{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_76650/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_76650","id":"gutenberg_76650","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/76650","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Philosophy, English -- 17th century"],"text":"------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note:\n\nThis version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.\nThe many instances of italic text are delimited with the \u2018_\u2019 character\nas _italic_. Title page use of blackletter text uses the \u2018=\u2019 as a\ndelimiter.\n\nMarginal sidenotes, which served as section and topic aids, were often\nrepeated on each page. The repetitive notes have been removed.\n\nMinor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please\nsee the transcriber\u2019s note at the end of this text for details regarding\nthe handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation.\n\n THE\n ENGLISH WORKS\n OF\n THOMAS HOBBES.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n THE\n\n ENGLISH WORKS\n\n OF\n\n THOMAS HOBBES\n\n OF MALMESBURY;\n\n NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED\n\n BY\n\n SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART.\n\n ---\n\n VOL. V.\n\n ---\n\n\n\n\n LONDON:\n JOHN BOHN,\n HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.\n\n ---\n\n MDCCCXLI.\n\n\n LONDON:\n C. RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN\u2019S LANE.\n\n THE\n\n QUESTIONS CONCERNING\n\n LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE,\n\n CLEARLY STATED AND DEBATED\n\n BETWEEN\n\n DR. BRAMHALL,\n BISHOP OF DERRY,\n\n AND\n\n THOMAS HOBBES\n OF MALMESBURY.\n\n\n\n\n TO THE READER.\n\n\n -------\n\n\nYou shall find in this little volume the questions concerning\n_necessity_, _freedom_, and _chance_, which in all ages have perplexed\nthe minds of curious men, largely and clearly discussed, and the\narguments on all sides, drawn from the authority of Scripture, from the\ndoctrine of the Schools, from natural reason, and from the consequences\npertaining to common life, truly alleged and severally weighed between\ntwo persons, who both maintain that men are free to _do_ as they _will_\nand to _forbear_ as they _will_. The things they dissent in are, that\nthe one holdeth, that it is not in a man\u2019s power now to choose the will\nhe shall have anon; that chance produceth nothing; that all events and\nactions have their necessary causes; that the will of God makes the\nnecessity of all things. The other on the contrary maintaineth, that not\nonly the _man_ is free to choose what he will _do_, but the _will_ also\nto choose what it shall _will_; that when a man willeth a good action,\nGod\u2019s will concurreth with his, else not; that the will may choose\nwhether it will _will_, or not; that many things come to pass without\nnecessity, by chance; that though God foreknow a thing shall be, yet it\nis not necessary that that thing shall be, inasmuch as God seeth not the\nfuture as in its causes, but as present. In sum, they adhere both of\nthem to the Scripture; but one of them is a learned School-divine, the\nother a man that doth not much admire that kind of learning.\n\nThis is enough to acquaint you withal in the beginning; which also shall\nbe more particularly explained by and by in the stating of the question,\nand dividing of the arguments into their several heads. The rest you\nshall understand from the persons themselves, when they enter. Fare ye\nwell.\n\n T. H.\n\n\n\n\n -------\n\n\n\n\n THE QUESTIONS\n\n CONCERNING\n\n LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE.\n\n\nWhether whatsoever comes to pass proceed from _necessity_, or some\nthings from _chance_, has been a question disputed amongst the old\nphilosophers long time before the incarnation of our Saviour, without\ndrawing into argument on either side the almighty power of the Deity.\nBut the third way of bringing things to pass, distinct from _necessity_\nand _chance_, namely, _freewill_, is a thing that never was mentioned\namongst them, nor by the Christians in the beginning of Christianity.\nFor St. Paul, that disputes that question largely and purposely, never\nuseth the term of _freewill_; nor did he hold any doctrine equivalent to\nthat which is now called the doctrine of freewill; but deriveth all\nactions from the irresistible will of God, and nothing from the will of\nhim that _runneth or willeth_. But for some ages past, the doctors of\nthe Roman Church have exempted from this dominion of God\u2019s will the will\nof man; and brought in a doctrine, that not only man, but also his will\nis free, and determined to this or that action, not by the will of God,\nnor necessary causes, but by the power of the will itself. And though by\nthe reformed Churches instructed by Luther, Calvin, and others, this\nopinion was cast out, yet not many years since it began again to be\nreduced by Arminius and his followers, and became the readiest way to\necclesiastical promotion; and by discontenting those that held the\ncontrary, was in some part the cause of the following troubles; which\ntroubles were the occasion of my meeting with the Bishop of Derry at\nParis, where we discoursed together of the argument now in hand; from\nwhich discourse we carried away each of us his own opinion, and for\naught I remember, without any offensive words, as blasphemous,\natheistical, or the like, passing between us; either for that the Bishop\nwas not then in passion, or suppressed his passion, being then in the\npresence of my Lord of Newcastle.\n\nBut afterwards the Bishop sent to his Lordship his opinion concerning\nthe question in writing, and desired him to persuade me to send an\nanswer thereunto likewise in writing. There were some reasons for which\nI thought it might be inconvenient to let my answer go abroad; yet the\nmany obligations wherein I was obliged to him, prevailed with me to\nwrite this answer, which was afterwards not only without my knowledge,\nbut also against my will, published by one that found means to get a\ncopy of it surreptitiously. And thus you have the occasion of this\ncontroversy.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n THE STATE OF THE QUESTION.\n\nThe question in general is stated by the Bishop himself, (towards the\nend of No. III.), in these words: \u201cWhether all events, natural, civil,\nmoral, (for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that\nconcerns not this question), be predetermined extrinsically and\ninevitably, without their own concurrence; so as all the actions and\nevents which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise\nafter any other manner or in any other place, time, number, measure,\norder, nor to any other end than they are. And all this in respect of\nthe supreme cause, or a concourse of extrinsical causes, determining\nthem to one.\u201d\n\nWhich though drawn up to his advantage, with as much caution as he would\ndo a lease, yet (excepting that which is not intelligible) I am content\nto admit. Not intelligible is, first, \u201cthat the conversion of a sinner\nconcerns not the question.\u201d If he mean, that the conversion of a sinner\nis from necessity, and predetermined, then he is, for so much as the\nquestion concerns religion, of the same mind that I am; and what he can\nmean else by that exception, I cannot guess. Secondly, these words,\n\u201cwithout their own concurrence,\u201d are insignificant, unless he mean that\nthe events themselves should concur to their production: as that fire\ndoth not necessarily burn without the concurrence of burning, as the\nwords properly import: or at least without concurrence of the fuel.\nThose two clauses left out, I agree with him in the state of the\nquestion as it is put universally. But when the question is put of the\nnecessity of any particular event, as of the will to write, or the like,\nthen it is the stating of that particular question: but it is decided in\nthe decision of the question universal.\n\nHe states the same question again in another place thus: \u201cThis is the\nvery question where the water sticks between us, whether there be such a\nliberty free from necessitation and extrinsical determination to one, or\nnot.\u201d And I allow it also for well stated so.\n\nAgain he says, \u201cIn a word, so great difference there is between natural\nand moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and mine in this\nquestion.\u201d So that the state of the question is reduced to this,\n\u201cWhether there be a moral efficacy which is not natural?\u201d I say there is\nnot: he says there is.\n\nAgain he writes thus: \u201cAnd therefore as it were ridiculous to say, that\nthe object of sight is the cause of seeing; so it is to say, that the\nproposing of the object by the understanding to the will, is the cause\nof willing.\u201d Here also the question is brought to this issue, \u201cWhether\nthe object of sight be the cause that it is seen?\u201d But for these words,\n\u201cproposing of the object by the understanding to the will,\u201d I understand\nthem not.\n\nAgain, he often useth such words as these: \u201cThe will willeth; the will\nsuspendeth its act, (_Rid est_, the will willeth not); the understanding\nproposeth; the understanding understandeth.\u201d Herein also lyeth the whole\nquestion. If they be true, I, if false, he is in error.\n\nAgain, the whole question is decided, when this is decided, \u201cWhether he\nthat willingly permitteth a thing to be done, when without labour,\ndanger, or diversion of mind, he might have hindered it, do not will the\ndoing of it?\u201d\n\nAgain the whole question of free-will is included in this, \u201cWhether the\nwill determine itself?\u201d\n\nAgain, it is included in this, \u201cWhether there be an universal grace,\nwhich particular men can take without a particular grace to take it?\u201d\n\nLastly, there be two questions; one, \u201cWhether a man be free in such\nthings as are within his power, to do what he will;\u201d another, \u201cWhether\nhe be free to will.\u201d Which is as much as to say (because will is\nappetite), it is one question, whether he be free to eat that has an\nappetite, and another, whether he be free to have an appetite? In the\nformer, \u201cwhether a man be free to do what he will,\u201d I agree with the\nBishop. In the latter, \u201cwhether he be free to will,\u201d I dissent from him.\nAnd, therefore, all the places of Scripture that he allegeth to prove\nthat a man hath liberty to do what he will, are impertinent to the\nquestion. If he has not been able to distinguish between these two\nquestions, he has not done well to meddle with either: if he has\nunderstood them, to bring arguments to prove that a man is free to do if\nhe will, is to deal uningenuously and fraudulently with his readers. And\nthus much for the state of the question.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n THE FOUNTAINS OF ARGUMENT IN THIS QUESTION.\n\nThe arguments by which this question is disputed, are drawn from four\nfountains. 1. From _authorities_. 2. From _the inconveniences consequent\nto either opinion_. 3. From _the attributes of God_. 4. From _natural\nreason_.\n\nThe _authorities_ are of two sorts, _divine_ and _human_. _Divine_ are\nthose which are taken from the holy Scriptures. _Human_ also are of two\nsorts; one, the authorities of those men that are generally esteemed to\nhave been learned, especially in this question, as the Fathers,\nSchoolmen, and old Philosophers: the other, are the vulgar and most\ncommonly received opinions in the world.\n\nHis reasons and places of Scripture I will answer the best I am able;\nbut his human authorities I shall admit and receive as far as to\nScripture and reason they be consonant, and no further.\n\nAnd for the arguments derived from the attributes of God, so far forth\nas those attributes are argumentative, that is, so far forth as their\nsignifications be conceivable, I admit them for arguments; but where\nthey are given for honour only, and signify nothing but an intention and\nendeavour to praise and magnify as much as we can Almighty God, there I\nhold them not for arguments, but for oblations; not for the language,\nbut (as the Scripture calls them) for the calves of our lips; which\nsignify not true nor false, nor any opinion of our brain, but the\nreverence and devotion of our hearts; and therefore they are no\nsufficient premises to infer truth or convince falsehood.\n\nThe places of Scripture that make for me are these. First, (Gen. xlv.\n5): Joseph saith to his brethren that had sold him, _Be not grieved nor\nangry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither: for God did send me\nbefore you to preserve life._ And again (verse 8), _So now it was not\nyou that sent me hither, but God._\n\nAnd concerning Pharaoh, God saith, (Exod. vii. 3): _I will harden\nPharaoh\u2019s heart._ And concerning Sihon King of Heshbon, Moses saith,\n(Deut. ii. 30): _The Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his\nheart obstinate._\n\nAnd of Shimei that did curse David, David himself saith, (2 Sam. xvi.\n10): _Let him curse, because the Lord hath said unto him, curse David._\nAnd (1 Kings, xii. 15): _The King hearkened not to the people, for the\ncurse was from the Lord._\n\nAnd Job, disputing this very question, saith, (Job xii. 14): _God\nshutteth man, and there can be no opening_: and verse 16: _The deceived\nand the deceiver are his_: and verse 17: _He maketh the Judges fools_:\nand verse 24: _He taketh away the heart of the chief of the people of\nthe earth, and causeth them to wander in a wilderness where there is no\nway_: and verse 25: _He maketh them to stagger like a drunken man._\n\nAnd of the King of Assyria, God saith, _I will give him a charge to take\nthe spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of\nthe streets._ (Isaiah x. 6.)\n\nAnd Jeremiah saith, (Jer. x. 23): _O Lord, I know that the way of man is\nnot in himself, it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps._\n\nAnd to Ezekiel, whom God sent as a watchman to the house of Israel, God\nsaith thus: _When a righteous man doth turn from his righteousness, and\ncommit iniquity, and I lay a stumbling block before him, he shall die;\nbecause thou hast not given him warning, he shall die in his sin._\n(Ezek. iii. 20.) Note here, God lays the stumbling block, yet he that\nfalleth dieth in his sin: which shows that God\u2019s justice in killing\ndependeth not on the sin only.\n\nAnd our Saviour saith, (John vi. 44): _No man can come to me, except the\nFather which hath sent me draw him._\n\nAnd St. Peter, concerning the delivering of Christ to the Jews, saith\nthus, (Acts ii. 23): _Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and\nforeknowledge of God, ye have taken_, &c.\n\nAnd again, those Christians to whom Peter and John resorted after they\nwere freed from their troubles about the miracle of curing the lame man,\npraising God for the same, say thus: _Of a truth against the holy child\nJesus whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the\nGentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together for to do\nwhatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done._ (Acts\niv. 27, 28.)\n\nAnd St. Paul, Rom. ix. 16: _It is not of him that willeth, nor of him\nthat runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy_: and verse 18, 19, 20:\n_Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he\nhardeneth. Thou wilt say unto me, why doth he yet find fault; for who\nhath resisted his will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that disputest\nagainst God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast\nthou made me thus?_\n\nAnd again, (1 Cor. iv 7): _Who maketh thee differ from another? and what\nhast thou that thou hast not received?_ and 1 Cor. xii. 6: _There are\ndiversities of operations, but it is the same God that worketh all in\nall_: and Eph. ii. 10: _We are his workmanship created in Jesus Christ\nunto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in\nthem_: and Philip. ii. 13: _It is God that worketh in you both to will\nand to do, of his good pleasure._\n\nTo these places may be added all the places that make God the giver of\nall graces, that is to say, of all good habits and inclinations; and all\nthe places wherein men are said to be dead in sin. For by all these it\nis manifest, that although a man may live holily if he _will_, yet _to\nwill_ is the work of God, and not eligible by man.\n\nA second sort of places there be, that make equally for the Bishop and\nme; and they be such as say that a man hath election, and may do many\nthings _if he will_, and also _if he will_ he may leave them undone; but\nnot that God Almighty naturally or supernaturally worketh in us every\nact of the will, as in my opinion; nor that he worketh it not, as in the\nBishop\u2019s opinion; though he use those places as arguments on his side.\n\nThe places are such as these, (Deut. xxx. 19): _I call heaven and earth\nto record this day against you, that I have set before you life and\ndeath, blessing and cursing. Therefore choose life, that both thou and\nthy seed may live_: and (Ecclesiasticus xv. 14): _God in the beginning\nmade man, and left him in the hand of his counsel_: and verse 16, 17:\n_He hath set fire and water before thee, stretch forth thy hand to\nwhither thou wilt. Before man is life and death, and whether him liketh\nshall be given him._\n\nAnd those places which the Bishop citeth: _If a wife make a vow, it is\nleft to her husband\u2019s choice, either to establish it, or to make it\nvoid_, (Numb. xxx. 13): and (Josh. xxiv. 15): _Chuse ye this day whom\nyou will serve_, &c. _But I and my house will serve the Lord_: and (2\nSam. xxiv. 12): _I offer thee three things, choose which of them I shall\ndo_: and (Isaiah vii. 16): _before the child shall know to refuse the\nevil and choose the good_. And besides these very many other places to\nthe same effect.\n\nThe third sort of texts are those which seem to make against me. As\nIsaiah v. 4: _What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have\nnot done in it?_\n\nAnd Jeremiah xix. 5: _They have also built the high places of Baal, to\nburn their sons with fire for burnt offerings unto Baal; which I\ncommanded not, nor spake it, neither came it into my mind._\n\nAnd Hosea xiii. 9: _O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself, but in me\nis thy help._\n\nAnd 1 Tim. ii. 4: _Who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the\nknowledge of truth._\n\nAnd Eccl. xv. 11, 12: _Say not thou, it is through the Lord I fell away;\nfor thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou, he\nhath caused me to err; for he hath no need of thee, sinful man._ And\nmany other places to the like purpose.\n\nYou see how great the apparent contradiction is between the first and\nthe third sort of texts, which being both Scripture, may and must be\nreconciled and made to stand together; which unless the rigour of the\nletter be on one or both sides with intelligible and reasonable\ninterpretations mollified, is impossible.\n\nThe Schoolmen, to keep the literal sense of the third sort of texts,\ninterpret the first sort thus; the words of Joseph, _It was not you that\nsent me hither, but God_; they interpret in this manner: _It was you\nthat sold me into Egypt, God did but permit it; it was God that sent me\nand not you_; as if the _selling_ were not the _sending_. This is\nSuarez; of whom and the Bishop I would know, whether the _selling_ of\nJoseph did infallibly and inevitably follow that permission. If it did,\nthen that _selling_ was necessitated beforehand by an eternal\npermission. If it did not, how can there be attributed to God a\nforeknowledge of it, when by the _liberty of human will_ it might have\nbeen frustrated? I would know also whether the _selling_ of Joseph into\nEgypt were a sin? If it were, why doth Joseph say, _Be not grieved nor\nangry with yourselves that ye sold me hither_? Ought not a man to be\ngrieved and angry with himself for sinning? If it were no sin, then\ntreachery and fratricide is no sin.\n\nAgain, seeing the _selling_ of him consisted in these acts, _binding_,\n_speaking_, _delivering_, which are all corporeal motions, did God\n_will_ they should not be, how then could they be done? Or doth he\npermit barely, and neither _will_ nor _nill_ corporeal and local\nmotions? How then is God the first mover and cause of all local motion?\nDid he cause the motion, and _will_ the law against it, but not the\nirregularity? How can that be, seeing the motion and law being existent,\nthe contrariety of the motion and law is necessarily coexistent?\n\nSo these places, _He hardened Pharaoh\u2019s heart_, _he made Sihon\u2019s heart\nobstinate_, they interpret thus: \u201cHe permitted them to make their own\nhearts obstinate.\u201d But seeing that man\u2019s heart without the grace of God,\nis uninclinable to good, the _necessity_ of the hardness of heart, both\nin Pharaoh and in Sihon, is as easily derived from God\u2019s _permission_,\nthat is, from his withholding his grace, as from his _positive decree_.\nAnd whereas they say, He _wills_ godly and free actions conditionally\nand consequently, that is, if the man _will_ them, then God _wills_\nthem, else not; and _wills_ not evil actions, but _permits_ them; they\nascribe to God nothing at all in the causation of any action either good\nor bad.\n\nNow to the third sort of places, that seem to contradict the former, let\nus see if they may not be reconciled with a more intelligible and\nreasonable interpretation, than that wherewith the Schoolmen interpret\nthe first.\n\nIt is no extraordinary kind of language, to call the commandments and\nexhortations and other significations of the _will_, by the name of\n_will_; though the _will_ be an internal act of the soul, and commands\nare but words and signs external of that internal act. So that the\n_will_ and the _word_ are diverse things; and differ as the _thing\nsignified_, and the _sign_. And hence it comes to pass, that the Word\nand Commandment of God, namely, the holy Scripture, is usually called by\nChristians God\u2019s will, but his revealed will; acknowledging the very\nwill of God, which they call his counsel and decree, to be another\nthing. For the revealed will of God to Abraham was, that Isaac should be\nsacrificed; but it was his will he should not. And his revealed will to\nJonas, that Nineveh should be destroyed within forty days; but not his\ndecree and purpose. His decree and purpose cannot be known beforehand,\nbut may afterwards by the event; for from the event we may infer his\nwill. But his revealed will, which is his word, must be foreknown,\nbecause it ought to be the rule of our actions.\n\nTherefore, where it is said that _God will have all men to be saved_, it\nis not meant of his will internal, but of his commandments or will\nrevealed; as if it had been said, \u201cGod hath given commandments, by\nfollowing of which all men may be saved.\u201d So where God says, _O Israel,\nhow often would I have gathered thee_, &c., _as a hen doth her chickens,\nbut thou wouldest not_, it is thus to be understood: \u201cHow oft have I by\nmy prophets given thee such counsel, as, being followed, thou hadst been\ngathered,\u201d &c. And the like interpretations are to be given to the like\nplaces. For it is not Christian to think, if God had the purpose to save\nall men, that any man could be damned; because it were a sign of want of\npower to effect what he would. So these words, _What could have been\ndone more to my vineyard, that I have not done_: if by them be meant the\nAlmighty power, might receive this answer: \u201cMen might have been kept by\nit from sinning.\u201d But when we are to measure God by his revealed will,\nit is as if he had said, \u201cWhat directions, what laws, what threatenings\ncould have been used more, that I have not used?\u201d God doth not will and\ncommand us to inquire what his will and purpose is, and accordingly to\ndo it; for we shall do that, whether we will or not; but to look into\nhis commandments, that is, as to the Jews, the law of Moses; and as to\nother people, the laws of their country.\n\n_O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself, but in me is thy help_: or\nas some English translations have it, _O Israel, thou hast destroyed\nthyself_, &c., is literally true, but maketh nothing against me; for the\nman that sins willingly, whatsoever be the cause of his will, if he be\nnot forgiven, hath destroyed himself, as being his own act.\n\nWhere it is said, _They have offered their sons unto Baal, which I\ncommanded not, nor spake it, nor came it into my mind_; these words,\n_nor came it into my mind_, are by some much insisted on, as if they had\ndone it without the will of God. For whatsoever is done comes into God\u2019s\nmind, that is, into his knowledge, which implies a certainty of the\nfuture action, and that certainty an antecedent purpose of God to bring\nit to pass. It cannot therefore be meant God did not will it, but that\nhe had not the will to command it. But by the way it is to be noted,\nthat when God speaks to men concerning his will and other attributes, he\nspeaks of them as if they were like to those of men, to the end he may\nbe understood. And therefore to the order of his work, the world,\nwherein one thing follows another so aptly as no man could order it by\ndesign, he gives the name of will and purpose. For that which we call\ndesign, which is reasoning, and thought after thought, cannot be\nproperly attributed to God; in whose thoughts there is no _fore_ nor\n_after_.\n\nBut what shall we answer to the words in Ecclesiasticus: _Say not thou,\nit is through the Lord I fell away; say not thou, he hath caused me to\nerr_. If it had not been, _say not thou_, but \u201cthink not thou,\u201d I should\nhave answered that Ecclesiasticus is Apocrypha, and merely human\nauthority. But it is very true that such words as these are not to be\nsaid; first, because St. Paul forbids it: _Shall the thing formed_,\nsaith he, _say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me so?_ Yet\ntrue it is, that he did so make him. Secondly, because we ought to\nattribute nothing to God but what we conceive to be honourable, and we\njudge nothing honourable but what we count so amongst ourselves; and\nbecause accusation of man is not honourable, therefore such words are\nnot to be used concerning God Almighty. And for the same cause it is not\nlawful to say that any action can be done, which God hath purposed shall\nnot be done; for it is a token of want of the power to hinder it.\nTherefore neither of them is to be said, though one of them must needs\nbe true. Thus you see how disputing of God\u2019s nature which is\nincomprehensible, driveth men upon one of these two rocks. And this was\nthe cause I was unwilling to have my answer to the Bishop\u2019s doctrine of\nliberty published.\n\nAnd thus much for comparison of our two opinions with the Scriptures;\nwhich whether it favour more his or mine, I leave to be judged by the\nreader. And now I come to compare them again by _the inconveniences\nwhich may be thought to follow them_.\n\nFirst, the bishop says, that this very persuasion, that all things come\nto pass by _necessity_, is able to overthrow all societies and\ncommonwealths in the world. The laws, saith he, are unjust which\nprohibit that which a man cannot possibly shun.\n\nSecondly, that it maketh superfluous and foolish all consultations,\narts, arms, books, instruments, teachers, and medicines, and which is\nworst, piety and all other acts of devotion. For if the event be\nnecessary, it will come to pass whatsoever we do, and whether we sleep\nor wake.\n\nThis inference, if there were not as well a necessity of the means as\nthere is of the event, might be allowed for true. But according to my\nopinion, both the event and means are equally necessitated. But\nsupposing the inference true, it makes as much against him that denies\nas against him that holds this necessity. For I believe the Bishop holds\nfor as certain a truth, _what shall be, shall be_, as _what is, is_, or\n_what has been, has been_. And then the ratiocination of the sick man,\n\u201cIf I shall recover, what need I this unsavoury potion? if I shall not\nrecover, what good will it do me?\u201d is a good ratiocination. But the\nBishop holds, that it is necessary he shall recover or not recover.\nTherefore it follows from an opinion of the Bishop\u2019s, as well as from\nmine, that medicine is superfluous. But as medicine is to health, so is\npiety, consultation, arts, arms, books, instruments, and teachers, every\none to its several end. Out of the Bishop\u2019s opinion it follows as well\nas from mine, that medicine is superfluous to health. Therefore from his\nopinion as well as from mine, it followeth, (if such ratiocination were\nnot unsound), that piety, consultation, &c. are also superfluous to\ntheir respective ends. And for the superfluity of laws, whatsoever be\nthe truth of the question between us, they are not superfluous, because\nby the punishing of one, or of a few unjust men, they are the cause of\njustice in a great many.\n\nBut the greatest inconvenience of all that the Bishop pretends may be\ndrawn from this opinion, is, \u201cthat God in justice cannot punish a man\nwith eternal torments for doing that which it was never in his power to\nleave undone.\u201d It is true, that seeing the name of punishment hath\nrelation to the name of crime, there can be no punishment but for crimes\nthat might have been left undone; but instead of _punishment_ if he had\nsaid _affliction_, may not I say that God may afflict, and not for sin?\nDoth he not afflict those creatures that cannot sin? And sometimes those\nthat can sin, and yet not for sin, as Job, and the man in the gospel\nthat was born blind, for the manifestation of his power which he hath\nover his creature, no less but more than hath the potter over his clay\nto make of it what he please? But though God have power to afflict a man\nand not for sin without injustice, shall we think God so cruel as to\nafflict a man, and not for sin, with extreme and endless torment? Is it\nnot cruelty? No more than to do the same for sin, when he that so\nafflicteth might without trouble have kept him from sinning. But what\ninfallible evidence hath the Bishop, that a man shall be after this life\neternally in torments and never die? Or how is it certain there is no\nsecond death, when the Scripture saith there is? Or where doth the\nScripture say that a second death is an endless life? Or do the Doctors\nonly say it? Then perhaps they do but say so, and for reasons best known\nto themselves. There is no injustice nor cruelty in him that giveth\nlife, to give with it sickness, pain, torments, and death; nor in him\nthat giveth life twice, to give the same miseries twice also. And thus\nmuch in answer to the inconveniences that are pretended to follow the\ndoctrine of necessity.\n\nOn the other side from this position, that a man is free to will, it\nfolloweth that the prescience of God is quite taken away. For how can it\nbe known beforehand what man shall have a will to, if that will of his\nproceed not from necessary causes, but that he have in his power to will\nor not will? So also those things which are called future contingents,\nif they come not to pass with certainty, that is to say, from necessary\ncauses, can never be foreknown; so that God\u2019s foreknowing shall\nsometimes be of things that shall not come to pass, which is as much to\nsay, that his foreknowledge is none; which is a great dishonour to the\nall-knowing power.\n\nThough this be all the inconvenient doctrine that followeth _free-will_,\nforasmuch as I can now remember; yet the defending of this opinion hath\ndrawn the Bishop and other patrons of it into many inconvenient and\nabsurd conclusions, and made them make use of an infinite number of\ninsignificant words; whereof one conclusion is in Suarez, that God doth\nso concur with the will of man, that _if man will, then God concurs_;\nwhich is to subject not the will of man to God, but the will of God to\nman. Other inconvenient conclusions I shall then mark out, when I come\nto my observations upon the Bishop\u2019s reply. And thus far concerning the\ninconveniences that follow both opinions.\n\nThe attribute of God which he draweth into argument is his _justice_, as\nthat God cannot be just in punishing any man for that which he was\nnecessitated to do. To which I have answered before, as being one of the\ninconveniences pretended to follow upon the doctrine of necessity. On\nthe contrary, from another of God\u2019s attributes, which is his\n_foreknowledge_, I shall evidently derive, that all actions whatsoever,\nwhether they proceed from the will or from fortune, were necessary from\neternity. For whatsoever God foreknoweth shall come to pass, cannot but\ncome to pass, that is, it is impossible it should not come to pass, or\notherwise come to pass than it was foreknown. But whatsoever was\nimpossible should be otherwise, was necessary; for the definition of\n_necessary_ is, that which cannot possibly be otherwise. And whereas\nthey that distinguish between God\u2019s _prescience_ and his _decree_, say\nthe foreknowledge maketh not the necessity without the decree; it is\nlittle to the purpose. It sufficeth me, that whatsoever was foreknown by\nGod, was necessary: but all things were foreknown by God, and therefore\nall things were necessary. And as for the distinction of foreknowledge\nfrom decree in God Almighty, I comprehend it not. They are acts\nco-eternal, and therefore one.\n\nAnd as for the arguments drawn from natural reason they are set down at\nlarge in the end of my discourse to which the Bishop maketh his reply;\nwhich how well he hath answered, shall appear in due time. For the\npresent, the actions which he thinketh proceed from liberty of will,\nmust either be necessitated, or proceed from fortune, without any other\ncause; for certainly to _will_ is impossible without thinking on what he\nwilleth. But it is in no man\u2019s election what he shall at any named time\nhereafter think on. And this I take to be enough to clear the\nunderstanding of the reader, that he may be the better able to judge of\nthe following disputation. I find in those that write of this argument,\nespecially in the Schoolmen and their followers, so many words strangers\nto our language, and such confusion and inanity in the ranging of them,\nas that a man\u2019s mind in the reading of them distinguisheth nothing. And\nas things were in the beginning before the Spirit of God was moved upon\nthe abyss, _tohu_ and _bohu_, that is to say, confusion and emptiness;\nso are their discourses.\n\n\n\n\n -------\n\n\n \u201cTO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE\n MARQUIS OF NEWCASTLE,\n ETC.\n\n \u201cSIR,--\n\n\u201cIf I pretended to compose a complete treatise upon this subject, I\nshould not refuse those large recruits of reasons and authorities which\noffer themselves to serve in this cause, for God and man, religion and\npolicy, Church and Commonwealth, (_a_) against the blasphemous,\ndesperate, and destructive opinion of fatal destiny. But as (_b_) mine\naim, in the first discourse, was only to press home those things in\nwriting, which had been agitated between us by word of mouth, (a course\nmuch to be preferred before verbal conferences, as being freer from\npassions and tergiversations, less subject to mistakes and misrelations,\nwherein paralogisms are more quickly detected, impertinences discovered,\nand confusion avoided), so my present intention is only to vindicate\nthat discourse, and together with it, (_c_) those lights of the Schools,\nwho were never slighted but where they were not understood. How far I\nhave performed it, I leave to the judicious and impartial reader,\nresting for mine own part well contented with this, that I have\nsatisfied myself.\n\n Your Lordship\u2019s most obliged,\n to love and serve you,\n \u201cJ. D.\u201d\n\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON\n THE BISHOP\u2019S EPISTLE TO MY LORD OF NEWCASTLE.\n\n\n(_a_) \u201cAgainst the blasphemous, desperate, and destructive opinion of\nfatal destiny.\u201d\n\nThis is but choler, such as ordinarily happeneth unto them who contend\nagainst greater difficulties than they expected.\n\n(_b_) \u201cMy aim in the first discourse was only to press home those things\nin writing, which had been agitated between us by word of mouth: a\ncourse much to be preferred before verbal conferences, as being freer\nfrom passions, &c.\u201d\n\nHe is here, I think, mistaken; for in our verbal conference there was\nnot one passionate word, nor any objecting of blasphemy or atheism, nor\nany other uncivil word; of which in his writing there are abundance.\n\n(_c_) \u201cThose lights of the Schools, who were never slighted but where\nthey were not understood.\u201d\n\nI confess I am not apt to admire every thing I understand not, nor yet\nto slight it. And though the Bishop slight not the Schoolmen so much as\nI do, yet I dare say he understands their writings as little as I do.\nFor they are in most places unintelligible.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n TO THE READER.\n\n\u201cChristian reader, this ensuing treatise was (_a_) neither penned nor\nintended for the press, but privately undertaken, that by the\nventilation of the question truth might be cleared from mistakes. The\nsame was Mr. Hobbes\u2019 desire at that time, as appeareth by four passages\nin his book, wherein he requesteth and beseecheth that it may be kept\nprivate. But either through forgetfulness or change of judgment, he hath\nnow caused or permitted it to be printed in England, without either\nadjoining my first discourse, to which he wrote that answer, or so much\nas mentioning this reply, which he hath had in his hands now these eight\nyears. So wide is the date of his letter, in the year 1652, from the\ntruth, and his manner of dealing with me in this particular from\ningenuity, (if the edition were with his own consent). Howsoever, here\nis all that passed between us upon this subject, without any addition,\nor the least variation from the original.\n\n\u201cConcerning the nameless author of the preface, who takes upon him to\nhang out an ivy-bush before this rare piece of sublimated stoicism to\ninvite passengers to purchase it, as I know not who he is, so I do not\nmuch heed it, nor regard either his ignorant censures or hyperbolical\nexpressions. The Church of England is as much above his detraction, as\nhe is beneath this question. Let him lick up the spittle of Dionysius by\nhimself, as his servile flatterers did, and protest that it is more\nsweet than nectar; we envy him not; much good may it do him. His very\nfrontispiece is a sufficient confutation of his whole preface, wherein\nhe tells the world, as falsely and ignorantly as confidently, that \u2018all\ncontroversy concerning predestination, election, free-will, grace,\nmerits, reprobation, &c., is fully decided and cleared.\u2019 Thus he\naccustometh his pen to run over beyond all limits of truth and\ndiscretion, to let us see that his knowledge in theological\ncontroversies is none at all, and into what miserable times we are\nfallen, when blind men will be the only judges of colours. _Quid tanto\ndignum feret hic promissor hiatu._\n\n\u201cThere is yet one thing more, whereof I desire to advertise the reader,\n(_b_) Whereas Mr. Hobbes mentions my objections to his book _De Cive_,\nit is true that ten years since I gave him about sixty exceptions, the\none-half of them political, the other half theological, to that book,\nand every exception justified by a number of reasons, to which he never\nyet vouchsafed any answer. Nor do I now desire it, for since that, he\nhath published his _Leviathan, Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui\nlumen ademptum_, which affords much more matter of exception; and I am\ninformed that there are already two, the one of our own Church, the\nother a stranger, who have shaken in pieces the whole fabric of his\ncity, that was but builded in the air, and resolved that huge mass of\nhis seeming Leviathan into a new nothing; and that their labours will\nspeedily be published. But if this information should not prove true, I\nwill not grudge upon his desire, God willing, to demonstrate, that his\nprinciples are pernicious both to piety and policy, and destructive to\nall relations of mankind, between prince and subject, father and child,\nmaster and servant, husband and wife; and that they who maintain them\nobstinately, are fitter to live in hollow trees among wild beasts, than\nin any Christian or political society. So God bless us.\u201d\n\n\n -------\n\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON\n THE BISHOP\u2019S EPISTLE TO THE READER.\n\n(_a_) \u201cNeither penned nor intended for the press, but privately\nundertaken, that by the ventilation of the question truth might be\ncleared. The same was Mr. Hobbes\u2019 desire at that time, as appeareth by\nfour passages in his book, &c.\u201d\n\nIt is true that it was not my intention to publish any thing in this\nquestion. And the Bishop might have perceived, by not leaving out those\nfour passages, that it was without my knowledge the book was printed;\nbut it pleased him better to take this little advantage to accuse me of\nwant of ingenuity. He might have perceived also, by the date of my\nletter, 1652, which was written 1646, (which error could be no advantage\nto me), that I knew nothing of the printing of it. I confess, that\nbefore I received the bishop\u2019s reply, a French gentleman of my\nacquaintance in Paris, knowing that I had written something of this\nsubject, but not understanding the language, desired me to give him\nleave to get it interpreted to him by an English young man that resorted\nto him; which I yielded to. But this young man taking his opportunity,\nand being a nimble writer, took a copy of it for himself, and printed it\nhere, all but the postscript, without my knowledge, and (as he knew)\nagainst my will; for which he since hath asked me pardon. But that the\nBishop intended it not for the press, is not very probable, because he\nsaith he writ it to the end \u201cthat by the ventilation of the question,\ntruth might be cleared from mistakes;\u201d which end he had not obtained by\nkeeping it private.\n\n(_b_) \u201cWhereas Mr. Hobbes mentions my objections to his book _De Cive_:\nit is true that ten years since, I gave him about sixty exceptions,\u201d &c.\n\nI did indeed intend to have answered those exceptions as finding them\nneither political nor theological, nor that he alleged any reasons by\nwhich they were to be justified. But shortly after, intending to write\nin English, and publish my thoughts concerning Civil Doctrine in that\nbook which I entitled _Leviathan_, I thought his objections would by the\nclearness of my method fall off without an answer. Now this _Leviathan_\nhe calleth \u201c_Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum_.\u201d\nWords not far fetched, nor more applicable to my _Leviathan_, than to\nany other writing that should offend him. For allowing him the word\n_monstrum_, (because it seems he takes it for a monstrous great fish),\nhe can neither say it is _informe_; for even they that approve not the\ndoctrine, allow the method. Nor that it is _ingens_; for it is a book of\nno great bulk. Nor _cui lumen ademptum_; for he will find very few\nreaders that will not think it clearer than his scholastic jargon. And\nwhereas he saith there are two of our own Church (as he hears say) that\nare answering it; and that \u201che himself,\u201d if I desire it, \u201cwill\ndemonstrate that my principles are pernicious both to piety and policy,\nand destructive to all relations,\u201d &c.: my answer is, that _I_ desire\nnot that he or they should so misspend their time; but if they will\nneeds do it, I can give them a fit title for their book, _Behemoth\nagainst Leviathan_. He ends his epistle with \u201cso God bless us.\u201d Which\nwords are good in themselves, but to no purpose here; but are a\nbuffoonly abusing of the name of God to calumny.\n\n\n\n\n -------\n\n\n A\n\n VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY\n\n FROM\n\n ANTECEDENT AND EXTRINSICAL NECESSITY.\n\n\n -------\n\n\n_J. D._ \u201cEither I am free to write this discourse for liberty against\nnecessity, or I am not free. If I be free, I have obtained the cause,\nand ought not to suffer for the truth. If I be not free, yet I ought not\nto be blamed, since I do it not out of any voluntary election, but out\nof an inevitable necessity.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ Right Honourable, I had once resolved to answer J. D.\u2019s\nobjections to my book _De Cive_ in the first place, as that which\nconcerns me most; and afterwards to examine this Discourse of Liberty\nand Necessity, which, because I never had uttered my opinion of it,\nconcerned me the less. But seeing it was both your Lordship\u2019s and J.\nD.\u2019s desire that I should begin with the latter, I was contented so to\ndo. And here I present and submit it to your Lordship\u2019s judgment.\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThe first day that I did read over T. H.\u2019s defence of the\nnecessity of all things, was April 20th, 1646. Which proceeded not out\nof any disrespect to him; for if all his discourses had been geometrical\ndemonstrations, able not only to persuade, but also to compel assent,\nall had been one to me, first my journey, and afterwards some other\ntrifles which we call business, having diverted me until then. And then\nmy occasions permitting me, and an advertisement from a friend awakening\nme, I set myself to a serious examination of it. We commonly see those\nwho delight in paradoxes, if they have line enough, confute themselves;\nand their speculatives and their practices familiarly interfere one with\nanother. (_b_) The very first words of T. H.\u2019s defence trip up the heels\nof his whole cause; \u2018I had once resolved.\u2019 To _resolve_ presupposeth\ndeliberation. But what deliberation can there be of that which is\ninevitably determined by causes without ourselves, before we do\ndeliberate? Can a condemned man deliberate whether he should be executed\nor not? It is even to as much purpose, as for a man to consult and\nponder with himself whether he should draw in his breath, or whether he\nshould increase in stature. Secondly, (_c_) to _resolve_ implies a man\u2019s\ndominion over his own actions, and his actual determination of himself.\nBut he who holds an absolute necessity of all things, hath quitted this\ndominion over himself; and (which is worse) hath quitted it to the\nsecond extrinsical causes, in which he makes all his actions to be\ndetermined. One may as well call again yesterday, as _resolve_ or newly\ndetermine that which is determined to his hand already. (_d_) I have\nperused this treatise, weighed T. H.\u2019s answers, considered his reasons,\nand conclude that he hath missed, and misled the question, that the\nanswers are evasions, that his arguments are paralogisms, that the\nopinion of absolute and universal necessity is but a result of some\ngroundless and ill-chosen principles, and that the defect is not in\nhimself, but that his cause will admit no better defence; and therefore,\nby his favour, I am resolved to adhere to my first opinion. Perhaps\nanother man reading this discourse with other eyes, judgeth it to be\npertinent and well-founded. How comes this to pass? The treatise is the\nsame, the exterior causes are the same; yet the resolution is contrary.\nDo the second causes play fast and loose? Do they necessitate me to\ncondemn, and necessitate him to maintain? What is it then? The\ndifference must be in ourselves, either in our intellectuals, because\nthe one sees clearer than the other; or in our affections, which betray\nour understandings, and produce an implicit adherence in the one more\nthan in the other. Howsoever it be, the difference is in ourselves. The\noutward causes alone do not chain me to the one resolution, nor him to\nthe other resolution. But T. H. may say, that our several and respective\ndeliberations and affections are in part the causes of our contrary\nresolutions, and do concur with the outward causes to make up one total\nand adequate cause to the necessary production of this effect. If it be\nso, he hath spun a fair thread, to make all this stir for such a\nnecessity as no man ever denied or doubted of. When all the causes have\nactually determined themselves, then the effect is in being; for though\nthere be a priority in nature between the cause and the effect, yet they\nare together in time. And the old rule is, (_e_) \u2018whatsoever is, when it\nis, is necessarily so as it is.\u2019 This is no absolute necessity, but only\nupon supposition, that a man hath determined his own liberty. When we\nquestion whether all occurrences be necessary, we do not question\nwhether they be necessary when they are, nor whether they be necessary\n_in sensu composito_, after we have resolved and finally determined what\nto do; but whether they were necessary before they were determined by\nourselves, by or in the precedent causes before ourselves, or in the\nexterior causes without ourselves. It is not inconsistent with true\nliberty to determine itself, but it is inconsistent with true liberty to\nbe determined by another without itself.\n\n\u201cT. H. saith further \u2018that upon your Lordship\u2019s desire and mine, he was\ncontented to begin with this discourse of Liberty and Necessity,\u2019 that\nis, to change his former resolution. (_f_) If the chain of necessity be\nno stronger, but that it may be snapped so easily insunder; if his will\nwas no otherwise determined without himself, but only by the\nsignification of your Lordship\u2019s desire and my modest entreaty, then we\nmay easily conclude that human affairs are not always governed by\nabsolute necessity; that a man is lord of his own actions, if not in\nchief, yet in mean, subordinate to the Lord paramount of heaven and\nearth; and that all things are not so absolutely determined in the\noutward and precedent causes, but that fair entreaties and moral\npersuasions may work upon a good nature so far, as to prevent that which\notherwise had been, and to produce that which otherwise had not been. He\nthat can reconcile this with an antecedent necessity of all things, and\na physical or natural determination of all causes, shall be great Apollo\nto me.\n\n\u201cWhereas T. H. saith that he had never uttered his opinion of this\nquestion, I suppose he intends in writing; my conversation with him hath\nnot been frequent, yet I remember well that when this question was\nagitated between us two in your Lordship\u2019s chamber by your command, he\ndid then declare himself in words, both for the absolute necessity of\nall events, and for the ground of this necessity, the flux or\nconcatenation of the second causes.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. I.\n\n(_a_) \u201cThe first day that I did read over T. H.\u2019s defence of necessity,\u201d\n&c.\n\nHis deferring the reading of my defence of necessity, he will not, he\nsaith, should be interpreted for disrespect. \u2019Tis well; though I cannot\nimagine why he should fear to be thought to disrespect me. \u201cHe was\ndiverted,\u201d he saith, \u201cby trifles called business.\u201d It seems then he\nacknowledgeth that the will can be diverted by business. Which, though\nsaid on the _by_, is contrary I think to the main, that the will is\nfree; for free it is not, if anything but itself can divert it.\n\n(_b_) \u201cThe very first words of T. H.\u2019s defence, trip up the heels of his\nwhole cause, &c.\u201d\n\nHow so? \u201cI had once,\u201d saith he, \u201cresolved. To resolve presupposeth\ndeliberation. But what deliberation can there be of that which is\ninevitably determined without ourselves?\u201d There is no man doubts but a\nman may deliberate of what himself shall do, whether the thing be\nimpossible or not, in case he know not of the impossibility; though he\ncannot deliberate of what another shall do to him. Therefore his\nexamples of the man condemned, of the man that breatheth, and of him\nthat groweth, because the question is not what they shall do, but what\nthey shall suffer, are impertinent. This is so evident, that I wonder\nhow he that was before so witty as to say, my first words tripped up the\nheels of my cause, and that having line enough I would confute myself,\ncould presently be so dull as not to see his argument was too weak to\nsupport so triumphant a language. And whereas he seemeth to be offended\nwith paradoxes, let him thank the Schoolmen, whose senseless writings\nhave made the greatest number of important truths seem paradox.\n\n(_c_) This argument that followeth is no better. \u201cTo resolve,\u201d saith he,\n\u201cimplies a man\u2019s dominion over his actions, and his actual determination\nof himself,\u201d &c.\n\nIf he understand what it is _to resolve_, he knows that it signifies no\nmore than after deliberation _to will_. He thinks, therefore, _to will_\nis to have dominion over his own actions, and actually to determine his\nown will. But no man can determine his own will, for the will is\nappetite; nor can a man more determine his will than any other appetite,\nthat is, more than he can determine when he shall be hungry and when\nnot. When a man is hungry, it is in his choice to eat or not eat; this\nis the liberty of the man; but to be hungry or not hungry, which is that\nwhich I hold to proceed from necessity, is not in his choice. Besides\nthese words, \u201cdominion over his own actions,\u201d and \u201cdetermination of\nhimself,\u201d so far as they are significant, make against him. For over\nwhatsoever things there is dominion, those things are not free, and\ntherefore a man\u2019s actions are not free; and if a man determine himself,\nthe question will still remain, what determined him to determine himself\nin that manner.\n\n(_d_) \u201cI have perused this treatise, weighed T. H.\u2019s answers, considered\nhis reasons,\u201d &c.\n\nThis and that which followeth, is talking to himself at random, till he\ncome to allege that which he calleth an old rule, which is this: (_e_)\n\u201cWhatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is. This is no\nabsolute necessity, but only upon supposition that a man hath determined\nhis own liberty,\u201d &c.\n\nIf the bishop think that I hold no other necessity than that which is\nexpressed in that old foolish rule, he neither understandeth me, nor\nwhat the word _necessary_ signifieth. _Necessary_ is that which is\nimpossible to be otherwise, or that which cannot possibly otherwise come\nto pass. Therefore _necessary_, _possible_, and _impossible_ have no\nsignification in reference to time past or time present, but only time\nto come. His _necessary_, and his _in sensu composito_, signify nothing;\nmy _necessary_ is a necessary from all eternity; and yet not\ninconsistent with true liberty, which doth not consist in determining\nitself, but in doing what the will is determined unto. This \u201cdominion\nover itself,\u201d and this _sensus compositus_, and this, \u201cdetermining\nitself,\u201d and this, \u201cnecessarily is when it is,\u201d are confused and empty\nwords.\n\n(_f_) \u201cIf the chain of necessity be no stronger but that it may be\nsnapped so easily asunder, &c. by the signification of your lordship\u2019s\ndesire, and my modest entreaty, then we may safely conclude that human\naffairs,\u201d &c.\n\nWhether my Lord\u2019s desire and the Bishop\u2019s modest entreaty were enough to\nproduce a _will_ in me to write an answer to his treatise, without other\nconcurrent causes, I am not sure. Obedience to his Lordship did much,\nand my civility to the Bishop did somewhat, and perhaps there were other\nimaginations of mine own that contributed their part. But this I am sure\nof, that altogether they were sufficient to frame my will thereto; and\nwhatsoever is sufficient to produce any thing, produceth it as\nnecessarily as the fire necessarily burneth the fuel that is cast into\nit. And though the Bishop\u2019s modest entreaty had been no part of the\ncause of my yielding to it, yet certainly it would have been cause\nenough to some civil man, to have requited me with fairer language than\nhe hath done throughout this reply.\n\n NO. II.\n\n_T. H._ And first I assure your Lordship, I find in it no new argument,\nneither from Scripture nor from reason, that I have not often heard\nbefore, which is as much as to say, that I am not surprised.\n\n_J. D._ (_a_) \u201cThough I be so unhappy that I can present no novelty to\nT. H., yet I have this comfort, that if he be not surprised, then in\nreason I may expect a more mature answer from him; and where he fails, I\nmay ascribe it to the weakness of his cause, not to want of preparation.\nBut in this cause I like Epictetus\u2019s counsel well, that (_b_) the sheep\nshould not brag how much they have eaten, or what an excellent pasture\nthey do go in, but shew it in their lamb and wool. Opposite answers and\ndownright arguments advantage a cause. To tell what we have heard or\nseen is to no purpose. When a respondent leaves many things untouched,\nas if they were too hot for his fingers, and declines the weight of\nother things, and alters the true state of the question, it is a shrewd\nsign either that he hath not weighed all things maturely, or else that\nhe maintains a desperate cause.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON HIS REPLY NO. II.\n\n(_a_) \u201cThough I be so unhappy that I can present no novelty to T. H. yet\nI have this comfort, that if he be not surprised, then in reason I may\nexpect a more mature answer from him,\u201d &c.\n\nThough I were not surprised, yet I do not see the reason for which he\nsaith he may expect a more mature answer from me; or any further answer\nat all. For seeing I wrote this at his modest request, it is no modest\nexpectation to look for as many answers as he shall be pleased to exact.\n\n(_b_) \u201cThe sheep should not brag how much they have eaten, but shew it\nin their lamb and wool.\u201d\n\nIt is no great bragging, to say I was not surprised; for whosoever\nchanceth to read Suarez\u2019s _Opuscula_, where he writeth of free-will and\nof the concourse of God with man\u2019s will, shall find the greatest part,\nif not all, that the Bishop hath urged in this question. But that which\nthe Bishop hath said of the reasons and authorities which he saith in\nhis epistle do offer themselves to serve in this cause, and many other\npassages of his book, I shall, I think, before I have done with him,\nmake appear to be very bragging, and nothing else. And though he say it\nbe Epictetus\u2019s counsel, that sheep should shew what they eat in their\nlamb and wool, it is not likely that Epictetus should take a metaphor\nfrom lamb and wool; for it could not easily come into the mind of men\nthat were not acquainted with the paying of tithes. Or if it had, he\nwould have said lambs in the plural, as laymen use to speak. That which\nfollows of my leaving things untouched, and altering the state of the\nquestion; I remember no such thing, unless he require that I should\nanswer, not to his arguments only, but also to his syllables.\n\n NO. III.\n\n_T. H._ The preface is a handsome one, but it appears even in that, that\nhe hath mistaken the question; for whereas he says thus, \u201cif I be free\nto write this discourse, I have obtained the cause,\u201d I deny that to be\ntrue. For it is not enough to his freedom of writing that he had not\nwritten it, unless he would himself; if he will obtain the cause, he\nmust prove that, before he wrote it, it was not necessary he should\nwrite it afterwards. It may be he thinks it all one to say, \u201cI was free\nto write it,\u201d and \u201cit was not necessary I should write it.\u201d But I think\notherwise; for he is free to do a thing, that may do it if he have the\nwill to do it, and may forbear if he have the will to forbear. And yet\nif there be a necessity that he shall have the will to do it, the action\nis necessarily to follow; and if there be a necessity that he shall have\nthe will to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The\nquestion, therefore, is not whether a man be a free agent, that is to\nsay, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to\nhis will; but whether the will to write, and the will to forbear, come\nupon him according to his will, or according to any thing else in his\nown power. I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will: but to\nsay, I can will if I will, I take to be an absurd speech. Wherefore I\ncannot grant him the cause upon this preface.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cTacitus speaks of a close kind of adversaries, which evermore\nbegin with a man\u2019s praise. The crisis or the catastrophe of their\ndiscourse is when they come to their _but_; as, he is a good natured\nman, _but_ he hath a naughty quality; or, he is a wise man, _but_ he\nhath committed one of the greatest follies; so here, \u2018the preface is a\nhandsome one, but it appears even in this that he hath mistaken the\nquestion.\u2019 This is to give an inch, that one may take away an ell\nwithout suspicion; to praise the handsomeness of the porch, that he may\ngain credit to the vilifying of the house. Whether of us hath mistaken\nthe question, I refer to the judicious reader. (_a_) Thus much I will\nmaintain, that that is no true necessity, which he calls necessity; nor\nthat liberty, which he calls liberty; nor that the question, which he\nmakes the question.\n\n\u201cFirst for liberty, that which he calls liberty, is no true liberty.\n\n\u201cFor the clearing whereof, it behoveth us to know the difference between\nthese three, _necessity_, _spontaneity_, and _liberty_.\n\n\u201cNecessity and spontaneity may sometimes meet together; so may\nspontaneity and liberty; but real necessity and true liberty can never\nmeet together. Some things are necessary and not voluntary or\nspontaneous; some things are both necessary and voluntary; some things\nare voluntary and not free; some things are both voluntary and free; but\nthose things which are truly necessary can never be free, and those\nthings which are truly free can never be necessary. Necessity consists\nin an antecedent determination to one; spontaneity consists in a\nconformity of the appetite, either intellectual or sensitive, to the\nobject; true liberty consists in the elective power of the rational\nwill; that which is determined without my concurrence, may nevertheless\nagree well enough with my fancy or desires, and obtain my subsequent\nconsent; but that which is determined without my concurrence or consent,\ncannot be the object of mine election. I may like that which is\ninevitably imposed upon me by another, but if it be inevitably imposed\nupon me by extrinsical causes, it is both folly for me to deliberate,\nand impossible for me to choose, whether I shall undergo it or not.\nReason is the root, the fountain, the original of true liberty, which\njudgeth and representeth to the will, whether this or that be\nconvenient, whether this or that be more convenient. Judge then what a\npretty kind of liberty it is which is maintained by T. H., such a\nliberty as is in little children before they have the use of reason,\nbefore they can consult or deliberate of any thing. Is not this a\nchildish liberty; and such a liberty as is in brute beasts, as bees and\nspiders, which do not learn their faculties as we do our trades, by\nexperience and consideration? This is a brutish liberty, such a liberty\nas a bird hath to fly when her wings are clipped, or to use his own\ncomparison, such a liberty as a lame man, who hath lost the use of his\nlimbs, hath to walk. Is not this a ridiculous liberty? Lastly, (which is\nworse than all these), such a liberty as a river hath to descend down\nthe channel. What! will he ascribe liberty to inanimate creatures also,\nwhich have neither reason, nor spontaneity, nor so much as sensitive\nappetite? Such is T. H.\u2019s liberty.\n\n(_b_) \u201cHis necessity is just such another, a necessity upon supposition,\narising from the concourse of all the causes, including the last dictate\nof the understanding in reasonable creatures. The adequate cause and the\neffect are together in time, and when all the concurrent causes are\ndetermined, the effect is determined also, and is become so necessary\nthat it is actually in being; but there is a great difference between\ndetermining, and being determined. If all the collateral causes\nconcurring to the production of an effect, were antecedently determined\nwhat they must of necessity produce, and when they must produce it, then\nthere is no doubt but the effect is necessary. (_c_) But if these causes\ndid operate freely or contingently; if they might have suspended or\ndenied their concurrence, or have concurred after another manner, then\nthe effect was not truly and antecedently necessary, but either free or\ncontingent. This will be yet clearer by considering his own instance of\n_casting ambs-ace_, though it partake more of contingency than of\nfreedom. Supposing the positure of the parties\u2019 hand who did throw the\ndice, supposing the figure of the table and of the dice themselves,\nsupposing the measure of force applied, and supposing all other things\nwhich did concur to the production of that cast, to be the very same\nthey were, there is no doubt but in this case the cast is necessary. But\nstill this is but a necessity of supposition; for if all these\nconcurrent causes, or some of them, were contingent or free, then the\ncast was not absolutely necessary. To begin with the caster, he might\nhave denied his concurrence, and not have cast at all; he might have\nsuspended his concurrence, and not have cast so soon; he might have\ndoubled or diminished his force in casting, if it had pleased him; he\nmight have thrown the dice into the other table. In all these cases what\nbecomes of his _ambs-ace_? The like uncertainties offer themselves for\nthe maker of the tables, and for the maker of the dice, and for the\nkeeper of the tables, and for the kind of wood, and I know not how many\nother circumstances. In such a mass of contingencies, it is impossible\nthat the effect should be antecedently necessary. T. H. appeals to every\nman\u2019s experience. I am contented. Let every one reflect upon himself,\nand he shall find no convincing, much less constraining reason, to\nnecessitate him to any one of these particular acts more than another,\nbut only his own will or arbitrary determination. So T. H.\u2019s necessity\nis no absolute, no antecedent, extrinsical necessity, but merely a\nnecessity upon supposition.\n\n(_d_) \u201cThirdly, that which T. H. makes the question, is not the\nquestion. \u2018The question is not,\u2019 saith he, \u2018whether a man may write if\nhe will, and forbear if he will, but whether the will to write or the\nwill to forbear come upon him according to his will, or according to any\nthing else in his own power.\u2019 Here is a distinction without a\ndifference. If his will do not come upon him according to his will, then\nhe is not a free, nor yet so much as a voluntary agent, which is T. H.\u2019s\nliberty. Certainly all the freedom of the agent is from the freedom of\nthe will. If the will have no power over itself, the agent is no more\nfree than a staff in a man\u2019s hand. Secondly, he makes but an empty show\nof a power in the will, either to write or not to write. (_e_) If it be\nprecisely and inevitably determined in all occurrences whatsoever, what\na man shall will, and what he shall not will, what he shall write, and\nwhat he shall not write, to what purpose is this power? God and nature\nnever made any thing in vain; but vain and frustraneous is that power\nwhich never was and never shall be deduced into act. Either the agent is\ndetermined before he acteth, what he shall will, and what he shall not\nwill, what he shall act, and what he shall not act, and then he is no\nmore free to act than he is to will; or else he is not determined, and\nthen there is no necessity. No effect can exceed the virtue of its\ncause; if the action be free to write or to forbear, the power or\nfaculty to will or nill, must of necessity be more free. _Quod efficit\ntale, illud magis est tale._ If the will be determined, the writing or\nnot writing is likewise determined, and then he should not say, \u2018he may\nwrite or he may forbear,\u2019 but he must write or he must forbear. Thirdly,\nthis answer contradicts the sense of all the world, that the will of man\nis determined without his will, or without any thing in his power. Why\ndo we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not? Why do we\nrepresent reasons to them? Why do we pray them? Why do we entreat them?\nWhy do we blame them, if their will come not upon them according to\ntheir will. _Wilt thou be made clean?_ said our Saviour to the paralytic\nperson (John v. 6); to what purpose, if his will was extrinsically\ndetermined? Christ complains, (Matth. xi. 17): _We have piped unto you,\nand ye have not danced._ How could they help it, if their wills were\ndetermined without their wills to forbear? And (Matth. xxiii. 37): _I\nwould have gathered your children together as the hen gathereth her\nchickens under her wings, but ye would not._ How easily might they\nanswer, according to T. H.\u2019s doctrine, \u2018Alas! blame not us; our wills\nare not in our own power or disposition; if they were, we would\nthankfully embrace so great a favour.\u2019 Most truly said St. Austin, \u2018Our\nwill should not be a will at all, if it were not in our power.\u2019 (_f_)\nThis is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned from our\ntutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by nature; we need not turn over\nany obscure books to find out this truth. The poets chaunt it in the\ntheatres, the shepherds in the mountains, the pastors teach it in their\nchurches, the doctors in the universities, the common people in the\nmarkets, and all mankind in the whole world do assent unto it, except an\nhandful of men who have poisoned their intellectuals with paradoxical\nprinciples. Fourthly, this necessity which T. H. hath devised, which is\ngrounded upon the necessitation of a man\u2019s will without his will, is the\nworst of all others, and is so far from lessening those difficulties and\nabsurdities which flow from the fatal destiny of the Stoics, that it\nincreaseth them, and rendereth them unanswerable. (_g_) No man blameth\nfire for burning whole cities; no man taxeth poison for destroying men;\nbut those persons who apply them to such wicked ends. If the will of man\nbe not in his own disposition, he is no more a free agent than the fire\nor the poison. Three things are required to make an act or omission\nculpable. First, that it be in our power to perform it or forbear it;\nsecondly, that we be obliged to perform it, or forbear it, respectively;\nthirdly, that we omit that which we ought to have done, or do that which\nwe ought to have omitted. (_h_) No man sins in doing those things which\nhe could not shun, or forbearing those things which never were in his\npower. T. H. may say, that besides the power, men have also an appetite\nto evil objects, which renders them culpable. It is true; but if this\nappetite be determined by another, not by themselves, or if they have\nnot the use of reason to curb or restrain their appetites, they sin no\nmore than a stone descending downward, according to its natural\nappetite, or the brute beasts who commit voluntary errors in following\ntheir sensitive appetites, yet sin not.\n\n(_i_) The question then is not whether a man be necessitated to will or\nnill, yet free to act or forbear. But saving the ambiguous acception of\nthe word _free_, the question is plainly this, whether all agents, and\nall events natural, civil, moral, (for we speak not now of the\nconversion of a sinner, that concerns not this question), be\npredetermined extrinsically and inevitably without their own concurrence\nin the determination; so as all actions and events which either are or\nshall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner,\nor in any other place, time, number, measure, order, nor to any other\nend, than they are. And all this in respect of the supreme cause, or a\nconcourse of extrinsical causes determining them to one.\n\n(_k_) \u201cSo my preface remains yet unanswered. Either I was extrinsically\nand inevitably predetermined to write this discourse, without any\nconcurrence of mine in the determination, and without any power in me to\nchange or oppose it, or I was not so predetermined. If I was, then I\nought not to be blamed, for no man is justly blamed for doing that which\nnever was in his power to shun. If I was not so predetermined, then mine\nactions and my will to act, are neither compelled nor necessitated by\nany extrinsical causes, but I elect and choose, either to write or to\nforbear, according to mine own will and by mine own power. And when I\nhave resolved and elected, it is but a necessity of supposition, which\nmay and doth consist with true liberty, not a real antecedent necessity.\nThe two horns of this dilemma are so straight, that no mean can be\ngiven, nor room to pass between them. And the two consequences are so\nevident, that instead of answering he is forced to decline them.\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON HIS REPLY NO. III.\n\n(_a_) \u201cThus much I will maintain, that this is no true necessity, which\nhe calleth necessity; nor that liberty which he calleth liberty; nor\nthat the question, which he makes the question,\u201d &c. \u201cFor the clearing\nwhereof, it behoveth us to know the difference between these three,\n_necessity_, _spontaneity_, and _liberty_.\u201d\n\nI did expect, that for the knowing of the difference between\n_necessity_, _spontaneity_, and _liberty_, he would have set down their\ndefinitions. For without these, their difference cannot possibly appear.\nFor how can a man know how things differ, unless he first know what they\nare? which he offers not to shew. He tells us that _necessity_ and\n_spontaneity_ may meet together, and _spontaneity_ and _liberty_; but\n_necessity_ and _liberty_ never; and many other things impertinent to\nthe purpose. For which, because of the length, I refer the reader to the\nplace. I note only this, that _spontaneity_ is a word not used in common\nEnglish; and they that understand Latin, know it means no more than\n_appetite_, or _will_, and is not found but in living creatures. And\nseeing, he saith, that _necessity_ and _spontaneity_ may stand together,\nI may say also, that _necessity_ and _will_ may stand together, and then\nis not the will free, as he would have it, from necessitation. There are\nmany other things in that which followeth, which I had rather the reader\nwould consider in his own words, to which I refer him, than that I\nshould give him greater trouble in reciting them again. For I do not\nfear it will be thought too hot for my fingers, to shew the vanity of\nsuch words as these, _intellectual appetite_, _conformity of the\nappetite to the object_, _rational will_, _elective power of the\nrational will_; nor understand I how reason can be the root of true\nliberty, if the Bishop, as he saith in the beginning, had the liberty to\nwrite this discourse. I understand how objects, and the conveniences and\nthe inconveniences of them may be represented to a man, by the help of\nhis senses; but how reason representeth anything to the will, I\nunderstand no more than the Bishop understands how there may be liberty\nin children, in beasts, and inanimate creatures. For he seemeth to\nwonder how children may be left at liberty; how beasts in prison may be\nset at liberty; and how a river may have a free course; and saith,\n\u201cWhat! will he ascribe liberty to inanimate creatures, also?\u201d And thus\nhe thinks he hath made it clear how _necessity_, _spontaneity_, and\n_liberty_ differ from one another. If the reader find it so, I am\ncontented.\n\n(_b_) \u201cHis necessity is just such another; a necessity upon supposition,\narising from the concourse of all the causes, including the last dictate\nof the understanding in reasonable creatures,\u201d &c.\n\nThe Bishop might easily have seen, that the necessity I hold, is the\nsame necessity that he denies; namely, a necessity of things future,\nthat is, an antecedent necessity derived from the very beginning of\ntime; and that I put necessity for an impossibility of not being, and\nthat impossibility as well as possibility are never truly said but of\nthe future. I know as well as he that the cause, when it is adequate, as\nhe calleth it, or entire, as I call it, is together in time with the\neffect. But for all that, the necessity may be and is before the effect,\nas much as any necessity can be. And though he call it a necessity of\nsupposition, it is no more so than all other necessity is. The fire\nburneth necessarily; but not without supposition that there is fuel put\nto it. And it burneth the fuel, when it is put to it, necessarily; but\nit is by supposition, that the ordinary course of nature is not\nhindered; for the fire burnt not the three children in the furnace.\n\n(_c_) \u201cBut if these causes did operate freely or contingently, if they\nmight have suspended or denied their concurrence, or have concurred\nafter another manner, then the effect was not truly and antecedently\nnecessary, but either free or contingent.\u201d\n\nIt seems by this he understands not what these words, _free_ and\n_contingent_, mean. A little before, he wondered I should attribute\nliberty to inanimate creatures, and now he puts causes amongst those\nthings that operate freely. By these causes it seems he understandeth\nonly men, whereas I shewed before that liberty is usually ascribed to\nwhatsoever agent is not hindered. And when a man doth any thing freely,\nthere be many other agents immediate, that concur to the effect he\nintendeth, which work not freely, but necessarily; as when the man\nmoveth the sword _freely_, the sword woundeth necessarily, nor can\nsuspend or deny its concurrence; and consequently if the man move not\nhimself, the man cannot deny his concurrence. To which he cannot reply,\nunless he say a man originally can move himself; for which he will be\nable to find no authority of any that have but tasted of the knowledge\nof motion. Then for _contingent_, he understandeth not what it meaneth.\nFor it is all one to say it is _contingent_, and simply to say _it is_;\nsaving that when they say simply _it is_, they consider not how or by\nwhat means; but in saying it is _contingent_, they tell us they know not\nwhether necessarily or not. But the Bishop thinking contingent to be\nthat which is not necessary, instead of arguing against our knowledge of\nthe necessity of things to come, argueth against the necessity itself.\nAgain, he supposeth that free and contingent causes might have suspended\nor denied their concurrence. From which it followeth, that free causes,\nand contingent causes, are not causes of themselves, but concurrent with\nother causes, and therefore can produce nothing but as they are guided\nby those causes with which they concur. For it is strange he should say,\nthey might have concurred after another manner; for I conceive not how,\nwhen this runneth one way, and that another, that they can be said to\nconcur, that is, run together. And this his concurrence of causes\ncontingent, maketh, he saith, the cast of _ambs-ace_ not to have been\nabsolutely necessary. Which cannot be conceived, unless it had hindered\nit; and then it had made some other cast necessary, perhaps _deux-ace_,\nwhich serveth me as well. For that which he saith of suspending his\nconcurrence, of casting sooner or later, of altering the caster\u2019s force,\nand the like accidents, serve not to take away the necessity of\n_ambs-ace_, otherwise than by making a necessity of _deux-ace_, or other\ncast that shall be thrown.\n\n(_d_) \u201cThirdly, that which T. H. makes the question, is not the\nquestion,\u201d &c.\n\nHe hath very little reason to say this. He requested me to tell him my\nopinion in writing concerning free-will. Which I did, and did let him\nknow a man was free, in those things that were in his power, to follow\nhis will; but that he was not free to will, that is, that his will did\nnot follow his will. Which I expressed in these words: \u201cThe question is,\nwhether the will to write, or the will to forbear, come upon a man\naccording to his will, or according to any thing else in his own power.\u201d\nHe that cannot understand the difference between _free to do if he\nwill_, and _free to will_, is not fit, as I have said in the stating of\nthe question, to hear this controversy disputed, much less to be a\nwriter in it. His consequence, \u201cif a man be not free to will, he is not\na free nor a voluntary agent,\u201d and his saying, \u201cthe freedom of the agent\nis from the freedom of the will,\u201d is put here without proof; nor is\nthere any considerable proof of it through the whole book hereafter\noffered. For why? He never before had heard, I believe, of any\ndistinction between free to do and free to will; which makes him also\nsay, \u201cif the will have not power over itself, the agent is no more free,\nthan a staff in a man\u2019s hand.\u201d As if it were not freedom enough for a\nman to do what he will, unless his will also have power over his will,\nand that his will be not the power itself, but must have another power\nwithin it to do all voluntary acts.\n\n(_e_) \u201cIf it be precisely and inevitably determined in all occurrences\nwhatsoever, what a man shall will, and what he shall not will, and what\nhe shall write, and what he shall not write, to what purpose is this\npower?\u201d &c.\n\nIt is to this purpose, that all those things may be brought to pass,\nwhich God hath from eternity predetermined. It is therefore to no\npurpose here to say, that God and nature hath made nothing in vain. But\nsee what weak arguments he brings next, which, though answered in that\nwhich is gone before, yet, if I answer not again, he will say they are\ntoo hot for my fingers. One is: \u201cIf the agent be determined what he\nshall will, and what he shall act, then he is no more free to act than\nhe is to will;\u201d as if the will being necessitated, the doing of what we\nwill were not liberty. Another is: \u201cIf a man be free to act, he is much\nmore free to will; because _quod efficit tale, illud magis est tale_;\u201d\nas if he should say, \u201cif I make him angry, then I am more angry; because\n_quod efficit_,\u201d &c. The third is: \u201cIf the will be determined, then the\nwriting is determined, and he ought not to say he _may_ write, but he\n_must_ write.\u201d It is true, it followeth that he must write, but it doth\nnot follow I ought to say he must write, unless he would have me say\nmore than I know, as himself doth often in this reply.\n\nAfter his arguments come his difficult questions. \u201cIf the will of man be\ndetermined without his will, or without any thing in his power, why do\nwe ask men whether they will do such a thing or not?\u201d I answer, because\nwe desire to know, and cannot know but by their telling, nor then\nneither, for the most part. \u201cWhy do we represent reasons to them? Why do\nwe pray them? Why do we entreat them?\u201d I answer, because thereby we\nthink to make them have the will they have not. \u201cWhy do we blame them?\u201d\nI answer, because they please us not. I might ask him, whether blaming\nbe any thing else but saying the thing blamed is ill or imperfect? May\nwe not say a horse is lame, though his lameness came from necessity? or\nthat a man is a fool or a knave, if he be so, though he could not help\nit? \u201cTo what purpose did our Saviour say to the paralytic person, _wilt\nthou be made clean_, if his will were extrinsically determined?\u201d I\nanswer, that it was not because he would know, for he knew it before;\nbut because he would draw from him a confession of his want. \u201c_We have\npiped unto you, and ye have not danced_; how could they help it?\u201d I\nanswer they could not help it. \u201c_I would have gathered your children as\nthe hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not._ How\neasily might they answer, according to T. H.\u2019s doctrine, Alas! blame not\nus, our wills are not in our own power?\u201d I answer, they are to be blamed\nthough their wills be not in their own power. Is not good good, and evil\nevil, though they be not in our power? and shall not I call them so? and\nis not that praise and blame? But it seems the Bishop takes blame, not\nfor the dispraise of a thing, but for a pretext and colour of malice and\nrevenge against him he blameth. And where he says our wills are in our\npower, he sees not that he speaks absurdly; for he ought to say, the\nwill is the power; and through ignorance detecteth the same fault in St.\nAustin, who saith, \u201cour will should not be a will at all, if it were not\nin our power;\u201d that is to say, if it were not in our will.\n\n(_f_) \u201cThis is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned from\nour tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by nature,\u201d &c.\n\nThis piece of eloquence is used by Cicero in his defence of Milo, to\nprove it lawful for a man to resist force with force, or to keep himself\nfrom killing; which the Bishop, thinking himself able to make that which\nproves one thing prove any thing, hath translated into English, and\nbrought into this place to prove free-will. It is true, very few have\nlearned from tutors, that a man is not free to will; nor do they find it\nmuch in books. That they find in books, that which the poets chant in\ntheir theatres and the shepherds in the mountains, that which the\npastors teach in the churches and the doctors in the universities, and\nthat which the common people in the markets, and all mankind in the\nwhole world do assent unto, is the same that I assent unto, namely, that\na man hath freedom to do if he will; but whether he hath freedom to\nwill, is a question which it seems neither the Bishop nor they ever\nthought on.\n\n(_g_) \u201cNo man blameth fire for burning cities, nor taxeth poison for\ndestroying men,\u201d &c.\n\nHere again he is upon his arguments from blame, which I have answered\nbefore; and we do as much blame them as we do men. For we say fire hath\ndone hurt, and the poison hath killed a man, as well as we say the man\nhath done unjustly; but we do not seek to be revenged of the fire and of\npoison, because we cannot make them ask forgiveness, as we would make\nmen to do when they hurt us. So that the blaming of the one and the\nother, that is, the declaring of the hurt or evil action done by them,\nis the same in both; but the malice of man is only against man.\n\n(_h_) \u201cNo man sins in doing those things which he could not shun.\u201d\n\nHe may as well say, no man halts which cannot choose but halt; or\nstumbles, that cannot choose but stumble. For what is sin, but halting\nor stumbling in the way of God\u2019s commandments?\n\n(_i_) \u201cThe question then is not, whether a man be necessitated to will\nor nill, yet free to act or forbear. But, saving the ambiguous\nacceptions of the word _free_, the question is plainly this,\u201d &c.\n\nThis question, which the Bishop stateth in this place, I have before set\ndown verbatim and allowed: and it is the same with mine, though he\nperceive it not. But seeing I did nothing, but at his request set down\nmy opinion, there can be no other question between us in this\ncontroversy, but whether my opinion be the truth or not.\n\n(_k_) \u201cSo my preface remains yet unanswered. Either I was extrinsically\nand inevitably predetermined to write this discourse,\u201d &c.\n\nThat which he saith in the preface is, \u201cthat if he be not free to write\nthis discourse, he ought not to be blamed; but if he be free, he hath\nobtained the cause.\u201d\n\nThe first consequence I should have granted him, if he had written it\nrationally and civilly; the latter I deny, and have shown that he ought\nto have proved that a man is free to will. For that which he says, any\nthing else whatsoever would think, if it knew it were moved, and did not\nknow what moved it. A wooden top that is lashed by the boys, and runs\nabout sometimes to one wall, sometimes to another, sometimes spinning,\nsometimes hitting men on the shins, if it were sensible of its own\nmotion, would think it proceeded from its own will, unless it felt what\nlashed it. And is a man any wiser, when he runs to one place for a\nbenefice, to another for a bargain, and troubles the world with writing\nerrors and requiring answers, because he thinks he doth it without other\ncause than his own will, and seeth not what are the lashings that cause\nhis will?\n\n NO. IV.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cAnd so to fall in hand with the question without any further\nproems or prefaces, by _liberty_, I do neither understand a liberty from\nsin, nor a liberty from misery, nor a liberty from servitude, nor a\nliberty from violence, but I understand a liberty from necessity, or\nrather from necessitation; that is, an universal immunity from all\ninevitability and determination to one; whether it be of _exercise_\nonly, which the Schools call a liberty of _contradiction_, and is found\nin God and in the good and bad angels, that is, not a liberty to do both\ngood and evil, but a liberty to do or not to do this or that good, this\nor that evil, respectively; or whether it be a liberty of _specification\nand exercise_ also, which the Schools call liberty of _contrariety_, and\nis found in men endowed with reason and understanding, that is, a\nliberty to do and not to do good and evil, this or that. Thus the coast\nbeing cleared,\u201d &c.\n\n_T. H._ In the next place he maketh certain distinctions of liberty, and\nsays, he means not liberty from sin, nor from servitude, nor from\nviolence, but from necessity, necessitation, inevitability, and\ndetermination to one. It had been better to define liberty, than thus to\ndistinguish; for I understand never the more what he means by liberty.\nAnd though he says he means liberty from necessitation, yet I understand\nnot how such a liberty can be, and it is a taking of the question\nwithout proof. For what else is the question between us, but whether\nsuch a liberty be possible or not? There are in the same place other\ndistinctions, as a liberty of exercise only, which he calls a liberty of\ncontradiction, namely, of doing not good or evil simply, but of doing\nthis or that good, or this or that evil, respectively: and a liberty of\nspecification and exercise also, which he calls a liberty of\ncontrariety, namely, a liberty not only to do or not to do good or evil,\nbut also to do or not to do this or that good or evil. And with these\ndistinctions, he says, he clears the coast, whereas in truth he\ndarkeneth his meaning, not only with the jargon of exercise only,\nspecification also, contradiction, contrariety, but also with pretending\ndistinction where none is. For how is it possible for the liberty of\ndoing or not doing this or that good or evil, to consist, as he saith it\ndoth in God and Angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or\nevil?\n\n_J. D._ (_a_) \u201cIt is a rule in art, that words which are homonymous, of\nvarious and ambiguous significations, ought ever in the first place to\nbe distinguished. No men delight in confused generalities, but either\nsophisters or bunglers. _Vir dolosus versatur in generalibus_, deceitful\nmen do not love to descend to particulars; and when bad archers shoot,\nthe safest way is to run to the mark. Liberty is sometimes opposed to\nthe slavery of sin and vicious habits, as (Romans vi. 22): _Now being\nmade free from sin_. Sometimes to misery and oppression, (Isaiah lviii.\n6): _To let the oppressed go free_. Sometimes to servitude, as\n(Leviticus xxv. 10): _In the year of jubilee ye shall proclaim liberty\nthroughout the land_. Sometimes to violence, as (Psalms cv. 20): _The\nprince of his people let him go free_. Yet none of all these is the\nliberty now in question, but a liberty from necessity, that is, a\ndetermination to one, or rather from necessitation, that is, a necessity\nimposed by another, or an extrinsical determination. These distinctions\ndo virtually imply a description of true liberty, which comes nearer the\nessence of it, than T. H.\u2019s roving definition, as we shall see in due\nplace. And though he say that \u2018he understands never the more what I mean\nby liberty,\u2019 yet it is plain, by his own ingenuous confession, both that\nhe doth understand it, and that this is the very question where the\nwater sticks between us, whether there be such a liberty free from all\nnecessitation and extrinsical determination to one. Which being but the\nstating of the question, he calls it amiss \u2018the taking of the question.\u2019\nIt were too much weakness to beg this question, which is so copious and\ndemonstrable. (_b_) It is strange to see with what confidence,\nnow-a-days, particular men slight all the Schoolmen, and Philosophers,\nand classic authors of former ages, as if they were not worthy to\nunloose the shoe-strings of some modern author, or did sit in darkness\nand in the shadow of death, until some third Cato dropped down from\nheaven, to whom all men must repair, as to the altar of Prometheus, to\nlight their torches. I did never wonder to hear a raw divine out of the\npulpit declare against School Divinity to his equally ignorant auditors.\nIt is but as the fox in the fable, who, having lost his own tail by a\nmischance, would have persuaded all his followers to cut off theirs, and\nthrow them away as unprofitable burthens. But it troubles me to see a\nscholar, one who hath been long admitted into the innermost closet of\nnature, and seen the hidden secrets of more subtle learning, so far to\nforget himself as to style School-learning no better than a plain\njargon, that is, a senseless gibberish, or a fustian language, like the\nchattering noise of sabots. Suppose they did sometimes too much cut\ntruth into shreds, or delight in abstruse expressions, yet certainly\nthis distinction of liberty into liberty of _contrariety_ and liberty of\n_contradiction_, or which is all one, of _exercise only_, or _exercise\nand specification jointly_, which T. H. rejects with so much scorn, is\nso true, so necessary, so generally received, that there is scarce that\nwriter of note, either divine or philosopher, who did ever treat upon\nthis subject, but he useth it.\n\n\u201cGood and evil are contraries, or opposite kinds of things. Therefore to\nbe able to choose both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, or of\nspecification. To choose this, and not to choose this, are\ncontradictory, or which is all one, an exercise or suspension of power.