{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_76229/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_76229","id":"gutenberg_76229","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/76229","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Science - Physics","Spanish essays -- Translations into English"],"text":"ESSAYS,\n                                    OR\n                               DISCOURSES,\n\n                              SELECTED FROM\n                           THE WORKS OF FEYJOO,\n                                   AND\n                       TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH,\n                                    BY\n                             JOHN BRETT, ESQ.\n\n                            VOLUME THE FOURTH.\n\n                                 LONDON,\n                       Printed for the TRANSLATOR:\n\n              Sold by H. PAYNE, Pall-Mall; C. DILLY, in the\n                  Poultry; and T. EVANS, in the Strand.\n\n                                MDCCLXXX.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.\n\n\n  PHYSICAL PARADOXES                               page 1\n\n  SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY                                 36\n\n  THE SHEW OR AFFECTATION OF LEARNING                 137\n\n  MORAL AND POLITICAL PARADOXES                       163\n\n  THE GREAT AND MASTERLY AUTHORITY OF EXPERIENCE      226\n\n  A DISPLAY OF THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES OF THE\n    VARIOUS PEOPLE, WITH REMARKS ON THE TALENTS\n    OF THE DIFFERENT ONES                             329\n\n\n\n\nPHYSICAL PARADOXES.\n\n\nI. The Greek word Paradox, or Paradoxologia, does not properly signify a\nfalse or implicatory proposition, but an improbable or incredible one;\nand therefore, this word is commonly applied to those propositions, which\nin the eye of the generality of mankind, at first sight seem false and\ncontradictory, and difficult to be assented to; but upon examining them\nstrictly and with attention, appear to be either true or probable. In\nthis discourse, we shall treat of some of the things of this species,\nwhich are to be found in the line of natural philosophy.\n\n\nPARADOX I.\n\n_Elemental Fire is not hot in the highest Degree._\n\nSECT. I.\n\nII. Vulgar physics, distribute the four qualities which are called\nfirst, among the four elements, assigning to each element one of them\nthat is intense in the highest degree, and another which approaches,\nor comes near to the highest. Thus to fire they attribute heat in the\nhighest degree, and dryness which is nearly approaching to the highest.\nTo the air, humidity in the highest degree, and heat near to it. To the\nwater, coldness in the highest degree, and moisture near to it. To the\nearth, dryness in the highest degree, and coldness near to it. This\ndistribution, which if regulated, not by a nice examination of the nature\nof things, but only by an imaginary proportion, is exposed to three\nserious and weighty objections which are started against it by the modern\nphilosophers; and it is only to the proposition that fire is hot in the\nhighest degree, that they have hitherto made no difficulty of assenting;\nbut that is the point I at present mean to controvert.\n\nIII. That elemental fire is not hot in the highest degree, may be\nevinced, by shewing there is another heat which is much greater,\nand that is the heat of the sun, when its rays are concentrated in\na burning-glass. It is certain, that the most vigorous effects and\noperations of elemental fire, does not come up in any degree of\ncomparison, to those of that most ardent star. This has been proved\nevidently, by the experiments made with the burning-glass invented and\nfabricated by Mons. Villete, an eminent artist of Lions in France; a\ndescription of which, was printed and published at Liege in 1715, and\nwas afterwards inserted in the Memoirs of Trevoux of the year 1716.\nThe instant the focus of this burning-glass was applied to any sort of\nwood, be it ever so green or moist, it set it as suddenly in a flame, as\nelemental fire would do dry tow. In less than a minute, it melted metals\nwhich were the most difficult of liquefaction, such as copper, iron,\ngold, and all minerals in general. The highest operation the chymists\nhave found elemental fire capable of performing, is that of vitrifaction,\nwhich is so called from its reducing matter to a species of glass;\nbut the most intense fire, besides its being tardy in this operation,\ncan perform it only on particular subjects; whereas the burning-glass\nvitrifies in a short time, every kind of matter, tiles, bricks, cement,\nbones, stones of all sorts, even marble, and porphyry; and what is most\nextraordinary, it vitrifies those sort of stones also, with which they\nmake the bottoms of furnaces for melting iron ore in, which although they\nwill endure that intense heat for many years together, will begin to\ndissolve almost immediately, upon applying the focus of the burning-glass\nto them.\n\nIV. Although this is very wonderful, what we are about to relate is still\nmore so. The analytic resolution of gold, or what is the same thing, the\nseparation or division of its principal component parts, had till then\nbeen deemed impossible; for the misers are not more tenacious of hoarding\nor preserving their gold, than the gold is of preserving its intrinsic\ntexture; for in spite of all the tortures by fire, which the chymists\ncould invent to break this texture, they could never make it lose its\noriginal form. Yet notwithstanding the valour of this generous metal,\nit submitted obediently to the power of the sun exerted through the\nburning-glass; as if that power to whom it is said to owe its existence,\nwas the only one to which it could bear to be subject.\n\nV. Mons. Homberg, of the Academy Royal of Sciences, was the first who\nexperienced this rare phenomenon, by resolving into smoak, with the focus\nof the burning-glass, at the Palace Royal at Paris, a great portion\nof its mass, which this celebrated chymist judged to be the mercurial\npart of the gold, and when this was gone, the residue which remained,\nappeared to be a terrestrial matter, mixed with somewhat of sulphur, that\nafterwards vitrified. So that in the opinion of Mons. Homberg, sulphur,\nand mercury, together with a portion of earth, is what gold is composed\nof, and although the two first are by their nature volatile, and capable\nof being dissipated and divided by the power of fire in all other metals,\nand in all other mixtures, they in gold are so intimately united, that\nno other force or influence can separate them, but that of the sun; it\nfollows then, that the heat of the sun is much greater than that of\nelemental fire, and that this last cannot be hot in the highest degree,\nwhich is what we undertook to prove.\n\n\nPARADOX II.\n\n_The Air ought rather to be esteemed cold, than hot._\n\nSECT. II.\n\nVI. The quality which Aristotle attributes to the air, is cold somewhat\nunder the highest degree, or nearly approaching to the highest degree.\nOther philosophers, with more foundation of reason, esteem it indifferent\nto heat and cold; and I, without setting about to combat this second\nopinion, say it is more reasonable to suppose it cold than hot. Which\nI shall attempt to demonstrate in the following manner: in order to\nmake a judgement of the qualities appertaining to a particular thing,\nwe should consider it in a state, where it is divested of the influence\nof any extrinsic agent, by the operations of which it may be affected;\nthe air then so circumstanced, will always be found to be cold; and\nfrom thence it should be inferred, that it naturally is cold. The minor\nof this proposition is proved, by the air being only warm while it is\naffected by the rays of the sun, and by its being found, that whenever\nthat influence is withdrawn, it becomes cold again, and that it is by so\nmuch the more cold, in proportion to the absence of that influence. From\nwhence it is observable, that in the temperate zones, the air is coldest\nwhen the nights are long; and that in the sub-polar, and circum-polar\nones, it is extremely cold, on account of the influence of the sun being\nwithdrawn from them for the space of six months together; and that when\nit returns to enlighten them, because of the obliquity of its rays, it\nstill continues cold, far beyond the degree of mediocrity.\n\nVII. Nor is saying that in the absence of the sun, the earth is the agent\nthat cools the air any reply to this; for if this was so, the lower\nregion of the air would be colder than the middle one, as being nearer to\nthe infrigidating cause; but this is contradicted by our experience; for\nwe very commonly see, that the water does not freeze in the lower region,\nwhen in the middle one it is frozen into hail in the clouds; and very\noften also, that which was frozen above, thaws suddenly upon its falling\ndown.\n\nVIII. If it should be objected to this, that Aristotle and the\nPeripatetics, when they say the air is warm, speak of the elemental air,\nand not of the air of the atmosphere which is mixed with an infinite\nnumber of heterogenous corpuscles, by some of which it may be made cold,\nand especially by the many nitrous ones with which it is impregnated. To\nthis I answer first, that in the country where I am now writing, there is\nnot the least appearance of the air being nitrous, for that there is not\na grain of nitre to be found in the whole country, notwithstanding which,\nthe cold in winter is sometimes pretty sharp. I answer secondly, that\nwe can only talk of the pure elemental air by conjecture, for no mortal\nhas yet ever breathed any of it, nor is it possible that any one ever\nshould, on account of this element being an open expanse, exposed to the\ninroads of the effluvias of all other bodies; and we should reason upon\nsensible qualities, by pursuing the thread of palpable experiments; and\nnot by pursuing that of ideal proportions, as Aristotle did in making\nthe division of his elemental qualities; for the Author of nature is not\nconfined to pursuing only such proportions as fall within the compass\nof our comprehension. This is the false principle, upon which all the\nPythagorean and Aristotelic philosophy has proceeded, and with respect\nto the doctrine of the four elements, that seems to be tainted with the\nsame vice, as I shall shew more fully in another place. All that I shall\nsay at present is, that Aristotle dealt out, and distributed the four\nqualities among the four elements, as if he had been the absolute master\nof them all, and could dispose of and arrange them agreeable to his will\nand pleasure.\n\n\nPARADOX III.\n\n_Water considered according to its Nature, is rather disposed to be\nsolid, than fluid._\n\nSECT. III.\n\nIX. This may be demonstrated, upon the same principle the antecedent\nparadox was; remove for any length of time, the interposition of any\nextrinsic agent that may contribute to warm the water, and it will always\nbe found to be solid, that is, in a frozen state. This then being so, we\nmay conclude, that is the state it is disposed to continue in agreeable\nto its nature. This is evinced by the sea under the Poles, and in the\nadjacent parts, being, during the whole six months the sun is absent\nfrom them, frozen to such a degree, that after the sun has revisited\nthem, and continued its influence for the other six months, it is never\ntotally thawed; and it is for this reason, that it has always been found\nimpracticable to sail to China by that rout.\n\nX. The water being under this influence, is a proof _ad hominem_, that it\ncannot, agreeable to the doctrine of Aristotle, be cold in the highest\ndegree, for if that was the case it must ever continue in a frozen state;\nso that we can only say, that by its nature it is most disposed to\nsolidity.\n\nXI. Frozen water being easily made liquid by a moderate heat, is no proof\nthat it is not naturally inclined to solidity. Metals may be liquified\nby an intense heat, but that does not shew that they are not of a solid\nnature; and a thing being more easily, or with more difficulty dissolved,\nmakes no difference with respect to this mode of reasoning; and therefore\nthe water being made liquid with a less intense heat, than is found\nnecessary to liquify metals, does not prove, that it is not disposed in\nits nature to be solid as well as them.\n\n\nPARADOX IV.\n\n_Either all Qualities are occult, or none of them are so._\n\nSECT. IV.\n\nXII. The school philosophers call all those qualities occult, which are\nnot reckoned among the four elemental ones, and which do not result\nfrom the various combinations of these elemental ones, because they\nsuppose their operations move in a line superior to those which may\nbe supposed to proceed from humidity, dryness, cold, heat, hardness,\nsoftness, colour, favour, &c. And although it is true, that some by\npursuing the system of assigning second qualities, which result from the\nvarious combinations of the first; or third qualities, resulting from the\nvarious combinations of the second; and among these third, have placed\nthe wonderful virtues of the load-stone, the operation of purges, and\nothers of those which they call occult, and which by these means they\nhave attempted to reduce to manifest ones; this mode of proceeding, has\nbeen abandoned by the generality of philosophers, and with reason; for\nit is very clear, that combine, and recombine, the qualities of humidity,\ndryness, heat, and cold, in what way you will, you will not be able to\nfind out, that they are capable of directing the load-stone to the Pole,\nor of causing it to attract iron.\n\nXIII. It is not my intention, to examine the nature and origin of all, or\neither of these qualities; but shall only say, that they are all equally\noccult, or are all equally manifest. In order to demonstrate this, we\nwill compare the calefactive virtue of fire which is looked upon as the\nmost manifest, with the attractive virtue of the load-stone, which is\nreputed the most occult. All that is known, or that is taught by the\nperipatetic doctrine, of the calefactory virtues of fire, may be reduced\nto this, that it is a property appertaining to that substance, or a\nquality that springs from, or arises out of its form, that produces the\neffect which we call heat, and that the action with which it causes it,\nis called calefaction; but so it is, that it is just in the same manner\nthat we know the attractive virtue of the load-stone; _viz._ that it is a\nproperty or quality, springing from, or arising out of the form of this\nentity, that produces the sensible effect of drawing the iron to it, and\nthat the action with which it causes it to approach towards it, is called\nattraction; it follows then, that we know just as much of the attractive\nvirtue of the load-stone, as we know of the calefactory virtues of fire;\nand therefore, both of them are equally occult, and equally manifest.\n\nXIV. And if we were to speak the truth, how could we deny, that the\nquality we call heat is occult, when it is even occult, whether it is\nor is not a quality? Not only the corpuscular philosophers deny it to\nbe possessed of all quality or form, but many of those who admit those\nproperties to be contained in it, constitute the heat to proceed from a\nvertical, or vibratory motion of the insensible particles of the body.\nAnd so long as we shall remain without an argument to convince us of the\ntruth of these opinions, we shall not know which of them is right.\n\n\nPARADOX V.\n\n_It is false, in a general and comprehensive sense, that Virtue by being\nunited becomes the stronger._\n\nSECT. V.\n\nXV. The axiom _Vis unita fortior_, I apprehend, applies more justly to\ncivil and political things, than to natural ones. If we attend, we shall\nfind that two agents, each of which is strong in proportion to four,\nby being joined together, will not be stronger than in proportion to\neight. If two men separately can support but four half hundreds each,\nby joining them together, you would find them not able to support above\neight. It is true, that a man who breaks arrows one by one, cannot break\na bundle of arrows tied together, which is the comparison that Scilurus\navailed himself of (Plut. in Apophth.) to persuade his sons to continue\nin fraternal union; but we should not understand by this, that by binding\nthem together, each arrow separately acquired any additional strength,\nfor this example was only intended to shew, that he who could with ease\nbreak each arrow separately, was not sufficiently strong to break the\nwhole bundle united together. Suppose, for instance, the bundle was to\nconsist of twenty arrows, if there was any thing less than a twentieth\npart of the force exerted to break a single arrow, than it was necessary\nto exert to break the whole bundle, it is as certain that that single\narrow would not be broke, as that the whole bundle would not. Thus this\nexample does not prove, that there is any additional virtue or strength\nadded to the wood of which the arrows are made, by uniting them together,\nbut only, that twenty joined together can resist a greater force than one\nsingly, which is a thing that is self-evident.\n\nXVI. Nothing can be plainer than this; but abstracted from the force\nof this reasoning, experience has shewn us, that in some agents,\nin contradiction to the common opinion, their union has diminished\ntheir strength. It is the general sentiment, that two threads twisted\ntogether and united in one cord, will support more weight than they\nwill separately; and that a rope made of many fine threads, is stronger\nthan all these threads divided. Mons. Reamur, of the Academy Royal of\nSciences, demonstrated in 1711, that the fact was quite otherwise, and\nthat the threads separate would support a greater weight than they would\nunited. He made this experiment with two single threads, and found that\neach by itself would support nine pounds and a half, which put together\nmake nineteen pounds; after this he caused them to be twisted together,\nand they were broke with sixteen pounds. He made another experiment with\nthree threads, one of which supported six pounds and a half; another\neight, and another eight and a half; the sum of all which put together\namounted to twenty-three pounds; and after causing them to be made into a\ncord, they would not sustain more than seventeen.\n\nXVII. It may perhaps be answered to this, that the threads in twisting\nthem together might be stretched and made finer, and their strength\nweakened; and that besides this, they might have been strained by\nsupporting the weight in the first instance; but this objection, although\nspecious, is insufficient; for by attending to the relation of this\nmatter in the History of the Academy Royal, we shall find, that by order\nof the Academy, another experiment was made in a quite opposite way, for\na small silk cord which supported a little more than five pounds, was\nafterwards untwisted, and they found that the single threads among them\nall sustained six pounds and a half.\n\nXVIII. The true cause of this phenomenon in my judgment, is, that the\nthreads in the twisted cord do not bear equally alike, because it seems\nto me morally impossible in the twisting, to preserve the exact length or\nbearing of all the fibres, but that some of them must be more tense or\ntight, and some of them more slack than others; in consequence of which,\nthe bearing of some must vary more from the perpendicular or central line\nof gravity, than that of the others, and that some part of them are upon\nthe stretch, and others rather slack at one and the same time. From hence\nit follows, that the weight at first is not supported by all the fibres,\nbut only by those which are the most tense, and the least distant from\nthe central line of gravity, which not being of themselves sufficient to\nresist the strain, give way, and that the weight afterwards falling upon\nthe others, they do the same; and that this is the case may be evidently\nseen, by observing when more weight is hung to a rope than it is able\nto sustain, it does not break instantly, but successively, and although\nthe total separation is performed in a very little time, there is space\nenough before it is compleated, for us to perceive, that some threads\nbreak first, and others afterwards.\n\nXIX. But although my opinion should not exactly coincide with the\nexperiments made in the academy, I conclude, that the judgment we should\nmake of this matter is, that both in this, and all other physical agents,\nvirtue united is the same that it is separate; for the cord breaking\nwith a less weight than the threads sustained separate, did not result\nfrom these last being stronger separate than they were united, but from\nthe fibres of the threads acting more together in their separate state,\nthan they did in their united one, as in the last case, the resistance of\nthe fibres to the force, was made more in succession than it was in the\nfirst; or to speak more properly, although the threads were united in the\ncord, their power or virtue of resistance to the force, was not united or\nexerted together.\n\n\nPARADOX VI.\n\n_The Sun in consequence of its own proper Nature, and intrinsic\nDisposition, heats and enlightens unequally at different Times._\n\nSECT. VI.\n\nXX. The common causes of our experiencing more or less heat, or more\nor less light from the sun, are the serene or loaded state of the\natmosphere; the oblique direction with which the sun\u2019s rays are reflected\non us; the position, or situation of places; the length or shortness of\nthe days; the tranquillity or agitation of the winds, and our vicinity\nto cold or warm places, such as snowy mountains, or warm subterraneous\neffluvia. But, abstracted from any of these sublunary or inferior causes,\nI say, that in the sun itself, is contained a cause, that occasions it\nto reflect more or less light or heat, and that it actually does reflect\nmore or less light and heat, at some times than it does at others, and\nthat this is in virtue of its own proper nature and disposition.\n\nXXI. The reason of which phenomenon is, the transitory spots, which the\nastronomers have for some time past observed in the sun. These are a sort\nof darkish places, unequal in size and duration, which seem as if they\nwere on the superficies of the star, and which at different times are\nmore or less numerous, although it has happened, that for years together\nnone of them have appeared. Some believe that the antient Chaldeans had\nsome knowledge of them, for in the Book of Job, we read the following\nexpression of Job\u2019s friend Eliphaz to him, that the Heavens themselves\nare not exempt from their spots: _C\u00e6li non sunt mundi in conspectu\nejus._ On the other hand, the want of telescopes among the ancients, did\nnot render their making observations on these things impossible; for some\nof these spots are so large, as to be visible without a telescope; as\nfor example that was, which was seen in the year 1706, whose superficies\naccording to the computation of the astronomers, was thirty-six times\nlarger than the whole earth; and when they arrive at this magnitude, or\nif they are even much less, they may be discerned, by looking at the sun\nwith a glass tinged with any dark colour.\n\nXXII. But the first person we have any account of, who observed these\nspots, was Father Christopher Scheinerus a jesuit, who applied himself\nto it with such diligence, that between the years 1611 and 1627 he had\nmade fourteen hundred observations of them, which he gives an account\nof in his _Rosa Ursina_. The celebrated Galileus Galilei began also to\nobserve them about the same time that Scheinerus did; and since them,\nthe most laborious astronomers of the last and the present century, have\napplied themselves to making the same observations; so that this is a\nmatter, which at present there is not the least doubt about; and although\nsome have entertained suspicions whether these spots were in the body\nof the sun, or at a little distance from it; others have removed those\ndifficulties, by demonstrating, that they are inherent in, and exist\non, the superficies of the sun; for they not only revolve in the same\nproportion the sun does, but they most probably remain upon it during\nthe whole time it takes in making an intire revolution, which it does in\ntwenty-seven days, and they are to be seen compleat for half the time of\nthat period; which could not happen, if the spots were inferior to the\nstar.\n\nXXIII. And whether these spots are sooty or smoaky vapours, which arise\nfrom the great furnace of the sun, as some think, or are any other\ndifferent thing; it is clear, that during their continuance, the light\nand the heat of it reflected on the lower elemental regions, must be\ndiminished in proportion to the size and number of the spots; and to this\ncause may be attributed, some of the notable diminutions of the light and\nheat of the sun, which we find recorded in history, provided they were\nnot occasioned by some obstructions in the atmosphere. Mayolus tells us,\nthat in the time of the emperor Justinian, the light of the sun for the\ngreatest part of a year was so dim and faint, that it scarce exceeded\nthat of the moon; and Plutarch tells us, that at the time of the death of\nJulius C\u00e6sar, the light of the sun was equally feeble for a whole year\ntogether; which Virgil also takes notice of in the following verses of\nthe Second Book of his Georgics:\n\n    _Ille etiam extincto miseratus C\u00e6sare Romam_\n    _Tunc caput obscura nitidum ferrugine texit:_\n    _Impiaque \u00e6ternam timuerunt s\u00e6cula noctem._\n\n\nPARADOX VII.\n\n_The Rays of the Sun reflected on a Concave Body, produce a greater Heat\nin Winter than in Summer, which Heat is greater still in Proportion to\nthe coldness of the weather._\n\nSECT. VII.\n\nXXIV. The experiments to prove this, were to the admiration of all the\nby-standers, repeatedly made with the burning-glass of Mons. Villete,\nwhich we have spoken of before; and it was observed at the time of making\nthem, that by so much the more cold the burning-glass was, by so much the\nquicker and stronger was the operation of the focus; and that by so much\nthe warmer it was, by so much the more tardy and remiss were its effects.\nAmong those who read these accounts, some looked upon them as wonderful,\nand others as incredible.\n\nXXV. But with all this, the reason of the phenomenon is not very hidden.\nIt is certain, that cold condenses bodies, and that heat dilates them. It\nis also certain, that the more dense a body is, the more apt and fit it\nis to cause reflection, and that it is least so, the more lax it is. From\nthese two premises it may be clearly inferred, that the effects we have\nmentioned were things of course; but for a further explanation of this\nmatter, I will say they were so from two causes; for the burning-glass\nby being in a warm state, must consequently be less compact and hard,\nand the operations of its focus more remiss and languid. In the first\nplace, because a great portion of the rays were absorbed in the pores of\nthe metal, which had been dilated by the heat, and made no reflection at\nall. Secondly, by their being dilated, and as we may say, become more\nspungy, the concave superficies of the metal were less smooth and equal,\nfrom whence it would follow, that many rays by being obstructed in their\ndescent by some insensible prominences, would not make their reflection\nin a right line on the point of the focus. This may be better understood,\nby attending to the reflections of a ball, that is struck against a\nwall with an unequal surface; and it is a position agreed to by all the\nmathematicians who have treated of catoptrics, that light and heat in\ntheir reflections, follow exactly the same rules, that heavy bodies do.\n\nXXVI. Nor is there are any difficulty in supposing, that a body as hard\nas metal, may undergo some insensible rarefaction when it grows warm; for\nin the first place, if a very intense heat can dilate metal, so as to\nmake it break all its ligatures and become fluid, a less heat would have\nthe same effect, in proportion to the degree of it, and might dilate and\nrarefy it a little. Secondly, experience teaches us, that every sort of\nmetal is more sonorous when it is cold, than when it is warm; from whence\nit may be evidently inferred, that heat and cold do somewhat alter its\ntexture; it being certain, that upon the texture, depends its being more\nor less sonorous.\n\n\nPARADOX VIII.\n\n_A flame extending itself upwards in a pyramidical or conic form, is\noccasioned by a violence done to the flame itself._\n\nSECT. VIII.\n\nXXVII. The endeavour of the flame to ascend, is the proof which is\nvulgarly exhibited, of there being an element or sphere of fire above\nus, by those who maintain that position; but we shall shew, that this is\na very feeble proof, even admitting their own state of the case, because\nevery thing that is lighter than the fluid that surrounds it, will, if it\nis not by violence restrained from doing so, rise above it, without being\ninvited to ascend by a sphere of its own species that is aloft; and it is\nfrom hence, that flame, smoke, vapour, an infinity of elemental effluvia,\nand divers other species of things ascend, without the assistance or\nintervention of any other cause, except that of their being lighter than\nthe inferior gross air.\n\nXXVIII. To this we shall add, that there is not in the flame, the\npropensity to ascend which they suppose, and which seems to be indicated\nby its rising upwards in a conic form; for this ascent is violent,\nand not natural to the flame. We shall illustrate this paradox, by\nan experiment which my Lord Bacon mentions in the first Book of his\nCenturies. A small wax candle, fitted into an iron tube, and placed\nperpendicular in a vessel filled with spirit of wine, in which it must\nbe immersed to such a depth, that when they are both set fire to, the\nflame of the candle shall not rise higher than that of the spirit; and\nyou will see, the flame of the candle and that of the spirit being\ndistinguishable by their different colour, that the flame of the candle\nwill appear in the middle of that of the spirit, extending itself in\nbreadth, and not in a pyramidical, but a round form, that occupies four\nor five times as much space, as that which it used to occupy when burning\nin the open air. This experiment proves, that the pyramidical form which\nthe flame regularly assumes, is caused by the pressure of the air that\nsurrounds it; and this is the sentiment of the modern philosophers, who\nwithout adverting to the experiment we have mentioned, would make no\nscruple of pronouncing, that the form it assumes is a violence done the\nflame.\n\nXXIX. By this example it may be seen, that experiments, provided they\nare made with judgment, and attended to with subtil reflection, are\nthe only means by which we can attain any certain knowledge of natural\nthings; but if they are made in a lumping way, and without due attention,\nand exactness, they are the occasion of innumerable errors. Many have\narisen, from attributing to a native inclination, or intrinsic virtue of\nsome body, effects, which are only caused by the impulse of some other\nneighbouring body. Before the gravity and elasticity of the air were\ndiscovered, it was looked upon as a thing demonstrated by experience,\nthat the water\u2019s rising in the pump, was from its inclination to obstruct\nor oppose a vacuum, and now it is a thing evinced by experience, that the\nair is what impels it to that ascent.\n\n\nPARADOX IX.\n\n_In the composition of all vegetables, there is contained a portion of\nmetal._\n\nSECT. IX.\n\nXXX. This is a novelty in physics, which has not been discovered till\nof late years. Mons. Gofredy of the Academy Royal, having examined the\nashes of many different plants, found in them all, some fine particles\nthat would adhere to the load-stone; from whence he concluded, that\nthese particles were either particles of iron, or else were particles\nof the load-stone itself. But, as it was a doubt which had never yet\nbeen cleared up, whether the load-stone would not attract other metallic\nparticles, which were not part of itself, nor of iron; the Lemeries\nfather and son, made some fresh enquiries, which removed all doubts\nrespecting the matter. They with a burning-glass melted the particles\nwhich the load-stone had attracted from the ashes of the plants; which\nafter much sparkling, liquefied into the very form and substance of\nthe load-stone, and of iron also; and when grown cold, formed a lump\nof the consistence and hardness of metal. Even in honey, after it has\nbeen distilled, have been found these particles which were attractable\nby the load-stone; from whence it may be inferred, that this metallic\ncomposition, exists in, and is diffused through the most subtil juice of\nflowers and blossoms.\n\nXXXI. But, after all this had been done, it still remained to be\nascertained, whether these particles pre-existed in the plant; or were\nthe production of the fire, and the result of their calcination; which\nsecond opinion appeared the most probable, because there seems no\ndifficulty in supposing, that the fire might transmute into metal some\nof the particles of vegetables; but there appeared a very great one, in\nconjecturing that so heavy a metal as iron, could rise to the summit of\ntrees, and pervade the most subtil fibres of their leaves.\n\nXXXII. Mons. Lemeri the son cleared up this doubt, by various subtil and\ncurious experiments, which not only evinced the volatility of iron, but\nalso excited a belief, that this metal contributed greatly to promote the\nvegetation of all kinds of plants. The most remarkable experiment he made\nwas the following one. Having poured spirit of nitre upon the filings\nof iron, there succeeded a violent effervescence, which after some time\nceased, and left the metal dissolved into a red liquid; by afterwards\npouring oil of tartar per deliquium to this liquid, another fermentation\nwas excited, which went on increasing, till, at last, it formed on\nthe sides of the vessel, various subtil branches, which after all the\nsensible fermentation had ceased, continued to grow till they reached the\ntop of the vessel.\n\nXXXIII. And although the first time he made this experiment, he obtained\nonly the rude lineaments of a tree, by varying afterwards the quantity\nof the oil of tartar, till he hit upon the just proportion of it, he\nobtained a perfect metallic vegetation, and produced a tree completely\nformed, with its roots, trunks, branches, leaves, and flowers. This able\nchymist concluded from his various observations on this matter, that both\nthe volatility, and the vegetation, were owing to the filings of the\niron; for without them, he could only produce some crystalline lumps at\nthe bottom of the vessel, which he concluded proceeded from the nitre\nthat had been dissolved. Whoever is desirous of knowing more of the\nmanner and effects of these operations, may read the accounts of them in\nthe Journals of the Academy Royal, of November 1706.\n\nXXXIV. But we are not to conclude from hence, that metallic vegetation is\nonly to be produced by iron. The Abb\u00e9 Vallemont in his first volume, _on\nthe natural Curiosities and Art of Agriculture_, says, that there were\nexhibited at Paris, such like artificial metallic vegetations, produced\nfrom gold, silver, iron, and copper. But that which was the most common,\nand the most in vogue there, was the vegetation procured from silver,\nwhich the chymists called the _Tree of Diana_; and which was produced in\nthe following manner. Dissolve an ounce of silver, in two or three ounces\nof spirit of nitre. Evaporate this dissolution in a sand-heat; till\nnearly half of it is consumed. Mix the remainder in a vessel, properly\nproportioned and suited for the business, with twenty ounces of clear\nwater, and two ounces of quick-silver. By leaving this mixture afterwards\nin a state of rest for forty days, a silver tree will grow, and in that\nspace of time will be compleatly formed, very nearly resembling a natural\none, in shape and figure. Mons. Homberg, a celebrated chymist of the\nAcademy Royal, by making use of the same materials, contrived to form a\nmetallic tree in less than a quarter of an hour; the receipt for doing\nwhich, together with the physical explanation of this phenomenon, given\nby Mons. Homberg, may be seen in the Memoirs of the Academy Royal, of the\nthirteenth of November 1692.\n\nXXXV. These metallic vegetations, joined to the discovery\nbeforementioned, of our having found iron in the ashes of all sorts\nof plants, not only prove that metals may, by virtue of certain\nfermentations, be made sufficiently volatile to enable them to rise\nupwards, and pervade all the tubes through which the alimentary juices\nof plants circulate, but also make it probable, that to this metallic\nmixture, they in great measure owe their vegetation.\n\nXXXVI. This is the substance of what, in support of this paradox, I\nhave found in the Works of the before-quoted philosophers; to which I\nshall add a conjecture of my own, which appears to me very efficacious\nto render credible, the formal existence of particles of iron, or\nload-stone, in all vegetables whatever; whether they are of load-stone,\nor iron, makes very little difference, as all experimental philosophers\nare agreed, that load-stone is nothing else but a fat or rich vein of\niron.\n\nXXXVII. My conjecture is founded on a theory, which is embraced\nat present by all the mathematicians, and confirmed by conclusive\nreasonings, which are founded on the earth being endued with a magnetic\nvirtue. The truth of this theory, is proved by innumerable observations.\nIt has been found, that the magnetic needle poised in equilibrio,\naccommodates itself to the meridian of the earth, in the same manner the\nload-stone does, that is, it does not point to the poles of the heavens,\nbut to those of the earth; for it has been observed in the northern\nregions, that it does not appear to elevate or point towards the pole\nof the heavens, but rather seems to depress, or point down towards that\nof the earth; and generally, in all, and every particular, the magnetic\nneedle has been found to be affected in the same proportions with respect\nto the terraqueous poles, that it is with respect to the load-stone. The\nvarious declinations that it is liable to, from the pole of the earth,\nin different places, cannot be attributed to any other cause, than\nthat of the unequal magnetism, of the terraqueous globe in different\nregions; and the different declinations of the poles of the load-stone\nare attributed to the unequal magnetism or perfection of the parts of\nthe stone. It has been found, that the earth itself, can communicate\nthe magnetic virtue to iron; for if you take a bar of iron red-hot from\nthe forge, and place it perpendicular in the earth, and there let it\nremain till it becomes cold, it will manifestly acquire the magnetic\nvirtue; and if it is afterwards poised in equilibrio, it will point to\nthe poles of the earth, in the same manner as if it had been touched by a\nload-stone. It will also acquire the same virtue, if it has remained for\nmany years in a perpendicular position, without its having been placed\nso in the earth red-hot; and the same has been experienced with respect\nto bars, that have been set before windows in an upright position. The\nsame effect will also be produced, by laying a hot bar upon the ground,\nexactly in a north and south direction, till it gets cold; but if it is\nso laid without being previously heated, and suffered to continue in that\nposition for several years together, it will be found to be impregnated\nwith the magnetic virtue. Whoever is desirous of seeing an account of\nthese observations more at large, and to satisfy himself how they evince\nthe magnetical quality of the earth, should read the mathematical authors\nwho treat of the load-stone, and he will find, that all the modern ones\nmake some remarks upon that particular.\n\nXXXVIII. This magnetic property of the terraqueous globe being admitted,\nit may be inferred from it, that excepting the exterior crust of the\nearth, which is composed of such heterogeneous parts, as are necessary\nfor the growth and increase of the various productions and mixtures with\nwhich it abounds, all the rest, is nothing else, but a solid quarry of\nload-stone; and this is the opinion that is strenuously maintained by\nsome; although there are others, who think that the magnetic virtue, is\ndistributed through all the parts of the terraqueous globe.\n\nXXXIX. Both these opinions may be right, for they do not seem\nincompatible one with another; but in favour of the second, which is\nthat which conduces best to support my sentiment, we may urge another\ncelebrated piece of experience, which evinces efficaciously, that this\nvery exterior earth which we touch and stand on, is impregnated with many\ninsensible particles of load-stone or iron; and this is manifest, from\nthe earth itself being endued with this magnetic virtue, or inclination\nof pointing to the pole; for bricks that are made from it, and are well\nburned and purged or freed from all foreign humour or moisture, and\nespecially if they are made long and narrow, by being touched with\na load-stone will acquire the virtue of pointing to the poles; and\nthey will even acquire it without being touched, if they are laid in a\nnorth and south position, and suffered to continue so for many years\ntogether. (See Father Dechales, lib. 1 & 2, de Magnete.) It being then\ncertain, that this quality of pointing to the pole, is peculiar to the\nload-stone, or the iron, and incommunicable to all other substances, it\nmust evidently be inferred from this property in the bricks, that the\nvery earth we touch and stand upon, is impregnated with particles of\nload-stone or iron. All vegetables then receiving their nourishment from\nthe earth, it is not wonderful that there should be found in them all,\nsome of these particles.\n\nXL. I would recommend it to those who take delight in philosophy, to\nendeavour to inform themselves, whether it is not probable, that all\nother mixtures are impregnated with these particles; for if that should\nbe found to be the case, we should discover the cause of the descent of\nheavy bodies; for there being in the earth the magnetic virtue, and in\nall other mixtures particles of iron, in spite of all our endeavours to\nseparate them, they always would be brought together again by attraction.\nBut as he who is a lover of the truth, should conceal no objection that\nmay be made to any supposition that he advances, I will not dissemble,\nthat I find a terrible one against this idea of mine; which is, that\naccording to this system, iron should be heavier than gold; for although\nwe should admit, that some iron, or magnetic particles are mixed with\nthe gold, it is not credible, that the quantity of them should be equal\nto those in the iron itself; for if that was the case, the load-stone\nwould attract the gold, as it does the iron. But whether there is in the\nterraqueous globe, another attractive quality distinct in kind from that\nof the load-stone, in virtue of which, all bodies may be disposed to\napproach it which we call heavy, by having in themselves a propensity to\ndo it correspondent to that there is between the load-stone and the iron,\nis very difficult to be proved.\n\n\n\n\nON SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\nSECT. I.\n\nI. There is so great a latitude in scepticism, and its gradations are so\ndifferent, that according to the various extension that is given to the\nmeaning of the word, it is used to describe the most extravagant error,\nand the most prudent mode of philosophizing. Rigid scepticism is a wild\ndelirium, moderate is prudent caution. But those who in this age, have\nundertaken to combat the moderate sceptics, have either from ignorance\nor malice, confounded them with the rigid. When I reflect how gross a\nthing ignorance must be in such a case, it makes me think they acted from\nmalice, and when I consider how detestable a thing malice is, it makes me\nconclude what they did was through ignorance.\n\nII. Although the Greek word _scepsis_, from whence sceptic and scepticism\nare derived, signifies inquisition, investigation, and speculation,\ncustom has in a great measure altered the meaning of the term; on\nwhich account, sceptical at this day, implies doubt, or doubting; and\nscepticism, that particular avowal which sceptics make of doubting,\nor withholding their assent to all matters, that are liable to be\ncontroverted or disputed.\n\nIII. This doubt or suspension of assent, may be more or less rational,\nin proportion to the greater or less extent that is given to it, or\naccording to the matters to which it relates. Thus, although doubting of\nmany things would be prudence, doubting of all would be madness.\n\n\nSECT. II.\n\nIV. And although authors commonly represent to us, some subtil\nphilosophers of antiquity, as obstinately persisting in suspending their\nassent to every thing that was proposed to them, and which was evident\nboth to their reason, and their senses, and likewise represent them, as\nearned defenders of universal scepticism, to which opinion they refuse to\nadmit of the least exception; yet for all this, it is very doubtful to\nme, whether these were their real sentiments; and I am rather inclined to\nthink, they did it, to shew their ingenuity, and to display their talent\nfor disputing; or that from some other motive, they spoke differently\nfrom what they thought. The most famous among this tribe, were\nArchesilaus, Carneades, and Pyrrho. But the first, if we believe Sextus\nEmpericus, was in reality a Platonist, and only a sceptic in appearance;\nwhose method it was, always to dispute problematically upon every thing\nin public, but was ever careful to suggest in private, to such of his\ndisciples as he found were the most capable, the Platonic doctrine.\nCicero says, that his zeal for contesting every thing that was advanced\nby his school-fellow and rival Zeno, carried him to the dangerous\nextreme, of endeavouring, although it was against the conviction of his\nown mind, to refute whatever was advanced by Zeno. We may add to this,\nthat according to the testimony of Diogenes Laertius, Archesilaus never\nwent to the extreme of doubting the evidence of his senses, but rather\ntreated with contempt and derision, those who carried scepticism to that\nlength.\n\nV. Carneades was a most subtil philosopher, and so eminent as an orator,\nthat Cicero in various parts of his works speaks of him with admiration\nand envy; and assures us, that by the keenness of his ingenuity, and\nthe fertile torrent of his elocution, he could persuade his hearers to\nbelieve whatever he thought fit, and Quintilian, and Numenius, declare\nthe same; and it is probable, that his propensity for disputation, and\nhis ambition of shewing his ingenuity, excited him to contest the most\nestablished axioms; which together with his affecting to distrust the\nevidence of his senses, made him pass for a rigorous sceptic. But we may\nventure to assert, that if an historical anecdote which is related of him\nby Numenius is to be credited, Carneades believed his eyes as much as any\nman living; for having surprized a concubine of his in the embraces of\nhis beloved disciple Mentor, he was so offended at his treachery, that he\nbroke with him for ever, and excluded him from being the successor to his\nacademy. How happened it then, that like a good sceptic, he did not doubt\nwhether the representation of that obscenity, might not be a _deceptio\nvisus_? I for my own part am inclined to think, that there never yet was\na sceptic in the world, who after the exhibition of such evidence, could\nmaintain his heart and his mind in a state of suspence.\n\nVI. It is commonly said of Pyrrho, who was by so much the most famous\nof all the sceptics, that he in a manner obscured the others, by giving\nhis name to the system of universal doubt, which at this day is called\nPyrrhonism, and the sectaries of it Pyrrhonists; and he was so positive\nin maintaining, that we should suspend our opinion, with respect to all\nwe saw, or felt, that he would not turn the least aside, to avoid being\nrun over by a mad horse, or bit by a mad dog; nor would he slacken his\npace, although he was warned that he was advancing near the edge of a\nprecipice; and that he would have perished a thousand times by these\ndangers, if his friends, who were attentive to his safety, had not\nprevented his running headlong into them. But although this account of\nhim is much vulgarized, I do not know whether any other antient author,\nexcept Antigonus Carystius, a Greek historian, who was contemporary with,\nor lived very nearly in the days of Pyrrho, has vouched the truth of it;\nat least the learned La Mothe de la Vayer, quotes him as the only author,\nwho attests the relation; and it is even doubtful whether Antigonus\nCarystius asserts the thing positively, because in the _Pr\u00e6parat. Evang.\nlib. 14. cap. 18._ of Eusebius, we find this author quoted for a fact,\nwhich contradicts that relation; which is, that Pyrrho, when a dog was\nonce about to run at him, climbed up a tree to get out of his way, and\navoid the danger. Upon which occasion, those who were present, raillied\nhim upon the difference there was between his doctrine and his practice.\n\nVII. But let Antigonus Carystius, who is an author I have not seen,\nor any other whatever, say what they will, to give sanction to this\nrelation, we may without the apprehension of being accused of injustice,\ncondemn as incredible, the account of Pyrrho\u2019s having carried his\nextravagance to such a length. This philosopher lived to the age of\nninety, and through the whole course of so long a life, it is not\nprobable, he should always have friends at his elbow, ready to save\nhim from the many dangers, to which a man of so rash a conduct must\nunavoidably have been very frequently exposed, and especially, in the\nlong voyage he made to India to consult the Gymnosophists. Diogenes\nLaertius, who is the person that gives us the account of the great age to\nwhich Pyrrho lived, and of his voyage to India, assures us, that Pyrrho\nled a very solitary and retired life, which is not very compatible with\nhis having always been attended by his friends, nor is it reasonable\nto conclude, that a man who was so very ridiculous as he is described\nto have been, could have very many, or very sincere ones. Finally, the\ncitizens of Elis, his countrymen, elected him the high priest of their\nreligion. Now how is it credible, that they should have confided such an\nemployment to a person, who if his scepticism had been carried to the\nlength we have mentioned, they must certainly have looked upon as a mad\nman? From this circumstance, it may also be inferred, that the charge of\nimpiety, which was generally imputed to him, was an unjust one; because\nhis countrymen would hardly have elected him the supreme minister of\ntheir religion, if they had known that he professed to be of no religion\nat all, and that he doubted the existence of a deity. What devotion or\nzeal could they expect for the service of the temple, from a man, who\neither was ignorant of, or doubted whether the object of their worship\nexisted?\n\n\nSECT. III.\n\nVIII. I not only think, that these philosophers did not in their hearts,\nadopt the system of universal doubt; but I also believe, there never was\nany one who sincerely did it; because there are objects, with respect to\nwhich, there can be no doubt but by implication. No one, for example, can\ndoubt of his own existence. The very act of doubting, is affirmative of\na certain knowledge, because he who doubts, must certainly be convinced\nthat he does doubt; and if the sceptics are not certain that they\ndoubt, how can they affirm they do with such obstinacy and stiffness?\nTherefore we should conclude, that it is not from sentiment, but from\ntheir fondness for disputation, that some of them defend the system of\nuniversal scepticism; and if there ever was any one who truly assented\nto it, we should not consider him as a philosopher, but as a lunatic;\nfor it would be improper to call maintaining such a system, a particular\nmode of philosophizing, as we ought with more justice, to term it a\nparticular mode of raving.\n\nIX. It is most likely then, that the most rigid sceptics, and those who\nwere truly and _bona fide_ such, admitted of some exceptions to the\nuniversality of their system, or understood it in some determined sense,\nwhich limited or restrained it. Socrates, whom some look upon as the\nprimitive father of the sceptics, said of himself, that he knew nothing\nwith certainty, except it was his ignorance of all things. This however,\nwas placing some sort of limitation to the system, although it was but a\nvery small one. But I am of opinion, that Socrates, who was a very modest\nman, only meant to say, that what he knew amounted to but a small matter,\nand that therefore we ought to understand his declaring himself totally\nignorant, as an hyperbolical expression. Saint Justin the martyr, and\nother fathers who highly applauded that philosopher, would not have done\nit, if they had taken him for a rigid sceptic, which would have amounted\nto the same, as his having been an impious man; because it is evident,\nthat he who doubts of every thing, cannot be a person of any religious\nprinciples; but he was so far from such a kind of man, that it is most\nprobable, the Athenians condemned him to death, because he affirmed the\nexistence of one only God. It is at least certain, that he treated the\nmultifarious number of the heathen gods with great derision; from whence\nwe should conclude, that he knew this important truth, that the Godhead\nadmits of no multiplication.\n\nX. Other sceptics, who said that they doubted of every thing, and that\nwe ought to doubt of every thing, did not perhaps mean to exclude all\ncertainty, but only scientific and demonstrative certainty, which except\nin mathematical cases, we must confess is very rare to be found. Even\nmany mathematical demonstrations, and especially those which are very\ncomplicated, are not exempt from the suspicion, of there being some\noccult fallacy contained in them, on which account they ceased to be\ntrue demonstrations. How many have presumed to demonstrate they could\nsquare the circle, whose modes of doing it, and their reasonings upon\nthe subject, when they came to be submitted to rigorous examination,\nhave been found to have some sophism involved in them, or to have been\nbuilt upon some supposition which was taken for certain, when in reality\nit was not so. The geometrical demonstrations, with which they prove\nthe infinite divisibility of the continued quantity, are sufficiently\nsimple; notwithstanding which, there are authors, who because the\ninfinite divisibility of the quantity is imperceptible, suspect, that\nthere is some occult sophistry involved in those demonstrations.\n\nXI. Others have refused to credit the evidence of their senses; but\nnot so grossly, but that they have condescended to make use of them to\ndirect their actions in the common affairs of civil and human life. They\ngovern themselves by them for the purpose of living, but not for that of\nphilosophizing. The information of their senses serves them to chuse the\nuseful, and avoid the pernicious, but not to determine the theory of an\nobject.\n\nXII. The arguments they assign for this distrust of their senses in the\nlast instance, may be reduced to three. The first is, the distinction we\nshould admit between the impression which objects make on our senses, and\nthe absolute essence or quality contained in the objects themselves. For\nexample, we say that hemlock is bitter. If by this expression, we mean to\ndeclare, that this herb makes on our palate a determined impression or\nsensation, which we call bitterness, we speak properly; but if we mean\nto say that the herb in itself contains an absolute quality, which we\ndescribe by the same name, we speak improperly; for if this was the case,\nall the animals who relish hemlock would find it bitter; but it happens\notherwise, for the goats are fond of it, and eat it greedily. In the same\nmanner do all those reason, who adopt this mode of arguing with respect\nto all other sensible species. They say, the fire produces in us that\nkind of impression, which we call heat; but that we ought not from thence\nto conclude, that it is hot in itself. Thus although by approaching very\nnear to it, it produces pain in us, still it is not sensible of any\nitself. Therefore we ought not for this reason, to say the fire contains\npain, it being at most only capable of occasioning pain; neither ought\nwe to call it hot, but only capable of producing heat; nor can we call\nit hot but by equivocation, as we say, Medicine is healthy, because it\nproduces health in the animal.