{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_76629/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_76629","id":"gutenberg_76629","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/76629","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Science","Science -- Philosophy"],"text":"GALLIO\n                                                                  OR\n                                                             THE TYRANNY\n                                                                  OF\n                                                               SCIENCE\n\n\n\n\n                                 GALLIO\n                                   OR\n                         The Tyranny of Science\n\n                                   BY\n                           J. W. N. SULLIVAN\n\n\n                             [Illustration]\n\n\n                     E. P. DUTTON & CO. :: NEW YORK\n\n\n\n\n                   GALLIO, OR THE TYRANNY OF SCIENCE\n                COPYRIGHT 1928 BY E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY\n                ALL RIGHTS RESERVED :: PRINTED IN U.S.A.\n\n\n\n\n                                 GALLIO\n\n\n\n\n                                 GALLIO\n                                   OR\n                         THE TYRANNY OF SCIENCE\n\n\n\n\n                                   1\n\n\nThere can be no doubt that the prestige of science has greatly\nincreased of recent times. In the days when Dickens wrote _The Mudfog\nPapers_ the man of science, to the general reading public, was a purely\ncomic figure. After the man of science had knocked the bottom out of\nthe Victorian universe with his theory of Natural Selection he inspired\nthe respect we accord to whatever is both powerful and sinister. He was\nobserved, warily and acutely, as an enemy. This reaction was perfectly\njustified, for science, as expounded to the populace by such men as\nHuxley and Tyndall, deprived life of all that had hitherto made it\nworth living. The gravamen of their offence was not that they made man\nan integral part of the animal kingdom, but that they presented him\nwith a universe that was entirely purposeless. Such a doctrine would\nprobably come as a shock even to a disillusioned and emaciated Eastern\nSage, but to the men of the Victorian age, almost every one of them\nbrought up in an orthodox Christian household and filled with that\nbelief in a wise Providence that comes of great material prosperity,\nit was nothing short of an outrage. Even the men of science themselves\nfound their great discovery more than a little disconcerting. Nobody\nwho reads them can fail to detect something strained, something\noccasionally almost frenzied, in their insistence on the duty of\nintellectual honesty. These men are, half the time, shouting aloud\nin order to hearten themselves. They were quite consciously martyrs\nto the truth. This is true, at any rate, of such men as Huxley and\nClifford. There were many men of science, of course, who were not\nsufficiently alive to live in a universe of any description. Outside,\ntheir laboratories they had no perceptible existence. Many of them died\nsimple Christians. But to all interested in such matters it became\nevident that the goal of science was the detailed explanation of man\nas the accidental outcome of \u201cmatter and motion\u201d. Since the arguments\nof the man of science could not be met (for only science can cast out\nscience) the only thing left was to abuse him. This was magnificently\ndone by Nietzsche, and rather less magnificently by Dostoevsky and\nTolstoi. Nietzsche pointed out that the man of science was not a\nhuman being. He was merely an instrument, the most costly, the most\nexquisite, the most easily tarnished of instruments. He was incapable\nof love; he was incapable of hate. His one purpose was to \u201creflect\u201d\nsuch things as he was tuned to receive. The philosophy evolved by such\na creature would be expressive of nothing but his own limitations. He\nwould be incapable of understanding the problems that concerned a man.\nThis was also the line taken, more or less, by Dostoevsky and Tolstoi,\nand it became very popular with artists of all kinds. Wordsworth\u2019s\nscorn for the botanist became the general attitude towards all men\nof science. It must be admitted that, judging from biographies of\nscientific men, there is much to be said for this view. Their favourite\nauthors appear to be Shakespeare and Ella Wheeler Wilcox: they are\nkind fathers and faithful husbands; in their social relations they\nare simple-minded snobs; and they are really amused by \u201clecture-room\nhumour\u201d. It seems unlikely that such people know much of the fierce\nvitality that sent Saints to rot on pillars and in dungeons, that sent\nmartyrs to the stake, or even that weaker form of vitality that causes\nour Divorce Court judges to be overworked. That they can understand\nthe universe, when it is obvious they do not understand Clapham, does\nnot seem likely. That, briefly, was the case of the artist against the\nman of science. The artist was conscious of more things in heaven and\nearth, staring him in the face, than he believed the man of science had\never dreamt of in his philosophy.\n\nIt is evident that the position to-day is rather different. It has\nbecome different since the War. It is probable, as we shall see\nlater, that the War itself is partly responsible for the increased\nattention paid by the artist to science. But the influence was not\ndirect. The artist was not transported with admiration for the men\nwho could make poison-gas,[1] although he may have been more inclined\nto believe their philosophy that existence is meaningless. No, the\nchange was, I believe, due to Einstein: in this respect he must be\nlikened to Newton and Darwin. The fact that his theory is completely\nunintelligible to the enormous majority of those who take an interest\nin it is not at all to its disadvantage. Rather the contrary. The\nartist is attracted by the theory, and respectful to it, not in the\nleast because he understands it, but because he feels it is the result\nof a most unusual and most powerful _imaginative_ effort. It gives\nhim a new conception of the power of the human consciousness. This\ntheory, he is convinced, has come from the heights. It is probable,\nas a matter of fact, he thinks this because he believes the theory\nto be about that mathematical platitude, a fourth dimension. The\nfourth dimension is a phrase to which imaginative people respond with\nquite extraordinary intensity. Its popularity is like that of giant\ntelescopes, as was proved when a thousand pounds was recently offered\nfor a simple explanation of it. It seems to be the phrase which, to\nthe non-mathematician, is most pregnant with the vast and liberating\nunknown. If its meaning is ever generally understood, we may anticipate\nthat interest in Einstein\u2019s theory will decline. This will be a pity,\nbecause the popular reaction to Einstein\u2019s theory is perfectly\njustified. It _is_ the most profound and original scientific theory\nthat has ever been invented, and it displays a kind of imagination\nalmost[2] unprecedented in the history of science. The feeling of the\nartist about it is right\u2015\u2015it is vastly important to him.\n\n  [1] He ought to have been. See _Callinicus_, by J. B. S. Haldane.