\nTherefore to be able to do or forbear to do the same action, or to\nchoose or not choose the same object, without varying of the kind, is a\nliberty of contradiction, or of exercise only. Now a man is not only\nable to do or forbear to do good only, or evil only, but he is able both\nto do and to forbear to do both good and evil. So he hath not only a\nliberty of the action, but also a liberty of contrary objects; not only\na liberty of exercise, but also of specification; not only a liberty of\ncontradiction, but also of contrariety. On the other side, God and the\ngood angels can do or not do this or that good; but they cannot do and\nnot do both good and evil. So they have only a liberty of exercise or\ncontradiction, but not a liberty of specification or contrariety. It\nappears then plainly, that the liberty of man is more large in the\nextension of the object, which is both good and evil, than the liberty\nof God and the good angels, whose object is only good. But withal the\nliberty of man comes short in the intention of the power. Man is not so\nfree in respect of good only, as God or the good angels, because (not to\nspeak of God, whose liberty is quite of another nature) the\nunderstandings of the angels are clearer, their power and dominion over\ntheir actions is greater, they have no sensitive appetites to distract\nthem, no organs to be disturbed. We see, then, this distinction is\ncleared from all darkness.\n\n\u201cAnd where T. H. demands, how it is possible for the liberty of doing or\nnot doing this or that good or evil, to consist in God and angels,\nwithout a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil? the answer is\nobvious and easy, _referendo singula singulis_, rendering every act to\nits right object respectively. God and good angels have a power to do or\nnot to do this or that good, bad angels have a power to do or not to do\nthis or that evil; so both, jointly considered, have power respectively\nto do good or evil. And yet, according to the words of my discourse, God\nand good and bad angels, being singly considered, have no power to do\ngood or evil, that is, indifferently, as man hath.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. IV.\n\nHe intendeth here to make good the distinctions of liberty of\n_exercise_, and liberty of _contradiction_; liberty of _contrariety_,\nand liberty of _specification and exercise_. And he begins thus:\n\n(_a_) \u201cIt is a rule in art, that words which are homonymous, or of\nvarious and ambiguous significations, ought ever in the first place to\nbe distinguished,\u201d &c.\n\nI know not what art it is that giveth this rule. I am sure it is not the\nart of reason, which men call logic. For reason teacheth, and the\nexample of those who only reason methodically, (which are the\nmathematicians), that a man, when he will demonstrate the truth of what\nhe is to say, must in the first place determine what he will have to be\nunderstood by his words; which determination is called definition;\nwhereby the significations of his words are so clearly set down, that\nthere can creep in no ambiguity. And therefore there will be no need of\ndistinctions; and consequently his rule of art, is a rash precept of\nsome ignorant man, whom he and others have followed.\n\nThe Bishop tells us that liberty is sometimes opposed to sin, to\noppression, to servitude; which is to tell us, that they whom he hath\nread in this point, are inconsistent in the meaning of their own words;\nand, therefore, they are little beholden to him. And this diversity of\nsignifications he calls distinctions. Do men that by the same word in\none place mean one thing, and in another another, and never tell us so,\ndistinguish? I think they rather confound. And yet he says, that \u201cthese\ndistinctions do virtually imply a description of true liberty, which\ncometh nearer the essence of it, than T. H.\u2019s roving definition;\u201d which\ndefinition of mine was this: \u201cliberty is when there is no external\nimpediment.\u201d So that in his opinion a man shall sooner understand\nliberty by reading these words, (Romans vi. 22): _Being made free from\nsin_; or these words, (Isaiah lviii. 6): _To let the oppressed go free_;\nor by these words, (Leviticus xxv. 10): _You shall proclaim liberty\nthroughout the land_, than by these words of mine: \u201cliberty is the\nabsence of external impediments to motion.\u201d Also he will face me down,\nthat I understand what he means by his distinctions of liberty of\n_contrariety_, of _contradiction_, of _exercise only_, of _exercise and\nspecification jointly_. If he mean I understand his meaning, in one\nsense it is true. For by them he means to shift off the discredit of\nbeing able to say nothing to the question; as they do that, pretending\nto know the cause of every thing, give for the cause of why the\nload-stone draweth to it iron, sympathy, and occult quality; making\n_they cannot tell_, (turned now into occult), to stand for the real\ncause of that most admirable effect. But that those words signify\ndistinction, I constantly deny. It is not enough for a distinction to be\nforked; it ought to signify a distinct conception. There is great\ndifference between duade distinctions and cloven feet.\n\n(_b_) \u201cIt is strange to see with what confidence now-a-days particular\nmen slight all the Schoolmen, and philosophers, and classic authors of\nformer ages,\u201d &c.\n\nThis word, _particular men_, is put here, in my opinion, with little\njudgment, especially by a man that pretendeth to be learned. Does the\nBishop think that he himself is, or that there is any universal man? It\nmay be he means a private man. Does he then think there is any man not\nprivate, besides him that is endued with sovereign power? But it is most\nlikely he calls me a particular man, because I have not had the\nauthority he has had, to teach what doctrine I think fit. But now, I am\nno more particular than he; and may with as good a grace despise the\nSchoolmen and some of the old Philosophers, as he can despise me, unless\nhe can shew that it is more likely that he should be better able to look\ninto these questions sufficiently, which require meditation and\nreflection upon a man\u2019s own thoughts, he that hath been obliged most of\nhis time to preach unto the people, and to that end to read those\nauthors that can best furnish him with what he has to say, and to study\nfor the rhetoric of his expressions, and of the spare time (which to a\ngood pastor is very little) hath spent no little part in seeking\npreferment and increasing of riches; than I, that have done almost\nnothing else, nor have had much else to do but to meditate upon this and\nother natural questions. It troubles him much that I style\nSchool-learning jargon. I do not call all School-learning so, but such\nas is so; that is, that which they say in defending of untruths, and\nespecially in the maintenance of free-will, when they talk of _liberty\nof exercise, specification, contrariety, contradiction, acts elicite and\nexercite_ and the like; which, though he go over again in this place,\nendeavouring to explain them, are still both here and there but jargon,\nor that (if he like it better) which the Scripture in the first chaos\ncalleth _Tohu_ and _Bohu_.\n\nBut because he takes it so heinously, that a private man should so\nhardly censure School-divinity, I would be glad to know with what\npatience he can hear Martin Luther and Philip Melancthon speaking of the\nsame? Martin Luther, that was the first beginner of our deliverance from\nthe servitude of the Romish clergy, had these three articles censured by\nthe University of Paris. The first of which was: \u201cSchool-theology is a\nfalse interpretation of the Scripture, and Sacraments, which hath\nbanished from us true and sincere theology.\u201d The second is: \u201cAt what\ntime School-theology, that is, mock-theology, came up, at the same time\nthe theology of Christ\u2019s Cross went down.\u201d The third is: \u201cIt is now\nalmost three hundred years since the Church has endured the\nlicentiousness of School-Doctors in corrupting of the Scriptures.\u201d\nMoreover, the same Luther in another place of his work saith thus;\n\u201cSchool-theology is nothing else but ignorance of the truth, and a block\nto stumble at laid before the Scriptures.\u201d And of Thomas Aquinas in\nparticular he saith, that \u201cit was he that did set up the kingdom of\nAristotle, the destroyer of godly doctrine.\u201d And of the philosophy\nwhereof St. Paul biddeth us beware, he saith it is School-theology. And\nMelancthon, a divine once much esteemed in our Church, saith of it thus:\n\u201cIt is known that that profane scholastic learning, which they will have\nto be called Divinity, began at Paris; which being admitted, nothing is\nleft sound in the Church, the Gospel is obscured, faith extinguished,\nthe doctrine of works received, and instead of Christ\u2019s people, we are\nbecome not so much as the people of the law, but the people of\nAristotle\u2019s ethics These were no raw divines, such as he saith preached\nto their equally ignorant auditors. I could add to these the slighting\nof School-divinity by Calvin and other learned Protestant Doctors; yet\nwere they all but private men, who, it seems to the Bishop, had forgot\nthemselves as well as I.\n\n NO. V.\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThus the coast being cleared, the next thing to be done, is to\ndraw out our forces against the enemy; and because they are divided into\ntwo squadrons, the one of Christians, the other of heathen philosophers,\nit will be best to dispose ours also into two bodies, the former drawn\nfrom Scripture, the latter from reason.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ The next thing he doth, after the clearing of the coast, is the\ndividing of his forces, as he calls them, into two squadrons, one of\nplaces of Scripture, the other of reasons, which allegory he useth, I\nsuppose, because he addresses the discourse to your Lordship, who is a\nmilitary man. All that I have to say touching this, is, that I observe a\ngreat part of those his forces do look and march another way, and some\nof them do fight among themselves.\n\n_J. D._ \u201cIf T. H. could divide my forces, and commit them together among\nthemselves, it were his only way to conquer them. But he will find that\nthose imaginary contradictions, which he thinks he hath espied in my\ndiscourse, are but fancies, and my supposed impertinences will prove his\nown real mistakings.\u201d\n\nIn this fifth number there is nothing of his or mine, pertinent to the\nquestion, therefore nothing necessary to be repeated.\n\n\n PROOFS OF LIBERTY OUT OF SCRIPTURE.--NO. VI.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cFirst, whosoever have power of election, have true liberty; for\nthe proper act of liberty is election. A spontaneity may consist with\ndetermination to one, as we see in children, fools, madmen, brute\nbeasts, whose fancies are determined to those things which they act\nspontaneously, as the bees make honey, the spiders webs. But none of\nthese have a liberty of election, which is an act of judgment and\nunderstanding, and cannot possibly consist with a determination to one.\nHe that is determined by something before himself or without himself,\ncannot be said to choose or elect, unless it be as the junior of the\nmess chooseth in Cambridge, whether he will have the least part or\nnothing. And scarcely so much.\n\n\u201cBut men have liberty of election. This is plain, (Numbers xxx. 13): _If\na wife make a vow it is left to her husband\u2019s choice, either to\nestablish it or to make it void_. And (Joshua xxiv. 15): _Choose you\nthis day whom you will serve_, &c. _But I and my house will serve the\nLord._ He makes his own choice, and leaves them to the liberty of their\nelection. And (2 Samuel xxiv. 12): _I offer thee three things, choose\nthee which of them I shall do_. If one of these three things was\nnecessarily determined, and the other two impossible, how was it left to\nhim to choose what should be done? Therefore we have true liberty.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ And the first place of Scripture taken from Numbers xxx. 13, is\none of them that look another way. The words are, _If a wife make a vow\nit is left to her husband\u2019s choice, either to establish it or make it\nvoid_. For it proves no more but that the husband is a free or voluntary\nagent, but not that his choice therein is not necessitated or not\ndetermined to what he shall choose by precedent necessary causes.\n\n_J. D._ \u201cMy first argument from Scripture is thus formed.\n\n\u201cWhosoever have a liberty or power of election, are not determined to\none by precedent necessary causes.\n\n\u201cBut men have liberty of election.\n\n\u201cThe assumption or _minor_ proposition is proved by three places of\nScripture, (Numbers xxx. 13; Joshua xxiv. 15; 2 Samuel xxiv. 12.) I need\nnot insist upon these, because T. H. acknowledgeth \u2018that it is clearly\nproved that there is election in man.\u2019\n\n\u201cBut he denieth the _major_ proposition, because, saith he, \u2018man is\nnecessitated or determined to what he shall choose by precedent\nnecessary causes.\u2019 I take away this answer three ways.\n\n\u201cFirst, by reason. Election is evermore either of things possible, or at\nleast of things conceived to be possible, that is, efficacious election,\nwhen a man hopeth or thinketh of obtaining the object. Whatsoever the\nwill chooseth, it chooseth under the notion of good, either honest, or\ndelightful, or profitable. But there can be no real goodness apprehended\nin that which is known to be impossible. It is true, there may be some\nwandering pendulous wishes of known impossibilities, as a man also that\nhath committed an offence may wish he had not committed it. But to\nchoose efficaciously an impossibility, is as impossible as an\nimpossibility itself. No man can think to obtain that which he knows\nimpossible to be obtained; but he who knows that all things are\nantecedently determined by necessary causes, knows that it is impossible\nfor anything to be otherwise than it is; therefore to ascribe unto him a\npower of election to choose this or that indifferently, is to make the\nsame thing to be determined to one, and to be not determined to one,\nwhich are contradictories. Again, whosoever hath an elective power, or a\nliberty to choose, hath also a liberty or power to refuse; (Isaiah vii.\n16): _Before the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the\ngood_. He who chooseth this rather than that, refuseth that rather than\nthis. As Moses (Hebrews xi. 25), choosing to suffer affliction with the\npeople of God, did thereby refuse the pleasures of sin. But no man hath\nany power to refuse that which is necessarily predetermined to be,\nunless it be as the fox refused the grapes which were beyond his reach.\nWhen one thing of two or three is absolutely determined, the others are\nmade thereby simply impossible.\n\n(_a_) \u201cSecondly, I prove it by instances, and by that universal notion\nwhich the world hath of election. What is the difference between an\nelective and hereditary kingdom, but that in an elective kingdom, they\nhave power or liberty to choose this or that man indifferently; but in\nan hereditary kingdom, they have no such power nor liberty? Where the\nlaw makes a certain heir, there is a necessitation to one; where the law\ndoth not name a certain heir, there is no necessitation to one, and\nthere they have power or liberty to choose. An hereditary prince may be\nas grateful and acceptable to his subjects, and as willingly received by\nthem (according to that liberty which is opposed to compulsion or\nviolence), as he who is chosen: yet he is not therefore an elective\nprince. In Germany all the nobility and commons may assent to the choice\nof the emperor, or be well pleased with it when it is concluded; yet\nnone of them elect or choose the emperor, but only those six princes who\nhave a consultative, deliberative, and determinative power in his\nelection; and if their votes or suffrages be equally divided, three to\nthree, then the King of Bohemia hath the casting voice. So likewise in\ncorporations or commonwealths, sometimes the people, sometimes the\ncommon-council, have power to name so many persons for such an office,\nand the supreme magistrate, or senate, or lesser council respectively,\nto choose one of those. And all this is done with that caution and\nsecresy, by billets or other means, that no man knows which way any man\ngave his vote, or with whom to be offended. If it were necessarily and\ninevitably predetermined, that this individual person, and no other,\nshall and must be chosen, what needed all this circuit and caution, to\ndo that which is not possible to be done otherwise, which one may do as\nwell as a thousand, and for doing of which no rational man can be\noffended, if the electors were necessarily predetermined to elect this\nman and no other. And though T. H. was pleased to pass by my University\ninstance, yet I may not, until I see what he is able to say unto it. The\njunior of the mess in Cambridge divides the meat in four parts; the\nsenior chooseth first, then the second and third in their order. The\njunior is determined to one, and hath no choice left, unless it be to\nchoose whether he will take that part which the rest have refused, or\nnone at all. It may be this part is more agreeable to his mind than any\nof the others would have been; but for all that he cannot be said to\nchoose it, because he is determined to this one. Even such a liberty of\nelection is that which is established by T. H.; or rather much worse in\ntwo respects. The junior hath yet a liberty of contradiction left, to\nchoose whether he will take that part, or not take any part; but he who\nis precisely predetermined to the choice of this object, hath no liberty\nto refuse it. Secondly, the junior, by dividing carefully, may preserve\nto himself an equal share; but he who is wholly determined by\nextrinsical causes, is left altogether to the mercy and disposition of\nanother.\n\n\u201cThirdly, I prove it by the texts alleged. (Numb. xxx. 13): _If a wife\nmake a vow, it is left to her husband\u2019s choice, either to establish it\nor make it void_. But if it be predetermined that he shall establish it,\nit is not in his power to make it void. If it be predetermined that he\nshall make it void, it is not in his power to establish it. And\nhowsoever it be determined, yet being determined, it is not in his power\nindifferently, either to establish it, or to make it void at his\npleasure. So (Joshua xxiv. 15): _Choose you this day whom ye will serve:\nbut I and my house will serve the Lord_. It is too late to choose that\n_this day_, which was determined otherwise yesterday. _Whom ye will\nserve, whether the Gods whom your fathers served, or the Gods of the\nAmorites._ Where there is an election of this or that, these Gods, or\nthose Gods, there must needs be either an indifferency to both objects,\nor at least a possibility to either. _I and my house will serve the\nLord._ If he were extrinsically predetermined, he should not say I\n_will_ serve, but I _must_ serve. And (2 Samuel xxiv. 12): _I offer thee\nthree things, choose thee which of them I shall do_. How doth God offer\nthree things to David\u2019s choice, if he had predetermined him to one of\nthe three by a concourse of necessary extrinsical causes? If a sovereign\nprince should descend so far as to offer a delinquent his choice,\nwhether he would be fined, or imprisoned, or banished, and had underhand\nsigned the sentence of his banishment, what were it else but plain\ndrollery or mockery? This is the argument which in T. H.\u2019s opinion looks\nanother way. If it do, it is as the Parthians used to fight, flying. His\nreason follows next to be considered.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. VI.\n\nIn this number he hath brought three places of Scripture to prove\n_freewill_. The first is, _If a wife make a vow, it is left to her\nhusband\u2019s choice either to establish it or to make it void_. And,\n_Choose you this day whom ye will serve, &c. But I and my house will\nserve the Lord._ And, _I offer thee three things, choose thee which of\nthem I shall do_. Which in the reply he endeavoureth to make good; but\nneeded not, seeing they prove nothing but that a man is free to do if he\nwill, which I deny not. He ought to prove he is free to will, which I\ndeny.\n\n(_a_) Secondly, \u201cI prove it by instances, and by that universal notion\nwhich the world hath of election.\u201d\n\nHis instances are, first, the difference between an hereditary kingdom\nand an elective; and then the difference between the senior and junior\nof the mess taking their commons; both which prove the liberty of doing\nwhat they will, but not a liberty to will. For in the first case, the\nelectors are free to name whom they will, but not to will; and in the\nsecond, the senior having an appetite, chooseth what he hath an appetite\nto; but chooseth not his appetite.\n\n NO. VII.\n\n_T. H._ For if there came into the husband\u2019s mind greater good by\nestablishing than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will follow\nnecessarily. And if the evil that will follow thereon in the husband\u2019s\nopinion outweigh the good, the contrary must needs follow. And yet in\nthis following of one\u2019s hopes and fears consisteth the nature of\nelection. So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose\nthis. And consequently choosing and necessity are joined together.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ (_a_) \u201cThere is nothing said with more show of reason in this\ncause by the patrons of necessity and adversaries of true liberty than\nthis, that the will doth perpetually and infallibly follow the last\ndictate of the understanding, or the last judgment of right reason. And\nin this, and this only, I confess T. H. hath good seconds. Yet the\ncommon and approved opinion is contrary, and justly.\n\n\u201cFor first, this very act of the understanding is an effect of the will,\nand a testimony of its power and liberty. It is the will, which\naffecting some particular good, doth engage and command the\nunderstanding to consult and deliberate what means are convenient for\nattaining that end. And though the will itself be blind, yet its object\nis good in general, which is the end of all human actions. Therefore it\nbelongs to the will, as to the general of an army, to move the other\npowers of the soul to their acts, and among the rest the understanding\nalso, by applying it and reducing its power into act. So as whatsoever\nobligation the understanding doth put upon the will, is by the consent\nof the will, and derived from the power of the will, which was not\nnecessitated to move the understanding to consult. So the will is the\nlady and mistress of human actions; the understanding is her trusty\ncounsellor, which gives no advice but when it is required by the will.\nAnd if the first consultation or deliberation be not sufficient, the\nwill may move a review, and require the understanding to inform itself\nbetter and take advice of others, from whence many times the judgment of\nthe understanding doth receive alteration.\n\n\u201cSecondly, for the manner how the understanding doth determine the will,\nit is not naturally but morally. The will is moved by the understanding,\nnot as by an efficient having a causal influence into the effect, but\nonly by proposing and representing the object. And therefore, as it were\nridiculous to say that the object of the sight is the cause of seeing,\nso it is to say that the proposing of the object by the understanding to\nthe will is the cause of willing; and therefore the understanding hath\nno place in that concourse of causes, which according to T. H. do\nnecessitate the will.\n\n\u201cThirdly, the judgment of the understanding is not always _practice\npracticum_, nor of such a nature in itself as to oblige and determine\nthe will to one. Sometimes, the understanding proposeth two or three\nmeans equally available to the attaining of one and the same end.\nSometimes, it dictateth that this or that particular good is eligible or\nfit to be chosen, but not that it is necessarily eligible or that it\nmust be chosen. It may judge this or that to be a fit means, but not the\nonly means to attain the desired end. In these cases no man can doubt\nbut that the will may choose, or not choose, this or that indifferently.\nYea, though the understanding shall judge one of these means to be more\nexpedient than another, yet forasmuch as in the less expedient there is\nfound the reason of good, the will in respect of that dominion which it\nhath over itself, may accept that which the understanding judgeth to be\nless expedient, and refuse that which it judgeth to be more expedient.\n\n\u201cFourthly, sometimes the will doth not will the end so efficaciously,\nbut that it may be, and often is deterred from the prosecution of it by\nthe difficulty of the means; and notwithstanding the judgment of the\nunderstanding, the will may still suspend its own act.\n\n\u201cFifthly, supposing, but not granting, that the will did necessarily\nfollow the last dictate of the understanding, yet this proves no\nantecedent necessity, but coexistent with the act; no extrinsical\nnecessity, the will and the understanding being but two faculties of the\nsame soul; no absolute necessity, but merely upon supposition. And\ntherefore the same authors who maintain that the judgment of the\nunderstanding doth necessarily determine the will, do yet much more\nearnestly oppugn T. H.\u2019s absolute necessity of all occurrences. Suppose\nthe will shall apply the understanding to deliberate and not require a\nreview. Suppose the dictate of the understanding shall be absolute, not\nthis or that indifferently, nor this rather than that comparatively, but\nthis positively; nor this freely, but this necessarily. And suppose the\nwill do will efficaciously, and do not suspend its own act. Then here is\na necessity indeed, but neither absolute nor extrinsical, nor\nantecedent, flowing from a concourse of causes without ourselves, but a\nnecessity upon supposition, which we do readily grant. So far T. H. is\nwide from the truth, whilst he maintains, either that the apprehension\nof a greater good doth necessitate the will, or that this is an absolute\nnecessity.\n\n(_b_) \u201cLastly, whereas he saith, that \u2018the nature of election doth\nconsist in following our hopes and fears,\u2019 I cannot but observe that\nthere is not one word of art in this whole treatise which he useth in\nthe right sense; I hope it doth not proceed out of an affectation of\nsingularity, nor out of a contempt of former writers, nor out of a\ndesire to take in sunder the whole frame of learning and new mould it\nafter his own mind. It were to be wished that at least he would give us\na new dictionary, that we might understand his sense. But because this\nis but touched here sparingly, and upon the by, I will forbear it until\nI meet with it again in its proper place. And for the present it shall\nsuffice to say, that hopes and fears are common to brute beasts, but\nelection is a rational act, and is proper only to man, who is _sanctius\nhis animal, mentisque capacius alt\u00e6_.\n\n_T. H._ The second place of Scripture is Joshua xxiv. 15; the third is 2\nSamuel xxiv. 12; whereby it is clearly proved, that there is election in\nman, but not proved that such election was not necessitated by the\nhopes, and fears, and considerations of good and bad to follow, which\ndepend not on the will nor are subject to election. And therefore one\nanswer serves all such places, if they were a thousand.\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThis answer being the very same with the former, word for word,\nwhich hath already sufficiently been shaken in pieces, doth require no\nnew reply.\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. VII.\n\n(_a_) \u201cThere is nothing said with more show of reason in this cause by\nthe patrons of necessity than this, \u2018that the will doth perpetually and\ninfallibly follow the last dictate of the understanding, or the last\njudgment of right reason,\u2019 &c. Yet the common and approved opinion is\ncontrary, and justly; for, first, this very act of the understanding is\nan effect of the will, &c.\u201d\n\nI note here, first, that the Bishop is mistaken in saying that I or any\nother patron of necessity, are of opinion that the will follows always\nthe last judgment of right reason. For it followeth as well the judgment\nof an erroneous as of a true reasoning; and the truth in general is that\nit followeth the last opinion of the goodness or evilness of the object,\nbe the opinion true or false.\n\nSecondly, I note, that in making the understanding to be an effect of\nthe will, he thinketh a man may have a will to that which he not so much\nas thinks on. And in saying, that \u201cit is the will which, affecting some\nparticular good, doth engage and command the understanding to consult,\u201d\n&c, that he not only thinketh the will affecteth a particular good,\nbefore the man understands it to be good; but also he thinketh that\nthese words \u201cdoth command the understanding,\u201d and these, \u201cfor it belongs\nto the will as to the general of an army, to move the other powers of\nthe soul to their acts,\u201d and a great many more that follow, are sense,\nwhich they are not, but mere confusion and emptiness: as, for example,\n\u201cthe understanding doth determine the will, not naturally, but morally,\u201d\nand \u201cthe will is moved by the understanding,\u201d is unintelligible. \u201cMoved\nnot as by an efficient,\u201d is nonsense. And where he saith, that \u201cit is\nridiculous to say the object of the sight is the cause of seeing,\u201d he\nshoweth so clearly that he understandeth nothing at all of natural\nphilosophy, that I am sorry I had the ill fortune to be engaged with him\nin a dispute of this kind. There is nothing that the simplest countryman\ncould say so absurdly concerning the understanding, as this of the\nBishop, \u201cthe judgment of the understanding is not always _practice\npracticum_.\u201d A countryman will acknowledge there is judgment in men, but\nwill as soon say the judgment of the judgment, as the judgment of the\nunderstanding. And if _practice practicum_ had been sense, he might have\nmade a shift to put it into English. Much more followeth of this stuff.\n\n(_b_) \u201cLastly, whereas he saith, \u2018that the nature of election doth\nconsist in following our hopes and fears,\u2019 I cannot but observe that\nthere is not one word of art in this whole treatise which he useth in\nthe right sense. I hope it doth not proceed out of an affectation of\nsingularity, nor out of a contempt of former writers,\u201d &c.\n\nHe might have said, there is not a word of jargon nor nonsense; and that\nit proceedeth from an affectation of truth, and contempt of metaphysical\nwriters, and a desire to reduce into frame the learning which they have\nconfounded and disordered.\n\n NO. VIII.\n\n_T. H._ Supposing, it seems, I might answer as I have done, that\nnecessity and election might stand together, and instance in the actions\nof children, fools, and brute beasts, whose fancies, I might say, are\nnecessitated and determined to one: before these his proofs out of\nScripture, he desires to prevent that instance, and therefore says, that\nthe actions of children, fools, madmen, and beasts, are indeed\ndetermined, but that they proceed not from election, nor from free, but\nfrom spontaneous agents. As for example, that the bee, when it maketh\nhoney, does it spontaneously; and when the spider makes his web, he does\nit spontaneously, and not by election. Though I never meant to ground\nany answer upon the experience of what children, fools, madmen, and\nbeasts do, yet that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by\nspontaneous, and how it differs from voluntary, I will answer that\ndistinction, and show that it fighteth against its fellow arguments.\nYour Lordship therefore is to consider, that all voluntary actions,\nwhere the thing that induceth the will is not fear, are called also\nspontaneous, and said to be done by a man\u2019s own accord. As when a man\ngiveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, or out of\naffection, he is said to do it of his own accord, which in Latin is\n_sponte_, and therefore the action is spontaneous; though to give one\u2019s\nmoney willingly to a thief to avoid killing, or throw it into the sea to\navoid drowning, where the motive is fear, be not called spontaneous. But\nevery spontaneous action is not therefore voluntary; for voluntary\npresupposes some precedent deliberation, that is to say, some\nconsideration and meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the\ndoing and abstaining from the action deliberated of; whereas many\nactions are done of our own accord, and are therefore spontaneous; of\nwhich nevertheless, as he thinks, we never consulted nor deliberated in\nourselves, as when making no question nor any the least doubt in the\nworld but that the thing we are about is good, we eat, or walk, or in\nanger strike or revile, which he thinks spontaneous, but not voluntary\nnor elective actions. And with such kind of actions he says\nnecessitation may stand, but not with such as are voluntary, and proceed\nupon election and deliberation. Now if I make it appear to you that even\nthese actions which he says proceed from spontaneity, and which he\nascribes only to fools, children, madmen, and beasts, proceed from\ndeliberation and election, and that actions inconsiderate, rash and\nspontaneous, are ordinarily found in those that are, by themselves and\nmany more, thought as wise or wiser than ordinary men are; then his\nargument concludeth, that necessity and election may stand together,\nwhich is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his\narguments to prove. And first, your Lordship\u2019s own experience furnishes\nyou with proof enough, that horses, dogs, and other brute beasts, do\ndemur oftentimes upon the way they are to take: the horse, retiring from\nsome strange figure he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And\nwhat else doth man that deliberateth, but one while proceed toward\naction, another while retire from it, as the hope of greater good draws\nhim, or the fear of greater evil drives him? A child may be so young as\nto do all which it does without all deliberation, but that is but till\nit chance to be hurt by doing somewhat, or till it be of age to\nunderstand the rod; for the actions wherein he hath once a check, shall\nbe deliberated on a second time. Fools and madmen manifestly deliberate\nno less than the wisest men, though they make not so good a choice, the\nimages of things being by diseases altered. For bees and spiders, if he\nhad so little to do as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have\nconfessed not only election, but also art, prudence, and policy in them,\nvery near equal to that of mankind. Of bees Aristotle says, their life\nis civil. He is deceived, if he think any spontaneous action, after once\nbeing checked in it, differs from an action voluntary and elective, for\neven the setting of a man\u2019s foot in the posture of walking, and the\naction of ordinary eating, was once deliberated, how and when it should\nbe done; and though it afterwards became easy and habitual, so as to be\ndone without fore-thought, yet that does not hinder but that the act is\nvoluntary and proceeds from election. So also are the rashest actions of\ncholeric persons voluntary and upon deliberation. For who is there, but\nvery young children, that has not considered when and how far he ought,\nor safely may, strike or revile. Seeing then he agrees with me that such\nactions are necessitated, and the fancy of those that do them is\ndetermined to the actions they do, it follows out of his own doctrine,\nthat the liberty of election does not take away the necessity of\nelecting this or that individual thing. And thus one of his arguments\nfights against another.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cWe have partly seen before how T. H. hath coined a new kind of\nliberty, a new kind of necessity, a new kind of election; and now in\nthis section a new kind of spontaneity, and a new kind of voluntary\nactions. Although he say that here is nothing new to him, yet I begin to\nsuspect that either here are many things new to him, or otherwise his\nelection is not the result of a serious mature deliberation. (_a_) The\nfirst thing that I offer, is, how often he mistakes my meaning in this\none section. First, I make voluntary and spontaneous actions to be one\nand the same; he saith, I distinguish them, so as spontaneous actions\nmay be necessary, but voluntary actions cannot. Secondly, (_b_) I\ndistinguish between free acts and voluntary acts. The former are always\ndeliberate, the latter may be indeliberate; all free acts are voluntary,\nbut all voluntary acts are not free. But he saith I confound them and\nmake them the same. (_c_) Thirdly, he saith, I ascribe spontaneity only\nto fools, children, madmen, and beasts; but I acknowledge spontaneity\nhath place in rational men, both as it is comprehended in liberty, and\nas it is distinguished from liberty.\n\n(_d_) \u201cYet I have no reason to be offended at it; for he deals no\notherwise with me than he doth with himself. Here he tells us that\n\u2018voluntary presupposeth deliberation.\u2019 But (No. XXV.) he tells us\ncontrary, \u2018that whatsoever followeth the last appetite is voluntary, and\nwhere there is but one appetite, that is the last:\u2019 and that \u2018no action\nof a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so\nsudden.\u2019 So (No. XXXIII.) he tells us, that \u2018by spontaneity is meant\ninconsiderate proceeding, or else nothing is meant by it:\u2019 yet here he\ntells us, that \u2018all voluntary actions which proceed not from fear, are\nspontaneous,\u2019 whereof many are deliberate, as that wherein he instanceth\nhimself, \u2018to give money for merchandise.\u2019 Thirdly, when I said that\nchildren, before they have the use of reason, act spontaneously, as when\nthey suck the breast, but do not act freely, because they have not\njudgment to deliberate or elect, here T. H. undertakes to prove that\nthey do deliberate and elect; and yet presently after confesseth again,\nthat \u2018a child may be so young, as to do what it doth without all\ndeliberation.\u2019\n\n\u201cBesides these mistakes and contradictions, he hath other errors also in\nthis section. As this, that no actions proceeding from fear are\nspontaneous. He who throws his goods into the sea to avoid drowning,\ndoth it not only _spontaneously_, but even _freely_. He that wills the\nend, wills the means conducing to that end. It is true that if the\naction be considered nakedly without all circumstances, no man willingly\nor spontaneously casts his goods into the sea. But if we take the\naction, as in this particular case, invested with all the circumstances,\nand in order to the end, that is, the saving of his own life, it is not\nonly voluntary and spontaneous, but elective and chosen by him, as the\nmost probable means for his own preservation. As there is an antecedent\nand a subsequent will, so there is an antecedent and a subsequent\nspontaneity. His grammatical argument, grounded upon the derivation of\nspontaneous from _sponte_, weighs nothing; we have learned in the\nrudiments of logic, that conjugates are sometimes in name only, and not\nin deed. He who casts his goods into the sea, may do it of his own\naccord in order to the end. Secondly, he errs in this also, that nothing\nis opposed to spontaneity but only fear. Invincible and antecedent\nignorance doth destroy the nature of spontaneity or voluntariness, by\nremoving that knowledge which should and would have prohibited the\naction. As a man thinking to shoot a wild beast in a bush, shoots his\nfriend, which if he had known, he would not have shot. This man did not\nkill his friend of his own accord.\n\n\u201cFor the clearer understanding of these things, and to know what\nspontaneity is, let us consult awhile with the Schools about the\ndistinct order of voluntary or involuntary actions. Some acts proceed\nwholly from an extrinsical cause; as the throwing of a stone upwards, a\nrape, or the drawing of a Christian by plain force to the idol\u2019s temple;\nthese are called violent acts. Secondly, some proceed from an\nintrinsical cause, but without any manner of knowledge of the end, as\nthe falling of a stone downwards; these are called natural acts.\nThirdly, some proceed from an internal principle, with an imperfect\nknowledge of the end, where there is an appetite to the object, but no\ndeliberation nor election; as the acts of fools, children, beasts, and\nthe inconsiderate acts of men of judgment. These are called voluntary or\nspontaneous acts. Fourthly, some proceed from an intrinsical cause, with\na more perfect knowledge of the end, which are elected upon\ndeliberation. These are called free acts. So then the formal reason of\nliberty is election. The necessary requisite to election is\ndeliberation. Deliberation implyeth the actual use of reason. But\ndeliberation and election cannot possibly subsist with an extrinsical\npredetermination to one. How should a man deliberate or choose which way\nto go, who knows that all ways are shut against him and made impossible\nto him, but only one? This is the genuine sense of these words\n_voluntary_ and _spontaneous_ in this question. Though they were taken\ntwenty other ways vulgarly or metaphorically, as we say _spontaneous\nulcers_, where there is no appetite at all, yet it were nothing to this\ncontroversy, which is not about words, but about things; not what the\nwords voluntary or free do or may signify, but whether all things be\nextrinsically predetermined to one.\n\n\u201cThese grounds being laid for clearing the true sense of the words, the\nnext thing to be examined is, that contradiction which he hath espied in\nmy discourse, or how this argument fights against his fellows. \u2018If I,\u2019\nsaith T. H., \u2018make it appear, that the spontaneous actions of fools,\nchildren, madmen, and beasts, do proceed from election and deliberation,\nand that inconsiderate and indeliberate actions are found in the wisest\nmen, then this argument concludes that necessity and election may stand\ntogether, which is contrary to his assertion.\u2019 If this could be made\nappear as easily as it is spoken, it would concern himself much, who,\nwhen he should prove that rational men are not free from necessity, goes\nabout to prove that brute beasts do deliberate and elect, that is as\nmuch as to say, are free from necessity. But it concerns not me at all;\nit is neither my assertion nor my opinion, that necessity and election\nmay not meet together in the same subject; violent, natural,\nspontaneous, and deliberate or elective acts may all meet together in\nthe same subject. But this I say, that necessity and election cannot\nconsist together in the same act. He who is determined to one, is not\nfree to choose out of more than one. To begin with his latter\nsupposition, \u2018that wise men may do inconsiderate and indeliberate\nactions,\u2019 I do readily admit it. But where did he learn to infer a\ngeneral conclusion from particular premises; as thus, because wise men\ndo some indeliberate acts, therefore no act they do is free or elective?\nSecondly, for his former supposition, \u2018that fools, children, madmen, and\nbeasts, do deliberate and elect,\u2019 if he could make it good, it is not I\nwho contradict myself, nor fight against mine own assertion, but it is\nhe who endeavours to prove that which I altogether deny. He may well\nfind a contradiction between him and me; otherwise to what end is this\ndispute? But he shall not be able to find a difference between me and\nmyself. But the truth is, he is not able to prove any such thing; and\nthat brings me to my sixth consideration, that neither horses, nor bees,\nnor spiders, nor children, nor fools, nor madmen do deliberate or elect.\n\n\u201cHis first instance is in the horse, or dog, but more especially the\nhorse. He told me that I divided my argument into squadrons, to apply\nmyself to your Lordship, being a military man; and I apprehend that for\nthe same reason he gives his first instance of the horse, with a\nsubmission to your own experience. So far well, but otherwise very\ndisadvantageously to his cause. Men used to say of a dull fellow, that\nhe hath no more brains than a horse. And the Prophet David saith, (Psalm\nxxxii. 9): _Be not like the horse and mule, which have no\nunderstanding_. How do they deliberate without understanding? And (Psalm\nxlix. 20), he saith the same of all brute beasts: _Man being in honour\nhad no understanding, but became like unto the beasts that perish_. The\nhorse \u2018demurs upon his way.\u2019 Why not? Outward objects, or inward\nfancies, may produce a stay in his course, though he have no judgment\neither to deliberate or elect. \u2018He retires from some strange figure\nwhich he sees, and comes on again to avoid the spur.\u2019 So he may; and yet\nbe far enough from deliberation. All this proceeds from the sensitive\npassion of fear, which is a perturbation arising from the expectation of\nsome imminent evil. But he urgeth, \u2018what else doth a man that\ndeliberateth?\u2019 Yes, very much. The horse feareth some outward object,\nbut deliberation is a comparing of several means conducing to the same\nend. Fear is commonly of one, deliberation of more than one; fear is of\nthose things which are not in our power, deliberation of those things\nwhich are in our power; fear ariseth many times out of natural\nantipathies, but in these disconveniences of nature deliberation hath no\nplace at all. In a word, fear is an enemy to deliberation, and betrayeth\nthe succours of the soul. If the horse did deliberate, he should consult\nwith reason, whether it were more expedient for him to go that way or\nnot; he would represent to himself all the dangers both of going and\nstaying, and compare the one with the other, and elect that which is\nless evil; he should consider whether it were not better to endure a\nlittle hazard, than ungratefully and dishonestly to fail in his duty\ntowards his master, who did breed him and doth feed him. This the horse\ndoth not; neither is it possible for him to do it. Secondly, for\nchildren, T. H. confesseth that they may be so young that they do not\ndeliberate at all; afterwards, as they attain to the use of reason by\ndegrees, so by degrees they become free agents. Then they do deliberate;\nbefore they do not deliberate. The rod may be a means to make them use\ntheir reason, when they have power to exercise it, but the rod cannot\nproduce the power before they have it. Thirdly, for fools and madmen, it\nis not to be understood of such madmen as have their _lucida\nintervalla_, who are mad and discreet by fits; when they have the use of\nreason, they are no madmen, but may deliberate as well as others; nor\nyet of such fools as are only comparative fools, that is, less wise than\nothers. Such may deliberate, though not so clearly, nor so judiciously\nas others; but of mere madmen, and mere natural fools, to say that they,\nwho have not the use of reason, do deliberate or use reason, implies a\ncontradiction. But his chiefest confidence is in his bees and spiders,\n\u2018of whose actions,\u2019 he saith, \u2018if I had been a spectator, I would have\nconfessed, not only election, but also art, prudence, policy, very near\nequal to that of mankind, whose life, as Aristotle saith, is civil.\u2019\nTruly I have contemplated their actions many times, and have been much\ntaken with their curious works; yet my thoughts did not reflect so much\nupon them, as upon their Maker, who is _sic magnus in magnis_, that he\nis not _minor in parvis_; so great in great things, that he is not less\nin small things. Yes, I have seen those silliest of creatures, and\nseeing their rare works I have seen enough to confute all the bold-faced\natheists of this age, and their hellish blasphemies. I saw them, but I\npraised the marvellous works of God, and admired that great and first\nintellect, who hath both adapted their organs, and determined their\nfancies to these particular works. I was not so simple as to ascribe\nthose rarities to their own invention, which I knew to proceed from a\nmere instinct of nature. In all other things they are the dullest of\ncreatures. Naturalists write of bees, that their fancy is imperfect, not\ndistinct from their common-sense, spread over their whole body, and only\nperceiving things present. When Aristotle calls them political or\nsociable creatures, he did not intend it really that they lived a civil\nlife, but according to an analogy, because they do such things by\ninstinct as truly political creatures do out of judgment. Nor when I\nread in St. Ambrose of their hexagons or sexangular cells, did I\ntherefore conclude that they were mathematicians. Nor when I read in\nCrespet, that they invoke God to their aid when they go out of their\nhives, bending their thighs in form of a cross, and bowing themselves;\ndid I therefore think that this was an act of religious piety, or that\nthey were capable of theological virtues, whom I see in all other things\nin which their fancies are not determined, to be the silliest of\ncreatures, strangers not only to right reason, but to all resemblances\nof it.\n\n\u201cSeventhly, concerning those actions which are done upon precedent and\npassed deliberations; they are not only spontaneous, but free acts.\nHabits contracted by use and experience, do help the will to act with\nmore facility and more determinately, as the hand of the artificer is\nhelped by his tools. And precedent deliberations, if they were sad and\nserious, and proved by experience to be profitable, do save the labour\nof subsequent consultations; _frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest\nper pauciora_. Yet nevertheless the actions which are done by virtue of\nthese formerly acquired habits, are no less free, than if the\ndeliberation were coexistent with this particular action. He that hath\ngained an habit and skill to play such a lesson, needs not a new\ndeliberation how to play every time that he plays it over and over. Yet\nI am far from giving credit to him in this, that walking or eating\nuniversally considered, are free actions, or proceed from true liberty;\nnot so much because they want a particular deliberation before every\nindividual act, as because they are animal motions and need no\ndeliberation of reason, as we see in brute beasts. And nevertheless the\nsame actions, as they are considered individually, and invested with\ntheir due circumstances, may be and often are free actions subjected to\nthe liberty of the agent.\n\n\u201cLastly, whereas T. H. compareth the first motions or rash attempts of\ncholeric persons with such acquired habits, it is a great mistake. Those\nrash attempts are voluntary actions, and may be facilitated sometimes by\nacquired habits. But yet for as much as actions are often altered and\nvaried by the circumstances of time, place, and person, so as that act\nwhich at one time is morally good, at another time may be morally evil;\nand for as much as a general precedent deliberation how to do this kind\nof action, is not sufficient to make this or that particular action good\nor expedient, which being in itself good, yet particular circumstances\nmay render inconvenient or unprofitable to some persons, at some times,\nin some places: therefore a precedent general deliberation how to do any\nact, as for instance, how to write, is not sufficient to make a\nparticular act, as my writing this individual reply, to be freely done,\nwithout a particular and subsequent deliberation. A man learns French\nadvisedly; that is a free act. The same man in his choler and passion\nreviles his friend in French, without any deliberation; this is a\nspontaneous act, but it is not a free act. If he had taken time to\nadvise, he would not have reviled his friend. Yet as it is not free, so\nneither is it so necessary as the bees making honey, whose fancy is not\nonly inclined, but determined, by nature to that act. So every way he\nfails. And his conclusion, that the liberty of election doth not take\naway the necessity of electing this or that individual thing, is no\nconsequent from my doctrine, but from his own. Neither do my arguments\nfight one against another, but his private opinions fight both against\nme and against an undoubted truth. A free agent endowed with liberty of\nelection, or with an elective power, may nevertheless be necessitated in\nsome individual acts, but those acts wherein he is necessitated, do not\nflow from his elective power, neither are those acts which flow from his\nelective power necessitated.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. VIII.\n\n(_a_) \u201cThe first thing that I offer is, how often he mistakes my meaning\nin this one section. First, I make voluntary and spontaneous actions to\nbe one and the same. He saith, I distinguish them,\u201d &c.\n\nIt is very possible I may have mistaken him; for neither he nor I\nunderstand him. If they be one, why did he without need bring in this\nstrange word, spontaneous? Or rather, why did the Schoolmen bring it in,\nif not merely to shift off the difficulty of maintaining their tenet of\nfree-will?\n\n(_b_) \u201cSecondly, he saith I distinguish between free acts and voluntary\nacts; but he saith, I confound them and make them the same.\u201d\n\nIn his reply No. II, he saith, that for the clearing of the question, we\nare to know the difference between these three, necessity, spontaneity,\nand liberty; and because I thought he knew that it could not be cleared\nwithout understanding what is will, I had reason to think that\nspontaneity was his new word for will. And presently after, \u201csome things\nare necessary, and not voluntary or spontaneous; some things are both\nnecessary and voluntary.\u201d These words, voluntary and spontaneous, so put\ntogether, would make any man believe spontaneous were put as explicative\nof voluntary; for it is no wonder in the eloquence of the Schoolmen.\nTherefore, presently after, these words, \u201cspontaneity consists in a\nconformity of the appetite, either intellectual or sensitive,\u201d signify\nthat spontaneity is a conformity or likeness of the appetite to the\nobject; which to me soundeth as if he had said, that the appetite is\nlike the object; which is as proper as if he had said, the hunger is\nlike the meat. If this be the bishop\u2019s meaning, as it is the meaning of\nthe words, he is a very fine philosopher. But hereafter I will venture\nno more to say his meaning is this or that, especially where he useth\nterms of art.\n\n(_c_) \u201cThirdly, he saith, I ascribe spontaneity only to fools, children,\nmadmen, and beasts. But I acknowledge spontaneity hath place in rational\nmen,\u201d &c.\n\nI resolve to have no more to do with spontaneity. But I desire the\nreader to take notice, that the common people, on whose arbitration\ndependeth the signification of words in common use, among the Latins and\nGreeks did call all actions and motions whereof they did perceive no\ncause, spontaneous and \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1: I say, not those actions which had no\ncauses; for all actions have their causes; but those actions whose\ncauses they did not perceive. So that spontaneous, as a general name,\ncomprehended many actions and motions of inanimate creatures; as the\nfalling of heavy things downwards, which they thought spontaneous, and\nthat if they were not hindered, they would descend of their _own\naccord_. It comprehended also all animal motion, as beginning from the\nwill or appetite; because the causes of the will and appetite being not\nperceived, they supposed, as the Bishop doth, that they were the causes\nof themselves. So that which in general is called spontaneous, being\napplied to men and beasts in special, is called voluntary. Yet the will\nand appetite, though the very same thing, use to be distinguished in\ncertain occasions. For in the public conversation of men, where they are\nto judge of one another\u2019s will, and of the regularity and irregularity\nof one another\u2019s actions, not every appetite, but the last is esteemed\nin the public judgment for the will: nor every action proceeding from\nappetite, but that only to which there had preceded or ought to have\npreceded some deliberation. And this I say is so, when one man is to\njudge of another\u2019s will. For every man in himself knoweth that what he\ndesireth or hath an appetite to, the same he hath a will to, though his\nwill may be changed before he hath obtained his desire. The Bishop,\nunderstanding nothing of this, might, if it had pleased him, have called\nit jargon. But he had rather pick out of it some contradictions of\nmyself. And therefore saith:\n\n(_d_) \u201cYet I have no reason to be offended at it, (meaning such\ncontradictions), for he dealeth no otherwise with me than he doth with\nhimself.\u201d\n\nIt is a contradiction, he saith, that having said that \u201cvoluntary\npresupposeth deliberation,\u201d I say in another place, \u201cthat whatsoever\nfolloweth the last appetite, is voluntary, and where there is but one\nappetite, that is the last.\u201d Not observing that _voluntary_ presupposeth\n_deliberation_, when the judgment, whether the action be voluntary or\nnot, is not in the actor, but in the judge; who regardeth not the will\nof the actor, where there is nothing to be accused in the action of\ndeliberate malice; yet knoweth that though there be but one appetite,\nthe same is truly will for the time, and the action, if it follow, a\nvoluntary action.\n\nThis also he saith is a contradiction, that having said, \u201cno action of a\nman can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden,\u201d I\nsay afterward that \u201cby spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding.\u201d\n\nAgain he observes not, that the action of a man that is not a child, in\npublic judgment how rash, inconsiderate, and sudden soever it be, it is\nto be taken for deliberation; because it is supposed, he ought to have\nconsidered and compared his intended action with the law; when,\nnevertheless, that sudden and indeliberate action was truly voluntary.\n\nAnother contradiction which he finds is this, that having undertaken to\nprove \u201cthat children before they have the use of reason do deliberate\nand elect,\u201d I say by and by after a \u201cchild may be so young as to do what\nhe doth without all deliberation.\u201d I yet see no contradiction here; for\na child may be so young, as that the appetite thereof is its first\nappetite, but afterward and often before it come to have the use of\nreason, may elect one thing and refuse another, and consider the\nconsequences of what it is about to do. And why not as well as beasts,\nwhich never have the use of reason; for they deliberate, as men do? For\nthough men and beasts do differ in many things very much, yet they\ndiffer not in the nature of their deliberation. A man can reckon by\nwords of general signification, make propositions, and syllogisms, and\ncompute in numbers, magnitudes, proportions, and other things\ncomputable; which being done by the advantage of language, and words of\ngeneral significations, a beast that hath not language cannot do, nor a\nman that hath language, if he misplace the words, that are his counters.\nFrom hence to the end of this number, he discourseth again of\nspontaneity, and how it is in children, madmen, and beasts; which, as I\nbefore resolved, I will not meddle with; let the reader think and judge\nof it as he pleaseth.\n\n NO. IX.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cSecondly, (_a_) they who might have done, and may do, many\nthings which they leave undone; and they who leave undone many things\nwhich they might do, are neither compelled nor necessitated to do what\nthey do, but have true liberty. But we might do many things which we do\nnot, and we do many things which we might leave undone, as is plain, (1\nKings iii. 11): _Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked\nfor thyself long life, neither hast asked riches for thyself, nor hast\nasked the life of thine enemies_ &c. God gave Solomon his choice. He\nmight have asked riches, but then he had not asked wisdom, which he did\nask. He did ask wisdom, but he might have asked riches, which yet he did\nnot ask. And (Acts v. 4): _After it was sold, was it not in thine own\npower?_ It was in his own power to give it, and it was in his own power\nto retain it. Yet if he did give it, he could not retain it; and if he\ndid retain it, he could not give it. Therefore we may do, what we do\nnot. And we do not, what we might do. That is, we have true liberty from\nnecessity.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ The second argument from Scripture consisteth in histories of\nmen that did one thing, when, if they would, they might have done\nanother. The places are two; one is in 1 Kings iii. 11, where the\nhistory says, God was pleased that Solomon, who might, if he would, have\nasked riches or revenge, did nevertheless ask wisdom at God\u2019s hands. The\nother is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, (Acts v. 4): _After it was\nsold, was it not in thine own power?_\n\nTo which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former\nplaces: that they prove that there is election, but do not disprove the\nnecessity which I maintain of what they so elect.\n\n\u201cWe have had the very same answer twice before. It seemeth that he is\nwell-pleased with it, or else he would not draw it in again so suddenly\nby head and shoulders to no purpose, if he did not conceive it to be a\npanchreston, a salve for all sores, or _dictamnum_, sovereign dittany,\nto make all his adversaries\u2019 weapons to drop out of the wounds of his\ncause, only by chewing it, without any application to the sore. I will\nnot waste the time to show any further, how the members of his\ndistinction do cross one another, and one take away another. To make\nevery election to be of one thing imposed by necessity, and of another\nthing which is absolutely impossible, is to make election to be no\nelection at all. But I forbear to press that at present. If I may be\nbold to use his own phrase, his answer looks quite another way from mine\nargument. My second reason was this: \u2018They who may do, and might have\ndone many things which they leave undone, and who leave undone many\nthings which they might do, are not necessitated, nor precisely and\nantecedently determined to what they do.\u2019\n\n\u201cBut we might do many things which we do not, and we do many things\nwhich we might leave undone, as appears evidently by the texts alleged.\nTherefore we are not antecedently and precisely determined, nor\nnecessitated to do all things which we do. What is here of _election_ in\nthis argument? To what proposition, to what term doth T. H. apply his\nanswer? He neither affirms, nor denieth, nor distinguisheth of any thing\ncontained in my argument. Here I must be bold to call upon him for a\nmore pertinent answer.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. IX.\n\nThe Bishop, for the proving of free-will, had alleged this text:\n_Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thyself long\nlife_, &c. And another, (Acts v. 4): _After it was sold, was it not in\nthine own power?_ Out of which he infers, there was no necessity that\nSolomon should ask wisdom rather than long life, nor that Ananias should\ntell a lie concerning the price for which he sold his land: and my\nanswer, that they prove election, but disprove not the necessity of\nelection, satisfieth him not; because, saith he, (_a_) \u201cthey who might\nhave done what they left undone, and left undone what they might have\ndone, are not necessitated.\u201d\n\nBut how doth he know (understanding power properly taken) that Solomon\nhad a real power to ask long life? No doubt Solomon knew nothing to the\ncontrary; but yet it was possible that God might have hindered him. For\nthough God gave Solomon his choice, that is, the thing which he should\nchoose, it doth not follow, that he did not also give him the act of\nelection. And for the other text, where it is said, that the price of\nthe land was in Ananias\u2019s power, the word _power_ signifieth no more\nthan the word right, that is, the right to do with his own what he\npleased, which is not a real and natural power, but a civil power made\nby covenant. And therefore the former answer is sufficient, that though\nsuch places are clear enough to prove election, they have no strength at\nall to take away necessity.\n\n NO. X.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all things come to\npass by inevitable necessity, then what are all those interrogations,\nand objurgations, and reprehensions, and expostulations, which we find\nso frequently in holy Scriptures, (be it spoken with all due respect),\nbut feigned and hypocritical exaggerations? _Hast thou eaten of the\ntree, whereof I commanded that thou shouldst not eat?_ (Gen. iii. 11.)\nAnd (verse 13) he saith to Eve, _Why hast thou done this?_ And (Gen. iv.\n6) to Cain, _Why art thou wroth, and why is thy countenance cast down?_\nAnd, (Ezech. xviii. 31): _Why will ye die, O house of Israel?_ Doth God\ncommand openly not to eat, and yet secretly by himself or by the second\ncauses necessitate him to eat? Doth he reprehend him for doing that,\nwhich he hath antecedently determined that he must do? Doth he propose\nthings under impossible conditions? Or were not this plain mockery and\nderision? Doth a loving master chide his servant because he doth not\ncome at his call, and yet knows that the poor servant is chained and\nfettered, so as he cannot move, by the master\u2019s own order, without the\nservant\u2019s default or consent? They who talk here of a twofold will of\nGod, _secret_ and _revealed_, and the one opposite to the other,\nunderstand not what they say. These two wills concern several persons.\nThe secret will of God, is what he will do himself; the revealed will of\nGod, is what he would have us to do; it may be the secret will of God to\ntake away the life of the father, yet it is God\u2019s revealed will that his\nson should wish his life and pray for his life. Here is no\ncontradiction, where the agents are distinct. But for the same person to\ncommand one thing, and yet to necessitate him that is commanded to do\nanother thing; to chide a man for doing that, which he hath determined\ninevitably and irresistibly that he must do; this were (I am afraid to\nutter what they are not afraid to assert) the highest dissimulation.\nGod\u2019s chiding proves man\u2019s liberty.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ To the third and fifth arguments, I shall make but one answer.\n\n_J. D._ (_a_) \u201cCertainly distinct arguments, as the third and fifth are,\nthe one drawn from the truth of God, the other from the justice of God,\nthe one from his objurgations and reprehensions, the other from his\njudgments after life, did require distinct answers. But the plain truth\nis, that neither here, nor in his answer to the fifth argument, nor in\nthis whole treatise, is there one word of solution or satisfaction to\nthis argument, or to any part of it. All that looks like an answer is\ncontained, No. XII: \u2018That which he does is made just by his doing; just,\nI say, in him, not always just in us by the example; for a man that\nshall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hinderance of the\nsame, if he punish him whom he commanded so for not doing it, is\nunjust.\u2019 (_b_) I dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning is not so\nbad as the words intimate and as I apprehend, that is, to impute\nfalsehood to Him that is truth itself, and to justify feigning and\ndissimulation in God, as he doth tyranny, by the infiniteness of his\npower and the absoluteness of his dominion. And therefore, by his leave,\nI must once again tender him a new summons for a full and clear answer\nto this argument also. He tells us, that he was not surprised. Whether\nhe were or not, is more than I know. But this I see plainly, that either\nhe is not provided, or that his cause admits no choice of answers. The\nJews dealt ingeniously, when they met with a difficult knot which they\ncould not untie, to put it upon Elias: _Elias will answer it when he\ncomes_.\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. X.\n\nThe Bishop argued thus: \u201cThirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all\nthings come to pass by inevitable necessity, then what are those\ninterrogations we find so frequently in holy Scriptures, (be it spoken\nwith all due respect), but feigned and hypocritical exaggerations?\u201d Here\nputting together two repugnant suppositions, either craftily or (be it\nspoken with all due respect) ignorantly, he would have men believe,\nbecause I hold necessity, that I deny liberty, I hold as much that there\nis true liberty as he doth, and more, for I hold it as from necessity,\nand that there must of necessity be liberty; but he holds it not from\nnecessity, and so makes it possible there may be none. His\nexpostulations were, first, _Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I\ncommanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?_ Secondly, _Why hast thou\ndone this?_ Thirdly, _Why art thou wroth, and why is thy countenance\ncast down?_ Fourthly, _Why will ye die, O house of Israel?_ These\narguments requiring the same answer which some other do, I thought fit\nto remit them to their fellows. But the Bishop will not allow me that.\nFor he saith,\n\n(_a_) \u201cCertainly, distinct arguments, as the third and fifth are, &c.\ndid require distinct answers.\u201d\n\nI am therefore to give an account of the meaning of the aforesaid\nobjurgations and expostulations; not of the end for which God said,\n_Hast thou eaten of the tree, &c._, but how those words may be taken\nwithout repugnance to the doctrine of necessity. These words, _Hast thou\neaten of the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldst not eat_,\nconvince Adam that, notwithstanding God had placed in the garden a means\nto keep him perpetually from dying in case he should accommodate his\nwill to obedience of God\u2019s commandment concerning the tree of knowledge\nof good and evil, yet Adam was not so much master of his own will as to\ndo it. Whereby is signified, that a mortal man, though invited by the\npromise of immortality, cannot govern his own will, though his will\ngovern his actions; which dependence of the actions on the will, is that\nwhich properly and truly is called _liberty_. And the like may be said\nof the words to Eve, _Why hast thou done this?_ and of those to Cain,\n_Why art thou wroth? &c._ and to Israel, _Why will ye die, O house of\nIsrael?_ But the Bishop here will say _die_ signifieth not _die_, but\nlive eternally in torments; for by such interpretations any man may\nanswer anything. And whereas he asketh, \u201cDoth God reprehend him for\ndoing that which he hath antecedently determined him that he must do?\u201d I\nanswer, no; but he convinceth and instructeth him, that though\nimmortality was so easy to obtain, as it might be had for the abstinence\nfrom the fruit of one only tree, yet he could not obtain it but by\npardon, and by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ: nor is there here any\npunishment, but only a reducing of Adam and Eve to their original\nmortality, where death was no punishment but a gift of God. In which\nmortality he lived near a thousand years, and had a numerous issue, and\nlived without misery, and I believe shall at the resurrection obtain the\nimmortality which then he lost. Nor in all this is there any plotting\nsecretly, or any mockery or derision, which the Bishop would make men\nbelieve there is. And whereas he saith, that \u201cthey who talk here of a\ntwofold will of God, secret and revealed, and the one opposite to the\nother, understand not what they say:\u201d the Protestant doctors, both of\nour and other Churches, did use to distinguish between the secret and\nrevealed will of God; the former they called _voluntas bene placiti_,\nwhich signifieth absolutely his will, the other _voluntas signi_, that\nis, the signification of his will, in the same sense that I call the one\nhis _will_, the other his _commandment_, which may sometimes differ. For\nGod\u2019s commandment to Abraham was, that he should sacrifice Isaac, but\nhis will was, that he should not do it. God\u2019s denunciation to Nineveh\nwas, that it should be destroyed within forty days, but his will was,\nthat it should not.\n\n(_b_) \u201cI dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning is not so bad, as\nthe words intimate, and as I apprehend; that is, to impute falsehood to\nHim that is truth itself,\u201d &c.\n\nWhat damned rhetoric and subtle calumny is this? God, I said, might\ncommand a thing openly, and yet hinder the doing of it, without\ninjustice; but if a man should command a thing to be done, and then plot\nsecretly the hinderance of the same, and punish for the not doing it, it\nwere injustice. This it is which the Bishop apprehends as an imputation\nof falsehood to God Almighty. And perhaps if the death of a sinner were,\nas he thinks, an eternal life in extreme misery, a man might as far as\nJob hath done, expostulate with God Almighty; not accusing him of\ninjustice, because whatsoever he doth is therefore just because done by\nhim; but of little tenderness and love to mankind. And this\nexpostulation will be equally just or unjust, whether the necessity of\nall things be granted or denied. For it is manifest that God could have\nmade man impeccable, and can now preserve him from sin, or forgive him\nif he please; and therefore, if he please not, the expostulation is as\nreasonable in the cases of _liberty_ as of _necessity_.\n\n NO. XI.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cFourthly, if either the decree of God, or the foreknowledge of\nGod, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or\nthe physical or moral efficacy of objects, or the last dictate of the\nunderstanding, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had\nno true liberty. For he was subjected to the same decrees, the same\nprescience, the same constellations, the same causes, the same objects,\nthe same dictates of the understanding. But, _quicquid ostendes mihi\nsic, incredulus odi_; the greatest opposers of our liberty, are as\nearnest maintainers of the liberty of Adam. Therefore none of these\nsupposed impediments take away true liberty.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ The fourth argument is to this effect: \u201cIf the decree of God, or\nhis foreknowledge, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation\nof causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of causes, or the last\ndictate of the understanding, or whatsoever it be, do take away true\nliberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. _Quicquid\nostendes mihi sic, incredulus odi._\u201d That which I say necessitateth and\ndetermineth every action, (that he may no longer doubt of my meaning),\nis the sum of all those things, which being now existent, conduce and\nconcur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one\nthing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced. This concourse\nof causes, whereof every one is determined to be such as it is by a like\nconcourse of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all\nset and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the\ndecree of God.\n\nBut that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of any thing, cannot\nbe truly said; seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge\ndependeth on the existence of the things known, and not they on it.\n\nThe influence of the stars is but a small part of the whole cause,\nconsisting of the concourse of all agents.\n\nNor doth the concourse of all causes make one simple chain or\nconcatenation, but an innumerable number of chains joined together, not\nin all parts, but in the first link, God Almighty; and consequently the\nwhole cause of an event does not always depend upon one single chain,\nbut on many together.\n\nNatural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary agents, and\nnecessitates the will, and consequently the action; but for moral\nefficacy, I understand not what he means by it. The last dictate of the\njudgment concerning the good or bad that may follow on any action, is\nnot properly the whole cause, but the last part of it; and yet may be\nsaid to produce the effect necessarily, in such manner as the last\nfeather may be said to break an horse\u2019s back, when there were so many\nlaid on before as there wanted but that to do it.\n\nNow for his argument, that if the concourse of all the causes\nnecessitate the effect, that then it follows, Adam had no true liberty.\nI deny the consequence; for I make not only the effect, but also the\nelection of that particular effect to be necessary, inasmuch as the will\nitself, and each propension of a man during his deliberation, is as much\nnecessitated, and depends on a sufficient cause, as any thing else\nwhatsoever. As for example, it is no more necessary that fire should\nburn, than that a man, or other creature, whose limbs be moved by fancy,\nshould have election, that is, liberty to do what he has a fancy to,\nthough it be not in his will or power to choose his fancy, or choose his\nelection or will.\n\nThis doctrine, because he says he hates, I doubt had better been\nsuppressed; as it should have been, if both your Lordship and he had not\npressed me to an answer.\n\n_J. D._ (_a_) \u201cThis argument was sent forth only as an espy to make a\nmore full discovery, what were the true grounds of T. H.\u2019s supposed\nnecessity. Which errand being done, and the foundation whereupon he\nbuilds being found out, which is, as I called it, a concatenation of\ncauses, and, as he calls it, a concourse of necessary causes; it would\nnow be a superfluous and impertinent work in me to undertake the\nrefutation of all those other opinions, which he doth not undertake to\ndefend. And therefore I shall waive them at the present, with these\nshort animadversions.\n\n(_b_) \u201cConcerning the eternal decree of God, he confounds the decree\nitself with the execution of his decree. And concerning the\nforeknowledge of God, he confounds that speculative knowledge, which is\ncalled _the knowledge of vision_, (which doth not produce the\nintellective objects, no more than the sensitive vision doth produce the\nsensible objects), with that other knowledge of God, which is called the\n_knowledge of approbation_, or _a practical knowledge_, that is,\nknowledge joined with an act of the will, of which divines do truly say,\nthat it is the cause of things, as the knowledge of the artist is the\ncause of his work. John i.: _God made all things by his word_; that is,\nby his wisdom. Concerning the influence of the stars, I wish he had\nexpressed himself more clearly. For as I do willingly grant, that those\nheavenly bodies do act upon these sublunary things, not only by their\nmotion and light, but also by an occult virtue, which we call influence,\nas we see by manifold experience in the loadstone and shell-fish, &c.:\nso if he intend that by these influences they do naturally or physically\ndetermine the will, or have any direct dominion over human counsels,\neither in whole or in part, either more or less, he is in an error.\nConcerning the concatenation of causes, whereas he makes not one chain,\nbut an innumerable number of chains, (I hope he speaks hyperbolically,\nand doth not intend that they are actually infinite), the difference is\nnot material whether one or many, so long as they are all joined\ntogether, both in the first link, and likewise in the effect. It serves\nto no end but to shew what a shadow of liberty T. H. doth fancy, or\nrather what a dream of a shadow. As if one chain were not sufficient to\nload poor man, but he must be clogged with innumerable chains. This is\njust such another freedom as the Turkish galley-slaves do enjoy. But I\nadmire that T. H., who is so versed in this question, should here\nconfess that he understands not the difference between physical or\nnatural, and moral efficacy: and much more that he should affirm, that\noutward objects do determine voluntary agents by a natural efficacy. No\nobject, no second agent, angel or devil, can determine the will of man\nnaturally, but God alone, in respect of his supreme dominion over all\nthings. Then the will is determined naturally, when God Almighty,\nbesides his general influence, whereupon all second causes do depend, as\nwell for their being as for their acting, doth moreover at some times,\nwhen it pleases him in cases extraordinary, concur by a special\ninfluence, and infuse something into the will, in the nature of an act,\nor an habit, whereby the will is moved and excited, and applied to will\nor choose this or that. Then the will is determined morally, when some\nobject is proposed to it with persuasive reasons and arguments to induce\nit to will. Where the determination is natural, the liberty to suspend\nits act is taken away from the will, but not so where the determination\nis moral. In the former case, the will is determined extrinsically, in\nthe latter case intrinsically; the former produceth an absolute\nnecessity, the latter only a necessity of supposition. If the will do\nnot suspend, but assent, then the act is necessary; but because the will\nmay suspend, and not assent, therefore it is not absolutely necessary.\nIn the former case, the will is moved necessarily and determinately; in\nthe latter, freely and indeterminately. The former excitation is\nimmediate; the latter is mediate _mediante intellectu_, and requires the\nhelp of the understanding. In a word, so great a difference there is\nbetween natural and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and\nmine in this question.\n\n\u201cThere remains only the last dictate of the understanding, which he\nmaketh to be the last cause that concurreth to the determination of the\nwill, and to the necessary production of the act, \u2018as the last feather\nmay be said to break an horse\u2019s back, when there were so many laid on\nbefore that there wanted but that to do it.\u2019 I have shewed (No. VII.)\nthat the last dictate of the understanding is not always absolute in\nitself, nor conclusive to the will; and when it is conclusive, yet it\nproduceth no antecedent nor extrinsical necessity. I shall only add one\nthing more at present, that by making the last judgment of right reason\nto be of no more weight than a single feather, he wrongs the\nunderstanding as well as he doth the will; and endeavours to deprive the\nwill of its supreme power of application, and to deprive the\nunderstanding of its supreme power of judicature and definition. Neither\ncorporeal agents and objects, nor yet the sensitive appetite itself,\nbeing an inferior faculty and affixed to the organ of the body, have any\ndirect or immediate dominion or command over the rational will. It is\nwithout the sphere of their activity. All the access which they have\nunto the will, is by the means of the understanding, sometimes clear and\nsometimes disturbed, and of reason, either right or misinformed. Without\nthe help of the understanding, all his second causes were not able of\nthemselves to load the horse\u2019s back with so much weight as the least of\nall his feathers doth amount unto. But we shall meet with his horseload\nof feathers again, No. XXIII.\n\n\u201cThese things being thus briefly touched, he proceeds to his answer. My\nargument was this: if any of these or all these causes formerly recited,\ndo take away true liberty, (that is, still intended from necessity),\nthen Adam before his fall had no true liberty.\n\n\u201cBut Adam before his fall had true liberty.\n\n\u201cHe mis-recites the argument, and denies the consequence, which is so\nclearly proved, that no man living can doubt of it. Because Adam was\nsubjected to all the same causes as well as we, the same decree, the\nsame prescience, the same influences, the same concourse of causes, the\nsame efficacy of objects, the same dictates of reason. But it is only a\nmistake; for it appears plainly by his following discourse, that he\nintended to deny, not the consequence, but the assumption. For he makes\nAdam to have had no liberty from necessity before his fall, yea, he\nproceeds so far as to affirm that all human wills, his and ours, and\neach propension of our wills, even during our deliberation, are as much\nnecessitated as anything else whatsoever; that we have no more power to\nforbear those actions which we do, than the fire hath power not to burn.\nThough I honour T. H. for his person and for his learning, yet I must\nconfess ingenuously, I hate this doctrine from my heart. And I believe\nboth I have reason so to do, and all others who shall seriously ponder\nthe horrid consequences which flow from it. It destroys liberty, and\ndishonours the nature of man. It makes the second causes and outward\nobjects to be the rackets, and men to be but the tennis-balls of\ndestiny. It makes the first cause, that is, God Almighty, to be the\nintroducer of all evil and sin into the world, as much as man, yea, more\nthan man, by as much as the motion of the watch is more from the\nartificer, who did make it and wind it up, than either from the spring,\nor the wheels, or the thread, if God, by his special influence into the\nsecond causes, did necessitate them to operate as they did. And if they,\nbeing thus determined, did necessitate Adam inevitably, irresistibly,\nnot by an accidental, but by an essential subordination of causes to\nwhatsoever he did, then one of these two absurdities must needs follow:\neither that Adam did not sin, and that there is no such thing as sin in\nthe world, because it proceeds naturally, necessarily, and essentially\nfrom God; or that God is more guilty of it, and more the cause of evil\nthan man, because man is extrinsically, inevitably determined, but so is\nnot God. And in causes essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause\nis always the cause of the effect. What tyrant did ever impose laws that\nwere impossible for those to keep, upon whom they were imposed, and\npunish them for breaking those laws, which he himself had necessitated\nthem to break, which it was no more in their power not to break, than it\nis in the power of the fire not to burn? Excuse me if I hate this\ndoctrine with a perfect hatred, which is so dishonourable both to God\nand man; which makes men to blaspheme of necessity, to steal of\nnecessity, to be hanged of necessity, and to be damned of necessity. And\ntherefore I must say and say again, _quicquid ostendes mihi sic,\nincredulus odi_. It were better to be an atheist, to believe no God; or\nto be a Manichee, to believe two Gods, a God of good and a God of evil;\nor with the heathens, to believe thirty thousand Gods: than thus to\ncharge the true God to be the proper cause and the true author of all\nthe sins and evils which are in the world.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. XI.\n\n(_a_) \u201cThis argument was sent forth only as an espy, to make a more full\ndiscovery, what were the true grounds of T. H.\u2019s supposed necessity.\u201d\n\nThe argument which he sendeth forth as an espy, is this: \u201cIf either the\ndecree of God, or the foreknowledge of God, or the influence of the\nstars, or the concatenation (which he says falsely I call a concourse)\nof causes, of the physical or moral efficacy of objects, or the last\ndictate of the understanding, do take away true liberty, then Adam\nbefore his fall had no true liberty.\u201d In answer whereunto I said, that\nall the things now existent were necessary to the production of the\neffect to come; that the _foreknowledge_ of God causeth nothing, though\nthe _will_ do; that the influence of the stars is but a small part of\nthat cause which maketh the necessity; and that this consequence, \u201cif\nthe concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect, then Adam had no\ntrue liberty,\u201d was false. But in his words, if these do take away true\nliberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty, the consequence\nis good; but then I deny that necessity takes away liberty; the reason\nwhereof, which is this, _liberty is to choose what we will, not to\nchoose our will_, no inculcation is sufficient to make the Bishop take\nnotice of, notwithstanding he be otherwhere so witty, and here so\ncrafty, as to send out arguments for spies. The cause why I denied the\nconsequence was, that I thought the force thereof consisted in this,\nthat necessity in the Bishop\u2019s opinion destroyed liberty.\n\n(_b_) \u201cConcerning the eternal decree of God,\u201d &c.\n\nHere begins his reply. From which if we take these words; \u201cknowledge of\napprobation;\u201d \u201cpractical knowledge;\u201d \u201cheavenly bodies act upon sublunary\nthings, not only by their motion, but also by an occult virtue, which we\ncall influence;\u201d \u201cmoral efficacy;\u201d \u201cgeneral influence;\u201d \u201cspecial\ninfluence;\u201d \u201cinfuse something into the will;\u201d \u201cthe will is moved;\u201d \u201cthe\nwill is induced to will;\u201d \u201cthe will suspends its own act;\u201d which are all\nnonsense, unworthy of a man, nay, and if a beast could speak, unworthy\nof a beast, and can befal no creature whose nature is not depraved by\ndoctrine; nothing at all remaineth to be answered. Perhaps the word,\n_occult virtue_, is not to be taxed as unintelligible. But then I may\ntax therein the want of ingenuity in him that had rather say, that\nheavenly bodies _do work by an occult virtue_, than that they _work he\nknoweth not how_; which he would not confess, but endeavours to make\n_occult_ be taken for a _cause_. The rest of this reply is one of those\nconsequences, which I have answered in the beginning, where I compare\nthe inconveniences of both opinions, that is, \u201cthat either Adam did not\nsin, or his sin proceeded necessarily from God;\u201d which is no stronger a\nconsequence than if out of this, \u201cthat a man is lame necessarily,\u201d one\nshould infer, that _either he is not lame_, or that _his lameness\nproceeded necessarily from the will of God_. To the end of this number\nthere is nothing more of argument. The place is filled up with wondering\nand railing.\n\n NO. XII.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cFifthly, if there be no liberty, there shall be no day of doom,\nno last judgment, no rewards nor punishments after death. A man can\nnever make himself a criminal, if he be not left at liberty to commit a\ncrime. No man can be justly punished for doing that which was not in his\npower to shun. To take away liberty hazards heaven, but undoubtedly it\nleaves no hell.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ The arguments of greatest consequence are the third and fifth,\nand fall both into one: namely, if there be a necessity of all events,\nthat it will follow that praise and reprehension, reward and punishment,\nare all vain and unjust: and that if God should openly forbid, and\nsecretly necessitate the same action, punishing men for what they could\nnot avoid, there would be no belief among them of heaven or hell.\n\nTo oppose hereunto, I must borrow an answer from St. Paul (Rom. ix.),\nfrom the eleventh verse of the chapter to the eighteenth, is laid down\nthe very same objection in these words: _When they_ (meaning Esau and\nJacob) _were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor evil, that the\npurpose of God according to election, not by works, but by him that\ncalleth, might remain firm, it was said to her_ (viz. to Rebecca) _that\nthe elder shall serve the younger. And what then shall we say, is there\ninjustice with God? God forbid. It is not therefore in him that willeth,\nnor in him that runneth, but in God that showeth mercy. For the\nScripture saith to Pharaoh, I have stirred thee up, that I may show my\npower in thee, and that my name may be set forth in all the earth.\nTherefore whom God willeth he hath mercy on, and whom he willeth he\nhardeneth._ Thus, you see, the case put by St. Paul is the same with\nthat of J. D., and the same objection in these words following (verse\n19): _Thou wilt ask me then, why will God yet complain; for who hath\nresisted his will?_ To this therefore the apostle answers, not by\ndenying it was God\u2019s will, or that the decree of God concerning Esau was\nnot before he had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what\nhe did; but thus (verse 20, 21): _Who art thou, O man, that\ninterrogatest God? Shall the work say to the workman, why hast thou made\nme thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same stuff to\nmake one vessel to honour, another to dishonour?_ According therefore to\nthis answer of St. Paul, I answer J. D.\u2019s objection, and say, the power\nof God alone, without other help, is sufficient justification of any\naction he doth. That which men make among themselves here by pacts and\ncovenants, and call by the name of justice, and according whereunto men\nare counted and termed rightly just and unjust, is not that by which God\nAlmighty\u2019s actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his\ncounsels are to be measured by human wisdom. That which he does is made\njust by his doing; just I say in him, not always just in us by the\nexample; for a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly\nthe hindrance of the same, if he punish him he so commanded for not\ndoing it, is unjust. So also his counsels, they be therefore not in\nvain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not. When\nGod afflicted Job, he did object no sin to him, but justified that\nafflicting him by telling him of his power. _Hast thou_ (says God) _an\narm like mine? Where wast thou, when I laid the foundations of the\nearth?_ and the like. So our Saviour, concerning the man that was born\nblind, said, it was not for his sin, nor his parents\u2019 sin, but that the\npower of God might be shown in him. Beasts are subject to death and\ntorment, yet they cannot sin. It was God\u2019s will it should be so. Power\nirresistible justified all actions really and properly, in whomsoever it\nbe found. Less power does not. And because such power is in God only, he\nmust needs be just in all his actions. And we, that not comprehending\nhis counsels, call him to the bar, commit injustice in it.