\n\nXIII. This distinction is the fundamental maxim, by which the modern\nphilosophers maintain their rejection of all the sensible qualities,\nwhich are assigned by Aristotle and his followers to objects; and they\ncarry the matter so far, that they will positively assert to you, that\nneither snow is white, nor charcoal black, nor a bell sonorous, nor a\nflower fragrant; and if you mean to express by these denominations,\nintrinsic qualities, or such as proceed from some accidental intrinsic\nform contained in objects; they will not allow such descriptions of\nthings to be good and valid, but only so far as they signify certain\ndetermined impressions, which by means of the physical and corporeal\nimpulse of the insensible particles of matter, are made on our organs,\nwhich are of the same use to us, to enable us to chuse the good, and\navoid the pernicious, as our knowledge of the real intrinsic forms would\nbe. They proceed to assert, that men would equally abstain from eating\narsenic, if they believed the moderns, who say this mineral kills by\ndissolving the blood, by the rapid motion of its particles; as they\nwould by believing Aristotle, who imputes all the mischief it occasions\nto be the effect of a venomous quality existing in the arsenic, and\nthat they would be equally anxious to acquire gold, by believing the\nmoderns, who say its brilliant yellow hue is the effect of a determined\nimpression made by the light on the retina, where it appears reflected\nin that colour, from the particular texture of the insensible particles\nof the gold, as they would, by believing Aristotle, who says, the colour\nproceeds from an accidental form, inherent in the gold itself. I know\nvery well, that a learned philosopher said, a little while ago, that\nthe ladies had great reason to complain of Descartes, for having taken\nfrom their faces that delicate smooth whiteness which makes them look so\ntempting, and for having placed it in their admirer\u2019s eyes. But although\nthis may do very well as a joke, it is certain, that the charm has an\nequal effect to make them appear desirable, whether it is stamped on the\neyes, by the particular reflection, which, by the determined texture of\nthe insensible particles of the skin, is made by the light, or whether\nit is produced by the intrinsic quality, which the Aristotelicans assign\nas the cause of colours; and I much doubt, whether to this day, the\nCarthesian philosophy has served any man as a preservative, against the\nvenom of that sweet poison, which we call beauty.\n\n\nSECT. IV.\n\nXIV. The second reason assigned for distrusting the evidence of our\nsenses, is the experience we have of the alterations which are produced\non sensible species, either by the interposition of a medium, or the\ndifferent dispositions of our organs. The species, which by passing\nthrough a uniform, or homogeneous medium, appears straight, by being\npassed through a different one, will seem crooked, as may be evinced by\npassing a straight wand from the air through water, which, by virtue\nof the refraction of rays produced in its passage from one element to\nthe other, will make it appear crooked. To him who has a jaundice, every\nthing he looks at seems yellow; and although it is true, that this is\nthe effect of a preternatural accident, we are not certain, whether\nabstracted from all morbific dispositions, there are not in various\nindividuals, different temperaments and configuration of parts, which\nare capable of producing different sensations with respect to the same\nobject; and it seems most probable, from all that is evident and manifest\nto our observation and experience, that the thing is so, for we don\u2019t\nsee any one individual, who is perfectly and exactly like another; and\nwe have known men, whose right eyes have represented objects, both with\nrespect to colour and magnitude, different from their left.\n\n\nSECT. V.\n\nXV. The third ground for the said distrust, is derived from the erroneous\nrepresentation of things made by the imaginary faculty, which fancies\nexternal sensations of objects that do not exist. Such, for example,\nas the imagination of him who has had a leg cut off, representing to\nhim a pain in the leg or foot that has been amputated; or that of an\nhypocondriac person, who fancies himself to be glass, earthen ware, a\nwolf, or a dog, whose imagination represents those strange forms, as\nevidently and manifestly palpable to his senses; so that he who fancies\nhimself glass, will swear with invincible firmness, that he perceives in\nhis own person the transparency, and feels on his own skin the smooth\nsurface, which is proper and peculiar to that artificial composition.\n\nXVI. This error is common to all men in their wanderings when they are\nasleep; because he who dreams, believes he perceives those objects with\nhis senses, which he only perceives with his imagination; and from hence,\nthe rigid sceptics deduce a most pernicious argument, by way of proving,\nthat we should doubt of every thing; because they say no man can be\npositively certain, whether he is asleep or awake; according to which\nmode of reasoning, no one can be certain, whether he sees, hears, or\ntouches any thing whatever; for notwithstanding his having the greatest\nconfidence that he is awake, it is possible that he may be sleeping; and\nthat the things which are represented to him as seen, heard, &c. are all\nimaginary. For example, I consider myself as now writing, and reading\nwhat I write. But what certainty have I that I am writing and reading?\nHave not I dreamed a thousand times, that I was reading and writing? And\nat those times, such occupations appeared to me, not as things that I was\ndreaming of, but as exercises that I was really and actually practising;\nand therefore, that may be the case with me at present.\n\nXVII. I have said already, and with reason, that this argument is a most\npernicious and dangerous one; for whatever answer you make to it, your\nadversary turns upon you, and urges the opposite opinion as forcibly,\nas you can support your reply. At least I have never seen any solution\nof this matter, which could more or less vanquish the force of the\ndifficulty. It has been objected to this sort of reasoning, that the\nargument proves too much, and tends to involve in, and reduce to the\nsame state of doubt, all the sacred dogmas of religion. This remark is a\njust one, for he who comes to doubt, whether all he hears or sees is not\na mere imaginary representation, must necessarily doubt of the reality\nof all the instruction he has received, both with respect to religion,\nand every other matter. But what advantage shall we gain, by insisting\nupon this against a sceptic, whose intention perhaps is to destroy all\nreligion? And although he should not argue with this depraved view, but\nshould reply to these objections out of wantonness, or from motives of\nvanity and ostentation, and a fondness of shewing his parts, it would be\nwasting time to dispute with him, or to press the argument, because these\ninstances, notwithstanding they are good ones and may be fairly insisted\non, are not answers.\n\nXVIII. It is certain there are some truths, that maugre the clearness and\nconfidence with which the understanding assents to them, are not exempt\nfrom being exposed to difficult objections; or to speak more properly,\nthere is no truth whatever, be it ever so firmly established, against\nwhich, some sophistical objection may not be raised. It would therefore\nnot be right upon all occasions, to give up a maxim, whose truth we\nclearly perceive and are convinced of, only because we can\u2019t reply to\nevery argument that may be urged against it. There are truths of such\na nature, that although they would strike, and be clear to any man of\nordinary understanding, still, the giving an answer to every objection\nthat could be raised against them, might possibly be found a difficult\ntask to a person of very subtil ingenuity. And notwithstanding we should\nnot be able to hit upon an argument, that would confront or silence those\nwhich are used by the sceptics, to persuade us to doubt whether we are\nsleeping or waking, we should not abandon ourselves to such a doubt, but\nsupport ourselves in a firm confidence, that we are not mistaken with\nrespect to the state we are in. And in truth, the arguments used to make\nus doubt of it, are not of such a nature, as that a clear, solid, and\nunembarrassed answer may not be given to them.\n\nXIX. And in order to do this, I shall begin with supposing, that evidence\nin this case may be of two sorts, mediate, and immediate. An evident\nproposition, supported by immediate evidence, is, when without the\nassistance of any kind of proof, it presents itself so clearly to our\nunderstandings, that the mind is constrained by invincible necessity to\nassent to it. An evident proposition supported by mediate evidence, is,\nwhen of itself, it is not represented to our understandings with all\nthis clearness, but is necessarily inferred from some other self-evident\nproposition.\n\nXX. I will suppose, secondly, that immediate evidence should be divided,\ninto metaphysical and experimental. The first is governed by universal\nprinciples, which of themselves persuade or convince the understanding;\nsuch as these, the whole is greater than a part; two contradictory\npropositions can\u2019t be both true at one and the same time. Experimental\nevidence is derived from certain singular truths, which strike every\nindividual with infallible conviction; such as these, that I at present\nhave such or such a desire, or that I think of such or such a thing, that\nI suffer some pain, or that I am affected with some particular sensation;\nfor example, joy, sadness, or anger.\n\nXXI. That every individual feels this experimental evidence in some\nparticular instances, no one can doubt, and even if any person, by\ngiving to his scepticism all imaginable extension, should be desirous of\ndoubting of every thing, he could never stifle the experimental evidence\nthat he doubted. And here I can\u2019t help remarking, that experimental\nevidence is a thing of such moment to the Carthesians, that all their\nmetaphysical testimonies depend on, or are derived from it; because, from\nthat first maxim or proposition, I think, is inferred immediately, the\nproof of their own existence; and mediately, all the other demonstrable\ntruths, are established upon experimental evidence only.\n\nXXII. It is also certain, that from the truths which are established\nupon experimental evidence, you can deduce no demonstrative reasoning;\nor at least of that sort, which the logicians call _\u00e0 priori_. The\nreason is, because they are evident of themselves, or else are supported\nby immediate evidence, and are not dependant upon any other thing\nfrom whence they are inferred. Therefore, although for example, I at\npresent am convinced that I am desirous of eating such or such a thing,\nI cannot persuade any other person that I fancy it, by any immediate\ndemonstration; because this is evident to me, not from any principle\nthat is notorious to all mankind, and from whence may be inferred\nthe existence of such a desire; but because the appetite itself, is\nintimately connected with my spirit, and I feel it so forcibly, that\nI cannot doubt of its existence: the same thing happens in the cases\nof those truths, which are established upon immediate metaphysical\nevidence. If I should be asked, how I know that the whole is greater\nthan one of its parts, I should answer, that I do not know it from any\nprinciple from whence it may be inferred, but because the truth, _that\nthe whole is larger than a part_, is so clearly evident to my mind, that\nit is as incompatible with doubt, as the light of the sun with midnight\ndarkness. If any one should deny to me, the truth of the maxim, that\ntwo contradictory propositions cannot be both true at the same time, it\nwould be impossible for me to prove the truth of the maxim, either by\narguments deduced _\u00e0 priori_, or _\u00e0 posteriori_. The reason is plain,\nbecause if I was to argue the point, the most I could do, would be\ninsisting on the manifest contradiction, and asserting the impossibility\nof the thing, which is the last resource of logical dialect. But observe,\nwhen we are got thus far, my adversary, to act consistently with his\nfirst caprice, thinks fit to change his ground, and to admit both\nextremes of the contradiction, and to insist they are both true. Now how,\nin this case, am I to prove that they cannot be so? Why I can do it by no\nother means, than by having recourse to the axiom, that it is impossible\ntwo contradictory propositions can be both true at the same time. But\nthis is begging the question from the beginning, and proving what is\ndenied, by the same proposition which is the subject of the dispute.\n\nXXIII. The suppositions we have just made, contain all the solutions we\nare capable of giving, to the above argument. I say then, that I myself,\nand I say the same of all others, who are in my present situation and\ncircumstances, have experimental Evidence that I am now awake: because\nthe state of wakefulness, which consists, in the intimate and ultimate\ndisposition of the faculties to exercise themselves in proper operations,\nis an object, which presents itself to my mind, with such clearness,\nthat if I was never so desirous of doing it, I cannot entertain a doubt\nof my being at present in that state; nor can any other reason be\nrequired of me, nor can I give any other, for assenting to this truth;\nneither can I for my assent to a first principle, give any other than the\nbeforementioned, nor alledge any other, to explain the existence of any\nreflection, which my soul is at present intent upon.\n\nXXIV. I will not however dissemble, that after this answer is given,\nthere still remains a serious difficulty to surmount, which may be\nstated in the following manner. The experimental evidence, from whence\nwe deduce this persuasion, is fallacious; because when we sleep and\ndream, we are under the same persuasion that we are awake, and our senses\nthen represent to us, that we are engaged in actual exercises in such a\nmanner, that if it was at that time to occur to us, to make reflection\nupon what we were doing, we should conceive, that we had experimental\nevidence of our speaking, seeing, hearing, &c. Therefore the idea that\nI now entertain upon reflection, that I have at present experimental\nevidence of my being at this instant awake, and engaged in study and\nwriting, affords me no absolute certainty that I am not asleep, or that I\nam actually so employed.\n\nXXV. This is the utmost extent to which the matter of doubting can be\ncarried. But by way of answer to it, I shall reply, that the persuasion\nwe have of being awake when we are dreaming, differs greatly from that\nwe have of being awake, when we actually are so. This last is a clear,\nfirm, determined, invincible persuasion, and such a one, as is required\nto constitute experimental evidence of the certainty of the fact; which\nit does in such a manner, that notwithstanding all the reflections we\ncan make, and all the doubts and difficulties we can suggest, our assent\nto, and persuasion of the truth of it, remains firm and unshaken. On\nthe contrary, when we are dreaming, our reflection is obscure, and the\npersuasion produced in consequence of it, feeble and wavering; which\nwill evidently appear to be the case, if in the course of our dreaming,\nit should occur to us to make a doubtful reflection, whether what our\nimagination represents to us is reality, or only a dream; and the result\nto a man who was to do this would be, a faint and doubtful determination\nof whether he actually dreams, or only believes he is dreaming, and he\nwould remain in a state of doubt, whether what his fancy represents to\nhim be real or not. I say in all these cases, his decision of the matter,\nwould not be resolute and firm, but wavering and languid. This doubt of\nwhether I am asleep or not, often occurs to me in dreams, which never\nfails to produce one of the two following effects, either to certify to\nme that I am dreaming, or to make me suspend my assent to the fact. And I\nwill venture to assure any one, who shall persist for a few moments, in\nproposing these doubts to himself when he is dreaming, that he will find\nthe same thing happen to him.\n\nXXVI. We may make use of the same reasoning, if the argument is applied to\nthe deliriums of maniacs. Every man, who after having been deprived of\nhis reason, comes to be restored to his senses, finds a great difference\nwith respect to the persuasions he feels, and the clearness of the\nopinions he forms in a state of sanity, and those he entertained when he\nwas mad. Mad people seldom make any reflections, either on the state of\ntheir mind, or the subject of their madness; and when they do happen to\nmake them, are generally more or less blinded by their apprehensions; of\nwhich I myself have known some instances; and it has fallen in my way, by\nthe force of lively representations, first to prevail on some mad people\nto doubt of the truth of their apprehensions, and afterwards to reason\nthem out of them; among whom there was a nun, who had been exceedingly\nmad for some years, and whose life was thought to be in danger,\nalthough in reality it was not so; and I being called to administer the\nsacraments to her, was so happy as to reduce her mind to a state of\ncalmness, that rendered her capable of receiving them as a penitent. This\nI accomplished, by using various reasonings and arguments, tending to\nundeceive her, and at last was so fortunate as to hit upon one, adapted\nto the nature of her disease, and the state of her mind, which had its\neffect: but in doing this, great attention should be had to the tone of\nthe voice, and the energy and vivacity of the looks, and care should be\ntaken, that every action should be such, as is likely to give efficacy\nand force to the arguments you use, in order that they should make an\nimpression on their minds; great caution should also be used not to\nirritate them; and by these means, they are often brought to intervals\nof sense; and although it is true, that they seldom last long, still the\ngaining an hour of calm reason, is a matter of great importance, as it\nwas in the case of the nun we have just mentioned.\n\nXXVII. The delicacy and curiosity of this subject, has caused me to dwell\non it longer than was necessary; for I am so far from apprehending, that\nthe arguments which are used in support of universal scepticism, will\nprevail with, or have any weight on the world in general, that I do not\nbelieve there ever yet was a man, who in reality was convinced by them.\n\n\nSECT. VI.\n\nXXVIII. The limitations with which rigid scepticism may be mitigated, are\ninnumerable; consequently, scepticism will appear more or less absurd,\naccording to the various exceptions with which it is corrected; but this\nis a matter of such extent, that to reason upon it with any degree of\nprecision would fill a large volume. I shall therefore proceed to treat\nof scepticism, as confined within the line of physics, which is the\npoint, to which I proposed at first to restrain my arguments on this\nsubject.\n\n\nSECT. VII.\n\nXXIX. I have always wondered, and do not yet cease to wonder, at seeing\nmodern philosophers attack scepticism as a physical error, and am much\nastonished, to find them condemn it in that sense as an error, dangerous\nto the dogmas of faith. Nor can I comprehend, how such a charge can\narise, otherwise, than from gross ignorance or malicious spite; unless it\nis applied to some sceptic, who from explaining himself loosely, may have\ngiven occasion for such an imputation.\n\nXXX. The system of physical scepticism, asserts, that physical and\nnatural things, do not admit of demonstration or scientific certainty,\nbut that they are all matter of opinion; and consequently, that we should\nnot call natural philosophy a science, because strictly speaking it is\nnot one, but rather a habit, or acquired facility, of reasoning with\nprobability upon natural things. We shall understand science in this\nplace, in the sense which Aristotle and the schoolmen understand it,\nwho define it, _to be an evident knowledge of the effect by the cause_.\nBut in our definitions, we shall not exclude experimental certainty,\nor certain knowledge, acquired by the experience we have had, and the\nobservations we have made, of physical matters; but we shall rather\nmaintain it, as the only method by which we can arrive at attaining\ntruth; although I doubt whether we shall ever attain by it, a discovery\nof the internal, or intimate nature of things.\n\nXXXI. Neither will we deny, that with respect to physical objects, many\npropositions may be advanced or supported, which are deducible with\ninfallible certainty from metaphysical principles: as for example from\nthis, _the whole is greater than its part_, is evidently inferred, that\na man is bigger than his head; and from this, _being is the effect of\noperation_, is inferred, that my father existed when he begot me. But\nthese, and other innumerable demonstrations of this sort, afford no\nphysical knowledge whatever; because they do not manifest in any degree,\neither great or small, the nature of the very entities which are the\nobjects of them. Why do I say manifest the nature of the entities? They\ndo not even display to the understanding, a single truth, which may not\nbe comprehended without their help, by the most rustic man upon earth.\nSo that the syllogistical conclusions upon infallible truths, which the\nschool philosophers so much boast of, do nothing more, than explain\nby circumlocution and in terms of art, the very things, which may be\nimmediately comprehended, and naturally explained, by any rational\nman who never studied. Further, how can they call by the name of\ndemonstrations, things which demonstrate nothing? that is, they manifest\nnothing, but what was manifest without their assistance. A logician will\nsay, thinking he says something to the purpose, that he knows by means\nof the art of demonstration, that which he could not know artificially\nwithout this aid. But I answer, that this artificial knowledge is\ntotally useless, because it neither manifests to me any one truth of\nwhich I was before ignorant, nor does it illustrate to me with greater\nclearness, the things I was before acquainted with; it being certain,\nthat it is as evident and clear to the rustic, and that he assents with\nas much firmness, that the whole tree is bigger than one of its branches,\nwithout the help of artificial logic, as I do, assisted with my whole\narmory of syllogisms. If a learned person, should undertake to instruct a\nman who walks well, and with a good grace, by explaining to him all the\nlaws of motion, to step scientifically; and also, by explaining to him\nthe number and use of the muscles, should teach him the application of\nthose laws to every member of his body concerned in that exercise; should\nnot we be apt to say, that besides his taking a very tedious one, he had\nalso taken a very needless trouble, it being certain, that his pupil,\nafter all this pains, would not walk a jot better, if so well as he did\nbefore; the cases are similar.\n\n\nSECT. VIII.\n\nXXXII. The thing then being understood, in the sense we have explained\nit, the conclusion I draw from the premises is, that science, or\nscientific certainty is not to be found in physics. Doctor Martinez, in\nthe second volume of his _Medicina Sceptica_, (Convers. 27.) proves this\nconclusion abundantly, both by the authority of scripture, and by the\nsentences of many fathers; though as the works of this author are easily\nto be met with, I shall not here insert the authorities he quotes, but\nshall content myself with adding to them two very remarkable ones that\nhe has omitted. The first is, that of my father St. Bernard (in Cant.\nCantic. Serm. XXXIII.), who when he is speaking of philosophers, says,\n_Vagi sunt, nulla stabiles certitudine veritatis, semper discentes,\net nunquam ad scientiam veritatis pervenientes._ And it is somewhat\nremarkable, that the Saint says further, philosophers never arrive at\nattaining a certain knowledge of the very truths they themselves are\nin search of, and are desirous of teaching to other people: _semper\ndiscentes_; and lest some should conclude he spoke of supernatural\ntruths, I thought it necessary to hint here, that these are not the\nobjects of philosophical inquiries. Neither should we suppose, that he\nspoke of the moral philosophers, because many of these, even including\nthe Gentiles, investigated many truths, that came within the compass of\ntheir plan, with intire certainty; and it is evident, that if Aristotle,\nhad written with as much precision upon physics, as he did upon ethics,\nwe needed not to have wished for any thing better.\n\nXXXIII. The second authority, is that of Lactantius Firmianus, an\nillustrious person, and a venerable member of the church; this great\nman (Lib. III. Divin. Instit. Cap. iv. v. and vi.) treats largely of\nthe scepticism of Archesilaus, of whom we have spoken before, and after\ncombating and confronting this philosopher effectually on the subject of\nuniversal doubt, admits without reserve, that he would have been right,\nif he had limited his scepticism to matters of physics, because there is\nnot, nor ever can be any science, which will teach mankind, the causes\nand reasons of natural things: _Quanto faceret sapientius, ac verius, si\nexceptione facta diceret causas, rationesque duntaxat rerum c\u00e6lestium,\nseu naturalium, quia sunt abdit\u00e6, nec sciri posse, quia nullus doceat,\nnec qu\u00e6ri opportere, quia inveniri qu\u00e6rendo non possunt_.\n\nXXXIV. Some of the sceptics themselves prove our conclusion, for they\nsay, that the things appertaining to physics are singular, and that\nfrom singular things you cannot derive a science. But this reason does\nnot satisfy me. In the first place, notwithstanding physical things\nare for the most part singular, they in some instances may cease to\nbe singular. Thus, although every real entity is singular, it may,\ncontemplated metaphysically, depart from its singularity. In fact, the\nschoolmen together with St. Thomas say, that physics may depart or be\nseparated from their singular, but not from their sensible nature;\nand that mathematical things, may depart or be separated from their\nsingular and sensible, but not from their intelligible nature; also,\nthat metaphysical ones, may depart or be separated from their singular,\nsensible, and intelligible. In the next place, the axiom that from\nsingular things you can derive no science, should be understood with some\ngrains of allowance; that is, of such singular things as are particularly\nnecessary to the individual, and are accidental to the species; but\nfrom those which appertain or belong to the species, science may be\ndeduced, even when they are connected with the individual. For example.\nIf I know scientifically; that man according to the general received\nopinion respecting him, is risible, I also know scientifically that\nPeter is risible, for in the following syllogism; _every man is risible;\nPeter is a man; and therefore Peter is risible_, is implied the truth\nof the premises, and the consequence deducible from it is, that it is\nscientifically evident. Further, if ever a philosopher should arise,\nwho should know with certainty, the specific nature of all material\nentities, and from that knowledge, should be able to demonstrate all\ntheir properties, and the respective operations appertaining to each\nspecies, and in virtue of this extraordinary penetration, should be\ncapable of giving reasons _\u00e0 priori_ for all the phenomena of nature, we\nshould not be able to deny, that such a philosopher possessed physical\nscience, notwithstanding the object of his science, related only to the\nspecies, unconnected with individuals. What then remains to be proved,\nis, that in physics there is to be found no sort of science, or evident\nknowledge of the matters appertaining merely to physics, abstracted from\nall other considerations; and truly the dogmatic naturalists, would be\nvery happy, could they be permitted to possess a knowledge that amounts\nto as much as this; nor would it disturb them, to have it dinned in their\nears, that the knowledge of common conceptions is metaphysical, and not\nphysical; for they would tell you, that both physics, and metaphysics,\nmay depart or be separated from their singularity, and that the principal\ndistinction between them is, that the last regards its object with a\ngreater degree of abstraction; that is, as exempt from all matter, and\nconsiders only those reasons, which may subsist abstracted from matter,\nsuch for example as spiritual entities; on the contrary, physics only\ncontemplate material and corporeal entities; the most sublime of which\nconceptions, is that which regards the reason of the body, and the\nlowest, that which is attached to the corporeal part of it. But call this\nknowledge by what sort of name you will, either physical or metaphysical,\nthe way to bring the matter to a short issue is, to shew that there is\nnot in reality, any such knowledge.\n\nXXXV. And what is more easy to be proved than this? I reason thus;\nphysics contemplate the nature of an entity that has motion, or\ncirculation; this may be considered, either according to the specific, or\ngenerative nature of the thing; and I assert, that nothing is known with\ncertainty of the nature of any entity that has motion or circulation,\neither in one or the other of the before named senses.\n\nXXXVI. And to begin with the specific, who can deny that in this sense,\nwe know nothing of any one entity? I defy all the philosophers to tell me\nwhat is the constituent or component physical substance, of any one of\nthe material entities that is to be found in the universe, and will give\nthem leave to chuse that which they have most examined. St. Basil has\nsome words (Epist. 168. _ad Eunomium_) that are admirably applicable to\nthis purpose, and which I shall here insert: _Itaque qui se existentium\nscientiam assequutum esse gloriatur, exponat nobis quomodo, quod minimum\nesse eorum, qu\u00e6 in lucem prodierunt, natura habeat._ Let the presumptuous\nphilosopher, who boasts of his physical knowledge, explain to us the\nnature of the least entity which God has created. Let him, adds the same\nFather, who is ostentatiously vain of having penetrated into the secrets\nof nature, tell us what is the nature of an ant: _Dicat formicarum nobis\nnaturam, qui eorum, qu\u00e6 in natura sunt scientiam cum fastu se pr\u00e6dicat\nassequutum._ But why should we waste time? There is not, nor ever was to\nthis day, any one, who by means of acquired science, could penetrate the\nconstituent or component physical substance of any living or inanimate\nentity; the reach of our capacities not permitting us to go further, than\nto distinguish by some very extrinsic accidents, one thing from another;\nand this mode of distinguishing, is confined principally to those we call\nnaturalists, and rarely extends to those in the schools, who acquire the\nappellation of philosophers, and who generally content themselves with\ndistinguishing some few, which they commonly do in the unhappy manner we\nshall proceed to point out; but when school philosophers descend to treat\nof specific conceptions, their philosophy is so miserable and confined,\nthat they only attempt to give the colour of a definition to a few\nspecies of brutes, whose voice they describe by some particular name,\nand then explain their conception of them, by some term derived from\nthat name; thus they call the lion a roaring animal; the dog a barking\none, and the horse a neighing one; but the fish, because they are very\nnumerous, and are for the most part mute, cannot well be comprehended\nwithin this rule, and therefore are obliged to go without a definition.\n\nXXXVII. The school philosophers cannot be ignorant, that these are not\ndefinitions, but should rather be termed mere shadows of definitions,\nwhich they make use of for want of true ones, to express logically,\nwhat definition is, what species, what gender, what difference, and\nother things appertaining to logical dialect; but is it not clear, that\ndefining a horse by calling him a neighing animal, can give us no better\nconception of the creature, than may be conveyed to us by the most stupid\nclown, who would explain the thing more simply, and without school\njargon, by telling us that a horse _is an animal that neighs, or is\ncapable of neighing_? Oh! what a penetrating philosophical description is\nthis of the nature of a horse!\n\nXXXVIII. If any one, notwithstanding what has been said, should chuse to\nreply, that nature, as the root of all operations, should be explained\naccording to the order, or habit of those operations; and thus, that a\nhorse is well and physically defined, by the radical order of the act of\nneighing; if any one, I say, should reply to me in this manner; I apprise\nhim in the first place, that all substantial nature has its absolute\nbeing, which is understood to be antecedent to the order of operations,\nfor the first, is supposed to be the cause or reason of the other;\nthat is to say, because such a thing has such a being in nature, from\nthence is derived the habit or aptness for such operations. I apprise\nhim secondly, that if we should permit nature to be well defined by the\nprecise or characteristic order of operation, this should not be extended\nto every sort of operation, but should be confined to the primary\noperation, which marks the foundation of the species; but alas, we are\nignorant of what that is. For example, if a man, as is generally thought,\nis well defined by his rational faculty, or radical power of reasoning;\nbecause the being able to reason or reflect, is the principal, or primary\noperation of man; a horse then should be defined by his radical habit\nto that act of perception, instinct, or knowledge, which is proper to\nhis species, and distinct from that of all other animals. But who has\npenetrated what this is? Or who has ever known the innate difference,\nthat there is between the instinct of a horse and a dog? And thus, as it\nwould be ridiculous and absurd to define a man by the radical order of\nelocution, by saying, that he is an animal who can talk and discourse;\nbecause this absurdity would be incurred, on account of the act of\nelocution being posterior, or secondary to that of reason or reflexion;\nand it would be much more ridiculous, to define him by the order of his\nvoice, which you describe by some particular name, and to define him in\nthe manner you define a horse, which you call a neighing animal; nor is\nit less absurd to define a horse by the radical order of his neighing.\nI apprise him thirdly, that if such definitions are admitted as good\nand legitimate, it is the most easy thing in the world, to define every\nsubstantial entity whatever, because in order to do it, you have only to\nobserve its operations, give the most remarkable one a name, and define\nit by that name. By the help of this instruction only, you may make every\npeasant a consummate philosopher, and enable him to define the nature of\nall the entities in the universe.\n\n\nSECT. IX.\n\nXXXIX. These reflexions answer no other purpose, than that of confronting\nhere and there a superficial and bastard schoolman, for all capable\npeople know and confess, that we are unable to give a definition of any\none substantial entity, except man. To what straight limits then is our\nphilosophy confined!\n\nXL. But the misfortune is, that we have no certainty, that the general\nreceived definition of a man, to wit, that he is a _rational animal_, is\na good and unexceptionable one; for we are clear it would not be a good\none, if this faculty appertains to other animals as well as him, and it\nis matter of doubt whether it does or not; but I will not, nor cannot, in\nsupport of this doubt, avail myself of the authority of Porphyrus, who in\nhis Treatise on Predicables, supposes God to be a rational animal; and\nin order to distinguish between God and man, defines man to be a mortal\nrational animal, because he thought that without the addition of the\nword mortal, the definition would be applicable to God as well as man.\nNeither will I avail myself of the authority of Aristotle, from whose\nsecond book, De Sect. Pythagora, Jamblicus cites these words: _Animalis\nrationalis aliud quidem est Deus, aliud autem homo._ But I may for this\npurpose, avail myself of the authority of some Fathers, among whom is\nSt. Austin, who all affirm, that the angels are corporeal, or at least\nhave doubted of their incorporeality; to which doubt, appertains that,\nof whether angels are rational animals, for in order to suppose them so,\nthere wants nothing but their being corporeal, and consequently it is\ndoubtful, whether the definition of rational animal, appertains solely to\nman.\n\nXLI. I may be told, that the corporeality of Angels has been condemned,\nand their incorporeality defined, in the second Council of Nice, and the\nfourth Lateran one. But in the first place, is it certain, that these\nCouncils declared the incorporeality of angels to be undeniable, and that\nthey declared affirming the contrary is erroneous; for it is somewhat\ndoubtful, whether the incorporeality was defined in them or not; because,\nalthough mention was made in these Councils of this matter, it was not\ndone with an express design to discuss the point, but was only touched\nupon, as we may say by _incidence_; which is an exception that all\neminent theologians admit, to our being bound to observe things that are\ncanvassed in that way even in Councils; as we are not obliged to suppose\nany matters defined in them, that are not debated and settled with an\nexpress intention. For which reason, the most learned Cano (_lib. 5. de\nConsiderat._) took the liberty of saying, that the opinion that angels\nwere corporeal, although it might be false, was not heretical; and long\nbefore him, St. Thomas in his book _de Malo_, (_qu\u00e6st. 16. art. 1._) had\nsaid, that this question was no part of the Catholic Dogmas. My father\nSaint Bernard (_lib. 5. de Considerat._) goes further; for he seems to\nthink, the opinion which denies the corporeality of angels, to be void\nof probability; and it will not be improper to remark here, that he was\nmuch posterior to the second Council of Nice, and Saint Thomas, not only\nto the second Council of Nice, but to the fourth Lateran one also. This\nmay likewise be alledged as an answer, to the objections that are made in\nconsequence of some texts of Scripture, which give the epithet of spirits\nto the angels; for it is certain, that the fathers who considered it as\ndefensible to maintain the corporeality of angels, were not ignorant of\nthose texts; the exposition of which, in truth is not difficult, for we\nmay fairly conclude, the Scripture calls them by this name, on account of\ntheir being airy or light bodies, and we may also suppose, that it is for\nthis reason, that in various places it gives the name of spirit to the\nair. _Spiritus procellarum. Advenientis spiritus vehementis, &c._\n\nXLII. The second reply I shall make, is, that supposing it to be\ndetermined that the angels are incorporeal, this truth is not established\nby philosophy, but by faith; and as upon the knowledge of this truth,\ndepends the certainty, that the definition of a rational animal does not\nbelong to an angel; it follows, that by the help of philosophy alone, we\nshould never have hit upon giving a definition of a man; and with respect\nto defining other things besides a man, its insufficiency is admitted.\nWhat sort of philosophy is this? It ought rather to be called a total\nwant of philosophy.\n\nXLIII. Not only with regard to the angels, but on the part of brutes\nalso, we find motives for doubting, whether the definition of _rational\nanimal_, may not be applied to them as well as to man. If _rational\nanimal_ signifies an animal capable of reflexion, the brutes are rational\nanimals in the opinion of all those, who suppose them to be endowed\nwith reason and reflexion: and as this sentiment may be supported by\nstrong arguments, it remains somewhat doubtful, whether rationality\nis not diffused in different proportions to other animals as well as\nmen, or whether it is confined to them only. It is true, that if this\nopinion should be admitted, we should grant, that the reason of man is\ndistinct from, and of a superior nature to that of brutes; but if in the\ndefinition, we do not point out the character which distinguishes them,\nwe are reduced to assign as the difference, a generical idea.\n\n\nSECT. X.\n\nXLIV. As we ascend the predicamental tree, and advance from the species,\nto the genuses or kinds; we perceive, that philosophy does not discern\nthese more clearly, than it did the others; for we find in both cases,\nequal ignorance, and equal uncertainty. If we ought to have scientific\ncertainty of any one genus in preference to another, it should be of that\nunder which we ourselves are comprehended, which is the animal kind, for\nthat is the thing which most immediately relates to us, and because also,\nwe employ more consideration and attention upon that, than we do upon\nthe others. We call the order animal, which comprehends man, and every\nother species of terrestrial and aquatic brutes, as likewise every kind\nof fish or fowl. And what do we know of animals according to this general\ndescription? Why that they are _sensitive living beings_; for that is\nthe definition we give of them. But do we know this with any degree of\ncertainty? By no means; for it has been doubted whether every animal is\nsensitive; and it has also been doubted, whether the sense of feeling\ndoes not belong to other entities as well as to animals.\n\nXV. The first doubt is built upon the opposition and arguments of the\nCartesians, who pretend, that all brutes are inanimate machines, and that\nthere is no other sensible animal but man; for which reason, in their\nopinion, a sensible being is not a generical entity, but a specific one,\nand proper to the human species in a quarter proportion. I am thoroughly\npersuaded, that this opinion of the Cartesians is a false one; but I\nhave not yet seen any evident argument or demonstration to confront\nit; nor has any person hitherto, hit upon one that evinces the falsity\nof it; for their principal foundation is not so weak, but that it has\npuzzled the most able Aristotelites to give an answer to it. But I do\nnot find, that this is any obstacle to our giving our firm assent to the\nsensibility of brutes; although we have no reason to glory in our proofs\nof this matter, when the contrary opinion, besides the arguments that are\nproduced to support it, finds so many partizans; and among them some of\nexcellent ingenuity. Nor have we any reason to suppose, what I have known\nmany people maintain, that all the Cartesians, think differently from\nwhat they speak in this matter; for some of them, are as full of the\ncaprice that brutes are insensible, as we are of the persuasion that the\ncontrary is the fact. A few years ago, certain ladies who were present\nat a bull-feast, seemed to express great concern for the sufferings of\none of the bulls, which the people employed for that purpose, worried\nexcessively. A French lady, who was a Cartesian philosopher, that sat\nnear them, begged they would not grieve, for says the good Cartesian\nwith great gravity, _I believe as firmly as I do in God and this cross,\nthat the bull feels no more pain than the bench I sit on_. I do not know\nwhether the other ladies believed her, but I am persuaded, that many are\nstedfastly of the same opinion with the French lady.\n\nXLVI. The second doubt, whether other entities besides animals are\nnot sensible, is patronized by Campanela, who labours by a variety of\narguments, to prove in divers parts of his Works, that all elemental\nthings are sensible. This doubt is also supported, and with more colour\nof reason, by those philosophers, who allow feeling to plants. And that\nthis opinion may not appear extravagant; for the information of those\nwho adopt the common sentiment, it will not be amiss to let them know,\nthat Aristotle did not look upon this thing in that light, for he rather\ninclines to patronize the doubt; for in his first book _de Plantis_,\nhe says, there is no certainty whether plants are, or are not, endued\nwith feeling, appetite, and knowledge: _Nec enim constat, habeant ne\nplant\u00e6 animam, appetendique facultatem, doloris item, & voluptatis, &\nrerum discretionis._ In the third place, the naturalists, who build upon\nexperimental observations, attribute feeling to some determined species\nof plants, which on that account, they call sensitive plants.\n\n\nSECT. XI.\n\nXLVII. If of our own proper genus, we know nothing with certainty, what\nmust our knowledge be of others? The genus most immediately next to our\nown, is that of plants, and in this, notwithstanding our proximity, we\ncan discern nothing but our ignorance; for we cannot venture even by\nconjectures, to point out the constitutive difference between them.\nThis is not only invisible to the eyes of evidence, but impalpable to\nthe essays of opinion. We commonly define the genus of a plant, by the\nterm insensible living entity. But the word insensible, which we use\nto describe the difference, only signifies want of sensibility; and\na positive entity, such as a plant is, cannot be ascertained by a\nnegative. Besides this, as we observed before, it is somewhat doubtful,\nwhether plants are, or are not sensible. We call them also _living\nvegetables_. But by this idea, we do not assign to the plant a different\nnature from the animal, for that this also is a living vegetable. If I\nam told, that the difference consists, in that the life of the animal\nis vegetative and sensitive, and that that of the plant is purely\nvegetative, I reply, that the adverb _purely_ in this place, signifies\nnothing but the want of sensitive life, which is meant to be expressed\nin the extreme, and a want, cannot be made use of as a descriptive term,\nto point out the constitutive difference between positive entities.\nNor will it be of any use to answer, that the term want, means a want\nor defect in the mode of explanation, and does not apply to the thing\nsignified; for till it can be ascertained what the thing signified is,\nwe must remain totally in the dark; and it is also false, that this\nterm _want_, is not applicable to the thing signified; for negative\nexpressions are positive with respect to the thing signified, when they\nare used to deny any imperfection in the object they relate to; for\nthe want of an imperfection, is the want of a want, it being certain,\nthat all imperfection consists in the want of positive perfection;\nfor which reasons these words, infinity, immensity, indivisibility,\nalthough negative with respect to the mode of expression, are positive\nwith respect to the thing signified; but the term insensible, or\ninsensibility, applied to a plant, signifies want of perfection, and thus\nis negative with respect to the thing signified.\n\nXLVIII. Besides this, some express a doubt, whether plants are\nvegetable or not; and some are also doubtful, whether the property\nof vegetation does not likewise belong to stones and metals. If we\nconsult the Cartesians upon this point, they will tell us, that all we\ncall vegetation or nutrition of plants, is pure mechanism, and that\nthe attraction of the nutritious juice which we attribute to them,\nis a solemn chimera. If we forsake the Cartesians, and apply to the\nexperimental philosophers, we shall find many of them, who will tell us,\nthat metals and stones grow by means of vegetation; which is an opinion,\nthat not long ago, was illustrated by Joseph Pitton de Tournfort, a\ncelebrated naturalist of the Academy Royal of Sciences at Paris, and\nmore especially, by the celebrated observations he made upon marble in\nthe wonderful cave of Antiparos; and with respect to metals, we, to the\nauthority of others, shall add that of Aristotle, who in his book _de\nMirabilibus Auscultationibus_, says, that in a territory of the island\nof Cyprus, they were used to sow iron, and that it grew and vegetated\nlike other plants.\n\nXLIX. And now we are speaking of Aristotle, we will not omit mentioning\nan authority of his, which is very applicable to our present subject,\nbecause it is totally opposite to a received opinion in the schools,\nto wit, that plants and animals are of two different genuses, and that\nthe distinction between them is, that the animal is a living sensible\nentity, and the plant a living insensible one. Aristotle in his book _de\nPlantis_ says, that oysters and other shell-fish, are both plants and\nanimals: _scimus autem, quod conchyla animalia sunt cognitione carentia:\nquapropter plant\u00e6 sunt, & animalia_. I ask now, how one species can be\nclassed under two diametrically opposite genuses? and how an oyster\ncan be both sensible and insensible? for as an animal, it ought to be\na living sensible entity, and as a plant, a living insensible one. Nor\ncan it be said, that Aristotle, when he called an oyster a plant, spoke\nin a metaphorical sense, for this mode of speaking is not allowed to\nphilosophers, but is only permitted to poets and orators. Besides, the\ncause he assigns, shews, that he spoke in a rigorous philosophical sense;\nalthough, to speak the truth, I do not comprehend who could reveal to\nAristotle, that oysters and other shell-fish are destitute of that sort\nof knowledge, which is proper and natural to the most stupid brutes.\n\n\nSECT. XII.\n\nL. From the lowest species, we proceed to the next above, and enquire,\nwhat is the nature of a living entity; what we are to understand by the\nterm living, and what is life? To this, we shall be answered from the\nschools, that life is motion _ab intrinsico_, and that living, means that\nwhich moves _ab intrinsico_; that is, its motion is produced by some\nintrinsic faculty, or virtue, which it has within itself.\n\nLI. This definition is incumbered with greater difficulties than the\nantecedent ones. All the modern philosophers oppose it, although for\ndistinct and contrary reasons. Gassendo, father Maignan, and the other\natomists, attribute motion _ab intrinsico_ to atoms, from which dogma it\nwill follow, that motion _ab intrinsico_, is not distinctly peculiar to\nliving animals. The Cartesians are very positive in maintaining, that\nnothing can give motion to itself, but that all motion in the universe,\nproceeds from that impulse, which God in the beginning gave to matter,\nwhich does, and ever will subsist, without being impaired or injured;\nand that by virtue of that impulse, motion is communicated from one part\nof matter to another; so that all which was before at rest, upon its\nbeginning to move, received its impulse from some other body which was in\nmotion before, and transferred its influence to that which was then at\nrest; and either partly, or in the whole, gave it the power of beginning\nto move; and they say further, that man, which is the only living\ncorporeal entity they admit, when he moves, cannot be properly said to\ngive motion to his members, but only directs their motion by his will, in\nvirtue of the power antecedently impressed by the impulse of other bodies\non the animal spirits.\n\nLII. It cannot be denied, that this doctrine is terribly fortified, by\nthe celebrated maxim of Aristotle, which says, _that every thing that\nmoves, is set in motion by something else_: and although the followers\nof the common opinion, explain this maxim, so as to render it not\nincompatible with the definition they give of living entities, there\nresults from this explanation, the inconvenience, that it weakens the\nprincipal force of the axiom which they avail themselves of to prove\nthe existence of a first mover, to stimulate a body at rest; for if\nwe suppose, that a living entity has the power of moving itself, we\ncannot maintain the necessity of a divine influence to produce this\nmotion, without admitting at the same time, the existence of a first\nmover in other respects, to be established. Thus it seems to me, that\nthe Cartesians can with some colour of reason pretend, that religion\nis interested in understanding the axiom in all the rigour, which they\nprofess to understand it themselves.\n\nLIII. But be it as it may, with respect to this difficulty, and all\nothers, which the moderns by virtue of their principles can oppose to the\ndoctrine of Aristotle; it is certain, that there may be very serious ones\nurged against their definition of living entities. Heavy bodies move _ab\nintrinsico_, and are not living entities. Fire moves _ab intrinsico_,\nand is not a living entity. The fermentative motion also, according to\ncommon physics, is understood to be _ab intrinsico_. And I have remarked\nand proved in another part of this work, that what the Aristotelites say\nof heavy bodies being moved by communicated impulse, in the form this\nexplanation is intelligible, is also applicable to the motion of living\nentities.\n\n\nSECT. XIII.\n\nLIV. There now only remains within the compass of the predicamental\nscale, one other thing to consider, which is the highest, and most\nsublime within the reach of physics, and that is, the nature and\ncomposition of the body; but where will this lead us to, the point being\nequally doubtful with all the rest? The composition of the body, is\ndivided into elemental and mixed; but as this last is composed of the\nother, unless we know what the elemental is, it is impossible to know\nof what the mixture consists. Very well; but who knows the nature and\nnumber of the elements? To this question, methinks I hear four answers,\nfrom four sects of philosophers, which are all different, although each\npretends to exclude the others from a competent knowledge of the matter.\nThe Aristotelites say, that they are air, fire, earth, and water. The\nchymists, that they are salt, sulphur, mercury, earth, and water. The\nCartesians insist, that they are composed of the subtil, the globulous,\nand another matter which is more gross, and which they call the third\nelement; and the atomists, that they consist of the atoms. These are\nthe opinions, which are at present the most prevailing, although there\nare numbers of others which I shall omit to mention, because they have\nbut few votaries. Now which of these opinions is the true one? Perhaps\nneither. At least there is but one sect out of the four that admits\neither of them to be true, and whichever that sect adheres to, the other\nthree assert to be false; which amounts to the same, as saying that\none witness deposes to the truth of the matter in question, and that\nthree give testimony against it. Thus no judge to whom the decision is\nconfided, can give sentence in favour of either of the parties; it being\nout of his power to affirm, that any one of their systems is right and\ntrue.\n\nLV. As the audience before whom I propound this reflection, is composed\nchiefly of the followers of Aristotle, methinks I hear them exclaim,\nthat if we were to collect the suffrages of the academic professors,\nwe should find most votes in favour of his opinion. To this, I reply\nin the first place, that although a plurality of sectaries, gives\ngreater extrinsic probability to an opinion, still it does not afford\ncertainty, nor intrinsic probability; and the question here, is not\nwhether Aristotle\u2019s opinion is the most probable, but whether it is\ncertain. I reply secondly, that it is doubtful, if we were to include\nthe professors who teach physics in all nations, whether we should in\nreality find a majority of votes in favour of Aristotle; and unless\nwe could prove by some authentic instrument, that God has limited the\nknowledge of philosophy to our nation only, and has excluded all others\nfrom inheriting the science, I do not know upon what pretension we can\nground a right, of admitting none but Spaniards to vote in the question.\nSome of our antient professors say, that we should not regard the\nopinions of strangers, because they are novelists; but at the same time,\nstrangers reply, that we should take no account of what the Spaniards\nassert, because they are obstinate and wrong-headed, and that there is\nno proof, be it ever so clear, that will make them depart from their old\nopinions; to which they add, that in Spain, they do not follow Aristotle\nfrom choice, but from necessity; for that it requires an heroic spirit,\nto contradict any thing that has been advanced by Aristotle in that\nkingdom, where whoever dares venture to oppose him, is instantly assailed\nby tempests of injuries, which fall on his head like violent hail storms.\nNor is even an heroic spirit, sufficient to enable a man to support such\nan opposition, because the duty of obedience, obliges people not to\ndepart from the line of their school; and this is also frequently the\ncase, in other countries; and from hence, some Anti-Aristotelites have\ninsisted, that the plurality of votes in favour of Aristotle should not\nprevail, because they cannot be supposed to be free.