\n\nBeing convinced that the mathematician, at any rate, might be a\npoet, the respect of imaginative people for science in general has\ngreatly increased. Many of them have decided that science is worth\nlooking into. Unfortunately mathematical physics, the master science\nof the present day and the one which has furnished ideals for the\nother sciences, is hopelessly technical. It is agreed that a modern\nintelligent man, conscious of his responsibilities as an inhabitant\nof the twentieth century, should be familiar with \u201cthe scientific\noutlook\u201d. But to acquire this outlook by brooding over the teachings\nand implications of modern physics is not easy. Thus although it is the\nrecent astonishing development in physics which is responsible for the\nrenewed public interest in science, it is other sciences that reap the\nbenefit. We have poets and painters who study anthropology and literary\ncritics who read books on the nervous system. The result appears to\nhave been disastrous. At a time when the physicists are abandoning\nmaterialism the artists are accepting it. They are accepting, as the\nlast word of science, a picture of the world that belongs to the early\nbad manner of physics. Again we hear, but this time from our literary\nmen, that slightly hysterical insistence on the duty of intellectual\nhonesty. It must be admitted that they have been predisposed to accept\nthis view by the War. It is a curious but indisputable psychological\nfact, perhaps first noted by Tolstoi, that the sight of a large number\nof naked human bodies makes it difficult to believe that they are\nanimated by immortal spirits possessing an eternal destiny. The sight\nof the \u201cwastage\u201d that occurred during the War, for those who saw any of\nit, produced the same curious effect. Also, a psychological fact that\ncannot be denied, it was difficult to preserve belief in the essential\nnobility of man when listening to patriotic non-combatants. There can\nbe no doubt that the War, for a large number of those connected with\nit, has made the acceptance of materialism easier. Even the creative\nartists, at one time great champions of the spiritual nature of\nman, are now sufficiently dubious about his nature to be reduced to\nimpotence.\n\n  [2] I say \u201calmost\u201d because there was Bernhard Riemann and his disciple\n      W. K. Clifford.\n\n\n\n\n                                   2\n\n\nThe notion that we live in a purposeless universe is so opposed to the\nmental habits we have inherited that it is a matter of the greatest\ndifficulty to bear it constantly in mind. Most of the people who\nhold this belief to-day would not do so but for three reasons: the\ndisillusionment caused by the War, their respect for science, and\ntheir belief that science preaches materialism. As for the War, that\nis an experience to which we must accommodate ourselves as best we\nmay. It is consistent with the belief that man is a developing spirit,\nbut it is certainly a proof that he is not very far developed. The\nrespect for science is, I believe, on the whole rather overdone. The\nrespect is a little excessive even when it relates to mathematical\nphysics, but it becomes almost absurd when it relates to some other\nbranches of science. I believe, for instance, that Freud\u2019s form of\npsycho-analysis, some forms of behaviourism, and many of the statements\nof the eugenists really are as silly as they look. All that they\nhave in common with such first-class mental activities as physics and\nchemistry is the name \u201cscience.\u201d It is this name that secures for them\nsuch attention as they get from intelligent people who are not cranks.\nBut even physics is a more provisional and more human thing than some\nromantic references to it would lead one to suppose. Even the tower of\nthe mathematician, which Mr Bernard Shaw imagines to have been always\nunshaken, has been seriously disturbed on more than one occasion. The\nstudent of the history of science will not be too confident even of the\n\u201cindubitable certainties\u201d of physics when he reflects on the universal\npassion of belief that attached to the notion of a mechanical ether,\nfor whose present absence from the universe some men of science are\nstill inconsolable, and when he reflects on the fate that has overtaken\nthat \u201cmost perfect and perfectly established law\u201d, Newton\u2019s law of\ngravitation. There are no indubitable certainties in science, a fact\nthat we who are contemporary with the destruction of the Newtonian\nsystem are not likely to forget. There are only provisional hypotheses.\nIt may even be, as Mr J. B. S. Haldane prophesies, that physiology\nwill one day invade and destroy mathematical physics, by which somewhat\ndark saying I suppose phenomena mathematically may be given up. Whether\nhe means that or not, it is a possibility, as Professor Eddington has\nhinted. The scientific practitioner usually treats his hypotheses as\ntools, but to the layman they become dogmas. One is led to believe\nthis by seeing that many of those who accept materialism on what they\nsuppose to be scientific evidence are rendered acutely unhappy by their\nbelief. A truer knowledge of the status of scientific theories would\nrender this agony unnecessary. There are people with a natural leaning\ntowards materialism, and science, preferably somewhat old-fashioned\nscience, will give them quite sufficient grounds to indulge their\npropensity with complete intellectual honesty. But science does not,\nand never has, brought forward sufficient evidence to justify a man\nturning materialist against his will. And perhaps no man has ever done\nso. Perhaps one can take the agonies of modern poets too seriously.\nMany artists, not only small ones, have no real indwelling force\nsuch as a man like Beethoven obviously possessed. They are merely\nvery impressionable and _adopt_ an attitude towards life, and this\nattitude is accepted and maintained, not because they really think it\nis true, but because they derive strength from it. It gives them a\ncentre from which they can work; it gives them a feeling of strength\nand completeness. The maintenance of their attitude towards life may\nbecome the condition that they exist and function as artists at all.\nNevertheless, the attitude is maintained only by a constant effort of\nwill, although, since the motive is self-preservation, the artist will\nnearly always think himself perfectly sincere. But I shall, without\ngoing into these refinements, take the unhappiness of our modern\nliterary men at its face-value, those, that is, who believe that the\nuniverse is purposeless and think this belief is founded on scientific\nevidence.\n\nThe point of view has been well put recently by Mr I. A. Richards,[3]\na literary critic who thinks it possible that poetry may be destroyed\nby science. He speaks of the \u201cneutralization of nature\u201d which has been\neffected by science, and contrasts this with the \u201cmagical view\u201d of the\nworld that has hitherto been accepted by artists. What he means by\nthis is that science reveals to us a universe quite indifferent to all\nhuman aspirations, whereas artists have hitherto assumed that man is\nof cosmic significance. The poet must learn to accept the scientific\nuniverse and give up believing in things like \u201cinspiration\u201d, \u201ca reality\ndeeper than the reality of science\u201d, and so on. \u201cExperience\u201d, says Mr\nRichards, \u201cis its own justification\u201d, by which he appears to mean that\nexperience just happens to be what it is by some kind of accident. It\npoints to nothing beyond itself. The ground for this belief is not,\nin Mr Richards\u2019 case, old-fashioned materialism. \u201cIt is not what the\nuniverse is made of but how it works, the law it follows, which makes\nknowledge of it incapable of spurring on our emotional responses.