\n\nI am not ignorant of the usual reply to this answer, by distinguishing\nbetween will and permission. As, that God Almighty does indeed permit\nsin sometimes, and that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth\nshall be committed; but does not will it, nor necessitate it. I know\nalso they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, saying, God\nAlmighty doth indeed cause the action, whatsoever action it be, but not\nthe sinfulness or irregularity of it, that is, the discordance between\nthe action and the law. Such distinctions as these dazzle my\nunderstanding. I find no difference between the will to have a thing\ndone, and the permission to do it, when he that permitteth it can hinder\nit, and knows it will be done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any\ndifference between an action that is against the law, and the sin of\nthat action. As for example, between the killing of Uriah, and the sin\nof David in killing Uriah. Nor when one is cause both of the action and\nof the law, how another can be cause of the disagreement between them,\nno more than how one man making a longer and shorter garment, another\ncan make the inequality that is between them. This I know, God cannot\nsin, because his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently no sin:\nand because whatsoever can sin is subject to another\u2019s law, which God is\nnot. And therefore it is blasphemy to say, God can sin. But to say, that\nGod can so order the world as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in\na man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such\nor other distinctions can make it clear that St. Paul did not think\nEsau\u2019s or Pharaoh\u2019s actions proceeded from the will and purpose of God,\nor that proceeding from his will could not therefore without injustice\nbe blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto\nJ. D.\u2019s opinion. For I now hold nothing in all this question between us,\nbut what seemeth to me not obscurely, but most expressly said in this\nplace by St. Paul. And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture.\n\n_J. D._ T. H. thinks to kill two birds with one stone, and satisfy two\narguments with one answer, whereas in truth he satisfieth neither.\nFirst, for my third reason. (_a_) Though all he say here were as true as\nan oracle; though punishment were an act of dominion, not of justice in\nGod; yet this is no sufficient cause why God should deny his own act, or\nwhy he should chide or expostulate with men, why they did that which he\nhimself did necessitate them to do, and whereof he was the actor more\nthan they, they being but as the stone, but he the hand that threw it.\nNotwithstanding anything which is pleaded here, this stoical opinion\ndoth stick hypocrisy and dissimulation close to God, who is truth\nitself.\n\n\u201cAnd to my fifth argument, which he changeth and relateth amiss, as by\ncomparing mine with his may appear, his chiefest answer is to oppose a\ndifficult place of St. Paul (Rom. ix. 11.) Hath he never heard, that to\npropose a doubt is not to answer an argument: _nec bene respondet qui\nlitem lite resolvit_? But I will not pay him in his own coin. Wherefore\nto this place alleged by him, I answer, the case is not the same. The\nquestion moved there is, how God did keep his promise made to Abraham,\n_to be the God of him and of his seed_, if the Jews who were the\nlegitimate progeny of Abraham were deserted. To which the apostle\nanswers (vers. 6, 7, 8), that that promise was not made to the carnal\nseed of Abraham, that is, the Jews, but to his spiritual sons, which\nwere the heirs of his faith, that is, to the believing Christians; which\nanswer he explicateth, first by the allegory of Isaac and Ishmael, and\nafter in the place cited of Esau and Jacob. Yet neither does he speak\nthere so much of their persons as of their posterities. And though some\nwords may be accommodated to God\u2019s predestination, which are there\nuttered, yet it is not the scope of that text, to treat of the\nreprobation of any man to hell fire. All the posterity of Esau were not\neternally reprobated, as holy Job and many others. But this question\nwhich is now agitated between us, is quite of another nature, how a man\ncan be a criminal who doth nothing but that which he is extrinsically\nnecessitated to do, or how God in justice can punish a man with eternal\ntorments for doing that which it was never in his power to leave undone;\nor why he who did imprint the motion in the heart of man, should punish\nman, who did only receive the impression from him. So his answer _looks\nanother way_.\n\n\u201cBut because he grounds so much upon this text, that if it can be\ncleared he is ready to change his opinion, I will examine all those\npassages which may seem to favour his cause. First, these words (ver.\n11): _being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil_, upon\nwhich the whole weight of his argument doth depend, have no reference at\nall to those words (verse 13), _Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I\nhated_; for those words were first uttered by the prophet Malachi, many\nages after Jacob and Esau were dead (Mal. i. 2, 3), and intended of the\nposterity of Esau, who were not redeemed from captivity as the\nIsraelites were. But they are referred to those other words (verse 12),\n_the elder shall serve the younger_, which indeed were spoken before\nJacob or Esau were born. (Gen. xxv. 23.) And though those words of\nMalachi had been used of Jacob and Esau before they were born, yet it\nhad advantaged his cause nothing: for hatred in that text doth not\nsignify any reprobation to the flames of hell, much less the execution\nof that decree, or the actual imposition of punishment, nor any act\ncontrary to love. God saw all that he had made, and it was very good.\nGoodness itself cannot hate that which is good. But hatred there\nsignifies comparative hatred, or a less degree of love, or at the most a\nnegation of love. As (Gen. xxix. 31), _when the Lord saw that Leah was\nhated_, we may not conclude thence that Jacob hated his wife; the\nprecedent verse doth fully expound the sense (verse 30): _Jacob loved\nRachel more than Leah_. So (Matth. vi. 24), _No man can serve two\nmasters, for either he will hate the one and love the other_. So (Luke\nxiv. 26), _If any man hate not his father and mother, &c. he cannot be\nmy disciple_. St. Matthew (x. 37) tells us the sense of it: _He that\nloveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me_.\n\n\u201cSecondly, those words (ver. 15) _I will have mercy on whom I will have\nmercy_, do prove no more but this, that the preferring of Jacob before\nEsau, and of the Christians before the Jews, was not a debt from God\neither to the one or to the other, but a work of mercy. And what of\nthis? All men confess that God\u2019s mercies do exceed man\u2019s deserts, but\nGod\u2019s punishments do never exceed man\u2019s misdeeds. As we see in the\nparable of the labourers (Matth. xx. 13-15): _Friend, I do thee no\nwrong. Did not I agree with thee for a penny? Is it not lawful for me to\ndo with mine own as I will? Is thy eye evil, because I am good?_ Acts of\nmercy are free, but acts of justice are due.\n\n\u201cThat which follows (verse 17) comes something nearer the cause. _The\nScripture saith unto Pharaoh, for this same purpose I have raised thee\nup_, (that is, I have made thee a king, or I have preserved thee), _that\nI might show my power in thee_. But this particle, _that_, doth not\nalways signify the main end of an action, but sometimes only a\nconsequent of it, as Matth. ii. 15: _He departed into Egypt_, that _it\nmight be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, out of Egypt have I\ncalled my son_. Without doubt Joseph\u2019s aim or end of his journey was not\nto fulfil prophecies, but to save the life of the child. Yet because the\nfulfilling of the prophecy was a consequent of Joseph\u2019s journey, he\nsaith, _that it might be fulfilled_. So here, _I have raised thee up,\nthat I might show my power_. Again, though it should be granted that\nthis particle _that_, did denote the intention of God to destroy Pharaoh\nin the Red Sea, yet it was not the antecedent intention of God, which\nevermore respects the good and benefit of the creature, but God\u2019s\nconsequent intention upon the prevision of Pharaoh\u2019s obstinacy, that\nsince he would not glorify God in obeying his word, he should glorify\nGod undergoing his judgments. Hitherto we find no eternal punishments,\nnor no temporal punishment without just deserts.\n\n\u201cIt follows, (ver. 18), _whom he will he hardeneth_. Indeed hardness of\nheart is the greatest judgment that God lays upon a sinner in this life,\nworse than all the plagues of Egypt. But how doth God harden the heart?\nNot by a natural influence of any evil act or habit into the will, nor\nby inducing the will with persuasive motives to obstinacy and rebellion\n(James i. 13, 14): _For God tempteth no man, but every man is tempted\nwhen he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed_. Then God is said to\nharden the heart three ways; first, negatively, and not positively; not\nby imparting wickedness, but by not imparting grace; as the sun\ndescending to the tropic of Capricorn, is said with us to be the cause\nof winter, that is, not by imparting cold, but by not imparting heat. It\nis an act of mercy in God to give his grace freely, but to detain it is\nno act of injustice. So the apostle opposeth hardening to shewing of\nmercy. To harden is as much as not to shew mercy.\n\n\u201cSecondly, God is said to harden the heart occasionally and not\ncausally, by doing good, (which incorrigible sinners make an occasion of\ngrowing worse and worse), and doing evil; as a master by often\ncorrecting of an untoward scholar, doth accidentally and occasionally\nharden his heart, and render him more obdurate, insomuch as he grows\neven to despise the rod. Or as an indulgent parent by his patience and\ngentleness doth encourage an obstinate son to become more rebellious.\nSo, whether we look upon God\u2019s frequent judgments upon Pharaoh, or God\u2019s\niterated favours in removing and withdrawing those judgments upon\nPharaoh\u2019s request, both of them in their several kinds were occasions of\nhardening Pharaoh\u2019s heart, the one making him more presumptuous, the\nother more desperately rebellious. So that which was good in it was\nGod\u2019s; that which was evil was Pharaoh\u2019s. God gave the occasion, but\nPharaoh was the true cause of his own obduration. This is clearly\nconfirmed, Exodus viii. 15: _When Pharaoh saw that there was respite, he\nhardened his heart_. And Exodus ix. 34: _When Pharaoh saw that the rain\nand the hail and the thunders were ceased, he sinned yet more, and\nhardened his heart, he and his servants_. So Psalm cv. 25: _He turned\ntheir hearts, so that they hated his people, and dealt subtly with\nthem_. That is, God blessed the children of Israel, whereupon the\nEgyptians did take occasion to hate them, as is plain, Exodus i. 7, 8,\n9, 10. So God hardened Pharaoh\u2019s heart, and Pharaoh hardened his own\nheart. God hardened it by not shewing mercy to Pharaoh, as he did to\nNebuchadnezzar, who was as great a sinner as he, or God hardened it\noccasionally; but still Pharaoh was the true cause of his own\nobduration, by determining his own will to evil, and confirming himself\nin his obstinacy. So are all presumptuous sinners, (Psalm xcv. 8):\n_Harden not your hearts as in the provocation, or as in the day of\ntemptation in the wilderness_.\n\n\u201cThirdly, God is said to harden the heart permissively, but not\noperatively, nor effectively, as he who only lets loose a greyhound out\nof the slip, is said to hound him at the hare. Will you see plainly what\nSt. Paul intends by hardening? Read Rom. ix. 22, 23: _What if God,\nwilling to shew his wrath and to make his power known_ (that is, by a\nconsequent will, which in order of nature follows the prevision of sin),\n_endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to\ndestruction. And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the\nvessels of mercy_, &c. There is much difference between _enduring_ and\n_impelling_, or inciting the vessels of wrath. He saith of the vessels\nof mercy, that _God prepared them unto glory_. But of the vessels of\nwrath, he saith only that they were _fitted to destruction_, that is,\nnot by God, but by themselves. St. Paul saith, that God doth _endure the\nvessels of wrath with much long-suffering_. T. H. saith, that God wills\nand effects by the second causes all their actions good and bad, that he\nnecessitateth them, and determineth them irresistibly to do those acts\nwhich he condemneth as evil, and for which he punisheth them. If _doing\nwillingly_, and _enduring_, if _much long-suffering_, and\n_necessitating_, imply not a contrariety one to another, _reddat mihi\nminam Diogenes_, let him that taught me logic, give me my money again.\n\n\u201cBut T. H. saith, that this distinction between the _operative_ and\n_permissive_ will of God, and that other between the action and the\nirregularity, do dazzle his understanding. Though he can find no\ndifference between these two, yet others do; St. Paul himself did (Acts\nxiii. 18): _About the time of forty years suffered he their manners in\nthe wilderness_. And (Acts xiv. 16): _Who in times past suffered all\nnations to walk in their own ways._ T. H. would make suffering to be\ninciting, their manners to be God\u2019s manners, their ways to be God\u2019s\nways. And (Acts xvii. 30): _The times of this ignorance God winked at_.\nIt was never heard that one was said to wink or connive at that which\nwas his own act. And (1 Cor. x. 13): _God is faithful, who will not\nsuffer you to be tempted above that you are able_. To tempt is the\ndevil\u2019s act; therefore he is called the _tempter_. God tempts no man to\nsin, but he suffers them to be tempted. And so suffers, that he could\nhinder Satan, if he would. But by T. H.\u2019s doctrine, to tempt to sin, and\nto suffer one to be tempted to sin when it is in his power to hinder it,\nis all one. And so he transforms God (I write it with horror) into the\ndevil, and makes tempting to be God\u2019s own work, and the devil to be but\nhis instrument. And in that noted place, (Rom. ii. 4, 5): _Despisest\nthou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and long-suffering, not\nknowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance; but after\nthy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thyself wrath\nagainst the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous judgment of\nGod?_ Here are as many convincing arguments in this one text against the\nopinion of T. H. almost as there are words. Here we learn that God is\n_rich in goodness_, and will not punish his creatures for that which is\nhis own act; secondly, that he _suffers_ and _forbears sinners long_,\nand doth not snatch them away by sudden death as they deserve. Thirdly,\nthat the reason of God\u2019s forbearance is to _bring men to repentance_.\nFourthly, that _hardness of heart and impenitency_ is not causally from\nGod, but from ourselves. Fifthly, that it is not the insufficient\nproposal of the means of their conversion on God\u2019s part, which is the\ncause of men\u2019s perdition, but their own contempt and despising of these\nmeans. Sixthly, that punishment is not an act of absolute dominion, but\nan act of righteous judgment, whereby God renders to every man according\nto his own deeds, wrath to them and only to them who _treasure up wrath\nunto themselves_, and eternal life to those who _continue patiently in\nwell-doing_. If they deserve such punishment who only neglect the\ngoodness and long-suffering of God, what do they who utterly deny it,\nand make God\u2019s doing and his suffering to be all one? I do beseech T. H.\nto consider what a degree of wilfulness it is, out of one obscure text\nwholly misunderstood to contradict the clear current of the whole\nScripture. Of the same mind with St. Paul was St. Peter, (1 Peter iii.\n20): _The long-suffering of God waited once in the days of Noah_. And 2\nPeter iii. 15: _Account that the long-suffering of the Lord is\nsalvation_. This is the name God gives himself, (Exod. xxxiv. 6): _The\nLord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering_, &c.\n\n(_b_) \u201cYet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith to be commonly true,\nthat he who doth permit any thing to be done, which it is in his power\nto hinder, knowing that if he do not hinder it, it will be done, doth in\nsome sort will it. I say in some sort, that is, either by an antecedent\nwill, or by a consequent will, either by an operative will, or by a\npermissive will, or he is willing to let it be done, but not willing to\ndo it. Sometimes an antecedent engagement doth cause a man to suffer\nthat to be done, which otherwise he would not suffer. So Darius suffered\nDaniel to be cast into the lion\u2019s den, to make good his rash decree; so\nHerod suffered John Baptist to be beheaded, to make good his rash oath.\nHow much more may the immutable rule of justice in God, and his fidelity\nin keeping his word, draw from him the punishment of obstinate sinners,\nthough antecedently he willeth their conversion? He loveth all his\ncreatures well, but his own justice better. Again, sometimes a man\nsuffereth that to be done, which he doth not will directly in itself,\nbut indirectly for some other end, or for the producing of some greater\ngood; as a man willeth that a putrid member be cut off from his body, to\nsave the life of the whole. Or as a judge, being desirous to save a\nmalefactor\u2019s life, and having power to reprieve him, doth yet condemn\nhim for example\u2019s sake, that by the death of one he may save the lives\nof many. Marvel not then if God suffer some creatures to take such\ncourses as tend to their own ruin, so long as their sufferings do make\nfor the greater manifestation of his glory, and for the greater benefit\nof his faithful servants. This is a most certain truth, that God would\nnot suffer evil to be in the world unless he knew how to draw good out\nof evil. Yet this ought not to be understood, as if we made any priority\nor posteriority of time in the acts of God, but only of nature. Nor do\nwe make the antecedent and consequent will to be contrary one to\nanother; because the one respects man pure and uncorrupted, the other\nrespects him as he is lapsed. The objects are the same, but considered\nafter a diverse manner. Nor yet do we make these wills to be distinct in\nGod; for they are the same with the divine essence, which is one. But\nthe distinction is in order to the objects or things willed. Nor,\nlastly, do we make this permission to be a naked or a mere permission.\nGod causeth all good, permitteth all evil, disposeth all things, both\ngood and evil.\n\n(_c_) \u201cT. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action and yet\nnot be the cause of the irregularity of the action. I answer, because he\nconcurs to the doing of evil by a general, but not by a special\ninfluence. As the earth gives nourishment to all kinds of plants, as\nwell to hemlock as to wheat; but the reason why the one yields food to\nour sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is not from the\ngeneral nourishment of the earth, but from the special quality of the\nroot. Even so the general power to act is from God. _In him we live, and\nmove, and have our being._ This is good. But the specification, and\ndetermination of this general power to the doing of any evil, is from\nourselves, and proceeds from the free-will of man. This is bad. And to\nspeak properly, the free-will of man is not the efficient cause of sin,\nas the root of the hemlock is of poison, sin having no true entity or\nbeing in it, as poison hath; but rather the deficient cause. Now no\ndefect can flow from him who is the highest perfection. (_d_) Wherefore\nT. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the particular and determinate act\nof killing Uriah to be from God. The general power to act is from God,\nbut the specification of this general and good power to murder, or to\nany particular evil, is not from God, but from the free-will of man. So\nT. H. may see clearly if he will, how one may be the cause of the law,\nand likewise of the action in some sort, that is, by general influence;\nand yet another cause concurring, by special influence and determining\nthis general and good power, may make itself the true cause of the anomy\nor the irregularity. And therefore he may keep his longer and shorter\ngarments for some other occasion. Certainly, they will not fit this\nsubject, unless he could make general and special influence to be all\none.\n\n\u201cBut T. H. presseth yet further, that the case is the same, and the\nobjection used by the Jews, (verse 19): _Why doth he yet find fault; who\nhath resisted his will?_ is the very same with my argument; and St.\nPaul\u2019s answer, (verse 20:) _O man, who art thou that repliest against\nGod? Shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it, why hast thou\nmade me thus? Hath not the potter power over his clay?_ &c., is the very\nsame with his answer in this place, drawn from the irresistible power\nand absolute dominion of God, which justifieth all his actions. And that\nthe apostle in his answer doth not deny that it was God\u2019s will, nor that\nGod\u2019s decree was before Esau\u2019s sin.\n\n\u201cTo which I reply, first, that the case is not at all the same, but\nquite different, as may appear by these particulars; first, those words,\n_before they had done either good or evil_, are not, cannot be referred\nto those other words, _Esau have I hated_. Secondly, if they could, yet\nit is less than nothing, because before Esau had actually sinned, his\nfuture sins were known to God. Thirdly, by the potter\u2019s clay, here is\nnot to be understood the pure mass, but the corrupted mass of mankind.\nFourthly, the hating here mentioned is only a comparative hatred, that\nis, a less degree of love. Fifthly, the hardening which St. Paul speaks\nof, is not a positive, but a negative obduration, or a not imparting of\ngrace. Sixthly, St. Paul speaketh not of any positive reprobation to\neternal punishment, much less doth he speak of the actual inflicting of\npunishment without sin, which is the question between us, and wherein T.\nH. differs from all that I remember to have read, who do all acknowledge\nthat punishment is never actually inflicted but for sin. If the question\nbe put, why God doth good to one more than to another, or why God\nimparteth more grace to one than to another, as it is there, the answer\nis just and fit, because it is his pleasure, and it is sauciness in a\ncreature in this case to reply, (Matthew xx. 15): _May not God do what\nhe will with his own?_ No man doubteth but God imparteth grace beyond\nman\u2019s desert. (_e_) But if the case be put, why God doth punish one more\nthan another, or why he throws one into hell-fire, and not another,\nwhich is the present case agitated between us; to say with T. H., that\nit is because God is omnipotent, or because his power is irresistible,\nor merely because it is his pleasure, is not only not warranted, but is\nplainly condemned by St. Paul in this place. So many differences there\nare between those two cases. It is not therefore against God that I\nreply, but against T. H. I do not call my Creator to the bar, but my\nfellow-creature; I ask no account of God\u2019s counsels, but of man\u2019s\npresumptions. It is the mode of these times to father their own fancies\nupon God, and when they cannot justify them by reason, to plead his\nomnipotence, or to cry, _O altitudo_, that the ways of God are\nunsearchable. If they may justify their drowsy dreams, because God\u2019s\npower and dominion is absolute; much more may we reject such\nphantastical devices which are inconsistent with the truth and goodness\nand justice of God, and make him to be a tyrant, who is the Father of\nMercies and the God of all consolation. The unsearchableness of God\u2019s\nways should be a bridle to restrain presumption, and not a sanctuary for\nspirits of error.\n\n\u201cSecondly, this objection contained ver. 19, to which the apostle\nanswers ver. 20, is not made in the person of Esau or Pharaoh, as T. H.\nsupposeth, but of the unbelieving Jews, who thought much at that grace\nand favour which God was pleased to vouchsafe unto the Gentiles, to\nacknowledge them for his people, which honour they would have\nappropriated to the posterity of Abraham. And the apostle\u2019s answer is\nnot only drawn from the sovereign dominion of God, to impart his grace\nto whom he pleaseth, as hath been shewed already, but also from the\nobstinacy and proper fault of the Jews, as appeareth verse 22: _What if\nGod, willing_ (that is, by a consequent will) _to shew his wrath, and to\nmake his power known, endureth with much long-suffering the vessels of\nwrath fitted to destruction_. They acted, God endured; they were\ntolerated by God, but fitted to destruction by themselves; for their\nmuch wrong-doing, here is God\u2019s _much long-suffering_. And more plainly,\nverse 31, 32: _Israel hath not attained to the law of righteousness.\nWherefore? Because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the\nworks of the law._ This reason is set down yet more emphatically in the\nnext chapter (Rom. x. 3): _They_ (that is, the Israelites) _being\nignorant of God\u2019s righteousness_, (that is, by faith in Christ), _and\ngoing about to establish their own righteousness_, (that is, by the\nworks of the law), _have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness\nof God_. And yet most expressly (chap. xi. 20): _Because of unbelief\nthey were broken off, but thou standest by faith_. Neither was there any\nprecedent binding decree of God, to necessitate them to unbelief, and\nconsequently to punishment. It was in their own power by their\nconcurrence with God\u2019s grace to prevent these judgments, and to recover\ntheir former estate; verse 23: _If they_ (that is, the unbelieving Jews)\n_abide not still in unbelief they shall be grafted in_. The crown and\nthe sword are immovable, (to use St. Anselm\u2019s comparison), but it is we\nthat move and change places. Sometimes the Jews were under the crown,\nand the Gentiles under the sword; sometimes the Jews under the sword,\nand the Gentiles under the crown.\n\n\u201cThirdly, though I confess that human pacts are not the measure of God\u2019s\njustice, but his justice is his own immutable will, whereby he is ready\nto give every man that which is his own, as rewards to the good,\npunishments to the bad; so nevertheless God may oblige himself freely to\nhis creature. He made the covenant of works with mankind in Adam; and\ntherefore he punisheth not man contrary to his own covenant, but for the\ntransgression of his duty. And divine justice is not measured by\nomnipotence or by irresistible power, but by God\u2019s will. God can do many\nthings according to his absolute power, which he doth not. He could\nraise up children to Abraham of stones, but he never did so. It is a\nrule in theology, that God cannot do anything which argues any\nwickedness or imperfection: as God cannot deny himself (2 Timothy ii.\n13); he cannot lie (Titus i. 2). These and the like are the fruits of\nimpotence, not of power. So God cannot destroy the righteous with the\nwicked (Genesis xviii. 25.) He could not destroy Sodom whilst Lot was in\nit, (Genesis xix. 22); not for want of dominion or power, but because it\nwas not agreeable to his justice, nor to that law which himself had\nconstituted. The apostle saith (Hebrews vi. 10), _God is not unrighteous\nto forget your work_. As it is a good consequence to say, this is from\nGod, therefore it is righteous; so is this also, this thing is\nunrighteous, therefore it cannot proceed from God. We see how all\ncreatures by instinct of nature do love their young, as the hen her\nchickens; how they will expose themselves to death for them. And yet all\nthese are but shadows of that love which is in God towards his\ncreatures. How impious is it then to conceive, that God did create so\nmany millions of souls to be tormented eternally in hell, without any\nfault of theirs except such as he himself did necessitate them unto,\nmerely to shew his dominion, and because his power is irresistible? The\nsame privilege which T. H. appropriates here to power absolutely\nirresistible, a friend of his, in his book _De Cive_, cap. VI., ascribes\nto power respectively irresistible, or to sovereign magistrates, whose\npower he makes to be as absolute as a man\u2019s power is over himself; not\nto be limited by any thing, but only by their strength. The greatest\npropugners of sovereign power think it enough for princes to challenge\nan immunity from coercive power, but acknowledge that the law hath a\ndirective power over them. But T. H. will have no limits but their\nstrength. Whatsoever they do by power, they do justly.\n\n\u201cBut, saith he, God objected no sin to Job, but justified his afflicting\nhim by his power. First, this is an argument from authority negatively,\nthat is to say, worth nothing. Secondly, the afflictions of Job were no\nvindicatory punishments to take vengeance of his sins, (whereof we\ndispute), but probatory chastisements to make trial of his graces.\nThirdly, Job was not so pure, but that God might justly have laid\ngreater punishments upon him, than those afflictions which he suffered.\nWitness his impatience, even to the cursing of the day of his nativity\n(Job iii. 3). Indeed God said to Job, (Job xxxviii. 4): _Where wast\nthou, when I laid the foundations of the earth?_ that is, how canst thou\njudge of the things that were done before thou wast born, or comprehend\nthe secret causes of my judgments? And (Job xl. 9): _Hast thou an arm\nlike God?_ As if he should say, why art thou impatient; dost thou think\nthyself able to strive with God? But that God should punish Job without\ndesert, here is not a word.\n\n\u201cConcerning the blind man mentioned John ix, his blindness was rather a\nblessing to him than a punishment, being the means to raise his soul\nilluminated, and to bring him to see the face of God in Jesus Christ.\nThe sight of the body is common to us with ants and flies, but the sight\nof the soul with the blessed angels. We read of some who have put out\ntheir bodily eyes, because they thought they were an impediment to the\neye of the soul. Again, neither he nor his parents were innocent, being\nconceived and born in sin and iniquity (Psalm li. 5). And in many things\nwe offend all (James iii. 2). But our Saviour\u2019s meaning is evident by\nthe disciples\u2019 question, John ix. 2. They had not so sinned, that he\nshould be born blind; or they were not more grievous sinners than other\nmen, to deserve an exemplary judgment more than they; but this corporal\nblindness befel him principally by the extraordinary providence of God,\nfor the manifestation of his own glory in restoring him to his sight. So\nhis instance halts on both sides; neither was this a punishment, nor the\nblind man free from sin. His third instance of the death and torments of\nbeasts, is of no more weight than the two former. The death of brute\nbeasts is not a punishment of sin, but a debt of nature. And though they\nbe often slaughtered for the use of man, yet there is a vast difference\nbetween those light and momentary pangs, and the unsufferable and\nendless pains of hell; between the mere depriving of a creature of\ntemporal life, and the subjecting of it to eternal death. I know the\nphilosophical speculations of some, who affirm, that entity is better\nthan non-entity, that it is better to be miserable and suffer the\ntorments of the damned, than to be annihilated and cease to be\naltogether. This entity which they speak of, is a metaphysical entity\nabstracted from the matter, which is better than non-entity, in respect\nof some goodness, not moral nor natural, but transcendental, which\naccompanies every being. But in the concrete it is far otherwise, where\nthat saying of our Saviour often takes place, (Matthew xxvi. 24): _Woe\nunto that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed. It had been good for\nthat man, that he had not been born._ I add, that there is an analogical\njustice and mercy due even to the brute beasts. _Thou shalt not muzzle\nthe mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn._ And, _a just man is\nmerciful to his beast_.\n\n(_f_) \u201cBut his greatest error is that which I touched before, to make\njustice to be the proper result of power. Power doth not measure and\nregulate justice, but justice measures and regulates power. The will of\nGod, and the eternal law which is in God himself, is properly the rule\nand measure of justice. As all goodness, whether natural or moral, is a\nparticipation of divine goodness, and all created rectitude is but a\nparticipation of divine rectitude, so all laws are but participations of\nthe eternal law from whence they derive their power. The rule of justice\nthen is the same both in God and us: but it is in God, as in him that\ndoth regulate and measure; in us, as in those who are regulated and\nmeasured. As the will of God is immutable, always willing what is just\nand right and good; so his justice likewise is immutable. And that\nindividual action which is justly punished as sinful in us, cannot\npossibly proceed from the special influence and determinative power of a\njust cause. See then how grossly T. H. doth understand that old and true\nprinciple, that the will of God is the rule of justice; as if by willing\nthings in themselves unjust, he did render them just by reason of his\nabsolute dominion and irresistible power, as fire doth assimilate other\nthings to itself, and convert them into the nature of fire. This were to\nmake the eternal law a Lesbian rule. Sin is defined to be that which is\ndone, or said, or thought, contrary to the eternal law. But by this\ndoctrine nothing is done, nor said, nor thought, contrary to the will of\nGod. St. Anselm said most truly, \u2018then the will of man is good, and\njust, and right, when he wills that which God would have him to will.\u2019\nBut according to this doctrine, every man always wills that which God\nwould have him to will. If this be true, we need not pray, _Thy will be\ndone in earth as it is in heaven_. T. H. hath devised a new kind of\nheaven upon earth. The worst is, it is an heaven without justice.\nJustice is a constant and perpetual act of the will, to give every one\nhis own; but to inflict punishment for those things which the judge\nhimself did determine and necessitate to be done, is not to give every\none his own; right punitive justice is a relation of equality and\nproportion between the demerit and the punishment. But supposing this\nopinion of absolute and universal necessity, there is no demerit in the\nworld. We use to say, that right springs from law and fact; as in this\nsyllogism, every thief ought to be punished, there is the law; but such\nan one is a thief, there is the fact; therefore he ought to be punished,\nthere is the right. But this opinion of T. H. grounds the right to be\npunished, neither upon law, nor upon fact, but upon the irresistible\npower of God. Yea, it overturneth, as much as in it lies, all law;\nfirst, the eternal law, which is the ordination of divine wisdom, by\nwhich all creatures are directed to that end which is convenient for\nthem, that is, not to necessitate them to eternal flames; then the law\nparticipated, which is the ordination of right reason, instituted for\nthe common good, to show unto man what he ought to do, and what he ought\nnot to do. To what purpose is it, to show the right way to him who is\ndrawn and haled a contrary way by adamantine bonds of inevitable\nnecessity?\n\n(_g_) \u201cLastly, howsoever T. H. cries out, that God cannot sin, yet in\ntruth he makes him to be the principal and most proper cause of all sin.\nFor he makes him to be the cause, not only of the law and of the action,\nbut even of the irregularity itself, and the difference between the\naction and the law, wherein the very essence of sin doth consist. He\nmakes God to determine David\u2019s will, and necessitate him to kill Uriah.\nIn causes physically and essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause\nis evermore the cause of the effect. These are those deadly fruits which\nspring from the poisonous root of the absolute necessity of all things;\nwhich T. H. seeing, and that neither the sins of Esau, nor Pharaoh, nor\nany wicked person do proceed from the operative, but from the permissive\nwill of God, and that punishment is an act of justice, not of dominion\nonly, I hope that according to his promise he will change his opinion.\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. XII.\n\nThe Bishop had argued in this manner: \u201cIf there be no liberty, there\nshall be no last judgment, no rewards nor punishments after death.\u201d To\nthis I answered, that though God cannot sin, because what he doth, his\ndoing maketh just, and because he is not subject to another\u2019s law, and\nthat therefore it is blasphemy to say that God can sin; yet to say, that\nGod hath so ordered the world that sin may be necessarily committed, is\nnot blasphemy. And I can also further say, though God be the cause of\nall motion and of all actions, and therefore unless sin be no motion nor\naction, it must derive a necessity from the first mover; nevertheless it\ncannot be said that God is the author of sin, because not he that\nnecessitateth an action, but he that doth command and warrant it, is the\nauthor. And if God own an action, though otherwise it were a sin, it is\nnow no sin. The act of the Israelites in robbing the Egyptians of their\njewels, without God\u2019s warrant had been theft. But it was neither theft,\ncozenage, nor sin; supposing they knew the warrant was from God. The\nrest of my answer to that inconvenience, was an opposing to his\ninconveniences the manifest texts of St. Paul, Rom. ix. The substance of\nhis reply to my answer is this.\n\n(_a_) \u201cThough punishment were an act of dominion, not of justice, in\nGod; yet this is no sufficient cause why God should deny his own act, or\nwhy he should chide or expostulate with men, why they did that which he\nhimself did necessitate them to do.\u201d\n\nI never said that God denied his act, but that he may expostulate with\nmen; and this may be (I shall never say directly, it is) the reason of\nthat his expostulation, viz. to convince them that their wills were not\nindependent, but were his mere gift; and that to do, or not to do, is\nnot in him that willeth, but in God that hath mercy on, or hardeneth\nwhom he will. But the Bishop interpreteth _hardening_ to be a permission\nof God. Which is to attribute to God in such actions no more than he\nmight have attributed to any of Pharaoh\u2019s servants, the not persuading\ntheir master to let the people go. And whereas he compares this\npermission to the indulgence of a parent, that by his patience\nencourageth his son to become more rebellious, which indulgence is a\nsin; he maketh God to be like a sinful man. And indeed it seemeth that\nall they that hold this freedom of the will, conceive of God no\notherwise than the common sort of Jews did, that God was like a man,\nthat he had been seen by Moses, and after by the seventy elders (Exod.\nxxiv. 10); expounding that and other places literally. Again he saith,\nthat God is said to harden the heart _permissively_, but not\n_operatively_; which is the same distinction with his first, namely\n_negatively_, not _positively_, and with his second, _occasionally_, and\nnot _causally_. So that all his three ways how God hardens the heart of\nwicked men, come to this one of _permission_; which is as much as to\nsay, God sees, looks on, and does nothing, nor ever did anything, in the\nbusiness. Thus you see how the Bishop expoundeth St. Paul. Therefore I\nwill leave the rest of his commentary upon Rom. ix. to the judgment of\nthe reader, to think of the same as he pleaseth.\n\n(_b_) \u201cYet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith, \u2018that he who doth\npermit anything to be done, which it is in his power to hinder, knowing\nthat if he do not hinder it, it will be done, doth in some sort will\nit;\u2019 I say in some sort, that is either by an antecedent will, or by a\nconsequent will; either by an operative will, or by a permissive will;\nor he is willing to let it be done, but not willing to do it.\u201d\n\nWhether it be called antecedent, or consequent, or operative, or\npermissive, it is enough for the necessity of the thing that the heart\nof Pharaoh should be hardened; and if God were not willing to do it, I\ncannot conceive how it could be done without him.\n\n(_c_) \u201cT. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action, and yet\nnot be the cause of the irregularity of the action? I answer, because he\nconcurs to the doing of evil by a general, but not by a special,\ninfluence.\u201d\n\nI had thought to pass over this place, because of the nonsense of\ngeneral and special influence. Seeing he saith that God concurs to the\ndoing of evil, I desire the reader would take notice, that if he blame\nme for speaking of God as of a necessitating cause, and as it were a\nprincipal agent in the causing of all actions, he may with as good\nreason blame himself for making him by concurrence an accessory to the\nsame. And indeed, let men hold what they will contrary to the truth, if\nthey write much, the truth will fall into their pens. But he thinks he\nhath a similitude, which will make this permissive will a very clear\nbusiness. \u201cThe earth,\u201d saith he, \u201cgives nourishment to all kinds of\nplants, as well to hemlock as to wheat; but the reason why the one\nyields food to our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is\nnot from the general nourishment of the earth, but from the special\nquality of the root.\u201d It seemeth by this similitude, he thinketh, that\nGod doth, not operatively, but permissively will that the root of\nhemlock should poison the man that eateth it, but that wheat should\nnourish him he willeth operatively; which is very absurd; or else he\nmust confess that the venomous effects of wicked men are willed\noperatively.\n\n(_d_) \u201cWherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the particular and\ndeterminate act of killing Uriah to be from God. The general power to\nact, is from God; but the specification of this general and good power,\nto murder, or to any particular evil, is not from God, but from the free\nwill of man.\u201d\n\nBut why am I so mightily mistaken? Did not God foreknow that Uriah in\nparticular, should be murdered by David in particular? And what God\nforeknoweth shall come to pass, can that possibly not come so to pass?\nAnd that which cannot possibly not come to pass, doth not that\nnecessarily come to pass? And is not all necessity from God? I cannot\nsee this great mistake. \u201cThe general power,\u201d saith he, \u201cto act is from\nGod, but the specification to do this act upon Uriah, is not from God,\nbut from free-will.\u201d Very learnedly. As if there were a power that were\nnot the power to do some particular act; or a power to kill, and yet to\nkill nobody in particular. If the power be to kill, it is to kill that\nwhich shall be by that power killed, whether it be Uriah or any other;\nand the giving of that power, is the application of it to the act; nor\ndoth power signify anything actually, but those motions and present acts\nfrom which the act that is not now, but shall be hereafter, necessarily\nproceedeth. And therefore this argument is much like that which used\nheretofore to be brought for the defence of the divine right of the\nbishops to the ordination of ministers. They derive not, say they, the\nright of ordination from the civil sovereign, but from Christ\nimmediately. And yet they acknowledge that it is unlawful for them to\nordain, if the civil power do forbid them. But how have they right to\nordain, when they cannot do it lawfully? Their answer is, they have the\nright, though they may not exercise it; as if the right to ordain, and\nthe right to exercise ordination, were not the same thing. And as they\nanswer concerning right, which is legal power, so the Bishop answereth\nconcerning natural power, that David had a general power to kill Uriah\nfrom God, but not a power of applying this power in special to the\nkilling of Uriah from God, but from his own free will; that is, he had a\npower to kill Uriah, but not to exercise it upon Uriah, that is to say,\nhe had a power to kill him, but not to kill him, which is absurd.\n\n(_e_) \u201cBut if the case be put why God doth punish one more than another,\nor why he throws one into hell fire, and not another, which is the\npresent case between us; to say with T. H., that it is because God is\nomnipotent, or because his power is irresistible, or merely because it\nis his pleasure, is not only not warranted, but is plainly condemned by\nSt. Paul in this place.\u201d\n\nI note first, that he hath no reason to say, the case agitated between\nus is, whether the cause why God punisheth one man more than another, be\nhis irresistible power, or man\u2019s sin. The case agitated between us is,\nwhether a man can now choose what shall be his _will_ anon, or at any\ntime hereafter. Again, it is not true that he says, it is my opinion\nthat the irresistible power of God is the cause why he punisheth one\nmore than another. I say only that when he doth so, the irresistible\npower is enough to make it not unjust. But that the cause why God\npunisheth one more than another, is many times the will he hath to show\nhis power, is affirmed in this place by St. Paul, _Shall the thing\nformed, say to him that formed it_, &c. And by our Saviour in the case\nof him that was born blind, where he saith, _Neither hath this man\nsinned nor his parents; but that the works of God may be made manifest_.\nAnd by the expostulation of God with Job. This endeavour of his to bring\nthe text of St. Paul to his purpose, is not only frustrate, but the\ncause of many insignificant phrases in his discourse; as this: \u201cIt was\nin their own power, by their concurrence with God\u2019s grace, to prevent\nthese judgments, and to recover their former estates,\u201d which is as good\nsense, as if he should say, that it is in his own power, with the\nconcurrence of the sovereign power of England, to be what he will. And\nthis, that \u201cGod may oblige himself freely to his creature.\u201d For he that\ncan oblige, can also, when he will, release; and he that can release\nhimself when he will, is not obliged. Besides this, he is driven to\nwords ill-becoming him that is to speak of God Almighty; for he makes\nhim unable to do that which hath been within the ordinary power of men\nto do. \u201cGod,\u201d he saith, \u201ccannot destroy the righteous with the wicked;\u201d\nwhich nevertheless is a thing ordinarily done by armies: and \u201cHe could\nnot destroy Sodom while Lot was in it;\u201d which he interpreteth, as if he\ncould not do it lawfully. One text is Genesis xviii. 23, 24, 25. There\nis not a word that God could not destroy the righteous with the wicked.\nOnly Abraham saith (as a man): _Shall not the Judge of all the earth do\nright?_ Another is Genesis 22): _Haste thee, escape thither; for I\ncannot do any thing till thou be come thither_. Which is an ordinary\nphrase, in such a case where God had determined to burn the city and\nsave a particular man, and signifieth not any obligation to save Lot\nmore than the rest. Likewise concerning Job, who, expostulating with\nGod, was answered only with the explication of the infinite power of\nGod, the Bishop answereth, that there is never a word of Job\u2019s being\npunished without desert; which answer is impertinent. For I say not that\nhe was punished without desert, but that it was not for his desert that\nhe was afflicted; for punished, he was not at all.\n\nAnd concerning the blind man, (John ix.), who was born blind, that the\npower of God might be shewn in him; he answers that it was not a\npunishment, but a blessing. I did not say it was a punishment; certainly\nit was an affliction. How then doth he call it a blessing? Reasonably\nenough: \u201cbecause,\u201d saith he, \u201cit was the means to raise his soul\nilluminated, and to bring him to see the face of God in Jesus Christ.\nThe sight of the body is common to us with ants and flies, but the sight\nof the soul, with the blessed angels.\u201d This is very well said; for no\nman doubts but some afflictions may be blessings; but I doubt whether\nthe Bishop, that says he reads of some who have put out their bodily\neyes, because they thought they were an impediment to the eye of the\nsoul, think that they did well. To that where I say that brute beasts\nare afflicted which cannot sin, he answereth, that \u201cthere is a vast\ndifference between those light and momentary pangs, and the unsufferable\nand endless pains of hell.\u201d As if the length or the greatness of the\npain, made any difference in the justice or injustice of the inflicting\nit.\n\n(_f_) \u201cBut his greatest error is that which I touched before, to make\njustice to be the proper result of power.\u201d\n\nHe would make men believe, I hold all things to be just, that are done\nby them who have power enough to avoid the punishment. This is one of\nhis pretty little policies, by which I find him in many occasions to\ntake the measure of his own wisdom. I said no more, but that the power,\nwhich is absolutely irresistible, makes him that hath it above all law,\nso that nothing he doth can be unjust. But this power can be no other\nthan the power divine. Therefore let him preach what he will upon his\nmistaken text, I shall leave it to the reader to consider of it, without\nany further answer.\n\n(_g_) \u201cLastly, howsoever T. H. cries out that God cannot sin, yet in\ntruth he makes him to be the principal and most proper cause of all sin.\nFor he makes him to be the cause not only of the law, and of the action,\nbut even of the irregularity itself, &c. wherein the very essence of sin\ndoth consist.\u201d\n\nI think there is no man but understands, no, not the Bishop himself, but\nthat where two things are compared, the similitude or dissimilitude,\nregularity or irregularity, that is between them, is made in and by the\nmaking of the things themselves that are compared. The Bishop,\ntherefore, that denies God to be the cause of the irregularity, denies\nhim to be the cause both of the law and of the action. So that by his\ndoctrine, there shall be a good law whereof God shall be no cause, and\nan action, that is, a local motion that shall depend upon another first\nmover that is not God. The rest of this number is but railing.\n\n PROOFS OF LIBERTY DRAWN FROM REASON. NO. XIII.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThe first argument is _Herculeum_ or _baculinum_, drawn from\nthat pleasant passage between Zeno and his man. The servant had\ncommitted some petty larceny, and the master was cudgelling him well for\nit. The servant thinks to creep under his master\u2019s blind side, and\npleads for himself that \u2018the necessity of destiny did compel him to\nsteal.\u2019 The master answers, \u2018the same necessity of destiny compels me to\nbeat thee.\u2019 He that denies liberty, is fitter to be refuted with rods\nthan with arguments, until he confess that it is free for him that beats\nhim, either to continue striking, or to give over, that is, to have true\nliberty.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ Of the arguments from reason, the first is that which he saith\nis drawn from Zeno\u2019s beating of his man, which is therefore called\n_argumentum baculinum_, that is to say, a wooden argument. The story is\nthis. Zeno held that all actions were necessary. His man therefore,\nbeing for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it.\nTo avoid this excuse, his master pleaded likewise the necessity of\nbeating him. So that not he that maintained, but he that derided the\nnecessity of things, was beaten; contrary to that he would infer; and\nthe argument was rather withdrawn, than drawn, from the story.\n\n_J. D._ \u201cWhether the argument be withdrawn from the story, or the answer\nwithdrawn from the argument, let the reader judge. T. H. mistakes the\nscope of the reason, the strength whereof doth not lie, neither in the\nauthority of Zeno, a rigid Stoic, which is not worth a button in this\ncause; nor in the servant\u2019s being an adversary to stoical necessity. For\nit appears not out of the story, that the servant did deride necessity,\nbut rather that he pleaded it in good earnest for his own justification.\nNow in the success of the fray, we were told even now, that no power\ndoth justify an action, but only that which is irresistible. Such was\nnot Zeno\u2019s. And therefore it advantageth neither of their causes,\nneither that of Zeno, nor this of T. H. What if the servant had taken\nthe staff out of his master\u2019s hand, and beaten him soundly, would not\nthe same argument have served the man as well as it did the master, that\nthe necessity of destiny did compel him to strike again? Had not Zeno\nsmarted justly for his paradox? And might not the spectators well have\ntaken up the judge\u2019s apothegm, concerning the dispute between Corax and\nhis scholar, \u2018an ill egg of an ill bird\u2019? But the strength of this\nargument lies _partly_ in the ignorance of Zeno, that great champion of\nnecessity, and the beggarliness of his cause, which admitted no defence\nbut with a cudgel. No man, saith the servant, ought to be beaten for\ndoing that which he is compelled inevitably to do: but I am compelled\ninevitably to steal. The major is so evident, that it cannot be denied.\nIf a strong man shall take a weak man\u2019s hand per force, and do violence\nwith it to a third person, he whose hand is forced, is innocent, and he\nonly culpable who compelled him. The minor was Zeno\u2019s own doctrine; what\nanswer made the great patron of destiny to his servant? very learnedly\nhe denied the conclusion, and cudgelled his servant; telling him in\neffect, that though there was no reason why he should be beaten, yet\nthere was a necessity why he must be beaten. And _partly_ in the evident\nabsurdity of such an opinion, which deserves not to be confuted with\nreasons, but with rods. There are four things, said the philosopher,\nwhich ought not to be called into question. First, such things whereof\nit is wickedness to doubt; as whether the soul be immortal, whether\nthere be a God, such an one should not be confuted with reasons, but\ncast into the sea with a mill-stone about his neck, as unworthy to\nbreathe the air, or to behold the light. Secondly, such things as are\nabove the capacity of reason; as among Christians, the mystery of the\nHoly Trinity. Thirdly, such principles as are evidently true; as that\ntwo and two are four, in arithmetic; that the whole is greater than the\npart, in logic. Fourthly, such things as are obvious to the senses; as\nwhether the snow be white. He who denied the heat of the fire, was\njustly sentenced to be scorched with fire; and he that denied motion, to\nbe beaten until he recanted. So he who denies all liberty from\nnecessitation, should be scourged until he become an humble suppliant to\nhim that whips him, and confess that he hath power, either to strike, or\nto hold his hand.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ In this Number XIII. which is about Zeno and his man, there is\ncontained nothing necessary to the instruction of the reader. Therefore\nI pass it over.\n\n NO. XIV.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cSecondly, this very persuasion that there is no true liberty,\nis able to overthrow all societies and commonwealths in the world. The\nlaws are unjust, which prohibit that which a man cannot possibly shun.\nAll consultations are vain, if every thing be either necessary or\nimpossible. Who ever deliberated whether the sun should rise to-morrow,\nor whether he should sail over mountains? It is to no more purpose to\nadmonish men of understanding than fools, children, or madmen, if all\nthings be necessary. Praises and dispraises, rewards and punishments,\nare as vain as they are undeserved, if there be no liberty. All\ncounsels, arts, arms, books, instruments, are superfluous and foolish,\nif there be no liberty. In vain we labour, in vain we study, in vain we\ntake physic, in vain we have tutors to instruct us, if all things come\nto pass alike, whether we sleep or wake, whether we be idle or\nindustrious, by unalterable necessity. But it is said, that though\nfuture events be certain, yet they are unknown to us: and therefore we\nprohibit, deliberate, admonish, praise, dispraise, reward, punish,\nstudy, labour, and use means. Alas! how should our not knowing of the\nevent, be a sufficient motive to us to use the means, so long as we\nbelieve the event is already certainly determined, and can no more be\nchanged by all our endeavours, than we can stay the course of heaven\nwith our finger, or add a cubit to our stature? Suppose it be unknown,\nyet it is certain. We cannot hope to alter the course of things by our\nlabours; let the necessary causes do their work, we have no remedy but\npatience, and shrug up the shoulders. Either allow liberty, or destroy\nall societies.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ The second argument is taken from certain inconveniences which\nhe thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true that ill use may be\nmade of it, and therefore your Lordship and J. D. ought, at my request,\nto keep private that I say here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed\nnone; and what use soever be made of truth, yet truth is truth; and now\nthe question is, not what is fit to be preached, but what is true. The\nfirst inconvenience he says is this, that laws which prohibit any action\nare then unjust. The second, that all consultations are vain. The third,\nthat admonitions to men of understanding, are of no more use than to\nfools, children, and madmen. The fourth, that praise, dispraise, reward,\nand punishment, are in vain. The fifth, that counsels, arts, arms,\nbooks, instruments, study, tutors, medicines, are in vain. To which\nargument, expecting I should answer by saying, that the ignorance of the\nevent were enough to make us use means, he adds (as it were a reply to\nmy answer foreseen) these words: \u201cAlas, how should our not knowing of\nthe event be a sufficient motive to make us use the means?\u201d Wherein he\nsaith right; but my answer is not that which he expecteth. I answer,\n\nFirst, that the necessity of an action doth not make the law which\nprohibits it unjust. To let pass, that not the necessity, but the will\nto break the law, maketh the action unjust, because the law regardeth\nthe will, and no other precedent causes of action; and to let pass, that\nno law can be possibly unjust, in as much as every man makes, by his\nconsent, the law he is bound to keep, and which, consequently, must be\njust, unless a man can be unjust to himself: I say, what necessary cause\nsoever precedes an action, yet, if the action be forbidden, he that doth\nit willingly, may justly be punished. For instance, suppose the law on\npain of death prohibit stealing, and there be a man who by the strength\nof temptation is necessitated to steal, and is thereupon put to death:\ndoes not this punishment deter others from theft? Is it not a cause that\nothers steal not? Doth it not frame and make their will to justice? To\nmake the law is therefore to make a cause of justice, and to necessitate\njustice; and consequently it is no injustice to make such a law.\n\nThe institution of the law is not to grieve the delinquent for that\nwhich is passed and not to be undone; but to make him and others just,\nthat else would not be so: and respecteth not the evil act past, but the\ngood to come. Insomuch as without this good intention of future, no past\nact of a delinquent could justify his killing in the sight of God. But,\nyou will say, how is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what\nwas done were necessary? To this I answer, that men are justly killed,\nnot for that their actions are not necessitated, but that they are\nspared and preserved, because they are not noxious; for where there is\nno law, there no killing, nor any thing else can be unjust. And by the\nright of nature we destroy, without being unjust, all that is noxious,\nboth beasts and men. And for beasts, we kill them justly, when we do it\nin order to our own preservation. And yet J. D. confesseth, that their\nactions, as being only spontaneous and not free, are all necessitated\nand determined to that one thing which they shall do. For men, when we\nmake societies or commonwealths, we lay down our right to kill,\nexcepting in certain cases, as murder, theft, or other offensive\nactions. So that the right which the commonwealth hath, to put a man to\ndeath for crimes, is not created by the law, but remains from the first\nright of nature, which every man hath to preserve himself; for the law\ndoth not take that right away, in case of criminals, who were by law\nexcepted. Men are not therefore put to death or punished, for that their\ntheft proceedeth from election; but because it was noxious and contrary\nto men\u2019s preservation, and the punishment conducing to the preservation\nof the rest: inasmuch as to punish those that do voluntary hurt, and\nnone else, frameth and maketh men\u2019s wills, such as men would have them.\nAnd thus it is plain, that from the necessity of a voluntary action\ncannot be inferred the injustice of the law that forbiddeth it, or of\nthe magistrate that punisheth it.\n\nSecondly, I deny that it makes consultations to be in vain; it is the\nconsultation that causeth a man, and necessitateth him, to choose to do\none thing rather than another. So that unless a man say that cause to be\nin vain, which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the\nsuperfluousness of consultation out of the necessity of the election\nproceeding from it. But it seems he reasons thus: If I must needs do\nthis rather than that, then I shall do this rather than that, though I\nconsult not at all; which is a false proposition, a false consequence,\nand no better than this: If I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live\ntill to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to-day. If\nthere be a necessity that an action shall be done, or that any effect\nshall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow that there is\nnothing necessarily required as a means to bring it to pass. And\ntherefore, when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before\nanother, it is determined also for what cause it shall be chosen; which\ncause, for the most part, is deliberation or consultation. And therefore\nconsultation is not in vain; and indeed the less in vain, by how much\nthe election is more necessitated.\n\nThe same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience;\nnamely, that admonitions are in vain; for admonitions are parts of\nconsultations; the admonitor being a counsellor, for the time, to him\nthat is admonished.\n\nThe fourth pretended inconvenience is, that praise and dispraise, reward\nand punishment, will be in vain. To which I answer, that for praise and\ndispraise, they depend not at all on the necessity of the action praised\nor dispraised. For, what is it else to praise, but to say a thing is\ngood? Good, I say, for me, or for somebody else, or for the state and\ncommonwealth. And what is it to say an action is good, but to say, it is\nas I would wish, or as another would have it, or according to the will\nof the state, that is to say, according to law? Does J. D. think, that\nno action can please me or him, or the commonwealth, that should proceed\nfrom necessity?\n\nThings may be therefore necessary and yet praiseworthy, as also\nnecessary and yet dispraised, and neither of both in vain; because\npraise and dispraise, and likewise reward and punishment, do by example\nmake and conform the will to good or evil. It was a very great praise,\nin my opinion, that Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, where he says, he\nwas good by nature, _et quia aliter esse non potuit_.\n\nTo his fifth and sixth inconvenience, that counsels, arts, arms, books,\ninstruments, study, medicines, and the like, would be superfluous, the\nsame answer serves that to the former; that is to say, that this\nconsequence, if the effect shall necessarily come to pass, then it shall\ncome to pass without its cause, is a false one. And those things named,\ncounsels, arts, arms, &c., are the causes of those effects.\n\n_J. D._ \u201cNothing is more familiar with T. H. than to decline an\nargument. But I will put it into form for him. (_a_) The first\ninconvenience is thus pressed. Those laws are unjust and tyrannical,\nwhich do prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be\ndone, and punish men for not doing of them. But supposing T. H\u2019s opinion\nof the necessity of all things to be true, all laws do prescribe\nabsolute impossibilities to be done, and punish men for not doing of\nthem. The former proposition is so clear that it cannot be denied. Just\nlaws are the ordinances of right reason; but those laws which prescribe\nabsolute impossibilities, are not the ordinances of right reason. Just\nlaws are instituted for the public good; but those laws which prescribe\nabsolute impossibilities, are not instituted for the public good. Just\nlaws do show unto a man what is to be done, and what is to be shunned;\nbut those laws which prescribe impossibilities, do not direct a man what\nhe is to do, and what he is to shun. The minor is as evident. For if his\nopinion be true, all actions, all transgressions are determined\nantecedently inevitably to be done by a natural and necessary flux of\nextrinsical causes. Yea, even the will of man, and the reason itself is\nthus determined. And therefore whatsoever laws do prescribe any thing to\nbe done, which is not done, or to be left undone which is done, do\nprescribe absolute impossibilities, and punish men for not doing of\nimpossibilities. In all his answer there is not one word to this\nargument, but only to the conclusion. He saith, that \u2018not the necessity,\nbut the will to break the law makes the action unjust.\u2019 I ask what makes\nthe will to break the law; is it not his necessity? What gets he by\nthis? A perverse will causeth injustice, and necessity causeth a\nperverse will. He saith, \u2018the law regardeth the will, but not the\nprecedent causes of action.\u2019 To what proposition, to what term is this\nanswer? He neither denies nor distinguisheth. First, the question here\nis not what makes actions to be unjust, but what makes laws to be\nunjust. So his answer is impertinent. It is likewise untrue. For first,\nthat will which the law regards, is not such a will as T. H. imagineth.\nIt is a free will, not a determined necessitated will; a rational will,\nnot a brutish will. Secondly, the law doth look upon precedent causes,\nas well as the voluntariness of the action. If a child, before he be\nseven years old or have the use of reason, in some childish quarrel do\nwillingly stab another, whereof we have seen experience, yet the law\nlooks not upon it as an act of murder; because there wanted a power to\ndeliberate, and consequently true liberty. Manslaughter may be as\nvoluntary as murder, and commonly more voluntary; because being done in\nhot blood there is the less reluctation. Yet the law considers, that the\nformer is done out of some sudden passion without serious deliberation,\nand the other out of prepensed malice and desire of revenge; and\ntherefore condemns murder, as more wilful and more punishable than\nmanslaughter.\u201d\n\n(_b_) \u201cHe saith, \u2018that no law can possibly be unjust;\u2019 and I say, that\nthis is to deny the conclusion, which deserves no reply. But to give him\nsatisfaction, I will follow him in this also, if he intended no more but\nthat unjust laws are not genuine laws, nor bind to active obedience,\nbecause they are not the ordinations of right reason, not instituted for\nthe common good, nor prescribe that which ought to be done; he said\ntruly, but nothing at all to his purpose. But if he intend, as he doth,\nthat there are no laws _de facto_, which are the ordinances of reason\nerring, instituted for the common hurt, and prescribing that which ought\nnot to be done, he is much mistaken. Pharaoh\u2019s law, to drown the male\nchildren of the Israelites (Exod. i. 22); Nebuchadnezzar\u2019s law, that\nwhosoever did not fall down and worship the golden image which he had\nset up, should be cast into the fiery furnace (Dan. iii. 4-6); Darius\u2019s\nlaw, that whosoever should ask a petition of any God or man for thirty\ndays, save of the king, should be cast into the den of lions (Dan. vi.\n7); Ahasuerus\u2019s law, to destroy the Jewish nation, root and branch\n(Esther iii. 13); the Pharisees\u2019 law, that whosoever confesseth Christ,\nshould be excommunicated (John ix. 22); were all unjust laws.\n\n(_c_) \u201cThe ground of this error is as great an error itself (such an art\nhe hath learned of repacking paradoxes); which is this, \u2018that every man\nmakes by his consent the law which he is bound to keep.\u2019 If this were\ntrue, it would preserve them, if not from being unjust, yet from being\ninjurious. But it is not true. The positive law of God, contained in the\nOld and New Testament; the law of nature, written in our hearts by the\nfinger of God; the laws of conquerors, who come in by the power of the\nsword; the laws of our ancestors, which were made before we were born;\ndo all oblige us to the observation of them; yet to none of all these\ndid we give our actual consent. Over and above all these exceptions, he\nbuilds upon a wrong foundation, that all magistrates at first were\nelective. The first governors were fathers of families; and when those\npetty princes could not afford competent protection and security to\ntheir subjects, many of them did resign their several and respective\ninterests into the hands of one joint father of the country.\n\n\u201cAnd though his ground had been true, that all first legislators were\nelective, which is false; yet his superstructure fails: for it was done\nin hope and trust that they would make just laws. If magistrates abuse\nthis trust, and deceive the hopes of the people by making tyrannical\nlaws, yet it is without their consent. A precedent trust doth not\njustify the subsequent errors and abuses of a trustee. He who is duly\nelected a legislator, may exercise his legislative power unduly. The\npeople\u2019s implicit consent doth not render the tyrannical laws of their\nlegislators to be just.\n\n(_d_) \u201cBut his chiefest answer is, that \u2018an action forbidden, though it\nproceed from necessary causes, yet if it were done willingly, it may be\njustly punished;\u2019 which, according to his custom, he proves by an\ninstance. \u2018A man necessitated to steal by the strength of temptation,\nyet if he steal willingly, is justly put to death.\u2019 Here are two things,\nand both of them untrue.\n\n\u201cFirst, he fails in his assertion. Indeed we suffer justly for those\nnecessities, which we ourselves have contracted by our own fault; but\nnot for extrinsical antecedent necessities, which were imposed upon us\nwithout our fault. If that law do not oblige to punishment, which is not\nintimated, because the subject is invincibly ignorant of it; how much\nless that law which prescribes absolute impossibilities: unless perhaps\ninvincible necessity be not as strong a plea as invincible ignorance.\nThat which he adds, \u2018if it were done willingly,\u2019 though it be of great\nmoment, if it be rightly understood, yet in his sense, that is, if a\nman\u2019s \u2018will be not in his own disposition,\u2019 and \u2018if his willing do not\ncome upon him according to his will, nor according to anything else in\nhis power,\u2019 it weighs not half so much as the least feather in all his\nhorse-load. For if that law be unjust and tyrannical which commands a\nman to do that which is impossible for him to do, then that law is\nlikewise unjust and tyrannical, which commands him to will that which is\nimpossible for him to will.\n\n\u201cSecondly, his instance supposeth an untruth, and is a plain begging of\nthe question. No man is extrinsically, antecedently, and irresistibly\nnecessitated by temptation to steal. The devil may solicit us, but he\ncannot necessitate us. He hath a faculty of persuading, but not a power\nof compelling. _Nos ignem habemus, spiritus flammam ciet_; as Gregory\nNazianzen, he blows the coals, but the fire is our own. _Mordet duntaxat\nsese in fauces illius objicientem_; as St. Austin, he bites not, until\nwe thrust ourselves into his mouth. He may propose, he may suggest, but\nhe cannot move the will effectively. _Resist the devil, and he will flee\nfrom you_ (James iv. 7). By faith we are able _to quench all the fiery\ndarts of the wicked_ (Ephes. vi. 16). And if Satan, who can both propose\nthe object, and choose out the fittest times and places to work upon our\nfrailties, and can suggest reasons, yet cannot necessitate the will,\n(which is most certain); then much less can outward objects do it alone.\nThey have no natural efficacy to determine the will. Well may they be\noccasions, but they cannot be causes of evil. The sensitive appetite may\nengender a proclivity to steal, but not a necessity to steal. And if it\nshould produce a kind of necessity, yet it is but moral, not natural;\nhypothetical, not absolute; coexistent, not antecedent from ourselves,\nnor extrinsical. This necessity, or rather proclivity, was free in its\ncauses; we ourselves by our own negligence in not opposing our passions\nwhen we should and might, have freely given it a kind of dominion over\nus. Admit that some sudden passions may and do extraordinarily surprise\nus; and therefore we say, _motus primo primi_, the first motions are not\nalways in our power, neither are they free: yet this is but very rarely,\nand it is our own fault that they do surprise us. Neither doth the law\npunish the first motion to theft, but the advised act of stealing. The\nintention makes the thief. But of this more largely No. XXV.\n\n(_e_) \u201cHe pleads moreover, \u2018That the law is a cause of justice,\u2019 that\n\u2018it frames the wills of men to justice,\u2019 and \u2018that the punishment of one\ndoth conduce to the preservation of many.\u2019 All this is most true of a\njust law justly executed. But this is no God-a-mercy to T. H.\u2019s opinion\nof absolute necessity. If all actions and all events be predetermined\nnaturally, necessarily, extrinsically, how should the law frame men\nmorally to good actions? He leaves nothing for the law to do, but either\nthat which is done already, or that which is impossible to be done. If a\nman be chained to every individual act which he doth, and from every act\nwhich he doth not, by indissolvable bonds of inevitable necessity, how\nshould the law either deter him or frame him? If a dog be chained fast\nto a post, the sight of a rod cannot draw him from it. Make a thousand\nlaws that the fire shall not burn, yet it will burn. And whatsoever men\ndo, according to T. H., they do it as necessarily as the fire burneth.\nHang up a thousand thieves, and if a man be determined inevitably to\nsteal, he must steal notwithstanding.\n\n(_f_) \u201cHe adds, that \u2018the sufferings imposed by the law upon\ndelinquents, respect not the evil act passed, but the good to come, and\nthat the putting of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any\ncrime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, except there be a real\nintention to benefit others by his example.\u2019 The truth is, the punishing\nof delinquents by law, respecteth both the evil act passed and the good\nto come. The ground of it, is the evil act passed, the scope or end of\nit, is the good to come. The end without the ground cannot justify the\nact. A bad intention may make a good action bad; but a good intention\ncannot make a bad action good. It is not lawful to do evil that good may\ncome of it, nor to punish an innocent person for the admonition of\nothers; that is to fall into a certain crime for fear of an uncertain.\nAgain, though there were no other end of penalties inflicted, neither\nprobatory, nor castigatory, nor exemplary, but only vindicatory, to\nsatisfy the law out of a zeal of justice by giving to every one his own,\nyet the action is just and warrantable. Killing, as it is considered in\nitself, without all undue circumstances, was never prohibited to the\nlawful magistrate, who is the vice-gerent or lieutenant of God, from\nwhom he derives his power of life and death.\n\n\u201cT. H. hath one plea more. As a drowning man catcheth at every bulrush,\nso he lays hold on every pretence to save a desperate cause. But first,\nit is worth our observation to see how oft he changeth shapes in this\none particular. (_g_) First, he told us, that it was the irresistible\npower of God that justifies all his actions, though he command one thing\nopenly, and plot another thing secretly, though he be the cause not only\nof the action, but also of the irregularity; though he both give man\npower to act, and determine this power to evil as well as good; though\nhe punish the creatures, for doing that which he himself did necessitate\nthem to do. But being pressed with reason, that this is tyrannical,\nfirst to necessitate a man to do his will, and then to punish him for\ndoing of it, he leaves this pretence in the plain field, and flies to a\nsecond; that therefore a man is justly punished for that which he was\nnecessitated to do, because the act was voluntary on his part. This hath\nmore show of reason than the former, if he did make the will of man to\nbe in his own disposition; but maintaining that the will is irresistibly\ndetermined to will whatsoever it doth will, the injustice and absurdity\nis the same, first to necessitate a man to will, and then to punish him\nfor willing. The dog only bites the stone which is thrown at him with a\nstrange hand, but they make the first cause to punish the instrument for\nthat which is his own proper act. Wherefore not being satisfied with\nthis, he casts it off and flies to his third shift. \u2018Men are not\npunished,\u2019 saith he, \u2018therefore, because their theft proceeded from\nelection,\u2019 (that is, because it was willingly done, for to elect and\nwill, saith he, are both one; is not this to blow hot and cold with the\nsame breath?) \u2018but because it was noxious and contrary to men\u2019s\npreservation.\u2019 Thus far he saith true, that every creature by the\ninstinct of nature seeks to preserve itself: cast water into a dusty\nplace, and it contracts itself into little globes, that is to preserve\nitself. And those who are noxious in the eye of the law, are justly\npunished by them to whom the execution of the law is committed; but the\nlaw accounts no persons noxious, but those who are noxious by their own\nfault. It punisheth not a thorn for pricking, because it is the nature\nof the thorn, and it can do no otherwise, nor a child, before it have\nthe use of reason. If one should take my hand perforce and give another\na box on the ear with it, my hand is noxious, but the law punisheth the\nother who is faulty. And therefore he hath reason to propose the\nquestion, \u2018how it is just to kill one man to amend another, if he who\nkilled did nothing but what he was necessitated to do.\u2019 He might as well\ndemand, how it is lawful to murder a company of innocent infants, to\nmake a bath of their lukewarm blood for curing the leprosy. It had been\na more rational way, first to have demonstrated that it is so, and then\nto have questioned why it is so. His assertion itself is but a dream,\nand the reason which he gives of it why it is so, is a dream of a dream.\n\n\u201cThe sum of it is this; \u2018that where there is no law, there no killing or\nany thing else can be unjust; that before the constitution of\ncommonwealths, every man had power to kill another, if he conceived him\nto be hurtful to him; that at the constitution of commonwealths,\nparticular men lay down this right in part, and in part reserve it to\nthemselves, as in case of theft or murder; that the right which the\ncommonwealth hath to put a malefactor to death, is not created by the\nlaw, but remaineth from the first right of nature which every man hath\nto preserve himself; that the killing of men in this case is as the\nkilling of beasts in order to our own preservation.\u2019 This may well be\ncalled stringing of paradoxes.\n\n\u201cBut first, (_h_) there never was any such time when mankind was without\ngovernors and laws, and societies. Paternal government was in the world\nfrom the beginning, and the law of nature. There might be sometimes a\nroot of such barbarous thievish brigands, in some rocks or deserts, or\nodd corners of the world; but it was an abuse and a degeneration from\nthe nature of man, who is a political creature. This savage opinion\nreflects too much upon the honour of mankind.\n\n\u201cSecondly, there never was a time when it was lawful, ordinarily, for\nprivate men to kill one another for their own preservation. If God would\nhave had men live like wild beasts, as lions, bears, or tigers, he would\nhave armed them with horns, or tusks, or talons, or pricks; but of all\ncreatures man is born most naked, without any weapon to defend himself,\nbecause God had provided a better means of security for him, that is,\nthe magistrate.\n\n\u201cThirdly, that right which private men have to preserve themselves,\nthough it be with the killing of another, when they are set upon to be\nmurdered or robbed, is not a remainder or a reserve of some greater\npower which they have resigned, but a privilege which God hath given\nthem, in case of extreme danger and invincible necessity, that when they\ncannot possibly have recourse to the ordinary remedy, that is, the\nmagistrate, every man becomes a magistrate to himself.\n\n\u201cFourthly, nothing can give that which it never had. The people, whilst\nthey were a dispersed rabble, (which in some odd cases might happen to\nbe), never had justly the power of life and death, and therefore they\ncould not give it by their election. All that they do is to prepare the\nmatter, but it is God Almighty that infuseth the soul of power.\n\n\u201cFifthly and lastly, I am sorry to hear a man of reason and parts to\ncompare the murdering of men with the slaughtering of brute beasts. The\nelements are for the plants, the plants for the brute beasts, the brute\nbeasts for man. When God enlarged his former grant to man, and gave him\nliberty to eat the flesh of his creatures for his sustenance, (Gen. ix.\n3), yet man is expressly excepted (verse 6): _Whoso sheddeth man\u2019s\nblood, by man shall his blood be shed_. And the reason is assigned, _for\nin the image of God made he man_. Before sin entered into the world, or\nbefore any creatures were hurtful or noxious to man, he had dominion\nover them as their lord and master. And though the possession of this\nsovereignty be lost in part, for the sin of man, which made not only the\ncreatures to rebel, but also the inferior faculties to rebel against the\nsuperior, from whence it comes that one man is hurtful to another; yet\nthe dominion still remains. Wherein we may observe how sweetly the\nprovidence of God doth temper this cross; that though the strongest\ncreatures have withdrawn their obedience, as lions and bears, to shew\nthat man hath lost the excellency of his dominion, and the weakest\ncreatures, as flies and gnats, to shew into what a degree of contempt he\nis fallen; yet still the most profitable and useful creatures, as sheep\nand oxen, do in some degree retain their obedience.\n\n(_i_) \u201cThe next branch of his answer concerns consultations, \u2018which,\u2019\nsaith he, \u2018are not superfluous, though all things come to pass\nnecessarily, because they are the cause which doth necessitate the\neffect, and the means to bring it to pass.\u2019 We were told (No. XI.) \u2018that\nthe last dictate of right reason was but as the last feather which\nbreaks the horse\u2019s back. It is well yet, that reason hath gained some\ncommand again, and is become at least a quarter-master. Certainly if any\nthing under God have power to determine the will, it is right reason.\nBut I have shewed sufficiently, that reason doth not determine the will\nphysically, nor absolutely, much less extrinsically, and antecedently;\nand therefore it makes nothing for that necessity which T. H. hath\nundertaken to prove.\n\n(_k_) \u201cHe adds further, that \u2018as the end is necessary, so are the means;\nand when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another,\nit is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen.\u2019 All which\nis truth, but not the whole truth; for as God ordains means for all\nends, so he adapts and fits the means to their respective ends, free\nmeans to free ends, contingent means to contingent ends, necessary means\nto necessary ends, whereas T. H. would have all means, all ends, to be\nnecessary. If God hath so ordered the world, that a man ought to use,\nand may freely use, those means of God, which he doth neglect, not by\nvirtue of God\u2019s decree, but by his own fault; if a man use those means\nof evil, which he ought not to use, and which by God\u2019s decree he had\npower to forbear; if God have left to man in part the free managery of\nhuman affairs, and to that purpose hath endowed him with understanding:\nthen consultations are of use, then provident care is needful, then it\nconcerns him to use the means. But if God have so ordered this world,\nthat a man cannot, if he would, neglect any means of good, which by\nvirtue of God\u2019s decree it is possible for him to use, and that he cannot\npossibly use any means of evil, but those which are irresistibly and\ninevitably imposed upon him by an antecedent decree; then not only\nconsultations are vain, but that noble faculty of reason itself is vain.\nDo we think that we can help God Almighty to do his proper work? In vain\nwe trouble ourselves, in vain we take care to use those means, which are\nnot in our power to use, or not to use. And this is that which was\ncontained in my prolepsis or prevention of his answer, though he be\npleased both to disorder it, and to silence it. We cannot hope by our\nlabours, to alter the course of things set down by God; let him perform\nhis decree, let the necessary causes do their work. If we be those\ncauses, yet we are not in our own disposition; we must do what we are\nordained to do, and more we cannot do. Man hath no remedy but patience,\nand to shrug up the shoulders. This is the doctrine that flows from this\nopinion of absolute necessity. Let us suppose the great wheel of the\nclock which sets all the little wheels going, to be as the decree of\nGod, and that the motion of it were perpetually infallible from an\nintrinsical principle, even as God\u2019s decree is infallible, eternal,\nall-sufficient. Let us suppose the lesser wheels to be the second\ncauses, and that they do as certainly follow the motion of the great\nwheel, without missing or swerving in the least degree, as the second\ncauses do pursue the determination of the first cause. I desire to know\nin this case, what cause there is to call a council of smiths, to\nconsult and order the motion of that which was ordered and determined\nbefore to their hands? Are men wiser than God? Yet all men know, that\nthe motion of the lesser wheels is a necessary means to make the clock\nstrike.\n\n(_l_) \u201cBut he tells me in great sadness, that \u2018my argument is just like\nthis other; if I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow,\nthough I run myself through with a sword to-day; which, saith he, is a\nfalse consequence, and a false proposition.\u2019 Truly, if by running\nthrough, he understands killing, it is a false, or rather a foolish\nproposition, and implies a contradiction. To live till to-morrow, and to\ndie to-day, are inconsistent. But by his favour, this is not my\nconsequence, but this is his own opinion. He would persuade us, that it\nis absolutely necessary that a man shall live till to-morrow, and yet\nthat it is possible that he may kill himself to-day. My argument is\nthis: if there be a liberty and possibility for a man to kill himself\nto-day, then it is not absolutely necessary that he shall live till\nto-morrow; but there is such a liberty, therefore no such necessity. And\nthe consequence which I make here, is this: if it be absolutely\nnecessary, that a man shall live till to-morrow, then it is vain and\nsuperfluous for him to consult and deliberate whether he should die\nto-day, or not. And this is a true consequence. The ground of his\nmistake is this, that though it be true, that a man may kill himself\nto-day, yet upon the supposition of his absolute necessity, it is\nimpossible. Such heterogeneous arguments and instances he produceth,\nwhich are half builded upon our true grounds, and the other half upon\nhis false grounds.\n\n(_m_) \u201cThe next branch of my argument concerns admonitions, to which he\ngives no new answer, and therefore I need not make any new reply, saving\nonly to tell him, that he mistakes my argument. I say not only, if all\nthings be necessary, then admonitions are in vain; but if all things be\nnecessary, then it is to no more purpose to admonish men of\nunderstanding than fools, children, or madmen. That they do admonish the\none and not the other, is confessedly true; and no reason under heaven\ncan be given for it but this, that the former have the use of reason and\ntrue liberty, with a dominion over their own actions, which children,\nfools, and madmen have not.\n\n\u201cConcerning praise and dispraise, he enlargeth himself. The scope of his\ndiscourse is, that \u2018things necessary may be praiseworthy.\u2019 There is no\ndoubt of it; but withal their praise reflects upon the free agent, as\nthe praise of a statue reflects upon the workman who made it. \u2018To praise\na thing,\u2019 saith he, \u2018is to say it is good.\u2019 (_n_) True, but this\ngoodness is not a metaphysical goodness; so the worst of things, and\nwhatsoever hath a being, is good: nor a natural goodness; the praise of\nit passeth wholly to the Author of nature; _God saw all that he had\nmade, and it was very good_: but a moral goodness, or a goodness of\nactions rather than of things. The moral goodness of an action is the\nconformity of it with right reason. The moral evil of an action is the\ndeformity of it, and the alienation of it from right reason. It is moral\npraise and dispraise which we speak of here. To praise anything morally,\nis to say, it is morally good, that is, conformable to right reason. The\nmoral dispraise of a thing is to say, it is morally bad, or disagreeing\nfrom the rule of right reason. So moral praise is from the good use of\nliberty, moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty; but if all things\nbe necessary, then moral liberty is quite taken away, and with it all\ntrue praise and dispraise. Whereas T. H. adds, that \u2018to say a thing is\ngood, is to say, it is as I would wish, or as another would wish, or as\nthe state would have it, or according to the law of the land;\u2019 he\nmistakes infinitely. He, and another, and the state, may all wish that\nwhich is not really good, but only in appearance. We do often wish what\nis profitable or delightful, without regarding so much as we ought what\nis honest. And though the will of the state where we live, or the law of\nthe land, do deserve great consideration, yet it is no infallible rule\nof moral goodness. And therefore to his question, \u2018whether nothing that\nproceeds from necessity can please me,\u2019 I answer, yes. The burning of\nthe fire pleaseth me, when I am cold; and I say, it is good fire, or a\ncreature created by God for my use and for my good. Yet I do not mean to\nattribute any moral goodness to the fire, nor give any moral praise to\nit, as if it were in the power of the fire itself either to communicate\nits heat or to suspend it; but I praise first the Creator of the fire,\nand then him who provided it. As for the praise which Velleius\nPaterculus gives Cato, that he was good by nature, _et quia aliter esse\nnon potuit_; it hath more of the orator, than either of the theologian\nor philosopher in it. Man in the state of innocency did fall and become\nevil; what privilege hath Cato more than he? No, by his leave. _Narratur\net divi Catonis s\u00e6pe mero caluisse virtus._ But the true meaning is,\nthat he was naturally of a good temper, not so prone to some kinds of\nvice as others were. This is to praise a thing, not an action,\nnaturally, not morally. Socrates was not of so good a natural temper,\nyet proved as good a man; the more his praise, by how much the\ndifficulty was the more to conform his disorderly appetite to right\nreason.\n\n\u201cConcerning reward and punishment, he saith not a word, but only that\nthey frame and conform the will to good, which hath been sufficiently\nanswered. They do so indeed; but if his opinion were true, they could\nnot do so. But because my aim is not only to answer T. H., but also to\nsatisfy myself, (_o_) though it be not urged by him, yet I do\nacknowledge that I find some improper and analogical rewards and\npunishments used to brute beasts, as the hunter rewards his dog, the\nmaster of the decoy-duck whips her when she returns without company. And\nif it be true, which he affirmeth a little before that I have confessed,\n\u2018that the actions of brute beasts are all necessitated and determined to\nthat one thing which they shall do,\u2019 the difficulty is increased.\n\n\u201cBut first, my saying is misalleged. I said, that some kinds of actions\nwhich are most excellent in brute beasts, and make the greatest show of\nreason, as the bees working their honey, and the spiders weaving their\nwebs, are yet done without any consultation or deliberation, by a mere\ninstinct of nature, and by a determination of their fancies to these\nonly kinds of works. But I did never say, I could not say, that all\ntheir individual actions are necessary, and antecedently determined in\ntheir causes, as what days the bees shall fly abroad, and what days and\nhours each bee shall keep in the hive, how often they shall fetch in\nthyme on a day, and from whence. These actions and the like, though they\nbe not free, because brute beasts want reason to deliberate, yet they\nare contingent, and therefore not necessary.