centers of population, but also of\nall other conventional weapons for the mass killing of noncombatants.\n\nA second limited objective should be the outlawing of radiological\nwarfare in all forms, which should include the use of the rigged H-bomb\nas well as the use of A-bombs in a manner that takes advantage of their\nradioactive effects. This would mean the prohibition of the explosion of\nA- or H-bombs from a low altitude, or their explosion underwater in a\nharbor.\n\nThese limited objectives would still permit nations to manufacture\natomic weapons and to use them as tactical weapons against military\npersonnel, while they would eliminate their use as strategic weapons\nagainst large urban centers. The very possession of atomic weapons by\nboth sides, however, may in itself prevent their use even tactically. In\nfact, there would still be the hope that they would serve as effective\ndeterrents against war itself.\n\nThe advantage of such a plan of limited objectives is the likelihood, or\nat least the possibility, that even Russia would not dare to turn it\ndown and thus stand before the world as preventing the prohibition of\nthe use of atomic weapons against civilian populations. And once we\nreached agreement with Russia on one set of limited objectives, the door\nmay possibly have been opened for further agreement on other limited\nobjectives.\n\nPeace, step by step, appears to be the only alternative to possible\ncatastrophe. One limited objective after another must become our major\npolicy.\n\n\n              A NOTE ON THE TYPE IN WHICH THIS BOOK IS SET\n\n_The text of this book is set in Caledonia, a Linotype face designed by\nW. A. Dwiggins. This type belongs to the family of printing types called\n\u201cmodern face\u201d by printers\u2014a term used to mark the change in style of\ntype-letters that occurred about 1800. Caledonia borders on the general\ndesign of Scotch Modern, but is more freely drawn than that letter._\n\n_The book was composed, printed, and bound by Kingsport Press, Inc.,\nKingsport, Tennessee._\n\n[Illustration: [Logo]]\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n                     _Also by_ WILLIAM L. LAURENCE\n\n\n                             DAWN OVER ZERO\n\n                            [_1946_, _1947_]\n\n\n   _This is a Borzoi Book, published in New York by Alfred A. Knopf_\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n                          TRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTES\n\n\n Page           Changed from                      Changed to\n\n   56 Valuing their liberty more their Valuing their liberty more than\n      lives, the American              their lives, the American\n\n  122 Einstein\u2019s formula, E = mc\u2082,     Einstein\u2019s formula, E = mc\u00b2,\n      revealed that matter             revealed that matter\n\n \u25cf Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained.\n \u25cf Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.","title":"The hell bomb","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":46389}