{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_76774/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_76774","id":"gutenberg_76774","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/76774","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Category: Sociology","Psychoanalysis","Psychology, Religious","Religion"],"text":"THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION\n\n\n              THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL LIBRARY\n\n                         EDITED BY ERNEST JONES\n\n                                 No. 15\n\n\n\n\n                       THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION\n\n\n                       SIGMUND FREUD, M.D., LL.D.\n\n                               TRANSLATED\n                                   BY\n                           W. D. ROBSON-SCOTT\n\n                     PUBLISHED BY HORACE LIVERIGHT\n                  AND THE INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS\n                               MCMXXVIII\n\n\n\n\n   _Printed in Great Britain by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_\n\n\n\n\n                           TRANSLATOR\u2019S NOTE\n\n\nI wish to express my thanks to the Editor and to Mr. James Strachey for\nreading through this translation and making many helpful suggestions.\n\n                                                             W. D. R.-S.\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER I\n\n\nWhen one has lived for long within a particular culture[1] and has often\nstriven to discover its origins and the path of its development, one\nfeels for once the temptation to turn one\u2019s attention in the other\ndirection and to ask what further fate awaits this culture and what\ntransformations it is destined to undergo. But one soon finds that the\nvalue of such an enquiry is diminished from the outset by several\nconsiderations. Above all, by the fact that there are only a few people\nwho can survey human activity in all its ramifications. Most people have\nbeen compelled to restrict themselves to a single, or to a few, spheres\nof interest; but the less a man knows of the past and the present the\nmore unreliable must his judgement of the future prove. And further it\nis precisely in the matter of this judgement that the subjective\nexpectations of the individual play a part that is difficult to assess;\nfor these prove to be dependent on purely personal factors in his own\nexperience, on his more or less hopeful attitude to life, according as\ntemperament, success or failure has prescribed for him. And finally one\nmust take into account the remarkable fact that in general men\nexperience the present na\u00efvely, so to speak, without being able to\nestimate its content; they must first place it at a distance, _i.e._ the\npresent must have become the past before one can win from it points of\nvantage from which to gauge the future.\n\nFootnote 1:\n\n  The German word _Kultur_ has been translated sometimes as \u2018culture\u2019\n  and sometimes as \u2018civilization\u2019, denoting as it does a concept\n  intermediate between these and at times inclusive of both.\u2014ED.\n\nAnd so he who yields to the temptation to deliver an opinion on the\nprobable future of our culture will do well to remind himself of the\ndifficulties just indicated, and likewise of the uncertainty that\nattaches quite universally to every prophecy. It follows from this that\nin hasty flight from so great a task I shall seek out the small tract of\nterritory to which my attention has hitherto been directed, as soon as I\nhave defined its position in general.\n\nHuman culture\u2014I mean by that all those respects in which human life has\nraised itself above animal conditions and in which it differs from the\nlife of the beasts, and I disdain to separate culture and\ncivilization\u2014presents, as is well known, two aspects to the observer. It\nincludes on the one hand all the knowledge and power that men have\nacquired in order to master the forces of nature and win resources from\nher for the satisfaction of human needs; and on the other hand it\nincludes all the necessary arrangements whereby men\u2019s relations to each\nother, and in particular the distribution of the attainable riches, may\nbe regulated. The two tendencies of culture are not independent of each\nother, first, because the mutual relations of men are profoundly\ninfluenced by the measure of instinctual satisfaction that the existing\nresources make possible; secondly, because the individual can himself\ntake on the quality of a piece of property in his relation to another,\nin so far as this other makes use of his capacity for work or chooses\nhim as sexual object; and thirdly, because every individual is virtually\nan enemy of culture, which is nevertheless ostensibly an object of\nuniversal human concern. It is remarkable that little as men are able to\nexist in isolation they should yet feel as a heavy burden the sacrifices\nthat culture expects of them in order that a communal existence may be\npossible. Thus culture must be defended against the individual, and its\norganization, its institutions and its laws, are all directed to this\nend; they aim not only at establishing a certain distribution of\nproperty, but also at maintaining it; in fact, they must protect against\nthe hostile impulses of mankind everything that contributes to the\nconquest of nature and the production of wealth. Human creations are\neasy to destroy, and science and technical skill, which have built them\nup, can also be turned to their destruction.\n\nSo one gets the impression that culture is something which was imposed\non a resisting majority by a minority that understood how to possess\nitself of the means of power and coercion. Of course it stands to reason\nthat these difficulties are not inherent in the nature of culture\nitself, but are conditioned by the imperfections of the cultural forms\nthat have so far been developed. Indeed it is not difficult to point out\nthese defects. While mankind has made solid advances in the conquest of\nnature and may expect to make still greater ones, no certain claim can\nbe established for a corresponding advance in the regulation of human\naffairs, and probably at every period, as again now, many men have asked\nthemselves whether this fragment that has been acquired by culture is\nindeed worth defending at all. One might suppose that a reorganization\nof human relations should be possible, which, by abandoning coercion and\nthe suppression of the instincts, would remove the sources of\ndissatisfaction with culture, so that undisturbed by inner conflict men\nmight devote themselves to the acquisition of natural resources and to\nthe enjoyment of the same. That would be the golden age, but it is\nquestionable if such a state of affairs can ever be realized. It seems\nmore probable that every culture must be built up on coercion and\ninstinctual renunciation; it does not even appear certain that without\ncoercion the majority of human individuals would be ready to submit to\nthe labour necessary for acquiring new means of supporting life. One\nhas, I think, to reckon with the fact that there are present in all men\ndestructive, and therefore anti-social and anti-cultural, tendencies,\nand that with a great number of people these are strong enough to\ndetermine their behaviour in human society.\n\nThis psychological fact acquires a decisive significance when one is\nforming an estimate of human culture. One thought at first that the\nessence of culture lay in the conquest of nature for the means of\nsupporting life, and in eliminating the dangers that threaten culture by\nthe suitable distribution of these among mankind, but now the emphasis\nseems to have shifted away from the material plane on to the psychical.\nThe critical question is whether and to what extent one can succeed,\nfirst, in diminishing the burden of the instinctual sacrifices imposed\non men; secondly, in reconciling them to those that must necessarily\nremain; and thirdly, in compensating them for these. It is just as\nimpossible to do without government of the masses by a minority as it is\nto dispense with coercion in the work of civilization, for the masses\nare lazy and unintelligent, they have no love for instinctual\nrenunciation, they are not to be convinced of its inevitability by\nargument, and the individuals support each other in giving full play to\ntheir unruliness. It is only by the influence of individuals who can set\nan example, whom the masses recognize as their leaders, that they can be\ninduced to submit to the labours and renunciations on which the\nexistence of culture depends. All is well if these leaders are people of\nsuperior insight into what constitute the necessities of life, people\nwho have attained the height of mastering their own instinctual wishes.\nBut the danger exists that in order not to lose their influence they\nwill yield to the masses more than these will yield to them, and\ntherefore it seems necessary that they should be independent of the\nmasses by having at their disposal means of enforcing their authority.\nTo put it briefly, there are two widely diffused human characteristics\nwhich are responsible for the fact that the organization of culture can\nbe maintained only by a certain measure of coercion: that is to say, men\nare not naturally fond of work, and arguments are of no avail against\ntheir passions.\n\nI know what objections will be brought against these arguments. It will\nbe said that the character of the masses, here delineated, which is\nsupposed to prove that one cannot dispense with coercion in the work of\ncivilization, is itself only the result of defective cultural\norganization, through which men have become embittered, revengeful and\nunapproachable. New generations, brought up kindly and taught to have a\nrespect for reason, who have experienced the benefits of culture early\nin life, will have a different attitude towards it; they will feel it to\nbe their very own possession, and they will be ready on its account to\nmake the sacrifice in labour and in instinctual renunciation that is\nnecessary for its preservation. They will be able to do without coercion\nand will differ little from their leaders. If no culture has so far\nproduced human masses of such a quality, it is due to the fact that no\nculture has yet discovered the plan that will influence men in such a\nway, and that from childhood on.\n\nIt may be doubted whether it is possible at all, or at any rate just\nnow, in the present stage of our conquest of nature, to establish a\ncultural organization of this kind; it may be asked where the throng of\nsuperior, dependable and disinterested leaders, who are to act as\neducators of the future generations, are to come from; and one may be\nappalled at the stupendous amount of force that will be unavoidable if\nthese intentions are to be carried out. But one cannot deny the grandeur\nof this project and its significance for the future of human culture. It\nis securely based on a piece of psychological insight, on the fact that\nman is equipped with the most varied instinctual predispositions, the\nultimate course of which is determined by the experiences of early\nchildhood. But the limitations of man\u2019s capacity for education set\nbounds to the efficacy of such a cultural transformation. One may\nquestion whether and in what degree it would be possible for another\ncultural milieu to efface the two characteristics of human masses that\nmake the guidance of men\u2019s affairs so very difficult. The experiment has\nnot yet been made. Probably a certain percentage of mankind\u2014owing to\nmorbid predisposition or too great instinctual vigour\u2014will always remain\nasocial, but if only one can succeed in reducing to a minority the\nmajority that is to-day hostile to culture, one will have accomplished a\ngreat deal, perhaps indeed everything that can be accomplished.\n\nI should not like to give the impression that I have wandered far away\nfrom the chosen path of my enquiry. I will therefore expressly assert\nthat it is far from my intention to estimate the value of the great\ncultural experiment that is at present in progress in the vast country\nthat stretches between Europe and Asia. I have neither the special\nknowledge nor the capacity to decide on its practicability, to test the\nexpediency of the methods employed, or to measure the width of the\ninevitable gulf between intention and execution. What is there in course\nof preparation eludes investigation, for which it is not ready; for this\nour long consolidated culture presents the material.\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER II\n\n\nWe have glided unawares out of the economic plane over into the\npsychological. At first we were tempted to seek the essence of culture\nin the existing material resources and in the arrangements for their\ndistribution. But with the discovery that every culture is based on\ncompulsory labour and instinctual renunciation, and that it therefore\ninevitably evokes opposition from those affected by these demands, it\nbecame clear that the resources themselves, the means of acquiring them,\nand the arrangements for their distribution could not be its essential\nor unique characteristic; for they are threatened by the rebelliousness\nand destructive passions of the members of the culture. Thus in addition\nto the resources there are the means of defending culture: the coercive\nmeasures, and others that are intended to reconcile men to it and to\nrecompense them for their sacrifices. And these last may be described as\nthe psychical sphere of culture.