{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_76880/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_76880","id":"gutenberg_76880","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/76880","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Journals","Category: Law & Criminology","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Philosophy -- Periodicals"],"text":"THE MONIST\n\n A\n QUARTERLY MAGAZINE\n\n VOL. II\n\n CHICAGO:\n THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.\n 1891-1892\n\n COPYRIGHT BY\n THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.\n 1891-1892.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS OF VOLUME II.\n\n\n PAGE.\n\n ARTICLES.\n\n American Politics. By Thomas B. Preston 41\n\n Anschauung, What Does \u2014\u2014 Mean? Editor 527\n\n Artificial Selection and the Marriage Problem. By Hiram M. Stanley 51\n\n Clifford on the Soul in Nature, Professor. By F. C. Conybeare 209\n\n Conservation of Spirit and the Origin of Consciousness, The. By\n Francis C. Russell 357\n\n Criminal Suggestion, On. By J. Delb\u0153uf 363\n\n Ethnological Jurisprudence. By Albert H. Post 31\n\n Evolution, The Continuity of. The Science of Language versus The\n Science of Life, as represented by Prof. F. Max M\u00fcller and Prof.\n G. J. Romanes. Editor 70\n\n Facts and Mental Symbols. By Ernst Mach 198\n\n Littr\u00e9, \u00c9mile. A Sonnet. By Louis Belrose Jr. 110\n\n Logical Theory, The Present Position of. By John Dewey 1\n\n Magic Square, The. By Hermann Schubert 487\n\n Mechanical Invention, The New Civilisation Depends on. By W. T.\n Harris 178\n\n Mental Evolution. An Old Speculation in a New Light. By C. Lloyd\n Morgan 161\n\n Mind, The Law of. By Charles S. Peirce 533\n\n Monism, Our. The Principles of a Consistent, Unitary World-View.\n By Ernst Haeckel 481\n\n Necessity, Mr. Charles S. Peirce\u2019s Onslaught on the Doctrine of.\n Editor 560\n\n Necessity, The Doctrine of \u2014\u2014 Examined. By Charles S. Peirce 321\n\n Psychical Monism. By Edmund Montgomery 338\n\n Religion and Progress. Interpreted by the Life and Last work of\n Wathen Mark Wilks Call. By Moncure D. Conway 183\n\n Spencer, Mr., on the Ethics of Kant. Editor 512\n\n Things in themselves, Are There \u2014\u2014? Editor 225\n\n Thought and Language. By George John Romanes 56\n\n Will and Reason. By B. Bosanquet 18\n\n LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.\n\n France. By Lucien Arr\u00e9at 266, 386, 583\n\n France. The Intellectual Awakening of the Langue D\u2019Oc.\n By Theodore Stanton 95\n\n Germany. Christian Ufer 103, 272, 396, 593\n\n DIVERSE TOPICS. CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.\n\n Clergy\u2019s Duty of Allegiance to Dogma and the Struggle between\n World-Conceptions. Editor 278\n\n Comte and Turgot. Prof. Schaarschmidt 611\n\n Evolution and Language, Comment on the Discussion on. By F.\n Max M\u00fcller 286\n\n Haeckel\u2019s Monism, Professor. Editor 598\n\n James\u2019s Psychology, Observations on Some Points in. By W. L.\n Worcester 417\n\n Littr\u00e9, A Defense of. By Louis Belrose Jr. 403\n\n Littr\u00e9\u2019s, \u00c9mile, Positivism. A Reply. Editor 410\n\n Logical Theory, The Future Position of. Edward T. Dixon 606\n\n Mind, The Nature of \u2014\u2014 and the Meaning of Reality. Editor 434\n\n Monism and Mechanicalism: Comments upon Prof. Ernst Haeckel\u2019s\n Position. Editor 438\n\n Peirce, Mr. Charles S., on Necessity. Editor 442\n\n Religion of Science, The. Editor 600\n\n Thought and Language. A letter by G. J. Romanes 402\n\n Thought-forms, The Origin of. Editor 111\n\n BOOK REVIEWS.\n\n Avenarius, Richard. _Der menschliche Weltbegriff_ 451\n\n Baldwin, James Mark. _Handbook of Psychology_ 467\n\n Bernheim. _Hypnotisme, Suggestion, Psychotherapie_ 465\n\n Cornill, C. H. _Einleitung in das alte Testament_ 443\n\n Curtis, Mattoon Monroe. _An Outline of Locke\u2019s Ethical Philosophy_ 300\n\n Delabarre, Edmund Burke. _Ueber Bewegungsempfindungen_ 297\n\n Delb\u0153uf, J. _Les F\u00eates de Montpellier_ 131\n\n Dillmann, Edmund. _Eine neue Darstellung der Leibnizischen\n Monadenlehre auf Grund der Quellen_ 460\n\n Dixon, Edward T. _The Foundations of Geometry_ 126\n\n Erhardt, Franz. _Der Satz vom Grunde als Prinzip des Schliessens_ 631\n\n Gruber, Hermann. _Der Positivismus vom Tode August Comte\u2019s bis\n auf unsere Tage (1857-1891)_ 133\n\n Holzmann, H. J. _Synoptiker. Apostelgeschichte_ 287\n\n H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden. _Das Dasein als Lust, Leid und Liebe_ 468\n\n Husserl, E. G. _Philosophie der Arithmetik_ 627\n\n Koenig, Edmund. _Die Entwickelung des Causalproblems in der\n Philosophie seit Kant_ 457\n\n Lasswitz, Kurd. _Seifenblasen_ 471\n\n Loeb, Jacques. _Untersuchungen zur physiologischen Morphologie\n der Thiere_ 468\n\n Lombroso, C. L. _Nouvelles Recherches de Psychiatrie et\n D\u2019Anthropologie Criminelle_ 618\n\n Lyons, Daniel. _Christianity and Infallibility_ 629\n\n Mach, E. _Grundriss der Naturlehre f\u00fcr die oberen Classen\n der Mittelschulen_ 617\n\n M\u00fcnsterberg, Hugo. _Schriften der Gesellschaft f\u00fcr psychologische\n Forschung_ 289\n\n Paszkowski, Wilhelm. _Die Bedeutung der theologischen Vorstellungen\n f\u00fcr die Ethik_ 453\n\n Pearson, Karl. _The Grammar of Science_ 623\n\n Pellegrini, Pietro. _Diritto Sociale Tentativo in Bozza_ 298\n\n Roberty, E. de. _Agnosticisme_ 631\n\n Roberty, E. de. _La Philosophie du Si\u00e8cle_ 293\n\n Romanes, George John. _Darwin and After Darwin_ 612\n\n Schmidkunz, Hans. _Psychologie der Suggestion_ 464\n\n Schr\u00f6der, Ernst. _Vorlesungen \u00fcber die Algebra der Logik_ 618\n\n Schurmann, Jacob Gould. _Belief in God_ 121\n\n Schwarz, Hermann. _Das Wahrnehmungsproblem vom Standpunkte des\n Physikers, des Physiologen und des Philosophen_ 455\n\n Scripture, E. W. _Ueber den associativen Verlauf der Vorstellungen_ 137\n\n Seth, Andrew. _The Present Position of the Philosophical Sciences_ 450\n\n Toy, Crawford Howell. _Judaism and Christianity_ 123\n\n Van Bemmelen, P. _Le Nihilisme Scientifique_ 298\n\n Whitney, William Dwight. _Max M\u00fcller and the Science of Language_ 469\n\n Wise, Isaac M. _Pronaos to Holy Writ_ 124\n\n Ziehen, Th. _Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie in 14\n Vorlesungen_ 461\n\n PERIODICALS 140-160; 303-320; 472-480; 634-640\n\n APPENDIX.\n\n Kant and Spencer. Reprinted articles relative to Mr. Spencer\u2019s estimate\n of Kant. (In No. 4 of this volume.)\n\n\n\n\n VOL. II. OCTOBER, 1891. NO. 1.\n\n THE MONIST.\n\n\n\n\nTHE PRESENT POSITION OF LOGICAL THEORY.\n\n\nThe remarkable fact in the intellectual life of to-day is the\ncontradiction in which it is entangled. On one hand we have an enormous\ndevelopment of science, both in specialisation of method and accumulation\nof material; its extension and thorough-going application to all ranges\nof experience. What we should expect from such a movement, would seem to\nbe confidence of intelligence in itself; and a corresponding organisation\nof knowledge, giving some guide and support to life. The strange thing\nis that instead of this we have, probably, the greatest apparent\ndisorganisation of authority as to intellectual matters that the world\nhas ever seen; while the prevalent attitude and creed of scientific men\nis philosophic agnosticism, or disbelief in their own method when it\ncomes to fundamental matters. Such a typical representative of modern\nscience as Mr. Huxley virtually laughs to scorn the suggestion of Mr.\nFrederic Harrison that science should or could become so organised as to\ngive any support, any authoritative stay, to life.\n\nNow I do not intend to discuss this apparent contradiction. It seems\nto me obvious enough that the contradiction is due to the fact that\nscience has got far enough along so that its negative attitude towards\nprevious codes of life is evident, while its own positive principle of\nreconstruction is not yet evident. But without urging this view upon the\nreader, I wish to ask how and where in the prevailing confusion logical\ntheory, as a synopsis of the methods and typical forms of intelligence,\nstands. Logical theory at once reflects and transforms the existing\nstatus of matters intellectual at any period. It reflects it, for\nlogical theory is only the express, the overt consciousness on the part\nof intelligence of its own attitude, prevailing spirit. It transforms\nit, because this express consciousness makes intelligence know where\nit stands, makes it aware of its strength and of its weakness, and by\ndefining it to itself forces it to take up a new and more adequate place.\n\nIt is obvious, then, that as the prevailing influence in the intellectual\nworld to-day is science, so the prevailing influence in logical theory\nmust be the endeavor to account for, to justify, or at least to reckon\nwith this scientific spirit. And yet if there is such confusion as we\nhave indicated, then there is also manifested some chaos in logical\ntheory, as to the true nature and method of science. Were it otherwise,\nwere there at present a logical theory adequate to the specific and\ndetailed practical results of science, science and scientific men would\nbe conscious of themselves, and would be confident in their work and\nattitude.\n\nThe especial problem of logic, as the theory of scientific method, is the\nrelation of fact and thought to each other, of reality and thought. It\nis, however, differentiated from the metaphysical theory of knowledge.\nLogic does not inquire into the ultimate _meaning_ of fact and thought,\nnor into their _ultimate_ relations to one another. It simply takes\nthem from the attitude of science itself, its business being, not the\njustification nor refutation of this attitude, but its development into\nexplicit doctrine. Fact means to logic no more, but certainly no less,\nthan it means to the special sciences: it is the subject-matter under\ninvestigation, under consideration; it is that which we are trying to\nmake out. Thought too means to logic what it means to science: method.\nIt is the attitude and form which intelligence takes in reference to\nfact\u2014to its subject-matter, whether in inquiry, experiment, calculation,\nor statement.\n\nLogic, then, would have for its essential problem the consideration of\nthe various typical methods and guiding principles which thought assumes\nin its effort to detect, master, and report fact. It is presupposed here\nthat there is some sort of fruitful and intrinsic connection of fact and\nthought; that thinking, in short, is nothing but the fact in its process\nof translation from brute impression to lucent meaning.\n\nBut the moment such a presupposition is stated, ninety-nine persons out\nof a hundred think that we have plunged, _ex abrupto_, from the certainty\nof science into the cloudland of metaphysic. And yet just this conception\nof the relation of thought (method) to fact (subject-matter) is taken\nfor granted in every scientific investigation and conclusion. Here,\nthen, we have in outline the present position of logic. It is that any\nattempt to state, in general, or to work out, in detail, the principle of\nthe intrinsic and fruitful relation of fact and thought which science,\nwithout conscious reflection, constantly employs in practice, seems\n\u201cmetaphysical\u201d or even absurd. Why is this? The answer to this question\nwill give the filling-up of the outline just presented.\n\nThe chief cause is that superstition which still holds enthralled\nso much of modern thought\u2014I mean formal logic. And if this seems\nlike applying a hard name to what, at best and at worst, is only an\nintellectual gymnastic, I can only say that formal logic seems to me\nto be, at present, _fons et origo malorum_ in philosophy. It is true\nenough that nobody now takes the technical subject of formal logic very\nseriously\u2014unless here and there some belated \u201cprofessor.\u201d It is true that\nit is generally relegated to the position of a subject which, for some\nunclear reason, is regarded as \u201cdisciplinary\u201d in a young man\u2019s education;\njust as certain other branches are regarded as elegant accomplishments\nin a young woman\u2019s finishing. But while the subject itself as a doctrine\nor science hardly ranks very high, the conception of thought which is at\nthe bottom of formal logic still dominates the _Zeitgeist_, and regulates\nthe doctrine and the method of all those who draw their inspiration\nfrom the _Zeitgeist_. Any book of formal logic will tell us what this\nconception of thought is: that thought is a faculty or an entity existing\nin the mind, apart from facts, and that it has its own fixed forms, with\nwhich facts have nothing to do\u2014except in so far as they pass under the\nyoke. Jevons puts it this way: \u201cJust as we thus familiarly recognise\nthe difference of form and substance in common tangible things, so we\nmay observe in logic, that the form of an argument is one thing, quite\ndistinct from the various subjects or matter which may be treated in that\nform.\u201d[1]\n\nProfessor Stock varies the good old tune in this way: \u201cIn every act of\nthought we may distinguish two things\u2014(1) the object thought about, (2)\nthe way in which the mind thinks of it. The first is called the Matter;\nthe second the Form of Thought. Now formal ... logic is concerned only\nwith the way in which the mind thinks, and has nothing to do with the\nparticular objects thought about.\u201d[2]\n\nIt is assumed, in fine, that thought has a nature of its own independent\nof facts or subject-matter; that this thought, _per se_, has certain\nforms, and that these forms are not forms which the facts themselves\ntake, varying with the facts, but are rigid frames, into which the facts\nare to be set.\n\nNow all of this conception\u2014the notion that the mind has a faculty of\nthought apart from things, the notion that this faculty is constructed,\nin and of itself, with a fixed framework, the notion that thinking is\nthe imposing of this fixed framework on some unyielding matter called\nparticular objects, or facts\u2014all of this conception appears to me as\nhighly scholastic, as the last struggle of medi\u00e6valism to hold thought in\nsubjection to authority. Nothing is more surprising than the fact that\nwhile it is fashionable to reject, with great scorn, all the results\nand special methods of scholasticism, its foundation-stone should still\nbe accepted as the corner-stone of the edifice of modern doctrine. It\nis still more surprising when we reflect that the foundation-stone is\ncoherent only with the medi\u00e6val superstructure. The scholastics when they\nheld that the method of thought was a faculty pursuing its own method\napart from the course of things, were at least consistent. They did not\nconceive that thought was free, that intelligence had rights, nor that\nthere was possible science independent of data authoritatively laid down.\nReally believing what they professed,\u2014that thought was something _in\nse_,\u2014they held that it must be supplied with a fixed body of dogmatic\nfact, from tradition, from revelation\u2014from external authority. They\nheld that thought in its workings is confined to extracting from this\ndogmatic body of fact what is already contained in it, and to rearranging\nthe material and its implications. To examine the _material_, to test\nits truth; to suppose that intelligence could cut loose from this body\nof authority and go straight to nature, to history itself, to find\nthe truth; to build up a free and independent science\u2014to this point\nof incoherency medi\u00e6val scholasticism never attained. To proclaim the\nfreedom of thought, the rejection of all external authority, the right\nand the power of thought to get at truth for itself, and yet continue\nto define thought as a faculty apart from fact, was reserved for modern\nenlightenment! And were it not somewhat out of my present scope, I should\nlike to show that modern culture is thus a prepared victim for the\nskilful dialectician of the reactionary army. If the modern _Zeitgeist_\ndoes not fall a prey to the cohorts of the army of external authority, it\nis not because it has any recognised methods or any recognised criterion\nby which it can justify its raising the \u201cbanner of the free spirit.\u201d It\nis simply the obstinate bulwark of outer fact, built up piecemeal by\nscience, that protects it.\n\nThe two main forces, which have been at work against the formul\u00e6 of\nformal logic, are \u201cinductive\u201d or empirical logic on one side, and the\nso-called \u201ctranscendental\u201d logic, on the other. Of these two, the\ninfluence of inductive logic in sapping in practical fashion and popular\nresults the authority of syllogistic logic has undoubtedly been much\nthe greater. I propose, briefly, to give certain reasons for holding,\nhowever, that the inductive logic does not furnish us with the needed\ntheory of the relation of thought and fact. To show this adequately would\ndemand the criticism of inductive logic in the detail of its methods, in\norder to show where it comes short. As this is impossible, I shall now\nconfine myself to a couple of general considerations.\n\nTo begin with, then, the empirical logic virtually continues the\nconception of thought as in itself empty and formal which characterizes\nscholastic logic. It thus has really no theory which differentiates it,\nas regards the nature of thought itself, from formal logic. I cannot see,\nfor example, what quarrel the most stringent upholder of formal logic\ncan have with Mill as to the latter\u2019s theory of the syllogism. Mill\u2019s\ntheory is virtually simply a theory regarding the formation of the major\npremiss\u2014regarding the process by which we formulate the statement that\nAll _S_ is _P_. Now, if we once accept the syllogistic position, this\nprocess lies outside the scope and problem of formal logic. It is not an\naffair of what Jevons calls the form of argument at all, but simply of\nthe matter, the particular facts which make the filling of the argument.\nI do not see that it is any part of the business of formal logic to tell\nwhere the major premiss comes from, nor how it is got. And, on the other\nhand, when it comes to the manipulation of the data contained in the\npremiss, Mill must fall back upon the syllogistic logic. Mill\u2019s theory,\nso far as the thought-element is concerned, presupposes the syllogistic\ntheory. And if this theory, on its side, does not presuppose something\nlike Mill\u2019s inductive theory, it is simply because the logician, as a\n_philosopher_, may prefer \u201cintuitionalism\u201d to \u201cempiricism.\u201d He may hold,\nthat is, that the content of some major premisses is given by direct\n\u201cintuition\u201d rather than gathered from experience. But in either case,\nthis consideration of the source of the content of the premiss belongs\nnot to formal logic, but to metaphysics.\n\nIf, then, the theory of the syllogism is incorrect in its assumptions\nas to the relation of fact and thought, the inductive logic must be\nsimilarly in error. Its great advantage over the old scholastic logic\nlies not in its logic as such, but in something back of the logic\u2014in\nits account of the derivation of the material of judgment. Whatever the\ndefects of Locke\u2019s or Mill\u2019s account of experience, any theory which\nsomehow presupposes a first-hand contact of mind and fact (though it be\nonly in isolated, atomic sensations) is surely preferable to a theory\nwhich falls back on tradition, or on the delivery of dogma irresponsible\nto any intellectual criticism. But in its account of the derivation\nof the material of judgment, inductive logic is still hampered by the\nscholastic conception of thought. Thought, being confined to the rigid\nframework in which the material is manipulated after being obtained, is\nexcluded from all share in the gathering of material. The result is that\nthis material, having no intrinsic thought-side, shrinks into a more\nor less accidental association of more or less shifting and transitory\nmental states.\n\nI shall not stop to argue that, on this ground, the \u201cinductive\u201d logic\ndeprives science of its most distinctive scientific features\u2014the\npermanence and objectivity of its truths. I think no one can deny that\nthere is at least an _apparent_ gap between the actual results of\nconcrete science and these results as they stand after the touch of\nthe inductive logic\u2014that the necessity and generality of science seem\nrather to have been explained away, than explained. I think most of the\ninductive logicians themselves (while endeavoring to account for this\napparent necessity as generated through association) would admit that\nsomething of science _seems_, at least, to have been lost, and that the\ngreat reason for putting-up with this loss is that the inductive logic\nis the sole alternative to a dogmatic intuitionalism and to arbitrary\nspinning-out of _a priori_ concepts.\n\nCertainly as long as thought is conceived after the fashion of\nsyllogistic logic, as a scheme furnished and fixed in itself, apart from\nreality, so long scientific men must protest against allowing thought any\npart or lot in scientific procedure. So long some such _modus operandi_\nas that given by Mill must be resorted to in order to explain scientific\nmethods and results. But, on the other hand, if the scholastic idea\nof thought as this something having its character apart from fact is\nonce given up, the cause which at present cramps the logic of science\ninto the logic of sensationalism and empiricism is also given up. And\nthis brings us to the other point in general regarding the inductive or\nempirical logic. It is not strictly a logic at all but a metaphysic. It\ndoes not begin with the fact of science, the fact of the fruitful inquiry\ninto fact by intelligence, at all. It does not, starting from this fact\nanalyse the various methods and types which thought must take upon itself\nin order to maintain this fruitful inquiry. On the contrary, it begins\nwith sensations, and endeavors by a theory of knowledge on the basis\nof sensationalism to build up the structure of cognition, ordinary and\nscientific. I am not concerned here with the truth of sensationalism as\na metaphysical theory of knowledge, nor with the adequacy of the notion\nof sensation advanced by Mill. It is enough from the logical point of\nview to point out that such a theory is not logic\u2014that logic does not\ndeal with something _back_ of the fact of science, but with the analysis\nof scientific method as such. And is it forcing matters to indicate that\nthis retreat from logic to metaphysic is also caused by the syllogistic\nnotion of thought? Formal thought, with its formul\u00e6 for simply unfolding\na given material, is of no use in science. There is, therefore, the\nneed of some machinery to take the place of thought. And this is found\nin sensation and in \u201cexperience\u201d according to the peculiar notion of\nexperience current in the inductive logic.\n\nIn a word, then (without attempting to show the insufficiency of\ninductive logic as the theory of science by reference to its treatment\nof specific points) inductive logic does not meet our needs because it\nis not a free, unprejudiced inquiry into the special forms and methods\nof science, starting from the actual sciences themselves. It is founded\nand built up with constant reference to the scholastic notion of thought.\nWhere it is not affected positively by it, it is still affected by its\nreaction from it. Instead of denying once for all validity or even sense\nto the notion of thinking as a special, apart process, and then beginning\na free, unhampered examination with an eye single to the fact of science\nitself, it retains this conception of thought as valid in a certain\ndepartment, and then sets out to find something to supply the gap in\nanother department. And thus we have the usual division of inductive and\ndeductive logic, inductive being interpreted as empirical and particular,\ndeductive as syllogistic and formal. They are counterpart and correlative\ntheories, the two sides of the notion of the separateness of fact and\nthought; they stand and fall together.\n\n\u201cTranscendental\u201d logic, while usually conceived as utterly opposed in\nspirit and in results to inductive logic, has yet been one with it\nin endeavoring to abolish formal logic as the sufficient method and\ncriterion of scientific truth. I say this although well aware that\ninductive logic is usually conceived as specifically \u201cscientific,\u201d while\nthe transcendental movement is regarded as the especial foe of science\u2014as\na belated attempt to restore an _a priori_ scholasticism, and to find\na scheme for evolving truth out of pure thought. This is because when\nthe \u201ctranscendental\u201d school talks of thought, of the synthetic and\nobjective character of thought, of the possibility of attaining absolute\ntruth through thought, and of the ontological value of thought, it is\nunderstood as meaning thought in the old, scholastic sense, a process\napart and fixed in itself, and yet somehow evolving truth out of its own\ninner being, out of its own enclosed ruminations. But on the contrary,\nthe very meaning of \u201ctranscendentalism\u201d is not only that it is impossible\nto get valid truth from the evolution of thought in the scholastic sense,\nbut that there is no such thought at all. Processes of intelligence which\nhave their nature fixed in themselves, apart from fact and having to\nbe externally applied to fact, are pure myths to his school. Types of\nthought are simply the various forms which reality progressively takes\nas it is progressively mastered as to its meaning,\u2014that is, understood.\nMethods of thought are simply the various active attitudes into which\nintelligence puts itself in order to detect and grasp the fact. Instead\nof rigid moulds, they are flexible adaptations. Methods of thought fit\nfact more closely and responsively than a worn glove fits the hand. They\nare only the ideal evolution _of_ the fact,\u2014and by \u201cideal\u201d is here meant\nsimply the evolution of fact into meaning.\n\nIf this is a fair description of what the \u201ctranscendental\u201d school means\nby thought, it is evident that it is a co-worker with the spirit and\nintent of \u201cinductive\u201d logic. Its sole attempt is to get hold of and\nreport the presupposition and rationale of science; its practical aim\nis to lay bare and exhibit the method of science so that the true seat\nof authority\u2014that is, the authority, the _backing_, of truth\u2014shall be\nforever manifest. It has simply gone a step further than \u201cinductive\u201d\nlogic, and thrown overboard once for all the scholastic idea of thought.\nThis has enabled it to start anew, and to form its theory of thought\nsimply by following the principles of the actual processes by which man\nhas, thus far in history, discovered and possessed fact.\n\nI shall not attempt here any defence of the \u201ctranscendental\u201d logic; I\nshall not even attempt to show that the interpretation of it which I\nhave given above is correct. It must go, for the present, simply as\nmy individual understanding of the matter. Simply taking this view of\n\u201ctranscendental\u201d logic for granted, I wish, in order to complete our\nnotion of the present position of logic, to consider the reasons which\nhave thus far prevented, say, the Hegelian logic from getting any popular\nhold\u2014from getting recognition from scientific men as, at least in\nprinciple, a fair statement of their own basic presupposition and method.\n\nThe first of these reasons is that the popular comprehension of the\n\u201ctranscendental\u201d movement is arrested at Kant and has never gone on to\nHegel. Hegel, it is true, overshadowed Kant entirely for a considerable\nperiod. But the Hegelian r\u00e9gime was partly pyrotechnical rather than\nscientific in character; and, partly, so far as it was scientific, it\nexhausted itself in stimulating various detailed scientific movements\u2014as\nin the history of politics, religion, art, etc. In these lines, if\nwe trust even to those who have no faith in the Hegelian method or\nprinciples, the movement found some practical excuse for being. But\nthe result of the case was\u2014and its present status is\u2014that because\nthe principle of Hegel was, for the time, lost either in display of\ndialectical fireworks, or in application to specific subjects, the\nprinciple itself has never met with any _general_ investigation. The\nimmense amount of labor spent on Kant during the past twenty years has\nmade method and principle familiar, if not acceptable, to the body of\nmen calling themselves educated. And thus, so far as its outcome is\nconcerned, the transcendental movement still halts with Kant.\n\nNow, at the expense of seeming to plunge myself deeper in absurdity than\nI have already gone, I must say that the Kantian principle is by far\nmore \u201ctranscendental\u201d in the usual interpretation of that term\u2014more _a\npriori_, more given to emphasising some special function of some special\nthought-power\u2014than the Hegelian. As against the usual opinion that while\nsome compromise between science and Kant is possible, the scientific\nspirit and Hegel are at antipodes, it appears to me that it is Kant who\ndoes violence to science, while Hegel (I speak of his essential method\nand not of any particular result) is the quintessence of the scientific\nspirit. Let me endeavor to give some reasons for this belief. Kant\nstarts from the accepted scholastic conception of thought. Kant never\ndreams, for a moment, of questioning the existence of a special faculty\nof thought with its own peculiar and fixed forms. He states and restates\nthat thought in itself exists apart from fact and occupies itself with\nfact given to it from without. Kant, it is true, gives the death-blow\nto scholasticism by pointing out that such a faculty of thought is\npurely analytic\u2014that it simply unfolds the material given, whether that\nmaterial be true or false, having no method of arriving at truth, and no\ntest for determining truth. This fact once clearly recognised, dogmatic\nrationalism, or the attempt to get truth from the \u201clogical\u201d analysis of\nconcepts was forever destroyed. The way was opened for an independent\nexamination of the actual method of science.\n\nBut while Kant revealed once for all the impossibility of getting truth,\nof laying hold of reality, by the scholastic method, he still retained\nthat conception of thought. He denied, not its existence, but its worth\nas relates to truth. What was the result? Just this: when he came to his\nexamination (criticism) of knowledge, it fell apart at once into two\nseparate factors, an _a priori_ and _a posteriori_. For if Kant finds,\nas against the dogmatic rationalist, that formal thought cannot give\nknowledge, he also finds, as against the sceptical empiricist, that\nunrelated sensation cannot give knowledge. Here too, instead of denying,\n_in toto_, the existence of unrelated sensation, he contented himself\nwith denying its functional value for knowledge. Unrelated sensation and\nformal thought are simply the complementary halves of each other. Admit\nthe one, and the other is its necessary counterpart.\n\nKant must now piece together his two separated factors. Sensation,\nunrelated manifold of sensation, is _there_, thought, isolated, analytic\nthought, is _here_. Neither is knowledge in itself. What more natural\nthan to put them together, and hold that knowledge is the union of a\nmatter or stuff, of sensations, atomic in themselves, on one hand, and a\nform, or regulating principle of thought, empty in itself, on the other?\nWe have two elements, both existing in isolation, and yet both useless\nfor all purposes of knowledge. Combine them, and presto, there is science.\n\nSuch a \u201ctranscendentalism\u201d as this may well stick in the crop of\nscientific men. For consider what is involved in it: an _a priori_\nfactor, on one side, and an _a posteriori_, on the other. Kant, from\none point of view, seems thus to have simply combined the weaknesses of\nempiricism and rationalism. He still continues to talk of experience\nitself as particular and contingent, and denies that it gives a basis\nfor any universal laws. Aside from his effort in the \u201cKritik der\nUrtheilskraft\u201d to overcome his original separation, special scientific\nlaws are to him only more or less extensive generalisations from\nexperience\u2014as much so to him as to Locke, or Mill. Scientific men indeed,\nhave accustomed themselves to this derogation of their own methods and\nresults, and, as \u201cinductive\u201d logicians, indulge in it quite freely\nthemselves. But an _a priori_ element, supplied by a thought fixed and\nseparate, scientific men cannot do away with. Nor do I know any reason\nwhy they should.\n\nIt is coming short, in my opinion, of the full stature of science to\ntreat it as a quantitative and varying generalisation of contingent\nparticulars, but this, at least, leaves what science there is free and\nunhindered. But _a priori_ elements supplied from outside the fact\nitself, _a priori_ elements somehow entering into the fact from without\nand controlling it\u2014this is to give up the very spirit of science. For\nif science means anything, it is that our ideas, our judgments may in\nsome degree reflect and report the fact itself. Science means, on one\nhand, that thought is free to attack and get hold of its subject-matter,\nand, on the other, that fact is free to break through into thought; free\nto impress itself\u2014or rather to express itself\u2014in intelligence without\nvitiation or deflection. Scientific men are true to the instinct of\nthe scientific spirit in fighting shy of a distinct _a priori_ factor\nsupplied to fact from the mind. Apriorism of this sort must seem like an\neffort to cramp the freedom of intelligence and of fact, to bring them\nunder the yoke of fixed, external forms.\n\nNow in Hegel there is no such conception of thought and of _a priori_, as\nis found in Kant. Kant formulated the conception of thought as objective,\nbut he interpreted this as meaning that thought subjective in itself\n_becomes_ objective when synthetic of a given sense-manifold. When Hegel\ncalls thought objective he means just what he says: that there is no\nspecial, apart faculty of thought belonging to and operated by a mind\nexisting separate from the outer world. What Hegel means by objective\nthought is the meaning, the significance of the fact itself; and by\nmethods of thought he understands simply the processes in which this\nmeaning of fact is evolved.\n\nThere has been, of late, considerable discussion of the place and\nfunction of \u201crelations\u201d in knowledge. This discussion in English\nspeculation, at least, tends to turn largely about Thomas Hill Green\u2019s\nreconstruction of Kantianism. I consider it unfortunate that this\ndiscussion has taken the form of a debate between empiricism and\nKantianism. The question of knowledge has thus come to be whether or\nnot certain relations are supplied by thought to sensations in order to\nmake an orderly whole out of the latter, chaotic in themselves. Now when\nHegel talks of relations of thought (not that he makes much use of just\nthis term) he means no such separate forms. Relations of thought are, to\nHegel, the typical forms of meaning which the subject-matter takes in\nits various progressive stages of being understood. And this is what _a\npriori_ means from a Hegelian standpoint. It is not some element _in_\nknowledge; some addition of thought to experience. It is experience\nitself in its skeleton, in the main features of its framework.\n\n\u201cRefutations\u201d of Hegel, then, which attempt to show that \u201cthought\u201d in\nitself is empty, that it waits for content from experience, that it\ncannot by any manipulation evolve truth out of itself are, if taken as\nhaving relevance to Hegel, simply meaningless. Hegel begins where these\narguers leave off. Accepting all that they can say, he goes one step\nfurther, and denies that there is any such \u201cthought\u201d at all anywhere in\nexistence. The question of the relations or \u201ccategories of thought\u201d is\njust the question of the broad and main aspects of fact as that fact\ncomes to be understood.\n\nFor example, Kant would prove the _a priori_ character and validity\nof the principle of causation by showing that without it science is\nimpossible, that it helps \u201cmake experience.\u201d Now, in terms, Hegel\u2019s\njustification of this relation would be the same; he too would show\nthat the fabric of experience implies and demands the causal relation.\nBut in Kant\u2019s case, the justification of the principle of causality\nby reference to the possibility of experience means that thought must\ncontinually inject this principle _into_ experience to keep it from\ndisappearing: that experience must be constantly braced and reinforced\nby the synthetic action of thought or it will collapse. In short, the\nneed of experience for this principle of causation means its need for\na certain support outside itself. But Hegel\u2019s demonstration of the\nvalidity of the causal principle is simply pointing out that the whole\nsupports the part, while the part helps make the whole. That is to say,\nHegel\u2019s reference is not to some outside action of thought in maintaining\nfact as an object of knowledge; it is to the entire structure of fact\nitself. His contention is simply that the structure of fact itself,\nof the subject-matter of knowledge, is such that in one of its phases\nit presents necessarily the aspect of causality. And if this word\n\u201cnecessarily\u201d gives pause, it must be remembered what the source of this\nnecessity is. It does _not_ lie in the principle of causation _per se_;\nit lies in the whole fact, the whole subject-matter of knowledge. It is\nthe same sort of necessity as when we say that a complete man _must_ have\nan eye; i. e., it is the nature of the human organism to develop and\nsustain this organ, while the organ, in turn, contributes to and thus\nhelps constitute the organism.\n\nIt is then evident that the question upon which the \u201crefutation\u201d of\nHegel turns is not in showing that formal \u201cthought\u201d cannot give birth to\ntruth except through the fructifying touch of experience. The question\nis simply whether fact\u2014the subject-matter of knowledge\u2014is such as Hegel\npresents it. Is it, in general, a connected system as he holds it to\nbe? And, if a system, does it, in particular, present such phases\n(such relations, categories) as Hegel shows forth? These are objective\nquestions pure and simple; questions identical, in kind, with the\nquestion whether the constitution of glucose is what some chemist claims\nto have found it.\n\nThis, then, is why I conceive Hegel\u2014entirely apart from the value of any\nspecial results\u2014to represent the quintessence of the scientific spirit.\nHe denies not only the possibility of getting truth out of a formal,\napart thought, but he denies the existence of any faculty of thought\nwhich is other than the expression of fact itself. His contention is\nnot that \u201cthought,\u201d in the scholastic sense, has ontological validity,\nbut that fact, reality is significant. Even, then, if it were shown\nthat Hegel is pretty much all wrong as to the special meanings which he\nfinds to make up the significance of reality, his main principle would\nbe unimpeached until it were shown that fact has not a systematic, or\ninterconnected, meaning, but is a mere hodgepodge of fragments. Whether\nthe scientific spirit would have any interest in such a hodgepodge may,\nat least, be questioned.\n\nHaving dealt at such length with the first reason why as yet the\n\u201ctranscendental\u201d movement has found no overt coalescence with the\nscientific, we may deal briefly with the remaining reason.[3] In the\nsecond place, then, the rationality of fact had not been sufficiently\nrealised in detail in the early decades of the century to admit of\nthe principle of the \u201ctranscendental\u201d movement being otherwise than\nmisunderstood. That is to say, the development and, more particularly,\nthe application of science to the specific facts of the world was\nthen comparatively rudimentary. On account of this lack of scientific\ndiscovery and application, the world presented itself to man\u2019s\nconsciousness as a blank, or at least as only stuff _for_ meaning, and\nnot as itself significant. The result was that Hegel must be interpreted\nsubjectively. The difficulties in the way of conceiving a world, upon\nwhich science had not yet expended its energies in detail, as an organism\nof significant relations and bearings were so great, that Hegel\u2019s attempt\nto point out these significant types and functions as immanent in reality\nwas inevitably misconstrued as an attempt, on Hegel\u2019s part, to prove that\na system of purely \u201csubjective\u201d thoughts could somehow be so manipulated\nas to give objectively valid results.\n\nHegel, in other words, anticipated somewhat the actual outcome of the\nscientific movement. However significant fact may be, however true it\nmay be that an apart faculty of thought is an absurdity, however certain\nit may be that there are no real types or methods of thought at all\nexcepting those of the object-matter itself as it comes to be understood,\nyet to man this objective significance cannot be real till he has made\nit _out_ in the details of scientific processes, and _made_ it applied\nscience in invention. Hegel\u2019s standpoint was, therefore, of necessity\nobscure. When the significant character of fact was not yet opened up\nin detail, a method which worked upon the basis that the only possible\nthought is the reflection of the significance of fact, had no chance of\nfair interpretation.. And thus it was (and largely is) that when Hegel\nspeaks of objective thought and its relations, he is understood as having\nthe ordinary conception of thought (that is, of thought as a purely\nseparate and subjective faculty), and yet as trying to prove that this\napart faculty has some mysterious power of evolving truth.\n\nThe question which now confronts us, therefore, as to the present place\nof logic is just this: Has the application of scientific thought to the\nworld of fact gone far enough so that we can speak, without seeming\nstrained, of the rationality of fact? When we speak of the rationality,\nof the intrinsic meaning of fact, can these terms be understood in their\ndirect and obvious sense, and not in any remote, or _merely_ metaphysical\nsense? Has the theoretical consideration of nature in its detailed\nstudy, has practical invention, as the manifestation of the rationality\nof fact, gone far enough so that this significance has become, or could\nbecome with some effort, as real and objective a material of study as are\nmolecules and vibrations?\n\nIt seems to me that we are already at this stage, or are at the point of\ngetting to it. Without arguing this question, however, (which, indeed,\ncan be proved only by acting upon it, only _ambulando_,) I would point\nout that the constant detailed work of science upon the world in theory\nand in invention, must in time give that world an evident meaning in\nhuman consciousness. What prevents scientific men from now realising this\nfact, is that they are still afraid of certain \u201ctranscendent\u201d entities\nand forces; afraid that if they relax their hostility to metaphysic,\nsome one will spring upon them the old scholastic scheme of external,\nsupernatural unrealities. To those who take the prevailing agnosticism\nnot as a thing, but as a symptom, this agnosticism means just this: The\nwhole set of external, or non-immanent entities, is now on the point of\nfalling away, of dissolving. We got just so far, popularly, as holding\nthat they are unknowable. In other words, they are crowded to the extreme\nverge. One push more, and off they go. The popular consciousness will\nhold not only that they are unknowable, but that they are not.\n\nWhat then? Science freed from its fear of an external and dogmatic\nmetaphysic, will lose its fear of metaphysic. Having unquestioned and\nfree possession of its own domain, that of knowledge and of fact, it\nwill also be free to build up the intrinsic metaphysic of this domain.\nIt will be free to ask after the structure of meanings which makes\nup the skeleton of this world of knowledge. The moment this point is\nreached, the speculative critical logic worked out in the development of\nKantian ideas, and the positive, specific work of the scientific spirit\nwill be at one. It will be seen that this logic is no revived, redecked\nscholasticism, but a complete abandonment of scholasticism; that it deals\nsimply with the inner anatomy of the realm of scientific reality, and has\nsimply endeavored, with however much of anticipation, to dissect and lay\nbare, at large and in general, the features of the same subject-matter,\nwhich the positive sciences have been occupying themselves with in\nparticular and in detail.\n\nThat we are almost at the point of such conflux, a point where the\ngeneral, and therefore somewhat abstract lines of critical logic will run\nin to the particular, and therefore somewhat isolated, lines of positive\nscience, is, in my opinion, the present position of logical theory.\n\n JOHN DEWEY.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] Jevons, _Elementary Lessons in Logic_, p. 5.\n\n[2] Stock, _Deductive Logic_, p. 3.\n\n[3] It should be understood that in the previous discussion so far as it\nrelates to Kant, I have taken him at his lowest terms\u2014those of logical\nself-consistency. So far as Kant does not succeed in freeing himself\nfrom his original position\u2014the existence of a formal, or apart, faculty\nof thought\u2014so far his emphasis of the _a priori_ in the sense already\nattributed to him is inevitable. But that the _tendency_ of Kant is to\nmake the thought-relations _a priori_ simply in the sense of being fact\u2019s\nown anatomy and physiognomy I should not deny.\n\n\n\n\nWILL AND REASON.\n\n\nIt has always been, I think, the practice in civilised society to speak\nof reason or good sense as in some way influencing action. And of course\nit must do so, if, as we suppose, it forms the radical distinction\nbetween man and the lower animals. \u201cBe reasonable,\u201d we say, in reference\nto action no less than to speculation. \u201cWisdom and blood,\u201d says\nShakespeare, \u201ccombating in so tender a body, we have ten proofs to one\nthat blood hath the victory.\u201d Blood here means passion. How does wisdom\nor knowledge combat passion? I do not say that wisdom and knowledge mean\nthe same thing, but if they do not, we should like to know the difference\nbetween them.\n\nIn this prevalent notion of the conflict between reason and desire, it\nmay be observed that reason is, as a rule, supposed to be negative or\nprohibitive. \u201cBe reasonable\u201d generally means \u201cgive up something you want\nvery much.\u201d According to one account, the inward monitor of Socrates\nwas always negative, and throughout moral philosophy, and especially\nthroughout moralising philosophy, which is not quite the same thing, you\nfind the point of view that reason conflicts with desire, and has in fact\nfor its function very much to prevent you doing or caring about whatever\nyou very particularly want to do or incline to care about. This is what\ngives rise to the state of things satirised in the old saying \u201cAny\nyoung man would rather face an imputation on his moral character than\nan imputation on his horsemanship.\u201d If moral character means a sort of\ndetachment from everything, this feeling is both natural and justifiable.\nThe popular interpretation of Aristotle leans in the direction of this\nidea about reason, in so far as the conception of the reason seems to be\nconnected with commonplace notions about the evils of excess, strongly\nrepresented in Greek proverbial philosophy. It was easy to add to these\nideas the conception of the evils of defect, which is little more than a\nverbal refinement on the other. These quantitative expressions have not\nmuch meaning in morality. Unquestionably, I think, the popular aspect of\nthe Aristotelian doctrine is an idea that you ought not to throw yourself\nvery deeply into anything. Reason is, in short, according to these\nmoralistic conceptions, though not according to Aristotle\u2019s fundamental\nview, a sort of check upon desire and little more.\n\nThis negative character of reason will, I hope, explain itself away as we\nproceed. The primary point on which I want to insist is not why reason is\nthus treated as negative, but how it comes that reason can be supposed\nto conflict with or control desire at all. I speak for the present of\nDesire, not of Will, because the meaning of desire is clearer; whereas\nit is a doubt, until we have explained the nature of active reason, what\nWill is, and whether it is distinguishable from desire.\n\nNow, on the other hand, there is a sentence of Aristotle \u201cIntelligence\nas such moves nothing,\u201d and this seems to come home to us quite as\nnaturally as the idea that reason controls action. All plain or\nunambiguous instances of reason or reasoning or intelligence, seem to\ndeal with discovery of fact, couched in a form which is capable of truth\nand falsehood. For our purpose we may treat it as elaborate perception,\nwhether direct or assisted through inference, such as calculation.\nCalculation is the old meaning of reasoning, both in Greek and Latin.\n\nHow do we get across from perception or calculation to anything that can\ninterfere with desire?\n\nOf course there is a meeting-point in the idea that attends desire.\nHuman desire, at least, is not blind. It is desire of something, which\nis before the mind as an idea; and in the case of desire which issues\nin action this something must be mentally specified in respect of the\nparticular means needed to bring it about. And also, the end or purpose\nwhich is desired for its own sake, is, in the connection of cause and\neffect, itself _de facto_ a means to other results _ad infinitum_, more\nor less of which are foreseen by the person who acts. Thus the act,\nas fully presented to the mind in idea, is a complication of external\ncircumstances, which are ideally distinguished, supposing the act to\nbe reflected on, as means, realisation of the purpose, and foreseen\nconsequences both of the means and of the realisation of the purpose.\n\nIt is, I think, all-important to remember, that these distinctions are\ndistinctions of relation to the acting subject, drawn very lightly by the\nacting subject on the shifting surface of a complicated set of results\npresented in idea, and are not at all complete distinctions, and lend\nthemselves very readily to self-deception. We shall see the importance of\nthis remark directly.\n\nIn the meantime, here we have one way in which reasonings about fact do\nhelp to modify our actions. If we know distinctly what we desire, say,\na week\u2019s holiday, then it is reasoning about matters of fact that will\ntell us what we must do to get it, and, in part, what the results will be\nboth of our getting it and of what we do to get it. Now for philosophical\npurposes we need not consider the foreseen consequences separately. They\nmust rank, morally, as means. That is to say, they are something which\nyou have to take into the bargain in order to get what you want. They\ncome in with all the other circumstances in determining whether you like\nthe action or not.\n\nNow is _this_ connection between action and reason what we have in mind\nwhen we say that a person ought to act reasonably, or that reason combats\ndesire? Do we understand by acting reasonably, that assuming some one\npart of the imagined circumstances to represent the purpose, the agent\nhas got all the means to it, and the foreseen consequences of it, and\nthe interdependence of the parts of the purpose itself, set out in a\nconnection which is truly perceived or scientifically inferred?\n\nWe do sometimes appear to mean this. We say: it is unreasonable to ask me\nto be at the station at nine when the train does not start till ten. It\nis unreasonable, you may say, on the ground that the means demanded of\nme are not, scientifically speaking, necessary to the end agreed upon.\nStill more we should pronounce it unreasonable to adopt any means which\nactually defeats your purpose; which could only happen, one would think,\neither from moral self-deception, or in complicated matters where the\nmeans are disputable. This second case does not matter to us; the first\ncarries us a little further, because it suggests that what you call the\nmeans may really contain your purpose, or one of your purposes, perhaps\ninconsistent with another. The hackneyed example of selfish charity is\nas good a case of this unreasonableness as can be found. The gift, which\nis professed to be merely a means to the good of another, is, under all\nthe conditions, a means contrary to that good, and is given because it\ngratifies an impulse of the donor. It might seem, in this case again, a\nfair explanation to pronounce such conduct unreasonable merely because\nthe means adopted are scientifically speaking inconsistent with the end\nproposed. We might bear in mind, however, that we seem to have detected\nhere a probable conflict of ends, not merely of means to an end.\n\nAdmitting, then, for the moment, that we hold conduct to be unreasonable\nif the perception, implied in it, of the relation between means,\nends, and consequences is flagrantly false, do we admit conduct to be\nreasonable _simply_ because the intellectual perception in question is\nclear and true? Taking truth in its ordinary sense, as truth of simple\nfact, we must deny this. I may know perfectly well that so much wine\nwill make me drunk, and may drink it with that object and with that\nresult, and yet no one will pronounce this a reasonable action, though my\njudgment of facts and results was as true and reasonable as could be. It\nmay be, however, that in a larger sense true judgment involves reasonable\naction.\n\nThus it does not seem that truth of perception or correctness of\ncalculation as to the connection of the circumstances which are presented\nin the idea of an act are sufficient to make the act reasonable, although\nserious blunders in the perception or calculation seem to make the act\nwhich implies them unreasonable. I even doubt whether the last clause\nwas rightly stated. I was obliged to say _flagrant_ errors, _serious_\nblunders. For it seems doubtful whether a purely intellectual error, or\nblunder of perception, does make an act \u201cunreasonable,\u201d which owing to\nsuch a blunder misses its mark. I incline to think that the reason why\nwe are forced, in such cases as I have instanced, to lay stress on the\n_flagrancy_ of the blunder, is that it makes us suspect self-deception\nor moral neglect on the part of the agent, makes us suspect, in other\nwords, that the inconsistency between means and ends was not owing to\nmere intellectual misjudgment, but was adopted with open or partially\nopen eyes. I do not think that I _should_ call my friend unreasonable\nfor wanting to meet at the station an hour before the departure of the\ntrain, if he could show me _bona fide_ grounds which made him imagine\nthat it was necessary to arrive so early. I might in that case think him\nmistaken, but should not venture to call him unreasonable, unless his\nmistake seemed so obvious that I thought it was committed on purpose,\nthat is, was not an intellectual mistake at all. When I call him\nunreasonable, perhaps I really suspect he is making a claim on my time\nto meet some private convenience of his own\u2014to avoid a crowd or to make\nsure of some particular carriage, which I do not care about\u2014and therefore\nperhaps it may after all be his _purpose_ that I think unreasonable.\n\nBut there is one great doctrine of reasonableness which does reduce it to\na question of means and ends, and that is, the doctrine that everything\nelse is a means to pleasure, whether that of the agent or that of all\nsentient beings. I do not want to discuss Hedonism psychologically\njust now, I only want to use it as an illustration of one way in which\nintelligence may be alleged to control action. The ultimate theory would\nthen be that this uniform purpose, pleasure, is a natural or obvious, or,\nso to speak, a _given_ purpose, and that all definite action is or has\nbeen prescribed by the intelligence dealing with matter of fact, as a\nmeans to the realisation of this given purpose.\n\nThen reasonable action would mean what our reasoning and perceptive\npowers, dealing with matters of fact, pronounce to make for pleasure,\nand unreasonable action would be all that does not. Here, though I\nwish to avoid hackneyed criticism, I must note that there is a certain\ndifficulty in getting across from the idea of one\u2019s own pleasure to that\nof other people\u2019s pleasure as a natural purpose, and sometimes we find\nthe contention that any person\u2019s pleasure is a _reasonable purpose_ to\nany person, which, like several indications before, takes us out of the\nconnection between reason and the mere calculation of means to an end.\n\nApart from this, I have, for our object, only to refer back to the\nsuspicion with which we regarded these distinctions between means, ends,\nand consequences, in the presented idea of an action. The burden of\nproof lies on those who limit the aspects in and for which activities or\nresults can be or ought to be desired. If we say that the whole complex\nof our moral life is a means to a partial though necessary incident in\nit, it seems to me that we are putting the cart before the horse. If you\ncould really say \u201cmoral life is the means, and pleasure is the end\u201d then\nit would follow that, should calculation tell you that moral life was not\nthe most effectual means, you would not prefer it. Now this old argument\nmay be pronounced unfair on the ground that it puts an impossible case;\njust like the counter-question which is asked by the opposite side, \u201cIf\nmorality led only to increased pain, would you prefer it then?\u201d Still,\nif these two questions together bring out the fact that pleasure is an\nincident of a whole complex of functions and activities which we cannot\nsuppose to be separated from it, we do get this much result, that there\nis no firm ground for distinguishing part of the complex as the end from\nthe rest as the means. And it seems clear, also, that we differentiate\npleasures _in kind_ according to the activities which they accompany,\njust as we have constantly found that the so-called means differentiates\nand qualifies the so-called purpose.\n\nThus I do not think that it is possible to represent the reasonableness\nof action as consisting in its guidance by right calculation of the means\nto an end, not even to the alleged simple and universal end of pleasure.\nAt the same time, this view has one essential element of truth, that is\nthe recognition that a positive impulse or claim can only be combated or\ndefeated by a positive impulse or claim. The view goes so far indeed as\nto say that one form of a general impulse can only be combated by another\nform of that same impulse through the discrepancy of the alternative\nmeans to its attainment. However this may be, so much does seem clear,\nviz. that reasonableness cannot be, as popular language tends to make\nit, something purely negative and prohibitive. Its negative aspect must\nbe secondary, and according to the suggestions furnished by the notions\nwe have been examining, must arise out of a discrepancy between two\nsets of means to the same acknowledged or accepted end. This I think is\nsolid ground, so far that we are bound to deduce the negative side of\nreasonableness from a positive nature, whether a general relation to one\nand the same purpose, or relations to different purposes. We have learnt,\non the other hand, to distrust the absolute distinction between means and\nend.\n\n2. Now I turn for a moment to what I may describe as _maxims_ of\nreasonableness. I will not call them \u201cA priori principles,\u201d because such\nan expression raises a question about the nature of experience which does\nnot concern the point before us. But I do treat them as characteristic of\na view which explains reasonableness rather by rules than by purposes;\nand it seems to follow from this that the rule must be alleged to be\nself-evident, because if they were derivative, they would most naturally\nbe derivative from purposes. But in the history of speculation of course\nthe same principle may be recommended at one time as analogous to an\naxiom of the reasoning power, and at another time as involved in the\npurposes which are recognised as good. Even the same writer may combine\nboth views.\n\nNow if such principles are supported as constituting the reasonableness\nof action, either because connected with the predominance of the\nspeculative intelligence, or because of an analogy between such\nprinciples and any axioms acceptable to the speculative intelligence, I\nbelieve that this support of them is due to a sheer confusion.\n\nI take two only, as illustrations, one of each type I have mentioned.\n\nPlato, it seems to me, constantly fails to distinguish between the\nreasonableness of conduct, and the reasonableness of abstract reasoning,\nthat is, of the scientific intellect. To the moral philosopher,\nscientific or theoretical interest and activity are one interest and\nactivity among others; and the reasonableness of activity is not\ninsured by pursuing an activity of reasonableness. It _may_ be quite\nunreasonable, in the moral sense, to pursue abstract reasoning as a\nvocation in life. When we say that in every man the reason should be\nuppermost, we do not mean that every man should devote himself to\nintellectual pursuits. Plato knows this, as, in a sense, he knows\neverything; but he uses all arguments for his purpose, and among others\nI think he allows it to be supposed that occupation with intellectual\nmatter is in a moral sense a predominance of the reason. I may instance\nhis attempt to prove that intellectual pleasures are the pleasantest,\nmore especially with reference to his aim in making the attempt, which\nis, I suppose, to recommend intellectual occupation as pre-eminently\nreasonable in the moral sense. To this I say No; if and in as far as the\ninference is meant to rest upon an identification of scientific with\nmoral reasonableness, I think it a sheer confusion. It is like saying\nthat because a doctor has to do with the promotion of health, therefore\nit is a healthy profession to be a doctor. But Plato\u2019s argument shows\nhow strongly this idea appealed to him, because he even recommends\nintellectual pleasures on the score of their sheer pleasantness, implying\nnot only that intellectual occupation is reasonableness in the moral\nsense, but that intellectual occupation, even when chosen by way of\nself-indulgence, is still reasonableness in the moral sense. Of course\nthe matter is complicated by a substantive connection, the degree of\nwhich is matter of opinion, between the two things, like that between\nbeing a physician and leading a healthy life. Intellectual exercise and\nambition have a definite influence on certain capacities concerned in the\nreasonable will. But it cannot be made out, that a tendency to the more\nintellectual occupations is in itself a tendency to moral reasonableness.\nMoral reasonableness must be a general characteristic of moral action,\nnot guaranteed by the special content of any form of activity.\n\nNext I have to discuss a principle which is advocated as an expression\nof the morally reasonable, on the ground of having a sort of analogy\nto several maxims or axioms of the intellectual world. It used to be\nsaid that justice is like a square; or that the rightness of an action\nconsists in its conformity to certain eternal proportions impressed upon\nthe world by God. I take one more modern form of these principles as a\ntype of them all. Bentham said, \u201cOne is only to count for one,\u201d and it is\na mere amplification of this when Mr. Sidgwick maintains, if I understand\nhim, that it is objectively reasonable not to prefer my own interest or\npleasure simply because it is my own, to that of some one else. This\nprinciple seems to me a commendable expression of moral judgment, and I\ndo not think that it is needless or empty. There is a famous passage in\nMiddlemarch where the heroine, in a matter which acutely touches her own\nfeelings, thinks to herself, \u201cNow how should I act if I could compel my\nown pain to be silent, and merely consider what is best for the lives of\nall the persons concerned in the situation?\u201d That I suppose is a concrete\nrendering of what this principle means.\n\nBut if we look closer, we see its weak side. It is negative, and\nconsequently abstract. You are not to heed your own feelings unless they\nare such that you would heed them if they were some one\u2019s else in the\nsame circumstances. This amounts to no more than saying, \u201cWe believe\nthere is always, under all circumstances, a right course.\u201d It is strictly\nparallel to the theoretical principles of Uniformity or Causation. \u201cWe\nbelieve that there is an explanation for everything; that nothing changes\nwithout some reason.\u201d These are useful maxims if they make us look for\nthe explanation, and so the other is a useful maxim, if it makes us look\nfor the right course. But it really falls between two stools. It is\nnot capable, as intellectual theorems are, of accurate development and\napplication by measurement and analysis. Yet on the other hand it makes\nno special appeal to any special content, or tendency of reasonableness\nembodied in definite ends. It is neither theoretically fertile, nor is it\na description of a practical influence.\n\nIt is a well-known phenomenon that those who suggest maxims or moral\naxioms of this kind as defining moral reasonableness are apt to be\nreduced to assuming a particular impulse, told off to assist or obey\nthe reason. Such are Plato\u2019s \u201cSpirited\u201d element in the soul, Kant\u2019s\nreverence, Mr. Sidgwick\u2019s general desire to do what is reasonable. This\nseems to me to be creating a rule which has no positive content, and\ntherefore has not the character of a human purpose, and then imagining an\nimpulse to obey it the nature of which is not accounted for in reference\nto any plan of life, but must simply be propounded as an isolated fact.\n\nIt kept suggesting itself to us above that reasonableness could not be\nthoroughly explained on the basis of a distinction between means and\nend, because actual ends are not simple and uniform, but are obviously\nqualified by the so-called means, or context of circumstance. We agreed,\nhowever, that what is reasonable must be so in virtue of a positive\ncontent, whether as means or perhaps as end, and that its negative or\nprohibitive aspect must arise from the conflict of two such positive\ncontents.\n\nWe have in this section looked at two interpretations of moral\nreasonableness apparently suggested by analogies with intellectual\nreasonings or principles, and we could not deny that each of them had a\ncertain appearance of truth, but one seemed to confuse the content with\nthe form, the other to consist of a form without any content.\n\n3. It suggests itself therefore that moral reasonableness must be a\ncharacteristic which we ascribe to purposes of action. Then we get a\nvariety of positive content, without relying on the distinction between\nmeans and end; while the abstract principles which we feel to be\nreasonable fall into their right place as very general descriptions of a\npurpose or scheme of life which can be called reasonable.\n\nBut the idea of a reasonable purpose requires explanation.\n\nFirst, it is irreconcilable with abstract Hedonism. You cannot have any\nrelations within a single and uniform purpose, and reason always involves\nrelations.\n\nSecondly, it is not the most intellectual purpose, the purpose that has\nmost to do with reasoning. I have tried to explain this above.\n\nThirdly, it _is_ such a life or purpose as possesses a self-consistent\nrelation of the parts to the whole. This is the general characteristic of\nany reasonable totality _qua_ reasonable, and it is this which forms the\ngeneral characteristic of reasonable purpose _qua_ reasonable.\n\nThen what is the meaning of the self-consistent relation of parts to the\nwhole in the case of a human scheme of life?\n\nWe cannot demand that our specific purposes should be related consciously\nto the purpose of the universe; because the universe as a whole is the\nobject of theoretical knowledge only, and this does not furnish us with\nthe idea of a concrete purpose at all. It seems then that the whole, by\nconsistency with which human purpose is or is not reasonable, must be the\nwhole of existing human purpose, taken of course as moving in a certain\ndirection, owing to the modification continually introduced through the\nprogressive realisation of purposes. I do not see that more than this can\nbe said without entering upon the analysis of the actual structure of the\nmoral world, of society and of history. What is important seems to me\nto be that we cannot construct the reasonable world of morality from a\ntheoretical view of men in general and of nature. We have to take it as\nit is, and are then perhaps able to show that it is an organised movement\nin the direction of self-consistency of purpose.\n\nIs there not more than one kind or type of self-consistency possible, as\nwhen self-indulgence is restricted simply within the bounds of health and\ndecency? This is the question whether consistency demands completeness,\ni. e. whether mere omission destroys consistency. It has often been\ndiscussed, and I suppose the general answer is that _assuming the unity\nof the total moral movement_, any elements omitted in any portion of the\nmovement must ultimately have their revenge by producing disturbance.\n\nThen if we ask what after all is the relation of the theoretical reason\nto the reasonable will or moral reason, the only answer seems to be\nthat the moral reason, in the individual or in the race, is the body of\nintellectual ideas which are in fact predominant as purposes in either,\nhaving become predominant by the power they have shown of crushing out\nor adjusting to themselves the active associations of all other ideas.\nAnd the power is what might be described as logical power; that is to say\nit depends on the range and depth which enables one idea to include in\nitself as in a system a great variety of minor purposes.\n\nThe intellect as such is for morality in the first instance simply the\nmedium in which the moral world or content of the moral world exists;\nand which therefore conveys to that content its own peculiar character\nof system and totality. Then, further, in theoretical reflection on the\nmoral world, I imagine that we notice this predominance of ideas which\nhave organising power, and we frame to express this predominance such\npredicates as important, right, good. And the whole of these judgments\nwe must call wisdom as opposed to knowledge. But I cannot myself see how\nthese or any judgments can be judgments of the moral reason. They seem\nto me to be, as judgments, necessarily judgments of the theoretic reason\ndealing with the facts of the moral world. But then there is the further\ncomplication that these judgments themselves, forming the content of\nintellectual ideas, may, if they have organising power, become actively\npredominant, and then again they will form a portion of the actual moral\nworld as general ideas or clues, inciting to the active search for\nconcrete ideas which are concordant with them. In this case they are not\nacting _as_ judgments, which are true and false, but only as dominant\ncontents. It is one thing to judge that there is a right in the moral\nworld, and another thing to be mastered by the right in one\u2019s own mind.\n\nIf I am asked, what I mean by the predominance of dominant ideas, which\nI allege to form the content of the reasonable will, I start from the\nposition that every idea would produce action if unchecked, simply by\nsuggestions which through associative reproductions call up the necessary\nmovement. Desire may, I believe, or may not intervene, as a state of\ntension between a pain of want and a pleasure produced by an idea. All\nthat is essential, it appears to me, is this idea which can suggest an\naction.\n\nIn the formed life of a civilised man the organising ideas have long\nasserted their predominant power, and in every moment crush out countless\nintruders each of which has in itself suggestions quite capable of\nleading to action. In childhood or insanity the yielding to every\nsuggestion is a mark of what is called absence or loss of will; that\nis, not the loss of a _general_ power to check minor suggestions, but of\nperfectly _definite_ habitual purposes which check them as a matter of\ncourse.\n\nThis view sounds no doubt like an iron Determinism, and I am not much\nconcerned to defend it from that imputation. After all, if we are\ndetermined by the content of our own minds, why then I suppose we\ndetermine ourselves. And trivial examples of indifferent alternatives\nsuch as \u201cI can blow out this candle or not as I please\u201d seem to me very\npoor representatives of the moral will, compared with the necessary\npressure of an over-mastering idea which drives the man up to the point\nof saying, \u201cThis is what must be decisive with one like me, and I have no\nalternative.\u201d We feel, as we say, that \u201cwe shall have to do it.\u201d Almost\nall really serious action, it seems to me, is of this type. And if I have\nread at all correctly this lesson of the new psychology which owes its\norigin largely to Herbart, it is an instructive meeting of extremes, that\nthe most analytic of psychologies should more than ever represent the\nindividual as the incarnation of a progressive order in ideas.\n\n B. BOSANQUET.\n\n\n\n\nETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE.[4]\n\n\nThere is in the history of jurisprudence no more significant event than\nthe foundation of the historical school by Gustav Hugo and Carl von\nSavigny. Jurisprudence, up to that time, was not a science, at least\nnot a science in the modern acceptation of the term. It was an art,\nwhich the practical lawyer learned and employed in strict conformity\nwith practical traditions, without reflecting on the reasons in virtue\nof which a legal norm or a social institution existed. The only part\nof jurisprudence of a scientific tendency was the philosophy of law.\nThis latter branch had, since Hugo Grotius, emancipated itself from the\nchurch, but it had advanced no farther than to substitute for the will\nof God, to which formerly right and wrong had been traced, the principle\nof human nature, and to found upon the social instincts of man a system\nof natural law,\u2014an ideal jurisprudential state by reference to which\npositive laws were tested in respect of their conformity with the ideally\nright and the ideally wrong. This fundamental conception of the essential\ncharacter of law was only slightly modified by the substitution of the\nhuman reason for human nature. The rational systems of jurisprudence also\nderived the state and the law from the individuality of man, especially\nfrom the social traits of this individuality, and definite notions and\nprinciples were thus enunciated from which state and law were deductively\nconstructed.\n\nThe historical school first introduced a change in all this. It afforded\nthe legal practitioner the possibility of seeing that the law which he\napplied was the slowly ripened product of a course of development that\nextended over many centuries, and it afforded the philosophical juristic\ninquirer the possibility of understanding, that the law was not founded\non immutable ideas and principles, but that it was a product of the\ncreative mind of a nation, that this product was subjected to processes\nof transformation and development, and did not admit of regulation by\nthe individual reason of a single philosophical inquirer. But while the\nhistory of law has become a universally recognised discipline in the\nscience of jurisprudence, the application of its underlying principles\nto the philosophy of law has as yet by no means been universally carried\nout. On the contrary, the reason still plays an extensive r\u00f4le as\nfoundation and evolutionary principle; and to a great extent the history\nof law and the philosophy of law still pursue their solitary ways as\nindependent branches of knowledge.\n\nIn recent times, through the influence of ethnology, jurisprudence has\nentered on a new epoch. A new branch of the science of law has arisen in\nEurope, the so-called ethnological jurisprudence, and has already found\nin Germany, Austria, Italy, France, Belgium, and Holland, enthusiastic\nsupporters. Ethnology, as it is known, is the science that has for the\nsubject of its investigations the totality of phenomena of social life of\nall the peoples of the earth, and which makes use, in this investigation,\nof the methods of inductive inquiry exclusively employed by physical\nand natural science. After the science of ethnology had advanced to a\ncertain point, the extension of ethnological inquiry to the domain of\njurisprudence followed as of course.\n\nTo a certain extent the investigations of the history of law had prepared\nthe way for ethnological jurisprudence. The inductive method was common\nto both. The idea of a history of the development of law was no longer\nstrange to jurisprudence. Only the courage was wanting to allow the eye\nto range over the legal systems of all the peoples of the globe, instead\nof, as before, restricting it to very narrow limits. The historical\ninvestigation of law began in Europe with the history of the Roman law.\nThereupon it was immediately extended to the Germanic laws of Europe, so\nthat now all West-European peoples possess a highly developed history of\nlaw of their own. Recently, also, the history of Slavonic law has been\nassiduously treated.\n\nWhereas in every case here it was a question of the sources of the\nlaws that stood in immediate historical connection with the prevailing\nsystems of Europe, jurisprudential investigation was slowly extended to\nmore remote ethnical fields. The first impulse in this direction came\nfrom comparative philology. This science had succeeded in tracing the\nlanguages of extended groups of peoples back to common primitive tongues.\nAmong these primitive tongues the Aryan, the common original language\nof the Indo-Germanic group of nations, first occupied the attention of\ninquirers, and the law of this group of nations thus became the first\nobject of investigation of a comparative jurisprudence extending beyond\nthe more restricted provinces of the history of law. The provinces of\nGr\u00e6co-Italic, Germanic, Slavic, Celtic, Iranic, and Indian law were\ninvestigated with respect to a common origin, and various agreements and\nvarious deviations were discovered. In very recent times the laws of the\nArmenians and the Ossetes in the Caucasus have been added to the laws of\nthe Aryans, and the laws of the Afghans will probably soon follow these.\n\nA number of more remote provinces of law have also been entered upon, in\nconnection with theological, philological, and connate inquiries. Thus,\nparticularly, in connection with biblical investigation the Israelitic\nlaw, in connection with the study of Arabic the Islamitic, in connection\nwith the decipherment of the hieroglyphic writings the Old-Egyptian,\nin connection with the decipherment of the cuneiform inscriptions the\nSoumerian and the Assyrian-Babylonian, and in connection with sinology\nthe law of China. In very recent times the Japanese law has also been\ntreated.\n\nIn the laws of all these peoples, by the side of many peculiarities, were\nalso found many phenomena of frequent and universal recurrence.\n\nAfter the science of law had so far extended its activity in this\ndirection, it was a final step only that ethnological jurisprudence\ntook when it declared that the subject of juristic science was the\ninvestigation of the laws of _all_ the peoples of the earth. And yet\nthis step was perhaps a more important one than all that had hitherto\nbeen taken. For a considerable group of peoples had up to then been\nentirely neglected by the science of law, namely the uncivilised\npeoples, the so-called primitive peoples or _Naturv\u00f6lker_. And just the\nlaws of these savages furnished the most remarkable disclosures. They\nexhibited everywhere the most singular parallel phenomena, and made it\npossible to open up a complete early history of the law, and to bring\nto light periods of jural development of which the history of civilised\npeoples has preserved but a few unintelligible remains. Ethnological\njurisprudence is thus able to supply complementary information at a point\nwhere the threads of the history of law are lost in the obscurity of\nearly times.\n\nThe condition of jural life in these primitive periods is very singular.\nNo juristic philosopher has ever lighted on the idea that primitive man\ncould exist with such jural conceptions as he actually does. That which\nethnological jurisprudence has brought to light in this connection is\nsomething absolutely new and astonishing, something that no brooding\nbrain could have ever developed out of any idea or principle. Indeed, it\nis so strange that it could not be conceived at all if we did not have it\nbefore our eyes to-day among savage tribes.\n\nThe collecting of the laws of uncivilised peoples constitutes an\nindependent task of ethnological jurisprudence. In this way the latter\nscience will fill up the gaps which historical jurisprudential inquiry\nleft open in our knowledge of the jural life of man. But more important\nthan all, perhaps, will ethnological jurisprudence become for the future\ndevelopment of the philosophy of law. In this connection it goes hand in\nhand with the sociological tendency which dominates our time and has its\nsurest foundation in ethnology.\n\nThe prime significance of ethnological jurisprudence lies in the fact\nthat it is an ethnological science.\n\nAt first ethnology was a purely empirical science. It gathered together\nall the attainable phenomena of ethnic existence, and separately, at\nfirst, among single peoples and tribes. After an extensive store of\nmaterial had accumulated in this manner, the discovery was made that\nin many provinces of ethno-social life, especially in the provinces of\nreligion, law, and morals, especially also in all provinces of social\ncustom, phenomena of essentially similar character presented themselves\namong a great number of peoples in the case of whom neither any original\ntribal relationship nor any infusion from one nation into the other could\nbe assumed; and, curious to say, these were frequently the most singular\nphenomena, of which one would have thought at first that they had sprung\nfrom the individuality of a determinate people. This discovery of\nuniversal ethnographic parallels was all the more surprising in view of\nthe fact that historical special inquiry, whose province up to then had\nbeen essentially national life, had placed especial emphasis on outwardly\nprominent events occurring in a different form in every nation, whereas\nphenomena that appeared uniformly among the different nations were little\nnoticed. People had therefore grown accustomed to regard every nation as\nsomething existing by itself and peculiar to itself, and, particularly,\nhad also declared it as inadmissible to employ phenomena of the life of\none nation to explain corresponding phenomena of the life of another\nnation.\n\nThe discovery of ethnographical parallels led to wholly different ideas.\nIt became clear that a great portion of human ethnical existence was\nnot founded in the peculiar character of particular peoples, but in the\ncharacter of the human race, in the universal nature of man. And it\nbecame in addition clear that that which repeated itself everywhere on\nthe earth, which was therefore an expression of the universal human, was\nsomething entirely different from that which previous philosophy had\ndeclared to be the actual human. It also became clear, at the same time,\nthat the nations thought quite differently from what the individual man\ndid. With this, however, the foundation of the entire previous philosophy\nwas shaken. If the axiom of modern ethnology is correct, namely that it\nis not _we_ that think, but _it_ that _thinks in us_,[5] we shall no\nlonger be able to explain our nature from our consciousness, from our\nego, from our reason, but we shall have to pursue this momentous \u201cIt\u201d\nthat thinks in us, and since we cannot find it _in_ us we shall have to\nsearch for it _outside of_ us in the expressions of the human soul in the\nlife of the race.\n\nThis is the fundamental idea of modern ethnology. It seeks to collect all\nthe expressions of the human soul in the life of the species, and from\nthem to derive its inferences as to the nature of man. It regards ethnic\nexistence as the precipitate of human psychical existence, and not merely\nof that part of it which is conscious, but also of that part of it which\nis unconscious, that which is inaccessible to introspective observation,\nthat which is not thought, but is merely lived. It enlarges accordingly\nthe domain of psychology, which was restricted hitherto to the analysis\nof the human consciousness, by the incorporation of an additional domain\nunmeasured in extent.\n\nThese general conceptions of ethnology are also determinative for\nthe science of ethnological jurisprudence, and from this results its\npeculiarity as contrasted with the other branches of juristic knowledge.\n\nEthnological jurisprudence places the centre of gravity of the science\nof law not like the previous juristic philosophy in the individual jural\nconsciousness, but in the law viewed as a province of ethnic existence.\nIt regards the laws of the nations as the precipitates of that which\nis now active and has been active as jural instinct in the entire\nhuman race. It assumes that when all the phenomena of law in the life\nof the nations have been fixed, an infinitely more valuable material\nwill be drawn therefrom adapted to the disclosure of the nature of law\nthan could have ever in the world been acquired by an analysis of the\nindividual jural consciousness. It does not regard the individual jural\nconsciousness as something innate in man and exempt from the altering\neffects of time, but as a product of the social conditions in which the\nindividual has grown up. It assumes, therefore, that the individual jural\nconsciousness changes with a change of the social conditions, so that a\nman who grows up under different social conditions possesses a different\njural perception. This assumption, if we compare the expressions of the\njural consciousness of races low in the scale of culture with those of\ncivilised peoples, is one that cannot be escaped. We have only to recall\nto mind the irresistible force with which the jural sense of peoples\nthat live under clan-constitutions demand vengeance of blood, whereas\nthis species of retaliation no longer exists in our jural consciousness\nof to-day. Thus there are hundreds and thousands of jural instincts and\nconceptions which are present at certain stages of civilisation and\ndisappear entirely at others.\n\nEthnological jurisprudence therefore assumes, that the juristic\nphilosopher who lays at the foundation of his system essentially his own\njural consciousness, simply enunciates therewith a system of law that\nanswers perhaps to the current conceptions of his time and his people,\nbut which can in no sense lay claim to a value beyond that.\n\nQuite different, on the other hand, are matters conditioned when the\ninquirer has before him the laws of all the peoples of the earth from the\nlowest to the highest. Here he has in his possession a picture of the\njural consciousness of the mind of humanity, which is no longer subject\nto alteration, but which, to the extent that the development of human\njural life has advanced, is complete.\n\nFor the execution of its task ethnological jurisprudence first requires\na collection of the laws of all the peoples of the earth. Each one of\nthese laws is of equal value to ethnological jurisprudence in so far\nas the jural consciousness of humanity has found expression in it in\nany form. Especially deserving of consideration are the laws of the\nso-called savage peoples that have been so much neglected and contemned\nhitherto; since they bring to light the jural consciousness of humanity\nin its germinal stages, and since higher formations are invariably best\nunderstood when we know their first beginnings.\n\nThe solidest basis for ethnological jurisprudence would be furnished by\na monographic treatment of the law of every single tribe and people of\nthe earth. By such monographic treatments the entire social organisation\nof a given tribe or people would be exhibited in all its complicated\nreciprocal relations, and we should be able to follow the law in all the\nthousands of minute ramifications that connect it with the remaining\nprovinces of national life. But such a monographic treatment of the law\nof all the nations of the earth is accompanied with great difficulties,\nand this part of the task of the science of law has as yet been\nundertaken only to a limited extent.\n\nThe condition of affairs is best in this respect where the nations\nthemselves have collected and compiled their legal customs in books of\nlaws. But such collections are found only among peoples that deserve\nto some extent the appellation of civilised peoples. Among the great\nmajority of peoples the law is simply practised and handed down by oral\ntradition, so that here the legal customs must be collected by members\nof foreign civilised nations,\u2014a very difficult labor and one that can be\naccomplished only by persons who take up their abode permanently among\nthe races in question and become thoroughly familiar with their language\nand habits of life.\n\nCollections of this character we possess unfortunately only to a very\nlimited extent, and our knowledge accordingly of the law of uncivilised\npeoples is still very meagre. Even the books of law possessed by the\nvarious peoples have not all been made available to juristic science.\nIn part they have not yet been printed, and in part they have not yet\nbeen translated into a generally understood language. Considerable time\nwill yet be required before the existing material has been made wholly\naccessible.\n\nNot before the legal customs of all the peoples of the earth have been\ncollected will ethnological jurisprudence be in a position to furnish a\nsuccessful solution of the task it has set itself,\u2014the task namely of a\ncausal analysis of all the phenomena of the jural life of the human race.\nYet to a certain extent this task may be undertaken at present, even with\na relatively limited store of material.\n\nThe starting-point for the ethno-juristic investigation of the phenomena\nof jural life is furnished by the ethno-juristic parallels, legal customs\nthat are found uniformly appearing among the nations, without there being\nany reason to assume that one nation has received them from another.\nLegal customs of this character are in part so universally diffused\nover the earth that they may be characterised as a common possession of\nmankind; in part they appear sporadically among unrelated peoples; in\npart they are restricted to more limited domains. The most important\nlegal customs are those that have universal dissemination; for here it\nmay be assumed that they are a necessary emanation of the social side\nof human life. Legal customs that occur only sporadically, but appear\nuniformly among unrelated peoples, must likewise be regarded as the\nproducts of the universal nature of man, yet only as such that _can_\narise under definite conditions of existence. Legal customs that occur\nonly in limited ethnological domains will have to be referred to the\npeculiar character of definite peoples and tribes. Legal institutions of\nuniversal character are, for example, the forms of marriage by capture\nand purchase of the bride, blood-vengeance, the right of refuge, the\nsystems of composition, ordeals, oaths, and so forth. Almost universal\nare the levirate, and the betrothal of children. Sporadically among\nunrelated peoples appear: the seizure of the corpse of the debtor for\ndebt; execution by fasting, whereby the creditor brings pressure to bear\nupon his debtor by having him fast a definite period of time before his\ndwelling; the custom of the chief doing combat with his grown up son,\nto whom the command of the tribe passes if he conquers his father; and\nso forth.[6] Frequently it is the most curious customs that thus recur,\namong peoples that are completely separated from each other by oceans\nand inaccessible mountain ranges and have unquestionably never been in\ncommunication with each other.\n\nThe explanation of these ethno-juristic parallel phenomena is in part\nnot very difficult, inasmuch as many of them can be traced back to\nfixed forms of social organisation. Thus, for example, a whole group\nof universally recurring legal customs is associated with the peculiar\nformation of the clan-constitutions and clan-law which regularly appears\namong uncivilised peoples and characteristically differs from the form of\npolitical organisation familiar to the present age. Many legal customs\nare also based on religious conceptions and social customs, and their\nexplication in such cases is frequently very difficult.\n\nA complete explanation of all the legal customs of all the peoples of\nthe earth with respect to their social causes would exhaust the work of\nethnological jurisprudence as an ethnological discipline. But in the\nsame way that the acquisitions of ethnology are in their turn utilisable\ntowards the constitution of a universal philosophy, to which they will\nimpart perhaps an entirely different character, so will the results\nof ethnological jurisprudence be in their turn utilisable towards the\nconstitution of a universal science of law and for the philosophy of\nlaw, in which probably, through its means also, a powerful change will\nbe inaugurated. These are the ideas, traced in their most general\ncharacters, that may be regarded as the fundamental ones in \u201cethnological\njurisprudence.\u201d\n\n ALBERT HERMANN POST.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[4] Translated from the manuscript of Dr. Albert Hermann Post by Thomas\nJ. McCormack.\n\n[5] Bastian.\n\n[6] The reader will find a brief survey of the ethno-juristic parallels\nappearing among the various peoples of the earth, in a treatise of mine\nentitled _Ueber die Aufgaben einer allgemeinen Rechtswissenschaft_\n(1891), pp. 27 to 72.\n\n\n\n\nAMERICAN POLITICS.\n\n\nNothing in this country appears to the stranger more intricate and\ninexplicable than our politics. The different parties, two big ones and\nseveral little ones, the various machines, county, state, and national,\nthe \u201cbosses,\u201d \u201cheelers,\u201d and \u201cworkers\u201d present such a confusion of ideas\nand a terminology so varied, that it is only after many years that\nthe foreigner begins to comprehend our system of government and the\nprinciples underlying our political movements. Indeed, the majority of\nAmericans themselves are no better off and have no clear perception of\nthe part they are playing in the administration of affairs or the ethical\neffects of the ballot which they cast. Ask the ordinary voter why he\nsupports the candidates of a certain party and you will find that his\nreasons are reducible to a few concrete facts, and are rarely governed by\nany general principles.\n\nIn the Southern states the vast majority of the whites are democrats\nthrough opposition to the republican party which fought the war and\ndeprived them of their slaves. The negroes on the other hand are\nrepublicans because it is to that party they owe their freedom, and\nfrom it they expect protection for themselves in the exercise of their\npolitical rights and the blessings of opportunity for education. The\npolitical question there becomes a race question, utterly regardless\nof the principles which the two great parties represent. Let there be\na complete change of platforms and the result would be precisely the\nsame as it has been for the past generation\u2014the South would still remain\ndemocratic, and the votes of their presidential electors would still be\ncast for the candidates of that party.\n\nThere is a minor race question in the feeling against foreigners, more\nespecially Irish, Italians, and Germans, influenced to some extent by\nthe fact that a large number of these foreigners are Roman Catholics and\nthat there is an uneasy suspicion on the part of some Americans that the\nCatholic church is hostile to the spirit of democracy, a suspicion not\nentirely unfounded if one should judge solely by the sayings and doings\nof some of the prelates of that church for the past forty years. This\n\u201cKnow-nothing\u201d sentiment at one time threatened to create a solid foreign\nvote in opposition. Germans and Irish united under the protecting wings\nof Tammany Hall and, aided by clergymen who hoped to obtain part of the\nstate educational fund for their private parochial schools, formed a\nstrong ally to the national democratic party. Happily prejudices of race\nand religion are dying out and neither party can now claim a monopoly\nof the foreign vote. Strange as it may seem, however, the Irish and\nGerman elements, so recently the objects of proscription themselves,\nhave in late years become embittered against the Chinese. To the patient\nindustry of the Mongolian immigrants is due the building of the Pacific\nrailroads, when it would have been impossible to obtain white labor, and\nthe cultivation and development of the Pacific coast states. Congress was\nterrorised into passing the law excluding all Chinese laborers. It was\nmore than race prejudice which contributed to this hatred of the Chinese.\nThe chief reason for Chinese exclusion was an economic one. Great masses\nof laborers feared that the Chinese by immigrating in vast numbers would\ndeprive them of work by taking their places at lower wages, and, having\nthe ballot, they dictated to Congress the terms of the Anti-Chinese Act.\n\nThe alien contract labor law is a measure conceived in the same\nspirit and directed against the hiring of laborers abroad by American\ncontractors, who could thus displace their employ\u00e9s at lower wages by\nHungarians, or Poles, or Russians, ignorant of the language of this\ncountry and whose compensation could be the more easily reduced to a\nbare maintenance, and who in sickness or old age could be turned out on\nthe roads to die without costing the contractor any contraction of his\nbank account. There was some excuse for this law, or at least for the\nfeeling which prompted it, when the miners of a whole section could be\nevicted and they and their families made to suffer the pangs of slow\nstarvation because the owners of the coal lands found they could obtain\nhuman machines at a less cost from abroad. It was natural that the\nlaborers should demand a law which offered some immediate relief even\nat the risk of meeting wrong with wrong, rather than that they should\nattempt to regulate affairs on abstract principles of justice while their\nstomachs were empty and their wives and children were dying for want of\nsufficient nourishment. That feeling, however, is also vanishing and\nAmerican workingmen are beginning to see that the increase in population,\nnative-born as well as that imported by contract, is steadily adding to\nthe number of competitors and lowering the rate of wages. Their attention\nis becoming more and more directed to the opening of new opportunities\nfor work rather than to the restricting of the number of workers.\n\nAnother class of men, if they vote at all, do so on no general principle\nof public welfare, but solely for their own advantage at the expense of\ntheir fellow men. These are to be found among the rich manufacturers, the\ncoal, and iron, and railway kings, and the manipulators of the crops of\nthe nation. Rarely casting a ballot in person, they give notice to their\nthousands of employ\u00e9s that if the latter do not support the candidates\nor the party which they happen to favor, the employ\u00e9s\u2019 places will be\ngiven to more pliant servants. These men are as non-partisan as the most\nardent reformer could wish. One of them, a few years ago when questioned\nby an investigating committee of the New York state legislature, said:\n\u201cIn a republican district I was a strong republican; in a democratic\ndistrict I was democratic; and in doubtful districts I was doubtful, but\nin politics I was an Erie railroad man every time.\u201d Another famous man\nof the same type said he had no politics; that he found it cheaper to\nbuy up one set of legislators after they were elected than to purchase\ntwo sets of candidates before election. These corrupt men, counting\ntheir wealth by tens of millions, influencing state legislatures and the\nnational Congress, and throwing their weight into Presidential campaigns,\nconstitute the chief \u201cdangerous class\u201d in the United States to-day,\nfar more threatening to the permanency of free institutions than the\nanarchists who were hanged at Chicago.\n\nThen there are the illy-paid employ\u00e9s of these men who do their bidding\nat the polls, voting for the candidates of their masters. Promise of\noffice or patronage lures others into the support of one party or the\nother. Lastly come the poorest of the poor who live in the most miserable\ntenement houses, or when single hive in the big lodging-houses which\nare found chiefly in New York and Chicago. A ton of coal or a barrel of\nflour is the bribe to the former, frequently effected through the medium\nof the poor wretch\u2019s wife who does not care for politics but sees a very\nmaterial advantage in the food or fuel offered by the ward worker. The\nlodging-house voters, paid by drinks of whiskey or dollar bills, until\nrecently in New York were marshalled in squads of twenty or thirty early\non the morning of election day, given their ballots and compelled to hold\nthem aloft between the thumb and forefinger of the right hand so that\nthe heeler or paid servant of some political faction might watch them\nfrom the moment they took their place in the line of voters until their\nballots were handed to the election inspectors and dropped in the box.\nBoth parties wink at such frauds and their henchmen directly countenance\nand assist in them but the party that happens to be in the majority in\nany locality is usually the one most guilty. The result is that the\nminority affects great virtue and loudly denounces the corruption of its\nopponents.\n\nAmong those who do vote on principle are the prohibitionists, the\ngreenbackers, the adherents of ephemeral labor parties and the\nsocialists. The anarchists generally refrain from voting because they\ndo not believe in any government by force and say that an enlightened\npublic opinion will lead the people to dispense with such things as the\narmy and navy and police and law courts. The socialists occasionally\nvote for the men of other parties whom they think represent the worst\nmeasures, in order the sooner, as they frankly avow, to produce\nrevolutionary conditions, which they expect would assist them greatly\nin their propaganda. The prohibitionists, greenbackers, and labor men\neach take a partial view of political economy. The first see the evils\nand degradation arising from intemperance and think that everything\nelse must yield to the one consideration of the abolition of the liquor\ntraffic. The panacea of the greenbackers consists in the destruction of\nthe monopoly of the currency now enjoyed by the national banks. The labor\nmen have different shibboleths at different times such as the prevention\nof child labor in factories, an eight-hour work-day and the like\u2014measures\nwhich might effect some relief but are minor matters compared with the\ngreat social problem of the increase of poverty in the midst of the\ngreatest productive energies which the world has ever seen, a problem\nwhich is rapidly coming to the front and overshadowing all others.\n\nBut these minor movements hardly produce a ripple on the surface of our\npolitical waters. There are only two parties worthy of the name in the\nUnited States to-day, as there have been but two ever since the days of\nThomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. These parties go on forming\nplatforms chiefly on the theory of offending the least number of voters\nand phrasing their declarations in vague terms which may be explained one\nway in one part of the country and another way in another part. Such is a\ncursory view of the field of American politics to-day.\n\nIt may seem that I have made out a pretty bad indictment of corruption\nagainst our politics and that the view of the cynic is correct that\nAmerican politics are desperately wicked and there is no health in them.\nBut the moral forces which are operating in the world are fortunately\nnot dependent upon the changeable methods or the selfish objects of\nmen. It is here in America, perhaps more than anywhere else, that the\nnatural laws of social development have fullest play. It is here that\nthe evolution of politics is working itself out freely, untrammelled by\ntradition or custom. It is here that the ultimate ideal of politics will\nfirst be reached. When the framers of the Declaration of Independence\nformulated their proposition that governments derive their just powers\nfrom the consent of the governed, a step in the right direction was\ntaken\u2014a step that was in accordance with our old Saxon traditions, yet\nfor the first time in the world\u2019s history made on an extended scale, to\nbase human government on the principles of natural law. And through all\nthe vicissitudes of our country, its struggle for independence, its\nwar for the liberation of its commerce, its civil conflict which would\nhave dismembered any other nation, or would have left one section the\nsubjugated serfs of the other, through a disputed presidential election\nwhich strained the written constitution to its utmost, the great moral\nforce of natural law has been working, now through one party, now through\nanother, gathering impetus as it goes and giving promise always of better\ntimes to come.\n\nIt is in this broad view that all the petty thieveries and striving for\nplace and power sink into utter insignificance. The people do still rule.\nThey may sleep for a time but are sure, sooner or later, to assert their\nrights in accordance with the instincts of the human mind, which are\ngood and not bad. As long as the suffrage shall exist it is reasonably\ncertain that this American government, \u201cof the people, by the people, for\nthe people,\u201d shall not perish from the earth. If the wealthy monopolists\ncould control the suffrage, the prospects might be different. The freedom\nof the voter has been impaired to a certain extent but the American\npeople with quick instincts have awakened to the danger. The Australian\nsystem of voting, which secures secrecy and freedom from intimidation and\nalmost extinguishes bribery is now becoming very popular. Fifteen of the\nstates have adopted it and the other twenty-nine will, no doubt, follow\ntheir example in a few years. But the introduction of measures for its\nestablishment presented the curious anomaly of being opposed by democrats\nin some localities and by republicans in others, both for partisan\nreasons, constitutional and high moral pretexts being of course advanced.\nWhen it becomes the general law, it will do more than anything else to\npurify electoral methods.