\n\nLVI. But abstracted from the quantum of extrinsic probability, contained\nin the doctrine of Aristotle respecting the elements; I assert, that\nupon a strict examination, you will not find more truth contained in\nhis sentiments, than in those of his adversaries. This opinion, I\ndeduce from the position, that his first qualities consist of four,\nto wit, heat, cold, wet, and dry, from which in exact proportion, he\nattributes one to be impregnated in the highest degree with each element,\nand another near to the highest. This proof, goes lame in innumerable\nparticulars. First, the giving to these qualities the title of first,\nis conferring a mere voluntary dignity on them, and especially, when\nwe know the invincible difficulty, that attends establishing, that all\nthe others result from them. Secondly, it is very doubtful, whether all\nthe four beforementioned, can properly be called qualities; for many\nAristotelites, and with great colour of reason, deny humidity and dryness\nto be such. That which is humid, is not so from any quality it possesses\nin itself, but because it has imbibed into its pores some foreign liquid\nsubstance, and let that be evaporated, and it will remain dry; from\nwhich we may conclude, that humidity is a substance, and that dryness\nconsists in the want of that substance. Thirdly, the appropriating these\nas two of the four elements, is done without any foundation or reason.\nIn the next place, how can they prove that water is cold in the highest\ndegree? If this was true it would kill us; neither can they prove it so,\nin a more moderate, or secondary degree, for we are taught by experience,\nit is indifferent to both cold and heat, according to the agent that is\napplied to it. It is heated by the fire; and remove it from the fire,\nand it becomes cool again, not because it has any propensity or natural\ndisposition to be cold, but because it is made so, by the cool atmosphere\nwhich surrounds it. There are many other very grave objections to be\nurged against this doctrine of the four qualities; and therefore the\nfoundation upon which it is built, and the reasoning deduced from it to\nestablish the quaternian system of the elements, are both very slight and\nfutil.\n\nLVII. The second argument, is built on the correspondence of the four\nhumours of the body, with the four Aristotelic elements; that is to say,\nthe blood with the air, the choler with the fire, the melancholy with the\nearth, and the pituitous with the water. But this puts us in a worse\nsituation than we were before. In the first place, it is a doubt among\nthe medical people, whether the humours of our bodies consist precisely\nof four. Some say they are more, and others that they are less. Some add\nto the four, the lymph, the pancreatic juice, and the nervous fluid;\nand some again will not admit, that there is any other humour except\nthe blood. Secondly, if the four elements correspond only with the four\nhumours, we are left without an element to correspond with the solids,\nwhich on account of the hardness of their substance, might with more\npropriety be compared to the earth, than to the melancholy humour, which\nis beyond comparison less hard and solid than the other. Thirdly, in the\nsame voluntary manner, with which they assign four elements to correspond\nwith the four humours, they may assign one element to correspond with the\nflesh, another with the bones, another with the marrow, another with the\nfat, or adipose substance, another with the tendons, and so on. Fourthly,\nin order to reason justly upon the human body, or animal species, we\nshould not seek for four substances that are analogous to the four\nhumours, but for four that enter into all the mixtures; for the question,\nrelates to elements that partake of the composition of all mixtures in\ngeneral, and not precisely of the animal. But what traces can we discern,\nof four humours, or four substances, equivalent to these, either in\nminerals, or plants?\n\nLVIII. The third argument in support of this quaternian system, is\npretended to be derived from experience; for it is alledged, that when\na piece of wood is burning, we see it resolve itself into the four\nAristotelic elements. At first it emits a small portion of water; then\nit takes fire; the fire is followed by smoke, which we know to be of an\naerial nature, by its ascending to the airy region; and last of all,\nthere remains a portion of earth in the ashes.\n\nLIX. Although as Etmuller says, in matters of physics and medicine,\n_pr\u00e6stat unum experimentum centum rationibus_, still, the experiment\njust alledged is so defective, that it is not of more value than the\narguments before urged. In the first place, dry wood, may as properly\nbe called a mixture as green wood, notwithstanding which, it emits no\nwater upon being laid on the fire. Secondly, as we are here treating\nof the elements in general which enter into, and make a part of the\ncomposition of every species of mixture, the fire should produce the\nsame appearances, and have the same effect upon them, that it has upon\nthe wood; but this does not happen, for minerals laid on the fire emit\nno water, unless it is when they have imbibed some foreign moisture.\nThirdly, the chymists by means of fire differently applied, extract from\nwood and other mixtures, various substances, which differ from those\nfour that are produced from the wood in the ordinary way of burning it;\nand it seems reasonable from hence, that we should augment the number\nof the elements. Fourthly, we do not know whether these substances\npre-existed in the wood, or whether they were produced _de novo_ by the\nfire. Fifthly, the ash is not earth, nor an elemental or simple body\nas is supposed, for there may be separated from it a large portion of\nsalt, which is a distinct substance from either of the four; for it is\nneither earth, air, water, or fire. Sixthly, neither is the smoke air,\nas is manifest from the soot which condenses in the chimney. If I should\nbe told, that in the smoke is contained a variety of particles, some of\nwhich compose the soot, which remains in the chimney, and others which\nmount higher, and are impregnated with the atmosphere, and become air; I\nreply, that in consequence of this, they should admit of a fifth element\nof soot; or to speak more properly, of five or six additional elements;\nfor Mr. Boyle informs us, that the chymists can extract from soot, five\nor six different substances. Finally, all that becomes ashes, existed\nbefore in the form of fire; from whence it follows, that the form of\nashes is a new production, for matter cannot exist under two substantial\nforms at one and the same time; and consequently, the elemental form of\nearth which the Aristotelites ascribe to the ashes, could not pre-exist\nin the mixture, but must be a new production. This objection militates\nprincipally against the Aristotelic principles; but others might be\nformed in different shapes, against every system whatever.\n\nLX. I have combated only the Aristotelic opinion of the elements, not\nbecause the others are not incumbered with equal difficulties, and\nexposed to equal objections, but because in Spain, we suppose the others\nto be perplexing, and even improbable, and conclude that of the four\nelements, to be just and right; I therefore chose to attack this system,\nto let my countrymen see, that we know nothing with certainty respecting\nthe elements.\n\n\nSECT. XIV.\n\nLXI. I have remarked before, that if we are ignorant of what the\nelemental bodies consist, we cannot possibly know the nature of the\nmixtures. But even if we could ascertain what the elements are, we\nshould still remain in profound philosophical ignorance with respect\nto the component parts, of both them and the mixtures; for admitting\nthe four following, air, fire, water, and earth, to be elements of all\nthe mixtures; who has yet ascertained the nature of those four bodies?\nAristotle only reasoned upon their qualities, and this he did with so\nlittle precision, that all he said may be looked upon as doubtful, for\nhe had no solid principle, from whence he inferred, that they possessed\nthe properties which he attributed to them; but drew all his conclusions,\nfrom an ideal proportion which struck his own imagination; and respecting\nwhich, it has since been proved, that he was mistaken. He says that\nair is hot, and fire dry in the highest degree; but in our essay on\nphysical paradoxes, we have proved that the air is not hot; and according\nto Aristotle\u2019s definition of humidity, we may infer, that a flame is\nhumid, for it cannot be contained within its own bounds, but pervades\nother regions. We also proved in our essay on physical paradoxes, that\nelemental fire is not hot in the highest degree; and to what I said\nthere, I will add in this place, that experience shews us, one fire is\nhotter than another, and has greater power to heat or melt substances,\neither in consequence of its greater bulk, or on account of the matter\nwith which it is made, or the manner the place is disposed and contrived,\nin which it is lighted; from all which it may be inferred, that fire in\nits nature is not hot in the highest degree, for if it was, as in every\nfire the nature of fire is preserved, every fire would be hot in the\nhighest degree, and of course, could not be exceeded in heat by another\nfire.\n\nLXII. Aristotle however, did no more than assign false or uncertain\nqualities to his four elements, and left untouched, substantial nature\nwhich is the root of them; and those who succeeded him in all after-ages,\nif they aimed at more, attained no more. The sectaries of Aristotle\ncontent themselves with saying of the elements, what they say of all\nother natural compositions; that is, that they are constituted of\nmatter in physical forms, are real incompleat entities, and evidently\ndistinct from each other. By all which, admitting this description to\nbe right, they teach us nothing, till they explain to us, of what the\nphysical form consists, and what is the specific nature of the physical\nform, in every natural composition. But their system explained in the\ngeneral way, in which they themselves define it, is strongly combated by\nthe modern philosophers, who find an insurmountable difficulty in the\ngeneration of the material forms, not being able to comprehend, how their\nproduction can be any thing else but a new creation; for the arguments\nthe Aristotelites fly to, of deducing them from the power of the matter,\ncontain nothing but words, void of all real signification; and truly\nAristotle himself having said, that the form is one of the principles of\na natural entity, and that the principles are those things, which are\nneither made from their own substance, nor from that of any other entity\nwhatever, shew them to be words which have no fixed meaning: _Qu\u00e6 nec ex\nse, nec ex aliis, sed ex quibus omnia fiunt_; how then can we reconcile\nthis doctrine, with the form being made of the matter?\n\n\nSECT. XV.\n\nLXIII. But have the moderns who exclaim so much against Aristotle, hit\nupon the truth? By no means. They have reasoned more boldly, but not with\nbetter success. They tell us, that the texture, collocation, figure, and\nmotion of the particles, produce all the operations of nature, without\nthe necessity of having recourse for this purpose, to accidental or\nsubstantial forms; but by saying this, they expose themselves to the\nsame fault which they reprehend in the Aristotelites, which is that of\nspeaking too generally; for as these last, do not explain or define, of\nwhat the substantial form consists which distinguishes one entity from\nanother, neither do the others determine, the texture, co-ordination,\nand figure of the particles which appertain, and are proper to each\ncomposition; in consequence of which, they all involve themselves in\ninnumerable difficulties, which they reciprocally object against each\nother. The Cartesian system appears chimerical to the Gassendists, and\nthe Maignanists; and these two last parties, although they agree in\nassigning the Atoms as the principles, and elements of all material\nthings, oppose one another in various particulars, it being a principle\nwith the Maignanists, that the Atoms are different in species, and with\nthe Gassendists, that they differ only in figure; all of which systems,\nare exposed to be combated by arguments that are terribly strong.\n\n\nSECT. XVI.\n\nLXIV. From all that has been said, it may be evidently concluded, that\nwe know nothing of the nature of that principal object of physics, _an\nens mobile_, either taken as confined to individuals, or considered\nwith respect to the species, or contemplated in an abstracted sense,\nas relating to the gradations, of lowest, inferior, or supreme. What\none sect affirms, another denies, and the worst is, that, attend to the\nreasoning of which of them you will, you will find the arguments against\nthe system of each, stronger than the proofs in favour of it. On this\naccount, Lactantius said wisely, that philosophers have swords, but no\nshields: _Gladium habent, scutum non habent._ They produce penetrating\narguments wherewith to assail the opinions of their opponents, but not\nsolid solutions, wherewith to defend their own. What can we do then in\nsuch a case? Why nothing but suspend our judgment, till some angel shall\ndecide the contest.\n\nLXV. Perhaps some one will remark to me, that the substantial nature\nof things is at a great distance from our view, and that therefore\nit is not wonderful, that we have not yet penetrated into the inmost\nrecesses of philosophy; for that without advancing so far, we may find\nsufficient matter whereon to exercise our speculations, in contemplating\nthe ordinary phenomena of nature, and by endeavouring to discover their\nproximate causes; which attempt, may possibly be crowned with success, by\nobserving and reasoning upon every species of movement which is performed\nby an entity, that has motion or circulation, according to the nature of\nsuch an entity.\n\nLXVI. I will acknowledge, that philosophy helps us to reason upon natural\nphenomena, and to enquire into their more immediate causes; but in doing\nthis, we frequently wander in the dark, and are much exposed to be\ninterrupted by impediments, produced by ignorance and doubts; except it\nis in the case of a few truths, the discovery of which, we owe to the\nlight of experience; and this fact is evinced, with respect to the very\ninstance of motion which has been just alledged.\n\nLXVII. With regard to the movements of generation, corruption,\nalteration, augmentation, and the rest, which are considered as distinct\nfrom local motion, you can find nothing that is not questionable,\nboth in the schools of the Aristotelites, and in those of the modern\nphilosophers. The very definition of motion in general, which was given\nby Aristotle, some reject as obscure, others as perplexed, and others\nas nugatory. The movements we are now treating of, in the opinion\nof Aristotle, are acquisitions of new forms, either substantial, or\naccidental; but the Moderns, who deny the existence of all material\nforms, object to this definition of those movements. Even among the\nAristotelites themselves, it is not agreed, whether motion is not\ninfluenced by passion; nor whether the first, is not obedient as a\npassive agent to the last. And thus in every thing else, it is all\nquestion, and all dispute.\n\n\nSECT. XVII.\n\nLXVIII. And why should we be surprized that with respect to these\nmovements, which as we may say, nature executes behind the curtain,\nhuman understanding has made so little, or next to no advances? what we\nought more to wonder at, is, that it happens the same with respect to all\nlocal motion, which lies so plain and open to our observation.\n\nLXIX. The motion with which heavy bodies descend, is the most frequent\nand common to our view. And what do we know of this? Of its properties\nvery little; of its causes nothing. We know it acquires some degree\nof acceleration in its passage, because we see it; but what is the\nproportion of the increased acceleration, is matter of great debate,\nboth among the philosophers, and mathematicians. We know that it is a\nmotion of descent, but we do not know whether its course is directed\nto the centre, or the axis of the earth. The cause of this motion\nremains so hidden, that the philosophers to this day, have given no\nopinion concerning it, that I will not venture to pronounce an absurd\none. The Aristotelites, by saying the cause of this motion proceeds\nfrom an innate disposition to move in every thing, say nothing, unless\nthey point out the particular virtue or faculty, which excites motion\nin heavy bodies, for what we have just mentioned, is the reason they\ngenerally assign for all species of movements. They should not be\nallowed to dispute or controvert what they themselves have advanced;\nand if they should attempt to give a more rigorous definition of their\nopinion, they would fall into a still greater absurdity; which made the\nlearned Father Saguens say, _Quis non palpat crassitiem hujus chimeric\u00e6\nopinionis?_ The Cartesians to account for this phenomenon, recur to the\nvertical motion of the subtil matter, which separating itself from the\nearth, and pursuing the angle or direction of tangents to the circle,\nimpels heavy bodies to descend. But this reasoning has been confuted by\nmost efficacious mathematical arguments. Gassendo invented an effluvia\ncomposed of terraqueous corpuscles, which mount into the air, and\npenetrate the pores of heavy bodies, which they generally encounter,\nand after turning their first course into a descending one, impel them\ndownwards. Nothing has so much convinced me of the great difficulty of\nthis question, as seeing a man of the subtil ingenuity of Gassendo,\nrecur for the solution of it, to a fiction destitute of all probability;\nand which is exposed to invincible objections. Father Maignan, and his\nfollowers also, make use of the terraqueous effluvia for the solution of\nthis difficulty; they do not allow that they act by impulse, but that by\ntheir sympathetic and magnetic virtue, when they come in contact with\nheavy bodies, they dispose them to descend.\n\nLXX. It is very probable, and perhaps more than probable, that the ascent\nof light bodies, is caused by the descent of heavy ones; because the\nheavy body has power, in consequence of the impetus of its descent, to\noccupy the lower station, where meeting with the light body, it obliges\nhim to leave that situation, and to mount upwards; for many argue with\ngreat colour of reason, that there is no such thing as absolute lightness\nto be conceived in any body whatever, nor is such a quality necessary,\na respective or comparative lightness, being sufficient to answer every\npurpose. Thus we say a body is light, not because it is void of gravity,\nbut because it is less heavy than the one with which we compare it. In\nthe same manner we say the air is light, not because it is not ponderous,\nbut because it is less so, than earth, water, and all the other bodies\nthat surround us; and that no other levity but the respective, is\nnecessary to cause bodies which we call light to ascend, may be clearly\nseen in the case of oil, which notwithstanding that it is heavy, if\nyou pour a quantity of water into the vessel where it is, the water on\naccount of its superior gravity, will occupy the inferior station, and\noblige the oil which was at the bottom to ascend. The same thing happens\nwith regard to air. If you dig a ditch to any depth in dry ground, the\nair will descend and occupy the whole of it; and there is no other way\nto dispossess the air from the bottom, and to make it rise upwards, but\nconveying water into the ditch, or by throwing into it some body that is\nheavier than the air.\n\nLXXI. It is not owing to the principles of physics, but to experience,\nthat we understand the little we know of this matter; and with respect to\nthis little, there still remains great difficulties for philosophers to\ncontemplate; and the greatest of all, is ascertaining the cause of the\nascent of vapours to the region of the air. It is certain, that vapours\nare nothing else but water, resolved into exceedingly minute particles.\nThe water however being heavier than air, how can the water arise to the\nheight occupied by the clouds? Every particle of water notwithstanding it\nweighs very little, is much heavier than a particle of air of equal size,\nand the greater or less gravity of liquids, for the purpose of their\nimpelling one another, is computed in the gross, and not according to the\nproportion of globules of equal size; and we know that a pound of water,\nwill cause a quarter of an hundred of oil to rise in a vessel.\n\nLXXII. Some philosophers, who were aware of this serious difficulty,\nupon reflexion, conjectured that some portion of ethereal matter or\npure air, might adhere to each particle of vapour; and in consequence\nof this conjunction of the two, the whole might become lighter than\nan equal quantity of the inferior gross air of our atmosphere; and on\nthis account, might mount on the top of it; for although iron is much\nheavier than water, if we fasten a small portion of iron to a bit of deal\nboard, it will swim, because the quantity of iron and board together, is\nlighter than an equal bulk of water. Francis Bayle, adopts this opinion\nof a portion of the ethereal matter adhering to the vapour; and on the\nother hand, Father Pardies a French jesuit supposes, that a particle of\nextended vapour, in the form of an air bubble, contains in its cavity the\nethereal matter. All this is far from certain; but I shall not detain\nmyself in controverting, either the one or the other of these modes of\nreasoning. Others again imagine, that various igneous particles, which\narise from the earth, after separating from the water or some other\nliquid those small particles which we call vapour, with their continual\nimpulse and agitation, force them upwards. But neither does this\nsystem appear to me very defensible, any more, than that of the vulgar\nphilosophers, who say, the sun by its activity attracts the vapours;\nfor if this was so, the vapours would not stop till they reached the\nsun, or at least till they were obstructed in the heaven of the moon, by\nthe moon itself, or some other solid body; for the attractive power is\nstronger, the nearer the thing attracted advances to that which attracts\nit; and the first would never cease to move towards the other, till it\ncame in contact with it, if it was not interrupted in its course by some\nobstruction; and besides, the attractive virtue is a certain something,\nwhich nobody can comprehend, and is therefore in a manner wholly banished\nfrom philosophy.\n\nLXXIII. Who would not be surprised, that physics should not have helped\nus to attain a knowledge of so common a phenomenon, as that of the ascent\nof vapours? but so far has it been from attaining it to any degree\nthat comes near to truth or certainty, that hitherto, we have not been\nable to discover any thing upon the point, that is satisfactory to the\nunderstanding. And with respect to all other species of motion, we are in\nthe same predicament.\n\n\nSECT. XVIII.\n\nLXXIV. Have we attained a knowledge of the cause of the elastic motion,\nwhich is the property that makes a wand or a sword-blade which is\nforcibly bent, recover of itself, the straight form it had before, or if\nit was naturally bent or crooked, and was opened and made straight by\nforce, makes it return to its original crooked shape? Descartes, for the\nexplanation of this phenomenon, recurs to his common asylum, the impulse\nof the subtil matter, which not being able to penetrate the pores of the\nwand or sword-blade on the hollow side, where the pores are closed by\nthe inflexion, by its great efforts to open and penetrate them, causes\nthe wand or sword-blade to recover its former figure. But who does not\nperceive, that for this purpose, it will be necessary to suppose the\nsubtil matter should be for ever moving in opposite directions, from west\nto east, and upwards and downwards, &c. for the wand or sword-blade, to\nwhatever aspect you turn the hollow side, recovers its natural figure\nequally the same? Besides, Descartes supposes the subtil matter to be\ninfinitely fluid, from whence it follows, that it will be impossible to\nshut the pores in such a manner, as that they will become impenetrable to\nit.\n\nLXXV. Others say, that the same impulse which is impressed on a wand or\nbow by him that bends it, is the thing which opens it afterwards. But\nagainst this opinion, it may be urged in the first place, that he who\nbends it, does it gradually and by slow degrees; and the impetus with\nwhich it opens, is violent and quick. Secondly, the archer who bends a\nbow, is not possessed of a force equal to that, with which it reverts\nto its former figure, for that is so great when the arrow is drawn\nnear the head, that it is capable of giving it an impetus, that will\npierce a substantial thick body through and through; and how can any one\ncommunicate a force or impulse, which is greater than that he possesses?\n\nLXXVI. The Aristotelites, who are great adepts at the easy invention of\ngiving the name of quality, virtue, or faculty, to express the cause they\nare enquiring after, and by the addition of an adjective to that name,\nwhich is a denomination taken from the effect, say, that the cause of\nthe elastic motion, is an elastic virtue which is inherent in the wand\nor sword-blade. This is in reality, having found out a master key, to\nunlock all the mysteries of nature; for there is nothing so obscure, that\nwith this invention may not be made manifest. If you ask, what is the\ncause of the marvellous properties of the load-stone, the answer is, the\nmagnetic virtue; if you ask, what are the causes that perform in us the\noperations, of the concoction of aliments, the expulsion of excrements,\nand that of nutrition, &c. the answer is, that they are performed by\na concoctive virtue, an expulsive virtue, and a nutritive one; and\naccording to the same mode of reasoning, the cause of the winds, is a\nventilating virtue, that of lightning a fulminating one, and that of the\nflux and reflux of the sea, is owing to two opposite virtues, the one\nfluxive, and the other refluxive. By this cheap mode of philosophizing,\nevery thing is demonstrated at a glance. But to speak seriously, what is\nthis, but answering in the very language of the question? Saying that\nthe cause of the elastic motion, is the elastic virtue, is in effect the\nsame as saying, the cause of the elastic motion, is the cause of the\nelastic motion; and saying the magnetic virtue, is that which causes the\nload-stone to attract the iron, is answering in the stile of pleasantry,\nwhich some children have studied, and are very ready at; who when a\nperson asks one of them, _My lad, whose son are you? the boy answers my\nfather\u2019s_.\n\n\nSECT. XIX.\n\nLXXVII. The cause of the progressive motion, is also very difficult\nto be accounted for. It is hard to comprehend, how the motion of a\nstone thrown from the hand subsists, after the action of throwing it\nceases. Who moves the stone after the hand is still? What many of the\nAristotelites say, is, that the action of the hand produces a quality\nin the stone, which they call impetus, and that this quality causes the\nstone to move after it is thrown from the hand. But this solution, is\ndestitute of all appearance of truth. If every violent motion, as the\nAristotelites maintain, proceeds from an extrinsic cause, how can the\nmotion of the stone thrown in a mounting direction, which is a violent\none, proceed from an intrinsic quality communicated to the said stone?\nIf all generation, or accumulation, according to the doctrine of the\nsame school, supposes corruption, what quality or accidental form in the\nstone was corrupted, to prepare it for engendering that new quality,\nwhich they call impetus? What dispositions preceded this generation? Or\nwhat time is there for their preceding it, when a globe of great bulk,\nwith its motion impels a little one? It being certain, that the contact\nof the two, does not continue longer than an instant, what property then\nhas that quality, to occasion so quick a corruption? Is it perchance, the\ngravity of the stone itself? This however, as it subsisted at the time\nof receiving the impulse, if it is a property opposite to that quality,\nwould at the instant, have prevented its generation, as it is afterwards\nsaid to impede its conservation. We might make many other reflexions, to\nprove, that that quality is chimerical. Others recur to the air, for the\nmeans by which the motion is continued, which they say, being violently\ndivided by the fore part of the stone, takes a sudden turn to the hinder\npart, and impels the stone forward. But omitting many other objections,\nwhich would render this mode of philosophizing totally improbable, I\nshall just remark, that it would follow from hence, that a stone could\nnot move through a void space, give it what impulse you will, which is\nwhat I imagine nobody can believe. Descartes, reconciles this difficulty,\nwith his maxim respecting the general law of the communication of\nmotion, established by the Author of nature at the creation, which we\nshall not combat minutely, in order not to waste time; but shall content\nourselves with observing, that that maxim applied to the present matter,\nand throughly investigated and explained, would signify, that the stone\nthrown from the hand, moves because God has ordained that it should move;\nbut to solve difficulties in this way, it is not necessary to study\nphilosophy.\n\n\nSECT. XX.\n\nLXXVIII. Finally, there is no motion whatever, about the cause of which,\nthe philosophers do not altercate. What contests have there been among\nthem, to explain how the movements of rarefaction, and condensation are\nperformed? Some fancy, that rarefaction consists, in the same quantity\nof matter occupying a larger space; which explanation, others looking\nupon as unintelligible, assert, it consists in the opening of the pores,\nand the extension in consequence of that opening, of various parts of\nthe body, by the introduction of a subtil liquid substance, in the same\nmanner that water enters a spunge, or as rarefied air enters water,\nor the \u00e6therial matter insinuates itself into the air. This is the\ndoctrine of the Cartesians; but in the opinion of the Maignanists, and\nGassendists, such reasoning is nothing to the purpose; for these, as\nthey admit in nature, not only of the possibility, but of the necessity\nof a vacuum, or many voids distributed in small interstices, find no\ninconvenience in supposing, that in bodies, there are small empty spaces,\nunpossessed by any matter whatever.\n\nLXXIX. Fermentation, this solemn instrument of nature for the performance\nof an infinite number of her works; consists in nothing, but an\nintestine motion of the insensible particles of the mixtures, by which\nis solicited, a new combination of their elements. But from whence does\nthis motion proceed? The Moderns, since the discovery of the acid and the\nalkali by Otho Takenius, attribute all the fermentations, to the meeting\nof these two substances. But this is only pointing out the matter, on\nwhich this motion has its effect, and we do not enquire here for the\nmaterial cause, but for the efficient one. Who, or what, impels the acid\nand the alkali to this conflict? The juice newly expressed from the\ngrape, will quiet this combustion for some little time; but after that,\nthe tumult begins again. What new agent can we discover here, to excite\nthe second fermentation? This is a secret, which only the Cartesians have\npresumed to unravel, by recurring to their invisible fairy, _the subtil\nmatter_; whom they make the author of all this domestic sedition. It is\nwith some propriety that I call it a fairy; for as the vulgar attribute\nto the fairies, all the nocturnal noises and commotions, whose causes\nthey are ignorant of; so the Cartesians impute all those motions, which\non account of the darkness that obscures their causes, may be truly\ntermed nocturnal, to the impulse of the subtil matter.\n\nLXXX. I am so far from believing, that the subtil matter is the _primum\nmobile_, or first mover of every thing, that I am inclined to think, it\nmoves nothing. My reason for this opinion, is as follows. The more fluid\na matter is, so much the less impulse it makes on any body it encounters.\nThus we see, that water gives a much less violent shock to a wall, than\nany other solid body of equal size, that may be forcibly driven against\nit; and air, a much less than water. No building could stand against, or\nresist a moderate gale of wind, if the air was as solid as water. The\nsubtil matter then, according to the doctrine of the Cartesians, being\ninfinitely fluid, can have but little impulse, or be able to impress but\nlittle agitation or motion, on the bodies it encounters. This consequence\nto me, is clear and plain; because, if in proportion to the augmentation\nof its fluidity, the impulse of a body is lessened, when the fluidity\ncomes to be infinite, the impulse will cease totally. From hence it would\nfollow, that there is no body whatever, which could be moved by the\nimpulse of the subtil matter.\n\nLXXXI. But admitting that it has power, as the Cartesians pretend, to\nmove the insensible particles of the mixtures; it will not follow\nfrom thence, that it furnishes us with an explanation of the present\nphenomenon. For in the first place, the subtil matter, if it has any\nimpulse, exercises it on the particles of the juice the instant that\nit is pressed from the grape; and even perhaps did it before, while\nthe liquor was contained within the outside skin or covering. How then\ndoes it happen, that it did not sooner excite that tumult, which is the\nsymptom and property of fermentation? Secondly, how can the acids and\nalkalies be said to produce this effect? for, according to the doctrine\nof the Cartesians, of whatever particles the mixtures consist, the subtil\nmatter would set them in motion, for that there is no mixture whatever,\nimpenetrable to its extreme subtilty. Thirdly, how can those exceeding\nslow fermentations, which are years before they manifest themselves, as\nin the instance of treacle, be attributed to the rapid and swift motion\nof the subtil matter?\n\n\nSECT. XXI.\n\nLXXXII. Saint Austin says wisely, that what is most surprizing, does not\nseem to strike us, although it is the object of our daily experience;\nwhich is a maxim, the saint applies to the wonders of nature, and falls\nin exceedingly _\u00e0 propos_ to suit with our present discussion. All the\nphilosophers he observes, admire as portentous things, the flight of\nthe iron to the load-stone, the pointing of this last to the poles,\nand the flux and reflux of the ocean. If we ask them why they consider\nthese motions as wonderful, they will answer, it is because they cannot\nascertain their causes. But we cannot help remarking, that this answer\namounts to a virtual acknowledgment, that all the movements of nature are\nequally wonderful, with those of the iron, the load-stone, and the ocean,\nfor their causes are equally disputed, because we are equally ignorant\nof them. The only difference between them is, that these motions are\nconfined to particular or determined entities, and the others are common,\nor nearly common to all.\n\nLXXXIII. I confess for my own part, that on whatever side I view nature,\nI equally wonder, because I find myself equally ignorant of it. The same\nSaint Austin, whom we have just quoted (Tract. 24. in Johan.), observes,\nthat the ordinary multiplication of grain, which is obtained at harvest,\nby means of the fertility of the earth, is equally a prodigy, with that\nextraordinary multiplication of loaves and fishes, which was effected\nby the majesty of Christ in the desert. Let now the vain philosopher\nboast, that he is able to decipher that great mystery, only because\nhe is possessed of a compleat apparatus of faculty phrases; such as\n_seminal virtue, previous dispositions, the corruption of one form, and\nthe introduction of another, attraction of the nutritious juice, the\nconversion of it into the proper substance, vegetation, nutrition_, &c.\nWas Saint Austin peradventure ignorant of those phrases, or of others\nequivalent to them? Yet notwithstanding this, he looked upon that natural\nmultiplication of grain, as an impenetrable mystery. These phrases,\nonly express or describe those operations which are familiar and open\nto our experience; but do not reveal to us, their causes, or the manner\nin which they are performed. The rustics, are acquainted with many more\nterms than we, expressive of the various operations with which nature in\nsuccession, proceeds to perfect that work. Are they peradventure on this\naccount great philosophers? what do I explain, by calling vegetation or\nnutrition, that progression, by which a plant acquires its increase in\nbulk? does this afford me any philosophical knowledge, respecting the\nmanner in which that operation is performed? There are two principal\nthings to be considered in vegetation; the first is, the ascent of\nthe nutritious juice by the fibres of the plant; the second is, the\nconversion of this juice into the vegetable substance; and we perceive in\nthose two things, two great mysteries. If we ask the school philosophers,\nhow the nutritious juice which is ponderous, rises spontaneously to\nthe very uppermost leaves of the highest trees, they will tell us that\nit rises by attraction. And what is this, but placing us in the same\nstate of doubt and difficulty, with respect to the most common work of\nvegetation, that we remain in, with respect to the motion of the iron to\nthe load-stone? Both the one and the other are called attraction, but we\nare equally ignorant, why, or how, the highest leaves of a tree attract\nthe juice which rises from the bowels of the earth, as we are, why or how\nthe load-stone attracts the iron.\n\nLXXXIV. Let us proceed to the second mystery. Who can explain to me, the\nmanner in which a juice that is so exceedingly fluid, subtil, and fine,\nas to be able to circulate through the smallest channels of the fibres,\nis afterwards converted into the solidity of wood or grain; and this\ndifficulty will increase, if we cast our eyes on the other mixtures,\nand reflect, that from another juice, or rather most fluid vapour, is\ngenerated copper and marble. Aristotle had certainly some reason for\nsaying, that nature was the very devil: _Natura d\u00e6monia est, non divina_\n(Lib. de Pr\u00e6sens. per somnum); for by observing her works with attention,\nit seems as if she did every thing by enchantment.\n\n\nSECT. XXII.\n\nLXXXV. It would be even some consolation to us under our ignorance,\nif only the manner, in which nature works in the interior part of\nher operations, was hidden from our eyes; but the most humiliating\ncircumstance is, that it is the same, with respect to every thing that\nimmediately presents itself to our senses. Bodies are familiar to our\ntouch; but hitherto, we have not been able to discover, whether they are\ncomposed of indivisible points, or of parts infinitely divisible; nor to\nwhat it is owing, that one body is hard, and another soft, one solid,\nanother fluid, one opake, and another diaphanous. We are continually\nviewing colours; but we do not yet know, what sort of things colours\nare; whether they are mere reflexions of the light, or whether they are\nintrinsic accidents appertaining to the object. The light illuminates,\nand assists us to see; but we find our understandings greatly obscured,\nwhen we consider the nature of light. Whether we conceive it to be\nsubstance, accident, body, or spirit, none of them are applicable to its\nnature, and still they all seem to be so. And with how many impenetrable\ndoubts and difficulties are we surrounded, when we consider the species\nwhich we call visible? If there is any one difficulty superior to, or any\none inequality more striking than another in the mysteries of physics, I\nwill venture to pronounce this is it. How the visible species of a star\nin the firmament, can in an instant, be translated from the same star to\nour eyes, when it must travel in that instant many thousands of miles, is\nbeyond conception; as is likewise, how this species can exist at one and\nthe same time, in the whole immense space between this and the firmament;\nit being certain, that in all this space, there is not a point, from\nwhich, by taking the view, you will not see the star. How also, contrary\nto the maxim of Aristotle, can many material species, differing only in\nnumber, exist or be seen, from the same point of space; it being certain,\nthat you may from such an identical point, see distinctly, many stars at\nthe same time? I shall omit many other objections, that are not inferior\nor less forcible to these I have urged, against the common opinion,\nthat might be also urged, against the mode of reasoning of the modern\nphilosophers.\n\n\nSECT. XXIII.\n\nLXXXVI. So that we see, our philosophy, from what we call first\nprinciples, down to our ultimate conclusions, is nothing but a\nfabrication, or weaving together of fallible conjectures; and that\neven these conjectures, terminate in nothing more than certain general\nnotions; for the nature of all the specific things, and the greatest part\nof the causes respecting the lowest species, are so far removed from our\npenetration, that we can hardly arrive at attaining a doubtful idea of\nthem. If we hit upon a truth, we owe the knowledge of it to experience,\nand this cannot be called scientific knowledge; for it is derived from\nself-evident principles, which may be comprehended by the most stupid of\nmankind; between whose manner of explaining the matter, if they attempt\ndoing it, and ours, there is only this difference, that we define it in\nterms of art, and they in ordinary and common ones, which are better than\nthe others, because they are more intelligible. This made the learned\nJesuit Claudius Franciscus Dechales say, that our physics consisted of\nnothing but a particular idiom, which conveyed no certain knowledge of\nany thing. (Tom. I. tract. de Progressu Matheseos).\n\nLXXXVII. It is much to be lamented, that those who are called professors\nin the schools, do not know more of the nature of things than the\nvulgar. But what would you think, if I was to say now, they know even\nless? It would seem, as if I was advancing an extravagant paradox; but\nnotwithstanding this, I assert that the proposition is a most true one,\nand may be easily proved; for as experience is the only channel, through\nwhich a knowledge of nature can be conveyed; they must have the best\nexperimental knowledge of natural things, who in various mechanical\noccupations, work up various natural entities; and not those who amuse\nthemselves with speculations, and live retired in schools. A fisherman,\nknows something of the properties of fish; a pilot, of the winds and\nthe tides; a sportsman, of birds and wild animals; and a husbandman, of\nthe generation and increase of plants. But what does the philosopher\nknow? why, he knows how to raise doubts about every thing, and that is\nall. Thus the school of physics is a theatre, where people are taught to\ndoubt without end. I say without end, because it is scarce possible the\nperiod should ever arrive, when they will be able to pass from doubt to\ncertainty. This may be clearly inferred, by their disputing at this day\nwith the same obstinacy, the same questions they disputed two hundred\nyears ago. If any elucidation, or certain knowledge, has been acquired\nwith respect to here and there a physical theorem, we are not indebted\nfor it to the schools, but owe it to the benefit of experience, which\ncomes from the world at large. We may thank the experiments of Torriceli,\nMonsieur Pascal, Otho Guerricus, and Boyle, for our knowledge that the\nair is ponderous. If we are certain, that the blood circulates from the\nheart through the arteries, and is returned by the veins, we owe the\ndiscovery to the anatomical observations of Peter Paul Sarpi and William\nHarvey. If we are clear, that the chyle is not conveyed to the liver, but\nto the heart; what ascertained this truth, but the diligent and practical\nscrutinies of John Paqueto, Thomas Bartolino, and the Englishman Lowther?\nExperience has been the only arbitrator, which has settled some disputes,\nand banished certain errors from the schools; and wherever matters have\nbeen left to speculation and reasoning, the suit still remains depending\nand undetermined. One age and another passes away, and the world during\nthe whole time, has been accustomed to hear the same vociferations, the\nsame arguments, and the same distinctions; and has seen the obstinacy\nof the contending parties, transferred, as if it were by hereditary\nsuccession, from professor to professor, without the least prospect,\neither of victory or reconciliation.\n\n\nSECT. XXIV.\n\nLXXXVIII. From this known ignorance of ours, we may deduce a very useful\nreflexion, which is, to be firm and steady in observing a due subjection\nto the sacred dogmas of faith. The inordinate confidence we place in\nour own reason, is a great enemy to religion. He who estimates his own\nunderstanding at an excessive high rate, rests his faith on the edge of\na precipice; for this vanity has shewn itself very glaringly, in all\nthe heresies we ever knew. In their pursuits of other vices, mankind\nhave taken different turns, but in this they have been all uniform; for\nalthough they have neither been all lascivious, nor all covetous, nor all\nambitious; still in this instance, they have all presumed much on their\nown understanding. And what can be a more efficacious antidote against\nthis mad presumption, than reflecting upon the little or nothing, we have\nbeen able to discover in matters of philosophy? how can he, who knows he\ncannot penetrate the misteries of nature, dare attempt fathoming those of\ngrace? If he reflects, there will result from that reflexion, a distrust\nof his own reason, and he will submit himself obediently to authority.\nThe philosopher Anaxagoras, whom on account of the extraordinary subtilty\nof his ingenuity, they by way of eminence, called the soul or spirit of\nantiquity, after having laboured with infinite industry in philosophy,\nsaid, that nature was all surrounded with clouds and darkness.\n_Anaxagoras pronuntiat circumfussa esse tenebris omnia._ (Lactant. lib.\niii. Divin. Instit. cap. 28.) And I must observe, that this philosopher,\nwho knew nature was impenetrable to his understanding, was the first of\nall the philosophers, if we believe Aristotle, Laertius, and Plutarch,\nwho declared himself convinced of the indispensable necessity of a\nsupreme intelligence, who must be the author and director of the whole.\nOn the other hand, those who boasted, and flattered themselves that they\nhad discovered all the mysteries and profundities of nature, for the most\npart, denied either the existence, or the providence of a deity.\n\nLXXXIX. I can with truth say of myself, that next to the divine grace,\na conviction of my own ignorance with regard to natural things, is\nthe most powerful weapon I could ever discover, wherewith to overcome\nall those difficulties or objections, which natural reason suggests,\nagainst the mysteries of faith. I often say to myself, good God! how\ncan I understand those wonders, which by using his extraordinary power,\nare wrought by the omnipotent hand, if I cannot comprehend, the common\neffects of his ordinary power? It is true, I am ignorant how, or by\nwhat means, a divine person can unite himself to human nature; but I am\nalso ignorant, how a spiritual soul can be united to a material body.\nNotwithstanding which, this is a matter of fact, and happens within\nmyself. Neither do I perceive, how the same water which falls from\nheaven, should be converted, not only into here and there a particular\nbody, but into all the animal and vegetable substances upon earth. In the\nmost plausible part of theological controversy, I find myself exceedingly\nembarrassed; for if I take the side of providence, I am assailed with\nthe forcible arguments in favour of liberty; and if I put myself on the\nside of liberty, they wage powerful war against me with the arguments in\nfavour of providence. But do not I see the same arguments, urged with\ngreater vehemence, in the vulgar philosophical controversy respecting the\ncomposition and unity of universal space, in which, whatever sentiment is\nmaintained, they instead of answering their opponents arguments, perplex\nthe dispute with a multiplicity of words? If I defend, with Aristotle,\nthe infinite divisibility of universal space, although to avoid being\nconcluded, I don\u2019t do it with my mouth, I cannot in my mind, help\nacknowledging the unity of a great number of its parts; and if with Zeno\nI acquiesce in the indivisibility, the mathematical arguments derived\nfrom the diagonal of a square, two concentric wheels united, and many\nother principles, not only leave me without an answer, but in a manner\nstrike me dumb.\n\nXC. I say again, if in those natural things that are open to our view,\nand which we touch with our hands every day, there occur a thousand\ndifficulties, that are insuperable to, and beyond the reach of our\nunderstandings, have we not the greatest reason to suppose, that the\nsame thing happens with respect to supernatural matters, they being\ntotally superior to the sphere of our senses? If, maugre all my prying,\nI can\u2019t perceive how God does an infinite number of things, which I see\nhim do every day, would it not be madness in me, to deny or to doubt\nthe existence of revealed things, only because I can\u2019t descry how God\nexecutes those things?\n\nIf there was a man so short-sighted, that he could not see objects that\nwere very near him, and should pretend that he saw those which were at\nthe distance of a hundred miles from his eyes, or else should take it\ninto his head to insist, that such objects, although they are well known\nto be _in esse_, do not exist, only because he can\u2019t see them, would\nnot all the world pronounce him a lunatic? This is exactly the same\nsort of madness as that of those who deny there are divine mysteries,\nonly because they can\u2019t comprehend or pry into them. Little vain stupid\nman, if the fabric of those material compositions which are ever before\nyour eyes, and are at all times familiar to your touch, is totally\nimpenetrable to your short and limited capacity, how can you expect to\ncomprehend the ineffable manner, in which Omnipotence performs those\nsupernatural wonders? You will tell me, that you can find no solution of\nthe arguments, which the Gentile urges to you against the mystery of the\nTrinity, or against that of the Incarnation; and I answer, that neither\ncan you find any, to those the philosopher urges against the composition\nof universal space, take which side of the question you will, and suppose\nit to be made up, of either divisible, or indivisible matter; but would\nyou conclude from thence, that it is not composed of either one or the\nother? you certainly would not; and it would be equal, if not greater\ndelirium, to deny the truth of those mysteries, only because you can\u2019t\nanswer, and remove the objections that are made to them. Is it fit, that\nan Infinite Power should proportion his works, to the limited measure\nof your understanding? or is it reasonable to suppose that God can do\nnothing, which you can\u2019t comprehend?\n\nXCI. No north wind, so quickly disperses the clouds which interrupt the\nrays of the sun, as these reflexions clear up the doubts, which natural\nreason opposes to the mysteries of faith. Leave then the presumptuous\ndogmatists to chew their scepticism, and to make the most of the\nobjections it furnishes against religion. But the sort of scepticism,\nwhich is precisely limited and confined to physics, is so far from\nprejudicing faith, that it serves to confirm and rivet it; by removing\nthe obstacles, which the presumption of natural reason throws in the way,\nto interrupt the effect of that humble docility, which is so necessary,\nto preserve the understanding in a due state of subjection to the\nauthority of revelation.\n\nXCII. Those men do great injury, not only to philosophy, but to the\nchurch also, who rashly endeavour, to interest the doctrine of revelation\nin the defence of their particular philosophical opinions. This the\nheretics lay hold of, to calumniate us with converting philosophical\nsentiments, into articles of faith; and by this artifice, they persuade\ntheir followers, that our belief is arduous, and unnecessarily\ncomplicated. Upon this presumption, some strangers found their\nassertions, when they accuse us of countenancing idiotism, and mixing it\nwith religion. It is but a little while ago, that one of them declared\nin his writings, that the opinions of men in Spain were not more free,\nthan their persons were in Turkey. In order to preserve a due respect for\nsacred things, it is necessary, not to confound them with profane ones;\nwhoever should begin to erect habitations in temples, would be the author\nof temples losing that respectful reverence that ought to be preserved\nin them. There are judges appertaining to the church, whose province it\nis, to determine what doctrines are useful, what pernicious, and what\nindifferent. Let us then leave the decision of those matters to them, and\ndon\u2019t let those who sincerely seek the truth, be terrified and disturbed\nby those scare-crows that are set up by partiality and faction, and\nsometimes by the pride of those, who have given their names to particular\nschools, or by the envy of others, who could not arrive at doing so much.\n\n\nSECT. XXV.\n\nXCIII. We having shewn now, that we possess no physical science or\ndemonstrative knowledge of natural things, we may entertain a reasonable\ndoubt whether we shall ever be able to attain any such. The most learned\nValles, is clear that we shall not; because physical knowledge is\nconfined to singular things, and alledges that from singular things, you\ncan\u2019t derive a science. But as we have observed before, this argument is\nill founded, and insufficient.\n\nXCIV. We might lay more stress upon two authorities the sceptics alledge\nin their favour, which are taken from the Ecclesiastes. The first is from\nChap. III. in these words. _Cuncta fecit bona in tempore suo, et mundum\ntradidit disputationi eorum, ut non inveniat homo opus, quod operatus est\nDeus ab initio usque ad finem._ The second is more formal and precise,\nand taken from Chap. VIII. _Et intellexi, quod omnium operum Dei nullam\npossit homo invenire rationem eorum, qu\u00e6 sunt sub sole: et quant\u00f2 plus\nlaboraverit ad qu\u00e6rendum, tant\u00f2 minus inveniat, etiamsi dixerit sapiens\nse nosse, non poterit reperire._ But in truth, these texts, when they\naffirm the impossibility of discovering the causes and reason of natural\neffects, may be understood to allude to the providential, and not to\nthe natural or physical ones. In fact, this is the sense in which some\nfathers and expositors understand them.\n\nXCV. Others again argue, that the desire of knowing the causes of\nnatural effects, is natural to, and implanted in man by nature itself;\nand as a natural desire can\u2019t prompt a man to an impossible inquiry,\nit follows, that attaining the science we are speaking of, is within\nthe compass of possibility. To this argument, Valles replies, it is\nabsolutely possible; and although not in this life, it is in that to\ncome, at which period, the blessed will see with God all things most\nclearly. This solution is attended with the following difficulty, that a\nnatural desire can\u2019t be directed to an impossible object; neither can it\nterminate in a supernatural one; and the knowledge the blessed will have\nof supernatural things, must be entitively supernatural, because it will\ndepend immediately on the light of glory. Upon the whole, we may suppose,\nthat there may belong to the soul in a state of separation from the\nbody, abstracted from the supernatural blessing of the light of glory, a\ncertain knowledge of all material things, in consequence of the species,\ninfused in the course and order of nature; which is the sentiment of\nEgidius Romanus, Father Saurez, and others; and this knowledge being\nnatural, may possibly be the effect of the thirst we possess for\nacquiring it in this mortal life.\n\nXCVI. But we can\u2019t help remarking, that the foregoing argument does\nnot stand in need of this solution, because it proceeds upon a false\nsupposition not adverted to by Valles; which is, that the desire of\nknowing things philosophically, is a principle implanted in man by\nnature. If this was so, all men would be impressed with this desire,\nwhich is not the case; for the greatest part of them seem to have no\npassion at all for physics; and many despise philosophical speculations,\nas useless, vain, and by no means entertaining. It is true, that all\nmen are desirous of knowledge, but this desire is not directed in all\nof them to the same object, or to the same species of objects. Generous\nsouls are naturally lovers of truth; but the majority, are only anxious\nto understand those things, the knowledge of which, may contribute to the\ngratification of their passions.