\n\nFor the sake of a uniform terminology we will describe the fact that an\ninstinct cannot be satisfied as \u2018frustration\u2019, the means by which this\nfrustration is secured as \u2018prohibition\u2019, and the condition produced by\nthe prohibition as \u2018privation\u2019. Then the next step is to distinguish\nbetween privations that do affect everybody and those that do not, those\nthat merely affect groups, classes, or even individuals. The former are\nthe oldest; with the prohibitions that cause them culture began, who\nknows how many thousands of years ago, to detach itself from the\nprimordial animal condition of mankind. To our surprise we have found\nthat they are still operative, that they still form the kernel of the\nhostility to culture. The instinctual wishes that suffer under them are\nborn anew with every child; there is a class of men, the neurotics, who\nreact already to this first group of frustrations by an asocial\nattitude. Such instinctual wishes are those of incest, of cannibalism,\nand of murder. It seems strange to classify these, in repudiating which\nall men seem to be at one, with those others, about whose permissibility\nor impermissibility in our culture there is so vigorous a dispute; but\npsychologically one is justified in doing this. Nor is the attitude of\nculture to these oldest instinctual wishes the same in each case;\ncannibalism alone seems to be proscribed by everyone, and\u2014to other than\nanalytic observation\u2014completely overcome; the strength of the incest\nwishes can still be perceived behind the prohibition; and under certain\nconditions murder is still practised, indeed enjoined, by our culture.\nIt is possible that cultural developments lie before us, in which yet\nother wish-gratifications, which are to-day entirely permissible, will\nappear just as disagreeable as those of cannibalism do now.\n\nAlready in these earliest instinctual renunciations a psychological\nfactor is involved, which remains of great importance for everything\nthat follows. It is not true to say that the human mind has undergone no\ndevelopment since the earliest times and that in contrast to the\nadvances of science and technical skill it is still the same to-day as\nat the beginning of history. We can point out one of these advances\nhere. It is in accordance with the course of our development that\nexternal compulsion is gradually internalized, in that a special mental\nfunction, man\u2019s super-ego, takes it under its jurisdiction. Every child\npresents to us the model of this transformation; it is only by that\nmeans that it becomes a moral and social being. This strengthening of\nthe super-ego is a highly valuable psychological possession for culture.\nThose people in whom it has taken place, from being the foes of culture,\nbecome its supporters. The greater their number in a cultural community,\nthe more secure it is and the more easily can it dispense with external\ncoercion. Now the degree of this internalization differs widely in the\ncase of each instinctual prohibition. As far as the earliest demands of\nculture, already mentioned, are concerned, the process of\ninternalization seems to have been to a great extent accomplished, if we\nleave out of account the unwelcome exception of the neurotics. But the\ncase is altered when we turn to the other instinctual claims. One notes\nwith surprise and concern that a majority of men obey the cultural\nprohibitions in question only under the pressure of external force, in\nfact only where the latter can assert itself and for as long as it is an\nobject of fear. This also holds good for those so-called moral cultural\ndemands, which in the same way apply to everyone. The greater part of\nwhat one experiences of man\u2019s moral untrustworthiness is to be explained\nin this connection. There are innumerable civilized people who would\nshrink from murder or incest, and who yet do not hesitate to gratify\ntheir avarice, their aggressiveness and their sexual lusts, and who have\nno compunction in hurting others by lying, fraud and calumny, so long as\nthey remain unpunished for it; and no doubt this has been so for many\ncultural epochs.\n\nIf we turn to those restrictions that only apply to certain classes of\nsociety, we encounter a state of things which is glaringly obvious and\nhas always been recognized. It is to be expected that the neglected\nclasses will grudge the favoured ones their privileges and that they\nwill do everything in their power to rid themselves of their own surplus\nof privation. Where this is not possible a lasting measure of discontent\nwill obtain within this culture, and this may lead to dangerous\noutbreaks. But if a culture has not got beyond the stage in which the\nsatisfaction of one group of its members necessarily involves the\nsuppression of another, perhaps the majority\u2014and this is the case in all\nmodern cultures,\u2014it is intelligible that these suppressed classes should\ndevelop an intense hostility to the culture; a culture, whose existence\nthey make possible by their labour, but in whose resources they have too\nsmall a share. In such conditions one must not expect to find an\ninternalization of the cultural prohibitions among the suppressed\nclasses; indeed they are not even prepared to acknowledge these\nprohibitions, intent, as they are, on the destruction of the culture\nitself and perhaps even of the assumptions on which it rests. These\nclasses are so manifestly hostile to culture that on that account the\nmore latent hostility of the better provided social strata has been\noverlooked. It need not be said that a culture which leaves unsatisfied\nand drives to rebelliousness so large a number of its members neither\nhas a prospect of continued existence, nor deserves it.\n\nThe extent to which cultural rules have been internalized\u2014to express it\npopularly and unpsychologically: the moral level of the members\u2014is not\nthe only psychical asset to be considered if one is estimating the value\nof a culture. In addition there is its heritage of ideals and artistic\ncreations, that is to say, of the satisfactions they both yield.\n\nOne will be only too readily inclined to include among the psychical\npossessions of a culture its ideals, that is, its judgements of what are\nits loftiest and its most ambitious accomplishments. It seems at first\nas if these ideals would determine the achievements of the cultural\ngroup; but the actual process would seem to be that the ideals are\nmodelled on the first achievements that the co-operation of internal\nability and external circumstances made possible, and that now these\nfirst achievements are merely held fast by the ideal as examples to be\nfollowed. The satisfaction the ideal gives to the members of the culture\nis thus of a narcissistic nature, it is based on pride in what has\nalready been successfully achieved. To make this satisfaction complete\nthe culture compares itself with others which have applied themselves to\nother tasks and have developed other ideals. On the strength of these\ndifferences every culture claims the right to despise the rest. In this\nway cultural ideals become a source of discord and enmity between\ndifferent cultural groups, as can be most clearly seen among nations.\n\nThe narcissistic satisfaction provided by the cultural ideal is also one\nof the forces that effectively counteract the hostility to culture\nwithin the cultural group. It can be shared not only by the favoured\nclasses, which enjoy the benefits of this culture, but also by the\nsuppressed, since the right to despise those that are outside it\ncompensates them for the wrongs they suffer in their own group. True,\none is a miserable plebeian, tormented by obligations and military\nservice, but withal one is a Roman citizen, one has one\u2019s share in the\ntask of ruling other nations and dictating their laws. This\nidentification of the suppressed with the class that governs and\nexploits them is, however, only a part of a larger whole. Thus the\nformer can be attached affectively to the latter; in spite of their\nanimosity they can find their ideals in their masters. Unless such\nrelations, fundamentally of a satisfying kind, were in existence, it\nwould be impossible to understand how so many cultures have contrived to\nexist for so long in spite of the justified hostility of great masses of\nmen.\n\nDifferent in kind is the satisfaction that art yields to the members of\na cultural group. As a rule it remains inaccessible to the masses, who\nare engaged in exhausting labour and who have not enjoyed the benefits\nof individual education. As we have long known, art offers substitutive\ngratifications for the oldest cultural renunciations, still always most\ndeeply felt, and for that reason serves like nothing else to reconcile\nmen to the sacrifices they have made on culture\u2019s behalf. On the other\nhand, works of art promote the feelings of identification, of which\nevery cultural group has so much need, in the occasion they provide for\nthe sharing of highly valued emotional experiences. And when they\nrepresent the achievements of a particular culture, thus in an\nimpressive way recalling it to its ideals, they also subserve a\nnarcissistic gratification.\n\nNo mention has yet been made of what is perhaps the most important part\nof the psychical inventory of a culture: that is to say, its\u2014in the\nbroadest sense\u2014religious ideas; in other words, the use of which will be\njustified later, its illusions.\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER III\n\n\nWherein lies the peculiar value of religious ideas?\n\nWe have spoken of the hostility to culture, produced by the pressure it\nexercises and the instinctual renunciations that it demands. If one\nimagined its prohibitions removed, then one could choose any woman who\ntook one\u2019s fancy as one\u2019s sexual object, one could kill without\nhesitation one\u2019s rival or whoever interfered with one in any other way,\nand one could seize what one wanted of another man\u2019s goods without\nasking his leave: how splendid, what a succession of delights, life\nwould be! True, one soon finds the first difficulty: everyone else has\nexactly the same wishes, and will treat one with no more consideration\nthan one will treat him. And so in reality there is only one single\nperson who can be made unrestrictedly happy by abolishing thus the\nrestrictions imposed by culture, and that is a tyrant or dictator who\nhas monopolized all the means of power; and even he has every reason to\nwant the others to keep at least one cultural commandment: thou shalt\nnot kill.\n\nBut how ungrateful, how short-sighted after all, to strive for the\nabolition of culture! What would then remain would be the state of\nnature, and that is far harder to endure. It is true that nature does\nnot ask us to restrain our instincts, she lets us do as we like; but she\nhas her peculiarly effective mode of restricting us: she destroys us,\ncoldly, cruelly, callously, as it seems to us, and possibly just through\nwhat has caused our satisfaction. It was because of these very dangers\nwith which nature threatens us that we united together and created\nculture, which, amongst other things, is supposed to make our communal\nexistence possible. Indeed, it is the principal task of culture, its\nreal _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_, to defend us against nature.\n\nOne must confess that in many ways it already does this tolerably well,\nand clearly as time goes on it will be much more successful. But no one\nis under the illusion that nature has so far been vanquished; few dare\nto hope that she will ever be completely under man\u2019s subjection. There\nare the elements, which seem to mock at all human control: the earth,\nwhich quakes, is rent asunder, and buries man and all his works; the\nwater, which in tumult floods and submerges all things; the storm, which\ndrives all before it; there are the diseases, which we have only lately\nrecognized as the attacks of other living creatures; and finally there\nis the painful riddle of death, for which no remedy at all has yet been\nfound, nor probably ever will be. With these forces nature rises up\nbefore us, sublime, pitiless, inexorable; thus she brings again to mind\nour weakness and helplessness, of which we thought the work of\ncivilization had rid us. It is one of the few noble and gratifying\nspectacles that men can offer, when in the face of an elemental\ncatastrophe they awake from their muddle and confusion, forget all their\ninternal difficulties and animosities, and remember the great common\ntask, the preservation of mankind against the supremacy of nature.\n\nFor the individual, as for mankind in general, life is hard to endure.\nThe culture in which he shares imposes on him some measure of privation,\nand other men occasion him a certain degree of suffering, either in\nspite of the laws of this culture or because of its imperfections. Add\nto this the evils that unvanquished nature\u2014he calls it Fate\u2014inflicts on\nhim. One would expect a permanent condition of anxious suspense and a\nsevere injury to his innate narcissism to be the result of this state of\naffairs. We know already how the individual reacts to the injuries that\nculture and other men inflict on him: he develops a corresponding degree\nof resistance against the institutions of this culture, of hostility\ntowards it. But how does he defend himself against the supremacy of\nnature, of fate, which threatens him, as it threatens all?\n\nCulture relieves him of this task: it performs it in the same way for\neveryone. (It is also noteworthy that pretty well all cultures are the\nsame in this respect.) It does not cry a halt, as it were, in its task\nof defending man against nature; it merely pursues it by other methods.\nThis is a complex business; man\u2019s seriously menaced self-esteem craves\nfor consolation, life and the universe must be rid of their terrors, and\nincidentally man\u2019s curiosity, reinforced, it is true, by the strongest\npractical motives, demands an answer.\n\nWith the first step, which is the humanization of nature, much is\nalready won. Nothing can be made of impersonal forces and fates; they\nremain eternally remote. But if the elements have passions that rage\nlike those in our own souls, if death itself is not something\nspontaneous, but the violent act of an evil Will, if everywhere in\nnature we have about us beings who resemble those of our own\nenvironment, then indeed we can breathe freely, we can feel at home in\nface of the supernatural, and we can deal psychically with our frantic\nanxiety. We are perhaps still defenceless, but no longer helplessly\nparalysed; we can at least react; perhaps indeed we are not even\ndefenceless, we can have recourse to the same methods against these\nviolent supermen of the beyond that we make use of in our own community;\nwe can try to exorcise them, to appease them, to bribe them, and so rob\nthem of part of their power by thus influencing them. Such a\nsubstitution of psychology for natural science provides not merely\nimmediate relief, it also points the way to a further mastery of the\nsituation.