\n\n\u201cSecondly, I do acknowledge, that as the fancies of some brute creatures\nare determined by nature to some rare and exquisite works; so in others,\nwhere it finds a natural propension, art, which is the imitator of\nnature, may frame and form them according to the will of the artist to\nsome particular actions and ends, as we see in setting-dogs, and\ncoy-ducks, and parrots; and the principal means whereby they effect\nthis, is by their backs or by their bellies, by the rod or by the\nmorsel, which have indeed a shadow or resemblance of rewards and\npunishments. But we take the word here properly, not as it is used by\nvulgar people, but as it is used by divines and philosophers, for that\nrecompense which is due to honest and dishonest actions. Where there is\nno moral liberty, there is neither honesty nor dishonesty, neither true\nreward nor punishment.\n\n\u201cThirdly, (_p_) when brute creatures do learn any such qualities, it is\nnot out of judgment, or deliberation, or discourse, by inferring or\nconcluding one thing from another, which they are not capable of.\nNeither are they able to conceive a reason of what they do, but merely\nout of memory or out of a sensitive fear or hope. They remember that\nwhen they did after one manner, they were beaten; and when they did\nafter another manner, they were cherished; and accordingly they apply\nthemselves. But if their individual actions were absolutely necessary,\nfear or hope could not alter them. Most certainly, if there be any\ndesert in it, or any praise due unto it, it is to them who did instruct\nthem.\n\nLastly, concerning arts, arms, books, instruments, study, physic, and\nthe like, he answereth not a word more than what is already satisfied.\nAnd therefore I am silent.\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. XIV.\n\n(_a_) \u201cThe first inconvenience is thus pressed. Those laws are unjust\nand tyrannical, which do prescribe things absolutely impossible in\nthemselves to be done, and punish men for not doing of them.\u201d\n\nI have already, in the beginning, where I recite the inconveniences that\nfollow the doctrine of necessity, made clear that the same\ninconveniences follow not the doctrine of necessity, any more than they\nfollow this truth, _whatsoever shall be, shall be_, which all men must\nconfess; the same also followeth upon this, that _whatsoever God\nforeknows, cannot but come to pass in such time and manner as he hath\nforeknown it_. It is therefore evident that these inconveniences are not\nrationally deduced from those tenets. Again, it is a truth manifest to\nall men, that it is not in a man\u2019s power to-day, to choose what will he\nshall have to-morrow, or an hour, or any time after. Intervening\noccasions, business, which the Bishop calls trifles, (trifles of which\nthe Bishop maketh here a great business), do change the will. No man can\nsay what he will do to-morrow, unless he foreknow, which no man can,\nwhat shall happen before to-morrow. And this being the substance of my\nopinion, it must needs be that when he deduceth from it, that counsels,\narts, arms, medicines, teachers, praise, prayer, and piety, are in vain,\nthat his deduction is false, and his ratiocination fallacy. And though I\nneed make no other answer to all that he can object against me, yet I\nshall here mark out the causes of his several paralogisms.\n\n\u201cThose laws,\u201d he saith, \u201care unjust and tyrannical, which do prescribe\nthings absolutely impossible to be done, and punish men for not doing of\nthem.\u201d In which words this is one absurdity, that _a law can be unjust_;\nfor all laws are divine or civil, neither of which can be unjust. Of the\nfirst there is no doubt. And as for civil laws, they are made by every\nman that is subject to them; because every one of them consenteth to the\nplacing of the legislative power. Another is this, in the same words,\nthat he supposeth there may be laws that are tyrannical; for if he that\nmaketh them have the sovereign power, they may be regal, but not\ntyrannical; if tyrant signify not King, as he thinks it doth not.\nAnother is in the same words, \u201cthat a law may prescribe things\nabsolutely impossible in themselves to be done.\u201d When he says\n_impossible in themselves_, he understands not what himself means.\n_Impossible in themselves_ are contradictions only, as to be and not to\nbe at the same time, which the divines say is not possible to God. All\nother things are possible at least in themselves. Raising from the dead,\nchanging the course of nature, making of a new heaven, and a new earth,\nare things possible in themselves; for there is nothing in their nature\nable to resist the will of God. And if laws do not prescribe such\nthings, why should I believe they prescribe other things that are more\nimpossible. Did he ever read in Suarez of any tyrant that made a law\ncommanding any man to do and not to do the same action, or to be and not\nto be at the same place in one and the same moment of time. But out of\nthe doctrine of necessity, it followeth he says, that \u201call laws do\nprescribe absolute impossibilities to be done.\u201d Here he has left out _in\nthemselves_, which is a wilful fallacy.\n\nHe further says that \u201cjust laws are the ordinances of right reason;\u201d\nwhich is an error that hath cost many thousands of men their lives. Was\nthere ever a King, that made a law which in right reason had been better\nunmade? And shall those laws therefore not be obeyed? Shall we rather\nrebel? I think not, though I am not so great a divine as he. I think\nrather that the reason of him that hath the sovereign authority, and by\nwhose sword we look to be protected both against war from abroad and\ninjuries at home, whether it be right or erroneous in itself, ought to\nstand for right to us that have submitted ourselves thereunto by\nreceiving the protection.\n\nBut the Bishop putteth his greatest confidence in this, that whether the\nthings be impossible in themselves, or made impossible by some unseen\naccident, yet there is no reason that men should be _punished for not\ndoing them_. It seems he taketh punishment for a kind of revenge, and\ncan never therefore agree with me, that take it for nothing else but for\na correction, or for an example, which hath for end the _framing_ and\n_necessitating of the will_ to virtue; and that he is no good man, that\nupon any provocation useth his power, though a power lawfully obtained,\nto afflict another man without this end, to reform the will of him or\nothers. Nor can I comprehend, as having only humane ideas, that that\npunishment which neither intendeth the correction of the offender, nor\nthe correction of others by example, doth proceed from God.\n\n(_b_) \u201cHe saith that no law can possibly be unjust,\u201d &c.\n\nAgainst this he replies that the law of Pharaoh, to drown the male\nchildren of the Israelites; and of Nebuchadnezzar, to worship the golden\nimage; and of Darius, against praying to any but him in thirty days; and\nof Ahasuerus, to destroy the Jews; and of the Pharisees, to\nexcommunicate the confessors of Christ; were all unjust laws. The laws\nof these kings, as they were laws, have relation only to the men that\nwere their subjects; and the _making_ of them, which was the action of\nevery one of those kings, who were subjects to another king, namely, to\nGod Almighty, had relation to the law of God. In the first relation,\nthere could be no injustice in them; because all laws made by him to\nwhom the people had given the legislative power, are the acts of every\none of that people; and no man can do injustice to himself. But in\nrelation to God, if God have by a law forbidden it, the making of such\nlaws is injustice. Which law of God was to those heathen princes no\nother but _salus populi_, that is to say, the properest use of their\nnatural reason for the preservation of their subjects. If therefore\nthose laws were ordained out of wantonness, or cruelty, or envy, or for\nthe pleasing of a favourite, or out of any other sinister end, as it\nseems they were, the making of those laws was unjust. But if in right\nreason they were necessary for the preservation of those people of whom\nthey had undertaken the charge, then was it not unjust. And for the\nPharisees, who had the same written law of God that we have, their\nexcommunication of the Christians, proceeding, as it did, from envy, was\nan act of malicious injustice. If it had proceeded from\nmisinterpretation of their own Scriptures, it had been a sin of\nignorance. Nevertheless, as it was a law to their subjects (in case they\nhad the legislative power, which I doubt of), the law was not unjust.\nBut the making of it was an unjust action, of which they were to give\naccount to none but God. I fear the Bishop will think this discourse too\nsubtile; but the judgment is the reader\u2019s.\n\n(_c_) \u201cThe ground of this error,\u201d &c., \u201cis this: that every man makes by\nhis consent the law which he is bound to keep,\u201d &c.\n\nThe reason why he thinketh this an error, is because the positive law of\nGod, contained in the Bible, is a law without our assent; the law of\nnature was written in our hearts by the finger of God without our\nassent; the laws of conquerors, who come in by the power of the sword,\nwere made without our assent; and so were the laws of our ancestors,\nwhich were made before we were born. It is a strange thing that he that\nunderstands the nonsense of the Schoolmen, should not be able to\nperceive so easy a truth as this which he denieth. The Bible is a law.\nTo whom? To all the world? He knows it is not. How came it then to be a\nlaw to us? Did God speak it _viva voce_ to us? Have we then any other\nwarrant for it than the word of the prophets? Have we seen the miracles?\nHave we any other assurance of their certainty than the authority of the\nChurch? And is the authority of the Church any other than the authority\nof the commonwealth, or that of the commonwealth any other than that of\nthe head of the commonwealth, or hath the head of the commonwealth any\nother authority than that which hath been given him by the members?\nElse, why should not the Bible be canonical as well in Constantinople as\nin any other place? They that have the legislative power make nothing\ncanon, which they make not law, nor law, which they make not canon. And\nbecause the legislative power is from the assent of the subjects, the\nBible is made law by the assent of the subjects. It was not the Bishop\nof Rome that made the Scripture law without his own temporal dominions;\nnor is it the clergy that make it law in their dioceses and rectories.\nNor can it be a law of itself without special and supernatural\nrevelation. The Bishop thinks because the Bible is law, and he is\nappointed to teach it to the people in his diocese, that therefore it is\nlaw to whomsoever he teach it; which is somewhat gross, but not so gross\nas to say that conquerors who come in by the power of the sword, make\ntheir laws also without our assent. He thinks, belike, that if a\nconqueror can kill me if he please, I am presently obliged without more\nado to obey all his laws. May not I rather die, if I think fit? The\nconqueror makes no law over the conquered by virtue of his power; but by\nvirtue of their assent, that promised obedience for the saving of their\nlives. But how then is the assent of the children obtained to the laws\nof their ancestors? This also is from the desire of preserving their\nlives, which first the parents might take away, where the parents be\nfree from all subjection; and where they are not, there the civil power\nmight do the same, if they doubted of their obedience. The children\ntherefore, when they be grown up to strength enough to do mischief, and\nto judgment enough to know that other men are kept from doing mischief\nto them by fear of the sword that protecteth them, in that very act of\nreceiving that protection, and not renouncing it openly, do oblige\nthemselves to obey the laws of their protectors; to which, in receiving\nsuch protection, they have assented. And whereas he saith, the law of\nnature is a law without our assent, it is absurd; for the law of nature\nis the assent itself that all men give to the means of their own\npreservation.\n\n(_d_) \u201cBut his chiefest answer is, that an action forbidden, though it\nproceed from necessary causes, yet if it were done willingly, may be\njustly punished,\u201d &c.\n\nThis the Bishop also understandeth not, and therefore denies it. He\nwould have the judge condemn no man for a crime, if it were\nnecessitated; as if the judge could know what acts are necessary, unless\nhe knew all that hath anteceded, both visible and invisible, and what\nboth every thing in itself, and altogether, can effect. It is enough to\nthe judge, that the act he condemneth be voluntary. The punishment\nwhereof may, if not capital, reform the will of the offender; if\ncapital, the will of others by example. For heat in one body doth not\nmore create heat in another, than the terror of an example createth fear\nin another, who otherwise were inclined to commit injustice.\n\nSome few lines before, he hath said that I built upon a wrong\nfoundation, namely, \u201cthat all magistrates were at first elective;\u201d I had\nforgot to tell you, that I never said nor thought it. And therefore his\nreply, as to that point, is impertinent.\n\nNot many lines after, for a reason why a man may not be justly punished\nwhen his crime is voluntary, he offereth this: \u201cthat law is unjust and\ntyrannical, which commands a man to will that which is impossible for\nhim to will.\u201d Whereby it appears, he is of opinion that a law may be\nmade to command the will. The style of a law is _do this_, or _do not\nthis_; or, _if thou do this, thou shalt suffer this_; but no law runs\nthus, _will this_, or _will not this_; or, _if thou have a will to this,\nthou shalt suffer this_. He objecteth further, that I beg the question,\nbecause no man\u2019s will is necessitated. Wherein he mistakes; for I say no\nmore in that place, but that he that doth evil willingly, whether he be\nnecessarily willing, or not necessarily, may be justly punished. And\nupon this mistake he runneth over again his former and already answered\nnonsense, saying, \u201cwe ourselves, by our own negligence in not opposing\nour passions when we should and might, have freely given them a kind of\ndominion over us;\u201d and again, _motus primo primi_, the first motions are\nnot always in our power. Which _motus primo primi_, signifies nothing;\nand \u201cour negligence in not opposing our passions,\u201d is the same with \u201cour\nwant of will to oppose our will,\u201d which is absurd; and \u201cthat we have\ngiven them a kind of dominion over us,\u201d either signifies nothing, or\nthat we have a dominion over our wills, or our wills a dominion over us,\nand consequently either we or our wills are not free.\n\n(_e_) \u201cHe pleads moreover that the law is a cause of justice,\u201d &c. \u201cAll\nthis is most true, of a just law justly executed.\u201d\n\nBut I have shown that all laws are just, as laws, and therefore not to\nbe accused of injustice by those that owe subjection to them; and a just\nlaw is always justly executed. Seeing then that he confesseth that all\nthat he replieth to here is true, it followeth that the reply itself,\nwhere it contradicteth me, is false.\n\n(_f_) \u201cHe addeth that the sufferings imposed by the law upon\ndelinquents, respect not the evil act passed, but the good to come; and\nthat the putting of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any\ncrime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, except there be a real\nintention to benefit others by his example.\u201d\n\nThis he neither confirmeth nor denieth, and yet forbeareth not to\ndiscourse upon it to little purpose; and therefore I pass it over.\n\n(_g_) \u201cFirst he told us, that it was the irresistible power of God that\njustifies all his actions; though he command one thing openly, and plot\nanother thing secretly; though he be the cause not only of the action,\nbut also of the irregularity, &c.\u201d\n\nTo all this, which hath been pressed before, I have answered before; but\nthat he says I say, \u201chaving commanded one thing openly, he plots another\nthing secretly,\u201d it is not mine, but one of his own ugly phrases. And\nthe force it hath, proceeded out of an apprehension he hath, that\naffliction is not God\u2019s correction, but his revenge upon the creatures\nof his own making; and from a reasoning he useth, \u201cbecause it is not\njust in a man to kill one man for the amendment of another, therefore\nneither is it so in God;\u201d not remembering that God hath, or shall have\nkilled all the men in the world, both nocent and innocent.\n\nMy assertion, he saith, \u201cis a dream, and the sum of it this; that where\nthere is no law, there no killing or anything else can be unjust; that\nbefore the constitution of commonwealths, every man had power to kill\nanother,\u201d &c., and adds, that \u201cthis may well be called stringing of\nparadoxes.\u201d To these my words he replies:\n\n(_h_) \u201cThere was never any time when mankind was without governors,\nlaws, and societies.\u201d\n\nIt is very likely to be true, that since the creation there never was a\ntime in which mankind was totally without society. If a part of it were\nwithout laws and governors, some other parts might be commonwealths. He\nsaw there was paternal government in Adam; which he might do easily, as\nbeing no deep consideration. But in those places where there is a civil\nwar at any time, at the same time there is neither laws, nor\ncommonwealth, nor society, but only a temporal league, which every\ndiscontented soldier may depart from when he pleases, as being entered\ninto by each man for his private interest, without any obligation of\nconscience: there are therefore almost at all times multitudes of\nlawless men. But this was a little too remote from his understanding to\nperceive. Again, he denies, that ever there was a time when one private\nman might lawfully kill another for his own preservation; and has\nforgotten that these words of his (No. II.), \u201cthis is the belief of all\nmankind, which we have not learned from our tutors, but is imprinted in\nour hearts by nature; we need not turn over any obscure books to find\nout this truth,\u201d &c.; which are the words of Cicero in the defence of\nMilo, and translated by the Bishop to the defence of free-will, were\nused by Cicero to prove this very thing, that it is and hath been always\nlawful for one private man to kill another for his own preservation. But\nwhere he saith it is not lawful _ordinarily_, he should have shown some\nparticular case wherein it is unlawful. For seeing it is a \u201cbelief\nimprinted in our hearts,\u201d not only I, but many more are apt to think it\nis the law of nature, and consequently universal and eternal. And where\nhe saith, this right of defence where it is, \u201cis not a remainder of some\ngreater power which they have resigned, but a privilege which God hath\ngiven them in case of extreme danger and invincible necessity,\u201d &c.; I\nalso say it is a privilege which God hath given them, but we differ in\nthe manner how; which to me seems this, that God doth not account such\nkilling sin. But the Bishop it seems would have it thus: God sends a\nbishop into the pulpit to tell the people it is lawful for a man to kill\nanother man when it is necessary for the preservation of his own life;\nof which necessity, that is, whether it be _invincible_, or whether the\ndanger be _extreme_, the bishop shall be the judge after the man is\nkilled, as being a case of conscience. Against the resigning of this our\ngeneral power of killing our enemies, he argues thus: \u201cNothing can give\nthat which it never had; the people whilst they were a dispersed rabble,\nwhich in some odd cases might happen to be, never had justly the power\nof life and death, and therefore they could not give it by their\nelection,\u201d &c. Needs there much acuteness to understand, what number of\nmen soever there be, though not united into government, that every one\nof them in particular having a right to destroy whatsoever he thinketh\ncan annoy him, may not resign the same right, and give it to whom he\nplease, when he thinks it conducible to his preservation? And yet it\nseems he has not understood it.\n\nHe takes it ill that I compare the \u201cmurdering of men with the\nslaughtering of brute beasts:\u201d as also a little before, he says, \u201cmy\nopinion reflects too much upon the honour of mankind: the elements are\nfor the plants, the plants for the brute beasts, and the brute beasts\nfor man.\u201d I pray, when a lion eats a man, and a man eats an ox, why is\nthe ox more made for the man, than the man for the lion? \u201cYes,\u201d he\nsaith, \u201cGod gave man liberty (Gen. ix. 3) to eat the flesh of the\ncreatures for his sustenance.\u201d True, but the lion had the liberty to eat\nthe flesh of man long before. But he will say, no; pretending that no\nman of any nation, or at any time, could lawfully eat flesh, unless he\nhad this licence of holy Scripture, which it was impossible for most men\nto have. But how would he have been offended, if I had said of man as\nPliny doth: \u201c_quo nullum est animal neque miserius, neque superbius_?\u201d\nThe truth is, that man is a creature of greater power than other living\ncreatures are, but his advantages do consist especially in two things:\nwhereof one is the use of speech, by which men communicate one with\nanother, and join their forces together, and by which also they register\ntheir thoughts that they perish not, but be reserved, and afterwards\njoined with other thoughts, to produce general rules for the direction\nof their actions. There be beasts that see better, others that hear\nbetter, and others that exceed mankind in other senses. Man excelleth\nbeasts only in making of rules to himself, that is to say, in\nremembering, and in reasoning aright upon that which he remembereth.\nThey which do so, deserve an honour above brute beasts. But they which\nmistaking the use of words, deceive themselves and others, introducing\nerror, and seducing men from the truth, are so much less to be honoured\nthan brute beasts, as error is more vile than ignorance. So that it is\nnot merely the nature of man, that makes him worthier than other living\ncreatures, but the knowledge that he acquires by meditation, and by the\nright use of reason in making good rules of his future actions. The\nother advantage a man hath, is the use of his hands for the making of\nthose things which are instrumental to his well-being. But this\nadvantage is not a matter of so great honour, but that a man may speak\nnegligently of it without offence. And for the dominion that a man hath\nover beasts, he saith, \u201cit is lost in part for the sin of man, because\nthe strongest creatures, as lions and bears, have withdrawn their\nobedience; but the most profitable and useful creatures, as sheep and\noxen, do in some degree retain their obedience.\u201d I would ask the Bishop,\nin what consisteth the dominion of man over a lion or a bear. Is it in\nan obligation of promise, or of debt? That cannot be; for they have no\nsense of debt or duty. And I think he will not say, that they have\nreceived a command to obey him from authority. It resteth therefore that\nthe dominion of man consists in this, that men are too hard for lions\nand bears, because, though a lion or a bear be stronger than a man, yet\nthe strength, and art, and especially the leaguing and societies of men,\nare a greater power than the ungoverned strength of unruly beasts. In\nthis it is that consisteth this dominion of man. And for the same reason\nwhen a hungry lion meeteth an unarmed man in a desert, the lion hath the\ndominion over the man, if that of man over lions, or over sheep and\noxen, may be called dominion, which properly it cannot; nor can it be\nsaid that sheep and oxen do otherwise obey us, than they would do a\nlion. And if we have dominion over sheep and oxen, we exercise it not as\ndominion, but as hostility; for we keep them only to labour, and to be\nkilled and devoured by us; so that lions and bears would be as good\nmasters to them as we are. By this short passage of his concerning\n_dominion_ and _obedience_, I have no reason to expect a very shrewd\nanswer from him to my _Leviathan_.\n\n(_i_) \u201cThe next branch of his answer concerns consultations, which,\nsaith he, \u2018are not superfluous, though all things come to pass\nnecessarily; because they are the cause which doth necessitate the\neffect, and the means to bring it to pass.\u2019\u201d\n\nHis reply to this is, that he hath \u201cshowed sufficiently, that reason\ndoth not determine the will physically,\u201d &c. If not physically, how\nthen? As he hath told us in another place, _morally_. But what it is to\ndetermine a thing morally, no man living understands. I doubt not but he\nhad therefore the will to write this reply, _because_ I had answered his\ntreatise concerning true liberty. My answer therefore was, at least in\npart, the _cause_ of his writing; yet that is the cause of the nimble\nlocal motion of his fingers. Is not the cause of local motion physical?\nHis will therefore was physically, and extrinsically, and antecedently,\nand not morally caused by my writing.\n\n(_k_) \u201cHe adds further that \u2018as the end is necessary, so are the means,\nand when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another,\nit is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen.\u2019 All which\nis truth, but not the whole truth,\u201d &c.\n\nIs it not enough that it is truth? Must I put all the truth I know into\ntwo or three lines? No. I should have added, that God doth adapt and fit\nthe means to their respective ends, free means to free ends, contingent\nmeans to contingent ends, necessary means to necessary ends. It may be I\nwould have done so, but for shame. _Free_, _contingent_ and _necessary_\nare not words that can be joined to _means_ or _ends_, but to _agents_\nand _actions_; that is to say, to things that move or are moved: a _free\nagent_ being that whose motion or action is not hindered or stopped, and\na _free action_, that which is produced by a free agent. A _contingent\nagent_ is the same with an _agent_ simply. But, because men for the most\npart think those things are produced without cause, whereof they do not\nsee the cause, they use to call both the agent and the action\ncontingent, as attributing it to fortune. And therefore, when the causes\nare necessary, if they perceive not the necessity, they call those\nnecessary agents and actions, in things that have appetite, _free_; and\nin things inanimate, _contingent_. The rest of his reply to this point\nis very little of it applied to my answer. I note only that where he\nsays, \u201cbut if God have so ordered the world, that a man cannot, _if he\nwould_, neglect any means of good, &c.;\u201d he would fraudulently insinuate\nthat it is my opinion, that a man is not _free to do if he will, and to\nabstain if he will_. Whereas from the beginning I have often declared\nthat it is none of my opinion; and that my opinion is only this, that he\nis not _free to will_, or which is all one, he is not master of his\nfuture will. After much unorderly discourse he comes in with \u201cthis is\nthe doctrine that flows from this opinion of absolute necessity;\u201d which\nis impertinent; seeing nothing flows from it more than may be drawn from\nthe confession of an eternal prescience.\n\n(_l_) \u201cBut he tells me in great sadness, that \u2018my argument is no better\nthan this; if I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow,\nthough I run myself through with a sword to-day; which, saith he, is a\nfalse consequence, and a false proposition.\u2019 Truly, if by running\nthrough, he understand killing, it is a false or rather a foolish\nproposition.\u201d He saith right. Let us therefore see how it is not like to\nhis. He says, \u201cif it be absolutely necessary that a man shall live till\nto-morrow, then it is vain and superfluous for him to consult whether he\nshould die to-day or not.\u201d \u201cAnd this,\u201d he says, \u201cis a true consequence.\u201d\nI cannot perceive how it is a better consequence than the former; for if\nit be absolutely necessary that a man should live till to-morrow, and in\nhealth, which may also be supposed, why should he not, if he have the\ncuriosity, have his head cut off to try what pain it is. But the\nconsequence is false; for if there be a necessity of his living, it is\nnecessary also that he shall not have so foolish a curiosity. But he\ncannot yet distinguish between a seen and an unseen necessity, and that\nis the cause he believeth his consequence to be good.\n\n(_m_) \u201cThe next branch of my argument concerns admonitions,\u201d &c.\n\nWhich he says is this: \u201cIf all things be necessary, then it is to no\nmore purpose to admonish men of understanding, than fools, children, or\nmadmen; but that they do admonish the one and not the other, is\nconfessedly true; and no reason under heaven can be given for it but\nthis, that the former have the use of reason and true liberty, with a\ndominion over their own actions, which children, fools, and madmen have\nnot.\u201d\n\nThe true reason why we admonish men and not children, &c., is because\nadmonition is nothing else but telling a man the good and evil\nconsequences of his actions. They who have experience of good and evil,\ncan better perceive the reasonableness of such admonition, than they\nthat have not; and such as have like passions to those of the admonitor,\ndo more easily conceive that to be good or bad which the admonitor saith\nis so, than they who have great passions, and such as are contrary to\nhis. The first, which is want of experience, maketh children and fools\nunapt; and the second, which is strength of passion, maketh madmen\nunwilling to receive admonition; for children are ignorant, and madmen\nin an error, concerning what is good or evil for themselves. This is not\nto say children and madmen want true liberty, that is, the liberty to do\nas they will, nor to say that men of judgment, or the admonitor himself\nhath a dominion over his own actions, more than children or madmen, (for\ntheir actions are also voluntary), or that when he admonisheth he hath\nalways the use of reason, though he have the use of deliberation, which\nchildren, fools, madmen, and beasts also have. There be, therefore,\nreasons under heaven which the Bishop knows not of.\n\nWhereas I had said, that things necessary may be praiseworthy, and to\npraise a thing is to say it is good, he distinguisheth and saith:\n\n(_n_) \u201cTrue, but this goodness is not a metaphysical goodness; so\nwhatsoever hath a being is good; nor a natural goodness; the praise of\nit passeth wholly to the Author of nature, &c.; but a moral goodness, or\na goodness of actions, rather than of things. The moral goodness of an\naction is the conformity of it to right reason,\u201d &c.\n\nThere hath been in the Schools derived from _Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics_,\nan old proverb rather than an axiom: _ens, bonum, et verum\nconvertuntur_. From hence the Bishop hath taken this notion of a\nmetaphysical goodness, and his doctrine that whatsoever hath a being is\ngood; and by this interpreteth the words of Gen. i. 31: _God saw all\nthat he had made, and it was very good_. But the reason of those words\nis, that _good_ is relative to those that are pleased with it, and not\nof absolute signification to all men. God therefore saith, that all that\nhe had made was very good, because he was pleased with the creatures of\nhis own making. But if all things were absolutely good, we should be all\npleased with their _being_, which we are not, when the actions that\ndepend upon their being are hurtful to us. And therefore, to speak\nproperly, nothing is good or evil but in regard of the action that\nproceedeth from it, and also of the person to whom it doth good or hurt.\nSatan is evil to us, because he seeketh our destruction, but good to\nGod, because he executeth his commandments. And so his _metaphysical\ngoodness_ is but an idle term, and not the member of a distinction. And\nas for natural goodness and evilness, that also is but the goodness and\nevilness of actions; as some herbs are good because they nourish, others\nevil because they poison us; and one horse is good because he is gentle,\nstrong, and carrieth a man easily; another bad, because he resisteth,\ngoeth hard, or otherwise displeaseth us; and that quality of gentleness,\nif there were no more laws amongst men than there is amongst beasts,\nwould be as much a moral good in a horse or other beast as in a man. It\nis the law from whence proceeds the difference between the moral and the\nnatural goodness: so that it is well enough said by him, that \u201cmoral\ngoodness is the conformity of an action with right reason\u201d; and better\nsaid than meant; for this _right reason_, which is the law, is no\notherwise certainly right than by our making it so by our approbation of\nit and voluntary subjection to it. For the law-makers are men, and may\nerr, and think that law, which they make, is for the good of the people\nsometimes when it is not. And yet the actions of subjects, if they be\nconformable to the law, are morally good, and yet cease not to be\nnaturally good; and the praise of them passeth to the Author of nature,\nas well as of any other good whatsoever. From whence it appears that\nmoral praise is not, as he says, from the good use of liberty, but from\nobedience to the laws; nor moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty,\nbut from disobedience to the laws. And for his consequence, \u201cif all\nthings be necessary, then moral liberty is quite taken away, and with it\nall true praise and dispraise\u201d, there is neither truth in it, nor\nargument offered for it; for there is nothing more necessary than the\nconsequence of _voluntary_ actions to the _will_. And whereas I had\nsaid, that to say a thing is good, is to say it is as I or another would\nwish, or as the state would have it, or according to the law of the\nland, he answers, that \u201cI mistake infinitely\u201d. And his reason is,\nbecause \u201cwe often wish what is profitable or delightful, without\nregarding as we ought what is honest\u201d. There is no man living that seeth\nall the consequences of an action from the beginning to the end, whereby\nto weigh the whole sum of the good with the whole sum of the evil\nconsequence. We choose no further than we can weigh. That is good to\nevery man, which is so far good as he can see. All the real good, which\nwe call honest and morally virtuous, is that which is not repugnant to\nthe law, civil or natural; for the law is all the right reason we have,\nand, (though he, as often as it disagreeth with his own reason, deny\nit), is the infallible rule of moral goodness. The reason whereof is\nthis, that because neither mine nor the Bishop\u2019s reason is right reason\nfit to be a rule of our moral actions, we have therefore set up over\nourselves a sovereign governor, and agreed that his laws shall be unto\nus, whatsoever they be, in the place of right reason, to dictate to us\nwhat is really good. In the same manner as men in playing turn up trump,\nand as in playing their game their morality consisteth in not\nrenouncing, so in our civil conversation our morality is all contained\nin not disobeying of the laws.\n\nTo my question, \u201cwhether nothing could please him, that proceeded from\nnecessity\u201d, he answers: \u201cyes; the fire pleaseth him when he is cold, and\nhe says it is good fire, but does not praise it morally\u201d. He praiseth,\nhe says, first the Creator of the fire, and then him who provided it. He\ndoes well; yet he praiseth the fire when he saith it is good, though not\nmorally. He does not say it is a just fire, or a wise, or a\nwell-mannered fire, obedient to the laws; but these attributes it seems\nhe gives to God, as if justice were not of his nature, but of his\nmanners. And in praising morally him that provided it, he seems to say,\nhe would not say the fire was good, if he were not morally good that did\nprovide it.\n\nTo that which I had answered concerning reward and punishment, he hath\nreplied, he says, sufficiently before, and that that which he\ndiscourseth here, is not only to answer me, but also to satisfy himself,\nand saith:\n\n(_o_) \u201cThough it be not urged by him, yet I do acknowledge that I find\nsome improper and analogical rewards and punishments, used to brute\nbeasts, as the hunter rewards his dog,\u201d &c.\n\nFor my part, I am too dull to perceive the difference between those\nrewards used to brute beasts, and those that are used to men. If they be\nnot properly called rewards and punishments, let him give them their\nproper name. It may be he will say, he has done it in calling them\n_analogical_; yet for any thing that can be understood thereby, he might\nhave called them _paragogical_, or _typical_, or _topical_, if he had\npleased. He adds further, that whereas he had said that the actions of\nbees and spiders were done without consultation, by mere instinct of\nnature, and by a determination of their fancies, I misallege him, and\nsay he made their individual actions necessary. I have only this to\nanswer, that, seeing he says that by instinct of nature their fancies\nwere determined to special kinds of works, I might justly infer they\nwere determined every one of them to some work; and every work is an\nindividual action; for _a kind of work_ in the general, is no work. But\nthese their individual actions, he saith, \u201care contingent, and therefore\nnot necessary\u201d; which is no good consequence: for if he mean by\n_contingent_, that which has no cause, he speaketh not as a Christian,\nbut maketh a Deity of fortune; which I verily think he doth not. But if\nhe mean by it, that whereof he knoweth not the cause, the consequence is\nnought.\n\nThe means whereby setting-dogs, and coy-ducks, and parrots, are taught\nto do what they do, \u201cis by their backs, by their bellies, by the rod, or\nby the morsel, which have indeed a shadow or resemblance of rewards and\npunishments: but we take the word here properly, not as it is used by\nvulgar people, but as it is used by divines and philosophers,\u201d &c. Does\nnot the Bishop know that the belly hath taught poets, and historians,\nand divines, and philosophers, and artificers, their several arts, as\nwell as parrots? Do not men do their duty with regard to their backs, to\ntheir necks, and to their morsels, as well as setting-dogs, coy-ducks,\nand parrots? Why then are these things to us the substance, and to them\nbut the _shadow_ or _resemblance_ of rewards or punishments?\n\n(_p_) \u201cWhen brute creatures do learn any such qualities, it is not out\nof judgment or deliberation or discourse, by inferring or concluding one\nthing from another, which they are not capable of; neither are they able\nto conceive a reason of what they do,\u201d &c.: but \u201cthey remember that when\nthey did after one manner, they were beaten, and when they did after\nanother manner, they were cherished; and accordingly they apply\nthemselves.\u201d\n\nIf the Bishop had considered the cogitations of his own mind, not then\nwhen he disputeth, but then when he followed those businesses which he\ncalleth trifles, he would have found them the very same which he here\nmentioneth; saving instead of _beating_, (because he is exempt from\nthat), he is to put _in damage_. For, setting aside the discourse of the\ntongue in words of general signification, the ideas of our minds are the\nsame with those of other living creatures, created from visible,\naudible, and other sensible objects to the eyes and other organs of\nsense, as their\u2019s are. For as the objects of sense are all individual,\nthat is, singular, so are all the fancies proceeding from their\noperations; and men reason not but in words of universal signification,\nuttered or tacitly thought on. But perhaps he thinketh remembrance of\nwords to be the ideas of those things which the words signify; and that\nall fancies are not effected by the operation of objects upon the organs\nof our senses. But to rectify him in those points is greater labour\n(unless he had better principles) than I am willing, or have at this\ntime leisure, to undergo.\n\nLastly, whereas he says, \u201cif their individual actions were absolutely\nnecessary, fear or hope could not alter them\u201d: that is true. For it is\nfear and hope, that makes them necessarily what they are.\n\n NO. XV.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThirdly, let this opinion be once radicated in the minds of\nmen, that there is no true liberty, and that all things come to pass\ninevitably, and it will utterly destroy the study of piety. Who will\nbewail his sins with tears? What will become of that grief, that zeal,\nthat indignation, that holy revenge, which the Apostle speaks of, if men\nbe once thoroughly persuaded that they could not shun what they did? A\nman may grieve for that which he could not help; but he will never be\nbrought to bewail that as his own fault, which flowed not from his own\nerror, but from antecedent necessity. Who will be careful or solicitous\nto perform obedience, that believeth there are inevitable bounds and\nlimits set to all his devotions, which he can neither go beyond, nor\ncome short of? To what end shall he pray God to avert those evils which\nare inevitable, or to confer those favours which are impossible? We\nindeed know not what good or evil shall happen to us: but this we know,\nthat if all things be necessary, our devotions and endeavours cannot\nalter that which must be. In a word, the only reason why those persons,\nwho tread in this path of fatal destiny, do sometimes pray, or repent,\nor serve God, is because the light of nature, and the strength of\nreason, and the evidence of Scripture, do for that present transport\nthem from their ill-chosen grounds, and expel those stoical fancies out\nof their heads. A complete Stoic can neither pray, nor repent, nor serve\nGod to any purpose. Either allow liberty, or destroy Church as well as\ncommonwealth, religion as well as policy.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ His third argument consisteth in other inconveniences which he\nsaith will follow, namely, impiety and negligence of religious duties,\nrepentance and zeal to God\u2019s service. To which I answer, as to the rest,\nthat they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the far greatest\npart of mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men\nwhom either the study of acquiring wealth or preferments, or whom the\nappetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the\nrash embracing of wrong principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth\nof things, that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help\ntheir piety. And therefore, if he had not desired this answer, I would\nnot have written it. Nor do I write it, but in hope your Lordship and he\nwill keep it private. Nevertheless, in very truth, the necessity of\nevents does not of itself draw with it any impiety at all. For piety\nconsisteth only in two things; one, that we honour God in our hearts,\nwhich is, that we think of his power as highly as we can: for to honour\nany thing, is nothing else but to think it to be of great power. The\nother, that we signify that honour and esteem by our words and actions,\nwhich is called _cultus_ or worship of God. He therefore, that thinketh\nthat all things proceed from God\u2019s eternal will, and consequently are\nnecessary, does he not think God omnipotent? does he not esteem of his\npower as highly as is possible; which is to honour God as much as can be\nin his heart? Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by external\nacts and words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? Yet\nis this external acknowledgment the same thing which we call worship. So\nthis opinion fortifieth piety in both kinds, externally and internally,\nand therefore is far from destroying it. And for repentance, which is\nnothing but a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being\nout of the way, though the cause that made him go astray were necessary,\nyet there is no reason why he should not grieve; and again, though the\ncause why he returned into the way were necessary, there remain still\nthe causes of joy. So that the necessity of the actions taketh away\nneither of those parts of repentance, grief for the error, nor joy for\nthe returning. And for prayer, whereas he saith that the necessity of\nthings destroys prayer, I deny it. For though prayer be none of the\ncauses that move God\u2019s will, his will being unchangeable, yet since we\nfind in God\u2019s word, he will not give his blessings but to those that ask\nthem, the motive to prayer is the same. Prayer is the gift of God, no\nless than the blessings. And the prayer is decreed together in the same\ndecree wherein the blessing is decreed. It is manifest, that\nthanksgiving is no cause of the blessing passed; and that which is\npassed, is sure and necessary. Yet even amongst men, thanks are in use\nas an acknowledgment of the benefit past, though we should expect no new\nbenefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God Almighty is but\nthanksgiving for his blessings in general; and though it precede the\nparticular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause or means of it, but a\nsignification that we expect nothing but from God, in such manner as He,\nnot as we will. And our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray, \u201cthy\nwill, not our will be done\u201d; and by example teaches us the same; for he\nprayed thus: _Father, if it be thy will, let this cup pass_, &c. The end\nof prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not to move, but to honour God\nAlmighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by Him only.\n\n_J. D._ \u201cI hope T. H. will be persuaded in time, that it is not the\ncoveteousness, or ambition, or sensuality, or sloth, or prejudice of his\nreaders, which render this doctrine of absolute necessity dangerous, but\nthat it is, in its own nature, destructive to true godliness; (_a_) and\nthough his answer consist more of oppositions than of solutions, yet I\nwill not willingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed. (_b_) First,\nhe errs in making inward piety to consist merely in the estimation of\nthe judgment. If this were so, what hinders but that the devils should\nhave as much inward piety as the best Christians? For they esteem God\u2019s\npower to be infinite, and tremble. Though inward piety do suppose the\nact of the understanding, yet it consisteth properly in the act of the\nwill, being that branch of justice which gives to God the honour which\nis due unto him. Is there no love due to God, no faith, no hope? (_c_)\nSecondly, he errs in making inward piety to ascribe no glory to God, but\nonly the glory of his power or omnipotence. What shall become of all\nother the Divine attributes, and particularly of his goodness, of his\ntruth, of his justice, of his mercy, which beget a more true and sincere\nhonour in the heart than greatness itself? _Magnos facile laudamus,\nbonos lubenter._ (_d_) Thirdly, this opinion of absolute necessity\ndestroys the truth of God, making him to command one thing openly, and\nto necessitate another privately; to chide a man for doing that which he\nhath determined him to do; to profess one thing, and to intend another.\nIt destroys the goodness of God, making him to be a hater of mankind,\nand to delight in the torments of his creatures; whereas the very dogs\nlicked the sores of Lazarus, in pity and commiseration of him. It\ndestroys the justice of God, making him to punish the creatures for that\nwhich was his own act, which they had no more power to shun, than the\nfire hath power not to burn. It destroys the very power of God, making\nhim to be the true author of all the defects and evils which are in the\nworld. These are the fruits of impotence, not of omnipotence. He who is\nthe effective cause of sin, either in himself or in the creature, is not\nalmighty. There needs no other devil in the world to raise jealousies\nand suspicions between God and his creatures, or to poison mankind with\nan apprehension that God doth not love them, but only this opinion,\nwhich was the office of the serpent (Gen. iii. 5). Fourthly, for the\noutward worship of God; (_e_) how shall a man praise God for his\ngoodness, who believes him to be a greater tyrant than ever was in the\nworld; who creates millions to burn eternally, without their fault, to\nexpress his power? How shall a man hear the word of God with that\nreverence, and devotion, and faith, which is requisite, who believeth\nthat God causeth his gospel to be preached to the much greater part of\nChristians, not with any intention that they should be converted and\nsaved, but merely to harden their hearts, and to make them inexcusable?\nHow shall a man receive the blessed sacrament with comfort and\nconfidence, as a seal of God\u2019s love in Christ, who believeth that so\nmany millions are positively excluded from all fruit and benefit of the\npassions of Christ, before they had done either good or evil? How shall\nhe prepare himself with care and conscience, who apprehendeth that\neating and drinking unworthily is not the cause of damnation, but,\nbecause God would damn a man, therefor he necessitates him to eat and\ndrink unworthily? How shall a man make a free vow to God without gross\nridiculous hypocrisy, who thinks he is able to perform nothing but as he\nis extrinsically necessitated? Fifthly, for repentance, how shall a man\ncondemn and accuse himself for his sins, who thinks himself to be like a\nwatch which is wound up by God, and that he can go neither longer nor\nshorter, faster nor slower, truer nor falser, than he is ordered by God?\nIf God sets him right, he goes right; if God sets him wrong, he goes\nwrong. How can a man be said to return into the right way, who never was\nin any other way but that which God himself had chalked out for him?\nWhat is his purpose to amend, who is destitute of all power, but as if a\nman should purpose to fly without wings, or a beggar who hath not a\ngroat in his purse, purpose to build hospitals?\n\n\u201cWe use to say, admit one absurdity, and a thousand will follow. To\nmaintain this unreasonable opinion of absolute necessity, he is\nnecessitated (but it is hypothetically, he might change his opinion if\nhe would) to deal with all ancient writers as the Goths did with the\nRomans, who destroyed all their magnificent works, that there might\nremain no monument of their greatness upon the face of the earth.\nTherefore he will not leave so much as one of their opinions, nor one of\ntheir definitions, nay, not one of their terms of art standing. (_f_)\nObserve what a description he hath given us here of repentance: \u2018it is a\nglad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out of the\nway\u2019. It amazed me to find _gladness_ to be the first word in the\ndescription of repentance. His repentance is not that repentance, nor\nhis piety that piety, nor his prayer that kind of prayer, which the\nChurch of God in all ages hath acknowledged. Fasting, and sackcloth, and\nashes, and tears, and _humicubations_, used to be companions of\nrepentance. Joy may be a consequent of it, not a part of it. (_g_) It is\na _returning_: but whose act is this returning? Is it God\u2019s alone, or\ndoth the penitent person concur also freely with the grace of God? If it\nbe God\u2019s alone, then it is his repentance, not man\u2019s repentance. What\nneed the penitent person trouble himself about it? God will take care of\nhis own work. The Scriptures teach us otherwise, that God expects our\nconcurrence (Revel. iii. 19, 20): _Be zealous and repent: behold I stand\nat the door and knock; if any man hear my voice, and open the door, I\nwill come in to him_. It is a \u2018glad returning into the right way\u2019. Why\ndare any man call that a wrong way, which God himself hath determined?\nHe that willeth and doth that which God would have him to will and to\ndo, is never out of his right way. It follows in his description, _after\nthe grief_, &c. It is true, a man may grieve for that which is\nnecessarily imposed upon him; but he cannot grieve for it as a fault of\nhis own, if it never was in his power to shun it. Suppose a\nwritingmaster shall hold his scholar\u2019s hand in his, and write with it;\nthe scholar\u2019s part is only to hold still his hand, whether the master\nwrite well or ill; the scholar hath no ground either of joy or sorrow,\nas for himself; no man will interpret it to be his act, but his\nmaster\u2019s. It is no fault to be out of the right way, if a man had not\nliberty to have kept himself in the way.\n\n\u201cAnd so from _repentance_ he skips quite over _new obedience_ to come to\n_prayer_, which is the last religious duty insisted upon by me here. But\naccording to his use, without either answering or mentioning what I say;\nwhich would have showed him plainly what kind of prayer I intend, not\ncontemplative prayer in general, as it includes thanksgiving, but that\nmost proper kind of prayer which we call _petition_, which used to be\nthus defined, to be an act of religion by which we desire of God\nsomething which we have not, and hope that we shall obtain it by him;\nquite contrary to this, T. H. tells us, (_h_) that prayer \u2018is not a\ncause nor a means of God\u2019s blessing, but only a signification that we\nexpect it from him\u2019. If he had told us only, that prayer is not a\nmeritorious cause of God\u2019s blessings, as the poor man by begging an alms\ndoth not deserve it, I should have gone along with him. But to tell us,\nthat it is not so much as a means to procure God\u2019s blessing, and yet\nwith the same breath, that \u2018God will not give his blessings but to those\nwho pray\u2019, who shall reconcile him to himself? The Scriptures teach us\notherwise, (John xvi. 23): _Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my\nname, he will give it you_: (Matth. vii. 7): _Ask, and it shall be given\nyou, seek, and ye shal find, knock, and it shall be opened unto you_.\nSt. Paul tells the Corinthians (2 Cor. i. 11), that he was _helped by\ntheir prayers_: that is not all; that _the gift was bestowed upon him by\ntheir means_. So prayer is a means. And St. James saith (chap. v. 16):\n_The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much_. If it\nbe _effectual_, then it is a cause. To show this efficacy of prayer, our\nSaviour useth the comparison of a father towards his child, of a\nneighbour towards his neighbour; yea, of an unjust judge, to shame those\nwho think that God hath not more compassion than a wicked man. This was\nsignified by Jacob\u2019s wrestling and prevailing with God. Prayer is like\nthe tradesman\u2019s tools, wherewithal he gets his living for himself and\nhis family. But, saith he, \u2018God\u2019s will is unchangeable\u2019. What then? He\nmight as well use this against study, physic, and all second causes, as\nagainst prayer. He shows even in this, how little they attribute to the\nendeavours of men. There is a great difference between these two:\n_mutare voluntatem_, to change the will; (which God never doth, in whom\nthere is not the least shadow of turning by change; his will to love and\nhate was the same from eternity, which it now is and ever shall be; his\nlove and hatred are immovable, but we are removed; _non tellus cymbam,\ntellurem cymba reliquit_); and _velle mutationem_, to will a change;\nwhich God often doth. To change the will, argues a change in the agent;\nbut to will a change, only argues a change in the object. It is no\ninconstancy in a man to love or to hate as the object is changed.\n_Pr\u00e6sta mihi omnia eadem, et idem sum._ Prayer works not upon God, but\nus; it renders not him more propitious in himself, but us more capable\nof mercy. He saith this, \u2018that God doth not bless us, except we pray, is\na motive to prayer\u2019. Why talks he of motives, who acknowledgeth no\nliberty, nor admits any cause but absolutely necessary? He saith,\n\u2018prayer is the gift of God, no less than the blessing which we pray for,\nand contained in the same decree with the blessing\u2019. It is true, the\nspirit of prayer is the gift of God. Will he conclude from thence, that\nthe good employment of one talent, or of one gift of God, may not\nprocure another? Our Saviour teacheth us otherwise: _Come thou good and\nfaithful servant, thou hast been faithful in little, I will make thee\nruler over much_. Too much light is an enemy to the sight, and too much\nlaw is an enemy to justice. I could wish we wrangled less about God\u2019s\ndecrees, until we understood them better. But, saith he, \u2018thanksgiving\nis no cause of the blessing past, and prayer is but a thanksgiving\u2019. He\nmight even as well tell me, that when a beggar craves an alms, and when\nhe gives thanks for it, it is all one. Every thanksgiving is a kind of\nprayer, but every prayer, and namely petition, is not a thanksgiving. In\nthe last place he urgeth, that \u2018in our prayers we are bound to submit\nour wills to God\u2019s will.\u2019 Who ever made any doubt of this? We must\nsubmit to the preceptive will of God, or his commandments; we must\nsubmit to the effective will of God, when he declares his good pleasure\nby the event or otherwise. But we deny, and deny again, either that God\nwills things _ad extra_, without himself, necessarily, or that it is his\npleasure that all second causes should act necessarily at all times;\nwhich is the question, and that which he allegeth to the contrary comes\nnot near it.\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. XV.\n\n(_a_) \u201cAnd though his answer consist more of oppositions than of\nsolutions, yet I will not willingly leave one grain of his matter\nunweighed.\u201d\n\nIt is a promise of great exactness, and like to that which is in his\nEpistle to the Reader: \u201cHere is all that passed between us upon this\nsubject, without any addition or the least variation from the original,\u201d\n&c.: which promises were both needless, and made out of gallantry; and\ntherefore he is the less pardonable in case they be not very rigidly\nobserved. I would therefore have the reader to consider, whether these\nwords of mine: \u201cour Saviour bids us pray, _thy will_, not _our_ will,\n_be done_, and by example teaches us the same; for he prayed thus:\n_Father, if it be thy will let this cup pass_,\u201d &c.: which seem at least\nto imply that our prayers cannot change the will of God, nor divert him\nfrom his eternal decree: have been weighed by him to a grain, according\nto his promise. Nor hath he kept his other promise any better; for (No.\nVIII.) replying to these words of mine, \u201cif he had so little to do as to\nbe a spectator of the actions of bees and spiders, he would have\nconfessed not only election, but also art, prudence, and policy in\nthem,\u201d &c., he saith, \u201cyes, I have seen those silliest of creatures, and\nseeing their rare works I have seen enough to confute all the bold-faced\natheists of this age, and their hellish blasphemies\u201d. This passage is\nadded to that which passed between us upon this subject; for it is not\nin the copy which I have had by me, as himself confesseth, these eight\nyears; nor is it in the body of the copy he sent to the press, but only\nin the margin, that is to say, added out of anger against me, whom he\nwould have men think to be one of the bold-faced atheists of this age.\n\nIn the rest of this reply he endeavoureth to prove, that it followeth\nfrom my opinion, that there is no use of piety. My opinion is no more\nthan this, that a man cannot so determine to-day, the will which he\nshall have to the doing of any action to-morrow, as that it may not be\nchanged by some external accident or other, as there shall appear more\nor less advantage to make him persevere in the will to the same action,\nor to will it no more. When a man intendeth to pay a debt at a certain\ntime, if he see that the detaining of the money for a little longer may\nadvantage himself, and seeth no other disadvantage equivalent likely to\nfollow upon the detention, he hath his will changed by the advantage,\nand therefore had not determined his will himself; but when he foreseeth\ndiscredit or perhaps imprisonment, then his will remaineth the same, and\nis determined by the thoughts he hath of his creditor, who is therefore\nan external cause of the determination of the debtor\u2019s will. This is so\nevident to all men living, though they never studied school-divinity,\nthat it will be very strange if he draw from it the great impiety he\npretends to do. Again, my opinion is only this: that whatsoever God\nforeknows shall come to pass, it cannot possibly be that that shall not\ncome to pass; but that which cannot possibly not come to pass, that is\nsaid by all men to come to pass necessarily; therefore all events that\nGod foreknows shall come to pass, shall come to pass necessarily. If\ntherefore the Bishop draw impiety from this, he falleth into the impiety\nof denying God\u2019s prescience. Let us see now how he reasoneth.\n\n(_b_) \u201cFirst, he errs in making inward piety to consist merely in the\nestimation of the judgment. If this were so, what hinders but that the\ndevils should have as much inward piety as the best Christians; for they\nesteem God\u2019s power to be infinite, and tremble?\u201d\n\nI said, that two things concurred to _piety_; one, to esteem his power\nas highly as is possible; the other, that we signify that estimation by\nour words and actions, that is to say, that we worship him. This latter\npart of piety he leaveth out; and then, it is much more easy to conclude\nas he doth, that the devils may have inward piety. But neither so doth\nthe conclusion follow. For goodness is one of God\u2019s powers, namely, that\npower by which he worketh in men the hope they have in him; and is\nrelative; and therefore, unless the devil think that God will be good to\nhim, he cannot esteem him for his goodness. It does not therefore follow\nfrom any opinion of mine, that the devil may have as much inward piety\nas a Christian. But how does the Bishop know how the devils esteem God\u2019s\npower; and what devils does he mean? There are in the Scripture two\nsorts of things, which are in English translated devils. One, is that\nwhich is called Satan, Diabolus, and Abaddon, which signifies in\nEnglish, an _enemy_, an _accuser_, and a _destroyer_ of the Church of\nGod. In which sense, the devils are but wicked men. How then is he sure\nthat they esteem God\u2019s power to be infinite? For, _trembling_ infers no\nmore than that they apprehend it to be greater than their own. The other\nsort of devils are called in the Scripture _d\u00e6monia_, which are the\nfeigned Gods of the heathen, and are neither bodies nor spiritual\nsubstances, but mere fancies, and fictions of terrified hearts, feigned\nby the Greeks and other heathen people, and which St. Paul calleth\n_nothings_; for an idol, saith he, is nothing. Does the Bishop mean,\nthat these nothings esteem God\u2019s power to be infinite and tremble? There\nis nothing that has a real being, but God, and the world, and the parts\nof the world; nor has anything a feigned being, but the fictions of\nmen\u2019s brains. The world and the parts thereof are corporeal, endued with\nthe dimensions of quantity, and with figure. I should be glad to know,\nin what classes of entities which is a word that schoolmen use, the\nBishop ranketh these devils, that so much esteem God\u2019s power, and yet\nnot love him nor hope in him, if he place them not in the rank of those\nmen who are enemies to the people of God, as the Jews did.\n\n(_c_) \u201cSecondly, he errs in making inward piety to ascribe no glory to\nGod, but only the glory of his power or omnipotence. What shall become\nof all other the Divine attributes, and particularly of his goodness, of\nhis truth, of his justice, of his mercy,\u201d &c.\n\nHe speaketh of God\u2019s goodness and mercy, as if they were no part of his\npower. Is not goodness, in him that is good, the power to make himself\nbeloved, and is not mercy goodness? Are not, therefore, these attributes\ncontained in the attribute of his omnipotence? And justice in God, is it\nanything else, but the power he hath, and exerciseth in distributing\nblessings and afflictions? Justice is not in God as in man, the\nobservation of the laws made by his superiors. Nor is wisdom in God, a\nlogical examination of the means by the end, as it is in men; but an\nincomprehensible attribute given to an incomprehensible nature, for to\nhonour him. It is the Bishop that errs, in thinking nothing to be power\nbut riches and high place, wherein to domineer and please himself, and\nvex those that submit not to his opinions.\n\n(_d_) \u201cThirdly, this opinion of absolute necessity destroys the truth of\nGod, making him to command one thing openly, and to necessitate another\nprivately, &c. It destroys the goodness of God, making him to be a hater\nof mankind, &c. It destroys the justice of God, making him to punish the\ncreatures for that which was his own act, &c. It destroys the very power\nof God, making him to be the true author of all the defects and evils\nwhich are in the world.\u201d\n\nIf the opinion of absolute necessity do all this, then the opinion of\nGod\u2019s prescience does the same; for God foreknoweth nothing, that can\npossibly not come to pass; but that which cannot possibly not come to\npass, cometh to pass of necessity. But how doth necessity destroy the\ntruth of God, by commanding and hindering what he commandeth? Truth\nconsisteth in affirmation and negation, not in commanding and hindering;\nit does not therefore follow, if all things be necessary that come to\npass, that therefore God hath spoken an untruth; nor that he professeth\none thing, and intendeth another. The Scripture, which is his word, is\nnot the profession of what he intendeth, but an indication of what those\nmen shall necessarily intend, whom he hath chosen to salvation, and whom\nhe hath determined to destruction. But on the other side, from the\nnegation of necessity, there followeth necessarily the negation of God\u2019s\nprescience; which is in the Bishop, if not ignorance, impiety. Or how\n\u201cdestroyeth it the goodness of God, or maketh him to be a hater of\nmankind, and to delight in the torments of his creatures, whereas the\nvery dogs licked the sores of Lazarus in pity and commiseration of him\u201d?\nI cannot imagine, when living creatures of all sorts are often in\ntorments as well as men, that God can be displeased with it: without his\nwill, they neither are nor could be at all tormented. Nor yet is he\ndelighted with it; but health, sickness, ease, torments, life and death,\nare without all passion in him dispensed by him; and he putteth an end\nto them then when they end, and a beginning when they begin, according\nto his eternal purpose, which cannot be resisted. That the necessity\nargueth a delight of God in the torments of his creatures, is even as\ntrue, as that it was pity and commiseration in the dogs that made them\nlick the sores of Lazarus. Or how doth the opinion of necessity \u201cdestroy\nthe justice of God, or make him to punish the creatures for that which\nwas his own act\u201d? If all afflictions be punishments, for whose act are\nall other creatures punished which cannot sin? Why may not God make the\naffliction, both of those men that he hath elected, and also of those\nwhom he hath reprobated, the necessary causes of the conversion of those\nhe hath elected; their own afflictions serving therein as chastisements,\nand the afflictions of the rest as examples? But he may perhaps think it\nno injustice to punish the creatures that cannot sin with temporary\npunishments, when nevertheless it would be injustice to torment the same\ncreatures eternally. This may be somewhat to meekness and cruelty, but\nnothing at all to justice and injustice: for in punishing the innocent,\nthe injustice is equal, though the punishments be unequal. And what\ncruelty can be greater than that which may be inferred from this opinion\nof the Bishop; that God doth torment eternally, and with the extremest\ndegree of torment, all those men which have sinned, that is to say, all\nmankind from the creation to the end of the world which have not\nbelieved in Jesus Christ, whereof very few, in respect of the multitude\nof others, have so much as heard of his name; and this, when faith in\nChrist is the gift of God himself, and the hearts of all men in his\nhands to frame them to the belief of whatsoever he will have them to\nbelieve? He hath no reason therefore, for his part, to tax any opinion,\nfor ascribing to God either cruelty or injustice. Or how doth it\n\u201cdestroy the power of God, or make him to be the author of all the\ndefects and evils which are in the world\u201d? First, he seemeth not to\nunderstand what _author_ signifies. _Author_, is he which owneth an\naction, or giveth a warrant to do it. Do I say, that any man hath in the\nScripture, which is all the warrant we have from God for any action\nwhatsoever, a warrant to commit theft, murder, or any other sin? Does\nthe opinion of necessity infer that there is such a warrant in the\nScripture? Perhaps he will say, no, but that this opinion makes him the\ncause of sin. But does not the Bishop think him the cause of all\nactions? And are not sins of commission actions? Is murder no action?\nAnd does not God himself say, _non est malum in civitate quod ego non\nfeci_; and was murder not one of those evils? Whether it were or not, I\nsay no more but that God is the cause, not the author, of all actions\nand motions. Whether sin be the action, or the defect, or the\nirregularity, I mean not to dispute. Nevertheless I am of opinion, that\nthe distinction of _causes_ into _efficient_ and _deficient_ is _bohu_,\nand signifies nothing.\n\n(_e_) \u201cHow shall a man praise God for his goodness, who believes him to\nbe a greater tyrant than ever was in the world; who creates millions to\nburn eternally without their fault, to express his power?\u201d\n\nIf _tyrant_ signify, as it did when it came first in use, a king, it is\nno dishonour to believe that God is a greater tyrant than ever was in\nthe world; for he is the King of all kings, emperors, and commonwealths.\nBut if we take the word, as it is now used, to signify those kings only,\nwhich they that call them tyrants, are displeased with, that is, that\ngovern not as they would have them, the Bishop is nearer the calling him\na tyrant, than I am; making that to be tyranny, which is but the\nexercise of an absolute power; for he holdeth, though he see it not, by\nconsequence, in withdrawing the will of man from God\u2019s dominion, that\nevery man is a king of himself. And if a man cannot praise God for his\ngoodness, who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault;\nhow can the Bishop praise God for his goodness, who thinks he hath\ncreated millions of millions to burn eternally, when he could have kept\nthem so easily from committing any fault? And to his \u201chow shall a man\nhear the word of God with that reverence, and devotion, and faith, which\nis requisite, who believeth that God causeth his gospel to be preached\nto the much greater part of Christians, not with any intention that they\nshould be converted and saved,\u201d &c.; I answer, that those men who so\nbelieve, have faith in Jesus Christ, or they have not faith in him. If\nthey have, then shall they, by that faith, hear the word of God with\nthat reverence, and devotion, and faith, which is requisite to\nsalvation. And for them that have no faith, I do not think he asketh how\nthey shall hear the word of God with that reverence, and devotion, and\nfaith, which is requisite; for he knows they shall not, until such time\nas God shall have given them faith. Also he mistakes, if he think that I\nor any other Christian believe, that God intendeth, by hardening any\nman\u2019s heart, to make that man inexcusable, but to make his elect the\nmore careful.\n\nLikewise to his question, \u201chow shall a man receive the sacrament with\ncomfort, who believeth that so many millions are positively excluded\nfrom the benefit of Christ\u2019s passion, before they had done either good\nor evil\u201d; I answer as before, _by faith_, if he be of God\u2019s elect; if\nnot, he shall not receive the sacrament with comfort. I may answer also,\nthat the faithful man shall receive the sacrament with comfort, by the\nsame way that the bishop receiveth it with comfort. For he also\nbelieveth that many millions are excluded from the benefit of Christ\u2019s\npassion, (whether positively or not positively is nothing to the\npurpose, nor doth positively signify any thing in this place); and that,\nso long before they had either done good or evil, as it was known to God\nbefore they were born that they were so excluded.\n\nTo his \u201chow shall he prepare himself with care and conscience, who\napprehendeth that eating and drinking unworthily is not the cause of\ndamnation, but because God would damn a man, therefore he necessitates\nhim\u201d: I answer, that he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, does not\nbelieve that God necessitates him to eat and drink unworthily, because\nhe would damn him; for neither does he think he eats and drinks\nunworthily, nor that God intends to damn him; for he believeth no such\ndamnation, nor intendeth any preparation. The belief of damnation is an\narticle of Christian faith; so is also preparation to the sacrament. It\nis therefore a vain question, how he that hath no faith shall prepare\nhimself with care and conscience to the receiving of the sacrament. But\nto the question, how they shall prepare themselves, that shall at all\nprepare themselves; I answer, it shall be by faith, when God shall give\nit them.\n\nTo his \u201chow shall a man make a free vow to God, who thinks himself able\nto perform nothing, but as he is extrinsically necessitated\u201d: I answer,\nthat if he make a vow, it is a free vow, or else it is no vow; and yet\nhe may know, when he hath made that vow, though not before, that it was\nextrinsically necessitated; for the necessity of vowing before he vowed,\nhindered not the _freedom_ of his vow, but made it.\n\nLastly, to \u201chow shall a man condemn and accuse himself for his sins, who\nthinks himself to be like a watch which is wound up by God,\u201d &c.: I\nanswer, though he think himself necessitated to what he shall do, yet,\nif he do not think himself necessitated and wound up to impenitence,\nthere will follow upon his opinion of necessity no impediment to his\nrepentance. The Bishop disputeth not against me, but against somebody\nthat holds a man may repent, that believes at the same time he cannot\nrepent.\n\n(_f_) \u201cObserve what a description he has given us here of repentance:\n\u2018It is a glad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out\nof the way.\u2019 It amazed me to find _gladness_ to be the first word in the\ndescription of repentance.\u201d\n\nI could never be of opinion that Christian repentance could be ascribed\nto them, that had as yet no intention to forsake their sins and to lead\na new life. He that grieves for the evil that hath happened to him for\nhis sins, but hath not a resolution to obey God\u2019s commandments better\nfor the time to come, grieveth for his sufferings, but not for his\ndoings; which no divine, I think, will call Christian repentance. But he\nthat resolveth upon amendment of life, knoweth that there is forgiveness\nfor him in Christ Jesus; whereof a Christian cannot possibly be but\nglad. Before this gladness there was a grief preparative to repentance,\nbut the repentance itself was not Christian repentance till this\nconversion, till this glad conversion. Therefore I see no reason why it\nshould amaze him to find gladness to be the first word in the\ndescription of repentance, saving that the light amazeth such as have\nbeen long in darkness. And \u201cfor the fasting, sackcloth, and ashes\u201d, they\nwere never parts of repentance perfected, but signs of the beginning of\nit. They are external things; repentance is internal. This doctrine\npertaineth to the establishing of Romish penance; and being found to\nconduce to the power of the clergy, was by them wished to be restored.\n\n(_g_) \u201cIt is a returning; but whose act is this returning? If it be\nGod\u2019s alone, then it is his repentance, not man\u2019s repentance; what need\nthe penitent person trouble himself about it?\u201d\n\nThis is ill argued; for why is it God\u2019s repentance, when he gives man\nrepentance, more than it is God\u2019s faith, when he gives man faith. But he\nlabours to bring in a concurrence of man\u2019s will with God\u2019s will; and a\npower in God to give repentance, if man will take it; but not the power\nto make him take it. This concurrence he thinks is proved by Revel. iii.\n19, 20: \u201cBe zealous, and repent. Behold, I stand at the door, and knock.\nIf any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him\u201d.\nHere is nothing of concurrence, nor of anything equivalent to it, nor\nmention at all of the will or purpose, but of the calling or voice by\nthe minister. And as God giveth to the minister a power of persuading,\nso he giveth also many times a concurrence of the auditor with the\nminister in being persuaded. Here is therefore somewhat equivalent to a\nconcurrence with the minister, that is, of man with man; but nothing of\nthe concurrence of man, whose will God frameth as he pleaseth, with God\nthat frameth it. And I wonder how any man can conceive, when God giveth\na man a will to do anything whatsoever, how that will, when it is not,\ncan concur with God\u2019s will to make itself be.\n\nThe next thing he excepteth against is this, that I hold, (_h_) \u201cthat\nprayer is not a cause, nor a means of God\u2019s blessing, but only a\nsignification that we expect it from him.\u201d\n\nFirst, instead of my words, \u201ca signification that we expect nothing but\nfrom him,\u201d he hath put \u201ca signification that we expect it from him\u201d.\nThere is much difference between my words and his, in the sense and\nmeaning; for in the one, there is honour ascribed to God, and humility\nin him that prayeth; but in the other, presumption in him that prayeth,\nand a detraction from the honour of God. When I say, prayer is not a\ncause nor a means, I take _cause_ and _means_ in one and the same sense;\naffirming that God is not moved by any thing that we do, but has always\none and the same eternal purpose, to do the same things that from\neternity he hath foreknown shall be done; and methinks there can be no\ndoubt made thereof. But the Bishop allegeth (2 Cor. i. 11): that \u201cSt.\nPaul was helped by their prayers, and that the gift was bestowed upon\nthem by their means;\u201d and (James v. 16): \u201cThe effectual and fervent\nprayer of a righteous man availeth much\u201d. In which places, the words\n_means_, _effectual_, _availeth_, do not signify any causation; for no\nman nor creature living can work any effect upon God, in whom there is\nnothing, that hath not been in him eternally heretofore, nor that shall\nnot be in him eternally hereafter; but do signify the order in which God\nhath placed men\u2019s prayers and his own blessings. And not much after, the\nBishop himself saith, \u201cprayer works not upon God, but us\u201d. Therefore, it\nis no cause of God\u2019s will, in giving us his blessings, but is properly a\nsign, not a procuration of his favour.\n\nThe next thing he replieth to is, that I make prayer to be a kind of\nthanksgiving; to which he replies, \u201che might even as well tell me, that\nwhen a beggar craves an alms, and when he gives thanks for it, it is all\none.\u201d Why so? Does not a beggar move a man by his prayer, and sometime\nworketh in him a compassion not without pain, and as the Scripture calls\nit, a yearning of the bowels; which is not so in God, when we pray to\nhim? Our prayer to God is a duty; it is not so to man. Therefore, though\nour prayers to man be distinguished from our thanks, it is not necessary\nit should be so in our prayers and thanks to God Almighty.\n\nTo the rest of his reply, in this No. XV, there needs no further answer.\n\n NO. XVI.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cFourthly, the order, beauty, and perfection of the world doth\nrequire that in the universe should be agents of all sorts, some\nnecessary, some free, some contingent. He that shall make, either all\nthings necessary, guided by destiny; or all things free, governed by\nelection; or all things contingent, happening by chance: doth overthrow\nthe beauty and the perfection of the world.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ The fourth argument from reason, is this. The order, beauty, and\nperfection of the world requireth that in the universe there should be\nagents of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some contingent. He that\nshall make all things necessary, or all things free, or all things\ncontingent, doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world.\n\nIn which argument I observe, first, a contradiction. For seeing he that\nmaketh anything, in that he maketh it, he maketh it to be necessary, it\nfolloweth, that he that maketh all things, maketh all things necessary\nto be. As if a workman make a garment, the garment must necessarily be.\nSo if God make every thing, every thing must necessarily be. Perhaps the\nbeauty of the world requireth, though we know it not, that some agents\nshould work without deliberation, which he calls necessary agents; and\nsome agents with deliberation, and those both he and I call free agents;\nand that some agents should work, and we not know how; and those effects\nwe both call contingent. But this hinders not, but that he that\nelecteth, may have his election necessarily determined to one by former\ncauses; and that which is contingent, and imputed to fortune, be\nnevertheless necessary, and depend on precedent necessary causes. For by\ncontingent, men do not mean that which hath no cause, but which hath not\nfor cause any thing which we perceive. As for example; when a traveller\nmeets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause,\nsufficient enough to produce it; but because the journey caused not the\nrain, nor the rain the journey, we say, they were contingent one to\nanother. And thus you see, though there be three sorts of events,\nnecessary, contingent, and free, yet they may be all necessary, without\nthe destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe.\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThe first thing he observes in mine argument, is contradiction,\nas he calls it; but in truth, it is but a deception of the sight, as one\ncandle sometimes seems to be two, or a rod in the water shows to be two\nrods; _quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis_. But what is\nthis contradiction? Because I say, he who maketh all things, doth not\nmake them necessary. What! a contradiction and but one proposition! That\nwere strange. I say, God hath not made all agents necessary; he saith,\nGod hath made all agents necessary. Here is a contradiction indeed; but\nit is between him and me, not between me and myself. But though it be\nnot a formal contradiction, yet perhaps it may imply a contradiction _in\nadjecto_. Wherefore to clear the matter, and dispel the mist which he\nhath raised, it is true, that everything when it is made, it is\nnecessary that it be made so as it is, that is, by a necessity of\ninfallibility, or supposition, supposing that it be so made; but this is\nnot that absolute, antecedent necessity, whereof the question is between\nhim and me. As to use his own instance: before the garment be made, the\ntailor is free to make it either of the Italian, Spanish, or French\nfashion indifferently; but after it is made, it is necessary that it be\nof that fashion whereof he hath made it, that is, by a necessity of\nsupposition. But this doth neither hinder the cause from being a free\ncause, nor the effect from being a free effect; but the one did produce\nfreely, and the other was freely produced. So the contradiction is\nvanished.\u201d\n\n\u201cIn the second part of his answer, (_a_) he grants; that there are some\nfree agents, and some contingent agents, and that perhaps the beauty of\nthe world doth require it; but like a shrewd cow, which after she hath\ngiven her milk casts it down with her foot, in the conclusion he tells\nus, that nevertheless they are all necessary. This part of his answer is\na mere logomachy, as a great part of the controversies in the world are,\nor a contention about words. What is the meaning of necessary, and free,\nand contingent actions? I have showed before what free and necessary do\nproperly signify; but he misrecites it. He saith, I make all agents\nwhich want deliberation, to be necessary; but I acknowledge that many of\nthem are contingent. (_b_) Neither do I approve his definition of\ncontingents, though he say I concur with him, that they are \u2018such agents\nas work we know not how\u2019. For, according to this description, many\nnecessary actions should be contingent, and many contingent actions\nshould be necessary. The loadstone draweth iron, the jet chaff, we know\nnot how; and yet the effect is necessary; and so it is in all sympathies\nand antipathies or occult qualities. Again, a man walking in the\nstreets, a tile falls down from a house, and breaks his head. We know\nall the causes, we know how this came to pass. The man walked that way,\nthe pin failed, the tile fell just when he was under it; and yet this is\na contingent effect: the man might not have walked that way, and then\nthe tile had not fallen upon him. Neither yet do I understand here in\nthis place by contingents, such events as happen beside the scope or\nintention of the agents; as when a man digging to make a grave, finds a\ntreasure; though the word be sometimes so taken. But by contingents, I\nunderstand all things which may be done and may not be done, may happen\nor may not happen, by reason of the indetermination or accidental\nconcurrence of the causes. And those same things which are absolutely\ncontingent, are yet hypothetically necessary. As supposing the passenger\ndid walk just that way, just at that time, and that the pin did fail\njust then, and the tile fall; it was necessary that it should fall upon\nthe passenger\u2019s head. The same defence will keep out his shower of rain.\nBut we shall meet with his shower of rain again, No. XXXIV; whither I\nrefer the further explication of this point.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. XVI.\n\nIn this number he would prove that there must be free agents and\ncontingent agents, as well as necessary agents, from the order, beauty,\nand perfection of the world. I that thought that the order, beauty, and\nperfection of the world required that which was in the world, and not\nthat which the Bishop had need of for his argument, could see no force\nof consequence to infer that which he calls free and contingent. That\nwhich is in the world, is the order, beauty, and perfection which God\nhath given the world; and yet there are no agents in the world, but such\nas work a seen necessity, or an unseen necessity; and when they work an\nunseen necessity in creatures inanimate, then are those creatures said\nto be wrought upon contingently, and to work contingently; and when the\nnecessity unseen is of the actions of men, then it is commonly called\nfree, and might be so in other living creatures; for free and voluntary\nare the same thing. But the Bishop in his reply hath insisted most upon\nthis, that I make it a contradiction to say that \u201che that maketh a\nthing, doth not make it necessary\u201d, and wonders how a contradiction can\nbe in one proposition, and yet within two or three lines after found it\nmight be. And therefore, to clear the matter, he saith that such\nnecessity is not _antecedent_, but a necessity _of supposition_: which,\nnevertheless, is the same kind of necessity which he attributeth to the\nburning of the fire, where there is a necessity that the thing thrown\ninto it shall be burned; though yet it be but burning, or but departing\nfrom the hand that throws it in; and, therefore, the necessity is\nantecedent. The like is in making a garment; the necessity begins from\nthe first motion towards it, which is from eternity, though the tailor\nand the Bishop are equally insensible of it. If they saw the whole order\nand conjunction of causes, they would say it were as necessary as any\nthing else can possibly be; and therefore God that sees that order and\nconjunction, knows it is necessary.\n\nThe rest of his reply is to argue a contradiction in me; for he says,\n\n(_a_) \u201cI grant that there are some free agents, and some contingent\nagents, and that perhaps the beauty of the world doth require it; but\nlike a shrewd cow, which, after she hath given her milk, casts it down\nwith her foot, in the conclusion I tell him, that nevertheless they are\nall necessary.\u201d\n\nIt is true that I say some are free agents, and some contingent;\nnevertheless they may be all necessary. For according to the\nsignifications of the words necessary, free, and contingent, the\ndistinction is no more but this. Of agents, some are necessary, some are\ncontingent, and some are free agents; and of agents, some are living\ncreatures, and some are inanimate; which words are improper, but the\nmeaning of them is this. Men call necessary agents, such as they know to\nbe necessary, and contingent agents, such inanimate things as they know\nnot whether they work necessarily or no, and free agents, men whom they\nknow not whether they work necessarily or no. All which confusion\nariseth from that presumptuous men take for granted, that that _is_ not,\nwhich they _know_ not.\n\n(_b_) \u201cNeither do I approve his definition of contingents; that they are\nsuch agents as work we know not how.\u201d\n\nThe reason is, because it would follow that many necessary actions\nshould be contingent, and many contingent actions necessary. But that\nwhich followeth from it really is no more but this: that many necessary\nactions would be such as we know not to be necessary, and many actions\nwhich we know not to be necessary, may yet be necessary; which is a\ntruth. But the Bishop defineth contingents thus: \u201call things which may\nbe done and may not be done, may happen or may not happen, by reason of\nthe indetermination or accidental concurrence of the causes\u201d. By which\ndefinition, contingent is nothing, or it is the same that I say it is.\nFor there is nothing can be done and not be done, nothing can happen and\nnot happen, by reason of the indetermination or accidental concurrence\nof the causes. It may be done or not done for aught he knows, and happen\nor not happen for any determination he perceiveth; and that is my\ndefinition. But that the indetermination can make it happen or not\nhappen, is absurd; for indetermination maketh it equally to happen or\nnot to happen, and therefore both; which is a contradiction. Therefore\nindetermination doth nothing; and whatsoever causes do, is necessary.\n\n NO. XVII.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cFifthly, take away liberty, and you take away the very nature\nof evil, and the formal reason of sin. If the hand of the painter were\nthe law of painting, or the hand of the writer the law of writing,\nwhatsoever the one did write, or the other paint, must infallibly be\ngood. Seeing therefore that the first cause is the rule and law of\ngoodness, if it do necessitate the will or the person to evil, either by\nitself immediately, or mediately by necessary flux of second causes, it\nwill no longer be evil. The essence of sin consists in this, that one\ncommit that which he might avoid. If there be no liberty to produce sin,\nthere is no such thing as sin in the world. Therefore it appears, both\nfrom Scripture and reason, that there is true liberty.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ To the fifth argument from reason, which is, that if liberty be\ntaken away, the nature and formal reason of sin is taken away, I answer\nby denying the consequence. The nature of sin consisteth in this, that\nthe action done proceed from our will, and be against the law. A judge,\nin judging whether it be sin or not which is done against the law, looks\nat no higher cause of the action than the will of the doer. Now when I\nsay the action was necessary, I do not say it was done against the will\nof the doer, but with his will, and so necessarily; because man\u2019s will,\nthat is, every act of the will, and purpose of man had a sufficient, and\ntherefore a necessary cause, and consequently every voluntary action was\nnecessitated. An action therefore may be voluntary and a sin, and\nnevertheless be necessary. And God may afflict by right derived from his\nomnipotency, though sin were not. And the example of punishment on\nvoluntary sinners, is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin\nless frequent; for God to punish such sinners, as I have shewed before,\nis no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his objections, both out\nof Scripture and reason.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201c_Scis tu simulare cupressum._ _Quid hoc?_\u201d It was shrewd\ncounsel which Alcibiades gave to Themistocles, when he was busy about\nhis accounts to the state; that he should rather study how to make no\naccounts. So it seems T. H. thinks it a more compendious way, to baulk\nan argument, than to satisfy it. And if he can produce a Rowland against\nan Oliver, if he can urge a reason against a reason, he thinks he hath\nquitted himself fairly. But it will not serve his turn. And that he may\nnot complain of misunderstanding it, as those who have a politic\ndeafness to hear nothing but what liketh them, I will first reduce mine\nargument into form, and then weigh what he saith in answer, or rather in\nopposition to it. (_a_) That opinion which takes away the formal reason\nof sin, and by consequence, sin itself, is not to be approved; this is\nclear, because both reason and religion, nature and Scripture, do prove,\nand the whole world confesseth, that there is sin. But this opinion, of\nthe necessity of all things by reason of a conflux of second causes,\nordered and determined by the first cause, doth take away the very\nformal reason of sin. This is proved thus. That which makes sin itself\nto be good, and just, and lawful, takes away the formal cause, and\ndestroys the essence of sin; for if sin be good, and just, and lawful,\nit is no more evil, it is no sin, no anomy. But this opinion of the\nnecessity of all things, makes sin to be very good, and just, and\nlawful; for nothing can flow essentially by way of physical\ndetermination from the first cause, which is the law and rule of\ngoodness and justice, but that which is good, and just, and lawful. But\nthis opinion makes sin to proceed essentially by way of physical\ndetermination from the first cause, as appears in T. H.