\n\nXCVII. We have seen the little force of the arguments urged on both\nsides, with respect to the doubts we have been canvassing. On which\naccount, I won\u2019t venture to give sentence in the question. Nor do I,\nnor can any one else without the assistance of Revelation, know the\njust limits of the human understanding with regard to natural things.\nAnd although the various philosophical systems which have hitherto been\ninvented, are exposed to great doubts, or are impeachable of containing\nmanifest nullities in them, who knows but that, in future some one may\nbe discovered so compleat, and so well founded, that the understanding\nmay be convinced of the truth of it. My opinion is, that if this is ever\nto be accomplished, it must be done by pursuing the plan and method\nprescribed by my Lord Bacon. It is true, that this is so laborious\nand prolix, that the execution of it may be apprehended to be morally\nimpossible; for although the monarchs of two very powerful kingdoms,\nFrance and England, for the space of more than a hundred years, have\ncaused four hundred able men, at a great expence, and under proper\nregulations, to be employed in making innumerable experiments, and in\nreasoning upon, and explaining them, the work is not yet far advanced;\nwhen then may we expect to see it accomplished? The Academy of Sciences\nat Paris, and the Royal Society of London, don\u2019t amount to more than a\nshred of my Lord Bacon\u2019s extensive project.\n\n\n\n\nOn the Shew or Affectation of Learning and Knowledge.\n\n\nSECT. I.\n\nI. Science, like Virtue, has its imitators and its hypocrites; and the\nvulgar are as much imposed upon by the one as the other. The numbers of\nunlearned people who pass for men of literature, is considerable; and the\nfalse appearances they put on, becomes a copious source of errors, both\nparticular and common. In this earthly region which we inhabit, apparent\nlearning is as much reverenced, and often-times as much respected, as\ntrue. There are those, who are very expert at putting on the semblance of\nlearned men, and of imposing themselves as such upon the world, although\nthe portion of literature they possess is but very small; however, if\nthey have the address to make their copied imitation of it appear an\noriginal painting, the copy will often make the same impression on\nmens minds, as if it actually was an original. When Zeuxis with his\npencil imitated grapes, the birds flew with as much eagerness to eat the\npainted, as if they had been real and natural grapes.\n\nII. In the eleventh century, Arnoldus Brixiens, who was a man of but\nlittle literature, did great mischief with his errors, both in his own\ncountry, and even in Rome itself; for as Gunterus Ligurinus observes,\nthat besides being an elegant reasoner, he had the address of giving\nhimself the air and appearance of a man of learning; _Assumpta sapientis\nfronte, disserto fallebat sermone rudes_; or as Otho Frinsingens\nremarks, a copious verbosity passed in him for knowledge and erudition;\n_Vir quidem natur\u00e6 non hebetis; plus tamen verborum profluvio, quam\nsententiarum pondere copiosus._ Thus Vigilantius, although he was\nan ignorant man, by his art in gaining over to him booksellers and\npublishers, who were the proclaimers of his fame, so far acquired the\nreputation of a person of literature, that he had the assurance to write\nagainst Saint Jerom, and to accuse him of being an Origenist.\n\nIII. The vulgar, who are incompetent judges of men of letters, are apt,\nalthough it is against their own interest, to countenance and give\ncredit to unlearned persons, whose deceptions in consequence of this\nencouragement become formidable. The delusion of popular ignorance is apt\nto magnify a very small light, into the blaze of a flaming torch; and to\nfancy it is as luminous, as the lanthorn placed on the top of the tower\nof Pharos, which Pliny says, at a great distance off, appears like a star\nto those who navigate the sea of Alexandria.\n\nIV. It may not be improperly remarked, that in order for a man to be\nesteemed a person of learning with the populace, it is not so necessary\nthat he should really be one, as that he should put on the pompous\nappearance of such a person. Arrogance and verbosity, if they are\naccompanied with a small degree of discernment, that helps a man to\njudge, when are the proper times to talk, and when to hold his tongue,\nand what are the subjects he should discourse, and what be silent upon:\nI say, if he has a little discretion to know how to conduct himself\nin these particulars, such management will have a notable effect. A\nconfident magisterial air in his decisions, and an artificial gesture,\nwhich when he sprinkles about the little he understands of the subject he\nis talking upon, and which seems to indicate that he has an infinitely\ngreater stock of knowledge of the matter treasured up in his inside; such\naffected appearances, I say, will have great weight and efficacy to\nfascinate the ignorant vulgar.\n\n\nSECT. II.\n\nV. On the other hand, men of true learning, are modest and candid;\nbut these two virtues, are enemies, and also great obstacles to the\nadvancement of their fame. He who knows most, is sensible, that what\nhe really knows, falls greatly short of what he is ignorant of. His\ndiscretion teaches him this, and his sincerity induces him to confess\nit; but his acting in this manner, greatly obstructs his gaining the\napplause of the world; for these confessions have the same effect, that\nthe evidence of those have, who bear witness against themselves; that is,\nthey are readily believed; and although it is impossible for any man to\nknow every thing, the vulgar are very unwilling to esteem him learned,\nwho owns himself ignorant of the least matter in his own profession.\n\nVI. Men of learning, are also most commonly timid, because they are apt\nto be diffident of themselves; so that although all they say should be\ndivine, if it is pronounced with a tremulous tongue, and a faltering\nvoice, it makes no impression on those who listen to them. A man would\ngain more credit with the world in general, by talking loud, and making\nextravagant bold assertions, than by reasoning diffidently, and as if\nhe was not quite clear; for the estimation due to discreet doubts has\nalways been suppressed, and in consequence of this suppression, has\ncontributed to countenance errors, and beget false conclusions. How has a\npresumptuous ignorant fellow, frequently availed himself of his imposing\ngesture, and the loudness of his voice? and how much by the strength\nof his lungs has he often concealed the weakness of his argument? But\nin truth, the noise made by a vociferous person, ought to render his\nsolidity suspected; because men, like other sonorous machines, are\nloudest the more hollow and empty they are.\n\nVII. If to these imposing appearances, there happens to be joined\na moderate portion of literature, it has a most powerful effect to\ncaptivate the vulgar, and to gain popular applause. In the instance of\nLuther, who although he might truly and properly be stiled a man of\nlearning, still the forcible manner in which he delivered himself, added\nto his address, may be supposed to have contributed more to the success\nof his preaching, than his literature.\n\n\nSECT. III.\n\nVIII. There are qualities also, which give people the reputation of able\nand learned men, when in reality they are quite the reverse. Gravity\nand circumspection, whether they are natural or artificial, contribute\nmuch to produce this effect. Gravity, says Magdalen Scuderi in one of\nher moral conversations, is a bodily mystery, invented to conceal the\ndefects of the mind; and if it is carried to excess, elevates the person\nwho wears this appearance, to the rank of an oracle. But I can see no\nreason why a person on this account, should be esteemed more than a man,\nbecause that the nearer he resembles a statue, he in reality is by so\nmuch less than a man; nor why risibility, being the distinguished mark\nof rationality, he should be esteemed the most rational, who is the\nleast addicted to laughter. The ingenious French author Montaigne, says\npleasantly, that among the whole brute creation, there is no animal so\ngrave as an ass.\n\nIX. Aristotle considered melancholy as a token of ingenuity. But I can\u2019t\ntell why he did this; for every day\u2019s experience convinces us, that\nthere are melancholy people who are very dull and stupid. If we were to\njudge of things as they appear to us at first sight, we might be easily\ninduced to confound the stupid with the thoughtful, and to mistake the\none for the other. People of dark and gloomy geniuses, have in some\nmeasure, the air and appearance of profound thinkers; but if we reflect,\nwe shall be convinced, that insociability is not a characteristic quality\nappertaining to a rational being. In those who look as if they were\nalways absorbed in thought, the negotiation or operation of the interior\npart of the soul seems to be inverted. Instead of the understanding\nsurveying and contemplating the species, the species seem to seize upon,\nand take possession of the understanding; and instead of the mind being\nmaster of the object, the object appears as if it was master of the mind;\nand the species that appear to seize upon it seem as if they bound it\ndown, and kept it confined. A person in this state should not be said to\nbe contemplative, but ought more properly to be compared to a man that is\nstunned; the immobility of whose thoughts, keeps his reason in a state\nof suspence. I observe, that there is no brute of a more festive and\nsociable disposition than a dog; and that there is no one which is endued\nwith a more noble instinct; yet, maugre this experience, I look upon the\nopposite extreme to excessive gravity to be the worst symptom of the\ntwo; for men who are always giggling and bantering, are generally very\nsuperficial.\n\nX. But both the silent and the loquacious have their partizans. Some\nconsider men of few words to be the most sagacious, and others give the\npreference to those who are rather prodigal in their use of them. The\ntalking but little, is occasioned either by excessive caution, or by\nfear, or else is the effect of modesty, and the want of a ready flow of\nwords; but not, as is commonly thought, does this indicate a want of\nknowledge. There is no man, who if he was to speak all he thinks, or that\noccurs to him, would not talk a great deal.\n\nXI. There are some, who observe an artificial medium between talking\nand holding their tongues, which is very well adapted to attract the\nveneration of the vulgar; that is, they speak with confidence upon\nsuch things as they understand, and take care to be silent upon such\nas they are ignorant of; but this they do, in a manner as if their\nsilence proceeded from reserve, and an unwillingness to enter upon the\nsubject. By these artifices, men of very moderate capacities, and whose\ninformations are very limited, pass themselves upon the world for persons\nof deep penetration, and a sort of walking libraries; and although they\nare possessed of only a very minute or abstracted portion of whatever is\nthe subject of conversation, they engage in the argument in very general\nterms, always taking care not to advance too far, and to retreat in time;\nwhich they do in a manner, as if they were tired of talking further upon\nthe question at present, and therefore would be glad to postpone it,\nto be discussed more at large another time. In reality, they have said\nall they know, but behave in this manner, in order to have it thought\nthey have only given a small specimen of their knowledge of the thing;\nalthough, like the painter who undertook to paint the eleven thousand\nvirgins, but never finished more than five of them, and declared that all\nthe rest should be supposed coming behind in procession, they would be\nglad, that what they have already said should conclude the debate; still,\nif any one, aware of their tricks, should then press them to a further\ndiscussion of the point, they either artfully turn the conversation, or\naffect a scornful dislike to discussing so weighty a matter before so\nthin an audience; or else get rid of the invitation made to them, with\na disdainful smile, and treat both the proposal and the proposer, as if\nthey were beneath their notice. These people are very ready at such sort\nof expedients, because they study them much, and have a great deal of\npractice in them.\n\nXII. There are others again, who have recourse to ambiguous and confused\nexpressions; which seem to say a great deal, when in reality they\nsay nothing; and which, like the answers of the oracles of old, are\napplicable to all kinds of events. In fact, they may be termed the images\nof those oracles; for although they are listened to with attention, they\nare little better than mere stocks or stones. The obscurity with which\nthey talk is a dark shade, that conceals what they are ignorant of; and\nthey make use of the stratagem of those who have no other but false\nmoney; that is, take care to pass it off under the cover of the night.\nBut notwithstanding all these glaring appearances, there are not wanting\nweak people, who esteem their embarrassment and confusion as marks of\ntheir learning, and who think, that men are like mountains, which the\nmore elevated and sublime they are, the more liable to be covered with\nclouds, and to cause dark shades which obstruct the fertility, and\nobscure the chearful appearance of the vallies.\n\n    _Majoresque cadunt altis de montibus umbr\u00e6._\n\nXIII. This deception, is commonly kept up and assisted by a persuasive\ncarriage, and by certain mysterious gestures and distortions of the\nfeatures; such as wrinkling the forehead, knitting the eye-brows, rolling\nthe eyes, swelling out the cheeks, thrusting forth the under-lip, and\nshaking the head; all which affected tokens of wisdom and importance,\nare displayed and accompanied, with a kind of disdainful countenance.\nThese are a sort of men, who have more than half the wisdom they seem to\npossess lodged in their features and muscles, which serve them to exhibit\nand express these symptoms of profundity. Tully very justly ridiculed\nthis artifice in Pison in the following words: _Respondes, altero ad\nfrontem sublato, altero ad mentem depresso supercilio, crudelitatem tibi\nnon placere._\n\n\nSECT. IV.\n\nXIV. Men, by affecting to despise others who know more than themselves,\nmake use of the most vile and mean artifices imaginable; but\nnotwithstanding this, it is the most sure method, to make them pass for\npersons of great knowledge, among people of groveling and plebeian minds.\nThere can be no greater injustice committed, nor a vainer effort made,\nthan that, of an envious man\u2019s attempting to transfer the merit which he\nhas purloined from another person to himself. It is true, that a small\ncloud may obstruct the splendor of the sun; but this obstruction does\nnot prevent this luminary from being the illustrious torch of heaven,\nnor can such a circumstance be of more consequence than a speck in the\natmosphere; nor does it require any science or learning, to enable a\nman to cast a thousand reflections and blemishes upon other people\u2019s\ndoctrines and writings. When there is no reason to conclude that such\nbehaviour proceeds from envy or malevolence, we ought to suppose that\nit springs from pure ignorance. I remember to have read in a Treatise\nintitled The Man of Letters, written by Father Daniel Bartoli, that an\nass once happening to stumble over the Iliad of Homer, he in a passion\ntore it to pieces with his teeth. Thus, in order to outrage, abuse, and\ndestroy a noble writing, nothing is better qualified than a beast.\n\nXV. Being tenacious, insolent, and overbearing in argument, is also\nanother means, which, although it is equally base and bad with the\nbeforementioned, is sometimes very efficacious to gain a person\nthe reputation of being a learned man.\u2014Foolish people, such as the\nMegalopolitans, of whom we have an account in Pausanias, pay greater\nveneration to Boreas the god of the north-wind than to any other\ndeity, and are apt to adore tumultuous geniuses as beings of supreme\nintelligence; and although it is absolutely irreconcileable and\nincompatible with it, to look upon barefaced arrogance as the child of\nsuperior learning. To this we may add another thing, that may have an\neffect to make them pass for wise and able persons, which is, that those\nwho are truly learned, avoid as much as possible, all controversy or\ndispute with people who are of this tenacious overbearing disposition;\nand this prudent declining to contend with them, is often construed into\nfear of engaging them; as if it was necessary for men of learning, in\norder to shew their spirit, to encounter reptiles and venomous snakes.\nCato\u2019s lamentation, or repentance, was just and generous, when he\nregretted having led his troops into the burning deserts of Africa, where\nthey had no other enemies to encounter but asps, horned serpents, vipers,\nfiery serpents, and basilisks. The horrors of the civil war in the plains\nof Pharsalia, where they engaged the invincible troops of C\u00e6sar, appeared\nto him less frightful, than those they experienced among the burning\nsands of Libya, where the most vile and abominable reptiles fought on\nC\u00e6sar\u2019s side,\n\n          _Pro C\u00e6sare pugnant_\n    _Dipsades, et peragunt civilia bella Cerast\u00e6._\n\nXVI. He who can reconcile it to himself, to be inflexible in argument,\nand to dispute without end, and with all his might, never suffering\nhimself to be convinced by reason, has made a large stride towards\nbeing reputed an Aristotle among the vulgar; for they, with respect to\nthe wars of Minerva, as well as those of Mars, are apt to declare the\nvictory, in favour of him who remains longest in the field, and, in their\nopinion, he never fails to come off conqueror, who has the last word.\nThis is the way the vulgar judge; but he who would be thought superior to\nthat class of people, must permit himself to be convinced by reason, for,\nif he does not, instead of acquiring the reputation of a learned man by\nsuch conduct, he lets himself down to the level of a brute.\n\nThe ingenious Doctor Luis Rodriguez, being asked what sort of a man a\nshallow physician was with whom he had been arguing, answered pleasantly,\n(although we must allow his wit favoured of the arrogance which is rather\ntoo common with the Portuguese) _He is so great an ass, that goad him\never so much, it is impossible to make him get on, or be the better for\nany reasoning that is bestowed on him._\n\nXVII. It is also a very common artifice with those who know but little,\nto bring the conversation to turn upon that little they are informed of.\nThis is very easy for people of power or authority to do. I knew a person\nof this sort myself, who, whatever conversation happened to arise in\ncompany, was used to train the subject of it insensibly, to fall on the\nfew points relative to it, which he had been reading or studying that\nday, or the day before, by which piece of management, he generally used\nto appear more learned than the rest of the company. Even in scholastic\ndisputes, this art is often practised. I have more than twice in my life,\nseen a good theologian foiled by a novice; who, by artfully sliding some\nchimerical proposition into the dispute, has drawn the argument from its\nproper object, and caused it to fall into a sumulistical labyrinth of\namplifications, restrictions, alienations, oppositions, conversions, and\nequipolations; the rules of which were fresh in the young man\u2019s memory,\nand which the old theologian had forgot. This was adopting the craft of\nthe rogue Cacus, who, having artfully drawn Hercules into his own cave,\nrendered his arms and superior strength of no use to him, by blinding him\nwith the smoak he continued to eject out of his mouth.\n\n\nSECT. V.\n\nXVIII. Besides the visionary wise people, or those which are such in\nappearance only, there are others who have credit given them for being\nmen of profound knowledge, merely from the mistakes and misapprehensions\nof others. He who studies logic and metaphysics in the schools, together\nwith those other matters, which under the denomination of philosophy are\ntaught there, notwithstanding the sounding names, of these faculties,\nand his being supposed to know every thing, in reality, knows but little\nmore than nothing. It is commonly said, that such a man is a great\nphilosopher, when in truth he is no philosopher at all, either great\nor little. All the ten categorical principles, together with the whole\ncontents of the eight books on physics, and their two adjuncts _on\ngeneration and corruption_, put into a logical alembic, would not produce\na drop of true philosophical spirit, that would assist us to explain the\nmost vulgar phenomenon in the sensible world. The Aristotelic ideas,\nhave no more to do with physics, than the Platonic ones; and the physics\nof the schools, are pure metaphysics. All that the Peripatetics have\nhitherto written or disputed concerning motion, has not determined, what\nis the line of reflection, by which a ball returns back that is struck\nagainst a wall, or what is the degree of velocity, with which a heavy\nbody descends by an inclined plane. He who by the ordinary metaphysical\nreasonings, thinks to attain a true knowledge of nature, is as mad, as he\nwho should fancy himself master of the world, because he is possessed of\na map of it.\n\nXIX. The great advantage of these philosophers in name, if in the schools\nthey manage with dexterity the rules of science, consists in this, that\nin virtue of the four species or rudiments of theology or medicine\nthey acquire there, they are enabled to dazzle the eyes of mankind,\nand to pass in the world, for great theologians and doctors of physic.\nWith respect to theology, the mistake in this matter is not so great;\nbut with regard to medicine, it cannot be greater. By the rule, _Ubi\ndesinit physicus, incipit medicus_, it seems as if it should follow of\ncourse, that a good philosopher is easily made a good doctor of physic.\nUpon this supposition, when people see a practising physician, who has\ntwenty syllogisms at his fingers ends, ready to explain and demonstrate,\nwhether privation is a principle annexed to a natural entity, or whether\nthe united mass or the whole, can be of a distinct or different texture\nfrom the parts, they fancy he is possessed of all the requisites and\nrecommendations, that are necessary to establish and fix him as a most\nable, or first rate man in his profession.\n\nXX. That most learned commentator upon Discorides, Andrew de Laguna,\nsays, that if it could conveniently be done, it would be good policy\nto send those flaming young physicians, who are just come from the\nuniversity, brimful of the bragadocio arrogance of _ergo_ and _probo_, to\npractise physic in those nations we are at war with, for that it would be\nattended with a great saving, both of men and money, to our own country.\n\nXXI. I can with confidence affirm, that there is no art or faculty,\nthat can be less conducive to the acquisition of medicinal knowledge,\nthan the physics of the schools. If all the philosophers that are,\nor ever were in the world, could be convened together, and remain in\nconsultation for a hundred years, they would not in all that time, by the\nmere help of philosophical speculations, be able to instruct us how we\nshould cure a chilblain; nor from that tumultuous consultation, should\nwe obtain any maxim, that ought not to be prohibited as contraband, and\nrefused admittance into the chamber of a sick person. Good sense joined\nto experience, either acquired by a man\u2019s own, or the practice of other\nreputable people, are both the father and mother of medicinal knowledge;\nnor has physics, that is to say the physics of the schools, the least\nshare in the propagation of this species.\n\nXXII. The reasoning of naturalists upon all kinds of mixtures,\nconsists, in whether they are constituted of matter and substantial\nforms according to the doctrine of Aristotle, or of atoms according\nto that of Epicurus, or of salt, sulphur, and mercury, according to\nthat of the chymists, or of the three elements, according to that of\nthe Cartesians: whether these are composed of undivisible points, or\nof parts dividable _in infinitum_; whether their action or operation\nis from their texture, or the motion of their particles, or from some\naccidental virtues which they call qualities; whether these qualities are\nof the manifest or the occult kind; and whether they are of the first,\nsecond, or third class or species. Now what has all this to do with\nmedicine? I will venture to pronounce no more, or rather less, than it\nhas with geometry or jurisprudence. When a physician goes about to cure\na tertian ague, all this farrago of questions applied to the operations\nor effect of the bark, is of no sort of use to him. The only thing that\nis of any importance for him to know, is, whether his experience has\ntaught him, that in the present state of the disorder, it will be proper\nto administer this febrifuge; but this he is to infer, not from the\nmaxims, _dici de omni, dici de nullo_; but from conviction, drawn from\nexperiments he has made himself of its efficacy in the like cases, and\nalso from those, which have been made by physicians of eminence who have\nwrote on the subject.\n\nXXIII. In no art whatever, is it of any use, to have a physical knowledge\nof the implements, with, or by which, a man does his business. A man\nmay be an excellent pilot, without being able to explain the directive\nvirtue of the load-stone to the pole; and a great soldier, although he\nis totally ignorant of the physical component parts of gunpowder, and\nthe metal with which military implements are made; and he may be a great\npainter, without knowing whether colours consist of intrinsic accidents,\nor whether they are produced by the various reflections of light. Nor\ndoes the being able to argue well upon these points, conduce in the\nleast degree, to make a man either a pilot, a soldier, or a painter. But\nthere is no necessity for my enlarging further, in order to extirpate\nthis common error from the world, as the learned Doctor Martinez, has\nfully and effectually exploded it in his two volumes, intitled Medicina\nSceptica.\n\n\nSECT. VI.\n\nXXIV. There is another common error respecting the subject-matter of this\nEssay, although the opinion built upon it, is rather better founded than\nthe one we have just been speaking of, and that is, looking upon every\nman as wise, able, and skilful, who has studied a great deal. The labour\nof study, seldom makes any great improvements, if it is not bestowed on\na clear and penetrating natural understanding; and may be compared to\nthe toils and expences of cultivation, that are employed upon a poor and\nnearly barren soil, which seldom produce much fruit. Among mankind, are\nto be found the turtles and the eagles of the human species. The last,\nwith a speedy and easy flight, ascend to the summit of Olympus; the\nfirst, after several days labour, shall not be able to reach to the top\nof a moderate hill.\n\nXXV. Much time employed in reading, furnishes a man with a deal of\nmatter; but the being able to penetrate, or rightly comprehend that\nmatter, is more a gift of nature, than a production from toil. There are\nsome, who may be termed learned from their memories, but who are not so\nin virtue of their understandings, and who may be compared to marble\ntablets with inscriptions engraved on them, which display the letters,\nbut do not perceive them. They are a kind of mental books, that are\nfilled with many texts, which they no more comprehend, or have a right\nidea of the meaning of, than the leaves on which they are written. If\nyou observe the use or application they make of the species they have\nacquired, you will perceive, they deduce no proper conclusions from what\nthey have read, nor make any observations on the things they have been\nperusing, that are pertinent or applicable to the subject-matter of those\nthings. Thus we see, that from the same species or set of ideas, may be\nformed good reasoning and bad; just as with the same sort of materials,\nyou may build elegant palaces, and rustic habitations.\n\nXXVI. Thus it may also happen, that a man shall know all the works\nof Saint Thomas by heart, and be a very poor theologian; and that he\nshall in the same manner, know all the statutes of the civil and canon\nlaw, and be a very bad lawyer. And although it is commonly said, that\nlaw-knowledge depends almost intirely upon memory, or at least, that\nit depends more upon memory than understanding, yet I consider this as\nanother common error. With a great many law-cases and maxims at his\nfingers ends, a man may draw a very bad plea; in the same manner as one,\nalthough his memory is stored with a vast variety of texts of scripture,\nmay make a very bad sermon. The choice of the most fit to apply to the\nsubject, depends upon the understanding, and not upon the memory. If men\nwere obliged to do law-business by surprize, and without having time to\nconsider and digest what they were about, a happy memory, in which were\ntreasured up pertinent texts and citations, would be a most essential\ningredient, and one, that it is almost indispensably necessary they\nshould be possessed of. But as this, in the regular course of practice,\nis not the case; he who has attended properly to the best books that have\nbeen written on the profession, and has a good general idea of them,\nwill seldom be at a loss where to look for apt cases and authorities,\nwherewith to support his arguments; and as I observed before, the choice\nof those which are the most conducive to this end, is more the business\nof understanding, than memory.\n\nXXVII. I have observed, that professional people in all faculties and\nsciences, have a great propensity to complain of the want of memory, and\nI have also observed, that they are apt to set a much higher value upon\nthe gift of memory, than the power of reasoning; so that it appears to\nme, that if there were to be two shops opened, in one of which was sold\nmemory, and in the other understanding, the man who kept the first would\nsoon make a fortune, and he who kept the second, would not take as much\nmoney as would buy him salt to his porridge. But my opinion, was always\nquite different from this common notion, and I can say for myself, that\nI set more value upon a drachm of understanding, than upon an ounce of\nmemory. I have been told, that I do not estimate memory at a high rate,\nbecause I have no occasion for it; but it is possible that those who told\nme this, may judge of me by themselves, who are not anxious about an\nincrease of talents or ingenuity, because they fancy they are abundantly\nprovided with all they stand in need of. I would not pretend to be\nendowed with a great share of memory, but I however think, I am rather\nbetter furnished in that respect, than I am in point of understanding;\nbut I do not set a greater value on the last of these faculties on that\naccount, nor does it proceed from my being anxious of an increase of\nit to myself, that I set a higher value upon understanding, than I do\nupon memory; but I give this preference from a persuasion, that in all\nthe ordinary occurrences of life, understanding will afford a man more\nassistance, and be of infinitely greater use to him than memory.\n\n\nSECT. VII.\n\nXXVIII. We have not as yet, said any thing of authors or writers; but\nthis semblance of learning, is the easiest to put on of all others.\nThere is no more difficulty in writing ill, than there is in talking ill;\nand provided a man writes in the _bon ton_, and can flourish with the\nking\u2019s licence in the front of his work, the book will go off, and the\nauthor will pass with the ideots of the world, for a learned, and an able\nman.\n\nXXIX. But a person may make sure of gaining applause as an author with\nthe generality of mankind, and this may be done in two ways, either by\nfilling his writing with common-place observations, and just taking care\nto diversify and scatter them about; or else by stealing from other\nauthors; and where there are great numbers of books to have recourse to,\nthe danger of being detected in the plagiary is not very considerable;\nfor there are very few who read many books, and nobody can read all\nthat are published; so that all the hazard a person runs of being found\nout, is, that here and there one out of many thousands of readers, may\ndiscover from whence he made the theft; and among all the rest, he would\npass for an original author, and they would acknowledge and respect him\nas such.\n\nXXX. The writing from alphabetical compilations is also extremely easy.\nThere is the Theatre of human life, the Polyantheas, and many other\nbooks, where erudition is arranged under the initial letters of the\nseveral branches of learning, and these books, by having copious indexes\nannexed to them, become a kind of public fountains, where all the\nanimals of the world may drink, both men and beasts. Whatever subject\na man undertakes to write upon, be it politics, morality, humanity,\nor history, he has only to turn to the index, which will point out to\nhim, where he may be furnished with a copious assortment of texts, and\ncitations, that are amassed together in these books for the use of all\nthe world, and where he may collect whatever he has occasion for. By this\nmanagement, the new author may gain himself the reputation of a man of\ngreat erudition and reading; for there are very few who can distinguish\nby the connection and regular series of a writing, that kind of copious\nerudition, which is well arranged and properly separated in the brain,\nand which flows opportunely from thence to the pen; from that, which a\nman when he is hard put to it, is obliged to collect from indexes and\ncommon-place books, with which he swells his work, and with which he\nheaps up in it, gross and bulky trifles, that consist of straw and chaff,\ncollected from common-place Latin citations and numbers.\n\n\n\n\nMORAL AND POLITICAL PARADOXES.\n\n\nPARADOX I.\n\n_The Invention of Gun-powder has been of great Use, and also very\nbeneficial to Mankind._\n\nI. If in the account which Virgil gives of the descent of \u00c6neas into\nhell, he points out, as one of the most tormented and afflicted he saw\nthere, Salmoneus that king of Elide, who in order to acquire to himself\ndivine honours, attempted to imitate, although it was but in a very poor\nway, the thunder and lightning of Jupiter;\n\n    _Vidi, & crudeles dantem Salmonea p\u0153nas,_\n    _Dum flammas Jovis, & sonitus imitatur Olympi._\n\nI say, if this was the case of Salmoneus, I believe I may venture to\npronounce, that the bulk of mankind, would judge the man deserving a much\nmore severe punishment, who invented gun-powder, and contrived cannon,\nand would think, that he had imitated much better than the king of\nElide, the noise, the flash, and the havoc made by those fiery flying\nmeteors. In truth, the world contemplate the Author of that invention\nwith such horror and indignation, that they detest his name. And Quevedo\nspeaks the sentiment of them all, or they nearly all assent to the\nopinion he expressed of him, in the following lines:\n\n    He was of iron race and heart,\n      In concave metal vast machine,\n    Who first combustible with art\n    Did shut;\n      And then to raise a horrid scene,\n      By violence produc\u2019d a flame,\n    Destructive as his savage mind,\n      And thus transferr\u2019d his odious name\n    As infamous to all mankind.\n\nII. This abomination of the inventor, arises from the world\u2019s considering\nthe invention of gun-powder, as a most pernicious thing to the human\nrace, as in consequence of it, the number of violent deaths has been\ngreatly increased; but this is an error, which in the discussion of this\nParadox I propose to banish from the world; and do not doubt, that by the\nhelp of a little reasoning and reflexion, I shall be able so to explain\nthe matter, as to cause the mistake to vanish.\n\nIII. So far is the common conjecture, that the invention of gun-powder\nhas increased the mortality of mankind, from being true, that on the\ncontrary, it has lessened it. It is a notorious fact, established upon\nthe faith of all antient and modern histories, that when they only\nused what are commonly called white arms in war, the battles were much\nmore bloody than they are at present. It was very rare then, that the\ndispute was decided, when the contest lay between troops that were nearly\nequal in valour and discipline, till one of the parties were almost\nhalf destroyed; but at present, instead of that, the death of a tenth\npart, is generally sufficient to determine the victory in favour of the\nconquering side. I confess, that this in some measure may be owing to the\nsuperior perfection the art of war is arrived at now, compared with what\nit was formerly. I say in some measure, because I apprehend the greatest\ndifference, should be imputed to the different way of fighting. In former\ndays, when they fought principally with swords, or cutting and thrusting\nweapons, the troops could not engage, without being intimately mixed one\nwith another. This mixing, conduced to irritate men\u2019s minds, and caused\na greater difficulty in discerning the advantages one army had gained,\nand the disadvantages the other laboured under: it also created great\nconfusion, and made it difficult for them to attend to or obey orders;\nand likewise made it very hard to withdraw the vanquished out of the\nreach of the conquerors; all which causes, concurred to make battles very\nobstinate and bloody. Now-a-days, it is sometimes sufficient to decide\nthe contest, if one of the parties before their coming very near each\nother, is greatly disordered by the fire of their adversaries; in which\ncase, if the general upon weighing the circumstances, concludes he cannot\nrepair the mischief, he orders a retreat.\n\nIV. In the sieges of fortified towns, this difference of bloodshed is\nstill greater; for the reduction of places, is become much more easy\nby the invention of gun-powder, and the slaughter attending reducing\nthem greatly less, than it was before the use of it. The siege of Troy,\nwhich we are told lasted ten years, would probably not have continued\ntwo months, if they had then known the use of cannon and mortars; by\nso much the more havoc these implements make of the stone walls, by so\nmuch the less, is the havoc made of men\u2019s lives. Bombs and cannon balls,\nare more terrifying than destructive. All hear their noise, and but few\nperish by their flash. Frequently, the surprize and panic they occasion,\nredeem people from the mischief of them, because the garrison, by being\nintimidated before they are considerably wasted, entertain thoughts of\nsurrendering; by which means, an infinite number of deaths, both on the\npart of the besieged, and the besiegers, are prevented.\n\nV. It has not only been observed, that there has been a saving of men and\ntime in sieges, since they have introduced carrying them on by artillery;\nbut it has also been remarked, that in proportion as the fire of them has\nbeen augmented, the destruction of the human race has been lessened. Upon\nthis experience, and with a view of preventing the effusion of blood,\nLouis the fourteenth during his reign, either from his own feelings, or\nby the advice of his best officers, directed, that they should increase\nthe expence of gun-powder in sieges. And Spain once imitated this\npractice very happily, and with great success; for having observed that\nthe siege of the town of Namur in 1695, on account of the smallness of\ntheir fire, cost them much time, and a great number of men, before they\ncould reduce the place; therefore when they came to besiege the citadel,\nthey for the space of seven days, kept an incessant fire against it,\nwith a hundred and forty cannon, and a hundred mortars and royals; by\nwhich means, they obliged it to surrender in much less time than they\nspent in besieging the town, and when the garrison consisted of eight\nthousand good troops able to do duty, exclusive of sick and wounded. It\nis a fact, that this good purpose was attained upon that occasion, and\nwould no doubt be attained upon others of the same sort, not only on\naccount of the terror, which such a fire impresses the besieged with, but\nbecause also, the continual fatigue it exposes them to, exhausts their\nspirits, and does not permit them, either to eat or sleep in safety, and\nobliges them to exert an almost continual bodily labour, in repairing\nthe breaches, and clearing the ditches of the rubbish that is beat down\ninto them, and also in transporting materials to make breastworks at the\nplaces attacked, together with ammunition and other things. Where the\ngarrison is not composed of veterans, the terror occasioned by the noise\nof so many cannon and mortars, joined to the tumbling of the edifices,\nis sufficient to intimidate, and frighten them into a surrender. And the\nsame thing will happen, when there are a great number of inhabitants shut\nup in a place, although the garrison should be a veteran one; as we are\ninformed by that great master in the art of war, the Marquis de Santa\nCruz de Mercenado, in the fifth book of his Military Reflexions.\n\nVI. It being then certain, that gun-powder has prevented the loss of a\ngreat many lives in war, the mischief that has happened from it is very\nlight, compared to this great advantage, nor is the evil of its affording\npeople the means of putting one another to death, to revenge private\ngrudges, to be compared with this benefit; for such misfortunes do not\namount to a thousandth part of the other advantages. Nor should all the\ndeaths that happen in that way, be charged to the account of gun-powder;\nfor the steel in most of these cases, is commonly the instrument of\nvengeance, and there are many of those instruments contrived very\nartfully, for the purpose of giving desperate wounds to people when they\nare off their guard. To this we may add, that rigorous laws against\npeoples carrying concealed pistols, may in a great measure, prevent these\ncruelties from being perpetrated by the means of gun-powder; so that by\nmaking a general computation, of all the good and bad resulting from\ngun-powder in these respects, we shall find, that for one man that is\nslain by it in consequence of private piques and quarrels, the lives of a\nthousand are saved, that would otherwise have been lost in the disputes\nbetween princes.\n\nVII. If we consider powder with regard to the advantages we derive from\nit in other respects, we shall find it to be very useful and beneficial\nto mankind, for it assists us to kill game, to extirpate wild beasts, to\nsmooth rugged surfaces, to blow up lime-stone, to open passages through\ncraggy mountains, to stop the progress of fires, and is likewise useful\nin a thousand other instances.\n\nVIII. From all which it may be inferred, that the inventor of gun-powder,\ninstead of meriting the execrations that are fulminated against him, is\ndeserving of the thanks and applause of the world. Who this inventor was,\nagreeable to the general opinion, may be seen in the twelfth Discourse of\nthe fourth volume of the Theatrico-Critico[1].\n\n\nPARADOX II.\n\n_What is commonly called Clemency in Princes and Magistrates, is\npernicious to the Public._\n\nIX. Clemency, as it is explained by Moralists and Theologians, is a\nvirtue; but as understood by the vulgar, it is a vice. This different\nacceptation of one and the same word, may be easily accounted-for. If\nwe advert to the doctrine laid down by St. Thomas, we shall there find,\nClemency explained as not inconsistent with severity. But I ask whether\nin the idea of the vulgar, these two qualities are not very different?\nThey are clearly so; because that which is termed severe, they without\nthe least hesitation deny can be clement. Therefore the signification\nwhich the vulgar give to the word Clemency, is different from that which\nis given to it by learned and wise men.\n\nX. Severity then in the opinion of these last, is an habitual\ninflexibility of the mind, which will not relax in the punishment of\ncrimes, whenever the dictates of right reason require they should be\npunished. Clemency also, as explained by them, is an habitual disposition\nto lessen the punishment of crimes, whenever the same right reason\ndictates that they should be lessened; _Quando oportet, et in quibus\noportet_, says the angelic doctor, and it is from his doctrine that this\ndefinition is taken. It is clear, there is no opposition, but rather an\nagreeable harmony between these two qualities; and it is also clear, that\nthe vulgar look upon that inflexibility of the mind in which severity\nconsists, as diametrically opposite to clemency; and thus they call\nobdurate, rigorous, inexorable, and austere, all those, who possess that\ninflexible habit.\n\nXI. That prince or magistrate is clement in the opinion of the vulgar,\nwho is to be wrought upon by the intreaties of friends, the tears of the\nguilty, and the cries of his orphan family; and who indulges the softness\nof his own disposition, and is induced from these motives, to mitigate\nthe punishments, which the law has allotted to crimes. But in reality,\nthis is not Clemency, but injustice. It is rather a vileness, and a\nweakness of mind, which is cloaked under the name of Clemency. He is a\nprotector and an encourager of wickedness, who from such considerations,\nand without any other motives, slackens his hand in the punishment of\ncrimes. He is an indirect tyrant of the state, and becomes an abettor\nof all those evils, which are occasioned by the daring rashness of\ndelinquents; and he is also a multiplier of them to an excessive number,\nby his forbearing to deter bad men from committing them by proper\nexamples; and it is for this reason, that we said in the title of this\nparadox, that that which is called Clemency in princes and magistrates,\nis prejudicial to the public at large.\n\nXII. Who then should be deemed truly clement? Why he who after duly\nweighing and considering all the particulars and circumstances of a case,\nis convinced by the dictates of right reason, that he ought to lessen the\npunishment assigned to a crime by the common law, and does lessen it in\nconsequence of such a conviction. This is all agreeable to the doctrine\nof St. Thomas before quoted; and from hence it may be inferred, that the\nexercise of clemency can never be arbitrary, as is generally imagined.\nI mean, that the lessening a punishment which the law prescribes for\na guilty person, can never be supposed to depend upon the mere will\nof a prince or magistrate. He ought only to lessen it, when he finds\nafter maturely weighing the circumstances, that it should be lessened,\nfor if they would not justify his doing it, he should not lessen it at\nall. There is no middle way. Clemency is a moderating virtue, which if\nexercised with excessive zeal may become vicious. I am very well aware,\nthis is giving much less extension to the virtue of clemency than the\ngeneral opinion allows to it. But that is nothing to the purpose, for\nthis is the true and sound doctrine respecting it.\n\nXIII. The just motives for lessening punishments in various cases, are\nmany; for example, the antecedent merits of the convicted person, the use\nhe may be of to the public, his known ignorance of the consequence of\nwhat he did, or his having committed the crime inadvertently; any serious\ninconvenience that might result to the public from his punishment; or any\nconvenience that might be derived to the state from moderating it, &c.\n\nXIV. That great Asturian hero, Pedro Menendez de Aviles governour of\nFlorida, acted on various occasions, and in matters of the utmost\nimportance, contrary to the orders that had been given him by the king.\nFor each of these transgressions, according to the strict letter of the\nlaw, he deserved to be punished capitally. The king, and a king who was\nso zealous of his authority as Philip the second, pardoned them all; but\nnot totally, for we may estimate as a partial punishment, his delaying\nso long to confer on him the rewards due to his signal merits, during\nwhich interval, that eminent man experienced not a few pinchings and\ninconveniences. The king acted clemently by proceeding in this manner;\nfor it would have been unjust, cruel, and savage in many respects, if he\nhad adhered to the letter of the law in punishing him. The state would\nhave lost a most profitable subject, some signal merits would have gone\nunrewarded, and so ill judged a precedent, would have been productive of\ngreat disadvantages to the public, because other commanders, who might\nafterwards find themselves in circumstances where strictly obeying their\norders would be attended with pernicious consequences, would obey them\nnotwithstanding, for fear of the punishment. Even without the assistance\nof so bad a precedent, that dread, occasioned the ruin of the grand\nArmada, fitted out by the same king Philip for the chastisement of\nEngland.\n\nXV. I suppose, that Peter Menendez, having always been successful when\nhe acted contrary to his orders, conduced much to excite, if it was not\nthe sole cause of the king\u2019s lenity and benevolence to him. But even the\nplea of this merit, was of no avail to that valiant youth the son of\nManlius Torquatus, who after returning home victorious and crowned with\nlaurels, was by order of his own father put to death, for having contrary\nto his orders, fought with, and defeated his enemies. This was acting\nwith improper severity, for although the offence by the strict letter of\nthe law, should have been punished capitally, the putting him to death\nwas savage, cruel, inhuman, and barbarous. The ardour and fire of his\nyouth, ought to have been admitted as a plea to mitigate his fault; but\nthere was much more room for shewing lenity to him on account of the\nzeal he manifested for the public good, by taking the advantage of a\nfavourable conjuncture, which it was impossible for the Consul to foresee\nwhen he gave him his orders, and thereby, doing so eminent a service to\nhis country. But the ferocious and sour virtue of the obdurate Manlius,\nneither weighed circumstances, nor attended to, or was influenced by the\ndictates of morality; and thus, he unjustly deprived his country of the\nlife and services of a youth, who gave the most promising hopes of his\nbecoming one day a great commander.\n\nXVI. When the circumstances of a case do not afford just motives\nfor departing from the letter of the law, there is no room for the\nexercise of clemency; as the departing from it in such an instance,\nwould be injustice, and it is impossible that the same action, should\nbe conformable to one virtue, and contrary to another, because at that\nrate, it might be both good and bad at one and the same time. Thus in\nthese cases, there is no other course to take, but that of applying\nthe punishment the law prescribes, without regarding the clamours\nof weak-minded people, who are capable of censuring such conduct as\nover-severe or harsh; for acting in this manner conduces to the public\ngood.\n\nXVII. Annon, the pious archbishop of Cologne, did, in the eleventh\ncentury, cause the eyes of several of his judges to be put out, for\nhaving given an unjust judgment against a poor woman; but he left one\nof the number with a single eye, in order that he might be able to lead\nthe others about. I suppose that such an example, could not fail to fill\nthe whole city with horror; but although many might exclaim against the\ncruelty of it, it was still just and useful, as the blinding of those\nfew judges, might contribute to open the eyes of an infinite number of\nothers, and cause them to look attentively, how they pronounced sentences\nin future.\n\nXVIII. The case I am about to mention, is more singular still: when\nCount Evkembaldus the sovereign of Burdan, was in a very weak and infirm\nstate, a complaint was preferred to him against a nephew of his, who\nhad violated the chastity of a young lady, and upon the charge being\nclearly proved against him, he, as he was a zealous lover and assertor\nof justice, ordered him to be put to death; but those who were directed\nto execute this sentence, evading doing it, upon a supposition that the\nCount must soon die, somebody informed him of the omission; and as he saw\nclearly that in his present weak state, although he should repeat his\norders, they would not be executed, he artfully contrived, by declaring\nthat his indignation against the youth was appeased, and that he was\ndisposed to forgive him, to get him brought into his sick room, where\ncoaxing him under some pretence to approach his bed, he seized him by the\ncollar with his left hand, and with a poignard that he held concealed in\nhis right, stabbed him into the throat, and killed him on the spot. Many\nseemed scandalized with this act; but there is no reason to suppose, that\nit was displeasing in the eyes of God.\n\nXIX. This inviolable integrity in the administration of justice, is no\nindication of obdurateness, but is rather compatible, with the greatest\ntenderness and compassion the human heart is susceptible of; although,\nwhere effective clemency cannot be admitted, there may be room for the\nintroduction of the affective.\n\nBriante Prieneus, one of the seven wise men of Greece, was observed to\nweep very bitterly after condemning a guilty person to death; upon\nwhich, somebody present asked him why he lamented, since it was in his\nown power to pardon the man; to this he answered, _You mistake, for it is\nby no means in my power, and therefore I weep. His life is a debt that is\ndue to justice, and this tenderness of mine, one that I owe to nature._\nIt is said of Vespasian, that he frequently wept and lamented in tears,\nthe deaths of guilty persons, whom he himself had justly condemned.\n\nXX. To him who has a heart so delicate, that the gentleness of his\ndisposition is apt to degenerate into weakness and debility, I will\nprescribe an admirable remedy, which shall comfort and strengthen his\nheart, and not lessen or abate its softness. This consists, in directing\nhis attention to contemplate another object, and in making that the\nobject of his compassion. Let us figure to ourselves a judge, at the\ncrisis when he has just passed sentence of death on a notorious rogue,\nwho has been guilty of many cruelties and outrages, and when he is\nassailed with the cries and intreaties of the convict to be merciful to\nhim; and let us also consider him, when those intreaties are afterwards\nrepeated with the enumeration of all those particulars, that are most\nlikely to excite tenderness and compassion, such, as imploring him to\ncommiserate his distressed wife and children, and to look with an eye\nof pity, on the miserable and afflicted state of an unhappy man, who is\nall contrition and repentance, and whose ignominious death, will bring\ndisgrace and affliction on his innocent friends and relations. Upon\nhearing this, he may be apt to say to himself, taking away the life of\na man is a terrible thing, and may perhaps revolve in his mind, all the\nhorrors of a person leading to execution, and also those he may feel,\nwhen he is just on the point of suffering the punishment he has been\ncondemned to by the law. These reflections may possibly stagger his\nconstancy, and dispose him to pardon the offender.\n\nXXI. But if he would turn the eyes of his understanding from\ncontemplating this tragical picture, and view another, which is much more\ntragical, and which is drawn and depicted from the circumstances that\nappeared in evidence at the trial; he might there see representations\nof cruelty and outrage in a variety of shapes, and distress and misery\nof various kinds, which have been brought by the depredations of this\nsavage fury, on numbers of innocent people, who are all then praying\nthat justice may be done on this violator of the laws of God and man;\nthis enemy to the peace, security, and happiness of mankind. When a\njudge contemplates such things, ought he not to be more affected with\nthe cries and lamentations of these sufferers, than with the intreaties\nand affliction of a wretch, who has been the author of so many evils,\nand whose misery and distress has been brought upon himself, by his own\noutrages and misdeeds?\n\nXXII. It may be replied to this, that these mischiefs can\u2019t be remedied\nby the execution of the man, and that putting him to death, will be only\nadding a new tragedy to those already exhibited; but have patience.