\n\nFor there is nothing new in this situation. It has an infantile\nprototype, and is really only the continuation of this. For once before\none has been in such a state of helplessness: as a little child in one\u2019s\nrelationship to one\u2019s parents. For one had reason to fear them,\nespecially the father, though at the same time one was sure of his\nprotection against the dangers then known to one. And so it was natural\nto assimilate and combine the two situations. Here, too, as in\ndream-life, the wish came into its own. The sleeper is seized by a\npresentiment of death, which seeks to carry him to the grave. But the\ndream-work knows how to select a condition that will turn even this\ndreaded event into a wish-fulfilment: the dreamer sees himself in an\nancient Etruscan grave, into which he has descended, happy in the\nsatisfaction it has given to his arch\u00e6ological interests. Similarly man\nmakes the forces of nature not simply in the image of men with whom he\ncan associate as his equals\u2014that would not do justice to the\noverpowering impression they make on him\u2014but he gives them the\ncharacteristics of the father, makes them into gods, thereby following\nnot only an infantile, but also, as I have tried to show, a phylogenetic\nprototype.\n\nIn the course of time the first observations of law and order in natural\nphenomena are made, and therewith the forces of nature lose their human\ntraits. But men\u2019s helplessness remains, and with it their father-longing\nand the gods. The gods retain their threefold task: they must exorcise\nthe terrors of nature, they must reconcile one to the cruelty of fate,\nparticularly as shown in death, and they must make amends for the\nsufferings and privations that the communal life of culture has imposed\non man.\n\nBut within these there is a gradual shifting of the accent. It is\nobserved that natural phenomena develop of themselves from inward\nnecessity; without doubt the gods are the lords of nature: they have\narranged it thus and now they can leave it to itself. Only occasionally,\nin the so-called miracles, do they intervene in its course, as if to\nprotest that they have surrendered nothing of their original sphere of\npower. As far as the vicissitudes of fate are concerned, an unpleasant\nsuspicion persists that the perplexity and helplessness of the human\nrace cannot be remedied. This is where the gods are most apt to fail us;\nif they themselves make fate, then their ways must be deemed\ninscrutable. The most gifted people of the ancient world dimly surmised\nthat above the gods stands Destiny and that the gods themselves have\ntheir destinies. And the more autonomous nature becomes and the more the\ngods withdraw from her, the more earnestly are all expectations\nconcentrated on the third task assigned to them and the more does\nmorality become their real domain. It now becomes the business of the\ngods to adjust the defects and evils of culture, to attend to the\nsufferings that men inflict on each other in their communal life, and to\nsee that the laws of culture, which men obey so ill, are carried out.\nThe laws of culture themselves are claimed to be of divine origin, they\nare elevated to a position above human society, and they are extended\nover nature and the universe.\n\nAnd so a rich store of ideas is formed, born of the need to make\ntolerable the helplessness of man, and built out of the material offered\nby memories of the helplessness of his own childhood and the childhood\nof the human race. It is easy to see that these ideas protect man in two\ndirections; against the dangers of nature and fate, and against the\nevils of human society itself. What it amounts to is this: life in this\nworld serves a higher purpose; true, it is not easy to guess the nature\nof this purpose, but certainly a perfecting of human existence is\nimplied. Probably the spiritual part of man, the soul, which in the\ncourse of time has so slowly and unwillingly detached itself from the\nbody, is to be regarded as the object of this elevation and exaltation.\nEverything that takes place in this world expresses the intentions of an\nIntelligence, superior to us, which in the end, though its devious ways\nmay be difficult to follow, orders everything for good, that is, to our\nadvantage. Over each one of us watches a benevolent, and only apparently\nsevere, Providence, which will not suffer us to become the plaything of\nthe stark and pitiless forces of nature; death itself is not\nannihilation, not a return to inorganic lifelessness, but the beginning\nof a new kind of existence, which lies on the road of development to\nsomething higher. And to turn to the other side of the question, the\nmoral laws that have formed our culture govern also the whole universe,\nonly they are upheld with incomparably more force and consistency by a\nsupreme judicial court. In the end all good is rewarded, all evil\npunished, if not actually in this life, then in the further existences\nthat begin after death. And thus all the terrors, the sufferings, and\nthe hardships of life are destined to be obliterated; the life after\ndeath, which continues our earthly existence as the invisible part of\nthe spectrum adjoins the visible, brings all the perfection that perhaps\nwe have missed here. And the superior wisdom that directs this issue,\nthe supreme goodness that expresses itself thus, the justice that thus\nachieves its aim\u2014these are the qualities of the divine beings who have\nfashioned us and the world in general; or rather of the one divine being\ninto which in our culture all the gods of antiquity have been condensed.\nThe race that first succeeded in thus concentrating the divine qualities\nwas not a little proud of this advance. It had revealed the father\nnucleus which had always lain hidden behind every divine figure;\nfundamentally it was a return to the historical beginnings of the idea\nof God. Now that God was a single person, man\u2019s relations to him could\nrecover the intimacy and intensity of the child\u2019s relation to the\nfather. If one had done so much for the father, then surely one would be\nrewarded\u2014at least the only beloved child, the chosen people, would be.\nMore recently, pious America has laid claim to be \u2018God\u2019s own country\u2019,\nand for one of the forms under which men worship the deity the claim\ncertainly holds good.\n\nThe religious ideas that have just been summarized have of course gone\nthrough a long process of development, and have been held in various\nphases by various cultures. I have singled out one such phase of\ndevelopment, which more or less corresponds to the final form of our\ncontemporary Christian culture in the west. It is easy to see that not\nall the parts of this whole tally equally well with each other, that not\nall the questions that press for an answer receive one, and that the\ncontradiction of daily experience can only with difficulty be dismissed.\nBut such as they are, these ideas\u2014religious, in the broadest sense of\nthe word\u2014are prized as the most precious possession of culture, as the\nmost valuable thing it has to offer its members; far more highly prized\nthan all our devices for winning the treasures of the earth, for\nproviding men with sustenance, or for preventing their diseases, and so\nforth; men suppose that life would be intolerable if they did not accord\nthese ideas the value that is claimed for them. And now the question\narises: what are these ideas in the light of psychology; whence do they\nderive the esteem in which they are held; and further, in all\ndiffidence, what is their real worth?\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER IV\n\n\nAn enquiry that proceeds uninterruptedly, like a monologue, is not\naltogether without its dangers. One is too easily tempted to push aside\nthoughts that would interrupt it, and in exchange one is left with a\nfeeling of uncertainty which one will drown in the end by\nover-decisiveness. I shall therefore imagine an opponent who follows my\narguments with mistrust, and I shall let him interject remarks here and\nthere.\n\nI hear him saying: \u2018You have repeatedly used the expressions \u201cculture\ncreates these religious ideas\u201d, \u201cculture places them at the disposal of\nits members\u201d, which sounds strange to me somehow. I could not say why\nmyself, but it does not sound so natural as to say that culture has made\nregulations about distributing the products of labour or about the\nrights over women and children.\u2019\n\nI think, nevertheless, that one is justified in expressing oneself thus.\nI have tried to show that religious ideas have sprung from the same need\nas all the other achievements of culture: from the necessity for\ndefending itself against the crushing supremacy of nature. And there was\na second motive: the eager desire to correct the so painfully felt\nimperfections of culture. Moreover, there is something particularly\napposite in saying that culture gives the individual these ideas, for he\nfinds them at hand, they are presented to him ready-made; he would not\nbe in a position to find them by himself. It is the heritage of many\ngenerations which he enters into and which he takes over as he does the\nmultiplication table, geometry, etc. There is certainly a distinction in\nthis, but it lies elsewhere, and I cannot examine it at this point. The\nfeeling of strangeness that you mention may be partly accounted for by\nthe fact that this stock of religious ideas is generally offered as a\ndivine revelation. But that is in itself a part of the religious system,\nand entirely leaves out of account the known historical development of\nthese ideas and their variations in different ages and cultures.\n\n\u2018Another point which seems to me more important. You would derive the\nhumanization of nature from the desire to put an end to human perplexity\nand helplessness in the face of nature\u2019s dreaded forces, and from the\nnecessity for establishing relations with, and finally influencing,\nthese forces. But this explanation seems to be superfluous. For\nprimitive man has no choice, he has no other way of thinking. It is\nnatural to him, as if innate, to project his existence outwards into the\nworld, and to regard all events that come under his observation as the\nmanifestations of beings who fundamentally resemble himself. It is his\nonly method of comprehension. And it is by no means self-evident, on the\ncontrary it is a remarkable coincidence, that he should succeed in\nsatisfying one of his great wants by thus indulging his natural\ndisposition.\u2019\n\nI do not find that so striking. For do you suppose that men\u2019s\nthought-processes have no practical motives, that they are simply the\nexpression of a disinterested curiosity? That is surely very improbable.\nI believe, rather, that when he personifies the forces of nature man is\nonce again following an infantile prototype. He has learnt from the\npersons of his earliest environment that the way to influence them is to\nestablish a relationship with them, and so, later on, with the same end\nin view, he deals with everything that happens to him as he dealt with\nthose persons. Thus I do not contradict your descriptive observation; it\nis, in point of fact, natural to man to personify everything that he\nwishes to comprehend, in order that later he may control it\u2014the\npsychical subjugation as preparation for the physical\u2014but I provide in\naddition a motive and genesis for this peculiarity of human thought.\n\n\u2018And now yet a third point. You have dealt with the origin of religion\nonce before, in your book _Totem und Tabu_. But there it appears in a\ndifferent light. Everything is the son-father relationship; God is the\nexalted father, and the longing for the father is the root of the need\nfor religion. Since then, it seems, you have discovered the factor of\nhuman weakness and helplessness, to which indeed the chief part in the\nformation of religion is commonly assigned, and you now transfer to\nhelplessness everything that was formerly father complex. May I ask you\nto enlighten me on this transformation?\u2019\n\nWith pleasure. I was only waiting for this invitation. But is it really\na transformation? In _Totem und Tabu_ it was not my purpose to explain\nthe origin of religions, but only of totemism. Can you from any\nstandpoint known to you explain the fact that the first form in which\nthe protecting deity revealed itself to men was that of an animal, that\na prohibition existed against killing or eating this animal, and that\nyet it was the solemn custom to kill it and eat it communally once a\nyear? It is just this that takes place in totemism. And it is hardly to\nthe purpose to argue whether totemism should be called a religion. It\nhas intimate connections with the later god-religions; the totem animals\nbecome the sacred animals of the gods; and the earliest, and the most\nprofound, moral restrictions\u2014the murder prohibition and the incest\nprohibition\u2014originate in totemism. Whether or not you accept the\nconclusions of _Totem und Tabu_, I hope you will admit that in that book\na number of very remarkable isolated facts are brought together into a\nconsistent whole.\n\nWhy in the long run the animal god did not suffice and why it was\nreplaced by the human\u2014that was hardly discussed in _Totem und Tabu_, and\nother problems of the formation of religion find no mention there at\nall. But do you regard such a limitation as identical with a denial? My\nwork is a good example of the strict isolation of the share that\npsycho-analytic observation can contribute to the problem of religion.