{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_75711/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_75711","id":"gutenberg_75711","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/75711","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Teaching & Education","Education"],"text":"THE MEANING OF\n  A LIBERAL EDUCATION\n\n\n\n\n  _The People\u2019s Institute\n  \u201cLectures-in-Print\u201d Series_\n\n\n  PSYCHOLOGY\n    by Everett Dean Martin               $3.00\n\n  BEHAVIORISM\n    by John B. Watson                    $3.00\n\n  INFLUENCING HUMAN BEHAVIOR\n    by H. A. Overstreet                  $3.00\n\n  INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY\n    by Charles S. Myers                  $2.50\n\n  THE MEANING OF A LIBERAL EDUCATION\n    by Everett Dean Martin               $3.00\n\n  MODERN SCIENCE AND PEOPLE\u2019S HEALTH\n    Edited by Benjamin C. Gruenberg      $2.50\n\n\n_Other Volumes in Preparation_\n\n  _W\u00b7W\u00b7NORTON & COMPANY, INC._\n  70 Fifth Avenue      New York\n\n\n\n\n  THE MEANING OF\n  A LIBERAL EDUCATION\n\n  BY\n\n  EVERETT DEAN MARTIN\n\n  _Director, The People\u2019s Institute, New York\n  Lecturer, The New School for\n  Social Research_\n\n  [Illustration]\n\n  NEW YORK\n  W\u00b7W\u00b7NORTON & COMPANY, INC.\n  _Publishers_\n\n\n\n\n  Copyright, 1926\n  W\u00b7W\u00b7NORTON & COMPANY, INC.\n\n\n  PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n  FOR THE PUBLISHERS BY THE VAIL-BALLOU PRESS\n\n\n\n\n  To her who lovingly gave me the first and most\n  important instruction, and inspired the\n  desire for scholarship,\n  MY MOTHER\n  THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nMost books that deal with the subject of education, and there are\nmany, are concerned with the training of the young. Much is said about\neducational methods but very little about content. There is discussion,\nalso, of the effectiveness of institutions, schools and colleges, and\nthe interest of the State in education. This book does not deal with\nsuch matters.\n\nIt is concerned with other problems. What is an educated person like?\nHow does he differ from the uneducated? Does he think differently and,\nif so, why? We shall be empirical in our study. We shall study persons\nwho are generally recognized as outstanding educated minds and ask what\nit is that characterizes them. Is an educated person one who is like\nSocrates, Erasmus, Montaigne, Goethe, Arnold, Santayana?\n\nThe theme of this book is that education is more than information, or\nskill, or propaganda. In each age education must take into account\nthe conditions of that age. But the educated mind is not a mere\ncreature of its own time. Education is emancipation from herd opinion,\nself-mastery, capacity for self-criticism, suspended judgment, and\nurbanity.\n\nIt is often believed that education, adult education in particular, is\nan avocation or an interest to occupy the individual in his leisure\ntime, like music or stamp collecting. The work of The People\u2019s\nInstitute at Cooper Union, New York, where these lectures were given,\nis essentially that of adult education. I have tried to think through\nwith those who attended the lectures what it is that for ten years\nwe have been trying to achieve. Adult education is now becoming an\nimportant interest in American life, and the inquiry seems timely.\n\nThis book, then, contends that education is a spiritual revaluation\nof human life. Its task is to _reorient_ the individual, to enable\nhim to take a richer and more significant view of his experiences, to\nplace him above and not within the system of his beliefs and ideals.\nIf education is not liberalizing, it is not education in the sense of\nthe title of the book. I use the term \u201cliberal\u201d not in the political\nsense, as if it meant half measures, but in its original sense meaning\nby a liberal education the kind of education which sets the mind free\nfrom the servitude of the crowd and from vulgar self-interests. In this\nsense, education is simply philosophy at work. It is the search for the\n\u201cgood life.\u201d Education is itself a way of living.\n\nI have written the book not from the standpoint of the professional\neducator for whom education is frequently--if it be adult education--an\nenterprise designed for the uplift of other people, but from the\nstandpoint of one who is concerned that his own education shall not\nstop in middle-life. No one is fit to be a teacher in whose own mental\nprocess education has ceased to go on. One is a student first and only\nincidentally a teacher. The best teacher is the seeker after truth\namongst his students. Probably the most successful educator cannot tell\nwhat is the secret of his success in teaching. That which is important\nabout the philosophy of education is not method but that background of\nknowledge which enables its possessor to judge what is worth knowing\nand doing.\n\n  EVERETT DEAN MARTIN.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  CHAPTER                                                PAGE\n\n        PREFACE                                           vii\n\n     I. INTRODUCTION                                        1\n\n    II. LIBERAL EDUCATION VERSUS ANIMAL TRAINING           23\n\n   III. LIBERAL EDUCATION VERSUS PROPAGANDA                45\n\n    IV. LIBERAL EDUCATION VERSUS BOOK LEARNING             66\n\n     V. THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF DOUBT                     84\n\n    VI. A MAN IS KNOWN BY THE DILEMMAS HE KEEPS           107\n\n   VII. THE FREE SPIRIT                                   127\n\n  VIII. THE APPRECIATION OF HUMAN WORTH                   146\n\n    IX. EDUCATION AND WORK                                160\n\n     X. EDUCATION AND MORALS                              180\n\n    XI. THE CLASSICAL TRADITION: PLATO AND ARISTOTLE      197\n\n   XII. HUMANISM: ERASMUS AND MONTAIGNE                   220\n\n  XIII. SCIENCE AND SUPERSTITION: HUXLEY                  252\n\n   XIV. THE FRUIT OF THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE                286\n\n    XV. POSTSCRIPT--ADULT EDUCATION IN AMERICA            308\n\n\n\n\n  THE MEANING OF\n  A LIBERAL EDUCATION\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThe evidence is unmistakable that there is an important change in the\nattitude of the public toward education. There is an increasingly\ngeneral demand for it in some form or other. Everywhere and in all\nclasses of society the interest in acquiring better knowledge is\napparent.\n\nIn England and on the continent of Europe there are thousands of\nclasses and groups patiently pursuing long and serious courses of\nstudy. American colleges and universities are crowded and many students\nare each year turned away. Vast and increasing numbers register\nannually for correspondence and university extension courses. The\ndemand for more education is shown also in the increasing number\nof lecture courses, people\u2019s colleges, and other centers of public\ndiscussion.\n\nWhile people do not always know just what it is they demand and\nfrequently the thing which they receive is not education, nevertheless\nthere is a new and very wide-spread interest. This new interest shows\nitself not only in the increasing number of persons engaged in some\nkind of educational activity but also in the fact that people are\nbeginning to see that education properly may be extended into adult\nlife.\n\nUntil recently, people have thought of education as something for\nchildren, something which a man either got or missed in his early\nyears, something which he generally forgot in his mature years. To\nthe average person, education was a matter of fond memories or of\nunpleasant associations with teachers, school houses and experiences\nof childhood. The \u201chighly\u201d educated person was the exceptional person\nin the community, discussions of the philosophy of education did not\nappeal to a wide public interest. Now higher branches of learning\nare being pursued by numbers of people outside regular educational\ninstitutions. Something very significant is happening. Perhaps at no\ntime since the thirteenth century has the desire for knowledge so\nnearly approached a mass movement.\n\nCertain qualifications must however be made. While much of the demand\nfor education is genuine and spontaneous, much of it is spurious,\nirrelevant, inconsequential. The increased attendance at school or\nuniversity does not necessarily mean that more education is going on.\nIt is frequently said that our colleges are crowded with inferior\nstudents. Athletics, fraternities, schools of business and the\nautomobile tend to displace science and the classics. American youth\nhas acquired its ideal of college life from the motion pictures. We\nshould not infer from the large numbers engaged in adult education\nthat democracy has suddenly decided to rid itself of intellectual\nshoddiness. If the advertisements of correspondence courses in\nself-improvement which regularly appear in the popular magazines are\nan indication of the instruction offered for sale, people might better\nspend their money for patent medicine or in having their fortunes\ntold. At best adult education consists largely of brief courses of\na vocational nature. Even worker\u2019s education, a movement which has\ninspired hope in many liberals, may easily be over estimated. Much\nof it is little more than a recrudescence of antiquated radical\npropaganda, designed to enable the proletariat to \u201cemancipate itself\nfrom the slavery of capitalism,\u201d and to get it \u201cready for a millennial\nindustrial democracy.\u201d The initiative often comes not from studious\nminded workers, but from enthusiastic intellectuals and idealistic\nuplifters. The cultural gesture is often pathetic or comic. It is\nnot uncommon for those who have completed the courses of study in a\n\u201cworkers\u201d college to find themselves more unadjusted than they were\nbefore.\n\nIt is sought to make of adult education something which will broaden\nthe interests and sympathies of people regardless of their daily\noccupation--or along with it--to lift men\u2019s thought out of the monotony\nand drudgery which are the common lot, to free the mind from servitude\nand herd opinion, to train habits of judgment and of appreciation of\nvalue, to carry on the struggle for human excellence in our day and\ngeneration, to temper passion with wisdom, to dispel prejudice by\nbetter knowledge of self, to enlist all men, in the measure that they\nhave capacity for it, in the achievement of civilization.\n\nAdult education is a way of living which should be open to all who care\nfor it for its own sake. It is not surprising that it frequently fails\nof its true aims. Education has always been regarded as a mere means to\nends that have nothing to do with it. It is to be expected, therefore,\nthat education in our day should be regarded primarily as a means of\nentrance to the already overcrowded professions, or to material gain or\nbetter social position. Doubtless it must remain so until the community\nbecomes sufficiently civilized so that some degree of liberal education\nis the expected thing in all classes, an interest and a goal, a\nspiritual bond of union somewhat like the idea of catholic religion in\nthe middle ages. This is an ideal which will not be realized by magic.\nThere is no cheap popular substitute for education. Nor are we nearing\nthe goal while as now almost anything passes for education.\n\nAlmost any method of salesmanship or trick of influencing people for\nany ends whatever is now \u201ceducation.\u201d Every one educates the public. It\nis marvelous how large a portion of the population of these states is\nqualified to instruct. Education has become the game men perpetually\nwork to convert their neighbors. It is the cure for every social ill.\nHow shall we put an end to the crime wave, abolish war, how to prevent\nsocial revolution,--or bring revolution about, how induce unwilling\npeople to accept cheerfully the coercion of national prohibition or\ngive lip service to some one\u2019s favorite brand of patriotism? The answer\nis in all cases--education. If you are engaged in increasing the sale\nof a certain soap, in putting everyone on guard against that social\ndisability of which one\u2019s best friend will not tell him, if you can\nfrighten a multitude with the danger of pyorrhea and thus increase your\nprofit in tooth paste--all this is now called education.\n\nMany see in the general movement for more education a great hope for\nhumanity. It was the belief in its political benefits that led to the\ncompulsory education of children in the nineteenth century. Men were\nsure that all that held the world back was ignorance. People would\nsurely wish to have their ignorance removed. Remove it, teach men the\nlaws of a reasonable and beneficent nature, and mankind in general\nwould be wise and happy and good. Ingersoll used to rejoice whenever he\nvisited a town where the schoolhouse was larger than the church.\n\nAs the humanitarians of the nineteenth century held that public school\neducation must inevitably put an end to tyranny and superstition, so\nmany of our contemporaries look upon adult education as the guarantor\nof a new and better civilization. There is to be an end of bigotry and\npartisan strife and of crowd hysteria and of the vulgarities which\nbeset democracy. They see genius appreciated, a selection by the masses\nof a sincere and competent leadership. Men everywhere are to learn \u201cnot\nonly how to make a living, but how to live.\u201d\n\nFinally, it is hoped that adult education will give us new methods\nand aims which will be carried back into our schools and colleges and\ntransform them. A better informed adult population will naturally take\na more active and intelligent interest in the education of youth. And\nwhen teachers try to instruct adults it will become necessary for them\nto make their teaching interesting and significant. The teachers will\nalso learn something about life, gleaning sheaves of ripe wisdom out\nof the mature experience of their students; they will become better\nteachers. All this may or may not come to pass. The point of interest\nis that there is this tendency to make a gospel of education.\n\nWe Americans have a weakness for new gospels. They are a pleasant form\nof verbal exercise. Liberty, Democracy, Social Reform, the Cause of\nLabor, Psychoanalysis--all have been put to such evangelistic use. Now\nwe are to become an educated nation by the simple process of everyone\neducating everyone else. Education is like reform, it is something\nwhich is always good for other people. There is much talk about adult\neducation and there are many conferences. But I have not attended a\nconference for the discussion of this subject in which anyone spoke\nof adult education as his own pursuit of knowledge. And as with most\ngospels, we are in such a hurry to save souls that we would begin\nproclaiming the new salvation to the nation before pausing to find out\nwhat education is.\n\nEducation has one thing in common with religion. One must come to it\nwith clean hands and a pure heart or one can never know the secret\npower of it. This is as true of a nation as of an individual. As a\npeople we have certain traits which may be praiseworthy in themselves,\nbut are distinctly hostile to the work of education. I will enumerate\nthem and then briefly indicate their element of hostility. They\nare, first, our genius for organization; second, our well-known\nutilitarianism; third, our cleverness in finding shortcuts to the ends\nwe seek; and fourth, our tendency to make propaganda.\n\nThe American way of doing things is to proceed to organize them. Our\ngenius for organization is probably our most generally recognized\nnational characteristic. It has given us such prestige as we enjoy\namong the nations of the earth. Ours is the land of the Woolworth\nBuilding, the Ford factories, the Anti-saloon League, Rotary, the Ku\nKlux Klan, and the college cheer leader. In organization there is power\nand there is efficiency, as seen in the success of our industries.\nLabor, politics, morals, religion, charity have all followed the\nsame course. In fact a man gains recognition in this country only by\nvirtue of his membership in some power-seeking group. He who remains\nunorganized is lost. And without a chairman, a committee, an executive\nsecretary and a press agent no human interest can survive. We simply do\nnot know what to do with it or how to think about it.\n\nOrganization, which is instrument or means, tends to become an end in\nitself. This is the fate of most organized causes; a movement arises\nwith its standardized labels and values, its stereotyped mannerisms,\nits rigamarole. Success is estimated in terms of material effects,\ntangible results, numbers and power. The organizer takes precedence\nover those who possess the interest which it is his task to serve.\nWhen a man becomes a labor organizer, he stops work. Many university\npresidents are not themselves teachers or even scholars. They are\ngood organizers, and with very much the same methods and standards\nof value one could as well organize a labor union or an insurance\ncompany. This is no criticism of the college president. His practical\nability is requisite of modern conditions. But ways of thinking and of\nfeeling are elusive and essentially personal, and when the attempt is\nmade to institutionalize them they vanish and a lifeless imitation is\nsubstituted. You may as well try to organize the weather as to organize\nfaith, hope and love. \u201cOrganized charity\u201d is almost a contradiction\nin terms. Organized religion is a garden of artificial flowers, badly\nfaded too. The spiritual life of the race was carefully weeded out long\nago.\n\nTo know the effect of organization upon education, one need only attend\na convention of the National Educational Association, or familiarize\noneself with the public school system anywhere. The system supplants\neducation. The present interest in adult education is in part a protest\nagainst the system. The thirst for knowledge is nowhere more genuine\nand healthy than in such groups as those which attend The People\u2019s\nInstitute of New York and other educational centers where learning\nis pursued with a minimum of organization. In such places people who\ndesire further knowledge of some subject in which they are interested\ncome together, voluntarily, and their only basis of association is\ntheir common intellectual interest. There is no cult or \u201cmovement\u201d;\nthere are no promoters for there is nothing to promote. There are\nno ulterior ends to serve and there are no outside influences or\nregulations save those necessary to insure honest scholarship and\ncompetent instruction. Many adult students would resent any attempt at\nfurther organization.\n\nThere is in existence at the present time a World Association for adult\neducation, and there was recently formed an American Association.\nBut these associations have no ambition to guide or control or to\nstandardize. Nor are they equipped to do so. One of the greatest\nservices that such an association, made up of teachers and students,\ncould perform would be to work to prevent the diversion of the present\ninterest in popular education to ends that are not educational.\n\n\u201cAdult Education\u201d is becoming a slogan, a phrase to capitalize, a\nlabel to attach to various activities which have hitherto borne other\nbrands,--Americanization for instance, or social work, or community\norganization, or reforms and propagandas of one sort or another. Much\nthat is now labeled Adult Education has a curiously familiar look.\nThere are faces one has seen before somewhere in other climes that then\nenjoyed the sunshine of popular interest. Praiseworthy enterprises\nno doubt, and not less praiseworthy is the somewhat tardy discovery\nthat the organizers have all along been speaking the prose of adult\neducation without knowing it.\n\nThe danger is that persons with long experience in promoting and\nadministering many things may also conceive of each educational task\nas primarily one of organization. In a recent conference on adult\neducation in a New England state, an enthusiastic public school\nadministrator in a burst of oratory proposed that adult education be\nmade compulsory. Another called attention to the appalling extent of\nilliteracy, particularly as regards the use of the English language,\nand urged that adult education be promoted as a preventive of crime.\nA third, a dean in an eastern college, insisted that adult education\nat once be departmentalized; graded, I suppose, into its primary,\nsecondary, collegiate and post-graduate branches. Nothing has yet\nbeen said about an adult kindergarten, though doubtless many people\ncould profit by attending such an institution. Perhaps the associated\nkindergartens have not yet discovered the fact that they also have been\nengaged in adult education.\n\nWe shall be disappointed if it is our hope to send the grown-up\npopulation of the country back to Public School to receive still more\nof the thing that caused many of them to leave. One of the leading\neducators in America recently asked a group of teachers whether any\namong them were so well satisfied with what they had accomplished in\ntheir own sphere that they could wish to extend their work through the\nadult years.\n\nIt is very difficult for the man of the system to think of education\nitself, he is too much preoccupied with gradations, requirements,\ndiscipline, reports, with seeing that a given minimum of identical work\nis done by all in a given time. He thinks in terms of buildings and\nequipment, submission to authority, conformity to herd opinion, service\nto the state. All or at least some of these things are necessary, but\nit is obvious that they do not constitute an education. This lesson\nAmerica has got to learn. There can be no quantity production of the\nthings of the spirit.\n\nAnother national trait which influences our education is our\nutilitarianism. I do not use this term in the sense that it was used by\nthose philosophers who held the principle of the Greatest Happiness.\nI refer to that in us which is spoken of as \u201cYankee shrewdness.\u201d\nExcept in politics and religion, we are a sensible people. And by\nsensible I mean--and most Americans would agree--practical. We can be\nvery efficient when we wish to,--that is, when there is anything to\ngain by it. We are straightforward, and except in matters concerning\nwhich we prefer to deceive ourselves, not easily taken in. Whatever we\nprofess, we are born pragmatists. Our first question about anything is\n\u2018what good is it\u2019, that is, what use is it? We demand results and we\nget them. We get things done because our philosophy of life is one of\naction, and our prevailing ethical standard is one of service. In the\nsolution of a practical problem, and most problems to which we give our\nattention are practical, we pride ourselves on our directness. We come\nto the point. We dispense with the unnecessary, the ornamental, the\ntraditional. It is a valuable trait.\n\nBut things sometimes have meanings other than that of usefulness. There\nare values which can not be measured in terms of money or personal\nadvantage, or of time lost or gained, or of industrial efficiency.\nHealth for instance is good not merely because the healthy man can\ndo more work; it is good for its own sake. Yet people are frequently\nadvised to guard their health for strictly economic reasons, and\npractical people have the habit of showing us the cost of disease,\npresenting statistics of labor-time lost, estimating the loss to the\ncommunity as so many thousands of dollars annually.\n\nI have known people to take a like utilitarian view of human\nrelationships, making friends for the sake of commercial and social\nadvancement, furnishing their houses, selecting their motor cars and\neven their clothes with the view to keeping up their credit at the\nbank. Many a man openly says that he belongs to certain clubs, and\nsometimes one even joins a church, for business reasons. How much the\npractical man misses is evident from the fact that it never occurs to\nhim that there are other reasons for doing these things.\n\nPractical men love to philosophize about the value of education. When\nI was a student I once rode up to the college with a farmer who was\npassing the campus on his way home from town. He informed me in no\nuncertain terms that he had no use for that institution. It irritated\nhim to see all those \u201cyoung loafers\u201d wasting their time learning Latin\nand Greek and lawn tennis. Not one of them, not even the faculty, knew\nhow to do anything; he had recently tested them out. He had asked the\nprofessor of Greek how many feet of lumber could be sawed from a log\ntwenty-three inches in diameter and twenty feet long, and the professor\ndid not know.\n\nThe farmer\u2019s point of view is now that of many modern institutions of\nlearning. Educators are determined to give people the knowledge they\nneed for success in life and work. Courses are offered in scenario\nwriting, millinery, salesmanship. Whether courses are anywhere offered\nin paper hanging--with credit toward the bachelor\u2019s degree, I do not\nknow. But it is held that as thinking is really part of acting, only\nthat knowledge is real which can be put in operation. There is a truth\nin this statement if one takes a sufficiently broad view of activity.\nBut the tendency is to make an easy and crude distinction between\nknowledge which is useful, and that which is merely \u201cornamental.\u201d This\ndistinction does not always hold. Knowledge may be like art, it may\nhave values which are more than use or ornamentation. Dr. Horace Kallen\ndivides values into economic values and \u00e6sthetic values. Economic goods\nare those which are valuable because they are the means of getting some\ngood other than themselves. Aesthetic goods are those which have value\nin themselves. Art is excellence. Education is the art of making living\nitself an art. It is the achievement of human excellence; it transcends\nboth the useful and the ornamental. It is a way of life, just as truly\nas the religious life is a way of life, or the moral life, or the\nsingle life.\n\nPeople motivated by a narrow utilitarianism do not really desire\neducation. They are quite content with a vulgar substitute--if it\npays. Education does not transform them; they tend to transform it\nafter their own likeness. That many are seeking \u201ceducation\u201d from\nsuch motives is evident. One has only to study the advertising pages\nof the popular magazines to note the kind of appeal that is made to\ninduce the ambitious to enroll in certain correspondence schools. The\nprospective student is given the promise that if he will subscribe for\ncertain courses he may some day sit in the boss\u2019s chair, and associate\nwith the big men at the top who do real things. Usually there is an\nalluring picture of these big men at their desks, thinking great\nideas; a picture which gives about the same notion of the lives of the\nsuccessful as one sees in the motion pictures. Sometimes the picture\nis of two men one on either side of the manager\u2019s desk. One stands\nmeekly, hat in hand, dressed as a laborer. On his face are the marks of\nsorrow, humility, hunger. The other man has the look of the typical\n\u201cgo-getter.\u201d The latter is seated; he is evidently giving an order.\nSuch a picture is not intended to be a comment upon the inequalities\nof our industrial system. The reader is informed that both men started\nat the bottom, that one improved his mind and his opportunities, the\nother\u2019s is a wasted life.\n\nSuch advertisements are typical, and are worthy of note because they\nindicate something of the nature of the prevailing American interest in\neducation. Here is an illustration of a domestic scene: The man stands\nat the door dejected. He has just been discharged from his position,\nand has come home to tell his wife. She sympathetically replies that he\nought long ago to have bought that course of lessons. Or she consoles\nhim with the question, \u201cWhy is it that all the others have gone ahead\nand you have not?\u201d\n\nBy contrast there is a series of invitations to enter the temple of\nknowledge in which a wife is portrayed leaning affectionately over\nher husband\u2019s shoulder. He holds a pay envelope in his hand and says,\n\u201cI am making real money now.\u201d It is well, when telling people of the\nadvantages of education, to give them an idea of the conversation which\ntakes place in the homes of the cultured.\n\nBut that anyone should seriously enter upon a course of study of\nthe world\u2019s classics in order that he may impress people with his\nknowledge, appear genteel, make himself attractive to women or gain\nentrance to an exclusive social set, is, I believe, a distinctly\nmodern contribution to educational theory. There recently came into\nmy possession half a shelf of little old books bound in leather.\nThey contain a translation of the Iliad and the Odyssey, some novels\nof Fielding and Smollet, and a book or two of seventeenth century\nreligious meditations. The volumes are discolored with age and are worn\nwith much reading, broken bindings are carefully repaired with hand\nstitching and torn pages pasted together by someone who prized and\nreverenced their content. They are part of the small library of a New\nEngland farmer of the early years of the Republic, who read his books\nby his kitchen fireside when the day\u2019s work was done, who lived with\nthem for years, and found in them a perpetual source of interest and\nwisdom and a refuge in an existence of loneliness and toil. Imagine\nanyone trying to sell that man a work of art with the promise that a\ncasual reading of it would enable him to appear more cultivated than he\nreally was.\n\nToday a much advertised and in fact admirable selection of classic\nliterature is offered with precisely this appeal. A full page display\nappears in the Sunday papers depicting a gaudy dining-room with three\npeople conventionally dressed for dinner seated at the table. There are\ntwo men and a beautiful woman. She is talking to the man on her right,\nand is evidently fascinated with his brilliant conversation. The man\non the left sits dumb and miserable and unnoticed; he can not join in\nsuch sophisticated and scintillating discussion. We are informed that\nthe poor man has neglected to read his fifteen minutes a day. It is to\nthis sort of thing that popular utilitarianism, aided and appealed to\nby commercialism, would divert a hesitating interest in education.\n\nEven in the best of educational institutions the utilitarian point of\nview with its emphasis upon a narrow efficiency has its dangers. It is\nthe source of that specialization which crams the student\u2019s head full\nof information concerning one subject, leaving him in ignorance of all\nelse and hence unable to gain a proper perspective of the knowledge\nthat he does possess.\n\nIn \u201cScience and the Modern World,\u201d Whitehead says\n\n  \u201cThe modern chemist is likely to be weak in zo\u00f6logy, weaker still\n  in his general knowledge of the Elizabethan drama, and completely\n  ignorant of the principles of rhythm in English versification. It\n  is probably safe to ignore his knowledge of ancient history. Of\n  course I am speaking of general tendencies; for chemists are no worse\n  than engineers, or mathematicians, or classical scholars. Effective\n  knowledge is professionalised knowledge, supported by a restricted\n  acquaintance with useful subjects subservient to it.\n\n  This situation has its dangers. It produces minds in a groove. Each\n  profession makes progress, but it is progress in its own groove. Now\n  to be mentally in a groove is to live in contemplating a given set of\n  abstractions. The groove prevents straying across country, and the\n  abstraction abstracts from something to which no further attention is\n  paid. But there is no groove of abstraction which is adequate for the\n  comprehension of human life....\n\n  The dangers arising from this aspect of professionalism are great,\n  particularly in our democratic societies. The directive force of\n  reason is weakened. The leading intellects lack balance. They see\n  this set of circumstances, or that set; but not both sets together.\n  The task of coordination is left to those who lack either the force\n  or the character to succeed in some definite career.... The point is\n  that the discoveries of the nineteenth century were in the direction\n  of professionalism, so that we are left with no expansion of wisdom\n  and with greater need of it. Wisdom is the fruit of a balanced\n  development. It is this balanced growth of individuality which it\n  should be the aim of education to secure.\u201d\n\nA philosophy which reduces learning to mere efficiency, makes of\neducation only a means to something other than personal development.\nIt sees each good as an economic good, a means only, making everything\nexist only for the sake of something else to be obtained. But there\nare goods which exist for their own sakes and one such good is human\nexcellence.\n\nIn the words of Dr. L. P. Jacks, \u201cThe civilization of power aims at\nthe _exploitation of the world_, which is thought of as a dead or\nmechanical thing, existing that men may exploit it. That of culture\naims at the _development of man_, thought of as a citizen of a universe\nwhich can be loved, enjoyed and reverenced: education being the name of\nthe process which leads him to love, enjoy and reverence it.\u201d\n\nAnother and even more serious danger is our passion for shortcuts.\nBusiness prospers by rapid turnover. Practical men demand quick\nresults. We are an impatient people, always in a hurry. We have not\ntime for the tedious labor processes necessary to produce well-made\narticles of handicraft. Consequently we have learned to be satisfied\nwith hastily and cheaply made commodities which somewhat resemble the\nreal articles and will do just as well--for the time being. Why should\nwe not buy cheap furniture, when we expect to move every first day of\nOctober? Why not wear garments made of shoddy, when everyone knows\nthe fashions will change even before shoddy can be worn threadbare?\nWhy erect buildings that will stand for centuries in cities where\neverything is torn-down and rebuilt in a decade, and even churches\nmove about following the shifting elements of the population which\nconstitute their membership? Just why we are all moving about in such\na hurry no one knows. Some people think that this restless haste is\nprogress. Whether it is or not, it is certainly modern.\n\nBut something of the shoddiness enters into the minds and hearts of\nmen, when shortcuts are sought in matters of mental growth which are\nessentially processes of slow maturing. Education requires time. The\nonly time wasted is that spent trying to save time. There should be no\nhaste or crowding or cramming. Mastery of any subject requires years of\nfamiliarity with it. The formal training one receives in an institution\nis but the introduction. Most people never get beyond a mere bowing\nacquaintance with knowledge.\n\nA prominent American manufacturer, so we are told, once made the\nstatement that if he wished to know anything he would employ an expert\nto tell him about it in five minutes. Among workers in adult education\nthere is a demand for easy text books, primers which will give to\npeople in a few pages and in words of one syllable the essentials of\nphilosophy, psychology, literature and natural science. Simple and\nclear statement is always desirable. No author really knows his subject\nmatter until he can \u201ctalk United States\u201d in presenting it. But that\nis another story. People who can read nothing more profound than the\ntabloid papers are a menace to education. They only retard the progress\nof any class they enter.\n\nYet there is a wide demand for tabloid information. We like outlines\nof history, psychology, philosophy; primers of relativity; ABC\u2019s of\natoms. Such books have value only for the student who after reading\nthem consults the original sources. But what people want is education\nwithout effort, ready-made education. I recently saw an advertisement\nin which there was offered for sale \u201ca whole library in one volume.\u201d\nAnother advertisement offers \u201cThe Essentials of a Liberal Education;\nTwenty Centuries of thought on your Library Shelf,\u201d--one shelf is all\nthat is required! And in addition the publishers will provide you with\n\u201ceasy reading courses.\u201d\n\nThe following example is typical of what happens to education when\nwisdom lifteth up her voice in the street. A full page advertisement\nappears in a Sunday newspaper. There is a picture of two successful\nbusiness men looking at a newspaper. The article which has caught their\nattention reads, \u201cR. P. Clark Made President of Big Mercantile Corp.\nBegan as Office Boy 21 years ago.\u201d Here are a few lines quoted from\ntheir comments,\n\n  \u201cThat fellow amazes me! Do you remember when he first came to us as\n  an office boy?... and all the other fellows had a head start on him\n  with their college degrees. He must have found an unusual way to\n  make up for his lack of schooling--he must have found a secret means\n  of improving his chances both in business and society. Clark knew\n  how tremendously he was handicapped by his lack of schooling and he\n  determined to find _a shortcut to education_. And this he found in\n  Elbert Hubbard\u2019s Famous Scrapbook.\u201d\n\nThere you have it. I have never seen a more complete statement of the\naverage man\u2019s idea of education. Mastery of the tricks which bring\nearly success; belief that there is somewhere a secret magic, knowledge\nof which will immediately transform one\u2019s personality;--the shortcut.\nNo appreciation of the fact that it is never information which\ntransforms a person, but the persistent effort put forth to acquire\nit. Education is on the air, in these enlightened times one can get\nit anywhere--like bootleg whiskey. It is proposed now to give adult\neducation by radio. All you need do to achieve scholarship is to turn\nit on, close your eyes, and go to sleep. You can get it without effort,\nwithout knowing that you are getting it, or just who is educating you.\n\nI mentioned earlier that one of the dangers to education in America\nis our weakness for propaganda. Few people know the difference\nbetween education and advertising. The latter is commonly spoken\nof as education by those engaged in it. I once knew an advertising\nmanager for a fruit grower\u2019s organization. He conceived a brilliant\nidea. Just as we have Health Week, Clean-Up Week, Fire Prevention\nWeek, he arranged in various localities an Orange Eating Week. He\ntold me that he could educate the public to eat as many oranges as he\nchose. Press agents are everywhere busy \u201ceducating the public\u201d for all\nsorts of objects; to respect the rights of vested capital, to give\nmoney to build cathedrals, to vote a straight party ticket. I once\nattended a banquet given by an organization of manufacturers. There\nI met a splendid-looking elderly gentleman and was told that he was\nthe attorney for the organization. As I had never before seen him, I\ninquired if he had offices in New York. My informant said, \u201cOh, no, he\nlives in Washington. His job is to educate Congress.\u201d\n\nIn spite of all this popular interest, or perhaps because of it, the\ncause of education is in a bad way. It is dangerous to encourage\npeople to think they are educated when they are not, or to believe\nthey are acquiring it when they are in fact getting something else.\nMuch that passes for adult education serves only to make people more\nsuperficial and opinionated than they were before. It is very doubtful\nif the general level of our intellectual life has been raised by such\nknowledge as the public has gained. The public can read and we have\nwith us the Hearst papers and the tabloids. Literacy has placed the\nbulk of the population daily at the mercy of the propagandist and the\npress agent. With libraries and colleges and high schools everywhere,\nand after a century of science, vast sections of the population can be\nswept by such movements as the Ku Klux Klan and Fundamentalism. State\nafter state prohibits the teaching in its schools of such scientific\nknowledge as will lead to a belief in evolution. Crazy reform,\nfantastic religious innovation, political foolishness and unbalanced\npartisanship may at any time sweep over the country. Intelligence in\nthis country makes a poor showing in competition with quackery and\ncomplacent ignorance for popular leadership.\n\nIt is common to lay the blame for the present state of affairs at the\ndoor of the schools and colleges. Without doubt they must accept some\nmeasure of responsibility in the matter. In many instances the only\nalternative to a general slump in standards of scholarship has been a\nnarrow academic pedantry. There has been much yielding to the pressure\nof popular prejudice, much display of conventional morality as a\ncover for second-rate educational activity. Faculties are well aware\nhow little a student may know and get through college. The colleges\nthemselves seem to have participated in the general cheapening of\neducation by their generosity in granting honorary degrees. Almost any\none who is successful in business or prominent in politics becomes a\n\u201cDoctor.\u201d Erasmus in the fifteenth century, even though he had already\nbecome probably the leading classical scholar of his times, studied\nand taught at Paris for nine years before he was granted his doctor\u2019s\ndegree. When the late Mr. Bryan threatened to print all his college\ndegrees on his card, in answer to the repeated statement that he was an\nignoramus, the joke was really on the colleges.\n\nBut too much is demanded of institutions of learning. Large numbers\nof students come to them with no background of cultural tradition,\nand they return to an environment which is distinctly hostile to\nintellectual pursuits. The public clamor that some one educate us in\nspite of ourselves is only another way of shouting, \u201cWe have piped\nunto you and ye have not danced.\u201d The ultimate responsibility for the\ncondition of education rests upon the average members of society,\nand it is reducible to a moral factor. Carlyle once said that people\ncould only be taken in by quacks when they had a certain element of\nquackery in their own souls. When multitudes regard education merely\nas a shortcut to financial success, or as a device for appearing to be\nsomething they are not, or as an instrument for converting others to\ntheir own partisan beliefs, they will of course get the \u201ceducation\u201d\nthey desire.\n\nOnce I thought that ignorance was an innocent thing, a sort of\nspiritual vacuum passively waiting to be filled with precious truths.\nExcept in children ignorance is by no means an innocent thing. It is a\nvery active element in human life. We must overcome strong resistances\nbefore we may begin to learn some things. We keep ourselves in\nignorance because there are facts and truths whose existence we prefer\nnot to admit. The man who strives to educate himself--and no one else\ncan educate him--must win a certain victory over his own nature. He\nmust learn to smile at his dear idols, analyze his every prejudice,\nscrap if necessary his fondest and most consoling belief, question his\npresuppositions, and take his chances with the truth. The greater the\nneed of education, the stronger the resistance to it.\n\nWhether the present increase of interest in education is to be an empty\ngesture depends upon whether the thing demanded is really education.\nThere is no one right way, and certainly each age with its special\nneeds and peculiar industrial and cultural environment should make its\nown contribution to educational achievement. But there is something\nwhich belongs to no special time and to all times, a way of approaching\nour tasks or valuing experiences. No one who is merely a creature of\nhis own times is really educated. There is conceivable a world in\nwhich,--great as are the historical accidents that separate them--a\nSocrates, or a Plato, or a Cicero, or an Erasmus, a Voltaire, a Goethe,\na Huxley would be at home. Much as they differ, there is yet something,\nwhich the educated have in common, a quality of spirit, something that\nmay not be defined, but that right-minded people recognize. We shall\nstrive from various avenues of approach to envisage it, for to miss it\nis to miss all. It is the meaning of a liberal education.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nLIBERAL EDUCATION VS. ANIMAL TRAINING\n\n\nIn a sense no living person is yet educated, for the learning process\nis never completed. But there must come a time when the process results\nin some differences in behavior. Often these differences seem to be\nsmall and irrelevant, amounting merely to added social grace or more\ncorrect use of language. Something more than this must differentiate\nthe educated from the uneducated or so much human energy would not be\nexpended in the effort to get education.\n\nWhen we inquire what the difference is, we find there is much\nconfusion. In the process of education knowledge is acquired. Many a\nperson\u2019s education consists of what he has learned. May one possess\nmuch knowledge or information and remain uneducated? I know a physician\nwho has great skill and wide professional information, yet he is\nessentially vulgar in his tastes and enjoyments and bigoted in his\nhuman relationships, and his judgments concerning most things are\nnarrow and hasty and are determined largely by passion and prejudice.\nYou feel that his learning has never become integrated with his\npersonality. It is a property annexed to his estate over which he is\nan absentee landlord. It has made no changes in his general habits of\nthought and behavior.\n\nThere are people whom no one would think educated, who yet have an\nastounding amount of information. They know all about race horses, or\nbridge, or baseball scores, or stocks and bonds. Many have a knowledge\nof such things which may be greater both in range and accuracy than\nthat which some professional scholars have of their special subjects.\n\nShall we say then that some kinds of knowledge have educational value\nand that others have not? But why should not all knowledge be equally\neducation? Is there a psychological reason for the alleged difference\nor is the exclusion of some kinds of knowledge the result merely of a\nconventional attitude? Our discussion of education resolves itself into\na philosophical problem.\n\nThe issue of practical education versus the so-called cultural comes\nup whenever people are interested in the subject. Partisans of the\nlatter type of learning are inclined to look down upon the former. They\nsay it is not education but only skill and efficiency. They hold that\neducation is scholarship and properly has to do with such subjects as\nthe classics, the humanities, philosophy, etc., which discipline the\nmind and ennoble the spirit. This is the traditional view.\n\nThose who take the opposite view ask what earthly purpose can useless\nand sequestered learning serve? They are suspicious of education for\n\u201crefinement\u201d or the \u201cgenteel tradition.\u201d Is it not the aim of the\npursuit of knowledge to enable one to do something, to attain mastery,\nto equip the mind to function well in an environment which demands\nactivity of us all? Is not anything well learned culture? An excellent\nstatement of this point of view can be found in Huxley\u2019s lectures on\neducation.\n\nThere has been much discussion of this question in the universities\nand colleges. There are those who deplore the decline of interest in\nthe classics and philosophy. They say that institutions of higher\nlearning are becoming mere \u201cintellectual cafeterias,\u201d that the change\nfrom classical education to an elective system embracing all sorts of\nvocational courses is a distinct loss, inasmuch as the knowledge so\nacquired lacks coordination and balance, while specialization crowds\nout the general and cultural subjects that form the foundation of\neducation.\n\nOn the other hand, why should not a University teach anything\nthat people wish to know? There was once resistance to including\nthe sciences, chemistry and physics and biology. The liberalizing\neffect and cultural value of these subjects is now recognized, and\ntheir usefulness is a social gain. Then why not domestic science,\nagriculture, mechanics, business methods? What is wrong with the\nschools of business at Harvard and Columbia?\n\nA similar issue exists in secondary education. It is often said that\nhigh schools pay too much regard to college entrance requirements,\nsince only a small portion of graduates expect to continue their\neducation. The students have gained only a most superficial\nintroduction to the classics and have learned nothing practical.\nSchools of trade, commerce, and of technology are increasing in number\nand the movement for such training is guided by principles of education\nvery different from those of the classical tradition.\n\nThose of us who are interested in adult education meet the same\nproblem. Writing of worker\u2019s education Dr. Horace M. Kallen says,\n\n  \u201c... The complexity of the tasks of any union official has grown so\n  great, their variety so considerable, that it is no longer possible\n  for an official merely to pass from the worker\u2019s bench to the\n  official\u2019s desk and completely discharge his duties.... Schools\n  would have to be provided analogous to the schools of business\n  administration maintained in the colleges.... Out of the instruction\n  there would in the course of time emerge a communicable permanent\n  record, on which the necessary accessories of books could be built.\n  Such a school of officials would be a nucleus from which the\n  educational process could ultimately radiate into every shop.\n\n  \u201cLabor education would finally thus become conversant with control\n  rather than escape. In such a conversancy more and more of the\n  energies now seeking relief in the vapors of the social mechanisms\n  of escape, would find satisfactory enchannelment in the technique of\n  control.\n\n  \u201cIt is the essential function of labor education to envisage, to\n  forecast and to enable this transition. The various arts would then\n  develop no longer as compensations against, but as expressions\n  and prophetic fulfillments, as criticisms and mitigations of,\n  the processes of this movement; they too would more largely be\n  coterminous with industrial life.\u201d\n\nDr. Kallen would probably not go so far as to say that the sole aim\nof Labor Education is to equip the members of the working class\nwith such knowledge as will enable them to master the industrial\nenvironment and change the social system. But there are those who hold\nsuch a view, just as there are those who hold that the worker should\nreceive only such education as will make him a more competent workman.\nBoth views, one held by extreme radicals, the other by conservative\ncapitalists, have in common the belief that education for workers is\npurely practical training. \u201cCultural\u201d subjects are sometimes studied,\nand there is a lively demand for them, but the tendency is to regard\nthis interest as an \u201cescape\u201d from reality into a world of fanciful\ncontemplation and mere verbal exercise. It is an intellectual luxury,\na form of entertainment or inspiration to which a worker is entitled,\nbut it is an interest which is a little under suspicion of being\n\u201cbourgeois.\u201d\n\nHence in all phases of education, this issue is debated. The issue\nis inevitable in a time like the present, with a classical tradition\nsurviving in an industrial civilization. Have we any need in the modern\nworld of cultural traditions which have their origin in antiquity?\nShould we or could we dispense with all educational values except those\nwhich are coterminous with the present industrial situation?\n\nWherever such an issue arises, I have learned to suspect both sides. As\na rule both are based upon a common presupposition which is an error.\nHere the presupposition is that the important factor in education is\nthe question what is to be taught, rather than the spirit of learning\nitself. Education is conceived of as knowledge acquired. Attention is\nfixed not on the learning process through which an individual becomes\nreoriented to his world, but upon the end result, something fixed\nand done, a certain amount of information stored up. Is this what we\nmean by learning? Is it receiving and memorizing a given something\neither cultural or practical? Or is it an adventure in any kind of\ntruth-seeking which changes the quality of one\u2019s future experience\nand enables one to behave not merely efficiently but wisely, with a\nbroad view and a sympathetic understanding of the many ways in which\nmen have striven to create meaning and value out of the possibilities\nof human life? If this last is correct, the real question is not what\nshall be learned but how and why and to what end. Is learning a venture\nin spiritual freedom that is humanism, or is it a routine process of\nanimal training? Both cultural and practical knowledge may be reduced\nto animal training--and they generally are. It is there that the issue\nbetween them arises.\n\nTo my mind, an educated person is not merely one who can do something,\nwhether it is giving a lecture on the poetry of Horace, running a\ntrain, trying a lawsuit, or repairing the plumbing. He is also one who\nknows the significance of what he does, and he is one who cannot and\nwill not do certain things. He has acquired a set of values. He has a\n\u201cyes\u201d and a \u201cno,\u201d and they are his own. He knows why he behaves as he\ndoes. He has learned what to prefer, for he has lived in the presence\nof things that are preferable. I do not mean that he is merely trained\nin the conventions of polite society or the conformities of crowd\nmorality. He will doubtless depart from both in many things. Whether\nhe conforms or not, he has learned enough about human life on this\nplanet to see his behavior in the light of a body of experience and\nthe relation of his actions to situations as a whole. Such a person is\nacquiring a liberal education and it makes little difference whether he\nhas been trained in philosophy or mechanics. He is being transformed\nfrom an automaton into a thinking being.\n\nThe antithesis of liberal education and practical training arises in\npart out of a misunderstanding on both sides of a principle stated\nin Aristotle\u2019s \u201cPolitics.\u201d In this book there is set forth the\nphilosopher\u2019s theory of education. He is seeking for his times just\nwhat our practical educators seek for ours--to train youth to deal\nmasterfully with existing conditions. Unlike many moderns he sees\nthat such training applies to the whole personality. This is evident\nfor example in his discussion of music where he considers the general\npsychological effects of various kinds of rhythm.\n\nThere were three important facts in the environment of the Greek youth\nto which the educator had to assist the student to adapt himself.\nThe way in which the intelligent person faced these facts was the\nmeaning of liberal education in Aristotle\u2019s time. There was first\na psychological fact. Popular myth was ceasing to function as an\nexplanation of the processes of nature and as a basis for the control\nof behavior. Fortunately for the Greeks, no priestly class had gained\ncontrol of their spiritual life. Stories of the doings of the gods\nwere coming to be regarded as mere poetry, in the modern sense of the\nterm. Philosophers did not hesitate to subject religious beliefs to\nthe judgment of reason. The assertion had been made that \u201cMan is the\nmeasure of all things.\u201d A spirit of intellectual freedom prevailed\nthat was unique in ancient times, I might say in any time. There was a\ndisposition to investigate, to classify natural phenomena, to speculate\nupon their nature and causes. Men were faced with the necessity of\nthinking their experience through to find meanings which elsewhere were\na matter of myth and folkway. Thought must be clarified and made exact\nif behavior was to be guided by reason. Philosophy, which included the\nbeginnings of science, and education were almost the same thing,--the\nsearch for the good life. I will discuss this point further in a later\nlecture.\n\nThe second fact concerning which the Greek youth must learn to behave\nintelligently was political in its nature. It was the existence of an\naristocratic democracy in which as a citizen he must participate with\nimportant results for both himself and the state. The free citizen must\nhave learned to judge what is good.\n\nThe third fact which challenged the educator was sociological; it was\nthe existence of slavery. This institution, which in the end was one\nof the causes of the breakdown of ancient civilization, seemed to be\nperfectly natural to the philosopher. Aristotle thinks that some people\nare slavish by nature. He has no thought of educating such persons,\nthough they may be trained to perform their tasks well. All should be\nso trained that they may live happily and well in the stations in life\nwhere they are. As most mechanical labor was performed by slaves, and\nby hirelings whose social status was not very different from that of\nthe slave, the Greeks candidly despised mechanic arts. Knowledge of\nthem was thought to be a slavish kind of skill. Aristotle likewise\nlooked down upon trade and commerce as debasing the mind, just as hard\nlabor was thought to demean the body. The free man must be so trained\nthat his privileges, his leisure and authority over others would make\nfor general human happiness. This education of the free man was called\n\u201cLiberal Education.\u201d It was the education of a leisure class. It was\na training for leadership and responsibility: not a mere initiation\ninto the idealogy of an exploiting class, together with the passwords\ncurrent in exclusive circles. Neither did it mean--at least for the\nancient Greek--the accumulation of dead and inconsequential knowledge\nthe only purpose of which was a pedantic display of erudition. In ages\nthat followed, the study of the classics tended to become something of\nthis sort. But this tendency marked a decline, a loss of the spirit of\nliberal education as it had once existed. Athenian education, in spite\nof the institution of slavery, developed men of wisdom and nobility\nof spirit and civilization of interest in such numbers that ancient\nGreece became the pioneer of western civilization and has remained the\ninspiration and guide to men in most of their efforts to attain a life\nof reason and beauty.\n\nThe fact that the liberal tradition had its origin in a society in\nwhich slavery prevailed has left traces in education which persist\neven to the present time. It is one of the things that cause people\nto believe that there are different types of education proper to\ndifferent social strata. Education becomes a mark of distinction. It is\nfor the privileged few. It is itself a privilege and a kind of vested\ninterest. There is a higher knowledge and a lower knowledge. In part\nthis distinction goes back to primitive times. In early civilization,\neveryone learned to do everything which the people of the tribe could\ndo. There was no specialization; all alike learned to fish, to hunt,\nto fight, to dance. The primitive magic was associated with every\nhuman interest and every form of activity, and for every type of\nperformance there was a magic formula. In time it became the special\nfunction of the elders and medicine men to remember the formulae and\npass them on to their successors. Knowledge of the formulae became the\nspecial privilege of the priestly class. Knowledge of labor processes\nremained with the mass. The former was higher knowledge and developed\ninto ancient wisdom. In certain religions it led to an esoteric\nintellectualism. The distinction gains emphasis among peoples like the\nHebrews, Moslems and Christians whose religion is the \u201cReligion of the\nBook.\u201d The \u201cHigher Knowledge\u201d is now a divine revelation preserved\nin the Sacred Book. With each of the peoples mentioned religious\nscholarship becomes the basis of all learning, and dominates education.\nAny accretions of general culture which are acquired and added to\ntheology, become tinctured by it. A priestly tradition is mingled with\nthe classic culture as the philosophy of Aristotle becomes elaborated\nfirst by the Arabs, and then by the Rabbis and Christian scholars of\nthe Middle Ages. What Aristotle meant simply as the training of the\nfree man in self-mastery, in time became a professionalized \u201chigher\nlearning,\u201d a sequestered scholarship largely unrelated to the existing\nenvironment.\n\nMedi\u00e6val education became scholasticism. It was still a higher\nknowledge set apart from other interests: it did not include\nproficiency in the arts of industry, but rather in book learning and\nin disputation. Liberal it was not, though it still in a sense had to\ndo with leisure. The good life had become one of pious contemplation.\nAristotle\u2019s free citizen was displaced by the cenobite and the\ncandidate for holy orders. The life of Reason became one of skill\nin the formal logic with which a given system of life and thought\nwas elaborated. Scholastic education made possible a high type of\nscholarship; it carried very far its training in the subtleties of\nargument. But it exhausted itself in a world of abstractions which it\nmistook for realities. It was a discipline, not a voyage of discovery.\nIt was a matter of routine learning by memorizing. Its aim was to\nmold the mind of the student to a fixed type. It placed him in an\nenvironment so manipulated as to determine his habits of thinking once\nfor all, to give support to required beliefs. It was education by\nindoctrination. It developed a type of mind which could be depended\non to do and say the expected thing on the expected occasion, one\nwhich would hold certain desired convictions and no others. For such\nan educational system, learning was accepting and retaining something\nprovided in advance. In this sense it was passive. Mentality was the\nproduct of environment. Scholastic education though it dealt with\n\u201cthings of the spirit\u201d was from one point of view \u201canimal training.\u201d\n\nIn the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the scholars of the\nRenaissance turned from theological education to human letters. A\nrevival of interest in the literature of antiquity became a sort of\npassion. Those who sought through the study of Greek and Latin poets,\nessayists, and philosophers to revive the spirit of the lost pagan\ncivilization were called Humanists. They had a philosophy of education\nvery different from that of scholasticism which was at that time on\nthe decline. There was the promise that education might again become\nliberal, in the sense I use the term. Wherever the \u201cNew Learning\u201d\nwas carried it had a liberalizing influence. It roused the hostility\nof \u201cobscurantists\u201d and created a jolly row in many institutions of\nlearning. It awakened pagan ideas throughout Italy, even in high\necclesiastical circles. It was bringing \u201crefinement\u201d to France. It\nwas receiving something of a triumph in Northern Europe under the\nleadership of Erasmus, when the Reformation again turned general\ninterest to theology. What the result of this humanistic movement in\neducation might have been had it gone on unchecked no one can say. No\none now believes it could have been what its leaders expected. They\ntried to produce an imitation in their own times of the manners and\nways of men who had lived centuries earlier in a wholly different\nenvironment. Such an attempt of course is futile. But it is conceivable\nthat as larger and larger numbers of people achieved freedom in the\nmodern world a liberal education might have done in our day what the\nGreeks sought to do in theirs--lay the foundations of freedom in a\nwell-considered basis of philosophy. In that event the whole of modern\neducation might have been vitalized by a cultural tradition which could\ntake into account the conditions under which modern men live and work\nwithout degenerating into narrow utilitarianism and mere mechanical\nefficiency.\n\nWhat chiefly survived from the Renaissance--at least in Protestant\ncountries--is the traditional education, in which the ancient classics\nare taught as tedious drill in language with the aim of improving the\nstudent\u2019s literary style, also of disciplining his soul by compelling\nhim to do something disagreeable, and finally so that he may be able\nto repeat a few Latin or Greek phrases, remember the names of a few\nancient writers and perhaps if he has been very diligent, retain a\nsufficient number of vague memory traces to enjoy a book like Professor\nErskine\u2019s \u201cPrivate Life of Helen of Troy.\u201d\n\nBut to call this liberal education requires both humor and imagination.\nLittle attempt is made to get behind the language into literary\nappreciation, or back of the literature to the ways and values of\nancient life and the wisdom of the ages, or to see the relation of\nsuch wisdom to the problems of living in the modern world. Traditional\neducation has again become an artificial thing, aloof from reality,\na higher knowledge set apart by itself. That is, if one may call it\nknowledge at all. Most college graduates after a few years do not\nremember enough Latin to enable them to translate their own diplomas,\nso badly are the classics taught, even as mere language drill.\n\nMuch of the spirit of scholasticism, though little of its thoroughness\nand subtlety, persisted in the later Protestantism. Its influence\nnecessarily tended to make this teaching of the humanities formal and\ninnocuous. After the Renaissance, members of the nobility and gentry,\nand later an increasing number of the middle class, sought higher\neducation for its refining influence, as an adornment rather than as a\nway of life. The result is a culture that is for the most part external\nto the sphere of our activities and interests, something borrowed, not\nwon; seldom an expression or valuation or glorification of modern life.\nThis also is a routine and a moulding to type. It is again a form of\nanimal training.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe development of science in the nineteenth century led to a demand\nfor the education requisite for modern life. The application of science\nto industry created a new environment. New knowledge was required and\nnew mental habits must be formed if there was to be effective control.\nNatural science gave men a new intellectual discipline and a new\nworld-view. With it came a new hope for the race. Mankind need only\nlearn the laws of nature and obey them to become wise and happy and\ngood. The new knowledge dispelled ignorance and superstition and set\nthe mind free. There was much criticism of traditional education, and\nmuch faith in the liberalizing effects of scientific training as well\nas in its practical results. Today scientific research occupies a most\nimportant place in education. In many colleges and universities it has\nalmost supplanted the classical studies. No modern person can be really\neducated without some training in scientific methods.\n\nBut science also may become mere animal training. Each science is a\nprofession, acquired as a technical training like learning a trade. Of\nthings outside his own trade the scientist may be quite ignorant and\nlacking in curiosity. He is often unable to see the significance of his\nspecialty for knowledge as a whole. Within his chosen field of study\nhe may come to resent new discovery--especially if it fails to confirm\nsome favorite theory. In some of the sciences, notably psychology,\nbiology, medicine and the social sciences, there are intense partisan\ndivisions, often rivalling in dogmatism and bitterness, those of\ntheology. Each \u201cschool\u201d develops its cult ideas, its jargon credo, and\nritual. Herd opinion holds sway over scientists as over other men.\nCertain phrases and mannerisms are adopted, just as among Rotarians,\nbecause they show that one belongs to the crowd. The psychologist\ntoday, for instance, must boast his ignorance of philosophy and make a\nnoise like a biologist. The advancement of knowledge is by no means the\nsole motive in scientific training; there is also much molding to type\neven though this latter objective is in conflict with the spirit of\nscience itself.\n\nMuch contemporary educational philosophy is openly and avowedly a\ntechnique of animal training; so much so that it quite properly\nborrows its pedagogical principles from animal psychology. It would be\ndifficult to over estimate the importance of animal experimentation\nfor modern theories of education. Schools of education are deeply\ninterested in the psychology of the learning process. Education is\nlearning, and learning is habit formulation. Habits are the acquired\nmodes of response of men and animals. They may be organized in the\nnervous tissue by any environmental factors which \u201ccondition\u201d certain\nreflexes; that is, chain certain responses to given stimuli. It is\npossible for an animal experimenter or an educator of children to\norganize the environmental situation in such a manner that definite\nsystems of desired responses may be regularly obtained whenever a\nstimulus of a certain kind is given. A simple and well-known experiment\nwhich will serve to explain what we mean by the conditioned reflex is\nthat of Pavlov. A hungry dog when shown meat secretes saliva. At the\ntime the dog sees the meat a bell is rung. This is repeated a number\nof times until the dog will secrete saliva at the sound of the bell,\nwithout the presence of the meat stimulus. The saliva response, induced\nby the bell stimulus, is the conditioned reflex.\n\nIt is said that all learning takes place after this fashion. An animal,\na cat, may be placed in a cage, the door being so arranged that escape\nis possible only when the cat strikes a certain latch. After a period\nduring which the cat makes all sorts of frantic random movements, the\nsuccessful movement finally occurs and the cat escapes. The experiment\nis repeated and perhaps the period of futile activity will not be so\nlong as at first. After a number of trials the cat will give up the\nrandom movements and at once unlock the door. The gradual shortening of\nthe interval of time required for the desired response may be plotted.\nIt is then called the animal\u2019s \u201clearning curve.\u201d\n\nSuch curves may also be made of human learning processes. It is said\nthat there is no essential difference between this animal learning and\nour own learning whether it be to swim or play tennis, or to memorize\na poem, or solve a problem in algebra, or to master the technique of\na profession. One\u2019s education thus consists wholly of one\u2019s organized\nsystems of responses, or habit patterns. We speak of education\nas the development of personality. But from this point of view\npersonality is nothing but the sum total of an individual\u2019s conditioned\nreflexes:--that is, it is merely the manner in which the organism has\nbeen taught to work. One eminent Behaviorist among the psychologists\ncompares personality to the running of a gas engine.\n\nI will not enter upon a psychological discussion of this view of\neducation, except to say that the method of animal training which is\ntaken for granted is open to serious criticism. The theory proceeds\non the assumption that _insight into the situation_ is not necessary\nto learning. The cat in the cage hits upon the successful gesture as\na matter of pure chance. After a number of experiments, each said to\nplace the animal in an identical situation, the successful action\nbecomes \u201cover determined,\u201d and fixed as a habit. It is doubtful whether\nsuch training is learning at all. The animal--and conceivably the human\nbeing--need never take in the situation. The successful art, the more\nthis learning process is perfected, degenerates into a mere gesture,\nrelated to the event in a purely external and arbitrary manner. It is\ndifficult to see how educational methods guided by such a theory could\ndo much to train the student in habits of independent judgment.