\u2019s whole\ndiscourse. Neither is it material at all whether it proceed immediately\nfrom the first cause, or mediately, so as it be by a necessary flux of\nsecond and determinate causes, which produce it inevitably. To these\nproofs he answers nothing, but only by denying the first consequence, as\nhe calls it, and then sings over his old song, \u2018that the nature of sin\nconsisteth in this, that the action proceed from our will, and be\nagainst the law\u2019, which, in our sense, is most true, if he understand a\njust law, and a free rational will. (_b_) But supposing, as he doth,\nthat the law enjoins things impossible in themselves to be done, then it\nis an unjust and tyrannical law; and the transgression of it is no sin,\nnot to do that which never was in our power to do. And supposing,\nlikewise as he doth, that the will is inevitably determined by special\ninfluence from the first cause, then it is not man\u2019s will, but God\u2019s\nwill, and flows essentially from the law of goodness.\n\n(_c_) \u201cThat which he adds of a judge, is altogether impertinent as to\nhis defence. Neither is a civil judge the proper judge, nor the law of\nthe land the proper rule of sin. But it makes strongly against him; for\nthe judge goes upon a good ground; and even this which he confesseth,\nthat \u2018the judge looks at no higher cause than the will of the doer\u2019,\nproves that the will of the doer did determine itself freely, and that\nthe malefactor had liberty to have kept the law, if he would. Certainly,\na judge ought to look at all material circumstances, and much more at\nall essential causes. Whether every sufficient cause be a necessary\ncause, will come to be examined more properly, No. XXXI. For the present\nit shall suffice to say, that liberty flows from the sufficiency, and\ncontingency from the debility of the cause. (_d_) Nature never intends\nthe generation of a monster. If all the causes concur sufficiently, a\nperfect creature is produced; but by reason of the insufficiency, or\ndebility, or contingent aberration of some of the causes, sometimes a\nmonster is produced. Yet the causes of a monster were sufficient for the\nproduction of that which was produced, that is a monster: otherwise a\nmonster had not been produced. What is it then? A monster is not\nproduced by virtue of that order which is set in nature, but by the\ncontingent aberration of some of the natural causes in their\nconcurrence. The order set in nature is, that every like should beget\nits like. But supposing the concurrence of the causes to be such as it\nis in the generation of a monster, the generation of a monster is\nnecessary; as all the events in the world are when they are, that is, by\nan hypothetical necessity. (_e_) Then he betakes himself to his old\nhelp, that God may punish by right of omnipotence, though there were no\nsin. The question is not now what God may do, but what God will do,\naccording to that covenant which he hath made with man, _fac hoc et\nvives_, _do this and thou shalt live_. Neither doth God punish any man\ncontrary to this covenant (Hosea xiii. 9): _O Israel, thy destruction is\nfrom thyself; but in me is thy help_. He that wills not the death of a\nsinner, doth much less will the death of an innocent creature. By\n_death_ or _destruction_ in this discourse the only separation of soul\nand body is not intended, which is a debt of nature, and which God, as\nLord of life and death, may justly do, and make it not a punishment, but\na blessing to the party; but we understand, the subjecting of the\ncreature to eternal torments. Lastly, he tells of that benefit which\nredounds to others from exemplary justice; which is most true, but not\naccording to his own grounds. For neither is it justice to punish a man\nfor doing that which it was impossible always for him not to do; neither\nis it lawful to punish an innocent person, that good may come of it. And\nif his opinion of absolute necessity of all things were true, the\ndestinies of men could not be altered, either by examples or fear of\npunishment.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. XVII.\n\nWhereas he had in his first discourse made this consequence: \u201cif you\ntake away liberty, you take away the very nature of evil, and the formal\nreason of sin\u201d: I denied that consequence. It is true, he who taketh\naway the liberty of doing, according to the will, taketh away the nature\nof sin; but he that denieth the liberty to will, does not so. But he\nsupposing I understood him not, will needs reduce his argument into\nform, in this manner. (_a_) \u201cThat opinion which takes away the formal\nreason of sin, and by consequence, sin itself, is not to be approved.\u201d\nThis is granted. \u201cBut the opinion of necessity doth this.\u201d This I deny;\nhe proves it thus: \u201cthis opinion makes sin to proceed essentially, by\nway of physical determination from the first cause. But whatsoever\nproceeds essentially by way of physical determination from the first\ncause, is good, and just, and lawful. Therefore this opinion of\nnecessity maketh sin to be very good, just, and lawful.\u201d He might as\nwell have concluded, whatsoever man hath been made by God, is a good and\njust man. He observeth not that sin is not a thing really made. Those\nthings which at first were actions, were not then sins, though actions\nof the same nature with those which were afterwards sins; nor was then\nthe will to anything a sin, though it were a will to the same thing,\nwhich in willing now, we should sin. Actions became sins then first,\nwhen the commandment came; for, as St. Paul saith, _without the law sin\nis dead_; and sin being but a _transgression of the law_, there can be\nno action made sin but by the law. Therefore this opinion, though it\nderive actions essentially from God, it derives not sins essentially\nfrom him, but relatively and by the commandment. And consequently the\nopinion of necessity taketh not away the nature of sin, but\nnecessitateth that action which the law hath made sin. And whereas I\nsaid the nature of sin consisteth in this, that \u2018it is an action\nproceeding from our will and against the law\u2019, he alloweth it for true;\nand therefore he must allow also, that the formal reason of sin lieth\nnot in the liberty or necessity of willing, but in the will itself,\nnecessary or unnecessary, in relation to the law. And whereas he limits\nthis truth which he allowed, to this, that _the law be just_, and _the\nwill a free rational will_, it serves to no purpose; for I have shown\nbefore, that no law can be unjust. And it seemeth to me that a rational\nwill, if it be not meant of a will after deliberation, whether he that\ndeliberateth reasoneth aright or not, signifieth nothing. A _rational\nman_ is rightly said; but a _rational will_, in other sense than I have\nmentioned, is insignificant.\n\n(_b_) \u201cBut supposing, as he doth, that the law enjoins things impossible\nin themselves to be done, then it is an unjust and tyrannical law, and\nthe transgression of it no sin,\u201d &c. \u201cAnd supposing likewise, as he\ndoth, that the will is inevitably determined by special influence from\nthe first cause, then it is not man\u2019s will, but God\u2019s will.\u201d He mistakes\nme in this. For I say not the law enjoins things impossible in\nthemselves; for so I should say it enjoined contradictories. But I say\nthe law sometimes, the law-makers not knowing the secret necessities of\nthings to come, enjoins things made impossible by secret and extrinsical\ncauses from all eternity. From this his error he infers, that the laws\nmust be unjust and tyrannical, and the transgression of them no sin. But\nhe who holds that laws can be unjust and tyrannical, will easily find\npretence enough, under any government in the world, to deny obedience to\nthe laws, unless they be such as he himself maketh, or adviseth to be\nmade. He says also, that I suppose the will is inevitably determined by\nspecial influence from the first cause. It is true; saving that\nsenseless word _influence_, which I never used. But his consequence,\n\u201cthen it is not man\u2019s will, but God\u2019s will\u201d, is not true; for it may be\nthe will both of the one and of the other, and yet not by concurrence,\nas in a league, but by subjection of the will of man to the will of God.\n\n(_c_) \u201cThat which he adds of a judge, is altogether impertinent as to\nhis defence. Neither is a civil judge the proper judge, nor the law of\nthe land a proper rule of sin.\u201d A judge is to judge of voluntary crimes.\nHe has no commission to look into the secret causes that make them\nvoluntary. And because the Bishop had said the law cannot justly punish\na crime that proceedeth from necessity, it was no impertinent answer to\nsay, \u201cthe judge looks at no higher cause than the will of the doer\u201d. And\neven this, as he saith, is enough to prove, that \u201cthe will of the doer\ndid determine itself freely, and that the malefactor had liberty to have\nkept the law if he would\u201d. To which I answer, that it proves indeed that\nthe malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would; but it\nproveth not that he had the liberty to have a will to keep the law. Nor\ndoth it prove that the will of the doer did determine itself freely;\nfor, nothing can prove nonsense. But here you see what the Bishop\npursueth in this whole reply, namely, to prove that a man hath liberty\nto do if he will, which I deny not; and thinks when he hath done that,\nhe hath proved a man hath liberty to will, which he calls the will\u2019s\ndetermining of itself freely. And whereas he adds, \u201ca judge ought to\nlook at all essential causes\u201d; it is answer enough to say, he is bound\nto look at no more than he thinks he can see.\n\n(_d_) \u201cNature never intends the generation of a monster. If all the\ncauses concur sufficiently, a perfect creature is produced; but by\nreason of the insufficiency, or debility, or contingent aberration of\nsome of the causes, sometimes a monster is produced.\u201d He had no sooner\nsaid this, but finding his error he retracteth it, and confesseth that\n\u201cthe causes of a monster were sufficient for the production of that\nwhich was produced, that is, of a monster; otherwise a monster had not\nbeen produced;\u201d which is all that I intended by sufficiency of the\ncause. But whether every sufficient cause be a necessary cause or not,\nhe meaneth to examine in No. XXXI. In the meantime he saith only, that\nliberty flows from the sufficiency, and contingency from the debility of\nthe cause; and leaves out necessity, as if it came from neither. I must\nnote also, that where he says nature never intends the generation of a\nmonster, I understand not whether by nature he means the Author of\nnature, in which meaning he derogates from God; or nature itself, as the\nuniversal work of God; and then it is absurd; for the universe, as one\naggregate of things natural, hath no intention. His doctrine that\nfolloweth concerning the generation of monsters, is not worth\nconsideration; therefore I leave it wholly to the judgment of the\nreader.\n\n(_e_) \u201cThen he betakes himself to his old help, that God may punish by\nright of omnipotence, though there were no sin. The question is not, now\nwhat God may do, but what God will do, according to that covenant which\nhe hath made with man, _Fac hoc et vives_, _do this and thou shalt\nlive_.\u201d It is plain (to let pass that he puts punishment where I put\naffliction, making a true sentence false) that if a man do this he shall\nlive, and he may do this if he will. In this the Bishop and I disagree\nnot. This therefore is not the question; but whether the will to do\nthis, or not to do this, be in a man\u2019s own election. Whereas he adds,\n\u2018he that wills not the death of a sinner, doth much less will the death\nof an innocent creature\u2019; he had forgot for awhile, that both good and\nevil men are by the will of God all mortal; but presently corrects\nhimself, and says, he means by death, eternal torments, that is to say,\neternal life, but in torments; to which I have answered once before in\nthis book, and spoken much more amply in another book, to which the\nBishop hath inclination to make an answer, as appeareth by his epistle\nto the reader. That which followeth to the end of this number, hath been\nurged and answered already divers times; I therefore pass it over.\n\n NO. XVIII.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cBut the patrons of necessity being driven out of the plain\nfield with reason, have certain retreats or distinctions which they fly\nunto for refuge. First, they distinguish between Stoical necessity and\nChristian necessity, between which they make a threefold difference.\n\n\u201cFirst, say they, the Stoics did subject Jupiter to destiny, but we\nsubject destiny to God. I answer, that the Stoical and Christian destiny\nare one and the same; _Fatum, quasi effatum Jovis_. Hear Seneca:\n_Destiny is the necessity of all things and actions depending upon the\ndisposition of Jupiter_, &c. I add, that the Stoics left a greater\nliberty to Jupiter over destiny, than these stoical Christians do to God\nover his decrees, either for the beginnings of things, as Euripides, or\nfor the progress of them, as Chrysippus, or at least of the\ncircumstances of time and place, as all of them generally. So Virgil:\n_Sed trahere et moras ducere_, &c. So Osyris in Apuleius, promiseth him\nto prolong his life, _ultra fato constituta tempora_, beyond the times\nset down by the destinies.\n\n\u201cNext, they say, that the Stoics did hold an eternal flux and necessary\nconnexion of causes; but they believed that God doth act _pr\u00e6ter et\ncontra naturam_, _besides and against nature_. I answer, that it is not\nmuch material whether they attribute necessity to God, or to the stars,\nor to a connexion of causes, so as they establish necessity. The former\nreasons do not only condemn the ground or foundation of necessity, but\nmuch more necessity itself upon what ground soever. Either they must run\ninto this absurdity, that the effect is determined, the cause remaining\nundetermined; or else hold such a necessary connexion of causes as the\nStoics did.\n\n\u201cLastly, they say, the Stoics did take away liberty and contingence, but\nthey admit it. I answer, what liberty or contingence was it they admit\nbut a titular liberty and an empty shadow of contingence, who do profess\nstiffly that all actions and events, which either are or shall be,\ncannot but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, in any\nother place, time, number, order, measure, nor to any other end, than\nthey are; and that in respect of God determining them to one. What a\npoor ridiculous liberty or contingency is this!\n\n\u201cSecondly, they distinguish between the first cause, and the second\ncauses; they say, that in respect of the second causes many things are\nfree, but in respect of the first cause all things are necessary. This\nanswer may be taken away two ways.\n\n\u201cFirst, so contraries shall be true together; the same thing at the same\ntime shall be determined to one, and not determined to one; the same\nthing at the same time must necessarily be, and yet may not be. Perhaps\nthey will say, not in the same respect. But that which strikes at the\nroot of this question is this, if all the causes were only collateral,\nthis exception might have some colour: but where all the causes being\njoined together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one total\ncause, if any one cause (much more the first) in the whole series or\nsubordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and\nwithout doubt makes the effect necessary. Necessity or liberty is not to\nbe esteemed from one cause, but from all the causes joined together. If\none link in a chain be fast, it fastens all the rest.\n\n\u201cSecondly, I would have them tell me whether the second causes be\npredetermined by the first cause, or not. If it be determined, then the\neffect is necessary, even in respect of the second causes. If the second\ncause be not determined, how is the effect determined, the second cause\nremaining undetermined? Nothing can give that to another which it hath\nnot itself. But say they, nevertheless the power or faculty remaineth\nfree. True, but not in order to the act, if it be once determined. It is\nfree, _in sensu diviso_, but not _in sensu composito_. When a man holds\na bird fast in his hand, is she therefore free to fly where she will,\nbecause she hath wings? Or a man imprisoned or fettered, is he therefore\nfree to walk where he will, because he hath feet and a locomotive\nfaculty? Judge without prejudice, what a miserable subterfuge is this\nwhich many men confide so much in.\n\n CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS WHICH HE SUPPOSING MAY BE BROUGHT TO HIS ARGUMENTS,\n ARE BY HIM REMOVED.\n\n_T. H._ He saith, \u201ca man may perhaps answer, that the necessity of\nthings held by him is not a Stoical necessity, but a Christian\nnecessity,\u201d &c., but this distinction I have not used, nor indeed have\never heard before. Nor do I think any man could make Stoical and\nChristian two kinds of necessities, though they may be two kinds of\ndoctrine. Nor have I drawn my answer to his arguments from the authority\nof any sect, but from the nature of the things themselves.\n\nBut here I must take notice of certain words of his in this place, as\nmaking against his own tenet. \u201cWhere all the causes\u201d, saith he, \u201cbeing\njoined together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one total\ncause, if any one cause, much more the first, in the whole series of\nsubordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and\nwithout doubt maketh the effect necessary.\u201d For that which I call the\nnecessary cause of any effect, is the joining together of all causes\nsubordinate to the first, into one total cause. If any one of those,\nsaith he, especially the first, produce its effect necessarily, then all\nthe rest are determined, and the effect also necessary. Now, it is\nmanifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects\nthat are next and immediate to it; and therefore by his own reason, all\neffects are necessary. Nor is that distinction of necessary in respect\nof the first cause, and necessary in respect of second causes, mine; it\ndoes, as he well noteth, imply a contradiction.\n\n_J. D._ \u201cBecause T. H. disavows these two distinctions, I have joined\nthem together in one paragraph. He likes not the distinction of\nnecessity, or destiny, into Stoical and Christian; no more do I. We\nagree in the conclusion, but our motives are diverse. My reason is,\nbecause I acknowledge no such necessity either as the one or as the\nother; and because I conceive that those Christian writers, who do\njustly detest the naked destiny of the Stoics, as fearing to fall into\nthose gross absurdities and pernicious consequences which flow from\nthence, do yet privily, though perhaps unwittingly, under another form\nof expression introduce it again at the back-door, after they had openly\ncast it out at the fore-door. But T. H. rusheth boldly without\ndistinctions, which he accounts but jargon, and without foresight, upon\nthe grossest destiny of all others, that is, that of the Stoics. He\nconfesseth, that \u201cthey may be two kinds of doctrine.\u201d May be? Nay, they\nare; without all peradventure. And he himself is the first who bears the\nname of a Christian, that I have read, that hath raised this sleeping\nghost out of its grave, and set it out in its true colours. But yet he\nlikes not the names of Stoical and Christian destiny. I do not blame\nhim, though he would not willingly be accounted a Stoic. To admit the\nthing, and quarrel about the name, is to make ourselves ridiculous. Why\nmight not I first call that kind of destiny which is maintained by\nChristians, Christian destiny: and that other maintained by Stoics,\nStoical destiny? But I am not the inventor of the term. If he had been\nas careful in reading other men\u2019s opinions, as he is confident in\nsetting down his own, he might have found not only the thing, but the\nname itself often used. But if the name of _fatum Christianum_ do offend\nhim, let him call it with Lipsius, _fatum verum_; who divides destiny\ninto four kinds: 1. mathematical or astrological destiny: 2. natural\ndestiny: 3. Stoical or violent destiny: and 4. true destiny; which he\ncalls, ordinarily, _nostrum_, our destiny, that is, of Christians; and\n_fatum pium_, that is, godly destiny; and defines it just as T. H. doth\nhis destiny, to be (_a_) a series or order of causes depending upon the\ndivine counsel (_De Constantia_, lib. 1. cap. xvii. xviii. xix). Though\nhe be more cautelous than T. H. to decline those rocks which some others\nhave made shipwreck upon, yet the divines thought he came too near them;\nas appears by his Epistle to the Reader in a later edition, and by that\nnote in the margin of his twentieth chapter, \u2018Whatsoever I dispute here,\nI submit to the judgment of the wise, and being admonished I will\nconvert it; one may convince me of error, but not of obstinacy.\u2019 So\nfearful was he to over-shoot himself; and yet he maintained both true\nliberty and true contingency. T. H. saith, \u2018he hath not sucked his\nanswer from any sect\u2019; and I say, so much the worse. It is better to be\nthe disciple of an old sect, than the ring-leader of a new.\n\n(_b_) \u201cConcerning the other distinction, of liberty in respect of the\nfirst cause, and liberty in respect of the second causes; though he will\nnot see that which it concerned him to answer, like those old _Lami\u00e6_,\nwhich could put out their eyes when they list; as, namely, that the\nfaculty of willing, when it is determined in order to the act, (which is\nall the freedom that he acknowledgeth), is but like the freedom of a\nbird when she is first in a man\u2019s hand, &c.: yet he hath espied another\nthing wherein I contradict myself, because I affirm, that if any one\ncause in the whole series of causes, much more the first cause, be\nnecessary, it determineth the rest. But, saith he, \u2018it is manifest that\nthe first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next\u2019.\nI am glad; yet it is not I who contradict myself, but it is some of his\n_manifest truths_ which I contradict; that \u2018the first cause is a\nnecessary cause of all effects\u2019; which I say is a manifest falsehood.\nThose things which God wills without himself, he wills freely, not\nnecessarily. Whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily, doth act or\nwork all that it can do, or all that is in its power. But it is evident\nthat God doth not all things without himself, which he can do, or which\nhe hath power to do. He could have raised up children unto Abraham of\nthe very stones which were upon the banks of Jordan (Luke iii. 8); but\nhe did not. He could have sent twelve legions of angels to the succour\nof Christ, (Matth. xxvi. 53); but he did not. God can make T. H. live\nthe years of Methuselah; but it is not necessary that he shall do so,\nnor probable that he will do so. The productive power of God is\ninfinite, but the whole created world is finite. And, therefore God\nmight still produce more, if it pleased him. But thus it is, when men go\non in a confused way, and will admit no distinctions. If T. H. had\nconsidered the difference between a necessary being, and a necessary\ncause, or between those actions of God which are immanent within\nhimself, and the transient works of God which are extrinsical without\nhimself; he would never have proposed such an evident error for a\nmanifest truth. _Qui pauca considerat, facile pronuntiat._\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. XVIII.\n\nThe Bishop, supposing I had taken my opinion from the authority of the\nStoic philosophers, not from my own meditation, falleth into dispute\nagainst the Stoics: whereof I might, if I pleased, take no notice, but\npass over to No. XIX. But that he may know I have considered their\ndoctrine concerning fate, I think fit to say thus much, that their error\nconsisteth not in the opinion of fate, but in feigning of a false God.\nWhen therefore they say, _fatum est effatum Jovis_, they say no more but\nthat _fate is the word of Jupiter_. If they had said it had been the\nword of the true God, I should not have perceived anything in it to\ncontradict; because I hold, as most Christians do, that the whole world\nwas made, and is now governed by the word of God, which bringeth a\nnecessity of all things and actions to depend upon the Divine\ndisposition. Nor do I see cause to find fault with that, as he does,\nwhich is said by Lipsius, that (_a_) fate is a _series or order of\ncauses depending upon the Divine counsel_; though the divines thought he\ncame too near the rocks, as he thinks I do now. And the reason why he\nwas cautelous, was, because being a member of the Romish Church he had\nlittle confidence in the judgment and lenity of the Romish clergy; and\nnot because he thought he had over-shot himself.\n\n(_b_) \u201cConcerning the other distinction, of liberty in respect of the\nfirst cause, and liberty in respect of the second causes, though he will\nnot see that which it concerned him to answer, &c.\u201d, \u201cas, namely, that\nthe faculty of willing, &c.\u201d I answer, that distinction he allegeth, not\nto be mine, but the Stoics\u2019; and therefore I had no reason to take\nnotice of it; for he disputeth not against me, but others. And whereas\nhe says, _it concerned me to make_ that answer which he hath set down in\nthe words following; I cannot conceive how it concerneth me (whatsoever\nit may do somebody else) to speak absurdly.\n\nI said that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that\nare next and immediate to it; which cannot be doubted, and though he\ndeny it, he does not disprove it. For when he says, \u201cthose things which\nGod wills without himself, he wills freely and not necessarily\u201d; he says\nrashly, and untruly. Rashly, because there is nothing without God, who\nis _infinite_, in whom _are all things_, and in whom _we live, move, and\nhave our being_; and untruly, because whatsoever God foreknew from\neternity, he willed from eternity, and therefore necessarily. But\nagainst this he argueth thus: \u201cWhatsoever cause acts or works\nnecessarily, doth work or act all that it can do, or all that is in its\npower; but it is evident that God doth not all things which he can do,\u201d\n&c. In things inanimate, the action is always according to the extent of\nits power; not taking in the power of willing, because they have it not.\nBut in those things that have will, the action is according to the whole\npower, will and all. It is true, that God doth not all things that he\ncan do if he will; but that he can _will_ that which he hath not\n_willed_ from all eternity, I deny; unless that he can not only _will a\nchange_, but also _change his will_, which all divines say is immutable;\nand then they must needs be necessary effects, that proceed from God.\nAnd his texts, _God could have raised up children unto Abraham_, &c.;\nand _sent twelve legions of angels_, &c., make nothing against the\nnecessity of those actions, which from the first cause proceed\n_immediately_.\n\n NO. XIX.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThirdly, they distinguish between liberty from compulsion, and\nliberty from necessitation. The will, say they, is free from compulsion,\nbut not free from necessitation. And this they fortify with two reasons.\nFirst, because it is granted by all divines, that hypothetical\nnecessity, or necessity upon a supposition, may consist with liberty.\nSecondly, because God and the good angels do good necessarily, and yet\nare more free than we. To the first reason, I confess that necessity\nupon a supposition may sometimes consist with true liberty, as when it\nsignifies only an infallible certitude of the understanding in that\nwhich it knows to be, or that it shall be. But if the supposition be not\nin the agent\u2019s power, nor depend upon anything that is in his power; if\nthere be an exterior antecedent cause which doth necessitate the effect;\nto call this free, is to be mad with reason.\n\n\u201cTo the second reason, I confess that God and the good angels are more\nfree than we are, that is, intensively in the degree of freedom, but not\nextensively in the latitude of the object; according to a liberty of\nexercise, but not of specification. A liberty of exercise, that is, to\ndo or not to do, may consist well with a necessity of specification, or\na determination to the doing of good. But a liberty of exercise, and a\nnecessity of exercise, a liberty of specification, and a necessity of\nspecification, are not compatible, nor can consist together. He that is\nantecedently necessitated to do evil, is not free to do good. So this\ninstance is nothing at all to the purpose.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ But the distinction of free, into free from compulsion, and free\nfrom necessitation, I acknowledge. For to be free from compulsion, is to\ndo a thing so as terror be not the cause of his will to do it. For a man\nis then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to it; as\nwhen a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or\nsubmits to his enemy for fear of being killed. Thus all men that do\nanything from love, or revenge, or lust, are free from compulsion; and\nyet their actions may be as necessary as those which are done upon\ncompulsion. For sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear; but\nfree from necessitation I say nothing can be. And it is that which he\nundertook to disprove. This distinction, he says, useth to be fortified\nby two reasons. But they are not mine. The first, he says, is, \u201cthat it\nis granted by all divines, that an hypothetical necessity, or necessity\nupon supposition, may stand with liberty\u201d. That you may understand this,\nI will give you an example of hypothetical necessity. _If I shall live,\nI shall eat_; this is an hypothetical necessity. Indeed, it is a\nnecessary proposition; that is to say, it is necessary that that\nproposition should be true, whensoever uttered; but it is not the\nnecessity of the thing, nor is it therefore necessary, that the man\nshall live, or that the man shall eat. I do not use to fortify my\ndistinctions with such reasons. Let him confute them as he will, it\ncontents me. But I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how an\neasy and plain thing, but withal false, may be, with the grave usage of\nsuch words as _hypothetical necessity_, and _necessity upon\nsupposition_, and such like terms of Schoolmen, obscured and made to\nseem profound learning.\n\nThe second reason that may confirm the distinction of free from\ncompulsion, and free from necessitation, he says, is that \u2018God and good\nangels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we\u2019. This reason,\nthough I had no need of it, yet I think it so far forth good, as it is\ntrue that God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are free. But\nbecause I find not in the articles of our faith, nor in the decrees of\nour Church, set down in what manner I am to conceive God and good angels\nto work by necessity, or in what sense they work freely, I suspend my\nsentence in that point; and am content that there may be a freedom from\ncompulsion, and yet no freedom from necessitation, as hath been proved\nin that, that a man may be necessitated to some actions without threats\nand without fear of danger. But how he can avoid the consisting together\nof freedom and necessity, supposing God and good angels are freer than\nmen and yet do good necessarily, that we must now examine.\n\n\u201cI confess,\u201d saith he, \u201cthat God and good angels are more free than we,\nthat is, intensively in degree of freedom, not extensively in the\nlatitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, not of\nspecification.\u201d Again we have here two distinctions that are no\ndistinctions, but made to seem so by terms invented, by I know not whom,\nto cover ignorance, and blind the understanding of the reader. For it\ncannot be conceived that there is any liberty greater than for a man to\ndo what he will, and to forbear what he will. One heat may be more\nintensive than another, but not one liberty than another. He that can do\nwhat he will, hath all liberty possible; and he that cannot, has none at\nall. Also liberty (as he says the Schools call it) of exercise, which\nis, as I have said before, a liberty to do or not to do, cannot be\nwithout a liberty, which they call of specification; that is to say, a\nliberty to do or not to do this or that in particular. For how can a man\nconceive, that he has liberty to do any thing, that hath not liberty to\ndo this, or that, or somewhat in particular? If a man be forbidden in\nLent to eat this, and that, and every other particular kind of flesh,\nhow can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than he\nthat hath no license at all?\n\nYou may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the\nSchools; and I do not doubt but that the imposing of them by authority\nof doctors in the Church, hath been a great cause that men have\nlaboured, though by sedition and evil courses, to shake them off; for,\nnothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannising over man\u2019s\nreason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the\nScripture, but by pretence of learning, and more judgment than that of\nother men.\n\n_J. D._ \u201cHe who will speak with some of our great undertakers about the\ngrounds of learning, had need either to speak by an interpreter, or to\nlearn a new language (I dare not call it jargon or canting) lately\ndevised, not to set forth the truth, but to conceal falsehood. He must\nlearn a new liberty, a new necessity, a new contingency, a new\nsufficiency, a new spontaneity, a new kind of deliberation, a new kind\nof election, a new eternity, a new compulsion, and in conclusion, a new\nnothing. (_a_) This proposition, _the will is free_, may be understood\nin two senses; either that the will is not compelled, or that the will\nis not always necessitated; for if it be ordinarily, or at any time free\nfrom necessitation, my assertion is true, that there is freedom from\nnecessity. The former sense, that the will is not compelled, is\nacknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable: _voluntas non\ncogitur_. For if the will may be compelled, then it may both will and\nnot will the same thing at the same time, under the same notion; but\nthis implies a contradiction. Yet this author, like the good woman whom\nher husband sought up the stream when she was drowned upon pretence that\nwhen she was living she used to go contrary courses to all other people,\nholds, that true compulsion and fear may make a man will that which he\ndoth not will, that is, in his sense may compel the will: \u201cas when a man\nwillingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to\nhis enemy for fear of being killed\u201d. I answer, that T. H. mistakes\nsundry ways in this discourse.\n\n(_b_) \u201cFirst, he erreth in this, to think that actions proceeding from\nfear are properly compulsory actions: which in truth are not only\nvoluntary, but free actions; neither compelled, nor so much as\nphysically necessitated. Another man, at the same time, in the same\nship, in the same storm, may choose, and the same individual man\notherwise advised might choose not, to throw his goods overboard. It is\nthe man himself, who chooseth freely this means to preserve his life. It\nis true, that if he were not in such a condition, or if he were freed\nfrom the grounds of his present fears, he would not choose neither the\ncasting of his goods into the sea, nor the submitting to his enemy. But\nconsidering the present exigence of his affairs, reason dictates to him,\nthat of two inconveniences the less is to be chosen, as a comparative\ngood. Neither doth he will this course as the end or direct object of\nhis desires, but as the means to attain his end. And what fear doth in\nthese cases, love, hope, hatred, &c. may do in other cases; that is, may\noccasion a man to elect those means to obtain his willed end, which\notherwise he would not elect. As Jacob, to serve seven years more,\nrather than not to enjoy his beloved Rachel. The merchant, to hazard\nhimself upon the rough seas in hope of profit. Passions may be so\nviolent, that they may necessitate the will, that is, when they prevent\ndeliberations; but this is rarely, and then the will is not free. But\nthey never properly compel it. That which is compelled, is against the\nwill; and that which is against the will, is not willed.\n\n(_c_) \u201cSecondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that \u2018a man is\nthen only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to an\naction\u2019: as if force were not more prevalent with a man, than fear. We\nmust know therefore, that this word _compelled_ is taken two ways:\nsometimes improperly, that is, when a man is moved or occasioned by\nthreats or fear, or any passion, to do that which he would not have\ndone, if those threats or that passion had not been. Sometimes it is\ntaken properly; when we do any thing against our own inclination, moved\nby an external cause, the will not consenting nor concurring, but\nresisting as much as it can. As in a rape, or when a Christian is drawn\nor carried by violence to the idol\u2019s temple. Or as in the case of St.\nPeter (John xxi. 18): _Another shall gird thee, and carry thee whither\nthou wouldest not_. This is that compulsion, which is understood when we\nsay, the will may be letted, or changed, or necessitated, or that the\nimperate actions of the will, that is the actions of the inferior\nfaculties which are ordinarily moved by the will, may be compelled: but\nthat the immanent actions of the will, that is, to will, to choose,\ncannot be compelled; because it is the nature of an action properly\ncompelled, to be done by an extrinsical cause, without the concurrence\nof the will.\n\n(_d_) \u201cThirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man be\nfree, but whether they be ordinarily free. Suppose some passions are so\nsudden and violent, that they surprise a man, and betray the succours of\nthe soul, and prevent deliberation; as we see in some _motus primo\nprimi_, or antipathies, how some men will run upon the most dangerous\nobjects, upon the first view of a loathed creature, without any power to\ncontain themselves. Such actions as these, as they are not ordinary, so\nthey are not free; because there is no deliberation nor election. But\nwhere deliberation and election are, as when a man throws his goods\noverboard to save the ship, or submits to his enemy to save his life,\nthere is always true liberty.\n\n\u201cThough T. H. slight the two reasons which I produce in favour of his\ncause, yet they who urged them deserved not to be slighted, unless it\nwere because they were School-men. The former reason is thus framed: a\nnecessity of supposition may consist with true liberty. But that\nnecessity which flows from the natural and extrinsical determination of\nthe will, is a necessity of supposition. To this, my answer is in\neffect, that (_e_) a necessity of supposition is of two kinds. Sometimes\nthe thing supposed is in the power of the agent to do, or not to do. As\nfor a Romish priest to vow continence, upon supposition that he be a\nRomish priest, is necessary; but because it was in his power to be a\npriest or not to be a priest, therefore his vow is a free act. So\nsupposing a man to have taken physic, it is necessary that he keep at\nhome; yet because it was in his power to take a medicine or not to take\nit, therefore his keeping at home is free. Again, sometimes the thing\nsupposed is not in the power of the agent to do, or not to do. Supposing\na man to be extremely sick, it is necessary that he keep at home; or\nsupposing that a man hath a natural antipathy against a cat, he runs\nnecessarily away so soon as he sees her: because this antipathy, and\nthis sickness, are not in the power of the party affected, therefore\nthese acts are not free. Jacob blessed his sons, Balaam blessed Israel;\nthese two acts being done, are both necessary upon supposition. But it\nwas in Jacob\u2019s power, not to have blessed his sons; so was it not in\nBalaam\u2019s power, not to have blessed Israel (Numb. xxii. 38). Jacob\u2019s\nwill was determined by himself; Balaam\u2019s will was physically determined\nby God. Therefore Jacob\u2019s benediction proceeded from his own free\nelection; and Balaam\u2019s from God\u2019s determination. So was Caiphas\u2019\nprophecy (John xi. 51): therefore the text saith, _he spake not of\nhimself_. To this T. H. saith nothing; but only declareth by an\nimpertinent instance, what _hypothetical_ signifies; and then adviseth\nyour Lordship, to take notice how errors and ignorance may be cloaked\nunder grave scholastic terms. And I do likewise intreat your Lordship to\ntake notice, that the greatest fraud and cheating lurks commonly under\nthe pretence of plain dealing. We see jugglers commonly strip up their\nsleeves, and promise extraordinary fair dealing, before they begin to\nplay their tricks.\n\n\u201cConcerning the second argument drawn from the liberty of God and the\ngood angels; as I cannot but approve his modesty, in \u2018suspending his\njudgment concerning the manner how God and the good angels do work\nnecessarily or freely, because he finds it not set down in the Articles\nof our faith, or the decrees of our Church\u2019, especially in this age,\nwhich is so full of atheism, and of those scoffers which St. Peter\nprophesied of, (2 Pet. iii. 3), who neither believe that there is God or\nangels, or that they have a soul, but only as salt, to keep their bodies\nfrom putrifaction; so I can by no means assent unto him in that which\nfollows, that is to say, that he hath proved that liberty and necessity\nof the same kind may consist together, that is, a liberty of exercise\nwith a necessity of exercise, or a liberty of specification with a\nnecessity of specification. Those actions which he saith are\nnecessitated by passion, are for the most part dictated by reason,\neither truly or apparently right, and resolved by the will itself. But\nit troubles him, that I say that God and the good angels are more free\nthan men, intensively in the degree of freedom, but not extensively in\nthe latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, but not\nof specification: which he saith are no distinctions, but terms invented\nto cover ignorance. Good words. Doth he only see? Are all other men\nstark blind? By his favour, they are true and necessary distinctions;\nand if he alone do not conceive them, it is because distinctions, as all\nother things, have their fates, according to the capacities or\nprejudices of their readers. But he urgeth two reasons. \u2018One heat,\u2019\nsaith he, \u2018may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than\nanother.\u2019 Why not, I wonder? Nothing is more proper to a man than\nreason; yet a man is more rational than a child, and one man more\nrational than another, that is, in respect of the use and exercise of\nreason. As there are degrees of understanding, so there are of liberty.\nThe good angels have clearer understandings than we, and they are not\nhindered with passions as we, and by consequence they have more use of\nliberty than we. (_f_) His second reason is: \u2018he that can do what he\nwill, hath all liberty, and he that cannot do what he will, hath no\nliberty\u2019. If this be true, then there are no degrees of liberty indeed.\nBut this which he calls liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty\nto do whatsoever he will. A man is free to shoot, or not to shoot,\nalthough he cannot hit the white whensoever he would. We do good freely,\nbut with more difficulty and reluctance than the good spirits. The more\nrational, and the less sensual the will is, the greater is the degree of\nliberty. His other exception against liberty of exercise, and liberty of\nspecification, is a mere mistake, which grows merely from not rightly\nunderstanding what liberty of specification, or contrariety is. A\nliberty of specification, saith he, is a liberty to do or not to do this\nor that in particular. Upon better advice he will find, that this which\nhe calls a liberty of specification, is a liberty of contradiction, and\nnot of specification, nor of contrariety. To be free to do or not to do\nthis or that particular good, is a liberty of contradiction; so\nlikewise, to be free to do or not to do this or that particular evil.\nBut to be free to do both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety,\nwhich extends to contrary objects or to diverse kind of things. So his\nreason to prove that a liberty of exercise cannot be without a liberty\nof specification, falls flat to the ground: and he may lay aside his\nlenten licence for another occasion. I am ashamed to insist upon these\nthings, which are so evident that no man can question them who doth\nunderstand them.\n\n(_g_) \u201cAnd here he falls into another invective against distinctions and\nscholastical expressions, and the \u2018doctors of the Church, who by this\nmeans tyrannized over the understandings of other men.\u2019 What a\npresumption is this, for one private man, who will not allow human\nliberty to others, to assume to himself such a licence to control so\nmagistrally, and to censure of gross ignorance and tyrannising over\nmen\u2019s judgments, yea, as causes of the troubles and tumults which are in\nthe world, the doctors of the Church in general, who have flourished in\nall ages and all places, only for a few necessary and innocent\ndistinctions. Truly, said Plutarch, that a sore eye is offended with the\nlight of the sun. (_h_) What then, must the logicians lay aside their\nfirst and second intentions, their abstracts and concretes, their\nsubjects and predicates, their modes and figures, their method synthetic\nand analytic, their fallacies of composition and division, &c.? Must the\nmoral philosopher quit his means and extremes, his _principia congenita\net acquisita_, his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, his\nnecessity absolute and hypothetical, &c.? Must the natural philosopher\ngive over his intentional species, his understanding agent and patient,\nhis receptive and eductive power of the matter, his qualities _infus\u00e6_\nor _influx\u00e6_, _symbol\u00e6_ or _dissymbol\u00e6_, his temperament _ad pondus_ and\n_ad justitiam_, his parts homogeneous and heterogeneous, his sympathies\nand antipathies, his antiperistasis, &c.? Must the astrologer and the\ngeographer leave their _apog\u00e6um_ and _perig\u00e6um_, their artic and\nantartic poles, their equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, horizon, zones,\n&c.? Must the mathematician, the metaphysician, and the divine,\nrelinquish all their terms of art and proper idiotisms, because they do\nnot relish with T. H.\u2019s palate? But he will say, they are obscure\nexpressions. What marvel is it, when the things themselves are more\nobscure? Let him put them into as plain English as he can, and they\nshall be never a whit the better understood by those who want all\ngrounds of learning. Nothing is clearer than mathematical demonstration:\nyet let one who is altogether ignorant in mathematics hear it, and he\nwill hold it to be as T. H. terms these distinctions, plain fustian or\njargon. Every art or profession hath its proper mysteries and\nexpressions, which are well known to the sons of art, not so to\nstrangers. Let him consult with military men, with physicians, with\nnavigators; and he shall find this true by experience. Let him go on\nshipboard, and the mariners will not leave their _starboard_ and\n_larboard_, because they please not him, or because he accounts it\ngibberish. No, no: it is not the School divines, but innovators and\nseditious orators, who are the true causes of the present troubles of\nEurope. (_i_) T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book, _De Cive_,\ncap. XII.: \u2018_that it is a seditious opinion, to teach that the knowledge\nof good and evil belongs to private persons_\u2019: and cap. XVII. \u2018that in\nquestions of faith, the civil magistrates ought to consult with\necclesiastical doctors, to whom God\u2019s blessing is derived by imposition\nof hands so as not to be deceived in necessary truths, to whom our\nSaviour hath promised infallibility.\u2019 These are the very men whom he\ntraduceth here. There he ascribes infallibility to them; here he\naccuseth them of gross superstitious ignorance. There he attributes too\nmuch to them; here he attributes too little. Both there and here he\ntakes too much upon him; (1 Cor. xiv. 32): _The spirits of the prophets\nare subject to the prophets_.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. XIX.\n\n(_a_) \u201cThis proposition, _the will is free_, may be understood in two\nsenses; either that the will is not compelled, or that the will is not\nalways necessitated, &c. The former sense, that the will is not\ncompelled, is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable.\u201d I\nnever said the will is _compelled_, but do agree with the rest of the\nworld in granting that it is _not compelled_. It is an absurd speech to\nsay it is compelled, but not to say it is necessitated, or a necessary\neffect of some cause. When the fire heateth, it doth not compel heat; so\nlikewise when some cause maketh the will to anything, it doth not compel\nit. Many things may compel a man to do an action, in producing the will;\nbut that is not a compelling of the _will_, but of the _man_. That which\nI call necessitation, is the effecting and creating of that will which\nwas not before, not a compelling of a will already existent. The\nnecessitation or creation of the will, is the same thing with the\ncompulsion of the man, saving that we commonly use the word compulsion,\nin those actions which proceed from terror. And therefore this\ndistinction is of no use; and that raving which followeth immediately\nafter it, is nothing to the question, _whether the will be free_, though\nit be to the question, _whether the man be free_.\n\n(_b_) \u201cFirst he erreth in this, to think that actions proceeding from\nfear are properly compulsory actions; which in truth are not only\nvoluntary, but free actions.\u201d I never said nor doubted, but such actions\nwere both voluntary and free; for he that doth any thing for fear,\nthough he say truly he was compelled to it, yet we deny not that he had\nelection to do or not to do, and consequently that he was a voluntary\nand free agent. But this hinders not, but that the terror might be a\nnecessary cause of his election of that which otherwise he would not\nhave elected, unless some other potent cause made it necessary he should\nelect the contrary. And therefore, in the same ship, in the same storm,\none man may be necessitated to throw his goods overboard, and another\nman to keep them within the ship; and the same man in a like storm be\notherwise advised, if all the causes be not like. But that the same\nindividual man, as the Bishop says, that chose to throw his goods\noverboard, might chose not to throw his goods overboard, I cannot\nconceive; unless a man can choose to throw overboard and not to throw\noverboard, or be so advised and otherwise advised, all at once.\n\n(_c_) \u201cSecondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that \u2018a man is\nthen only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to an\naction.\u2019 As if force were not more prevalent with a man than fear,\u201d &c.\nWhen I said _fear_, I think no man can doubt but the fear of force was\nunderstood. I cannot see therefore what quarrel he could justly take, at\nsaying that a man is compelled by fear only; unless he think it may be\ncalled compulsion when a man by force, seizing on another man\u2019s limbs,\nmoveth them as himself, not as the other man pleaseth. But this is not\nthe meaning of compulsion: neither is the action so done, the action of\nhim that suffereth, but of him that useth the force. But this, as if it\nwere a question of the propriety of the English tongue, the Bishop\ndenies; and says when a man is moved by fear, it is _improperly_ said he\nis compelled. But when a man is moved by an external cause, the will\nresisting as much as it can, then he says, he is _properly_ said to be\ncompelled; as in a rape, or when a Christian is drawn or carried by\nviolence to the idol\u2019s temple. Insomuch as by this distinction it were\nvery proper English to say, that a stone were compelled when it is\nthrown, or a man when he is carried in a cart. For my part, I understand\ncompulsion to be used rightly of living creatures only, which are moved\nonly by their own animal motion, in such manner as they would not be\nmoved without the fear. But of this dispute the English and well-bred\nreader is the proper judge.\n\n(_d_) \u201cThirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man be\nfree, but whether they be ordinarily free.\u201d Is it impossible for the\nBishop to remember the question, which is _whether a man be free to\nwill?_ Did I ever say, that no actions of a man are free? On the\ncontrary, I say that all his voluntary actions are free, even those also\nto which he is compelled by fear. But it does not therefore follow but\nthat the will, from whence those actions and their election proceed, may\nhave necessary causes, against which he hath never yet said anything.\nThat which followeth immediately, is not offered as a proof, but as\nexplication, how the passions of a man surprise him; therefore I let it\npass, noting only that he expoundeth _motus primo primi_, which I\nunderstood not before, by the word _antipathy_.\n\n(_e_) \u201cA necessity of supposition is of two kinds; sometimes a thing\nsupposed, is in the power of the agent to do or not to do, &c.;\nsometimes a thing supposed, is not in the power of the agent to do or\nnot to do,\u201d &c.\n\nWhen the necessity is of the former kind of supposition, then, he says,\nfreedom may consist with this necessity, in the latter sense that it\ncannot. And to use his own instances, to vow continence in a Romish\npriest, upon supposition that he is a Romish priest, is a necessary act,\nbecause it was in his power to be a priest or not. On the other side,\nsupposing a man having a natural antipathy against a cat; because this\nantipathy is not in the power of the party affected, therefore the\nrunning away from the cat is no free act.\n\nI deny not but that it is a free act of the Romish priest to vow\ncontinence, not upon the supposition that he was a Romish priest, but\nbecause he had not done it unless he would; if he had not been a Romish\npriest, it had been all one to the freedom of his act. Nor is his\npriesthood anything to the necessity of his vow, saving that if he would\nnot have vowed he should not have been made a priest. There was an\nantecedent necessity in the causes extrinsical; first, that he should\nhave the will to be a priest, and then consequently that he should have\nthe will to vow. Against this he allegeth nothing. Then for his cat, the\nman\u2019s running from it is a free act, as being voluntary, and arising\nfrom a false apprehension (which nevertheless he cannot help) of some\nhurt or other the cat may do him. And therefore the act is as free as\nthe act of him that throweth his goods into the sea. So likewise the act\nof Jacob in blessing his sons, and the act of Balaam in blessing Israel,\nare equally free and equally voluntary, yet equally determined by God,\nwho is the author of all blessings, and framed the will of both of them\nto bless, and whose will, as St. Paul saith, cannot be resisted.\nTherefore both their actions were necessitated equally; and, because\nthey were voluntary, equally free. As for Caiphas\u2019 his prophecy, which\nthe text saith _he spake not of himself_, it was necessary; first,\nbecause it was by the supernatural gift of God to the high-priests, as\nsovereigns of the commonwealth of the Jews, to speak to the people as\nfrom the mouth of God, that is to say, to prophecy; and secondly,\nwhensoever he did speak not as from God, but as from himself, it was\nnevertheless necessary he should do so, not that he might not have been\nsilent if he would, but because his will to speak was antecedently\ndetermined to what he should speak from all eternity, which he hath yet\nbrought no argument to contradict.\n\nHe approveth my modesty in suspending my judgment concerning the manner\nhow the good angels do work, necessarily or freely, because I find it\nnot set down in the articles of our faith, nor in the decrees of our\nChurch. But he useth not the same modesty himself. For whereas he can\napprehend neither the nature of God nor of angels, nor conceive what\nkind of thing it is which in them he calleth will, he nevertheless takes\nupon him to attribute to them _liberty of exercise_, and to deny them _a\nliberty of specification_; to grant them a _more intensive_ liberty than\nwe have, but not a _more extensive_; using, not incongruously, in the\nincomprehensibility of the subject incomprehensible terms, as _liberty\nof exercise_ and _liberty of specification_, and degrees of intension in\nliberty; as if one liberty, like heat, might be more intensive than\nanother. It is true that there is greater liberty in a large than in a\nstraight prison, but one of those liberties is not more intense than the\nother.\n\n(_f_) \u201cHis second reason is, _he that can do what he will, hath all\nliberty, and he that cannot do what he will, hath no liberty_. If this\nbe true, then there are no degrees of liberty indeed. But this which he\ncalls liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty.\u201d It is one thing\nto say a man hath liberty to do what he will, and another thing to say\nhe hath power to do what he will. A man that is bound, would say readily\nhe hath not the liberty to walk; but he will not say he wants the power.\nBut the sick man will say he wants the power to walk, but not the\nliberty. This is, as I conceive, to speak the English tongue: and\nconsequently an Englishman will not say, the liberty to do what he will,\nbut the power to do what he will, is omnipotence. And therefore either I\nor the Bishop understand not English. Whereas he adds that I mistake the\nmeaning of the words _liberty of specification_, I am sure that in that\nway wherein I expound them, there is no absurdity. But if he say, I\nunderstand not what the Schoolmen mean by it, I will not contend with\nhim; for I think they know not what they mean themselves.\n\n(_g_) \u201cAnd here he falls into another invective against distinctions and\nscholastical expressions, and the doctors of the Church, who by this\nmeans tyrannized over the understanding of other men. What a presumption\nis this, for one private man,\u201d &c. That he may know I am no enemy to\nintelligible distinctions, I also will use a distinction in the defence\nof myself against this his accusation. I say therefore that some\ndistinctions are _scholastical_ only, and some are _scholastical_ and\n_sapiential_ also. Against those that are _scholastical_ only, I do and\nmay inveigh. But against those that are _scholastical_ and _sapiential_\nalso, I do not inveigh. Likewise some doctors of the Church, as Suarez,\nJohannes \u00e0 Duns, and their imitators, to breed in men such opinions as\nthe Church of Rome thought suitable to their interest, did write such\nthings as neither other men nor themselves understood. These I confess I\nhave a little slighted. Other doctors of the Church, as Martin Luther,\nPhilip Melancthon, John Calvin, William Perkins, and others, that did\nwrite their sense clearly, I never slighted, but always very much\nreverenced and admired. Wherein, then, lieth my presumption? If it be\nbecause I am a private man, let the Bishop also take heed he contradict\nnot some of those whom the world worthily esteems, lest he also (for he\nis a private man) be taxed of presumption.\n\n(_h_) \u201cWhat then, must the logicians lay aside their first and second\nintentions, their abstracts and concretes &c.: must the moral\nphilosopher quit his means and extremes, his _principia congenita et\nacquisita_, his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, his necessity\nabsolute and hypothetical, &c.: must the natural philosopher give over\nhis intentional species, &c.: because they do not relish with T. H.\u2019s\npalate?\u201d I confess that among the logicians, Barbara, Celarent, Darii,\nFerio, &c. are terms of art. But if the Bishop think that words of\n_first and second intention_, that _abstract_ and _concrete_, that\n_subjects_ and _predicates_, _moods_ and _figures_, _method synthetic_\nand _analytic_, _fallacies_ of _composition_ and _division_, be terms of\nart, I am not of his opinion. For these are no more terms of art in\nlogic, than _lines_, _figures_, _squares_, _triangles_, &c. in the\nmathematics. Barbara, Celarent, and the rest that follow, are terms of\nart, invented for the easier apprehension of young men, and are by young\nmen understood. But the terms of the School with which I have found\nfault, have been invented to blind the understanding, and cannot be\nunderstood by those that intend to learn divinity. And to his question\nwhether the moral philosopher must quit his means and extremes, I\nanswer, that though they are not terms of art, he ought to quit them\nwhen they cannot be understood; and when they can, to use them rightly.\nAnd therefore, though _means_ and _extremes_ be terms intelligible, yet\nI would have them quit the placing of virtue in the one, and of vice in\nthe other. But for his _liberty of contradiction_ and _contrariety_, his\n_necessity absolute_ and _hypothetical_, if any moral philosopher ever\nused them, then away with them; they serve for nothing but to seduce\nyoung students. In like manner, let the natural philosopher no more\nmention his _intentional species_, his _understanding agent and\npatient_, his _receptive and eductive power of the matter_, his\n_qualities infus\u00e6_ or _influx\u00e6_, _symbol\u00e6_ or _dissymbol\u00e6_, his\n_temperament ad pondus_ and _ad justitiam_. He may keep his _parts\nhomogeneous_ and _heterogeneous_; but his _sympathies_ and\n_antipathies_, his _antiperistasis_ and the like names of excuses rather\nthan of causes, I would have him fling away. And for the astrologer,\n(unless he means astronomer), I would have him throw away his whole\ntrade. But if he mean astronomer, then the terms of _apog\u00e6um_ and\n_perig\u00e6um_, artic, antartic, equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, horizon,\nzones, &c. are no more terms of art in astronomy, than a saw or a\nhatchet in the art of a carpenter. He cites no terms of art for\ngeometry; I was afraid he would have put _lines_, or perhaps _equality_\nor _inequality_, for terms of art. So that now I know not what be those\nterms he thinks I would cast away in geometry. And lastly, for his\nmetaphysician, I would have him quit both his terms and his profession,\nas being in truth (as Plutarch saith in the beginning of the life of\nAlexander the Great) not at all profitable to learning, but made only\nfor an essay to the learner; and the divine to use no word in preaching\nbut such as his auditors, nor in writing but such as a common reader,\nmay understand. And all this, not for the pleasing of my palate, but for\nthe promotion of truth.\n\n(_i_) \u201cT. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book, _De Cive_, cap.\nXII., that it is \u2018a seditious opinion to teach that the knowledge of\ngood and evil belongs to private persons\u2019: and cap. XVII, that \u2018in\nquestions of faith the civil magistrates ought to consult with the\necclesiastical doctors, to whom God\u2019s blessing is derived by imposition\nof hands, so as not to be deceived in necessary truths,\u2019 &c. There he\nattributes too much to them, here he attributeth too little; both there\nand here he takes too much upon him. _The spirits of the prophets are\nsubject to the prophets._\u201d He thinks he hath a great advantage against\nme from my own words in my book _De Cive_, which he would not have\nthought if he had understood them. The knowledge of good and evil is\njudicature, which in Latin is _cognitio causarum_, not _scientia_. Every\nprivate man may do his best to attain a knowledge of what is good and\nevil in the action he is to do; but to judge of what is good and evil in\nothers, belongs not to him, but to those whom the sovereign power\nappointeth thereunto. But the Bishop not understanding, or forgetting,\nthat _cognoscere_ is to judge, as Adam did of God\u2019s commandment, hath\ncited this place to little purpose. And for the infallibility of the\necclesiastical doctors by me attributed to them, it is not that they\ncannot be deceived, but that a subject cannot be deceived in obeying\nthem when they are our lawfully constituted doctors. For the supreme\necclesiastical doctor, is he that hath the supreme power: and in obeying\nhim no subject can be deceived, because they are by God himself\ncommanded to obey him. And what the ecclesiastical doctors, lawfully\nconstituted, do tell us to be necessary in point of religion, the same\nis told us by the sovereign power. And therefore, though we may be\ndeceived by them in the belief of an opinion, we cannot be deceived by\nthem in the duty of our actions. And this is all that I ascribe to the\necclesiastical doctors. If they think it too much, let them take upon\nthem less. Too little they cannot say it is, who take it, as it is, for\na burthen. And for them who seek it as a worldly preferment, it is too\nmuch. I take, he says, too much upon me. Why so? Because _the spirits of\nthe prophets are subject to the prophets_. This is it that he finds\nfault with in me, when he says that I am a private man, that is to say,\nno prophet, that is to say, no bishop. By which it is manifest, that the\nBishop subjecteth not his spirit but to the Convocation of bishops. I\nadmit that every man ought to subject his spirit to the prophets. But a\nprophet is he that speaketh unto us from God; which I acknowledge none\nto do, but him that hath due authority so to do. And no man hath due\nauthority so to do immediately, but he that hath the supreme authority\nof the commonwealth; nor mediately, but they that speak such things to\nthe people, as he that hath the supreme authority alloweth of. And as it\nis true in this sense, that _the spirits of the prophets are subject to\nthe prophets_; so it is also true that _we ought not to believe every\nspirit, but to try the spirits, whether they are of God; because many\nfalse prophets are gone out into the world_ (1 John iv. 1). Therefore I\nthat am a private man, may examine the prophets; which to do, I have no\nother means but to examine whether their doctrine be agreeable to the\nlaw; which theirs is not, who divide the commonwealth into two\ncommonwealths, civil and ecclesiastical.\n\n NO. XX.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cNow to the distinction itself, I say, first, that the proper\nact of liberty is election, and election is opposed, not only to\ncoaction, but also to coarctation, or determination to one.\nNecessitation or determination to one, may consist with spontaneity, but\nnot with election or liberty; as hath been showed. The very Stoics did\nacknowledge a spontaneity. So our adversaries are not yet gone out of\nthe confines of the Stoics.\n\n\u201cSecondly, to rip up the bottom of this business, this I take to be the\nclear resolution of the Schools. There is a double act of the will: the\none more remote, called _imperatus_, that is, in truth the act of some\ninferior faculty, subject to the command of the will, as to open or shut\none\u2019s eyes; without doubt these actions may be compelled. The other act\nis nearer, called _actus elicitus_, an act drawn out of the will, as to\nwill, to choose, to elect. This may be stopped or hindered by the\nintervening impediment of the understanding, as a stone lying on a table\nis kept from its natural motion; otherwise the will should have a kind\nof omnipotence. But the will cannot be compelled to an act repugnant to\nits inclination, as when a stone is thrown upwards into the air; for\nthat is both to incline and not to incline to the same object at the\nsame time, which implies a contradiction. Therefore to say the will is\nnecessitated, is to say, the will is compelled so far as the will is\ncapable of compulsion. If a strong man holding the hand of a weaker,\nshould therewith kill a third person, _h\u00e6c quidem vis est_, this is\nviolence; the weaker did not willingly perpetrate the fact, because he\nwas compelled. But now suppose this strong man had the will of the\nweaker in his power as well as the hand, and should not only incline,\nbut determine it secretly and insensibly to commit this act: is not the\ncase the same? Whether one ravish Lucretia by force, as Tarquin, or by\namatory potions and magical incantations not only allure her, but\nnecessitate her to satisfy his lust, and incline her effectually, and\ndraw her inevitably and irresistibly, to follow him spontaneously,\nLucretia in both these conditions is to be pitied. But the latter person\nis more guilty, and deserves greater punishment, who endeavours also, so\nmuch as in him lies, to make Lucretia irresistibly partake of his crime.\nI dare not apply it, but thus only: take heed how we defend those secret\nand invincible necessitations to evil, though spontaneous and free from\ncoaction.\n\n\u201cThese are their fastnesses.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ In the next place, he bringeth two arguments against\ndistinguishing between being free from compulsion, and free from\nnecessitation. The first is, that election is opposite, not only to\ncoaction or compulsion, but also to necessitation or determination to\none. This is it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore\nbringeth no new argument to prove it. And to those brought formerly, I\nhave already answered; and in this place I deny again, that election is\nopposite to either. For when a man is compelled, for example, to subject\nhimself to an enemy or to die, he hath still election left in him, and a\ndeliberation to bethink which of these two he can better endure; and he\nthat is led to prison by force, hath election, and may deliberate,\nwhether he will be haled and trained on the ground, or make use of his\nfeet.\n\nLikewise when there is no compulsion, but the strength of temptation to\ndo an evil action, being greater than the motives to abstain,\nnecessarily determines him to the doing of it, yet he deliberates whilst\nsometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear, are\nworking on him, and consequently he electeth which he will. But\ncommonly, when we see and know the strength that moves us, we\nacknowledge necessity; but when we see not, or mark not the force that\nmoves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not causes, but\nliberty that produceth the action. Hence it is that they think he does\nnot choose this, that of necessity chooseth it; but they might as well\nsay fire does not burn, because it burns of necessity. The second\nargument is not so much an argument, as a distinction, to show in what\nsense it may be said that voluntary actions are necessitated, and in\nwhat sense not. And therefore he allegeth, as from the authority of the\nSchools and that which \u201crippeth up the bottom of the question\u201d, that\nthere is a double act of the will. The one, he says, is _actus\nimperatus_, an act done at the command of the will by some inferior\nfaculty of the soul, as to open or shut one\u2019s eyes: and this act may be\ncompelled. The other, he says, is _actus elicitus_, an act allured, or\nan act drawn forth by allurement out of the will, as to will, to choose,\nto elect: this, he says, cannot be compelled. Wherein letting pass that\nmetaphorical speech of attributing command and subjection to the\nfaculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family among\nthemselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in\nsearching the truth of the question: you may observe first, that to\ncompel a voluntary act is nothing else but to will it. For it is all one\nto say, my will commands the shutting of mine eyes or the doing of any\nother action, and to say, I have the will to shut mine eyes. So that\n_actus imperatus_ here, might as easily have been said in English, _a\nvoluntary action_, but that they that invented the term understood not\nany thing it signified. Secondly you may observe, that _actus elicitus_\nis exemplified by these words, to will, to elect, to choose, which are\nall one; and so to will is here made an act of the will; and indeed, as\nthe will is a faculty or power of a man\u2019s soul, so to will is an act of\nit according to that power. But as it is absurdly said, that to dance is\nan act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; so it\nis also to say, that to will is an act allured or drawn out of the power\nto will, which power is commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the\nsum of his distinction is, that a voluntary act may be done on\ncompulsion, that is to say, by foul means; but to will that or any act\ncannot be but by allurement or fair means. Now, seeing fair means,\nallurements, and enticements, produce the action which they do produce\nas necessarily as threatening and foul means, it follows, that to will\nmay be made as necessary as any thing that is done by compulsion. So\nthat the distinction of _actus imperatus_, and _actus elicitus_, are but\nwords, and of no effect against necessity.\n\n_J. D._ \u201cIn the next place follow two reasons of mine own against the\nsame distinction, the one taken from the former grounds, that election\ncannot consist with determination to one. To this, he saith, he hath\nanswered already. No; truth is founded upon a rock. He hath been so far\nfrom prevailing against it, that he hath not been able to shake it.\n(_a_) Now again he tells us, that \u2018election is not opposite to either\u2019,\nnecessitation or compulsion. He might even as well tell us, that a stone\nthrown upwards moves naturally; or that a woman can be ravished with her\nown will. Consent takes away the rape. This is the strangest liberty\nthat ever was heard of, that a man is compelled to do what he would not,\nand yet is free to do what he will. And this he tells us upon the old\nscore, that \u2018he who submits to his enemy for fear of death, chooseth to\nsubmit\u2019. But we have seen formerly, that this which he calls compulsion,\nis not compulsion properly, nor that natural determination of the will\nto one, which is opposite to true liberty. He who submits to an enemy\nfor saving his life, doth either only counterfeit, and then there is no\nwill to submit; (this disguise is no more than a stepping aside to avoid\na present blow); or else he doth sincerely will a submission, and then\nthe will is changed. There is a vast difference between compelling and\nchanging the will. Either God or man may change the will of man, either\nby varying the condition of things, or by informing the party otherwise:\nbut compelled it cannot be, that is, it cannot both will this and not\nwill this, as it is invested with the same circumstances; though, if the\nact were otherwise circumstantiated, it might nill that freely which now\nit wills freely. (_b_) Wherefore this kind of actions are called mixed\nactions, that is partly voluntary, partly involuntary. That which is\ncompelled in a man\u2019s present condition or distress, that is not\nvoluntary nor chosen. That which is chosen, as the remedy of its\ndistress, that is voluntary. So hypothetically, supposing a man were not\nin that distress, they are involuntary; but absolutely without any\nsupposition at all, taking the case as it is, they are voluntary. (_c_)\nHis other instance of \u2018a man forced to prison, that he may choose\nwhether he will be haled thither upon the ground, or walk upon his\nfeet,\u2019 is not true. By his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it\npleaseth them who have him in their power. If they will drag him, he is\nnot free to walk; and if they give him leave to walk, he is not forced\nto be dragged. (_d_) Having laid this foundation, he begins to build\nupon it, that \u2018other passions do necessitate as much as fear\u2019. But he\nerrs doubly; first, in his foundation. Fear doth not determine the\nrational will naturally and necessarily. The last and greatest of the\nfive terrible things is death; yet the fear of death cannot necessitate\na resolved mind to do a dishonest action, which is worse than death. The\nfear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three children to worship\nan idol, nor the fear of the lions necessitate Daniel to omit his duty\nto God. It is our frailty, that we are more afraid of empty shadows than\nof substantial dangers, because they are nearer our senses; as little\nchildren fear a mouse or a visard more than fire or weather. But as a\nfit of the stone takes away the sense of the gout for the present, so\nthe greater passion doth extinguish the less. The fear of God\u2019s wrath\nand eternal torments doth expel corporeal fear: _fear not them who kill\nthe body, but fear him who is able to cast both body and soul into hell_\n(Luke xii. 4). (_e_) _Da veniam imperator; tu carcerem, ille gehennam\nminatur._--_Excuse me, O emperor, thou threatenest men with prison, but\nhe threatens me with hell._ (_f_) Secondly, he errs in his\nsuperstruction also. There is a great difference, as to this case of\njustifying, or not justifying an action, between force and fear, and\nother passions. Force doth not only lessen the sin, but takes it quite\naway. He who forced a betrothed damsel was to die; \u2018but unto the\ndamsel,\u2019 saith he, \u2018thou shalt do nothing, there is in her no fault\nworthy of death\u2019 (Deut. xxii. 26). Tamar\u2019s beauty, or Ammon\u2019s love, did\nnot render him innocent; but Ammon\u2019s force rendered Tamar innocent. But\nfear is not so prevalent as force. Indeed if fear be great and justly\ngrounded, such as may fall upon a constant man, though it do not\ndispense with the transgression of the negative precepts of God or\nnature, because they bind to all times, yet it diminisheth the offence\neven against them, and pleads for pardon. But it dispenseth in many\ncases with the transgression of the positive law, either divine or\nhuman; because it is not probable that God or the law would oblige man\nto the observation of all positive precepts, with so great damage as the\nloss of his life. The omission of circumcision was no sin, whilst the\nIsraelites were travelling through the wilderness. By T. H.\u2019s\npermission, (_g_) I will propose a case to him. A gentleman sends his\nservant with money to buy a dinner; some Russians meet him by the way,\nand take it from him by force; the servant cried for help, and did what\nhe could to defend himself, but all would not serve. The servant is\ninnocent, if he were to be tried before a court of Areopagites. Or\nsuppose the Russians did not take it from him by force, but drew their\nswords and threatened to kill him except he delivered it himself; no\nwise man will conceive, that it was either the master\u2019s intention or the\nservant\u2019s duty to hazard his life or limbs for saving of such a trifling\nsum. But on the other side, suppose this servant, passing by some\ncabaret or tennis-court where his comrades were drinking or playing,\nshould stay with them, and drink or play away his money, and afterwards\nplead, as T. H. doth here, that he was overcome by the mere strength of\ntemptation. I trow, neither T. H. nor any man else would admit of this\nexcuse, but punish him for it: because neither was he necessitated by\nthe temptation, and what strength it had was by his own fault, in\nrespect of that vicious habit which he had contracted of drinking or\ngaming: (James i. 14): _Every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of\nhis own lust and enticed_. Disordered passions of anger, hatred, lust,\nif they be consequent (as the case is here put by T. H.) and flow from\ndeliberation and election, they do not only not diminish the fault, but\nthey aggravate it, and render it much greater.\n\n(_h_) \u201cHe talks much of the \u2018motives to do and motives to forbear, how\nthey work upon and determine a man\u2019; as if a reasonable man were no more\nthan a tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by the rackets of the second\ncauses; as if the will had no power to move itself, but were merely\npassive, like an artificial popingay removed hither and thither by the\nbolts of the archers, who shoot on this side and on that. What are\nmotives, but reasons or discourses framed by the understanding, and\nfreely moved by the will? What are the will and the understanding, but\nfaculties of the same soul? And what is liberty but a power resulting\nfrom them both? To say that the will is determined by these motives, is\nas much as to say that the agent is determined by himself. If there be\nno necessitation before the judgment of right reason doth dictate to the\nwill, then there is no antecedent, no extrinsical necessitation at all.\n(_i_) All the world knows, that when the agent is determined by himself,\nthen the effect is determined likewise in its cause. But if he\ndetermined himself freely, then the effect is free. Motives determine\nnot naturally, but morally; which kind of determination may consist with\ntrue liberty. But if T. H.\u2019s opinion were true, that the will were\nnaturally determined by the physical and special influence of\nextrinsical causes, not only motives were vain, but reason itself and\ndeliberation were vain. No, saith he, they are not vain, because they\nare the means. Yes, if the means be superfluous, they are vain. What\nneeded such a circuit of deliberation to advise what is fit to be done,\nwhen it is already determined extrinsically what must be done?\n\n(_k_) \u201cHe saith, \u2018that the ignorance of the true causes and their power,\nis the reason why we ascribe the effect to liberty; but when we\nseriously consider the causes of things, we acknowledge a necessity\u2019. No\nsuch thing, but just the contrary. The more we consider, and the clearer\nwe understand, the greater is the liberty, and the more the knowledge of\nour own liberty. The less we consider, and the more incapable that the\nunderstanding is, the lesser is the liberty, and the knowledge of it.\nAnd where there is no consideration nor use of reason, there is no\nliberty at all, there is neither moral good nor evil. Some men, by\nreason that their exterior senses are not totally bound, have a trick to\nwalk in their sleep. Suppose such a one in that case should cast himself\ndown a pair of stairs or from a bridge, and break his neck or drown\nhimself; it were a mad jury that would find this man accessary to his\nown death. Why? Because it was not freely done, he had not then the use\nof reason.\n\n(_l_) \u201cLastly, he tells us, that \u2018the will doth choose of necessity, as\nwell as the fire burns of necessity\u2019. If he intend no more but this,\nthat election is the proper and natural act of the will as burning is of\nthe fire, or that the elective power is as necessarily in a man as\nvisibility, he speaks truly, but most impertinently; for, the question\nis not now of the elective power, _in actu primo_, whether it be an\nessential faculty of the soul, but whether the act of electing this or\nthat particular object, be free and undetermined by any antecedent and\nextrinsical causes. But if he intend it in this other sense, that as the\nfire hath no power to suspend its burning, nor to distinguish between\nthose combustible matters which are put unto it, but burns that which is\nput unto it necessarily, if it be combustible; so the will hath no power\nto refuse that which it wills, nor to suspend its own appetite: he errs\ngrossly. The will hath power either to will or nill, or to suspend, that\nis, neither to will nor nill the same object. Yet even the burning of\nthe fire, if it be considered as it is invested with all particular\ncircumstances, is not otherwise so necessary an action as T. H.\nimagineth. (_m_) Two things are required to make an effect necessary.\nFirst, that it be produced by a necessary cause, such as fire is;\nsecondly, that it be necessarily produced. Protagoras, an atheist, began\nhis book thus: \u2018Concerning the Gods, I have nothing to say, whether they\nbe or they be not\u2019: for which his book was condemned by the Athenians to\nbe burned. The fire was a necessary agent, but the sentence or the\napplication of the fire to the book was a free act; and therefore the\nburning of his book was free. Much more the rational will is free, which\nis both a voluntary agent, and acts voluntarily.\n\n(_n_) \u201cMy second reason against this distinction, of liberty from\ncompulsion but not from necessitation, is new, and demonstrates clearly\nthat to necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to compel the\nwill so far as the will is capable of compulsion; and that he who doth\nnecessitate the will to evil after that manner, is the true cause of\nevil, and ought rather to be blamed than the will itself. But T. H., for\nall he saith he is not surprised, can be contented upon better advise to\nsteal by all this in silence. And to hide this tergiversation from the\neyes of the reader, he makes an empty shew of braving against that\nfamous and most necessary distinction, between the _elicite_ and\n_imperate_ acts of the will; first, because the terms are _improper_;\nsecondly, because they are _obscure_. What trivial and grammatical\nobjections are these, to be used against the universal current of\ndivines and philosophers. _Verborum ut nummorum_, it is in words as it\nis in money: use makes them proper and current. A _tyrant_ at first\nsignified a lawful and just prince; now, use hath quite changed the\nsense of it, to denote either a usurper or an oppressor. The word\n_pr\u00e6munire_ is now grown a good word in our English laws, by use and\ntract of time; and yet at first it was merely mistaken for a\n_pr\u00e6monere_. The names of Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, were derived at first\nfrom those heathenish deities, the Sun, the Moon, and the warlike god of\nthe Germans. Now we use them for distinction sake only, without any\nrelation to their first original. He is too froward, that will refuse a\npiece of coin that is current throughout the world, because it is not\nstamped after his own fancy. So is he that rejects a good word, because\nhe understands not the derivation of it. We see foreign words are daily\nnaturalized and made free denizens in every country. But why are the\nterms improper? \u2018Because,\u2019 saith he, \u2018it attributes command, and\nsubjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth\nor family among themselves, and could speak one to another.\u2019 Therefore,\nhe saith, (_o_) they who invented this term of _actus imperatus_,\nunderstood not anything what it signified. No; why not? It seemeth to\nme, they understood it better than those who except against it. They\nknew there are _mental terms_, which are only conceived in the mind, as\nwell as _vocal terms_, which are expressed with the tongue. They knew,\nthat howsoever a superior do intimate a direction to his inferior, it is\nstill a command. Tarquin commanded his son by only striking off the tops\nof the poppies, and was by him both understood and obeyed. Though there\nbe no formal commonwealth or family either in the body or in the soul of\nman, yet there is a subordination in the body, of the inferior members\nto the head; there is a subordination in the soul, of the inferior\nfaculties to the rational will. Far be it from a reasonable man so far\nto dishonour his own nature, as to equal fancy with understanding, or\nthe sensitive appetite with the reasonable will. A power of command\nthere is, without all question; though there be some doubt in what\nfaculty this command doth principally reside, whether in the will or in\nthe understanding. The true resolution is, that the directive command or\ncounsel is in the understanding; and the applicative command, or empire\nfor putting in execution of what is directed, is in the will. The same\nanswer serves for his second impropriety, about the word _elicite_. For\nsaith he, \u2018as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured, or\ndrawn by fair means, out of the ability to dance; so is it absurdly\nsaid, that to will or choose, is an act drawn out of the power to will\u2019.\nHis objection is yet more improper than the expression. The art of\ndancing rather resembles the understanding than the will. That drawing\nwhich the Schools intend, is clear of another nature from that which he\nconceives. By _elicitation_, he understands a persuading or enticing\nwith flattering words, or sweet alluring insinuations, to choose this or\nthat. But that _elicitation_ which the Schools intend, is a deducing of\nthe power of the will into act; that drawing which they mention, is\nmerely from the appetibility of the object, or of the end. As a man\ndraws a child after him with the sight of a fair apple, or a shepherd\ndraws his sheep after him with the sight of a green bough: so the end\ndraws the will to it by a metaphorical motion. What he understands here\nby an ability to dance, is more than I know, or any man else, until he\nexpress himself in more proper terms; whether he understand the\nlocomotive faculty alone, or the art or acquired habit of dancing alone,\nor both of these jointly. It may be said aptly without any absurdity,\nthat the act of dancing is drawn out (_elicitur_) of the locomotive\nfaculty helped by the acquired habit. He who is so scrupulous about the\nreceived phrases of the Schools, should not have let so many improper\nexpressions have dropt from his pen; as in this very passage, he\nconfounds the _compelling_ of a voluntary action, with the _commanding_\nof a voluntary action, and _willing_ with _electing_, which, he saith,\n\u2018are all one\u2019. Yet _to will_ properly respects the end, _to elect_ the\nmeans.\n\n(_p_) \u201cHis other objection against this distinction of the acts of the\nwill into _elicite_ and _imperate_, is obscurity. \u2018Might it not,\u2019 saith\nhe, \u2018have been as easily said in English, a voluntary action.\u2019 Yes, it\nmight have been said as easily, but not as truly, nor properly.\nWhatsoever hath its original from the will, whether immediately or\nmediately, whether it be a proper act of the will itself, as to elect,\nor an act of the understanding, as to deliberate, or an act of the\ninferior faculties or of the members, is a voluntary action: but neither\nthe act of reason, nor of the senses, nor of the sensitive appetite, nor\nof the members, are the proper acts of the will, nor drawn immediately\nout of the will itself; but the members and faculties are applied to\ntheir proper and respective acts by the power of the will.\n\n\u201cAnd so he comes to cast up the total sum of my second reason with the\nsame faith that the unjust steward did make his accounts (Luke xvi).\n\u2018The sum of J. D.\u2019s distinction is,\u2019 saith he, \u2018that a voluntary act may\nbe done on compulsion,\u2019 (just contrary to what I have maintained), \u2018that\nis to say, by foul means: but to will that or any act, cannot be but by\nallurement or fair means.\u2019 I confess the distinction is mine, because I\nuse it; as the sun is mine, or the air is mine, that is common to me\nwith all who treat of this subject. (_q_) But his mistakes are so thick,\nboth in relating my mind and his own, that the reader may conclude he is\nwandered out of his known way. I will do my duty to show him the right\nway. First, no acts which are properly said to be compelled, are\nvoluntary. Secondly, acts of terror, (which he calls foul means), which\nare sometimes in a large improper sense called compulsory actions, may\nbe, and for the most part are, consistent with true liberty. Thirdly,\nactions proceeding from blandishments or sweet persuasions, (which he\ncalls fair means), if they be indeliberated, as in children who want the\nuse of reason, are not presently free actions. Lastly, the strength of\nconsequent and deliberated desires doth neither diminish guilt, nor\nexcuse from punishment, as just fears of extreme and imminent dangers\nthreatened by extrinsical agents often do; because the strength of the\nformer proceeds from our own fault, and was freely elected in the causes\nof it; but neither desires nor fears, which are consequent and\ndeliberated, do absolutely necessitate the will.\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. XX.\n\n(_a_) \u201cNow again he tells us, that election is not opposite to either\nnecessitation or compulsion. He might even as well tell us, that a stone\nthrown upwards moves naturally, or that a woman can be ravished with her\nown will. Consent takes away the rape,\u201d &c. If that which I have told\nhim again, be false, why shows he not why it is false? Here is not one\nword of argument against it. To say, I might have said as well that a\nstone thrown upwards moves naturally, is no refutation, but a denial. I\nwill not dispute with him, whether a stone thrown up move naturally or\nnot. I shall only say to those readers whose judgments are not defaced\nwith the abuse of words, that as a stone moveth not upwards of itself,\nbut by the power of the external agent who giveth it a beginning of that\nmotion; so also when the stone falleth, it is moved downward by the\npower of some other agent, which, though it be imperceptible to the eye,\nis not imperceptible to reason. But because this is not proper discourse\nfor the Bishop, and because I have elsewhere discoursed thereof\nexpressly, I shall say nothing of it here. And whereas he says, \u2018consent\ntakes away the rape\u2019; it may perhaps be true, and I think it is; but\nhere it not only inferreth nothing, but was also needless, and therefore\nin a public writing is an indecent instance, though sometimes not\nunnecessary in a spiritual court. In the next place, he wonders how \u201ca\nman is compelled, and yet free to do what he will\u201d; that is to say, how\na man is made to will, and yet free to do what he will. If he had said,\nhe wondered how a man can be compelled to will, and yet be free to do\nthat which he would have done if he had not been compelled, it had been\nsomewhat; as it is, it is nothing. Again he says, \u201che who submits to an\nenemy for saving his life, doth either only counterfeit, or else his\nwill is changed,\u201d &c.: all which is true. But when he says he doth\ncounterfeit, he doth not insinuate that he may counterfeit lawfully; for\nthat would prejudice him hereafter, in case he should have need of\nquarter. But how this maketh for him, or against me, I perceive not.