\u201d This\nreminds one of the \u201ciron laws\u201d of the Victorian age, which many people\nfound so depressing, although the logical connection between existence\nhaving conditions and existence being purposeless is a little hard to\nfollow. But although the particular iron laws of the Victorians have\ngone, Mr Richards finds the theory of relativity no more cheering. \u201cA\ngod voluntarily or involuntarily subject to Einstein\u2019s General Theory\nof Relativity does not make an emotional appeal and physics does not\nfind it necessary to mention him.\u201d Apparently it is the existence of\nany law at all that is resented: the poet can feel happy only in a\nworld of pure miracle. I strongly doubt the correctness of Mr Richards\u2019\ndiagnosis.[4] I am certain that not all poets have been as childish\nas that. No\u2015\u2015the essential element in this general outlook is not\nthat phenomena occur in an orderly way, but that man\u2019s existence is\nnot regarded as forming part of some universal purpose. The essential\nelement is the same as in old-fashioned materialism, the \u201caccidental\ncollocations of atoms\u201d theory. The emphasis was on the \u201caccidental\u201d\nnot on the \u201catoms\u201d. This becomes clear when Mr Richards describes the\nappropriate emotional reaction to his view. \u201cA sense of desolation\nand uncertainty, of futility, of the baselessness of aspirations, of\nthe vanity of endeavour, and a thirst for a life-giving water which\nseems suddenly to have failed, are the signs in consciousness of this\nnecessary reorganization of our lives.\u201d It is difficult to believe\nthat this state of mind can be produced by the recognition of such\nfacts as that unsupported stones always fall to the ground. But if Mr\nRichards is right, I suggest that the poets who are so depressed by\nlaw and order should study, besides the theory of relativity, Quantum\nTheory. They will find there much that is, at present, agreeably\nmiraculous. But one need not fly to miracles to get rid of the bug-bear\nof \u201cunalterable law\u201d. It is only necessary to understand the true\nstatus of the unalterable laws, and this is just what relativity theory\nenables us to do.\n\n  [3] _Science and Poetry_, 1926.\n\n  [4] But possibly Mr Richards means that the scientific description\n      does not include values. See Section 5 of this essay.\n\n\n\n\n                                   3\n\n\nThe idea that there is a conflict between science and art, which is at\nbottom the idea that there is a conflict between science and mysticism,\nrests, I have suggested, upon an old-fashioned conception of the\nstatus of physics. The first duty of a man who bases his conclusions\non science is to make sure that his science is up-to-date. The science\nthat leads to the depressing conclusions I have just sketched is not\nup-to-date. Until a few years ago the physicist thought that the\nmaterial universe he dealt with was a real, objectively existing\nuniverse in the sense that, in the absence of consciousness, it would\nbe very much the same as it appeared to be. This universe was subject\nto laws, and these laws might conceivably have been different. There\nwas no _a priori_ reason, for instance, why the force of gravitation\nshould not vary as the inverse cube of the distance. There was no _a\npriori_ reason why matter and energy should be conserved. These were\nlaws of governance of the material universe; their discovery had\nrequired much effort and the rejection of alternatives. Man was in no\nsense responsible for them: he happened to live in a universe governed\nby them. These were the iron laws of the Victorians and are the laws,\napparently, that depress modern poets. One of the great discoveries of\nrelativity theory is that these laws need be no more depressing than\nthe laws of Euclidean geometry. No artist has felt his aspirations\nbaseless because he cannot draw a circle whose circumference is six\ntimes its radius. He has no more right to despair because there\nis an inexorable law of gravitation. This has been made clear by\nProfessor Eddington, whose mathematical development of relativity\ntheory is of great philosophical importance, and would, in a more\nadequately educated community, be given more newspaper headlines than\nTutankhamen. The real universe, according to relativity theory, is a\nfour-dimensional world of point-events. Of the nature of point-events\nwe know nothing. All that we require to know, for the purposes of\nphysics, is that it takes four numbers to specify a point-event\nuniquely, and that some kind of structure\u2015\u2015a minimum amount of\nstructure\u2015\u2015may be postulated of the world of point-events. We then\nfind, purely by mathematical processes, that certain characteristics of\nthis world will have the quality of permanence. The mind, faced with\nthis world of evanescent point-events, selects those characteristics\nthat are permanent as being of special interest. This is merely because\nthe mind happens to be that kind of thing. As a consequence of this\npredilection of the mind there arises space and time, matter, and the\nlaws of nature. There arises, in fact, the \u201cobjective universe\u201d. The\nreal world of point-events has many other characteristics to which the\nmind pays no attention. A different principle of selection, exercised\non the same total world of point-events, would result in an utterly\ndifferent universe, a universe that is, for us, quite unimaginable. And\nthe universe that the mind has selected and constructed from the world\nof point-events does not in the least depend on what the point-events\n_are_. All that is necessary is that a certain minimum amount of\nstructure should be attributed to the world of point-events. It is from\nthe relations between the point-events, quite independent of their\nsubstance, that the mind has created the material universe and its\nlaws. These laws, it must be emphasized, are _necessary_ consequences\nof the mind\u2019s selective action. They are necessary in the same sense\nthat the sum of the three interior angles of a Euclidean triangle must\nbe two right angles. Of the underlying reality deduced by physics we\ncan say almost nothing. It may be what Newton called the \u201csensorium\u201d\nof God, and the point-events may be his thoughts. They do not succeed\none another in time for, at this stage of analysis, space and time are\n\u201cmerged in one\u201d. This perfectly gratuitous hypothesis may appeal to\nsome mystics, for our thoughts, considered as belonging to the world\nof point-events, would be part of the thoughts of God. It would be\nindeed true that in him we lived and moved and had our being. We see,\nthen, the limitations of physics. All that depends on the _structure_\nof reality belongs to physics, including other universes than ours.