{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_76061/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_76061","id":"gutenberg_76061","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/76061","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Civilization -- History","Ethics"],"text":"The Dale Memorial Lectures, 1922.\n\nCIVILIZATION AND ETHICS\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF CIVILIZATION\n\nPART II\n\nBY\n\nALBERT SCHWEITZER\n\nD.THEOL.; D.PHIL.; D.MED. (STRASSBURG)\n\n_Second Edition_\n\nTRANSLATED BY\n\nC. T. CAMPION\n\nM.A. (OXON.)\n\nA. & C. BLACK, LTD.\n\n4, 5 & 6 SOHO SQUARE, LONDON, W. 1\n\n1929\n\n\n\n\n\n_First Edition published November, 1923_\n\n_Second Edition (revised), published in 1929_\n\n\n\nTo\n\nMY WIFE\n\nTHE MOST LOYAL OF COMRADES\n\n\n_Printed in Great Britain._\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\nMY subject is the tragedy of the Western world-view._(_1_)_\n\nWhile still a student I was surprised to find the history of thought\nalways written merely as a history of philosophical systems, never as\nthe history of man\u2019s effort to arrive at a world-view. Later, when\nreflecting on the current of civilization in which I found myself\nliving, I was struck by the strange and inexorable connexions which\nexist between civilization and our view of the world as a whole. Next\nI felt a still stronger compulsion to put to Western thought the\nquestion what it has been aiming at, and what result it has reached in\nthe matter of world-view. What is there left of the achievements of\nour philosophy when it is stripped of its tinsel of learning? What has\nit to offer us when we demand from it those elemental ideas which we\nneed if we are to take our position in life as men who are growing in\ncharacter through the experience given by work?\n\nSo I came to an unsparing reckoning up with Western thought. I\nrecognized and admitted that it has sought for that world-view from\nwhich alone a deep and comprehensive civilization can come. It wanted\nto reach a position [pg vi] of world- and life-affirmation and on that\nfoundation lay down that it is our duty to be active, to strive for\nprogress of all kinds, and to create values. It wanted to reach an\nethical system and on that foundation lay down that for the sake of\nserviceable activity we have to place our life at the service of ideas\nand of the other life around us.\n\nBut it did not succeed in grounding its world- and life-affirming\nethical world-view convincingly and permanently in thought. Our\nphilosophy did nothing more than produce again and again unstable\nfragments of the serviceable world-view which hovered before its\nmind\u2019s eye. Consequently our civilization also remained fragmentary\nand insecure.\n\nIt was a fatal mistake that Western thought never admitted to itself\nthe unsatisfying result of its search for a stable and serviceable\nworld-view. Our philosophizing became less and less elemental, losing\nall connexion with the elementary questions which man must ask of life\nand of the world. More and more it found satisfaction in the handling\nof philosophic questions that were merely academic, and in an expert\u2019s\nmastery of philosophical technique. It became more and more the\ncaptive of secondary things. Instead of real music it produced again\nand again mere bandmaster\u2019s music, often magnificent stuff of its\nkind, but still only bandmaster\u2019s music.\n\nThrough this philosophy which did nothing but philosophize instead of\nstruggling for a world-view grounded in thought and serviceable for\nlife, we came to be without any world-view and therefore without any\ncivilization.\n\nSigns of an awakening of thought on this point are beginning to be\nvisible. It is admitted here and there that philosophy must again try\nto offer a world-view. This is generally expressed by saying that\npeople are encouraging it to venture once more on \u201cmetaphysics,\u201d that\nis to put forward definitive views about the spiritual nature of the\nworld, whereas hitherto it has been occupied with the classification\nof scientific facts and in cautious hypotheses.\n\nNot only in philosophy, but in thought generally this [pg vii]\nawakening of the need for a world-view expresses itself as a need for\n\u201cmetaphysics.\u201d Fantastic systems of \u201cmetaphysics\u201d are sought for and\noffered. Individuals who believe that they have at their disposal\npeculiar psychic experiences, and assert that with their aid they can\nlook behind the actual nature of phenomena, come forward as bringers\nof a world-view.\n\nBut neither the cautious academic, nor the much-claiming fantastic\n\u201cmetaphysics,\u201d can really give us a world-view. That the road to a\nworld-view leads through \u201cmetaphysics\u201d is a fatal error which has\nalready enjoyed too long a span of life in our Western thought. It\nwould be tragic if we renewed its vigour just now, when we are faced\nby the necessity of working our way out of that lack of world-view in\nwhich our misery, both spiritual and material, is grounded. No further\nwandering along the traditional roads that lead nowhere can save us,\nwhether we advance as the successors of our fathers or on adventurous\nlines of our own. Only in a deep conception of and experience in the\nproblems of world-view is there for us any possibility of advance.\n\nThat is why I am undertaking what has never been attempted in this way\nbefore, viz. so to pose the problem of the Western world-view as to\nmake the Western search for a world-view come to a halt and take\naccount of itself. There are two points on which it must be clear\nbefore it proceeds to further exertion. The first is the overwhelming\nimportance in the search for a world-view of the quality of the\nworld-view sought. What is it that we want? We want to find the world-\nand life-affirmation and the ethical system which we need for that\nserviceable activity which gives our life a meaning, based on such\nthought about the world and life as finds a meaning in them also. If\nour search for a world-view is once thoroughly permeated by the\nrecognition that everything turns upon these two fundamental\nquestions, it is thereby saved from betaking itself to by-paths,\nthinking that by some happy disposition of fortune it can reach its\ngoal along them. It will then [pg viii] not search for a \u201cmetaphysic,\u201d\nthinking by means of it to reach a world-view, but it will search for\na world-view and accept with it anything \u201cmetaphysical\u201d that may turn\nup. From every point of view it will remain elemental.\n\nThe second task which the conscious search for a world-view must not\nshirk, is the consideration of what is the real and ultimate nature of\nthe process by which it has hitherto attempted to secure that\nserviceable world-view which hovered before it. Reflexion on this is\nnecessary that it may make up its mind whether further advance along\nthe road it has hitherto followed gives any prospect of success. Our\nphilosophy ought to have been philosophizing long ago about the road\nalong which it was going in search of a world-view. It never did so,\nand therefore was always running uselessly round and round in a\ncircle.\n\nThe process by which Western thought has hitherto sought for a\nworld-view is doomed to be fruitless. It consisted simply in\ninterpreting the world in the sense of world- and life-affirmation,\nthat is, in attributing to the world a meaning which allowed it to\nconceive the aims of mankind and of individual men as having a meaning\nwithin it. This interpretation is acted upon by all Western\nphilosophy. A few thinkers who venture to be un-Western and resolutely\nallow world- and life-negation and ethics to be made subjects of\ndiscussion, are side-currents which do not affect the main course of\nthe river.\n\nThat this process followed by Western thought consists in adopting an\noptimistic-ethical interpretation of the world will not be clear\nwithout further explanation, for it is, indeed, not always openly\nfollowed. The optimistic-ethical interpretation is often to be found\nimbedded in the results of investigations into the nature of\nknowledge; it often appears beneath a veil of \u201cmetaphysics\u201d; it is\noften so delicately shaded that it produces none of its usual effects.\nIt is only when one has clearly grasped the fact that Western thought\nhas nothing else in mind than to establish for itself a world-view\nbased on world- and life-affirmation and ethical in character, that\none can realize [pg ix] how in its theory of knowledge, in its\nmetaphysics, and in all its movements generally in the game of life,\nit is guided, consciously or unconsciously, by the effort to interpret\nthe world in some way or other and in some measure in the sense of\nworld- and life-affirmation and of ethics. Whether in this attempt it\ngoes to work openly or secretly, skilfully or unskilfully, honourably\nor craftily, does not matter. Western thought needs this\ninterpretation that it may be able to give a meaning to human life.\nIts view of life is to be a result of its view of the world. No other\ncourse was ever taken into consideration by it.\n\nBut this awakening of Western thought will not be complete until that\nthought steps outside itself and comes to an understanding with the\nsearch for a world-view as this manifests itself in the thought of\nmankind as a whole. We have too long been occupied with the developing\nseries of our own philosophical systems, and have taken no notice of\nthe fact that there is a world-philosophy of which our Western\nphilosophy is only a part. If, however, one grasps philosophy as being\na struggle to reach a view of the world as a whole, and seeks out the\nelementary convictions which are to deepen it and give it a sure\nfoundation, one cannot avoid setting our own thought face to face with\nthat of the Hindus and Chinese in the Far East. The latter looks\nstrange to us because much of it has remained even till now na\u00efve and\nembodied in myth, while in other parts again it has spontaneously\nadvanced to refinements of criticism and to artificialities. But this\ndoes not matter. The essential thing is that it is a struggle for a\nworld-view: the form it takes is a secondary matter. Our Western\nphilosophy, if judged by its own latest pronouncements, is much na\u00efver\nthan we admit to ourselves, and we fail to perceive it only because we\nhave acquired the art of expressing what is simple in a learned way.\n\nAmong the Hindus we encounter the world-view which is based on world-\nand life-negation, and the way in which it grounds itself in thought\nis calculated to leave us not knowing what to make of our prejudice in\nfavour of world- [pg x] and life-affirmation, which, as Westerners, we\nare inclined to assume as something more or less self-evident.\n\nThe attraction and tension which in Hindu thought govern the relations\nbetween world- and life-negation and ethics, afford us glimpses into\nthe problem of ethics for which Western thought offers us no\ncomparable opportunities.\n\nNowhere, again, has the problem of world- and life-affirmation, both\nin itself and in its relation to ethics, been felt in so elemental and\ncomprehensive a fashion as in Chinese thought. Lao-tse, Chwang-tse,\nKung-tse (Confucius), Meng-tse, Lie-tse, and the rest, are thinkers in\nwhom the problems of world-view with which our Western thought is\nwrestling, encounter us in a form, strange indeed, but compelling our\nattention.\n\nDiscussing these problems with them means discussing them with\nourselves also.\n\nThat is why I bade our search for a world-view seek to reach clear\nideas about itself, and come to a halt in order to fix its attention\non the thought of mankind as a whole.\n\nMy solution of the problem is that we must make up our minds to\nrenounce completely the optimistic-ethical interpretation of the\nworld. If we take the world as it is, it is impossible to attribute to\nit a meaning in which the aims and objects of mankind and of\nindividual men have a meaning also. Neither world- and\nlife-affirmation nor ethics can be grounded on what our knowledge of\nthe world can tell us about the world. In the world we can discover\nnothing of any purposive evolution in which our activities can acquire\na meaning. Nor is the ethical to be discovered in any form in the\nworld-process. The only advance in knowledge that we can make is to\ndescribe more and more minutely the phenomena which make up the world\nand their course. To understand the meaning of the whole\u2014and that is\nwhat a world-view demands\u2014is for us an impossibility. The last fact\nwhich knowledge can discover is that the world is a manifestation in\nevery way puzzling, of the universal will-to-live.\n\n[pg xi]\n\nI believe I am the first among Western thinkers who has ventured to\nrecognize this crushing result of knowledge, and who is absolutely\nsceptical about our knowledge of the world without at the same time\nrenouncing with it belief in world- and life-affirmation and ethics.\nResignation as to knowledge of the world is for me not a hopeless fall\ninto a scepticism which leaves us to drift about in life like a\nderelict vessel. I see in it that effort of honesty which we must\nventure to make in order to arrive at the serviceable world-view which\nhovers within sight. Every world-view which does not start from\nresignation in regard to knowledge, is artificial and a mere\nfabrication, for it rests upon an inadmissible interpretation of the\nworld.\n\nWhen once thought has become clear to itself about the relation in\nwhich world-view and life-view stand to each other, it is in a\nposition to reconcile resignation as to knowledge with adherence to\nworld- and life-affirmation and ethics. Our view of life is not\ndependent on our view of the world in the way that uncritical thought\nimagines it to be. It does not wither away if it cannot send its roots\ndown into a corresponding world-view, for it does not originate in\nknowledge although it would like to base itself thereon. It can safely\ndepend upon itself alone, for it is rooted in our will-to-live.\n\nWorld- and life-affirmation and ethics are given in our will-to-live,\nand they come to be clearly discerned in it in proportion as it learns\nto think about itself and its relation to the world. The rational\nthought of other times aimed at getting to know the world, and at\nbeing able in that knowledge to conceive of the highest impulses of\nour will-to-live as purposive in view of the universe and its\nevolution. But that aim was unattainable. We are not meant to unite\nthe world and ourselves in such harmony with one another. We were\nna\u00efve enough to assume that our view of life must be contained in our\nview of the world, but the facts do not justify this assumption. The\nresult is that our thought finds itself involved in a dualism with\nwhich it can [pg xii] never finally settle. It is the dualism of\nworld-view and life-view, of knowing and willing.\n\nTo this dualism all the problems with which human thought has busied\nitself ultimately go back. Every fragment of the thought of mankind\nwhich has any bearing on man\u2019s view of the world\u2014whether in the\nworld-religions or in philosophy\u2014is an attempt to resolve this\ndualism. It is sometimes softened down, but only to let a unitary,\nmonistic world-view be adopted in its place; at other times it is left\ncurrent, but is transformed into a drama with a monistic issue.\n\nInnumerable are the expedients which thought used in trying to get rid\nof dualism. Everything it has undertaken commands respect, even the\nstaggering _na\u00efvet\u00e9s_ and the meaningless acts of violence to which it\ncommitted itself, for it was always acting under the compulsion of an\ninner necessity: it wanted to rescue a serviceable world-view from the\nabyss of dualism.\n\nBut from this continuous mishandling of the problem no solution could\nissue capable of satisfying thought. We were to be taken over the\nabyss on tottering bridges of snow.\n\nInstead of going on bridging this abyss with forced logic and\nimaginative ideas, we must make up our minds to get to the root of the\nproblem and let it work upon us as it comes straight to meet us in the\nfacts. The solution is, not to try to get rid of dualism from the\nworld, but to realize it as something which can no longer do us any\nharm. That is possible if we leave behind us all the arts and the\nunveracities of thought and bow to the fact that, as we cannot\nharmonize our life-view and our world-view, we must make up our minds\nto put the former above the latter. The volition which is given in our\nwill-to-live reaches beyond our knowledge of the world. What is\ndecisive for our life-view is not our knowledge of the world but the\ncharacter of the volition which is given in our will-to-live. The\nuniversal spirit meets us in nature as puzzling creative power. In our\nwill-to-live we experience [pg xiii] it within us as volition which is\nboth world- and life-affirming and ethical.\n\nOur relation to the world as it is given in the character of our\nwill-to-live, when this latter seeks to comprehend itself in thought:\nthat is our view of the world. World-view is a product of life-view,\nnot _vice vers\u00e2_.\n\nThe rational thought of to-day, therefore, does not hunt the phantom\nof getting to know the world. It leaves knowledge of the world on one\nside as something unattainable by us, and tries to come to clear ideas\nabout the will-to-live which is within us.\n\nThe problem of world-view, then, brought back to facts and tackled by\nrational thought without assumptions being made, may be put thus:\n\u201cWhat is the relation of my will-to-live, when it learns to think, to\nitself and to the world?\u201d And the answer is: \u201cFrom an inner compulsion\nto be true to itself and to remain consistent with itself, our\nwill-to-live enters into relations with our own individual being and\nwith all manifestations of the will-to-live which surround it, that\nare determined by the sentiment of reverence for life.\u201d\n\nReverence for life, _veneratio vit\u00e6_, is the most direct and at the\nsame time the profoundest achievement of my will-to-live.\n\nIn reverence for life my knowledge passes into experience. The\nunsophisticated world- and life-affirmation which is within me just\nbecause I am will-to-live has, therefore, no need to enter into\ncontroversy with itself, if my will-to-live learns to think and yet\ndoes not understand the meaning of the world. In spite of the negative\nresults of knowledge I have to hold fast to world- and\nlife-affirmation and deepen it. My life carries its own meaning in\nitself. This meaning lies in my living out the highest idea which\nshows itself in my will-to-live, viz. the idea of reverence for life.\nWith that for a starting-point I give value to my own life and to all\nthe will-to-live which surrounds me, I persevere in activity, and I\nproduce values.\n\nEthics grow out of the same root as world- and [pg xiv]\nlife-affirmation, for ethics, too, are nothing but reverence for life.\nThat is what gives me the fundamental principle of morality, viz. that\ngood consists in maintaining, promoting, and enhancing life and that\ndestroying, injuring, and limiting life are evil. Affirmation of the\nworld, which means affirmation of the will-to-live that manifests\nitself all round me, is only possible if I devote myself to other\nlife. From an inner necessity I exert myself in producing values and\npractising ethics in the world and on the world even though not\nunderstanding the meaning of the world. For in world- and\nlife-affirmation and in ethics I carry out the will of the universal\nwill-to-live which reveals itself in me. I live my life in God, in the\nmysterious divine personality which I do not know as such in the\nworld, but only experience as a mysterious Will within myself.\n\nRational thinking which is free from assumptions ends therefore in\nmysticism. To relate oneself in the spirit of reverence for life to\nthe multiform manifestations of the will-to-live which together\nconstitute the world is ethical mysticism. All profound world-view is\nmysticism, the essence of which is just this: that out of my\nunsophisticated and na\u00efve existence in the world there comes, as a\nresult of thought about self and the world, spiritual self-devotion to\nthe mysterious infinite Will which is continuously manifested in the\nuniverse.\n\nThis world-affirming, ethical, active mysticism has always been\nhovering as a vision before Western thought, but the latter could\nnever adopt it because in its search for a world-view it always turned\ninto the wrong road of optimistic-ethical interpretation of the world,\ninstead of reflecting directly on the relation which man assumes to\nthe world under the inner compulsion of the deepest characterisation\nof his will-to-live.\n\nFrom my youth onwards I have felt certain that all thought which\nthinks itself out to an issue ends in mysticism. In the stillness of\nthe prim\u00e6val forest in Africa I have been able to work out this\nthought and give it expression.\n\nI come forward therefore with confidence as a restorer [pg xv] of that\nrational thought which refuses to make assumptions. I know indeed that\nour time will have absolutely no connexion with anything that is in\nany way rationalistic, and would like to know it renounced as an\naberration of the eighteenth century. But the time will come when it\nwill be seen that we must start again where that century came to a\nstop. What lies between that time and to-day is an intermezzo of\nthought, an intermezzo with extraordinarily interesting and valuable\nmoments, but nevertheless an unhappy and fatal one. Its inevitable end\nwas our sinking into a condition in which we had neither world-view\nnor civilization, and which contains in itself all that spiritual and\nmaterial misery in which we languish.\n\nThe restoration of our world-view can come only as a result of\ninexorably truth-loving and recklessly courageous thought. Such\nthinking alone is mature enough to learn by experience how the\nrational, when it thinks itself out to a conclusion, passes\nnecessarily over into the non-rational. World- and life-affirmation\nand ethics are non-rational. They are not justified by any\ncorresponding knowledge of the nature of the world, but are the\ndisposition in which, through the inner compulsion of our\nwill-to-live, we determine our relation to the world.\n\nWhat the activity of this disposition of ours means in the evolution\nof the world, we do not know. Nor can we regulate this activity from\noutside; we must leave entirely to each individual its shaping and its\nextension. From every point of view, then, world- and life-affirmation\nand ethics are non-rational, and we must have the courage to admit it.\n\nIf rational thought thinks itself out to a conclusion, it comes to\nsomething non-rational which, nevertheless, is a necessity of thought.\nThis is the paradox which dominates our spiritual life. If we try to\ncome through without this non-rational, the result is views of the\nworld and of life which are without life and without value.\n\nAll valuable conviction is non-rational and has an emotional\ncharacter, because it cannot be derived from [pg xvi] knowledge of the\nworld but arises out of the thinking experience of our will-to-live,\nin which we stride out beyond all knowledge of the world. This fact it\nis which the rational thought that thinks itself out to a conclusion\ncomprehends as the truth by which we must live. The way to true\nmysticism leads up through rational thought to deep experience of the\nworld and of our will-to-live. We must all venture once more to be\n\u201cthinkers,\u201d so as to reach mysticism, which is the only direct and the\nonly profound world-view. We must all wander in the field of knowledge\nto the point where knowledge passes over into experience of the world.\nWe must all, through thought, become religious.\n\nThis rational thought must become the prevailing force among us, for\nall the valuable ideas that we need develop out of it. In no other\nfire than that of the mysticism of reverence for life can the broken\nsword of idealism be forged anew.\n\nIn the disposition to reverence for life lies enclosed an elementary\nconception of responsibility to which we must surrender ourselves; in\nit there are forces at work which drive us to revision and ennoblement\nof our individual social and political disposition.\n\nIt is the disposition to reverence for life, too, which alone is\ncapable of creating a new consciousness of law. The misery prevailing\nunder our political and social condition consists to a great extent in\nthis, that neither jurists nor laity have in their minds a living and\ndirect conception of law. During the age of rational thought there was\na search made for such a conception, and effort was made to establish\nfundamental laws which were held to be given in the nature of man, and\nto get them generally recognized. Later on, however, this was given\nup, and laws passed at definite dates displaced natural law. Finally\nwe got to the stage of being satisfied with purely technical law. This\nwas the intermezzo which followed the period of rational thought in\nthe sphere of law.\n\nWe have entered on a period in which the feeling for [pg xvii] law is\nhopelessly bereft of force, of soul, and of sense of moral obligation.\nIt is a period of lawlessness. Parliaments produce with easy readiness\nstatutes which contradict the idea of law. States deal arbitrarily\nwith their subjects without regard to the maintenance of any feeling\nfor law. Those, indeed, who fall into the power of a foreign nation\nare outlaws. No respect is shown for their natural right to a\nfatherland, or freedom, or dwelling-place, or property, or industry,\nor food, or anything else. Belief in law is to-day an utter ruin.\n\nThis state of things was in preparation from the moment when the\nsearch for the natural conception of law, grounded on rational\nthought, was given up.\n\nThe only thing to be done, then, is to make a new connexion in the\nsphere of law also, at the point where the thread of the rational\nthought of the eighteenth century got broken. We must search for a\nconception of law that is grounded in an idea which grows directly and\nindependently out of a world-view. We have to re-establish human\nrights which cannot be infringed, human rights which guarantee to each\nperson the greatest possible freedom for his personality in his own\nnational body, human rights which protect his existence and his human\ndignity against any foreign violence to which he may be subjected.\n\nJurists have allowed law and the feeling for law to be ruined. They\ncould not help it, however, for there was no idea provided by the\nthought of the time to which a living conception of law could have\nanchored itself. In the complete absence of any world-view law\ncollapsed entirely, and it is only out of a new world-view that it can\nbe built up again. It is from a fundamental idea about our relation to\nall that lives, as such, that it must flow in future, as from a spring\nwhich can never dry up and never become a swamp. That spring is\nreverence for life.\n\nLaw and ethics spring up together from the same idea. Law is so much\nof the principle of respect for life as can be embodied in an external\ncode; ethics are what cannot be so embodied. The foundation of law is\nhumanity. It is [pg xviii] folly to wish to put out of action the\nlinks between law and world-view.\n\nIn this way a world-view is the germ of all ideas and dispositions\nwhich are determinative for the conduct of individuals and of society.\n\nFlying machines carry men to-day through the air over a world in which\nhunger and brigandage have a place. It is not in China only that one\nrecognizes the grotesque character of such progress: it is almost\ntypical for mankind generally, and such grotesque progress cannot be\nchanged to the normal till a general disposition prevails which is\ncapable of bringing order again into the chaos of human life through\nethics. In the last resort the practical can be realized only through\nthe ethical\n\nWhat a remarkable circle! Rational thought which thinks itself out\narrives at something non-rational and subjective which is a necessity\nof thought, viz. the ethical affirmation of world and life. On the\nother hand, what for the purpose of moulding the conditions of\nexistence for individual men and mankind as a whole is rational, that\nis to say, what is objectively practical in this regard, can only be\nbrought about by individuals perseveringly putting into action the\nabove-mentioned non-rational and subjective. The non-rational\nprinciple underlying our activity, a principle which is provided for\nus by rational thought, is the sole rational and practical principle\nunderlying all the happenings which are to be produced through human\naction. Thus the rational and the non-rational, the objective and the\nsubjective proceed each from the other, and return each into the other\nagain. Only when the play of this mutual interchange is in full\nactivity do normal conditions of existence arise for men and mankind.\nLet it be disturbed and the abnormal develops.\n\nI have, then, in this book written the tragedy of the search for a\nworld-view, and have myself trodden a new path to the same goal.\nWhereas Western thought has not arrived at any goal because it would\nnot venture resolutely into the desert of scepticism about knowledge\nof the world, [pg xix] I make my way through this desert with calm\nconfidence. It is, after all, only a narrow strip, and it lies in\nfront of the ever-green oasis of an elemental world-view which grows\nout of thought about the will-to-live. In my attempt, however, to\nreach a world-view by this new method, I am conscious of having done\nno more than put together and think out to conclusions many gropings\nafter this new method which were made by other seekers during the\nperiod covered.\n\nBut I also put into this book my conviction that mankind must renew\nitself in a new temper of mind, if it is not to be ruined. I entrust\nto it, further, my belief that this revolution will come about, if\nonly we can make up our minds to become thinking men.\n\nA new Renaissance must come, and a much greater one than that in which\nwe stepped out of the Middle Ages; a great Renaissance in which\nmankind discovers that the ethical is the highest truth and the\nhighest practicality, and experiences at the same time its liberation\nfrom that miserable obsession by what it calls reality, in which it\nhas hitherto dragged itself along.\n\nI would be a humble pioneer of this Renaissance, and throw the belief\nin a new humanity, like a torch, into our dark age. I make bold to do\nthis because I believe I have given to the disposition to humanity,\nwhich hitherto has ranked only as a noble feeling, a firm foundation\nin a world-view which is a product of elementary thinking and can be\nmade intelligible to everyone. Moreover, it has gained thereby a power\nof attracting and convincing which it has not had hitherto; and is\ncapable now of coming to terms in energetic and consistent fashion\nwith our so-called reality, and of proving its full value within it.\n\nALBERT SCHWEITZER.\n\n_July_, 1923.\n\nThe two instalments of my Philosophy of Civilization which are now\nready\u2014_The Decay and Restoration of [pg xx] Civilization_ and\n_Civilization and Ethics_\u2014will be followed by two others. In the next,\nwhich will be entitled _The World-view of Reverence for Life_, I\nelaborate this world-view, which so far I have only sketched for a\nconclusion to my discussion of the search for a world-view, as carried\non down to the present day. The fourth and last will treat of the\nCivilized State.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe translator offers his thanks to Mrs. C. E. B. Russell, now helping\nat Lambarene, who kindly reviewed the whole work before it went to the\nprinters. Many of her criticisms and suggestions were adopted, and\nhave helped to secure a better translation.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nI. THE CRISIS IN CIVILIZATION AND ITS SPIRITUAL CAUSE  [I]\n\n  The material and spiritual elements in civilization [I]\n  Civilization and world-view [6]\n\nII. THE PROBLEM OF THE OPTIMISTIC WORLD-VIEW [11]\n\n   The Western and the Indian conceptions of civilization[11]\n   The struggle for the optimistic world-view [12]\n   Optimism and pessimism [14]\n   Optimism, pessimism, and ethics [17]\n\nIII. THE ETHICAL PROBLEM [19]\n\n   The difficulties of ethical perception [19]\n   The importance of thought about ethics [21]\n   The search for a basic principle of morality [22]\n   Religious and philosophical ethics [24]\n\nIV. RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL WORLD-VIEWS [27]\n\n   The world-views of the world-religions [27]\n   The world-views of the world religions and that of Western\n   thought [29]\n\nV. CIVILIZATION AND ETHICS IN THE GR\u00c6CO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY [32]\n\n   The beginnings: Socrates [32]\n   Epicureanism and Stoicism. The ethic of resignation [35]\n   Plato\u2019s abstract basic principle of the ethical. The ethic\n   of world-negation [40]\n   Aristotle. Instruction about virtue in place of ethics [42]\n   The ideal of the civilised State in Plato and Aristotle [47]\n   Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius [52]\n   The optimistic-ethical world-view of the later Stoicism [57]\n\nVI. OPTIMISTIC WORLD-VIEW AND ETHICS IN THE RENAISSANCE AND\nPOST-RENAISSANCE PERIODS [61]\n\n   Belief in progress and ethics [61]\n   Christian and Stoic elements in modern ethics [64]\n\nVII. LAYING THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND\nEIGHTEENTH CENTURIES [71]\n\n   Hartley, Holbach. Devotion as enlightened egoism [71]\n   Hobbes, Locke, Helvetius, Bentham [75]\n   Altruism as a natural quality. Hume, Adam Smith [80]\n   The English ethic of self-perfecting [84]\n   Shaftesbury, An optimistic-ethical nature-philosophy [87]\n\nVIII. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS OF CIVILIZATION IN THE AGE OF\nRATIONALISM [90]\n\n   The mentality and the achievements of the ethical belief\n   in progress [90]\n   Obstacles to the reform movement. The French Revolution [99]\n   The undermining of the rationalistic world-view [102]\n\nIX. THE OPTIMISTIC-ETHICAL WORLD-VIEW IN KANT [106]\n\n   Kant\u2019s ethics, deepened, but lacking content [106]\n   Kant\u2019s attempt to reach an ethical world-view [110]\n\nX. NATURE-PHILOSOPHY AND WORLD-VIEW IN SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ [116]\n\n   Spinoza\u2019s attempt to reach an optimistic-ethical\n   nature-philosophy [116]\n   Leibniz\u2019s optimistic-ethical world-view side by side with\n   nature-philosophy [122]\n\nXI. J. G. FICHTE\u2019S OPTIMISTIC-ETHICAL WORLD-VIEW [125]\n\n   Speculative philosophy and Gnosticism [125]\n   Fichte\u2019s speculative founding of an ethic and of optimism [126]\n   Fichte\u2019s mysticism of activity incapable of being carried\n   through [131]\n\nXII. SCHILLER; GOETHE; SCHLEIERMACHER [136]\n\n   Schiller\u2019s ethical world-view: Goethe\u2019s world-view based on\n   nature-philosophy [136]\n   Schleiermacher\u2019s attempt at a nature-philosophy [138]\n\nXIII. HEGEL\u2019S SUPRA-ETHICAL OPTIMISTIC WORLD-VIEW [141]\n\n   Ethics in Hegel\u2019s nature-philosophy, and in his philosophy of\n   history [141]\n   Hegel\u2019s supra-ethical world-view. His belief in progress [145]\n\nXIV. THE LATER UTILITARIANISM, BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL\nETHICS [150]\n\n   Beneke, Feuerbach, Laas, Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill [150]\n   Darwin and Spencer [153]\n   The weak points in biological and sociological utilitarianism [156]\n   Sociological ethics and socialism. Mechanical belief in\n   progress [160]\n\nXV. SCHOPENHAUER AND NIETZSCHE [165]\n\n   Schopenhauer. An ethic of world- and life-denial [165]\n   Absorption of ethics in world- and life-denial [171]\n   Nietzsche\u2019s criticism of current ethics [174]\n   Nietzsche\u2019s ethic of higher life-affirmation [177]\n\nXVI. THE ISSUE OF THE WESTERN STRUGGLE FOR A WORLD-VIEW [181]\n\n   Academic thinkers: Sidgwick, Stephen, Alexander, Wundt, Paulsen,\n   H\u00f6ffding [181]\n   The ethic of self-perfecting, Kant\u2019s successors: Cohen,\n   Herrmann [183]\n   The ethic of self-perfecting: Martineau, Green, Bradley, Laurie,\n   Seth, and Royce [185]\n   Nature-philosophy and ethics. Fouill\u00e9e, Guyau, Lange, Stern [186]\n   Nature-philosophy and ethics in Eduard von Hartmann [194]\n   Nature-philosophy and ethics in Bergson, Chamberlain, Keyserling,\n   Haeckel [198]\n   The death-agony of the optimistic-ethical world-view [202]\n\nXVII. THE NEW WAY [205]\n\n   Why the optimistic-ethical world-view cannot be carried through to\n   the logical conclusion [205]\n   Life-view independent of world-view [208]\n\nXVIII. THE FOUNDATIONS OF OPTIMISM SECURED FROM THE WILL-TO-LIVE [212]\n\n   The pessimistic result of knowledge [212]\n   The world- and life-affirmation of the will-to-live [216]\n\nXIX. THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS, STARTING FROM THE HISTORY OF ETHICS [221]\n\n   An ethic of self-devotion, or an ethic of self-perfecting? [221]\n   Ethics and a theory of knowledge. Ethics and natural happenings.\n   The enthusiastic element in ethics [224]\n   The ethic of ethical personality, and the ethic of society [228]\n   The problem of a complete ethic [230]\n\nXX. THE ETHIC OF DEVOTION AND THE ETHIC OF SELF-PERFECTING [232]\n\n   The widening of the ethic of self-devotion into a cosmic\n   ethic [232]\n   The ethic of self-perfecting and mysticism [235]\n   Abstract mysticism and the mysticism of reality. Supra-ethical and\n   ethical mysticism [241]\n\nXXI. THE ETHIC OF REVERENCE FOR LIFE [244]\n\n   The basic principle of the moral [244]\n   The ethic of resignation. An ethic of veracity towards oneself,\n   and an activist ethic [251]\n   Ethics and thoughtlessness. Ethics and self-assertion [253]\n   Man and other living creatures [256]\n   The ethic of the relation of man to man [258]\n   Personal and supra-personal responsibility. Ethics and\n   humanity [262]\n\nXXII. The CIVILIZING POWER OF THE ETHIC OF REVERENCE FOR LIFE [269]\n\n   Civilization as a product of reverence for life [269]\n   The four ideals of civilization. The struggle for a civilized\n   mankind in the machine age [271]\n   Church and State as historical entities, and as ideals of\n   civilization [278]\n   The moralizing of the religious and political community [280]\n\nFOOTNOTES\nINDEX [287]\n\n\n\n\nCIVILIZATION AND ETHICS\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE CRISIS IN CIVILIZATION AND ITS SPIRITUAL CAUSE\n\n\nThe material and spiritual elements in civilization\n\nOUR civilization is going through a severe crisis.\n\nMost people think that the crisis was produced by the war, but that is\nwrong. The war, with everything connected with it, is only a\nphenomenon of the condition of un-civilization in which we find\nourselves. Even in States which took no part in the war, and on which\nthe war had no direct influence, civilization is shaken, only the fact\nis not so clearly evident in them as in those which were hard hit by\nthe consequences of its peculiarly cruel spiritual and material\nhappenings.\n\nYet is there any real, live thought going on among us about this\ncollapse of civilization, and about possible ways of working ourselves\nup out of it? Scarcely! Clever men stumble about in seven-league boots\nin the history of civilization and try to make us understand that\ncivilization is some kind of natural growth which blossoms out in\ndefinite peoples at definite times and then of necessity withers, so\nthat new peoples with new civilizations must keep replacing the\nworn-out ones. When they are called upon, indeed, to complete their\ntheory by telling us what peoples are destined to be our heirs, they\nare somewhat embarrassed. There are, in fact, no peoples to be seen\nwhom one could imagine to be capable of even a portion of such a task.\nAll the peoples of the earth have been in large measure under the\ninfluence both of our civilization [pg 002] and of our lack of it, so\nthat they share more or less our fate. Among none of them are to be\nfound thoughts which can lead to any considerable original movement of\ncivilization.\n\nLet us put on one side cleverness and interesting surveys of the\nhistory of civilization, and busy ourselves in a practical way with\nthe problem of our endangered civilization. Of what character is this\ndegeneration in our civilization, and why has it come about?\n\nTo begin with, there is one elementary fact which is quite obvious.\nThe disastrous feature of our civilization is that it is far more\ndeveloped materially than spiritually. Its balance is disturbed.\nThrough the discoveries which now place the forces of Nature at our\ndisposal in such an unprecedented way, the relations to each other of\nindividuals, of social groups, and of States have undergone a\nrevolutionary change. Our knowledge and our power have been enriched\nand increased to an extent that no one would have thought possible. We\nhave thereby been enabled to make the conditions of human existence\nincomparably more favourable in numerous respects, but in our\nenthusiasm over our progress in knowledge and power, we have come to a\ndefective conception of what civilization is. We value too highly its\nmaterial achievements and no longer keep in mind as vividly as is\ndesirable the importance of the spiritual. Now the results are upon\nus, and summon us to reflect. They tell us in terribly harsh language\nthat a civilization which develops only on its material side but not\nin corresponding measure on its spiritual side, is like a ship which\nwith defective steering gear gets at a constantly accelerating pace\nout of control, and thereby heads for a catastrophe.\n\nThe essential nature of civilization does not lie in its material\nachievements, but in the fact that individuals keep in mind the ideals\nof the perfecting of man, and the improvement of the social and\npolitical conditions of peoples, and of mankind as a whole, and that\ntheir habit [pg 003] of thought is determined in living and constant\nfashion by such ideals. Only when individuals work in this way as\nspiritual forces on themselves and on society is the possibility given\nof solving the problems which have been produced by the facts of life,\nand of attaining to a general progress which is valuable in every\nrespect. Whether there is rather more or rather less of material\nachievement to record is not what is decisive for civilization. Its\nfate depends on whether or no thought keeps control over facts. The\nissue of a voyage does not depend on whether the vessel\u2019s pace is\nsomewhat quicker or somewhat slower, but on whether it steers a\ncorrect course, and its steering gear keeps in good condition.\n\nRevolutions in the relations of life between individuals, society, and\npeoples, as they follow in the train of our great material\nachievements, make, if they are to show real progress in the sense of\nvaluable civilization, higher demands on the habit of thought of\ncivilized people, just as the increased speed of a ship presupposes\ngreater reliability in rudder and steering gear. Advances in knowledge\nand power work out their effects on us almost as if they were natural\noccurrences. It is not within our power so to direct them that they\ninfluence favourably in every respect the relations in which we live,\nbut they produce for individuals, for society, and for nations,\ndifficult and still more difficult problems, and bring with them\ndangers which it is quite impossible to estimate beforehand.\nParadoxical as it may seem, our advances in knowledge and power make\ntrue civilization not easier but more difficult. One can even say\nthat, judging by the events of our own and the two preceding\ngenerations, we are almost entitled to doubt whether in view of the\nway in which these material achievements have been showered upon us,\ntrue civilization is still possible.\n\nThe most widespread danger which material achievements bring with them\nfor civilization consists in the fact that through the revolutions in\nthe conditions of life men [pg 004] become in greater numbers unfree,\ninstead of free. The type of man who once cultivated his own bit of\nland becomes a worker who tends a machine in a factory; manual workers\nand independent trades-people become employees. They lose the\nelementary freedom of the man who lives in his own house and finds\nhimself in immediate connexion with Mother Earth. Further, they no\nlonger have the extensive and unbroken consciousness of responsibility\nof those who live by their own independent labour. The conditions of\ntheir existence are therefore unnatural. They no longer carry on the\nstruggle for existence in comparatively normal relations in which each\none can by his own ability make good his position whether against\nNature or against the competition of his fellows, but they see\nthemselves compelled to combine together and create a force which can\nextort for itself better living conditions. They acquire thereby the\nmentality of unfree men, in which ideals of civilization can no longer\nbe contemplated in the needful purity, but become distorted to\ncorrespond with the surrounding atmosphere of struggle.\n\nTo a certain extent we have all of us, under modern conditions, become\nunfree men. In every rank of life we have from decade to decade, if\nnot from year to year, to carry on a harder struggle for existence.\nOverwork, physical or mental or both, is our lot. We can no longer\nfind time to collect and order our thoughts. Our spiritual dependence\nincreases at the same pace as our material dependence. In every\ndirection we come to conditions of dependence which in former times\nwere never known in such universality and such strength. Economic,\nsocial, and political organizations, which are steadily becoming more\nand more complete, are getting us more and more into their power. The\nState with its more and more rigid organization holds us under a\ncontrol which is growing more and more decided and inclusive. In every\nrespect, therefore, our individual being is depreciated. It is\nbecoming more and more difficult to be a personality.\n\n[pg 005]\n\nThus it is that the progress of our external civilization brings with\nit the result that individuals, in spite of all the advantages they\nget, are in many respects injured both materially and spiritually in\ntheir capacity for civilization through those very advantages.\n\nIt is our progress in material civilization, too, which intensifies in\nso disastrous a way our social and political problems. Through the\nsocial ones we are involved in a class struggle which shakes and\nthrows into confusion economic and national relations. If we go down\nto rock-bottom, it was machinery and world commerce which brought\nabout the world war, and the inventions which put into our hands such\nmighty power of destruction made the war of such a devastating\ncharacter that conquered and conquerors alike are ruined for a period\nof which no one can see the end. It was also our technical\nachievements which put us in a position to kill at such a distance,\nand to wipe out the enemy in such masses, that we sank so low as to\npush aside any last impulse to humanity, and were mere blind wills\nwhich made use of perfected lethal weapons of such destructive\ncapacity that we were unable to maintain the distinction between\ncombatants and non-combatants.\n\nMaterial achievements, then, are not civilisation, but become\ncivilization only so far as the mental habit of civilized peoples is\ncapable of allowing them to work towards the perfecting of the\nindividual and the community. Fooled, however, by our advances in\nknowledge and power, we did not reflect on the danger to which we were\nexposing ourselves by the diminished value we put on the spiritual\nelements in civilization, and we surrendered completely to a na\u00efve\nsatisfaction at our magnificent material achievements, and went astray\ninto an incredibly superficial conception of civilization. We believed\nin a progress which was a matter of course, because contained in the\nfacts themselves. Instead of harbouring in our thought ideals approved\nby reason, and undertaking to mould reality into accordance with them,\nwe were fooled [pg 006] by a vain feeling for reality, and wanted to\ncome through with lowered ideals which were borrowed from it. By\ntaking this course we lost all control over the facts.\n\nAccordingly, just when the spiritual element in culture was necessary\nin extraordinary strength, we let it waste away.\n\nCivilization and World-View\n\nHow could it come about that the spiritual element in civilization\nbecame so lost to us?\n\nTo understand that, we must go back to the time when it was at work\namong us in a direct and living way, and the path thereto leads us\nback into the eighteenth century. Among the Rationalists who approach\neverything through reason, and would regulate everything in life by\nrational considerations, we find expression given in elemental\nstrength to the conviction that the essential element in civilization\nis a habit of thought. It is true that they are already impressed by\nmodern achievements in discovery and invention, and do allow to the\nmaterial side of civilization a corresponding importance. But they\nnevertheless regard it as self-evident that the essential and valuable\nelement in civilization is the spiritual. That interest is focused\nfirst of all on the spiritual progress of men and humanity, and in\nthat they believe with a mighty optimism.\n\nThe greatness of these men of the period of the \u201cAufkl\u00e4rung\u201d lies in\nthis, that they set up as ideals the perfecting of the individual, of\nsociety, and of mankind, and devote themselves to these ideals with\nenthusiasm. The force on which they count for the realizing of them is\nthe general habit of thought; they demand of the human spirit that it\nshall transform men and the relations in which they live, and they\ntrust to it to prove itself stronger than the facts of life.\n\nBut whence came the impulse to set up such high ideals of\ncivilization, and their confidence of being able to realise [pg 007]\nthem? It was from their view of the world (Weltanschauung).\n\nThe Rationalist world-view is optimistic and ethical, its optimism\nconsisting in this, that it assumes as ruling in the world a general\npurposive adaptation which is directed to the perfecting of the world,\nand from this purposiveness the efforts of individual men and of\nmankind to secure material and spiritual progress derive meaning and\nimportance and a guarantee of success.\n\nThis world-view is ethical because it regards the ethical as something\nin accordance with reason, and on that ground demands from man that,\nputting egoistic interests behind him, he shall devote himself to all\nideals that are waiting for realization, taking the ethical as in\neverything the standard by which to judge. A habit of humane thought\nis for the Rationalists an ideal which they can be induced by no\nconsideration to resign.\n\nWhen at the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the\nnineteenth the reaction against rationalism set in and criticism began\nto play upon it, its optimism was reproached as being superficial and\nits ethics as being sentimental. But the good it did, in spite of its\nmanifold imperfections, by inspiring men with ideals of civilization\ngrounded in reason, the spiritual movements which criticise it and\ntake its place cannot develop in the same way. The energy of thought\nabout civilization decreases imperceptibly but steadily. In proportion\nas the world-view of rationalism is left behind, the feeling for\nactuality makes its influence felt, until at last, from the middle of\nthe nineteenth century onwards, ideals are borrowed no longer from\nreason but from actuality, and we therewith sink still further into a\nstate of uncivilization and lack of humanity. This is the clearest and\nthe most important of all the facts which can be established in the\nhistory of our civilization.\n\nWhat has it to tell us? It tells us that there is a close connexion\nbetween civilization and world-view. Civilization is the product of an\noptimistic-ethical view of the world. [pg 008] Only in proportion as\nthe prevalent world-view is one which is world- and life-affirming and\nat the same time ethical, do we find ideals of civilization put\nforward and kept influential in the habits of thought of individuals,\nand of society.\n\nThat this inner relation between civilization and the world-view of\ncivilized peoples has never received the attention that it deserves,\nis the result of there having been among us so little real meditation\non the essential nature of civilization.\n\nWhat is civilization? It is the sum total of all progress made by men\nand mankind in every sphere of action and from every point of view, so\nfar as this progress helps towards the spiritual perfecting of\nindividuals as the progress of all progress.\n\nThe impulse to strive for progress in all spheres of action and from\nevery point of view comes to men out of an optimistic world-view which\naffirms the world and life to be something valuable in themselves, and\nconsequently bears within itself a compulsion to raise to its highest\npossible value all that is, so far as it can be influenced by us.\nHence come will and hope, and effort directed to the improvement of\nthe condition of individuals and of society, of peoples and of\nmankind. This leads to a lordship of the spirit over the powers of\nNature, to the completion of the religious, social, economic, and\npractical grouping of men, and to the spiritual perfecting of\nindividuals and of the community.\n\nJust as the world- and life-affirming, that is, the optimistic\nworld-view is alone capable of stirring men to effort aimed at\npromoting civilization, so in an ethical world-view alone is there\nlatent the power to make men, when putting aside and giving up\naltogether their selfish interests, persevere in such effort for\ncivilization, and keep them always turned in the direction of the\nspiritual and moral perfecting of the individual as the essential\nobject of civilization. Bound the one to the other, then, world- and\n[pg 009] life-affirming world-view and ethics think out in harmony the\nideals of true, complete civilization and set to work at realizing\nthem.\n\nIf civilization remains incomplete or its level falls, this rests in\nthe last resort on the fact that either the world- and\nlife-affirmation of the world-view, or its ethics, or both of them\nhave remained undeveloped or have gone backwards. And that is the case\nwith us. It is evident that the ethics required for civilization have\ngone out of use.\n\nFor decades we have been accustoming ourselves increasingly to measure\nwith relative ethical standards, and no longer to allow ethics to have\ntheir say in all questions alike. This renunciation of consistent\nethical judgment we feel as an advance in practicality.\n\nBut our world- and life-affirmation also have become shaky. The modern\nman no longer feels under any compulsion to think about ideals of\nprogress and to will them. To a large extent he has come to terms with\nactuality. He is much more resigned than he admits to himself, and in\none respect he is even outspokenly pessimistic. He does not really\nbelieve any more in the spiritual and ethical progress of men and of\nmankind, which is nevertheless the essential element in civilization.\n\nThis stunting of our world- and life-affirmation and of our ethics has\nits cause in the constitution of our world-view. In regard to this we\nhave since the middle of the nineteenth century been going through a\ncrisis. It is no longer possible for us to arrive at a conception of\nthe universe in which the meaning of the existence of men and of\nmankind can be recognized, and in which, therefore, there are also\ncontained the ideals which flow from thoughtful world- and\nlife-affirmation and from ethical volition. We are falling more and\nmore into a condition of having no world-view at all, and from our\nlack of that comes our lack of civilization.\n\nThe great question for us is, therefore, whether we have to renounce\npermanently the world-view which carries within it in all their\nstrength the ideals of the perfecting of men and of mankind, and of\nethical effort. If we succeed [pg 010] in establishing again a\nworld-view in which world- and life-affirmation is given in convincing\nfashion, we shall become masters of the decay of civilization which is\nin progress, and shall reach again a true and living civilization.\nOtherwise we are condemned to see the wreck of all attempts to arrest\nthe degeneration. Only when the truth that renewal of civilization can\nonly come by a renewal of our world-view becomes a universal\nconviction, and a new longing for a world-view sets in, shall we find\nourselves on the right path. But this is not yet in prospect. The\nmodern man is still without any correct feeling of the full\nsignificance of the fact that he is living with an unsatisfactory\nworld-view, or without any at all. The unnatural and dangerous\ncharacter of this condition must first be brought home to his\nconsciousness, just as those persons who exhibit disturbances of the\nstability of their nervous system have to be clearly told that their\nvitality is threatened, although they feel no pain. Similarly, we have\nto stir up the men of to-day to elementary meditation upon what man is\nin the world, and what he wants to make of his life. Only when they\nare impressed once more with the necessity of giving meaning and value\nto their existence, and thus come once more to hunger and thirst for a\nsatisfying world-view, are the preliminaries given for a spiritual\ncondition in which we become again capable of civilization.\n\nBut in order to learn the way to such a world-view we must see clearly\nwhy the struggle undertaken by the European spirit to secure it was\nfor a time successful, but during the second half of the nineteenth\ncentury came to an unfortunate end.\n\nBecause our thinking is too little occupied with civilization it has\nbeen insufficiently noticed that the most important part of the\nhistory of philosophy is the history of man\u2019s struggle for a\nsatisfactory world-view. Regarded in this light, the history unrolls\nitself like a tragic drama.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 011]\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE PROBLEM OF THE OPTIMISTIC WORLD-VIEW\n\n\nThe Western and the Indian conceptions of civilization\n\nFOR us Westerners civilization consists in this, that we work for the\nperfecting of ourselves and of the world at the same time.\n\nBut do the activities that are directed outwards and inwards\nnecessarily belong together? Cannot the spiritual and moral perfecting\nof the individual, which is the ultimate aim of civilization, also be\nsecured if he works for himself only and leaves the world and its\ncircumstances to themselves? Who gives us any guarantee that the\ncourse of the world can be influenced so as to promote the special aim\nof civilization, viz., the perfecting of the individual? Who tells us\nthat it has any meaning at all which can be further developed? Is not\nany action of mine which is directed on the world a diversion of what\ncould be directed on myself, though everything depends finally upon\nthe latter?\n\nMoved by these doubts the pessimism of the Hindus and that of\nSchopenhauer refuse to allow any importance to the material and social\nachievements, which form the outward and visible part of civilization.\nAbout society, nation, mankind, the individual is not to trouble\nhimself; he is only to strive to experience in himself the sovereignty\nof spirit over matter.\n\nThis, too, is civilization, in that it pursues the final object of the\nlatter, viz., the spiritual and ethical perfecting of the individual.\nIf we Westerners pronounce it incomplete, we must not do so too\nconfidently. Do the outward progress of mankind and the inner\ncompletion of the individual really belong together as we imagine them\nto? Are we not, under an illusion, forcing together things which are\n[pg 012] different in kind? Has the spirit in one kind of action\nactually some gain for the other?\n\nWhat we set up as our ideal we have not realized. We lost ourselves in\noutward progress, allowing the moralization and inward deepening of\nthe individual to come to a stop. So we have not been able to produce\npractical proof of the correctness of our view of what civilization\nis. We cannot, therefore, simply put aside that other narrower\nconception, but must come to terms with it.\n\nThere will come a time\u2014it is already being prepared for\u2014when\npessimistic and optimistic thought, which have hitherto talked past\neach other almost as strangers, will have to meet for practical\ndiscussion. World-philosophy is just dawning. It will shape itself in\na struggle as to whether its world-view shall be optimistic or\npessimistic.\n\nThe struggle for the optimistic world-view\n\nThe history of Western philosophy is the history of the struggle for\nan optimistic world-view. If in antiquity and in modern times the\npeoples of Europe have managed to produce a civilization, it is\nbecause in their thought the optimistic world-view was dominant, and\nheld the pessimistic permanently in subjection, although it was not\nable to suppress it altogether.\n\nThe accessions of knowledge which have come in the course of our\nphilosophy have been nothing in themselves: they always stand in the\nservice of one world-view or the other, and attain only in it to their\nreal significance.\n\nBut the characteristic thing about the way in which the settlement is\nmade on each occasion, is that it never is made openly. The two\nworld-views are never brought face to face and the case of each heard.\nThat the optimistic alone is in the right is a conviction which is\naccepted as more or less self-evident. The only thing felt as a\nproblem is how to marshal all possible knowledge in the triumphal\nprocession of proof to defeat the other, and to knock on the head\nanything that may still wish to rise in its defence.\n\n[pg 013]\n\nSince the pessimistic world-view has never made its presence properly\nfelt, Western thought manifests a lofty unwillingness to understand\nit, though it has a splendid faculty for detecting it. Where it finds,\nas in Spinoza, too little interest for activity directed upon the\nworld, it reacts immediately with rejection of it. Yet all objectively\nthinking investigation of the reality of nature is disliked by it\nbecause it may lead to the central position of the human spirit in the\nworld being insufficiently emphasised. It is because materialism seems\nlikely to be the last ally of pessimism that it carries on so\nembittered a struggle against it.\n\nIn the discussion of the problem of the theory of knowledge from\nDescartes to Kant and beyond him it is really the cause of the\noptimistic world-view which is being maintained. That is why the\ntheoretical possibility of a depreciation or a denial of the world of\nsense is attacked with such obstinacy. By proving the ideality of\nspace and time Kant hopes to make finally secure the optimistic\nworld-view of rationalism with all its ideals and demands. Only so can\nit be explained that the most acute examinations of the theory of\nknowledge are carried through with the most na\u00efve conclusions about\nworld-view. The great post-Kantian systems of thought, however much\nthey differ from one another in their subject-matter and the process\nof the speculation with which they deal with it, are all united in\nthis, that they crown the optimistic world-view in their cloud-castles\nas the ruler of the universe.\n\nTo fit in the aims of mankind with those of the universe in a\nlogically convincing fashion, that is the endeavour in which European\nphilosophy serves the optimistic world-view. Anyone who does not help,\nor who is indifferent about it, is an enemy.\n\nIn its prejudice against scientific materialism philosophy was right.\nMaterialism has done much more to shake the position of the optimistic\nworld-view than Schopenhauer has, although it never proceeded against\nit with outspoken hostility. When, after the collapse of the great\nsystems, [pg 014] it was allowed to seat itself at table with\nphilosophy, which had now become more modest, it even exerted itself\nto find out in what sort of tone the latter would like the\nconversation to be carried on. In dealing with Darwin and others,\nphilosophizing natural science made touchingly na\u00efve attempts so to\nextend and stretch out the history of zoological development which led\nup to man, that mankind and with it the spiritual should appear again\nas the goal of the world-process, as in the speculative systems. But\nin spite of these well-meant efforts of the proletarian guest the\nconversation could no longer be carried on in the old spirit. Of what\nuse was it for him to try to be better than his reputation? He brought\nwith him more respect for nature and facts than was consistent with\nthe convincing establishment of the optimistic world-view. He\ntherefore shook it, even when he did not intend to.\n\nTo such a disregard of nature and science as was shown by the earlier\nphilosophy we can never return. Nor can we expect the return of a\nsystem of thought which makes it possible to discover in any\nconvincing way in the universe the aims and objects of mankind, as was\nallowed by the old methods. The optimistic world-view ceases,\ntherefore, to be self-evident to us, or to be demonstrable by the arts\nof philosophy. It must give up the idea of finding for itself a solid\nfoundation.\n\nOptimism and Pessimism\n\nConfusion is caused by the fact that the optimistic and pessimistic\nworld-views seldom come forward in their purity in the history of\nhuman thought. Their relations are usually such that the one is\npredominant, while the other treats with it without being officially\nrecognized. In India a tolerated world- and life-affirmation maintains\nfor pessimism something of interest in the external civilization which\nit nominally denies. With us pessimism slips in and gnaws at the\ncivilizing energies of the optimistic view, the result being that\nbelief in the spiritual progress of [pg 015] mankind has left us. From\nit, too, comes the fact that we everywhere conduct the business of\nlife with lowered ideals.\n\nPessimism is a lowered will-to-live, and is to be found wherever man\nand society are no longer under the pressure of all those ideals of\nprogress which must be thought out by a will-to-live that is\nconsistent with itself, but have sunk to the level of letting\nactuality be, over wide stretches of life, nothing but actuality.\n\nIt is where pessimism is at work in this anonymous fashion, that it is\nmost dangerous to civilization. It attacks then the most valuable\nideas belonging to life-affirmation, leaving the less valuable ones\nuntouched. Like some concealed source of magnetic power it disturbs\nthe world-view\u2019s compass, so that it takes, without suspecting it, a\nwrong course. Thus the unavowed mixture of optimism and pessimism in\nour thought has the result that we continue to approve the external\nblessings given us by civilization, things which to thinking pessimism\nare a matter of indifference, while we abandon that which alone it\nholds to be valuable, the pursuit of inner perfection. The desire for\nprogress which is directed to objects of sense, goes on functioning\nbecause it is nourished by actuality, while that which reaches after\nthe spiritual becomes exhausted, because it is thrown back upon the\ninner stimulus which comes from the thinking will-to-live. As the tide\nebbs, objects which reach deep down are left stranded, while what is\njust on the surface remains afloat.\n\nOur degeneration, then, traced back to our world-view and what\nresulted from it, consists in true optimism having, without our\nnoticing it, disappeared from among us. We are by no means a race\nweakened and decadent through excessive enjoyment of life, and needing\nto pull ourselves together to show vigour and idealism amid the\nthunderstorms of history. Although we have retained our vigour in most\ndepartments of the direct activities of life, we are spiritually\nstunted. Our conception of life with all that depends on it has been\nlowered both for individuals and for the community. The higher forces\nof volition and [pg 016] influence are impotent in us, because the\noptimism from which they ought to draw their strength has become\nimperceptibly permeated with pessimism.\n\nA characteristic feature of the presence at the same time of optimism\nand pessimism as lodgers in \u201cThoughtless House\u201d is that each goes\nabout in the other\u2019s clothes, so that what is really pessimism gives\nitself out among us as being optimism, and _vice vers\u00e2_. What passes\nfor optimism with the mass of people is the natural or acquired\nfaculty of seeing things in the best possible light. This illumination\nof them is the result of a lowered conception of what ought to be now\nand in the future. A person ill with consumption is brought by the\npoison of the disease into the condition which is called Euphoria, so\nthat he experiences an imaginary feeling of health and strength.\nSimilarly there is an external optimism present in individuals and in\nsociety just in proportion as they are, without realizing it, infected\nwith pessimism.\n\nTrue optimism has nothing to do with any sort of lenient judgement. It\nconsists in contemplating and willing the ideal in the light of a deep\nand self-consistent affirmation of life and the world. Because the\nspirit which is so directed proceeds with clear vision and impartial\njudgement in the valuing of all that is given, it wears to ordinary\npeople the appearance of pessimism. That it wishes to pull down the\nold temples in order to build them again more magnificently is by the\nvulgar optimism put down to its discredit as sacrilege.\n\nThe reason, then, why the only legitimate optimism, that of volition\ninspired by imagination, has to carry on such a hard struggle with\npessimism is that it always has first to track the latter down in\nvulgar optimism and unmask it. That is a task which optimism has never\nfinished, for so long as it allows the enemy to emerge in any shape\nthere is danger for civilization. When that happens, activity in\npromoting the special aims of civilization always diminishes, even if\nsatisfaction with its material achievements remains as strong as\nbefore.\n\n[pg 017]\n\nOptimism and pessimism, therefore, do not consist in counting with\nmore or less confidence on such or such a future for the existing\nstate of things, but in what the will desires to have as the future.\nThey are qualities not of the judgement, but of the will. The fact\nthat up to now that inadmissible definition of these qualities was\ncurrent side by side with the correct one, so that there were four\nitems to deal with instead of two, made the game easier for the\nunthinking by deceiving us about what true optimism is. Pessimism of\nthe will they passed off as optimism of the judgement, and optimism of\nthe will they put aside as pessimism of the judgement. These false\ncards must be taken from them, so that they may not continue to\ndeceive the world in such a fashion.\n\nOptimism, Pessimism, and Ethics\n\nIn what relation do optimism and pessimism stand to ethics?\n\nThat close and peculiar relations do exist between them is clear from\nthe fact that in the thought of mankind the two struggles, that for\noptimistic or pessimistic world-view and that about ethics, are\nusually involved in each other. It is the general belief that when one\nis being fought out the other is being fought as well.\n\nThis mutual connexion is very convenient for thought. When a\nfoundation for ethics is being laid, optimistic or pessimistic\narguments are unawares pressed into the service, and _vice vers\u00e2_\nethical arguments when optimism or pessimism have to be established.\nIn this process Western thought lays most stress on justifying a\nlife-affirming ethical system, that is an activist one, and thinks\nthat merely by doing so it has proved the case for optimism in its\nworld-view. With Indian thought the most important thing is finding a\nlogical foundation for pessimism, and the justifying of a life-denying\nethical system, _i.e._ a passivist one, is rather a derivative from\nthat.\n\nThe confusion which resulted from the two struggles for [pg 018]\noptimism and pessimism and for ethics not being kept distinct, has\ncontributed almost more than anything else to prevent the thought of\nmankind from attaining to clarity.\n\nIt was an easy mistake to make. The question whether it is to be\naffirmation or denial of life and the world, crops up in ethics in the\nsame way as in the dispute between optimism and pessimism. Things\nwhich by their nature belong together feel themselves drawn together,\nso that optimism naturally thinks it can support itself on an\naffirmative ethical system, and pessimism thinks the same about a\nnegative one. Nevertheless, the result has hitherto always been that\nneither of these two closely-related entities could stand firm,\nbecause neither of them chose to depend on itself alone.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 019]\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE ETHICAL PROBLEM\n\n\nThe difficulties of ethical perception\n\nHOW came mankind to think about morality and to make progress in that\nsphere of thought?\n\nIt is a picture of confusion that unrolls itself before the eyes of\nanyone who undertakes a journey through the history of man\u2019s search\nfor the ethical. The progress made in that sphere of thought is\ninexplicably slow and uncertain. That the scientific view of the world\ncould be delayed in its rise and development is to a certain extent\nintelligible, for its advance depended more or less on the chance of\nthere existing gifted observers, whose discoveries in the realm of the\nexact sciences and the knowledge of nature was needed first, to\nprovide new horizons and to point out new paths for thought.\n\nBut in ethics thought is thrown back entirely on itself: it has to do\nonly with man himself and his self-development, which goes on by a\nprocess of causation from within. Why, then, does it not make better\nprogress? Just because man himself is the material which has to be\ninvestigated and moulded.\n\nEthics and \u00e6sthetics are the step-children of philosophy. They both\ndeal with a subject which is coy about submitting itself to reflexion,\nfor they both treat of spheres in which man exercises his purely\ncreative activities. In science man observes and describes the course\nof nature, and tries to penetrate its mysteries. In practical matters\nhe uses and moulds it by applying what he has grasped of it outside\nhis own person. But in his moral and artistic activities he uses\nknowledge and obeys impulses, [pg 020] perceptions, and laws which\noriginate in himself. To establish these firmly and to create ideals\nfrom them is an undertaking which can be successful to a certain\nextent only. Thought lags behind the material on which it exercises\nitself.\n\nThis is evident from the fact that the examples with which ethics and\n\u00e6sthetics try to work upon reality are usually not quite consistent\nand are often foolish. And how far from simple is whatever is laid\ndown in either this or that! How the assertions made contradict each\nother! The guidance that an artist can get for his activities from the\nbest works on \u00e6sthetics is but small. Similarly, a business man who\nseeks in a work on ethics advice as to how, in any given case, he is\nto bring the demands of his business into harmony with those of\nethics, can seldom find any satisfactory information.\n\nThe inadequacy in this respect of \u00e6sthetics is not of great importance\nfor the spiritual life of mankind. Artistic activity is always the\npeculiar affair of individuals whose natural gifts develop more by the\nactual production of works of art than by consideration of the\nconclusions arrived at by \u00e6sthetic theorizing.\n\nWith ethics, however, it is a matter of the creative activity of the\nmass of men, an activity which is largely determined by the principles\nwhich are current in the general thought of the time. The absence of\nthat progress which is still possible in ethics is something tragic.\n\nEthics and \u00e6sthetics are not sciences. Science, as the description of\nobjective facts, the establishment of their connexion with one\nanother, and the drawing of inferences from them, is only possible\nwhen there is a succession of similar facts to be dealt with, or a\nsingle fact in a succession of phenomena, when, that is, there is a\nsubject matter which can be reduced to order under a recognized law.\nBut there is no science of human willing and doing, and there never\ncan be. Here there are only subjective and infinitely various facts to\nbe studied, and their mutual connexion lies within the mysterious\nhuman ego.\n\nIt is only the history of ethics that is scientific, and that [pg 021]\nonly so far as a history of man\u2019s spiritual life is scientifically\npossible.\n\nThe importance of thought about ethics\n\nThere is, therefore, no such thing as a scientific system of ethics;\nthere can only be a thinking one. Philosophy must give up the illusion\nwhich it has cherished even down to the present day. As to what is\ngood and what is bad, and about the considerations in which we find\nstrength to do the one and avoid the other, no one can speak to his\nneighbour as an expert. All that one can do is to impart to him so\nmuch as one finds in oneself of that which ought to influence\neverybody, though better thought out perhaps, and stronger and\nclearer, so that noise has become a musical note.