\nAlthough it is true, that this will not remedy the mischiefs that\nare past, it will deter others from committing the like offences for\nthe future. The pardoning crimes, operates like a contagion; and the\nimpunity of a delinquent, inspires others with boldness, and infects\nthem with the inclination of becoming delinquents also; on the contrary,\nby punishing such a man, you strike terror into ill-intentioned people,\nand prevent the distresses of thousands; and although you can\u2019t remedy\nthe misfortunes of the innocent persons who have already been injured,\nyou may prevent the like mischiefs from being done to an infinite number\nof others. Let a judge now weigh all these things, and then determine,\nwhether advancing the public good, and doing justice to these injured\npeople, ought not more to excite his compassion, than that devil in human\nshape who awaits the execution of his sentence; and finally, I must\nobserve to him, that if he lets such a miscreant go unpunished, those\nvery innocent people whom he has injured, will implore the justice of\nheaven against him for having pardoned so horrid a wretch.\n\n\nPARADOX III.\n\n_What is termed liberality in princes, is for the most part injurious to\ntheir subjects._\n\nXXIII. I consider liberality, not only as a virtue, but as a most noble\none, that is so much the more worthy to be treasured up in the breast of\na man, by so much the more his station of life is exalted. It is certain,\nthat although all vices are vile and base, and all virtues noble, there\nare vices, which in an especial manner deserve to be stigmatized with the\nepithet of sordid, and that there are virtues, which shine forth with a\nsuperior splendor and dignity. Among the first sort, avarice should be\nclassed, and among the second, liberality.\n\nXXIV. From hence it may be inferred, that avarice, which is always a vile\nquality, in princes, is a superlatively vile one, as this meanness of\nspirit, is unworthy of the elevated dignity of a throne. Vespasian was a\nprince of admirable endowments, he was a great warrior, politician, and\nmagistrate, and was besides temperate, discreet, and affable; but his\navarice was a dark shade, which obscured all these perfections; so that\nthe most a person can do who reads his history, is not to abhor him, but\nhe never can bring himself to esteem or love him. He, to increase his\nrevenues and fill his coffers, went to the extreme length, of laying a\ntax on the excrements of the human body; but the matter out of which the\ntax arose, was not so noisome and stinking, as the tax itself.\n\nXXV. Although, it does not follow from hence, that prodigality, which\nis a vice diametrically opposite to avarice, is not a great blemish in\nprinces; for in truth, it is more blameable in them than in private\npeople. A private prodigal, wastes his own substance; a prince, the\nsubstance of other men. A private person by his extravagance, hurts\nhimself; a sovereign, by his, injures a whole community; so that,\nalthough the two vices are unlike in themselves, when centered in\nprinces, they produce with respect to the public, the same effects.\nThe avaricious prince impoverishes his people to enrich himself; and\nthe prodigal one, impoverishes himself to enrich others. What the first\nheaps up, is buried; what the other amasses together, is dissipated; and\nby attending closely to this object, you will find, that prodigality is\nthe most pernicious vice of the two; because what a prodigal sovereign\nsquanders in needless largesses to enrich particular people, does not\nreturn, or if ever it does, it is very late, or it is by some rare\naccident, that it ever returns again to the public stock; whereas what\nan avaricious prince hoards up, may be serviceable in the days of his\nsuccessor, and may greatly contribute to lessen the burdens of his\nsubjects.\n\nXXVI. But how shall we define what should be termed prodigality in\nprinces? Why by calling all that such, which is commonly stiled\nliberality. The vulgar, and even those who are superior to the vulgar,\nallow of a large extension, to the arbitrary and voluntary expences of\nprinces. It is commonly understood, that when a prince from caprice,\nor from particular affections for a subject, makes him a present, that\nthe donation should be proportioned to the power and grandeur of the\nperson who bestows it; but I consider the thing in quite a different\nlight. Whatever considerable sum of the public money is expended, which\nis not laid out, directly or indirectly, to advance the public benefit,\nis injustice and profusion. That which comes out of the pockets of the\npublic, should be expended in such things as are beneficial to the\npublic. Would it not be most unjust providence, to apply, for the sake\nof indulging the caprice or ostentation of a sovereign, that which is\ncontributed by millions of people, to enrich a particular person, who by\nsome chance accident, in a matter that was of little importance to the\ncommunity, has done something that was agreeable to, and that has gained\nhim the favour of his prince?\n\nXXVII. Alexander ordered his treasurer to give to the philosopher\nAnaxarchus, any sum of money he should desire. He requested a hundred\ntalents; and the treasurer informed Alexander of the excessive demand of\nthe philosopher; to which Alexander answered, _he has done very right,\nfor he well knows that he has a friend who is both able and willing\nto give him that sum_; and ordered the treasurer to pay him the money\nimmediately. Is this liberality? It is true, that it is celebrated as\nsuch in an infinite number of books; but I say, that it was no such\nthing, for that it should rather have been termed mad prodigality,\nwhich is the legitimate child of vain-glory; and that it was not only\nprodigality, but cruelty and tyranny. With those hundred talents,\nhe might have administered to many distresses; and if a prince has\nsuperfluities, he should lay them out for such purposes. But refraining\nto administer to the hunger and necessities of numbers of poor people,\nto satiate the gluttonous cravings of an avaricious philosopher, was\na glaring act of partiality, which rendered it doubtful, which of the\ntwo was the most unjust person, Anaxarchus for demanding such a sum, or\nAlexander for gratifying him in his demand.\n\nXXVIII. The same Alexander, being requested by his friend Perilus to\nfurnish him with a sum of money to portion out his daughters, ordered\nfifty talents to be delivered to him. To which Perilus modestly replied,\nthat ten would be sufficient; to this Alexander answered, _that is not\na matter for my consideration, for although ten talents would be as\nmuch as would answer your purpose, it would not be a present suitable\nto my grandeur_. I find this celebrated by many writers, as a noble and\nmagnanimous act, and Alexander\u2019s saying upon doing it, as a commendable\nand a well-pointed one; but in my opinion, the act was an act of madness,\nand that his saying upon doing it, was a very weak and trifling one.\nDoes the grandeur of a prince consist in extravagances and profusions?\nDoes it display grandeur, to take from many what is absolutely needful\nfor them, to furnish a few others with superfluities? It does not,\nbut rather favours of injustice, baseness, and tyranny; and they only\ncan call such behaviour magnanimous, who have lost the use of their\nunderstanding.\n\nXXIX. A thousand crowns in specie, were one day presented to Don Alfonso,\nthe fifth king of Arragon of that name, and the first of Naples. A person\nwho was standing by at the time, said, _How happy it would make me, if\nall that money was mine!_ To which the king answered, _Take it then,\nfor I am desirous of making you happy._ Was this magnanimity? I know\nthat it has been cried up as such; but I say, it rather shewed weakness\nof mind, and a want of proper resolution, to resist an absurd impulse\nof vain-glory. I suppose also, that it was from the want of thinking\nor reflexion, that the king was guilty of that profusion, and that he\nwas hurried into it by his vanity, which suggested to him, that making\nthe man a present of the money would blazon his fame, and manifest to\nthe world, that he had both the disposition and the power to make a man\nhappy. But I would ask him (and this is a question that might be put\nto all the princes in the world) whether, if it is an act of greatness\nto make one man happy, it is not a much superior one to make a great\nmany so? If it is glorious in a sovereign to make an individual happy,\nis it not beyond comparison more glorious, to make a whole nation so?\nAnd there is no doubt but this might be done, if a prince would avoid\nall profusion, and regulate his conduct by a discreet \u0153conomy; if he\nwould curtail all superfluous expences, be a check upon the avarice of\nhis ministers, or else deliver the administration of his affairs into\nthe hands of none but men of integrity, who are capable of proportioning\nthe contributions to be paid by his subjects to their abilities, and who\nshould be careful, not to over-burthen the husbandmen and manufacturers;\nfor these are the people, who by their labours, are the principal\ninstruments of enriching a state, and whenever they find the weight of\nthe taxes, squeeze out of them the greatest part of their earnings,\nthey will leave off work, and betake themselves to an idle and vagabond\nlife. To sum up the whole, a prince, by conforming to the precepts that\nare dictated by justice, religion, and prudence, and by not bestowing\non any one in particular, more than his necessities demand, or than is\ndue to his merits, will become the common father of his people; and by\nextending his paternal care, and dispensing his generosity with an equal\nand impartial hand to them all alike, will be able to make them all happy.\n\nXXX. The royal treasury, may be compared to the ocean. It receives its\npecuniary contributions from all the monies in the kingdom, as the ocean\ndoes its stock of waters from all the rivulets, fountains, and streams\nin the whole world. The royal treasury then, should do by the kingdom,\nas the ocean does by the world; that is, after permitting those waters\nto be exhaled in vapours, return the same stock in refreshing rains,\nto fertilize the earth. It would argue a great defect in the sovereign\nprovidence, as the stock of the ocean is supplied by all the waters\nof the world, if he was only to permit a return of them, to fertilize\nhere and there a district, in consequence of which, all the rest would\nbecome barren. Just so, would it be an intolerable absurdity in human\ngovernment, to apply the money of the public treasury, to which the\nwhole kingdom has contributed, in prodigal donations to enrich a few\nindividuals, and by with-holding it from all the rest, leaving them in\ndistress and misery.\n\nXXXI. The reigning emperor of China at the beginning of this century,\nwas with respect to the matter we are treating of, one of the greatest\nexamples, that ever has, or perhaps ever will be exhibited to the world.\nI rely on the authority of Father Contanein for the truth of this\nassertion, and on the account he gives of this emperor in his letters,\nwhich are dated at Canton the latter end of the year 1725, and which are\ncopied into the 18th volume of edifying and curious letters of foreign\nmissionaries; but I only at present, have before me an extract from them,\nwhich is inserted in the second volume of the Memoirs of Trevoux of the\nyear 1728.\n\nXXXII. That prince, laboured incessantly to promote the good of his\nsubjects. The object absorbed all his thoughts, and occupied his whole\nattention. Every day of the year, and all hours of the day, were days and\nhours of giving audience and expediting business; and he scarce devoted\nany to amusement or recreation. To provide for the conveniences of his\nown person, he used the riches of his treasury with great moderation; but\nhe expended them with a truly royal magnificence, when he administered to\nthe necessities of his people. He procured punctual information, of the\nstate and condition of all his provinces, and took care to know, which\nof them was opulent, and which indigent; this he did, to the end, that he\nmight succour with the greater ease, such of them as were in distress. If\nany town had been desolated, either by an earthquake or a conflagration,\nif any province had suffered by an inundation, or by any adverse\naccidents, had been prevented from yielding their usual produce, or if\nby any other chain of accidents, a province happened to be impoverished,\nhe immediately remitted large sums, to repair their buildings, and to\nrelieve their poor. All his subjects experienced to flow from his bowels,\na balsam of tenderness, compassion, and paternal love, which healed all\ntheir calamities, and relieved all their distresses.\n\nXXXIII. In the same year, 1725, some provinces suffered greatly\nfrom excessive rains, and the emperor took measures to relieve the\ndistresses that had been occasioned by them, which, in order to do\nmore effectually, he sent instructions written in his own hand, to the\nprincipal men and mandarines of all his empire, which began thus; _This\nsummer, extraordinary and uncommon quantities of rain have fallen, and\nthe provinces of Pekin, Chantong, and Honan, have been inundated by\nthem. I feel much for the distresses of my people who inhabit those\nprovinces; and have it much at heart to relieve them. Their afflictions\nare continually present to my imagination both night and day, nor can I\nenjoy sound sleep, or tranquillity of mind, while I know that my subjects\nsuffer; and as it is absolutely necessary to send immediate relief to\nthose vast numbers of poor distressed people, I command you great men and\nmagistrates of my empire, to choose some trusty and able persons, such\nas are capable of executing my instructions, and who prefer the public\ngood to their own private interests; and dispatch them to the three\nbefore-named provinces, to distribute to the afflicted inhabitants of\nthem, the tokens of my benevolence and compassion. Let them scrutinize\nthe most obscure and remote corners, to find out all the poor and\ndistressed, to the end, that no one may remain without proper succour\nand relief. I know that it has sometimes happened, that in the making\nthese sort of distributions, acts of injustice and partiality have been\ncommitted; but I will take care that the conduct of those you send shall\nbe watched, and do you look to it also._\n\nXXXIV. There is another testimony in the before recited letter, which\ndoes honour, not only to the generosity and benevolence of this prince,\nbut to his heroic disinterestedness also. It having been customary with\nhim for a great many years, to release a certain province from paying\na part of their annual tribute; which he did because he thought it was\njust and necessary. The inhabitants, to express their gratitude for this\nkindness and generosity to them, meditated erecting some monuments to\nhis honour, and had actually begun the work, which the governor of the\nprovince informed him of. To which information of the governor\u2019s, the\nemperor gave the following answer: _What you acquaint me with, is totally\ndisagreeable to me, and what I by no means approve. When I conceded this\ngrace to the inhabitants of the province you preside over, I had no other\nmotive or view in doing it, than that of acting justly by, and making all\nmy subjects happy alike; but had no intention of procuring to myself a\nvain honour. Such expences are superfluous and unnecessary, and can never\nbe of any use or benefit to me; and as I have sent proclamations through\nall my empire, exhorting my people to practise frugality and \u0153conomy, I\nwonder how they could presume to think of running into these needless and\nmad expences, or how you could permit them to do it: it is also to be\napprehended, that the inferior officers who are generally the collectors\nof money for these purposes, may be tempted to put part of it into their\nown pockets. Prohibit therefore immediately, the proceeding any further\nin this matter, and with respect to the edifice and monument of stone,\nI forbid the erecting of it; and I repeat again, that when I do these\nacts of grace and favour, it is not with a view of acquiring a vain\nreputation, but because I think it just and necessary; and to the end,\nthat every one may be enabled to do his duty in society, and that the\ntranquillity and happiness of my subjects in general may be established\non a solid foundation._\n\nXXXV. All the conduct of this prince was of the same tenor. He with a\nmost sagacious penetration, attended to the proceedings and conduct\nof all the mandarines; and gave them instructions, that they should\napprize him of all that occurred to them, which might conduce to promote\ngood government. He made many regulations, that were just and wise;\nhe established premiums for the husbandmen, who had distinguished\nthemselves by their industry, and the improvements they had made in\nagriculture; and for the manufacturers and mechanics, who had signalized\nthemselves by their diligence and ingenuity; he made provision for the\nwidows of virtuous citizens, and settled rewards that were to be paid\nto such children, as distinguished themselves by their filial care of,\nand tenderness to their aged parents, &c. and is this Prince who was\nso perfect in his morals, and so great a pattern of policy, the same\nman, who proscribed Christianity throughout all his dominions? I fear\nwe must be obliged to answer in the affirmative, and to contemplate\nwith astonishment, the inscrutable secrets of the divine Providence;\nand to exclaim, _Oh! how incomprehensible are God\u2019s judgments, and how\nuntraceable are his ways!_ But the blindness of this emperor in matters\nof religion, should not preclude our recommending him as a signal\npattern, of that sort of \u0153conomy and liberality which should be practised\nby princes.\n\nXXXVI. I have said of the _\u0153conomy and liberality_, for both these\nvirtues, are found to be perfectly compatible with each other, and to be\nadmirably reconciled together in the practice of that prince. The true\nand proper effect, and essential operation of liberality, according to\nthe doctrine of St. Thomas, consists, in proportioning our affection\nfor money in such a manner, that our excessive love of it shall never\nobstruct our laying it out for such purposes, as are just and laudable.\nThus the epithet of liberal, does not belong to him who expends it\nto indulge his whim or humour, or from motives of ostentation, or to\ngratify his affection for some particular people, he is desirous of\nenriching; for all this is prodigality: but he deserves to be called\nliberal, who applies money to promote and accomplish virtuous ends, and\nwho is always ready to part with it, when it may be made conducive to\npromote such purposes. There is field enough within these limits, for\nthe exercise of the virtue of liberality. He is liberal, who succours\nthe poor, rewards the deserving, supports by generous donations men of\nability, and who constructs useful public edifices, and, in general, all\nmoney that is laid out for the benefit of the public, may be said to\nbe expended on objects of liberality, which liberality, if judiciously\nextended, may be deserving of the epithet of magnificence. These two last\nvirtues are distinguishable from each other, by the first being limited\nnot to exceed the bounds of moderation: and the other being permitted\nto extend to the expending vast sums, provided the money is laid out\nfrom laudable motives, and on objects, that are really conducive to the\npublic utility. Thus Louis the Fourteenth did an act of magnificence,\nin building the Hospital of Invalids at Paris, and did a much superior\none, by constructing the canal, that makes a navigable communication\nbetween Languedoc and Bourdeaux; because the great expences that attended\nexecuting these works, were incurred to promote the public good, and\nactually were great advantages to the public at large; but the palaces\nthat were built by Nero and Caligula, which occupied as much ground as\ntwo large towns might have stood on, do not deserve to be called works of\nmagnificence; because the vast sums that were laid out in constructing\nthem, were by no means expended to promote the public good, but only to\ngratify the ostentatious vanity of two profuse men. The emperor Adrian\nwas magnificent, by forgiving at once, the payment of all that was\nowing to him for the sixteen preceding years, by Rome, Italy, and all\nthe imperial provinces; but Alfonso the Twelfth of Castile was prodigal\n(provided the story that is told of him, and circulated in so many books\nrespecting this matter is true) in expending a vast sum of money, for\nthe redemption of Baldwin, emperor of Constantinople; as the first case\nconcerned the whole Roman empire; and Spain was not at all interested in\nthe last.\n\nXXXVII. Finally, A prince may exercise not only his liberality, but his\nmagnificence also, by bestowing great donations, upon here and there an\nindividual of signal and superior merit, (but I would be understood to\nmean such merit as has been beneficial to the state) because in doing\nthis, his attention may be supposed, as not confined to rewarding the\nvirtue of a single man; but to the exciting the emulation of many. And\nconsidered in this light, what Spain gave to Colon, did not exceed the\nbounds of justice and moderation; what she gave to Cortez was little;\nand what she gave to the great Captain next to nothing. When a prince or\nnation should exercise magnificence, if the donation they bestow is not\nequal to the merit of the person it is conferred on, or the dignity of\nthe party who confers it, it can never deserve to be termed liberality,\nfor there is no middle way in these cases, and if the gift does not\namount high enough to be deserving of the epithet of magnificence, it\ndeclines to the other extreme, and sinks into parsimony.\n\n\nPARADOX IV.\n\n_There is more Objection made to promoting People to important\nEmployments on account of their Youth, than there ought to be._\n\nXXXVIII. As in the use of their potential or intellectual faculties, some\ngive early tokens of dulness or perverseness, and others display bright\ntokens of commendable and useful talents; which render it probable, that\nthe state would prevent great mischiefs by the early chastisements of\nthe first, and that it would reap great benefits by the timely favouring\nand encouraging the virtuous bodings of the second; as there are young\nmen, who in prudence and understanding excell those who are much further\nadvanced in years. If such, in the prime of their lives, were promoted\nto fill posts of importance, the state would for a long time, reap\nthe benefit of their good administration: whereas, by deferring their\nadvancement till they grow old, this benefit is but of short duration.\nThe most learned and penetrating society of Jesuits, at the age of\nthirty-eight, raised to the high post of Prepositor-general of their\nOrder, Father Claudius Acquaviva. Who can entertain a doubt, but that in\nso extensive a society, there were many men further advanced in life,\npossessed of all the requisites for the well-discharging the duties of\nsuch an office? But notwithstanding this, Father Acquaviva, at this age,\nwas preferred to all the others, to fill this important station; this was\ndone, either because he possessed the requisite qualities for discharging\nthe duties of the office in a more eminent degree than the others, or\nbecause, although they might be equal to him in talents, there was a\nprobability of their enjoying the fruits of his excellent government for\na much longer time, than they were likely to enjoy the benefit of the\nservices of those who were further advanced in life; in which expectation\nit turned out afterwards that they were not disappointed. The famous\nServita Fray Pablo Sarpi was made Provincial of his Religion, at the\nage of twenty-seven. The portentous talents of that young man, gave\njust reason for their electing him, and their judgment in doing so, was\nafterwards confirmed by the sentiments of the republic; who appointed\nhim, contrary to their ordinary practice, at about the same period his\nown society conferred this honour on him, their Counsellor. It is true,\nthat this extraordinary favour of the republic, was very injurious to\nthe religious character of Father Sarpi, for he engaged with such warmth\nin defence of the state, against the pretensions of the Apostolic See,\nthat only in his habit of a friar, he preserved the appearance of being a\nCatholic.\n\nXXXIX. He who at thirty, has the discretion that people commonly have\nat fifty, when he arrives at the age of forty, will have a discretion,\nmuch superior to that of the bulk of mankind. And this exceeding will\nbe greater still, if from the age of thirty, he begins to exercise his\ntalents in public business, as he will go on improving them more and more\nevery day by his practice. Why then should not the state encourage the\ncultivation of a soil, which is capable of producing so much for their\nservice? Or why should they lose any part of the copious fruit, that may\nbe produced from such a stock?\n\nXL. To this reasoning I shall add, that when there is an equality of\nintellectual talents, the middle age should be preferred to the more\nadvanced, for that is the time, in which the faculties of both body and\nmind are in their full vigour, which are things of great importance, in\nthe good administration or execution of public business. What might be\ngained by the experience of a man who has had a great deal of practice;\nif he happens only to begin to act at a time of life when his faculties\nare on the decline, may be overbalanced by the loss that would be\nsustained by the languid execution of his designs. I am persuaded that\nthe miscarriages of Cyrus, Pompey, and other famous warriors in their\nadvanced state of life, who had always been conquerors in the days of\ntheir youth and vigour, was owing to no other cause but this; and am of\nopinion, that they attributed to a falling-off of fortune, what only\nresulted from a decadence of their robustness, and the activity of their\nminds.\n\nXLI. It may perhaps be objected to what I have been advancing, that it is\nin but here and there a rare instance, that this doctrine of mine will\napply, for that it is very uncommon to meet in an early time of life,\nwith a man of equal ability, to one who is more advanced in years; and\nthat if I only mean to recommend, that in these rare instances, they\nshall have the preference given them, I have been beating my brains to\nlittle purpose; for that this is already an established practice; and\nthere is no man who has observed the world with any attention, who is not\nconvinced, that we have had here and there an instance, of a young man\nbeing preferred to one more advanced in years?\n\nXLII. But to this, I reply in the first place, that admitting, in\nthese particular cases, what is just and proper has been done, it does\nnot follow from thence, that the doctrine we have been laying down is\nuseless; for although our arguments on this head may be unnecessary as an\ninstruction to those who have the dispensation of employments, they may\nbe of use by way of reproof or correction, to grumblers and complainers.\nA young man scarce ever attains any honour or preferment, but a thousand\nold unprofitable ones murmur at it, and not only a thousand old ones who\nare useless, but the majority of the young ones also; who by being of\nabout the same standing in life, are stimulated to shew resentment, by\nthe fire of emulation.\n\nXLIII. We shall answer secondly, that a young man\u2019s excelling old ones in\nunderstanding and judgment, is nothing near so uncommon as is generally\nimagined, but is rather a thing which we experience very frequently.\nThere is scarce a community consisting of twenty or thirty individuals,\nwhere we do not see a particular young man, better informed, and more\ncapable than many of the old ones. This proceeds, from the temperaments\nof men having generally a greater effect on the faculties of their\nminds, than their ages. The exceeding that a man experiences in himself\nin this respect at fifty years of age, and at thirty-five, is seldom\nvery considerable, and will rarely be perceptible, if he has not passed\nthe last fifteen years, from a life of much indolence, to one of much\napplication. On the contrary, the exceeding there is between some men\nand others on account of their different temperaments and geniuses, is\nenormous. We every day see those, who from their aptness at acquiring\nevery science and faculty, will become adepts in them, in a quarter part\nof the time, that others are obliged to employ in hard study to attain\nthem.\n\nXLIV. From this great difference in the temperaments and genius of\nindividuals, spring those prodigious advances of some young men in\nliterary attainments, which are frequently not equalled, by those who\nhave studied till eighty. Such for example as John Pico de Mirandola,\nthe Scotch man Jacob Creighton, the Spaniard Fernando de Cordoba, Gaspar\nScioppius, Hugo Grotius, Spanolito who is now the wonder of Paris, and\nothers. We might add to these examples many more, which are not so\nwell known, but which are not less extraordinary; but we shall content\nourselves with pointing out two, that are the most striking ones. The\nfirst is Gustavus de Helmfeld, the son of a Swedish Senator, who at ten\nyears of age, could speak twelve Languages, the Swedish, the Muscovite,\nthe Polish, the French, the Spanish, the Italian, the German, the\nFlemish, the English, the Latin, the Greek, and the Hebrew; he besides\nhad a knowledge of philosophy, and a tincture of that of theology, and\nalso understood some parts of the mathematics.\n\nXLV. But the prodigious child, that was born at Lubec in 1721, and died\nin 1725, exceeded every thing we have hitherto heard of. His name was\nChristian Henry Heneiken. The relation I shall give of him, is taken\nfrom the first volume of the Memoirs of Trevoux of 1731, into which it\nwas copied, from the accounts we have had of him from various authors of\nthe same city and country, all of whom were esteemed men of the greatest\ncredit and veracity. This surprizing child, at ten months old begun to\nspeak, and at twelve, understood the principal events contained in the\nPentateuch; and at thirteen, those of the history of the Old Testament;\nat fourteen those of the New; and at two years of age, he answered\npertinently to any questions that were asked him, concerning antient or\nmodern history, and likewise, with respect to geography. He very soon\nafter, began to speak Latin with ease, and immediately upon that, French\nalso. Before he entered into his fourth year, he knew the genealogies of\nthe principal houses in Europe, and explained sensibly and judiciously,\nmany sentences and passages of holy scripture. He soon after this,\nlearned to write, at a time when he was scarce able to hold the pen. He\nabhorred all other aliment except milk, which must always be that of the\nnurse who first begun to suckle him; so that he was not weaned till a few\nmonths before his death. He was of a very delicate frame, and frequently\nvisited with sickness. And at length, on the 27th of June, 1725, he died;\nfilling with astonishment all those who knew him, at the constancy and\nheroic resignation he shewed through the whole course of his sickness,\ntill the period, that he surrendered his soul into the hands of his\nCreator.\n\nXLVI. I am very well aware, that the circumstances of this history may\nhave been exaggerated, but I do not find any thing impossible in them.\nWho knows the ultimate bounds, to which the ability of man may extend?\nPerhaps there may be none assigned to it, but that it may continue to\nincrease more and more, and that the limits of its extension have never\nyet been fixed or assigned. With respect to his essential perfection, all\nphilosophers and theologians agree, that no creature was ever so perfect,\nbut that God may create another still more perfect. Why then with regard\nto accidental perfection in the same species, do we not see the same\nthing? Our gross mode of reasoning, is apt to confine possibility within\nthe narrow limits of our experience. That which we never saw, we imagine\ncan never happen; as if in the little which God has been pleased to\npresent to our view, is displayed the utmost extent of the omnipotent\npower. Setting bounds to possibility, is setting them to the operations\nof the all powerful.\n\nXLVII. I agree, that our assent to the existence of a thing, should\nnot be extended so far, as not to be confined within less bounds, than\nthe immense space of possibility; letting our belief be regulated by\nprobability, is much safer, than letting it extend to possibilities;\npossibility, can only be measured by the extent of the divine power;\nprobability, may be guided and limited by the force and credibility\nof testification. Thus he would act prudently, who with respect to the\nhistory of the child of Lubec, should reject a good portion of the\ncircumstances, but still admit enough of them, to render the story a most\nwonderful one, the like of which, had never been known in former ages;\nas it is not probable, that the authors who were the countrymen of the\nchild, should lie exorbitantly, in a case where if they had deviated\ngreatly from the truth, it was in the power of thousands of living\nwitnesses to have convicted them of the imposture.\n\nXLVIII. From the beforementioned examples, and an infinite number of\nothers that might be instanced, may be inferred, the enormous difference\nthere is between some souls and others, which difference, is owing\nsolely to a difference of temperament; compared to which, that produced\nby a disparity of age, is very small, even if we compute it from early\nmanhood, to the period of decadence. The result of my own observation,\nwith the exception of here and there a rare instance, is, that those who\nat thirty years old are dull, will always be dull; that those who at\nthat age are imprudent, will always be imprudent; and that those who at\nthirty, in matters of argument or conversation, do not talk pertinently,\nor reason well, will never reason well. I do not however deny, that\ncultivation will not improve both men and plants, but it will never make\nthorns bear grapes, or brambles figs.\n\nXLIX. I think there seems now to remain but one objection for me to\nanswer out of all those that have been urged to what I have advanced; and\nthat is, that although admitting some have a great natural superiority\nof talents compared to others; still, the impetuosity and fire which\ncommonly prevails in the flower of a man\u2019s youth, is apt to have a\npernicious effect on his conduct. Granted. But besides the exceptions to\nthis rule being infinite, as we every day see youths, who are very sedate\nand discreet; and to which we may add, that there is another passion very\npredominant in old people that is productive of much more mischief in\npublic affairs, than the fire or impetuosity of youth; I mean the vice of\navarice, in the operations of which, there is not a moment\u2019s relaxation;\non the contrary, the passion of anger, is only apt to be excited by\nparticular accidents, and when the ebullitions of choler abate or\nsubside, they are succeeded by long intervals of calm and tranquillity.\nAnger is a transitory fury, or a fever of short duration, whose attacks\nare sudden, and last but for a little while, and which in a moderate\nspace of time vanish and disappears; but avarice is a harpy, that has\nnested itself in the heart, and is a dropsy of the soul, which increases\nand grows worse every day. The first, now and then disturbs and irritates\nthe moral temper of man; the other, vitiates all his actions, because its\nvenomous influence ever exists. The first grows weaker every day, and is\nenfeebled by its own exertions; the other, is incessantly gaining new\nstrength, and becoming more powerful, _vires acquirit eundo_; so that\navarice contrary to the ordinary course of nature, is by so much the more\nvigorous, by so much the older it grows; it is a passion, that not only\nacts in cold blood, but acts with so much the more activity, the colder\nthe blood grows; and hence it is, that its mischiefs are not only greater\nthan those produced by anger; but they are also much more incurable. Thus\nif the infirmities incident to youth, are pernicious in those who occupy\nposts of importance in the public line, those that are attendant on old\nage are much more so.\n\n\nPARADOX V.\n\n_All Handicraft Trades Should be hereditary._\n\nL. In Lacedemonia, which was one of the best-governed states of\nantiquity, it was an inviolable law, as Herodotus informs us, that the\nson of a husbandman, should be bred a husbandman, and the son of a\ntaylor, a taylor, and the same with respect to all other occupations\nwhere people earn their living by their labour. The same practice\nprevailed in Egypt, and prevails among the idolatrous people of Indostan\nat this day.\n\nLI. I know very well, that to enforce the importance and propriety of\nthis paradox, the authority of these, and other such examples that might\nbe instanced, is weak, compared to the infinite number of opposite ones\nthat might be produced against it. Therefore, it will be absolutely\nnecessary for us to have recourse to reason, to supply this defect of\nauthority.\n\nLII. It appears to me, that two advantages of great importance would be\nderived to the public by trades being hereditary; the first of which is,\nthat it would contribute greatly to the perfectioning of arts. When\nthere is no other relation or connexion between the master and his pupil,\nthan the latter being the apprentice of the first, the master is seldom\nvery anxious about instructing his scholar; and what is more, he is not\nwell disposed to communicate to him any particular secrets of his art,\nwhich he has acquired by virtue of his own penetration and experience;\nand generally, contents himself with instructing him in what is commonly\nknown and practised. But there is no reserve of this sort, when the\ninstruction is conveyed from the father to his son, for paternal love\ncannot assent to it; and hence it is, that where the skill of the master\nis equal, he will be better taught who learns of his father, than he who\nis instructed by a stranger.\n\nLIII. By this total translation of skill from father to son, and by\nthe same trade being continued in, and handed down to their posterity,\nthere would without doubt result this benefit, that the art of it would\nbe improved, and that it would continue advancing every age, nearer\nand nearer to perfection. It is very common, for one artist to make\nsome improvements on what he has learned from another; and it is very\ncommon also, for him who has made them, to let them die and be buried\nwith him; on account of its being against his interest, to communicate\nthem to other people. This impediment to making his improvements known,\nseldom subsists between father and son; because the father, most\ncommonly considers the interest of his son as his own; and consequently,\ncommunicates to his son all he knows. If the son from his own ingenuity,\nmakes improvements on what he has been taught by his father, and hands\nthem down to the grandson; and they all continue to do the same by their\nsuccessors; the arts by this means, would proceed to approach nearer to\nperfection every generation.\n\nLIV. There are two other circumstances that are very worthy of being\nattended to, which would contribute to recommend this political system\nfor improving the arts; the one is, that children would begin to learn\nmuch sooner than they commonly do. In the house of an artificer, where\nthe son is destined to follow the trade of his father, he will scarce\nhave done sucking the breast of his mother, when he will begin to drink\nthe milk of his father\u2019s instruction; in consequence of which, not\nonly time would be gained, but his application to the business would\nbecome more natural to him. The other circumstance is, that the state\nwould avoid the loss of many good artificers, which is occasioned by\nthe inconstancy of the tempers and dispositions of youth. Those, who\nby continuing to work at the trade they first began to learn, would\nbecome excellent artificers, by going on to change their occupations\ncontinually, would never arrive at being more, than mere novices, or\nbeginners; and this mischief would be avoided, by obliging the son of\nevery handicraft person, to follow the trade of his father.\n\nLV. The second convenience that would result to the public by trades\nbeing hereditary, is, that it would ascertain the ranks and classes of\npeople in a state; it being no uncommon thing, for disputes to arise\nbetween families, about birth and precedence; which inconvenience would\nbe remedied by such a regulation, as in such a case, the rank of most\npeople would be ascertained, and the cause of these disputes in a great\nmeasure removed.\n\n\nPARADOX VI.\n\n_Torture is a very fallible means for discovering the truth in criminal\nCases._\n\nLVI. I enter upon this essay, begging permission of all tribunals of\njustice to speak my sentiments on this head. I venerate the laws and\nthe use of them; but as I am treating here of such as are purely human,\nI apprehend I may be permitted to reason on the tendency or propriety of\nthem. Nor is the torture being admitted in the ecclesiastical courts,\nas a mode of enquiry in the examination into crimes, any objection to\nmy doing this, for as the learned Canonist Francis Schomer observes,\nthis practice is not conformable to the antient discipline of the\nchurch; and he quotes other authors in support of this opinion, and says\nfurther, that in a long course of time, it by little and little, came to\nbe transferred from the secular tribunals to the ecclesiastical ones:\n_Predetentim \u00e0 curiis s\u00e6cularibus ad ecclesiasticas pervenisse_ (Schmier\nin Supplem. ad lib. v. Decret); so that doubting of the propriety of\ninquiring by torture in the ecclesiastical courts, amounts to no more,\nthan disputing whether the antient or modern practice of those courts, is\nthe most consonant to reason.\n\nLVII. Besides, this being a matter which in its own nature is open to\ncontroversy, there are two notable circumstances in it, which encourage\nme to enter upon the discussion of the point. The first is, that very\nmany people think as I do on the subject, and that among those very many,\nthere are more than a few of the very judges, who practise ordering\nthe torture, in cases where that practice has been long established.\nTheir sentiments in theory do not correspond with their conduct, but\nnotwithstanding this, they act as they should do, for they have no\nauthority to dispense with the laws, but are only ministerial under\nthem. The second is, that the most learned father Claudius Lacroix,\nhas preceded me in publishing the same sentiments I entertain on this\nsubject, in his first volume of Moral Theology, lib. iv. &c.\n\nLVIII. Countenanced and encouraged by so illustrious an author, whose\nopinion in questions of morality is so much respected, and so generally\nassented to by all Christendom, I shall enter upon the undertaking\nboldly, and shall argue with spirit in support of his opinion and my own.\nThe extent of the question is but short, and whenever reason sets its\nfoot within its boundary, it soon arrives at the end of it.\n\nLIX. It cannot be denied, that the not confessing in the torture,\ndepends upon the spirit and fortitude of the person tortured, to resist\nthe rigour of that trial; and I ask now, is this spirit and fortitude\nproduced by the innocence of such a person? It clearly is not, but rather\nby the robustness of mind or body which that person possesses. The\ntorture then, can be of no use to ascertain the guilt or innocence of any\none, but it is the bodily strength or weakness of mind, of whoever is\nunfortunate enough to experience its rigour, that determines the point.\n\nLX. Nero having unjustly repudiated his wife Octavia, and married Poppea,\nshe not content with having usurped the bridal bed, and crown of Octavia,\nbut in order to deprive her of life and honour also, accused her of\nhaving had a criminal correspondence with a slave. For the purpose of\nascertaining the guilt of Octavia, six of her female servants were put to\nanswer by the torture; and what was the result of this? why, that some\nof them declared her guilty, and others denied it. Did not they all know\nthat the accusation was false? and do not all authors agree that they\ndid? But what did this signify, if, in the torture, their pain, and not\ntheir veracity, influenced them to confess she was guilty of the crime?\nWhoever has fortitude enough to endure the rigour of the cord, will deny\nthe fault he is tortured to confess, although he was really guilty of it;\nwhoever has not, will confess a crime he never committed. The effects of\nthe torture on the servants of Octavia, tended to prove the fortitude of\nsome of then, and the weakness of others; but for ascertaining the truth\nwere of no use.\n\nLXI. It seems then, that the innocent are exposed to equal danger from\nthe torture with the guilty. A terrible inconvenience this, but the worst\npart of it is, that the danger is not equal, but greater on the side of\ninnocence. I may be told that I am advancing a new paradox, and I confess\nthat I am, but if I am not greatly mistaken, I shall make it appear,\nthat I have been advancing nothing that is not strictly true. It is a\nknown fact, that those who are daring enough to commit great crimes, are\nmuch more hardened, robust, and ferocious people, than those who lead a\nquiet and regular life. It should follow then from these premises, that\nthey are better calculated to endure the rigours of a torture, than the\ntranquil and inoffensive part of mankind; and it will also follow from\nthence, that these last will be more likely to confess themselves guilty\nof a crime they are falsely accused of, than the others will be, to\nconfess one they have really committed. This is a remark made by father\nLacroix, and the following are his words: _sequitur per torturas s\u00e6p\u00e8\neverti justitiam, quia innocentes, qui s\u00e6p\u00e8 sunt impatientes dolorum,\ncoguntur se fateri nocentes; e contra nocentes, qui plerumque sunt\nferociores, tolerata tortura se probant innocentes._\n\nLXII. On the contrary, those of quiet and peaceable dispositions,\nare generally people of more delicate feelings than the others, and\nespecially, if their mode of living has corresponded with the native\nexcellence of their tempers. From whence it should follow, that the\nprobable result of putting one of these to the torture, would be, that\nhe would sooner confess himself guilty of a crime he never committed,\nthan one of the others, would own himself guilty of one he had actually\nperpetrated.\n\nLXIII. I consider the sentiment of Plato to be a true one, who says,\nthat great vices, no less than great virtues, require great powers and\nfortitude to exercise them. The serenity with which Geronimus Olgiatus,\nBalthasar Gerardus, and Francis Ravillac, the first for the assassination\nof Galeazus Maria duke of Milan, the second for that of William prince\nof Orange, and the third for that of Henry the Fourth of France, fully\ndemonstrate, that those who dare attempt great and dangerous things, are\ncapable of enduring great torments.\n\nLXIV. I shall conclude this subject, with the striking, and most\nefficacious testimony of Father Frederic Spe, which throws all the\nlight upon this matter that can be wished for, or desired. This learned\nGerman Jesuit, when he is treating of the little dependance there is\nto be placed on the confessions of people accused of witchcraft, which\nconfessions have been extorted from them by the rack; quotes, in support\nof what he advances, the testimony of the Baron de Leibnitz, and Vincent\nPlaccius, whom he supposes to be the author of the anonymous Treatise,\nintituled, _Cautio criminalis in processu contra sagas_.\n\nLXV. Father Spe, when he is speaking of the confessions that have been\nmade by supposed witches and wizards, when put to torture, delivers\nhimself thus; the numbers of lyes they will tell, both of themselves and\nothers, is incredible. All which the judges are desirous they should say\nis true, they confess to be true; and they own every thing they would\nhave them own of themselves, compelled to it by the violence of the\ntorture; and they do not afterwards dare to retract what they have said,\nfor fear of being tortured again; thus these miserable wretches, go to\ntheir deaths attesting a falsehood. Father Spe concludes in this manner,\nI am certain that what I have said is just and right, and I appeal\nfor the truth of it, to the judge of that supreme tribunal, where all\nmankind, both quick and dead, will one day be sentenced to rewards and\npunishments, proportioned to their merits and demerits.\n\nLXVI. I declare that when I first read this account, I found my whole\nframe pervaded by a deep melancholy sensation, that resembled somewhat\nlike horror mixed with pity. He who gives the relation, is a learned,\ngrave, exemplary, and sound divine, instructed in this case, not by\nconjectural reasoning, but by certain informations, acquired in the\nsacred confessional chair, and taken from the mouths of those, who were\non the point of being led to execution as guilty people; and this he\ndeclared from repeated experience he had had of those matters, during\na long course of years. What can be objected that is deserving of any\nattention, to so conclusive a testimony?\n\nLXVII. The certainty Father Spe had, of the almost invincible force of\nthe torture, to oblige innocent people to confess themselves guilty of\ncrimes they never committed, is very forcibly illustrated, in a vehement\ndeclaration to the judges, with which he concludes his Essay. He says to\nthem, why are you so solicitous in searching out, and why do you take\nso much pains to discover, people who are guilty of witchcraft? There\nis no necessity for your giving yourselves all this trouble, for if you\nwant to discover more, I can tell you how to furnish yourselves with\nthem, without labour or difficulty; take the first Capuchins, the first\nJesuits, and the first men of any other religious order, that you shall\nmeet by chance, and put them to the torture; and if you shall be desirous\nof making them do so, you will find that there is scarce one of them,\nwho will not confess that he has been guilty of the crime of witchcraft.\nIf any of them should deny it, repeat the torture two or three times,\nand I will engage that you will bring them to. Pluck out their hair by\nthe roots, exorcise them, and repeat to them the common-place cant that\nthe devil has hardened them; and as if you was convinced this suspicion\nwas just, behave to them, with determined inflexibility, and you will\nperceive, that there is not one among them, who will refuse to submit.\nI have pointed out to you already how you may be supplied with an ample\nstock of sorcerers, but if you want more still, take the prelates of the\nchurches, and all the canons and doctors belonging to them; and by the\napplication of the same means, you will be convinced, that they may be\nall brought to confess themselves guilty of witchcraft; for people who\nhave been bred up in so delicate a way, will hardly find themselves able\nto resist the rigours of a torture. But if you are not satisfied with\nthis supply, and should want more still, I would recommend to you, to put\none or two of yourselves to the torture, and you will find that you will\nconfess also in the same manner the others have done; and if immediately\nafter this, you were to torture me, you would be satisfied, that I should\ndo the same. And by this mode of proceeding, you may make witches,\nwizards, and magicians, of all mankind.\n\nLXVIII. I am ready to admit, that so vehement a declamation, should not\nbe made to all judges indifferently, but that it should be addressed\nonly to such as proceeded with the little caution those did whom\nFather Spe alludes to; although it is certain, that in accusations for\nwitchcraft, there is more danger of innocent people being brought to\ncapital punishment by the torture, than there is by charges of any other\nnature. Every man of discretion knows, upon what ridiculous grounds,\nthe common people spread reports of folks being guilty of witchcraft,\nand with what ease the world believe them, and how ready they are to\ntestify to the truth of such reports. In consequence of which, if the\naccused persons happen to be brought before judges, who, like the rustic\nvulgar, are filled with the notion or belief, that there are multitudes\nof witches and wizards, they immediately have recourse to the torture,\nand innocent people are tormented like delinquents. From whence it\nfollows, that those who are falsely accused, from their inability to\nresist the pain of the rack, assent to the interrogatory, and against\ntheir consciences own themselves guilty. To this number, we may add many\nothers, who own themselves guilty from delusion or infatuation. This\ndelusion is contagious, and multiplies and spreads exceedingly, whenever\nthere prevails a rage for finding out witchcrafts; for the numbers of\nthese delinquents are increased, in all places where there are officious\ninquisitors after sorcerers, just as the numbers of possessed people are,\nwhere there are plenty of persevering and absurd exorcists.\n\nLXIX. But notwithstanding that in such accusations, on account of their\nbeing so frequently ill-founded, the hazard of innocence being oppressed\nby the anguish of the torture becomes greater than in other cases; still\nthe same danger subsists, though not in so great a degree, with respect\nto all those who are falsely accused of any other serious crimes. I mean,\nthat if any one from want of fortitude, confesses in the torture the\ncrime of witchcraft, which he is quite innocent of, he may in the same\nmanner, and by the same means, be brought to confess himself guilty of\na murder, a sacrilege, a robbery, or any other great offence he never\ncommitted. Thus the experience of the learned Jesuit, with respect to\nthe fallibility of the torture in the examination into the truth of\nwitchcraft; identifies and proves its fallibility, in the inquiry into\nthe certainty, of whether any other person has been guilty of a crime he\nstands accused of.\n\n\nPARADOX VII.\n\n_It should be the Duty of Magistrates, to oblige every individual in a\nstate to earn his own living._\n\nLXX. This was one of the laws of the most prudent Solon; and it was\nso inviolably observed in Athens, that Athen\u00e6us tells us, the two\nphilosophers Asclepiades and Menedemus, were convened before the\nAreopagus, to give an account how they got their living; and they\nobviated the charge that had been brought against them, of leading an\nidle life, and having no visible means of subsistence; by proving, that\nthey earned two drachmas every night, by grinding in, or turning a\nhorse-mill; and Herodotus says, that before the days of Solon, this same\nlaw had been established in Egypt by King Amasis.\n\nLXXI. There is no doubt, but the same establishment would be useful\nin all states. Why do I say useful? It would be laudable also, and of\nthe utmost importance. By a careful examination into, and attention\nto this matter, communities would be freed from the nuisance of great\nnumbers of drones, and poisonous reptiles. There is scarce a populous\ntown or city, where you don\u2019t see great numbers of people, who without\nany estate or income, and without employing themselves in any honest or\nuseful occupation, live well in their houses, and appear genteelly and\nhandsomely dressed in the streets. And what are the funds by which they\nsupport all this? why some of them support themselves, by thefts and\nrobberies; others by the vile practice, of prostituting the beauty of\ntheir wives for hire; others by money they borrow of a thousand people,\nwithout any intention of ever paying it; others by tricks and cheats of\nvarious kinds, with which they impose upon innocent and unguarded people;\nand indeed, if the mask was to be taken off from all those who are said\nto live by their ingenuity, it would be found, that almost all of them,\nlive by foul practices and roguery; and the mask would be taken off, by\nadopting the before proposed examination and enquiry, and by providing,\nand rigorously executing punishments proportioned to such evils, the body\npolitic, would be purged and cleansed from an infinite number of vicious\nhumours.\n\n\nPARADOX VIII.\n\n_A great part of what is expended in Alms, is not only thrown away, but\ndoes mischief._\n\nLXXII. The following sentence of King David\u2019s is a remarkable one;\n_Blessed is he who exercises his attention and his understanding, for the\nrelief of the poor and the needy._ Beatus qui intelligit super egenum,\net pauperem.\u2014He does not say, blessed is he who to succour the poor,\nexercises his love, his compassion, or his charity, but blessed is he\nwho exercises his attention or understanding on this object. There is\ndoubtless the appearance of a mystery in this, but the mystery is, that\nalms, unless distributed with understanding, discretion, and judgment, do\nno good.