\nAll that depends upon the _substance_ of reality for ever lies outside\nphysics. As to the actual universe we live in, why we should regard\nit as actual is a problem for psychology. The difference between the\nactual and the non-actual is a distinction conferred by our minds. It\nis very probable that the whole movement of the universe in time is\nalso contributed by our minds. It seems to be true that events do not\ntake place\u2015\u2015we come across them. Why we do not know the future is again\na question of psychology. Ignorance of the future, like the existence\nof the material universe, is a clue to the constitution of our minds.\nThis has a bearing on the question of \u201cpurpose\u201d in the universe. The\nconception of purpose seems to suppose a process in time, and therefore\nmay be a totally irrelevant idea when applied to reality.\n\nThe philosophical implications of relativity theory will doubtless\ntake a long time to work out. The four-dimensional universe of\npoint-events is something that can be argued about but it is, to use an\nold-fashioned phrase, \u201cinconceivable\u201d. Mankind, excepting professional\nlogicians, never remains content with the inconceivable. A purely\nlogical conclusion is not enough; it has to be grasped imaginatively,\nby which I do not necessarily mean that it has to be pictured. To\nbecome familiar with a theory does not merely mean that one is able, as\na form of mental wire-walking, to slip nimbly back and forth over the\nlogical connections of the structure. It means taking it into oneself\nin some indefinable manner\u2015\u2015becoming \u201cintimate\u201d with it. Only when a\ntheory is \u201crealized\u201d, as we say, do we feel that we truly understand\nit. Ideas, points of view, that we were able to see only in flashes,\nbecome part of our normal intellectual equipment. The process may\nwell be called a growth of consciousness. There are ideas which our\nconsciousness, when it first approaches them is, as it were, too flabby\nto grasp. We first have to exercise our mental muscles. Every student\nof a line of thought such as mathematics, which is rather outside\nour normal preoccupations, becomes aware of an actual change in his\nmental powers. Notions so abstract that at first they seemed almost\nmeaningless gradually become perfectly clear and permanent additions to\none\u2019s mental resources. Students of musical composition find that their\ncapacity for mentally hearing a number of parts rapidly increases. In\nsome cases it is almost as if a new faculty of the mind were born and\ndeveloped.\n\nThe physics of recent years has made heavy demands upon our capacity\nfor realization. The electron theory, with its analysis of matter into\n\u201cdisembodied charges of electricity\u201d required, for its understanding,\nthe breaking up of old habits of thought. To young students the idea\nwas, at first, extremely baffling\u2015\u2015almost nonsense. To realize it one\nhad to make more abstract one\u2019s idea of matter until the notion of\n\u201csubstance\u201d was replaced by the notion of \u201cbehaviour\u201d. Anything that\nbehaved in the way characteristic of matter was matter. The central\nidea of the restricted principle of relativity, the idea of different\ntime-systems, was still more difficult to grasp. In this case we had to\nbecome convinced that our ordinary idea of simultaneity, an idea which\nseemed perfectly clear, was really a bogus idea. The attacks on the\ntheory of relativity show, for the most part, merely that their authors\nare unable to abandon old habits of thought. With the complete theory\nof relativity, as we have it now, the task of adjustment has become\nenormous. There cannot be, even now, more than very few scientific men\nwho naturally approach a problem from the point of view of relativity\ntheory. In most cases a conscious effort of mental preparation is\nrequired, such as occurs when a novelist, sitting down to continue\nhis work, deliberately thinks himself into the appropriate frame of\nmind. Yet doubtless the next generation or so will think in terms of\nrelativity theory as naturally as we thought in terms of the Newtonian\nsystem. I would not hold it as impossible that the human mind may come\nto realize, imaginatively as well as logically, the four-dimensional\nspace-time continuum. But it seems that the mind of the physicist, at\nany rate, will have to do more than become familiar with relativity\ntheory. It will have to accommodate itself somehow to the quantum\ntheory for, although we can write down the laws which govern sub-atomic\nphenomena and make deductions from them, these laws are, at present,\nunintelligible. An electron behaves as if it had foreknowledge of\nwhat it was about to do and could make the mathematical calculations\nnecessary to achieve its end. We cannot admit this to be possible, and\nwe can only suppose that the difficulty arises from the way we think\nabout things. We must learn to think in a different way, and what the\nconsequences of that new way of thinking will be no one can say. We\nknow very little of the possibilities of the development of the human\nconsciousness.\n\nThe proper attitude to-day in which the problem of man\u2019s place in\nnature should be approached is one of bewilderment and humility. Both\nthe material universe and the mind of man are very mysterious things.\nAt the present time it is only an inadequate mind which is confident\nthat it knows what is impossible. There was never a time when hearty\ndogmatism and loud confidence were more out of place. We must think as\nbest we can, of course. The next step upward in the development of the\nhuman consciousness will not be achieved by either slovenly credulity\nor slovenly scepticism, but only by a terrifying mental travail. I\nsee a human mind as some multiple plant, here in full flower, there\nstill in the bud. Different minds have flowered in different ways.\nBeethoven\u2019s _Heiliger Dankgesang eines Genesenen an die Gottheit_\npoints to the complete development in him of something which those\nof us who understand him have only in embryo. In those who do not\nunderstand him it is non-existent. And the great mystics ought at least\nto make us doubt whether it is we who are not deficient rather than\nthey who are mad. It is rash to dismiss our exceptional moods, our\nstrange flashes of what seems like insight, as mere whimsies without\nsignificance. They may be faint stirrings of the next thing that is\ndestined to become fully alive. All that we can say is that the mind\nlives in a universe largely of its own creation, and that the universe,\ntogether with the mind, will change in ways we cannot foresee.\n\n\n\n\n                                   4\n\n\nWe have seen that the philosophy that regards man as a meaningless\naccident in an alien universe receives no support from modern physics.\nThe true ground of that philosophy is now, as it always has been, the\napparently meaningless misery that forms part of life. It is not by\nmistaking matter for an ultimate reality or by pondering on the fact\nthat laws of nature exist that we can conclude that man is of no cosmic\nsignificance. That conclusion can be reached logically only on the\nbasis of arbitrary assumptions. But the conclusion is not, in fact,\nreached in that way: it is reached through feeling. And it cannot\nbe transcended by a logical process, but only in virtue of a mystic\nexperience.\n\nThe old materialistic outlook, although it no longer has any scientific\njustification, is still active in many branches of science. It has made\npopular certain types of explanation and is the cause of the direction\npursued by certain researches. In particular it has led to a great\ndeal of useless or misleading work being done in the attempt to reduce\nqualitative to quantitative differences.