\n\nIs there, however, any sense in ploughing for the thousand and second\ntime a field which has already been ploughed a thousand and one times?\nHas not everything which can be said about ethics already been said by\nLao-tse, Confucius, the Buddha, and Zarathustra; by Amos and Isaiah;\nby Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; by Epicurus and the Stoics; by\nJesus and Paul; by the thinkers of the Renaissance, of the\n\u201cAufkl\u00e4rung,\u201d and of Rationalism; by Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hume; by\nSpinoza and Kant; by Fichte and Hegel; by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and\nothers? Is there a possibility of getting beyond all these so\nmaterially contradictory convictions of the past to something new\nwhich will have a stronger and more lasting influence? Can the ethical\nkernel of the thoughts of all these men be collected into an idea of\nthe ethical, which will unite all the energies to which they appeal?\nWe must hope so, if we are not to despair of the fate of the human\nrace.\n\nDoes thought about ethics bring more ethics into the world? The\nconfused picture offered us by the history of ethics is enough to make\none sceptical about it. On the other hand, it is clear that ethical\nthinkers like Socrates, Kant, or Fichte had a moralizing influence on\nmany of their [pg 022] contemporaries. From every revival of ethical\nreflexion there went forth ethical movements which made the\ncontemporary generation fitter for its tasks. If any age lacks the\nminds which force it to reflect about the ethical, the level of its\nmorality sinks and with it its capacity for answering the questions\nwhich present themselves to it.\n\nIn the history of ethical thought we wander in the innermost circles\nof world-history. Of all the forces which mould reality morality is\nthe first and foremost. It is the determining knowledge which we must\nwring from thought. Everything else is more or less secondary.\n\nFor this reason everyone who believes that he can contribute something\nto help forward the ethical self-consciousness of society and of\nindividuals has the right to speak now, although it is political and\neconomic questions that the present day prescribes for study. For what\nis inopportune is really opportune. We can accomplish something\nlasting in the problems of political and economic life only if we\napproach them as men who are trying to think ethically. All those who\nhelp forward in any way our thought about ethics are working for the\ncoming of peace and prosperity to the world. They are engaged in the\nhigher politics, and the higher rational economics, and even if all\nthey can do is nothing more than to bring ethical thinking to the\nfore, they have nevertheless done something valuable. All reflexion\nabout ethics has as one result a raising and rousing of the general\ndisposition to morality.\n\nThe search for a basic principle of morality\n\nBut however certain it is that every age lives by the energies which\nhave sprung from its thought about ethics, it is equally certain that\nup to now the ethical thoughts which have become current have after a\nlonger or a shorter period lost their power of convincing. Why has the\nestablishment of an ethical system never met with more than a partial\nand temporary success, and never been a permanency? Why is the history\nof the ethical thinking of [pg 023] mankind the history of\ninexplicable stoppages and fallings-back? Why has there been in this\nsphere no organic progress which allows one period to build upon the\nachievements of preceding ones? Why in the sphere of ethics do we live\nin a town full of ruins, in which one generation builds for itself\nhere, and another there, what is absolutely necessary?\n\n\u201cTo preach morality is easy, to establish it is hard,\u201d says\nSchopenhauer, and that saying shows what the problem is.\n\nIn every effort of thought about ethics there is to be seen,\ndistinctly or indistinctly, the search for a basic principle of\nmorality, which needs no support outside itself, and unites in itself\nthe sum total of all moral demands. But no one has ever succeeded in\nreally formulating this principle. Elements only of it were brought to\nlight and given out to be the whole, until the difficulties which\nemerged destroyed the illusion. The tree, however finely it sprouted,\ndid not live to grow old, because it was unable to send its roots down\ninto the permanently nourishing and moisture-giving earth.\n\nThe chaos of ethical views becomes to some extent intelligible as soon\nas one sees that we are concerned with differing and mutually\ncontradictory views about fragments of the basic principle. The\ncontradiction has its foundation in their incompleteness. There is\nethical matter in what Kant objects to in the ethics of rationalism,\nas also in what he puts in its place; in that part of Kant\u2019s writings\nwhere his conception of the moral is opposed by Schopenhauer, as also\nin what is to take its place in the ethical system of the latter.\nSchopenhauer is ethical in the points on which Nietzsche attacks him,\nand Nietzsche is ethical in his opposition to Schopenhauer. What is\nwanted is to find the fundamental chord in which the dissonances of\nthese varied and contradictory ethical ideas unite in producing\nharmony.\n\nThe ethical problem, then, is the problem of a basic principle of\nmorality, which is founded in thought. What is the common element of\ngood in the manifold goods which we feel to be such? Is there such a\nuniversally valid [pg 024] conception of the good? If there is, in\nwhat does it consist, and how far is it real and necessary for me?\nWhat influence has it over my general disposition and my actions? Into\nwhat relations with the world does it bring me?\n\nIt is, then, on the basic principle of the moral that the attention of\nthought has to be fixed. The mere giving of a list of virtues and\nduties is like striking notes at random on the piano and thinking it\nis music. And when we come to discuss the works of earlier moralists,\nit is only the elements in them which can help the establishment of an\nethical system that will interest us, not the way in which any system\nhas been advocated.\n\nOtherwise there is no success for any attempt to bring order into\nchaos. How utterly at sea Friedrich Jodl_(_2_)_ is in his history of\nethics, the most important existing work in this department, when he\ntries to estimate the relative values of the various ethical\nstandpoints! Failing to judge them directly by their distance from an\ninitial basic principle of morality, he is unable to establish a\nstandard of comparison. He gives us, therefore, only a survey of\nethical views, and no history of the ethical problem.\n\nReligious and philosophical ethics\n\nWhen we come to look for the fundamental principle of morality, are we\nconcerned only with the direct attempts of philosophy to find it? No,\nwe are concerned with every kind, those of religion as well as others.\nWe must trace out the whole experience of mankind in its search for\nthe ethical.\n\nThe raising of a dividing wall between philosophical ethics and\nreligious ethics is based on the mistaken idea that the former are\nscientific and the latter non-scientific. But neither of them is\neither: they are both alike merely thought; only one has freed itself\nfrom acceptance of the traditional religious world-view, while the\nother still maintains its connexion with it.\n\n[pg 025]\n\nThe difference, however, is merely relative. Religious ethics appeal,\nindeed, to a supernatural authority, but that is rather the form which\nthey assume. As a matter of fact, however high they rise, they still\nseek to find an independent basic principle of morality. In every\nreligious genius there lives an ethical thinker, and every really deep\nphilosophical moralist is in some way or other religious.\n\nHow indeterminate is the border-line is shown by Indian ethics. Are\nthey religious, or are they philosophical? Originating in the thought\nof the priests, they claim to be a deeper exposition of the demands of\nreligion, but in essential nature they are philosophical. With the\nBuddha and others, they venture to make the step from pantheism to\natheism, but without giving up their claim to be religious. Spinoza\nand Kant, however, who are counted among philosophical moralists, do,\nif we judge by the general direction of their thought, belong at the\nsame time to the religious ones.\n\nIt all depends on a relative difference in methods of thought. The one\ngroup works towards the basic principle of ethics by a more intuitive\nprocess, the other by a process which is more analytical. It is the\ndepth, not the method of the thought, which decides the matter. The\nmore intuitive thinker produces his ethical thought like an artist who\nwith the production of an important work of art opens up new horizons.\nIn deep-reaching moral sayings like the beatitudes of Jesus the basic\nprinciple of morality shines out. There comes progress in the\nrecognition of what is moral, even if the provision of a foundation\nfor it fails to advance in the same way.\n\nOn the other hand, the searching for the basic principle of the moral\nby the process of critical analysis may lead to an impoverished system\nof ethics, because there runs through it the effort to take into\naccount only what is connected with the idea that seems to be what is\nbeing sought for. That is why philosophical ethics are as a rule so\nfar behind practical ethics, and have so little direct influence.\nWhile religious moralists in one mighty word can get down to the [pg\n026] waters flowing far below the surface, philosophical ethics often\ndig out nothing but a slight hollow in which a puddle forms.\n\nNevertheless, it is rational thinking alone which is able to pursue\nthe search for the basic principle with perseverance and hope of\nsuccess. It must find it at last, if it only goes deep enough, and is\nsimple enough.\n\nThe weakness of all ethics hitherto, whether philosophical or\nreligious, has lain in this, that they have not shown individuals how\nto deal directly and naturally with reality. To a large extent they\nmerely talk \u201cabout it and about.\u201d They do not touch a man\u2019s daily\nexperience, and therefore they exert no permanent pressure upon him.\nThe result is lack of ethical thought, and mere platitudes about\nethics.\n\nThe true basic principle of the ethical must be not only something\nuniversally valid, but something absolutely elementary and inward,\nwhich, once it has dawned upon a man, never lets him loose, which as a\nmatter of course runs like a thread through all his meditation, which\nnever lets itself be thrust aside, and which continually challenges\nhim to come to an understanding with reality.\n\nFor centuries men who navigated the seas guided themselves by the\nstars. In time they rose above this imperfect method through the\ndiscovery of the magnetic needle, which by its natural principle of\nactivity pointed them to the north. Now they can tell where they are\nin the darkest night on the most distant sea. That is the kind of\nprogress that we have to seek in ethics. So long as we have nothing\nbut an ethical system of ethical sayings, we direct our course by\nstars, which, however brilliant their shining, give us only more or\nless reliable guidance, and can be hidden from us by rising mist.\nDuring a stormy night they leave mankind, as we know by recent\nexperiences, in the lurch. If, however, we have in our possession a\nsystem of ethics as a principle which is a necessity of thought and\ncomes to clearness within ourselves, there begins a far-reaching\nethical deepening of individuals, and steady ethical progress in\nmankind.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 027]\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nRELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL WORLD-VIEWS\n\n\nThe world-views of the world-religions\n\nIN the world-religions we can see powerful attempts to establish an\nethical world-view.\n\nThe religious thinkers of China, Lao-tse (born 604 B.C.), Kung-tse\n(Confucius, 537-479 B.C.), Meng-tse (372-289 B.C.) and Chwang-tse\n(fourth century B.C.), all try to ground the ethical in a world- and\nlife-affirming nature-philosophy. In so doing they arrive at a\nworld-view which, because it is optimistic-ethical, contains\nincentives to inward and outward civilization.\n\nThe religious thinkers of India also, the Brahmanic philosophers, the\nBuddha (560-480 B.C.), and the Hindus, start, like the Chinese, from\nthought about the existing world, _i.e._ from nature-philosophy. They\ndo not, however, take a world- and life-affirming view of it, but a\nworld- and life-denying one. Their world-view is pessimistic-ethical,\nand contains, therefore, incentives to inward civilization only, not\nto outward as well.\n\nChinese religiousness, and Indian, recognize only a single\nworld-principle. They are monistic and pantheistic. Their world-view\nhas to solve the problem of how far we can recognize the original\nsource of the world as ethical, and how far, correspondingly, we\nbecome ethical by the surrender to it of our will.\n\nIn contrast to these monistic-pantheistic world-views we find\ndualistic ones in the religion of Zarathustra (sixth century B.C.), in\nthat of the Jewish prophets (from the eighth century B.C. onwards),\nand in those of Jesus and Mohammed, this last, however, showing itself\nto be in [pg 028] all points unoriginal and decadent. These religious\nthinkers do not start from an investigation of the existence which\nmanifests itself in the universe, but from a view of the ethical which\nis quite independent of it. They put it in opposition to natural\nhappenings. Accordingly they assume the existence of two\nworld-principles, the natural and the ethical. The first is in the\nworld, and has to be overcome; the other is incorporated in an ethical\npersonality which is outside the world and has been given the final\nauthority in this sphere.\n\nIf among the Chinese and the Hindus the basic principle of morality\nwas life in harmony with the world-will, so among dualists it is an\nattempt to be something different from the world in harmony with an\nethical divine personality which is outside and above the world.\n\nThe weakness of dualistic religions is that their world-view, because\nit rejects every kind of nature-philosophy, is always na\u00efve. Their\nstrength lies in the fact that they have the ethical within\nthemselves, directly present and with undiminished force. They have no\nneed to strain it and explain it, as monists have to, so as to be able\nto conceive it as an effluence from the world-will which reveals\nitself in nature.\n\nThe world-views of the dualistic world-religions, taken as a whole,\nare optimistic. They live in the confident belief that ethical force\nwill prove superior to natural, and so raise the world and mankind to\ntrue perfection. Zarathustra and the older Jewish prophets represent\nthis process as a kind of world-reform. The optimistic element in\ntheir world-view asserts itself in a quite natural way. They have the\nwill, and the hope of being able to transform human society and to\nmake the races of the world fit for their higher destiny. Progress in\nany department of life means for them something gained, for they think\nof inward and outward civilization together.\n\nWith Jesus the value of the optimistic element in his world-view is\nimpaired by the fact that he looks forward to the perfected world as a\nresult of a catastrophic end to the natural one, and while with\nZarathustra and the older [pg 029] Jewish prophets the Divine\nintervention is to a certain extent only the completion of the human\nactivities which have been directed to the perfecting of the world, it\nis with Jesus the only thing which has to be taken into account. The\nkingdom of God is to appear in a supernatural way; it is in no way\nprepared for by any effort made by mankind to attain to civilization.\n\nThe world-view of Jesus, because it is fundamentally optimistic,\naccepts the ends aimed at by outward civilization. Being, however,\nentangled in the expectation of the end of the world, it is\nindifferent to all attempts made to improve the temporal, natural\nworld by a civilization which organizes itself on lines of outward\nprogress, and it busies itself only with the inward ethical perfecting\nof individuals.\n\nJust in proportion, however, as the Christian world-view draws the\nconsequences of the world\u2019s not coming to an end, and accepts the idea\nthat the kingdom of God must be established by a process of\ndevelopment which transforms the natural world, it begins to\nunderstand and be interested in the completing of social organization,\nand in all such progress in outward civilization as contributes to it.\nThen the optimistic element in the world-view can again work\nunhindered side by side with the ethical. Thus we get an explanation\nof the fact that Christianity, which in the ancient world showed\nitself hostile to civilization, seeks in modern times with more or\nless success to conduct itself as the world-view which is for progress\nin every sphere of activity.\n\nThe world-views of the world-religions and that of Western thought\n\nThe questions which press for an answer from the world-religions in\ntheir struggle to reach an ethical and an optimistic-ethical\nworld-view, are the same as those which present themselves to Western\nphilosophy also. The great problem is to think out a connexion between\nthe universe and ethics.\n\n[pg 030]\n\nThe three types of world-view which show themselves in the\nworld-religions, recur also in Western philosophy. The latter, too,\nattempts to find an ethical code either in a world- and\nlife-affirming, or in a world- and life-denying, nature-philosophy, or\nit attempts, rejecting more or less completely all nature-philosophy,\nto reach a world-view which is in itself ethical. Only, it at the same\ntime does its best to avoid acknowledging, and indeed to conceal, the\nna\u00efve and dualistic element which is inevitably encountered when this\nlast method of procedure is followed.\n\nThe world-views, then, of the world-religions, and that of Western\nphilosophy, do not belong to different worlds, but stand in close\ninward relations to one another. Further, the distinctions between a\nreligious world-view and a philosophical one is a quite superficial\none. The religious world-view which seeks to comprehend itself in\nthought becomes philosophical, as is the case among the Chinese and\nthe Hindus. On the other hand a philosophical world-view which goes\nreally deep, assumes a religious character.\n\nAlthough Western thought does, in principle, approach the problem of\nworld-view without any presuppositions, it has not been able to keep\nitself entirely from being influenced by religious world-views. From\nChristianity it has received impulses of a decisive character, and the\nattempt to convert the na\u00efve-ethical world-view of Jesus into a\nphilosophical one has cost it more attention and effort than it admits\nto itself. With Schopenhauer and his successors the pessimistic monism\nof India finds expression, and it enriches their reflexion upon the\nnature of the ethical.\n\nThus the energies of all the great world-views stream into Western\nthought, and through the co-operation of these varied forms of thought\nand energy the latter is enabled to exalt into a universal conviction\nthe optimistic-ethical world-view which hovers before its mind, and\nthat too in a strength which it has never displayed in any previous\nage or in any other part of the world. And that is why Western thought\nhas advanced farthest both in inward civilization and in outward.\n\n[pg 031]\n\nTo give a real foundation to the optimistic-ethical world-view Western\nthought is indeed as little able as any of the world-religions were,\nand because the West experiences the problem of world-view in its most\nuniversal and most pressing form it is the scene of the greatest\nadvances made by the civilized mind, but also of its greatest\ncatastrophes. It experiences portentous changes in its world-view, and\nis familiar, too, with terrible periods when it has no world-view at\nall.\n\nIt is because our Western thought is so sensitive in both these\ndirections, that it reveals most clearly the questions and\ndifficulties amid which the search for an optimistic world-view moves.\n\nHow far does the history of our thought give to us Westerners the\nexplanation of our fate? What road does it indicate to us as the best\nfor our future search after a world-view in which the individual can\nfind inwardness and strength, and mankind progress and peace?\n\n\n\n\n[pg 032]\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nCIVILIZATION AND ETHICS IN THE GR\u00c6CO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nThe beginnings: Socrates.\n\nIN the seventh century before Christ the Greek spirit begins to free\nitself from the world-view which underlay the traditional religion,\nand undertakes the task of establishing another on a foundation of\nknowledge and thought.\n\nFirst there comes a nature-philosophy, the result of investigation of\nBeing with reflexion upon what it really is. Then criticism begins its\nwork. Belief in the gods is found unsatisfying, not only because the\ncourse of nature is not made intelligible by the rule of dwellers in\nOlympus, but also because these personalities no longer answer to the\ndemands of feeling which is thoughtful and moral. These two elements,\nnature-philosophy and criticism, are found united in Xenophanes and\nHeraclitus in the sixth century B.C.\n\nIn the course of the fifth century B.C. Sophists appear, and begin to\nconcern themselves critically with the accepted standards of value\ncurrent for social life and individual activities._(_3_)_ The result\nis annihilating. The more moderate of these \u201cEnlighteners\u201d proclaim the\noverwhelming majority of these standards which pass for moral to be\nmerely claims made by society on its members, leaving open thereby the\npossibility that a small remainder may be able to prove themselves to\nrational consideration as moral in [pg 033] themselves. But the\nyounger radical sophists maintain the position that all morality, like\nall current law, has been invented by organized society in its own\ninterest. Hence the thinking man who is freeing himself from this\ntutelage will make his own moral standards, and will follow in them\nnothing but his own pleasure and interests. Thus Western philosophical\nthought about the problem of ethics and civilisation starts with a\nshrill dissonance.\n\nWhat was Socrates (470-399 B.C.) able to contribute, when he came\nforward to oppose this tendency?\n\nIn the place of the simply pleasurable he put the rationally\npleasurable.\n\nBy rational consideration, he asserts, it is possible to establish a\nstandard of action in which the happiness of the individual, rightly\nunderstood, is in harmony with the interests of society. Virtue\nconsists in right knowledge.\n\nThat the rationally moral is that which procures for the agent true\npleasure, or, what means the same thing, true profit, Socrates draws\nout into the most diverse applications in the simple everyday\ndiscussions which Xenophon has transmitted to us in his\n_Memorabilia_._(_4_)_ The dialogues of Plato show him going beyond\nthis primitive utilitarianism, and seeking a conception of the good\nwhich has been made something inward and aims at the well-being of the\nsoul; which stands, too, in relationship with the beautiful._(_5_)_\nHow much of these more advanced views are the Master\u2019s own, and how\nmuch of his own thoughts his pupil has in this way put into his mouth,\ncannot now be decided.\n\nThat Socrates spoke of an inner, mysterious voice, the \u201cdaimonion\u201d, as\nbeing the highest moral authority in man is indeed certain, for it is\nmentioned in his indictment. His [pg 034] utilitarian rationalism is\ntherefore completed by a kind of mysticism. An empirical ethic, that\nis, one established out of past experience and with a view to future\nexperience, and an intuitive ethic live in him side by side and\nundistinguished from one another, to be separated later and developed\nin contrast to one another in his pupils, the Cynics and Cyrenaics on\nthe one hand, and Plato on the other.\n\nWas Socrates at all conscious that with the bringing back of the moral\nto that which is rationally pleasurable he builds the road only a\nshort way further, and stops exactly at the point where the real\ndifficulty makes its appearance, viz. that of defining the most\ngeneral content of the moral as given by reason? Or was he so simple\nas to regard the general formula he had arrived at as the solution of\nthe difficulty?\n\nThe confidence which he displays in all his public life leads us to\nsuppose the latter. In his unaffected simplicity lies his strength. In\nthat perilous hour when Western thought comes to the point of having\nto philosophize about the moral in order to arrest the dissolution of\nGreek society which has been begun by a body of unstable and\ndisputatious teachers, the wise man of Athens shatters all scepticism\nby the mighty earnestness of his conviction that what is moral can be\ndetermined by thought. Beyond that general statement he does not go,\nbut he is the source of that serious spirit in which antiquity after\nhis day busied itself with the problem. What would that ancient world\nhave become without him?\n\nCharacteristic for this prologue to Western philosophizing about the\nmoral is the indifference with which Socrates stands outside the\nphilosophic efforts to reach a complete world-view. He troubles\nhimself neither about the results of natural science, nor about\ninquiries into the nature of knowledge, but is busied simply with man\nin his relation to himself and to society. Lao-tse, Confucius, the\nIndian philosophers, the Jewish prophets, and Jesus seek to comprehend\nethics as somehow or other derived from, or [pg 035] forming part of,\na world-view. Socrates gives them no foundation but themselves. On\nthis stage, which has no scenery to form a background, there will\nappear in succession to him the utilitarians of every age.\n\nAnd here a remarkable prospect opens to us. To all efforts to\ndetermine the content of the moral more help is afforded by the ethic\nwhich keeps clear of all connexion with a complete world-view than by\nany other. Such an ethic is the most practical. And yet this isolation\nis unnatural. The idea that ethics are rooted in a complete\nworld-view, or must find their completion in one\u2014that is, the idea\nthat one\u2019s relations to one\u2019s fellow-men and to society are in the\nlast resort rooted in some relation to the world\u2014never loses its\nnatural claim. Hence again and again\u2014already in Plato, then in\nEpicurus and in the Stoic philosophy\u2014ethics feel the need of again\nconnecting themselves with world-view, and the same process continues\nin modern thought. But the practical search for the content of the\nethical remains the prerogative of those who are busied with ethics in\nthemselves.\n\nIn Socrates the ethical mysticism of devotion to the inner voice takes\nthe place of the complete world-view, which was in future to be the\nfoundation of the ethical determination of mankind.\n\nEpicureanism and Stoicism. The Ethic of Resignation\n\nThree tasks were left by Socrates to his successors: to determine more\nexactly the content of the rationally useful; to give the world the\nmost universal general-notion of the good; and to think ethics into a\ncomplete world-view.\n\nWhat conclusions are come to by those who concern themselves with the\nfirst question, and seek to determine the rationally useful from a\ncorresponding experience of pleasure?\n\nAs soon as the notion of pleasure is brought into connexion with\nethics it shows disturbances, as the magnetic [pg 036] needle does in\nthe neighbourhood of the poles. Immediate pleasure shows itself as\nincapable in every respect of being reconciled with the demands of\nethics, and it is therefore given up. Lasting pleasure is called on to\ntake its place, but this retreat does not suffice. Lasting pleasure,\ninterpreted seriously, can be nothing but pleasure of the mind. Even\nthis position, however, is not tenable. Reflexion upon the ethic which\nis to produce happiness sees itself compelled at last to give up the\npositive notion of pleasure in any form. It has to reconcile itself to\nthe negative notion which conceives pleasure as somehow or other a\nliberation from the need of pleasure. Thus the individualistic,\nutilitarian ethic, also called Eud\u00e6monism, destroys itself as soon as\nit ventures to be consistent. This is the paradox which reveals itself\nin the ethics of antiquity.\n\nInstead of coming to maturity in the following generations, the\nethically-rational life-ideal put forward by Socrates succumbs to an\nincurable decline, because the notion of pleasure, which lives in it,\ndenies itself as soon as it makes any attempt to think itself out.\n\nAristippus (_c._ 435-355 B.C.), the founder of the Cyrenaic school,\nDemocritus of Abdera (_c._ 450-360 B.C.), the author of the atomic\ntheory, and Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) seek to retain as much as possible\nof the positive notion of pleasure. The Cynic school of Antisthenes\n(born _c._ 440 B.C.), and the Stoicism which originated with Zeno, a\nnative of Kittium in Cyprus (_c._ 336-264 B.C.), keep from the very\nbeginning to the negative notion._(_6_)_ But the final result is the\nsame with both. Epicurus sees himself compelled at last to exalt the\n[pg 037] absence of desire for pleasure as being itself the purest\npleasure, landing thereby on the shore of resignation where the Stoics\ntake their exercise. The fundamental difference between the two great\nphilosophical schools of antiquity does not lie in what they offer to\nmen as ethical. About what the \u201cwise man\u201d does and leaves undone, they\nboth frequently express themselves in the same way. What separates\nthem is the world-view with which their ethic is combined.\nEpicureanism accepts the atomistic materialism of Democritus, is\natheistic, asserts that the soul perishes, and is in every respect\nirreligious. Stoicism is pantheistic.\n\nWith Epicurus and Zeno ethics no longer trust themselves, as with\nSocrates, to maintain an independent existence. They see the necessity\nof attaching themselves to some sort of world-view. Travelling along\nthis road, Epicurus is guided solely by the effort after veracity. He\nleaves the talking to the purely scientific knowledge of the world,\nnot allowing ethics to join in the investigation of Being and\nintroduce into it what might be of advantage to itself. How poor, or\nhow rich, it will finally become is to him a matter of indifference.\nThe one thing he is concerned about is that the world-view be a true\none, and therein lies the greatness of Epicurus with its claim to our\nrespect.\n\nStoicism seeks to satisfy the need for an inward, stable world-view;\nlike the Chinese monists it tries to find a meaning in the world. It\ntries to widen out the ethical rationalism of Socrates into cosmic\nrationalism. The moral is to show itself to be conduct agreeable to\nthe pronouncements of world-reason.\n\nStoicism has a vision of an optimistic-ethical affirmation of life,\ngrounded in the nature of the cosmos, but it fails to reach it. It is\nnot untutored enough to acquiesce in the ethical simplicity of a\nnature-philosophy such as can be seen in Lao-tse and in the older\nphilosophical Taoism. It is ever struggling to discover in\nworld-reason the notion of purposive activity, and is ever mercilessly\nthrust back upon that of activity pure and simple. Hence the ethic\nwith which it is operating never has a sufficiently universalist [pg\n038] character to let it form a natural connexion with world-reason.\nAs might be expected from its origin, it is dominated by the problem\nof pleasure and not-pleasure, and therefore no longer possesses any\nefficacious instinct for effort. Its horizons, because still\ndetermined by the questions arising out of ancient citizenship and the\nancient city-state, are narrow. It is, therefore, not advanced enough\nto engage in thought on nature-philosophic lines, concerned with both\nthe world and man, although it does feel the inner necessity for doing\nso.\n\nThe vacillation which is characteristic of Stoicism comes, then, from\nthe fact that the results it attains to do not match its aspirations,\nbut are much poorer than the latter. The spirit of antiquity tries to\nfind an optimistic-ethical life-affirmation in nature-philosophy, and\nto find in it also the justification of those instincts for reliable\nactivity which it has possessed since the days when it was entirely\nuntutored, but it cannot do so. Whenever it acknowledges what has\nhappened it sees clearly that thinking about the universe leads only\nto resignation, and that a life in harmony with the world means quiet\nsurrender to being carried along in the flood of world-happenings,\nand, when the hour comes, sinking into it without a murmur.\n\nStoicism talks, it is true, with deep earnestness of responsibility\nand duty, but since it cannot draw either from nature-philosophy or\nfrom ethics a well-established and living notion of activity, it shows\nus in these words nothing but beautiful corpses. It is impotent to\ncommand anything whatever that is bound up with voluntary activity\nwhich is conscious of its aim. Again and again evidence breaks through\nthat its thinking has been pushed aside on to the track of passivity.\nNature-philosophy only provides the cosmic background for the\nresignation to which ethics have come. The ideal which gives life to\nChinese Monism, of the perfecting of a world through ethical and\nethically organized mankind, is not really discerned, much less\nsecurely grasped.\n\nOne watches with dismay the shaping of the fate of [pg 039] ancient\nethics in Epicureanism and Stoicism. In place of the vigorous\nlife-affirming ethic which Socrates expects from rational thinking,\nresignation steps in. An inconceivable impoverishment takes place in\nthe representation of the moral. The notion of action cannot be worked\nout to completion. Even so much of it as, thanks to tradition, still\nsurvives in the simple thought-methods of the Greek world in general,\nis lost.\n\nThe ancient Greek was more citizen than man. Active devotion to the\ncause of the community was to him a matter of course. Socrates\npresupposes it. In the conversations which Xenophon hands down to us\nin the _Memorabilia_ he is ever insisting on it that the individual\nmust improve himself in order to become an active citizen. The natural\ncourse would have been that the thought which originated with him\nshould deepen this mentality by setting before it the highest social\naims. It was, however, never at all in a position to maintain the\nmentality as it received it. More and more it leads the individual to\nwithdraw himself from the world and from all that goes on in it.\n\nBy a never-ceasing process of change the ethics of Greek thought\nbecome in Epicureanism and Stoicism ethics of decadence. Not being\ncapable of producing ideals of progressive development for collective\nbodies, they are also impotent to become really ethics of\ncivilization. In place of the ideal of the man who works for\ncivilization they set the ideal of the \u201cwise man.\u201d It is only the\ninward individual civilization of refined and reflective\nself-liberation from the world that now floats before its eyes, but\nthis in all its depth.\n\nIt is true that there is power in the preaching of resignation which\nancient thought, now become knowing about life, allows to go forth to\nmankind. Resignation is the lofty porch through which one enters upon\nethics. But Epicurus and the Stoics stop in this porch. Resignation\nbecomes for them an ethical world-view. Hence they are incapable of\nleading ancient society from its untutored life- and world-affirmation\nto one based on thought.\n\n[pg 040]\n\nThe conception of the rationally pleasurable, which was the legacy of\nSocrates, is not productive enough to keep a world alive. It is\nimpossible to develop out of it the ideas of a utilitarianism directed\nto the welfare of the community, although he believed he found them in\nit. Ethical thought remains confined within the circle of the\nself-regarding. Every attempt to ennoble the rationally pleasurable\nends in life-affirmation changing into life-denial. On this logical\nfact was wrecked the ancient West, which, after the critical awakening\nof the Greek spirit, could have been saved only by means of a\nreflective optimistic-ethical world-view. It was able to develop\nseriously what Socrates gave it, but not to make it capable of\nproducing life and civilization.\n\nPlato\u2019s abstract basic principle of the ethical. The ethic of\nworld-negation\n\nPlato, too (427-347 B.C.), and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), the two great\nindependent thinkers of antiquity, are incapable of producing an ethic\nof action, and so giving civilization a firm foundation.\n\nPlato seeks the general notion of the Good, but he abandons the path\nwhich was pointed out, even if not followed to the end, by Socrates,\nviz. the determination of it by a process of induction. He gives up\ntrying to arrive at the nature of the Good by considerations of the\nkind, the object, and the results of action, that is to say, by its\ncontent. He wants to establish it by a purely formal process, by\nabstract logical thinking.\n\nIn order to arrive at an ethic he uses a detour through the theory of\nideas. All similar phenomena, he says, are to be conceived of as\nvarying copies of an original\u2014to express which he uses the word\n\u201cidea.\u201d In trees there is to be seen the idea of tree, in horses, that\nof horse. The idea does not come to us, as we are inclined to think,\nby our abstracting from trees the idea of tree, and from horses that\nof horse. We have it within us already. It originates, not in our [pg\n041] experience of the empirical world but in the recollection which\nour soul brought with it from the supra-sensuous, pure world of ideas,\nwhen it began its existence in a body. In the same way we have brought\nwith us the idea of the Good.\n\nThus in a tortured doctrine which is disfigured everywhere with\nfancies and obscurities, Plato tries to found ethics on a theory about\nthe character of our knowledge of the world of sense, and he is\nencouraged to this undertaking by the consideration that it is not\nfrom reflexion that we obtain our conception of the Beautiful, which\nis closely allied with that of the Good: we bring that conception also\nwith us, ready made.\n\nPlato is the first of all thinkers who feels that the presence of the\nethical idea in man is what it is: something profoundly puzzling. That\nis his greatest distinction. Hence he cannot profess to be satisfied\nwith the attempt of the historic Socrates to explain the Good as that\nwhich is rationally pleasure-giving. It is clear to him that it is\nsomething unconditional, with a compelling force of its own, and to\npreserve for it this character seems to him, as later to Kant, to be\nthe great task of thought.\n\nBut what is the result of his undertaking? A fundamental principle for\nethics which is devoid of content. In order to secure its lofty\ncharacter it is allowed to be born of abstract considerations in the\ncountry of the supra-sensuous. It can, therefore, never find itself at\nhome in reality and become familiar with it, nor can any rules for\nconcrete ethical conduct be developed from it. Thus Plato, when he\ntreats practically of ethics, is compelled to abide by the chief\nvirtues, as popularly conceived. In the _Republic_ he names four of\nthem: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, and he founds them not\non his general idea of the Good, but on his psychology.\n\nBut the characteristic ethic of Plato has nothing whatever to do with\nsuch virtues. If the conception of the Good is supra-sensible and the\nimmaterial world is the only real one, then it is only thought and\nconduct which deal with the [pg 042] immaterial that can have any\nethical character. In the world of appearance there is nothing of\nvalue to be made actual. Man is simply compelled to be an impotent\nspectator of its shadow-play. All willing must be directed to enabling\noneself to turn away from this, and get sight of that true activity\nwhich goes on in the light.\n\nThe true ethic, then, is world-negation. To this view Plato was\ncommitted the moment he allowed the ethical to find its home in the\nworld of pure Being. Thoughts of ascetic inactivity find expression in\nhim side by side with the Greek feeling for reality, and it is\nconfusing that he does not recognize the conflict between them, but\nspeaks now in one sense, now in the other. His ethic is a chaos, and\nhe himself an expert in inconsistency.\n\nPlato\u2019s ethic of world-denial is not an original creation; he takes it\nover in the Indian setting in which it is offered to him by Orphism\nand Pythagoreanism. By what route there found its way into Greek\nthought this pessimism which has been thought out to a system and\nprovided with the doctrine of re-incarnation, we do not know, and\nshall probably never learn. The presence side by side in Greek thought\nof an artless optimism and a mature pessimism will always remain for\nus the great puzzle of Greek civilization. But if the pessimism had\nnot been there, Plato must have introduced it. The abstract basic\nprinciple of morality which he adopts in order to preserve the\nabsolute character of morality which he was the first to pronounce to\nbe a necessity, precludes any other content than that of the denial of\nthe sensible world and of natural life.\n\nAristotle. Instruction about virtue in place of ethics\n\nPlato\u2019s fate alarms Aristotle. He refuses to soar to the heights where\nPlato lost himself. How then does he fare?\n\nHis object is the establishment of a serviceable ethic which is in\nharmony both as to extent and content with reality. What he\naccomplished lies before us in the [pg 043] so-called _Nicomachean\nEthics_, the comprehensive work which he composed for the benefit of\nhis son, Nicomachus. The general thought of Socrates, that ethics are\na striving after happiness, he acknowledges. But at the same time he\nmakes quite clear his opinion that the part played by activity in\nethics must be a much more important one than is given to it in Plato\nor in the other post-Socratics. Aristotle feels that the crux of the\nquestion is the conception of activity, and this he wants to save. He\ntherefore avoids Plato\u2019s paths of abstract thinking, and rejects the\nethic of pleasure and not-pleasure over which the Cyrenaics and Cynics\nwork so hard. In his ethical thinking the vitality of the ancient\nworld tries to find expression.\n\nIn magnificent fashion he lays down the pre-suppositions which are\nnecessary for the carrying through of his undertaking. He finds the\nmotive to activity in the conception of pleasure, a thing he can do\nbecause his whole philosophy has indeed for its aim and object the\nconceiving of Being as formative activity. Hence the essential element\nin human nature also is activity. Happiness is to be defined as\nactivity in accordance with the law of excellence. Rational pleasure\nis experience of the perfecting of one\u2019s activity.\n\nStarting from the conception of pleasure which experiences itself as\nactivity, Aristotle is on the way to comprehend ethics as deepened\nlife-affirmation, and to attack the problem of leading the ancient\nworld up from a na\u00efve and unreflecting world-affirmation to a thinking\none. But on the way he diverges from the high-road.\n\nWhen he has to ask the decisive question as to what make activity\nmoral, he shrinks from discussing the problem of the basic principle\nof the moral. Ethics are not some sort of knowledge which gives a\ncontent to activity, he says in opposition to Socrates. The content of\nthe will is already given. No reflexion and no knowledge can put\nanything new into it, or alter it.\n\nEthics consist, then, not in a guiding of the will by aims and objects\nwhich knowledge puts before it, but in the will\u2019s [pg 044] own\nregulation of itself. The right thing to do is to establish the\ncorrect balance between the different elements in the given contents\nof the will. Left to itself, the latter rushes to extremes. Rational\nreflexion keeps it in the correct middle path. Thus brought to a state\nof harmony, human activity can be conceived as motived and ethical.\nVirtue, therefore, is readiness to observe the correct mean which is\nto be acquired by practice.\n\nInstead of creating an ethic, Aristotle contents himself with a\ndoctrine of virtue. This depreciation of the ethical is the price he\npays in order to reach an ethic which ends neither in the abstract nor\nin resignation. While he shirks the problem of the basic principle of\nthe moral, he still remains able to establish an ethic of activity,\nthough the latter contains indeed no live forces, only dead ones.\n\nAristotle\u2019s ethic is therefore an \u00e6sthetic of the impulses of the\nwill. It consists in a catalogue of virtues and in the demonstration\nthat they are to be conceived as a mean. Thus courage lies between\nrashness and cowardice, temperance between sensuality and\ninsensibility, truthfulness between boastfulness and irony,_(_7_)_\nliberality between prodigality and avarice, high-mindedness between\nconceit and small-mindedness, gentleness between quarrelsomeness and\ncharacterless good-nature.\n\nOn this excursion through the field of the ethical, there open up many\ninteresting views. In an acute and living discussion Aristotle lets\nhis readers survey the questions of the relations of man to his\nfellow-men and to society. How much that is deep and true there is in\nthe chapter on moral excellence and in that on friendship! How he\nwrestles with the problem of justice!\n\nNo one can fail to feel the charm of the _Nicomachean Ethics_. There\nis revealed in them a noble personality with abundant experience of\nlife, depicted with a magnificent simplicity. But just in proportion\nas the method followed [pg 045] is advantageous technically, it is\nvalueless in itself. The ethical is reconciled with reality without\nhaving first tried to come to clear understanding of itself. It is in\nthis reconciliation that the understanding is to be found, so\nAristotle thinks, but he is mistaken. His mind is seduced through his\nhaving observed that some virtues\u2014but even these more or less under\ncompulsion\u2014allow themselves to be conceived as real means between two\nextremes, and he is misled into developing on these lines the whole of\nhis ethical system.\n\nBut a more or less natural quality, which in ordinary speech is called\na virtue, is one thing, virtue in the really ethical sense is another.\nThe middle quality between prodigality and avarice is not the ethical\nvirtue of liberality, out the quality of rational economy. The middle\nquality between rashness and cowardice is not the ethical virtue of\ncourage, but the quality of rational prudence. The combination of two\nqualities only produces a single one. But virtue, in the ethical\nsense, means a quality guiding itself by an ideal of self-perfection,\nand being serviceable for some object which looks towards the\nuniversal. Liberality as an ethical virtue means a process of spending\nwhich serves some object recognized by the person practising it as\nvaluable in principle, and in such a way that any natural tendency to\nprodigality, should there be such in the giver, plays no part, while\nthe tendency to avarice is paralysed.\n\nDevotion of one\u2019s property or one\u2019s life to an object which is\nvaluable in principle is under all circumstances ethical, while\nprodigality and avarice, rashness and cowardice as simple qualities\nnot inspired by any higher aim have never any ethical character; they\nare merely something natural. Whether the devotion of one\u2019s property\nor of one\u2019s life for an object valuable in principle is made more\ncompletely than need be or exactly to the extent required by the\ncircumstances, does not alter in any way the ethical character of the\ndecision and the action. Such excess or defect only shows how much or\nhow little the ethical will has allowed [pg 046] itself to be at the\nsame time influenced by considerations of prudence.\n\nAristotle\u2019s representation, then, rests on the fact that he allows\nvirtue in ordinary speech and virtue in the ethical sense to get mixed\nup. He smuggles in the really ethical, and then offers it as the\nresultant of two natural qualities, each of which is an extreme.\n\nIn the chapter on temperance\u2014_Ethics_, Bk. III., 10\u2014he has to allow\nthat the theory which makes the ethical a mean between two extremes\ncannot be carried through completely. The love of beauty, he says\nplainly, however strong it becomes, remains what it is; there can\nnever be any question of excess. He throws out this admission without\nseeing that he thereby undermines his feeble definition of the ethical\nas the appropriate relative mean, and, like Socrates and Plato,\nacknowledges that there can be something which its content allows to\nbe reckoned as good in itself.\n\nAristotle is so firmly resolved not to let himself be entangled in the\nproblem of the basic principle of ethics, that he will allow nothing\nto lead him to the discussion of it. He means to voyage along the\ncoast, keep to facts, and deal with ethics as if they were a branch of\nnatural science. Only he forgets that in science we can confine\nourselves to venturing from definite given happenings through\nhypotheses to the nature of the Being which lies behind them, while in\nethics, on the contrary, we have to establish a basic principle\nthrough the application of which we secure our happenings.\n\nIt is because he misunderstands their nature that Aristotle cannot\nhelp ethics forward. Plato rides off over the head of Socrates and\nloses himself in abstractions. Aristotle, in order to maintain the\nconnexion with reality goes down below Socrates. He brings together\nmaterial for a monumental building, and runs up a wooden shack. Among\nteachers of virtue he is one of the greatest. Nevertheless, the least\nof those who venture on the search for the basic principle of the\nethical, is greater than he.\n\n[pg 047]\n\nEthical theory is no more ethics than cartilage is bone. But how\nstrange is this inability to establish the basic principle of ethical\naction which Socrates regarded as the certain, and from the very first\nsure and certain, product of thoughtful reflexion on the ethical! Why\ndo all the ancient thinkers who in succession to Socrates search for\nit, always miss it? Why does Aristotle cease to concern himself with\nit, and so condemn himself to a doctrine of virtue in which, as a\nmatter of fact, there is hardly any more living ethical force than\nthere is in the abstract ethical system of Plato or in the ethics of\nresignation of the rest?\n\nThe Ideal of the Civilized State in Plato and Aristotle\n\nHow little Plato and Aristotle are capable of establishing an ethic of\naction can be seen from the way in which they sketch their ideal of\nthe civilized State. Plato develops his in the _Republic_, Aristotle\nhis in the _Politics_. At this very time, Mencius (Meng-tse) is\nputting before the princes of China a doctrine of the civilized State.\n\nThat the State must be something more than a union which regulates in\nthe most practical way the common life of a number of persons whom\nnatural conditions compel to depend upon one another, is quite clear\nto both of them. They also agree in demanding that the State shall\npromote the true prosperity of its citizens. This is, however,\nunthinkable and impossible without virtue, and the State must\ntherefore develop into an ethical institution. \u201cHonourable and\nvirtuous conduct is the object which the political community aims at,\u201d\nis the way Aristotle puts it.\n\nThe State, which is given by history, is therefore to come under the\ninfluence of a representation of its nature as a political body which\nis both ethical and rational. In the _Republic_ Plato puts in the\nmouth of Socrates the following sentiment: \u201cUnless it happen that\neither philosophers acquire the kingly power in States, or those who\nare to-day called kings and potentates cultivate philosophy truly and\nsufficiently, and thus political power and philosophy [pg 048] become\nas one . . . there can be no deliverance from evil for States, nor\never, so I think, for the human race\u201d (Bk. V, 473, C and D).\n\nWhen, however, it comes to a more detailed carrying out of the ideal\nof the civilized State, Plato and Aristotle betray remarkable\nembarrassment. First of all, their vision of the State of the future\nis not that of a community which embraces a whole nation, but is\nalways just a copy of the Greek city-republic with appropriate\nimprovements. That they think out their ideal within such narrow\nlimits is historically intelligible, but for the development of the\nphilosophical idea of the civilized State it is deplorable.\n\nOne result of these narrow limits is that both are anxiously concerned\nto provide that the well-being of the city-republic shall not be\nendangered by the increase of the population. The number of the\ninhabitants is to be kept as far as possible always near the same\nfigure. Aristotle is not frightened by the proposal that weakly\nchildren shall be allowed to die of hunger, and that unborn children\nshall be got rid of by intentional abortion. That the Spartan State,\non the contrary, regards the increase of the population as desirable,\nand exempts a citizen from all imposts as soon as he has four\nchildren, does not seem to him to be reasonable.\n\nAgain, just as these two thinkers cannot work themselves up to a\ngeneral idea of a national State, so they are unable to reach the idea\nof mankind. They make a strict line of division between the unfree on\nthe one side, and the free on the other. The former they regard merely\nas creatures made for work, who are to maintain the material\nwell-being of the State. What becomes of them as human beings is to\nthem a matter of very little interest. Such beings as they are not\nmeant to have any share in the growth towards perfection which is to\nbe brought about by means of the civilized State.\n\nSlavery was, indeed, attacked now and again by the Sophists from their\npoint of view, not, however, on the [pg 049] ground of humanity but\nfrom a desire to raise doubts about the accepted justification of\nexisting institutions. Aristotle defends it as a natural arrangement,\nbut recommends kindly treatment.\n\nArtisans, and in general all who earn their living by the labour of\ntheir hands, are not to be allowed to be citizens. \u201cOne cannot\npractise virtue, if one leads the life of an artisan, or of one who\nlabours for pay,\u201d says Aristotle. An ethical valuation of labour as\nsuch is still something unknown to him, even though he conceives of\nhappiness as \u201cactivity in accordance with the law of excellence.\u201d\nPlato and he are still entirely under the influence of the ancient\nview that only the \u201cfree\u201d man can have full value as a man.\n\nIn details of the ideal of the State, however, the two part company,\nand Aristotle argues against Plato, though, unfortunately, just those\nparts of the _Politics_ in which he sketches his ideal State have not\ncome down to us complete. The main difference is that Aristotle keeps\ncloser than Plato to the historically given. He builds his State upon\nthe family; Plato makes the State into a family. In his _Republic_ the\nfree men live with property, wives, and children owned in common. They\nare to possess nothing as their own, so that they may not by private\ninterests be held back from working for the general welfare. Moreover,\nthe general welfare allows the State to breed its citizens\nsystematically. He prescribes the connections which men and women are\nto form, and permits only such as allow the expectation of a new\ngeneration which is sound both in body and mind. The offspring of\nunions not approved by the authorities are either to be killed before\nbirth, or got rid of by starvation.\n\nAristotle contents himself with guaranteeing the quality of the\noffspring by legal regulation of the age for marriage. Women may get\nmarried at eighteen, men not till they are thirty-seven. Moreover,\nmarriages are to take place preferably in winter, and as far as\npossible, when the wind is in the north.\n\n[pg 050]\n\nIn what, then, does the good consist which is to be realized by this\ncivilized State? To this decisive question Aristotle and Plato have in\nreality only the answer that it is meant to make it possible for a\nnumber of its members, viz. the \u201cfree\u201d men, to devote themselves\nentirely to their own bodily and mental culture free from care about\nmaterial things, and to take the lead in public affairs. It is not\nestablished with a view to the production of anything ethical in any\ndeeper sense, nor for the sake of an ideal of progress on lines which\ncould be described as in any sense great and noble. Nowhere do the\ncharacteristic limitations of ancient ethics reveal themselves so\nclearly as in the poverty of their ideal of the State.\n\nThe ethical valuation of man as man has not yet been reached. Hence\nthe State has for its object, not the growth to perfection of all, but\nonly that of a particular class.\n\nThe nation, too, is not yet recognized as a great entity both natural\nand ethical, and therefore no consideration is given to the question\nof uniting the various city communities for the joint pursuit of\nhigher objects. Each remains isolated. Plato thinks he has satisfied\nthe claims produced by membership of the same nation by requiring that\nin wars waged by Greek States against one another the houses shall not\nbe destroyed nor the fields laid waste, as if the war were against\nbarbarians.\n\nThe idea of humanity as a whole has not yet come in sight. It is,\ntherefore, not possible for Plato and Aristotle to make their State\nwork in co-operation with others to promote the general progress of\nmankind.\n\nThey therefore establish their civilized State on a type which is\nhemmed in in every direction by narrow horizons. Moreover, the\npolitical community which they adopt as the type is at the very time\nwhen they are writing already a dying entity. While Aristotle is\nwriting his _Politics_, his pupil, Alexander the Great, is founding an\nempire, and Rome is beginning to subject Italy to her rule.\n\nMore important still than all external faults in their ideal [pg 051]\nof the civilized State is the fact that these two thinkers are unable\nto introduce into the community the energies which are needed for its\nmaintenance. The idea of the civilized State is present with the\nvitality needed, only when the individual is by the impulse contained\nin his world-view moved so far as to devote himself to organized\nsociety with enthusiastic activity. Without civic idealism no\ncivilized State! But to assume anything of that kind in the members of\ntheir State is impossible for Plato and Aristotle, since both have\nalready reached the ideal of the wise man who withdraws himself\nprudently and gracefully from the world.\n\nPlato admits this. His wise citizens who are destined to be rulers\ndevote themselves to the service of the State only when their turn\ncomes, and are glad when they are set free and can again in retirement\nbusy themselves, as wise among wise, with the world of pure Being.\n\nAristotle, when he raises in the _Politics_ the question whether the\ncontemplative life is not to be preferred to that of political\nactivity, decides in theory in favour of the latter. \u201cIt is a\nmistake,\u201d he says, \u201cto value inactivity higher than activity, since\nhappiness consists in activity.\u201d But in the doctrine of virtue in the\n_Nicomachean Ethics_ there is nothing which could lead the individual\nto place his life at the service of the community.\n\nPlato and Aristotle cherish undoubtedly the ancient conviction that\nthe individual ought to devote himself to the State, but they cannot\nfind a foundation for it in their world-view. Like Epicurus and the\nadherents of the Porch, they are under the spell of an ethic in which\nthere is present no will to attempt a transformation of the world.\n\nHow much greater than the two Greeks is Mencius, when he is thinking\nout the ideal of the civilized State! He can make it as large as he\nlikes and take men into its service with their best thoughts, because\nit results in the most natural way from a large-scale world-view of\nethical activity.\n\nPlato and Aristotle, lacking such a world-view, can do no more than\nguess at the nature of a civilized State, and invent one for\nthemselves. Plato\u2019s _Republic_ is a mere [pg 052] curiosity.\nAristotle\u2019s _Politics_ is valuable, not on account of the theory of\nthe civilized State which is there presented, but only for his\nmagnificent practical analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of\nthe various State-constitutions, and of their economic problems.\n\nThe decadence of antiquity does not begin, then, with the suppression\nof the individual by the Empire, and its destruction of the normal\nmutual relations between the individual and the community. It sets in\nimmediately after Socrates, because the ethical thinking which started\nwith him cannot really lead the individual beyond himself, and set him\nas an effective force in the service of the moralization and the\nperfecting of social relations.\n\nThere is no middle term between the ethic of enthusiasm and that of\nresignation. But an ethic of resignation cannot think out, much less\nbring into existence, a system of social relations which can be called\nreally civilized.\n\nSeneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius\n\n\u201cIn imperial times Stoicism shrivels up into a moralizing popular\nphilosophy\u201d is what we are usually told in treatises about ancient\nphilosophy. As a matter of fact what we have to deal with is by no\nmeans a shrivelling up, but a serious struggle for a living ethic\nwhich begins unexpectedly in the later period of Gr\u00e6co-Roman thought,\nand leads to an optimistic-ethical nature-philosophy.\n\nThe pillars of this movement are L. Ann\u00e6us Seneca (4 B.C.\u2014A.D. 65),\nNero\u2019s teacher, who at the command of his pupil had to open his veins;\nthe Phrygian slave, Epictetus (born _c_. A.D. 50), who in A.D. 94 was\nwith all philosophers banished from Rome by Domitian; the Emperor\nMarcus Aurelius (A.D. 121-180) who, brought up by pupils of Epictetus,\ndefends the Empire at a time of great danger, and writes his\nphilosophical _Meditations_ while in camp._(_8_)_\n\n[pg 053]\n\nIn their classical period Greek ethics offer us either egoistic\nconsiderations of advantage, or cold doctrines of virtue, or ascetic\nrenunciation of the world, or resignation. In whichever direction they\nturn, they never lead men out beyond themselves.\n\nIn Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, they lose this\nself-regarding character. Renouncing the spirit of the earlier time\nthey develop to an ethic of universal brotherhood, and busy themselves\nwith the immediate, altruistic relations of man to man.\n\nWhence comes this understanding for humanity, which is never seen in\nclassical antiquity?\n\nThe older Greek moralists are concerned with the State. Their interest\nis absorbed in the maintenance of the organization of society which is\nembodied in the city-republic, so that the free citizens can continue\nto live the life of freedom. The type of complete manhood is to be\nrealized. All around there is the activity of men who receive no\nconsideration except so far as they are means to this end.\n\nBut amid the mighty political and social revolutions which lead to the\ncreation of the Empire this mentality ceases to be accepted as a\nmatter of course. The fearful experiences it goes through cause\nfeeling to become more human, and the horizons of ethics are widened.\nThe city-republic, on which ethical thinking had been built up, has\ndisappeared, but an empire now crushes men down just in the same way.\nThus the individual man as such becomes the object of reflexion and of\nethics. The conception of the brotherhood of all men appears. A\ndisposition to humanity makes itself heard, and Seneca condemns the\ngladiatorial shows. Nay more: even the [pg 054] inner relationship\nbetween mankind and the animal world is recognized.\n\nSo now when they have caught sight of mankind as a whole and man as\nsuch, ethics reach such a depth and breadth as allows them to try to\ncomprehend themselves in a universal world-will. Henceforth\nnature-philosophy and ethics can work together. Stoicism had from the\nvery beginning a vision of this, but had not been able to make it a\nreality, since it had not at its disposal the needful living and\nuniversalist ethic.\n\nBut there is another reason why optimism and ethics can now in\nnature-philosophy come into power. The old school of the Porch was\ncrushed down into resignation just in proportion as it submitted to\nthe necessity for critical thinking. But as time goes on, the\npractical and religious instincts which were always present in its\nworld-view, gain in strength. The antiquity which is passing away is\nno longer critical, but either sceptical or religious, and therefore\nthe later school of the Porch can let itself be guided by the ethical\ndemands of its world-view much more completely than the old one could.\nIt becomes at once deeper and more simple than the latter, and, like\nChinese ethical monism, rises to such freedom from limitations as to\nbe able to interpret the world-will as ethical. So now Stoics appear\nwho, like Confucius, like Mencius, and like Chwang-tse, and indeed,\nlike the Rationalists of the eighteenth century, preach ethics as\nsomething grounded in the nature of the universe and of mankind. They\ncannot prove the truth of this world-view any better than could Zeno\nand his pupils, who also resorted to it, but they announce it with an\ninner conviction which the former could not command, and produce their\nresults by means of an enthusiasm which was denied to their\npredecessors.\n\nWhen the later school of the Porch reaches the stage of exalting the\nworld-principle more and more to become a personal and ethical god, it\nis following laws which are at work also in Hinduism.\n\n[pg 055]\n\nYet the world-view of resignation, which it has inherited from the\nolder school, it never succeeds in rendering entirely impotent. In\nSeneca and Epictetus this is still strongly maintained side by side\nwith the ethical conception of the universe. It is only in Marcus\nAurelius that the optimistic motives sound victoriously through.\n\nStoicism was from the beginning a multiform elemental philosophy, and\nit is because it ventured to be this in such comprehensive measure\nthat the later Stoicism is so rich and so full of life.\n\nMoral Sayings of Seneca\n\nNo man is nobler than his fellow, even if it happen that his spiritual\nnature is better constituted and he is more capable of higher\nlearning. The world is the one mother of us all, and the ultimate\norigin of each one of us can be traced back to her, whether the steps\nin the ladder of descent be noble or humble. To no one is virtue\nforbidden; she is accessible to all; she admits everyone, she invites\neveryone in: free men and freedmen, slaves, kings, and exiles. She\nregards neither birth nor fortune; the man alone is all she wants.\n\nIt is a mistake to think that the status of a slave affects the whole\nof a person\u2019s nature; the nobler part of it is not touched thereby.\n\nEvery single person, even if there is nothing else to recommend him, I\nmust hold in regard, because he bears the name of man.\n\nIn the treatment of a slave we have to consider not how much we can do\nto him without being liable to punishment, but how much the nature of\nright and of justice allows us to, seeing that these bid us treat\ngently even prisoners and purchased slaves. Although in the treatment\nof a slave everything is allowed, there is nevertheless something\nwhich through the common right of every living being is stigmatized as\nnot permissible in the treatment of a man, because he is of the same\nnature as thyself.\n\nThis, in fact, is the demand which is laid upon each man, viz. that he\nworks when possible, for the welfare of many; if that is\nimpracticable, that he works for the welfare of a few; failing that,\nfor the welfare of his neighbours, and if that is impossible, for his\nown.\n\nIt is through untiring benevolence that the bad are won over, and\nthere is no disposition so hard and so hostile to loving treatment ...\nas to refuse love to the good people whom it will in the end have to\nthank again for something more. \u201cNot a word of thanks did I get! What\nam I now to begin to do?\u201d What the gods do, . . . who begin to shower\nbenefits on us before we are aware of it, and continue them even\nthough we do not thank them.\n\nMoral Sayings of Epictetus\n\nNature is wonderful, and full of love for all creatures.\n\nWait upon God, ye men. When He calls you, and releases you from [pg\n056] service, then go to Him; but for the present remain quietly in\nthe position in which He has placed you.\n\nYou carry a god about with you, and do not know it, unhappy one! You\nhave him within yourself, and do not notice it when you defile him\nwith unclean thoughts or foul deeds.\n\nCultivate the will to satisfy yourself, and to stand right before God.\nStrive to become pure, one with yourself and one with God.\n\nThink silence best; say only what is necessary, and say it shortly.\nAbove all, do not talk about thy fellow-men, either to praise them, or\nto blame them, or to compare them with others. Do not swear; never, if\npossible, or at any rate as seldom as possible. Your bodily\nwants\u2014food, drink, clothing, housing, service\u2014satisfy in the simplest\nway. Avoid unseemly joking, for there is always a danger of becoming\nvulgar, and joking away the respect of your fellow-men.\n\nAs you are careful when walking not to tread on a nail or to sprain\nyour ankle, so take care not to let your soul get hurt.\n\nMoral Sayings from the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius\n\nEverything that happens, happens right, and if you can observe things\ncarefully, you will recognize that it is so. I do not mean only in\naccordance with the course of nature, but much more that they happen\nin accordance with the law of righteousness, and as if controlled by a\nBeing who orders all things according to merit.\n\nIf I am active, I am so with due regard to the general welfare. If\nanything happens to me, I accept it and consider it in relation to the\ngods and the universal source from which, in close connection, come\nall our happenings.\n\nHe who commits unrighteousness is godless, for universal nature\ncreated rational beings for one another; to help each other where\nthere is need, but never to injure one another.\n\nLove mankind; obey the godhead.\n\nIf thou art unwilling to get up in the morning, reflect thus: I am\nwaking in order to go and work as one of mankind.\n\nSeek all thy joy and contentment in advancing, mindful always of God,\nfrom one generally useful deed to another.\n\nThe best way to avenge oneself on anyone is to avoid returning evil\nfor evil.\n\nIt is a privilege of man to love even those who do him wrong. One can\nreach this level by reflecting that all men are of one family with\noneself; that their shortcomings are due to ignorance, and against\ntheir will; that in a short time both of you will be dead.\n\nWhat is good is necessarily useful, and that is why the good and noble\nman must be concerned about it.\n\nNobody gets tired of seeking his own advantage. But doing so procures\nus an activity which is natural. Never get tired, then, of seeking\nthine own advantage, provided thou procurest thus the advantage of\nothers also.\n\n[pg 057]\n\nTreat as befits a man endowed with reason, that is magnanimously and\nnobly, the animals which are not so endowed, and indeed all creatures\nwhatever that can feel but have no reason. But other men, since they\nare endowed with reason, treat with friendly affection.\n\nThou has existed till now as a fragment of the universe, and wilt some\nday be absorbed in thy producer, or rather, thou wilt suffer a\ntransformation and reappear as a new germ of life.\n\nMany grains of incense are destined for the same altar. Some fall soon\ninto the flame, others later, but that makes no difference.\n\nThe Optimistic-Ethical World-View of the later Stoicism\n\nIn their optimistic-ethical world-view the later Stoics find those\nimpulses to effort which were not available for the ancient ethics of\nthe classical age. Marcus Aurelius is an enthusiastic utilitarian like\nthe Rationalists of the eighteenth century, because, like them, he is\nconvinced that nature itself has bound up together what is ethical and\nwhat is advantageous to the individual and to the community.\n\nThat being so, the classical question of ancient ethics whether the\nthinking man is to busy himself with public affairs or not must again\nbe discussed. Epicurus taught that \u201cthe wise man has nothing to do\nwith State affairs unless exceptional circumstances arise.\u201d Zeno\u2019s\ndecision was that \u201che will take part in the business of the State\nunless obstacles prevent it.\u201d Both schools leave the retirement into\noneself to the decision of the Wise man, only one lets the grounds for\nthe decision be given somewhat earlier, the other somewhat later. The\nthought of a devotion to the general good which is to be kept active\nfor its own sake and under all circumstances is outside the circle of\nvision of their ethic.\n\nWith the later Stoics it emerges, because the conception of \u201cmankind\u201d\nhas come in sight. Man, as Seneca works out in his treatise on Leisure\n(_De Otio_), belongs to two republics. One is a large and universal\none, extends as far as the sun shines, and embraces both gods and men;\nthe other is that into which through the fate assigned us by our [pg\n058] birth, we have been adopted as citizens. Circumstances may bring\nit about that the wise man cannot dedicate himself to the service of\nthe State, but, to escape the storm, must \u201ctake refuge in the\nharbour.\u201d It may happen\u2014and Seneca has in mind his own time\u2014that not\none of existing States is of such a character as to put up with the\nactivity of the wise man. Nevertheless, the latter does not wholly\nwithdraw into himself, but he serves the great republic by working to\nimprove the general outlook of mankind, and to hasten the coming of a\nnew age.\n\nIn Epictetus also this deepened and widened notion of duty is to be\nfound. Marcus Aurelius does not even consider any impossibility of\ntaking part in public life. In him there speaks the ruler who feels\nhimself to be the servant of the State. His ideal is the citizen who\n\u201cfrom one activity which makes his fellow-citizens happier goes on to\nanother, and undertakes with alacrity anything whatever that the State\nlays upon him.\u201d \u201cDo what is needed, and what is bidden by the reason\nof a being who is destined by nature to membership of a State, and do\nit as it is bidden.\u201d\n\nIn the middle of the second century A.D. ancient thought arrives at an\noptimistic-ethical world-view which holds within itself living ideals\nof civilization, and therefore anticipates those which later on in the\neighteenth century will bring into activity so mighty and universal a\nmovement of civilization. But for the men of the Gr\u00e6co-Roman world it\ncomes too late. It does not permeate the masses, but remains the\nprivate possession of an _\u00e9lite_.\n\nIt cannot permeate the masses, because there are forces at work among\nthem with which it cannot combine. It is true, indeed, that the ethic\nof the later Stoicism is so near akin to the universal charity of the\nChristian ethic, that by the tradition of later times Seneca is\ndeclared to be a Christian, and that the Church father, Augustine,\nholds up the life of the heathen emperor, Marcus Aurelius, as an\nexample for Christians.\n\nYet the two movements cannot amalgamate, but have [pg 059] to fight\neach other. Marcus Aurelius is responsible for most terrible\npersecutions of Christians, and Christianity on its side declares war\nto the knife against the Porch.\n\nWhy this strange fatality? Because Christianity is dualistic and\npessimistic, the ethic of Stoicism is monistic and optimistic.\nChristianity abandons the natural world as evil, the later Stoics\nidealize it. It helps not at all that their ethical teaching is almost\nidentical. Each appears as part of a world-view which is\nirreconcilable with that of the other. All contradictions in the world\nmay be concealed, but not that between two world-views, and the\nstruggle ends with the annihilation of the optimistic-ethical\nworld-view of the Stoics, which is defended by officers without an\narmy. The attempt that was undertaken as the ancient world was coming\nto an end, to restore the Empire and make it an empire as wide as\nmankind, was a failure.