\n\nLXXIII. A hand that is precipitate in giving, such a one for example, as\nClaudian represents that of Probus to have been,\n\n    _Pr\u00e6ceps illa manus fluvios superabat Ib\u00e8ros_\n    _Aurea dona vomens_\u2014\n\nwho relieved many poor, but at the same time supported many people in\nidleness; and such conduct not only supports, but it creates or breeds\nup many such, for wherever alms are distributed copiously and without\ndiscretion, there will be found many people, who without this assistance\nwould betake themselves to work to procure themselves a livelihood, who\nat present live idly, and omit their own industry, which they are enabled\nto do, at the expence, and by the profusion of others. The evils that\nresult to a state from such imprudent dispensations, are sufficiently\nserious; it loses by this means, the work of a great many useful hands,\nand the numbers of the indolent, vicious, and profligate, are greatly\nincreased by it.\n\nLXXIV. It is said of a man who distributes great quantities of alms,\nthat he gives with both hands; but he should remember, that according to\nthe directions of our Lord and Saviour, he should only give with one; he\nsays, when you dispense alms, don\u2019t let your left hand know what your\nright hand does: _te autem faciente eleemosynam, nesciat sinistra tua\nquid faciat dextra tua_. This implies, that it is with the right hand\nonly that alms should be given. If I am told that I dwell too much on\nthe literal meaning of the word, I answer it was never my intention to\ndo so; for I am inclined to think, there is a profound implied sentiment\ncouched under this description. It is the constant stile of holy writ, to\nuse the expression right hand, to symbolize or define good works, and the\nexpression left hand to signify the contrary; and hence it is, that in\nmany parts of it, when it speaks of the hand of God, it never mentions it\nin an emphatical manner, without the addition of the adverb right, which\nis used to convey an idea, that the operations of God are just and holy.\nChrist then requires, that alms should be given with the right hand, by\nwhich expression, we may suppose he meant to signify, that there are good\nand bad alms, and that he approves the first, and condemns the others;\nand also to prohibit our giving with both hands, for that this would be\nproceeding without choice or distinction, and would also confound the\ngood with the bad.\n\nLXXV. I know some divines are of opinion, that we should bellow our\ncharity, and that it is not incumbent on us to examine scrupulously\ninto the necessities of those we bestow it on; but this is no argument\nwhy a state should not take proper precautions, to prevent those from\nreceiving the benefit of charitable christian donations, who ought to\nget their living by their labour, and to exclude all such from being\npartakers of this benevolence, who surrender themselves up to indolence,\nand a voluntary and vicious state of poverty.\n\n\nPARADOX IX.\n\n_Death should not be dreaded, on account of what there is simply in the\nthing itself, or on account of what a person feels at that crisis._\n\nLXXVI. There is a fear of death, which is well founded and salutary;\nanother, which is ill founded and pernicious; and another, which ought to\nbe indifferent, because it is natural, and which only by being carried\nto too great an excess can become vicious. He fears death reasonably and\nprofitably, who contemplates it as a transition from hence to eternity;\nhe fears it naturally, who considers it as the termination of his life;\nand he fears it unreasonably, who viewing it simply with regard to what\nthere is in the thing itself, abstracted from all that has preceded,\nand all that is to follow it, supposes that it will be attended with\nexcessive pain.\n\nLXXVII. This apprehension, although it is very common both among the\nignorant and the learned, I look upon to be chimerical and vain, and to\nhave no foundation in truth, therefore, I shall not scruple placing it\nin the catalogue of vulgar errors. I don\u2019t mean to treat here, of the\npains incident to diseases which dispose or lead to death, which without\ndoubt are often very severe; but I only mean to enquire or examine,\nwhether it is probable we feel any, or any very sensible pain, at that\nmoment when the soul is separated from the body. It is generally thought,\nthat at that instant, a more intense pain is felt, than can be produced\nby all the torments a man is capable of inventing. Authors exaggerate\nthis pain in books, orators in pulpits, and all sorts of people in\nconversation, and reason upon it in the following manner. If, say they,\ntearing a nail from the finger, or a finger from the hand, produces a\npain so acute, that a man is scarce able to endure it, what must he\nfeel, or how will he be able to bear that which tears the soul from the\nbody? Here the strict union between these parts is described in the most\nfeeling manner, in order to enhance or aggravate the sensation that must\nbe experienced at their separation; and they compare it to the final\nparting of two fast or fond friends, who have lived long and happily\ntogether; or to two integrant parts of an animated body, the division\nof which is the more painful, the more firmly and intimately they are\nunited together. To heighten this description, they add, that this pain\npervades all, and every one of the parts of the human body, both internal\nand external, because the soul is torn equally from them all alike; which\nis a universality, that cannot exist in any other pain, because he who\nis roasted alive, or thrown into a great fire, does not feel pain in his\nentrails, at the time his external parts begin to scorch: agreeable to\nthis mode of reasoning, they conclude, that the pain which is felt at the\nmoment of death, is enormous, beyond all imagination and description.\n\nLXXVIII. I see this matter in quite a different light, and look upon\nall this aggravated degree of pain to be imaginary, and consider the\nreasoning by which the existence of it is attempted to be proved,\nas fallacious and delusive. It is confounding our ideas of objects,\nto suppose that the division of integral parts, is analogous to the\nseparation of the soul from the body. The pain in the first instance,\nconsists in the forcibly breaking their connexions, or in the first\nshocks of the violence, which disposes to their disunion. In the\nseparation of the soul from the body, there is no insertion of material\nfibres to be torn out by the roots, nor any division to be made of\nconnected substantial parts. From whence then can bodily pain be derived?\n\nLXXIX. The using the same words promiscuously, causes mankind to run\ninto infinite errors, and especially if the application of them is made\nto things that are fundamentally very different. The expression _tearing\nthe soul from the body_, fascinates or misleads many people in the\nbusiness we are now treating of; the phrase should be understood in a\nfigurative sense, and we are apt to construe it in a strict or literal\none. In consequence of which, as we know we can\u2019t tear from our bodies,\nthe most minute shred, without feeling great pain, or even extract any\nforeign substance, that has been violently introduced into, and sticks\nin any part of our frame, without being liable to the same sensation;\nled away then and betrayed by the sound of the expression, we are apt to\nimagine, that something similar happens in the separation of the soul\nfrom the body; but the soul is a pure spirit, that can neither adhere,\nor be made to adhere to any body whatever, nor can it be bound to it by\nligatures, nor united with it by fibres, nor fixed to it by any kind of\nfastening, nor intangled with it by any kind of roots or insertions; and\nfinally, the mode of its union to the body, is incomprehensible to all\nour philosophy or understanding; and consequently, a description of its\ndisunion cannot be given in the words of any language. There is no doubt,\nbut the term _tearing from_ is metaphorical; and that we might with less\nimpropriety, although we never can with propriety, in describing the\nseparation of the soul from the body, say, that it evaporated off, it\nwas dissipated, or that it had been exhaled, than that it had been torn\naway; for its disunion from the body, is performed by a movement that is\nsupremely insensible, because on the part of the corporeal substance,\nthere is not the least resistance made to its flying off. Vapours are\ncontinually exhaling from every part of our bodies, without giving us\nthe least pain. And why is this? Why it is, because that on account of\ntheir thinness and delicacy, they find no opposition in their passage,\neither from the solids, or the pores of the skin. What obstruction then\ncan you suppose the soul meets with, in its exit from the body, which is\ninfinitely more subtil and thin, than the finest vapours?\n\nLXXX. Let us contemplate the thing in another point of view; and admit\nthat the soul at the time of its being snatched away from the body,\ncaused a violent shock, like that of tearing to pieces all the entrails,\nand inverting the whole interior organization. I say that even supposing\nthis, the pain that it would occasion would be very slight, or next to\nnothing; and the reason is, because that in those ultimate stages of\nlife, all the faculties are so extremely languid, and the operations of\nnature so feeble and remiss, as hardly to be perceived; and the sensation\nof pain, which is one of those faculties, being in the same state with\nthe others, and the agent which is to stimulate them being equally feeble\nwith the rest; although in the time of vigour, it was capable of exerting\na force that had the power of producing great pain, in the present state\nof things, it is not capable of giving a shock that can excite any very\nacute sensation, nor if it was, is the subject it is exercised upon\ncapable of perceiving, or being violently affected by it.\n\nLXXXI. I am inclined to think, that a few moments before death, there\ncomes on a kind of half death, or stupor, that is something like a\nlethargy or swooning, and that in this interval, there remains no kind\nof recollection or reflexion; and it is probable, that the morning of\nour life, and the evening of our death, are preceded by a sort of\ncrepuscules or twilight, which brighten and grow clearer as the day of\nour life comes on, and which darken and grow more obscure, as the total\nnight of our death draws near.\n\nLXXXII. Hitherto we have been treating of natural deaths; but violent\ndeaths, which do not happen till three or four days after receiving\nthe injury that occasions them, may be considered to come under the\ndescription of natural ones; as we may suppose those people die in the\nsame way, that those do who are carried off by an acute disease.\n\nLXXXIII. Sudden violent deaths, which are so much dreaded, are the least\npainful of all; and indeed I was about to say, that people in such\ncases, hardly feel any pain at all, or at most but an instantaneous one;\nbecause the operation of the cause which induces them, takes away in\na moment, all sense of feeling. It is well known, that those who have\nfallen from a great height, and have lain a considerable time afterwards\nas if they were dead, have, when they came to themselves, affirmed, they\ndid not feel the blow they received upon coming to the ground. The great\nChancellor Bacon, tells a story of a gentleman who was very desirous of\nknowing what people felt who were hanged, and in order to be satisfied\nabout it, determined to make an experiment of the thing on himself. For\nthis purpose, he fastened a rope to the cieling of a room, in which rope\nhe made a noose, and after adjusting it to a proper length, he stood upon\na stool, and fixed the nooze round his neck, in the expectation, that\nafter suffering himself to be suspended, he should be able to recover the\nstool again; but the good gentleman was a little out in his calculation;\nfor if it had not been for a friend who was present, to whom he had\ncommunicated what he intended to do, and who cut the rope in time, the\nexperimental philosopher had been as dead as if he had been executed by\nthe hands of the hangman. The account he gave of this matter was, that\nfrom the moment his body became suspended by the rope, he lost all sense\nand recollection; that he had not the least remembrance of the stool, or\napprehension of the danger he was in, nor even any sensation of pain,\narising from the suffocation that was brought on.\n\nLXXXIV. This, I firmly believe, is what happens to all those who are\nexecuted by the hands of justice, whether they are hanged, strangled by\nthe bow-string, or beheaded; and in general, to all those who suffer\nviolent deaths that are as sudden as these are; for they can only feel a\nmomentary or instantaneous pain, and the instant they receive the fatal\nblow, they are from that time, to the separation of the soul from the\nbody, mere effigies of men, and have no more sensation of pain, than\nstocks or stones; and notwithstanding, that between the intermediate\nspace of their receiving the blow, or in case they are hanged, of being\nturned off, they are seen to make some convulsive motions, these motions\nare merely mechanical, and are by no means governed by the will, or\ndirected by reason.\n\nLXXXV. We will not exempt, as coming under this general rule, even those\nwho are burnt alive. This is a sort of punishment, which strikes all the\nworld with extreme horror, because they generally conceive, that from the\ninstant a person who is executed in this way, is thrown into the fire,\nto the time of his resigning his last breath, he feels the excruciating\ntorments of the fire. But I am of opinion, that he feels nothing after\nthe first minute that he is committed to the flames; nor can I conceive,\nthat his perception of pain can endure even so long as that.\n\nLXXXVI. I think I have tolerably well proved, what I at first asserted;\nbut as the reader may object, that this paradox ought to have been\nclassed among physical matters, instead of among moral and political\nones, I will endeavour now, to remove this objection; which I hope I\nshall be able to do, notwithstanding the decadence of the faculties, and\nthe want of sensation at the moment of death, are properer objects for\nphilosophical, than moral speculations. I shall begin with observing,\nthat we ought to distinguish between the matter of the proof, and the\nessence of the subject we are handling. The subject in the present case,\nconsists in a theoretical proposition, that death with respect to what\nthere is simply and merely in the thing itself, ought not to be feared,\nor that the fear of death, considered in this manner, is not reasonable\nor well-founded; now thus considered, the question is purely a moral one,\nbecause it directly combats an inordinate passion of the soul. The proofs\nof the truth of the proposition, appertain to philosophy; but this is\nwhat we see happen every day with regard to other moral questions. When\nthe question is, whether a marriage should be dissolved on account of\nimbecility, all the proofs in the trial are purely physical, &c.\n\nLXXXVII. But the question more immediately appertains to morality, on\naccount of the end for which I proposed it, than it does with respect to\nits own proper matter; for this end is a point of morality of the most\nserious importance. There is great necessity for banishing this panic\nterror, and this dismal apprehension of the tormenting pains of death.\nIt is very common to see dying people (and I speak of what I have known\nand experienced myself) extremely distressed by this idea, not so much\non account of the dread of the exquisite pain itself, as on account of\nthe consequences that may result from it. They figure to themselves, that\nthe pains which terminate this mortal life, are so extremely intense,\nthat they will occasion them to lose all patience, and prevent their\nsubmitting themselves to the will of Providence with the christian\nresignation they ought; and are also apprehensive, that it would cause\nthem to break out into furious acts of desperation. This anxiety has such\nan effect on them, that it prevents the operation of those christian\ndispositions, that should accompany a man in his last moments, and which\nare so necessary to promote his dying a good death; and besides this,\nthey even put him in danger of distrusting the Divine Goodness at so\ncritical a period. I have seen many who were in their perfect senses, and\nwho had been people of good and exemplary lives, who have been greatly\ndistressed by this idea;\n\n    _O genus attonitum gelid\u00e6 formidine mortis!_\n\nLXXXVIII. I suppose that sentence of St. Paul\u2019s, _Fidelis autem Deus\nest, qui non patietur vos tentari supra id quod potestis_, in English,\n_God is good and just, and will not suffer you to be tried or tempted\nbeyond your strength_, would be an excellent antidote for this malady.\nThe thinking otherwise of the Deity, would not be contemplating him, as a\nmost merciful father, nor as a just God, but considering him as a cruel\ntyrant, who at the moment on which your eternal happiness depends, should\nafflict you so severely, as to cause you to commit acts of desperation.\nWhat faith, and the light of natural reason teaches us, is, that his\ngoodness never permits the rigour of the trial, to exceed the power\nof the soul to contend with and resist it; and as I observed before,\nthis reflexion is an excellent antidote against the malady we have been\nspeaking of; but with all this, if it is not assisted and enforced by the\npersuasive eloquence of an able friend, or a good pastoral director, it\nis apt to lose some of its efficacy, and not to quiet the fluctuations of\nthe mind so thoroughly as could be wished, and especially if not attended\nto in time; and I therefore think that it would be necessary, whether\nsick or well, for all people to remain in a firm persuasion, that these\nexcruciating pains in the article of death are imaginary.\n\n\n_Appendix to the foregoing._\n\nLXXXIX. I have sometimes observed, that those who attend on dying people\nhave been much dejected upon finding them in their last moments, make\nsome very irregular and extraordinary motions, and have been afraid and\nbelieved that those agitations, had proceeded from some impatience that\nhad seized them. But let them not be uneasy on this account; because it\nis most likely, that these motions are merely mechanical; and that in\ncase they should not be so, there is no mischief to be apprehended from\nthem; for in that proximate state to death, if people are not deprived\nof their senses, the use of their reason is so feeble, or so confused,\nthat very little, if any, of that free will can be exercised by them\nwhich is necessary to constitute sin, or at least any serious sin; for\nno intoxicated man, nor any one at the instant he awakes from a profound\nsleep, can be in a more stunned or stupified state, than a dying person\nat such a crisis.\n\nXC. Finally, both with respect to the matter of this appendix, as well\nas with regard to that of the subject of this Essay, I shall proceed to\ngive a last, and most efficacious consolation, against the apprehension,\nthat the extreme pains of death are likely to endanger the loss of\npeople\u2019s souls; for admitting that those pains were real, and as severe\nas they are represented to be, is there any danger that the dying\nperson who is oppressed by them, should fall into the serious sin of\nimpatience, or that he should incur the guilt of any other mortal crime?\nTo this, I resolutely answer that he could not; for the same reasoning\nthat states the pain to be so insufferably intense, removes all the\nhazard of sinning, because it must disturb the understanding to such\na degree, as to deprive a man of all free will. This is a consequence\nresulting from all passions that are excessively violent, as is agreed\nby all philosophers and theologians. Virgil, who had great judgment and\npenetration in these matters, represents Chor\u0153bus, who had been totally\ndeprived of his senses by grief for the imprisonment of his beloved\nCassandra, as divested of all free will or reflexion also, in the\nfollowing lines:\n\n    _Non tulit hanc speciem furiat\u00e2 mente Chor\u0153bus,_\n    _Et sese medium injecit moriturus in agmen._\n\n\nPARADOX X.\n\n_The desire of posthumous fame is vain and futile._\n\nXCI. There is no appetite or craving of man can be more irrational, than\nthat, which is directed to an object he can never taste of or enjoy; and\nsuch a one, is the desire of having his name become famous in the world\nafter his death. When a man is dead, every thing here that respects\nhimself dies also; and what advantage can it be of to him after his\ndecease, that all the world burst forth in acclamations and applauses of\nhis great deeds and talents? The smoke of all this incense vanishes in\nthe air, nor can the least particle of it, touch or affect him to whom\nit is offered. He feels no more of the praises of his virtues, than a\nstatue; nor is he any more sensible of the celebrations of his grandeur,\nthan an edifice that is erected to perpetuate it. If his works were\npleasing in the eye of God, and he is in the regions of rest, he may\nfeel the satisfaction of having left a good example to the world; and\nall that passes out of that sphere, let the celebrations of the world\nbe what they will, can be of no avail to him. He will either despise,\nor be totally ignorant of the eulogiums that are bestowed on him by\nmortals. What convenience or what satisfaction, do either Alexander and\nC\u00e6sar now enjoy, from being applauded through the globe for the two\nmost illustrious warriors of the world? Homer and Virgil, from being\ncelebrated as the two most elegant poets? and Cicero and Demosthenes,\nfrom being admired as the two most eloquent orators? They are perhaps\nentirely ignorant of all that is said of them here; and if they are\npermitted to know it, it is most likely, that such knowledge tends more\nto torment than please them. Empedocles was certainly a great mad-man,\nif, according to what some have said of him, he precipitated himself\ninto the flames of Mount \u00c6tna, in order that the world upon not finding\nhis body, should imagine he had ascended up to heaven, and would worship\nhim as a deity. This philosopher however, as he was a follower of the\nPythagorean system, and believed the transmigration of souls, might\nexpect, that by his being placed successively in a variety of bodies,\nhe should hereafter view with great pleasure, the worship and adoration\nthat was paid to him in this world; but what enjoyment of this sort can\na man hope for, who believes that when he leaves these regions, he shall\nnever return to them again? And what can it be to such a man, whether\nhe is worshiped or forgotten? Thus the emperor Adrian was much madder\nthan Empedocles, who without believing in the doctrine of transmigration,\nerected temples and altars, and appointed priests, making provision\nat the same time for maintaining them, and providing victims to be\nsacrificed to his infamous little idol Antinous. Of what service could\nall this be to that disgraced and unfortunate boy? And we may make the\nsame observation, on the apotheosis and ridiculous deification of the\nRoman Emperors. Vespasian, although he expected this farce after his\ndeath, would be played over with respect to him, treated the thing with\nthe scorn it deserved, by saying to those who surrounded him when he was\nnear his end, _I feel as if I was going to be converted from a man into a\ndeity_.\n\nXCII. That mankind should be desirous of seeing themselves applauded,\nand their names honoured while living, seems very natural, because they\nmay find a gratification in it; but that they should be anxious for\nposthumous honours, which they can neither taste or enjoy, seems to\nbespeak a disordered imagination, and a distempered brain. Ovid paints\nSappho, as feeling great satisfaction, at seeing her muse celebrated by\nall the world.\n\n    _At mihi Pegasides blandissima carmina dictant;_\n    _Jam canitur toto nomen in orbe meum._\n\nThus far he expressed himself very properly, because he spoke in the name\nof Sappho while she was living, and might be supposed to be gratified\nby, and pleased with the aromatic fumes of those acclamations. But he\nreasoned very ill, when speaking of Hercules and Theseus, he reckoned as\na balance for the loss of those heroes, the applauses the world would\nbestow on their memories:\n\n    _Occidit et Theseus, et qui tumulavit Orestem;_\n      _Sed tamen in laudes vivit uterque suas._\n\nXCIII. The eulogiums of the dead, can only be enjoyed by the living. The\nrelations, the friends, and the country of the deceased, divide among\nthemselves the whole fragrancy of this grateful gale, nor can the least\nbreath of it reach the region, which is inhabited by those who depart\nhence. There remains to the dead but one happy lot, and that is derived\nfrom, and depends on their having died well. _Beati mortui, qui in Domino\nmoriuntur._\n\n\nPARADOX XI.\n\n_There is no man of a clear and good understanding who is not a\ngood-intentioned one._\n\nXCIV. I believe that all the mortals in every quarter of the Globe, will\nbe struck with surprize, at hearing me broach this paradox, and will look\nupon it as one of the greatest chimeras in ethics, that ever entered\nthe head of man; for there is scarce any one of the least observation,\nwho cannot affirm and attest, he has seen and known people of very good\ncapacities, who were very perverse and ill-disposed. But I, in opposition\nto all this, assert that I never met with such a one; and I not only make\nthis declaration, but declare further, that I think it next to impossible\nthat there should be such a man, and that if by chance such a one should\nbe found, he ought to be considered as a monster.\n\nXCV. But in order that we should not misunderstand or confound things,\nI think it necessary for me to explain, what I understand by an\nevil-intentioned man. By an evil-intentioned man, then, I mean such a\none in whom those vices reign, which are most pernicious to society,\nthat is to say, malignity of heart, unforgivingness, turbulence or\nrestlessness, and a desire of usurping other peoples property; and in\ngeneral, all sly and crafty persons should be enumerated in the catalogue\nof evil-intentioned men, such for example, as are attentive to nothing\nbut their own gratifications and emoluments, and who have not the least\nconcern for, or who are totally indifferent about the good of their\nneighbour, or the welfare of the public.\n\nXCVI. The deformity, the baseness, and the dissonance from natural\nreason, there is in a person\u2019s doing a voluntary injury to another, is\nso strikingly represented to a man of a clear and a sound understanding,\nthat except in here and there an instance, where some violent passion\nintervenes to disturb and disorder the reason, it seems impossible, that\na person should voluntarily commit acts that are directly injurious and\noffensive to his neighbour. And it may be from this principle, that we\nhave seen some who have been reputed as atheists, who, notwithstanding\ntheir erroneous belief that there is no such thing as future rewards and\npunishments, and that they expect no recompence for their good actions,\nor chastisement for their bad ones hereafter; as members of human\nsociety, have behaved well, or at least have done no civil mischief to\nit; I mean that they have conducted themselves like quiet peaceable\npeople, and have lived contentedly upon their own patrimonies, or on what\nthey have lawfully acquired, and have shewn themselves averse to all\nviolence and injustice. Such among the antients, was Pliny the elder; and\nsuch among those of more modern date, was the Englishman Thomas Hobbes.\n\nXCVII. The genuine and true reason of this is, that the existence of a\nSupreme Being, although it is most plain and clear, is not with respect\nto the human understanding, self-evident, or, as the Theologians explain\nthe thing, is not _per se nota quo ad nos_; but is made infallibly\nevident, by deductions drawn from other principles; and where a deduction\nof this sort is absolutely necessary, a person may suspect, that it is\nvery possible now and then some fallacy may creep in. But the deformity\nof such vicious actions as we have been speaking of, is evident of\nitself; and whenever such actions are represented to the understanding,\nit clearly comprehends their baseness, and the operation of them is\nodious and apparent in the eyes of every man, unless as we observed\nbefore, some circumstance intervenes to disturb his reason.\n\nXCVIII. To this it may be urged by way of objection, in the first place,\nthat in order to perceive and be convinced of the turpitude of those\nactions, there is no necessity for a man to be possessed of a bright\nunderstanding, as a middling one, or even one below the middle class,\nwould be sufficient for this purpose; so that this reasoning will prove\nthe turpitude to be plain to every understanding, high, middling, and\nlow, or else that it is evident to neither of them.\n\nXCIX. To this I answer, that although the thing may be known with intire\ncertainty to every one of them, there is a great difference between\nthe knowledge and comprehension of one man, and that of another. Two\nunderstandings that are unequal, notwithstanding they may both know, and\nbe thoroughly persuaded of the same truth, may be struck with it very\ndifferently; and in proportion as one of these understandings is the most\nclear, that one will know it more distinctly, more strikingly, and with\na more refined degree of penetration; and in proportion as the other\nis less clear, that other will perceive it less distinctly, and more\nconfusedly. In consequence of this inequality of understandings, objects\nmake a more strong or a more weak impression on the soul, and have more\nor less influence to excite in it, these, or those affections. The same\ninfinite goodness of God which is known to the blessed, is known with\ninfallible certainty by the worldly also. How then comes it to pass, that\nthe first love him necessarily and intensely, and that we worldly mortals\nare so luke-warm in our love of him? This is occasioned by no other\ncause than the following, that although our knowledge of him is evident,\nthat of the blessed is the most clear, and ours the most obscure; and\nin proportion as the understanding knows a good or an evil with greater\nclearness, the will is moved with a greater impetus, to love the first,\nand abhor the last.\n\nC. This may be very opportunely and aptly explained, by the operation of\nany corporeal sense; for he whose olfactory nerves are very quick, will\nbe more offended with an ill smell, than one in whom that sensation is\nmore languid and remiss; and although this last may be able clearly to\ndistinguish the ill smell, he will be less disgusted at it; nor will it\nappear so hateful to him; and this happens from no other reason, than\nthat the olfactory perception of the first is very clear, and that of the\nsecond rather obstructed or more dull; and although not only the man who\nhas a very quick and delicate ear, but also he who has one that is more\nobtuse, may evidently perceive the dissonance of three or four voices\nwhich are totally discordant; the last will bear it without being much\naffected, and the other will be almost distracted by it; and this is all\nderived from the cause above-mentioned.\n\nCI. And it happens just so with regard to intellectual perception. The\ndeformity of vicious actions, which are self-evident, is apparent and\nclear, not only to men of perspicuous understandings, but to those of\nthe most inferior capacities, provided they are not quite stupid; but\nby the first perceiving them with a lively clearness, and the others\nsomewhat confusedly, they produce a kind of horror in those who have that\nclearness of perception, which does not permit their wills to embrace\nsuch objects; while those to whom they do not appear so disgusting and\nunpleasant, may be betrayed into grasping turpitudes, under the disguise\nof delights and pleasures. But I would not have it understood that I mean\nto insinuate by what I have said here, that there ever is a suspension,\nor obstruction of the operation, of every, or any man\u2019s free will.\n\nCII. It may be objected in the second place, that there are entire\nnations, among whom it cannot be denied, that there are to be found\nmany men of excellent understandings, who hold robbery, deceit, and\neven cruelty to be lawful, and that consequently, they cannot consider\nthese things as turpitudes, or have a just sense of their baseness. To\nthis I answer, that our assertion with respect to a good understanding,\ndoes not allude to one placed in such a situation. The general error\nof a nation in any matter whatever, is like a dark fog which bewilders\npeople, causes them to mistake their way, and perplexes the clearest\nunderstandings. If in early infancy, when the rational faculties are\nweak, children are familiarized to, and brought up under the influence\nof deceitful prejudices; and when they come to years of maturity, they\nare accustomed to reverence a common error as irrefragable authority; if\nit should happen afterwards, that a ray of light breaks in upon them,\nwhich discovers to them the truth, they timidly fly from the elucidation,\ndistrust their own reason and reflexion, and are apt to suspect such\nelucidation to be a delusion, and to suppose that it would be criminal in\nthem to regard it.\n\nCIII. I answer secondly, that it is not known with any degree of\ncertainty, that men of excellent understandings, who are educated and\nbrought up in those nations we call barbarous, are infected with all the\nerrors that prevail in those nations; and with respect to myself, I am\nfully persuaded they are not. We know that various eminent men among\nthe Gentiles, in matters of religion, thought very differently from the\npopulace. It is true however, that there were but few of them who had\nsufficient resolution to speak out, as they for the most part disguised\ntheir opinions, from motives of fear or policy. We ought also to admit,\nthat among the barbarous nations of these times, there are still to be\nfound men of this character. Nor is there any necessity for limiting such\nan opinion within the bounds of mere conjecture; for there are various\nhistorical relations, which bear testimony to actions of heroic virtue,\nthat have been lately done by some of the individuals of those very\nnations, where maxims of inhumanity are prevalent at this day; of which\nif it was necessary, a long catalogue might be adduced.\n\nCIV. In the third place, it may be objected, that experience teaches\nus, there is scarce a country or populous city, where you may not find\nsome people of perspicuous understandings, and who, although they are\nof wayward dispositions and depraved inclinations, are subtil and\npenetrating. To this I answer resolutely and determinedly, that I defy\nany man to produce such an instance. I have known and conversed with\nmany of those people, who have been esteemed men of good understanding,\nand perverse dispositions, but have always found the common opinion of\nthose persons to be extremely erroneous. The vulgar frequently look upon\npersons of very superficial talents, as men of great understanding; and\nupon hearing them talk off hand, although there is nothing solid in what\nthey say, and observing in them a readiness at expressing themselves,\nand more especially if they deliver themselves with confidence, and a\nmagisterial air, most people are apt to give them credit for being men\nof admirable understandings; when in truth, there is hardly one out of a\nhundred of them, who can penetrate more than skin-deep into the objects\nhe converses upon. There is another very common deception in this matter,\nand that is, looking upon cunning people as men of depth or penetration,\nwhen they are as palpably different from one another, as light is from\ndarkness. I call those cunning people, who are solely attentive to\nnothing but their own concerns, and who by all sorts of under-hand ways\nand means, and by all kinds of little arts and deceits, are endeavouring\nto promote their own particular interest. Can these be called men\nof sublime understandings? To do this, requires but little depth or\npenetration, as all that is necessary to accomplish such ends, is low\ncraft and roguery; and there is hardly any capacity, be it ever so mean,\nwhich cannot comprehend and apply such trivial artifices: every one may\narrive at doing this; but a noble understanding, discerning the baseness\nof them, abominates such practices; although the vulgar, to whose bastard\ndispositions they are better suited, embrace them with eagerness.\nDissimulation, so far from requiring an exalted understanding to support\nand carry it on, requires none at all, for we see some irrational animals\nwho exercise it with great address. The foxes are very expert at it, but\nthat does not in any wise render their nature superior to that of brutes;\nand I repeat again, that I never knew an understanding that had any thing\nof the elevated or sublime in its composition, that did not abhor all\nduplicity and fraud.\n\nCV. If we see this matter in the other extreme point of view, we shall\nfind it liable to great equivocation. It frequently happens, that a man\nof very pure virtue, who has somewhat of native dryness or bluntness in\nhis composition, appears to those of rude and uncultivated capacities,\nas a person of a depraved disposition. Those who are zealous lovers of\ntruth and justice, are accustomed, not always to accommodate themselves\nto those courteous condescensions; by which people acquire popular\nacceptation; as by attending to the substance of things, they are apt to\noverlook forms and ceremonies. Words from their mouths, signify what the\nsound and sense of them express: they confider courteous dissimulation as\na treacherous enemy of virtue; and are ignorant of the art of painting\nvice in counterfeit colours, for the sake of pleasing or flattering\nany man; but on the contrary, are always careful to describe it so, as\nthat it may appear in its true native shape, and in all its deformity.\nThe more prevalent lying, deceit, and perfidy is, the more they loath\nand nauseate it, and are observed to be more strict and severe in their\nreprehensions of it; and besides, they never look smilingly, but upon\nthose in whom they perceive a clean mind. This unpleasing integrity,\nis regarded by the bulk of the world, as a kind of misanthropy, or\nmalevolence towards the generality of mankind; and the number of those,\nwho busy themselves in painting such men, as impracticable, perverse,\nand ill-intentioned is infinite; for they are pleasing but to very few,\nas there are but few who are pleased with them; so that either from the\nmalice of their opponents, or from the want of a proper knowledge of\nthe world in those that are indifferent with respect to their opinions\nof them, it easily comes to pass, that a man of exalted and sincere\nvirtue, is often looked upon by a whole town, as a person of intentional\nmalignity.\n\nCVI. Whoever is upon his guard not to fall into one of the two\nbeforementioned errors, and has capacity to distinguish true virtue from\nfalse, and a clear and good understanding, from a cloudy, crooked, or\ncrafty one, will be convinced as I myself have been convinced, that there\nnever fails to be much virtue lodged in the person, in whom you find a\nreal good and clear understanding. I would not however be understood to\ninsinuate, that all men of great genius and capacity should be saints;\nfor meritorious virtue, or such as entitles a man to inherit eternal\nlife, is the child of grace, and not of nature. Neither would I be\nunderstood to say, that all kinds of moral virtues should be resplendent\nin such a man as I have been describing, but only those, whose opposite\nvices, at first sight, and without the assistance of any reasoning or\nreflection, are manifest and apparent; and whose deformity, at a glance,\nstrikes the eye of every beholder; nor would I even be understood to\nassert so much as this, without some limitation and exception; for\nevery vehement passion during the time it lasts, will make the most\nprudent man act like a mad one, and the most acute one, like a fool;\nbut abstracted from the intervention of such accidents, it is my firm\nopinion, that every man of a clear and good understanding, is an honest\nand a good-intentioned one.\n\n\n\n\nTHE GREAT AND MASTERLY AUTHORITY of EXPERIENCE.\n\n\nSECT. I.\n\nI. There arrived in the kingdom of Cosmosia, two famous women, who were\nvery opposite to each other; but both with the same design, which was\nthat of obtaining the absolute dominion over that empire. The first was\ncalled Solidina, the other Idearia; the first was learned, but simple;\nthe second ignorant, and ostentatious. The people of the country, were\nignorant like the last, and simple as the first. Hence, Solidina thought\nto win them to her by kindness, and by instructing them; and Idearia,\nto subdue them by craft and imposition. Idearia opened a public school,\nand promised in pompous language, that in a very short time, and with\nlittle or no trouble, she would make all those extremely learned and\nwise, who chose to attend her lectures. The greatness of the promise,\njoined to the imposing appearance of the new doctress, mounted in the\nprofessional chair, together with her great volubility, and flow of\nmountebank rhetoric, soon filled the school with pupils. She began her\nlectures, which all consisted, in laying before her auditors in new and\nunusual language, the chimeras, contained in the extensive field of the\nimagination. And, oh wonderful to relate! either Idearia had somewhat of\nenchantment about her, or else there was something very singular in her\nmethod of applying her artifice and cunning; for in a few years after\nopening her school, she persuaded those miserable people, they perfectly\nunderstood all that could be learned.\n\nII. Solidina, pursued a course diametrically opposite to that taken by\nIdearia. In an humble garb, and without any parade or ostentation, she\nwent from house to house, and familiarizing herself with all men, taught\nthem in plain and easy language, true and useful documents. The most\nretired cottages, and the most humble work-shops, were schools suited\nto her doctrines, for she found in all of them, sensible objects, which\nexamined by the help, or auxiliary aid of the understanding, served the\npurpose of books for teaching and explaining her lessons; and so far was\nshe from inspiring an indiscreet presumption in her disciples, that she\ningenuously told them, that all she taught, was a mere trifle, compared\nto the infinite deal there is to be learned; and that to arrive at a\nmoderate knowledge of things, required infinite labour and application.\nThis modesty of Solidina\u2019s, was very prejudicial to her, because at the\nvery time she made this declaration, Idearia, was boasting and blazoning\nin her school, that in a concise mode, and with very little trouble,\nshe would make all her auditors universally learned; the consequence of\nwhich was, that the pupils of Solidina one after another began to drop\noff, and go over to Idearia, in hopes that in her school, they should\narrive at the summit of learning _per saltum_. What contributed much\nto forward this defection, was, that Idearia also spoke of Solidina\nwith contempt, calling her base, vile, mechanical, and stupid; by which\nmeans, the poor tutress became abandoned by all the people of rank, and\nwas obliged to retire from the city to the villages, where she applied\nherself to instructing poor husbandmen, in that sort of knowledge, that\nwas necessary and useful, for the cultivation and improvement of their\nlands.\n\nIII. Idearia by the banishment of her rival, now becoming triumphant,\nentertained thoughts of establishing an absolute and despotic sway\nover her disciples; and to accomplish this purpose, she published an\nedict, by which every one was required not to believe in future, aught\nhe should see with his eyes, or touch with his hands, but only to credit\nsuch things as she should be pleased to order him to believe; requiring\nfurther, that he should look upon it as an indispensable obligation,\nalways to defend with invincible obstinacy and unremitting vociferation\nher doctrines, against whoever should presume to contradict them. All\nheads bowed obedient to this tyrannic decree, and people began firmly\nto believe many maxims, which before they had found a difficulty in\nassenting to; such for example, as that the truth can never be found out\nor ascertained but by means of fiction; that there is a mode of coming\nat the knowledge of things, which may be taught to a child in four\ndays; that mankind are all alike, which is a rule that will hold good\nwith respect to every other species, and if you know what one of a sort\nis, you know what they all are; that insensible and inanimate things,\nhave their desires, their prejudices, and their affections, the same\nas animate ones; that that body, which is the most brilliant, and most\nheating of any, has nothing igneous in its composition; and that on the\nother hand, there is another very large body, which is purely igneous,\nthat is neither luminous, nor heating, nor does it stand in need of any\npabulum to sustain it; that all living creatures have a large portion\nof fire in their composition, without excepting even the fish, although\nthey are always in or under the water, nor the turtle, whose blood is\npositively cold.\n\nIV. These and many other such-like portentous particulars, did Idearia\nteach to, and impose on her credulous disciples; who all received and\nembraced them as infallible truths; but at length there arose in the\nvery school of the doctress herself, a contentious schism, or scandalous\ndisagreement, which was begun by one Papyratius, a man of subtil and\nanimated genius, but a great lover of novelties. This man introduced new\nand not less astonishing dogmas than the others; such as that all the\nliving creatures in the world, man only excepted, have no more sensation\nor feeling than stocks or stones; and that in every man, there is but a\nvery small portion of the body which possesses the presence of the soul;\nthat the extension of the world is infinite; that the motion of sublunary\nbodies, is equally semper-eternal with that of the c\u0153lestial ones; that\nthe imaginary space, is really and truly a body; that every thing upon\nthe face of the earth, is in so continual and rapid a motion, as in the\nspace of every twenty-four hours, to travel some thousands of leagues;\nthat we in all things, should give credit to our imaginations, but none\nto our senses; for that the representations made by these last, are apt\ngrossly to deceive us; and that neither is the swan white, or the crow\nblack, nor is fire hot, or snow cold, &c.\n\nV. These novelties, and others of the same sort, although they were\ncondemned from the beginning by the majority of Idearia\u2019s disciples,\ndid not fail to attract a number of votaries, sufficient to form a\nnew school. The two parties inveighed against each other with great\nbitterness, and one side reprobated as absurd errors, what the other\nmaintained as conclusive dogmas.\n\nVI. This division, after long and obstinate disputes, in which the\narguments were so nearly poised in equilibrium, that neither side could\nclaim the victory, in the course of time, opened the eyes of many,\nand made them doubt whether they had not lightly, or even blindly,\nadmitted as articles of human faith, doctrines, that were uncertain,\nand exposed to be terribly contested. They observed, that the arguments\nwith which each side attacked the opinions of their opponents, were\nbeyond comparison stronger, than the reasons with which they defended\ntheir own. From hence they inferred, that both the one and the other\nwere evidently doubtful, and might very probably be false. This brought\nto their remembrance the poor and neglected Solidina, and made them\nreflect, that she proved all she advanced, by sensible and plain\ndemonstrations. This remark becoming every day more general, and more\nadverted to by men of the first-rate ingenuity in the schools; they took\nthe matter into consideration, and the result of their deliberations\nwas, a determination to recall Solidina from her retirement, and to\nbring her back to the city; which after having done with solemn pomp,\nthey erected a magnificent school for her, where she has continued to\nteach from that time, with a reputation that has increased daily; and her\nbeing favoured with the countenance and protection of some illustrious\npersonages of high rank, has greatly contributed to advance her credit,\nand particularly the encouragement she has met with from the princes,\nGalindo and Anglosio, who are both great lovers, and patrons of Solidina.\n\n\nSECT. II.\n\nVII. This History, which was printed in French, was given me to read by\na stranger who was on his travels; but as soon as I had read what I have\njust related, he snatched the book out of my hands, and asked me if I\ncomprehended what I had read? The question gave me to understand, there\nwas something mysterious in the History, and that under the plain letter,\nwas conveyed some signification, different from what the words expressed.\nI answered him, that I had not understood it in any other sense, than\nwhat the language seemed to imply; but that if he would permit me to\nread it over again with a little attention, I might perhaps be able to\ncomprehend its meaning. He gave me leave, and then upon reflection,\nfirst on the nature of the doctrines it mentioned, although they were\nnot pointed out very clearly, and secondly, on the allusion of the names\ngiven to the personages who were introduced into the scene, I found it\nwas not very difficult to decypher the riddle, which I interpreted in the\nfollowing manner.\n\nVIII. The kingdom of _Cosmosia_ is the world, which is the signification\nof the Greek word _Cosmos_. _Solidina_ is experience, and _Idearia_\nimagination. These names are very properly suited, both to the characters\nand doctrines of the parties. Experience _solidly_ proves her maxims, by\nsensible and clear demonstrations; and imagination, grounds her opinions\non the vain representation of her _ideas_. Solidina was a long while\nbanished, and during all that time, Idearia reigned triumphant; for\nfrom the period that Pythagoras reduced all philosophy to his numbers,\nPlato to his ideas, and Aristotle to his precisions; and for many ages\nafterwards, the world knew no other but an ideal physic; nor did it pay\nthe least attention, to the experimental or solid. In the first maxims\nof Idearia, we perceive many of the dogmas of the peripatetic doctrine,\nand in her second, many of the Cartesian ones; and they gave the name of\nPapyratius to the broacher of this last system, because the French word\n_Carte_, signifies the same as the Latin word _Papyrus_, from whence\nthe appellative was derived. Des Cartes is ranged among the auditors of\nIdearia, because he was disposed instead of less, rather more than the\nPeripatetics, to regulate all physics by imagination and ideas. At length\nthe mistake of this method was perceived, and Solidina was recalled\nfrom the villages to the city; and experiment and observation, which for\na long time had only been in use among the rustics, and employed in the\nbusiness of husbandry, to increase the product of the earth, improve\nthe mountainous land, and to encourage the propagation, and mend the\nbreed of herds and cattle; were not long since introduced in pomp, and\ncountenanced by some courts, in the neighbourhood of which, academies\nwere instituted, to examine nature by their help; and as the most\ncelebrated of these, were the Academy of Sciences at Paris, and the Royal\nSociety of London, which were founded under the protection of the kings\nof France and England, they called the two princes who were the lovers\nand patrons of Solidina, by the names of Galindo, and Anglosio, which\nwere derived from the Latin words _Gallia_, and _Anglia_, which in that\nlanguage signify France and England.\n\nIX. The stranger approved of the whole, and every part of my explanation,\nand assured me, that by the context that followed what I had read, the\nintention of the author of that mysterious History, could be no other\nthan what I had described it. But I told him I was not inclined to\napprove, nor could I approve of the whole and every part of its content;\nfor that I observed in it some latitudinary expressions, which seemed to\nreflect upon, and were derogatory of the peripatetic doctrine, so I only\nacknowledged to him, that in the most essential parts, the thing seemed\njust and right. He replied, that as I was a Spaniard, and a sectary of\nthe peripatetic school, my objection and the reasons for it might be\nadmitted. Upon saying this, he took his leave of me, and pursued his\njourney, leaving me in a disposition to meditate on the subject of our\nconversation, and lay before the public, such reflections as should occur\nto me respecting the matter of it, which may be seen in the sequel of\nthis discourse.\n\n\nSECT. III.\n\nX. The first thing that offers itself to our consideration, is the little\nor no progress, which natural reason, unassisted by experience, has made\nin the examination of the affairs of nature in the course of so many\nages. Nature is as little understood in the schools at this day, as it\nwas in the academies of Plato, of Lyceus, and of Aristotle. What secret\nhave these academies developed? or what diminutive portion of this most\nextensive country have they discovered? What utility has the labours of\nso many men of excellent ingenuity, as have cultivated philosophy in the\nreasoning and speculative way, produced to the world? What art, either\nliberal or mechanical, of the many that are necessary for the service\nof man, or the good of the public, do we owe to speculative invention;\nand I might even say, what small advancement in any such art, has been\nderived from it? What document of the schools, has conduced to instruct\na husbandman in the cultivation of his lands? They there talk much of\ncauses, effects, productions, and dispositions of matter, but all this\nhas not yet produced any maxim that can be relied on, for the most\nadvantageous mode of cultivating the land, in order to dispose it to the\nproduction of this or that particular plant, nor to instruct us at what\ntime it should be sown, nor in the least to inform us with regard to\nmany other circumstances, that should be attended to in the raising it.\nSchoolmen, after the example of Aristotle, treat largely of qualities,\nwhich they place in a predicament apart, or by themselves; without having\nby this means, discovered any qualities at all, either in the mixtures,\nor the elements; but on the contrary, Aristotle has rather been miserably\nmistaken in those he attempted to point out, by his rules of proportion\nand combination; I mean in those that appertain to the air, and the\nwater, as we have proved in another part of our works; and it would\nnot be difficult to prove the same thing, with regard to those he has\nassigned to the earth. If perchance he has been right in ascertaining\nthe qualities belonging to fire, (although in our _Physical Paradoxes_\nwe have denied his position with respect to its being hot in the highest\ndegree) I say, if he has been right in this particular, it was not\nbecause philosophy had penetrated the secret, but because the thing was\nmanifested to us by our senses.\n\nXI. These are the organs, by which all the natural truths we are\nable to obtain a knowledge of are conveyed to our spirits. Even in\nthe mathematical faculties, which affect to confide every thing to\ntheoretical demonstrations, they cannot, except in the two elemental\nones, arithmetic and geometry, safely advance a step, without\nholding before them, the light of experience. It was this taught the\ngeographer, the situation and position of the divers parts of the globe;\nthe navigator, the directive virtue of the load-stone; the static\nphilosopher, the weight, the descent, and acceleration of motion in their\ndescent, of heavy bodies; the mechanic and engineer, the augmentation of\npower by machinery, or the multiplication of purchase; the astronomer,\nthe movements and course of the stars; the musician, the consonant and\ndissonant intervals of music; the optician, perspective, or the effects\nof vision when the eye surveys distant objects; to the catoptrician, and\ndioptrician, the laws of reflexion, and refraction.\n\n\nSECT. IV.\n\nXII. And it is very worthy of remarking, that even after experience\nhad made those first discoveries, on which the theory and practice of\narts are founded, those primitive lights were in general found to be\ninsufficient to enable the understanding to make further advances in\nthem, but it was rather found to be necessary, that the same experience\nshould continue as they proceeded on, to direct their steps, and correct\ntheir errors. I will explain what I mean, by two examples taken from\nnavigation.