\n\nProfessor Wolfgang K\u00f6hler spent four years studying the intelligence\nof apes at the anthropoid station in Tenerife. His experiments with\nthese animals followed a procedure quite the reverse of that we have\nbeen discussing. He arranged his experiments so that there could be\nno chance and no routine, so that the situation as a whole implied a\ndefinite action on the part of the animal, an action which would be\nnatural to it once it gained insight into the situation. From simple\ntasks he moved to more complex ones, always keeping the moment of\ninsight as the crucial factor in the experiment. An ape is placed in a\ncage and fruit is put outside beyond the animal\u2019s reach. A stick has\nalso been placed within reach. After vain attempts to reach the fruit\nwith its hand, the ape suddenly sits quietly looking the situation\nover: it looks from the fruit to the stick, then seizes the latter and\npulls in the fruit. Later the animal is required to choose between a\nlong stick and a shorter one, then two sticks are put within reach\nwhich must be joined before success may be attained.\n\nFrom such tasks the animal is led on to those which finally test the\nlimitations of its insight. So far as I know no use has yet been made\nof such psychological study of animal learning by our educators. But\nif we must resort to animal psychology in order to understand the\nprocesses of human learning it would seem that K\u00f6hler\u2019s methods would\nbe more suggestive to the educator than those which assume that the\nlearner is throughout an automaton without understanding.\n\nThe so-called \u201cnew psychology\u201d has filled modern education with\nconfusion. Fads and fancies of all sorts prevail, each with its\npsychological jargon. \u201cProgressive\u201d experimental schools everywhere\ngive voice to \u201cmodern ideas.\u201d In many such schools there is a minimum\nof discipline, pupils are encouraged to take the initiative in all\nthings, to study what they like, and when they choose. Everything\nis made as easy and as interesting as possible, and there is much\ntalk about permitting the student to express himself and develop\nhis personality. So long as we confine our attention merely to the\nmethods of teaching we have the impression that this \u201cnew\u201d education\nis anything but standardized. We get a different impression when we\nturn to examine the ideals of scholarship, the valuations, and general\noutlook on life which the newer philosophy of education accepts\nuncritically. In fact very little thought is given to these matters.\nThe prevailing interests and trends of a democratic, industrial age are\ntaken as the ultimate criteria. It might almost be said that education\nhas come to be regarded merely as a function of the environment.\n\nNow it is one thing to train a mind to deal effectively with its\nenvironment and to achieve some value in the modifications which it\nmakes in that environment. It is a different thing to hold that mind\nis the product of the environment. A well-known psychologist says that\nthe aim of his science is to predict and control behavior. He offers\nus the conditioned reflex as the means to any desired result, and says\nthat if he could have full control of the environment of a given number\nof children, he would permit some one to select by lot the future life\nand career of each child, and he would form the mind of each according\nto the chosen pattern. Our modern environmentalists have more in common\nwith medi\u00e6val scholasticism than they think. The aim of both is to\nproduce an individual who will react under all circumstances according\nto a prearranged pattern.\n\nScholasticism, as we have seen, consisted chiefly of memory drill and\ntraining in logic and disputation. Law and theology were sometimes\nstudied, but proficiency in such subjects does not in itself mean\nthat a man has acquired a liberal education. He may only have learned\nto do the conventional trick when the expected signal is given,\nmuch like a trained dog in a circus. The same must be said of much\nmodern professional training. The scholastic spirit haunts the legal\nmind to this day. Also it is possible--perhaps usual--for one to\nstudy medicine, and never once get an idea of what medicine means to\nthe scientist. Most people educated by school teachers and college\nprofessors are in fact trained in this way. Think of what passes for\nmoral and religious training. With respect to the most important\nquestions in life, people have been so \u201cconditioned\u201d that they do not\ntry to solve problems as they arise, but to say and do the expected\nthing on occasion. I once heard a professor in a theological seminary\ninstruct his class in the art of visiting the sick. The students were\nbusy copying in their note books the speeches which it is correct for\na pastor to make on such occasions. The following is typical of such\ninstruction. \u201cAs you enter the sick-room it is well to say When God\nputs a man down on his back, it is so that he may look up into Heaven.\u201d\n\nIn such habit formation, learning is mere repetition. There is nothing\nof independence of judgment, no reflection on ends, no development of\nthe capacity to deal with new situations. The better one is trained the\nmore automatic one\u2019s behavior becomes. And here we see the limitations\nto much so-called practical education,--\u201ceducation for work and for\nlife.\u201d\n\nYes, but do we live simply to do things and to serve, to perform,\nhowever well, the tasks required by our times? Is all the world a\nstage, and are men merely actors who have learned well or poorly the\nlines written for them by someone else or dictated by necessity? And\nis there to be no understanding of the meaning of the part we play, or\nof the drama as a whole? Is no one through his education to contribute\nsomething original to the drama of life?\n\nIt seems to me that the animal training theory rests upon two\npresuppositions, both of which are wrong. The first is that the mind\nconsists of what it has learned, that is, that it is the product\nof environment. This is really not a psychological doctrine, but a\nmetaphysical assumption. It is the mechanist theory; an idea which\nworks well as scientific method, but which leads to false conclusions\nwhen taken as a description of ultimate reality.\n\nThe second presupposition is a by-product of present-day industrial\ndemocracy. It is that education is a means to efficient service, with\nits rewards, getting on, general prosperity, etc. But is industry\nthe end and aim of our existence? It is said that man if he is to\nbe happy must be able to express himself in his work. I would not\ndispute this statement, but it is important to consider what it is\nthat finds expression in one\u2019s work. If work, in addition to being the\nmeans to some material end or bodily good, is also to be a form of\nself-expression, then the point of interest is the kind of selfhood, or\nquality of experience expressed. Then work exists for education, not\neducation for work.\n\nSomething is possible to mankind, which transcends work and by which\nwork itself is valued. As mere craftsmen we lose the sense of what\ngood workmanship is and become the blind slaves of necessity or of\ndesire the moment that education ceases to be the goal of labor. I\ndo not mean merely that we learn by doing. That is the way animals\nlearn and it is all they learn. By repeated performance an individual\nlearns how to do a task, but he does not thereby learn what to do, nor\nwhy it is done. Education has to do with insight, with valuing, with\nunderstanding, with the development of the power of discrimination,\nthe ability to make choice amongst the possibilities of experience and\nto think and act in ways that distinguish men from animals and higher\nmen from lower. The ancients thought of education as the attainment of\nthe virtues, wisdom, courage, temperance, justice. It is the pursuit\nof that knowledge which gives self-mastery. It is an interest which\nis never exhausted, but grows always broader and richer. It consists\nnot in learning tricks but in developing ourselves. It is a victory\nwon in some secret chamber of the mind which gradually transforms the\nwhole personality and reveals itself as an indefinable quality in\nevery word and act. It is a spiritual awakening; and if this awakening\ndoes not come, a person is not being educated however much he knows.\nI think it is the inability to win this psychological victory, or the\ndisinclination to make the effort necessary to it, that accounts for\nthe fact that some people cannot be educated. Though the change in\nthe quality of the personality is indefinable, it is a very concrete\nfact in human life. Its presence is evident in the work of writers as\ndifferent otherwise as Sir Thomas More, Galsworthy, Anatole France,\nJonathan Edwards, Henry Adams, etc. There is a quality of the educated\nmind which may best be described as a kind of sincerity, and conversely\nthe outstanding trait of ignorance is that of clever insincerity. The\npathetic thing about the wrongly educated,--those who are trained\nmerely to produce an effect, or get results, is that in the deeper\nhuman relationships they seldom know what sincerity is. Education is\nthe antithesis of vulgarity.\n\nDirectly and immediately, it is useless. It is a kind of living which\nis of value for its own sake, a personal achievement which possesses\nintrinsic worth. It is not _for_ anything. To subject it to an ulterior\nend--citizenship, efficiency, the economic emancipation of the working\nclass, increased income; or to educate people for \u201ccharacter,\u201d or to\nperpetuate a religious faith, or any other purpose however good, is to\nmake education a means to something quite irrelevant. Such misuse shows\nthat people are not interested in their education but in something\nelse. Education, the development of people, is not a means, it is\nitself the true end of civilization.\n\nWhile education is not _for_ anything, indirectly it improves\neverything that people do. Make education the aim and meaning of\nliving, and all becomes different. Experience has a new center of\ngravity. Facts fall into new and more significant perspective. Objects,\ndistinctions, relationships, qualities, are seen which before passed\nunnoticed. And as personality does not exist in a vacuum but in\nthe relationships established between organism and environment, no\nimprovement of it can fail to make itself felt in the quality of one\u2019s\nwork. Animal training may give one the means to make a living; liberal\neducation gives living a meaning.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nLIBERAL EDUCATION VS. PROPAGANDA\n\n\nWhoever is concerned about his education should be on his guard against\npropaganda. He who assists in the education of another should be doubly\ncautious. The temptation to convert people to our own particular\ncause, movement or belief is almost irresistible. An epidemic itch for\nmanipulating the public has infected the whole population. Perhaps\nnever was the business of \u201cselling\u201d ideas and interests of all sorts so\ncommon a practice or so cleverly done. Press agents, publicity experts,\nadvertisers and propagandists have become a pest. Much of the news is\n\u201ctreated\u201d for interests which may or may not be disclosed. Militarists,\npacifists, prohibitionists, birth controlists, social workers, business\ninterests, anti-vivisectionists, radicals, reactionaries and all kinds\nof reformers insinuate themselves everywhere like crawling insects.\nEvery legislative body is over-run with lobbyists. Every government,\nour own included, fights with propaganda as deadly as poison gas.\nChurches have reduced even the spreading of the gospel to the level of\nadvertising. And to judge by the popularity of one of the vulgarest\nbooks ever written about the founder of Christianity, a large number\nof churchmen are happy to believe that Jesus Christ was the world\u2019s\ngreatest salesman and business executive!\n\nIt ought not to be necessary to say that propaganda is not education.\nBut the confusion of the two is common. It is often very difficult\nto enlist the interest of people even in their own education if the\npropagandist motive is left out of it. I find that our students are\noften at first perplexed. They ask me, \u201cWhat party or creed or social\nmovement do you represent? What are you trying to convert us to?\u201d I\nhave even been asked why I lecture at all, if it is not my purpose to\ntell students what they should think and do. The idea of a course of\nstudy as an adventure in truth-seeking, an investigation deliberately\nplanned without made-in-advance conclusions or ulterior aims, is\ndifficult for many minds. If no partisan motive is apparent, students\noften suspect that there must be some dark and secret conspiracy.\nPeople like to have their instructors labeled and tagged. Otherwise\nthey feel that they are not being given anything. They prefer to be\ntold what to think.\n\nAnd of course everyone wishes to tell his fellows what to think. The\ngeneral interest in our neighbor\u2019s \u201ceducation\u201d rather than our own\nis responsible for much of the present confusion of education with\npropaganda. This is especially true in the education of children.\nScarcely one person in ten believes children should be told the truth.\nChildren are credulous and easily acquire habits which become fixed for\nlife: hence the tendency to take advantage of their innocence and while\ngiving them the instruction which it is now recognized that society\nowes them, to add something which certain people wish them to believe\nwhen they grow up. Consequently there has hardly ever been a time when\neducation was not to some extent diverted into propagandist channels.\nGovernments and churches and ruling classes and commercial groups have\nalways sought to get their hands on the institutions for the education\nof youth and utilize them for their own interests. The tendency is\nuniversal. Radicals denounce the Fundamentalists, the capitalists and\nthe Catholic Church for doing this sort of thing, and then do the same\nthing themselves; as for example, in the revolutionary propaganda that\nsometimes passes as \u201cworker\u2019s education,\u201d the socialist Sunday School,\nthe system of public education in Soviet Russia.\n\nThe habit of speaking of propaganda as if it were education has\ngrown with the activities of the advertising profession and other\nexpert manufacturers of public opinion. Anyone with anything to sell\n\u201ceducates\u201d the public to buy his product. The word is so commonly\nused for advertising that few question the legitimacy of such use. In\nfact the popularity of this use of the word education has a definite\npsychological cause. Many people would like to get their education\nby the easy method of reading subway advertisements. It is pleasant\nmoreover to feel that we are being educated when we glance at the\nbillboards on the way from New York to Philadelphia or look over the\nback pages in the Saturday Evening Post.\n\nI once heard an editor of a farm journal boast that his paper had\neducated the housewives of his state to buy cereal in packages\nrather than in bulk. A recent well-written book on the psychology of\nadvertising by a gentleman who styles himself a \u201cPublic Relations\nCounsel\u201d explains the technique of making propaganda. The author refers\nto such propagandist efforts as education, and says that the difference\nbetween education and propaganda is this: when your side of the case is\ngiven publicity, that is education; when your opponent publishes his\nside, that is propaganda.\n\nIt is doubtful, however, if members of the advertising profession\nare the worst sinners in this respect. Nearly everyone with a cause\nto promote does the same. We often hear single-taxers, socialists,\npatriotic societies, or vegetarians, speak of their propaganda as\neducation. In the report on the prohibition situation issued by the\nFederal Council of Churches of Christ in America, the suggestion is\nmade that there be a campaign of \u201ceducation\u201d in the interest of the\nenforcement of the Volstead Act.\n\nAlthough the educator and the propagandist are both concerned with\nthe dissemination of information, they have nothing else in common.\nThey use contrary methods and they strive for opposite goals. The\npropagandist is interested in _what_ people think; the educator in\n_how_ they think. The propagandist has a definite aim. He strives to\nconvert, to sell, to secure assent, to prove a case, to support one\nside of an issue. He is striving for an _effect_. He wishes people\nto come to a conclusion; to accept his case and close their minds\nand act. The educator strives for the open mind. He has no case to\nprove, which may not later be reversed. He is willing to reconsider,\nto be experimental, to hold his conclusions tentatively. The result\nfor which he strives is a type of student who will not jump at the\npropagandist\u2019s hasty conclusions or be taken in by his catchwords.\nTo the one \u201clearning\u201d is passively accepting something; criticism of\nthe matter offered is not encouraged. To the other, learning comes by\nexamining. The propagandist need have no respect for the personalities\nof those he manipulates. The educator must respect his student, since\nthe development of personality is his aim. In the end the question is\nwhether people are to be _used_ for purposes other than their own. This\nis the sole object of the propagandist; its successful achievement is\nthe defeat of the educator.\n\nEven in the service of a good cause, propaganda makes for\nsuperficiality in both him who gives and him who receives it. The\nconvert has seen the light. He is on the right side. He need have\nno more doubts or hesitation. Curiosity and further speculation\nare no longer necessary. Reasoning henceforth can become special\npleading--mere rationalization, an array of clever plausibilities\ndesigned to strengthen the faith and protect the devotee against the\ndanger that he may change his mind. He now becomes a propagandist\nhimself, a lay preacher as it were, whose mission in life is to convert\nand uplift others. He begins to harp on one string. In his eagerness to\nconvince he resorts to the obvious, the thing said for effect. He is\nmore concerned with the force of his arguments than with the accuracy\nof his statements. He is so busy with the general good that he neglects\nto purify himself. With unwashed hands he breaks his bread and serves\nit to his neighbors. I have seldom seen a person who has spent years\nmaking converts, who has not lost in intellectual integrity. Emerson\nnoted this trait in the abolitionists of his day. It is a quality which\nworld menders of all types have in common. Sooner or later the passion\nto convert, like any other passion over-indulged, warps the whole\npersonality. The propagandist becomes intemperate. He loses something\nin delicacy and sense of humor. There is in his manner a mixture\nof emotion and coercion and a kind of slyness. Finally from much\nrepetition of stock phrases the great cause itself becomes hackneyed\nand professionalized. Most of the messages which men would carry to the\nmasses slip through the propagandists\u2019 fingers and dribble out before\nthey arrive at their destination.\n\nI have tried to make clear the differences between propaganda and\neducation. If I am correct, it follows that whenever the educator\nbecomes a propagandist he gives up his proper function. I do not mean\nthat a school teacher should not advocate political change or any other\nreform he chooses. He is a citizen as well as a teacher, and has the\nright to express his convictions, however unpopular they may be. But it\nis not as a teacher that he does so. Ordinarily the public insists that\nthere are certain views that he may not express either in or outside\nhis class-room. At the same time he is required to be the advocate of\npopular moral, religious and political prejudices, however erroneous\nhe knows them to be. Public education suffers much from this lack of\nfreedom, for it operates to keep independent minds out of the teaching\nprofession. Unless any subject may be presented and every relevant fact\ndiscussed without fear or favor, the instruction offered students is a\ncheat.\n\nIt is however in the process of teaching itself that the spirit of\nthe propagandist may supplant that of the educator. It is much easier\nto appeal to authority than to experiment, to command assent than to\nawaken curiosity, to tell the student what he must believe than to\nwait for the maturing of his judgment. There are five devices commonly\nin use among propagandists which may defeat the effort for a liberal\neducation. They are the fixation of ideas by repetition, the trick of\nover-simplification, insinuation by appeal to prejudice, distortion of\nfact, and coercion.\n\nPsychology has taught the advertising profession the selling power of\nmere monotonous repetition. At one of the stations of the Hudson Tube I\ncounted five posters all displaying the same advertisement of a certain\nshaving cream. The advertiser had not leased so much space because of\nextravagance, nor was he afraid that people would fail to notice his\nadvertisement if he displayed it on only one board. It was so large and\nvivid that the passerby could easily see it. His aim was to deepen the\nimpression by repetition. For the same reason a flashing intermittent\nelectric sign on which the same letters are illuminated again and again\nis more effective than one with a continuous light. Another example of\nthis method is the poster containing the name of a popular cigarette\ntogether with the command, \u201cRead this out loud.\u201d\n\nAdvertisement of this nature makes no attempt to argue or explain or\npersuade, or to call attention to the merit of the article for sale.\nMany commodities in common use owe their popularity not to the fact\nthat people are persuaded that they are superior to a rival but because\na trade word has become fixed in memory through endless repetition.\n\nA similar method is often used in selling ideas and movements.\nSantayana says, \u201cA confused competition of propaganda is carried on\nby the most expert psychological methods--for instance, by always\nrepeating a lie instead of retracting when it is exposed. A formula of\nthis nature may not be a conscious lie, it need only be so fixed in\nthe mind by long repetition that it becomes compulsive. The person who\ncontinues repeating it becomes unable to consider the facts which would\ncontradict it.\u201d\n\nThus the religious propagandist will continue repeating an obsolete\ndogma long after its untruth is a matter of common knowledge. The use\nwhich propagandists make of rumor is another example of this principle.\nDuring the war we saw much of this sort of thing. The wildest\nfabrications were accepted uncritically; when everyone was repeating\nthem it seemed disloyal to question their bases of fact. In any\npolitical campaign the editorials and speeches are made up largely of\nrepetitions. Popular moral ideas are psychologically similar; we call\nthem platitudes. In fact public discussion which is mostly propaganda\nof one sort or another consists almost wholly of monotonous repetition.\nAnyone who has had experience with an open forum will, I think, agree\nwith me that the discussion from the floor--and not unfrequently the\nplatform also--shows an amazing monotony of repetition. I have known\nmen for years to gain the recognition of the chair and repeat the\nsame phrases night after night, no matter what was the subject under\ndiscussion. We love routine.\n\nThere is I believe less routine learning, less mere memory drill, in\nour schools now than in former years. I doubt if many students learn\ngeography or history or the multiplication tables or Latin grammar\nin the manner I was made to learn these subjects. However, it is\nnot in these subjects, which are at best the mere scaffolding of\nknowledge, that humdrum does the greatest harm. It is in its failure\nto stimulate genuine thinking about the important human interests that\neducation commonly falls short of its liberalizing function. There is\na dullness about sing-song repetition of the multiplication table or\nthe recital of the names of the rivers of China, but it does not equal\nin monotony the uniformity with which college graduates will say the\nsame things about politics, the protective tariff, the labor problem,\nthe constitution of the United States, or the relation of commerce to\nculture. I recently heard a professor, who holds an important chair in\none of our leading universities say that his institution strove not\nso much for scholarship as to develop a certain type of college man.\nNo doubt he had in mind a desirable type of man, but any attempt to\nmould a group to a single form can succeed only at the expense of the\nindividuality of the student. Moreover, such a goal naturally causes\nthe authorities to adopt methods of drill and standardization. Whenever\nthe aim of education is fixed in advance, it tends to propaganda and\nilliberalism.\n\nThe habit of repetition develops a credulous and incurious mind. It\nproduces a type of person who not only accepts his beliefs second-hand,\nbut also tends to over-simplify any subject under consideration, and\nso never get to the bottom of it as an educated mind should strive\nto do. It is very convenient to stop speculation with a half-true\ngeneralization stated as the conclusion of the whole matter. We love\nbig words; catch phrases are easy to remember and to repeat. Moral and\nreligious teachers know this, hence their use of aphorisms. One does\nnot stop to analyze an aphorism; it is self-evident, final.\n\nPropagandists and advertisers are also aware of this human trait, and\nthey delight in making slogans for us. \u201cI\u2019d walk a mile for a Camel,\u201d\n\u201cChildren cry for it,\u201d \u201cFour out of five now lose,\u201d are examples of a\ntype of advertising familiar to all. Recently an effort was made in New\nYork to check the \u201ccrime wave\u201d with a slogan. A poster addressed to\npotential robbers was displayed in various parts of the city containing\nthe words, \u201cYou can\u2019t win.\u201d A comparison of the number of convictions\nwith the number of crimes of violence would seem to indicate that this\nslogan had about the same measure of truthfulness as most others.\n\nSlogans used in commercial advertising are for the most part innocent\nenough. But there are slogans used in types of propaganda which are\nnot innocent. I will discuss the distortion of fact later; my point\nis that the type of phrase-making we are discussing tends at best to\nclose the mind. Every movement tends to dry up into a verbal cult\nwith a fixed phraseology the repetition of which seems to satisfy\nthe adherents\u2019 hunger for truth. The thinking of most men consists of\nlittle more than the repetition of the phrases which characterize the\ngroup to which they belong. There are groups which regularly assemble\nto listen to their familiar verbal formulas repeated again and again,\nderiving much satisfaction from the time-worn phrases. Any deviation\nfrom regularity or omission of any part is resented in the same spirit\nthat caused primitive men to hold that any deviation from the magic\nritual was sinful. It was the observation of this wide-spread trait\nin many forms that led me to the conclusion that there is practically\nonly one soap-box speech on socialism, one address on the principles\nof the single tax, one revival sermon, one type of campaign speech for\neach party. At least I find that most members of any movement all say\nthe same thing. If one knows what kind of an \u201c_ist_\u201d a man happens to\nbe and is familiar with the ritual of that \u201c_ism_,\u201d one can ordinarily\npredict what the man will say on any subject. Frequently propagandists\ndo not recognize their own principles when they hear them stated in\nordinary English.\n\nAnd once the cult phrases are thoroughly learned it is very difficult\nfor an individual to learn anything more. This is why the teaching\nof any subject should never be permitted to take on a set form, for\ncult ideas reduce an issue or situation to a statement so simple that\nit is a mere caricature. Subjects that require exhaustive analysis\nand deep meditation or much more information than anyone possesses\nare settled with amazing finality by oracular-minded people. How many\nmatters of vital importance are met with such phrases as \u201cOne hundred\npercent American,\u201d \u201cMy country right or wrong,\u201d \u201cEvery Bolshevik\nshould be stood up against a wall and shot,\u201d \u201cPlenty of room at the\ntop,\u201d \u201cReward of Merit,\u201d \u201cProgressive,\u201d \u201cReactionary,\u201d \u201cThe cure\nfor democracy is more democracy,\u201d \u201cLet the people rule,\u201d \u201cDown with\ncapitalist exploitation,\u201d \u201cLabor produces all wealth,\u201d \u201cThe demon rum,\u201d\n\u201cGodless evolution.\u201d\n\nThe habit which politicians, professional reformers and other\npropagandists have of appealing to popular prejudice in order to gain\nadherents is a well-known phenomenon of social psychology. Every\npolitical campaign is an orgy of this sort of thing. Mayor Hylan of\nNew York, when his incompetence was exposed, diverted attention by\ndenouncing the \u201cinterests.\u201d In the same city a few years ago those who\nwere opposed to modernizing the public school system stirred up a large\nsection of the population with the assertion that the \u201cGary School\u201d was\na Steel Trust school. During the war men were elected to office not\nbecause of their record but according to how strenuously they professed\ntheir Americanism and denounced alleged pro-Germans and socialists. A\n\u201cfriend of the people\u201d attacks Wall Street as a matter of course. Any\nman who questions the wisdom of the prohibition laws is immediately\nsaid to be in league with the \u201cliquor interests.\u201d In prohibition\npropaganda effective use was made of the fact that many brewers were\nof German descent. In the South the Ku Klux Klan is mainly anti-Negro,\nin the Middle West it is anti-Catholic. In the East it takes on an\nanti-Semitic coloring. It is by such appeals that multitudes are\nmarshalled and led first in one direction and then in another, always\nto the temporary advantage of a group of leaders. Into all this an\nulterior purpose, a quite personal interest is often insinuated. During\nthe war I made a collection of advertisements in which all sorts of\narticles were urged upon the purchaser with the statement that in\nbuying such goods the public was helping win the war.\n\nIt is obvious that whenever a crowd movement is created its propaganda\nhas a marked illiberal influence upon institutions of learning. During\nthe war public education in this country suffered seriously. A spirit\nof intolerance often wholly irrelevant to the winning of the war took\npossession of many educators. Eminent scientists lost their heads and\nceased to behave with that good judgment which people expect of a\nscholar in a critical situation.\n\nSuch results of propaganda are not limited to times of warfare. I know\na college where the work of every department was seriously disorganized\nfor a semester by a religious revival in the town. The pressure of\nreligious prejudices upon institutions of learning in this country is\none of the most serious forces with which education has to contend.\nThe hostility in the West and South toward the teaching of any other\naccount of the origin of man than that contained in the book of\nGenesis, is not new. It is merely the giving of legislative support to\nreligious dogma which strikes us as new. And that has also happened\nmany times in history. Popular religion has always watched education\nwith jealous eyes. However, there is one factor in the present\nFundamentalist attack upon the theory of evolution which seems to have\nescaped general notice. There is revealed an attitude toward education\nin general which should give us concern because it seems to be held by\nmany people who are not rural Fundamentalists. When those who conceived\nof teaching as imparting a doctrine--let us say of special creation\nor the authority of the Bible--found that students were being made\nacquainted with biological science and its various hypotheses regarding\nthe evolution of species, they could not understand that science could\nbe taught in any other spirit than that of theology. They still thought\nof teaching as imposing upon the uncritical student mind a system of\nbelief, a rival creed but still something alleged to be a final truth,\nwhich must be accepted on authority. Persons who speak in this manner\nof teaching simply do not know what education is. How could a scientist\ngo about teaching evolution in this way? Nobody but a propagandist\never teaches a theory. The scientific laboratory itself is a witness\nagainst such a philosophy of education. Here the student is exposed to\nthe phenomena to be studied, and to the sources of information and is\naided to discover the facts for himself and draw his own conclusions.\nScience learned by any other process is a mere pretense to knowledge. I\nsuspect it was not the doctrine of evolution so much as permitting the\nstudent to draw his own conclusions from the facts that most disturbed\nthe advocates of popular religious dogma. Yet few people saw the\nissue in this light. At the Dayton trial of the instructor who broke\nthe statute passed by the legislature of Tennessee, chief emphasis\nseems to have been laid on the issue whether after all evolution is\ncontrary to Genesis. Most people seem to have accepted without comment\nthe Fundamentalist notion of what teaching is. The whole meaning of\neducation is involved in this issue. Education is not the substitution\nof new creeds for old. Appeals to popular prejudice will continue\nto do harm to education so long as it is conceived of as \u201cteaching\u201d\nany beliefs whatsoever. As long as students are to be indoctrinated,\nnaturally every group will wish its own propaganda taught.\n\nIn this connection I should say a word about adult education. Those\nengaged in this branch of instruction are loud in their criticism\nof the propaganda which passes for education in school and college.\nMany of them have turned to adult education in order to spread some\npropaganda of their own. Teachers in this field are constantly\ntempted to yield to the prejudices of their students in order to\ngain popularity and keep up attendance. Each type of institution or\nspecial group has its peculiar prejudices and will insist that the\ninstruction given in its classes be so presented as to lend support\nto its interests and beliefs. Where churches maintain classes, adult\neducation will tend to take on a certain color. It will assume another\nin the trade union, still another when the appeal is to radicals. We\nhave already seen that a school of adult education may be in fact a\nsocialist theological seminary. Many others merely provide continued\nemployment for people who had been professional Americanization\npropagandists in the hectic years that followed the war.\n\nA favorite method among propagandists is distortion of fact. It\nis difficult for anyone who takes an intensely partisan view of a\nsituation to be honest with himself or careful about matters of\nfact. Respect for the truth is, I think, an acquired taste. And the\npropagandist is a special pleader. There is always the tendency to\nload the dice, to over-emphasize anything that lends support and to\ngloss over and explain away any fact that might weaken the case. Rumor,\nallegation, mere surmise, will, if it happens to be useful, to put\nout as fact established beyond the possibility of doubt. An excellent\nexample of this practice is a statement recently issued by a committee\nof one of the large Protestant denominations attacking both the\nGovernor of the State and the Mayor of New York. On the occasion of the\nlatter\u2019s visit to the South I quote a sentence or two.\n\n  \u201cThe South will be interested to know Mr. Walker\u2019s connection with\n  New York\u2019s odorous prize-fighting game and with those elements in\n  New York which are doing their best to murder American standards of\n  morality.... Let it remember the propaganda which is systematically\n  organized to incite to crime in the South and West in order that the\n  prohibition law may be overthrown by these criminal activities....\n  Let it remember that Governor Smith and his friends were the first\n  political group in America to introduce a religious issue into a\n  convention of a political party, an atrocious thing to do in a\n  country where all religions stand on the same basis.\u201d\n\nNote how the impression is given that the Mayor\u2019s alleged sympathy\nwith those who wish to repeal the Volstead Act is a connection with\npropaganda systematically organized to incite to crime and undermine\nAmerican morals. The reference to Governor Smith is typical of much\npropaganda.\n\nThis method of championing causes is so common that it is almost\nimpossible to get at the truth about any public question. I have very\nlittle interest in what is happening in Russia. If I had, I should not\nknow what to believe. Spokesmen for both the Bolshevists and their\nenemies seem to be about equally unable to tell the truth.\n\nThe pursuit of knowledge is the pursuit of the truth about something,\nand since propaganda is not the pursuit of truth, its influence upon\neducational institutions is illustrated by many of the text books on\nAmerican History in common use in the Public Schools. When attempts\nwere made to write the account of the American Revolution with\nfairness to both sides and, in the light of established fact, certain\nover-patriotic propagandists became much excited and thought they had\ndiscovered a pro-British conspiracy to deliver this republic again\ninto the clutches of the British monarchy.\n\nSubject matter which is even remotely associated with popular\ndogmas of religion, morals, patriotism, is likely to be modified so\nas to appear to be in harmony with such dogmas when presented to\nstudents. Each religious sect has its own version of Church history.\nRadicals who wish to hold the environment--hence the present social\nsystem--responsible for human failure, are always inclined to accept\nuncritically the biological doctrine of the inheritance of acquired\ncharacters. Patriotism makes it almost impossible for students anywhere\nto gain a correct knowledge of the history of their own country. The\nmoral interest inevitably influences the study of literature. We have\nalready discussed the teaching of the classics. Their educational value\nconsists chiefly in opening windows upon a way of life very different\nfrom our own. It broadens our sympathy with all that is human to gain\nan understanding of men who were inspired by ideals often the contrary\nof those held sacred in our own parish. Yet it is just this educational\nvalue which is commonly lost in the teaching of the classics,\nespecially in Puritanical communities. The least significant books of\nantiquity, writings like Caesar\u2019s Commentaries and Cicero\u2019s political\norations, are often selected as required studies. It is not an accident\nthat the works most commonly studied are those least shocking to\nconventionally minded people, not those which give the student the\nbest account of ancient civilization. Likewise in the teaching of\nmodern literature, there is so much expurgation, censorship, evasion,\nthat most students get the impression that literature is produced by\nSunday School teachers for the edification of very nice people. If, as\nmany believe, it is best to protect younger students in this manner,\nI think they should at least be led to understand what is happening.\nOtherwise they are likely to leave school convinced that their own\none-sided and somewhat infantile view of life and letters is the\ncorrect and only possible view and so influence the public authorities\nto enact legislation establishing censorships over literature and art,\ndesigned to impose their own limitations upon everyone.\n\nFinally when opportunity is favorable or occasion requires it, most\npropagandists will resort to coercion. History has revealed this fact\nagain and again. It has often been said that the martyrs of today are\nthe persecutors of tomorrow. With the possibility of the seizure of\npower in sight, methods of moral suasion become irksome; they are too\nslow. Men must be forced to do what is good for them. Propaganda is\ndesigned to gather a crowd to the support of an idea. I have shown\nelsewhere that when the crowd mind appears any group will practice\ncoercion if it can. Hardly a generation passed after the Edict of\nMilan, setting Christians free from persecution, before the Christians\nthemselves practiced persecution. The French Revolution set up a\nguillotine in the name of liberty, equality and fraternity. New England\npilgrims of religious liberty persecuted Quakers and other \u201cheretics.\u201d\nRadicals proclaim their faith in industrial democracy, free speech, the\nbrotherhood of man, and the Bolsheviks gain power by a coup d\u2019etat, and\nhold it by means of a policy of terror. Santayana says that the many\npropagandas which today float in the blue sky of liberalism are only\nwaiting to show their true colors and resort to open attack and that\nwhoever is victorious will make an end of liberalism. When physical\nforce is not in actual use, it hides just around the corner. In much\nmoral suasion there is a note of intolerance and of invasion. The man\nwho knows he is right puts you always on the defensive.\n\nEven commercial advertising frequently reveals this spirit. Perhaps\nadvertisers got the idea from the posters used by the government\nduring the war. We all remember the commanding figure of Uncle Sam,\nfinger pointed at our faces and beneath the figure the words, \u201c_You_\nbuy Liberty Bonds.\u201d Many advertisements now seek to command in such\na manner. We are ordered to buy this and that--not asked if we want\nit. Or our privacy is otherwise invaded. I recently saw on a subway\nplatform an advertisement of soap which contained these words, \u201cAre you\nclean or only nearly clean?\u201d\n\nWhen a crowd of world reformers becomes a crusade, men do not confine\nthemselves to asking impertinent questions. They are not even deterred\nby constitutional guaranties of personal rights. The storm rages\nuntil it blows itself out and leaves behind only the debris of what\nbefore had been good feeling among men. When a crusade is on--and\nthere are usually several going at the same time in a democracy like\nours--educational institutions are pressed into its service, and are\nforced to take sides, or at best maintain a precarious middle of the\nroad policy. This is not the task of those interested in education.\nThey are not \u201cin the middle of the road.\u201d They are not on the trampled\nhighway at all. Their task, while others are wrangling over unreal\nissues that today take their toll of life and tomorrow are forgotten,\nis to keep the lights of civilization burning, to humanize their own\nbehavior with reasonableness and good taste.\n\nAs Emerson said, history has been mean: all nations have been mobs.\nThe populace runs after this passing cause and that popular hero. To\nthe populace your rejection of popular standards is a rejection of\nall standards. But there is a time in each man\u2019s education when he\narrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance, that imitation is\nsuicide, that he must take himself for better or for worse. All men\npreen themselves on the improvement of society and no man improves.\nSociety never advances, it recedes as fast on one side as it gains on\nthe other. Society is a wave; the wave moves forward, but the water\nof which it is composed does not. Whoso would be a man must be a\nnon-conformist.\n\nSuch a suggestion as this at once meets serious objection. It is\ncontrary to the habits of this busybody age. Many will ask, how\ncan we have done with propaganda? We live in the age of publicity\nand organization, of causes and needed reforms. Great movements\nchallenge our complacency and invite our support. What, without these\ninterests, could we live for? How could we accomplish anything for the\ncommon good? Is not the educated person as you depict him aloof and\nineffective, a monastic sort of person who disdains the common ways\nand devotes his days to idle contemplation? And have you not yourself\nsaid again and again that intellect does not exist as a sequestered,\ninactive thing or end in itself, but that thinking is a part of doing?\nHow then can intellect be trained in indifference to the affairs of men?\n\nBut I have not argued that one seclude himself. Is there nothing to\noccupy the modern man except to stuff himself with half-truths and\nregulate society? Does existence lose its value at the mere suggestion\nthat man mind his own business? What I have said is that a person\ncannot educate himself by filling his head with propaganda.\n\nI do think people of our age are too much devoted to causes and not\nenough to their own education. Perhaps I should say that people\u2019s\ndevotion to causes is too narrow, too impatient, too uncritical.\nDoubtless we should serve our cause better if we stopped to look before\nwe leap. I am not sure that ignorance, however devoted and active, ever\naccomplishes much good for mankind.\n\nI might ask in turn, do our propagandas often get the results expected?\nLook at pacifist propaganda, or the slogan about the war to end war,\nlook at socialist propaganda today after a half century and more of\nit, consider prohibition. The intellectuals of our generation have\nexhausted themselves running after this and that new sociological\nmagic. And there is a general feeling of frustration and futility.\nWhere progress has been made in our times, it has been in matters\nthat do not lend themselves easily to propaganda; success had been\nachieved in the arts and sciences. Intellect has failed when playing at\nleadership of social movements.\n\nThe ends sought by propaganda may be and often are good. But education\nis also an end. We are not required to occupy ourselves with any cause\nto the extent that we fail to educate ourselves. The first social\nobligation of any man is his own education. I am a mere muddler and\na nuisance if I act on the principle that I have any obligations to\nsociety that go beyond my knowledge of means and ends and of good\nand evil. Social service should be a by-product of education. I do\nnot imagine that Socrates or Erasmus sought education in order that\nthey could be more useful to society. Social obligation or no social\nobligation, you and I have the right to such education as we have the\nnative intelligence to acquire. We have that right because we are\nthe kind of animals we are. No cause is more important than this. Let\nus serve where and when we can, but let us not surrender our mental\nintegrity for any man\u2019s sake.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nLIBERAL EDUCATION VS. BOOK LEARNING\n\n\nIs education something one can \u201cget\u201d in an institution? We are seeking\nto discover what an educated person is like,--as Plato would say, to\n\u201cfind\u201d the educated man. Whether the learning process takes place\nin an institution or out of it is from this point of view a matter\nof small interest. I should like to picture the liberally educated\nindividual as a mellow amateur, competent and well-informed, but with\nall natural and human, wholly at ease with his knowledge and master\nof his technique; one whose thinking is play and whose mind does not\nsqueak as it runs along. But there frequently appears in educational\ncircles a professionalism that is rather formidable and terrifying.\nI do not mean the specialized knowledge requisite for the so-called\nlearned professions. One may be highly trained professionally, and like\nWilliam James and Mr. Justice Holmes, retain the spirit of the amateur\nalways. By professionalism I mean a certain artificiality of manner,\nbookishness, over-strictness in regard to petty rules, a disposition\nto identify education with the display of just that knowledge which\nthe educated are conventionally supposed to possess. Many people think\nof education as something \u201chigh-brow,\u201d a fastidiousness which belongs\nto the \u00e9lite. There are those who give the impression that education\nis a thing of books and schools and formalities; and that there is a\nrecognized fraternity of the finished products of the system. As proof\nthat one belongs to this fraternity there are degrees and credits which\nshow that the candidate has passed certain examinations and has done a\nrequired amount of reading. We have seen that people may seek education\nbecause they hope it will give them a certain prestige. I once heard\na man say, \u201cI\u2019d give ten thousand dollars if I only knew Greek.\u201d I\nwondered why Greek had such value in his eyes. I learned that he had\nbeen in the company of two elderly men, one a clergyman and the other a\nphysician. He was humiliated because of his ignorance when the two fell\nto discussing some Greek text reminiscent of college days. It never\noccurred to him that he could secure a few text books and acquire this\ncoveted knowledge in his spare time whenever he chose to do so.\n\nPeople persist in thinking that education comes to a man by virtue\nof his attendance at some place where it may be \u201cgot.\u201d We frequently\nhear someone say, \u201cI _had_ so many years of Latin,\u201d or \u201cI _took_\nmathematics,\u201d or \u201cI did not _get_ much history.\u201d Formal education,\nwhich is book knowledge acquired in a school,--this possession which\nmen measure and grade and standardize,--may or may not be an aid to\ngeneral culture. The thing I mean by liberal education is too elusive\nfor the man with the yard stick.\n\nWith the modern theories of learning there has come some difference\nof opinion regarding the educational value of books. Traditional\neducation consisted almost wholly of book knowledge. Knowledge of the\nbooks written about a subject was rated as familiarity with the subject\nitself.\n\nThere is a recent tendency, both within and without institutions of\nlearning, to skim over as many as possible of the latest books. This\nleaves little or no time for the great books, knowledge of which is\nessential to a liberal education. In the library of a very up-to-date\nwriter on sociological and economic subjects, I did not find a single\nbook, except a few school texts, written before nineteen hundred.\nModern writers all seem to desire to express the movements of the day.\nBut it is difficult to see how one\u2019s judgment of the present can be\nvery sound, if one has no background of the cultural traditions of the\nrace. Ideas of life gained from an exclusive study of the present are\nnecessarily second-rate. Professor John Erskine says, \u201cTo live only\nin the moment, to imagine only one\u2019s own place was once thought to be\nthe fate of the stupid. We have made it the ideal of education.... No\ncollege is liberal which trains its students to identify the excellent\nor the important exclusively with the contemporary.\u201d He says that\neducation should prejudice us in favor of authors who are wise, and\nthat there have not been many great men nor many great ideas. One may\nacquire a liberal education from the reading of relatively few books.\n\u201cThe Student ... ought to know Hobbes; he ought to know Pascal, and\nPlato and Bacon and Homer, and Spinoza and Galileo, and Leonardo da\nVinci.\u201d\n\nAnd I would add that anyone pursuing his education ought to know\nErasmus and Montaigne, Butler\u2019s \u201cHudibras,\u201d and something of Hume,\nVoltaire, Anatole France, and the best of the classic poets. This is\nnot a great deal of reading. It can moreover be done in a leisurely\nmanner, and this is important. Our modern habit of cluttering up the\nmind with all sorts of second-rate, up-to-date printed matter accounts\nin part for the jumpiness and hectic quality of the modern spirit. No\none seems to take time for quiet reflection any more. Everyone is too\nbusy keeping up-to-date, gaining a superficial knowledge of the latest\nthing, and before we can pause to separate the true from the false in\nit, it is already out of date and something still more \u201cmodern\u201d is the\nfashion.\n\nThere is a tendency among very modern educators to reduce book learning\nto a minimum. It is said that book knowledge is only hear-say,\nsecond-hand information. The student does not make a fact his own\nso long as he must take someone\u2019s word for it. What books tell you\nprevents your finding out for yourself. You know an emotion only when\nyou feel it, a fact when you deal with it, a truth when you discover\nit. \u201cWe learn by doing.\u201d A leading progressive educator says, \u201cThe\nschool of tomorrow is going to get away from mere reciting what has\nbeen got from books. That is, we are going to give up the notion that\nthe school is the place where we assign certain set tasks and the child\ngoes off and prepares those things and then comes back to convince us\nthat he has done what was required.... In the school of the future,\nthe child is going to live, really live. This means what he learns he\nlearns because he needs it then and there.\u201d\n\nThis rather extreme form of protest against formal book learning is\nreally an attempt to correct the opposite extreme. We all know persons,\nconventionally educated, who substitute reading for living, and the\nbook for reality. There are those who never talk about events or ideas,\nbut always quote what some book says about them, as if they believed\nthat work, love, joy, pain, became fit subjects of contemplation\nonly in print. The world of actions and things gives way to a world\nof words only. Human existence becomes a sort of grown-up children\u2019s\ngame of authors. Education becomes an evasion of the challenge of\nreal situations. Emotion and fancy are exhausted in doing nothing. It\nbecomes preferable to read about things than to experience them. The\nindividual thinks he has acquired wisdom; he merely has a taste for\nreading and a good memory.\n\nIn these days when educators are frantically striving to find some new\nmethod of teaching which will save democracy from mediocrity, it is\nthe habit to blame the older education for any and all intellectual\nfutility. I believe, however, that futile persons would be ineffective\nno matter what the method of instruction. The statement quoted above\nto the effect that in the schools of the future the children are going\nto live and are to stop reciting required lessons and learn what they\nneed \u201chere and now,\u201d is a little like the platitude that one can learn\nmore out of life than out of books, a saying which always flatters the\nilliterate. It seems to be thoroughly modern to believe that the best\nway to get an education is to stop studying and just _live_,--whatever\nthat is.\n\nI am of the opinion, however, that anyone who can learn from life can\nalso learn from books without spoiling his mind. There is a difference\nbetween learning from books and merely learning to repeat passages\nfrom them, and I had thought that in really learning from books one\nwas learning from life. Whether one can get more information from\nbooks than from things depends somewhat on the books, also what it is\none wishes to learn, as well as one\u2019s capacity to learn. Manipulation\nof objects--doing--has no more educational value than repeating\nwords. Either may become a mere routine exercise. Education is the\norganization of knowledge into human excellence. It is not the mere\npossession of knowledge, but the ability to reflect upon it and grow in\nwisdom. It would seem that as few people acquire wisdom from practical\nexperience as from books.\n\nThe high-school educated multitude, which prefers the radio to reading,\nfinds the tales of classic literature tedious except when presented in\nthe \u201cmovies,\u201d reads history only in outline, and natural science only\nwhen popularized in a series of ABC books, is probably correct in its\nfeeling that books cannot teach it much; and what it is learning from\nlife is manifest in the sort of life it lives. The habit of reading\ngood books, ability to know the good ones from the inferior, capacity\nto enjoy books for the beauty and wisdom that may be found in them, are\nessential parts of a liberal education. A school that implants good\nhabits of discriminating reading in its students is a good school. One\nthat fails to do this is a bad school. The modern educational system\nhas taught the public to read,--and the public reads mostly trash.\n\nThat education in a so-called democracy may be official and\nprofessionalized and at the same time superficial and illiberal is\nmanifest. Thomas Davidson, a pioneer teacher of adults in this country,\nexpressed great hope in the promise of public education in America.\nBut there is one fact about such intellectual life as there is in\nthis country which seems to have escaped Davidson\u2019s attention, I\nsuppose because his own case was an exception. It is a fact which I\nbelieve may be one of the causes of the small influence which learning\nexerts in the daily life and thought and preferences of our people.\nThousands of people say that their education is of no use to them in\nlater years. It is an interest which they do not keep up but leave\nbehind at the school-house door. They think that education belongs\nproperly in the school, and except for some practical advantage most\npeople seldom think of making any cultural achievement of their own\noutside the school. Most advance in scholarship in this country is the\nwork of professionals, members of university faculties. Outside the\ninstitutions of learning, there is very little independent creative\nthought. Exception must be made of our literary men, but these too are\nprofessionals. There are almost no men of leisure who carry on the\nprogress of civilization as educated amateurs. In this respect we are\nmuch like Germany before the war, where advance in scholarship was\nalmost confined to the universities and the attempt was made to create\nknowledge by the machinery of organized research.\n\nAn example of the situation in our country is to be found in the fact\nthat almost every member of the American Philosophical Association is\na Ph.D. and a teacher of philosophy in a degree-granting institution.\nIt might almost be said that philosophy, beyond the merest introduction\nto the subject, is studied in order that students may become teachers\nof still other teachers. I suspect that a similar situation exists\nin other learned societies. This confinement of scholarship to the\nprofessional student leaves the public without guidance and at the\nmercy of quacks. It causes a break between education and other\ninterests which the public school strives in vain to bridge over,\nbecause in such a situation the school itself becomes official and\nsequestered. Thus education is constantly being done up in little\npackages and sent out from the places where it is grown, like the\ngarden seeds which Congressmen used to send to their constituents and\nwhich nobody planted. Education does not take root because nobody\nplants it. People think that culture is the special function of the\nprofessional gardeners, and there are even educators who would be\nastonished and jealous if they saw anything but elementary scholarship\ngrowing at large outside their walls.\n\nIn this respect, it seems to me, Great Britain has had the advantage.\nMany of her greatest contributions to science and philosophy came\nfrom outside the regular university faculties. Such men as Hobbes,\nMilton, Bacon, Locke, Hume, Spencer, Mill and Darwin may have received\nconventional training, but they went out and did something with it\nafterwards. They helped create an ideal of the educated man which we\nhave yet to gain. Hence Great Britain has had many amateur scholars who\nwere also men of affairs, men like Mr. Balfour and the Haldanes, whose\ninfluence has helped keep education from being over-professionalized.\n\nSome of the highest educational attainments in history have been\nreached without the setting up of any institution at all, in our sense\nof the term. Protagoras, Socrates, and Abelard simply gathered groups\nof fellow students about them who lived for years in their company,\nfirst as disciples then as assistants. Such education to be sure was\nfor the selected few, but after a man had spent some time with his\nteacher, he acquired a philosophy which changed his way of life. The\nmodern attempt to educate everyone really educates hardly anyone. The\npublic school imparts a certain elementary instruction--in eight or ten\nyears about as much as a normally intelligent youth could master in\ntwo years if he set his mind to it. In matters of taste and standards\nof value, public school education makes little difference; or in\ndeveloping thirst for knowledge, tolerance, independence of judgment.\nThe task of giving instruction to the youth of an entire community is\nso great that thoroughness is almost impossible. The task falls to the\nstate, and the state is a vested interest and the protector of other\nvested interests, interests which are not always consistent with the\ndesire for knowledge. There are factions in the community which the\npublic authorities must conciliate. We have seen what can happen to the\nteaching of biology and history when such factions become organized to\ncontrol the public education of a state. Public servants are nowhere\neager to have education so free to pursue its proper function that\nthere is developed an alert and critically minded public to whom they\nmust justify certain of their practices. What the state desires of\neducation is soldiers, reliable voters, law-abiding citizens, contented\nworking men, prosperous traders. Hence a spirit of docility and\ncredulity, often of timidity, prevails in the school.\n\nWhere there are large numbers in attendance, the individual student\nreceives little personal attention. The education of backward students\nis sometimes given more consideration than that of the normally\nintelligent. The chief aim is to get the student through and pass him\nalong to the next grade, and the pace at which the instructor moves is\nset by the mediocre. Whether this state of affairs will be remedied by\nthe use of intelligence tests remains to be seen. At present mental\nmeasurement is a sort of fad. The system requires that all shall learn\nthe same lesson in the same manner at the same time.\n\nStandardization develops a kind of mass mind, which in mature years\nrenders men very susceptible to crowd appeal. Learning imposed upon\nthe student by the system is put on the outside like a mental uniform.\nHabits become stereotyped in the elementary, non-reflective aspects of\nbehavior and knowledge. There is little in this to guide the student\nto the spiritual values of a liberal education. Most of those who pass\nthrough the system never know that such values exist.\n\nThe public school system is a great bureaucracy with autocracy at the\ntop and deference to authority all the way down through the hierarchy\nof superintendents, principals, and instructors, to the students.\nThe administrator holds dominion over the teacher. Little is left to\npersonal initiative. Any system which requires little responsibility of\nits employees but much deference to petty authority in time comes to\nbe filled with persons to whom such servitude is not irksome. Serious\nscholarship is rare. The teacher is not encouraged to independence\nof judgment concerning the subject which for years it is his work\nto teach. Teaching becomes a trade and is practised with as little\nintellectual interest as most trades. Other than idealizing the\nexisting situation together with whatever persons or interests control\nthe school system, little attention is given to the social setting into\nwhich the school sends its students when they leave.\n\nDr. Kallen says, \u201cFree public education and private instruction\npurchasable at a price are both but the community\u2019s device to meet\npresent needs by transmitting the past unchanged. They provide a\ngrammar of assent, not a logic of inquiry. The mental posture they\nhabituate the youth in is not the posture of reflection. The mental\nposture they habituate the youth in is the posture of conformity.\nThey require belief, not investigation. They impose reverence for\nthe past and idealization of the present. They envision the future\nas a perpetuation of the past, not as a new creation of it. They are\nMain Street\u2019s most powerful instrument of self-reproduction without\nvariation.... They enable government both visible and invisible to\ncontinue by consent, for they forestall and inhibit in the citizens\nof the land the technique of doubt and dissent which is the necessary\ncondition of good government and the true inwardness of that eternal\nvigilance so notoriously the price of liberty.\u201d\n\nHere and there, in spite of the system, someone gets his feet on the\npath which leads to liberal education. But in general it cannot be\nsaid that the public school has realized the dreams of those who in\nthe early nineteenth century hoped that free universal education would\nplace democratic institutions on the solid foundations of enlightened\npublic opinion and general respect for truth. It was believed that the\ncurse of ignorance would be removed; that humbug and insolence would\nbe driven from the control of affairs; that labor would be ennobled by\nunderstanding, and freedom secured by the attainment of self-mastery.\nAll were now to have access to scholarship; the precious wisdom of the\ngreat minds of all times, no longer the possession of the favored few,\nshould be made to live in the daily experience of the nations.\n\nWe are not so utopian in our hopes for the future of society as were\nthe Humanitarian idealists of the nineteenth century. Perhaps people\nhave expected too much of public education and have required too\nlittle. We need not be astonished that the education of the public is\ncommitted to a system which becomes an end in itself; that is human.\nNor need we be astonished that public education is administered and\ncarried on by persons most of whom do not know what education is; that\nis the democratic way of dealing with public affairs. If you are to get\nyour education, whoever you are you must not be content to let it be a\npublic affair. You must make it your private affair.\n\nSevere criticism of both the public school and the university is\ncommon. There is much talk about capitalistic influence, and the\ndenial of academic freedom by prominent business men who contribute\nto endowments and constitute boards of trustees. In so far as this\ncriticism comes from professional radical propagandists it need not be\ntaken very seriously. Such persons merely want their own propaganda\nincluded in the curriculum. University presidents no doubt often play\npolitics and do other things common to professional money-raisers.\nFaculties are often little more than pedantic trade unions, and if we\nare to judge the colleges of the country by the number of first-rate\nscholars who graduate from them or by the extent of their influences as\na whole on the cultural standards of the country, we may well question\nwhether higher education in America succeeds any better than the public\nschool.\n\nBut I wonder why so much criticism is directed at trustees and\nfaculties and so little at the students. The habit of constantly\ndenouncing someone because we are not better educated is rather\nludicrous. If our people really desire education they can have it. If\nI am dissatisfied with my ignorance, I may seek knowledge at any time,\nand no one else, in or out of college, can ever gain wisdom for me.\nAnyone who has kept up his interest in his education after graduation\nknows that what is learned in school and college is at best a small\npart of it--merely the beginning of an education. Anyone who does not\ncontinue his studies through the years of a busy life and thinks that\nthe brief introduction to the tools of scholarship which he received\nin his adolescence is education, should apologize to his college, not\ncriticize it. Granted that there is much bad teaching, there is more\nbad studying,--or I should say, hardly any studying at all. Professor\nJames Harvey Robinson used to say, \u201cA college is a place where there is\nmuch teaching and no learning.\u201d\n\nIs it not possible that a large portion of the population cannot be\neducated? Such persons are not all necessarily dull, they may be\nnaturally uninterested in education, and it is likely that many enter\ninstitutions of learning with the mistaken notion that it is education\nthey desire, when what they really want is success, a good time, and a\nlittle training in what they think are the manners and ways of speech\nof polite society. The finishing school once supplied this need; now\nthe colleges have to do it.\n\nThe motives which lead people to seek college education divide the\nstudents into three types. First there are the few who love learning.\nThe spirit which once caused groups of young men to follow Abelard or\nErasmus still brings an occasional youth to college. Such students may\nneed guidance, advice and the fellowship of mature scholars. It is not\nnecessary to force them to study, or offer them \u201csnap courses,\u201d or\ncram them for examination. Much of the procedure and regulation--the\nregimentation common in institutions of learning--is unnecessary and\nsometimes harmful to them. Most of them would become educated persons\neven if they never saw a college class-room.\n\nA second type of student attends college and university in large\nnumbers. The motive is preparation for a professional career. Many of\nthe best students belong to this type. Whether in addition to their\nprofessional training they ever gain a liberal education--we have\nseen that the two are not necessarily the same--will depend largely\nupon what they do after they get their degrees. If they then have an\ninterest in educating themselves, their technical training ought to be\nan advantage, for most of them have learned how to study. But so much\npurely technical knowledge must be drilled into a man\u2019s head that the\nstudent who is preparing for a degree in engineering, law, medicine\nor scientific research has very little time for anything else. Many of\nthe most successful physicians, engineers and scientists need adult\neducation quite as much as do ordinary working men.\n\nThe third type, the majority of undergraduate students, are for the\nmost part pleasant young men and women of the upper middle class. Their\nparents are \u201cputting them through college\u201d because it is the expected\nthing to do. A man wishes to give his children every advantage. While\na bachelor\u2019s degree is not exactly a social necessity, there are many\nwho would have something like an inferiority complex without it. I knew\none family in New York City who almost went into mourning when the only\nson failed in his Harvard entrance examinations. Students of this type\nenjoy four happy years, largely at public expense, with other young\npeople of their own age in an environment designed to keep them out of\nmischief. I have no doubt this grown-up kindergarten life is good for\nthem; most of them seem to appreciate it. In later years they remain\nenthusiastically loyal to Alma Mater, coming back to football games\nand class reunions and contributing to the support of the college.\nAs alumni their influence is not always on the side of progress in\neducation, but perhaps they make up for this failure in other ways.\n\nI am prepared, moreover, to say that the existence of hundreds of\ncenters filled with such care-free young people may be a good thing\nfor the country. They keep alive a tradition of good cheer and of\nman\u2019s right to happiness in a country that is otherwise sordidly\ncommercial. A leisure class is a social necessity for it serves as an\nexample to other people showing them how to enjoy their idle hours. The\nEnglish aristocracy with its horse races and other out-door sports has\ndone much to make life interesting to all classes in that otherwise\nfactory-ridden country, and its example has been followed by people in\nother lands. Now about the only leisure class we have in America is the\nundergraduate student body. A privileged class is always popular with\nthe rest of the population in a normally constituted state. And so the\nwhole country enjoys vicariously the amusements of its undergraduate\nboys and girls. The college youth with his automobile, his pipe, and\nhis big fur coat is a favorite hero in the motion pictures. Moreover,\nthe fact that the period of loafing is limited to four years is a\nblessing, for by taking turns a greater number may enjoy the privilege\nthan the industry of the country could possibly support in permanent\nidleness.