\n\nThe horizons of the philosophy of the ancient world had remained\nnarrow too long. No ethical thinkers had appeared who at the right\ntime might have led that world to an ethical optimism about reality.\nIt was a calamity, too, that the natural sciences, which had started\nin such a promising way, came to a standstill, partly through the\nfault of fate, partly because philosophy turned away from them, before\nmankind discovered the law of the uniformity of nature, and obtained\nthereby control over it. Hence the men of antiquity never acquired\nthat self-consciousness which in their descendants of modern times has\nkept alive, even through the darkest periods of history, the belief in\nprogress\u2014even though it be sometimes progress of the most superficial\nkind. This psychological factor is of great importance.\n\nIt is true that artistic ability, which in the Greek spirit meets us\nin such abundant measure, is also control over the material, but this\ncreative power was unable to draw the man of antiquity up to a higher\nlife-affirmation and to belief in progress. It served only to let him\nexpress himself, in words and in form, in the antagonism between\nprimitive [pg 060] world- and life-affirmation, and thinking world-\nand life-denial. It is the puzzling intermixture of serenity and\nmelancholy which produces the tragic charm of Greek art.\n\nFrom every point of view, then, a strong ethical world- and\nlife-affirmation is made difficult for the ancient world. It therefore\nfalls more and more a prey to pessimistic world-views, which draw its\nthoughts away from reality, and celebrate the liberation of the\nspiritual from its bondage to the material in a succession of cosmic\ndramas. Gnosticism, Oriental and Christian, Neo-Pythagoreanism, which\narose as early as the first century B.C., the Neo-Platonism which\noriginated with Plotinus (A.D. 204-269), and the great\nMystery-religions, all come to meet the religious, world-shunning\ndisposition of the masses during the breaking-up of antiquity, and\noffer it that deliverance from the world of which it is in search. In\nthis chaos of ideas Christianity emerges victorious because it is the\nmost robust religion of redemption, because as a community it\npossesses the strongest organization, and because beneath its\npessimistic world-view it has at its disposal living ethical ideas.\n\nThe optimistic-ethical monism of the later Stoics is like a sunbeam\nbreaking through in the evening of the long, gloomy day of antiquity\nwhile the darkness of the middle ages is already drawing on, but it\nhas no power to waken any civilization to life. The time for that is\npast. The spirit of antiquity, having failed to reach an ethical\nnature-philosophy, has become the prey of a pessimistic dualism in\nwhich no ethic of action is any longer possible; there can only be an\nethic of purification.\n\nThe thoughts of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius are the winter\nseed of a coming civilization.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 061]\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nOPTIMISTIC WORLD-VIEW AND ETHICS IN THE\nRENAISSANCE AND POST-RENAISSANCE PERIODS\n\n\nBelief in Progress and Ethics\n\nTHE essential characteristic of the modern age is this, that it thinks\nand acts in the spirit of a world- and life-affirmation which has\nnever before shown itself with such active strength.\n\nThis world-view breaks through in the Renaissance, first at the end of\nthe fourteenth century, and it arises as a protest against the\nmedi\u00e6val enslavement of the human spirit. The movement is helped to\nvictory by the increasing knowledge of Greek philosophy in its\noriginal form which is the result of the migration to Italy about the\nmiddle of the fifteenth century of learned Greeks from Constantinople.\nAmong the thinking men of that time there arises the belief that\nphilosophy must be something more elemental and more living than\nScholasticism made it.\n\nBut the thought of antiquity would not have been sufficient by itself\nto keep alive this new world- and life-affirmation which appealed to\nit. It has not, in truth, the mentality required. But another kind of\nfuel is in time brought for the fire. Taking refuge from book-learning\nin nature, the men of that time discover the world. As seamen they\nreach countries whose very existence was not suspected, and they\nmeasure the size of the earth. As inquirers they press on into the\ninfinite and the secrets of the universe, and learn by experience that\nforces governed by uniform laws are at work in it, and that man has\npower to make them serviceable to himself. The knowledge and power won\nby Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), Copernicus [pg 062] (1473-1543),\nKepler (1571-1630), Galileo (1564-1642), and others are decisive for\nthe current world-view.\n\nAs a movement which draws its life solely from spiritual forces, the\nRenaissance passes its bloom-time comparatively quickly, and without\nforming much fruit. With Paracelsus (1493-1541), Bernardino Telesio\n(1508-1588), Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), and others, an enthusiastic\nnature-philosophy announces itself. It does not, however, reach full\ngrowth. The Renaissance has not strength enough to bring to birth a\nworld- and life-affirming philosophy corresponding to their spirit.\nHere and there their thought surges for a time, like a rough sea,\nagainst the world-denying world-view of the Church. Then all is still.\nWhat we know definitely as the philosophy of modern times begins\nalmost without any reference to the Renaissance. It springs not from\nany nature-philosophy, but from the problem of the theory of knowledge\nwhich was raised by Descartes, and from that starting-point philosophy\nhas once more had laboriously to seek its way to a nature-philosophy.\n\nIt is not, then, because it was enlarged during the Renaissance into a\nfully thought out world-view that world- and life-affirmation made\ngood its position in the modern age. If it was able to hold out right\ninto the eighteenth century, when it triumphs against the world- and\nlife-denial which medi\u00e6val thought and Christianity kept working in\nopposition to it, it owed this to the circumstance that progress in\nknowledge and power never ceased. In them the new mentality had a\nsupport which never gave way, but became continually stronger. Since\nthe new scientific knowledge cannot be suppressed nor its progress\narrested, belief in the power of truth becomes firmly established.\nSince it becomes more and more evident that nature works with a\nuniformity which never misses its aim, there grows up a confidence\nthat the circumstances of society and of mankind generally can be so\norganized as to secure definite objects. Since man is ever obtaining\n[pg 063] greater power over nature, he takes it more and more as\nself-evident that the reaching of perfection in other spheres also is\nonly a question of a sufficiency of will-power and a correct way of\ngrappling with problems.\n\nUnder the steadily working influence of the new mentality the\nworld-view of Christianity changes, and becomes leavened with the\nleaven of world- and life-affirmation. It gradually begins to be\naccepted as self-evident that the spirit of Jesus does not give up the\nworld in despair, but aims at transforming it. The early Christian\nconception of the Kingdom of God, which was born of pessimism and,\nthanks to Augustine, prevailed through the Middle Ages, is rendered\nimpotent, and its place is taken by one which is the offspring of\nmodern optimism. This new orientation of the Christian world-view,\nwhich is accomplished by a slow and often interrupted process of\nchange between the fifteenth century and the end of the eighteenth, is\nthe decisive spiritual event of the modern age. During this period\nChristianity takes no account of what is happening to itself. It\nbelieves that it is remaining unchanged, whereas in reality, by this\nchange from pessimism to optimism, it is surrendering its original\ncharacter.\n\nThe man of modern times, then, becomes optimistic, not because\ndeepened thought has made him understand the world in the sense of\nworld- and life-affirmation, but because discovery and invention have\ngiven him power over it. This enhancement of his self-appreciation and\nthe consequent strengthening of his will and his hopes, determine his\nwill-to-live in a correspondingly pronounced and positive sense.\n\nIn the ancient world man\u2019s natural disposition to world- and\nlife-affirmation could not be worked out to a complete world-view of\nthe same, because at that time deep thought about the world and life\npressed resignation upon him as a necessity of thought. In the man of\nthe modern age the mentality produced by discovery and invention\nunites with his natural disposition to world- and life-affirmation,\nand establishes him in an optimistic world-view [pg 064] without\nleading him to deeper thought about the world and life.\n\nThe spirit of the modern age is not the work of any one great thinker.\nIt wins its way gradually by reason of the unbroken series of triumphs\nwon by discovery and invention. Hence it is not a result of chance\nthat an almost unphilosophic and moreover somewhat antiquated\npersonality like Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam (1561-1626), is the man\nwho drafts the programme of the modern world-view. He founds it upon\nthe sentence: \u201cKnowledge is power.\u201d His picture of the future he\ndevelops in his _New Atlantis_, in which he describes how the\ninhabitants of an island, through the practical application of all\nknown discoveries and inventions and all possible rational reflexion\non the purposive organization of society, find themselves in a\nposition to lead the happiest possible lives._(_9_)_\n\nChristian and Stoic Elements in Modern Ethics\n\nWhat is the relation between ethics and the mentality of belief in\nprogress, and how were they influenced by it?\n\nWhen the ethical thought of antiquity wanted to come to clearness\nabout itself, it fell a victim to resignation, because it tried to\ndetermine the moral as that which is rationally profitable and\npleasurable to the individual. It remained shut up within the circle\nof the egoistic, and never reached the thought of social\nutilitarianism. From such a fate modern ethics are protected in\nadvance. They have no need to produce from their own resources the\nthought that the ethical is action directed to promoting the welfare\nof others, for they find it as something already accepted as true.\nThat is the gift of Christianity. The thought of Jesus that the\nethical is the individual\u2019s active self-devotion to others has won its\nway to acceptance. Ethics, [pg 065] which are making themselves\nindependent of religion, keep, as a result of their passage through\nChristianity, a pronouncedly active and altruistic mode of thought.\nWhat they have to do now is to provide this possession with a rational\nfoundation.\n\nIt is extraordinarily significant that to meet modern ethics there\ncomes in the Late Stoicism a philosophical ethical system in which\nthere appear, as the result of rational thinking, thoughts which run\nside by side with Christian morality. There is now coming up for the\nbenefit of modern times the seed sown by Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus\nAurelius. Cicero, too, counts with modern times for so much, because\nits thinkers find in his writings noble morality based upon thought.\nThe discovery of Late Stoicism\u2019s ethic of humanity is for modern times\nakin to their discovery of nature. They identify it with the real\nChristian ethic, and contrast it with the scholastic, in which Jesus\nis expounded according to Aristotle. It is through Late Stoicism that\nmodern times become aware that the moral is something direct. Because\nSeneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius speak to such an extent just as\nJesus did, they help to spread the conviction that the truly rational\nethic and the ethic of the Gospels coincide with one another.\n\nWhen antiquity came to an end, Late Stoicism and Christianity, in\nspite of the identity of their moral teaching, had torn each other to\npieces. In modern times they unite in order to produce together an\nethical world-view. Why is that now possible which before was\nimpossible? Because the chasm which lay between their respective\nworld-views has been bridged. Christianity now treats world- and\nlife-affirmation as valid.\n\nBut how could this volte-face of Christianity be brought about?\nBecause of the fact that in spite of its pessimistic world-view it\nupholds an ethic which, so far as it touches the relation of man to\nman, is an activist ethic. The pessimistic world-view, if it thinks\nitself out to a consistent conclusion, must end with a purely\nworld-denying ethic, [pg 066] divorced from action, as it has in\nIndia. The peculiar character, however, of the world-view of Jesus\nwhich is determined by the expectation of the end of the world and the\ncoming of a supernatural kingdom of God, together with the directness\nof his ethical feeling, entail his proclaiming of an ethic of active\ndevotion to one\u2019s fellow-Man in spite of his pessimistic attitude\ntowards the natural world. This activist ethic is what is wanted to\nprovide the cardinal-point of an evolution from a\nChristian-pessimistic world-view to one of Christian optimism. The\nmodern age, following its instinct, assumes it as self-evident that an\nethic which deals with the active relations of man to man is\npre-supposed to be an ethic which assigns a positive value to action\nas such, and, further, that such an ethic of action belongs to a\nworld-view which is optimistic and which wills and hopes for a\ntransformation of relationships.\n\nIt is, then, the ethic of active self-devotion taught by Jesus which\nmakes it possible for Christianity to do what is suggested by the\nspirit of the modern age, and modulate from the pessimistic to the\noptimistic world-view. This result finds expression in the way the new\nconception of Christianity, when it has to come to an understanding\nwith the old one, contrasts itself as \u201cthe religion of Jesus\u201d with\n\u201cthe Christianity of dogma.\u201d\n\nA way is prepared, then, in Erasmus and individual representatives of\nthe Reformation, shyly at first but then more and more clearly, for an\ninterpretation of the teaching of Jesus which corresponds to the\nspirit of modern times, an interpretation which conceives the teaching\nas a religion of action in the world. Historically and in actual fact\nthis is a wrong interpretation, for the world-view of Jesus is, so far\nas concerns the future of the natural world, thoroughly pessimistic.\nHis religion is not a religion of world-transforming effort, but the\nreligion of awaiting the end of the world. His ethic is characterised\nby activity only so far as it commands men to practise unbounded\ndevotion to their fellow-men if they would attain to that inner\nperfection [pg 067] which is needed for entrance into the supernatural\nkingdom of God. An ethic of enthusiasm, and therefore presumably\nfocused upon an optimistic world-view, forms part of a pessimistic\nworld-view! That is the magnificent paradox in the teaching of Jesus.\n\nBut the modern age was right in overlooking this paradox and in\nassuming in Jesus an optimistic world-view which corresponded to an\nethic of enthusiasm and met with a welcome the spirit of Late Stoicism\nand of modern times. For the progress of the spiritual life of Europe\nthis mistake was a necessity. What crises the latter must have gone\nthrough, if it had not been able without embarrassment to place the\nnew world-view under the authority of the great personality of Jesus!\n\nThe mistake was such a natural one that till the end of the nineteenth\ncentury it was never seriously shaken. When historical criticism, at\nthe beginning of the twentieth century, proclaimed its discovery that\nJesus, in spite of his activist ethic, thought and acted under a\npessimistic world-view dominated by the expectation of the end of the\nworld, it aroused indignation. It was accused of degrading Jesus to a\nmere enthusiast, while it after all only put an end to the false\nmodernising of his personality._(_10_)_\n\nWhat we at the present time have to do is to go through the critical\nexperience of being obliged to think as modern men under a world-view\nof world- and life-affirmation, and yet let the ethic of Jesus speak\nto us from out of a pessimistic world-view.\n\nOf this problem which is disclosing itself to-day the early period of\nthe modern age suspects nothing. Jesus and the moralists of Late\nStoicism together are its authorities for an ethical world- and\nlife-affirmation.\n\nWhat the Late-Stoic ethic is for the modern age is shown by Erasmus of\nRotterdam (1466-1536), Michel de [pg 068] Montaigne (1533-1592),\nPierre Charron (1541-1603), Jean Bodin (1530-1596), and Hugo Grotius\n(1583-1645), and that whether their ideas run predominantly on\nChristian or on freethinking lines. To the Later Stoics Erasmus owes\nit that he can understand the simple gospel of Jesus which was being\ndiscovered behind the Church\u2019s dogmas, as being the essence of all\nethical philosophizing. It is by finding support in them that\nMontaigne in his _Essays_ (1580) is saved from falling into complete\nethical scepticism. Because he is inspired by the Later Stoics, Bodin\nin his work _De la r\u00e9publique_ (1577), puts forward an ethical ideal\nof the State to combat the ideas of Machiavelli\u2019s _Prince_\n(_Principe_) (1515). Because he draws from the same source, Pierre\nCharron in his work _De la sagesse_ (1601), ventures to assert that\nethics are higher than traditional religion, and can maintain\nthemselves in an independent position in face of it without losing\nanything of their essential nature or of their depth. Because the work\nof Marcus Aurelius has preceded him, Hugo Grotius is able in his\nfamous work, _De jure belli ac pacis_ (1625) to lay so securely the\nfoundations of natural and international law, and thereby to champion\nthe claims of reason and humanity in the domain of jurisprudence.\n\nOther considerations apart, it would have been the first task of the\nrising power of natural science to restore to currency the world-view\nof Epicurus, and Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655)_(_11_)_ attempts it. He\nfails, however, to accomplish his purpose. By its inward belief in\nprogress the mentality of the modern age is driven in elemental\nfashion beyond scepticism and sceptical ethics. What is great in\nEpicurus, viz. that in obedience to the deepest demands of truth he\ntries to think ethically within a nature-philosophy which does not\ninterpret nature as embodying any purpose, can neither be comprehended\nnor be put before his own age by the philosopher\u2019s all too clever\nmodern prophet.\n\n[pg 069]\n\nFor the weighty questions of absolute truth that time is by no means\nripe. Its capacity is only that of the uncritical. Typical for its\nspirit is Isaac Newton (1643-1727), who in his investigation of nature\nis purely empirical, and in his world-view remains simply Christian.\n\nAgainst the difficulties which crop up for ethics and world- and\nlife-affirmation out of a nature-philosophy which works without any\npresuppositions, the Renaissance and the Post-Renaissance are secure.\nThe belief in progress which arises from the achievements of discovery\nand invention, and the joy felt in action itself are their world-view.\n\nThanks to belief in progress, new life streams into ethics. The inner\nrelations between ethics and world- and life-affirmation begin to have\ntheir effect. The elementary impulses to activity which are embodied\nin the Christian ethic are set free, and the belief in progress gives\nthem an aim and object: the transformation of the circumstances of\nsociety and of mankind.\n\nIt is not any really deeper ethical thinking that brings the modern\nage in, but the influence exerted by the belief in progress, which\narose out of the achievements of discovery and invention, on the ethic\nwhich drew its life from Stoic and Christian thought. The cart is\ndrawn by the belief in progress, and at first ethics have only to run\nalong beside it. But as the cart gets heavier and the road more\ndifficult to negotiate, so that ethics ought to lend their strength to\nhelp, they refuse, because they have no strength of their own. The\ncart begins to run backward, and carries belief in progress, and\nethics with it, down the hill.\n\nThe task before philosophy was to change the world- and\nlife-affirmation which arose out of enthusiasm over the attainments in\ndiscovery and invention into a deeper, inner one arising out of\nthought about the universe and the life of man, and on that same\nfoundation to build up an ethical system. But philosophy could do\nneither.\n\nAbout the middle of the nineteenth century, when it has become\nperfectly clear that we are living with a world- and [pg 070]\nlife-affirmation which has its source merely in our confidence in\ndiscovery and invention and not in any deeper thinking about the world\nand life, our fate is sealed. The modern optimistic-ethical\nworld-view, though it has done so much for the material development of\ncivilization, proves to be like a building erected already to a\nconsiderable height but on rotten foundations, and has to collapse.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 071]\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nLAYING THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS IN THE\nSEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES\n\n\nHartley, Holbach. Devotion as Enlightened Egoism\n\nMODERN times find world- and life-affirmation so self-evident that\nthey feel no need to give them a sure foundation, and to deepen them,\nby thought about the world and life. Pessimism they brush aside as\nreactionary folly, without suspecting how deep down into thought it\nhas sent its roots.\n\nThey do, however, see the necessity of establishing the nature of the\nethical. How do they proceed to do this?\n\nThat the ethical means action directed to promoting the common good is\ntheir firm belief from the first, and they are safe from the fate of\nancient thought, viz. sticking fast in the mud of resignation while\ntrying to give the ethical a proper foundation. Instead of that they\nhave to answer the question how the unegoistic makes it appearance\nbeside the egoistic, and in what inner relation they stand to each\nother.\n\nA performance now begins like that which went on after the appearance\nof Socrates, only the task is proposed this time not by an individual\nbut by the spirit of the time. Another attempt is made to consider the\nethical problem in isolation, as if it consisted in reflexions on the\nrelation of the individual to himself and to society, these having no\nneed to settle their position with regard to ultimate questions of the\nmeaning of the world and of life. The ethical problem seems, too, to\nbe a much easier one than it was then, because world-affirmation and\nactivity directed towards the general welfare no longer have to be\nproved, but appear among the presuppositions which are taken for\ngranted.\n\n[pg 072]\n\nThere are three ways in which the relations between the egoistic and\nthe altruistic can be made clear. Either one assumes that the egoistic\nin the thought of the individual is automatically converted into the\naltruistic by consistent meditation. Or one supposes the altruistic to\nhave its beginning in the thought of society and thence to pass over\ninto the convictions of the individual. Or one retires to the position\nthat egoism and altruism are both among the original endowments of\nhuman nature. All three explanations are attempted, each with most\nvaried arguments. They are not always carried to a conclusion without\nintermixture, and with many thinkers there is interplay of one with\nanother.\n\nThe attempt to deduce devotion to the common welfare from egoism by\npsychological considerations is made in the most systematic way by\nDavid Hartley (1705-1757)_(_12_)_ and Dietrich von Holbach\n(1723-1789)._(_13_)_\n\nHartley, a theologian who betook himself to the practice of medicine,\nclaims to see in altruism a purposive ennoblement of original\nselfishness which comes into play under the influence of rational\nthought. The much-reviled Holbach ascribes its origin to the fact that\nthe individual, if he rightly understands his own interest, will\nalways form his conception of it in connection with the interest of\nsociety, and therefore direct his activities to the latter as well.\n\nBoth attempt to carry up their building, so far as it goes, with\nmaterialistic considerations and then to roof it with idealist ones.\nBut neither with the coarser nor with the finer considerations nor\nwith both together can the psychological derivation of altruism from\negoism produce any convincing result.\n\nThe coarser ones do not carry us very far. It is acknowledged, [pg\n073] of course, that the prosperity of society depends upon the moral\ndisposition of its members and that the better the moral condition of\nsociety the better is the individual\u2019s expectation of prosperity. But\nit does not follow that the individual becomes more moral, the better\nhe understands his own interests. The mutual relation between him and\nsociety is not of such a character that he derives benefit from the\nlatter just in proportion as he himself by his moral conduct helps to\nestablish its prosperity. If the majority of its members are with\nshort-sighted egoism intent only on their own good, then the man who\nacts with wider outlook makes sacrifices from which there is no\nprospect of gain for himself, even if the best happens and they are\nnot lost without benefiting the community. If, on the other hand,\nthrough the moral conduct of the majority of its members the condition\nof society is favourable, the individual profits by it even if he\nfails to behave towards it as morality demands. By conduct which\ndisregards both past and future, he will carve for himself an unduly\nbig share of personal prosperity out of the prosperity of the\ncommunity, milking the cow which the rest feed. The influence of the\nindividual on the prosperity of the community and the reaction of\nsocial prosperity on that of the individual do not stand in a simple\nrelation to each other which acts equally in both directions. The\nconsideration, therefore, that egoism, rightly understood, will oblige\nthe individual to resolve on activity which is directed to promoting\nthe common good, is a ship which sails well, but leaks.\n\nThe psychological derivation of altruism from egoism must, then, in\nsome way or other, make an appeal to the self-sacrifice of the\nindividual. This it does by inducing him to consider that in happiness\nthere is a spiritual element as well as a material. Man needs (it is\nsaid) not only external prosperity, but to be respected by others and\nto be satisfied with himself, and he can have this double experience\nonly when he concerns himself about the [pg 074] prosperity of others.\nEven Holbach, who tries to be inexorably matter-of-fact, lets these\nconsiderations speak loudly.\n\nThe attempt is made, therefore, above the prolonged bass note of the\nconception of happiness derived from ordinary egoism, to modulate into\nthe spiritualized conception of it.\n\nThe path which this attempt has to follow runs parallel to that which\nled the successors of Socrates into the abyss of the paradoxical. In\norder to get from egoism into altruism and so think out to a\nconclusion the ethic of the rationally-pleasurable, the Epicureans\nwished to use the same scale of values for spiritual and material\npleasure alike. The only result was that their ethic transformed\nitself into resignation. Now again, in modern times, and again for the\nsake of ethics, spiritual happiness is to be regarded as happiness in\nthe same way as material happiness is, and here again the result is a\nparadox.\n\nMaterial and spiritual happiness are not so related that the one can\nfind its continuation in the other. If the second is for the sake of\nethics called in with the first, it does not strengthen the first, but\nparalyses it. The man who does earnestly try to guide himself by the\nlight of spiritual as well as material happiness, ends by finding that\nthe recognition accorded him by his fellow-men, which at first seemed\nto him to make almost the whole of spiritual happiness, becomes more\nand more meaningless. It is to him a miserable lump of solder which\ndrops down between material and spiritual happiness without being able\nto fasten them together. More and more exclusively he experiences\nspiritual happiness as the condition in which he is at one with\nhimself and therefore can justifiably accord himself a certain amount\nof self-appreciation.\n\nSpiritual happiness is sufficient unto itself. Either the man is led\nto resolve on ethical conduct because he expects from it a moulding of\nthe outward circumstances of his being which will bring him profit and\npleasure; or he chooses it because he finds his happiness in obeying\nhis inner compulsion to ethical action. In the latter case he [pg 075]\nhas left far behind him all calculations about the interdependence of\nhis morality and his material happiness. The fact that he is a moral\nman is in itself his happiness, even though it land him in the most\ndisadvantageous situations.\n\nBut if spiritual happiness can never be welded into union with\nmaterial, it is useless trouble to try to depict altruism as an\nennobling of egoism.\n\nIf the ordinary conception of pleasure, that it may be brought into\nunion with ethics, is submitted to a process of refining, it ends by\nbeing refined away. In ancient ethics, in which the refining is done\nunder the influence of an ethical system which is definitely egoistic,\nit transforms itself into the pleasure of being without pleasure, and\nallows ethics to end in resignation. In modern ethics, in which the\npleasure to be refined is under the influence of altruism, it works\nitself up into an irrational and immaterialistic enthusiasm. In both\ncases there is the same paradoxical proceeding, only that in one case\nit goes in the negative direction, in the other in the positive.\n\nWhenever, then, thought wishes to conceive ethics as springing from\npleasure or happiness, it arrives at resignation or enthusiasm, at\nspiritualised egoistic or at spiritualised expansive conduct.\n\nThere is no way in which natural pleasure can, in really deep\nthinking, be brought into connexion with ethics.\n\nHobbes, Locke, Helvetius, Bentham\n\nThe explanation that altruism is a principle of action which the\nindividual takes over from society is to be found expressed in\ncharacteristic ways by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679),_(_14_)_ John Locke\n(1632-1704),_(_15_)_ Adrien Helvetius (1715-1771)_(_16_)_ and Jeremy\nBentham (1748-1832)._(_17_)_\n\n[pg 076]\n\nHobbes represents the State as commissioned and empowered by the\nmajority of the individual citizens to engage the whole body in action\nfor the common advantage. In this way alone, he asserts, is it\npossible to realise the common good in which the egoism of individuals\nfinds the highest possible degree of prosperity. Left to themselves,\nmen would never be able to get free from their short-sighted egoism,\nand would, therefore, miss prosperity. Their only possible course,\nthen, is to join in setting up an authority which will drive them into\naltruism.\n\nWith external means only, however, organized society cannot engage the\nindividual in all the activities which are needed for the common good.\nIt must strive to ensure its power over him by means of spiritual\nconviction as well. Locke takes this need into consideration.\nAccording to him it is God and society together who force altruism\nupon the individual by appealing at the same time to his egoism. These\ntwo authorities have, that is to say (as our reason enables us to\nrecognize), so ordered the course of things that actions beneficial to\nsociety are rewarded, and those injurious to it are punished. God has\nat his disposal rewards and punishments of endless duration. Society\nworks in two different ways: through the power given to it by the\ncriminal law, and through the law of public opinion in which it uses\npraise and blame as spiritual means of compulsion. Man being guided\nboth by pleasure and absence of it, he manages to accommodate himself\nto those rules which defend the general good so effectually, and he\nthereby becomes moral.\n\nIn spite of all their differences on single points, Hobbes and Locke\nagree in having this external conception of ethics. The essential\npoint of distinction between them is [pg 077] that with Hobbes society\nalone plies the whip, while with Locke God and society handle it\ntogether.\n\nHelvetius, who belonged to a family which had migrated from the\nPalatinate into France, is more refined and more inward. In his life\nas a farmer of taxes and a property-owner, he always tried, along with\nhis noble-minded wife, to act with kindness and justice as he explains\nthem in his book. It is clear to him that ethics means somehow or\nother enthusiastic action, that is, action which springs out of\nfeeling._(_18_)_ Society cannot, therefore, force these virtues into\nthe individual; it can only educate him into them, and it does in fact\napply all the means and devices which are at its disposal to influence\nhis egoism in their direction. Above all it makes good use of his\nstriving to win recognition and fame. The praise which it pours on\nthat which is \u201cgood\u201d in its own sense of the word is for the mass of\nmen the strongest inducement to take up work for its interests.\nHelvetius would perhaps have offered a less external conception of how\nethical action is realized, if he had not, with the best intentions,\ntaken so much trouble to depict morality as something which can be\ntaught.\n\nIn the view that morality is enthusiastic action to which the\nindividual is roused by society, Bentham agrees entirely with\nHelvetius, but he carries it through in a much deeper way. Out of the\n_Romanza_ he makes a hymn.\n\nThe part played by society in bringing morality into existence cannot,\naccording to Bentham, be emphasized too strongly. In vehement words he\nopposes the view that the human conscience can decide between good and\nevil. Nothing can be left to subjective feeling. Man is truly moral\nonly when he receives his ethics at the hand of society and works them\nout with ardour.\n\nBut if society is to decide about ethics, it must first bring order\ninto its own ethical views, and therefore, says Bentham, must learn to\ncombine clear and definite notions [pg 078] with its presentation of\nthe general good. That done, it must make up its mind to apply this\nprinciple with absolute consistency as a foundation for legislation\nand the establishment of ethical standards, excluding all\nconsiderations of a different character. A \u201cmoral arithmetic\u201d should\nbe constructed which allows the calculating in correct utility values\nof all decisions that have to be made.\n\nDealing in a dry, practical way with all cases of penal legislation,\nand of establishment of standards by the moral law, Bentham then shows\nthat the principle of the greatest good of the greatest number is\napplicable in all of them, and guides us safely and accurately in\nquestions of good and evil.\n\n\u201cMoral philosophy, in its general meaning, is the theory underlying\nthe art of so directing the actions of men that there is produced the\ngreatest possible amount of happiness.\u201d\n\nIt is legislation that decides what moral actions the community can\norder to be performed, and if it is to exert an educative influence it\nmust be humane through and through.\n\n\u201cBut there are many actions which, though useful to the community,\nlegislation may not command. There are even many injurious actions\nwhich it may not forbid, although moral philosophy does so.\nLegislation is, in a word, a circle with the same centre as moral\nphilosophy, but its circumference is smaller.\u201d\n\nWhen law ceases to be available, there is nothing that society can do\nexcept be continually putting before the individual personally how\ngreatly he contributes to his own welfare by furthering that of\nothers. Bentham does not make it do this with educative guile as does\nHelvetius. Society appeals to his feeling for truth. It throws itself\nat his feet and entreats him for the sake of the general welfare to\nlisten to the voice of reason. Thus the dry way in which Bentham\nwrites about ethics has in it something peculiarly impressive, and\nexplains the powerful influence which this [pg 079] eccentric member\nof the House which looks across the Park at Westminster has exercised\nall over the world through the individuals who were inspired by him.\n\nThe most influential parts of his work are those in which he\nintensifies the seriousness of men and sharpens their outlook by\nleading them to reflect not only on the immediate but also on the more\ndistant consequences of anything done or left undone, and, further,\nnot only on the material consequences but on the spiritual ones. It\ndoes one good to note the courage with which this fanatic for utility\nventures to represent material blessings as the foundation of\nspiritual ones.\n\nBentham is one of the most powerful moralists who have ever appeared\nin the world, but his mistakes are as great as his insight. The latter\nis shown in this, that he conceives morality as a kind of enthusiasm.\nHis mistake is that he thinks he must guarantee the rightness of this\nenthusiasm by making it nothing higher than a judgement of society\nwhich is taken over by the individual.\n\nThis compels us to rank Bentham with Hobbes, Locke, and Helvetius,\nalthough in other respects he stands high above them. He, like them,\nmakes morality arise outside the individual. He, like them, in order\nto find his explanation of the altruistic, puts out of action the\nethical personality which is in man, and, to compensate for this,\nraises society to an ethical personality that he may then by a\ntransmission of energy connect individuals with this central\npower-station. The difference is only that with the other commonplace\nmoralists the individual is a marionette directed by society on\nethical principles, whereas in Bentham he carries out with deep\nconviction the movements suggested to him.\n\nEthical thought falls from one paradox into another. If, as in\nantiquity, it thinks out a system in which the activity that must be\ndirected to the common good is not sufficiently represented, it\narrives at ethics which are no longer ethics, and ends in resignation.\nIf it assumes and starts from such an activity directed to the common\ngood, [pg 080] it arrives at an ethic in which there is no ethical\npersonality. It is, strange to say, unable to mark out the middle\ncourse and let an activity which is directed to the promotion of the\ncommon good spring out of the ethical personality itself.\n\nAltruism as a natural quality. Hume, Adam Smith\n\nThe explanations of altruism as an ennobling of egoism which has a\nspontaneous origin through the activity of reason, or which is brought\ninto existence through the influence of society, are obviously\nunsatisfying both psychologically and ethically. Utilitarianism must\ntherefore necessarily come to admit that altruism is somehow or other\ngiven independently in human nature side by side with egoism. It is\ntrue that it always appears there as the backward twin-brother who can\nbe reared only with the most careful nursing, and therefore the\nupholders of the third alternative given above appeal to the\nconsiderations used for the first two. They continually allow the\ncapacity for altruistic feeling to be exposed to the influence of\nconsiderations which seem calculated to let egoism discharge its\nwaters into altruism. The two first views are taken into service as\nwet-nurses for the third. David Hume (1711-1776)_(_19_)_ and Adam\nSmith (1723-1790)_(_20_)_ must be named here.\n\nHume agrees with the other utilitarians in allowing that the principle\nof seeking to promote the common good must be accepted as the dominant\nprinciple of morality. Whether actions are good or bad is decided\nsolely by whether they are directed towards the production of general\nhappiness [pg 081] or not. There is nothing which is in itself ethical\nor unethical.\n\nTo the idea that ethics can have as their object the self-perfecting\nof the individual as little weight is given by Hume as by the other\nutilitarians. Like them, he opposes asceticism and other life-denying\ndemands of Christian ethics, because he cannot discover in them\nanything profitable for the general welfare.\n\nBut what makes men decide to work together for the common good?\nConsistent utilitarians answer: Reflexion about what the common good\nmeans. Of this one-sidedness Hume is not guilty, because he does not\nfind it to be in accord with psychological facts. It is not out of\nhigh-minded reflexion, he asserts, but out of direct sympathy that the\nemotions and actions of benevolence arise. The virtues which serve the\ncommon good have their origin in feeling. We can resolve on acts of\nlove only because there is in us an elementary feeling for the\nhappiness of men, and a dislike of seeing them in misery. We become\nmoral through sympathy.\n\nIt would not have been a big step further to explain this sympathy as\na form of the egoistic need of happiness, more or less through the\nassumption that in order to be really happy a man must see happiness\nall round him. But Hume does not use such roads as that. He does not\naim at constructive thought but at stating facts, and it is enough for\nhim that direct sympathy with other men be proved to be a principle\ninherent in human nature. We have to stop somewhere or other, he says\nin one place, in our search for causes. In every science there are\ncertain general principles beyond which there is no more general\nprinciple still for us to discover.\n\nAmong the elements which are effective in developing moral feeling,\nHume attributes great importance to the love of fame. This keeps us\nconsidering ourselves in the light in which we wish to appear in the\neyes of others, for the effort to secure the respect of others is a\npotent educator in virtue. On this point he thinks like Frederick the\nGreat, from whom comes the sentence: \u201cThe love of fame [pg 082] is\ninnate in noble souls; you have only to arouse it and urge it on, and\nmen who till then merely vegetated, will seem to you, when explained\nby this happy instinct, to be changed into demi-gods.\u201d_(_21_)_\n\nAdam Smith wishes to trace out the idea of sympathy in all its\nmanifestations, and in doing so he discovers that our capacity for\nsympathy covers more than participation in the weal or woe of others.\nIt brings us, he says, to a community of thought with those who are\ndoing something. We feel ourselves directly attracted or repelled by\nthe actions of others and the motives at the back of them. Our ethics\nare the product of these sympathetic experiences. We come in time to\ntake care that an impartial third party can justify and sympathise\nwith the mainspring and the tendency of our actions. Innate sympathy\nnot only with the actions but also with the experience of others is\nthus the beneficent regulator of the behaviour of men to one another.\nThis feeling God has implanted in human nature that it may keep men\nfaithful to work for the common good.\n\nHow far this somewhat artificial extension of the notion of sympathy\nthrough the doctrine of the impartial third party really means a step\nforward beyond Hume we may leave undiscussed.\n\nIn his famous work, _An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the\nWealth of Nations_ (1776), Adam Smith founds this prosperity purely\nupon the entirely free and intelligent activity of egoism. About the\npart to be played by ethics in economic questions he says nothing.\nEconomic development he leaves to be determined by its own internal\nlaws, and is confident that, if these are left a free course, the\nresult will be favourable. Adam Smith, the moral philosopher, is also,\nbecause he is endowed with a rationalistic optimism, the founder of\nthe _laissez-faire_ form of economic [pg 083] doctrine, that of the\nManchester school, as it is called. He led industry and commerce in\ntheir struggle for liberation from the petty and injurious tutelage of\nauthority. To-day, when economic life among all peoples is again\ndelivered over to the most short-sighted ideas of authorities who\nnever think in terms of economics, we can measure the greatness of his\nperformance.\n\nLike Adam Smith, Bentham also is an adherent of the principle of\nfreedom in economic life. At the same time he has an ethical\nconception of society, and demands from it that in a spirit of\nprogress it shall help to level out as far as possible the differences\nbetween rich and poor.\n\nWhat, then, do Hume and Adam Smith mean for ethics? They introduce\ninto the treatment of them the element of empirical psychology. They\nbelieve that through the value they give to the significance of\nsympathy they are giving a natural foundation to utilitarianism,\nthough in reality this psychology begins to correct it and to\nundermine its position. There hovers before the mind of utilitarianism\nthe great conception that ethics are a result of reflexion. It thinks\nto make men moral by keeping their attention fixed on the deep nature\nof ethics and the necessity of the ends at which it aims.\n\nThis conception draws its life from the conviction that thought has\nbeen given complete control over the will. The absolute rationality of\nthe ethical is the foundation on which it builds, and if it is not to\nget quite bewildered about its own nature, it cannot allow itself to\nrecognize as presuppositions of the ethical, facts which are given it\nby psychology and cannot be verified independently.\n\nWith Hume and Adam Smith, who trace ethics back to something given in\nhuman nature which resembles instinct, there crops up the problem how\nethics can be something natural, and at the same time something\nsubordinate to thought, for that they are subordinate to thought has\nto be assumed even by the champions of this psychological\nutilitarianism. If they were nothing but the exercise of an instinct,\nthey would not be capable of widening and [pg 084] deepening, nor\ncould they be imparted to all and sundry with convincing force. Yet\nhow is it conceivable that thought influences the sympathetic\ninstinct? What have the two in common that the work of one can be\ncarried further by the other?\n\nIf Hume and Adam Smith had suspected the far-reaching character of\nthis great problem of ethics which they brought into the field of\ndiscussion, they would have had to go on and settle the extent and the\ndepth of this sympathy which they adopted in their scheme, in order to\nunderstand how it continues to function in the domain of thought.\n\nBut they fail to notice the far-reaching character of what they lay\ndown, and believe they have done nothing but give by means of\npsychology an explanation of altruism which is superior to these\ncurrents. The spirit of the time, in its wonderful capacity for\nholding various ideas side by side, takes possession of their view,\nand the popular utilitarianism now confidently appeals to it as\ndeclaring that altruism is to be conceived as a rational ennobling of\negoism, as a result of the influence of society, and in addition as a\nmanifestation of a natural instinct.\n\nIt is, really, only in appearance that the psychological conception of\nethics imparts new life to utilitarianism. It is rather a consumption\ngerm which the latter absorbs. The establishment of a natural element\nin ethics, when the consequences of it begin to make themselves felt,\ncan only end in its devouring rationalist utilitarianism, as becomes\nevident in the nineteenth century when biological thought becomes\ninfluential in ethics. The funeral procession of rationalist\nutilitarianism begins to assemble with Hume and Adam Smith, though it\nis a long time before the coffin is taken to the cemetery.\n\nThe English ethic of self-perfecting\n\nAgainst the utilitarians, who would derive from the content of the\nmoral the essential nature of it, and the [pg 085] obligation to\nmorality, the \u201cIntellectualists\u201d and the \u201cIntuitionists\u201d enter the\nlists. The empirical derivation of ethics seems to them to be an\nendangering of the majesty of the moral. Morality\u2014this is the thought\nbefore their minds\u2014is a striving after perfection, and this develops\nitself in us because it is implanted in us by nature. Action for the\ncommon advantage does not by any means constitute ethics; it is only a\nmanifestation of the struggle after self-perfecting.\n\nTo this deeper and more comprehensive conception of ethics, however,\nthe Intellectualists and Intuitionists do not give correct expression.\nFor that they are still too much entangled in a lifeless and\nsemi-scholastic philosophizing.\n\nTheir chief strength lies in their showing up of the weaknesses of the\nfoundation which Hobbes and Locke give to ethics, and to these they\nprincipally devote themselves, bringing to their task a great deal\nthat is correct about the directly and absolutely binding character of\nthe moral law. That the meaning of the moral is not to be found merely\nin the useful character of the actions inspired by it but also in the\nself-perfecting of the agent which is effected by them, and that\nmorality presupposes a moral personality, is emphasized by them in\nmany happy turns of expression.\n\nWhen, however, the task before them is to describe exactly in what way\nmen carry in them the idea of the good as a force which works\neffectively upon their character, the Intellectualists and the\nIntuitionists land themselves in a psychologizing which is sometimes\ningenious, but often artificial and commonplace. They occupy\nthemselves with logical distinctions instead of investigating in a\npractical fashion the nature of man. Instead of really developing the\nproblem in answer to the innovators, they work at it with data taken\nfrom an out-of-date philosophy. They hark back largely to Plato, and\nagain they argue largely, anxiously or unconsciously, not as\nphilosophers, but as theologians.\n\nOn individual points they diverge from each other, and [pg 086] attack\neach other\u2019s positions according as they would have the foundations of\nthe ethical more intellectualist, or more sentimental and mystical, or\nmore theological.\n\nThe majority of these anti-utilitarians belong to the Cambridge\nPlatonizing school. We must name here Ralph Cudworth\n(1617-1688),_(_22_)_ Henry More (1614-1687),_(_23_)_ the Rev. Samuel\nClarke (1675-1729),_(_24_)_ Bishop Richard Cumberland\n(1632-1718),_(_25_)_ and William Wollaston (1659-1724)._(_26_)_\n\nAccording to Cudworth the truths of morality are just as evident as\nthese of mathematics. For More the ethical is an intellectual power of\nthe soul meant for the control of natural impulses. Cumberland finds\nthe moral law given in the reason which has been bestowed upon man by\nGod. Clarke, living in the thought world of Isaac Newton, sees it as\nthe spiritual phenomenon which corresponds to the law of nature.\nWollaston defines it as that which is logically right.\n\nPressed back to their fundamental meaning, these thinkers do nothing\nbut amplify the statement that the ethical is ethical. They assert\nthat the utilitarian view of ethics is pitched too low, but they do\nnot succeed in establishing, in contrast to it, a more exalted\nprinciple in such a way that a higher and more comprehensive content\nof ethics can be derived from it. As to content their ethic does not\nreally differ from that of the utilitarians. It merely lacks the great\nenthusiastic driving-force which shows itself in the latter. To\nestablish a living ethic of self-perfecting is beyond the capacity of\nthe Intellectualists and the Intuitionists.\n\nWhat is the inner connexion between the struggle for self-perfecting\nand action for the common advantage? That [pg 087] is the weighty\nquestion of ethics which crops up in the settlement of differences\nbetween the utilitarians and their conservative opponents. At first it\nremains veiled, and it does not come to clear expression till we reach\nKant.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nA peculiar position in the ethical thought of the eighteenth century\nis held by Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury\n(1671-1713)._(_27_)_ He opposes not only the utilitarians, but the\nIntellectualists and the Intuitionists as well, and tries to secure a\nmediating position between them. That the content of ethics is\nutilitarian he openly admits, but he derives the ethical neither from\nconsiderations of usefulness nor from the intellect; he places its\norigin in feeling. At the same time he emphasizes, as does Adam Smith\nalso a few years later, its relationship to the \u00e6sthetic.\n\nBut the important thing is that he puts forward a living philosophy of\nnature which connects itself with ethics. He is convinced that harmony\nreigns in the universe and that man is meant to experience this\nharmony in himself. \u00c6sthetic feeling and ethical thinking are for him\nforms of a growing union with the divine life, which struggles to find\nexpression in the spiritual being of man as it does in nature.\n\nWith Shaftesbury ethics descend from a rocky mountain range into a\nluxuriant plain. The utilitarians know as yet nothing of a world.\nTheir ethic is contained in considerations about the relation of the\nindividual to society. The anti-utilitarians have some idea of a\nworld, but not a correct one. They elaborate ethics with a formal\ntheology and a formal philosophizing about the All, but Shaftesbury\nplants ethical thought in the universe of reality, which he himself\ncontemplates through an idealising optimism, reaching thereby a direct\nand universal notion of the moral.\n\n[pg 088]\n\nA mysticism based on a philosophy of nature begins to spin its magic\nthreads through European thought. The spirit of the Renaissance rules\nagain, no longer, however, like a raging storm, as in Giordano Bruno,\nbut as a gentle breeze. Shaftesbury thinks pantheistically, more\npantheistically than he confesses to himself, but his is not a\npantheism which throws his age into struggles about world-views, and\ncomes into conflict with theism. It is the pantheism which rules in\nHinduism and in Late Stoicism also; one which is not dangerous, and\nraises no question of principle, desiring only to be regarded as a\nvivifying of belief in God.\n\nShaftesbury exerts also a liberating influence on the spiritual life\nof his time by giving ethics a much freer attitude towards religion\nthan anyone had ventured to do up to that time. Religion, according to\nhim, has not to give decisions about ethics, but on the contrary must\ntest its own claims to be true by its relation to pure ethical ideas.\nHe even ventures to represent the Christian teaching about rewards and\npunishment as not consistent with pure ethical considerations.\nMorality, he says, is pure, only when good has been done simply\nbecause it is good.\n\nHis optimistic-ethical philosophy of nature is offered by Shaftesbury\nonly as a sketch. He throws out his ideas without proving that they\nare well founded, and without feeling any necessity for thinking them\nout to a conclusion. He steps with an easy stride across all problems.\nWhat a difference between his philosophy of nature and Spinoza\u2019s! Yet\nhis meets the needs of his time. He offers what is new to it, and what\ninspires it: ethics bound up with a living world-view.\n\nThe belief in progress now clothes itself in a living world-view which\nreally suits it. This is the process which, thanks to Shaftesbury,\nbegan in the first decades of the eighteenth century and went on\ndeveloping till the end of it. Hence the appearance of his writings,\nwhich were immediately spread abroad through the whole of Europe, [pg\n089] is the great event for the spiritual life of the eighteenth\ncentury. Voltaire, Diderot, Lessing, Condorcet, Moses Mendelssohn,\nWieland, Herder, and Goethe too, are under his influence, and he\ndominates popular thought completely. Hardly ever has any man had so\ndirect and so powerful an influence on the formation of the world-view\nof his time as the invalid whose life ended at Naples when he was only\nforty-two.\n\nDirect continuators of Shaftesbury\u2019s ethic are found in Francis\nHutcheson (1694-1747)_(_28_)_ and Bishop Joseph Butler\n(1692-1752),_(_29_)_ but they take from it just that soft\nindefiniteness which gives it its charm and its strength. Hutcheson,\nwho strongly emphasizes theology\u2019s independence of ethics, the\nrelationship of the latter to the \u00e6sthetic, and their utilitarian\ncontent, stands nearer to his teacher than does Butler, who does not\ngo as far in his welcome of utilitarianism, and also opposes, from the\nChristian standpoint, the optimism of Shaftesbury\u2019s world-view.\n\nBut Shaftesbury\u2019s true successor is J. G. Herder (1744-1803). In his\n_Ideas on the Philosophy of Human History_ (4 vols., 1784-1791), he\ncarries the optimistic-ethical nature-philosophy on into a\ncorresponding philosophy of history.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 090]\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nLAYING THE FOUNDATIONS OF CIVILIZATION IN THE AGE OF RATIONALISM\n\n\nThe Mentality and the Achievements of the Ethical Belief in Progress\n\nTHANKS to the fully worked out optimistic-ethical world-view with\nwhich the belief in progress surrounds itself in the course of the\neighteenth century, these generations prove capable of thinking out\nthe ideals of civilization and advancing towards their realization.\nThe fact that all attempts to give ethics a foundation in reason have\nturned out on the whole unsatisfactory does not move them, if indeed\nthey give the point any consideration at all. By the conviction that\nthey have formed a rational conception of the world which gives it an\noptimistic-ethical meaning, they are carried on over all the inner\nproblems of ethics. The alliance which belief-in-progress and ethics\nhave in the course of modern times contracted with one another is\nsealed by means of their world-view, and now they set to work\ntogether. Rational ideals are to be realized.\n\nThe ethical and the optimistic come into power, therefore, in the\nworld-view of the eighteenth century, although they have not yet\nreceived any real foundation. Scepticism and materialism range around\nthe fortress like hordes of unconquered enemies, though at first\nwithout being dangerous; as a rule they have themselves absorbed no\nsmall amount of belief-in-progress and of ethical enthusiasm. Voltaire\nis an example of the sceptic who stands under the restraint exercised\nby the prevalent optimistic and ethical thought.\n\nSo far as its elements are concerned the world-view of rationalism\nhides itself under the optimistic-ethical monism [pg 091] of Kungtse\n(Confucius) and the Later Stoics, but the enthusiasm which supports it\nis incomparably stronger than any felt by them. The circumstances,\ntoo, amid which it appears are far more favourable, and so it becomes\nan elemental power throughout a whole people.\n\nIn a world-view which springs from a noble faith, but is remarkable\nalso for the extent of its knowledge, the men of the eighteenth\ncentury begin to think out ideals of civilization and to realise them\nin such measure that the greatest epoch in the history of human\ncivilization now dawns.\n\nThe great feature of the mentality of this belief in progress which is\never showing itself in works is its magnificent want of respect for\nall existing things, whether belonging to the past or the present.\nThese are to it in all their various forms the imperfect, which is\ndestined to be replaced by a perfect.\n\nThe eighteenth century is thoroughly unhistoric. In what is good as in\nwhat is bad it cuts itself loose from whatever was or is, and is\nconfident of being able to put in its place something that is more\nvaluable, because more ethical or more in accordance with reason. In\nthis conviction the age feels itself so creative that it has no\nunderstanding for creations of original genius. Gothic buildings,\nearly painting, J. S. Bach\u2019s music, and the poetry of earlier ages,\nare felt by these generations as art which was produced at a time when\ntaste had not yet been purified. Activity which follows rules in\naccordance with right reason will, they think, introduce a new art\nwhich will be superior in every respect to any that has preceded it.\nFull of this self-confidence, a mediocre musician like Zelter in\nBerlin works over the scores of Bach\u2019s Cantatas. Full of this\nself-confidence, honourable poetasters re-write the texts of the\nwonderful old German chorales and replace the originals in the hymn\nbooks with their own wretched productions.\n\nThat they so na\u00efvely push forward right into the sphere [pg 092] of\nart the boundaries of the creative faculties with which nature endowed\nthem is a mistake made by these men for which they have often been\nlaughed at. But mockery cannot do them much harm. In those departments\nof life in which the important matter is the shaping of things\naccording to ideals given by reason\u2014and work done upon such things\nmeans for the establishment of civilization very much more than any\nwork spent in the promotion of art\u2014they are as creative as any\ngeneration ever has been, and as scarcely any will be in the future.\nThey are frightened by nothing which has to be undertaken in this\nsphere, and in every department they make the most astonishing\nadvance.\n\nThey venture also to deal with religion. That religion should be split\nup into various antagonistic confessional bodies is to them an offence\nagainst reasonable reflexion. Only a relative, not any absolute\nauthority, they maintain, can be allowed to the belief which is handed\ndown in historical formulas. Finding expression in so many and such\nvaried forms it can, of course, be nothing but a more or less\nimperfect embodiment of the ethical religion taught by reason, which\nmust be equally intelligible to all men. The right thing is,\ntherefore, to strive after the religion of reason, and to accept as\ntrue only such parts of the various confessions as are in harmony with\nit.\n\nThe churches, naturally, put themselves on the defensive against this\nspirit, but against the strong general convictions of the age they are\nunable in the long run to hold out. Protestantism succumbs first,\nbecause the elements already within it allow such considerations to\nfind easy access. It carries within itself impulses to rationalism,\ninherited from Humanism, from Huldreich Zwingli (1484-1531) and from\nthe Italians L\u00e6lius (1525-1562) and Faustus Socinus (1539-1604), and\nthese impulses, hitherto suppressed, now find themselves set\nfree._(_30_)_\n\n[pg 093]\n\nCatholicism shows itself more capable of resistance. Nothing in its\npast makes it inclined to enlist under the banner of the spirit of the\nage: its strong organization serves as a protection against this. Yet\nit, too, has to yield considerably, and to allow its doctrines to\npass, so far as may be, for a symbolic expression of the religion of\nreason.\n\nWhile utilitarian ethics are on the whole the product of the English\nspirit, the whole of Europe takes part in the expounding of the\nreligion of reason. Herbert of Cherbury (1582-1648), John Toland\n(1669-1722), Anthony Collins (1676-1729), Matthew Tindal (1655-1733),\nDavid Hume (1711-1776), Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), Jean-Jacques\nRousseau (1712-1778), Voltaire (1694-1778), Denis Diderot (1713-1784),\nHermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz\n(1646-1716), Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Gotthold Ephraim Lessing\n(1729-1781), Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), and a host of others,\nwhether standing nearer to or further from the Church, and whether or\nnot going further than others in systematic criticism, all bring\nstones for the erection of the great building in which the piety of\nilluminated mankind is to live._(_31_)_ The researches in the history\nof religion made by the Germans, like Johann Salomo Semler\n(1725-1791), Johann David Michaelis (1717-1791), and Johann August\nErnesti (1707-1781), provide scientific data which throw light upon\nthe division between eternal truths and the time-conditioned\nconvictions of religion.\n\nThe creed of the religion of reason is simply the optimistic-ethical\nworld-view reproduced in a Christian phraseology, that is in one\npreserving within it the Christian theism, and the belief in\nimmortality. An all-wise and wholly benevolent Creator has produced\nthe world, and he upholds it in [pg 094] corresponding fashion. Men\nare endowed with free will, and discover in their reason and their\nheart the moral law which is meant to lead individuals and mankind to\nperfection, and to accomplish in the world God\u2019s highest purposes.\nEvery man has within him an indestructible soul, which feels his moral\nlife as the highest happiness, and after death enters a state of a\npure, spiritual existence.\n\nThis belief in God, in virtue, and in immortality was held to have\nbeen taught in its purest form in previous ages in the teaching of\nJesus, but it was acknowledged that elements of the same beliefs were\nto be found in all the higher religions._(_32_)_\n\nIf the eighteenth century attained to an optimistic-ethical world-view\nwhich preached itself so confidently and was so widely accepted, the\nreason is that it was able to re-interpret Christianity\u2014which had by\nthat time got rid of the world- and life-denial that was originally\ninherent in it\u2014in that sense. Jesus was to it a teacher who even in\nhis own age and then through all the intervening centuries had been\nmisunderstood, and was now first rightly accepted as a revealer of the\nreligion of reason. Let anyone read a rationalistic Life of Jesus,\nsuch as those of Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1753-1812) or Karl Heinrich\nVenturini (1768-1849)._(_33_)_ They hold Jesus up to admiration as the\nchampion of enlightenment and of blessings for the common people. This\ntransformation of the historical picture is made easier for them by\nthe fact that the chief component element of the Gospel narrative is\nethical teaching, while the late-Jewish pessimistic world-view which\nit presupposes is hardly more than hinted at.\n\n[pg 095]\n\nAs an immediate result of the wiping out of confessional differences\nthe middle of the eighteenth century sees the beginning of a period of\ntolerance in place of the persecution of all rejecters of orthodoxy\nwhich had been common till then. The last serious act of confessional\nintolerance was expulsion of all evangelicals from the Salzburg\ndistrict by the Archbishop of that town, Count von Firmian, in the\nyears 1731 and 1732.\n\nAbout the middle of the century there begins also the movement of\nopposition to the Jesuits, who were recognized as the enemies of\ntolerance, and this led to the suppression of the order in 1773 by\nPope Clement XIV._(_34_)_\n\nBut the religion of reason fought superstition as well as intolerance.\nIn 1704 the philosopher and jurist of Halle, Christian Thomasius\n(1655-1728), published his essays condemning trial for\nwitchcraft,_(_35_)_ and about the middle of the century the law courts\nin most of the States of Europe refused to concern themselves any\nlonger with the crime of magic. The last death sentence on a witch was\npassed in 1782 at Glarus, in Switzerland.\n\nAbout the end of the century it became good form to detest anything\nwhich had even a remote connexion with superstitious convictions.\n\nAgain, the will-to-progress of the eighteenth century deals with\nnationalist prejudices in the same way as it deals with religious\nones. Above and beyond individual nations it points to mankind as the\ngreat object towards which ideals are to be directed. Educated people\naccustom themselves to see in the State not so much an organ of\nnational feeling as a mere organization for legal and economic\npurposes. Cabinets may carry on war with each other, but in the\nthought of the common people there grows up a recognition of the\nbrotherhood of nations.\n\nIn the sphere of law, too, the will-to-progress acquires [pg 096]\nstrength. The ideas of Hugo Grotius get accepted. The law of reason is\nexalted in the convictions of the men of the eighteenth century to a\nposition above all traditional maxims of jurisprudence. It alone is\nallowed to have permanent authority, and legal decisions have to be in\nharmony with it. Fundamental principles of law, but principles equally\nindisputable everywhere, have to be deduced from human nature. To\nprotect these and to ensure to every human being a human value with an\ninviolable measure of freedom of which he can never be robbed, is the\nfirst task of the State. The proclamation of \u201cthe Rights of Man\u201d by\nthe States of North America, and the French Revolution, do no more\nthan give recognition and sanction to what, in the convictions of the\ntime, had already been won.\n\nThe first State in which torture was abolished was Prussia, and this\nwas secured by an administrative order of Frederick the Great\u2019s in\n1740. In France a certain amount of torture was practised down to the\nRevolution\u2014 and somewhat later, for the thumb-screw was used under the\nDirectory during the examination which the royalist conspirators had\nto undergo._(_36_)_\n\nSide by side with the fight against absence of law and the existence\nof inhuman laws, go efforts to adapt law to circumstances. Bentham\nraises his voice against laws which tolerate usury, against senseless\ncustoms duties, and against inhuman methods of colonization.\n\nThere dawns an age in which the purposive and the moral are the ruling\nauthorities. Officialdom acquires during these generations familiarity\nwith the notions of duty and honour, which later become natural to it.\nFar-reaching beneficial reforms are introduced into administration\nwithout any outcry.\n\nThe education of mankind in citizenship makes splendid progress. The\ngeneral good becomes the criterion of [pg 097] excellence both for the\ncommands of rulers and the obedience of their subjects, while at the\nsame time a beginning is made of securing that everyone shall be\neducated in a manner corresponding to his human dignity and the needs\nof his personal welfare. The war against ignorance is begun.\n\nThe way is prepared, too, for a more rational method of living. Houses\nare built so as to be more comfortable, and the land is better\ncultivated. Even the pulpit uses its influence to promote improvements\nof this kind. The theory that reason has been given to man to be used\nconsistently and in every department of life plays at this time an\nimportant and beneficent part in the preaching of the Gospel, even if\nthe way in which this is done often makes queer demands on our belief.\nSermons, for example, often treated incidentally of the best methods\nof manuring, irrigating, and draining the fields. That Jenner\u2019s\ndiscovery of vaccination was so readily adopted in many districts was\ndue to the enlightenment which was spread abroad by the clergy.\n\nCharacteristic of the age of rationalism are the private societies\nformed to promote the moral and utilitarian progress of mankind. In\n1717 members of the higher ranks of society in London reorganize as\n\u201cThe Order of Freemasons\u201d the brotherhood which in earlier times had\nbeen built up by the union in a single body of the members of the\nmedi\u00e6val building-lodges, but was now in a state of decay, and to this\nnew organization was assigned the duty of labouring to build up a new\nhumanity. About the middle of the century this order had spread all\nover Europe, and reached the zenith of its success. Princes,\nofficials, and intellectuals alike joined it in great numbers, and\nwere inspired by it to the achievement of a huge amount of reform.\n\nSimilar aims were pursued by the \u201cOrder of the Illuminate\u201d (or\nenlightened) which was founded in Bavaria in 1776, but was suppressed\nin 1784 by the reactionary Bavarian Government, which was still under\nthe influence [pg 098] of the Jesuits. It is said to have been the\nintellectual counterpart of the Jesuit order, on the model of whose\norganization it was formed.\n\nThat private societies aiming at the rational and moral perfecting of\nmankind should work effectively seemed to the men of the eighteenth\ncentury so much a matter of course that they assumed them to have\nexisted in earlier times. In a series of rationalist descriptions of\nthe life of Jesus it is assumed that the sect of the Essenes, near the\nDead Sea, of whom we learn from Josephus, the Jewish writer of the\nfirst century A.D., was such an order, and that it was in touch with\nsimilar brotherhoods in Egypt and India. Jesus, it is said, was\ntrained by them, and then helped by them to carry through the _r\u00f4le_\nof the Messiah, in order that with the authority given by a holy yet\npopular personality he might work to spread true illumination. The\nfamous _Life of Jesus_ by Karl Venturini carries this assumption out\nin complete detail. According to him, the miracles of Jesus were\nstaged by brothers of this secret association.\n\nBe that as it may, the fact that the will-to-progress of the\neighteenth century created for itself in these private societies\norganizations which spread throughout Europe, contributed much to its\nability to influence the age.\n\nIt must be admitted indeed that the men of the rationalistic period\nwere smaller than their achievements. True, they all possessed\npersonality, but it did not reach very deep. It was produced by the\nenthusiasm which they found in the mentality of the time and which\nthey shared with all their contemporaries. The individual imbibed\npersonality through the taking over of a ready-made world-view, which\ngave him firm standing-ground together with ideals. His own\ncontribution was really nothing more than the capacity for enthusiasm.\nThat is why the men of this age are so remarkably like one another.\nThey all graze side by side in the same nourishing pasture land.\n\nNevertheless, the ideas of the purposive and the ethical [pg 099] have\nnever exercised so much influence over reality as they did among these\nmen of shallow optimism and sensitive morale. No book has been written\nyet which fully describes their achievements, doing justice to their\norigin, their character, their number, and their significance. We can\nthen only really comprehend what they accomplished when we recognize\nthe tragic fact that the most valuable part of it is lost to us, while\nwe do not feel in ourselves any ability to reproduce it. They were\nmasters of the facts of life to an extent which we are to-day quite\nunable to realize.\n\nOnly a world-view which accomplishes all that rationalism did has a\nright to condemn rationalism. The greatness of that philosophy is that\nits hands are blistered.\n\nObstacles to the reform movement. The French Revolution\n\nThe great work of reform is never completed, partly because external\ncircumstances arise which check it, but also because the world-view of\nrationalism becomes convulsed from within. In its confidence in the\nenlightening power of all that is in accordance with reason the\nwill-to-progress was inclined to underestimate the resisting power of\nthe traditional, and to wish to carry through reforms where minds had\nnot been sufficiently prepared for their reception. On these\nunsuccessful advances followed reaction which permanently injured the\nwork. This was the case in south-eastern Europe. Joseph II. of\nAustria, who was emperor from 1764 to 1790, is the type of the\nreforming prince. He discontinued the use of torture, opposed the\ninfliction of the death penalty, abolished serfdom, gave the Jews full\ncivic rights, introduced a new method of legislation and a new system\nof legal administration, took away all class privileges, contended for\nthe equality of all before the law, protected the oppressed, founded\nschools and hospitals, guaranteed the freedom of the Press and freedom\nof domicile, abolished all State monopolies, and promoted the\ndevelopment of agriculture and industry.\n\n[pg 100]\n\nBut he is a ruler in the wrong place. He decrees these reforms and\nthen similar shocks, one after another, in countries which, being in\nspiritual things still wholly under the dominion of the Catholic\nChurch of that time, are not prepared for them, and moreover in other\nthings as well display a specially backward attitude, because they\nbelong to the zone in which the Europe of that day passed over into\nAsia. The Emperor is therefore unable to count upon either any\nwillingness to make sacrifices in the classes which are to give up\ntheir privileges, or upon any understanding of his ideas in the common\npeople. In his attempts to organize the monarchy as a unity and in an\neffective way for practical purposes, he comes into conflict with the\nnationalities themselves of which it is composed. The reduction in the\nnumber of the religious houses, which he undertakes out of economic\nconsiderations, with the introduction of the freedom of the Press and\nof a system of State education, bring on him the hostility of the\nChurch. Finally, because he is a ruler in the wrong place, this noble\nreforming emperor dies of a broken heart, while Europe, because the\nwill-to-progress in Austria can accomplish nothing even at the time of\nits greatest strength, owing to unfavourable circumstances, is\ncondemned to a period of the deepest misery over the problems of that\nhuge State, which have in this way been rendered insoluble, and over\nthe portion of Asia beyond it along the southern Danube.