\n\nEntirely above the question of methods, however, there are certain\nprinciples involved in American politics which it becomes of the highest\nimportance to comprehend and which furnish the key to the apparently\ninexplicable confusion. These principles, it seems to me, are reducible\nto two, which may be likened to the centripetal and centrifugal forces in\nnature. As both are needed for the stability of the physical universe,\nso both the centralising and decentralising tendencies in politics are\nnecessary for the co-ordination of the state. It is in the free play\nof these forces, each in its proper sphere, that lies the assurance of\nthe perpetuity of American institutions. But as the ideal has not yet\nbeen reached, the practical result is that one tendency begins to act,\nat first legitimately, then from the aggrandisement of power and the\n\u201ccohesive force of public plunder\u201d the administrators of government\nattempt to stretch it unduly, the opposition comes to power and the\nsame story is repeated. In each case the liberal party succeeds the\nconservative, acts at first wisely, then corrupted by the subtle\ntemptations of place and power, and wishing to retain both, it becomes\nopposed to change and begets a new conservatism, while new liberals arise\non a higher plane of evolution to continue the never-ending struggle. And\nit must be recollected that the conservative party of each generation is\nfar more liberal than the one which it displaced, thus giving assurance\nof perpetual progress.\n\nThis has been the epitome of all American history; each party\ngovernment, by whatever name it may have been known, has been liberal in\ncomparison with its predecessor and conservative as to its successor.\nWhen Washington organised his administration it was no doubt regarded\nin Europe as highly revolutionary and anarchistic. But such a class\ngovernment, with laws of entail and slavery, and cruel punishments for\npetty offences, as existed then, would not be tolerated for a single year\nat the present time. Thomas Jefferson who founded the democratic party,\nthen called the republican, was a consistent opponent of aristocracy\nand personally was a man far in advance of his time, but most of his\nfollowers would be horrified if they should now come back to earth and\nsee the powers possessed by the general government to-day, necessary,\nlegitimate powers, without which the affairs of the nation could not be\nadministered for a single week. The United States soon got rid of laws\nof entail and the established churches. The democracy came to power and\nheld it nearly sixty years. Long continuance in office endeared its\npossession to that party while the very growth of the nation, from five\nmillions to thirty-one millions, demanded changes in internal policy\nwhich were not forthcoming. There were not lacking signs of popular\ndiscontent. In 1840 the democrats met their first defeat, and for three\nor four presidential terms the votes vibrated between the democrats and\nthe whigs. But the latter were not united on a consistent policy. They\nneeded a principle. The principle was shaping itself. Slavery, which had\nbeen abolished in the Northern states, was gradually strengthening in\nthe South. The democrats forgot, or rather most of them never learned,\nthat true democracy knows no distinction of color. The abolitionists\nwere denounced by press and pulpit as socialists, as the disturbers of\npublic order, as blasphemers against the very law of God contained in\nHoly Writ. The people, however, returned to power these same socialists\nand the institution of chattel slavery was doomed. That would have been\nthe case in any event, but the civil war precipitated it, just as many\nother unjust wars in history have resulted in disestablishing the very\ninstitutions to perpetuate which the wars were made.\n\nThe republican party grandly and patriotically fulfilled its mission. By\ndegrees, however, the enormous destruction of wealth during the war and\nthe heavy debt entailed by it, created a burdensome system of taxation\nwhich substituted self-interest for patriotism. Duties were laid upon\nimports from abroad heavier than those which formed one of the chief\ncauses for the revolt of the colonies against Great Britain. These duties\nenabled American manufacturers to make on American soil the same class\nof goods that were imported and charge the same price as the imported\ngoods enhanced by the duty, of course pocketing for themselves the extra\nprofit which the tariff aided them to obtain from consumers. The quickest\nway to wealth was to start some manufacture, get the government to put a\ntax on similar articles imported and pocket the difference, or to get an\ninternal revenue measure passed taxing a certain line of domestic goods,\npay the tax in the first instance and then charge it to the consumers\nwith of course a good commission added for patriotic services. As long as\nthe government had work for every man who could shoulder a musket, the\npernicious effect of the system was not clearly seen. But when the war\nwas over and one million men returned to productive avocations, wages\nbegan to fall. Then the question of taxation inevitably came to the\nfront and has now become the living issue of the hour. The needle of the\nsuffrage is again vibrating, the republican party has been deprived of\npower for four years and the democratic President emphasised the issue by\npushing the question of tariff reform to the foreground. His re-election\nwas defeated, but the question is debated with more vigor than ever, and\nall signs point to absolute free trade as one of the certainties of the\nfuture. Judging from the last Congressional elections, the people have at\nlast turned their faces in the right direction.\n\nIt will be noticed that two elements, which I have called the centripetal\nand the centrifugal, have been predominant in shaping American politics.\nThey may be termed the socialistic and the anarchistic forces. Socialism\nclaims the direction of everything by a strong centralised government.\nAnarchists say with the democrats, \u201cThat government is best which governs\nleast,\u201d and logically argue for the abolition of all government. Now,\nthe right or wrong of these principles depends upon their application.\nOnly the most rabid anarchist would object to the Post Office, for\ninstance, and few socialists would claim that the state has a right to\nregulate a man\u2019s clothing or his religion. It is on the question as to\nwhat subjects these principles should be applied that all our American\nparties arise. The early federalists were socialistic in that they\nbelieved in a strong central government and in relegating as few things\nas possible to the states. President Jefferson introduced the anarchistic\nor centrifugal principle of decentralisation and individualism. But as\nthe nation grew, it was seen that this wrought injustice, especially in\nthe matter of slavery which was a violation of human rights, however the\ndifferent states might regard it. Then the socialistic or centripetal\nprinciple began to act and slavery disappeared. Now it seems likely\nthat the individualistic principle will again become dominant in an\nattempt to abolish all fiscal restrictions upon trade. After this may\nfollow the socialistic principle of state ownership of railways and\ntelegraphs. Perhaps this will be the work of the new political forces\nevidently gathering, as foreshadowed by the Farmers\u2019 Alliance, after the\nbreaking-up of parties and after the democrats, having given us free\ntrade, will have resumed their natural position of conservatives. Then,\nin the remoter future, may come the anarchistic principle of the removal\nof the restrictions against female suffrage. And so it will go on, first\none principle acting and fulfilling its mission, then the other, each\nbringing the nation to a higher plane of progress and uniting it more and\nmore closely with the grand upward march of the human race.\n\nWhat is this, after all? It is not socialism. It is not anarchy. It is\nneither democracy nor republicanism. It is EVOLUTION. It does not depend\non the temporary success of party governments for its action. It does not\neven solely result from our unique position or our independence wrested\nfrom Great Britain. Back of it lie the broad principles of British\nliberty, of common law, of Magna Charta won from King John on the plains\nof Runnymede. Back of it is the great wave of democracy arising out of\nthe darkness of the Middle Ages. Back of it are the injunctions of Him\nof Galilee who taught the natural law as no man ever taught before. Back\nof it is Roman jurisprudence and Greek art and culture and the early\nefforts of the days when Cadmus brought the alphabet to Europe with his\nPh\u0153nician colony. Indeed, back of it lies the primeval impulse of the\nfirst man, God-endowed, ape-descended, who stood upon his feet and began\nto think. We may carry our thoughts still further to the times when the\nred sunlight first filtered through the thick clouds upon an uninhabited\nworld, and still further may we go in thought into the ages of eternity,\nand assert with fullest confidence that the principles of progress to-day\nworking themselves out in politics are but the reflection of the divine\nideals founded in the laws of nature.\n\nCan the course of such progress be turned back? Can we despair of the\nfuture in the light of all the past? Is not the general movement onward\nand upward? Will not the sneers at ephemeral phases of our American\npolitics pass away with the incidents which they justly condemn, while\nthe principles of progress remain forever?\n\n THOMAS B. PRESTON.\n\n\n\n\nARTIFICIAL SELECTION AND THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM.[7]\n\n\nBy artificial selection I mean all conscious and purposive arrangements\nbetween men and women which have in view character of offspring. This is\nopposed to natural selection which is merely instinctive unteleological\nunion with one of the opposite sex as impelled by animal passion or\nromantic love. All sexual union among the lower animals is by natural\nselection; they do not forecast consequences, and by conforming to\nknown laws determine consequences. Among the lower races of men natural\nselection is the sole or at least dominant factor in marital matters,\nbut as civilisation advances artificial selection becomes a more and\nmore powerful element. A truly thoughtful and intelligent man in our\nday in view of marriage will most carefully consider his own life\nhistory and that of his parents and ancestors, and also that of his\nintended partner and her ancestors, as to physical or mental disease,\nwhich might be handed down to the issue of the proposed union. He\nwould not, for instance, marry into a family which has a tendency to\nconsumption or insanity, for this would be a crime against his possible\ndescendants. Further, this growth of artificial selection with the\nprogress of society is manifest not only as regards individual action but\nby state regulation. Even in barbarous states it soon becomes evident\nto the leaders that if strong healthy men are to be had to defend and\nmaintain the nation, strict attention must be paid to the character of\nthose who marry. In Sparta and other ancient states this principle was\nrecognised, and modern governments seek in many more or less indirect\nways to encourage marriage between the most fit, so that good citizens\nand warriors may be raised up to serve the state. All this regulation\nof marriage by either individual or state action which looks to the\ncharacter of offspring I term artificial selection.\n\nIn the evolution of man as a rational animal artificial selection will\nmore and more prevail, and human breeding will become a well defined\nart. Man is always artificial,[8] and it is his goal to become in all\nhis life unnatural and thoroughly artful. There can ultimately be no\n_laissez-faire_ policy as to marriage or any other institution. The\nhistory of marriage is the history of the gradual retirement of natural\nselection; but art has come in here more slowly than in other relations\nof life owing to tremendous conservatism and the power of human passion.\nBut the time has now come when man must more than ever before attend by\nartificial selection\u2014that is, purposed care\u2014to the perpetuation of the\nspecies in the line of its true advancement, spiritual achievement. I do\nnot now see how the necessity of artificial selection can be gainsaid by\nany one who takes a broad view of the evolution of the race.\n\nThe methods of artificial selection are either negative, which restrain\nthe unfit from propagating, or positive, which encourage the fit to\npropagate. The most radical negative method is mutilation, and is\nemployed by man with the lower animals and with slaves, but this\nplan could hardly be used by civilised society for human breeding.\nImprisonment temporarily restrains some classes of society from\nperpetuating themselves. Prevention of conception is at present mostly\na voluntary means, but accomplishes the elimination of both fit and\nunfit. Celibacy of monk and nun, of bachelor and maid, works also in both\ndirections. In many indirect ways society discourages from marriage those\nwhom it supposes to be unfit as tested by wealth, rank, or birth.\n\nIt is not, however, so much by the extension of any negative methods, but\nrather by positive means that artificial selection may be best employed.\nI will mention three forms by which human breeding might be materially\nadvanced.\n\nBy common law and custom the wife surrenders herself physically to submit\nand morally to obey the husband. This is not for the most part harshly\nand literally carried out in civilised countries; still there is a vast\ndeal of oppression which is hidden from all eyes, and which is often\npassively received by women as her rightful lot. This again is a subject\nupon which delicacy\u2014perhaps unwise\u2014forbids free discussion, but its\nbearing is manifest. If women have the choice to bear or not to bear, and\nshe with educated conscience choose by fitness of offspring, a large and\npowerful element of artificial selection may be introduced. Again all\ngovernments have laws concerning marriage which act in general toward\nencouraging the fit. Certain conditions as to age, etc., being fulfilled,\nthe state grants a marriage licence, and public opinion might easily be\nled to make the requirements more stringent. As a physician has suggested\nto me a certificate of health from an approved medical examiner might\nbe required of all applicants for legal marriage. This would certainly\nbe a strong measure of artificial selection, and would save much misery\nspringing from ignorance and vice. It surely seems scarcely fitting that\nthose who cannot pass an examination for life insurance freely contract\nmarriage with view to issue.\n\nBut the plan of artificial selection which seems to me most feasible at\nthe present time would be voluntary associations of men and women who\nbind themselves to learn and apply the laws of heredity in their marriage\nrelations, to seek for expert guidance, and in all their life to live not\nmerely purely, but according to reason and science. Heredity societies\nof this stamp which should favor marriages only between members would\nultimately become a rational aristocracy, and true and good blood would\nbe perpetuated in the best manner. There is much, indeed, to be done in\nthe science of heredity, especially as regards laws of transmission of\nmental and moral qualities,[9] but still we have even now a sufficient\nbasis of knowledge to make the experiment well worth trying.\n\nMany objections can be raised to such schemes. For instance, it will\nbe said that they might assure us of obtaining men of talent, but we\nshould forever lose men of genius. If such societies were in, vogue in\nthe Elizabethan period, we might never have had a Shakespeare. What\nlikelihood that a scientific expert would advise the marriage of John\nShakespeare and Mary Arden! I answer that we should have had a dozen\nShakespeares instead of one. The law of the production of geniuses is\nnot beyond human ken. Maud S. is truly a genius in horseflesh, but\nshe came into the world in no fortuitous or instinctive way, but by\nscientific breeding. The applicability of similar foresight in breeding\nmen would produce geniuses in abundance. It may not be accomplished in an\nexactly analogous manner, an expert leading around eminent men to \u201cmake\nthe season,\u201d but the analogous practical results will nevertheless be\nobtained.\n\nAnother objection which might be urged is that any such scheme would\nseriously diminish population. True; but what thoughtful man applies\nthe numerical test to the progress of the race! It is not quantity of\ncitizens but quality, which constitutes the true greatness of states. The\ncounting of heads instead of what is in heads, is a mistake into which\ndemocracies are peculiarly apt to fall. Were all men exactly equal a\ncensus would be a true test, but considering the tremendous inequalities\nin humanity it is sheer folly for a country to glory in the number of its\nadherents, or a sect in the number of its adherents, or a city in the\nnumber of its citizens. Civilisations are weighed down and ultimately\ncrushed by the dead weight of the masses. The barbarian is not without\nbut within the civilisation. By recent inquiries in New York and Chicago\nthe slums appear to be five times as prolific as the most aristocratic\nportions; and while good may come from the lowest born, and bad from the\nhighest born, still the chances are decidedly in favor of the high born.\nA few rise above the level of their birth, a few sink below it, but the\ngreat majority of men remain for their lives on the general level of\nsociety in which they were born. The United States would be a greater\nnation with 10,000,000 choice inhabitants than with ten times 10,000,000\nof the ill bred and low bred. Athens by the vulgar test of numbers was\nbut a small and mean city, but in true greatness as revealed in far\nreaching spiritual power, she stands in the very forefront.\n\nAgain it will be objected that scientific schemes for human breeding\nwould inevitably destroy that beautiful flower of Christian civilisation,\nthe poetry and romance of love. Sentiment and chivalry would wither, and\nbrutality and cold calculation would supplant all tender and refined\nemotion. I should answer that the true refinement which refuses to\nobtrude the things of sense, and true purity which refuses to dwell on\nthem salaciously, are perfectly compatible with the fullest knowledge\nand the consequent action. Lubricity breeds best upon a half knowledge\nacquired in dubious ways. A serious practical scientific treatment of\nthis subject will not glorify the flesh with the fierce gusto of Walt\nWhitman, nor, with the Zola school, dwell upon animalism with the morbid\ndetail of a heated imagination; but it will bring into the clearest light\nthe laws of sex and the rules for the development of the human race into\nthe perfect man. These laws of nature, which science reveals, are laws of\nduty and laws of God, and when once appropriated as such by Ethics and\nReligion, they will become the basis for all that is high in emotion and\nchivalrous in action.\n\nIn that most vital of matters, human breeding, man is far behind his\nprogress in all other spheres of action; but here as elsewhere Science\nmust enter, not to destroy but to fulfil, to build up manhood and\nwomanhood into the perfected relations which can only come from rational\naction, illuminated by complete knowledge, and sanctioned by noblest\nsentiment.\n\n HIRAM M. STANLEY.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[7] In an article in _The Arena_ for June, 1890, I endeavored to plainly\nset forth the renewal of society from its lowest elements as the\ngreatest disease in our social life, and to show that the remedy lies\nin a thorough application of science to human breeding. Just how this\napplication was to be made I did not state, for I did not include this\nin the scope of my discussion. Mr. Stead in his _Review of Reviews_ for\nJuly, 1890, and Mr. Wallace in the September _Fortnightly Review_ and\nOctober _Popular Science Monthly_, 1890, have drawn inferences on this\npoint which I am not prepared to allow. Mr. Stead speaks in headlines and\nin text of \u201cmurder, mutilation, or imprisonment\u201d as the methods which I\nhint at, and Mr. Wallace remarks upon my views \u201cthat such interference\nwith personal freedom in matters so deeply affecting individual happiness\nwill never be adopted by the majority of any nation, or if adopted would\nnever be submitted to by the minority without a life-and-death struggle.\u201d\nIt seems incumbent then on me to state more clearly what I understand\nby artificial selection, and what forms of it are most expedient at the\npresent time.\n\n[8] By artificial I understand not what is unnatural or against nature\nbut that which is after conscious deliberation more in accord with the\nlaws of nature. It is a higher degree of the natural.\n\n[9] See my remarks on this point in _Nature_, Oct. 31, 1889.\n\n\n\n\nTHOUGHT AND LANGUAGE.\n\n\nI have read with interest Prof. Max M\u00fcller\u2019s paper on the above subject\nin the current issue of _The Monist_, not only because it is in large\npart devoted to a consideration of my own work on \u201cMental Evolution,\u201d\nbut still more because the explanations which it supplies touching\ncertain points of disagreement between us appear to show that I have\nnot misrepresented his statements, even if, as he alleges, I have\nmisapprehended his meanings.\n\nThe work to which allusion has just been made was published in 1888, and,\nas far as I am aware, it is only now that Prof. Max M\u00fcller has sought to\nmeet my views as there expressed. Hence we may take it that his answer\nis, at all events, well matured. Furthermore, we may take it, from the\ntone in which his answer is conveyed, that he credits me with having had\nat least an honest desire to understand, and accurately to represent,\nhis meaning in all the places where I have ventured to criticise it. It\nappears, however, that at all events in one important respect I have\nbetrayed \u201ca complete misapprehension\u201d of his meaning\u2014viz. with reference\nto his \u201ctheory of the origin of roots\u201d (_The Monist_, p. 582); and it is\nfor the purpose of correcting this misapprehension that he has published\nthe latter half of his present paper. My reply, therefore, must take\nthe form of excusing myself for the complete misapprehensions which are\nalleged.\n\nIt is desirable at the outset to emphasise a distinction which I was\ncareful to draw in my work on \u201cMental Evolution in Man\u201d\u2014that, namely,\nbetween philology and philosophy. A man may be an excellent authority on\nthe \u201cScience of Language,\u201d and yet but a very indifferent writer on the\n\u201cScience of Thought.\u201d On the other hand, a man may know nothing at first\nhand touching the special province of a philologist, and nevertheless\nbe fully capable of criticising what a philologist has published in the\nway of theoretical deductions from his facts\u2014especially where these\ndeductions quit the sphere of philology, and soar into that of Darwinian,\nor anti-Darwinian, speculation. This distinction, indeed, between the\nparticular science of philology and the general scope of philosophy,\nProf. Max M\u00fcller himself recognises where he says: \u201cWhile the student\nof language seems to me to have a perfect right to treat the roots of\nlanguage as ultimate facts, it is difficult for the philosopher not to\nlook beyond.\u201d (_The Monist_, p. 579.) Nevertheless he complains of me\nbecause, while accepting all his philological facts upon his authority\nas a philologist (save in so far as they are not accepted by other\nphilologists), I have been obliged to express dissent from not a few\nof his theoretical deductions\u2014especially, as I have already indicated,\nwhere these have reference to the general doctrine of evolution as\napplied to the mind of man. But how, I may ask, could a treatise be\nwritten on \u201cMental Evolution in Man,\u201d or \u201cThe Origin of Human Faculty,\u201d\nwithout considering the results which have been gained by the science\nof comparative philology? Or how can it be maintained that, in order to\ndeal with these results in relation to the general theory of descent, a\nwriter must first of all himself become an authority in that particular\nscience? At any rate, I deemed it enough for the only purposes which I\nhad in view, to read attentively all the leading authorities in this\nscience, and, after extracting from them the information upon matters of\nfact which their researches had established, to show what I regarded as\nthe bearing of these facts upon the theory of mental evolution. Nor can I\nplead guilty to the charge of arrogant presumption, which the following\nwords appear to convey:\n\n \u201cWe see in his case how dangerous it is for a man who can claim\n to speak with authority on his own special subject, to venture\n to speak with authority on subjects not his own. Professor\n Romanes has, no doubt, read several books on philology and\n philosophy, but he is not sufficiently master of his subject to\n have the slightest right to speak of men like Noir\u00e9, Huxley,\n Herbert Spencer, to say nothing of Hobbes, with an air of\n superiority. That is entirely out of place.\u201d (_The Monist_, p.\n 383.)\n\nNow that any such \u201cair of superiority\u201d occurs in my book, I must deny\u2014and\nthis is a matter of fact. Noir\u00e9 is alluded to only with reference to\nhis theory of the origin of language, which I go further in accepting\nthan does any \u201cphilosopher\u201d or \u201cphilologist,\u201d with the single exception\nof Prof. Max M\u00fcller himself. Huxley is mentioned in several places as a\nleading authority on anatomical matters, where my argument requires an\nauthoritative statement upon them. Herbert Spencer, curiously enough,\nis never mentioned at all; while Hobbes is named only once, and then as\nsustaining, by a \u201cshrewd analysis,\u201d an opinion which I am advocating by\nquotations from recognised authorities in philosophy. Truly, therefore,\nit would be well for my critic \u201cto say nothing of Hobbes\u201d; and better\nstill if he had looked at my index before condemning my supposed\ntreatment of Herbert Spencer, Huxley, and Noir\u00e9. As it is, his allusion\nto these names \u201cis entirely out of place.\u201d\n\nBut even apart from this particularly unfortunate allusion, his more\ngeneral charge as to my \u201cventuring to speak authoritatively on subjects\nnot his [my] own,\u201d is equally out of place. The following is my\nintroduction to the chapter on Comparative Philology, and I cannot see\nthat it betokens any \u201cair of superiority\u201d:\n\n \u201cIn now turning to this important branch of my subject, I may\n remark, _in limine_, that, like all the sciences, philology can\n be cultivated only by those who devote themselves specially\n to the purpose. My function, therefore, will here be that\n of merely putting together the main results of philological\n research, so far as this has hitherto proceeded, and so far\n as these results appear to me to have any bearing upon the\n \u2018origin of human faculty.\u2019 Being thus myself obliged to rely\n upon authority, where I find that authorities are in conflict,\n I will either avoid the points of disagreement, or else state\n what has to be said on both sides of the question. But where\n I find that all competent authorities are in substantial\n agreement, I will not burden my exposition by tautological\n quotations.\u201d\n\n * * * * *\n\nHaving thus disposed of a merely personal matter, I may pass on to my\njustification of the \u201ccomplete misapprehension\u201d into which I have fallen\nwith respect to Prof. Max M\u00fcller\u2019s work on the \u201cScience of Thought.\u201d\n\nIn the first place he tells us:\n\n \u201cOn page 267 Mr. Romanes says that I profess, as a result of\n more recent researches, to have reduced the number of Sanskrit\n roots to 121. I wish I had. But the number of roots in Sanskrit\n stands as yet at about 800: the number 121 of which he speaks\n is the number of concepts expressed by these roots, many of\n them conveying the same, or nearly the same, idea.\u201d (_The\n Monist_, p. 583.)\n\nNow it is quite true that on page 267 I made the statement which is here\nchallenged; but as I immediately go on to speak repeatedly of the \u201cnumber\n121\u201d as being \u201cthe number of concepts expressed by the roots,\u201d\u2014and\nactually quote at length the whole 121 concepts with Prof. Max M\u00fcller\u2019s\nown heading,\u2014I am not sure that the point is worth the stress which is\nnow laid upon it. Nevertheless, I may explain why in this one passage\nI used the word \u201croots,\u201d instead of the word \u201cconcepts.\u201d Briefly, the\nonly reason was because, according to Prof. Max M\u00fcller\u2019s theory of\nthe origin of roots, it seemed to me virtually the same thing, from\na psychological point of view, whether we speak of the reduction in\nquestion as pertaining to roots or to concepts. For, according to the\ntheory, \u201cevery root embodies a concept,\u201d or is the obverse side of a\nconcept. Consequently, if the Sanskrit language presents some 800 roots,\nwhile it is expressive of only 121 concepts, the balance of the 800 roots\nmust be concerned in conveying the same, or nearly the same, ideas\u2014as\nProf. Max M\u00fcller himself expressly asserts in the above quotation from\n_The Monist_. Indeed, the whole object of his psychological analysis of\nlinguistic roots was to prove that such is the case; and, therefore, that\nthe 121 roots which serve to convey the 121 concepts are the only roots\nrequired for the purposes of communication in Sanskrit speech. No doubt\nit would have been better if I had stated all this in my book; but even\nif its omission led to obscurity, I can scarcely see that on this account\nthere could have been a \u201cmisrepresentation\u201d where there was certainly\nno \u201cmisapprehension.\u201d For, as already stated, I spoke of \u201c121 roots\u201d\nonly once, while I alluded to \u201c121 concepts\u201d many times\u2014and usually,\nmoreover, in inverted commas. Lastly, it may be observed that, following\nhis theory concerning the \u201corigin of roots,\u201d Prof. Max M\u00fcller himself\nso far identifies roots with concepts as to head one of his lists, in\nlarge capitals\u2014ROOTS OR CONCEPTS. Therefore in saying that he professed\nto have reduced the psychologically efficient elements of Sanskrit speech\nto 121 constituents, it did not appear to me that I was departing from\nhis own terminology when in one passage I spoke of these 121 constituents\nas roots, while everywhere else I spoke of them as concepts. \u201cGive us,\u201d\nhe says, \u201cabout 800 roots, and we can explain the largest dictionary;\ngive us about 121 concepts, and we can account for the 800 roots.\u201d\n(\u201cScience of Thought,\u201d p. 551.) Well, if this is so, the 800 roots (i. e.\nphonetically separable elements) have been reduced to the 121 \u201cconcepts\nor roots\u201d (i. e. psychologically separable elements). My critic cannot\nboth have his cake and eat it. Either he must abide by the philological\nmeaning of a root, as the ultimate result of philological analysis; or\nelse he must abide by his own philosophical meaning of a root, as the\nembodiment of a concept. Under the former definition there will be about\n800 roots of Sanskrit; under the latter definition, and according to his\nanalysis, there will be only 121.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe next point with regard to which \u201ccomplete misapprehension\u201d is alleged\nmay best be presented by my critic\u2019s own words, thus:\n\n \u201cProfessor Romanes thinks it necessary to remark that \u2018these\n concepts do not represent the ideation of primitive man\u2019! I\n never said they did. I never pretended to be acquainted with\n the ideation of primitive man. All I maintained was that,\n making allowance for obscure words, every thought, that of the\n lowest savage as well as of the most minute philosopher, can be\n expressed with these 800 roots, and traced back to these 121\n concepts.\u201d (_The Monist_, p. 584.)\n\nNow, it is perhaps needless to say, I am extremely glad to learn that\nsuch was the meaning intended; but I trust that the following quotations\nwill furnish a sufficient excuse for my misunderstanding of it:\n\n \u201cI hope that those who will carefully examine the results\n at which I have arrived, will admit that they prove by\n overwhelming evidence that the meanings of roots are really\n what we expected them to be, and that they express the\n primitive social acts of primitive social man, and the states\n more or less closely associated with such acts.\u201d (\u201cScience of\n Thought,\u201d p. 403.)\n\nFrom this it appears that if Prof. Max M\u00fcller never professed to be\nacquainted with the ideation of _primitive_ man, he did profess to have\nproved, by overwhelming evidence, a very large acquaintance, not only\nwith the ideation, but also with primitive acts of primitive _social_\nman. Possibly his acquaintance with both these matters is very much\nmore intimate than mine; but as I have always taken it to be virtually\ncertain that \u201cprimitive man\u201d was \u201csocial\u201d in his habits, I should like\nto learn the reasons which have induced my critic to believe in a still\nmore \u201cprimitive man,\u201d who was addicted to a solitary mode of life. For,\notherwise, the only distinction on which his criticism appears to rest is\na distinction without a difference.\n\nAgain he says:\n\n \u201cThe Science of Thought assures us that every thought that ever\n crossed the mind of man can be traced back to about 121 simple\n concepts.\u201d (Ibid., p. 418.)\n\nAnd that the word \u201cman\u201d here is not intended tacitly to exclude\n\u201cprimitive man\u201d (whether \u201csocial\u201d or solitary), I gathered from the fact\nof the 121 concepts in question being tabulated under the heading, in\nlarge capitals, THE 121 ORIGINAL CONCEPTS. For, if the word \u201coriginal\u201d\nhere was intended to mean original only with reference to the Sanskrit\nlanguage, why did the writer follow it up with his statement about the\nScience of Thought, assuring us that _every_ thought which had _ever_\ncrossed the mind of _man_ could be _traced back_ to these 121 original\nconcepts?\n\nLastly, not only by such particular passages was I led to suppose that\nthe writer was referring to \u201cprimitive man\u201d when he was writing about\n\u201cprimitive social man,\u201d etc.; but still more was I led to suppose this\nby the whole drift and tenor of his work. For what would be the sense\nof all his disquisitions upon the importance of linguistic science in\nits relation to the theory of evolution, if he intended to restrict his\ninferences to the _semi-civilised_ condition of man, which (as he allows)\nmust have been the condition of the speakers of Sanskrit? Clearly, if\nthis were his intention, there would have been _no_ sense in all these\ndisquisitions; and therefore, here again, my critic cannot both preserve\nhis cake and consume it. Either let him adopt the position which he\ntakes up in _The Monist_, as a philologist pure and simple, who \u201cnever\npretended to be acquainted with the ideation of primitive man,\u201d who\nrefuses to go beyond the \u201cfacts\u201d of the \u201cScience of Language,\u201d or to\nspeculate upon their theoretical relations to the \u201cScience of Thought\u201d:\nor else let him do as he does in his published works\u2014superimpose upon his\nfunctions as a \u201cStudent of Language\u201d the functions of a \u201cPhilosopher,\u201d\nfreely speculate upon \u201cthe origin of roots,\u201d elaborately argue the whole\npsychology of \u201cconcepts,\u201d and strenuously endeavor to show that \u201clanguage\nis the Rubicon of mind,\u201d which not only now, but at all times, has\nseparated man from the lower animals, as a being mysterious in origin, if\nnot unique in kind.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNext we are told:\n\n \u201cProfessor Romanes dwells on what he calls the interesting\n feature of all roots being verbs. This is simply a\n contradiction in terms. In giving the meaning of roots scholars\n generally employ the infinitive or the participle, \u201cto go,\u201d\n or \u201cgoing\u201d; but they have stated again and again that a root\n ceases to be a root as soon as it is used in a sentence.\u201d (_The\n Monist_, p. 584.)\n\nNow, by a \u201cverb\u201d I understand a word that signifies either an action or a\nstate; and by a \u201croot\u201d I understand\u2014here agreeing with Prof. Max M\u00fcller\nhimself\u2014\u201can element of human speech,\u201d so far as this has been hitherto\nreduced by philological analysis. Again, I hold\u2014in this also agreeing\nwith him\u2014that \u201cas soon as a root is used for predication it becomes a\nword, whether outwardly it is changed or not.\u201d (\u201cScience of Thought,\u201d p.\n440.) Well, if we are agreed upon these points, I do not see how there\ncan be any \u201ccontradiction in terms\u201d when I stated the fact \u201cof all roots\nbeing verbs.\u201d\n\nIn the first place, if one were to agree with Prof. Max M\u00fcller himself\nin holding that originally every root was \u201csomething real, something\nthat was actually used in conversation\u201d (Ibid. p. 420), there can be no\ncontradiction in terms if we translate this into saying that originally\nevery root was a word\u2014for the mere quibble that not until it was spoken\ndid the root become a word does not affect the matter, any more than if\nwe were to say the same of any word now in use, which has given birth to\na progeny of other words. But even if we disagree with Prof. Max M\u00fcller,\nand suppose that roots are merely \u201cphonetic elements,\u201d or the residual\nextract of a group of originally allied words, we should still be correct\nin saying that the \u201cconcepts\u201d which they \u201cembody\u201d are all concepts which\nnow admit of being expressed in equivalent words.\n\nSo much for the \u201ccontradiction in terms,\u201d which is alleged to arise if we\nspeak of roots as _words_. Touching the second point, or the accuracy of\nsaying that the words which roots express are always _verbs_, my defence\nis sufficiently easy. For to say, as my critic says, that \u201cin giving\nthe meaning of roots scholars generally employ the infinitive or the\nparticiple,\u201d appears to me a most unphilosophical observation, since it\nappears to indicate that in the opinion of its writer the significance\nof a verb is but conventionally given to a root by the verbal form into\nwhich it is thrown by scholars. But the fact is that, even if they tried,\nscholars could rarely deprive a root of its significance as a verb, no\nmatter into what verbal form they might choose to throw it. Take any root\nat random, such as HA _to go_. However much we may ring the changes, as\n\u201cto go,\u201d \u201cgoing,\u201d \u201cgoer,\u201d it is impossible to get rid of the fundamental\nsignificance of the root as a verb. And although it is, of course,\npossible to select a root which presents a more equivocal interpretation,\nthe cases in which this can be done are, comparatively speaking, not\nnumerous, and apparently never such as to exclude the probability of its\nhaving primarily conveyed the force of a verb. For instance, HUR _to\nfall_, may be regarded either as a verb or a noun-substantive; but we\ncannot say that there is anything to render more probable the view of\nthe root having been originally expressive of a fall than of the act of\nfalling; and inasmuch as there do not appear to be any roots which _can_\nonly have originally had the force of nouns or adjectives, while there\nare so many which _can_ only have originally had the force of verbs,\nwe may fairly conclude that in the accidentally more equivocal cases\nthe roots were likewise originally expressive of actions or of states.\nFor, if not, why are there not as many roots which convey such meanings\nas _sky_, or _blue_ (which never can have had equivalents in the forms\nof verbs), as there are roots like HA, where we cannot doubt that the\nmeaning from the first must have been the meaning of a verb?\n\nI am the more surprised at this head of Prof. Max M\u00fcller\u2019s criticism,\nbecause it belongs to the very essence of his own theory touching \u201cthe\norigin of roots,\u201d that they _must_ all originally have conveyed the\nmeaning of verbs. Therefore from end to end of his own book he constantly\nalludes to roots as expressive of \u201cactions\u201d; never as expressive of\nobjects or qualities. For instance:\n\n \u201cAll, or nearly all, the roots of Sanskrit, or rather of the\n Aryan family in general, express, as we shall see, acts, and\n more particularly the commonest acts performed by members of a\n primitive society.\u201d (\u201cScience of Thought,\u201d p. 272.)\n\nAnd even in _The Monist_ article itself the same thing is stated thus:\n\n \u201cLet us remember that a most careful psychological analysis\n had led Noir\u00e9 to the conclusion that the germs of all\n conceptional thought were to be found in the consciousness of\n our own repeated acts. And let us place by the side of this,\n the well-ascertained fact that the germs of all conceptional\n language, what we call roots, express with few exceptions the\n repeated acts of men.\u201d (_The Monist_, p. 580.)\n\nAgain:\n\n \u201cWe begin with the fact that the great bulk of a language\n consists of words, derived, according to the strictest rules,\n not from cries, but from articulate roots. No one denies this.\n We follow this up with a second fact, that nearly all the roots\n express acts of men. No one denies that.\u201d (p. 588.)\n\nVery well then, I submit that the only real distinction between Prof. Max\nM\u00fcller\u2019s rendering of this \u201cfact,\u201d and my own rendering of it, consists\nin my having added \u201cstates\u201d to \u201cacts,\u201d and observing that then the\ncomparatively few outstanding roots may be included with the \u201cnearly all\u201d\nunder the one category of \u201cverbs.\u201d\n\nFor the distinction which he draws in _The Monist_ is not a real\ndistinction: it is merely a verbal distinction.\n\nHere it is:\n\n \u201cIf Professor Romanes approves of my saying that roots stood\n for any part of speech, just as the monosyllabic expressions\n of children do, I can only say that, if I ever said so, I\n expressed myself incorrectly. A root never stands for any part\n of speech, because as soon as it is a part of speech it is no\n longer a root.\u201d (_The Monist_, p. 585.)\n\nThis, as I have previously observed, is merely a quibble. If originally\nevery root was \u201csomething real, something used in conversation,\u201d\noriginally all roots were _words_, in just the same sense as \u201cthe\nmonosyllabic expressions of children\u201d are words. And if \u201cnearly all these\nroots express the acts of man,\u201d while most (if not all) the outstanding\nresiduum were apparently expressive of states, it follows that the\nroots in question were not only words, but _verbs_. And in stating this\n\u201cfact\u201d I supposed that I was but following Prof. Max M\u00fcller\u2019s statement\nof it, where he constitutes it the philological basis of his theory on\nthe \u201corigin of roots\u201d\u2014viz. that all roots sprang from sounds made by\n\u201cprimitive social man\u201d when engaged in their \u201csocial _acts_.\u201d But, while\naccepting this fact, I objected to the theory raised upon it, because\nthe latter did not consider that roots which originally had the force of\nverbs must have been more likely to have survived, and so to have come\ndown to us, than those which may originally have had the significance\nof any other parts of speech. And it was only in order to supply this\nfurther consideration that I alluded to the \u201cfact\u201d at all.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWe come next to some disparaging remarks upon \u201cbabies,\u201d \u201cparrots,\u201d\nand the lower animals generally (_The Monist_, pp. 586-7). Prof. Max\nM\u00fcller \u201crefuses to argue\u201d with me, \u201cor any other philosopher, either in\nthe nursery or the menagerie.\u201d So be it. As a philologist, of course,\nhe is assuredly right; no one would expect him so to argue. But as a\nphilosopher, who has written a large book on the \u201cScience of Thought,\u201d he\nis no less assuredly wrong. And one may be pardoned for wondering at this\nintentionally ostrich-like attitude on the part of a philosopher\u2014who is\n\u201cgoing beyond the origin of roots\u201d\u2014with respect to the fundamental germs\nof the sign-making faculty.\n\nAgain, my critic appears to imagine that I am a supporter of the\nonomatopoetic theory\u2014to the extent of regarding _all_ human language as\nhaving originated in imitations of natural sounds. (_The Monist_, pp.\n586-7.) But over and over again I have stated that this is not my view.\nI believe, indeed, that there is a very large amount of truth in this\ntheory; but I deem it on all grounds most improbable that the principle\nof imitation has been the _only_ principle concerned in the origin of\nspeech. I have argued that probably many other principles must have been\nconcerned, including the \u201csynergastic\u201d principle suggested by Noir\u00e9, and\nenthusiastically adopted by my critic as alone sufficient to explain the\nwhole problem of the origin of speech\u2014and this although it is clearly but\na particular branch of the general onomatopoetic theory. Hence, so far\nas I am concerned, it does not signify one iota whether any given root\nowed its origin to the principle of imitation, or to some other of the\ngeneral principles which I believe to have been concerned in the birth\nof articulate language. And, if possible, still less does it signify\nwhether or not in the development of any given word, such as \u201cthunder,\u201d\nthe original root-sound has been afterwards imitatively modified, \u201cfrom a\nfeeling that it should be so.\u201d These matters are no doubt of importance\nwithin the four corners of philology; but in relation to the \u201cbiological\ntheory\u201d of descent they present no importance at all.\n\nYet I am told:\n\n \u201cThose who cannot see the difference between a man, or for all\n that, between a mocking-bird, saying _Cuckoo_, and a whole\n community fixing on the sound of TAN, as differentiated by\n various suffixes and prefixes, and expressing the concept\n of stretching in such words as _tonos_, _tone_, _tonitru_,\n _thunder_, _tanu_, _tenuis_, _thin_, should not meddle with the\n Science of Language.\u201d (_The Monist_, pp. 588-9.)\n\nDoubtless. But as no word of this applies to me, I may be permitted to\nobserve that if any one who has read my book can possibly suppose that it\ndoes, he should not meddle with the Science of Thought.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn conclusion, if it be the case that I have completely misapprehended\nProf. Max M\u00fcller with regard to the points which he has mentioned,\u2014and\nall of which I have now considered,\u2014have I not furnished sufficient\njustification? Even now I cannot see in what respects it is possible\nto amend any subsequent edition of my book, so as to correct the\nmisapprehensions which are alleged. But although my \u201cmistakes\u201d are thus\nfar from \u201cclear,\u201d I am glad to have had this opportunity of publicly\ndiscussing them with Prof. Max M\u00fcller, if only for the sake of adding the\nfollowing remarks.\n\nBe it observed, in the first place, that whatever may be thought of the\nforegoing \u201cjustification,\u201d\u2014whether it be held that the misapprehensions\nare due to ambiguity on the one side or to obtuseness on the other,\u2014at\nleast it is certain that the misapprehensions complained of all have\nreference to points of no importance whatsoever as regards the general\ntheory of descent, even although some of them are not altogether\nwithout importance as regards the particular science of philology. Thus\nit is quite immaterial, so far as the doctrine of _Mental Evolution_\nis concerned, whether we say that the roots of Sanskrit are 800,\nphilologically speaking, or 121, psychologically speaking. Again, as\nsoon as it is explained by Prof. Max M\u00fcller that by his \u201c121 original\nconcepts\u201d he means the number of concepts \u201coriginal\u201d only as regards\nthe Sanskrit language; that by \u201cprimitive social man\u201d he means only the\nsemi-civilised progenitors of the Indo-European race; that by \u201cevery\nthought that ever crossed the mind of man\u201d admitting of being \u201ctraced\nback to about 121 simple concepts,\u201d he means no more than that such is\nthe case as regards the recent and highly evolved Aryan branch of the\nhuman species;\u2014when once all this is explained, it becomes evident that\nthus far there _can_ be no difference of opinion between us. For in that\ncase he is not dealing with \u201cthe Origin of Human Faculty,\u201d either in\nregard to language or to thought: he is considering merely the higher\ninflorescence of both. Once more, whether all, or nearly all, the roots\nof Sanskrit can properly be called _words_, and, if so, whether we must\nnot go still further and call them _verbs_,\u2014these are questions of\nmere terminology. If the roots were originally \u201cused in conversation,\u201d\nand if, as thus used, they were, with but few doubtful exceptions, all\nexpressive of \u201cacts\u201d or \u201cstates,\u201d it becomes mere verbal hair-splitting\nto challenge the propriety of saying that the roots were originally\nverbs. At all events, the matter has nothing to do with the general\nquestion of man\u2019s derivative origin. Lastly, the same has to be said of\nthe purely philological question as to how far the principle of imitation\nhas obtained in the first formation of these archaic \u201cwords,\u201d or \u201croots.\u201d\nFor, archaic though they be in a philological sense, in a phylological\nsense they are things of yesterday, and so can scarcely be said to have\nany direct relation at all to \u201cthe origin of speech,\u201d or the rise of\narticulate sign-making. This has to be inferred from observations in\nthe \u201cmenagerie,\u201d as distinguished from research in the library; and the\nfact that Prof. Max M\u00fcller expressly refuses to give me the pleasure of\nhis company where the best materials for studying the really \u201cprimitive\u201d\ncondition of the sign-making faculty are to be met with, merely renders\nmore impossible than ever any real collision between his linguistic\nstudies on the one side, and my \u201cbiological theory\u201d on the other.\n\nBut although it thus appears sufficiently evident that my\n\u201cmisapprehensions\u201d of his linguistic conclusions are as unimportant\nin relation to the theory of descent as they are few\u2014and, I think,\nalso excusable\u2014in themselves, it is impossible to doubt that far below\nthe level of Sanskrit roots, and far beyond the range of philological\nscience, there is a wide difference of opinion between us. For when he\npasses from the \u201cScience of Language\u201d to the \u201cScience of Thought,\u201d\u2014when\nhe quits his sphere as a philologist to enter that of the philosopher,\u2014he\npersistently and consistently affirms that what he calls \u201cthe old barrier\nbetween man and beast\u201d remains, and that he is as yet unable to perceive\nhow it can ever be removed. This barrier of course is predicative\nlanguage\u2014the obverse side of conceptional thought; and the firm opinion\nthus expressed by so eminent a philologist is not only of weight _per\nse_, but is rendered more so on account of the manifest freedom from\nprejudice with which it is associated. It is on this account that I\ndevoted so much space in my book on \u201cMental Evolution\u201d to a consideration\nof his views; and therefore I am sorry that his present reply has not\nbeen directed to meeting my criticisms on this really important matter\nof philosophical doctrine, rather than to indicating \u201cmisapprehensions\u201d\nwith regard to such merely trivial matters of a purely philological kind\nas those which I have here been dealing with. But perhaps at some future\ntime he may give me the benefit of his criticism upon my work as a whole,\nor not merely on the fringes of such details as really have no bearing on\nthe objects of that work.\n\nAnd, if he should ever see his way to doing this, I am quite sure that\nthe discussion would be one of a friendly character. For the points\nat issue would all have reference to that large and vague domain of\nspeculative theory touching \u201cthe origin of human faculty,\u201d where it is\ninevitable\u2014and, in my judgment, even desirable\u2014that wide differences of\nopinion should obtain. We are but at the commencement of a great and\nobscure problem, which only in our own generation has been presented by\nthe science of biology to the contemplation of philosophy. Therefore it\nwould be folly indeed if any man were to regard his own opinions upon it\nas other than provisional\u2014and even more foolish if he were to introduce\nany \u201c_meum_ and _tuum_ into these discussions.\u201d\n\nThus I invite Prof. Max M\u00fcller to state the grounds of his assertion in\n_The Monist_, that \u201call the facts of real language are against\u201d me as\nan advocate of what he calls the biological theory of the developmental\norigin of man. This theory, he says, \u201cderives no support whatever from\nthe Science of Language.\u201d I believe, on the other hand, that these are\nwholly unwarranted statements; and that the Science of Language does\nsupport the theory in question to as high a degree as is possible from\nthe nature of the case. On account of this great difference of opinion, I\nfelt, when writing my book, that I should be doing but scant justice to\nthe matured judgment of so eminent a philologist if I did not carefully\nconsider all that he had written upon the subject. And so, as I have\nsaid, I devoted more of my book to a consideration of his views than to\nthose of any other philologist; and while accepting his scientific facts\non his authority as a philologist, I nevertheless felt it incumbent on me\nto show why his philosophical deductions, where they had reference to the\ntheory of descent, appeared to me by no means of equivalent value. This\ndistinction, as I observed at the commencement of the present article, is\nsurely a legitimate distinction; and I should be sorry indeed if anything\nthat I have ever said can appear inconsistent with the genuine admiration\nwhich is due to Prof. Max M\u00fcller as \u201ca student of language,\u201d or with the\nno less genuine esteem which I have the best reason for knowing is due to\nhim as a friend.\n\n GEORGE J. ROMANES.\n\n\n\n\nTHE CONTINUITY OF EVOLUTION.\n\nTHE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE VERSUS THE SCIENCE OF LIFE, AS REPRESENTED BY\nPROF. F. MAX M\u00dcLLER AND PROF. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES.\n\n\nAll the sciences form, or at least ought to form, one great system,\nculminating in the science of sciences. Therefore it is more than\ndoubtful how any science could exist without being somehow in contact\nwith other sciences; and all of them must stand in some relation to\nphilosophy. It is necessary that each science should develop in relative\nindependence of the other sciences. We cannot expect to decide, for\ninstance, chemical problems by physical or purely mechanical laws\nbefore we have carefully searched the nature and conditions of chemical\nprocesses. But as soon as this has been done we can expect that a\ncomparison between the results of two or more sciences will throw new\nlight upon the subject-matter on both sides. Solomon says: \u201cTo everything\nthere is a season and a time to every purpose under the heaven.\u201d Thus the\nsciences have to grow, each one on its own grounds, and when they have\nreached a certain state of maturity, they will coalesce with each other.\nAnd two sciences will by their coalescence fertilise the one the other so\nas to produce a new department which may by and by develop into a special\nscience.\n\nNow it appears to the uninitiated as if the spiritual world of science\nwere in every respect different from the world of objective realities\naround us. While in the world of bodily realities the struggle for\nexistence is fought eternal peace is supposed to reign in the sacred\nhalls of intellectual aspirations. Says the German poet:\n\n \u201c_H\u00e4rt in dem Raume stossen sich die K\u00f6rper,_\n _Leicht bei einander wohnen die Gedanken._\u201d\n\nThis is true only in a very limited sense. Ideas are the most intolerant\nbeings imaginable. The struggle for existence is raging as fiercely in\nthe intellectual realm as in the world of realities, and there also the\nlaw that the fittest will survive holds good.\n\nFar be it from us to denounce this state of general warfare, for although\nit is hard on those who succumb, it is the means by which evolution\nbecomes possible; and evolution in the domain of science means a nearer\napproach to truth. If in the evolution of thought two neighboring\nsciences have developed so far as to meet, a struggle will ensue. The\nideas on the two sides will have to fight before they coalesce. It\nis natural that different scientists look at things from different\nstandpoints. They have developed a terminology which exactly suits their\npurpose and thus the representatives of the different sciences are often\nlike people of a different nationality. They do not understand each\nother because they speak different languages. Moreover they have not\nunfrequently a different religion; that means, their ideas about truth\nand the test of truth appear to be different and sometimes they regard\none another as no better than heathens. The battle is unavoidable,\nand considering all in all, the battle is desirable, it should not be\navoided. The fittest to survive being the truest, the whole progress of\nscience through the struggle for existence among ideas consists in the\napproach to truth.\n\nIt may be objected that there are peacemakers who will reconcile the\ncontending parties. True. And it is further true that the aim of every\nwar is peace. But a peacemaker can be successful only if his mind is\nbroad enough to let the whole battle be fought out within himself.\nThe battle itself is and will remain unavoidable. Idea stands against\nidea, and the mental process of reflection is nothing but a struggle of\nconflicting ideas which takes place in one and the same mind. The aim of\nall reflection is the settlement of the conflict, so that all ideas will\nagree. The two parties disappear in one; errors are given up, and that\nwhich is consistent only will remain. In other words Dualism makes room\nfor Monism.\n\nIt is a good sign of the times that a battle has begun to rage between\nthe so-called natural sciences and the science of language. The old\nHegelian distinction between the _Geisteswissenschaften_ and the\n_Naturwissenschaften_ has been surrendered; and Prof. F. Max M\u00fcller was\namong the foremost to inculcate the truth that philology is a natural\nscience. If philology is a natural science it cannot be but that its\nsubject of investigation is a part of nature and as such it stands in\nclose relation to other parts of nature. One and the same thing may\nbe the subject of investigation of different sciences. One and the\nsame plant may be an object of observation to the physiologist, to the\nbotanist, to the druggist, to the physician, and to the chemist. Their\nstandpoints and their purposes being different, they will bring to light\nvery different results, and if these results are contradictory among each\nother the conflict is at hand. It cannot be shirked but must be decided\nby an honest and square fight. We have witnessed of late a conflict\nbetween philology and anthropology concerning the origin of the Aryas\nand it looks as if this conflict will contribute much to promote our\nknowledge of the oldest history of mankind, although the last word has\nnot as yet been spoken: _adhuc sub judice lis est_.\n\nWe are now confronted with a conflict between Philology and Biology. The\nfirst skirmishes have been fought by two men who are entitled to speak,\neach one in behalf of his science. Prof. F. Max M\u00fcller stands up for\nphilology and Prof. George John Romanes for biology.\n\nProfessor Romanes takes it for granted that the rational mind of man has\ndeveloped gradually from the lower stage of the brute. He says in his\nbook \u201cMental Evolution in Man,\u201d p. 276:\n\n \u201cThe whole object of these chapters has been to show, that on\n psychological grounds it is abundantly intelligible how the\n conceptual stage of ideation may have been gradually evolved\n from the receptual\u2014the power of forming general, or truly\n conceptual ideas, from the power of forming particular and\n generic ideas. But if it could be shown\u2014or even rendered in any\n degree presumable\u2014that this distinctly human power of forming\n truly general ideas arose _de novo_ with the first birth of\n articulate speech, assuredly my whole analysis would be\n destroyed: the human mind would be shown to present a quality\n different in origin\u2014and, therefore, in kind\u2014from all the\n lower orders of intelligence: the law of continuity would be\n interrupted at the terminal phase: an impassable gulf would be\n fixed between the brute and the man.\u201d\n\nAnd Prof. Max M\u00fcller criticises the position of Professor Romanes in an\narticle on Thought and Language (_The Monist_, Vol. I. No. 4, p. 582); he\nsays:\n\n \u201cMy learned friend, Professor Romanes, labors to show that\n there is an unbroken mental evolution from the lowest animal\n to the highest man. But he sees very clearly and confesses\n very honestly that the chief difficulty in this evolution is\n language and all that language implies. He tries very hard to\n remove that barrier between beast and man.... Professor Romanes\n is, I believe, a most eminent biologist, and the mantle of\n Darwin is said to have fallen on his shoulders. Far be it from\n me to venture to criticise his biological facts. But we see in\n his case how dangerous it is for a man who can claim to speak\n with authority on his own special subject, to venture to speak\n authoritatively on subjects not his own.\u201d\n\nIt is not at all my intention to appear on the battle-field as a\npeacemaker between these two generals, or to settle the problems that\narise from the conflict between philology and biology. That will\nbe better done by the parties concerned, and I am rather inclined\nto speak with Schiller when he thought of the struggle between the\ntranscendentalist philosopher and the empirical naturalist:\n\n \u201cEnmity be between you! Your alliance would not be in time yet.\n Though you may separate now, Truth will be found by your search.\u201d\n\nI look forward with great interest to further discussions which will\nbring out with more clearness the positions of both parties, and it is\nnot impossible that both parties as soon as they have better understood\neach other, will agree much better than either of them expected. But\nit may be permitted me to make a few comments upon a proposition that\nis involved in this conflict, which, however, properly considered, is\nneither of a philological nor a biological nature. This is the idea of\nthe continuity of evolution. Prof. Max M\u00fcller says somewhere that, if\na Darwinian means an evolutionist, he had been a Darwinian long before\nDarwin. \u201cHow a student of the science of language,\u201d he says, \u201ccan be\nanything but an evolutionist is to me utterly unintelligible.\u201d So there\nis no doubt about his being an evolutionist as much as Professor Romanes.\nBut the question is, What means evolutionist? Is he an evolutionist who\nbelieves in a piecemeal evolution interrupted here and there by acts of\nspecial creation? In my conception of the term, an evolutionist believes\nin evolution wherever there is life and this involves the wholesale\nrejection of special-creation acts as well as of the idea that any being\nor organism (the organism of language included) could ever have made its\nappearance in full growth and maturity or that any phenomenon of life\ncould present a break in the continuity of evolution.\n\nThe Greek myth tells us that the Goddess of Reason, the blue-eyed Pallas\nAthene, was not born like other gods and mortals in the natural way of a\nslow development. She jumped out of the head of Zeus full-armed in all\nher beauty and gifted with the powers of her unusual accomplishments.\nIs this myth true after all? Does the Logos of rational thought\npresent us with an instance in which the development process has been\ninterrupted? If so, we shall have to abandon the evolution theory as a\ntheory and return to the old-fashioned view of special-creation acts.\nThe difference between these two views is not of degree, but of kind.\nHe who accepts the principle of evolution as the law of life abandons\nforever the idea of special and unconnected beginnings as much as that of\nspecial-creation acts. He cannot with consistency believe in an evolution\nwith interruptions, for the theory of evolution is serviceable only if\nevolution is conceived as continuous. Prof. Max M\u00fcller of course has a\nright to define and use the word evolutionist as he sees fit, but if he\nexcludes continuity from the idea of evolution, we declare that he has\ntaken out the quintessence of its meaning and the core of its truth.\n\nWhy this is so, we shall now briefly discuss.\n\nThe evolution theory has been gradually developed by empirical\ninvestigations and it owes its all but universal acceptance to the great\nmass of _a posteriori_ evidence furnished by the natural sciences. It\nrests nevertheless upon a better and safer foundation than isolated\ninstances of hap-hazard experience. Its foundation is quarried out of\nanother and more reliable material. The evolution theory rests upon the\nground of _a priori_ arguments.\n\nBy _a priori_ we do not understand anything mysterious, but simply such\ncognition as possesses universality and necessity. That cognition which\nis in possession of universality and necessity is also called formal\ncognition. The formal sciences (for instance arithmetic, mathematics,\npure logic, and pure mechanics) give us information about such truths as\nare applicable, because they are purely formal, to the formal conditions\nof anything and everything possible. Because we know _beforehand_ that\nthe purely formal laws will hold good under all conditions Kant called\ntheir formulated theorems \u201ca priori.\u201d All the objections to the idea of\napriority made by John Stuart Mill and other empiricists are due to their\nmisinterpretation of the term.[10]\n\nMr. Mill was mistaken when he thought Kant meant _a priori_ cognitions\nwere innate ideas which came to man from spheres unknown. The very first\nsentence of Kant\u2019s \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d proves that Kant knew of no\nother knowledge than that which begins with experience. Kant says, \u201cThat\nall our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt.\u201d But our\nknowledge consists of two elements, viz. the empirical and the formal.\nThe former bears always the character of the special and incidental,\nthe latter of the universal and necessary. The former is sensory, being\nfurnished by the senses, the latter is properly mental originating in and\nwith the action of the mind in dealing with sense-materials, in arranging\nthem and bringing them into certain relations.\n\nFormal knowledge is different in kind from empirical knowledge. The\nrule \u201ctwice two is four\u201d will hold good for all possible cases, but the\nstatement \u201cA swan is white\u201d does not hold good for all possible cases.\nEuropean swans as a rule are white, but Australian swans are black, and\nfor all we know, we might find swans that are blue, or red, or yellow.\nEmpirical knowledge is full of exceptions, formal knowledge is rigid,\nthere is no exception to any rule of formal knowledge.\n\nAll formal knowledge has developed by degrees. The history of the\nsciences, of mathematics, logic, arithmetic, and also of the natural\nsciences furnishes sufficient evidence. The formal part of the natural\nsciences, by Kant called _reine Naturwissenschaft_, consists of such\ncognitions as the law of cause and effect and the law of the conservation\nof matter and energy. The formulation of these laws has been accomplished\nafter much and careful empirical investigation. And it could not be\notherwise. The latter law was elaborated in its full clearness long after\nKant. The law of causality and the law of the conservation of matter\nand energy are purely formal, they are not sense-impressions and do\nnot contain any sensory elements. They are general rules of universal\napplicability which being rigidly universal and without exceptions are\nnecessary under all conditions. Before we make any experiment we can know\nthat they will hold good in the experiment. Indeed all our experimenting\nis based upon the supposition that the law of causation holds good and\nthat there can be neither an increase nor a decrease of matter and energy.\n\nThe mistake made by the so-called transcendentalists is this, that\nthey consider formal thought as having an independent existence, being\nready at hand before cognition is possible, while in fact it is a part\nof cognition which at least in its germ is present in every actual\nexperience.\n\nThe theory of evolution is not more and not less a formal principle\nthan the law of causation and the law of the conservation of matter and\nenergy. Indeed it is nothing but the same thing applied to a special\ncase. The theory of evolution is the principle of the conservation\nof matter and energy applied to the province of life. The theory\nof evolution denies the possibility of special acts of creation.\nThere cannot come something out of nothing. And the new creations\nthat actually originate daily before our eyes are not creations from\nnothing, they are simply transformations. There was a time on earth in\nwhich no living being existed, neither plant nor animal. How did life\noriginate? Our answer is, It did not originate out of nothing, but it\nevolved. Non-organised matter organised. That non-organised matter must\ncontain the elementary conditions of organised life is a conclusion\nwhich we cannot escape from our point of view; and which is fully and\nsatisfactorily corroborated by our daily experience that water, earth,\nand air under the sun\u2019s influence are changed into wheat; and wheat is\nmanufactured into the bread which nourishes man and sustains his life.\nNon-organised particles of matter are constantly being organised in\nliving organisms and displace the worn-out materials in their tissues\u2014not\none atom of the latter remaining for good in a healthy living body.\n\nThe theory of evolution may be called an hypothesis, an assumption, a\npresumption. But in that case we must say with Mill that the rule twice\ntwo is four is also a mere assumption. The evidence for the latter is not\nstronger than that for the former. Mill declares that after all twice two\nmight somewhere be five. Exactly so and not otherwise evolution might be\nsomewhere interrupted, so that something would originate out of nothing\ninstead of evolving from other things through transformation.\n\nProf. Max M\u00fcller speaks very sarcastically about the speechless man, the\n_homo alalus_ who is supposed to be the ancestor of the present man. He\nsays (l. c., p. 585):\n\n \u201cOf the _Homo alalus_, the speechless progenitor of _Homo\n sapiens_, with whom Professor Romanes seems so intimately\n acquainted, students of human speech naturally know nothing.\u201d\n\nProf. Max M\u00fcller also condemns all efforts of approaching the problem\nof the origin of language through observation of children and animals.\nThe former he calls \u201cnursery philology\u201d the latter \u201cmenagerie\npsychology.\u201d And it is certainly true that the problem of the origin\nof language cannot be solved from observations of children or animals,\nbecause the problem lies in another field. The problem is not how a\nready made language is transferred upon the growing mind of a baby\nbut how speechless beings developed into speaking beings. And all the\nintelligence of clever animals is still very different from the rational\nthought of man. This is true, but it is also true that good observations\nof animal psychology and also of nursery philology will throw some light\nupon the evolution of rational thought.\n\nProf. Max M\u00fcller says:\n\n \u201cHow can we attempt to realise what passes within the mind of\n an animal?... We can imagine anything we like about what passes\n in the mind of an animal,\u2014we can know absolutely nothing.\u201d\n\nWe are fully aware of the fact that the problem of the origin of language\nis quite different from the problems of animal psychology. A solution of\nthe latter, which are extremely complex and difficult, would not help\nus to solve the former. This being conceded we can nevertheless see\nno reason why animal psychology should be condemned and given up as a\nhopeless task.\n\nIt is not true that \u201cwe can know absolutely nothing about what passes in\nthe mind of an animal.\u201d It is true we cannot see the animals\u2019 feelings\nand thoughts, but we can see their actions which reveal their feelings\nas much as and sometimes even plainer than the speech of our brother man\nreveals his thoughts. Might we not say with the same reason, \u201cWe see only\nthe printed book of a scientist (which is an expression of his views as\nmuch as the behavior of an animal is of its feelings) but we can know\nabsolutely nothing about what passes in the mind of that scientist. All\nwe can do is to judge from analogy\u201d? And should we on that account give\nup all reading and studying and also all arguing with others?\n\nAnimal psychology is not only justified as a science, but we can even\nhope that correct observations of animal intelligence will assist us\nin correctly understanding the higher intelligence of human thought.\nAnd \u201cthat some useful hints may be taken from watching children is not\ndenied\u201d by Prof. Max M\u00fcller either, although this little concession\nappears only in the shape of a short foot-note. The _homo alalus_ is by\nno means a merely mythical figure, for according to the law of evolution\nman must have developed out of a being lower than the present man. His\nfirst ancestor must have been simple life-substance something like that\nof the am\u0153ba. He must have passed through a long period in which he was\nnot capable of articulate speech. That we know nothing particular about\nthe _homo alalus_ is no proof against his existence. Moreover every\ninfant is an actual real _homo alalus_, a speechless man, or should we\naccording to Prof. Max M\u00fcller class our babies among the brutes?\n\nProf. Max M\u00fcller says (_The Monist_, p. 585):\n\n \u201cIf, like Professor Romanes, we begin with the \u2018immense\n presumption that there has been no interruption in the\n developmental process in the course of psychological history,\u2019\n the protest of language counts for nothing; the very fact that\n no animal has ever formed a language, is put aside simply as an\n unfortunate accident.\u201d\n\nThe theory of evolution rightly understood is no presumption in the\nusual sense of the word. It is no more a presumption than to say that\nsomething cannot come from nothing. And what is \u201cthe protest of language\u201d\nwhich would disprove the continuity of evolution? That rational or human\nthought is something _sui generis_, that it is different in kind and\nnot in degree from brute intelligence; that language is an impassable\nbarrier between man and brute, being the Rubicon which no other animal\nhas crossed. Very well. We agree entirely with all these propositions.\nHuman reason is different in kind from brute intelligence and human\nreason has developed such as it is through language only. Nay reason is\nlanguage. Noir\u00e9 is right when he says, Man thinks because he speaks.\nBut the Rubicon of language was not an absolutely impassable barrier.\nThe speechless ancestor of man, whether we call him _homo alalus_ or\nanthropoid, or even man-ape, _has_ crossed it, and having crossed it he\nbecame the C\u00e6sar of the animal creation.\n\nProf. Max M\u00fcller\u2019s theory of the identity of language and thought[11] is\nso valuable because it bridges the gap between the rational sphere of\nman and the not-yet rational sphere of the brute creation. It explains\nthe origin of reason. The origin of reason in the world of living beings\nis explained as soon as the origin of language is understood, for reason\ndevelops with language and rational thought is nothing but rational\nspeech. If the origin of language were an unfathomable mystery, Prof.\nMax M\u00fcller\u2019s view of the identity of language and thought would lose all\npractical importance.\n\nThe proposition of the identity of language and thought is a very radical\nidea; it is the fundamental idea of monism. In a more general form it\nwas first pronounced by Giordano Bruno, who says somewhere that, if we\ncould put the soul of a man into the organism of an animal, say of a\nsnake, it would cease to be a human soul and become the soul of a snake.\nSpeech would be changed into a hissing, in accordance with the snake\u2019s\norgans for uttering sounds. And in the same way all the feelings, all the\nconcepts, all the desires and inclinations\u2014in short the whole psychical\nlife would be that of a snake.\n\nThought is the soul of language. As there are no ghost-souls, so there\nare no ghost-thoughts. And the soul is not something distinct from the\norganism, it is the form of the organism. It happens in fairy-tales that\nthe Prince is transformed into a frog, but if a fairy could transform\na man into a frog, his soul would certainly also become a frog-soul.\nLanguage is the visible organism of the invisible thought, and as is\nlanguage, exactly so is thought.\n\nThe problem how language has developed was first answered by the\nonomatopoetic theory, \u201cthe bow-wow theory\u201d as Max M\u00fcller calls it.\nLanguage was conceived as an echo of nature, as a reflex action that\ntakes place in a living and feeling being. Yet this theory had to be\nabandoned, because an historical investigation of language proved that\nwords with very few exceptions were not imitations of external sounds.\nYet the spirit of investigation was not daunted by this defeat, and\nthe bow-wow theory reappeared in a modified form. Language was still\nconsidered as a reflex action; however, it was conceived to be a reflex\nwhich re-echoed the impressions of natural phenomena as they had affected\nman. This was the exclamation theory which seeks the origin of language\nin the \u201cohs and ahs,\u201d the sighs and shouts of a feeling mind. Prof. Max\nM\u00fcller calls this theory \u201cthe pooh-pooh theory.\u201d This theory had also\nto be discarded because it was in conflict with the actual facts of\nthe evolution of language. Next Noir\u00e9 and Prof. Max M\u00fcller came with\ntheir theory, called by Noir\u00e9 \u201cthe synergastic theory,\u201d which conceives\nlanguage as the expression of common work, also called by Noir\u00e9 the Logos\ntheory, the sympathetic theory, and the causality theory. Prof. Max\nM\u00fcller in order to forestall any deriders of this theory suggests calling\nit \u201cthe yo-he-ho theory,\u201d yo-he-ho being the sailors\u2019 song when engaged\nin some common work as hoisting or hauling.\n\nThis yo-he-ho theory actually explains the origin of language, and it is,\nso far as we can see, not in conflict with any historical or philological\nfacts. But in honor of the inventors of the onomatopoetic theory it must\nbe recognised that the main idea of the yo-he-ho theory is the same as\nthat of the bow-wow theory. The main idea is this: Language did not\noriginate in man\u2019s mind out of itself in some mysterious way representing\na break in the continuity of evolution, but it is a certain reflex-action\nof living and feeling beings taking place in consequence of external\nstimuli. This reflex-action however is not direct, but indirect. It is\nnot that of a single being, it is the reflex-action of a whole society,\nengaged in common work. It developed in consequence of their common\nactivity and through their want of intercommunication.\n\n * * * * *\n\nProf. Max M\u00fcller charges against the evolutionist, that \u201cthe very fact\nthat no animal has ever formed a language is put aside simply as an\nunfortunate accident.\u201d Is this a fair reprehension? Is not the fact that\nno animal, except man, crossed the Rubicon of language quite a distinct\nproblem? And accepting Professor Noir\u00e9\u2019s theory of the origin of language\nwhich considers speech as the product of a common activity accompanied\nby what may be called _clamor concomitans_, I see very good reasons why\nother animals did not develop language. First, there is no animal, with\nthe sole exception perhaps of ants and bees, that lives in societies.\nSome of them live in herds, but there is a great difference between a\nherd and a society. This difference is first a difference of degree, but\ngradually it becomes a difference of kind. Secondly, animals have no\norgans to work with, while man has his hands, and we may add, thirdly,\nthat no animal, not even the parrot, has the same power of articulation.\n\nProf. Ludwig Noir\u00e9 accepts without equivocation the idea that the\nspeechless ancestor of man became a rational being by developing language\nand I was always under the impression that Prof. Max M\u00fcller agreed with\nhis late friend not only concerning the identity of language and reason,\nbut also concerning the origin of reason. But if Prof. Max M\u00fcller agrees\nwith Noir\u00e9, why does he object to the continuity of evolution which as\nhe states in a private letter to us is \u201conly a beautiful postulate\u201d?\n\nNow there are indeed facts which prove that the Rubicon of reason is not\nso impassable to animals as Prof. Max M\u00fcller makes us believe. Let us\nhear Noir\u00e9 on the subject. He explains most logically that man performs\nhis many labors and has become a civilised being only with the help of\nlanguage, by naming things and handling them in his mind. Noir\u00e9 says:\n\n \u201cIt can be graphically shown, how ideas may represent for\n man the r\u00f4le of things real; how man has acquired the power\n of combining in his representative faculty the most remote\n objects, and thereby has been able to accomplish the great\n miracles of human industry and commerce. But all this would\n be utterly inconceivable without concepts, which impart to\n percepts their unity and self-dependence, bring about and\n multiply their rational connection. Hence also, no animal\n can ever advance a single step beyond _present_ perceptive\n representation, can never escape from the constraint with\n which Nature circumscribes the narrow sphere of its wants.\n Unfortunately, however, in apparent contravention of this rule,\n ants to the present day carry on a regular and methodical\n species of agriculture, keep livestock and domestics like\n we! Nay, they have been caught in conversations and social\n entertainments of a quarter of an hour\u2019s duration\u2014God save the\n mark!\u201d[12]\n\nThis passage is full of humor, and the humor is slightly mingled with a\ncomical anger and self-irony. There is a fine theory excellent in every\nrespect worked out in all its details by the Professor and now he finds a\nfew trifles of facts which possess the impudence not to adapt themselves\nto the theory. \u201c_Gott besser\u2019s_,\u201d sighs Noir\u00e9, for it is not his fault\nthat the ants accomplish things which they ought not to, and the good\nLord is called upon to adapt nature with more rigidity to the Professor\u2019s\ntheories.\n\nIs there not an obvious reason why ants stand so high in their\nperformances? Are not ants social beings, more so than any other animal?\nWe are ignorant still of all their means of communication. But that they\nhave some means of communication seems to be an established fact. When\nants from different hills but of the same kind give each other battle,\nit happens not unfrequently that a warrior attacks another warrior of the\nsame people most fiercely, but both let go as soon as they touch each\nother with their feelers.[13] I refrain from telling stories about the\nlife of these wonderful creatures partly because one well-authenticated\nreport is sufficient for our purpose and partly because I must suppose\nthat most of my readers are familiar with the facts as presented by\nDarwin, Lubbock, Forel, Huber, and many others. I will add only one\nobservation which is so far as I know undisputed. If ants of a special\nkind rob the larv\u00e6 of another kind and educate them as their slaves, the\nslaves will in case of war or danger stand by their masters even against\ntheir own folks. They evidently speak the language of the hill in which\nthey have been raised.\n\nProfessor Forel successfully made the experiment, with the assistance of\nant-nurses, of raising together several kinds of ants from the larv\u00e6 of\nhostile species. The ferocious Amazons and the Sanguine\u00e6 did not show\nany enmity toward their comrades of the Pratensis and Rufa. When set\nat liberty and transferred to a new residence they remained together\nand behaved exactly as if they naturally belonged together. And this\nexperiment may be quoted to corroborate the proposition of Prof. Max.\nM\u00fcller that \u201cthought is thicker than blood.\u201d[14]\n\nNow it would be a desperate case for Professor Noir\u00e9 to maintain his\ntheory in the face of these facts, if by language we have to understand\nvocal signs only. Yet the idea of his and also of Prof. Max M\u00fcller\u2019s\ntheory consists in the truth that thoughts cannot walk about like ghosts\nin bodiless nudity: they are a system of notation. As such they are\nsymbolised in signs and are inseparable from their signs. These signs are\nsounds with men, and by words we understand usually sound-symbols. But\nthere are other systems of notation besides vocal signs and they are\nfor that reason not less language than speech. We have reason to believe\nthat ants are in possession of symbolical signs and that most of them are\ncommunicated through their feelers.\n\nProfessor Romanes describes the origin of ideas (in the second chapter of\n\u201cMental Evolution in Man,\u201d p. 23) in the following way:\n\n \u201cJust as Mr. Galton\u2019s method of superimposing on the same\n sensitive plate a number of individual images gives rise\n to a blended photograph, wherein each of the individual\n constituents is partially and proportionally represented; so\n in the sensitive tablet of memory, numerous images of previous\n perceptions are fused together into a single conception, which\n then stands as a composite picture, or class-representation,\n of these its constituent images. Moreover, in the case of\n a sensitive plate it is only those particular images which\n present more or less numerous points of resemblance that admit\n of being thus blended into a distinct photograph; and so in the\n case of the mind, it is only those particular ideas which admit\n of being run together in a class that can go to constitute a\n clear concept.\u201d\n\nProfessor Romanes calls such a composite picture of sense-impressions\nas must be supposed to exist in the animal brain \u201ca recept\u201d and he\ndistinguishes it from \u201cthe concept\u201d of man. He says: \u201cReception means a\n_taking again_.... The word \u2018recept\u2019 is seen to be appropriate to the\nclass of ideas in question, because in receiving such ideas the mind is\npassive.\u201d By \u201cconcept\u201d however he understands \u201cthat kind of composite\nidea which is rendered possible only by the aid of language or by the\nprocess of naming abstractions as abstractions.\u201d[15]\n\nWe agree with Professor Romanes in the main point, viz. that the process\nof evolution must be considered as uninterrupted, but we cannot agree\nwith him on several minor points.[16]\n\nWe must express our doubt concerning the propriety of calling the mind\npassive when receiving impressions. Every single sensation is an active\nprocess, just as much as a reflex motion, and it may be considered as a\nreaction that takes place in response to the stimulus of the impression.\nConception of course is also an active process, and concepts, the\nproducts of conception, establish a new department in the mind. \u201cNoir\u00e9,\nquoted by Prof. Max M\u00fcller, says: \u2018All trees hitherto seen by me leave\nin my imagination a mixed image, a kind of ideal presentation of a tree.\nQuite different from this is my concept, which is never an image.\u2019\u201d[17]\n\nAnd this is true.\n\nWe have on another occasion explained that sensations are\nsense-impressions which have acquired meaning.[18] Rays of light are\nreflected from an object and fall upon the retina of an eye. Here they\nproduce a disturbance of nervous substance which is transmitted to the\nbrain where it is felt as the image say of a tree. Now the ether-waves\nare not sight, but a certain form of ether-waves corresponds to a\ncertain form of sight, and the latter comes to stand for the former. The\nmental picture of a tree becomes a symbol for a special object outside\nof us and it is projected to the place where experience has taught\nus to expect that object. In naming objects we repeat the process of\nexpressing by symbols. Sensations are symbols, and names are symbols of\nsymbols. The name and concept tree is not the composite picture of all\nthe trees I have seen, but it is the symbol of this composite picture\nof sense-impressions. Sensations are like the chords of a piano and the\nconcepts are like the keys. The key is different in kind from the chord\nwhich belongs to it. When I touch the key the chord will sound: when I\npronounce a name the composite sensation of all its analogous memories\nwill be awakened.\n\n * * * * *\n\nCan there be any question that difference in kind can originate by\ndegrees? Professor Romanes uses the phrase \u201cdifferent in kind\u201d as\nsynonymous with \u201cdifferent in origin\u201d and therefore declares that human\nreason and animal intelligence are \u201cdifferent in degree\u201d only. The\nword \u201ckind,\u201d it is true, is at least as vague as the word species and a\nnaturalist may often be doubtful where to draw the line. Man and monkey\nare different in kind, and they are also more different in origin than\nCarl Vogt assumed, for man is not the descendant of any of the monkey\nfamilies now existent. But this does not disprove that they are of a\nstill remoter common origin or at least that they originated in the same\nway in some am\u0153boid form as simple life-substance.\n\nNew formations which originate through combining are as much new\ncreations, i. e. things new in kind, as if they were produced through\nspecial-creation acts of God which are said to be creations out of\nnothing and not mere transformations.\n\nMan builds houses out of bricks and timbers. Is not the house something\ndifferent in kind from the trees and the clay from which the materials\nhave been taken? Is not the boiler of a steam-engine different in purpose\nand accordingly also different in kind from a tea-kettle? Is not every\ninvention something different in kind? And is not the same true of the\nproducts of thought? Is not a triangle something different in kind from\na line? And the origin of the former is not more miraculous than that of\nthe latter. A triangle is more complex than a line, but its existence\nin the mind is not more of a mystery than the existence of the line.\nDifference in kind need not include difference of origin. Harmony is\ndifferent in kind from melody. Notes in succession produce melody, while\nsimultaneous notes produce harmony. In either case it is simply a matter\nof combination.\n\nProfessor Romanes when speaking of the passivity of sense-impressions\nseems to think of the unconsciousness of the process. We are not\nconscious of the transformation of impressions into sensations while\nwe can become aware of our efforts to change the sense-material into\nconcepts. Yet the nature of mind is throughout activity. And no one has\nperhaps insisted more strongly on the activity of mind than Prof. Max\nM\u00fcller. But Prof. Max M\u00fcller distinguishes between the activity of the\nmind and the ego which as he supposes performs that activity. He says\n(\u201cScience of Thought,\u201d p. 63):\n\n \u201cWe think of a mind dwelling in a body, and we soon find\n ourselves in the midst of psychological mythology. Let it be\n clearly understood, therefore, that by Mind I mean nothing but\n that working which is going on within, embracing sensation,\n perception, conception, and naming, as well as the various\n modes of combining and separating the results of these\n processes for the purpose of new discovery.\n\n \u201cBut if Mind is to be the name of the work, what is to be the\n name of the worker? It is not yet the Self, for the Self, in\n the highest sense, is a spectator only, not a worker; but it is\n what we may call the Ego, as personating the Self; it is what\n other philosophers mean by the Monon, of which, as we shall\n see, there are many. Let us call therefore the worker who does\n the work of the mind in its various aspects, the Monon or the\n Ego.\u201d\n\nAnd in another passage (l. c., p. 552) he speaks of the simplicity of the\nmonon:\n\n \u201cIf then the process of thought is so simple as we saw, not\n less simple, at least, than that of speech, it follows, that\n the complicated apparatus which had been postulated by most\n philosophers for the performance of thought in its various\n spheres of manifestation, must make room for much plainer\n machinery. Instead of intuition, intellect, understanding,\n mind, reason, genius, judgment, and all the rest, we want\n really nothing but a self-conscious Monon, capable of changing\n all that is supplied by the senses into percepts, concepts,\n and names. These changes may be represented as something\n very marvellous, and we may imagine any number of powers and\n faculties for the performance of them.\u201d\n\n \u201cGrant a Monon conscious of itself, and conscious therefore of\n the impacts made upon it or the changes produced in it by other\n Mona which it resists, and we require little more to explain\n all that we are accustomed to call Thought.\u201d\n\nThe continuity of evolution naturally holds good according to Max M\u00fcller\nfor the natural man, but not for the Self.\n\nHow is this? Is the monon perhaps conceived as not-natural or outside of\nnature. Hardly. For Prof. Max M\u00fcller speaks of the object also as being a\nmonon.[19] If the objects are as much mona as the subjects the same laws\nmust hold good for both, and the subject-monon must be supposed to be an\nobject-monon if considered in its relation to other object-mona.\n\nIf Prof. Max M\u00fcller\u2019s protest against the continuity of evolution is not\nbased upon the dualism of natural and extra-natural mona, what can it\nmean when he says that evolution does not hold good for the Self?\n\nIf the Self is conceived as a monon, i. e. something \u201calone\u201d like an\natomic unit, it can have no evolution. Evolution is change of form\nthrough the production of new configurations. A monon or an isolated unit\nconsidered by itself cannot evolve. It is as it ever has been and will\nbe\u2014a monon.\n\nIf this is Prof. Max M\u00fcller\u2019s meaning, we must ask, How does he know\nthat the self is a monon and that objects are mona? Do they not, if so\nconceived, become highly mysterious entities? New mona are constantly\nborn into this World. Whence do they come? Is every birth of a child\nthe new creation of another monon by the creator, who so distributes\nthe babes in the world that like babes are given to like parents thus\nproducing the wrong impression of heredity as well as of a continuity of\nevolution? The idea of explaining all the activities of the mind by the\npostulate of a conscious monon is very simple indeed, but the problems\nwhich would arise from this postulate are extremely complex, and it seems\nto us that after all the proposition of evolution is by far the simplest\nsolution of all the difficulties.[20]\n\nMind as we conceive it is the product of evolution. Mind has been\nevolved in a world which (judging from its product) must be conceived as\nbeing freighted not only with energy but also with the potentiality of\nfeeling. Mind, as we know it in experience, is no monon, no indivisible\nunit, but a unitary system of feelings and thoughts produced through\nexternal impressions upon one part of the world by the rest of the world\nwhich surrounds it. Mind is an abstract term; it does not denote a part\nof the world, but a certain quality of a part of the world, viz. the\nfeelings and thoughts of special kinds of organisms. Mind is produced\nthrough external impressions, but it does not consist merely of external\nimpressions. Mind, as we have stated before, is not passive; it is\nactive. It consists of the reactions which take place in response to\nimpressions and also of the accumulated products of these reactions.\nThus every mind is the concentrated effect of the whole cosmos upon one\nspecial part of the cosmos, not as it takes place in one moment, but as\nit has taken place in a definite and continuous period up to date. The\naccumulation of these effects makes the mind grow and expand and the\nsystem of the growth constitutes its specific character. We can as little\nthink of the mind as appearing suddenly by an act of special creation\nas we can think that an oak tree can be created out of nothing or that\nit can exist without previous growth. The law of continuity holds good\nas much in the realm of the human mind as in the domain of animal and\nplant-life.\n\n * * * * *\n\nSo far we have borne in mind the philosophical and scientific aspect\nonly of the continuity of evolution. There is another aspect however\nof no less importance, that is the religious view of the subject. We\ndo not believe that science and religion are two different spheres of\nthought and that something may be true in science which is not true in\nreligion. Since the theory of evolution has revolutionised almost all our\nsciences, we ask, what influence must this change of thought exercise\nupon religion? Is not the religious idea of God destroyed and the whole\nsystem of religion overturned?\n\nWe think not. An old and very powerful system of theology which has been\nconsidered as orthodox for centuries will become untenable as soon as\nthe idea of evolution and the continuity of evolution are recognised in\ntheir sweeping importance; but religion itself will enter into a new\nphase of evolution and the idea of God will not be cast aside as a\nmere superstition of the Dark Ages, it will be purified and appear in a\ngreater and sublimer, in a nobler, higher, and in a truer conception than\never before.\n\nThe idea of God is an historical heirloom of past ages. The religious\nman and the philosopher of all times have tried to put into it their\nhighest, their best, their grandest, and their purest emotions as well\nas thoughts. And these thoughts were not meaningless, they were not mere\nfancies. They contained the quintessence of their conception concerning\nthat feature of reality which has produced us as living, thinking, and\naspiring beings, and which still prompts us to aspire to higher aims. The\nworld which has produced other beings and ourselves, cannot be and is not\na meaningless congeries of material particles in motion. It is a living\ncosmos. It is a grand harmonious universe pregnant with mind, and nothing\nin it is suffered to exist for any length of time but that which conforms\nto its laws; and that which conforms to its laws we call moral.\n\nThe idea of God, however, as it is commonly taught in our schools is\nfull of pagan notions, and the very paganism of the present God-idea is\noften supposed to be its deepest and holiest meaning. No wonder that\natheism increases with the progress of science! And why should not\natheism increase, if it is truer than a superstitious theism? Atheism\nI believe will increase more and more until theism is cleansed of its\npagan notions. But atheism will not come to stay, for atheism is a mere\nnegative view and negations have no strength to live. They have power to\ncriticise and they will serve as a leaven in the dough. Their purpose is\nthe purification of the positive views. Negations will pass away as soon\nas their purpose is fulfilled.\n\nThe old pagan conception (now considered as orthodox) places God in the\ndark nooks and crevices of our knowledge. Wherever science fails and\nwherever our inquiring mind is entangled in problems which we cannot hope\nto solve, wherever the continuity of nature and of the order of nature\nis hidden from our intellectual sight, the so-called orthodox believer\ncomes forth and declares: \u201cThis is a holy place. Here is the finger of\nGod\u2019s special interference!\u201d Consider what a degrading view of God this\nis! The place of darkness is conceived as an actual break in the order\nof the world and this break is supposed to be a special revelation of\nGod! If we trust in truth, we need not shun the light of science and the\nGod of science\u2014in contradistinction to the pagan notion of God\u2014reveals\nhimself in the discoveries of science. God lives not in darkness but\nin light, and his existence is proved not through the breaks in nature\n(which we can be sure do not exist, and wherever they appear are due to\nour ignorance) but through the order of nature, for God _is_ the order of\nnature. God is that power through which we exist as living, thinking, and\naspiring beings, and to which we have to conform in order to live.\n\nWhen Darwin speaks of \u201clife as having been originally breathed into a few\nforms or into one _by the Creator_,\u201d he either uses allegorical language\nor he means that the beginning of life was an act of special creation.\nHe apparently means the latter and is in this respect not a consistent\nevolutionist. Darwin was great as a reformer of natural science, but\nin theology he still stood upon the old standpoint. He calls God to\nrescue where science fails. The Creator did not originally breathe life\ninto the organism, but his breath is constantly ensouling all living\nbeings. Now suppose there were or there could be exceptions to the law of\ncausation, to the conservation of matter and energy, or to the continuity\nof evolution, would that not rather be a drawback in nature? Are the\npatches on a coat better proof that it was made by a tailor than the\nwhole coat? Any kind of theology which still recognises special-creation\nacts, or miracles, or breaks in evolution, we do not hesitate to say,\nis not yet free from paganism, for it still sticks to the religious\nconception of the medicine-man that God is a great magician. The God of\nthe medicine-man lives in the realm of the unknown and he appears in\nman\u2019s imagination where the light of science fails. The God of science\nhowever is the God of truth, and evidence of his existence is not found\nin the darkness of ignorance but in the light of knowledge. God\u2019s being\nis not recognised in the seeming exceptions to natural laws, but in the\nnatural laws themselves. God\u2019s existence is not proved by our inability\nto trace here or there the order of cause and effect, as if a disorder\nin the world made it divine; on the contrary the only rational ground\nof a faith in God is the irrefragable cosmic order of the universe. It\nis true that we have to give up the idea of a personal God, but is not a\nsuperpersonal God greater than the idol which we have made unto our own\nlikeness?\n\nThe God of science is perhaps more in agreement with the biblical God\nthan the God of dogmatic theology. The interpretations of biblical\npassages which are at present generally considered as orthodox are\n(merely from the standpoint of impartial exegetics) untenable. The first\nchapter of Genesis has not one word about special-creation acts. Neither\nthe Elohim nor the Jahveh-Adonai account declares that in the beginning\nthere had been Nothing. Both accounts (Gen. Chap. I. 1 to II. 3, and\nII. 3 et seqq.) agree that God \u201cshaped\u201d the world. The word _barah_ (to\nshape, to form, to make) is nowhere used in the sense of creating out of\nnothing. The Psalmist says, \u201cBy the word of the Lord were the heavens\nmade,\u201d which was so interpreted in the New Testament that it meant \u201cby\nthe logos,\u201d and the gospel of St. John adds \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f26\u03bd \u1f41 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, i.\ne. and the word was God. Logos means rational speech or reason, and\nthe world-reason through which the heavens were made can mean only the\ncosmic order of the universe. This idea of St. John\u2019s thought out to its\nultimate conclusions means monism.\n\nThere is a common error that scientific progress is dangerous to\nreligion. Scientific progress is dangerous to superstition only. Religion\n(i. e. true religion) is not based upon our ignorance, but upon our\nknowledge; it is not a child of the darkness but of the light, and faith\nfar from being a mere belief, i. e. the imperfect knowledge of an opinion\nfor which no proof is forthcoming, is applied knowledge, it is knowledge\nplus the confidence that this knowledge can be made the basis of ethics\nand the supreme rule for regulating our conduct in life. The history of\nreligion has been and is still a constant purification of our religious\nideas, and the crucible in which the religious ideas are purified is\nscience. We are slowly but constantly progressing toward a high religious\nideal and this ideal is a cosmical religion free from the pagan notions\nso severely criticised by Christ and yet so carefully preserved by\nthe Christian churches. This cosmical religion will be the religion\nof science. It will not consist of religious indifference nor of a\ntoleration of any and every opinion as is so often erroneously proclaimed\nas the ideal of liberalism. On the contrary it will be in a certain sense\nthe most orthodox religion, for its maxim will be to stand on the truth\nand nothing but the truth. And the truth is not at all indifferent or\ntolerant. The truth is extremely intolerant and suffers no error beside\nit, although, as a matter of course, the truth is very tolerant in so\nfar as it sanctions no violence but employs only the spiritual sword of\nconviction by argument and logical proof.\n\nWe have given up the idea of special acts of creation as the calling\nforth disconnectedly of something out of nothing. We conceive the whole\nworld as an orderly cosmos, well regulated by laws and evolving the\nforms of life in agreement with its laws. Is there less divinity in a\ncosmos than in a half chaotic world in which God makes exceptions and\ncounteracts his own ordinances? Is the idea of creation less religious\nif it ceases to mean an origination of something out of nothing? Is not\nman at least just as wonderful if evolved step by step out of the dust\nof the earth through innumerable stages in the long process of evolution\nas if he were made directly out of clay? And is there less divinity in\nhis soul, is he any less shaped unto the image of God because his growth\ntook place according to natural laws? Natural laws, in the conception\nof purified religion, of the religion of science, are nothing but the\nideas of God, eternal and immutable, and formulated by scientists not on\nthe ground of special revelations but on the ground of the universal and\nunchangeable, and throughout consistent revelation of God in his works.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe science of language and the science of life are two important\nhighroads to the cognition of truth. That both sciences will be\nconsistent with each other, that their results will finally be seen to\nharmonise perfectly is beyond all doubt and also that their bearing upon\nreligious ideas will contribute much to their purification. Prof. F.\nMax M\u00fcller and Prof. George John Romanes are two great scholars, each\none is a leader in his own branch of knowledge, and where they come in\nconflict, it appears to us, that they rather complement than refute each\nother. Both are strong Monists, although emphasising different sides of\nMonistic truth and we feel convinced that their very differences will\nhelp us to elaborate more fully and clearly and more comprehensively\nthe great truth of Monism\u2014of that Monism which will more and more be\nrecognised as the corner-stone of science and also of the religion of\nscience.