\n\nBut while all this may be good for the country, it is not very good for\nthe colleges. It is bad for the morale of any institution to sail under\nfalse colors, and colleges are popularly supposed to be educational\ninstitutions. The college faculties themselves must to some extent\nshare this popular delusion, or else they would not permit the public\nto go on believing it. The attempt to live up to this erroneous idea\nputs everybody under a strain, students and faculty alike, and is\nthe one unpleasant thing about college life. Instructors are forever\nannoying the students, trying to get some work out of them. Attendance\non classes is required, and a series of examinations is arranged which\nnobody enjoys and which do no good anyway. They only make it necessary\nto send an occasional student home, and then there are tears, other\nstudents are frightened and sometimes lose sleep cramming for the next\nexamination, and the instructor loses popularity, especially if his\ncourse is an elective one.\n\nIt is among this type of undergraduates that \u201ccampus opinion\u201d has\nits origin. Campus opinion is distinctly hostile to learning, and it\nholds sway over students with the same tenacity as other crowd ideas\namong the uneducated elements of the population. The student who takes\nhis education seriously loses caste and is regarded as a joke. Few\nyoung people are sufficiently non-gregarious to stand out against the\nscornful laughter of their fellows.\n\nWhat the average student gets from college, then, is an opportunity to\ncomplete his adolescence in an interesting and healthy environment, the\nexperience of being away from home and on his own, and fraternity and\nclub life--pleasant in itself--in which friendships are formed that\nlast through life and are often useful business connections in after\nyears. There is also athletics, through which the student may develop\nhis muscles, gain the desirable moral quality of good sportsmanship,\nand satisfy any ambition he may have to become a college hero. One\nalways becomes famous in college outside the class-room, never in it.\nIncidentally, if a student is naturally clever at picking up bits of\ninformation with a minimum of reading, he gains a bowing acquaintance\nwith about as much knowledge as should be the possession of one with a\nfair secondary education. Finally, he forms certain habits and acquires\ncertain manners and tastes which mould him to the type of the average\ncollege graduate, and goes out in the world to take his place in the\nsocial and business circles of his home town, where, if he should ever\nmention Aristotle, people would think he was crazy.\n\nThe college graduate can play a good game of tennis, wear his clothes\nwell, talk about the latest novel, walk across a room with grace and\ndignity, and share the club opinions of his set, and there is nothing\noffensive in his table manners. I do not mean to underrate these\naccomplishments. The person who does not have them, however great his\nachievement in scholarship, is a boor, too lacking in sensitiveness\nto assimilate the knowledge he has stored in his head. But these are\naccomplishments that should be learned at home, as a matter of course;\ncolleges ought not to be necessary for training of this sort.\n\nWherein the education of the average college graduate fails of its\ntrue ends is seen in what might be called the deeper things of the\nspirit. No profound intellectual passion has been awakened, no habit\nof independent judgment formed. The college man shares the usual\npopular prejudices of his community. He runs with the crowd after the\nhero of the hour, and shows the same lack of discrimination as do\nthe uneducated. He votes the same party ticket, is intolerant along\nwith his neighbors, and puts the same value on material success as do\nthe illiterate. His education has made very little difference in his\nreligious beliefs, his social philosophy, his ethical values, or his\ngeneral outlook on the world. Like all opinionated and half-educated\npeople, he jumps to hasty conclusions, believes what others believe,\ndoes things because others do them, worships the past, idealizes the\npresent.\n\nIn contrast with this, let me quote a passage from John Stuart Mill.\nThe author meant it to be a description of the scientist. It stands as\na suggestion of what a liberally educated mind should be.\n\n  \u201cTo question all things;--never to turn away from any difficulty;\n  to accept no doctrine either from ourselves or from other people\n  without a rigid scrutiny by negative criticism; letting no fallacy,\n  or incoherence, or confusion of thought, step by unperceived; above\n  all, to insist upon having the meaning of a word clearly understood\n  before using it, and the meaning of a proposition before assenting to\n  it;--these are the lessons we learn \u2018from workers in Science.\u2019 With\n  all this vigorous management of the negative element, they inspire no\n  scepticism about the reality of truth or indifference to its pursuit.\n  The noblest enthusiasm, both for the search after truth and for\n  applying it to its highest uses, pervades those writers.\u201d\n\nWhen all is said, the ignorance and folly of men are things that\ninstitutions cannot cure. Each must discover the path of wisdom\nfor himself. One does not \u201cget\u201d an education anywhere. One becomes\nan educated person by virtue of patient study, quiet meditation,\nintellectual courage, and a life devoted to the discovery and service\nof truth.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF DOUBT\n\n\nThe seventh book of Plato\u2019s Republic begins with the Parable of the\nCave. To show \u201chow far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened\u201d the\nphilosopher draws a picture of human beings living in an underground\nden, all of them from childhood chained with their backs to the light\nso that all they can see is moving shadows cast upon the opposite\nwall. This world of shadows is the system of popular beliefs. To\nthese people \u201cthe truth would be literally nothing but the shadow of\nimages.\u201d Plato tells us to imagine what would happen if the prisoners\nwere released and disabused of their error. If any one of them is\nsuddenly compelled to turn and face the light, the glare blinds him\nand he suffers a sharp pain. If he is reluctantly dragged up into\nthe outside world of sunlight he is at first dazzled. After he is\naccustomed to the new vision, all reality will appear different. He\nwill see the difference between shadow and substance. He will know that\npopular belief is error. If now he should return, what a difference\nthere would be between his new wisdom and that which in the den passed\nfor wisdom! \u201cAnd if they were in the habit of conferring honors among\nthemselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows,\nand to remark which of them went before and which followed after,\nand which were together, and who were therefore best able to draw\nconclusions as to the future, do you think he would care for such\nhonors and glories?--And if there were a contest and he had to compete\nin measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of\nthe den and while his eyes were yet weak,\u201d we are told that he would\nfumble and be ridiculous, and men would say, \u201cUp he went and down he\ncame without his eyes,\u201d and they would pass a law that no one should\neven think of ascending any more or try to release another and lead him\nup.\n\nI will not discuss the metaphysical implications of this parable about\nwhich there is dispute. Plato says we shall not misapprehend him if\nwe interpret this upward journey as education. Whoever would face the\nlight must turn his back on the crowd and its shadows. He must climb\ninto another world of values. The educated man thinks differently. His\nbeliefs are different from those of the herd. He is being set free from\nits delusions, even from what it holds to be important. This is not\nbecause he wishes to be aloof or superior, but because he is gaining a\ndifferent conception of what believing itself is. He has a new approach\nto things in general, new habits of judging. He is beginning to form\nhis own judgments, and to judge is to weigh, to consider, to question,\nto seek evidence, to doubt.\n\nCommon men cherish their na\u00efve faiths and ask no questions. They\nimagine that education is simply greater information of the same sort\nwhich they also possess in some measure, and that it is the part of\nwisdom to establish the reality of their shadows. They resent a wisdom\nwhich is different from their own and unsettles belief. He who acquires\ninformation without the will to doubt is a common man and his kind\nunderstand him. Hence men tend to display their information and conceal\ntheir education. However much a man may know, so long as he does not\nbecome _re-oriented_, the crowd does not suspect him, but admires\nhis learning. He is like a former Mayor of New York in his high hat\nat the head of the Policeman\u2019s Parade. The multitude used to stand\nwith their mouths open gazing at him. Each in imagination saw in the\nexalted figure himself risen to a place of honor and success. So it\nis with the \u201cbrainy man.\u201d The \u201clightening calculator\u201d or the man who\ncan recite from memory the population statistics of the cities of the\nUnited States is a museum wonder. But when it was announced in a New\nYork theater that only twelve men could understand Einstein\u2019s theory of\nrelativity, I am told that the crowd hissed.\n\nInformation is a kind of skill. Everyone can possess this skill to the\nextent he chooses, and people do not resent an exhibition of unusual\nskill of such a nature. In America most men and boys have some measure\nof skill at the game of baseball, so this game is the popular national\nform of sport. The skillful professional ball-player is simply one of\nthe common boyhood ideals realized. He differs from the spectators of\nthe game in degree, but not in kind. He plays the same game they all\nplayed, and is the same sort of person they all were as boys--only more\nso. So with most kinds of information, the amount one may acquire makes\nonly a quantitative difference, not a difference in kind. But as a man\nbecomes educated he discovers that he is playing a new game; he is\nbecoming a different kind of person, with different likes and dislikes,\ndifferent interests, different ideals and faiths, and such beliefs as\nhe has he holds differently.\n\nWhat the multitude most fears in education is the danger that the\ncrowd faith will be lost in the process. This fear is often justified.\nOld beliefs will be lost and they should be. The fear appears in\nconsciousness as solicitude for the spiritual welfare of the person\nbeing educated. It is really anxiety over the menace of education to\nherd living and thinking. It is the function of education to lure the\nindividual out of the pack and give him opportunity to know his own\nmind, a thing he can never do so long as he runs and barks and bites\nalong with all the rest. To return to Plato\u2019s figure, every person who\nclimbs out of the cave not only loses his own faith in the reality of\nshadows but weakens the faith of those who remain behind. Cave men\nmake strenuous efforts to resist education. Their common practice is\nto maintain their own systems of pseudo education in which no one is\npermitted to turn his eyes away from the wall.\n\nAgain, education has been likened to leaven. When it is honest it is\nvery much like yeast. Before the culture is introduced the solution\nof ideas is in equilibrium. The mind has simply accepted what was\npoured into it by parents, teachers, priests, and politicians. In the\nsolution there is reflected a compact, \u201cstill,\u201d neatly ordered little\nsystem of knowledge. \u201cGod\u2019s in his heaven, all\u2019s right with the world.\u201d\nDuty is clear, all is conventionally arranged, truth is eternal and\nlogic can prove it. Human rights are decreed by the founders of the\nrepublic. The course of destiny is disclosed to reason and faith and\nthe promise sealed in divine revelation. At this stage, most minds\nare carefully sealed up or a prophylactic is stirred in, for if those\nsugary solutions are exposed to a live spiritual culture they begin\nto \u201cwork.\u201d Then they are spoiled for certain purposes. With the\nfermentation there is sometimes foam and gas; but a chemical change is\ntaking place, brewing a mind with a \u201ckick\u201d in it. It is interesting\nthat bread and wine and education are all made by a similar process;\nhence an educational Volsteadism has often been enforced so that many\nof the best minds have had to be \u201chome brewed.\u201d\n\nProfessor Dewey somewhere speaks of education as freeing the mind of\n\u201cbunk.\u201d It is a large task. No one wholly succeeds. I never saw a\ncompletely \u201cdebunked\u201d individual. Strive as we may to eradicate it,\nthere is always in our thinking an amount of error, of wish-fancy\naccepted as objective fact, of exaggeration, special pleading,\nself-justification. Many of our beliefs are not founded in reason at\nall, but are demanded by some unconscious and repressed impulse in\nour nature. Men make a virtue of their faith when in fact they are\n_victims_ of it; they can no more help believing certain things than a\nneurotic can stop a compulsive habit.\n\nIt is said that it is easy to doubt and that to believe is an\naccomplishment. It is not so. It is easier to believe than to doubt.\nThe things we must train ourselves to doubt are as a rule just\nthe things we wish to believe. It is children and savages and the\nilliterate who have the most implicit faith. It is said that unbelief\nis sin. This is not so; it is nobler to doubt than to believe, for to\ndoubt is often to take sides with fact against oneself. Nietzsche said\nthat this trait is characteristic of \u201chigher men.\u201d It was Huxley, as I\nremember it, who considered that man could in nothing fall so low as\nwhen he deliberately took refuge in the absurd. Even with a rationalist\nlike Huxley doubt is not merely a function of the intellect. Under\ncertain circumstances it is a moral necessity.\n\nThe pursuit of knowledge is not the same, however, as scrupulous\navoidance of error. He who strives to do his own thinking must accept\nresponsibility for himself. He must expect that he will make mistakes.\nHe may end in total failure. He must take his chances and be willing\nto pay the cost of his adventure. I know professional scholars who\nare so afraid they may write or say something which their colleagues\nwill show to be wrong that they never express an opinion of their own\nor commit themselves to any downright statement. Such equivocation\nand qualifying--playing safe--is not what I mean by doubt. I do not\nmean merely that one should be always on guard against the possibility\nof error, but that one should learn to hold all one\u2019s beliefs with\na half-amused light-heartedness. Most minds are loaded down with\nthe seriousness of their convictions. Solemnity in the presence of\nour eternal verities is awkwardness, and makes us always a little\nridiculous, giving us the appearance of one about to shake hands with\nthe President. Why not enjoy the humor of the situation? Our great\ntruths may all the while be \u201cspoofing\u201d us. It will do no harm to give\nthem a sly wink now and then.\n\nCrowd men have no sense of humor. It is very difficult to educate\nsolemn and opinionated people. Like Omar, they always come out by that\nsame door wherein they went. I have known students to complete a course\nof study having learned nothing, because of their disinclination to\nconsider any fact which might cause them to surrender some belief about\nreligion or economic theory with which they entered. Whoever leaves an\ninstitution of learning with the same general outlook on life that he\nhad when he first came might better have employed his time otherwise.\nHe is not a student; he is a church-member.\n\nA well-known reformer says in his autobiography that his education,\nto the present time, has been a long process of \u201cun-learning.\u201d The\nprogressive disillusionment began in college when he was forced to\nabandon the religious dogmas of his childhood. It continued through a\nseries of hard experiences and misdirected efforts to improve the world\nfrom each of which he reaped a harvest of doubt, leaving behind the\nexposure of one economic or sociological fallacy after another, until\nin the end he had left only his faith in Woodrow Wilson and in the\nproletariat. Then he lost Wilson.\n\nPerhaps one who still has the proletariat is not utterly disillusioned.\nIf the education continues that too may go the way of earlier beliefs.\nIt is one thing to despair of a society only one section of which can\nstand the test of our idealism. It is quite another matter if one is\nled to re-examine one\u2019s idealism. It is this latter kind of doubt which\nhas the greater importance. The significant thing is not the particular\nbelief which a man gives up or retains but the manner in which he\nbelieves what he does believe. Change the latter and you change a basic\nhabit pattern; you change the man.\n\nNot all scepticism has educational value. There is a kind of doubting\nwhich is merely the negative response of the unteachable, the\nsuspiciousness of the wilfully ignorant, the refusal of the incurious\nto examine disturbing and challenging evidence. There are, as an\neighteenth century philosopher said, minds that are moulded to the form\nof one idea. Many people, after they have accepted one idea, tame it\nand keep it as a sort of watchdog to frighten all other ideas away.\nThis refusal to be convinced may appear to be scepticism; it is only\nstubbornness. The late Mr. Bryan and his followers were very sceptical\nof evolution. But this hostile attitude is very different from the\nscepticism of those scientists who hold that the theory is a mere\nworking hypothesis which is yet to be confirmed. The scepticism of\nignorance is motivated by the desire to save an old faith. Savages have\nbeen known to exhibit this incredulity toward certain aspects of our\nmore advanced knowledge. If you were to tell the natives of Borneo that\nthere is no dragon in the sky which eats up the moon during an eclipse,\nthat there are no spirits and no magic, I imagine they would laugh in\nyour face and think you a fool. Many a discovery and invention has been\ngreeted by a grinning and incredulous public even in civilized society.\nThe scepticism which has value is that which leads one on to further\nstudy and investigation. And it is characterized by intellectual\nmodesty.\n\nPhilosophic doubt is not the pitiable condition of the soul that timid\nspirits imagine. It is not pessimism or cynicism, but a healthy and\ncheerful habit. It gives peace of mind. Men who stop pretending can\nsleep o\u2019 nights. There is a certain scepticism which is in no sense the\nspirit that denies. It is a frank recognition of things as they come.\nIt is almost a test of a man\u2019s honesty, among those who have stopped\nto think about the nature and limitations of our knowledge. Certainly\ncultivated people do not exhibit the same degree of cock-sureness\nas do the ignorant. People think the old saying about \u201cdoubting the\nintelligence that doubts\u201d is funny. Popular audiences will always\nlaugh at it. But why not? It is a platitude that the more a man learns\nthe more he realizes how little he knows. Existence is filled with\ninscrutable mystery. To none of the profound questions that we ask of\nit is there any final answer. We must be satisfied ultimately with\nsurmise, with symbol and poetic fancy. Speculations about the soul,\nGod, the ultimate nature of reality and the course of destiny, and as\nto whether existence has any meaning or purpose beyond our own, or\nwhether our life itself is worthwhile--all these speculations and many\nothers of similar nature lead to no conclusions in fact, and we return\nalways to the point from which we started. The very terms in which we\nput such questions are often meaningless when closely examined by the\nintellect, and the answer to them is determined by our own moods.\n\nThere is a general belief that science can answer the riddle. But\nscience is only one possible view of things, the one best adapted to\nthe needs of creatures like ourselves. It cannot deal with questions\nof value. It can tell us how things operate, their relative mass and\npositions in space and time, but it cannot tell us what they are in\nthemselves, nor why they exist nor anything about their goodness\nor beauty. The more exact scientific knowledge becomes, the more\nclosely it approaches mathematics. Pure mathematics deals only with\nabstractions and logical relations and can dismiss the whole world of\nobjects. Science presupposes the data of experience and the validity\nof its own logical principles. It substitutes its mechanized order of\nthings for things as we experience them.\n\nHuman reasoning is partial in all its processes. We think successfully\nabout things when we ignore all the aspects or qualities of them except\nthose which are relevant to the purpose at hand. The H\u2082O-ness of water\nis no more the ultimate nature of water than is its wetness, or its\nthirst quenching quality. That it is H\u2082O is only one of the things that\nmay be said about water. Now if we add together bits of one-sided and\npartial scientific knowledge, we do not thereby gain a sum total which\nis the equivalent of reality as a whole. We have a useful instrument\nfor dealing with our environment, because in thought we have greatly\nsimplified it by ignoring in each instance all that is irrelevant. But\nwhat we now have is a universe of discourse, a human construction which\nis what it is because we are always more interested in some aspects of\nthings than in others.\n\nAll our ideas are views--they have been likened to snapshots. The\nworld of which we are part is in flux. It comes to us as process,\nand our intellect does not grasp the movement any more than we can\nrestore the movement of a man running by adding together a series of\nphotographs. The movement always takes place between the pictures.\nIntellect is an instrument, not a mirror. Our world is not reducible\nto a form of thought, and when men speak of truth, reality, cause,\nsubstance, they are really only saying what they mean by certain words.\nThe world, as James said, has its meanings for us because we are\ninterested spectators, and so far as we can see none of these meanings\nare final. Whitehead and others have shown that some of the basic\nconcepts of physical science which have held sway since the seventeenth\ncentury are now subject to revision. Santayana says that knowledge\nis faith--animal faith. It would be strange if it were otherwise, if\nhairy little creatures such we are, whose ancestors lived in trees and\nmade queer guttural noises, should so organize human discourse as to\nbe able to say the last word about reality as a whole. It is well that\nwe should marvel at our achievements of knowledge, for they are man\u2019s\nnoblest work; but let us remember that human reason, itself a phase and\npart of the process of nature, can only view the whole process from\nits own partial standpoint, and that is enough unless we aspire to\ninfallibility.\n\nMan is a disputatious animal who loves to speak like Sir Oracle.\nUneducated people, ashamed of their ignorance, commit themselves\nhastily and cling to their commitments, for to change one\u2019s mind is an\nadmission that one was mistaken. We wish to be vindicated as having\nall along been in the right. Hence it is more natural to contend for\na principle than to test a hypothesis. The ego becomes identified\nwith certain convictions. We feel ourselves personally injured if our\nconvictions are subjected to criticism. We are not ordinarily grateful\nto the person who points out our errors and sets us right. But if our\neducation is to proceed, we must get over our delusion of infallibility.\n\nThis fiction of infallibility is very common, and those who have not\nlearned to doubt this fiction, who are sure that they have the truth\nand are on the side of the right are as a rule the more ignorant\nand provincial elements of the population. It is no accident that\nFundamentalism, prohibition, and other forms of moral regulation exist\nin inverse ratio to urbanity and have their strongholds in rural\ncommunities. People to whom it never occurs to ask how they know so\nclearly they are right when better informed people have doubts on the\nsubject, are the ones who naturally strive to coerce their neighbors.\nTo many minds there are no social or moral problems. The answer is\nalways known by the crusader. It is very simple. To him there can be\nno two opinions. The standards which prevail in his own parish, the\nself-expression of his own type, are the will of God. Principles of\nright and wrong are known immediately without reflection or regard\nto the situations where they are to be applied; they are revealed to\nconscience. \u201cRight is right and wrong is wrong everywhere and forever\nthe same!\u201d\n\nMen who hold such a view learn little from experience, and this is why\ncrowds never change their minds. They have first to be disintegrated\nand a new crowd formed about new standards, because each crowd\nrepresents its will as a divine command, a matter of eternal principle.\n\nTo learn anything from experience it is necessary to take into account\nthe results of our behavior. But when you do a thing merely because\nit is demanded by a universal principle which must be vindicated at\nall costs, or because it is a divine command to be carried out with\nunquestioning obedience, you need not consider the results. Hence you\ncannot be shown that you were mistaken. In this sense men\u2019s gods and\ntheir _a priori_ ideas have the function of preserving their fiction\nof infallibility. There always appears what Professor Overstreet calls\nthe proclamation of \u201cthe One Right Way.\u201d Differences of opinion are\nheld to be not mere differences of point of view, but the difference\nbetween Right and Wrong, Good and Evil. Those who think differently\nare the wicked, the ungodly, the _enemy_. They must be convinced by\nbeing vanquished, silenced. Every knee must bow and every tongue\nconfess. There is no longer a meeting of minds in the search for\ntruth. The triumph of the Right is in the belief of the average man a\nknockout. There must be no compromise; any attitude other than intense\npartisanship is disloyalty. One in a discussion must line up for or\nagainst a proposition, take sides, have a ready answer for anything\nthat the other side says, and be sure that nothing will cause one to\nmodify one\u2019s views. Is any one ever convinced by public debate? Or does\none emerge from a church quarrel, a political campaign, a session of\nthe legislature, a convention of a trade union with a broader outlook\nor better understanding?\n\nThe egotism of the ignorant keeps them in ignorance. There is an\namusing notion that the masses are kept in ignorance by clever\nconspirators against freedom and progress. The average man\u2019s reasoning\nconsists chiefly of the repetition of cant phrases in support of\npreconceived ideas. He wishes to hear only what he can applaud, and he\napplauds what saves his face and puts his enemies to shame. Theological\ndisputation has always been carried on in this spirit, and so have most\npopular discussions of morals, politics and economic problems.\n\nProfessor Overstreet says that this \u201cOne Right Way\u201d attitude is\nessentially adolescent. This does not mean that it is essentially\nyouthful. Adolescence is the period when there is normally an\nexaggerated emotional interest in the ego. A delayed adolescent type\nof mentality is common. Psychologists speak of it as narcissism,--a\nfixation of interest upon the idea of self. Among psychopathic\nindividuals and also among crowds this _narcissism_ is very dominant\nand leads to exaggerated notions of self-importance and to other fixed\nideas. Inability to entertain any doubt of self becomes inability to\nquestion any idea which one would like to believe true. Hence the\ndelusion of infallibility. I think that vast numbers of otherwise\nnormal people are made susceptible to crowd thinking because they\nsimply do not know that there are ways of life and thought different\nfrom their own which good people may and do honestly hold. Crowd\nappeal at once entrenches prejudice and flatters the ego, compensating\nit perhaps for any half-conscious feeling of inferiority it may have\nbecause for instance a man over-rates school education and \u201cdid not get\nit.\u201d\n\nIt is interesting to note how this delusion of infallibility may often\nlead men to believe and assert the most incredible fabrications. I\nquote from a recent New York newspaper an exaggerated example which\nwill illustrate what I mean.\n\n  \u201cThe League of Nations has been asked to do a lot of strange things\n  by people all over the world, but it remained for a New York business\n  man to request action on the most unusual topic of all. Announcement\n  is made by the league secretariat that it has received a letter\n  from the New Yorker declaring his opinion that \u2018brain enslavement,\u2019\n  otherwise known as spirit writing or receiving messages from the\n  dead, is the cause of many evils. He said he wanted the league to\n  stop this system all over the world, making the specific charge that\n  the American courts of \u2018so-called justice\u2019 are controlled by the\n  spirit movement.\u201d\n\nNote the last sentence; the \u201cspecific charge\u201d is very typical. There is\nnot the least notion that so sweeping an indictment should be supported\nby evidence. It _must be_ so, for how can the alleged tolerant attitude\nof the courts be explained otherwise? An explanatory idea is asserted\nas an established fact. Here we have a mind incapable of entertaining\ndoubt. As usual in unhealthy reasoning, the thinking in this case is\na syllogism. Spiritualism is a form of brain enslavement which is the\ncause of wide-spread evil. All who do not sufficiently oppose it are\ncontrolled by it. The courts do not sufficiently resist it. Therefore\nthe courts are controlled by the spirit movement. If the premises are\ntrue the conclusion of course follows logically. The trouble with\ndiseased thinking is not its logic, but its inability to examine\nits premises in the light of fact. A healthy mind would doubt these\npremises before reaching such a ridiculous conclusion. Doubt makes for\nsanity.\n\nI do not wish the force of this example to be lost. Most people will\nsee it so long as we are talking about spirits, for there is much\nwholesome doubt about the doings of spirits. But let us substitute for\nspirits something else concerning which surmise commonly passes as\nestablished fact, and we have something very familiar. \u201cThe American\ncourts are controlled by Wall Street,\u201d or by the Catholic Church, or\nby British propagandists, or the attempt is being made by labor unions\nor by Communists. So it is with popular thinking on most subjects.\nAcquaintance with facts does not seem to be necessary for the formation\nof opinion. I can easily assert alleged facts on my own authority;\nit hurts my pride when I am asked for evidence. I once heard a\nfundamentalist preacher say that everyone who doubted the infallibility\nof the Bible merely sought an excuse for living a life of sin. Such\nstatements must be true; they are so logical, moreover they justify a\nman in his fixed beliefs and put doubters always in the wrong. Many\npeople even in their reading do little more than seek confirmation\nfor notions founded on such thinking. The censorship of books is\nhardly necessary to keep people\u2019s minds in the beaten path. Many\npeople cannot read a book with which they do not agree. We disguise\nour infallibility under the infallibility of our favorite author. He\nbecomes an authority. We read our own meanings into his text when\nnecessary. We pick out the passages which support us and quote them on\nall occasions. For instance, a mind saturated with the teachings of\nKarl Marx will take in nothing else and will view every other author\nfrom the standpoint of his agreement with Marx. It is always so with\nthe sectarian mind, whether in religion or in politics.\n\nThe sort of logic which we have just been considering leads men to\nassume extreme positions of all sorts. Opinionated and undisciplined\nminds always tend to carry an idea to extremes, to jump to a\nconclusion, to let enthusiasm carry belief beyond the limits of good\njudgment. This all or none attitude is supposed to be zeal in the\nservice of principle. It is merely intemperance. Education strives for\nthe virtue of temperance, and temperance--which among the uneducated\nbecomes merely abstinence from the use of alcoholic beverages--is the\navoidance of rash assertion, and of ill-considered and hasty inference.\nThe temperate man stops to think. Careful thought seldom leads one\nwild. An educated mind is not so likely to \u201cgo off half-cocked.\u201d It\nhas fewer enthusiasms and so accumulates a reserve; a sense of the\nridiculous helps it keep its balance.\n\nMost men feel uncomfortable when they must hold their minds open\nand judgment in abeyance. Judgment suspended gives a feeling of\nunstable equilibrium, of tension; it is irksome like resistance to\ntemptation. In addition to this discomfort in being unsettled, there\nis a disturbing feeling of insecurity in the thought that we live in\na world in which certitude is rare and difficult. In many situations\nit is necessary to act before all the evidence is at hand. We must act\non faith and take our chances. All men cherish their faiths, but few\nhave the courage to act on faith. We naturally wish to feel ourselves\nmore secure than we really are in a world where much is left to chance.\nA formula generally believed gives such a delusion of security. The\ngreater the number of those who believe, the more convinced is the\naverage man of the truth of the formula and the more safe he feels.\n\nI think this wish to feel at home in the universe has inspired much of\nreligion. It is also one of the reasons why, as older religions wane,\neach man must have his \u201ccause,\u201d his social gospel, his movement. These\nthings afford a sense of comradeship in which there is safety. They\ngive one \u201csomething to tie to,\u201d something enduring to believe in. And\nas each cause or movement claims the future and looks forward to sure\nvindication and triumph, the future becomes predictable and congenial.\n\nThis search for an ideal security has had its influence on philosophy.\nMany philosophers, from the time of the ancient Greeks till now,\nhave sought to construct systems of ideas, verbal forms in which in\ncontemplation they could find refuge from the universal change in\nwhich all things come and pass away. Inasmuch as it is possible to\nthink of an object or class and to mean the same even when the objects\nthemselves are no longer present, a system of abstract and unusual\nuniversal ideas is set up and thought of as existing in itself, outside\nthe process of time and change. The system of thought so conceived\nis held to be more enduring than the world of changing objects. The\nideal world is then the real world. In it alone is knowledge of the\nTruth which abides forever. Such systems appear to me to be elaborate\nattempts to sustain a fictitious security by taking refuge from reality\nin a logical arrangement of man\u2019s own empty forms of thought. From the\npoint of view of education it should be said that such philosophies\nrequire much learning before one can understand them, but they tend to\ndogmatism and the closed mind.\n\nA modern method of supporting the fiction of security--less austere and\nsophisticated than some of those of official philosophy--prevails among\nthose who speak the language of science. It is known as mechanism.\nAs scientific _method_, mechanism is indispensable. It is found by\nexact measurement and careful scrutiny that given two identical\nmaterial situations, the same result will follow. There is a certain\norderliness about the processes of nature, which if we ignore all else\nbut the movement and masses and temporal and spatial relationships of\nparticles of matter, lends itself to statement in mathematical terms.\nIn this manner events are predictable with great accuracy. And now\nbecause it becomes possible for human reason to interpret facts of\nnature when they are thought of only with respect to mass, movement,\nposition, it is held that nature itself is really nothing but mass,\nmotion, position, etc. The laws and methods of interpretation are\nthought to constitute the nature of that which is interpreted. A method\ndeliberately adopted in order to give a mathematically rational account\nof certain selected aspects of nature is now taken for a correct\npicture of ultimate reality. The reason which measures masses and\ndistances believes it has discovered itself as the true nature of the\nthing measured. The universe is held to be at once like a machine, and\nat the same time essentially rational. Security is again grounded in\nforms of thought.\n\nIt is said that all futures are predictable by the new logic of science\nif we only knew enough about complex phenomena to be able to strip them\ndown to that which can be expressed in mathematical terms. Of course\nno one professes to be able to calculate the curve of the whole, or to\nhave worked out a quantitative statement of many of the phenomena of\nlife. But it is a scientific faith that it might conceivably be done.\nThis seems to me to be merely saying that we could reduce the universe\nto reason if we only could do it, which is tautology. I am not sure\nthat a universe so reduced would be anything more than a bare system of\nthought about only one aspect of the universe. But scepticism here is\nas distasteful to many scientists as the scientists\u2019 own scepticism is\ndistasteful to theologians.\n\nI am not asserting dogmatically that we cannot know truth or the\nnature of reality. I am not suggesting that we cannot be educated\nwithout ending in universal scepticism or agnostic negation. It seems\nto me that we have, or can have, such knowledge as will make our\nintellects fairly adequate instruments in the performance of their\nproper functions. But I do not see what such functioning has to do\nwith ascribing finality to our beliefs or trying to legislate for\nall possible worlds. I am not suggesting an attitude of despair in\nthe pursuit of truth, but am trying to state the very reason for any\nlearning at all, for what is the use of it if we know it all before we\nstart?\n\nEducation may not end in doubt, but it ends when a man stops doubting.\nBut why speak of the end of a process that should continue through\nlife? As I see it, the process is more often discontinued at the point\nof some fictitious certainty than in any moment of doubt. Doubt, the\nwillingness to admit that conjecture is subject to revision, is a spur\nto learning. The recognition that our truths are not copies of eternal\nrealities but are human creations designed to meet human needs, puts\none in a teachable frame of mind. And the discovery that thinking\nmay be creative makes intellectual activity interesting. Much has\nbeen written by indoctrinators about the wretchedness of the dogmatic\nsceptic. I wonder how these writers, themselves so innocent of doubt,\nknow so much about him. I have never found such a man. I do not believe\nhe ever existed. There are writers who question things that most men\ndo not even know exist, compared with whom professional \u201cfreethinkers\u201d\nare often na\u00efve. But such writers are often gentle and cheerful spirits\nwhose minds are not at all paralyzed by doubt, but are active, subtle,\nstimulating.\n\nHumanity during the course of civilization has fixed certain habits,\nmade certain discoveries, constructed certain systems of ordered\nknowledge by emphasizing the relevant and significant. There is little\nlikelihood that the whole structure will come tumbling about our\nheads because somebody examines into its nature. In fact the highest\nachievement of civilization would appear to be a mind capable of\nunderstanding our human ways of thinking for what they are. But if\nour learning should cause us to abandon all our consoling beliefs and\nideals and pet theories; if it should reveal human folly in our every\ngreat cause, and futility in our every scheme of social reconstruction,\neven then we cannot for such reasons shirk the task of educating\nourselves. There would remain for each of us the ideal of what an\neducated mind might become; no knowledge could take from us the ideals\nof courage, of preserving our integrity, of standing undaunted before\nthe challenge to our spirit.\n\nAgain a question arises similar to that we discussed at the close\nof the chapter on propaganda. Does not education, then, cause doubt\nand indifference so that the educated remain aloof and fail to take\ntheir share of social responsibility or participate in the activities\nof their times? Is it not the mass of \u201ccommon people\u201d therefore, and\nnot the scholars, which accomplishes the overthrow of tyrannies and\nachieves progress? In a day when everybody is a professional or amateur\nreformer and people are led to believe that they can make their lives\ncount only as they participate in some mass movement, it is natural\nthat this question should present itself as we consider what education\nmeans.\n\nHistory should aid us to an answer here. The author of \u201cOur Times,\u201d\nMark Sullivan, after giving an account of the partisan strife and\npopular movements of the last quarter of the nineteenth century,\nsuggests that perhaps all this expenditure of energy and intensity\nof enthusiasm was but part of the passing show and came to nothing,\nwhile the so-called leaders who seemed to be creating history were but\nthe puppets of deeper and silent forces. He suggests that the enduring\nchanges are those of science and the arts. I believe we have here one\nof the important lessons of history. Progress in civilization has been\nthe work almost wholly of scientists, philosophers, artists, engineers,\nand unique individuals. The rest has been froth and foam, a struggle\nto liberate mankind from the clutches of its most recent liberators,\ncrowd devouring crowd, mass movements marching to Utopia down blind\nalleys. Unfortunately there is some truth in the statement that the\nintelligence of the race has little influence upon mass movements.\nThis is not because scholarship is aloof, however, so much as because\nthe multitude in its enthusiasms does not heed the counsels of wisdom.\nWhen I become a zealot for a movement I lose my critical faculties.\nIn exalting my cause I would persuade myself that my existence is of\nmore importance to the world than it really is. No one so devoted and\nearnest could possibly be in the wrong, and in the righteousness of my\ncause, I have infallibility. What need have I of the wisdom that comes\nby taking thought when I have the truth by intuition and intensity of\nfeeling?\n\nIf it is true that men can only be made to act under the lash of blind\nfaith and enthusiasm, then the estate of man is a sorry one indeed.\nFor most of the things done will end in tragic failure. It is only the\nconceit of ignorance to believe that the world can be straightened once\nfor all by people who do not know what they are doing. Moreover, to say\nthat ignorance is necessary to the accomplishment of good is to say,\nthat ignorance is desirable and better for man than knowledge. There\nhave been those who held such a view. Obscurantists always hold it. It\nis the philosophy of pessimism, and it is interesting to note that it\nis the believer and the devotee, the man of action and not the gentle\ndoubter who finally ends in pessimism.\n\nFor want of intelligence the devotees of causes have been the mischief\nmakers in all times. We cannot always know who does the most good\nin the world, but the evil that men do lives after them and it is\nsometimes possible to estimate the amount of harm done. Who has done\nthe most harm in human history, the sceptics or the believers, the\ndevotees of causes or the devotees of culture and urbanity? St. Bernard\nwith his crusade, or Abelard with his doubts? The men who conducted the\nInquisition, or the men who doubted the doctrine of the Trinity? Calvin\nand the obscurantists on both sides of the Reformation, or Erasmus and\nthe Humanists? Cromwell and his Puritans or Voltaire and the Deists?\nRobespierre or Goethe?\n\nThe devotees to causes have kept human life in turmoil. If the\nimmorality they would cure has slain its thousands, their \u201cmorality\u201d\nhas slain its tens of thousands. In most cases the strife has been\nuseless and for causes that might have been won in other ways, really\nwon. The devotee of a cause requires little provocation to practice\npersecution, and only the opportunity to play the tyrant.\n\nDoubt not only has educational value: it preserves social sanity. I\nwould suggest as part of everyone\u2019s education the reading of such\nauthors as Lucian, Epicurus, Abelard, Hobbes, Montaigne, Rabelais,\nErasmus, Lessing, Voltaire, Hume and Anatole France. There is no blood\non these men\u2019s hands. They have quietly smiled in the face of bigotry\nand superstition. In their words there is laughter and there is light.\nPerhaps no one of them ever intended to be a liberator of mankind. They\nmerely thought and spoke as free spirits, and their very presence puts\nsham and cant and unction and coercion and mistaken zeal to shame. They\nhave done more for freedom and truth than all the armies of crusading\ndevotees.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nA MAN IS KNOWN BY THE DILEMMAS HE KEEPS\n\n\nWilliam James said that wherever there is selection among alternatives\nthere is mental life. Man is a choosing animal, and his choices\ndetermine both the ends sought and the means to be employed. We\nwill not discuss the question whether our choices are spontaneous\nor are determined wholly or in part by environmental and hereditary\nfactors. Whatever determines them, our habits of choosing,--the\ngeneral character of the things we prefer,--reveal the kind of people\nwe are. And as learning is not merely the acquiring of more and more\ninformation but is accompanied by a gradual transformation of habit\nsystems, its progress is manifest not merely by what a man knows at\nany stage in his education, but also by the kind of issue that is real\nto him, the questions which he permits life to put to him, the sort of\ntemptations he has to struggle to avoid, the kind of goods that are\nvital to him. When I was a boy my parents used to tell me, \u201cA man is\nknown by the company he keeps.\u201d The saying, while designed to protect\nyouth from the dangerous influence of evil companionship, is not wholly\ntrue. Many persons, from ambition or other motives, seek the society of\npersons unlike themselves. Those who are more gregarious than selective\nmay exercise little choice among their associates. But ordinarily\npeople like to be with their own kind. Criminals keep company with\nother criminals, golfers with other golfers, stamp collectors with\nothers who have the same interest. We wish our friends to be interested\nin the things that interest us. Groups long associated tend to become\nhomogeneous. When marked differences of taste and opinion develop,\ncompanions drift apart. Hence it is obvious that the company one keeps\nis determined in part by the dilemmas he keeps.\n\nWe do not normally keep the same set of dilemmas through life. Each\nstage of development presents new challenges, problems, alternatives;\nas we mature our habits of judgment change. We see things in a\ndifferent light. What was once a matter of vital concern becomes a dead\nissue. Our interest is caught and our choice determined by aspects of\nsituations to which we did not react at all at an earlier stage. We do\nnot solve all the problems of any stage, but we outgrow them,--get over\nthem.\n\nPsychopathology today has much to say about the nature and sequence of\nthe dilemmas which at any period haunt the mind of an individual. The\nmatter is so important that I wonder more has not been made of it by\nthose interested in education. The public, it seems, would have the\neducator fill the student\u2019s head with useful information but expects\nthe student to keep the same beliefs and general outlook on life that\nhe had before. We speak of rising to a higher mental plane; this is\nlittle else than learning to wrestle with more and more significant\nproblems. A little girl in her third summer says, \u201cI\u2019m a nice girl;\nI don\u2019t bite sister now.\u201d To bite or not to bite, to keep one\u2019s self\nclean, to refrain from crying, are normally the dilemmas of early\nchildhood. If they are not dead issues to a person twenty years old,\nthey may be regarded as psychopathic symptoms. When a mature individual\nis found wrestling with impulses which should have been reduced to\nhabit and dismissed from consciousness in earlier years, we have a\nphenomenon which psychologists call \u201cregression,\u201d or \u201cfixation\u201d of\nemotional interest in mental habits that are normally outgrown. Toward\nthe tasks and situations of adult life, the individual strives to\nmaintain an infantile attitude and hence fails to adjust himself.\nSometimes the regression shows a preoccupation with infantile wishes,\nand sometimes with those of early adolescence; in any case there is\nstruggle to maintain the inhibitions or the defenses which veil the\ninadequately repressed impulses.\n\nThe manner in which lessons learned from experience normally transform\nan impulse from its expression in very simple and crude dilemmas to\nits later and more subtle manifestations may be seen in the forms\nwith which people exhibit and disguise their egoism during successive\nstages of development. When a very young child is beginning to\ndiscover himself and his little world, he finds his own body and its\nfunctions tremendously interesting. Soon he discovers that certain\nof his performances command attention. He learns to make use of such\nperformances in order to get what he wants. He will exercise his power\nover parent or nurse by throwing his toys on the floor again and again\nand howling until some one picks them up. Long before he condescends to\ntalk, he notices when people admire him and say complimentary things\nabout him. A very young child will do little stunts by way of showing\noff, and will exhibit irritation if ignored or left alone. He cries out\nat any restraint upon his movements or resistance to his wishes.\n\nThe egoism of everyone retains something of the infantile quality. But\nfamily discipline, social experience, and the awakening of powers of\nobservation and thought result in new forms of expression. This ego\ninterest becomes associated with an ideal of self and its importance\nwhich the individual guards as his honor, his reputation. Every man\nis intent upon keeping up his feeling of self-importance; each feels\nthat one so important deserves special consideration. Egoism in normal\npeople becomes to some extent liberated from its infantile interests\nand is sublimated, that is, attached to ends that are socially\npermissible. The original impulse remains, but it wrestles with new\nproblems. The wish to be admired is a factor in all ambition, also in\nromantic love. A love affair is even more a mutual admiration society\nthan a phenomenon of sex interest. The impulse to command which in the\nnursery led the child to throw toys on the floor for others to pick up,\nlater becomes a desire for leadership, a struggle for political power,\na passion for manipulating or reforming others.\n\nWe also find the infantile egoism transferred to religion, where\nit plays an important part in adult life. Many of the very images\nand emotional attitudes of infancy may thus be kept alive. The\nbeliever may still feel that he is loved as the infant is loved by\nthe parent,--loved now by the Heavenly Father. He may again feel\nthat he can have what he desires by asking the father in prayer.\nSelf-importance survives as belief in the immortality of the soul and\nas assurance of salvation. Thus with development and experience, the\nsame ego interest becomes transformed in the tasks it progressively\nsets itself, and in widening the range of the ends for which it\nstrives. Each stage of development presents its peculiar problems, its\npeculiar goods and evils, its possible alternative attitudes toward\nthe values of experience. Therefore it ought to be quite as possible\nto determine a person\u2019s mental age by noting the kind of things which\nsatisfy his ego interest, as by any other device of mental measurement.\nIn common practice this is the way in which we judge people.\n\nA man stands revealed both by the things he strives to gain and by\nthose he seeks to avoid. The thing that most easily shocks him is\nusually that which he himself is struggling to overcome. It represents\nsomething to which in his secret heart he can say neither yes nor\nno. His dilemma troubles him. He seeks to avoid the inner gnawing by\ncarrying the fight into the open. He turns his personal conflict into\nthe appearance of a public issue, and you then have the moral reformer.\nPeople who repeat scandal, demand laws for the censorship of books and\nplays, and search through literature intent upon deleting passages they\nthink are obscene, are too much preoccupied with vice and obscenity.\nThey are like those compulsion neurotics who spend their time writing\nalibis to prove their innocence of the crime they are constantly\ntempted to commit.\n\nThe thing a man must make an effort to conceal always betrays him.\nWe all know the type of person who strives in all things to appear\nrefined, who makes painful efforts for correct speech and proper\nmanners. There are those who are seriously concerned about being in\nwhat they call society, and those who read books of etiquette and are\ndisturbed by such important questions as whether when escorting a lady\nyou should take her arm or let her take yours. And there is the man who\nsigns his name with ornate flourish and tries to impress waiters and\nhotel servants with his importance, and there are the people who are\nmuch exercised over the forgiveness of their sins. All in one way or\nanother place themselves on their own level.\n\nThe correlation between people\u2019s material desires and their general\nintellectual interests is so universal that it is used as a guide\nin placing advertisements. There are \u201cclass\u201d papers, each designed\nto appeal to readers who occupy a certain cultural stratum. The\nadvertising appeals which such papers carry vary with the reading\nmatter. The older, more literary magazines present a sharp contrast\nboth in reading matter and in advertising to the newer fiction\nmagazines. In the first group the essay predominates, with poetry\nand literary criticism, and only an occasional work of fiction. In\nthe second group there is hardly anything but fiction, with possibly\na brief hortatory editorial. Both types are evidently published to\ninterest readers of average wealth. The number of advertisements of\nautomobiles, real estate, and securities and other investments is\nin about the same proportion in both. But the former group, which\nis obviously designed to appeal to more thoughtful and intelligent\nreaders, contains a larger number of pages given over to advertisements\nof books, schools, colleges, places of travel, works of art.\n\nWe need not discuss the cheaper fiction magazines. They are obviously\nprepared for a still different reading public. The public to which\nthe better ones appeal is indicated by the dominant character of\nthe advertising, which consists largely of aids to beauty and\ncorrespondence courses in self-improvement. The stories in such\nperiodicals are as typical as the advertisements. Thus it is that in\ntheir daily preferences, as truly as in the greater issues of their\nlives, people select themselves and are segregated into classes,\nor spiritual types--types which may live in daily contact with one\nanother, yet worlds apart.\n\nDemocracy strives to ignore the cultural differences among people.\nEducation intensifies them. The attempt to place everyone on the\nsame mediocre plane, even though it be a level considerably above\nthe lowest, is not education; it is a kind of social work. Education\nmeans finding one\u2019s own level. Like all progress it is qualitative\nand differentiating. Just as organic evolution is a process which\ncan be measured only in the extent of the differences it has made\nbetween higher and more complex organisms and lower ones, so with\neducation. It brings out distinctions of human worth, places people\non the rounds of a ladder, the gradations of which are discernible in\nthe kind of interests they have, in the quality of their choices, the\nperplexities they wrestle with and overcome, the tasks and issues they\nset themselves.\n\nThe general advance of civilization is in some respects like that of\nthe individual. We may learn much about the general cultural attainment\nof any age by noting the issues that divided people at that time and\nthe problems that troubled them. There are all sorts of \u201ccultural lags\u201d\nin the course of progress, but it helps us to estimate the general\nintellectual level Europe had attained at the close of the middle ages\nto learn that whole communities could be terribly disturbed over the\nquestion, \u201cWhat is the evil omen of a comet which suddenly appears\nin the zenith?\u201d--so disturbed indeed that on one occasion it is said\npopular pressure forced the Pope to go out and pronounce an official\ncurse upon a comet and command it to leave the sky, which it did much\nto everybody\u2019s peace of mind. Again, we can form something of an\nopinion of the mentality of an age in which there is general interest\nin such a question as \u201cShall a person accused of witchcraft be put to\ntorture to compel him to testify against himself?\u201d or, \u201cHow far may one\nwalk on the Sabbath day without committing sin?\u201d or \u201cDoes the doctrine\nof the rights of man apply to negro slaves?\u201d or \u201cWho amongst us has\ncommitted the unpardonable sin,\u201d or \u201cWill a child that dies without\nbaptism go to Hell,\u201d or, by way of illustrating something of the spirit\nof contemporary America, \u201cWho\u2019s your bootlegger?\u201d\n\nI have said that many of our dilemmas are not resolved, but are\noutgrown. This leads us to a further observation of their educational\nsignificance. Many of the issues which stir a community are insoluble\nbecause they rest upon presuppositions which are unsound and so long as\nthe assumption remains unchallenged the issue will haunt men\u2019s minds.\nWhen one goes back of the issue and sees the premises to be false,\nthe whole wrangle becomes meaningless. The question about torturing\npeople accused of witchcraft presupposes the superstition that it is\npossible for an individual to enter into a contract with the devil.\nGet rid of belief in devils and witch trials themselves cease. So the\nnightmare about the \u201cdamnation of babes\u201d ceases to be a live issue for\na mind that has become sufficiently civilized to have passed beyond the\nprimitive man\u2019s terror of Hell. And so I think it is with most popular\nbeliefs and public issues and partisan conflicts, as well as with many\nof our private dilemmas. As stated they presuppose a disguised error,\nor are the fruit of factors that remain unconscious. So long as we\naccept the fatal assumption the issue is real to us. We are caught and\nheld in the dilemma and our educational progress stops.\n\nProgress in thinking, without which learning is mere repeating, comes\nby examining foundations. The educated mind differs from the uneducated\nin the insight which enables it to file a demurrer, dismiss the case,\nor restate it in terms that lead somewhere. It is in getting us over\nour dilemmas that education frees our minds.\n\nIt is often said that the aim of education is to equip the student with\na set of principles and beliefs which will serve him through life.\nYes, but principles are _leading ideas_. Their function is to lead\nus to correct conclusion and right action. They are instruments, not\nends in themselves, and they must occasionally be re-tested. They are\nnot final statements of the issues of living. Much misunderstanding\nand mental suffering--most of our false dilemmas--grow out of popular\nconfusion about principles. Men feel that if they change their beliefs\nor arrive at unexpected conclusions or resolve their dilemmas away they\nare losing or compromising their principles. There is no sacrifice of\nprinciple in re-stating an issue as a result of better knowledge and\ninsight. There is no defense of principle in a controversial spirit\nwhich cares more for partisan victory than for truthfulness. The level\non which a controversy is waged is often a matter of greater importance\nthan the victory of either side. If the victory of either means the\ntriumph of the same irrational type of man, it makes little difference\nwho wins. In most partisan and sectarian struggles the principle at\nstake--if any--is lost sight of in a mass of confusion. It frequently\nhappens that both sides contend for the same \u201cideal\u201d and base their\ncontentions upon the same mistaken premises. In most cases men\u2019s\nprinciples are little more than phrases which justify in their own\nminds their contentiousness and will to power.\n\nAn examination of its presuppositions may transform an issue into a\nvery different sort of problem. There is, for instance, the controversy\nnow raging in parts of America between religion and science. Many\neducated persons say there is no conflict between religion and science.\nIn their own thought there may be none, because they do not mean by\neither of these terms what the man on the street means by them. To him\nreligion is a system of dogma based upon divine revelation. He cannot\nconceive of religion without belief in the stories related in the\nBible or belief in the teachings of his church. By belief he means the\nfirm conviction that alleged historical events and miracles happened\njust as related. He conceives of science also as a body of doctrine\naccording to which the specific teachings of religion are held to be\nuntrue. Stated in these terms conflict is inevitable, a person who has\nscientific knowledge cannot be religious, and the issue must be fought\nto the end.\n\nFor the thinking mind the problem becomes a quite different one.\nScience is a method, not primarily a system of doctrine. It is a way\nof discovering truth which must be followed wherever it leads, and it\npresents us with the problem of how we are to value and interpret its\ndiscoveries. The problem presents itself differently from an ascending\nseries of points of view.\n\nA student who has grown up under traditional religious influences\nand has probably given the matter little thought, begins the study\nof natural science, biology or geology, let us say, and learns\nsomething of the evidence for the theory of evolution. He begins to\nspeculate upon its implications. He may, as many do, strive in some\nmanner to reconcile evolution with the account of creation set forth\nin the Bible. After further thought and study this simple device for\nreconciling science and religion may not satisfy him. He sees that\nsomething more than the reinterpretation of a text is necessary.\nHe finds himself striving to reconcile two entirely different\nworld-views. As a rational explanation of the world and its origin,\nreligion is wholly incompatible with science. The student, considering\nthat this is the function of religion, and finding that as a method\nof giving an account of natural processes religion fails, may discard\nit, and become an apostle of science, and an opponent of religion,\nsave as a system of ethics. Persons who hold this rationalistic view\nof religion commonly try in turn to make a gospel of science. Religion\nis darkness; science is light. Religion enslaves; science liberates.\nReligion holds progress in check; science is the Religion of Humanity,\nand the triumph of Reason is the promise of the salvation of the\nworld. This view was widely prevalent in the nineteenth century. It is\nthe stage at which the average person with some knowledge of science\nbreaks off and considers the problem settled. It is an honestly taken\nposition, which often requires no small courage. I hope no one will\nthink me an apologist for religion if I suggest that this is a rather\ninnocent and unsophisticated attempt to solve the problem. It assumes\nthat it is the proper function of religion to explain nature and\nimprove the life of humanity. What a simple and straightforward affair\nthe human spirit appears to be from this point of view. No subtle\ntwistings and turnings, no hidden pitfalls, no twilight regions, no\ndark secrets.\n\nSuppose now one were to cease expecting religion to do the explanatory\ntask of science, and were also to cease trying to make a new religion\nof science, is it not likely that the conflict, or contrast, between\nthe two might appear in altered perspective? It is possible to regard\nboth scientific and religious concepts as symbols--figures of speech,\neach expressive of its exclusive values. In another study, I likened\nthe difference between science and religion to that which exists\nbetween the two recognized symbols of the United States of America--the\nmap and the flag. The former is the scientific symbol; it has to do\nwith position, movement, measurement of distance. Maps exist for the\nintellectual and practical interest. The flag stands for the emotional\ninterest; it has to do with certain historical associations, but is\nitself no guarantee of the accuracy of any historical tradition. It is\npoetry.\n\nOnce we grant that religion is poetry, a new set of problems emerges.\nIs the poetry good or bad? What valuations of the possibilities--or\nimpossibilities--of experience are here expressed in these symbols?\nWhich of my ideas about the world are maps and which are flags? Much\nof the popular conflict of religion and science arises out of general\nconfusion on this point. A super-patriot might conceivably be such a\nworshipper of the flag that he would resent the disclosure of certain\ngeographical or historical facts which would lead to revaluation of\nsome of his emotional attitudes. Doubtless many Americans have an\nexaggerated and emotionally determined idea of the history if not of\nthe geography of their country, yet it is unthinkable that they should\nconfuse the flag with the map. But existence as a whole is not so\neasily surveyed, and such maps as we have of it often extend beyond\nthe comprehension of the average man. In all lower approaches to the\nproblem of religion, the flags which symbolize certain emotional\nappreciations of the universe are confused with maps of it. In his\nreligion the average man is still an idolator, psychologically similiar\nto the poor heathen who cannot distinguish between his god and his\nwooden image. On the popular level, the conflict of religion and\nscience is an elaborately rationalized struggle for supremacy by a type\nof mind which has not yet grasped the true inwardness of its emotional\nattitudes. While the consideration of the problem remains on this\nlevel, nothing is gained for education. There is mental grasp of the\nsituation when the problem is re-stated in terms of the inwardness of\nreligion and the objectivity of science. And it then becomes possible\nto form hypotheses which inspire further pursuit of knowledge. New\nknowledge leads to the better organization of knowledge previously\nacquired.\n\nWe have another familiar example of the educational value of displacing\nlower dilemmas by higher ones by examination of the presuppositions.\nFor a generation and more many minds have been preoccupied with\nsome aspect or other of the controversy between conservatism and\nradicalism. There have been so many varieties of opinion on both sides\nthat it is impossible to make a clear-cut statement of the issue or\nto find any particular group or theory which is representative of\neither side. From the standpoint of the majority of the United States\nSenate, the followers of Mr. La Follette were dangerous radicals.\nFrom the standpoint of the communists these same La Follette men\nwere conservatives, counter-revolutionaries. In general the conflict\nhas been between those who are interested in preserving the present\norder of things intact together with its traditions, established\ninstitutions, privileges and inequalities, and those who favor some\nbasic changes which they believe will remedy the situation. We will not\ndiscuss the merits of either side to this conflict. In some form or\nother it comes up repeatedly. It is a real issue, but the discussion\nof it may proceed on various levels of thought, and this fact has\nsomething to do with education. Intellectuals believe that their\nradicalism is the result of enlightenment, while their opponents\nbelieve that on the whole education makes for conservatism and that\nradicals are ignorant foreigners who have been misled by professional\ntrouble makers. The present controversy is not conducive to education\nin any of its forms, or on either side. It tends to divert education\nfrom its true aims into partisan service, and to produce in both\nparties a fixed and unteachable type of mind. As the case is ordinarily\npresented, a stupid and panicky conservatism is faced by a superficial\nand equally intemperate radicalism.\n\nThe problem cannot be discussed intelligently, nor can the\nconsideration of it lead to increase of knowledge, until its\npresuppositions are critically examined, and the whole matter is\nre-stated in more intelligible terms. It is these presuppositions to\nwhich I wish to call attention, for without them the controversy could\nnot have arisen in its present forms. Although there is a great variety\nof these forms, the same presuppositions are common to all and are\nusually accepted without question by both sides. The disposition to\ngo back and question the presuppositions is evidence that education\nis going on. We have some such evidence in recent years for many have\nmodified their positions in regard to various aspects of the social\nproblem.\n\nMore attention has been given to the changes of view among radicals\nthan to those which have taken place among conservatives. Since events\nof recent years have greatly encouraged self-expression on the part of\nmisinformed noisy extremists who appoint themselves spokesmen of the\nlatter group, we sometimes get the impression that conservatives learn\nnothing. But I incline to the opinion that there has been perhaps an\nequal proportion of learning by the more thoughtful minority on both\nsides of the controversy.\n\nAmong radicals modification of views has occurred sufficiently to\narouse general interest in the questions \u201cWhat has become of the\npre-war liberals?\u201d \u201cWhat has happened to radicalism?\u201d A former\nmember of the radical group some years ago wrote a book entitled\n\u201cTired Radicals,\u201d in which he adopted the usual view that the change\nof outlook among radicals was the result of the loss of energy and\nenthusiasm which comes with middle age. But if radicalism were merely\na form of youthful enthusiasm, I believe the movement would be more\nwide-spread than it has ever been in America. The suggestion is worth\nconsidering that in some cases the change of views might indicate that\nthe individual has learned something. By learning I mean the better\ngrasp of the subject which comes when one examines the presuppositions\nof both sides. Conversely, those who have not examined their\npresuppositions during the last twenty years have learned nothing.\nThey continue talking, but they are addressing a generation that is\npast and gone. Anachronisms of this sort are common occurrences among\nconservatives. They occur with equal frequency among radicals. And when\na man whose education has stopped leaves the radical movement and joins\nthe opposition, he frequently shows himself to be not an aging prophet\nwho has lost his enthusiasms, but the same intensely opinionated and\nmilitant person he was before.