\n\nIn France, too, the wrong men are in control. There the spread of the\nnew ideas prepares the way splendidly for reform, but the reforms are\nnot undertaken, because its rulers cannot understand the signs of the\ntimes, and allow the State to collapse in ruin. Consequently the\nreform movement has to take the road of violence, whereby it slips\naway from the guidance of the educated, and falls into the hands of\nthe mob, from which it is taken by the powerful genius of Napoleon.\nNative of an island in which the Europe of that day passed over into\nAfrica, and lacking all [pg 101] deeper education, he is uninfluenced\nby the valuable convictions of his time. Guided solely by the force of\nhis own personality, he decides what is to happen in Europe, and hurls\nit into wars through which it sinks into misery. Thus from East and\nfrom West alike disaster overtakes the work of the will-to-progress.\n\nThe French Revolution is a snowstorm falling upon trees in blossom. A\ntransformation which promises great things is in progress, but\neverywhere softly and slowly. Extraordinarily valuable results are\nbeing prepared in the thoughts of men. Provided that circumstances\nremain even tolerably near the normal, there stands before humanity in\nEurope an extraordinarily desirable development. But in place of that\nthere sets in a chaotic period of history in which the\nwill-to-progress has to cease more or less completely from its work,\nand becomes a bewildered spectator. The first stage of the advance of\nreforming thought, thought bent with full consciousness of its aims on\nsecuring the practical and the ethical, comes to a complete stop.\n\nAn experience for which it was in no wise prepared now falls to the\nlot of the will-to-progress. Up to this time it had always been a more\nor less obsolescent reality with which it had had to come to terms. In\nthe French Revolution, however, and in the following period, it\nbecomes familiar with a reality which has at its disposal elemental\nforces. Up to this time the only factor to be reckoned with had been\nthe force of originality exercised by rational thought. In Napoleon it\nhas to learn to recognize as power a personality with creative genius\nof its own.\n\nBy his reorganization of France, a magnificent work but concerned only\nwith the technical matters of administration, Napoleon creates a new\nState. His work, too, has had the way prepared for it by the labour of\nrationalism, so far as this upset the equilibrium of the old and made\ncurrent the idea of something new but necessary. But the new State\nwhich now comes into existence is not the State [pg 102] which is\nethical and in harmony with reason, but merely the State which works\nwell. Its achievements compel our admiration. In the nursery garden\nwhich the will-to-progress was laying out in order to plant it with\nnoble flowers an individual ploughs for himself a piece of ordinary\narable land which at once produces an excellent crop. With the\nelemental creative forces of reality revealing their power in so\nimposing a fashion, the noble but unoriginal spirit of the age, with\nall its higher aims, finds itself in a state of instability from which\nit never completely recovers. Hegel, who saw Napoleon ride past after\nthe Battle of Jena, tells us that he then saw the World-spirit on\nhorseback. In these words we can hear all the confused spiritual\nexperience of that time expressing itself.\n\nThe undermining of the rationalistic world-view\n\nThere now sets in a development which works against the spirit of the\ntimes, and the hitherto unopposed authority of the rational ideal is\nundermined. Forces in reality which are not guided by it, obtain\nrecognition.\n\nWhile the will-to-progress remains an amazed spectator of events,\nrespect for what is historical recovers itself, though it seemed to\nhave been banished for ever. In religion, in art, and in law, men\nbegin, though at first only quite shyly, to look again with other eyes\non the traditional. It is no longer reckoned as merely something which\nis to be replaced, but men venture to admit to themselves that it\nconceals within itself original values. The forces of reality, which\nhad been taken by surprise, now begin everywhere to act on the\ndefensive, and a guerilla warfare develops against the\nwill-to-progress.\n\nThe various religious bodies revoke the abdications which they had\nmade before the religion of reason. The law which has grown up in the\ncourse of time begins to set itself in opposition to the law laid down\nby reason. In the atmosphere of passion produced by the Napoleonic\nwars, [pg 103] national thought takes on a new character, directing on\nitself, and beginning to absorb, the universal enthusiasm for ideals.\nThe struggles carried on no longer by chancelleries but by whole\nnations are fatal to the ideals of cosmopolitanism and national\nbrotherhood, and by this awakening of national thought a whole series\nof political problems affecting the whole of Europe are rendered\ninsoluble. Just as the organization of Austria as a unified modern\nState has now become impossible, so also has the civilizing of Russia,\nand the destiny of Europe, viz. to be shipwrecked over these\nterritories which are in it but not of it, begins to reveal itself.\n\nAt the close of the Napoleonic era the whole of Europe is in a\ncondition of misery. Far-seeing ideas of reform can be neither thought\nout nor worked out; only extemporized palliative measures suit the\ntime. The will-to-progress is therefore unable to recover its former\nvigour.\n\nIt is fatally affected, too, by the fact that everybody with any\ncapacity for independent thought feels himself attracted by this new\nvaluation of things and facts, and thereby drawn on to irritation at\nthe one-sided, doctrinaire character of the rationalist way of looking\nat life.\n\nNevertheless, the position of the will-to-progress is far from being a\ncritical one. The first attacks are made by Romanticism and the\nfeeling for reality, but are mere outpost-skirmishes, and for a long\ntime yet the will-to-progress remains master of the field. Bentham\nremains still the great authority. Alexander II. of Russia, Tsar from\n1801 to 1825, instructs the legislative commission which he sets up to\nobtain on all doubtful points the opinion of the great Englishman.\nMadame de Sta\u00ebl expresses the opinion that the fateful period she has\nlived through will one day be called by posterity not the Napoleonic\nage but the Benthamite._(_37_)_\n\nThe noblest men of the period still live in the unshaken [pg 104]\nconviction that nothing can delay the speedy and conclusive victory of\nthe purposive and moral. The philosophically minded mathematician and\nastronomer, the Marquis Marie Jean de Condorcet (1743-1794), though\nput by the Jacobins upon the list of the proscribed, writes, while\nliving in concealment in Paris in a dismal room in the Rue des\nFossoyeurs, his _Historical Sketch of the Progress of the Human\nSpirit_._(_38_)_ Then, having been betrayed, he wanders about the\nClamart quarries, is recognized by the labourers, in spite of his\ndisguise, as an aristocrat, and while confined in the prison of Bourg\nla Reine, puts an end to his life by poison. The document in which he\ngave his exposition of the ethical belief in progress concludes with a\nforward glance at the time, now soon to appear, when reason, having\nattained a position of permanent sovereignty, will put every human\nbeing in possession of the rights which belong to man as man, and will\nestablish purposive and ethical relations in every department of life.\n\nThere is one thing, it must be admitted, which Condorcet and those who\nshare his views overlook. Their belief that the final result will be\ngood might be considered justifiable if the will-to-progress had been\nendangered only through unfavourable outward circumstances, the\nrevival, that is, of the higher estimation of reality, and the\nromantic idealizing of the past. But it is threatened far more\nseriously by something else than it is by them. The assurance\ndisplayed by rationalism rests on the fact that it regards the\noptimistic-ethical world-view as something proved to be correct. But\nit is not that. It rests like the world-views of Confucius and the\nLater Stoics on a na\u00efve interpretation of the world. All deeper\nthought, therefore, even if it is not directed against rationalism, or\neven if it aims at strengthening its position, must in the long run\nhave a damaging effect upon it. Hence Kant and Spinoza mean doom to\nit. Kant undermines it by his attempt to [pg 105] provide a deeper\nfoundation for the essence of the ethical. Spinoza, the thinker of\nthe seventeenth century, brings it to confusion when his\nnature-philosophy begins, a hundred years after his death, to occupy\npeople\u2019s attention.\n\nIt is about the beginning of the new century, the nineteenth, just\nwhen the pressure exerted by material and spiritual circumstances\nalike begins to make itself felt, that the optimistic-ethical\nworld-view begins to suspect the existence of the serious problems\nwhich are cropping up within it.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 106]\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nTHE OPTIMISTIC-ETHICAL WORLD-VIEW IN KANT\n\n\nKant\u2019s ethics, deepened, but lacking content\n\nSO far as the general tendency of his thought goes Immanuel Kant\n(1724-1804) lives entirely in the optimistic-ethical world-view of\nrationalism._(_39_)_ He has, however, a feeling that its foundations\nare not deep and firm enough, and he regards it as his task to put\nthem on ground which is in every respect more secure. For this purpose\na deeper ethic, and a less na\u00efve positiveness in assertions about\nworld-view which touch upon the supra-sensible, seem to him desirable.\n\nLike the English intellectualists and intuitionists, Kant is offended\nby the idea that the ethic in which the modern age finds satisfaction\nand its impulse to activity is rooted merely in considerations of the\nuniversal advantage of morally good actions. Like them, he feels that\nit is something more than this, and that in the ultimate analysis it\nhas its origin in the compulsion which men experience to strive for\nself-perfecting. But while his predecessors stick fast in the matter\nprovided by semi-scholastic philosophy and theology, he attacks the\nproblem along the lines of pure ethical thought. It follows for him\nthat the fundamental origin and the exalted character of the moral can\nbe preserved only if we always consciously make it an end in itself,\nand never merely a means to an end. Even if moral conduct prove itself\nto be always advantageous and practical, our motive to it must\nnevertheless always be a [pg 107] purely inward compulsion. The\nutilitarian ethic must abdicate before that of immediate and sovereign\nduty. That is the meaning of the doctrine of the categorical\nimperative.\n\nThe English anti-utilitarians had in common with the utilitarians the\nthought that the moral law was related in its essence to empirical\nnatural law. Kant, however, asserts that it has nothing to do with the\norder of nature, and has its origin in supra-natural impulses. He is\nthe first since Plato to feel, like him, that the ethical is the\nmysterious fact within us. In powerful language he proves in the\n_Critique of the Practical Reason_ that ethics are a volition which\nraises us above ourselves, makes us free from the natural order of the\nworld, and attaches us to a higher world-order. That is his great\ndiscovery.\n\nIn the development of it, however, he is not happy. Whoever asserts\nthe absoluteness of moral duty, must also give the moral an absolute\nand completely universal content. He must specify a principle of\nconduct which shows itself as absolutely binding, and as lying at the\nfoundations of the most varied ethical duties. If he does not succeed\nin doing this, his work is only a fragment.\n\nWhen Plato announces that ethics are something supra-natural and\npuzzling, his world-view provides him with a basic principle of the\nethical which corresponds to these qualities, and also has a definite\ncontent. He is in a position to define ethics as a process of becoming\npure and free from the world of sense. This, his own special ethic, he\ndevelops in the passages where he is consistent with himself. Then,\nwhen he cannot complete his argument without an active ethic, he has\nrecourse to the popular theory of virtue.\n\nKant, however, as a child of the modern spirit, cannot let world- and\nlife-denial rank as an ethic. Therefore, since he can go only a part\nof the way with Plato, he sees himself faced with the confusing task\nof letting a purposive, activist ethic which is directed on the\nempirical world originate in impulses which are not determined by any\nadaptation to the empirical.\n\n[pg 108]\n\nHe can find no solution of the problem thus set. In the form which he\ngives it it is in fact insoluble. But he never even realises that he\nhas arrived at the problem of finding a basic principle of the moral\nwhich is a necessity of thought. He is content with formally\ncharacterizing ethical duty as absolutely binding. That duty, unless a\nreal content is at once given to it, remains an empty concept, he is\nunwilling to admit. For the exalted character of his basic principle\nof the moral he pays the price of having it devoid of all content.\n\nBeginnings of an attempt to establish a basic moral principle which\nhas a content are to be found in his treatise, _Prolegomena to a\nMetaphysic of Morals_ (1785), and again later in _A Metaphysic of\nMorals_ (1797). In the 1785 volume he arrives at the dictum: \u201cAct in\nsuch a way that you use every human being both in your own person and\nin everyone else\u2019s always as an end, never merely as a means.\u201d But\ninstead of seeing how far the totality of ethical duties can be\ndeveloped out of this principle, he prefers in the 1797 treatise to\nset before ethics two ends to be aimed at, viz. the perfecting of\noneself and the happiness of others, and to enlarge upon the virtues\nwhich promote them.\n\nIn his investigation of the ethic which aims at personal perfecting,\nhe drives his gallery with sure instinct towards the recognition that\nall virtues which contribute thereto must be conceived of as\nmanifestations of sincerity and of reverence for one\u2019s own spiritual\nbeing. He does not, however, go the length of comprehending these two\nas a unity, just as little does he concern himself to make clear the\ninner connexion between self-perfecting and effort directed to the\ncommon good, and in that way to dig down to the roots of the ethical\nas such.\n\nHow far Kant is from understanding the problem of finding a basic\nmoral principle which has a definite content can be seen from the fact\nthat he never gets beyond an utterly narrow conception of the ethical.\nHe persists obstinately in drawing the boundary of his ethic as close\n[pg 109] as possible, making it concerned with no duties beyond those\nof man to man. The relation of man to non-human existences he does not\ndraw within it. It is only indirectly that he includes in it the\nprohibition of cruelty to animals, putting this among the duties of\nman to himself. By inhuman treatment of animals, he says, sympathy\nwith their sufferings is blunted in us, and thereby \u201ccomes a weakening\nof a natural disposition which is very helpful to our morality in\nrelation to other men, and it gradually dies out.\u201d\n\nAgain as to the vandalism of the destruction of what is beautiful, in\nthe form, that is, of natural objects which are viewed as entirely\nwithout feeling, this is said to be unethical only because it violates\nthe duty of man to himself by undermining the desire\u2014itself a support\nto morality\u2014of having something to love without regard to utility.\n\nIf the sphere of the ethical is limited to the relations of man to\nman, then all attempts to reach a basic principle of the moral with an\nabsolutely binding content are rendered hopeless beforehand. The\nabsolute demands the universal. If there really is a basic principle\nfor the moral, it must be concerned in some way or other with the\nrelations between man and life as such in all its manifestations.\n\nKant, then, does not essay the task of developing an ethic which\ncorresponds to his deepened conception of the ethical. On the whole he\ndoes nothing more than put the current utilitarian ethic under the\nProtectorate of the Categorical Imperative. Behind a magnificent\nfa\u00e7ade he constructs a block of tenements.\n\nHis influence on the ethics of his time is twofold. He furthers it by\nchallenging it to profounder reflection on the nature of the ethical\nand the ethical destiny of man. At the same time he is a danger to it\nin that he robs it of its simplicity. The strength of the ethic of the\nage of reason lies in its na\u00efve utilitarian enthusiasm. It directly\nenlists men in its service by offering them good aims and objects.\nKant makes it insecure by bringing this directness in question and\ncalling for an ethic which is derived from much less elementary\nconsiderations. Depth is gained at [pg 110] the cost of vitality,\nbecause he fails to establish at the same time a basic moral principle\nwith a content, a principle which compels acceptance from deep and yet\nelementary considerations.\n\nSeveral times Kant actually makes it his object to block the natural\nsources of morality. He will not, for example, allow direct sympathy\nto be regarded as ethical. The inner feeling for the suffering of\nanother as if it were one\u2019s own is not to count as duty in the real\nsense of the word, but only as a weakness by which the evil in the\nworld is doubled. All help to others must have its source in a\nreasoned consideration of the duty of contributing to the happiness of\nothers.\n\nBy taking from ethics their simplicity and directness, Kant also\nloosens the connexion which they and the belief in progress had formed\nwith one another, and through which the two together had proved so\nproductive of good. The disastrous separation between them which later\non, in the course of the nineteenth century, became complete, was\npartly due to him.\n\nIn consequence of his wishing to drive out the na\u00efve rationalistic\nconception of the ethical in favour of a deepened one without at the\nsame time being in a position to establish a basic principle of it\nwhich has been correspondingly deepened, has a definite content of its\nown, and is directly convincing, Kant brings the ethics of his time\ninto danger. He labours at the provision of new foundations without\nremembering that the house will develop cracks, if it is not propped\nup sufficiently.\n\nKant\u2019s attempt to reach an ethical world-view\n\nKant passes by the problem of finding a basic principle of the moral\nwith a definite content, because, while attempting to deepen the\nconcept of the ethical, he pursues an object which lies outside\nethics. He wishes to bring ethical idealism into connexion with an\nidealistic representation of the world which has its source in a\ntheory of knowledge. But [pg 111] from that source he hopes there will\ncome an ethical world-view able to satisfy critical thought.\n\nWhy has Kant with a rigorism which intentionally depreciates ordinary\nmoral experience ventured forward to the discovery that the moral law\nhas nothing to do with the natural world-order, but is something\nsuper-sensible? Because he refuses, similarly, to let the sensible\nworld which is experienced by us in space and time be accepted as\nanything more than a manifestation of something nonsensible which\nmakes up true reality. The concept of a moral which contains none but\ninward and spiritual duties is for him the expanding ladder which he\ndraws out so as to reach by means of it the region of Being in itself.\nHe has no feeling of dizziness when in company with ethics, he mounts\nabove all empirical experience and all empirical aims and objects. He\nis determined to go right up with her, and she can never be\nsufficiently _a priori_ for him, because he sets up another ladder of\nthe same length, that of epistemological idealism, and tries to lean\none against the other, so that they may give each other mutual\nsupport.\n\nHow does it come about that the theoretical assumption that the world\nof sensible phenomena has a non-sensible world of Being lying behind\nit, has any importance for world-view? Because within the notion of\nabsolute duty which man experiences at work within himself there lies\na fact of the world-order of that same non-sensible world. Hence\narises the possibility, so Kant thinks, of raising to certainty by\nmeans of ethics those great elements in the non-sensible world which\nare of value for the optimistic-ethical world-view, viz. the ideas of\nGod, of the ethical freedom of the will, and of immortality, which\notherwise would always remain merely problematical.\n\nSo far as rationalism affirms unhesitatingly from the standpoint of\ntheoretical knowledge the ideas of God, of the ethical freedom of the\nwill (_i.e._, of virtue), and of immortality, which make up its\noptimistic-ethical world-view, it builds upon a foundation which\ncannot bear the weight of critical thought. Kant wishes, therefore, to\nerect the [pg 112] optimistic-ethical world-view as a lake-dwelling\nupon piles rammed into place by ethics. These three ideas are to be\nable to claim real existence for themselves as necessary postulates of\nthe ethical consciousness.\n\nThis plan, however, of thus securing the position of the\noptimistic-ethical world-view cannot be carried out. It is only the\nidea of the ethical freedom of the will that can be made a postulate\nof the moral consciousness. To establish the ideas of God and\nimmortality as equally \u201cpostulates,\u201d Kant has to abandon all\nhonourable logic and argue with bold and ever bolder sophisms.\n\nThere is no way of uniting epistemological and ethical idealism,\nhowever enticing the undertaking looks at first sight. When they are\nset side by side, the happenings which take place according to a law\nof causation subordinate to freedom, and become conscious in man\nthrough the moral law, become identified with the happenings which are\nuniversal in the world of things in themselves. There ensues a\ndisastrous confusion of the ethical with the intellectual. If the\nsensible world is only a manifestation of an immaterial world, then\nall the happenings which come about in the space and time sphere of\ncausation produced by necessity are only parallel appearances of the\nevents which are brought about in the intellectual sphere of causation\nproduced by freedom. All happenings, therefore, human activity just as\nmuch as natural happening, are, according to the point of view, at\nonce intellectual and free, and at once natural and necessary. If\nethical activity produced by freedom is represented as analogous with\nthe results of epistemological idealism, then either everything that\nhappens in the world, conceived as intellectual happening, is ethical,\nor there is no such thing as an ethical happening. Because it has\nchosen to put side by side these two things, human activity and\nnatural happening, Kant\u2019s way of looking at the question has to\nrenounce all ability to maintain the difference between them. But the\nvery life of ethics depends on this difference being there and\neffective.\n\n[pg 113]\n\nEpistemological idealism is a dangerous companion for the ethical. The\nworld-order of immaterial happening has a supra-ethical character.\nFrom the setting side by side of ethical and epistemological idealism\nthere can never result an ethical world-view: it will always be a\nsupra-ethical one.\n\nFrom epistemological idealism, therefore, ethics have nothing to\nexpect, but everything to fear. By its depreciation of the reality of\nthe empirical world the ethical world-view is not helped: it is\ninjured.\n\nEthics have materialist instincts. They want to concern themselves\nwith empirical happenings and transform the circumstances of the\nempirical world. But if that world is only \u201cappearance,\u201d derived from\nan intellectual world which functions within it or behind it, ethics\nhave nothing on which to act. To wish to influence a self-determined\nplay of appearances has no sense. Ethics can therefore allow validity\nto the view that the empirical world is mere appearance only with the\nlimitation that activity exerted upon the appearance does at the same\ntime influence the reality lying behind it. But thereby they come into\nconflict with all epistemological idealism.\n\nKant is defeated by the same fate which rules in Stoic, Indian, and\nChinese monism alike. As soon as thought tries in any way to\ncomprehend ethics in connexion with the world-process, it falls at\nonce, whether it is conscious of it or not, into the supra-ethical\nmanner of regarding it. Fully to shape ethics to an ethical world-view\nmeans letting them come to terms with nature-philosophy. Ethics are\nthereupon, as a matter of fact, devoured in one way or another by that\nphilosophy, even if they are in word saved from that fate. The\ncoupling of ethical idealism with epistemological is only bringing\nethics and nature-philosophy into relation with one another in a\nroundabout way by which it is hoped to outwit the logic of facts. But\nthis logic cannot be outwitted. The tragical result lies in the\nidentification which has been made of the ethical with the\nintellectual.\n\n[pg 114]\n\nThe ethical is not something irrational which becomes explicable when\nwe betake ourselves from the world of appearance to the region of\nimmaterial Being that lies behind it. Its intellectual character is of\na peculiar kind, and rests upon the fact that the world-process, as\nsuch, comes in man into contradiction with itself. It follows that the\nethical will and ethical freedom of the will are not explicable by any\ntheory of knowledge, and cannot, moreover, serve as a support to any\nsuch theory.\n\nAs a result of conceiving the moral law and empirical obedience to\nnatural law as in absolute opposition to each other, Kant finds\nhimself on the road which leads to a dualistic world-view. Afterwards,\nhowever, in order to satisfy the claims of the unitary and optimistic\nworld-view which the spirit of the age prescribes to him, he manages\nwith the stratagems which are provided for him by the combination of\nethical and epistemological idealism, to work himself back on to the\nroad which leads to the monistic point of view.\n\nKant is great as an ethical thinker, great too with his theory of\nknowledge, but as shaper of a world-view he is not in the first rank.\nBy his deepened conception of the nature of the ethical, a conception\nwhich lands him in dualistic thought, the problem of the\noptimistic-ethical world-view is unfolded in an entirely new way.\nDifficulties reveal themselves which till then no one could have\nimagined to exist. But he does not deal with them. He is blinded by\nhis ambition to be the Copernicus of the optimistic-ethical\nworld-view, believing that he can show the difficulties inherent in\nthat view to be misunderstandings which explain themselves away as\nsoon as, by means of his epistemological idealism, actual\ncircumstances and relations take the place of these which are apparent\nbut inexplicable. In reality he does nothing but replace the na\u00efve\noptimistic-ethical interpretation of the world which was the basis of\naction for the rationalists by an artfully contrived one.\n\nHe does not take the trouble to ask in what the optimistic [pg 115]\nethical world-view consists, to what final items of knowledge and\ndemands it leads, and how far these are confirmed by experience of the\nmoral law. He takes it over without examination in the formula: \u201cGod,\nFreedom (or Virtue), and Immortality,\u201d which was supplied to it by\nrationalism, and wishes to raise it in this na\u00efve form to a certainty.\n\nThere is thus in Kant\u2019s philosophy the most terrible want of thought\ninterwoven with the deepest thinking. New truths, weighty in their\nnovelty, make their appearance in it. But they get only half-way on\ntheir journey. The absoluteness of ethical duty is grasped, but its\ncontent is not investigated. Experience of the ethical is recognized\nas the great secret by means of which we comprehend ourselves as\n\u201cother than the world\u201d; but the dualistic thinking which goes with it\nis not worked out any further. That the final items of our knowledge\nof our world-view are assertions of the ethical will is admitted, but\nthe consequences of this supremacy of the will over knowledge are not\nthought out to a conclusion.\n\nKant stimulates powerfully the men of his time, but is unable to make\nsecure for them the optimistic-ethical world-view in which they have\nlived. His mission is, although both he and they are content to\ndeceive themselves in the matter, to deepen it, and ... to let it\nbecome less secure than before.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 116]\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nNATURE-PHILOSOPHY AND WORLD-VIEW IN\nSPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ\n\n\nSpinoza\u2019s attempt to reach an optimistic-ethical nature-philosophy\n\nJUST when Kant is beginning to influence men\u2019s minds, the entirely\ndifferent ideas of a thinker who had now been dead for a century,\nBaruch Spinoza (1632-1677),_(_40_)_ begin to interest those who are\nsearching for a world-view. The _Critique of Pure Reason_ appears in\n1781. In 1785 F. H. Jacobi in his letters addressed to Moses\nMendelssohn, _Concerning the Teaching of Spinoza_, draws attention\nonce more to the philosopher whom hitherto everyone had attacked\nwithout making any effort to understand him.\n\nSpinoza desires to obtain an ethic from a real nature-philosophy. He\nmakes no attempt to give an optimistic-ethical interpretation of the\nuniverse, or to refashion it with any theory of knowledge. He accepts\nit just as it is in every respect. His philosophy is therefore\nelementary nature-philosophy, but his method of expounding it is by no\nmeans elementary. Acquiescing in the way Descartes puts the problem\nand the language he uses, he makes his own thought about the universe\nproceed \u201cin geometrical fashion\u201d in a series of axioms, definitions,\nprecepts, and proofs. Nature-philosophy is embodied in his\nphilosophizing in a magnificent way, but it is as stiff as an\nice-bound landscape.\n\nHis chief work\u2014published after his death, because he could not venture\nto publish it himself\u2014he entitles _Ethics_. The [pg 117] title is\nconfusing, because the nature-philosophy in it is developed almost as\ncompletely as the ethics. It is only when the reader has shaken\nhimself free of all na\u00efve conceptions in his thought about the\nuniverse that he can be permitted, according to Spinoza, to begin upon\nethics. The fact that ethics too are broken up into precepts which are\ngiven as proved is very prejudicial to their exposition.\n\nIn his attempt to found ethics upon nature-philosophy, Spinoza\nproceeds as follows. Everything that exists, he says, is given in that\ninfinite Being, which may be called either God or Nature. For us, and\nto us, it presents itself in two forms: as thought (spirit) and as\ncorporeity (matter). Within this divine nature everything, human\nactivity included, is determined by necessity. There is no such thing\nas doing, there are only happenings. The meaning of human life,\ntherefore, cannot consist in action, but only in coming to an ever\nclearer understanding of man\u2019s relation to the universe. Man becomes\nhappy when besides belonging to the universe naturally, he also\nsurrenders himself to it consciously and willingly, and loses himself\nspiritually within it.\n\nSpinoza demands therefore a higher experience of life. With the Stoics\nand the thinkers of India and China, he belongs to the great family of\nthe monistic and pantheistic nature-philosophers. Like them, he\nconceives of God merely as the sum-total of nature, and accepts as\nvalid only the notion of God which makes him in this way an\nindependent unity. The attempts, made in the interests of the ethical\nworld-view, to allow God to be at the same time an ethical personality\nstanding outside the universe, are to him an offence against thought.\nTheir only object is, of course, to obtain with the help of a\nconfessed or unconfessed dualism a starting-point for an\noptimistic-ethical world-view. They are striving to reach along\nna\u00efve-religious by-roads the goal for which the rationalistic\noptimistic-ethical interpretation of the universe is making along the\ndirect, but not less na\u00efve, main-road.\n\n[pg 118]\n\nThe tragic result of monistic thinking in the Stoic, the Indian, and\nthe Chinese philosophies is that nature-philosophy, when consistent,\narrives only at resignation, not at ethics. Has Spinoza escaped this\nfate?\n\nLike Lao-tse, Chwang-tse, Lie-tse, and the Chinese thinkers as a body,\nSpinoza champions an optimistic monism without suspecting that under a\nfar-away heaven and in a far-off age, he had such great\npredecessors._(_41_)_ His resignation is of a world- and\nlife-affirming character. He conceives of infinite Being not as\nsomething devoid of qualities, as the Indians do, but as life with a\nfull content. The self-perfecting, therefore, for which man is to\nstrive is not for him, as it is for them, in any way an anticipation\nof a state of death, but a living out of life which is guided by deep\nreflexion. An elegantly egoistic world- and life-affirmation speaks\nthrough him, as through Chwang-tse.\n\nThe efforts of the man who refuses to deceive himself about himself\nare not directed, therefore, to any sort of action which is recognized\nas serviceable, but are concerned with maintaining his own Being and\ngiving it the fullest possible experience of life. Whatever good he\ndoes to others he never does for their sakes, but always for his own.\n\nSpinoza rejects the achievement of modern ethics as influenced by\nChristianity, viz. the regarding of altruism as something that belongs\nto the essence of ethics, and confines himself to the thought that in\nthe last resort all ethical action aims at our own interests, though\nit may be at our highest spiritual ones. In order to avoid thinking\nanything which is not a necessity of thought, he goes back of his own\nfree will into the captivity in which ancient ethics lived.\n\nIf he could let himself go, he would, like Chwang-tse, conduct a\ncampaign against the morality of love and duty. But since he already\nhas as thoroughgoing opponents the [pg 119] authorities, the\ntheologians, whether Jewish or Christian, and almost every\nphilosopher, he has to speak cautiously and offer mankind without\nattracting notice the life-view which advocates profound and thinking\negoism.\n\nJust as God, the totality of universal Being, acts not with any aim or\nobject but from an inner necessity, so also does the man who has\nattained to insight. He does only what contributes to complete\nexperience of life, nothing else. Virtue is capacity for\nself-maintenance at the highest level, and this self-maintenance is\nattained to when reason is the highest motive to action, and efforts\nafter knowledge and freedom from passion take possession of the man\nand make him free, that is, allow his conduct to be determined by\nhimself alone and on purely inward grounds. The ordinary man is\nunstable, moved hither and thither in all sorts of ways by outward\ncauses, with no idea of his future fortune or his final fate, like a\nship that is tossed about, now here, now there, on a stormy sea.\nEthics, therefore, consists in living our life more in the form and\nfashion given it by thought than in bodily actuality.\n\nActing, therefore, with a deep, enlightened egoism and purely from\nintellectual impulses, a man behaves nobly in every relation of life.\nHe strives to requite hatred, indignation, and contempt with love and\nnoble feeling, because he knows that hatred causes him discomfort. He\nseeks at any price to create around him an atmosphere of peace. He\nnever acts deceitfully, but always straightforwardly. He has no need\nto feel sympathy. Since he lives entirely under the guidance of\nreason, he does good whenever the opportunity offers, on principle,\nand therefore does not need to be roused to noble feeling by any\nexperience of discomfort. In fact he avoids sympathy. Again and again\nhe makes it clear to himself that everything that happens is brought\nabout by some necessity in the divine nature and in obedience to\neternal laws. Just as he finds nothing in the world which deserves\nhatred, mockery, and contempt, so he finds in it nothing to evoke\nsympathy. [pg 120] Man must be ever striving to be virtuous and happy,\nand if he is conscious of having done good within the limits of what\nis commanded him, he can with an easy mind leave his fellow-men and\nthe world to their fate. Beyond the possibilities of his own immediate\nactivities he need have nothing to do with them.\n\nThe wise man who practises the higher life-affirmation possesses\npower. He has power over himself, power over his fellow-men, and power\nover circumstances. How very similar is the tone of Spinoza\u2019s thought\nto that of Lao-tse, Chwang-tse, and Lie-tse!\n\nSpinoza lives out his own ethic. In contented independence he passes\nhis life, till consumption brings it to an early close. He declines an\ninvitation to be lecturer in philosophy at Heidelberg University. He\nis strict with himself, but his resignation is lighted up by a mild\ntrait of considered humanity and friendliness. The persecutions to\nwhich he is exposed fail to embitter him.\n\nIntent though he is on thinking only in accordance with pure\nnature-philosophy, Spinoza does not concern himself so exclusively\nwith the two natural entities, nature herself and the individual man,\nas do many of his Chinese predecessors, but maintains an interest in\norganized society. He is convinced that it betokens progress when men\nchange, from the \u201cnatural\u201d stage of society to the \u201ccivic.\u201d Being\nformed for living with his fellows, man is freer if he settles by\ngeneral agreement what belongs to each, and what the relations are to\nbe between himself and society. The State must, therefore, have power\nto issue general orders as to how people are to live, and to secure\nrespect for its laws by means of penalties.\n\nA real devotion of oneself to the common weal appears, however, to\nSpinoza not to be called for. According to him the perfect human\nsociety appears of itself just in proportion as its individual members\nlive according to reason. In contrast, therefore, to his contemporary,\nHobbes, Spinoza looks for the progress of society not to the [pg 121]\nmeasures taken by the authorities, but to a growth towards perfection\nin the dispositions of their subjects. The State is to educate its\ncitizens not to submissiveness, but to the right use of freedom. In no\nway must it do any injury to their sincerity, and it must therefore\ntolerate all religious views.\n\nFar as Spinoza goes to meet the spirit of the age, there is one point\non which he cannot agree with it, viz. that there are ethical aims and\nobjects, aims and objects practical and purposive, to be realized in\nthe world.\n\nAdvancing far ahead of his contemporaries, he reaches a universal\nnotion of ethics, and recognizes that from the standpoint of\nconsistent thinking, every ethical relation is nothing but an\nexpression of the relation of the individual to the universe. When,\nhowever, ethics have in this way become universal, they are faced by\nthe question how the relation of the individual to the universe is\nconceivable as producing an effect upon the universe. On the answer to\nthis question it depends whether a real activist ethic can be\nestablished, or whether the ethical is only so far present as\nresignation can be explained as ethical.\n\nThat is the reef which threatens danger to all nature-philosophy, and\nwhenever a thinker imagines that with clever seamanship and a\nfavourable wind he can sail round it without coming to grief upon it,\nhe is nevertheless finally driven upon it, as by submarine currents,\nand suffers the same fate as his predecessors. Like Lao-tse and\nChwang-tse, like the Indians, the Stoics, and all self-consistent\nthinkers before him, Spinoza is unable to furnish what ethics demand,\nviz. that the relation of man to the universe shall be conceived of as\nnot merely a spiritual relation, but as active devotion to it in the\nworld of sense. The opponents of this solitary thinker are\ninstinctively conscious that with the re-establishment of an\nindependent nature-philosophy there appears something which means\ndanger to the optimism and the ethics of their world-view. Hence [pg\n122] we find in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries everyone\nuniting to suppress Spinoza\u2019s philosophy.\n\nIt is on behalf of optimism that the age is most troubled. The\nterrible earthquake which in 1755 destroyed Lisbon, sets the mass of\nmen asking whether the world is really ruled by a wise and kindly\nCreator. Voltaire, Kant, and many other thinkers of the age seize on\nthe occurrence as a topic for discussion, partly confessing their\nperplexity, partly seeking new ways out of the difficulty for their\noptimism.\n\nLeibniz\u2019s optimistic-ethical world-view side by side with\nnature-philosophy\n\nHow little optimism and ethics have to expect from a real\nnature-philosophy is shown not only in Spinoza, but also in Gottfried\nWilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)._(_42_)_ In his _Theodic\u00e9e_ (1710) he\ntries to be fair to the optimistic world-view. He is helped in this by\nthe fact that his nature-philosophy is much more living and adaptable\nthan Spinoza\u2019s. He is also determined to employ every possible device\nto attach an optimistic meaning to reality. He nevertheless gets no\nfurther than a laborious establishment of the conclusion that the\nactually existing world is the best of all possible ones.\n\nMoreover, so much of optimism as he rescues is useless for his\nworld-view because it contains no energies which can be directed to\nethical action upon the world. When he is consistent with himself he\nremains, like Spinoza, a prisoner within nature-philosophy. All the\ndifficulties for ethics which Spinoza\u2019s deterministic\nnature-philosophy contains within itself, are to be found also in his.\nOwing to the fact that he does not put the union of thought (spirit)\nand extension (matter) far away in the Absolute, but allows it to be\nrealized in countless tiny individualities [pg 123] which in their\ntotality constitute the universe\u2014he calls them monads\u2014his\nnature-philosophy corresponds to the multiform character of reality\nmuch better than Spinoza\u2019s does. He anticipates to a considerable\nextent the modern nature-philosophy which is based on the cell-theory\nof matter. Yet he, too, remains under the spell of the way the problem\nis put by Descartes. He does not allow the individualities in which\nthought and extension are united, to enter into living relations with\neach other, but limits their existence to being merely forces with\npowers of conception. Their being consists in being conscious of the\nuniverse, more clearly some, more confusedly others, but each\nindependent of the rest.\n\nIn Spinoza there is a possibility of reaching an ethic, inasmuch as an\nattempt can be made to give an ethical interpretation to the mystical\nrelation between man and the Absolute. Leibniz bars this path against\nhimself in that he does not recognize such an abstract Absolute as the\ncontent of the universe. It is, therefore, not the result of chance\nthat he nowhere philosophizes searchingly about ethics. In no way can\nan ethic be deduced from his nature-philosophy.\n\nInstead of admitting to himself this result and unfolding the problem\nof the relation between ethics and nature-philosophy, he weaves into\nhis philosophy traditional dicta about ethics, and defines the Good as\nlove to God and man.\n\nIn nature-philosophy Leibniz is greater than Spinoza, because he deals\nwith living reality more thoroughly than the latter does. In the\nstruggle for a correct world-view, however, he is far behind him,\nbecause Spinoza, a man with a simpler mental endowment than his,\nrecognizes the reconciliation of ethics and nature-philosophy as the\ncentral problem of world-view, and proceeds to deal with it.\n\nIf Leibniz had remained consistent, he would have ended in atheism, as\ndoes the Indian Samkhya philosophy, which similarly makes the world\nconsist of a multiplicity of [pg 124] eternal individualities. Instead\nof that, he introduces into his nature-philosophy, in order to rescue\nfor himself a satisfactory world-view, a theistic notion of God, and\nby giving it an optimistic, ethical, and theistic expression, he makes\nit acceptable to the eighteenth century. His philosophy, popularized\ntill it is almost unrecognizable by Christian Wolff (1679-1754), helps\nto lay the foundations of German rationalism.\n\nBut in spite of the treason of which he is thus, though with the best\nintentions, guilty against nature-philosophy, Leibniz cannot undo the\nfact that thinking on nature-philosophy lines awoke at that time to\nactivity through him. Without wishing it, he too contributes to making\nSpinoza an influence.\n\nBut to let oneself be mixed up with nature-philosophy is for the\nspirit of the time to step into the dangerous unknown. It therefore\nresists as long as possible. At last, however, since Kant and Spinoza\ntogether are undermining the optimistic-ethical world-view of\nrationalism which has been built upon the real world and so\nconveniently fitted up, it has to make up its mind to rebuild, and\nattempt the process of arriving at a conception of optimism and ethics\nby direct thinking on the essential nature of the world. For the\ncarrying out of this undertaking the German speculative philosophy\noffers its services.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 125]\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\nJ. G. FICHTE\u2019S OPTIMISTIC-ETHICAL WORLD-VIEW\n\n\nSpeculative philosophy and Gnosticism\n\nTHE vision of an optimistic-ethical philosophy cast in one mould\nhovers in front of speculative philosophy, which hopes to discover the\nmeaning of the world by the most direct route. It will have nothing to\ndo with analysing the phenomena of the universe in order to deduce its\nnature from them. It proceeds deductively, not inductively. In pure\nabstract thinking it hopes to learn for itself how the real world has\nevolved out of the notion of Being. It is imaginative\nnature-philosophy in a logical dress.\n\nThe right to deal with the world in this fashion is derived by\nspeculative thought from the results of the theory of knowledge,\naccording to which the world as we observe it is more or less our own\nrepresentation of it. We have, somehow or other, a creative share in\nits coming into existence. It follows that the logic which is the rule\nwith the finite ego is to be conceived as an emanation of that which\nholds good with the Absolute. The individual is therefore entitled to\ndisclose in his own thinking the motives and the process of the\nemanation of the empirical world out of the notion of Being.\nSpeculation, or in other words constructive logic, is the key to the\nsecret door into knowledge of the world.\n\nGenerically, speculative German philosophy is essentially related to\nthe Gr\u00e6co-Oriental Gnosticism, which in the first centuries of the\nChristian era advances its views concerning the emergence of the\nsensible world from the world of pure Being._(_43_)_ The Gnostic\nsystems aim at establishing a world-view [pg 126] of redemption. They\nconcentrate on the question how the spiritual individualities which\nfind themselves in the material world came there, and how they can\nreturn from it into the world of pure Being. Speculative German\nphilosophy on the other hand tries to obtain such a knowledge of the\nworld as shall give a meaning to the activities of the spiritual\nindividualities in the world. Speculative thinking at the beginning of\nthe Christian era is dualistic and pessimistic; that at the beginning\nof the nineteenth is monistic and optimistic. In both cases, however,\nthe method of obtaining the world-view is the same.\n\nAmong the representatives of the speculative philosophy the most\neminent are: Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Wilhelm\nJoseph Schelling (1775-1854), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel\n(1770-1831). It is only Fichte and Hegel, however, who produce\nworld-views with a characteristic stamp of their own. Schelling gets\nno further than a nature-philosophy, and stands almost completely\naside from the struggle for an optimistic-ethical world-view with\nwhich his age is occupied. Kept in a perpetual state of flux, his\nthinking makes use of all possible starting-points one after another\nand is now more concerned with natural science, now more akin to\nSpinoza\u2019s thought, and now to Christian. He never makes a definite,\nconscious attempt to found an ethic.\n\nFichte\u2019s speculative founding of an ethic and of optimism\n\nFichte begins as the antipodes of Spinoza._(_44_)_ He aims at\nextracting from the universe a confession that it is a purely [pg 127]\noptimistic ethical one, by thinking Kant\u2019s thoughts out to a\nconclusion.\n\nKant, according to him, made the mistake of not bringing his two\ndiscoveries, viz. epistemological idealism and the ethic of the\ncategorical imperative into that inward connexion with one another in\nwhich they really stand.\n\nWhat is the meaning of the fact that the moral law and the sensible\nworld both become actual in me? That is the starting-point of Fichte\u2019s\nphilosophizing.\n\nThrough the categorical imperative I experience that my particular ego\nis a self-determined will to activity. Correspondingly, every \u201cthing\nin itself\u201d which I assume to exist behind phenomena as the real on\nwhich they are based, is similarly a self-determined will to activity.\nThe essential nature of infinite Being also can consist of nothing\nelse. The universe is, therefore, the phenomenal form of an infinite,\nself-determined will to activity.\n\nWhy does the absolute Ego appear as a phenomenon in a sensible world?\nWhy is Being revealed as Becoming? If I understand this, I have\ncomprehended the meaning of the world and of my own life.\n\nNow the absolute Ego, because it is infinite will to activity cannot\npersist in being merely an Ego. It establishes a non-Ego to be a limit\nto itself in order that it may again and again overcome it, and\nthereby become conscious of itself as will to activity. This\nproceeding takes place amid the multiplicity of finite rational\nbeings. In their power of intuition the sensible world becomes actual,\nand in their overcoming of it they recognize a duty which makes itself\nmysteriously felt within them and unites them with the world-spirit.\nThis is the meaning of the philosophy of the identity of Ego and\nnon-Ego.\n\nIt is not only, then, that the world exists merely in my mental\ncreation of it: it is, further, only produced in me in order that I\nmay have something on which my will to fulfilment of duty can exercise\nitself. The phenomena of becoming and disappearing which I project out\nof myself [pg 128] exist only that I may through them comprehend\nmyself as an ethical being. In this way epistemological idealism and\nthe categorical imperative, when they act together and one climbs on\nthe shoulders of the other, can look behind the curtain which hides\nthe secret of the world.\n\nKant protests against the idea that Fichte\u2019s system is to be\nconsidered the completion of his philosophy. As a matter of fact,\nhowever, Fichte does with ingenious art continue the lines which were\nbegun in the _Critique of Pure Reason_ and the _Critique of the\nPractical Reason_, and think out the ideas of the philosopher of\nK\u00f6nigsberg to a self-contained world- and life-affirming ethical\nworld-view. He presents them in a generally intelligible form in _The\nDestiny of Man_, published in 1800. This book is one of the most\npowerful documents produced by the struggle for an ethical world-view.\n\nFichte gives a content to the abstract, absolute duty of Kant, making\nit consist in this, that man, as the instrument of the ever-active\nabsolute Ego, assigns to himself the destiny of working with the\nlatter \u201cto bring the whole sensible world under the sovereignty of\nreason.\u201d\n\nSince his fundamental moral principle possesses a content, Fichte is\nable to deduce particular demands from it, but that content is so\ngeneral and vague that the code of duty which is drawn out from it has\nbut little vital force. Nothing can really be got out of this\nfundamental principle beyond the demand that man shall in every\nsituation of life fulfil the duties which from time to time fall to\nhim as a result of his destiny of having to help forward the\nsovereignty of reason over nature. Fichte therefore distinguishes the\ngeneral duties which man, as such, has to fulfil, and the special ones\nwhich are incumbent on him according to his natural gifts, his social\nposition, and his profession. The latter are emphasized as specially\nimportant.\n\nBy defining ethics as activity which aims at subjecting the sensible\nworld to reason, Fichte gives a cosmic formulation to the utilitarian\nethic of rationalism, and thus [pg 129] produces a comprehensive and\ndeep foundation for the ethical enthusiasm which was a discovery of\nhis time. In this matter also he carries through something which\nhovered before the mind of Kant.\n\nThereby he opposes the representatives of the popular philosophy of\nthe Illumination, and in a polemical pamphlet he criticizes very\nseverely Christoph Friedrich Nicolai. At bottom, however, the only\nreproach he can level at them is that they wish to go on housing\nethics and belief in progress in the na\u00efve world-view arrived at by\nthe healthy human reason instead of accepting both of them from the\nworld-view produced by the union of epistemological idealism and the\ncategorical imperative. To persist in imperfect rationalism when the\nperfect has been made a reality by Kant and himself is, in his\nopinion, a crime against truth. To him the beginning of wisdom is\ninsight into the paradox that \u201cconsciousness of the world of actuality\nsprings from our need of action and not, _vice vers\u00e2_, our need of\naction from our consciousness of the world.\u201d\n\nThe spirit of Fichte\u2019s world-view, then, is completely that of\nrationalism, only that it believes it has found itself at home with\nhim in the real nature of Being, and now comes forward with still\nstronger conviction and a still more burning enthusiasm. In Fichte\u2019s\nwritings, men are positively driven with the lash to work for the\nimprovement of the world. With impressive pathos he teaches them to\nobey the inner voice which urges them on to activity, and indicates to\nthem their definite duty whatever may be the special circumstances of\ntheir existence, and to recognize in so doing that they are thus\nfulfilling the highest, and indeed the only destiny of their lives.\n\nIt is as the result of this inner urge to activity that we long for a\nbetter world than the one which we see around us, and belief in that\nbetter world is the food by which we live. Fichte makes confession of\nunbounded optimism. \u201cAll those outbreaks of untamed force before which\nhuman power is annihilated, those devastating hurricanes, [pg 130]\nthose earthquakes, those volcanic eruptions, can be nothing else than\nthe last wrestlings of the wild mass of nature against the uniformly\nprogressive, purposive, and life-promoting course to which, in\nopposition to its own tendencies, it is being compelled.\u201d . . .\n\u201cNature is to become to us more and more transparent and capable of\nexamination even to its innermost secret, and enlightened human power,\narmed with its own inventions, is destined to master it without\ntrouble, and then to exploit peacefully its once for all made\nconquest.\u201d_(_45_)_ Here Fichte gives us the triumphant pagan of the\nbelief in progress which the spirit of the modern age, that lives on\nthe achievements of its knowledge and power, has been composing since\nthe Renaissance. He is as thoroughly convinced as the staunchest\nrationalist that nature is the buffalo which has remained refractory\nso long, but will at last be brought beneath the yoke.\n\nThat mankind will perfect itself and reach a condition of unbroken\npeace, is to him as certain as the perfection that nature will one day\narrive at. At present, it is true, we are in a period of arrested\nprogress with temporary setbacks, but when this is past, and all\nuseful things which have been discovered at one end of the world, get\nknown to and distributed to all, then mankind, using its powers in\ncomplete co-operation and marching forward in step, will raise itself\nuninterruptedly, without arrest of progress or setback, to a culture\nof which we can form no conception.\n\nTo the State Fichte assigns in his early writings a not very important\n_r\u00f4le_, but in his later ones a great one. In _The Foundations of the\nLaw of Nature_ (_Grundlage des Naturrechts_) (1796), it is for him\nonly the maintainer of law and order. In his work _The Complete\nCommercial State_ (_Der geschlossene Handelsstaat_), which appeared in\n1800, he allows it to organize industry and to take over social\nduties. In his _Addresses to the German Nation_ (_Reden an die\ndeutsche Nation_, 1808), he makes it a moral educator and a protector\nof the virtue of humanity.\n\n[pg 131]\n\nThe man who, with the help of epistemological idealism, has made his\nway through to the higher rationalism, is safe from losing his\noptimism, even though he goes through the cruellest experiences. He\nhas grasped the fact that the sensible world is only the limit which\nthe infinitely active will has created on purpose to be overcome. This\nlends him inward independence in the face of all happenings. He has no\nneed to understand them individually. He can let a large proportion of\nthem be put aside as puzzling to his finite spirit. What is essential\nhe knows: viz. that what is real in the world is not matter, but\nspirit only.\n\nPartaking of the eternally active spirit, man is raised above the\nworld, and is eternal. The sufferings he meets with afflict nature\nonly \u201cwith which he is connected in a marvellous way,\u201d but not\nhimself, the being who is exalted above the whole of nature. Of death\nhe has no fear. He does not die to himself, but merely to those who\nsurvive him. . . . \u201cAll death in nature is birth. . . . Nature is\nthroughout nothing but life. It is not death which kills, but the\nliving life which, concealed behind the old one, now begins and\nproceeds to develop. Death and birth are nothing but the struggle of\nlife with itself in an effort to reveal itself more and more clearly\nand more and more like its real self.\u201d It is in similar words that the\nChinese monist, Chwang-tse, announces that life is eternal and the\ndying of an individual only means that one existence is being re-cast\nto form another. .\n\nFichte\u2019s mysticism of activity incapable of being carried through\n\nFichte\u2019s philosophy of absolute activity is the expression of his own\nstrong ethical personality, which with impetuosity and self-sacrifice\ntakes problems in hand, and uses itself up in the strain involved. But\neven he is unable to make a genuine combination of epistemological\nidealism and ethical so as to produce an ethical world-view which is a\n[pg 132] necessity of thought. The impossibility of the undertaking\nreveals itself everywhere.\n\nIn order to conceive ethics as a part of the normal course of\nworld-happenings, Fichte, like all others who make the same attempt,\ngives up as hopeless any differentiation between human action and\nworld-happenings. The world-spirit\u2019s impulse to activity, he says,\nexperiences itself in man as will to ethical action. But, indeed, the\nwhole world is filled with this will to activity which is for ever\nsurging against the limitations it has set up for itself. Everything\nthat happens is only an expression of it. What difference, then, is\nthere between natural happenings and ethical? Between activity in\nitself and ethical activity? Purposive activity directed with\nknowledge and intention to the subjection of the sensible world to\nreason is ethical, decides Fichte. But what does that mean, when\nclosely examined? It means that the finite spirit becomes moral by\nentering into and taking seriously the play of the infinite spirit\nwhich aims at overcoming its own self-created limitations. Looking in\nthis way at Fichte\u2019s thought, we see clearly that with the world-view\nwhich results from the combination of ethical and epistemological\nidealism, ethics have no longer any meaning.\n\nAgain, what is the meaning of \u201cbringing the whole of the sensible\nworld under the sovereignty of reason\u201d? This conception of the ethical\nis not only too wide, but fantastic also. To a limited extent man is\nable to harness the forces of nature for his service, and with a\nlittle stretching of language he can, with Fichte, describe such\naction as not purposive merely, but also in the widest sense ethical.\nUpon this terrestrial globe he has some \u201cinfluence,\u201d but upon the\nworld none. That he gives names to the mighty heavenly bodies and can\ncalculate the orbits of many of them, cannot mean that he brings them\nunder the sovereignty of reason. Upon deep-sea life, too, he exercises\nno other influence than catching specimens of it and giving them\nnames.\n\nThat he may be able to assert that there is such a thing [pg 133] as\nan ethical purpose in the world, Fichte falsifies the world\u2019s birth\ncertificate, and gives it the categorical imperative for father and\nepistemological idealism for mother. But this is of no use. The\nethical purpose thus produced cannot satisfy ethical thought.\n\nBy conceiving the infinite spirit, in which the finite spirit has a\nshare, as will to activity, Fichte tries to make possible a world-view\nof ethical world- and life-affirmation. In reality, however, this\ntakes him no further than a more emphatic world- and life-affirmation,\ninto which, with the help of speculative thought, he smuggles the idea\nof duty, thereupon proclaiming it to be ethical. It fares with him\njust as with the Chinese philosophers, who similarly exert themselves\nin vain to produce an ethic out of world- and life-affirmation.\n\nAbsorption in the Absolute by means of action is, as Fichte thinks,\nsomething prodigious, but, just like its counterpart, absorption in\nthe Absolute which is effected by an act of thought, it is not ethical\nbut supra-ethical. The element which is needed by the mysticism of\nabsorption in the Absolute to make it ethical cannot be secured either\nby enhancing or by depreciating the will to activity.\n\nFichte\u2019s mysticism of activity in which man lets loose his energy in\nthe world is related to the ethic of deed, just as Spinoza\u2019s mysticism\nof knowledge in which man is absorbed in the world is related to that\nof self-perfecting, but it is only very incompletely that either can\ndevelop itself into a real ethic.\n\nThe absorption in the Absolute which comes into actuality in an act of\nthought lies nearer to nature-philosophy than that which completes\nitself in an active deed. The Brahmans, the Buddha, Lao-tse,\nChwang-tse, Spinoza, and the mystics of every age, have experienced\nthe becoming one with the Absolute as a coming-to-rest in it. Fichte\u2019s\nmysticism of activity lies more in the path of dualistic thinking than\nin that of real nature-philosophy. It is something which has been\nextorted by enthusiasm, but Fichte [pg 134] is devoted to it, and\nrightly, because he has a feeling that the interests of an active\nethic are better guarded by it than by the other. Since, however, he\nthus once and for all decides for a nature-philosophy, he comes,\ndominated though he is by the ideal of an active ethic, more and more\nto the natural quietist consequences of a nature-philosophy. He goes\nthrough a process of evolution which brings him nearer to Spinoza\u2019s\nworld-view. In his _Instruction Concerning the Blessed Life_, which\nappeared in 1806, six years later than _The Destiny of Man_, it is to\nhim no longer the ethical which in itself is the highest, but the\nreligious. The ultimate meaning of life, as he now recognizes, is not\nto act in God, but to be merged in Him. \u201cSelf-annihilation is the\ngateway into the higher life.\u201d\n\nHe believes, indeed, that he is thereby merely deepening his\nworld-view without diminishing its ethical energy, and he remains\nhimself, right to the end, the fiery spirit which consumes itself in\nactivity for promoting the progress of the world. But his thought has\nbent under the weight of nature-philosophy. Without clearly admitting\nit to himself, he recognizes that out of nature-philosophy there can\nbe drawn only an intellectual, not an ethical meaning for the world\nand life. Spinoza observes with a smile how he retires upon the\nthought beyond which a nature philosophy cannot advance.\n\nFichte is the first philosopher to declare plainly that no world-view\nis ethical which does not enable man to explain that an enthusiastic\nactive devotion to the universe is something grounded in the nature of\nthe world and of life. But the road he takes in order to develop this\nthought leads him astray. Instead of going more deeply into the\nquestion how ethical happenings, though coming from the world-spirit,\nand directed upon the world, are nevertheless different from normal\nworld-happenings, and investigating the nature of this difference, he\nemploys the trick, which had been made possible by Kant, of declaring,\nwith the help of epistemological idealism, that the ethical world-view\nis a necessity of thought. Many of his contemporaries [pg 135] believe\nwith him that it has thereby really reached a position of supremacy,\nand even those who cannot go with him the whole length of the\nphilosophy of the Ego and Non-Ego, are gripped by the force of the\nethical personality which speaks from Fichte\u2019s writings.\n\nThe direct effect, then, of Fichte\u2019s philosophy is that the\noptimistic, ethical spirit of rationalism maintains its position and\nbecomes stronger and deeper. His philosophy is a source of inspiration\nwhich produces a mighty impulse to ethics and civilization. But the\nvessel in which, with a magnificent wind behind him, he starts with\nhis companions on a voyage over the sea of knowledge is a leaky one. A\ncatastrophe is only a question of time.\n\nFichte\u2019s belief that he has obtained from the nature of the universe\nthe living compulsion to ethical duty and ethical work which he feels\nwithin himself, is an illusion. The manner, however, in which he\nconceives the problem of the optimistic-ethical world-view, and\nperceives that for its solution the ordinary processes of life afford\nno help, so that more or less violent ones must be allowed to take\ntheir turn, reveals him as a great thinker.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 136]\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\nSCHILLER; GOETHE; SCHLEIERMACHER\n\n\nSchiller\u2019s ethical world-view; Goethe\u2019s world-view based on\nnature-philosophy\n\nVERY important is the fact that the deepened optimistic-ethical\nworld-view of Kant and Fichte finds a champion in Friedrich von\nSchiller (1759-1805), who brings it to the mass of the people with the\nforce, added by poetical language. He is himself philosophically\ngifted, and undertakes in addition to develop it further. He wishes to\nbroaden the foundation of the ethical by showing its relation to the\n\u00e6sthetic.\n\nIn his _Letters Concerning the \u00c6sthetic Education of Mankind_ (1795),\nhe works out the idea that art and ethics belong together as far as\nthis, that man maintains with the sensible world a relation which is\nfree and creative. \u201cThe transition from the passive condition of\nfeeling to the active one of thinking and willing comes about in no\nother way than through an intermediate condition of \u00e6sthetic freedom.\n. . . There is no way of making the sentient man rational other than\nfirst making him \u00e6sthetic.\u201d In what way the capacity for freedom which\nis built up in man by \u00e6sthetic practice really disposes him to\nmorality, Schiller does not work out in further detail. His treatise,\nin spite of all the notice it attracted and deserves, is more\nrhetorical than substantial. He has not gone to the bottom of the\nproblem of the relations between the \u00e6sthetic and the ethical.\n\nIn contrast to Schiller, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832),\nstands in almost as cold an attitude to the world-view of the deepened\nrationalism as he does to that of ordinary rationalism. To him it is\nimpossible to share [pg 137] the confidence with which others, looking\naround, regard optimistic and ethical convictions as well founded.\nWhat separates him from Kant, and Fichte, and Schiller, is reverence\nfor the reality of nature. Nature is to him something in herself, not\nmerely something existing with a view to mankind. He does not require\nfrom her that she shall fit herself completely into our\noptimistic-ethical designs. He does no violence to her either through\nepistemological and ethical idealism or through presumptuous\nspeculation, but lives in her as a human being who looks at existence\nwith wonder and does not know how to bring her relation to the\nworld-spirit within any formula.\n\nDescartes led modern philosophy astray by cutting the world up into\nobjects which have extension and objects which think, and by going on,\nmoreover, to refuse to each of them the possibility of influencing the\nother. Following in his steps, thinkers rack their brains over the\nproblem of these two parallel kinds of existence, and try to embrace\nthe world in formulas. That the world is life, and that in life lies\nthe riddle of riddles, never enters their minds. Hence they overlook\nin their philosophizing what is most important. Because Descartes\npreceded them, the two great spirits who adhere to nature-philosophy,\nSpinoza and Leibniz, cannot get further than a nature-philosophy which\nis more or less dead. Being in the line of descent from Descartes,\nKant and Fichte renounce all philosophizing over the real world.\n\nDescartes and the ethical belief-in-progress, therefore, agree in a\ncommon neglect of nature. Both alike overlook the fact that she is\nliving, and that she exists for her own sake, and it is because he\ncannot join them in this that Goethe dares to confess that he\nunderstands nothing about philosophy. His greatness is this: that in a\ntime of abstract and speculative thought he had the courage to remain\nelemental.\n\nOverwhelmed by the mysterious individual life in nature, he persists\nin maintaining a magnificently imperfect [pg 138] world-view. With the\nspirit of an investigator he looks within into everything; in that of\nan inquirer he looks around upon everything. He wants to think\noptimistically. Shaftesbury\u2019s thoughts exercise their charm upon him\nalso. But in the chorus of optimism which makes itself heard so loudly\naround him, he cannot join. World- and life-affirmation is for him not\nsuch a simple thing as it is for Fichte and Schiller. He strives to\nreach an ethical world-view, but admits to himself that he cannot\ncarry it through, and he therefore does not venture to attribute a\nmeaning to nature. To life, however, he will attribute one. He seeks\nit in serviceable activity. To make the world-view of activity at home\nin nature-philosophy is to him an inner necessity. The conviction that\nactivity provides the only real satisfaction that is to be found in\nlife and that therein lies the mysterious meaning of existence is\nshown by him in _Faust_ as something which he has laboriously gained\nduring his pilgrimage through existence and to which he will hold\nfast, without being able to explain it completely.\n\nGoethe struggles to arrive at a conception of ethical activity, but\ncannot reach one because nature-philosophy is unable to provide him\nwith any criterion of what is ethical. What that philosophy had to\nrefuse to the Chinese monists and to Spinoza, she cannot give to him\neither.\n\nThe range of this world-view of Goethe\u2019s which deals thus with reality\nremains hidden from his contemporaries. Its incompleteness alienates\ntheir sympathies and irritates them. For knowledge of the world and of\nlife which cannot be reduced to a system, but sticks fast in facts,\nthey have no understanding. They hold to their optimism and their\nethic.\n\nSchleiermacher\u2019s attempt at a nature-philosophy\n\nDaniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834), stands apart both from the\nordinary and from the deepened rationalism because he cannot free\nhimself from the influence of [pg 139] Spinoza._(_46_)_ His life-work\nis directed to preaching the Spinozan nature-philosophy as being, as\nfar as he can make it so, both an ethic and the Christian religion.\nHence he always dresses it up as one or the other of these.\n\nThe accepted ethical code, in Schleiermacher\u2019s opinion, makes man\nmerely run about the earth as an ethical individual bent on improving\nthe world. Living in this way, in a constant state of enthusiasm, he\nbecomes in danger of losing himself and becoming unpersonal. He\nforgets that his primary duty is, first of all to be alone with\nhimself, to look within himself, and, instead of being a mere human\ncreature, to make himself into a personality.\n\nThis renunciation of rationalism\u2019s enthusiasm for activity is to be\nfound in the _Monologues_, those splendid introspective meditations\nmeant for the first New Year\u2019s Day of the nineteenth century. One\nseems to hear in them Lao-tse and Chwang-tse criticising the moralism\nand the fanaticism for progress of Confucius.\n\nMan\u2019s first task is, according to Schleiermacher, to realize his\noneness with the Infinite and in the Infinite to see the world. Only\nthat which results from this as action is really significant, and has\nimportance for morality.\n\nSpinoza\u2019s ethic consisted in keeping oneself at the highest level and\nliving one\u2019s life more after the fashion of a life of thought than\nafter that of a life of corporeal existence. Schleiermacher\u2019s ethic\nhas the same objective except that he seeks to combine with it a more\ncomprehensive interest in the world than is to be found in Spinoza. He\nis helped in this direction by his belief that progress is something\nimmanent.\n\nWe have, he says, no other perfecting to bring about in things than\nthat which is inherent in them. Ethics, therefore, are not a setting\nup of laws, but the recognition and the description of the tendencies\nworking for perfection which appear in the world itself, together with\nbehaviour [pg 140] in accord with their spirits. The moral law is not\ndistinct from the law of nature and pursues no other aims than the\nlatter does. It is only the law of nature arriving in man at the\nconsciousness of itself.\n\nSchleiermacher, therefore, feels that his task is not, as Fichte\nconceived his to be, the bringing of the universe under the\nsovereignty of reason; it consists solely in supporting the oneness of\nnature and reason in the sphere of human action, which is ever\nstriving to realize itself within that universe. \u201cAll ethical\nknowledge is the expression of the ever-beginning but never completed\nefforts of reason to become nature.\u201d Ethics are a contemplative\n\u201cscience.\u201d They revolve around the two poles of natural science and\nhuman history.\n\nThe ethic which results from this fundamental conception is, like\nthose of Lao-tse and Chwang-tse, so toned down that there is no longer\nany real power in it. However completely Schleiermacher may try to\nconceal this fact by his wonderful powers of description, it plays\nonly a subordinate _r\u00f4le_. What gives a meaning to human existence is\nsomething which is independent of deeds; it is the oneness with the\nInfinite which is experienced in feeling.\n\nWith its clever dialectic, but not in reality, Schleiermacher\u2019s ethic\nshows itself finally to be superior to that of Spinoza. His world-view\nis that of Spinoza, only enriched by his belief in the immanence of\nthe power of progress. Hence his ethic is iridescent with somewhat\nmore brilliant colours.\n\nThus do a living nature-philosophy in Goethe and a Spinozan one in\nSchleiermacher undermine the ground on which stand the men of the now\nbeginning nineteenth century, whose thinking is so enthusiastically\noptimistic-ethical. The crowd pays no attention to their dangerous\nproceedings. It gazes at the fireworks which Kant and Fichte let off,\nwhile Schiller recites his poetry. And now there begin to rise bursts\nof rockets which throw a peculiarly brilliant light. The past-master\nin the art of firework display, Hegel, has come into action!