\n\n EDITOR.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[10] Compare the article _The Origin of Thought-Forms_ in the present\nnumber, under the caption \u201cDiverse Topics.\u201d\n\n[11] I should prefer to speak of the oneness or inseparableness of\nthought and language, but since Prof. Max M\u00fcller has sufficiently\nexplained himself, I use here his term \u201cidentity\u201d in the sense of\ninseparableness as it is used by Prof. Max M\u00fcller.\n\n[12] _The Logos Theory_, by Ludwig Noir\u00e9. Translated from the German.\n_The Open Court_, iii. p. 2196. English translations of Noir\u00e9\u2019s most\nimportant articles concerning the origin of language, have appeared in\nNos. 33, 137, 139, 141, 142 of _The Open Court_.\n\n[13] That ants communicate with each other through their antenn\u00e6 is an\nundeniable fact. But Landois believes that they communicate also through\nsounds. Some ants possess in their stridulation-organ a kind of a rattle\nthe sound of which, however, is perceptible to the human ear only in the\nPonera ants.\n\n[14] See _Three Lectures on the Science of Language_, p. 47. The Open\nCourt Publishing Co., Chicago.\n\n[15] Prof. Lloyd Morgan introduces several new terms, which seem well\ncoined. The mental product which is called the object of sense he calls\n\u201cconstruct\u201d; the most prominent feature in a composite sense-image, he\ncalls the \u201cpredominant\u201d; and if the predominant is named and isolated by\nabstraction he calls it an \u201cisolate.\u201d\n\n[16] An impartial criticism of Professor Romanes\u2019s position has been made\nby Prof. Lloyd Morgan in his recent work _Animal Life and Intelligence_.\n\n[17] This quotation is requoted from Prof. Lloyd Morgan, _Animal Life and\nIntelligence_, p. 325.\n\n[18] _The origin of Mind_, in _The Monist_, Vol. I. No. I.\n\n[19] L. c., p. 281. \u201cSo much about the subject or the monon. What now\nabout the objects or the mona?\u201d\n\n[20] Prof. Max M\u00fcller is a great admirer of Kant and so am I. But it\nappears to me that we differ greatly in what we accept as the essential\nteachings of the master; and I grant willingly that Prof. Max M\u00fcller has\npreserved the doctrines of Kant more faithfully than I. I have attempted\nto modernise Kant. If I am called a Kantian (and I do not object to the\nname, on the contrary I am proud of it) it is because I proceed from\nKant and I attempt to preserve the spirit of Kant\u2019s philosophy rather\nthan his doctrines. For the sake of the spirit of Kantian philosophy I\nhave seen myself urged to surrender the idea of the thing-in-itself as\nsomething unknowable. Prof. Max M\u00fcller has preserved in his philosophy\n(for such is the _Science of Thought_) the Ding-an-sich theory. Believing\nin things-in-themselves he must consistently believe in a self or monon,\nfor this monon is nothing but the thing-in-itself of the soul.\n\nI have limited myself in the present article to the principle of\ncontinuity in evolution as a point of divergence between Prof. Max M\u00fcller\nand the views defended by _The Monist_. If I attempted at present to\nenter into the philosophical problem of things-in-themselves, I should be\nobliged to tax too much the patience of my readers. But as I am convinced\nthat the reason of our difference with Prof. Max M\u00fcller concerning the\ncontinuity of evolution lies deeper still, I intend to treat the subject\nof things-in-themselves in a future number.\n\n\n\n\nLITERARY CORRESPONDENCE\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\nFRANCE.\u2014THE INTELLECTUAL AWAKENING OF THE LANGUE D\u2019OC.\n\n\nI have never seen mentioned in your periodical publications the _Revue\ndes Pyr\u00e9n\u00e9es_; and perhaps I should never have heard of the periodical\nmyself if I had not been in this interesting old city, and if my eye\nhad not chanced on the title of one of the articles of a recent number\nadvertised in a local journal. \u201cUn Ari\u00e9geois s\u00e9nateur des Etats-Unis\nd\u2019Am\u00e9rique: Pierre Soul\u00e9\u201d was the title that attracted my attention and\ncaused me to procure a copy, which I have found interesting in more ways\nthan one.\n\nThe publication is a well-printed quarterly of 150 pages, and has\ncompleted some time since the second year of its existence. Its full\ntitle is as follows: _Revue des Pyr\u00e9n\u00e9es et de la France meridionale,\nOrgane de l\u2019Association Pyr\u00e9n\u00e9enne et de l\u2019union des Soci\u00e9t\u00e9s Savantes\ndu Midi_. The founders of the periodical are the late JULIEN SACAZE, a\nsavant much venerated in these parts, and DR. F. GARRIGOU, its present\neditor.\n\nThe Association Pyr\u00e9n\u00e9enne, of which, as we have just seen, the _Revue_\nis the organ, is an active and significant organisation. Here are some\nof its aims. While it recognises the greatness of the Capital, Paris,\nit advocates decentralisation, by \u201cshowing that workers living in the\nprovinces are as capable as others, though enjoying less support and\nfunds, to aid in the building up of the great scientific edifice of\nFrance.\u201d The importance and boldness of this declaration can scarcely be\nappreciated by those who have not breathed for some time the excessively\nmonopolistic atmosphere of the French capital, which has been so baneful\nto so many national interests. The Association would also act as a\nmeans of union between the various learned societies of the South, the\nMidi, and thus render it possible to organise an annual Congress \u201cfor\nthe discussion and defense of the grand scientific, industrial, and\ncommercial questions which concern Southern France.\u201d\n\nHere we see brought out still more precisely that rivalry between the\nSouth and North, characteristic of most nations, and which presents such\ncurious aspects in the past and present history of France.\n\nI never weary of quietly noting, while in the South, the delightful\ncontempt which the _m\u00e9ridionaux_ show for their Parisian fellow\ncountrymen. The other day at dinner, for instance, I heard a learned\nprofessor of one of the Southern Universities defending the Southern\naccent and preferring it to \u201cthe Parisian accent,\u201d as he put it. But I\nwould need pages of your space to develop this line of thought. Suffice\nit to say here that the Association Pyr\u00e9n\u00e9enne and its organ the _Revue\ndes Pyr\u00e9n\u00e9es_ intend to prove, and have succeeded in proving, if we may\njudge by this number of the _Revue_ and by the account of the proceedings\nof the first Congress of the Association, placed at the head of the\nnumber, that there are creditable savants and sound learning outside of\nthe walls of Victor Hugo\u2019s \u201cVille Lumi\u00e8re.\u201d\n\nAnother object of the Association would be dear to Castelar\u2019s heart.\nI give it in full: \u201cTo remove morally the grand Pyreneean curtain and\nto offer the hand of friendship to a nation justly proud of its past,\nwhose interests touch our own, and which has the right, because of\nthe illustrious sons of Catalonia, Aragon, and Navarre, to take part\nin an intellectual and Pyreneean association based on science.\u201d This\nis a paraphrase of Louis XIV\u2019s famous remark concerning the Pyrenees,\nwhen he placed his grandson on the throne of Spain. Nor can one be\nsurprised at the strong affection which binds Southern France to the\nIberian peninsula. The grand mountains, the \u201cPyreneean curtain,\u201d which\nseparate the two countries, are always in sight, their snow-capped peaks\nglittering in the sun; the various _patois_, especially the dialect\nof Pau, resemble the Spanish more than they do the French tongue;\nSpanish money is foisted on you at the shops, and picturesque Spanish\nmountaineers lend a peculiar charm to the country fairs, while the nation\nis ever on the eve of a pronunciamento, destined to give to Spain the\nrepublican institutions of France.\n\nBut to return to PIERRE SOUL\u00c9 who is the cause and starting point of this\nletter. Commandant Trespaill\u00e9\u2019s eulogistic biographical sketch is of\nslight interest to American readers, who can find elsewhere a fuller and\nmore exact account of the brilliant but rather disappointing career of\nthe once famous Franco-Louisiana statesman. M. Trespaill\u00e9\u2019s reference to\n\u201cOld Hickory\u201d as \u201cthe immortal Jackson,\u201d his statement that the American\npeople is full of prejudices against the French race, his metamorphosing\nNew Hampshire\u2019s only President into Pierre Francklin, and some other\nsimilar slips can be overlooked, for this essay offers a striking example\nof the dominant idea of the _Revue_, the Association and patriotic\nSoutherners generally,\u2014the glorification of the great men and great\nactions of the sunny South, the \u201cMidi ensoleill\u00e9.\u201d\n\nAnd I must admit, foreigner though I am, that I share much of this\nenthusiasm for persons and things meridional, and especially for the\nlatter. What a land this is for historical and arch\u00e6ological study!\nTake this number of the _Revue des Pyr\u00e9n\u00e9es_, for instance; it is full\nof it. Here, for example, are the titles of three of the papers read\nat the first Congress of the Association Pyr\u00e9n\u00e9enne, to which Congress\nI referred above: \u201cThe Domitian Road from Narbonne to Perpignan,\u201d \u201cThe\nThird Century School of Sculpture in Southern Gaul,\u201d and \u201cThe Roman Road\nfrom Narbonne to Carcassonne.\u201d There are several articles in the _Revue_\nabout the University of Toulouse, which is stated to be the oldest in\nFrance after that of Paris, having been founded in 1229, more than two\nhundred and fifty years before the discovery of America. The law school\neven antedates 1229 and its foundation is lost in the obscurity of\nthe early centuries of the Christian era. Another article begins the\npublication of a list of the professors at the law school. The first\nrecorded name dates from 1251. When one finds such themes as these on\nevery hand, Rome, Gaul, the Middle Ages, and feudalism become almost\nliving realities. And how inexhaustibly rich Languedoc is in these\nreminders of the distant past.\n\nAnd the patois or dialects of this part of France are not the least\nancient and interesting subjects for study. Wonder is often expressed\nthat the English of America differs so slightly from the English of\nEngland, with three thousand miles of ocean separating the two countries.\nThe wonder increases when you find that here in Languedoc the same patois\ndiffers in some particulars from town to town. Let me first mention some\nbig differences and then touch upon some minor ones. If you take the\ntrain which leaves Toulouse at about half past eleven in the morning,\nyou will arrive at Pau at half past four. During these five hours on a\npretty slow train you have passed from one patois to another. The lower\nclasses of Toulouse cannot understand the lower classes of Pau. And\nif you continue in the same train, at about half past eight you reach\nMaul\u00e9on, in the French Basque Provinces, where the populace of neither\nToulouse nor Pau could carry on a conversation with the populace of\nMaul\u00e9on. Thus a nine hours\u2019 ride of about 175 miles on an accommodation\ntrain carries you through a region where French is the vernacular of the\neducated classes and is the official language, but where the great mass\nof the population is divided into three groups, each speaking a different\ndialect.\n\nThe modifications which the same patois undergoes in neighboring\nlocalities is not less curious though of course not so radical. Roughly\nspeaking it may be said that the same patois is spoken from Montpellier\nto Bordeaux and from Toulouse well up into the centre of France, which\nembraces the region where prevailed the Langue d\u2019oc from which the\npresent patois is derived. But, while a peasant could make himself\nunderstood throughout this wide territory, his ear would often be\nperplexed by more than one strange word and phrase. I was once told on\nthe Riviera that the patois of Menton differed considerably from that of\nNice and that this was particularly the case before the construction of\nthe Corniche road and the railway, when a denizen of the former place\ncould reach the latter city only by doubling Cape Martin under sail. I\ndo not know how true this statement is, but I believe it to be correct,\nafter a superficial study on these same lines which I have just made in\nthe Department of the Tarn, one of the most isolated portions of Upper\nLanguedoc. I find that the patois of towns as near together, as are New\nYork, Newark, Patterson, Nyack and Tarrytown, for example, differs, not,\nperhaps, in its construction but in its vocabulary. Let me give some\nexamples. Thus, potato, which is _truffet_ at Cordes, becomes _truffo_\nat Castres. _Patano_, the word employed in the South East end of the\nDepartment is also heard at Castres, but never at Cordes, which is in the\nNorth West end of the Department, Castres being about in the centre. Dog\nis _cagnot_ and _c\u00f4_ at Cordes, and _gous_ at Castres. (At Montpellier,\nin a contiguous Department it is _tschi_, while at Pau they say _can_,\nwhich approaches very near the Latin.) Pig is _pourcel_ at Castres and\n_tessou_ at Cordes. Broom _engranicro_ at Castres and _balatso_ at\nCordes. I have also noted the following difference between the Tarn\npatois and that of Pau. The _f_ of the former always becomes an aspirated\n_h_ in the latter. Thus, _femo_, woman (Castres) is _henno_ at Pau;\n_fourco_, pitchfork (Castres) _hourco_ (Pau); _foun_ fountain (Castres)\n_houn_ (Pau).\n\nA comparison of this patois with the French as regards the spelling of\ngeographical names reveals a fact that would somewhat dampen the ardor\nof our friend Colonel Shephard, of New York, in his effort to force the\ngazeteers to give geographical names as they are written in the countries\nwhere they are found. One might have thought that such near neighbors as\nthe Langue d\u2019oil and the Langue d\u2019oc would have come to some rational\nunderstanding on this point and that the Ile-de-France would have\naccepted the spelling of Languedoc. But not so. The towns and rivers of\nthis part of France look as different in French and patois printed pages\nand sound as differently when pronounced by educated and peasant mouths,\nas do the towns and rivers of Italy when seen in Italian and English\nbooks or when spoken by Americans and Italians. Thus Toulouso became\nToulouse; Castros, Castres; Dourgnos, Dourgne; Carcassouno, Carcassonne;\nNarbouno, Narbonne; Billofranco, Villefranche; Labaou, Lavaur; Bibiers,\nViviers; Boou, Vour; Abrayrou, Aveyron; Cordos, Cordes, etc.\n\nThese patois, these dialects of the old Langue d\u2019oc, are awakening just\nnow increasing interest in the literary circles of the Midi, for it is\nonly within recent years that the French has appeared to threaten their\nextinction. The spread of the railroad system and especially the wide\ndevelopment of the primary school since the advent of the Third Republic,\nare dealing deadly blows at these popular dialects. But they are still\nfar from moribund. I have frequently been told that even to-day one\nstumbles now and then on old peasants living up in the isolated Black\nMountain, a spur of the C\u00e9vennes, and which divides Upper from Lower\nLanguedoc, who cling to _oc_, although _obe_ or _ope_, or the French\n_oui_ and _si_, are the common affirmative particles of the patois.\n\nIt has often happened to me when taking a constitutional to ask my way\nand discover that I am addressing a person who neither understands\nnor speaks French, though, as a rule, all peasants understand French\nand the vast majority can speak the language too, but after a rather\nsorry fashion. A foreigner finds at least one comfort in all this: in\nLanguedoc he uses the national tongue more correctly than thousands of\nnative born Frenchmen! Nor is the knowledge of patois confined to the\npeasantry or the working classes of the towns. The _bourgeoisie_, with\nexceedingly rare exceptions, are quite at home in it, and the children\nof the nobility often prattle with their peasant nurse more easily in\npatois than in the polished speech of their parents. During a political\ncampaign, it is a very common thing for a would-be deputy to address\ncountry voters in their familiar dialect, thereby gaining the favor not\nalone of the _f\u00e9libres_; while, during this same period of electoral\nexcitement, the local papers publish almost daily editorials written in\npatois. In hundreds of rural churches the short sermon after early mass\nis preached in patois, and many a time I have found myself turning with\nsurprise when I heard French spoken in the streets of Languedocian towns\nof considerable size.\n\nThere was a time when the government and the ruling classes of Languedoc\nitself strove to eradicate these dialects and to substitute French\nfor them. The aim was a patriotic one; greater national unity, it was\nbelieved, would thus be secured. But that period has gone by, and at\npresent there is a strong tendency to preserve from destruction these\nlinguistic souvenirs of a rapidly fading past. What the enthusiastic\n_f\u00e9libres_ would do for Proven\u00e7al, they and their disciples and imitators\nin Languedoc would do for the dialects of South Western France. At the\nCongr\u00e8s d\u2019Etudes Languedociennes, held recently at Montpellier, one of\nthe members proposed that the French language should be taught in the\nprimary schools through the medium of the langue d\u2019oc. The suggestion\nis not so chimerical as it appears to be at first blush, for one of the\ngreatest and never-ending difficulties of the country schoolmaster in\nthis part of France is to teach his scholars the three R\u2019s by means of\nthe French, which is a foreign tongue to ninety-nine out of a hundred\nof them. One is not surprised, therefore, to find that one of the\nresolutions passed by this same Congress takes up the plan proposed in\nthe paper just referred to, and declares in favor of \u201cthe utilisation of\nthe langue d\u2019oc for teaching French in the primary schools.\u201d\n\nAt a recent sitting of the General Council of the Bordeaux University a\nresolution was passed calling for the creation of a chair of \u201cSouthern\nlanguages.\u201d In explanation of this term, the _Gironde_, the leading\nBordeaux newspaper, says: \u201cBesides giving instruction in Spanish, one of\nthe labors of the professor would be to teach our South Western dialects\nin which the most important historical documents of this part of the\ncountry were drawn up during several centuries.\u201d The editor then goes on\nto say: \u201cIf the State does not feel able to found this chair, will not\nsome private individual come forward and imitate the example of James E.\nClark, who recently established at Worcester, Mass., a university endowed\nwith a capital of $12,500,000?\u201d\n\nSpeaking of primary schools reminds me of a curious fact which has\nfrequently attracted my attention in Languedoc this winter. In no other\npart of France perhaps was it so common for a town to grow up around a\ncastle; for this region was terribly harried by the Wars of Religion,\nand the poor peasants were forced to seek the protection of some lord.\nIn order to render them more impregnable, these castles were generally\nbuilt on some high hill. So now one sees on every hand decaying hamlets\nsurrounding ruined castles left almost deserted on the very crown of some\npyramidal mount, while the busy town of to-day has descended to the more\naccessible base of the hill. But since the advent of the Third Republic\nand the grand impetus given to primary instruction, these abandoned\ncastles have taken a new lease of life, and been converted into school\nbuildings. The other day during an hour\u2019s drive in Upper Languedoc I saw\ntwo of these old useless feudal piles consecrated to popular nineteenth\ncentury education. What a train of reflections is thus suggested! Within\nthe very same walls where some proud ignorant seignior once lorded it\nover his humble vassals, the descendants of these serfs, still speaking\nthe tongue of their oppressed ancestors, but enjoying all the liberties\nthen usurped by their masters, are now being instructed in branches of\nknowledge of which the feudal knight had scarcely an inkling. What a\nrevolution was that of \u201989!\n\n THEODORE STANTON.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\nGERMANY.\u2014RECENT PUBLICATIONS IN THE DOMAIN OF PATHOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY.\n\n\nThe science of anthropology claims, as we know, to have discovered, that\nthe various epochs of history are marked not only by characteristic\nreligious, political, social, and literary conditions, but not\nunfrequently also by particular forms of disease; and it is the opinion\nof eminent medical authorities that nervous and mental diseases\nconstitute the \u201cpathological feature\u201d of modern civilisation. This,\nof course, is not to be understood as meaning that diseases of this\ncharacter have not appeared in previous epochs, but simply that they\noccur with unusual frequency at the present day and in unusually grave\nforms.\n\nA book treating of the affliction of the age ought to count on a large\ncircle of readers, and it will be all the more deserving of such if it\nthoroughly and skilfully fulfils its purpose of holding up the mirror to\nthe time and of imparting the light and advice required in this matter.\nThis has been done in an excellent manner by the work of the Bremen\nalienist Dr. SCHOLZ, entitled _Die Di\u00e4tetik des Geistes\u2014Ein F\u00fchrer zu\npraktischer Lebensweisheit_, which has just appeared in its second and\nenlarged edition, Leipsic, E. H. Mayer. This book is distinguished from\nthe majority of similar recent publications intended for a greater public\nby its relative thoroughness. It must be characterised as thorough and\ncomprehensive, also, in comparison with the older and more celebrated\nwork, which its title at once suggests, FEUCHTERLEBEN\u2019S _Di\u00e4tetik\nder Seele_. The character of the book is not \u201cpurely psychological,\u201d\noverlooking the high importance of the influence of the body, as was\nthe case with Beneke; nor does it lean towards the moralising of a\nHeinroth and Ideler; nor does the author treat his subject from an\nexclusively medical point of view: the work, in fact, is anthropological\nin character. Its contents possess chiefly in two respects great\ninterest: (1) from a universal human point of view, in that it affords\nus a glance into the awful abysses of life, in the company of an expert\nguide who tells us how these depths are to be avoided, or at least gives\nconsolation to those whose way leads necessarily through them; and (2)\nfrom a pedagogical point of view, in that it directs attention to the\nheredity of the morbid constitutions and abnormalities that oppose\nobstacles to education or may become such if improperly treated.\n\nIt is obvious that morbid mental dispositions must be taken into account\nin all work of education and instruction, if we wish to avoid an\negregious violation of the universally recognised requirement to regard\nindividuality. And from this point of view the book of Dr. Scholz will\nawaken in readers who have anything to do at all with education, the\ndesire to learn more about the nature of morbid mental life in the young\nthan is presented in this treatise destined for a large public.\n\nSuch a wish would have had to remain unsatisfied six years ago, when the\n_Di\u00e4tetik des Geistes_ first appeared. It is true, English physicians\nparticularly, like West, Conolly, Maudsley, and others, had a long time\npreviously directed attention to the morbid phenomena of infant psychic\nlife, but their work, like that of their French and German professional\nassociates, lies buried in medical magazines and volumes not easily\naccessible. The first to apply himself to the work needed in this\ncondition of affairs was Professor EMMINGHAUS, who digested and collected\nall the material, thus supplied, in a compendious work bearing the title\n_Die psychischen St\u00f6rungen des Kindesalters_, T\u00fcbingen, Laupp, 1887. The\nfact indeed is not to be left unrecognised that the book, in so far as it\nmay be used by those who have not had a medical training, possesses two\ndefects,\u2014defects, however, for which the author cannot be censured. In\nthe first place, it is intended for physicians only, and is therefore,\non account of the many technical terms it uses, at times not uniformly\nintelligible. To the serious student, however, who possesses the previous\npsychological and physiological knowledge most indispensable, it presents\nno difficulties of too great magnitude. The second defect likewise\nsprings from the purpose of the work. It consists in the fact that,\nexcepting a few occasional references and hints, the pedagogical aspect\nof the question is not considered. Pedagogists, here, are confronted with\na problem which must be solved, and of which the solution will certainly\nnot be a thankless task. The writer of these lines has approached one\naspect of this question in a treatise of his entitled _Nervosit\u00e4t and\nM\u00e4dchenerziehung_, Wiesbaden, 1890, in the course of which study he has\narrived at the conviction that an important factor is lacking in modern\npedagogics and the training of teachers. This conviction he has put into\nwords in another treatise, _Geistesst\u00f6rungen in der Schule_, Wiesbaden,\n1891, with what success it remains for the future to say.\n\nTwo years after the appearance of Emminghaus\u2019s work a translation was\npublished in Germany of a French book of a similar character. _Der Irrsin\nim Kindesalter_, by Dr. PAUL MOREAU, authorised edition by Dr. Demetrio\nGalatti, Stuttgart, 1889, Ferdinand Enke, publisher. Unfortunately,\nMoreau, as his own preface reveals, did not know, when he wrote his\nbook, of the existence of the German work,\u2014a circumstance that has not\nbeen without regrettable consequences. Taken in conjunction with the\nwork of Emminghaus, however, Moreau\u2019s book possesses, on account of the\nnumerous morbid cases it gives, a high value; although it cannot bear\ncomparison with the former work in richness of material and familiarity\nwith the literature of the subject, and much less so in the psychological\ntreatment of the subject, where Emminghaus is incomparably subtler and\nmore profound.\n\nA treatise that is closely related, in point of subject-matter, on\nthe one hand to the works of Emminghaus and Moreau, and on the other\nto the books of Preyer (_Die Seele des Kindes_) and P\u00e9rez (_Les trois\npremi\u00e8res ann\u00e9es de l\u2019enfant_ and _L\u2019enfant de trois \u00e0 sept ans_) on\nthe development of children, has just been published by a Leipsic\nteacher under the title of _Die Periodicit\u00e4t in der Entwickelung\nder Kindesnatur_, _Neue Gesichtspunkte f\u00fcr Kinderforschung und\nJugenderziehung_, by GUSTAV SIEGERT, Leipsic, 1891, R. Voigtl\u00e4nder.\nThe author endeavors, in a very interesting manner we must admit, to\nshow that, in the development of the child, lasting states in regular\nalternate succession occur of mental and physical buoyancy on the one\nhand and depression on the other, of moral exaltation, likewise, and\nmoral subsidence. The fundamental cause of this periodical alternation,\nof the general existence of which numerous proofs are adduced, is\nsupposed to lie in the alternate strengthening and relaxation of the\nindividual\u2019s forces of action, brought on by the expenditure and\nreproduction of energy; additional determinative causes, accelerative as\nwell as retardatory, are found in intercourse with the world and with\nother human beings. We may call the former the individual and the latter\nthe social cause of the phenomena of periodicity. In the application of\nhis results to juvenile education the author arrives at some far-reaching\npropositions of reform, the consideration of which, however, we shall\nhave to leave to the pedagogical press.\n\nWe shall have to preserve the same attitude with regard to a new work\nof the well-known Leipsic professor Dr. STRUMPELL\u2014_Die p\u00e4dogogische\nPathologie oder die Lehre von den Fehlern der Kinder_, Leipsic, 1890,\nVerlag von Georg B\u00f6hme Nachfolger. We must refer here to this otherwise\nhighly deserving book only in one respect, where we have occasion for\ncensure. The author does not in his expositions sufficiently take account\nof the intimate connection between physical and mental phenomena, and the\nconsequence of this is among other things that he excludes pathological\nmental conditions (the physical causes of which he is forced to admit)\nas a matter of principle from the pedagogic system and consigns them\nentirely into the charge of the physician. In our treatise mentioned we\nhave explained why this is not allowable, as well as, in addition, what\nportion of duty devolves on the teacher in the consideration of these\npathological mental conditions. Strumpell\u2019s mistake springs from the\nfact that he conceives with Herbart the essential object of education\nto be intellectual culture. Allowing that Herbart cannot be taken to\ntask for entertaining this conception, we may yet demand of Strumpell\nthe recognition of the results of recent physiological psychology to the\nextent at least of perceiving that psychical and physical phenomena are\n_one_ if not the _same_. Even the opponents of Monism dare not overlook\nthis truth,\u2014a truth moreover that admits very well of reconciliation with\nthe Herbartian pluralism to which Strumpell is devoted.\n\nWe might cite here numerous pathological conditions of mind that very\nplainly spring from physical causes and to which the instructor has to\ngive attention just as much as the physician. Instead, however, of citing\nparticular cases, we will refer to three little treatises that are in\nthe highest degree instructive on this point, not only for teachers\nexclusively but also for all who have to do with children. Dr. MAXIMILIAN\nBRESGEN, specialist in diseases of the nose and throat at Frankfort on\nthe Main, has published at the house of Leopold Voss in Hamburg (1890)\na brochure entitled _Ueber die Bedeutung behinderter Nasenathmung nebst\nbesonderer Ber\u00fccksichtigung der daraus hervorgehenden Ged\u00e4chtniss- und\nGeistesschw\u00e4che_. A treatise of like character is that of Dr. med.\nLENZMANN of Duisburg, entitled _Ueber den sch\u00e4dlichen Einfluss der\nbehinderten Nasenathmung auf die k\u00f6rperliche und geistige Entwickelung\ndes Kindes_, Bielefeld, 1890, Anders Verlag. Both treatises contain,\namong other things not to be considered here, instructive examples of\nthe rise and disappearance of that morbid mental condition to which Hack\nfirst directed notice in Germany but which elsewhere became known through\nthe researches of the Dutch physician Guye by the name of _Aprosesia\nnasalis_. The third treatise is by Dr. med. RALF WIECHMANN, specialist\nfor nervous diseases at Brunswick, and bears the title _Eine sogenannte\nVeitstanzepidemie in Wildbad_, Leipsic, 1890, Verlag von Georg Thieme.\nBy St. Vitus\u2019s dance (Ger. _Veitstanz_) we understand the disease of\nwhich the well-known symptoms are involuntary muscular twitchings usually\naccompanied by severe or light psychical disturbances, known in medicine\nby the name of _chorea minor_ and _chorea rhythmica_, and sometimes\noccurring in epidemics. At the school in Wildbad the number of the\nafflicted children rose in the course of time to twenty-six. Wiechmann\nexpatiates at length in his book on the character of the contagion, and\narrives through an exhaustive use of the existing literature on the\nsubject at the result, that there was present in the individual children\nattacked substantially a physical predisposition, an unstable nervous\nsystem. As the first children attacked were not removed, the convulsive\nmotions were seen and perceptually taken up by the other children, who\nwere just approaching the period of puberty and labored under hereditary\npredispositions. \u201cOnce these images had entered perceptually into the\nunstable brain, they became competent to operate as stimuli and to be\ntranslated into involuntary muscular motions.\u201d\n\nThe conclusion of my letter may be taken up with the discussion of a\ntreatise that deserves a somewhat more detailed consideration. The\ndirector of the Royal W\u00fcrtembergian State Insane Asylum at Zwiefalten,\nDr. F. L. A. Koch, who already possesses eminent repute in the domain\nof psychiatry, has just published the first part of a new work called\n_Die psychopathischen Minderwertigkeiten\u2014Erste; Abteilung: Einleitung,\nDie angeborenen andauernden psychopathischen Minderwertigkeiten_,\nRavensburg, 1891, Verlag von Otto Maier. In this work the author extends\nthe development of the ideas he some time previously outlined in his\n_Rudiments of Psychiatry_, second edition, 1889. In the expression\n\u201cpsychopathische Minderwertigkeiten\u201d (psychopathical secondary factors)\nKoch embraces all those psychical irregularities, be they natural or\nacquired, affecting the life of the human personality, which though in\nthe severest cases even not amounting to actual mental disorders, yet in\nthe most favorable instances so affect the persons afflicted with them\nthat they appear as lacking the full possession of mental normality and\ncapacity. Primarily, of course, the treatise is intended for physicians,\nand the author counts on the gratitude of this profession in so far as\nhe has undertaken to put in independent form the separate facts formerly\nscattered over the whole domain of psychiatry, to free them from other\nneuro- and psycho-pathological subjects, and to unite them into one\nspecial group of pathological states. But the author also counts on his\nbook being used by the representatives of other professions, by pastors,\ntutors, teachers, jurists, sociologists, historians, and the like, and\nindeed with perfect justice.\n\nThe savers of souls, if they had mastered to a slight degree even\nthe comprehension of the psychopathical secondary factors, would be\nastonished to see how many people there are in the case of whom medicine\nis more effective against \u201cspiritual\u201d vexations than pastoral advice,\nand that often such advice, being one-sided and starting from false\nassumptions, does harm only. They would see in the peculiarity of the\nreligious needs and tribulations of many a man a psycho-pathological\nabnormality; they would come to understand how the otherwise\nunintelligible badness of many another has its source in a pathological\nbasis: they would not regard and hail as absolutely good, moreover, many\n\u201cgood impulses\u201d;\u2014all this they would find out if they had learned to\nnote and comprehend what the import is of such persons being descended\nfrom neurotic ancestors, of their exhibiting palpable indications of\ndegeneration, and having also perhaps insane, idiotic, whimsical, and\nepileptical brothers and sisters. They would furthermore perfectly\ncomprehend, that in the case of people who are descended from healthy\nparents, but who from being in times past happy and joyful Christians\nare now struggling with distractions of soul, it were often better\nfirst to inquire after the state of their organs of digestion. And they\nwould be able to deal quite differently from formerly with many a soul\nentrusted to their care, perhaps also more easily to conquer, or at least\nto endure, some secret burden of their own lives. The import of the\nbook for the educator is easily inferrible from the remarks made. For\nthe jurist, who has to deal with the problems of accountability and the\nadministering of punishment, its importance is manifest. Sociology, too,\nthe deeper it enters into its problems, will not be able to dispense with\npsychopathology, and in this field it is precisely the psychopathical\nsecondary factors that eminently demand attention. In that which concerns\nits connection with history we need only mention the names of Lombroso,\nEmminghaus (_Allgemeine Psychopathologie_) and M\u00f6bius (_Rousseaus\nKrankheitsgeschichte_), to point out the importance of a work like that\nbefore us. We recommend it without reserve to all whom it touches.\n\n CHR. UFER.\n\nAltenburg, July, 1891.\n\n\n\n\n\u00c9MILE LITTR\u00c9.\n\n\n Some debts there are that make the debtor proud;\n So ours to him, who could philosophise\n With common-sense, and sweep from starry skies\n The brain-spun webs that darken like a cloud.\n\n We loved him, for his highest thoughts avowed\n Our own akin and less than ours allies;\n Born of the common soil but born to rise\n And light the labor of the laurel-browed.\n\n Justice he traced to truth; morality,\n Back to the brutish primal needs of man;\n And stood himself for all the best might be.\n\n He wrought in words, a faithful artisan;\n And lived to shame their loutish mockery\n Whose virtue ended where his own began.\n\n LOUIS BELROSE, JR.\n\n\n\n\nDIVERSE TOPICS.\n\n\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF THOUGHT-FORMS.\n\n\nDr. H. Potoni\u00e9, the editor of the _Naturwissenschaftliche Wochenschrift_,\nBerlin, advances in one of its recent numbers (Vol. vi. 15) the following\nproposition concerning the origin of the forms of thought: \u201cAll the\nforms of thought have originated in the struggle for life not otherwise\nthan the forms of organisms.\u201d This is further explained in the following\nsentence: \u201cThose conceptions which are called _a priori_, are inherited;\nthey have been necessarily used by the primitive thinking organisms and\nare now in their disposition immediately present. Yet they have been\ngained by experience. Without any knowledge, for instance, of space and\ntime, no action is possible; accordingly their conception is perhaps the\noldest and therefore it appears aprioristic.\u201d\n\n\nI. THOUGHT-FORMS AND THE FORMS OF EXISTENCE.\n\nWe agree with Dr. Potoni\u00e9 that thought-forms grow naturally and that they\ngrow such as they are, of necessity. In our opinion formal thought, with\nits so-called _a priori_ theorems, is derived from the thought-forms by\nabstraction. (See \u201cFundamental Problems\u201d pp. 26-60, the chapter Form and\nFormal Thought.) If it had been possible for other thought-forms to have\noriginated together with those which we possess at present, and it may be\nparenthetically remarked that we do not consider it as possible; but _if_\nit had been possible, we do not deny that all the other thought-forms\nwould have gone to the wall, they would have perished in the struggle for\nexistence and our present thought-forms alone would have survived. In\nthis we agree with Dr. Potoni\u00e9, and a naturalist may be satisfied with\nthis statement, because it suffices for his purposes. The recognition\nof the objective validity of the laws of formal thought is all that\nthe specialist wants for this or that branch of science. But this\nrecognition is not sufficient for the philosopher. He has to understand\nthe problem why the subjective laws of purely formal thought possess an\nabsolute and an objective validity for the world of real existences. He\nmust understand not only how thought-forms originated, but also why and\non what ground the laws of formal thought are considered as necessary\nand universal truths. The question of their origin and growth is of\nsecondary importance compared with the question of their rigidity and\napriority.\n\nMr. Herbert Spencer has made the same proposition as Dr. Potoni\u00e9 and\nhis view briefly expressed is this: \u201cThe laws of formal thought are _a\npriori_ to the individual, but _a posteriori_ to the race.\u201d In other\nwords apriority must be explained by heredity. A dog cannot count,\nbecause none of his ancestors have ever counted, but a child has the\nfaculty to learn counting because innumerable ancestors of his have\ncounted and his brain possesses a predisposition to learn counting\neasily. Concerning our apprehension of space-relations which expressed as\nmathematical theorems appear to us necessary and are called _a priori_,\nMr. Spencer says:\n\n \u201cWe cannot think otherwise because during that adjustment\n between the organism and the environment which evolution has\n established, the inner relations have been so moulded upon\n the outer relations that they cannot by any effort be made\n not to fit them. Just in the same way that an infant\u2019s hand,\n constructed so as to grasp by bending the fingers inwards,\n implies ancestral hands which have thus grasped, and implies\n objects in the environment to be thus grasped by this infantine\n hand when it is developed, so the various structures fitting\n the infant for apprehension of space-relations, imply such\n apprehensions in the past by its ancestors and in the future by\n itself.\u201d\n\nMan\u2019s ability to learn counting is inherited, and there may be more or\nless of it in different people. Mathematical talent is inherited just as\nmuch as musical talent or other faculties. But the philosophical question\nconcerning the apriority of mathematical theorems has nothing whatever to\ndo with the origin of mathematical talent. When Mr. Spencer declares that\napriority is but an inherited aposteriority, this is equivalent and is\nintended to be equivalent to an actual denial of all apriority. His very\nexplanation proves that he does not see the real problem, and in the same\nway Dr. Potoni\u00e9 overlooks it entirely. The philosophical problem of the\napriority is not an historical problem, it cannot be solved by tracing\nthe evolution of thought-forms. The philosopher does not ask how did\nthought-forms originate, but why do we attribute to the laws of formal\nthought necessity and universality and on what ground can we justify our\nassumption?\n\nMr. Spencer compares our apprehension of space-relations to our inherited\nhabit to grasp with our hands and to walk with our feet. This comparison\nis misleading and inappropriate. That we grasp with our hands and walk\nwith our feet is incidental. There are animals who have developed other\nlimbs for the same purposes. There are monkeys who grasp with their\ntails and the elephant grasps with his nose. There is no necessity and\nno universality in our predisposition of grasping with our hands. Yet\nthere resides necessity and universality in the laws of formal thought\nso that wherever animals develop rational thought we are sure that to\nthem twice two will always equal four just as much as it does to us.\nHowever they may be different in other respects: they may be winged\ncreatures or may be somewhat like our ants, they may have developed other\nbodily structures than we can dream of, nevertheless their arithmetic,\ntheir logic, and their mathematics will in all essentials be exactly the\nsame as ours. There are animals whose thought-forms are not as highly\ndeveloped as in man, but there are no animals in whom they are developed\ndifferently. We must consider it as impossible even that on other stars\nrational creatures can be found whose reason differs from ours. To them\nalso twice two will be four.\n\n\nII. THE PROBLEM OF APRIORITY.\n\nKant did not call the formal laws _a priori_ in order to characterise\nthem as innate ideas, but simply to denote that their validity is\nnecessary and universal. If I have to walk twice a distance of two miles,\nI know \u201cbeforehand\u201d (i. e. _a priori_) that I shall have to walk four\nmiles\u2014even before I have made the actual experience. And this wonderful\nquality of giving information beforehand is characteristic of all the\nlaws of formal thought. It is certain that our ability of applying the\nlaws of formal thought has been acquired by experience in the race as\nwell as in the individual. But their necessity has to do with experience\nin so far only as its recognition is the indispensable condition of all\nmethodical experience\u2014i. e. of science. The laws of formal thought and\nour recognition of their necessity and universality (alias, \u201capriority\u201d)\nare the organ of any and all scientific cognition. The methods of the\nsciences are exact measuring and counting based upon the faith that the\nlaws of measuring and counting are unalterable and unfailingly reliable.\nWe know beforehand that they will hold good for all possible cases.\n\nOur experience of millenniums suffices to prove that the laws of formal\nthought agree with the laws of actual existence, and Kant\u2019s view to\nconsider them as merely subjective and not objective appears to me\nuntenable. We may fairly consider Kant\u2019s subjectivism as a thing of the\npast. And the agreement of the forms of objectivity with the forms of\nsubjectivity is easily explained when we bear in mind that the thinking\nsubject is a part of the objective world. It is but natural that the\nforms of existence are impressed upon the thinking subject as forms of\nthought.\n\nYet the question of the necessity and universality of the laws of form\nremains. Can we comprehend why the form of objective reality as well as\nof subjective thought must be such as they are, and might they not just\nas well be different? Is this question legitimate and can it be answered?\nWe say Yes, the question is legitimate and can be answered.\n\nAll the laws of formal thought are products of thought-operations which\nare based on no other principle than that of identity (_A_ = _A_). As\nsoon as thinking beings have developed to that degree of thought-ability\nin which they are able to deal with the abstract idea of pure form, they\ncan make constructions of pure forms. So long as these constructions\nof pure forms are made consistently and correctly (i. e. in strict\nagreement with the principle of identity), they will be found to hold\ngood in reality and we can _a priori_\u2014before we have made the actual\nexperience\u2014rely on their applicability.\n\nThe laws of pure forms (forms of thought as well as forms of existence)\ncan satisfactorily be proved to anyone who acknowledges the principle\nof identity. The principle of identity is not an assumption but it is\nthe generalised statement of the simplest thought-operation, which, if\nemployed with consistency, can serve as a rule for other and more complex\nthought-operations. Consistency is the condition of thought. Consistency\nproduces order, and order is the most characteristic feature of thought.\nWe create some pure form in some definite way, for instance in counting\nwe posit a unit (we call it \u201cone\u201d). Now we create in the same definite\nway again a pure form, we again posit a unit (we again call it \u201cone\u201d).\nIn so far as these two \u201cones\u201d are the product of the same operation they\nwill be the same and we express this truth in the sentence 1 = 1 or _A_ =\n_A_.\n\nWhen, for the sake of assistance in the process of abstract thought, we\nuse real objects to represent our pure forms, similarly as an abacus is\nemployed for assisting the young mind of a child in learning arithmetic,\nthe dissimilarity of the objects is of no account. The proposition of\ntheir identity has no reference to the material objects, but to the\noperation. Two operations being according to some special and definite\nmethod exactly the same, their products are also exactly the same,\nand the rest is not to be minded, because we have in our abstraction\npurposely excluded everything else.\n\nHere is not the place to show the palpable advantages of the methods\nof abstract thought and especially of the abstract thought-operations\nwith pure forms. It is sufficient to characterise its main principle of\nprocedure. We may also parenthetically remark that from our position\nwe are no longer in need of axioms either in mathematics or in any\nother formal science. The data of formal sciences are certain mental\noperations, viz. positing pure forms, and combining, separating, and\nrecombining them. The subject matter of formal sciences consists in the\nproducts of these operations. To formulate some of the simplest products\nin axioms is a mistake which has been pointed out by Hermann Grassmann in\nhis _Ausdehnungslehre_.\n\nWe are struck and overawed with the cosmic order of all natural phenomena\nwhich, as science teaches, is produced through the rigidity of the formal\nlaws of existence. The planetary system with its regularity of motion\nwhich in spite of its many complications has been formulated by Kepler in\nmost simple laws is an object of wonder to us. This order of nature is\nthe same order as the grand harmony that prevails in mathematics and all\nthe other formal sciences. The most complicated laws of both, forms of\nnature and forms of thought, are nothing but generalisations of special\napplications of the principle of identity in some kind of action that\ntakes place. While the order of the objective world excites our wonder\nwe can understand the order of the subjective world of thought-forms\nand know that, being the product of certain mental operations according\nto the principle of identity, it must be a matter of course. Thus the\nintrinsic necessity of the laws of our thought-forms gives us a clue to\nthe intrinsic necessity of the laws of nature.\n\n\nIII. CONSERVATION OF MATTER AND ENERGY, AND CAUSATION.\n\nThe law of the conservation of matter and energy is nothing but an\napplication of the principle of identity to nature as a whole. And the\nlaw of cause and effect is again a corollary only of the law of the\nconservation of matter and energy. The law of causation is a formula\nwhich maintains that there is identity in difference. Some motion\nproduces a change of form. There is accordingly a different state after\nthe motion than before. Yet the total amount of matter and energy\nremains the same. This is the identity in the change. David Hume and\nwith him John Stuart Mill and the empiricists misunderstood the problem\nof causation. Instead of considering cause and effect as one continuous\nprocess that should be analysed, they considered cause and effect\nseparately and attempted a synthesis. In addition to this mistake, causes\nas well as effects were defined to be objects. Hume says cause and\neffect are objects following one another. Cause however is a process;\nit is a motion, a change that takes place, an event that happens; it\nis not a thing. And effect is the product of such a process. Effect is\na special form, a special state of things, a special configuration,\nbut not the material of which this configuration consists. A certain\npoison introduced into the stomach of a living being produces certain\nmotions in the bowels, called cramps, which may finally prove fatal.\nOne change produces other changes and their product is a new state of\nthings which is accompanied with pain and ends in death. It is wrong to\ncall strychnine the cause and a dead mouse the effect. But if we call\nstrychnine the cause and a dead mouse the effect, we must forever despair\nof solving the problem of causation by a reduction to the principle of\nidentity, for strychnine is not at all identical with a dead mouse. No\ncause is the same thing as its effect, and we can by no means identify\ncause and effect. And yet the principle of identity holds good. The\nidentity in causation is the conservation of matter and energy in a\nchange of form.\n\nIt has been maintained that the law of cause and effect could never be\nproved; it is either an innate idea prior to experience (Schopenhauer and\nSchopenhauer\u2019s interpretation of Kant) or it is an assumption derived\nfrom experience of which (since experience is not as yet exhausted)\nwe cannot know whether it will hold good forever (J. S. Mill). In\ncontradistinction to these views we maintain, that the law of cause and\neffect can satisfactorily be proved to anyone who accepts the principle\nof identity. So far as the principle of identity is recognised, all\nthe formal laws are unequivocally determined, or popularly expressed\nthey are as they are, they will remain so and cannot be otherwise, they\nare necessary. All the determining factors and also the procedure of\nan operation are set forth, no unforeseen events are possible, for the\nnon-formal elements are excluded, and therefore the result will be in one\ncase just as it is in any other. Thus it can _a priori_ be stated that\nformal laws will always hold good.\n\nThe question has been raised: Whether or not our knowledge of the\napriority of formal laws is independent of experience. We answer: In\na certain sense it is dependent upon experience, in another it is\nnot. Historically and evolutionarily it is dependent upon experience.\nA store of innumerable experiences has to be gained before a rational\ncreature will be able to make the abstraction of pure forms. As soon as\nthis stage is attained, man possesses a world in himself. He can now\nexperiment within himself with mental images, for instance with numbers:\nhe can calculate. His mental operations with pure form are called \u201cpure\nthought\u201d and \u201cpure thought\u201d is now opposed to \u201cexperience through the\nsenses.\u201d The word \u201cexperience\u201d accordingly is used in two ways; it has a\nbroad and a narrow meaning. In its broad sense it means any acquisition\nof knowledge generally, in its narrow sense it means knowledge acquired\nthrough the sense-activity alone. Our knowledge of the apriority of\nformal laws rests upon experience in its broad sense, but not upon\nexperience in its narrow sense. We can never derive the idea of necessity\nfrom sense-impressions. John Stuart Mill in rejecting innate ideas saw\nno other way than to derive the formal laws from experience (taking\nhere experience in the broad sense). Yet he did not make a distinction\nbetween formal thought and sense-experience. He considered the nature of\nsense-experience as typical for all experience. And thus, again, taking\nexperience in the narrow sense of the term, he was from his premises\nperfectly justified in rejecting the idea of necessity. If the process\nof cause and effect is really a synthesis of two things represented in\ntwo different sense-impressions following each other, then indeed we have\nno guarantee that the same sequences will always be observed; and there\nmay be worlds in which the law of causality does not operate. Mill saw\nall the consequences of his mistake, he conceded freely that we are not\njustified in assuming that twice two will always be four: many thousands\nof experiences are in its favor, but we cannot be at all sure that no\ncase will ever happen in which twice two makes five.\n\nThe ideas of causality and of the conservation of matter and energy are\nnot derived from experience in the narrow sense of the word, not from\nsense-experience, but from experience in the wider sense of the word, i.\ne. from sense-experience arranged with the assistance of formal laws. We\nshould not forget that mere sense-experience exists only in our abstract\nthought. In reality all sense-experience is relational, it is inseparable\nfrom its form. Form and the laws of form are not something purely mental\nwhich is transferred to the world of reality, form is something real, it\nis objective, it is a quality of the facts and the thought-forms of mind\nare a part and a product of the formal structure of the universe.\n\nThe ideas of causation and of the conservation of matter and energy are\nnot prior to experience, they are a part of experience, i. e. experience\nin the wider sense. They are not part of the sense-experience, but the\nresults of our experiments with purely formal thought-operations, and\nbeing the vital instrument or organ of cognition they are the condition\nof all methodical experience.\n\n\nIV. WHY IS MR. MILL\u2019S PROPOSITION UNTENABLE?\n\nIn practical life we all expect that 2 \u00d7 2 will under all circumstances\nmake 4, and not 5. We reject Mr. Mill\u2019s idea that there may be even a\npossibility of the latter. Is our expectancy really due to _a posteriori_\nexperience which having been repeated so often in the lives of our\nancestors is now so firmly rooted in our minds that we imagine it to\nbe necessary and _a priori_? No! certainly not. The experiences of our\nrace in the struggle for life has produced our ability of thought,\nbut it has nothing to do with the apriority of the products of formal\nthought-operations. A statement of formal thought such as \u201ctwice two\nmakes four,\u201d cannot be compared to statements of sense-experience such\nas that sugar has a sweet taste. There may be a moment in which the\ntaste of sugar will be bitter to our tongue. This is quite possible.\nBut to say that twice two might in the future or in any other world, as\nMr. Mill maintains, make five is nonsensical, and the possibility of\nthis assumption cannot be placed in one line with the possibilities of\nextraordinary and exceptional sense-experiences.\n\nWhat does \u201ctwice two makes four\u201d mean? Two means 1 + 1, and twice two\nmeans 1 + 1 plus 1 + 1. This sum is called \u201cfour\u201d; and what we call\nfive is 4 + 1. To maintain that the operation 2 \u00d7 2 might produce the\nresult 5, is to admit conditions which have been excluded. Pure forms\nare not like animals which multiply; they are and remain such as they\nhave been posited. When we put two am\u0153bas into a glass and then add two\nother am\u0153bas, it is quite possible that in the mean time one of the first\nset has divided into two. In that case we would have five am\u0153bas. But\nthe operation 2 \u00d7 2 cannot breed any additional units, so as to produce\na greater number than the sum of 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. Nor can we let any of\nthese units disappear into naught, so as to produce the result 3, without\ncommitting some inconsistency in our thought-operations, for the products\nof our thought-operations are rigid and must remain such as they have\nbeen posited. They are not animals blessed with fertility but pure forms\nand nothing but pure forms.\n\nHow could Mr. John Stuart Mill overlook so palpable a contrast as\nthat between formal knowledge and sense-experience? He was apparently\nprejudiced against the term \u201ca priori,\u201d which as we freely confess is a\nvery poor and inadequate expression. Mr. Mill himself states the cause of\nhis prejudice in his autobiography. He says:\n\n \u201cThere is not any idea, feeling, or power, in the human mind,\n which, in order to account for it, requires that its origin\n should be referred to any other source than experience.\u201d\n\nMr. Mill was justly exasperated against anything _a priori_, for in his\ntime, it had become customary among certain philosophers to classify all\npet superstitions which could not be proved by experience as _a priori_.\nMr. Mill continues:\n\n \u201cWhatever may be the practical value of a true philosophy\n of these matters, it is hardly possible to exaggerate the\n mischiefs of a false one. The notion that truths external\n to the mind may be known by intuition or consciousness,\n independently of observation and experience, is, I am\n persuaded, in these times the great intellectual support of\n false doctrines and bad institutions. By the aid of this theory\n every inveterate belief and every intense feeling, of which\n the origin is not remembered, is enabled to dispense with the\n obligation of justifying itself by reason, and is erected into\n its own all-sufficient voucher and justification. There never\n was such an instrument devised for consecrating all deep-seated\n prejudices.\u201d\n\nWe appreciate the cause of Mr. Mill\u2019s prejudice, but we cannot agree\nwith him. And Mr. Mill is mistaken when he imagines that a rejection\nof apriority will abolish false doctrines and superstitions. On\nthe contrary. The recognition of absolute necessity based upon the\nuniversality of formal thought will alone be a safe basis of science\nthrough which we can reject _prima facie_ the wrong pretensions of\nsuperstitions and pseudo-science. If we assume with Mr. Mill that all\nformal knowledge partakes of the nature of sense-experience, that there\nis no difference between the two, no general judgment would be allowable\nand the idea of necessity would be inadmissible. These consequences\nare accepted by Mill. In that case science would lose its value and\nphilosophy would be without foundation. The most absurd superstition\ncould not be rejected off-hand on the ground of being contrary to that\nwhich through logic and other formal sciences has been found to be\nnecessary and a condemnation of any superstition on the part of science\nwould be mere arrogance. Pseudo-science would have the same right with\ntrue science.\n\nIt is obvious that without being obliged to consider the apriority of\nformal laws as innate, we need not accept the consequence of Mr. Mill\u2019s\nphilosophy. We can and we do retain the idea of necessity and we consider\nit as the corner-stone of all science.\n\n\nV. THE MEANING OF \u201cNECESSARY.\u201d\n\nWe have to be on our guard lest we introduce some mystical element\ninto the idea of necessity. There is nothing mystical about necessity.\nNecessary means that a certain operation, if it is exactly the same\noperation as another one, will produce exactly the same result. When we\nposit two units twice, we shall have the same result as when we posit\none unit four times; and we call this result four. We shall reach the\nsame product whenever we repeat the same operation. Knowing that we\nshall always reach the same result, we can, _a priori_ (or beforehand)\nand with certainty, determine the result of certain operations after we\nhave mentally gone through the same operations for all possible cases\nand under any imaginable conditions. That a perfect apriority with an\nunfailing certainty is possible only in the domain of formal thought\nis natural. The reason is that we know our thought-forms exhaustively.\nThey contain nothing but that which has been predicated about them. Our\nsense-experience however is always piecemeal and never exhaustive.\n\nComprehension is actually a tracing of form relations and a formulating\nthem in concise statements. The scientist\u2019s work is based upon the\nmethods of measuring and counting (i. e. the methods of formal sciences)\nand he undertakes to show that certain phenomena, different in some\nrespects, are the same in other respects, that their sameness can be\nstated in a comprehensive and exact formula. In this way he marks out\ntheir determining factors in terms of formal thought (for instance in\nnumbers), so that we can compute them and predict them according to their\ndetermining factors, so that we can know, according to their conditions,\nthat they will be always as they are.\n\nThe importance of formal thought is paramount in science and the problem\nabout the necessity which attaches to the laws of formal thought is the\nfundamental problem of philosophy.\n\nThere are many philosophers, still, troubling themselves to solve the\nproblem in the fashion of Schopenhauer or of Mill or looking upon the\nproblem as insolvable. We do not doubt that the solution here presented\nis the only possible solution which as soon as it is understood will find\na general acceptance.\n\nMust it be added that the solution of this fundamental problem does\nnot involve the ready solutions of all other minor problems? Oh no! We\nall know that the solution of one problem is only a stepping-stone for\nattacking other problems. The possibilities of progress are as unlimited\nas the scope of cognition. Light on this general subject gives us hope\nthat we shall succeed in throwing light also upon other subjects which\nare still shrouded to the philosophical inquirer in impenetrable darkness.\n\n\nVI. MODERN LOGIC.\n\nThe problem of modern logic is at bottom no other problem than that of\nformal thought and of the origin of thought-forms. Professor Dewey in\nthe excellent essay which appears as the leading article of this number\nsays: \u201cAny book of logic will tell us what this conception of thought\nis: that thought is a faculty or an entity existing in the mind apart\nfrom facts and that it has its own fixed forms with which facts have\nnothing to do\u2014except in so far as they pass under the yoke.\u201d This is\nthe old conception of thought, rightly criticised by Professor Dewey,\nfor, closely considered, it turns out to be dualistic. However, as soon\nas a proposition is recognised to contain or to rest upon dualism, it\nbecomes a problem. The problem of modern logic is, How can we arrive at a\nmonistic conception of logic, how can we rid ourselves of the dualism on\nthe one side of facts not yet rationalised by the method of thought-forms\nand on the other side of mind with its empty thought-forms assimilating\nfacts to its own nature.\n\nOur solution of the difficulty has been proposed, in the sense outlined\nby Professor Dewey, in \u201cFundamental Problems.\u201d Professor Dewey, according\nto our opinion, is right when he says there is no such a thing as\ntranscendental thought, or pure thought, thought by itself. And there is\nno such a thing either as fact, crude irrational chaotic fact. The world\nof fact, indeed, is a cosmos and no chaos; there never was a chaos and\nnever will be a chaos, for the laws of form are an essential and the most\ncharacteristic feature of the world.\n\nCan there be any question how the order found in thought-forms originates\nin a world in which the inorganic and unfeeling mineral crystallises in\na regular shape according to strict mathematical laws, i. e. the laws\nof form? A world in which the plant grows not otherwise than according\nto strict mathematical laws building up roots and stem and leaves and\npetals and stamens and all other organs obedient to a certain plan which\nwill vary according to circumstances, but throughout consistent with\nthe principles of formal laws? Can there be any question that in this\nworld of cosmic harmony thought-forms will develop in feeling beings as\na microcosm exhibiting the same regularity and conformity to law as do\nin this world all other things animate and inanimate? Our pure, i. e.\nmerely formal, thought is an abstraction which serves the purpose of\ncomprehension. And so is the concept \u201cmatter,\u201d being that which produces\nsense-impressions. There are no such ghosts as pure matter or pure\nthoughts in reality.\n\nModern logic, so far as we conceive it to be right, is by no means an\noverthrow of the old formal Logic, generally called Aristotelian. It is\nsimply an amendment made in order to exclude an erroneous interpretation.\nAnd so is modern mathematics not so much a revolution as an extension\nof the old Euclidian system. It is a revolution only against a certain\nunclear conception of mathematics according to which this science is said\nto rest upon axioms, these axioms representing absolute truth\u2014unprovable,\nincomprehensible, and mysterious.[21]\n\nThe main truth of monism is that reality forms one indivisible whole\nand all our concepts are mere abstractions representing certain parts\nor certain features of the whole. As soon as we try to think of any\nof them as things in themselves we become involved in inextricable\ncontradictions. It appears as if the formal sciences contained some\ntruths which were absolute and independent of actual reality. But let any\none think of any number, of 2 or 3, and he will soon find that conceived\nas absolute beings they are meaningless and unthinkable.\n\nThis is not to say that numbers are phantoms, but that conceived as\nabsolute beings they are phantoms. Numbers and all formal concepts\nrepresent something real, they represent pure forms. And form is as much\na part and feature of reality as is matter and energy.\n\n P. C.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[21] Hermann Grassmann, one of the founders of modern mathematics, has\ncalled attention to the fact that Euclid had a clearer conception of the\nfundamental concepts of mathematics than his ill-informed translators\nand interpreters. Grassmann says in his _Ausdehnungslehre_: \u201cFrom the\nimputation of confounding axioms with assumed concepts Euclid himself,\nhowever, is free, Euclid incorporated the former among his postulates\n(\u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1) while he separated the latter as common concepts (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9)\u2014a proceeding which even on the part of his commentators was no\nlonger understood, and likewise with modern mathematicians, unfortunately\nfor science, has met with little imitation. As a matter of fact, the\nabstract methods of mathematical science know no axioms at all.\u201d\u2014Quoted\nfrom _The Open Court_, Vol. II. No. 77, _A Flaw in the Foundation of\nGeometry_, by Hermann Grassmann, translated from his _Ausdehnungslehre_\nby \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK REVIEWS.\n\n\nBELIEF IN GOD. Its Origin, Nature, and Basis. Being the Winkley Lectures\nof the Andover Theological Seminary for the Year 1890. By _Jacob Gould\nSchurmann_. New York: Charles Scribner\u2019s Sons. 1890.\n\nThe learned Sage Professor of Philosophy in Cornell University, after\ntracing the historical origin and development of the belief in God,\nexpresses his conviction that the problem of the modern theist consists\nin the union of the Aryan and Semitic modes of interpreting existence. We\nshall then have \u201ca synthesis of the Father of all spirits with the ground\nof all nature.\u201d This is the hypothesis developed in the course of the\nlectures delivered by Professor Schurmann last year before the Andover\nTheological Seminary on the Winkley foundation, that form the contents of\nthe present volume. The theism embodied in that hypothesis is called by\nthe author _anthropocosmic_, because, while it is based on the facts of\nthe universe and those of human nature, the universe must be interpreted\nin the terms of man, and not man in the terms of the universe. The key\nto the universe is the self-conscious spirituality which makes us selves\nand persons. Hence anthropocosmic theism is the doctrine of a Supreme\nBeing \u201cwho is ground both of nature and of man, but whose essence is not\nnatural but spiritual.\u201d\n\nBefore considering the evidence for this hypothesis, let us see what\nthe author has to say with reference to the logical character of the\nbelief in God. He shows that _agnosticism_\u2014of which he treats under\nits three significations as referring to the method of knowledge, the\nobject of knowledge, and the subject of knowledge\u2014is not consistent\nwith the insight into nature and the constitution of knowledge gained\nby the Newtonian method of hypotheses and verifications. Science, as\nopposed to pure phenomenalism, assumes that what has not originated\nin the percipient subject is objectively real, and it postulates the\nuniversality of law in nature, a postulate which is the expression of a\nconviction of \u201cthe unity and universal inner connection of all reality.\u201d\nThe objective world cannot be understood without reference to our own\nconscious experience, and as the only reality we know from the inside\nis a spiritual _ego_, self-conscious spirit must be ascribed to the one\nultimate reality whose existence science assumes, as that which will\nalone satisfy the requirement of unity in the midst of change.\n\nIt might be objected here, that the existence in man of a spiritual\n_ego_ requires proof before that of a universal spirit or world-soul can\nbe inferred from it. The author takes the existence of the _ego_ for\ngranted, a course which is quite allowable from the theistic standpoint,\nalthough, in the face of what is now known as to the dissolution of the\nego under abnormal conditions of the organism, not scientific. Having\nmade that assumption and inferred the existence of God from that of the\nhuman spirit, the author explains the nature of the one by reference to\nthat of the other. He tells us, that the finite spirit is identical,\nwithin the limits of its range, with the infinite spirit, because it is\nan _ego_, and that in the _ego_ we have, not merely a mode of the divine\nactivity, but a part of the divine essence. Such being the case, the\nauthor has no difficulty in inferring the attributes of God from the\nphenomena exhibited by man. Thus God is a God of righteousness because\nthe moral capacity in the human spirit must have its ground in the\ninfinite Spirit. Again universal benevolence or love is the ideal of\nwhich human morality is the realisation; hence we must conceive of the\nSpirit of the universe as a God of love.\n\nWe do not think the author\u2019s final conclusion, that \u201cthe phenomena\nboth of the universe and of human life require the thinking mind to\npostulate a Supreme Ground of things which we are entitled to describe as\nself-conscious Spirit and loving Father,\u201d is warranted by his premises.\nBut we can accept the statement that our knowledge of God must continue\nto grow with our knowledge of man and nature. Through these alone can we\nknow Him, but the difficulty is to interpret the revelation. Let it be\nadmitted also that the end of nature is the production of man, and that\nwhat is referred to by the author as the human spirit is \u201cthe organ of\nthat communication of God which is the end of the universe.\u201d This does\nnot in reality throw any light on the nature of God. The utmost that can\nbe said is that, as man is an organism possessing certain functions, the\nuniverse, viewed as God, must have an organic existence with functions\n_corresponding_ to those exhibited by the human organism.\n\nThe author\u2019s reasoning in support of the belief in God as cause or ground\nof the world, and as realising purpose in the world is very ingenious.\nHe affirms that the creational form of the argument from causality is\ninsufficient. It satisfies the devotional needs of a certain class\nof worshipers, but what the religious, as well as the scientific,\nconsciousness demands is a God \u201chere in the world, not there outside of\nit or making it.\u201d It has not yet been shown that the universe has had a\nbeginning in time, and the argument in favor of the eternity of matter\nends with an assurance of the eternity of spirit alone. Spirit is the\neternal reality, and nature its eternal manifestation, the latter being\nno more separable from the former \u201cthan the spoken word from the thought\nit symbolises.\u201d The causal relation is, however, absolutely necessary\nfor our apprehension of the facts of the universe, and as it cannot\nbe interpreted without contradiction as an action between independent\nbeings, it must be explained as the eternal dependence of the world upon\nGod. This implies that God must be volitional as well as self-conscious;\n\u201cfor without will there could be no activity, no efficient causation,\nno material universe.\u201d The universe is thus the eternal expression of\nthe divine will. But what is the purpose realised in creation? The\nactivity of the divine will precludes the notion of a blindly working\nnature. As creation is the eternal self-revelation of God, the supreme\nand preconceived end of all things must be the glory of God. But man is\nindispensable for the attainment of God\u2019s glory, and therefore the end\nof nature as a realised scheme of divine ideas is the production of man.\nThe volitional and teleological arguments as thus stated by the author\nare consistent with the theory of evolution developed by Darwin, but\nthey may be combatted on other grounds connected with the conditions of\nthe existence of God as one with Nature. With this observation, we must\nleave Professor Schurmann\u2019s very thoughtful book which, although for the\nreasons we have stated, not conclusive, presents the theistic argument\nwith great clearness and in its strongest form.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nJUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY. A Sketch of the Progress of Thought from Old\nTestament to New Testament. By _Crawford Howell Toy_. Boston: Little,\nBrown & Co. 1890.\n\nThis work is another contribution to that genuine history which is alone\ncompetent to impart any true instruction. In it the author undertakes to\ngive an account of the genesis of Christianity as a child of Judaism.\n\nIt seems to be the thesis of the author that those conceptions and\nbeliefs that characterise any form of religion are rather determined by\nthe social evolution than that the social progress and its features are\ndetermined by the evolution of ideas among which the religious ideas\nare specially influential. In his introduction the author sketches out\nhis view of the general laws of social progress as the same are related\nto religious thought. He notices in history the tendency of ethnic\nreligions to give way to or to develop into universal religions, and\nargues that Christianity is destined to overcome all its rivals and\nprevail universally. This kind of a conclusion is a natural one to follow\nfrom the theory that the character of thought is determined by social\ncircumstances and progress. But if it be true that the special course\nof the evolution of thought and its characteristic form at any epoch is\ndetermined by causes that are uncontrolled by social conditions, that as\nbetween thought and society thought is the masterful factor, then quite\nanother conclusion may ensue. But the dubitable nature of the main thesis\nof the work does not much detract from the great excellence of the work\nin general. As a history of the evolution of Jewish religious conceptions\nand beliefs from the very first until the establishment of Christianity,\nit is in the highest degree interesting and instructive.\n\nAfter a discussion of the literature of the Jews and the formation of the\ncanon, the author proceeds to describe in full detail the nature genesis\nand mutations of the cardinal religious doctrines as they revealed\nthemselves to the Israelite, Jewish, and early Christian insight. The\nentire body of the data are interpreted in consonance with the modern\nscientific idea of the organic nature of society. Jesus is regarded as\nthe master spirit that created the Christian Church, and Paul whom many\nwould install as the real author of the same is accordingly given only a\nsecond place. Altogether it may be said that Professor Toy has given us\na most valuable contribution to religious history and to the scientific\ninterpretation of the same.\n\n \u03c1\u03c3\u03bb.\n\n\nPRONAOS TO HOLY WRIT. Establishing, on Documentary Evidence, the\nAuthorship, Date, Form, and Contents of each of its Books, and the\nAuthenticity of the Pentateuch. By _Isaac M. Wise_. Cincinnati: Robert\nClarke & Co. 1891.\n\nRabbi Isaac Wise, the president of the Hebrew Union College of Cincinnati\nand the Nestor of Orthodox Judaism in America, presents in the \u201cPronaos\nto Holy Writ\u201d a review of the Biblical books with comments as to their\nauthenticity and the times in which they were written. Having read these\n\u201cbooks and every word thereof in the original for a term of sixty-six\nyears, i. e. from boyhood up to his seventy-second birthday,\u201d and having\n\u201cacquainted himself with all the ancient versions and commentaries\nand a large portion of the modern translations and commentaries of\nthe Bible,\u201d the author is entitled to be heard. Rabbi Wise is a stern\nmonotheist and he declares: \u201cGod only did create light out of darkness;\nman cannot produce truth out of fiction, unless in his self-delusion\nproblematic truth satisfies him. All so-called gems of truth buried under\nthe quicksand of fiction and deception are problematic at best, if not\nsupported by authoritative corroborants.\u201d This is true. All truth depends\nupon verification. We cannot make truth, but must find it, we must be\nable to corroborate it, and the corroborants of truth are its authority.\nDr. Wise\u2019s idea of a corroborant is different from ours, he says: \u201cNo\none can speak conscientiously of Bible truth before he knows that the\nBible is true, and especially in its historical data.\u201d This seems to\nindicate that we must have a belief in the truth of the Bible before\nwe investigate it and that moral truths, the ethics, the philosophy of\nthe Bible depend upon its historical data. We cannot go so far with the\nauthor of the Pronaos. Dr. Wise says: \u201cThe science commonly called Modern\nBiblical Criticism, actually Negative Criticism which maintains on the\nstrength of unscientific methods that the Pentateuch is not composed of\noriginal Mosaic material, no Psalms are Davidian, no Proverbs Solomonic,\nthe historical books are unhistorical, the prophecies were written\npost festum, there was no revelation, inspiration, or prophecy, must\nalso maintain that the Bible is a compendium of pious or even impious\nfrauds, wilful deceptions, unscrupulous misrepresentations.\u201d Dr. Wise\nthought it necessary to meet Negative Criticism with the documentary\nevidence and for this purpose he wrote his Pronaos, which is to be an\nentrance-hall to the Temple of Biblical Truth. We do not side with the\nnegativism of certain biblical critics, for we believe that historical\ninvestigations have proved large portions of the Pentateuch to be Mosaic,\nseveral psalms to be Davidian, and the historical books to contain as\nmuch history as many old historical books contain. We believe that they\nhave to be judged and searched and commented just as much and in the\nsame spirit of scientific inquiry as our philologists treat Herodotus\nor Livy. But the value of the Bible, in our opinion, does not depend\nupon the acceptance or rejection of these or those historical data; nor\nis it necessary to consider the Hebrew prophets as special revelations\nof God, in contradistinction to the divine revelation in nature and the\nhistory of mankind in general. It may be true enough that the orthodox\nGod-idea of Monotheism depends upon the belief in special revelation\nand prophecies, and it is also true that most of the Biblical criticism\nhas been destructive and negative. But there is a way possible between\nboth standpoints which may be called positive criticism. This positive\ncriticism attempts to understand the very life and meaning of the old\nreligion, it attempts to comprehend the belief of the orthodox and\nconstrue it in the terms of science\u2014i. e. of rational and clear thought.\nReligion is certainly not a mere fraud or a vain illusion, it is an\nideal which developed naturally out of certain needs of man and the\nconditions of society. That religious ideas, especially the idea of God\nas the cosmic power which represents the moral authority, are no mere\nfictions, is proved by their survival, and those who believe in evolution\nshould not be blind to the fact that there is something good, something\ntrue, something well adapted to surroundings in religion. To find these\nelements of truth and goodness which constitute the life of religion\nis not mere negative criticism, but positive criticism, and it is not\nat all necessary for those who aspire in this direction, to believe in\nany historical data, or in special revelations, or in prophecies, or in\nthe personality of God, but simply to trust in truth. Truth is the only\nway of salvation even though it may shatter the most sacred idols of a\nvenerable orthodoxy.\n\nThe contents of the book show that the standpoint of the author does not\nblind him to the finer traits of the natural development of his religion.\nSo, for instance, Solomon\u2019s rationalism is excellently contrasted with\nthe spirit which manifested itself in the Judges as well as the Prophets.\nThe author of the Judges was an outspoken theocratic democrat. \u201cHe\nliterally pours out his abhorrence of the monarchical anti-theocratic\ninstitution in narrating the story of the first usurper Abimelech, the\nson of Gideon.... Entirely different are the language and tendency of\nthe two appendices, evidently written by another author, who evinces his\nanimosity to the democratic form of government by saying four times:\n\u2018In those days there was no king in Israel,\u2019 to which he adds twice\n\u2018every man did what seemed right in his sight\u2019\u201d (p. 46). \u201cThe Solomonic\nethics is a commentary on the Mosaic ethics, as by reason understood....\nMan\u2019s knowledge of ethical doctrine is identical with his knowledge\nof God\u2019s moral attributes, and all moral obligation has its root in\nthe Mosaic God-idea....\u201d According to Solomon \u201cwisdom based upon and\nrooted in the fear of Jehovah with the revealed material before them was\nall-sufficient, without any further special oracles of any prophets. This\npeculiar rationalism brought upon him the ire of prophets and rabbis\u201d (p.\n111).\n\nSome reviewers of Dr. Wise\u2019s book will probably find fault with him that\nhe has taken little if any account of the results of modern biblical\ninvestigations. And this is a grievous fault in our times where it seems\nto be essential for a scholar and author to have read the very latest\nthings published on a subject while an acquaintance with the views of\nthe classical old authorities is considered unnecessary. It appears that\nDr. Wise did not intend to present his views or criticisms of and his\nanswers to the latest biblical investigations. It may even be that he is\nnot familiar with many of them. Granting this to be a fault of his book\nit is, nevertheless, refreshing to us to find an author who has actually\nread and is excellently familiar with all the old sources of the subject\nhe is writing upon.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nTHE FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. By _Edward T. Dixon_. Cambridge (Eng.):\nDeighton, Bell & Co. 1891.\n\nThis work is divided into three parts, the first containing such\ndoctrines of psychology and logic as the author deems sound and useful\nfor his purposes, the second exhibiting the author\u2019s \u201csubjective theory\nof geometry deduced from the two fundamental concepts _position_ and\n_direction_,\u201d and the third \u201con the applicability of the foregoing\nsubjective geometry to the geometry of material space.\u201d\n\nIn his preface the author expresses his desire that those who criticise\nhis work shall \u201cconsider categorically\u201d certain questions relating to his\ntheory of definition, to the definitions and axioms prescribed by him,\nto his proofs of propositions and to the \u201cobjective applications\u201d of his\nthree axioms.\n\nGeometry may be studied for two distinct purposes, neither of which\nnecessarily involves the other. Unless the aim is mainly the discipline\nof the logical faculty, it is plainly a poor method of study to pore\nover the definitions, axioms, postulates, theorems, problems, and\ndemonstrations of Euclid or any similar text-book. Practical resources\nand geometrical information can be acquired much better and more rapidly\nby a course of mechanical drawing with here and there a more or less\nloose explanation of the grounds and reasons that warrant the geometrical\ndoctrines, than by means of the Euclidian course. Under such a method of\ninstruction the student would rarely feel any real doubt as to the truth\nof his geometrical knowledge.\n\nBut where the paramount aim is the training of the reason the Euclidian\nrigor is all important. Hence the perfection of that method by the\ndiscovery and certification of the ultimate grounds on which, and the\nprinciples by which, it may be unfolded systematically and in necessary\nand sufficient sequence without presumption or fallacy, is an object of\nthe most momentous concern to science, to philosophy, and to culture in\ngeneral. For it is well known that however good an account elementary\ngeometry may give of its superstructure the reports given of its\nfoundations are all very far from satisfactory.\n\nRepeated and strenuous efforts have been made, and by the most competent\nof our race, to discover and certify the true state of the case in\nrespect to the geometrical foundations, in order that the whole edifice\nof that science shall display throughout the same thorough-going\nnecessity and sufficiency that distinguishes it in general.\n\nThe author of the work under review is persuaded that he is now able to\nperform this so desirable service. He avers his belief that the system\nof geometry he \u201chas set forth in this book is _logically sound_ and that\nconsequently the more it is discussed and criticised, the more firmly\nwill it become established.\u201d He takes his stand upon two fundamental\nconcepts, _position_ and _direction_, which he defines not explicitly but\n\u201cimplicitly.\u201d This leads us to consider his first question and his theory\nof definition.\n\nThe embarrassments that involve the foundations of elementary geometry\nare mainly, if not wholly, those which involve the general problems of\ndefinition. Now a definition is the certification of the purport of a\nname by means of a statement or a conspiracy of statements necessary and\nsufficient to that end. But names are constituents absolutely necessary\nfor the formation of any statement, so that the above definition of a\ndefinition may be restated thus: A definition is the certification of the\npurport of one name by means of other names, necessary and sufficient\nto certify the purport of the one defined. Evidently then, definition\ncan only lead us from name to name in unending process, or to some\nundefinable name, or to some name that we choose to leave undefined; and\nthe question arises, on what sort of names shall we take our stand as\nultimate grounds?\n\nOur author answers this question as follows: \u201cThe propounder of a\nscientific theory is not of course expected to teach his readers to\nspeak, it is only necessary for him to define the terms peculiar to his\nscience, or those to which he wishes to attach peculiar meanings. He may\ntherefore assume that the meanings of all other words are known to his\nreaders.\u201d\n\nHe then propounds that \u201call that is logically required for a definition\nis one or more assertions with regard to the word to be defined or, its\nattributes,\u201d provided \u201cthey are not demonstrably incompatible with each\nother.\u201d\n\nAlthough our author conceives that logical competence requires no more\nthan this for a good definition, he yet goes on to remark, that \u201cif the\ndefinition is to form the basis of a deductive science it is further\nadvisable that the assertions should be independent,\u201d and that \u201cwhere\nit is required to define a term whose denotation is already known, it\nis further necessary not only that the assertions should be commonly\naccepted as true with respect to it, but that they should restrict the\nmeaning of the term exactly to its accepted denotation, neither more nor\nless, and should do so in the simplest manner that can be devised.\u201d\n\nIt is upon this theory of definition that our author requests of his\ncritics a \u201ccategorical\u201d answer to his first question, \u201cDo you accept the\nrequirements I have laid down for a logical definition? (If not please\nstate which of them you object to, why you object to it, and what you\nwould propose to substitute for it.)\u201d\n\nSince it is a \u201ccategorical\u201d answer that is requested and since also it is\nthe matter of definition that is put in issue, we wish that our author\nhad been more definite and had made his propositions better issuable, for\nwe must protest that we regard ourselves obliged to answer to what we\ncan best conceive to be the author\u2019s true meanings rather than to what he\nhas explicitly said.\n\nWe do not conceive that he regards it as _necessary_ to a definition that\nthe defining assertions should be expressed \u201cin the simplest manner that\ncan be devised.\u201d We have also to take his use of the word \u201crestrict\u201d\nas importing completion as well as limitation, and his use of the word\n\u201crequirements\u201d as intending conditions that together are sufficient as\nwell as necessary.\n\nIf we are right in our understanding of the meanings of our author he\ncontemplates four cases, first, the definition of a name that has no\ndenotation already known and that is not to form the basis of a deductive\nscience, second, the definition of a name that has no denotation already\nknown but which is to form the basis of a deductive science, third, the\ndefinition of a name that has a denotation already known but which is not\nto form the basis of a deductive science, and fourth the definition of a\nname that has a denotation already known and is to form the basis of a\ndeductive science.\n\nIn this fourth case our author deems it requisite for a logical\ndefinition that there shall be made one or more assertions about the\nsubject of definition that are not demonstrably incompatible with one\nanother, that are independent of one another, that are commonly accepted\nas true in respect to the subject defined and that \u201crestrict\u201d the meaning\nof the name under definition exactly to its accepted denotation.\n\nIt seems to us that this last requirement dispenses with the necessity\nof all the rest. If we have provided an assertion or a set of assertions\nthat do in fact complete and limit the meaning of the subject of\ndefinition exactly to its proper denotation that is a definition in full.\nIt implies that the defining assertions are all consistent with one\nanother, and in case any assertion is dependent upon one or more of the\nrest that is a circumstance wholly immaterial. _Utile per inutile non\nnocetur._\n\nAgain, what is it to be commonly accepted as true? Does logical\ncompetence depend on the altering states of our knowledge or on the\nfluctuations of opinion? Was a whale logically defined as a fish before\nwe learned that it was a mammal?\n\nThe third case allows of the application of the same comment as that\nmade upon the fourth. But in the first and second cases the doctrines\nof the author as well as his suppositions are very notable. He supposes\nthe anomaly of names without any known denotation, by which he may mean\nthose which have no application whatever. In respect to such he propounds\nthat they may be given a logical definition by making one or various\nconsistent assertions as applicable to them or to their attributes.\n\n\u201cThe proof of the pudding will be found in the eating,\u201d as our author\nsays. So let us say that a troft may be perceived whenever our attention\nis excited, and that trofts are of multitudinous variety. Do these\nassertions constitute a logical definition? It is a prime requisite for\na definition that the defining assertion or assertions shall have a\nmeaning, which is the same as to say that names must be employed that\nare already significant. These significant names must be so used that the\nintellectual sensibility shall be excited to perceive in a determinate\nway that which is intended to be defined. In other words, sense and not\nnonsense must be produced in the mind that considers the definition.\nPerhaps, however, our author intends such words as electricity, or\nspirit, or energy.\n\nBecause of the considerations above indicated and others we cannot accept\nthe author\u2019s requirements for a logical definition as a whole. Some of\nthem are in some of his cases unnecessary, while taken together they\nsupply no new means whereby to solve the several problems of definition.\n\nThe author\u2019s subjective theory of geometry is plainly the outgrowth of\nhis confidence in the solvent power of the concept of direction as a\nprime datum of geometry.\n\nEverything of consequence in his essay depends upon the worth of this\nconcept as a geometrical foundation. Considering the disparagement\nthat has been visited upon that concept by numerous writers of good\ngeometrical rank we naturally look for considerations tending to remove\nthe discredit that has befallen that notion. Instead however of this we\nfind the most palpable set of circular definitions. Direction is defined\nby direction in the most distracting way, thus:\n\n\u201c(_a_) A direction may be conceived to be indicated by naming two points\nas the direction from one to the other.\u201d\n\nThe inaptitude of the term direction for use in geometry is rooted in\nits ambiguous purport. As commonly used it means at least three distinct\nbut closely associated notions which become confused in thought and\nexpression unless the most solicitous care is taken to distinguish\nthem. When we speak of the direction of one point from another or of\nthe direction from one point to another we mean the straight off-ness\nor from-ness or to-ness which one bears to the other; in other words\na relation of separation and straight mediation. When again we speak\nof the direction of a motion we intend the indefinite straight sense\nof its procession, which is not a relation but an attribute of the\nmotion. When still again we speak of the direction of a line we mean its\nstraight _lay_ as compared or as comparable with other actual or possible\ncorrelates which is again a relation but not necessarily the same\nrelation as that that obtains between two points.\n\nIn all these meanings the notion of straightness is involved, and could\nwe say in lieu of straightness first directness and then direction and\nholding fast in thought this sense of the word, make a noun of it, so\nthat a direction would intend the same as a straightness and no more, it\nmight obtain a useful geometric term and notion.\n\nTo define it we might first define a line thus: A line is a space\nboundary that is indefinitely long but not otherwise of any extent.\nThen, a direction is a line such that between the points that bound any\nassigned parcel of it no copy of said parcel is possible.\n\nBut direction purports to our author the second of the meanings above\nset forth, namely, the indefinite straight sense of the procession of a\nmotion. Definite parcels of a direction thus understood are identical\nwith vectors.\n\nNow the notion of straightness is after the notions of point and line\nthe most fundamental one of geometry and the one which is altogether the\nmost prominent and useful. It is the necessary means for any definition\nof a vector or of the notion which our author deems so important. As\nstraightness is attributable only to lines and long things which a line\nmay represent it makes no difference whether we define straightness\nor a straight line, but a masterful performance of this definition is\nabsolutely necessary before the foundations of geometry can be abidingly\ncertified.\n\nOur author defines a straight line thus: \u201cA straight line is a continuous\nseries of points extending from each of them in the same two directions.\u201d\nWhat kind of a thing a continuous series of points may be we are not told\nbut as a point is defined to be \u201ca portion of matter so small that for\nthe purpose in hand variations of positions within it may be neglected\u201d\nwe take it that a straight line is a continuous series of particles of\nmatter. The \u201cpurpose in hand\u201d in this case must of course be the purpose\nof geometry.\n\nIn defining an angle our author first lays down that \u201cThe difference\nbetween two directions is called their _inclination_ to one another\u201d and\nthen \u201cThe measure of an inclination is called an _angle_.\u201d\n\nConsidering that it is the doctrine of the author that every straight\nline has two contrary directions the measure of whose inclination is an\nangle of one hundred and eighty degrees, we imagine a northeast southwest\nline cutting an east west line and wonder if the right hand upper angle\nis really two angles according to whether or not the directions both pass\nto the left or both pass to the right or pass one to the left and the\nother to the right.\n\nWere this an ordinary work we might regard it as due to the author to\nnotice the many excellencies which characterise it, in spite of the\ndefects which we notice. But as our author evidently realises, the\neminent dignity of the topic challenges and its singular importance\ndemands unsparing criticism. He who offers to instruct the world on the\nfoundations of geometry draws his sword and throws away the scabbard, and\nlike a doughty champion he will scorn to accept any favor, prizing only\nsuch success as he shall take at the point of an efficacy of treatment\nthat conquers all competent and candid criticism.\n\nStringent as are such terms of contest an author who is a worthy\ncompetitor in the field of geometric research can be well content with\nthem in the perception that the very same conditions apply in full force\nto the comments of his critics.\n\nThe author is undoubtedly an able man and a close thinker. He has\nconcentrated his mind upon a work that is worth the energy of a lifetime.\nBut we must confess our judgment to be that in spite of his capacity and\nevident devotion he has come short of the high result to which he has\naspired.\n\n \u03c1\u03c3\u03bb.\n\n\nLES F\u00caTES DE MONTPELLIER. PROMENADE A TRAVERS LES CHOSES, LES HOMMES ET\nLES IDEES. By _J. Delb\u0153uf_. Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan.\n\nWe have here a charming narrative by the well-known Professor at the\nUniversity of Li\u00e8ge of his visit to the f\u00eates of Montpellier, undertaken\nin great measure to make the personal acquaintance of M. Dauriac, the\ncritic in the _Revue Philosophique_ of the author\u2019s work \u201cLa mati\u00e8re\nbrute et la mati\u00e8re vivante.\u201d The description given of the f\u00eates,\nwhich marked the sixth centenary of the University of Montpellier, is\nvery entertaining, as is the account of the journey through the South\nof France; but as M. Delb\u0153uf says that he was more curious to become\nacquainted with men than with places, what he tells us about the former\nwill be the more interesting.\n\nThe author, with the companions of his tour, could not pass Nancy\nwithout stopping to see \u201cthe masters in the science of hypnotism\u201d there.\nAn account of what he saw and heard gives the author the opportunity\nof repeating \u201cThat he does not regard forgetfulness on awaking as\ncharacteristic of profound hypnosis, and that experience is against\nthe efficacity of criminal suggestion unless the subject is criminally\ninclined.\u201d The f\u00eates at Montpellier commenced with a religious service\nin the Cathedral, during which the Bishop, M. de Cabri\u00e8res, preached a\nsermon so liberal in tone, that M. Delb\u0153uf thinks the time is arriving\nwhen the church will demonstrate that Moses was the precursor of Darwin.\nAt the University reception which followed, M. Delb\u0153uf sought out among\nthe professors for his friend M. Dauriac, whom he had figured when first\nhe heard from him as small, thin and dark, but now found, in accordance\nwith the usual rule in such cases, that he was tall, robust and fair.\nIn the course of their subsequent conversations the two Professors\nmade mutual confidences, M. Dauriac confessing that his true vocation\nwas music, and that he was preparing a work on the psychology of the\nmusician; while M. Delb\u0153uf informed his friend that he was about to reply\nto his criticism of \u201cLa mati\u00e8re brute et la mati\u00e8re vivante,\u201d and that he\nwould throw the greatest light on the origin, which was still obscure, of\nlife and death. If the genial Li\u00e8ge Professor can do this, he may be the\nfirst to reap the benefit referred to in his own words: \u201cThe discovery of\nthe cause of death could not fail to assure the immortality of its author\nand its inspirer, and sooner or later that of humanity at large.\u201d For,\naccording to a medical adage, if the cause of a disease is known it is\nalready conquered.\n\nMontpellier was honored during the f\u00eates with the presence of Helmholtz,\nto whom but for national jealousy would have been confided the part of\nspeaking in the name of the foreign universities. Nevertheless he was\nthe true hero of the occasion, and when at the official reception, on\nthe President of the Republic shaking his hand and saying a few gracious\nwords someone feebly hissed, Helmholtz received in response a perfect\novation of applause. M. Delb\u0153uf met with a congenial spirit in the\nProfessor of Zoology, M. Sabatier, who has a laboratory at Cette. Their\nviews on free-will were in sympathy. They agreed in allowing freedom not\nonly to the superior animals, and to inferior animals and plants, but\neven to so called inorganic matter. M. Sabatier is a Christian and at\nthe same time a convinced transformist; having arrived at his views from\nreligious considerations. He cited M. Dauriac as saying, \u201cThe reign of\ndeterminism is not in the objective world; its empire extends itself over\nnature only after having been exercised over thought. There is no other\nnecessity than that of logic or mathematics.\u201d M. Delb\u0153uf is evidently\nan \u201cindeterminist\u201d by nature. He heartily sympathised with the students\nin all their demonstrations of freedom, although one of them assumed\na somewhat serious character. Dining in the open air with M. Milhaud\nthe author of an article in the _Revue Philosophique_ on non-Euclidian\ngeometry, he was prepared to talk mathematics. The surroundings were\ntoo much for him, however, and in recalling the scene he cries, \u201cTo the\ndevil with philosophy and mathematics! I cannot recall what we said; in\nmy remembrances, I see only blooming faces, I hear only the indistinct\nbursts of gaity.\u201d M. Delb\u0153uf\u2019s sympathetic nature is shown in the fact,\nwhich he records, that wild animals in confinement soon become familiar\nwith him.\n\nOne of the principal objects of the author\u2019s journey was to see M.\nGabriel Tarde, \u201cone of the most prolific and original publicists in\nFrance, if not in Europe,\u201d who resides at Sarlat. After quoting passages\nfrom an article of M. Tarde on Social Darwinism, which appeared in the\n_Revue Philosophique_, M. Delb\u0153uf remarks that nothing is more attractive\nand at the same time more fatiguing than the reading of his works. M.\nTarde is \u201cthe locomotive that carries you to the end of your journey\nacross countries by turns wild, agricultural, industrial, picturesque;\nbut without giving you time to regard and admire.\u201d Referring to M.\nTarde\u2019s acute criticisms of Lombroso and his theories, the author says,\n\u201cIt is not that he strikes the pseudo-thinker with formidable blows, but\nhe makes him drop gently to the ground.\u201d The French publicist sees in\n_imitation_ the source of social life, and he has been long engaged in\ndeveloping the idea, to the great importance of which M. Delb\u0153uf bears\nwitness; although he objects to the use which M. Tarde makes of terms\ntaken from mathematics, physics, and biology, to express his sociological\nviews. On the question of free-will there was no agreement. Although the\nlatter is a determinist, he believes in penal responsibility, on the\nground of personal identity; the diseased person or the madman is no\nlonger himself, in which they differ from the criminal.\n\nWe can say nothing of M. Delb\u0153uf\u2019s visit to the canons of the Tarn. Here\nwas captured a lizard which displayed, when compared with a Spanish\nlizard in captivity with it, as much difference in character as could be\nfound between two men chosen at hazard. The author concludes an amusing\ndescription of the habits of the two captives by recommending their\nhistory to the politicians and the historians of France and Spain, as\nlikely to throw light on that of the peoples themselves. We leave M.\nDelb\u0153uf, whose book of seventy-five pages may be said to be as full of\ninteresting matter as an egg is of meat, with quoting his postscript:\n\u201cOn the day that these lines appear (March 1891) the Spanish lizard has\nfinally cast off his savage character and follows in the footsteps of the\nFrench. Effect of imitation.\u201d\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nDER POSITIVISMUS VOM TODE AUGUST COMTE\u2019S BIS AUF UNSERE TAGE (1857-1891).\nBy _Hermann Gruber_, S. J. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder\u2019sche\nVerlagshandlung. 1891.\n\nThis pamphlet of 194 pages is the continuation of another pamphlet on\nAugust Comte, the founder of Positivism, which was reviewed in _The Open\nCourt_, No. 134. The author is a Jesuit and it is a matter of course that\nall the facts he relates, all the doctrines he explains are represented\nfrom the standpoint of Roman Catholicism. The booklet is of great\nimportance in so far as we learn through it what an erudite Catholic mind\nthinks of that recent movement of philosophy which has been called by\nthe collective name Positivism. The method pursued by Hermann Gruber is\nmost recommendable. He states facts and quotes abundantly so as to let\nthe various philosophers speak for themselves. He is economical with the\nsalt of his own opinion, yet he uses it with such a discretion that Roman\nCatholics can become thoroughly acquainted with infidel views without\nsuffering in their faith.