\n\u201cThere is a vast difference,\u201d saith he, \u201cbetween compelling and changing\nthe will. Either God or man may change the will of man, either by\nvarying the condition of things, or by informing the party otherwise;\nbut compelled it cannot be,\u201d &c. I say the same; the will cannot be\ncompelled; but the man may be, and is then compelled, when his will is\nchanged by the fear of force, punishment, or other hurt from God or man.\nAnd when his will is changed, there is a new will formed, (whether it be\nby God or man), and that necessarily; and consequently the actions that\nflow from that will, are both voluntary, free, and necessary,\nnotwithstanding that he was compelled to do them. Which maketh not for\nthe Bishop, but for me.\n\n(_b_) \u201cWherefore this kind of actions are called mixed actions, that is\npartly voluntary, partly involuntary, &c. So supposing a man were not in\nthat distress, they are involuntary.\u201d That some actions are partly\nvoluntary, partly involuntary, is not a new, but a false opinion. For\none and the same action can never be both voluntary and involuntary. If\ntherefore parts of an action be actions, he says no more but that some\nactions are voluntary, some involuntary; or that one multitude of\nactions may be partly voluntary, partly involuntary. But that one action\nshould be partly voluntary, partly involuntary, is absurd. And it is the\nabsurdity of those authors which he unwarily gave credit to. But to say,\nsupposing the man had not been in distress, that then the action had\nbeen involuntary, is to say, that the throwing of a man\u2019s goods into the\nsea, supposing he had not been in a storm, had been an involuntary\naction; which is also an absurdity; for he would not have done it, and\ntherefore it had been no action at all. And this absurdity is his own.\n\n(_c_) \u201cHis other instance of a man forced to prison, that he may choose\nwhether he will be haled thither upon the ground or walk upon his feet,\nis not true. By his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it\npleaseth them who have him in their power.\u201d It is enough for the use I\nmake of that instance, that a man when in the necessity of going to\nprison, though he cannot elect nor deliberate of being prisoner in the\njail, may nevertheless deliberate sometimes, whether he shall walk or be\nhaled thither.\n\n(_d_) \u201cHaving laid this foundation, he begins to build upon it, that\nother passions do necessitate as much as fear. But he errs doubly,\u201d &c.\nFirst, he says, I err in this, that I say that fear determines the\nrational will naturally and necessarily. And first, I answer, that I\nnever used that term of rational will. There is nothing rational but\nGod, angels, and men. The will is none of these. I would not have\nexcepted against this expression, but that every where he speaketh of\nthe will and other faculties as of men, or spirits in men\u2019s bellies.\nSecondly, he offereth nothing to prove the contrary. For that which\nfolloweth: \u201cthe last and greatest of five terrible things is death; yet\nthe fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to a dishonest\naction; the fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three\nchildren to worship an idol, nor the fear of the lions necessitate\nDaniel to omit his duty to God,\u201d &c.: I grant him that the greatest of\nfive (or of fifteen, for he had no more reason for five than fifteen)\nterrible things doth not always necessitate a man to do a dishonest\naction, and that the fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the\nthree children, nor the lions Daniel, to omit their duty; for somewhat\nelse, namely, their confidence in God, did necessitate them to do their\nduty. That the fear of God\u2019s wrath doth expel corporeal fear, is well\nsaid, and according to the text he citeth: and proveth strongly, that\nfear of the greater evil may necessitate in a man a courage to endure\nthe lesser evil.\n\n(_e_) \u201c_Da veniam imperator; tu carcerem, ille gehennam\nminatur_:--Excuse me, O Emperor; thou threatenest men with prison, but\nGod threatens me with hell.\u201d This sentence, and that which he saith No.\nXVII, that neither the civil judge is the proper judge, nor the law of\nthe land is the proper rule of sin, and divers other sayings of his to\nthe same effect, make it impossible for any nation in the world to\npreserve themselves from civil wars. For all men living equally\nacknowledging, that the High and Omnipotent God is to be obeyed before\nthe greatest emperors; every one may pretend the commandment of God to\njustify his disobedience. And if one man pretendeth that God commands\none thing, and another man that he commands the contrary, what equity is\nthere to allow the pretence of one more than of another? Or what peace\ncan there be, if they be all allowed alike? There will therefore\nnecessarily arise discord and civil war, unless there be a judge agreed\nupon, with authority given to him by every one of them, to show them and\ninterpret to them the Word of God; which interpreter is always the\nemperor, king, or other sovereign person, who therefore ought to be\nobeyed. But the Bishop thinks that to shew us and interpret to us the\nWord of God, belongeth to the clergy; wherein I cannot consent unto him.\nExcuse me, O Bishop, you threaten me with that you cannot do; but the\nemperor threateneth me with death, and is able to do what he\nthreateneth.\n\n(_f_) \u201cSecondly, he errs in his superstruction also. There is a great\ndifference, as to this case of justifying or not justifying an action,\nbetween force and fear, &c. Force doth not only lessen the sin, but\ntakes it quite away, &c.\u201d I know not to what point of my answer this\nreply of his is to be applied. I had said, the actions of men compelled\nare, nevertheless, voluntary. It seems that he calleth _compulsion_\nforce; but I call it a fear of force, or of damage to be done by force,\nby which fear a man\u2019s will is framed to somewhat to which he had no will\nbefore. Force taketh away the sin, because the action is not his that is\nforced, but his that forceth. It is not always so in compulsion;\nbecause, in this case, a man electeth the _less evil_ under the notion\nof _good_. But his instances of the betrothed damsel that was forced,\nand of Tamar, may, for anything there appeareth in the text, be\ninstances of compulsion, and yet the damsel and Tamar be both innocent.\nIn that which immediately followeth, concerning how far fear may\nextenuate a sin, there is nothing to be answered. I perceive in it he\nhath some glimmering of the truth, but not of the grounds thereof. It is\ntrue, that just fear dispenseth not with the precepts of God or nature;\nfor they are not dispensable; but it extenuateth the fault, not by\ndiminishing anything in the action, but by being no transgression. For\nif the fear be allowed, the action it produceth is allowed also. Nor\ndoth it dispense in any case with the law positive, but by making the\naction itself lawful; for the breaking of a law is always sin. And it is\ncertain that men are obliged to the observation of all positive\nprecepts, though with the loss of their lives, unless the right that a\nman hath to preserve himself make it, in case of a just fear, to be no\nlaw. \u201cThe omission of circumcision was no sin,\u201d he says, \u201cwhilst the\nIsraelites were travelling through the wilderness.\u201d It is very true, but\nthis has nothing to do with compulsion. And the cause why it was no sin,\nwas this: they were ready to obey it, whensoever God should give them\nleisure and rest from travel, whereby they might be cured; or at least\nwhen God, that daily spake to their conductor in the desert, should\nappoint him to renew that sacrament.\n\n(_g_) \u201cI will propose a case to him,\u201d &c. The case is this. A servant is\nrobbed of his master\u2019s money by the highway, but is acquitted because he\nwas forced. Another servant spends his master\u2019s money in a tavern. Why\nis he not acquitted also, seeing he was necessitated? \u201cWould,\u201d saith he,\n\u201cT. H. admit of this excuse?\u201d I answer, no: but I would do that to him,\nwhich should necessitate him to behave himself better another time, or\nat least necessitate another to behave himself better by his example.\n\n(_h_) \u201cHe talks much of _the motives to do, and the motives to forbear_,\nhow they work upon and determine a man; as if a reasonable man were no\nmore than a tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by the rackets of the\nsecond causes,\u201d &c. May not great things be produced by second causes,\nas well as little; and a foot-ball as well as a tennis-ball? But the\nBishop can never be driven from this, that the will hath power to move\nitself; but says it is all one to say, that \u201can agent can determine\nitself,\u201d and that \u201cthe will is determined by motives extrinsical\u201d. He\nadds, that \u201cif there be no necessitation before the judgment of right\nreason doth dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent nor\nextrinsical necessitation at all\u201d. I say indeed, the effect is not\nproduced before the last dictate of the understanding; but I say not,\nthat the necessity was not before; he knows I say, it is from eternity.\nWhen a cannon is planted against a wall, though the battery be not made\ntill the bullet arrive, yet the necessity was present all the while the\nbullet was going to it, if the wall stood still: and if it slipped away,\nthe hitting of somewhat else was necessary, and that antecedently.\n\n(_i_) \u201cAll the world knows, that when the agent is determined by\nhimself, then the effect is determined likewise in its cause.\u201d Yes, when\nthe agent is determined by himself, then the effect is determined\nlikewise in its cause; and so anything else is what he will have it. But\nnothing is determined by itself, nor is there any man in the world that\nhath any conception answerable to those words. But \u201cmotives,\u201d he says,\n\u201cdetermine not naturally, but morally\u201d. This also is insignificant; for\nall motion is natural or supernatural. Moral motion is a mere word,\nwithout any imagination of the mind correspondent to it. I have heard\nmen talk of a motion in a court of justice; perhaps this is it which he\nmeans by moral motion. But certainly, when the tongue of the judge and\nthe hands of the clerks are thereby moved, the motion is natural, and\nproceeds from natural causes; which causes also were natural motions of\nthe tongue of the advocate. And whereas he adds, that if this were true,\nthen \u201cnot only motives, but reason itself and deliberation were vain\u201d;\nit hath been sufficiently answered before, that therefore they are not\nvain, because by them is produced the effect. I must also note, that\noftentimes in citing my opinion he puts in instead of mine, those terms\nof his own, which upon all occasions I complain of for absurdity; as\nhere he makes me to say, that which I did never say, \u201cspecial influence\nof extrinsical causes\u201d.\n\n(_k_) \u201cHe saith, that \u2018the ignorance of the true causes and their power,\nis the reason why we ascribe the effect to liberty; but when we\nseriously consider the causes of things, we acknowledge a necessity.\u2019 No\nsuch thing, but just the contrary.\u201d If he understand the authors which\nhe readeth upon this point, no better than he understands what I have\nhere written, it is no wonder he understandeth not the truth of the\nquestion. I said not, that when we consider the causes of things, but\nwhen we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge\nnecessity. \u201cNo such thing,\u201d says the Bishop, \u201cbut just the contrary; the\nmore we consider, and the clearer we understand, the greater is the\nliberty,\u201d &c. Is there any doubt, if a man could foreknow, as God\nforeknows, that which is hereafter to come to pass, but that he would\nalso see and know the causes which shall bring it to pass, and how they\nwork, and make the effect necessary? For necessary it is, whatsoever God\nforeknoweth. But we that foresee them not, may consider as much as we\nwill, and understand as clearly as we will, but are never the nearer to\nthe knowledge of their necessity; and that, I said, was the cause why we\nimpute those events to liberty, and not to causes.\n\n(_l_) \u201cLastly, he tells us, that _the will doth choose of necessity, as\nwell as the fire burns of necessity_. If he intend no more but this,\nthat election is the proper and natural act of the will, as burning is\nof the fire &c., he speaks truly, but most impertinently; for the\nquestion is not now of the elective power, _in actu primo_, &c.\u201d Here\nagain he makes me to speak nonsense. I said, \u201cthe man chooseth of\nnecessity\u201d; he says I say, \u201cthe will chooseth of necessity\u201d. And why:\nbut because he thinks I ought to speak as he does, and say as he does\nhere, that \u201celection is the act of the will\u201d. No: election is the act of\na man, as power to elect is the power of a man. Election and will are\nall one act of a man; and the power to elect, and the power to will, one\nand the same power of a man. But the Bishop is confounded by the use of\ncalling by the name of will, the power of willing in the future; as they\nalso were confounded, that first brought in this senseless term of\n_actus primus_. My meaning is, that the election I shall have of\nanything hereafter, is now as necessary, as that the fire, that now is\nand continueth, shall burn any combustible matter thrown into it\nhereafter: or to use his own terms, the will hath no more power to\nsuspend its willing, than the burning of the fire to suspend its\nburning: or rather more properly, the man hath no more power to suspend\nhis will, than the fire to suspend its burning. Which is contrary to\nthat which he would have, namely, that a man should have power to refuse\nwhat he wills, and to suspend his own appetite. For to refuse what one\nwilleth, implieth a contradiction; the which also is made much more\nabsurd by his expression. For he saith, the will hath power to refuse\nwhat it wills, and to suspend its own appetite: whereas _the will_, and\n_the willing_, and _the appetite_ is the same thing. He adds that \u201ceven\nthe burning of the fire, if it be considered as it is invested with all\nparticular circumstances, is not so necessary an action as T. H.\nimagineth\u201d. He doth not sufficiently understand what I imagine. For I\nimagine, that of the fire which shall burn five hundred years hence, I\nmay truly say now, it shall burn necessarily; and of that which shall\nnot burn then, (for fire may sometimes not burn the combustible matter\nthrown into it, as in the case of the three children), that it is\nnecessary it shall not burn.\n\n(_m_) \u201cTwo things are required to make an effect necessary: first that\nit be produced by a necessary cause, &c.: secondly, that it be\nnecessarily produced, &c.\u201d To this I say nothing, but that I understand\nnot how a cause can be necessary, and the effect not be necessarily\nproduced.\n\n(_n_) \u201cMy second reason against this distinction of liberty from\ncompulsion, but not from necessitation, is new, and demonstrates\nclearly, that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to\ncompel the will, so far as the will is capable of compulsion; and that\nhe who doth necessitate the will to evil after that manner, is the true\ncause of evil, &c.\u201d By this second reason, which he says _is new, and\ndemonstrates_, &c, I cannot find what reason he means. For there are but\ntwo, whereof the latter is in these words: \u201cSecondly, to rip up the\nbottom of this business, this I take to be the clear resolution of the\nSchools; there is a double act of the will; the one more remote, called\n_imperatus_, &c.; the other act is nearer, called _actus elicitus_,\u201d &c.\nBut I doubt whether this be it he means, or no. For this being the\nresolution of the Schools, is not new; and being a distinction only, is\nno demonstration; though perhaps he may use the word demonstration, as\nevery unlearned man now-a-days does, to signify any argument of his own.\nAs for the distinction itself, because the terms are Latin, and never\nused by any author of the Latin tongue, to shew their impertinence I\nexpounded them in English, and left them to the reader\u2019s judgment to\nfind the absurdity of them himself. And the Bishop in this part of his\nreply endeavours to defend them. And first, he calls it a trivial and\ngrammatical objection, to say they are _improper_ and _obscure_. Is\nthere anything less beseeming a _divine_ or a _philosopher_, than to\nspeak _improperly_ and _obscurely_, where the truth is in question?\nPerhaps it may be tolerable in one that divineth, but not in him that\npretendeth to demonstrate. It is not the universal current of divines\nand philosophers, that giveth words their authority, but the generality\nof them who acknowledge that they understand them. _Tyrant_ and\n_pr\u00e6munire_, though their signification be changed, yet they are\nunderstood; and so are the names of the days, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday.\nAnd when English readers not engaged in School divinity, shall find\n_imperate_ and _elicit acts_ as intelligible as those, I will confess I\nhad no reason to find fault.\n\nBut my braving against that famous and most necessary distinction,\nbetween the elicit and imperate acts of the will, he says was only to\nhide from the eyes of the reader a tergiversation in not answering this\nargument of his; \u2018he who doth necessitate the will to evil, is the true\ncause of evil; but God is not the cause of evil; therefore he does not\nnecessitate the will to evil\u2019. This argument is not to be found in this\nNo. XX., to which I here answered; nor had I ever said that the will was\ncompelled. But he, taking all necessitation for compulsion, doth now in\nthis place, from necessitation simply, bring in this inference\nconcerning the cause of evil, and thinks he shall force me to say that\nGod is the cause of sin. I shall say only what is said in the Scripture,\n_non est malum, quod ego non feci_. I shall say what Micaiah saith to\nAhab, (1 Kings xxii. 23): _Behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit into\nthe mouth of all these thy prophets_. I shall say that that is true,\nwhich the prophet David saith (2 Sam. xvi. 10): _Let him curse; because\nthe Lord hath said unto him, curse David_. But that which God himself\nsaith of himself (1 Kings xii. 15): _The king hearkened not to the\npeople, for the cause was from the Lord_: I will not say, least the\nBishop exclaim against me; but leave it to be interpreted by those that\nhave authority to interpret the Scriptures. I say further, that to cause\nsin is not always sin, nor can be sin in him that is not subject to some\nhigher power; but to use so unseemly a phrase, as to say that God is the\ncause of sin, because it soundeth so like to saying that God sinneth, I\ncan never be forced by so weak an argument as this of his. Luther says,\n_we act necessarily; necessarily by necessity of immutability, not by\nnecessity of constraint_: that is in plain English, necessarily, but not\nagainst our wills. Zanchius says, (_Tract. Theol._ cap. VI. Thes. I.):\n_The freedom of our will doth not consist in this, that there is no\nnecessity of our sinning; but in this, that there is no constraint_.\nBucer (_Lib. de Concordia_): _Whereas the Catholics say, man has free\nwill, we must understand it of freedom from constraint, and not freedom\nfrom necessity_. Calvin (_Inst._ cap. II. sec. VI.): _And thus shall man\nbe said to have free will, not because he hath equal freedom to do good\nand evil, but because he does the evil he does, not by constraint, but\nwillingly_. Monsr. du Moulin, in his _Buckler of the Faith_ (art. IX):\n_The necessity of sinning is not repugnant to the freedom of the will.\nWitness the devils, who are necessarily wicked, and yet sin freely\nwithout constraint._ And the Synod of Dort: _Liberty is not opposite to\nall kinds of necessity and determination. It is indeed opposite to the\nnecessity of constraint: but standeth well enough with the necessity of\ninfallibility._ I could add more: for all the famous doctors of the\nReformed Churches, and with them St. Augustin, are of the same opinion.\nNone of these denied that God is the cause of all motion and action, or\nthat God is the cause of all laws; and yet they were never forced to\nsay, that God is the cause of sin.\n\n(_o_) \u201c\u2018They who invented this term of _actus imperatus_, understood\nnot\u2019, he saith, \u2018any thing what it signified.\u2019 No? Why not? It seemeth\nto me, they understood it better than those who except against it. They\nknew there are _mental terms_, which are only conceived in the mind, as\nwell as _vocal terms_, which are expressed with the tongue, &c.\u201d In this\nplace the Bishop hath discovered the ground of all his errors in\nphilosophy, which is this; that he thinketh, when he repeateth the words\nof a proposition in his mind, that is, when he fancieth the words\nwithout speaking them, that then he conceiveth the things which the\nwords signify: and this is the most general cause of false opinions. For\nmen can never be deceived in the conceptions of things, though they may\nbe, and are most often deceived by giving unto them wrong terms or\nappellations, different from those which are commonly used and\nconstituted to signify their conceptions. And therefore they that study\nto attain the certain knowledge of the truth, do use to set down\nbeforehand all the terms they are to express themselves by, and declare\nin what sense they shall use them constantly. And by this means, the\nreader having an idea of every thing there named, cannot conceive amiss.\nBut when a man from the hearing of a word hath no idea of the thing\nsignified, but only of the sound and of the letters whereof the word is\nmade, which is that he here calleth _mental terms_, it is impossible he\nshould conceive aright, or bring forth any thing but absurdity; as he\ndoth here, when he says, \u201cthat when Tarquin delivered his commands to\nhis son by only striking off the tops of the poppies, he did it by\n_mental terms_\u201d; as if to strike off the head of a poppy, were a mental\nterm. It is the sound and the letters, that maketh him think _elicitus_\nand _imperatus_ somewhat. And it is the same thing that makes him say,\nfor think it he cannot, that to will or choose, is drawn, or allured, or\nfetched out of the power to will. For drawing cannot be imagined but of\nbodies; and therefore to will, to speak, to write, to dance, to leap, or\nany way to be moved, cannot be said intelligibly to be _drawn_, much\nless to be drawn out of a power, that is to say, out of an ability; for\nwhatsoever is drawn out, is drawn out of one place into another. He that\ncan discourse in this manner in philosophy, cannot probably be thought\nable to discourse rationally in any thing.\n\n(_p_) \u201cHis other objection against this distinction of the acts of the\nwill into _elicit_ and _imperate_, is obscurity. \u2018Might it not,\u2019 saith\nhe, \u2018have been as easily said in English, _a voluntary action_?\u2019 Yes it\nmight have been said as easily, but not as truly, nor as properly.\u201d He\nsays, _actus imperatus_ is when a man opens or shuts his eyes at the\ncommand of the will. I say, when a man opens and shuts his eyes\naccording to his will, that it is a voluntary action; and I believe we\nmean one and the same thing. Whether of us speak more properly or more\ntruly, let the reader judge.\n\n(_q_) \u201cBut his mistakes are so thick, &c., I will do my duty to shew him\nthe right way. First, no acts which are properly said to be compelled,\nare voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror, &c.\u201d This is nothing but Tohu\nand Bohu.\n\n NO. XXI.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThe rest are umbrages quickly dispelled. First, the astrologer\nsteps up, and subjects liberty to the motions of heaven, to the aspects\nand ascensions of the stars:\n\n ----Plus etenim fati valet hora benigni,\n Quam si nos Veneris commendet epistola Marti.\n\n\u201cI stand not much upon them, who cannot see the fishes swimming beside\nthem in the rivers, yet believe they see those which are in heaven; who\npromise great treasures to others, and beg a groat for themselves. The\nstars at the most do but incline, they cannot necessitate.\n\n\u201cSecondly, the physician subjects liberty to the complexion and\ntemperature of the body. But yet this comes not home to a necessity.\nSocrates, and many others, by assiduous care have corrected the\npernicious propensions, which flowed from their temperatures.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ In the rest of his discourse he reckoneth up the opinions of\ncertain professions of men, touching the causes wherein the necessity of\nthings, which they maintain, consisteth. And first, he saith, the\nastrologer deriveth his necessity from the stars. Secondly, that the\nphysician attributeth it to the temper of the body. For my part, I am\nnot of their opinion; because neither the stars alone, nor the\ntemperature of the patient alone is able to produce any effect without\nthe concurrence of all other agents. For there is hardly any one action,\nhow casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever\nis _in rerum natura_. Which, because it is a great paradox, and depends\non many antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place.\n\n_J. D._ \u201cTowards the latter end of my discourse, I answered some\nspecious pretences against liberty. The two first were of the astrologer\nand the physician: the one subjecting liberty to the motions and\ninfluences of the heavenly bodies; the other to the complexions of men.\n(_a_) The sum of my answer was, that the stars and complexions do\nincline, but not at all necessitate the will: to which all judicious\nastronomers and physicians do assent. And T. H. himself doth not dissent\nfrom it. So as to this part, there needs no reply.\n\n(_b_) \u201cBut whereas he mentions a \u2018great paradox of his own, that there\nis hardly any one action to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever\nis _in rerum natura_\u2019; I can but smile to see with what ambition our\ngreat undertakers do affect to be accounted the first founders of\nstrange opinions, as if the devising of an ill-grounded paradox were as\ngreat an honour as the invention of the needle, or the discovery of the\nnew world. And as to this paradox in particular, I meddle not with\nnatural actions, because the subject of my discourse is moral liberty.\nBut if he intend not only the kinds of things, but every individual\ncreature, and not only in natural but voluntary actions, I desire to\nknow how Prester John, or the great Mogul, or the king of China, or any\none of so many millions of their subjects, do concur to my writing of\nthis reply. If they do not, among his other speculations concerning this\nmatter I hope he will give us some restrictions. It were hard to make\nall the negroes accessary to all the murders that are committed in\nEurope.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. XXI.\n\nThere is not much in this part of his reply that needeth animadversion.\nBut I must observe, where he saith, (_a_) \u201cthe sum of my answer was,\nthat the stars and complexions do incline, but not at all necessitate\nthe will:\u201d he answereth nothing at all to me, who attribute not the\nnecessitation of the will to the stars and complexions, but to the\naggregate of all things together that are in motion. I do not say, that\nthe stars or complexions of themselves do incline men to will; but when\nmen are inclined, I must say that that inclination was necessitated by\nsome causes or other.\n\n(_b_) \u201cBut whereas he mentions \u2018a great paradox of his own; that there\nis hardly any one action, to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever\nis _in rerum natura_\u2019; I can but smile to see with what ambition our\ngreat undertakers do affect to be accounted the first founders of\nstrange opinions, &c.\u201d The Bishop speaks often of paradoxes with such\nscorn or detestation, that a simple reader would take a paradox either\nfor felony or some other heinous crime, or else for some ridiculous\nturpitude; whereas perhaps a judicious reader knows what the word\nsignifies; and that a paradox, is an opinion not yet generally received.\nChristian religion was once a paradox; and a great many other opinions\nwhich the Bishop now holdeth, were formerly paradoxes. Insomuch as when\na man calleth an opinion a paradox, he doth not say it is untrue, but\nsignifieth his own ignorance; for if he understood it, he would call it\neither a truth or an error. He observes not, that but for paradoxes we\nshould be now in that savage ignorance, which those men are in that have\nnot, or have not long had laws and commonwealth, from whence proceedeth\nscience and civility. There was not long since a scholar that\nmaintained, that if the least thing that had weight should be laid down\nupon the hardest body that could be, supposing it an anvil of diamant,\nit would at the first access make it yield. This I thought, and much\nmore the Bishop would have thought, a paradox. But when he told me, that\neither that would do it, or all the weight of the world would not do it,\nbecause if the whole weight did it, every the least part thereof would\ndo its part, I saw no reason to dissent. In like manner when I say,\n\u2018there is hardly any one action to the causing of which concurs not\nwhatsoever is _in rerum natura_;\u2019 it seems to the Bishop a great\nparadox; and if I should say that all action is the effect of motion,\nand that there cannot be a motion in one part of the world, but the same\nmust also be communicated to all the rest of the world, he would say\nthat this were no less a paradox. But yet if I should say, that if a\nlesser body, as a concave sphere or tun, were filled with air, or other\nliquid matter, and that any one little particle thereof were moved, all\nthe rest would be moved also, he would conceive it to be true, or if not\nhe, a judicious reader would. It is not the greatness of the tun that\naltereth the case; and therefore the same would be true also, if the\nwhole world were the tun; for it is the greatness of this tun that the\nBishop comprehendeth not. But the truth is comprehensible enough, and\nmay be said without ambition of being the founder of strange opinions.\nAnd though a grave man may smile at it, he that is both grave and wise\nwill not.\n\n NO. XXII.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThirdly, the moral philosopher tells us how we are haled hither\nand thither with outward objects. To this I answer, \u201cFirst, that the\npower which outward objects have over us, is for the most part by our\nown default, because of those vicious habits which we have contracted.\nTherefore though the actions seem to have a kind of violence in them,\nyet they were free and voluntary in their first originals. As a\nparalytic man, to use Aristotle\u2019s comparison, shedding the liquor\ndeserves to be punished, for though his act be unwilling, yet his\nintemperance was willing, whereby he contracted this infirmity.\n\n\u201cSecondly I answer, that concupiscence, and custom, and bad company, and\noutward objects do indeed make a proclivity, but not a necessity. By\nprayers, tears, meditations, vows, watchings, fastings, humi-cubations,\na man may get a contrary habit, and gain the victory, not only over\noutward objects, but also over his own corruptions, and become the king\nof the little world of himself.\n\n Si metuis, si prava cupis, si duceris ir\u00e2,\n Servitii patiere jugum, tolerabis iniquas\n Interius leges. Tunc omnia jure tenebis,\n Cum poteris rex esse tui.\n\n\u201cThirdly, a resolved mind, which weighs all things judiciously and\nprovides for all occurrences, is not so easily surprised with outward\nobjects. Only Ulysses wept not at the meeting with his wife and son. I\nwould beat thee, said the philosopher, but that I am angry. One spake\nlowest, when he was most moved. Another poured out the water, when he\nwas thirsty. Another made a covenant with his eyes. Neither opportunity\nnor enticement could prevail with Joseph. Nor the music nor the fire,\nwith the three children. It is not the strength of the wind, but the\nlightness of the chaff, which causeth it to be blown away. Outward\nobjects do not impose a moral, much less a physical necessity; they may\nbe dangerous, but cannot be destructive to true liberty.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them that say,\nexternal objects presented to men of such and such temperatures, do make\ntheir actions necessary; and says, the power, that such objects have\nover us, proceeds from our own fault. But that is nothing to the\npurpose, if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own\npower. And therefore that opinion may hold true, for all this answer.\nFurther, he saith, prayer, fasting, &c., may alter our habits. It is\ntrue: but when they do so, they are causes of the contrary habit, and\nmake it necessary; as the former habit had been necessary, if prayer,\nfasting, &c., had not been. Besides we are not moved, nor disposed to\nprayer or any other action, but by outward objects, as pious company,\ngodly preachers, or something equivalent. In the next place he saith, a\nresolved mind is not easily surprised. As the mind of Ulysses, who, when\nothers wept, he alone wept not. And of the philosopher that abstained\nfrom striking, because he found himself angry. And of him that poured\nout the water, when he was thirsty; and the like. Such things I confess\nhave, or may have been done; and do prove only that it was not necessary\nfor Ulysses then to weep, nor for the philosopher to strike, nor for\nthat other man to drink: but it does not prove that it was not necessary\nfor Ulysses then to abstain, as he did, from weeping; nor the\nphilosopher to abstain, as he did, from striking; nor the other man to\nforbear drinking. And yet that was the thing he ought to have proved.\n\nLastly, he confesseth that the disposition of objects may be dangerous\nto liberty, but cannot be destructive. To which I answer, it is\nimpossible; for liberty is never in any other danger than to be lost.\nAnd if it cannot be lost, which he confesseth, I may infer it can be in\nno danger at all.\n\n_J. D._ (_a_) \u201cThe third pretence was out of moral philosophy\nmisunderstood, that outward objects do necessitate the will. I shall not\nneed to repeat what he hath omitted, but only to satisfy his exceptions.\n(_b_) The first is, that \u2018it is not material, \u2019though the power of\noutward objects do proceed from our own faults, if such faults of ours\nproceed not from causes in our own power\u2019. Well, but what if they do\nproceed from causes that are in our own power, as in truth they do? Then\nhis answer is a mere subterfuge. If our faults proceed from causes that\nare not, and were not in our own power, then they are not our faults at\nall. It is not a fault in us, not to do those things which never were in\nour power to do: but they are the faults of these causes from whence\nthey do proceed. (_c_) Next he confesseth, that it is in our power, by\ngood endeavours, to alter those vicious habits which we had contracted,\nand to get the contrary habit. \u2018True,\u2019 saith he, \u2018but then the contrary\nhabit doth necessitate the one way, as well as the former habit did the\nother way.\u2019 By which very consideration it appears, that that which he\ncalls a necessity, is no more but a proclivity. If it were a true\nnecessity, it could not be avoided nor altered by our endeavours. The\ntruth is, acquired habits do help and assist the faculty; but they do\nnot necessitate the faculty. He who hath gotten to himself an habit of\ntemperance, may yet upon occasion commit an intemperate act. And so on\nthe contrary. Acts are not opposed to habits, but other habits. (_d_) He\nadds, \u2018that we are not moved to prayer or any other action, but by\noutward objects, as pious company, godly preachers, or something\nequivalent\u2019. Wherein are two other mistakes: first, to make godly\npreachers and pious company to be outward objects; which are outward\nagents: secondly, to affirm that the will is not moved but by outward\nobjects. The will is moved by itself, by the understanding, by the\nsensitive passions, by angels good and bad, by men; and most effectually\nby acts or habits infused by God, whereby the will is excited\nextraordinarily indeed, but efficaciously and determinately. This is\nmore than equivalent with outward objects.\n\n\u201cAnother branch of mine answer was, that a resolved and prepared mind is\nable to resist both the appetibility of objects, and the unruliness of\npassions: as I showed by example. (_e_) He answers, that I prove Ulysses\nwas not necessitated to weep, nor the philosopher to strike; but I do\nnot prove that they were not necessitated to forbear. He saith true. I\nam not now proving, but answering. Yet my answer doth sufficiently prove\nthat which I intend; that the rational will hath power, both to slight\nthe most appetible objects, and to control the most unruly passions.\nWhen he hath given a clear solution to those proofs which I have\nproduced, then it will be time for him to cry for more work.\n\n\u201cLastly, whereas I say, that outward objects may be dangerous, but\ncannot be destructive to true liberty; he catcheth at it, (_f_) and\nobjects, that \u2018liberty is in no danger but to be lost; but I say it\ncannot be lost, therefore\u2019, he infers that, \u2018it is in no danger at all.\u2019\nI answer, first, that liberty is in more danger to be abused, than to be\nlost. Many more men do abuse their wits, than lose them. Secondly,\nliberty is in danger likewise to be weakened or diminished; as when it\nis clogged by vicious habits contracted by ourselves, and yet it is not\ntotally lost. Thirdly, though liberty cannot be totally lost out of the\nworld, yet it may be totally lost to this or that particular man, as to\nthe exercise of it. Reason is the root of liberty; and though nothing be\nmore natural to a man than reason, yet many by excess of study, or by\ncontinual gormandizing, or by some extravagant passion which they have\ncherished in themselves, or by doting too much upon some affected\nobject, do become very sots, and deprive themselves of the use of\nreason, and consequently of liberty. And when the benefit of liberty is\nnot thus universally lost, yet it may be lost respectively to this or\nthat particular occasion. As he who makes choice of a bad wife, hath\nlost his former liberty to choose a good one.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. XXII.\n\n(_a_) \u201cThe third pretence was out of moral philosophy misunderstood,\nthat outward objects do necessitate the will.\u201d I cannot imagine how the\nquestion, whether outward objects do necessitate or not necessitate the\nwill, can any way be referred to moral philosophy. The principles of\nmoral philosophy are the laws; wherewith outward objects have little to\ndo, as being for the most part inanimate, and which follow always the\nforce of nature without respect to moral laws. Nor can I conceive what\npurpose he had to bring this into his reply to my answer, wherein I\nattribute nothing in the action of outward objects to morality.\n\n(_b_) \u201cHis first exception is, that \u2018it is not material that the power\nof outward objects do proceed from our own faults, if such faults of\nours proceed not from causes in our own power\u2019. Well, but what if they\ndo proceed from causes that are in our own power, as in truth they do?\nThen his answer is a mere subterfuge.\u201d But how proves he that in truth\nthey do? \u2018Because else,\u2019 saith he, \u2018they are not our faults at all.\u2019\nVery well reasoned. A horse is lame from a cause that was not in his\npower: therefore the lameness is no fault in the horse. But his meaning\nis, it is no injustice unless the causes were in his own power. As if it\nwere not injustice, whatsoever is willingly done against the law;\nwhatsoever it be, that is the cause of the will to do it.\n\n(_c_) \u201cNext he confesseth, that it is in our power by good endeavours to\nalter those vicious habits which we had contracted, and to get the\ncontrary habits.\u201d There is no such confession in my answer. I said,\nprayer, fasting, &c., may alter our habits. But I never said that the\nwill to pray, fast, &c. is in our own power. \u201c\u2018True,\u2019 saith he, \u2018but\nthen the contrary habit doth necessitate the one way, as well as the\nformer habit did the other way.\u2019 By which very consideration it appears,\nthat that which he calls a necessity, is no more but a proclivity. If it\nwere a true necessity, it could not be avoided, nor altered by our\nendeavours.\u201d Again he mistakes: for I said that prayer, fasting, &c.\nwhen they alter our habits, do necessarily cause the contrary habits;\nwhich is not to say, that the habit necessitates, but is necessitated.\nBut this is common with him, to make me say that which out of reading,\nnot out of meditation, he useth to say himself. But how doth it appear,\nthat prayer and fasting, &c. make but a proclivity in men to do what\nthey do? For if it were but a proclivity, then what they do they do not.\nTherefore they either necessitate the will, or the will followeth not. I\ncontend for the truth of this only, that when the will followeth them,\nthey necessitate the will; and when a proclivity followeth, they\nnecessitate the proclivity. But the Bishop thinks I maintain, that that\nalso is produced necessarily, which is not produced at all.\n\n(_d_) \u201cHe adds, \u2018that we are not moved to prayer or any other action,\nbut by outward objects, as pious company, and godly preachers, or\nsomething equivalent\u2019. Wherein are two other mistakes: first, to make\ngodly preachers and pious company to be outward objects, which are\noutward agents; secondly, to affirm that the will is not moved but by\noutward objects. The will is moved by itself, &c\u201d. The first mistake, he\nurgeth that I call preachers and company objects. Is not the preacher to\nthe hearer the object of his hearing? No, perhaps he will say, it is the\nvoice which is the object; and that we hear not the preacher, but his\nvoice; as before he said, the object of sight was not the cause of\nsight. I must therefore once more make him smile with a great paradox,\nwhich is this; that in all the senses, the object is the agent; and that\nit is, when we hear a preacher, the preacher that we hear; and that his\nvoice is the same thing with the hearing and a fancy in the hearer,\nthough the motion of the lips and other organs of speech be his that\nspeaketh. But of this I have written more largely in a more proper\nplace.\n\nMy second mistake, in affirming that the will is not moved but by\noutward objects, is a mistake of his own. For I said not, the will is\nnot moved, but we are not moved: for I always avoid attributing motion\nto any thing but body. The will is produced, generated, formed, and\ncreated in such sort as accidents are effected in a corporeal subject;\nbut moved it cannot be, because it goeth not from place to place. And\nwhereas he saith, \u201cthe will is moved by itself,\u201d if he had spoken\nproperly as he ought to do, and said, the will is made or created by\nitself, he would presently have acknowledged that it was impossible. So\nthat it is not without cause men use improper language, when they mean\nto keep their errors from being detected. And because nothing can move\nthat is not itself moved, it is untruly said that either the will or any\nthing else is moved by itself, by the understanding, by the sensitive\npassions, or by acts or habits; or that acts or habits are infused by\nGod. For infusion is motion, and nothing is moved but bodies.\n\n(_e_) \u201cHe answers, that I prove Ulysses was not necessitated to weep,\nnor the philosopher to strike, but I do not prove that they were not\nnecessitated to forbear. He saith true; I am not now proving, but\nanswering.\u201d By his favour, though he be answering now, he was proving\nthen. And what he answers now, maketh nothing more toward a proof than\nwas before. For these words, \u201cthe rational will hath power to slight the\nmost appetible objects, and to control the most unruly passions,\u201d are no\nmore, being reduced into proper terms, than this: the appetite hath\npower to be without appetite towards most appetible objects, and to will\ncontrary to the most unruly will; which is jargon.\n\n(_f_) \u201cHe objects that \u2018liberty is in no danger, but to be lost; but I\nsay it cannot be lost; therefore\u2019, he infers, \u2018that it is in no danger\nat all.\u2019 I answer, first, that liberty is in more danger to be abused,\nthan lost, &c.; secondly, liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened\nby vicious habits; thirdly, it may be totally lost.\u201d It is true that a\nman hath more liberty one time than another, and in one place than\nanother; which is a difference of liberty as to the body. But as to the\nliberty of doing what we will, in those things we are able to do it\ncannot be greater one time than another. Consequently outward objects\ncan no ways endanger liberty, further than it destroyeth it. And his\nanswer, that liberty is in more danger to be abused than lost, is not to\nthe question, but a mere shift to be thought not silenced. And whereas\nhe says liberty is diminished by vicious habits, it cannot be understood\notherwise than that vicious habits make a man the less free to do\nvicious actions; which I believe is not his meaning. And lastly, whereas\nhe says that \u201cliberty is lost, when reason is lost; and that they who by\nexcess of study, or by continual gormandising, or by extravagant\npassion, &c., do become sots, have consequently lost their liberty\u201d: it\nrequireth proof. For, for any thing that I can observe, mad men and\nfools have the same liberty that other men have, in those things that\nare in their power to do.\n\n NO. XXIII.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cFourthly, the natural philosopher doth teach, that the will\ndoth necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding. It is\ntrue indeed the will should follow the direction of the understanding;\nbut I am not satisfied that it doth evermore follow it. Sometimes this\nsaying hath place: _video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor_. As that\ngreat Roman said of two suitors, that the one produced the better\nreasons, but the other must have the office. So reason often lies\ndejected at the feet of affection. Things nearer to the senses move more\npowerfully. Do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his\nchild, than for the sin of his soul; yet appreciatively in the\nestimation of judgment, he accounts the offence of God a greater evil\nthan any temporal loss.\n\n\u201cNext, I do not believe that a man is bound to weigh the expedience or\ninexpedience of every ordinary trivial action to the least grain in the\nbalance of his understanding; or to run up into his watch-tower with his\nperspective to take notice of every jackdaw that flies by, for fear of\nsome hidden danger. This seems to me to be a prostitution of reason to\npetit observations as concerning every rag that a man wears, each drop\nof drink, each morsel of bread that he eats, each pace that he walks.\nThus many steps must he go, not one more nor one less, under pain of\nmortal sin. What is this but a rack and a gibbet to the conscience? But\nGod leaves many things indifferent: though man may be so curious, he\nwill not. A good architect will be sure to provide sufficient materials\nfor his building; but what particular number of stones or trees, he\ntroubles not his head. And suppose he _should_ weigh each action thus,\nyet he _doth_ not; so still there is liberty. Thirdly, I conceive it is\npossible in this mist and weakness of human apprehension, for two\nactions to be so equally circumstantiated, that no discernible\ndifference can appear between them upon discussion. As suppose a\nchirurgeon should give two plaisters to his patient, and bid him apply\neither of them to his wound; what can induce his reason more to the one\nthan to the other, but that he may refer it to chance whether he will\nuse?\n\nBut leaving these probable speculations, which I submit to better\njudgments, I answer the philosopher briefly thus: admitting that the\nwill did necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding, as\ncertainly in many things it doth: yet, first, this is no extrinsical\ndetermination from without, and a man\u2019s own resolution is not\ndestructive to his own liberty, but depends upon it. So the person is\nstill free.\n\n\u201cSecondly, this determination is not antecedent, but joined with the\naction. The understanding and the will, are not different agents, but\ndistinct faculties of the same soul. Here is an infallibility, or an\nhypothetical necessity as we say, _quicquid est, quando est, necesse est\nesse_: a necessity of consequence, but not a necessity of consequent.\nThough an agent have certainly determined, and so the action be become\ninfallible, yet if the agent did determine freely, the action likewise\nis free.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ The fourth opinion which he rejecteth, is of them that make the\nwill necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding; but it\nseems he understands that tenet in another sense than I do. For he\nspeaketh as if they that held it, did suppose men must dispute the\nsequel of every action they do, great and small, to the least grain;\nwhich is a thing that he thinks with reason to be untrue. But I\nunderstand it to signify, that the will follows the last opinion or\njudgment, immediately preceding the action, concerning whether it be\ngood to do it or not; whether he hath weighed it long before, or not at\nall. And that I take to be the meaning of them that hold it. As for\nexample: when a man strikes, his will to strike follows necessarily that\nthought he had of the sequel of his stroke, immediately before the\nlifting of his hand. Now if it be understood in that sense, the last\ndictate of the understanding does certainly necessitate the action,\nthough not as the whole cause, yet as the last cause: as the last\nfeather necessitates the breaking of a horse\u2019s back, when there are so\nmany laid on before, as there needeth but the addition of that one to\nmake the weight sufficient. That which he allegeth against this, is\nfirst, out of a poet, who in the person of Medea says, _video meliora\nproboque, deteriora sequor_. But the saying, as pretty as it is, is not\ntrue. For though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her children,\nyet the last dictate of her judgment was that the present revenge on her\nhusband outweighed them all; and thereupon the wicked action followed\nnecessarily. Then the story of the Roman, that of two competitors said\none had the better reasons, but the other must have the office: this\nalso maketh against him. For the last dictate of his judgment that had\nthe bestowing of the office, was this; that it was better to take a\ngreat bribe, than reward a great merit. Thirdly, he objects, that things\nnearer the senses move more powerfully than reason. What followeth\nthence but this; that the sense of the present good is commonly more\nimmediate to the action, than the foresight of the evil consequents to\ncome? Fourthly, whereas he says, that do what a man can, he shall sorrow\nmore for the death of his son, than for the sin of his soul: it makes\nnothing to the last dictate of the understanding; but it argues plainly,\nthat sorrow for sin is not voluntary. And by consequence, repentance\nproceedeth from causes.\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThe fourth pretence alleged against liberty was, that the will\ndoth necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding. This\nobjection is largely answered before in several places of this reply,\nand particularly No. VII. In my former discourse I gave two answers to\nit: the one certain and undoubted, that (_a_) supposing the last dictate\nof the understanding did always determine the will, yet this\ndetermination being not antecedent in time, nor proceeding from\nextrinsical causes, but from the proper resolution of the agent, who had\nnow freely determined himself, it makes no absolute necessity, but only\nhypothetical, upon supposition that the agent hath determined his own\nwill after this or that manner. Which being the main answer, T. H. is so\nfar from taking it away, that he takes no notice of it. The other part\nof mine answer was probable; that it is not always certain that the will\ndoth always actually follow the last dictate of the understanding,\nthough it always ought to follow it. (_b_) Of which I gave then three\nreasons. One was, that actions may be so equally circumstantiated, or\nthe case so intricate, that reason cannot give a positive sentence, but\nleaves the election to liberty or chance. To this he answers not a word.\nAnother of my reasons was, because reason doth not weigh, nor is bound\nto weigh the convenience or inconvenience of every individual action to\nthe uttermost grain in the balance of true judgment. The truth of this\nreason is confessed by T. H.; though he might have had more abetters in\nthis than in the most part of his discourse, that nothing is\nindifferent; that a man cannot stroke his beard on one side, but it was\neither necessary to do it, or sinful to omit it. From which confession\nof his it follows, that in all those actions wherein reason doth not\ndefine what is most convenient, there the will is free from the\ndetermination of the understanding; and by consequence the last feather\nis wanting to break the horse\u2019s back. A third reason was, because\npassions and affections sometimes prevail against judgment: as I proved\nby the example of Medea and C\u00e6sar, by the nearness of the objects to the\nsenses, and by the estimation of a temporal loss more than sin. Against\nthis reason his whole answer is addressed. And first, (_c_) he\nexplaineth the sense of the assertion by the comparison of the last\nfeather; wherewith he seems to be delighted, seeing he useth it now the\nsecond time. But let him like it as he will, it is improper, for three\nreasons. First, the determination of the judgment is no part of the\nweight, but is the sentence of the trier. The understanding weigheth all\nthings, objects, means, circumstances, convenience, inconvenience; but\nitself is not weighed. Secondly, the sensitive passion, in some\nextraordinary cases, may give a counterfeit weight to the object, if it\ncan detain or divert reason from the balance: but ordinarily the means,\ncircumstances, and causes concurrent, they have their whole weight from\nthe understanding; so as they do not press the horse\u2019s back at all,\nuntil reason lay them on. Thirdly, he conceives that as each feather has\na certain natural weight, whereby it concurs not arbitrarily, but\nnecessarily towards the overcharging of the horse; so all objects and\ncauses have a natural efficiency, whereby they do physically determine\nthe will; which is a great mistake. His objects, his agents, his\nmotives, his passions, and all his concurrent causes, ordinarily do only\nmove the will morally, not determine it naturally. So as it hath in all\nordinary actions a free dominion over itself.\n\n\u201cHis other example, of a man that strikes, \u2018whose will to strike\nfolloweth necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroke,\nimmediately before the lifting up of his hand\u2019: as it confounds\npassionate, indeliberate thoughts, with the dictates of right reason, so\nit is very uncertain; for between the cup and the lip, between the\nlifting up of the hand and the blow, the will may alter, and the\njudgment also. And lastly, it is impertinent; for that necessity of\nstriking proceeds from the free determination of the agent, and not from\nthe special influence of any outward determining causes. And so it is\nonly a necessity upon supposition.\n\n\u201cConcerning Medea\u2019s choice, the strength of the argument doth not lie\neither in the fact of Medea, which is but a fiction, or in the authority\nof the poet, who writes things rather to be admired than believed, but\nin the experience of all men: who find it to be true in themselves, that\nsometimes reason doth shew unto a man the exorbitancy of his passion,\nthat what he desires is but a pleasant good, that what he loseth by such\na choice is an honest good, that that which is honest is to be preferred\nbefore that which is pleasant; yet the will pursues that which is\npleasant, and neglects that which is honest. St. Paul (Rom. vii. 15)\nsaith as much in earnest, as is feigned of Medea: that _he approved not\nthat which he did_, and that _he did that which he hated_. The Roman\nstory is mistaken: there was no bribe in the case but affection. Whereas\nI urge, that those things which are nearer to the senses do move more\npowerfully, he lays hold on it; and without answering to that for which\nI produced it, infers, \u2018that the sense of present good, is more\nimmediate to the action than the foresight of evil consequents\u2019: which\nis true; but it is not absolutely true by any antecedent necessity. Let\na man do what he may do, and what he ought to do, and sensitive objects\nwill lose that power which they have by his own fault and neglect.\nAntecedent or indeliberate concupiscence doth sometimes, but rarely,\nsurprise a man, and render the action not free. But consequent and\ndeliberated concupiscence, which proceeds from the rational will, doth\nrender the action more free, not less free, and introduceth only a\nnecessity upon supposition.\n\n\u201cLastly, he saith, that \u2018a man\u2019s mourning more for the loss of his child\nthan for his sin, makes nothing to the last dictates of the\nunderstanding\u2019. Yes, very much. Reason dictates that a sin committed is\na greater evil than the loss of a child, and ought more to be lamented\nfor: yet we see daily how affection prevails against the dictate of\nreason. That which he infers from hence, that \u2018sorrow for sin is not\nvoluntary, and by consequence that repentance proceedeth from causes\u2019;\nis true as to the latter part of it, but not in his sense. The causes\nfrom whence repentance doth proceed, are God\u2019s grace preventing, and\nman\u2019s will concurring. God prevents freely, man concurs freely. Those\ninferior agents, which sometimes do concur as subordinate to the grace\nof God, do not, cannot, determine the will naturally. And therefore the\nformer part of his inference, that sorrow for sin is not voluntary, is\nuntrue, and altogether groundless. That is much more truly and much more\nproperly said to be voluntary, which proceeds from judgment and from the\nrational will, than that which proceeds from passion and from the\nsensitive will. One of the main grounds of all T. H.\u2019s errors in this\nquestion is, that he acknowledgeth no efficacy but that which is\nnatural. Hence is this wild consequence; \u2018repentance hath causes\u2019, and\ntherefore \u2018it is not voluntary\u2019. Free effects have free causes,\nnecessary effects necessary causes: voluntary effects have sometimes\nfree, sometimes necessary causes.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY NO. XXIII.\n\n(_a_) \u201cSupposing the last dictate of the understanding did always\ndetermine the will, yet this determination, being not antecedent in\ntime, nor proceeding from extrinsical causes, but from the proper\nresolution of the agent, who had now freely determined himself, makes no\nabsolute necessity, but only hypothetical, &c.\u201d This is the Bishop\u2019s\nanswer to the necessity inferred from that, that the will necessarily\nfolloweth the last dictate of the understanding; which answer he thinks\nis not sufficiently taken away, because the last act of the\nunderstanding is in time together with the will itself, and therefore\nnot antecedent. It is true, that the will is not produced but in the\nsame instant with the last dictate of the understanding; but the\nnecessity of the will, and the necessity of the last dictate of the\nunderstanding, may have been antecedent. For that last dictate of the\nunderstanding was produced by causes antecedent, and was then necessary\nthough not yet produced; as when a stone is falling, the necessity of\ntouching the earth is antecedent to the touch itself. For all motion\nthrough any determined space, necessarily makes a motion through the\nnext space, unless it be hindered by some contrary external motion; and\nthen the stop is as necessary, as the proceeding would have been. The\nargument therefore from the last dictate of the understanding,\nsufficiently inferreth an antecedent necessity, as great as the\nnecessity that a stone shall fall when it is already falling. As for his\nother answer, that \u201cthe will does not certainly follow the last dictate\nof the understanding, though it always ought to follow it\u201d, he himself\nsays it is but probable; but any man that speaks not by rote, but thinks\nof what he says, will presently find it false; and that it is impossible\nto will anything that appears not first in his understanding to be good\nfor him. And whereas he says the will ought to follow the last dictate\nof the understanding, unless he mean that the man ought to follow it, it\nis an insignificant speech; for duties are the man\u2019s not the will\u2019s\nduties: and if he means so, then it is false; for a man ought not to\nfollow the dictate of the understanding, when it is erroneous.\n\n(_b_) \u201cOf which I gave then three reasons. One was, that actions may be\nso equally circumstantiated, that reason cannot give a positive\nsentence, but leaves the election to liberty or chance. To this he\nanswers not a word.\u201d There was no need of answer: for he hath very often\nin this discourse contradicted it himself, in that he maketh \u201creason to\nbe the true root of liberty, and men to have more or less liberty, as\nthey have more or less reason\u201d. How then can a man leave that to\nliberty, when his reason can give no sentence? And for his leaving it to\nchance; if by chance he mean that which hath no causes, he destroyeth\nProvidence; and if he mean that which hath causes, but unknown to us, he\nleaveth it to necessity. Besides, it is false that \u201cactions may be so\nequally circumstantiated, that reason cannot give a positive sentence\u201d.\nFor though in the things to be elected there may be an exact equality:\nyet there may be circumstances in him that is to elect, to make him\nresolve upon that of the two which he considereth for the present; and\nto break off all further deliberation for this cause, that he must not\n(to use his own instance) by spending time in vain, apply neither of the\nplaisters, which the chirurgeon gives him, to his wound. \u201cAnother of his\nreasons was, because reason doth not weigh every individual action to\nthe uttermost grain.\u201d True; but does it therefore follow, a man gives no\nsentence? The will therefore may follow the dictate of the judgment,\nwhether the man weigh or not weigh all that might be weighed. \u201cHis third\nreason was, because passions and affections sometimes prevail against\njudgment.\u201d I confess they prevail often against _wisdom_, which is it he\nmeans here by _judgment_. But they prevail not against the _dictate of\nthe understanding_, which he knows is the meaning of _judgment_ in this\nplace. And the will of a passionate and peevish fool doth no less follow\nthe dictate of that little understanding he hath, than the will of the\nwisest man followeth his wisdom.\n\n(_c_) \u201cHe explaineth the sense of the assertion by the comparison of the\nlast feather: wherewith he seems to be delighted, seeing he useth it now\nthe second time. But let him like it as he will, it is improper, for\nthree reasons.\u201d To me this comparison seemeth very proper; and therefore\nI made no scruple (though not much delighted with it, as being no new\ncomparison) to use it again, when there was need again. For in the\nexamination of truth, I search rather for perspicuity than elegance. But\nthe Bishop with his School-terms is far from perspicuity. How near he is\nto elegance, I shall not forget to examine in due time. But why is this\ncomparison improper? \u201cFirst, because the determination of the judgment\nis no part of the weight: for the understanding weigheth all things,\nobjects, means, circumstances, convenience, inconvenience; but itself is\nnot weighed.\u201d In this comparison, the objects, means, &c, are the\nweights, the man is the scale, the understanding of a convenience or\ninconvenience is the pressure of those weights, which incline him now\none way, now another; and that inclination is the will. Again, the\nobjects, means, &c, are the feathers that press the horse, the feeling\nof that pressure is understanding, and his patience or impatience the\nwill to bear them, if not too many, or if too many, to lie down under\nthem. It is therefore to little purpose that he saith, the understanding\nis not weighed. \u201cSecondly\u201d, he says the comparison is improper, \u201cbecause\nordinarily, the means, circumstances, and causes concurrent, have their\nwhole weight from the understanding; so as they do not press the horse\u2019s\nback at all, until reason lay them on.\u201d This, and that which followeth,\n\u201cthat my objects, agents, motives, passions, and all my concurrent\ncauses, ordinarily do only move the will _morally_, not determine it\nnaturally, so as it hath in all ordinary actions a free dominion over\nitself,\u201d is all nonsense. For no man can understand, that the\nunderstanding maketh any alteration in the object in _weight_ or\n_lightness_; nor that _reason lays on objects upon the understanding_;\nnor that the will _is moved_, nor that any motion _is moral_; nor that\nthese words, _the will hath a free dominion over itself_, signify\nanything. With the rest of this reply I shall trust the reader; and only\nnote the last words, where he makes me say, _repentance hath causes_,\nand therefore _it is not voluntary_. But I said, repentance hath causes,\n_and that_ it is not voluntary; he chops in, _and therefore_, and makes\nan absurd consequence, which he would have the reader believe was mine,\nand then confutes it with these senseless words: \u201cFree effects have free\ncauses, necessary effects necessary causes; voluntary effects have\nsometimes free, sometimes necessary causes\u201d. Can any man but a Schoolman\nthink the will is voluntary? But yet the will is the cause of voluntary\nactions.\n\n NO. XXIV.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cFifthly and lastly, the divine labours to find out a way how\nliberty may consist with the prescience and decrees of God. But of this\nI had not very long since occasion to write a full discourse, in answer\nto a treatise against the prescience of things contingent. I shall for\nthe present only repeat these two things. First, we ought not to desert\na certain truth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain\nmanner. God should be but a poor God, if we were able perfectly to\ncomprehend all his actions and attributes. Secondly, in my poor\njudgment, which I ever do and ever shall submit to better, the readiest\nway to reconcile contingence and liberty with the decrees and prescience\nof God, and most remote from the altercations of these times, is to\nsubject future contingents to the aspect of God, according to that\npresentiality which they have in eternity. Not that things future, which\nare not yet existent, are co-existent with God: but because the infinite\nknowledge of God, incircling all times in the point of eternity, doth\nattain to their future being, from whence proceeds their objective and\nintelligible being. The main impediment which keeps men from subscribing\nto this way, is because they conceive eternity to be an everlasting\nsuccession, and not one indivisible point. But if they consider, that\nwhatsoever is in God is God; that there are no accidents in him, (for\nthat which is infinitely perfect cannot be further perfected); that as\nGod is not wise, but wisdom itself, not just, but justice itself, so he\nis not eternal, but eternity itself: they must needs conclude, that\ntherefore this eternity is indivisible, because God is indivisible; and\ntherefore not successive, but altogether an infinite point,\ncomprehending all times within itself.\u201d\n\n_T. H._ The last part of this discourse containeth his opinion about\nreconciling liberty with the prescience and decrees of God, otherwise\nthan some divines have done; against whom he had formerly written a\ntreatise, out of which he only repeateth two things. One is, that \u201cwe\nought not to desert a certain truth, for not being able to comprehend\nthe certain manner of it\u201d. And I say the same; as for example, that he\nought not to desert this certain truth: that there are certain and\nnecessary causes, which make every man to will what he willeth, though\nhe do not yet conceive in what manner the will of man is caused. And yet\nI think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive: seeing that we\nsee daily, that praise, dispraise, reward, punishment, good and evil\nsequels of men\u2019s actions retained in memory, do frame and make us to the\nelection of whatsoever it be that we elect; and that the memory of such\nthings proceeds from the senses, and sense from the operation of the\nobjects of sense, which are external to us, and governed only by God\nAlmighty; and by consequence, all actions, even of free and voluntary\nagents, are necessary.\n\nThe other thing he repeateth is, that \u201cthe best way to reconcile\ncontingency and liberty with the prescience and decrees of God, is to\nsubject future contingents to the aspect of God\u201d. The same is also my\nopinion, but contrary to what he hath all this while laboured to prove.\nFor hitherto he held liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty and\nthe decrees of God, irreconcilable; unless the aspect of God (which word\nappeareth now the first time in this discourse) signify somewhat else\nbesides God\u2019s will and decree, which I cannot understand. But he adds,\nthat we must subject them \u201caccording to that presentiality which they\nhave in eternity\u201d; which he says cannot be done by them that conceive\neternity to be an everlasting succession, but only by them that conceive\nit an indivisible point. To this I answer, that as soon as I can\nconceive eternity to be an indivisible point, or any thing but an\neverlasting succession, I will renounce all I have written on this\nsubject. I know St. Thomas Aquinas calls eternity _nunc stans_, an _ever\nabiding now_; which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, I\nnever could conceive it; they that can, are more happy than I. But in\nthe mean time he alloweth hereby all men to be of my opinion, save only\nthose that conceive in their minds a _nunc stans_; which I think are\nnone. I understand as little, how it can be true that \u201cGod is not just,\nbut justice itself, not wise but wisdom itself, not eternal but eternity\nitself\u201d: nor how he concludes thence that \u201ceternity is a point\nindivisible, and not a succession\u201d: nor in what sense it can be said,\nthat an \u201cinfinite point,\u201d &c, wherein is no succession, can \u201ccomprehend\nall times,\u201d though time be successive.\n\nThese phrases I find not in the Scripture. I wonder therefore what was\nthe design of the Schoolmen to bring them up; unless they thought a man\ncould not be a true Christian, unless his understanding be first\nstrangled with such hard sayings.\n\nAnd thus much in answer to his discourse; wherein I think not only his\nsquadrons, but also his reserves of distinctions are defeated. And now\nyour Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question, with\nmy reasons for it, positively and briefly as I can, without any terms of\nart, in plain English.\n\n_J. D._ (_a_) \u201cThat poor discourse which I mention, was not written\nagainst any divines, but in way of examination of a French treatise,\nwhich your Lordship\u2019s brother did me the honour to show me at York.\n(_b_) My assertion is most true, that we ought not to desert a certain\ntruth because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner. Such a\ntruth is that which I maintain, that the will of man in ordinary actions\nis free from extrinsical determination: a truth demonstrable in reason,\nreceived and believed by all the world. And therefore, though I be not\nable to comprehend or express exactly the certain manner how it consists\ntogether with God\u2019s eternal prescience and decrees, which exceed my weak\ncapacity, yet I ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest. But T.\nH.\u2019s opinion, of the absolute necessity of all events by reason of their\nantecedent determination in their extrinsical and necessary causes, is\nno such certain truth, but an innovation, a strange paradox, without\nprobable grounds, rejected by all authors, yea, by all the world.\nNeither is the manner how the second causes do operate, so obscure, or\nso transcendent above the reach of reason, as the eternal decrees of God\nare. And therefore in both these respects, he cannot challenge the same\nprivilege. I am in possession of an old truth, derived by inheritance or\nsuccession from mine ancestors. And therefore, though I were not able to\nclear every quirk in law, yet I might justly hold my possession until a\nbetter title were showed for another. He is no old possessor, but a new\npretender, and is bound to make good his claim by evident proofs: not by\nweak and inconsequent suppositions or inducements, such as those are\nwhich he useth here, of \u2018praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, the\nmemory of good and evil sequels and events\u2019; which may incline the will,\nbut neither can nor do necessitate the will: nor by uncertain and\naccidental inferences, such as this; \u2018the memory of praises, dispraises,\nrewards, punishments, good and evil sequels, do make us\u2019 (he should say,\n_dispose_ us) \u2018to elect what we elect; but the memory of these things is\nfrom the sense, and the sense from the operation of the external\nobjects, and the agency of external objects is only from God; therefore\nall actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are necessary\u2019. (_c_) To\npass by all the other great imperfections which are to be found in this\nsorite, it is just like that old sophistical piece: He that drinks well\nsleeps well, he that sleeps well thinks no hurt, he that thinks no hurt\nlives well; therefore he that drinks well lives well.\n\n(_d_) \u201cIn the very last passage of my discourse I proposed mine own\nprivate opinion, how it might be made appear, that the eternal\nprescience and decrees of God are consistent with true liberty and\ncontingency. And this I set down in as plain terms as I could, or as so\nprofound a speculation would permit: which is almost wholly\nmisunderstood by T. H., and many of my words wrested to a wrong sense.\nAs first, where I speak of the aspect of God, that is, his view, his\nknowledge, by which the most free and contingent actions were manifest\nto him from eternity, (Heb. iv. 13, _all things are naked and open to\nhis eyes_), and this not discursively, but intuitively, not by external\nspecies, but by his internal essence; he confounds this with the will\nand the decrees of God; though he found not the word _aspect_ before in\nthis discourse, he might have found prescience. (_e_) Secondly, he\nchargeth me, that hitherto I have maintained that \u2018liberty and the\ndecrees of God are irreconcilable.\u2019 If I have said any such thing, my\nheart never went along with my pen. No, but his reason why he chargeth\nme on this manner is, because I have maintained that \u2018liberty and the\nabsolute necessity of all things\u2019 are irreconcilable. That is true\nindeed. What then? \u2018Why,\u2019 saith he, \u2018necessity and God\u2019s decrees are all\none.\u2019 How all one? That were strange indeed. Necessity may be a\nconsequent of God\u2019s decrees; it cannot be the decree itself. (_f_) But\nto cut his argument short: God hath decreed all effects which come to\npass in time; yet not all after the same manner, but according to the\ndistinct natures, capacities, and conditions of his creatures, which he\ndoth not destroy by his decree; some he acteth, with some he\nco-operateth by special influence, and some he only permitteth. Yet this\nis no idle or bare permission; seeing he doth concur both by way of\ngeneral influence, giving power to act; and also by disposing all events\nnecessary, free, and contingent to his own glory. (_g_) Thirdly, he\nchargeth me, that I \u2018allow all men to be of his opinion, save only those\nthat conceive in their minds a _nunc stans_, or how eternity is an\nindivisible point, rather than an everlasting succession\u2019. But I have\ngiven no such allowance. I know there are many other ways proposed by\ndivines, for reconciling the eternal prescience and decrees of God with\nthe liberty and contingency of second causes; some of which may please\nother judgments better than this of mine. Howsoever, though a man could\ncomprehend none of all these ways, yet remember what I said, that a\ncertain truth ought not to be rejected, because we are not able, in\nrespect of our weakness, to understand the certain manner or reason of\nit. I know the loadstone hath an attractive power to draw the iron to\nit; and yet I know not how it comes to have such a power.\n\n\u201cBut the chiefest difficulty which offers itself in this section is,\nwhether eternity be an indivisible point, as I maintain it; or an\neverlasting succession, as he would have it. According to his constant\nuse, he gives no answer to what was urged by me, but pleads against it\nfrom his own incapacity. \u2018I never could conceive,\u2019 saith he, \u2018how\neternity should be an indivisible point.\u2019 I believe, that neither we nor\nany man else can comprehend it so clearly as we do these inferior\nthings. The nearer that anything comes to the essence of God, the more\nremote it is from our apprehension. But shall we therefore make\npotentialities, and successive duration, and former and later, or a part\nwithout a part, as they say, to be in God? Because we are not able to\nunderstand clearly the divine perfection, we must not therefore\nattribute any imperfection to him.\n\n(_h_) \u201cHe saith moreover, that \u2018he understands as little how it can be\ntrue which I say, that God is not just but justice itself, not eternal\nbut eternity itself.\u2019 It seems, howsoever he be versed in this question,\nthat he hath not troubled his head overmuch with reading School-divines\nor metaphysicians, if he make faculties or qualities to be in God really\ndistinct from his essence. God is a most simple or pure act, which can\nadmit no composition of substance and accidents. Doth he think, that the\nmost perfect essence of God cannot act sufficiently without faculties\nand qualities? The infinite perfection of the Divine essence excludes\nall passive or receptive powers, and cannot be perfected more than it is\nby any accidents. The attributes of God are not divers virtues or\nqualities in him, as they are in the creatures; but really one and the\nsame with the Divine essence, and among themselves. They are attributed\nto God to supply the defect of our capacity, who are not able to\nunderstand that which is to be known of God under one name, or one act\nof the understanding.\n\n\u201cFurthermore he saith, that \u2018he understands not how I conclude from\nhence, that eternity is an indivisable point, and not a succession\u2019.\n(_i_) I will help him. The Divine substance is indivisible; but eternity\nis the Divine substance. The major is evident, because God is _actus\nsimplicissimus_, a most simple act; wherein there is no manner of\ncomposition, neither of matter and form, nor of subject and accidents,\nnor of parts, &c; and by consequence no divisibility. The minor hath\nbeen clearly demonstrated in mine answer to his last doubt, and is\nconfessed by all men that whatsoever is in God, is God.\n\n\u201cLastly, he saith, he conceives not \u2018how it can be said, that an\ninfinite point, wherein is no succession, can comprehend all time which\nis successive\u2019. I answer, that it doth not comprehend it formally, as\ntime is successive; but eminently and virtually, as eternity is\ninfinite. To-day all eternity is co-existent with this day: to-morrow\nall eternity will be co-existent with to-morrow: and so in like manner\nwith all the parts of time, being itself without parts. He saith, \u2018he\nfinds not these phrases in the Scripture\u2019. No, but he may find the thing\nin the Scripture, that God is infinite in all his attributes, and not\ncapable of any imperfection.\n\n\u201cAnd so to show his antipathy against the Schoolmen, that he hath no\nliberty or power to contain himself when he meets with any of their\nphrases or tenets, he falls into another paroxism or fit of inveighing\nagainst them; and so concludes his answer with a _plaudite_ to himself,\nbecause he had defeated both my squadrons of arguments and reserves of\ndistinctions\n\n Dicite Io p\u00e6an, et Io bis dicite p\u00e6an.\n\n\u201cBut because his eyesight was weak, and their backs were towards him, he\nquite mistook the matter. Those whom he saw routed and running away,\nwere his own scattered forces.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S REPLY, NO. XXIV.\n\n(_a_) \u201cThat poor discourse which I mention, was not written against any\ndivines, but in way of examination of a French treatise, &c\u201d. This is in\nreply to those words of mine, \u201cthis discourse containeth his opinion\nabout reconciling liberty with the prescience and decrees of God,\notherwise than some divines have done, against whom he had formerly\nwritten a treatise\u201d. If the French treatise were according to his mind,\nwhat need was there that the examination should be written? If it were\nnot to his mind, it was in confutation of him, that is to say, written\nagainst the author of it: unless perhaps the Bishop thinks that he\nwrites not against a man, unless he charge him with blasphemy and\natheism, as he does me.\n\n(_b_) \u201cMy assertion is most true, that we ought not to desert a certain\ntruth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner.\u201d To\nthis I answered, that it was true; and as he alleged it for a reason why\nhe should not be of my opinion, so I alleged it for a reason why I\nshould not be of his. But now in his reply he saith, that his opinion is\n\u201ca truth demonstrable in reason, received and believed by all the world.\nAnd therefore, though he be not able to comprehend or express exactly\nthe certain manner how this liberty of will consists with God\u2019s eternal\nprescience and decrees, yet he ought to adhere to that truth which is\nmanifest.\u201d But why should he adhere to it, unless it be manifest to\nhimself? And if it be manifest to himself, why does he deny that he is\nable to comprehend it? And if he be not able to comprehend it, how knows\nhe that it is demonstrable? Or why says he that so confidently, which he\ndoes not know? Methinks that which I have said, namely, that \u201cthat which\nGod foreknows shall be hereafter, cannot but be hereafter, and at the\nsame time that he foreknew it should be; but that which cannot but be,\nis necessary; therefore what God foreknows, shall be necessarily, and at\nthe time foreknown\u201d: this I say looketh somewhat liker to a\ndemonstration, than any thing that he hath hitherto brought to prove\nfree will. Another reason why I should be of his opinion, is that he is\n\u201cin possession of an old truth derived to him by inheritance or\nsuccession from his ancestors\u201d. To which I answer, first, that I am in\npossession of a truth derived to me from the light of reason. Secondly,\nthat whereas he knoweth not whether it be the truth that he possesseth,\nor not; because he confesseth he knows not how it can consist with God\u2019s\nprescience and decrees; I have sufficiently shewn that my opinion of\nnecessity not only agrees with, but necessarily followeth from the\neternal prescience and decrees of God. Besides, it is an unhandsome\nthing for a man to derive his opinion concerning truth by succession\nfrom his ancestors; for our ancestors, the first Christians, derived not\ntherefore their truth from the Gentiles, because they were their\nancestors.\n\n(_c_) \u201cTo pass by all the other great imperfections which are to be\nfound in this sorite, it is just like an old philosophical piece: he\nthat drinks well, sleeps well; he that sleeps well, thinks no hurt; he\nthat thinks no hurt, lives well; therefore he that drinks well, lives\nwell.\u201d My argument was thus: \u201celection is always from the memory of good\nand evil sequels; memory is always from the sense; and sense always from\nthe action of external bodies; and all action from God; therefore all\nactions, even of free and voluntary agents, are from God, and\nconsequently necessary\u201d. Let the Bishop compare now his scurrilous\nargumentation with this of mine; and tell me, whether he that sleeps\nwell, doth all his lifetime think no hurt.\n\n(_d_) \u201cIn the very last passage of my discourse I proposed my own\nprivate opinion, how it might be made appear that the eternal prescience\nand decrees of God are consistent with true liberty and contingency,\n&c.\u201d If he had meant by liberty, as other men do, the liberty of action,\nthat is, of things which are in his power to do which he will, it had\nbeen an easy matter to reconcile it with the prescience and decrees of\nGod; but meaning the liberty of will, it was impossible. So likewise, if\nby contingency he had meant simply coming to pass, it had been\nreconcilable with the decrees of God; but meaning coming to pass without\nnecessity, it was impossible. And therefore though it be true he says,\nthat \u201che set it down in as plain terms as he could\u201d, yet it was\nimpossible to set it down in plain terms. Nor ought he to charge me with\nmisunderstanding him, and wresting his words to a wrong sense. For the\ntruth is, I did not understand them at all, nor thought he understood\nthem himself; but was willing to give them the best interpretation they\nwould bear; which he calls wresting them to a wrong sense. And first, I\nunderstood not what he meant by the aspect of God. For if he had meant\nhis foreknowledge, which word he had often used before; what needed he\nin this one place only to call it _aspect_? Or what need he here call it\nhis _view_? Or say that all things are open to the eyes of God not\n_discursively_, but _intuitively_; which is to expound _eyes_ in that\ntext, Hebr. iv. 13, not figuratively but literally, nevertheless\nexcluding _external species_, which the Schoolmen say are the cause of\nseeing? But it was well done to exclude such insignificant speeches,\nupon every occasion whatsoever. And though I do not hold the\nforeknowledge of God to consist in _discourse_; yet I shall be never\ndriven to say it is by _intuition_, as long as I know that even a man\nhath foreknowledge of all those things which he intendeth himself to do,\nnot by discourse, but by knowing his own purpose; saving that man hath a\nsuperior power over him, that can change his purpose; which God hath\nnot. And whereas he says, I confound this aspect with the will and\ndecrees of God, he accuseth me wrongfully. For how could I so confound\nit, when I understood not what it meant?\n\n(_e_) \u201cSecondly, he chargeth me, that hitherto I have maintained that\n\u2018liberty and the decrees of God are irreconcileable\u2019\u201d. And the reason\nwhy I do so is, because he maintained that liberty and the absolute\nnecessity of all things are irreconcileable. If liberty cannot stand\nwith necessity, it cannot stand with the decrees of God, of which\ndecrees necessity is a consequent. I needed not to say, nor did say,\nthat necessity and God\u2019s decrees are all one: though if I had said it,\nit had not been without authority of learned men, in whose writings are\noften found this sentence, _voluntas Dei, necessitas rerum_.\n\n(_f_) \u201cBut to cut his argument short: God hath decreed all effects which\ncome to pass in time, yet not all after the same manner, but according\nto the distinct natures, capacities, and conditions of his creatures;\nwhich he doth not destroy by his decree: some he acteth.\u201d Hitherto true.\nThen he addeth: \u201cwith some he co-operateth by special influence; and\nsome he only permitteth; yet this is no idle or bare permission\u201d. This\nis false. For nothing operateth by its own original power, but God\nhimself. Man operateth not but by special power, (I say special power,\nnot special influence), derived from God. Nor is it by God\u2019s permission\nonly, as I have often already shown, and as the Bishop here\ncontradicting his former words confesseth. For _to permit only_, and\n_barely to permit_, signify the same thing. And that which he says, that\nGod _concurs by way of general influence_, is jargon. For every\nconcurrence is one singular and individual concurrence; and nothing in\nthe world is general, but the signification of words and other signs.\n\n(_g_) \u201cThirdly, he chargeth me, that \u2018I allow all men to be of his\nopinion, save only those that conceive in their minds a _nunc stans_, or\nhow eternity is an indivisible point, rather than an everlasting\nsuccession.\u2019 But I have given no such allowance.\u201d Surely if the reason\nwherefore my opinion is false, proceed from this, that I conceive not\neternity to be _nunc stans_, but an everlasting succession, I am allowed\nto hold my opinion till I can conceive eternity otherwise: at least he\nallows men not till then to be of his opinion. For he hath said, \u201cthat\nthe main impediment which keeps men from subscribing to that way of his,\nis because they conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession, and\nnot one indivisible point\u201d. As for the many other ways which he says are\n\u201cproposed by divines for reconciling the eternal prescience and decrees\nof God with the liberty and contingency of second causes\u201d, if they mean\nsuch liberty and contingency as the Bishop meaneth, they are proposed in\nvain; for truth and error can never be reconciled. But \u201chowever,\u201d saith\nhe, \u201cthough a man could comprehend none of all these ways, yet we must\nremember that a certain truth ought not to be rejected, because we are\nnot able to understand the reason of it.\u201d For \u201che knows,\u201d he says, \u201cthe\nloadstone hath an attractive power to draw the iron to it, and yet he\nknoweth not how it cometh to have such a power.\u201d I know the load-stone\nhath no such attractive power; and yet I know that the iron cometh to\nit, or it to the iron; and therefore wonder not, that the Bishop knoweth\nnot how it cometh to have that power. In the next place he saith, I\nbring nothing to prove that eternity is not an indivisible point, but my\nown incapacity \u201cthat I cannot conceive it\u201d. The truth is, I cannot\ndispute neither for nor against (as he can do) the positions I\nunderstand not. Nor do I understand what derogation it can be to the\ndivine perfection, to attribute to it potentiality, that is (in English)\npower, and successive duration; for such attributes are often given to\nit in the Scripture.\n\n(_h_) \u201cHe saith moreover, that \u2018he understands as little how it can be\ntrue which I say, that God is not just, but justice itself, nor eternal,\nbut eternity itself\u2019. It seems, howsoever he be versed in this question,\nthat he hath not troubled his head over-much with reading\nSchool-divines, or metaphysicians.\u201d They are unseemly words to be said\nof God: I will not say, blasphemous and atheistical, which are the\nattributes he gives to my opinions, because I do not think them spoken\nout of an evil mind, but out of error: they are, I say, unseemly words\nto be said of God, that he is not just, that he is not eternal, and (as\nhe also said) that he is not wise; and cannot be excused by any\nfollowing _but_, especially when the _but_ is followed by that which is\nnot to be understood. Can any man understand how justice is just, or\nwisdom wise? and whereas justice is an accident, one of the moral\nvirtues, and wisdom another; how God is an accident or moral virtue? It\nis more than the Schoolmen or metaphysicians can understand; whose\nwritings have troubled my head more than they should have done, if I had\nknown that amongst so many senseless disputes, there had been so few\nlucid intervals. But I have considered since, where men will undertake\nto reason out of natural philosophy of the incomprehensible nature of\nGod, that it is impossible they should speak intelligibly, or in other\nlanguage than metaphysic, wherein they may contradict themselves, and\nnot perceive it; as he does here, when he says, \u201cthe attributes of God\nare not diverse virtues or qualities in him, as they are in the\ncreatures, but really one and the same with the divine essence and\namongst themselves, and attributed to God to supply the defect of our\ncapacity\u201d. Attributes are names; and therefore it is a contradiction, to\nsay they are really one and the same with the divine essence. But if he\nmean the virtues signified by the attributes, as justice, wisdom,\neternity, divinity, &c; so also they are virtues, and not one virtue,\n(which is still a contradiction); and we give those attributes to God,\nnot to shew that we apprehend how they are in him, but to signify how we\nthink it best to honour him.\n\n(_i_) \u201c\u2018In the next place he will help me to understand,\u2019 he says, \u2018how\neternity is an indivisible point.\u2019 The divine substance is indivisible;\nbut eternity is the divine substance. The major is evident, because God\nis _actus simplicissimus_; the minor hath been clearly demonstrated in\nmy answer to his last doubt, and is confessed by all men, that\nwhatsoever is attributed to God is God.\u201d The major is so far from being\nevident, that _actus simplicissimus_ signifieth nothing. The minor is\nsaid by some men, thought by no man; for whatsoever is thought, is\nunderstood. And all that he hath elsewhere and here dilated upon it, is\nas perfect nonsense, as any man ever writ on purpose to make merry with.