\n\n\n\n\n[pg 141]\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\nHEGEL\u2019S SUPRA-ETHICAL OPTIMISTIC WORLD-VIEW\n\n\nEthics in Hegel\u2019s nature-philosophy, and in his philosophy of history\n\nIN his speculative philosophy Fichte\u2019s first and chief interest was\nethical. Hegel, deeper and more objective than he, aims at truth\nbefore everything._(_47_)_ While using any helpful considerations\nwhich are provided by facts, his aim is to discover the meaning of\nBeing. He therefore cannot join Fichte in the violent procedure,\nsuggested by his ethic, of giving the world the categorical imperative\nfor father and epistemological idealism for mother. Before going so\nfar as to write out a birth-certificate for the world, he undertakes\nsome material investigations. He studies the laws which govern events,\nas they are revealed in history. He then lays these as the foundation\nfor the constructive operations which are to explain the origin of the\nworld out of the notion of Being. His philosophy, therefore, is a\nphilosophy of history become cosmic. The building, so far as one can\nmeasure it externally, is solidly constructed. That is why it is still\nconvincing even where its lines lose themselves in infinity.\n\nWhat, then, does Hegel discover to be the principle underlying the\ncourse of events in history? He discovers that every process of\nbecoming advances with natural progress, and that this progress\nrealizes itself in the occurrence of a consecutive series of\ncontradictions which invariably issue in reconciliation! In thoughts\nas in facts, [pg 142] every thesis evokes an antithesis. Then these\nunite in a synthesis which preserves what is valuable in either of\nthem. Every synthesis that is reached becomes again a thesis for a new\nantithesis. From these there results again a new synthesis, and so on\nfor ever.\n\nWith the aid of this scheme Hegel can expound the course of history.\nFrom it he is also able to develop the basic principles of logic.\nHence he is sure that from it it must be possible to make intelligible\nhow the notional world which can be logically developed out of the\nnotion of Being passes over into being the world of reality. He\ncarries this fancy through to its conclusion in such magnificent\nfashion, that even we, who are proof against its charm, can understand\nhow it was possible to become intoxicated with it.\n\nWhile Fichte seeks to give an ethical meaning to the expansion of pure\nBeing into the world of reality, Hegel from the very outset takes his\nstand upon the assertion that in its ultimate analysis the meaning of\nthe world can only be an intellectual one. The Absolute has no other\nobject in bringing a world into existence than to become conscious of\nitself. It is infinitely creative spirit, but not, as in Fichte\u2019s\nthought, with the object of endlessly working, but with that of\nreturning into itself by the road of its own creations.\n\nIn nature the Absolute comprehends itself only very dimly. It is first\nin man that it really experiences itself, and that in three ascending\nstages. In the man who is concerned merely with himself and nature it\nis still subjective spirit. In the communal spirit of men who\ncooperate for the legal and ethical organization of human society, it\nexpands to objective spirit and at the same time, on a basis of\nnotions provided within this spirit, shows itself capable of being\ncreative. In art, in religion, and in philosophy it becomes conscious\nof itself as absolute spirit, existing in and for itself and having\novercome the contradictions of subject and object, thought and Being.\nIn art it contemplates itself as such; in religious devotion [pg 143]\nit presents itself as such; in philosophy, which is pure thought, it\ncomprehends itself as such. With the world represented as thought, the\nAbsolute experiences itself.\n\nBefore the destiny to which Spinoza submits with a smile, against\nwhich Fichte and Schleiermacher rebel, Hegel bows in courageous\nreverence for truth. His world-view is supra-ethical mysticism. The\nethical is to him only a phase in the development of intellectuality.\nCivilization he conceives not as something ethical, but only as\nsomething intellectual.\n\nFor proof that the ethical is nothing in itself but only a phenomenon\nof the intellectual, Hegel appeals to French usage. \u201cThe moral,\u201d he\nsays, \u201cmust be taken in the wider sense in which it signifies not the\nmorally good alone. \u2018Le moral\u2019 is in French opposed to the physical\nand means the spiritual, the intellectual, or the non-material in\ngeneral.\u201d_(_48_)_\n\nThe notion of the ethical with which Hegel works is extraordinarily\nwide. It consists in \u201cthe will having for its objects not subjective,\n_i.e._, selfish, interests, but a universal content.\u201d_(_49_)_ It is\nthe business of thought to define this universal content in particular\ninstances.\n\nIf Hegel had fully explored the fact that the individual will comes to\nassign itself universal objects, and had felt this fact to be the\nmysterious one that it is, he could not have passed so lightly as he\ndoes over the ethical problem. He would have had to admit to himself\nthat the spiritual element which manifests itself in it is unique in\ncharacter, and cannot be included in any higher one, or classified\nunder any other at all. The problem of the mutual relationship between\nthe spiritual and the moral would have been clearly posed.\n\nBut Hegel is so anxious to find some sort of shelter for his\nspeculative optimistic world-view that he estimates the birth of the\nethical in man not by and for itself, but simply [pg 144] as a\nphenomenon of the rise of the supra-individual spirit. Instead of\ndirecting his thought to the question of how the individual spirit in\neach several person can be at the same time supra-individual and\nconscious of its oneness with the Absolute, Hegel sets out to make\nintelligible the higher experience of the individual by means of the\nmutual relations between it and the universal spirit of the collective\nbody to which it belongs. He says it is presumption for the individual\nspirit as such to seek, as it does in Indian thought, to comprehend\nits relation to the Absolute. Becoming one with the Absolute is an\nexperience of the universal spirit of collective humanity when it has\nreached its loftiest height. Only when it stands in connection with\nthis, as a river with the waters of a lake through which it had\nflowed, can the individual spirit obtain experience of the Absolute.\nThis is the fatal turning towards the general and supra-personal at\nwhich the Hegelian philosophy makes itself superficial.\n\nEthics, then, for Hegel have at bottom only the significance that they\nmake possible the growth of a society in the collective spirit of\nwhich the absolute spirit can come to a consciousness of itself. Man\nbecomes moral by submitting voluntarily to the demands which society\nrecognizes as expedient with a view to the creation of the higher\nspirituality.\n\nHegel has no ethic for the individual. The deep problems of ethical\nself-perfecting and of the relations between man and man do not\nconcern him. When he does come to talk about ethics his subject is the\nfamily, society, and the State.\n\nWith Bentham ethics complete law. Hegel works the two in together. It\nis significant that he wrote no treatise on ethics. All that he does\npublish about ethics is to be found in his philosophy of law.\n\nHis first concern is to show that the State, correctly conceived, is\nnot merely a legal, but a legal-ethical body. Fichte had made it the\nethical educator of the individual. For Hegel it is the essential\nelement in all moral happenings, [pg 145] \u201cthe self-conscious moral\nsubstance,\u201d as he expresses it. What is most valuable in the moral\ncomes to actuality in it and through it. This overvaluing of the State\nis a natural consequence of his low valuation of the spiritual\nsignificance of individuality as such.\n\nHegel\u2019s supra-ethical world-view. His belief in progress\n\nWith Fichte\u2019s idea, which he found it impossible to work out\ncompletely, of giving ethics a cosmic foundation in such a way that\nits content might be the bringing of the world under the sovereignty\nof reason, Hegel can have nothing to do. His feeling for the real\ndebars him from anything so fantastic. But that he altogether gives up\nthe cosmic notion of ethics is fatal. Instead of allowing ethics and\nnature-philosophy to come to an understanding together in his\nspeculative thought, he makes a sacrifice of ethics from the start. He\nrefuses them the liberty (which they enjoyed with Spinoza, Fichte, and\nSchleiermacher), of trying to get themselves conceived as the relation\nof the individual to the universe. They are forbidden, further, to try\n(as they can do with the Chinese monists), to get accepted as a\nrelation which forms part of the meaning of the universe. They are\nrestricted to being a standard for the regulation of the relations\nbetween individuals and society. They may not be active as a formative\nidea in the creation of a world-view upon a foundation of\nnature-philosophy. They are simply built into the edifice as an\nalready shaped and dressed stone.\n\nIn consequence of Hegel\u2019s allowing ethics no significance beyond that\nof a preparatory motive to realizing the spiritual meaning of the\nworld, his teaching becomes remarkably analogous to the Brahmanic.\nHegel and the Brahmans are akin because, as consistent thinkers, they\nventure to admit that thought about the world and the Absolute which\nlies behind it can reach only an intellectual, never an ethical\nmeaning in the union of the finite spirit [pg 146] with the infinite,\nand therefore value ethics only as a preparatory motive thereto. With\nthe Brahmans ethics prepare the individual for the intellectual act in\nwhich he experiences the Absolute in himself and himself dies in it.\nWith Hegel they help in the formation of society, in the communal\nspirit of which the Absolute first becomes capable of experiencing\nitself.\n\nIt is only a relative difference between Hegel and the Brahmans that\nthe latter make their intellectualist mysticism individualist and\nworld- and life-denying, while Hegel carries his through as world- and\nlife-affirming, and makes the intellectual act take place only when a\nsociety has produced the requisite spirituality. The inner similarity\nin character of the two world-views is not affected thereby. One is\nthe complement of the other. Both give value to ethics only as a phase\nof intellectuality.\n\nWith Hegel, as with the Brahmans, ethics are indeed given a shelter,\nbut they are not shown to be necessary. For the production of the\nconsciousness of oneness with the Absolute the decisive element for\nthe Brahmans is, in the last resort, only a sufficient advance in\nworld- and life-denial, and depth of meditation. With Hegel, society,\nwhich has to produce the spirituality in which the absolute spirit\nexperiences itself in the finite, could come into existence just as\nwell by means of law alone, as by means of ethics and law together.\nHis ethic is, in truth, only a species of law.\n\nWith the Brahmans ethics are a colouring which their world- and\nlife-denial takes on for a certain distance; with Hegel they are a\nsimilar mode of self-manifestation of his world- and life-affirmation.\nHegel\u2019s world-view is in and by itself supra-ethical mysticism with\nworld- and life-affirmation, just as that of the Brahmans is\nsupra-ethical mysticism with world- and life-denial.\n\nThat his world-view is this and nothing else Hegel admits in the fit\nof brutal frankness under the influence of which he wrote on June\n25th, 1820, the famous Preface to his _Philosophy of Law_. Our task\n(he there explains,) is not to [pg 147] re-fashion reality in\naccordance with ideals which have arisen in our spirit, but we have to\nlisten to the way in which the real world affirms itself, and us\nwithin itself, in its own immanent impulse to progress. \u201cWhat is\nrational is real, and what is real is rational.\u201d The eternal which is\npresent under the form of the temporal and transient and is developing\nwithin this, it is worth our while to recognize and thereby to become\nreconciled with reality. It is not for philosophy to set up ideas\nabout what is to be. Her task is to understand what is. She does not\nproduce any new age, but is only \u201cher own age comprehended in\nthought.\u201d She always arrives too late to be an instructor as to what\nthe world ought to be, and she begins to speak only when reality has\ncompleted its process of construction. \u201cMinerva\u2019s owl does not begin\nher flight till darkness is closing in.\u201d Beneficent peace will be\nbrought us by the sincere recognition of reality.\n\nRationalism is an ethical belief in progress combined with an ethical\nwill-to-progress. It was as such that Kant and Fichte had undertaken\nto deepen it. After passing through Hegel\u2019s mind it is only a belief\nin progress . . . belief in a progress which is immanent in things. It\nis this alone that this powerful speculative thinker believes himself\nable to place upon a cosmic foundation, and in this he is in contact\nwith Schleiermacher. On the whole, and reduced to the simplest\npossible expression, his world-view and Schleiermacher\u2019s lie not very\nfar apart. The secret feud in which the two thinkers lived with one\nanother had in reality no objective justification.\n\nThe extent of the strategical retreat on which Hegel enters remains\nhidden from his contemporaries. They rejoice unreservedly at the\nmagnificent energy which his system displays, and with the less\nreservation because he himself only once, viz. in the Preface to his\n_Philosophy of Law_, expresses himself freely about the final results\nof his thinking. The fact that with him the moon of ethics is obscured\ndoes not evoke the excitement that might [pg 148] normally have been\nexpected, because, in compensation, he allows the sun of the\ncosmically founded belief in progress to shine all the brighter. Being\nstill under the influences of rationalism, the men of that time are so\naccustomed to regard ethics and belief in progress as organically\nconnected that they look on the strengthening of optimism effected by\nHegel as being also a strengthening of ethics.\n\nHegel\u2019s formal assumption that progress comes about through a\nsuccession of antitheses which are always finally reconciled in\nvaluable syntheses has kept optimism alive through most critical times\nright on to the present day. Hegel is the creator of that confident\nfeeling for reality with which Europe staggered into the second half\nof the nineteenth century without becoming aware that ethics have at\nsome point or other been left behind. And that being so, he is able to\nhold his optimistic philosophy of history out of which his world-view\ngrows, only because he lives in a period when a general temper which\nworks with ethical energies of extraordinary strength is carrying\nHumanity forward in an extraordinary way. Whence the progress comes,\nwhich he experiences all around him, the great philosophic historian\ndoes not recognize. He explains as produced through natural forces\nwhat has originated from ethical ones.\n\nIn Hegel\u2019s world-view the connexion between ethics and belief in\nprogress, in which the spiritual energy of modern times has always\nrested, is broken, and with the separation both are ruined. Ethics\nlanguish, and the belief in progress, now left to itself, becomes\nspiritless and powerless because it is now only a belief in immanent\nprogress, and no longer a belief in progress of all kinds which is\nproduced by enthusiasm. With Hegel there rises the spirit which\nborrows its ideals empirically from reality and believes in the\nprogress of Humanity more than it labours to promote it. Hegel stands\non the bridge of an ocean liner and explains to the passengers the\nwonders of the machinery in the vessel that is carrying them, and the\nmysteries of the [pg 149] calculation of its course. But he gives no\nthought to the necessary maintenance as before of the fires under the\nboilers. Hence the speed gradually diminishes until the vessel comes\nat last to a standstill. It no longer obeys the helm, and becomes a\nplaything of storms.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 150]\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\nTHE LATER UTILITARIANISM. BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ETHICS\n\n\nBeneke, Feuerbach, Laas, Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill\n\nTHE fact that speculative philosophy also is unable to establish the\noptimistic-ethical world-view upon nature-philosophy is not felt with\nall its weight in the intellectual life of Europe. In that philosophy\nwe have, indeed, a form of thought which flames out like a flash of\nlightning and vanishes as quickly, but it is confined to Germany. The\nrest of Europe takes hardly any notice of Fichte and Hegel, just as,\nindeed, it paid scarcely any attention to Kant. It does not understand\nthat these adventurous advances in the struggle for the\noptimistic-ethical world-view have been undertaken by leaders who see\nclearly that the battle is not to be won on the usual lines. The\nuniversal conviction is, of course, that the victory was won long\nbefore, and can no longer be disputed. It is only later that people in\nFrance and England see what Kant, Fichte, and Hegel aimed at, and what\ntheir significance was in the struggle for world-view.\n\nFor the intellectual life of Europe, then, the world-view of\nrationalism still stands upright at a time when it has, in truth,\nalready collapsed. Generally speaking a generation lives, of course,\nless by the world-view that has been produced within it than by that\nof the previous age. The light of a star is still visible to us when\nit has long ceased to exist. There is hardly anything in the world\nthat clings so toughly to life as a world-view does.\n\nIt never becomes clear, then, to the popular utilitarian ethic that in\nthe course of the first half of the nineteenth century it is being\ngradually robbed of its world-view by [pg 151] new modes of thought,\nthose of historical science, romanticism, nature-philosophy, and\nnatural science. Certain that it is still in favour with the healthy\nhuman reason, it remains unmoved at its post, and still does a\nconsiderable amount of work. Whenever, too, it considers its future\nprospects, it assumes that if it should ever have to give up all\nconnexion with rationalism, it will be able to come to terms with\npositivism, that world-view which has been sobered by exact sciences.\nAs a matter of fact, rationalism does merge imperceptibly into a kind\nof popular positivism. The optimistic-ethical interpretation of the\nuniverse is still relied on, but less unreservedly and less\nenthusiastically than previously. In this weakened form rationalism\nmaintains itself till the end of the nineteenth century, and even till\nsomewhat later, always working to produce the temper that desires\ncivilization, whether independently or accompanied by popular\nreligiousness.\n\nWhile, then, Kant, Fichte, and Schleiermacher are struggling with the\nethical problem, Bentham supplies the world with an ethic. The\nperiodical entitled _The Utilitarian_ (_L\u2019Utilitaire_) is started in\nParis in 1829 to propagate his views. In England the _Westminster\nReview_ works for him. In 1830 Friedrich Eduard Beneke\u2019s translation\nof his _Principles of Civil and Criminal Legislation_ paved a way for\nhim in Germany. At his death\u2014which occurred in 1832, a year after\nHegel\u2019s\u2014Bentham could take to the grave with him the conviction that,\nthanks to him, an ethic which provided enlightenment both for the\nreason and for the heart had proved victorious everywhere.\n\nAll the earlier methods followed to establish utilitarianism continue\nat work in the nineteenth century. Friedrich Eduard Beneke\n(1798-1854),_(_50_)_ the translator of Bentham, [pg 152] and Ludwig\nAndreas Feuerbach (1804-1872)_(_51_)_ take up with confidence the\nattempts of David Hartley and Dietrich von Holbach to derive the\nunegoistic directly from the egoistic, and try hard to complete them\nin a deepened psychology. Beneke believes himself able to show how\nthrough the continuous influence of reason on the feelings of pleasure\nand non-pleasure, there builds itself up in man a capacity for moral\njudgement which holds up before him as the highest goal for his\nactivity the all-round perfecting of human society. Feuerbach derives\naltruism from the possession by man of an impulse to think himself\ninto the personality of others and to put himself in their place.\nThereby, he says, his impulse to seek happiness loses its original\nindependence, and suffers if the happiness of others is spoilt. At\nlast, under the influence of habit, man forgets altogether that his\nrelation of helpfulness with his fellows was originally meant to\nsatisfy the impulse to seek his own happiness, and he conceives his\nown care for their welfare as duty.\n\nErnest Laas (1837-1885),_(_52_)_ repeats the view that ethics consist\nprimarily in the individual\u2019s acceptance of the rules laid down by\nsociety, an acceptance which from being a matter of habit becomes at\nlast unconscious and automatic.\n\nIn general, however, the utilitarianism of the nineteenth century\nprops itself up with the assumption which is first made by David Hume\nand Adam Smith, that from the very beginning the non-egoistic is given\nin human nature side by side with the egoistic.\n\nAuguste Comte (1798-1857)_(_53_)_ in his _Physiology of Society_\npraises as the greatest achievement of his time the then commencing\nrecognition of the fundamental social tendency in human nature. The\nfuture of mankind depends in his opinion on intelligence working\ncorrectly and perseveringly [pg 153] on this endowment, and so\nrendering man\u2019s natural benevolence capable of achieving the noblest\nand most beneficial objects. If devotion to the universal good remains\nat work in the multitude of individuals so as to provide the necessary\ncomplement to their natural egoism, there will arise out of the\nrational understanding between the two a society which is ever\nbringing itself nearer to perfection in its economic and social\nrelations.\n\nA great defender and developer of utilitarianism in England was John\nStuart Mill (1806-1873),_(_54_)_ who in this followed in the footsteps\nof his father, James Mill (1773-1836).\n\n\nDarwin and Spencer\n\nUtilitarian ethics receive unexpected help from natural science.\nBiology declares itself able to explain by reference to its origin the\ndevotion to others which thinkers had decided to accept as inherent in\nman by the side of the egoistic, but not further derivable from it.\nThe unegoistic, so it teaches, does as a matter of fact grow out of\nthe egoistic, only it does not issue from it afresh on every occasion\nas a result of conscious reflexion by the individual. The change has\ntaken place in the species by a long and slow process, and is now\nrevealed as an acquired faculty. The conviction that the welfare of\nthe individual is best secured if the whole body of individuals is\nalso active in promoting the common good has been established by\nexperience in the struggle for existence. Action on this principle has\nthus become a characteristic of individuals which develops more and\nmore in the course of generations. We possess this devotion to others\nas descendants of herds which maintained themselves in the struggle\nfor existence while others succumbed in it, because the social\nimpulses were developed in them the most strongly and the most\nuniversally.\n\n[pg 154]\n\nThis thought is developed by Charles Darwin (1869-1882)_(_55_)_ in his\n_Descent of Man_, and by Herbert Spencer (1820-1903)_(_56_)_ in his\n_Principles of Ethics_. Each of these thinkers refers to the other.\n\nAltruism is therefore now regarded as something natural and at the\nsame time as something which has come into existence through\nreflexion, and the relation subsisting between it and egoism as having\nadmittedly become rational. On this judgement is founded at the same\ntime the conviction that the co-operation of these two impulses, as it\ndeveloped in the past, will allow itself also to be perfected in the\nfuture. More and more will these two impulses show clearly their\nmutual dependence on each other. From sporadic altruism, developing in\nthe animal kingdom for the production and maintenance of new\ngenerations, we have advanced to a settled altruism which serves the\nmaintenance of the family and society. To bring this to completion\nmust now be our aim. We shall succeed if the compromise between egoism\nand altruism continues to grow better adjusted and more purposive. We\nmust advance to the view which at first seems to be a paradox that (to\nuse Spencer\u2019s language) the general prosperity can be reached mainly\nthrough a corresponding struggle of all individuals for their own\nprosperity and that of individuals, on the other hand, partly through\ntheir struggle for the general prosperity.\n\nComte\u2019s _Physiology of Society_ is thus given a foundation in natural\nscience by Darwin and Spencer.\n\nUtilitarianism now continues on its way full of satisfaction at having\nfound itself conceived by modern biology and in the history of\nevolution as something natural. But it has not thereby become either\nfresher or more capable. It advances more and more slowly. Its breath\nfails. What is the matter with it? Its ethical energy leaves it\nbecause [pg 155] it has conceived itself to be something natural. The\nfatal fact that ethics cease to be ethics in proportion as they are\nbrought into harmony with natural happenings, is fulfilled not only\nwhen ethics are developed out of nature-philosophy but also when they\nare explained by biology.\n\nEthics consist in this: that natural happenings in man are seen, on\nthe basis of conscious reflexion, to carry within them an inner\ncontradiction. The more this contradiction is removed into the sphere\nof that which goes back to instinct, the weaker do ethics become.\n\nThe origin of ethics is assuredly this: that something which is\ncontained as instinct in our will-to-live is taken up through\nconscious reflexion and further developed. The great question is,\nhowever, what this last and most original element in the instinct of\nsolidarity is, this element which by thinking is developed far beyond\neverything instinctive, and in what way this development is\naccomplished. By proclaiming developed herd-mentality to be ethics,\nDarwin and Spencer show that they have not gone to the root of the\nproblem of the relation between instinct and thinking reflexion in\nethics. If nature wishes to have a perfect herd, she does not appeal\nto ethics, but gives the individuals, as in the ant- or the\nbee-kingdom, instincts by the force of which they are wholly merged in\nthe society.\n\nBut ethics are the putting into practice the principle of solidarity\non a basis of free reflexion, and this practice, moreover, directs\nitself not only to individuals of the same species, but to everything\nliving in general. The ethics of Darwin and Spencer are a failure from\nthe first, because they are too narrow and do not leave the irrational\nits rights. The social impulse which they put in the place of the\nsympathy which is assumed by Hume and Adam Smith is set at a lower\npitch than the latter, and is correspondingly less calculated to\nexplain real ethics.\n\nThe transition from egoism to altruism, then, it is equally impossible\nto carry through if one transfers the proceeding from the individual\nto the species. The fact that the process is thereby prolonged allows\nnumerous series of [pg 156] most delicate transitions to be taken into\naccount and their results to be summed up as inheritance of acquired\ncharacters. Nevertheless, that does not explain truly ethical\ndevotion. The fruits of ethics are hung upon the bush of social\nimpulse, but the bush itself did not bear them.\n\nThe weak points in biological and sociological utilitarianism\n\nThe strength of utilitarianism lies in its simplicity. Bentham and\nAdam Smith still show this quality. They have society in their minds\nas the sum of a number of individuals, not as an organized body. Their\nefforts are directed to inducing human beings to do as much good as\nthey can to each other.\n\nWith John Stuart Mill this simplicity disappears. To him, and then in\nstill stronger measure to Spencer and others, it occurs that the ethic\nof the conduct of an individual to his fellows cannot be carried\nthrough as a matter of reasoning. Hence, they conclude, \u201cscientific\nethics\u201d has to do only with the relations between individuals and\norganized society as such.\n\nBentham\u2019s simple utilitarianism puts before the individual an estimate\nof the manifold ways in which society needs his devotion if it is to\nsee all its members prosperous, and appeals to his enthusiasm. The\nutilitarianism which has become biological and sociological tries to\nreckon up for the individual the correct balance between egoism and\ndevotion. It pretends to be social-science transformed to sentiment.\n\nAdam Smith keeps ethics and sociology still apart in such a way that\nhe is not a sociologist when he speaks as a moralist, and not a\nmoralist when he puts forward sociological theories. Now, however, the\ntwo points of view are worked in together, and indeed in such a way\nthat ethics are merged in sociology.\n\nThe ethic of the simple utilitarianism is concerned with actions\nproduced by enthusiasm, the biologico-sociological ethic with the\nconscientious employment of the complicated [pg 157] machinery of\norganized society. In the former an occasional piece of ineffective\naction means at worst a waste of power, in the latter a disturbance of\nthe organism. Hence thorough-going utilitarianism comes to a\ndepreciatory estimate of the ethic of the individual which springs\nfrom ethical convictions in the individual and does not think\nbiologically and sociologically.\n\nThat in the sphere of individual ethics there are no more discoveries\nto make, passes with the later utilitarians for admitted. They regard\nthem as an uninteresting hinterland, to advance into which is not\nworth while. They therefore confine themselves to the fertile coast\nland of social ethics. They see, no doubt, that the streams which\nwater this lower ground come from the hinterland of individual ethics.\nBut instead of following them up to their sources their only care is\nto make the lower ground safe from occasional inundations which may be\ncaused by them. They therefore lead the streams into such deep-lying\nchannels that the land gets parched.\n\nScientific ethics undertakes the impossible, viz. to regulate devotion\nfrom outside. It tries to drive water-mills without any head of water,\nand to shoot with a bow which is but half-bent.\n\nHow tortured are Spencer\u2019s disquisitions on absolute and relative\nethics! For the natural, ethical point of view absolute ethics\nconsists in this: that a man experiences directly in himself an\nabsolute ethical \u201cmust.\u201d Because absolute ethics thinks of devotion\nwithout limits and would lead straight to a self-sacrifice which would\nin some way or other suspend life and activity, it has to come to an\nunderstanding with reality and decide what measure of self-sacrifice\nis to be made, and how far that minimum of compromise can be allowed\nwhich is necessary to ensure a continuation of life and activity. In\nthis origin out of absolute ethics of applied, relative ethics the\nscientific, biological point of view cannot acquiesce. Spencer\ntransforms the conception of absolute ethics and turns it into [pg\n158] the conduct of the perfect man in the perfect society. We have no\nneed, he says, to picture to ourselves the ideal man except \u201cas he\nwould exist in ideal social surroundings.\u201d \u201cAccording to the evolution\nhypothesis the two mutually condition each other, and only where both\nare to be found, is such ideal action also possible.\u201d\n\nThe ethic which thereby comes into consideration is produced,\ntherefore, from outside. It is determined by the relation in which\nsociety and the individual stand to one another in their mutual state\nof imperfection. Into the place of the living conception of absolute\nethic there steps a fiction. It is only relative standards, subject to\nthe changes produced by time and relations with others, that the ethic\nof sociological utilitarianism provides for men. That means that it\ncan only feebly rouse his will to the ethical. It even reduces him to\na state of confusion because it takes from him the elementary\nconviction that he has to exert himself without regard to what the\ngiven relations are in a state of perfection, and must contend with\ncircumstances from an inward compulsion, even without the certainty of\nany result at all.\n\nSpencer is more biologist than moralist. Ethics are to him merely the\nsetting in which the principle of utility comes to us after it has\nbeen worked up in the brain-cells together with the experiences it has\nproduced, and after it has been passed on by heredity. Thus he gives\nup all the inward forces by which ethics live. The urge to attain to a\nperfecting of the personality which has to be reached through ethics\nand the longing for a spiritual bliss which is to be experienced\nwithin them, are deprived of their office.\n\nThe ethic of Jesus and of the religious thinkers of India withdraws\nitself completely from social to individual ethics. The utilitarianism\nwhich has become scientific ethics gives up individual ethics in order\nthat social ethics may alone have currency. In the first case ethics\ncan survive because it keeps possession of the mother-country, and has\nsacrificed only its foreign possessions. In the [pg 159] other it\nwishes to exert its authority in the foreign possessions while the\nmother-country belongs to it no more. Individual ethics without social\nethics are imperfect, but they can be very deep and living. Social\nethics without individual ethics are like a limb with a tourniquet\nround it, into which life no longer flows from the body. They become\nso impoverished that they really cease to be ethics any longer.\n\nThe reduction to impotence of scientific, biological ethics shows\nitself not only in the fact that it finally makes all ethical\nstandards merely relative. Such ethics can no longer uphold the duty\nof humanity as they ought to.\n\nA sinister uniformity prevails in the evolution of ethics. The ethics\nof antiquity began to teach humanity after they had lost in the Later\nStoicism their interest in organized society as they found it existing\nin the ancient state. Modern utilitarianism, conversely, loses its\nsensitiveness to the duty of humanity in proportion to the consistency\nwith which it develops into an ethic of organized society. It cannot\nbe otherwise. The essence of humanity consists in this: that\nindividuals never allow themselves to think impersonally in terms of\nexpediency as society does, or to sacrifice individual existences in\norder to attain their object. The outlook which seeks the welfare of\norganized society cannot do anything but compromise with the sacrifice\nof individuals or groups of individuals. In Bentham, with whom\nutilitarianism is still simple and concerns itself with the conduct of\nindividuals to the multitude of other individuals, the idea of\nhumanity has not been tampered with. Biological, sociological\nutilitarianism is obliged to give it up as being sentimentality which\ncannot maintain itself in the face of matter-of-fact ethical\nreflexion. Thus sociological ethics contribute not a little to the\ndisappearance from the modern mind of any shrinking from inhumanity.\nIt allows individuals to adopt the mentality of society instead of\nkeeping them in a state of tension with regard to it.\n\n[pg 160]\n\nSociety cannot exist without sacrifice. The ethics which start from\nindividuals try to distribute this in such a way that through the\ndevotion of individuals as many as possible are voluntary sacrifices,\nand that the individuals who are most severely hit are relieved of\ntheir burden as far as possible by others. This is the doctrine of\nself-sacrifice. The sociological ethics which no longer reach back at\nindividual ethics can only lay it down that the progress of society\nadvances according to inexorable laws at the price of the freedom and\nprosperity of individuals and groups of individuals. This is the\ndoctrine of being sacrificed by others.\n\nIf followed out consistently, biological and sociological\nutilitarianism arrives finally, even if with hesitation, at the\nconviction that in reality it no longer has for its object the\ngreatest possible happiness of the greatest possible number. To this\nobject, which was thus formulated by Bentham, it must now assign, as\nbeing sentimental, a place behind one which corresponds more exactly\nto reality. What is to be realized in the ever more complete\ndevelopment of the mutual relations between the individual and society\nis not, if one dares to admit it, an increase in the welfare either of\nthe individual or of society but . . . the enhancing and perfecting of\nlife as such. However much it may struggle against it, utilitarianism,\nas soon as it has become biological and sociological, undergoes a\nchange in its ethical character, and enters the service of\nsupra-ethical aims. Spencer still fights to keep it in the path of\nnatural ethical feeling.\n\nDeveloped utilitarianism, directed to the enhancing and perfecting of\nlife, can no longer regard the claims of humanity as absolutely\nbinding, but must make up its mind in certain cases to go outside\nthem. Biology has become its master.\n\nSociological ethics and socialism. Mechanical belief in progress\n\nIf it be granted that progress in the welfare of society depends on\nthe application of the conclusions of biology [pg 161] and scientific\nsociology, it is not as a matter of course necessary to leave to the\ngood pleasure of the individual the corresponding conduct which is to\nbe ethical. It can be imposed upon him, if by economic measures and\nmeasures of organization the relation between the individual and\nsociety is determined in such a way that it automatically functions in\nthe most effective way. Thus by the side of social ethics socialism\nmakes its appearance. Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825),_(_57_)_\nCharles Fourier (1772-1837)_(_58_)_ and P. J. Proudhon\n(1809-1865)_(_59_)_ in France, Robert Owen, the mill-owner\n(1771-1858),_(_60_)_ in England, and Ferdinand Lassalle\n(1825-64),_(_61_)_ and others in Germany, prelude its appearance. Karl\nMarx (1818-1883)_(_62_)_ and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) put forward\nin _Das Kapital_ its consistent programme, demanding the abolition of\nprivate property and the State-regulation both of labour and of the\nreward of labour.\n\n_Das Kapital_ is a doctrinaire book which works with definitions and\ntables, but never goes very deeply into questions of living and the\nconditions of living. The great influence it exerts rests on the fact\nthat it preaches belief in a progress which is inherent in events, and\nworks itself out in them automatically. It undertakes to unveil the\nmechanism of history, and to show how the succession of different\nmethods of social organization\u2014slavery, feudalism, the bourgeois\nwage-system\u2014tend towards the final replacement of private production\nby State-communistic [pg 162] production as the logical crown of\ncompleted evolution. Through Marx, Hegel\u2019s belief in inherent progress\nbecomes, if with a somewhat different interpretation, the conviction\nof the masses. His optimistic feeling for reality takes the helm.\n\nThrough the rise of socialism ethical utilitarianism loses in\nimportance. The hopes of the crowd begins to centre no longer on what\ncan be accomplished in the world by an ethical temper which is\nsteadily growing stronger, and working ever more and more effectively\nin social matters, but on what is reached when free course is secured\nfor the laws of progress which are assumed to be inherent in things.\n\nIt is true that ethical utilitarianism still maintains itself as an\ninfluential reforming temper among the educated. In the competition\nwith socialism there even starts a strong movement which stirs\nindividuals, society, and the State alike into effective action\nagainst social distress. One of its leaders is Friedrich Albert Lange\n(1828-1875), the author of _The History of Materialism_ (1866). In his\nwork _The Labour Question in its Significance for the Present and the\nFuture_ (1866) he discusses the social tasks of the time and the\nmeasures that will be effective for their accomplishment, and appeals\nfor ethical idealism without which, he says, nothing profitable can be\naccomplished._(_63_)_\n\nChristianity too supports the movement. In 1864 Bishop Ketteler, of\nMainz, comes forward, demanding in his book _The Labour Question and\nChristianity_ the creation of a Christian-social temper._(_64_)_\n\nIn England it is the clergymen, Frederick Denison Maurice (1805-1872)\nand Charles Kingsley (1819-1875), who bid Christendom adopt a social\ntemper. The latter\u2019s [pg 163] famous sermon _The Message of the Church\nto Working Men_ was preached in the evening of Sunday, June 22nd,\n1851, before the workers who had come to London to see the first\nInternational Exhibition. On account of the excitement it caused, the\nBishop of London inhibited him from preaching [in his\ndiocese]._(_65_)_\n\nIn Russia, Count Leo Tolstoi (1828-1910)_(_66_)_ lets loose the force\nof the ethical thinking of Jesus. He does not, like others, interpret\nhis words as teaching a social idealism focused on the service of\nsystematic purposive effort, but allows them to be the commands to the\nabsolute, uncalculating devotion which their author meant them to be.\nIn his _Confessions_, which in the eighties were read throughout the\nworld, the lava of primitive Christianity pours itself into the\nChristianity of modern times.\n\nThe social-ethical movement produces most result in Germany, because\nin that country the State welcomes it in the person of the\nHohenzollerns. In 1883 and 1884 the Reichstag passes, in spite of the\ndisapproving attitude of the Social Democratic Party, laws for the\nprotection of the worker which may be considered to be models of their\nkind.\n\nIn the bosom of socialism itself thoughtful spirits like Eduard\nBernstein (b. 1850),_(_67_)_ and others, come to see that even the\nmost effective measures taken for the social organization of society\ncannot succeed unless there is a strong [pg 164] ethical idealism\nbehind them as their driving force. This is a return to the spirit of\nLassalle.\n\nThere exists, then, an active social-ethical temper. But it is\nnevertheless only a trickling stream of water in a big river-bed. That\nthe reforms called for under the guidance of ethics can be realized is\nno longer a general conviction, as it was in the age of rationalism.\nThe ethical temper which wishes to work for the future of mankind\nbecomes less and less appreciated. In the victory, so fateful for the\ndevelopment of civilized mankind, won by Marxian State-socialism over\nthe social ideas of Lassalle which allow much more natural play to the\nforces of reality, we see an expression of the fact that in the\nmentality of the masses the belief-in-progress has emancipated itself\nfrom ethics and has become mechanical. Confusion in the conception of\ncivilization and ruin of the civilized temper are the consequence of\nthis disastrous separation. The spirit of the modern age renounces\nthereby the very thing which really constituted its strength.\n\nHow remarkable are the vicissitudes undergone by ethics!\nUtilitarianism refuses all contact with nature-philosophy. It wishes\nto be an ethic which is concerned only with the practical, but it does\nnot therefore escape its fate, which is to be wrecked upon\nnature-philosophy. In its attempt to secure a basis for itself and to\nthink itself out completely, it changes into biological-sociological\nutilitarianism. Next it loses its ethical character. Without becoming\naware of it, it has, of course, at the same time got entangled with\nnature and natural happenings, and has given cosmic problems a place\nwithin itself. Although it pretends to be only the practical ethic of\nhuman society it has become a product of nature. It has been no good\nremoving all the distaffs: the Sleeping Beauty pricks her finger\nnevertheless. No ethic can avoid coming to an understanding with\nnature-philosophy.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 165]\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\nSCHOPENHAUER AND NIETZSCHE\n\n\nSchopenhauer. An ethic of world- and life-denial\n\nAS bad luck will have it, the two most important ethical thinkers who\nspeak to us in the second half of the nineteenth century, Schopenhauer\nand Nietzsche, do not help the age in the search for what it needs,\nviz., a social ethic which is also true ethics. Concerned only with an\nindividualist ethic out of which no social ethic can be developed,\nthey offer incitements which, however valuable in themselves, cannot\narrest the demoralisation in world-view which is in progress.\n\nCommon to both is the fact that they are elemental moralists. They\npursue no abstract cosmic speculations. Ethics are for them an\nexperience of the will-to-live. They are therefore, from their very\ncore, cosmic.\n\nIn Schopenhauer the will-to-live tries to become ethical by turning to\nworld- and life-denial; in Nietzsche by devoting itself to a deepened\nworld- and life-affirmation.\n\nFrom the standpoint of their own elemental ethics these two thinkers,\nwho stand in such deep contrast to each other, rise as judges of what\nthey find accepted as ethics in their time.\n\nArthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) begins to publish at the beginning of\nthe century. His _The World as Will and Idea_ appears in 1819._(_68_)_\nBut he first obtains a hearing about 1860 when the speculative\nphilosophy had definitely gone bankrupt, and the unsatisfactory nature\nof the ethic of [pg 166] popular utilitarianism, as also of that of\nKant\u2019s successors, was generally acknowledged.\n\nThe most important among the earlier of these is Johann Friedrich\nHerbart (1776-1841). His importance lies in the department of\npsychological investigation. It is on a psychological foundation that\nhe tries to establish ethics in his _General Practical Philosophy_\n(1808). He traces the moral back to five direct and ultimate\njudgments, which are not derivable from anything beyond themselves,\nand which may be compared with \u00e6sthetic judgments. They are these: the\nideas of inward freedom, of perfection, of benevolence, of right, and\nof equity. By submitting itself to this mode of outlook, which starts\nfrom pure intuition and is confirmed as correct for human beings by\nthe course of their experience, the will becomes ethical.\n\nInstead, therefore, of seeking one basic principle only for the moral\nHerbart accepts several ethical ideas which appear side by side. This\nan\u00e6mic ethical theory possesses no convincing power. In his teaching,\nhowever, about society and the State Herbart does produce something\nsolid.\n\nTo the earlier successors of Kant there belongs also Immanuel Hermann\nFichte (1797-1879), a son of J. G. Fichte, the so-called Younger\nFichte, with his _System of Ethics_ (2 vols., 1850-1853), which in its\ntime enjoyed considerable repute.\n\nSchopenhauer is the first representative in Western thought of a\nconsistent world- and life-denying ethic. The suggestions which\nbrought him to it came to him from the philosophy of India, which\nearly in the nineteenth century began to be known in Europe._(_69_)_\nFor the exposition of his world-view he starts, like Fichte, from\nKant\u2019s epistemological idealism. Like Fichte he defines the essence of\nthings in themselves (which is to be accepted as underlying all\nphenomena) to be Will, not, however, like [pg 167] Fichte as will to\naction, but more directly and more correctly as will-to-live. The\nworld, he says, I can understand only by analogy with myself. Myself,\nlooked at from outside, I conceive as a sensible phenomenon in space\nand time, but looked at from within, as will-to-live. Correspondingly,\neverything which meets me in the phenomenal world is a manifestation\nof the will-to-live.\n\nWhat is the meaning, then, of the world-process? Simply that countless\nindividualities which are rooted in the universal will-to-live are\ncontinually seeking satisfaction in aims which they set before\nthemselves, in obedience to an inward impulse, and finding none. Again\nand again they experience the disappointment that pleasure longed for,\nnot pleasure attained, is real pleasure; they have continually to\nfight against hindrances; their own will-to-live continually comes\ninto conflict with other wills-to-live. The world is meaningless, and\nall existence is suffering. The knowledge of this is attained to by\nthe will-to-live in the highest living creatures, who are gifted with\nthe power of remaining always conscious that the totality of what is\naround them, outside themselves, is merely a world of appearances.\nSurveying in this way the totality of existence, the will is then in a\nposition to reach clarity of thought about itself and about existence.\n\nThat it must effect something in the world that is worth while is the\nobsession with which the will-to-live has befooled itself in European\nphilosophy. When it has attained to knowledge of itself, it knows that\noptimistic world-affirmation is of no benefit to it. It can only hurry\nit on from unrest to unrest, from disappointment to disappointment.\nWhat it must try to do is to step out from the terrible game in which,\nbedazzled, it is taking part, and settle itself to rest in world- and\nlife-denial.\n\nFor Spinoza the meaning of the world-process is that supreme\nindividualities arise, who find their experience within the Absolute;\nfor Fichte that the urge to activity of the Absolute comprehends\nitself in supreme individualities as ethical; for Hegel that the\nAbsolute comes in supreme [pg 168] individualities to adequate\nconsciousness of itself; for Schopenhauer that in individualities the\nAbsolute attains to knowledge of itself, and finds deliverance from\nthe blind urge to life-affirmation which is within it. The meaning of\nthe world-process, therefore, is always found in this: that the Finite\nand the Infinite blend their experiences of one another. Spinoza,\nFichte, and Hegel\u2014and this is the weakness of their world-view\u2014cannot\nmake it properly intelligible how far this experience in the Finite\ncan be said to have really a meaning for the Absolute. In\nSchopenhauer, however, it has such a meaning. In man the universal\nwill-to-live begins to turn from the path of unrest and suffering into\nthat of peace.\n\nThe transition from Being to nothingness is introduced. This\nnothingness is nothingness, it is true, only to the will-to-live,\nwhich is still filled with urge to life-affirmation and with its\nconception of the world. What it is in itself, this Nirvana of the\nBuddhists, cannot be defined with our conceptions, which come to us\nthrough our senses.\n\nThat Schopenhauer carries through his pessimistic-ethical world-view,\nas Fichte does his optimistic-ethical, with the material provided by\nepistemological idealism has not the importance that he himself\nattributes to this fact. Indian predecessors have made this connexion\neasier for him. In itself, pessimism can be developed just as well\nwithout epistemological idealism. The drama of the tragical experience\nof the will-to-live remains the same whatever the decorations and the\ncostumes with which it is played.\n\nAlthough, therefore, it makes its appearance in the dress of Kant\u2019s\ntheory of knowledge, Schopenhauer\u2019s philosophy is elemental\nnature-philosophy.\n\nWhat then are the ethical elements in his ethic?\n\nLike that of the Indians it appears in a threefold shape: as an ethic\nof resignation, as an ethic of universal pity, and as an ethic of\nworld-renunciation.\n\nAbout resignation Schopenhauer speaks in forcible words. In language\nwhich rises to the level of poetry, he [pg 169] describes how the man\nwho is intent on his own self-perfecting does not meet the destinies\nof his existence in childish resistance to what is hard, but feels\nthem as incitements to become free from the world. In the\ndisagreeables which poison existence for him, and in the misfortune\nwhich threatens to crush him, he suddenly feels himself lifted out of\neverything on which he sets value, and brought to the triumphant\nfeeling that nothing can any longer do him any harm. The field of\nresignation, which the philosophical ethics of modern times had\nallowed to lie fallow for generations, is replanted by Schopenhauer.\n\nEthics are pity. All life is suffering. The will-to-live which has\nattained to knowledge is therefore seized with deep pity for all\ncreatures. It experiences not only the woe of mankind, but that of all\ncreatures with it. What is called in ordinary ethics \u201clove\u201d is in its\nreal essence pity. In this powerful feeling of pity the will-to-live\nis diverted from itself. Its purification begins.\n\nHow anxious Kant and Hegel and others are in their ethics to deprive\ndirect pity of its rights, because it does not suit their theories!\nSchopenhauer takes the gag out of its mouth and bids it speak. Those\nwho, like Fichte, Schleiermacher, and others, ground ethics on a\npainfully thought out world-scheme, expect man to run every time to\nthe topmost attic of his reflexions to fetch down his motives to moral\naction. According to the sociological utilitarians he should always\nfirst sit down and calculate what is ethical. Schopenhauer bids him do\nsomething never yet heard of in philosophical ethics\u2014listen to his own\nheart. The elemental ethical which has by the others been pushed into\nthe corner, can now, thanks to him, takes its proper place again.\n\nThe others, in order not to get embarrassed with their theories, have\nto limit ethics exclusively to the conduct of man to man. They\nanxiously insist upon it that pity for animals is not ethical in\nitself, but has importance only in view of the kindly disposition\nwhich must ever be [pg 170] maintained among men. Schopenhauer tears\ndown these fences, and teaches love to the most insignificant being in\ncreation.\n\nThe artificial and curious pleas, too, which the rest produce to put\nman into an ethical relation to organised society disappear in\nSchopenhauer. Fichte\u2019s and Hegel\u2019s ethical over-valuation of the State\nmakes him smile. He himself is left free from the necessity of\ndragging into ethics things of the world which refuse to be fitted\ninto them. He can allow the conviction that ethics consist in being\ndifferent from the world to flame up in blinding clearness. He is\npledged to no concessions, since he does not, like the others,\nrepresent an ethic which wishes to do something purposive in the\nworld. Because his world-view is world- and life-denying he can be an\nelemental moralist when others have to renounce being such. Nor does\nhe need, like them, to sever all connexion with Jesus and religious\nethics. He can appeal as often as he likes to the fact that his\nphilosophy only establishes what has always been accepted by the piety\nof Christianity and of the Indians as the essential element in the\nmoral. It is well-known that Schopenhauer judged Christianity to have\nthe Indian spirit, and to be probably, in some way or other, of Indian\norigin._(_70_)_\n\nElemental ethics now obtain once more their right place in a thinking\nworld-view, and this explains the enthusiasm which Schopenhauer\narouses when he at last gets known. That it was possible to ignore for\nnearly forty years the very significant matter which he gave to the\nworld remains one of the most remarkable events in the history of\nEuropean thought. The optimistic world-view passed at that time for so\nself-evident that the man who laid hands upon it even in the directly\nilluminating thoughts upon ethics to which Schopenhauer gave\nutterance, could not obtain a hearing. At a later period also many\nattach themselves to Schopenhauer only because of his ethical maxims\nwith their natural and interesting appeal, and refuse to accept [pg\n171] his consistent world-view of world- and life-denial. It is a\nright feeling which guides them.\n\nAbsorption of ethics in world- and life-denial\n\nSchopenhauer\u2019s world-view, like that of the Brahmans, because it\nreveals itself as consistent world- and life-denial, is in the last\nresort not ethical but supra-ethical. Even though through several\nchapters of his ethics he can speak in more elemental fashion than\nSpinoza, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, he is nevertheless in\nreality no more ethical than they are. He ends, as they do, in the\nfrozen sea of the supra-ethical point of view, only at the South Pole\ninstead of at the North. The price which he pays for being able to\noutbid them in elemental ethics is his world view of world- and\nlife-denial. But the price is a ruinous one.\n\nWith Schopenhauer, as with the Indians, ethics are only a phase of\nworld- and life-denial. They are nothing in themselves but merely what\nthey are in the frame provided by that world-view. And everywhere\nthere peeps through his ethically tinted world- and life-denial world-\nand life-denial as such. Like a strange sun in the sky it devours\nethics, just as the real sun devours a cloud from which men are vainly\nhoping to get a refreshing shower of rain.\n\nOn the assumption of world- and life-denial all ethical action is\nillusory. Schopenhauer\u2019s pity is merely deliberative. Of pity which\nbrings help he can have no real knowledge any more than the Indian\nthinkers can. Like all will-to-action in the world, such pity has no\nmeaning. It has no power to lighten the misery of the rest of\ncreation, since that misery lies in the will-to-live, which is\nincurably full of suffering. The one thing, therefore, that pity can\ndo is to enlighten the will-to-live everywhere about the delusion in\nwhich it is held captive, and bring it to the apathy and peace offered\nby world- and life-denial. Schopenhauer\u2019s pity, like that of the\nBrahmans and the [pg 172] Buddha, is at bottom merely theoretical. It\ncan use as its own the words of the religion of love, but it stands at\na far lower level than the latter. Obstructing the way to any real\nethic of love it has before it, as the Indian thinkers also have, the\nideal of absolute inactivity.\n\nThe ethic of self-perfecting also is present in Schopenhauer more in\nword than in reality. The attainment of inward freedom from the world\nis really ethical only if the personality is thereby enabled to work\nas a more direct force in the world, but this thought is not to be\nfound either in Schopenhauer or in the Indians. World- and life-denial\nis with them an end in itself, and it continues to assert itself when\nits ethical character has ceased. Higher than ethics, says\nSchopenhauer, stands asceticism. Everything which helps to deaden the\nwill-to-live, is to him significant. Men and women who renounce love\nand the hope of offspring so that there may be less life in the world,\nare to him in the right. Those who deliberately choose religious\nsuicide, and after employing every conceivable device for deadening\nthe will-to-live allow the lamp of life to be extinguished, as the\nBrahmans do, by withholding all nourishment from the body, these\nsimilarly act as truly enlightened. Only suicide as the outcome of\ndespair is to be rejected. That is, of course, not a result of the\ntrue life-denial, but is, on the contrary, the act of a life-affirming\nwill, which is only discontented with the conditions in which it finds\nitself._(_71_)_\n\nWith Schopenhauer, then, ethics reach only so far as world- and\nlife-denial has willed and is in a position to declare itself ethical.\nThey are only an introduction to, and a preparation for, liberation\nfrom the world. It is, at bottom, by an intellectual act that the\nsuspension of the will-to-live is consummated. If I have won my way\nthrough to the understanding that the whole phenomenal world is\ndelusion and misery, and that my will-to-live has no need to take\nseriously the world and itself, then I am released. How far and to\nwhat extent I then take part in [pg 173] the game of life with the\nconsciousness that I am but a player in it, has no importance.\n\nSchopenhauer does not think out the pessimistic world-view in the\ngreat and calm manner of the wise men of India. He behaves under its\ninfluence like a nervous and ailing European. While they, on the\nground of the liberating knowledge they have reached, advance with\nmajestic gait from the ethical to the supra-ethical, and leave behind\nthem good and evil as two things, over both of which they have equally\ntriumphed, he reveals himself as a miserable Western sceptic._(_72_)_\nIncapable of living out the world-view which he preaches, he clings to\nlife as to money, appreciates the pleasures of the table as well as\nthose of love, and has more contempt than pity for mankind. As though\nto justify himself in this, he in _The World as Will and Idea_, where\nhe has just been speaking about the deadening of the will-to-live,\nrebels against the notion that anyone who teaches a saintly course of\nlife must also live like a saint. \u201cIt is indeed,\u201d so runs the famous\npassage, \u201ca strange demand to make of a moralist that he shall\nrecommend no other virtue than those which he himself possesses. To\nsum up in a series of conceptions the whole essence of the world, in\nabstract terms, in general terms, and with clearness, and to offer it\nthus as a reflected copy in permanent rational conceptions which are\nalways ready to hand; that and nothing else is philosophy.\u201d_(_73_)_\n\nWith these sentences Schopenhauer\u2019s philosophy commits suicide. Hegel\nhas a right to say that philosophy is not imperative but only\nreflective thinking, for his own philosophy does not claim to be\nanything more. But _The World as Will and Idea_ protests with\nilluminating language and in a tone of urgent entreaty against the\nwill-to-live. It ought therefore to be the life-creed of the man whose\nvoice it is.\n\n[pg 174]\n\nThe fact that Schopenhauer can for a moment so far forget himself as\nto express himself sceptically about ethics has its own deep-reaching\nexplanation. It belongs to the essence of world- and life-denial,\nwhich he wishes to proclaim as ethics, that it cannot be thought out\nconsistently to a conclusion, and that it cannot be put consistently\ninto practice. Even with the Brahmans and the Buddha it keeps itself\nalive by inadmissible concessions to world- and life-affirmation. But\nwith Schopenhauer it goes so far in that direction that he can no\nlonger make any attempt to bring theory and practice into harmony, but\nmust move about resolutely in an atmosphere of unveracity.\n\nSchopenhauer does succeed in letting the ethical appearance which\nworld- and life-denial can assume, shine out in brilliant colours. But\nof really producing an ethic out of world- and life-denial he is as\nlittle capable as the Indians.\n\nNietzsche\u2019s criticism of current ethics\n\nFriedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) in the early period of his activity is\nunder the spell of Schopenhauer._(_74_)_ One of his _Old-fashioned\nReflexions_ bears the title: \u201cSchopenhauer as Educator.\u201d Later on he\ngoes through a development which leads him to recognise as the ideal a\nscientifically deepened Positivism and Utilitarianism. He is his real\nself first when, starting with _Joyous Science_, he tries to establish\nhis world-view of the higher life-affirmation, and thereby becomes\nanti-Schopenhauer, anti-Christian, and anti-Utilitarian.\n\nThe criticism he passes upon the philosophical and religious ethics\nwhich he finds accepted is passionate and spiteful. But it goes deep.\nHe casts at them two reproaches, viz. that they have made a pact with\nunveracity, and that they do not allow men to become personalities. In\n[pg 175] this he says only what had long been due. Sceptics had\nalready made public many such complaints. But he speaks as one who is\nsearching for the truth, and who is concerned about the spiritual\nfuture of mankind, thus giving such complaints a new tone and a wider\nrange. Whereas the current philosophy believed that it had in the main\nsolved the ethical problem, and was united with biological and\nsociological utilitarianism in the conviction that in the department\nof individual ethics there were no more discoveries to be made,\nNietzsche turns the whole game upside down, and shows that all ethics\nrest upon those of the individual. The question about the essential\nnature of good and evil which was generally accepted as settled, he\nputs forward again in elemental fashion. The truth that ethics in\ntheir essential nature are a process of self-perfecting shines out in\nhim, as in Kant, although in a different light. Hence his place is in\nthe first rank of the ethical thinkers of mankind. Those who were torn\nfrom their false certainty when his impassioned writings descended on\nthe lowlands of the thought of the outgoing nineteenth century, as the\nsouth wind sweeps down from the high mountains in spring, can never\nforget the gratitude they owe to this upheaver of thought, with his\npreaching of veracity and personality.\n\nAccepted ethics are deficient in veracity, according to Nietzsche,\nbecause the conceptions of good and evil which they make current do\nnot spring out of man\u2019s reflexion on the meaning of his life, but have\nbeen invented in order to keep individuals useful to the majority. The\nweak proclaim that sympathy and love are good, because that is to\ntheir advantage. Thus led astray, all men try to force themselves to\nthe opinion that they fulfil the highest destiny of their existence by\nsurrender of themselves and devotion to others. But this opinion never\nbecomes with them a real inward conviction. They live out their lives\nwithout any thought of their own as to what makes their life valuable.\nThey join the crowd in praising the morality of humility and\nself-sacrifice as the true morality, but they [pg 176] do not really\nbelieve in it. They feel self-assertion to be what is natural, and act\naccordingly without admitting the fact to themselves. The public\nethical respect paid to humility and self-sacrifice they do not\nquestion; they help to maintain it, from fear that individuals\nstronger than themselves might become dangerous to them, if this\nmethod of taming men were abandoned.\n\nCurrent ethics, then, are something with which mankind as a whole is\ndeceived by means of traditional views, and with which individuals\ndeceive themselves.\n\nWith indignant statements like these Nietzsche is so far in the right,\nthat the ethic of humility and self-sacrifice does as a matter of\nprinciple avoid coming to a clear and practical understanding with\nreality. It lives by leaving quite undetermined the degree of\nlife-denial which is involved in it. In theory it proclaims\nlife-denial; in practice, however, it allows a life-affirmation which\nhas thereby become unnatural and sickly to prevail. Stripped of all\nits passion, then, Nietzsche\u2019s criticism means that only that ethic\ndeserves to be accepted as current which springs from independent\nreflexion on the meaning of life, and comes to a straightforward\nunderstanding with reality.\n\nIndividual ethics come before social ethics. Not what ethics mean for\nsociety, but what they mean for the perfecting of the individual, is\nthe first question which has to be put to them. Do they allow a man to\nbecome a personality or not? It is here, says Nietzsche, that current\nethics fail. They do not allow men to grow straight up, but trains\nthem like stunted trees on espaliers. They put humility and\nself-surrender before men as the content of perfection, but to the\nethical, which consists in man being one with himself, and veracious\nthrough and through, they contribute nothing.\n\nWhat does \u201cnoble\u201d mean? shouts Nietzsche to his age with harsh words as\nbeing the ethical question which has been forgotten. Those who, when\nthe question re-echoed everywhere, were touched by the truth which was\nstirring, and by the anxiety which was trembling within it, [pg 177]\nhave received from that solitary thinker all that he had to give to\nthe world.\n\nIf life-denial brings with it so much that is unnatural and fraught\nwith doubt, it cannot be ethics. Ethics, then, must consist of a\nhigher life-affirmation.\n\nNietzsche\u2019s ethic of higher life-affirmation\n\nBut what is the higher life-affirmation? Fichte and the speculative\nphilosophers generally make it consist in this, that the will of man\nconceives itself within the infinite will and in consequence of this\nno longer belongs to the universe in merely natural fashion, but\nsurrenders itself knowingly and willingly to the latter as an energy\nwhich acts in intelligent harmony with the infinite will. Nietzsche\nsees clearly that in this way they have not arrived at any convincing\nidea of the content of the higher life-affirmation, but are moving in\nthe region of the abstract. He himself means to remain at all costs\nelemental, and he therefore avoids philosophizing about the universe,\nshowing himself thereby to be a true moralist like Socrates. He jeers\nat those who, not content with belittling mankind, proceed further to\nprofane the reality of the world by declaring that it exists merely in\nthe human imagination. It is only on the essential nature of the\nwill-to-live and the way to use it most completely in experience, that\nhe himself wishes to reflect.\n\nHis original belief was that he could conceive the higher\nlife-affirmation as the development to a higher spirituality of the\nwill-to-live. When, however, he attempted to carry this idea through,\nit took on, without his being aware of it, another form. Higher\nspirituality means, of course, the repressing of natural impulses and\nnatural claims on life, and is thereby connected in some way or other\nwith life-denial. Higher life-affirmation, therefore, can only consist\nin the content of the will-to-live being raised to its highest\nconceivable power. Man carries out the meaning of his life by\naffirming with the clearest consciousness of [pg 178] himself\neverything that is within him\u2014even his impulses to secure power and\npleasure.\n\nBut the opposition between the spiritual and the natural Nietzsche\ncannot get rid of. Just in proportion as he emphasizes the natural\ndoes the spiritual shrink back. Under the visible influence of the\nmental disease which is threatening him the ideal man grows into the\n\u201csuperman,\u201d who asserts himself triumphantly against all fate, and\nseeks his own ends without any consideration for the rest of mankind.\n\nFrom the very outset Nietzsche is condemned, in his thinking out of\nwhat life-affirmation means, to arrive at the higher form of it by a\nmore or less meaningless living out of life to the full. He wants to\nlisten to the highest efforts of the will-to-live without putting it\nin any relation to the universe. But the higher life-affirmation can\nbe a living thing only when life-affirmation tries to conceive itself\nin world-affirmation. Life-affirmation in itself, in whichever\ndirection it turns, can only become enhanced life-affirmation, never a\nhigher form of it. It careers about in circles unable to take any\nfixed course, like a ship with its steering apparatus tied firmly up.\n\nNietzsche, however, instinctively shrinks from fitting\nlife-affirmation into world-affirmation, and bringing it by that\nmethod to development into a higher and ethical life-affirmation.\nLife-affirmation within world-affirmation means devotion to the world,\nbut with that there follows somehow or other life-denial within the\nlife-affirmation. But it is just this interplay of the two that\nNietzsche wants to get rid of, because it is there that ordinary\nethics come to grief. . . .\n\nNietzsche was not the first to put forward in Western thought the\ntheory of living one\u2019s own life to the full. Greek sophists and others\nafter them anticipated him by this. There is a great difference,\nhowever, between him and his predecessors. They are for living a full\nlife because it brings them enjoyment. He, on the other hand brings to\nthe theory the much deeper thought that by living [pg 179] one\u2019s own\nlife victoriously to the full life itself is honoured, and that by\nraising life to a higher power the meaning of existence is brought\nout. Men of genius and strong individuality, therefore, should be\nintent only on allowing the greatness that is in them to become an\nactuality._(_75_)_\n\nNietzsche\u2019s true predecessors are unknown to him. They have their\nhome, like those of Spinoza, in China. In that country\nlife-affirmation made the attempt to come to clear ideas about itself.\nIn Lao-tse and his pupils it is still na\u00efvely ethical. In Chwang-tse\nit becomes cheerful resignation; in Lie-tse the will to secret power\nover things; in Yang-tse it ends in an all-round living of life to the\nfull. Nietzsche is a synthesis, showing itself in a European\nmentality, of Lie-tse and Yang-tse. It is only we Europeans who are\ncapable of producing the philosophy of brutality.\n\nZarathustra is for Nietzsche the symbol of the thoughts which are\nforming within him: Zarathustra as the hero of veracity who ventures\nto value natural life as a good, and as the genius who is far removed\nfrom the Judaeo-Christian mode of thought.\n\nNietzsche is at bottom no more unethical than Schopenhauer. He is\nmisled by the ethical element which there is in life-affirmation into\ngiving the status of ethics to life-affirmation as such. Thereby he\nfalls into the absurdities which follows from an exclusive affirmation\nof life, just as Schopenhauer falls into those of an exclusive denial\nof life. Nietzsche\u2019s will-to-power should cause no more offence than\nSchopenhauer\u2019s will-to-self-annihilation, as it is explained in the\npassages in his works which deal with asceticism. It is interesting to\nnote that neither of the two men lives in accordance with his view of\nlife. Schopenhauer is no [pg 180] ascetic but a _bon vivant_, and\nNietzsche does not lord it over his fellow men but lives in seclusion.\n\nLife-affirmation and life-denial are both for a certain distance\nethical; pursued to a conclusion both are unethical. This result,\nwhich was reached by the optimistic thought of China and the\npessimistic thought of India, makes its appearance in Europe in\nNietzsche and Schopenhauer because they are the only thinkers in this\ncontinent who philosophise in elemental fashion about the\nwill-to-live, and venture to follow the paths of one-sidedness. Each\ncompleting the other, they pronounce sentence on the ethics of\nEuropean philosophy by bringing into daylight again the elemental\nethical thoughts contained in life-denial as well as in\nlife-affirmation, thoughts which philosophy was keeping buried.\nArriving as they do at the non-ethical by thinking out to a\nconclusion, one of them life-denial, the other life-affirmation, they\ncorroborate, if taken together, the statement that the ethical\nconsists neither of life-denial nor of life-affirmation, but is a\nmysterious combination of the two.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 181]\n\nCHAPTER XVI\n\nTHE ISSUE OF THE WESTERN STRUGGLE FOR A WORLD-VIEW\n\n\nAcademic thinkers: Sidgwick, Stephen, Alexander, Wundt, Paulsen,\nH\u00f6ffding\n\nTHE attempts of speculative philosophy to find a foundation for ethics\nin knowledge of the nature of the world have come to grief. Ethics\nbased on science and sociology have shown themselves powerless.\nSchopenhauer and Nietzsche, although they bring back into general\nacceptance some elementary questions of ethics, are unable,\nnevertheless, to establish a satisfying ethic.\n\nIn the later decades of the nineteenth century, therefore, ethics find\nthemselves in an unenviable position. They remain of good courage,\nhowever, being confident that they have at their disposal a\nsufficiency of \u201cscientifically\u201d recognized results to guarantee them\nan assured existence.\n\nThis conviction is produced by a series of inter-related works\u2014chiefly\nacademic manuals of ethics. Their authors are of the opinion that\nethics can be built, like the arch of a bridge, upon two piers. One of\ntheir piers is the natural ethical disposition of man; the other they\nallow themselves to find in those needs of society which influence the\nspirit and temper of individuals. They consider their task to be the\nbringing into actual existence of the arch (the possibility of\ncompleting which they take for granted), with the solid material of\nmodern psychology, biology, and sociology, and the dividing of the\nload in the best calculated way between the two piers. Fundamentally\nthey do nothing beyond restoring with new means the standpoint of\nHume.\n\nThe following writers try to carry through this adjustment of the\nethics which start from the standpoint of [pg 182] ethical personality\nand those which start from that of society: Henry Sidgwick\n(1838-1900),_(_76_)_ Leslie Stephen (1832-1904),_(_77_)_ Samuel\nAlexander (b. 1859),_(_78_)_ Wilhelm Wundt (b. 1832),_(_79_)_\nFriedrich Paulsen (1846-1908),_(_80_)_ Friedrich Jodl (b.