\n\nThe book consists of two parts: (I) The Positivism of the schools in\nconnection with Comte and of the Positivistic movement outside of these\nschools. The first part begins with a discussion of Littr\u00e9. Littr\u00e9, \u201cthe\nvoice, the spirit and the soul of Positivism,\u201d as Bourdon calls him,\nis characterised as a philological genius. Although he had chosen the\nmedical profession, which however he abandoned early, and although he\nregarded the propaganda of the positive philosophy as his life-work,\nall his talents lay in the direction of special investigation in the\nliterary, historical, and linguistic fields, and the editing of the\nFrench dictionary remains his main achievement.\n\nComte had not nominated a successor who should in his place be the\n_Directeur du positivisme_. Littr\u00e9 had forfeited this honor on account\nof his quarrels with Comte in which he strongly sided with Madame Comte\nagainst her husband. After Comte\u2019s death P. Lafitte was elected as a\ntemporary director and he has kept this office ever since, which he\nconducts with remarkable devotion and unselfishness. Although without\nproperty himself he proposed not to use the positivistic funds until he\nhad shown himself through his work worthy of using them. He ekes out a\nscanty living for himself by giving lessons in mathematics, and devotes\nall the rest of his time to the management of and the propaganda for\nthe Positive Church. His co-workers are Audiffrent, Antoine, Robinet,\nand others\u2014all of them as the reviewer thinks strange people, visionary\nenthusiasts, and, to use an expressive Americanism, regular cranks.\nLack of space prevents us from recapitulating their ceremonies, their\nsacraments, festivals, pilgrimages, memorials, and other forms of\nservice. Their whole behavior proves that they are and will remain\ninfidel Roman Catholics and it would have been wiser if they had not\nleft the church at all. The positivistic orthodoxy culminates in the\npositivistic mystery of Comte\u2019s idea of a \u201cVirgin-Mother\u201d (_Vierge-M\u00e8re_)\nwhich according to Lafitte is destined to elevate the intercourse\nbetween the sexes, while Audiffrent, Lagarrigue, and the Brasilian Lemos\nstick closely to Comte\u2019s view \u201cto represent positivism as directly\nconceived under the Utopia of a virgin-mother.\u201d[22] General Lemos goes\nso far as to say \u201cWe prefer to be looked upon with St. Paul for the\nsake of our faithfulness toward Comte as fools than to be praised by\nthe contemporary frivolity as sages.\u201d And Audiffrent defends against\nLafitte the diplomatic action of Comte\u2019s with the General of the Jesuits\nconcerning an alliance between Positivism and Catholicism. Positivism,\nhe says, invites all who have ceased to believe in God to become\npositivists, but it induces all those who still believe in God to turn\nCatholics, thus making an alliance possible of the disciplined against\nthe non-disciplined.\n\nIf the Jesuit General ever has seriously considered the offer, he would\nperhaps have accepted it, for there is no doubt that he would have made\nthe better bargain as all the discipline we should say is on his side.\n\nThe English group of Comtean Positivists consists mainly of Fr. Harrison,\nRichard Congreve, George Eliot and James Cotter Morison. The second part\nof the book which treats of the positivistic movement outside of the\npositivistic schools in England, France, Germany and other countries will\nbe less interesting to English and American readers partly because the\nsubject is better known to them partly because our author is apparently\nmore familiar with his French than with his English sources. The second\npart begins with John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. It mentions Bain,\nLewes, Clifford, Maudsley, Darwin, Sully, Romanes, Huxley, Tyndall.\nClifford\u2019s view is sketched in sixteen lines but in such a way that\nit appears grotesque. As French positivists outside the schools are\nmentioned Taine, Ribot, Fouill\u00e9e, Guyau, Charles Richet, J. Luys, Cl.\nBernard, and Roberty. It is correctly said of Ribot that his doctrine\nof personality is most characteristic of his views. The unity of a\npersonality in the ego does not grow from above downwards but from below\nupwards, but Gruber is mistaken in saying of Charles Richet, the editor\nof the _Revue Scientifique_, that he represents about the same views as\nTh. Ribot. Richet\u2019s publication on telepathic experiments in which he\nconfidently believes, would never be countenanced by Ribot.\n\nAs the first German positivist is mentioned Eugen D\u00fchring. Riehl, Laas,\nLange, Vaihinger and Avenarius are disposed of together in the next\nfollowing chapter. Several pages are devoted to Wundt.\n\nThe little chapter headed _Nord-America_ (p. 171) consisting of two and\na half pages begins with the words: \u201cAccording to the testimony of G.\nStanley Hall philosophy in the new world is in its swaddling-clothes\nstill (_in den Kinderschuhen_). Philosophers over there are as rare\nas snakes in Ireland (_Schlangen in Norwegen_).[23] For scientific\ninstruction in the United States are used as guiding stars Spencer,\nLewes, Darwin, Huxley, and Haeckel.\u201d As a representative Atheist is\nnamed Ludeking, a man unknown to fame, while Colonel Ingersoll is not\nmentioned at all. It is maintained that J. D. Bell, a professor in\nNew York had proclaimed the same confession of faith as Comte in _The\nModern Thinker_\u2014a journal which we have never seen nor ever heard of.\nThe societies for ethical culture are characterised as avowing \u201ca purely\nnatural religion\u201d while in fact natural religion, the religion of science\nand philosophy, as a basis of ethics is as rigorously rejected by\nProfessor Adler as any dogmatic religion, and more than half of the two\nand a half pages is filled with a masonic proclamation of the Sovereign\nGrand Commander, Albert Pike, of Washington, which preaches the belief in\nan unknowable God and denounces Atheism.\n\nThe booklet closes with the following sentences: \u201cThe full and true\npositivism is embodied in the Catholic Church. The divine revelation\nwhich she represents is that which is truly real ... truly sure ... truly\nprecise ... truly organic ... truly useful. The deepest root, however,\nand the most essential nature of all true positivism (this is vouched for\nby reason as well as by revelation) is not the relative but the absolute.\u201d\n\nHere we conclude our review of the book. We have however to add a few\nwords which concern _The Monist_ as well as all the publications of The\nOpen Court Publishing Co. Hermann Gruber mentions in his book _The Open\nCourt_ and its editor together with the societies for ethical culture.\nWe have, ourselves, characterised our views as positivism and as monism,\nbut we stated at the same time that our positivism had nothing to do\nwith Comte or with any one of Comte\u2019s disciples.[24] They have (with the\nsole exception of Ribot and I should hesitate to call him a Comtean)\ncontributed little if anything to the formation of our views. The name\nPositivism is a good and expressive word and we have adopted it because\ntaken in its proper meaning it represents the true principle of modern\nphilosophy. However we cannot agree with any of the fundamental tenets\neither of Comte or of his most positivistic and most scientific disciple\nLittr\u00e9.[25] Comte as well as Littr\u00e9 are radical agnostics they repeat\nagain and again that \u201cWe can know nothing about first and final causes.\nPositive philosophy denies nothing and maintains nothing.\u201d According\nto our view of the subject this attitude is rather negativism than\npositivism. But it is not even negativism; it is worse, it is mere\nscepticism leading to indifferentism. It sounds very philosophical to\nspeak of the inscrutability of first and final causes but the very\nterms \u201cfirst causes\u201d and \u201cfinal causes\u201d are most nonsensical and\nself-contradictory concepts. (See \u201cFundamental Problems,\u201d pp. 88-90, and\n101.) Comte and Littr\u00e9 imagine to have conquered metaphysics, but in fact\nthey are the worst kind of metaphysicians. They believe in the ghosts of\nmetaphysics as strongly as some medi\u00e6val minds believe in devils but are\nafraid to wrestle with them, because, as they maintain these metaphysical\nghosts cannot be conquered.\n\nComtean Positivism, especially as it is represented by Littr\u00e9, consists\nmainly if not exclusively of the doctrine to \u201clet metaphysics alone\u201d\n(which latter includes the object of religious worship) and limits\nscience to positive issues. Thus the oneness of the sciences, a unitary\nworld-conception is lost, for the hierarchy of the sciences which are\nto serve as a substitute for philosophy is rather a summing up of the\nstock of knowledge than a system of the sciences exhibiting their organic\ngrowth. It is an inventory rather than a plan to guide science in its\nfurther evolution. It is an anatomy rather than a physiology, for the\nvery life and spirit of the sciences is missing. And outside the pale of\nthe hierarchy of the sciences there is looming around an awful something\nquite different in its nature, like an infinite ocean surrounding a\nforlorn island, the unknowable first and final causes! That which is\ncalled by former philosophers \u201cmetaphysics,\u201d which is at the same time\nthe essence of religion, is by no means either unknowable or indifferent.\nIt is not something beyond, something extramundane, it is the very life\nof the world and our religious and philosophical opinions are not only\nof a theoretical interest. They are the main factors of our lives which\nin the long run will determine the direction of our development. That\nthis is so, has not been sufficiently recognised, and we would suggest in\nthis connection that a history of the United States should be written to\npoint out that the political liberty of the country and its republicanism\nare nothing but the application of its religious principles and of the\nPuritan conviction of religious independence. The historic growth of the\ncolonies remained faithful to this maxim. The religion of a man and of\na nation is the most important thing. In the same way the structure of\na seed predetermines the whole plant, and the angle of crystallisation\ntogether with the shape of the crystal-nucleus from which the process of\ncrystallisation starts, will determine the formation of the whole crystal.\n\nHis sceptical attitude led Littr\u00e9 to what he and his friends call\n\u201ctolerance.\u201d Littr\u00e9\u2019s wife was a devout Catholic and his daughter was\neducated in her mother\u2019s faith. He had intended to explain to her his\nviews of the subject when she had reached maturity, and leave the choice\nto her. But when the moment came, he declared that \u201cthe experiment was\nnot worth the tears which it would cause.\u201d Our view of \u201ctolerance\u201d is\nradically different. Whatever the truth may be it should be struggled\nfor, cost it ever so many tears or pains.\n\nWe cannot sympathise with Littr\u00e9\u2019s method of constructing ethics upon the\nnutritive and sexual instincts, the former producing egotism, the latter\naltruism. Emotions are, says Littr\u00e9, as much as ideas, the result of\nbrain-processes in consequence of external impressions and \u201cthe struggle\nbetween both kinds of emotion make up the moral life.\u201d Littr\u00e9 rejects\nthe evolution theory and its attempts to explain ethics. (See Gruber\u2019s\nbook p. 20.) Having explained our views of ethics on other occasions,\nit is sufficient here to state that we consider Littr\u00e9\u2019s attempt as a\nfailure. We cannot even adopt the so-called \u201cpositive method,\u201d of which\nLittr\u00e9 says: \u201cWhoever adopts this method is a positivist and whether\nhe acknowledges the fact or not, also a disciple of Comte. Whoever\nemploys another method is a metaphysician. It is the surest mark by\nwhich a careful mind will discriminate what belongs to the positive\nphilosophy and what is foreign to it.\u201d What is this method? Says Littr\u00e9:\n\u201cIt is an acknowledged principle of positive science that nothing real\ncan be stated through reasoning (_raisonnement_). The world cannot be\nguessed.\u201d Littr\u00e9 is opposed to so-called _a priori_ arguments. Hermann\nGruber says in the preface: \u201cThis positive method is embraced by all\nthe representatives of the lines of thought here discussed. All of them\nintend to build up their systems with the exclusion of scholastic,\nrespectively of Kantian, Hegelian, or any _a priori_ speculations\nafter purely \u2018scientific\u2019 methods upon the foundation of the facts of\nexperience.\u201d We certainly intend to build our world conception \u201cupon the\nfacts of experience\u201d but the most important facts among them are their\nformal relations and these formal relations when represented in thought\nare exactly that element which Kant called _a priori_. The sense-element\naffords us the building stones, but the _a priori_ element represents\nthe mortar without which we could not build. So much do we oppose\nthis one-sided philosophy which takes its stand upon what is wrongly\ncalled the purely scientific method, that our views have been called\nthe Philosophy of Form, and justly, for Form is that feature of the\nworld which makes of it a cosmos and formal thought is the organ of our\ncomprehension.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nUEBER DEN ASSOCIATIVEN VERLAUF DER VORSTELLUNGEN. Inaugural-Dissertation.\nBy _E. W. Scripture_, M. A., Fellow of Clark University. Leipzig: Wilhelm\nEngelmann. 1891.\n\nThis essay of 102 pages characterises most excellently some of the\nproceedings and methods of Professor Wundt\u2019s psychological laboratory.\nThe author, a disciple of Wundt, is a native American who studied in\nBerlin, Z\u00fcrich, and Leipzig, and took his degree of Doctor on the ground\nof this dissertation. The object of the treatise is not so much to solve\nas to formulate the problem of the associative course of concepts, and\nthe author hopes that in a future treatise he will be able to propound\nhis theory based upon the facts here related.\n\nThe experiments were made with the assistance of seven friends, among\nthem German students, a doctor of philosophy, a doctor of medicine,\nand a teacher. They were of different nationality, three Germans, one\nBelgian, one Japanese, one Englishman from the Cape, and two Americans,\nthe author included. The apparatus used was so arranged that the person\noperated upon sat in the dark, before him was a plate of ground glass\nintercepting from a camera an image which was exposed for four seconds.\nPictures of all kinds, colors, and plainly printed words were used. For\nother sense-impressions the observer was also seated in the dark. Several\ninstruments for producing sounds were ready on a table. Tastes were\neffected by liquids which the person operated upon had to drink, and the\nsense of touch was investigated through handing him cards to which some\nsmall objects had been attached. The author was partly operator, partly\nobserver, i. e. the person operated upon. The ideas evoked through the\nsense-impressions produced in this way, are enumerated in tabular form in\nthe order in which they arose.\n\nAmong the experiments made in this way we find one kind which is of\nspecial interest. Sir William Hamilton made the remark in his Lectures\non Metaphysics that unconscious ideas may serve as connecting links\nbetween two ideas otherwise unassociated. He represented his view in the\nfollowing way: Let _A_, _B_, _C_, be three ideas, _A_ does not suggest\n_C_, but both are associated with _B_. It happens that _A_ is directly\nfollowed by _C_ in consciousness. In such a case _A_ may recall _B_\nand _B_ may recall _C_, but _B_ being a _minimum visibile_ or _minimum\naudibile_ does not enter consciousness. Thus the idea of the mount Ben\nLomond called into Hamilton\u2019s mind the system of Prussian education.\nSubsequent reflection taught him that he had met on Ben Lomond a German.\nThe recollection of the place was associated with the ideas\u2014a German,\nGermany, Prussia. These ideas were too weak to enter consciousness yet\nthey reawakened another idea which did enter consciousness, the system of\nPrussian education.\n\nThis is a mere suggestion of Hamilton\u2019s but Dr. Scripture proved its\ntruth by actual experiment. He took cards containing some simple\nwords, such as MENSCH, GEHEN, KOMMEN, BLUME, etc., and also Japanese\nwords in Roman characters HANA, HITO, IUKU, KURU. To every word was\nattached another Japanese word in Japanese characters so that the same\ncharacter appeared on HANA and BLUME; HITO and MENSCH; JUKU and GEHEN;\nKURU and KOMMEN. The words were shown twice so as to give a stronger\nimpression. The Japanese gentleman was excluded from these experiments,\nand indeed, the unknown Japanese characters which were only dimly or\nnot at all remembered, evoked the corresponding words: HITO\u2014MENSCH;\nKURU\u2014KOMMEN; BLUME\u2014HANA, etc. Dr. Scripture adds: \u201cThese associations\nwere involuntary, the observer imagined them to be wrong, and could find\nno reason for the involuntary appearance of the words. He had not thought\nat all of the connecting links.\u201d\n\nIt appears that the links in a chain of concepts need not be all\nconscious and the result of his experiments in this line is formulated by\nDr. Scripture as follows: A concept apperceived can bring another concept\ninto the focus of consciousness although it was never associated with it,\nif there are other psychic elements of lower degrees or even outside of\nconsciousness which are connected with both\u2014provided that there are no\nother elements stronger than these. The effect of the unconscious link\nhowever is much weaker than that which was conscious.\n\nPages 71-101 are devoted to the investigations of the after-effect of\nconcepts. The phenomena of ideation being extremely complex, we cannot\nassume that the process of a so-called reproduced concept is analogous\nto the original idea. A sensation changes during its presence with\nreference to the degree of consciousness of its parts and even the\nconcepts as a whole may be altered. The process is different according\nto circumstances. The renewed concepts differ from their originals,\n(1) in the degree of the consciousness of the whole idea, (2) in the\ndegree of the consciousness of its parts among themselves, (3) in\nform, color, relations, etc., (4) in duration. In order to avoid the\nmetaphysical influence of hypothetical theories we ought to avoid all\nkinds of terms suggestive of a theory and stick closely to a simple\ndescription of facts. Therefore Dr. Scripture proposes to discard such\nwords as \u201cretention, reproduction, revival,\u201d etc., and suggests the term\n\u201cafter-effect.\u201d Yet he adds, quoting from Wundt, \u201cthese after-effects\nthemselves are as little ideas as the effects produced upon nerves and\nmuscles by exercise can be called actions of will.\u201d\n\nDr. Scripture avoids explaining what he conceives these after-effects to\nbe. We see no reason for disagreement and should say that the result of\nthe after-effects is what generally goes by the name of \u201cdisposition.\u201d\nAnd a certain disposition is produced according to the law of the\nconservation of form in living structures. (See \u201cThe Soul of Man,\u201d pp.\n418-424.)\n\nDr. Scripture is led by a consideration of his observations to the\nfollowing statement: \u201cEach concept is conditioned through the effects of\nthe elements of the present state of consciousness and the after-effects\nof many (if not of all) previous elements of consciousness.\u201d\n\nThis result is not compatible with the theory of reproduction now almost\nuniversally accepted by the association-psychology. Wundt says: \u201cIf only\ncertain single concepts were renewed, we might perhaps explain why in the\nmemory-picture certain elements of a former reproduction are missing:\nbut we could not explain why the elements of a concept change so often\nqualitatively as is indeed the case. This, it appears, is possible only\nbecause a memory-picture and others of a kindred nature affect each other\nmutually.\u201d\n\nThis will find explanation in the following experiment. The observer\nsees a dog, and thinks of a circus, which he saw a year ago. There is\nno direct association between the picture of the dog and the special\nreminiscence of that circus visited a year ago. The association was\nformed at the moment. Former sensations of dogs had their after-effects\nand this special reminiscence was localised.\n\nDr. Scripture maintains that H\u00f6ffding\u2019s association theory contains too\nmany hypothetical elements; it presupposes faculties of the soul to join\nlike with like and to combine simultaneous or consecutive events.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[22] ... \u201cA repres\u00e9nter le positivisme comme directement r\u00e9summ\u00e9 par\nl\u2019utopie de la Vierge-M\u00e8re\u201d\u2014Comte to Audiffrent, the 8th of St. Paul 69\n(May 28, 1857.)\n\n[23] Good philosophers, it is true, are rare in America, perhaps rarer\nthan in Europe. Nevertheless the interest in philosophy is exceedingly\nstrong here. There are metaphysical and philosophical clubs all over the\ncountry, and the crop of philosophical dilettanti is at least as great on\nthis side of the Atlantic as in Paris.\n\n[24] It is a matter of course that we are in strong sympathy with many\nphilosophers and scientists whom Hermann Gruber classes among the\npositivists outside of the positivistic schools, not only Th. Ribot, but\nalso Guyau, Fouill\u00e9e, Roberty, and others. How much they were influenced\nby the Comte-Littr\u00e9 or the Comte-Lafitte Positivism is difficult to say.\nIt is certain that many of them would have accomplished the same work in\nthe same way with or without Comte. Roberty was first a fervid disciple\nof Comte, but he soon combated not only Comte\u2019s law of the three stages\n(which latter by the bye was according to Schaarschmidt first pronounced\nby Turgot) but also his agnosticism, declaring that Comte was still\nentangled in metaphysicism, and that the last bulwark, the idea of the\nunknowable, had to be conquered also.\n\n[25] We publish in this number a sonnet by Louis Belrose, Jr. to \u00c9mile\nLittr\u00e9. Mr. Belrose is a positivist who attended together with Mr. Fred.\nHarrison positivistic lectures in France. We publish Mr. Belrose\u2019s poem\nas an expression of his gratitude and admiration toward a master mind but\nnot as an expression of our view of Littr\u00e9.\n\n\n\n\nPERIODICALS.\n\n\nMIND. July, 1891. No. LXIII.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGY. By _E. W. Scripture_.\n\n THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. I. By _H. R. Marshall_.\n\n SCHOPENHAUER\u2019S CRITICISM OF KANT. By _W. Caldwell_.\n\n DISCUSSION: On the Origin of Music. (1) By _R. Wallaschek_;\n (2) By Prof. _J. McK. Cattell_; The Coefficient of External\n Reality. By Prof. _J. Mark Baldwin_.\n\n CRITICAL NOTICES: James\u2019s \u201cThe Principles of Psychology\u201d;\n Pfleiderer\u2019s \u201cDevelopment of Theology in Germany\u201d; Keynes\u2019s\n \u201cScope and Method of Political Economy\u201d; Lehmann\u2019s \u201cDie Hypnose\n und die damit verwandten normalen Zust\u00e4nde.\u201d\n\nAs all sciences treat, to a great extent, of the same objects, they\ncan be separated only according to _how_ they treat things. On this\nprinciple, Mr. Scripture divides sciences into Special Sciences,\nGeneral or Philosophical Sciences, and Didactic Sciences. The Special\nsciences are, I, the Mathematical Sciences, treating the _forms_ of all\nexperience; II, the Phenomenal Sciences, treating of the _contents_\nof all experience; the second class is divided into the Physical\nSciences, which treat experience from its objective side, and Mental\nSciences, which treat experience from its subjective side. The group\nof Mental Sciences is best divided, according to Wundt\u2019s scheme, into\nthe sciences of mental processes, Psychological Sciences; the sciences\nof mental products, Philological Sciences; and the Sciences of mental\ndevelopment, Historical Sciences. Psychology as a science of mental\nphenomena has a two-fold relation to the physical sciences: it is\ncomplementary to them, a necessary auxiliary; they are complementary\nto it, accessories in psychological investigation. States of mind\nalways remain states of mind; they cannot be resolved into motions of\nparticles of matter, and it is a fundamental axiom that _mental phenomena\ncannot influence or be influenced by material phenomena_. But we are\njustified in talking about a nervous stimulation becoming a percept, a\nmuscular contraction following an act of will, as long as we remember\nthat these are only substitutes for unknown quantities. Physiology\ninvestigates nervous changes; Psychology, mental changes; Physiological\nPsychology, the relations between the two. Mental phenomena are of two\nkinds, mental processes and mental products. Psychology is the science\nof mental processes; it seeks the exact description and explanation\nof the operations of our inner experience. The relation of Psychology\nto Philosophy is a burning question. Metaphysics, or Philosophy in\nthe narrower sense, seeks from the agreement of the results of all\nother sciences to establish a system of the principles that underlie\nall existence, i. e. a theory of the universe, material and mental.\nAfter the general principles have been determined by metaphysics,\nphilosophy has the duty of correcting the special sciences when they\nset up one-sided hypotheses, and of helping where they are unable to\nproceed alone. Psychology is considered a part of philosophy, but as\na special science, treating mental processes from its own standpoint,\nit is distinct from psychology as a general science treating mind,\nrelations of mind and matter, etc., from the standpoint of philosophy.\nThe latter should be termed Philosophical Psychology. The relation of\nPsychology to Logic depends on what the latter is. Logic is a science of\nthought, but thought is also a subject of psychology. Psychology treats\nthoughts as we think them; Logic, as we ought to think them. Each of the\nsciences, Epistemology, the doctrine of knowledge, and Methodology, the\ndoctrine of methods, treats of thought for its own distinct purpose.\nThe former determines what the truth is; the latter determines how we\nought to think. The didactic sciences are of two kinds: the sciences of\nthe general principles or ends to be obtained, and the sciences of the\nmeans to attain these ends. Among the former is General Pedagogy, which\ndetermines the ends to be sought for in education. Psychology furnishes\nthe foundation of fact; the science of general pedagogy judges which of\nthese facts are desirable, in much the same way as epistemology judges\nwhich are true.\n\nIn a former article (_Mind_ No. 56) Mr. Marshall showed that Pleasure\nand Pain are primitive qualities which, under proper conditions, _may_\nappear with any psychosis, whatever be its content. He now finds that\nall the most notable pleasure-pain theories may in the first instance\nbe placed in four groups, determined by the emphasis of certain kinds\nof pleasure or pain. An examination of pleasure-pain theories shows,\n_first_ that there is a general agreement, with but few dissenting\nvoices, that all pleasure is at bottom the same thing, and that all pain\nin its essence is a single psychological phenomenon, and further that\npleasures and pains are unifiable; _second_, that there are certain facts\nso marked in experience as to have become the basis of the majority of\npleasure-pain theories. Mr. Marshall proceeds to consider the theory that\n\u201cthe activity of the organ of any content if efficient is pleasurable,\nif inefficient is painful.\u201d He concludes that pleasures and pains are\ninvolved with the nutritive conditions of the active organ, and lays\ndown the principle that \u201call pleasure-pain phenomena are determined by\nthe action in the organs concomitant of the conscious state, as related\nto the nutritive conditions of the organs at the time of the action.\u201d\nThe difference between the hypernormality of pain and of pleasure,\nturns upon the fact that pleasure is obtained where the organ has been\n_rested_. Rest in an organ which is sometimes active means storage of\nenergy derived from blood supply; and action after rest means the use\nof stored energy. But as action of an organ after rest gives a psychic\ncontent which is pleasurable, we have the working hypothesis: \u201cPleasure\nis experienced wherever the physical action which determines the content\ninvolves the use of stored force\u2014the resolution of potential into actual\nenergy; or, in other words, whenever the energy involved in the reaction\nto a stimulus is greater in amount than the energy of the stimulus.\u201d\nBy a similar process of reasoning we obtain the hypothesis: \u201cPain is\nexperienced whenever the physical action which determines the content\nis so related to the supply of nutriment that the energy involved in\nthe reaction to the stimulus is less in amount than the energy of the\nstimulus.\u201d We may also say in general, \u201cPleasure and pain are primitive\nqualities of psychic states which are determined by the relation\nbetween activity and capacity in the organs, the activities of which\nare concomitants of the psychosis.\u201d Mr. Marshall then supplies the\npsychological interpretation of the physiological phenomena attendant on\nthe pleasures of Rest and of Relief, and of the pain of Obstruction or\nhindered activity. He concludes the present article with the statement\nthat the physical concomitants of pleasure-pain phenomena are to be found\nin general qualities common to all processes which are at the basis\nof our conscious life; and that this is corroborated by introspective\nanalysis of pleasures and pains. Mr. Marshall\u2019s idea does not appear to\nus as a happy solution of the problem.\n\nThe object of Mr. Caldwell\u2019s paper is to explain Kantism through\nSchopenhauer, who claimed to be Kant\u2019s only true successor in philosophy.\nSchopenhauer came to the conclusion that Kant\u2019s only real discovery,\ngiven in the \u201c\u00c6sthetic,\u201d was that Space and Time were known by us _a\npriori_. The principle of Causality is the only element of value he\nfinds in the \u201cAnalytic,\u201d and a much simpler account could have been\ngiven of it. The \u201cDialectic\u201d represents the Negative side of the\nCritical Philosophy, which although conclusive, might have been stated\nmore simply. In Ethics Kant rendered the immortal service of showing,\nby his attribution of a noumenal freedom to man, compensating for his\nphenomenal necessary determination, \u201cthat the kingdom of virtue is not\nof this world\u201d; although the _K. d. prakt. V._ is only an application\nto ethics of the principles already reached in the sphere of the Pure\nReason. Schopenhauer finds the _K. d. Urtheilskraft_ to contain the\ncharacteristic defect of Kant\u2019s whole Philosophy\u2014the starting from\nindirect instead of direct knowledge. Lastly, the criticism of the\nTeleological Judgment only shows what the _K. d. r. V._ already showed,\nthe subjectivity of what we may call the ontological categories.\nAccording to Schopenhauer, the chief tendency of the Kantian philosophy\nis to establish \u201cthe total diversity of the real and the ideal.\u201d The\nIdeal he explains as \u201cthe visible, spatial appearance with the qualities\nthat are perceived on it,\u201d and the Real as the \u201cthing-in-and-for-itself,\u201d\nwhich is the reality underlying and determining the world of experience,\nand, as such, a real and not a hypothetical entity. Schopenhauer never\nspeaks of it in the plural, as Kant does, and so keeps consistently to\na monistic point of view. He says, \u201cThe way in which Kant introduced\nsuch a thing-in-itself and sought to reconcile it with his philosophy\nwas faulty.\u201d This concerns Kant\u2019s method, against which Schopenhauer\ndirects the full force of his criticism. The fundamental principle\nof Kant\u2019s method Schopenhauer takes to be the starting from indirect\nreflective knowledge: Philosophy is for Kant a science of conceptions,\nwhile for himself it is a science _in_ conceptions; philosophy being a\nconceptualised or _generalised_ statement of our knowledge. Schopenhauer\nsees all Kant\u2019s errors contained in the following sentence from the _K.\nd. r. V._: \u201cIf I take away all thought\u201d (through the categories), \u201cfrom\nempirical knowledge, there remains absolutely no knowledge of an object,\nfor through mere perceptions nothing at all is thought.\u201d In endeavoring\nto construct a philosophy out of pure conceptions Kant failed to solve\nthe problem, in having the thing-in-itself left on his hands. This proved\nto Schopenhauer that the path of abstract reflection was closed as the\npath of philosophy. Mr. Caldwell demurs to Schopenhauer\u2019s statement\nthat the \u201c\u00c6sthetic\u201d is Kant\u2019s only discovery, yet as the \u201c\u00c6sthetic\u201d\nshows the tendency to conceptual abstraction, his view of Space and Time\nis of extreme importance. It is of the \u201cLogic\u201d of the _K. d. r. V._\nthat Schopenhauer\u2019s criticism is materially and formally most radical.\nHe gives a different account of the functions of the Soul, rejecting\naltogether the faculty-distinctions of Kant: he associates Kant\u2019s faculty\nof Understanding more with Sense and the category of Cause with the\nspatio-temporal or perceptual construction of the world, and holds the\nother eleven categories to be mere blind windows put into a scheme\nthrough Kant\u2019s love of symmetry; and, secondly, he holds Kant\u2019s account\nof Reason to be utterly false, and substitutes his own doctrine of the\nthing-in-itself for Kant\u2019s three Ideas of Reason. By Reason Schopenhauer\nmeans the power the mind has of forming general conceptions and of\nknowing by way of conception or idea, the matter for conceptions and\nideas being of course derived from Perception. Reasoned knowledge is an\nabstraction from perceived knowledge, and all knowledge, as Schopenhauer\nsays, is originally and in itself perceptive. The confusion in Kant\u2019s\naccount of the elements entering into knowledge, is Schopenhauer\u2019s\nreason for holding that Kant can only have had the fundamental principle\nof his method imperfectly present to his mind. His whole difficulty\nin relating the elements of knowledge to each other arose from the\nfact that he in his thought likened the categories to conceptions\nthrough want of an explicit and persistent recognition of the nature of\nconception. Schopenhauer himself classifies the categories according to\nthe planes or stages of experience they characterise: the perceptual,\nthe mathematical, the logical, and the ethical in order. The categories\nare all abstractions, but not conceptions or notions. Conceptions are a\nparticular kind of abstractions, and so are categories: to conceptions\n_material_ entities correspond, but to categories only relations or\nforms. Knowledge consists in the detection of relations existing between\nthe different planes or sections of the perceptual continuum, the\ndifference in perceived things being that some are immediately and others\nonly mediately perceived. The true reason of Schopenhauer\u2019s revolt from\nthe method of conceptions is to be found in the difficulties in which he\nfelt himself involved by the theory of Subjective Idealism. Philosophy,\nhe says, is a search for the Thing-in-itself, but he tells Kant that from\nthe idea nothing but the idea follows, and that the path of Reflexion\nor Knowledge is closed as the path of philosophy. Had Schopenhauer kept\nmore true to his ruling that knowledge is originally and in itself\nperception, he would not have maintained that the world is my idea. The\nThing-in-itself is the shadow cast by the Reflective or Abstracting\nUnderstanding. With both Kant and Schopenhauer it is primarily invented\nto get rid of the difficulty bred of a belief in an abstraction or\nunreality, and as it is a pure mental fiction, we may safely deny that\nthere is any such thing in reality.\n\nMr. Wallaschek finds the origin of music in a rhythmical impulse in man.\nThe sense of rhythm arises from the general appetite for exercise, which\nrecurs in rhythmical form owing to sociological as well as psychological\nconditions. On the one hand, there is the social character of primitive\nmusic, compelling a number of performers to act in concert. On the\nother hand, our perception of time-relations involves a process of\nintellection, by means of which the mind is able to comprehend them as\na whole. Since music is produced not merely as an auditory impression\nand expression, but also in order to evoke reflexion, it must contain\nthe qualities of time-order and rhythm. Mr. Herbert Spencer\u2019s theory of\nthe origin of the general appetite for exercise is said to afford the\nmost valid explanation. It is the surplus vigor in more highly evolved\norganisms, exceeding what is required for immediate needs, in which play\nof all kinds takes its rise. We owe our musical faculty to the time-sense\nrather than to our sense of hearing. The perception of particular\ntones and tunes plays a very low part, if any, in primitive music. In\nalmost all the examples furnished by ethnology, we see that music is\nthe expression of emotion, which is also one of the sources of human\nlanguage. Mr. Spencer is said to be wrong, however, in thinking that\nmusical modulation originates in the modulations of speech Music and\nspeech have a reciprocal influence, and primitive human utterance, using\nsound-metaphors and onomatop\u0153ia, may resemble primitive musical tones.\nNevertheless, an early separation of distinct tones and indistinct sounds\nseems to have taken place, not as a transition from the one as prior to\nthe other as succeeding, but as a divergence from a primitive state which\nis, strictly speaking, neither of the two.\n\nProfessor Cattell objects that the theories of Darwin and Spencer on the\norigin of music, describe what probably took place, rather than explain\nwhy it was necessary that it should have taken place. As to Spencer\u2019s\nexplanation of harmony, he affirms that it amounts to saying that harmony\ngives pleasure because it is pleasant. After referring to the connection\nof harmony with the existence of overtones, Prof. Cattell states that\nmusic is not, as commonly supposed, a creation of the imagination, freer\nthan the other arts from a physical basis, but is rather a discovery and\na development. All the combinations of music are latent in the sounds Of\nnature, and the history of music bears witness to the gradual adoption of\nsuch as are more remote. The difference in voices rests on the overtones\npresent, and the immense emotional effects of music are due to the fact\nthat music expresses the emotion of the human voice, using and developing\nthose combinations of tones which the voice uses when moved by sorrow and\njoy, despair and exultation.\n\nBy the _Coefficient_ of External Reality, Professor Baldwin means the\nsomething which attaches to some presentations in virtue of which we\nattribute reality to them; while others, not having the coefficient,\nare discredited. Diametrically opposed solutions of this question\nare held. To one class of writers, the coefficient of the reality\nof an image is its independence of the will; to another class, the\ncoefficient is subjection to the will. If we make a distinction between a\nmemory-coefficient of reality\u2014that is, the something about a memory which\nleads us to believe it represents a real experience\u2014and a sensational\ncoefficient, that is, the criterion of present sensational reality, we\nsee that those two kinds of reality differ in their relation to the\nwill. A present sensible reality is not under the control of any will,\nbut a memory coefficient is subjected to will, in the sense that we\nare able to get the image again as a sensation by repeating the series\nof voluntary muscular sensations which were associated with it in its\nfirst experience. This memory-coefficient of external reality must be\ndistinguished from the coefficient of memory itself; the latter being\nthe feeling that an image has been in consciousness before, i. e.\nrecognition, or sense of familiarity. A true memory is an image which I\ncan get at will by a train of memory-associates, and which, when got, is\nfurther subject to my will. (London: Williams & Norgate.)\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. July, 1891. Vol. I. NO. 4.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION. By Prof.\n _Edward Caird_.\n\n THE FUNCTIONS OF ETHICAL THEORY. By Prof. _James H. Hyslop_.\n\n THE MORALITY OF NATIONS. By Prof. _W. R. Sorley_.\n\n J. S. MILL\u2019S SCIENCE OF ETHOLOGY. By _James Ward_.\n\n VICE AND IMMORALITY. By _R. W. Black_.\n\n THE PROGRESS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE ADAM SMITH. By _Francis\n W. Newman_.\n\n PROGRAMME OF SCHOOL OF APPLIED ETHICS.\n\n DISCUSSIONS: The Moral Aspect of \u201cTips\u201d and \u201cGratuities.\u201d By\n _Christine Ladd Franklin_.\n\nIdeas and facts, says Professor Caird, are continually being woven\ntogether as warp and woof, into the web of man\u2019s intellectual life.\nThe idea of the unity of mankind has within the last century become\nan almost instinctive presupposition of all civilised men. It has\nspecial application to the history of religion. In a man\u2019s religion we\nhave expressed his ultimate attitude to the universe. Even atheism or\nagnosticism involves a definite attitude towards the ultimate problem\nof human life. The modern ideas of the organic unity and the organic\nevolution of man inevitably compel us to seek for the one principle of\nlife which is striving towards the full realisation of itself.\n\nProfessor Hyslop remarks, that two questions may be asked: (1) Why is\nit that any disturbance in ethical speculation at once brings men up\nin arms about the consequences? (2) Why is there such a tendency even\nin speculative ethics to bring its theories into harmony and sympathy\nwith \u201cpractical\u201d problems? The preliminary answer is the distinction\nbetween science and art. The aim of science is to find causes; the aim\nof art to produce ends by means of these causes. But art may be divided\ninto productive and practical art. Every consideration of the scope and\naim of ethics shows it to be both a science and an art. As a science it\nendeavors to explain something; as an art, to realise something. Its\ncomplications are thus two-fold. Ethics may be a science in two distinct\nrelations. First, it aims to show the general conception which will\nreduce the various motives actually governing human conduct to unity.\nSecondly, it aims to show the end that ought ideally to govern conduct,\nand this is the supreme object of ethics as a science.\n\nIn relation to the Morality of Nations, Professor Sorley says that the\nrelations of the state, diplomatic or military, with other states may be\ncompared with the relations of one individual to another, but the two\nsets of relations are not the same. A crime is an act punishable by law,\nand it is absurd therefore to speak as if the state, acting legally,\ncould commit a crime. But if theft ceased to be a crime it would be as\nmuch an offense against morality as before. Taxation to which the taxed\nhave not consented and unfair taxation cannot be regarded as theft, as\nsome suppose. Individual morality becomes mixed with national morality\nwhen those through whom the state acts act for themselves and for their\nown interests, instead of for the common good. Within a nation the state\nis above all individuals, but there is no corresponding superior power\nover nations. What remains is a general obligation upon states to observe\njustice in their dealings with one another. National morality differs\nfrom individual morality in that a nation\u2019s first duty may be said to\nbe to itself. There is no selfishness, there is only patriotism, in its\nrecognising the fact and acting upon it. The intercourse of nations can\nonly reach a full measure of development under a common moral law, which\nrecognises the rights of one nation as of equal value with the rights of\nany other.\n\nMr. Ward points out, that Mill, in his exposition of what he called\nEthology, or the Exact Science of Human Nature, repeated in all the\nissues of his \u201cLogic,\u201d remarks that Ethology must first proceed\ndeductively. The laws of the formation of character \u201care derivative\nlaws, resulting from the general laws of mind, and are to be obtained by\ndeducing them from those general laws.\u201d There was a want of clearness\nin Mill\u2019s conception of an individual. The notion of a Self proved,\non his own admission, \u201cthe real stumbling block\u201d to his psychological\ntheory. In discussing the influence of remarkable men, Mill allows that\n\u201cwhatever depends on the peculiarities of individuals, combined with the\naccidents of the positions they hold, is necessarily incapable of being\nforeseen.\u201d When we attempt to estimate the influence of circumstances\non individuals, we must often know how the circumstances appear to\n_them_,\u2014this personal equation so to say is frequently incalculable.\n\nIn the main, says Mr. Black, sin exists intimately in, or as an\ninseparable affection or potentiality of, the person as a whole, and to\ndiscourage it is to discourage the person, and tantamount, therefore,\nto discouraging his goodness as well. At this point the division of\nsin into vice and immorality becomes essential to a rational solution.\nImmorality is crime against living moral agents. Vice may be defined as\nthe spending of the forces of one\u2019s own life to the detriment of its\nmoral capabilities.\n\nMr. Francis W. Newman, who began the study of Political Economy seventy\nyears ago, when he was sixteen, gives in this article his views on the\nevils of land tenure in England.\n\nMrs. Franklin thinks \u201cthe subjective feeling of worth and dignity\u201d which\ndistinguishes the people of this country will be injured by \u201cgiving\nfees to our inferiors when they perform some service for which they are\n(or ought to be) otherwise well paid.\u201d That the matter is not \u201cabsolute\nethics\u201d is apparent from the fact that in Japan a totally different\nsentiment prevails. The editor, Prof. Josiah Royce (under the signature\nof J. R.) in commenting on Mrs. Franklin\u2019s communication after referring\nto the evils of the German custom of Trinkgeld as detailed by v. Ihering,\nsays that if it harms the manhood of our writers to \u201ctip\u201d them the\nmischief should be met by organised devices such as v. Ihering proposes,\nand not by individual action. (Philadelphia: _International Journal of\nEthics_, 1602 Chestnut Street.)\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.\n\nCONTENTS: June, 1891. No. 186.\n\n LES RESULTATS DES THEORIES CONTEMPORAINES SUR L\u2019ASSOCIATION DES\n IDEES. By _B. Bourdon_.\n\n COMMENT LA SENSATION DEVIENT IDEE. By _J. Payot_.\n\n NOTES ET DISCUSSIONS. QU\u2019EST-CE QUE LA PHYSIOLOGIE GENERALE? By\n _Durand_ (_de Gros_).\n\nCONTENTS: July, 1891. No. 187.\n\n LA NOTION DE LIMITE EN MATHEMATIQUES. By _G. Milhaud_.\n\n COUP D\u2019OEIL SUR L\u2019HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE EN RUSSIE (I). By\n _F. Lannes_.\n\n LES SOURCES DE LA PHILOSOPHIE DE L\u2019INDE. By _P. Regnaud_.\n\nM. Bourdon reviews the modes of association proposed by various\npsychologists, and the factors which intervene to give force to\nassociations. Wundt alone; among psychologists has the great merit of not\nplacing ideas and sensations in actual opposition. The laws of ideology\nare almost the same as those of physics; and the law of association ought\nto be true not only for ideas, but for sensations and for objects. M.\nBourdon\u2019s conclusion is that the theory of the association of ideas has\nhitherto been treated from a too subjective and idealistic point of view.\nHe would substitute for the theory of _association_ of idea a theory of\na _society_ of phenomena, which conception he thinks better explains the\nprocess.\n\nIn a preceding contribution to the _Revue Philosophique_ (May, 1890)\nM. Payot showed that sensation is the translation into terms of\nconsciousness of that which, considered from the objective point\nof view, is a reaction of the organism, as a whole, to an external\nimpression. Sensations are the irreducible element of the psychic life.\nThey contribute the materials which the mind modifies, combines, and\nclasses according to their relations, variable or invariable. This\nis chronologically posterior to sensation, which has an affective\norigin. The reactions corresponding to the most frequent sensations\nbecome more and more rapid until consciousness, \u201cwhich translates only\nphysiological states of a sufficient duration,\u201d has not time to appear.\nHere we have a reflex-act. In an intermediate zone where reactions take\na time sufficient for them to be conscious, the intellectual states,\nto which the abstract name of the intellectual faculty has been given,\nhave birth. Differentiation operates between sensible and intellectual\nfacts, until they seem to belong to two irreducible faculties; but the\nintellectual states are grafted on the sensible states, and although\nthe graft develops so greatly that the sensibility appears like a\nparasite, the latter is the primitive trunk and through it the graft\nexists by a kind of continued creation. Sensations are convenient\nabstractions but nothing more. A sensation never presents itself in\nthe adult consciousness without a crowd of instantaneously evoked\nrelations. There is never absolute exclusion between perception and\nsensation: these are two states which dissolve into each other, which\nhave no difference in nature, and which are separable only in gross.\nProperly speaking there are no sensations, only perceptions more or less\ncomplex. In sensation the state of mind is considered in itself without\nreference to its relations; in perception attention is paid chiefly to\nthe relations. But sensation exists only for consciousness, as it can\nnever enter directly into intellectual constructions, but only through\nthe state of remembrance. Every sensation so far as we are sensible of\nit is purely felt, and we effectuate our mental constructions not with\nsensations, but with our remembrances of sensations. But the r\u00f4le of\nsensation is still more restricted. However rapid its flight across\nconsciousness it instantaneously provokes the remembrance of numerous\nsensations of differences and resemblances with anterior sensations. It\nis an occasion for this, and nothing more. To be perceived, a sensation\nmust be followed by sensations different from itself. The mind seizes\nrelations of resemblance between sensations and resemblances between\nrelations: it classes them, the chaos unravels and organises itself.\nThe organisation has been progressive, but at all stages the procedure\nis alike; it consists in disengaging remembrances more or less masked\nby dissimilarities: this is the universal procedure of the mind and the\ncondition _sine qua non_ of thought.\n\nIn his article on _General Physiology_, M. Durand (de Gros) in criticism\nof M. Ch. Richet\u2019s article on this subject which appeared in the\nApril number of the _Revue Philosophique_, points out that Richet in\napplying the term \u201cgeneral anatomy\u201d to the anatomy of the tissues, and\n\u201cspecial anatomy\u201d to the anatomy of the organs, overlooked the fact that\n_generality_ and _speciality_ when used to express the two opposite sides\nof a science express relations of abstract, nominal extension and not\nreal extension. Thus, by general chemistry is intended the consideration\nof the higher laws governing the molecular actions of bodies, the\none on the other, whatever that may be, and the modes of composition\nwhich result therefrom for each of them. General physiology should be,\ntherefore, the philosophy of the science of the functions of life,\nthat is to say, the higher laws embracing all these various particular\nfunctions; special physiology having for its object these particular\nfunctions in what is proper to each of them and distinguishes it from\nthe others. Physiology has reference, however, to the other animals as\nwell as man, and also to plants, and hence the term general physiology\nhas been applied to the physiology common to all living beings, and\nspecial physiology to that which concerns the various animal and vegetal\nspecies taken separately. But this is in reality comparative physiology,\nand thus positive physiologists have made a false use of the term general\nphysiology, and have left the true general physiology unrecognised and\nunnamed. In conclusion, M. Durand presents his conception of \u201corganology.\u201d\n\nIn the form of a dialogue M. Milhaud meets the objections made to the\nnotion of limit in Mathematics. The question whether to have a limit,\nfor anything variable, is not synonymous with attaining a limit, is\nconsidered in connection with Zeno\u2019s problem of Achilles and the\ntortoise, the strict solution of which is, not that Achilles will\nnever overtake the tortoise, but that he will not overtake it on this\nside of a spot situated at a distance of 10/9 of a metre from the\nstarting-point, within a period equal to 10/9 of a second commencing\nat the instant of starting. To the objection that by its very nature\nthe limit cannot be attained, as where the limit and the variable\nelement which indefinitely approaches it are essentially different,\nit is replied that when a variable element has a limit, this element\nis a _quantity_ and the limit is a quantity of the same kind, quality\nbeing neglected. In the proposition: the length of the circumference is\nthe limit of the perimeters of the inscribed polygons, the limit is a\nquantity of the same kind, that of length. It is not necessary to know\nwhether the definition accords with reality. M. Milhaud then shows by\nreference to the properties of an unlimited series of inscribed polygons\nand the corresponding circumscribed polygons, that two such series of\ngeometrical lengths satisfying the required conditions can always be\nconsidered as defining a new length, superior to all the first and\ninferior to all the others. As to its existence, it can be said only\nthat a length exists only as determined, as limited; and a state of\nlength, or a particular length has a right to exist, provided that the\nproperties of quantity which condition it are not contradictory. The\nessence of mathematical space, breadth, length is only the content of\ntheir definitions. Mathematics owes its existence to the condition of\ncreating for itself a world of fictions. There is a divergence of opinion\nas to whether incommensurables should be represented by lengths or by\nnumerical symbols, but the divergence is a last echo of the endless\ndiscussions which the notions of infinity and continuity have raised\namong mathematicians.\n\nPhilosophic thought, says M. Lannes, presents, in Russia, in its past\nhistory, a very poor condition. Philosophy does not exist, unless that\nname be given to such moral precepts, or domestic recommendations as we\nfind in \u201cthe instruction\u201d of a Vladimir Monomaque or in the \u201cDomostro\u00ef.\u201d\nThe Russian mind was easily guarded against the liberties of thought,\nregarding science and philosophy with contempt and holy dread. There, as\nduring the Middle Ages in the rest of Europe, the end to attain, to which\nall others were subordinated, was the safety of the soul. It was only\nwith Peter the Great that thought took a freer flight, notwithstanding\nthe restrictions that it had still to support. The Little Russians were\nthe first to turn towards western instruction. In order to meet the\nJesuits, who appeared in Russia about the middle of the 16th century,\nwith the arms they used, scholastic philosophy was introduced into the\ncollege of Pierre Mohila, at Kief. Aristotle was taken as guide and the\nteaching was in Latin. Under Alexis Mikha\u00eflovitch, rational, natural, and\nmoral philosophy began to be taught in a formal manner at the Academy\nof Moscow. Peter the Great ordered an important place to be given to\nrhetoric and dialectics, and the mention of logic, psychology, and\nmetaphysics in the programme of the Academy. In 1755 logic, metaphysics,\nand morality entered into the teaching of philosophy at the University.\nIn the 18th century two currents of ideas manifested themselves, of\nwhich some are connected with mysticism, others with the influence of\nFrench philosophy. The former became associated, through Novikof and\nSchwartz, with free-masonry, which was regarded as a means of acquiring a\nknowledge of God, of nature, and of man, of becoming a better Christian,\na better citizen, and a better family head. Novikof and Schwartz founded\nthe \u201cSociety of the Friends of Instruction,\u201d and through their zeal\na mass of moral and religious books were published for distribution\nin places of instruction. The influence of the French \u201cphilosophers\u201d\nof the 18th century was preponderant in Russia in the second half of\nthe 18th century. Voltaire enjoyed the greatest favor, and his renown\nwas universal. Freethought penetrated the middle classes, and even\nconservative and religious men denied miracles in the course of history,\nconsidered religion as a political instrument, and attacked the ignorance\nand cupidity of the clergy. On the happening of the French revolution\nCatherine was frightened and took rigorous measures against those who\nwished to use freedom of thought.\n\nQuestions of pedagogy held a great place in the thoughts of Catherine.\nShe confided the care of pedagogic reforms to Betski, who showed that\ntrue education is that which unites the development of the body, of the\nmind, and of the heart; but the moral element ought to have the first\nplace. Alexander I. re-established philosophic liberalism and sought\nto excite interest in social, economic, and political questions. The\nuniversity of Moscow was reorganised, and one of the faculties included\ndogmatic and moral theology, theoretical and practical philosophy,\nnatural, political and popular rights. Philosophy also established itself\nin the new universities of Kharkof, Kazan, and Petersburg. But minds\nwere possessed with more living ideas and various tendencies, political,\nmoral, religious, sceptical, led to the establishment of numerous secret\nsocieties whose starting point was the masonic alliance. About 1816,\nSchr\u00f6der had introduced into the foreign lodges a spirit of cosmopolitan\nhumanity. Fessler saw in the lodges a means of moral education, the basis\nof civic education. In order to be received as a mason, it was necessary\nto pass through certain \u201cconsecrations,\u201d to obtain certain \u201cdegrees of\nknowledge.\u201d Among those \u201cconsecrated\u201d by Fessler was Sp\u00e9ranski who,\nnotwithstanding his mysticism, was imbued with the principles of the\nRevolution. On the reaction under Prince Galitzyn, the minister of\npublic instruction, science was given a mystical end, and religion was\ndeclared to be the supreme science. The sciences which could do injury\nto religion, as geology, were either discarded, or directed to be taught\naccording to the spirit of Holy Scripture. As to philosophy, the teaching\nof moral philosophy, which does not separate morality from the faith,\nwas alone allowed. The treatises of the Kantian Jacob were forbidden, as\ncontaining scandalous theories. In general, in the universities, during\nthe first year of the nineteenth century the objects of philosophic\nstudy were somewhat vague. The utility of the sciences, of education,\nof the individual characters of peoples, enthusiastic discourses on\nfree will, on the rights of reason, on the spirit and forces of nature.\nFessler and Vellanski introduced the German philosophy and principally\nthat of Schelling, which became in some sort the lever which put in\nmovement ideas on the independence and the nationality of civilisation.\nThe most ardent champion of Schelling\u2019s doctrine was Odoievski, whose\nexternal personality marks curiously the idea entertained of philosophy\nand philosophers between 1820 and 1845. A philosopher was represented as\na sort of romantic Faust, leading a kind of life different from common\nmortals. If he occupied himself with physical sciences, the philosopher\nwas regarded as the equal of a sorcerer with terrible powers. M. Lannes\nconcludes his present article with a sketch of the life and philosophy\nof Galitch, who on his return to St. Petersburg from a three years\ntour through Europe wrote a dissertation on philosophy, in which he\nexplained the development of beings by the double action of _activity_\nand _passivity_, the one being cause, the other product. In 1819 Galitch\ntaught in the University logic, psychology, and metaphysics, and later\nhe received authority to teach the history of philosophy, to which he\ngave an _eclectic_ character, in accordance with the instructions of\nhis hierarchical superiors. In his _esoteric_ teaching he initiated his\nfriends into the philosophy of Schelling. In that year he published a\n\u201cHistory of Philosophic Systems,\u201d the appearance of which was a rare\nnovelty in the Russian Scientific World. He subsequently published\nseveral other works, but the manuscript of one on the \u201cPhilosophy of\nthe History of Humanity,\u201d which cost him much labor was destroyed by\nfire. The merit of Galitch is to have wished to establish in Russia\nphilosophy _as science_. He assigned to the study of philosophy the\nwhole encyclopedia of the sciences, but true philosophic knowledge\nis the knowledge of the unity from which external phenomena flow. M.\nLannes gives an analysis of Galitch\u2019s \u201cPicture of Man,\u201d where, before M.\nRenouvier, he says of freedom, \u201cit can itself begin an entire series of\nphenomena, which are then linked together in the relations of dependence,\nthat is to say are the necessary acts of a voluntary principle.\u201d Galitch\ndeserves to occupy a small place in the general history of the philosophy\nof humanity. If there existed before him a science of the relations of\nthe soul and the body, he was at least one of the first to elaborate a\nprogramme of what is called to-day _comparative psychology_.\n\nM. Regnaud finds the sources of the philosophy of India in India itself,\nas they appear in all their simplicity and primitive character in\nthe Rig-Veda, the very ancient collection of liturgical hymns of the\nBrahmans. The whole doctrine implied by both the Vedic cult and the\ntext of the hymns is resumed in a verse of the Rig Veda. \u201cEach day the\nsame liquid rises and descends; the rains vivify the earth, the fires\nof the sacrifice vivify the sky.\u201d The libations destined to feed the\nfire of sacrifice and which consisted of inflammable liquids, such as\nthe _ghrita_ or clarified butter, were poured out each time that the\nsacrifice was celebrated into the atmosphere (or the sky) whose life\nthey maintained, in like manner as liquid and solid foods sustain the\nlife of man. The whole religious conception of the Vedic epoch consists\nthen in the idea of an endless _circulus_, of a perpetual exchange\nof the elements of life, in an immense body which is the universe,\nwhose arterial centre is the sacrifice, and the fire the motor, the\ndistributer, and so to say the brain. (Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan.)\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nREVUE DE L\u2019HYPNOTISME. April, 1891. No. 10. 5th YEAR.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n (1) ACCOUCHEMENT DANS L\u2019HYPNOTISME. By _Dr. Fraipont_ and _M.\n J. Delb\u0153uf_. (2) ACCOUCHEMENT PENDANT LE SOMMEIL HYPNOTIQUE.\n By _Dr. M. G. Kingsbury_. (3) MEMOIRE RELATIF A CERTAINES\n RADIATIONS PERQUES PAR LESSENSITIFS. By _Baron de Reichembach_.\n (4) DISCUSSIONS ET POLEMIQUE: La Nutrition dans l\u2019hypnotisme.\n By _Gilles de la Tourette_ and _H. Cathelineau_. (5) RECUEIL\n DE FAITS: Contribution \u00e0 l\u2019application de la th\u00e9rapeutique\n suggestive. By _Dr. P. Van Velsen_. Huit observations\n d\u2019accouchement sans douleur sous l\u2019influence de l\u2019hypnotisme.\n By _Dr. Marie Dobrovosky_. REVUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE.\n\nDr. Fraipont terminates his interesting memoir with the remark that\nsave under very exceptional circumstances, as when the subject is very\nsensitive or has before suffered a sort of trance, hypnotism can\nscarcely have any practical importance in accouchment. M. Delb\u0153uf refers\nin a postscript to the case of a patient described in his writings by the\ninitial J..., and states that her accouchment confirms him in his view of\nthe r\u00f4le of the brain, which he regards as a moderating and inhibiting\norgan, and consequently in the opinion expressed by him in the _Revue\nPhilosophique_ as to the essence of freedom, which he regards as having\nan arresting and not an inciting effect.\n\nMM. de la Fourette and Cathelineau confirm the conclusion drawn from\nresearches made by them for Professor Charcot, that nutrition is affected\nduring the hypnotic sleep, and therefore that hypnotism is a pathological\ncondition. (Paris: 170 Rue Saint-Antoine.)\n\n\nPHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVII. Nos. 9 and 10.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n GOETHES VERHAELTNISS ZU SPINOZA UND SEINE PHILOSOPHISCHE\n WELTANSCHAUUNG. By _G. Schneege_. I.\n\n WILHELM WUNDT\u2019S \u201cSYSTEM DER PHILOSOPHIE.\u201d By _Johannes\n Volkelt_. I.\n\n RECENSIONEN: (1) A. Fouill\u00e9e, L\u2019Avenir de la m\u00e9taphysique\n fond\u00e9e sur l\u2019exp\u00e9rience. By _C. Schaarschmidt_. (2) Th. von\n Varnb\u00fcler, Widerlegung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. By\n _E. K\u00f6nig_. (3) Bericht \u00fcber neuere Erscheinungen aus dem\n Gebiete der Geschichte der \u00c6sthetik. By _E. K\u00fchnemann_. (4)\n C. Baeumker, Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen\n Philosophie. By _P. Natorp_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nJohannes Volkelt continues his review of Wilhelm Wundt\u2019s \u201cSystem of\nPhilosophy.\u201d Prof. C. Schaarschmidt criticises Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s view of a\nfuture metaphysics as based upon experience, from the Kantian standpoint.\nDr. E. K\u00f6nig explains with sufficient strength the futility of Varnb\u00fcler\nin his bold attempt of refuting Kant\u2019s \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d and Dr.\nPaul Natorp, the editor, devotes an article to Prof. Clemens Baeumker\u2019s\nbook \u201cDas Problem der Materie in der Griechischen Philosophie,\u201d in\nwhich the author sets forth that the problem of matter is not a limited\nproblem, but the sum total of all those questions which have reference to\nthe existence of some cause of sensory phenomena which in its nature is\ndifferent from consciousness. The problems of psycho-physics and of the\ntheory of cognition are modern and were unknown to the ancients. Their\nstandpoint remained throughout that of realism. A r\u00e9sum\u00e9 of the views of\nGreek philosophers from Thales down to the New Platonists follows.\n\nThe leading article is devoted to Goethe\u2019s relation to Spinoza and his\nphilosophical world-conception.\n\nGoethe\u2019s philosophical and religious opinions are naturally of the\ngreatest interest, because Goethe, the child of nature in the highest\nsense of the word, represents a genius not such as our great contemporary\nCesare Lombroso conceives him to be, i. e. a species of the abnormal\nman and a kind of insane person, but such as genius is conceived by the\nlayman, i. e. an abnormally normal man, a man whose excellencies lie in\na rare harmony of highly developed perfections\u2014not in eccentricities.\nGoethe\u2019s eccentricities were not worse or more extended than those of\naverage people, but he had more sense, more humor, more depth, and more\nspirit. Well, Goethe as a son of man and as a type of an unusually\nperfect man was a poet, a philosopher, a scientist, an historian, an\nartist, a man of the world, and a man of practical life, all in one, and\nthe opinions of this man in the religio-philosophical field show at least\nthat they accord with man as a child of nature.\n\nGoethe\u2019s philosophical views were strongly influenced by Spinoza yet not\nso as if Spinoza had impressed his view upon Goethe. Goethe happened to\nread Spinoza\u2019s \u201cEthics\u201d while still immature in mind and felt himself\npowerfully attracted by the spirit of the book. \u201cWhat I may have read out\nof or into that work,\u201d he writes, \u201cI could give no account. Yet I found\na pacification of my passions. A great and free vista upon the sensual\nand moral world seemed to open before my eyes. That strange sentence \u2018_He\nwho loves God must not demand of God to love him in return_,\u2019 with all\nits premises and conclusions filled all my thoughts. To be unselfish in\neverything and most so in love and friendship was my highest delight, my\nmaxim, my practice, so that the bold expression of later years \u2018If I love\nthee, it is none of thy business\u2019 came right from my heart. In addition\nto this, it must be recognised that the most intimate combinations result\nfrom contraries. The all-pervading calmness of Spinoza contrasted with\nmy excited aspirations, his mathematical method was a counterpart of\nmy poetical thoughts and habits.\u201d In Spinoza\u2019s doctrine of necessity\nGoethe found comfort concerning man\u2019s dependence upon the outer world\nwhich caused him so much pain. It is probable that the famous sentence\nof the liberation from passions through a clear comprehension of them\nwas very sympathetic to Goethe, for it is a characteristic feature of\nhis poetry that they were confessions as well as liberations of all that\nmoved and disturbed him. As soon as Goethe was able to give to himself\na clear account concerning that which had affected his soul and as soon\nas he could give a poetical form to it so that it became something\nindependent and outside of him, he gained, in the sense of Spinoza\u2019s\ndoctrine of liberation from passions, the peace and liberty of his soul.\nYet Spinoza\u2019s doctrine of necessity was a metaphysical conception.\nGoethe transferred it into the domains of practical ethics, thus giving\nrise to his idea of resignation. Goethe writes in the beginning of the\nsixteenth book of \u201cWahrheit und Dichtung\u201d: \u201cOur physical as well as our\nsocial life, customs, habits, worldly wisdom, philosophy, religion, even\nmany incidental events, everything demands of us that we should resign\nourselves. So many things which most intrinsically belong to us we are\nnot allowed to develop. That of the outer world which we want as a\ncomplement of our nature is taken away and many things which are foreign\nto us and disagreeable are thrown upon us. We are deprived of everything\nthat we have with difficulty acquired, of everything that is friendly and\nbefore we fully comprehend it we find ourselves obliged _to surrender\nour very personality_, first piecemeal and finally in its entirety.\u201d\nProfessor Schneege says that Goethe\u2019s practice of resignation gave him\nsolace when he felt low-spirited concerning the limits of human willing\nand wishing and hoping, and his resignation was as a matter of principle\na total resignation. A partial resignation leads to the pessimistic\noutcry \u201cAll is vanity,\u201d yet the total resignation affords an inner peace\nand produces that \u201cair of peace,\u201d _die Friedensluft_ as Goethe calls it,\nwhich surrounds us when reading Spinoza.\n\nOne of Goethe\u2019s maxims is quite Spinozistic. Goethe says (_Max. und Refl.\nAbth._ v.): \u201cHe who declares himself to be free will feel himself at once\ndependent but he who dares to declare himself dependent, feels himself\nfree.\u201d\n\nGoethe rejected the idea of a personal and transcendent Deity which was\nurged so strongly upon him by Lavater. Rejecting Lavater\u2019s view, he says\n(_Wahrh. und Dicht._ xiv.): \u201cI assured him in accord with my Realism\nwhich is inborn as well as acquired that since it had pleased God and\nNature to make me as I am, I must remain so.\u201d The expression \u201cGod and\nNature\u201d savors strongly of Spinoza\u2019s \u201cDeus sive natura.\u201d\n\nAccording to Eckermann (_Gesp. m. G._ ii, p. 169) Holbach\u2019s _Syst\u00e9me de\nla nature_ had also made a strong impression upon Goethe. Nevertheless\nhe was dissatisfied with the spirit of French materialism. He says: \u201cHow\nempty and hollow is this sad atheistic twilight, in which the earth with\nall its forms and the heaven with all its stars disappear. Matter only is\nsaid to exist, being in motion from eternity to eternity, thus producing\nto the right and to the left without further ado all the innumerable\nphenomena of being.\u201d Goethe\u2019s view of \u201cGod and nature,\u201d did not deny the\nDeity as such, but identified both in the sense of Spinoza. In this sense\nGoethe interpreted the sentence: _Qui deum amat conari not potest, ut\nDeus ipsum contra amet\u2014si homo id conaretur, cuperet ergo ut Deus quem\namat, non esset Deus_. The latter idea, \u201cif a man wished that God should\nlove him in return, he would wish that God be not God\u201d is a corollary\nonly to the impersonal conception of Spinoza\u2019s non-anthropomorphised\nDeity. We cannot and we must not think of God as a human being who like\na monarch makes favorites of those who are faithful not so much to the\ndivine laws of ethics but to God personally.\n\nGoethe agreed in his views of Spinoza with Herder, who in a letter\nto Jacobi writes: \u201cThe \u03c0\u03c1\u1f7c\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe6\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2, my dear Jacobi, in all\nanti-spinozistic systems is that God is supposed to be the great _ens\nentium_, the cause of all phenomena, a cypher, an abstract idea which we\nhave formulated. However, that is not so according to Spinoza; God is to\nhim the most real and active unity which says to itself \u2018I am that I am,\nand shall be in all the changes of my phenomena that which I shall be.\u2019\nWhat you mean, my dear fellows, by an existence outside of the world,\nI do not understand. If God does not exist in the world, and indeed,\neverywhere unlimited in his totality and entirety, he does not exist at\nall. The limitation of personality does not belong to the infinite being,\nsince a person originates with us by limitation as a kind of _modus_ or\nas an aggregate of beings whose activity is endowed with the illusion of\nunity.\u201d A modification of Spinoza\u2019s view consists in the recognition of\nthe creative activity which Herder attributes to God. In another letter\nto Jacobi, Herder writes: \u201cYou wish God in the shape of man like a friend\nwho thinks of you. Consider that in that case he must think humanly of\nyou. If he is partial to you he will be partial against others. Explain\nto me why you need him to be human. He speaks to you, he affects you\nthrough all noble men who are his organs and most so through his organ\nof organs, the core of his spiritual creation, his only begotten. I must\nconfess that this philosophy makes me exceedingly happy. Goethe has read\nSpinoza since your departure and it is a test case to me that he has\nconceived him exactly as I do.\u201d\n\nHerder was a clergyman and he held the highest position of his church,\nbeing Superintendent General. Would the protestant state churches of\nto-day either in England or in Germany have room for a man like Herder?\n\nGoethe concurred with Herder, that the idea of an extramundane Deity has\nno sense, an outside God is powerless and an immanent God alone is a\nreality. He puts in the mouth of Faust the following lines:\n\n \u201cThe God that in my breast is owned\n Can deeply stir the inner sources.\n The God above my powers enthroned\n He cannot change external forces.\u201d\n\n _Faust I, Scene 4, Tr. Bayard Taylor._\n\nSpinoza makes a difference between _natura naturans_ and _natura\nnaturata_. A similar contrast is made by Goethe in the following lines\nwhich are found among the _Zahme Xenien_, Part vii.\n\n \u201cLife dwells in each celestial body\n And on its self-selected roads\n It likes to travel with the others.\n There are in our earth\u2019s deep abodes\n The forces, shrouded now in night\n And rising up again to light\n If with eternal repetition\n Some circles infinitely roam,\n If thousand stones in strong construction\n Together build life\u2019s glorious dome,\n Then through all things is pleasure thrilling,\n The great, the little, both are blessed,\n _Yet all this yearning, all this striving_\n _In God the Lord, is eternal rest_.\u201d[26]\n\nAccording to Schneege, Goethe was an agnostic. Faust says:\n\n \u201cMysterious even in open day\n Nature retains her veil, despite our clamors.\n That which she doth not willingly display,\n Cannot be wrenched from her with levers, screws and hammers.\u201d\n\n _I, 1. Tr. Bayard Taylor._\n\nThis quotation however expresses Faust\u2019s despair and not Goethe\u2019s\nphilosophical view. It is true that Goethe has made a few utterances\nwhich savor of agnosticism, but most of them are expressive of the idea\nthat we can never be through with our wisdom; every new solution proposes\nnew problems.\n\n \u201c_Will mich jedoch des Worts nicht sch\u00e4men:_\n _Wir tasten ewig an Problemen._\u201d\n\n _Zahme Xenien_, vii.\n\n [Will not be ashamed of the confession:\n We are dealing with problems without intercession.]\n\nHow little Goethe was in accord with the view of modern agnosticism\nor phenomenalism, that we know the outside of nature only and not her\ninside, can be learned from his opposition to Haller\u2019s famous lines:\n\n \u201cNature\u2019s Within from mortal mind\n Must ever lie concealed.\n Thrice blessed e\u2019en he, to whom she has\n Her outer shell revealed.\u201d\n\nIn answer to the agnostic sentiment of the famous naturalist, Goethe\nanswered with the following verses (quoted in the translation given in\n\u201cFundamental Problems,\u201d p. 142):\n\n \u201c_Nature\u2019s \u2018within\u2019 from mortal mind_\u201d\n Philistine, sayest thou,\n \u201c_Must ever lie concealed?_\u201d\n To me, my friend, and to my kind\n Repeat this not. We trow\n Where\u2019er we are that we\n Within must always be.\n\n \u201c_Thrice blessed e\u2019en he to whom she has_\n _Her outer shell revealed?_\u201d\n This saying sixty years I heard\n Repeated o\u2019er and o\u2019er,\n And in my soul I cursed the word,\n Yet secretly I swore.\n Some thousand thousand times or more\n Unto myself I witness bore:\n Gladly gives Nature all her store,\n She knows not kernel, knows not shell,\n For she is all in one.\n But thou,\n Examine thou thine own self well\n whether thou art kernel or art shell.\n\nWe ought to bear in mind that Goethe was no philosopher in the strict\nsense of the word and did not attempt to have a system that should\nbe free from contradictions. So we read in one place: \u201cMan is not\nborn to solve the problem of the world, but to seek for the limit\nof the incomprehensible and then to remain within the limits of the\ncomprehensible,\u201d and in another place \u201cMan must hold fast to the belief\nthat what seems incomprehensible is comprehensible, for otherwise he\nwould cease to investigate.\u201d\n\nThe idea of evolution was the basis of Goethe\u2019s idea of immortality. Here\nalso he remains in accord with Herder who had proposed in his \u201cIdeas for\na Philosophy of the History of Mankind\u201d his views of the development\nof beings by degrees. Goethe wrote from Rome (See \u201cHerder\u2019s Nachlass,\u201d\ned. D\u00fcntzer, Frankfort, 1756, i, p. 17.): \u201cHow much I enjoy Herder\u2019s\n\u2018Ideas,\u2019 I can scarcely express. Since I expect no Messiah, this [viz.\nthe prospect of further evolution] is to me the dearest Gospel.\u201d\n\nGoethe\u2019s idea of the soul is not clearly worked out in its philosophical\naspect. He speaks of souls as of monads and believes in a migration\nof the soul. \u201cI am sure,\u201d Goethe said to Falk, \u201cI have been here some\nthousand times and expect to come again some thousand times.\u201d\n\nGoethe was very decided in practical and ethical respects. Goethe\ndeviated from Spinoza by introducing a strong trait of individualism into\nSpinoza\u2019s cosmism.\n\n \u201c_Zweck sein selbst ist jegliches Thier._\u201d[27]\n\n [Every creature has its purpose in itself.]\n\nAnd man is the last product of constantly higher evolving Nature\u2014_das\nletzte Product der sich immer steigernden Natur_. Nature\u2019s intention\naccording to Goethe\u2019s view is to produce constantly more perfect\ncreatures. He says: \u201cImagine Nature standing as a gamester before the\nroulette table constantly shouting _au double_. With all she has won\nthrough all the phases of her activity she continues to play on into\ninfinity. Stone, plant, animal, everything is risked in such hazarding\nventures again and again, and who can tell whether man himself is not but\na venture for a higher aim.\u201d Death was to Goethe no destruction but a\ndissolution. A destruction or annihilation appeared as an impossibility\nto him. And his idea of immortality was not one of existence after\ndeath but of a continued activity. In the year 1825 Goethe declared to\nChancellor von M\u00fcller (\u201cGespr\u00e4che m.d. Kanzler von M\u00fcller,\u201d p. 99), that\nhe should not know what to do with an immortality in which he would not\nfind new tasks to do and new difficulties to conquer. (Heidelberg: Georg\nWeiss.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. II.\nNo. 4.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER KOMPLEXIONEN UND RELATIONEN. By _E.\n Meinong_.\n\n WUNDT\u2019S ANTIKRITIK. By _C. Stumpf_.\n\n UEBER DIE UNTERSCHIEDSEMPFINDLICHKEIT FUER KLEINE ZEITGROESSEN.\n Eine vorl\u00e4ufige Mitteilung. By _F. Schumann_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nProfessor A. Meinong discusses Ch. v. Ehrenfels\u2019s article \u201cUeber\nGestaltqualit\u00e4ten\u201d[28] adding the results of his own investigations\nsuggested to him by this essay. Ehrenfels starts from Professor Mach\u2019s\nconsideration of figure and melody (see Mach\u2019s _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Analyse der\nEmpfindungen_) and proposes the question, What are figure and melody\nin themselves? Are they merely a combination of elements or are they\nsomething in contradistinction to their elements, something entirely\nnew? Melodies and figures, says Ehrenfels, can be so transposed that\nnot any one of their original elements will remain. Thus the similarity\nof figures in space as well as of tones is something different from the\nsimilarity of their elements; they must be something different than\ntheir mere sum. This is \u201cthe figure-quality\u201d or _Gestaltsqualit\u00e4t_, and\nEhrenfels distinguishes between two kinds, (1) those of time (2) those\nof space, which he calls (1) _Tongestalten_ and (2) _Raumgestalten_. In\naddition to these are discussed the figure-qualities of sensations and\nof inner apperception. Ehrenfels proposes the psychological question\nwhether these figure-qualities are immediately given together with\ntheir foundations or whether they must be considered as the product of\na special activity, and he decides in favor of the former possibility.\nProfessor Meinong whose work has been in similar lines, refers to his\narticle \u201cPhantasievorstellung und Phantasie\u201d[29] and criticises the term\n\u201cfigure-quality,\u201d proposing in its stead the words _fundierend_ and\n_fundiert_, using the German term _Fundament_ as a correlative expression\nof \u201crelation.\u201d There is no relation without complexity and psychological\nexperience has actually to deal with complex facts only. Melody and\nfigure are names for the totality of the foundations including their\n\u201cfounded\u201d contents.\n\nIt may be that we are unduly prejudiced in favor of our own terminology,\nbut it seems to us that the expression \u201cform\u201d will prove to be the most\nappropriate word. Form is neither quality nor quantity, but form can\nproduce qualities. Let the same qualities, say of chemical elements,\ncombine in different forms, and we shall obtain substances with different\nqualities. Figure and melody are special kinds of form. Forms consist\nin and originate through combination, and the unity produced through a\nspecial form-combination is actually something new, as much so as if\nit were a special-creation act. This wonderful power of form makes the\nstudy of form all-important in all branches of science. A neglect of the\nstudy of form will lead either to materialism when matter and motion are\nconceived as the only quality-producing factors, or to agnosticism as\nsoon as a deeper inquiry proves that matter and motion are not sufficient\nto explain the most essential properties of the objects of investigation.\nWe cannot judge from the present article how much Ehrenfels and Meinong\nare in sympathy with our standpoint, but we can see that their efforts\nare in the same direction.\n\nThe second article is a rejoinder by Prof. C. Stumpf of Munich to Prof.\nW. Wundt\u2019s reply to his critic. Professor Stumpf complains of Wundt that\nhe ignored the points raised in his criticism and that his \u201cAntikritik\u201d\nconsisted only of \u201ca chain of distortions and insinuations.\u201d\n\nF. Schumann publishes his results regarding sensibility for the\ndifference between smallest quantities of time. He employed a chronograph\nmodified in two respects from Wundt\u2019s chronograph. First he replaced\nthe expensive chronometer by a treading-wheel and introduced Pfeil\u2019s\ntime-marker, which, as he thinks, is handier as well as more precise\nthan Wundt\u2019s time-marker. Schumann\u2019s results agree with the results of\nProfessor Mach showing a maximum of 0.3-0.4 seconds, the relation of the\nperceptible difference to the normal time being in different persons only\n0.022. (Hamburg and Leipsic: L. Voss.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nPHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH. Vol. IV. No. 3.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n ENTHAELT DIE CHEMISCH-PHYSIKALISCHE ATOMTHEORIE WIDERSPRUECHE?\n By _S. J. Linsmeier_.\n\n NOCH EINMAL ZU PLATON\u2019S TIMAEUS p. 51 E-p. 52 B. By _Clemens\n Baeumker_.\n\n DAS GESETZ VON DER ERHALTUNG DES LEBENS. (Zusatz der\n Redaction.) By _W. Frye_.\n\n DIE LOGISCHEN GAENGE DES DENKENS. By _Dr. G. Grupp_.\n\n W. WUNDT\u2019S SYSTEM DER PHILOSOPHIE. By _C. Gutberlet_.\n\n RECENSIONEN UND REFERATE.\n\nThe publishers and editors of _The Monist_ are not Roman Catholics and\nwe suppose that the majority of our readers are not either. But all the\nmore it appears to us necessary to state as a matter of justice that the\nRoman Catholic publications (i. e. those which avowedly and confessedly\nrepresent Roman Catholic thought) are far superior to their analogous\nProtestant contemporaries. The latter are debating their particular\nsectarianisms and do not seem to be interested in the progress of their\ntimes. They do not heed the discoveries of science or the views of\nphilosophers, they live in a world of their own. It is different with\nRoman Catholics. The present magazine proves that they have thinkers\namong them who keep abreast of the time. It is true that there is more\ndiscipline in the camp of Roman Catholics which shuts their champions\nout from free enquiry in a certain direction concerning some fundamental\ntenets, but with all this discipline goes along a broad-mindedness in\nattacking the different problems of modern science and philosophy and\nbringing them into harmony with the Roman Catholic faith.\n\nThe _Philosophisches Jahrbuch_ is published by the _G\u00f6rres-Gesellschaft_\nand edited by Dr. Const. Gutberlet. Jacob Joseph G\u00f6rres is the well-known\nchampion of the Catholic Church (1776-1848)\u2014a restless spirit who began\nhis public career as an enthusiastic defender of the French Revolution\nfor the propagation of which he published a fanatical journal _Das rothe\nBlatt_. With the rise of Napoleon he despaired of the cause of liberty,\nbut he took courage again in the war of independence (1813-1815). In his\njournal _Der Rheinische Merkur_ he denounced bitterly those Germans who\nstill held to the French; he recommended his countrymen to have more love\nfor their language, customs, and traditions and exhorted the princes to\nstand united against the common foe and re-institute the empire. The\nwar over he was persecuted by the Prussian government on account of his\nrenewed interests in revolutionary affairs (he had published in 1820 a\npamphlet \u201cGermany and the Revolution\u201d) and showing a decided inclination\nto mysticism (\u201cEmanuel Schwedenborg, his Visions and his Relation to\nthe Church,\u201d 1827) he joined the Ultramontane party in the conviction\nthat his ideals could be realised in the Roman Catholic Church. The rest\nof his life he remained faithful to Rome and was the most active, the\nmost vigorous, and also the ablest defender of Roman Catholic views and\ninterests. The present magazine is a Quarterly conducted with scholarship\nand tact, although as a matter of course not without that prejudice\nwhich necessarily results from the principle of giving all thoughts into\ncaptivity under a special and foredetermined faith. The last volume (vol.\niii) is rich in interesting articles. Prof. Dr. Hayd, strange enough,\ndefends the liberty of investigating the authority of faith, which the\neditor, however, without rejecting the idea off-hand considers as bold\n(_gewagt_). There are articles on the freedom of will, on the infinite\nnumber of possibilities, mongolian cosmology, Pascal\u2019s position toward\nscepticism, analogies between cognition of God and cognition of nature\nwith special reference to Kant\u2019s criticism of the evidences of the\nexistence of God. The present number of vol. iv contains an article on\nthe chemico-physical theory of atoms. The question is proposed whether or\nnot this theory contains contradictions. The author starts from Dalton\u2019s\nDefinition, whom he regards together with Wallaston as the founder of\nmodern atomism. The four weightiest objections are considered, but\nthe author arrives at the conclusion that all of them are based upon\nmisconceptions. He sums up: \u201cChemists and Physicists do not repudiate\neyes and senses when proposing and defending the atomistic theory. On\nthe contrary they use for their view and build it upon an exceedingly\nricher material of observation than is employed by their antagonists....\nThis denial of the validity of the most important objections, however,\ndoes not imply that the atomistic theory is without difficulties, gaps,\nunexplained details, etc. It is not as yet so certain a fact as for\ninstance the heliocentric world-conception. It is an hypothesis still and\nwill have to remain such for quite a long time. Yet we can confidently\nassert that the difficulties are by far less than those offered to\nthe acceptance of the Copernican hypothesis at the time of the first\ncondemnation of Galileo (1616) which were solved afterward by Galileo in\nthe year 1632. We have further to state that the atomistic theory has\nbeen developed more and more since Dalton, the number and the importance\nof the explanations offered in it have constantly increased.\u201d\n\nDr. Frye of Jena discusses Preyer\u2019s latest view of \u201cThe Self-Gubernation\nof Life\u2014_Die Selbststeuerung des Lebens_\u201d which appeared in a recent\nnumber of the _Naturwissenschaftliche Wochenschrift_ (Berlin). Preyer\nconsiders his newly discovered law as a corollary to the conservation\nof matter and energy and maintains that the total amount of life in the\nworld is as much constant as are matter and energy. Living mass (_Mz_)\nplus inanimate mass (_Mn_) are constant (_C_); _Mz_ + _Mn_ = _C_. So\nfar scientists will agree, but Preyer adds that each separate item is\nconstant for itself. He declares that \u201cthe total amount of protoplasm\nin the world remains unchanged in quantity.\u201d It is hardly probable that\nPreyer\u2019s view will be adopted by science.\n\nDr. Grupp discusses the logical paths of thought, and the editor,\nProfessor Dr. Gutberlet explains and criticises Wundt\u2019s System of\nPhilosophy.\n\nOne of the most valuable features for Catholic readers must be considered\nthe book reviews. Here the thoughts of the most advanced thinkers are as\nit were digested for the Catholic world. The material is carefully sifted\nbut the exposition of heretic opinions is not evaded. The criticisms\nfrom the pen of Dr. Gutberlet are often trenchant and should not be left\nunheeded by the adversaries of the Church. (Fulda: Verlag der Fuldaer\nAktien-Druckerei.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nRIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA. July and August, 1891.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n LA SCIENZA DELL\u2019EDUCAZIONE NELLE SCUOLE E NELLE RIVISTE\n ITALIANE. By _F. Cicchitti-Suriani_.\n\n LA FILOSOFIA DI EMPEDOCLE. By _S. Ferrari_.\n\n SCIENZE FILOSOFICHE E SOCIALI: RELAZIONE SUL CONCORSO AI PREMII\n MINISTERIALI. By _A. Chiappelli_.\n\n ALCUNE CONSIDERAZIONI SULL\u2019ECLETTISMO. By _L. Ferri_.\n\n BIBLIOGRAFIA, ETC.\n\n_The Science of Education in Italian Schools and in Italian Reviews._\nEvery nation is said to possess a peculiar physiognomy of its own,\nthrough which it is distinguished from every other nation; and\nconsequently any nation will adopt a system of education that is best\nsuited to its own national genius, to its racial, religious, and\nhistorical traditions. This may be true in a purely practical sense; but\non the other hand, education, theoretically, as science or pedagogics,\npasses the narrow limits of any state or form of government, and ought\nto be ruled by principles and general laws common to the entire human\nfamily. Historically, ever since the 16th century, the educational\nmovements in Italy have been directly called forth by the Catholic\nrevival and reaction during and immediately following the period of the\nrenaissance. Such was the origin of the _Filippini_, _Ignorantelli_,\n_Barnabiti_, _Ignaziani_, _Calasanziadi_, _Somaschi_, and of many other\nreligious teaching-bodies that have made Italy until recently a bustling\narena of ecclesiastical educational systems.\n\n_The Philosophy of Empedocles._ This first instalment of Signor Ferrari\u2019s\nstudies deals with the cosmological ideas of the great Agrigentine\npoet-philosophers. From the formation of the first elements to the\nhighest functions of the human soul throughout, we perceive that\neverything is governed by the same laws, and that which is best, all\nhappiness in fact, is only found in unity and harmony, evil and pain in\ndisagreement and in separation. The law of evolution, in the modern sense\nof the word, prevails everywhere in the physical system of Empedocles.\nYet his philosophy did not exclusively consist in mechanical evolution.\nTo his cosmological doctrines were added moral and religious tenets,\nwhich, however, are not evolved continuously with the former. (Rome.\nTipografia delle Terme Diocleziane di G. Balbi\u2014160 Via Cavour, 162.)\n\n \u03b3\u03bd\u03bb\u03bd.\n\n\nVOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII. Vol. II. No. 4. May, 1891.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n ETHICS OF LIFE AND OF THE FREE IDEAL. By _K. Ventzel_. (In\n this article the writer explains and criticises the well-known\n ethical theories of the late French thinker M. Guyau.)\n\n THE PESSIMIST THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE: CRITICISM, POSITIVISM. By\n _E. de Roberti_.\n\n RELIGIOUS METAPHYSICS OF THE MOSLEM ORIENT. (Conclusion.) By\n _S. Umanetz_.\n\n LETTERS ON COUNT TOLSTO\u00cf\u2019S BOOK. \u201cOn Life.\u201d (Conclusion.) By\n _A. Kozloff_.\n\n (The writer concludes his letters to Mr. N. N. with remarks\n to the effect that count Tolsto\u00ef\u2019s philosophy in all its\n aspects and phases is manifestly characterized by a principle\n of _dualism_. In the development of this general principle\n through the different phases of his system and in his theory of\n knowledge this dualism might assume the name of rationalism,\n in metaphysics, that of idealism, and in ethics the name of\n ascetical, quietistic eudemonism.\n\n ON DETERMINISM IN CONNECTION WITH MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY.\n By _N. Shishkin_. Lecture delivered before the Moscow\n Psychological Society. February, 1891.\n\n THE DOMAIN AND LIMITS OF SUGGESTION. By _N. Bajenoff_. Lecture\n delivered at the annual session of the Moscow Psychological\n Society. January, 1891.\n\n ANENT THE FICTIONS OF PROFESSED CHRISTIANITY. By _Vladimir\n Solovieff_.\n\n (This article has appeared in an English translation in _The\n Open Court_, Nos. 206 and 208, under the title \u201cChristianity:\n Its Spirit and its Errors.\u201d It is a remarkable contribution\n to the literature of to-day. Professor Nicolas von Grote of\n Moscow writes about its author: \u201cVladimir Solovieff is at\n present, besides the Count Tolsto\u00ef, our most eminent thinker;\n he is a distinguished philosopher as well as theologian....\n You Americans should be familiar with his works on religious\n and ecclesiastical \u2018questions\u2019.\u201d Vladimir Solovieff is the\n author of the following works: \u201cThe Religious Foundations of\n Life,\u201d \u201cThe Dogmatic Development of the Church,\u201d \u201cJudaism and\n the Christian Question.\u201d (These titles are translated from the\n Russian.) Other writings of his are \u201cL\u2019id\u00e9e russe,\u201d \u201cLa Russie\n et l\u2019\u00e9glise universelle,\u201d \u201cGeschichte der Theokratie.\u201d)\n\n SPECIAL DEPARTMENT. (1) Hegel\u2019s Ontology. A Posthumous\n Dissertation. By _N. P. H. Platonoff_. (2) The Influence of\n fatigue upon the intuition of special relations. By _Nik.\n Mar\u00fcn_. (3) Fundamental moments in the evolution of the new\n philosophy. Main tendencies of the new philosophy. Empiricism\n and Naturalism. Bacon and Hobbes. By _N. Grote_. (Moscow.)\n\n \u03b3\u03bd\u03bb\u03bd.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[26] Specially translated for _The Monist_.\n\n[27] _Metamorphose der Thiere._\n\n[28] _Vierteljahrsschr. f. wissensch. Phil._ 1890. 3, p. 249-292.\n\n[29] _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Phil. n. philos. Kritik._ Vol. 95, p. 173. 1889.\n\n\n\n\n VOL. II. JANUARY, 1892. NO. 2.\n\n THE MONIST.\n\n\n\n\nMENTAL EVOLUTION.\n\nAN OLD SPECULATION IN A NEW LIGHT.\n\n\nThe theory of organic evolution, now generally accepted, needs to\nbe supplemented by a theory of mental evolution. On a superficial\nexamination of the matter the necessity for such a supplementary theory\ndoes not perhaps strike one as obvious, the mental seeming naturally to\narise out of the organic and to be part of one continuous development.\nBut closer investigation and a more rigid and exact treatment bring to\nlight certain important and peculiar features, and disclose the necessity\nof some such hypothesis as it is my purpose to set forth briefly in the\nfollowing pages.\n\nBy organic evolution I mean the natural development, whether by\n\u201cselection\u201d alone or by this in co-operation with other natural\nprocesses, of the organisms which live upon the surface of this earth;\nand by mental evolution I mean the natural development of the mental\nfaculties in at least the higher animals among these organisms. Now with\nregard to organic evolution there is no common and general agreement\nin respect of the first origin of primitive life on the earth. Some\nevolutionists believe that the living was somewhen, somehow, and\nsomewhere evolved from the not-living. Others do not feel justified in\nholding this view, and deem it wiser to restrict their speculations as\nto natural genesis within the limits of the organic. So too at the other\nend of the developmental curve; there is no common and general agreement\nas to the evolution of the mental faculties or spiritual being of man.\nSome evolutionists believe that both in body and in mind, man is the\nproduct of natural development; others do not feel justified in holding\nthis view, and retain unshaken the conviction that man in his spiritual\nessence is no part nor product of the common elements of nature. Seeing\nthen that on either side there is want of agreement, on the one hand as\nto the origin of life, on the other as to the origin of man, I shall deal\nfor the most part with that large area concerning which there is a more\nunanimous consensus of opinion, and in the main confine my speculations\nwithin the field of mental evolution in animals, ranging, say, from the\nam\u0153ba to the dog.\n\nFew will be found to deny or even to question the fact that our dumb\ncompanions and four-footed friends have mental faculties which enable\nthem accurately to adjust their actions to the varied circumstances\nin the midst of which their lives are passed. Even if we see cause\nto hesitate, as I myself hesitate, before we ascribe to them\nself-consciousness and reason, in the narrower sense in which this word\nis used; still we must acknowledge that their instincts are powerful,\ntheir intelligence wonderfully keen and active; and that they are capable\nof strong emotional feeling both of affection and of antipathy. Should\nwe so welcome them as our companions and friends if we regarded them as\nunconscious, insentient automata? But when we turn to the other end of\nthe scale of life, to the am\u0153ba and all the myriad minutiae that swarm\nin ponds and stagnant pools, we are wont to speak with less confidence.\nTheir consciousness, if so we can call it, is of so simple an order,\ntheir sentience of so low a grade, that we can hardly with any accuracy\nuse the phrase \u201cmental faculties\u201d with reference to organisms so lowly.\nWe feel uncertain whether in their case unconscious automatism does not\nafter all pretty accurately express the facts. At any rate it would\ntrouble us little or not at all if some one proved their automatism\nto-morrow. And yet, on the theory of evolution, out of such lowly\nbeginnings have sprung the sagacity and affectionate devotion of the\ndog. But if the am\u0153ba and his tribe are insentient automata, at what\nstage of the development did consciousness creep in? And whence came\nit? Or put what is fundamentally the same question in another way. In\nthe common course of generation the dog is developed from a minute\negg-cell, one hundredth of an inch or less in diameter, with which a yet\nmore minute sperm has entered into fertile union. Supplied with shelter,\nwarmth, and nutriment by that maternal self-sacrifice which is a deeply\nsignificant fact of organic progress, this little speck of living stuff\npasses, by a process strictly continuous, though profoundly modified by\nthe catastrophe of birth, into the dog with its wealth of intelligence\nand affection. It is surely impossible without extravagance to speak of\nthe fertilised ovum as conscious. Where then in the continuous process\nof development does consciousness come in? How, and whence? We are not\nnowadays to be put off with the ambiguous assertion that consciousness\nand intelligence are \u201cpotentially\u201d present in the germ. We ask: What is\n_actually_ present therein as the basis of this potentiality? Or are we\ntold that consciousness dawns at or shortly after the catastrophe of\nbirth? Then again we ask: Whence comes this dawning consciousness, and\nby what means does it become associated with the puppy\u2019s brain? In yet\nanother form does a question of like general implication suggest itself.\nGranted that in the ovum there is present something which we may call the\ngerm of consciousness somehow associated with the protoplasmic material\nof which that ovum is constituted. How comes it that, in the adult dog,\nconsciousness is associated with the brain? Why is the association of\nconsciousness concentrated, so to speak, in this one tissue of the\nmany which arise during the differentiation of development? That the\nassociation is so concentrated or specialised is now generally admitted\nto be the fact. We speak indeed of the skin, the palate, the nose, the\neye, the ear, as each in its kind sensitive. But none the less we believe\nthat the seat of consciousness is the brain or some part of it. Only\nwhen the nerves running inwards from skin, palate, nose, eye, or ear,\nhave conveyed their appropriate stimuli to the brain, does that organ\ntingle with the accompaniment of consciousness. There and there only\ndoes consciousness \u201cemerge\u201d; not in peripheral sense-organ or ingoing\nnerve. But why? How comes it that there is this peculiar association of\nconsciousness with the functioning of a particular organ?\n\nPerhaps we are told that consciousness is the special product of\nbrain-tissue. But let us note that the word \u201cproduct\u201d is here used in\nan unwonted sense. We are not likely, it is to be hoped, to fall into\nthe crude and demonstrably false materialism expressed in the formula,\n\u201cas the liver secretes bile, so does the brain secrete consciousness.\u201d\nConsciousness being immaterial, the second and fourth terms are\nincommensurable, and the formula is sheer nonsense. Nor are we likely\n(though here there is greater danger) to fall into the more subtle error\nof regarding consciousness as a mode of energy. \u201cGranted,\u201d says Professor\nTyndall, \u201cthat a definite thought and a definite molecular action of the\nbrain occur simultaneously; we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor\napparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass by\na process of reasoning from the one to the other: the chasm between the\ntwo classes of phenomena would still remain intellectually impassable.\u201d\nConsciousness is something _sui generis_. It is neither matter nor\nenergy. It may accompany the transformations of energy in the dog\u2019s\nbrain; but to the category of these transformations of energy it does\nnot, and, for any clear thinker, can not belong. And if we are told that\nthe word \u201cproduct\u201d is used in the sense implied by Professor Huxley when\nhe speaks of phenomena of consciousness being \u201ccalled into existence\u201d by\nphysical processes; then we must again ask whence they are called into\nexistence. We do not now speak of matter or energy being called into\nexistence from a shadowy nowhere. When a cloud is called into existence\non a mountain peak we know that the material particles have only assumed\na new form. When the electrical current is called into existence or\ngenerated as we phrase it, we know that we are dealing with one of the\nmany transformations of energy. And when phenomena of consciousness\nare said to be called into existence, we have a right to ask: Do you\nmean, by this phrase, creation _ex nihilo_? Or do you mean, origin by\ntransformation? And if the latter, transformation of what?\n\nHaving thus opened up these several questions, all of like implication,\nlet us now endeavor to set forth the answer which seems most\nphilosophical and most closely in accordance with scientific analogies.