\nIf I am now trying to add to it the other, less deeply hidden, part, you\nshould not accuse me of inconsistency, just as before I was accused of\nbeing one-sided. It is of course my business to point out the connecting\nlinks between what I said before and what I now put forward, between the\ndeeper and the manifest motivation, between the father complex and man\u2019s\nhelplessness and need for protection.\n\nThese connections are not difficult to find. They consist in the\nrelation of the child\u2019s helplessness to the adult\u2019s continuation of it,\nso that, as was to be expected, the psycho-analytic motivation of the\nforming of religion turns out to be the infantile contribution to its\nmanifest motivation. Let us imagine to ourselves the mental life of the\nsmall child. You remember the object-choice after the anaclitic type,\nwhich psycho-analysis talks about? The libido follows the paths of\nnarcissistic needs, and attaches itself to the objects that ensure their\nsatisfaction. So the mother, who satisfies hunger, becomes the first\nlove-object, and certainly also the first protection against all the\nundefined and threatening dangers of the outer world; becomes, if we may\nso express it, the first protection against anxiety.\n\nIn this function the mother is soon replaced by the stronger father, and\nthis situation persists from now on over the whole of childhood. But the\nrelation to the father is affected by a peculiar ambivalence. He was\nhimself a danger, perhaps just because of that earlier relation to the\nmother; so he is feared no less than he is longed for and admired. The\nindications of this ambivalence are deeply imprinted in all religions,\nas is brought out in _Totem und Tabu_. Now when the child grows up and\nfinds that he is destined to remain a child for ever, and that he can\nnever do without protection against unknown and mighty powers, he\ninvests these with the traits of the father-figure; he creates for\nhimself the gods, of whom he is afraid, whom he seeks to propitiate, and\nto whom he nevertheless entrusts the task of protecting him. Thus the\nlonging-for-the-father explanation is identical with the other, the need\nfor protection against the consequences of human weakness; the child\u2019s\ndefensive reaction to his helplessness gives the characteristic features\nto the adult\u2019s reaction to his own sense of helplessness, _i.e_. the\nformation of religion. But it is not our intention to pursue further the\ndevelopment of the idea of God; we are concerned here with the matured\nstock of religious ideas as culture transmits them to the individual.\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER V\n\n\nNow to take up again the threads of our enquiry: what is the\npsychological significance of religious ideas and how can we classify\nthem? The question is at first not at all easy to answer. Having\nrejected various formulas, I shall take my stand by this one: religion\nconsists of certain dogmas, assertions about facts and conditions of\nexternal (or internal) reality, which tell one something that one has\nnot oneself discovered and which claim that one should give them\ncredence. As they give information about what are to us the most\ninteresting and important things in life, they are particularly highly\nvalued. He who knows nothing of them is ignorant indeed, and he who has\nassimilated them may consider himself enriched.\n\nThere are of course many such dogmas about the most diverse things of\nthis world. Every school hour is full of them. Let us choose geography.\nWe hear there: Konstanz is on the Bodensee. A student song adds: If you\ndon\u2019t believe it go and see. I happen to have been there, and can\nconfirm the fact that this beautiful town lies on the shore of a broad\nstretch of water, which all those dwelling around call the Bodensee. I\nam now completely convinced of the accuracy of this geographical\nstatement. And in this connection I am reminded of another and very\nremarkable experience. I was already a man of mature years when I stood\nfor the first time on the hill of the Athenian Acropolis, between the\ntemple ruins, looking out on to the blue sea. A feeling of astonishment\nmingled with my pleasure, which prompted me to say: then it really is\ntrue, what we used to be taught at school! How shallow and weak at that\nage must have been my belief in the real truth of what I heard if I can\nbe so astonished to-day! But I will not emphasize the significance of\nthis experience too much; yet another explanation of my astonishment is\npossible, which did not strike me at the time, and which is of a wholly\nsubjective nature and connected with the peculiar character of the\nplace.\n\nAll such dogmas as these, then, exact belief in their contents, but not\nwithout substantiating their title to this. They claim to be the\ncondensed result of a long process of thought, which is founded on\nobservation and also, certainly, on reasoning; they show how, if one so\nintends, one can go through this process oneself, instead of accepting\nthe result of it; and the source of the knowledge imparted by the dogma\nis always added, where it is not, as with geographical statements,\nself-evident. For instance: the earth is shaped like a globe; the proofs\nadduced for this are Foucault\u2019s pendulum experiment, the phenomena of\nthe horizon and the possibility of circumnavigating the earth. Since it\nis impracticable, as all concerned realize, to send every school child\non a voyage round the world, one is content that the school teaching\nshall be taken on trust, but one knows that the way to personal\nconviction is still open.\n\nLet us try to apply the same tests to the dogmas of religion. If we ask\non what their claim to be believed is based, we receive three answers,\nwhich accord remarkably ill with one another. They deserve to be\nbelieved: firstly, because our primal ancestors already believed them;\nsecondly, because we possess proofs, which have been handed down to us\nfrom this very period of antiquity; and thirdly, because it is forbidden\nto raise the question of their authenticity at all. Formerly this\npresumptuous act was visited with the very severest penalties, and even\nto-day society is unwilling to see anyone renew it.\n\nThis third point cannot but rouse our strongest suspicions. Such a\nprohibition can surely have only one motive: that society knows very\nwell the uncertain basis of the claim it makes for its religious\ndoctrines. If it were otherwise, the relevant material would certainly\nbe placed most readily at the disposal of anyone who wished to gain\nconviction for himself. And so we proceed to test the other two\narguments with a feeling of mistrust not easily allayed. We ought to\nbelieve because our forefathers believed. But these ancestors of ours\nwere far more ignorant than we; they believed in things we could not\npossibly accept to-day; so the possibility occurs that religious\ndoctrines may also be in this category. The proofs they have bequeathed\nto us are deposited in writings that themselves bear every trace of\nbeing untrustworthy. They are full of contradictions, revisions, and\ninterpolations; where they speak of actual authentic proofs they are\nthemselves of doubtful authenticity. It does not help much if divine\nrevelation is asserted to be the origin of their text or only of their\ncontent, for this assertion is itself already a part of those doctrines\nwhose authenticity is to be examined, and no statement can bear its own\nproof.\n\nThus we arrive at the singular conclusion that just what might be of the\ngreatest significance for us in our cultural system, the information\nwhich should solve for us the riddles of the universe and reconcile us\nto the troubles of life, that just this has the weakest possible claim\nto authenticity. We should not be able to bring ourselves to accept\nanything of as little concern to us as the fact that whales bear young\ninstead of laying eggs, if it were not capable of better proof than\nthis.\n\nThis state of things is in itself a very remarkable psychological\nproblem. Let no one think that the foregoing remarks on the\nimpossibility of proving religious doctrines contain anything new. It\nhas been felt at all times, assuredly even by the ancestors who\nbequeathed this legacy. Probably many of them nursed the same doubts as\nwe, but the pressure imposed on them was too strong for them to have\ndared to utter them. And since then countless people have been tortured\nby the same doubts, which they would fain have suppressed because they\nheld themselves in duty bound to believe, and since then many brilliant\nintellects have been wrecked upon this conflict and many characters have\ncome to grief through the compromises by which they sought a way out.\n\nIf all the arguments that are put forward for the authenticity of\nreligious doctrines originate in the past, it is natural to look round\nand see whether the present, better able to judge in these matters,\ncannot also furnish such evidence. The whole of the religious system\nwould become infinitely more credible if one could succeed in this way\nin removing the element of doubt from a single part of it. It is at this\npoint that the activity of the spiritualists comes in; they are\nconvinced of the immortality of the individual soul, and they would\ndemonstrate to us that this one article of religious teaching is free\nfrom doubt. Unfortunately they have not succeeded in disproving the fact\nthat the appearances and utterances of their spirits are merely the\nproductions of their own mental activity. They have called up the\nspirits of the greatest of men, of the most eminent thinkers, but all\ntheir utterances and all the information they have received from them\nhave been so foolish and so desperately insignificant that one could\nfind nothing else to believe in but the capacity of the spirits for\nadapting themselves to the circle of people that had evoked them.\n\nOne must now mention two attempts to evade the problem, which both\nconvey the impression of frantic effort. One of them, high-handed in its\nnature, is old; the other is subtle and modern. The first is the _Credo\nquia absurdum_ of the early Father. It would imply that religious\ndoctrines are outside reason\u2019s jurisdiction; they stand above reason.\nTheir truth must be inwardly felt: one does not need to comprehend them.\nBut this _Credo_ is only of interest as a voluntary confession; as a\ndecree it has no binding force. Am I to be obliged to believe every\nabsurdity? And if not, why just this one? There is no appeal beyond\nreason. And if the truth of religious doctrines is dependent on an inner\nexperience which bears witness to that truth, what is one to make of the\nmany people who do not have that rare experience? One may expect all men\nto use the gift of reason that they possess, but one cannot set up an\nobligation that shall apply to all on a basis that only exists for quite\na few. Of what significance is it for other people that you have won\nfrom a state of ecstasy, which has deeply moved you, an imperturbable\nconviction of the real truth of the doctrines of religion?\n\nThe second attempt is that of the philosophy of \u2018As If\u2019. It explains\nthat in our mental activity we assume all manner of things, the\ngroundlessness, indeed the absurdity, of which we fully realize. They\nare called \u2018fictions\u2019, but from a variety of practical motives we are\nled to behave \u2018as if\u2019 we believed in these fictions. This, it is argued,\nis the case with religious doctrines on account of their unequalled\nimportance for the maintenance of human society.[2] This argument is not\nfar removed from the _Credo quia absurdum_. But I think that the claim\nof the philosophy of \u2018As If\u2019 is such as only a philosopher could make.\nThe man whose thinking is not influenced by the wiles of philosophy will\nnever be able to accept it; with the confession of absurdity, of\nillogicality, there is no more to be said as far as he is concerned. He\ncannot be expected to forgo the guarantees he demands for all his usual\nactivities just in the matter of his most important interests. I am\nreminded of one of my children who was distinguished at an early age by\na peculiarly marked sense of reality. When the children were told a\nfairy tale, to which they listened with rapt attention, he would come\nforward and ask: Is that a true story? Having been told that it was not,\nhe would turn away with an air of disdain. It is to be expected that men\nwill soon behave in like manner towards the religious fairy tales,\ndespite the advocacy of the philosophy of \u2018As If\u2019.\n\nFootnote 2:\n\n  I hope I am not doing an injustice if I make the author of the\n  philosophy of \u2018As If\u2019 represent a point of view that is familiar to\n  other thinkers also. Cp. H. Vaihinger, _Die Philosophie des Als ob_,\n  Siebente und achte Auflage, 1922, S. 68: \u2018We include as fictions not\n  merely indifferent theoretical operations but ideational constructions\n  emanating from the noblest minds, to which the noblest part of mankind\n  cling and of which they will not allow themselves to be deprived. Nor\n  is it our object so to deprive them\u2014for as _practical fictions_ we\n  leave them all intact; they perish only as _theoretical truths_\u2019 (C.\n  K. Ogden\u2019s translation).\n\nBut at present they still behave quite differently, and in past ages, in\nspite of their incontrovertible lack of authenticity, religious ideas\nhave exercised the very strongest influence on mankind. This is a fresh\npsychological problem. We must ask where the inherent strength of these\ndoctrines lies and to what circumstance they owe their efficacy,\nindependent, as it is, of the acknowledgement of the reason.