\n1849),_(_81_)_ Georg von Gizyki (1851-1895),_(_82_)_ Harald H\u00f6ffding\n(b. 1843),_(_83_)_ and others. Of these ethical writers who, in spite\nof the variety of experience they bring to bear on the subject, are\nessentially related to one another, the most original is Leslie\nStephen, the scientifically soundest is Wilhelm Wundt, the most\nethical is Harald H\u00f6ffding.\n\nH\u00f6ffding makes the ethical originate partly out of a consideration\nwhich limits the sovereignty of the present minute. \u201cAn action (he\nsays) is good which preserves the totality of life and gives fulness\nand life to its content; an action is bad which has a more or less\ndecided tendency to break into and narrow the totality of life and its\ncontent.\u201d Supporting this consideration come also instincts of\nsympathy, which make us feel pleasure in the pleasure of others, and\npain at their pain. The aim of ethics is general prosperity.\n\nOf these ethical writers some put the chief emphasis on the ethical\ndisposition of the individual, while others hold that ethics are\nconstituted chiefly by their content, which aims at the good of\nsociety. What is common to them all [pg 183] is that they try to\ncombine the ethic of ethical personality and the ethic of\nutilitarianism without having inquired into their higher unity. That\nis why the chapters in which they touch on the problem of the basic\nprinciple of the moral are always the part of their works which is the\nleast clear and the least living. One is conscious of how happy they\nfeel when they have waded through this swamp, and can launch out into\nconsideration of the different ethical standpoints which have emerged\nin history, or can face questions on single points in ethical\npractice. And when they handle practical questions, it is obvious that\nthey are not in possession of any usable basic principle of the moral.\nTheir coming to terms with reality is a mere groping here and there.\nThe considerations on the strength of which they decide are set out\nnow in this sense, now in that. Hence these ethical writers frequently\noffer very interesting discussions on ethical problems, but the\nconception of the moral never gets from them any real explanation or\nany deepening. The criterion of a real ethic is whether it allows\ntheir full rights to the problems of personal morality and of the\nrelation of man to man, problems with which we are concerned every day\nand every hour, and in which we must become ethical personalities.\nThese academical works do not do this. Therefore, although they may\narrive at results which deserve attention, they are not capable of\ngiving effective ethical impulses to the thought of their time.\n\nThe ethic of self-perfecting. Kant\u2019s successors: Cohen, Herrmann\n\nThis mediating ethic is not left uncriticized. In Germany inheritors\nof the Kantian spirit like Hermann Cohen (b. 1842)_(_84_)_ and Wilhelm\nHerrmann (1846-1922)_(_85_)_ oppose [pg 184] it, and in\nEnglish-speaking countries successors of the Intuitionists like James\nMartineau (1805-1900),_(_86_)_ F. H. Bradley (b. 1846),_(_87_)_ T. H.\nGreen (1836-1882),_(_88_)_ Simon Laurie (1829-1909),_(_89_)_ and James\nSeth (b. 1860)._(_90_)_\n\nIn spite of wide differences in detail these thinkers agree in\nrefusing to derive ethics either from the ethical disposition of man\nor from the claims of society. They represent them as produced\nentirely through the ethical personality. To become ethical\npersonalities, however, (so they say) we step out of ourselves and\nwork for the good of the community.\n\nCohen and Herrmann attempt to reach an ethic which is a consistent\nunity by using logic to put a content into the empty categorical\nimperative of Kant. They wish to make good what he missed in his\n_Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_ (Foundations for a Metaphysic\nof Morals) and in his _Metaphysik der Sitten_ (A Metaphysic of\nMorals). Cohen finds the origin of ethics in the pure Will thinking\nout the idea of one\u2019s fellow-man and that of the associating of men to\nform a state, his ethical ego being brought into existence by this\nlogical operation. The ethic thus attained consists in honesty,\nmodesty, loyalty, justice, and humanity, and culminates in the\nrepresentation of the state as the highest creation of the moral\nspirit. But that this ethic is only the offspring of mental ability is\nbetrayed by the whole story of its appearance. The \u201cpure will\u201d is an\nabstraction which cannot start anything.\n\nInstead of obtaining an ethic by deduction, using abstract logical\nmethods, Wilhelm Herrmann opens for it the back-door of experience. He\ndoes indeed make ethics consist in \u201cthe bowing of the individual\nbefore the power [pg 185] of a something which is universally valid in\nthought,\u201d but that content of ethics which is a necessity of thought\nwe are to reach by seeing ourselves in each other as if in a mirror,\nand deciding what kind of conduct makes us mutually \u201creliable.\u201d The\nthought of the unconditional claim originates, therefore,\nspontaneously in us, but awakes to the fact that it is determined by\nits content \u201cthrough experience of human intercourse, and in the\nrelation of reliability.\u201d\n\nHerrmann did not carry this philosophic ethic through to completion.\nHe sketches it as an introduction to a not less artificial theological\nethic. His conception is allied to Adam Smith\u2019s theory of the\nimpartial third party (see page 82).\n\nMartineau, Green, Bradley, Laurie, Seth, and Royce\n\nMartineau, Green, Bradley, Laurie, and Seth try to reach an ethic\nwhich is a consistent unity by making the whole of ethics originate in\nthe need of self-perfecting. Of these, Martineau goes more on the\nlines of the moralists of the eighteenth century, known as the\nCambridge Platonists. Ethics consist for him in thinking ourselves\ninto the ideal of perfection, which God gave us with our life, and\nletting ourselves be determined by it. T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley,\nSimon Laurie, and James Seth show more or less the influence of J. G.\nFichte. The ethical is with them founded on the fact that man wishes\nto live his life out in the deepest way as an effective personality,\nand thereby attain to true union with the infinite spirit. This\nthought is expounded best by T. H. Green. He is also led at the same\ntime to the relation between civilization and ethics, and lays it down\nthat all the achievements of human activity, especially the political\nand social perfecting of society, are nothing in themselves, and have\na real meaning only so far as they render more thorough inward\nperfecting attainable by individuals. A spiritualized conception of\ncivilization is therefore now struggling [pg 186] for acceptance. An\nupholder on American soil of this ethic of self-perfecting is Josiah\nRoyce (1855-1916)._(_91_)_\n\nIn the effort to conceive of ethics as a whole as being an ethic of\nself-perfecting, that is to say of conduct which springs from inward\nnecessity, these thinkers express thoughts which belong to a living\nethic. To be energetically concerned with the basic principle of the\nmoral, even though one be led in the direction of the universal and\napparently abstract, always brings with it results which are valuable\nfor practice, even if the solution of the problem itself is not\nthereby advanced beyond a certain point.\n\nThese thinkers go so far on these lines as to conceive of ethics as\nhigher life-affirmation, consisting in devoting ourselves to the\nactivity which the world-spirit wills for us. They represent the\nmysticism of activity taught by J. G. Fichte, but without its\nspeculative foundation.\n\nThey leave unsolved, however, nay, they do not even put the question,\nhow the higher life-affirmation comes to give itself a content which\nstands in contradiction to the course of nature. They conceive of\nhigher life-affirmation as self-devotion, that is to say as\nlife-affirmation within which life-denial is active. But how does this\nparadox come about? How far is this direction of the will, which\ncontradicts the natural will-to-live, a necessity of thought? Why must\nmen become different from the world in order to exist and work in the\nworld in true harmony with the world-spirit? And what meaning has this\nconduct of his for the happenings which take place in the universe?\n\nNature-philosophy and ethics. Fouill\u00e9e, Guyau, Lange, Stern\n\nThe thought of Alfred Fouill\u00e9e (1838-1913)_(_92_)_ and Jean [pg 187]\nMarie Guyau (1854-1888)_(_93_)_ also circles round the conception of\nethics as higher life-affirmation. They too conceive of the ethical as\ndevotion, that is to say, as life-affirmation within which life-denial\nis present, but they dig deeper than the English and American\nrepresentatives of the ethic of self-perfecting, in that they seek to\nconceive of ethics within a nature-philosophy. Hence questions come to\nbe discussed which remain unnoticed in the former. The problems of the\nbasic principle of the moral and that of the optimistic-ethical\nworld-view are once more opened up and, for the first time, in a\ncomprehensive and elemental way.\n\nFouill\u00e9e philosophises in a noble way about the will-to-live. The\nideas which arise in us, directed towards ethical ideals, are (he\nsays), like our ideas generally, not simply something produced by\nthought, but are the expression of forces which press within us\ntowards making existence full and complete._(_94_)_ Speaking\ngenerally, we must in this matter clearly understand that the\nevolution which in the course of the world produces and maintains\nexistence is the work of re-presentative forces (_id\u00e9es-forces_), and\nis therefore to be explained in the last analysis as psychic. It\nreaches its highest point in man\u2019s ideas, which will their ends with\nclear consciousness. In this highest being, man, reality gets so far\nas to produce ideals which go out beyond reality, and by their means\nto be led on beyond itself. Ethics are therefore a result of the\nevolution of the world. The idea of self-perfecting through devotion,\nwhich we experience as the puzzling element within us, is after all a\nnatural manifestation of the will-to-live. The ego which has reached\nthe farthest height of willing and representing enlarges itself by\noverflowing upon other human existences. Devotion is, therefore, not a\nsurrender of the self, but a [pg 188] manifestation of its\nexpansion._(_95_)_ The man who analyses himself more deeply learns by\nexperience that the highest life-affirmation comes about, not by the\nnatural will-to-live simply rising into will-to-power, but by its\n\u201cexpanding.\u201d \u201cAct towards others as if you became conscious of them at\nthe same time as you become conscious of yourself.\u201d_(_96_)_\n\nJean Marie Guyau, a pupil and friend of Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s, in his _Sketch of\nan Ethic without Obligation or Sanction_, tries to work out the\nthought of this ethical life-affirmation through expansion. Ordinary\nethics, he says, stand helpless before this insoluble cleft between\nthe ego and other men, but living nature makes no stop at that point.\nThe individual life is expansive because it is life. As in the\nphysical sphere it carries within itself the impulse to produce fresh\nlife like itself, so in the spiritual sphere also it wishes to widen\nits own existence by linking it on to other life like itself. Life\nincludes not feeding only, but also production and fruitfulness; real\nliving is not a taking in only, but a giving out of oneself as well.\nMan is an organism which imparts itself to others; its perfection\nconsists in the most complete imparting of itself. In this\nphilosophizing, then, Hume\u2019s notion of sympathy is given more profound\nexpression.\n\nFouill\u00e9e and Guyau, both of them invalids, lived together at Nice and\nMentone. Trying in one another\u2019s company to realise the ethical higher\nlife-affirmation, they take their exercise on the very shore on which\nNietzsche that same year thought out his heightened life-affirmation\nof _Beyond Good and Evil_. He knows their works, as they also know\nhis, but as men they remain personally unknown to each other._(_97_)_\n\n[pg 189]\n\nFouill\u00e9e and Guyau, because they think deeply, are led to\nnature-philosophy by their philosophizing about the way in which the\nwill-to-live is to become ethical. They wish to conceive ethics,\nwithin a world- and life-affirming nature-philosophy, as a deepening,\nwhich is a necessity of thought, of life-affirmation. They thus join\nthe procession of the Chinese monists. That which these, like Spinoza\nand Fichte, attempted and failed to do, they attempt again in the\nconfidence that their nature-philosophy will be fairer to the\nconception of living existence than that of the others was.\n\nNavigating the rushing stream of heightened life-affirmation, they try\nwith mighty efforts at the oars to reach the bank of the ethical. They\nbelieve that they will be able to land there . . . but the waves carry\nthem past it, as they did all those who attempted the journey before\nthem.\n\nThat life-affirmation in its highest form, by a paradox which lies in\nthe nature of things, becomes ethical devotion to others they cannot\nshow convincingly. This proposition, in which they would transform the\nnatural world-view into an ethical one, is truth only for the thought\nwhich dares to make the same jump because it sees no possibility\notherwise of reaching land from the drifting boat.\n\nThe ethic of Fouill\u00e9e and Guyau, then, is an enthusiastic conception\nof life to which man pulls himself up when coming to terms with\nreality, in order to assert himself and exert himself in the universe\nin accordance with a higher value which he feels in himself.\n\nFouill\u00e9e and Guyau are, therefore, elemental moralists like\nSchopenhauer and Nietzsche. They are not, however, like the latter,\nmaking a voyage with their rudder tightly lashed in the circle of\nworld- and life-denial or of world- and life-affirmation; they hold on\ntheir course with sure feeling towards the mysterious union of\nworld-affirmation, life-affirmation, and life-denial which constitutes\nethical life-affirmation. . . . But this course takes them out over\nthe boundless ocean. They never reach land.\n\n[pg 190]\n\nIn order to understand themselves as a direction of the will-to-live\nwhich is a necessity of thought, and to think themselves out to an\nethical world-view, ethics must come to terms with nature-philosophy.\nWe find them, then, attempting\u2014as did the Rationalists, and Kant, and\nthe speculative philosophers\u2014to read into the world, in simple or in\ndetailed thought, an optimistic-ethical meaning, or at least, as with\nSpinoza, to give an ethical character in some way or other to the\nrelation of the individual to the universe. These two men also,\nFouill\u00e9e and Guyau, wrestle with nature-philosophy in order from it to\njustify ethics and an ethical world-view as not without meaning. At\nthe same time, however, they dare\u2014and this is the new element which\nappears in them\u2014to look straight in the face the possibility that it\nwill perhaps be impossible to carry their undertaking through. What\nwill then become of ethics and world-view? Although they ought really\nto totter and fall, they do nevertheless remain standing\u2014so Fouill\u00e9e\nand Guyau judge.\n\nWhether the idea of the good can finally claim any objective validity\ncannot be asserted with complete confidence, says Fouill\u00e9e in his\n_Morale des Id\u00e9es-forces_. Man must finally be content to force\nhimself to acceptance of the ethically expansive life-affirmation,\nmerely because he feels it to be the only thing which is capable of\nmaking life valuable. Out of love for the ideal he triumphs over all\ndoubt, and sacrifices himself to it, untroubled about whether or no\nanything results from his doing so.\n\nGuyau\u2019s _Sketch of a Morality without Obligations or Sanctions_ ends\nin similar thoughts. An inner force, he says, works upon us and drives\nus forward. Do we go forward alone, or will the idea eventually win\nfor itself some influence upon nature? . . . Anyhow let us go forward!\n. . . \u201cPerhaps the earth, perhaps mankind, will one day reach some as\nyet unknown goal which they themselves have created. There is no hand\nleading us, no eye watching on our behalf; the rudder was broken long\nago, [pg 191] or rather there never was one at all; it has to be\nprovided. That is a big task, and it is our task.\u201d . . . Ethical men\nare crossing the ocean of events on a rudderless and mastless\nderelict, so to say, hoping nevertheless that they will some day and\nsomewhere reach land.\n\nIn these sentences there is announced from a distance the\ndisappearance of the optimistic-ethical interpretation of the world.\nBecause they venture on renouncing this, and proclaim in principle the\nsovereign independence of ethics, Fouill\u00e9e and Guyau belong to the\ngreatest thinkers who have had a share in shaping our world-view.\n\nThey do not, however, follow to the end the path on which they have\nstumbled. While they make ethics independent of whether its activity\ncan or cannot prove itself legitimate as significant and effective in\nthe totality of world-happenings, they assume the existence of a\nconflict between world-view and life-view, which philosophy down to\ntheir day had actually not noticed. But they do not investigate its\nnature, and do not show how it is that life-view can venture to assert\nitself in opposition to world-view, and even to exalt itself as the\nmore important. They are content to prophesy that ethics and ethical\nworld-view will grow green again as mighty oases, fed by subterranean\nsprings, even if the sand-storms of scepticism should have turned into\na desert the broad territory of the optimistic-ethical knowledge of\nthe world, in which we once wanted to make our home. At bottom,\nhowever, they hope that nothing like this will happen, and their\nconfidence that a nature-philosophy which deals in the proper way with\nthe nature of Being will after all finally reach an ethic and a\nworld-view, is not completely overthrown.\n\nSince they at first claim only a hypothetical validity for their new\nview, and do not carry it through as a matter of principle, Fouill\u00e9e\nand Guyau do not exercise upon the thought of the end of the\nnineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth the influence\nwhich they ought to have. Their age was, indeed, not ready for that\n[pg 192] renunciation of knowledge for which their writings were\npreparing the way.\n\nA forerunner of their ethic is to be found in that which Friedrich\nAlbert Lange sketches as his own at the end of his _History of\nMaterialism_ (1866). Ethics, he says, are an imaginative creation on\nwhich we determine, because we carry an ideal within ourselves. We\nrise above the actual because we find no satisfaction in it. We are\nethical because our life thereby obtains a definite character such as\nwe long for. . . . Ethics mean becoming free from the world.\n\nLange also, then, has already reached the view that from direct\nphilosophizing about the world and life an ethical world-view results,\nnot as a necessity of thought, but as a necessity for life. But like\nthe two French thinkers he just throws out the thought instead of\nfollowing it out into all its presuppositions and consequences.\n\nA peculiar supplement which completes the ethics of Fouill\u00e9e, Guyau,\nand Lange, without actually going back to them, is provided by the\nBerlin physician, Wilhelm Stern, in an inquiry, which has attracted\nfar too little notice, into the evolutionary origin of ethics. The\nessential nature of the moral, he says, is the impulse to maintenance\nof life by the repelling of all injurious attacks upon it, an impulse\nthrough which the individual being experiences a feeling of\nrelationship to all other animate beings in face of nature\u2019s injurious\nattacks upon them. How has this mentality arisen in us? Through the\nfact that animate beings of the most varied kinds have been obliged\nthrough countless generations to fight side by side for existence\nagainst the forces of nature, and in their common distress have ceased\nto be hostile to one another, so that they might attempt a common\nresistance to the annihilation which threatened them, instead of\nsuccumbing in a common ruin. This experience, which began with their\nfirst and lowest stage of existence and has become through thousands\nof millions of generations more and more [pg 193] pronounced, has\ngiven its special character to the psychology of all living beings.\nAll ethics are an affirmation of life, the character of which is\ndetermined by perception of the dangers to existence which living\nbeings experience in common.\n\nHow much deeper Wilhelm Stern digs than Darwin did! According to\nDarwin, experience of the never-ceasing, universal danger to existence\nproduces finally nothing but the herd-instinct, which holds together\ncreatures of the same species. According to Stern, there is developed\nby the same experience a kind of solidarity with everything that\nlives. The barriers fall. Man experiences sympathy with animals, as\nthey experience it, only less completely, with him. Ethics are not\nonly something peculiar to man, but something which, though in a less\ndeveloped form, is to be seen also in the animal world as such.\nSelf-devotion is an experience of the deepened impulse to\nself-preservation. In the active as well as in the passive meaning of\nthe word the whole animate creation is to be included within the basic\nprinciple of the moral.\n\nThe fundamental commandment of ethics, then, is that we cause no\nsuffering to any living creature, not even the lowest, unless it is to\neffect some necessary protection for ourselves, and that we be ready\nto undertake, whenever we can, positive action for the benefit of\nother creatures.\n\nIn Fouill\u00e9e, Guyau, and Lange ethics come to terms with\nnature-philosophy, but without any advance towards making themselves\ncosmic. They fall into the anachronism of regarding themselves still,\neven at that date, as nothing beyond the regulating of the temper and\ndisposition of man towards his fellow-men, instead of widening\nthemselves out so as to deal with the conduct of man towards every\nliving creature and towards Being in general. In Stern they take this\nobvious, further step.\n\nNo ethic short of one that has made itself universal and cosmic is\ncapable of taking in hand the investigation of the basic principle of\nthe moral; only such an ethic can [pg 194] really come to terms in\nintelligible fashion with nature-philosophy.\n\nNature-philosophy and ethics in Eduard von Hartmann\n\nIn Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906)_(_98_)_ also, ethics try to\ncomprehend themselves within nature-philosophy. His _Philosophy of the\nUnconscious_ is largely in line with the thoughts of Fouill\u00e9e, but in\nthe matter of world-view he goes off in another direction. Instead of\nallowing ethics, when they are coming to terms with nature-philosophy,\nto experience their freedom from it, he compels them to base\nthemselves on such a philosophy. His nature-philosophy is pessimistic.\nIt confesses to being unable to discover any principle which contains\na meaning in the course of nature. Therefore (so Hartmann concludes,\nas do the Indians and Schopenhauer), the world-process is something\nwhich must come to a standstill. Everything that exists must gradually\nenter on the blessed condition of will-lessness. Ethics are the\ndisposition which brings this development into action.\n\nIn language obscure enough von Hartmann formulates at the end of his\n_Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness_ his pessimistic-ethical\nworld-view as follows: \u201cExistence in the world of matter is the\nIncarnation of the Godhead; the world-process is the history of the\nPassion of the Incarnate God, and at the same time the way to the\nRedemption of Him who is crucified in the flesh; but morality is\nco-operation for the shortening of this road of suffering and\nredemption.\u201d\n\nThen, however, instead of unfolding what this ethic is, and how it is\nto come into force, he undertakes to show that all ethical standpoints\nwhich have ever made their appearance in any way in history have their\nown justification. He wants to house them all within an evolution\nwhich necessarily leads to a pessimistic ethic.\n\n[pg 195]\n\nEvery moral principle which shows itself in history (von Hartmann\nasserts) changes itself by starting on a search for the completion\nwhich lies nearest to it. It lives itself out, and then makes way for\nthe higher moral principle which issues logically from it. That is how\nthe ethical consciousness in individuals and in mankind works itself\nup from one moral principle to another till it reaches the highest\nknowledge. From the primitive moral principle of aiming at individual\npleasure it travels past the authoritarian, the \u00e6sthetic, the\nsentimental, and the intellectual moral systems, which are one and all\nsubjective, to the objective morality of care for the general\nhappiness. But still beyond this it is led to the evolutionary moral\nprinciple of the development of civilisation, and here it learns to\nthink on supra-moral lines. It grasps the notion that for moral\nconsideration there is still something higher than the prosperity of\nindividuals and of society, namely \u201ccontest and struggle for the\nmaintenance and enhancing of civilization.\u201d This according to usual\nideas unethical conception of ethics has to live itself out\ncompletely, so that it may then be resolved into an ethic of world-\nand life-denial.\n\nBy this insight into the logic of the course of ethical evolution, von\nHartmann is saved from making any protest, as an ordinary ethical\nthinker would, against the unethical civilization-ethics of the close\nof the nineteenth century. He knows, on the contrary, that he is\nhelping the cause of rightly understood ethical progress, if he treats\nthem with respect as a necessary phenomenon, and urges that they be\nallowed to live themselves out with the utmost completeness. We have\nlearnt (he therefore proclaims) to see through the ethic which aims at\nmaking men and peoples happy as being a piece of sentimentality, and\nwe ought now to make up our minds to deal seriously with the\nsupra-ethical ethic of the enhancing of life and civilization. We must\nlearn to regard as good whatever is necessary for the development of\ncivilization, and we [pg 196] are no longer at liberty to condemn war\nin the name of ethics. \u201cThe principle of the development of\ncivilization compels us to recognize all these protests as unsound,\nsince wars are the chief means of carrying on the struggle between\nraces, _i.e._, the process of natural selection within mankind, and\npreparation for the effective waging of war has formed one of the most\nimportant means of education and training for mankind in every phase\nof the development of their civilization, as it will also, so far as\nwe can see, in the future.\u201d_(_99_)_ Economic misery too, and the\nstruggles which arise from it, are seen by the ethical spirit which\nlooks further ahead to subserve a higher objective. The sufferings\nunder the wage system, which are far greater than those under slavery,\nare necessary for the course of civilization. The struggle which they\nevoke calls forces into being and has an educative result. The course\nof civilization needs a favoured minority to serve as bearers of its\nideas. Beneficence and charity to the poor must therefore be practised\nwith moderation. The need which spurs men on to active work must not\nbe banished from the world.\n\nAnother element in the course of civilization is the taking into\npossession of the whole earth by the race with the highest\ncivilization, which must therefore increase its numbers as much as\npossible. In order to make the female population keen about the task\nwhich thus falls to them, women must be raised intellectually, _i.e._,\ntheir patriotism and national feeling must be increased as much as\npossible, their historical sense must be aroused, and they must be\nfilled with enthusiasm for the principle of civilization which\nunderlies evolution. \u201cTo effect this object, the history of\ncivilization must be made the foundation of all instruction in the\nupper classes of girl-schools.\u201d_(_100_)_\n\nIt is desirable, therefore, to make efforts to secure the \u201cimprovement\nof the human type,\u201d and the attainment [pg 197] of an enhancement of\ncivilization in which \u201cthe world-spirit becomes in increasing measure\nconscious of itself.\u201d\n\nIn his nature-philosophy and his philosophy of history, then, Eduard\nvon Hartmann reaches a supra-ethical world-view in which Hegel and\nNietzsche drink to brotherhood, and the principles of inhumanity and\nrelativity, which underlie biologico-sociological ethics, sit at table\nwith garlands on their heads.\n\nHow and when the supra-ethical ethic of enhanced world- and\nlife-affirmation passes over into the highest ethic of world- and\nlife-denial, and in what way this highest ethic, in which we function\nas Redeemers of the Absolute, is to be carried out in practice, von\nHartmann is, however, unable to make clear. The abstruse modulations\nwith which, in the last chapters of his work, he tries to get from one\nto the other provide us with ample proof of the unnatural character of\nthe undertaking. To produce a world-view with Hegel for body and\nSchopenhauer for head, is an absurdity. By his resolve to attempt it,\nvon Hartmann admits his inability to make enhanced life-affirmation\nbecome in a natural way ethical.\n\nEduard von Hartmann prefers to the profession of moralist that of\nphilosopher of the history of morals. Instead of serving the world\nwith an ethical system of morals, he makes it happy with the discovery\nof the principle of inherent progress in the history of morals, and\nthus helps to befool completely the thought of his age, which is\nliving its life in an unethical and unspiritual optimism.\n\nFrom the history of ethics nothing is to be obtained except a certain\namount of clearness about the problem of ethics. Anyone who discovers\nin it principles which promise automatic progress in the ethical\ndevelopment of mankind has by his miserably faulty construction of\nthat history read these principles into the facts without any\njustification.\n\n[pg 198]\n\nNature-philosophy and ethics in Bergson, Chamberlain, Keyserling,\nHaeckel\n\nHenri Bergson (b. 1860)_(_101_)_ renounces altogether the attempt to\nbring together nature-philosophy and ethics. Houston Stewart\nChamberlain (b. 1855)_(_102_)_ and Count Hermann Keyserling (b.\n1880)_(_103_)_ make the attempt but without reaching any result.\n\nIn his philosophizing about nature, Bergson does not go beyond the\n_r\u00f4le_ of the observing subject. He analyses in a masterly way the\nnature of the process of knowledge. His investigations into the origin\nof our conception of time and of the actions of our consciousness\nwhich are bound up with it, have taught us how to comprehend the\ncourse of nature in its living reality. Leading us on beyond the\nscience which consists in external affirming and calculating, Bergson\nshows that the true knowledge of Being comes to us through a sort of\nintuition. Philosophizing means experiencing our consciousness as an\nemanation of the creative impulse which rules in the world. Bergson\u2019s\nnature-philosophy has therefore a close inward connexion with that of\nFouill\u00e9e, but he does not find it necessary, as Fouill\u00e9e does, to\nproduce from it a world- and life-view. He limits himself to depicting\nit from the standpoint of the problem of the theory of knowledge. He\ndoes not attempt any analysis of the ethical consciousness. Year after\nyear we have waited for him to complete his work, as he no doubt\nhimself intended, with an attempt at producing an ethic on the basis\nof nature-philosophy. But he [pg 199] contented himself with\ndeveloping in ever-new forms his theories about our inner knowledge of\nthe real. He never comes to the recognition that all deepening of our\nknowledge of the world acquires its real meaning only so far as it\nteaches us to comprehend what we ought to aim at in life. He lets the\nwaves of events roll past us, as if we were seated on an island in the\nstream, whereas we are in reality obliged to exert ourselves as\nswimmers in the stream.\n\nDuring the war the German picture-houses were crammed. People went to\nsee the pictures in order to forget their hunger. Bergson\u2019s philosophy\nbrings before us as living events the world which Kant depicted in\nmotionless wall-pictures. But to satisfy the hunger of to-day for\nethics he does nothing. He has no world-view to offer us in which we\ncan find a life-view. Over the whole of his philosophy there prevails\na quietistic, sceptical tone.\n\nHouston Stewart Chamberlain tries to find a world-view which is based\non nature-philosophy and is at the same time ethical. His work\nentitled _Immanuel Kant_ (1905), which is really a journey through the\nproblems raised by philosophy with attempts to solve them, ends in the\nthought that we have to combine Goethe\u2019s nature-philosophy, which\nconceives Becoming as an eternal Being, with Kant\u2019s judgement about\nthe nature of duty, if we wish to reach a real civilization. He finds\nhimself unable, however, to carry through to completion such a\nworld-view.\n\nRoused by Chamberlain, Hermann Keyserling goes in the aims of his\nthinking far beyond Bergson. He wants to reach clear ideas not only\nabout knowledge of the world, but also about life and work in the\nworld. From the pinnacle, however, to which he mounts, he sees only\nthe field of wisdom; that of ethics is veiled in mist. The highest\nidea, so he declares at the conclusion of his work _The Structure of\nthe World_, is that of truth. We want to know, because knowledge,\n\u201cwhether it visibly serves life at present or not, already implies in\nitself a purposive reaction to the outer world.\u201d In correct knowledge\nthe [pg 200] human spirit enters into reciprocal relations with the\nuniverse. Life carries within itself its own purposive character.\n\nKeyserling finds it quite in order that the world-view of great men\nshould be superior to ordinary moral standards. One must not reproach\nLeonardo da Vinci for working as willingly in the service of the\nFrench king, Francis I., as he had done previously in that of the\nSforzas whom Francis expelled. \u201cAlmost every great spirit is a\ncomplete egoist.\u201d If any one has experience of life in its full extent\nand depth and living force, and works in reciprocity with the\nuniverse, interest in the human race is for him a kind of\nspecialization which is no longer incumbent on him.\n\nIn the Preface to the second edition of _The Structure of the World_\n(1920), Keyserling admits that he has not reached a decision about the\nethical problem. In his _Philosophy as Art_ (1920), he declares it to\nbe the foremost duty of our time to \u201cmake the wise man a possible\ntype, to draw him out by education, and give him all necessary\npublicity and scope for his activities.\u201d\n\nThe wise man is the one man who is capable of veracity, the man who\nlets all the tones of life sound in him, and seeks to be in tune with\nthe fundamental bass-note which is given in him. He has no universally\nvalid world-view to impart to others. He has not even for himself one\nthat is definite and final; he has only one which is liable to\nconstant alteration for the better. He himself is unalterable only in\nthis, that he wants to live his life in its entirety and in the most\nvital co-operation with the Universe, and at the same time ever\nstrives to be himself. Veracious and emphatic life-affirmation is\ntherefore the last word of this philosophizing about the world and\nlife. . . .\n\nThus does nature-philosophy admit that it cannot produce an ethic.\n\nWith the lesser spirits self-deception goes further. The ordinary\nscientific monism, the greatness of which consists in its being an\nelemental movement towards veracity in an [pg 201] age which is weary\nof veracity, is still convinced that from its insight into the\nessential nature of life, into the development of lower life into\nhigher, and into the inner connexion of the individual life with the\nlife of the universe, it can somehow or other arrive at an ethic. But\nit is significant that its representatives take altogether different\nroads in the search for an ethic. An incredible absence of thought and\nof plan reigns in the ethical philosophizing of the ordinary\nscientific nature-philosophy. Many of its representatives have before\ntheir mind\u2019s eye a conception of the moral as a becoming one with the\nuniverse, a conception which is related to that of the Stoics and\nSpinoza. Others, influenced by Nietzsche, entertain the thought that\ntrue ethics are an enhanced and aristocratic life-affirmation, and\nhave nothing to do with the claims of the \u201cdemocratic\u201d social\nethics._(_104_)_ Others again, like Johannes Unold in his work _Monism\nand its Ideals_ (1908), try to bring together nature-philosophy and\nethics just in such a way as to let them conceive of the human\nactivity which is directed to social ends as the final result of the\ndevelopment of the organic world. There are also scientific\nnature-philosophers who are content to put together out of what is\ncommonly regarded as moral an ethic which is universally accepted, and\nto exalt it, so far as they can, into a product of nature-philosophy.\nIn Ernst Haeckel\u2019s (1834-1919) work _The Riddle of the Universe_\n(1899), there is an ethic of that character built on to the palace of\nnature-philosophy like an outside kitchen. The basic principle of\nmonistic ethical theory is (so it is here maintained) the equal\njustification of Egoism and of Altruism, and then a balance between\nthem. Both are laws of nature. Egoism serves the preservation of the\nindividual, altruism that of the species. This \u201cgolden rule of\nmorality\u201d is said to be of equal significance [pg 202] with the rule\nwhich Jesus and other ethical thinkers before him are said to have\nenunciated in the demand that we shall love our neighbour as\nourselves. Spencer and water is poured out under a Christian label.\n\nThe death-agony of the optimistic-ethical world-view\n\nAn inexorable development of thought, then, brings it about that the\nphilosophy of the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of\nthe twentieth, either advances to a supra-ethical world-view, or finds\nitself living in an ethical ruin. What happens in the great German\nspeculative philosophy of the beginning of the nineteenth century is a\nprelude to the _d\u00e9nouement_ of the drama. In that philosophy an\nethical world-view tries to find itself a foundation in speculative\nnature-philosophy, and in doing so becomes, as stands confessed in\nHegel, supra-ethical. Later, ethics believe themselves capable of\nproviding a \u201cscientific\u201d conception of themselves, thanks to the\nresults reached by psychology, biology, and sociology, but in\nproportion as they effect this, their energy decreases. Later still,\nwhen through the growth of science and the inward changes in thought a\nnature-philosophy which is in harmony with scientific observation of\nnature becomes the only possible philosophy, ethics have once more to\nmake a real attempt to found themselves in a nature-philosophy which\nis directed upon the universe. There is nothing, however, but the\nenhancement and perfecting of life which nature-philosophy can give as\nthe meaning of life. Hence ethics must struggle to conceive the\nenhancement and perfecting of life as something which comes to pass\nwithin the field of ethical ideas, and it is this that the most modern\nthought is striving for, on lines of development which are often\napparently irreconcilable, without ever attaining its goal.\n\nWhenever ethics really rely in any way upon nature-philosophy for the\nproduction of the convincing, ethical world-view which the age is\nlonging for, they get wrecked [pg 203] upon it in one way or another.\nEither they actually attempt to give themselves out to be somehow a\nnatural enhancement of life and thereby so alter their character that\nthey cease to be really and truly ethics. Or they abdicate; perhaps,\nas with Keyserling, leaving the field free to supra-ethical\nworld-view, perhaps, as with Bergson, leaving nature-philosophy and\nethical questions with it, to rest in peace.\n\nThus the sun of ethics becomes darkened for our generation,\nnature-philosophy pushing forward like a wall of cloud. Just as an\ninundation overwhelms pastures and fields with its water-borne\n_d\u00e9bris_, so do the supra-ethical and the unethical ways of thinking\nbreak in upon our mentality. They bring about the most terrible\ndevastations without anyone having any clear idea of what the\ncatastrophe means, or indeed being conscious of anything wrong beyond\nthat the spirit of the time is rendering all ethical standards\npowerless.\n\nEverywhere there grows up an unethical conception of civilization. The\nmasses reconcile themselves in an incomprehensible way to the theory\nof the relativity of all ethical standards and to thoughts of\ninhumanity. Freed from any obligation of ethical intention, the belief\nin progress suffers a process of externalization which increases from\nyear to year, becoming finally nothing better than a wooden fa\u00e7ade\nwhich conceals the pessimism behind it. That we have lapsed into\npessimism is betrayed by the fact that the demand for the spiritual\nadvance of society and mankind is no longer seriously made among us.\nWe have now resigned ourselves, as if no explanation of it were\nneeded, to the fate of being obliged to smile at the high-flying hopes\nof previous generations. There is no longer to be found among us the\ntrue world- and life-affirmation which reaches down to the depths of\nthe spiritual nature of man. Unavowed pessimism has been consuming us\nfor decades.\n\nDelivered over to events in a temper and disposition which is\npowerless because it is entirely without any true [pg 204] and ethical\nideals of progress, we are experiencing the collapse of material and\nspiritual civilization alike.\n\nBy its belief in an optimistic ethical world-view the modern age made\nitself capable of a mighty advance towards civilization. Its thought,\nhowever, has not been able to show this world-view to be founded in\nthe nature of things, and we have therefore sunk, consciously and\nunconsciously, into a condition in which we have no world-view at all,\na condition of pessimism, too, and of absence of all ethical\nconviction, so that we are on the point of complete shipwreck.\n\nThe bankruptcy of the optimistic-ethical world-view was announced\nbeforehand as little as was the financial bankruptcy of the ruined\nstates of Europe. But just as the latter was gradually revealed as\nhaving actually come about by the constantly diminishing value of the\npaper-money that was issued, so is the former being gradually revealed\nby the constantly diminishing power among us of the true and profound\nideals of civilization.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 205]\n\nCHAPTER XVII\n\nTHE NEW WAY\n\n\nWhy the optimistic-ethical world-view cannot be carried through to the\nlogical conclusion\n\nTHE greatness of European philosophy consists in its having chosen the\noptimistic-ethical world-view; its weakness in its having again and\nagain imagined that it was putting that world-view on a firm\nfoundation, instead of making clear to itself the difficulties of\ndoing so. The task before our generation is to strive with deepened\nthought to reach a truer and more serviceable world-view, and thus to\nbring to an end our living on and on without any world-view at all.\n\nOur age is striking out unmeaningly in every direction like a fallen\nhorse in the traces. It is trying with external measures and new\norganisation to solve the problems with which it has to deal, but all\nin vain. The horse cannot get on its feet again till it is unharnessed\nand allowed to get its head up. Our world will not get upon its feet\nagain till it lets the truth come home to it that its cure is not to\nbe found in active measures but in new ways of thinking.\n\nBut new ways of thinking can arise only if a true and serviceable\nworld-view draws individuals within its influence.\n\nThe one serviceable world-view is the optimistic-ethical. Its renewal\nis a duty incumbent on us. Can we prove it to be true?\n\nIn the struggle of the thinkers who for centuries exerted themselves\nto demonstrate the truth of the optimistic-ethical world-view, and\nkept surrendering themselves comfortably to the illusion, always very\nsoon shattered, that [pg 206] they had succeeded, the problem with\nwhich we are concerned reveals itself in outlines which become clearer\nand clearer. We are now in a position to reckon up why those or those\npaths, apparently so full of promise, have led to nothing, and can\nlead to nothing. By the insight into the problem thus won we shall be\npreserved from entering on impassable roads and forced to follow the\nonly one which is practicable.\n\nThe most general result of the attempts made up to the present is\nthis: that the optimistic-ethical interpretation of the world, by\nwhich it was hoped to put the optimistic-ethical world-view on a firm\nfoundation, cannot be carried through to a conclusion. Yet how logical\nand natural it seemed to tune up the meaning of life and the meaning\nof the world to the same note! How invitingly the path opened out of\nexplaining our own existence from the nature and significance of the\nworld! The path rises so naturally to the crest of the foothills that\none could only believe it led up to the highest point of knowledge.\nBut high up in the ascent it breaks off with chasms ahead.\n\nThe reflexion that the meaning of human life must be conceivable\nwithin the meaning of the world is such an obvious one to thought,\nthat the latter never lets itself be led from its path by the failure,\none after another, of all attempts in that direction. It merely\nconcludes that it has not tackled the problem in the right way. It\ntherefore has resort to the whisperings of the theory of knowledge,\nand undertakes to impugn the reality of the world in order to deal\nwith it more successfully. In Kant, in the speculative philosophy, and\nin much \u201cspiritualistic\u201d popular philosophy which has been current\nalmost down to our own day, it preserved its hope of reaching its goal\nby some sort of combination of epistemological with ethical realism.\nHence the philosophy of academic manuals declaims against the\nunprejudiced thinking which tries to reach a world-view without first\nhaving been baptised by Kant with fire and the Holy Spirit. But this\ntoo is a vain proceeding. The refined and underhand attempts to form a\n[pg 207] conception of the world with an optimistic-ethical meaning\nmeet with no better success than the na\u00efve ones. What our thinking\ntries to proclaim as knowledge is never anything but an unjustifiable\ninterpretation of the world.\n\nAgainst the admission of this, thought guards itself with the courage\nof despair, because it fears it will find itself in that case with no\nidea of what to do in face of the problem of life. What meaning can we\ngive to human existence, if we must renounce all pretence of knowing\nthe meaning of the world? Nevertheless there remains only one thing\nfor thought to do, and that is to adapt itself to facts.\n\nThe hopelessness of the attempt to find the meaning of life within the\nmeaning of the world is shown first of all by the fact that in the\ncourse of nature there is no purposiveness to be seen in which the\nworking of men, and of mankind as a whole, could in any way intervene.\nOn one of the smaller among the millions of heavenly bodies there have\nlived for a short space of time some human beings. For how long will\nthey continue so to live? Any lowering or raising of the temperature\nof the earth, any change in the inclination of the axis of their\nplanet, a rise in the level of the ocean, or a change in the\ncomposition of the atmosphere, could put an end to their existence. Or\nthe earth itself may fall, as so many other heavenly bodies have\nfallen, a victim to some cosmic catastrophe. We are entirely ignorant\nof what we mean for the earth. How much less then may we presume to\ntry to attribute to the infinite universe a meaning which has us for\nits object, or which can be explained in terms of our existence!\n\nIt is not, however, merely the huge disproportion between the universe\nand human beings which makes it impossible for us to give the aims and\nobjects of mankind a logical place in those of the universe. Any such\nattempt is made useless beforehand by the fact that we have not yet\nsucceeded in discovering any general purposiveness in the course of\nnature. Whatever we do find of purposiveness in the world is never\nanything but isolated instances of it.\n\n[pg 208]\n\nIn the production and maintenance of some definite form of life nature\ndoes sometimes act purposively in a magnificent way. But in no way\ndoes she ever seem intent on uniting these instances of purposiveness\nwhich are directed to single objects into a collective purpose. She\nnever undertakes to let life coalesce with life to form a collective\nlife. She is wonderfully creative force, and at the same time\nsenselessly destructive force. We face her, absolutely unable to form\nany notion of what to do. What is full of meaning within the\nmeaningless, the meaningless within what is full of meaning: that is\nthe essential nature of the universe\n\nLife-view independent of world-view\n\nThese elemental established conclusions European thought has tried to\nignore. It can do so no longer, and it is of no use to try. The facts\nhave silently produced their consequences. While the\noptimistic-ethical world-view still maintains itself among us as a\ndogma, we no longer possess the ethical world- and life-affirmation\nwith which it ought to provide us. Perplexity and pessimism have taken\npossession of us without our admitting it.\n\nThere remains, therefore, nothing for us to do but to admit that we\nunderstand nothing of the world, and are surrounded by nothing but\nenigmas. Our knowledge is becoming sceptical.\n\nJust as thought has hitherto allowed world-view and life-view to hang\ntogether, mutually connected, so have we in consequence fallen\nsimilarly into a sceptical conception of life. But is it really the\ncase that life-view is towed along by world-view, and that when the\nlatter can no longer be kept afloat life-view must sink with it into\nthe depths? Necessity bids us cut the tow-rope and try to let\nlife-view continue its voyage independently.\n\nThis man\u0153uvre is not such a surprising one as it seems. While people\nacted as though their life-view were taken from their world-view, the\nconnexion between the two was really just the opposite, their\nworld-view was formed from [pg 209] their life-view. What they put\nforward as their view of the world was an interpretation of the world\nin the light of their life-view.\n\nThe life-view held by European thought being optimistic-ethical, the\nsame character was attributed by everybody to their world-view in\ndefiance of facts. The will, without admitting it, overpowered\nknowledge. Life-view prompted and world-view recited. The belief that\ntheir life-view was derived from their world-view was therefore only a\nfiction.\n\nIn Kant this overpowering of knowledge, which had till then been just\nna\u00efvely allowed, was worked out systematically. His doctrine of the\n\u201cPostulates of the Practical Reason\u201d means just this: that the will\nclaims for itself the decisive word in the last pronouncements of the\nworld-view. Only Kant manages to arrange the matter so cleverly that\nthe will never forces its supremacy on knowledge, but receives it from\nthe latter as a free gift, and then makes use of it in carefully\nchosen parliamentary ways. It proceeds as if it had been invoked by\nthe theoretical reason to provide possible truths with reality\nbelonging to truths which are necessities of thought.\n\nIn Fichte the will dictates to knowledge its world-view without any\nregard at all for the arts of diplomacy.\n\nFrom the middle of the nineteenth century onward there can be\ndiscerned a tendency in natural science no longer to claim that\nworld-view shall accommodate itself to scientifically established\nfacts. The valuable convictions of the traditional world-view are to\nhold good, even if they cannot be brought into harmony with the\naccepted knowledge of the world. After the publication of Du\nBois-Raymond\u2019s (1818-1896) lectures \u201cOn the Limits of our Knowledge of\nNature\u201d it begins with a certain school of natural science to be\nconsidered almost a part of good manners to declare oneself\nincompetent in questions of world-view. There grows up gradually what\none may call a modern doctrine of the two-fold nature of truth. To\nthis movement expression is given by the \u201cKeplerbund,\u201d which was [pg\n210] founded in 1907 by representatives of natural science, and goes\nso far as to declare acceptable to natural science the valuable\npronouncements of the current world-view, even when given in formulas\nprovided by ecclesiastical authority. This new doctrine of the\ntwo-fold nature of truth is brought to philosophical expression by the\ntheory of the solidity of \u201cvalue-judgments.\u201d By means of this theory\nAlbrecht Ritschl (1822-1889) and his imitators try to uphold the\nvalidity of a religious world-view side by side with a scientific one.\nAlmost the whole religious world, so far as it tries to remain a\nthinking body, grasps at such expedients. Next, in William James\u2019s\n(1842-1910) philosophy of Pragmatism the will admits in half-na\u00efve,\nhalf-cynical fashion that all the knowledge professed by its\nworld-view has been produced by itself.\n\nThat the valuable assertions made by the world-view are to be traced\nback to the will which has been determined by valuable convictions is\ntherefore a fact, and since Kant\u2019s day the fact has been admitted in\nthe most varied directions. The shock given to the feeling for\nveracity, which accompanies this no longer na\u00efve but half-conscious\nand insidiously employed interpretation of the world, plays a fatal\npart in the mentality of our time.\n\nBut why go on with this want of candour? Why keep knowledge in\nsubservience to the will by means of a kind of infamous secret police?\nAny world-view deduced therefrom must ever be a poor weak thing. Let\nus allow the will and knowledge to come together in a relation which\nis honourable to both.\n\nIn what has hitherto been called world-view there are two things\nunited: view of the world and life-view. So long as it was possible to\ncherish the illusion that the two were harmonious and each completed\nthe other, there was nothing to be said against this combination. Now,\nhowever, when the divergence can no longer be concealed, the wider\nconception of world-view which includes life-view organically within\nitself, must be given up. It is no longer permissible to go on na\u00efvely\nbelieving that we get our life-view [pg 211] from our view of the\nworld, or furtively elevating in some way or other our life-view into\na view of the world. We are standing at a turning-point of thought.\nCritical action which clears away all prevailing _na\u00efvet\u00e9s_ and\ndishonesties has become necessary. We must make up our minds to leave\nlife-view and view of the world mutually independent of each other,\nand see that a straightforward understanding between the two is\nreached. We have to admit that because our life-view is made up of\nconvictions which are given in our will-to-live but are not confirmed\nby knowledge of the world, we have allowed it to go beyond the varied\nknowledge which makes up our view of the world.\n\nThis renunciation of world-view in the old sense, that is of a unitary\nworld-view which is complete in itself, means a painful experience for\nour thought. We come hereby to a dualism against which we at every\nmoment instinctively rebel. But we must surrender to facts. Our will\nto live has to accommodate itself to the inconceivable fact that it is\nunable with its own valuable convictions to discover itself again in\nthe manifold will-to-live which is seen manifested in the world. We\nwanted to form a life-view for ourselves out of items of knowledge\ngathered from the world. But it is our destiny to live by means of\nconvictions which an inward necessity makes a part of our thought.\n\nIn the old rationalism reason undertook to investigate the world. In\nthe new it has to take as its task the attaining to clarity about the\nwill-to-live. Thus we return to an elemental philosophising which is\nonce more busied with questions of world- and life-view as they\ndirectly affect men, and seeks to give a safe foundation to, and to\nkeep alive, the valuable ideas which we find in ourselves. It is in a\nlife-view which is dependent on itself alone, and has come in a\nstraightforward way to an understanding with world-knowledge, that we\nhope to find once more power to attain to ethical world- and\nlife-affirmation.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 212]\n\nCHAPTER XVIII\n\nTHE FOUNDATIONS OF OPTIMISM SECURED FROM THE WILL-TO-LIVE\n\n\nThe pessimistic result of knowledge\n\nTHERE are two things which thought has to do for us; it must lead us\nup out of the na\u00efve world- and life-affirmation to a deepened one, and\nit must let us go on from mere ethical impulses to an ethic which is a\nnecessity of thought.\n\nDeepened world- and life-affirmation consists in this, that we have\nthe will to maintain our own life and every kind of existence that we\ncan in any way influence, and to bring them to their highest value. It\ndemands from us that we think out all ideals of the material and\nspiritual perfecting of individual men, of society, and of mankind as\na whole, and let ourselves be determined by them to steady activity\nand steady hope. It does not allow us to withdraw into ourselves, but\norders us to bring to bear a living and so far as possible an active\ninterest on everything which happens around us. To endure a state of\nunrest through our relation to the world, when by withdrawing into\nourselves we might enjoy rest; that is the burden which deeper world-\nand life-affirmation lays upon us.\n\nWe begin our life-course in an unsophisticated world- and\nlife-affirmation. The will-to-live which is in us gives it to us as\nsomething which is a matter of course. But later, when thought awakes,\nthe questions crop up which make a problem of what has hitherto been a\nmatter of course. What meaning will you give your life? What do you\nmean to do in the world? When, along with these [pg 213] questions, we\nbegin trying to reconcile knowledge and will-to-live, facts get in the\nway of this with confusing suggestions. Life attracts us, they say,\nwith a thousand expectations, and fulfils hardly one of them. And the\nfulfilled expectation is almost a disappointment, for only anticipated\npleasure is really pleasure; in pleasure which is fulfilled its\nopposite is already stirring. Unrest, disappointment, and pain are our\nlot in the short span of time which lies between our entrance on life\nand our departure from it. The spiritual is in a dreadful state of\ndependence on the bodily. Our existence is at the mercy of meaningless\nhappenings and can be brought to an end by them at any moment. The\nwill-to-live gives me an impulse to action, but the action is just as\nif I wanted to plough the sea, and to sow in the furrows. What did\nthose who worked before me effect? What significance in the endless\nchain of world-happenings have their efforts had? With all its\nillusive promises the will-to-live only means to mislead me into\nprolonging my existence, and allowing to enter on existence, so that\nthe game may go on without interruption, other beings to whom the same\nmiserable lot has been assigned as to myself.\n\nThe discoveries in the field of knowledge against which the\nwill-to-live knocks when it begins to think, are therefore altogether\npessimistic. It is not by accident that all religious world-views,\nexcept the Chinese, have a more or less pessimistic tone and bid man\nexpect nothing from his existence here.\n\nWho will stop us from making use of the freedom we are allowed, and\ncasting existence from us? Every thinking human being makes\nacquaintance with this thought. We let it take a deeper hold of us\nthan we suspect from one another, as indeed we are all more oppressed\nby the riddles of existence than we allow others to notice.\n\nWhat determines us, so long as we are comparatively in our right mind,\nto reject the thought of putting an end to our existence? An\ninstinctive feeling of repulsion from such a deed. The will-to-live is\nstronger than pessimistic [pg 214] facts of knowledge. An instinctive\nReverence for Life is within us, for we are will-to-live. . . .\n\nEven the consistently pessimistic thought of Brahmanism makes to the\nwill-to-live the concession that voluntary death may only come about\nwhen the individual has put behind him a considerable portion of life.\nThe Buddha goes still further, rejecting any violent exit from\nexistence and demanding only that we let the will-to-live within us\ndie out.\n\nAll pessimism, then, is inconsistent. It does not push open the door\nto freedom, but makes concessions to the obvious fact of existence. In\nIndian thought, which tends to pessimism, it attempts to make these\nconcessions as small as possible, and to maintain the impossible\nfiction that merely the bare life is being lived with complete\nabstinence from any share in the happenings which are taking place\nhere, there, and everywhere about it. With us the concessions are\nlarger, since the conflict between the will-to-live and pessimistic\nrecognition of facts is to a certain extent damped down, and obscured\nby the optimistic world-view which prevails in the general mode of\nthought. There arises an unthinking will-to-live which lives out its\nlife trying to snatch possession of as much happiness as possible, and\nmeaning to do something active without having made clear to itself\nwhat its intentions really are.\n\nWhether somewhat more or somewhat less of world- and life-affirmation\nis retained matters little. Whenever the deepened world- and\nlife-affirmation is not reached there remains only a depreciated\nwill-to-live, which is not equal to the tasks of life. Thought usually\ndeprives the will-to-live of the force lent it by its freedom from\npre-conceptions, without being able to induce it to adopt a practice\nof reflexion in which it would find new and higher force. Thus it\nstill possesses energy enough to continue in life, but not enough to\novercome pessimism. The stream becomes a swamp.\n\nThat is the experience which determines the character [pg 215] of\nmen\u2019s existence, without their confessing it to themselves. They\nnourish themselves scantily on a little bit of happiness and many vain\nthoughts, which life puts in their manger. It is only by the pressure\nof necessity, exerted by elementary duties which throng upon them,\nthat they are kept in the path of life.\n\nOften their will-to-live is changed into a kind of intoxication.\nSpring sunshine, trees in flower, passing clouds, fields of waving\ncorn provoke it. A will-to-live which announces itself in many forms\nin magnificent phenomena all around them, carries their own\nwill-to-live along with it. Full of delight, they want to take part in\nthe mighty symphony which they hear. They find the world beautiful. .\n. . But the transport passes. Horrid discords allow them once more to\nhear only noise, where they thought they perceived music. The beauty\nof nature is darkened for them by the suffering which they discover\neverywhere within it. Now they see once more that they are drifting\nlike shipwrecked men over a waste of waters, only that their boat is\nat one moment raised aloft on mountainous waves and the next sinks\ninto the valleys between them, and that now sunbeams, and now heavy\nclouds, rest upon the heaving billows.\n\nNow they would like to persuade themselves that there is land in the\ndirection in which they are drifting. Their will-to-live befools their\nthinking, so that it makes efforts to see the world as it would like\nto see it. It compels it also to hand them a chart which confirms\ntheir hopes of land. Once more they bend to the oars, till once more\ntheir arms drop with fatigue, and their gaze wanders, disappointed,\nfrom billow to billow.\n\nThat is the voyage of the will-to-live which has abjured thought.\n\nIs there, then, nothing else that the will-to-live can do but drift\nalong without thought, or sink in pessimistic knowledge? Yes, there\nis. It must indeed voyage across this boundless sea; but it can hoist\nsails, and steer a definite course.\n\n[pg 216]\n\nThe world- and life-affirmation of the will-to-live\n\nThe will-to-live which tries to know the world is a shipwrecked\ncastaway; the will-to-live which gets to know itself is a bold\nmariner.\n\nThe will-to-live is not restricted to maintaining its existence on\nwhat the ever unsatisfying knowledge of the world offers it; it can\nfeed on the life-forces which it finds in itself. The knowledge which\nI acquire from my will-to-live is richer than that which I win by\nobservation of the world. There are given in it values and incitements\nbearing on my relation to the world and to life which find no\njustification in my reflexion upon the world and existence. Why then\ntune down one\u2019s will-to-live to the pitch of one\u2019s knowledge of the\nworld, or undertake the meaningless task of tuning up one\u2019s knowledge\nof the world to the higher pitch of one\u2019s will-to-live. The right and\nobvious course is to let the ideas which are given in our will-to-live\nbe accepted as the higher and decisive kind of knowledge.\n\nMy knowledge of the world is a knowledge from outside, and remains for\never incomplete. The knowledge derived from my will-to-live is direct,\nand takes me back to the mysterious movements of life as it is in\nitself.\n\nThe highest knowledge, then, is the knowing that I must be true to the\nwill-to-live. It is this knowledge that hands me the compass for the\nvoyage I have to make in the night without the aid of a chart. To live\nout one\u2019s life in the direction of its course, to raise it to a higher\npower, and to ennoble it, is natural. Every depreciation of the\nwill-to-live is an act of unveracity towards myself, or a symptom of\nunhealthiness.\n\nThe essential nature of the will-to-live is determination to live\nitself to the full. It carries within it the impulse to realise itself\nin the highest possible perfection. In the flowering tree, in the\nstrange forms of the medusa, in the blade of grass, in the crystal;\neverywhere it strives to reach the perfection with which it is\nendowed. In everything [pg 217] that exists there is at work an\nimaginative force, which is determined by ideals. In us, beings who\ncan move about freely and are capable of pre-considered, purposive\nworking, the impulse to perfection is given in such a way that we aim\nat raising to their highest material and spiritual value both\nourselves and every existing thing which is open to our influence.\n\nHow this striving originated within us, and how it has developed, we\ndo not know, but it is given with our existence. We must act upon it,\nif we would not be unfaithful to the mysterious will-to-live which is\nwithin us.\n\nWhen the will-to-live arrives at the critical point where its early\nunsophisticated world- and life-affirmation has to be changed into a\nreflective one, it is the part of thought to assist it by holding it\nto the thinking out of all the ideas which are given within it and to\nthe surrender of itself to them. That the will-to-live within us\nbecomes true to itself and remains so; that it experiences no\ndegeneration but develops itself to complete vitality, that is what\ndecides the fate of our existence.\n\nWhen it comes to clearness about itself, the will-to-live knows that\nit is dependent on itself alone. It is meant to attain to freedom from\nthe world. Its knowledge of the world can prove to it that its\nstriving to raise to their highest value its own life and every living\nthing which can be influenced by it remains in the course of the\nworld-whole, something problematic. In this it has not been misled.\nIts world- and life-affirmation carries its meaning in itself. It\nfollows from an inward necessity, and is sufficient for itself. By its\nmeans my existence joins in pursuing the aims of the mysterious\nuniversal will of which I am a manifestation. In my deepened world-\nand life-affirmation, I manifest reverence for life. With\nconsciousness and with volition I devote myself to Being. I become of\nservice to the ideals which it thinks out in me; I become imaginative\nforce like that which works enigmatically in nature, and thus I give\nmy existence a meaning from within outwards.\n\n[pg 218]\n\nReverence for life means to be in the grasp of the infinite,\ninexplicable, forward-urging Will in which all Being is grounded. It\nraises us above all knowledge of things and lets us become a tree\nwhich is safe against drought, because it is planted among running\nstreams. All living piety flows from reverence for life and the\ncompulsion towards ideals which is given in it. In reverence for life\nlies piety in its most elemental and deepest form, in which it has not\nyet involved itself with any explanation of the world or no longer\ndoes so, but is piety which comes simply from inward necessity, and\ntherefore asks no questions about ends to be pursued.\n\nThe will-to-live, too, which has become reflective and has made its\nway through to deeper world- and life-affirmation, tries to secure\nhappiness and success, for as will-to-live it is will to the realizing\nof ideals. It does not, however, live on happiness and success.\nWhatever of these it obtains is a strengthening of itself which it\nthankfully accepts, though it is resolved on action, even if happiness\nand success must be denied it. It sows as one who does not count on\nliving to reap the harvest.\n\nThe will-to-live is not a flame which burns only when events provide\nsuitable fuel; it blazes up, and that with the purest light, when it\nis forced to feed on what it derives from itself. Then, too, when\nevents seem to leave no future for it but suffering, it still holds\nout as an active will. In deep reverence for life it makes the\nexistence which according to usual ideas is no longer in any way worth\nliving, precious, because even in such an existence it experiences its\nown freedom from the world. Quiet and peace radiate from a being like\nthat upon others, and cause them also to be touched by the secret that\nwe must all, whether active or passive, preserve our freedom in order\ntruly to live.\n\nTrue resignation is not a becoming weary of the world but the quiet\ntriumph which the will-to-live celebrates at the hour of its greatest\nneed over the circumstances of life. [pg 219] It flourishes only in\nthe soil of deep world- and life-affirmation.\n\nIn this way our life is a coming to an understanding between our\nwill-to-live and the world, along with which we have continually to be\non our guard against allowing any deterioration in our will-to-live.\nThe struggle between optimism and pessimism is never fought to a\nfinish within us. We are ever wandering on slipping rubble above the\nabyss of pessimism. When that which we experience in our own existence\nor learn from the history of mankind, falls oppressively upon our\nwill-to-live and robs us of our freshness and our power of\ndeliberation, we might lose hold, and be carried away with the moving\nboulders into the abyss below. But knowing that what awaits us below\nis death, we work our way up to the path again. . . .\n\nOr it may perhaps be that pessimism comes over us, like the bliss of\ncomplete rest over those who, tired out, sit down in the snow. No\nlonger to be obliged to hope for and aim at what is commanded us by\nthe ideals which are forced upon us by the deepened will-to-live! No\nlonger to be in a state of unrest when by lessening our efforts we can\nhave rest! . . . Gently comes the appeal from knowledge to our will to\ntune itself down to the facts. . . .\n\nThat is the fatal state of complete rest in which men, and civilised\nmankind as a whole, grow numb and die.\n\nAnd when we think that the enigmas by which we are surrounded can no\nlonger harm us, there once more rises up before us somewhere or other\nthe most terrifying of them all, the fact that the will-to-live can be\nshattered in suffering or in spiritual night. This enigma, too, before\nwhich our will-to-live shudders as before the most inexplicable of all\ninexplicable things, we must learn to leave unsolved.\n\nThus does pessimistic knowledge pursue us closely right on to our last\nbreath. That is why it is so profoundly significant that the\nwill-to-live rouses itself at last and once for all to insist on its\nfreedom from having to understand the world, and shows itself capable\nof letting itself be [pg 220] determined solely by that which is given\nwithin itself. With humility and courage it makes its way through the\nendless chaos of enigmas, fulfilling its mysterious destiny, making a\nreality of its union with the infinite will-to-live.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 221]\n\nCHAPTER XIX\n\nTHE PROBLEM OF ETHICS, STARTING FROM THE HISTORY OF ETHICS\n\n\nAn ethic of self-devotion, or an ethic of self-perfecting?\n\nTHOUGHT, then, which reaches bottom, arrives at an unshakeable\nworld-and-life affirmation. Let it now try whether it can lead us to\nan ethic. But that it may not proceed with us, as it so often does,\nmerely at random, it shall gather from the thought which has hitherto\nbeen devoted to ethics all the guidance which is there to be found.\n\nWhat does the history of ethics teach?\n\nAs a quite general principle we learn from it, that the object of all\nethical enquiry is the discovery of the universal basic principle of\nthe moral.\n\nThe basic principle of the moral must show itself to be a necessity of\nthought, and must bring man to an unceasing, living, and practical\nconflict and understanding with reality.\n\nThe principles of the moral which have hitherto been offered us are\nabsolutely unsatisfying. This is clear from the fact that they cannot\nbe thought out to a conclusion without leading to paradoxes, or losing\nin ethical content.\n\nClassical thought tries to conceive of the ethical as that which\nbrings rational pleasure. It did not succeed, however, from that\nstarting-point in arriving at an ethic of active devotion. Shut up\nwithin the egoistic-utilitarian, it ends in an ethically-coloured\nresignation.\n\nThe ethical thought of modern times is from the outset\nsocial-utilitarian. It is to it a matter of course that the individual\nmust devote himself in every respect to his fellow-individuals, and to\nsociety. But when it tries to [pg 222] give a firm foundation to this\nethic of devotion which seems to it so much a matter of course, and to\nthink it out to a conclusion, it is driven to the most remarkable\nconsequences, which are inconsistent with each other in the most\nvaried directions. At one time it explains devotion as a refined\negoism; at another as something which society forcibly imposes on\nindividuals; at another as something which it develops in him by\neducation; at another, as in Bentham, as something which he adopts as\none of his convictions on the ground of the urgent representations of\nsociety; at another as an instinct which he obeys. The first\nassumption cannot be carried through; the second, third, and fourth\nare unsatisfying because they allow ethics to reach men from the\noutside; the last leads to a _cul-de-sac_. If, for example, devotion\nis an instinct, it must, of course, be made conceivable how thought\ncan work upon it, and raise it to the level of a considered, widely\ninclusive, voluntary activity at which level it first becomes ethical.\nThis, which is its peculiar problem, utilitarianism does not\nrecognise, much less solve. It is always in too much of a hurry to\ncome to practical results. At last it gives its bond to biology and\nsocial science, which bring it to conceiving itself as herd-mentality,\nwonderfully developed and capable of still further development. It\nthereby bring itself to a halt far below the level of real ethics.\n\nThe ethic of devotion fails therefore most remarkably, although it\nstarts from what is most elementary and essential in ethics, to shape\nitself in a way which satisfies thought. It is as if it had the true\nbasic principle of ethics within its reach, yet always grasped to\nright or left of it.\n\nBy the side of these two attempts to understand ethics as effort to\nprocure rational pleasure, or as devotion to one\u2019s fellow-men and to\nsociety, there is a third, which tries to explain ethics as effort\nafter self-perfecting. This attempt has in it something abstract and\nventuresome. It disdains to start from a universally acknowledged\ncontent of the ethical, as utilitarianism does, and in contrast to\nthat [pg 223] sets before thought the task of deriving the whole\ncontent of ethics from the effort after self-perfecting.\n\nPlato, the first representative in the West of the ethics of\nself-perfecting, and Schopenhauer try to solve the problem by setting\nup, as do the Indians, world- and life-denial to be the basic\nprinciple of the ethical. That, however, is no solution. World- and\nlife-denial, if consistently thought out and carried through, does not\nproduce an ethic but reduces ethics to impotence.