\nAnd to this end let us consider the living dog. His frame is pulsating\nwith life and restless activity, and somehow associated with the\ntransformations of energy in that brain of his there is consciousness\u2014or\nwhat in the dog is the analogue of that consciousness with which\nalone I can claim any acquaintance at first hand, my own. Were his\nskin and the walls of his skull as transparent as glass; did the\nmolecular vibrations of his brain lie open to the keenest scrutiny of\nthe physical investigator; could we trace in detail all the varied and\norderly transformations of energy of which that brain is the theatre;\nthe accompanying consciousness would still be beyond our reach. _We_\nmight follow the changes of energy; he alone would feel the states of\nconsciousness. But suppose that the dog dies. His body lies before us\nstiff with the _rigor mortis_. If we had weighed it previous to death,\nand if we were to weigh it again after death, the scales would give\nus no information of the departure of anything material. All signs of\nconsciousness, however, are gone. And could we see through skin and skull\ninto the brain, which during life was the theatre of so complex and\norderly a sequence of transformations of energy, we should find that it\nwas still and motionless. It is true that we cannot actually do this. But\nwe know that, whereas, during life, the functional action of the brain\ngives rise to certain material products, at death the production of these\nsubstances ceases. We are therefore justified in saying that, omitting\nminor qualifications, the orderly transformations of energy in the brain\nand the concomitant consciousness cease together at death. Closely\nassociated during life, varying together in health and sickness, ceasing\ntogether at death, what is the nature of their connection?\n\nOn the hypothesis of scientific monism it is believed that they are\ndifferent aspects of the same phenomena: that what objectively to the\nphysical investigator are transformations of energy in the brain, are\nsubjectively to the dog states of consciousness? Let us look into this\nhypothesis. Let us see whither it will lead us; and if it will in any way\nhelp us over some of our difficulties. But first let us pay a moment\u2019s\nattention to the impatient exclamation which some may feel inclined to\ninterpose, that this assumption of the ultimate identity of brain-energy\nand consciousness, the two being respectively the objective and\nsubjective aspects of the same occurrences, does not in the least do away\nwith the mystery of the matter. That the same two occurrences should have\ndifferent aspects, objective and subjective, is, it will be said, just\nas mysterious as that two separate existences energy and consciousness\nshould be associated together. Of course it is. I should be shallow and\npretentious indeed if my object were by any _hocus pocus_ to attempt to\nhide the so-called mystery. _All_ ultimate facts are mysterious. The\nfall of a stone to the ground is to-day as mysterious as it was in the\ndays before Newton; the phenomena of life, as mysterious as in the days\nbefore Darwin. Our advances in science and in thought may do away with\nminor mysteries, but they leave the great ultimate facts of nature as\nmysterious as before. The end of our explanations is always to bring us\nface to face with the inexplicable. Not, therefore, in any hope of doing\naway with an ultimate mystery do I suggest that we look into and follow\nout some implications of this so called identity hypothesis.\n\nLet us regard the matter from the objective aspect first, from the side\nto which the occurrences present themselves as transformations of energy.\nThe state of consciousness being _ex hypothesi_ accompanied or \u201ccalled\ninto existence\u201d by certain complex and orderly molecular vibrations in\nthe brain or some part thereof, we have to note that from the physical\npoint of view these molecular vibrations constitute an exceeding complex\nand orderly mode of energy. It is upon this energy that we must fix our\nattention; the material structure of the brain being what we may call\nthe vehicle of its manifestation. I am anxious that the reader should\ncarefully follow me here. We are too apt to regard the _structure_ as\nthe essential thing on which to concentrate our mental gaze, partly no\ndoubt because, through the invaluable labors of microscopists, we know\nso much that is definite about this structure. But a more penetrating\ninsight enables us to see that the structure is merely the necessary\nbasis of what is the really important thing\u2014the manifestation of\nenergy. The material structure of a steam-engine is of importance. But\nwhy? Because it is the vehicle for the performance of work. That is the\nreally essential part of the business. In like manner nerve-structure\nis of importance. But why? Because it is the vehicle for what Professor\nHuxley happily termed the neurosis, the complex and orderly manifestation\nof energy. The essential importance of looking at the _going_ machine,\nat the performance of work, at the energy of the matter in motion, not\nmerely the material structure that is moved\u2014the essential importance, I\nsay, of fixing our attention on this, being fairly grasped, we may now\nproceed to enquire from what the complex and orderly vibrations of the\ndog\u2019s brain have been evolved. In the fertilised ovum from which the dog\nwas developed, (and the same is true of the am\u0153boid ancestor from which,\nhypothetically, the race of dogs has been evolved,) there is certainly\nnothing approaching the orderly complexity of these molecular vibrations.\nBut there are simpler organic modes of motion from which these complex\nmolecular vibrations have arisen by a continuous process of development.\nIt is from these simpler modes of energy in the simpler organic substance\nof the ovum that the more complex modes of energy which characterise\nthe workings of the dog\u2019s brain have been evolved. In the development\nof the ovum into the embryo, and thence into the puppy and the dog, we\nmay trace step by step all the stages of the evolution of those material\nstructures which are the vehicles of these special manifestations of\norganic energy. We may watch the further and further differentiation of\nthe nervous tissue, and the fashioning of the brain and its parts. It is\ntrue that we cannot indicate the exact moment when, in the increasing\ncomplexity of the tissues, the simpler forms of organic energy pass\ninto the higher form of brain energy accompanied by consciousness. But\nthat is just because it is a continuous development, an evolution. That\nthe passage from the one into the other does actually take place we are\nbound, by all the canons of logical reasoning, to admit. It is only\nduring life, however, that neurosis occurs or is possible. A great number\nof modes of organic energy proceed side by side in the pulsating tissues\nof the living dog, their orderly continuance being what we term _life_.\nAnd only in and through their orderly continuance is the maintenance of\nthe structure of the tissues rendered possible. The organic structure is\nlike a spinning top. Only so long as it spins and manifests its proper\nenergy is its stability maintained. All around it are forces which tend\nto make it totter to its fall. But so long as it spins freely it can\nresist all minor attempts to upset its stability. And when the dog dies;\nwhat happens then? The molecular vibrations of the brain in common with\nall other forms of organic energy cease. The top no longer spins; and the\nstructure totters to its fall. Decomposition sets in. The orderly organic\nchanges which characterise life, give place to the destructive changes\nwhich characterise decay. But according to the law of the conservation\nof energy, although there is decomposition of the tissues of which the\nbody was composed there is no destruction or annihilation of energy. The\nparticular modes of energy through which the body was instinct with life\npass away; but only to give rise to their equivalents in other modes\nof energy. Just as the puddle in the road disappears, but only to give\norigin to an equivalent mass of invisible water-vapor; just as the candle\ndisappears, but only to give rise to its equivalent mass in the products\nof combustion; so throughout life and in death the energy which throbs\nin the tissues neither appears nor disappears except at the expense of,\nor to the gain of, other modes of energy. Life is like a vortex in a\nrapid stream; on surrounding energy it is dependent for its continued\nexistence; into surrounding energy it melts away. And this is true not\nonly of individual life but of life in its entirety. Some believe that\nthe vortex had a natural origin, the organic being evolved from the\ninorganic. Others hold that it was through the direct interposition\nof the finger of God that the tiny vortex of primitive life was set\na twirling. Be this as it may, once initiated the vortex of life is\ndependent on surrounding stores of energy.\n\nTurning now from the objective aspect to the subjective aspect we pass\nfrom neural processes to states of consciousness. In the language of\nthe identity hypothesis, here provisionally adopted, the states of\nconsciousness in the dog\u2019s mind, are the subjective aspect of what, from\nthe objective aspect, are the molecular vibrations of his brain-tissues.\nAnd as in considering the matter objectively, so now in regarding the\nmental aspect, we must ask from what the complex and orderly states of\nconsciousness of the dog\u2019s mind have been evolved. In the fertilised\novum from which the dog is developed, (and the same is true of the\nam\u0153boid ancestor from which, hypothetically, the race of dogs has been\nevolved,) nothing so complex as a state of consciousness is to be found.\nFrom what then have the states of consciousness been evolved? Do we not\nseem forced by parity of reasoning to answer: From something more simple\nthan consciousness but of the same order of existence, which answers\nsubjectively to the simpler organic energy of the fertilised ovum? Such,\nat any rate, is the hypothesis which appears to me the most philosophical\nand the most logically consistent. It requires, however, no little effort\nof thought to conceive the existence of those elementary states from\nwhich consciousness may have had its origin. We may be aided in doing so,\nperhaps, if we fix our attention on the close association of brain-energy\nand states of consciousness, regarding them as _distinguishable_ but\nnot _separable_. Now the nervous energy of the brain is extraordinarily\ncomplex; and yet we believe that it arises by a process of continuous\ndevelopment from the much less complex energy of the fertilised ovum. In\nthe ovum there is no brain-energy; there is only the far simpler germinal\nenergy from which it is evolved. So too, the consciousness in the dog\u2019s\nmind is wonderfully complex; but if it has arisen by a process of\ndevelopment, it must have been evolved from something of like nature only\nindefinitely simpler. May we not fairly suppose, therefore, that in the\nfertilised ovum, though there is no consciousness, there are the germinal\nstates from which consciousness may be evolved? Or to put the matter\ntersely, may we not say: As the complex molecular vibrations of the brain\nare to the simpler molecular vibrations of the ovum; so are the complex\nstates of consciousness associated with the former to the simpler states\nof infra-consciousness, if we may so call them, associated with the\nlatter? It is the association of consciousness and infra-consciousness\nwith energy\u2014its objective manifestation\u2014that is the distinguishing\nfeature of the view which I am endeavoring to set forth. Concomitant\nwith the evolution of higher modes of organic energy from those lowly\nmodes which alone obtain in the ovum or the am\u0153ba, is the evolution of\nconsciousness from lowly modes of infra-consciousness.\n\nIt is true that it is only through the exercise of the conceptual\nfaculty of reason, never through the senses or by direct perception,\nthat we can reach this suggested infra-consciousness. But this will\nhardly be regarded as a valid objection by those who believe in the\nexistence of the ether, or by those who adopt the atomic theory, neither\nof which could be reached by the senses or by perception alone. Still\nless will it be regarded as an objection by those who have grasped\nthe distinction between energy as manifested in the objective world,\nand consciousness as inevitably subjective. Of no consciousness other\nthan our own have we direct and first-hand experience. And yet certain\nmanifestations of energy as exhibited by other living beings force upon\nus the conviction that we are not alone in possessing the subjective\nattribute of consciousness. That not only the dog and the elephant, but\nthe bee also and the spider are endowed with this attribute and are\nconscious, though not self-conscious, few of us doubt for a moment. But\ntheir consciousness is presumably far simpler than ours. Carrying this\nsimplification yet farther down the scale of animal life, we reach in\nthe jelly-fish, the sea-anemone, and the sponge, forms of life which can\nhardly be said to be conscious at all with a consciousness comparable to\nour own. Yet they would seem to be endowed with the dim foreshadowings\nof such consciousness. Finally in the am\u0153ba and the monad we have these\ndim foreshadowings reduced to the lowest terms that are suggested by\nthe study of organic life. If, then, in the series of organic forms,\ndown even to the lowest, we admit consciousness or its foreshadowing,\nthough it lies and must ever lie beyond the reach of our senses, why\nshould we hesitate to generalise our belief in logical and scientific\nform, and hold that all organic modes of energy are associated with\nconscious or infra-conscious states?[30] It may perhaps, be objected\nthat such a view, carried to its logical conclusion involves the\nsupposition that all the tissues of the body are conscious or at\nleast infra-conscious, whereas it is a well-established scientific\nconclusion that consciousness is specially associated with the nervous\ntissue of the brain. I see no reason, however, why this conclusion\nshould not be accepted. If the organic transformations of energy in\nthe ovum are associated with what for lack of a better term I have\nhere called infra-consciousness, then there are two possibilities.\nEither the accompanying consciousness is _entirely_ concentrated in\nassociation with the molecular vibrations of the brain; or it merely\nbecomes _dominant_ in the functioning of that tissue and continues in\nthe dim infra-conscious condition in the other tissues of the body.\nNow to judge from our own experience it is only the dominant molecular\nvibrations in the brain that are accompanied by the clear light of\nconsciousness. The sub-dominant neural changes are indeed accompanied by\na dim sub-consciousness. But there are many molecular changes (even in\nthe cerebral hemispheres themselves where consciousness is \u201ccalled into\nexistence\u201d) which do not rise to the level of consciousness at all or\nare quite lost in the glare of that consciousness. Why this should be\nso I am not prepared to say. It seems to be a law of our mental being.\nCertainly it is convenient that it is so; and it may have been fostered\nor established by natural selection. We all know the sense of confusion\nthat arises when, in certain states of intense nervous excitement, a\nhost of ideas are crowding up into dominance and jostling each other\nfor supremacy. An organism so constituted that such a state of things\nwas normal, would, we may suppose, stand but a poor chance of survival.\nHence perhaps there has arisen that due subordination of conscious,\nsub-conscious, and infra-conscious states which characterises the\nnormal life of conscious beings. Having regard, then, to the cerebral\nhemispheres where consciousness emerges, not all the molecular changes\nthere transpiring rise to the level of full consciousness. There is not\na little of what Dr. Carpenter used to call unconscious cerebration. We\nseem forced to admit the existence of submerged states of consciousness;\nstates which are infra-conscious, but which may become conscious at any\nmoment by rising into dominance. And if in the cerebral hemispheres\nthere are infra-conscious states, why should there not be associated\nwith every molecular thrill of the living body yet lower states of\ninfra-consciousness too deeply submerged ever in man to become dominant?\n\nIt is, however, one thing to show that there is no insuperable objection\nto accepting the existence of such infra-conscious states, if such\nexistence be otherwise probable, and another thing to establish this\nprobability. And this leads us back again to the grounds on which their\nexistence may fairly be regarded as probable. We are told that the mental\nfaculties of the dog in common with his physical or organic frame, have\narisen in the course of ages by a process of development. It is clear\nthat such a statement is intended to apply to the living dog with active\nfaculties; to a _going_ mechanism, or rather organism which is also\nconscious. Well and good. The material structure has been evolved from\nlower forms of matter: the organic modes of energy (in virtue of which he\nlives), from lower forms of energy, the mental states (in virtue of which\nhe is conscious), from\u2014what? I suggest in continuation and conclusion of\nthis sentence\u2014from lower forms of infra-consciousness; that is to say,\nof what is of the same order of existence as consciousness, but has not\nyet risen to the level of consciousness. Many people will no doubt see\nno necessity for such a conclusion. It is making an unnecessary bother,\nthey will say, about a very simple matter. At some undefined stage of\norganic evolution\u2014perhaps when nervous tissue had its genesis, perhaps\nearlier\u2014consciousness began to dawn and has since developed in clearness\nand brightness during the evolution of higher and higher organisms.\nAccording to this view, the ascending curve of evolution is divisible at\nsome undefined point into two portions: of which one represents organic\nevolution previous to the dawn of consciousness; the other organic\nevolution subsequent to the dawn of consciousness. But the question at\nonce suggests itself: From what did consciousness dawn at this undefined\npoint? In answer to which there are some who do not hesitate to reply\nthat the consciousness arose out of the physical conditions; that when\nthe rhythmic dance of organic molecules reached a certain intensity and\nintricacy consciousness was developed. There is, indeed, a certain class\nof nerve-physiologists, or of medical men who write on nerve-physiology,\nwho, if they do not hold that states of consciousness are generated\nfrom the energy which accompanies the working of the brain-tissues, at\nany rate write as if this was their belief. But such a view is quite\nuntenable. If there is one thing clearly established, both by those who\nhave approached the matter from the scientific side, and by those who\nhave approached the matter from the metaphysical side, it is that the\ndistinction between energy and consciousness is radical and absolute.\nNo conceivable increase in the orderly complexity of the molecular\nvibrations of brain-tissue could give rise to that consciousness which\ndiffers _toto c\u0153lo_ from any manifestation of energy.\n\nAnd yet though stated in a form that is philosophically false, and\ntherefore misleading, the conclusions of these earnest students of\nnerve-physiology are practically sound. Grant, for the moment, that the\nstates of consciousness in the dog\u2019s mind are the subjective aspect of\nthe molecular energy of his brain. Then the following diagram (Fig.\n1.) will represent the ascending curve of development which, from the\nobjective aspect, is a development of modes of energy, and from the\nsubjective aspect is a development of modes of consciousness.\n\n[Illustration: FIG. 1.]\n\nNow what the nerve-physiologists are sometimes apt to do is, at some\nmoment of development say _a_, to change their point of view, from\nthe subjective aspect which deals with consciousness to the objective\naspect which deals with energy. Their conclusions are practically sound\nbecause they are still dealing with the same developmental curve. They\nstate these conclusions in language which is philosophically misleading\nbecause they suddenly jump from the subjective aspect to the objective\naspect and ignore the great distinction between the two. When they say\nthat consciousness emerges from the physical conditions at _a_, they\npresumably mean that at this point we are first justified in speaking of\nconsciousness or the subjective aspect in anything like a human sense.\nBut is it not more logical to hold that, just as from the objective\nstandpoint the complex energy of the dog\u2019s brain has been developed\nfrom the simpler energy of the ovum, so from the subjective standpoint,\nthe complex consciousness of the dog\u2019s mind has been developed from\nthe simpler infra-consciousness of the ovum? And if we do not accept\nthis view, do we not seem committed to the unevolutionary doctrine\nthat the conscious aspect suddenly makes its appearance, without those\nlowly germinal beginnings which it is of the essence of any theory of\ndevelopment to postulate?\n\nIt will perhaps be said that all this assumes an identity hypothesis,\nwith its supposed double aspect, which is not accepted by the majority\nof men of science. Let us look at the matter, therefore, from what would\nseem the only other point of view open to one who accepts the theory of\ndevelopment as applicable alike to the dog\u2019s mind and to the dog\u2019s body.\nIf states of consciousness and the molecular transactions in the brain\nare not different aspects of the same occurrences, they are parallel,\nconcomitant, or associated phenomena. Our diagram will thus become that\ngiven below.\n\n[Illustration: FIG. 2.]\n\nHere the parallel or associated phenomena occur together at the higher\nend of the developmental curve, and, at _a_, the consciousness is\nsupposed to emerge. On this view there is less justification for the\nnerve-physiologists\u2019 assertion that it arises out of physical processes;\nfor it is not simply another aspect of these processes, but something\nwholly different arbitrarily associated with them. Even on this view\nit would seem more logical to suppose that since the association of\nmental states with the dominant neural energy is of normal occurrence\nfrom _a_ onwards, the consciousness there emerging has been evolved from\ninfra-consciousness parallel and concomitant with the physical processes\nin the ovum. If this be not so, we may once more ask: From what has\nthe parallel line to the right of the diagram been evolved? We cannot\nsay from the neural conditions without changing our point of view and\nignoring the great distinction between matter and energy on the one hand\nand consciousness on the other. From what then has the consciousness been\nevolved, if not from something of like nature only indefinitely simpler\nwhich has here been spoken of as infra consciousness?\n\nWe must now take a further step, one however in which all evolutionists\nwill not be prepared to follow us. Attention has already been drawn to\nthe fact that those who accept the theory of evolution are not agreed\nin their faith\u2014for it is on either side a matter rather of belief than\nof demonstration\u2014with respect to the origin of life. Some believe that\nthe primitive organic germs were not produced by natural development\nnor through any process of evolution. For such, the hypothesis I am\nadvocating must be submitted in the following form\u2014when first the\nlife-energy was started by the direct interposition of the finger of God\nit was endowed with some dim form of infra-consciousness which in the\ncourse of evolution developed into consciousness. And presumably those\nwho see in the am\u0153ba and the fertilised ovum some dim foreshadowings of\nconsciousness may follow me thus far. But for those who believe that\nthe organic has arisen on this earth by process of natural development\nfrom the inorganic, the hypothesis must be more sweeping in its range.\nWe must say that all modes of energy of whatever kind whether organic or\ninorganic have their conscious or infra-conscious aspect.[31] Startling\nas this may sound there is, I believe, no other logical conclusion\npossible for the evolutionist _pur sang_. For where are we to draw\nthe line? The states of consciousness of the higher animals have been\nevolved from lower forms of infra-consciousness in the am\u0153ba-like or\nyet more simple protoplasmic germs in the dawn of life. But if those\nlow forms of organic infra-consciousness were themselves evolved, from\nwhat could they arise if they were not developed from yet more lowly\nforms of infra-consciousness similar in kind but inferior in degree\nassociated with inorganic transformations of energy? In any case it is\nhere submitted that this doctrine that infra-consciousness is associated\nwith _all_ forms of energy is necessarily implied in the phrase mental\nevolution for all thinkers who have grasped the distinction between\nconsciousness and energy. And if this be admitted there is disclosed,\nby implication, an answer behind and beyond that ordinarily given to a\nquestion which has again and again been asked\u2014the question:\u2014Is there a\nconservation of consciousness analogous to the conservation of energy?\nThe negative answer generally given to this question results from the\nfact that the question itself has always been put in a form which does\nnot admit of a satisfactory solution. There is not a conservation of\nconsciousness any more than there is a conservation of neural energy\nor a conservation of electricity. There is no conservation of neural\nenergy because this is only one mode of energy which may be transformed\ninto other modes. Not until we have generalised energy so as to include\n_all_ its modes can we speak of conservation in reference to it. So\ntoo not until we have generalised that universal form of existence, of\nwhich consciousness is only the highest and most developed mode, so as\nto include all modes, can we speak of conservation in reference to it.\nBut so generalised I submit that there is a conservation of that form\nof existence which includes both consciousness and infra-consciousness,\nco-ordinate and coextensive with the conservation of energy.[32] Just as\nthe dominant neural transformations in the dog\u2019s brain are like a special\nvortex in the onward-flowing stream of the world\u2019s energy, so are the\nstates of consciousness in his mind like a special vortex in the onward\nflowing stream of that mode of existence which, whether it have risen to\nthe level of consciousness or not, is still of the conscious order. For\nthe believer in scientific monism there is but one vortex, objectively\npresented as energy, subjectively felt in consciousness. For the dualist\nthere are two vortices, (1) an objective vortex and (2) a subjective\nvortex associated with the other and \u201ccalled into existence\u201d by it.\nIn either case the vortex is dependent for its continual existence on\nsurrounding stores of that out of which it has arisen; and in either case\nthe modern tendencies of scientific thought suggest conservation which is\nbut the antithesis of creation _ex nihilo_.[33]\n\nIn conclusion it should be noted that this hypothesis is but a new\npresentation of an old speculation. It differs as it here stands from\nany theory of \u201cmind-stuff\u201d in that it regards the question rather from\nthe dynamical than from the statical point of view. Not \u201cmind-stuff\u201d\nanswering to matter but a universal conscious order or aspect of\nexistence answering to universal energy is the leading idea I have sought\nto develop. In its newer form, again, this hypothesis differs from the\nview that \u201call force is will-power,\u201d or the view that \u201call matter is\nconscious,\u201d or the theory of \u201cintelligent monads,\u201d in endeavoring, not to\ncarry anything like _our_ consciousness down into association with the\nsimpler manifestations of energy, but rather to seek in association with\nthese lower manifestations the germinal states indefinitely simpler than\nconsciousness, from which nevertheless consciousness has been developed.\nFinally the keynote of this newer presentation is that which is the\nkeynote of all modern theories of life and of thought\u2014the doctrine of\nevolution.\n\n C. LLOYD MORGAN.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[30] I have elsewhere (_Animal Life and Intelligence_, p. 467) suggested\nthe term _kinesis_ for the manifestation of energy, and the term\n_metakinesis_ for its conscious or infra-conscious aspect.\n\n[31] In the phraseology I have elsewhere suggested, there is no kinesis\nunaccompanied by its metakinetic aspect.\n\n[32] That is to say, a conservation of metakinesis co-ordinate and\ncoextensive with the kinetic conservation of energy.\n\n[33] The bearing of this conservation of consciousness and\ninfra-consciousness (metakinesis) on Eastern conceptions of immortality\nand on transmigration would be an interesting theme to follow out but is\nbeyond the scope of the present paper.\n\n\n\n\nTHE NEW CIVILISATION DEPENDS ON MECHANICAL INVENTION.\n\n\nBy reason of his physical nature man is hampered by three wants\u2014he\nneeds food, clothing, and shelter. In his first and lowest stage of\ncivilisation man lives in a state of enthrallment to nature. He dreads\nand worships the cruel forces of matter. But by the aid of science, and\ninvention which flows from science, man attains domination or control\nover things and forces and directs them into the service of humanity for\nuse or for beauty. The soul conquers nature by science and machinery and\nthen it next desires to see this conquest over nature reflected in works\nof art. Hence it creates architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and\npoetry, all of these fine arts portraying man\u2019s victory over wants and\nnecessities.\n\nIf the spectacle of pauperism and crime, the savagery that still lingers\nin the slums of our cities, sternly reminds us of the yet feeble hold\nwhich our civilisation has obtained even in cities\u2014if the census of\nmankind proves that three-fourths are yet counted as below the line\nthat separates the half-civilised from the civilised\u2014yet we are wont to\nconsole ourselves by the promise and potency which we can all discern\nin productive industry aided by the might of science and invention.\nThis view is always hopeful. We see that there is a sort of geometric\nprogress in the conquest over things and forces. The ability of man to\ncreate wealth continually accelerates. The more he obtains the more\nhe can obtain. The more each one gets the more his neighbor also can\nget. Even the weakling of society, the pauper or beggar, the insane,\nand the criminal all fare better in the centres of wealth than they do\nat a distance from them where there is no wealth to beg or steal and\nno asylums created and sustained by wealth to shelter and heal their\ndiseased bodies.\n\nWealth in the modern sense of the word, far more than in its ancient\nsense, is self-productive. It is capital, and capital is wealth\nthat generates wealth. Capital represents conquered forces and\nthings\u2014conquered for the supply of human wants. Capital consists of\nnatural forces yoked and set to work for food, clothing, shelter, and the\nfacilities of human culture. The three physical wants (food, clothing,\nand shelter) are produced by nature\u2014they are the chains and fetters\nwhereby nature asserts her right to enslave humanity\u2014to keep man in a\nstate of thralldom.\n\nBut the Promethean cunning of man, realised first in science and next\nin useful machines, has succeeded in subduing the powers of nature and\nimposing on them the task of supplying and gratifying the very needs\nwhich nature creates in us. Nature had chained man to the task of daily\ntoil for food, clothing, and shelter. But man turns back upon nature and\ncompels her to take the place of human drudgery and produce an abundance\nof these needed supplies and bring them wherever they are needed for\nconsumption. This is accomplished by mechanical combinations that secure\nthe service of steam, electricity, and various devices of earth, air,\nfire, and water.\n\nThis self-generating wealth that exists in the shape of capital is so\nmuch on the increase that it fills all classes of our population with\nhopes or if not with hopes at least with discontents\u2014and discontent is\ncertainly the product of hope struggling up from the depths of the soul.\nWithout the vivid perception of a higher ideal and without the feeling\nthat it is attainable, there would not be any such thing as discontent.\nThe average production of man, woman, and child in the United States\nincreased in the thirty years between 1850 and 1880 from about 25 cents\nper day to 40 cents per day\u2014an increase of over 60 per cent. This means\nthe production of far more substantial improvements for human comfort.\nMuch more wealth is created that possesses an enduring character and may\nbe handed down to the next generation. Finer dwellings, better roads and\nstreets, fences for lands, drainings and levelings, and the processes\nnecessary to bring wild land under cultivation, artificial supplies\nof water and gas, the warehouses and elevators, and the appliances of\ncommerce\u2014and finally the buildings and furnishings of culture, including\nchurches, schools, libraries, museums, asylums, and all manner of\npublic buildings. Great Britain, the leading nation in commerce and\nmanufactures, according to the returns for 1888 (see Mulhall\u2019s \u201cDict.\nStatistics,\u201d new edition) distributed comfortable incomes of $1000 and\nupwards to each family of 30 per cent. of the entire population, and the\nremaining 70 per cent. averaged $485 per annum (for each family). France\nprovided incomes of $1300 per annum for 24 per cent. of its families.\nThis shows what great capitalists are doing for the creation and\ndistribution of wealth. Italy showed by its income returns that less than\n2 per cent. received incomes of $1000 and upwards, while 98 per cent. of\nthe families averaged less than $300 income. Italy makes little use of\nsteam power and labor saving machines.\n\nIf science progresses and its concomitant, useful invention, progresses\nas fast for the next hundred years as it has done for the past forty\nyears, the vision of Edward Bellamy of comfort for all will be realised\nwithout the necessity of any form of socialism. There will be comfort and\neven luxury for all who will labor a moderate amount of time.\n\nScience inventories nature and discovers properties and possible\ncombinations. Invention uses these combinations to meet mechanical\nproblems. Can any one doubt who looks into the state of science and its\ncontinually improving methods that the conquest of nature will be more\nrapid in the coming century than it has been in the past century?\n\nBut we are challenged by the question: What is the good of annihilating\nthe necessity for bodily toil? Will not man degenerate spiritually as\nhe comes to possess luxury at cheaper and cheaper rates? These material\nadvantages gained by useful invention which create a steady and permanent\nsupply of food, clothing, and shelter, are they not mere sumptuary\nprovisions and do they imply progress in civilisation? To this challenge\nwe reply by pointing out the relation of invention to the communication\nof intelligence and the diffusion of knowledge by newspaper and book.\n\nIn the first place it is obvious that the three classes of employments\ndevoted chiefly to the supply of the physical wants\u2014namely agriculture,\nmanufactures, and commerce\u2014are undergoing change by aid of mechanic\ninvention in such a manner as to bring the laborer everywhere more and\nmore into relation with his fellow men. In other words commerce increases\nmore and more, and becomes a part of all employments. In exchanging goods\neach gets something that he needed more than what he parted with. But the\nbest result of the exchange is the acquaintance formed between producer\nand consumer. Each has learned something of the other\u2019s ideas, modes of\nlooking at the world and habits of action. Each one\u2019s life is enriched by\nthe addition of the knowledge of the life of the other.\n\nMan as a spiritual being has for his problem the exploration of the two\nworlds\u2014the worlds of nature and man. The problem is too great for the\nindividual and he must avail himself of the work of others. Each man may\ninventory a small portion of nature different from all others. Each one\nmay live a life different from another\u2019s. But the individual gets a very\nsmall glimpse of nature by the aid of his own senses. He gets a very\nsmall arc of the total of human life in his survey of his own biography.\n\nBut by intercommunication each one may extend and supplement his own\nobservations of nature and of the experience of life,\u2014he may avail\nhimself of the aid of the sense-perceptions of others and still more of\nthe aid of the thoughts and reflections of others.\n\nWe see at once that man is man because he possesses and uses this means\nof re-enforcing his individual observations and reflections by those of\nthe race. Man is an individual endowed with the power of absorbing the\nresults of the race. We have with this a definition of civilisation and a\nstandard of measurement by which we may determine the rate of progress.\nAdvancement means that there are improved means realised by which each\nindividual can give to the rest of mankind the results of his living and\ndoing and thinking and at the same time share in the lives, thoughts, and\ndeeds of others.\n\nLooked at in the light of this definition we shall be enabled to claim\nprogress in civilisation on substantial grounds. We shall be able to\nsee something more hopeful in the material progress promised us in\nthe coming century than the cheap supply of bodily comforts. We see\na progressive increase of intercommunication which will enable each\nindividual to command the results of the rational intelligence of all\nmankind.\n\nMan is first a speaking animal and next a writing animal. Each\nword that he uses expresses a general meaning. Each word therefore\nstores up an indefinite amount of experience. All men may pour into\nit their experience and by it recognise the experience of others.\nThe art of writing at once increases infinitely the possibility of\nintercommunication because it preserves the experience recorded for\npersons widely separated in space and far removed in time. It renders\nevery _where_ in some sense a _here_ and every _when_ a _now_. But\nmechanic invention comes to the aid of speech and the elementary arts of\nwriting by printing with movable types. Printing and gunpowder are two\ngreat elementary arts both attributed to the Germanic race\u2014the two wheels\nof modern civilisation so to speak. But the Anglo-Saxon has added the\nsteam engine and the telegraph. The one makes locomotion possible to an\nincreasing degree and the other makes instantaneous intercommunication\nwith all places possible.\n\nArmed with these instrumentalities our modern civilisation lives in a\nsort of spiritual border land. It looks across the frontier and is in\na constant process of interaction with all other nations. The great\ninstrument of this process is the daily newspaper. Our people are\nbecoming from year to year a travelled people\u2014in a short time the per\ncent. of the population that has crossed the ocean has doubled. The\nper cent. that has visited the western border land has quadrupled. But\nthe number of people who live in constant daily interrelation with all\nmankind by aid of the daily newspaper has increased a hundred fold within\na single generation.\n\nThe test of a civilisation is its efficiency in re-enforcing the\nendeavors of each individual so as to give him access to the labors of\nthe world. We are approaching a spiritual civilisation as well as an era\nof the general distribution of wealth.\n\n W. T. HARRIS.\n\n\n\n\nRELIGION AND PROGRESS.\n\nINTERPRETED BY THE LIFE AND LAST WORK OF WATHEN MARK WILKS CALL.\n\n\nOn August 20, 1890, died Wathen Mark Wilks Call, M. A.,\u2014a spirit finely\ntouched to fine issues. The posthumous work before me revives the sense\nof personal bereavement, but soothes it with the satisfaction of holding\nanother interview with the beloved scholar on themes that through many\nyears engaged our conversation. Here is a casket of golden thoughts cast\nup from the deep where went down the white-winged ship freighted with\nsuch treasures. The general world is unconscious that it is poorer;\nits ports and marts had little welcome for the dainty wares of this\nunfamiliar bark. Many an American thinker will through this specimen of\nthe sunken treasures realise the world\u2019s loss when it is irreparable;\nand some who used to hover around the silver sail now vanished, and come\nashore laden with its gifts, have wondered that this writer, valued by\nMill, George Eliot, and the scholarly English circle, should have courted\nobscurity rather than fame. He was not indolent, though his published\nvolumes were few: \u201cLyra Hellenica\u201d (1842), \u201cReverberations\u201d (1849,\nsecond edition 1876), \u201cGolden Histories\u201d (1871). Besides his poems, his\ncontributions in the reviews,\u2014some, like \u201cThe Nero Saga\u201d (_Theological\nReview_, July, 1871), equal to volumes,\u2014would make a substantial and\nimportant collection. There is enough thought and learning in his poems\nand anonymous articles, to have earned fame for an ambitious and pushing\nauthor. Why then did the world get so much less than it ought to have\ngot from this fine and active brain, and why is he so little known?\n\nMany years ago I heard from his own lips the story of his life, which\nis partly told in the fifty pages that introduce this book, under the\ntitle \u201cA Chapter from my Autobiography.\u201d It will there be seen that\neven so late as thirty-six years ago the finest minds and hearts that\ncould not accept creed-dogmas might be almost mortally wounded. From\nthat time he lived and wrote as from a retreat. The actual case, as he\ntold it me, was that his sister, a widow, left him executor of her last\nwill and testament, and the guardian of her children. He was tenderly\nattached to this sister and to her children. She knew his opinions and\nhis doubts. When he went into the court for confirmation of his trust he\nwas confronted by the postscript of a letter he had written to a supposed\nfriend intimating his \u201cdissent from the creeds of the churches.\u201d For this\nmild and vague heresy he was prevented from acting as the guardian of his\nsister\u2019s children, and fulfilling a sacred trust.\n\nAt this time he was a clergyman in the Church of England, which to-day\ncontains many ministers more unorthodox than Mr. Call was when he\nreceived this crushing legal blow. This public disgrace of a sensitive\nscholar, the loss of position, the alienation of friends, added to the\ngrief of seeing his sister\u2019s children carried to strangers, parted him\nfrom the world. He seemed to have no place in it. Stunned, lacerated, he\nhad no heart to enter on any new profession. But from his retreat came\nthe poems, pathetic but hopeful, entitled \u201cReverberations,\u201d some of which\nare sung in the liberal chapels of England. Deified egotism and vengeance\nhad brought home to him all their heartlessness: all nature was overcast\nwith this chilling cloud.\n\nSilently bearing his grief, he gave himself to the search for truth\nin those matters which had been predetermined for him by a thousand\nsubtle influences and associations. Born in 1817, he had graduated\nat Cambridge,\u2014the chief poet of its Magazine,\u2014had passed through his\nShelleyan phase of scepticism, and entered the church (1845) through one\nof the many casuistical blind-ways provided in that old minster for those\nwho hesitate at the main portal. Eleven years were occupied in passing\nfrom one to another theoretical cloister or tower of the venerated church\nbefore he finally discovered that it had no place for him. Nor was there\nany church which he could honestly enter. He must be the hermit of his\ntruth. But in that retreat, where the lonely scholar must eat his own\nheart, the healing hand of a true divinity found him.\n\nLove found him. He married (1857) a lady whose beauty was the expression\nof her genius. Her father was Dr. Brabant, the friend of Strauss, and\nfounder of the _Westminster Review_. In early life she married C. C.\nHennell, author of \u201cAn Inquiry into the Origin of Christianity,\u201d\u2014a\nwork which made a deep impression on Theodore Parker, who made it the\nsubject of an article in the old _Dial_. Miss Brabant, versed in ancient\nand modern languages, did excellent work on the _Westminster Review_,\nassisted by her friend Marian Evans, afterwards known as \u201cGeorge Eliot.\u201d\nThese two ladies, as I have heard, undertook together the translation\nof Strauss\u2019s \u201cLeben Jesu,\u201d and were more than half through it when Miss\nBrabant married. By a contrivance of Mrs. Hennell the name of Marian\nEvans alone, and to her regret, appeared on the title-page. \u201cGeorge\nEliot\u201d thereby gained a reputation helpful to her, though somewhat\nembarrassing, implying as it did a knowledge of Hebrew and Greek which\nshe did not possess.\n\nMr. Call\u2019s marriage was most happy. The Calls were regarded by their\ncircle of kindred spirits as representing the true ideal union. They had\ntogether shared the friendship of the finest intellects, and had moved\nabreast in intellectual progress, for more than the life of a generation\nwhen parted by death.\n\nAbout seven years ago trouble for the first time entered this almost\nsacred household. A formidable consumption of one lung set in,\nthreatening Mr. Call\u2019s life. I have always believed that this was the\nlong latent bequest of pious cruelties suffered in earlier life. Six\nyears ago the case became hopeless, in its normal course, and the\nphysicians said that the only possibility of recovery lay in a rare\nand difficult operation, imperilling the few months of life that might\nremain. The patient and his devoted wife resolved to incur this risk.\nA tube was inserted through the back; through it the pus was drained\nfrom the ulcerated lung; and little by little the tube was withdrawn, by\ninfinitesimal degrees, as the healing process went on behind it. It was\na painful anxious process of many weeks. At this time, when he was kept\nmotionless, I marvelled at his cheerful spirit; though the slightest\nmiscarriage in the wearisome operation might prove fatal, the patient was\nalways serene. One of his physicians, by no means sure of the result,\napproached him on the subject of religion, and the condition of his soul.\nSoon after Mr. Call gave me an account of the conversation. In religious\nmatters the doctor had dabbled where Call had dived; it ended in the\nphysician\u2019s being compelled to consider the condition of his own soul,\nand why he should be holding the religion of primitive man along with a\nscience almost able to raise the dead.\n\nThe wonderful operation was perfectly successful. Love had healed the\nyoung man\u2019s broken heart; science had healed the mature man\u2019s dying\nframe. The real miracles that supplant fictitious ones, and fulfil\ntheir fables, had been brought home to him. Five happy years were added\nto his life, during which he wrote the important work to be hereafter\nconsidered. On a summer evening last year he passed a pleasant evening\nat home, ended with a game of cribbage with his wife. During the night\nhe died painlessly of heart disease; a _post mortem_ examination proved\nthe lungs quite sound. My friend\u2019s body and mind and affections were so\ncombined in organic unity that his very ailments had for me symbolical\nsignificance. The unsuspected failure of the heart, for instance, seems a\nlast sequel of the spiritual lesion given him by Dogma as a parting blow:\nits counterpart is to me visible in the fact that after writing this work\nhe hardly had heart to publish it. The substance of it was completed in\n1887; it was entirely finished in 1889; it lay in his library one year.\nHis wife wished him to publish it\u2014so she told me\u2014but he thought the world\nwould not be interested in his views. So deep had bigotry been able to\nsend this man into the vale of Humiliation; and what an intellect was\nthus discouraged may be partly estimated by those who shall read this\nbook on \u201cFinal Causes\u201d published by his widow.\n\nIn the last generation many young men, awakened by the song of Byron\nand Shelley, started out on a new spiritual pilgrimage. Their path was\nat first fringed with poetic flowers, and in the distance shone the city\ncalled Beautiful. But the path at length became flinty, the city became\nmore dim with progress towards it, and many a pilgrim turned back. Those\nwho pressed on were unique men, so that they came to parting ways, and\neach had to advance on his individual and lonely path, albeit they were\ntravelling in the same direction. The records of these pilgrimages,\nwherever found, are chapters in the scriptures of their generation. There\nis one thing common to them all,\u2014the tenacity with which they have clung\nto their old faith, and after it to their old church, until beaten off by\nbigotry or by conscience. \u201cMy God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?\u201d It\nwas no mere cry, but a question reaching far into the ages, and stirring\ninnumerable crucified hearts that have found no voice. Men do not forsake\ntheir God; their God forsakes them. They have invested some ancient name\nwith all the pearls of their heart; they have idealised him as wisdom,\njustice, love, compassion; but no sooner do they think an honest thought,\nor maintain justice and love against unjust and heartless dogmas, than\ntheir Good Shepherd beats such tender lambs with his crook and sets the\nwolves on them. Yet even then, so long as they can, they keep in the\nfold, and lift their lacerated hands in prayer. They will even practice\nsome self-deception that they may continue the old formulas after the\ntruth has forsaken these.\n\nMr. Call\u2019s youthful scepticism,\u2014a spell wrought by Byron and\nShelley,\u2014being chiefly the expression of others\u2019 experiences, and with\nbut little root in his own, carried him no further than the study of\nphilosophy and theology. It was not deep enough to prevent his entering\non residence in the University of Cambridge with a view of becoming\na clergyman. The struggle being not yet in the arena of his own life\nand heart, but a combat for his soul between the Humes and the Jeremy\nTaylors, poetic sentiment easily carried the day. His nature clamored\nfor a realised ideal, and the Church captivated him. \u201cThe church, as the\nembodiment of celestial truth, as the aggregate of noble and beautiful\nspirits, dead or living, appeared a sublime conception.\u201d When a youth\nfalls in love does he consider whether his beautiful lady\u2019s bloom may\nnot be hectic, or hereditary cancer be hovering near the fair breast?\nOur young scholar weds our Lady of the Litany amid the light of stained\nwindows, and the white-robed choristers. He presently finds that the\nlovely creature insists on his preaching the doctrine that all who\ndo not yield to her charms are to be burnt at the stake eternally.\n\u201cHuman philosophy had failed to explain to me the mystery of existence;\nChristian philosophy explained it to be the perpetuation of sin and\nmisery, intensified by omnipotent intervention.\u201d Recoiling from this the\nyoung clergyman went through years of critical investigation; he mastered\nthe exegesis of the Germans and the French; and at length found himself\na simple believer in the religion of Humanity. He, a clergyman of the\nChurch of England!\n\nIn the fifty preliminary pages of this posthumous book, comprising \u201cA\nChapter from my Autobiography,\u201d we have a succinct and useful summary of\nthe crucial criticisms under which biblical authority and supernaturalism\nhave been relegated to professional casuistry. This we will not study\nhere\u2014profoundly interesting as it is\u2014but dwell for a little on the\nsituation in which the scholar found himself.\n\n\u201cWhile I had thus been working my way through darkness into light\u2014the\nsober light of sad reality\u2014life had been bringing to all who belonged\nto me, as well as to myself, varied experiences of pain and sorrow. For\ntheir sake I had already done violence to my better nature. Was I now\nto render the previous sacrifice nugatory? Was the black shadow of my\nunbelief to enfold those who had already more than their share of the\nburden of life to sustain? Sympathising friends had early encouraged me\nto retain my position in the church. A beneficed clergyman, advanced\nin years, whose studies had ended, like my own, in the abandonment of\ndogmatic Christianity, had drawn up a statement of the motives which,\nas he argued, justified him in the retention of his preferment. This\nstatement was forwarded to me. A celebrated and venerable German\nprofessor had sent me a message deprecating the abandonment of a post\nwhich, he thought, I might continue to occupy without dishonor to myself\nand with profit to others. I had hitherto deferred to the judgment of\npersons whom I regarded as superior to myself in knowledge of life and\nin ability to determine questions of moral obligation; but the progress\nof unbelief and enlarged experience decided me, at last, on the adoption\nof an independent course of thought and action. Taking counsel of my own\nheart, I resolved to terminate a conflict which had become intolerable.\nPainful and singular complications preceded, accompanied, and followed my\nretirement from the English Church.\u201d\n\nHere is the \u201cRobert Elsmere\u201d of real life. Since Mr. Call left the Church\nof England, thirty-five years ago, it has become a largely rationalistic\ninstitution. Legal prosecutions of clergymen for heresy have resulted\nin proving that the evangelical and orthodox have no more right to the\nChurch, in Law, than the liberals. They were usurpers of authority not\nguaranteed by the constitution, in which there is nothing requiring\na clergyman to believe in hell, or the devil, or miracles, or the\ninfallibility of the Bible. Many clergymen are now honestly preaching a\nsimple theistic and humanitarian religion, and when told they ought to\nleave the Church need only reply, \u201cIf you think so you have a right to\nprosecute me.\u201d\n\nThe English charlatan who calls himself \u201cFather Ignatius,\u201d who could only\nmake himself ridiculous as a heresy-hunter abroad, seems to have found\nthe Episcopal Church in New York provincial enough to take him seriously.\nHe would never venture to suggest the prosecution of a Broad Churchman\nat home. His ignorant tribe have too keen a recollection of their severe\nfalls in grappling with Bishop Colenso, and the authors of \u201cEssays and\nReviews.\u201d We have, however, to deal with America, where the sects, by\ndeparture of some of their best brains, seem falling more and more under\ncontrol of their illiberal constituents, though the consecration of\nBishop Phillips Brooks show that reactionists will not have it all their\nown way. The passage I have quoted above bears upon a moral problem\nwhich has already become urgent among us, and in the progress of inquiry\nmust inevitably become of very serious importance to large numbers\nof ministers and their families. I therefore introduce here a little\ndigression on this subject.\n\nWhat is the moral duty of a young minister who finds himself occupying\nthe pulpit of a denomination in whose generally accepted doctrines he has\nceased to believe? The New York _Evening Post_ recently declared this\nto be a plain moral question. If\u2014thus it argues\u2014a man has voluntarily\nentered the ministry of a church, and afterwards forms opinions which,\nif known, would have prevented his admission, he is morally bound to\nresign. But the question is much more complex than that. In a majority\nof cases the minister has not entered \u201cvoluntarily,\u201d\u2014within the genuine\nmoral scope of that term. His orthodox parents, abetted by their\npreacher, have kept light from him, repressed his reason, imprisoned\nhim in Sunday schools and prayer-meetings; he has been accorded no free\nchoice; he has been led as a captive, before his intellect was capable\nof judgment, artificially terrified about his soul, and the world\u2019s\ndanger of damnation, and at length found himself in the pulpit. When\nthe victim finds himself disabused of these fictions, what is his duty?\nIn my belief it would be immoral for him to resign without having first\nsecured a public decision of his church on the issue. His paramount\nobligations are to the community in which he lives. He is morally bound\nto preach the truth as he sees it, openly, honestly, plainly. He cannot\nutter the discredited creeds, prayers, or dogmas. But he has a right,\u2014nay\nhe is bound,\u2014to throw upon the church which has entrapped him the\nresponsibility of repudiating his principles and doctrines. He should say\nto his church: \u201cYou are responsible for the unhappy situation in which I\nfind myself. By your zealous propaganda you frightened or persuaded my\nparents, my friends, myself, into acceptance of dogmas I now find false.\nThe logical result of taking you seriously was to turn from all worldly\noccupations, and devote my life to the work of saving mankind from a\nterrible doom. Now, awakened from the nightmare superinduced by you, I\nfind myself past the opportunities of youth, the time for preparations\nin other professions irrecoverably lost, and a family dependent on me.\nThe situation concerns not only you and me, but others we have involved.\nFor years I have been laboring with you to try and persuade other youths\ninto the same situation as my own. Something is due to them. I have\ndeceived them and must undeceive them. You say I must be true, but you\nmust be true also. I have innocently reached a position which enables\nme to compel you to publish to the world exactly where you stand. I will\nclearly define my convictions: if you cannot tolerate them in your pulpit\nthe youth will know the precise limits to their freedom they agree to\nin entering your ministry. If you can tolerate them they will know your\nliberalism. Therefore I remain here proclaiming my truth, and will not\nhelp you to cover the truth up by a resignation relieving you of the duty\nof proclaiming your position with equal clearness. You have got me here,\nand if I go now you must turn me out. So shall the cause of truth be\nadvanced.\u201d\n\nWhile this may be affirmed, I think, as a general ethical principle,\nit is equally true that each case must be judged by itself. The above\nprinciple depends on the condition that the ministry has been honestly\nentered from religious motives, there being no mental reservations\nat that time. It will be observed that in the case of Mr. Call the\nconsideration entered that he had passed through a phase of Shelleyan\nscepticism in early youth. This had to be weighed, and perhaps may\nhave had much to do with his determination to retire voluntarily from\nthe ministry. He never concealed his views, however, and it is well\nknown that great efforts are made by older preachers to beat down the\nscepticism that often arises in the minds of young candidates for the\nministry. In such case these unwise advisers assume a large share of\nresponsibility for the event, whether enough to justify the subsequent\nheretic in compelling a conflict must depend on the minister\u2019s\nconscience. Although, therefore, Mr. Call decided rightly, in accordance\nwith his moral consciousness, it were by no means fair to maintain, with\nthe author of \u201cRobert Elsmere,\u201d that ministers who find themselves more\nliberal than the majority of preachers in their church should surrender\nto such mere superiority of physical force without testing its legality\nand laying on it responsibility for its exercise of power. Robert Elsmere\nshould, on moral principles, have remained in the church. By so remaining\nColenso, Dean Stanley, Charles Kingsley, Max M\u00fcller, Professor Jowett,\nMatthew Arnold, and others, have revealed the fact that, in their church,\nthought is not delivered up by law to the despotism of a majority.\n\nThe case, however, is somewhat different again where the new opinions\nadopted by a minister amount to an abandonment of the fundamental\ndoctrines of his church. That may not exonerate him from demanding a\nformal and public declaration of the church, but this being secured, it\nmust affect his relation to the general world. Should it be proved that\nhe may be legally tolerated, he must then consider whether it is his\nlegitimate means of influence, or whether he would be substituting for\nhis own expression the mask of an extinct faith. The ethical principle\nabove affirmed relates to the first practical step of the minister whose\nbeliefs have changed. The progressive and inquiring mind that continues\nin a church where it is barely tolerated does so at great peril. Where\nthe swift foot agrees to march with the halt the pace must be that of the\nhalt. Sceptical minds occupying pulpits even of liberal denominations\nare likely to discover, should such engagements end, that they have been\nunconsciously arresting their own development in finding a conciliatory\n_modus vivendi_ with the reactionary brethren. There is, indeed, a class\nof fine intellects, like the great English Broad Churchmen already\nnamed, whose comparatively advanced views are the result of larger\nlearning; they have discovered that two and two are four, and gathered\ncourage to deny that the amount is five. These constitute the right\nleaven by which great organisations are raised to higher standards of\nknowledge and veracity. But there are original and philosophic inquirers\nwhose particular power were only buried in such organisations, without\nelevating them. These are due to the corps of pioneers in the direction\nwhither the organisations are advancing. Their task is original research.\nThese cannot wisely wear the uniform of any religious or political party.\n\nMr. Call was such an original mind, and after he had left the English\nchurch his course was to the maturity represented in this ripe book on\n\u201cFinal Causes.\u201d But had he not passed eleven of his best years in the\nchurch, out of his true habitat, we should have more fruit of this fine\nflavor. It is therefore a voice from his experience that here reaches us,\nas from his grave:\n\n \u201cScepticism has been vigorously advancing in the nation\u2014I\n might say, in Europe. And not only has it extended its sphere,\n but it includes within that sphere some of the loftiest and\n profoundest intellects of the age\u2014men renowned for vast and\n exact erudition, for scientific research or critical acumen.\n Philosophers, poets, historians, novelists, openly or silently\n disavow Christianity. In palaces, in lordly mansions, in\n college halls, in secluded homesteads, and here and there in\n rectory or vicarage, scepticism, if it has not a bold and\n fearless utterance, at least expresses itself in a guarded\n whisper. It becomes doubly a duty, then, when notwithstanding\n the general diffusion of avowed or latent unbelief, we trace\n everywhere the presence of a conservatism that conceals and\n hesitates and trembles at the doubts which it cannot suppress,\n that individual dissentients should candidly disclose their\n theological divergences. Christianity, indeed, which has had\n its triumphs in the past, will long conserve a portion of\n its power, and continue to furnish guidance not only for the\n unreasoning multitude, but for thousands of excellent men and\n women who cannot abandon the old religious ideal. But there is\n no final arrest for the intellectual progress of mankind.\u201d\n\nWe now turn to Mr. Call\u2019s work on \u201cFinal Causes.\u201d In an introductory\nchapter of eight pages he compresses the history of the doctrine of\nDesign in nature from Anaxagoras, B. C. 500, to our own time, stating\nits modifications, criticisms, denials. In the second chapter a brief\naccount is given of \u201cNatural Theology,\u201d whose modern form is found to\nrest fundamentally on Newton\u2019s generalisation, that a body at rest\ncontinues at rest unless acted upon by some external force; and on the\ngeometrical order of planetary revolutions. Starting anew from this point\nthe human mind has discovered in the varied realms of nature apparent\nevidences of a supersensuous Intelligence. Kant, however, is brought\nto criticise Newton. \u201cKant notes with delight that the \u2018harmonical\nrelations which excite the feelings in a more sublime manner than even\nthe contingent beauties of nature originate in the properties of space\u2019;\nand this inevitable congruity he refers ultimately, indeed, to Divine\nWisdom, but directly to a common dependence on a single sovereign\nground, to a unity of possibilities which it is no more difficult to\nconceive as self-existent than it is to conceive an Intelligent Cause as\nself-existent.\u201d Matter is not, then, naturally inert, but an aggregate\nof forms and forces, and nature a self-adjusting, self-evolving power.\nIn a chapter on \u201cOrder and General Adaptation\u201d it is shown that nature\ncontains vast realms of Disorder; and alleged \u201cspecial adaptations\u201d\nare shown too as often as otherwise for cruelty and agony. \u201cWith what\nfeelings,\u201d asks G. H. Lewes, \u201ccan we contemplate the destruction of\nsuch an organism as that of man for the sake of some microscopic animal\nmade to live upon it? With what feelings can we think of a human being\nsacrificed to the growth of cancer-cells? What is the contrivance\nand benevolence here?\u201d Particular illustrations of design on which\nteleologists have depended,\u2014the eye, the bee\u2019s cell, the bird\u2019s wing\u2014are\nexamined with critical and scientific care, and imperfections, gratuitous\nand cruel if ascribed to omnipotent wisdom, found everywhere. \u201cTo assert\nthat the Creator of the world is infinitely powerful and infinitely wise\nwere to deny that he is infinitely good.\u201d\n\nTo escape the dilemma just stated, some theists postulate a \u201climited\nor constitutional deity.\u201d Dr. Martineau\u2019s idea of a \u201cmaterial datum\nobjective to God\u201d is an effort to relieve the deity of responsibility\nfor the evils of nature, but Mr. Call declares the selection of \u201cpower\u201d\nas the limited attribute is arbitrary. We have, he thinks, no more\nlogical right to limit the deity\u2019s power than his intelligence, or his\nbenevolence. (This is doubtful, however, and requires more consideration\nthan is here given it.) \u201cThe Evolutionary God\u201d is next considered, and\ndisproved by the uselessness and unfitness of some structures in various\norganisations, the often injurious character of others, (e.g. the\nintestinal canal called the vermiform process,) while the moral sense is\nstill offended by the general predatory method of natural selection.\n\nThe validity of the Design argument disposed of, Mr. Call leaves to the\ntheist whatever evidences of a deity he may find in his ideals, emotions,\naspirations, intuitions. He points out that the Designer thus disproved\nhas never been able to satisfy the intellect or heart, the like being\ntrue of the \u201cUnknowable.\u201d The sole sacred ideal left us is that of\nhumanity; not of the whole race but of the purer, nobler constituents of\nit.\n\n \u201cAs Humanity will be the sole Ideal Object to which dutiful\n obligation and exalted sentiment will be referred, so the\n world of Humanity will be the world revealed, not by divine\n inspiration or metaphysical intuition, but by Positive Science\n The shadowy abstractions of the speculative rationalist, the\n fanciful conceptions of the theologian, will gradually pass\n away. To the Semitic explanation of the world and of man will\n succeed that of Laplace and Darwin. The great and majestic\n truths of the stellar universe, the mysteries of life, of\n light, of heat, of sound; the wonders of natural history,\n the magic of geologic lore, the epic of man\u2019s progression in\n time; the exaltation, the solace, the delight which flow from\n poetry, music, painting, sculpture; the interest in the arts,\n industrial no less than \u00e6sthetic; in the fellowship of work\n which ameliorates the common lot; in friendships of man and\n woman, short of passionate love, and in the happier profounder\n affection of wife and husband; in all home charities and\n patriotic activities, and in the identification of personal\n \u2018feelings with the entire life of the human race\u2019;\u2014all these\n incidents of thought and varieties of emotion and action will\n possess the intellect and fill the heart of future generations,\n in a mode and degree which we can now only imperfectly realise,\n and which, in the end, will leave men but little reason to\n regret that the raptures of saint or prophet, or the splendours\n of ancient theocracy, or the power and glory of the Medi\u00e6val\n Church, or the imposing premise of Hellenic or of Teutonic\n speculation, are as the dreams of a night that has passed\n forever away.\u201d\n\nHave we, in this prophetic conclusion, the afterglow of a faith sunk\nbeneath the horizon? Why should we suppose that such beautiful things\nwill come to pass in the future? Such prophecies have hitherto been\ninspired by belief in an overruling and omnipotent Love. But we are now\nbrought by science and philosophy to the misgiving of Solomon, \u201cWe are\nborn at all adventure.\u201d Things, the sceptic may say, will grow better if\nman compels them so, otherwise they can as easily grow worse.\n\nIt appears to me that in the old dogma of Jehovah\u2019s curse on the world\nand its redemption by Jesus there is buried, as in a sarcophagus, a\nskeleton of human nature, and of moral history, resembling the man of\nto-day, and the history we are making. There was an appeal of the human\nheart from Jehovah to Jesus,\u2014from the cursing to the saving deity. The\nterrible arraignments of nature written by some of the greatest men since\nDarwin\u2019s discovery have not found any one to answer them. The severest\nindictment of the world, perhaps, is that by the late Cardinal Newman,\nwho declares, \u201cEither there is no Creator, or this living society of\nmen is in a true sense discarded from his presence.... _Since_ there\nis a God, the human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal\ncalamity.\u201d From a deity who having created his own materials, built up\na creation liable to such calamity, mankind are once more appealing.\nThe ancient case was Jesus _vs._ Jehovah; the present case is Humanity\n_vs._ the Creator of Nature. This rebellion of the moral sentiment and\nof compassionateness is not intellectually conscious; it goes on, and\nfor a long time must go on, with ceremonial respect to the Final Cause\nof all the evils humanity tries to heal; but it appears to me certain\nthat the heart and enthusiasm which once went out to a personal God\nare again turning to a crucified humanity. The humanitarian movements\nof our time have arisen simultaneously with the overwhelming evidences\nof nature\u2019s cruelty and imperfections revealed by Science. The earlier\ndeists appealed from biblical superstitions and ecclesiastical cruelties\nto the God visible in the order and beauty of the universe. With the\nexistence of evil in external nature they never grappled. Bishop Butler\u2019s\n\u201cAnalogy\u201d first stated the problem. He answered deistic objections to the\ninhumanities of the Bible by pointing out the like in nature. Instead of\nanswering the deists he set them on a new departure which has ended in\nresults summed up in Mr. Call\u2019s book. The omnipotent creator of nature\nis following the biblical Jehovah into extinction. But the instincts and\naspirations of the human heart and mind remain the same; the religious\nsentiment remains. The stream that is dammed up in one direction or\nanother does not lose any force thereby; it streams into other channels\nif it can find such, or floods field and village if it finds none. It\nwill beat earthward as strongly as it once beat heavenward; it will, if\nchannels be not provided, carry away institutions as it has carried away\ngods and goddesses.\n\nIt has become therefore of great importance to recognise if possible\nthe lines of least resistance along the mighty stream of religious\nenthusiasm, and provide that its energies shall not be destructive but\nconservative of human welfare. At present the most conservative force\nin the earth is ignorance: were the suffering masses of the world to\ndiscover, suddenly and universally, that the old creeds are fictions,\ntheir evils not providential, their heavenly hopes vain, every nation\nwould be filled with convulsions. Fortunately the sun is not shot up into\nthe heavens. But enlightenment progresses rapidly, and we have begun\nnone too soon turning the rising flood of light and fire into the human\nchannels long obstructed by sanctified inhumanities.\n\nMr. Call\u2019s little book, which I hope will find publication and wide\ncirculation in America, sums up succinctly and cogently the present\nreligious situation, and the steps by which it has been reached. It\nremains for us all to sweep the new horizon with eye and telescope,\nto compare our observations and to catch the first ray of the star\nthat shall point wise men to the new incarnation. To my own mind this\nbook is one of the many signs and promises that the divine will be\nsteadily merged into and identified with the human. Not with humanity\nas an objective and historical entity, as Comte believed, but with the\ndistinctive characteristics of humanity, the supreme qualities of reason\nand love: this will become the ideal of the reasoners and the lovers; it\nwill then become the creating Word, instructing all; it will finally be\nmade flesh and dwell among us, and all shall behold in it the glory of\nthe kingdom of Man.\n\n MONCURE D. CONWAY.\n\n\n\n\nFACTS AND MENTAL SYMBOLS.\n\n\nI perceive from Dr. Carus\u2019s answer to my letter in No. 3 Vol. I of _The\nMonist_, that amid all the agreement of our mutual endeavors a material\ndifference of opinion exists between us on an important question of\nspecial character. As I was not successful in rendering my thought clear\non this point, I shall endeavor on the present occasion to explain _what_\nit was that forced me to abandon my old position (1863), which is very\nnear to that of Dr. Carus, and to assume a new one. The supposition\nthat our difference of opinion is merely apparent and can be adjusted\nby a precise agreement as to the terms employed is a very natural one\nin philosophical discussions. It is hardly tenable, though, when the\ndivergent views in question arise _subsequently_ to one another in the\n_same_ person.\n\nI must state, in starting, that I pursued in my youth physical _and_\nphilosophical studies, particularly psychology, with equal ardor. There\nwas hardly the question at that time of an experimental psychology, of\na relation of psychological to physiological research. No more so did\nphysics at that day think of a psychological analysis of the notions it\nwas constantly employing. How the notions of \u201cbody,\u201d \u201cmatter,\u201d \u201catom,\u201d\netc., were come by, was not investigated. Objects were given of which\nphysicists never questioned the inviolability and with which they\nunconcernedly pursued their labors.\n\nThe fields of physical and psychological research thus stood\n_unconciliated_ the one by the side of the other, each having its own\nparticular concepts, methods, and theories. No one questioned, indeed,\nthat the two departments were connected in some way. _The way_, however,\nappeared an insoluble riddle; as it yet appears to Dubois-Reymond.\n\nNow although this condition of things was not such as to satisfy my mind,\nit was nevertheless natural that as a student I should seek to acquire\ntentatively the prevailing views of both provinces and put them into\nconsistent connection with one another.\n\nI thus formed provisorily the view that Nature has two _sides_\u2014a physical\nand a psychological side. If psychical life is to be harmonised at all\nwith the theories of physics we are obliged, I thought, to conceive of\nthe atoms as _feeling_ (ensouled). The various dynamic phenomena of the\natoms would then represent the physical processes, while the internal\nstates _connected therewith_ would be the phenomena of psychic life. If\nwe accept in faith and seriousness the atomistic speculations of the\nphysicists and of the early psychologists (on the unity of the soul), I\nstill see hardly any other course to arrive at a half-way supportable\nmonistic conception.\n\nIt is unnecessary to set forth at length here what a prominent place the\nartificial scaffolding we employ in the construction of our knowledge\nassumes in these monadic theories as contradistinguished from the facts\nthat deserve knowledge, and how poorly such theories satisfy in the long\nrun a vigorous mind. As a fact, employment with this cumbrous artifice\nwas in my case the means that effected very soon the appearance of my\nbetter conviction, already latently present.[34]\n\nIn the further progress of my physical work I soon discovered that it was\nvery necessary _sharply to distinguish_ between what we _see_ and what\nwe mentally _supply_. When, for example, I imagine heat as a substance\n(a fluid) that passes from one body into another, I follow with ease\nthe phenomena of conduction and compensation. This idea led Black,\nwho established it, to the discovery of specific heat, of the latent\nheat of fusion and vaporisation, and so forth. _This same_ idea of a\nconstant quantity of heat-substance _prevented_ on the other hand Black\u2019s\nsuccessors from using their eyes. They no longer mark the fact which\nevery savage knows, that heat is _produced_ by friction. By the help of\nhis undulatory theory Huygens follows with ease the phenomena of the\nreflexion and refraction of light. The same theory _prevents_ him, for he\nthinks solely of the longitudinal waves with which he was familiar, from\nmarking the fact of polarisation which he himself discovered, but which\nNewton on the other hand, undisturbed by theories, perceives at once.\nThe conception of fluids acting at a distance on conductors charged with\nelectricity facilitates our view of the behavior of the objects charged,\nbut it _stood in the way of_ the discovery of the specific inductive\ncapacity, which was reserved for the eye of Faraday undimmed by any\ntraditional theories.\n\nValuable therefore as the conceptions may be which we mentally\n(theoretically) supply in our pursuit of facts, bringing to bear, as\nthey do, older, richer, more general, and more familiar experiences\non facts that stand alone, thus affording us a broader field of view,\nnevertheless, the same conceptions may, as classical examples and our\nown experience demonstrate, lead us astray. For a theory, indeed, always\nputs in the place of a fact something _different_, something more\nsimple, which is qualified to represent it in some _certain_ aspect,\nbut for the very reason that it is different does _not_ represent it\nin other aspects. When in the place of _light_ Huygens mentally put\nthe familiar phenomenon of _sound_, light itself appeared to him as a\nthing that he knew, but with respect to polarisation, which sound-waves\nlack, as a thing with which he was doubly unacquainted. Our theories are\nabstractions, which, while they place in relief that which is important\nfor _certain fixed_ cases, neglect almost necessarily, or even disguise,\nwhat is important for other cases. The law of refraction looks upon\nrays of light as homogeneous straight lines, and that is sufficient\nfor the comprehension of the geometrical aspect of the matter. But the\npropositions that relate to refraction will never lead us to the fact\nthat the rays of light are periodical, that they interfere. Just the\ncontrary, the favorite and familiar conception of a ray as a smooth\nstraight line will rather render this discovery difficult.\n\nOnly in rare cases will the resemblance between a fact and its\ntheoretical conception extend _further_ than we ourselves postulate. Then\nthe theoretical conception may lead to the discovery of _new_ facts, of\nwhich conical refraction, circular polarisation, and Hertz\u2019s electric\nwaves furnish examples that stand in opposition to those given above. But\nas a general rule we have every reason to distinguish sharply between\nour theoretical conceptions of phenomena and that which we observe. The\nformer must be regarded merely as auxiliary instruments that have been\ncreated for a _definite_ purpose and which possess permanent value only\nwith respect to that purpose. No one will seriously imagine for a moment\nthat a real circle with angles and sines actually performs functions in\nthe refraction of light. Every one, on the contrary, regards the formula\nsin\u03b1/sin\u03b2 = _n_ as a kind of geometrical model that _imitates in form_\nthe refraction of light and _takes its place_ in our mind. In this\nsense, I take it, all the theoretical conceptions of physics\u2014caloric,\nelectricity, light-waves, molecules, atoms, and energy\u2014must be regarded\nas mere helps or expedients to facilitate our viewing things. Even\nwithin the domain of physics itself the greatest care must be exercised\nin transferring theories from one department to another, and above all\nmore instruction is not to be expected from a theory than from the facts\nthemselves.\n\nBut instances were not lacking that demonstrated to me, how much greater\nthe confusion was which was produced by the direct transference of\ntheories, methods, and inquiries that were legitimate in physics, into\nthe field of psychology.\n\nAllow me to illustrate this by a few examples.\n\nA physicist observes an image on the retina of an excised eye, notices\nthat it is turned upside down with respect to the objects imaged, and\nputs to himself very naturally the question, How does a luminous point\nsituated _at the top_ come to be reflected on the retina _at the bottom_?\nHe answers this question by the aid of dioptrical studies. If, now, this\nquestion, which is perfectly legitimate in the province of physics, be\ntransferred to the domain of psychology, only obscurity will be produced.\nThe question why we see the _inverted_ retina-image _upright_, has no\nmeaning as a psychological problem. The light-sensations of the separate\nspots of the retina are connected with sensations of locality from the\nvery beginning, and we _name_ the places that correspond to the parts\ndown, _up_. Such a question cannot present itself to the perceiving\nsubject.\n\nIt is the same with the well-known theory of projection. The problem of\nthe _physicist_ is, to seek the luminous object-point of a point imaged\non the retina of the eye in the backward prolonged ray passing through\nthe point of intersection of the eye. For the perceiving subject this\n_problem_ does not exist, as the light-sensations of the retinal spots\nare connected from the beginning with determinate space-sensations. The\nentire theory of the psychological origin of the \u201cexternal\u201d world by the\nprojection of sensations outwards is founded in my opinion on a mistaken\ntransference of a _physically_ formulated inquiry into the province\nof _psychology_. Our sensations of sight and touch are bound up with,\nare connected with, various _different_ sensations of space, that is to\nsay these sensations have an existence _by the side of_ one another or\n_outside of_ one another, exist in other words in a _spatial_ field,\nin which our body fills but a part. That table is thus self-evidently\n_outside of_ my body. A projection-problem does not present itself, is\nneither consciously nor unconsciously solved.\n\nA physicist (Mariotte) makes the discovery that a certain spot on the\nretina is blind. He is accustomed to associating with every spatial\npoint an imaged point, and with every imaged point a sensation. Hence\nthe question arises, what do we see at the points that correspond to the\nblind spots, and how is the gap in the image filled out? If the unfounded\ninfluence of the physicist\u2019s method of procedure on the discussion of\npsychological questions be excluded, it will be found that no problem\nexists at all here. We see _nothing_ at the blind spots, the gap in the\nimage is _not_ filled out. The gap, moreover, is not felt, for the reason\nthat a defect of light-sensation at a spot blind from the beginning can\nno more be perceived as a gap in the image than the blindness say of the\nskin of the back can be so perceived.\n\nI have chosen intentionally simple and obvious examples, such as\nrender it clear what unnecessary confusion is caused by the careless\ntransference of a conception or mode of thought which is valid and\nserviceable in one domain, into another.\n\nIn the work of a celebrated German ethnographer I read recently the\nfollowing sentence: \u201cThis tribe of people deeply degraded itself by the\npractise of cannibalism.\u201d By its side lay the book of an English inquirer\nwho deals with the same subject. The latter simply puts the _question\nwhy_ certain South-Sea islanders eat human beings, finds out in the\ncourse of his inquiries that our own ancestors also were once cannibals,\nand comes to understand the position the Hindus take in the matter\u2014a\npoint of view that occurred once to my five-year-old boy who while\neating a piece of meat stopped suddenly shocked and cried out, \u201c_We_ are\ncannibals to the animals!\u201d \u201cThou shalt not eat human beings\u201d is a very\nbeautiful maxim; but in the mouth of the ethnographer it sullies the\ncalm and noble lustre of unprepossession by which we so gladly discover\nthe true inquirer. But a step further and we will say, \u201cMan _must_ not\nbe descended from monkeys,\u201d \u201cThe earth _shall_ not rotate,\u201d \u201cMatter\n_ought_ not everywhere to fill space,\u201d \u201cEnergy _must_ be constant,\u201d and\nso on. I believe that our procedure differs from that just characterised\nonly in degree and not in kind, when we transfer views reached in the\nprovince of physics with the dictum of sovereign validity into the domain\nof psychology, where they should be tested anew with respect to their\nserviceability. In such cases we are subject to dogma, if not to that\nwhich is forced upon us by a power from without like our scholastic\nforefathers, yet to that which we have made ourselves. And what result\nof research is there that could not become a dogma by long habit of use,\nsince the very skill which we have acquired in familiar intellectual\nsituations, deprives us of the freshness and unprepossession which are so\nrequisite in a new situation.\n\nNow that I have set forth in general outlines the position I take, I may\nbe able perhaps to establish my opposition to the _dualism of feeling\nand motion_. This dualism is to my mind an artificial and an unnecessary\none. The way it has arisen is analogous to that in which the imaginary\nsolutions of certain mathematical problems have arisen\u2014by the improper\nformulation of the questions involved.\n\nIn the investigation of purely physical processes we generally employ\nnotions so abstract that as a rule we only think cursorily or not at\nall of the sensations that lie at and constitute their foundation.\nFor example, when I establish the fact that an electric current of 1\nAmp\u00e8re develops 10\u00bd cubic centimetres oxyhydrogen gas at 0\u00b0 C. and 760\nmm mercury pressure in a minute, I am easily disposed to attribute to\nthe objects defined a reality wholly independent of my sensations. But\nI am obliged in order to arrive at what I have determined to conduct\nthe current through a circular wire having a definite measured radius,\nso that the current, the intensity of terrestrial magnetism being\ngiven, shall turn the magnetic needle at its centre a certain angular\ndistance out of the meridian. The intensity of terrestrial magnetism\nmust have been disclosed by a definite observed period of vibration\nof a magnetic needle of measured dimensions, known weight, and so\nforth. The determination of the oxyhydrogen gas is no less intricate.\nThe whole statement, so simple in its appearance, is based upon an\nalmost unending series of simple sensory observations (sensations),\nparticularly so when the observations are added that guarantee the\nadjustment of the apparatus, which may have been performed in part long\nbefore the actual experiment. Now it may easily happen to the physicist\nwho does not study the psychology of his operations, that he does not\n(to reverse a well-known saying) see the trees for the woods, and that\nhe slurs over the sensory elements at the foundation of his work. Now\nI maintain, that every physical notion is nothing more than a definite\nconnection of the sensory _elements_ which I denote by _A_ _B_ _C_ ...,\nand that every physical fact rests therefore on such a connection. These\n_elements_\u2014elements in the sense that no further resolution has for the\npresent been effected of them\u2014are the most ultimate building stones of\nthe physical world that we have as yet been able to seize.\n\nPhysiological research also may have a purely physical character. I can\nfollow the course of a physical process as it propagates itself through a\nsensitive nerve to the spinal column and brain of an animal and returns\nby various paths to the muscles of the animal, whose contraction produces\nfurther events in the environment of the animal. I need not think, in so\ndoing, of any feeling on the part of the animal; what I investigate is a\npurely physical object. Very much is lacking, it is true, to our complete\ncomprehension of the details of this process, and the assurance that it\nis all motion can neither console me nor deceive me with respect to my\nignorance.\n\nLong before there was any scientific physiology people perceived that the\nbehavior of an animal confronted by physical influences is much better\nviewed, that is understood, by attributing to the animal _sensations_\nlike our own. To that which I see, to _my_ sensations, I have to _supply\nmentally_ the sensations of the _animal_, which are not to be found in\nthe province of my own sensation. This contrariety appears still more\nabrupt to the scientific inquirer who is investigating a nervous process\nby the aid of colorless abstract notions, and is required for example\nto add mentally to that process the sensation green. This last can\nactually appear as something entirely novel, and we can ask ourselves how\nit is that this miraculous thing is produced from chemical processes,\nelectrical currents, and the like.[35]\n\nPsychological analysis has taught us that this surprise is unjustified,\nsince the physicist deals with sensations in everything on which he\nemploys himself. This analysis is also able to render it clear to us that\nthe mental addition by analogy of sensations and complexes of sensations\nwhich at the time being are not present in the field of sense or cannot\neven come into it, is also daily practised by the physicist, as when\nfor example he imagines the moon an inert heavy mass although he cannot\ntouch the moon but only see it. The totally strange character of the\nintellectual situation above described is therefore an illusion.\n\nThe illusion disappears when I make observations (psychologically) on my\nown person which are limited to the sensory sphere. Before me lies the\nleaf of a plant. The green (_A_) of the leaf is united with a certain\noptical sensation of space (_B_) and sensation of touch (_C_), with the\nvisibility of the sun or the lamp (_D_). If the yellow (_E_) of a sodium\nflame takes the place of the sun, the green (_A_) will pass into brown\n(_F_). If the chlorophyl granules be removed,\u2014an operation representable\nlike the preceding one by elements,\u2014the green (_A_) will pass into white\n(_G_). All these observations are _physical_ observations. But the\ngreen (_A_) is also united with a certain process on my retina. There\nis nothing to prevent me in principle from physically investigating\nthis process on my own eye in exactly the same manner as in the cases\npreviously set forth, and from reducing it to its elements _X_ _Y_\n_Z_.... If this were not possible in the case of my own eye, it might\nbe accomplished with that of another, and the gap filled out by analogy\nexactly as in physical investigations. Now in its dependence upon _B_ _C_\n_D_ ..., _A_ is a _physical element_, in its dependence on _X_ _Y_ _Z_\n... it is a _sensation_. The green (_A_) however is not altered at all\n_in itself_, whether we direct our attention to the one or to the other\nform of dependence. _I see, therefore, no oppositions of physical and\npsychical, no duality, but simply identity._ In the sensory sphere of my\nconsciousness everything is at once physical and psychical.\n\nThe obscurity of this intellectual situation has arisen according to\nmy conviction solely from the transference of a physical prepossession\ninto the domain of psychology. The physicist says: I find everywhere\nbodies and the motions of bodies only, no sensations; sensation therefore\nmust be something _entirely different_ from the physical objects I deal\nwith. The psychologist accepts the second portion of this declaration:\nTo him, it is true, sensation is _given_, but there corresponds to it a\nmysterious physical something which conformably to physical prepossession\nmust be _different_ from sensation. But what is it that is the really\nmysterious thing? Is it the Physis or the Psyche? or is it perhaps\n_both_? It would almost appear so, as it is now the one and now the\nother that is intangible. Or does the whole reasoning involved rest on a\nfallacious circle?\n\nI believe that the latter is the case. For me the elements designated by\n_A_ _B_ _C_ ... are immediately and indubitably given, and for me they\ncan never afterwards be volatilised away by any considerations which are\nafter all based in every case on their existence.[36]\n\nTo the department of special research having for its subject the sensory,\nphysical, and psychical province which is not made superfluous by this\ngeneral orientation and Which cannot be forestalled, the relations of\n_A_ _B_ _C_ ... only remain to be ascertained. This may be expressed\nsymbolically by saying that it is the purpose and end of special research\nto find equations of the form _f(A, B, C_, ...) = 0.\n\nI hope with this to have designated the point in which I am in opposition\nto Dr. Carus, with whom I agree so much in other respects. I am obliged,\nnotwithstanding the latter fact, to regard this point as essential,\ninasmuch as my whole mode of thinking and direction of inquiry have\nbeen changed by the view it involves, and because, moreover, I do not\nbelieve that the difference in question can be dissipated by any verbal\nexplanations however exact.\n\nThis whole train of reasoning has for me simply the significance\nof negative orientation for the avoidance of pseudo-problems. I\nrestrict myself, moreover intentionally here, to the question of\nsense-perceptions, for the reason that at the start exact special\nresearch will find here alone a safe basis of operations.\n\n ERNST MACH.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[34] A Greek philosopher to whom change of spatial configuration,\npressure, and percussion were probably the only natural processes of\nwhich he had any intimate knowledge, thought out the atomistic theory.\nThis theory we retain to-day, though it be in a modified form. And in\nfact natural phenomena really do exist that act _as if_ the pressure\nand impact of very small particles were involved in their production\n(the dynamical theory of gases), phenomena that admit therefore by this\nconception of being more clearly viewed. However, this conception, like\nthat of caloric, possesses value only in certain fields. We know to-day\nthat pressure and impact are by no means simpler phenomena than are for\nexample the phenomena of gravitation. The contention that in physics\neverything can be reduced to the motion of smallest particles is, taken\nat its best, a more than improper draft on the future. Utterances of this\nkind afford no assistance to the solution of burning special questions,\nbut only confound, and have about the same explanatory value as the\nutterances of the late physical philosophy of Oken which prescribe for\nexample with the greatest ease the course of the creation of the world by\na division of zero-quantities into _+a_ and _-a_ (0 = _+a_ _-a_).\n\nThe motion of a _single_ body as a totality does indeed appear simpler\nat first glance than any other process, and this is the justification\nof attempts at a _physical_ monadic theory. The thoughts of a _single_\nman are connected together; the thoughts of two different men are not.\nHow can the processes of the different parts of the brain of one man be\nconnected? In order to make the connection very intimate, we collect\neverything which requires to be psychically connected in _a single_\npoint, although the connection is not explained by this procedure. Thus\nthe psychological monadic theory is created on the basis of a motive and\nof an illusion similar to that on which the physical rests.\n\nLet us assume for a moment the proposition in the text; viz., that the\natoms are endowed with feeling. By the space co\u00f6rdinates _x_, _y_, _z_,\n_x\u2032_, _y\u2032_, _z\u2032_ ... of the atoms are determined _in the atoms_ internal\nconditions \u03b1, \u03b2, \u03b3, \u03b1\u2032, \u03b2\u2032, \u03b3\u2032 ... and _vice versa_. For we feel by\nour senses our physical environment, and our physical invasions of our\nenvironment are conditioned by our sensations. The idea is then at hand,\n\u03b1, \u03b2, \u03b3 ... alone being directly given, to set up by the elimination of\n_x_, _y_, _z_ ... equations directly between \u03b1, \u03b2, \u03b3, \u03b1\u2032, \u03b2\u2032, \u03b3\u2032.... This\nlatter point of view would be very near to my present one, aside from the\nfact that the latter wholly rejects metaphysical considerations.\n\n[35] The following is a legitimate question: To what kind of nervous\nprocesses is the sensation green to be mentally added. Such questions\ncan be solved only by special inquiry, and not by a reference in a\ngeneral way to motion and electric currents. How disadvantageous our\nremaining satisfied with such general conceptions is, can be seen from\nthe fact that inquirers have been repeatedly on the brink of abandoning\nthe _specific energies_, one of the greatest acquisitions we have made,\nsimply because they were unable to discover any difference in the\ncurrents of different sensory nerves. I was impelled as early as 1863\nin my lectures on psycho-physics to call attention to the fact that the\n_most diverse kinds_ of nervous processes can conceal themselves in a\ncurrent. Current is an abstraction and places in relief but one feature\nof the process\u2014the passage of energy though a transverse section. A\ncurrent in diluted sulphuric acid is something entirely different from a\ncurrent in copper. We must therefore also expect that a current in the\nacoustic nerve is something entirely different from a current in the\noptic nerve.\n\n[36] It is the transitoriness of sense-perceptions that so easily leads\nus to regard them as mere appearances as contrasted with permanent\nbodies. I have repeatedly pointed out that unconditioned permanent states\ndo not exist in nature, that permanences of connection only exist. A\nbody is for me the same complex of sight-and-touch-sensations every time\nthat it is placed in the same circumstances of illumination, position in\nspace, temperature, and so forth. The supposed constancy of the body is\nthe constancy of the union of _A_, _B_, _C_ ... or the constancy of the\n_equation f_(_A_, _B_, _C_ ...) = 0.\n\n\n\n\nPROFESSOR CLIFFORD ON THE SOUL IN NATURE.\n\n\nNo one can read Clifford\u2019s Lectures and Essays, without feeling that,\nif their author is less known and valued as an original thinker than as\na master of mathematical analysis, it is only because having turned the\nforce of his genius onto mathematics first he had time to complete some\nwork in that direction, whereas his premature death in 1879 only allowed\nhim to give us an earnest of the philosophical work which he had it in\nhim to perform.\n\nThe short biography which Prof. F. Pollock contributed to the first\nedition of his lectures and essays gives an interesting sketch of\nthe phases of opinion through which Clifford passed. It appears that\nbefore he took his degree in 1867 and for a little time after he was\na high churchman; but, says Pollock, \u201cthere was an intellectual and\nspeculative activity about his belief which made it impossible that he\nshould remain permanently at that stage.\u201d \u201cHe never slackened in the\npursuit of scientific knowledge and ideas,\u201d and conscious of a hiatus\nbetween orthodox views and some of the results of science he yet held\nthat religious beliefs are outside the region of scientific proof and\nthat there is a special theological faculty or insight, analogous to the\nscientific, poetic, and artistic faculties, the persons in whom this\ngenius is exceptionally developed being the founders of new religions and\nreligious orders. This is not unlike the solution of religious doubts\nwhich Hume playfully suggested and which John Henry Newman has seriously\nadopted, namely that \u201cdivinity, or theology, has a foundation in _reason_\nso far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid\nfoundation is _faith_ and divine revelation.\u201d \u201cWhen or how,\u201d continues\nhis biographer, \u201cClifford first came to a clear perception that this\nposition of quasi-scientific Catholicism was untenable I do not exactly\nknow; but I know that the discovery cost him an intellectual and moral\nstruggle, of which traces may be found here and there in his essays. Most\nreaders of these essays would consider that Clifford is very unfair to\nthe Christian beliefs which he had abandoned and beyond doubt he felt\na certain grudge against them for having so long duped him.\u201d[37] The\ntheories of Mr. Darwin and Herbert Spencer took the place in Clifford\u2019s\nmind of the old fashioned creed; Natural selection was to unriddle the\nuniverse, to yield a new system of ethics and education. We read that\nClifford had an extraordinary power of taking up a theory provisionally,\nof throwing himself into it, accepting it, applying it, and of rejecting\nit in case it was not satisfactory; and this may account perhaps for his\nsomewhat dogmatic assertion in many cases of crude views. There is one\ncharacteristic of Clifford however which all may emulate, and that is the\ncandor and fearlessness of his thinking and speaking. Let me quote a few\nwords from one of the best and most stirring of these essays:\n\n \u201cIf I let myself believe anything on insufficient evidence,\n there may be no great harm done by the mere belief; it may be\n true after all, or I may never have occasion to exhibit it in\n outward acts. But I cannot help doing this great wrong towards\n man, that I make myself credulous. The danger to society is\n not merely that it should believe wrong things, though that is\n great enough; but that it should become credulous, and lose\n the habit of testing things and inquiring into them; for then\n it must sink back into savagery.... If a man, holding a belief\n which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of afterwards,\n keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it in\n his mind, purposely avoids the reading of books and the company\n of men that call in question or discuss it, and regards as\n impious those questions which cannot easily be asked without\n disturbing it\u2014the life of that man is one long sin against\n mankind.\u201d\n\nThe essay on the nature of things in themselves marks the furthest\nlimit at which Clifford\u2019s speculation arrived. In it Clifford begins by\ndiscarding the ordinary distinction between reality and ideas, eternal\nobject and eternal subject, of feeling and thing. The distinction\nis really between two orders of feeling; there is the subjective or\ninner order, in which sorrow succeeds the hearing of bad news, and the\nobjective or outward in which the feeling of letting go is followed\nby sight of falling object. It is with the latter order that physical\nscience concerns itself, and all the inferences of natural science are\ninferences of my real or possible feeling. Since an object is a set\nof changes _in_ my consciousness and not anything out of it, is just\nmy feeling real or possible and therefore part of me, it might seem\nas if we were shut up in ourselves and excluded from participation in\nany other reality. So we should be, says Clifford, if we made no other\ninferences beside those of physical science; but when I come to the\nconclusion that _you_ are conscious and that you have objects in your\nconsciousness similar to those in mine, I am not inferring any actual or\npossible feelings of my own, but _your_ feelings, which are not and can\nnever be objects in my consciousness. To feelings and consciousness thus\ninferred to exist in another, Clifford gives the name of _eject_, because\nin the very act of inference they are _thrown out_ of my consciousness,\nrecognised as outside of it, as _not_ being a part of me. \u201cThe existence\nof my conception of you in my consciousness carries with it a belief in\nthe existence of you outside of my consciousness.... How this inference\nis justified, how consciousness can testify to the existence of anything\noutside of itself I do not pretend to say; I need not untie a knot which\nthe world has cut for me long ago.\u201d (Vol. II, p. 73.)\n\nThus, _objects_ in the sense of things presented in _my_ consciousness,\nmy phenomena, are not the sole or chief reality; ejects are equally real\nand my conviction of your existence as a conscious being like myself is\ncoeval and of equal weight with my belief in my own conscious existence.\nYou and your feelings are strictly speaking the only things which are\nreal outside of myself and my consciousness. For though my objects or\nphenomena are external to my body they are not outside my consciousness,\nbut part and parcel thereof. Nay, more than this an individual object,\ni. e. an object which is mine and mine only, never exists at all,\naccording to Clifford, in the mind of man; for with each object as it\nexists in my mind is bound up the thought of similar objects existing in\nother men\u2019s minds. All the objects in fact of which we are ever conscious\nare objects of consciousness in general, are in Clifford\u2019s phrase social\nobjects. \u201cA fixed habit causes an object as it is found in my mind to\nbe formed as a social object and insensibly embodies in it a reference\nto the minds of other men.\u201d This belief in ejects is moreover the root\nof all language and all morals:\u2014of language, because any sound which,\nbecoming a sign to my neighbor, becomes thereby a mark to myself, must\nby the nature of the case be a mark of the social object and not of the\nindividual object: of morals, because the \u201cfirst great commandment,\nevolved in the light of day by healthy processes wherever men have lived\ntogether, is, \u2018Put yourself in his place.\u2019\u201d\n\nSo far there is nothing to distinguish Clifford\u2019s theory from ordinary\nIdealism, which denies that the universe is real except as a phenomenon\nor appearance before a Self conscious thereof. The future course of\nClifford\u2019s argument turns upon two assumptions. One of these, borrowed\nfrom the current physiology of the brain, is this: that the changes in my\nconsciousness\u2014ejective facts he calls them\u2014run parallel with the changes\nin my brain, which are objective facts. The parallelism between them is\none of complexity, an analogy of structure. The complex ejective facts\nare the same sort of complication of simple ejects as the complex motions\nof the brain are of simple molecular movements. Clifford illustrates the\npoints from the relation of speech to writing, the sentence spoken is the\nsame function of the elementary sounds as the same sentence written is of\nthe corresponding letters. In like manner the complex human mind is the\nsame function of simple feelings as the brain is of primary atoms.