\n\nXIII. The first regards the direction, or pointing of the magnetical\nneedle to the pole. This admirable property, which was totally unknown to\nthe antients, was discovered in the thirteenth century, and immediately\napplied to the improvement of navigation. Upon its first discovery,\nthe philosophers, according to their wonted custom of pretending to\ndiscern the causes of things, imputed this effect, as derived from an\noccult sympathy with the pole, contained in the very essence, form, and\nsubstance of the loadstone; and as this is supposed to be invariable,\nthey concluded, that the direction must infallibly be invariable also.\nThey continued in this good faith for about four hundred years, at the\nend of which long period, Crinon, a pilot of Dieppe as some say, or\nCabot, a Venetian Navigator as others believe, was the first who observed\nthe declinations of the magnetical needle from the true north, that\nis, that it did not always point directly to the pole, but declined in\ndifferent places, sometimes towards the west, and at others towards the\neast. The philosophers heard this novelty with great disgust, because it\ngave the lye to some of their most established maxims, and therefore they\nset about to contradict it with all their force. But in the end, they\nwere obliged to submit to repeated experiments, authorized and confirmed,\nby the testimonies of people of undoubted credit.\n\nXIV. Having afterwards discovered, that under the meridian of the Azores\nor western islands, there was no variation of the magnetical needle\nat all, the astronomers and geographers, thought they had found out a\nfixed station, whereat to commence the first meridian, which had before\nbeen counted arbitrarily, from whatever place they chose to begin\nit. But this idea soon vanished, for a little while afterwards, they\ndiscovered two other meridians, where there was no variation; the one\nat a head-land near _the Cape of Good Hope_, to which, on this account\nthey gave the name of _Needle Cape_; and another, at the spot where the\ncity of Canton is situated. Upon this, they thought they had found out a\ncertain principle, whereon to ground a compleat system for calculating or\ncomputing variations, by graduating them for the intermediate stations,\nin proportion to their greater or less distance from the mean space\nbetween the two places where there was no variation.\n\nXV. But as nature frequently mocks the ideal propositions that are\nfabricated by the brain of man, this time of rejoicing lasted but a few\nyears, for they discovered, that this declination of the magnetic needle,\nvaried more or less at the same place at different times, and that this\nchange of variation was perpetual. This discovery, not only demolished\nthe antecedent imagined rules, but nearly took away all hope, of their\never in future, finding out any certain one for their guidance; and\nthis, notwithstanding many men, eminent for their skill in physics and\nmathematics, have long, and still do, labour at accomplishing it.\n\nXVI. In this instance, may be seen the fallibility of the most plausible\nreasonings unaccompanied by experiments. And we shall see the same, in\nthe other we are about to mention, which relates to the flux and reflux\nof the sea.\n\nXVII. As the flux and reflux of the sea, is evident and apparent to\nall those who inhabit near the sea-coasts, and the course and changes\nof the Moon to all mankind, it was easy and natural, to observe the\ncorrespondence there was between the movements of the one and the other;\nthat is, that the rising and falling of the tide, keeps pace with the\nrising and setting of the moon; and it is probable, that the first people\nwho remarked this, fancied that by this single observation, they had\ndiscovered the system of these admirable movements. But this delusion\nwas but short-lived, for they soon afterwards observed, that within the\nspace of the same lunar month, there was a great disproportion between\nthe rising and falling of the tide, and that it flowed higher, and ebbed\nlower, at the new and full moon, than it did at the quarters. But when\nthey had advanced this step, it is likely they gave themselves credit\nfor having discovered the whole secret, and supposed, that they knew all\nthat was to be known of the matter; and when they observed there was so\nexact a correspondence, between the motions of the tide, and the phases\nof the moon, they did not entertain the least doubt, but that they were\ntotally influenced by this planet. But experience also undeceived mankind\nwith respect to this error, for they found out, that there was another\nvariation of the tides, which did not depend upon the revolutions of the\nmoon, but upon those of the sun; that is, that supposing other things to\nbe equal, they rise higher, at, or near the equinoxes, than they do at\nthe solstices. This gave them to understand, that the moon did not reign\nso despotic over the tides, as to exclude the sun from all share in the\ndominion of them.\n\nXVIII. But after all this was ascertained, they found, that by\ntrusting the bringing of ships into barr\u2019d or tide harbours, to the\nmere combination of the before-nam\u2019d observations, they fell into very\ndangerous errors; for that there are two other variations, which are very\nconsiderable, and especially one of them, and which can\u2019t be comprehended\nunder any general rule whatsoever; the one is with respect to the time of\nfull sea; and the other, regards the quantum of rise of the water. The\ntime of full sea varies at different ports, even under the same meridian,\nand does not happen in all of them at the same hour. They vary also with\nrespect to the magnitude of them, because there is an enormous difference\nin the height they flow at some ports, to what they do at others, for\nthe water will rise more than ten fathoms upon some coasts, and not above\na few feet on others, and in others again, the rise is hardly perceptible.\n\n\nSECT. V.\n\nXIX. If the rules deduced from experimental observations are so fallible,\nthat it is absolutely necessary in order to avoid all error, to pursue\nthe thread of them so scrupulously, that reason should not venture to\nadvance a step, without the light of an experiment appropriated to the\nbusiness it is in search of; I say, if these rules are not to be relied\non, what confidence can we place in those maxims, which derive their\norigin from our arbitrary ideas?\n\nXX. Nature conforms to, and is governed by the idea of its great\nartificer, not by that of man; and it is strange temerity in man, to\npresume he can comprehend the idea of such an artificer. I have sometimes\nthought, that if we were told, that there were numbers of those luminous\nbodies in the heavens which we call stars, although we could not see\nthem, every one would imagine, such a disposition and collocation of them\nin the sphere, as best suited his own fancy. One would conceive them\ndistributed into various regular sets of figures, such as triangular,\nhexangular, circular, &c. which formed so many different constellations;\nanother, that they were composed of a beautiful suit, of well ranged and\nharmonious groups; another, that they were disposed after the manner of\nflowers, which he had seen growing in parterres in some garden; another,\nthat they were formed in such a position, as resembled the shape of\nvarious images, either mystic or natural. In fact, there would be no\nbody, that would not attribute to them some most beautiful resemblance,\nor imitation, of those things which he had ever seen, that seemed most\npleasing to him, either in art, or nature. Notwithstanding which,\nthey would all deceive themselves, and be greatly surprised, upon the\nfirmament afterwards being displayed to their view, to find the stars\nplaced and ranged in a position, quite different and distinct from all\nthey had imagined.\n\n\nSECT. VI.\n\nXXI. Thus it frequently happens, that men think in one manner, and God\noperates in another. Men suppose, and they suppose right, that the works\nof God are all executed with order, and in proportion; but although they\nsuppose well, they reason ill; because they think there is no other\norder and proportion, than that which comes within the reach of their\ncomprehension. The works of God, it is true are wrought with proportion;\nbut with a sublime proportion, which is much superior to our rules. It is\nblind temerity in man, to imagine that God in his works, is to conform\nhimself to our human gross ideas of proportions.\n\nXXII. It was a confidence in such proportions, that caused Pythagoras to\nerr egregiously in his dimensions of the magnitude, and his calculation\nof the distance of the heavens, which he thought to compute, by the\nnumerical series of the intervals of music. And others were not much\nwiser than Pythagoras, who by fancying they had found some special\nperfection in the number four, chose to stamp it on, and regulate all the\noperations of nature by it. From hence came the four elements, the four\nfirst qualities, the four cardinal points of the globe, the four quarters\nof the year, and the four humours of the body.\n\n\nSECT. VII.\n\nXXIII. If even in those consequences, which to all human appearance, we\ndeduce immediately from the truths which nature herself presents to our\nsenses, we are sometimes liable to be mistaken; what dependance can we\nplace in those, that are founded on principles, which without consulting\nnature, are established by our fancy? What consequence to all appearance\ncould seem better inferred, than that of the repugnance of nature to a\nvacuum, founded on the palpable experiment of the water rising in the\npump? But by the light of innumerable other experiments, the mistake was\ndiscovered; and it was found out, that the true cause of that, and all\nsuch-like ph\u00e6nomena, was the weight of the air.\n\nXXIV. We see with our eyes, whether we explain the cause of it as\nproceeding from an intrinsic quality, or from attraction, or from\nimpulse, that gravity precipitates bodies with a swift movement towards\nthe earth. It seems most natural to suppose, by reasoning from the\nfamous axiom, _sicut se habet simpliciter ad simpliciter, ita magis ad\nmagis_, that to a duplicate gravity, there would correspond a duplicate\nacceleration of motion. But the fact differs widely from this proportion.\n\nXXV. It is plain, that air is much more subtle and thin than water. Who\nfrom hence, would not infer as an unavoidable consequence, that air must\npenetrate all bodies which water penetrates? Notwithstanding this, we\nsee that water penetrates paper, which air does not penetrate, or it\npenetrates it in so small a degree, or so slowly, that we look upon it as\nnext to no penetration at all.\n\nXXVI. Who judging by general or common principles, would not conclude,\nthat wet hay was much less liable to take fire than dry? But experience\nteaches us, that by putting together quantities of hay too moist, it will\ntake fire of itself, which could never have happened, if the hay had been\nput together sufficiently dry, or more thoroughly made.\n\nXXVII. What maxim is better established, or more generally assented\nto among the naturalists, than that a vivifying heat of the blood, is\nindispensably necessary for the preservation of life? But with all this,\nFather Plumier, a learned priest of the order of Minimus, in a voyage in\nthe Pacific ocean, for want of water, found himself under a necessity of\ndrinking the blood of turtles, and declares, he found it as cold as the\ncommon water in Europe. (Mem. de Trevoux, an. 1704, tom. 1. page 175.)\nWho, agreeable to the laws of ratiocination, can say otherwise, than that\nthe third quality, resulting from the mixing three or four f\u0153tid things\ntogether, must be f\u0153tid also? But experience manifests to us, that this\nconsequence is not infallible. Mr. Lemeri bought a certain quantity of\nthe gums galbanum, sagapenum, and opopanax, and also some bitumen of\nJud\u00e6a, which he put all together into a retort, and found that there\nresulted from the mixtures, a strongly scented oil, greatly resembling\nmusk; now the bitumen in smell, does not in the least resemble musk, and\nthe other three drugs are absolutely f\u0153tid. (Hist. de l\u2019Academ. Royal,\nann. 1706.)\n\nXXVIII. If a philosopher, destitute of all other information, except that\nwhich he had acquired in the schools, should be told that two liquids,\nwhich to the touch appear cold, should upon being mixed together, not\nonly heat and boil, but also emit a flame; he would be in a terrible\nagitation, and armed with his infallible conclusive principle, _that\nnothing can communicate a quality which it does not possess_, would\nexclaim against the proposition. But let him exclaim as much as he will,\nit is a certain fact, that from mixing a pure acid, with the essential\noil of an aromatic plant, there will result that commotion.\n\nXXIX. We know that water, is much heavier than air; and we also know,\nthat the vapours which arise from the earth, are nothing else but\nparticles of water, very minutely divided, and consequently, that they\nmust be much heavier than particles of air of the same size. We know\nalso, that a liquid cannot ascend above another, when they are put\ntogether, except when it\u2019s particles of equal size are lighter than those\nof the other. From these premises, it should follow as an infallible\nconsequence, that these vapours cannot rise superior to the air we\nbreathe. But let this consequence appear ever so infallible, experience\nconvinces us that the fact is otherwise.\n\nXXX. Nobody is ignorant, that the aromatic species, such as the clove,\nthe pimienta, and the cinnamon, are hot or heating, and that the regions\nnearest the poles are cold, and those nearest the equinoctial hot. From\nthese premises, what naturalist would not infer, that the use of these\nspecies would be less pernicious to the inhabitants of the cold regions,\nthan to those of the hot? But experience is ever demonstrating to us the\ncontrary. For a scruple of clove is more offensive to, and has a greater\neffect on the first, than a drachm has on the last.\n\nXXXI. And similar to this, has been the experience of the Hollanders, in\nsome of their voyages to the East Indies. It happened once, that upon\npassing the line, the greatest part of the people belonging to a ship\nwere taken sick, and that more than half of them died, and that those\nonly recovered, to whom in their sickness they gave great quantities of\nbrandy. The medical men found great difficulty in believing, that these\npeople could owe the preservation of their lives to drinking to excess\nof a liquor, which if not taken sparingly and with moderation, is found\nto be very pernicious to health. But in the end, they found themselves\nobliged to yield to experience; and admit of the liberal use of brandy,\nwhich afterwards delivered with equal success, all the afflicted from\ntheir illness.\n\nXXXII. It is then absolutely necessary to submit to experience, and if we\nare not disposed to abandon the real road of truth, to seek for nature in\nherself, and not in the deceitful image which our fancy forms of her.\n\n\nSECT. VIII.\n\nXXXIII. I am not ignorant that there are some schoolmen, who represent\nthe application to experiments, as disgraceful to, and beneath the\ndignity of philosophy. But this is a most absurd error, for at this rate,\nstudying the imaginations of men, would be a more honourable occupation,\nthan ruminating on the works of God. In books of theory, we contemplate\nhuman ideas; in natural entities, divine ones. Let reason now determine,\nwhich is the most noble study.\n\nXXXIV. The prince of philosophers, Aristotle, thought differently in this\nrespect to the present school ones, for he said, we should not disdain to\nexamine with our senses, the most trifling works of nature, for that we\nshould find in them all, marks of sublime wisdom, and just and beautiful\ningenuity: _Aggredi enim qu\u00e6que sine ullo pudore debemus, cum in omnibus\nnatur\u00e6 numen, et honesium, pulchrumque insit ingenium._ For so it is,\nthat in the most humble plant, in the most vile insect, and in the most\nrude rock, we see the traces of an omnipotent hand, and the marks of\ninfinite wisdom.\n\nXXXV. Besides this, it is a matter of great importance to him who is in\nsearch of truth, to chuse the path that leads directly on to his object,\nand not to pursue that which will conduct him out of his way, although it\nshould to the eye, appear the most desirable, and the most pleasant to\nwalk through. There is no doubt, that a physician in a college, mounted\nin a professional chair, and reading a lecture, makes a more pompous\nfigure, than when he is attending to, and observing the dissection of a\ndead body in an hospital; but it is by attending to the dissection, that\nhe attains a knowledge of the situation and arrangement of the internal\nparts of the body, which he could never have acquired, by reasoning or\ndisputing all his life long in a school. Ideal gold, is possessed in\nimagination by lazy people, who while they are sleeping in their beds,\ndream it is showered down on them; but the true ore, can only be acquired\nby force of labour, and digging in the mines with diligence and industry.\nAnd in no other manner, otherwise than in appearance only, can we attain\nmore, than that shadow of truth, which we call probability, for these\nare the largest advances we can make, by the force of our imaginations\nexerted in the retirements of the closet; and the truth itself, is only\nto be found by scrutinizing sensible objects, and searching in them, for\nthe hidden secrets of nature.\n\n\nSECT. IX.\n\nXXXVI. There is another objection to experimental observations, which\nis not more reasonable, or better founded than that we have just\nmentioned, which is made by some superficial schoolmen, who say, that\nthese sort of enquiries, do not require reason and perspicuity, but\nonly eye-sight, diligence, and memory; on which account they condemn\nthem, as things not well calculated for the exertion of invention, and\ningenuity. But how little do these people know of the nature of those\nphysical experiments, or of the manner in which they are made, which have\nemployed the attention of so many learned and sublime spirits, of France,\nItaly, England, and Germany. In order to discover whether any deceitful\nappearance has crept in, they repeat every experiment many times over;\nand invent many ingenious methods of examination, to find out, whether\nthe phenomenon proceeded from that cause, which at first sight it seemed\nto be derived from, or whether it was the effect of some accidental, or\noccult one. They make exact and nice combinations of their experiments,\nand invent ingenious methods of comparing them one with another, and then\nweigh in a most delicate balance, both the analogies, and the differences\nbetween them, in order to derive with almost mathematical certainty, the\nconsequences to be deduced from them; and they peep into those crevices\nof nature that are nearly imperceptible, that they may discern through\nthem, her inmost secrets; and I beyond comparison, find more delicate\ningenuity, and more perspicuity, in many of the experiments of the famous\nBoyle, than I do in all the abstractions, and reduplications, of the most\nsubtle metaphysicians.\n\n\nSECT. X.\n\nXXXVII. It is certainly and indispensably necessary, to make experimental\nobservations with the most exquisite attention, in order to avoid our\nbeing deceived by them, as our forefathers have been, and as many people\nare at this day; who, confiding in a superficial and careless experiment,\nhave precipitated their conclusions, and without giving themselves time\nto reflect, have deduced consequences, from the first information of\ntheir senses. From the ascent of the water in the pump, by considering\nthe thing inattentively, was inferred the repugnance of nature to a\nvacuum. To what labours did Torrizeli, Pascal, and other sublime geniuses\nsubmit, what a variety of experiments did they make, and with what\ningenuity did they combine and compare them, in order to undeceive the\nworld, and convince mankind, that the true cause of this phenomenon was\nthe weight of the air!\n\nXXXVIII. From the flame flying upwards, was inferred the chimerical\nregion of fire, immediately adjoining to the heaven of the moon. In\nour essay on Physical Paradoxes, we related the ingenious experiment\nwith which my Lord Bacon proved, that the flame did not ascend from any\nnatural propensity it had to fly upwards, but because it was compelled to\nit, by the lateral pressure of the air.\n\nXXXIX. I was once in conversation with some school philosophers, and\nour discourse happening to turn upon physical matters, I took occasion\nto propose a question to them, which was, whether cold water (and the\nsame may be said of every other liquid) was more subtil and penetrating\nthan hot, which it seemed evidently to be, by the following experiment,\nthat when we poured iced water to drink in summer time into a glass,\nwe perceived the glass wet and moist on the outside, which had the\nappearance of the water having transuded through the pores of the\nglass; and as this did not happen when the water was luke warm, or in\na temperate state, it was inferred that such water, was not so subtil\nand thin as cold. As the bystanders seemed converts to the force of the\nbefore-named experiment, it gave me a good deal of trouble, to undeceive\nand convince them of their mistake, although at length I accomplished\ndoing it, by making it evident to them by various most clear experiments,\nthat the moisture which adhered to the outside of the glass, did not\ntransude through its pores, but that it consisted of the coagulated\nvapours, of the circumambient air, which being in a warm state, condensed\nand were converted into water, upon their coming in contact with any\nvery cold body, and that they became more condensed the less porous this\nbody was. For this reason, the vapours that are raised by fire, condense\nas soon as they come to the head of the alembick; and for the same, if\nwe breathe upon a bright iron bar, or any other metallic body, that has\na smooth or polished surface, and is very cold, the vapour we breathe\nfrom our mouths, when it comes in contact with that body, will condense,\nand adhere to it; and it is also for the same reason, that in frosty\nnights, we see the inside of the glass of windows moist, when they are\ndry without, which appearance, I have known surprise many people, who\nthought that that humidity was a portion of the external air, which had\npenetrated through the glass; and it is likewise for the same reason,\nthat our breath, and the breath of other animals, is visible in cold\nweather, it being then sufficiently condensed by the circumambient air,\nto make it become apparent. But the most convincing argument I made use\nof in the dispute, and which I advanced as a conclusive one, was, that if\nyou covered the exterior superficies of the glass with paper, there would\nnot the least moisture adhere to it, in the whole course of a frosty\nnight, and it is clear that the paper is not impenetrable to moisture,\nbut can only prevent the external air, from coming immediately in contact\nwith the glass.\n\nXL. As it relates to the subject of the impenetrability of glass by\nliquids, I cannot forbear in this place taking notice of another very\ncommon error, which has originated from drawing conclusions hastily from\nexperiments, without making proper reflexions on them. It is generally\nbelieved, that the zest of the rind of a lemon penetrates through glass,\nwhich opinion is founded on the persuasion, that if you press out the\nzest on the outside of a glass, the liquor that is within will taste of\nit. I concluding this penetration to be impossible, after meditating\nupon the matter, easily discovered the cause of this error; which is as\nfollows, upon pressing out the zest, some of the particles are apt to\nfly and rest on the edges of the glass or very near it, and adhere to\nthat part, which in drinking the lip is applied to; and thus the palate\nperceives the taste of the zest, which is communicated to it, from the\nedge of the glass. To determine whether this was not the case, I squeezed\nsome of the zest in the ordinary way against the outside of the glass,\nand then turning it half round, applied my lips to the opposite side,\nand did not perceive the least taste or flavour of the zest of the lemon.\nAnd it will happen the same to any one, who will give himself the trouble\nto make the same experiment.\n\n\nSECT. XI.\n\nXLI. The evidence of our senses alone, then, is not sufficient to enable\nus to derive just conclusions from experiments; for caution, reflection,\njudgement, and reason, are always necessary; and sometimes in so great\na degree, that all the exertion of human talents and ingenuity, is not\nequal to an adequate examination of the phenomena. Sir Isaac Newton, an\nEnglishman, who was a genius of the first rate, and a member of the Royal\nSociety of London, in the beginning of the present century, published\nvarious tracts upon optics, in which, he displayed a great novelty to\nthe philosophers and mathematicians; that is, that all colours exist\nand are contained, actually and formally, in the rays of light; which\nare constituted of heterogeneous particles, of unequal refrangibility.\nHe proved this singular opinion, with many experiments of exquisite\ninvention, contrived and considered, with no less exquisite delicacy, and\nin fact, made more than a few converts to his opinion in many parts, but\nmore especially among the English mathematicians; and a Mr. Gauger who\nwas one of these, enforced the Newtonian doctrine, with a great number\nof additional experiments; but in a short time, one Senor Rizetti, wrote\nagainst this new system, and stated many experiments in favour of the\nold opinion, and even pretended, that those which had been quoted by\nGauger, militated against the Newtonian sentiment. Gauger replied to\nthis, and paid Rizetti in his own coin; that is, he not only defended\nthe consequences which he deduced from his own experiments, but turned\nthose derived from the experiments of Rizetti against the doctrine of the\nItalian. It is certain that experience, as applied to many objects, opens\na most extensive and fertile field for exercising the ingenuity of man,\nand that nature, even to him who seeks to know her in that way, is in\nvarious instances impenetrable and inaccessible.\n\nXLII. But we should acknowledge that in general, the difficulties are not\nso invincible, as not to be surmounted by reason and industry, and that\nthe deceptions which sometimes result from experiments, proceed either\nfrom the want of proper diligence and attention in making them, or from\nthe want of adequate ingenuity, to judge of, and decide upon them.\n\nXLIII. This is very frequently the case with respect to medicinal\nobservations; and from hence springs that enormous disagreement, with\nrespect to the opinions that are alledged to be founded upon them.\nOne says, that he has experienced the efficacy and salutary fruits,\nof such a medicine, in such a disease; and another insists, that he\nhas administered the same medicine, in the same disease, and under the\nsame circumstances, and found it to be pernicious. One of the two must\nbe mistaken, and I believe it is not very uncommon for both of them\nto be so; for it might possibly happen, that the medicine neither did\ngood nor harm, and that the administration of it, was a mere matter of\nindifference, and the thing itself what we call a chip in porridge.\nBut from what could this difference of sentiment and assertion arise?\nWhy from one of them seeing that his patient, after administering the\nmedicine to him grew better, and from the other perceiving, that his\nafter taking it grew worse; although it might possibly happen, that\nneither the one grew better, nor the other grew worse in consequence\nof taking the medicine, but from a very different cause. The diseases\nof the two patients, from their different constitutions, or internal\ntemperaments, (which is for the most part, a thing impenetrable to\nphysicians) might be in such a state, that the one was disposed to\nabate, and the other to increase.\n\nXLIV. And although the patients may be numerous, with respect to whom\nthis experience is alledged; and admitting that they neither all die,\nnor all recover, every one according to his pre-occupation, will impute\nto the remedy, either the happiness of those who did well, or the\nmisfortune of those who perished; and unless they shall resolve, to make\na computation of the good or bad success of the practice of those who use\nthat medicine, with that of those who never administer it, and compare\nthem carefully together, this doubt will probably never be cleared up.\n\n\nSECT. XII.\n\nXLV. This inattention, is without doubt what produces, and what keeps up\nin the world, men\u2019s estimation for an infinite number of useless things,\non which they bestow the noble epithet of remedies; and this false\nnotion, has filled the medical books and the apothecaries shops, with an\ninfinite deal of trash, the reading of which fatigues the memory; and\nthe taking of which, ruins the health and constitution of the patient.\nYou will find accumulated in them, a great number of remedies for slight\ndiseases, which if left to nature, would cure themselves; and although\nall practitioners do not approve of the same remedy for the same\ndisorder; does this prove, that the patient of each got better by taking\nthis or that thing? I say does this prove it? for neither the imprudent\nsick person, nor those about him, hardly ever reflect, that there were\nmany others besides him, who were affected with the same disorder, and\nwho without taking any medicine at all, recovered as well, and as quickly\nas he did?\n\nXLVI. A benign or favourable sort of catarrh, as is very frequently the\ncase, becomes epidemical in a city; for which, some call-in the doctor\nand take medicines, and others do not; and such is the blindness of those\nwho have had advice as it is called, that they believe they owe the\nrecovery of their health to the doctor, although they evidently see, that\nall those recovered as well as they, who had no advice, and who took no\nphysic.\n\nXLVII. The delicate fine lady, who whenever she feels a slight pain in\nher head, sends for the doctor, is fully persuaded, although the pain\ncontinues for the space of twenty or thirty days, that the capital pills\nhe prescribed for her, removed it; but it does not occur to the poor\nlady, that many of her friends and neighbours, who at times have the same\nsort of pains in their heads, and who take nothing for them, get well as\nsoon, and frequently sooner, than she with the help of all her pills.\n\nXLVIII. It is very common for those who have pains in their teeth and\njaws, (and I say the same of all those affections which come and go of\nthemselves,) to fancy, and give the preference to a particular remedy,\nwhich they are of opinion relieved them; but it is proper to observe\nhere, that every one applauds his own, and reprobates as insignificant,\nthat which is used by other people. From whence does this arise? some\nwill say, that as peoples temperaments are different, it may happen,\nthat in the same species of complaint, the remedy which does good to one\nman, may have no effect on another; but this is a common and inefficient\nevasion, and such a one, as overturns and levels to the ground, the\nuse of all medicinal applications; for if this was the case, as all\nindividuals have distinct temperaments, no less than distinct faces,\nit would be necessary to contrive a distinct medicine for every single\nindividual, and in all his disorders, to apply particular remedies,\ndifferent from those, which in the same species of complaints, should be\nadministered to every other person.\n\nXLIX. The cause then of this opposition of sentiments, is most probably\nas follows. The first time a man is attacked with a pain in his teeth\nor jaws, it is very common for him to make use of various applications,\nfor besides those which are ordered by the doctor, all those who have\nfelt the same pain, recommend, some one thing, and some another; and as\nthe sensation is acute, the poor patient anxious to be relieved, proceeds\nin succession, to apply all those remedies, at length, perhaps at the\nend of eight, ten, or fifteen days, the pain abates; and as there is not\none of those days, in which the patient has not made use of one or other\nof these receipts, happy is that which he used the last; for to that he\nattributes his relief, and reprobates all the others as insignificant.\nAnother diseased person, proceeds to take his medicines in regular order;\nbut the course of this regulation, frequently depends upon the casual\nconcurrence in opinion of the people who are consulted, or the power\nthat one of them has of prevailing over, and leading the rest; from\nwhence it frequently happens, that this man of persuasive eloquence,\nadvises the using a medicine in the first instance, which some other\npractitioner might think it advisable to administer last. The result of\nwhich is, that in case the patient does well, his recovery is imputed\nto the application of the last remedy; and hence it comes to pass, that\none reprobates a medicine which another applauds, and so _vice versa_.\nThus all the reputation the remedy acquires, be it what it may, depends\nupon the casual application of it, just at the time nature was disposed\nto terminate the disorder by a favourable crisis, and hence it is, that\nthe relief came to be attributed to the medicine. And notwithstanding\nthat afterwards, upon another occasion, by using the same medicine in\nthe first attacks of the same complaint, they did not experience the\nsame effects from it; still the same prepossession is continued in its\nfavour, that was formed on its supposed success on the first trial; and\nalthough the patient, did not find himself better for several days after\ntaking it in this last instance, they persisted in imputing his recovery\nto the favourite receipt, and in thinking that without the assistance of\nit, the disease would have been more tedious, and more severe. Nor is\nit of any avail to remove this prejudice, their seeing that others, who\nneither make use of that or any other remedy, do not suffer more prolix,\nor more acute pain than those who apply it; for although they see they\nwill not perceive it; and if they do perceive it, they will not attend to\nor acknowledge it.\n\n\nSECT. XIII.\n\nL. There is a certain delusion, that is very fortunate for the\napothecaries, and very fatal to the sick, that is derived from a\npersuasion in many of these last, that their diseases would be eternal,\nor incurable, without the help of medicine; although they see every day,\nothers cured of the same diseases, without this aid; and although the\ndisorder was of so slight a sort, that all those who did nothing but\nleave nature to itself, recovered from it, he who called in a physician,\nupon his getting well, thanked the doctor for his cure, when in reality,\nhe perhaps did nothing but delay it. I protest that when catarrhs have\nbeen epidemical, I have in various instances observed, that they lasted\nas long with those who took medicines, as they did with those who took\nnone; and the only difference that I could perceive between them was,\nthat the last recovered their natural state of robustness as soon as the\ncatarrh left them; and that those who had taken physic, did not recover\nit till several days afterwards.\n\nLI. There is another mistake said to be built upon experience, under the\ndeception of which, many shelter themselves, and pretend, in opposition\nto those who differ from them in opinion, to justify the necessity of\nplentiful evacuations. The rigid Helmonists, or sectaries of Van Helmont,\nreprobate as prejudicial, purging and bleeding, in every case whatever;\nand in opposition to this doctrine, is urged the common experience,\ndeduced from the cases of an infinite number of patients, who have\nbeen purged and blooded, and have all done well; and that there have\nbeen some weeks in sickly times, in which one physician has ordered a\nhundred patients to be purged, and as many to be blooded, and that not\none of them has died. How then in opposition to this experience, say the\nGalenists, can any one pretend to insist, that bleeding and purging do\nharm?\n\nLII. I do not undertake to defend the Helmonists, nor do I consider their\nopinion, as more probable than the contrary one; but I say, that from\nthe experience alledged, nothing can be concluded to their prejudice. We\nshould suppose, that those who exclaim against purging and bleeding, do\nnot think them so pernicious, as to be fatal to all those who undergo\nthese operations; for even supposing them to be injurious, they are not\ncapable of destroying a man in perfect health, nor one that is visited by\na slight disorder. I believe, that although an intemperate use of them\nkills many, they are chiefly those who are affected with some obstinate\ndisease; for in these cases, when nature is much weakened by struggling\nwith a powerful disorder, if you add a fresh enemy for her to encounter\nin the imagined remedy, you compleat her overthrow, and lay her prostrate\non the earth. But those who are affected with a disease that is not\ndangerous, (and there are many of this sort, which in appearance seem\nviolent ones,) generally preserve a sufficient degree of strength, to\nresist both the distemper, and some unnecessary bleedings and purgings;\nand although these may weaken the natural faculties, and retard the cure,\nthey very seldom are known to deprive the patient of life.\n\nLIII. That the number of mild disorders, greatly exceeds that of the\ndangerous ones, is very plain and certain; what then can we find\nextraordinary, in those who are attacked with the first sort getting\nwell, notwithstanding they may have been injudiciously purged and\nblooded? out of a hundred patients that a physician visits in a week,\nseldom more than one or two of them labour under dangerous disorders.\nIt is customary with many people to send for the doctor, upon being\nattacked with a slight inflammation, a catarrh, an ephemeris or fever of\na day, a fluxion of the eyes, a repletion of the stomach, and such kind\nof indispositions; and if he happens to be one of the common or vulgar\nsort, he seldom fails to purge and bleed. But admitting that the purging\nand bleeding were never so improperly administered, does it follow from\nthence, that the patient must die? Or why should this be an unavoidable\nconsequence, if in the same situation, he had been stabbed with a\npoignard that had not penetrated very deep, or that had not wounded a\nvital part, he would have escaped with his life?\n\nLIV. As I observed before, I am neither a partizan of the Helmonists, nor\na favourer of the Galenists; but I look upon it as a thing certain, that\nan intemperate use of purging and bleeding, has destroyed many men, and\nespecially, if administered when nature is much weakened; notwithstanding\nwhich, I am persuaded that they are serviceable in many cases. Whether\nthey are absolutely necessary, and whether patients could not do well,\nif other remedies were substituted in their places, is a point I will\nnot take upon me to determine; and especially, when I have fresh in\nmy memory, the declaration of a physician, whose authority has great\nweight with me. This is Lucas Tozzi, a famous Italian physician, who in\nhis exposition of the third aphorism of the first book of Hippocrates,\n_Habitus Athletarum, &c._ after combating and controverting the\nusefulness of bleeding, with seemingly very efficacious and persuasive\nreasoning, he asserts, and offers to prove, that it is not necessary\nin any one of the diseases, in which the Galenists insist it cannot be\ndispensed with; and in answer to the experience they alledge of its\nutility, he quotes his own; and says, _if they appeal to experience, and\ninsist that it is evident from thence, that many people have been cured\nof various disorders by blood-letting; I reply, that in the hospital of\nthe Anunciada at Naples, where I have officiated as physician many years,\nI have cured in a short space of time, and without taking from them one\ndrop of blood, hundreds and thousands of patients, who have been attacked\nwith some one or other of the following disorders, frensies, pleurisies,\nquinsies, inflammations of the liver, spitting of blood, erysipelases,\nand all kinds of fevers_.\n\nLV. What shall we say to this? Lucas Tozzi was not only a great theorist,\nbut also a most expert, successful, and much esteemed practitioner, and\nas such, his advice was solicited with anxiety by people of the first\nrank. If he without bleeding cured all those disorders, which in the\ncommon opinion stand most in need of that evacuation, and not only cured\nthem, but did it in a short time, what diseases must they be which cannot\nbe cured without blood-letting?\n\nLVI. And it is very remarkable, that in the same manner the Galenists\nendeavour to deduce from experience the necessity of blood-letting\nin many diseases, they endeavour also to establish the preference,\nthat should be given to drawing blood in particular disorders, from\nparticular veins, such as the hepatic, and cephalic. Anatomy however,\nmakes it as clear as the sun at noon-day, that this preference is not\ngrounded on any solid foundation, and that the cephalic vein bears no\nmore relation to, nor is any more connected with the head, than the\nhepatic, nor the hepatic with the liver, than the cephalic; and that all\nthe veins of the same arm, communicate indifferently with all parts of\nthe body, as the laws of circulation demonstrate; and as that observation\nwhich was pretended to be derived from experience, was founded in\nmistake, it is not improbable, that that which is generally alledged in\nfavour of bleeding, may be so likewise.\n\nLVII. What appears to me is, that the rule so much cried up by the\nGalenists, and which establishes the necessity of bleeding, in\npleurisies, is liable to so many exceptions, that we ought not to\nregard it as a general one; and we have observed in another part of\nour works, that in some epidemical pleurisies, it has been found to be\nevidently injurious. It is but a little while ago, that a learned French\nphysician, whose works are mentioned in the Memoirs of Trevoux, wrote\nstrongly against bleeding in winter pleurisies and peripneumonies; and\nhis reasoning had great weight with some eminent physicians of Paris. I\ncan certify, that in the last winter 1731, when many people were attacked\nwith pleurisies in this country, it was generally remarked, and we\nreceived informations to the same effect from all quarters, that those\nwho were blooded died, and that those who were not did well.\n\nLVIII. I would have it understood, that I wish all I have said, with\nrespect to the utility or inutility of purging and bleeding in general,\nshould be considered as the sentiments of a man, who takes no side in the\ndispute, but who proposes what he advances problematically, and with a\nview of convincing the world, that in order to avoid being misled, they\nshould examine with great attention and exactness, any observation that\nis alledged to be founded on experience, for this is the principal object\nI had in view, in writing this discourse.\n\nLIX. It would argue weakness and want of judgment, for any one to\nesteem a thing as a remedy for a particular disease, without reflecting\nand making a remark, the propriety of which must stare every man in\nthe face, and that is, comparing the success of the practice of those\nwho use that medicine, with that of those who do not make use of it.\nThere have been physicians, who have declared themselves enemies to the\nadministration of the bark; but notwithstanding this, there is no body at\nthis day, who disputes its febrifuge efficacy in intermittent cases; for\nexperience shews, that it will stop the fit, although it may return again\nafterwards, and although in the opinion of some people, the medicine\nmay leave some bad impression on the body. If purging and bleeding\nwould have the same effect, in some sort of fevers, we should all agree\nin attributing to them a febrifuge virtue; notwithstanding that some\npractitioners, might give the preference to other remedies, as more safe,\nand better adapted. But this is so far from being the case with respect\nto these evacuations, that their efficacy of removing fevers, is at this\nday strongly contested, for experience has not yet manifested, that they\nare remedies for these disorders, in any degree or manner, that is not\nexceedingly doubtful or disputable.\n\n\nSECT. XIV.\n\nLX. As far as the nature of the case will permit us (for all things\nare not capable of being mathematically or decisively demonstrated),\nwe should endeavour to discover the truth, by imitating the diligence\nand attention which many English physicians exercised, in examining\ninto the eligibility of the precautionary remedy called inoculation,\npractised by the Turks, to elude the fatal effects of the small-pox. This\nis a subject, that has been much talked on in other kingdoms for some\nyears; although in Spain we have hardly heard it mentioned. The event\nof communicating the infection in this way, most generally is, that the\nperson inoculated has the distemper very lightly, and is hardly ever\nobliged through the whole course of the disease, to keep his bed.\n\nLXI. The account of this precautionary method, was brought to England by\none Maitland, who was surgeon to Mr. Wortley Mountague, his Britannic\nmajesty\u2019s ambassador at the Porte, and was from thence communicated to\nthe other nations of Europe. Maitland had observed, that this practice\nwas almost universal in all the cities of the Levant, and that it was\nattended with wonderful success. He communicated these remarks to Mr.\nand Mrs. Mountague, and they had fortitude enough, upon the faith of\nwhat he had told them, to make the experiment upon a son they had with\nthem of six years old, which being attended with success, they repeated\nit upon another of their children when they returned to England. Many\nwere animated with these examples and these accounts; and the practice\nof inoculation, began to be much approved, and much adopted in England,\nnotwithstanding it was greatly opposed, and objected to by some people\nthere, and by many in other countries; and especially by the physicians\nof Paris, who exclaimed strongly against it.\n\nLXII. But as this contest was such a one, as ought not to be determined\nby speculative reasoning, an appeal was made to experience, which appeal,\nwas prosecuted in such a manner by those who were advocates for the\npractice, as seemed to exclude all doubt and perplexity. Physicians\nwho resided in different parts of the kingdom, were requested to give\naccounts of the success of their practice by this method, and to transmit\nthem to London, which when received, were printed and published. By these\naccounts, two facts were established; the first was, that inoculation\nfreed the patient from the danger of a second infection; and the second\nwas, that those to whom the small-pox was communicated in this way, very\nrarely died; and although it is true that some few of them miscarried,\nthey were mostly such, as were afflicted with some other disorder at the\ntime of their inoculation, of which they would have died, if they had\nnot had the small-pox; but these altogether, did not amount to but very\nlittle more than a tenth part of those, who perished by catching it in\nthe natural way; for by the best calculation they could make, one out of\neight died of the last, and not above one in eighty of the first.\n\nLXIII. This is the account I have read of this matter in the Memoirs of\nTrevoux; to which some may object, that it is possible the relations of\nthe cases, were not published so faithfully as they were received. To\nthis I answer, that it is probable great pains were taken in making the\nenquiries, and great fidelity observed in publishing the accounts, as the\nMemoirs of Trevoux tell us, that upon the strength of their authority,\nsome of the royal family of England were inoculated.\n\nLXIV. And let it not be insisted in opposition to this, that if the fact\nhad been so well established, it could have admitted of no contradiction.\nThey know little of the human passions, who think this remark a solid\none. Those who contradict, either through blind prepossession, or from\nmotives of emulation, interest, or envy, seldom submit, or will own\nthemselves convinced by proofs that are self-evident; nor is there\nany species of evidence, that can bar every door, at which a false\nsubterfuge may steal in, nor against the intrusion of a thousand\nsophistical objections, introduced by those, who are under the dominion\nof the beforenamed passions. I speak feelingly of this matter, having had\nwoeful experience of the truth of what I assert, since I first began to\nwrite for the public.\n\nLXV. In reality, some of the objections that were made to inoculation,\nwere the most ridiculous in the world. Some rigid Presbyterians, made the\ncause of religion interested in the question, and asserted, that that\npractice, was an affront to the sovereignty, and an opposition to the\ndecrees of God; and one of them declared in his preaching, that it was a\ndiabolical invention, for the devil by inoculation had communicated the\nsmall-pox to Job, which was the distemper that so sorely afflicted that\nholy Patriarch. Into what absurdities, does a violent ardour hurry a man\nin a controversy! Of all sensible human beings, there are none so nearly\nallied to mad men, as passionate disputants.\n\nLXVI. Towards the conclusion of this virulent contest, a very curious\ncircumstance came to light, which was, that this precautionary method\nwhich had made so much noise, and which had generally been supposed to\nhave been brought from Turkey, had for ages before, been in use in the\nisland of Great Britain itself; for that it had been practised from time\nimmemorial, in the southern parts of the principality of Wales, where\nthey communicated the infection in two ways either by rubbing some of the\nvariolous matter hard on the skin of the person to whom the distemper was\nto be given, or else by dipping a needle into that matter, and pricking\nhis skin with it; and as they gave the person from whom the matter was\ntaken a small sum of money, this was called buying the small pox; and\nthey produce very authentic testimonies, that scarce any one of those who\ncame by the distemper in this manner died, and that there was no instance\nof a person who had acquired the disease in this way, ever having had it\na second time.\n\n\nSECT. XV.\n\nLXVII. We shall conclude this discourse, by pointing out three capital\nerrors, which are derived from want of proper attention in making\nexperiments. The first is, that of taking for the effect, what in reality\nis the cause, and taking for the cause, what is nothing more than the\neffect. The second consists in taking for the cause, something that comes\nin by accident, and which has no influence whatever. The third consists,\nin between two effects proceeding from one and the same cause, taking one\nof them for the cause of the other. I shall give examples of these three\nerrors, in observations appertaining to medicine, which are said to be\nderived from experience, because mistakes in this branch, are generally\nattended with worse consequences, than those in other ordinary physical\nmatters.\n\nLXVIII. It happens, that a man feels an ardent and extraordinary thirst\nupon himself, without being able to assign any apparent cause of it;\nhe drinks water to great excess, and in a few hours is seized with a\nfever, or an acrid fluxion. It is common in such cases, to attribute\nthe indisposition to the excessive drinking of water, and to apprehend,\nthat was the cause of the disease; but this was so far from being the\ncase, that the indisposition was rather the cause of his drinking to that\nexcess. But I would have it observed, that I speak of an instance, in\nwhich the thirst was not brought on by any manifest or apparent cause,\nsuch as the having used any violent exercise, or having been exposed\nto some great heat, either of the sun or fire, or having been a long\ntime without drinking, or having eaten something very salt. I say that\nagreeable to this state of the case, it is very clear, that the thirst\nmust have arisen from some internal cause; but the question is, from what\ncause? Why it could be from no other, than a morbific disposition, that\nhad begun to prevail within his body; or let us express it in another\nmanner, and say, that it proceeded from an acrid or salt humour, which\nhad just begun to get in motion, and by vellicating the fibres that\nproduce the sensation of thirst, had by that means excited it. Every\npreternatural and extraordinary effect, demands a preternatural and\nextraordinary cause to occasion it; and if we suppose that the thirst was\nsuch an effect, and we cannot assign any external cause to which we can\nattribute it; we must conclude that it proceeded from some preternatural\ninternal cause; which in all probability, must be the morbific\ndisposition.\n\nLXIX. The want of this reflection, occasions great errors to be committed\nin physic, for by running counter to the course of nature, you must\nunavoidably mistake the road that leads to the cure. The consequence\nof mistaking the effect for the cause, is administering as a medicine,\nwhat in reality is poison; for it is clear, that if the physician\napprehends the humidity and coldness of the water to be the cause of the\ndistemper, when in truth it was produced by the acrid, salt, peccant, or\ninflammatory humour, I say if this should happen to be the case, and he\ncalculates his prescriptions to correct the humidity and coldness, he by\nso doing, will inflame and increase the original disorder.\n\nLXX. This species of error, is not confined to the case we have\ninstanced, but is capable of being extended to a vast expanse. I am much\ninclined to think, that all the extraordinary and vehement emotions, both\nof the irascible, and libidinous kind, which precede distempers a small\ndistance of time before they make their appearance, and for which you can\nassign no special external cause, are the effects of those distempers, in\ntheir original stages; I mean, that in the first agitations of such cases\nas we are speaking of, a person is apt to fall into violent passions upon\nvery slight provocations, such as he knows by his own experience, were\nnever used to agitate or have that effect on him, and either immediately,\nor within a few hours afterwards, he is seized with a fever. People are\napt to suppose, that the passion was the cause of the disease; but I say,\nthat the disease occasioned the anger; for if this man, agreeable to his\nnatural disposition, was never subject to such violent starts of passion,\nupon such, or even greater provocations, it necessarily follows, that\nthat which he experienced upon this occasion, must have been the effect\nof some preternatural internal cause, which lay concealed within him,\nmost probably the first fermentative movements of the peccant humour,\nwhich soon afterwards produced a fever. In reality, it is easy for any\none to perceive, and I have remarked it many times both with respect\nto myself and others, that the irascible passion, is much more apt to\nbe inflamed upon slight occasions, in those first stages, or almost\ninsensible beginnings of such indispositions as tend to be somewhat\nserious, than at other times.\n\nLXXI. I do not however deny, that the ardour of passion may excite a\nfever; for this without doubt, may have a great share in producing such\nan effect, and we may reasonably suppose that it has, and especially in\nsuch people as are of a choleric disposition; but when this is not the\ncase, we should rather suppose, that the passion tended to augment the\nindisposition which followed the sudden fit of anger, and which would\nhave made its appearance without the intervention of that anger, although\nit might have been attended with milder symptoms. And the same we say\nof anger, is applicable to sadness and fear also, for they conformable\nto the language of the philosophers, are passions appertaining to the\nirascible.\n\nLXXII. We may reason in the same general way, upon the effects of the\namorous passion. All vehement desires for ordinary objects, which\nfrequently present themselves to a man\u2019s view, and which are totally\nunusual to him, and for which we cannot assign any special external\ncircumstance that should excite those desires, we should conclude,\nthat they proceed from some preternatural internal disposition. The\nindulgences or gratifications of these extraordinary desires, are always\nattended with actions of excess, to which are generally attributed the\nindisposition that follows them; but in truth, the indisposition which\nlaid concealed, irritated the appetite, and was the cause of the excess,\nand not the excess of the indisposition.