\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER VI\n\n\nI think we have sufficiently paved the way for the answer to both these\nquestions. It will be found if we fix our attention on the psychical\norigin of religious ideas. These, which profess to be dogmas, are not\nthe residue of experience or the final result of reflection; they are\nillusions, fulfilments of the oldest, strongest and most insistent\nwishes of mankind; the secret of their strength is the strength of these\nwishes. We know already that the terrifying effect of infantile\nhelplessness aroused the need for protection\u2014protection through\nlove\u2014which the father relieved, and that the discovery that this\nhelplessness would continue through the whole of life made it necessary\nto cling to the existence of a father\u2014but this time a more powerful one.\nThus the benevolent rule of divine providence allays our anxiety in face\nof life\u2019s dangers, the establishment of a moral world order ensures the\nfulfilment of the demands of justice, which within human culture have so\noften remained unfulfilled, and the prolongation of earthly existence by\na future life provides in addition the local and temporal setting for\nthese wish-fulfilments. Answers to the questions that tempt human\ncuriosity, such as the origin of the universe and the relation between\nthe body and the soul, are developed in accordance with the underlying\nassumptions of this system; it betokens a tremendous relief for the\nindividual psyche if it is released from the conflicts of childhood\narising out of the father complex, which are never wholly overcome, and\nif these conflicts are afforded a universally accepted solution.\n\nWhen I say that they are illusions, I must define the meaning of the\nword. An illusion is not the same as an error, it is indeed not\nnecessarily an error. Aristotle\u2019s belief that vermin are evolved out of\ndung, to which ignorant people still cling, was an error; so was the\nbelief of a former generation of doctors that _tabes dorsalis_ was the\nresult of sexual excess. It would be improper to call these errors\nillusions. On the other hand, it was an illusion on the part of Columbus\nthat he had discovered a new sea-route to India. The part played by his\nwish in this error is very clear. One may describe as an illusion the\nstatement of certain nationalists that the Indo-Germanic race is the\nonly one capable of culture, or the belief, which only psycho-analysis\ndestroyed, that the child is a being without sexuality. It is\ncharacteristic of the illusion that it is derived from men\u2019s wishes; in\nthis respect it approaches the psychiatric delusion, but it is to be\ndistinguished from this, quite apart from the more complicated structure\nof the latter. In the delusion we emphasize as essential the conflict\nwith reality; the illusion need not be necessarily false, that is to\nsay, unrealizable or incompatible with reality. For instance, a poor\ngirl may have an illusion that a prince will come and fetch her home. It\nis possible; some such cases have occurred. That the Messiah will come\nand found a golden age is much less probable; according to one\u2019s\npersonal attitude one will classify this belief as an illusion or as\nanalogous to a delusion. Examples of illusions that have come true are\nnot easy to discover, but the illusion of the alchemists that all metals\ncan be turned into gold may prove to be one. The desire to have lots of\ngold, as much gold as possible, has been considerably damped by our\nmodern insight into the nature of wealth, yet chemistry no longer\nconsiders a transmutation of metals into gold as impossible. Thus we\ncall a belief an illusion when wish-fulfilment is a prominent factor in\nits motivation, while disregarding its relations to reality, just as the\nillusion itself does.\n\nIf after this survey we turn again to religious doctrines, we may\nreiterate that they are all illusions, they do not admit of proof, and\nno one can be compelled to consider them as true or to believe in them.\nSome of them are so improbable, so very incompatible with everything we\nhave laboriously discovered about the reality of the world, that we may\ncompare them\u2014taking adequately into account the psychological\ndifferences\u2014to delusions. Of the reality value of most of them we cannot\njudge; just as they cannot be proved, neither can they be refuted. We\nstill know too little to approach them critically. The riddles of the\nuniverse only reveal themselves slowly to our enquiry, to many questions\nscience can as yet give no answer; but scientific work is our only way\nto the knowledge of external reality. Again, it is merely illusion to\nexpect anything from intuition or trance; they can give us nothing but\nparticulars, which are difficult to interpret, about our own mental\nlife, never information about the questions that are so lightly answered\nby the doctrines of religion. It would be wanton to let one\u2019s own\narbitrary action fill the gap, and according to one\u2019s personal estimate\ndeclare this or that part of the religious system to be more or less\nacceptable. These questions are too momentous for that; too sacred, one\nmight say.\n\nAt this point it may be objected: well, then, if even the crabbed\nsceptics admit that the statements of religion cannot be confuted by\nreason, why should not I believe in them, since they have so much on\ntheir side\u2014tradition, the concurrence of mankind, and all the\nconsolation they yield? Yes, why not? Just as no one can be forced into\nbelief, so no one can be forced into unbelief. But do not deceive\nyourself into thinking that with such arguments you are following the\npath of correct reasoning. If ever there was a case of facile argument,\nthis is one. Ignorance is ignorance; no right to believe anything is\nderived from it. No reasonable man will behave so frivolously in other\nmatters or rest content with such feeble grounds for his opinions or for\nthe attitude he adopts; it is only in the highest and holiest things\nthat he allows this. In reality these are only attempts to delude\noneself or other people into the belief that one still holds fast to\nreligion, when one has long cut oneself loose from it. Where questions\nof religion are concerned people are guilty of every possible kind of\ninsincerity and intellectual misdemeanour. Philosophers stretch the\nmeaning of words until they retain scarcely anything of their original\nsense; by calling \u2018God\u2019 some vague abstraction which they have created\nfor themselves, they pose as deists, as believers, before the world;\nthey may even pride themselves on having attained a higher and purer\nidea of God, although their God is nothing but an insubstantial shadow\nand no longer the mighty personality of religious doctrine. Critics\npersist in calling \u2018deeply religious\u2019 a person who confesses to a sense\nof man\u2019s insignificance and impotence in face of the universe, although\nit is not this feeling that constitutes the essence of religious\nemotion, but rather the next step, the reaction to it, which seeks a\nremedy against this feeling. He who goes no further, he who humbly\nacquiesces in the insignificant part man plays in the universe, is, on\nthe contrary, irreligious in the truest sense of the word.\n\nIt does not lie within the scope of this enquiry to estimate the value\nof religious doctrines as truth. It suffices that we have recognized\nthem, psychologically considered, as illusions. But we need not conceal\nthe fact that this discovery strongly influences our attitude to what\nmust appear to many the most important of questions. We know\napproximately at what periods and by what sort of men religious\ndoctrines were formed. If we now learn from what motives this happened,\nour attitude to the problem of religion will suffer an appreciable\nchange. We say to ourselves: it would indeed be very nice if there were\na God, who was both creator of the world and a benevolent providence, if\nthere were a moral world order and a future life, but at the same time\nit is very odd that this is all just as we should wish it ourselves. And\nit would be still odder if our poor, ignorant, enslaved ancestors had\nsucceeded in solving all these difficult riddles of the universe.\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER VII\n\n\nHaving recognized religious doctrines to be illusions, we are at once\nconfronted with the further question: may not other cultural\npossessions, which we esteem highly and by which we let our life be\nruled, be of a similar nature? Should not the assumptions that regulate\nour political institutions likewise be called illusions, and is it not\nthe case that in our culture the relations between the sexes are\ndisturbed by an erotic illusion, or by a series of erotic illusions?\nOnce our suspicions have been roused, we shall not shrink from asking\nwhether there is any better foundation for our conviction that it is\npossible to discover something about external reality through the\napplying of observation and reasoning in scientific work. Nothing need\nkeep us from applying observation to our own natures or submitting the\nprocess of reasoning to its own criticism. Here a series of enquiries\npresent themselves, which in their result should be of decisive\nimportance for constructing a \u2018Weltanschauung\u2019. We surmise, too, that\nsuch an endeavour would not be wasted, and that it would at least\npartially justify our suspicions. But the author of these pages has not\nthe means to undertake so comprehensive a task; forced by necessity, he\nconfines his work to the pursuit of a single one of these illusions,\nthat is, the religious.\n\nBut now the loud voice of our opponent bids us to stop. We are called to\naccount for our transgressions.\n\n\u2018Arch\u00e6ological interests are no doubt most praiseworthy, but one does\nnot set about an excavation if one is thereby going to undermine\noccupied dwelling-places so that they collapse and bury the inhabitants\nunder their ruins. The doctrines of religion are not a subject that one\ncan be clever about, as one can about any other. Our culture is built up\non them; the preservation of human society rests on the assumption that\nthe majority of mankind believe in the truth of these doctrines. If they\nare taught that there is no almighty and all just God, no divine world\norder, and no future life, then they will feel exempt from all\nobligation to follow the rules of culture. Uninhibited and free from\nfear, everybody will follow his asocial, egoistic instincts, and will\nseek to prove his power. Chaos, which we have banished through thousands\nof years of the work of civilization, will begin again. Even if one\nknew, and could prove, that religion was not in possession of the truth,\none should conceal the fact and behave as the philosophy of \u201cAs If\u201d\ndemands\u2014and this in the interests of the preservation of everybody. And\napart from the danger of the undertaking, it is also a purposeless\ncruelty. Countless people find their one consolation in the doctrines of\nreligion, and only with their help can they endure life. You would rob\nthem of what supports them, and yet you have nothing better to give them\nin exchange. It has been admitted that so far science has not achieved\nmuch, but even if it had advanced far further, it would not suffice for\nmen. Man has yet other imperative needs, which can never be satisfied by\ncold science, and it is very strange\u2014to be frank, it is the acme of\ninconsistency\u2014that a psychologist who has always emphasized how much in\nmen\u2019s lives the intelligence retreats before the life of the instincts\nshould now strive to rob men of a precious wish-satisfaction, and should\nwant to give them in exchange a compensation of an intellectual nature.\u2019\n\nWhat a number of accusations all at once! However, I am prepared to deny\nthem all; and what is more, I am prepared to defend the statement that\nculture incurs a greater danger by maintaining its present attitude to\nreligion than by relinquishing it. But I hardly know where to begin my\nreply.\n\nPerhaps with the assurance that I myself consider my undertaking to be\ncompletely harmless and free from danger. This time the overestimation\nof the intellect is not on my side. If men are such as my opponents\ndescribe them\u2014and I have no wish to contradict it\u2014then there is no\ndanger of a devout believer, overwhelmed by my arguments, being deprived\nof his faith. Besides, I have said nothing that other and better men\nhave not said before me in a much more complete, forcible and impressive\nway. The names of these men are well known. I shall not quote them. I\nshould not like to give the impression that I would count myself of\ntheir number. I have merely\u2014this is the only thing that is new in my\nstatement\u2014added a certain psychological foundation to the critique of my\ngreat predecessors. It is hardly to be expected that just this addition\nwill produce the effect that was denied to the earlier attempts.\nCertainly I might be asked at this point why I write such things if I am\nconvinced of their ineffectiveness. But we shall come back to that\nlater.\n\nThe one person this publication may harm is myself. I shall have to\nlisten to the most unpleasant reproaches on the score of shallowness,\nnarrow-mindedness, and lack of idealism and of understanding for the\nhighest interests of mankind. But on the one hand these remonstrances\nare not new to me; and on the other hand, if a man has even in his early\nyears learnt to face the displeasure of his contemporaries, what effect\nthen can it have on him in his old age, when he is certain to be soon\nbeyond the reach of all favour or disfavour? In former times it was\ndifferent. Then utterances such as these brought with them a sure\nforeshortening of one\u2019s earthly existence and a speedy approach of the\nopportunity to gain personal experience of the next life. But, I repeat,\nthose times are over, and to-day such things can be written without\nendangering even the author; the most that can happen will be that in\nthis or that country the translation and the circulation of his book\nwill be forbidden\u2014and naturally this will happen just in that country\nwhich feels certain of the high standard of its culture. But one must be\nable to put up with this also, if one makes any plea for\nwish-renunciation or for acquiescence in fate.