\n\nThe other assumption is based upon the current doctrine of evolution. Our\nbodies have been evolved step by step out of inorganic matter, and we\nhave before our eyes a line of organisms connecting man with the simplest\natom of matter. In this series there is no hiatus between one form and\nanother, no breach of morphological continuity, but one species arises\nby insensible gradation out of its predecessors. Now in the case of\norganisms of a certain complexity we cannot help inferring consciousness,\nand as we go back along the line we not only see the complexity of the\norganism and of its nervous system insensibly diminishing, but for the\nfirst part of our course we have reason to think that the complexity\nof consciousness insensibly diminishes also.[38] The conclusion is\nforced upon us that nature is animate from top to bottom and that the\nhumblest atom has an elementary feeling or eject of its own as simple in\ncomparison with the complex intelligence of man as the atom is itself\nsimple in comparison with his very complex brain. Unless we admit this we\nare in a dilemma. The ejective facts which we cannot help inferring in\nthe case of all animals must extend further down through vegetables to\ninorganic phenomena, or else there must be a point at which we could say:\nhere the object begins to have an inner or ejective fact corresponding\nto it as my mind corresponds to my body. But the series of objective\nforms presents no sudden break anywhere, not even between animals and\nvegetables, such as to warrant our supposing that ejective facts extend\nthus far down in the series and no further.\n\nClifford is not quite as explicit about the nature of the elementary\nejects, which answer to moving molecules, as we should like him to be.\nOf one thing however he is quite certain; they are elementary feelings\nwhich yet are neither modifications of a consciousness nor yet imply\na consciousness in which alone they can exist. Every feeling may be\npart of a consciousness, but it need not be so. Consciousness is only a\nderivative and secondary result, following on the arrangement of feeling\nin a particular way and it is evolved at a very late period in the\nhistory of the world. In itself a feeling is an absolute _Ding-an-sich_,\nwhose existence is not relative to anything else. _Sentitur_ is all that\ncan be said of it.\n\nThus strictly speaking it is not _consciousness_ which extends throughout\nthe series of objective forms from man down to the molecule. It is\nonly feeling. Consciousness proper only belongs to the later and higher\nmembers of the series. \u201cIf we make a jump from man say to the tunicate\nmollusks, we see no reason there to infer the existence of consciousness\nat all.\u201d Therefore the doctrine of evolution itself forbids us to regard\nall ejects as being of the _same_ substant as mind. They are only of like\nsubstance \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd not \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, only quasi-mental[39] and not in\nthemselves either rational, intelligent, or conscious.[40]\n\nBesides the evolutionist\u2019s reason that it is absurd to attribute\nconsciousness and personality to tunicate mollusks there is another\nreason drawn from human introspection for asserting elementary feelings\nto be absolute and unrelated existence. \u201cA feeling, at the instance when\nit _exists_, exists _an und f\u00fcr sich_ and not as _my_ feeling.\u201d[41] The\nself-perception of the ego, the sense that in all my various feelings it\nis _I_ who am conscious, this \u201cunity of apperception\u201d does not exist in\nthe instantaneous consciousness which it unites, but only in subsequent\nreflection upon it. It consists further in the power of establishing a\ncertain connexion between the memories of any two feelings which we had\nat the same instant.\n\nThere is one other point of extreme importance to be noticed in\nClifford\u2019s account of the elementary feelings or ejects. They are\nconnected together in their sequence and coexistence by counterparts\nof the physical laws of matter. Were it not so their correspondence\nwith motions of matter could not be kept up. That they should be\nthus connected with one another militates at first sight with the\ncharacteristic of absoluteness above ascribed to them by Clifford. We\nmust suppose therefore that when Clifford says that their existence is\nnot relative to anything else, he means no more than that they are not\nultimately related to a personal consciousness. We must suppose that it\nis these laws of the sequence and coexistence of elementary feelings\nwhich, \u201cwhen molecules are so combined together as to form the film on\nthe under side of a jelly-fish, so combine the elements of mind-stuff\nwhich go along with them as to form the faint beginnings of sentience.\nThe same laws combine feelings so as to form some kind of consciousness,\nwhen the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and nervous\nsystem of a vertebrate\u201d (p. 85).\n\nWe are now after these preliminary explanations in a position to\nappreciate what is the gist and core of Clifford\u2019s speculations. It is\nthis, that the reality external to our minds which is represented in\nour minds as matter is in itself mind-stuff or elementary feelings. The\nuniverse consists entirely of mind-stuff. Some of this is woven into the\ncomplex form of human minds containing imperfect representations of the\nmind-stuff outside them and of themselves also, as a mirror reflects\nits own image in another mirror, _ad infinitum_. Such an imperfect\nrepresentation is called a material universe. The two chief points\ntherefore of the doctrine as summed up by Clifford himself are:\n\n1) Matter is a mental picture in which mind-stuff is the thing\nrepresented.\n\n2) Reason, intelligence, and volition are properties of a complex which\nis made up of elements themselves not rational, not intelligent, not\nconscious.\n\nWe shall do Clifford an injustice if we interpret the foregoing theory as\na dualistic and not as a monistic view, i. e. as a view which postulates\ntwo ultimate principles of reality rather than one. Clifford however\noften speaks as if feeling and matter were two co\u00f6rdinate aspects of\nreality, irreducible to one another. For example he allows himself to\nspeak of mind-stuff as going along with the material object, of laws\nconnecting the elements of mind-stuff which are only _counterparts_ of\nthe physical laws of matter and not those laws themselves. Again he\nwrites (p. 78) as follows: \u201cThe distinction between eject and object,\nforbids us to regard the eject, another man\u2019s mind, as coming into the\nworld of objects in any way, or as standing in the relation of cause\nor effect to any changes in that world.\u201d Such language reminds us of\nSpinoza\u2019s doctrine that body alone can determine body to move and only\nthought determine thought to think, but we must not therefore suppose\nthat for Clifford as for Spinoza the two rival kingdoms of thought\nand extended matter are irreconcilably severed or nominally united by\nthe figment of a single substance of which they are attributes: What\nClifford means is that the thing _is_ a feeling so far as it is anything\nat all and that, if things coexist or succeed each other according to\nlaws, they only coexist and follow _as_ feelings and conformably to\nlaws of feeling. Not only is the elementary feeling a thing itself, but\nthings-in-themselves are elementary feelings.\n\nIt is incumbent therefore on us to ask if an elementary feeling is\nequal to the double burden put upon it by this theory of being the real\nuniverse of things and of creating the human intelligence. In answering\nthis question we must be careful to divest feelings beforehand of any\ncharacteristics which they only possess as gathered up into the unity\nof a self, for at the stage in which we are considering reality selves\nhave not yet arisen. It is hard to conceive what is left of feeling after\nthese characteristics have been removed, nor does introspection help us\nhere, for, as Clifford very truly says, the fundamental deliverance of\nconsciousness affirms its own complexity and it seems impossible, as I\nam at present constituted, to have only one absolutely simple feeling at\na time. Elementary feelings however could hardly constitute the cosmos\nwithout they follow one another, coexist, and connect themselves together\nin their groupings according to certain laws, i. e. by some inherent\nnecessity always take up the same attitudes toward each other, and this\nmuch Clifford assumes that they do. Yet these assumptions will not bear\nexamination. Let us examine first the postulate that feelings follow in\na fixed order; call them _a_ _b_ _c_ _d_, _b_ succeeds _a_ and precedes\n_c_ and it makes a difference, which comes after or before the other. Now\nbeing absolute feelings, not only is _a_ past and non-existent before _b_\nbegins to be, so _b_ before _c_, but each is in turn the entire reality\nand there is no consciousness before which they pass in procession. The\nreal would thus fall into disconnected and mutually indifferent moments\n_a_ _b_ _c_ _d_; and as each of these in turn exhausts reality and is\nalso unconscious of what goes before and after, there would be no real\nsuccession at all. In a real succession it makes a difference whether _b_\ncomes before _or_ after _a_, but in the case we suppose it could make no\ndifference. In truth there can be no relation of before and after between\ntwo terms except for a self, which takes note of the one disappearing and\nof the other appearing; and whenever we speak of things following one\nanother we tacitly presuppose a self before whom the procession passes.\n\nIt is even more difficult to understand how elementary feelings can be\ngrouped and complicated in a fixed order of coexistence. Mind has not\nyet emerged, so we must suppose that the grouping takes place in space.\nIn that case one feeling must be right or left, above or below another.\nThe futility of such speculation will come home to anyone who will try to\nrealise how a feeling of smell can be above or below one of taste.\n\nWe have next to consider Clifford\u2019s account of the genesis out of\nelementary feelings of personal consciousness. The hypothesis of\nmind-stuff, we must remember, was framed in order to preserve the same\ncontinuity of ejective facts as we see to exist in the case of objective\nfacts, to provide, that is, a gradual development of the human mind out\nof the simpler feelings of am\u0153b\u00e6 and even of atoms. It must be denied\nhowever that the hypothesis is a success if we retain the usual meanings\nof the words continuity and development. Properly speaking a thing can\nonly be said to grow or develop when it remains the same with itself all\nthrough the process and unfolds therein capacities which were anyhow\nlatent in it to start with. Thus a tadpole develops into a frog, a grub\ninto a butterfly, and the child grows into the man. But in the series\nof ejects which begins from atoms and after running through am\u0153ba and\nape finally culminates in the human intelligence there is no point of\nidentity, no community between the first and last terms. The eject which\nis the molecule is denied by Clifford to be either conscious or rational,\nnor has it even will, like the philosophical factotum of Schopenhauer or\nVon Hartmann. It is a purely negative conception, the abstract opposite\nof that mind into which it is to ultimately develop. The hiatus between\nour intelligence and a thing in itself, which call it feeling, or\nmind-stuff, or what we will, is merely all that our intelligence is not,\nis none the less of a hiatus, because it is, with the help of apes and\nam\u0153b\u00e6, spread out thin, so to speak. It would be better frankly to avow\nthe chasm that exists than to gloss over it with words like evolution and\ndevelopment.\n\n\u201cWhen a material organism,\u201d writes Clifford, \u201chas reached a certain\ncomplexity of nervous structure, the complex of ejective facts which goes\nalong with its action reaches that mode of complication which is called\nconsciousness. When a stream of feelings is so compacted together that\nat each instant it consists of (1) new feelings, (2) fainter repetitions\nof previous ones, and (3) links connecting these repetitions, the stream\nis called a consciousness. Consciousness is thus a relative thing, a\nmode of complication of certain elements, and a property of the complex\nso produced.\u201d If we look into this statement we see that it only amounts\nto this: that feelings constitute a conscious self when they become the\nfeelings of a conscious self and not before, for except as gathered up in\nthe unity of a self which has memory and remains the same throughout its\ndifferences feelings can be neither new nor repeated nor joined by links.\n\n1) That a feeling is new means that I attend to it, contrast it with\nformer ones, and decide that I have not felt it before.\n\n2) That a feeling is a previous feeling now repeated means that I\nrecognise it as having already occurred.\n\n3) If feelings are joined by links of what nature are these links?\nClifford does not say that they also are feelings, so presumably they are\nnot; in that case no link is left save a connecting self. But even if the\nlink is a feeling it cannot be less than a feeling of the togetherness\nof two other feelings, but such a feeling would involve memory of those\nfeelings and memory involves self-hood. It is really, however, an abuse\nof words to apply the term feeling in such a case. We might with Hume ask\nof this feeling which links other feelings \u201cIs it a taste, a smell, a\nsound, an impression of sight or touch?\u201d\n\nClifford makes a reference to Haeckel\u2019s treatise upon \u201cZellseelen und\nSeelenzellen.\u201d[42] Haeckel\u2019s view is that every protoplasmic cell has\na soul of its own and that when a number of these are combined under\ncertain conditions, as in the human brain, they generate as their\nresultant the human soul. He helps out his theory by pointing to such\nphrases as national spirit, a nation\u2019s conscience, a people\u2019s will.\nNothing, he contends, could be more real than these entities, which\nare yet only resultants of the wills, spirits, and consciences of the\nseparate individuals who compose the nation.\n\nThis is an interesting speculation, which it would be a pity to dismiss\nabruptly merely because it is groundless. No doubt our bodies and brains\nmay be regarded as colonies of protoplasmic units of which each has an\nindependent life of its own, of which each is born, nourishes itself,\nreproduces itself, and at last breaks up and dies. The colorless cells\nespecially in our blood are such units and have as good a claim to be\ncalled individuals as the am\u0153ba which we find swimming about by itself\nin any pond. These units are certainly alike and must be allowed to\nhave inner states of their own. It may also be freely conceded that the\nexistence of certain inward states in these cells of which my brain and\nnerves are composed is the condition of certain states of feeling and\nemotion arising in me. But all these admissions fail to advance us a step\ntoward Haeckel\u2019s conclusion. That any number of atoms of protoplasm have\nsouls and soul-states is not enough _per se_ to produce an extra soul\nwhich is none of them, yet _like_ their souls and possessed of a life of\nits own. Even if the molecules of my brain were each in possession of a\nself-consciousness as ample as my own, their mere juxtaposition could not\ngive rise to my self-consciousness. From first to last their soul-states\nremain theirs, mine remain mine. The reasoning employed by Haeckel\ninvolves a fallacy of composition:\u2014because each of a colony of cells _a_,\n_b_, _c_, _d_, has a soul of its own, therefore the colony as a whole has\na soul of its own, which is not the soul of any one of them. Nor do the\nanalogies Haeckel invokes help him at all, for the life of a nation does\nnot exist at all except as the lives of the individuals composing that\nnation, nor do we expect to find any traits in our so-called national\nspirit which are not ultimately contributed by individuals; Haeckel\nhowever would have us believe that the mere composition of the primitive\nand simple souls of separate am\u0153b\u00e6 results in a _human_ soul with its\nwealth of intuitions and interests. The utmost we are entitled to say is\nthat given a certain collocation of cells in the brain there may by an\nentirely new act of the infinite be generated a human soul. It is only by\nplaying fast and loose with words that we can deduce this new soul from\nan aggregate of other souls either like or unlike itself.\n\nIt is surprising that Clifford should have recognised that the reality\nunderlying so-called matter is akin to mind and yet have identified\nit rather with the quasi-mental facts of an am\u0153ba or of an atom than\nwith the intelligence of man. The argument by which he arrives at\nthis conclusion is as follows: You as a face, a voice, a touch, as an\nobject to my senses in short, are a mere phantasm or appearance in my\nconsciousness, part and parcel of myself and not distinct from me in\nany way. But I cannot help inferring an eject, to wit feelings and a\nconsciousness like my own, behind the sensible show of your person; and\nthis consciousness of yours which I address as _you_, is the truth of\nthe object or appearance, which I have. _You_ are the reality which I\nreally perceive, so far as I perceive anything more than my own feelings.\nSimilarly when I watch an am\u0153ba, what I perceive as a somewhat formless\nmass of protoplasm is really in itself the struggling life within. Lastly\nwhat I handle and perceive as a crystal or metal is really the eject. If\nhere we read force or unconscious will instead of eject or mind-stuff,\nClifford\u2019s view would practically coincide with Schopenhauer\u2019s; for force\nis truly an eject in Clifford\u2019s sense, not an object or appearance to me.\n\nNow the human intelligence arises late in the history of things and is\naltogether a secondary and derivative thing. Consequently the world\nis not really what it is for my consciousness. My _Weltanschauung_ is\nfalse in proportion as my mind is complex and derivative. Conversely,\nthe _Weltanschauung_ of each being approximates to truth and becomes\nless and less illusive in proportion as the eject which it in reality is\napproaches the primitive simplicity of mind-stuff. I am _really_ very\nlittle of what I am _consciously_. If you want a truer exponent of the\ntruth of things you must go to the am\u0153ba or lower still. It, as compared\nwith me, is _consciously_ most of what it is _really_. The absolutely\nsimple atom is probably the only being who is quite free from delusions.\nThe conclusion then to which Clifford conducts us is this: that the\nuniverse is not really such as it appears to our intelligence, still\nless, I presume, such as it would appear to a higher intelligence than\nours. It is really such and such only as it would appear to the being\nwhose eject is the lowest rung in the ladder of mind-stuff. Our universe\nspread out in space and time, with all its splendours and harmonies,\nis a delusion; nay, more, the human soul with its \u00e6sthetic and moral\nsensibilities, its fears and aspirations, is the parent delusion which\nbreeds the delusion of a cosmos. \u201cWe are such stuff as dreams are made\nof.\u201d\n\nThe loose way in which Clifford used the word feeling, as equivalent\nto any form of consciousness, blinded him to the fact that a qualified\nthing as such is not given in feeling at all and led him to suppose\nthat the universe as we know it would continue to stand in the absence\nof all complex ejects whatever. Mr. Green has shown that all theories\nof the object which ignore the workmanship of thought manifest therein\nand identify the _esse_ of things with their _percipi_ lead straight to\nnihilism. To such nihilism Clifford\u2019s doctrine, like Hume\u2019s which it\nresembles, immediately bring us. But Hume did not take seriously the\ndemolition of reality involved in his theory that things are only real\nas they are felt and that feelings are \u201centirely loose and separate\u201d\n(Treatise I, 559) while the solid framework of reality is an illusion\nbred of a propensity of our minds to feign connections and relations\nwhere there are none. Hume tells us that he regarded his own speculations\nas \u201cphilosophical melancholy and delirium,\u201d as \u201cclouds to be dispelled\u201d\n(Treatise I, 501). He writes \u201cI dine, I play a game of backgammon, I\nconverse and am merry with my friends; and when, after three or four\nhours\u2019 amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so\ncold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find it in my heart to\nenter into them any further.\u201d But Clifford, like Huxley, took Hume _au\ngrand serieux_, forgetting that feeling as such does not reveal an object\nat all. There is a passage in a letter of Clifford\u2019s written to Professor\nPollock in September, 1874, \u00e0 propos of Green\u2019s introduction to Hume,\nwhich evinces pretty clearly that Clifford did not discern the true drift\nof Hume\u2019s speculations in the way Hume did himself. \u201cI hope,\u201d he writes,\n\u201cyou have seen Sidgwick\u2019s remarks on the introduction; he points out\nthat to prove Hume insufficient is not to do much at the present day....\nGreen, for instance, points out that Hume has no complete theory of the\nobject;\u2014to find fault with Hume for the omission is like blaming Newton\nfor not including Maxwell\u2019s electricity in the Principia.\u201d Here Clifford\nhardly writes as if he saw that his own theory of the object as e. g. an\nunrelated feeling is open to exactly the same criticisms as Hume\u2019s, as\nif he understood, what Hume had an inkling of, that, in proving the ego\nto be a relative thing instead of the heart and centre of reality, you\ndissipate the universe into nothing. There are several other features in\nClifford\u2019s doctrine that call for criticism. It should for example be\npointed out that the entire view that ejects are the truth of objects\nis in the first instance a deliverance of consciousness itself. I only\ntranscend my individual feelings, says Clifford, so far as I infer\na consciousness more or less like my own to underlie them; and this\nunderlying eject is the sole reality. \u201cHow this inference is justified,\nhow consciousness can testify to the existence of anything outside of\nitself, I do not pretend to say; I need not untie a knot which the world\nhas cut for me long ago.\u201d (Vol. II, p. 73.) But if consciousness is but\nthe property of a temporary conjunction of unconscious feelings, what\nvalue shall we attach to its assurances? They are certainly not valid\nexcept for itself; they do not hold good for the atomic feelings of which\nthe world ultimately consists. But my belief that the real is in the\nlast resort an atom of feeling is simply an extension of my conviction\nthat ejects are the truth of my feelings. Prove this conviction an\nillusion\u2014and Clifford does prove it to be such, when he declares\nconsciousness to be a relative thing\u2014and you prove the entire theory an\nillusion. Thus the tail of Clifford\u2019s theory is bitten off by the head.\n\nThe hypothesis that feelings can be felt, without being felt as my\nfeelings, is a very noteworthy one. \u201cA feeling at the instant when it\n_exists_, exists _an und f\u00fcr sich_, and not as my feeling.\u201d This is\nwhy a Greek said \u03b4\u03ad\u03b4\u03bf\u03c1\u03ba\u03b1 in the sense of I see, because the act of\nperception is necessarily over, when we become conscious of it. \u201cWhen,\u201d\ncontinues Clifford, \u201cI remember the feeling as _my_ feeling, there\ncomes up not merely a faint repetition of the feeling, but inextricably\nconnected with it a whole set of connections with the general stream of\nmy consciousness.\u201d This is very truly and acutely observed but it is an\nadmission that the unrelated feeling is no element in our experience,\nthat in our cosmos at least there is no \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7 whatever, but that every\ncorner of it is illumined by the presence of a relating self. _My_\nconsciousness never directly testifies at all to the existence of an\nabsolute feeling. To be _my_ feeling a feeling must already be brought by\nconnections of content into the web of my experience, but what do I know\nof feelings which are not mine. Are not \u201cabsolute feelings\u201d an inference\nbased on observation of low organisms like the am\u0153ba, which we are\nconvinced have no self and yet feel? It should be also noticed that this\nsupposition that we are not directly but only _ex post facto_ conscious\nof our feelings \u1f14\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd. Thus Clifford writes: \u201cThis memory\n(of a feeling which existed _an und f\u00fcr sich_ as _my_ feeling) is, _qua_\nmemory, relative to the past feeling, which it partially recalls; but\nin so far as it is itself a feeling, _it_ is absolute, _Ding an sich_.\u201d\nThat is to say, I am not directly but only _ex post facto_ conscious even\nof what I remember. To be conscious of the content of a memory I must\n_remember_ that I remember it. Surely this new memory in turn cannot be\nknown _ex post facto_ and so I must _remember_ that I remember that I\nremember _et sic ad infinitum_, before I become really _conscious_ of\nanything at all.\n\nOne other point might be raised. What is the nature and origin of the\nlaws which govern the sequence and coexistence of feelings. We have\nalready seen that feelings as such neither follow nor coexist apart from\na self.\n\n\u201cThese laws are counterparts of the laws which govern physical\nphenomena.\u201d Clifford in writing thus conducts his speculation Without\nprejudice to his common-sense belief in a world of necessarily and\nrationally related things. He does not see that with the reduction of\nthe real to a feeling physical facts disappear and with these facts the\nlaws to which laws of feeling shall correspond. He is evidently confusing\nthe laws of feeling with the psychological laws of association which\ndepend upon the environment of the individual\u2019s senses by a world already\nreal. He does not see that the problem he really imposes on himself is\nthis: starting from no world at all to arrive at one, or starting from\nthe world as it may be supposed to picture itself in the feelings of an\nam\u0153ba to arrive at it as it exists for the human intelligence. We must\nnot concede to Clifford any more than to Hume this postulate of a real\ncosmical order which shall give the cue to feelings when and how to\nfollow and coexist. Huxley only allows it to Hume, because not having\npassed the threshold of Idealistic philosophy he cannot divest himself\nof it. If, however, this postulate be denied, then the doctrine that the\n_esse_ of things lies in their _percipi_ will recommend itself to no one.\n\n F. C. CONYBEARE.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[37] On the whole, however, it is probable that in dealing such hard\nblows as he did at priests and dogmas he was actuated by sheer love of\ntruth, and those who knew him best assure us that he was entirely free\nfrom bitterness and from the vanity which sets some people upon beating\ntheir grandmother in public by way of showing that they are grown up in\ntheir opinions.\n\n[38] _Clifford\u2019s Essays_, Vol. ii, p. 83.\n\n[39] Vol. ii, p. 61.\n\n[40] Vol. ii, p. 87.\n\n[41] P. 80.\n\n[42] _Deutsche Rundschau_, July, 1878.\n\n\n\n\nARE THERE THINGS IN THEMSELVES?\n\n\nThe proposition that things in themselves cannot be known, has often, and\nperhaps justly, been proclaimed as the central idea of Kant\u2019s philosophy.\nKant concludes the first section of his \u201cTranscendentale Elementarlehre\u201d\nwith this \u201ccritical admonition\u201d:\n\n \u201cThat in general nothing which is intuited in space is a thing\n in itself, and that space is not a form which belongs as a\n property to things; but that objects are quite unknown to us\n in themselves, and what we call outward objects are nothing\n else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form\n is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is\n not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be.\u201d\n (\u201cKritik d. r. V.\u201d \u00a7 4.)\n\nThe term \u201cthing in itself\u201d means originally the object as it is,\nindependent of the thinking subject\u2019s cognition. For instance: A rainbow\nappears in the clouds; the rainbow is not a thing in itself, but the\nappearance of a thing in itself. The rainbow exists in man\u2019s sensibility\nonly. The colors of the spectrum, indeed all colors, the colors of the\nsky, of the clouds, of trees, of living beings, are sensations only;\nthey are subjective phenomena, they are certain kinds of feelings\nrepresenting objective realities, but they are not these objective\nrealities themselves. They are perceived in the brain and are projected\nto a place outside the organism. The rainbow, as it is seen, is not a\nthing, but it is something seen, it is an appearance only. And this is\ntrue of all things seen and heard and perceived by any one of the senses.\nThe sense-pictures are localised in space, they are projected outside to\na spot where the combined experience of the senses has taught a sentient\nbeing to expect them. But all the objects of the objective world as they\nare perceived are and remain subjective sense-perceptions. The world of\nour senses around us is woven of our sensations. It is mere appearance.\nThis is not a question concerning which there is any doubt, this is\nsimply a matter of fact. But the question arises, \u201cCan we know things as\nthey are independent of sensation? Can we know things in themselves?\u201d\n\nThe physicist and every scientist is engaged with the problem, What are\nnatural phenomena independent of sensation? Light is a sensation of\nvision, but what is the objective process that takes place when a human\neye perceives light? The physicist answers this problem by eliminating\nin his mind the sense-element and by describing the facts of the process\nin terms of matter and motion. His answer is that light, objectively\nconsidered, is a certain vibration of the ether. If we can rely upon\nphysical science, the thing in itself of a rainbow would be a certain\nrefraction of ether-waves. These vibrations of the ether-waves are\ntransmitted from the sun, and being broken in the falling raindrops\nactually take place independent of cognition, they are real whether we\nlook at them or not.\n\nThe ultimate aim of science is a description of the natural phenomena\nnot in terms of sense-elements, but in terms of form. That feature of a\nthing which we call its matter, constitutes its reality, but the form\nof a thing, of a motion, or of a process makes the thing that which it\nis; every act of causation is a change of form, and the forms of things\nare determined with the assistance of the operations of purely formal\nthought, i. e. through measuring or counting. Such is science, not only\nas it ought to be, but also as it actually is. All our scientists, each\none in his field, are consciously or unconsciously working out a solution\nof this problem. And a solution of this problem means, in our conception,\nthe objective cognition of the world\u2014i. e., a description of the natural\nprocesses as they are independent of sensibility.\n\nKant knew very well that a description of things and of natural processes\nin terms of form was possible. He clung, nevertheless, to the proposition\nthat things in themselves are unknowable. And why? A description of\nthings and of natural processes in terms of form was in his opinion\nnot as yet a description of things in themselves, for\u2014and here we are\nconfronted with the original idea and the fundamental error of Kantian\nthought\u2014Kant did not consider the forms of things as an objective quality\nof theirs, he maintained that the formal element is purely mental and\nmerely subjective. The thinking mind, he declared, attributes them to the\nobject. Space and time, the pure forms of existence, together with all\nother forms, such as causation, are, according to Kant, not qualities\nof the objective world, but of the thinking subject. The thinking\nsubject cannot help viewing the world in the form of its own cognition,\nit transfers these forms to the objects. Therefore the thing in itself\naccording to Kant would not be represented in a description of the thing\npurely in terms of form, the thing in itself would mean the thing as it\nwould be, independent of time and space.\n\nLet us here point out a distinction between the thing in itself and\nnoumenon. Noumenon means \u201ca thing of thought.\u201d The noumenal world is the\nworld of thoughts in a thinking being\u2019s mind. The noumenon must not be\nidentified with the thing in itself. The two terms are often confounded,\nbut they have to be distinguished. The idea of reflected ether-vibrations\nis a \u201cnoumenon,\u201d but the reflected ether-vibrations themselves, the\nobjective process are a thing, i. e. an objective reality, and in so far\nas they are a reality, considered as being independent of sensation, we\nmay call them \u201ca thing in itself.\u201d Now when Kant denies the objectivity\nof time and space, he must, implicitly, also deny the objective\nvalidity of a description made in terms of measuring and counting. The\npictorial world of our sense-perception is subjective, it is built up of\nsensations, it is not objective; and the world of thought is the attempt\nto reduce the subjective world of sense-imagery to terms of objective\nvalidity, i. e. to terms of form. But this world of thought is according\nto Kant purely mental, it is purely noumenal, or, in other words, noumena\ndo not represent things independent of cognition, they represent things\nas our mind thinks them. The sensory world is mere appearance, it is a\nsubjective phenomenon, but the world of thought, says Kant, is no less\nsubjective, it is a world of thought which describes things in terms of\npurely mental properties and not in properties of the things themselves.\nThis is tantamount to the proposition, that things in themselves cannot\nbe known.\n\nThe term \u201cthing in itself,\u201d in the sense of a thing as it is independent\nof sensibility, would better be called \u201cthe objective thing,\u201d and we\nshall so call it when we wish to distinguish it from Kant\u2019s thing in\nitself. The objective thing is the thing, not expressed in terms of\nsubjective elements, such as feelings or sensibility, but in terms of\nobjective elements, i. e. in terms of form. That a description of things\nin terms of forms is possible has never been denied either by Kant or by\nany Kantian; but they deny that these descriptions are anything more than\nmere noumena; Kant and the orthodox Kantians deny that they represent the\nthings as they are in themselves. Thus the term thing in itself in the\nKantian sense comes to mean the thing as it is independent of space and\ntime.\n\nThat every noumenon is a mental sign is a matter of course; the noumenal\nworld is ideal. But we maintain that these mental signs represent real\nqualities of the objective world; they have a meaning; the things\nrepresented by them are actual features of reality. Kant denies this.\nTo him the noumenal world is purely noumenal. To Kant there is no space\noutside the space-conception, and so he declares that space is ideal;\nit is not an objective quality of things. However, we maintain, that\nour space-conception describes, i. e. depicts, or represents space, our\nspace-conception is ideal, yet space is not ideal but real; it is an\nobjective quality of the world.\n\nKant\u2019s view is dualistic, or at least necessarily leads to dualism, and\nit appears to rest on an unpronounced dualistic assumption. Kant treats\n\u201cthe subject\u201d as something quite distinct and separate from \u201cthe object.\u201d\nIf he had borne in mind that the subject is always at the same time an\nobject, he would have treated both subject as well as object as mere\nabstractions of one and the same reality. Resting upon this erroneous\npresupposition, Kant\u2019s most consequential mistake, in our opinion, was\nhis conception of what he called \u201cthe ideality of time and space.\u201d If\ntime and space were purely ideal, purely mental, purely subjective, then\nindeed, the things as they are would forever remain unknown to us, then\nindeed the thinking mind would be as if shut up within a hollow globe out\nof which it could never escape, then indeed the world would be divided\ninto two parts, the objective world, and the subjective world; and the\ngap between both could never be bridged over. The thinking mind would\nhave within itself a noumenal world built upon the subjective elements\nof sense-impressions. This subjective world would possess no objective\nvalue, it would not describe realities, and the objective world would\nthus be unknowable, inscrutable, and mystical.\n\nThe idea of a thing in itself found another support in a mistaken\nconception of the unity of certain things, especially of organisms. The\nunity of a combination of parts is not merely the sum of the parts,\nit consists in their peculiar combination which makes an harmonious\nco-operation possible. This unity is an additional element; it is an\nentirely new creation which exhibits features not contained in any\nof its parts. There is no latent watch contained in a heap of little\nwheels and cogs, the watch is created through the combination of these\nwheels and cogs. The unity of a thing is its form, consisting in a\nspecial arrangement of its parts; and this form although not material is\nnevertheless real.\n\nThe materialistic conception overlooks the importance of form; but the\nspiritualist and also the transcendentalist materialise it as some\nspiritual substance, as entities or independent existences. They are in\nthis way as much materialistic as the materialist.\n\nThe question has seriously been asked, What is a melody in itself. The\nquestion has sense when we understand by it, What are those new qualities\nwhich appear through a certain combination of sounds? Those qualities\nare not nothing, they are something quite peculiar. We call one of them\nrhythm, another one is the fixed succession of notes of a different\npitch. The qualities of a melody as a whole are not qualities of its\nseparate parts; yet therefore the melody is not a thing in itself. We\nmight just as well speak of a watch in itself, meaning thereby that\npeculiar unity of the combination of its parts which makes of them a\nwatch. But if we thus speak of \u201cthe watch in itself,\u201d we must be aware\nthat this idea has not somewhere in a transcendental fairy-land an\nindependent existence above space and time, and outside of its parts.\nThe unity of a certain interacting group of parts is, on the one hand,\nno mere addition of the thinking subject, it is not purely noumenal, it\nis real and objective; on the other hand it is not a thing in itself,\nindependent of its parts, it is the product of the relations in which its\nparts affect one another.\n\nIs not perhaps the basis of these vagaries a mistaken conception of\nlanguage? We call a certain sensory picture a tree and we say, the tree\nhas roots, a stem, branches, leaves, and fruits. Autumn sets in and the\nwind shakes the leaves off the branches. Now we speak of a leafless\ntree. We cut the tree down and we speak of a rootless tree. We burn the\ntrunk and the branches, and the tree as a phenomenon is gone, all its\nproperties are taken away. What remains? The tree in itself is left, but\nthe tree in itself does not exist. If all the property of a person is\ntaken from him, the person himself is still left. The properties of a\ntree, however, are not properties in the same sense; they are qualities.\nIf all the qualities and parts of a tree are gone, if only the tree in\nitself is left\u2014then there is left nothing but the empty word tree, the\nidea of a tree.\n\n\nII. KANT\u2019S VIEW OF SPACE AND TIME.\n\nLet us briefly consider the ground upon which Kant bases his view of the\nideality of space and time. Kant asks:\n\n \u201cWhat then are time and space? Are they real existences? Or are\n they merely relations or determinations of things, such however\n as would equally belong to these things in themselves, though\n they should never become objects of intuition; or _are they\n such as belong only to the form of intuition, and consequently\n to the subjective constitution of the mind_, without which\n these predicates of time and space could not be attached to any\n object?\u201d[43] (Kr. d. r. V. \u00a7 2; \u201cMeiklejohn,\u201d p. 23.)\n\nWe should say, to state our opinion briefly, that space and time are not\n\u201creal existences,\u201d i. e. they are not concrete objects, but they are real\nnevertheless; they are not material things; not thingish realities, yet\nthey are objective properties of things. They are the forms of things\nand processes, and belong to the things whether they become objects of\ncognition or not. In this sense, they actually belong to the things in\nthemselves, viz. to the objective things.\n\nKant argues that space and time are not conceptions derived from outward\nexperience; they have not been abstracted from sense-impressions. They\nare necessary representations _a priori_, they are not discursive ideas\nor generalisations, for there is but one space and one time, space being\nrepresented as infinite and time as eternal.\n\nFrom these arguments Kant draws the conclusions that space and time do\nnot represent qualities of an object but that they are the form of all\nsensory phenomena, space being the form of the external, time of the\ninternal sense. In other words, space and time belong to the subjective\ncondition of the sensibility and not to the objective world.\n\nWe answer that our conceptions of space and time are after all derived\nfrom experience. Space and time are abstractions. There is no time in\nitself. There is no space in itself. Space and time are not directly\nderived from outward experience, nor are they derived from the\nsense-elements of experience. Inner experience, i. e. reflection to the\nexclusion of sense-impression, the experimenting with pure forms, will\nlead to the construction of the concepts of space as well as of time.\nSpace and time, magnitudes and numbers having been constructed in the\nmind of a thinking subject are applied to practical experience. When\ncounting three trees we do not abstract the number \u201cthree\u201d from the three\ntrees, but we apply to them the system of numbers in our possession.\n\nSays Kant:\n\n \u201cWe never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves\n of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough\n think that no objects are found in it. It must therefore be\n considered as the condition of the possibility of phenomena and\n by no means as a determination dependent upon them and is a\n representation _a priori_, which necessarily supplies the basis\n for external phenomena.\u201d\n\nSpace being the generalised concept of extended form, and time that of\nmotion without reference to any contents, it is naturally impossible to\nthink the non-existence of space and time. Thinking is an act, it is a\nprocess; and any act, any process, any event, is a reality which implies\nor presupposes the existence of the forms of reality. We can think of\nmatter without reference to form, i. e. we can have the abstract idea\nof matter; but we cannot think that there is any matter void of form.\nThis does by no means prove that form has nothing to do with matter. On\nthe contrary, it proves that form and matter are inseparable. The form\nof existence need not therefore be called \u201cthe basis\u201d of existence, it\nis simply one universal feature of existence. And the form of existence\nbeing bound up with existence itself, it is necessary that any thinking\nexistence in so far as it is real, in so far as it is at the same time\nan object and part of the objective world should also be in possession\nof the conditions to evolve the idea of form out of itself through inner\nexperience.\n\nThis inner experience of experimenting with pure forms is also a kind of\nexperience. It is not a purely subjective process; it is a subjective\nprocess to the thinking subject, which to other subjects, however, would\nappear as an objective process. The laws of pure form as stated in the\nsciences of purely formal thought, are not merely subjective; they\npossess objective validity. It is true and from our standpoint a matter\nof course that the laws of form are _a priori_, which means, they hold\ngood for any pure form.\n\nModern positivism, such as we defend it, is monistic. We consider the\nentire world as one great whole and do not forget that all noumenal\nrepresentations of certain features of the world, of matter, mind, form,\neven of things and our own souls included, are mere abstractions. Reality\nitself remains undivided and indivisible. Abstract concepts are mental\nsymbols invented to represent certain features of reality. But although\nwe can in our mind separate these features and distinguish them from\nother features, in the world of reality they cannot be cut out or thought\nof as things in themselves. Granting the oneness of reality which dawns\nupon us instinctively before consciousness is fully matured, we are\ninevitably led to the conception that there is but one form of reality,\nwhich implies that there is but one space and one time.\n\n\nIII. FORM NOT IMPORTED BY THE MIND INTO REALITY.\n\nKant says, and in this we agree with Kant, that \u201call thought must\ndirectly by means of certain signs relate ultimately to _Anschauungen_.\u201d\nThe word _Anschauung_ (the \u201conlooking,\u201d generally translated by\n\u201cintuition\u201d) means the immediate presence of sense-perception. Says Kant:\n\u201cThe effect of an object upon our faculty of representation is called\nsensation, and that intuition which refers to an object by means of\nsensation is called empirical intuition.\u201d For instance, I see a rose: The\nimage of the rose which I see is the appearance or the phenomenon. Kant\ncontinues:\n\n \u201cThat which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation I\n term its _matter_, but that which effects that the contents of\n the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call\n its _form_.\u201d\n\nIn other words matter is that which affects the senses and form is to\nbe expressed in relations. The difference between the formal and the\nmaterial is obvious. The formal is of great importance, nay, it is of\nparamount importance, but the formal is neither anything apart from the\nmaterial nor is it a substance. Both concepts are disparate, but they\nhave been derived by mental abstraction from the same reality.\n\nWe fully agree with Kant when he continues:\n\n \u201cThat in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which\n they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be\n itself sensation.\u201d\n\nBut we do not agree with Kant when from this proposition he derives the\nfollowing conclusion:\n\n \u201cIt is, then, the _matter_ of all phenomena that is given to us\n _a posteriori_; the _form_ must lie ready _a priori_ for them\n in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from\n all sensation.\u201d\n\nHere lies the great fallacy of Kant, which rests upon an erroneous\nstatement and an actual distortion of fact. The phenomenon of a rose\nwhich I see before me is not merely sensory, but also formal. The\nphenomenon, i. e. the image of the rose (_die Anschauung_) is a sensation\nof a special form. The term sensation as it is generally used implies\nits having a special form. Accordingly the form does not, at least not\nfrom the beginning, lie ready _a priori_ in the mind; the form is given\ntogether with the sensation.\n\nKant speaks of \u201cthat which is annexed to perception by the conceptions\nof understanding,\u201d as if our understanding added the formal out of the\nmind to the sensory elements given by experience. What is the mind? The\nmind is a product of the world; it is a system of symbols representing\nthe things of the world and their relations including such possible\nrelations as are worthy of aspiring for. In short, the mind consists of\nideas and ideals.[44]\n\nIt has often been said that the mind is the creator of the sensory and\nnoumenal world. This is incorrectly expressed, for mind _is_ the sensory\nand noumenal world itself. The sense-pictures, the thought-symbols, and\nthe ideals of a man are actual parts of his mind. They are not products\nbut constituents of his mind. Their organised totality is his mind\nitself. The activity which takes place in a mind, i. e. the combining,\nthe separating, and recombining of memories, thoughts, and ideals are the\nactual realities, and if we speak of a man\u2019s understanding, or reason,\nor any other so-called faculty, we have to deal with abstractions. The\nactivity of mentally separating form and matter might be called by the\ngeneral term understanding. However the faculty of understanding is not a\ndistinct mental organ, it consists in the single acts of understanding,\nand the word understanding is a mental symbol representing them all\ntogether as if they were one thing.\n\nAnd certainly these acts of understanding as little import the formal\ninto the world of sensation as the miner carries the metals into the\nmines. The formal, the relational, or the _a priori_, is first extracted\nout of the data of experience not otherwise than iron is gained out of\nthe ores. The ore is not iron but it contains iron, the phenomenon of\na rose is not purely a sense-impression, it is a sense-impression of\na certain form. We are aware of the fact that mind is an entirely new\ncreation different from the non-mental world, yet at the same time we\nmaintain that the elements from which mind develops are the same as\nthe elements of the non-mental world. Nature furnishes the entire raw\nmaterial and whatever new creation the product of a new development is,\nnothing can be added to the raw material, of which the formal is the most\nindispensable part.\n\nThe raw material of sensory phenomena as soon as it is worked out, and\nalso the activity of working it out are called mind. Mind accordingly\noriginates with the appearance of sentient substance as the organisation\nof feelings and the memories of feelings\u2014these memories being conditioned\nthrough the preservation of the form of sentient substance. Mind is not\nsomething different from the world but must be considered as its product\nand highest efflorescence. Mind is made of the same substance as the\nuniverse and the mind-forms are the forms of objective existence.\n\nAs soon as a system of forms has developed in a sentient being, thus\nconstituting its mind, this system can again be referred to the\nobjective forms of things. In this sense we can say with Kant, that the\nunderstanding imports form into phenomena; and this re-importation, this\nreferring the objectively formal to the subjective system of formal\nthought, is an essential element in cognition.\n\n\nIV. PROFESSOR JODL\u2019S VIEW OF THE THING IN ITSELF.\n\nThe idea of a thing in itself independent of space and time and the\nunknowableness of the thing in itself are the basis of all agnosticism.\nAnd an agnostic tendency is at present predominant even among positive\nworkers and thinkers. Agnosticism is still the philosophy of the day\neven among those who have surrendered its basis (which is Kant\u2019s\ntranscendental idealism) and accept the monistic world-conception.\nFriedrich Jodl, professor at the University of Prague and author of the\nwell-known \u201cHistory of Ethics,\u201d in answer to a letter of mine formulates\nin concise terms this modernised view of a thing in itself. He writes:\n\n \u201cYou are right. The thing in itself is a dangerous idea,\u2014one\n that easily leads astray. But so long as we have no better\n expression to represent the relation for which it stands we\n shall have to use it. You also accept the following three\n momenta: (1) Objective existence or reality. (2) Effectiveness\n of Reality upon consciousness, i. e. sensation. (3)\n Effectiveness of sensation upon consciousness and reproduction\n of sensation in consciousness, i. e. representation. Nobody,\n however, can maintain that in sensation, and still less\n in representation, the whole of reality will appear in\n consciousness. First we learn from history what progress has\n been made in the cognition of reality and secondly it is\n obvious that we are infinitely far from an actual comprehension\n of reality. We have strong reasons to suspect that there\n are many processes in reality which in no way affect our\n sensibility and cannot enter into consciousness, and we know\n for sure that we do not comprehend\u2014i. e. reconstruct from\n them assumed causes\u2014many things, indeed most things, which we\n observe in their effects. Our cognition of nature, if we begin\n to construct, always leads us to some _x_. It may be doubted\n whether this _x_ is an unknown or an unknowable. In my opinion\n it is both\u2014anyhow we cannot eliminate it.\n\n \u201cI am convinced that many things which are unknown to-day and\n appear as unknowable will be known and knowable in a thousand\n years. But I doubt whether the total mass of the Unknowable has\n been noticeably diminished. For the Unknowable is infinite and\n the infinite if divided by any finite number can never produce\n a finite number. Every solved problem contains new and greater\n problems. What shall we call this? I believe that the term\n \u201cthing in itself\u201d is after all the best expression. Whoever\n wants to turn a mystic on account of it cannot be prevented.\n This state of things can be brought out of existence by an act\n of violence only.\u201d\n\nIt is most certainly true, as Professor Jodl says, that sensations do not\ndepict the whole of reality. But why should they? Cognition is possible\nonly by limiting the attention to a special point. Every sense organ is\nan organ of abstraction. Every sense depicts the effects of reality in\nits own way and in this way alone. It may freely be granted that there\nare many processes in reality which do not affect our sensibility. Yet\nthere is nothing in reality which does not affect something in some\nway. If it did not, it could not be said to exist. The chemical rays\nof light do not affect our eye, they are invisible and were for that\nreason not noticed. But these rays are not without any effects. If we\ncannot observe them directly, we can invent sensitive plates or other\ninstruments for observing their effects indirectly. Indirect observation\nmakes it possible that the limitation of our senses does not result in a\nlimitation of knowledge.\n\nSays Professor Jodl:\n\n \u201cOur cognition of nature if we begin to construct always leads\n us to some _x_.\u201d\n\nThis sentence indicates that Professor Jodl\u2019s and our conception of\ncognition are different. Cognition is not a reconstruction of assumed\ncauses; it is a unification of our representative sensations or ideas.\nSomething is again noticed, it is re-cognised, to be the same thing.\nCognition is adaptation of new facts to our present stock of knowledge;\nit is the proper arrangement of new data in our system of mental\nrepresentations. Cognition, accordingly, is the reduction of the unknown\nto terms of the known. How can it ever lead to an _x_? The positive\nconception of cognition is, as Kirchoff defines, it \u201can exhaustive and\nmost simple description of facts.\u201d It is a reconstruction of facts or,\nas Mach says, _Ein Nachbilden der Thatsachen_. Cognition is based upon\n_Anschauungen_; it will lead to an ultimate _x_, only in case we expect\nthat cognition instead of being a description of facts will have to give\nus information about how it happens that facts exist, how they originated\nout of nothing.\n\nProfessor Jodl\u2019s thing in itself is not outside of Space and Time (as is\nKant\u2019s thing in itself) but it is the overwhelming infinitude of problems\nto be solved with which we cannot hope to get through even though our\nlife lasted billions of light-years. Let me repeat here what I said in\nthe second edition of \u201cFundamental Problems,\u201d\n\n \u201cA philosophy which starts from the positive data of\n experience, and arranges them in the system of a monistic\n conception of the world, will meet with many great problems\n and in solving them will again and again be confronted with\n new problems. It will always grapple with something that is\n not yet known. The unknown seems to expand before us like an\n infinite ocean upon which the ship of knowledge advances. But\n the unknown constantly changes into the known. We shall find no\n real unknowable wherever we proceed. The idea of the unknowable\n is like the horizon\u2014an optic illusion. The more we advance,\n the farther it recedes. The unknowable is no reality; the\n unknowable can nowhere prevent knowledge nor can the horizon\n debar a ship in her voyage, from further progress.\u201d (p. 271.)\n\nMan\u2019s knowledge has value as positive information concerning the facts\nhe has to deal with, and the infinitude of the not known, the infinitude\nof other problems and things which he will never face, is of no\nconsequence whatever. Positivism commences and has to commence with the\npositive facts of the given experience and not with the infinitude of\npossibilities which lie beyond our horizon. Compare knowledge to property\nand suppose a man is to buy a farm. Shall we discourage him with the idea\nthat the whole amount of soil on the surface of the earth and of other\nplanets is infinite, and this infinitude of all existences if divided by\nhis finite little possession can never result in a finite number. Even\nif it were doubled, if it were multiplied a thousand times, it remains\nas good as nothing in comparison with the rest of the world which he\ncannot acquire. However, his possession is something to him, whatever the\nrelation of infinite possibilities may be in proportion to it.\n\nThe concept of infinitude serves a good purpose in its place, but we\ncannot use it for analogies in other fields or bring it in relation to\nconcrete realities. We produce confusion and drop into mysticism as soon\nas we handle the idea of infinitude as if it were a positive thing. The\ninfinite is a function which is mathematically expressed by 1/0 = \u221e, and\nwhenever we bring anything in relation to the infinite, we at once dwarf\nthe greatest number no less than the smallest number into zero.\n\nClearness of thought is the indispensable method of sound philosophy\nfor constructing a positive world-conception, which in great outlines\nis a description of the facts of reality. By suffering mysticism as a\nlegitimate conception either in science or in philosophy, we enhance the\ninterests of those who prefer the chiaroscuro of vague notions to clear\nthought.\n\n\nV. CLIFFORD\u2019S AND SCHOPENHAUER\u2019S CONCEPTIONS OF THE THING IN ITSELF.\n\nWhen Clifford speaks of things in themselves he does not mean Kant\u2019s\nthing in itself, he means neither the object independent of the thinking\nsubject nor the thing independent of space and time. He means the thing\nas it would be if viewed from the thing itself.\n\nA man appears to other thinking beings as an active body, as an organism\nthat is in motion; but to himself he appears as a feeling being. The\nsubjectivity of things as they appear to the things themselves consists\nin our own case of states of awareness, and this subjectivity is called\nby Clifford the thing in itself.\n\nA certain brain motion is in its subjective aspect a feeling. This\nfeeling is according to Clifford the thing in itself of the visible,\nobservable, and measurable motion. The thing in itself of so-called\ninanimate beings is not feeling, but elements of feeling. In other words,\nthe world-substance is everywhere in itself potentiality of feeling and\nClifford therefore calls it \u201cmind-stuff.\u201d\n\nSchopenhauer arrives at his conception of the thing in itself practically\nin the same way. There is the world as it appears to us, the objective\nworld of motion in space and time. What the kernel of this world may be,\nwe can know from self-observation. The kernel of ourselves, Schopenhauer\nsays, is Will; and the will is also the kernel of things; the will is the\nthing in itself.\n\nWe understand by will the passage into action, i. e. an incipient\nmotion of the organism if accompanied with the psychical element of\nconsciousness, and this consciousness is a state of awareness of the will\nincluding its direction and aim. Will, as the term is generally used, is\nalways conscious. Schopenhauer however speaks of the will as being blind,\ni. e. without knowledge, without awareness of itself and its aim. This\nindicates that he uses the word not in its original but in a figurative\nmeaning.\n\nThe fall of a stone may be characterised as a blind motion without\nawareness and without the stone\u2019s having a consciousness as to its\ndirection or aim; and in a similar (although not in the same) way\nClifford speaks of the elements of feeling as being not rational. We\nagree with Schopenhauer that that factor in a stone which makes it fall\nwhen placed in a certain position is as much a natural process as the act\nof a man, only of a lower grade and a simpler kind. Schopenhauer calls\nthat which both have in common \u201cwill.\u201d Yet in common language we call the\nobjective aspect of that which both processes have in common, \u201cmotion.\u201d\nWhat then is the subjective aspect of a falling stone? It is not a state\nof awareness, it is no feeling, but it is the potentiality of a state of\nawareness, it is potential feeling. There _is_ a subjective aspect, but\nthis subjective aspect is so far as we can judge of no account to the\nstone.\n\nThat something in the stone which corresponds to man\u2019s consciousness,\nviz. the stone\u2019s subjectivity, is not mind, but it is potential mind.\nAnd potential mind is not as Mr. Conybeare expresses it \u201cmind diluted,\u201d\npotential mind is no mind at all.\n\nThe world-substance as it exists in inorganic matter is not mind. But\nthe universe taken as a whole, the All, is for that reason not less than\nmind. On the contrary, it is infinitely more than mind. The All is not\nbrute force and inert matter only, the universe is a cosmos, and its\nsubjectivity necessarily develops, according to the laws of form which\ncharacterise the cosmos throughout, into mind. We disagree with Professor\nClifford most emphatically when he describes the mind-stuff of which\naccording to his terminology the world consists, as not rational.\n\nThe world it is true is not rational in its elements, but the world as\na whole, the entire cosmos with its laws and especially in its formal\norder, is the prototype of all rationality. Human reason is rational\nonly in so far as it conforms with, as it reflects, as it describes the\norder of the cosmos. The human mind is a microcosm. We do not call the\nmacrocosm, in whose image the microcosm has been created, a mind, because\nwe understand by the term mind not reality itself but reality pictured in\nsymbols of feeling. We understand by mind the individual conception of\nthe world as it is mapped out in the brain of a sentient being, and not\nthe universe itself, not the all-being. We understand by mind a creature\nand not the creator, a soul and not God.\n\nThe cosmos, the All, God, that which creates the mind, is not dead, not\nirrational, and not inferior to mentality. It is the source of all life,\nit is the condition of all order, it is the standard of all morality. All\nthe minds that exist are but parts of it. In it, with it, and through it\nwe live and shall live forever. For although we shall die, our being can\nnever be blotted out. Existence knows no annihilation and life knows no\ndeath. What we call death is a dissolution of life in a special part,\nbut the contents of a life, the thoughts, the ideas, and the ideals are\npreserved and transmitted, they are implanted into other minds; the soul\ncontinues to live. And this continuance of the life of the soul is not\na mere dissolution in the All, it is not the immortality of force and\nmatter; it is the preservation of its special existence, of its most\ncharacteristic and individual features for an immeasurably long period\nhence, which will last as long as the conditions of life remain favorable\nupon earth. Yet even if a whole solar system were broken to pieces, life\nwill reappear; mind will be born again to struggle for truth and to\naspire to live in conformity with truth.\n\n\nVI. THINGS AND RELATIONS.\n\nThe proposition that things in themselves are unknowable finds a strong\nargument in the statement that we can know relations only, that all\nknowledge is relative. It is undoubtedly true that all knowledge is\nrelative and knowledge is a knowledge of relations. But what is a\nrelation? When I once proposed this question, I was answered:\n\n \u201cA relation is the connection between two things; it is that\n something in which the one stands to the other, in short, it is\n the betwixtness of things.\u201d\n\nThis is exactly what a relation is not. From such a definition of\nrelation agnosticism will necessarily follow. It is a misstatement of\nthe case, and when we come to follow out the idea, we shall be led into\ninextricable contradictions, and unless we revise the whole argument, we\nshall have to confess that we are at our wit\u2019s end.\n\nThe question, what is a relation? was one of the issues between the\ntwo great medi\u00e6val schools of philosophy, the Nominalists and the\nRealists.[45] The Nominalists answered: \u201cA relation is a mere product of\nthe mind,\u201d while the Realists declared that \u201ca relation without which the\nthing cannot be, is in the thing.\u201d\n\nBoth schools relied upon Aristotle\u2019s authority. Aristotle had declared\nthat matter is mere possibility of existence (it is \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f44\u03bd) and form\nis that which makes it real, the formal is the real, form is existence\nor being (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1). The metal of a statue, Aristotle says, is its matter,\nthe idea of the statue is its form, both together make the real statue.\nThe metal having had another form before, did not exist with the inherent\npurpose of being this metal of the statue. The metal is the mere\npotentiality of becoming a statue.[46] Hence, says Aristotle, not the\nmatter but the form constitutes the reality of the statue, the form is\nthat which is real, or that which makes actual, \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u1f44\u03bd, it is the\nbeing in completeness or actuality, \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03bb\u03b5\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u1f44\u03bd, i. e. that which makes\na thing exist in its purpose (\u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd). If the formal alone is and\nmakes real, relations must be real. This is in favor of the Realists.\n\nYet Aristotle\u2019s philosophy is not in every respect clearly worked out.\nIn fact there are two Aristotles, the one being a Platonist, the other\na naturalist, the one believing in universals, the other investigating\nconcrete things and taking individuals as real beings. But both\nAristotles and with them both parties of the schoolmen had no clear\nconception of the nature of ideas, what they are, and what they purport,\nand how we can discriminate between their subjective and objective\nelements. Ideas have a meaning. Is their meaning purely mental or has it\nan objective value? We say that it has.\n\nThe same Aristotle who considered the formal as that which makes real,\ndenied the objective existence of relations. He said that such qualities\nas greater, or smaller, double or half, indeed all relations (the \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\nof things) did not belong to the things, but were added to them by the\nthinking subject. Ergo relations are mere products of the mind, they have\nno objective value. This was in favor of the Nominalists.\n\nNow it is true that some relations are purely mental in so far as the\ncomparison upon which they rest is purely imaginary. An answer to the\nquestion, Who was the greater, Alexander or C\u00e6sar? depends upon the\nstandard of measurement which we create for the special purpose. Some\nsuch relations have no objective value, they are not facts but a play of\nimagination dependent on the recognition of the standard of measurement.\nBut how is it, if we express the relation between the gravity of a stone\nand the whole mass of the earth as it manifests itself in the stone\u2019s\nfall? Is that also a mere product of the mind? Certainly Newton\u2019s laws\ndescribing gravitation in exact and mathematical formulas are a product\nof the mind, but this product of the mind has an objective value, it has\na meaning, it describes facts, and these facts are certain relations\nbetween certain things.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe fault of the modern misconception of relativity lies in the\nassumption that the two or more things are considered as things in\nthemselves. We are apt to consider the gravity of two masses, of a stone\nand of the earth, as a relation between two independent things. Here is\nthe stone and there is the earth and the relation is considered as some\nthird item, being the connection in which the one stands to the other.\n\nIn reality there are not two things and, in addition to them a\nbetweenness of the two things. The world is not a sum of things, not even\na system of things, but a whole indivisible entirety and what we call\nthings are abstractions which serve special purposes in the household of\ncognition. All things consist as it were of innumerable relations to all\nother things. When we abstract one special process which takes place in\nthe province of what we are wont to call _two_ things, we have to deal\nwith a relation.\n\nThere are no relations of themselves and there are no things of\nthemselves. Relations describe certain features of reality obtaining\nbetween what we call two or more things, and in this description all\nother features of which the real things consist are purposely omitted.\n\nThere is no quality of things but it is at the same time a quality of\nrelation. Every quality of a thing characterises it under a certain\ncondition; it appears as an effect upon something and thus it is actual\nas a relation. Cognition analyses things into bundles of relations and\nall these relations together make up the things.\n\nThe modern idea that we can know relations only and that there are\nthings in themselves which are unknowable is an old error inherited\nfrom medi\u00e6val scholasticism, and its roots can be traced back to the\nphilosophy of Aristotle. The difficulty disappears as soon as we\nconsider the whole world (ourselves included) as an interacting whole,\nand that the conceptions \u201cthings\u201d and \u201crelations\u201d have been invented\nfor describing certain of its parts and certain of its interactions or\ninterconnections.\n\nIf we push the idea of things in themselves to the ultimate extreme\nwe arrive at the atomistic conception of the universe. _Atoms are the\nthings in themselves reduced to the point system._ If we consider the\nworld as a heap of innumerable atoms, we are at a loss how to explain\nthe interaction among these atoms. The atomist universalises the\nsubstance-abstraction and will be disappointed afterwards not to be able\nto deduce from his universalisation other qualities which are found in\nreality, such as the relations of things, their interconnections, their\nspontaneity of motion, the life of organised beings, and the mind of\nthinking creatures.\n\nIdeas are symbols and symbols have a meaning. The whole realm of\nmental representations may be viewed in their symbolism or in their\nsignificance. Considering their symbolism, ideas of things as well as of\nrelations, are products of the mind, considering their meaning, ideas\nrepresent realities; in other words: their contents or that which they\nsignify is real.\n\nIt appears that neither Nominalism nor Realism is right; yet if we\nstretch them only a little, if we are allowed to interpret them in the\nlight of a monistic world-conception, both are right. They cease to\nbe contradictory and become complementary. Universals are real, say\nthe Realists, i. e. the forms and relations of things are actualities.\nUniversals are names, say the Nominalists, i. e. the relations and forms\nin which we describe the world are mental symbols.\n\nThe Realists had the misfortune to defeat the Nominalists entirely,\nand thus had a chance to insist upon being right in every respect. All\nopposition having ceased, the errors of Realism grew in extraordinary\nexuberance. Nominalism in the mean time raised its head in opposition to\nthe recognised authority of the church as well as the schools, slowly\nyet powerfully and irresistibly. The errors and the tyranny of Realism\ngave strength to the Nominalistic movement which reached its height in\nKant\u2019s philosophy. The Realists had gone to the extreme of declaring\nthat universals were things, real substances, independent of single and\nconcrete objects, and the Nominalists on the other hand, represented\nby Kant, went so far as to declare that all relations, time and space\nincluded were _mere_ products of the mind.\n\nIf the relations are mere products of the mind, all knowledge being\na knowledge of relations, knowledge becomes impossible. That last\nconsequence was drawn by Kant and is emphatically insisted upon by\nagnosticism.\n\nThere is but one world-conception that can dispense with these\nconclusions: it is that View which conceives of the All as a whole; and\nof knowledge as a description of its parts, qualities, and relations,\never mindful on the one hand that the parts are parts, that qualities\nand relations are certain features only, not entire realities, or\nisolated entities, and that the symbols thereof frequently overlap each\nother; on the other hand that there is nothing absolute,[47] and that\nthere are no things in themselves.\n\nThe relativity of knowledge, whether we conceive of it as the relativity\nof the object to the subject in general or as an appreciation of the fact\nthat all knowledge gives and can give information of relations only, does\nnot lead to the conclusion that knowledge is impossible. Relativity is a\nfundamental feature of knowledge, and we shall understand that it must be\nso if we consider that reality itself is a great system of relations.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe interconnection of all things with all things appears to be so\ncomplete, that if we intended to explain or understand one single fact\nfully and exhaustively in all its relations, past, present, and future,\nwe should be obliged to give a complete description of the universe. Says\nTennyson:\n\n \u201cFlower in the crannied wall,\n I pluck you out of the crannies;\u2014\n Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,\n Little flower\u2014but if I could understand\n What you are, root and all, and all in all,\n I should know what God and man is.\u201d\n\nWe might address in the same way anything else, an atom of hydrogen, a\ngrain of sand as well as the sun, the action of a tiny speck of irritable\nprotoplasm as well as the soul of man.\n\n\nVII. IS THE EGO A THING IN ITSELF?\n\nProf. Lloyd Morgan in his excellent work \u201cAnimal Life and Intelligence\u201d\nuses repeatedly the word \u201cmind\u201d as if it were a thing in itself.\nProfessor Morgan is a monist and he does not intend the word to mean a\nthing in itself; yet such is the influence of language that we, all of\nus, unless we are constantly on our guard, will inadvertently slip into\ndualistic expressions. Professor Morgan says, with reference to certain\nsensations of animals (p. 309):\n\n \u2018From these stippled sensations the mind in all cases\n elaborates a continuum.\u2019\n\nThe unity which arises out of stippled sensations and which through\ntheir interaction becomes a continuum is called mind. To speak of\nmind as working out the continuum is mythological language, it is the\ntransformation of the abstract idea \u201cmind\u201d into a real and independent\nthing whose existence is conceived to be independent of the reality from\nwhich it has been abstracted.\n\nAgain, Professor Morgan says: \u201cOur constructs are literally our\nhandiwork.\u201d Our constructs, i. e. our mental signs constructed to\nrepresent realities, constitute our soul; they are we ourselves.\n\nProfessor Morgan, as I understand him, does not believe in a mind\nbehind the psychical facts of mental activity, he does not assume the\npre-existence of mind to the continuum elaborated. His view of mind\nappears to be the same as ours. The more noteworthy, then, is his usage\nof the term \u201cmind.\u201d It is a remarkable instance of how language naturally\ninveigles us into a belief in things in themselves. Words seem to denote\nconcrete existences and as soon as we use words in this way we are\nentangled in dualism.\n\nProf. F. Max M\u00fcller as well as the late Prof. Thomas Hill Green,\nthe founder of the Oxford transcendentalist school, start from this\nassumption, that man\u2019s mental activity is performed by a something which\nis quite distinct from it. This something is the thing in itself of the\nhuman soul. Prof. F. Max M\u00fcller says:\n\n \u201cIf mind is the name of the work, what is the name of the\n worker?... It is what we may call the ego as personating the\n self; it is what other philosophers call the monon. Let us\n call therefore the worker who does the work of the mind in its\n various aspects, the Monon or the Ego.\u201d\n\nThis conception which asks for the worker of the work is based upon a\nmaterialistic view of the human organism. An organism is not a dead\nmachine which must be set a-going by somebody who attends to it.\nOrganisms are active and not passive, they are living and not dead. Every\npart of an organism is a worker and so is the whole. And if we speak of\nits \u201clife\u201d we must bear in mind that \u201clife\u201d is an abstract which denotes\na certain inseparable quality of the organism. The work and the worker\nare two abstracts of one and the same thing. The reality from which these\nterms have been abstracted is \u201csomething working.\u201d This something working\ndoes not consist of a worker and his work, but the worker is in every\npart of his work. The worker of our mental activity is the work itself.\nBoth are identical.\n\nThe objection is made: \u201cWhence does the activity come which appears in\nthe realm of organised life.\u201d The answer is: Activity is a universal\nquality of all existence. There is no such a thing as absolutely\ninert matter. Every chemical element combines with other elements\nspontaneously, according to its inherent nature and not through the\ninfluence of a worker manipulating its atoms. Spontaneity is a universal\nfeature of reality. Nature is throughout self-working activity. And this\nits most remarkable character is preserved in its highest efflorescence\nin the soul of man.\n\nThe present number of _The Monist_ contains a lucid presentation of the\ntranscendentalist position by Mr. F. C. Conybeare, an Oxford scholar and\na personal disciple of Professor Green, with special reference to the\nviews of Prof. William Kingdon Clifford. Mr. Conybeare, like Prof. F. Max\nM\u00fcller, assumes a Self independent of the reality from which the idea of\nself has been abstracted, and he attempts to prove the existence of this\nself as follows:\n\n \u201cIn truth there can be no relation of before and after between\n the two terms except for a self which takes note of the one\n disappearing and of the other appearing; and whenever we speak\n of things following one another we tacitly presuppose a self\n before whom the procession passes.\u201d\n\nThe transcendentalist adopts, in the realm of psychology, the error\nof atomism. If we accept the view that the world consists of isolated\natoms, we are at a loss how to bring the atoms into relations; the unity\nof every group of atoms, every thing and every system of things will\nbecome a mystery. And if we look upon feelings as unrelated things in\nthemselves, their connection becomes a deep problem. Mr. Conybeare solves\nthis problem of the connection that obtains among the feelings supposed\nto be atomical, by postulating a relation-producing entity, called the\nself. He says:\n\n \u201cNo link is left, save a connecting self.\u201d\n\nAnd this assumed entity of a connecting self or ego is taken to be \u201cthe\nheart and centre of reality.\u201d Reality, that which we have to deal with\nin real life and what is commonly called reality, appears as a second\nclass of reality in comparison with this assumed thing in itself of our\nexistence. The thing in itself is thus regarded as something realer than\nreal; it is conceived to be a reality of a higher degree.\n\nMr. Conybeare is very explicit in the explanation of his transcendental\n\u201cself.\u201d He says:\n\n \u201cFeelings constitute a conscious self when they become the\n feelings of a conscious self and not before, for except as\n gathered up in the unity of a self which has [sic!] memory and\n remains the same throughout its differences, feelings can be\n neither new, nor repeated, nor joined by links.\u201d\n\nWhat does \u201cself\u201d mean? What can it mean? What is the \u201cunity of the self\u201d?\nThese are questions which have not been answered to our satisfaction\nby the transcendentalists. Whenever they speak of the self, they lose\nthemselves in mysticism. Their \u201cself\u201d is an assumed entity which they\nhave carefully divested of everything real and actual. Their self is\ntranscendental and not a being of the world; it is a myth.\n\nLet us describe the simplest possible instance of psychical activity.\n\nAn irritation takes place in some sentient substance. This irritation\nproduces an extra-commotion. We must say \u201cextra-commotion\u201d because\nall sentient substance is in a state of constant activity. This\nextra-commotion causes the sentient substance to assume a certain form,\nand while it lasts, a certain and special feeling takes place in some\npart of the sentient substance. This certain and special feeling ceases,\nas soon as the extra-commotion, caused through the irritation, abates.\nThere can be no doubt that certain effects of this extra-commotion\nremain. Its trace is left in the sentient substance and this trace is\npreserved in the constant whirl of the sentient being\u2019s normal activity.\nNow, we suppose that an irritation of the same kind takes place in the\nsame sentient substance. This second irritation finds the substance no\nlonger in the same condition. It finds the sentient substance prepared\nto receive it. The feeling which now appears is no longer a simple\nfeeling. The second irritation causes a commotion as much as the first,\nand this commotion acts as a stimulant upon the trace left by the first\nirritation. This trace being again in a state of extra-commotion is\nrevived and the same kind of feeling appears. Thus the second irritation\nis accompanied by a state of awareness in which two feelings are blended,\nthe revival of the former feeling and the feeling of the present\nirritation.\n\nThe preservation of traces left in sentient substance is the condition\nof memory. We understand by memory the psychical aspect thereof, and the\nact of reviving, so that their correspondent feelings will reappear, is\ncalled recollection.\n\n\u201cMemory\u201d has been the greatest stumbling-block to our psychologists as\nwell as to our philosophers. Even modern works written from a positive\nstandpoint treat memory frequently as a mysterious faculty of the mind.\nMr. Conybeare speaks of the self as _having_ memory, while in fact,\nmemory is one of the features, indeed the most important feature, of\nmind-activity.\n\nSays Mr. Conybeare:\n\n \u201cSuch a feeling [of the togetherness of two feelings] would\n involve memory and memory involves self-hood.\u201d\n\nMemory does not involve any transcendental self-hood. True self-hood,\nviz. that which can reasonably be understood by self-hood, is not prior\nto, not the cause of memory; self-hood, i. e. the personality of a man,\nthe organised unity of the psychical aspect of a human organism, is\nconsequent upon, it is the effect of, memory. Self-hood is the product of\nmemory.[48]\n\nThe self is also called the ego. What is the ego?\n\nThe ego is a Latin term used in philosophical language to denote the\npronoun \u201cI,\u201d and the pronoun \u201cI\u201d is quite a definite nerve-structure\nsituated in quite a definite place of the centre of language. As\nall words, so also the term \u201cI\u201d is a symbol. Its general meaning is\nunequivocal; it stands for the name of the speaker. It stands for Mr.\nBrown, if Mr. Brown speaks of himself, for Mr. Smith, if Mr. Smith speaks\nof himself, etc.\n\nWhat does Mr. Brown mean when he says, \u201c_I_ speak, _I_ act, _I_ will, _I_\nfeel pain, _I_ feel pleasure, _I_ intend,\u201d etc.?\n\nWhen Mr. Brown speaks, a certain number of word-structures in the\ncentre of language are in a state of commotion, innervating the muscles\nof speech. Correspondent to this physiological process, a state of\nconsciousness obtains, which is an awareness of the situation. When\nhe adds: \u201cI say this,\u201d it is again a special nerve-structure that is\nirritated into action and he might just as well say: \u201cMr. Brown says\nthis.\u201d The idea of Mr. Brown, viz. of his own personality, is just as\nmuch an idea as his idea of Mr. Smith. The main difference consists\nin the fact that the idea of one\u2019s own personality is very much more\nimportant than the ideas representing other personalities.\n\nThe nervous structure representing the feeling of the idea \u201cI\u201d must be\nthe centre of innumerable nervous tracts connecting it with all those\nactivities which when performed are thought of as done by ourselves.\nThe \u201cI do this\u201d is almost constantly ready to fill the present state\nof consciousness and to accompany any action performed through the\ninnervation of other brain structures.\n\nSentient substance is not always actually feeling. It is feeling only\nwhen in a state of extra-commotion. Systems of sentient substance\nare called organisms; all its structures are interconnected and most\nso those structures in which sentiency as well as motory impulses\nare differentiated\u2014viz. the nervous structures. The extra-commotions\nwhich agitate the different nervous structures, the memories of\nformer sense-perceptions, of sounds, of words, of ideas depend upon\nthe conditions of the moment. Now this and now another structure will\nrepresent the summit of commotion and the feeling of the strongest\ncommotion at a given time will under normal conditions appear as the\ncontents of consciousness. It is as it were the focus in which the\nattention of the whole organism is centralised. That which appears in\nthe focus is clear and distinct, while the other weaker feelings rapidly\ndisappear into the undistinguishable general feeling of the organism as a\nwhole, commonly called c\u0153n\u00e6sthesis or _Gemeingef\u00fchl_.\n\nThe centre of attention is constantly changing; yet whenever a thinking\ncreature stops to ask himself, who is doing this? Who is willing this?\nWho is thinking this? the answer is given: \u201cI am doing this; I am willing\nthis; I am thinking this.\u201d The structure of the little pronoun \u201cI\u201d seems\nto be the most ticklish of all; it is always ready to force itself into\nthe foreground.\n\nThe answer, \u201cI am doing this,\u201d proposes the _totum pro parte_. The\nwhole personality is supposed to do what a part of it is performing.\nThe hands are executing this work; these hands of course are innervated\nfrom certain regions of the brain. Some parts of the personality are\nin a relative rest and have nothing to do with the work presently on\nhand. A commotion in a certain number of brain-structures represents the\nphysiological aspect of a deliberation, perhaps the planning of some\naction. Psychologically considered certain ideas appear successively\nand sometimes simultaneously in the focus of consciousness. The ideas\ndisagree and other ideas replace them until a combination is formed in\nwhich the ideas do agree. This state of agreement brings a temporary\npeace into the tumult of conflicting ideas; the plan is ready; it may\npass into action at once, or, perhaps, the ego-structure will appear in\nconsciousness and will quietly think: \u201cI will do it.\u201d\n\nWhen certain motory nerve-structures are innervated, they cause under\nnormal conditions their respective muscles to contract, they produce\nmotion. Under normal conditions the nervous process accompanying the idea\n\u201cI will raise my arm\u201d serves as an irritation upon the cortical centre of\narm-raising, yet it is not the \u201cI\u201d that in some mystical way raises the\narm. The idea \u201cI\u201d has as little and as much to do with this discharge of\nenergy as any other idea. The idea \u201cI\u201d is not the power behind the veil\nthat produces the will.\n\nWhat is will? As soon as some plan of action is joined with the idea\nthat it should be executed, supposing it be not counteracted by any\nstronger idea that it should not be done, this combination represents\na will. A will accordingly is the psychological aspect of an incipient\naction, and it is usually, or if it is not it can always be accompanied\nwith the thought \u201cI will it.\u201d But this accompanying thought however is\nnot the energy displayed in the act of willing.\n\nThe \u201cI will it,\u201d or \u201cI do it,\u201d or \u201cI perceive it\u201d being always ready to\nappear together with the strongest idea in the field of consciousness,\nthe term \u201cego\u201d has acquired a specialised meaning. It means that part of\na man\u2019s personality which at the time is the contents of the \u201cI will,\u201d or\n\u201cI think,\u201d i. e. it is his present state of consciousness. Every organism\nis a coherent system and thus all the feelings of an organism naturally\nblend into a unity. The strongest feeling however appears in the normal\nstate of waking in a distinct clearness thus representing a centre of\nconsciousness.\n\nHowever, whether we use the term \u201cego\u201d in the sense of the idea \u201cI\u201d\nmeaning the whole personality of the speaker, or in the sense of the\npresent centre of consciousness, it designates in either case a definite\nreality, the origin and action of which are natural facts and as plain as\nany other psychological phenomena.\n\nNeither the ego-idea nor the centre of consciousness are transcendental.\nThe former is as little mystical as are the ideas dog, horse, man, etc.;\nthe latter no less miraculous than any other feeling or display of\nsentiency.\n\n\nVIII. THE EGO-CENTRIC VIEW ABANDONED.\n\nThe contrast between the old and the new psychology appears strongest\nin their conceptions of the ego. The former believes that the ego is\n\u201cthe thing in itself\u201d of man\u2019s soul and takes it to be the centre of\nall psychical phenomena, while the latter looks upon the ego-idea as\none idea among many other co-ordinated ideas and considers the centre\nof consciousness as the strongest feeling at a given time, which as\nsuch naturally predominates over and eclipses the other feelings of the\norganism.\n\nThe new psychology brings about a change of standpoint similar to\nthat effected by the Copernican system in astronomy. In astronomy\nthe geo-centric, and in psychology the ego-centric standpoint had to\nbe abandoned. And all things seem to be upset to those who are still\naccustomed to the old conception. To them the physical and moral\nworld-conceptions appear to become impossible. If the new view were\ncorrect, so they imagine, the entire universe would break to pieces. All\nour modes of speech are formed in accord with the old view. We speak of\nsunset and sunrise, and so in our daily conversation the little pronoun\n\u201cI\u201d plays a part which makes it seem as if the ego-idea were the centre\nof all soul-life and as if this \u201cI\u201d were the active agent in all acts of\nwilling and doing.\n\nThe advantage of the Copernican system lies in this, that we can think\nof the motions of the sun and the planets in a systematic and unitary\nconception without being either involved in contradictions or obliged to\ninvent mysterious qualities in the stars for explaining the velocities,\ndirections, or other phenomena of the celestial bodies. The most\nimportant advantage however is the practical applicability of the new\ntheory.\n\nThe old theory of the soul necessarily leads to mysticism. Fictitious\nfacts of a transcendent character must be invented in addition to the\nfacts observed, in order to explain the latter. The new theory after\nabandoning the ego-centric standpoint of the thing in itself of a soul\nshows the facts of psychic life in an harmonious and unitary conception.\nAll facts agree among themselves and we are not in need of supplementing\nthem with mysterious inventions. It must be emphasised, at the same time,\nthat the new conception throws a new light upon ethics; it shows the\nerror and perversity of all egotism, for it would be a mistake to act as\nif the ego were really the centre of soul-life.\n\nHere the new psychology comes in contact with religion. What is the\npractical aim of all the great religions of the world but a surrender\nof the ego, a renunciation of the self as the centre of our being, and\nthe acceptance of the moral law as the regulative power of our actions?\nThe new psychology gives a justification and a scientific explanation\nof Christian ethics while the latter from the standpoint of the old\npsychology necessarily appears as mystical and supernatural.\n\n\nIX. PERSONALITY AND EVOLUTION.\n\nThe ego, i. e. the centre of consciousness, is constantly shifting, while\nthe personality of a man is relatively constant, certain important ideas\nbeing stable and thus lending character to the whole system of thoughts\nand intentions.\n\nThe term personality indicating the self-hood of a man is used in several\nways. First, we understand by a man\u2019s personality his bodily appearance;\nsecondly the whole system of his mentality, viz. his knowledge, his\ntemperament, his character; thirdly the history of his life, past,\npresent, and future; fourthly his position in life, his possessions,\nhis connections, his influence, or at last we mean by it all these four\nitems together. In all these applications the man and his personality are\nconceived as a unity. And they are a unity. Wherever the term unity is\napplicable, it is most certainly applicable here. All the many facts of\nthe history of his life are one continuous process; all the parts of his\nbody are parts of a system, and the world of his ideas also will under\nnormal conditions bear a certain harmonious character. Wherever in any\nsoul the concord among the ideas has been disturbed, a state of unrest\nwill ensue until the peace of soul is restored in one or another way. But\nwith the same necessity as every water surface tends to present a smooth\nlevel, so the ideas in one and the same soul tend to come to a state of\nagreement. As every water surface has its ripples so even that mind which\nhas attained an undisturbed peace of soul is constantly confronted with\nsome problems\u2014be they ever so trifling\u2014producing some slight disturbances\nin his life.\n\nThe unity of a self, it is apparent, is the inevitable consequence\nof given conditions. It is not something which exists outside the\npersonality and its constituent parts, it is in the personality and it\ndevelops together with it. Mr. Conybeare supposes that \u201cthe unity of\na self remains the same throughout.\u201d This is an error, and this error\nvitiates Mr. Conybeare\u2019s whole conception of growth and evolution. He\nsays:\n\n \u201cProperly speaking a thing can only be said to grow or develop\n when it remains the same with itself all through the process\n and unfolds therein capacities which were anyhow latent in it\n to start with.\u201d\n\nThe truth contained in this proposition may be expressed thus: When a\nthing develops, some part of it remains the same during the change,\nso that a continuity is preserved. Yet every change of a part of an\norganism\u2014such is the intimate interconnection of all its parts\u2014produces\nan alteration, be it ever so small, of the whole unity. And in the course\nof evolution the character of the whole thing may be changed. Think of\nthe growth of a caterpillar into a butterfly, or of an egg-cell into a\nman. However, the changes in the character of an adult man will become\nslighter and slighter the stronger certain features of his existence\npreserve their sameness, although the most stable personality will,\nnevertheless, be subject to, at least, unimportant changes as long as\nlife lasts.\n\nMr. Conybeare, like his master Professor Green and all the\ntranscendentalists, is still under the influence of a belief in the\nthing in itself. The unity of an organism which is the product of the\nco-operation of its parts, is not some independent thing whose business\nit is to gather up their single activities and bring them into relation\nwith one another. The unity of a self is the combination of all those\nrelations which make of its parts a systematised whole, and this unity\nis changing together with its constituents; as a matter of fact, we have\nto state that it does _not_ remain constant or the same with itself.\nMark that I do not deny the unity of the soul, nor do I underrate the\nenormous importance of this unity. But I do deny that this unity exists\nindependent of its parts. It is as much immanent in its parts as is a\nmelody in its notes. There is as little a transcendental self-hood as a\nmelody in itself independent of its sounds.\n\nThe assumption of a transcendental unity which throughout the process\nof evolution remains the same with itself naturally leads to a wrong\nconception of what Mr. Conybeare calls \u201clatent capacities.\u201d The terms\npotential existence and latent qualities are fertile and useful ideas but\nwe must beware not to employ them incorrectly. Any heap of iron ore can\nbe called a potential sword. This is a mode of speaking which expresses\nthe possibility that the ore can be changed somehow into a sword. But the\nsword does not exist at all, not even as a latent quality of the ore.\nThe ore has no latent qualities of that kind. Those qualities of the ore\nwhich represent the potential sword are very patent to everybody who\nknows the art of using them properly and changing them into an actual\nsword.\n\nWe may say that the hen\u2019s egg contains a potential chick; but this is a\nmere mode of speech devised to say that the egg can be changed into a\nchick under certain conditions. There is no chick at all contained in the\negg and nothing that is like a chick.\n\nEvolution is not, as the name suggests, a process of unfolding; evolution\nis, as Christian Friedrich Wolff calls it, an \u201cepigenesis,\u201d i. e.\nthe process of the additional growth of new formations. The chick is\nsomething different in kind from the egg. The unity of the egg-cell\norganism in the yolk is radically different from the unity of the\nfull-fledged chick. The former shows traces of irritability but not\nof consciousness, while the latter exhibits unmistakable symptoms of\npsychical activity. The formation of the chicken-soul is a new formation\nas much as the growth of feathers. The feathers of the chick are an\nadditional growth; there are no latent feathers in the egg. We might\nexpress ourselves to the effect that the egg contains the potential\nexistence of feathers, but with the same logic we might say the egg\ncontains a potential chicken broth.\n\nIt is however true that something remains constant in the process of\ngrowth. There is a preservation of form in the constant change of\nmaterial particles and this is the physiological basis of memory, so that\na man of eighty may say \u201cI remember when I was a child,\u201d although not one\nparticle of the substance of which the child consisted is left in him.\nThe continuity produced through this preservation of form makes growth\nand evolution possible.\n\nThe preservation of memory-structures constitutes the possibility of\nreviving the feelings of the past, it constitutes a preservation of\nsoul. The material parts of the body are thrown out but the form being\npreserved, the soul remains. And this preservation of the soul is the\nbasis of its additional growth through new and enlarged experience. The\nsoul of the child is not lost in the man, it is preserved. It has lost\ncertain features and at the same time it has gained new features, it has\ndeveloped, and the unity of the soul has more or less changed with the\ndevelopment.\n\nWhat is true of the individual is also true of mankind. Mankind as a\nwhole is different in the savage and in civilised society. Nevertheless\nthe latter has developed from the former. Certain traits have been\ndropped, other radically new features have appeared. That which was\nvaluable in the soul of primitive man is not lost. The better part of his\nsoul still lives in the highest developed man of to-day; the continuity\nis preserved. And to-day all our moral instruction aims at this, so to\nlive that our souls also will be preserved in the future evolution of\nhumanity. The gist of ethics is to make the soul immortal.[49]\n\n\nX. PROFESSOR MACH\u2019S POSITION.\n\nThe problem, \u201cAre there things in themselves?\u201d is closely connected with\nthe subject of my discussion with Professor Mach. Professor Mach as\nwell as myself are aspiring to arrive at a consistent and harmonious or\nunitary world-conception. Both of us recognise that things in themselves\nhave no room in a monistic philosophy, both of us recognise that concepts\nare means only of orientation, they are the mental tools of living beings\ndeveloped as an assistance in dealing with the surrounding world. They\nare symbols in which the processes of nature are copied and imitated and\nwhich can serve for planning or modeling and thus predetermining the\ncourse of nature. So far we agree, but then there appears a difference\nwhich it is difficult for me to understand or formulate in precise terms.\n\nProfessor Mach objects to the dualism of motion and feeling, which he\ndeclares he conceives as a unity not as a duality. But so do I. It\nappears to me that we must differ somehow in the method of constructing\nthe unity. I see indeed a contrast of physical and of psychical. This\ncontrast, however, in my conception does not belong to the object but to\nthe subject. It is a contrast of our conception of things, but it is not\na contrast existing objectively in the real things themselves. The world\nis not composed of the psychical and the physical, but certain features\nof the world are called physical, and others psychical. Both terms are\nabstracts.\n\nProfessor Mach said in his first article and repeats it again in the\npresent article that his former standpoint resembles very closely my\npresent standpoint. When reading Professor Mach\u2019s lectures of 1863,\nI took pains to look for the similarity, and finding many things in\nwhich I could agree I dropped the differences taking the agreements\nas the essential points. In reading, however, Professor Mach\u2019s r\u00e9sum\u00e9\nof his former position as stated in this present article, I find that\nhe attaches prominence to several points which I cannot endorse.\nI do not accept the theory that atoms feel, that they are endowed\nwith consciousness. I have never spoken of atoms when dealing with\npsychological problems. The term \u201catom\u201d is a chemical term invented\nas a help for thinking the equivalence of the weight of the elements\nwhich always combine in definite proportions. The term \u201catom\u201d has in\nmy opinion no sense if applied to other phenomena. The term \u201catom\u201d has\nnot been abstracted from psychical phenomena nor has it been invented\nfor describing them. There is accordingly no probability that it can\nfind there any appropriate application. We might as well expect that\nmathematical terms such as lines, points, circles, etc., are applicable\nin psychology. The idea of conscious circles or points can not in my mind\nbe more absurd than that of conscious atoms. The rule must be observed\nthat we can use abstractions made for a special purpose for that purpose\nonly; they will not serve any other purpose as well. It is true that they\nare often employed as analogies, but in such cases, we must bear in mind\nthat we are dealing with mere analogies.\n\nIn addition to the impropriety of using the term atoms in psychology, it\nappears to me erroneous to attribute feeling or anything like feeling\nto physical processes of any description. Natural processes are so\nconstituted, that under certain conditions, such as take place in animal\norganisms, they will develop feelings. Clifford speaks in this sense of\nthe elements of feeling. Lloyd Morgan calls it metakinesis, and I find\nthat feelings being simply states of awareness represent the subjectivity\nof natural processes. We have reasons to suppose that in the processes\nof unorganised nature this subjectivity is neither feeling nor anything\nlike feeling: but the subjectivity of the natural processes is as it were\nthe stuff out of which our own feelings are formed.\n\nI accept all the arguments of Professor Mach that our ideas are\nartificial products; and I am also anxious to distinguish in our ideas\nbetween that which describes facts and that which has been added to the\ndescription of facts in shape of theories or conjectures.\n\nThe sense-pictures of objects and ideas also are not things but images\nand symbols of things created for the purpose of representing things;\nthey are as Prof. Lloyd Morgan says, \u201cconstructs.\u201d But these constructs\nare not mere fancy, they are not air-castles. They are constructed in\norder to imitate certain realities. Now, in building these constructs\nas an imitation or a copy of reality, we are often at a loss how to\nbuild them. There is for instance in the objective reality observed, a\nsomething somewhere high in the air, the basis of which is invisible,\nand being limited in our means of acquiring information we are ignorant\nof the real state of things. So in reconstructing or imitating the\nfacts, we build scaffolds to support it, and we are too apt to forget\nthat these scaffolds do not represent objective facts but are artifices\nto make certain facts, which we know in parts only, thinkable, i. e.\nrepresentable without breaks in mental constructs.\n\n\nXI. TRUTH IN MYTHOLOGY.\n\nThere is one point which I have emphasised and which it appears to me\nProfessor Mach neglects, namely that our noumenal world of ideas has\nan objective meaning. The ideal constructs represent realities. They\ndo not consist of scaffolds alone and there is no scaffold which has\nnot been erected to help in building up representations of facts. Let\nus call the representation of facts positive science or simply truth\nand the scaffolding the mythology of science, and we shall see that the\nroad to truth leads everywhere through mythology. Certain facts of the\nsurrounding world impress themselves upon a sentient being and these\nimpressions come to represent facts. These facts are not seen at once in\ntheir causal connection, they appear unconnected among themselves, and in\nthe attempt to formulate them, to represent them, to construct them in\nmental images, we fill out the gaps of our knowledge with such inventions\nas are supplied by analogy.\n\nMythology is, in religion as well as in science, the indispensable ladder\nto truth. We cannot build without scaffolds. So we cannot construct truth\nwithout mythology. We have to introduce allegorical expressions in order\nto fill out gaps with analogies.\n\nMythology becomes fatal to the building up of truth, as soon as we\nconsider it as truth itself. The scaffold is erected simply as an\nassistance for building and if the building is finished the scaffold\nshould be torn down. The progress of science which is so much helped\nby mythology has periods of purification in which the mythology is\ndiscarded. This is sometimes a difficult task, because the very terms\nof science are mostly both at the same time truth and mythology,\nbuilding-stones and scaffold.