\n\nA good deal of what passes for scientific work amongst eugenists\nand psychologists consists of attempts to match things which are\nqualitatively different. This is the favourite procedure of that kind\nof psycho-analysis which reduces everything to sex. Discrimination\nis fatiguing; also, it makes appeal to sensibilities which many\nearnest \u201cscientific workers\u201d do not possess. It is much easier to make\nmeasurements than to know exactly what you are measuring.\n\nTo give up the ideal of measurability would be equivalent, to many\npeople, to abandoning \u201cscience\u201d altogether. \u201cScience is measurement\u201d,\nwe are informed. This ideal is borrowed from physics, the science\nwhose aim it is to give mathematical descriptions of phenomena. But\nwe may have branches of knowledge that may fairly be called science\nalthough they are not mathematical. We may find it necessary to use\nconcepts that cannot be mathematically defined. It may not be mere\nlack of knowledge which prevents biology, for instance, from being a\nmathematical science. It may be impossible in the nature of things ever\nto give the equation to a chicken. But the bias towards measurability\nis very strong and has led to measurements being made, particularly in\npsychology, where we really have no clear idea at all as to what is\nbeing measured. When, for instance, Professor Karl Pearson compares\nfraternal resemblances in such things as stature and arm-length with\nfraternal resemblances in intelligence and conscientiousness, what\nexactly is he doing? A great deal of what is called experimental\npsychology impresses one as being nothing but the application of\nan inappropriate technique by exceptionally innocent and unworldly\n\u201cscientists\u201d. The methods found so successful in physics are applied\nto everything under the sun. It is pretty obvious that this is not due\nto some mystic, Pythagorean conviction that number is the principle of\nall things, but merely to mental inertia. Many \u201cintelligence tests\u201d\nand many of the statistical results obtained by the eugenists impress\nthe ordinary person as being laughably superficial. In their eagerness\nto \u201cmeasure\u201d something our researcher seem to lose their ordinary\ncommon sense, whereas their subject really requires the subtlety and\nsympathy of a very good novelist. It is amazing the number of dull,\nunimaginative people who find a congenial life work in prosecuting\nresearches in pseudo-science. The ordinary public, unfortunately,\ndoes not discriminate between one kind of science and another, with\nthe result that the contempt they rightly feel for some so-called men\nof science is apt to be extended to all scientific men. Thus Mr G.\nK. Chesterton, having heard that some \u201cscientists\u201d explain the shape\nof a church spire as symbolical of phallic worship, begins to doubt\nthe whole Royal Society. It must be remembered that in science real\ninsight and imagination are as rare as in any other human activity. In\nthe clear-cut sciences, such as physics and chemistry, where the right\nway of attacking problems is known and where an elaborate technique\nhas been built up, there is plenty of room for valuable routine work.\nAll the difficult preliminary work of getting right conceptions and\nprinciples has been done. The routine worker can measure the electric\ncapacities of different condensers because the difficult notion of\nelectric capacity has been made clear by his masters. But the routine\nworker in psychology who measures \u201cintelligence\u201d is not doing anything\ndefinite at all. His subject is not yet ripe for the application of\nsuch exact methods. In this way the prestige of physics has exerted\na harmful influence on the study of psychology. It is true that some\nexperimental psychologists are becoming aware of the fact that they do\nnot always know what they are measuring. There are controversies as to\nwhat a given set of measurements has measured, and some measurements\nseem to be undertaken on the off-chance that a meaning will some day be\nfound for them. It is not suggested that all experimental psychology is\nof this kind, but it is certainly true that many psychological papers,\ncomplete with correlation coefficients and \u201ccurves\u201d of all kinds, wear\nan air of precision to which they have no real claim.\n\nA more definitely materialistic bias is observable in the attempts to\nexplain psychological happenings in terms of physiology. The result\nis that learned and acute men, caught in the jungle of neurology,\npainfully fight their way out with some such epoch-making discovery\nas that one learns a subject more rapidly if one is interested in\nit. This result, which is supposed to be incompatible with the\npurely physiological theory of the mind, owes all its difficulty to\nthat in compatibility. Otherwise it is a perfectly obvious fact of\nexperience. If it were not for the prestige achieved by materialism\nin the Victorian age it is probable that psychology would be very\nmuch further advanced than it is. But the side-tracking influence of\nthat philosophy has meant that psychologists have had painfully to\ndiscover the obvious. But if materialism, in small doses, delays the\nrecognition of the obvious, it does, when fully developed, deny the\nobvious. This is what the behaviourists do. They deny that we think or\nthat we can form images in our minds. The only possible answer to this\ntheory is a satire, as when Voltaire answered the theory that in this\nworld everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds\nby writing _Candide_. But in this queer modern world behaviourism,\ninstead of being greeted with laughter, is answered carefully and\npolitely, apparently in the spirit in which Monsieur Bergeret shook\nhands with the _vers libriste_ poet, \u201cfor fear of wronging beauty in\ndisguise\u201d. The position of the ordinary man in face of these theories\nis, nevertheless, a difficult one. Behaviourism may sound to him\nnonsense, but so does non-Euclidean geometry. His natural reaction\nwould be to class both of them with the theory that the English\nare descended from the lost ten tribes of Israel. Nevertheless,\nnon-Euclidean geometry is not nonsense. In these circumstances it is\nprobably fortunate that there are people patient enough to prepare\ncareful and reasoned refutations of any whimsy that anybody cares to\nput forth. The extraordinary predisposition of the learned towards\nconcocting merely silly theories must always be borne in mind. Studious\npersons often have a very small range of experience of life; they have\nnothing like so broadly based a sense of probability as the ordinary\nman of the world possesses, which is why so many of them seem curiously\ninnocent and gullible. The beaming and genial professor expounding\nhis theory often seems curiously like a child playing with toys. The\nmixture of amusement and respect with which the world watches him is,\non the whole, the correct reaction. As long as he is dealing with\nthe incomprehensible one may grant him authority. Nobody dreams of\nquestioning astronomical pronouncements about forthcoming eclipses. But\nwhen he is talking about the very stuff of our ordinary experience,\nas in psychology, we do wrong to accept the obviously absurd for\nfear that it cannot be as silly as it looks. A great deal of what is\ncalled psycho-analysis, for instance, is merely silly. Only people\nsingularly deficient in common-sense and completely lacking in a sense\nof humour could have invented anything so preposterous. Undoubtedly\nsome pathological states are of sexual origin, but the lengths to\nwhich the theory has been carried and the kind of interpretations\nthat are given make the development of psycho-analysis one of the\ngreatest psychological curiosities of our time. Whole-hearted belief in\npsycho-analysis certainly points to the existence of a complex. As with\nany other complex, it is defended by arguments to which none except\nthose who are similarly afflicted can attach the slightest validity.