\nAnd so is that whereby he answers to my objection, that a point cannot\ncomprehend all time, which is successive; namely, his distinction, that\n\u201ca point doth not comprehend all time _formally_, as time is successive;\nbut _eminently_ and _virtually_, as eternity is infinite\u201d. And this,\n\u201cto-day all eternity is co-existent with this day, and to-morrow all\neternity will be co-existent with to-morrow\u201d. It is well that his\neternity is now come from a _nunc stans_ to be a _nunc fluens_, flowing\nfrom this day to the next, and so on. This kind of language is never\nfound in the Scripture. No, but the thing, saith he, is found there,\nnamely, that God is infinite in all his attributes. I would he could\nshew me the place where God is said to be infinite in all his\nattributes. There be places enough to shew that God is infinite in\npower, in wisdom, mercy, &c: but neither is he said to be infinite in\nnames (which is the English of attributes), nor that he is an\nindivisible point, nor that a point doth comprehend time eminently and\nvirtually; nor that to-day all eternity is co-existent with to-day, &c.\nAnd thus much in answer to his reply upon my answer. That which\nremaineth, is my reply upon his answer to my positive doctrine on this\nsubject.\n\n MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY NO. XXV.\n\n_T. H._ First, I conceive that when it cometh into a man\u2019s mind to do or\nnot to do some certain action, if he have no time to deliberate, the\ndoing or abstaining necessarily followeth the present thought he had of\nthe good or evil consequence thereof to himself. As for example, in\nsudden anger the action shall follow the thought of revenge, in sudden\nfear the thought of escape. Also when a man hath time to deliberate, but\ndeliberates not, because never anything appeared that could make him\ndoubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinion of the goodness\nor harm of it. These actions I call voluntary. He, if I understand him\naright, calls them spontaneous. I call them voluntary, because those\nactions that follow immediately the last appetite, are voluntary. And\nhere, where there is one only appetite, that one is the last.\n\nBesides, I see it is reasonable to punish a rash action; which could not\nbe justly done by man, unless the same were voluntary. For no action of\na man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden;\nbecause it is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time\nof his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence\nit is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of anger, shall\nnevertheless be justly put to death: because all the time wherein he was\nable to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for\none continual deliberation; and consequently the killing shall be judged\nto proceed from election.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\nJ. D. \u201cThis part of T. H.\u2019s discourse hangs together like a sick man\u2019s\ndreams. (_a_) Even now he tells us, that \u2018a man may have time to\ndeliberate, yet not deliberate\u2019. By and by he saith, that \u2018no action of\na man, though never so sudden, can be said to be without deliberation\u2019.\nHe tells us, No. XXXIII., that \u2018the scope of this section is to show\nwhat is spontaneous\u2019. Howbeit he showeth only what is voluntary; (_b_)\nso making voluntary and spontaneous to be all one; whereas before he had\ntold us, that \u2018every spontaneous action is not voluntary, because\nindeliberate; nor every voluntary action spontaneous, if it proceed from\nfear.\u2019 (_c_) Now he tells us, that \u2018those actions which follow the last\nappetite, are voluntary; and where there is one only appetite, that is\nthe last\u2019. But before he told us, that \u2018voluntary presupposeth some\nprecedent deliberation and meditation of what is likely to follow, both\nupon the doing and abstaining from the action\u2019. (_d_) He defines\nliberty, No. XXIX., to be \u2018the absence of all extrinsical impediments to\naction\u2019. And yet in his whole discourse he laboureth to make good, that\nwhatsoever is not done, is therefore not done, because the agent was\nnecessitated by extrinsical causes not to do it. Are not extrinsical\ncauses, which determine him not to do it, extrinsical impediments to\naction? So no man shall be free to do any thing but that which he doth\nactually. He defines a free agent to be \u2018him who hath not made an end of\ndeliberating\u2019 (No. XXVIII.). And yet defines liberty to be \u2018an absence\nof outward impediments\u2019. There may be outward impediments, even whilst\nhe is deliberating. As a man deliberates whether he shall play at\ntennis: and at the same time the door of the tennis-court is fast locked\nagainst him. And after a man hath ceased to deliberate, there may be no\noutward impediments: as when a man resolves not to play at tennis,\nbecause he finds himself ill-disposed, or because he will not hazard his\nmoney. So the same person, at the same time, should be free and not\nfree, not free and free. And as he is not firm to his own grounds, so he\nconfounds all things, the mind and the will, the estimative faculty and\nthe understanding, imagination with deliberation, the end with the\nmeans, human will with the sensitive appetite, rational hope or fear\nwith irrational passions, inclinations with intentions, a beginning of\nbeing with a beginning of working, sufficiency with efficiency. So as\nthe greatest difficulty is to find out what he aims at. So as I had once\nresolved not to answer this part of his discourse; yet upon better\nadvice I will take a brief survey of it also; and show how far I assent\nunto, or dissent from that which I conceive to be his meaning.\n\n\u201cAnd first, concerning sudden passions, as anger or the like. (_e_) That\nwhich he saith, that \u2018the action doth necessarily follow the thought\u2019,\nis thus far true; that those actions which are altogether undeliberated\nand do proceed from sudden and violent passions, or _motus primo primi_,\nwhich surprise a man, and give him no time to advise with reason, are\nnot properly and actually in themselves free, but rather necessary\nactions; as when a man runs away from a cat or a custard out of a secret\nantipathy.\n\n(_f_) \u201cSecondly, as for those actions \u2018wherein actual deliberation seems\nnot necessary, because never anything appeared that could make a man\ndoubt of the consequence\u2019: I do confess, that actions done by virtue of\na precedent deliberation, without any actual deliberation in the\npresent, when the act is done, may notwithstanding be truly both\nvoluntary and free acts, yea, in some cases and in some sense, more free\nthan if they were actually deliberated of in present. As one who hath\nacquired by former deliberation and experience a habit to play upon the\nvirginals, needs not deliberate what man or what jack he must touch, nor\nwhat finger of his hand he must move to play such a lesson; yea, if his\nmind should be fixed, or intent to every motion of his hand, or every\ntouch of a string, it would hinder his play, and render the action more\ntroublesome to him. Wherefore I believe, that not only his playing in\ngeneral, but every motion of his hand, though it be not presently\ndeliberated of, is a free act, by reason of his precedent deliberation.\nSo then (saving improprieties of speech, as calling that voluntary which\nis free, and limiting the will to the last appetite; and other mistakes,\nas that no act can be said to be without deliberation) we agree also for\nthe greater part in this second observation.\n\n(_g_) \u201cThirdly, whereas he saith, that \u2018some sudden acts proceeding from\nviolent passions, which surprise a man, are justly punished\u2019; I grant\nthey are so sometimes; but not for his reason, because they have been\nformerly actually deliberated of; but because they were virtually\ndeliberated of, or because it is our fault that they were not actually\ndeliberated of, whether it was a fault of pure negation, that is, of not\ndoing our duty only, or a fault of bad disposition also, by reason of\nsome vicious habit which we had contracted by our former actions. To do\na necessary act is never a fault, nor justly punishable, when the\nnecessity is inevitably imposed upon us by extrinsical causes. As if a\nchild, before he had the use of reason, shall kill a man in his passion;\nyet because he wanted malice to incite him to it, and reason to restrain\nhim from it, he shall not die for it in the strict rules of particular\njustice, unless there be some mixture of public justice in the case.\n\n(_h_) \u201cBut if the necessity be contracted by ourselves, and by our own\nfaults, it is justly punishable. As he who by his wanton thoughts in the\nday-time doth procure his own nocturnal pollution: a man cannot\ndeliberate in his sleep, yet it is accounted a sinful act, and\nconsequently, a free act, that is, not actually free in itself, but\nvirtually free in its causes; and though it be not expressly willed and\nchosen, yet it is tacitly and implicitly willed and chosen, when that is\nwilled and chosen from whence it was necessarily produced. By the\nLevitical law, if a man digged a pit and left it uncovered, so that his\nneighbour\u2019s ox or his ass did fall into it, he was bound to make\nreparation; not because he did choose to leave it uncovered on purpose\nthat such a mischance might happen, but because he did freely omit that\nwhich he ought to have done, from whence this damage proceeded to his\nneighbour. Lastly, there is great difference between the first motions,\nwhich sometimes are not in our power, and subsequent acts of killing or\nstealing, or the like, which always are in our power if we have the use\nof reason, or else it is our own fault that they are not in our power.\nYet to such hasty acts done in hot blood the law is not so severe, as to\nthose which are done upon long deliberation and prepensed malice,\nunless, as I said, there be some mixture of public justice in it. He\nthat steals a horse deliberately, may be more punishable by the law than\nhe that kills the owner by chance-medley: yet the death of the owner was\nmore noxious, (to use his phrase), and more damageable to the family,\nthan the stealth of the horse. So far was T. H. mistaken in that also,\nthat the right to kill men doth proceed merely from their being noxious\n(No. XIV).\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP\u2019S ANSWER TO MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND\n NECESSITY NO. XXV.\n\n(_a_) \u201cEven now he tells us, that \u2018a man may have time to deliberate,\nyet not deliberate\u2019. By and by he saith, that \u2018no action of a man,\nthough never so sudden, can be said to be without deliberation\u2019.\u201d He\nthinks he hath here caught me in a contradiction; but he is mistaken;\nand the cause is, that he observed not that there may be a difference\nbetween deliberation and that which shall be construed for deliberation\nby a judge. For a man may do a rash act suddenly without deliberation;\nyet because he ought to have deliberated, and had time enough to\ndeliberate whether the action were lawful or not, it shall not be said\nby the judge that it was without deliberation, who supposeth that after\nthe law known, all the time following was time of deliberation. It is\ntherefore no contradiction, to say a man deliberates not, and that he\nshall be said to deliberate by him that is the judge of voluntary\nactions.\n\n(_b_) \u201cAgain, where he says, \u2018he maketh voluntary and spontaneous\nactions to be all one\u2019, whereas before he had told us that \u2018every\nspontaneous action is not voluntary, because indeliberate; nor every\nvoluntary action spontaneous, if it proceed from fear\u2019.\u201d He thinks he\nhath espied another contradiction. It is no wonder if speaking of\nspontaneous, which signifieth nothing else in Latin (for English it is\nnot) but that which is done deliberately or indeliberately without\ncompulsion, I seem to the Bishop, who hath never given any definition of\nthat word, not to use it as he would have me. And it is easy for him to\ngive it any signification he please, as the occasion shall serve to\ncharge me with contradiction. In what sense I have used that word once,\nin the same I have used it always, calling that spontaneous which is\nwithout co-action or compulsion by terror.\n\n(_c_) \u201cNow he tells us, that \u2018those actions which follow the last\nappetite are voluntary, and where there is one only appetite, that is\nthe last\u2019. But before he told us, that \u2018voluntary presupposeth some\nprecedent deliberation and meditation of what is likely to follow, both\nupon the doing and abstaining from the _action_\u2019.\u201d This is a third\ncontradiction he supposeth he hath found, but is again mistaken. For\nwhen men are to judge of actions, whether they be voluntary or not, they\ncannot call that action voluntary, which followed not the last appetite.\nBut the same men, though there were no deliberation, shall judge there\nwas, because it ought to have been, and that from the time that the law\nwas known to the time of the action itself. And therefore both are true,\nthat voluntary may be without, and yet presupposed in the law not to be\nwithout deliberation.\n\n(_d_) \u201cHe defines liberty (No. XXIX.) to be \u2018the absence of all\nextrinsical impediments to action\u2019. And yet in his whole discourse he\nlaboureth to make good, that whatsoever is not done, is therefore not\ndone, because the agent was necessitated by extrinsical causes not to do\nit. Are not extrinsical causes which determine him not to do it,\nextrinsical impediments to action?\u201d This definition of liberty, that it\nis \u201cthe absence of all extrinsical impediments to action\u201d, he thinks he\nhath sufficiently confuted by asking whether the extrinsical causes,\nwhich determine a man not to do an action, be not extrinsical\nimpediments to action. It seems by his question he makes no doubt but\nthey are; but is deceived by a too shallow consideration of what the\nword _impediment_ signifieth. For impediment or hinderance signifieth an\nopposition to endeavour. And therefore if a man be necessitated by\nextrinsical causes not to endeavour an action, those causes do not\noppose his endeavour to do it, because he has no such endeavour to be\nopposed; and consequently extrinsical causes that take away endeavour,\nare not to be called impediments; nor can any man be said to be hindered\nfrom doing that, which he had no purpose at all to do. So that this\nobjection of his proceedeth only from this, that he understandeth not\nsufficiently the English tongue. From the same proceedeth also that he\nthinketh it a contradiction, to call a free agent him that hath not yet\nmade an end of deliberating, and to call liberty an absence of outward\nimpediments. \u201cFor,\u201d saith he, \u201cthere may be outward impediments, even\nwhile he is deliberating.\u201d Wherein he is deceived. For though he may\ndeliberate of that which is impossible for him to do; as in the example\nhe allegeth of him that deliberateth whether he shall play at tennis,\nnot knowing that the door of the tennis-court is shut against him; yet\nit is no impediment to him that the door is shut, till he have a will to\nplay; which be hath not till he hath done deliberating whether he shall\nplay or not. That which followeth of my confounding mind and will; the\nestimative faculty and the understanding; the imagination and\ndeliberation; the end and the means; the human will and the sensitive\nappetite; rational hope or fear, and irrational passions; inclinations\nand intentions; a beginning of being and a beginning of working;\nsufficiency and efficiency: I do not find in anything that I have\nwritten, any impropriety in the use of these or any other English words;\nnor do I doubt but an English reader, who hath not lost himself in\nSchool-divinity, will very easily conceive what I have said. But this I\nam sure, that I never confounded beginning of being with beginning of\nworking, nor sufficiency with efficiency; nor ever used these words,\nsensitive appetite, rational hope, or rational fear, or irrational\npassions. It is therefore impossible I should confound them. But the\nBishop is either mistaken, or else he makes no scruple to say that which\nhe knows to be false, when he thinks it will serve his turn.\n\n(_e_) \u201cThat which he saith, that \u2018the action doth necessarily follow the\nthought\u2019, is thus far true; that those actions which are altogether\nundeliberated, and do proceed from violent passions, &c, are not\nproperly, and actually in themselves free, but rather necessary actions,\nas when a man runs away from a cat or a custard.\u201d Thus far he says is\ntrue. But when he calls sudden passions _motus primo primi_, I cannot\ntell whether he says true or not, because I do not understand him; nor\nfind how he makes his meaning ever the clearer by his example of a cat\nand a custard, because I know not what he means by a secret antipathy.\nFor what that antipathy is he explaineth not by calling it secret, but\nrather confesseth he knows not how to explain it. And because he saith,\nit is _thus far true_, I expect he should tell me also how far it is\nfalse.\n\n(_f_) \u201cSecondly, as for those actions wherein actual deliberation seems\nnot necessary, \u2018because never anything appeared that could make a man\ndoubt of the consequence\u2019; I do confess that actions done by virtue of a\nprecedent deliberation, without any actual deliberation for the present,\nmay notwithstanding be truly voluntary and free acts.\u201d In this he agrees\nwith me. But where he adds, \u201cyea, in some cases, and in some sense more\nfree, than if they were actually deliberated of in present\u201d, I do not\nagree with him. And for the instance he bringeth to prove it, in the man\nthat playeth on an instrument with his hand it maketh nothing for him.\nFor it proveth only, that the habit maketh the motion of his hand more\nready and quick; but it proveth not that it maketh it more voluntary,\nbut rather less; because the rest of the motions follow the first by an\neasiness acquired from long custom; in which motion the will doth not\naccompany all the strokes of the hand, but gives a beginning to them\nonly in the first. Here is nothing, as I expected, of how far that which\nI had said, namely, that the action doth necessarily follow the thought,\nis false; unless it be \u201cimproprieties of speech, as calling that\nvoluntary which is free, and limiting the will to the last appetite; and\nother mistakes, as that no act can be said to be without deliberation\u201d.\nFor improprieties of speech, I will not contend with one that can use\n_motus primo primi_, _practice practicum_, _actus elicitus_, and many\nother phrases of the same kind. But to say that free actions are\nvoluntary; and that the will which causeth a voluntary action, is the\nlast appetite; and that that appetite was immediately followed by the\naction; and that no action of a man can be said in the judgment of the\nlaw, to be without deliberation: are no mistakes, for anything that he\nhath proved to the contrary.\n\n(_g_) \u201cThirdly, whereas he saith, that \u2018some sudden acts, proceeding\nfrom violent passions which surprise a man, are justly punished\u2019; I\ngrant they are so sometimes, but not for his reason, &c.\u201d My reason was,\n\u201cbecause he had time to deliberate from the instant that he knew the\nlaw, to the instant of his action, and ought to have deliberated\u201d, that\ntherefore he may be justly punished. The Bishop grants they are justly\npunished, and his reason is, \u201cbecause they were virtually deliberated\nof\u201d, or, \u201cbecause it is our fault they were not actually deliberated\nof\u201d. How a man does deliberate, and yet not actually deliberate, I\nunderstand not. If virtual deliberation be not actual deliberation, it\nis no deliberation. But he calleth virtual deliberation, that which\nought to have been, and was not; and says the same that he condemns in\nme. And his other reason, namely, because it is our fault that we\ndeliberated not, is the same that I said, that we ought to have\ndeliberated, and did not. So that his reprehension here, is a\nreprehension of himself, proceeding from that the custom of\nSchool-language hath made him forget the language of his country. And to\nthat which he adds, \u201cthat a necessary act is never a fault, nor justly\npunishable, when the necessity is inevitably imposed upon us by\nextrinsical causes\u201d, I have sufficiently answered before in diverse\nplaces; shewing that a fault may be necessary from extrinsical causes,\nand yet voluntary; and that voluntary faults are justly punishable.\n\n(_h_) \u201cBut if the necessity be contracted by ourselves, it is justly\npunishable. As he who by his wanton thoughts in the day time, doth\nprocure his own nocturnal pollution.\u201d This instance, because it maketh\nnot against anything I have held, and partly also because it is a\nstinking passage, (for surely if, as he that ascribes eyes to the\nunderstanding, allows me to say it hath a nose, it stinketh to the nose\nof the understanding); this sentence I pass over, observing only the\ncanting terms, _not actually free in itself_, but _virtually free in its\ncauses_. In the rest of his answer to this No. XXV, I find nothing\nalleged in confutation of anything I have said, saving that his last\nwords are, that \u201cT. H. is mistaken in that also, that the right to kill\nmen doth proceed merely from their being noxious\u201d (No. XIV.). But to\nthat I have in the same No. XIV. already answered. I must not pass over,\nthat a little before he hath these words: \u201cIf a child, before he have\nthe use of reason, shall kill a man in his passion, yet because he\nwanted malice to incite him to it, and reason to restrain him from it,\nhe shall not die for it, in the strict rules of particular justice,\nunless there be some mixture of public justice in the case\u201d. The Bishop\nwould make but an ill judge of innocent children, for such are they\nthat, for want of age, have not use enough of reason to abstain from\nkilling. For the want of reason proceeding from want of age, does\ntherefore take away the punishment, because it taketh away the crime,\nand makes them innocent. But he introduceth another justice, which he\ncalleth _public_; whereas he called the other _particular_. And by this\npublic justice, he saith, the child though innocent may be put to death.\nI hope we shall never have the administration of public justice in such\nhands as his, or in the hands of such as shall take counsel from him.\nBut the distinction he makes is not by himself understood. There are\npublic causes, and private causes. Private are those, where the parties\nto the cause are both private men. Public are those, where one of the\nparties is the commonwealth, or the person that representeth it, and the\ncause criminal. But there is no distinction of justice into public and\nprivate. We may read of men that, having sovereign power, did sometimes\nput an innocent to death, either upon a vow; as Jepthah did in\nsacrificing his daughter; or when it hath been thought fit that an\ninnocent person should be put to death to save a great number of people.\nBut to put to death a child, not for reason of state, which he\nimproperly calls public justice, but for killing a man, and at the same\ntime to acknowledge such killing to be no crime, I think was never heard\nof.\n\n NO. XXVI.\n\n_T. H._ Secondly, I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall do\na thing or not do a thing, that he does nothing else but consider\nwhether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to\nconsider an action, is to imagine the consequences of it, both good and\nevil. From whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing but\nalternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or\n(which is the same thing) alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite\nto do or acquit the action of which he deliberateth.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ (_a_) \u201cIf I did not know what deliberation was, I should be\nlittle relieved in my knowledge by this description. Sometimes he makes\nit to be a consideration, or an act of the understanding; sometimes an\nimagination, or an act of the fancy; sometimes he makes it to be an\nalternation of passions, hope and fear. Sometimes he makes it concern\nthe end, sometimes to concern the means. So he makes it I know not what.\nThe truth is this in brief: \u2018Deliberation is an inquiry made by reason,\nwhether this or that, definitely considered, be a good and fit means,\nor, indefinitely, what are good and fit means to be chosen for attaining\nsome wished end.\u2019\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXVI.\n\n(_a_) \u201cIf I did not know what deliberation was, I should be little\nrelieved in my knowledge by this description. Sometimes he makes it to\nbe a consideration, or an act of the understanding, sometimes an\nimagination, or an act of the fancy, &c. So he makes it I know not\nwhat.\u201d If the Bishop had observed what he does himself, when he\ndeliberates, reasons, understands, or imagines, he would have known what\nto make of all that I have said in this Number. He would have known that\nconsideration, understanding, reason, and all the passions of the mind,\nare imaginations. That to consider a thing, is to imagine it; that to\nunderstand a thing, is to imagine it; that to hope and fear, are to\nimagine the things hoped for and feared. The difference between them is,\nthat when we imagine the consequence of anything, we are said to\nconsider that thing; and when we have imagined anything from a sign, and\nespecially from those signs we call names, we are said to understand his\nmeaning that maketh the sign; and when we reason, we imagine the\nconsequence of affirmations and negations joined together; and when we\nhope or fear, we imagine things good or hurtful to ourselves: insomuch\nas all these are but imaginations diversely named from different\ncircumstances: as any man may perceive as easily as he can look into his\nown thoughts. But to him that thinketh not himself upon the things\nwhereof, but upon the words wherewith he speaketh, and taketh those\nwords on trust from puzzled Schoolmen, it is not only hard, but\nimpossible to be known. And this is the reason that maketh him say, I\nmake deliberation he knows not what. But how is deliberation defined by\nhim? \u201cIt is\u201d, saith he, \u201can inquiry made by reason, whether this or that\ndefinitely considered, be a good and fit means; or indefinitely, what\nare good and fit means to be chosen for attaining some wished end.\u201d If\nit were not his custom to say, the understanding understandeth, the will\nwilleth, and so of the rest of the faculties, I should have believed\nthat when he says deliberation is an inquiry made by reason, he meaneth\nan inquiry made by the man that reasoneth; for so it will be sense. But\nthe reason which a man useth in deliberation, being the same thing that\nis called deliberation, his definition that deliberation is an inquiry\nmade by reason, is no more than if he had said, deliberation is an\ninquiry made by deliberation; a definition good enough to be made by a\nSchoolman. Nor is the rest of the definition altogether as it should be;\nfor there is no such thing as an \u201cindefinite consideration of what are\ngood and fit means\u201d; but a man imagining first one thing, then another,\nconsidereth them successively and singly each one, whether it conduceth\nto his ends or not.\n\n NO. XXVII.\n\n_T. H._ Thirdly, I conceive, that in all deliberations, that is to say,\nin all alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that\nwhich we call the will, and is immediately before the doing of the\naction, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other\nappetites to do and to quit, that come upon a man during his\ndeliberation, are usually called intentions and inclinations, but not\nwills; there being but one will, which also in this case may be called\nlast will, though the intention change often.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ (_a_) \u201cStill here is nothing but confusion; he confounds the\nfaculty of the will with the act of volition; he makes the will to be\nthe last part of deliberation; he makes the intention, which is a most\nproper and elicit act of the will, or a willing of the end, as it is to\nbe attained by certain means, to be no willing at all, but only some\nantecedaneous _inclination_ or propension. He might as well say, that\nthe uncertain agitation of the needle hither and thither to find out the\npole, and the resting or fixing of itself directly towards the pole,\nwere both the same thing. But the grossest mistake is, that he will\nacknowledge no act of man\u2019s will, to be his will, but only the last act,\nwhich he calls the last will. If the first were no will, how comes this\nto be the last will? According to his doctrine, the will of a man should\nbe as unchangeable as the will of God, at least so long as there is a\npossibility to effect it. (_b_) According to this doctrine,\nconcupiscence with consent should be no sin; for that which is not truly\nwilled is not a sin; or rather should not be at all, unless either the\nact followed, or were rendered impossible by some intervening\ncircumstances. According to this doctrine no man can say, this is my\nwill, because he knows not yet whether it shall be his last appeal. The\ntruth is, there be many acts of the will, both in respect of the means\nand of the end. But that act which makes a man\u2019s actions to be truly\nfree, is election; which is the deliberate choosing or refusing of this\nor that means, or the acceptation of one means before another, where\ndivers are represented by the understanding.\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXVII.\n\n(_a_) \u201cStill here is nothing but confusion; he confounds the faculty of\nthe will with the act of volition; he makes the will to be the last part\nof deliberation; he makes the intention, which is a most proper and\nelicit act of the will, to be no willing at all, but only some\nantecedaneous (he might as well have said, antecedent) inclination.\u201d To\nconfound the faculty of the will with the will, were to confound a\n_will_ with _no will_; for the faculty of the will is no will; the act\nonly which he calls _volition_, is the will. As a man that sleepeth hath\nthe _power_ of _seeing_, and _seeth not_, nor hath for that time any\n_sight_; so also he hath the _power_ of willing, but _willeth nothing_,\nnor hath for that time any _will_. I must therefore have departed very\nmuch from my own principles, if I have confounded the _faculty_ of the\n_will_ with the _act_ of _volition_. He should have done well to have\nshown where I confounded them. It is true, I make the will to be the\nlast part of deliberation; but it is that will which maketh the action\nvoluntary, and therefore needs must be the last. But for the preceding\nvariations of the will to do and not to do, though they be so many\nseveral wills, contrary to and destroying one another, they usually are\ncalled _intentions_; and therefore they are nothing to the will, of\nwhich we dispute, that maketh an action voluntary. And though a man have\nin every long deliberation a great many _wills_ and _nills_, they use to\nbe called inclinations, and the last only _will_ which is immediately\nfollowed by the voluntary action. But nevertheless, both he that hath\nthose intentions, and God that seeth them, reckoneth them for so many\nwills.\n\n(_b_) \u201cAccording to this doctrine, concupiscence with consent should be\nno sin; for that which is not truly willed, is not a sin.\u201d This is no\nconsequent to my doctrine: for I hold that they are, in the sight of\nGod, so many consents, so many willings, which would have been followed\nby actions, if the actions had been in their power. It had been fitter\nfor a man in whom is required gravity and sanctity more than ordinary,\nto have chosen some other kind of instance. But what meaneth he by\n_concupiscence with consent_? Can there be concupiscence without\nconsent? It is the consent itself. There may be also a lawful\nconcupiscence with consent. For concupiscence makes not the sin, but the\nunlawfulness of satisfying such concupiscence; and not the consent, but\nthe will and design to prosecute that which a man knoweth to be\nunlawful. An appetite to another man\u2019s bread, is concupiscence; and\nthough it be with consent to eat, it is no sin; but the design to take\nit from the other, notwithstanding that he may fail in his design, that\nis the sin. And this instance might have served his turn as well as the\nother; and for consent, if he had understood the truth, he might have\nput design.\n\n NO. XXVIII.\n\n_T. H._ Fourthly, that those actions which man is said to do upon\ndeliberation, are said to be voluntary, and done upon choice and\nelection. So that voluntary action, and action proceeding from election,\nis the same thing. And that of a voluntary agent, it is all one to say\nhe is free, and to say he hath not made an end of deliberating.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ (_a_) \u201cThis short section might pass without an animadversion,\nbut for two things. The one is, that he confounds a voluntary act with a\nfree act. A free act is only that which proceeds from the free election\nof the rational will after deliberation; but every act that proceeds\nfrom the sensitive appetite of man or beast, without deliberation or\nelection, is truly voluntary. (_b_) The other thing observable is his\nconclusion, that \u2018it is all one to say a man is free, and to say he hath\nnot made an end of deliberating\u2019; which confession of his overturns his\nwhole structure of absolute necessity. For if every agent be\nnecessitated to act what he doth act by a necessary and natural flux of\nextrinsical causes, then he is no more free before he deliberates, or\nwhilst he deliberates, than he is after; but by T. H.\u2019s confession here,\nhe is more free whilst he deliberates, than he is after. And so after\nall his flourishes, for an absolute or extrinsical necessity, he is glad\nto set himself down, and rest contented with an hypothetical necessity,\nwhich no man ever denied or doubted of; ascribing the necessitation of a\nman in free acts to his own deliberation, and in indeliberate acts to\nhis last thought, No. XXV. What is this to a natural and special\ninfluence of extrinsical causes? (_c_) \u201cAgain, \u2018liberty\u2019, saith he, \u2018is\nan absence of extrinsical impediments\u2019; but deliberation doth produce no\nnew extrinsical impediment; therefore let him choose which part he will,\neither he is free after deliberation, by his own doctrine, or he was not\nfree before. Our own deliberation, and the direction of our own\nunderstanding, and the election of our own will, do produce an\nhypothetical necessity, that the event be such as the understanding hath\ndirected, and the will elected. But for as much as the understanding\nmight have directed otherwise, and the will have elected otherwise, this\nis far from an absolute necessity. Neither doth liberty respect only\nfuture acts, but present acts also. Otherwise God did not freely create\nthe world. In the same instant wherein the will elects, it is free,\naccording to a priority of nature, though not of time, to elect\notherwise. And so in a divided sense, the will is free, even whilst it\nacts; though in a compounded sense it be not free. Certainly,\ndeliberation doth constitute, not destroy liberty.\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXVIII.\n\n(_a_) \u201cThis short section might pass, but for two things; one is, that\nhe confounds a voluntary act with a free act.\u201d I do indeed take all\nvoluntary acts to be free, and all free acts to be voluntary; but withal\nthat all acts, whether free or voluntary, if they be acts, were\nnecessary before they were acts. But where is the error? \u2018A free act\u2019,\nsaith he, \u2018is only that which proceeds from the free election of the\nrational will, after deliberation; but every act that proceeds from the\nsensitive appetite of man or beast, without deliberation or election, is\ntruly voluntary.\u2019 So that my error lies in this, that I distinguish not\nbetween a rational will and a sensitive appetite in the same man. As if\nthe appetite and will in man or beast were not the same thing, or that\nsensual men and beasts did not deliberate, and choose one thing before\nanother, in the same manner that wise men do. Nor can it be said of\nwills, that one is rational, the other sensitive; but of men. And if it\nbe granted that deliberation is always (as it is not) rational, there\nwere no cause to call men rational more than beasts. For it is manifest\nby continual experience, that beasts do deliberate.\n\n(_b_) \u201cThe other thing observable is his conclusion, that \u2018it is all one\nto say, a man is free, and to say, he hath not made an end of\ndeliberating\u2019: which confession of his overturns his whole structure of\nabsolute necessity.\u201d Why so? \u2018Because\u2019, saith he, \u2018if every agent be\nnecessitated to act what he doth act by extrinsical causes, then he is\nno more free before he deliberates, or whilst he deliberates, than he is\nafter\u2019. But this is a false consequence; he should have inferred\nthus:--\u201cthen he is no less necessitated before he deliberates than he is\nafter\u201d; which is true, and yet nevertheless he is more free. But taking\nnecessity to be inconsistent with liberty, which is the question between\nus: instead of _necessitated_ he puts in _not free_. And therefore to\nsay \u2018a man is free till he hath made an end of deliberating\u2019, is no\ncontradiction to absolute and antecedent necessity. And whereas he adds\npresently after, that I ascribe the necessitation of a man in free acts\nto his own deliberation, and in indeliberate acts to his last thoughts:\nhe mistakes the matter. For I ascribe all necessity to the universal\nseries or order of causes, depending on the first cause eternal: which\nthe Bishop understandeth, as if I had said in his phrase, to a special\ninfluence of extrinsical causes; that is, understandeth it not at all.\n\n(_c_) \u201cAgain, \u2018liberty,\u2019 saith he, \u2018is an absence of extrinsical\nimpediments\u2019: but deliberation doth produce no new extrinsical\nimpediment; therefore either he is free after deliberation, or he was\nnot free before.\u201d I cannot perceive in these words any more force of\ninference, than of so many other words whatsoever put together at\nadventure. But be his meaning what he will, I say not that deliberation\nproduceth any impediments: for there are no impediments but to the\naction, whilst we are endeavouring to do it, which is not till we have\ndone deliberating. But during the deliberation there arise thoughts in\nhim that deliberateth, concerning the consequence of the action whereof\nhe deliberateth, which cause the action following; which are not\nimpediments to that action which was not done, but the causes of that\nwhich was done. That which followeth in this Number is not intelligible,\nby reason of the insignificance of these words, \u201cunderstanding\ndirecteth; will electeth; hypothetical necessity\u201d; which are but jargon,\nand his \u201cdivided sense\u201d and \u201ccompounded sense\u201d, nonsense. And this also,\n\u201cliberty respecteth not future acts only, but present acts also\u201d, is\nunintelligible. For how can a man have liberty to do or not to do that\nwhich is at the same instant already done. For where he addeth,\n\u201cotherwise God did not freely create the world\u201d, it proves nothing;\nbecause he had the liberty to create it, before it was created. Besides,\nit is a profaning of the name of God, to make instances of his\nincomprehensible working in a question as this is, merely natural.\n\n NO. XXIX.\n\n_T. H._ Fifthly, I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this\nmanner:--Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action, that\nare not contained in the nature, and in the intrinsical quality of the\nagent. As for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have\nliberty to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no\nimpediment that way; but not across, because the banks are impediments.\nAnd though water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the liberty\nto ascend, but the faculty or power; because the impediment is in the\nnature of the water and intrinsical. So also we say, he that is tied\nwants the liberty to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in\nhis bonds; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because\nthe impediment is in himself.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ (_a_) \u201cHow that should be a right definition of liberty, which\ncomprehends neither the genus nor the difference, neither the matter nor\nform of liberty, which doth not so much as accidentally describe liberty\nby its marks and tokens; how a real faculty or the elective power should\nbe defined by a negation, or by an absence, is past my understanding,\nand contrary to all the rules of right reason which I have learned.\nNegatives cannot explicate the nature of things defined. By this\ndefinition, a stone hath liberty to ascend into the air, because there\nis no outward impediment to hinder it; and so a violent act may be a\nfree act. Just like his definition are his instances of the liberty of\nthe water to descend down the channel, and a sick or lame man\u2019s liberty\nto go. The latter is an impotence, and not a power or a liberty. The\nformer is so far from being a free act, that it is scarce a natural act.\nCertainly the proper natural motion of water, as of all heavy bodies, is\nto descend directly downwards towards the centre; as we see in rain,\nwhich falls down perpendicularly. Though this be far from a free act,\nwhich proceeds from a rational appetite; yet it is a natural act, and\nproceeds from a natural appetite, and hath its reason within itself. So\nhath not the current of the river in its channel, which must not be\nascribed to the proper nature of the water, but either to the general\norder of the universe, for the better being and preservation of the\ncreatures: (otherwise the waters should not move in seas and rivers as\nthey do, but cover the face of the earth, and possess their proper place\nbetween the air and the earth, according to the degree of their\ngravity): or to an extrinsical principle, whilst one particle of water\nthrusteth and forceth forward another, and so comes a current, or at\nleast so comes the current to be more impetuous; to which motion the\nposition of the earth doth contribute much, both by restraining that\nfluid body with its banks from dispersing itself, and also by affording\nway for a fair and easy descent by its proclivity. He tells us sadly,\nthat \u201cthe water wants liberty to go over the banks, because there is an\nextrinsical impediment; but to ascend up the channel, it wants not\nliberty, but power\u201d. Why? Liberty is a power; if it want power to\nascend, it wants liberty to ascend. But he makes the reason why the\nwater ascends not up the channel, to be intrinsical, and the reason why\nit ascends not over the banks, to be extrinsical; as if there were not a\nrising of the ground up the channel, as well as up the banks, though it\nbe not so discernible, nor always so sudden. The natural appetite of the\nwater is as much against the ascending over the banks, as the ascending\nup the channel. And the extrinsical impediment is as great, ascending up\nthe channel, as over the banks; or rather greater, because there it must\nmove, not only against the rising soil, but also against the succeeding\nwaters, which press forward the former. Either the river wants liberty\nfor both, or else it wants liberty for neither.\n\nBut to leave his metaphorical faculties, and his catachrestical liberty:\nhow far is his discourse wide from the true moral liberty; which is the\nquestion between us? His former description of a free agent, that is,\n\u2018he who hath not made an end of deliberating\u2019, though it was wide from\nthe mark, yet it came much nearer the truth than this definition of\nliberty; unless perhaps he think that the water hath done deliberating\nwhether it will go over the banks, but hath not done deliberating\nwhether it will go up the channel\u201d.\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXIX.\n\n(_a_) \u201cHow that should be a right definition of liberty, which\ncomprehends neither the genus nor the difference, neither the matter nor\nthe form of liberty, &c: how a real faculty or the elective power,\nshould be defined by a negation or by an absence: is past my\nunderstanding, and contrary to all the rules of right reason which I\nhave learned.\u201d A right definition is that which determineth the\nsignification of the word defined, to the end that in the discourse\nwhere it is used, the meaning of it may be constant and without\nequivocation. This is the measure of a definition, and intelligible to\nan English reader. But the Bishop, that measures it by the genus and the\ndifference, thinks, it seems, though he write English, he writes not to\nan English reader unless he also be a Schoolman. I confess the rule is\ngood, that we ought to define, when it can be done, by using first some\nmore general term, and then by restraining the signification of that\ngeneral term, till it be the same with that of the word defined. And\nthis general term the School calls _genus_, and the restraint\n_difference_. This, I say, is a good rule where it can be done; for some\nwords are so general, that they cannot admit a more general in their\ndefinition. But why this ought to be a law of definition, I doubt it\nwould trouble him to find the reason; and therefore I refer him (he\nshall give me leave sometimes to cite, as well as he,) to the fourteenth\nand fifteenth articles of the sixth chapter of my book _De Corpore_. But\nit is to little purpose that he requires in a definition so exactly the\ngenus and the difference, seeing he does not know them when they are\nthere. For in this my definition of liberty, the genus is absence of\nimpediments to action; and the difference or restriction is that they be\nnot contained in the nature of the agent. The Bishop therefore, though\nhe talk of genus and difference, understands not what they are, but\nrequires the matter and form of the thing in the definition. Matter is\nbody, that is to say, corporeal substance, and subject to dimension,\nsuch as are the elements, and the things compounded of the elements. But\nit is impossible that matter should be part of a definition, whose parts\nare only words; or to put the name of matter into the definition of\nliberty, which is immaterial. \u201cHow a real faculty can be defined by an\nabsence, is\u201d, saith he, \u201cpast my understanding.\u201d Unless he mean by _real\nfaculty_ a _very faculty_, I know not how a faculty is real. If he mean\nso, then a very absence is as real as a very faculty. And if the word\ndefined signify an absence or negation, I hope he would not have me\ndefine it by a presence or affirmation. Such a word is liberty; for it\nsignifieth freedom from impediments, which is all one with the absence\nof impediments, as I have defined it. And if this be contrary to all the\nrules of right reason, that is to say, of logic, that he hath learned, I\nshould advise him to read some other logic than he hath yet read, or\nconsider better those he did read when he was a young man and could less\nunderstand them. He adds, that \u201cby this definition, a stone hath liberty\nto ascend into the air, because there is no outward impediment to hinder\nit\u201d. How knows he whether there be impediments to hinder it or not?\nCertainly if a stone were thrown upwards, it would either go upwards\neternally, or it must be stopped by some outward impediment, or it must\nstop itself. He hath confessed, that nothing can move itself; I doubt\nnot therefore that he will confess also, that it cannot stop itself. But\nstopped we see it is; it is therefore stopped by impediments external.\nHe hath in this part of his answer ventured a little too far in speaking\nof definition, and of impediments, and motion; and bewrayed too much his\nignorance in logic and philosophy; and talked so absurdly of the current\nof rivers, and of the motion of the seas, and of the weight of water,\nthat it cannot be corrected otherwise than by blotting it all out.\n\n NO. XXX.\n\n_T. H._ Sixthly, I conceive nothing taketh beginning from itself, but\nfrom the action of some other immediate agent without itself: and that\ntherefore when first a man had an appetite or will to something, to\nwhich immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his\nwill is not the will itself, but something else not in his own\ndisposing. So that, whereas it is out of controversy that of voluntary\nactions the will is a necessary cause; and by this which is said, the\nwill is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not; it\nfolloweth that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and\ntherefore are necessitated.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThis sixth point doth not consist in explicating of terms, as\nthe former; but in two proofs, that voluntary actions are necessitated.\nThe former proof stands thus: \u2018Nothing takes beginning from itself, but\nfrom some agent without itself, which is not in its own disposing\ntherefore, &c\u2019. _Concedo omnia_; (_a_) I grant all he saith. The will\ndoth not take beginning from itself. Whether he understand by _will_ the\nfaculty of the will, which is a power of the reasonable soul, it takes\nnot beginning from itself, but from God, who created and infused the\nsoul into man, and endowed it with this power: or whether he understand\nby _will_ the act of willing, it takes not beginning from itself, but\nfrom the faculty or from the power of willing, which is in the soul.\nThis is certain; finite and participated things cannot be from\nthemselves, nor be produced by themselves. What would he conclude from\nhence? That therefore the act of willing takes not its beginning from\nthe faculty of the will? Or that the faculty is always determined\nantecedently, extrinsically, to will that which it doth will? He may as\nsoon draw water out of a pumice, as draw any such conclusion out of\nthese premises. Secondly, for his \u201ctaking a beginning\u201d, either he\nunderstands _a beginning of being_, or a _beginning of working and\nacting_. If he understand a beginning of being, he saith most truly,\nthat nothing hath a beginning of being in time from itself. But this is\nnothing to his purpose: the question is not between us, whether the soul\nof man or the will of man be eternal. But if he understand _a beginning\nof working or moving actually_, it is a gross error. All men know that\nwhen a stone descends, or fire ascends, or when water, that hath been\nheated, returns to its former temper; the beginning or reason is\nintrinsical, and one and the same thing doth move and is moved in a\ndiverse respect. It moves in respect of the form, and it is moved in\nrespect of the matter. Much more man, who hath a perfect knowledge and\nprenotion of the end, is most properly said to move himself. Yet I do\nnot deny but that there are other beginnings of human actions, which do\nconcur with the will: some outward, as the first cause by general\ninfluence, which is evermore requisite, angels or men by persuading,\nevil spirits by tempting, the object or end by its appetibility, the\nunderstanding by directing. So passions and acquired habits. But I deny\nthat any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by\ndetermining it physically to one, except God alone, who doth it rarely,\nin extraordinary cases. And where there is no antecedent determination\nto one, there is no absolute necessity, but true liberty.\n\n(_b_) \u201cHis second argument is _ex concessis_: \u2018It is out of\ncontroversy\u2019, saith he, \u2018that of voluntary actions the will is a\nnecessary cause\u2019. The argument may be thus reduced: necessary causes\nproduce necessary effects; but the will is a necessary cause of\nvoluntary actions. I might deny his major. Necessary causes do not\nalways produce necessary effects, except they be also necessarily\nproduced; as I have shewed before in the burning of Protagoras\u2019s book.\nBut I answer clearly to the minor, that the will is not a necessary\ncause of what it wills in particular actions. It is without\n_controversy_ indeed, for it is without all probability. That it wills\nwhen it wills, is necessary; but that it wills this or that, now or\nthen, is free. More expressly, the act of the will may be considered\nthree ways; either in respect of its nature, or in respect of its\nexercise, or in respect of its object. First, for the nature of the act:\nthat which the will wills, is necessarily voluntary, because the will\ncannot be compelled. And in this sense, \u2018it is out of controversy, that\nthe will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions\u2019. Secondly, for the\nexercise of its acts, that is not necessary: the will may either will or\nsuspend its act. Thirdly, for the object, that is not necessary, but\nfree: the will is not extrinsically determined to its objects. As for\nexample: the cardinals meet in the conclave to choose a Pope; whom they\nchoose, he is necessarily Pope. But it is not necessary that they shall\nchoose this or that day. Before they were assembled, they might defer\ntheir assembling; when they are assembled, they may suspend their\nelection for a day or a week. Lastly, for the person whom they will\nchoose, it is freely in their own power; otherwise if the election were\nnot free, it were void, and no election at all. So that which takes its\nbeginning from the will, is necessarily voluntary; but it is not\nnecessary that the will shall will this or that in particular, as it was\nnecessary that the person freely elected should be Pope: but it was not\nnecessary either that the election should be at this time, or that this\nman should be elected. And therefore voluntary acts in particular have\nnot necessary causes, that is, they are not necessitated.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXX.\n\nI had said, that nothing taketh beginning from itself, and that the\ncause of the will is not the will itself, but something else which it\ndisposeth not of. Answering to this, he endeavours to shew us the cause\nof the _will_.\n\n(_a_) \u201cI grant\u201d, saith he, \u201cthat the will doth not take beginning from\nitself, for that the faculty of the will takes beginning from God, who\ncreated the soul, and poured it into man, and endowed it with this\npower; and for that the act of willing takes not beginning from itself,\nbut from the faculty or from the power of willing, which is in the soul.\nThis is certain; finite and participated things cannot be from\nthemselves, nor be produced by themselves. What would he conclude from\nhence? That therefore the act of willing takes not its beginning from\nthe faculty of the will?\u201d It is well that he grants finite things (as\nfor his _participated_, it signifies nothing here) cannot be produced by\nthemselves. For out of this I can conclude that the act of willing is\nnot produced by the faculty of willing. He that hath the faculty of\nwilling, hath the faculty of willing something in particular. And at the\nsame time he hath the faculty of nilling the same. If therefore the\nfaculty of willing be the cause he willeth anything whatsoever, for the\nsame reason the faculty of nilling will be the cause at the same time of\nnilling it: and so he shall will and nill the same thing at the same\ntime, which is absurd. It seems the Bishop had forgot, that _matter_ and\n_power_ are indifferent to contrary _forms_ and contrary _acts_. It is\nsomewhat besides the matter, that determineth it to a certain form; and\nsomewhat besides the power, that produceth a certain act: and thence it\nis, that is inferred this that he granteth, that nothing can be produced\nby itself; which nevertheless he presently contradicteth, in saying,\nthat \u201call men know when a stone descends, the beginning is intrinsical\u201d,\nand that \u201cthe stone moves in respect of the form\u201d. Which is as much as\nto say, that the form moveth the matter, or that the stone moveth\nitself; which before he denied. When a stone ascends, the beginning of\nthe stone\u2019s motion was in itself, that is to say, intrinsical, because\nit is not the stone\u2019s motion, till the stone begins to be moved; but the\nmotion that caused it to begin to ascend, was a precedent and\nextrinsical motion of the hand or other engine that threw it upward. And\nso when it descends, the beginning of the stone\u2019s motion is in the\nstone; but nevertheless, there is a former motion in the ambient body,\nair or water, that causeth it to descend. But because no man can see it,\nmost men think there is none; though reason, wherewith the Bishop (as\nrelying only upon the authority of books) troubleth not himself,\nconvince that there is.\n\n(_b_) \u201cHis second argument is, _ex concessis_: \u2018It is out of\ncontroversy, that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary cause\u2019.\nThe argument may be thus reduced: necessary causes produce necessary\neffects; but the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions. I might\ndeny his major; necessary causes do not always produce necessary\neffects, except they be also necessarily produced.\u201d He has reduced the\nargument to nonsense, by saying necessary causes produce not necessary\neffects. For necessary effects, unless he mean such effects as shall\nnecessarily be produced, is insignificant. Let him consider therefore\nwith what grace he can say, necessary causes do not always produce their\neffects, except those effects be also necessarily produced. But his\nanswer is chiefly to the minor, and denies that the will is not a\nnecessary cause of what it wills in particular actions. That it wills\nwhen it wills, saith he, is necessary; but that it wills this or that,\nis free. Is it possible for any man to conceive, that he that willeth,\ncan will anything but this or that particular thing? It is therefore\nmanifest, that either the will is a necessary cause of this or that or\nany other particular action, or not the necessary cause of any voluntary\naction at all. For universal actions there be none. In that which\nfolloweth, he undertaketh to make his doctrine more expressly understood\nby considering the act of the will three ways: \u201cin respect of its\nnature, in respect of its exercise, and in respect of its object\u201d. For\nthe nature of the act, he saith, that \u201cthat which the will wills, is\nnecessarily voluntary\u201d, and that in this sense he grants it is out of\ncontroversy, that the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions.\nInstead of \u201cthat which the will wills\u201d, to make it sense, read that\nwhich the man wills; and then if the man\u2019s will be, as he confesseth, a\nnecessary cause of voluntary actions, it is no less a necessary cause\nthat they are actions, than that they are voluntary. For the exercise of\nthe act, he saith that \u201cthe will may either will, or suspend its act\u201d.\nThis is the old canting, which hath already been sufficiently detected.\nBut to make it somewhat, let us read it thus: the man that willeth, may\neither will or suspend his will: and thus it is intelligible, but false;\nfor how can he that willeth, at the same time suspend his will? And for\nthe object he says, that \u201cit is not necessary but free\u201d, &c. His reason\nis, because, he says, it was not necessary, for example, in choosing a\nPope, to choose him this or that day, or to choose this or that man. I\nwould be glad to know, by what argument he can prove the election not to\nhave been necessitated: for it is not enough for him to say, I perceive\nno necessity in it; nor to say, they might have chosen another, because\nhe knows not whether they might or not; nor to say if he had not been\nfreely elected, the election had been void or none. For though that be\ntrue, it does not follow that the election was not necessary; for there\nis no repugnance to necessity, either in election or in freedom. And\nwhereas he concludeth, \u201ctherefore voluntary acts in particular, are not\nnecessitated\u201d; I would have been glad he had set down what voluntary\nacts there are, not particular, which by his restricting of voluntary\nacts he grants to be necessitated.\n\n NO. XXXI.\n\n_T. H._ Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to which\nnothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect. The\nsame is also a necessary cause: for if it be possible that a sufficient\ncause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanted somewhat which\nwas needful to the producing of it; and so the cause was not sufficient.\nBut if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the\neffect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause: for that is said\nto produce an effect necessarily, that cannot but produce it. Hence it\nis manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced necessarily: for\nwhatsoever is produced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or\nelse it had not been. And therefore also voluntary actions are\nnecessitated.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThis section contains a third argument to prove that all\neffects are necessary; for clearing whereof, it is needful to consider\nhow a cause may be said to be sufficient or insufficient.\n\n\u201cFirst, several causes singly considered may be insufficient, and the\nsame taken conjointly be sufficient to produce an effect. As (_a_) two\nhorses jointly are sufficient to draw a coach, which either of them\nsingly is insufficient to do. Now to make the effect, that is, the\ndrawing of the coach necessary, it is not only required that the two\nhorses be sufficient to draw it, but also that their conjunction be\nnecessary, and their habitude such as they may draw it. If the owner of\none of these horses will not suffer him to draw; if the smith have shod\nthe other in the quick, and lamed him; if the horse have cast a shoe, or\nbe a resty jade, and will not draw but when he list; then the effect is\nnot necessarily produced, but contingently more or less, as the\nconcurrence of the causes is more or less contingent.\n\n(_b_) \u201cSecondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either because it\nproduceth that effect which is intended, as in the generation of a man;\nor else, because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced, as\nin the generation of a monster. The former is properly called a\nsufficient cause, the latter a weak and insufficient cause. Now, if the\ndebility of the cause be not necessary, but contingent, then the effect\nis not necessary, but contingent. It is a rule in logic, that the\nconclusion always follows the weaker part. If the premises be but\nprobable, the conclusion cannot be demonstrative. It holds as well in\ncauses as in propositions. No effect can exceed the virtue of its cause.\nIf the ability or debility of the causes be contingent, the effect\ncannot be necessary.\n\n\u201cThirdly, that which concerns this question of liberty from necessity\nmost nearly, is that (_c_) a cause is said to be sufficient in respect\nof the ability of it to act, not in respect of its will to act. The\nconcurrence of the will is needful to the production of a free effect.\nBut the cause may be sufficient, though the will do not concur. As God\nis sufficient to produce a thousand worlds; but it doth not follow from\nthence, either that he hath produced them, or that he will produce them.\nThe blood of Christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind; but it doth\nnot follow therefore, that all mankind shall be actually saved by virtue\nof his blood. A man may be a sufficient tutor, though he will not teach\nevery scholar, and a sufficient physician, though he will not administer\nto every patient. For as much therefore as the concurrence of the will\nis needful to the production of every free effect, and yet the cause may\nbe sufficient _in sensu diviso_, although the will do not concur; it\nfollows evidently, that the cause may be sufficient, and yet something\nwhich is needful to the production of the effect, may be wanting; and\nthat every sufficient cause is not a necessary cause.\n\n\u201cLastly, if any man be disposed to wrangle against so clear light, and\nsay, that though the free agent be sufficient _in sensu diviso_, yet he\nis not sufficient _in sensu composito_, to produce effect without the\nconcurrence of the will, he saith true: but first, he bewrays the\nweakness and the fallacy of the former argument, which is a mere\ntrifling between sufficiency in a divided sense, and sufficiency in a\ncompounded sense. And seeing the concurrence of the will is not\npredetermined, there is no antecedent necessity before it do concur; and\nwhen it hath concurred, the necessity is but hypothetical, which may\nconsist with liberty.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXI.\n\nIn this place he disputeth against my definition of _a sufficient\ncause_, namely, that cause to which nothing is wanting needful to the\nproducing of the effect. I thought this definition could have been\nmisliked by no man that had English enough to know that _a sufficient\ncause_, _and cause enough_, signifieth the same thing. And no man will\nsay that that is _cause enough_ to produce an effect, to which any thing\nis wanting needful to the producing of it. But the Bishop thinks, if he\nset down what he understands by _sufficient_, it would serve to confute\nmy definition: and therefore says: (_a_) \u201cTwo horses jointly are\nsufficient to draw a coach, which either of them singly is insufficient\nto do. Now to make the effect, that is, the drawing of the coach\nnecessary, it is not only required that the two horses be sufficient to\ndraw it, but also that it be necessary they shall be joined, and that\nthe owner of the horses will let them draw, and that the smith hath not\nlamed them, and they be not resty, and list not to draw but when they\nlist: otherwise the effect is contingent\u201d. It seems the Bishop thinks\ntwo horses may be sufficient to draw a coach, though they will not draw,\nor though they be lame, or though they be never put to draw; and I think\nthey can never produce the effect of drawing, without those needful\ncircumstances of being strong, obedient, and having the coach some way\nor other fastened to them. He calls it a sufficient cause of drawing,\nthat they be coach horses, though they be lame or will not draw. But I\nsay they are not sufficient absolutely, but conditionally, if they be\nnot lame nor resty. Let the reader judge, whether my sufficient cause or\nhis, may properly be called cause enough.\n\n(_b_) \u201cSecondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either because it\nproduceth that effect which is intended, as in the generation of a man;\nor else, because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced, as\nin the generation of a monster: the former is properly called a\nsufficient cause, the latter a weak and insufficient cause.\u201d In these\nfew lines he hath said the cause of the generation of a monster is\nsufficient to produce a monster, and that it is insufficient to produce\na monster. How soon may a man forget his words, that doth not understand\nthem. This term of _insufficient_ cause, which also the School calls\n_deficient_, that they may rhyme to _efficient_, is not intelligible,\nbut a word devised like _hocus pocus_, to juggle a difficulty out of\nsight. That which is sufficient to produce a monster, is not therefore\nto be called an insufficient cause to produce a man; no more than that\nwhich is sufficient to produce a man, is to be called an insufficient\ncause to produce a monster.\n\n(_c_) \u201cThirdly, a cause is said to be sufficient in respect to the\nability of it to act, not in respect of its will to act, &c. As God is\nsufficient to produce a thousand worlds.\u201d He understands little, when\nmen say, God is sufficient to produce many worlds, if he understand not\nthe meaning to be, that he is sufficient to produce them if he will.\nWithout this supposition, _if he will_, a man is not sufficient to\nproduce any voluntary action, not so much as to walk, though he be in\nhealth and at liberty. The will is as much a sufficient cause without\nthe strength to do, as the strength without the will. To that which he\nadds, that my definition is \u201ca mere trifling between a sufficiency in a\ndivided sense, and a sufficiency in a compounded sense\u201d, I can make no\nanswer; because I understand no more what he means by sufficiency in a\ndivided sense, and sufficiency in a compounded sense, than if he had\nsaid sufficiency in a divided nonsense, and sufficiency in a compounded\nnonsense.\n\n NO. XXXII.\n\n_T. H._ Lastly, I hold that the ordinary definition of a free agent,\nnamely, that a free agent is that, which when all things are present\nwhich are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce\nit, implies a contradiction, and is nonsense; being as much as to say,\nthe cause may be sufficient, that is, necessary, and yet the effect not\nfollow.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThis last point is but a corollary, or an inference from the\nformer doctrine, that \u2018every sufficient cause produceth its effect\nnecessarily\u2019; which pillar being taken away the superstructure must\nneeds fall to the ground, having nothing left to support it. \u2018Lastly, I\nhold\u2019, saith he. What he is able to prove, is something: so much reason,\nso much trust. But what he holds, concerns himself, not others. But what\nholds he? \u2018I hold\u2019, saith he, \u2018that the ordinary definition of a free\nagent implies a contradiction, and is nonsense.\u2019 That which he calls the\n\u2018ordinary definition\u2019 of liberty, is the very definition which is given\nby the much greater part of Philosophers and Schoolmen. And doth he\nthink that all these spake nonsense: or had no more judgment than to\ncontradict themselves in a definition? He might much better suspect\nhimself, than censure so many. Let us see the definition itself: \u2018A free\nagent is that, which when all things are present that are needful to\nproduce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it.\u2019 I acknowledge the\nold definition of liberty, with little variation. But I cannot see this\nnonsense, nor discover this contradiction. For (_a_) in these words,\n\u2018all things needful\u2019, or \u2018all things requisite\u2019, the actual\ndetermination of the will is not included. But by all things needful or\nrequisite, all necessary power either operative or elective, all\nnecessary instruments and adjuments extrinsical and intrinsical, and all\nconditions are intended. As he that hath pen, and ink, and paper, a\ntable, a desk, and leisure, the art of writing, and the free use of his\nhand, hath all things requisite to write if he will; and yet he may\nforbear if he will. Or as he that hath men, and money, and arms, and\nmunition, and ships, and a just cause, hath all things requisite for\nwar; yet he may make peace if he will. Or as the king proclaimed in the\ngospel (Matth. xxii. 4): _I have prepared my dinner, my oxen and my\nfatlings are killed, all things are ready; come unto the marriage_.\nAccording to T. H.\u2019s doctrine, the guests might have told him that he\nsaid not truly, for their own wills were not ready. (_b_) And indeed if\nthe will were (as he conceives it is) necessitated extrinsically to\nevery act of willing, if it had no power to forbear willing what it doth\nwill, nor to will what it doth not will; then if the will were wanting,\nsomething requisite to the producing of the effect was wanting. But now\nwhen science and conscience, reason and religion, our own and other\nmen\u2019s experience doth teach us, that the will hath a dominion over its\nown acts to will or nill without extrinsical necessitation, if the power\nto will be present _in actu primo_, determinable by ourselves, then\nthere is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the producing of\nthe effect.\n\n\u201cSecondly, these words, \u2018to act or not to act, to work or not to work,\nto produce or not to produce\u2019, have reference to the effect, not as a\nthing which is already done or doing, but as a thing to be done. They\nimply not the actual production, but the producibility of the effect.\nBut when once the will hath actually concurred with all other causes and\nconditions and circumstances, then the effect is no more possible nor\nproducible, but it is in being, and actually produced. Thus he takes\naway the subject of the question. The question is, whether effects\nproducible be free from necessity. He shuffles out \u2018effects producible\u2019,\nand thrusts in their places \u2018effects produced\u2019, or which are in the act\nof production. Wherefore I conclude, that it is neither nonsense nor\ncontradiction to say that a free agent, when all things requisite to\nproduce the effect are present, may nevertheless not produce it.\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXII.\n\nThe question is here whether these words \u2018a free agent is that, which\nwhen all things needful to the production of the effect are present, can\nnevertheless not produce it\u2019, imply a contradiction; as I say it does.\nTo make it appear no contradiction, he saith: (_a_) \u201cIn these words,\n\u2018all things needful\u2019, or \u2018all things requisite\u2019, the actual\ndetermination of the will is not included\u201d: as if the will were not\nneedful nor requisite to the producing of a voluntary action. For to the\nproduction of any act whatsoever, there is needful, not only those\nthings which proceed from the agent, but also those that consist in the\ndisposition of the patient. And to use his own instance, it is necessary\nto writing, not only that there be pen, ink, paper, &c.; but also a will\nto write. He that hath the former, hath all things requisite to write if\nhe will, but not all things necessary to writing. And so in his other\ninstances, he that hath men and money, &c. (without that which he\nputteth in for a requisite), hath all things requisite to make war if he\nwill, but not simply to make war. And he in the Gospel that had prepared\nhis dinner, had all things requisite for his guests if they came, but\nnot all things requisite to make them come. And therefore \u201call things\nrequisite\u201d, is a term ill defined by him.\n\n(_b_) \u201cAnd indeed if the will were (as he conceives it is) necessitated\nextrinsically to every act of willing; if it had no power to forbear\nwilling what it doth will, nor to will what it does not will; then if\nthe will were wanting, something requisite to the producing of the\neffect were wanting. But now when science and conscience, reason and\nreligion, our own and other men\u2019s experience doth teach us, that the\nwill hath a dominion over its own acts to will or nill without\nextrinsical necessitation, if the power to will be present _in actu\nprimo_, determinable by ourselves, then there is no necessary power\nwanting in this respect to the producing of the effect.\u201d These words,\n\u201cthe will hath power to forbear willing what it doth will\u201d; and these,\n\u201cthe will hath a dominion over its own acts\u201d; and these, \u201cthe power to\nwill is present _in actu primo_, determinable by ourselves\u201d; are as wild\nas ever were any spoken within the walls of Bedlam: and if science,\nconscience, reason, and religion teach us to speak thus, they make us\nmad. And that which followeth is false: \u201cto act or not to act, to work\nor not to work, to produce or not to produce, have reference to the\neffect, not as a thing which is already done or doing, but as a thing to\nbe done\u201d. For to act, to work, to produce, are the same thing with to be\ndoing. It is not the act, but the power that hath reference to the\nfuture: for act and power differ in nothing but in this, that the former\nsignifieth the time present, the latter the time to come. And whereas he\nadds, that I shuffle out effects producible, and thrust into their\nplaces effects produced; I must take it for an untruth, till he cite the\nplace wherein I have done so.\n\n NO. XXXIII.\n\n_T. H._ For my first five points; where it is explicated, first, what\nspontaneity is; secondly, what deliberation is; thirdly, what will,\npropension, and appetite is; fourthly, what a free agent is; fifthly,\nwhat liberty is: there can be no other proof offered but every man\u2019s own\nexperience, by reflecting on himself, and remembering what he useth to\nhave in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth, when he saith, an\naction is spontaneous, a man deliberates, such is his will, that agent\nor that action is free. Now, he that so reflecteth on himself, cannot\nbut be satisfied, that _deliberation_ is the considering of the good and\nevil sequels of the action to come; that by _spontaneity_ is meant\ninconsiderate proceeding; for else nothing is meant by it; that _will_\nis the last act of our deliberation; that a _free agent_, is he that can\ndo if he will and forbear if he will; and that _liberty_ is the absence\nof external impediments. But to those that out of custom speak not what\nthey conceive, but what they hear, and are not able or will not take the\npains to consider what they think, when they hear such words, no\nargument can be sufficient; because experience and matter of fact is not\nverified by other men\u2019s arguments, but by every man\u2019s own sense and\nmemory. For example, how can it be proved, that to love a thing and to\nthink it good are all one, to a man that does not mark his own meaning\nby those words? Or how can it be proved that eternity is not _nunc\nstans_, to a man that says these words by custom, and never considers\nhow he can conceive the thing itself in his mind? Also the sixth point,\nthat a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a cause, can no\nother way be made known but by trying how he can imagine it. But if he\ntry, he shall find as much reason, if there be no cause of the thing, to\nconceive it should begin at one time as another, that is, he hath equal\nreason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible. And\ntherefore he must think there was some special cause, why it began then\nrather than sooner or later; or else, that it began never, but was\neternal.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cNow at length he comes to his main proofs; he that hath so\nconfidently censured the whole current of Schoolmen and Philosophers of\n_nonsense_, had need to produce strong evidence for himself. So he calls\nhis reasons, No. XXXVI., _demonstrative proofs_. All demonstrations are\neither from the cause or the effect, not from private notions and\nconceptions which we have in our minds. That which he calls a\ndemonstration, deserves not the name of an intimation. He argues thus:\n\u2018that which a man conceives in his mind by these words, spontaneity,\ndeliberation, &c.; that they are\u2019. This is his proposition, which I\ndeny. (_a_) The true natures of things are not to be judged by the\nprivate _ideas_, or conceptions of men, but by their causes and formal\nreasons. Ask an ordinary person what _upwards_ signifies, and whether\nour antipodes have their heads upwards or downwards; and he will not\nstick to tell you, that if his head be upwards, theirs must needs be\ndownwards. And this is because he knows not the formal reason thereof;\nthat the heavens encircle the earth, and what is towards heaven is\nupwards. This same erroneous notion of _upwards_ and _downwards_, before\nthe true reason was fully discovered, abused more than ordinary\ncapacities; as appears by their arguments of _penduli homines_, and\n_pendul\u00e6 arbores_. Again, what do men conceive ordinarily by this word\n_empty_, as when they say an empty vessel, or by this word _body_, as\nwhen they say, there is no body in that room? They intend not to exclude\nthe air, either out of the vessel or out of the room: yet reason tells\nus, that the vessel is not truly empty, and that the air is a true body.\nI might give a hundred such like instances. He who leaves the conduct of\nhis understanding to follow vulgar notions, shall plunge himself into a\nthousand errors; like him who leaves a certain guide to follow an _ignus\nfatuus_, or a will-with-the-wisp. So his proposition is false. (_b_) His\nreason, \u2018that matter of fact is not verified by other men\u2019s arguments,\nbut by every man\u2019s own sense and memory\u2019, is likewise maimed on both\nsides. Whether we hear such words or not, is matter of fact; and sense\nis the proper judge of it: but what these words do, or ought truly to\nsignify, is not to be judged by sense but by reason. Secondly, reason\nmay, and doth oftentimes correct sense, even about its proper object.\nSense tells us that the sun is no bigger than a good ball; but reason\ndemonstrates, that it is many times greater than the whole globe of the\nearth. As to his instance: \u2018how can it be proved, that to love a thing\nand to think it good is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own\nmeaning by these words\u2019, I confess it cannot be proved; for it is not\ntrue. Beauty, and likeness, and love, do conciliate love as much as\ngoodness, _cos amoris amor_. Love is a passion of the will; but to judge\nof goodness is an act of the understanding. A father may love an\nungracious child, and yet not esteem him good. A man loves his own house\nbetter than another man\u2019s; yet he cannot but esteem many others better\nthan his own. His other instance, \u2018how can it be proved that eternity is\nnot _nunc stans_, to a man that says these words by custom, and never\nconsiders how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind\u2019, is just\nlike the former, not to be proved by reason, but by fancy, which is the\nway he takes. And it is not unlike the counsel which one gave to a\nnovice about the choice of his wife, to advise with the bells: as he\nfancied so they sounded, either take her or leave her.\n\n(_c_) \u201cThen for his assumption, it is as defective as his proposition,\nthat by those words spontaneity, &c, men do understand as he conceives.\nNo rational man doth conceive a _spontaneous_ action and an\n_indeliberate_ action to be all one. Every _indeliberate_ action is not\n_spontaneous_; the fire considers not whether it should burn, yet the\nburning of it is not _spontaneous_. Neither is every _spontaneous_\naction _indeliberate_; a man may deliberate what he will eat, and yet\neat it _spontaneously_. (_d_) Neither doth _deliberation_ properly\nsignify, the considering of the good and evil sequels of an action to\ncome, but the considering whether this be a good and fit means, or the\nbest and fittest means for obtaining such an end. The physician doth not\ndeliberate whether he should cure his patient, but by what means he\nshould cure him. Deliberation is of the means, not of the end. (_e_)\nMuch less doth any man conceive with T. H. that deliberation is an\n_imagination_, or an act of fancy not of reason, common to men of\ndiscretion with madmen, and natural fools, and children, and brute\nbeasts. (_f_) Thirdly, neither doth any understanding man conceive, or\ncan conceive, that \u2018the will is an act of our deliberation\u2019; (the\nunderstanding and the will are two distinct faculties); or that \u2018only\nthe last appetite is to be called our will\u2019. So no man should be able to\nsay, this is my will, because he knows not whether he shall persevere in\nit or not. (_g_) Concerning the fourth point we agree, that \u2018he is a\nfree agent that can do if he will, and forbear if he will\u2019. But I wonder\nhow this dropped from his pen. What is now become of his absolute\nnecessity of all things, if a man be free to do and to forbear anything?\nWill he make himself guilty of the _nonsense_ of the Schoolmen, and run\nwith them into contradictions for company? It may be he will say, he can\ndo if he will, and forbear if he will, but he cannot will if he will.\nThis will not serve his turn; for if the cause of a free action, that\nis, the will to do it be determined, then the effect, or the action\nitself is likewise determined; a determined cause cannot produce an\nundetermined effect; either the agent can will and forbear to will, or\nelse he cannot do and forbear to do. (_h_) But we differ wholly about\nthe fifth point. He who conceives _liberty_ aright, conceives both a\n_liberty in the subject_ to will or not to will, and a _liberty to the\nobject_ to will this or that, and a _liberty from impediments_. T. H. by\na new way of his own cuts off the _liberty of the subject_; as if a\nstone was free to ascend or descend, because it hath no outward\nimpediment: and the _liberty towards the object_; as if the needle\ntouched with the loadstone were free to point either towards the north\nor towards the south, because there is not a barricado in its way to\nhinder it. Yea, he cuts off the _liberty from inward impediments_ also;\nas if a hawk were at liberty to fly when her wings are plucked, but not\nwhen they are tied. And so he makes _liberty from extrinsical\nimpediments_ to be complete liberty; so he ascribes _liberty_ to brute\nbeasts, and _liberty_ to rivers, and by consequence makes beasts and\nrivers to be capable of sin and punishment. Assuredly Xerxes, who caused\nthe Hellespont to be beaten with so many stripes, was of this opinion.\nLastly, T. H.\u2019s reason, that \u2018it is custom, or want of ability, or\nnegligence, which makes a man conceive otherwise\u2019, is but a begging of\nthat which he should prove. Other men consider as seriously as himself,\nwith as much judgment as himself, with less prejudice than himself, and\nyet they can apprehend no such sense of these words. Would he have other\nmen feign they see fiery dragons in the air, because he affirms\nconfidently that he sees them, and wonders why others are so blind as\nnot to see them?\n\n(_i_) \u201cThe reason for the sixth point is like the former, a fantastical\nor imaginative reason. \u2018How can a man imagine anything to begin without\na cause, or if it should begin without a cause, why it should begin at\nthis time rather than at that time?\u2019 He saith truly, nothing can _begin_\nwithout a cause, that is, _to be_; but it may _begin to act_ of itself\nwithout any other cause. Nothing can begin without a cause; but many\nthings may begin, and do begin without necessary causes. A free cause\nmay as well choose his time when he will begin, as a necessary cause be\ndetermined extrinsically when it must begin. And although free effects\ncannot be foretold, because they are not certainly predetermined in\ntheir causes; yet when the free causes do determine themselves, they are\nof as great certainty as the other. As when I see a bell ringing, I can\nconceive the cause of it as well why it rings now, as I know the\ninterposition of the earth to be the cause of the eclipse of the moon,\nor the most certain occurrent in the nature of things.\n\n(_k_) \u201cAnd now that I have answered T. H.\u2019s arguments drawn from the\nprivate conceptions of men concerning the sense of words, I desire him\nseriously without prejudice to examine himself, and those natural\nnotions which he finds in himself, (not of words, but of things; these\nare from nature, those are by imposition), whether he doth not find by\nexperience, that he doth many things which he might have left undone if\nhe would, and omits many things which he might have done if he would;\nwhether he doth not some things out of mere animosity and will, without\neither regard to the direction of right reason or serious respect of\nwhat is honest or profitable, only to show that he will have a dominion\nover his own actions; as we see ordinarily in children, and wise men\nfind at some times in themselves by experience; (and I apprehend this\nvery defence of necessity against liberty to be partly of that kind);\nwhether he is not angry with those who draw him from his study, or cross\nhim in his desires; (if they be necessitated to do it, why should he be\nangry with them, any more than he is angry with a sharp winter, or a\nrainy day that keeps him at home against his antecedent will?); whether\nhe doth not sometimes blame himself, and say, \u2018O what a fool was I to do\nthus and thus\u2019, or wish to himself, \u2018O that I had been wise\u2019, or, \u2018O\nthat I had not done such an act\u2019. If he have no dominion over his\nactions, if he be irresistibly necessitated to all things that he doth,\nhe might as well wish, \u2018O that I had not breathed,\u2019 or blame himself for\ngrowing old, \u2018O what a fool was I to grow old\u2019.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXIII.\n\nI have said in the beginning of this number, that to define what\nspontaneity is, what deliberation is, what will, propension, appetite, a\nfree agent, and liberty is, and to prove they are well defined, there\ncan be no other proof offered, but every man\u2019s own experience and memory\nof what he meaneth by such words. For definitions being the beginning of\nall demonstration, cannot themselves be demonstrated, that is, proved to\nanother man; all that can be done, is either to put him in mind what\nthose words signify commonly in the matter whereof they treat, or if the\nwords be unusual, to make the definitions of them true by mutual consent\nin their signification. And though this be manifestly true, yet there is\nnothing of it amongst the Schoolmen, who use to argue not by rule, but\nas fencers teach to handle weapons, by quickness only of the hand and\neye. The Bishop therefore boggles at this kind of proof; and says, (_a_)\n\u201cthe true natures of things are not to be judged by the private ideas or\nconceptions of men, but by their causes and formal reasons. Ask an\nordinary person what upwards signifies,\u201d &c. But what will he answer, if\nI should ask him, how he will judge of the causes of things, whereof he\nhath no idea or conception in his own mind? It is therefore impossible\nto give a true definition of any word without the idea of the thing\nwhich that word signifieth, or not according to that idea or conception.\nHere again he discovereth the true cause why he and other Schoolmen so\noften speak absurdly. For they speak without conception of the things,\nand by rote, one receiving what he saith from another by tradition, from\nsome puzzled divine or philosopher, that to decline a difficulty speaks\nin such manner as not to be understood. And where he bids us ask an\nordinary person what upwards signifieth, I dare answer for that ordinary\nperson he will tell us as significantly as any scholar, and say it is\ntowards heaven; and as soon as he knows the earth is round, makes no\nscruple to believe there are antipodes, being wiser in that point than\nwere those which he saith to have been of more than ordinary capacities.\nAgain, ordinary men understand not, he saith, the words _empty_ and\n_body_; yes, but they do, just as well as learned men. When they hear\nnamed an empty vessel, the learned as well as the unlearned mean and\nunderstand the same thing, namely, that there is nothing in it that can\nbe seen; and whether it be truly empty, the ploughman and the Schoolman\nknow alike. \u201cI might give\u201d, he says, \u201ca hundred such like instances.\u201d\nThat is true; a man may give a thousand foolish and impertinent\ninstances of men ignorant in such questions of philosophy concerning\nemptiness, body, upwards, and downwards, and the like. But the question\nis not whether such and such tenets be true, but whether such and such\nwords can be well defined without thinking upon the things they\nsignified; as the Bishop thinks they may, when he concludeth with these\nwords, \u201cso his proposition is false\u201d.\n\n(_b_) \u201cHis reason, \u2018that matter of fact is not verified by other men\u2019s\narguments, but by every man\u2019s own sense and memory\u2019, is likewise maimed\non both sides. Whether we hear such words or not, is matter of fact, and\nsense is the proper judge of it; but what these words do, or ought truly\nto signify, is not to be judged by sense, but by reason.\u201d A man is born\nwith a capacity after due time and experience to reason truly; to which\ncapacity of nature, if there be added no discipline at all, yet as far\nas he reasoneth he will reason truly; though by a right discipline he\nmay reason truly in more numerous and various matters. But he that hath\nlighted on deceiving or deceived masters, that teach for truth all that\nhath been dictated to them by their own interest, or hath been cried up\nby other such teachers before them, have for the most part their natural\nreason, as far as concerneth the truth of doctrine, quite defaced or\nvery much weakened, becoming changelings through the enchantments of\nwords not understood. This cometh into my mind from this saying of the\nBishop, that matter of fact is not verified by sense and memory, but by\narguments. How is it possible that, without discipline, a man should\ncome to think that the testimony of a witness, which is the only\nverifier of matter of fact, should consist not in sense and memory, so\nas he may say he saw and remembers the thing done, but in arguments or\nsyllogisms? Or how can an unlearned man be brought to think the words he\nspeaks, ought to signify, when he speaks sincerely, anything else but\nthat which himself meant by them? Or how can any man without learning\ntake the question, \u201cwhether the sun be no bigger than a ball, or bigger\nthan the earth\u201d, to be a question of fact? Nor do I think that any man\nis so simple, as not to find that to be good which he loveth; good, I\nsay, so far forth, as it maketh him to love it. Or is there any\nunlearned man so stupid, as to think eternity is this present instant of\ntime standing still, and the same eternity to be the very next instant\nafter; and consequently that there be so many eternities as there can be\ninstants of time supposed? No, there is scholastic learning required in\nsome measure to make one mad.\n\n(_c_) \u201cThen for his assumption, it is as defective as his proposition,\nthat by these words, spontaneity, &c. men do understand as he conceives,\n&c. No rational man doth conceive a spontaneous action and an\nindeliberate action to be all one; every indeliberate action is not\nspontaneous, &c.\u201d Not every _spontaneous_ action _indeliberate_? This I\nget by striving to make sense of that which he strives to make nonsense.