\n\nKant, the modern restorer of the ethic of self-perfecting, sets up the\nconception of absolute duty, but without giving it any content. He\nthereby admits his inability to derive the content of ethics from the\neffort after self-perfecting.\n\nIf the ethic of self-perfecting tries really to acquire a content, it\nmust allow that ethics consist either in world- and life-denial or in\nhigher world- and life-affirmation. The first need not be considered;\nthere remains, therefore, only the other.\n\nSpinoza conceives the higher world- and life-affirmation as a thinking\nabsorption in the universe. He does not, however, arrive thereby at a\nreal ethic, but only at an ethically-coloured resignation.\nSchleiermacher uses much art to lend this ethical colouring a more\nbrilliant tone. Nietzsche avoids the paths of resignation, but reaches\nthereby a world- and life-affirmation which is ethical only so far as\nit feels itself to be an effort after self-perfecting.\n\nThe only thinker who succeeds to some extent in giving to\nself-perfecting within world- and life-affirmation an ethical content\nis J. G. Fichte. The result, however, is valueless, because it\npresupposes an optimistic-ethical view of the nature of the universe\nand of the position of man within it, which is based upon inadmissible\nspeculation.\n\nThe ethic of self-perfecting is therefore not capable of so\nestablishing the basic principle of the moral, that it has a content\nwhich is ethically satisfying; the ethic of devotion, on the other\nhand, starting from the content which it [pg 224] presupposes, cannot\nreach a basic principle of ethics which is grounded in thought. The\nattempt made by antiquity to conceive ethics as that which brings\nrational pleasure we need no longer consider. It is only too clear\nthat it does not take sufficiently into account the enigma of\ndevotion, and can never solve it. There remain, therefore, for\nconsideration only the two undertakings, so strangely opposed to one\nanother, one of which starts from devotion as a generally accepted\ncontent of the ethical in order to conceive it as belonging to the\nself-perfecting of man, while the other starts from self-perfecting\nand seeks to conceive devotion as an item in its content which is a\nnecessity of thought.\n\nIs there a synthesis of these two? In other words, do devotion and\nself-perfecting belong together in such a way that the one is\ncontained in the other?\n\nIf this inward unity has not been visible hitherto, may not the cause\nbe that reflexion, whether upon devotion or upon self-perfecting, did\nnot go deep enough and was not sufficiently inclusive?\n\nEthics and a theory of knowledge. Ethics and natural happenings. The\nenthusiastic element in ethics\n\nBefore thought attempts to investigate more deeply and completely the\nnature of devotion and that of self-perfecting, it must proceed\nfurther to put clearly before itself what there is offered to it in\nthe way of different kinds of knowledge and other considerations on\nits journey through the Western search for ethics.\n\nIt may be accepted as something fully recognised that ethics have\nnothing to expect from any theory of knowledge. Depreciation of the\nreality of the sensible world brings them merely apparent profit.\nThought believes it can draw from the possibility of a spiritualising\nof the world some advantage for the optimistic-ethical interpretation\nof it. It has been, however, established by this [pg 225] time that\nethics can no more be derived from an ethical interpretation of the\nworld than world- and life-affirmation can be referred back to an\noptimistic interpretation of it, and that they must instead of that\nfind their foundation in themselves in a world which is recognised as\nabsolutely enigmatic. At once and for ever, then, all attempts to\nbring ethical and epistemological idealism into connexion with one\nanother have to be recognised as useless for ethics. Ethics can let\nspace and time go hang.\n\nIn epistemological investigations into the nature of space and time\nethics feel a satisfaction which is strong but uninterested. They view\nthem as efforts after knowledge which must be made, but they know that\nthe results can never touch what is essential in any world- and\nlife-view. It suffices them to know that the whole world of sense is a\nmanifestation of forces, that is to say of an enigmatically manifold\nwill-to-live. In this their thought is spiritualistic. It is\nmaterialistic, however, so far as it presupposes manifestation and\nforce to be connected in such a way that any effect produced upon the\nformer influences the force which lies behind it. Ethics feel that if\nit were not thus possible for one will-to-live to produce through the\nmanifestation effects on another will-to-live, they would have no\nreason for existing. But to investigate how this relation between\nforce and its manifestation is to be explained from the standpoint of\nepistemology, and whether it can be explained at all, ethics can leave\nundecided as being none of their business; they claim for themselves,\njust as does natural science, the right to remain free from\npreconceptions.\n\nIn this connexion it is interesting to observe that it is among the\nrepresentatives of scientific materialism that enthusiastic ethical\nidealism is often to be met with, while the adherents of\nspiritualistic philosophy are usually moralists with an unemotional\ntemperament.\n\nWith renunciation of all help from epistemological [pg 226] idealism,\nit follows that ethics ask for nothing and expect nothing from\nspeculative philosophy. They declare they have nothing to do with any\nkind of ethical interpretation of the world.\n\nThought gathers, further, from the history of ethics that the latter\ncannot be conceived as being merely a natural happening which\ncontinues itself in man. In the ethical man natural happenings come\ninto contradiction with themselves. Nature knows only a blind\naffirmation of life. The will-to-live which animates natural forces\nand living beings is concerned to work itself out unhindered. But in\nman this natural effort is in a state of tension with a mysterious\neffort of a different kind. Life-affirmation exerts itself to take up\nlife-denial into itself in order to serve other living beings by\nself-devotion, and to protect them, even eventually by self-sacrifice,\nfrom injury or destruction. It is true that self-devotion plays a\ncertain _r\u00f4le_ in non-human living beings. As a temporary instinct it\nrules in sexual love and in parental love; as a permanent instinct it\nis found in certain individual members of animal species (_e.g._,\nants, bees) which, because sexless, are incomplete individualities.\nThese manifestations are in a certain way a prelude to the interplay\nof life-affirmation and life-denial which is at work in the ethical\nman. They do not, however, explain it. That which is active elsewhere\nonly as a temporary instinct, or as an instinct in incomplete\nindividualities and that, too, always within special relations of\nsolidarity with others, becomes now, in man, a steady, voluntary,\nunlimited form of action, a result of thought, in which individuals\nendeavour to realise the higher life-affirmation. How does this come\nabout?\n\nHere one is faced once more by the problem of the _r\u00f4le_ which thought\nplays in the origin of ethics. It seizes on something of which a\npreliminary form is seen in an instinct, in order to extend it and\nbring it to perfection. It comprehends the content of an instinct, and\ntries to give it practical application in new and consistent action.\n\n[pg 227]\n\nIn some way or other the _r\u00f4le_ of thought lies in the fulfilment of\nlife-affirmation. It rouses the will-to-live to recognise as in\nanalogy with the life-affirmation which is in itself, the\nlife-affirmation which shows itself in the manifold life which is\neverywhere around it, and to join in its experiences. On the\nfoundation of this world-affirmation life-denial takes its place as a\nmeans of helping forward this affirmation of other life than its own.\nIt is not life-denial in itself that is ethical, but only such as\nstands in the service of world-affirmation and becomes purposive\nwithin it.\n\nEthics are a mysterious chord in which life-affirmation and\nworld-affirmation are the ground-note and the fifth; life-denial is\nthe third.\n\nIt is important, further, to know what is to be gathered from ethical\ninquiry down to the present time about the intensity and the extension\nof the life-denial which stands in the service of world-affirmation.\nAgain and again the attempt has been made to establish this\nobjectively. In vain! It belongs to the nature of devotion that it\nmust live itself out subjectively and without reservations.\n\nIn the history of ethics there is downright fear of what cannot be\nsubjected to rules and regulations. Again and again thinkers have\nundertaken to define devotion in such a way that it remains rational.\nThis, however, is never done except at the cost of the naturalness and\nliving character of ethics. Life-denial remains something irrational,\neven when it places itself at the service of a purposive policy. A\nuniversally applicable balance between life-affirmation and\nlife-denial cannot be established. They remain in a state of continual\ntension. If any relaxation does take place, it is a sign that ethics\nare collapsing, for in their real nature they are unbounded\nenthusiasm. They originate indeed in thought, but they cannot be\ncarried through to a logical conclusion. Anyone who undertakes the\nvoyage to a true ethic must be prepared to be carried round and round\nin the whirlpool of the irrational.\n\n[pg 228]\n\nThe ethic of ethical personality, and the ethic of society\n\nTogether with the subjectively enthusiastic nature of ethics goes the\nfact that it never wishes to succeed in developing the ethic of\nethical personality into a serviceable ethic of society. It seems so\nobvious, that from right individual ethics right social ethics should\nresult, the one continuing itself into the other like a town into its\nsuburbs. In reality, however, they cannot be so built that the streets\nof the one continue as those of the other. The plans of each are drawn\non principles which take no account of that.\n\nThe ethic of ethical personality is personal, incapable of regulation,\nand absolute; that which is established by society for its own\nprosperous existence is supra-personal, regulated, and relative. Hence\nthe ethical personality cannot surrender to it, but lives always in\ncontinuous disputation with it, obliged again and again to oppose it\nbecause it finds its focus too short.\n\nIn the last analysis the antagonism between the two arises from their\ndiffering valuations of humaneness. Humaneness consists in this\u2014that\nno human being is ever sacrificed to a purpose. The ethic of ethical\npersonality aims at preserving humaneness. That which is established\nby society is impotent in that respect.\n\nWhen the individual is faced with the alternative of having to\nsacrifice in some way or other the happiness or the existence of\nanother, or else to bear the loss himself, he is in a position to obey\nthe demands of ethics and to choose the latter. But society, thinking\nimpersonally and pursuing its aims impersonally, does not allow the\nsame weight to consideration for the happiness or existence of an\nindividual. In principle humaneness is not an item in its ethic. But\nindividuals come continually into the position of being in one way or\nanother executive organs of society, and then the conflict between the\ntwo points of view becomes active. That this may always be decided in\nits own favour, [pg 229] society exerts itself to limit as closely as\npossible the authority of the ethic of personality, although inwardly\nit has to acknowledge its superiority. It wants to have servants who\nwill never oppose it.\n\nEven a society the ethical standard of which is relatively high, is\ndangerous to the ethics of its members. If those things which form\nprecisely the defects of a social ethic develop strongly, and society\nexercises, further, an excessively strong spiritual influence on\nindividuals, then the ethic of ethical personality is ruined. This\nhappens in present-day society, the ethical conscience of which is\nbecoming fatally stunted by a biologico-sociological ethic and this,\nmoreover, finally corrupted by nationalism.\n\nThe great mistake made by ethical thought down to the present time is\nthat it fails to admit the essential difference between the ethic of\nethical personality and that which is established from the standpoint\nof society, and always thinks that it ought, and is able, to cast them\nin one piece. The result is that the ethic of personality is\nsacrificed to the ethic of society. An end must be put to this. What\nmatters is to recognise that the two are engaged in a conflict which\ncannot be made less intense. Either the ethic of personality raises\nthe social ethic, so far as it can, to its own level, or it is dragged\ndown by the latter.\n\nBut to get rid of the present unhealthy state of opinion it is not\nenough to bring individuals to a consciousness that if they are not to\nsuffer spiritual harm they must be in a state of continual conflict\nwith the ethics of society. What matters is to establish a basic\nprinciple of the moral, which will put the ethic of personality in a\nposition to come with consistency and success to discussion and\nagreement with the ethic of society. Hitherto there has been no\npossibility of putting this weapon into its hands. Ethics have, as we\nknow, always been regarded as the most thorough-going possible\ndevotion to society.\n\nThe ethic of ethical personality, then, and the ethic [pg 230] which\nis established from the standpoint of society cannot be traced back\nthe one to the other, and are not of equal value. The first only is a\nreal ethic; the other is improperly so called. Thought must aim at\nfinding the basic principle of absolute ethics, if it is to reach the\ncondition of being ethics at all, and it was because it was not clear\non this point that it made so little progress. Progress in ethics\nconsists in our making up our minds to think pessimistically of the\nethic of society.\n\nThe ethic which is established from the standpoint of society\nconsists, in its essential nature, in this, that society appeals to\nthe moral disposition of the individual in order to secure from it\nwhat cannot be forced upon it by compulsion and law. It only comes\nnearer to real ethics when it comes to an agreement with the ethic of\npersonality and tries to bring its own demands on the individual into\nharmony as far as possible with the latter\u2019s. In proportion as society\ntakes on the character of an ethical personality, its ethic becomes an\nethic of ethical society.\n\nThe problem of a complete ethic\n\nIn general, thought should have busied itself with the question of\nwhat is included in the whole field of ethics, and how the different\nelements within it are connected with each other.\n\nIn ethics are included the ethic of passive self-perfecting, which is\neffected by inward self-liberation from the world (resignation); the\nethic of active self-perfecting effected by means of the mutual\nrelations between man and man; and the ethic of ethical society.\nEthics are thus an extensive gamut of notes. They start from the not\nyet ethical, where the vibrations of resignation begin to make\nthemselves perceptible as notes of ethical resignation. With\nincreasingly rapid vibrations they pass from the ethic of resignation\ninto that of active self-perfecting. Rising still higher they emerge\ninto the notes of the ethic of [pg 231] society which are already\nbecoming more or less harsh and noisy, and they die away finally into\nthe legal commands of society which are never more than conditionally\nethical.\n\nUp to now all ethical systems have been thoroughly fragmentary. They\nconfine themselves to this or that octave of the gamut. The Indians\nand, following in their train, Schopenhauer are, on the whole,\nconcerned only with the ethic of passive self-perfecting; Zarathustra,\nthe Jewish prophets, and the great moralists of China only with that\nof active self-perfecting. The interest of modern Western philosophy\nis fixed almost exclusively on the ethic of society. In consequence of\nthe starting-point which they chose, the thinkers of antiquity in the\nWest cannot get any further than an ethic of resignation. The deeper\nthinkers among our moderns\u2014Kant, J. G. Fichte, Nietzsche, and\nothers\u2014have inklings of an ethic of active self-perfecting.\n\nEuropean thought is characterised by almost always playing in the\nupper octaves, and not in the lower ones. Its ethic has no bass\nbecause the ethic of resignation plays no part in it. An ethic of\nduty, that is an activist ethic, appears to it to be a complete one.\nIt is because he is a representative of the ethic of resignation that\nSpinoza remains such a stranger to his own age.\n\nInability to understand resignation and the relations prevailing\nbetween ethics and resignation, is the fatal weakness of modern\nEuropean thought.\n\nIn what, then, does a complete ethic consist? In an ethic of passive\nself-perfecting, together with one of active self-perfecting. The\nethic which is established from the standpoint of society is a\nsupplementary one which has to be corrected by that of active\nself-perfecting.\n\nIn view of that fact, a complete ethic must be put forward in a shape\nwhich compels it to seek to come to terms with the ethic of society.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 232]\n\nCHAPTER XX\n\nTHE ETHIC OF DEVOTION AND THE ETHIC OF SELF-PERFECTING\n\n\nThe widening of the ethic of self-devotion into a cosmic ethic\n\nBEING sufficiently informed about the questions which have called for\nsolution and the results attained in the search for an ethic down to\nthe present time, the ethic of self-devotion and that of\nself-perfecting can now try to combine their ideas, with a view to\nestablishing together the true basic principle of the moral.\n\nWhy do they not succeed in combining their ideas?\n\nOn the side of the ethic of self-devotion the fault must somehow lie\nin the fact that it is too narrow. As a matter of principle social\nutilitarianism is concerned only with the relations of man to man and\nto human society. The ethic of self-perfecting on the other hand is\nsomething universal. It has to do with the relation of man to the\nworld. If the ethic of self-devotion, therefore, wishes to agree with\nthat of self-perfecting, it must become, like the latter, universal,\nand let its devotion be directed not only towards man and society but\nsomehow or other towards all life whatever in the world.\n\nBut ethics hitherto have been unwilling to take even the first step in\nthis universalizing of devotion.\n\nJust as the housewife who has scrubbed out the parlour, takes care\nthat the door is left shut so that the dog may not get in and spoil\nthe work she has done by the marks of his paws, so do European\nthinkers watch carefully that no animals run about in the fields of\ntheir ethics. The stupidities they are guilty of in trying to maintain\nthe traditional narrow-mindedness and to raise it to a principle [pg\n233] border on the incredible. Either they leave out altogether all\nsympathy for animals, or they take care that it shrinks to a mere\nafterthought which means nothing. If they admit anything more than\nthat, they think themselves obliged to produce elaborate\njustifications, or even excuses, for so doing.\n\nIt seems as if Descartes with his dictum that animals are mere\nmachines had bewitched the whole of European philosophy.\n\nSo important a thinker as Wilhelm Wundt mars his ethic with the\nfollowing sentences: \u201cThe only object for sympathy is man. . . . The\nanimals are for us fellow-creatures, an expression by which language\nalready hints at the fact that we acknowledge here a kind of\nco-ordination with ourselves only with reference to the ultimate\nground of everything that happens, viz., creation. Towards animals\nalso, then, there can arise within us stirrings which are to a certain\nextent related to sympathy, but as to true sympathy with them there is\nalways wanting the fundamental condition of the inner unity of our\nwill with theirs.\u201d To crown this wisdom he ends with the assertion\nthat of rejoicing with animals there can at any rate be no question,\nas if he had never seen a thirsty ox drink.\n\nKant emphasises especially that ethics have to do only with duties of\nman towards men. The \u201chuman\u201d treatment of animals he thinks himself\nobliged to justify by putting it forward as a practising of\nsensibility which helps to improve our sympathetic relations with\nother human beings.\n\nBentham, too, defends kindness to animals chiefly as a means of\npreventing the growth of heartless relations with other men, even\nthough he here and there recognises it as something obviously right.\n\nDarwin in his _Descent of Man_ notices that the feeling of sympathy\nwhich is dominant in the social impulse, becomes at last so strong\nthat it comes to include all men, and indeed even animals. But he does\nnot pursue the problem and the [pg 234] significance of this fact any\nfurther, and contents himself with establishing the ethics of the\nhuman herd.\n\nThus it ranks with European thought as a dogma that ethics have to do\nproperly only with a man\u2019s relation to his fellows and to society. The\nmotives which emanate from Schopenhauer, Stern, and others, for\nthrowing down the antiquated line of circumvallation, are not\nunderstood.\n\nThis backward attitude is the more unintelligible seeing that both\nIndian thought and Chinese, even when they have only scarcely begun to\ndevelop, make ethics consist in a kindly relation to all creatures.\nMoreover, they have come to this view quite independently of each\nother. The subtle and far-reaching commands concerning regard for\nanimals in the popular Chinese ethics of the book _Kan Yin Pien_\n(_Concerning Rewards and Punishments_) cannot be referred back, as is\ncommonly supposed, to Buddhist influences._(_105_)_ They have no\nconnexion with metaphysical discussions about the mutual relationship\nof all beings, such as became effective as the ethical horizon widened\nin Indian thought, but originate in a living, ethical feeling which\ndares to draw the consequences which seem to it to be natural.\n\nWhen European thought refuses to make self-devotion universal, the\nreason is that its efforts are directed to reaching a rational ethic\nwhich deals with universally valid judgments, and it sees a prospect\nof that only when it can keep its feet upon the solid ground of\ndiscussion of the interests of human society. But an ethic which\nbusies [pg 235] itself with the relations of man to the whole creation\nforsakes it. Such an ethic is driven into discussions about existence\nas such. Whether it will or not, it has to plunge into the adventure\nof coming to terms with nature-philosophy, and the result of such an\nadventure cannot be foreseen.\n\nThis is a correct conclusion. But it has already been shown that the\nethic of society, which guides men from the outside, supposing it can\nbe drawn up in this way at all, is never a true ethic, but merely an\nappendix to ethics. It has been established further that true ethics\nare always subjective, that they have an irrational enthusiasm as\ntheir very breath of life, and have to come to terms with\nnature-philosophy. The ethic of self-devotion has, therefore, no\nreason for shrinking from this in any case unavoidable adventure. Its\nhouse has been burnt down. Let it go out into the world to seek its\nfortune.\n\nLet it, then, venture to accept the thought that self-devotion has to\nbe practised not only towards men but towards all living creatures,\nyes, towards all life whatever that exists in the world and is within\nthe reach of man. Let it rise to the conception that the relation of\nmen to each other is only an expression of that in which they all\nstand to Being and to the world in general. Having thus become cosmic,\nthe ethic of devotion can hope to meet the ethic of self-perfecting,\nwhich is fundamentally cosmic, and to unite itself with it.\n\nThe ethic of self-perfecting and mysticism\n\nBut in order that the ethic of self-perfecting may combine with that\nof self-devotion, it must first become cosmic in the right way.\n\nIt is indeed fundamentally cosmic, because self-perfecting can consist\nof nothing but this, that man comes into his true relation to the\nBeing that is in him and outside him. His natural, outward connexion\nwith Being he means to [pg 236] change into a spiritual, inward\ndevotion to it, letting his passive and active relation to things be\ndetermined by this devotion.\n\nIn this effort, however, he has never yet got further than a passive\ndevotion to Being. He is always driven past active devotion to it.\nThis one-sidedness is what makes it impossible for the two ethics of\nself-perfecting and of self-devotion to penetrate each other, and to\nproduce together the complete ethic of passive and active\nself-perfecting.\n\nBut what is the reason that the ethic of self-perfecting, in spite of\nall its efforts, cannot get out of the circle of the passive? It is\nthat it allows the spiritual inward devotion to Being to be directed\nto an abstract notion of Being instead of to real Being. Thus it\napproaches nature-philosophy in a wrong way.\n\nWhence this error? It is a result of the difficulties which the ethic\nof self-perfecting meets when it attempts to comprehend itself in\nnature-philosophy.\n\nIn a fashion which is deep, though it strikes us as unfamiliar,\nChinese thought undertakes to arrive at this agreement. It thinks that\nit is somehow or other in the \u201cimpersonal\u201d element of the world\u2019s\nactivity that the secret of the truly ethical lies. It accordingly\nmakes spiritual devotion to Being consist in this, that we look away\nfrom the subjective stirrings within ourselves, and relate ourselves\nto the laws of objectivity which we discover in the course of nature.\n\nIt is with this deep \u201cbecoming like the world\u201d that the thought of\nLao-tse and that of Chwang-tse are concerned. The motifs of such an\nethic make themselves heard in a wonderful fashion in Lao-tse\u2019s\n_Taoteking_; but they cannot be made to produce a complete symphony.\nThe meaning of what happens in the world is a thing we cannot\ninvestigate. What we do understand of it is that all life tries to\nlive itself out. The true ethic of life, therefore, \u201cin the spirit of\nwhat happens\u201d would seem to be that of Yang-tse and Friedrich\nNietzsche. On the other hand the assumption [pg 237] of an\nobjectivity, dominant in the course of nature, which can be a pattern\nfor our activity is nothing else than an attempt, undertaken with the\npalest of colours, to paint the world as ethical. Correspondingly,\nthis existence in the spirit of the world means with Lao-tse and\nChwang-tse an inward liberation from the rule of passion and from\noutward occurrences, which is accompanied by marked depreciations of\nall tendencies to activity. Whenever life in the spirit of the world\nleads to a really activist ethic as with Confucius, Mo-Di, and others,\nthere has been a corresponding interpretation of the meaning of the\nworld. Whenever, in general, human thinking raises\nbeing-like-the-world to an ethic, the ethical willing of mankind has\nread somehow or other into the world-spirit an ethical character in\norder to be able to find itself in it later.\n\nSince no motives to ethical activity are to be discovered in the\ncourse of nature, the ethic of self-perfecting must allow both the\nactive and the passive ethic to originate side by side in the bare\nfact of spiritual inward self-dedication to Being. It must derive them\nboth from the act as such, without any presupposition of any sort of\nethical quality in Being. Then first will thought have reached a\ncomplete ethic without having been guilty of any sort of na\u00efve or\ntricky proceedings.\n\nThat is the problem at which the ethical searching of all peoples and\nall ages vainly toils, so far as it ventures to think in the spirit of\ntrue nature philosophy. With the Chinese and the Indians, in Stoicism,\nwith Spinoza, Schleiermacher, Fichte, and Hegel, and in all mysticism\nof union with the Absolute, it reaches only an ethic of resignation,\nconsisting of inward liberation from the world, never at the same time\nan ethic of working in the world and upon the world.\n\nIt is true that it only seldom ventures honestly to admit to itself\nthe unsatisfactory result. As a rule it seeks to widen it, and to\nmaintain in some measure an activist ethic in spite of it, letting\nthis ethic be combined in some form or other with the ethic of\nresignation. The more [pg 238] consistent the thinkers, the more\nmodest is the space occupied by the piece thus hooked on.\n\nWith Lao-tse and Chwang-tse, with the Brahmans and the Buddha, with\nthe Stoics of antiquity, with Spinoza, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, and\nwith the great monist mystics the activist ethic is reduced to little\nmore than nothing. With Confucius and Meng-tse, with the Hindoo\nthinkers, with the representatives of the Later Stoicism, and with J.\nG. Fichte it makes strenuous efforts to assert itself, but it can do\nso only so far as it takes either na\u00efve or sophisticated thought to\nhelp it.\n\nEvery world-and-life-view which is to satisfy thought is mysticism. It\nmust seek to give to the existence of man such a meaning as will\nprevent him from being satisfied with being a part of the infinite\nexistence in merely natural fashion, but will make him determine to\nbelong to it inwardly and spiritually also, through an act of his\nconsciousness.\n\nThe ethic of self-perfecting is in inmost connexion with mysticism.\nIts own destiny is decided in that of mysticism. Thinking out the\nethic of self-perfecting means nothing else than seeking to found\nethics on mysticism. Mysticism, on its side, is a valuable\nworld-and-life-view only in proportion as it is ethical.\n\nAnd yet it finds it cannot succeed in being ethical. Experience of\nbecoming one with the Absolute, of existence within the world-spirit,\nof ascent into God, or whatever one may choose to call the process, is\nnot in itself ethical; it is only spiritual. Of this deep distinction\nIndian thought has become conscious. With the most varied phrasing it\nproclaims the statement: \u201cSpirituality is not ethics.\u201d We Europeans\nhave remained na\u00efve in matters of mysticism. What appears among us as\nmysticism is usually mysticism with a more or less Christian, that is\nto say ethical, colouring. Hence we are inclined to deceive ourselves\nabout the ethical content of mysticism.\n\nIf one analyses the mysticism of all peoples and all ages to find out\nits ethical content, we find that this is [pg 239] extraordinarily\nsmall. Even the ethic of resignation, which seems after all to belong\nnaturally to mysticism, is in it more or less afflicted with\nimpotence. Through the absence of the activist ethic with which it\nshould normally be bound up, it to a certain extent loses its hold,\nand pushes itself more and more into the region of no longer ethical\nresignation. There then arises a mysticism that no longer helps the\neffort for self-perfecting, which is the deeper work to which it is\ncalled, but allows absorption into the Absolute to become an aim in\nitself. The purer the mysticism, the further has this evolution\ndeveloped. Mysticism becomes then a world- and life-view of the merging\nof the finite existence in the infinite, if indeed it does not get\nreversed, as with the Brahmans, into the lofty mysticism of the\nexistence of infinite existence within the finite. The ethic of\nself-perfecting, which should arise out of mysticism, is therefore\nalways in danger of perishing in mysticism.\n\nThe tendency of mysticism to become supra-ethical is quite natural. As\na matter of fact its connexion with an Absolute which has neither\nqualities nor needs has nothing more to do with self-perfecting. It\nbecomes a pure act of consciousness, and leads to a spirituality which\nis just as bare of content as the pre-supposed Absolute. Feeling its\nweakness, mysticism does all it can to be more ethical than it is, or\nat any rate to appear so. Even the Indian form of it makes efforts in\nthis direction, although again, on the other hand, it has courage to\nbe veracious enough to rank the spiritual above the ethical.\n\nIn order to judge what mysticism is worth ethically one must count\nonly what it contains in itself in the way of ethics, not what it does\nor says beyond that. Then, however, the ethical content of even\nChristian mysticism is terrifyingly small. Mysticism is not a friend\nbut a foe of ethics; it devours it. And yet the ethic which is to\nsatisfy thought must be born of mysticism. All deep philosophy, all\ndeep religion, are ultimately a struggle for ethical mysticism and\nmystical ethics.\n\n[pg 240]\n\nDominated by efforts to secure an activist ethical world- and\nlife-view, we Westerners do not allow mysticism to come into its own.\nIt leads among us a furtive, intermittent existence. We feel\ninstinctively that it stands in antagonism to activist ethics, and we\nhave therefore no inward relationship to it.\n\nOur great mistake, however, is thinking that we can reach without\nmysticism an ethical world- and life-view, which shall satisfy thought.\nUp to now we have done nothing but fabricate world- and life-views.\nThey are good because they keep men up to activist ethics, but they\nare not true, and therefore they are always collapsing. Moreover they\nare not deep. Hence European thought makes men ethical indeed, but\nsuperficial, and the European, because he is surfeited with world-view\nwhich has been fabricated with a view to activist ethics, has no\ncollectedness and no inward personality, nor indeed any feeling of\nneed for these things.\n\nIt is indeed time for us to abandon this error. Depth and stability in\nthinking come to the world- and life-view of activist ethics only when\nthis springs from mysticism. The question of what we are to make of\nour life is not solved by our being driven out into the world with an\nimpulse to activity, and never being allowed to collect ourselves for\nthought. It can be really answered only by a world- and life-view which\nbrings man into a spiritual inward relation to Being, out of which\nthere results of natural necessity an ethic both passive and active.\n\nThe hitherto accepted mysticism cannot effect this because it is\nsupra-ethical. The struggle of thought has therefore to direct itself\nupon ethical mysticism. We must rise to a spirituality which is\nethical, and to an ethic which includes within itself all\nspirituality. Then only do we become profoundly qualified for life.\n\nEthics must resolve to originate in mysticism. Mysticism, on its side,\nmust never think that it exists for its own sake. It is not a flower,\nbut only the calyx. Ethics are [pg 241] the flower. Mysticism which\nexists for itself only is the salt which has lost its savour.\n\nThe hitherto accepted mysticism leads into the supra-ethical because\nit is abstract, and abstraction is the death of ethics, for ethics are\na living relation for a living life. We must therefore abandon\nabstract mysticism, and turn to the mysticism which is alive.\n\nAbstract mysticism and the mysticism of reality. Supra-ethical, and\nethical mysticism\n\nThe Essence of Being, the Absolute, the World-spirit, and all similar\nexpressions denote nothing actual, but something conceived in\nabstractions which for that reason it is also absolutely impossible to\nrepresent to the mind. The only reality is the Being which manifests\nitself in phenomena.\n\nHow does thought come to such a meaningless proceeding as making man\nenter into a spiritual relation with an unreal creation of thought? By\nyielding to temptation in two ways, one general, one particular.\n\nThrown back upon the necessity of expressing itself in words thought\nadopts as its own the abstractions and symbols which have been coined\nby language. But this coinage should have no more currency than allows\nit to represent things in an abbreviated way, instead of putting them\nforward with all the detail in which they are given. But in time it\ncomes about that thought works with these abstractions and symbols as\nif they represented something really existing. That is the general\ntemptation.\n\nThe particular temptation lies in this case in this, that man\u2019s\ndevotion to infinite Being, effected with the help of abstractions and\nsymbols, is thereby given expression in an enticingly simple way. It\nis taken to consist of entrance into relation with the totality of\nBeing, that is to say, with its spiritual essence.\n\nThat looks very well in words and in thought. Reality, [pg 242]\nhowever, knows nothing about the individual being able to enter into\nconnexion with the totality of Being. As it knows of no Being except\nthat which manifests itself in the existence of individual beings, so\nalso it knows of no relations except these of one individual being to\nanother. If mysticism, then, means to be honest, there is nothing for\nit to do but to cast from it the usual abstractions, and to admit to\nitself that it can do nothing rational with this imaginary essence of\nBeing. The Absolute may be as meaningless to it as his fetish is to a\nconverted negro. It must in all seriousness go through the process of\nconversion to the mysticism of reality. Abandoning all stage\ndecorations and declamation, let it try to get its experience in\nliving nature.\n\nThere is no Essence of Being, but only infinite Being in infinite\nmanifestations. It is only through the manifestations of Being, and\nonly through those with which I enter into relations, that my being\nhas any intercourse with infinite Being. The devotion of my being to\ninfinite Being means devotion of my being to all the manifestations of\nBeing which need my devotion, and to which I am able to devote myself.\n\nOnly an infinitely small part of infinite Being comes within my reach.\nThe rest of it drives on past me, like distant ships to which I make\nsignals they do not understand. But by devoting myself to that which\ncomes within my reach and needs me, I make spiritual, inward devotion\nto infinite Being a reality and thereby give my own poor existence\nmeaning and richness. The river has found its sea.\n\nFrom devotion to the Absolute there comes only a dead spirituality. It\nis a purely intellectual act. No motives to activity are given in it.\nEven the ethic of resignation can only eke out a miserable existence\non the soil of such an intellectualism. But in the mysticism of\nreality devotion is no longer a purely intellectual act, but one in\nwhich everything that is alive in man has its share. There is\ntherefore dominant in it a spirituality which carries in itself [pg\n243] in elemental form the impulse to action. The gruesome truth that\nspirituality and ethics are two different things no longer holds good.\nHere the two are one and the same.\n\nNow, too, the ethic of self-perfecting and the ethic of devotion can\ninterpenetrate each other. They now become, we see, cosmic in\nnature-philosophy, which leaves the world as it is. Hence they cannot\nbut meet each other in a thought (which satisfies in every direction\nthe laws of thinking), of living devotion to Being which lives. In\nthis thought lie passive and active self-perfecting in mutual\nagreement and perfect union. They comprehend each other as the working\nout of one and the same inner compulsion. Having become one they no\nlonger need first of all to exert themselves to establish by joint\nefforts the completed ethic of influencing the world through\nliberation from the world. The completeness is now automatically\nattained. Now there ring out in wonderful harmonies all the notes in\nthe gamut of ethics, from the vibrations in which resignation begins\nto be audible as ethics, up to the higher notes in which ethics pass\nover into the harsh noises of the commands which are proclaimed by\nsociety to be ethical.\n\nSubjective responsibility for all life which comes within his reach,\nresponsibility which widens out extensively and intensively to the\nlimitless, and which the man who has become inwardly free from the\nworld experiences and tries to make a reality, that is ethics. It\noriginates in world- and life-affirmation. It makes itself a reality in\nlife-denial. It is completely bound up with optimistic willing. Never\nagain can the belief-in-progress get separated from ethics, like a\nbadly-fastened wheel from a cart. The two turn inseparably on the same\naxle.\n\nThe basic principle of ethics, that principle which is a necessity of\nthought, which has a definite content, which is ever bringing itself\ninto steady, living, and practical agreement with reality, proclaims\nitself to be: Devotion to life out of reverence for life.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 244]\n\nCHAPTER XXI\n\nTHE ETHIC OF REVERENCE FOR LIFE\n\n\nThe basic principle of the moral\n\nCOMPLICATED and laborious are the roads along which ethical thought,\nwhich has mistaken its way and lost itself, must be brought back. Its\ncourse, however, maps itself out quite simply if, instead of taking\napparently convenient short cuts, it keeps to its right direction from\nthe very beginning. For this three things are necessary.\n\nIt must have nothing to do with an ethical interpretation of the\nworld.\n\nIt must become cosmic and mystical, that is, it must seek to conceive\nall the devotion which rules in ethics as a manifestation of an\ninward, spiritual relation to the world.\n\nIt must not go astray into abstract thinking, but must remain\nelemental, understanding self-devotion to the world to be\nself-devotion of human life to every form of living being with which\nit can come into relation.\n\nThe origin of ethics is that I think out the full meaning of the\nworld-affirmation which is given by nature together with the\nlife-affirmation in my will-to-live, and try to make it a reality.\n\nTo become ethical means to begin to think sincerely.\n\nThinking is the agreement between willing and knowing which is come to\nwithin me. Its course is a na\u00efve one, if the will demands of the\nknowledge to be shown a world which corresponds to the impulses which\nit carries within itself, and if the knowledge attempts to satisfy\nthis requirement. The place of this dialogue, a dialogue which is\ndoomed beforehand to produce no result, must be taken by a correct\none, in which the will demands from the knowledge only what it really\nknows.\n\n[pg 245]\n\nIf the knowledge answers solely with what it knows, it is always\nteaching the will one and the same fact, viz., that in and behind all\nphenomena there is will-to-live. Knowledge, though ever becoming\ndeeper and more inclusive, can do nothing except take us deeper into\nthe enigmatic fact that all that is, is will-to-live. Progress in\nscience consists only in increasingly accurate description of the\nphenomena in which life in its innumerable forms appears and passes,\nletting us discover life where we did not previously expect it, and\nputting us in a position to turn to our own use in this or that way\nwhat we have learnt of the course of the will-to-live in nature. But\nwhat life is, no science can tell us.\n\nFor our world- and life-view, then, the gain derived from knowledge is\nonly that it makes it harder for us to be thoughtless, because it\nforces upon our attention ever more strongly the mystery of the\nwill-to-live which we see stirring everywhere. Hence the difference\nbetween learned and unlearned is an entirely relative one. The\nunlearned man who, at the sight of a tree in flower, is overpowered by\nthe mystery of the will-to-live which is stirring all round him, knows\nmore truly than the learned one who studies under the microscope or in\nphysical and chemical activity a thousand forms of the will-to-live,\nbut who, with all his knowledge of the life-course of these\nmanifestations of the will-to-live, is unmoved by the mystery that\neverything which exists is will-to-live, while he is puffed up with\nvanity at being able to describe exactly a fragment of the course of\nlife.\n\nAll true knowledge passes on into experience. The nature of the\nmanifestations I do not know, but I form a conception of it in analogy\nto the will-to-live which is within myself, and thus my knowledge of\nthe world becomes experience of the world. The knowledge which is\nbecoming experience does not allow me to remain in face of the world a\nsubject who merely knows; it forces upon me an inward relation to the\nworld, and fills me with reverence for the mysterious will-to-live\nwhich is in everything. By making [pg 246] me think and wonder, it\nleads me ever upwards to the heights of reverence for life. There it\nlets my hand go. It cannot accompany me further. My will-to-live must\nnow find its way about the world by itself.\n\nIt is not by informing me what this or that manifestation of life\nmeans in the sum-total of the world that knowledge brings me into\nconnexion with the world. It goes about with me not in outer circles,\nbut in the inner ones. From within outwards it puts me in relation to\nthe world by forcing my will-to-live to feel everything around it as\nalso will-to-live.\n\nWith Descartes, philosophy starts from the dogma: \u201cI think, therefore\nI exist.\u201d With this poverty-stricken, arbitrarily chosen beginning, it\nis landed irretrievably on the road to the abstract. It never finds\nthe entrance to ethics, and remains entangled in a dead world- and\nlife-view. True philosophy must start from the most immediate and\ncomprehensive fact of consciousness, which says: \u201cI am life which\nwills to live, in the midst of life which wills to live.\u201d This is not\na cleverly composed dogmatic formula. Day after day, hour after hour,\nI live and move in it. At every moment of reflexion it stands fresh\nbefore me. There bursts forth again and again from it as from roots\nthat can never dry up, a living world- and life-view which can deal\nwith all the facts of Being. A mysticism of ethical union with Being\ngrows out of it.\n\nAs in my own will-to-live there is a longing for wider life and for\nthe mysterious exaltation of the will-to-live which we call pleasure,\nwith dread of annihilation and of the mysterious encroachment on the\nwill-to-live which we call pain; so is it also in the will-to-live all\naround me, whether it can express itself before me, or remains dumb.\n\nEthics consist, therefore, in my experiencing the compulsion to show\nto all will-to-live the same reverence as I do to my own. There we\nhave given us that basic principle of the moral which is a necessity\nof thought: It is good to maintain and to promote life; it is bad to\ndestroy life or to obstruct it.\n\n[pg 247]\n\nAs a matter of fact everything which in the ordinary ethical valuation\nof the relations of men to each other ranks as good, can be brought\nunder the description of material and spiritual maintenance or\npromotion of human life, and of effort to bring it to its highest\nvalue. Conversely, everything which ranks as bad in human relations is\nin the last analysis material or spiritual destruction or obstruction\nof human life, and negligence in the effort to bring it to its highest\nvalue. Separate individual categories of good and evil which lie far\napart and have apparently no connexion at all with one another fit\ntogether like things which belong to each other, as soon as they are\ncomprehended and deepened in this the most universal definition of\ngood and evil.\n\nThe basic principle of the moral means, however, not only an ordering\nand deepening of the current views of good and evil, but also a\nwidening of them. A man is truly ethical only when he obeys the\ncompulsion to help all life which he is able to assist, and shrinks\nfrom injuring anything that lives. He does not ask how far this or\nthat life deserves one\u2019s interest as being valuable, nor, beyond that,\nwhether and how far it can appreciate such interest. Life as such is\nsacred to him. He tears no leaf from a tree, plucks no flower, and\ntakes care to crush no insect. If in summer he is working by\nlamplight, he prefers to keep the window shut and breathe a stuffy\natmosphere rather than see one insect after another fall with singed\nwings upon his table.\n\nIf he goes into the street after a shower and sees an earthworm which\nhas strayed on to it, he bethinks himself that it must get dried up in\nthe sun, if it does not get back soon enough to ground into which it\ncan burrow, and so he lifts it from the deadly stone surface, and puts\nit on the grass. If he comes across an insect which has fallen into a\npuddle, he stops a moment in order to hold out a leaf or a stalk on\nwhich it can save itself.\n\nHe is not afraid of being laughed at as sentimental. It is the fate of\nevery truth to be a subject for laughter until [pg 248] it is\ngenerally recognized. Once it was considered folly to assume that men\nof colour were really men and ought to be treated as such, but the\nfolly has become an accepted truth. To-day it is thought to be going\ntoo far to declare that constant regard for everything that lives,\ndown to the lowest manifestations of life, is a demand made by\nrational ethics. The time is coming, however, when people will be\nastonished that mankind needed so long a time to learn to regard\nthoughtless injury to life as incompatible with ethics.\n\nEthics are responsibility without limit towards all that lives.\n\nThe definition of ethics as a relation to things within a disposition\nto reverence for life, strikes one in its absolutely universal extent\nas cold. But it is the only complete one. Sympathy is too narrow to\nrank as the essence of the ethical. It denotes, of course, only\ninterest in the suffering will-to-live. But ethics include also\nfeeling as one\u2019s own all the circumstances and all the aspirations of\nthe will-to-live, its pleasure, too, and its longing to live itself\nout to the full, as well as its urge to self-perfecting.\n\nLove means more, since it includes fellowship in suffering, in joy,\nand in effort, but it shows the ethical only in a simile, although in\na natural and deep one. It makes the solidarity produced by ethics\nanalogous to that which nature calls forth on the physical side, for\nmore or less temporary purposes between two beings which complete each\nother sexually, or between them and their offspring.\n\nThought must strive to bring to expression the nature of the ethical\nin itself. To effect this it comes inevitably to defining ethics as\ndevotion to life which is inspired by reverence for life. Even if the\nword reverence for life sounds so general as to seem somewhat\nlifeless, what is signified by it is nevertheless something which the\nman into whose thought it has made its way can never get rid of.\nSympathy, and love, and every kind of valuable emotion are given\nwithin it. With a restless living force [pg 249] reverence for life\nworks upon the disposition into which it has entered, and throws it\ninto the unrest of a feeling of responsibility which at no place and\nat no time ceases to affect it. Just as the screw which burrows\nthrough the water drives the ship along, so does reverence for life\nthe man.\n\nArising, as it does, from an inner compulsion, the ethic of reverence\nfor life is not dependent on the extent to which it is able to think\nitself out to a satisfying life-view. It need give no answer to the\nquestion of what significance the ethical man\u2019s work for the\nmaintenance, promotion, and exalting of life can have in the total\nhappenings of the course of nature. It does not let itself be misled\nby the calculation that the maintaining and completing of life which\nit practises is hardly worth consideration beside the tremendous,\nunceasing destruction of life which goes on through natural forces.\nHaving the will to action, it can leave on one side all the problems\nof the success of its work. Full of significance for the world is the\nfact in itself that in the ethically developed man there has made its\nappearance in the world a will-to-live which is filled with reverence\nfor life and devotion to life.\n\nIn my will-to-live the universal will-to-live experiences itself\notherwise than in its other manifestations. In them it shows itself in\na process of individualising which, so far as I can see from the\noutside, is bent merely on living itself out to the full, and in no\nway on union with any other will-to-live. The world is a ghastly drama\nof will-to-live divided against itself. One existence makes its way at\nthe cost of another; one destroys the other. One will-to-live merely\nexerts its will against the other, and has no knowledge of it. But in\nme the will-to-live has come to know about other wills-to-live. There\nis in it a longing to arrive at unity with itself, to become\nuniversal.\n\nWhy does the will-to-live experience itself in this way in me alone?\nIs it because I have acquired the capacity of reflecting on the\ntotality of Being? What is the goal of this evolution which has begun\nin me?\n\n[pg 250]\n\nTo these questions there is no answer. It remains a painful enigma for\nme that I must live with reverence for life in a world which is\ndominated by creative will which is also destructive will, and\ndestructive will which is also creative.\n\nI can do nothing but hold to the fact that the will-to-live in me\nmanifests itself as will-to-live which desires to become one with\nother will-to-live. That is for me the light that shines in the\ndarkness. The ignorance in which the world is wrapped has no existence\nfor me; I have been saved from the world. I am thrown, indeed, by\nreverence for life into an unrest such as the world does not know, but\nI obtain from it a blessedness which the world cannot give. If in the\ntenderheartedness produced by being different from the world another\nperson and I help each other in understanding and pardoning, when\notherwise will would torment will, the division of the will-to-live is\ngot rid of. If I save an insect from the puddle, life has devoted\nitself to life, and the division of life against itself is got rid of.\nWhenever my life devotes itself in any way to life, my finite\nwill-to-live experiences its union with the infinite will in which all\nlife is one, and I enjoy a feeling of refreshment which prevents me\nfrom pining away in the desert of life.\n\nI therefore recognize it as the destiny of my existence to be obedient\nto this higher revelation of the will-to-live in me. I choose for my\nwork the removal of this division of the will-to-live against itself,\nso far as the influence of my existence reaches. Knowing now the one\nthing needful, I leave on one side the enigma of the world and of my\nexistence in it.\n\nThe surmisings and the longings of all deep religiousness are\ncontained in the ethic of reverence for life. This religiousness,\nhowever, does not build up for itself a completed world-view, but\nresigns itself to the necessity of leaving its cathedral unfinished.\nIt finishes the choir only, but in this choir piety maintains a living\nand never-ceasing divine service.\n\n[pg 251]\n\nThe ethic of resignation. An ethic of veracity towards oneself, and an\nactivist ethic\n\nThe ethic of reverence for life shows its truth also in that it\nincludes in itself the different elements of ethics in their natural\nconnexion. Hitherto no ethic has been able to present in their\nparallelism and their interaction the effort after self-perfecting, in\nwhich man acts upon himself from outside without deeds, and the\nactivist ethic. The ethic of reverence for life can do this, and\nindeed in such a way that it not only answers academic questions, but\nalso produces a deepening of ethical insight.\n\nEthics are reverence for the will-to-live within me and without me.\nFrom the former comes first the profound life-affirmation of\nresignation. I apprehend my will-to-live as not only something which\ncan live itself out in happy occurrences, but also something which has\nexperience of itself. If I refuse to let this self-experience\ndisappear in thoughtlessness, and persist in feeling it to be\nvaluable, I begin to learn the secret of spiritual self-assertion. I\nwin an unsuspected freedom from the various destinies of life. At\nmoments in which I had expected to find myself overwhelmed, I find\nmyself exalted in an inexpressible and surprising happiness of freedom\nfrom the world, and I experience therein a clearing of my life-view.\nResignation is the vestibule through which we enter ethics. Only he\nwho in deepened devotion to his own will-to-live experiences inward\nfreedom from outward occurrences, is capable of devoting himself in\nprofound and steady fashion to the life of others.\n\nJust as in the reverence for my own will-to-live I struggle for\nfreedom from the destinies of life, so I struggle too for freedom from\nmyself. Not only in face of what happens to me, but also with\nattention to the way in which I deal with the world, I practise the\nhigher self-maintenance. Out of reverence for my own existence I place\nmyself under the compulsion of veracity towards myself. Everything [pg\n252] I acquired would be purchased too dearly by action in defiance of\nmy convictions. I fear that if I were untrue to myself I should be\nwounding my will-to-live with a poisoned spear.\n\nThe fact that Kant makes, as he does, veracity towards oneself the\ncentre point of his ethic, testifies to the depth of his ethical\nfeeling. But because in his search for the essential nature of the\nethical he fails to find his way through to reverence for life, he\ncannot comprehend the connexion between veracity towards oneself and\nan activist ethic.\n\nAs a matter of fact the ethic of veracity towards oneself passes\nimperceptibly into that of devotion to others. Such veracity compels\nme to actions which manifest themselves as devotion in such a way that\nordinary ethics derive them from devotion.\n\nWhy do I forgive anyone? Ordinary ethics say, because I feel sympathy\nwith him. They allow men to seem to themselves, when they pardon\nothers, frightfully good, and allow them to practise a style of\npardoning which is not free from humiliation of the other. They thus\nmake forgiveness a sweetened triumph of self-devotion.\n\nThe ethic of reverence for life does away with this unpurified view.\nAll acts of forbearance and of pardon are for it acts forced from one\nby veracity towards oneself. I must practise unlimited forgiveness\nbecause, if I did not, I should be wanting in veracity to myself, for\nit would be acting as if I myself were not guilty in the same way as\nthe other has been guilty towards me. Because my life is so liberally\nspotted with falsehood, I must forgive falsehood which has been\npractised upon me; because I myself have been in so many cases wanting\nin love, and guilty of hatred, slander, deceit, or arrogance, I must\npardon any want of love, and all hatred, slander, deceit, or arrogance\nwhich have been directed against myself. I must forgive quietly and\nwithout drawing attention to it; in fact I do not really pardon at\nall, for I do not let things develop to any such act of judgement. Nor\nis this any eccentric proceeding; [pg 253] it is only a necessary\nwidening and refinement of ordinary ethics.\n\nThe struggle against the evil that is in mankind we have to carry on\nnot by judging others, but by judging ourselves. Struggle with oneself\nand veracity towards oneself are the means by which we work upon\nothers. We quietly draw them into our efforts after the deep spiritual\nself-assertion which springs out of reverence for one\u2019s own life.\nPower makes no noise. It is there, and works. True ethics begin where\nthe use of language ceases.\n\nThe innermost element then, in activist ethics, even if it appears as\nself-devotion, comes from the compulsion to veracity towards oneself,\nand obtains therein its true value. The whole ethic of being other\nthan the world flows pure only when it comes from this source. It is\nnot from kindness to others that I am tender-hearted, peaceable,\nforbearing, and friendly, but because by such behaviour I prove my own\ndeepest self-assertion to be true. Reverence for life which I apply to\nmy own existence, and reverence for life which keeps me in a temper of\ndevotion to other existence than mine, interpenetrate each other.\n\nEthics and thoughtlessness. Ethics and self-assertion\n\nOrdinary ethics, because they are without any basic principle of the\nethical, are obliged to engage at once in the discussion of\nconflicting duties. The ethic of reverence for life has no such need\nfor hurry. It takes its own time to think out in all directions its\nown principle of the moral. Knowing itself to be firmly established,\nit then settles its position with regard to these conflicts.\n\nIt has to come to terms with three adversaries: these are\nthoughtlessness, egoistic self-assertion, and society.\n\nTo the first of these it pays usually insufficient attention, because\nno open conflicts arise between them. This adversary does,\nnevertheless, obstruct it imperceptibly.\n\nThere is, however, a wide field which our ethic can take [pg 254]\npossession of without any collision with the troops of egoism. Man can\naccomplish much that is good, without having to require of himself any\nsacrifice. And if there really goes with it a bit of his life, it is\nsomething so insignificant that he feels it no more than if he were\nlosing a hair or a piece of dead skin.\n\nOver wide stretches of conduct the inward liberation from the world,\nthe being true to oneself, the being different from the world, yes,\nand even devotion to other life, is only a matter of giving attention\nto this particular relation. We fall short so much, because we do not\nkeep ourselves up to it. We do not stand sufficiently under the\npressure of any inward compulsion to be ethical. The steam hisses at\nall points out of the leaky boiler. The resulting losses of energy are\nas high as they are in ordinary ethics, because these ethics have at\ntheir disposal no single basic principle of the moral which works upon\nthought. They cannot repair the boiler; they do not, indeed, ever even\nexamine it. Reverence for life, however, being something which is ever\npresent to thought, penetrates unceasingly and in all directions men\u2019s\nobservation, reflexion, and resolutions. A man can keep himself clear\nof it as little as the water can prevent itself from being coloured by\nthe dye-stuff which is dropped into it. The struggle with\nthoughtlessness is started, and is always advancing.\n\nBut what is the relation between ethics and reverence for life in the\nconflicts which arise between inward compulsion to devotion, and\nnecessary self-assertion?\n\nI too am subject to division of my will-to-life against itself. In a\nthousand ways my existence stands in conflict with that of others. The\nnecessity to destroy and to injure life is imposed upon me. If I walk\nalong an unfrequented path, my foot brings destruction and pain upon\nthe tiny creatures which populate it. In order to preserve my own\nexistence, I must defend myself against the existence which injures\nit. I become a hunter of the mouse which inhabits my house, a murderer\nof the insect which wants to have its nest there, a mass-murderer of\nthe bacteria which [pg 255] may endanger my life. I get my food by\ndestroying plants and animals. My happiness is built upon injury done\nto my fellow-men.\n\nHow does our ethic assert itself in the tragic necessity to which I am\nsubjected through the division of my will-to-live against itself?\n\nOrdinary ethics seek compromises. They try to lay down how much of my\nexistence and of my happiness I must sacrifice, and how much of them I\nmay preserve at the cost of the existence and happiness of other\nlives. With this distinction they produce an experimental, relative\nethic. They offer as ethical what is in reality not ethical but a\nmixture of non-ethical necessity and ethics. They thereby establish a\nhuge confusion, and allow the starting of an ever-increasing\nobscuration of the conception of the ethical.\n\nThe ethic of reverence for life knows nothing of a relative ethic. It\nallows to rank as good only the maintenance and promotion of life. All\ndestruction of and injury to life, under whatever circumstances they\ntake place, it condemns as evil. It does not keep in store adjustments\nbetween ethics and necessity all ready for making up. It is always\nagain and again and in ways that are always original coming to terms\nin men with reality. It does not abolish for man all ethical\nconflicts, but compels him to decide for himself in each case how far\nhe can remain ethical and how far he must submit himself to the\nnecessity for destruction of and injury to life, and therewith incur\nguilt. It is not by receiving instruction about agreement between\nethical and necessary, that a man makes progress in ethics, but only\nby coming to hear more and more plainly the voice of the ethical, by\nbecoming ruled more and more by the longing to preserve and promote\nlife, and by becoming more and more obstinate in resistance to the\nnecessity for destroying or injuring life.\n\nIn ethical conflicts man can arrive only at subjective decisions. No\none can lay down for him at what point, on each occasion, lies the\nextreme limit of possibility for [pg 256] his persistence in the\npreservation and promotion of life. He alone has to decide, by letting\nhimself be guided by a feeling of the highest possible responsibility\ntowards other life.\n\nWe must never let ourselves become blunted and dull. We are living in\ntruth, when our experience in these conflicts is ever deepening. The\ngood conscience is an invention of the devil\u2019s.\n\nMan and other living creatures\n\nWhat does reverence for life say about the relations between men and\nthe animal world?\n\nWhenever I injure life of any sort, I must be quite clear whether it\nis necessary. Beyond the unavoidable, I must never go, not even with\nwhat seems insignificant. The farmer who has mown down a thousand\nflowers in his meadow to feed his cows, must be careful on his way\nhome not to strike off in thoughtless pastime the head of a single\nflower by the roadside, for he thereby commits a wrong against life\nwithout being under the pressure of necessity.\n\nThose who experiment with operations or the use of drugs upon animals,\nor inoculate them with diseases, so as to be able to bring help to\nmankind with the results gained, must never quiet any misgivings they\nfeel with the general reflexion that their gruesome proceedings aim at\na valuable result. They must first have considered in each individual\ncase whether there is a real necessity to force upon any animal this\nsacrifice for the sake of mankind, and they must take the most careful\npains to ensure that the pain inflicted is made as small as possible.\nHow much wrong is committed in scientific institutions through neglect\nof an\u00e6sthetics, which to save time or trouble are not administered!\nHow much, too, through animals being subjected to torture merely to\ngive to students a demonstration of perfectly understood phenomena. By\nthe very fact that animals have been subjected to experiments, and\nhave by their pain won such valuable results for suffering [pg 257]\nmen, a new and special relation of solidarity has been established\nbetween them and us. From that springs for each one of us a compulsion\nto do to every animal all the good we possibly can. By helping an\ninsect when it is in difficulties I am thereby attempting to cancel\npart of man\u2019s ever new debt to the animal world. Whenever an animal is\nin any way forced into the service of man, every one of us must be\nconcerned with the suffering which it has thereby to undergo. None of\nus must allow to take place any suffering for which he himself is not\nresponsible, if he can hinder it in any way, at the same time quieting\nhis conscience with the reflexion that he would be mixing himself up\nin something which does not concern him. No one must shut his eyes and\nregard as non-existent the sufferings of which he spares himself the\nsight. Let no one regard as light the burden of his responsibility.\nWhile so much ill-treatment of animals goes on, while the moans of\nthirsty animals in railway trucks sound unheard, while so much\nbrutality prevails in our slaughter-houses, while animals have to\nsuffer in our kitchens painful death from unskilled hands, while\nanimals have to endure intolerable treatment from heartless men, or\nare left to the cruel play of children, we all share the guilt.\n\nWe are afraid of making ourselves conspicuous, if we let it be noticed\nhow we feel for the sufferings which man brings upon the animals. We\nthink at the same time that others have become more \u201crational\u201d than we\nare, and that they take as being usual and as a matter of course, what\nwe are excited about. Yet suddenly they will let slip a word which\nshows us that they too have not yet learnt to acquiesce. And now,\nthough they are strangers, they are quite near us. The mask in which\nwe misled each other falls off. We know now, from one another, that we\nare alike in being unable to escape from the gruesome proceedings that\nare taking place unceasingly around us. What a happy making of a new\nacquaintance!\n\nThe ethic of respect for life guards us from letting each other\nbelieve through our silence that we no longer experience [pg 258]\nwhat, as thinking men, we must experience. It prompts us to keep each\nother sensitive to what distresses us, and to talk and to act together\nwithout any feeling of shyness, just as the responsibility we feel\nmoves us to. It makes us keep on the look-out together for\nopportunities of bringing some sort of help to animals, to make up for\nthe great misery which men inflict on them, and thus to step for a\nmoment out of the incomprehensible horror of existence.\n\nThe ethic of the relation of man to man\n\nIn the matter also of our relation to other men, the ethic of\nreverence for life throws upon us a responsibility so unlimited as to\nbe terrifying.\n\nHere again it offers us no rules about the extent of the\nself-maintenance which is allowable; again, it bids us in each case\ncome to terms with the absolute ethic of self-devotion. I have to\ndecide in accordance with the responsibility of which I am conscious,\nhow much of my life, my possessions, my rights, my happiness, my time,\nand my rest I must devote to others, and how much of them I may keep\nfor myself.\n\nIn the question of possession, the ethic of reverence for life is\noutspokenly individualist in the sense that wealth acquired or\ninherited must be placed at the service of the community, not through\nany measures taken by society, but through the absolutely free\ndecision of the individual. It expects everything from a general\nincrease in the feeling of responsibility. Wealth it regards as the\nproperty of society left in the sovereign control of the individual.\nOne man serves society by carrying on a business in which a number of\nemployees earn their living; another by giving away his wealth in\norder to help his fellows. Between these two extreme kinds of service\nlet each decide according to the responsibility which he finds\ndetermined for him by the circumstances of his life. Let no one judge\nhis neighbour. The one thing that matters is that each shall value\nwhat he possesses as means to action. Whether this is [pg 259]\naccomplished by his keeping and increasing his wealth, or by surrender\nof it, matters little. Wealth must reach the community in the most\nvaried ways, if the latter is to profit by it in the best way.\n\nThose who possess little wealth to call their own are most in danger\nof holding what they have in a purely selfish spirit. There is\nprofound truth in the parable of Jesus which makes the servant who had\nreceived least the least loyal to his duty.\n\nMy rights too the ethic of reverence for life does not allow to belong\nto me. It forbids me to quiet my conscience with the reflexion that as\nthe stronger, but by quite legitimate means, I am advancing myself at\nthe cost of one who is weaker than I. In what the law and public\nopinion allow me it sets a problem before me. It bids me think of\nothers, and makes me ponder whether I can allow myself the inward\nright to pluck all the fruit that my hand can reach. Thus it may\nhappen that in obedience to consideration for the existence of others\nI do what seems to ordinary opinion to be folly. Yes, it may even show\nitself to be folly by the fact that my renunciation has not been of\nthe slightest benefit to him for whom it was made. And yet I was\nright. Reverence for life is the highest court of appeal. What it\ncommands has its own significance, even if it seems foolish or\nuseless. We all look, of course, in one another, for the folly which\nindicates that we have higher responsibilities making themselves felt\nin ourselves. Yet it is only in proportion as we all become less\nrational, in the meaning given it by ordinary calculation, that the\nethical disposition develops in us, and allows problems to become\nsoluble which have hitherto been insoluble.\n\nNor will reverence for life grant me my happiness as my own. At the\nmoments when I should like to enjoy myself without restraint, it wakes\nin me reflexion about misery that I see or suspect, and it does not\nallow me to drive away the uneasiness thereby caused to me. Just as\nthe wave cannot exist for itself, but is ever a part of the heaving\nsurface of ocean, so must I never live my life for itself, but [pg\n260] always in the experience which is going on around me. It is an\nuncomfortable doctrine which the true ethic whispers into my ear. You\nare happy, it says; therefore you are called upon to give much.\nWhatever more than others you have received in health, natural gifts,\nworking capacity, success, a beautiful childhood, harmonious family\ncircumstances, you must not accept as being a matter of course. You\nmust pay a price for them. You must show more than average devotion of\nlife to life.\n\nTo the happy the voice of the true ethic is dangerous, if they venture\nto listen to it. When it calls to them, it never damps down the\nirrational which glows within it. It assails them to see whether it\ncan get them out of their rut and turn them into adventurers of\nself-devotion, people of whom the world has too few. . . .\n\nReverence for life is an inexorable creditor! If it finds anyone with\nnothing to pledge but a little time and a little leisure, it lays an\nattachment on these. But its hardheartedness is good, and sees\nclearly. The many modern men who as industrial machines are engaged in\ncallings in which they can in no way be active as men among men, are\nexposed to the danger of merely vegetating in an egoistic life. Many\nof them feel this danger, and suffer under the fact that their daily\nwork has so little to do with spiritual and ideal aims and does not\nallow them to put into it anything of their human nature. Others\nacquiesce; the thought of having no duties outside their daily work\nsuits them very well.\n\nBut that men should be so condemned or so favoured as to be released\nfrom responsibility for devotion as men to men, the ethic of reverence\nfor life will not allow to be legitimate. It demands that every one of\nus in some way and with some object shall be a man for men. To those\nwho have no opportunity in their daily work of giving themselves as\nman to men, and have nothing else that they can give, it suggests\ntheir offering something of their time and leisure, even if these have\nbeen granted to them in scanty measure. Find for yourselves some\nsecondary [pg 261] work (it says to them), an inconspicuous one,\nperhaps a secret one. Open your eyes and look for a human being or\nsome work devoted to human welfare which needs from some one a little\ntime or friendliness, a little sympathy, or sociability, or work.\nThere may be a solitary or an embittered fellow-man, an invalid or an\ninefficient person to whom you can be something. Perhaps it is an old\nperson or a child. Or some good work needs volunteers who can offer a\nfree evening, or run errands. Who can enumerate the many ways in which\nthat costly piece of fixed capital, a human being, can be employed!\nMore of him is wanted everywhere! Hunt, then, for some situation for\nyour humanity, and do not be frightened away if you have to wait, or\nto be taken on trial. And do not be disturbed by disappointments.\nAnyhow, do not be without some secondary work in which you give\nyourself as a man to men. There is one that is marked out for you, if\nyou only truly will to have it. . . .\n\nThus does the true ethic speak of those who have only a little time\nand a little human nature to give. Well will it be with them if they\nlisten to it, and are preserved from becoming stunted natures, because\nthey have neglected this devotion of self to others.\n\nBut to everyone, in whatever state of life he finds himself, the ethic\nof respect for life does this: it forces him ever and again to be\ninwardly concerned with all the human destinies and all the other\nlife-destinies which are going through their life-course around him,\nand to give himself, as man, to the man who needs a fellow-man. It\nwill not allow the learned man to live only for his learning, even if\nhis learning makes him very useful, nor the artist to live only for\nhis art, even if by means of it he gives something to many. It does\nnot allow the very busy man to think that with his professional\nactivities he has fulfilled every demand upon him. It demands from all\nand every that they devote a portion of their life to their fellows.