\n\nTake, for instance, the term atom. The chemist observes that the elements\nalways combine in certain proportions and formulates the law of the\nequivalence of their atomic weights. In order to think this process, to\nreconstruct it in mental images, he imagines that matter consists of\ninfinitely small particles of constant weight. This is a fiction useful\nfor its purpose but it may be just as erroneous as the method employed\nin the infinitesimal calculus of thinking of a continuous curve as\nconsisting of a broken line of infinitely small parts, or of thinking\nof a certain force as being composed of a parallelogram of forces. The\nparallelogram of forces is a scaffold helpful for representing in mental\nsymbols the coexistence of different abstractions of the same kind (e. g.\nmotions of a different velocity and direction). But this scaffold is not\na mere scaffold, it is not erected without any purpose, its final aim is\nthe description of facts.\n\nThe proposition to consider light as rays traveling in straight lines\nis a scaffold, it is mythology; but this analogy contains a truth, it\ncontains a real building-stone which should not be torn down with the\nscaffold. This truth is one-sided; it represents one feature of light\nand disregards other features. It disregards entirely the transversal\noscillations of the ether, yet it describes another feature\u2014viz., the\ntransmission and refraction of light for the comprehension of which we\nneed not take into consideration the undulation theory. The physicist\ncalculates with his formula sin\u03b1/sin\u03b2 = _n_ the angle of refraction.\nThere is certainly neither a sine\u03b1 nor a sine\u03b2 in reality, but there are\ncertain relations of reality which are described in these expressions and\nthe action of the light has a definite quality which can be determined\nwith the assistance of the formula sin\u03b1/sin\u03b2 = _n_.\n\nIf the scientist succeeds in determining such real qualities of things,\neven though it be done with the assistance of mythology, he discovers\na truth. He has with the help of his scaffolds succeeded in placing a\nbuilding-stone where it belongs.\n\nSome scaffolds have to be torn down because they hinder further building;\nother scaffolds must remain because they assist us in modeling, and\nplanning, and predetermining certain processes of nature. They are like\nstaircases which enable us to reach with ease otherwise inaccessible\nplaces on towers or domes.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe idea that science is full of mythology appears strange to the\nnon-scientific, and it is often overlooked by scientists themselves.\nBut the idea that religious mythology in spite of its many irrational\nsuperstitions and wrong analogies beams with truth is also little heeded\nby the many. In fact, man\u2019s method of reaching truth is the same in\nreligion as in science.\n\nThe religious ideas such as God and soul are mental constructs which\ncopy certain realities; but these very terms, such as they are used,\nare mythological expressions; they are still surrounded by their\nscaffolds. Many people know by their own experience the usefulness and\nindispensability of the scaffold. Without the scaffold they would never\nhave had an inkling of the truth, for the representation of which it was\nbuilt, and it is natural that they consider the scaffold as the building\nitself. This is the reason why the narrow-minded orthodox denounce anyone\nwho would lay hand on or tear down any part of the scaffold, which has\nbecome a hindrance to the further development of religious ideals.\n\nPositivism, i. e. the representation of facts without any admixture of\ntheory or mythology, is an ideal which in its purity perhaps will never\nbe realised. Nevertheless it is no _ignis fatuus_, no will-o\u2019-the-wisp\nthat leads us astray. Our science is constantly more and more\napproaching this ideal and the progress of humanity is intimately\nconnected with it.\n\nScience has not merely a theoretic value, its aim and purpose consist\nin its application to practical life. Science is throughout ethical.\nThus ethics has also its mythological phase. In agreement with Professor\nMach (p. 204), we should find it ridiculous if one who presumes to be an\nethical teacher of mankind would say:\n\n \u201cMan _must_ not be descended from monkeys,\u201d \u201cThe earth _shall_\n not rotate,\u201d \u201cMatter _ought_ not everywhere to fill space,\u201d\n \u201cEnergy _must_ be constant,\u201d and so on.\n\nWhy is it ridiculous? Because we cannot prescribe a certain deportment to\nfacts. It is however not ridiculous to let a precise and carefully sifted\nknowledge of facts determine our own deportment.\n\nScience has to teach ethics. But here also we should distinguish between\npositive facts and mythology. Ethics based upon mere theories, upon\nour interpretations of nature which we add to facts, is mythological;\npositive ethics is simply that deportment which is suggested by a\ncomprehension of the facts themselves.\n\nMythological ethics may be quite correct, just as much so as the\napplication of a mythological theory of science may be within certain\nlimits reliable as a working hypothesis. But it is desirable to\nunderstand the nature of mythological ethics in order to distinguish\nbetween truth and fiction.\n\nWhen Professor Mach speaks of sensations as being the elements of the\nworld and of things as being complexes of these elements he apparently\ndoes not use the word sensation in its usual sense. It has ceased to be\nan abstract term which represents one feature only of a process of nature\nand has become a symbol for an entire reality. And is not such a usage of\nterms as if they were not abstracts but the things themselves liable to\nlead to misconceptions?\n\nProfessor Mach\u2019s \u201celements,\u201d it seems to me, are only elements, i.\ne. ultimate and unanalysable materials, if considered as terms of a\npsychological view of the world; they are not elements in the domains of\nother abstractions, such as are made by physiology or physics. Moreover,\nalthough this method eliminates the duality of soul and body, mind and\nmatter, feeling and motion, it does not explain the problem.\n\nProfessor Mach might answer that the problem as to the duality of mind\nand matter is a sham problem, just as much as the problem why do we\nsee things upright when the retina picture of the eye shows the things\ninverted? But a problem is to him who has solved the problem always a\nsham problem. Every problem disappears as a problem as soon as it is\nsolved. It is true that we see as little with the blind spot of the eye\nas with the skin of our back. The problem of the blind spot is not why\ndo we not see with the blind spot, (which is simply a matter of fact,)\nbut why do we not notice, when using only one eye, its lack of sight\nin a spot surrounded with sight-seeing structures? We have to employ\nartificial means to convince ourselves that we are really blind in that\nspot!\n\nAll problems are merely subjective; they are a conflict between two\nconceptions and as Professor Mach himself says, the solution of problems\nconsists in the adaptation of thought to facts, i. e. to new facts or new\nviews of facts. By an adaptation of our thought to the enlarged field\nof vision the problem vanishes; it has ceased to be a problem. In fact\nit never existed as an objective phenomenon. There are no problems in\nnature. There are problems only to the investigating mind. But even the\nformulation of problems is a problem to be solved, and perhaps the most\ndifficult and subtle kind of problems is to discover the flaw in wrongly\nformulated problems.\n\nThe problem of the duality of body and soul, matter and mind, feeling\nand motion, ceases to be a problem to him who has worked his way through\nto a monistic conception, but to those who have not as yet succeeded in\nestablishing a unitary view of these ideas, because they take them to be\nseparate and distinct existences, it is a problem of great importance.\n\n\nXII. THE ONENESS OF SUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY.\n\nThe world is not rigid being, but activity, not absolute existence but\na system of changing relations, not an abstract _Sein_ but a concrete\n_Wirklichkeit_\u2014a constant working of cause and effect. There is no\ndualism in this, for the _Wirklichkeit_ is one and undivided.\n\nYet every relation admits of two standpoints, just as the line _AB_,\nwhich may serve to represent a certain and definite relation, is\ndeterminable from both ends, _A_ as well as _B_. Let us call _A_ the\nsubject and _B_ the object. Neither _A_ nor _B_ is a reality, a whole\ncomplete _Wirklichkeit_. A thing in order to be real must be active, it\nmust work, it must stand in relation to something else. _A_ is a mere\nmathematical point, but _AB_ representing a process does something, it\nperforms work, it is real. A thing in itself, if it could exist at all,\nwould be tantamount to non-existence, it would represent a _Sein_ without\nbeing _Wirklichkeit_. When bearing this in mind, it appears natural\nthat the oneness of existence, representable in such relations as is\nthat of _AB_ = -_BA_ will admit of two standpoints, _BA_ representing\nsubjectivity, and _AB_ representing objectivity. We can consider the\nrelation of the world at large to one special point (which latter may\nin its turn stand for a whole system of relations) or vice versa the\nrelation of this point to the world at large. The former standpoint is\nthat of the microcosm, or the soul, the latter that of the macrocosm or\nthe universe; the former results in awareness, the latter appears as\nmatter in motion. The former is subjectivity, the latter objectivity.\n\nReality must not be conceived of as being a compound of the elements of\nfeeling and of motion, of subjectivity and objectivity or of kinesis and\nmetakinesis. I do not think there are atoms one-half of which contains\nthe potentiality of sentience while the other half is freighted with\nenergy. I conceive of reality as being one throughout, but, being\nthroughout resolvable in relations, it will as a matter of course have\ntwo sides. What these two sides are like can be known through experience\nonly, and experience teaches that under certain conditions the subjective\nside develops into feeling and consciousness, while the objective side is\nrepresented in the feeling of conscious beings as motions.\n\nThis view explains the duality of our conception of psycho-physical\nfacts, but it is certainly not dualism. The duality belongs to the\nscaffold not to the facts themselves. The facts can only be thought of\nas being one and undivided, and no conception can stand except it be\nmonistic.\n\nSubjectivity and objectivity are terms that express relations and not\nthings in themselves. There are, however, philosophers who show a great\ngrief unless either the subjectivity of being, or the objectivity of\nbeing, or the unities in which things or personalities are gathered\nup, are considered as things in themselves. All those features of\nreality which appear to their conception unexplainable, such as the\nrelations that obtain among things and especially the thoughts of\nthinking beings are supposed to be the effects of some transcendental\nentity, of a thing in itself. And if a philosophy denies the existence\nof transcendentalistic thought-entities or of any such things in\nthemselves, which serve as cement to combine the _disjecta membra_ of\ntheir world-conception, it is generally declared to lead straight on to\nnihilism\u2014not because the world itself but because their world-system\nwould thereby be annihilated.\n\nAll things that exist, if considered as separate things, will pass\naway; but if considered as parts of the all-existence of reality, they\nare eternal. In fact things are not separate things, in the sense of\nisolated, absolute, or abstract beings, although we may speak of them as\nsuch for our ephemeral purposes. All things that exist, the human soul\nincluded, are and will remain parts of the One and All.\n\nThis destroys their individuality as little as a brick ceases to be a\nbrick because it serves its part in the building of a dome. The soul of a\nman if his life be well spent, is not annihilated in death, his soul has\nbecome a living stone in the temple of humanity. It continues to live and\nmarches on in the general progress of the race.\n\nWe are parts of a great whole now, and we shall remain parts of the same\ngreat whole forever. We have never been and shall never be transcendental\nselfhoods or metaphysical egos, or any kind of things in themselves. Our\npersonality is real life, it is actual being. As such it is bound up in\nthe universal life of the One and All and no particle of it will be lost.\nWe need not fear death, for the air we breathe is immortality.\n\n EDITOR.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[43] Italics are ours. Kant affirms the italicised question.\n\n[44] The problem of \u201cThe Origin of the Mind\u201d having been the subject of a\nformer paper need not be discussed here. See _The Monist_, Vol i, No. 1,\np. 69-86, and _The Soul of Man_, pp. 23-46.\n\n[45] It is scarcely necessary to mention that medi\u00e6val Realism is\ndifferent from modern Realism.\n\n[46] Aristotle\u2019s idea of matter being potential existence is a fiction.\nFictions of that kind are useful for certain purposes, but we must not\nforget that they are fictions. We might just as well introduce any\nother system of fictions. For instance we might with certainly not less\npropriety look upon the idea in the mind of an artist as potential\nreality while its appearance in a material shape is conceived to produce\nactual reality.\n\n[47] The term \u201cabsolute\u201d is for that reason neither meaningless nor\nredundant. It denotes a certain method of viewing things, but is not an\nobjective quality of things.\n\n[48] See the chapter \u201cSoul Life and the Preservation of Form\u201d in _The\nSoul of Man_, p. 418.\n\n[49] The abandonment of the ego as a metaphysical being is not, as it\nappears to many, a surrender of the soul or of its immortality. That\nthe immortality of the soul from the standpoint of modern psychology\nis preserved, that it appears in a new light, grander and nobler than\nbefore, and that this conception of immortality is of an enormous\npractical importance, have been the main incentives of Mr. E. C. Hegeler\nin founding _The Open Court_ and _The Monist_.\n\n\n\n\nLITERARY CORRESPONDENCE\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\nFRANCE.\n\n\nThe recent work of M. F. PAULHAN, _Le Nouveau Mysticisme_, places us in\nthe presence of a feature of modern life, if not extremely important, at\nleast very curious.\n\nWe assist at the formation of a new spirit. But what is it? What is its\nvalue? A reply to this question would exact a long and minute analysis\nof all social facts. M. Paulhan does not flatter himself that he has\nexhausted it, and he offers us only portions, although excellent and\ninstructive, of the required work. He shows us in rapid review, the\ndissolution of the ancient world, the intellectual and moral anarchy\nwhich has to-day reached its highest possible point; he seeks, in the\nruins amidst which we tread, the constructive elements of a new order of\nthings, and makes an effort to foresee what it will be.\n\n\u201cThe scientific mind,\u201d writes he, \u201cthe religious spirit, pity for\nsuffering, the sentiment of justice, social mysticism, the attraction for\nmysterious perhaps dangerous facts that we begin to have a glimpse of,\nthe kind of new power which the knowledge of them can give us, a general\nneed of universal harmony: such are the principal characters of the\nspirit which is forming itself.\u201d They are not, he himself says, all new.\nIt is not the presence of these elements which is significant, but rather\nthe singular combination in which they occur, and we could say, the\nprecipitate that they give in the particular chemical solution where they\nfind themselves thrown. In every case, the phenomenon does not affect\nentirely, it seems to us, the same characters, according to whether we\nobserve it in the philosophic or scientific order, in the practical\norder, or in that of sentiment, which literature represents. The name\nof mysticism does not belong to every part of the new spirit equally;\nor more exactly, the spirit which is produced could well not be truly\nmysticism, but only a side phenomenon, and the very evident resurrection\nof the spirit which is disappearing.\n\nM. Paulhan, if I do not deceive myself, sometimes allows himself to be\ntoo much influenced by a certain literature, to which I do not allow a\nvery great value, and of which even the sincerity may be suspected. It\nrepresents at first, to my mind, individual conditions, and it evidently\nimpeaches some authors of a morbid diathesis. Many of our prophets, as\nis known in the _Quartier Latin_, have or affect vices which exclude by\nthemselves all generating power. Then, it is very difficult, in our age,\nto appreciate exactly the relations of literature to the public mind,\nseeing the diversity of romantic books, and the correlation of one to\nthe other is perhaps not so strict, so profound as it has been in other\njunctures of history. In short, the modern romance is a document the\nrelative value of which needs to be established by a most severe critic.\n\nSome facts dominate the question, viewed as a whole. It is necessary to\nshow the work of the scientific mind, which has the result of creating\nnew mental habits. It is necessary to consider also that the disorder,\n_the spirit of evil_, so finely analysed by M. Paulhan, corresponds\nchiefly to the interpretations of ignorance, to the exaggerations of\nsentiment, and to the dreams, more or less monstrous, of inventive\nfantasy. It is necessary, finally, if they wish to augur of the future,\nto endeavor to disengage the laws of construction, still badly defined,\nof our political fabrics. The thought of M. Paulhan is good at bottom,\nand the materials with which he constructs the _possible future_ are\ntaken from the positive conditions of our mental and social life: in the\npractical order, \u201cco-operation\u201d is added to the social systems already\nexisting, although disturbed, such as the family and the nation; in the\nideal order, the conception, beyond that of humanity, of a \u201ccosmical\nwhole,\u201d and a \u201cuniverse,\u201d which, to repeat it after Comte, will be\nfavorable to man, in a certain sense, seeing that he causes it to exist.\n\nWe recommend the reading of this book. One\u2019s time is never lost with\na thinker of the stamp of M. Paulhan; he has the merit this time of\ndisclosing to us in a few pages a vast horizon, where some points are\ndelineated with clearness. Logicism has caused much evil in our country.\nLet us now beware of mysticism!\n\n * * * * *\n\nOne of the most curious episodes of this new mysticism is assuredly\nthe Buddhist preaching, begun in France by a small group of writers.\nM. AUGUSTIN CHABOSEAU, one of the representatives of this religious\ntendency, publishes a work, _Essai sur la philosophie boudhique_,[50]\nwhich it is expedient to mention. M. Chaboseau has thought it would be of\ninterest to sum up in a volume the results of the studies on Buddhism,\nand to present it \u201csuch as science has proved it, that is to say very\ndifferent from what Christian polemists, worldly amusers, theosophic\nfanatics, endeavor to disseminate.\u201d He has had the ambition to write this\nvolume, and for my part, I do not refuse him my curiosity.\n\nBut that Buddhism truly contains a religious formula capable of\nattracting to it the souls of our Occident, I have difficulty in\nbelieving. This India is very far from us, and its confused philosophy\nis behind us. I do not think that the nations of to-day will return to\na by-gone mode; and then, this doctrine of Sakya-Muni has something\nagainst it, that I hesitate to say, as it might seem puerile: its god is\ntoo fat. Its god or its sage, as you wish. Yes, that breadth of form,\nthat opulence of flesh, taken as a mark of goodness and power, shocks\nour artistic taste. Do not forget that every religion which claims our\nwill ought to satisfy our \u00e6sthetic sentiment: it is one of the essential\nfactors of the religious sentiment, a compound sentiment where all\nthe emotions of a race ought to find their harmony. The opposition of\nIndia to us, so striking in the ideal of the beautiful, still continues\nin metaphysical speculation. We are too moderate, too sober, for the\ndebauches of imagination in which it delights. Buddhism will be to us\nonly a passing excrescence, and I ask myself if it lives well in the\nsouls where it has sincerely penetrated.\n\nI should have much to do to speak, in the briefest manner, of all the\nbooks or treatises, which in a direct or indirect manner relate either\nto the war of Aryanism against Semitism, and principally against the\nChristianism in which certain authors see the most disastrous conquest of\nSemitic genius; or to the reviving of mystic traditions, strange dreams,\nand monstrous desires; or to a religious restoration, of which the most\nordinary prejudice is to assure the immortality of the soul and to reopen\nthe beyond to man. These works are in general of slight value; they are\nthe multiplication of decays, and we are compelled to consider them as\nsocial wastes, of which the abundance betrays unquestionably the bad\nhealth of the organism, or at least a difficult crisis of its evolution.\n\n * * * * *\n\nBut let us return to the works of philosophy properly so-called. What\nare we to think of that of M. F. RAUH? I deceive myself much if his\n_Essai sur le fondement m\u00e9taphysique der la morale_ is considered of\nmuch service in his own circles. M. Rauh, who belongs to the philosophic\nyouth, the youth of the age, can be well assured that the partisans of\nscientific morality will not upbraid him for \u201cthe admiration of high\nmetaphysical thoughts\u201d with which he does himself honor, but he can fear\nlest the metaphysicians accuse him of further compromising metaphysics by\nthe denser obscurities he casts on it. One is stupefied to find again in\na modern book a phraseology so made up of abstract words, of substantives\nwith capitals, and logical shadows which affect the posture of realities.\nMuch study, much work, without advancing one step, and still worse, in\norder to throw us again into the _culs-de-sac_ from whence we have had\nso much difficulty to disengage ourselves. All the profit one can derive\nfrom this dialectic is to contemplate at the end the vague shadow of its\nown body that is perceived on the wall.\n\nThe metaphysicians of a certain school are not only reluctant to have\nto accept that morality is a natural formation, a social product, an\nhistorical fact; they wish further that the existence even of moral\nsociety should depend on the intelligence that they have of it, or of\nthe explanation that they give of it. They affirm boldly, and these are\nthe words even of M. Rauh, that \u201cthe fate of morality is united to that\nof metaphysics\u201d\u2014their metaphysics. This is a pretension as exorbitant as\nwould be that of a naturalist who should refer the reality of the animal\nworld to the idea he formed of zo\u00f6logical types, or that of a chemist\nwho should subject the value of the positive results of science to a\nparticular hypothesis as to the constitution of bodies.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThere are certain difficulties of language to criticise in the work of\nM. ISIDORE MAUS, barrister in the Court of Appeals at Brussels, _De la\njustice p\u00e9nale, \u00e9tude philosophique sur le droit de punir_. A curious\nspectator, he tells us, of the battle waged between the new school of\nanthropology and the ancient penal jurisprudence, he seeks to divine the\nissue of it. It will probably end, according to him, in the formation of\na medium penal jurisprudence, which will accept limited responsibilities,\nand which, while protecting society, will do its best \u201cto give to\npunishment all the advantages it can.\u201d\n\nIt would be exaggerated no doubt, I willingly grant it, to take away from\nrepression every mark of moral reparation, all weight of \u201creformative\npower\u201d; but I am always shocked to hear partial responsibilities spoken\nof. From the social point of view, the responsibility remains perfect;\nit is united, indeed, to the very act of having caused injury, beyond\nall appreciation. From the point of view of the individual, the word\nresponsibility has the grave inconvenience of implying that the quantity\nof liberty or free-will attributable to the delinquent is measured.\nIt would be less compromising and more exact, to value simply the\nquality, the worth of the delinquent, according to the totality of\nhis affective, intellectual, voluntary, and pathological character,\naccording to the nature and the conditions of the act of which he is\naccused, etc. We should thus escape contradictions of words which easily\nbecome contradictions of fact; we should no more stumble at this latent\ndifficulty of free-will, in medium cases\u2014for _serious cases_ are never\ndifficult. Words exercise a tyranny which jurists would do well to\ndistrust.\n\nIs not this, moreover, just about what M. Maus means by his favorite\nformula\u2014that justice ought \u201cto individualise as much as possible\u201d? It is\na pity only that he does not present his conclusions with the requisite\nclearness. His exposition is not distinct and frank. He has mental\nhabitudes, subtilities of reasoning, which are of value at the Palais,\nbut which it is suitable to rid oneself of when writing a book: his would\ngain much by being entirely remodeled, made clear and disentangled.\n\n * * * * *\n\nM. E. DE LAVELEYE offers to the public a fourth edition, revised and\nconsiderably augmented, of his great work, _De la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et de ses\nformes primitives_. We have not to recall the numerous facts which this\nwork contains and the knowledge of which has become sufficiently general;\nnor to commend M. de Laveleye, who no longer expects fresh praises for\nit. I have only to express the regret that he should have retained the\ntheory of property expounded in the last chapter of his book, or rather\nthe metaphysical conception of right with which he connects it. It seems\nas if he wished to excuse himself from reducing property to the simple\nvalue of a fact, modifiable in its forms, by indicating as a fixed point\nan \u201corder\u201d which shall be the best, which shall be _known_ and _wished_\nof God, _sought_ and _realised_ by man.\n\nM. de Laveleye knows it as well as any one. Right is only a rule, an\nexpression of the relations of men among themselves, in a determined\ngeographical and historical medium. Its changes depend, in part on\nexternal conditions, in part on the characters of man himself, the\nstate and variable equilibrium of his passions and of his mentality.\nIf certain forms of right establish themselves proportionally, in the\ncourse of the life of nations, the fact is explained by the constancy\nand the universality of certain conditions, either physical or mental;\nthe repetition of social arrangements, which produces ultimately a\nmore stable structure and constitutes a sort of axis of development,\nis somewhat analogous, if we may be permitted this comparison, to the\nrepetition of the essential elements in all architecture, or of the\nprimitive forms in all the products of the ceramic art. What is the\ngood of enveloping with mystery the ideal we create ourselves, and of\nrendering obscure a notion that we can positively explain? But let\nus leave here this little quarrel, for it does not touch the solid\ngroundwork of the book.\n\nStill to signalise are: _Premiers principes m\u00e9taphysiques de la\nscience de la nature_, translated from Kant by M. M. CH. ANDLER and\nED. CHAVANNES, who have written an interesting introduction _On the\nphilosophy of nature in Kant_; and _L\u2019Ann\u00e9e philosophique, I\u02b3\u1d49 ann\u00e9e_\n1890, published under the direction of F. PILLON, former manager of\n_La Critique philosophique_. There will be found in this last volume\ntwo profound studies, one by M. Renouvier on the phenomenist method,\nthe other by M. Pillon on the criticism of the infinite, an excellent\narticle by M. L. Dauriac on philosophy and particularly on the \u00e6sthetics\nof Guyau, finally a bibliography of French works which appeared in 1890.\nI wish good success to this publication; it will become valuable, and\nit will be still more so, in my opinion, if M. Pillon, will not recoil\nbefore the fatigue, no doubt sufficiently great, of adding to the\nBibliography a critical sketch of the review articles published in the\ncourse of the year.\n\n LUCIEN ARR\u00c9AT.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[50] Georges Carr\u00e9, publisher. The other works mentioned in this article\nbelong to the _Librarie Alcan_.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\nRECENT GERMAN WORKS IN PSYCHOLOGY.\n\n\nA well-known alienist, Professor Pelman of Bonn, in a recently published\nwork, advanced the assertion that the literary taste of the day pointed\nto a considerable decline of the intellectual health of the present\ngeneration. To him who assumes with Pelman some causal foundation of this\nstate of affairs, it is indeed an alarming sight to pass in review the\nshow windows of our great book centres Leipsic and Berlin and to discover\nthe great number of editions that the products of the literature of a\ncertain class are passing through.\n\nAmong the books that are at present all the vogue, Tolsto\u00ef\u2019s \u201cKreutzer\nSonata\u201d stands in the front rank. Numberless articles in the newspapers\nand the magazines have already made this wonderful work the subject of\ndiscussion, both from the \u00e6sthetical and from the moral point of view.\nNow comes a physician, who discusses the psychological aspect of the\nstory, and discusses it in a manner which must claim our interest and to\nwhich in the main points it emphasises we cannot deny our assent.\n\nDr. H. BECK has published at the house of Rauert and Rocco of Leipsic,\na brochure bearing the title _Des Grafen Leo Tolsto\u00ef Kreutzer Sonate\nvom Standpunkte des Irrenarztes_, and arrives on the basis of a careful\nanalysis at the result that Tosdnischew is a decidedly neuropathical\ncharacter. Now as Tolsto\u00ef, on his own express declaration in his\nconcluding remarks, places his own views in Tosdnischew\u2019s mouth, this\njudgment respecting the principal character of the story also holds\ngood in great measure of its author. Generally, indeed, Beck is very\nconsiderate towards Tolsto\u00ef\u2019s person, in the expression of his opinions;\nbut he is nevertheless very plainly outspoken when he says at the\nconclusion of his little book: \u201cLet us characterise this monstrous\nproduct, the \u2018Kreutzer Sonata,\u2019 as that which it appears to every person\nof sound sentiments\u2014as the emanation, namely, of a diseased brain, of a\ndegenerated Psyche.\u201d\n\nThe Munich physician Dr. Puschmann, who in the year 1873 in a special\ntreatise represented Richard Wagner, then still alive, as psychically\ndiseased, has thus found, as we see, in a certain sense a successor\nin Dr. Beck. But while Puschmann\u2019s pamphlet, having been occasioned\nby certain conditions of affairs in Munich, was written in a hostile\nspirit, and while the little book of Beck\u2019s makes no secret of its\nauthor\u2019s aversion to Tolsto\u00ef and his works, a notorious representative\nof unhealthy \u201cyoung Germany,\u201d the novelist Wilhelm Walloth, meets at\nother hands with an uncommonly tender treatment. There is indeed nothing\nremarkable in this, for if anyone is in need of tender treatment it is\na man who is sick. But it is very remarkable that the diseased state of\na nervous system should be accredited to the writer Walloth as a great\npoetic excellence.\n\nG. LUDWIGS, the author of the treatise _Wilhelm Walloth_, Leipsic, 1891,\nVerlag von Wilhelm Friedrich, had in so far the advantage of Puschmann\nand Beck, that he was not placed under the necessity of originally\ndemonstrating what the actual state of the nervous system of his hero\nwas, from his works. This condition had already been established by\nexpert physicians in a much talked of trial before the District Court of\nLeipsic for circulating obscene publications. Ludwigs was able therefore\nto proceed immediately with his problem of ascertaining the extent to\nwhich a diseased state of the nervous system had effect in Walloth\u2019s\nnovels and poems. His discussion of this last question possesses great\ninterest for the psychologist, although the reader will find considerable\ndifficulty in accommodating his thoughts to Ludwigs\u2019s occasionally very\nsingular style. Setting aside the odd expressions of Ludwigs, we may\nsay that there is exhibited in a pre-eminent degree in the writings of\nWalloth, first, what the physicians call hyper\u00e6sthesia, and by this\nis meant not only an excessive sensitiveness of the senses but also\u2014a\ncondition that is connected with the last\u2014an extraordinary intensity of\nthe emotional activity. Secondly, are found numberless bold associations\nof ideas which are much better known to the physician than to the\n\u00e6sthetician.\n\nUnfortunately Walloth is not the only one of the representatives of\n\u201cyoung Germany,\u201d in whose works the characters of disease appear in such\nintensity, and the circumstance that books of this class are bought in\nsuch numbers and read in still greater, places the tastes and sentiments\nof a large portion of the educated German public in a questionable light.\n\nIf we turn our glance away from the sensational phenomena of literature\nto the phenomena of ordinary life, which are not uncommonly enacted in\nthe halls of justice, it is in first rank the incorrigible swindlers and\nsharpers that excite our attention. We have received on this subject from\nDr. ANTON DELBRUECK, a physician of a Swiss insane asylum, an interesting\nlittle work bearing the title _Die pathologische L\u00fcge und die psychisch\nabnormen Schwindler_, Stuttgart, 1891, Verlag von Ferdinand Enke. In\nthis book the author makes an investigation of the gradual transition of\na normal psychological process into processes exhibiting pathological\nsymptoms, and shows, in so doing, by ample material, that in every kind\nof intentional deception the consciousness of intention can exhibit very\ndifferent degrees of intensity and can imperceptibly sink in a succession\nof cases to zero. As a matter of course, Delbr\u00fcck\u2019s treatise is primarily\nof interest to medical experts and lawyers, but it will also be of\ninterest in a secondary degree to all circles that devote their attention\nto psychological studies generally, particularly so to educators who\nhave not infrequently to do with pathological lies, as G. Stanley Hall\nquite recently pointed out in a very instructive article in _The America\nJournal of Psychology_ on the lying of children, and as is developed in\nthe work of Dr. Sollier, before mentioned in _The Monist_, entitled _La\npsychologie de l\u2019idiot et l\u2019imb\u00e9cile_, which is also to be had in a very\ngood German edition, translated by Paul Brie, under the title _Der Idiot\nund der Imbecille_, published by Leopold Voss of Hamburg.\n\nIn the German edition of Sollier\u2019s book Professor Pelman, whom we have\nabove mentioned, has written an introduction in which he speaks of the\nwork in words of praise similar to those expressed by Lucien Arr\u00e9at in\n_The Monist_. \u201cSollier,\u201d says he, \u201chas put us into the possession of a\npsychology of mental imbecility, in a completeness in which hitherto\nit was not at our disposal.\u201d Then follows another passage which we\nwill also quote, as it forms an important supplement to the remarks\nof Arr\u00e9at. It is this: \u201cImbecility had remained the step-child of the\nscience of psychiatry and has not by any means met with the consideration\nwhich in view of its social importance is due to it. If we go through\nthe works, as great in number as they are in voluminousness, which\nhave been published in the style of Lombroso on criminals and their\npeculiar characteristics, we shall be unable to escape the impression\nproduced in our minds that the characteristics of imbeciles portrayed by\nSollier recur point for point in the typical criminal. Here as there,\nthe same insufficiency of all ethical development, the same frivolity,\nand the same incapacity for being of use in society exist. That which\nin Sollier\u2019s explanation decides the whole anthropological position of\nthe imbecile\u2014his anti-social, society-hostile attitude\u2014is emphasised by\nall writers as the characteristic trait common to all criminals, and\nthe description of imbeciles and criminals coincides as completely in\nthis respect as if the same individual had sat for both pictures. The\nconclusions that follow from this can only enlist new adherents in the\nranks of the anthropological school, and this result also I should place\nto the profit-account of the present book.\u201d\n\nHowever profitable and necessary employment with the diseased states of\nthe human soul may be, personally at least it is an unpleasant subject\nfor us, and we are glad therefore that we may abandon this domain for the\npresent letter.\n\nThe occasion of this is afforded by a valuable gift from Prof. W. PREYER,\nformerly of Jena, now of Berlin. Professor Preyer has presented us with\na rather large volume bearing the title _Wissenschaftliche Briefe von\nGustav Theodor Fechner und W. Preyer. Nebst einem Briefweschsel zwischen\nK. von Vierordt und Fechner sewie mehreren Beilagen. Mit dem Bildnisse\nFechner\u2019s und vier Holzschnitten_. Hamburg und Leipsic, 1890. Verlag\nvon Leopold Voss. The work contains a correspondence extending from the\nyear 1873 to the year 1883, in which the two distinguished scientists\ndiscuss (chiefly) myo-physical and psycho-physical questions, and will\nbe of great interest to many readers of _The Monist_, especially as it\nmakes its appearance simultaneously with the issuing of a new edition of\nFechner\u2019s _Elemente der Psychophysik_ by Wilhelm Wundt.\n\nThe much fought over and much disputed province of psycho-physics has\nalso been entered on by a younger psychologist, who has already acquired\na considerable name,\u2014by Hugo M\u00fcnsterberg, docent at the university of\nFreiburg in Baden. In his _Beitr\u00e4ge zur experimentellen Psychologie_,\nwhich are published in parts at indefinite periods by Mohr of Freiburg in\nBaden\u2014three parts have already been published\u2014M\u00fcnsterberg raises, in the\nfirst place, a vigorous protest against Wundt; repudiating on the basis\nof the results of independent experiment the apperception hypothesis\nwhich has been propounded by the scientist mentioned, and producing proof\nthat all kinds of so-called apperception are reducible to associations\nof the representative activity. Secondly, he offers us in the third part\na new foundation on which to base psycho-physics. It is, of course,\nimpossible, in so difficult a subject, to reproduce briefly yet clearly\nthe developments to which M\u00fcnsterberg devotes one hundred and twenty-two\npages. But we will at least supply a few hints with regard to what this\nnew foundation of psycho-physics is.\n\nIn the first place, M\u00fcnsterberg rejects the notion that prevails with\nFechner and his school, that a powerful sensation is a multiple of a\nweaker one, by which the first can be measured. The stronger sensation\nis, says he, in comparison with the weaker one something wholly new;\nfor, accurately considered, the intensity of a sensation is also of a\nqualitative nature. However, we are not by any means at liberty to infer\nfrom this that the measurement of psychical quantities is impossible.\nTo appreciate this, it is first requisite that we should get clear\nideas with respect to the psychological foundation of our physical\nmeasurements. The only foundation of these last is our muscular feeling,\nto this extent, that all measurement is founded on the measurement of\nquantities of space, time, and mass, and any estimate of the latter is\nonly possible on the basis of the muscular feeling that enters as a\nfactor in the conceptions involved. All physical measurement rests on the\nestablishment, and therefore reproduction, of _like_ muscular sensations;\non exactly the same foundation rests also all measurement of psychical\nquantities, of intensities of sensation, and since this foundation is\nthe same, for this very reason the same justification is due to the\nmeasurement of psychical intensity as is due to physical measurements.\nThis is the foundation on which the psycho-physics of M\u00fcnsterberg is\nraised, which for a fuller view must be studied in the third part of the\n\u201cBeitr\u00e4ge\u201d itself.\n\n CHR. UFER.\n\nAltenburg, November, 1891.\n\n\n\n\nDIVERSE TOPICS.\n\n\n\n\nTHE CLERGY\u2019S DUTY OF ALLEGIANCE TO DOGMA AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN\nWORLD-CONCEPTIONS.\n\n\nA late number of the _Gegenwart_ of Berlin (Vol. xl, No. 30) contained\nan article by Mr. Eugene Schiffer, a German justice, on the subject\n\u201cWorld-Conception and the Office of Judge,\u201d in which attention was called\nto the fact that the performance of duties, not only in the pulpit\nbut in all the professions, and pre\u00ebminently in the dispensation of\njustice through the courts, depends upon and stands in a more or less\nclose connection with some definite world-conception; thus showing that\nreligion of some kind forms and must form the background of the practical\nlife of society. He says:\n\n \u201cThe Church demands of its disciples as an indispensable\n condition of serving her the confession of a certain\n world-conception; she requires that every one who intends to\n take upon himself her rights and duties, should in his inmost\n heart agree with her concerning the contents of her faith,\n especially concerning the dogmas on eschatology, on God and\n world, body and soul, the origin and end of things; and this\n is but a matter of course, for the essential part and also the\n foundation of her activity lie in these very doctrines and in\n their propagation. It is a hard and a severe demand. Although\n on the one hand the morally free fulfilment of her requests\n contains the germ of an harmonious development of life and\n promises an extraordinary concentration and elevation of all\n faculties, it leads on the other hand to serious conflicts, of\n which the pages of history not less than the experiences of our\n daily life exhibit innumerable and sad instances. We recollect\n the terrible spiritual struggles in the souls of those who\n commenced to doubt, and the outcome is generally a pitiful\n catastrophe, either submission and hypocrisy with the weak,\n or tribulation, renunciation, and ruin with those who thought\n higher of truth than of their worldly emoluments.\n\n \u201cMost of the other professions and trades know nothing of the\n indispensability of a certain world-conception. The merchant,\n the mechanic, the lawyer, the soldier, the teacher, the\n laborer, can upon the whole think concerning these highest\n problems of life as they please. An inner and ideal conflict\n between their views and their calling seems definitely\n excluded. Outer and practical conditions\u2014such as administrative\n injunctions of a certain kind, the aspiration of progress, the\n ambition to be better off, etc.\u2014may sometimes produce conflicts.\n\n \u201cYet this character of indifference concerning a general\n world-conception which is found in the secular professions and\n trades does not bear the stamp of permanence. For ultimately\n the entire doing and achieving of every thinking man, so far\n as it rises above the mere vegetative functions, is intimately\n connected with that common world-conception which everywhere\n influences and guides him. This is unnoticeable so long as the\n harmony of the connection remains undisturbed, but it manifests\n itself in consciousness as soon as its harmony is threatened\n through some important change of any of its parts. Even to-day\n a deep-going change is preparing itself; even now the struggle\n about the world-conception is fought more severely and more\n bitterly than ever and a new doctrine goes far enough to\n uncover the ultimate roots of our civilisation, of our position\n in life, of our calling; it attacks and shakes the present\n world-conception.\n\n \u201cThis implies the possibility of a conflict between the old\n and the new faith even outside the pale of the church, and\n this conflict may influence the choice of a calling. This\n possibility has become an imminent probability concerning the\n office of judge, especially the judge of a criminal court.\n\n \u201cThe dispensation of justice rests to a great extent upon the\n presupposition of guilt and the criminal law of to-day is\n almost throughout built upon this idea of guilt. It is true\n that this view has not always been taken. The Greek law and\n the old Germanic law interfered even in the gravest cases\n exclusively on account of the objective state of things without\n taking into consideration the criminal intent of the defendant.\n But this view was superseded in the former case by the Roman,\n in the latter by the canonical law, both requiring the\n conception of a moral and a subjective guilt, and at present\n the criminal law of every civilised nation (with the sole\n exception of the Chinese who threaten with capital punishment\n him who accidentally kills no less than the intentional\n murderer) rests upon the foundation of a belief in guilt.\n\n \u201cBut there is no room for guilt in the materialistic\n world-conception. Everything that happens, the activity of the\n human soul included is to be explained according to mechanical\n principles and thus the view that man\u2019s will is not free is\n proposed as one of its fundamental doctrines. While in this\n way there is no possibility left that a man might have acted\n differently than he actually did, this view takes away his\n responsibility. And this movement which either cancels or\n weakens the momentum of guilt, has taken hold of the minds of\n men far beyond the circle of decided materialists.\n\n \u201cThe foundation of our criminal law stands or falls with the\n idea of guilt. With it stands and falls also the office of\n the judge, whose duty is the dispensation and utilisation of\n justice. He who does not believe in the possibility of guilt\n cannot without inconsistency pronounce any one guilty. He who\n as a matter of principle or at least within certain not well\n defined limits denies the freedom of the human will can no\n longer serve as a judge, certainly not as a criminal judge.\u201d\n\nJustice Eugene Schiffer is a conservative man. He demands that for the\nprotection of the old world-conception the office of judge should be\ncarefully guarded against such intruders as are not in sympathy with the\npresent world-conception. He says:\n\n \u201cExactly as the church, in order to preserve herself and\n to guard against her theology being diluted into a watery\n philosophy of religion, is bound not to separate the conditions\n of her life from a definite world-conception, so also justice,\n in order to deserve its name, should oblige its servants to\n take a definite position toward the ultimate world-problems....\n He who does not accept in his conviction the moral foundations\n of a certain calling, must not choose it, or if he has chosen\n it, he must renounce it\u2014or he must in his profession act\n against his conviction\u2014unless he risks being discharged from\n his office on account of a neglect of duties.\u201d\n\nWe agree with Justice Schiffer in one most important point, viz.,\nthe intimate connection of religion with practical life and of our\nworld-conception with all our doing and achieving. But we differ from him\nin another no less important point, viz., in the proposition to prevent\nthe present world-conception from undergoing a further growth and higher\nevolution. His proposition is nothing less than to make humanity and all\nits institutions stationary.\n\nEverything that exists has a natural right to defend its existence, and\nso has the present world-conception. But that which grows and develops\nout of the conditions of the present existence has also a natural\nright to attain existence. The ideal world of the \u201cis to be\u201d is not a\nnon-existence, as it might appear to the unknowing, but a germ existence,\nand if there is no room for both the actual existence of the present\nstate and the germ existence of a new state, a struggle will ensue. There\nare at present and always have been many spurious world-conceptions\nwhich if they overcame the present world-conception would lead humanity\nbackward to the beginning of civilisation. Indeed most propositions of\nreform are reversals which would undo the results of evolution and reduce\nmankind to primitive conditions. The fermenting minds of those who still\nhope to cure all the ills and woes of society by one stroke, have not\nyet outgrown the idea of the perfection, nobility, and happiness of the\nso-called original state of nature,\n\n \u201cWhen wild in woods the noble savage ran.\u201d\n\nYet among all the plans of reform there is one which is correct,\nanswering the wants of the time; and among all the world-conceptions\nwhich struggle to exist there is also one which is the legitimate outcome\nof the present world-conception. It is the present world-conception\nenlarged through additional experience and purified of certain errors.\nAnd it is an often repeated occurrence in history that the old and the\nnew, father and son, have to fight with each other. The heir apparent\neither does not know that he is the child of his antagonist, or the\nlatter the defendant of the present state does not know that he fights\nwith his own son. This often repeated fact has found a mythological\nexpression in the old Teutonic song of Hildebrand meeting in combat his\nson Hadubrand, a legend which in similar versions appears again in other\nAryan sagas, the best known of which is the tale of Rustem\u2019s struggle\nwith Sohrab in Firdus\u2019s great Iranian epic.\n\nCan the struggle between the old and the new world-conception be avoided?\nNo, it cannot and should not, for the new has to prove its legitimacy\nby showing its intrinsic strength; it must show that it has the power\nto exist. The struggle cannot be avoided, but the bitterness, the\nseverity, the barbarity of the struggle can be avoided. Let Hildebrand\nand Hadubrand measure swords in a spiritual encounter, let the vanquished\nideas yield to the stronger ideas, and they will prepare the gradual\nchange of an evolution instead of the sudden rupture of a revolution.\n\nFreedom of thought is always the best soil for a peaceful evolution\nbut any system that binds the consciences of men and ties their ideas\ndown to the average level of a certain age will be as dangerous as a\nboiler without a valve. There are periods of instability in history\nwhen the strengthening of the conservative spirit by imposing fetters\nupon the consciences of men appears useful and almost a condition for\nthe development of some kind of a civilisation. This found expression\nin the historic legends of Lycurgus and Solon, binding their countrymen\nby oath not to alter the laws of the state. But these periods are after\nall ephemeral, and we ought to know by this time that we cannot bid\nthe sun stand still or check the spirit of progress and the growth of\nmankind. There are nations which develop slowly because they rush into\ninnovations, but there are other nations which have gone to the wall\nbecause of over-conservatism through which they were induced to suppress\nthe freedom of thought and to deny the right of doubting the absolute\nvalidity of the prevailing world-conception.\n\nThe proposition of Justice Schiffer to bind the conscience of the judge\nby an oath of allegiance to that world-conception which is at present\nrecognised as orthodox, is actually a law in the constitution of the\nchurch, and conflicts in the consciences of clergymen are of a common\noccurrence. The opinion that a clergyman who has ceased to believe in\ncertain dogmas of his church has to resign this position is very common\namong freethinkers as well as orthodox believers. At first sight this\nseems to be the only choice left to a man of honesty and a lover of\ntruth. I held this opinion myself for a long time. There is nevertheless\nanother view of the subject which caused me to change my opinion\nentirely, and I am glad to perceive that such a man as Mr. Moncure\nD. Conway who held himself a position in the church and having grown\nmore and more liberal has retired from active service, declares most\nemphatically that a clergyman who has grown liberal should not resign\nbut stay in the church and wait till the church forces him to leave his\nposition. This is an honest course, a clergyman has a right to pursue it\nand he will thereby open the eyes of his fellow-men; he will further the\ninterests of mankind, and people will thus be enabled to judge better\nwhether or not it is just to impose these burdens upon the pastors of the\nchurch.\n\nLet us consider the case more closely. First, the oath which a young\nclergyman gives at his ordination is a promissory oath, and like all\npromissory oaths it holds good on the supposition that all the main\nconditions remain the same. If a man promises and binds himself by\nan oath to start to-morrow morning on a journey he does so on the\nsupposition that it will be possible. So far as he can foresee it\nis possible, but incidents may happen which will make it impossible\nto-morrow. A promissory oath will be a weight on the conscience if it has\nto be broken, but it has no legal force. Thus soldiers swear an oath of\nallegiance to their king, and under ordinary circumstances there will be\nno cause for doubt as to the propriety of remaining faithful to the oath.\nBut many cases of great perplexity will appear when a civil war splits a\nnation in twain so that brother stands against brother and faithfulness\nto the king may be the most degrading felony toward one\u2019s highest and\nholiest ideals, perhaps also toward one\u2019s bodily parents and nearest\nkin. Who does not recollect the sad end of Ludwig II, king of Bavaria.\nWhen the mind of the unfortunate monarch was too much deranged to leave\nhim in possession of his royal power, a commission of several authorised\nmen went to the castle where he resided to place him under the care of\na physician. The king refused to receive the commission and ordered his\nfaithful guards by whom he was surrounded to seize the commission, gouge\nout their eyes and treat them otherwise in the most outrageous way. The\ncommission not being protected were for a moment in great danger, but\nhappily the guards perceiving the seriousness of the situation did not\nexecute the king\u2019s orders and we might say,\u2014broke their oath.\n\nDid they really break their oath? No, they did not, for when they were\nsworn to obey their sovereign master and lord, it was supposed that the\nking was and would remain in his right mind. He became insane and this\nchanged the situation entirely.\n\nThe oath of allegiance which the ministers of a church swear at their\nordination is made in the bona fide conviction on both sides,\u2014the church\non the one side and the man that takes orders on the other side,\u2014that\nthe dogmas to which he pledges his troth are the truth. The oath holds\ngood so long as a minister believes that the dogmas of the church are the\ntruth; it still holds good so long as he considers it possible that they\nmay be true. But the oath to believe them ceases to bind in the sense in\nwhich it was demanded as soon as a minister sees clearly that they are\nnot true and that their truth is an actual impossibility. It ranks in the\nsame category as the oath of allegiance to a sovereign who has become\ninsane.\n\nBut the case is more complex still. If promissory oaths have no legal\nforce because in certain cases a man would have to act against the letter\nof the oath, have these oaths no binding power whatever, as soon as a\nminister recognises the incongruity of the church belief with truth? I\nshould say that they have a binding power, yet this binding power must be\nsought not in the letter but in the spirit of the oath.\n\nOne of the most prominent of juridical authorities, Prof. Rudolf von\nJhering, has written a book entitled \u201cDer Zweck im Recht.\u201d He finds that\nall laws, all wills, all decrees have a purpose, and this purpose is\ntheir spirit. There are laws worded so badly that obedience to the letter\nof the law would under certain and unforeseen circumstances enforce\nexactly the contrary of that which the law was made for. Instances of\nthis kind are of not an uncommon occurrence especially with regard to\nwills; testators and their legal advisors being often unable to formulate\ntheir intentions in a logical shape. Jhering maintains that a judge in\nconstruing a will, a decree, or a law has to find out the intention and\npurpose of the testator, the magistrate that gave the decree, or the\nlegislator, and it is this intention or purpose with which his decisions\nhave to agree. Supposing however that this purpose of a will or a law\nis wrong in itself or nonsensical, a judge has to construe it so that\nit will have sense. If the purpose is criminal the whole transaction is\nillegal, if it is irrational or illogical, it has to be interpreted so as\nto make it rational and logical. If it has reference to antiquated views,\ncustoms or institutions it has to be adapted to the corresponding modern\nviews and to existing conditions.\n\nAn instance from practical life will explain the last point. There are\nmany institutions in Northern Germany which were founded as cloisters or\nmonasteries. The nuns and monks have been engaged partly in teaching,\npartly in attending to the sick, and in other useful purposes. The funds\nof these institutions exist still, and serve now those purposes directly\nwhich they have served formerly indirectly through the service of nuns\nand monks. Most of them are employed for the maintenance of schools,\nsome of them as hospitals, others as homes for unmarried daughters\nof government officials or for homeless aristocratic ladies without\nmeans, etc. These changes have been wrought by history as the natural\nconsequence of new conditions. Many of them were made in actual violation\nof the letter of the testators\u2019 will; yet they were made bona fide with\nthe intention to remain faithful to its spirit? The question is not what\na testator intended his will to be half a millennium ago, but what he\nwould intend it to be in the living present, knowing all the changes\nwhich the progress of the times have wrought and having progressed with\nthe times.\n\nBefore we answer the question, What is the purpose of the minister\u2019s\noath? we should first see clearly, what is the purpose of the church. Is\nthe purpose of the church really to be sought in the propaganda of some\nabsurd dogmas? Or does not rather the preaching of these dogmas itself\nserve a purpose?\n\nThe dogmas of Christianity were some time ago supposed to be the\nindispensable instruments of ethical instruction. All the churches are\neducational institutions to inculcate the moral ought on the basis of\na popular world-conception. The church of England for instance is a\nnational institute and it is not true that one church party has the\nright to impose its religious conception upon the rest of the nation.\nWhen the church was founded some crude notions were taken to be absolute\ntruths and no man can at the present time be required to believe these\ncrudities. All institutions are conservative but most conservative are\nthe courts of justice and the church. The conservatism of jurisprudence\nis characterised in the saying which appears to be its leading principle\n_fiat justicia et pereat mundus_. Jurisprudence too often forgets that\nthe dispensation of justice serves the purpose of sustaining life,\nof promoting the general welfare and enhancing the prosperity of the\ncommunity; it overlooks the spirit and clings to the letter.\n\nOur justices are inclined to believe that if a new world-conception\narises, (which by the bye will as we believe not be materialistic nor\nwill it destroy the idea of moral responsibility, although it may\nchange our views about guilt,) their whole system of jurisprudence\nwill break down. They are afraid of a _pereat justicia et vivat\nmundus_. Justice Schiffer is not at all anxious to prove the truth of\nthe old world-conception, he is satisfied with proving that the new\nworld-conception is incompatible with the old view of justice. Criminal\nlaw means punishment and punishment presupposes the idea of guilt. He\nargues:\n\n\u201cThe question remains whether the conflict between the new and the old\nworld-conception could be avoided by adapting our views of justice to the\nnew world-conception; yet this question is to be denied, for the notions\nof guilt and punishment belong to each other according to logical,\nethical, and moral principles. To punish without assuming guilt is as\nnonsensical as it is immoral.\u201d\n\nIt would lead us too far here to show that moral responsibility still\nsubsists on the supposition of a strict determinism and that the\ncriminal law with its punishments will not be abolished in the future.\nYet there is no doubt that our views of punishment will have to be\nchanged; indeed they have changed and how much they have changed, can\nbe learned by a comparison of an execution of to-day with one of a few\nhundred years ago. The idea of punishment in the sense of inflicting\npain as a retribution has gone and it has gone forever. There is no more\nburning of the criminal with hot irons, or twitching with hot tongs,\nor tearing out his tongue, or stretching on the wheel. The criminal is\nexecuted with as little pain to him as possible. Why this change? Because\na new world-conception has entirely altered our views of punishment\nand it is going to alter them still more. Penology is not to be based\nupon sentimentality as some so-called philanthropists intend to do;\nnevertheless it is to and it will become humane because we have abandoned\nthe old conception of guilt which as Justice Schiffer correctly states\nwas a fundamental idea in the old jurisprudence, and this antiquated\nconception of guilt has partly but not as yet entirely been overcome.\n\nThe church is in a position similar to that of the criminal law courts.\nA change of our world-conception has set in and the church is not as\nyet adapted to the change. The church having found it necessary for its\npurpose of preaching ethics to insist on the belief in a world-conception\nwhich demonstrates a moral world order, now attempts to perpetuate\ncertain errors of our ancestors\u2019 conception of this moral world-order.\n\nThe oath of a clergyman having been asked and given bona fide on the\nsupposition that the dogmas of the church were the truth, holds good\nstill, but it must be construed as in similar cases a judge would have\nto construe a faulty will or an ill-worded law. It has to be construed in\nthe spirit and not in the letter.\n\nClergymen who have grown liberal should not leave the church. It is their\nduty to stay in the church and to make their influence felt to broaden\nthe spirit of the church. If the church removes them from their position,\nthey yield to the authority at present in power, but they should not\nyield without a struggle, to be conducted on their part modestly but\nfirmly, with reverence toward their authorities, with tact and decency,\nbut fearlessly and bravely, for they are fighting not only for their\npersonal interests but for the progress of mankind, they are fighting for\nthe holiest treasures of the church\u2014for truth.\n\nThe abolition of these burdens on the consciences of the clergy would\nbe a natural consequence of repeated struggles. Let a pastor be bound\nto respect his church authorities, to obey them in all matters of\nadministration, let him be bound to revere the ecclesiastical traditions\nof which he should never speak lightly, but do not prescribe to him a\nbelief of any kind. Pledge him to serve the truth, to speak the truth and\nto live the truth; and that simple pledge will have more weight than the\nrequirement to believe dogmas which, his superiors know but too well can\nno longer be believed literally but must be taken _cum grano salis_.\n\nChrist says concerning the observances insisted upon by the Scribes\nand Pharisees: \u201cThey bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne: and\nlay them upon men\u2019s shoulders.\u201d This passage is applicable also to the\npresent system of ordination. Christ\u2019s saying is read in the churches and\nit is, as most of his words are, as new to-day as it was at his time,\nbut who thinks of its application to our present system of burdening the\nconsciences of men?\n\n P. C.\n\n\n\n\nA COMMENT BY PROF. F. MAX M\u00dcLLER CONCERNING THE DISCUSSION ON EVOLUTION\nAND LANGUAGE.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The Monist:_\n\nI must thank you and Professor Romanes for the frank and searching\ncriticism to which you have both subjected my article on \u201cThought and\nLanguage,\u201d published in _The Monist_. You have shown that you care for\ntruth and not for victory, and you have carefully abstained from any\npersonal remarks which are so apt to embitter scientific controversy\nand in consequence to render its chief object, the discovery of more\ntruth, illusory. We all have the same object, we all want to know what\nis true\u2014why then should we not all work together, listen to friendly\ncriticism, accept useful advice, confess our mistakes, and work as hard\nas we can in the special field allotted to each of us.\n\nAs soon as I find a little more leisure, I shall not fail to reply fully\nto both your articles. At present I only write to you to defend myself\nagainst an undeserved charge brought against me by Professor Romanes.\nI had said that Professor Romanes had no right to speak of men like\nNoir\u00e9, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, to say nothing of Hobbes, with an air\nof superiority. Professor Romanes replies that he never mentioned Mr.\nHerbert Spencer at all, that it would have been well for me, if, before\ncondemning his supposed treatment of Herbert Spencer, Huxley, and Noir\u00e9,\nI had looked at his Index. This is a serious charge. It would show a\nwant of accuracy unpardonable in a scholar. It is true, Mr. Herbert\nSpencer\u2019s name does not occur in the Index. But on p. 230 we read: \u201cSo\nhere again we meet with additional proof, were any required, of the folly\nof regarding the copula as an essential ingredient of a proposition.\u201d Now\nit is well known that it is Mr. Herbert Spencer who regards the copula\nas an essential ingredient of a proposition. I have shown that the facts\nof language are against Mr. Herbert Spencer, but I should not therefore\nthink it right to charge him with folly. This will show that if I wrote\nwithout Index, I did not write without book.\n\n Yours truly,\n\n F. MAX M\u00dcLLER.\n\nOxford, Oct. 28, 1891.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK REVIEWS.\n\n\nSYNOPTIKER. APOSTELGESCHICHTE. Bearbeitet von Professor _H. J. Holzmann_.\nZweite verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. Freiburg, i. B.: Akademische\nVerlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr. 1892.\n\nThis book is the first volume of the \u201cHand-Commentar zum Neuen Testament\u201d\nedited by the Professors H. Holtzmann, R. A. Lipsius, P. W. Schmiedel,\nand H. v. Soden.\n\nNo better man could have been selected for the first part of this great\nwork than Prof. H. J. Holtzmann, who is not only a theologian of most\ncomprehensive scholarship but also has devoted his energies to this\nspecial subject. He has lectured regularly for a number of years at\nthe university of Strassburg six or eight times weekly on the synoptic\ngospels and three times weekly on the Acts. The principle of his\nmethod has been laid down in a former work of his, viz. \u201cLehrbuch der\nhistorisch-kritischen Einleitung in das Neue Testament.\u201d The present book\ncontains an enormously voluminous material condensed into a comparatively\nsmall space of 448 pp. large octavo. The author being a theologian his\nattitude toward his subject is naturally reverent, paying an unreserved\nhomage to the greatness of Jesus. Yet at the same time his investigations\nare strictly scientific and in accordance with the rules of criticism\nas employed in any historical investigation. It is no exaggeration to\nconsider Professor Holtzmann\u2019s work as representative in the highest\ndegree; it embraces the most complete knowledge at present attainable and\nthat too in a most concise form as a practical handbook with parallel\ntables and indexes of reference for students of the New Testament.\n\nThe author first formulates \u201cthe synoptic problem,\u201d which has been solved\nafter innumerable vain attempts by the so-called \u201cMarcus-Hypothesis,\u201d\nwhich is at present considered as satisfactory, because it alone fulfils\nevery condition and explains all the difficulties. Holtzmann regards\nthe figure of Christ as historical. The impression of his powerful\npersonality was a living presence in the first congregation at Jerusalem.\nBut all the interest centred in his words. The words of their Lord were\nfaithfully preserved by oral tradition. Sentences so short and yet so\npregnant with meaning as \u201cBlessed are the peacemakers,\u201d or \u201cYe are the\nsalt of the earth,\u201d \u201cBut let your communication be, Yea, yea: Nay,\nnay, etc.,\u201d are so impressive that whoever has heard them once, will\nnever forget them. The interest in the word was soon complemented by\nan interest in facts and events which was much later followed by an\ninterest in dogma. The first differences among the Christians originated\nthrough the mission among the heathens. The gentile Christian became\nindifferent concerning the Jewish traditions and clung with all his\nreligious enthusiasm to the Christ as his saviour. Christianity became\na cosmic religion while the Jewish Christians still looked upon Christ\nas the Messiah of the people of Israel. The Jewish view of Christianity\nis represented by Matthew, the gentile view by Luke. Mark however does\nnot show any development of dogma. According to Papias, the Apostle\nSt. Peter had whenever it became necessary for an explanation of the\nwords of Christ, occasionally told certain events of the life of Jesus;\nwhich were afterwards written down by Mark. We find in Mark, Matthew,\nand Luke the same building stones, but how differently arranged! Mark\nshows evidence of relating real facts of history, he begins with John\nthe Baptist, tells us how Jesus became baptised, how he preached the\nkingdom of God; according to Mark, Jesus does not declare himself as the\nMessiah from the beginning. His activity grows by degrees, his disciples\nincrease, he heals the sick, and it is from the mouth of these that\nhe was first proclaimed as the Messiah. He becomes a power among the\npeople and makes himself offensive to the authorities who consider him\nas dangerous and attempt to take his life. Jesus forbids those whom he\nheals to proclaim that he is the Messiah. He sends out his disciples not\nto preach him as the Messiah, but to proclaim the kingdom. At last in\nPeter the idea dawns that prompts him to declare: \u201cThou art the Christ.\u201d\nYielding before the persecution of his enemies, Jesus travels North and\nEast and here he accustoms himself to the idea of a suffering son of man.\nHis self-confidence increases and he travels courageously to Jerusalem\nwhere, as he could foresee, he would meet his fate. The drama of his\nlife culminates in his word \u201c\u1f10\u03b3\u03ce \u03b5\u1f30\u03bc\u03b9\u201d (1462) in which he reveals his\nself-consciousness as being the Messiah. Being triumphantly hailed in\nJerusalem by people of Galilee and such as believed in him he hastened\nhis doom. It is not likely that Jesus could have publicly been held to\nbe the Messiah for any length of time, for the Roman police was wont\nto suppress such movements without discrimination. They did not stop\nto investigate the case as to the character or motive of the movement\nwhether or not it was purely religious or political. They never tolerated\nany \u201cson of David\u201d or \u201cking of Israel\u201d who held any influence over large\nmasses of the people.\n\nWhile Mark still preserves the development of Jesus\u2019s messianic\nconsciousness, Luke as well as Matthew have entirely obliterated it.\nAccording to Mark, Jesus proclaims the kingdom; Matthew and Luke make\nhim preach his person. They make Jesus proclaim himself as the Messiah\nfrom the very beginning and his command not to speak it out openly given\nto those whom he healed and also to his disciples has no sense here.\nMatthew has a liking for cabalistic numbers, there are three times\nseven generations the names of which are not without doing violence to\nhistorical facts adjusted to the pattern, there are three temptations,\nseven parables, etc. Throughout we notice reflection, purposive selection\nof the material, and artificial adjustment to a plan. The book has a\ntendency to show that Jesus was the King of Israel predicted by the\nprophets and in the psalms. Luke on the other hand has also a dogmatic\nprogramme. It is the gospel of gentile Christianity as founded by Paul.\n\nThe critical school finds adversaries among theologians as well as\nunchristian thinkers, both of whom are apt to speak of fraud when\nreligious books are written with certain dogmatic tendencies. Professor\nHoltzmann objects to such a view of the development of Christianity. He\nsays that a religion which did not rouse sufficient enthusiasm to develop\na religious poetry would be very poor and lifeless. Even the apocrypha of\nthe New Testament are evidence of the vigor of the new religion, although\nwe must be aware of the fact that the Church showed good judgment when\nadopting its canon to accept those which were full of moral meaning and\nto reject those which were mere myth without any deeper significance.\n\nWe have given this abstract of one part of Holtzmann\u2019s work with\nthe omission of all the learned by-work for those not familiar with\ntheological investigation. Similar results are obtained by an inquiry\ninto the origin of the Acts. The apostles were the first and living\nrepresentatives of the Christ. Out of the interest in the apostles\u2019 words\ngrew an interest in their actions and lives, and there are a great many\nwritings of this subject preserved. One only has been received into the\ncanon.\n\nIt is impossible to follow Professor Holtzmann into the details of his\nwork, but we can warmly recommend it as the best compendium existing, not\nonly for the student of theology but for everybody who is interested in\nthe results of the scientific criticism of the synoptic gospels and the\nActs.[51]\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nSCHRIFTEN DER GESELLSCHAFT FUER PSYCHOLOGISCHE FORSCHUNG. Heft 2. Ueber\nAufgaben und Methoden der Psychologie. By _Hugo M\u00fcnsterberg_. Leipsic:\nAmbr. Abel. 1891.\n\nIn this monograph Professor M\u00fcnsterberg prepares the way for greater and\nmore important work. His aim is to define the province of psychology and\nto investigate the methods which have to be employed. Psychology is not\nphilosophy; accordingly the consideration whether there is a reality of\nan outside world does not belong here. The psychologist is not bound\nto wait till this and other metaphysical questions are decided with\ncertainty; the reality of the outside world has simply to be assumed\ntogether with its cognisability.\n\nWhat means \u2018to explain\u2019? \u201cTo explain means simply to render clear that\nwhich is not clear or to reduce the unknown to the known, the complex\nto the simple (p. 104).... It is an indispensable presupposition of\nany natural science to consider nature as being capable of explanation\n(_erkl\u00e4rbar_), and this presupposition means that natural processes\ncan be perfectly separated into most simple mechanical processes.\nThis presumption can be realised to-day only on the basis of the\natom-conception. It is accordingly not an experience, but a postulate\nof natural science to derive the whole material world-process from the\nmechanism of atoms. A description becomes an explanation in the measure\nin which it approaches this aim\u201d (p. 105). The question is, whether in\npsychology, description can be supplanted by explanation, whether laws\ncan be stated instead of mere rules.\n\nProfessor M\u00fcnsterberg takes that ground in psychology which as it appears\nto us is the only tenable ground, viz. that feelings are not motions\nand cannot be explained as converted physical processes. Professor\nM\u00fcnsterberg says: \u201cA sensation, a feeling, a will can never fill even\nthe very smallest space. What is extended in space can never itself be\na state of consciousness. To the psychologist this distinction is now\na matter of course, so much so that it is difficult to call to one\u2019s\nmind how much trouble it cost to acquire this insight. The object\nof psychology accordingly can never be an object in space, it can\nnever be a process of motion, accordingly, even brain-irritation can\nunder no circumstances ever become the object of psychology\u201d (p. 97).\nPsychology has to investigate the psychical phenomena of the individual\nconsciousness (p. 102), it has to separate it into its elements, i.\ne. those ingredients which are no longer divisible; which being done,\npsychology searches for the rules for the combinations of these psychical\nelements and shows us the different complex contents which are formed in\nthis way by the elements up to that totality of single combinations which\nis given us as the contents of our spiritual personality (p. 103).\n\n\u201cThe question is, (1) Are there psychological processes in us, the\ndevelopment of which presents itself with immediate certainty as\nnecessary, and (2) can we reduce all the individual and with them all the\nspiritual phenomena to such spiritual processes recognised as necessary?\nThe first question can be affirmed, although only in a limited sense,\nand the second question must be unequivocally denied, thus making an\nimmediate explanation of psychical phenomena impossible\u201d (p. 107).\nThe first question is to be affirmed in a limited sense, because \u201cif\ncertain premises are thought, the conclusion, it appears to us as a\nnecessity, can be thought thus and not otherwise\u201d (p. 108). But this\nis \u201ca logical and not a psychological necessity.\u201d To actually think\nthe conclusion depends upon the will to think it. The will actually\nexisting, the logical necessity becomes a psychological, for \u201cthe\nconnection between the willing and the willed (_zwischen Willen und\nGewolltem_) always appears to us as necessary.... Where there is inner\nwill there is an inner necessity.\u201d Now, in order to make explanations in\nthe physical world, we supplement that which has been actually observed\nwith not-observed connections. But we cannot, according to M\u00fcnsterberg,\nin an analogous way supplement in the world of psychical phenomena the\nconscious states with any other kind of states which are not conscious,\nthus referring our spiritual life and acts of will to unconscious\nprocesses, for \u201cthe very nature of psychical states is consciousness,\ni. e. a state of being conscious. _Ihr Sein ist das bewusst-sein...._\nA state of consciousness, says M\u00fcnsterberg, which is not conscious,\nis comparable not to a body which is not perceived, but to one which\ndoes not exist. Accordingly unconscious psychical phenomena do not\nexist. All psychical phenomena are directly given and the reduction of\ntheir combinations in a certain way through hypothetical psychological\nsupplements is once for all excluded\u201d (p. 110).\n\nWe agree in all the main positions with Professor M\u00fcnsterberg, but in the\nlast mentioned point we disagree. Professor M\u00fcnsterberg limits psychical\nstates or feelings to states of consciousness without considering that\nthere are subconscious and even unconscious feelings. By consciousness\nwe understand those feelings alone which are concentrated so as to be\nconnected with the ego, i. e. the present centre of consciousness. We\nassume that even the spinal ganglions of the brainless frog are feeling\nif the skin is irritated, but this feeling can never become conscious,\nit can no more be telegraphed to the central station so as to become\nco-ordinated with other feelings which are registered in the brain. The\nobjection may be raised, We do not know whether the ganglion is feeling;\nand I should answer, I call feeling anything that is of the same nature\nas the elements of which consciousness consists, and we have all reasons\nto assume that there is such an elementary psychical accompaniment of\nthe ganglionic irritations, and that consciousness rises from many such\nelements through their co-ordinate combination in the brain. Isolated\nfeelings are never conscious, and consciousness is a co-operative system\nof feeling. This distinction between consciousness and feeling is a mere\nmatter of terminology. If we find another terminology more practical\nwe are willing to surrender ours. Yet such a distinction between\nconsciousness and feeling seems to be necessary for a proper description\nof the psychical facts. The assumption of subconscious states and even\nof unconscious feelings is a great help in explaining the phenomena of\nconsciousness. But unless we are grossly mistaken, our disagreement is\nmerely apparent, for Professor M\u00fcnsterberg, rejecting the idea of a\npsychological explanation, believes in the parallelism of psychical and\nphysical phenomena. \u201cThe physical acts\u201d (he says on p. 125) \u201creducible\nto mechanical axioms can be explained through causation, the psychical\nacts follow one another without inner necessity. If we connect both, we\nare enabled to transfer the necessity-connection of the physical upon\nthe psychical and offer thus an explanation where otherwise description\nonly was possible.\u201d But in doing this, have we not supplemented those\npsychical elements which appear as conscious states by other psychical\nelements which have not entered into that combination which makes them\nactually conscious? It is an hypothetical addition for the sake of\nexplanation, a _Hilfsconstruction_ just as much as the supposition of the\nexistence of atoms or electric currents or other physical phenomena which\nare not directly observed, but indirectly in their effects only.\n\nSupplements are necessary for explanation wherever the immediate facts\ndo not contain all the elements of a certain process. If an observable\nphenomenon has not its conditions in observable facts we hypothetically\nassume unobservable facts as its causes. But we may incidentally\nremark that description and explanation are not different in kind, but\nin degree. Explanation is an exhaustive description set forth in its\ngreatest possible simplicity. An exhaustive description enumerates all\nthe determinative factors of a process and it drops everything that\nis of no account, so that information is imparted with the greatest\neconomy as well as completeness. An exhaustive description is a reliable\nguide to preascertain the outcome of a process, and reveals in this\nway the identity in the change, the continuity of the process and the\nconservation of matter and energy in their transformations, or, in\nother words, it reveals the necessity of the result. There is perhaps\nno natural science in which the processes can be exhaustively described\nwithout hypothetical supplements and so the science of psychology forms\nno exception to the general rule.\n\nThe aim of psychology in its wider sense will be \u201cto separate all the\ncontents of consciousness into their elements, to state their laws of\ncombination, and to seek in an empirical way for the diverse elementary\npsychical contents, their correspondent physiological irritations,\nin order to explain in this way mediately from the coexistence and\nsuccession of physiological irritations the purely psychological laws of\ncombinations which as such are unexplainable\u201d (p. 127).\n\nOur objection to this view resembles much some of the objections which\nProfessor M\u00fcnsterberg himself makes when speaking of the availability of\nthe mathematical method so-called. He says: \u201cMeasuring and counting of\npsychological phenomena have been made repeatedly, directly as well as\nindirectly, and it has been proved that mathematics can be applied to\npsychology.... Nevertheless it would be a misuse of the word if we named\nthese numerical descriptions an \u2018application of the mathematical method.\u2019\nIf an historian of literature counts the poems and dramas of authors,\nif he also calculates how long it took them to write their literary\nproducts, who would call his work a mathematical history of literature?\nEven astronomy would be no mathematical science if we counted only the\nstars in the sky.\u201d If the aim of psychological explanation were as\nProfessor M\u00fcnsterberg here asserts to be reached through the explanation\nof physiological states only, we should say, that the physiological\nmethod were alone admissible in psychology, a principle to which our\nauthor rightly objects. Psychical states sometimes demand a physiological\nexplanation, and we cannot understand psychology without having a\ncertain amount of physiological knowledge. Nevertheless, the explanation\nof psychical states and the necessity of certain connections must be\nunderstood mainly from the psychical elements themselves. Psychical\nelements, i. e. feelings, as has been explained on other occasions,\nhave acquired and constantly do acquire meaning. This meaning which\nappears in sensation-symbols and thought-symbols and which is different\nin the different forms of feeling (correspondent to different forms of\nnervous action), creates a new domain,\u2014the domain of spirit,\u2014and thus\npsychical states are changed into spiritual facts. Suppose for instance\nthat a merchant receives his mail; he opens a letter containing some\nimportant news which sets at once all his nerves into irritation, makes\nhim neglectful of all other things in order to attend with great haste\nto one special affair. How can we explain this instance, or any other\nspiritual act through a consideration of physiological conditions. Is\nit not the meaning alone which special sense-impressions convey that\nproduces the extraordinary effects? The physiologist would as little be\nable to detect this meaning through an analysis of the sense-impressions,\nas an electrician would be to understand the import of a telegram when\nmeasuring the strength of the electric current in the telegraph wires.\nThe combinations of the purely psychical states may after all not be\nquite unexplainable, while their physiological concomitants are in many\ncases insufficient to account for spiritual interconnections.\n\nIn discussing the methods of psychology Professor M\u00fcnsterberg rejects the\nspeculative and the mathematical methods; he claims a great importance\n(and we agree with him) for self-observation. But self-observation is\nno easy task; it requires a high degree of training. \u201cHe who does not\nunderstand botany cannot make observations of plant-life. The same things\nwhich call into play certain associations in the botanist are also seen\nby the layman, but they remain unobserved. Self-observation is in a\nsimilar way ... not without its presuppositions; it is dependent upon a\nrich store of ready associations\u201d (p. 164).\n\nPsychological investigations under natural conditions are classified\nby M\u00fcnsterberg according to their objects, as those of the normal man,\nthe child, the savage, the insane, the animal, etc. In experimental\npsychology, psychopetal, psychofugal, and psychocentral processes are\ndistinguished. For psycho-physiological investigations we have besides,\n(1) the immediate experiment in the laboratory, (2) the method of\nanatomy, (3) of comparative anatomy, (4) and of physiology. Professor\nM\u00fcnsterberg concludes with an appeal to institute special professorships\nof psychology, which is at present a mere branch of philosophy. It\ntakes all the energy of one man to keep abreast with the progress of\npsychological investigation. \u201cNo medical man, no lawyer, no theologian,\nor educator should enter into practical life without having passed an\nexamination in psychology ... the growing generation of children, the\nsick, the criminal, and the comfort-seeking souls of mankind have to\nsuffer if teachers, physicians, judges, and preachers are ignoramuses\nin the matter of human soul-life.... But here also the gods have placed\nsweat before virtue.\u201d\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nLA PHILOSOPHIE DU SI\u00c8CLE. By _E. de Roberty_. Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan.\n\nThe author of the present work, which forms a volume of the Library of\nContemporary Philosophy, is one of those disciples of the founder of\nFrench positivism who, while following in his footsteps to a certain\npoint, do not hesitate to diverge from the beaten track when they think\ntheir leader has gone astray in his philosophic quest. M. de Roberty\nspeaks of Comte with reverence as his first guide and his best master,\nand he finds in the very contradictions of the Master the germ of his own\nconception of the general trend of philosophic development.\n\nThe fundamental thesis of the present work is that the three\ncontemporaneous philosophic systems, those of Criticism, Positivism,\nand Evolutionism, are merely varieties of a single species, as strictly\nparallel manifestations of a common stock of beliefs and general\nhypotheses. The basic identity of the thought of this century is shown\nby the ever increasing convergence of the great leading ideas, as\nexhibited in the prevailing theories of knowledge, by the preponderance\nof relativism, and of agnosticism. It reveals itself, especially in the\nsimilar conceptions formed by the most varied systems, not only of the\nessential characters of philosophy, its method, and the ends it ought to\npursue, but also of the scientific laws which govern its evolution. We\ncannot follow the author through his discussion of all these points and\nwe must therefore restrict ourselves to the most salient features of his\nargument.\n\nModern philosophy is represented by three principal schools: Criticism\nwhich originated with Kant, Positivism founded by Comte, and Evolutionism\nintroduced by Spencer. These three systems had a common ancestry,\nthat of sensualism. The critical philosophy is the legitimate heir of\nsensuous idealism, and the positive philosophy the immediate descendant\nof sensuous materialism. The evolution philosophy is itself rooted in\nsensualism, but it is really a conciliator of the two great philosophies\nwhich preceded it, Criticism and Positivism. This conclusion, which\nappears to us just, is supported by various considerations to which\nreference here is not necessary. M. de Roberty bears testimony to\nthe influence of the philosophy of Kant over the development of the\nevolutionist conception, which could be applied to society only by\ngiving an apparent universality to the mechanical hypothesis. This was\naccomplished by Spencer, as it had been done to some extent by Comte.\nThe popularity of the evolution philosophy is explained by the author\nas due to its admixture of agnosticism with a monism which captivates\nthe masses \u201cby the audacious assertion that it has raised all veils and\nresolved all enigmas.\u201d Kant, Comte, and Spencer have equally seized this\ncharacteristic trait of the genius of our century. They each treat, says\nM. de Roberty, of the most transcendent problems of metaphysics, and\nplace them carefully under the cover of the experimental method. Let us\nadd that they are each different expressions of that genius, which marks\nthe progress of the mental evolution of mankind.\n\nThe second part of M. de Roberty\u2019s work deals in the first place with the\nconceptions of philosophy, its nature and its end, framed by the three\ngreat modern systems. The confusion generally made between philosophy\nand science is first pointed out, the evil of which arises from the fact\nthat allowance is not made for the progress of scientific knowledge. The\nauthor is strongly inclined to favor the idea of the general equivalence\nof science and philosophy, in the sense that every effect is identified\nwith its cause. But as the effect is always modified with its cause,\nneither the content not the general conception of philosophy can remain\nunchangeable. Philosophy becomes thus the co-ordination of the sciences\nin view of their general and abstract finality\u2014by which is meant simply\nthe last term of an evolution\u2014a conception of the world.\n\nIn what do the conceptions of philosophy held by the criticist, the\npositivist, and the evolutionist, differ from that formulated by M. de\nRoberty? He affirms that they all entertain certain errors of method\nderived chiefly from ancient metaphysics. The prototype is found in Kant,\nwho says that philosophy is a system of universal acquirements formed\nof abstract notions, and that it has for its aim the passage of our\nunderstanding from sensible to suprasensible knowledge. The latter is the\n_a priori_, the permanent and verifiable hypothesis, for each of them.\nIt is the transcendental element which all modern philosophy has derived\nfrom the past, and which forms the bond of alliance between faith and\nknowledge. Of the three postulates of Spencer, the universal hypothesis\nis in the first, an Unknowable Force. The other two belong to psychology,\nproving that the English evolutionist, like Comte, confounds science with\nphilosophy, which to him, as to his predecessors, is a simple theory of\nknowledge.\n\nPhilosophy is a method which conducts to a conception of the world. But,\nsays M. de Roberty, modern philosophies fail in that they deal with\nhypotheses. Now, although hypothesis is the soul of the special sciences,\nfor philosophy it must always be a purely mental recreation. To render\nvalid the universal hypothesis constructed by philosophers, it would be\nnecessary that the sum of the final truths of science should include the\nsum of the phenomena which constitute nature.\n\nWe cannot follow the author through his ingenious criticisms of Spencer\u2019s\ngreat synthetic formula, to which he devotes the twelfth chapter of the\npresent work, and which he characterises as the perfect type of the\nuniversal unverifiable hypothesis. Nor can we do more than give a passing\nglance at his views of the psychology of the three modern systems of\nphilosophy. He affirms that the metaphysical transformation by criticism\nof psychology into philosophy left hardly anything to the special\nscience. To positivism is due the conception of psychology as forming an\nintegral part of biology, which has led to the important psycho-physical\nexperiments of the present day. But the biological analysis of the\nindividual should be followed by social analysis, the study of mental\nmanifestations in society, in connection with which should be created a\nspecial concrete science to embrace the higher psychology, as pointed out\nby the author in his work \u201cLa Sociologie.\u201d Science, art, and industry are\na projection into the external world of the thinking, feeling, acting\nsubject, and psychology ought also to be thus projected by fusion with\nbiology, or with biology and sociology, which it is necessary to study if\nwe would discover psychic laws.\n\nIn the chapter on the Supremacy of Science, the author affirms that\nthe philosophy which will result from the progress of psychology and\nsociology will present a striking contrast with all known metaphysical\nforms, but it will always remain a world-conception, and it will have\nto submit to the law of correlation which explains the character and\ndestinies of its predecessor. Agnosticism, which invites men to bend\nbefore the _Deus ignotus_ of all religions, marks the fatal termination\nof ancient anthropomorphism, influenced by a progressive knowledge,\nand thus appears as the final integration of all theology. It also\nrepresents, however, the condition of incognisance to which the opposite\nstate will succeed when the cycle of abstract sciences is completed and\na really scientific psychology formed. Then hypotheses as to universal\ncauses will receive their psychological solution, and it will remain for\nphilosophy only to confront and co-ordinate them with the general results\nof other sciences. Having arrived at this point M. de Roberty formulates\nthe conclusion that Philosophy and Science are terms which connote two\nprinciple _species_ in the vast _genus_ designated by the single term\n_knowledge_. The most marked trait of future philosophy will be the\ndistinction of these two species, as their confusion was the most general\ncharacter of the philosophy of the past. Philosophy and science will\nthen be perfectly identified, but the identity will be general and not\nspecific. Thus philosophy will not be positive in the sense of Comte, it\nwill never _completely_ identify itself with science.\n\nIn his last chapter, entitled \u201cThe Intellectual Series,\u201d M. de Roberty\ncontinues his criticism of the views of Comte as to the law of the\nevolution of philosophy. He shows that, so far from this being the most\ngeneral law of intellectual evolution, and therefore the supreme law of\nall social phenomena, philosophy is only one of three intermediate terms,\nthe others being art and industry, by the aid of which the evolution\nof scientific ideas acts on the ensemble of the social evolution. The\nintellectual evolution is the direct consequence of the social fact, but\nthe social evolution is subject to the laws of intellectual evolution,\nwhich embrace four great classes of conceptions, answering to the four\nwell recognised groups of facts known as science, philosophy, art, and\nindustry. We have here the same series of special evolutions as those\nsupposed by Comte, with the important change, however, marked by the\ninversion of the first two members of the series. In this relation, the\nauthor affirms that Comte\u2019s law of the three states is false so far\nas concerns the evolution of the sciences, and is of very secondary\nimportance as regards the evolution of philosophy and the two succeeding\nevolutions.\n\nThe author concludes his work with a criticism intended to show that the\nprincipal defects of Comte\u2019s system arise from the confusion previously\ninsisted on in relation to the first terms of the intellectual series,\nscience and philosophy. That confusion is exhibited in the statement\nthat among the ancients philosophy was developed before science and art.\nM. de Roberty, moreover, declares Comte\u2019s theory that the industrial\ndevelopment is the point of departure of modern civilisation, leads to\na complete subversion of the logical and historical. Instead of the\nuseful or the proper being, as that theory would require, the foundation\nof the good and this, in its turn, the germ of the true, the true is\nthe foundation of the beautiful, and of the good and the useful. But\nthe true is more complex than supposed by Comte. It possesses at least\ntwo aspects, science and philosophy, which may be really distinguished,\nalthough the line which separates them is yet undetermined.\n\nWe have given a summary of M. de Roberty\u2019s general argument, instead of\nreferring to particular propositions which may be open to criticism,\nbecause his work appears to us a very valuable contribution towards the\nelucidation of the important question as to the position of philosophy\nin relation to science. We shall look with much interest for the\nappearance of the author\u2019s two further works which he announces as\nsupplementary to the present one. That on Agnosticism is already in the\npress. The subject of the other work is Monism, which M. de Roberty\ncharacterises as \u201cthe chimerical pursuit which has essayed, through the\nages, to fix the so-called unity of things, the extra or supralogical\nidentity of phenomena.\u201d This hypothetical monism of philosophy is dealt\nwith incidentally in the present work. The \u201csupralogical identity of\nphenomena\u201d is a different kind of monism from that of _The Monist_.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nUEBER BEWEGUNGSEMPFINDUNGEN. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung\nder Doctorw\u00fcrde vorgelegt der hohen philosophischen Facult\u00e4t der\nAlbert-Ludwigs-Universit\u00e4t zu Freiburg i. B. By _Edmund Burke Delabarre_\nof Massachusetts. Freiburg in Baden: Hch. Epstein, 1891.\n\nDr. Edmund Burke Delabarre introduces himself to the world of science\nwith an excellent monograph on motion-sensations, based upon careful\nobservations which were made in Professor M\u00fcnsterberg\u2019s psychological\nlaboratory at Freiburg i. B. The subject of the dissertation is of\ngreat importance and there is much confusion prevalent at present\neven among the most prominent authorities. It appears to us that Dr.\nDelabarre has adopted the right view and he certainly defends it with\ngreat ability. Professor Wundt rejects in his Physiological Psychology\nall the theory of the so-called \u201cmuscle-sense\u201d and admits that there\nis some truth in the three explanations devised as an explanation of\nour consciousness of performed motions, which thus would be a complex\nof (1) pressure-sensations, (2) specific muscle-sensations, and (3)\ninnervation-sensations. This third kind of sensations is of a very\nhypothetical nature. The term signifies that, when muscles are innervated\nwe are supposed to have a direct sensation of the innervation in the\ncentral nerve-organs; and this view is objected to by M\u00fcnsterberg, who\nsays that \u201ca brain irritation which is not accompanied with centripetal\neffects or central after-effects of former muscular activity has its\nphysiological consequences but excites no conscious states.\u201d Thus,\naccording to Dr. Delabarre, without the motion of the sense-organs,\ni. e. muscular activity, there is no consciousness; all consciousness\nderives its data from the periphery. Dr. Delabarre goes over the whole\nfield of the literature of the subject and weighs all pros and cons. He\nfinds that all cases are intelligible without the supposition of central\ninnervation-sensations. He admits that the term muscle-sense is vague,\nbut he believes that the term having been generally introduced may be\nretained. He defines it as that complex of sensations which results from\nmuscular activity.\n\nThe second part of the dissertation contains the reports of the\nexperiments, describing the instruments used and the methods employed.\n\nWe are informed that Dr. Delabarre has been appointed to the chair of\npsychology in Brown University.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nLE NIHILISME SCIENTIFIQUE. I. Dialogue entre le Doctor Oud\u00e8n et\nL\u2019Etudiant Ti son Neveu. Rapport\u00e9 par _P. Van Bemmelen_. Leide: E. J.\nBrill, 1891.\n\nDr. Oud\u00e8n\u2019s nephew thus summarises the scientific, or rather\n\u201cphilosophic\u201d views of his uncle: \u201cThere is no God, but there is the\nworld. In this world there are neither souls, nor mind, nor life; there\nis only matter and its elementary forces. Nevertheless these forces do\nnot exist; there is only movement, the sole function of matter, which is\ninert. In its turn, matter has no reality; it is composed of geometrical\npoints which are susceptible of movement. But as there is neither time\nnor space, there is no movement.\u201d Nothingness is thus reached, but\nbeyond is illusion, the _maja_ of the Hindoos, which explains all our\nconceptions of nature including that of our own being. This scientific\n_maja_ is not the semblance of a real world, but that of a world which\ndoes not exist, so that illusion and nothingness are the same thing. From\nwhich it follows that there is no illusion and no mind to be deceived!\nMr. Van Bemmelen\u2019s opuscule is an ingenious _jeu d\u2019esprit_, evidently\nintended to exhibit a certain phase of speculation as a _reductio ad\nabsurdum_.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nDIRITTO SOCIALE TENTATIVO IN BOZZA. Dell\u2019Avv. _Pietro Pellegrini_. Borga\na Mozzano. 1891.\n\nThere is no denying the activity of the statesmen and scholars of modern\nItaly in the cause of radical, social reconstruction and, as remarked by\na recent traveller in Italy, in the \u201cbuilding up again a Commonwealth,\nfounded on high principles of right and equality.\u201d \u201cDiritto Sociale,\u201d in\nItalian jurisprudence, of course, relates to municipal and positive law,\nin its social-economical and social-political aspects. But, in a country\nwith the municipal and political traditions of Italy, this \u201cDiritto\nSociale,\u201d even in modern times, exhibits a tendency to crystallise into a\nkind of concrete, social religion. The Avvocato Signor Pietro Pellegrini,\nthe learned author of this book, appears to feel deeply concerning the\npresent condition of this branch of jurisprudence in Italy.\n\nIn his preface the author says, that during the present century legal\nscience has not made any very substantial progress; that the revolution\nof the last century, while asserting the famous rights of man, forgot\nthe rights of juridic persons, of corporations, and law became an\n_individualista_\u2014or, individualiser. On the strength of his juridic\npersonality man thereupon engaged in a struggle for his rights on\nthe vast social field, but he found himself alone\u2014an individual and\nnothing more. As such, he could not form a juridic, social organism,\nbut he merely sought to adapt himself to an actual, external juridic\norganisation, differing but slightly from old-time despotism. On this\nbasis the State still continues to create municipal and positive laws,\nmore or less adapts them to the facts of reality, arbitrarily creating\njuridic persons and administrative bodies, such as the _mandamenti_,\n_circondarii_, _provincie_ of the modern Italian kingdom\u2014all of which are\nonly hybrid administrative _entia_, that do not in the least satisfy a\nnumber of local public needs; and therefore, there is no harmony between\nindividual men and the juridic persons, between the public administrative\nentia and the State, and there is bloody war among the States themselves.\n\nThe ultimate cause of all this conflict is to be ascribed to the\nindividualism of the law, in not recognising organic, juridic relations;\nand this, moreover, necessarily called forth the reaction of an\nexaggerated socialism.... Person has a much wider significance than\nindividual; person cannot be isolated, individual, because, juridically,\nperson implies an exchange of relations with others; hence, juridic\npersons ought to enjoy a greater legal authority than they actually\nenjoy in our modern jurisprudence. The _plasma sociale_, or the original\nsocial mould, is developed by degrees into a vital, practically real,\norganism, endowed with a physical body, that needs the material means\nof nutrition, in order to live, to preserve, and develop itself. These,\nhowever, do not exist; because nature furnishes only sufficient means to\npreserve man in a purely savage, animal condition. But, at least, there\nexist the sources, or fountain-heads, from which it is possible to derive\nthe desired nutritive materials; on condition of molding or transforming\nthose fountain-heads, and of assuming their efficacious, practical\ndirection. In the individualised or individual system there takes place a\nstruggle among the individuals for the possession of that nourishment, in\nwhich case, however, the sources themselves are appropriated rather than\nthe nutritive materials they contain. Such is the exclusive nature of\nthe social means of nutrition, present and future, through which a large\nnumber of individuals will be at the mercy of a few, while the notorious\n\u201crights of man,\u201d remain powerless....