\n\nAnd then it occurred to me to ask whether the publication of this work\nmight not do some harm after all\u2014not indeed to a person, but to a cause:\nthe cause of psycho-analysis. For it cannot be denied that this is my\ncreation, and that an abundance of distrust and ill-will has been shown\nto it. If I now come forward with such displeasing statements, people\nwill be only too ready to displace their feelings from my person on to\npsycho-analysis. Now one can see, it will be said, where psycho-analysis\nleads to. The mask is fallen; it leads to the denial of God and of an\nethical ideal, as indeed we have always supposed. To keep us from the\ndiscovery, we have been made to believe that psycho-analysis neither\nhas, nor can have, a philosophical standpoint.\n\nThis pother will be really disagreeable to me on account of my many\nfellow-workers, several of whom do not at all share my attitude to\nreligious problems. However, psycho-analysis has already braved many\nstorms, and it must face this new one also. In reality psycho-analysis\nis a method of investigation, an impartial instrument like, say, the\ninfinitesimal calculus. Even if a physicist should discover with the\nhelp of the latter that after a certain period the earth will be\ndestroyed, one would still hesitate to impute destructive tendencies to\nthe calculus itself, and to proscribe it on that account. Nothing that I\nhave said here against the truth-value of religion needed the support of\npsycho-analysis; it had been said by others long before psycho-analysis\ncame into existence. If one can find a new argument against the truth of\nreligion by applying the psycho-analytic method, so much the worse for\nreligion, but the defenders of religion will with equal right avail\nthemselves of psycho-analysis in order to appreciate to the full the\naffective significance of religious doctrines.\n\nAnd now to proceed with the defence: clearly religion has performed\ngreat services for human culture. It has contributed much toward\nrestraining the asocial instincts, but still not enough. For many\nthousands of years it has ruled human society; it has had time to show\nwhat it can achieve. If it had succeeded in making happy the greater\npart of mankind, in consoling them, in reconciling them to life, and in\nmaking them into supporters of civilization, then no one would dream of\nstriving to alter existing conditions. But instead of this what do we\nsee? We see that an appallingly large number of men are discontented\nwith civilization and unhappy in it, and feel it as a yoke that must be\nshaken off; that these men either do everything in their power to alter\nthis civilization, or else go so far in their hostility to it that they\nwill have nothing whatever to do either with civilization or with\nrestraining their instincts. At this point it will be objected that this\nstate of affairs is due to the very fact that religion has forfeited a\npart of its influence on the masses, just because of the deplorable\neffect of the advances in science. We shall note this admission and the\nreasons given for it, and shall make use of it later for our own\npurposes; but the objection itself has no force.\n\nIt is doubtful whether men were in general happier at a time when\nreligious doctrines held unlimited sway than they are now; more moral\nthey certainly were not. They have always understood how to externalize\nreligious precepts, thereby frustrating their intentions. And the\npriests, who had to enforce religious obedience, met them half-way.\nGod\u2019s kindness must lay a restraining hand upon his justice. One sinned,\nand then one made oblation or did penance, and then one was free to sin\nanew. Russian mysticism has come to the sublime conclusion that sin is\nindispensable for the full enjoyment of the blessings of divine grace,\nand therefore, fundamentally, it is pleasing to God. It is well known\nthat the priests could only keep the masses submissive to religion by\nmaking these great concessions to human instincts. And so it was\nsettled: God alone is strong and good, man is weak and sinful.\nImmorality, no less than morality, has at all times found support in\nreligion. If the achievements of religion in promoting men\u2019s happiness,\nin adapting them to civilization, and in controlling them morally, are\nno better, then the question arises whether we are right in considering\nit necessary for mankind, and whether we do wisely in basing the demands\nof our culture upon it.\n\nLet us consider the unmistakable character of the present situation. We\nhave heard the admission that religion no longer has the same influence\non men that it used to have (we are concerned here with European\nChristian culture). And this, not because its promises have become\nsmaller, but because they appear less credible to people. Let us admit\nthat the reason\u2014perhaps not the only one\u2014for this change is the increase\nof the scientific spirit in the higher strata of human society.\nCriticism has nibbled at the authenticity of religious documents,\nnatural science has shown up the errors contained in them, and the\ncomparative method of research has revealed the fatal resemblance\nbetween religious ideas revered by us and the mental productions of\nprimitive ages and peoples.\n\nThe scientific spirit engenders a particular attitude to the problems of\nthis world; before the problems of religion it halts for a while, then\nwavers, and finally here too steps over the threshold. In this process\nthere is no stopping. The more the fruits of knowledge become accessible\nto men, the more widespread is the decline of religious belief, at first\nonly of the obsolete and objectionable expressions of the same, then of\nits fundamental assumptions, also. The Americans who instituted the\nmonkey trial in Dayton have alone proved consistent. Elsewhere the\ninevitable transition is accomplished by way of half-measures and\ninsincerities.\n\nCulture has little to fear from the educated or from the brain workers.\nIn their case religious motives for civilized behaviour would be\nunobtrusively replaced by other and secular ones; besides, for the most\npart they are themselves supporters of culture. But it is another matter\nwith the great mass of the uneducated and suppressed, who have every\nreason to be enemies of culture. So long as they do not discover that\npeople no longer believe in God, all is well. But they discover it,\ninfallibly, and would do so even if this work of mine were not\npublished. They are ready to accept the results of scientific thought,\nwithout having effected in themselves the process of change which\nscientific thought induces in men. Is there not a danger that these\nmasses, in their hostility to culture, will attack the weak point which\nthey have discovered in their taskmaster? If you must not kill your\nneighbour, solely because God has forbidden it and will sorely avenge it\nin this or the other life, and you then discover that there is no God so\nthat one need not fear his punishment, then you will certainly kill\nwithout hesitation, and you could only be prevented from this by mundane\nforce. And so follows the necessity for either the most rigorous\nsuppression of these dangerous masses and the most careful exclusion of\nall opportunities for mental awakening or a fundamental revision of the\nrelation between culture and religion.\n\n\n\n\n                              CHAPTER VIII\n\n\nOne would suppose that this last proposal could be carried out without\nany special difficulty. It is true that it would involve some measure of\nrenunciation, but one would gain, perhaps, more than one lost, and a\ngreat danger would be avoided. But people have a horror of it, as if\ncivilization would thereby be exposed to an even greater danger. When\nSaint Boniface felled the tree which was venerated as sacred by the\nSaxons, those who stood round expected some fearful event to follow the\noutrage. It did not happen, and the Saxons were baptized.\n\nIt is manifestly in the interest of man\u2019s communal existence, which\nwould not otherwise be practicable, that civilization has laid down the\ncommandment that one shall not kill the neighbour whom one hates, who is\nin one\u2019s way, or whose property one covets. For the murderer would draw\non to himself the vengeance of the murdered man\u2019s kinsmen and the secret\nenvy of the others who feel as much inward inclination as he did to such\nan act of violence. Thus he would not enjoy his revenge or his spoil for\nlong, but would have every prospect of being killed soon himself. Even\nif he could defend himself against single foes by his extraordinary\nstrength and caution, he would be bound to succumb to a combination of\nthese weaker foes. If a combination of this sort did not take place,\nthen murder would continue ceaselessly, and the end of it would be that\nmen would exterminate one another. It would be the same state of affairs\namong individuals that still prevails in Corsica among families, but\notherwise survives only among nations. Insecurity of life, an equal\ndanger for all, now unites men into one society, which forbids the\nindividual to kill and reserves to itself the right to kill in the name\nof society the man who violates this prohibition. This, then, is justice\nand punishment.\n\nWe do not, however, tell others of this rational basis for the murder\nprohibition; we declare, on the contrary, that God is its author. Thus,\nmaking bold to divine his intentions, we find that he has no wish,\neither, for men to exterminate each other. By acting thus we invest the\ncultural prohibition with a quite peculiar solemnity, but at the same\ntime we risk making its observance dependent on belief in God. If we\nretract this step, no longer saddling God with our own wishes, and\ncontent ourselves with the social justification for the cultural\nprohibition, then we renounce, it is true, its hallowed nature, but we\nalso avoid endangering its existence. And we gain something else as\nwell. Through some kind of diffusion or infection the character of\nsanctity and inviolability, of other-worldliness, one might say, has\nbeen extended from some few important prohibitions to all other cultural\ninstitutions and laws and ordinances. And often the halo becomes these\nnone too well; not only do they invalidate each other by making\nconflicting decisions according to the time and place of their origin;\neven apart from this they betray every sign of human inadequacy. One can\neasily recognize among them things which can only be the product of\nshortsightedness and apprehensiveness, the expression of narrow\ninterests, or the result of inadequate hypotheses. The criticism to\nwhich one must subject them also diminishes to an unwelcome extent\npeople\u2019s respect for other and more justified cultural demands. As it is\na delicate task to decide what God has himself ordained and what derives\nrather from the authority of an allpowerful parliament or a supreme\njudicial decision, it would be an indubitable advantage to leave God out\nof the question altogether, and to admit honestly the purely human\norigin of all cultural laws and institutions. Along with their\npretensions to sanctity the rigid and immutable nature of these laws and\nregulations would also cease. Men would realize that these have been\nmade, not so much to rule them, as, on the contrary, to serve their\ninterests; they would acquire a more friendly attitude to them, and\ninstead of aiming at their abolition they would aim only at improving\nthem. This would be an important advance on the road which leads to\nreconciliation with the burden of culture.\n\nBut here our plea for a purely rational basis for cultural laws, that is\nto say, for deriving them from social necessity, is interrupted by a\nsudden doubt. We have chosen as our example the origin of the murder\nprohibition. But does our account of it correspond to historical truth?\nWe fear not; it appears to be merely a rationalistic construction. With\nthe help of psycho-analysis we have studied this very point in the\nhistory of human culture, and supported by this study we are bound to\nsay that in reality it did not happen like this. Even in men to-day\npurely reasonable motives are of little avail against passionate\nimpulses. How much weaker, then, must they have been in the primordial\nanimal man! Perhaps even now his descendants would still kill one\nanother without inhibition, if there had not been among those acts of\nmurder one\u2014the slaughter of the primal father\u2014which evoked an\nirresistible emotional reaction, momentous in its consequences. From it\narose the commandment: thou shalt not kill, which in totemism was\nconfined to the father-substitute, and was later extended to others, but\nwhich even to-day is not universally observed.\n\nBut according to arguments which I need not repeat here, that primal\nfather has been the prototype of God, the model after which later\ngenerations have formed their figure of God. Hence the religious\nexplanation is right. God was actually concerned in the origin of that\nprohibition; his influence, not insight into what was necessary for\nsociety, brought it into being. And the process of attributing man\u2019s\nwill to God is fully justified; for men, knowing that they had brutally\nset aside the father, determined, in the reaction to their outrage, to\nrespect his will in future. And so the religious doctrine does give us\nthe historical truth, though of course in a somewhat remodelled and\ndisguised form; our rational explanation belies it.\n\nWe now observe that the stock of religious ideas contains not only\nwish-fulfilments, but also important historical memories. What\nmatchless, what abundant power this combination of past and present must\ngive to religion! But with the help of an analogy we may perhaps feel\nour way towards another view of the problem. It is not a good thing to\ntransplant ideas far away from the soil in which they grew, but we\ncannot resist pointing out the resemblance which forms this analogy. We\nknow that the human child cannot well complete its development towards\nculture without passing through a more or less distinct phase of\nneurosis. This is because the child is unable to suppress by rational\nmental effort so many of those instinctual impulsions which cannot later\nbe turned to account, but has to check them by acts of repression,\nbehind which there stands as a rule an anxiety motive. Most of these\nchild neuroses are overcome spontaneously as one grows up, and\nespecially is this the fate of the obsessional neuroses of childhood.