\nI never thought the word _spontaneity_ English. Yet because he used it,\nI make such meaning of it as it would bear, and said it \u201cmeant\ninconsiderate proceeding, or nothing\u201d. And for this my too much\nofficiousness, I receive the reward of being thought by him not to be a\nrational man. I know that in the Latin of all authors but Schoolmen,\n_actio spontanea_ signifies that action, whereof there is no apparent\ncause derived further than from the agent itself; and is in all things\nthat have sense the same with voluntary, whether deliberated or not\ndeliberated. And therefore where he distinguished it from voluntary, I\nthought he might mean indeliberate. But let it signify what it will,\nprovided it be intelligible, it would make against him.\n\n(_d_) \u201cNeither doth deliberation properly signify \u2018the considering of\nthe good and evil sequels of an action to come\u2019; but the considering\nwhether this be a good and fit means, or the best and fittest means, for\nobtaining such an end.\u201d If the Bishop\u2019s words proceeded not from hearing\nand reading of others, but from his own thoughts, he could never have\nreprehended this definition of deliberation, especially in the manner he\ndoth it; for he says, it is the considering whether this or that be a\ngood and fit means for obtaining such an end; as if considering whether\na means be good or not, were not all one with considering whether the\nsequel of using those means be good or evil.\n\n(_e_) \u201cMuch less doth any man conceive with T. H. that \u2018deliberation is\nan act of fancy\u2019, not of reason, common to men of discretion with\nmadmen, natural fools, children, and brute beasts\u201d. I do indeed conceive\nthat deliberation is an act of imagination or fancy; nay more, that\nreason and understanding also are acts of the imagination, that is to\nsay, they are imaginations. I find it so by considering my own\nratiocination; and he might find it so in his, if he did consider his\nown thoughts, and not speak as he does by rote; by rote I say, when he\ndisputes; not by rote, when he is about those trifles he calleth\nbusiness; then when he speaks, he thinks of, that is to say, he\nimagines, his business; but here he thinks only upon the words of other\nmen that have gone before him in this question, transcribing their\nconclusions and arguments, not his own thoughts.\n\n(_f_) \u201cThirdly, neither doth any understanding man conceive, or can\nconceive, either \u2018that the will is an act of our deliberation\u2019 (the\nunderstanding and the will are two distinct faculties); or \u2018that only\nthe last appetite is to be called our will\u2019.\u201d Though the understanding\nand the will were two distinct faculties, yet followeth it not that the\nwill and the deliberation are two distinct faculties. For the whole\ndeliberation is nothing else but so many wills alternatively changed,\naccording as a man understandeth or fancieth the good and evil sequels\nof the thing concerning which he deliberateth whether he shall pursue\nit, or of the means whether they conduce or not to that end, whatsoever\nit be, he seeketh to obtain. So that in deliberation there be many\nwills, whereof not any is the cause of a voluntary action but the last;\nas I have said before, answering this objection in another place.\n\n(_g_) \u201cConcerning the fourth point we agree, that \u2018he is a free agent,\nthat can do if he will and forbear if he will\u2019. But I wonder how this\ndropped from his pen? &c. It may be he will say he can do if he will and\nforbear if he will, but he cannot will if he will.\u201d He has no reason to\nwonder how this dropped from my pen. He found it in my answer No. III,\nand has been all this while about to confute it, so long indeed that he\nhad forgot I said it; and now again brings another argument to prove a\nman is free to will, which is this: \u201cEither the agent can will and\nforbear to will, or else he cannot do and forbear to do\u201d. There is no\ndoubt a man can will one thing or other, and forbear to will it. For\nmen, if they be awake, are always willing one thing or other. But put\nthe case, a man has a will to-day to do a certain action to-morrow; is\nhe sure to have the same will to-morrow, when he is to do it? Is he free\nto-day, to choose to-morrow\u2019s will? This is it that is now in question,\nand this argument maketh nothing for the affirmative or negative.\n\n(_h_) \u201cBut we differ wholly about the fifth point. He who conceives\nliberty aright, conceives both a \u2018liberty in the subject\u2019, to will or\nnot to will, and a \u2018liberty to the object\u2019 to will this or that, and a\n\u2018liberty from impediments\u2019. T. H., by a new way of his own, cuts off the\n\u2018liberty of the subject\u2019, as if a stone were free to ascend or descend\nbecause it hath no outward impediment; and the \u2018liberty towards the\nobject\u2019, as if the needle touched with the loadstone were free to point\neither towards the north or towards the south, because there is not a\nbarricado in its way.\u201d How does it appear, that he who conceives liberty\naright, conceives a liberty in the subject to will or not to will;\nunless he mean liberty to do if he will, or not to do if he will not,\nwhich was never denied? Or how does it follow, that a stone is as free\nto ascend as descend, unless he prove there is no outward impediment to\nits ascent; which cannot be proved, for the contrary is true? Or how\nproveth he, that there is no outward impediment to keep that point of\nthe loadstone, which placeth itself towards the north, from turning to\nthe south? His ignorance of the causes external is not a sufficient\nargument that there are none. And whereas he saith, that according to my\ndefinition of liberty, \u201ca hawk were at liberty to fly when her wings are\nplucked, but not when they are tied\u201d; I answer that she is not at\nliberty to fly when her wings are tied; but to say, when her wings are\nplucked that she wanted the liberty to fly, were to speak improperly and\nabsurdly; for in that case, men that speak English use to say she cannot\nfly. And for his reprehension of my attributing liberty to brute beasts\nand rivers; I would be glad to know whether it be improper language, to\nsay a bird or beast may be set at liberty from the cage wherein they\nwere imprisoned or to say that a river, which was stopped, hath\nrecovered its free course; and how it follows, that a beast or river\nrecovering this freedom must needs therefore \u201cbe capable of sin and\npunishment\u201d?\n\n(_i_) \u201cThe reason for the sixth point is like the former, a phantastical\nor imaginative reason: \u2018How can a man imagine anything to begin without\na cause; or if it should begin without a cause, why it should begin at\nthis time, rather than at that time?\u2019 He saith truly, nothing can\n_begin_ without a cause, that is _to be_; but it may _begin to act_ of\nitself without any other cause. Nothing can _begin_ without a cause; but\nmany things may _begin_ without a necessary cause.\u201d He granteth nothing\ncan _begin_ without a cause; and he hath granted formerly that nothing\ncan cause itself. And now he saith, it may begin _to act_ of itself. The\naction therefore _begins to be_ without any cause, which he said nothing\ncould do, contradicting what he had said but in the line before. And for\nthat that he saith, that \u201cmany things may begin not without a cause, but\nwithout a necessary cause\u201d; it hath been argued before; and all causes\nhave been proved, if entire and sufficient causes, to be necessary. And\nthat which he repeateth here, namely, that \u201ca free cause may choose his\ntime when he will begin to work\u201d; and that \u201calthough free effects cannot\nbe foretold, because they are not certainly predetermined in their\ncauses, yet when the free causes do determine themselves, they are of as\ngreat certainty as the other\u201d; it has been made appear sufficiently\nbefore that it is but jargon, the words _free cause_ and _determining\nthemselves_ being insignificant, and having nothing in the mind of man\nanswerable to them.\n\n(_k_) \u201cAnd now that I have answered T. H.\u2019s arguments, drawn from the\nprivate conceptions of men concerning the sense of words, I desire him\nseriously to examine himself, &c.\u201d One of his interrogatories is this,\n\u201cwhether I find not by experience, that I do many things which I might\nhave left undone if I would\u201d. This question was needless, because all\nthe way I have granted him that men have liberty to do many things if\nthey will, which they left undone because they had not the will to do\nthem. Another interrogatory is this, \u201cwhether I do not some things\nwithout regard to the direction of right reason, or serious respect of\nwhat is honest or profitable\u201d. This question was in vain, unless he\nthink himself my confessor. Another is, \u201cwhether I writ not this defence\nagainst liberty, only to show I will have a dominion over my own\nactions\u201d. To this I answer, no: but to show I have no dominion over my\nwill, and this also at his request. But all these questions serve in\nthis place for nothing else, but to deliver him of a jest he was in\nlabour withal: and therefore his last question is, \u201cwhether I do not\nsometimes say, \u2018Oh, what a fool was I to do thus and thus!\u2019 or, \u2018Oh,\nthat I had been wise!\u2019 or, \u2018Oh, what a fool was I to grow old!\u2019\u201d Subtle\nquestions, and full of episcopal gravity! I would he had left out\ncharging me with _blasphemous, desperate, destructive, and atheistical_\nopinions. I should then have pardoned him his calling me _fool_; both\nbecause I do many things foolishly, and because, in this question\ndisputed between us, I think he will appear a greater fool than I.\n\n NO. XXXIV.\n\n_T. H._ For the seventh point, that all events have necessary causes, it\nis there proved in that they have sufficient causes. Further, let us in\nthis place also suppose any event never so casual, as for example, the\nthrowing ambs-ace upon a pair of dice; and see if it must not have been\nnecessary before it was thrown. For, seeing it was thrown, it had a\nbeginning, and consequently a sufficient cause to produce it; consisting\npartly in the dice, partly in the outward things, as the posture of the\nparty\u2019s hand, the measure of force applied by the caster, the posture of\nthe parts of the table, and the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting\nthat was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast;\nand consequently, that cast was necessarily thrown. For if it had not\nbeen thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it;\nand so the cause had not been sufficient. In the like manner it may be\nproved that every other accident, how contingent soever it seem, or how\nvoluntary soever it be, is produced necessarily; which is that J. D.\ndisputes against. The same also may be proved in this manner. Let the\ncase be put for example, of the weather. _It is necessary, that\nto-morrow it shall rain or not rain._ If therefore it be not necessary\nit shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain. Otherwise it is not\nnecessary that the proposition, _it shall rain or it shall not rain_,\nshould be true. I know there are some that say, it may necessarily be\ntrue, that one of the two shall come to pass, but not singly, that it\nshall rain or it shall not rain. Which is as much as to say, one of them\nis necessary, yet neither of them is necessary. And therefore, to seem\nto avoid that absurdity, they make a distinction, that neither of them\nis true _determinate_, but _indeterminate_. Which distinction either\nsignifies no more than this: one of them is true, but we know not which,\nand so the necessity remains, though we know it not: or if the meaning\nof the distinction be not that, it has no meaning. And they might as\nwell have said, one of them is true _tytyrice_, but neither of them\n_tupatulice_.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ (_a_) \u201cHis former proof, that all sufficient causes are\nnecessary causes, is answered before (No. XXXI). (_b_) And his two\ninstances of casting ambs-ace, and raining to-morrow, are altogether\nimpertinent to the question now agitated between us, for two reasons.\nFirst, our present controversy is concerning free actions, which proceed\nfrom the liberty of man\u2019s will: both his instances are of contingent\nactions, which proceed from the indetermination or contingent\nconcurrence of natural causes. First, that there are free actions which\nproceed merely from election, without any outward necessitation, is a\ntruth so evident as that there is a sun in the heavens; and he that\ndoubteth of it, may as well doubt whether there be a shell without the\nnut, or a stone within the olive. A man proportions his time each day,\nand allots so much to his devotions, so much to his study, so much to\nhis diet, so much to his recreations, so much to necessary or civil\nvisits, so much to his rest; he who will seek for I know not what causes\nof all this without himself, except that good God who hath given him a\nreasonable soul, may as well seek for a cause of the Egyptian pyramids\namong the crocodiles of Nilus. (_c_) Secondly, for mixed actions which\nproceed from the concurrence of free and natural agents, though they be\nnot free, yet they are not necessary. As, to keep my former instance, a\nman walking through a street of a city to do his occasions, a tile falls\nfrom a house and breaks his head. The breaking of his head was not\nnecessary, for he did freely choose to go that way without any\nnecessitation; neither was it free, for he did not deliberate of that\naccident; therefore it was contingent, and by undoubted consequence,\nthere are contingent actions in the world which are not free. Most\ncertainly by the concurrence of free causes, as God, the good and bad\nangels, and men, with natural agents, sometimes on purpose and sometimes\nby accident, many events happen, which otherwise had never happened;\nmany effects are produced, which otherwise had never been produced. And\nadmitting such things to be contingent, not necessary, all their\nconsequent effects, not only immediate, but mediate, must likewise be\ncontingent, that is to say, such as do not proceed from a continued\nconnexion and succession of necessary causes; which is directly contrary\nto T. H.\u2019s opinion.\n\n(_d_) \u201cThirdly, for the actions of brute beasts, though they be not\nfree, though they have not the use of reason to restrain their appetites\nfrom that which is sensitively good by the consideration of what is\nrationally good, or what is honest, and though their fancies be\ndetermined by nature to some kinds of work; yet to think that every\nindividual action of theirs, and each animal motion of theirs, even to\nthe least murmur or gesture, is bound by the chain of unalterable\nnecessity to the extrinsical causes or objects, I see no ground for it.\nChrist saith, _one of these sparrows doth not fall to the ground without\nyour heavenly Father_, that is, without an influence of power from him,\nor exempted from his disposition; he doth not say, which your heavenly\nFather casteth not down. Lastly, for the natural actions of inanimate\ncreatures, wherein there is not the least concurrence of any free or\nvoluntary agents, the question is yet more doubtful. For many things are\ncalled contingent in respect of us, because we know not the cause of\nthem, which really and in themselves are not contingent, but necessary.\nAlso many things are contingent in respect of one single cause, either\nactually hindered, or in possibility to be hindered, which are necessary\nin respect of the joint concurrence of all collateral causes. (_e_) But\nwhether there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the\nbeginning, so as they must all have concurred as they have done, and in\nthe same degree of power, and have been deficient as they have been in\nall events whatsoever, would require a further examination, if it were\npertinent to this question of liberty; but it is not. It is sufficient\nto my purpose, to have showed that all elective actions are free from\nabsolute necessity: and moreover, that the concurrence of voluntary and\nfree agents with natural causes, both upon purpose and accidentally,\nhath helped them to produce many effects, which otherwise they had not\nproduced, and hindered them from producing many effects, which otherwise\nthey had produced: and that if this intervention of voluntary and free\nagents had been more frequent than it hath been, as without doubt it\nmight have been, many natural events had been otherwise than they are.\nAnd therefore he might have spared his instance of casting ambs-ace and\nraining to-morrow. And first, for his casting ambs-ace: if it be thrown\nby a fair gamester with indifferent dice, it is a mixed action; the\ncasting of the dice is free, but the casting of ambs-ace is contingent.\nA man may deliberate whether he will cast the dice or not; but it were\nfolly to deliberate whether he will cast ambs-ace or not, because it is\nnot in his power, unless he be a cheater that can cog the dice, or the\ndice be false dice; and then the contingency, or degree of contingency,\nceaseth accordingly as the caster hath more or less cunning, or as the\nfigure or making of the dice doth incline them to ambs-ace more than to\nanother cast, or necessitate them to this cast and no other. Howsoever,\nso far as the cast is free or contingent, so far it is not necessary:\nand where necessity begins, there liberty and contingency do cease to\nbe. Likewise his other instance of raining or not raining to-morrow, is\nnot of a free elective act, nor always of a contingent act. In some\ncountries, as they have their _stati venti_, their certain winds at set\nseasons; so they have their certain and set rains. The Ethiopian rains\nare supposed to be the cause of the certain inundation of Nilus. In some\neastern countries they have rain only twice a year, and those constant;\nwhich the Scriptures call _the former and the later rain_. In such\nplaces not only the causes do act determinately and necessarily, but\nalso the determination or necessity of the event is foreknown to the\ninhabitants. In our climate, the natural causes celestial and sublunary\ndo not produce rain so necessarily at set times; neither can we say so\ncertainly and infallibly, it will rain to-morrow, or it will not rain\nto-morrow. Nevertheless, it may so happen that the causes are so\ndisposed and determined, even in our climate, that this proposition, it\nwill rain to-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow, may be necessary in\nitself; and the prognostics, or tokens, may be such in the sky, in our\nown bodies, in the creatures, animate and inanimate, as weather glasses,\n&c., that it may become probably true to us that it will rain to-morrow,\nor it will not rain to-morrow. But ordinarily, it is a contingent\nproposition to us; whether it be contingent also in itself, that is,\nwhether the concurrence of the causes were absolutely necessary, whether\nthe vapours or matter of the rain may not yet be dispersed, or otherwise\nconsumed, or driven beyond our coast, is a speculation which no way\nconcerns this question. So we see one reason why his two instances are\naltogether impertinent; because they are of actions which are not free,\nnor elective, nor such as proceed from the liberty of man\u2019s will.\n\n\u201cSecondly, our dispute is about absolute necessity; his proofs extend\nonly to hypothetical necessity. Our question is, whether the concurrence\nand determination of the causes were necessary before they did concur,\nor were determined. He proves that the effect is necessary after the\ncauses have concurred, and are determined. The freest actions of God or\nman are necessary, by such a necessity of supposition, and the most\ncontingent events that are, as I have showed plainly, No. III, where his\ninstance of ambs-ace is more fully answered. So his proof looks another\nway from his proposition. His proposition is, \u2018that the casting of\nambs-ace was necessary before it was thrown\u2019. His proof is, that it was\nnecessary when it was thrown. Examine all his causes over and over, and\nthey will not afford him one grain of antecedent necessity. The first\ncause is in the dice: true, if they be false dice there may be something\nin it; but then his contingency is destroyed: if they be square dice,\nthey have no more inclination to ambs-ace, than to cinque and quatre, or\nany other cast. His second cause is \u2018the posture of the party\u2019s hand\u2019:\nbut what necessity was there that he should put his hands into such a\nposture? None at all. The third cause is \u2018the measure of the force\napplied by the caster\u2019. Now for the credit of his cause let him but\nname, I will not say a convincing reason nor so much as a probable\nreason, but even any pretence of reason, how the caster was necessitated\nfrom without himself to apply just so much force, and neither more nor\nless. If he cannot, his cause is desperate, and he may hold his peace\nfor ever. His last cause is the posture of the table. But tell us in\ngood earnest, what necessity there was why the caster must throw into\nthat table rather than the other, or that the dice must fall just upon\nthat part of the table, before the cast was thrown: he that makes these\nto be necessary causes, I do not wonder if he make all effects necessary\neffects. If any one of these causes be contingent, it is sufficient to\nrender the cast contingent; and now that they are all so contingent, yet\nhe will needs have the effect to be necessary. And so it is when the\ncast is thrown; but not before the cast was thrown, which he undertook\nto prove. Who can blame him for being so angry with the Schoolmen, and\ntheir distinctions of necessity into absolute and hypothetical, seeing\nthey touch his freehold so nearly?\n\n\u201cBut though his instance of raining to-morrow be impertinent, as being\nno free action, yet because he triumphs so much in his argument, I will\nnot stick to go a little out of my way to meet a friend. For I confess\nthe validity of the reason had been the same, if he had made it of a\nfree action, as thus: _either I shall finish this reply to-morrow, or I\nshall not finish this reply to-morrow_, is a necessary proposition. But\nbecause he shall not complain of any disadvantage in the alteration of\nhis terms, I will for once adventure upon his shower of rain. And first,\nI readily admit his major, that this proposition, _either it will rain\nto-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow_, is necessarily true: for of\ntwo contradictory propositions, the one must of necessity be true,\nbecause no third can be given. But his minor, that \u2018it could not be\nnecessarily true, except one of the members were necessarily true\u2019, is\nmost false. And so is his proof likewise, that \u2018if neither the one nor\nthe other of the members be necessarily true, it cannot be affirmed that\neither the one or the other is true\u2019. A conjunct proposition may have\nboth parts false, and yet the proposition be true; as, _if the sun shine\nit is day_, is a true proposition at midnight. And T. H. confesseth as\nmuch, No. XIX. \u2018_If I shall live I shall eat_, is a necessary\nproposition, that is to say, it is necessary that that proposition\nshould be true whensoever uttered. But it is not the necessity of the\nthing, nor is it therefore necessary that the man shall live or that the\nman shall eat\u2019. And so T. H. proceeds: \u2018I do not use to fortify my\ndistinctions with such reasons\u2019. But it seemeth he hath forgotten\nhimself, and is contented with such poor fortifications. And though both\nparts of a disjunctive proposition cannot be false; because if it be a\nright disjunction, the members are repugnant, whereof one part is\ninfallibly true; yet vary but the proposition a little to abate the edge\nof the disjunctions, and you shall find in that which T. H. saith to be\ntrue, that it is not the necessity of the thing which makes the\nproposition to be true. As for example, vary it thus: _I know that\neither it will rain to-morrow or that it will not rain to-morrow_, is a\ntrue proposition: but it is not true that I know it will rain to-morrow,\nneither is it true that I know it will not rain to-morrow; wherefore the\ncertain truth of the proposition doth not prove that either of the\nmembers is determinately true in present. Truth is a conformity of the\nunderstanding to the thing known, whereof speech is an interpreter. If\nthe understanding agree not with the thing, it is an error; if the words\nagree not with the understanding, it is a lie. Now the thing known, is\nknown either in itself or in its causes. If it be known in itself as it\nis, then we express our apprehension of it in words of the present\ntense; as _the sun is risen_. If it be known in its cause, we express\nourselves in words of the future tense; as _to-morrow will be an eclipse\nof the moon_. But if we neither know it in itself, nor in its causes,\nthen there may be a foundation of truth, but there is no such\ndeterminate truth of it that we can reduce it into a true proposition.\nWe cannot say it doth rain to-morrow, or it doth not rain to-morrow;\nthat were not only false but absurd. We cannot positively say it will\nrain to-morrow, because we do not know it in its causes, either how they\nare determined or that they are determined. Wherefore the certitude and\nevidence of the disjunctive proposition is neither founded upon that\nwhich will be actually to-morrow, for it is granted that we do not know\nthat; nor yet upon the determination of the causes, for then we would\nnot say indifferently either it will rain or it will not rain, but\npositively it will rain, or positively it will not rain. But it is\ngrounded upon an undeniable principle, that of two contradictory\npropositions the one must necessarily be true. (_f_) And therefore to\nsay, _either this or that will infallibly be, but it is not yet\ndetermined whether this or that shall be_, is no such senseless\nassertion that it deserved a _tytyrice tupatulice_, but an evident truth\nwhich no man that hath his eyes in his head can doubt of.\n\n(_g_) \u201cIf all this will not satisfy him, I will give one of his own kind\nof proofs; that is, an instance. That which necessitates all things,\naccording to T. H. (No. XI), is the decree of God, or that order which\nis set to all things by the eternal cause. Now God himself, who made\nthis necessitating decree, was not subjected to it in the making\nthereof; neither was there any former order to oblige the first cause\nnecessarily to make such a decree; therefore this decree being an act\n_ad extra_, was freely made by God without any necessitation. Yet\nnevertheless this disjunctive proposition is necessarily true: _either\nGod did make each a decree, or he did not make such a decree_. Again,\nthough T. H.\u2019s opinion were true, that all events are necessary, and\nthat the whole Christian world are deceived who believe that some events\nare free from necessity; yet he will not deny, but if it had been the\ngood pleasure of God, he might have made some causes free from\nnecessity; seeing that it neither argues any imperfection, nor implies\nany contradiction. Supposing therefore that God had made some second\ncauses free from any such antecedent determination to one; yet the\nformer disjunction would be necessarily true: either this free\nundetermined cause will act after this manner, or it will not act after\nthis manner. Wherefore the necessary truth of such a disjunctive\nproposition doth not prove that either of the members of the disjunction\nsingly considered, is determinately true in present; but only that the\none of them will be determinately true to-morrow.\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXIV.\n\n(_a_) \u201cHis former proof, that all sufficient causes are necessary\ncauses, is answered before (No. XXXI).\u201d When he shall have read my\nanimadversions upon that answer of his, he will think otherwise,\nwhatsoever he will confess.\n\n(_b_) \u201cAnd his two instances of casting ambs-ace, and of raining\nto-morrow, are altogether impertinent to the question, for two reasons.\u201d\nHis first reason is, \u201cbecause\u201d, saith he, \u201cour present controversy is\nconcerning free actions, which proceed from the liberty of man\u2019s will;\nand both his instances are of contingent actions, which proceed from the\nindetermination, or contingent concurrence of natural causes\u201d. He knows\nthat this part of my discourse, which beginneth at No. XXV, is no\ndispute with him at all, but a bare setting down of my opinion\nconcerning the natural necessity of all things; which is opposite, not\nonly to the liberty of will, but also to all contingence that is not\nnecessary. And therefore these instances were not impertinent to my\npurpose; and if they be impertinent to his opinion of the liberty of\nman\u2019s will, he does impertinently to meddle with them. And yet for all\nhe pretends here, that the question is only about liberty of the will;\nyet in his first discourse (No. XVI), he maintains that \u201cthe order,\nbeauty, and perfection of the world doth require that in the universe\nshould be agents of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some\ncontingent\u201d. And my purpose here is to show by those instances, that\nthose things which we esteem most contingent are nevertheless necessary.\nBesides, the controversy is not whether free actions which proceed from\nthe liberty of man\u2019s will, be necessary or not; for I know no action\nwhich proceedeth from the liberty of man\u2019s will. But the question is,\nwhether those actions which proceed from the man\u2019s will, be necessary.\nThe man\u2019s will is something, but the liberty of his will is nothing.\nAgain, the question is not whether contingent actions which proceed from\nthe indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes, (for\nthere is nothing that can proceed from indetermination), but whether\ncontingent actions be necessary before they be done; or whether the\nconcurrence of natural causes, when they happen to concur, were not\nnecessitated so to happen; or whether whatsoever chanceth, be not\nnecessitated so to chance. And that they are so necessitated, I have\nproved already with such arguments as the Bishop, for aught I see,\ncannot answer. For to say, as he doth, that \u201cthere are free actions\nwhich proceed merely from election, without any outward necessitation,\nis a truth so evident as that there is a sun in the heavens\u201d, is no\nproof. It is indeed as clear as the sun, that there are free actions\nproceeding from election; but that there is election without any outward\nnecessitation, is dark enough.\n\n(_c_) \u201cSecondly, for mixed actions, which proceed from the concurrence\nof free and natural agents, though they be not free, yet they are not\nnecessary, &c.\u201d For proof of this he instanceth in a tile, that falling\nfrom a house breaks a man\u2019s head, neither necessarily nor freely, and\ntherefore contingently. Not necessarily, \u201cfor\u201d, saith he, \u201che did freely\nchoose to go that way without any necessitation\u201d. Which is as much as\ntaking the question itself for a proof. For what is else the question,\nbut whether a man be necessitated to choose what he chooseth? \u201cAgain\u201d,\nsaith he, \u201cit was not free, because he did not deliberate whether his\nhead should be broken or not\u201d; and concludes \u201ctherefore it was\ncontingent; and by undoubted consequence, there are contingent actions\nin the world which are not free\u201d. This is true, and denied by none; but\nhe should have proved, that such contingent actions are not antecedently\nnecessary by a concurrence of natural causes; though a little before he\ngranteth they are. For whatsoever is produced by a concurrence of\nnatural causes, was antecedently determined in the cause of such\nconcurrence, though, as he calls it, contingent concurrence; not\nperceiving that concurrence and contingent concurrence are all one, and\nsuppose a continued connection and succession of causes which make the\neffect necessarily future. So that hitherto he hath proved no other\ncontingence than that which is necessary.\n\n(_d_) \u201cThirdly, for the actions of brute beasts, &c, to think each\nanimal motion of theirs is bound by the chain of unalterable necessity,\nI see no ground for it.\u201d It maketh nothing against the truth, that he\nsees no ground for it. I have pointed out the ground in my former\ndiscourse, and am not bound to find him eyes. He himself immediately\nciteth a place of Scripture that proveth it, where Christ saith, _one of\nthese sparrows doth not fall to the ground without your heavenly\nFather_; which place, if there were no more, were a sufficient ground\nfor the assertion of the necessity of all those changes of animal motion\nin birds and other living creatures, which seem to us so uncertain. But\nwhen a man is dizzy with _influence of power_, _elicit acts_,\n_permissive will_, _hypothetical necessity_, and the like unintelligible\nterms, the ground goes from him. By and by after he confesseth that\n\u201cmany things are called contingent in respect of us, because we know not\nthe cause of them, which really and in themselves are not contingent,\nbut necessary\u201d; and errs therein the other way; for he says in effect,\nthat many things are, which are not; for it is all one to say, they are\nnot contingent, and they are not. He should have said, there be many\nthings, the necessity of whose contingence we cannot or do not know.\n\n(_e_) \u201cBut whether there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes\nfrom the beginning, so as they must all have concurred as they have\ndone, &c, would require a further examination, if it were pertinent to\nthis question of liberty; but it is not. It is sufficient to my purpose\nto have showed, &c.\u201d If there be a necessary connexion of all natural\ncauses from the beginning, then there is no doubt but that all things\nhappen necessarily, which is that that I have all this while maintained.\nBut whether there be or no, he says, it requires a further examination.\nHitherto therefore he knows not whether it be true or no, and\nconsequently all his arguments hitherto have been of no effect, nor hath\nhe showed anything to prove, what he purposed, that elective actions are\nnot necessitated. And whereas a little before he says, that to my\narguments to prove that sufficient causes are necessary, he hath already\nanswered; it seemeth he distrusteth his own answer, and answers again to\nthe two instances of _casting ambs-ace_, and _raining or not raining\nto-morrow_; but brings no other argument to prove the cast thrown not to\nbe necessarily thrown, but this, that he does not deliberate whether he\nshall throw that cast or not. Which argument may perhaps prove that the\ncasting of it proceedeth not from free will, but proves not anything\nagainst the antecedent necessity of it. And to prove that it is not\nnecessary that it should rain or not rain to-morrow; after telling us\nthat the Ethiopian rains cause the inundation of Nilus: that in some\neastern countries they have rain only twice a year, which the Scripture,\nhe saith, calleth _the former and the latter rain_; (I thought he had\nknown it by the experience of some travellers, but I see he only\ngathereth it from that phrase in Scripture of _former and latter rain_);\nI say, after he has told us this, to prove that it is not necessary it\nshould rain or not rain to-morrow he saith that \u201cin our climate the\nnatural causes, celestial and sublunary, do not produce rain so\nnecessarily at set times, as in the eastern countries; neither can we\nsay so certainly and infallibly, it will rain to-morrow, or it will not\nrain to-morrow\u201d. By this argument a man may take the height of the\nBishop\u2019s logic. \u201cIn our climate the natural causes do not produce rain\nso necessarily at set times, as in some eastern countries. Therefore\nthey do not produce rain necessarily in our climate, then when they do\nproduce it\u201d. And again, \u201cwe cannot say so certainly and infallibly, it\nwill rain to-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow; therefore it is not\nnecessary either that it should rain, or that it should not rain\nto-morrow\u201d: as if nothing were necessary the necessity whereof we know\nnot. Another reason, he saith, why my instances are impertinent, is\nbecause \u201cthey extend only to an hypothetical necessity\u201d, that is, that\nthe necessity is not in the antecedent causes; and thereupon challengeth\nme for the credit of my cause to name some reason, \u201chow the caster was\nnecessitated from without himself to apply just so much force to the\ncast, and neither more nor less; or what necessity there was why the\ncaster must throw into that table rather than the other, or that the\ndice must fall just upon that part of the table, before the cast was\nthrown\u201d. Here again, from our ignorance of the particular causes that\nconcurring make the necessity he inferreth, that there was no such\nnecessity at all; which indeed is that which hath in all this question\ndeceived him, and all other men that attribute events to fortune. But I\nsuppose he will not deny that event to be necessary, where all the\ncauses of the cast, and their concurrence, and the cause of that\nconcurrence are foreknown, and might be told him, though I cannot tell\nhim. Seeing therefore God foreknows them all, the cast was necessary;\nand that from antecedent causes from eternity; which is no hypothetical\nnecessity.\n\nAnd whereas to my argument to prove, that \u2018raining to-morrow if it shall\nthen rain, and not raining to-morrow if it shall then not rain\u2019, was\ntherefore necessary, because \u2018otherwise this disjunctive proposition, it\nshall rain or not rain to-morrow, is not necessary\u2019, he answereth that\n\u201ca conjunct proposition may have both parts false, and yet the\nproposition be true; as, if the sun shine it is day, is a true\nproposition at midnight\u201d: what has a conjunct proposition to do with\nthis in question, which is disjunctive? Or what be the parts of this\nproposition, _if the sun shine, it is day_? It is not made of two\npropositions, as a disjunctive is; but is one simple proposition,\nnamely, this, _the shining of the sun is day_. Either he has no logic at\nall, or thinks they have no reason at all that are his readers. But he\nhas a trick, he saith, to abate the edge of the disjunction, by varying\nther proposition thus, \u201cI know that _it will rain to-morrow_, or _that\nit will not rain to-morrow_, is a true proposition\u201d; and yet saith he,\n\u201cit is neither true that I know it will rain to-morrow, neither is it\ntrue that I know it will not rain to-morrow\u201d. What childish deceit, or\nchildish ignorance is this; when he is to prove that neither of the\nmembers is determinately true in a disjunctive proposition, to bring for\ninstance a proposition not disjunctive? It had been disjunctive if it\nhad gone thus, _I know that it will rain to-morrow, or I know that it\nwill not rain to-morrow_; but then he had certainly known determinately\none of the two.\n\n(_f_) \u201cAnd therefore to say, either this or that will infallibly be, but\nit is not yet determined whether this or that shall be, is no such\nsenseless assertion that it deserved a _tytyrice tupatulice_\u201d. But it is\na senseless assertion, whatsoever it deserve, to say that this\nproposition, it shall rain or not rain, is true _indeterminedly_, and\nneither of them true _determinedly_; and little better, as he hath now\nqualified it, \u201cthat it will infallibly be, though it be not yet\ndetermined whether it shall be or no\u201d.\n\n(_g_) \u201cIf all this will not satisfy him, I will give him one of his own\nkinds of proof, that is, an instance. That which necessitates all\nthings, according to T. H. is the decree of God, &c.\u201d His instance is,\n\u201cthat God himself made this necessitating decree, and therefore this\ndecree, being an act _ad extra_, was freely made by God, without any\nnecessitation\u201d. I do believe the Bishop himself believeth that all the\ndecrees of God have been from all eternity, and therefore he will not\nstand to this, that God\u2019s decrees were ever made; for whatsoever hath\nbeen made, hath had a beginning. Besides, God\u2019s decree is his will; and\nthe Bishop hath said formerly, that the will of God is God, the justice\nof God, God, &c. If therefore God made a decree, according to the\nBishop\u2019s opinion God made himself. By which we may see, what fine stuff\nit is that proceedeth from disputing of incomprehensibles. Again he\nsays, \u201cif it had been the good pleasure of God, he might have made some\ncauses free from necessity; seeing that it neither argues any\nimperfection, nor implies any contradiction\u201d. If God had made either\ncauses or effects free from necessity, he had made them free from his\nown prescience; which had been imperfection. Perhaps he will say, that\nin these words of his, _the decree, being an act ad extra, was freely\nmade by God_, I take no notice of that _act ad extra_, as being too hot\nfor my fingers. Therefore now I take notice of it, and say that it is\nneither Latin, nor English, nor sense.\n\n NO. XXXV.\n\n_T. H._ The last thing, in which also consisteth the whole controversy,\nnamely, that there is no such thing as an agent, which, when all things\nrequisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it,\nor (which is all one) that there is no such thing as freedom from\nnecessity; is easily inferred from that which hath been before alleged.\nFor if it be an agent, it can work; and if it work, there is nothing\nwanting of what is requisite to produce the action; and consequently the\ncause of the action is sufficient; and if sufficient, then also\nnecessary, as hath been proved before.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cI wonder that T. H. should confess, that the whole weight of\nthis controversy doth rest upon this proposition: \u2018that there is no such\nthing as an agent, which, when all things requisite to action are\npresent, can nevertheless forbear to act\u2019; and yet bring nothing but\nsuch poor bullrushes to support it. (_a_) \u2018If it be an agent\u2019, saith he,\n\u2018it can work\u2019; what of this? _A posse ad esse non valet argumentum_:\nfrom _can work_ to _will work_, is a weak inference. And from _will\nwork_ to _doth work upon absolute necessity_, is another gross\ninconsequence. He proceeds thus: \u2018if it work, there is nothing wanting\nof what is requisite to produce the action\u2019. True, there wants nothing\nto produce that which is produced; but there may want much to produce\nthat which was intended. One horse may pull his heart out, and yet not\ndraw the coach whither it should be, if he want the help or concurrence\nof his fellows. \u2018And consequently\u2019, saith he, \u2018the cause of the action\nis sufficient\u2019. Yes, sufficient to do what it doth, though perhaps with\nmuch prejudice to itself; but not always sufficient to do what it should\ndo, or what it would do. As he that begets a monster, should beget a\nman, and would beget a man if he could. The last link of his argument\nfollows: (_b_) \u2018and if sufficient, then also necessary\u2019. Stay there; by\nhis leave, there is no necessary connexion between sufficiency and\nefficiency; otherwise God himself should not be all-sufficient. Thus his\nargument is vanished. But I will deal more favourably with him, and\ngrant him all that which he labours so much in vain to prove, that every\neffect in the world hath sufficient causes; yea more, that supposing the\ndetermination of the free and contingent causes, every effect in the\nworld is necessary. (_c_) But all this will not advantage his cause the\nblack of a bean: for still it amounts but to an hypothetical necessity,\nand differs as much from that absolute necessity, which he maintains, as\na gentleman who travels for his pleasure, differs from a banished man,\nor a free subject from a slave.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXV.\n\n(_a_) \u201c\u2018If it be an agent,\u2019 saith he, \u2018it can work\u2019. What of this? _A\nposse ad esse non valet argumentum_; from _can work_ to _will work_, is\na weak inference. And from _will work_ to _doth work upon absolute\nnecessity_, is another gross inconsequence.\u201d Here he has gotten a just\nadvantage; for I should have said, if it be an agent it worketh, not it\ncan work. But it is an advantage which profiteth little to his cause.\nFor if I repeat my argument again in this manner: that which is an\nagent, worketh; that which worketh, wanteth nothing requisite to produce\nthe action or the effect it produceth, and consequently is thereof a\nsufficient cause; and if a sufficient cause, then also a necessary\ncause: his answer will be nothing to the purpose. For whereas to these\nwords, \u2018that which worketh, wanteth nothing requisite to produce the\naction or the effect it produceth,\u2019 he answereth, \u201cit is true, but there\nmay want much to produce that which was intended\u201d, it is not contrary to\nany thing that I have said. For I never maintained, that whatsoever a\nman intendeth, is necessarily performed; but this, whatsoever a man\nperformeth, is necessarily performed, and what he intendeth, necessarily\nintended, and that from causes antecedent. And therefore to say, as he\ndoth, that the cause is sufficient to do what it doth, but not always\nsufficient to do what a man should or would do, is to say the same that\nI do. For I say not, that the cause that bringeth forth a monster, is\nsufficient to bring forth a man; but that every cause is sufficient to\nproduce only the effect it produceth; and if sufficient, then also\nnecessary.\n\n(_b_) \u201c\u2018And if sufficient, then also necessary\u2019. Stay there; by his\nleave, there is no necessary connexion between sufficiency and\nefficiency; otherwise God himself should not be all-sufficient.\u201d\nAll-sufficiency signifieth no more, when it is attributed to God, than\nomnipotence; and omnipotence signifieth no more, than the power to do\nall things that he will. But to the production of any thing that is\nproduced, the will of God is as requisite as the rest of his power and\nsufficiency. And consequently, his all-sufficiency signifieth not a\nsufficiency or power to do those things he will not. But he will deal,\nhe says, so favourably with me, as to grant me all this, which I labour,\nhe saith, so much in vain to prove: and adds, (_c_) \u201cBut all this will\nnot advantage his cause the black of a bean; for still it amounts but to\nan hypothetical necessity\u201d. If it prove no more, it proves no necessity\nat all; for by hypothetical necessity he means the necessity of this\nproposition, _the effect is, then when it is_; whereas necessity is only\nsaid truly of somewhat in future. For _necessary_ is that which cannot\npossibly be otherwise; and _possibility_ is always understood of some\nfuture time. But seeing he granteth so favourably that sufficient causes\nare necessary causes, I shall easily conclude from it, that whatsoever\nthose causes do cause, are necessary antecedently. For if the necessity\nof the thing produced, when produced, be in the same instant of time\nwith the existence of its immediate cause; then also that immediate\ncause was in the same instant with the cause by which it was immediately\nproduced; the same may be said of the cause of this cause, and so\nbackward eternally. From whence it will follow, that all the connexion\nof the causes of any effect from the beginning of the world, were\naltogether existent in one and the same instant; and consequently, all\nthe time from the beginning of the world, or from eternity to this day,\nis but one instant, or a _nunc stans_; which he knows by this time is\nnot so.\n\n NO. XXXVI.\n\n_T. H._ And thus you see how the inconveniences, which he objecteth must\nfollow upon the holding of necessity, are avoided, and the necessity\nitself demonstratively proved. To which I could add, if I thought it\ngood logic, the inconvenience of denying necessity; as that it destroys\nboth the decrees and prescience of God Almighty. For whatsoever God hath\npurposed to bring to pass by man as an instrument, or foreseeth shall\ncome to pass, a man, if he have liberty, such as he affirmeth from\nnecessitation, might frustrate and make not to come to pass: and God\nshould either not foreknow it and not decree it, or he should foreknow\nsuch things shall be as shall never be, and decree that which shall\nnever come to pass.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThus he hath laboured in vain to satisfy my reasons, and to\nprove his own assertion. But for demonstration, there is nothing like it\namong his arguments. Now he saith, (_a_) he could add other arguments,\nif he thought it good logic. There is no impediment in logic, why a man\nmay not press his adversary with those absurdities which flow from his\nopinion; _argumentum ducens ad impossibile_ or _ad absurdum_, is a good\nform of reasoning. But there is another reason of his forbearance,\nthough he be loath to express it. _H\u00e6ret lateri l\u00e6thalis arundo._ The\narguments drawn from the attributes of God do stick so close in the\nsides of his cause, that he hath no mind to treat of that subject. By\nthe way, take notice of his own confession, that \u2018he could add other\nreasons, if he thought it good logic\u2019. If it were predetermined in the\noutward causes, that he must make this very defence and no other, how\ncould it be in his power to add or subtract any thing: just as if a\nblind man should say in earnest, _I could see if I had mine eyes_? Truth\noften breaks out whilst men seek to smother it. (_b_) But let us view\nhis argument: \u2018if a man have liberty from necessitation, he may\nfrustrate the decrees of God, and make his prescience false\u2019. First, for\nthe decrees of God, this is his decree that man should be a free agent;\nif he did consider God as a most simple act, without priority or\nposteriority of time, or any composition; he would not conceive of his\ndecrees, as of the laws of the Medes and Persians, long since enacted\nand passed before we were born, but as coexistent with ourselves, and\nwith the acts which we do by virtue of those decrees. Decrees and\nattributes are but notions to help the weakness of our understanding to\nconceive of God. The decrees of God are God himself, and therefore\njustly said to be before the foundation of the world was laid: and yet\ncoexistent with ourselves, because of the infinite and eternal being of\nGod. The sum is this, the decree of God, or God himself eternally,\nconstitutes or ordains all effects which come to pass in time, according\nto the distinct natures or capacities of his creatures. An eternal\nordination is neither past nor to come, but always present. So free\nactions do proceed as well from the eternal decree of God, as necessary;\nand from that order which he hath set in the world.\n\n\u201cAs the decree of God is eternal, so is his knowledge. And therefore to\nspeak truly and properly, there is neither fore-knowledge nor\nafter-knowledge in him. The knowledge of God comprehends all times in a\npoint, by reason of the eminence and virtue of its infinite perfection.\nAnd yet I confess, that this is called fore-knowledge in respect of us.\nBut this fore-knowledge doth produce no absolute necessity. Things are\nnot therefore, because they are foreknown; but therefore they are\nforeknown, because they shall come to pass. If any thing should come to\npass otherwise than it doth, yet God\u2019s knowledge could not be irritated\nby it; for then he did not know that it should come to pass, as now it\ndoth. Because every knowledge of vision necessarily presupposeth its\nobject, God did know that Judas should betray Christ; but Judas was not\nnecessitated to be a traitor by God\u2019s knowledge. If Judas had not\nbetrayed Christ, then God had not fore-known that Judas should betray\nhim. The case is this: a watchman standing on the steeple\u2019s-top, as it\nis the use in Germany, gives notice to them below, who see no such\nthings, that company are coming, and how many; his prediction is most\ncertain, for he sees them. What a vain correction were it for one below\nto say, what if they did not come, then a certain prediction may fail.\nIt may be urged, that there is a difference between these two cases. In\nthis case, the coming is present to the watchman; but that which God\nfore-knows, is future. God knows what shall be; the watchman only knows\nwhat is. I answer, that this makes no difference at all in the case, by\nreason of that disparity which is between God\u2019s knowledge and ours. As\nthat coming is present to the watchman, which is future to them who are\nbelow: so all those things which are future to us, are present to God,\nbecause his infinite and eternal knowledge doth reach to the future\nbeing of all agents and events. Thus much is plainly acknowledged by T.\nH. No. XI: that \u2018fore-knowledge is knowledge, and knowledge depends on\nthe existence of the things known, and not they on it\u2019. To conclude, the\nprescience of God doth not make things more necessary than the\nproduction of the things themselves; but if the agents were free agents,\nthe production of the things doth not make the events to be absolutely\nnecessary, but only upon supposition that the causes were so determined.\nGod\u2019s prescience proveth a necessity of infallibility, but not of\nantecedent extrinsical determination to one. If any event should not\ncome to pass, God did never foreknow that it would come to pass. For\nevery knowledge necessarily presupposeth its object.\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXVI.\n\n(_a_) \u201c\u2018He could add\u2019, he saith, \u2018other arguments, if he thought it good\nlogic,\u2019 &c. There is no impediment in logic, why a man may not press his\nadversary with those absurdities which flow from his opinion.\u201d Here he\nmisrecites my words; which are, \u2018I could add, if I thought it good\nlogic, the inconvenience of denying necessity; as that it destroys both\nthe decrees and prescience of God Almighty\u2019. But he makes me say I could\nadd other arguments; then infers, that there is no impediment in logic,\nwhy a man may not press his adversary with the absurdities that flow\nfrom his opinion, because _argumentum ducens ad impossibile_ is a good\nform of reasoning; making no difference between _absurdities_, which are\nimpossibilities, and _inconveniences_, which are not only possible but\nfrequent. And though it be a good form of reasoning to argue from\nabsurdities, yet it is no good form of reasoning to argue from\ninconveniences; for inconvenience may stand well enough with truth.\n\n(_b_) \u201cBut let us view his argument: \u2018If a man have liberty from\nnecessitation, he may frustrate the decrees of God, and make his\nprescience false\u2019. This is his decree, that man should be a free agent.\nIf he did consider God as a most simple act, without priority or\nposteriority of time, or any composition, he would not conceive of his\ndecrees as long since enacted, but as coexistent with ourselves\u201d. Here\nagain he would have me conceive eternity to be _nunc stans_, that is, an\ninstant of time, and that instant of time to be God; which neither he\nnor I can conceive, nor can without impiety say, as he doth here, that\nthe decrees of God are God. In which consisteth all the rest of his\nanswer to this Number, saving that he putteth in sometimes, that \u201cthe\nforeknowledge of God produceth not necessity\u201d, which is granted him; but\nthat anything can be foreknown which shall not necessarily come to pass,\nwhich was not granted, he proveth no otherwise than by his assertion,\n\u201cthat every instant of time is God\u201d; which is denied him.\n\n NO. XXXVII.\n\n_T. H._ This is all that hath come into my mind touching this question,\nsince I last considered it. And I humbly beseech your Lordship to\ncommunicate it only to J. D. And so praying God to prosper your Lordship\nin all your designs, I take leave, and am, my most noble and obliging\nLord,\n\n Your most humble servant,\n T. H.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cHe is very careful to have this discourse kept secret, as\nappears in this section, and in the XIVth and XVth sections. If his\nanswer had been kept private, I had saved the labour of a reply. But\nhearing that it was communicated, I thought myself obliged to vindicate\nboth the truth and myself. I do not blame him to be cautious; for in\ntruth, this assertion is of desperate consequence, and destructive to\npiety, policy, and morality. (_a_) If he had desired to have it kept\nsecret, the way had been to have kept it secret himself. It will not\nsuffice to say, as No. XIV, that \u2018truth is truth\u2019: This is the common\nplea of all men. Neither is it sufficient for him to say, as No. XV,\nthat \u2018it was desired by me\u2019, long before that he had discovered his\nopinion by word of mouth. And my desire was to let some of my noble\nfriends see the weakness of his grounds, and the pernicious consequences\nof that opinion. (_b_) But if he think that this ventilation of the\nquestion between us two may do hurt, truly I hope not. The edge of his\ndiscourse is so abated, that it cannot easily hurt any rational man, who\nis not too much possessed with prejudice.\u201d\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXVII.\n\nIn this place I said nothing, but that I would have my Lord of Newcastle\nto communicate it only to the Bishop. And in his answer he says, (_a_)\n\u201cif I had desired to have it kept secret, the way had been to have kept\nit secret myself\u201d. My desire was, it should not be communicated by my\nLord of Newcastle to all men indifferently. But I barred not myself from\nshowing it privately to my friends; though to publish it was never my\nintention, till now provoked by the uncivil triumphing of the Bishop in\nhis own errors to my disadvantage.\n\n(_b_) \u201cBut if he think that this ventilation of the question may do\nhurt, truly I hope not. The edge of his discourse is so abated, that it\ncannot easily hurt any rational man, who is not too much possessed with\nprejudice.\u201d It is confidently said; but not very pertinently to the hurt\nI thought might proceed from a discourse of this nature. For I never\nthought it could do hurt to a rational man, but only to such men as\ncannot reason in those points which are of difficult contemplation. For\na rational man will say with himself, _they whom God will bring to a\nblessed and happy end, those he will put into an humble, pious, and\nrighteous way; and of those whom he will destroy, he will harden the\nhearts_: and thereupon examining himself whether he be in such a way or\nnot, the examination itself would, if elected, be a necessary cause of\nworking out his salvation with fear and trembling. But the men who I\nthought might take hurt thereby, are such as reason erroneously, saying\nwith themselves, _if I shall be saved, I shall be saved whether I walk\nuprightly or no_: and consequently thereunto, shall behave themselves\nnegligently, and pursue the pleasant way of the sins they are in love\nwith. Which inconvenience is not abated by this discourse of the Bishop;\nbecause they understand not the grounds he goeth on, of _nunc stans_,\n_motus primo primi_, _elicit acts_, _imperate acts_, and a great many\nother such unintelligible words.\n\n NO. XXXVIII.\n\n_T. H._ Postscript. Arguments seldom work on men of wit and learning,\nwhen they have once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion. If\nanything do it, it is the shewing of them the causes of their errors,\nwhich is this. Pious men attribute to God Almighty, for honour sake,\nwhatsoever they see is honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing,\nwilling, knowing, justice, wisdom, &c.: but deny him such poor things as\neyes, ears, brains, and other organs, without which we worms neither\nhave nor can conceive such faculties to be: and so far they do well. But\nwhen they dispute of God\u2019s actions philosophically, then they consider\nthem again as if he had such faculties, and in that manner as we have\nthem. This is not well; and thence it is they fall into so many\ndifficulties. We ought not to dispute of God\u2019s nature; he is no fit\nsubject of our philosophy. True religion consisteth in obedience to\nChrist\u2019s lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both in attributes\nand actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain.\n\n[Sidenote: The Bishop\u2019s reply.]\n\n_J. D._ \u201cThough sophistical captions do seldom work on men of wit and\nlearning, because _by constant use they have their senses exercised to\ndiscern both good and evil_ (Heb. v. 14), yet (_a_) solid and\nsubstantial reasons work sooner upon them than upon weaker judgments.\nThe more exact the balance is, the sooner it discovers the real weight\nthat is put into it; especially if the proofs be proposed without\npassion or opposition. Let sophisters and seditious orators apply\nthemselves to the many-headed multitude, because they despair of success\nwith men of wit and learning. Those whose gold is true, are not afraid\nto have it tried by the touch. Since the former way hath not succeeded,\nT. H. hath another to shew as the causes of our errors, which he hopes\nwill prove more successful. When he sees he can do no good by sight, he\nseeks to circumvent us under colour of courtesy: _Fistula dulce canit,\nvolucrem dum decipit auceps_. As they who behold themselves in a glass,\ntake the right hand for the left, and the left for the right (T. H.\nknows the comparison); so we take our own errors to be truths, and other\nmen\u2019s truths to be errors, (_b_) If we be in an error in this, it is\nsuch an error as we sucked from nature itself, such an error as is\nconfirmed in us by reason and experience, such an error as God himself\nin his sacred Word hath revealed, such an error as the Fathers and\nDoctors of the Church in all ages have delivered, such an error wherein\nwe have the concurrence of all the best philosophers, both natural and\nmoral, such an error as bringeth to God the glory of justice, and\nwisdom, and goodness, and truth, such an error as renders men more\ndevout, more pious, more industrious, more humble, more penitent for\ntheir sins. Would he have us resign up all these advantages, to dance\nblindfold after his pipe? No, he persuades us too much to our loss. But\nlet us see what is the imaginary cause of our imaginary error. Forsooth,\nbecause \u2018we attribute to God whatsoever is honourable in the world, as\nseeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom; but deny him such\npoor things as eyes, ears, brains\u2019; and so far, he saith \u2018we do well.\u2019\nHe hath reason, for since we are not able to conceive of God as he is,\nthe readiest way we have, is by removing all that imperfection from God,\nwhich is in the creatures; so we call him infinite, immortal,\nindependent: or by attributing to him all those perfections which are in\nthe creatures, after a most eminent manner; so we call him best,\ngreatest, most wise, most just, most holy. (_c_) But saith he, \u2018When\nthey dispute of God\u2019s actions philosophically, then they consider them\nagain, as if he had such faculties, and in that manner as we have them\u2019.\n\n\u201cAnd is this the cause of our error? That were strange indeed; for they\nwho dispute philosophically of God, do neither ascribe faculties to him\nin that manner that we have them, nor yet do they attribute any proper\nfaculties at all to God. God\u2019s understanding and his will is his very\nessence, which, for the eminency of its infinite perfection, doth\nperform all those things alone in a most transcendant manner, which\nreasonable creatures do perform imperfectly by distinct faculties. Thus\nto dispute of God with modesty and reverence, and to clear the Deity\nfrom the imputation of tyranny, injustice, and dissimulation, which none\ndo throw upon God with more presumption than those who are the patrons\nof absolute necessity, is both comely and Christian.\n\n\u201cIt is not the desire to discover the original of a supposed error,\nwhich draws them ordinarily into these exclamations against those who\ndispute of the Deity. For some of themselves dare anatomize God, and\npublish his eternal decrees with as much confidence, as if they had been\nall their lives of his cabinet council. But it is for fear lest those\npernicious consequences which flow from that doctrine essentially, and\nreflect in so high a degree upon the supreme goodness, should be laid\nopen to the view of the world; just as the Turks do first establish a\nfalse religion of their own devising, and then forbid all men upon pain\nof death to dispute upon religion; or as the priests of Moloch, the\nabomination of the Ammonites, did make a noise with their timbrels all\nthe while the poor infants were passing through the fire in Tophet, to\nkeep their pitiful cries from the ears of their parents. So (_d_) they\nmake a noise with their declamations against those who dare dispute of\nthe nature of God, that is, who dare set forth his justice, and his\ngoodness, and his truth, and his philanthropy, only to deaf the ears and\ndim the eyes of the Christian world, lest they should hear the\nlamentable ejulations and howlings, or see that rueful spectacle of\nmillions of souls tormented for evermore (_e_) in the flames of the true\nTophet, that is, hell, only for that which, according to T. H.\u2019s\ndoctrine, was never in their power to shun, but which they were ordered\nand inevitably necessitated to do, only to express the omnipotence and\ndominion, and to satisfy the pleasure of Him, who is in truth the Father\nof all mercies, and the God of all consolation. (_f_) _This is life\neternal_ (saith our Saviour), _to know the only true God, and Jesus\nChrist whom he hath sent_ (John xvii. 3.). _Pure religion, and undefiled\nbefore God and the Father, is this, to visit the fatherless and widows\nin their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world_,\nsaith St. James (James i. 27.). _Fear God and keep his commandments; for\nthis is the whole duty of man_, saith Solomon (Eccles. xii. 13.). But T.\nH. hath found out a more compendious way to heaven: \u2018True religion\u2019,\nsaith he, \u2018consisteth in obedience to Christ\u2019s lieutenants, and giving\nGod such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their\nseveral lieutenancies shall ordain\u2019. That is to say, _be of the religion\nof every Christian country where you come_. To make the civil magistrate\nto be Christ\u2019s lieutenant upon earth, for matters of religion, and to\nmake him to be supreme judge in all controversies, whom all must obey,\nis a doctrine so strange, and such an uncouth phrase to Christian ears,\nthat I should have missed his meaning, but that I consulted with his\nbook, _De Cive_, c. XV. sect. 16, and c. XVII. sect. 28. What if the\nmagistrate shall be no Christian himself? What if he shall command\ncontrary to the law of God or nature? _Must we obey him rather than\nGod?_ (Acts iv. 19.) Is the civil magistrate become now the only ground\nand pillar of truth? I demand then, why T. H. is of a different mind\nfrom his sovereign, and from the laws of the land, concerning the\nattributes of God and his decrees? This is a new paradox, and concerns\nnot this question of liberty and necessity. Wherefore I forbear to\nprosecute it further, and so conclude my reply with the words of the\nChristian poet,\n\n Jussum est C\u00e6saris ore Galieni,\n Quod princeps colit ut colamus omnes.\n \u00c6ternum colo Principem, dierum\n Factorem, Dominumque Galieni.[A]\n\n-----\n\nFootnote A:\n\n Prudentius. \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd. Hymn. vi.\n\n-----\n\n ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO THE POSTSCRIPT NO. XXXVIII.\n\nHe taketh it ill that I say that arguments do seldom work on men of wit\nand learning, when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary\nopinion. Nevertheless it is not only certain by experience, but also\nthere is reason for it, and that grounded upon the natural disposition\nof mankind. For it is natural to all men to defend those opinions, which\nthey have once publicly engaged themselves to maintain; because to have\nthat detected for error, which they have publicly maintained for truth,\nis never without some dishonour, more or less; and to find in themselves\nthat they have spent a great deal of time and labour in deceiving\nthemselves, is so uncomfortable a thing, as it is no wonder if they\nemploy their wit and learning, if they have any, to make good their\nerrors. And, therefore, where he saith, (_a_) \u201csolid and substantial\nreasons work sooner upon them, than upon weaker judgments; and that the\nmore exact the balance is, the sooner it discovers the real weight that\nis put into it\u201d: I confess, the more solid a man\u2019s wit is, the better\nwill solid reasons work upon him. But if he add to it that which he\ncalls learning, that is to say, much reading of other men\u2019s doctrines\nwithout weighing them with his own thoughts, then their judgments become\nweaker, and the balance less exact. And whereas he saith, \u201cthat they\nwhose gold is true, are not afraid to have it tried by the touch\u201d; he\nspeaketh as if I had been afraid to have my doctrine tried by the touch\nof men of wit and learning; wherein he is not much mistaken, meaning by\nmen of learning (as I said before) such as had read other men, but not\nthemselves. For by reading others, men commonly obstruct the way to\ntheir own exact and natural judgment, and use their wit both to deceive\nthemselves with fallacies, and to requite those, who endeavour at their\nown entreaty to instruct them, with revilings.\n\n(_b_) \u201cIf we be in an error, it is such an error as is sucked from\nnature; as is confirmed by reason, by experience, and by Scripture; as\nthe Fathers and Doctors of the Church of all ages have delivered; an\nerror, wherein we have the concurrence of all the best philosophers, an\nerror that bringeth to God the glory of justice, &c.; that renders men\nmore devout, more pious, more humble, more industrious, more penitent\nfor their sins.\u201d All this is but said; and what heretofore hath been\noffered in proof for it, hath been sufficiently refuted, and the\ncontrary proved; namely, that it is an error contrary to the nature of\nthe will; repugnant to reason and experience; repugnant to the\nScripture; repugnant to the doctrine of St. Paul, (and \u2019tis pity the\nFathers and Doctors of the Church have not followed St. Paul therein);\nan error not maintained by the best philosophers, (for they are not the\nbest philosophers, which the Bishop thinketh so); an error that taketh\nfrom God the glory of his prescience, nor bringeth to him the glory of\nhis other attributes; an error that maketh men, by imagining they can\nrepent when they will, neglect their duties; and that maketh men\nunthankful for God\u2019s graces, by thinking them to proceed from the\nnatural ability of their own will.\n\n(_c_) \u201c\u2018But,\u2019 saith he, \u2018when they dispute of God\u2019s actions\nphilosophically, then they consider them again as if he had such\nfaculties, and in such manner as we have them.\u2019 And is this the cause of\nour error? That were strange indeed; for they who dispute\nphilosophically of God, do neither ascribe faculties to him, in that\nmanner that we have them, nor yet do they attribute any proper faculties\nat all to God. God\u2019s understanding and his will is his very essence,\n&c.\u201d Methinks he should have known at these years, that to dispute\nphilosophically is to dispute by natural reason, and from principles\nevident by the light of nature, and to dispute of the faculties and\nproprieties of the subject whereof they treat. It is therefore\nunskilfully said by him, that they who dispute philosophically of God,\nascribe unto him no proper faculties. If no proper faculties, I would\nfain know of him what improper faculties he ascribes to God. I guess he\nwill make the understanding and the will, and his other attributes, to\nbe in God improper faculties, because he cannot properly call them\nfaculties; that is to say, he knows not how to make it good that they\nare faculties, and yet he will have these words, \u201cGod\u2019s understanding\nand his will are his very essence\u201d, to pass for an axiom of philosophy.\nAnd whereas I had said, we ought not to dispute of God\u2019s nature, and\nthat He is no fit subject of our philosophy, he denies it not, but says\nI say it.\n\n(_d_) \u201cWith a purpose to make a noise with declaiming against those who\ndare dispute of the nature of God, that is, who dare set forth his\njustice and his goodness, &c.\u201d The Bishop will have much ado to make\ngood, that to dispute of the nature of God, is all one with setting\nforth his justice and his goodness. He taketh no notice of these words\nof mine, \u2018pious men attribute to God Almighty for honour\u2019s sake,\nwhatsoever they see is honourable in the world\u2019; and yet this is setting\nforth God\u2019s justice, goodness, &c, without disputing of God\u2019s nature.\n\n(_e_) \u201cIn the flames of the true Tophet, that is hell.\u201d The true Tophet\nwas a place not far from the walls of Jerusalem, and consequently on the\nearth. I cannot imagine what he will say to this in his answer to my\n_Leviathan_, if there he find the same, unless he say, that in this\nplace by the _true_ Tophet, he meant a _not true_ Tophet.\n\n(_f_) \u201c_This is life eternal_ (saith our Saviour) _to know the only true\nGod, and Jesus Christ_, &c.\u201d This which followeth to the end of his\nanswer and of the book, is a reprehension of me, for saying that \u2018true\nreligion consisteth in obedience to Christ\u2019s lieutenants\u2019. If it be\nlawful for Christians to institute amongst themselves a commonwealth and\nmagistrates, whereby they may be able to live in peace one with another,\nand unite themselves in defence against a foreign enemy; it will\ncertainly be necessary to make to themselves some supreme judge in all\ncontroversies, to whom they ought all to give obedience. And this is no\nsuch strange doctrine, nor so uncouth a phrase to Christian ears, as the\nBishop makes it, whatsoever it be to them that would make themselves\njudges of the Supreme Judge himself. No; but, saith he, Christ is the\nSupreme Judge, and we are not to obey men rather than God. Is there any\nChristian man that does not acknowledge that we are to be judged by\nChrist, or that we ought not to obey him rather than any man that shall\nbe his lieutenant upon earth? The question therefore is, not of who is\nto be obeyed, but of what be his commands. If the Scripture contain his\ncommands, then may every Christian know by them what they are. And what\nhas the Bishop to do with what God says to me when I read them, more\nthan I have to do with what God says to him when he reads them, unless\nhe have authority given him by him whom Christ hath constituted his\nlieutenant? This lieutenant upon earth, I say, is the supreme civil\nmagistrate, to whom belongeth the care and charge of seeing that no\ndoctrine may be taught the people, but such as may consist with the\ngeneral peace of them all, and with the obedience that is due to the\ncivil sovereign. In whom would the Bishop have the authority reside of\nprohibiting seditious opinions, when they are taught (as they are often)\nin divinity books and from the pulpit? I could hardly guess, but that I\nremember that there have been books written to entitle the bishops to a\n_divine right_, underived from the civil sovereign. But because he\nmaketh it so heinous a matter, that the supreme civil magistrate should\nbe Christ\u2019s lieutenant upon earth, let us suppose that a bishop, or a\nsynod of bishops, should be set up (which I hope never shall) for our\ncivil sovereign; then that which he objecteth here, I could object in\nthe same words against himself. For I could say in his own words, _This\nis life eternal, to know the only true God, and Jesus Christ_ (John\nxvii. 3.). _Pure religion, and undefiled before God is this, to visit\nthe fatherless_, &c. (James i. 27.) _Fear God and keep his commandments_\n(Eccles. xii. 13.). But the Bishop hath found a more compendious way to\nheaven, namely, that true religion consisteth in obedience to Christ\u2019s\nlieutenants; that is (now by supposition), to the bishops. That is to\nsay, that every Christian of what nation soever, coming into the country\nwhich the bishops govern, should be of their religion. He would make the\ncivil magistrate to be Christ\u2019s lieutenant upon earth for matters of\nreligion, and supreme judge in all controversies, and say they ought to\nbe obeyed by all; how strange soever and uncouth it seem to him now, the\nsovereignty being in others. And I may say to him, what if the\nmagistrate himself (I mean by supposition the bishops) should be wicked\nmen; what if they should command as much contrary to the law of God or\nnature, as ever any Christian king did, (which is very possible); must\nwe obey them rather than God? Is the civil magistrate become now the\nonly ground and pillar of truth? No:\n\n Synedri jussum est voce episcoporum,\n Ipsum quod colit ut colamus omnes.\n \u00c6ternum colo Principem, dierum\n Factorem, Dominumque episcoporum.\n\nAnd thus the Bishop may see, there is little difference between his Ode\nand my Parode to it; and that both of them are of equal force to\nconclude nothing.\n\nThe Bishop knows that the kings of England, since the time of Henry\nVIII, have been declared by act of Parliament supreme governors of the\nChurch of England, in all causes both civil and ecclesiastical, that is\nto say, in all matters both ecclesiastical and civil, and consequently\nof this Church supreme head on earth; though perhaps he will not allow\nthat name of _head_. I should wonder therefore, whom the Bishop would\nhave to be Christ\u2019s lieutenant here in England for matters of religion,\nif not the supreme governor and head of the Church of England, whether\nman or woman whosoever he be, that hath the sovereign power, but that I\nknow he challenges it to the Bishops, and thinks that King Henry VIII.\ntook the ecclesiastical power away from the Pope, to settle it not in\nhimself, but them. But he ought to have known, that what jurisdiction,\nor power of ordaining ministers, the Popes had here in the time of the\nking\u2019s predecessors till Henry VIII, they derived it all from the king\u2019s\npower, though they did not acknowledge it; and the kings connived at it,\neither not knowing their own right, or not daring to challenge it; till\nsuch time as the behaviour of the Roman clergy had undeceived the\npeople, which otherwise would have sided with them. Nor was it unlawful\nfor the king to take from them the authority he had given them, as being\nPope enough in his own kingdom without depending on a foreign one: nor\nis it to be called schism, unless it be schism also in the head of a\nfamily to discharge, as often as he shall see cause, the school-masters\nhe entertaineth to teach his children. If the Bishop and Dr. Hammond,\nwhen they did write in the defence of the Church of England against\nimputation of schism, quitting their own pretences of jurisdiction and\n_jus divinum_, had gone upon these principles of mine, they had not been\nso shrewdly handled as they have been, by an English Papist that wrote\nagainst them.\n\nAnd now I have done answering to his arguments, I shall here, in the end\nof all, take that liberty of censuring his whole book, which he hath\ntaken in the beginning, of censuring mine. \u2018I have\u2019, saith he, (No. I.)\n\u2018perused T. H.\u2019s answers, considered his reasons, and conclude he hath\nmissed and mislaid the question; that his answers are evasions, that his\narguments are paralogisms, and that the opinion of absolute and\nuniversal necessity is but a result of some groundless and ill chosen\nprinciples.\u2019 And now it is my turn to censure. And first, for the\nstrength of his discourse and knowledge of the point in question, I\nthink it much inferior to that which might have been written by any man\nliving, that had no other learning besides the ability to write his\nmind; but as well perhaps as the same man would have done it if to the\nability of writing his mind he had added the study of School-divinity.\nSecondly, for the manners of it, (for to a public writing there\nbelongeth good manners), it consisteth in railing and exclaiming and\nscurrilous jesting, with now and then an unclean and mean instance. And\nlastly, for his elocution, the virtue whereof lieth not in the flux of\nwords, but in perspicuity, it is the same language with that of the\nkingdom of darkness. One shall find in it, especially where he should\nspeak most closely to the question, such words as these: divided sense,\ncompounded sense, hypothetical necessity, liberty of exercise, liberty\nof specification, liberty of contradiction, liberty of contrariety,\nknowledge of approbation, practical knowledge, general influence,\nspecial influence, instinct, qualities infused, efficacious election,\nmoral efficacy, moral motion, metaphorical motion, _practice practicum_,\n_motus primo primi_, _actus eliciti_, _actus imperati_, permissive will,\nconsequent will, negative obduration, deficient cause, simple act, _nunc\nstans_; and other like words of nonsense divided: besides many\npropositions such as these: the will is the mistress of human actions,\nthe understanding is her counsellor, the will chooseth, the will\nwilleth, the will suspends its own act, the understanding understandeth,\n(I wonder how he missed saying, the understanding suspendeth its own\nact,) the will applies the understanding to deliberate; the will\nrequires of the understanding a review; the will determines itself; a\nchange may be willed without changing of the will; man concurs with God\nin causing his own will; the will causeth willing; motives determine the\nwill not naturally, but morally; the same action may be both future and\nnot future; God is not just but justice, not eternal but eternity;\neternity is _nunc stans_; eternity is an infinite point which\ncomprehendeth all time, not formally, but eminently; all eternity is\nco-existent with to-day, and the same co-existent with to-morrow: and\nmany other like speeches of nonsense compounded, which the truth can\nnever stand in need of. Perhaps the Bishop will say, these terms and\nphrases are intelligible enough; for he hath said in his reply to No.\nXXIV, that his opinion is demonstrable in reason, though he be not able\nto comprehend, how it consisteth together with God\u2019s eternal prescience;\nand though it exceed his weak capacity, yet he ought to adhere to that\ntruth which is manifest. So that to him that truth is manifest, and\ndemonstrable by reason, which is beyond his capacity; so that words\nbeyond capacity are with him intelligible enough.\n\nBut the reader is to be judge of that. I could add many other passages\nthat discover, both his little logic, as taking the insignificant words\nabove recited, for terms of art; and his no philosophy in distinguishing\nbetween moral and natural motion, and by calling some motions\nmetaphorical, and by his blunders at the causes of sight and of the\ndescent of heavy bodies, and his talk of the inclination of the\nload-stone, and divers other places in his book.\n\nBut to make an end, I shall briefly draw up the sum of what we have both\nsaid. That which I have maintained is, that no man hath his future will\nin his own present power. That it may be changed by others, and by the\nchange of things without him; and when it is changed, it is not changed\nnor determined to any thing by itself; and that when it is undetermined,\nit is no will; because every one that willeth, willeth something in\nparticular. That deliberation is common to men with beasts, as being\nalternate appetite, and not ratiocination; and the last act or appetite\ntherein, and which is immediately followed by the action, is the only\nwill that can be taken notice of by others, and which only maketh an\naction in public judgment voluntary. That to be free is no more than to\ndo if a man will, and if he will to forbear; and consequently that this\nfreedom is the freedom of the man, and not of the will. That the will is\nnot free, but subject to change by the operation of external causes.\nThat all external causes depend necessarily on the first eternal cause,\nGod Almighty, who worketh in us both to will and to do, by the mediation\nof second causes. That seeing neither man nor any thing else can work\nupon itself, it is impossible that any man in the framing of his own\nwill should concur with God, either as an actor or as an instrument.\nThat there is nothing brought to pass by fortune as by a cause, nor any\nthing without a cause, or concurrence of causes, sufficient to bring it\nso to pass; and that every such cause, and their concurrence, do proceed\nfrom the providence, good pleasure, and working of God; and\nconsequently, though I do with others call many events _contingent_, and\nsay they _happen_, yet because they had every of them their several\nsufficient causes, and those causes again their former causes, I say\nthey _happen_ necessarily. And though we perceive not what they are, yet\nthere are of the most contingent events as necessary causes as of those\nevents whose causes we perceive; or else they could not possibly be\nforeknown, as they are by him that foreknoweth all things. On the\ncontrary, the Bishop maintaineth: that the will is free from\nnecessitation; and in order thereto that the judgment of the\nunderstanding is not always _practice practicum_, nor of such a nature\nin itself as to oblige and determine the will to one, though it be true\nthat spontaneity and determination to one may consist together. That the\nwill determineth itself, and that external things, when they change the\nwill, do work upon it not naturally, but morally, not by natural motion,\nbut by moral and metaphorical motion. That when the will is determined\nnaturally, it is not by God\u2019s general influence, whereon depend all\nsecond causes, but by special influence, God concurring and pouring\nsomething into the will. That the will when it suspends not its act,\nmakes the act necessary; but because it may suspend and not assent, it\nis not absolutely necessary. That sinful acts proceed not from God\u2019s\nwill, but are willed by him by a _permissive_ will, not an _operative_\nwill, and that he hardeneth the heart of man by a negative obduration.\nThat man\u2019s will is in his own power, but his _motus primo primi_ not in\nhis own power, nor necessary save only by a hypothetical necessity. That\nthe will to change, is not always a change of will. That not all things\nwhich are produced, are produced from _sufficient_, but some things from\n_deficient_ causes. That if the power of the will be present _in actu\nprimo_, then there is nothing wanting to the production of the effect.\nThat a cause may be sufficient for the production of an effect, though\nit want something necessary to the production thereof; because the will\nmay be wanting. That a necessary cause doth not always necessarily\nproduce its effect, but only then when the effect is necessarily\nproduced. He proveth also, that the will is free, by that universal\nnotion which the world hath of election: for when of the six Electors\nthe votes are divided equally, the King of Bohemia hath a casting voice.\nThat the prescience of God supposeth no necessity of the future\nexistence of the things foreknown, because God is not eternal but\neternity, and eternity is a _standing now_, without succession of time;\nand therefore God foresees all things intuitively by the presentiality\nthey have in _nunc stans_, which comprehendeth in it all time past,\npresent, and to come, not formally, but eminently and virtually. That\nthe will is free even then when it acteth, but that is in a compounded,\nnot in a divided sense. That to be made, and to be eternal, do consist\ntogether, because God\u2019s decrees are made, and are nevertheless eternal.\nThat the order, beauty, and perfection of the world doth require that in\nthe universe there should be agents of all sorts, some necessary, some\nfree, some contingent. That though it be true, that to-morrow it shall\nrain or not rain, yet neither of them is true _determinate_. That the\ndoctrine of necessity is a blasphemous, desperate, and destructive\ndoctrine. That it were better to be an Atheist, than to hold it; and he\nthat maintaineth it, is fitter to be refuted with rods than with\narguments. And now whether this his doctrine or mine be the more\nintelligible, more rational, or more conformable to God\u2019s word, I leave\nit to the judgment of the reader.\n\nBut whatsoever be the truth of the disputed question, the reader may\nperadventure think I have not used the Bishop with that respect I ought,\nor without disadvantage of my cause I might have done; for which I am to\nmake a short apology. A little before the last parliament of the late\nking, when every man spake freely against the then present government, I\nthought it worth my study to consider the grounds and consequences of\nsuch behaviour, and whether it were conformable or contrary to reason\nand to the Word of God. And after some time I did put in order and\npublish my thoughts thereof, first in Latin, and then again the same in\nEnglish; where I endeavoured to prove both by reason and Scripture, that\nthey who have once submitted themselves to any sovereign governor,\neither by express acknowledgment of his power, or by receiving\nprotection from his laws, are obliged to be true and faithful to him,\nand to acknowledge no other supreme power but him in any matter or\nquestion whatsoever, either civil or ecclesiastical. In which books of\nmine, I pursued my subject without taking notice of any particular man\nthat held any opinion contrary to that which I then wrote; only in\ngeneral I maintained that the office of the clergy, in respect of the\nsupreme civil power, was not magisterial, but ministerial; and that\ntheir teaching of the people was founded upon no other authority than\nthat of the civil sovereign; and all this without any word tending to\nthe disgrace either of episcopacy or of presbytery. Nevertheless I find\nsince, that divers of them, whereof the Bishop of Derry is one, have\ntaken offence especially at two things; one, that I make the supremacy\nin matters of religion to reside in the civil sovereign; the other, that\nbeing no clergyman, I deliver doctrines, and ground them upon words of\nthe Scripture, which doctrines they, being by profession divines, have\nnever taught. And in this their displeasure, divers of them in their\nbooks and sermons, without answering any of my arguments, have not only\nexclaimed against my doctrine, but reviled me, and endeavoured to make\nme hateful for those things, for which (if they knew their own and the\npublic good) they ought to have given me thanks. There is also one of\nthem, that taking offence at me for blaming in part the discipline\ninstituted heretofore, and regulated by the authority of the Pope, in\nthe universities, not only ranks me amongst those men that would have\nthe revenue of the universities diminished, and says plainly I have no\nreligion, but also thinks me so simple and ignorant of the world as to\nbelieve that our universities maintain Popery. And this is the author of\nthe book called _Vindici\u00e6 Academiarum_. If either of the universities\nhad thought itself injured, I believe it could have authorised or\nappointed some member of theirs, whereof there be many abler men than\nhe, to have made their vindication. But this Vindex, (as little dogs to\nplease their masters use to bark, in token of their sedulity,\nindifferently at strangers, till they be rated off), unprovoked by me\nhath fallen upon me without bidding. I have been publicly injured by\nmany of whom I took no notice, supposing that that humour would spend\nitself; but seeing it last, and grow higher in this writing I now\nanswer, I thought it necessary at last to make of some of them, and\nfirst of this Bishop, an example.\n\n END OF VOL. V.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n Transcriber\u2019s Note\n\nThere were two kinds of sidenote in this volumn. At the top of each\npage, the section number, along with either \u201cAnimadversions upon the\nBishop\u2019s reply\u201d or \u201cThe Bishop\u2019s Reply\u201d, is repeated. The former have\nbeen removed as they are redundant with the section title. The \u201cBishop\u2019s\nReply\u201d notes are positioned before each paragraph beginning \u201cJ. D\u201d to\nmark where the \u201cBishop\u2019s\u201d voice resumes.\n\nThe sidenote on p. 81 mistakenly referred to \u201cAnimadversions...\u201d rather\nthan the expected \u201cThe Bishop\u2019s reply.\u201d\n\nOther errors deemed most likely to be the printer\u2019s have been corrected,\nand are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the\noriginal.\n\n 5.11 to do what he will,[\u201d] Added.\n\n 10.13 O Israel, thy de[s]truction Restored.\n\n 25.8 So God bless us.[\u201d] Added.\n\n 33.8 of the second causes.[\u201d] Added.\n\n 38.17 [t]hat one may take away an ell Restored.\n\n 62.25 between [l/d]uade distinctions cloven feet. Restored\n (probable).\n\n 85.26 [\u201c/\u2018]that wise men may do Replaced.\n\n 85.27 actions,[\u201d/\u2019] Replaced.\n\n 85.33 [\u201c/\u2018]that fools, children, Replaced.\n\n 85.34 and elect,[\u201d/\u2019] Replaced.\n\n 126.34 but his own justice better[.] Restored.\n\n 137.3 would have him to will.[\u2019] Added.\n\n 142.1 [\u201c]Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken Added.\n\n 145.1 Another is Genesis xix. 22[)]: Removed.\n\n 151.14 that all consult[a]tions are vain. Restored.\n\n 155.33 for the public good[,/.] Replaced.\n\n 185.7 when it is necess[s]ary Removed.\n\n 229.23 _Quid hoc?_[\u201d] Added.\n\n 310.17 choose a good one.[\u201d] Added.\n\n 316.30 and so the[ the] action be become Removed.\n\n 324.11 and if he[ ]means so Inserted.\n\n 336.5 [\u201c]But because his eyesight was weak Added.\n\n 405.28 was I to grow old!\u2019[\u201d] Added.\n\n 425.6 forbear to act[\u201d/\u2019]; Replaced.\n\n 434.15 not too much possessed with prejudice.[\u201d] Added.\n\n 437.24 such poor things as eyes, ears, brains[\u2019] Added.\n\n 439.33 the religion of every Ch[r]istian country Inserted.\n\n 447.30 per[s]used T. H.\u2019s answers Removed.\n\n 454.9 whereof the[ the Bishop of Derry is one Removed.","title":"The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 05 (of 11)","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":133346}