\n\nWhen, therefore, I suggest that a change of attitude toward the social\nquestion may be indicative of learning, I do not mean to imply that\nit is the function of education to turn radicals into conservatives.\nRather its function is to give the men on each side a different mental\noutlook. Back of the controversy as it has existed in our times there\nis a certain presupposed philosophy which is passing away as education\nincreases, and its passing modifies the thinking of persons on both\nsides. Humanism in education is supplanting the older Humanitarianism.\nInterest in cultural values is supplanting the earlier naturalism.\nRousseau and Bentham and Comte and D. F. Strauss and William Morris\nare making way for the coming social psychologists. Social philosophy\nbecomes analytical. The sweeping generalizations of Marx and the day\ndreams of Bellamy begin to have interest chiefly for the historical\nstudent. Democratic dogma, little questioned in the nineteenth century,\nis now subjected to criticism. A different intellectual spirit is\nabroad which necessarily modifies the general outlook of those who\nshare in it.\n\nLet us note more specifically some of the presuppositions behind the\nRadical-Conservative dilemma. There is the Humanitarian doctrine that\nman is naturally good and daily growing better. All that is needed\nfor his perfection is freedom or opportunity. This assumption is\ncommon to both parties, one holding that such opportunity is under\nthe present system granted to all who wish to take advantage of it,\nthe other that under the present system opportunity is granted only\nto the privileged few and denied to the toiling masses, who are kept\ndown in wage slavery. All the evils of human life are attributed to\nthe present system. Remove the evil system and everybody will be good\nand happy. There is much talk about \u201cthe emancipation of labor.\u201d Both\nsides assume that social justice is possible, each maintaining that\nits own triumph is the triumph of justice. And both sides are disposed\nto estimate the values of civilization and the meaning of personal\nsuccess in terms of material possession. The good life is the life of\nthe man with plenty of money. We hear much of the materialism and the\ndominance of business interests today. Everyone is urged to get ahead.\nA man measures his worth by the amount of his income. Conservatives can\nsee no ground for dissatisfaction with a system which makes for unusual\nprosperity. Radicals deny that prosperity is universal, say that the\nrich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer, interpret\nall history in terms of the struggle for wealth, and spread before\nthe masses the promise of abundance with a minimum of toil. On both\nsides we find that easy optimism which is said to be characteristic\nof half-educated minds. It is assumed that the evils of the world are\nonly superficial, that they are contingent upon purely environmental\nfactors, and can be removed by legislation or by mass action. Progress\nis assured. No one doubts that a prosperous and happy life is possible\nto all if only wealth were properly distributed. As the control of\naffairs passes more and more completely into plebeian hands and as the\ntastes and dilemmas of mediocrity come to set standards of value, the\nworld is supposed to be getting better.\n\nThis questionable assumption leads to distortion of fact by both\nparties, and must continue to do so as long as the controversy is kept\non this level. I wonder what would happen if instead of merely drawing\nhasty inferences from these na\u00efve assumptions, it should become the\npractice to examine them. Perhaps the issue might be re-stated in\nmore significant terms. But what concerns us at present is not the\nsocial problem as such, but the fact that the attempt to clear up the\nintellectual muddle about it means that education is going on.\n\nA glance at the nature of the presuppositions we have been discussing\nwill help us to understand why it is that they are so seldom examined.\nThey flatter. Apart from their radical or conservative implications,\nsuch ideas are congenial to the average man. They pat him on the\nback. It is no small satisfaction to believe that the environment is\nresponsible for all human ills, that evil may easily be removed by\nmass action; that given material abundance, the good life follows\nautomatically; that distinctions among men are reducible to economic\nfactors; that the supremacy of our own type is the goal of progress. I\nbelieve that the level at which one\u2019s education stops, the particular\nset of dilemmas in which one\u2019s mind becomes fixed is usually determined\nby some self-satisfying assumption. If my ego can remain elated over\nthe possession of an automobile, or the right to vote, or the belief\nthat I and my kind are or ought to be socially superior, or because I\ncan play the saxophone, or am able to resist the temptation to pick\npockets, the problems which have live interest for me will be the\nproblems which lie on these levels. I recently talked with a man who\nwas quite pleased with himself because for some years he had not been\nin jail. He frequently compared the advantages and disadvantages of\nlife \u201con the inside\u201d and \u201con the outside.\u201d To his mind all days and all\npeople were thought of as \u201cinside\u201d or \u201coutside,\u201d a point of view which\nI imagine few people linger over or find personally gratifying. But the\nvirtues men pride themselves on are as a rule those which compensate\nthem for the particular vices to which they are tempted.\n\nThe house I live in had for a number of years been rented to an elderly\nScotch woman who kept it as a \u201crooming house.\u201d When she moved out she\nsaid to me, \u201cI hear you are going to do this house over and make it\nyour own home. Some day you may be sitting here and thinking, \u2018What use\nto go on in this house of mine?\u2019 It\u2019ll be a satisfaction to you to\nknow that you are in a respectable place. Never once in all the years\nthat I rented out furnished rooms did the patrol wagon have to back up\nto this door at midnight.\u201d\n\nThe things which people find consoling both reveal and determine\nthe plane on which their thinking takes place. I have heard a young\nman say with a note of defiance, \u201cYes, sir, I\u2019m a single-taxer and\nI\u2019m proud of it.\u201d So involved is the ego in our dilemmas that we\noften require the assistance of a specialist in getting over them.\nPsychoanalysts whose task is chiefly that of helping people face\ncertain facts about themselves, speak of their work as re-education.\nIn a sense all education is re-education, the untying of the knots in\nwhich our self esteem in its defense has entangled itself. Perhaps\nnothing is so effective a bar to education as intellectual immodesty.\nA man\u2019s education stops at the point where he becomes incapable of\nself-criticism. And because egotism is always a bit ridiculous, the\nconceited mind protects itself from criticism by making its interests\nsublime. In the presence of the sublime, laughter is taboo. The subject\nconcerning which man has lost his sense of humor is just the subject\nconcerning which criticism leads to self-criticism. There are persons\nwho cannot take a joke about \u201cThe Grand Old Party,\u201d or the Government\nat Washington, or the teachings of Karl Marx. Recently a group of\nchurch men publicly denounced the New York newspapers because of\ntheir humorous remarks about prohibition. Once when I was asked for a\ndefinition of a radical I seriously offended a prominent socialist with\nthe innocent remark that a radical is a man who loves Labor and hates\nwork.\n\nLack of humor is always evidence of unteachableness. Ignorance is\npompous. The holy tone with which people proclaim their convictions is\nuncivilized. When the American people are better educated, there will\nbe less solemn pantomime in the land. We could not with straight faces\nindulge ourselves in the hysterical reforms, the bitter partisanships,\nreligious fanaticism and race prejudice which at present show how\nseriously we take ourselves. Education should help people make an art\nof living, and the art of living, like all arts, is play. Learn to play\nwith your ideals, even with your sublimities, and you will break the\nhold upon you of many a crude and hampering dilemma.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE FREE SPIRIT\n\n\nFreedom is not as precious to the members of this postwar generation\nas it was to some of their ancestors. The nation which once followed\nthe leadership of Mazzini and Garibaldi now suffers a dictatorship with\napparently little protest. In England, the stronghold of liberalism,\na conservative government places a censorship upon the words of the\nman who is probably that country\u2019s best-known writer. Socialism has\nits beginnings in that passion for freedom and humanity which inspired\nthe youth of the early nineteenth century and ends at Moscow with a\nconstitution from which even a Bill of Rights is omitted. In America\nwe now see that democracy does not guarantee liberty. The government\nshows decreasing respect for the immunities of the individual. Crowd\nmovements spread intolerance and are ever demanding more strict\nregulation in matters of personal conduct and private judgment. One\nfrequently hears the remark, \u201cThe talk about personal liberty is\ndisgusting nonsense.\u201d\n\nThere are various reasons for this change of spirit. The individual\nrather willingly permits himself to be transformed from a private\nperson to a numerical unit in his group or mass because as part of\na public he gains power through the force of numbers. Individualism\nin a society in which every one is chiefly interested in industrial\ncompetition tends to become little more than the stock argument of\nthose who wish to defend economic privilege. Other privileges are lost\nsight of in a standardized world. Moreover, as people begin to see that\nfreedom is not something with which all men are equally endowed by\ntheir creator, but is achieved in varying degree, there is a tendency\nto minimize its importance. We are naturally somewhat suspicious of\nthe freedom of others. Those who themselves have little capacity for\nit would impose their own limitations upon all others. From childhood\nonward we wish to be able to do what we see others doing. When this\nis impossible, there is a tendency to restrain them from doing what\nwe cannot do. Masterful spirits grant themselves privileges which may\nappear wicked to the crowd. The free mind allows too much. When on\nthe other hand a person who has not attained some degree of mastery\ndeclares his independence, we do not speak of him as free, we say that\nhe \u201ctakes liberties.\u201d\n\nThus where the ideals of the educated mind prevail there is a general\ngain in freedom through increase in mastery. Where the ideals of the\nignorant and wrongly educated predominate, there is a decline in\nfreedom and an increase in the disposition to take liberties. It is the\ncustom today to rule out of the consideration of values any reference\nto the things of the mind, and to try to ground all values, freedom\nincluded, on a strictly economic and legal foundation, as if they were\nproduced by and existed only for a brainless and impersonal equilibrium\nof social forces. We are beginning to see that for a people which loses\nsight of the inwardness of the sources of freedom, constitutional\nguarantees do not long guarantee, and each power-seeking group begins\nto take liberties with the organized life of the community. The\nso-called liberalism of those modern writers who make apology for this\nsort of thing has in it little of the spirit of liberal education. It\nis rather the plebeianization of scholarship. I as a liberal am not\nobliged to throw my hat in the air over each degradation of value that\nmarks the triumphant progress of democracy.\n\nIt is the ideal of the educated man, not the demands of the crowd which\nis the best guarantee of freedom. I believe we are chiefly indebted to\nthis ideal for such freedom as we enjoy. Education when it is genuine\nmust for its own sake move in an atmosphere of intellectual freedom.\nIt must wander where truth leads the way. It must attain independence\nof judgment and a certain decent privacy for contemplation. It is in\nitself freedom from servitude and from routine. It broadens one\u2019s\ninterests and hence one\u2019s sympathetic understanding of others. Nothing\nhuman is alien to it. The educated mind, having business of its own,\nminds its own business. Hence it grows in tolerance. Freedom is always\nfreedom for something,--freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom\nfrom meddlesome interference, freedom from the crushing weight of\nauthority and tradition, freedom in matters of religious belief. Every\nsuch freedom is largely the result of the influence of education, and\neach exists in any community in inverse ratio to its ignorance and\nprovincialism.\n\nThe classical tradition has its origin, as we saw, in the efforts of\nGreek philosophers to teach free men the essentials of the good life.\nIt has by no means remained true to its ideal, but each rediscovery\nof its meaning has had a liberalizing effect. The modern sense of the\nworth of the individual--which is only recently on the decline--and\nthe humanist philosophy of education alike show the influence of the\nRenaissance. The eighteenth century, stilted and formal as it was,\ncould with some justification call itself the age of the Enlightenment.\nIt was the age of Voltaire, the age of great educational advance. It\nwas also the age from which we derive most of our pronouncements about\nliberty and the rights of man. I would almost go so far as to say that\nwhen education is not liberalizing, it is not really education but is\na highly systematized species of propaganda. This liberalizing quality\nis so essential to education, and is so clearly a way of the spiritual\nlife, that its presence determines the genuineness of any movement or\nphilosophy that may bear the name Liberalism.\n\nThe term \u201cfree spirit\u201d has been so frequently abused, that I hesitate\nto use it. It suggests Rousseau\u2019s Emile, educated to obey only the\nbenign laws of nature and his own impulses. \u201cHe follows no formula,\nyields neither to authority nor to example, and neither acts nor speaks\nsave as it seems best to him.\u201d One thinks of such phrases as Max\nStirner\u2019s \u201cEgo and His Own,\u201d or Whitman\u2019s \u201cSpontaneous Me,\u201d or \u201cThe\nBeautiful Soul\u201d of nineteenth century Romanticism. One is reminded of\nthe young woman from Nebraska who came to live in Greenwich Village,\nNew York City, and said her soul felt as if it had taken off its shoes\nand stockings. The cult of spiritual freedom had quite a vogue in New\nYork a few years ago. I believe it originated in the Latin Quarter of\nParis. The devotee of it displayed his free spirit by wearing a flowing\ntie and corduroy trousers, by his obvious disdain of barbershops and\nlaundries, by his talk which was mostly about sex, socialism and the\nnew art, and by his general air of lassitude and disillusionment.\n\nI believe that this pose, together with much of the sentimental\nliberalism which passes for \u201cemancipation\u201d among intellectuals, may\nbe traced back to Jean Jacques Rousseau. Nearly all the basic ideas\nof contemporary liberalism as well as those of the \u201cnewer education\u201d\nfrequently associated with the liberal movement, may be found in the\nwritings of Rousseau. It is amusing to hear liberals proclaim these old\nideas as if they were the most advanced theories of life and education.\nAnd you have but to compare Rousseau with Erasmus or Voltaire or Huxley\nto see how far away he is from the spirit of liberal education. The\nlatter is tender-hearted and hard-headed. Rousseau is soft-headed and\nhard-hearted. An emotional egoism feeds on dreams of social revolt\nand of an idyllic return to nature. Rousseau hates civilization, with\nits duties and responsibilities. He becomes romantic and sentimental\nabout Nature. His ideal of the free man is Robinson Crusoe. \u201cWe are\nborn sensible.\u201d \u201cThe natural man is complete in himself; he is the\nnumerical unit, the absolute whole, who is related only to himself or\nto his fellow-man. Civilized man is but a fractional unit.\u201d \u201cCivilized\nman is born, lives and dies in a state of slavery. At his birth he\nis stitched in swaddling clothes; at his death he is nailed in a\ncoffin, and as long as he preserves the human form he is fettered by\nour institutions.\u201d Hence if you would educate, \u201cObserve nature and\nfollow the route which she traces for you.\u201d \u201cAll wickedness comes from\nweakness. A child is bad only because he is weak; make him strong and\nhe will be good.\u201d \u201cKeep the child dependent on things alone, and you\nwill have followed the order of nature in his education.\u201d \u201cDo not let\nhim know what obedience is when he acts, nor what control is when\nothers act for him. Equally in his actions and in yours let him feel\nhis liberty.\u201d\n\n\u201cO men, be humane; it is your foremost duty.... Why would you take from\nthose little innocents the enjoyment of a time so short and of a good\nso precious which they cannot abuse? Why would you fill with bitterness\nand sorrow those early years so rapidly passing, which will no more\nreturn to them than to you? Fathers, do you know the moment when death\nawaits your children? Do not prepare for yourselves regrets by taking\nfrom them the few moments which nature has given them.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe only habit which a child should be allowed to form is to contract\nno habit whatsoever.\u201d\n\n\u201cIt is absolutely certain that the learned societies of Europe are but\nso many public schools of falsehood; and very surely there are more\nerrors in the Academy of Sciences than in the whole tribe of Hurons.\u201d\n\n\u201cHappy the people among whom one can be good without effort and just\nwithout virtue.\u201d\n\nI trust that these passages selected almost at random from Rousseau\u2019s\ntreatise on education, \u201cEmile,\u201d do not give a wholly unfair impression\nof this author\u2019s philosophy of life. Man in the state of nature is wise\nand good. Civilization has corrupted him by enslaving him. If he does\nevil it is not because he is bad, but because he is weak. We should not\nhang the criminal but blame the society which made him what he is.\n\nThe proper function of education is to enable the individual--the\nlittle innocent--to grow up naturally without discipline, without\nforming any habits, never sacrificing present enjoyment to future\nknowledge, inspired always by the ideal of that happy state in which\none may be good without effort. The ideal education therefore is the\nlife of the North American aborigine or what Rousseau imagined such a\nlife to be. Freedom here is the return to nature.\n\nFrom the times of Hobbes and of Montaigne onward there seems to have\nbeen a growing interest in \u201cMan in the state of nature.\u201d But whereas\nwith most writers this interest was largely a matter of theory and\nspeculation, with Rousseau man in the state of nature becomes an ideal,\na norm.\n\nIt would appear that in this dream of the return to nature, there\nis symbolized an infantile wish to escape from the tasks and\nresponsibilities and restraints of adult life. Psychologists speak\nof such an \u201cinfantile return\u201d as _regression_. This regressive ideal\nof freedom is a very different thing from the liberalizing influence\nof education as I understand it. I have characterized education as a\nvictory won over one\u2019s wish-fancies and childish egoism, as the lifting\nof the problems of life to higher and more significant dilemmas, as\nthe attainment of mastery. A humanistic liberalism seeks freedom\nas broadmindedness; it strives for a highly civilized, urbane and\nsophisticated state of mind in which insight is deepened and interest\nis widened. Rousseauian liberalism seeks freedom in relaxation of\neffort, in denial of the claims of civilization, in the idealization of\nnature and of primitive man.\n\nMany persons who today style themselves liberals are of the Rousseauian\ntype. There are those who proudly call themselves rebels. A certain\nnaturalism is carried to the point of hostility to form as such\nand to orderliness of any sort. There is frequently a disdain of\n\u201crespectability,\u201d and a tendency to play the intellectual vagabond.\nI think this is one reason why certain liberals are much taken with\nmodern imitations of the primitive in art. The element of regression\nwhich characterizes the paintings and sculpture of certain \u201crebels\u201d is\npatent to the psychologist. Many of these works of art closely resemble\nthe typical drawings of dementia praecox patients. In dementia,\nregression, or infantile return, is complete and final. The patient\nis free from a disturbing world, having returned to precisely the\n\u201csensibility,\u201d as Rousseau terms it, with which he was born.\n\nUtopian schemes of social reconstruction, and the notion that merely\nchanging the present system would put an end once for all to human\nmisery, are in many cases disguised forms of the wish to return to\nchildhood and thus escape the vicissitudes of adult life in civilized\nsociety. The burden of our industrial civilization is so great that it\nis no wonder many should take this path of escape. However, the utopian\nfantasy is by no means confined to those who have the hardest struggle.\nAnd there can be no objection to it when it inspires well-considered\nefforts for social improvement. There is a type of \u201cliberal\u201d however,\nwho regards the attempt to solve any concrete problem of civilization\nas a compromise of his idealism.\n\nAnother aspect of the philosophy of Rousseau has influenced\ncontemporary liberalism with somewhat paradoxical results. The basis of\nthat happy state in which one may be just without virtue is elaborated\nin \u201cThe Social Contract.\u201d Rousseau was not the first to hold the\ncontract theory of organized society. Both Hobbes and Locke made use\nof this idea. But with Rousseau it becomes a doctrine with distinctly\nilliberal implications. The argument is somewhat as follows:\n\nMan finds it impossible to continue in the blissful state of nature.\nIn order to preserve their freedom, men voluntarily enter into a\nmutual agreement, according to which each gives over his individual\nsovereignty and receives back an equal portion of the common will,\nleaving him as free as he was before. Thus there comes into being a\ncollective sovereign power. All others are of course usurpations and\nare destructive of freedom. This new sovereign can do no wrong, there\nis no need to protect the individual against it because it is made up\nprecisely of the wills of all individuals, and the people will not do\ninjury to themselves since each seeks happiness. Such sovereignty,\nwhich is really the absolute dominion of the mass over its members, can\nneither be delegated nor divided, and its exercise is _liberty_.\n\nBut is it? This tree is known by the fruit it bears. Notice that for\npurposes of this theory, all aspects of the individual will are now\ndenied except those which may be pooled into a sort of group will and\ndrawn out again in equal and identical portions for all men. That is,\nsociety is transformed from a plurality of individuals to the unity\nof a mass. Man acting as a mass unit takes precedence in all things\nover man acting as a private person. Privacy is gone. Liberty is not\npersonal independence, but the freedom of the group to do what it wills\nunchecked. Mass action can do no wrong. According to the logic of this\nview no proper bounds may be set to the rule of \u201cthe people,\u201d except\nsuch as the sovereign will itself chooses to set. Accordingly, liberty\nbecomes the rule of all over each in any matter whatsoever concerning\nwhich neighbors choose to restrain or meddle with one another. This\nmeans that myself as person must in all things take orders from that\nattenuated public-meeting self of me and of other men which we have\neach received in equal portion from the mass will. Everything unique in\nme is whittled away from this mass-self and I count only by virtue of\nmy membership as a numerical unit of the group. And now since any check\nor hindrance to the sovereignty of the mass is seen as an unjustifiable\nrestriction upon its liberty, there is a tendency to extend the tyranny\nof the mass to every possible human concern. The demand for liberty\nis no longer the assertion of the right of private judgment for those\ncapable of exercising it; it is \u201cLet the people rule.\u201d No wonder men\ncome to distinguish between personal liberty and the rights of The\nPeople. The idolatry of the mass turns freedom inside out.\n\nSo much for theory. In common practice each majority tends to regard\nitself as the sovereign will and play the tyrant, all in the name of\nliberty. Each militant minority and struggle group in society seeks\nby hook or crook to capture the machinery of law and force its will\nupon the public, and in the effort to make its own group will the\nsovereign will, the members of each group persuade themselves that in\nthus resisting restraint upon their particular mass movement they are\nfighting for liberty. A spirit of factiousness spreads through the\ncommunity, restriction and regulation increase and multiply, all in\nthe exercise of crowd-liberty. If your crowd is now in possession of\nsocial power, you are called a conservative. If it is still struggling\nto make its will supreme, you may call yourself a liberal. It is an\nironical turn of history that brings it about that many restrictions\nupon the freedom of the individual are advocated in the name of\nliberalism. Liberalism shades off into a form of radicalism which would\nset up a dictatorship to accomplish its ends. Many people use the terms\ninterchangeably. Radicals in recent years, as the illiberal aims of the\nmovement unmask themselves, tend to repudiate the name liberal, and\nto denounce the liberal as one who having started out along a certain\nroad, hesitates or turns back at the last minute. Such liberalism finds\nitself in the difficult position of having proposed measures which it\nhesitated to carry out. It is embarrassed by its own radical offspring.\n\nSuch liberalism has little in common with that which is the aim of\nliberal education. As it appears in contemporary America, it is a\nsort of abortive mass movement caused by the mingling of two social\nphilosophies which for want of better terms I will call the Lockean and\nthe Rousseauian traditions.\n\nJohn Locke wrote his essay on Government at the close of the\nseventeenth century. This book together with his \u201cEssay on the Human\nUnderstanding,\u201d did much to shape the thinking of the eighteenth\ncentury, and made a strong impression upon Samuel Adams, Thomas\nPaine, Jefferson and other leaders of the American Revolution. The\n\u201cself-evident truths\u201d set forth in our Declaration of Independence\nclearly reveal this influence. I do not wish to imply that Locke\nwas the author of American liberalism. He merely has his place in a\ntradition which goes back to Magna Charta and is essentially British.\nThe quarrel between the colonies and the ministers of King George was\na phase of the greater struggle between Parliament and the crown.\nFor centuries the Englishman has stood up for his individual rights,\nhas stubbornly resisted any attempt of the sovereign to invade his\nprivacy or to seize his property without his consent. The Englishman is\nnaturally jealous of his government. He looks upon it with suspicion\nand seeks to limit its exercise of power. He gives it no peace until it\nguarantees him security from interference with his personal freedom.\nJefferson\u2019s remark that that government is best which governs least\nis typical of the spirit of British liberalism. It was this spirit\nwhich inspired the revolt of the Puritans against both the King and the\nChurch. The same sentiment is expressed in the petition of Rights which\nwas presented to the throne about the time that Locke wrote the essay\non government. And it was in this same spirit that the founders of the\nRepublic framed the Constitution of the United States. They rather\ngrudgingly granted the government certain specific powers, and sought\nby means of various checks and balances to limit the exercise of them.\nEven then the public was so alive to the dangers of the new sovereignty\nthat it refused to adopt the constitution until it was amended by the\naddition of the Bill of Rights.\n\nThere were added to this assertion of the inalienable rights of the\nindividual in opposition to the sovereign power the deeper sense of\nthe importance of the individual gained in the Reformation, and the\ninsistence upon the right and duty of exercising private judgment which\ncame with the rationalism of the eighteenth century. The eighteenth\ncentury, with its \u201cappeal to reason\u201d in opposition to the authority\nof priest and Bible, was in fact an intellectual declaration of\nindependence which became for educated minds an essential part of the\nliberal tradition. Liberalism owes much to the Deists and men like\nHume. It is not a mere coincidence that a large number of the leaders\nof the American Revolution were \u201cfreethinkers.\u201d Thus liberalism became\nsomething more than a political movement. It became a philosophy of\npersonal liberty, of independence of authority, of tolerance. The\nrights which the liberal claimed for himself he was--at least in\ntheory--willing to grant to others. He took the side of the \u201cunder\ndog.\u201d The tradition is best represented in England by such men as\nPriestley, Martineau, Kingsley, Cobden, Bright, Morley, J. S. Mill,\nHuxley, and in America by Paine, Jefferson, Channing, Emerson, Theodore\nParker, Lincoln, and Ingersoll.\n\nThe decline of liberalism to the level of Bryanism, the betrayal by\n\u201cOne Hundred Percent Americanism\u201d of the spirit in which the Republic\nwas founded, the spread of bigotry among the masses, the prevailing\npartisan spirit and the illiberalism of professed \u201cliberals,\u201d the\nchanging of our constitution from a guarantee of personal liberty to\nthe authorization of Federal interference with the daily habits and\ncustoms of the individual--these are not matters for which we may hold\nrecent immigrants responsible. They are, I regret to say, symptomatic\nof tendencies which are most commonly manifest among Americans of\nBritish descent. They show how far the spirit of a nation may drift\nin one hundred and fifty years when it renounces its intellectual\nleadership.\n\nLiberalism as a political movement was early divorced from liberalism\nas an intellectual movement. The former became Andrew Jacksonism,\n\u201cshirt-sleeve democracy,\u201d free-soil-ism, abolitionism, populism, the\nSingle Tax movement, opposition to big business, Progressiveism.\nEver since the time of the settlement of New England the pioneer and\nfrontiersman, the \u201cdebtor class,\u201d the town laborer and the farmer,\nhave had to carry on a struggle against the \u201cmoney powers\u201d of the\nlarge industrial centers. The conflict of \u201cthe poor against the\nrich\u201d--generally characterized by a demand for governmental regulation\nof industry and cheap money--reached its culmination in the \u201cFree\nSilver\u201d issue of 1896. Of this \u201cbattle for humanity,\u201d the author of\n\u201cOur Times\u201d quotes William Allen White.\n\n  \u201cIt was a fanaticism like the Crusades. Indeed, the delusion that was\n  working on the people took the form of religious frenzy. Sacred hymns\n  were torn from their pious tunes to give place to words which deified\n  the cause and made gold--and all its symbols, capital, wealth,\n  plutocracy--diabolical. At night, from ten thousand little white\n  schoolhouse windows, lights twinkled back vain hope to the stars.\n  For the thousands who assembled under the schoolhouse lamps believed\n  that when their legislature met and their governor was elected, the\n  millennium would come by proclamation. They sang their barbaric\n  songs in unrhythmic jargon, with something of the same mad faith\n  that inspired the martyrs going to the stake. Far into the night the\n  voices rose--women\u2019s voices, children\u2019s voices, the voices of old\n  men, of youths and of maidens, rose on the ebbing prairie breezes, as\n  the crusaders of the revolution rode home, praising the people\u2019s will\n  as though it were God\u2019s will, and cursing wealth for its iniquity. It\n  was a season of shibboleths and fetiches and slogans. Reason slept;\n  and the passions--jealousy, covetousness, hatred--ran amuck; and\n  whoever would check them was crucified in public contumely.\u201d\n\nThe demand for governmental regulation has been on the increase since\n1896 and has almost worked a revolution in our form of government. I\nwill not discuss the degree to which such an extension of the powers\nof the central government is desirable. I am aware of the fact that\nthe motive is largely that of protecting the economic independence\nof the average individual. The point I wish to make is that the\nmethods advocated reveal the change that has come over liberalism.\nNotwithstanding Jefferson\u2019s statement about the government which\ngoverned least, the extensions of the powers of government have not\never been limited to matters industrial, and we find men calling\nthemselves liberals accepting all sorts of restrictions upon their\nliberty without complaint. Liberalism has taken on a partisan\nspirit with all the intolerance, hysteria, and coerciveness that\nusually characterizes crowd movements. The same elements that voted\n\u201cliberal\u201d with Mr. Bryan thirty years ago, later supported Bryan the\nfundamentalist, and today are staunch prohibitionists. I cannot help\nfeeling that something of the fundamentalist was lurking under the\nskin of the American liberal all along. The tradition of personal\nindependence derived from our British ancestors had about reached this\nstage of decline, when efforts were made to supplant it with a very\ndifferent type of liberalism from continental Europe.\n\nThe \u201cold liberalism\u201d was in theory individualistic; the \u201cnew\nliberalism\u201d was socialistic. It brought with it such ideas as \u201cthe\nclass struggle,\u201d \u201cmass action,\u201d the \u201ccooperative commonwealth.\u201d\nFreedom was to be gained for all in the form of the \u201cemancipation\u201d\nof the working class. Youthful intellectuals idealized the\nproletariat, organized socialist locals, talked about the \u201cmaterialist\ninterpretation of history,\u201d denounced \u201cthe capitalists,\u201d addressed\none another as \u201ccomrade,\u201d closed their letters to one another with\nthe words, \u201cYours for the Revolution,\u201d and a few took the trouble to\nstudy the writings of Karl Marx. The old liberalism was seen as mere\n\u201cbourgeois idealogy,\u201d mental slavery, a system of ideas fabricated by\nthe master class in order to keep the working class in perpetual wage\nslavery. The new liberal felt himself intellectually emancipated. If\nhe was very, very liberal, he styled himself a radical. The movement\nreached its maximum strength about the year 1910, and then began\nto decline. It appealed to some who had been liberals of the older\nAmerican type, but the response of labor was negligible. Radicalism\nprofessed to be a spontaneous revolt of oppressed working people. In\nfact it was a cult, with its dogmas about labor, which existed chiefly\namong middle-class intellectuals. Its leaders--and it consisted mostly\nof leaders with very little rank and file--were seldom working men.\n\nAlthough its economic creed is the product of the nineteenth century,\na study of the history of this movement would show it to be in direct\nline of descent from Rousseau. Many of the basic ideas are distinctly\nRousseauian. Civilization, which Rousseau hated, is now the wicked\ncapitalist system. There is the same emphasis on the collective will,\non mass action, on the idea of revolution, the same belief that The\nPeople is the only rightful sovereign, that society exists by virtue\nof a sort of covenant among men which can be altered at will, and that\nuniversal happiness may be attained by changing the system which is\nresponsible for all misery and misbehavior.\n\nRadicalism, carried to its logical conclusion, is Communism, in which\nthere is no pretense of liberalism, no place for freedom. It has\ngreatest appeal for a type of mind which is by nature doctrinaire\nand inelastic, and its propaganda tends to fixed opinion and to\nilliberalism. A generation ago Nietzsche said of it,\n\n  \u201cIn every country of Europe, and the same in America, there is at\n  present something which makes an abuse of this name: a very narrow,\n  prepossessed, enchained class of spirits, who desire almost the\n  opposite of what our intentions and instincts prompt.... Briefly and\n  regrettably, they belong to the _levellers_, these wrongly named free\n  spirits--as glib-tongued and scribe-fingered slaves of the democratic\n  taste and its modern ideas: all of them men without solitude, without\n  personal solitude, blunt honest fellows to whom neither courage nor\n  honorable conduct ought to be denied; only, they are not free, and\n  are ludicrously superficial, especially in their innate partiality\n  for seeing the cause of almost _all_ human misery and failure in\n  the old forms in which society has hitherto existed--a notion which\n  happily inverts the truth entirely! What they would fain attain with\n  all their strength, is the universal, green-meadow happiness of the\n  herd, together with security, safety, comfort, and alleviation of\n  life for everyone.\u201d\n\nThe word liberal is commonly associated with that extension of\ndemocracy which the crowd thinks is progress. If you favor this\nprogress, you are said to be a liberal. If you doubt that it is\nprogress you are thought to oppose progress as such and so are\na conservative. If the progress of democracy were accompanied\nby a corresponding advance of culture and gain in wisdom and\nbroadmindedness, this use of the term liberal would be appropriate.\n\nMen become free only as they achieve self-government. I take it that a\nman governs himself to the degree that he acts upon his own judgment.\nFreedom thus presupposes first that people are capable of judging\nthings for themselves, and second, that they are permitted to do so.\nIf the progress of democracy resulted in fewer laws and wiser laws,\nwe should in time have self-government. But the reverse is the case:\nthe extension of democracy brings about an extension of the powers of\ngovernment and the multiplication of foolish laws. It does not follow\nthat people\u2019s judgment is improved because they can vote about more\nand more things. Nor is there any assurance that they will not begin\nvoting about things that are none of their business and thus destroy\nthe right of private judgment, which is the exercise of freedom. You\ndo not decide things for yourself when everything is submitted to a\nreferendum or regulated by the legislature. If the people or their\nrepresentatives should vote to establish a censorship of books, or to\nprohibit smoking tobacco, or to compel church attendance on Sunday,\nthat would be democracy; but it would not be a gain for freedom.\nSelf-government is impossible when every private matter is turned into\na public question. Men with third-rate minds--and there are enough of\nthem once they get together to constitute a solid majority--shrink from\nthe responsibility of exercising private judgment, but are prepared and\neager to decide any matter whatsoever once it becomes a public issue.\nThey are, moreover, disinclined to allow a large measure of personal\nfreedom to one another or to any one. Self-government in a democracy\ntherefore means not private judgment but national independence,\nuniversal franchise, and no constitutional restraints upon the will of\nthe majority. In common practice, \u201cliberty\u201d is the legally recognized\nright of the crowd to tell the individual what he may not do in matters\nwhich concern only himself. Any man has _liberty_ when he has a voice\nin the government of the land. He has _freedom_ when he governs\nhimself. His freedom may be prevented either by lack of judgment or by\noutside interference. The effect of education in the community is to\nimprove judgment and lessen outside interference with the exercise of\nit. Properly defined, a liberal is a person who strives for precisely\nthese results. Liberalism, in this sense, and education are the same.\n\nI said that a man is free when he acts according to his own judgment.\nThis does not mean that the free man is able to choose anything he\nwishes. Necessity constrains him just as it does the unfree. It means,\nhowever, that his assent or dissent in any matter follows from his\npersonal insight into the implications of the situation. He does the\nrequired thing even when he does not like it, because he has the\nintelligence to see that it is required under the circumstances. He is\nnot compelled to take some other person\u2019s word as to what is required.\nHe is free not only because he is independent of the will of another in\nreaching his decision, but primarily because he knows what he is doing\nand why he does it.\n\nThere is a very old, extra-canonical legend according to which the Lord\nJesus, passing by, saw a man digging in the field on the Sabbath day,\nand he said to the man, \u201cIf thou knowest what thou doest, bless\u00e9d art\nthou; if thou knowest not, curs\u00e9d art thou.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE APPRECIATION OF HUMAN WORTH\n\n\nI have a number of neighbors whose sons and daughters are at present\nsuffering the agony of preparation for college. What a nightmare it\nis possible to make of education! Three or four years of attendance\nat expensive private schools where the sole aim seems to be to get\nthe student through his college entrance examinations with a passing\ngrade. Students terrified, parents anxiously awaiting reports of work\ndone or not done, teachers tired out, one student fails in his Latin,\nanother in algebra, a third is sent home because of loss of interest in\nstudy, and there are tears, family conferences, special tutors, reviews\nand memory drills in vacation time, until finally the student \u201cgets\nthrough\u201d and drops the subject, his interest in it dead.\n\nI am not one of those who believe that education may be achieved\nwithout effort. But study is not work only, it is also a form a\nenjoyment. There are many things which it is a delight to know, not\nbecause such knowledge is useful or is required for a passing grade,\nbut because it is an aid to the appreciation of value. It is fun.\n\nThere are people who attend concerts from a sense of duty, striving\nthereby to improve their souls, but it is possible to listen to music\nwith no other motive than the wish to enjoy it. It is the person who\nenjoys music who in the end becomes the discriminating listener. The\nsame is true of the reading of books. William James once said the\nclassics are necessary to education because knowledge of them makes us\n\u201cconnoisseurs of human excellence.\u201d Literature has a charm which is\noften lost when it is made \u201crequired reading.\u201d\n\nAn intelligent boy of seventeen who was having difficulty with his\nschool work recently said to me, \u201cI think it is because I really am\nnot interested, and the things I wish to know they do not teach in our\nschool because the colleges will not give credit for them.\u201d When I\nasked him what study would interest him, he replied that he thought he\nwould like to try philosophy and requested me to suggest a good book\nfor a beginner, declaring that he intended to take up this study in\naddition to his school work.\n\nI have no doubt that had he made this request of one of his instructors\nhe would have been told that he had better spend his time preparing\nhis lessons. But I took a chance that his interest might be genuine,\nand told him that I thought he would find Plato\u2019s \u201cRepublic\u201d a good\nintroduction to Philosophy, and suggested that he read the first\nfour books. During the previous semester he had been permitted to\ndrop one of his courses because reading was \u201ctoo great a strain upon\nhis eyes.\u201d When I next saw the boy I inquired how he had got on with\nthe \u201cRepublic.\u201d He said, \u201cWhy, I found it so exciting that I did not\nstop at the end of the first four books, but read all ten.\u201d When I\nasked him what he found interesting in the dialogues, he said, \u201cI do\nnot understand many of the conclusions they reached, but I enjoyed\nlistening in on those conversations. They are so logical, and I liked\nthe way Socrates leads the others along, springs surprises on them, and\nmakes them see what they mean by what they say. I begin to see what the\ndifference is between thinking and just talking--and many passages\nwere beautiful also.\u201d For the first time in his life, he had realized\nthat the pursuit of knowledge could be an interesting adventure.\nMoreover, his parents told me that he had shown improvement in his\nregular studies.\n\nWhen the ancients said that knowledge is knowledge of the good,\nthey meant in part that with the increase of knowledge comes better\ndiscrimination. If education is _for_ anything it is that we learn to\nchoose the good. By the \u201cgood\u201d I do not mean good in general, or good\nas an abstraction of philosophical discourse, nor the conventionally\ngood. I mean any excellence whatsoever. In order to see and appreciate\nexcellence, you must yourself have struggled for it. He who has never\nstriven to surpass himself, surrounds himself with the shoddy, the\nsecond-rate, the cheap. In matters of taste, of sentiment, of good\nworkmanship, he cannot distinguish between that which is genuine and\nthat which is imitation. In matters of taste there is much that is\npurely arbitrary and conventional, so that what is good taste in one\nage may be bad taste in another. Nevertheless, there is a psychological\nsoundness in our use of the word taste to designate certain judgments\nof worth. It implies some degree of self-restraint, a sensitiveness to\nsubtle stimuli which comes with the habit of giving attention to minute\ndifferences of quality. In contrast, animals which gulp down their food\nhastily and in great quantities do not pause to taste it. Similarly,\nthe mind which has not disciplined itself \u201cswallows things whole,\u201d\nas we say. It is not disturbed by the incongruous or the hideous. It\nis sensitive only to coarser stimuli: it prefers the hackneyed, the\nraucous, the loud and flashy.\n\nI once knew a church in a small town which worshipped in a plain\nrectangular old building with colonial windows. When a rival\ndenomination erected a monstrous building with a huge circular\nstained-glass window facing the street, the group which worshipped\nin the old structure became dissatisfied. After much difficulty\nin securing the money, a committee was sent to a near-by city and\npurchased a quantity of gaudily-colored translucent paper similar to\nthat one used occasionally to see on the front door of a saloon. This\npaper the congregation proudly pasted on its colonial window panes.\n\nThe architecture of the average church in this country and the hymns\nthe people sing are much better indications of the level of their\nspiritual life than are the creeds they profess. The general cultural\nlevel of the population is revealed by the style of houses men build,\nthe kind of furniture with which they surround themselves, the type of\nmotion picture which becomes popular, the magazines on the news stands,\nthe character of the journals which have the largest circulation,\nthe \u201csong hits\u201d of the day, the programs which are broadcast for the\nradio. These things all have spiritual significance, they indicate a\nprevailing type of reaction toward all the values of experience.\n\nThe public is curiously indifferent to the lack of genuineness of\nsentiment; \u201chocum\u201d and bathos; deliberate and obvious counterfeits\nof emotional reactions characterize practically every appeal to\nthe general public. Think of the popularity of a play like \u201cAbie\u2019s\nIrish Rose,\u201d or of that, a generation ago, of a song like \u201cAfter the\nBall,\u201d or of a book like \u201cThe Man Nobody Knows.\u201d Think of the typical\nChautauqua lecture or political address. Think of the notorious\ninsincerity of the motion pictures. People ask, \u201cWhat is the matter\nwith the movies?\u201d The answer is, the audience. Half-educated people do\nnot seem to be sensitive to the difference either between good and bad\nworkmanship or between artistic sincerity and insincerity. Standards\nof value, in all the older forms of art, have been set by the knowing\nones. The artist was obliged to submit his creation to the criticism\nof persons who had some background of tradition and general knowledge.\nWith the quantity production methods of the motion pictures, it becomes\npossible for the first time to make the man on the street the critic,\non whose judgment depends survival, and as the New Testament says,\n\u201cBy what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged.\u201d In selecting our\npreferences we pass judgment on ourselves.\n\nThe multitude dupes itself with its desire to get something for\nnothing; hence its love of the miraculous. All appeals to it are thus\nover-capitalized, and made to appear grand and glorious. Shirking\nthe effort necessary for real achievement leads to the preference of\nquackery. There is a story that a physician who had yielded to the\ntemptation to make easy money by advertising himself as the discoverer\nof a magic remedy for disease, received a call from a former friend and\ncolleague who disapproved of the practice. When the visitor sought to\npersuade him that such methods would not pay, the other stepped to the\nwindow and said, \u201cCome now, look with me at the faces of the people\npassing along the street; how many of them do you think would become\nyour patients and how many mine?\u201d I am told by a professor of biology\nwho gives a pre-medical course in a Western university that less than a\nthird of the cases of sickness in the country are treated by reputable\nmembers of the medical profession.\n\nI have been somewhat interested in the popularization of psychology.\nOn the occasion of a visit to a great public library, I was assured\nby the librarian that there was a tremendous popular demand for books\nwhich deal with the subject of psychology. I was shown a section in\nwhich these books were kept so that they would be easily accessible.\nThe greater number were written by persons who had no knowledge of\nthe subject. They were utterly misleading. Psychology was commonly\npresented as a wonderful, easily practiced device for performing\nmiracles, a system of secret formulae for curing disease, for getting\ninto harmony with the divine source of all being, for manipulating the\n\u201csubconscious\u201d in ways that assured peace, prosperity, self-mastery,\nand power over others. I think it is a conservative statement to\nsay that nine-tenths of the stuff that bears the name \u201cPsychology\u201d\nin popular magazines devoted to the subject, in widely advertised\nbooks, in lectures and correspondence courses in self-improvement, is\npure charlatanism and sleight-of-hand arranged for those who wish to\nindulge themselves in systematic self-deception. It is not mere lack of\ninformation which causes people to prefer the cheap. With respect to\nthe things of the mind, people have various standards of living.\n\nA teacher of economics says that by a person\u2019s standard of living we\nmean to designate those things which he insists upon having even if\nit is necessary to give up marriage and parenthood to possess them.\nHowever much people may desire and strive for comfort and abundance,\nfrom the standpoint of economics, those who marry and beget children\nin poverty have a low standard of living. Hence the standard is\nnot directly a function of the amount of per capita wealth, but is\npsychologically determined. And the standard often applies to other\nthings besides material possession. Persons who have a high standard\nare often poor. They might easily turn their efforts to the acquiring\nof wealth, but they will deprive themselves and postpone marriage for\nthe sake of some cultural interest, education, a scholarly or literary\ncareer. They will go without a motor car in order to have money to\nbuy books. It would be interesting to make a comparative study of the\nfamilies of college professors and certain groups of artisans, who have\nabout the same income as that of the average professor, in order to\nsee which type had the greater number of children, and which sent the\ngreater number of their young people to college, also which possessed\nthe greater number of automobiles or radios. Thus the standard of\nliving applies not to what one wishes to possess, but to what one is\nwilling to pay for a certain kind of living. It has to do with quality,\nnot mere quantity. This principle applies to intellectual standards of\nvalue. People are content with the second-rate because it is easier.\n\nWith learning there comes a new reverence. Perhaps I might speak of\nit as the educated man\u2019s faith. Respect for the excellent is possible\nonly to a mind which has learned to recognize distinctions of worth.\nAn undiscriminating multitude clings to its idols or substitutes new\nidolatries for old precisely because it is blind to those differences\nof value which constitute the meaning of existence for mankind. People\nseek something \u201cgiven\u201d to believe in, some universal formula of\nsalvation, because they are unable to distinguish the relative worth\nof concrete experiences actual or possible. Those who shrink from the\nresponsibility of their own yes or no take refuge in an imaginary\n_cosmic_ yes and no. But ground your faith in the difference between\nthe better and the worse, and you have a faith which grows stronger\nwith the increase of knowledge. All other \u201cfaiths\u201d grow weaker because\nthey are substitutes and evasions, futile attempts to possess value\nwithout the exercise of discrimination.\n\nIf existence as a whole has a purpose or a universal meaning, I do\nnot see how our minds could know it, or what use it could ever be to\nthe mind that grasped it. I have tried to show that our thoughts and\nbeliefs are _human ways_, that our thinking is partial. As James said,\nall meanings depend upon the fact that we are \u201cinterested spectators\u201d\nand prefer some things to others. Aside from our human interests and\npreferences, everything being so far as we can see equally inevitable,\nhas the same degree of existence, or right to be, and all is equally\nimportant. Nothing then has any special importance. And if nothing is\nimportant, nothing has any meaning. It might be said that each thing\nhas meaning for the whole. But since the whole lies beyond our ken,\nsuch a statement does not help us much. The world of meanings and of\ntruths therefore does not have an independent existence but is related\nto our preferences and is a human creation. I am not, however, at\npresent concerned with the problem of the meaning of truth. Truth is\nitself a value. I am trying to state a simple creed by which a man may\nbest order his life and discover that which an intelligent mind may\nreverence. It is, \u201cI believe in the distinction of worth.\u201d\n\nThe loss of belief in distinction turns both society and the world of\nvalues upside down. It is symptomatic of the dominance of mediocrity.\nWith the degradation of power there is a corresponding degradation of\nvalue. The power which rules the modern world is the power of numbers.\nMany will say it is the power of money. This too is a numerical force,\nhaving nothing to do with quality or the discrimination of value: the\npossession of money does not as such lift the possessor out of the\nmass. There is much talk about the conflict of the masses with the\ncapitalists, but since on both sides the struggle is one for economic\nadvantage rather than for spiritual value, it may be regarded merely\nas the conflict between successful and unsuccessful mass units over a\ncommon interest. Money power and the power of numbers are not really\na confrontation of contrasting valuations of the possibilities of\nexperience. On both sides the conflict is waged on about the same\nlevel and for identical ends. Capitalism is not really the foe of\ndemocracy, it is democracy\u2019s first-born child. The self-made successful\nbusiness man is the \u201csuccess\u201d in democratic society, its ideal. He is\nwhat the mass as a whole strives to become. Some people think this is\nindividualism. Infrequently it is, usually it is not. Dollars still\nare numbered, and money power is the power of numbers. Its power is\nthe same as concentrated mass power, since it is of this same order.\nWe speak of \u201camassing\u201d money. The mass idea and the ideals of the mass\nprevail all round. Capitalism holds sway by virtue of its mass appeal,\nand by virtue of the fact that the capitalist is the realization of the\naverage man\u2019s ambition. The mass because it is powerful and can grant\nor withold favors, lords it over the realm of values. Emphasis is laid\nupon that which produces an identical type of reaction in a maximum\nnumber of people. The commonplace is rated high because it is the\naverage.\n\nThe rare, the unique, the excellent, cannot be syndicated and\ndrops out of consideration. The standards which prevail are those\nof undifferentiated men. Mass appeal asserts the equal importance\nof all individuals, as if a man\u2019s worth consisted in his mere\n\u201cnumber-oneness.\u201d This is the democratic dogma of equality. Critics\nof the dogma frequently say that it represents the foolish attempt to\ndeclare all men equal in all respects. I doubt this. It seems to me\nthat this dogma is perfectly correct so far as it goes. It declares\nall men to be equal _before the law_. And law is no respecter of\npersons, hence all men are equal before that which does not respect\ntheir personalities. Which is to say that all men are equal in one\nrespect--that each is a numerical unit when he is considered as a\nmember of the mass. It is not denied that men may be unequal in other\nrespects. The point is that these \u201cother respects\u201d do not get a\nhearing. But the only recognition of the individual that amounts to\nanything is that which recognizes the differences of one from another.\n\nWhen we emphasize excellence, good workmanship, sincerity, ability,\nvirtue, wisdom, we have in mind matters concerning which the\ndifferences among men are the differences between superiority\nand inferiority. Hence discrimination of value is recognition of\ndistinctions of worth among men. Lose sight of distinctions of\nworth--of the very desirability of distinction as a social good--and\nall values decline to the level of mediocrity.\n\nIn the supremacy of man as mass the mediocre man, he who in all things\ncorresponds to type, and is most reducible to average, is King. For him\nbooks and journals are published; clergymen and editors speak for him\nand say what they think he believes; laws are made in his interest.\nPrograms for the radio and motion pictures are made to please him. His\ndilemmas are held up as the dilemmas of every one. His goods become the\nstandards to which all are expected to conform. He has purchasing power\nand he has votes. He can make and unmake heroes. He determines the\ndirection of the course of events in his day and generation. Society\nmoves in the direction of the type of man about whom there is most\ngeneral concern, the man whose preferences set the pace.\n\nThe goal set by \u201cmodern ideas\u201d would seem to be not the attainment of\na higher level of values, not greater personal worth among men, but\nthe more complete supremacy of man as mass. Recognition of personal\nworth is discouraged, for it necessitates the admission that some\npersons are by nature, or as a result of effort, superior to others.\nSuch an admission is contrary to the idealization of the mass, which is\nthe worship of the power of numbers. Personal distinction is frowned\nupon and discounted. Differences of superiority or inferiority are,\nif grudgingly admitted, said to be the result not of difference in\nnative endowment or of individual achievement, but mere products of\nenvironment. Hence human excellence is an accident.\n\nThere is a wide-spread tendency to minimize and deny the significance\nof personality. An advanced school of psychology holds that belief\nin the existence of personality is a superstition. Personality is\nsimply the way the nervous organization works and is similar to the\nrunning of a gas engine. Any hereditary differences of capacity or of\nteachableness are negligible. All individual traits are reducible to\nconditioned reflexes which are what they are because of the coincidence\nof certain stimuli. I am what I am because somebody co-operating with\nthe environment conditioned me in this way. I have absolutely nothing\nto do with the matter. Consciousness, interest, attention, will, have\nno place in this psychology. The same may be said of all attempts to\nexplain the phenomena of life in mechanistic terms. Historic movements\nare explained as if individuals had nothing to do with them. Social\nchange is said to be the product of impersonal economic forces, and\nprogress the result of mass action. Thus the Great Man at best only\nrepresents the mass tendencies of his times. Even for discoveries in\nscience and creative achievement in the arts, the mass is given credit\nalthough it may have resisted these things when they were new.\n\nI believe that such attempts to _depersonalize_ humanity are\nconsciously or unconsciously motivated by the wish to avoid the\nrecognition of the possibility of superiority in an age when the\nvalues of civilization are largely committed to the tender custody of\nman acting as mass in the struggle for power. Whether distinctions of\nworth are recognized or not, deny that they may exist, deny that men\nmay have greater or less worth in themselves, and human achievement\nbecomes merely the attainment of bodily comfort, or social power, or\nsatisfaction of egoistic desires. There are many who would hold that\nsuch is the case. But our existence is not measured by what we can\nget or what we can do, but by what with our getting and doing we may\n_become_. Mankind differs from other animals not merely in getting and\ndoing, man is himself different, and is more than they. It is in this\nthat his evolution is seen. The same is true of the individuals in the\nmass; some are more in themselves than others. So obvious a truth would\nnever require statement except in a standardized, crowd-manipulating\nage in which there is much that encourages the inferior to abound.\n\nI am not suggesting that we devise some plan for picking out all the\nsuperior individuals for preferment and honor, or that we weed out the\ninferior ones by some process of elimination, or that the educated man\nshould or could pose as a superior person. He who must make an effort\nto exhibit any excellence has attained little of it. If the world is\nspiritually right side up, people will be selected by the standards\nof value that prevail. When you buy a newspaper, vote a party ticket,\ngo to a theatre, listen to a lecture, read a book, express a moral\nsentiment or show any preference whatever, you are doing more than just\nthat thing. Our daily choices determine what we ourselves become, and\nthey do something else also; the total of them has survival value for\nsome particular type of man. We are thus daily deciding whose dilemmas\nshall determine the quality of living, and what kind of human life is\nto be lived on this planet, and who shall thrive and who shall perish.\n\nHuman progress is not something we achieve directly by joining a\nmovement and forcing our convictions upon others. It is something we\nhelp determine every day in the choices we make. The elements of it\ncome like the variations which appear in the structure of plants and\nanimals. And as Darwin said it is the function of the environment,\nin causing modifications of species, to select certain variants\nfor survival and to eliminate others; so also in the progress of\ncivilization do our daily preferences operate. Natural selection and\nprimitive custom operate blindly and automatically and without reason.\nIt is because education improves judgment and the appreciation of value\nthat Thomas Davidson spoke of it as \u201cconscious evolution.\u201d\n\nThe education of a people at any time is its answer to the riddle of\nlife. This answer is more than giving an account of the processes of\nnature; it is the opening and closing of doors upon the possibilities\nof experience--and upon various human types. Thus education is\nselective. It is the sifting out of the relative worth of men. It finds\nthe significance of living to be the struggle for excellence. Its goal\nis a higher type of living man and woman. Its great task therefore,\nin the modern world, is the reassertion of the _inequalities_ which\nmass appeal ignores, the rediscovery for the modern spirit of the\ndistinction between superiority and inferiority. It is impossible\nto lift any mind from a lower to a higher plane when that which\ndistinguishes one plane from another is obliterated by placing all on\na level. Appreciation of distinctions of worth is an essential of a\nliberal education, as it is of the whole spiritual life of man.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nEDUCATION AND WORK\n\n\nIn the closing sentence of the preceding chapter, I used the words\n\u201cspiritual life.\u201d Perhaps it is unnecessary to say that I did not have\nin mind anything vaguely metaphysical, supernatural or mystical. I\nmeant the phrase to designate a hierarchy of values which is possible\nto an organism capable of exercising choice among its experiences.\nIt is in the sense that it deals with qualities and their relative\nimportance that education may be said to be spiritual, spiritual in a\npurely naturalistic sense. It is the ordering of interests and habit\npatterns so that behavior is characterized by a tone and a significance\nthat it would not otherwise possess.\n\nThere are those who write and speak of education as if the mind and its\nideas existed in a world apart from the world of things. It is possible\nfor a man to pursue his studies in complete isolation from the world\nabout him. But as mental life is possible only in response to some\nenvironment, such pursuit of learning merely substitutes an artificial\nand sequestered environment for the actual one. If the meanings and\nvalues disclosed in this artificial environment remain permanently\ndifferent from those which might be realized in the world of our daily\ntasks and relationships, such education is merely an elaborate escape\nfrom reality. The educated mind responds to our common world. It\ndiffers from the uneducated mind not in that it responds to a different\nset of situations, but in that it responds with a different system of\nvalues. Education is not so much a special interest separated from\nother interests as it is a method of transforming all our interests.\n\nIt ought to have something of importance to do with work, since most\npeople are engaged in some form of work most of their time. And when in\nan industrial age like the present, the whole life of society revolves\nabout the system of production of wealth, it is impossible to precede\nwith education and ignore the challenge to it of our industrialism. It\nmay not be the task of education to provide a solution of the labor\nproblem. But education certainly fails of its function when men are\nunable to retain its values while struggling with such problems.\n\nPeople rarely behave like educated human beings when they are\nconfronted by an economic issue. Liberality of outlook, tolerance,\ntemperance of judgment, self-control, ability to see when one is\nmaking oneself ridiculous, respect for the truth, are not often found\non either side of an industrial conflict. Fantastic notions of the\nrelation of education to work abound because there is much confusion\nabout the meaning and value of work for human personality. Labor is at\nthe same time idealized and despised.\n\nRuskin, Carlyle, and many humanitarians have held labor to be most\npraiseworthy. Work is a blessing, in it are peace of mind and\nself-respect. Work is noble, and it ennobles him who does it. A\ncontemporary writer on the subject of education warns us that the hand\nmay not be \u201cdishonored with impunity.\u201d By dishonored he means that hand\nwork may be considered inferior to brain work to the extent that there\nis great disparity between the rewards. Distinction has been made\nbetween work of hand and work of brain. The former is real work. Once\nin a parade of working men in Pittsburgh, I saw on a banner carried\nat the head of a column of metal workers, these words in very large\ncapitals, _We Work_. The implication was that some others, slightly to\ntheir discredit, did not really work. From the idealization of work to\nthe idealization of the worker is a logical step. The working class,\na class which in earlier centuries was looked upon as the despised\n\u201cproletariat,\u201d attained a new status in nineteenth century thought.\nMen began to look to labor as the one class capable of righting the\nage-long wrongs of humanity, and to believe the control of society by\norganized labor to be the only means to the establishment of peace and\njustice. Most of the writers who praised labor were themselves members\nof the so-called leisure class. A few like Tolstoi vainly tried to\nsupport themselves by manual toil. Many who wrote convincingly of the\nblessings of labor did not personally avail themselves of its ennobling\nadvantages. In the earlier humanitarian sentiment of the nobility of\nlabor, the worker was envisaged as a free and independent person in\nwhose wholesome activity there was healthfulness. Good workmanship\ncommanded general respect and revealed the dignity of labor. There were\nsimplicity and grandeur in the primitive act of a man eating his bread\nin the sweat of his brow. He who lived close to earth gained something\nof the silent, calm majesty of nature. Able to cope with natural forces\nand giving mankind as good as he received, he need ask favor of no man.\n\nRousseau says, \u201cOutside of society, an isolated man, owing nothing to\nany one, has a right to live as he pleases; but in society, where he\nnecessarily lives at the expense of others, he owes them in labor the\nprice of his support; to this there is no exception. To work, then, is\na duty indispensable to social man. Rich or poor, powerful or weak,\nevery idle citizen is a knave.\n\n\u201cNow of all the occupations which can furnish subsistence to man, that\nwhich approaches nearest to the state of Nature is manual labor; of all\nthe conditions the most independent of fortune and of men, is that of\nthe artisan. The artisan depends only on his labor. He is free--as free\nas the husbandman is a slave; for the latter is dependent on his field,\nwhose harvest is at the discretion of others. The enemy, the prince,\na powerful neighbor, may take away from him this field; on account\nof it he may be harassed in a thousand ways; but wherever there is a\npurpose to harass the artisan, his baggage is soon ready; he folds his\narms and walks off. Still, agriculture is the first employment of man;\nit is the most honorable, the most useful, and consequently the most\nnoble that he can practice. I do not tell Emile to learn agriculture,\nfor he knows it. All rustic employments are familiar to him; it is\nwith them that he began, and to them he will ever be returning. I\nsay to him, then, Cultivate the heritage of your fathers. But if you\nlose this heritage, or if you have none, what are you to do? Learn a\ntrade.... I wish to give him a rank which he cannot lose, a rank which\nwill honor him as long as he lives. I wish to raise him to the state of\nmanhood; and whatever you may say of it, he will have fewer equals by\nthis title than by all those which he will derive from you.... It is\nimportant to learn a trade, less for the sake of knowing the trade than\nfor overcoming the prejudices which despise it. You say you will never\nbe compelled to work for a living. Ah, so much the worse--so much the\nworse for you! But never mind; do not work from necessity, but work\nfor glory....