\nThe complex is strongly materialistic, not in the sense that everything\nis reduced to \u201cmatter and motion\u201d, but in the sense that the lowest\nhuman activities are made explanatory of all the rest. One often finds,\nassociated with a belief in materialism, a desire to deny any form\nof spiritual excellence. The ostensible motive is simplification, as\nwhen material substances are reduced to a small number of chemical\nelements; but it is usually obvious, from the forced explanations that\nare attempted, that the real motive is something very different. Much,\nof course, must be attributed to insensitiveness, as we see when we\nturn to psycho-analytic explanations of works of art. The extraordinary\nforce of the psycho-analysts\u2019 complex is well shown by the sort of\narguments they find convincing. Thus they may profess to show that\nartistic tastes never exist without suppressed sexual desires. Their\nway of establishing this fact, which is chiefly by asserting it, is\ncomparatively rational. But they then proceed to the statement that a\ntaste for art is merely a disguised form of sexual desire. They might\nas well say that it is a disguised form of hunger, since artists are\nquite as notorious for being hungry as for being erotic, and artistic\ntastes are never found to exist in a man who takes no nourishment.\n\nNot only much modern psychology, but some other modern sciences such as\ncomparative religion, are prone to a certain fallacy that may be called\nthe fallacy of \u201cexplanation by origins\u201d. This kind of explanation has\nbeen made popular by the theory of evolution, and the fallacy consists\nin supposing that to give the historical antecedents of a thing is to\ngive an analysis of that thing. Thus, some authorities suppose that by\nshowing that religion has developed from primitive magic rites, they\nhave thereby proved that religion is nothing but a disguised form of\nmagic. One might as well say that an oak-tree is a disguised form of an\nacorn, or that a man is a disguised form of an amoeba. But this error\nis too glaring to be committed by more than a small percentage of our\nmodern \u201cthinkers\u201d. A much more insidious danger is that this type of\nexplanation leads one to under-estimate the complexity of the thing\nto be explained. There is a tendency to neglect those factors in the\nfinal product which cannot be traced in its historical antecedents.\nThis is one form of the widespread error of undue simplification. No\nhuman mind can deal exhaustively with concrete facts. Every natural\nentity, whether it be a flower or a nation, contains far too many\nfactors for thought to grasp it completely. The art of human thinking\nis to make useful abstractions. Any man is a very complicated creature.\nAll the artists and scientists of the world could not describe him\nexhaustively. But for the purposes of war every man under a certain\nmilitary rank was regarded as a physical structure supporting weapons\nand a stomach on two legs. This abstraction was useful for the purposes\nfor which it was invented. A somewhat different abstraction is required\nwhen a man is considered as a voter. When a man is considered as\na \u201chand\u201d or a \u201cworker\u201d it is found that slightly more complicated\nabstractions are required. In fact, the great fault of economic theory\nhas been that its \u201ceconomic man\u201d was too simple an abstraction. The\neconomist left out certain factors in his conception of man, with the\nresult that his plans, when applied to real men, do not work. I am\nsuggesting that the sciences which ape physics suffer, amongst other\nthings, from inadequate abstractions. This is not surprising, for\nthere is every reason to suppose that the extraordinary difficulties\nexperienced by physics itself, at the present day, are due to the same\ncause. An analysis of this position will show us the direction of the\nprobable future development of science and help us to see in what\nconsists the importance of the arts.\n\n\n\n\n                                   5\n\n\nMany people, including some scientific men, take science too seriously.\nThey think that science gives a far more comprehensive picture of\nreality than it really does. There have been philosophers who have\ngone so far as to suppose that those factors of experience that\nscience does not find it necessary to talk about do not really exist.\nThis is the basis of the belief that colours, sounds, and scents have\nno \u201cobjective\u201d existence; they exist only in the mind, whereas such\nqualities as mass and extension are supposed to exist independently of\nthe mind. It is true that science does not find it necessary to refer\nto colours, sounds, and scents in giving its description of nature,\nwhereas it does find it necessary to refer to mass and extension. But\nthat does not prove that the former qualities are not as real as the\nlatter, are not as indubitably part of the universe. The scientific\nconcepts have by no means proved themselves adequate to account for\nthe whole of experience. Nearly everything of real importance to\nman lies at present outside science. The fact is that science was\nundertaken as an intellectual adventure: it was an attempt to find\nout how far nature could be described in mathematical terms. Certain\nprimary conceptions\u2015\u2015time, space, mass, force, and so on\u2015\u2015all of which\ncan be defined mathematically, were adopted, and it became a highly\nabsorbing game to find out how much of what goes on around us could be\ndescribed, mathematically, in terms of these conceptions. The success\nof this effort has been so astonishing that some scientific men have\nforgotten to be astonished. They have come to take it for granted that\na complete mathematical description of the world should be possible.\nThis assumption is not a rational one: it is a pure act of faith. The\ngreat founders of the scheme made no such mistake: they were quite\naware of the precarious nature of their enterprise. Thus, Newton, the\ngreatest and most successful of them all, says that, if they find the\nmathematical method does not work, they must try a different method.\nThe mathematical method, which is the very essence of modern science,\nhas, however, worked splendidly. From the time of its origination in\nthe seventeenth century until the present day it has had no serious\nrival. The ancient \u00e6sthetic principle, which led to the conclusion that\nthe planets moved in circles because the circle is the only perfect\nfigure, is still used by theosophists, but not by men of science.