\nThe remainder can be cleared up still later by psycho-analytic\ntreatment. In just the same way one might assume that in its development\nthrough the ages mankind as a whole experiences conditions that are\nanalogous to the neuroses, and this for the same reasons, because in the\nages of its ignorance and intellectual weakness it achieved by purely\naffective means the instinctual renunciations, indispensable for man\u2019s\ncommunal existence. And the residue of these repression-like processes,\nwhich took place in antiquity, has long clung on to civilization. Thus\nreligion would be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity. It,\nlike the child\u2019s, originated in the Oedipus complex, the relation to the\nfather. According to this conception one might prophesy that the\nabandoning of religion must take place with the fateful inexorability of\na process of growth, and that we are just now in the middle of this\nphase of development.\n\nSo we should form our behaviour after the model of a sensible teacher,\nwho does not oppose the new development confronting him, but seeks to\nfurther it and to temper the force of its onset. To be sure this analogy\ndoes not exhaust the essence of religion. If on the one hand religion\nbrings with it obsessional limitation, which can only be compared to an\nindividual obsessional neurosis, it comprises on the other hand a system\nof wish-illusions, incompatible with reality, such as we find in an\nisolated form only in Meynert\u2019s amentia, a state of blissful\nhallucinatory confusion. But these are only just comparisons, with whose\nhelp we can endeavour to understand social phenomena; individual\npsychology supplies us with no exact counterpart.\n\nIt has been shown repeatedly (by myself, and particularly by Theodor\nReik) into what details the analogy of religion and the obsessional\nneurosis may be pursued, how much of the vicissitudes and peculiarities\nof the formation of religion may be understood in this way. And it\naccords well with this that the true believer is in a high degree\nprotected against the danger of certain neurotic afflictions; by\naccepting the universal neurosis he is spared the task of forming a\npersonal neurosis.\n\nOur knowledge of the historical value of certain religious doctrines\nincreases our respect for them, but it does not invalidate our proposal\nto exclude them from the motivation of cultural laws. On the contrary!\nThis historical residue has given us the conception of religious dogmas\nas, so to speak, neurotic survivals, and now we may say that the time\nhas probably come to replace the consequences of repression by the\nresults of rational mental effort, as in the analytic treatment of\nneurotics. One may prophesy, but hardly regret, that this process of\nremodelling will not stop at dispelling the solemn air of sanctity\nsurrounding the cultural laws, but that a general revision of these must\ninvolve the abolition of many of them. And this will go far to solve our\nappointed problem of reconciling men to civilization. We need not regret\nthe loss of historical truth involved in accepting the rational\nmotivation of cultural laws. The truths contained in religious doctrines\nare after all so distorted and systematically disguised that the mass of\nmankind cannot recognize them as truth. It is an instance of the same\nthing when we tell the child that new-born babies are brought by the\nstork. Here, too, we tell the truth in symbolic guise, for we know what\nthat large bird signifies. But the child does not know it; he hears only\nthe distortion, and feels that he has been deceived; and we know how\noften his refractoriness and his distrust of the grown-ups gets bound up\nwith this impression. We have come to the conclusion that it is better\nto avoid such symbolic disguisings of the truth, and to allow the child\nknowledge of the real state of affairs in a way suitable for his stage\nof intellectual development.\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER IX\n\n\n\u2018You allow yourself contradictions which are hard to reconcile with one\nanother. First you declare that a work like yours is quite harmless; no\none will let himself be robbed of his religious faith through such\ndiscussions. But since, as became evident later, it is your aim to\ndisturb this faith, one may ask: why in fact do you publish it? At\nanother point, however, you admit that it might be dangerous, indeed\nvery dangerous, for a man to discover that people no longer believe in\nGod. Docile though he had been hitherto, now he would throw off all\nallegiance to the laws of culture. Your whole argument that the\nreligious motivation of the cultural commandments signifies a danger for\nculture rests, in fact, on the assumption that the believer can be made\ninto an unbeliever. But that is a complete contradiction.\n\n\u2018And here is another contradiction: you admit on the one hand that man\nwill not be guided by intelligence; he is ruled by his passions and by\nthe claims of his instincts; but on the other hand you propose to\nreplace the affective basis of his allegiance to culture by a rational\none. Let who can understand this. To me it seems a case of either the\none or the other.\n\n\u2018Besides, have you learnt nothing from history? Once before such an\nattempt to substitute reason for religion was made, officially and in\nthe grand manner. Surely you remember the French Revolution and\nRobespierre, and also how short-lived and how deplorably ineffectual the\nexperiment? It is being repeated in Russia at present, and we need not\nbe curious about the result. Do you not think we may assume that man\ncannot do without religion?\n\n\u2018You have said yourself that religion is more than an obsessional\nneurosis. But you have not dealt with this other aspect of it. You are\ncontent to work out the analogy with the neurosis. Men must be freed\nfrom a neurosis. What else is lost in the process does not trouble you.\u2019\n\nProbably these apparent contradictions have arisen because I have been\ndealing too hastily with complicated matters, but we can make up for\nthis to some extent. I still maintain that in one respect my work is\nquite harmless. No believer will let himself be led astray by these or\nby similar arguments. A believer has certain ties of affection binding\nhim to the substance of religion. There are certainly a vast number of\nother people who are not religious in the same sense. They obey the laws\nof civilization because they are intimidated by the threats of religion,\nand they fear religion so long as they consider it as a part of the\nreality that restricts them. These are the people who break free as soon\nas they dare to give up their belief in its reality value; but arguments\nhave no effect on them either. They cease to fear religion when they\nfind that others do not fear it, and of these I have asserted that they\nwould learn of the decline of religious influence even if I did not\npublish my work.\n\nBut I suppose you yourself attach more value to the other contradiction\nwith which you tax me. Since men are so slightly amenable to reasonable\narguments, so completely are they ruled by their instinctual wishes, why\nshould one want to take away from them a means of satisfying their\ninstincts and replace it by reasonable arguments? Certainly men are like\nthis, but have you asked yourself whether they need be so, whether their\ninmost nature necessitates it? Can an anthropologist give the cranial\nindex of a people whose custom it is to deform their children\u2019s heads by\nbandaging them from their earliest years? Think of the distressing\ncontrast between the radiant intelligence of a healthy child and the\nfeeble mentality of the average adult. Is it so utterly impossible that\nit is just religious up-bringing which is largely to blame for this\nrelative degeneration? I think it would be a very long time before a\nchild who was not influenced began to trouble himself about God and the\nthings beyond this world. Perhaps his thoughts on these matters would\nthen take the same course as they did with his ancestors; but we do not\nwait for this development; we introduce him to the doctrines of religion\nat a time when he is neither interested in them nor capable of grasping\ntheir import. Is it not true that the two main points in the modern\neducational programme are the retardation of sexual development and the\nearly application of religious influence? So when the child\u2019s mind\nawakens, the doctrines of religion are already unassailable. But do you\nsuppose that it is particularly conducive to the strengthening of the\nmental function that so important a sphere should be closed to it by the\nmenace of hell pains? We need not be greatly surprised at the feeble\nmentality of the man who has once brought himself to accept without\ncriticism all the absurdities that religious doctrines repeat to him,\nand even to overlook the contradictions between them. Now we have no\nother means of controlling our instincts than our intelligence. And how\ncan we expect people who are dominated by thought-prohibitions to attain\nthe psychological ideal, the primacy of the intelligence? You know too\nthat women in general are said to suffer from so-called \u2018physiological\nweak-mindedness\u2019, _i.e._ a poorer intelligence than the man\u2019s. The fact\nitself is disputable, its interpretation doubtful; but it has been\nargued for the secondary nature of this intellectual degeneration that\nwomen labour under the harshness of the early prohibition, which\nprevented them from applying their mind to what would have interested\nthem most, that is to say, to the problems of sexual life. So long as a\nman\u2019s early years are influenced by the religious thought-inhibition and\nby the loyal one derived from it, as well as by the sexual one, we\ncannot really say what he is actually like.\n\nBut I will curb my ardour and admit the possibility that I too am\nchasing after an illusion. Perhaps the effect of the religious\nthought-prohibition is not as bad as I assume, perhaps it will turn out\nthat human nature remains the same even if education is not abused by\nbeing subjected to religion. I do not know, and you cannot know either.\nIt is not only the great problems of this life that seem at present\ninsoluble; there are many smaller questions also that are hard to\ndecide. But you must admit that there is here the justification for a\nhope for the future, that perhaps we may dig up a treasure which can\nenrich culture, and that it is worth while to make the experiment of a\nnon-religious education. Should it prove unsatisfactory, I am ready to\ngive up the reform and to return to the earlier, purely descriptive\njudgement: man is a creature of weak intelligence who is governed by his\ninstinctual wishes.\n\nThere is another point in which I wholeheartedly agree with you. It is,\nto be sure, a senseless proceeding to try and do away with religion by\nforce and at one blow\u2014more especially as it is a hopeless one. The\nbeliever will not let his faith be taken from him, neither by arguments\nnor by prohibitions. And even if it did succeed with some, it would be a\ncruel thing to do. A man who has for decades taken a sleeping draught is\nnaturally unable to sleep if he is deprived of it. That the effect of\nthe consolations of religion may be compared to that of a narcotic is\nprettily illustrated by what is happening in America. There they are now\ntrying\u2014plainly under the influence of petticoat government\u2014to deprive\nmen of all stimulants, intoxicants and luxuries,[3] and to satiate them\nwith piety by way of compensation. This is another experiment about the\nresult of which we need not be curious.\n\nFootnote 3:\n\n  _I.e._ tea, alcohol, and tobacco.\n\nAnd so I disagree with you when you go on to argue that man cannot in\ngeneral do without the consolation of the religious illusion, that\nwithout it he would not endure the troubles of life, the cruelty of\nreality. Certainly this is true of the man into whom you have instilled\nthe sweet\u2014or bitter-sweet\u2014poison from childhood on. But what of the\nother, who has been brought up soberly? Perhaps he, not suffering from\nneurosis, will need no intoxicant to deaden it. True, man will then find\nhimself in a difficult situation. He will have to confess his utter\nhelplessness and his insignificant part in the working of the universe;\nhe will have to confess that he is no longer the centre of creation, no\nlonger the object of the tender care of a benevolent providence. He will\nbe in the same position as the child who has left the home where he was\nso warm and comfortable. But, after all, is it not the destiny of\nchildishness to be overcome? Man cannot remain a child for ever; he must\nventure at last into the hostile world. This may be called \u2018_education\nto reality_\u2019; need I tell you that it is the sole aim of my book to draw\nattention to the necessity for this advance?\n\nYou fear, probably, that he will not stand the test? Well, anyhow, let\nus be hopeful. It is at least something to know that one is thrown on\none\u2019s own resources. One learns then to use them properly. And man is\nnot entirely without means of assistance; since the time of the deluge\nscience has taught him much, and it will still further increase his\npower. And as for the great necessities of fate, against which there is\nno remedy, these he will simply learn to endure with resignation. Of\nwhat use to him is the illusion of a kingdom on the moon, whose revenues\nhave never yet been seen by anyone? As an honest crofter on this earth\nhe will know how to cultivate his plot in a way that will support him.