\nIn what way and to what extent this is laid down for him the\nindividual must gather from the thoughts which arise in [pg 262] him,\nand from the destinies in which his life moves. One man\u2019s sacrifice is\noutwardly unpretentious. He can accomplish it while continuing to live\na normal life. Another is called to some conspicuous devotion, and\nmust therefore put aside regard for his own progress. But let neither\njudge the other. The tasks of men have to be decided in a thousand\nways to let the good become actual. What he has to bring as an\noffering is the secret of each individual. But one with another we\nhave all to recognize that our existence reaches its true value only\nwhen we experience in ourselves something of the truth of the saying:\n\u201cWhoever shall lose his life, the same shall find it\u201d (S. Matt. x.\n39).\n\nPersonal and supra-personal responsibility. Ethics and humanity\n\nThe ethical conflicts between society and the individual arise out of\nthe fact that the latter has to bear not only a personal, but also a\nsupra-personal responsibility. When my own person only is concerned, I\ncan always be patient, alway forgive, use all possible consideration,\nalways be tender-hearted. But each of us comes into a situation when\nhe is responsible not for himself only, but also for some undertaking,\nand then is forced into decisions which conflict with personal\nmorality.\n\nThe industrialist who manages a business, however small, and the\nmusician who undertakes public performances, cannot be men in the way\nthey would like to be. The one has to dismiss a worker who is\nincapable or given to drink, in spite of any sympathy he has for him\nand his family; the other cannot let a singer whose voice is the worse\nfor wear perform any longer, although he knows what distress he thus\ncauses.\n\nThe more extensive a man\u2019s activities, the oftener he finds himself in\nthe situation of having to sacrifice something of his humanity to his\nsupra-personal responsibility. Out of this conflict consideration\nbrings the average person to the decision that the wider\nresponsibility does, as a matter of principle, annul the personal. It\nis with this idea [pg 263] that society addresses the individual. For\nthe quieting of consciences for which this decision is too categorical\nit perhaps lays down a few principles which undertake to determine in\na way that is valid for everybody, how far in any case personal\nmorality can have a say in the matter.\n\nTo the current ethic no course remains open but to sign this\ncapitulation. It has no means of defending the fortress of personal\nmorality, because it has not at its disposal any absolute notions of\ngood and evil. Not so the ethic of reverence for life. That possesses,\nas we can see, what the other lacks. It therefore never surrenders the\nfortress, even if the latter is permanently invested. It feels itself\nin a position to persevere in holding it, and by continual sorties to\nkeep the besiegers on the _qui vive_.\n\nOnly the most universal and absolute purposiveness in the maintenance\nand promotion of life, which is the objective aimed at by reverence\nfor life, is ethical. All other necessity or expediency is not\nethical, but only a more or less necessary necessity, or a more or\nless expedient expediency. In the conflict between the maintenance of\nmy own existence and the destruction of, or injury to, another, I can\nnever put the ethical and the necessary together to form a relative\nethical; I must choose between ethical and necessary, and, if I choose\nthe latter, must take it upon myself to be guilty through an act of\ninjury to life. Similarly I am not at liberty to think that in the\nconflict between personal and supra-personal responsibility I can\nbalance the ethical and the expedient to make a relative ethical, or\neven annul the ethical with the purposive; I must choose between the\ntwo. If under the pressure of the supra-personal responsibility I\nyield to the expedient, I become guilty in some way or other through\nfailure in reverence for life.\n\nThe temptation to combine with the ethical into a relative ethical the\nexpedient which is commanded me by the supra-personal responsibility\nis especially strong, because it can [pg 264] be shown, in defence of\nit, that the person who complies with the demand of this\nsupra-personal responsibility, acts unegoistically. It is not to his\nindividual existence or his individual welfare that he sacrifices\nanother existence or welfare, but he sacrifices an individual\nexistence and welfare to what forces itself upon him as expedient in\nview of the existence or the welfare of a majority. But ethical is\nmore than unegoistic. Ethical is nothing but the reverence felt by my\nwill-to-live for every other will-to-live. Whenever I in any way\nsacrifice or injure life, I am not within the ethical, but I become\nguilty, whether it be egoistically guilty for the sake of maintaining\nmy own existence or welfare, or unegoistically guilty for the sake of\nmaintaining a greater number of other existences or their welfare.\n\nThis so easily made mistake of accepting as ethical a violation of\nreverence for life if it is based upon unegoistic considerations, is\nthe bridge by crossing which ethics enter unintentionally the\nterritory of the non-ethical. The bridge must be broken down.\n\nEthics go only so far as humanity does, humanity meaning respect for\nthe existence and the happiness of individual human beings. Where\nhumanity ends pseudo-ethics begin. The day on which this boundary is\nonce for all universally recognized and marked out so as to be visible\nto everyone, will be one of the most important in the history of\nmankind. Thenceforward it can no longer happen that ethics which are\nnot ethics at all are accepted as real ethics, and deceive and ruin\nindividuals and peoples.\n\nThe ethics hitherto current have hindered us from becoming as earnest\nas we must be by the fact that they have utterly deceived us as to the\nmany ways in which each one of us, whether through self-assertion, or\nby actions justified by supra-personal responsibility, become guilty\nagain and again. True knowledge consists in being gripped by the\nsecret that everything around us is will-to-live and seeing clearly\nhow again and again we incur guilt against life.\n\nFooled by pseudo-ethics, man stumbles about in his [pg 265] guilt like\na drunken man. If he becomes instructed and earnest he seeks the road\nwhich leads him least into guilt.\n\nWe are all exposed to the temptation of lessening the guilt of\ninhumanity which comes from our working under supra-personal\nresponsibility, by withdrawing as far as possible into ourselves. But\nsuch freedom from guilt is not honestly obtained. Ethics start with\nworld- and life-affirmation, and therefore will not allow us this\nflight into negation. They forbid us to be like the housewife who\nleaves the killing of the eels to her cook, and compels us to\nundertake all duties involving supra-personal responsibility which\nfall to us, even if we should be in a position to decline them for\nreasons more or less satisfactory.\n\nEach one of us, then, has to engage, so far as he is brought to it by\nthe circumstances of his life, in work which involves supra-personal\nresponsibility, but we must do it not in the spirit of the collective\nbody, but in that of the man who wishes to be ethical. In every\nindividual case we struggle therefore to preserve as much humanity as\nis ever possible in such work, and in doubtful cases we venture to\nmake a mistake on the side of humanity rather than on that of the\nobject in view. When we have become instructed and earnest, we think\nof what is usually forgotten: that all public activity of whatever\nsort has to do not with facts only, but also with the creation of that\nspirit and temper which is desirable in the collective body. The\ncreation of such a spirit and temper is more important than anything\ndirectly attained in the facts. Public work, in which the utmost\npossible effort is not made to preserve humanity, ruins the\ndisposition. He who under the influence of supra-personal\nresponsibility simply sacrifices men and human happiness when it seems\ncommanded, accomplishes something. But he has not reached the highest\nlevel. He has only outward, not spiritual influence. We have spiritual\ninfluence only when others notice that we do not decide coldly in\naccordance with principles laid down once and for all, but in each\nindividual case fight for humanity.\n\n[pg 266]\n\nThere is too little among us of this kind of struggling. From the\nsmallest who is something in the smallest business, right up to the\npolitical ruler who holds in his hands the decision for peace or war,\nwe act too much as men who in any given case can prepare without\neffort to be no longer men, but merely the executive of general\ninterests. Hence there is no longer among us any trust in a\nrighteousness lighted up with human feeling. Nor have we any longer\nany real respect for one another. We all feel ourselves in the power\nof a mentality of cold, impersonal, and usually unintelligent\nopportunism, which stiffens itself with appeals to principle, and in\norder to carry out small interests is capable of the greatest\ninhumanity and the greatest folly. We therefore see among us one\ntemper of impersonal opportunism confronting another, and all problems\nare executed in a useless conflict of force against force because\nthere is nowhere at hand such a spirit and temper as will make them\nsoluble.\n\nOnly through our struggles for humanity can forces which work in the\ndirection of the truly rational and expedient become powerful, while\nthe present spirit and temper prevails. Hence the man who works under\nsupra-personal responsibilities has to feel himself answerable not\nonly for the successful result which is to be realized through him,\nbut for the general spirit and temper which has to be created.\n\nWe therefore serve society without losing ourselves in it. We do not\nallow it to be our guardian in the matter of ethics. That would be as\nif the solo violinist allowed his bowing to be regulated by that of\nthe double-bass player. Never for a moment do we lay aside our\nmistrust of the ideals established by society, and of the convictions\nwhich are kept by it in circulation. We always know that society is\nfull of folly and will deceive us in the matter of humanity. It is an\nunreliable horse, and blind into the bargain. Woe to the driver if he\nfalls asleep!\n\nAll this sounds too hard. Society serves ethics by giving legal\nsanction to its most elementary principles, and handing [pg 267] on\nthe ethical principles of one generation to the next. That is much,\nand it claims our gratitude. But society is also something which\nchecks the progress of ethics again and again, by arrogating to itself\nthe dignity of the ethical teachers. To this, however, it has no\nright. The only ethical teacher is the man who thinks ethically, and\nstruggles for an ethic. The conceptions of good and evil which are put\nin circulation by society are paper-money, the value of which is to be\ncalculated not by the figures printed upon it, but by its relation to\nits exchange value in gold of the ethic of reverence for life. But so\nmeasured, its exchange value reveals itself as that of the paper-money\nof a half-bankrupt state.\n\nThe collapse of civilization has come about through ethics being left\nto society. A renewal of it is possible only if ethics become once\nmore the concern of thinking human beings, and if individuals seek to\nassert themselves in society as ethical personalities. In proportion\nas we secure this, society will become, instead of the purely natural\nentity, which it naturally is, an ethical one. Previous generations\nhave made the terrible mistake of idealizing society as ethical. We do\nour duty to it by judging it critically, and trying to make it, so far\nas is possible, more ethical. Being in possession of an absolute\nstandard of the ethical, we no longer allow ourselves to make\nacceptable as ethics principles of expediency or even of the vulgarest\nopportunism. Nor do we remain any longer at the low level of allowing\nto be current as in any way ethical meaningless ideals, of power, of\npassion, or of nationalism which are set up by miserable politicians\nand maintained in some degree of respect by bewildering propaganda.\nAll the principles, dispositions, and ideals which make their\nappearance among us we measure, in their showy pedantry, with a rule\non which the measures are given by the absolute ethic of reverence for\nlife. We allow currency only to what is consistent with the claims of\nhumanity. We bring into honour again regard for life and [pg 268] for\nthe happiness of the individual. Sacred human rights we again hold\nhigh; not those which political rulers exalt at banquets and tread\nunderfoot in their actions, but the true ones. We call once more for\njustice, not that which purblind authorities have elaborated in a\nlegal scholasticism, nor that about which demagogues of all shades of\ncolour shout themselves hoarse, but that which is filled to the full\nwith the value of each single human existence. The foundation of law\nand right is humanity.\n\nThus we bring the principles, dispositions, and ideals of the\ncollective body into agreement with humanity. At the same time we\nshape them in accordance with reason, for only what is ethical is\ntruly rational. Only so far as the current disposition of men is\nanimated by ethical convictions and ideals is it capable of truly\npurposive activity.\n\nThe ethic of reverence for life puts in our hands weapons for fighting\nfalse ethics and false ideals, but we have strength to use them only\nso far as we\u2014each one in his own life\u2014preserve our humanity. Only when\nthose men are numerous who in thought and in action bring humanity to\nterms with reality, will humanity cease to be current as a mere\nsentimental idea and become what it ought to be, a leaven in the\nspirit and temper of individuals and of society.\n\n\n\n[pg 269]\n\nCHAPTER XXII\n\nTHE CIVILIZING POWER OF THE ETHIC OF REVERENCE FOR LIFE\n\n\nCivilization as a product of reverence for life\n\nTHE reverence for life which has grown up in the will-to-live which\nhas become reflective, contains world- and life-affirmation and ethics\nside by side and interpenetrating each other. It therefore cannot but\ncontinually think out and will all the ideals of ethical civilization,\nand bring them into agreement with reality.\n\nReverence for life will not allow to pass as current the purely\nindividualistic and inward conception of civilization as it rules in\nIndian thought and in mysticism. That man should make efforts for\nself-perfecting by withdrawing into himself is to it a deep, but an\nincomplete, ideal of civilization.\n\nIn no way does reverence for life allow the individual to give up all\ninterest in the world. It is unceasingly compelling him to be\nconcerned about all the life that is round about him, and to feel\nhimself responsible for it. Whenever life is in question the\ndevelopment of which we can influence, our concern with it, and our\nresponsibility for it, are not satisfied by our maintaining and\npromoting its existence as such; they demand that we shall try to\nraise it to its highest value in every respect.\n\nThe being that can be influenced in its development by us is man.\nReverence for life compels us, therefore, to picture to ourselves and\nto will every kind of progress of which man and humanity are capable.\nIt throws us into a restless condition of ever picturing to ourselves\nand willing civilization, but as ethical men.\n\nEven a not yet deepened world- and life-affirmation [pg 270] produces\nthis picturing and willing of civilization, but it leaves a man to\nexert himself more or less without guidance. In reverence for life,\nhowever, and the willing which accompanies it, to raise men and\nhumanity to their highest value in every respect, he possesses the\nguidance which leads him to complete and purified ideals of\ncivilization which with full consciousness of their goal come to terms\nwith reality.\n\nDefined from outside and quite empirically, complete civilization\nconsists in making actual all possible progress in discovery and\ninvention and in the arrangements of human society, and seeing that\nthey work together for the inward perfecting of individuals which is\nthe real and final object of civilization. Reverence for life is in a\nposition to complete this conception of civilization and to supply a\nfoundation for its most inward elements. This it does by defining what\nis meant by the inward perfecting of man, and making it consist in\nreaching the spirituality of an ever deepening reverence for life.\n\nIn order to give a meaning to the material and spiritual progress\nwhich is to be made actual by the individual man and mankind, the\nordinary representation of civilization has to assume an evolution of\nthe world, in which such progress has a meaning. But to do so, it puts\nitself in dependence on a play of phantasy which reaches no result. It\nis impossible to depict an evolution of the world in which the\ncivilization produced by the individual man and mankind means\nsomething.\n\nIn reverence for life, on the contrary, civilization recognizes that\nit has nothing at all to do with the evolution of the world, but\ncarries its meaning in itself. The essence of civilization consists in\nthis, that the reverence for life which in my will-to-live is\nstruggling for recognition does get stronger and stronger in\nindividuals and in mankind. Civilization, then, is not a phenomenon of\nany world-evolution, but an experience of the will-to-live within us,\nwhich it is neither possible nor necessary to bring into [pg 271]\nrelation with the course of nature as we know it from outside. As a\nperfecting of our will-to-live it is sufficient for itself. What the\ndevelopment that takes place in us means in the totality of the\ndevelopment in the world we leave on one side as something\nundiscoverable. That as a result of all the progress which men and\nmankind can make there shall exist in the world as much as possible of\nwill-to-live, putting reverence for life into practice on all life\nwhich comes within reach of its influence, and seeking perfection in\nthe spiritual atmosphere of reverence for life: this and nothing else\nis civilization. So completely does it carry its value in itself that\neven the certainty of the human race ceasing to exist within a\ncalculable period, would not be able to lead us away from our efforts\nto attain to civilization.\n\nAs a development in which the highest experience of the will-to-live\nlives itself out, civilization has a meaning for the world without\nneeding any explanation of the world.\n\nThe four ideals of civilization. The struggle for a civilized mankind\nin the machine age\n\nThe will-to-live which is filled with reverence for life is interested\nin the most lively and persevering way that can be imagined in all\nkinds of progress. Moreover, it possesses a standard by which to\nassess their value correctly, and can create a spirit and temper which\nallows them all to work in with one another in the most effective way.\n\nThree kinds of progress come within the purview of civilization:\nprogress in knowledge and power; progress in the social organization\nof mankind; progress in spirituality.\n\nCivilization is made up of four ideals: the ideal of the individual;\nthe ideal of social and political organization; the ideal of spiritual\nand religious social organization; the ideal of humanity as a whole.\nOn the basis of these four ideals thought comes to terms with\nprogress.\n\nProgress in knowledge has a directly spiritual significance [pg 272]\nwhen it is interpreted by thought. It makes us recognize, ever more\ncompletely, that everything which exists is power, that is to say,\nwill-to-live; it is ever making larger the circle of the will-to-live\nof which we can form conceptions by analogy with our own. What a\nsignificance it has for our meditation on the world that we have\ndiscovered in the cell an individual existence, in the capacity of\nwhich for activity and suffering we see repeated the elements of our\nown vitality! By our ever-growing knowledge we are roused to ever\ngreater astonishment at that secret of life which surrounds us on\nevery hand. From simple simplicity we arrive at a more profound\nsimplicity.\n\nFrom our knowledge comes also power over the forces of nature. Our\npowers of movement and of action are increased in an extraordinary\nway. There comes about a far-reaching change in the circumstances of\nour life.\n\nThe progress which accompanies it, however, is not to the same extent\nan advantage for the development of man. By the power we obtain over\nthe forces of nature we do indeed free ourselves from nature, and make\nher serviceable to us, but at the same time we thereby also cut\nourselves loose from her, and slip into conditions of life, the\nunnatural character of which brings with it dangers of many sorts.\n\nWe press the forces of nature into our service by means of machines.\nThere is a story in the writings of Chwang-tse of how a pupil of\nConfucius saw a gardener who, to get water for his flower-beds, went\ndown to the spring with his bucket every time. So he asked him whether\nhe would not like to lessen his labour. \u201cHow can I?\u201d replied the\nother. \u201cYou take a long piece of wood for a lever,\u201d said Confucius\u2019\npupil, \u201cweighted behind, but light in front; with this you dip for the\nwater and it comes up without the least trouble. They call this device\na draw-well.\u201d But the gardener, who was something of a philosopher,\nanswered: \u201cI have heard my teacher say: \u2018If a man uses machines, he\ncarries on all the affairs of life like a machine; whoever [pg 273]\ncarries on his affairs like a machine gets a machine-like heart; and\nwhen anyone has a machine-like heart in his breast, he loses true\nsimplicity.\u2019\u201d\n\nThe dangers that were suspected by that gardener in the fifth century\nB.C. are active among us in full force. Purely mechanical labour has\nbecome the lot of numbers among us to-day. Cut loose from their own\nhouse and from any ground of their own which might feed them, they\nlive in a depressing, materialist unfreedom. As a result of the\nrevolution which the machine has produced, we are almost all of us\nsubjected to an existence of labour which is far too much governed by\nrule, too limited in its nature, and too trying to the system.\nReflexion and collectedness are made difficult for us. Family life and\nthe upbringing of our children are impoverished. We are all more or\nless in danger of becoming human things instead of personalities. Many\nsorts of material and spiritual injury to human existence form\ntherefore the dark side of the achievements of discovery and\ninvention.\n\nEven our capacity for civilization is endangered. Claimed entirely for\nso severe a struggle for existence, many of us are no longer in a\nposition to think about ideals which make for civilization. Such men\ncannot reach the objective mood which is necessary for it. All their\nattention is directed to the improvement of their own existence. The\nideals which they set up for this latter object they proclaim to be\nideals of civilization, and thus they start confusion in the general\npicture of what civilization is.\n\nIn order to fit ourselves to the state of things produced by the\nresults of these achievements of discovery and invention which are,\nindeed, desirable although injurious, we must think out the ideal of\nhumanity and wrestle with circumstances to make them hinder as little,\nand help as much as possible the development of man up to this ideal.\n\nThe ideal of civilized man is none other than that of a man who in\nevery relation of life preserves true human nature. To be civilized\nmen means for us almost this: [pg 274] that in spite of the conditions\nof modern civilization we remain human. It is only taking thought for\neverything which belongs to true human nature that can preserve us,\namid the conditions of the most advanced external civilization, from\ngoing astray from civilization itself. It is only if the longing to\nbecome again truly man is awakened in the man of to-day, that he will\nbe able to find his way out of the confusion in which, blinded by\nconceit at his knowledge and pride in his powers, he is at present\nwandering. Only then, too, will he be in a position to work against\nthe pressure of those relations of life which threaten his human\nnature.\n\nReverence for life demands, therefore, as the ideal of the material\nand spiritual being of man, that with the completest possible\ndevelopment of all his faculties and in the widest possible freedom,\nboth material and spiritual, he strives to be honest with himself and\nto take a sympathetic and helping interest in all the life that is\naround him. In earnest concern about himself he must ever keep in mind\nall the responsibilities which are his lot, and so, as sufferer and as\nactor, preserve in his relation to himself and to the world a living\nspirituality. There should ever be before him as true human nature the\nduty of being ethical in the profound world- and life-affirmation of\nreverence for life.\n\nIf it is recognized as the aim of civilization that every man shall\nattain to true human nature in an existence which is as fully as\npossible worthy of him, then the uncritical overvaluing of the\nexternal elements of civilization which we have taken over from the\nend of the nineteenth century can no longer prevail among us. We are\nforced more and more into a reflexion which compels us to distinguish\nbetween the essentials and the unessentials of civilization.\nUnspiritual pride in civilization loses its power over us. We dare to\nface the truth that with the progress of discovery and invention\ncivilization has become not easier, but more difficult. We become\nconscious of the problem of the mutual relations between the material\nand [pg 275] the spiritual. We know that we all have to wrestle with\ncircumstances on behalf of our human nature, and make it an object of\nour care to transform the almost hopeless struggle which many have to\ncarry on to preserve their human nature, into one which offers some\nhope.\n\nAs a spiritual help in this struggle we offer them the spirit and\ntemper which will allow no man ever to be sacrificed to circumstances,\nas if he were a mere human thing. Formulated by so-called thinkers and\npopularized in all possible forms, the conviction is general that\ncivilization is the privilege of an _\u00e9lite_, and that man in the mass\nis only a means for realizing it. At the same time the spiritual help\nwhich they can claim is denied to these men who have to wrestle to\npreserve their human nature. That is the effect of the devotion to\nreality to which we have surrendered ourselves. But reverence for life\nrebels against it, and produces a spirit and temper in which there is\noffered to every man in the thoughts of others the human value and the\nhuman dignity which the circumstances of life would deny him. The\nstruggle has thus lost its extreme bitterness. Man has now to assert\nhimself only against his circumstances, and no longer against his\nfellow-men at the same time.\n\nFurther, the temper of reverence for life helps those who have to\nstruggle hardest on behalf of their human nature by keeping alive the\nconception of human nature as the privilege which must be preserved at\nany price. It keeps them from engaging with one-sided aims in their\nstruggle for the diminishing of their material unfreedom, and bids\nthem bethink themselves that much more of human nature and inward\nfreedom can be combined with their actual life-circumstances than they\nactually secure. It leads them on to preserve recollectedness and\ninwardness when they have hitherto given them up.\n\nThere must come about a spiritualizing of the masses. The mass of\nindividuals must begin to reflect about their lives, about what they\nwant to secure for their lives in the [pg 276] struggle for existence,\nabout what makes their circumstances difficult, and about what they\nthemselves renounce. They are wanting in spirituality because they\nhave only a confused conception of what spirituality is. They forget\nto think, because elementary thought about themselves has become\nsomething unfamiliar to them. In what is in our day cultivated as\nspirituality and practised as thought, there is absolutely nothing\nthat comes directly home to them as necessary for them. But if it\ncomes about that the thoughts suggested by reverence for life become\ncommon among us, there will be a mode of thought provided which will\nwork in everybody, and a spirituality aroused which will show itself\nin everybody. Even those who are engaged in the hardest struggle on\nbehalf of their human nature will then be led to reflexion and\ninwardness, and will thereby obtain powers which they did not before\npossess.\n\nThough all of us are alike aware that the maintenance of civilization\nis dependent first and foremost on the breaking out of the fountains\nof spiritual life in us, we shall nevertheless zealously take in hand\nour economic and social problems. The highest possible material\nfreedom for the greatest possible number is a requirement of\ncivilization.\n\nThe recognition that we evidently have so little power over economic\nrelations does not discourage us. We know this to be to a considerable\nextent a result of the fact that hitherto facts were contending with\nfacts, and passions with passions. Our powerlessness comes from our\nfeeling for reality. We shall be able to deal with things much more\neffectively, if we resolve to try to solve our problems by a change of\nspirit and temper. And we are at length ready for the recognition of\nthis. The efforts for control which were made on the strength of\neconomic theories and Utopias were in every respect failures, and have\nbrought us into a terrible condition. There remains nothing for us to\ndo but to try a radical change of policy, [pg 277] viz., the solution\nof our problems by means of a helpful understanding and confidence in\na way that will prove effective. It is reverence for life alone which\ncan create the spirit and temper needed for this. The understanding\nand confidence which we mutually accord to each other with a view to\nwhat is most purposive, and by means of which we obtain the utmost\npower that is possible over circumstances, can be enjoyed only if\neveryone can assume in everyone else reverence for the existence of\nthe other and regard for his material and spiritual welfare as a\nspirit and temper which influences them to the depths of their being.\nOnly through reverence for life can we attain the standards of\neconomic justice, about which we have to come to an understanding with\neach other.\n\nWill it be possible to bring about this development? We must, if we\nare not to be ruined together, materially and spiritually. All\nprogress in discovery and invention works itself out at last to a\nfatal result, if we do not maintain control over it through a\ncorresponding progress in our spirituality. Through the power which we\ngain over the forces of nature we get in an inexplicable way as human\nbeings control over other human beings. With the possession of a\nhundred machines a single man or a company is given a supremacy over\nall who work the machines. Some new invention makes it possible for\none man by a single movement to kill not merely a hundred, but ten\nthousand of his fellow-men. In no sort of struggle is it possible to\navoid becoming ruinous to one another by economic or physical power.\nAt best the result is that the oppressor and the oppressed exchange\nr\u00f4les. The only thing that can help is that we renounce the power\nwhich is given us over one another. But that is something to be done\nby spirituality.\n\nIntoxicated by the progress in discovery and invention with which our\nage has been flooded, we forgot to trouble ourselves about men\u2019s\nprogress in spirituality. In the absence of all thought we slid\nwithout knowing it into [pg 278] pessimism, believing, that is, in all\nsorts of progress, but no longer in the spiritual progress of the\nindividual and of mankind.\n\nFacts call us now to bethink ourselves, just as movements of their\ncapsizing vessel drive the crew up on to the deck and into the\nrigging. Belief in the spiritual progress of the individual and of\nmankind has already become almost impossible for us, but with the\ncourage of despair we must force ourselves into it. That we shall all\nunanimously again will this spiritual progress and again hope for it:\nthat is the reversal of the helm which we must succeed in making, if\nour vessel is at the last moment to be brought once more before the\nwind.\n\nOnly through thoughtful reverence for life shall we become capable of\nthis achievement. If that reverence begins anywhere to work in our\nthinking and in our spirit and temper, then the miracle is possible.\nThe power of the elementary and living spirituality that is to be\nfound in it is beyond calculation.\n\nChurch and State as historical entities, and as ideals of civilization\n\nState and Church are only modified forms of the organization of men\ntowards humanity. The ideals of social-political and religious\norganization are therefore determined by the necessity of these\nentities being made effective aids to the spiritualizing of men, and\nto their organization towards humanity.\n\nThe fact that the ideals of State and Church among us are not at work\nin their true form is due to our historical sense. The men of the\n\u201cAufkl\u00e4rung\u201d assumed that State and Church had come into existence by\nreason of estimates made of their usefulness. They sought to\ncomprehend the nature of these two entities by means of theories about\ntheir origins, but in this proceeding they did nothing but read back\ntheir own view into history. Not feeling the least reverence for any\nnatural historical entity, they [pg 279] found it easy to approach\nthem with demands suggested by a rational ideal. We, on the contrary,\nhave such a measure of this reverence that we feel shy of wishing to\ntransform in accordance with theoretical ideas what had a quite\ndifferent origin.\n\nBut State and Church are not merely natural historical entities; they\nare also necessary ones. The only way in which reflexion can deal with\nthem is to be always at work, transforming them from what they are as\nreceived, into organisms which are in accordance with reason and\neffective in every respect. Only in this capacity for development is\ntheir existence fully apprehended and justified.\n\nThe natural historical entity presents us always only with initial\nfacts which lead on to corresponding further happenings, but never\nwith facts in which the nature of the society, that is to say the way\nin which we are to behave towards it and to belong to it, can be\ndetermined. If one allows that in the conception of the natural entity\nthere is also given one of a self-determined purpose, there arises a\nfundamental confusion in people\u2019s notion of the organization. The\nindividual and humanity as a whole, which are just as truly natural\nentities as the two historical ones, are robbed of their rights and\nsacrificed to the latter. The increased understanding with which we\nnow study the natural policy of societies with historical origin can\ntherefore not alter at all our demand that State and Church shall\ndirect their course more and more with reference to the ideal of man\nand of humanity as their natural poles, and be obliged to find in them\ntheir higher effectiveness.\n\nCivilization demands, then, that State and Church become capable of\ndevelopment. This presupposes that the relations of influence between\nthe collective body and individual members of it will become different\nfrom what they have been. In the last few generations the individual\nhas in face of State and Church surrendered more and more of his\nspiritual independence. He received his spirit [pg 280] and temper\nfrom them, instead of the spirit and temper that was growing within\nhim working as a shaping force upon State and Church.\n\nThis abnormal relation was unavoidable. The individual had, of course,\nnothing in which he could be spiritually independent. He had,\ntherefore, no spirit and temper in which he could come to terms with\nthe entities of real life. Nor was he in a position to think out\nideals which could work upon reality. There was no course left for him\nbut to adopt as an ideal an idealized reality.\n\nBut in the world- and life-view of reverence for life he obtains the\nmeans to a firm and valuable self-determination. It is with a will and\na hope which he carries ready shaped within himself that he faces\nreality. It is to him something self-evident that every society that\nis formed among men must serve towards the maintenance, the\nadvancement, and the higher development of life, and the production of\ntrue spirituality.\n\nThat which is decisive for the commencement of a development of State\nand Church which has civilization for its aim and object, is that the\nmass of men belong to these two entities in the spirit and temper of\nreverence for life and the ideals which grow out of it: when that is\nthe case there arises in State and Church a spirit which works for\ntheir transformation into something ethical and spiritual.\n\nA forecast of the course this process will take cannot be made, nor is\none needed. The spirit and temper of reverence for life is a force\nwhich works effectively in every direction. The important thing is\nthat it shall be present with a strength and a steadiness which will\nsuffice to bring about the transformation.\n\nThe moralizing of the religious and political community\n\nIf the Church is to accomplish its task, it must unite men in\nelementary, thoughtful, ethical religiousness. This [pg 281] it has\ndone hitherto very imperfectly. How far it is from being what it ought\nto be, its absolute failure in the war revealed. There devolved on it\nthe duty of summoning men out of the struggle of national passions to\nreflexion, and to keep them in the spirit and temper of the highest\nideals. It was not able to do this, and indeed did not seriously\nattempt to. Only too completely historical, and too well organized,\nand too little a directly religious association, itself succumbed to\nthe spirit of the time and mixed up with religion the dogmas of\nnationalism and pragmatism. There was only one tiny church, the\ncommunity of the Quakers, which attempted to defend the unconditional\nvalidity of reverence for life, as it is contained in the religion of\nJesus.\n\nThe spirit and temper of reverence for life is able to work for the\ntransformation of the Church to the ideal of a religious association,\nbecause it is itself deeply religious. In all historically formulated\nbelief it seeks to bring into general acceptance as the elemental and\nessential thing in piety the ethical mysticism of oneness with the\ninfinite Will, which experiences itself in us as the will to love. By\nputting in the very centre of things the most living and universal\nelement of piety, it leads the different religious associations out of\nthe narrowness of their historical past, and paves the way for\nunderstanding and union between them.\n\nBut this spirit and temper does even more than that. Besides bringing\nthe existing historical religious associations out of their historical\nexistence into a development towards the ideal of a religious\nassociation, it works also where they can do nothing, in the sphere of\nnon-religion. There are many non-religious people among us. They have\nbecome so partly through thoughtlessness and absence of any\nworld-view, and partly because as a result of honest thinking they\ncould no longer be content with a traditional religious world-view.\nThe world- and life-view of reverence for life enables these\nnon-religious minds to [pg 282] learn that every world- and life-view\nwhich begins to think honestly necessarily becomes religious. Ethical\nmysticism reveals to them the necessity to thought of the religion of\nlove, and leads them back to paths which they believed they had\nabandoned for ever.\n\nJust as the transformation of the religious association must be the\nresult primarily of an inward change, so must that of the social and\npolitical community also.\n\nIt is true, indeed, that to believe in the possibility of transforming\nthe modern state into the civilized state is a piece of heroism. The\nmodern state finds itself to-day in an unprecedented condition of\nmaterial and spiritual penury. Collapsing under the weight of debts,\ntorn by economic and political struggles, stripped of all moral\nauthority, and scarcely able any longer to maintain its authority in\npractical matters, it has to wrestle for its existence in a succession\nof fresh troubles. Whence is it to get power to develop, in the face\nof all these things, into a truly civilized state?\n\nWhat crises and catastrophes the modern state is still destined to go\nthrough cannot be foreseen. Its position is further endangered\nespecially by the fact that it has far overstepped the limits of its\nnatural sphere of operation. It is an extraordinarily complicated\norganism which intervenes in all social relationships, which tries to\nregulate everything, and therefore in every respect functions\nineffectively; it tries to dominate economic life as it dominates\nspiritual life; and for its activities over this extensive field it\nworks with machinery which in itself at once constitutes a danger.\n\nAt some time and in some way or other the modern state must emerge\nfrom its financial trouble, and reduce its activity to a normal\nstandard, but by what methods it can ever again get back to a natural\nand healthy condition remains still a riddle.\n\nThe tragic thing is, then, that we have to belong to the unsympathetic\nand unhealthy modern state while cherishing [pg 283] the will to\ntransform it into a civilized state. There is demanded from us an\nabsolutely impossible achievement of faith in the power of the spirit.\nBut the ethical world- and life-view gives us strength for the task.\n\nLiving in the modern state and thinking out the ideal of the civilized\nstate, we first of all put an end to the illusions which the former\ncherishes about itself. Only by the majority of its members taking up\na critical attitude towards it can it come to itself again in\nreflexion about itself. The absolute impossibility of the continuance\nof the state in its present condition must become the universal\nconviction before things can become in any way better.\n\nBut at the same time, through meditation on the civilized state, the\nperception must become common property that all merely external\nmeasures for raising and making healthy the modern state, however\neffective they may be in themselves, will have only a quite imperfect\nresult unless the spirit of the state becomes quite different. Let us,\nthen, undertake to drive the modern state, so far as the power of our\nthought reaches, into the spirituality and the morality of the\ncivilized state as it is to be, by following the ideas contained in\nreverence for life. We demand from it that it shall become more\nspiritual and more ethical than any state has hitherto been called on\nto become. Only with efforts to reach the true ideal do we get\nprogress.\n\nThe objection is raised that, according to all experience, the state\ncannot exist by relying merely on truth, justice, and ethical\nconsiderations, but has in the last resort to take refuge in\nopportunism. We smile at this experience. It is refuted by the dreary\nresults it has produced. We have, therefore, the right to declare the\nopposite course to be true wisdom, and to say that true power for the\nstate as for the individual is to be found in spirituality and the\nethical. The state lives by the confidence of those who belong to it;\nit lives by the confidence felt in it by other [pg 284] states.\nOpportunist policy may have temporary successes to record, but in the\nlong run it assuredly lands itself in failure.\n\nThus ethical world- and life-affirmation lays upon the modern state\nthe requirement that it shall aspire to making itself an ethical\npersonality. It presses this obstinately upon the state, and does not\nlet itself be deterred by the smiles of superior persons. The wisdom\nof to-morrow has a different tone from that of yesterday.\n\nOnly by a new spirit and temper ruling within it can the state attain\nto peace within its borders; only by a new spirit and temper arising\nbetween them can different states come to understand each other, and\ncease to bring destruction upon each other; only by treating the\noverseas world in a different spirit and temper from that of the past\nand of to-day, can the modern state cease to load itself in that\nquarter with guilt.\n\nSuch moral talk about the civilized state has often been produced in\nthe past. Certainly it has. But it acquires a special tone at a time\nwhen the modern state is perishing in misery, because it refused in\nthe past to continue to be in any way spiritually ethical. It\npossesses a new authority, too, to-day because in the world- and\nlife-view of reverence for life there is revealed the significance of\nthe ethical in its full extent and its full profundity.\n\nWe are therefore freed from any duty of forming a conception of the\ncivilized state which accords with the declarations of nationalism and\nnational civilization, and we are at liberty to turn back to the\nprofound _na\u00efvet\u00e9_ of thinking it to be a state which allows itself to\nbe guided by an ethical spirit and temper. With confidence in the\nstrength of the civilized spirit and temper which springs from\nreverence for life we take upon ourselves the task of making this\ncivilized state an actuality.\n\nWe look round beyond peoples and states upon humanity as a whole,\nfeeling ourselves responsible to the civilized spirit and temper. To\nanyone who has surrendered himself [pg 285] to ethical world- and\nlife-affirmation the future of men and of mankind is an object of care\nand of hope. To become free from this care and hope is poverty; to be\nwholly surrendered to it is riches. Thus it is our consolation, that\nin a time of difficulty and without knowing how much we may still\nexperience of a better future, we are paving the way, solely by our\nconfidence in the power of the spirit, for a civilized mankind which\nis to come.\n\nKant published, with the title _Towards Perpetual Peace_, a work\ncontaining rules which were to be observed with a view to lasting\npeace whenever treaties of peace were concluded. It was a mistake.\nRules for treaties of peace, however well intended and however ably\ndrawn up, can accomplish nothing. Such thinking as brings power to the\nspirit and temper produced by reverence for life is the only thing\nwhich can bring to mankind perpetual peace.\n\nFINIS\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\nPreface Notes\n\n1 [_Translator\u2019s Note_.\u2014Weltanschauung. This compound word may be\ntranslated \u201ctheory of the universe,\u201d \u201cworld-theory,\u201d\n\u201cworld-conception,\u201d or \u201cworld-view.\u201d The first is misleading as\nsuggesting, wrongly, a scientific explanation of the universe; the\nsecond and third as suggesting, less ambitiously but still wrongly, an\nexplanation of how and why our human world is what it is. The last\nindicates a sufficiently wide knowledge and consideration of our\ncorner of the universe to allow all factors to be taken into\nconsideration which bear on the question at issue.\n\nThere may be passages in which it is desirable to vary the\ntranslation, and others in which it is possible to give the meaning in\nmore elegant English, for good English style does not take kindly to\nsuch compound words. But this latter consideration can be only a\nsecondary one in the translation of a philosophical work, the first\nobject of which must be to ensure that the author\u2019s meaning shall be\nreproduced as clearly as possible.]\n\n\nCHAPTER III Notes\n\n2 Friedrich Jodl: _A History of Ethics as Philosophical Science_, 2nd\ned., 2 vols. (Vol. I., 1906; Vol. II., 1912). It treats of the ethics\nof Western philosophy only.\n\n\nCHAPTER V Notes\n\n3 Very important for our knowledge of the old philosophy and ethics\nare the ten books entitled _The Lives and Teaching of Famous\nPhilosophers_, Diogenes Laertius in the third century after Christ.\nJust because they are purely anecdotal, They have preserved for us\nmuch information and many views which otherwise\u2014for the works on the\nphilosophers treated of have all been lost\u2014we should not possess.\n\n4 Xenophon, one of the generals who led the ten thousand back out of\nAsia, wrote down his recollections of Socrates after the latter\u2019s\ndeath. By his report of the simple conversations of the master he\nseeks to render impotent for all time the accusation that he corrupted\nthe youth and taught atheism, for even after his death teachers of\nrhetoric did in fact draw up formal complaints against him. Xenophon\u2019s\nstraightforward, realistic portrait of Socrates is extraordinarily\nvaluable.\n\n5 The most important dialogues in this connexion are the _Protagoras_,\nthe _Gorgias_, the _Ph\u00e6drus_, the _Symposium_, the _Ph\u00e6do_, and the\n_Philebus_.\n\n6 Of the writings of the Cyrenaics and the Cynics, of Democritus,\nEpicurus, Zeno, and the older Stoics hardly anything has come down to\nus. Our knowledge of them is derived mostly from Diogenes Laertius.\n\nThe Cyrenaics were known as the philosophers of pleasure because\nAristippus, the first preacher of the world-wisdom of joy, hailed from\nCyrene. The Cynics, or dog-philosophers, derived their name from the\nfact that they despised the amenities of life and often delighted in a\ncoarse naturalness. The best known of them is Diogenes of Sinope (died\n323 B.C.).\n\nZeno\u2019s philosophy was called Stoicism because he taught at Athens in a\ncolonnaded portico called the Stoa Poikile (_i.e._, the painted\nportico).\n\n7 _Translator\u2019s Note_.\u2014Irony is intentional self-depreciation or\ndisclaiming what one really possesses.\n\n8 Of Seneca quite a series of ethical treatises have come down to us.\nWe mention here: _On Clemency_ (_De Clementia_, addressed to Nero);\n_On Benefits_ (_De Beneficiis_); _On Tranquillity of Soul_ (_De\nTranquillitate Animi_), _On Anger_ (_De Ira_).\n\nOur knowledge of the teachings of Epictetus we owe to his pupil,\nFlavius Arrianus, the historian. The latter has recorded a number of\nhis master\u2019s lectures in eight books, of which four have survived. In\naddition to these he collected and published a number of his sayings\non morality in the _Enchiridion_.\n\nIn the popular philosophizings of Cicero (106-43 B.C.) as well, we can\nsee an attempt to produce a new ethic which is really living.\n\n\nCHAPTER VI Notes\n\n9 Bacon was Lord Chancellor under James I. of England, but was in 1621\ndeprived of his office because found guilty of corruption. His two\nchief works are the _Novum Organum Scientiarum_ (1620) and _De\nDignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum_ (1623). Of the _New Atlantis_ only\na fragment has survived.\n\n10 See the writer\u2019s books: _Das Messianit\u00e4ts- und Leidensgeheimniss.\nEine Skizze des Lebens Jesu_ (1901). English version: _The Mystery of\nthe Kingdom of God_ (1914 A. & C. Black). _Geschichte der\nLeben-Jesu Forschung_ (1906; new edition, 1922). English version: _The\nQuest of the Historical Jesus_ (1911; 3rd impression, 1922 A. & C.\nBlack).\n\n11 Gassendi: _De vita, moribus, et doctrina Epicuri_ (1647) and\n_Syntagma philosophi\u00e6 Epicuri_ (1649).\n\n\nCHAPTER VII Notes\n\n12 D. Hartley: _Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his\nExpectations_ (1749; 6th ed., 1834).\n\n13 D. von Holbach: _Syst\u00e8me de la nature ou des lois du monde physique\net du monde moral_ (1770).\n\n14 Thomas Hobbes: _Elementa philosophica de cive_ (1642); _Leviathan,\nor the Matter, Form, and Authority of Government_ (1651); _De homine_.\n\n15 John Locke: _An Essay concerning Human Understanding_ (2 vols.,\n1690).\n\n16 Adrien Helvetius: _Trait\u00e9 de l\u2019Esprit_ (1758).\n\n17 Jeremy Bentham: _An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and\nLegislation_ (1780). E. Dumont (1759-1828) of Geneva, an admirer of\nBentham who was domiciled in England, reproduced this work in French\nin a free abbreviation as _Trait\u00e9s de l\u00e9gislation civile et p\u00e9nale_\n(1802). Frederick Edward Beneke followed this abbreviation when he\nproduced a German translation with the title: _Grunds\u00e4tze der Civil-\nund Criminalgesetzgebung_ (1830).\n\n18 _Translator\u2019s Note_.\u2014German \u201centhusiastisches Handeln.\u201d The\nexplanatory periphrasis is added once for all, since \u201centhusiastic\u201d\nimplies a kind and degree of feeling which is not implied in these\nphilosophical passages.\n\n19 David Hume: _A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to\nintroduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects_\n(1740). German translation by Heinrich Jacob (2 vols., 1791): _Inquiry\nConcerning the Principles of Morals_ (1751).\n\n20 Adam Smith: _The Theory of Moral Sentiments_ (1759); _Inquiry into\nthe Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations_ (1770). German\ntranslation of _The Theory of Moral Sentiments_ by L. Th. Kosegarten\n(1791). Adam Smith was Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow.\n\n21 \u201cL\u2019amour de la gloire est inn\u00e9 dans les belles \u00e2mes; il n\u2019y a qu\u2019\u00e0\nl\u2019animer, il n\u2019y a que l\u2019exciter, et des hommes qui v\u00e9g\u00e9taient\njusqu\u2019alors, enflamm\u00e8s par ce heureux instinct, vous para\u00eetront\nchang\u00e9s en demi-dieux.\u201d\u2014_\u0152uvres de Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric le Grand_, vol. ix., p.\n98.\n\n22 R. Cudworth: _Intellectual System of the Universe_ (1678);\n_Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality_ (postumous,\n1731).\n\n23 H. More: _Enchiridium Ethicum_ (1667).\n\n24 S. Clarke: _A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of\nNatural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian\nRevelation_ (1706).\n\n25 R. Cumberland: _De legibus natur\u00e6 disquisitio philosophica_ (1672).\n\n26 W. Wollaston: _The Religion of Nature Delineated_ (1722).\n\n27 _Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times_ (3 vols., 1711).\nIn the second volume there is included his ethical treatise entitled,\n_Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit_, which appeared first, in 1699,\nindependently. It was published in French in 1745 by Denis Diderot.\n\n28 F. Hutcheson: _An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty\nand Virtue_ (1725); _A System of Moral Philosophy_ (1755, posthumous).\n\n29 Joseph Butler: _Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature, or Man\nconsidered as a Moral Agent_ (1726).\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII Notes\n\n30 The freely thinking, anti-dogmatic religiousness of Socinianism had\nmaintained itself chiefly in Poland, Holland, Hungary, England, and\nNorth America. Its closer adherents called themselves also\nLatitudinarians, the more distant ones Unitarians. The fact that\nreligious rationalism had already existed in a literary form made its\nappearance in the eighteenth century easier.\n\n31 Tindal\u2019s work bears the title _Christianity as Old as the Creation_\n(1730). Pierre Bayle\u2019s famous _Dictionnaire historique et critique_\nappeared for the first time in two volumes in 1695.\n\n32 The most impressive, and perhaps the most profound document of the\nreligion of reason is the confession of faith which Rousseau in his\nnovel _Emile_ (1762) puts into the mouth of a country minister from\nSavoy.\n\n33 F. V. Reinhard: _Essay concerning the Plan which the Founder of the\nChristian Religion drew up for the Benefit of Mankind_ (1791; 4th ed.,\n1798). K. H. Venturini: _Natural History of the Great Prophet of\nNazareth_ (1800-1802). See for an account of them the writer\u2019s work:\n_The Quest of the Historical Jesus_ (1906; 4th ed., 1922 (German); 1st\nEnglish ed., 1910; 3rd, 1922).\n\n34 Expulsion of the Jesuits from Portugal, 1759; from France, 1764;\nfrom Spain and Naples, 1767; from Parma, 1768.\n\n35 _Short Theses upon the Sin of Witchcraft and the Practice of Trial\nTherefor_.\n\n36 See G. Len\u00f4tre: \u201cLes Agents Royalists sous la Revolution\u201d (_Revue\ndes Deux Mondes_, 1922).\n\n37 Her dictum is given in the English periodical, _The Atlas_, in its\nissue of January 27th, 1828.\n\n38 _Esquiss\u00e8 d\u2019un tableau historique des progr\u00e8s de l\u2019esprit humain_.\nIt was published in 1795, after the author\u2019s death, at the expense of\nthe National Convention.\n\n\nCHAPTER IX Notes\n\n39 Immanuel Kant: _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ (1781); _Grundlegung\nzur Metaphysik der Sitten_ (1785); _Kritik der praktischen Vernunft_\n(1788); _Kritik der Urteilskraft_ (1790); _Die Religion innerhalb der\nGrenzen der blossen Vernunft_ (1793); _Metaphysik der Sitten_ (1797).\n\n\nCHAPTER X Notes\n\n40 _Tractatus theologico-politicus_ (anonymous, 1670); _Ethica ordine\ngeometrico demonstrata_ (posthumous and anonymous, 1677; German\ntranslation by Johann Lorenz Schmidt, 1744); _Tractatus politicus_\n(posthumous and anonymous, 1677). First complete edition of Spinoza\u2019s\nworks, 1802-3.\n\n41 Lao-tze (born, _circa_. 604 B.C.): _Taoteking_; Chwang-tse (fourth\ncentury B.C.): _The True Book of the Southern Flower Land_; Lie-tse\n(fourth century B.C.): _The True Book of the Primitive Water-spring_.\n\n42 G. W. Leibniz: _Syst\u00e8me nouveau de la nature, et de la\ncommunication des substances_ (1695); _Nouveaux Essais_ (1704); _La\nMonadologie_ (1714).\n\n\nCHAPTER XI Notes\n\n43 The greatest representatives of Gnosticism are Basilides,\nValentinus, and Marcion, all three living in the first half of the\nsecond century B.C. At the beginning of that century all sorts of\nGnostic systems spring up, as did speculative ones at the beginning of\nthe nineteenth. The two great Christian teachers of Alexandria,\nFlavius Clemens at the end of the second century A.D., and Origen at\nthe beginning of the third, try to bring the Gnostic speculations into\nharmony with the doctrine of the Church.\n\n44 J. G. Fichte: _The Foundations of All Scientific Theories_ (1794);\n_The System of Moral Teaching According to the Principles of Science_\n(1798); _The Destiny of Man_ (1800); _How to Attain to the Happy Life_\n(1806); _Addresses to the German Nation_ (1808).\n\nA complete edition of J. G. Fichte\u2019s works was edited by his son, J.\nH. Fichte, in 1845 and the following years. A good selection has been\npublished by F. Medicus (1908 to 1912).\n\n45 This and the following quotations are from _The Destiny of Man_.\n\n\nCHAPTER XII Notes\n\n46 D. E. Schleiermacher: _Discourses on Religion for the Educated\namong its Contemners_ (1799); _Monologues_ (1800); _Outlines of a\nCritique of Moral Philosophy down to the Present Day_ (1803);\n_Christian Belief_ (1821-23); _Draft of a System of Moral Philosophy_\n(posthumous, 1835).\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII Notes\n\n47 Friedrich Hegel: _Phenomenology of the Spirit_ (1807); _The Science\nof Logic_ (3 vols., 1812-26); _Encyclop\u00e6dia of the Philosophical\nSciences_ (1817); _The Philosophy of Law_ (1821); _The Philosophy of\nHistory_ (posthumous, 1840). Complete edition of his works in eighteen\nvolumes, prepared by his pupils, 1832-45.\n\n48 _The Encyclop\u00e6dia_, Part III. (1845 ed.), p. 386.\n\n49 _The Encyclop\u00e6dia of Philosophical Sciences_, Part III. (1845 ed.),\np. 359.\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV Notes\n\n50 F. E. Beneke: _Prolegomena to a Physiology of Morals_ (1822); _The\nNatural System of Practical Philosophy_ (3 vols., 1837-40). By his\nappearance as a champion of utilitarianism and his consequent attitude\nof hostility to Kant, Beneke drew upon himself the enmity of Hegel,\nand was compelled in 1822 to stop the course of lectures which he was\ngiving as a _Privat-dozent_ at Berlin University. After Hegel\u2019s death\nhe filled a professorship at Berlin.\n\n51 L. A. Feuerbach: _What is Christianity?_ (1841); _Divinity,\nFreedom, and Immortality from the Standpoint of Anthropology_ (1866).\n\n52 Ernst Laas: _Idealism and Positivism_ (3 vols., 1879-84).\n\n53 _The Physiology of Society_ is the fourth volume of Comte\u2019s _Course\nof Positive Philosophy_ (6 vols., 1830-42).\n\n54 John Stuart Mill: _Principles of Political Economy_ (2 vols.,\n1848); _Utilitarianism_ (1861). There is a German translation of his\nworks by Th. Gomperz (12 vols., 1869-86). It was J. S. Mill who\nintroduced into philosophy the word \u201cutilitarian\u201d as the descriptive\ntitle of this particular school of ethic.\n\n55 Charles Darwin: _The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to\nSex_ (1871).\n\n56 Herbert Spencer: _Social Statics_ (1851); _The Data of Ethics_\n(1879); _The Principles of Ethics_ (1892).\n\n57 Henri de Saint-Simon: _L\u2019Organisateur_ (1819-20); _Cat\u00e9chisme des\nIndustriels_ (1823-24).\n\n58 Charles Fourier: _Le nouveau monde industriel et soci\u00e9taire_\n(1829).\n\n59 P. J. Proudhon: _Qu\u2019est-ce que la Propri\u00e9t\u00e9?_ (1840).\n\n60 Robert Owen: _A New View of Society_ (1813); and _Book of the New\nMoral World_ (7 parts, 1836-49).\n\n61 Ferdinand Lassalle: _Das System der erwonbenen Rechte_ (2 vols.,\n1861); _Offenes Antwortschreiben an das Centralkomitee zur Berufung\neines allgemeinen deutschen Arbeiterkongresses_ (1863).\n\n62 Karl Marx: _Manifesto of the Communist Party_ (1848, in\ncollaboration with Friedrich Engels); _Capital_ (vol. i., 1867; the\nsecond and third volumes were published in 1884 and 1894 by Friedrich\nEngels).\n\n63 The same spirit pervades the work of the national economist, Gustav\nSchmoller of Berlin: _Concerning Some Questions of Law and National\nEconomy_ (1875). Schmoller was the leader of the so-called \u201cSocialists\nof the Chair.\u201d\n\n64 The first to set before Christendom its duty to take part in the\nsolution of the social question is F\u00e9licit\u00e9 de Lamennais (1782-1854)\nin his _Paroles d\u2019un croyant_ (1833). This book was condemned by the\nPope in 1834.\n\n65 The English public was made familiar with working-class misery by\nKingsley\u2019s novel _Yeast_ (which appeared in 1848 in _Fraser\u2019s\nMagazine_, and in 1851 was printed as a book), and by two articles of\nHenry Mayhew\u2019s in the _Morning Chronicle_ (December 14th and 18th,\n1849). That Christian Socialism made its appearance first in England\nand France is connected with the fact that the industry which creates\nsocial problems developed earliest in these countries.\n\n66 Leo Tolstoi: _My Confessions_; German translation as _Worin besteht\nmein Glaube_ (1884); French as _Ma Religion_ (1884); English as\n_Christ\u2019s Christianity_ (1885). See also _What then shall we do?_\n(German, 1886). The fact that Tolstoi\u2019s ethical Christianity\nassociates itself with contempt for civilization brings it near to\nprimitive Christianity. But the all-important question, how the power\nof the ethical thoughts of Jesus are to work in the temper and the\ncircumstances of modern times, it does not answer. Tolstoi is a great\nstimulator but no guide.\n\n67 Eduard Bernstein: _The Presuppositions of Socialism, and the Tasks\nof Social Democracy_ (1899).\n\n\nCHAPTER XV Notes\n\n68 What Schopenhauer wrote after this, his chief work, which was\nprinted when he was thirty, are only appendixes and popular\nexplanations of it: _Concerning the Will in Nature_ (1836), _The Two\nFundamental Problems of Ethics_ (1840), _Parerga and Paralipomena_ (2\nvols., 1851).\n\n69 In 1802-1804 Anquetil Duperron (1731-1805) published in two\nvolumes, with a Latin translation, the _Oupnek\u2019hat_, a collection of\nfifty Upanishads, which he had brought back from India in a Persian\ntext.\n\n70 _The World as Will and Idea_, vol. ii., chap. xli.\n\n71 _The World as Will and Idea_, vol. i., chap. lxix.\n\n72 That the man who has won through to complete world- and life-denial\nremains holy even if he commits actions which according to accepted\nideas are unethical, is taught by the Bhagavadgita as well as by the\nUpanishads.\n\n73 _The World as Will and Idea_, vol. i., chap. lxviii.\n\n74 Friedrich Nietzsche: _Old-fashioned Reflexions_ (4 parts,\n1873-1876), _Human and All too Human_ (3 vols., 1878-1880), _Joyous\nScience_ (1882), _Thus spake Zarathustra_ (4 parts, 1883-1885),\n_Beyond Good and Evil_ (1886), _On the Genealogy of Morality_ (1887),\n_The Will to Power_ (posthumous, 1906).\n\n75 Max Stirner (1806-1856), whose real name was Kaspar Schmidt, has\nrecently been regarded as a predecessor of Nietzsche\u2019s on account of\nhis book, _The Individual and His Property_ (1845), in which he\nsupports the theory of merciless egoism. But he is not one. He has\nprovided no really deep philosophical background for his anarchistic\negoism. He speaks as a mere logician, and does not rise above the\nlevel of the Greek sophists. A religious reverence for life, such as\nNietzsche feels, is not to be found in him.\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI Notes\n\n76 H. Sidgwick: _The Method of Ethics_ (1874). (German translation by\nC. Bauer, 1909.)\n\n77 Leslie Stephen: _The Science of Ethics_ (1882).\n\n78 S. Alexander: _Moral Order and Progress: An Analysis of Ethical\nConceptions_ (1889).\n\n79 Wm. Wundt: _Ethics: An Examination of the Facts and Law of the\nMoral Life_ (1887).\n\n80 Friedrich Paulsen: _A System of Ethics_ (1889).\n\n81 Friedrich Jodl: _A History of Ethics as Philosophical Science_ (2\nvols., 2nd ed., 1906 and 1912).\n\n82 Georg von Gizyki: _Moral Philosophy, expounded so as to be\nintelligible to all_ (1888).\n\n83 Harald H\u00f6ffding (a Dane): _Ethics_ (1887). (German translation,\n1888.)\n\nGeorg Simmel (1858-1918) adopts a critical attitude towards modern\n\u201cscientific\u201d ethics in his _Introduction to Moral Science_ (1892).\n\n84 H. Cohen: _Kant\u2019s Foundation given to Ethics_ (1877); _The Ethic of\nthe Pure Will_ (1904).\n\n85 W. Herrmann: _Ethics_ (1901).\n\nIn France Charles Renouvier (1838-1903) tries, in his _Science of the\nMoral_ (1869), to restore the Kantian system of ethics.\n\n86 Jas. Martineau: _Types of Ethical Theory_ (2 vols., 1885).\n\n87 F. H. Bradley: _Ethical Studies_ (1876).\n\n88 T. H. Green: _Prolegomena to Ethics_ (posthumous, 1883).\n\n89 Simon Laurie: _Ethica, or the Ethics of Reason_ (1885). (A French\ntranslation by Georges Remack, 1902.)\n\n90 James Seth: _Study of Ethical Principles_ (3rd ed., 1894).\n\n91 Josiah Royce: _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy_ (1892); _Religious\nAspects of Philosophy_ (4th ed., 1892).\n\n92 A. Fouill\u00e9e: _Critique des syst\u00e8mes de morale contemporaine_\n(1883); _Evolutionisme des id\u00e9es-forces_ (1890; German translation,\n1908); _La morale des id\u00e9es-forces_ (1907).\n\n93 Jean Marie Guyau: _La morale anglaise contemporaine_ (1879);\n_Esquisse d\u2019une morale sans obligation ni sanction_ (1885);\n_L\u2019irreligion de l\u2019avenir_ (1886). A German version of his works\nappeared in 6 vols. in 1912.\n\n94 \u201cToute id\u00e9e enveloppe un \u00e9l\u00e9ment impulsif; nulle id\u00e9e n\u2019est un \u00e9tat\nsimplement repr\u00e9sentatif.\u201d (Every idea contains an element of impulse;\nno idea is merely a condition of re-presenting something in thought.)\n\n95 . . . \u201cnotre conscience de nous-m\u00eame tendant \u00e0 sa pl\u00e9nitude par son\nexpansion en autrui.\u201d ( . . . our consciousness of ourselves, which\npresses on to its full growth by expanding into others.)\n\n96 \u201cAgis envers les autres comme si tu avais conscience des autres en\nm\u00eame temps que de soi.\u201d\n\n97 Fouill\u00e9e reveals his attitude towards Nietzsche in a work entitled\n_Nietzsche and Immoralism_. Notes on the works of Fouill\u00e9e and Guyau\nhave been preserved by Nietzsche.\n\n98 Eduard von Hartmann: _Philosophy of the Unconscious_ (1869);\n_Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness_ (1879).\n\n99 _Phenomenology_, p. 670.\n\n100 _Phenomenology_, p. 700.\n\n101 Henri Bergson: _Sur les donn\u00e9es imm\u00e9diates de la conscience_\n(1888). (English translation by F. L. Pogson, 1910: _Time and\nFreewill; An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness_.) _Mati\u00e8re\net memoire. Essai sur la relation du corps et de l\u2019esprit_ (1896).\n(English translation by N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer: _Matter and\nMemory_, 1911.) _L\u2019\u00e9nvolution cr\u00e9atrice_ (1907). (English translation\nby A. Mitchell: _Creative Evolution_, 1911.)\n\n102 H. S. Chamberlain: _The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century_\n(1899). (14th impression, 1922.) _Immanuel Kant_ (1905); _Goethe_\n(1912).\n\n103 Count Hermann Keyserling: _The Structure of the World_ (1906); _A\nPhilosopher\u2019s Travel-Diary_ (2 vols., 1919); _Philosophy as Art_\n(1920).\n\n104 So Otto Braun in his essay \u201cMonism and Ethics\u201d in the volume\nentitled _Monism Expounded in Contributions from its Representatives_\n(edited by Arthur Drews; vol. i., 1908). The poverty of this ethic is\nclearly revealed when the editor tries to indicate its content.\n\n\nCHAPTER XX Notes\n\n105 This book dates from about the eleventh century A.D. It has been\ntranslated into English by James Legge (_Sacred Books of the East_,\n1891) and by T. Susuki and P. Carus (Chicago, 1906); into French by M.\nA. R\u00e9musat (_Le livre des r\u00e9compenses et des peines_, 1816), and by\nStanislas Julien (1835); into German by W. Sch\u00fcler (_Zeitschrift f\u00fcr\nMissionskunde_, 1909).\n\n\u201cBe human with animals, and do no harm to insects, plants, and trees,\u201d\nis the command of one saying in this book. The following acts are\ncondemned: \u201cHunting men or animals to death; shooting with bow and\narrow at birds; hunting quadrupeds; driving insects out of their\nholes; frightening birds which are asleep in the trees; blocking up\nthe holes of insects, and destroying birds-nests.\u201d To delight in\nhunting is described as a serious moral perversion.\n\n\n\n\n[pg 286]\n\nINDEX\n\n\nAlexander the Great, 50\nAlexander II., 103\nAlexander, Samuel, 182\nAmos, 21\nAntisthenes, 36\nAnti-Utilitarians(ism), 86, 87, 107\nAristippus, 36 n.\nAristotle, 21,42,44 ff., 65\nArrian, 53 n.\nAugustine, 58\n\nBach, J. S., 91\nBacon, Lord Verulam, 64\nBasilides, 125 n.\nBayle, 93\nBeneke, 151\nBentham, 75, 77, 79, 83, 96, 103,\n144, 151, 159, 222, 233\nBergson, 198 f., 203\nBernstein, 163\nBodin, 68\nBradley, 184 f.\nBraun, 201 n.\nBuddha, 21, 25, 27, 133, 172, 174, 214, 238\nButler, Bp., 89\n\nCarus, P., 234 n.\nChamberlain, 198 f.\nCharron, 68\nCherbury, Lord H. of, 93\nChwang-tse, 27, 54, 118, 120 f.,\n131, 133, 139, 179, 236 f., 272\nCicero, 52 n., 65\nClarke, 86\nClemens, Flavius, 126 n.\nClement XIV., 95\nCohen, 183 f.\nCollins, 93\nComte, 152, 154\nCondorcet, 89, 104\nConfucius (Kung-tse), 21, 27, 34,\n54, 91, 104, 139, 237 f., 272\nCopernicus, 61, 114\nCudworth, 86\nCumberland, 86\nCynics, 34, 36, 43\nCyrenaics, 34, 36, 43\n\nDarwin, Chas., 14,153 ff., 193, 233\nDemocritus, 36 f.\nDescartes, 13, 62, 116, 123, 137,\n233, 246\nDiderot, 87 n., 89\nDiogenes Laertius, 32 n., 36 n.\nDiogenes of Sinope, 36 n.\nDomitian, 52\nDrews, 201 n.\nDu Bois-Raymond, 209\n\nEngels, 161\nEpictetus, 52-6, 58, 60, 65\nEpicurus(ism), 21, 36-9, 51, 58, 68\nErasmus, 66 f.\nErnesti, 93\nEssenes, The, 98\n\nFeuerbach, 152\nFichte, J. G., 21, 126 ff., 136-145,\n147, 150 f., 166-171, 177, 185,\n189, 209, 223, 231, 237 f.\nFichte, Imm. H., 126 n., 166\nFirmian, Archbishop, 95\nFouill\u00e9e, 186-193, 198\nFourier, 161\nFrederick the Great, 81, 96\nFreemasons, 97\n\nGalileo, 62\nGassendi, 68\nGiordano, Bruno, 62, 88\nGizyki, von, 182\nGnostics, 60, 125 f.\nGoethe, 89, 136 ff., 140, 199\nGomperz, 153 n.\nGreen, T. H., 184 ff.\n\n[pg 287]\n\nGrotius, 68, 96\nGuyau, 187-93\n\nHaeckel, 201\nHartley, 72, 152\nHartmann, 194-197\nHegel, 21, 102, 126, 141-149, 150,\n162, 167, 170, 173, 197, 202,\n237 f.\nHelvetius, 75-79\nHeraclitus, 32\nHerbart, 166\nHerder, 89\nHerrmann, 183-185\nHobbes, 75-79, 85, 120\nH\u00f6ffding, 182\nHolbach, von, 72, 152\nHumanism, 92\nHume, 80-84, 93, 152, 155, 181,\n188\nHutcheson, 89\n\nIlluminati, The, 97\nIndian Philosophy, 11, 14, 17, 25,\n27, 28, 30, 34, 42, 54, 66, 88,\n113, 117 f., 121, 123, 145 f.,\n158, 166, 171, 194, 214, 223,\n231, 237, 239\nIntellectualists, 87, 106\nIntuitionists, 87, 106, 184\nIsaiah, 21\n\nJacobi, 116\nJames, 210\nJenner, 97\nJesuits, 95, 98\nJesus, 21, 25, 27, 34, 63, 64, 65,\n66, 67, 94, 98, 158, 202\nJodl, 24, 182\nJoseph II., 99\nJosephus, 98\n\nKant, 13, 21, 23, 25, 41, 87,\n106-115, 122, 127-129, 134,\n136, 137, 140, 147, 150, 151,\n166, 169, 184, 190, 199, 206,\n209, 223, 231, 233, 252\nKepler, 62\nKeplerbund, 209\nKetteler, 162\nKeyserling, 198-200, 203\nKingsley, Charles, 162 f.\n\nLaas, 152\nLamennais, 162 n.\nLange, 162, 192 f.\nLao-tse, 21, 27, 34, 37, 118, 120,\n121, 133, 139, 179, 236 f.\nLassalle, 161, 164\nLatitudinarians, 93 n.\nLaurie, 184 f.\nLegge, 234 n.\nLeibniz, 93, 116, 122-124, 137\nLeonardo da Vinci, 61, 200\nLen\u00f4tre, 96 n.\nLessing, 89, 93\nLie-tse, 118, 120, 179\nLocke, 21, 75-79, 85\n\nMachiavelli, 68\nMarcus Aurelius, 52-60, 65, 68\nMarcion, 125 n.\nMartineau, 184 f.\nMarx, 161 f.\nMaurice, F. D., 162\nMayhew, 163 n.\nMendelssohn, Moses, 89, 93, 116\nMeng-tse, 27, 47, 51, 54, 237\nMichaelis, 93\nMill, James, 153\nMill, John Stuart, 150, 153\nMo-di, 237\nMohammed, 27\nMonism, 60, 90, 114, 138, 189,\n201\nMontaigne, 67\nMore, Henry, 86\n\nNapoleon Buonaparte, 100, 102\nNeoplatonism, 60\nNeopythagoreanism, 60\nNero, 52\n\n[pg 288]\n\nNewton, Isaac, 69, 86\nNicolai, 129\nNietzsche, 21, 23, 165, 174-180,\n188 f., 197, 201, 223, 231, 236\nOrigen, 126 n.\nOrphism, 42\nOwen, Robert, 161\n\nParacelsus, 62\nPaulsen, 182\nPaul (the Apostle), 21\nPlato, 21, 33-35, 40-52, 85, 223\nPlotinus, 60\nPositivism, 152\nProphets, the Jewish, 21, 27, 34, 231\nProudhon, 161\nPythagoreanism, 42\n\nRationalists (ism), 6, 90-105,124-131,\n135, 139, 147, 150 f., 190,\n211\nReformation, 66\nReimarus, 93\nReinhard, 94\nRenaissance, 21, 61 f., 69\nRenouvier, 183\nRitschl, 210\nRousseau, 93\nRoyce, 186\n\nSaint Simon, 161\nSchelling, 126\nSchiller, 136-138, 140\nSchleiermacher, 138-140, 145\nSchmoller, 162\nScholasticism, 61\nSchopenhauer, 11, 13, 21, 23, 30,\n165-174, 179 f., 189, 197, 223,\n231, 234\nSchweitzer, Albert, 67 n., 94 n.\nSemler, 93\nSeneca, 52-60, 65\nSeth, 184 f.\nSforza, 200\nShaftesbury, Lord, 21, 85-87, 138\nSidgwick, H., 182\nSimmel, 182 n.\nSmith, Adam, 80-84, 87, 152\n155 f., 185\nSocinians, 92\nSocrates, 21, 33-47, 52, 71, 74,\n177\nSophists, 32, 48, 178\nSpencer, H., 153-158, 202\nSpinoza, 13, 21, 25, 88, 104\n116-124, 133, 137-140, 143\n167, 189, 223, 237 f.\nSta\u00ebl, Madame de, 103\nStephen, Leslie, 182\nStern, 192 f., 234\nStirner, 179 n.\nStoics, 21, 35-9, 54, 57, 237\n\nTaoism, 37\nTelesio, 62\nThomasius, 95\nTindal, 93\nToland, 93\nTolstoi, 163\n\nUnitarians, 93\nUnold, 201\nUtilitarianism, 80-83, 87-89, 107\n109, 150-164, 166, 221, 232\n\nValentinus (Gnostic), 125 n.\nVenturini, 94, 98\nVoltaire, 89, 90, 93, 122\n\nWieland, 89\nWollaston, 86\nWolff, 93, 124\nWundt, 182, 233\n\nXenophanes, 32\nXenophon, 33, 39\n\nYang-tse, 179, 236\n\nZarathustra, 21, 27 f., 179, 231\nZelter, 91\nZeno, 36 f., 54, 57\nZwingli, 92\n\n\n\n\nTRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTES\n\n\nThe formatting of both the .htm and .txt files followed that of three\nsimilar books, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, The Mystery of the\nKingdom of God and The Decay and Restoration of Civilization already\nin Project Gutenberg. I have included page numbers in the format [pg\nxxx] for both .htm and .txt.\n\nI made several hyphenation choices, forced by de-hyphenation at\nthe ends of lines:\n\n1. Will-lessness p. 194.\n2. birds-nests note 105 p. 234.\n\nCases of inconsistent use (both hyphenated and unhyphenated are\npresent) were left as they are: two-fold, non-sensible, Kung-tse,\nun-civilization, pre-conceptions, pre-suppositions, thorough-going,\nre-fashion, present-day, world-view, driving-force, sum-total,\nwill-to-power, belief-in-progress, nature-philosophy,\nrationally-pleasurable, ever-new, general-notion, world-and-life\naffirmation, matter-of-fact, wage-system, fellow-men, bass-note,\nworld-religions, so-called, will-to-action, ready-made, all-round,\noptimistic-ethical.\n\nI left the misspelled word \u201cpostumous\u201d in footnote 22 from p. 86, the\nmisspelled word \u201calway\u201d from p. 262 but I corrected the birth date for\nHenri Bergson from 1560 to 1860 on p. 198, I corrected the spelling of\nthe translator of Mill in the Index to \u201cGomperz\u201d, the spelling of the\nGerman philosopher \u201cLeibniz\u201d on p. 93 and the Index and the spelling\nof the German philosopher \u201cNietzsche\u201d on p. 175 and 176. I eliminated\nthe small caps used for the first name of each starting letter in the\nIndex.\n\nIn the .txt version I have used utf8 encoding and the following\nmarkers:\n\n1. italic text surrounded by _\n2. footnote references in the form _(_number_)_","title":"Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":102392}