\n\n\u201cYou enter the first shop whose trade you have learned: \u2018Foreman, I am\nin need of employment.\u2019 \u2018Fellow-workman, stand there and go to work.\u2019\nBefore noon comes you have earned your dinner, and if you are diligent\nand frugal, before the week has passed you will have the wherewithal\nto live for another week; you will have lived a free, healthy, true,\nindustrious and just man. It is not to lose one\u2019s time to gain it in\nthis way.\u201d\n\nHere as always Rousseau is romantic. This is all very beautiful--until\nyou try it. I am inclined to think that most men who entertain this\nview have never worked for a living. The happy few amongst the\ntoilers of earth may here and there have enjoyed this independence.\nIt is certainly not the experience of the rank and file in our\npresent industrial system. With the development of the system, and\nthe consequent organization of labor, the idealization of work is\nsupplanted by the idealization of the labor movement and its aims.\nIn the writings of Marx, labor as work is represented merely as so\nmuch homogeneous effort-filled time which is measured and reckoned in\nstrictly numerical terms, as if its qualitative or personal elements\ncould be ignored or were non-existent. Skill and artistic genius are\nrepresented as the mere telescoping or contraction of a number of\nlabor-time units into a given period--a speeding up, as it were, not\nsomething inherently superior in kind. This point of view might satisfy\none who was concerned only with the number of hours of employment\nand indifferent to what he did or how he did it. But it takes little\naccount of that pride in achievement without which those who assert the\ndignity of labor are making a virtue of necessity.\n\nMarxians assert with much truth that pride in achievement is crushed\nby the methods of machine production and by the exploitation of\nlabor under a system of \u201cwage slavery.\u201d But this is to abandon the\nolder idealization of work and of workmanship. Labor is now viewed\n_realistically_ as an irksome servitude. Marxians argue that labor\ncreates all wealth and is therefore justly entitled to it all. It is\nbeside our point to enter into a discussion of this proposition. I am\nmerely seeking to show that in this philosophy, emphasis is shifted\nfrom the idealization of work to the idealization of the labor movement\nitself. A Marxian could agree with Aristotle that mechanical toil is\ndebasing, only he would add \u201cunder the present system.\u201d Emancipate\nlabor, give it its rights, reward it justly and force all to do their\nshare of it, and then work will be ennobling. Which is to say, work\nwill be ennobling only in an ideal society. This position is an attempt\nto restore with one hand what is taken away with the other. Work is\nrobbed of its dignity when excellence in it is not thought worthy\nof consideration, when superiority of workmanship is represented\nmerely as a greater quantity of abstract labor-time. Advocates of\nthe cause of labor do not say much about the distinction between\nsuperior and inferior workmanship. And here we have an example of\nthe mass-psychology of which I spoke earlier. In the degree that you\nconsider men as mass, you ignore individual worth.\n\nThere has been a slight tendency to regard labor as an instinct. The\nimpulse to work is of course a universal human trait. Work is normal,\nnatural, right, and those who have no desire for it are going contrary\nto the demands of human nature. Some such position as this is taken by\nMr. Veblin in his delightful satire, \u201cThe Instinct of Workmanship.\u201d\nThe author of this book holds with McDougall that man has an instinct\nto work, but that unfortunately the instinct has been corrupted. This\ncorruption began in primitive times with elders, medicine men and\nwarriors. And throughout historic time, with each succeeding privileged\nclass, human nature has become steadily more perverted and abject,\nuntil this instinct reaches its final stage of corruption in the\npresent capitalist system. Thus a last count is added to the indictment\nof capitalism. It has corrupted labor\u2019s instinct of workmanship.\n\nI have never known whether Mr. Veblin meant his humor to be taken\nseriously, or intended his book to be a subtle thrust at the\ntheologians. His argument may be regarded as a clever parody of\nthe doctrine of the fall of man in Adam\u2019s sin, with the consequent\ncurse upon all the descendants of our first parent. In any case, his\ncontention adds somewhat to the confusion as to the true significance\nof labor. I have not found evidence to prove that man has an instinct\nof workmanship. Hence the relation of education to work is not that of\nthe rational control of instinct, for if the knowledge of simple labor\nprocesses were innate, men would not even need \u201cpractical\u201d education in\nthem.\n\nNot all men have held a high opinion of labor. Nietzsche says work is a\ndisgrace. There are doubtless many people who secretly agree with him.\nI have known working men who suffered from an \u201cinferiority complex.\u201d It\nis possible that the protest of labor is not wholly against injustice,\nbut is in part a protest against the feeling of inferiority. It is\nnot uncommon to find young people who are ashamed to work. It is not\nonly among the rich and privileged that we find those who look down\non labor. The same attitude exists in all classes, for much the same\nreason that the majority of people despise the poor and emulate the\nrich. Work has in the past been the lot of the slave. Most men are at\npresent driven to labor by necessity, and many entertain the hope of\nescaping from the necessity as soon as possible.\n\nWe have even Biblical authority for this attitude. The punishment of\nAdam for his act of disobedience is a life of labor. Henceforth he must\nearn his living, tilling the ground and eating his bread in the sweat\nof his brow--in other words, labor is a curse. And so it is regarded\nby the law of the land. When a man is convicted of a crime the court\nsentences him to prison and to \u201chard labor\u201d--until such time as he is\npardoned and may return to his career of crime and life of leisure.\n\nIt is interesting to note the place assigned to work by the Hebrew and\nChristian religions which, having their origin in the folkways and the\ndaydreams of the masses, are very sympathetic to the poor toilers of\nearth. Yet we are told that to keep the Sabbath holy, the day must not\nbe defiled with labor. There is no mention of the blessedness of labor\nin the Beatitudes; the command to consider the birds of the air and the\nlilies of the field which toil not neither do they spin and yet are\nclothed and fed, reveals a spirit very remote from that of industry.\nHeaven is thought of as a place of eternal rest.\n\nA similar popular valuation of labor is revealed in the myths of\nantiquity. The gods do not work. Vulcan, the exception to this rule,\nis always made to appear ridiculous among the gods; they are said to\nlaugh at his awkwardness. The \u201clabors\u201d of Hercules are not really\ntoil but exhibitions of miraculous strength. For the most part in the\nlegends which have expressed the wish-fancies of mankind, the hero\ndoes everything but work; he fights, makes love, kills dragons, goes\non strange voyages, wins a kingdom, in fact, his adventures may be\ninterpreted as symbolic expressions of the wish of mankind to escape\nthe common burden of toil.\n\nI think, moreover, men belittle their work when they accept the\nbroad distinction between the \u201cbrain\u201d worker and the \u201chand\u201d worker.\nPsychologists say that thinking is as truly bodily activity as is any\nother form of labor, and there is very little so-called work that does\nnot require thought. There is every conceivable gradation from that\nlabor which is almost wholly routine, to that which consists of nothing\nbut solving problems. No one knows the point where labor ceases to be\nbrain work and becomes manual. The world\u2019s work requires of men many\nkinds of activity, some of great importance, some of little. There is\nno use either of idealizing it or in despising it. Men do their work\nbecause they have to and are neither noble nor ignoble because of it.\n\nThe problem is how can I in my situation make my position a place\nwhere a man has really lived and toiled and thought and realized\nvalues through his effort, and has not permitted himself to become an\nautomaton or a fool. The labor problem however tends to become one\nprimarily not of the significance of work at all, but of improving the\nmaterial conditions of those who toil. This latter problem is wholly\njustifiable. But because of the prevailing mental confusion about labor\nitself, it is generally assumed that if a man works he should receive a\ndifferent sort of \u201ceducation\u201d from that of other educated people, and\nthat his training should be the means to ends that have little to do\nwith interest in education as such.\n\nThere are those who always view the education of workers strictly from\nthe standpoint of its value for social security. Just as a well-known\nstatistician not long ago advised the American investor to support\nthe Church, whether or not he agreed with its doctrines, because\nthe influence of the Church upon the masses, he said, was on the\nside of invested capital, so there are those who believe that giving\neducational opportunity to working men is a sort of premium paid upon a\ngeneral policy of social insurance.\n\nThe fear of the menace of labor often inspires efforts for the\neducation of workers in the hope that with better knowledge labor will\nbecome safe and sane. There is a wide-spread belief that education\nlike religion is a conservative influence. If working men were only\nbetter informed they would have a more sympathetic understanding of the\nintentions of their employers; they would show some appreciation of\ntheir economic opportunities under our free institutions; they would\nknow better than to go on strike, or listen to their union leaders,\nor dally with socialistic ideas. Perhaps so, but I have yet to see an\neducational effort which was consciously directed to these ends that\nwas either sincere or intellectually respectable.\n\nFrom a wholly different point of view, the relation of education to\nwork would seem to present no problem at all. Work itself is said to\nbe the only genuine method of education. A popular writer who holds\nadvanced ideas on this subject, says that the four years at college are\nwasted, that \u201cas early as fifteen or sixteen a youth should be brought\ninto contact with realities and kept in contact with realities from\nthat age on. That does not mean that he will make an end of learning\nthen, but only that he will henceforth go on learning--and continue\nlearning for the rest of his life--in relation not to the \u2018subjects\u2019 of\na curriculum, but to the realities he is attacking.\u201d In this passage\none detects the odor of Rousseau. We discussed this theory when we were\nconsidering liberal education as animal training. At best it is but\nhalf true. If learning necessarily came from contact with realities,\nevery one would be educated. But there is no assurance that people will\nsee the significance of the realities they \u201cattack.\u201d The importance of\nexperimental study is not a new discovery. Science has long employed\nthe laboratory method. And even laboratory work, work done in an\nenvironment which is carefully arranged to stimulate discovery, does\nnot always develop habits of independent judgment.\n\nThe notion that experience is necessarily the best teacher is popular.\nThe newspapers encourage it. If a man makes a success in business,\ninterviewers seek his opinion on every conceivable subject. In worker\u2019s\nclasses there is occasionally a student who has no doubt that his\nexperience in the shop is a better education than that which people get\nfrom books. Such students do not as a rule gain much from study, for no\nmatter what subject is under discussion, they always know more about it\nthan the instructor.\n\nExperience as such teaches just what is experienced and nothing more.\nFew minds are able to reflect judiciously upon experience or to draw\ncorrect conclusions from it. Labor is something that can be known only\nby one who has experienced it, and this experience is important for\nanyone who desires a broad knowledge of human life. But it is with work\nas it is with travel: each is an aid to education only as it quickens\ninsight. The man on the Bowery who boasts that he has traveled over\nAmerica from coast to coast may really never have left the Bowery; in\neach place he has visited, he finds himself in the same sort of lodging\nhouse, in the same environment, among the same sort of companions, all\nwith the same interests.\n\nSo with many kinds of work. Much of it is mere routine. He who from day\nto day does the same thing, until he is able to perform the movements\nwith a minimum of effort and attention, is certainly acquiring a habit,\nbut we have seen that not all habit formation is education. Those\nwho work with certain kinds of machinery frequently complain of the\nmonotony of their work. I think that one of the serious objections to\nsuch work is that it has so little educational value. Perhaps this\nobjection may be offset by the fact that machine production makes\npossible a shortening of the working day and hence gives the worker\nmore leisure time. Some think that adult education is important because\nit gives people something to do in their unemployed hours. But people\ndo not always improve their minds during the time when they are free\nfrom labor, and many whose work is routine, possess by nature or\ndevelop routine habits of mind which interfere with their education.\nThey become victims of fixed ideas, of slogans and catchwords.\n\nPerhaps the nearest approach to a real integration of education and\nwork is vocational training. This is the \u201ceducation\u201d which most people\nseek. Universities offer an increasing number of courses in practical\nsubjects such as engineering, mining, business methods. Various trades\nare taught in public schools. By far the greater number of courses\noffered to adult students are sold with the promise that they will\nincrease the purchaser\u2019s efficiency and \u201cput more pay in his envelope.\u201d\nI have already discussed this useful knowledge. Both the individual\nand society profit by it. And in addition to its practical advantages,\nthere is a sincerity and lack of pretense about such education which\ndistinguish it from much of the traditional education. It must be\nthorough or it cannot meet the test of practical experience. If\nmen learned mechanics with no more thoroughness than that which\ncharacterizes the study of the classics, the country would go into\nbankruptcy.\n\nBut as I have tried to show, this training for practical efficiency\nis too narrow. It does not necessarily widen the student\u2019s interests\nor deepen his insight or improve his judgment concerning matters that\nlie outside the range of his technical information. Advocates of this\ntype of education often become partisan and declare that it alone is\neducation.\n\nIt is doubtless too soon to speculate upon the effects of our new\npolicy of reducing immigration to the point where it is almost\nnegligible. Whether the effect is to intensify competition among\nworking people, or to lessen it because of a labor shortage, in either\ncase the result is obvious. Somebody must do the actual work of the\ncountry. We shall soon have a working class in America that is more\nthan one generation old. That is, we are now for the first time in\nour history tending toward a relatively fixed and permanent working\nclass. The various national strains in it will be held together long\nenough to become acquainted with one another, long enough to find more\nin common than a common opposition to capital, long enough to develop\na working class tradition which is American. Workers will not only\nstrive individually to become middle class; they will be obliged to\nimprove their condition as a class. To the economic struggle there\nwill be added efforts for culture. Many workers are already beginning\nto seek education as an aid to a more satisfactory and less sordid\nexistence while working at their tasks. Sooner or later education\nmust cease to be the distinguishing mark of a privileged class, or a\ndevice which aids a man to the goal of his ambition; it must become a\nuniversal practice of learning how to live like a civilized being in\nany occupation.\n\nI have said that people\u2019s ideas of the relation of education to work\nare for the most part confused and fantastic, and that among the\ncauses of this confusion was a misconception of the meaning of labor.\nWe saw that the older romantic idealization of labor gives way to\nthe idealization of Labor not as work but as an organized movement.\nThere are \u201cfriends of Labor\u201d who think of workers\u2019 education as class\neducation. And by class education they do not mean the extension of the\nopportunity for liberal education to people who toil for their daily\nbread. They are not interested in liberal education, any more than\nthey are interested in work. They wish working men to be given such\ninstruction as will be useful in the \u201cclass struggle.\u201d Labor is to have\nits own kind of education.\n\nIt is said that educators are but the retainers, the \u201chigh-brow\u201d\npolicemen of the vested interests and must always teach what the\nmasters require. The educators\u2019 task is to train the masses to be more\nproductive and willing servants of the masters, to train the sons of\nthe owners in the idealogy so that they may work it to advantage, to\nmould them to the type of the most successful and provide them with the\ninsignia and passwords of culture which will show that they belong to\nthe fraternity of the privileged. Traditional education, being nothing\nbut a weapon of the ruling class, is not for the workers. The workers\nare now passing through a period of discipline which is preparing\nthem to be the future masters of the world. As the old education was\nfor the old master class, the new must likewise be the ideology of\nthe future master class, the organized proletariat. The workers must\neducate themselves, for any education that capitalists provide for\nthem will be the capitalist education which enslaves the worker. The\nnew education in proletarian ideals must be wholly different from the\npast. Its aim is not to provide useless and ornamental knowledge, or\nescapes and consolations, but to equip labor to emancipate itself from\nthe rule of capital and to conquer and control industrial society. Thus\nlabor education is sometimes little more than old fashioned radical\npropaganda. Where this is not the case, workers may still be urged to\nthe pursuit of knowledge by militant appeal. The following is quoted\nfrom a bulletin issued by a state director of labor education in the\nWest:\n\n  \u201cHe (the worker) lives in a society committed to the practice of\n  buying his labor cheap and selling its product dear, to the theory\n  that property is sacred and life of little value. In support of this\n  position toward labor, the press, the pulpit, and too often the\n  school lend their aid....\n\n  \u201cAll this passion for justice will accomplish nothing, believe me,\n  unless you get knowledge. You may be strong and clamorous, you\n  may win a victory, you may effect a revolution, but you will be\n  trodden down again under the feet of knowledge unless you get it for\n  yourselves. Even if you should win that victory, you will be trodden\n  down again under the feet of knowledge if you leave knowledge in the\n  hands of privilege, because knowledge will always win over ignorance.\u201d\n\nIf as an individual a man is interested in his education only in so\nfar as it may be to his economic advantage, we regard him as a rather\nstupid materialist. It is no less stupidly materialistic to urge a\nclass to seek knowledge merely for the sake of a common economic\nadvantage. As a rule, ignorant men place a strictly material valuation\nupon education. If education is nothing but the training of certain\ngroups of animals in the best methods for taking material advantage\nof one another, it makes little difference which group wins in the\nclass struggle. This theory means that the belief that education can\nmake a difference in the kind of living is a delusion, and that the\nonly significant differences in human life are the results of economic\nforces.\n\nHave we, in the notion of a special type of education for the working\nclass, a correct view of the relation between education and work?\nLet us admit for the sake of argument, that traditional education is\nclass education, elaborated in the interest of the dominant elements\nin society. Even then it might have a function other than that of an\naid to systematic exploitation. It might serve as a guide to the use\nof leisure time. It might aid men in discriminating between ends which\nwere worthy of effort and those which were not. It might be necessary\nfor the development of personality, and to enable people to discover\nthat which would give some intelligible meaning to their existence.\nHitherto the privilege of the fortunate few, it might conceivably be a\ngood which may now be the possession of the many.\n\nI cannot see that the interests I have just mentioned are necessarily\nthose of any particular class. And it would seem that insofar as\ntraditional education has failed, the failure has been the result of\nsubordinating these very universal human interests to the special\neconomic advantages of a particular class. Along with the class spirit,\nirrelevant factors enter into education. Education becomes illiberal\nand propagandist, a drill in herd opinion. Prejudice is not removed; it\nis intensified. A spirit of intolerance is bred concerning anything\nwhich might effect class interest.\n\nAnd now it is argued that since liberal education has been spoiled by\none class in making it the servant of its class interests, the working\nclass is justified in again spoiling it for its own special interests.\nIf men prefer a substitute to the real thing, it is their own affair.\nBut a person is either being educated or he is not, and whether he is\nor not is a matter quite independent of his particular occupation. Of\ncourse a man\u2019s education will make a difference in the spirit in which\nhe works and in the quality of his workmanship, for it changes the man.\nIf traditional education is unfit for the working man, it is not fit\nfor anyone. I can see no reason why economic differences should be made\nthe basis of cultural differences. The knowledge that has value should\nbe accessible to all regardless of their economic interests, or the\nprofession they practice. If a bad education should not be given to a\nworker, it is not because he is a working man but because he is a man.\nAnything that it is good for one class to know is good for another. A\nbanker may appreciate Shakespeare\u2019s sonnets, so may a tailor; but there\nis not one Shakespeare for the first and another Shakespeare for the\nsecond. If biology is worth knowing, its value is not changed because a\nmachinist studies it. If a philosophy is true, it is true for the man\nwho can understand it, whether he be a railroad president or a coal\nminer. There is no proletarian arithmetic or capitalist algebra or\nMarxian astronomy.\n\nTo be sure, a worker\u2019s education should take account of the economic\nsituations in his environment. So should the education of all men.\nIt is sometimes said that within the ranks of labor there is a new\ncivilization in the making. Working men are said to have ideals and\nstandards, an ethic and culture of their own which are now manifest\nas working class \u201cidealogy.\u201d I have not noticed it. From the time I\nwas a small boy, I have had somewhat unusual opportunities to know the\nlabor movement, and during the last twenty years have sought to make\na psychological study of it. The \u201clabor point of view\u201d is commonly\nthat which propagandists wish the worker to have. In America the\n\u201crevolutionary class-conscious proletariat\u201d exists only on paper. If\nwe consider the ideals, habits and ambitions of working people, it is\ndifficult to conclude that they form a culture group apart. The working\nman votes for Al Smith and Calvin Coolidge, dresses like the grocer\nand the bank clerk, drives a motor car if he can afford it, reads the\npopular journals, has about the same ideas of patriotism, morals,\ngovernment, and success in life as his employer, and tends in every way\nto become more and more \u201cmiddle class.\u201d\n\nSuppose the change contemplated by many radicals should occur and\nthat there should be a \u201csocial revolution.\u201d What of the education of\nworkers then? The worker would still spend his days at the machine or\nbench. Is it not conceivable that men might then in their pursuit of\nknowledge have some interests other than the economic? Under no system\nshould people permit their entire personalities to be drawn into and\nused up by industry. Industry is a means, not an end. It is in its\nproper place when it makes possible the achievement of culture. As a\nman becomes educated, he should learn so far as circumstances permit,\nto put his work in its proper place. The relation of education to work\nis no different from its relation to all the interests and activities\nand demands which life makes of us. A community may be said to have\na culture only when all men--each in his own way,--cooperate in the\nrealization of certain values, which give to all their actions and\nstrivings a perspective, an order, a meaning. It is in this sense that\nEurope in the thirteenth century may be said to have had a culture.\nIn discussing the cultural values of any period of history, there is\ndanger of over-simplification. The picture which I have of that century\nmay not be historically correct, but it will serve to illustrate my\npoint. Catholic Christianity at the close of the Middle Ages possessed\na set of values which entered into everything that people did or\nthought and gave it meaning. The secular did not really exist for\nthe men of that age. All work was religious work. Everywhere there\nwas ceremony, the shrine, sacredness. The fields were blessed before\nplowing; harvest was a gay religious festival. Every labor process\nand every station in society was brought to the service of the common\nideal, and from it gained added significance. For it the peasant tilled\nthe ground, its themes were the inspiration of the sculptor, the\npainter, the musician, the builder. In the service of this valuation of\nthe experiences of life the King ruled, the soldier fought, the monk\nsaid his prayers, the philosopher meditated.\n\nThe cultural ideal of an age is revealed in the type of man for whom\nthe people have greatest reverence. Such a man is the meaning of\nliving for the men of that age. Inquire of the thirteenth century in\nwhom is its ideal realized, and the answer is clear. It is realized in\nthe saints. I do not mean to suggest that everybody in those days was\nsaintly. But there was common agreement that human life existed for\nthe achievement of sainthood. People achieved it in varying degrees\nand by methods which appear strange to us of the twentieth century.\nBut all men hoped to achieve it in the next world if not in this. The\nexistence of the saints in Heaven was a storehouse of merit upon which\nall could draw. And one living saint was held to be enough to justify\nthe existence of an entire age.\n\nI trust it is not necessary for me to add that the saint is\nnot my ideal of the meaning of life. Ideals of asceticism and\nother-worldliness have no interest for me. But I wonder what would\nhappen if people should \u201cgo in\u201d for education with the unanimity\nof agreement as to its value that they once showed with regard to\nreligion. I hesitate to make the suggestion lest I appear to suggest\nsomething solemn, sanctimonious, pious and official. We have enough of\nthat sort of thing now among professional educators.\n\nIf instead of the attainment of sainthood the attainment of wisdom\ncould be made the commonly accepted goal and meaning of the activities\nof modern men, we should again have a culture in which industry would\ntake its proper place. We have for it now no other goal than the\nmaking of money, and hence industry runs amuck while the spirit of\ncommercialism crushes out all our values. We keep the wheels going\nround, but the quality of living and the meaning of our work decline.\nCooperation in the service of the ideal gives way to a competitive\nstruggle for material possession and power and our lives are used up in\nmaking a living. Only the peoples that have achieved a culture have a\ngoal for which to labor.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nEDUCATION AND MORALS\n\n\nThe source of much of our interest in public education is concern for\nour neighbors\u2019 morals. This is doubtless why in America we commonly\nthink of adult education as something which should exist for other\npeople rather than for ourselves. We are a nation of moral reformers.\nEducation is often proposed as an alternative to moral legislation.\nThere is an increasing demand for more effective moral education in the\npublic schools.\n\nWhen the educator becomes an \u201cuplifter\u201d the moral interest is always\na little forced and education suffers. Moral enthusiasm, when it is\nenthusiasm for the good of others, tends to make of education a species\nof organized charity. Seek education for yourself and it is the search\nfor the good life. From ancient times men have sought knowledge that\nthey might become better judges of good and evil. To one who is seeking\nto know what is good, all popular moral conventions, taboos, and\nalleged divine commandments become proper subjects of study, criticism\nand possible revaluation. Moral education is not mere drill in the ways\nof the herd. The good man\u2019s first duty, as Professor Erskine says, is\nto be intelligent. Good intentions alone do not enable a man to judge\nwisely or behave well. The prevailing idea that one can be at the same\ntime good and stupid has strongly influenced our education. Moral\neducation becomes moralizing. The phrase \u201cethical culture\u201d is either\ntautological or it is a contradiction in terms.\n\nIf we were each more genuinely interested in our education there would\nbe much less talk about morality and less occasion for such talk. The\nmoralist is as a rule the person with a lower middle-class mind, who\ninsists upon calling general attention to his own dilemmas. Mediocrity\nmakes parade of virtue a claim to superiority, presenting a picture of\nitself as the likeness of the good man. Goodness is defined in negative\nterms. The good man is he who observes the \u201cthou shalt not,\u201d not he\nwho can do the rare and difficult thing. It is in the localities where\nthere is least artistic appreciation or intellectual curiosity or\ncosmopolitan spirit, the places where people have nothing with which to\noccupy their minds, that we find the strongholds of \u201cmorality.\u201d Where\neducation prevails, people learn to behave themselves as a matter of\nwisdom and good taste. Those who are sufficiently practiced in the art\nof living to be able to observe the common decencies without always\n\u201cwatching their step,\u201d may sometimes look up from the ground and take a\nbroader view.\n\nMuch of the ethical instruction which is given in school is both\nbad education and bad morals. Those colleges in which there is most\ntalk about \u201ceducation for character\u201d are as a rule those which most\npatently fail as educational institutions. The instructor tends to\n\u201cprotest too much.\u201d The attitude of authority discourages the spirit of\nsearch and criticism. Popular prejudice is intrenched. Non-essentials\nare over-emphasized. Crowd-mindedness, rather than independence of\njudgment, prevails. Every crowd persuades itself that it is vindicating\nthe right and justifies its behavior with fine moral sentiments. The\nstudent in school is made susceptible to catchwords and is prepared\nto become the typical crowd man of the future. To this end he is\ngiven \u201cideals,\u201d that is, he is taught to worship certain words such as\n\u201cjustice,\u201d \u201cpurity,\u201d \u201cbrotherly love.\u201d Instead of learning to enquire\nwhat such words mean when applied to concrete situations, he is led\nto believe that he possesses the realities for which they stand when\nhe has an attitude of adoration for the words. Henceforth, he can,\nwithout using his brains, be always right even in matters where he\nknows nothing, by the trick of seeing in each practical problem a moral\nissue. It is in this manner that the majority is always right in a\ndemocracy. If you question its wisdom, you are put in the position of\none who attacks its moral ideals. From the first day in school on, the\nchild is drilled in cant and in deference to prevailing public opinion.\nHe is brought up in an atmosphere of sex morality by a stupid and\nshame-faced policy of expurgation and censorship, the assumption being\nthat apparent ignorance is \u201cpurity.\u201d A student in a woman\u2019s college\npreparing to become a teacher of English literature, elected a course\nin the eighteenth century novel, and after listening to the lectures,\nshe felt it her duty to look over some of the books. Unable to find\nthe works of Fielding in the library, she inquired of the instructor\nwhere she could secure a copy of \u201cTom Jones.\u201d The instructor replied,\n\u201cHeavens, child, you are not going to _read_ it!\u201d This is perhaps an\nextreme case, but it illustrates much of the influence of morals upon\nthe education of the young.\n\nIs the student to acquire the virtue of patriotism? Then he is not\nto be shown the full force of the example of those who have resisted\ntyranny, but must have his head filled with a glorified version of\nhis country\u2019s history. Is he to learn respect for law? He is not\nequipped with principles which enable him to discriminate between\nwise and foolish legislation. His teachers and preachers tell him that\nlaw is divine and must be obeyed because it is the law. After three\ngenerations and more of such education, we have a population in which\nmoral independence is decidedly on the wane. The statute book, not\nprivate judgment, becomes the guide to conduct, and the Federal courts\nthe safeguard to morals. Open protest against official invasion of\nindividual rights gives way to furtiveness and evasion. Moral training\nwhich does not encourage critical examination of popular ideas of what\nis right and good, does not tend to make men better, but only of one\nmind.\n\nPopular suspicion of intelligence and the belief that one may be good\nand do right without it, is carried over into the field of education.\nMoral education becomes a special kind of education. It is thought that\nthere is a \u201cmoral knowledge\u201d which is different from other knowledge.\nThe attempt is made to train character as if character did not include\nintelligence. Education, then, intent upon character, distrusts\nintelligence. The moral interest results in routine drill in current\nprecepts and values, not in the awakening of moral responsibility.\nProfessor Dewey says,\n\n  \u201cMorals are often thought to be an affair with which ordinary\n  knowledge has nothing to do. Moral knowledge is thought to be a\n  thing apart, and conscience is thought of as something radically\n  different from consciousness. This separation, if valid, is of\n  special significance for education. Moral education in school is\n  practically hopeless when we set up the development of character as\n  a supreme end, and at the same time treat the acquiring of knowledge\n  and the development of understanding, which of necessity occupy the\n  chief part of school time, as having nothing to do with character. On\n  such a basis, moral education is inevitably reduced to some kind of\n  catechetical instruction, or lessons about morals. Lessons \u2018about\n  morals\u2019 signify as a matter of course lessons in what other people\n  think about virtues and duties. It amounts to something only in the\n  degree in which pupils happen to be already animated by a sympathetic\n  and dignified regard for the sentiments of others. Without such a\n  regard, it has no more influence on character than information about\n  the mountains of Asia: with a servile regard, it increases dependence\n  upon others, and throws upon those in authority the responsibility\n  for conduct. As a matter of fact, direct instruction in morals has\n  been effective only in social groups where it was a part of the\n  authoritative control of the many by the few. Not the teaching as\n  such but the re\u00ebnforcement of it by the whole r\u00e9gime of which it was\n  an incident made it effective. To attempt to get similar results\n  from lessons about morals in a democratic society is to rely upon\n  sentimental magic.\u201d\n\nI do not see how it is possible to isolate moral education as a special\ndiscipline and have either a liberal education or a sound sense of\nmoral values.\n\nIn institutions of higher learning, \u201cMoral Philosophy\u201d or the \u201cScience\nof Ethics\u201d is sometimes thought to be training in morals. It is so\nonly to the extent that such study is itself good education. I find\nthat many students have the same experience that I had with my college\ncourse in Ethics. I took up the study believing that at last I should\nlearn what is right and how to do it. I soon discovered that I had\nentered upon the driest and least practical course of study offered in\nthe college. Insofar as I could see there was nothing in Ethics that I\ncould turn to for advice about any of the problems of my own conduct.\nI understand that in some institutions the students\u2019 demand for advice\nhas resulted in courses of ethics which consist of case studies. No\ndoubt the opinions of the students and the instructor concerning\ncertain hypothetical dilemmas of conduct are very interesting. But as\nPlato would say, such study is made up of \u201copinion,\u201d not \u201cknowledge.\u201d\nIt is doubtful if such discourse ever results in modifying behavior.\n\n\u201cPure\u201d ethics consists of _a priori_ arguments about the teachings of\nphilosophy concerning such abstract concepts as the moral judgment, the\nnature of the Good, the idea of Duty in general, not of my particular\nduties. Such study may be good training in logic, but it has no more to\ndo with conduct than has formal logic, and not as much as mathematics,\nfor one may apply the principles of mathematics to concrete problems.\nPerhaps the greatest gain for the student from such study is the\ndiscovery that philosophers do not agree upon any one system of morals,\nand that in strict logic we do not know what we mean by our moral\ngeneralizations. The more universal an ethical concept is, the more\nit exists wholly within and for reason, the less is it a deduction\nfrom experience and the less use is it as a guide to behavior. Ethics,\nas moral philosophy, is not a descriptive study of the customs and\npractices of people, or of what things men in diverse times and places\nhave held to be good or evil, right or wrong; this is anthropology.\nIt is not the study of the mental processes of judging or of forming\nhabits or of that quality of actual experience which men call good;\nthis is psychology. Ethics, moreover, is not a scientific study of the\nmeans of accomplishing any good whatsoever; for this at once leads out\nof pure ethics into economics, mechanics, medicine, etc. Pure ethics is\npure logic applied to ultimate concepts _about_ morality in general.\nIt is the \u201cformulation of the Good as it would hold for all possible\nworlds,\u201d a kind of speculation or contemplation. Its good does not\nexist in experience anywhere; it is metaphysical and exists only for\nphilosophizing. Hence ethic, strictly speaking, is concerned with ends\nnot with means, and the ends are not experienced, they are only thought\nabout. As an example of such an approach to morals, there is Kant\u2019s\nCategorical Imperative, from the consideration of which everything\nconcrete, empirical, personal is removed.\n\nI quote some typical passages from the discussion of the teaching of\nethics in a contemporary Journal of Philosophy,\n\n  \u201cThe task of moral philosophy is, by analysis of the moral judgments\n  men actually make, to arrive at clear notions about obligation,\n  rights, good, punishment and the like. And the point of honor, the\n  chastity of the philosopher\u2019s mind, should be never to suffer his\n  genuine moral judgments to be warped in deference to his theory. For\n  that is to poison the wells of truth. All that is valuable in ethics\n  is formal....\n\n  \u201cFinally, it may be asked, has then moral philosophy no practical\n  value? I think its prime value is purely speculative,--the supreme\n  interest of the topic for thoughtful minds and its importance for\n  metaphysics. But, like everything else, it has its effects. I think\n  it is, when studied in its purity, an unrivalled mental training.\n  I believe that the more (apart from casuistry) we reflect on the\n  nature of the moral law the more we are likely to reverence it.\n  And lastly I think that nearly every human being does and must to\n  some extent philosophize. We are all apt to form crude principles,\n  as that morality consists in keeping the law, or obeying the ten\n  commandments, or realizing our selves, or seeking the common\n  good. And then we are apt pendantically and priggishly to distort\n  our genuine moral judgments in accordance with these inadequate\n  generalizations. Moral philosophy criticizes such formulas and shows\n  that they are either untrue or circular. Either self-realization\n  means realizing the _right_ part of the self or it is not always\n  right. Promoting the \u201ccommon good\u201d either means bringing about those\n  satisfactions which moral reason judges _ought_ to be brought about\n  (e. g., those which are _just_ or of a _higher_ value) or it is not\n  always right. And so a truer moral philosophy releases us from the\n  false dogmatisms which may, though usually they do not, corrupt our\n  practise....\n\n  \u201cOn the other hand, members of my class actually approached me, as if\n  I were a father-confessor, for the solution of special problems in\n  conduct!\u201d\n\nIn the following quotation from the same Journal, a different view is\nexpressed. The author believes that ethics is sometimes concerned with\nthe practical problems of conduct, but admits that this inclusion of\npractical interests results in some ambiguity and confusion.\n\n  \u201cConceding that there is a science of ethics that does not teach us\n  either to be good or that we ought to be good any more than logic\n  teaches us how to think or that we ought to think, or esthetics\n  teaches us how to appreciate beauty and that we ought to love it,\n  there yet remains the question, is there a legitimate place in\n  philosophical education for a science of ethics which frankly does\n  not disclaim a \u201cpractical\u201d interest? Is there a science of ethics\n  that is \u201cpractical\u201d in something more than the Protagorean sense of\n  supplying instruction in \u201chow to manage our homes in the best way,\n  and to be able to speak and act the best in public life?\u201d (Such\n  instruction might well encourage sophistry and the casuistry of which\n  Professor Carritt speaks.) Is there, in other words, a science of\n  ethics which is \u201cpractical,\u201d not in the sense of telling the pupil\n  what moral decisions to make, but in cultivating the \u1f14\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n  which would render possible well-considered choices? If there is not\n  a place for such a science, it seems hardly forthright or consistent\n  to perpetuate the ambiguity. If there is a legitimate place for\n  it, it is the duty of moral philosophers to terminate the present\n  ambiguity by explaining it. We can scarcely afford to laugh at or\n  deny it.\u201d\n\nThe relation of morals to education is to be found neither in special\ndiscipline and habit formation in the effort for character apart from\nintelligence, nor in drill in the logic of an _a priori_ science. When\nmoral training is made a special interest set off from other aims of\neducation, it defeats itself. There is no such thing as a moral good\nseparate from other goods. A moral good is simply the best choice among\nthe conflicting goods of experience, actual or possible. As James said,\nthe good is that which satisfies a desire. _A priori_, every desire\nshould be satisfied, since considered in itself it is a demand for a\nsatisfaction. But since desires are in conflict, choice is necessary.\nThe good deed is the right thing to do, or the right way of doing it.\nAll education if it is really education is moral education. It is\nbecause people do not grasp this fact that futile efforts at special\nmoral training are made in which the connections with education are\nartificial and extraneous. Thus the pursuit of knowledge is shorn of\nits significance for conduct, and morals is divorced from intelligence.\nAs Professor Dewey says,\n\n  \u201cA narrow and moralistic view of morals is responsible for the\n  failure to recognize that all the aims and values which are desirable\n  in education are themselves moral. Discipline, natural development,\n  culture, social efficiency, are moral traits--marks of a person\n  who is a worthy member of that society which it is the business of\n  education to further. There is an old saying to the effect that it\n  is not enough for a man to be good; he must be good for something.\n  The something for which a man must be good is capacity to live\n  as a social member so that what he gets from living with others\n  balances with what he contributes. What he gets and gives as a human\n  being, a being with desires, emotions, and ideas, is not external\n  possessions, but a widening and deepening of conscious life--a more\n  intense, disciplined, and expanding realization of meanings. What\n  he _materially_ receives and gives is at most opportunities and\n  means for the evolution of conscious life. Otherwise, it is neither\n  giving nor taking, but a shifting about of the position of things in\n  space, like the stirring of water and sand with a stick. Discipline,\n  culture, social efficiency, personal refinement, improvement of\n  character are but phases of the growth of capacity nobly to share\n  in such a balanced experience. And education is not a mere means to\n  such a life. Education is such a life. To maintain capacity for such\n  education is the essence of morals.\u201d\n\nMoral behavior is not only social. It is also _intelligent_ behavior.\nAn act has moral significance when the performance shows _insight_ into\nthe situation. An action done under compulsion or without understanding\nhas no moral value. A machine may behave very correctly but it is not\na moral being. An act has moral meaning to just the extent that its\nauthor grasps the implications of the situation in which he must act\nand is guided by consideration of the results. An act is judged, not as\nmoralists would have it, merely by the intention, but by its results.\nIt is the aim of education to develop the insight and foresight and\nbreadth of vision which make it possible for an individual to take\nresponsibility for the results of his behavior. The greater the\nintelligence, the more nearly does the consideration of an act approach\nthe estimate of the total result. Thus _the aims of education and\nmorals are the same_;--the good life in so far as it may be attained by\nintelligent choice and behavior.\n\nMen have long sought to reconcile the true and the good. But what they\nhave sought to reconcile were as a rule mere _ideas_ about the true\nand the good. It is not as logical abstractions that the true and the\ngood are one, but in the recognition that the really wise act is the\ngood deed. It is in this sense that wisdom is virtue--in the sense\nthat virtue is wisdom. But the objection will be made that educated\nmen are sometimes clever rascals who are only the more evil for all\ntheir knowledge. I do not think I beg the question when I say that such\nmen are not wise but merely clever. Nor do I mean that good conduct\nis merely a matter of reasoning and calculating. No one denies that\ndesire and instinct and purpose are involved. But if I am not mistaken\nit is generally recognized that education and morals alike have\nsomething to do with training and controlling these aspects of human\nnature. Intelligence is not mere intellect. It is the whole man wisely\ndirecting himself with respect to his environment and its alternatives.\n\nFrom one age or locality to another fashions in behavior patterns\nchange. These fashions seem to be important at the time they hold\nsway. People confuse them with morals. Efforts are sometimes made by\nreformers to introduce innovations similar to those which designers\nof clothing each season create in haberdashery. A liberal journal in\nNew York recently published a series of articles dealing with \u201cThe New\nMorality.\u201d But morality is neither new nor old. Rules of conduct which\ncan be made mere matters of style are applicable chiefly to actions the\nresults of which are unimportant. Such rules have really very little\nmoral value. They constitute, however, the customs or folkways which\nprevail at a given time. Conformity in such matters is required by the\nherd. Often this requirement is the only reason for observing certain\nrules; the opposite course would be just as good. It is with respect to\nsuch matters that education has the effect of liberating the individual\nand improving morals. It breaks the hold of the taboo, makes it\npossible to discriminate between the important and the unimportant and\nleads to the formation of principles based upon consideration of the\nresults of behavior. The differences in conduct that count are those\nbetween stupid deeds and well-considered deeds. Intelligence takes into\naccount the fact that no action of man can be isolated and judged apart\nfrom its place in the social environment, and its effects both for the\nauthor and for his human relationships. Long ago Aristotle showed that\neach of our virtues unless intelligently exercised tends to extreme and\nto become a vice. A virtue is what it does, not what it feels like to\nits possessor. Much is said today about the necessity of loyalty. There\ncan be no social stability without it; but there is probably no more\nserious social menace than unintelligent loyalty.\n\nMen persist in ascribing to their moral principles a sanctity,\na sublimity, which makes them appear to have an independent and\neternal existence and to be ends in themselves. I believe this to\nbe a superstition. In what respect is a moral principle more to be\nreverenced than a principle of mechanics? To worship Duty in general\nis simply to make a god out of a human generalization. The \u201crightness\u201d\nabout which men grow eloquent exists simply as the implications of the\nconcrete situation in which an act is performed. As the ability to\ngrasp such implications improves, principles of conduct are employed\nwhich are relevant to the situation. I spoke of insight into the\nsituation toward which action is taken as being alike essential to\neducation and to the moral judgment. He whose conduct is regulated by\nhis own insight and by principles which are relevant to the situation\nat hand is a morally responsible being, and to the degree that a man\nassumes responsibility for his conduct, he reveals the quality of his\neducation. Those who seek to avoid responsibility substitute for their\nown insight rules of behavior which have as their basis something that\nlies outside the demands of the situation where the behavior takes\nplace. Judge your conduct by this other, outside something and ignore\nthe lessons written in the results of your deed, and you cease to learn\nanything from your behavior; your education in this direction has come\nto a stop.\n\nEducation frequently comes to such a halt when moral teaching is\ncarried on as part of religious instruction. There is a common belief\nthat religion is the real basis of morals. I think this belief has\nits source in the fact that religious institutions in the past, being\nby nature conservative, have sought to perpetuate the folkways. The\nchurch is a form of social organization and has its own interest in\nmaintaining among its members certain standards of behavior. Often\nit has been the only existing agency for the instruction of the\nyoung. Most religious systems carry with them certain commandments\nand precepts the keeping of which they secure by means of promises of\nfuture reward or threats of punishment. Since both the precepts and the\nreligious beliefs and ceremonies have evolved together out of primitive\nman\u2019s ideas of divine authorship and authority, men do not see that\nthe basis of morals lies in social necessity--the need for mutual\nadjustment among men. The church\u2019s pre\u00ebmption of the field of morals is\nallowed to stand long after its squatter rights in other fields--art\nindustry, science, etc.--have been challenged. We forget that religion\nwas once thought to be the basis of all the interests of civilization,\nso that naturally the moral interest came under its sway.\n\nIt is obvious that every society, whatever be its religion, must\ndevelop its moral codes as men learn to live together. In the community\neveryone is part of the environment of everyone else, and each must\nadjust himself to such a human environment. Adjustment is impossible\nif there is no order in the environment. Hence from the beginning\ncertain habits and customs have existed which make it possible for men\nto predict to some extent what their neighbors will do. These habits\nand customs are the primitive morals which it is the task of wisdom\nto inquire into and revalue and gradually improve or discard, and\nsubstitute intelligently considered means and ends.\n\nWhen moral precepts are presented in the form of divine commandments,\nmorality is merely obedience; it consists in keeping the commandments,\nnot in acting according to the demands of the situation. The problems\nof the control of behavior are solved in advance, and the solutions\nlearned by repetition and memory drill. If I act in strict obedience\nto a divine command, the results of my deed are not my affair. The\nresponsibility for the result is upon the deity. I can ignore, in\nfact, should ignore, the lessons of experience and of conduct. The\ncommandment does not require of me any insight into the situations in\nwhich I act. I have no moral responsibility. People whose conduct is\nguided by such morality have committed many outrageous deeds and have\nwith good conscience closed their eyes to the terrible consequences\nof their behavior. From the standpoint of their education, they are\nchildren; they have never yet attained the age of moral responsibility.\nIt is in matters of moral education that the infantile attitude of\nmind which religion preserves in the adult life of the race becomes a\nserious obstacle to a liberal education.\n\nAgain there is a tendency to disregard the consequences of my acts if\nI seek, as many moderns do, to make a religion of morality itself. It\nis often said, religion is a life, the religious man is the good man.\n\u201cMy religion is the Golden Rule,\u201d or some other rule. It all depends on\nwhat you mean. If you mean that in a vague sort of way you try to be\ngood and that a certain moral earnestness is religion enough for you,\nvery well, but you have not said much. Thomas Paine said, \u201cTo do good\nis my religion.\u201d But I am not sure he added much to his good will by\nstyling it a religion. He might as well have said, \u201cI desire very much\nto do good.\u201d So do all right-minded people, the difficulty comes when\nwe try to find out what specifically we mean by doing good.\n\nAgain it is said there is \u201csalvation by character,\u201d but one does not\npossess a character. One either is or is not a character. One does\nnot become a character as a result of routine moralizing or of mere\nconformity to conventional standards. President Wilson is quoted as\nsaying, \u201cThere is no more priggish business in the world than the\ndevelopment of one\u2019s character.\u201d Run away from the man who would be\ngood to you in order to develop his character. Do the thing that in\nyour best judgment is the thing to do under the existing circumstances,\ndo it as well as you can, watch what happens and learn your lesson from\nit, and if you _are_ a character you will not go far wrong.\n\nIn all behavior, he who takes responsibility takes chances. There\nare those who demand moral certainty. They imagine an absolute good,\na universal principle of right and duty, to be the elemental law of\nthe universe. Duty is sublime, the Moral Law is God. People persuade\nthemselves that their adoration of this impersonal god develops in them\nthe \u201cmoral will,\u201d when in fact its function is to provide them with a\nfictitious sense of security. I think the ethical philosophy of Kant\nis motivated by this wish for security, rather than by an interest\nin morals as such. He seeks a good which is to be possessed merely by\nthinking it, a maxim which is universally valid. But if I have such a\nmaxim, assuming that it can be made applicable to any concrete problem\nof conduct, then all I need consider is whether I have acted according\nto the rule. Here again I need not be concerned about the results of my\nbehavior. It is not the consequences of my act that show it to be right\nor wrong. My deed is right if it is the act of the moral will.\n\nAnother method of escaping moral responsibility is to run with the\ncrowd. The crowd never considers consequences; it is bent upon\nvindicating its principles at any cost. It is anonymous; in it the\nindividual may not be held to account. The crowd is not the same as\nthe multitude; it is a distinct phenomena of social psychology. We\nall have in our natures certain anti-social impulses. The crowd is\na sort of pseudo-social environment in which these impulses are not\ninhibited but are indulged with mutual moral approval. All crowds\nprofess to be devoted to some moral ideal. Their moral idealism is\nmere self-justification and pretext for letting oneself go. It is\na weapon useful in partisan strife; it puts the opposition in the\nwrong and justifies hostility. Hence public questions tend to become\nmoral issues, and the attempt to understand the situation gives way\nto righteous indignation toward anyone who witholds approval of the\ncrowd\u2019s aims and methods.\n\nAnd the crowd strives to hold its members in line. Conformity to its\nways and standards is required of all, and becomes an end in itself.\nOne does things because others do them. The crowd man is shocked by\nthe unconventional because it is unusual. His ideas of right and\nwrong, which he thinks he has by _a priori_ intuition or moral sense,\nare merely those which prevail in his set or parish. The average\nman\u2019s conscience, which seems to him to be an infallible moral guide\nand which he holds to be sacred and personal, is little more than a\nreflection of herd opinion. And as men become marshalled in the mass\nmovements of present-day society, they tend more and more to submit the\ncontrol of conduct to the \u201cpublic conscience\u201d and to leave less and\nless to private judgment. _There is no judgment but private judgment._\nThe public conscience is a creature of emotional instability. It is\ncharacterized by periodic obsessions similar to those of mania. It will\nremain utterly indifferent to glaring evil and every appeal to it is\nunheeded; then all of a sudden perhaps over a trifle, or an unconfirmed\nrumor, it is stirred to the highest pitch of excitement. It has a\n\u201ccause\u201d and for a time is occupied with nothing else. All realities\nare thrown out of perspective. The cause is vindicated regardless of\nconsequences; it is carried triumphant at the head of a procession\nof human wreckage, bitterness and folly. As soon as the mischief is\ncomplete, the cause is abandoned. Men begin to \u201ccome to,\u201d and public\nconscience sleeps until the next episodic attack.\n\nIt is precisely in regard to matters which most deeply stir the public\nconscience that the educated man will be on his guard. He will not\nbe easily bullied into surrendering his private judgment to public\nopinion. He will not permit the big words of herd morality to scare him\naway from the consideration of cold facts. Before a man can think for\nhimself, he must have learned to think at all. There is only one sound\nmethod of moral education. It is in teaching people to think.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\nTHE CLASSICAL TRADITION--PLATO AND ARISTOTLE\n\n\nThe classical tradition in education is one of the ironies of history.\nThat pedants should have succeeded in making this tradition into a mere\nconvention is almost incredible. In the poetry, drama and philosophy\nwhich we have inherited from ancient Athens there is a spirit of youth,\nof freedom, of inquiry, of adventure. In the estimation of Egypt or of\nIndia, the culture of Greece was _parvenu_. The striking thing about\nthe Greek spirit is its humanism, its lack of priestly tradition, its\nindependence of religious authority. The men of the fifth century\nbefore Christianity were creators, not imitators. They were following\nmany lines of inquiry for the first time, unhampered by the prestige\nof orthodoxy. A noisy populace could condemn the philosopher but could\nnot secure his deference to its beliefs. No idea, no institution was so\nvenerable or sacred as to escape critical examination. The practice of\nexamining all things was the method of education; its aim was the life\nof Reason. There was no official instruction, no established truth,\nno traditionally recognized knowledge. Student and teacher together\npursued wisdom not as scribes and custodians of ancient and hallowed\ndoctrine, but rather in the spirit of those who enter upon a voyage of\nnew discovery. Such is the spirit of the classical tradition and no\neducation is liberal which loses that spirit.\n\nIf we wish to know the meaning of a liberal education, we should turn\nto those in whose lives and thoughts it was a living reality. I do\nnot believe that the student who grasps the significance of Plato\u2019s\nApology, or the Ph\u00e6do, or the Republic, can ever after be quite the\nsame. I once overheard a group of sophomores discussing the relative\ngreatness of various historical characters. Each had his favorite hero,\na conqueror, a statesman, an orator. One of the boys, who I afterwards\nlearned had discovered Plato\u2019s dialogues for himself, said, \u201cYou\nfellows are just repeating what you have heard people say or have read\nin your history books. You\u2019ll never know what a great man is till you\nknow Socrates. I think he was the greatest man who ever lived.\u201d I saw\nin his face a look of quiet earnestness which I have never forgotten.\nSomething was happening in that boy\u2019s thinking. He was living through\nan educational experience.\n\nTo the question what is an educated person like, one answer is, he\nis like Socrates, or like Plato. Whitman said, \u201cI and my kind do not\nconvince by argument; we convince by our presence.\u201d In the Dialogues\nthere is a presence. Here the personality of a great genius stands\nrevealed. You really come to know Socrates. In his company you cannot\nfail to delight in his humor, his brilliant flashes of insight, the\nsubtlety and tenacity and wide sweep of his thought, his daring, his\nunfailing reasonableness, his candor and freedom of spirit. Whether\nthis personality is the Socrates of history or a creation of Plato\u2019s\ngenius or a mixture of both is a matter that need not concern us\nat present. Our aim is to \u201cfind\u201d the educated man. Here by common\nagreement is the supreme type.\n\nOutside the Dialogues and a few such sources of information as the\nwriting of Xenophon, we know little that is authentic about Socrates.\nBefore Socrates there had been much speculation about natural phenomena\nand the laws which govern the universe. Philosophers had begun to seek\nnaturalistic rather than mythological explanations of the world of\nobjects. This scientific interest was genuine, but the Greeks lacked a\nlogic of scientific method. Before man may think correctly, understand\nhis world or live wisely he must develop habits of exact thinking;\nhe must know what he means by what he says. He must examine his own\nsentiments and beliefs, and presuppositions.\n\nAs an educator Socrates was positively revolutionary, subversive,\ndisconcerting. He stands out in sharp contrast to the other great\nteachers of antiquity, and to most of those who have lived after him.\nHe gives mankind an entirely different idea of what education is. He\npursues knowledge; the others proclaim it. Unlike the philosophers of\nIndia and Egypt or the prophets of Judea, _Socrates has no gospel_, no\ncreed, no made-in-advance message, no \u201cthus saith the Lord,\u201d no system\nof \u201ctruth.\u201d Others indoctrinate; Socrates proclaims his ignorance. He\nis not a sceptic, for he believes that knowledge is not only possible,\nbut that men possess it, though they seldom make use of that which they\npossess. Although not a sceptic, Socrates is decidedly an agnostic. He\nshows popular ideas to be ignorance, mere opinion. Living at a time\nwhen even the intelligent few had hardly begun to question traditional\nillusions, he did not seek to lure his students back to acquiescence to\nauthority, but to develop a technique for testing all things. To use a\nmodern colloquialism, Socrates simply strove to \u201cdebunk\u201d the minds of\nhis students. He tried to aid Athenian youths to understand themselves,\nto think their way to some degree of freedom and mastery, to ground\ntheir ideas of virtue, justice, government, in well-considered reason,\nto gain temperance of judgment, to re-examine what they thought they\nknew and see if it were knowledge or only opinion. And his was no mere\nidle curiosity, but a serious and courageous facing of the elemental\nproblems of human living. He set the precedent for all subsequent\nliberal education.\n\nThe herd loves nothing so little as the Socratic dealing with its\nopinions. Such questioning is a challenge to popular faiths; it demands\nthat men reorient their minds to the values of experience. It arouses\nin the opinionated the unwelcome suspicion that possibly they may be\ndeceiving themselves. It carries with it the suggestion that those\nwho uncritically accept dogma and custom are possibly intellectually\nless alert than the critically minded few. It gives the hint that\nconformity and moral earnestness are not enough for the good life and\nthat those who lay claim to ideas they have not thought out are a\nlittle ridiculous. Every man who rises out of crowd-mindedness into\nindependent thinking weakens to that extent the faith of the crowd in\nitself, and puts it on the defensive. Aristophanes gained popularity in\nAthenian democracy by holding up the figure of Socrates to ridicule.\nAnd when Socrates\u2019 challenge could no longer be met with laughter, the\nFundamentalists of his day condemned the old philosopher to death on\nthe charge that he was corrupting the youth. As Woodrow Wilson once\nsaid, \u201cThe human race has inexhaustible resources for resisting the\nintroduction of knowledge.\u201d\n\nHow the influence of Socrates survives in the work of his pupil Plato\nevery school boy knows. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in\nthe beautiful dialogues which Plato wrote many years after his master\u2019s\ndeath, the figure of Socrates becomes little more at times than a\nvehicle of the author\u2019s own thought. But not every one thinks of the\ndialogues as primarily a record of a great work of adult education.\nThe Socratic method of education is retained by Plato, but he modifies\nthe objectives. Plato has something to \u201cteach.\u201d Knowledge is still\nfound by the method of clarifying men\u2019s thinking. But if men are to\nlive the life of reason, their knowledge must give them a definite\noutlook on life. Plato seeks something to tie to. He is occupied with\nthe search for reality, \u201cpure being.\u201d His interest in mathematics\nleads him to attempt to construe the world according to principles\nof abstract thought. The world of _ideas_ is seen to be the ultimate\nreality, the world of objects is but a manifestation,--as James put\nit, but a \u201cstereotyped copy of the deluxe edition\u201d which exists in the\neternal. Hence knowledge is not only clear thinking; to know is to\npossess reality. The real world consists of form, of idea, of universal\nand abstract principle. Education becomes philosophic contemplation\nof the ideas of the good, the true, the beautiful. A Francis Bacon or\nan Isaac Newton in Plato\u2019s situation would doubtless have developed a\nlogic of science. Plato elaborates a metaphysic. But it would be an\nerror to suppose that Plato is occupied merely with meditation upon\nthe transcendental. All knowledge is one. The truth, of which the mind\nbears witness to itself, must ultimately prevail in the affairs of men.\nThe idea of the good must take the place of the old mythology. Wisdom\nis virtue. The people are enemies of the truth and hate philosophy\nlargely because they have never known \u201ca human being who in word\nand work is perfectly moulded as far as he can be into the likeness\nof virtue--such a man ruling a city which bears the same image.\u201d Of\nexisting states, \u201cnot one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature.\u201d\n\n\u201cBut no one is satisfied with the appearance of good,--the reality\nis what they seek; in the case of good, appearance is despised by\neveryone.\u201d\n\n\u201cOf this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of\nall his actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end and\nyet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same\nassurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever\ngood there is in other things--of a principle such and so great as this\nought the best men in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be\nin the darkness of ignorance?\u201d\n\nThus Plato\u2019s greatest dialogue, \u201cThe Republic,\u201d interweaves the\nspeculative with the practical; it is at once a treatise on reality\nand appearance, an inquiry into the nature of the good, an elaboration\nof the abstract principle of justice into the constitution of an ideal\naristocratic republic, and a philosophy of education.\n\nJowett, in his introduction to the third edition to the English\ntranslation of this dialogue, says,\n\n  \u201cThe Republic of Plato is also the first treatise upon education,\n  of which the writings of Milton and Locke, Rousseau, Jean Paul, and\n  Goethe are the legitimate descendants. Like Dante or Bunyan, he has\n  a revelation of another life; like Bacon, he is profoundly impressed\n  with the unity of knowledge; in the early Church he exercised a real\n  influence on theology, and at the Revival of Literature on politics.\n  Even the fragments of his words when \u2018repeated at secondhand\u2019 (Symp.\n  215 D) have in all ages ravished the hearts of men, who have seen\n  reflected in them their own higher nature. He is the father of\n  idealism in philosophy, in politics, in literature. And many of the\n  latest conceptions of modern thinkers and statesmen, such as the\n  unity of knowledge, the reign of law, and the equality of the sexes,\n  have been anticipated in a dream by him.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe Republic\u201d begins with a discussion of justice. It is agreed that\njustice is virtue and wisdom, and injustice is vice and ignorance.\nJustice is the virtue both of an individual and of a state. In order\nto discover the nature of this virtue, the author proceeds to \u201ccreate\nin idea a State.