\nSimilarly the old moralistic principle, which explained the fact\nof water rising in a pump by saying that nature abhorred a vacuum,\npossibly lingers on only in such superstitions as that sunlight puts\nthe fire out. In more modern times the only notorious rival of the\nNewtonian method was the dialectic method of Hegel, who evolved the\nlaws of the universe from his inner consciousness. But the best-known\nresult of this method, that there could not be more planets than were\nknown to exist, happened to be published on the very day that a new\nplanet was discovered. The mathematical method, then, is at the present\nday without a rival. But, although we cannot at present imagine what\ncould replace the mathematical method, we must be careful not to\nexaggerate the significance of the results that have been achieved by\nit. For these results depend not only on the method, but also on the\nmaterial the method has to work with. And there is good reason to\nsuppose, in the present state of physics, that the material with which\nscience has worked hitherto is turning out to be not quite satisfactory.\n\nThis material is chiefly the Newtonian set of abstractions. Newton\npostulated, as the fundamental constituents out of which the perceived\nuniverse is built up, Space, Time, and Matter. Space and time he\nregarded as absolute and as quite independent of matter. Matter was an\nenduring substance that simply inhabited space and time. The analysis\nof these conceptions has resulted in the Einstein theory, in which\nneither space, time, nor matter are fundamental. The interesting\nthing about this analysis, from our present point of view, is that it\nshows clearly what arbitrary elements are present in the scientific\ndescription of the universe. For we must remember that moral and\n\u00e6sthetic elements were ruled out of the real universe simply because\nscience did not find it necessary to mention them. The foundation\nstones of the scientific edifice, namely space, time, and matter,\nwere supposed to be the only realities. Everything else was a sort\nof illusion. Men who must have been theory-mad soberly maintained\nthat little particles of matter wandering about purposelessly in\nspace and time produced our minds, our hopes, and fears, the scent of\nthe rose, the colours of the sunset, the songs of the birds, and our\nknowledge of the little particles themselves. The sole realities were\nthe little wandering particles and the space and time they wandered\nin. The existence of everything else depended on the mind, and was\ninconceivable without the mind. It is interesting, therefore, that\nscience has now reached a position where space, time, and matter also\ndepend on the mind. In giving a scientific description of the universe\nEinstein does not find it necessary to begin with space, time, and\nmatter. These entities become \u201cderivative\u201d. The universe becomes more\nspectral than ever if we are going to adopt the materialist principle\nthat what depends on the mind does not really exist. Even the universe\nof wandering particles is comparatively cosy compared with this modern\nuniverse of undefinable \u201cpoint-events\u201d. But if we do not adopt the\nmaterialist principle we may assert that moral and \u00e6sthetic values\nare as much a part of the real universe as anything else, and that\nthe reason why science does not find it necessary to mention them is\nnot because they are not there but because science is a game played\naccording to certain rules, and those rules have excluded these values\nfrom the outset. The life-insurance actuary may, for his purposes,\nneglect many things about men, and yet calculate, quite correctly,\nwhat percentage of them will die at forty. But he has not proved that\nthe qualities he has neglected do not exist simply because they do not\ncome in to upset his calculations. A politician finds that he has to\nbase his calculations on quite different aspects of mankind from those\nfound satisfactory by the actuary. In the same way, a mountain is a\ndifferent thing to a poet from what it is to a man of science. For the\nkind of understanding of the universe that the man of science is after,\nthe mountain is merely a heap of certain kinds of matter weighing so\nmany millions of tons. The poet, who is after a different kind of\nvision, finds it necessary to take into account quite other factors\nwhich enter into his total experience of the mountain. The scientist\nmay also experience emotions of awe and reverence in the presence of\nthe mountain, but for the purposes of his science these factors of his\nexperience may be neglected. He _abstracts_ from the total concrete\nfact of his experience of the mountain. The mountain, as he describes\nit in the scientific paper he proceeds to write, is a mere pale\nshadow of the real mountain; he probably leaves it indistinguishable\nfrom any other mountain that happens to weigh the same, just as to\nthe life-insurance actuary all men of forty are exactly alike. If we\nbelieve that the factors in experience that the scientific man neglects\nare quite as real as those he takes into account, it becomes a matter\nfor wonder that science is possible. How is it that science forms a\nclosed system\u2015\u2015that nothing from the worlds it neglects ever comes in\nto disturb it?\n\nIt is one of the great services of relativity theory to philosophy that\nit provides an answer to this question. The answer is that the entities\ndiscussed by physics are defined in terms of one another. The three\nhundred years of building up exact science really amounts, in the last\nanalysis, to doing what the dictionary compiler did when he defined a\nviolin as a small violoncello and a violoncello as a large violin. Of\ncourse, if this statement were literally true, science would give us\nno information about the universe at all. Nevertheless, the statement\nis true about the actual procedure of science, and it is in virtue of\nthis procedure that science forms a closed system. But what is left out\nof this description is the scientist himself. The mysterious process\nwhich is not taken into account in this description of the scientific\nmethod is the process by which the consciousness of the scientist makes\ncontact with the entities he is talking about. In deducting the world\nfrom \u201cpoint-events\u201d, for instance, we begin by talking about something\nwe have no direct cognisance of, namely point-events. From point-events\nwe deduce \u201cpotentials\u201d\u2015\u2015again a mere word. But from potentials we\ndeduce \u201cmatter\u201d, and here we are talking of something of which we\nhave direct knowledge. Similarly, the circular definition of violin\nand violoncello tells us nothing as it stands. But to a man who can\nidentify one of these entities, to a man who has ever seen a violin, it\ngives genuine information.\n\nWe need not be surprised, therefore, that nothing from the outside\never seems to disturb the equanimity that reigns within the closed\nsystem of physics. The abstractions with which it begins are all it\never has to deal with. There are no subsequent fresh contacts with\nreality. If the region covered by relativity theory embraced the whole\nof physics it would seem that, so far as physical science is concerned,\nwe knew all that there is to be known. But it is notorious that, of\nrecent years, an entirely new set of phenomena has been discovered in\nphysical science. These phenomena arise when we consider, not matter\nin bulk but matter in its smallest particles. These phenomena are,\nat present, strictly incomprehensible. The celebrated quantum theory\nprovides us with rules for dealing with some of them, but does not\nmake them intelligible. It seems that science has here reached its\nlimits. Professor Eddington has even hinted that these phenomena may\nindicate that the universe is finally irrational, that is, that the\nattempt to describe nature mathematically will have to be given up.