\nThus by withdrawing his expectations from the other world and\nconcentrating all his liberated energies on this earthly life he will\nprobably attain to a state of things in which life will be tolerable for\nall and no one will be oppressed by culture any more. Then with one of\nour comrades in unbelief he will be able to say without regret:\n\n                        Let us leave the heavens\n                    To the angels and the sparrows.\n\n\n\n\n                               CHAPTER X\n\n\n\u2018That does sound splendid. A race of men that has renounced all\nillusions and has thus become capable of making its existence on the\nearth a tolerable one! But I cannot share your expectations. And this,\nnot because I am the pig-headed reactionary you perhaps take me for. No;\nit is because I am a sensible person. It seems to me that we have now\nexchanged r\u00f4les; you prove to be the enthusiast, who allows himself to\nbe carried away by illusions, and I represent the claims of reason, the\nright to be sceptical. What you have just stated seems to me to be\nfounded on errors, which after your precedent I may call illusions\nbecause they betray clearly enough the influence of your wishes. You\nindulge in the hope that generations which have not experienced the\ninfluence of religious teaching in early childhood will easily attain\nthe wished-for primacy of the intelligence over the life of the\ninstincts. That is surely an illusion; in this decisive point human\nnature is hardly likely to alter. If I am not mistaken\u2014one knows so\nlittle of other civilizations\u2014there are even to-day peoples who do not\ngrow up under the pressure of a religious system, and they come no\nnearer your ideal than the others. If you wish to expel religion from\nour European civilization you can only do it through another system of\ndoctrines, and from the outset this would take over all the\npsychological characteristics of religion, the same sanctity, rigidity\nand intolerance, the same prohibition of thought in self-defence.\nSomething of this sort you must have in justice to the requirements of\neducation. For you cannot do without education. The way from sucking\nchild to civilized man is a long one; too many young people would go\nastray and fail to arrive at their life tasks in due time if they were\nleft without guidance to their own development. The doctrines made use\nof in their education will always confine the thought of their riper\nyears, exactly as you reproach religion with doing to-day. Do you not\nobserve that it is the ineradicable natural defect of our, of every,\nculture that it imposes on the child, governed by his instincts and\nintellectually weak, the making of decisions to which only the matured\nintelligence of the grown-up can do justice? But owing to the fact that\nmankind\u2019s development through the ages is concentrated into a few years\nof childhood culture cannot do otherwise, and it is only by affective\ninfluence that the child can be induced to accomplish the task assigned\nto it. And so this is the outlook for your \u201cprimacy of the intellect\u201d.\n\n\u2018And now you should not be surprised if I intervene on behalf of\nretaining the religious system of teaching as the basis of education and\nof man\u2019s communal life. It is a practical problem, not a question of\nreality value. Since we cannot, for the sake of the preservation of our\nculture, postpone influencing the individual until he has become ready\nfor culture\u2014many would never be so anyhow\u2014and since we are obliged to\npress some system of teaching on the growing child which shall have the\neffect on him of a postulate that does not admit of criticism, it seems\nto me that the religious system is by far the most suitable for the\npurpose; of course just on account of that quality\u2014its power for\nwish-fulfilment and consolation\u2014by which you claim to have recognized it\nas an \u201cillusion\u201d. In face of the difficulty of discovering anything\nabout reality, indeed the doubt whether this is possible for us at all,\nwe must not overlook the fact that human needs are also a part, and\nindeed an important part, of reality, and one that concerns us\nparticularly closely.\n\n\u2018I find another advantage of religious doctrine in one of its\npeculiarities, to which you seem to take particular exception. It admits\nof an ideational refinement and sublimation, by which it can be divested\nof most of those traces of a primitive and infantile way of thinking\nwhich it bears. What is then left is a body of ideas which science no\nlonger contradicts and which it cannot disprove. These modifications of\nreligious doctrine, which you have condemned as half-measures and\ncompromises, make it possible to bridge the gap between the uneducated\nmasses and the philosophical thinker, and to preserve that common bond\nbetween them which is so important for the protection of culture. With\nit you would have no need to fear that the poor man would discover that\nthe upper strata of society \u201cno longer believe in God\u201d. I think I have\nshown by now that your endeavour reduces itself to the attempt to\nreplace a proved and affectively valuable illusion by one that is\nimproved and without affective value.\u2019\n\nYou shall not find me impervious to your criticism. I know how difficult\nit is to avoid illusions; perhaps even the hopes I have confessed to are\nof an illusory nature. But I hold fast to one distinction. My\nillusions\u2014apart from the fact that no penalty is imposed for not sharing\nthem\u2014are not, like the religious ones, incapable of correction, they\nhave no delusional character. If experience should show\u2014not to me, but\nto others after me who think as I do\u2014that we are mistaken, then we shall\ngive up our expectations. Take my endeavour for what it is. A\npsychologist, who does not deceive himself about the difficulty of\nfinding his bearings in this world, strives to review the development of\nmankind in accord with what insight he has won from studying the mental\nprocesses of the individual during his development from childhood to\nmanhood. In this connection the idea forces itself upon him that\nreligion is comparable to a childhood neurosis, and he is optimistic\nenough to assume that mankind will overcome this neurotic phase, just as\nso many children grow out of their similar neuroses. These pieces of\nknowledge from individual psychology may be inadequate, their\napplication to the human race unjustified, the optimism without\nfoundation; I grant you the uncertainty of all these things. But often\nwe cannot refrain from saying what we think, excusing ourselves on the\nground that it is given for no more than it is worth.\n\nAnd there are two points that I must dwell on a little longer. First,\nthe weakness of my position does not betoken any strengthening of yours.\nI think you are defending a lost cause. We may insist as much as we like\nthat the human intellect is weak in comparison with human instincts, and\nbe right in doing so. But nevertheless there is something peculiar about\nthis weakness. The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not\nrest until it has gained a hearing. Ultimately, after endlessly repeated\nrebuffs, it succeeds. This is one of the few points in which one may be\noptimistic about the future of mankind, but in itself it signifies not a\nlittle. And one can make it a starting-point for yet other hopes. The\nprimacy of the intellect certainly lies in the far, far, but still\nprobably not infinite, distance. And as it will presumably set itself\nthe same aims that you expect to be realized by your God\u2014of course\nwithin human limits, in so far as external reality, \u1f08\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7, allows\nit\u2014the brotherhood of man and the reduction of suffering, we may say\nthat our antagonism is only a temporary and not an irreconcilable one.\nWe desire the same things, but you are more impatient, more exacting,\nand\u2014why should I not say it\u2014more selfish than I and those like me. You\nwould have the state of bliss to begin immediately after death; you ask\nof it the impossible, and you will not surrender the claim of the\nindividual. Of these wishes our god \u0391\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2[4] will realize those which\nexternal nature permits, but he will do this very gradually, only in the\nincalculable future and for other children of men. Compensation for us,\nwho suffer grievously from life, he does not promise. On the way to this\ndistant goal your religious doctrines will have to be discarded, no\nmatter whether the first attempts fail, or whether the first\nsubstitute-formations prove to be unstable. You know why; in the long\nrun nothing can withstand reason and experience, and the contradiction\nreligion offers to both is only too palpable. Not even the purified\nreligious ideas can escape this fate, so long as they still try to\npreserve anything of the consolation of religion. Certainly if you\nconfine yourself to the belief in a higher spiritual being, whose\nqualities are indefinable and whose intentions cannot be discerned, then\nyou are proof against the interference of science, but then you will\nalso relinquish the interest of men.\n\nFootnote 4:\n\n  The twin gods \u0391\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2-\u1f08\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7 of the Dutchman _Multatuli_.\n\nAnd secondly: note the difference between your attitude to illusions and\nmine. You have to defend the religious illusion with all your might; if\nit were discredited\u2014and to be sure it is sufficiently menaced\u2014then your\nworld would collapse, there would be nothing left for you but to despair\nof everything, of culture and of the future of mankind. From this\nbondage I am, we are, free. Since we are prepared to renounce a good\npart of our infantile wishes, we can bear it if some of our expectations\nprove to be illusions.\n\nEducation freed from the burden of religious doctrines will not perhaps\neffect much alteration in man\u2019s psychological nature; our god \u0391\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 is\nnot perhaps a very powerful one; he may only fulfil a small part of what\nhis forerunners have promised. If we have to acknowledge this, we shall\ndo so with resignation. We shall not thereby lose our interest in the\nworld and in life, for we have in one respect a sure support which you\nlack. We believe that it is possible for scientific work to discover\nsomething about the reality of the world through which we can increase\nour power and according to which we can regulate our life. If this\nbelief is an illusion, then we are in the same position as you, but\nscience has shown us by numerous and significant successes that it is no\nillusion. Science has many open, and still more secret, enemies among\nthose who cannot forgive it for having weakened religious belief and for\nthreatening to overthrow it. People reproach it for the small amount it\nhas taught us and the incomparably greater amount it has left in the\ndark. But then they forget how young it is, how difficult its\nbeginnings, and how infinitesimally small the space of time since the\nhuman intellect has been strong enough for the tasks it sets it. Do we\nnot all do wrong in that the periods of time which we make the basis of\nour judgements are of too short duration? We should take an example from\nthe geologist. People complain of the unreliability of science, that she\nproclaims as a law to-day what the next generation will recognize to be\nan error and which it will replace by a new law of equally short\ncurrency. But that is unjust and in part untrue. The transformation of\nscientific ideas is a process of development and progress, not of\nrevolution. A law that was at first held to be universally valid proves\nto be a special case of a more comprehensive law, or else its scope is\nlimited by another law not discovered until later; a rough approximation\nto the truth is replaced by one more carefully adjusted, which in its\nturn awaits a further approach to perfection. In several spheres we have\nnot yet surmounted a phase of investigation in which we test hypotheses\nthat have soon to be rejected as inadequate; but in others we have\nalready an assured and almost immutable core of knowledge. Finally an\nattempt has been made to discredit radically scientific endeavour on the\nground that, bound as it is to the conditions of our own organization,\nit can yield nothing but subjective results, while the real nature of\nthings outside us remains inaccessible to it. But this is to disregard\nseveral factors of decisive importance for the understanding of\nscientific work. Firstly, our organization, _i.e._ our mental apparatus,\nhas been developed actually in the attempt to explore the outer world,\nand therefore it must have realized in its structure a certain measure\nof appropriateness; secondly, it itself is a constituent part of that\nworld which we are to investigate, and readily admits of such\ninvestigation; thirdly, the task of science is fully circumscribed if we\nconfine it to showing how the world must appear to us in consequence of\nthe particular character of our organization; fourthly, the ultimate\nfindings of science, just because of the way in which they are attained,\nare conditioned not only by our organization but also by that which has\naffected this organization; and, finally, the problem of the nature of\nthe world irrespective of our perceptive mental apparatus is an empty\nabstraction without practical interest.\n\nNo, science is no illusion. But it would be an illusion to suppose that\nwe could get anywhere else what it cannot give us.\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n\n\n                          TRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTES\n\n\n \u25cf Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained.\n \u25cf Used numbers for footnotes.\n \u25cf Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.","title":"The future of an illusion","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":18756}