\u201d The state must be protected from evil, it must\nhave guardians. The guardians need to have both natural gifts and\nthe qualities of a philosopher. The good watchdog must be able to\ndistinguish between the face of the friend and that of the foe. \u201cAnd\nmust not an animal be a lover of learning who distinguishes what he\nlikes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance?\u201d\n\n\u201cWhen we have found the desired natures, and now that we have found\nthem, how are they to be educated? Is not this an inquiry which may\nbe expected to throw light on the greater inquiry which is our final\nend--How do justice and injustice grow up in States?\u201d\n\nJustice, he says, is each man doing his own business and not being a\nbusybody. One should practice the thing to which his nature is best\nadapted. Justice is harmony, and harmony in the State is like harmony\nin the nature of the individual. Intelligence must direct and control\nthe emotions, and the movements of the body. Hence in the just State,\nmen are to be divided into classes according to their degree of native\nsuperiority.\n\nThis is not an easy task, for men will not easily be persuaded to\naccept such distinctions of worth among themselves.\n\n\u201cHow then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods ... just one\nroyal lie which may deceive the rulers if that be possible, and at any\nrate the rest of the city?\u201d\n\n\u201cWell then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you\nin the face, or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which\nI propose to communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the\nsoldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to be told that their\nyouth was a dream, and the education and training which they received\nfrom us, an appearance only; in reality during all that time they were\nbeing formed and fed in the womb of the earth, where they themselves\nand their arms and appurtenances were manufactured; when they were\ncompleted, the earth, their mother, sent them up; and so, their country\nbeing their mother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for\nher good, and to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are\nto regard as children of the earth and their own brothers....\n\n\u201c\u2018Citizens,\u2019 we shall say to them in our tale, \u2018you are brothers, yet\nGod has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command,\nand in the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also\nthey have the greatest honour; others he has made of silver, to be\nauxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has\ncomposed of brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved\nin the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden\nparent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden\nson. And God proclaims as a first principle to the rulers, and above\nall else, that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard,\nor of which they are to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the\nrace. They should observe what elements mingle in their offspring; for\nif the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and\niron, then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the\nruler must not be pitiful towards the child because he has to descend\nin the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be\nsons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are\nraised to honour, and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle\nsays that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will be\ndestroyed.\u2019\u201d\n\nPlato\u2019s ideal state is thus an aristocracy of intelligence and of\nvirtue. There must be selection of those who are to rule. A series of\ntests is proposed. Those selected must have shown greatest eagerness\nto do what is good for their country. The youth are to be subjected\nto various trials, toils, pains, conflicts, to determine whether they\ncan be forced to change their opinions by suffering pain, or by the\ninfluence of enchantments, or the lure of pleasure, or as a result of\nfear. Only those who come out of the trials victorious are to be made\nrulers.\n\nTheir education is to be a rigid discipline, and it is to continue as\nlong as they live. Along with the tests which they must endure, the\nyoung are to grow up in a healthy environment, and in an atmosphere of\nsimplicity. First a censorship is established to guard them against\nevil influences. Only authorized tales are to be told them. Erroneous\nrepresentation of the gods is forbidden. As the young cannot judge\nwhat is allegorical and what is literal, the state is to determine the\ngeneral forms in which the poets may cast their tales. Mothers may not\nfrighten children with myths. The Gods must never be represented as\nthe authors of evil. Nor may one be allowed to say that wicked men are\noften happy and the good miserable. Elsewhere Plato says that no one\nshall be permitted to travel abroad until he reaches the age of forty.\nWhen he comes home he must tell the youth that the institutions of\nother states are inferior to their own. If any man blasphemes, he is\nto be put in the reformatory for five years. If in the end he remains\nunrepentant he is to be put to death.\n\nPlato requires that the young receive training in gymnastics and music\nbefore entering upon the study of philosophy. Certain kinds of music\nthey may not be allowed to hear. Flute players are not to be admitted\nto Plato\u2019s state. Those who are clever at pantomime are to be exiled.\nThe theater is frowned upon, for the guardians must not be trained\nto be imitators. Certainly they may not learn to imitate any kind of\nilliberalism or baseness. In their acting they may not imitate slaves,\nnor bad men, nor madmen, nor the neighing of horses, the bellowing\nof bulls, nor the roll of thunder; nor may they represent smiths,\nboatswains, or other artificers. And they may not play the part of a\nwoman old or young quarreling with her husband, or in conceit of her\nhappiness or when she is in affliction or sorrow or weeping--\u201cand\ncertainly not one who is in sickness, love, or labor.\u201d\n\nThere must be temperance and order and not too much laughter. There\nmust be no sensuality and coarseness. There will be no need of lawyers\nand physicians. \u201cThere can be no more disgraceful state of education\nthan this; that not only artisans and the meaner sort of people need\nthe skill of first-rate physicians and judges, but also those who\nprofess to have had a liberal education.\u201d\n\nThus would Plato direct the early education of the guardians of the\nstate. He has much more to say about protecting them from what he\nregards as dangerous influences than about the subject matter in which\nthey are to be trained. His guardians are to become noble men; they are\nnot to be imitators or trained animals or exploiters or traders. It\nis often said by those who believe in the materialist conception of\nhistory that education is an instrument for exploitation by the ruling\nclass. In Plato\u2019s state education is a mark of privilege, but his ideal\nnobleman is a communist. He must not touch silver or gold; he must live\nlike a Spartan. He may call nothing his own, neither house nor wife nor\nchild. The rulers are to be philosophers, and philosophers, kings.\n\nHence the education of later life is the pursuit of philosophy. It is\nknowledge of the idea of the good. True knowledge is drawn from within,\nit is the turning of the eyes toward the light shed by the world of the\nIdea, the spiritual world. It is the awakening of memories of ideas\nseen by the soul of an earlier existence. Our world of concrete objects\nand of sense experience cannot give this knowledge. Education deals\nalmost wholly with abstractions and with universals, and its method is\ndialectic.\n\nI think that much of the illiberalism of Plato grows out of his theory\nof knowledge. To him as to Socrates, knowledge is of universals. Mere\nawareness of concrete objects we will agree is not knowledge. If we\nonly knew unrelated things--just one thing and then another, as we have\nthem in sense experience, we could have knowledge _of_ them but not\n_about_ them. It is the knowledge about things that gives the world\nits meanings. Much of the significance of things depends upon how we\nconceive their relations. Every concept is an abstraction; it signifies\nnot some concrete fact, but a class or a common quality which inheres\nin a number of objects. So the Greeks sought to find concepts which\nwould not be self-contradictory and would hold for all of the class\nto which they were applied, and for nothing else. The Greeks did not\nseek accurate information concerning facts. They believed they had\nexact knowledge when they had discovered just what they meant by any\nconcept. They had almost no experimental science. They had begun to\nbe deeply interested in the phenomena of nature but their interest\nwas largely speculative as yet. If they had possessed the modern\nscientific laboratory their knowledge could still have been abstract\nbut it would have remained knowledge about nature. Knowledge would\nhave increased as men carefully observed objects, classified them,\nstudied their relations and made note of the changes which take place\nunder fixed conditions. By the method of forming hypotheses and then\ntrying to verify them by fact, knowledge could have been at once both\nof the universal and of the concrete. It would have been recognized\nall along that universals are merely descriptive terms signifying\ncommon properties and that they do not stand for realities which are\nindependent of or outside the several individual objects in which these\nproperties are found. With Socrates, I believe, knowledge is about\nuniversals, but he is primarily concerned with attaining clear and\nworkable abstractions, that is, he is interested chiefly in sharpening\nthe _instruments_ of thinking.\n\nWith Plato the interest in ideas is very different. He is a\nmathematician. He is fascinated with ideas of number and of geometrical\nform. Mathematics to many minds seems to consist of a world of pure\nreason which is more permanent than the world of things. Philosophers\nbefore Plato had wrestled with the problem of change. Existence was\nseen to be a stream in which everything is carried along toward\nits inevitable destruction. Every object at any moment is but the\ncross-section of the process of its becoming something different. Our\nbodies grow and perish, so also does all pass away. The rivers run to\nthe sea, the plants die, the temples of the gods crumble. Even the\nmountains are but waves on the surface of a sea of time into which all\nthings sink and are lost forever. How can the temporary objects which\nwhirl past in the course of their transformation be said really to\nexist? Existence surely must be endurance.\n\nI think that Plato, like many thinkers since, saw the terrifying\nsignificance of the flow of things and sought security and \u201creality\u201d\nin something permanent outside the process of change. What was more\nnatural than that he should turn to the realm of abstract thought? The\nobjects we perceive change, but a concept always means the same. The\nworld may pass away, things may each turn into other things, as water\ninto vapor and fire to smoke and the body to dust, but two and two are\nstill four, and the sum of the angles of a triangle remains constant.\nHence above and behind the world of objects there is a world of ideas\ninto which the teeth of time cannot gnaw.\n\nYou have only to believe that ideas have an existence independent of\nthe minds which think them and all is transformed. Instantly you step\nout of Time into Eternity; form without content; number without things\nto be counted; common properties of objects stripped of the objects in\nwhich such properties inhere; the forms of logical discourse, minus\nthe things talked about and the talkers as well; goodness, without\nanything in particular to be good; beauty in general, independent\nof any concrete beautiful thing, truth universal and absolute and\noutside experience. All this is now the _real_ world, and the world\nof troublesome, fleeting objects becomes a shadow and a delusion.\nKnowledge is knowledge of the \u201creal.\u201d In other words, knowledge is\nabout itself. The more abstract and universal an idea is the more\nreality it has. The mind persuades itself that it possesses Being,\nMotion, the Good and the Beautiful merely by the magic of thinking\nabout them in abstract terms. The universe is transformed into an\nordered system of postulates and verbal exercises. Education now is\nsomething more than the clarification of concepts; it is initiation\ninto the superworld of eternal verities.\n\nIt is not my purpose to attempt a discussion of Platonic Idealism.\nIt has fascinated many of the most subtle minds of the race down to\nour own times. It is the foundation of much Christian theology. Its\nre-affirmation at the time of the Renaissance has brought with it the\nrestatement of many problems which must be considered in the course of\none\u2019s education. My point is that Plato with all his genius contributed\nto the tradition of liberal education a system of values very different\nfrom the humanism and agnosticism of Socrates. His influence has often\ntended to make the aim of education mere intellectuality, rather than\nintelligent grappling with the problems of living, and to transform the\nsearch for the good life into a flight from the realities of experience.\n\nGo one step further and you land in ascetic mysticism. The Soul,\nthe Knower, is no more at home in the world of objects than is the\nphilosopher in the market place. It belongs to the spiritual world, the\nhigher realms of Being, in which ideas are forever pure and free of\ndistortion by matter. In the Ph\u00e6do, Plato says that if we are to have\npure knowledge, the soul must be quit of the body which ever thwarts\nit. Body and soul belong to different worlds. Plato thus prepares the\nway for St. Paul and his doctrine that the spirit lusteth against the\nflesh and the flesh against the spirit, and that to be present in the\nbody is to be absent from the Lord.\n\nIf matter is corruption and mankind is during life chained to the\nmaterial body, human nature ceases to be trustworthy. Plato\u2019s distrust\nof human nature bears fruit some centuries later in the statement that\nthe natural man is sin and death, and in the doctrine of regeneration.\nAnd unregenerate man is prone to error. Knowledge of the truth comes\nby divine revelation and is to be sustained by infallible authority.\nDissent is heresy; assent may be required in the interest of salvation.\nWe have not yet reached the position of Tertullian, \u201cI believe that\nwhich is absurd,\u201d but Platonism is headed in that direction. Knowledge\nwhich feeds on itself in the end eats itself up.\n\nBut there is in Plato something of far greater educational importance\nthan any metaphysic or theory of knowledge. When James said that in\nthe study of the classics one learns to recognize human excellence,\nI wonder if he had Plato in mind. I have no doubt that Nietzsche was\nthinking of him when he turned to philosophy for an answer to his\nquestion, \u201cwhat is noble?\u201d One who deliberately strives to imitate\nthe manners and acquire the virtues of noble spirits, is a prig and\na clown. But unless education ennobles the mind, one becomes only a\nwell-informed cad. Nietzsche\u2019s catalogue of noble traits is a little\nabsurd. We learn what is noble only when we see it. And efforts at\neducation \u201cfor character\u201d are little more than cheap conventional\nsubstitutes for such excellence. But there is a loftiness and sweep in\nPlato\u2019s thought which are more than genius; a graciousness which is\nmore than skill; a sincerity which is more than moral earnestness. He\nhas wrestled with the most searching problems that existence presents\nto the mind of man, problems which each must face and to which he must\ngive his answer if ever he is to become a master spirit. Would you know\nwhat nobility of mind is? Study Plato.\n\nThe tradition of liberal education is a golden thread woven into the\nfabric of civilization. Viewed in the perspective of history, the\nthread is often broken. It is worked into various patterns according to\nthe divergent interests of successive ages, each pattern expressive of\nthe values and meanings which men once held important. The patterns,\nwhether lovely or grotesque, whether they are woven in or are merely\n_appliqu\u00e9_, are the creations of the time. The thread belongs to all\ntimes, and whether for this tradition we are more indebted to Plato\nthan to Aristotle is a question we leave to those who are interested in\nthe history of education. We are seeking to know what the tradition is.\n\nI recently heard a teacher of philosophy say, \u201cAristotle is dead.\u201d His\ninfluence has died many times since the early death of his pupil, the\nMacedonian conqueror, left the philosopher to the tender mercies of a\nsuspicious Athens. It would seem that the interest in Aristotle dies,\nonly to reappear subsequently in new configurations. He has something\nthat we always come back to when sanity returns after an epoch of\nexaggeration and over-emphasis. If Socrates is critical intelligence,\nand Plato nobility of spirit, Aristotle is sanity. All three are\nessentials of liberal education.\n\nOne can hardly over-rate the extent of Aristotle\u2019s influence upon the\neducation of western Europe. For many centuries men spoke of him as\n\u201cThe Philosopher,\u201d drilled their minds in his logic, added little to\nhis metaphysics, his natural philosophy, his principles of ethics and\npolitics. Three periods of intellectual awakening may be attributed\nlargely to the revival of interest in his writings--that of Rome at\nthe time of Cicero, whose education and philosophy was essentially\nAristotelian; that of the brilliant Arabic culture which preceded the\nCrusades; and that of the scholastic education of western Europe,\nat the close of the Middle Ages. In the last, Aristotle\u2019s teaching\nwas very much distorted as a result of theological interest and of\nignorance of the Greek language; and his hold upon education had with\nmuch difficulty to be broken before men could turn their attention to\nthe study of nature or develop a logic of science. Aristotle could not\nhave anticipated that his authority would one day become an obstacle to\nthe study of nature. He himself was the great naturalist of his age.\nHis extensive work of research and classification of natural phenomena\nremained unequalled until modern times. Had the Greeks not despised\nmechanics, Aristotle might have possessed the necessary instruments\nfor scientific experiment, and our knowledge of nature might have been\ncenturies ahead of where it is today.\n\nUnlike Plato, his former master, Aristotle did not displace the world\nof objects by a world of abstract thought. He seems to have held that\nuniversals are real, but only as an account of the order which prevails\nin the world. His logic is primarily instrumental. His whole philosophy\nis an attempt at well-ordered common sense.\n\nThe \u201cPolitics\u201d and \u201cEthics\u201d contain Aristotle\u2019s philosophy of\neducation. It is the task of the legislator to consider how his\ncitizens may be good men. This is also the task of the educator.\nGoodness is not represented as obedience to divine commands. Neither\nis its aim that of securing reward in a future life. The aim of\ngoodness is the good life, and the good life is the happy life, the\nlife that is lived well. Such a life requires certain material goods,\nalso friendships, health, good looks, leisure and _aret\u00e8_. There is no\nword in English which is the exact equivalent of _aret\u00e8_. It is often\ntranslated virtue, or excellence. But Aristotle has in mind a definite\nquality of excellence, which includes distinction, good breeding,\nself-command, wisdom, balance and poise, and equanimity in all things.\n_Aret\u00e8_ is the art of living.\n\nNothing could be farther from Aristotle\u2019s thought than that education\nshould become a separate interest or pursuit of a knowledge that\nhas nothing to do with the kind of life a man leads. To his mind\nthe central question for education is, what sort of man is it most\ndesirable that one should become. Moderns may justly criticise him\nbecause he omits any reference to work, other than to say that it is\ndebasing. His philosophy of education is that of a leisure class. And\nsince work makes up the greater portion of most men\u2019s experience in\nlife, it may be said that Aristotle would train men to possess the\nsubjective qualities of virtue only, and without reference to their\ntasks and duties. It cannot be denied that his theory of education\nhas often been so employed. I have already discussed at some length\nthe relation of education to work. While Aristotle, like others of\nhis time, looks down upon labor, it does not follow that a man is\nnecessarily shut off from the good life as Aristotle depicts it merely\nbecause he earns his own bread. Let us say that Aristotle is in error\nwhen he says that work is debasing. We may still hold that if his \u201cgood\nlife\u201d is good at all, it is good for the man who works for his living.\nMy point is that this philosophy of education is not unrelated to the\nordinary affairs of life, but that it points out those habits which\nbest enable one to turn such affairs to value and to happy use.\n\nAristotle has set forth his idea of the good man in no uncertain terms.\nThe good is not Plato\u2019s absolute or ideal good--good in general; it\nis _happiness_. It is to be attained not merely by philosophical\nspeculation, but by \u201can energy of the soul according to reason,\u201d\nby well-considered habits of choosing. Happiness is the aim of all\nknowledge and of every act. But the educated do not agree with the\nvulgar as to what it is. The latter believe it to be the accident of\ngood fortune. The former hold that it is the result of virtue. Virtues\nare praiseworthy habits. \u201cVirtue\u201d therefore is a habit accompanied\nwith deliberate preference, in the relative mean defined by reason,\nand as the prudent man would define it, \u201cIt is the mean state between\ntwo vices, one in excess, the other in defect. Temperance and courage\nare destroyed both by the excess and the defect, but are preserved by\nthe mean. Virtues are neither passions nor capacities.\u201d They are not\nmere moral enthusiasms nor any subjective state of mind. Wisdom and\ndeliberation are required for virtue. _The good man is the educated\nman._\n\nEducation is not merely the teaching of morals, or the laying down\nrules for behavior. The virtuous habits are not acquired by rote nor\nexercised automatically. The habit of virtue is that of _appropriate\nresponse_ to the situation, the response which is right because\n\u201cnothing may be\u201d taken away from it nor added to it without causing it\nto tend toward vicious excess or defect. There must be discrimination\nor one will go to extreme. Courage is not mere bravery; it is that\nwell-considered \u201cmean state\u201d between fear and over-confidence.\nAristotle quotes Socrates to the effect that courage is a \u201ckind of\nscience.\u201d\n\nThe temperate man does not feel desire \u201cexcept in moderation, nor more\nthan he ought, nor in any case improperly.\u201d He does not desire things\nwhich are dishonorable or beyond his means. He is in the mean in all\nthings, his desires are \u201caccording to the suggestions of right reason.\u201d\nLiberality is the mean between prodigality and stinginess. It is not\nvirtuous to give unless one gives wisely. \u201cThe liberal man therefore\nwill give for the sake of the honorable, and he will give properly for\nhe will give to proper objects, in proper quantities, at proper times,\nand his giving will have all the other qualities of right giving, and\nhe will do this pleasantly and without pain; for that which is done\naccording to virtue is pleasant.\u201d... \u201cBut if it should happen to a\nliberal man to spend in a manner inconsistent with propriety and what\nis honorable, he will feel pain, but only moderately and as he ought,\nfor it is characteristic of virtue to feel pleasure and pain at proper\nobjects, and in a proper manner.\u201d\n\nMagnanimity is a virtue if accompanied by intelligence. The magnanimous\nare concerned with honor. He who being really worthy, estimates his own\nworth highly, is magnanimous. He whose worth is low and who estimates\nit lowly is not magnanimous, but modest. He who estimates his worth\nlightly when he is really unworthy is vain. He who estimates it less\nhighly than it deserves is \u201clittle-minded.\u201d In good or bad fortune,\nthe magnanimous will behave with moderation, he will not be too much\ndelighted with success nor too much grieved at failure. He must take\nmore care for truth than for the good opinion of men. He will not be\nservile, for all flatterers are mercenary and low-minded. He will\nnot be given to the habit of too much admiring the great, nor will he\nbe fond of talking about himself or about other people; he will not\nrecollect injuries, nor be over-anxious, nor disposed to praise or\nblame. \u201cThe step of the magnanimous man is slow, his voice deep and\nhis language steady: for he who only feels anxiety about a few things\nis not apt to be in a hurry: and he who thinks highly of nothing is\nnot vehement and shrillness and quickness of speaking arise from these\nthings.... But vain men are foolish and ignorant of themselves ...\nlittle-mindedness is more opposed to magnanimity than vanity, for it\nis oftener found and is worse.\u201d Hence a just appreciation of one\u2019s\nworth--knowledge of self, as Socrates would have said--is essential to\nAristotle\u2019s ideal man.\n\nFurthermore, meekness is a virtue only when it is a sign of\nintelligence. \u201cHe who feels anger on proper occasions, at proper\npersons, and besides in a proper manner, at proper times, and for a\nproper length of time is an object of praise.\u201d The meek man is not\ncarried away by passion. He who is excessively sensitive to anger is\nirascible. He who is unsensitive is a fool.\n\nEven the virtue of truthfulness must be exercised in moderation and\nwith good judgment. The excess of it is arrogance, the defect is\ncunning or false modesty. Wit is also a virtue; the excess, Aristotle\nsays, is buffoonery or sarcasm, the defect is clownishness.\n\nJustice is discussed in a manner quite different from that of Plato.\nThe problem of universal justice is dismissed, and justice is\nconsidered in relation to various transactions between man and man.\nHence the necessity of defining \u201cright reason.\u201d Aristotle turns to a\ndiscussion of Prudence, Intelligence, Deliberation, Wisdom. He says,\n\u201cIt is not sufficient to know the theory of virtue,\u201d--the end is\nin \u201cpractical matters.\u201d Aristotle holds the relation of morals to\neducation is much the same as that which we found it to be in the\npreceding chapter. Mere precept and example are not enough; there must\nbe general culture, and education should extend throughout a lifetime.\n\n\u201cBut reasoning and teaching, it is to be feared, will not avail in\nevery case, but the mind of the hearer must be previously cultivated\nby habits to feel pleasure and aversion properly just as the soil\nmust be which nourishes the seed. For he who lives in obedience to\npassion would not listen to reasoning which turns him away from it:\nnay more, he would not understand it. And how is it possible to change\nthe convictions of such a man as this? On the whole, it appears that\npassion does not submit to reasoning, but to force....\n\n\u201cPerhaps it is not sufficient that we should meet with good education\nwhen young: but since when we arrive at manhood we ought also study\nand practice what we have learnt we should require laws also for this\npurpose.\u201d\n\nAristotle discusses the desirability of public education. He thinks\nthat first men must become fitted for the duties of the legislator.\nAnd since, he says, all previous writers have discussed the subject of\npolitics without scientific examination of the subject, he proposes to\nundertake such an examination for himself.\n\nLet us note that neither Plato nor Aristotle when considering the good\nlife, thinks that the individual may attain it in isolation. It is not\nmerely a quality of the soul, but has to do with all of one\u2019s human\nrelationships. Aristotle says that it is very difficult for the young\nto receive a good education under a bad government. He would seem to\nmake the state and the laws a means to education. And it is the aim\nof both the state and education to enable the citizen to live happily.\nEducation is training in wisdom and virtue, and the exercise of these\nis freedom. Those who are incapable of education are slaves by nature;\nthose who obey only passion and abstain from vicious things not because\nthey are disgraceful but for fear of punishment, cannot be reasoned\nwith; they must be restrained by force. Education is liberal in that it\nenables a man to govern himself.\n\nIn comparison with Plato, Aristotle appears prosaic, worldly,\nand lacking in charm and humor. Much that he says appears to us\nplatitudinous, for the same reason that the woman found Shakespeare\u2019s\ndramas full of familiar quotations. We forget how subversive of\nconvention and dogma it is to found the good life in the life of\nreason. Aristotle has passed by mythology and tradition and the\nsanctions of religion and has achieved a purely secular guide to\nconduct. He has made freedom and happiness the goal of virtue and\neducation, and has done this without descending to utilitarianism. He\nhas made right reason the standard of life and has at the same time\ngiven to the standard an \u00e6sthetic valuation. He has linked education\nwith conduct, and suggested a moral training which gives human nature\ncredit for some degree of intelligence. Aristotle is no longer \u201cthe\nPhilosopher.\u201d Education in the modern world is necessarily set to tasks\nvery different from those of ancient Greece. But the good life is still\nthe goal, and Aristotle\u2019s good man has remained one of the ideals of\nliberal education.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\nHUMANISM: ERASMUS AND MONTAIGNE\n\n\nEach man\u2019s education is a unique achievement. There are as many kinds\nof education as there are kinds of men. In every educated mind there\nis a mixture of temperament and learning, a selection and emphasis, an\nelusive quality like that which haunts a work of art. We may recognize\nthis elusive something but we cannot define it or describe it. Such\nwords as wisdom, virtue, independence of judgment, freedom, cannot give\nus the meaning of education. We must know the educated man. If you\nread and understand Erasmus of Rotterdam, you will see what education\nis better than if you read all the books written about theories of\neducation. A liberally educated person is like Erasmus.\n\nI do not mean that Erasmus is the only type of educated mind, or that\nthe educated man is like him in all respects. Certainly I would not\nsuggest that one living in the twentieth century should strive to\nimitate a scholar who lived in the fifteenth. Change of environment\ncalls for a different response. But there are certain constant factors.\nNew modes of response may be necessary in order to recreate the\nvalues which men of other times discovered, values the loss of which\nin our times would cheapen our whole existence. If this were not so\nthere would be no point in trying to learn anything from men of other\ntimes. There are those who have such faith in the infallibility of\ncontemporary opinion that they are convinced the past has nothing to\nteach us. The ways of the present are \u201cprogress,\u201d and progress is its\nown criterion of the good and needs no other guide than the interests\nof the hour. Such persons are usually to be found cheering for \u201cthe\nlatest thing.\u201d As a rule they are people without background or reserve.\nWe live in the present, to be sure. But if we are really to live in it\nand are not content merely to act a part in the passing show, we must\nconsider the values which are at issue in the responses we make. To\nthat end there is enlightenment in knowing the values for which other\nmen of other times struggled. The kind of living we are to achieve with\nour environment is not determined by the environment itself, but by the\nkind of men and women we are--by what we bring to our environment from\nthe widest possible knowledge of what is worth doing. Men like Erasmus\nand Montaigne lived better lives than most of their contemporaries\nbecause of the wisdom of the ages that was in them. It may be said that\nother men in their times also shared this ancient knowledge, for was\nnot The Revival of Learning at its height? Many did and were better\nmen for it. Many were fascinated by the Renaissance who merely shared\nits externalities but did not thereby become wiser men; they remained\ncreatures of their own times. It became \u201cthe latest thing\u201d to ape the\nancients without understanding them. Among obscurantists, and fanatics\nand corruptionists, Erasmus and Montaigne lived like educated men.\n\nAt the close of the fifteenth century, it was said, \u201cWhatever is\nartistic, finished, learned and wise is called Erasmian.\u201d It is\ndifficult to speak of Erasmus except in terms of the superlative.\nThe most broadly educated man of his times, he was not only the\nrepresentative scholar of his generation; he remains an example to\nus all of the truly civilized man. His polished wit, his humanity,\nhis gentle irony, his unfailing reasonableness, his ability to see\nthrough cant and superstition, his philosophic calm in the midst of\nintense partisan strife, his good taste and sense of proportion: these\nqualities of mind belong to no one age, they are the constants of which\nI spoke a moment ago; they are the essentials of a civilized attitude\ntoward life in any age. Without them man is a barbarian.\n\nThe Great Humanist saw as no one else did the spiritual significance\nof the revival of learning, and he came to represent all that was best\nin it. Scholarship to him was more than erudition and pedantry and\nliterary style. He found in classic literature a window opening upon a\nnew vision of the meaning and possibilities of living. He became the\nchampion of a new way of life and thought. Past and present met and\nmingled in his thought and became a new life of reason. \u201cHe quietly\nstepped out of medievalism,\u201d the first modern man, the forerunner of\nDescartes and Voltaire.\n\nIn a time when all human interests were submerged in religion, Erasmus\nsought to humanize the Church, and leave it an international fellowship\nof culture, free of dogma and superstition. He turns from knowledge of\ndivine things to human letters as the guide to living, and from blind\nfaith to reason. The Gospel becomes for him the \u201cphilosophy of Christ.\u201d\nWith equal impartiality he could translate the mocking dialogues of\nLucian and provide the coming Reformation with its first standard Greek\ntext of the New Testament. His boldness in omitting passages from this\nlatter work, which he found not to be authentic, and his occasional\nunconventional commentary on the text brought him under the suspicion\nof being at heart a sceptic and a heretic.\n\nWith bigotry and persecution almost universal all around him, Erasmus\ntaught tolerance, moderation, respect for truth. In a splendid\nbiographical study, Professor Preserved Smith says that Erasmus\u2019s\n\u201cColloquies\u201d did more for the spread of liberal ideas than any book\nof the sixteenth century. Another historian says, \u201cAlmost all the\nliberating ideas on which the international culture of the present\nrests, are present in germ in his thought.\u201d\n\nThe continent of Europe in the year fifteen hundred was culturally far\ninferior to Asia. Compared to the civilization of Greece and Rome, all\nChristendom was barbarian. The wave of interest in education which in\nthe thirteenth century had caused the universities to become crowded,\nwhile it had not passed, had subsided into a dull scholastic dialectic.\nEducation had little effect upon the life of the masses or their\nrulers. In Italy art and letters were breaking away from religious\ntradition, but the new spirit which prevailed at Florence, Padua, and\nRome had little sway north of the Alps. Medi\u00e6val Christianity had\nreached its culmination and was in a period of moral and intellectual\ndecline. Thoughtful men everywhere were dissatisfied. The time was soon\nto come when this dissatisfaction could no longer be held in restraint,\nwhen throughout a century of bloodshed, civil war, and violence and\nhatred such as Europe had never known, the Church would be torn asunder\nand anarchy and terror reign until modern nationalism and industrialism\ncould painfully emerge from the smouldering ruins.\n\nIt is said that when Leo X ascended the Papal throne, there was placed\nabove his head in Latin the inscription, \u201c_Nunc tempora Pallas\nhabet_,\u201d--Now Athene reigns. Not many years were to pass before the\nsacred walls, which had under the Pontificate of his predecessor been\ndecorated by Michelangelo and Raphael, were to echo the sound of church\nbells ringing out the tidings of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew\u2019s Day.\nSoon all over Europe the floodgates would be open and Christendom would\nbe inundated by torrents of fury. Soon in defense of the sacred Gospel,\nChristians would tear at Christians\u2019 throats. With instruments of iron,\ntongues would be wrenched from the mouths of men and women, eyes gouged\nfrom their sockets, limbs broken on the rack. The bed of torture and\nthe heap of burning faggots would become commonplace spectacles for\nthe public to gaze upon. For a hundred years and more Europe was to\nbe ablaze with war on every hand, until it should sink exhausted by\nthe mutual destruction of Christian armies into almost unimaginable\nmisery and poverty. And this struggle which was destined to breed\nhatreds and sectarian divisions lasting even till today, might have\nbeen avoided, probably could have been averted, could the spirit of\nErasmus have prevailed. Protestants hold the Catholics responsible for\nthe horrors of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century. Catholics\nhold the Protestants responsible. Both were equally guilty, for they\nwere equally ignorant and barbarous and deluded with superstition. This\nis the kind of thing that happens and always will happen when ignorance\nbreaks loose in the world. Then in the general madness even learned men\nlike Melanchthon and \u0152colampadius and the Medicis lose their poise and\nbecome partisans.\n\nErasmus during the most trying time kept his sanity. And both sides\ndenounced him bitterly. He was accused of taking a cowardly middle of\nthe road position. What neither group of militant partisans could\nsee was that Erasmus, far from being in the middle of the road, was\nnot on their wretched highway at all. He remained true to the issue\nfor which he had struggled from the first. Erasmus saw that what was\nwrong with Europe, indeed what really gave rise to the abuses of\nmedi\u00e6val society, was barbarism sanctioned by religious superstition.\nHe knew that vice and folly and brutality and hypocrisy were not to\nbe removed by religious warfare, but rather deepened. He saw the same\nspirit of doctrinaire scholasticism, the same intolerance and cruelty\nand pious ignorance on both sides of the coming controversy. He knew\nthat conditions could be improved only when the leading minds of\ncontemporary Europe could acquire the decencies which characterize the\nliberally educated of all times. Whether history has vindicated Erasmus\nin this conviction of his is a matter concerning which opinions differ.\nI think it has. Such liberty and cultural progress as the modern world\nenjoys it would seem to have derived from the Erasmian tradition, not\nthat of Luther, Calvin or Wesley. Protestantism without the humanism\nof Erasmus is Fundamentalism. And conversely, Paris and Vienna and\nMunich are nominally Catholic, but they have known the influence of\nErasmus and Voltaire to a degree that many Protestant communities have\nnot known such influence, and so far as the advance of civilization is\nconcerned, I think that life in such localities will compare rather\nfavorably with that of certain strictly Protestant communities. I\nbelieve that those movements of the present day which have greatest\nspiritual significance and value--modernism in religion, liberalism in\neducation, the dawning recognition of the necessity of intelligence and\nof individual responsibility in matters of belief and conduct, efforts\nfor the humanization of industry and the state--are but the belated\nresumption of the humanizing work begun in northern Europe by Erasmus\nand others and broken off by the Reformation. From this point of view\nthe Reformation is not the continuation of the Renaissance, but would\nappear to have been something of a bourgeois reaction against it.\n\nLong before the storm broke, Erasmus was carrying on a brave work\nagainst ignorance and obscurantism. In our times, we have seen\nsomething of the conflict of science with theology. This issue is\ntame in comparison with the conflict of theology with Humanism which\noccupied scholars at the beginning of the sixteenth century. It is\ndifficult for us now to imagine that there could be bitter opposition\nto the teaching of the Latin and Greek literatures. The issue is\nblurred for us. Theologians are less acrimonious than they once\nwere, and Scholasticism has long been on the decline. The classics\nmoreover, are taught in such a manner that few students see the deep\nspiritual chasm which separates the Christian approach to life from\nthat of the Latin and Greek poets and philosophers. It was pretty well\nrecognized on both sides of the dispute that the ancients were pagans,\nrank heathen. Those who opposed these unchristian writers did so for\nmuch the same reason that early Christians in the second century had\nassailed \u201cthe present evil world\u201d and all its works.\n\nIn Italy the Renaissance tended for a time to take on a definitely\npagan aspect. Imitation of the ancients became a rather ridiculous\ngesture, and the fad was often carried to extremes which were little\nless than childish. Cardinals assumed the speech and manners of ancient\nRoman senators. Sermons were preached in sonorous Ciceronian style. In\ncertain quarters Christ was identified with Apollo, and God the Father\nwith Jupiter. Nuns were spoken of as \u201cvestal virgins,\u201d and painters and\nsculptors created figures of Mars and Venus and mingled these and other\nheathen idols with the images of the saints.\n\nThe apparent sympathy of high ecclesiastical personages with such\ngoings on was one of the causes of the hostility to the Papacy which\nlater swept over northern Europe.\n\nThe sanity of Erasmus saved him and helped save the revival of learning\nfrom such superficiality. He found in Humanism a balanced and serious\nwisdom which he strove to combine with the Christian philosophy of\nlife. The synthesis he achieved was not a new system of theology;\nit was the gradual merging of an older outlook upon life into a new\noutlook, a transformation of intellectual interests. Professor Smith\nquotes a passage which indicates something of Erasmus\u2019s position\nregarding the classics. That this literature was pagan he well knew,\nbut its paganism did not to his mind exclude it from the spiritual life\nof mankind. He says of an essay of Cicero\u2019s, \u201cA heathen wrote this to\nheathen and yet his moral principles have justice, sincerity, truth,\nfidelity to nature; nothing false or careless is in them.\u201d \u201cWhen I read\ncertain passages of these great men, ... I can hardly refrain from\nsaying, \u2018St. Socrates, pray for me.\u2019\u201d\n\nErasmus found himself the leader of Humanism as an educational\nmovement. He stated the issue in precisely the terms that gave sincere\nand intelligent men a new vision of the spiritual life. And he did it\nwith such a wealth of learning, such reasonableness, such unanswerable\nirony and wit that his name became the symbol of the new scholarship.\nHis books had a larger circulation than those of any other writer of\nhis generation. And as for many years he travelled about Europe,\nmoving from one center of learning to another, his coming was hailed\nwith triumph. Scholars everywhere attended him, sat at his feet, took\nup the cause he championed. The Humanists were winning victory after\nvictory and could look forward to the triumph of their movement in the\neducation of western Europe. How rapidly the spread and advance of\nculture might have proceeded or what directions it might have taken if\nmen\u2019s thoughts had not been turned again to theological controversy\nand to bitter warfare, no one can say. Perhaps the masses were not\nprepared to accept or tolerate so sudden a change as that for which\nErasmus strove, for Humanism was a much more radical departure from\nthe mental habits and standards of value of the Middle Ages than was\nProtestantism. The leaders of the Renaissance did not accept the\nReformation because they regarded it as a backward step. Perhaps they\nhad themselves gone too far ahead. Perhaps the representation of the\ngood man as the intelligent man, an ancient Greek idea which the\nHumanists revived, will always be offensive to the masses. Erasmus\nseemed--he still seems to many--to have lacked moral earnestness. He\ngenerated light and what mankind wants is heat. At any rate, the masses\nin the nations where the new scholarship was being carried, showed\nthat they did not want the pagan wisdom. Instead they suddenly became\npossessed with a longing for the primitive faith of the first Christian\ncentury, or what they thought was that faith. They followed the leader\nwho gave them not insight, but a moral issue.\n\nBoth Luther and Erasmus had visited Rome. Each was impressed by the\n\u201csight of antique monuments.\u201d Each saw evidence of the corruption and\nveniality which along with luxury surrounded the gay Papal court.\nLuther later spoke of Rome as the \u201csink of every abomination,\u201d a\nconviction which doubtless had much to do with determining the course\nof events which led to his break with Papal authority.\n\nOf the effect of all this on the mind of Erasmus, we have the record in\na book, one of the great classics of literature, \u201cIn Praise of Folly.\u201d\nIn the letter of dedication to his friend Sir Thomas More, Erasmus says\nthat in his late travels from Italy, that he might not trifle away his\ntime in the rehearsal of old wives\u2019 fables, he began reflecting upon his\npast studies, and thought it good to divert himself by drawing up a\n\u201cpanegyrick upon Folly.\u201d He suggests that this trifling may be a whet\nto more serious thought and that \u201ccomical matters may be so treated\nof, as that a reader of ordinary sense may possibly thence reap more\nadvantage than from some more big and stately argument.\u201d He hints that\nhe does not wish to be so carping that he will fail to instruct, and\nsays that he who points indifferently at all, can hardly be accused of\nbeing angry with any one man or one vice. And he wonders at the \u201ctender\nhumor\u201d of an age in which some are so \u201cpreposterously devout that they\nwould sooner wink at the greatest affront against our Saviour, than be\ncontent that a prince or a pope should be nettled with the least joke\nor gird, especially in what relates to their ordinary customs.\u201d\n\nHere we have the characteristic reactions of two contrasting types\nof men who probably can never understand each other. To Luther the\nvices of Rome are sin; to Erasmus they are folly. The one is filled\nwith moral indignation at the iniquity of the world, and rushes into\nthe fray to stamp it out, puts it on the defensive, attacks it in its\nstronghold. The other makes iniquity ridiculous, renders it defenseless\nby laughing away its pretexts at justification, showing it to itself\nas folly and reminding all men that their foolishness may be removed\nonly by wisdom. No doubt without more moral indignation in the world\nthan Erasmus seems to have shown there would be too easy tolerance of\nabuse. On the other hand, without his insight and scepticism and irony,\nindignation turns to malice, men lose their perspective, and their\npower of self-criticism; they become so intent upon the struggle for\nrighteousness that they forget what they are struggling for, and when\nthe great cause finally triumphs, it carries to victory the same old\niniquities in new dress.\n\nIt is evident from a reading of \u201cIn Praise of Folly\u201d that Erasmus\u2019\nthought made deeper inroads into the very spirit of Medi\u00e6val thought\nand religion than did Luther\u2019s moral indignation. It undermined many\nthings that the Reformer left standing. \u201cIn Praise of Folly\u201d was\nwritten eight years before Luther\u2019s break with the Pope, and it reveals\na mind emancipated from much more than the Papacy. The man who could\nwrite this satire must have regarded the Reformation as a quarrel which\ndealt with only the surface of the problem. I do not wonder that later\nboth Catholics and Protestants considered him a sceptic. It is my\nbelief that he was too sceptical to become greatly excited about the\nReformation. He is impressed with the whole stupid comedy of the life\nabout him.\n\nKnowledge of this book should be part of every man\u2019s education. It has\nmuch more than a historical interest for the modern student. In form\nit is an oration which Folly delivers in praise of herself. She makes\na good case; perhaps too good a case. Folly says that however slightly\nshe is esteemed in the common vogue of the world--being often decried\neven by those who are themselves the greatest fools--yet she is _the\ndeity who really rules the world_ and is the source of most men\u2019s\nhappiness. \u201cAt first sight of me you all unmask and appear in more\nlively colors.\u201d\n\nWithout Folly society would go to pieces. Indeed no one would ever be\nborn, for would women ever have children or marry except for Folly? And\nexcept for Folly marriages would be few and divorces many. How could\nthe government exist without Folly? Have not wise legislators in all\ntimes recognized the necessity of fooling the people? After showing\nhow Folly reigns in the arts and the professions, and how each nation\nhas its pet folly and self-conceit, the speaker sums up, \u201cI am so\ncommunicative and bountiful as to let no particular person pass without\nsome token of my favor, whereas other deities bestow gifts sparingly\nand to their elects only.\u201d\n\nLet us note this reference to Folly as \u201cdeity.\u201d Does Erasmus mean to\nimply that Folly is the deity that mankind really worships and has been\nworshipping all the while? He makes Folly say,\n\n  \u201cWell, but there are none (say you) build any altars, or dedicate\n  any temple to Folly. I admire (as I have before intimated) that the\n  world should be so wretchedly ungrateful. But I am so good natured\n  as to pass by and pardon this seeming affront, though indeed the\n  charge thereof, as unnecessary, may well be saved; for to what\n  purpose should I demand the sacrifice of frankincense, cakes,\n  goats, and swine, since all persons everywhere pay me that more\n  acceptable service, which all divines agree to be more effectual and\n  meritorious, namely, an imitation of my communicable attributes?...\n  Farther, why should I desire a temple, since the whole world is but\n  one ample continued choir, entirely dedicated to my use and service?\n  Nor do I want worshippers at any place where the earth wants not\n  inhabitants. And as to the manner of my worship, I am not yet so\n  irrecoverably foolish, as to be prayed to by proxy, and to have my\n  honour intermediately bestowed upon images and pictures, which quite\n  subvert the true end of religion....\u201d\n\nBut Folly has not time to recount all the foolishness of the ignorant,\nneither is it necessary. She confines herself to the follies of those\nwho make pretense of wisdom. Of these the theologians doubtless \u201cleast\nlike to be reminded of their dependence upon Folly,\u201d but in evidence of\nthis fact,\n\n  \u201cThey will cut asunder the toughest argument with as much ease\n  as Alexander did the Gordian knot; they will thunder out so many\n  rattling terms as shall fright an adversary into conviction. They\n  are exquisitely dexterous in unfolding the most intricate mysteries;\n  they will tell you to a tittle all the successive proceedings of\n  omnipotence in the creation of the universe; they will explain\n  the precise manner of original sin being derived from our first\n  parents; they will satisfy you in what manner, by what degrees, and\n  in how long a time our Saviour was conceived in the Virgin\u2019s womb,\n  and demonstrate in the consecrated wafer how accidents may subsist\n  without a subject. Nay, these are accounted trivial, easy questions;\n  they have yet far greater difficulties behind, which nothwithstanding\n  they solve with as much expedition as the former; ... whether Christ,\n  as a son, bears a double specifically distinct relation to God the\n  Father, and his virgin mother? whether this proposition is possible\n  to be true, the first person of the Trinity hated the second? whether\n  God, who took our nature upon him in the form of a man, could as\n  well have become a woman, a devil, a beast, an herb, or a stone? and\n  were it so possible that the Godhead had appeared in any shape of an\n  inanimate substance, how he should then have preached his gospel?\n  or how have been nailed to the cross? whether if St. Peter had\n  celebrated the eucharist at the same time our Saviour was hanging on\n  the cross, the consecrated bread would have been transsubstantiated\n  into the same body that remained on the tree?\u201d\n\n  \u201cFurther, does any one appear a candidate for any ecclesiastical\n  dignity, why an ass or a plough jobber shall sooner gain it than a\n  wise man.\u201d...\n\n  \u201cAll their preaching is mere stage-playing, and their delivery the\n  very transports of ridicule and drollery. Good Lord! how mimical are\n  these gestures? What heights and falls in their voice? What toning,\n  what bawling, what singing, what squeaking, what grimaces, making\n  of mouths, and apes\u2019 faces, and distorting of their countenance;\n  and this art of oratory as a choice mystery, they convey down by\n  tradition to one another. The manner of it I may adventure thus\n  farther to enlarge upon. First, in a kind of mockery they implore the\n  divine assistance, which they borrowed from the solemn custom of the\n  poets....\n\n  \u201cNow as to the popes of Rome, who pretend themselves Christ\u2019s vicars,\n  if they would but imitate his exemplary life, in the being employed\n  in an unintermitted course of preaching; in the being attended with\n  poverty, nakedness, hunger, and a contempt of this world; if they did\n  but consider the import of the word pope, which signifies a father;\n  or if they did but practice their surname of most holy, what order or\n  degrees of men would be in a worse condition? There would be then no\n  such vigorous making of parties, and buying of votes, in the conclave\n  upon a vacancy of that see: and those who by bribery, or other\n  indirect courses, should get themselves elected, would never secure\n  their sitting firm in the chair by pistol, poison, force of violence.\n  How much of their pleasure would be abated if they were but endowed\n  with one dram of wisdom? Wisdom, did I say? Nay, with one grain of\n  that salt which our Saviour bid them not lose the savour of. All\n  their riches, all their honour, their jurisdictions, their Peter\u2019s\n  patrimony, their offices, their dispensations, their licences, their\n  indulgences, their long train and attendants, (see in how short a\n  compass I have abbreviated all their marketing of religion;) in a\n  word, all their perquisities would be forfeited and lost.\u201d...\n\nFinally, after quoting many passages in praise of Folly and of foolish\nactions and foolish persons which occur in his precious classic\nliterature, Erasmus does a surprising thing. At the time this book\nwas written those who later were to become the Reformers were already\ndisposed to appeal to the Bible as an infallible authority equal to, if\nnot above, that of the Church. That Erasmus placed the Holy Scriptures\nin the same category as other ancient literature is indicated by his\nfree and easy treatment of it. He humorously quotes many passages to\nprove that the Bible actually enjoins men to practice folly and eschew\nwisdom. Were not our first parents expelled from Eden in punishment for\nthe sin of eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge? He does not\neven spare the New Testament.\n\n  \u201cNow therefore I return to St. Paul, who uses these expressions \u2018Ye\n  suffer fools gladly,\u2019 applying it to himself; and again, \u2018As a fool\n  receive me,\u2019 and \u2018That which I speak, I speak not after the Lord,\n  but as it were foolishly\u2019; and in another place, \u2018We are fools for\n  Christ\u2019s sake.\u2019 See how these commendations of Folly are equal to the\n  author of them, both great and sacred. The same holy person does yet\n  enjoin and command the being a fool, as a virtue of all others most\n  requisite and necessary: for, says he, \u2018If any man seem to be wise in\n  this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise.\u2019...\n\n  \u201cNor may this seem strange in comparison to what is yet farther\n  delivered by St. Paul, who adventures to attribute something of Folly\n  even to the all-wise God himself, \u2018The foolishness of God (says he)\n  is wiser than men\u2019 ... wherein is to be understood that other passage\n  of St. Paul, \u2018The preaching of the cross to them that perish, is\n  foolishness.\u2019 But why do I put myself to the trouble of citing so\n  many proofs, since this one may suffice for all, namely, that in\n  those mystical psalms wherein David represents the type of Christ,\n  it is there acknowledged by our Saviour, in way of confession, that\n  even he himself was guilty of Folly; \u2018thou (says he) O God knowest\n  my foolishness?\u2019 Nor is it without some reason that fools for their\n  plainness and sincerity of heart have always been most acceptable to\n  God Almighty.... So our Saviour in like manner dislikes and condemns\n  the wise and crafty, as St. Paul does expressly declare in these\n  words, \u2018God hath chosen the foolish things of the world\u2019; and again,\n  \u2018it pleased God by foolishness to save the world\u2019; implying that by\n  wisdom it could never have been saved. Nay, God himself testifies\n  as much when he speaks by the mouth of his prophet, \u2018I will destroy\n  the wisdom of the wise, and bring to nought the understanding of the\n  learned.\u2019 Again, our Saviour does solemnly return his Father thanks\n  for that he had \u2018hidden the mysteries of salvation from the wise, and\n  revealed them to babes,\u2019 i. e. to fools.\u201d\n\nThe book ends with these words, \u201cI hate a pot-companion with a good\nmemory: so indeed I hate a hearer that will carry anything away with\nhim. Wherefore in short, farewell: be jolly, live long, drink deep, ye\nmost illustrious votaries of Folly.\u201d\n\nIt is said that Luther was repelled by this book. I do not wonder.\nErasmus would seem to be as far removed from the spirit of\nProtestantism as from that of medi\u00e6val Catholicism. Has Erasmus,\nperhaps without wholly realizing the fact himself, stepped quite\noutside the traditional Christian system of beliefs and values into\na world-view which is partly that of the ancient philosophies and\npartly that of the eighteenth century Rationalist? I do not know. He is\ncertainly a liberal in matters of religion, but unlike our contemporary\nliberals, he shows little interest in natural science.\n\nHe was severely criticised for refusing to participate in the\nReformation on the side of the Reformers. The following bits of\ncorrespondence which I quote from Professor Smith\u2019s biography indicate\nthe esteem in which he and Luther finally held each other. Luther wrote\nabout the year 1524:\n\n  \u201cSince we see that the Lord has not given you courage and sense to\n  assail those monsters openly and confidently with us, we are not the\n  men to expect what is beyond your power and measure.... We only fear\n  that you may be induced by our enemies to fall upon our doctrine with\n  some publication, in which case we should be obliged to resist you to\n  your face.... Hitherto I have controlled my pen as often as you prick\n  me, and have written in letters to friends, which you have seen, that\n  I would control it until you publish something openly. For although\n  you will not side with us, and although you injure and make skeptical\n  many pious men by your impiety and hypocrisy, yet I cannot and do\n  not accuse you of willful obstinancy.... We have fought long enough;\n  we must take care not to eat each other up. This would be a terrible\n  catastrophe, as neither of us wishes to harm religion, and without\n  judging each other both may do good.\u201d\n\nErasmus wrote to his friend, Everard,\n\n  \u201cWith what odium Luther burdens the cause of learning and that of\n  Christianity! As far as he can he involves all men in his business.\n  Everyone confessed that the Church suffered under the tyranny of\n  certain men, and many were taking counsel to remedy this state of\n  affairs. Now this man has arisen to treat the matter in such a way\n  that he fastens the yoke on us more firmly, and that no one dares to\n  defend even what he has said well. Six months ago I warned him to\n  beware of hatred. \u2018The Babylonian Captivity\u2019 (a bitter treatise which\n  Luther wrote) has alienated many from him, and he daily puts forth\n  more atrocious things.\u201d\n\nAnd again to Luther, in reply to a very unkind letter,\n\n  \u201cYour letter was delivered to me late and had it come on time it\n  would not have moved me.... The whole world knows your nature,\n  according to which you have guided your pen against no one more\n  bitterly and, what is more detestable, more maliciously than against\n  me.... The same admirable ferocity which you formerly used against\n  Cochlaeus and against Fisher, who provoked you to it by reviling,\n  you now use against my book in spite of its courtesy. How do your\n  scurrilous charges that I am an atheist, an Epicurean, and a skeptic\n  help the argument?... It terribly pains me, as it must all good men,\n  that your arrogant, insolent, rebellious nature has set the world in\n  arms.... You treat the Evangelic cause so as to confound together all\n  things sacred and profane as if it were your chief aim to prevent the\n  tempest from ever becoming calm, while it is my greatest desire that\n  it should die down.... I should wish you a better disposition were\n  you not so marvelously satisfied with the one you have. Wish me any\n  curse you will except your temper, unless the Lord change it for you.\u201d\n\nMuch has been made of the following \u201cdamning\u201d admission:\n\n  \u201cWould that some \u2018deus ex machina\u2019 might make a happy ending for this\n  drama so inauspiciously begun by Luther! He himself gives his enemies\n  the dart by which they transfix him, and acts as if he did not wish\n  to be saved, though frequently warned by me and by his friends to\n  tone down the sharpness of his style.... I cannot sufficiently wonder\n  at the spirit in which he has written. Certainly he has loaded the\n  cultivators of literature with heavy odium. Many of his teachings and\n  admonitions were splendid, but would that he had not vitiated these\n  good things by mixing intolerable evils! If he had written all things\n  piously, yet I should not have courage to risk my life for the truth.\n  All men have not strength for martyrdom. I fear least, if any tumult\n  should arise, I should imitate Peter (in denying the Lord).\u201d\n\nIt is doubtful if Erasmus meant this confession of weakness to be taken\nliterally. Cowards are not often so honest with themselves, nor do\nthey make such candid revelations of their fears, but rather affect a\nshow of bravery so long as it is possible to disguise their weakness\nof character. Had Erasmus been less strong, he would have yielded to\npressure, joined the reformers and sought refuge among them. Instead,\nhe stood against the crowd, knowing well that although he might decline\nto join the ranks of Luther, there was no refuge for him amongst the\nchurchmen whom he had been attacking for many years. He did not betray\nhis own cause, the Renaissance, but remained true to it in opposition\nto bigotry and ignorance on both sides of the controversy. In support\nof the revival of learning he was courageous enough. Surrounded as he\nwas by madness, he conceived it to be the task of the wise man to keep\nhis balance and work for peace and sanity.\n\nI believe this to be the first social task of the educated. Could\na Socrates, or a Seneca, or Cicero have returned to life in the\nyear 1525, it is difficult to imagine that he would have pursued a\ncourse very different from that Erasmus pursued. A man\u2019s intellectual\nintegrity does not require that he take sides when he believes that\nneither side has the truth. I believe Erasmus took the longer view, for\ntoday we find Humanism gradually supplanting orthodoxy among educated\nProtestants, and I have no doubt that something similar is taking place\nin Catholic centers of culture. The liberal Catholic and the liberal\nProtestant are more nearly of one mind than is either of them with the\nFundamentalist in his own sect. And they are each nearer to Erasmus.\nErasmus did not suffer martyrdom, neither did he make martyrs of those\nwho opposed him. Persecution and martyrdom are the first things that\nthe uneducated think of in any social crisis. The masses are prepared\nto make any conflict the occasion of both, and with only the vaguest\nidea of what the killing is all about. If there were more men like\nErasmus there would be less occasion for such practices. His is the\ncause which will never triumph by force.\n\nHumanism, which in the Italian Renaissance was something of a _parvenu_\neffort at culture, comes to its maturity with Montaigne. It is an\neducational experience lived through, a wisdom grown into, as Montaigne\nsays, with everything in its season. Montaigne\u2019s mind is stored with\nthe fruits of the wisdom of all historic times. He quotes the ancients\nas only Erasmus could, yet he is never an imitator or copier. His is\none of the most original minds in literature, and his originality\nincreases as he grows older and has time to think. It is very different\nfrom the rebelliousness of certain contemporary radicals, whose\nliberalism might be characterized as retarded adolescence.\n\nA contemporary critic says of him, \u201cMontaigne ... was one of the most\ncivilized men of whom we have any record: his intellectual curiosity\nwas matched by his magnanimity. He hated cruelty, prejudice, violence\nand stupidity: his love of life was so great that it illumined every\nobject in the world of sense and in the world of thought. His style was\nso original that his remarks on little things have outlived thousands\nof works dealing soberly with portentous ideas. He could write on\ntrivial themes without becoming trivial.\u201d\n\nLike Erasmus, he has a delicious sense of humor in which there is no\nbitterness. He is so accustomed to ideas that he can play with them.\nHe can smile at his own weaknesses, and discuss every question with\nopen mind and with that \u201ckindly irony which is perhaps the ripest of\nall moods in which poor humanity can look at itself.\u201d But Erasmus\nwas the professional scholar, and we think of him always moving in\ncircles where learning is of special interest. One does not think of\neducational institutions when one reads Montaigne\u2019s essays, but of the\neducated man himself. He is the learned layman, the _amateur_ whose\nlearning is assimilated with all the interests of the daily routine of\nliving. He is not \u201ctaken in\u201d by his culture so as to make it an end in\nitself. He says,\n\n  \u201cI labor not to be beloved more and esteemed better being dead than\n  alive.... If I were one of those to whom the world may be indebted\n  for praise, I would quit it for one moytie, on condition it would\n  pay me before hand.... I make no account of goods which I could\n  not employ to the use of my life. Such as I am, so I would not be\n  elsewhere than on paper. Mine art and industry have been employed\n  to make myself of some worth; my study and endeavor to doe, and not\n  to write. I have applied all my skill and devoire to frame my life.\n  Lo--heere mine occupation and my work. I am a less maker of books\n  than of anything else.... Whosoever hath any worth in him, let him\n  shew it in his behaviour, manners and ordinary discourses; be it\n  to treat of love or of quarrels; of sport and play or bed-matters,\n  at board or elsewhere; or be it in the conduct of his own affairs\n  or private household matters.... Demand a Spartan whether he would\n  rather be a cunning Rhethorician, then an excellent souldier;\n  nay, were I asked, I wuld say a good Cooke, had I not some one to\n  serve me. Good Lord--how I would hate such a commendation, to be a\n  sufficient man in writing and a foolish, shallow-headed braine or\n  coxcombe in all things else.\u201d\n\nHe ridicules those who strive to make a show of learning and \u201calledge\nPlato and Saint Thomas for things which the first man they meete would\ndecide as well.... Such learning as could not enter into their middle\nhath staid on their tongues.\u201d\n\n  \u201cBeing young I studied for ostentation; then a little to enoble\n  myselfe and become wiser; now for delight and recreation, never for\n  gaine. A vaine conceit and lavish humour I had after this kinde of\n  stuffe; not only to provide for my need, but some what further to\n  adorne and embellish my selfe withall; I have since partlie left it.\u201d\n\nHe loves Letters but does not worship them. He remains a little\nsurprised and amused at his own bits of wisdom and does not quite know\nhow he came into the company of the philosophers.\n\n  \u201cNothing may be spoken so absurdly but that it is spoken by some of\n  the philosophers. And therefore do I suffer my humors or caprices\n  more freely to pass in publike. For as much as though they are borne\n  with, and of me, and without any patterne; well I wot, they will\n  be found to have relation to some ancient humour, and some shall\n  be found, that will both know and tell whence, and of whom I have\n  borrowed them. My customes are naturall; when I contrived them, I\n  called not for the help of any discipline: And weake and faint as\n  they were, when I have had a desire to expresse them, and to make\n  them appeare to the world a little more comely and decent, I have\n  somewhat endevoured to aide them with discourse, and assist them with\n  examples. I have wondred at my selfe, that by mere chance I have\n  met with them, agreeing and sutable to so many ancient examples and\n  Philosophicall discourses. What regiment my life was of, I never knew\n  nor learned but after it was much worne and spent. A new figure: An\n  unpremeditated Philosopher and a casuall.\u201d\n\nIt is this unostentatious, unpremeditated, casual and chatty quality\nof Montaigne\u2019s writing that reveals the genuineness of his education.\nA present-day critic would lead us to believe that he kept a note\nbook and patiently copied out of his classics the passages which he\nmight use as illustrations. In a characteristic bit of humor at his\nown expense, Montaigne seems to justify this idea that he was a mere\ncompiler of other men\u2019s thoughts.\n\n  \u201cWe labor and toyle and plod to fill the memorie and leave both\n  understanding and conscience empty. Even as birds flutter and skip\n  from field to field to peck up corn or any grain and without tasting\n  the same carrie it in their bills therewith to feed their little\n  ones: so doe our pedants glean and pick learning from books and\n  never lodge it further than their lips only to disgorge and cast\n  it to the wind. It is strange how filthy sottishness takes hold of\n  mine example. Is not that which I do in the greatest part of this\n  composition all one and self same thing? I am forever here and there\n  picking and culling from this and that book the sentences that please\n  me, not to keepe them (for I have no store house to reserve them in)\n  but to transport them into this: where to say truth, they are no more\n  mine than in their first place.