\nThis is a possibility that Newton foresaw. But it seems more likely\nthat our present state of bewilderment has a different cause. That\ncause, we shall probably find, is the insufficiency of the abstractions\nhitherto used in science. We have to go back to the concrete facts of\nexperience and build up a richer, fuller set of abstractions. Physics\nis now paying the penalty of inadequate abstraction. In particular, it\nmust revise its notions of space, time, and substance. This revision\nis quite independent of the Einstein theory, and is made necessary,\nnot by that theory but by the quantum theory. A first attempt at\nthis revision has been made by that great mathematical philosopher,\nProfessor Whitehead.[5] We need not deal with his investigation, which\nis at present in a highly technical state. The space and time of the\nnew theory are interconnected and do not consist of independent volumes\nand instants. Every volume of space has reference to the whole of\nspace, and every moment of time refers both to the past and the future.\nHence both memory and expectation are given a rational basis. On the\nold view, as Hume pointed out, there is no reason whatever to suppose\nthat the order of nature should continue. Why do we expect that the\nforce of gravity will be in existence to-morrow? There was no _reason_\nat all for this expectation or for any other. That is to say, the whole\nof science itself was based on blind faith. The new foundations of\nscience make science itself a rational activity. As for the notion of\n\u201csubstance\u201d, Professor Whitehead proposes to replace it by the notion\nof \u201corganism\u201d. We may imagine an electron, for instance, as a repeated\npattern of events. One of the great difficulties of the quantum\nphenomena is that an electron seems to pass from one place to another\nwithout passing through the intervening space. On the basis of the new\nabstractions this difficulty can be overcome. We have to imagine an\nelectron as requiring a certain time to manifest itself\u2015\u2015just as a tune\ndoes.\n\n  [5] _Science and the Modern World._\n\nFrom our present point of view, however, the chief interest attaching\nto these new foundations for science is the place occupied in them\nby the intuitions of the poets. Mr Richards, literary critic, tells\nus that the poets must learn from science; Professor Whitehead,\nmathematician and physicist, tells us that science must learn from the\npoets. Instead of the poet having to realize that his intuitions are\nillusory and belong to a childish, _d\u00e9mod\u00e9_ view of the world, it is\nthe scientific man who must realize that his abstractions are too thin\nand narrow to be any longer useful, and that the poet makes closer\ncontact with reality. When Wordsworth says:\n\n    \u201cYe Presences of Nature in the sky\n     And on the earth! Ye Visions of the hills!\n     And Souls of lonely places! can I think\n     A vulgar hope was yours when ye employed\n     Such ministry, when ye through many a year\n     Haunting me thus among my boyish sports,\n     On caves and trees, upon the woods and hills,\n     Impressed upon all forms the characters\n     Of danger or desire; and thus did make\n     The surface of the universal earth\n     With triumph and delight, with hope and fear\n     Work like a sea?...\u201d\n\nhe is not, according to Professor Whitehead, expressing fantasies that\nthe strong-minded realist can afford to neglect: he is describing\nthe actual concrete facts of experience, facts which, says Professor\nWhitehead, \u201care distorted in the scientific analysis\u201d. It is the artist\nnot the scientist who deals most adequately with reality. It is the man\nof science, taking his pale abstractions for the only realities, who\ndwells in dream-land.\n\nSo far as we can see at present, however, science cannot abandon its\nmethod. It cannot deal with the whole concrete fact: it must continue\nto make abstractions. But the present _impasse_ in scientific theory\nis an indication that it must go back to the beginning and include more\nfactors of the concrete fact in its abstractions. It seems likely that,\nin doing so, it will have to presuppose a philosophy very different\nfrom the materialism hitherto current amongst scientific men. The world\nwill have to be regarded as an evolutionary process, where \u201cpatterns\nof value\u201d emerge. It will have to be regarded as an interconnected\nwhole, and the separation of mind from matter, and mind from mind, will\nhave to be replaced by a conception which regards these distinctions,\nin their present form, as unreal. One very desirable result of this\ntransformation will be that the arts will be taken seriously. The\nold outlook did not regard values as inherent in reality. They were\nmerely expressive of the accidental human constitution, but had no\ncosmic significance. Art existed to provide a unique thrill, called\nthe \u201c\u00e6sthetic emotion\u201d. On the new outlook the function of the arts\nis to communicate knowledge and, moreover, the most valuable kind of\nknowledge. Art, much more than science, expresses the concrete facts\nof experience in their actuality. Music, in particular, finds its\nhighest function in revealing to us the possibilities of the spirit\nof man himself. The music of such a man as Beethoven is a revelation\nof existence from the vantage point of a higher consciousness. It is,\nwe may hope, prophetic of the future development of the race. Not\nonly art, but morals, acquire vastly greater importance on the new\noutlook. Morals are no longer a purely private concern, expressive of a\nparticular human constitution in an alien, strictly non-moral universe.\nMen are no longer justified in believing that their only duty is to\npreserve their self-respect and to make the most of their opportunities.\n\nScience, in view of our increased knowledge of its aims and powers,\ncan no longer be presented to us as a tyrant. Science assumes certain\nfundamental principles and entities, and there is an arbitrary element\nin these assumptions. What science does not assume does not thereby not\nexist. It gives, and it appears that it must forever give, a _partial_\ndescription of the universe. The fact that the elements of reality it\nleaves out do not come in to disturb it is no presumption against the\nexistence of these elements. For science forms a closed system simply\nbecause it employs the device of cyclic definition. The teachings of\nscience, so far as the spiritual problems of men are concerned, need no\nlonger be regarded as stultifying: they are merely irrelevant.\n\n\n                   *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Notes:\n\n \u2015\u2015Text in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_).\n\n \u2015\u2015Punctuation and spelling inaccuracies were silently corrected.\n\n \u2015\u2015Archaic and variable spelling has been preserved.","title":"Gallio : $b or, The tyranny of science","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":9549}