\n\nLXXIII. The following mistake also, is very frequently fallen into. A\nperson who has always been indifferent about this or that particular\nfood, we will say lettuces for example, all of a sudden takes a great\nfancy for them, and will eat two or three large ones. If he is afterwards\nattacked with a pain of the head, and defluxion upon the breast, or a\ndiarrh\u0153a, the fault is sure to be laid upon the lettuces, which are\naccused as the cause of all the mischief; but in reality, the mischief\nhad before crept into the constitution, and had induced the extraordinary\ndesire to eat the lettuces.\n\nLXXIV. I would not however, be understood to insinuate, that eating of\nany thing to excess, does not frequently occasion or bring on various\ndiseases; for I only mean that my position should be understood to allude\nto a desire that is vehement, and unusual to the person, and for which,\nyou can assign no visible external cause that should excite it; for under\nsuch circumstances, there is a necessity for concluding it was owing to\nsome internal cause, that was sufficiently powerful to merit the name\nof a morbific disposition; which is an appellation it could not have\ndeserved, if the appetite although extraordinary, had not been excessive.\n\nLXXV. I am confirmed in the truth of the remark I have just made, by the\nreflexion, that a diversity of appetites, must undoubtedly proceed from a\ndiversity or alteration of temperaments; and it follows of course, that\nevery alteration in the temperament, must be attended with an alteration\nof the appetite. It is easy to discern, that no sick person, preserves\nhis appetite in the same even state, in which it continues when he is\nin health; and this not only with respect to the quantity he eats and\ndrinks; but with respect to the quality of his nourishment also; nor is\nthis confined to the objects of his palate only, but extends to those of\nall his other feelings and inclinations, both internal and external.\n\n\nSECT. XVI.\n\nLXXVI. The second capital error committed in making experimental\nobservations, and which is more common than the first, is that of\nmistaking for the cause, something that intervenes by accident, and is\nneither cause nor effect. There is scarce any sick person, who does\nnot fancy he knows what has been the cause of his disorder, which he\ngenerally imputes to something particular that he has done, or some\nalteration he has made in his way of living a little before he was seized\nwith his distemper; although the thing to which he imputes it, bears no\nallusion to, nor any proportion with the disorder that afflicts him. The\nhaving eaten an olive more than it was usual for him to eat, or having\nfasted a quarter of an hour longer than his usual time, or having drunk\ntwo spoonfulls more than common, or abated twenty yards of his ordinary\nwalking, together with some other particulars, that are equally trifling\nand insignificant with those we have mentioned; but notwithstanding the\nfutility of these observations, he is apt to impute to such causes the\ndisorder he labours under, without reflecting, that this machine of ours,\nfrom the weakness of its own texture, is sufficiently exposed to its\nbreaks, ebbings and flowings. The humours of the body, even when the\ninfluence of all external causes, and every thing that depends on our\nown free will, are regulated with perfect uniformity, are nevertheless\nexposed to various alterations. The heterogeneous nature of them as they\nrespect one another, and also considered with respect to every particle\nof each of them separately, must necessarily conduce to their being in\ndifferent states. If those superstitious spirits, who are such idolaters\nof their health, that with respect to their own regimen they would weigh\neven atoms, would well consider this, they would free themselves from the\ncontinual anxiety in which they live, and which is more pernicious to\nthem, than those very indispositions they are so terrified at, and which\nthey are at so much pains to escape.\n\nLXXVII. But the most common accusation of all, is that which charges the\nweather as the cause of our disorders. He who commits no excesses, and\ncannot assign any other cause for his being out of order, lays the blame\nupon the weather, and even he who does commit them, to avoid criminating\nhimself, lays the blame on the weather also; which be it hot, moist,\ndry, variable, or settled, people are never at a loss to find out some\npretence whereon to ground the accusation. If in July, as is customary\nat that season, we find it very hot, we say the heat is the cause of our\ndisorders; but if the weather at that time happens to be more benign and\ntemperate than usual, they still lay the blame upon it, alledging that\nsuch a temperature of air is not natural to the season. The same sort of\ncharge is brought against the cold in winter, whether it is intense or\nmoderate. If at that time of the year, the weather is variable, there is\nscarce any one who does not find fault with it; neither is it exempted\nfrom blame if it is settled, for then they say that change of weather\nis indispensably necessary to our constitutions; and that any kind of\nweather which lasts a long while is hostile to them; that long cold\noccasions constipations, long heat dissolves and weakens us, long wet\nsuffocates us, and that long drought burns us up and consumes us.\n\nLXXVIII. I have often remarked, that all our misfortunes are imputed to\ntwo common enemies: our spiritual ones to the Devil, and our bodily ones\nto the weather. There is scarce any one, who, in order to extenuate his\nown guilt, does not say, he was tempted by the Devil to commit the crime\nhe has been guilty of. He is as irrational who thinks, that if there\nwas no Devil to tempt us, we should never sin, as he is who thinks,\nthat if the weather was regulated in a most perfect form and order, we\nshould never be sick. Within ourselves, and in the very essence of our\nbeing, lies the origin of all our ills, both spiritual and temporal; and\nour nature is swayed by its own weight, towards both the one and the\nother evil; although we can never be led into the first without our own\nconsent; but the other species, may frequently be brought on us against\nour will.\n\n\nSECT. XVII.\n\nLXXIX. The third error committed in making experimental observations,\nalthough it is not so common as the two first, is pretty often incurred.\nIf he for example, who on account of his having used some violent\nexercise, drinks small liquors to excess, and afterwards finds himself\nfeverish, imputes his being so, as is very frequently the case, to his\nhaving drank such liquids to excess; the generality of men, seldom\nreflecting upon any excesses, but those of the appetite; but with all\nthis, violent exercise is much more likely to inflame the blood, and\ndisturb the humours, than drinking to excess of small liquids, and\ntherefore it would be much more rational, to impute the fever to the\nviolence of the exercise, than to drinking small liquids to excess.\n\nLXXX. I believe that from the blunder of mistaking two effects of the\nsame cause, the one for the cause, and the other for the effect, arose\nthe opinion, which is so common among medical people; that all fluxions\nwherever they fall, the gout not excepted, descend from the head; and it\nbeing very common, for those who are affected with acrid fluxions that\nfall on any part of the body, to feel pains and heaviness in their heads;\nI suppose that from thence sprung the notion, that all fluxions originate\nin, and are derived from the brain; but there are not a few modern\nphysicians who are of a contrary sentiment, and in my opinion they are\nright.\n\nLXXXI. In the first place, I do not know why the vicious humours, from\nwhence the matter of fluxions are derived, should make the grand circuit\nthrough the head, before they fall on any particular part that is at a\ndistance from it; as they could, by being mixed with the blood in their\ncirculation through the veins and arteries, be derived immediately from\nthem, on any member or part of the body.\n\nLXXXII. Secondly, if such a vast quantity of humour, as is discharged by\nsome fluxions, was to be lodged in the brain, it seems to me that it must\nrender a man quite stupid, and that organ incapable of exercising any of\nits functions.\n\nLXXXIII. Thirdly, it is not easy to point out the channel, through which\nthe humour passes from the interior part of the head. Many pretend to\nsay it passes through the Ethmoides, or Os Criboso; but Sneider denies\nthis, for that you cannot find any cavities or perforations in this\nbone, through which those humours could flow, and especially if they are\npituitous and clammy, as the antients supposed them to be; and to this we\nmay add, that this bone is entirely covered or lined by the meninges, and\nthe interior tunic of the nose. It is true, as Doctor Matinez observes\nin his treatise on anatomy, that its upper part is very porous, and that\nfrom thence it came to be called the os criboso, or spungy bone; but as\nthese spungy pores do not pervade the whole bone, and are not pierced\nthrough it, setting aside the obstacle it would meet with from the\nmembranes or tunics that surround it, the humour could not pass that way.\nIf it is insisted, that it flows through the nervous ducts, I ask how it\ncomes not to be attended with obstructions, that must produce dangerous\nconsequences?\n\nLXXXIV. Fourthly and lastly, that through whatever channels you suppose\nthe humour to pass; how does it happen, that neither in them, nor the\nparts immediately connected with them, it does not excite any sensations,\nbut that sore feelings, are only perceived at the part where it vents\nitself? Is it not totally incredible, that a very acrid humour derived\nfrom the head, and which flows to the stomach, to the breast, to the\nintestines, and even to the extremities of the feet, should produce no\nsensations in the intermediate parts between the head, and the place on\nwhich it falls? This difficulty, which occurred to me many years ago, I\nhave often mentioned to medical people, but never could get any solution\nof it that was satisfactory to me.\n\nLXXXV. If by way of objection to what I have here advanced, the argument\nwe have mentioned before is urged, that defluxions on any part of the\nbody are generally attended with a pain in the head; I answer, that it\ncannot be inferred from thence, that the humour descends from the head.\nIn the first place, for I have observed it many times with regard to\nmyself, these fluxions are often not attended with any pain in the head\nat all; and to make the inference just, they should always be attended\nwith one. Secondly, although a pain in the head should constantly\naccompany a defluxion, the objection made would easily be removed, by\nsaying, that this appearance is fallacious, for that both the pain and\nthe defluxion, are effects of the same cause, and not one the cause of\nthe other. In fact, reason tells us this is the case; for the acrid\nhumour, which when separated from the mass of blood, falls on, and\ndischarges itself at this or that place, while it continues in the\ncirculation, has nothing to hinder it from venting some portion of its\npoison on the head, and exciting pain there; and especially, as it is\ngenerally supposed, the nidus of the humour which flows in defluxions,\nis in the glands, and the brain holds the first place in that class; for\nwhich reason, Hippocrates and Wharton, call it the great and principal\ngland.\n\nLXXXVI. If it is replied to this, that in every defluxion which is\nsomewhat violent, although we do not feel what may be properly called\npain in the head, we at least perceive a heaviness in it; which renders\nthat organ unfit for its operation. I confess that this is so, but to the\nconfession, shall beg leave to add two remarks. The first is, that this\nis not a symptom peculiar to fluxions, for that the same thing happens in\nmany other disorders; but the generality of physicians do not conclude\nfrom hence, that those diseases originate in the head. Secondly,\nneither is this heaviness or inaptitude, peculiar to the head, for upon\nobservation, you will find that fluxions and many other disorders also,\nhave the same effect upon the other members of the body. Whoever is\naffected with a violent defluxion, either on the throat, the breast, the\nstomach, or any other part, will find that his whole body, and every\nmember of it, is more heavy and listless, than when he is in good health;\nand that all his limbs are less fit for action; and that they all with a\nvery little exercise of them, become soon tired. Thus we have no reason\nto attribute a heaviness as peculiar to the head, in the attacks of\nfluxions, when we see it is common in those attacks, to all the other\nmembers of the body; and it has been for want of making this reflexion,\nthat the world have conjectured all defluxions were derived from the\nhead.\n\n\n\n\nA DISPLAY of the INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES OF THE VARIOUS PEOPLE, With\nREMARKS on the TALENTS of the DIFFERENT ONES.\n\n\nSECT. I.\n\nI. There is no doubt, but the different temperament of air in countries,\ninduces a sensible diversity in men, brutes, and plants. In plants, the\ndifference is so great, that the same which in one country is innocent\nand salutary, in another is noxious and poisonous, which, as we are\nassured, is the case with the Persian apple. The diversity between\nbrutes, is not less than that between plants, both with respect to their\nsize, fierceness, strength, and other qualities; but besides what is\nobvious and clear to the observation of all men in this matter; we are\nassured there are countries, where many sorts of animals, degenerate\ntotally from the characteristic property of their species. If we are to\nbelieve Lucianus, Macedonia produces serpents, so social to the human\nrace, that they will play with children, and gently apply their mouths to\nthe nipples of women\u2019s breasts to suck their milk; and as Louis de Marmol\ninforms us, in Gruregra a mountainous country in the kingdom of Fez,\nthe lions which are very numerous, are so tame and so timid, that the\nwomen with sticks in their hands, beat and drive them about like so many\ndomestic dogs.\n\nII. If the difference in our own species, which is produced by a\ndiversity of climate, is not so great, it is sufficiently evident and\napparent. It is manifest, that there are countries, where the inhabitants\nare remarkable for being of larger stature than they are in others, or\nfor being more active, more strong, more healthy, or more beautiful; and\nthat this difference subsists with respect to all other things, that\ndepend upon the two faculties that are common to both men and brutes,\nthat is, the sensitive and the vegetative. Even in nations which border\nupon each other, this difference is sometimes observable.\n\nIII. Distinct dispositions of body, are attended with distinct qualities\nof mind; and from distinct temperaments, result distinct inclinations;\nand from distinct inclinations, distinct customs and manners. The\nfirst of these consequences is a necessary one; but the second is not\nso certain, because a man\u2019s free will may restrain the impetus of his\ninclination; but as is most commonly the case, men let their free will be\nled by the emotions, which are produced by the interior disposition of\nthe machine; so that we may safely pronounce, that men in one country are\nmore addicted to passion and anger, in another to gluttony, in another to\nbe lascivious, and in another to be lazy or slothful.\n\nIV. The inequality between men of different regions in the rational part,\nis generally supposed not to be less, but rather greater, than it is in\nthe sensitive and vegetative; and it is not only in the conversation of\nthe vulgar that we see this opinion upheld, but we see it supported in\nthe writings of the learned; where we find one nation described as rude\nand savage, another as stupid, and another as barbarous; so that when\naccording to this description of them, we come to compare one of these\nnations, with one of those who are esteemed cultivated and polished,\nwe conceive that there is nearly as great a difference between the\ninhabitants of the one and the other, as there is between men and wild\nbeasts.\n\nV. I differ so widely from the common opinion in this particular, that\nwith respect to the essential part of the use of the understanding,\nin the inhabitants of one nation and another, the difference is\nimperceptible. This sentiment cannot be better justified, than by\nshewing, that those nations which are commonly reputed rude and\nbarbarous, are not inferior in ingenuity to the most cultivated ones, and\nperhaps in some instances excel them.\n\n\nSECT. II.\n\nVI. We will begin our comparisons with the nations of Europe. The\nGermans, who have been so stigmatized for heavy dull people, that Father\nDomingo Bohursius a French Jesuit, in his Conversations of Aristius and\nEugenius, made no scruple of pronouncing, that he doubted whether it was\npossible to find a man of bright talents in the whole country: however,\nin answer to this charge, it may be alledged, that Germany has produced\nso many excellent authors in all kinds of literature, that it is hardly\npossible to number them. I doubt whether the before-named Frenchman, by\nrummaging for them through the series of all past ages, can point out\ntwo of his countrymen, who were equally eminent with Rabanus Maurus, and\nAlbertus the Great. The epithets which Cardinal Baronius bestows upon\nRabanus Maurus, are, that he was the resplendent star of his age, and\nthe supreme Theologian of his time; and Sextus Senense, recognizes him\nas a man most perfectly accomplished in all kinds of letters; and the\nAbbot Trithemius, after celebrating him as a most excellent Theologian,\nPhilosopher, Orator, and Poet, adds, that Italy never produced a man\nequal to this; and Trithemius was not ignorant, that Saint Thomas Aquinas\nwas a native of Italy. Whom can France boast that exceeded Trithemius\nhimself, who was so greatly venerated by Cornelius Agrippa; or who\nexcelled the Abbot Rupertus, or Father Athanasius Kircher, who according\nto Caramuel was divinely learned; or Father Gaspar Schotti, and many\nothers whom I shall omit? Neither should we forbear to mention that ray\nor flash of criticism, Gaspar Sciopius, who was the terror of all the\nlearned men of his time, who at the age of sixteen begun to write books,\nwhich were the admiration of men of years and experience. I have in this\nliterary map of Germany, only pointed out the mountains of greatest\neminence, as I had not room to insert the lesser ones in it.\n\nVII. The Hollanders, who in the days of antiquity were reputed for such\nstupid people, that it was common among the Romans, when they had a mind\nto describe a heavy dull man, or one that was slow of apprehension, to\nmake use of the following proverbial expression, _auris Batava_; that he\nhad the ears of a Hollander; however, the Dutch since then, have clearly\nproved, that imputation was a false one, for the opinion of their being\npeople of ability, is at this day very fully established. Their civil\ngovernment, and their industry in commerce, are the admiration of all the\nworld; and there is scarce an art, that is not cultivated and brought\nto great perfection among them. The two Williams of Nassau, Erasmus,\nand Hugo Grotius, are striking examples of their talents for policy and\nliterature. Thus we see in this as well as other nations, the want of\napplication has been construed into rudeness; but as soon as the neglect\nof study was remedied, the injustice of the imputation became manifest.\n\nVIII. The abilities of the Muscovites also, have till of late days,\nbeen held in as much contempt as those of the antient Hollanders were;\nfor it was but in the last century, that Urban Chevreau a celebrated\nwit of France, laid that a Muscovite was _the man of Plato_; by which\nexpression, the French Author alluded to the poor definition that\nphilosopher gave of a man, when he described him to be an animal without\nfeathers, who walked upon two legs, _animal bipes implume_; this gave\noccasion to the joke of Diogenes, who having plucked the feathers off a\ncock, threw him into the school of Plato among his disciples, calling\nout with a loud voice, _see the Man of Plato_. Chevreau attempted to\nsay, that the Muscovites were nothing like men but in their figure. But\nafter the Czar Peter Alexiowitz had introduced arts and sciences among\nthem, it soon became evident, that the Muscovites were as much men in all\nrespects, as any of the other people in Europe. But if this never had\nbeen done, how could any one suppose that a people who were stupid and\nsenseless, should have been able to form a most extensive empire; and to\npreserve it for so long a space of time as the Russians have preserved\ntheirs? It required great ability to conquer such an empire; and to\npreserve it in the face of two such powerful enemies as the Turks and the\nPersians, much more. I am not ignorant, that Muscovy is a part of antient\nScythia, whose moroders were reputed, and with reason, the most savage\nand barbarous of men; this barbarism, did not proceed from their want of\nnatural talents, but from the want of those talents being cultivated; of\nwhich truth, the famous philosopher Anacharsis is a striking instance,\nwho was the only man of that nation, that went to study in Greece. If\nnumbers of other Scythians had done the same, Scythia might possibly have\nexhibited many Anacharsises.\n\n\nSECT. III.\n\nIX. If we attempt going out of Europe, every thing beyond those limits\nseems barbarous to us. When the imagination of the vulgar contemplates\nAsia, it represents to them, the Turks, the Persians, the Indians, the\nChinese and the Japonese, as little better than so many congregations of\nsatyrs, or demi-brutes. But notwithstanding this, there are none of these\nnations, who do not make as great advances in all the things they apply\nthemselves to, as we do in whatever we study.\n\nX. Their abhorrence for, nor their ignorance of the sciences in Turkey,\nis not so great as is generally imagined; for they have professors\nboth in Constantinople and Grand Cairo, who teach astronomy, geometry,\narithmetic, poetry, and the Arabic and Persian languages. But they have\nnot so great an esteem for those faculties, as they have for politics;\nin their knowledge of which, there is scarce any nation who is equal to\nthem, nor are there any subtilties appertaining to political arts, which\nthey are ignorant of. The great English traveller, Mr. Chardin, in the\nrelation of his voyage to India by land, tells us, that when he passed\nthrough Constantinople, he had much conversation with Senor Quirini the\nVenetian ambassador at the Porte; who assured him, that he had never\ntreated with a man of equal penetration to the vizir of that time; and\ndeclared, that if he had a son whom he wished to breed a negociator,\nhe would send him to the school of the Ottoman court preferable to any\nother. The Turks excel in all things that require dexterity of hand, and\nin all bodily exercises they take a fancy to. They are the best pen men\nin the world, and this is the reason, why they never would permit the\nart of printing to be introduced among them; and they are also the most\nactive and dextrous rope-dancers in Europe. Cardanus relates wonders of\ntwo of them he saw in Italy, one of whom became a Christian, and lived\nan exemplary life, but always continued his old exercise; although his\nbecoming a convert to Christianity, removed the suspicion that the vulgar\nentertained of his dealing with the devil. The dexterity of the Turks as\narchers, is so eminent, that the force and exactness with which they can\nshoot arrows is almost incredible. John Barclay, in the fourth book of\nhis Satyricon, testifies to have seen a Turk penetrate with an arrow,\na plate of steel, that was above an inch thick; and that he had seen\nanother, who with the shaft of an arrow without any iron to it, split the\nbody of a small tree. In the art of confectioning poisons, they are also\nvery expert; for they will make them not only very active, but contrive\nthem so, as that they may be administered without creating suspicion; a\nthin vapour with which a piece of fine linen is impregnated, if it is\nafterwards made up in any form, and sent as a present to the person to be\ndispatched, is made the instrument to take away his life. This is a most\nhorrid and execrable art; but although it proves the perverse and wicked\ndisposition of those people, is an argument of their great talents, for\nacquiring a profound knowledge of all they apply themselves to understand.\n\nXI. The Persians, are still more polished than the Turks. They have\ntheir colleges and universities, where they study arithmetic, geometry,\nastronomy, natural and moral philosophy, medicine, jurisprudence,\nrhetoric, and poetry; which last, they are passionately fond of, and\nwrite elegant verses, although they are generally too redundantly\nabounding in pompous metaphors; and they are so far from being guilty\nof that ferocious neglect of urbanity which we are apt to impute to all\nthe Mahometans, that there are no people who excel them in expressions\nof civility, tenderness, and affection. Whenever a Persian invites any\none to his house, or is desirous of manifesting his esteem for him, he\ngenerally makes use of these, or some such like expressions; _I intreat\nyou that you will honour my habitation with your presence; and I shall\nbe ready to devote myself to making it agreeable to you in every shape,\nand to indulging all your wishes; and should even be willing that the\nfavourite females of my eyes, should be converted to carpets for you to\nset your feet on_.\n\nXII. It is true that in the East Indies, we do not find the cultivation\nof letters, but we find there a more than ordinary capacity for attaining\nthem. John Baptist Tavernier, speaking of the negroes or mulattoes of\nthat country called Canarines, many of whom are employed in various\noccupations in Goa, the Philippine islands, and other places in the\npossession of the Portugueze and Spaniards, says, that the children of\nthose who apply themselves to study, acquire more in six months, than\nthe children of Europeans learn in a year; and says further, that he\nwas told this by some of the religious of Goa who had the tutelage of\nthem. I am persuaded that the Portugueze, when they first saw this\nsooty-faced race, believed their reason, was as obscure and dark as their\ncomplexions; and that they supposed themselves nearly as superior in\nnatural talents to them, as men are to brutes; and in how many parts of\nthe globe, where we judge the inhabitants to be stupid, might we possibly\nsee the same thing! for the metal of their understandings, for want of\nexamining it by the touch-stone of study, has remained occult and unknown.\n\n\nSECT. IV.\n\nXIII. But the greatest injustice that the vulgar have been guilty of in\nthis particular, is in the conception they have formed of the abilities\nof the Chinese. Why do I say the vulgar? When you hear men dignified with\nuniversity honours, whenever they have a mind to heighten an extravagant\naction, or mode of proceeding that is contrary to all reason, say at\nevery turn, _this could hardly have happened among the Chinese_; which\namounts to the same thing, as making the conduct of the Chinese, the\nstandard for measuring extreme barbarism. This certainly cannot tally\nvery well with the idea those people entertain of themselves, which is,\nthat they are the quintessence of policy, ingenuity, and penetration;\nfor it is a proverb among them, that the Chinese have two eyes, the\nEuropeans but one, and that all the rest of the world are totally blind.\n\nXIV. The truth is, that they have great reason to believe this; for\nthey excel in their civil government and policy all other nations.\nTheir precautions for preventing civil, and avoiding foreign wars are\nadmirable; and learned and wise men, are not held in such estimation by\nany other people in the world, as by them, and it is to such only, that\nthey confide the reins of government. This alone, is sufficient to give\nthem credit for being the most rational of mankind. The excellence of\ntheir inventive faculty is evident, from their being the first people,\nwho hit upon the three famous inventions, of printing, gun-powder, and\nthe nautical needle; for the knowledge of these in China, is supposed\nto be much anterior to our acquaintance with them in Europe; and there\nare also some well-grounded suspicions, that they were communicated to\nus from the Chinese. They excel exceedingly, in whatever arts they apply\nthemselves to attain; and notwithstanding our utmost exertions, we in\nEurope, have not been able to equal, nor even to imitate them in many.\n\nXV. There is great reason to believe they excel us in their knowledge\nof medicine, and in their mode of applying it. Their physicians, are\nboth physicians and apothecaries; and it was formerly the custom in all\nnations to unite the two professions in one; would to God it was the\nsame now! They keep in their houses all the medicines they make use of,\nwhich consist of various simples, whose virtues they have well examined\nand understand; which they collect, prepare, and apply. They are very\nattentive to, and take a long time in examining the pulse; and it is\nvery common for them to be near an hour in exploring its movements. But\nthe information they get from this circumstance, and the appearance of\nthe tongue is such, that by revolving these particulars in their mind;\nthey without asking any questions, either of the sick person or those\nwho attend him, pronounce on what sort the distemper is, the symptoms\nthat attend it, the time the patient was taken ill, together with all the\nantecedent and subsequent circumstances, that have accompanied, and will\naccompany it.\n\nXVI. I am well aware, that this will appear incredible to our physicians;\nbut the various accounts we have of China, some of which, have been\nwritten by men of most exemplary and unexceptionable characters, all\nagree in vouching the truth of these particulars, so that our refusing\nto give credit to them, would seem rash and unreasonable. But if I could\npossibly have entertained any doubt of this matter, our illustrious Don\nJoseph Manuel de Andaya y Hara, the worthy Prelate of Oviedo, would\nhave removed them, who confirmed these relations to me, upon his own\nexperience of a Chinese physician that practised in Manila, the capital\nof the Philippine Islands, of whom he told me wonderful things, both with\nrespect to his prognostics and methods of cure. I am persuaded that some\nof our physicians about the court, have got the Book of Andrew Cleyer,\nthe first physician of Batavia, intituled _Medicina Chinensium_, which\nwas printed at Augsburgh. The diary of the learned of Paris in the year\n1682, makes mention of it; and in that may be seen more at large, many of\nthese accounts.\n\nXVII. But, skilful as the Chinese physicians are in the practice of\ntheir art, the Chinese people are not behind them, in their skilful and\nwise regulations for the government of the physicians. If the physician,\nafter having examined the pulse and the tongue, does not hit upon the\ndistemper and the symptoms of it, which rarely happens, he is dismissed\nas unskilful, and another called in. If he does hit upon the foregoing\nparticulars, which is most commonly the case, they confide the cure to\nhim, and he immediately goes home, and fetches from his house a bag of\nsimples, which he gives directions for the using of, pointing out the\nmanner in which, and the quantity of each that should be applied or\ntaken. When he has compleated the cure, he is paid amply for his time\nand attendance, and also for the medicines he has expended; but if the\npatient does not recover, the physician is not paid, either for the one\nor the other; so that the money of the sick person, is saved if he does\nnot get well; and the physician, loses both his time and his medicines\nif he does nor cure him. It is much to be wished, that such a regulation\nsubsisted among us; for although Quevedo some time ago complained of the\nwant of it, he did not know it was established in China. It is true, that\nhe made the complaint in a bantering way, but I believe he felt the want\nof the regulation very sensibly.\n\nXVIII. We may say in general of Asia, that this was the country in which\narts and sciences originated; letters owed their birth to Phenicia; and\nwere from thence transported into Egypt and Greece; and the knowledge of\nastronomy came from Chaldea, and from thence was circulated into various\nother countries.\n\n\nSECT. V.\n\nXIX. As to what regards Africa, we should consider, that it gave birth to\na Cyprianus, and a Tertullian, and what is still more, to an Augustin;\nand that the Africans were at one time, as much superior to the Spaniards\nin military skill, as the Spaniards at this day are to the Africans; and\nthat there was a time, when the conquest of all Spain cost the Africans\nless blood, than it has since cost Spain to conquer a few spots in\nMauritania. The soil and the climate of Africa, are the same now they\nwere formerly, and consequently capable of producing equal geniuses; and\nthe fault of not cultivating them, should not be imputed to the soil\nor the climate, but to the want of opportunities of instruction, or to\nthe neglect of application; but with all this, they are perhaps not\nso uncultivated as is commonly thought. Father Buttier, in his little\ntreatise, intituled _An Examination of Vulgar Prejudices_, gives us the\ncopy of a speech, which the ambassador from Morocco made to Louis the\nFourteenth, which was as eloquent and as much to the purpose, as if it\nhad been composed by a learned European.\n\n\nSECT. VI.\n\nXX. The conceit, which upon the first discovery of America was\nentertained of its inhabitants, and which still subsists among the\ngenerality of people, is, that they are not so much directed by reason\nas by instinct; as if some Circe, in her peregrinations through that\nvast country, had transformed all their men into beasts. But with all\nthis, there are abundant testimonies, that their capacities are in no\nwise inferior to ours. The illustrious Palafox, is not contented with\nallowing them to be equal to us in natural talents, but in the memorial\nhe presented to the King in their favour, entitled _A Natural Display\nof the Indies_, declares they excel us. He there gives a relation of an\nIndian, whose person he knew, and who went by the name of _The Man of\nSix Trades_, from his understanding, and being able to work well at that\nnumber; and of another, who learned to build organs in an amazing short\ntime; and of another, who in an amazing short time also, learned to play\nthe organ. He there likewise gives an account of the exquisite address,\nwith which an Indian recovered a horse that had been purloined from him\nby a Spaniard. The Indian, commenced a prosecution against the Spaniard\nfor his horse, and when the trial came on, the beast was brought into\ncourt, where the Spaniard alledged that he had bought him, and had had\nhim in his possession for several years, which he brought witnesses to\nconfirm. The Indian, who had no evidence to prove his property in the\nhorse, finding himself hard pressed, instantly threw his cloak over the\nhorse\u2019s head, and requested that the Spaniard who insisted that he had\nbeen owner of the horse for so long a time, might tell of which eye he\nwas blind; the Spaniard, who was taken by surprise, and much confounded\nwith the question, answered at random, the right; upon which the Indian\npulled the cloak off the horse\u2019s head, and manifested to the whole court,\nthat he was not blind of either eye; this evinced the roguery of the\nSpaniard, and the Indian recovered his horse.\n\nXXI. The Europeans under the command of Cortes, had scarce penetrated\ninto the kingdom of Mexico, before they experienced many particulars,\nwhich convinced them, that the natives of that country were of the same\nspecies with themselves, and the children of the same common Father. We\nread in the History of the Conquest of Mexico, many military stratagems\nof the Indians, that were not inferior to those of the Carthaginians, the\nGreeks and the Romans; and many people have remarked, that the Crioles or\nchildren of Spaniards who are born in America, are more sprightly, and\nhave more intellectual quickness, than those who are born in Spain; but\nwhether what others add, that although their ingenuity manifests itself\nsooner, it does not last to so late a period of life, be just or not, I\ncannot pretend to determine.\n\nXXII. It would be reasoning erroneously and grossly, to entertain a\nmean opinion of the capacities of the Indians, because upon their first\nintercourse with us, they gave pieces of gold for glass beads; for he\nwould be more rude than they, who should conclude they were savage, upon\nthis account. If we were to view glass free from our prepossession in\nfavour of gold, glass would appear the most beautiful of the two; and\nwith respect to what is sought after, for the purpose of ornament and\nostentation, out of two things that are equally beautiful, that which is\nmost scarce is always preferred. The Americans then in this instance,\ndid no more than what is done by all the world. They had plenty of gold\nbut no glass; and it was on this account that they concluded, and not\nwithout reason, that a string of beads, was a fitter ornament to adorn\nthe neck of a princess, than a gold chain. A diamond, if we only regard\nthe necessary utility of it, is not of superior value to a glass bead;\nbut if we regard its lustre, it certainly excels it; and although,\nnotwithstanding the principal difference between the two things, consists\nonly, in the lustre and beauty of the diamond, the Asiatics sell the\nEuropeans a diamond that weighs two ounces, for an amazing number of\npounds sterling; and why is this? It can only be, because such diamonds\nare exceedingly scarce. The inhabitants of the island of Formosa,\nesteemed fine brass preferable to gold, because they had greater plenty\nof gold than fine brass, and continued to do so, till the Hollanders gave\nthem to understand, the great estimation in which gold was held in other\nregions. If there was a greater plenty of gold all over the world, than\nthere was of fine brass, the last of these metals would be preferred to\nthe first. Upon the arrival of the Dutch Admiral Matelief at the Cape\nof Good Hope in the year 1605, the African inhabitants of that country,\ngave him eight and thirty sheep and two bullocks, for a small quantity\nof iron, which did not in its value exceed twenty-pence; and the best\nof it was, that they were equally satisfied they had imposed upon the\nHollanders, as the Hollanders were that they had imposed upon them. They\nhad a super-abundance of cattle, and were in great want of iron. And in\nwhatever country the same super-abundance of cattle, and the same want of\niron prevails, they must purchase the iron with the same number of cattle.\n\nXXIII. Father Lafitau a Missionary Jesuit, who was a long time among\nthole North American Indians, who, on account of their being esteemed\nthe most barbarous of all, are called savages, gives great applauses of\ntheir government and civil policy, and compares them in these respects,\nto the antient Lacedemonians: and what is more extraordinary, he also\nbestows great panegyrics on their eloquence; and goes so far as to say,\nthat he has known here and there one of them, whose orations were equal\nto those of Cicero and Demosthenes, and expresses some doubt, whether\nthey may not be said to excel them. This relation of Father Lafitau, may\nbe seen in the Memoirs of Trevoux of 1724, art. 106. It is possible, that\nthis account is somewhat hyperbolical; but it should be considered, that\nFather Lafitau had a long and an intimate intercourse with these people,\nand there is no doubt, but a man who sees things in a near point of view,\ncan judge better of them, than those who see them at a distance.\n\nXXIV. Our intellectual sight, is exposed to the same defect that our\ncorporeal one is, and is apt to represent distinct things less than they\nare. There is no man, let his stature be as gigantic as it will, who\ndoes not appear like a pigmy at a great distance. The same that happens\nwith respect to the size of bodies, happens with regard to the stature\nof souls. Those nations which are very remote from us, appear so small\nin our eye as rational creatures, that we scarce allow them to be endued\nwith the faculty of reason; but if we were to view them near, we should\nprobably form a different judgment of them.\n\n\nSECT. VII.\n\nXXV. It may perhaps be objected to what I have been advancing, that the\nvery absurd opinions entertained in matters of religion, by the bulk of\nthe people of Asia, Africa, and America, without insisting, upon the\ntotal want of any religion among some of them, should induce us to form a\nvery mean judgment of their talents.\n\nXXVI. To this I answer in the first place, that although errors in\nmatters of religion are the worst of all errors, they are no absolute\nproofs of the rudeness of those who assent to them. Nobody is ignorant,\nthat the antient Greeks and Romans, who were exceedingly well skilled in\narts and sciences, were extremely absurd with respect to the objects of\ntheir adoration. They worshiped as deities, men who had been adulterers,\nperfidious, and guilty of all sorts of wickedness. Rome, which as Saint\nLeon observes, domineered over all the other nations, was herself under\nthe dominion of the errors of them all. When a man sets himself to search\nfor a divinity from among his own species, it is a mark of a depraved\nimagination, and the question respecting his capacity, is not worth\nenquiring into, as we may naturally conclude, he has lost his reason\nbefore he makes the attempt. And he who walks blindfold, is not more\nterrified by a high precipice than a low one, as he is unable to discern\nthe difference. I do not even know, whether when a man first begins to\nerr in these particulars, he does not go the most extravagant lengths,\nwho has been the best-informed; because in matters of religion, when the\nfirst error has taken root, it is easy for the person who is possessed\nwith it, to confound the mysterious with the ridiculous, and by an\naffected subtilty, pretend to discover some hidden signs of divinity in\nthose things, which in the eye of common sense, are the most remote from,\nor have the least to do with it.\n\nXXVII. I answer secondly, that we have no certainty, that the idolatry\nof these various nations was so gross as it has been represented. With\nrespect to the antient idolaters, some learned men have enforced this\ndoubt very strongly, and have insisted, that there were solid reasons for\nsupposing, that in the image they did not worship the wood, the metal,\nor the marble of which it was made, but some good genius or demon, whom\nthey believed to have resided in it. Truly it seems incredible, that\na statuary, such a one as Horace humourously describes in one of his\nSatyrs, should stand with his hatchet in one hand, and having the other\non the wood he was about to work, suspended and perplexed, whether he\nshould carve the God Priapus, or Escanus; I say it is incredible, that\nsuch a man should suppose himself vested with sufficient authority to\nfabricate a Deity.\n\nXXVIII. I say the same of the animated idols. How is it credible that\nthe Egyptians, who were for some ages the repositories of the sciences,\nshould chuse for the ultimate object of their adoration, a most vile\nsnake, and even a dog, or an onion, which Juvenal ironically and with\nderision tells them, was raised up to them in their own gardens? _O\nsanctas gentes, quibus h\u00e6c nascuntur in hortis numina._ It is much\nmore reasonable to suppose, that that nation, who were much addicted to\nrepresent every thing enigmatically, and by symbols, should adore these\nvile creatures in some mystical sense, which these served as a sort of\nhierogliphics to explain the signification of, and that their adoration\nof them, was not absolute but respective. The same reasoning might be\nbrought to apply to other nations, both of former and modern times, as\nwell as to them.\n\nXXIX. I am confirmed in this opinion, by what I have read concerning the\nsuperstition which prevails in the island of Madagascar. The inhabitants\nof that island, worship a cricket, and every one rears his own with great\ncare and veneration. Some French ships in their voyage to India in the\nyear 1665, touched at Madagascar, and being apprized of the superstition\nof the natives, a curious Frenchman, asked one of them whom they\nrespected as a wise man, what could induce them to worship so vile an\nanimal, who answered, _that they worshiped the principal and head of all,\nthat is the Creator in the creature, and that it was necessary to direct\ntheir adoration to a sensible object, in order to fix the attention_.\nWho could have expected to meet with so delicate a sentiment, in such a\ncountry? I do not insist, that the reply exempts them from the note of\nsuperstition, but it proves, that they are not stupid and insensible. If\nthe same observation the Frenchman made on the absurdity of the worship\nof the people of Madagascar, had been made to an antient Egyptian, he in\nall probability, would have returned the same answer to it in substance,\nwhich the Madagascar man gave.\n\nXXX. With regard to people who are supposed to have no religion at all,\nI must declare, that I doubt whether there are any such people in the\nworld. The voyagers who assure us there are such, might possibly from\ntheir want of sufficient intercourse with them, or from the want of\nunderstanding their language, not be able to penetrate their sentiments\non that head; for all nature proclaims the existence of a Creator with so\nloud a voice, that the most sleepy reason cannot fail to be awakened with\nher cries.\n\n\nSECT. VIII.\n\nXXXI. There is then, scarce any people whatever, if you examine deeply\ninto things, who can with justice be deemed barbarous. I will not however\ndeny, that there is not between particular nations, some inequality in\nthe use or application of their reason. Yes, but this depends in some\nmeasure, on the disposition of their organs, and the climate in which\nthey are born, and these possibly may have some influence to promote this\ndisposition. But if I was to be asked which are the most penetrating and\nacute nations, I should answer ingenuously that I could give no judgment\nin the matter that might safely be relied on. I see that the sciences,\nat one time flourished among the Phenicians, at another among the\nChaldeans, at another among the Egyptians, at another among the Greeks,\nat another among the Romans, and at another among the Arabs, and that\nat last, they extended themselves to almost all the European nations. I\nobserve also, that the inhabitants of every country into which they were\nnot introduced, were looked upon as rude and uncivilized; but it was\ngenerally remarked, that after they came to be introduced into one of\nthese last, the natives of it did not make less advances in them, than\nthose did, who had the happiness to be the first visited by them. Perhaps\nif the world lasts much longer, and there should happen great revolutions\nof empire in it, as Minerva goes wandering about the earth, and continues\nto shift her station according to the violent agitations she receives\nfrom the impulse of Mars; I say if such revolutions should happen, the\nIroquois, the Laplanders, the Troglodytes, the Garamantes, and other\npeople, whom we now look upon with disdain, and whom we with repugnance\nadmit to be members of our species, may one day possess the sciences in\nan eminent degree; so that experience will hardly assist us to determine,\nthe inequality of ingenuity, that prevails in different nations.\n\nXXXII. Much less then can we determine the point by physical reasonings.\nMany have endeavoured to establish, that this inequality bears\nproportion, to the predominance of the elemental qualities which prevail\nin different countries; and it is commonly said, that humid and cloudy\nclimates, produce heavy dull spirits, and serene and dry ones, sprightly\nand penetrating ones. Aristotle gives the preference in this matter, to\nthose who inhabit the hot countries. Agreeable to the first of these\nopinions, the Venetians and the Hollanders, should be very stupid dull\npeople, for the first live in marshes surrounded by standing waters,\nand the last in a muddy low country, that might be said to have been\nstolen from the sea, and which is surrounded by standing waters also; and\nagreeable to the second, the negroes of Angola, should be more acute than\nthe English. It does not appear to me, that any reasonable man should\nadmit of either of these consequences. But it is not necessary for us\nto dwell longer on this subject at present; as we have shewn at large in\nour defence of the women, that we cannot infer there is any inequality\nof understanding, produced by the predominance, the sensible qualities\nhave on the temperament; and that therefore, we are under a necessity of\nacknowledging, that the influence our native country may have over it, is\nthe effect of some occult cause, which is impenetrable to our reason, or\nat least, which has not been penetrated by it as yet.\n\nXXXIII. When I say that by experience, we can hardly distinguish the\ninequality of ingenuity of nations, I would be understood to mean,\nin point of the essential qualities, of penetration, solidity, and\nclearness; and not in point of the accidental ones, of superior quickness\nand readiness, or those of being more slow and tardy of comprehension;\nfor with respect to these, it is evident that some nations exceed others.\nThus it is manifest, that the Italians and French are more quick and\nready than the Spaniards; and even in Spain itself, there is a great\ndifference between the inhabitants of one province and those of another\nin these respects; for it is remarked, that in Asturias, the people are\nquicker of apprehension, and are more ready at explaining themselves,\nthan they are in any of the other provinces; and the experience of this,\nshould be sufficient to dissuade us from falling-in with that general\nnotion, that rainy countries produce heavy dull people; as it is well\nknown, that the heavens may rather be said to inundate, than refresh this\ncountry, so that it may be truly called,\n\n    _Nimborum patriam, loca f\u0153ta furentibus austris._\n\nXXXIV. But if I was to give my opinion which of the nations of Europe\nshould be preferred to the rest, with respect to their penetration,\nI should incline to the sentiment of Heidegger a German author, who\nconcedes this advantage to the English. It is certain that Great Britain,\nsince literature, arts, and sciences, were first cultivated in it, has\nproduced a copious harvest of authors of the first class. The recital of\nthose only, which have arisen in that country, out of the Benedictine and\nSeraphic orders of religious, would be tedious and tiresome. But I cannot\nforbear to mention, that we are indebted to each of these two orders, for\nthree stars of the first magnitude. To the Benedictine, for the venerable\nBede, the famous Alcuinus, and the celebrated Calculator Suiset. To the\nSeraphic, for Alexander de Ales, the subtil Scotus, and his disciple\nWilliam Ocman. Cardanus in his Treatise (de Subtilit. lib. 16. de\nScient.) graduates among the twelve most acute geniuses of the world, the\nsubtil Scotus and the Calculator Suiset, in the fourth and fifth rank, of\nwhom he says: _Barbaros ingenio nobis haud esse inferiores, quandoquidem\nsub Brum\u00e6 c\u0153lo, divisa toto orbe Britannia duos tam clari ingeniique\nviros emisserit._\n\nXXXV. Neither should we conceal, that at the time when the other nations\nof Europe scarce knew what the mathematics meant, the two beforementioned\norders of Religious exhibited two illustrious English mathematicians;\nRoger Bacon, and Oliver of Malmsbury; of the first of whom, the vulgar\nfeigned the same tale, they did of Albertus Magnus, that is, that he had\nmade a brazen head, which answered all questions that were put to it. The\nother was not less famous than he, of whom John Pitseus relates, that he\nhad invented some machinery, by the help of which he was enabled to fly,\nalthough he never could attain at doing it, for above the distance of\nabout a hundred and twenty yards at a time; but that was doing more, than\nany other man ever did before him.\n\nXXXVI. On physical subjects, England has furnished a greater number of\noriginal authors, than all the other nations of Europe put together; and\nthe French, who are very tenacious of the reputation of their country\nfor producing men of ingenuity, are obliged to confess, that the English\nare superior to them in philosophical abilities. It may without rashness\nor exaggeration be said, that all the advances which have been made in\nphysical knowledge for a century past, are owing to my Lord Chancellor\nBacon. It was he that broke through the strait limits, within which,\nPhysics till his time had been imprisoned; and he was the man who threw\ndown the columns, on which to mark the boundaries of human knowledge in\nnatural things, _ne plus ultra_ had been inscribed. The most learned\nPeter Gassendo, was nothing else but a faithful disciple of Bacon\u2019s, and\nwhat Bacon had said in a summary way, he repeated more at large, in his\nextensive philosophical writings. All that Descartes said which was of\nany real value, he took from Bacon. After Bacon, we may reckon as great\noriginals, Mr. Boyle, and the most subtil Sir Isaac Newton; as also John\nLocke[2], Sir Kenelm Digby, and many others; but the misfortune is, that\nthe lustre of their ingenuity, was tarnished with the same religious\nblemish my Lord Bacon\u2019s was; and when they had once strayed out of the\nright path, they flew with such velocity, that the extent of their\nwanderings, was great as the liveliness of their imaginations. But with\nall this, there has not been wanting in England, since it was blemished\nwith heresy, a Sir Thomas More, who was as celebrated for his Catholic\nconstancy, as he was for his eminence in the sciences.\n\nXXXVII. I must also say, that I have always observed in the English\nphilosophers, great frankness, and that they gave a simple plain relation\nof the result of their experience and labours, free from all artifice and\ndeceit; which is a thing not very common with those of other nations; and\nI have remarked this particularly, in Bacon, Boyle, Sir Isaac Newton,\nand Sydenham the physician; and it has afforded me great pleasure, to\nsee, how without boasting they have declared what they know, and without\nblushing, have confessed what they are ignorant of. This is the true\nmark and characteristic of sublime geniuses. Oh! how much it is to\nbe lamented, that such great lights, should be obscured by heretical\nprejudices!\n\n\nEND OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n[1] The translator thinks, as he has not translated that Discourse, it\nwill not be amiss to insert here the Author\u2019s sentiment on this subject.\nIn the Essay or Discourse referred to, after reciting the arguments that\nhave been used to prove the invention came from China, and the claims\nthat have been made on the behalf of a variety of people, to their being\nthe inventors; he gives it as his opinion, that Bertoldus Schuvart, a\nGerman Franciscan friar, and an eminent chemist, was the man who invented\nit, or at least was the person who, brought the invention to perfection.\n\n[2] This is the same John Locke, of whose writings, as also of those of\nRapin, Sidney, and Bishop Hoadly, the late David Hume, in his History of\nGreat Britain, gives the following description: \u201cCompositions of the most\ndespicable kind both for style and matter, which have been extolled, and\npropagated, and read; as if they had equalled the most celebrated remains\nof antiquity.\u201d\n\nVid. vol. viii. pag. 323, of the last edition of Hume\u2019s History of Great\nBritain, published in 1778.\n\n\n\n\nERRATA.\n\n\nPage 68, line 27, _read_ such for example as spiritual entities.\n\nPage 101, line 8, _for_ that, _read_ and that.\n\nPage 104, line 16, _read_ and after turning, &c.\n\nPage 129, line 25, _for_ executed, _read_ executes.\n\nPage 157, line 12, _for_ ascends, _read_ ascend; and line 21, _for_\nlerned, _read_ learned.\n\nPage 158, line 20, _for_ but, _read_ yet.\n\nPage 169, line 13, _read_ many of those instruments.\n\nPage 187, line 20, _read_ proper resolution.\n\nPage 212, line 9, _for_ had, _read_ has.\n\nPage 213, line 14, _for_ raise, _read_ arise.\n\nPage 271, line 3, _for_ reasonable, _read_ reasoning.\n\nPage 272, line 6, _for_ qulities, _read_ qualities.\n\nPage 273, line 10, _for_ is, _read_ are.\n\nPage 297, line 14, _read_ as it is called.\n\nPage 352, line 6, _for_ eben, _read_ been.\n\n=Transcriber\u2019s Note:= The errata have been corrected, along with a few\nother minor printing errors.","title":"Essays, or discourses, vol. 4 (of 4) : $b Selected from the works of Feyjoo, and translated from the Spanish","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":79066}