\u201d\n\nBut it is obvious that these essays were not the product of a mind\nwhich worked in such a sophomoric manner as this. Montaigne\u2019s mind\nis saturated with \u201cancient humor.\u201d There is no pretense or conscious\neffort to appear erudite. While many other Renaissance scholars were\nwriting in Latin and affecting a Ciceronian style, Montaigne wrote\nin French. He is, I believe, the creator of the essay as a form of\nliterary expression, a style which is more free and informal than the\nconventional forms of his day.\n\nA man who spent his days in seclusion in his library in the tower\nof his castle, he writes not of books but of every conceivable\nhuman interest and commonplace reality. His wisdom turns to such\nconsiderations as, \u201cBy diverse means men come to a like end.\u201d \u201cHow\nthe soul dischargeth her passions upon false objects.\u201d \u201cWhether the\ncaptaine of a place besieged ought to sally forth to parley.\u201d He writes\nof \u201cIdleness,\u201d of \u201cLiars,\u201d or \u201cVirtue,\u201d of \u201cDrunkenness,\u201d of \u201cExercise\nor Practice,\u201d of \u201cProfit and Honesty,\u201d of \u201cRepenting,\u201d of \u201cCoaches,\u201d\nof \u201cThe Verses of Virgil,\u201d of \u201cVanity,\u201d of \u201cThe affection of fathers to\ntheir Children,\u201d of \u201cSeneca\u201d and \u201cPlutarch\u201d and \u201cJulius Caesar.\u201d Always\nhis interest is in human experience. Shrewd personal observations are\nmingled with stories from antiquity and quaint philosophic maxims in a\nmind which is at once mature and inquisitive, loquacious and sceptical,\ncandidly self-revealing, without pretention, equally at home among\nbooks and things. Let those who object to the teaching of the classics\non the ground that they tend to a \u201cseparation of education from life\u201d\ngo back and re-read Montaigne.\n\nAlthough the two were by temperament very different, Montaigne would\nhave pleased Erasmus. His education and philosophy of life were very\nmuch the type that Erasmus strove to encourage. When Montaigne was\nborn, in 1533, the influence of the Renaissance had already made\nitself felt in France. He was three years old when Erasmus died. But\nhis casual mention of \u201cThe Adages\u201d and \u201cColloquies\u201d of Erasmus would\nindicate that sometime in his youth these books formed part of his\neducation. His knowledge of Greek and Latin began at a very early\nperiod in his life. It is said that when he was a mere infant his\nfather placed him in the home of a neighboring scholar so that he would\ngrow up with the same familiarity with these languages as with his\nmother tongue. He entered what was called a \u201ccollege\u201d at the age of\nsix. It was, I suppose, a preparatory school. It must have come under\nthe influence of the revival of learning for it had on its faculty some\nof the ablest scholars in France at that time. At the age of thirteen\nhe entered a university to study Law, took his degree at twenty, and at\ntwenty-one was appointed councilor for the Parliament of Bordeaux. He\nseems to have had some military experience also, and to have spent some\ngay years at court.\n\nWhen he was thirty-nine years old he inherited the estate and castle\nof Montaigne near Bordeaux. He married, and except for the few years,\nwhen against his inclination he served as Mayor of Bordeaux, he spent\nthe remainder of his days in private life, looking after his estate and\nenjoying hours of unbroken meditation in his tower library, reading his\nHorace and Plutarch and the ancient poets and philosophers generally.\nHe says he was not a great reader, but that he liked to have his\nbooks about him. He especially enjoyed the privacy of his library,\nfrom which, he gives us to understand, his wife and the rest of the\nhousehold were excluded.\n\nMontaigne began writing brief essays when he was forty-five years old,\nnot at first for publication but rather so that he might present a true\npicture of himself to his family and friends. The writing evidently\namused him for as the years passed the essays grew longer and their\ncontent more serious.\n\nIf we are to see the full significance of the essays as the revelation\nof an achievement in education--and that is our present interest in\nthem--we must remember what was happening in the world at the time\nthey were written. The struggle of the Reformation was in full swing.\nMontaigne\u2019s lifetime coincides with what was doubtless the most bitter\nand acrimonious period of that religious conflict. Everywhere there\nwas persecution, riot, intrigue, retaliation; men seemed to have lost\nutterly the liberal spirit of the Renaissance and to have forgotten\nthat there was such a virtue as tolerance.\n\nMontaigne was an exception. It is said that during the years of\nbloodshed in France, his castle was never fortified, nor closed, and\nthat both Catholics and Protestants were welcome there. The battle does\nnot disturb Montaigne\u2019s equanimity, nor warp his judgment; it remains\nto him a little more than a fight in the street. I should like to call\nattention to this indifference to the great mass movement of the times,\nfor there are those who contend that philosophy, art and letters are\nbut the by-products of such movements. At a time when nearly every\none is eaten up with partisan zeal, Montaigne hardly mentions the\nReformation. He says, \u201cI perswade you, in your opinions and discourses,\nas much as in your custom, and in every other thing, to use moderation\nand temperance, and avoid all newfangled inventions and strangenesses.\nAll extravagant wais displease me.\u201d\n\nWhile others are resorting to torture and massacre for the sake of a\nfaith which they do not question, Montaigne quietly retires and has\ntime to see when he is making himself ridiculous.\n\n  \u201cIt is not long since I retired my selfe unto mine owne house, with\n  full purpose, as much as lay in me, not to trouble myselfe with any\n  businesse, but solitarily and quietly to weare out the remainder\n  of my wellnigh spent life: when me thought I could doe my spirit\n  no greater favor than to give him the full scope of idlenesse, and\n  entertaine him as best he pleased, and withall to settle himselfe as\n  best he liked: which I hoped he might, now being by time become more\n  settled and ripe, accomplish very easily: but I finde\n\n      \u2018... evermore idlenesse\n      Doth wavering mindes addresse.\u2019\n\n  That contrariwise, playing the skittish and loose broken jade, he\n  takes a hundred times more cariere and libertie unto himselfe than\n  he did for others: and begets in me so many extravagant chimeraes\n  and fantastical monsters, so orderless, and without any reason, one\n  huddled upon the other, that at leisure to view the foolishnesse and\n  monstrous strangeness of them, I have begun to keep a register of\n  them, hoping, if I live, one day to make him ashamed and blush at\n  himselfe.\u201d\n\nToward the multitude and its judgments of value he is indifferent,\n\n  \u201cOur soule must play her part, but inwardly, within our selves,\n  where no eyes shine but ours: ... not for any advantage but for the\n  gracefulness of honestie itselfe. This benefit is much greater, and\n  more worthie to be wished and hoped, then honor and glory, which is\n  naught but a favorable judgment that is made of us.... Is it reason\n  to make the life of a wise man depend on the judgment of fooles?\n  Nothing is so incomprehensible to be just waied as the mindes of the\n  multitude....\n\n  \u201c... In this breathie confusion of brutes and frothy chaos of reports\n  and of vulgar opinions which still push us on, no good can be\n  established. Let us not propose so fleeting and so wavering an end\n  unto ourselves. Let us constantly follow reason: And let the vulgar\n  approbation follow us that way, if it please. Of the many thousands\n  of worthie, valiant men which fifteen hundred years since [the day of\n  Juvenal] have died in France with their weapons in their hands, not\n  one in a hundred have come to our knowledge.... It shall be much, if\n  a hundred years hence the civil warres which lately we have had in\n  France be but remembered in grosse.\u201d\n\nYes, the multitude may follow if it pleases; Montaigne will not urge\nit. He may remind it that in a few years its cause may be forgotten.\nBut how free he is from the righteous indignation and vindictiveness\nand factiousness which everywhere storm about him. He has that urbanity\nof which I spoke, and the serenity of one who has learned to laugh at\nhis own prejudices.\n\n  \u201cSurely, man is a wonderful, vaine, divers and wavering subject: it\n  is very hard to ground any directly constant and uniforme judgment\n  upon him.\u201d\n\nHis wisdom leads him to see not only the folly of mankind, but also\nhis own folly and weakness, which he does not strive to conceal, but\nrelates with amusing candor.\n\n  \u201cI have, a kind of raving, fanciful behavior that retireth well into\n  myselfe: and on the other side a grosse and childish ignorance of\n  many ordinary things: by means of which two qualities I have in my\n  daies committed five or six as sottish trickes as any one whatsoever:\n  which to my derogration may be reported....\n\n  \u201cFor my part, I may in generall wish to be other than I am: I may\n  condenme and mislike my universall forme: I may beseech God to\n  grant me an undefiled reformation and excuse my natural weaknesse:\n  but me seemeth I ought to tearme this repentance, no more than the\n  displeasure of being neither an Angell nor Cato....\n\n  \u201cWhen I consult with my age of my youthe\u2019s proceedings, I finde that\n  commonly (according to my opinion) I managed them in order. This\n  is all my resistance is able to perform. I flatter not myselfe: in\n  like circumstances I should be ever the same. It is not a spot, but\n  a whole dye that staynes mee. I acknowledge no repentence (that) is\n  superficiall, meane, and ceremonious.\n\n  \u201cCrosses and afflictions (works of penance) make me doe nothing but\n  curse them. They are for people that cannot be arroused but by the\n  whip.... The happy life (in my opinion, not as said Antisthenes, the\n  happy death,) is it that makes man\u2019s happinesse in this world.\n\n  \u201cI have not preposterously busied myselfe to tie the taile of a\n  Philosopher unto the head and bodie of a varlet: nor that this\n  paultrie end, should disavow and belie the fairest soundest and\n  longest part of my life. I will present myselfe and make a generall\n  muster of my whole, everywhere uniformally. Were I to live againe, it\n  should be as I have already lived. I neither deplore the past, nor\n  dread what is to come.\u201d\n\nThe man who can speak so of himself is not likely to hold up any\nuniversal standard of faith or practice. He is not the man with the\nmessage for humanity, as were the Reformers and their enemies in the\nchurch. He is not a partisan because he has gone beyond such dilemmas.\nHis knowledge of many books and of many and diverse explantations of\nthe riddle of life and many kinds of goods and evils has made him\nsee that there is no \u201cone right way.\u201d Reason has often been opposed\nto faith. Montaigne sees that reason too is faith, and faith all too\nhuman. There can be no finality.\n\nI suspect that his tolerance and aloofness during the Reformation in\nFrance were the result of a point of view somewhat similar to that of\nLessing\u2019s \u201cNathan the Wise,\u201d and his story of the three rings. No one\npossessed the original, which was supposed to entitle the owner to\nthe ancestral blessing and inheritance. All, like all religions, were\ncounterfeits of the lost article.\n\nMontaigne gives his ideas of religion and philosophy in the longest of\nhis essays, \u201cAn Apologie of Raymond Sebond.\u201d He says that his father\nonce requested him to translate a book on natural Theology by an\nunknown Spanish writer of this name. His remarks reveal the extent to\nwhich his mind is freed from both rationalism and religious dogmatism.\n\n  \u201cWe should accompany our faith with all the reason we possess: yet\n  always with this proviso, that we think it does not depend on us,\n  and that all our strength and arguments can never attain to so\n  supernaturall and divine a knowledge.\u201d\n\nHis remarkable detachment is seen in the following. He says that the\nbest test of Verity is the practice of virtue.\n\n  \u201cAnd therefore was our good Saint Lewis in the right, when that\n  Tartan King who was to become a Christian intended to come to Lions\n  to kisse the Pope\u2019s feet, and there to view the sanctitie he hoped\n  to find in our lives and manners, instantly to divert him from it\n  fearing lest our dissolute manners and licentious kind of life might\n  scandalize him and so alter his opinion foreconceived of so sacred a\n  religion. How be it the contrary happened to another who for the same\n  effect being come to Rome, and there viewing the dissoluteness of the\n  prelates and people of those days, was so much more confirmed in our\n  religion, considering with himselfe what force and divinity it must\n  of consequence have since it was able, amidst so many corruptions and\n  so viciously poluted hands to maintain her dignitie and splendor....\n\n  \u201cOur zeale worketh wonders when ever it secondeth our inclination\n  toward hatred, cruelitie, ambition, avarice, detraction or\n  rebellion.... Among other discommodities of our nature this is\n  one, there is darkness in our minds, and in us not only necessity\n  of erring but love of errors.... Presumption is our naturall and\n  originall infirmitie. Of all creatures, man is the most miserable\n  and fraile, and therewithall the proudest and disdainfullest ...\n  he ascribeth divine conditions unto himselfe that he selecteth and\n  separateth himselfe from out the ranke of other creatures.... By\n  what comparison from them to us doth he conclude the brutishness he\n  ascribeth unto them? When I am playing with my cat who knows whether\n  she have more sport in dallying with me than I in gaming with her? We\n  entertain one another with mutuall apish tricks.\u201d\n\n  \u201cWe understand them (the beasts) no more than they us. By the same\n  reason may they as well esteem us Beasts, as we them. It is no great\n  marvell if we understand them not: no more doe we understand the\n  Cornish, the Welch, or Irish.\u201d\n\nHe is persuaded he says, that if anyone who has pursued knowledge will\n\u201cspeak in conscience, he will confess that all the benefit he hath\ngotten by so tedious a pursuit, hath been that he hath learned to know\nhis own weaknesse.\u201d\n\n  \u201cMy profession is not to know the truth nor to attaine it. I rather\n  open than discover things. The wisest that ever was, being demanded\n  what he knew, answered that he knew nothing.\u201d\n\nHe speaks with approval of the doubters, the Phyrronians who \u201cbut\ndesire to be contradicted, thereby to engender doubt and suspense of\njudgment which is their end and drift.\u201d Thus these men have attained\nthe condition of a quiet and contented life, exempted from the\nagitations which beset ourselves because we imagine we have a certainty\nand a knowledge that we do not possess.\n\nAfter all \u201cthat ignorance which knoweth and condemneth itselfe,\u201d is\nnot absolute ignorance. Montaigne seems to hold that it is the best\nwe may attain and that in knowing and condemning our ignorance we may\navoid much of the misery and mischief we inflict upon ourselves and one\nanother. The fears and revenge and jealousies and partisan strife and\nrebellion and envy and immoderate desires which everywhere he finds\nabout him all proceed, he thinks, from presumptuous ignorance which\ndoes not know itself to be ignorance. In the midst of theological\ndisputation he smilingly reminds his neighbors that as,\n\n  \u201cXenophanes said pleasantly that if beastes frame any gods unto\n  themselves (as likely it is they doe) they surely frame them like\n  unto themselves and glorifie themselves as we do. For what may not a\n  Goose say this? All parts of the world behold me, the earth serveth\n  me to tread upon, the sunne to give me light, the starres to inspire\n  me with influence: this commodity I have of the winds, and this\n  benefit of the waters: there is nothing that this world\u2019s vault doth\n  so favorably looke upon as me selfe: I am the favorite of nature. Is\n  it not man that careth for me, that keepeth me, and serveth me? For\n  me it is he soweth and reapeth and grindeth. If he eat me, so doth\n  man feede on his fellow, and so doe I on the wormes that consume and\n  eat him.\u201d\n\n  \u201cI commend the Milesian wench who seeing Thales the Philosoper\n  continually amusing hemselfe in the contemplation of heaven\u2019s wide\n  bounding vault and ever holding his eyes aloft, laid something in\n  his way to make him stumble, thereby to warne and put him in minde\n  that he should not amuse his thoughts about matters above the clouds\n  before he had provided for and well considered those at his feet.\n  Verily she advised him well, and it better became him rather to looke\n  to himselfe than to gaze on heaven.\u201d\n\n\u201c_The wisest judging of heaven is not to judge of it at all._\u201d His own\nmodest answer to the riddle of existence in contrast to those who would\n\u201cturne and winde God Almighty according to their own measure,\u201d is \u201cQue\nscay-je?\u201d--What do I know?\n\nMontaigne is not a hard and soulless sceptic. He is a well poised,\nmodest thinker and an honest man. He is not a denier, but one whose\nmind is free from cant, humbug, pretentiousness. Historically he is one\nof the links between the best in modern education and the questioning\nSocrates whom he knew and loved. I trust that in presenting the\nHumanist tradition in this concrete manner, I have been able to suggest\nsomething of its spirit. It has a necessary place in liberal education\nbecause it helps liberate the mind from the clutches of opinionated\nignorance, from the follies which prevail as truth in our own age, and\nfrom conceit and vanity to which our human nature is ever prone.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\nSCIENCE AND SUPERSTITION--HUXLEY\n\n\nWhen the ancient Humanist, Protagoras, said, \u201cMan is the measure of\nall things,\u201d he probably did not mean that all things may be measured\nby man, for in his following sentence he is sceptical of our knowledge\nof many things. He meant rather that all our measurements are human.\nThis independence of supernaturalism was not always characteristic\nof educated minds of antiquity, but it is one of the distinguishing\nfeatures of the educational tradition which we have derived from Greece\nand Rome. Thus Aristotle would establish ethics in the life of reason.\nThis same naturalistic bias also inspires those early attempts at\nscience which were broken off under the influence of Christianity.\n\nThe Renaissance was accompanied by a re-awakened interest in nature,\nand in human nature as part of nature as a whole. The trend toward\nnaturalism is seen in art, in the resumption of scientific research and\nexperimentation, and in the effort to supplant scholastic theology by\nthe study of human letters. To Da Vinci, for instance, science, art,\nand letters were but the varied aspects of the same cultural awakening.\nBut for the greater number of those who felt the influence of the\nRenaissance, science and letters became quite separate interests.\nThe new learning of the Humanists was almost exclusively a literary\nscholarship. Erasmus and his followers had very little interest in\nnatural science. They found in classic literature a body of mature\nwisdom ready to hand. Science on the contrary, was obliged to begin\n_de novo_, and slowly construct its instruments of thought, building,\ngradually a new system of knowledge. The brunt of the conflict with\nscholastic education fell upon the humanists. The real renaissance of\nscience did not take place until the seventeenth century.\n\nMeanwhile the Reformation had caused a revival of religious interest,\nand in Protestant countries like England, and later America, the\ninfluence of religion upon higher learning remained powerful. It\npermitted the classical tradition to survive in letter rather than in\nspirit. The naturalistic implications of the classics were ignored;\ncommentators whenever possible read into the texts the conventional\nbeliefs and sentiments of Protestantism. Humanism became \u201ctraditional\neducation,\u201d a new scholasticism, formal and innocuous, a mark of\nintellectual respectability, a \u201crefining\u201d influence, an embroidery of\nfamiliar quotation in the speech of parsons and country squires.\n\nSuccessive generations of grown-up schoolboys in Gothic halls,\nlaboriously translated, over and over again, hackneyed passages from a\nliterature that in the fifteenth century had been carried about like\nthe fire of Prometheus, kindling defiance to Heaven all over Europe.\nOften men could think of no better reason for the study of the ancient\nclassics than that in the tedium and monotony of language drill there\nwas a \u201cdiscipline\u201d which was good for the soul. The student\u2019s attention\nwas centered upon the niceties of construction and upon the task of\nmemorizing rules of grammar and a vocabulary, all stuffed into his head\nin the most artificial manner conceivable. He was not likely to be\npuzzled over the discovery that there might be something spiritually\nirreconcilable between Lucretius and the Thirty Nine Articles, or\nbetween the dialectic of Socrates and the Westminster confession of\nfaith.\n\nThere is a world of difference between this _denatured_ Humanism and\nthat of Erasmus or Montaigne. That this traditional education made\nfor polish and good breeding cannot be denied. Neither, I think,\ncan it be denied that there was something sterile and illiberal in\nProtestant-classical education. It is significant that both the\nEnlightenment of the eighteenth century and the progress of science in\nthe seventeenth and nineteenth centuries took place chiefly outside the\nestablished universities and sometimes in spite of their opposition.\n\nI do not see how the situation could well have been otherwise. In the\nfirst place the older Humanists themselves dealt the naturalism of\nthe ancients and such of it as was again coming to life a severe blow\nwhen they championed letters and remained indifferent to science.\nIn the second place, the Reformation quite side-tracked the revival\nof learning, superseded it, and took over into its own service only\nso much of it as it found congenial to its religious interests. It\nwas a mass movement, an attempt at a restatement of Christianity in\nterms of the philosophy of the common man, a philosophy to which\nthe questioning, enlightened common sense and worldly wisdom of a\nMontaigne, a Voltaire or a Hume is never very congenial. Santayana\nsays, \u201cThe philosophy of the common man is an old wife that gives him\nno pleasure, yet he cannot do without her, and resents any aspersions\nthat strangers may cast on her character.\n\n\u201cOf this homely philosophy the tender cuticle is religious belief;\nreally the least vital and most arbitrary part of human opinion, the\nouter ring, as it were, of the fortifications of prejudice, but for\nthat very reason the most jealously defended; since it is on being\nattacked there, at the least defensible point, that rage and alarm at\nbeing attacked at all are first aroused in the citadel. People are not\nnaturally sceptics, wondering if a single one of their intellectual\nhabits can be reasonably preserved; they are dogmatists angrily\nconfident of maintaining them all. Integral minds, pupils of a single\ncoherent tradition, regard their religion, whatever it may be, as\ncertain, as sublime, and as the only rational basis of morality and\npolicy. Yet in fact religious belief is terribly precarious, partly\nbecause it is arbitrary, so that in the next tribe or in the next\ncentury it will wear quite a different form; and partly because,\nwhen genuine, it is spontaneous and continually remodelled, like\npoetry, in the heart that gives it birth. A man of the world soon\nlearns to discredit established religions on account of their variety\nand absurdity, although he may good-naturedly continue to conform\nto his own; and a mystic before long begins fervently to condemn\ncurrent dogmas, on account of his own different inspiration. Without\nphilosophical criticism, therefore, mere experience and good sense\nsuggest that all positive religions are false, or at least (which\nis enough for my present purpose) that they are all fantastic and\ninsecure.\u201d\n\nSpeaking of the Reformation and its relation to science, Whitehead\nsays, \u201cWe cannot look upon it as introducing a new principle into human\nlife.\u201d Perhaps he is inclined to over-emphasize the assertions of\nthe Reformers that they were only restoring what had been forgotten.\nBut he says, \u201cIt is quite otherwise with the rise of modern science.\nIn every way it contrasts with the contemporary religious movement.\nThe Reformation was a popular uprising and for a century and a half\ndrenched Europe in blood. The beginnings of the scientific movement\nwere confined to a minority among the intellectual \u00e9lite.\u201d\n\nIt is doubtless because the Humanists remained relatively indifferent\nto science, that its early struggles with theology were comparatively\nmild. It was permitted to make remarkable progress in the seventeenth\ncentury without raising an issue too great for its strength. It is\ninteresting to note that when in the nineteenth century the conflict\nof natural science with theology became acute, science was at the same\ntime engaged in a struggle for recognition by the official educational\nsystem in which the classical tradition held sway.\n\nThe outstanding public champion of science in this conflict was Thomas\nH. Huxley. He could say of university education in England in the year\n1868, that the colleges no longer promoted research in science, and\nwere hardly more than \u201cboarding schools for bigger boys.\u201d Once they\nhad been homes for the life study of the most abstruse and important\nbranches of knowledge.\n\n  \u201cI believe there can be no doubt that the foreigner who should wish\n  to become acquainted with the scientific, or the literary, activity\n  of modern England, would simply lose his time and his pains if he\n  visited our universities with that object.\n\n  \u201cThe countrymen of Grote and of Mill, of Faraday, of Robert Brown, of\n  Lyell, and Darwin, to go no further back than the contemporaries of\n  men of middle age, can afford to smile at such a suggestion. England\n  can show now, and she has been able to show in every generation\n  since civilization spread over the West, individual men who hold\n  their own against the world, and keep alive the old tradition of her\n  intellectual eminence.\n\n  \u201cBut in the majority of cases, these men are what they are in virtue\n  of their native intellectual force, and of a strength of character\n  which will not recognise impediments. They are not trained in the\n  courts of the Temple of Science, but storm the walls of that edifice\n  in all sorts of irregular ways, and with much loss of time and power,\n  in order to obtain their legitimate positions.\n\n  \u201cOur universities not only do not encourage such men; do not offer\n  them positions, in which it should be their highest duty to do,\n  thoroughly, that which they are most capable of doing; but, as far as\n  possible, university training shuts out of the minds of those among\n  them, who are subjected to it, the prospect that there is anything in\n  the world for which they are specially fitted.--Imagine the success\n  of the attempt to still the intellectual hunger of any of the men I\n  have mentioned, by putting before him, as the object of existence,\n  the successful mimicry of the measure of a Greek song, or the roll of\n  Ciceronian prose!\u201d\n\nTwelve years later Huxley was still waging his contest for the\nadmission of science to the curricula of school and college against an\nopposition the obstinacy of which is a little difficult for us today to\nunderstand.\n\n  \u201cFor I hold very strongly by two convictions--The first is, that\n  neither the discipline nor the subject-matter of classical education\n  is of such direct value to the student of physical science as to\n  justify the expenditure of valuable time upon either; and the second\n  is, that for the purpose of attaining real culture, an exclusively\n  scientific education is at least as effectual as an exclusively\n  literary education.\n\n  \u201cI need hardly point out to you that these opinions, especially the\n  latter, are diametrically opposed to those of the great majority of\n  educated Englishmen, influenced as they are by school and university\n  traditions. In their belief, culture is obtainable only by a liberal\n  education; and a liberal education is synonymous, not merely with\n  education and instruction in literature, but in one particular form\n  of literature, namely, that of Greek and Roman antiquity. They hold\n  that the man who has learned Latin and Greek, however little, is\n  educated; while he who is versed in other branches of knowledge,\n  however deeply, is a more or less respectable specialist, not\n  admissable into the cultured caste. The stamp of the educated man,\n  the University degree, is not for him.\u201d\n\n  \u201cThe representatives of the Humanists, in the nineteenth century,\n  take their stand upon classical education as the sole avenue to\n  culture, as firmly as if we were still in the age of Renascence. Yet,\n  surely, the present intellectual relations of the modern and the\n  ancient worlds are profoundly different from those which obtained\n  three centuries ago. Leaving aside the existence of a great and\n  characteristic modern literature, of modern painting, and, especially\n  of modern music, there is one feature of the present state of the\n  civilized world which separates it more widely from the Renascence,\n  than the Renascence was separated from the middle ages.\n\n  \u201cThis distinctive character of our own times lies in the vast and\n  constantly increasing part which is played by natural knowledge. Not\n  only is our daily life shaped by it, not only does the prosperity\n  of millions of men depend upon it, but our whole theory of life has\n  long been influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the general\n  conceptions of the universe, which have been forced upon us by\n  physical science.\u201d\n\n  \u201cThe scientist, no longer disposed to remain on the defensive with\n  the usual apology for science, carries the battle into the opposing\n  camp and indicts the opposition, with some justice I think, for\n  its failure even when judged by its own traditional standards of\n  education.\n\n  \u201cThere is no great force in the _tu quoque_ argument, or else the\n  advocates of scientific education might fairly enough retort upon\n  the modern Humanists that they may be learned specialists, but that\n  they possess no such sound foundation for a criticism of life as\n  deserves the name of culture. And, indeed, if we were disposed to be\n  cruel, we might urge that the Humanists have brought this reproach\n  upon themselves, not because they are too full of the spirit of the\n  ancient Greek, but because they lack it.\n\n  \u201cThe period of the Renascence is commonly called that of the \u201cRevival\n  of Letters,\u201d as if the influences then brought to bear upon the\n  mind of Western Europe had been wholly exhausted in the field of\n  literature. I think it is very commonly forgotten that the revival of\n  science, effected by the same agency, although less conspicuous, was\n  not less momentous....\n\n  \u201cWe cannot know all the best thoughts and sayings of the Greeks\n  unless we know what they thought about natural phenomena. We cannot\n  fully apprehend their criticism of life unless we understand\n  the extent to which that criticism was affected by scientific\n  conceptions. We falsely pretend to be the inheritors of their\n  culture, unless we are penetrated, as the best minds among them were,\n  with an unhesitating faith that the free employment of reason, in\n  accordance with scientific method, is the sole method of reaching\n  truth.\n\n  \u201cThus I venture to think that the pretensions of our modern Humanists\n  to the possession of the monopoly of culture and to the exclusive\n  inheritance of the spirit of antiquity must be abated, if not\n  abandoned.\u201d\n\nHuxley was one of the few educators of his time who ought to have seen\nclearly that in the education of the ancients there was no conflict\nof interest between science and letters; the two were one in the\nnaturalistic minds of the Greeks. He is aware of the fact that both\nscience and letters were revived by the Renaissance, but it would seem\nthat he permits his zeal in the cause of scientific training to force\nhim at times into a rather one-sided and partisan position.\n\n  \u201cBut for those who mean to make science their serious occupation;\n  or who intend to follow the profession of medicine; or who have to\n  enter early upon the business of life; for all these, in my opinion,\n  classical education is a mistake; and it is for this reason that I\n  am glad to see \u2018mere literary education and instruction\u2019 shut out\n  from the curriculum of Sir Josiah Mason\u2019s College, seeing that its\n  inclusion would probably lead to the introduction of the ordinary\n  smattering of Latin and Greek....\u201d\n\n  \u201cThe great peculiarity of scientific training, that in virtue of\n  which it cannot be replaced by any other discipline whatsoever,\n  is this bringing of the mind directly into contact with fact, and\n  practising the intellect in the completest form of induction; that is\n  to say, in drawing conclusions from particular facts made known by\n  immediate observation of nature.\u201d\n\nThe struggle for recognition of the liberalizing educational value of\nscience was carried to successful issue in the nineteenth century.\nIn backward communities, Fundamentalism still sets its face against\ncertain of the anti-supernaturalist implications of science, and it is\nalways possible that if at any time the populace now dazzled by the\n\u201cwonders\u201d of science, should suspect the full meaning of the world-view\nwhich science would substitute for the older anthropomorphic ideas\nabout the universe, there may be a wide-spread popular reaction against\nit in the name of religion. But at present in educational institutions\ngenerally, scientific courses tend to predominate over the classical.\nMost of the struggles for \u201cacademic freedom\u201d and most of the live\nproblems in education revolve about the teaching of the sciences.\nA vastly greater number of minds are today set free from dogma and\nsuperstition and childish deference to authority by methods of\nscientific research than by the study of the classics. The latter is on\nthe decline and I suppose must continue to be so until Humanism again\npossesses that vitality and naturalism, and independence of judgment\nwhich men had when the Greeks set out to discover the Good Life.\n\nDewey says that without initiation into the scientific spirit one is\nnot in possession of the best tools which humanity has so far devised\nfor effectively directed reflection. In it may be realized that desire\nfor exact knowledge as different from mere opinion which the ancients\nsought. It tests all things in the light of experiment and by appeal\nto cold objective fact. It is often said that science is Reason in\ncontrast with Faith. Certainly the scientist cannot in his research\npermit himself to be swayed by religious belief and remain scientific.\nHe must accept no conclusion on authority or because he wishes to\nbelieve it. But the scientific mind is not, as a matter of fact, as\nstrictly rationalistic as was the scholastic mind. The logic of the\nlatter is a formal vindication of The Truth conceived in advance of\nknowledge of fact. The reasoning of the former proceeds by a succession\nof shrewd guesses which are held to be mere hypothesis until verified\nby the facts. This necessity of holding judgment in abeyance, and\nof being willing to discard any belief or postulate that may not be\nconfirmed by objective reality, has the greatest educational value. In\nspite of the everlasting deceitfulness and conceit of human nature and\nnotwithstanding the fact that pompous ignorance and fraud are often\npalmed off upon the public as scientific knowledge, I should say,\nprecisely because of these things, training in scientific methods is\nthe best device available to the educator for instilling into the human\nmind some measure of respect for truth.\n\nTo this end Huxley would introduce scientific experimentation into the\nelementary school and would establish \u201cscientific Sunday schools,\u201d\n\n  \u201cWould there really be anything wrong in using part of Sunday for\n  the purpose of instructing those who have no other leisure, in a\n  knowledge of the phenomena of Nature, and of man\u2019s relation to\n  Nature?\n\n  \u201cI should like to see a scientific Sunday-school in every parish,\n  not for the purpose of superseding any existing means of teaching\n  the people the things that are for their good, but side by side with\n  them. I cannot but think that there is room for all of us to work in\n  helping to bridge over the great abyss of ignorance which lies at our\n  feet.\n\n  \u201cAnd if any of the ecclesiastical persons to whom I have referred\n  object that they find it derogatory to the honour of the God whom\n  they worship, to awaken the minds of the young to the infinite wonder\n  and majesty of the works which they proclaim His, and to teach them\n  those laws which must needs be His laws, and therefore of all things\n  needful for man to know--I can only recommend them to be let blood\n  and put on low diet. There must be something very wrong going on in\n  the instrument of logic if it turns out such conclusions from such\n  premises.\u201d\n\nThere is an intellectual cleanness, something downright and honest\nabout the scientific pursuit of knowledge, and this uncompromising\nmental integrity characterizes everything that Huxley said and did.\nThere is nothing shifty in a mind trained as his was. His is like a\ncool north breeze on one of those clear summer days that sometimes\nfollow a period of sultriness, fog and rain. If things are a little too\nsharply outlined, they are at least recognized for what they are. No\nevasive mistiness obscures the landscape. To Huxley the foundation of\nmorality is to give up pretending to believe that for which there is no\nevidence. He held that the lowest depths to which the human race could\nfall--after knowing what science now reveals of nature--would be to go\nback and deceive itself with comforting fictions. You will remember\nhis correspondence with Kingsley when death had entered his home. The\ngrief-stricken Huxley refused the consolations of a faith in which he\ncould not whole-heartedly believe. Like Socrates and Montaigne and\nmany educated men today, Huxley was candidly agnostic with respect to\nmatters which lie beyond the radius of human knowledge.\n\nHuxley was a determinist, but it is doubtful if he was a materialist.\nAt least he held to a materialism which in one sense might be\nreconciled with a form of idealism. In the address in honor of Joseph\nPriestley he said,\n\n  \u201cWithout containing much that will be new to the readers or Hobbs,\n  Spinoza, Collins, Hume, and Hartley, and indeed, while making no\n  pretensions to originality, Priestley\u2019s \u2018Disquisitions relating to\n  Matter and Spirit,\u2019 and his \u2018Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity\n  Illustrated,\u2019 are among the most powerful, clear, and unflinching\n  expositions of materialism and necessarianism which exist in the\n  English language, and are still well worth reading.\n\n  \u201cPriestley denied the freedom of the will in the sense of its\n  self-determination; he denied the existence of a soul distinct\n  from the body; and as a natural consequence, he denied the natural\n  immortality of man.\n\n  \u201cIn relation to these matters English opinion a century ago was very\n  much what it is now.\n\n  \u201cA man may be a necessarian without incurring graver reproach than\n  that implied in being called a gloomy fanatic, necessarianism,\n  though very shocking, having a note of Calvinistic orthodoxy; but,\n  if a man is a materialist; or, if good authorities say he is and\n  must be so, in spite of his assertion to the contrary; or, if he\n  acknowledge himself unable to see good reasons for believing in the\n  natural immortality of man, respectable folks look upon him as an\n  unsafe neighbour of a cashbox, as an actual or potential sensualist,\n  the more virtuous in outward seeming, the more certainly loaded with\n  secret \u2018grave personal sins.\u2019\n\n  \u201c... I must confess that what interests me most about Priestley\u2019s\n  materialism, is the evidence that he saw dimly the seed of\n  destruction which such materialism carries within its own bosom. In\n  the course of his reading for his \u2018History of Discoveries relating\n  to Vision, Light, and Colours,\u2019 he had come upon the speculations of\n  Boscovich and Michell, and had been led to admit the sufficiently\n  obvious truth that our knowledge of matter is a knowledge of its\n  properties; and that of its substance--if it have a substance--we\n  know nothing. And this led to the further admission that, so far\n  as we can know, there may be no difference between the substance\n  of matter and the substance of spirit (\u2018Disquisitions, p. 16\u2019).\n  A step farther would have shown Priestley that his materialism\n  was, essentially, very little different from the Idealism of his\n  contemporary, the Bishop of Cloyne.\u201d\n\nPerhaps William James may have had Huxley or his type in mind when\nhe wrote his famous passage about learning \u201cto stand this universe.\u201d\nYet I suspect that Huxley\u2019s universe was more simple and benevolent,\nmore na\u00efvely conceived than was that of James. Huxley was to the end a\nrationalist, and lived and worked in a period when Nature was thought\nto be essentially reasonable. Man need only learn the laws of nature\nand obey them to become wise and happy and good. The aim of education\nwas to acquaint the student with the laws of nature.\n\n  \u201cWell, what I mean by Education is learning the rules of this mighty\n  game. In other words, education is the instruction of the intellect\n  in the laws of Nature, under which name I include not merely things\n  and their forces, but men and their ways; and the fashioning of the\n  affections and of the will into an earnest and loving desire to move\n  in harmony with those laws. For me, education means neither more nor\n  less than this....\n\n  \u201cSuppose it were perfectly certain that the life and fortune of every\n  one of us would, one day or other, depend upon his winning or losing\n  a game of chess. Don\u2019t you think that we should all consider it to\n  be a primary duty to learn at least the names and the moves of the\n  pieces; to have a notion of a gambit, and a keen eye for all the\n  means of giving and getting out of check?\n\n  \u201cYet it is a very plain and elementary truth, that the life, the\n  fortune, and the happiness of every one of us, and, more or less, of\n  those who are connected with us, do depend upon our knowing something\n  of the rules of a game infinitely more difficult and complicated than\n  chess. It is a game which has been played for untold ages, every man\n  and woman of us being one of the two players in a game of his or\n  her own. The chess-board is the world, the pieces are the phenomena\n  of the universe, the rules of the game are what we call the laws\n  of Nature. The player on the other side is hidden from us. We know\n  that his play is always fair, just and patient. But we also know, to\n  our cost, that he never overlooks a mistake, or makes the smallest\n  allowance for ignorance. To the man who plays well, the highest\n  stakes are paid, with that sort of overflowing generosity with which\n  the strong shows delight in strength. And one who plays ill is\n  checkmated--without haste, but without remorse.\n\n  \u201cMy metaphor will remind some of you of the famous picture in which\n  Retzsch has depicted Satan playing at chess with man for his soul.\n  Substitute for the mocking friend in that picture a calm, strong\n  angel who is playing for love, as we say, and would rather lose than\n  win--and I should accept it as an image of human life....\n\n  \u201cThat man, I think, has had a liberal education who has been so\n  trained in youth that his body is the ready servant of his will, and\n  does with ease and pleasure all the work that, as a mechanism, it\n  is capable of; whose intellect is a clear, cold, logic engine, with\n  all its parts of equal strength, and in smooth working order; ready,\n  like a steam engine, to be turned to any kind of work, and spin the\n  gossamers as well as forge the anchors of the mind; whose mind is\n  stored with a knowledge of the great and fundamental truths of Nature\n  and of the laws of her operations; one who, no stunted ascetic, is\n  full of life and fire, but whose passions are trained to come to\n  heel by a vigorous will, the servant of a tender conscience; who has\n  learned to love all beauty, whether of Nature or of art, to hate all\n  vileness, and to respect others as himself.\n\n  \u201cSuch an one and no other, I conceive, has had a liberal education;\n  for he is, as completely as a man can be, in harmony with Nature. He\n  will make the best of her, and she of him. They will get on together\n  rarely; she as his ever beneficent mother; he as her mouthpiece, her\n  conscious self, her minister and interpreter.\u201d\n\nBut surely liberal education is more than becoming the mouthpiece\nof a benevolent nature. It seems to me that Huxley omits one of the\nessentials. Just as the nineteenth century Humanists, because of\ntheir neglect of science, possessed only a distorted and one-sided\nview of Humanist education, so it would seem to me that nineteenth\ncentury science in its opposition to traditional education, failed to\nsee that science is itself a part of Humanism. It is not merely the\ndiscovery of given \u201cLaws\u201d which exist independently in a benevolent\nand rational universe. It is the observation of certain relationships\nand recurrences and the statement of these things in general terms\nthat will give them significance for _human beings_. What nature is\naside from the fact that we are interested spectators does not concern\nus. Science grows out of the fact that we are more interested in\nsome things than in others. It is a human achievement; it is one of\nthe answers that mankind gives to the riddle of existence. It is not\nexistence which gives that answer, it is man. And education must not\nonly seek knowledge of the facts of nature, but having obtained such\nknowledge, _must try to understand what to do about it_. Now that we\nunderstand our natural environment, what kind of life can we best\nachieve with it? What valuations have men put upon deeds and things?\nWhat values is it possible to achieve? Our education is not done when\nwe have learned Nature\u2019s _yes_ and _no_; we have our own _yes_ and _no_\nto give.\n\nScientists quietly observing certain aspects of reality--those which\nlend themselves to knowing as a specialized undertaking--are happy\nto find that their abstract conceptions mutually imply and support\none another in an ordered system of knowledge. Their own reason which\nthey are thus able to impose upon nature, they believe they have\ndiscovered in nature itself. Hence nature appears to be more ordered\nthan it really is, and to be essentially reasonable and beneficent.\nCompare Huxley\u2019s picture of nature as a beneficent mother of whom the\neducated mind \u201cmakes the best, and she of him,\u201d he \u201cher conscious\nself, her minister and interpreter,\u201d with William James\u2019 statement\nabout \u201cthis partially hospitable and \u2018stepmotherly\u2019 world of ours.\u201d\nThe latter is surely the more profound and correct view. Water is not\nonly H\u2082O, it may drown you or quench your thirst. Fire is not merely\na process of oxidation, it is hot. It may be your willing servant, or\nyour relentless enemy. The modification of species which nineteenth\ncentury scientists held to be the outcome of natural selection is not\nwhat natural selection means to the organisms which experienced it.\nTo them it is a relentless struggle for a precarious and fleeting\nexistence in which satisfactions and victories are mingled with terror\nand starvation and agony. And man placed in the midst of such a world\nseeks education not only that he may interpret its happenings to an\nintelligence which is part of the natural process, but that he may\nselect wisely among the alternatives which Nature presents to him, lift\nhimself above chaos and the slime, and achieve an existence that, at\nleast while it lasts, has some significance and quality of decency and\nworth.\n\nIt is to this end that science is education; a true Humanism is\nimpossible without it. Such a Humanism is as anti-supernaturalistic as\ndeterminism. But it is naturalism with mankind, however, not merely\npictured as a passive resultant of natural forces, but actively\nselecting and creating value. As Huxley himself says, its aim is to\nprovide criteria for a \u201ccriticism of life.\u201d\n\n  \u201cMoreover this scientific \u2018criticism of life\u2019 presents itself to\n  us with different credentials from any other. It appeals not to\n  authority, nor to what anybody may have thought or said, but to\n  nature. It admits that all our interpretations of natural fact are\n  more or less imperfect and symbolic, and bids the learner seek for\n  the truth not among words but among things. It warns us that the\n  assertion which outstrips evidence is not only a blunder but a crime.\u201d\n\nHe saw a new culture in process of development, one which would enlist\nthe whole spiritual life of mankind,\n\n  \u201cThe scenes are shifting the great theatre of the world. The act\n  which commenced with the Protestant Reformation is nearly played out,\n  and a wider and deeper change than that effected three centuries\n  ago--a reformation, or rather a revolution of thought, the extremes\n  of which are represented by the intellectual heirs of John of Leyden\n  and of Ignatius Loyola, rather than by those of Luther and of\n  Leo--is waiting to come on, nay, visible behind the scenes to those\n  who have good eyes. Men are beginning, once more, to awake to the\n  fact that matters of belief and of speculation are of absolutely\n  infinite practical importance; and are drawing off from that sunny\n  country \u2018where it is always afternoon\u2019--the sleepy hollow of broad\n  indifferentism--to range themselves under their natural banners.\n  Change is in the air. It is whirling feather-heads into all sorts\n  of eccentric orbits, and filling the steadiest with a sense of\n  insecurity. It insists on reopening all questions and asking all\n  institutions, however venerable, by what right they exist, and\n  whether they are, or are not, in harmony with the real or supposed\n  wants of mankind.\u201d\n\nHuxley\u2019s services to education were more than his struggle for the\nrecognition of the educational value of science. His own contributions\nto the science of biology and his able championing of the case which\nDarwin had made in favor of the hypotheses of evolution did much to\nplace the biological sciences in their present position of pre\u00ebminence\nand to aid in placing both education and modern thought upon the basis\nof a philosophy of evolution.\n\nAfter receiving his degree in medicine, Huxley was appointed to the\nposition of assistant surgeon in the British navy. As he cruised about\non the war-ship \u2018Rattlesnake,\u2019 he began his studies of marine animals.\nDarwin, you will remember, had also spent long months on southern seas\nas government naturalist assigned to the Beagle. During the years that\nfollowed each had risen to a high position as a British scientist,\nconducting research, publishing papers, making new discoveries, all of\nwhich contributed to make the nineteenth century, as John Fiske said,\n\u201cthe century of science.\u201d\n\nDuring the years when Darwin was patiently elaborating the theory of\n\u201cdescent with modification\u201d which was destined within his own lifetime\nto bring about a revolutionary transformation in the philosophy of\nnature, Huxley did much to organize the science of Biology as a\ndefinite branch of natural history. His great energy and industry, his\npassion for exact knowledge and his genius for clear and comprehensive\nstatement made him one of the outstanding scientists of England. As\nprofessor of Natural History at the Royal School of Mines, and later in\nthe Royal College of Surgeons, and as publicist and member of numerous\ncommissions on science and education, he was in a position to throw\na tremendous weight of influence to the support of his convictions,\nshould he be drawn into a scientific controversy.\n\nWhen in 1859 Darwin published the \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d Huxley was one\nof the small group of eminent scientists whose favorable judgment\nDarwin felt would be necessary if the theory of natural selection were\nto command the attention of the scientific world. Darwin did not invent\nthe doctrine of evolution. This idea had from time to time suggested\nitself to men\u2019s minds whenever a naturalistic account of creation was\nattempted. The increase of knowledge of comparative anatomy, of geology\nand of zo\u00f6logy, and the discovery of certain structural likenesses\nand differences among both living organisms and the fossil remains\nwhich were found in the several layers of the earth\u2019s surface, could\nnot fail to suggest to many minds the thought that perhaps all forms\nof life might be related in one comprehensive evolutionary process.\nAlthough the evidence against the dogma of special creation was rapidly\naccumulating, no valid explanation had been found. Lamarcks\u2019 theory\nthat the structural modifications which characterize the various\nspecies of organisms were the result of effort and use and of special\nenergizing and development of various organs, was under discussion.\nThe theory did not, however, interest Huxley, because it implied that\nmodifications which occurred as a result of effort and use could be\ninherited, a belief for which there was not sufficient evidence.\n\nDarwin\u2019s book put the whole problem in a new light, and stated the\nhypotheses of organic evolution as an alternative to \u201cspecial creation\u201d\nin terms which were comprehensible to a mind trained in natural\nscience. Heretofore a mysterious principle of development had been\nsubstituted for a miracle of creation. Darwin did not invoke any such\nprinciple but with good scientific logic sought his explanation of the\norigin of species in the casual connections among observable facts.\n\nIt is not my purpose now to enter upon a discussion of Darwinism, or\nits present status in biology, a general understanding of which I think\nshould be part of the education of a modern man. I suspect that many\nmoderns who \u201cbelieve in evolution\u201d merely cherish a popular faith in\nsome mystical law of unusual progress, such as is expressed in the\nverse, \u201cSome call it evolution and some God.\u201d\n\nHuxley was uncompromisingly opposed to all such romantic theologizing\nin science. He was moreover, aware, as Darwin himself was, of the\ndifficulties of Darwin\u2019s theory. But he grasped the significance of\nwhat Darwin had done and saw the ground upon which he had placed the\ndiscussion of the problem, and he held that in the main Darwin was\ncorrect. Gracefully and courageously he took his stand at Darwin\u2019s\nside. In various addresses, essays, books, he drew upon his extensive\nknowledge for evidence in support of the theory. In \u201cMan\u2019s Place in\nNature\u201d he uncompromisingly placed the origin and development of the\nhuman race within the process of the evolution of animal organisms. He\ndid not remain indifferent to the storm of ecclesiastical indignation\nand popular abuse and ridicule with which a grateful humanity greeted\nthe most important scientific discovery of the century. He accepted\nthe challenge, and during the decades that followed 1860 he was\nprobably the outstanding champion in England, not only of evolution,\nbut of science itself. In 1925, upon the centennial of his birth, his\ngrandson, Julian Huxley wrote,\n\n  \u201cOf the general truth of the evolutionary hypothesis, its enormous\n  value to biology, and the necessary reorientation which it would give\n  to the general current of thought, he had no doubts; nor did he spare\n  himself in the cause. It is sometimes as well, in these easier-going\n  and theologically more tolerant days, when we are reaping what he\n  and others like him sowed, and may sometimes be tempted to think of\n  his criticism as essentially destructive, to remember what power of\n  inertia, what violence of the odium theologicum there was in the\n  opposition. \u2018Professor Huxley\u2019 became a sort of bogy in orthodox\n  lower middle-class families, almost as \u2018Boney\u2019 had done for the\n  nation in earlier days. He was attacked as irreligious, immoral,\n  unscrupulous, on the platform, in the press, by letter. That sort of\n  opposition cannot be persuaded; it must die out or be destroyed.\u201d\n\nThe scholar confronted by the fury and stupidity of the mob, and\ncounted a fool for his pains when he strives to induce it to listen to\nreason, has often turned aside in disgust. Henceforth he will write and\nspeak for the learned few. Let the masses, who think that a scientific\ndemonstration may be satisfactorily refuted with derision and slander,\nconsume themselves in their own ignorance. They have made it clear\nthat learning is not for such as they. In the Theatetus Plato tells\nus of the discomfiture of the philosopher in the marketplace. As \u201cthe\nrabble\u201d is in all times heedless or hostile to reason, there has often\ndeveloped the idea that any belief that is popular is thereby shown\nto be untrue and vulgar. Cato at once became suspicious of himself\nwhen any utterance of his met with applause. Among would-be educated\nminds this suspicion becomes a cult. Anything is \u201crefined\u201d and true\nto the extent that it is unpopular--and for the reason that it is not\nshared by the many. Today this attitude--which is really intellectual\nsnobbishness--gains plausibility from the fact that much of the\npopularization of science is base caricature and misrepresentation.\n\nIt is obvious that the wider the circulation of pseudo-science, the\ngreater is the need of genuine instruction in the elements of science\nand of general culture. I can see no other way by which modern learning\nor modern civilization may be sustained. The man on the street has\npower to determine which values shall survive in our common life, and\nwhich shall perish, to a degree that he never had before. He exercises\nthis influence upon our culture in many ways both direct and indirect,\nand his sway is not likely to be diminished in an industrial society\nwhich increasingly tends to give social power to the various groups\nwhich compose it in direct proportion to their numerical strength.\n\nMoreover, it is not likely that a strictly esoteric intellectualism can\nsurvive at all, much less attain that leadership which is the proper\nfunction of intelligence in human affairs in a world organized as ours\nis. As I have said before, our intellectual hold upon reality, even\nfor the best trained minds, is more precarious than we think. A slight\ngeneral shifting of emotional interest or of perspective--the spread,\nlet us suppose, of Fundamentalism through lower middle class minds\ngenerally,--a sudden spasm of popular disillusionment regarding the\n\u201cwonders\u201d of science or of hostility toward scientific methods which\nare ever upsetting the consolations of faith,--might conceivably occur\nat any time, and bring the beginning of the end of all that scholars\nhave struggled for since the Renaissance. If as Huxley said, the epoch\nwhich began with the Reformation is about played out, it is not by\nany means a foregone conclusion what the sequel is to be. If science\nand letters are to join forces in the achievement of a truly Humanist\nculture, this culture must be rooted in the life and thought of the\ncommunity. It will not likely be again a fifteenth century Italian\nmimicry of the age of Cicero; neither can it support itself like a\nbridge over an illiterate and enslaved populace, after the fashion of\nancient Athenian Humanism. This modern public can read, it is very\nvociferous, it has votes and purchasing power and it pays to flatter\nit. But there is in the modern public a small and growing minority,\nscattered throughout all classes in the community, who honestly desire\nknowledge of science and the humanities.\n\nProfessional scholarship has in the example of Huxley a splendid\nprecedent for any attempts it may care to make to ally itself with\nthis teachable minority. I once invited a neighboring biologist to\nparticipate with other research scholars, in a course of lectures at\nCooper Union on scientific methods. He declined, because he believed\nthat a scientist who lectured to popular audiences cheapened his\nreputation. I wondered if he had forgotten the great service to science\nrendered by Huxley, who did not think it beneath the dignity of one\nwho was perhaps the leading biologist of England to wage the struggle\nfor scientific advance in the presence of a public which was much\nless trained in the principles of natural science than the people who\nregularly attend the lectures at Cooper Union.\n\nHuxley seemed to believe that the outcome of the struggle of evolution\nagainst popular ignorance and superstition was inseparable from the\nfate of science itself. He set himself to make knowledge of the\nprinciples of science universal. He did a work of adult education\nthat has not been surpassed in modern times. If today there is greater\nfreedom for scientific research and teaching, and in general a more\nliberal and tolerant attitude on the part of official and popular\nreligion toward scientific discovery, our generation is in no small\nmeasure indebted to Huxley.\n\nIn reply to the commonly expressed fear that liberal education may give\nus a type of mind which is sceptical and ineffective, I offer Huxley.\nThe educated man may not perhaps take sides on the ever recurrent\nquestion who is to profit at another\u2019s expense, nor easily give his\ndevotion to the particular Utopian scheme of social reorganization\nwhich happens to be the fashion of the reformers of his day. But if he\nis like Huxley, he will be alert enough when he finds that intellectual\nintegrity and cultural progress are at stake. Like Erasmus, Huxley\nsurvives in the philosophy of modern education as a symbol of\nenlightenment in its struggle against obscurantism. Both insist upon\nthe recognition of the value of one aspect of a developing educational\ntradition which has its origin in ancient Greece, and is in sharp\ncontrast both with popular opinion and with medi\u00e6val scholasticism.\nAs I have indicated, it was unfortunate that these two educational\ninterests did not develop out of the Renaissance, as one, for a\nwell-rounded Humanism is an integration of both. Erasmus champions the\ncause of \u201chuman letters\u201d and in the end classical education degenerates\ninto a species of Protestant scholasticism. Huxley champions science,\nbut is unable to liberate science itself from a mechanistic philosophy\nwhich became associated with it two centuries earlier. The struggle\nof science with theology was but a continuation of the spirit of the\nRenaissance. The struggle of science against an entrenched classical\ntradition meant that _the Renaissance had become divided against\nitself_. This dualism is reflected in science down to the present time.\nIt is revealed in Huxley\u2019s type of agnosticism, which is really na\u00efve\nin comparison with the sophisticated, mellow scepticism of Montaigne or\nHume, or in our own day with that of Mr. Santayana, who sees that all\nknowledge is faith.\n\nIt was not so with Huxley; about the finality of the knowledge that\ncan be brought within the scope of scientific method he had no doubt\nwhatever. Of other knowledge he is sceptical because of want of\nevidence. This is courageous and honest, and, from the standpoint\nof the struggle in which science was then engaged with theological\nrationalism, the issue cannot be compromised without the surrender of\nscience to superstition. Although Huxley is an evolutionist and clearly\nsees that human intelligence is part of the behavior of an organism\nwhich is itself a cross-section as it were of a process of nature,\nhe seems to hold that morality and truth are absolute and eternal\nprinciples which exist outside the process and constitute the very\nbasis of existence. Reason which knows these eternal principles and\nin which they inhere, must then also exist outside the process. But\nwe have seen that reason is a function of the behavior of an animal.\nHuxley is thus a Rationalist; as much so as any Scholastic. The body\nof scientific knowledge which we possess is the revelation of the\ntrue nature of the facts which we experienced. It is the intellectual\nequivalent of reality.\n\nBut is scientific knowledge knowledge of facts taken in their\nwholeness, or is it in each instance knowledge of some special _aspect_\nof the facts--fact reduced to abstract quality, to number and point in\nspace and to a multiple of smaller and \u201cmore real\u201d units all conceived\nin logical relationship rather than as experienced? Suppose we should\nsay that scientific ideas do not exist independent of the minds that\nthink them, are not equivalents of independent truths which reason\ndiscovers, but are the devices which an unusually intelligent animal\nconstructs out of the many kinds of relationships it is able to notice\namongst the objects which interest it.\n\nFrom this point of view, the one most consistent, I believe, with\na biology and a psychology which must take evolution into account,\nscientific ideas are seen to be humanly created symbols, not cerebral\nphotographs of the ultimate nature of things. Why should the ultimate\nnature of a lobster be the fact that a morphologist discovers it to be\nan \u201carticulate,\u201d anymore than that I discover that it turns red when\nput in boiling water? Scientific ideas are instruments. Abstraction and\nclassification are in a sense labor-saving devices, according to which\nwe may hold that what is true for one object or event is true for all\nof its kind.\n\nBut the success of our thinking depends upon which of these many\naspects and relationships we observe and hence how we classify them.\nAll aspects and relationships are equally true, as James said, if true\nat all. Correct thinking is the thinking which seizes upon those which\nare relevant to our interest and purpose. And the interest and purpose\nare human, not inherent in the world of things. Hence the order science\nfinds in nature is not _given_; it is the order of human thought\nitself. Thus science also is \u201chuman letters.\u201d\n\nThe humanist, or organic, view of the world of science differentiates\nthe twentieth century philosophy of nature from the mechanistic\nphilosophy of earlier science. Mechanism, which is faith that the\nuniverse is reducible to Reason is, I hold, a survival from the old\nreligious dualism, according to which matter and spirit were separate\nentities each belonging to its own world of phenomenon. The existence\nof Reason as an entity in itself could be taken for granted, because\nReason belonged to the realm of spirit or mind, which though it existed\noutside the material order of being, had yet established this order in\nconformity to Reason.\n\nHuxley\u2019s agnosticism properly denies that man can have knowledge of\nthis world of spirit, yet retains from that realm the principle of\nreason which it re-discovers in the world of material phenomena. Hence\nHuxley was more religious than he knew. It is not the agnostic who is\nthe non-religious man, but the na\u00efve realist who sees every fact and\nsituation uncolored by fancy or theory or illusion. For such a mind,\nspiritual values do not exist. This kind of materialism is a different\nthing from philosophical materialism, which is very theoretical and\nfanciful. There are persons who approach this na\u00efve realism, but I\ndoubt if anyone is wholly lacking in poetry and fancy. Certainly Huxley\nwas not.\n\nOrdinarily we see our environment in a perspective of wish-fancy and\ntraditional myth and magic. To more logical minds the world of objects\nis colored by the \u201csentiment of Rationality.\u201d The universe appears to\nthem to be governed, not by an indulgent or harsh imaginary Father, but\nby a principle of Reason. In each case, the fiction of security gives\nthe feeling of salvation. In a wholly rational universe salvation is\nexplanation. Everything is reasonable, hence right, if only we could\nexplain it and show its place in the whole. Nineteenth century science\ncould conceive of the world order as a mechanism and believe that it\nhad passed from faith to knowledge in its agnosticism of the things of\nthe spirit, but as Whitehead says, \u201cthe faith in the possibility of\nscience generated antecedently to the development of modern scientific\ntheory is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology.\u201d\n\nThe conflict in the nineteenth century on behalf of science has\neffected education in various ways. It has not emptied the churches,\nbut it has had a marked liberalizing influence, causing various groups\nof believers to seek to modify the public expressions of their faith\nin the light of modern knowledge. It has given the average educated\nperson of today a very different conception of his world from that\ncommonly held a century ago. It has to some extent revived the Socratic\ninsistence upon clear and accurate thinking as the first requirement\nof an educated mind. It has brought a greater degree of objectivity\nand wholesomeness of outlook to bear upon the formation of the mental\nhabits of students. It is by its insistence upon the biological point\nof view, causing marked changes in men\u2019s ideas of human nature and\nsociety, gradually turning their thought away from the political dogma\nof the eighteenth century to a less doctrinaire social philosophy.\n\nOn the other side, it may be said to be in part responsible for the\nover-specialization common in our educational institutions. It has\nleft on the mind of the public the impression that science is a new\nkind of magic, sometimes actually augmenting the general credulity and\ngullibility. Almost any sort of nonsense may now find space in the\ncolumns of the Sunday papers and pass current with the assertion that\nit is \u201cscientific.\u201d Minds stuffed with a smattering of science may be\njust as opinionated as minds stuffed with a smattering of theology.\n\nA result which could perhaps not have been foreseen in 1875--and\nwhich I believe twentieth century science is destined to remedy--grew\nout of the one-sidedness of the Humanism of Huxley and others of his\nday which I have discussed. The scientific interest tended to have\na mechanizing influence upon all life and culture, to ignore and\nsometimes deny all values which resisted laboratory methods. And having\nreduced all possible phenomena of life to a statement of the movements\nof particles of matter which were said to underlie and cause all else,\nthis purposeless correlation of matter, space and movement expressed in\nmathematical formulae was frequently given out as the true picture of\nthe nature of all existence--human life included.\n\nBiologists and psychologists often have resorted to rather amusing\ngestures and have deliberately ignored possible lines of inquiry\nin order to imitate as closely as possible the physicists and the\nastronomers. Just as matter was thought to consist of combinations\nof atoms, so living organisms consisted of cells, and complex acts\nof behavior were seen to consist of combinations of simple reflexes.\nThe cell and the reflex, being the irreducible minimum of physiology\nand of psychology, were said to be the realities which constituted\nthe nature of the organism and its acts. All phenomena of life were\nbut combinations of these elemental realities. Find the smallest\nparticles in the combination, show how by a mechanical principle\nthey are inevitably placed in certain temporal and spacial and\nother quantitative relationships, and behold, science has led you\nto _Reality_. All this seemed to be very certain in the nineteenth\ncentury; it alone was _knowledge_, all else was mere opinion and error.\n\nProfessor Whitehead says, \u201cBut the progress of biology and psychology\nhas probably been checked by the uncritical assumption of half-truths.\nIf science is not to degenerate into a medley of _ad hoc_ hypotheses,\nit must become philosophical and must enter upon a thorough criticism\nof its own foundations....\n\n\u201cThere persists, however, throughout the whole period the fixed\nscientific cosmology which presupposes the ultimate fact of an\nirreducible brute matter, or material, spread throughout space in\na flux of configurations. In itself such a material is senseless,\nvalueless, purposeless. It just does what it does do, following a\nfixed routine imposed by external relations which do not spring from\nthe nature of its being. It is this assumption that I call \u2018scientific\nmaterialism.\u2019\u201d\n\n\u201cThe progress of science has now reached a turning point. The stable\nfoundations of physics have broken up: also for the first time\nphysiology is asserting itself as an effective body of knowledge, as\ndistinct from a scrap-heap. The old foundations of scientific thought\nare becoming unintelligible. Time, space, matter, material, ether,\nelectricity, mechanism, organism, configuration, structure, pattern,\nfunction, all require reinterpretation. What is the sense of talking\nabout a mechanical explanation when you do not know what you mean by\nmechanics?\u201d\n\nIt is this disposition to find the real nature of the facts in the\nsmallest homogeneous particles, in other words, \u201catomism,\u201d which\nscience in the twentieth century modifies. The parts themselves,\nconsidered without regard to their position in the whole event, are\nnothing. The reality is the organism, the situation as a whole. The\nunity of a tree is very different from that of a machine, and even\nphysicists are beginning to suspect that they also deal with the\nformer kind of unity. The effect of this change of view upon education\nis difficult to predict. I believe there are indications of a better\nsynthesis of science with general culture than that which obtained in\nHuxley\u2019s time. And as science modifies its mechanistic presuppositions,\nthere will doubtless be an increase of the importance of philosophy\nin education, less pretense at finality, greater intellectual modesty\nand more general appreciation of human worth than is possible when\neducational philosophy is under the sway of a scientific dogma which\ndehumanizes the individual, reduces him to atoms, and regards him as a\nmachine.\n\nThe recognition of the probability that much even of our established\nscientific knowledge is a human convention, should have a liberalizing\neffect upon the education of the present generation. Compare the\nassurance of Huxley with the following passages which I quote from the\nwritings of Bertrand Russell, the first from his book on \u201cRelativity,\u201d\nand the second from the closing words of \u201cThe ABC of Atoms.\u201d\n\n\u201cWhat we know about the physical world, I repeat, is much more\nabstract than was formerly supposed. Between bodies there are\noccurrences, such as light waves; of the _laws_ of these occurrences,\nwe know something--just as much as can be expressed in mathematical\nformulae--but of their _nature_ we know nothing. Of the bodies\nthemselves, as we saw in the preceding chapter, we know so little\nthat we cannot even be sure that they are anything: they _may_ be\nmerely groups of events in other places, those events which we should\nnaturally regard as their effects.... Perhaps an illustration may make\nthe matter clear. Between a piece of orchestral music as played, and\nthe same piece of music as printed in the score, there is a certain\nresemblance, which may be described as a resemblance in structure.\nThe resemblance is of such a sort that, when you know the rules,\nyou can infer the music from the score or the score from the music.\nBut suppose you had been stone deaf from birth, but had lived among\nmusical people. You could understand, if you had learned to speak\nand to do lip-reading, that the musical scores represented something\nquite different from themselves in intrinsic quality, though similar\nin structure. The value of music would be completely unimaginable to\nyou, but you could infer all its mathematical characteristics, since\nthey are the same as those of the score. Now our knowledge of nature is\nsomething like this. We can read the scores, and infer just so much as\nour stone-deaf person could have inferred about music. But we have not\nthe advantages which he derived from association with musical people.\nWe cannot know whether the music represented by the scores is beautiful\nor hideous; perhaps, in the last analysis, we cannot be quite sure that\nthe scores represent anything but themselves.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe theory of relativity has shown that most of traditional dynamics,\nwhich was supposed to contain scientific laws, really consisted of\nconventions as to measurement, and was strictly analogous to the\n\u2018great law\u2019 that there are always three feet to a yard. In particular,\nthis applies to the conservation of energy. This makes it plausible\nto suppose that every apparent law of nature which strikes us as\nreasonable is not really a law of nature, but a concealed convention,\nplastered on to nature by our love of what we, in our arrogance, choose\nto consider rational. Eddington hints that a real law of nature is\nlikely to stand out by the fact that it appears to us irrational,\nsince in that case it is less likely that we have invented it to\nsatisfy our intellectual taste. And from this point of view he inclines\nto the belief that the quantum-principle is the first real law of\nnature that has been discovered in physics.\n\n\u201cThis raises a somewhat important question: Is the world \u2018rational,\u2019\ni. e., such as to conform to our intellectual habits? Or is it\n\u2018irrational,\u2019 i. e., not such as we should have made it if we had been\nin the position of the Creator? I do not propose to suggest an answer\nto this question.\u201d\n\nNo, we do not know whether the world is such as we would have made\nit if we had been in the position of the Creator. But it is possible\nfor us to gain some intelligent idea of what we can and should make\nof our world so far as lies within our human power and understanding.\nThroughout all historic times men have striven to attain that insight,\ndiscrimination and foreknowledge which would enable them to become\n\u201clegislators of values\u201d--to give their existence quality and their\nexperiences an order of preference that would lend beauty and harmony\nand some permanence to the half-chaotic stream of events and objects\nwhich swept through their lives. This is the aim of the pursuit of\nknowledge. It is to give to existence an \u201corder of rank.\u201d What if the\norder be a human one? General co\u00f6peration in its development is what we\nmean by culture. And education is not mere perpetuation of the order of\nthe past. The hierarchy of values must be constantly recreated if it is\nto survive. Knowledge of the past is the inspiration to such creative\neffort and knowledge of nature is a guide to it. A generation ago\nWilliam James, whose philosophy of science was thoroughly Humanistic,\nsuggested that the fascination of the pursuit of knowledge was that\nwe might thus be in at the places where truth is actually in the\nmaking, and that we should never know what sort of world this would be\n\u201ctill the last man\u2019s vote is in and counted.\u201d What we are to make of\nthis unfinished world depends largely upon the power and wisdom and\nappreciation of value which we may attain through our education.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\nTHE FRUIT OF THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE\n\n\nFinally, with what appraisement may the seeker for knowledge view\neducation itself? In the course of our study we have cast aside\nnumerous idols and comforting fictions. We have seen that in the\nprocess of a liberal education old dilemmas are outgrown; that the\nhabit is formed of questioning all things; that the educated mind\nbecomes capable of amused self-criticism, attains urbanity of spirit\nand tolerant scepticism of the crowd and its partisan controversies,\nand with civilized resignation learns that it may not possess finality\nin matters of truth and right, but that a man must order his life\naccording to the wisest discrimination of value of which he is capable.\n\nNow, I believe, the wise man will pursue his education always viewing\nit with a certain light-heartedness and detachment. Wisdom itself will\nnot be taken too seriously by one who sees that in the best of it there\nis an entertaining amount of human folly. Like Falstaff\u2019s confession,\n\u201cI am not much better than one of the wicked,\u201d Socrates, the wisest,\nknows he is not much better than one of the foolish. People who\nsolemnly try to improve their minds, with groanings of the spirit that\ncannot be uttered, determined to reach some cultural \u201cPike\u2019s peak or\nbust,\u201d do not often become educated; they become intellectual bores.\n\nEducation is a way of living, but it is never a substitute for life.\nRational living does not mean that interest, feeling, love, respect,\npractical achievement, do not count, or that in the end education\nshould make of life a mere _knowledge affair_. One does not pursue\nscholarship merely for the sake of philosophical contemplation, or as\nan intellectual trick. And there is no magic about education, but plain\ncommon sense. I think we may safely say that a life guided by reason\nand good taste is better than one enslaved to tradition, tabu, narrow\nutilitarianism, conventionalism and passion. But surely education is\nnot a hair shirt to be worn in order to discipline the spirit and\nachieve the modern idea of salvation. Neither is it something to be\nattained by practicing before the mirror. It is nothing ostentatious.\nNor is it to be made a cult of. It does not work miracles, nor can it\ncreate out of airy nothingness an intelligence that does not exist.\n\nI think much of the criticism of education that one frequently hears\nthese days grows out of an exaggerated notion of the transformation\nwhich some people expect a few years of education to work. I know a\nnumber of college graduates who are very bitter in their criticism of\ncollege education, protesting that they did not learn anything that did\nthem any good. Perhaps they expected too much for the amount of effort\nput forth and tried to do too great a business on a small intellectual\ncapital. Or perhaps such criticism is in part a pose; in certain\ncircles it is now \u201cthe thing.\u201d\n\nAn article which recently appeared in a student\u2019s journal is typical\nof this attitude toward College education. The writer asks, \u201cAre the\nAmerican colleges worth their keep?\u201d They have not, he says, given to\nthe nation the trained leadership which we had the right to expect of\nthem. Enter any University Club and you will find yourself far removed\nfrom that intellectual atmosphere which should be characteristic of\neducation in a great democracy. Few college men may be found fighting\non the side of social justice. Few have the courage to deviate in any\nway from the totums and tabus of a plutocratic, materialistic society.\nFew have any very different ideas from those of their chauffeurs of\nwhat constitutes success in life. Men\u2019s colleges are no different\nfrom girl\u2019s finishing schools; they are not educational institutions,\nbut exist merely to impart information of the ways and manners of\nupper-class society. Instructors are devitalized, for none but a\ndevitalized person could endure the system. Trustees have the habit\nof judging colleges by the same standards they apply to business, yet\njudged even by such standards, the author thinks higher education is a\nfailure. If Mr. Henry Ford turned out motor cars as bad as the products\nthe colleges turn out, he would soon be bankrupt!\n\nIn so far as such sweeping indictments are inspired by a feeling of\nantipathy toward the so-called upper classes, it is not necessary for\nus to discuss them. But I think that criticisms of this sort also\nreveal a tendency to expect too much of education. We become more\ncharitable when we pause to consider how small a part, even at best,\nintelligence plays in the control of human behavior. We have seen what\nErasmus thought about this subject. Most of those who call attention to\nthe general lack of intelligence, draw a distinction between the amount\nof it in existence and the amount in common use. This is a democratic\nview of the matter. It flatters the average man if you tell him that he\npossesses more intelligence than he is using. A more correct view is\nperhaps that of Freud, who says that most of us in modern civilization\nare living \u201cpsychologically beyond our means.\u201d\n\nA good example of this democratic view may be found in a discussion\nof \u201cIntelligence in Our Time,\u201d by a very able professor in one of\nthe Eastern colleges. \u201cThe general state of intelligence in our time\nis of the strangest. It is richly and splendidly equipped and it is\ntragically unsuccessful,--unsuccessful, that is, in the conduct of\nlife, both personal and social.\u201d You may test it, broadly speaking,\nby the troubles of the world. \u201cOne of the foremost failures of human\nintelligence is not to remember its own importance.\u201d In other words,\nI suppose we haven\u2019t enough intelligence to use our intelligence. We\nlive in \u201ca sea of loose and floating ideas, more of them produced\ndaily, and no clearly recognized way of deciding, to the coercion of\nall trained minds, which is right.... When people go wrong in reasoning\nthey usually do so in obvious ways, by violating obvious rules.\u201d\nIntelligence has its standards, but does not enforce them; it \u201clacks\nconfidence in itself.... On most important subjects opinions differ. In\neach case something else appears as more important than intelligence,\nsomething else has the right of way.\u201d\n\nIn other words, we know better than to believe and behave as we do\nmost of the time. But I doubt if this unfortunate state of man is a\npeculiarity of our times. I suspect that there has long been more\nknowledge than intelligence in the world. The difficulty is that we\nfrequently do not know how to use the knowledge we possess, for to\nuse knowledge well requires wisdom, and no one can give us wisdom.\nI can see no gain in condemning the human race for not using its\nintelligence. I suspect that the beliefs we entertain and the deeds\nwe perform or leave undone are the best measure of the intelligence\nwe possess. Let us each own up to a certain native stupidity and\ndeceitfulness of heart which no amount of education can wholly cure or\neven successfully disguise. The admission will to some extent save us\nfrom that childish pride of intellect which is a common affliction of\nthose who \u201cgo in\u201d for education.\n\nSometimes pride of intellect disguises itself with a holy tone and\nreverential mien, as if education were a very solemn affair. When I\nwas a school boy, there was in our town a woman librarian who presided\nover our little public library with deadly seriousness. She filled the\nplace with a crushing and awesome silence, as with reverential whispers\nshe quietly moved on tiptoe among the books like one ministering in the\nhouse of the dead. I have known people to behave in this spirit toward\nliterature. I have seen school teachers and professors take such an\nattitude toward education. It characterizes the average baccalaureate\naddress and is discernible in much that is said and written about\neducation. I know several \u201cprophets\u201d of adult education who succeed in\ngiving a similar impression. Their very souls creak under the weight of\nthe world-mending \u201cspiritual values\u201d of adult education. If people will\ntake their education as hard as the Kantians take morality, they are\nwelcome to their \u201csublimities.\u201d There are minds which seem to have been\nformed only for the service of the sublime and do not work well except\nwhen closeted in its presence. But I would rather dwell in the tents of\nthe wicked than be a door-keeper in such a house of serious thinkers.\nExtravagant claims for education lead to pretense, to painful efforts\nat keeping up appearances, to exposure and ultimate disillusionment.\n\nSeveral times in history there has occurred a wide-spread reaction\nagainst education, followed by a long period of decline of interest\nin it. Usually such reactions have taken the form of a revival of\nreligion and have followed upon a period of general intellectual\nawakening. The Augustan age is followed by primitive Christianity, the\nRenaissance by the Reformation, the eighteenth century, the age of \u201cthe\nEnlightenment,\u201d by those distinctly anti-intellectualist movements, the\nRevival, the Revolution and Romanticism. May not one of the causes of\nsuch reactions be the fact that people have been led to expect too much\nof the prevailing education? Men for a time believe that education will\ndisclose some wonderful secret which is about to transform the world,\nand when they find that the learned doctors do not reveal the secret\nbecause they have none to reveal, and that the world does not at once\nproceed to transform itself, they turn from learning to religion where\nthe secret is kept from the wise and revealed unto babes. No one is\nmore concerned than I that the interest in education be as wide-spread\nand as genuine as possible. But I would not force its growth lest we\nget all foliage and no fruit. It is better that in its due season the\ntree be known by the fruit it bears.\n\nJust as some believe that education is a sort of gospel, there are\nothers who contend that knowledge makes for unhappiness. One evening\nat an informal dinner in New York a small group of thoughtful people,\nall of middle age, were discussing in a rather desultory manner the\neducation of the younger generation. Suddenly the conversation became\nserious. One of the women said, \u201cThey are hard, disillusioned young\nrealists. What else could we expect? It is the result of the education\nwe are giving them. They know too much.\u201d She continued, \u201cI wish, though\nI do not see how it could have been done, that we could have retained\nthe simple beliefs of our parents. It was very comforting to believe\nthose things. It seems to me that everything I learn robs me of some\nconsoling ideal and makes the world appear cruel and terrible.\u201d\n\nTo the question, what shall we put in the place of the old faiths which\neducation leads us to doubt, there is perhaps no other answer than\nthat we shall _exchange an infantile mentality for a mature one_. Most\npeople will agree that it is better to grow up, but as to whether we\nare happier without our childish illusions, opinions differ.\n\nMuch of the tenderness which people show for small children is a\nmixture of pity and envy. The other day I saw a business man about\nfifty years old gaze long and wistfully at an infant playing with his\ntoys. He said as he turned away, \u201cI wish I could remember what it feels\nlike to be his age. Can you imagine what this world must look like to\nhim?\u201d There is my own small son who is now just learning to stand on\nhis feet and speak a word or two. How trusting and sweet he is. He is\nnot afraid of any one or any thing. No one would of course wish him to\nlive always surrounded only by pretty pictures and parental kindness.\nBut it is easy to understand how one in moments of weariness and doubt\nmight envy him his brief day of blessed ignorance. Think of it, he does\nnot even know that people have to work, and that it is the common lot\nof mankind both to endure and inflict suffering. He does not suspect\nthe existence of such things as hospitals, slaughter houses, war,\nslums, jails, policemen or Congress. He does not know that he is not\nimmortal, or that he must ever part with those he loves. He must know\nthese things since they exist, and must learn about many other facts\nequally hard to endure. And as he grows up I want him to learn to cut\nhis way through the fictions with which men strive to disguise the\nsignificance of many painful realities from which there is no escape.\n\nSuch is knowledge, and such is the price we pay for it. One reason\nwhy mankind persistently resists the introduction of knowledge is the\ndisinclination to pay the price. It is not altogether easy, as James\nsaid, to \u201cstand this universe.\u201d The longing for the irresponsibility\nof childhood is very common among mankind, and it gives rise to many\ncomforting fictions which yield reluctantly to knowledge of fact. The\ngeneral attitude toward wisdom has in it always a touch of the dread\nof the unknown. There is a very old legend that our first parents\nwere expelled from paradise after eating of the fruit of the tree of\nknowledge.\n\nEven our boasted practical knowledge of nature and of mechanics can\nhardly be said to be an unmixed blessing. We are not quite so utopian\nin our enthusiasm over applied science as we were twenty years ago. I\nonce burst into eloquence with an entertaining peroration something\nlike the following: \u201cEverywhere as science displaces the hallowed\nsurvivals of primitive magic and superstition, man emerges from\ndarkness with dignity and freedom in his bearing and titanic power in\nhis hands. The great friend for whom humanity has waited is the quiet\nman in the laboratory amongst his test tubes and apparatus. What kings\ncould not command, nor priests call down from an unanswering heaven, he\ncan command and bring into being to enrich the heritage of happiness\nfor all. The earth blossoms for science. Where the medicine man in the\ndesert once vainly prayed for rain, science digs an irrigation ditch\nand waste lands turn into fields of grain. Since the beginning of time\nmen have cringed in the shadow of death as the specter of plague\nwalked in their midst heedless of the prayers of faith. Science offers\nno sacrifice to propitiate revengeful gods: it drains the swamps: it\nresorts to such mundane devices as screens, vaccine and the quarantine,\nand for the first time in all history the human race is freed of its\nmost terrifying scourge. Science has drawn the nations together as\nits lines of mechanical communication have annihilated the spacial\ndistances which have hitherto isolated man from man. It has lightened\nthe burden of toil and has multiplied the productive force of labor a\nhundredfold. It has lengthened the span of the average human life by\nnearly a decade.\n\n\u201cAnd with what a wealth of unforeseen goods it has supplied us, motor\ncars, and a\u00ebroplanes, and talking machines, and a countless variety of\nnew chemical products. What indeed can we not achieve with its aid; we\ncan send our messages around the world, dig the Panama Canal, throw a\ndam across the Mississippi and turn the wheels and light the homes of\ndistant cities. We can make the lightning our household servant, we\ncan fly through the clouds, we can weigh distant suns, and by throwing\ntheir light waves through a spectroscope, analyze them chemically and\ntell whether they are composed of gas or solid matter and whether they\nare moving towards us or receding. As science is giving us mastery\nover nature, why should it not likewise give man control over his own\nnature? The existence in a scientific age of poverty and crime and\ninjustice and corruption is an anachronism. Human reason has at last\ndecided to make itself at home and put the house of life in order, and\nall nature smilingly welcomes it. It is flushed with success and well\nit may be, for in it is the promise of the final triumph of man on the\nearth.\u201d\n\nWe are not so sanguine now. We have seen the destructive uses to which\nscientific knowledge may be put in warfare. We are not so hopeful about\nthe easy control of human nature by means of it. It cannot be said that\nthere has been a general gain in intelligence, corresponding to the\nincrease of specialized scientific knowledge. The disturbing thought\nhas been expressed that the tremendous power of the engines created\nby applied science for our generation is something like dangerous\nexplosives in the hands of young children. We are like passengers on a\nsteamship speeding through fog with an empty pilot house.\n\nWe move swiftly from one place to another, but it is doubtful if we\nfind more happiness or good when we reach our destination, or if we\nbehave more wisely than do men who know nothing of the fruits of\nscience. Those who are acquainted with China, a country in which a vast\npopulation has maintained the oldest civilization extant without any\nscience at all, say that the cultural level of that nation has not been\nraised by the occasional importation of western methods of sanitation,\nmilitary science, electric lights and chewing gum.\n\nMedical research has saved the lives of countless numbers of children,\nso that infant mortality is negligible now as compared with that of the\nages that had no science. I am sure no one would wish to give up such\na splendid application of modern knowledge to human welfare. Yet even\nthis has its price. There are biologists who doubt if the amount of\nhuman suffering has been so greatly reduced as we at first supposed.\nThey say that many physically unfit persons are thus preserved, only to\nsuffer in later life, and that the survival to maturity, of such poorly\nequipped organisms and their reproduction lowers the quality of the\nracial stock of the nation. This is an extreme position and is perhaps\na premature conclusion, but it illustrates my point that at best our\nmodern knowledge may not be had without paying some price for it.\n\nTheoretical knowledge of nature may be said to be no less costly than\napplied science. In the sixteenth century man could without fear of\ncontradiction proclaim the earth to be the center of the Universe and\nhis own welfare and salvation the purpose of creation. Every step in\nthe progress of science from Newton to Einstein has tended to rebuke\nthe egotism of man--unless perchance he could find compensation in\nthe fact that he is a creature who has the intellectual courage to\nsaw off the bough of sustaining belief that he is sitting on. Early\nastronomy revealed to man that his earth, far from being \u201cthe Center\u201d\nwas but a perishable and relatively very small kind of moon whirling\nabout a slowing cooling sun, by no means the best of a galaxy of bigger\nand brighter suns all moving by necessity through freezing space in\nutter indifference to the inhabitants of this little planet. Chemistry\nshowed man that his glowing life was a molecular process. Physics\ntaught him that all change and movement were but the redistribution of\na meaningless and purposeless energy the quantity of which remained\nforever constant. Geology reminded him that he was but a newcomer among\nthe forms of life which had lived and left their remains in the crust\nof the earth. Biology revealed to him his kinship with other animals\nand his lowly origin. Psychology sought to find his soul, and gave up\nthe search, finding it easier to account for his behavior in terms\nof animal impulse and reflex action. Anthropology discovered for him\nthe origin of his cherished beliefs in the customs of primitive man.\nSociology reduced his individual existence to that of a statistical\nunit in the mass.\n\nIt now appears probable that science may abandon in time its\ntraditional mechanistic conceptions of the cosmos and of life, but\nthere is little likelihood that such a change of outlook will restore\nman to the place in nature which he once thought he occupied. Nor may\nwe expect it to envisage for him a world more conducive to his wishes\nthan that pictured by the science of the nineteenth century. Indeed,\nit is possible that he may have to learn to live without even those\nfictions of security which were features of the older rationalism of\nscience.\n\nNow I have tried to state the situation in its bold harshness, for the\neducated mind today must know all this and must wrestle with it. The\nknowledge cannot of itself lead to happiness, nor do I think that it\nnecessarily leads to unhappiness. All depends upon what we are able to\nmake of our existence in such a world. Although we possess different\nand more precise instruments of knowledge, I do not think this is the\nfirst time that thoughtful minds have seen through popular fancy and\nthe shows of things. I believe wise men of all times have suspected\nthat existence is different from what people na\u00efvely imagine it to be.\nAnd it is precisely because they wrestled with such suspicions, asked,\n\u201cwhat then?\u201d, and have sought to give their existence some meaning and\nworth, that their words are precious. Now that education is general,\nand vast numbers seek it, it is well to remind ourselves that no one of\nus can really find wisdom until he has alone struggled for value with\ndestiny and naked fact.\n\nThe fear that most men cannot do this, and that they will turn aside\nwith some substitute for knowledge or with that \u201clittle learning\nwhich is a dangerous thing\u201d has led some writers, wrongly I think, to\nquestion that any good may come of universal education. This esoteric\npoint of view is dramatically stated by Dostoevsky in \u201cThe Brothers\nKaramazov,\u201d in the person of the Grand Inquisitor who rebukes the\nChrist on the occasion of his return to Seville to comfort the victims\nof the Inquisition. The Inquisitor tells the Christ that he has\ndemanded too much of mankind. What the masses need is not freedom of\nthe spirit, but mystery, miracle, and authority; someone to take their\nbread from their hands, bless it and give it back to them; someone who\nwill permit them to sin, and take the responsibility on his own soul,\nsomeone who will _guard the secret_ and deceive mankind every step of\nthe way as he leads it down to death. The old Inquisitor says to the\nChrist, \u201cIf at the last day you condemn me, I will defy you to your\nface, for I too have eaten bitter roots in the wilderness.\u201d\n\nNietzsche in his lectures on \u201cThe Future of our Educational\nInstitutions\u201d at B\u00e2le, takes a similar position. Nietzsche believed\nthat to the degree that education is extended it is weakened and\nminimized. The masses think they can reach at a single bound what the\nwise man has had to win for himself only after long and determined\nstruggles to live like a philosopher.\n\n  \u201cAnd do you not fear that solitude will wreak its vengeance upon you?\n  Just try living the life of a hermit of culture. One must be blessed\n  with overflowing wealth in order to live for the good of all on one\u2019s\n  own resources! Extraordinary youngsters! They felt it incumbent upon\n  them to imitate what is precisely most difficult and most high,--what\n  is possible only to the master, when they, above all, should know\n  how difficult and dangerous this is, and how many excellent gifts\n  may be ruined by attempting it!... No one would strive to attain to\n  culture if he knew how incredibly small the number of really cultured\n  people actually is, and can ever be.\u201d\n\n  \u201c... those blatant heralds of educational needs, when examined at\n  close quarters, are suddenly seen to be transformed into zealous,\n  yea, fanatical opponents of true culture, i. e., all those who\n  hold fast to the aristocratic nature of the mind; for, at bottom,\n  they regard as their goal the emancipation of the masses from the\n  mastery of the great few; they seek to overthrow the most sacred\n  hierarchy in the kingdom of the intellect--the servitude of the\n  masses, their submissive obedience, their instinct of loyalty to the\n  rule of genius.... The education of the masses cannot, therefore,\n  be our aim; but rather the education of a few picked men for great\n  and lasting works. We well know that a just posterity judges the\n  collective intellectual state of a time only by those few great and\n  lonely figures of the period.... What is called the \u2018education of the\n  masses\u2019 cannot be accomplished except with difficulty; and even if a\n  system of universal compulsory education be applied, they can only be\n  reached outwardly....\n\n  \u201cWe know, however, what the aspiration is of those who would disturb\n  the healthy slumber of the people, and continually call out to them:\n  \u2018Keep your eyes open! Be sensible! Be wise!\u2019 we know the aim of those\n  who profess to satisfy excessive educational requirements by means of\n  an extraordinary increase in the number of educational institutions\n  and the conceited tribe of teachers originated thereby. These very\n  people, using these very means, are fighting against the natural\n  hierarchy in the realm of the intellect, and destroying the roots of\n  all those noble and sublime plastic forces which have their material\n  origin in the unconsciousness of the people.\u201d\n\n  \u201cThis eternal hierarchy, towards which all things naturally tend, is\n  always threatened by that pseudo-culture which now sits on the throne\n  of the present. It endeavors either to bring the leaders down to the\n  level of its own servitude or else to cast them out altogether.\u201d\n\nWhether Nietzsche\u2019s theories of education were derived from his\npolitical philosophy, or the reverse, I do not know. We are not,\nhowever, interested in discussing political and sociological theories.\nThe point is that Nietzsche held that education is difficult and\ndangerous, and that only the rare, strong, courageous spirits may\nattain it. The many really do not want education at all, he thinks, but\nonly that cheaper knowledge which will give them success and enable\nthem to take their places in the rank and file; seeking such education\nthe herd tramples culture under foot, like cattle in growing corn when\nthe fences are down. Difficult and dangerous as knowledge is, it is\nto Nietzsche the most precious possession of man. All his writing on\nthis subject is a warning cry that the cultural values of civilization\nare in danger of being lost in an education for democracy. I think he\nhad a real issue, although I wish he had possessed more self-control\nin arguing his case; he had always something of the intemperance and\nover-excited gestures of a religious evangelist or soap-box orator.\n\nA much more sane statement of the true aims of education in conflict\nwith Philistinism is that of Matthew Arnold. I hesitate to mention\nArnold because those who are still guilty of the errors he exposed will\nsay he was a Victorian, and how could his ideas of education have any\nvalue for a progressive twentieth century population? I doubt if many\nmen of today, advocates of advanced theories of education included, are\nas far removed from the vulgarities and pseudo-culture of the Victorian\nage as Arnold was. Like Nietzsche, he holds that the multitude gives\nevidence that it does not really want education. Unlike Nietzsche, he\ndoes not think that knowledge is some grim secret which only a few\nheroic supermen may attain. The fruits of knowledge are not merely\nideas about life and reality which men may or may not believe in, but\nare to be known in the quality of life and thought which characterize\nthe educated mind.\n\nArnold\u2019s phrase \u201csweetness and light\u201d is a little suggestive of a\nUnitarian sermon, or of some cult of the \u201chigher life.\u201d It is obvious\nthat if a man deliberately set out to drill his soul in the ways of\nsweetness and light he might become a very lady-like individual; he\nwould not necessarily become an educated person. All such deliberate\nefforts at self-improvement, if they are not characterized by a\nsentimental insincerity which is content with imitation and appearance,\nare at least a little like the effort of Benjamin Franklin to school\nhimself in the moral virtues, who, finding the task too great, decided\nthat he could best gain proficiency by practicing his desired virtues\none at a time.\n\nYou may rest assured that Arnold had nothing of this sort in mind,\nmuch as he seems at one time to have admired the wisdom of Franklin.\nHe meant that certain mental traits are sufficiently characteristic\nof educated minds generally to be the distinguishing marks which\ndifferentiate them from the uneducated. To be sure, it is a thankless\ntask to call attention to such traits, and no one who does it may\nexpect to be very popular, but sometimes, when the culture of a\nnation is in danger, it has to be done. Arnold has in mind characters\nlike Socrates, Erasmus, Montaigne--no muddle-headed, opinionated or\nnarrow-minded men, but men who had attained clarity of thought and the\ninsight which pierces the glamour of things and the follies of men, and\nyet could speak and write without bitterness or rancor or malice.\n\n  \u201cHere culture goes beyond religion, as religion is generally\n  conceived by us.\n\n  \u201cIf culture, then, is a study of perfection, and of harmonious\n  perfection, general perfection, and perfection which consists\n  in becoming something rather than in having something, in an\n  inward condition of the mind and spirit, not in an outward set of\n  circumstances,--it is clear that culture, instead of being the\n  frivolous and useless thing which Mr. Bright, and Mr. Frederic\n  Harrison, and many other Liberals are apt to call it, has a very\n  important function to fulfill for mankind. And this function is\n  particularly important in our modern world, of which the whole\n  civilisation is, to a much greater degree than the civilisation\n  of Greece and Rome, mechanical and external, and tends constantly\n  to become more so. But above all in our own country has culture a\n  weighty part to perform, because here that mechanical character,\n  which civilization tends to take everywhere, is shown in the most\n  eminent degree. Indeed nearly all the characters of perfection,\n  as culture teaches us to fix them, meet in this country with some\n  powerful tendency which thwarts them and sets them at defiance.... So\n  culture has a rough task to achieve in this country. Its preachers\n  have, and are likely to long have, a hard time of it, and they will\n  much oftener be regarded, for a great while to come, as elegant or\n  spurious Jeremiahs than as friends and benefactors....\n\n  \u201cFaith in machinery is, I said, our besetting danger; often in\n  machinery most absurdly disproportioned to the end which this\n  machinery, if it is to do any good at all, is to serve; but always in\n  machinery, as if it had a value in and for itself. What is freedom\n  but machinery? what is population but machinery? what is coal but\n  machinery? what are railroads but machinery? what is wealth but\n  machinery? what are, even, religious organisations but machinery? Now\n  almost every voice in England is accustomed to speak of these things\n  as if they were precious ends in themselves, and therefore had some\n  of the characters of perfection indisputably joined to them.... But\n  culture indefatigably tries, not to make what each raw person may\n  like the rule by which he fashions himself; but to draw ever nearer\n  to a sense of what is indeed beautiful, graceful, and becoming, and\n  to get the raw person to like that....\n\n  \u201cThe people who believe most that our greatness and welfare are\n  proved by our being very rich, and who most give their lives and\n  thoughts to becoming rich, are just the very people whom we call\n  Philistines. Culture says, \u2018Consider these people, then, their way of\n  life, their habits, their manners, the very tones of their voices;\n  look at them attentively; observe the literature they read, the\n  things which give them pleasure, the words which come forth out of\n  their mouths, the thoughts which make the furniture of their minds;\n  would any amount of wealth be worth having with the condition that\n  one was to become just like these people by having it?\u2019\u201d\n\nAs Nietzsche sees that education must struggle for its values if it is\nto survive in a democracy, Arnold is equally aware of its conflict with\nmiddle-class English Puritanism. He will give the Puritan credit for\nhis moral earnestness, but--\n\n  \u201cthe Puritan\u2019s ideal of perfection remains narrow and inadequate,\n  although for what he did well he has been richly rewarded.\n  Notwithstanding the mighty results of the Pilgrim Fathers\u2019 voyage,\n  they and their standard of perfection are rightly judged when\n  we figure to ourselves Shakespeare or Virgil,--souls in whom\n  sweetness and light, and all that in human nature is most humane,\n  were eminent,--accompanying them on their voyage, and think what\n  intolerable company Shakespeare and Virgil would have found them! In\n  the same way let us judge the religious organizations which we see\n  all around us. Do not let us deny the good and the happiness which\n  they have accomplished; but do not let us fail to see clearly that\n  their idea of human perfection is narrow and inadequate, and that\n  the Dissidence of Dissent and the Protestantism of the Protestant\n  religion will never bring humanity to its true goal.\u201d\n\nOf the relation of education to the growing power of nineteenth century\ndemocracy, Arnold says,\n\n  \u201cOther well-meaning friends of this new power are for leading it,\n  not in the old ruts of middle-class Philistinism, but in ways which\n  are naturally alluring to the feet of democracy, though in this\n  country they are novel and untried ways. I may call them the ways of\n  Jacobinism. Violent indignation with the past, abstract systems of\n  renovation applied wholesale, a new doctrine drawn up in black and\n  white for elaborating down to the very smallest details a rational\n  society for the future.... Culture is the eternal opponent of the two\n  things which are the signal marks of Jacobinism,--its fierceness,\n  and its addiction to an abstract system. Culture is always assigning\n  to system-makers and systems a smaller share in the bent of human\n  destiny than their friends like.\u201d\n\nThe following is as truly the problem of education today as it was on\nthe day it was written, and the answer that our generation gives to the\nproblem will determine the whole quality of the fruit of knowledge for\nour lives.\n\n  \u201c... Plenty of people will try to give the masses, as they call them,\n  an intellectual food prepared and adapted in the way they think\n  proper for the actual condition of the masses. The ordinary popular\n  literature is an example of this way of working on the masses.\n  Plenty of people will try to indoctrinate the masses with the set of\n  ideas and judgments constituting the creed of their own profession\n  or party. Our religious and political organisations give an example\n  of this way of working on the masses. I condemn neither way; but\n  culture works differently. It does not try to teach down to the level\n  of inferior classes; it does not try to win them for this or that\n  sect of its own, with ready-made judgments and watchwords. It seeks\n  to do away with classes; to make the best that has been thought and\n  known in the world current everywhere; to make all men live in an\n  atmosphere of sweetness and light, where they may use ideas, as it\n  uses them itself, freely,--nourished, and not bound by them.\n\n  \u201cThe great men of culture are those who have had a passion for\n  diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society\n  to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time; who\n  have laboured to divest knowledge of all that was harsh, uncouth,\n  difficult, abstract, professional, exclusive; to humanise it, to\n  make it efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and learned,\n  yet still remaining the _best_ knowledge and thought of the time,\n  and a true source, therefore, of sweetness and light. Such a man was\n  Abelard in the Middle Ages, in spite of all his imperfections; and\n  thence the boundless emotion and enthusiasm which Abelard excited.\n  Such were Lessing and Herder in Germany, at the end of the last\n  century; and their services to Germany were in this way inestimably\n  precious.... And why? Because they _humanized_ knowledge; because\n  they broadened the basis of life and intelligence.\u201d\n\nThe human race has demonstrated how it can get along without knowledge;\nit has not on any general scale demonstrated how it can get along with\nknowledge. Ignorance and vulgarity have amazing survival value in human\nsociety. Knowledge has its dangers. One may lose one\u2019s faith in the\npursuit of it or expend much effort, and never attain it; and, what is\nworse, never know that one has not attained it. Or having gained some\nbit of knowledge, one may not store it up as final truth and abide with\nit, but having seen must pass on to other knowledge. The pursuit of\nknowledge is an open road.\n\nAll, or nearly all, who have pursued knowledge will say that such a\npursuit is a great adventure. It is an adventure which never goes\nstale, nor loses its lure, nor grows old, and there are indirect\nresults of such an adventure which cannot be measured. Just as he who\nhas traveled in many lands returns and views his home with new eyes\nnever really having seen it before, so he who follows knowledge in time\nsees the things about him in new light. They have a richer meaning and\nbetter perspective for they have a wider reference.\n\nWhat might happen if a considerable portion of the population should,\nor could, become devoted to education in the way that men have engaged\nthemselves in religion, war, and commerce, we perhaps can never know.\nMen have been converted to religion and have \u201cback-slid\u201d or have\noutgrown their faith. Men have gaily marched off to war and before\nthe conflict ended have grown sick of it. Men have given up commerce,\nfinding that it does not satisfy some deep longing in their natures.\nMost of those who begin their education leave off before they learn\nwhat it is about. But the few who have remained to taste the fruit of\nknowledge as a rule become addicted to it, and never leave off, being\nnever satisfied with what they have yet attained. If for eating this\nfruit they find themselves outside the paradise of childish innocence\nand popular belief, they do by their bearing give us the impression\nthat the experience is worth its cost. It is only the half-educated,\nthose who would follow wisdom and at the same time look back over their\nshoulders casting longing glances at comforting ignorance, unable to\nsay farewell, who dwell upon the painfulness of knowledge. I have the\nsuspicion that those who wear a long face as if they knew some dreadful\nsecret that would break the heart of the world if the rest of mankind\nknew it, are men who find in the Byronic attitude a convenient way of\nconvincing themselves that they are intellectual heroes. Or they are\nromanticists who enjoy the sorrows of Werther.\n\nFor the encouragement of those who might wish to continue their\neducation or assist in the education of another, I have tried to\npresent certain historical examples of men who have attained wisdom.\nThey are brave men and true; they do not make us ashamed of our race.\nIt is a pleasure to try to understand such minds, and I trust that in\nthese times when every fence is down and there are in the field of\neducation many strange animals and much shouting and confusion, we\nmay have been able to gain something, from turning our attention to\nSocrates and Plato and Aristotle and Erasmus and Montaigne and Huxley\nand Nietzsche and Arnold, that will help us to see the meaning of\neducation. But we can never be sure whether we like its fruits until we\ntaste them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV--POSTSCRIPT\n\nADULT EDUCATION IN AMERICA\n\n\nWhen the European universities were established in the late\nMiddle Ages, they were not, like our modern American colleges,\nsuper-high-schools. It was not their primary purpose to give to\nundergraduates and aspiring professional students a maximum fund\nof information during a brief period of residence. There were many\nthousands of such students, but the college or university was in a real\nsense an institution for adult education. It was a place of residence\nfor mature scholars, a center where such men could pursue their\nstudies and live the life of education, just as in the monasteries men\ncould live the \u201creligious\u201d life. The teaching which went on in these\nuniversities was in a sense a secondary activity.\n\nAmong the many changes which have occurred in life and education\nsince the thirteenth century, that represented by Goethe\u2019s \u201cFaust\u201d\nhas special interest for us. The modern man attempts to live the life\nof the spirit outside the cloister. In this respect we are, as I have\nsaid, more like the ancient Athenians who formed themselves into little\ngroups and attached themselves as disciples to their teacher for an\nindefinite period of time. We may easily imagine the students and\nfriends of Socrates continuing with him for years their philosophical\ninquiries, while at the same time engaged in the conduct of their\nduties as citizens and householders. Both Plato and Aristotle, as we\nhave seen, thought of education in this way. It was an interest which\nas a matter of course extended into adult life. This continued emphasis\nupon the education of the mature mind is important, for it is in\ncontrast with much modern thought on the subject. Modern educators are\nchiefly interested in the problems of teaching children.\n\nBut there is a still more significant fact about such adult education\nas we may have today which necessarily differentiates it from both the\nthirteenth century and the ancients. The average mature individual,\nis not like the ancient Greek student, a member of the leisure class,\nnor may he like the medi\u00e6val scholar retreat to a cloister. He must\nearn his living and seek education during his leisure time. To be\nsure, the formal and professional education of our time has still the\nadvantages of a certain privilege and seclusion. Adult education must\nnecessarily proceed without these valuable aids to learning. In earlier\nages it was generally believed that education could not be achieved\nwithout these advantages. Modern men insist that the spiritual values\nof life be realized not in contemplative aloofness but in the life of\nactivity. They also demand a satisfactory existence for as many people\nas possible; hence all are to have opportunity to share in the cultural\ngoods of civilization. Education is made universal and, below a certain\nage, compulsory. But it is obvious that unless education is to remain\nthe privilege of a few professionally trained scholars, large numbers\nof people must be given the facilities for continued study after school\nor college days are passed.\n\nIn other words, the aim of adult education is the cultivated amateur.\nI have tried to show that this is precisely the aim of all liberal\neducation. Learning which is discontinued when one leaves school has\nbeen for the most part wasted effort. Education is not culture unless\noutside college halls it is a permanent and wide-spread interest\nwhich makes a difference in the tastes and habits of thought of the\ncommunity. We have seen that Huxley deplored the fact that much of the\nintellectual leadership of Victorian England was found outside the\nuniversity faculties. While this may have been a just criticism of\nthe universities, it was a sign of intellectual vigor in the nation.\nEducation may be said to be achieving its purposes in a nation to the\nextent that quiet reflection supplants superficial cleverness, and that\nminds with patience and grace and breadth of outlook, with indifference\nto fads and catchwords and with respect for excellence, supplant the\n\u201cgo-getter,\u201d the \u201cmovie-fan,\u201d the worshipper of Mammon, the sensation\nmonger and the narrow sectarian.\n\nThe extent to which our education is a reality in the life of this\nRepublic is almost daily brought to our attention. A very small\npercentage of the population spends four years at college, during which\ntime most of it retains very much the same general habit patterns\nand beliefs and outlook on life that it had when it entered. After\ngraduation, students bring home little cultural interest or added civic\nvirtue. They for the most part vote the regular party ticket, support a\nchurch in which they happen to have been brought up, play golf, dance\nto jazz music, talk prohibition and drink synthetic gin, repeat the\nshibboleths of the group in which they grew to maturity, and make money.\n\nA small minority of students attend post-graduate schools, become\nresearch scholars, and within the radius of their special branch of\nstudy often reach high proficiency and unequalled scholarship. In the\nuniversities of New York City are gathered many of the most eminent\nscholars in America. But it must be said that very little educational\ninfluence passes over the chasm which separates our professionalized\neducation from the man in the street. Today a mob is moved to tears of\na patriotic fervor and to murderous indignation at the sight of a woman\nremoving from the front of her property some faded red, white and blue\nbunting which had been hung up by a tenant for the occasion of a street\nfestival some days previous; tomorrow an empty-pated multitude tries to\nbreak into an undertaker\u2019s establishment and tramples hysterical women\nunder foot in the effort to view the body of a deceased motion picture\nactor; and anon half the city runs oggling and open-mouthed after a\nyoung woman who can swim across the English Channel.\n\nWithout background or tradition other than folkway and a perishing\nancient dogma, and with quantity production methods devised to pamper\nto its fancy, this multitude tends to cheapen the quality of everything\nit comes near, while it parades its material prosperity before the\nworld as evidence of superior American virtue. Education has not\nyet taken root in our soil. It is a potted plant, like those little\nevergreen trees which may be seen growing in painted tubs on the stoops\nof New York houses. Such ancestral systems for valuing experience and\ncontrolling behavior as people brought to this country were mostly\ncast aside in the process of Americanization; the swift tempo of\nindustrialism supplanted the slow process of spiritual maturing, and a\nnewspaper-fashioned public opinion became the dominant cultural force\nfor the country at large.\n\nWe do not know at present whether the alleged general interest in\nadult education is evidence of a spontaneous and growing desire for\nknowledge, or is something promoted, worked up by interests which\nwould \u201ceducate the masses\u201d in order to attain certain economic ends,\nindividual or social. Nearly three million persons are said to be\nannually enrolled for various courses of study outside the resident\nclasses of established institutions of learning. Undoubtedly a great\nvariety of motives prompts these hundreds of thousands of people\nto take up the task of study. But wide-spread as this interest is,\npopularization of knowledge is not the same as the humanization of\nknowledge. We have seen how the values of religion may decline into\nempty caricatures of the spiritual life amongst certain popular sects.\n\nThose engaged in the work of adult education, often fear that the\nmovement may become standardized after the fashion of the public school\nsystem. Is it possible to keep up the standards without resorting to\nthe mechanical uniformity we commonly call standardization? I think\nthis is possible only if we are guided by a philosophy of liberal\neducation. Lose sight of such a philosophy and adult education\nbecomes a confusion of tongues. In such confusion there is of course\nfreedom from uniformity, yet there may be much standardization; each\neducational cult may easily degenerate into a doctrinaire, misguided\nsect. If I am correct in holding that the aim of liberal education\nis to produce the cultivated amateur, who possesses in general the\nmental traits which in the preceding chapters of this book we have\nseen to characterize the liberally educated mind, we have in the\npursuit of such a goal the very thing that will save adult education\nfrom degenerating, like Protestantism, into a conflict of narrow\northodoxies. Without such a goal, any passing fancy or popular\nprejudice, however ungrounded in philosophy, may come to serve as a\ndominant ideal of education. Adult education then becomes the means to\nevery sort of propaganda and personal ambition.\n\nOne educator of adults conducts short-time \u201cinstitutes\u201d for farmers\nin which during a period of two or three weeks instruction is given\nin such subjects as the fertilization of the soil, rotation of crops,\nmarketing, and the elements of bookkeeping. Others offer instruction to\nindustrial workers which will improve their efficiency and deepen their\nloyalty to the company. Others teach various trades and professions.\nMuch of the Americanization propaganda which gave employment to\nuplifters during the years following the war is now called adult\neducation. There is a group of very serious idealists who believe that\nby means of adult education they may initiate working people into the\n\u201cproletarian culture of the future,\u201d and arm the working class with\nthe necessary weapons for a social revolution. Others would conduct\nschools in which young people may be trained to become professional\nlabor leaders. To still others the task of adult education is very\nclear and simple: it is nothing else than the transformation of our\nentire civilization by the method of leading people back to nature\nand enabling them to express their emotions, to which end classes in\nappreciation and self-expression are organized, and students are sent\nout after two or three months of such training prepared to teach the\nemotional awakening to others.\n\nAdult education thus becomes a matter of slogans. Each educator is sure\nhe has it and can give the formula. It is that \u201cevery man be given\nopportunity to think for himself,\u201d or it is to give people \u201ca new and\nmodern world view,\u201d or to help people \u201cget out of the ruts in which\nthey find themselves,\u201d or to enable one to \u201cevaluate his experience,\u201d\nor it is \u201can adventure in independence.\u201d\n\nMany of these things may be very desirable, but are they education?\nTaken together, they reveal something of the confusion which always\nresults when men try to find their standards of value in the passing\ninterests of the hour. Adult education is a democratic movement and\nhence tends to make the desires and ideals of the uneducated rather\nthan those of the educated its standards and aims. The idea sometimes\nprevails in education, just as it has prevailed in religion and in\npolitics, that if only the masses may emancipate themselves from the\npast and start all over again, setting up their own values, there will\nnecessarily be great improvement. Hence Labor, for instance, is to have\n\u201cits own education,\u201d whatever that is. To be sure, every person, be he\na laborer or anyone else, must in the end educate himself, and perhaps\nthe masses in insisting upon their own values and ideals can make\nno worse business of their education than when they are \u201cgiven\u201d the\neducation which someone equally uneducated and materialistic thinks is\ngood for them.\n\nIt is obvious that the _methods_ of adult education must be different\nfrom those in common use in teaching children. The instructor cannot\ncompel attendance; he cannot require submission to his authority; he\nmust realize that he is among people who, though they have not his\nspecial knowledge, have yet each his own experience, and he must see\nthe relations of his knowledge to such experience; and in fact he must\nmake himself a student with the others. Now because the methods differ\nfrom those of formal education, people frequently infer that the _aim_\nalso is different. There are many things which would seem to lead to\nsuch an inference.\n\nIn the first place, in all education, attention is focused almost\nexclusively upon methods of teaching rather than upon the question,\n\u201cwhat is an educated person?\u201d Again many of those who are interested in\nadult education both as instructors or as students have grown up in an\nenvironment of traditional education, they have seen the futility and\nmeaninglessness of much that passes for education in the schools and\ncolleges, and are often moved to protest against the system and all its\nworks. I have tried to show that the failure of formal education is the\nresult of the fact that educators frequently do not know what liberal\neducation is. But many people who are irritated with the school system\nseem never to have raised the question whether what is taught in school\nis liberal education. They assume that it is what it appears to be, and\nhence, instead of seeking the meaning of liberal education, they turn\naway and strive to set up a hastily considered educational aim of their\nown.\n\nFinally, adult students are sometimes very opinionated--especially\nwhen they first come to class. Often they have violent prejudices and\nare extremely \u201cadvanced.\u201d Such minds are very much creatures of the\npopular movement of the hour. The educator, if he is to keep his hold\nupon these persons, must gain their favor and sustain their interest.\nThe easiest way to gain and keep a following is to make concession to\npopular prejudice. Classes in adult education, like the reading public,\nwish to be told what they would like to regard as true. One of the\ngreat \u201ctruths\u201d for which they often seek support is the belief that\nthe increasing or anticipated supremacy of the mass is \u201cprogress.\u201d\nMen wish adult education to be modern, to reflect current thought and\npresent-day tendencies. In an earlier chapter I tried to show how\nmuch of the popular thought that men believe very advanced is really\nunrecognized Rousseauism. Often the idea of a new start in education\nis only a survival of Rousseau\u2019s revolt against civilization. Since\nthe influence of Rousseau serves always to rationalize any plebeian\nwish-fancy whatsoever, it is not surprising that it should sometimes\nappear to set the goal of adult education. To the degree that the\ndesire for education is genuine and spontaneous, the demand will\nnaturally be for what people think, is education.\n\nBut in spite of all the chaos and confusion as to aims, adult\neducation, when the initiative comes from people who are hungry for\nknowledge, even though they do not know what education is, shows more\npromise than when the initiative comes from the professional school\nteacher. In the former case, there is some likelihood that someone will\nstumble upon the meaning of a liberal education. As a form of protest\nagainst the established educational system, I think adult education\nis a wholesome movement. The school authorities frequently show an\ninterest in this new thirst for knowledge which is met with suspicion.\nI do not wonder. They have not shown themselves so uniformly successful\nin the training of youth that they are justified in seeking to extend\ntheir machinery over adult efforts for knowledge. Much that school\nsuperintendents regard as adult education is really only elementary\neducation, primary instruction offered to adults. _The surest way to\ndefeat learning is to place it in charge of those whose own education\nhas stopped._ Their influence is everywhere to divert this mature\ninterest in learning to the only ends such professional educators know;\nservice to the state, conformity and routine, material advancement and\nindustrial efficiency, the uplift of the masses.\n\nIn the words of a great educator of the nineteenth century, we should\n\u201cinquire whether it is the masses alone who need a reformed and\nimproved education.\u201d Adult education is not something to be \u201cgiven\u201d\nto the masses, while college education may be kept for the sons of\nprivilege. There is no such thing as \u201cmass education.\u201d Throughout\nthe mass of mankind, college graduates included, there are scattered\nhere and there persons who can learn something and have the desire\nto continue learning. It is as important for us to consider for whom\nadult educational opportunities should exist as it is to consider what\neducation is. Such opportunities are for people who are worth educating.\n\nAdult education is selective. Its aim is not to provide a slight\nincrease of information and a few noble sentiments for the rank and\nfile, but to select out of the undifferentiated mass those who are\nnaturally capable of becoming something more than automatons. These\nneed no credits or examinations or promise of diplomas to spur them\nto intellectual effort. They would gain wisdom if there were no\neducational institutions, or classes, or lectures. But they need advice\nand the fellowship of other studious minds, for they are often lonely.\nVery few even professional students can easily carry on their studies\nwhen isolated from their kind. Hence the existence of universities.\nThe rush and racket of our industrial civilization are so great that\nthere is need to establish for those whose minds can rise above it, an\nenvironment where thought is leisurely and where people may be found\nwho have had learning long enough to be at home with it. The isolated\nstudent, like the person learning to swim, makes much needless effort.\nHe tries to stuff his head with learning. He needs time to meditate\nupon what he learns, talk about it, assimilate it, see its relations to\nhis knowledge and experience as a whole. I believe this to be the value\nof group discussion, where there is a real meeting of minds. I do\nnot, however, as some seem to do, believe that a company of uninformed\npeople talking nonsense are necessarily engaged in a work of mutual\neducation. It is not as groups that men may attain wisdom. With all\nthe aid possible from others, education is necessarily an individual\nachievement.\n\nWe need adult education not because it is a path to some Utopia,\nor imaginary triumph of the masses, or because it will add to the\ncontentment of the poor, or improve their morals and their industrial\nefficiency, or raise the tone of politics. We need adult education for\nthe same reason that we need any education at all. From the beginning\nof time men of a certain type have sought such knowledge of the riddle\nof existence as would make some measure of excellence possible to\nman. The result of all their striving is a vast body of knowledge\nwhich is the heritage of the men and women of our time. To share in\nthe possession of this knowledge and to work for its improvement and\nincrease is to men and women of a certain type simply to attain to\ntheir true human estate. They desire education because that is the kind\nof animal they happen to be. Such persons are different from the common\nlot. It is not that they may possess some secret information which the\nothers may not have. They have a different _goal_.\n\nSuch decency and tolerance and good sense and genuine idealism as exist\nin the midst of general human folly are largely the indirect results of\nthe efforts of these men and women for knowledge and wisdom. Society as\na whole is the gainer for their education. To the end that such minds\nmay find themselves, together with the work and the adventure which\nare their destiny, the widest possible efforts at general education\nshould be made. It is because of what people are in themselves and may\nbecome, not because of something they may get, that liberal education\nis the duty of man. What Huxley said of England in 1868 is true for\nAmerica today:\n\n  \u201ca few voices are lifted up in favour of the doctrine that the masses\n  should be educated because they are men and women with unlimited\n  capacities of being, doing, and suffering, and that it is as true\n  now, as it ever was, that the people perish for lack of knowledge.\u201d\n\n\nTHE END\n\n\n\n\n_Announcing_\n\nTHE NEW SCIENCE SERIES\n\n\nOne of the most significant developments in our life today is that as\nscientific knowledge almost daily advances, educated people are left\nmore and more in ignorance of its achievements. Scientists for the most\npart write for each other and the general reader is forced to resort to\npopularizers of science for his information. It is apparently forgotten\nthat many of the greatest scientists from Galileo and Copernicus to\nDarwin and Huxley wrote largely for the public they wished to reach\nwith their ideas.\n\nThe publishers have this tradition in mind in offering THE NEW SCIENCE\nSERIES which will present the latest scientific trends and discoveries\nfrom all parts of the world in a series of books written by leading\nscientists or those in close touch with their work. It is the aim of\nthis series to help modern men and women to know more about themselves\nand their world, and to feel that they understand something of what it\nis all about.\n\n\nEDITED BY C. K. OGDEN\n\n  VOL. I. MYTH IN PRIMITIVE PSYCHOLOGY BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, Ph.D.,\n  D.Sc.\n\n  VOL. II. SCIENCE AND POETRY I. A. RICHARDS, M.A.\n\n  VOL. III. FATALISM OR FREEDOM C. JUDSON HERRICK, Sc.D., Ph.D.\n\n\n_Other Volumes in Preparation_\n\nEACH VOLUME $1.00\n\n\n  _For descriptive catalogue, ask your bookseller or write\n  W \u00b7 W \u00b7 NORTON & COMPANY_\n  70 Fifth Avenue      New York\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s note\n\n\n\n\nMinor punctuation errors have been changed without notice. Spelling\nwas standardized except for quotes. Hyphenation was standardized where\nappropriate.\n\nThe following changes were made:\n\n  Page 37: \u201cPavlow. A hungry dog\u201d          \u201cPavlov. A hungry dog\u201d\n  Page 54: \u201cinformation that anyone\u201d       \u201cinformation than anyone\u201d\n  Page 76: \u201cin the early nineteeth\u201d        \u201cin the early nineteenth\u201d\n  Page 88: \u201cNietsche said that\u201d            \u201cNietzsche said that\u201d\n  Page 123: \u201cit not the social problem\u201d    \u201cis not the social problem\u201d\n  Page 130: \u201cMax Sterner\u2019s \u201cEgo\u201d\u201d          \u201cMax Stirner\u2019s \u201cEgo\u201d\u201d\n  Page 137: \u201cit hestitated to carry\u201d       \u201cit hesitated to carry\u201d\n  Page 141: \u201corganized soicalist locals\u201d   \u201corganized socialist locals\u201d\n  Page 142: \u201csort of convenant among\u201d      \u201csort of covenant among\u201d\n  Page 176: \u201cits value it not\u201d             \u201cits value is not\u201d\n  Page 176: \u201ca philosophy it true\u201d         \u201ca philosophy is true\u201d\n  Page 198: \u201ccreation of Plato\u2019s genuis\u201d   \u201ccreation of Plato\u2019s genius\u201d\n  Page 199: \u201cto aquiescence to authority\u201d  \u201cto acquiescence to authority\u201d\n  Page 224: \u201cMichaelangelo and Raphael\u201d    \u201cMichelangelo and Raphael\u201d\n  Page 224: \u201cMelanchthon and \u0152colampadus\u201d  \u201cMelanchthon and \u0152colampadius\u201d\n  Page 239: \u201cmatched by his magnaminity\u201d   \u201cmatched by his magnanimity\u201d\n  Page 253: \u201cfire of Promethus\u201d            \u201cfire of Prometheus\u201d\n  Page 256: \u201cbelieve there an be\u201d          \u201cbelieve there can be\u201d\n  Page 304: \u201csystem-makers and sytems\u201d     \u201csystem-makers and systems\u201d\n  Page 304: \u201cdestiny then their friends\u201d   \u201cdestiny than their friends\u201d\n  Page 306: \u201ca covenient way\u201d              \u201ca convenient way\u201d","title":"The meaning of a liberal education","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":96766}