\n\nThe rights emanating from the organic concept of personality, together\nwith the physico-economical laws of the fountain-heads of social\nnourishment, spontaneously furnish the equitable distribution of\nthe nutritive materials to each organic member, so that there is no\nmonopolising of those natural fountain-heads, but a normal nutrition of\nall the organs, according to their needs, and their actual capacity as\njuridically displayed....\n\nThose fountain-heads, besides being limited, are scattered through\nspace, because it is impossible to unite or concentrate them on any\nparticular point of the globe. Hence this _plasma sociale_ or social\nmold is distributed through space according to imperative laws, that\nresult from the combined capacities of the respective juridic, that is,\nsocial persons, with the capacities of the respective sources of social\nnourishment\u2014of different municipal organisations, of cities, townships,\nand villages. All these are pre-eminently juridic and social persons,\neach one possessing its peculiar functions, that cannot be exercised\nby other persons. The present work contains a lengthy but valuable\nintroduction in four chapters, discussing the general concept of law; and\nthereupon the book is divided into three parts, in which are explained\nthe principles and development of positive law in its respectively\ncivil-social, social-economical, and social-political aspects. This work,\nthroughout, presents a number of equally important and novel points of\nview, through which the author\u2019s concept of an organic municipal and\nsocial law everywhere becomes the surest means of creating unity and\nharmony, not only within the general department of law, but also within\nthe sphere of practical legislation.\n\n \u03b3\u03bd\u03bb\u03bd.\n\n\nAN OUTLINE OF LOCKE\u2019S ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY. By _Mattoon Monroe Curtis_, M.\nA. Leipsic: Gustav Fock, 1890.\n\nThis excellent study was presented to the University of Leipsic as the\nInaugural Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, and\nit is well deserving of publication, if for no other reason than the\nneed of such a work. There appears to have been hitherto no complete\naccount of Locke\u2019s System of Ethics, which does not even find a place in\nMackintosh\u2019s \u201cDissertation on Ethical Philosophy.\u201d The author has not\nbeen able to discover any trace of the treatise on Ethics which Locke\nproposed to write, but his published works \u201cabound in ethical observation\nand severally took their rise from ethical considerations,\u201d so that there\nis no deficiency of materials from which to ascertain his ideas on that\nsubject.\n\nMr. Curtis very justly remarks that it is important to ascertain an\nauthor\u2019s views before criticising them, a truism which is not always\nacted on, as indeed was the case with Locke\u2019s own critics. He does not,\nhowever, profess to criticise but, as the title of his work shows,\nto give an outline of Locke\u2019s Ethical Philosophy. In his Preface he\nstates that his author adopted the Stoic division of Philosophy into\nPhysics, Ethics, and Logic. The object of Ethics, is described by Locke,\nin his noted \u201cEssay,\u201d as the seeking out of those rules and measures\nof human actions, which lead to happiness, and the means to practice\nthem. The end of this, is not bare speculation, and the knowledge of\ntruth; but _right_, and a conduct suitable to it. In the application\nof its principles Locke may be said to have gone further than any of\nhis predecessors and of most of his successors. As pointed out by Mr.\nCurtis, he maintains that the institutions of government, religion, and\neducation are, in essence, ethical and that all are parts of a system\nwhich must be based upon, and be in harmony with, the fundamental\nphysiological and psychological principles of human nature. This follows\nfrom Locke\u2019s principle that the Individual, and not the Family, is the\nreal social unit. Man is a rational, social, religious, and political\nbeing, and, therefore, \u201cin the individual is contained, potentially, all\ninstitutionalism.\u201d\n\nIt must be noticed, however, that to Locke the moral dynamic in human\nsociety is the concept of God. He regards this idea \u201cas a natural,\nformal, necessary and transcendental principle at the root of human\nnature and institutions, and consistently declares that the denial of it\ndissolves all,\u201d as it alone gives a sufficient explanation and sanction\nto the principles of morality. This brings us to the very foundation of\nethics. All depends, however, on our conception of God. Locke maintained\nthat duty \u201ccannot be understood without a law, nor a law be known or\nsupposed without a law giver, or without reward or punishment.\u201d His\nconception of God, therefore, was that of a law-giver, and he believed\nthat the existence of God could be demonstrated not only by teleological\nargument, but also by psychological proof drawn from the being and nature\nof man. Locke was so thoroughly convinced of the dependence of morality\non the existence of God, that, notwithstanding his general liberality of\nthought, he excluded atheists from toleration. He writes: \u201cPromises and\nCovenants, and Oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no\nhold upon an Atheist.\u201d\n\nIt would be a mistake to suppose that, because Locke believed morality\nto be founded in our conception of God, he considered the moral law\nreferable simply to the divine will, and therefore to be arbitrary and\nchangeable. So far from this, he regarded the moral law as eternal\nand immutable, and affirmed that its cardinal principles could be\ndiscovered and laid hold of by the light of nature. As says Pfleiderer,\nwhen speaking of Locke and Wolff, \u201cLocke also considers a supernatural\nrevelation to be possible, and to have actually taken place in\nChristianity, but he insists as strongly as Wolff does, and even more\nlogically, that this revelation must not in any way contradict the\nnatural revelation given us by God in our reason.\u201d Locke expressly\ndeclares, that the reason _is_ natural revelation, while revelation is\nnatural reason enlarged. The latter he regarded as necessary because,\nalthough reason is sufficient for the virtuous, penalties must be relied\nupon for influencing the multitude; and in revelation the doctrine of\nimmortality with future rewards and punishments is made known. Whether\nthis revelation is true or false, the fear of future punishment has\nundoubtedly had a restraining influence over the vicious. But reason\nwould not be sufficient for the virtuous without an inclination natural\nor acquired, to virtue. It is a question of disposition, and this will\nbe virtuous or vicious, according to the conditions under which the\nindividual has come into being and been \u201ceducated,\u201d in the fullest sense\nof this term. Reason forms part of these conditions which, so far as they\nare not purely objective, are dependent on or referable to human nature;\nas, indeed, must be the supposed revelation of enlarged natural reason.\n\nIn relation to the ethical life, Locke declares that happiness is the\nonly idea which reason takes up out of the sphere of pleasure and pain,\nand yet that if we aim directly at happiness, we shall miss it. What then\nhas to be done is to seek out \u201cthe rules and measures of human actions\nwhich lead to happiness.\u201d This is the office of ethics, the end of which\nis virtue, and thus happiness and virtue are one. With Locke moral\nactions are only those that depend \u201cupon the choice of an understanding\nand free agent.\u201d The agent here intended is, as pointed out by Mr.\nCurtis, the man, and not the will. Locke says that the proper question\nin connection with freedom, is not \u201cwhether the will be free, but whether\nthe man be free.\u201d The will is determined by the mind, and liberty is\n\u201ca power to act, or not to act, according as the mind directs.\u201d In his\n\u201cThoughts concerning Education\u201d Locke affirms that \u201cthe result of our\njudgment, upon examination, is what ultimately determines the man, who\ncould not be free, if his will were determined by anything but his own\ndesire, guided by his own judgment.\u201d The position of Locke is, says the\nauthor, that of Plato and Kant: Reason is given as the governor of the\nwill, by its sway to constitute it good. Thence we may rightly conclude,\nthat those who are not governed by reason have not true freedom.\n\nWe have not space to consider the views entertained by Locke on\nInstitutional Ethics, beyond referring to his doctrine that property\nrights are given only by labor, and not by occupation, and that labor\nis the source of all values. The latter doctrine cannot now be accepted\nas sound, whatever may be said as to the former, but Locke deservedly\nholds a high place as a political economist. He seems indeed to have\nbeen a kind of universal genius. Mr. Curtis refers to the remark made of\nhim \u201cthat no philosopher since Aristotle has made and recorded so many\nvaluable observations, or given so great a stimulus to human thought.\u201d\nAny fresh light that can be thrown on the opinions entertained by so\nprofound a thinker, especially on the important question of ethics, is of\nvalue and hence we welcome the present work as an acceptable addition to\nphilosophic literature.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n * * * * *\n\nN. B.\u2014Owing to lack of space, reviews of a number of new works have\nbeen crowded out of the present number of _The Monist_; among which the\nfollowing will appear in No. 3: _Die Entwickelung des Causalproblems\nin der Philosophie seit Kant_, by Dr. Edmund Koenig; _Spinoza\u2019s\nErkenntnisslehre in ihrer Beziehung sur modernen Naturwissenschaft\nund Philosophie_, by Dr. Martin Berendt and Dr. Julius Friedl\u00e4nder;\n_Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie_, by Dr. Th. Ziehen; _Handbook\nof Psychology_, by J. M. Baldwin; _An Essay on Reasoning_, by Edward T.\nDixon; _Das Dasein als Lust, Leid und Liebe_, by H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden; _Die\nBedeutung der theologischen Vorstellungen f\u00fcr die Ethik_, by Wilhelm\nPaszkowski; and _Einleitung in das Alte Testament_, by Prof. C. H.\nCornill.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[51] A companion work on the Old Testament has been written by Professor\nCornill. We shall review it in our next number.\n\n\n\n\nPERIODICALS.\n\n\nVOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII.[52] Vol. II. No. 6. September, 1891.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE. By _B.\n Tchitcherin_.\n\n PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN THEOCRACY IN THE FIFTH CENTURY. The\n Cosmic Views of St. Augustine in his Genesis. By _Prince E.\n Trubetzkoi_.\n\n ETHICS OF LIFE AND OF THE FREE IDEAL (conclusion). By _K. N.\n Ventzel_.\n\n OPINIONS CONCERNING L. N. TOLSTO\u00cf. By _N. Strachoff_.\n\n FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. By _Vladimir Solovieff_.\n\n SPECIAL PART: (1) Fundamental Moments in the Evolution of\n the New Philosophy. Metaphysical Philosophy: Descartes and\n Occasionalists. By _N. Grote_. (2) Measurableness of the\n Simplest Mental Acts. By _E. Tchelpanoff_.\n\n CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. Review of Philosophical\n Periodicals. Book Reviews.\n\n APPENDIX: 1) Recent Publications. 2) Transactions of the Moscow\n Psychological Society.\n\n_Positive Philosophy and the Unity of Science._ This article is made up\nof extracts from a lengthy competitory dissertation presented by the\nauthor to the Moscow Psychological Society. The writer points out the\nfallacy of the \u201cfundamental law\u201d of the Comtist philosophy\u2014the supposed\ngradual evolution of human thought through three successive phases,\u2014the\ntheological, metaphysical, and positive stage of development. The\nwriter contends, that the so-called \u201cpositive stage,\u201d as conceived by\nComte, is really neither positive, nor even scientific, if we examine\nits main foundations. As all the world knows, Comte was not satisfied\nwith the results of the particular sciences, but wished to effect their\ncomprehensive unity. The writer lays stress on the fact that Comte failed\nto perceive the inward contradiction of his whole system. His followers,\nin order to overcome this difficulty, were compelled to advance still\nanother step. Despite the teaching of Comte, they recognised in\nmathematics the whole of a science that derived its principles from\nexperience. This is shown by Littr\u00e9 in his criticism of the system of\nComte (_Aug. Comte et la Philosophie positive_, page 567), where Littr\u00e9\nrefers himself to the analysis of Stuart Mill in his Logic. The author,\nin order to reach a definite and satisfactory solution of this important\nproblem, in his next, concluding article, will investigate the nature and\nalleged solidity of the mathematical principle.\n\n_The Philosophy of the Christian Clergy in the Fifth Century._ In\nanalysing the whole literary activity of St. Augustine, we observe, in\nthe evolution of his doctrine, three stages, that closely correspond\nto his own personal struggle against the three heresies of his\ntime\u2014Manicheism, Donatism, and Pelagianism. Yet all of these three\nstages are characterised by one and the same principle\u2014the ideal unity\nof the Christian churches. This ideal aspiration reveals itself as a\nkind of constructive principle of the universe; as the supreme principle\nof a social organisation of humanity, as the substance and contents of\nsubjective, human freedom. The Bishop of Hippona,\u2014after thus having\ndeveloped the several aspects of his doctrine against the heresies,\u2014sums\nup, and concentrates his teaching, in its widest bearings, against\nthe heathen. Here this Christian ideal attains its fullest and final\nexpression, and is formulated as a _Civitas Dei_, as the unity of a\nuniversal, divine Sovereignty.\n\n_Ethics of Life and of the Free Ideal._ In concluding his exhaustive\nreflections on the subject of Guyau\u2019s system of ethics, in which the\nwriter frequently has occasion to cite the critical parallel views of\nA. Fouill\u00e9 and of other English and Russian philosophers, Mr. Ventzel\nremarks, that his aim has been, not only to introduce M. Guyau\u2019s\nsystem of ethics to his Russian readers, but also and mainly to show\nthe relations of this system of ethics to moral obligation. The writer\nwishes to say in conclusion a few words about Guyau\u2019s relation to ethical\nsanction. Guyau rejected any moral sanction, in the strict sense of\nthe word, that was distinguished or detached from social sanctions, as\nsuch. In this sense he conceives moral sanction and moral obligation in\nhis Ethics of Life, in his _Equisse d\u2019une Morale_. If life, of itself,\ncreates an obligation to work, simply, on the strength of our capacity to\nwork, in such case life also will create its own ethical sanction. Even\nwhen generously giving itself away, life will without fail, again and\nagain, find itself. No matter how it be cut short, life will preserve a\nvivid consciousness of its fulness and significance and will reappear in\nsome other place and under other conditions; for, truly, nothing in this\nworld lives and works in vain.\n\n_Opinions Concerning Leon N. Tolsto\u00ef._ Mr. Strachoff\u2019s psychological\nstudy would doubtless possess an additional interest to western readers\nif the writer had really given an exclusively Russian estimate of\nTolsto\u00ef\u2019s character and intellectual activity. In this respect, however,\nwe must not expect to find any very marked deviation from the well-known\ncurrent views of the reading public of other nations. \u201cThe main cause,\u201d\nMr. Strachoff observes, \u201cwhy people are incensed against Tolsto\u00ef, is to\nbe found in the fact, that, of all men, Tolsto\u00ef has most widely deviated\nfrom universally received ethical notions, and that he antagonises his\ncentury, even in certain delicate problems, that will always be the\ndearest to mankind. You cannot help feeling this, when you listen to the\nclamour, reproach, and vituperation, that have been raised against him\nthroughout the civilised world. For the rest, it seems rather odd, that,\nat the close of the nineteenth century, there should have risen such a\nnumber of deadly foes against an inoffensive writer and thinker like\nTolsto\u00ef; and yet, long ago, we had been accustomed to the intemperate\nutterances of a host of enraged freethinkers, whom we have endured with\npatience and meekness. Why, accordingly, have we all of a sudden lost\nour patient tolerance, and why are we almost ready to start a systematic\npersecution against the thoughts and words of a book like the _Vasnaya\nPolyana_ (Clear Field)?... It must be admitted, that there is a certain\noriginality in his writings. Every line possesses a freshness and novelty\nthat are entirely his own; and yet his language is tame, and the subjects\neven more common than in other writers. He frequently describes the\nbirth and death of very plain people. He tells us how these same people\namuse themselves, eat, drink, and dance on feast-days, cut the hay, go to\nchurch, to confession, and so forth. Occasionally he tells how a jealous\nhusband kills his wife,\u2014a fact, that has been told in so many other\nliteratures. But in anything he relates, he has the art of throwing a\nstrong, clear light upon his subject, so that it seems to us, as if those\ntime-worn scenes were seen and heard for the first time. In this consists\nthe real originality of Tolsto\u00ef\u2019s art. And he is the same in his ethical\nteachings. They strike us by their directness, vigor, sincerity; and for\nthis very reason they powerfully arouse our love and our yearning for\nthose deep, spiritual cravings that invite man to lead a higher life\u2014\u201cto\nlive a god-like life.\u201d Here also, at times, it appears to us, that we\nhear about those lofty aspirations for the first time; but when you pay\nclose attention, you will find that his doctrine is really based on the\nethics of the past, and you meet with traits of that self-same Christian\ndoctrine with which you have been familiar from early childhood.\u201d\n\n_From the Philosophy of History._ Mr. Solovieff, this time also, has\nchosen a title that scarcely conveys a definite idea of the aim and\ncontents of his article, which describes the specific relations of the\nChristian idea to the historical evolution and political ideal of the\nnations of antiquity. (Moscow, 1891)\n\n \u03b3\u03bd\u03bb\u03bd.\n\n\nMIND. October, 1891. No. LXIV.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n BELIEF. By _G. F. Stout_.\n\n THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. (II.) By _H. R.\n Marshall_.\n\n THE FESTAL ORIGIN OF HUMAN SPEECH. By _J. Donovan_.\n\n INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION. By _L. T. Hobhouse_.\n\n DISCUSSION: (1) Dr. M\u00fcnsterberg and Experimental Psychology. By\n _E. B. Titchener_. (2) On the Origin of Music. By _H. Spencer_.\n\n VALEDICTORY.\n\nUnder \u201cBelief\u201d Mr. Stout includes every mode and degree of assent or\ndissent. To disbelieve a proposition is to believe its contradictory.\nDoubt is belief in a disjunctive judgment. In a former article he\ndealt with the \u201cGenesis of the Cognition of Physical Reality.\u201d He now\ntreats of the various kinds of real existence; as follows. _The Real in\nSensation._ The real as immediately apprehended in sensation must not be\nconfounded with the percipient mind. Sensation as such is real in so far\nas it limits and controls the movement of attention, by restricting the\nrange of subjective selection. _The Real in Judgments of Comparison._\nIn and through the peculiar movement of attention in endeavoring to\nkeep it fixed on _A_ in the very act of fixing it on _B_, the points of\nagreement and difference between _A_ and _B_ gradually emerge into clear\nconsciousness. _Objective Attributes of Presentation._ Dr. Pikler\u2019s\ntheory of the psychology of Objective Existence fails to distinguish\nbetween the phenomena which are merely observed by voluntary attention\nand those which are actually produced by it. The act of introspection\nmodifies more or less the mental processes which it examines. Their\npre-existing strength and mode of operation can be ascertained only by\nelimination of the peculiar reinforcement or enfeeblement which they\nacquire by emergence into distinct consciousness. _The Objectivity of\nSpace and Spatial Relations._ Although we can produce change of place\nby moving our bodies, according to our will, this freedom of selective\nselection has rigid limits imposed on it by the very nature of space.\nThis control imposed on our freedom by the nature of the object\nconstitutes its objectivity. The constant possibility of transition\nfrom one position to another is apprehended as inherent in the very\nnature of space independently of our will. Whenever I distinctly attend\nto the nature of a spatial limit, I must of necessity admit that space\nis boundless. What has been said about the objectivity of space in\ngeneral applies _mutatis mutandis_ to the objectivity of space-relations\nas treated by the geometrician. The psychological conditions of my\nsubjective certitude lie ultimately in the impassable barriers,\narising from the very nature of space, which confine the freedom of\nmy constructive movement. _Reality in the Association of Ideas._\nAssociation is a cause of belief. If certain contents of consciousness\nhave once been copresented in a certain relation to each other, the\nreproduction of the one tends to bring about the reproduction of the\nother in the same relation in which they were originally copresented.\nA comparatively feeble association may command belief merely from the\nabsence of counter-associations. This is the basis of Bain\u2019s doctrine\nof primitive credulity. _Subconscious Conditions of Belief._ The\npresentations which successively emerge into the forms of consciousness\nare only fragmentary portions of the total mental system. Many, if not\nmost, of our beliefs depend on the operation of subconscious elements\nwhich, in massive combination, co-operate to support a certain connection\nof ideas which appears in consciousness as an object of attention. But\nsuch massive support may arise from the connexion of the belief with\npractical interests or \u00e6sthetic enjoyments, or with some powerful organic\nsensation. _Apperception and Belief._ Ideal combinations may be separable\nor inseparable according as this or that apperceptive system happens to\nbe predominant. This is best seen in its pathological exaggeration in\nthe case of suggestible patients. Under normal conditions the necessary\nalternation of different apperceptive masses produces a corresponding\nvariation in the conditions of belief. _The Real in the Products of\nConstructive Imagination._ The work of imagination either imposes an\nillusion on the mind, or it does not. In both cases there is a certain\nreference to reality. Illusion is a temporary and often more or less\nimperfect belief in the product of constructive imagination; a belief\nwhich can be indirectly produced or dissipated at will. _The Real as\nPhysical Resistance._ In the experience of the irregular interruption\nof otherwise continuous series of muscular sensation, which, apart from\nthis restriction, are producible at will, we apprehend real existence.\nThe reality, however together with that of sensation as such, being\ncommunicated to the interpretations which we are constrained to put both\nupon sensations and their order, gives rise by a very complex process to\nthe presentation of a physical world. _Conclusion._ The law of conflict\nis the psychological counterpart of the logical law of contradiction.\n\nIn the present paper Mr. Marshall examines in detail his thesis that\nPleasure and Pain are determined by the relations between the amount of\nactivity in, and the nutritive conditions of the organ which determines\nthe conscious content (_Mind_ No. 63). He states the psychological\nconditions for Pleasure to be: \u201cA content which appears normally at\nregular intervals will tend to be indifferent. If it appear with\nhypernormal intensity or frequency suddenly in the course of the normal\nregularity, it will for a relatively short time appear as pleasurable,\nbut this pleasurableness will soon fall away into indifference.\u201d The\npsychological condition of Pain is said to be: \u201cIf a content which has\nalready often appeared in consciousness appear with unusual frequency\nor exceptional intensity, it will ordinarily be accompanied at first by\npleasure, which usually will wane until the content appears indifferent.\nIf the hypernormal stimulus continue (except as after described) the\ncontent will become painful, and this pain will increase in amount, and\nhaving reached a maximum will decrease gradually until it disappears, but\nin general with it will also gradually disappear the content itself, not\nto reappear in consciousness for a considerable time, if ever. In some\ncases, however, if the content be not over intense, we may look for a\ngradual decrease of the pain felt at the beginning until a condition of\nindifference is reached.\u201d Time is an essential factor in the process of\norganic repair. For each organ there will be a certain time after action\nhas ceased at which recurrent activity will be most effective. Here we\nhave the physical basis of the gratifications obtained through rhythms.\nThere is also a relation of rhythm to pain. The throbbing of acute pain,\nso far as it is not directly traceable to _pressures_ of blood-supply,\nis probably indirectly traceable to the _rhythm_ of blood-supply.\nTurning to Psychology proper, the laws of Pleasure-Pain may be stated\nin terms of Attention. Pleasure, as involving the use of stored force,\nimplies a continuance of activity in the organ of pleasurable content,\nand therefore a tendency to continuance of Attention upon that content.\nPain, on the other hand, implies a tendency to cessation of activity\nin the organ of the painful content, and therefore the disappearance\nof the content. The notion that pleasure is mere absence of pain is\ndenied by this theory, which accounts for the connexion, in a broad way,\nbetween Pleasure and Pain and activities respectively advantageous and\ndisadvantageous. In relation to Ethics this theory teaches that the _act_\nof will, _per se_, is pleasurable as the outcome of the conditions of\nopposition which are anterior to the will-act. Further, action in the\ndirection of the greatest desire is the most pleasant action. But this\ndoes not show that the effect of habit may not be such as to lead to\naction against the strongest desire and away from the greatest pleasure.\nFurther, the object of desire, whilst it may be, is not necessarily the\nattainment of pleasure.\n\nA scrutiny of the psychological aspect of musical pleasure, says Mr.\nDonovan, will lead to the conviction that its origin required simpler\npsychological machinery than the origin of speech, which was possible\nonly through the aid of that machinery. The ear is superior to the eye\nin respect of their relative contributions toward making up our mental\nlife and activity. The superiority of the ear rests on its functional\npassivity. This allowed auditory impressions to force themselves into\nconsciousness in season and out of season. The facts of history and\nethnology which may be given a new aspect when regarded in the light of\nthe analysis of music cover a very wide field, beginning with the first\nand rudest vestiges of communal sympathy and tribal glorification, and\nextending up to the national song or epic. It is peculiar to man to\ngive expression to communal interest in a way which has nothing to do\nwith life-caring instincts. That interest finds its first and rudest\nexpression in bodily play-excitement: (1) bodily play-movements in\nimitation of actions, (2) rhythmic beating, (3) some approach to song,\nand (4) some degree of communal interest, display themselves as the\nmost constant elements of all festal celebrations. If we start from the\ngenerally-accepted explanations of play-movements in animals, and grasp\nthe ultimate reason why play-excitement became infused with the communal\nspirit, there will be no difficulty in tracing evidence of this spirit\neven where they are most hidden by accompanying habits. Success in a\ncommon enterprise tends to preserve it. The natural modes of expression\nof the communal elation follow, i. e. the bodily play-movements in\nimitation of the successful actions and the rhythmic beating. These\nmovements give to consciousness preservative elements of sensation. Every\nstep of tonal development was made in order to prove the effectiveness\nof the elements of sensation which could preserve the content of\nconsciousness springing out of play-excitement and communal elation. The\nattention-drawing power a musical tone possessed was enhanced by the\nconditions of its production which ensured repetition in a persistent\ntemporal succession. Animals\u2019 excited cries were both before and after\nthe stimulating rhythmic beating\u2014produced tones. The same excitement\nwhich impelled to these cries also impelled to rhythmic beating, and thus\nproduced a persistent auditory model for the cries. The philologist says\nthat roots are elements of words which analysis can reduce no further.\nThe psychologist can trace them back to the musical tones which became\nreproductive agents of the vague presentative elements of actions as they\nhad been repeatedly held together in consciousness by the psychological\nmachinery of nascent musical pleasure.\n\nIn a previous article (_Mind_, No. 62) Mr. Hobhouse aimed at proving\nthat all reasoning involved generalisation from observed facts, and\nthat all such generalisation could be shown to proceed on a definite\nprinciple. There are two main ways in which Induction and Deduction may\nbe distinguished. First we may distinguish the assertion of a universal\nfrom its application. The application of a universal to a particular case\nis represented by the syllogism in which the major is a general judgment\nand the minor a particular judgment of perception. When two judgments are\ncompared they are found to be (1) Tautologous\u2014the same assertion of the\nsame fact. (2) Different statements of the same fact. (3) Assertions of\ndifferent facts. A judgment expresses a relation between two terms, and\nhence two judgments may be said to assert the same fact when they assert\nthe same relation between the same terms. But if either of the terms or\nthe relation differs, then they assert different facts. Generalisation\ninvolves a universal principle connecting different facts. Syllogism does\nnot. Syllogism appears as simply the opposite side of generalisation.\nIn the latter we assert a universal for the first time, in the former\nwe apply a universal already asserted. But in both we are dealing with\nthe same relation of universal and particular. Whether we assert or\napply our universal, the same ultimate logical fact, expressed in the\naxiom of Induction, is at the bottom of the process. But a different\ndistinction may be drawn between Induction and Deduction. The whole\nprocess of bringing particular facts under universals by observation\nof similar particulars may be called Induction, while the combination\nof several universals in a chain of reasoning is called Deduction. In\nthe first, Generalisation, we assert a universal on the ground of a\nparticular, or a particular on the ground of a similar particular. In\nthe second, Construction, we assert a relation between two universals\non the ground of the relation of each to one or more intermediate\nrelations. Construction involves generalisation at every step, and is a\ntrue reasoning process. The nature of the generalisation may be shown by\nthe typical Deductive axiom. If, where two terms are in any way related\nto a third, a relation between the two is observed, then when any other\ntwo terms are similarly related to any third, the relation between these\ntwo will be similar to that observed between the first two. The simplest\nconstruction on which others rest is that of two relations to the same\ntype, and this axiom applies to relations so understood. The axioms\npostulated by Reasoning lay down the conditions under which facts not\npresented may be known to exist, and they are thus distinguished from\nthose principles called the \u201cLaws of Thought.\u201d\n\nMr. Titchener severely criticises Dr. M\u00fcnsterberg\u2019s experimental\npsychology, pointing out various errors, and concludes that \u201cwhether the\ntheories of the _Beitr\u00e4ge_ stand or fall, their experimental foundation\nhas very little positive worth.\u201d\n\nIn reply to the criticisms in _Mind_, No. 63, Mr. H. Spencer points\nout that Dr. Wallaschek has overlooked a passage in which the former\nrecognises rhythm as an essential component of music. He does not\ncoincide with Dr. Wallaschek\u2019s view, however, since it regards music as\nacquiring its essential character by a trait which it has in common with\nother things, instead of by a trait which it has apart from other thing.\nIt is from the emotional element of speech that music is evolved\u2014not from\nits intellectual element.\n\nAfter referring to the fact that harmony, as ordinarily understood and as\nspoken of by him, is concerned with the fundamental tones and ignores the\novertones, Mr. Spencer states that he cannot accept Prof. Cattell\u2019s view\nthat harmony has been developed from melody. To establish the evolution\nof the one from the other, there must be found some identifiable\ntransitions between the combinations of tones constituting _timbre_,\nwhich do not constitute harmony to our perception, and those combinations\nof tones which do constitute harmony to our perception.\n\nIn his Valedictory on retiring from the Editorship of _Mind_, Professor\nRobertson refers to the establishment of the _Review_ in 1876, on the\ninitiative of Professor Bain, by whom it has since been sustained, and he\nmentions that most of the experimental research has been contributed by\nthe American hands \u201cthat have been or are now organising psychological\nlaboratories over all the breadth of their own land.\u201d (London: Williams\nand Norgate.)\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. October, 1891. Vol. II. No. I.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n THE UNITY OF THE ETHICS OF ANCIENT GREECE. By Prof. _Leopold\n Schmidt_.\n\n THE PROBLEM OF UNSECTARIAN MORAL INSTRUCTION. By _Felix Adler_,\n Ph. D.\n\n THE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT. By Rev. _Hastings Rashdall_.\n\n AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF OUR TIME. By Prof.\n _Henry C. Adams_.\n\n THE PREVENTION OF CRIME. By Dr. _Ferdinand T\u00f6nnies_.\n\n THE ETHICAL TEACHING OF SOPHOKLES. By Prof. _Arthur Fairbanks_.\n\n THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN LAND. By Prof. _J. Platter_.\n\n DISCUSSIONS.\n\nProf. Schmidt\u2019s article is a reply to a criticism of his work on the\nethics of the ancient Greeks which had appeared in the _International\nJournal of Ethics_.\n\nDr. Adler\u2019s article is the introductory lecture of his course on Moral\nInstruction before the School of Applied Ethics at Plymouth. He refers\nfirst to the difficulty in the way of combining moral and religious\ninstruction in the public schools arising from the difference in\nreligious belief of the tax payers, and to the devices suggested to\ncircumvent the difficulty. The first of these devices is that Catholics,\nDissenters, and Jews, shall formulate a common platform of belief. There\nare two obvious objections to this proposal. It would leave out of\naccount the party of the agnostics and be a gross injustice to them, and\nit would never content the really religious minds of any denomination. It\nwould be acceptable only to the comparatively small class of so-called\nrationalists or theists pure and simple, and they have no right under\nthe specious plea of reconciling the various creeds, in effect, to force\ntheir own creed upon the rest of the community. The second device is that\nreligious and moral instruction combined shall be given in the public\nschools by persons of the several denominations. The high authority of\nGermany is invoked in favor of that system but Dr. Adler states that the\nexample of Germany cannot be quoted as a precedent owing to the relation\nbetween the state and the schools in that country. The system, moreover\nis not a happy one as, agreeably to Professor Smith\u2019s propositions that\nscientific instruction must be unsectarian and religious instruction must\nbe sectarian, the latter ought to have no place in state schools, at\nleast in a country where the separation of church and state is complete.\nTo the third arrangement proposed, that each sect should build its own\nschools, and draw upon the fund supplied by taxation according to the\nnumber of children which it educates, there are two objections. Owing to\nthe power of sects and their influence, direct and indirect, the rules\nand regulations prescribed by the state for the schools to conform to\nwould not be enforced. And secondly, the purpose for which the public\nschool exists would be defeated, as the sectarian schools tend to prevent\nthe growth of that national unit which it is the very business of the\npublic school to create and foster. The correct answer to the question\nas to the way in which to impart moral instruction so as to satisfy\nall parties will be the solution of the problem of unsectarian moral\neducation. The answer is: It is the business of the moral instructor\nin the school to deliver to his pupil the subject matter of morality,\nbut not to deal with the sanctions of it; to give his pupils a clear\nunderstanding of what is right and what is wrong, but not to enter into\nthe question why the right should be done and the wrong avoided. The\nconscience can be enlightened, strengthened, and always without once\nraising the question why. Professor Adler, it appears to us, overlooks\nthe intimate connection between the two questions of what is wrong, and\nwhy is it wrong. With the \u201cwhy,\u201d which is the moral sanction so-called,\nhe excludes the criterion of right and wrong and confines himself to\nconventional morality. Professor Adler proposes, that the material for\nthe moral lessons should be \u201cthe stock of moral truths accepted by all\ngood men.\u201d This would be a very simple solution of the ethical problem.\nMankind need no longer remain in doubt as to what good and bad is.\nWe have only to accept the propositions of \u201call good men.\u201d But where\nis the judge that shall decide who are to be considered as good men?\nEither Professor Adler considers his own views of moral goodness as\nauthoritative and ultimate or his reasoning moves in a vicious circle.\n\nProfessor T\u00f6nnies and the Rev. Hastings Rashdall discuss punishment as a\npreventive of crime. Professor Adams finds that the genius of invention\nestablished the factory system replacing the old domestic system of\nindustry. The change of a society based upon tools into a society based\nupon machinery means that the worker has lost control over the conditions\nof labor which he now tries to regain. Arthur Fairbanks says that\naccording to the ethics of Sophokles, conscience was sense of conformity\nto an \u00e6sthetic ideal. J. Platter of Z\u00fcrich rejects Henry George\u2019s theory\nas \u201cnonsense.\u201d (Philadelphia: _International Journal of Ethics_, 1602\nChestnut Street.)\n\n \u03c9\u03ba.\n\n\nRIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA. September and October, 1891.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n L\u2019IMMAGINAZIONE NELLE SUE RELAZIONI NORMALI E MORBOSE COLLA\n SENSIBILITA. By _L. Ambrosi_.\n\n L\u2019ORIGINE INDIANA DEL PITAGORISMO SECONDO L. VON SCHR\u00d6DER. By\n _P. D\u2019Ercole_.\n\n LUIGI VIVES, PEDAGOGISTA DEL RINASCIMENTO. By _A. Piazzi_.\n\n LA FILOSOFIA DI EMPEDOCLE. By _S. Ferrari_.\n\n_Imagination in its normal and diseased relations to sensibility._ The\nwriter calls our attention to the endless variety of different and\napparently contradictory things that are usually attributed to the\nfaculty of imagination. To some this faculty of the human mind is the\nmain cause of human errors, and with Montaigne they call it \u201cla folle\ndu logis\u201d; but to others, imagination plays a rather important part in\nthe discovery of great scientific theories. All unanimously admit, that\nimagination lends fuel to the flames of all kinds of evil passions; but\non the other hand it cannot be denied, that imagination sustains the\nwill in every work of great stress, or great sacrifice, by the vivid\nrepresentation of an expected final success. All human votaries and\npossessors of this fleeting, inconstant mental faculty are by turns\n\u201chappy, unhappy, sane, sick, wealthy or poor; it makes us believe, doubt,\nor deny reason; it makes fools and sages.\u201d (Pascal, _Pens\u00e9es_, Art. 3, \u00a7\n3). Yet how can the psychologist reconcile all this; how can he find the\ndifferent circumstances, through which one and the same cause produces\nsuch an endless variety and discrepancy of facts? Several psychologists,\nwho have tried to follow the flights of imagination throughout all its\ndifferent manifestations by the sole aid of style and language, have\nbeen poets rather than true philosophers. Such was Delille in his poem\n_l\u2019Imagination_; and such was even Professor Mantegazza himself, in that\nchapter of his _Physiology of Pleasure_, which he has dedicated to the\n\u201cGioie della fantasia,\u201d where he describes this faculty with far more\nenthusiasm than scientific precision. Bonstetten, in his _Recherches sur\nla nature et lois de l\u2019imagination_, Gen\u00e8ve, 1807, is supposed to have\nbeen the first to give a minute and exclusively psychological analysis\nof imagination; but his investigations seem to prove, that a delicate\nsubject of this kind, like certain volatile essences, evaporates at\nthe moment we wish to analyse it, and cannot be defined by any strict\nscientific formulas and classifications. And yet, if we really wish\nto study the psychology of imagination, we must not be frightened by\nthese difficulties, or regard them as insurmountable. We may not be\nable to reduce all these varied phenomena to very definite and limited\ncategories, but it does not follow from this, that we have only to make\na simple, empirical registration of these phenomena. As Michaut observes\n(_L\u2019Imagination_, Introduction): \u201cWherever we find a general element,\nthere also we shall find room for science.\u201d Despite the inconstancy of\nthe phenomena, it remains true, that also in the facts of imagination\nthere is something constant and regular; that they are subject to laws,\nwhich might be probably severed from the phenomena, and be reduced to a\ncertain unity and uniformity, without forgetting, at the same time, that\nthis fleeting and delicate subject is not always reducible to absolutely\nstrict classification.\n\nHow are we, accordingly, to obtain that harmony and unity of view, that\nwill unite and group all those diversified manifestations? Mind cannot\nbe conceived as a collection of different states, but we have to assume,\nthat within the Psyche there is something substantial; there is unity,\nconstancy in its energy; and that this side of its being is also the\nprinciple of its transitory actions. We recognise therefore the existence\nof two distinct sources of spiritual energy, that will better make us\nunderstand the diversity of its products: on the one side, the soul\nitself, with the formal laws of its simple being, and, on the other side,\nthe power or force of its sensible representations,\u2014of its reactions.\nThis distinction, applied to the present problem, will on the one hand\ncause us to consider images as the products of an activity of an inferior\norder, called psyche soul, but we shall behold on the other, that same\nsoul, when it has freed itself from the tyranny of the senses, itself\nbecoming properly what is called mind, its emancipation rising to the\nhigher function of arranging and organising the images produced by the\naid of the senses. Hence follows, that the relations of either conflict\nor harmony which these products of the soul have among each other, and\nto mind proper, will serve as a criterion of a classification, in which\nwe have to take note: (1) of the reciprocal action between sensations\nand images; (2) of that between images and images; (in both of which\ninstances the power of the products possesses an advantage over the power\nof mind;) and (3) of the action of mind upon images. By this road it\nwill be possible to follow all the phases of the evolution of mind from\nthe moment when overcome by obstinate images it is reduced to a life of\ndisorder, incoherency, or, as it were, to death of mind, until the moment\nwhen in its own turn mind takes hold of the numerous images by which it\nis besieged, and by subjecting them to its own laws\u2014to laws of unity and\nharmony\u2014it creates out of that disorderly chaos of images the wonderful\nsynthesis of science and works of art. From that instant we behold mind\nrise through a series of intermediate stages, from abject servitude to\nthe loftiest heights of freedom, from a state of humiliating impotency to\nan unhampered display of its true, inward activity,\u2014from folly to genius.\nIn other words, it is chiefly this psychic activity, in all its different\nstages of development and power, that must be our guiding criterion in\nthe study of the phases and phenomena of imagination.\n\nThe writer, thereupon, seeks to explain the nature of this psychic\nactivity in its application to images. He briefly investigates the\norigin of images, their immediate derivation from the sensations, and\ntheir intimate reciprocal connection, by virtue of which the one cannot\nbe produced without the other; and whence there arise many different\nrelations, that not only explain, but even enable us to classify a large\nnumber of facts relating to this mental faculty. The writer concludes\nwith some general remarks on the diseases of imagination.\n\n_The Hindu Origin of Pythagorism according to L. von Schroeder._ This\narticle was suggested by Dr. L. v. Schroeder\u2019s monograph: _Pythagoras\nund die Inder. Eine Untersuchung \u00fcber die Herkunft und Abstammung\nder Pythagorischen Lehren_. The discussion about the local origin of\nPythagorism began with the ancients themselves, is being continued in our\nown time, and, from the nature of the subject itself, bids fair to be\nprotracted for an indefinite period still. In recent times this arduous\nproblem has invaded the domain of comparative ethnology, comparative\nreligion, philology, in brief, of all the historical sciences, receiving,\ndoubtless, striking and copious illustrations from all these, yet at the\nrisk of almost losing sight of itself. In Pythagorism, as in certain\nother products of the human mind, it is difficult to discriminate with\nabsolute historical certainty between \u201cmine\u201d and \u201cthine.\u201d The real\nsolution of the problem may perhaps be found in the original unity of\nthe evolution of the Indo-European mind. The writer, however, views\nthe problem simply as one of comparative religion and the history of\nphilosophy. The ancients advocated the Italic, or Tyrrhenian origin of\nthe Pythagorean system, and among modern Italians, Vico and Gioberti have\ndone the same. The Chinese origin was defended by Gladisch. The third,\nthe Egyptian origin, also dates from antiquity, and in modern times has\nbeen ardently defended by Roth. The fourth, the supposed Hellenic origin,\nhas had the greatest number of followers, and has been ably championed by\nDr. Edw. Zeller in his work, _Die Philosophie der Griechen_. As regards\nthe last, the alleged Hindu origin, this was suggested of course by the\nnumerous striking analogies found between Hindu and Pythagorean doctrine.\nStill, all that has been said on the subject by Schroeder, Max M\u00fcller,\nWeber, and others, has failed to thoroughly convince the writer. In his\nnext article he promises to show, that everything has induced him to\nbelieve that the Hindus themselves rather borrowed their doctrine of\ntransmigration from the philosophical system of Pythagoras.\n\n_Luigi Vives. A Pedagogist of the Renaissance._ The interesting subject\nof this article is probably to this day but little understood or\nappreciated by the pedagogists of northern Europe. To this day, many\namong them seem ignorant of the fact, or, perhaps, are unwilling to\nfrankly admit, that along with the Catholic revival, and the intellectual\nrenaissance of the Latin nations, there was initiated the tradition of\nreally humane pedagogics, founded on the nature of man, and, in its aim\nand workings, vastly superior to the educational systems of the nations\nbeyond the Alps. It was an earnest, liberal, refining educational\nsystem, that professed an affectionate regard for youth. It banished\ncorporal punishment, and addressed itself directly to the heart and the\nintelligence. The Jesuit maxim: \u201cdebetur pueris maxima reverentia,\u201d still\nrecalls the original spirit of this humane system of education. It is\nperhaps not an exaggeration to maintain, that, in the spirit of the time,\nit also aimed at the _beautiful_ in education. It was a declared enemy\nto any thought, speech or action in _bad form_. To the subject of this\narticle, the Spanish bishop of Valencia, Louis Vives, is due the honor\nof having been one of the most ardent and successful promoters of this\nnew educational system, and to have been the Jean Jacques Rousseau of\nhis time. Vives was born in the year 1492, and died in the year 1540. He\nhad studied at the University of Paris, and was an intimate friend of\nErasmus of Rotterdam. He is moreover the author of a number of valuable\neducational works. Bishop Vives, however, must also be regarded as a\nclergyman, who in his practical career would at times find it difficult\nto reconcile his broad-minded scholastic ideals with the duties of\nhis calling, and with the exaggerated ascetical tendencies by which\nhe was surrounded. As a matter of fact, in a short time the church is\nseen practically to override all this liberal educational movement of\nthe renaissance. Within the college- and convent-walls, in the Latin\ncountries, the humane paternal pedagogics of the renaissance soon and\neasily degenerated into oppressive, injurious, personal surveillance, and\nan odious theocratic tyranny. With all our sincere admiration for the\nwork initiated by men like Louis Vives, we must nevertheless maintain,\nthat all, or nearly all, the ecclesiastic educational systems of the\nLatin countries during the following centuries, can scarcely lay valid\nclaims to a place within the pale of true pedagogical science.\n\n_The Philosophy of Empedocles._ In this concluding article the writer\nexhaustively discusses the religious tenets and ethical precepts of\nEmpedocles, as both appear in the Pro\u00ebmium, in the third book on Physics,\nand in the poem of the \u201c\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u201d\u2014or expiatory atonements.\n\n_Bibliography._ In this department we notice a lengthy review of Prof. E.\nDal Pozzo di Mombello\u2019s _Lectures on Monism_, delivered at the University\nof Perugia. In this number are also contained the _Bollettino Pedagogico\nFilosofico_, _Critical Notices_, and _Recent Publications_. (Rome.\nTipografia delle Terme Diocleziane. 1891.)\n\n \u03b3\u03bd\u03bb\u03bd.\n\n\nREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. November, 1891. No. II.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n LES ORIGINES DE NOTRE STRUCTURE INTELLECTUELLE ET C\u00c9R\u00c9BRALE. I.\n Le Kantisme. By _A. Fouill\u00e9e_.\n\n DU R\u00d4LE DE LA VOLONT\u00c9 DANS LA CROYANCE. By _J. J. Gourd_.\n\nIn discussing the part of the will played in belief, M. J. J. Gourd\nconsiders our belief in an ultra-phenomenal reality which he calls\n\u201cmetaphysical belief.\u201d \u201cAll thought,\u201d he says, \u201cinvolves a relation,\nviz. a relation between subject and object. Every relation presupposes a\ncomparison of its terms and this comparison is not established if the\nsubject and object belong to different worlds. The subject is undoubtedly\nfound in consciousness, the object must be there also. All the ingenious\narguments to escape this conclusion are vain. Accordingly, one may well\nbelieve in the truth of the metaphysical belief, but this belief is not\ntrue.\u201d\n\nM. G. Tarde, the great criminologist and an opponent of Professor\nLombroso\u2019s school reviews the penological and criminological literature\nof recent times in France, Italy, and Belgium.\n\nAlfred Fouill\u00e9e revises in the article on \u201cthe origin of our intellectual\nand cerebral structure\u201d several solutions of the problem of the nature\nof thought-forms, especially Kant\u2019s view of the _a priori_. Strongly\ninfluenced by Schopenhauer, he makes of the great pessimist\u2019s will-theory\nquite an original and peculiar application and finds that the question of\n\u201c_id\u00e9es-forces_\u201d is also at the bottom of the question of the origin of\nideas. In comparing the origin of ideas to the origin of solar systems,\nhe says: \u201cIdeas are the condensation of that which exists everywhere in\na nebulous state into luminous centres and conscious focuses. Sensation\nis desire.\u201d And he sums up his view in the sentence: \u201cNihil est in\nintellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu et voluntate.\u201d (Paris: F\u00e9lix\nAlcan.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. II.\nNo. 5.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n DIE SINNE DER VERBRECHER. By _C. Lombroso_ and _S. Ottolenghi_.\n (Mit 4 Figuren.)\n\n UEBER VERGLEICHUNGEN VON TONDISTANZEN. By _Gustav Engel_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nCesare Lombroso and his assistant S. Ottolenghi communicate the results\nof their investigations of the senses of born criminals in a similar\nway as the former of the two had done in his \u201cStudies in Criminal\nAnthropology,\u201d _The Monist_, Vol. i, No. 2, p. 177 et sqq. Our authors\nsay: \u201cSince the days of the famous Greek sage who said that nothing came\ninto the intellect save through the gateway of the senses, it could be\nforeseen that a study of the senses would become the gateway to ethics.\u201d\nAnd, it is a fact recognised for some time but not as yet proved by exact\nmethods that a lack of moral sense is often accompanied with an obtusity\nof the sense-organs. Dr. Azam\u2019s famous Felida showed an entire absence of\nthe moral sense when she was in a state of analgesia; Romanes has pointed\nout that the sensitiveness to pain is greater in tame animals than in\nwild beasts, this is especially noticeable in the dog. It is noteworthy\nalso that savage peoples are almost insensible to pain while civilisation\noften increases sensibility till it becomes hyper\u00e6sthesia.\n\nObtusity of the sense-organs in criminals should not be confounded\nhowever with the an\u00e6sthesia of criminals, because the rarity of\nlaterality, the absence of isolated insensible places, the lack of motory\nanomalies, etc., exclude the supposition of hysteria.\n\nOur authors found among 15 criminal boys between 10 and 14 years no less\nthan ten cases of absolute analgesia, which proves that this symptom\ncannot be the effect of alcoholism, syphilis, marasmus, or overwork of a\nspecial trade.\n\nSeveral anecdotes are told about the insensibility to pain. An old thief\nhad his leg amputated with the greatest apathy: the operation done, he\ntook the limb into his hand and joked about it. An inveterate murderer,\nhis penal servitude being ended, was dismissed out of the bagnio of the\nisland S. He asked the warden to be retained, because he did not know how\nto get food and shelter. His demand being refused, he opened his bowels\nwith the handle of a spoon, went to bed as usual, and died without even a\nsigh. Mandrin, a criminal, shortly before his execution allowed himself\nto be cut in eight places without giving a sign of pain; criminal R.\nflayed the skin of his face with a piece of glass. In the penitentiary at\nChatham during the years 1871 and 1872, 841 voluntary wounds and injuries\nwere made. Among them 27 convicts had mutilated some limb, and in 17\ncases the limb had to be amputated.\n\nThis obtusity of the sensory organs in criminals is supposed to be of\na cortical origin and being similar to the phenomena of savage life is\ninterpreted as atavism. Criminals show deficiencies in the senses of\ntouch, smell, taste, and hearing, but not of sight. And this is analogous\nto the savage in whom the sense of sight is naturally very strong, and\nno criminal could execute numerous thefts or escape the arm of justice\nwithout a high development of the sense of sight.\n\nIn the second article on comparisons of tone-distances Gustav Engel,\nProfessor at the Royal High-school of Music in Berlin, takes occasion\nto explain his views of the subject with reference to the severe\ncriticism of C. Stumpf on Carl Lorenz\u2019s theory. Wilhelm Wundt had taken\npart in the discussion in favor of Lorenz. The subject of the article\nlies in the border-land between the physiology of hearing and music;\nand Professor Engel comes to the conclusion that affinity of tones, i.\ne. the interval-sense in a melodious succession does not lead to the\nsame accuracy and reliability of hearing as their concord. He objects\nto the idea of an arithmetical difference as proposed by Lorenz and\nWundt, and proves it through the fact that the Pythagorean tierce in\nthe unaccompanied scale makes a less noticeable disturbance than in a\nconcord, while the approximately pure tierce (which is too low only\nby a small fracture of a comma) is excellent in the concord while it\ncauses a slight disturbance in the melody. Musical intervals are not\nidentical with the geometrical intervals, yet they are based upon them as\na selection made among innumerable possibilities for certain purposes.\nTheir acceptance is established only in harmonic music, but this fact too\nadds some difficulties to the investigations made in this field, for if\ntwo tones sound together, we can no longer distinguish them separately,\nas would be required for the investigation; and if we let the one succeed\nthe other their geometrical relation is no longer discerned with the same\nprecision. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nVIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT F\u00dcR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XV. Nos. 3\nand 4.\n\nCONTENTS of No. 3:\n\n PSYCHISCHE UND PHYSISCHE ACTIVIT\u00c4T. By _H. H\u00f6ffding_.\n\n UEBER SPRACHREFLEX, NATIVISMUS UND ABSICHTLICHE SPRACHBILDUNG.\n (Achter Artikel.) By _A. Marty_.\n\n ZUR PHILOSOPHIE DER MATHEMATIK. By _Chr. v. Ehrenfels_.\n\n DER FOLGERUNGSCALCUL UND DIE INHALTSLOGIK. By _E. G. Husserl_.\n\nCONTENTS of No. 4:\n\n DIE GESETZM\u00c4SSIGKEIT DER PHYSISCHEN ACTIVIT\u00c4T. By _H. H\u00f6ffding_.\n\n ETHNOLOGIE UND \u00c6STHETIK. By _E. Grosse_.\n\n UEBER DIE FORTSCHREITENDE ENTWICKLUNG DES MENSCHENGESCHLECHTS.\n (Erster Artikel.) By _F. Rosenberger_.\n\n UEBER SPRACHREFLEX, NATIVISMUS UND ABSICHTLICHE SPRACHBILDUNG.\n (Neunter Artikel). By _A. Marty_.\n\n UEBER FERNWIRKUNG UND ANORMALE. WAHRNEHMUNGSF\u00c4KHIGKEIT.\n Methodologische Randglossen. By _M. Offner_.\n\nProf. H. H\u00f6ffding\u2019s article on psychical and physical activity is an\nanswer to a criticism by Professor Kroman. Professor H\u00f6ffding had\nproposed, concerning the relation of the psychical to the physical, a\ntheory which he called the \u201cidentity hypothesis,\u201d according to which\nthe physical and psychical activities are not different in their nature\nbut only in their phenomenal appearance. K. Kroman, a countryman and\ncolleague of H. H\u00f6ffding\u2014both are professors at the University of\nCopenhagen\u2014rejected in his recent work \u201cLogic and Psychology\u201d the\nidentity hypothesis and characterised it as \u201cDuplicism,\u201d a name against\nwhich H\u00f6ffding protests. Kroman\u2019s objections are as follows: _a_) Natural\nscience knows of no reason to conceive of the relation of the psychical\nto the material in the way expressed by the identity-hypothesis. _b_)\nOn the basis of the identity-hypothesis it remains unexplained how we\ncan know anything about the external world. _c_) It is inexplicable how\nan identity can obtain of two so different things as are the bodily\nmultiplicity and the psychical unity. Professor H\u00f6ffding investigates\nthese three objections separately and comes to the conclusion that\nhis identity-hypothesis shows the relation between the psychical and\nmaterial nature in a clear and simple light. It excludes on the one hand\nmaterialism and on the other hand spiritualism. The question whether\neither phenomenon, spirit or matter, represents the absolute nature of\nexistence, cannot, according to H\u00f6ffding, be answered. It appears to\nus that Professor H\u00f6ffding\u2019s position is sound in all main points and\nmay be considered as that view which is most prevalent among modern\npsychologists. However, concerning the question whether spirit or matter\nrepresents the absolute nature of existence, we refer the reader to the\neditorial article \u201cAre there Things in Themselves?\u201d section XII, \u201cThe\nOneness of Subjectivity and Objectivity.\u201d In our opinion the question\nitself is illegitimate. Neither the subjectivity of spirit, nor the\nobjectivity of matter represents the absolute nature of existence;\nboth together form the nature of existence; and we omit here the word\n\u201cabsolute\u201d purposely. The question as to which abstract, matter or\nspirit, represents the absolute nature of existence seems to us similar\nto the question which of the two terms _A_ and _B_ represents in the\nrelation _A:B_ the absolute nature of the relation. The obvious answer is\nneither.\n\nThe eighth article of A. Marty of Prague on Language-reflex is mainly of\na controversial nature directed against L. Tobler\u2019s article on the origin\nof language in the _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr V\u00f6lker-Psychologie_. By Nativism,\nMarty understands the theory that certain involuntary articulate sounds\nare associated with certain ideas, while the so-called empirical theory\nattempts to explain the origin of the first words without such innate\nmechanical relations between sounds and concepts. Marty represents the\nempirical solution of the problem and objects to the extreme nativism,\nbut he grants that Tobler\u2019s modified nativism approaches very much to his\nown position.\n\nThe longest article of the present number (63 pp.) is an essay full of\nvaluable hints by Chr. v. Ehrenfels on the Philosophy of Mathematics.\nThe epistemological basis of mathematics demands a psychological\ninvestigation of its contents. Accordingly the author proposes to present\na psychological characterisation of the number-conceptions, from\nwhich he derives some conclusions concerning the theory of cognition.\nHe investigates the origin of the unity conception which is generally\ndefined as \u201cpositing a unit\u201d or as \u201cconceiving as a unit.\u201d We usually\nbelieve that we abstract numbers directly from the objects, when we\nlook for instance at one house with two doors and five windows. But\nthis process of abstraction is not quite so direct as it seems. The\nnumber-conception is not taken from external observation, but carried\ninto the same; yet this is done involuntarily and inadvertently so that\nit appears as if they were _eo ipso_ contained in it.\n\nWhat is the origin of the concepts \u201cunity\u201d and \u201cmultiplicity\u201d? Two\nmethods present themselves: 1) The concentration of attention and (2)\nthe act of bringing into relation. The former produces a unity and,\nwhen successively directed to several objects, a series of units. The\nlatter appears to be required by the consideration that the conception\nof a number is conditioned by acts of distinguishing. The number\n\u201ctwo\u201d requires two acts of distinguishing, \u201cthree\u201d requires three,\n\u201cfour\u201d requires six and the number _n_ requires _n_/2(_n_-1) acts\nof distinguishing. This explains why we can have clear and direct\nconceptions only of very low figures. The idea that a combination of both\nmethods will explain the facts is by no means excluded. But there is a\nthird source which may be used to explain the unity conception, viz.\ninner experience. \u201cThe unity of consciousness,\u201d Ehrenfels says, \u201chas been\nmisused in philosophy to demonstrate the substantiality, simplicity,\nand indestructibility of the soul.\u201d Nevertheless there is some truth in\nthe unity idea, for the present psychical phenomena present themselves\nin a peculiar amalgamation, which admits of a comparison between two\nelements while it erects a barrier between the _ego_ and the _tu_. Our\npsychical contents will always appear to us as a unit; and on this basis\nwe might declare that the unity conception is derived from this source.\n[Here Ehrenfels does not see that the concentration of attention is\npractically the same as the unity of consciousness, for attention means\nconsciousness, and concentration produces unity.]\n\nNumber-conceptions originate by counting. We disjoin things; for\ninstance, we throw a number of apples into a basket, or we let the finger\nslide over the division lines of a measuring stick naming each unit while\nproceeding in the act. From such processes the function of counting\ncan be abstracted while the details are neglected as unimportant. Most\nof the higher numbers are never directly but only indirectly realised.\nSo for instance twenty is to many that number which will be reached by\ncounting up to twenty, yet the single units of the number are lost sight\nof entirely. Such number-conceptions belong to the class of \u201cindirect\nconcepts\u201d which represent objects not through marks belonging to the\nobject itself, but originating through its relation to other objects.\nThe basis of such indirect concepts had been called by Ehrenfels\n_Gestaltsqualit\u00e4ten_, i. e. figure qualities, and by Meinong _fundierte\nInhalte_ or founded contents. Thus indirect conceptions are parts\ncontingent upon some such basis.\n\nNumber-conceptions are not always clearly thought out and there are some\nhelps to represent higher or more complex numbers. Thus we can think of\nten as represented by the outside and inside corners of a pentagram,\ntwelve as the edges of a cube, etc., and common among all nations is the\nusage of the fingers to represent numbers up to ten. Such helps are quite\ndifferent from indirect number-conceptions and may be called figurative\nnumber-conceptions.\n\nThat there are mathematical conceptions of magnitudes which have no\nobjective analogon is quite natural, for there is even in an indirect\nconception no warrant for its objective reality; and we ought to\nconsider how many word- and idea-combinations are possible without\ntheir possessing some analogous reality. Yet the so-called irrational\ncannot properly be called a number, it is the demand of a number which\nin fractions can sufficiently for certain purposes but never fully be\nrealised.\n\nNegative numbers always presuppose a contrast and such conditions arise\nnaturally wherever the fundamental ideas imply two opposite directions,\nfor instance past and future in time, credit and debit in business, etc.\nIt is a matter of course that there are in reality as little either\npositive or negative numbers, as there are positive or negative colors or\nsounds.\n\nConcerning the necessity idea, Ehrenfels says: \u201cNobody will consider\nit as possible that five plus seven will in some cases make any other\nnumber than twelve. We are confident that the same addition will under\nall circumstances yield the same sum.\u201d Ehrenfels grants the psychical\ncertitude of this but not the mathematical, and thinks that on this\npoint there is a difference of opinion allowable. Here we disagree from\nEhrenfels and refer the reader to former articles on kindred subjects in\n_The Monist_, especially the article on \u201cThe Origin of Thought-forms,\u201d\nVol. II, p. 111. We must bear in mind that in mathematics we are moving\nin a realm of pure forms and the statement 7 + 5 = 12 is, as the Germans\nexpress it, _eindeutig bestimmt_, i. e. it is determined exhaustively in\none and the only one possible way. The numbers 7 and 5 being rigid, their\nsum and their product will also be rigid.\n\nThis difference of opinion may be contingent upon a difference of the\nconception of the _a priori_. Ehrenfels defines as \u201ca priori\u201d such\njudgments which having come into our possession, are readily accepted\nwithout proof. We follow Grassmann in rejecting the acceptance of\nanything without proof, including the idea of mathematical axioms. The\n_a priori_ in our terminology becomes identical with that which pertains\nto formal thought: and it would make no difference whether the instance\npresented is as simple as 1 + 1 = 2 or extremely complex as are the\ndifferential calculus and logarithms. Accordingly we disagree also from\nEhrenfels when he finds even in such additions as for instance 825 +\n217 = 1042 vestiges of an _a posteriori_ character. The employment of\nthe logarithms accordingly appears to Ehrenfels also _aposterioristic_\nbecause the fruits of other peoples\u2019 labors are utilised!\n\nConcerning John Stuart Mill\u2019s view of the subject, Ehrenfels says that\n\u201cit is still deeply entangled in the errors of that conception which it\nso bitterly opposes, viz. in the formalism of the old purely _a priori_\nconception. For only he who adheres to the view that all mathematics\nare deduced from a few axioms can think of attributing to those axioms\nthe highest degree of plausibility which is assumed for them on the\nground of comprehensive deduction.\u201d We agree with Ehrenfels\u2019s objection\nto Mill, but we cannot agree with his view that mathematics derives any\nelements from _a posteriori_ elements, although we grant that quite new\ndepartments are created simply by a different employment of certain\nfunctions. Accordingly mathematics cannot be derived from a few axioms\nonly but is the products of certain functions.\n\nEhrenfels calls attention to the fact that the mathematician operating\nwith symbols often forgets entirely what he has to think of in connection\nwith these symbols. \u201cThis is not strange,\u201d he adds, \u201cfor thoughtless\nword-combinations present analogous instances, yet it is strange that\nthe result almost without exception comes out right; _es stimmt!_\u201d We\nobject here; operations with mathematical symbols are not thoughtless\ncombinations, at least, they are not meaningless. They are operations\nnot with things, but with symbols representing certain relations among\nthings. When gamblers play with chips representing real money, they need\nnot think during the game of the value represented by a chip, and yet\nwhen the account is made, the result attained with the assistance of the\nchips will come out right. There is no reason to wonder at it. Chips like\nmathematical symbols might in a certain sense be called thoughtless, for\ncertainly they do not think; but they are not thoughtless in the sense\nthat they are meaningless, that nothing is thought by them.\n\nEhrenfels apparently sees a problem where there is none and this is\nclosely connected with another point. He looks upon the mathematician\u2019s\ninability of thinking out in every respect the objective meaning of\nmathematical symbols as a shortcoming of man\u2019s intellect. While it\nappears that we cannot think anything by many mathematical symbols (for\ninstance by _a\u2070 = 1_) except the symbol itself, the enormous success\nof mathematical thought is evidence that they must have some definite\nmeaning although it is to be excogitated only by those beings who will\ntransgress the average intelligence of to-day, the first germs of whose\nexistence are the mathematical geniuses of the present generation. It\nappears to us that undoubtedly every mathematical symbol has a definite\nmeaning, representing the result of some function. That the result will\nsometimes be unattainable or unrealisable, that especially all operations\nwith zero make the whole calculation indefinite (which naturally arises\nfrom the nature of zero) does not alter the truth of this proposition in\nthe least.\n\nWe have to make one additional remark. The peculiarity of mathematics\nthat we do not throughout our operations think out the meaning of the\nsymbols is not a shortcoming of our intelligence, but the strength of\nmathematical science. The advantage of all the formal sciences and\nespecially of mathematics consists in this that we _need not_ think out\nevery detail, but that we can, through the assistance of mathematical\nsymbols, perform the most intricate operations with machine-like\nexactness. The economy of thought produced in this way is not a\ndeficiency of man\u2019s mind, but a virtue.\n\nProf. H. H\u00f6ffding (in No. 4) insists upon the causal law as being\nindispensable in psychology. There are some people and among others his\ncolleague Professor Kroman who regard moral motives as an exception.\n\u201cYet,\u201d says Professor H\u00f6ffding, \u201cshould the decisive moment of a decision\nnot be determined by the causal law, the will could never be determined\nthrough a reflection on the possible effects of the action and thus every\nreason would be missing to attribute to man any responsibility.\u201d\n\nE. Grosse expatiates on the proposition to apply the comparative method\nof ethnology to \u00e6sthetics. Ferd. Rosenberger proposes the following\nprogramme: \u201cKnowledge is power; activity based upon such power is the\ncause of happiness. Therefore with the increase of knowledge, there is\nan increase of happiness, successful activity however is impossible\nwithout virtue. Therefore we conclude that an increase of happiness will\nbe accompanied with an increase of virtue.\u201d A. Marty in this his ninth\narticle blames Steinthal for having misrepresented the eighteenth century\ntheories of the origin of language.\n\nM. Offner reviews Dr. Charles Richet\u2019s reports of his telepathic\nexperiments, but the reviewer cannot assent to Richet\u2019s opinion \u201cthat\nthese facts possess a strange coincidence and that they are, probably,\nthe result of a relation and not of pure chance.\u201d (Leipsic: O. R.\nReisland.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nPHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVIII. Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n ZUM BEGRIFF DER UNBEWUSSTEN VORSTELLUNG. By _E. v. Hartmann_.\n\n UEBER DAS GEBET. EIN RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHISCHES FRAGMENT.\n Sendschreiben an Herrn E. Renan in Paris. By _M. J. Monrad_.\n\n WERKE ZUR PHILOSOPHIE DES SOCIALEN LEBENS UND DER GESCHICHTE.\n Erster Artikel (H. Spencer, Sociologie, Bd. III). By _F.\n T\u00f6nnies_.\n\n RECENSIONEN: H. M\u00fcnsterberg, Beitr\u00e4ge zur experimentellen\n Psychologie No. 3. Neue Grundlegung der Psychophysik. By _Th.\n Ziehen_. W. Enoch Der Begriff der Wahrnehmung. By _P. Natorp_.\n Ch. B\u00e9nard. L\u2019esth\u00e9tique d\u2019Aristote et de ses successeurs. By\n _A. D\u00f6ring_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nThe well-known philosopher Edward von Hartmann defines his position\nwith reference to the idea of an unconscious representation. Granting\nthat there are no unconscious sensations, perceptions, conceptions\nor memories, because feeling either is conscious or not at all, he\nintroduces the idea of unconscious representations again as the most\nadequate determination. He says, \u201cEither we must renounce all speaking\nand thinking of non-sensual objects or we must be satisfied with using\nfigurative expressions.\u201d\n\nM. J. Monrad, a Norwegian, argues, in the second article against M. E.\nRenan\u2019s theory of prayer, whom he had visited some years ago in Paris,\nthat prayer has after all an effect upon the objective world and it is\nnot limited to a merely subjective and psychological influence. Monrad\npresupposes a belief in God, prayer bringing the individual in unison\nwith God, changes the will of the individual into a co-ordinate willing\nof God and thus renders the individual a co-worker of God. This, however,\nshould not be conceived to take place by magic and in contradiction to\nnature, but through nature, man using the laws of nature.\n\nF. T\u00f6nnies of Kiel gives an exposition of Mr. Spencer\u2019s social views\nwhich are, briefly expressed, \u201cthe final victory of society over\nthe state.\u201d Professor T\u00f6nnies answers that \u201cwe all want a higher\ncivilisation, but the development of a higher civilisation is not\nconditioned by the final victory of society over the state. On the\ncontrary, it may be said that it depends upon a victory of the state over\nsociety in so far as public rights will supersede private rights.... The\ntruth is that state and society are contingent, the one upon the other\nand also limiting each other.\u201d (Berlin: Dr. R. Salinger.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[52] _Questions of Philosophy and Psychology._ In the Russian language.\n\n\n\n\n VOL. II. APRIL, 1892. NO. 3.\n\n THE MONIST.\n\n\n\n\nTHE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY EXAMINED.\n\n\nIn _The Monist_ for January, 1891, I endeavored to show what elementary\nideas ought to enter into our view of the universe. I may mention that on\nthose considerations I had already grounded a cosmical theory, and from\nit had deduced a considerable number of consequences capable of being\ncompared with experience. This Comparison is now in progress, but under\nexisting circumstances must occupy many years.\n\nI propose here to examine the common belief that every single fact in\nthe universe is precisely determined by law. It must not be supposed\nthat this is a doctrine accepted everywhere and at all times by all\nrational men. Its first advocate appears to have been Democritus the\natomist, who was led to it, as we are informed, by reflecting upon the\n\u201cimpenetrability, translation, and impact of matter (\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03b3\u1f74 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2).\u201d That is to say, having restricted his attention\nto a field where no influence other than mechanical constraint could\npossibly come before his notice, he straightway jumped to the conclusion\nthat throughout the universe that was the sole principle of action,\u2014a\nstyle of reasoning so usual in our day with men not unreflecting as to be\nmore than excusable in the infancy of thought. But Epicurus, in revising\nthe atomic doctrine and repairing its defences, found himself obliged\nto suppose that atoms swerve from their courses by spontaneous chance;\nand thereby he conferred upon the theory life and entelechy. For we now\nsee clearly that the peculiar function of the molecular hypothesis in\nphysics is to open an entry for the calculus of probabilities. Already,\nthe prince of philosophers had repeatedly and emphatically condemned the\ndictum of Democritus (especially in the \u201cPhysics,\u201d Book II, chapters\niv, v, vi), holding that events come to pass in three ways, namely,\n(1) by external compulsion, or the action of efficient causes, (2) by\nvirtue of an inward nature, or the influence of final causes, and (3)\nirregularly without definite cause, but just by absolute chance; and this\ndoctrine is of the inmost essence of Aristotelianism. It affords, at\nany rate, a valuable enumeration of the possible ways in which anything\ncan be supposed to have come about. The freedom of the will, too, was\nadmitted both by Aristotle and by Epicurus. But the Stoa, which in every\ndepartment seized upon the most tangible, hard, and lifeless element,\nand blindly denied the existence of every other, which, for example,\nimpugned the validity of the inductive method and wished to fill its\nplace with the _reductio ad absurdum_, very naturally became the one\nschool of ancient philosophy to stand by a strict necessitarianism, thus\nreturning to the single principle of Democritus that Epicurus had been\nunable to swallow. Necessitarianism and materialism with the Stoics went\nhand in hand, as by affinity they should. At the revival of learning,\nStoicism met with considerable favor, partly because it departed just\nenough from Aristotle to give it the spice of novelty, and partly because\nits superficialities well adapted it for acceptance by students of\nliterature and art who wanted their philosophy drawn mild. Afterwards,\nthe great discoveries in mechanics inspired the hope that mechanical\nprinciples might suffice to explain the universe; and though without\nlogical justification, this hope has since been continually stimulated\nby subsequent advances in physics. Nevertheless, the doctrine was in\ntoo evident conflict with the freedom of the will and with miracles to\nbe generally acceptable, at first. But meantime there arose that most\nwidely spread of philosophical blunders, the notion that associationalism\nbelongs intrinsically to the materialistic family of doctrines; and thus\nwas evolved the theory of motives; and libertarianism became weakened.\nAt present, historical criticism has almost exploded the miracles, great\nand small; so that the doctrine of necessity has never been in so great\nvogue as now.\n\nThe proposition in question is that the state of things existing at any\ntime, together with certain immutable laws, completely determine the\nstate of things at every other time (for a limitation to _future_ time\nis indefensible). Thus, given the state of the universe in the original\nnebula, and given the laws of mechanics, a sufficiently powerful mind\ncould deduce from these data the precise form of every curlicue of every\nletter I am now writing.\n\nWhoever holds that every act of the will as well as every idea of the\nmind is under the rigid governance of a necessity co-ordinated with that\nof the physical world, will logically be carried to the proposition\nthat minds are part of the physical world in such a sense that the laws\nof mechanics determine everything that happens according to immutable\nattractions and repulsions. In that case, that instantaneous state of\nthings from which every other state of things is calculable consists\nin the positions and velocities of all the particles at any instant.\nThis, the usual and most logical form of necessitarianism, is called the\nmechanical philosophy.\n\nWhen I have asked thinking men what reason they had to believe that every\nfact in the universe is precisely determined by law, the first answer\nhas usually been that the proposition is a \u201cpresupposition\u201d or postulate\nof scientific reasoning. Well, if that is the best that can be said for\nit, the belief is doomed. Suppose it be \u201cpostulated\u201d: that does not\nmake it true, nor so much as afford the slightest rational motive for\nyielding it any credence. It is as if a man should come to borrow money,\nand when asked for his security, should reply he \u201cpostulated\u201d the loan.\nTo \u201cpostulate\u201d a proposition is no more than to hope it is true. There\nare, indeed, practical emergencies in which we act upon assumptions of\ncertain propositions as true, because if they are not so, it can make no\ndifference how we act. But all such propositions I take to be hypotheses\nof individual facts. For it is manifest that no universal principle can\nin its universality be compromised in a special case or can be requisite\nfor the validity of any ordinary inference. To say, for instance, that\nthe demonstration by Archimedes of the property of the lever would fall\nto the ground if men were endowed with free-will, is extravagant; yet\nthis is implied by those who make a proposition incompatible with the\nfreedom of the will the postulate of all inference. Considering, too,\nthat the conclusions of science make no pretence to being more than\nprobable, and considering that a probable inference can at most only\nsuppose something to be most frequently, or otherwise approximately,\ntrue, but never that anything is precisely true without exception\nthroughout the universe, we see how far this proposition in truth is from\nbeing so postulated.\n\nBut the whole notion of a postulate being involved in reasoning\nappertains to a by-gone and false conception of logic. Non-deductive,\nor ampliative inference is of three kinds: induction, hypothesis, and\nanalogy. If there be any other modes, they must be extremely unusual\nand highly complicated, and may be assumed with little doubt to be of\nthe same nature as those enumerated. For induction, hypothesis, and\nanalogy, as far as their ampliative character goes, that is, so far as\nthey conclude something not implied in the premises, depend upon one\nprinciple and involve the same procedure. All are essentially inferences\nfrom sampling. Suppose a ship arrives in Liverpool laden with wheat\nin bulk. Suppose that by some machinery the whole cargo be stirred up\nwith great thoroughness. Suppose that twenty-seven thimblefuls be taken\nequally from the forward, midships, and aft parts, from the starboard,\ncentre, and larboard parts, and from the top, half depth, and lower\nparts of her hold, and that these being mixed and the grains counted,\nfour fifths of the latter are found to be of quality _A_. Then we\ninfer, experientially and provisionally, that approximately four fifths\nof all the grain in the cargo is of the same quality. I say we infer\nthis _experimentally_ and _provisionally_. By saying that we infer it\n_experientially_, I mean that our conclusion makes no pretension to\nknowledge of wheat-in-itself, our \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, as the derivation of that word\nimplies, has nothing to do with _latent_ wheat. We are dealing only with\nthe matter of possible experience,\u2014experience in the full acceptation\nof the term as something not merely affecting the senses but also as\nthe subject of thought. If there be any wheat hidden on the ship, so\nthat it can neither turn up in the sample nor be heard of subsequently\nfrom purchasers,\u2014or if it be half-hidden, so that it may, indeed, turn\nup, but is less likely to do so than the rest,\u2014or if it can affect our\nsenses and our pockets, but from some strange cause or causelessness\ncannot be reasoned about,\u2014all such wheat is to be excluded (or have\nonly its proportional weight) in calculating that true proportion of\nquality _A_, to which our inference seeks to approximate. By saying that\nwe draw the inference _provisionally_, I mean that we do not hold that\nwe have reached any assigned degree of approximation as yet, but only\nhold that if our experience be indefinitely extended, and if every fact\nof whatever nature, as fast as it presents itself, be duly applied,\naccording to the inductive method, in correcting the inferred ratio,\nthen our approximation will become indefinitely close in the long run;\nthat is to say, close to the experience _to come_ (not merely close by\nthe exhaustion of a finite collection) so that if experience in general\nis to fluctuate irregularly to and fro, in a manner to deprive the ratio\nsought of all definite value, we shall be able to find out approximately\nwithin what limits it fluctuates, and if, after having one definite\nvalue, it changes and assumes another, we shall be able to find that out,\nand in short, whatever may be the variations of this ratio in experience,\nexperience indefinitely extended will enable us to detect them, so as\nto predict rightly, at last, what its ultimate value may be, if it have\nany ultimate value, or what the ultimate law of succession of values may\nbe, if there be any such ultimate law, or that it ultimately fluctuates\nirregularly within certain limits, if it do so ultimately fluctuate.\nNow our inference, claiming to be no more than thus experiential and\nprovisional, manifestly involves no postulate whatever.\n\nFor what is a postulate? It is the formulation of a material fact which\nwe are not entitled to assume as a premise, but the truth of which is\nrequisite to the validity of an inference. Any fact, then, which might\nbe supposed postulated, must either be such that it would ultimately\npresent itself in experience, or not. If it will present itself, we\nneed not postulate it now in our provisional inference, since we shall\nultimately be entitled to use it as a premise. But if it never would\npresent itself in experience, our conclusion is valid but for the\npossibility of this fact being otherwise than assumed, that is, it is\nvalid as far as possible experience goes, and that is all that we claim.\nThus, every postulate is cut off, either by the provisionality or by the\nexperientiality of our inference. For instance, it has been said that\ninduction postulates that, if an indefinite succession of samples be\ndrawn, examined, and thrown back each before the next is drawn, then in\nthe long run every grain will be drawn as often as any other, that is to\nsay postulates that the ratio of the numbers of times in which any two\nare drawn will indefinitely approximate to unity. But no such postulate\nis made; for if, on the one hand, we are to have no other experience of\nthe wheat than from such drawings, it is the ratio that presents itself\nin those drawings and not the ratio which belongs to the wheat in its\nlatent existence that we are endeavoring to determine; while if, on\nthe other hand, there is some other mode by which the wheat is to come\nunder our knowledge, equivalent to another kind of sampling, so that\nafter all our care in stirring up the wheat, some experiential grains\nwill present themselves in the first sampling operation more often than\nothers in the long run, this very singular fact will be sure to get\ndiscovered by the inductive method, which must avail itself of every sort\nof experience; and our inference, which was only provisional, corrects\nitself at last. Again, it has been said, that induction postulates that\nunder like circumstances like events will happen, and that this postulate\nis at bottom the same as the principle of universal causation. But this\nis a blunder, or _bevue_, due to thinking exclusively of inductions\nwhere the concluded ratio is either 1 or 0. If any such proposition were\npostulated, it would be that under like circumstances (the circumstances\nof drawing the different samples) different events occur in the same\nproportions in all the different sets,\u2014a proposition which is false and\neven absurd. But in truth no such thing is postulated, the experiential\ncharacter of the inference reducing the condition of validity to this,\nthat if a certain result does not occur, the opposite result will be\nmanifested, a condition assured by the provisionality of the inference.\nBut it may be asked whether it is not conceivable that every instance\nof a certain class destined to be ever employed as a datum of induction\nshould have one character, while every instance destined not to be so\nemployed should have the opposite character. The answer is that in that\ncase, the instances excluded from being subjects of reasoning would not\nbe experienced in the full sense of the word, but would be among these\n_latent_ individuals of which our conclusion does not pretend to speak.\n\nTo this account of the rationale of induction I know of but one objection\nworth mention: it is that I thus fail to deduce the full degree of\nforce which this mode of inference in fact possesses; that according to\nmy view, no matter how thorough and elaborate the stirring and mixing\nprocess had been, the examination of a single handful of grain would\nnot give me any assurance, sufficient to risk money upon, that the next\nhandful would not greatly modify the concluded value of the ratio under\ninquiry, while, in fact, the assurance would be very high that this ratio\nwas not greatly in error. If the true ratio of grains of quality _A_ were\n0.80 and the handful contained a thousand grains, nine such handfuls out\nof every ten would contain from 780 to 820 grains of quality _A_. The\nanswer to this is that the calculation given is correct when we know\nthat the units of this handful and the quality inquired into have the\nnormal independence of one another, if for instance the stirring has been\ncomplete and the character sampled for has been settled upon in advance\nof the examination of the sample. But in so far as these conditions are\nnot known to be complied with, the above figures cease to be applicable.\nRandom sampling and predesignation of the character sampled for should\nalways be striven after in inductive reasoning, but when they cannot be\nattained, so long as it is conducted honestly, the inference retains some\nvalue. When we cannot ascertain how the sampling has been done or the\nsample-character selected, induction still has the essential validity\nwhich my present account of it shows it to have.\n\nI do not think a man who combines a willingness to be convinced with a\npower of appreciating an argument upon a difficult subject can resist the\nreasons which have been given to show that the principle of universal\nnecessity cannot be defended as being a postulate of reasoning. But then\nthe question immediately arises whether it is not proved to be true, or\nat least rendered highly probable, by observation of nature.\n\nStill, this question ought not long to arrest a person accustomed to\nreflect upon the force of scientific reasoning. For the essence of\nthe necessitarian position is that certain continuous quantities have\ncertain exact values. Now, how can observation determine the value of\nsuch a quantity with a probable error absolutely _nil_? To one who is\nbehind the scenes, and knows that the most refined comparisons of masses,\nlengths, and angles, far surpassing in precision all other measurements,\nyet fall behind the accuracy of bank-accounts, and that the ordinary\ndeterminations of physical constants, such as appear from month to month\nin the journals, are about on a par with an upholsterer\u2019s measurements\nof carpets and curtains, the idea of mathematical exactitude being\ndemonstrated in the laboratory will appear simply ridiculous. There is\na recognised method of estimating the probable magnitudes of errors in\nphysics,\u2014the method of least squares. It is universally admitted that\nthis method makes the errors smaller than they really are; yet even\naccording to that theory an error indefinitely small is indefinitely\nimprobable; so that any statement to the effect that a certain continuous\nquantity has a certain exact value, if well-founded at all, must be\nfounded on something other than observation.\n\nStill, I am obliged to admit that this rule is subject to a certain\nqualification. Namely, it only applies to continuous[53] quantity. Now,\ncertain kinds of continuous quantity are discontinuous at one or at\ntwo limits, and for such limits the rule must be modified. Thus, the\nlength of a line cannot be less than zero. Suppose, then, the question\narises how long a line a certain person had drawn from a marked point\non a piece of paper. If no line at all can be seen, the observed length\nis zero; and the only conclusion this observation warrants is that the\nlength of the line is less than the smallest length visible with the\noptical power employed. But indirect observations,\u2014for example, that the\nperson supposed to have drawn the line was never within fifty feet of the\npaper,\u2014may make it probable that no line at all was made, so that the\nconcluded length will be strictly zero. In like manner, experience no\ndoubt would warrant the conclusion that there is absolutely _no_ indigo\nin a given ear of wheat, and absolutely _no_ attar in a given lichen.\nBut such inferences can only be rendered valid by positive experiential\nevidence, direct or remote, and cannot rest upon a mere inability to\ndetect the quantity in question. We have reason to think there is no\nindigo in the wheat, because we have remarked that wherever indigo is\nproduced it is produced in considerable quantities, to mention only\none argument. We have reason to think there is no attar in the lichen,\nbecause essential oils seem to be in general peculiar to single species,\nif the question had been whether there was iron in the wheat or the\nlichen, though chemical analysis should fail to detect its presence,\nwe should think some of it probably was there, since iron is almost\neverywhere. Without any such information, one way or the other, we\ncould only abstain from any opinion as to the presence of the substance\nin question. It cannot, I conceive, be maintained that we are in any\n_better_ position than this in regard to the presence of the element of\nchance or spontaneous departures from law in nature.\n\nThose observations which are generally adduced in favor of mechanical\ncausation simply prove that there is an element of regularity in nature,\nand have no bearing whatever upon the question of whether such regularity\nis exact and universal, or not. Nay, in regard to this _exactitude_, all\nobservation is directly _opposed_ to it; and the most that can be said\nis that a good deal of this observation can be explained away. Try to\nverify any law of nature, and you will find that the more precise your\nobservations, the more certain they will be to show irregular departures\nfrom the law. We are accustomed to ascribe these, and I do not say\nwrongly, to errors of observation; yet we cannot usually account for such\nerrors in any antecedently probable way. Trace their causes back far\nenough, and you will be forced to admit they are always due to arbitrary\ndetermination, or chance.\n\nBut it may be asked whether if there were an element of real chance in\nthe universe it must not occasionally be productive of signal effects\nsuch as could not pass unobserved. In answer to this question, without\nstopping to point out that there is an abundance of great events\nwhich one might be tempted to suppose were of that nature, it will be\nsimplest to remark that physicists hold that the particles of gases\nare moving about irregularly, substantially as if by real chance, and\nthat by the principles of probabilities there must occasionally happen\nto be concentrations of heat in the gases contrary to the second law\nof thermodynamics, and these concentrations, occurring in explosive\nmixtures, must sometimes have tremendous effects. Here, then, is in\nsubstance the very situation supposed; yet no phenomena ever have\nresulted which we are forced to attribute to such chance concentration of\nheat, or which anybody, wise or foolish, has ever dreamed of accounting\nfor in that manner.\n\nIn view of all these considerations, I do not believe that anybody, not\nin a state of case-hardened ignorance respecting the logic of science,\ncan maintain that the precise and universal conformity of facts to\nlaw is clearly proved, or even rendered particularly probable, by any\nobservations hitherto made. In this way, the determined advocate of exact\nregularity will soon find himself driven to _a priori_ reasons to support\nhis thesis. These received such a sockdologer from Stuart Mill in his\nExamination of Hamilton, that holding to them now seems to me to denote\na high degree of imperviousness to reason; so that I shall pass them by\nwith little notice.\n\nTo say that we cannot help believing a given proposition is no argument,\nbut it is a conclusive fact if it be true; and with the substitution\nof \u201cI\u201d for \u201cwe,\u201d it is true in the mouths of several classes of minds,\nthe blindly passionate, the unreflecting and ignorant, and the person\nwho has overwhelming evidence before his eyes. But that which has been\ninconceivable to-day has often turned out indisputable on the morrow.\nInability to conceive is only a stage through which every man must pass\nin regard to a number of beliefs,\u2014unless endowed with extraordinary\nobstinacy and obtuseness. His understanding is enslaved to some blind\ncompulsion which a vigorous mind is pretty sure soon to cast off.\n\nSome seek to back up the _a priori_ position with empirical arguments.\nThey say that the exact regularity of the world is a natural belief, and\nthat natural beliefs have generally been confirmed by experience. There\nis some reason in this. Natural beliefs, however, if they generally\nhave a foundation of truth, also require correction and purification\nfrom natural illusions. The principles of mechanics are undoubtedly\nnatural beliefs; but, for all that, the early formulations of them were\nexceedingly erroneous. The general approximation to truth in natural\nbeliefs is, in fact, a case of the general adaptation of genetic products\nto recognisable utilities or ends. Now, the adaptations of nature,\nbeautiful and often marvellous as they verily are, are never found to\nbe quite perfect; so that the argument is quite _against_ the absolute\nexactitude of any natural belief, including that of the principle of\ncausation.\n\nAnother argument, or convenient commonplace, is that absolute chance is\n_inconceivable_. This word has eight current significations. The Century\nDictionary enumerates six. Those who talk like this will hardly be\npersuaded to say in what sense they mean that chance is inconceivable.\nShould they do so, it would easily be shown either that they have no\nsufficient reason for the statement or that the inconceivability is of a\nkind which does not prove that chance is non-existent.\n\nAnother _a priori_ argument is that chance is unintelligible; that is\nto say, while it may perhaps be conceivable, it does not disclose to\nthe eye of reason the how or why of things; and since a hypothesis can\nonly be justified so far as it renders some phenomenon intelligible, we\nnever can have any right to suppose absolute chance to enter into the\nproduction of anything in nature. This argument may be considered in\nconnection with two others. Namely, instead of going so far as to say\nthat the supposition of chance can _never_ properly be used to explain\nany observed fact, it may be alleged merely that no facts are known\nwhich such a supposition could in any way help in explaining. Or again,\nthe allegation being still further weakened, it may be said that since\ndepartures from law are not unmistakably observed, chance is not a _vera\ncausa_, and ought not unnecessarily to be introduced into a hypothesis.\n\nThese are no mean arguments, and require us to examine the matter a\nlittle more closely. Come, my superior opponent, let me learn from your\nwisdom. It seems to me that every throw of sixes with a pair of dice is a\nmanifest instance of chance.\n\n\u201cWhile you would hold a throw of deuce-ace to be brought about by\nnecessity?\u201d [The opponent\u2019s supposed remarks are placed in quotation\nmarks.]\n\nClearly one throw is as much chance as another.\n\n\u201cDo you think throws of dice are of a different nature from other events?\u201d\n\nI see that I must say that _all_ the diversity and specificalness of\nevents is attributable to chance.\n\n\u201cWould you, then, deny that there is any regularity in the world?\u201d\n\nThat is clearly undeniable. I must acknowledge there is an approximate\nregularity, and that every event is influenced by it. But the\ndiversification, specificalness, and irregularity of things I suppose is\nchance. A throw of sixes appears to me a case in which this element is\nparticularly obtrusive.\n\n\u201cIf you reflect more deeply, you will come to see that _chance_ is only a\nname for a cause that is unknown to us.\u201d\n\nDo you mean that we have no idea whatever what kind of causes could bring\nabout a throw of sixes?\n\n\u201cOn the contrary, each die moves under the influence of precise\nmechanical laws.\u201d\n\nBut it appears to me that it is not these _laws_ which made the die turn\nup sixes; for these laws act just the same when other throws come up. The\nchance lies in the diversity of throws; and this diversity cannot be due\nto laws which are immutable.\n\n\u201cThe diversity is due to the diverse circumstances under which the\nlaws act. The dice lie differently in the box, and the motion given to\nthe box is different. These are the unknown causes which produce the\nthrows, and to which we give the name of chance; not the mechanical law\nwhich regulates the operation of these causes. You see you are already\nbeginning to think more clearly about this subject.\u201d\n\nDoes the operation of mechanical law not increase the diversity?\n\n\u201cProperly not. You must know that the instantaneous state of a system\nof particles is defined by six times as many numbers as there are\nparticles, three for the co-ordinates of each particle\u2019s position, and\nthree more for the components of its velocity. This number of numbers,\nwhich expresses the amount of diversity in the system, remains the same\nat all times. There may be, to be sure, some kind of relation between\nthe co-ordinates and component velocities of the different particles, by\nmeans of which the state of the system might be expressed by a smaller\nnumber of numbers. But, if this is the case, a precisely corresponding\nrelationship must exist between the co-ordinates and component velocities\nat any other time, though it may doubtless be a relation less obvious\nto us. Thus, the intrinsic complexity of the system is the same at all\ntimes.\u201d\n\nVery well, my obliging opponent, we have now reached an issue. You think\nall the arbitrary specifications of the universe were introduced in one\ndose, in the beginning, if there was a beginning, and that the variety\nand complication of nature has always been just as much as it is now. But\nI, for my part, think that the diversification, the specification, has\nbeen continually taking place. Should you condescend to ask me why I so\nthink, I should give my reasons as follows:\n\n1) Question any science which deals with the course of time. Consider\nthe life of an individual animal or plant, or of a mind. Glance at the\nhistory of states, of institutions, of language, of ideas. Examine the\nsuccessions of forms shown by paleontology, the history of the globe\nas set forth in geology, of what the astronomer is able to make out\nconcerning the changes of stellar systems. Everywhere the main fact is\ngrowth and increasing complexity. Death and corruption are mere accidents\nor secondary phenomena. Among some of the lower organisms, it is a moot\npoint with biologists whether there be anything which ought to be called\ndeath. Races, at any rate, do not die out except under unfavorable\ncircumstances. From these broad and ubiquitous facts we may fairly infer,\nby the most unexceptionable logic, that there is probably in nature some\nagency by which the complexity and diversity of things can be increased;\nand that consequently the rule of mechanical necessity meets in some way\nwith interference.\n\n2) By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the\nuniverse, acting always and everywhere though restrained within narrow\nbounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law continually,\nand great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety\nand diversity of the universe, in the only sense in which the really\n_sui generis_ and new can be said to be accounted for. The ordinary view\nhas to admit the inexhaustible multitudinous variety of the world, has\nto admit that its mechanical law cannot account for this in the least,\nthat variety can spring only from spontaneity, and yet denies without\nany evidence or reason the existence of this spontaneity, or else shoves\nit back to the beginning of time and supposes it dead ever since. The\nsuperior logic of my view appears to me not easily controverted.\n\n3) When I ask the necessitarian how he would explain the diversity and\nirregularity of the universe, he replies to me out of the treasury of his\nwisdom that irregularity is something which from the nature of things we\nmust not seek to explain. Abashed at this, I seek to cover my confusion\nby asking how he would explain the uniformity and regularity of the\nuniverse, whereupon he tells me that the laws of nature are immutable and\nultimate facts, and no account is to be given of them. But my hypothesis\nof spontaneity does explain irregularity, in a certain sense; that is, it\nexplains the general fact of irregularity, though not, of course, what\neach lawless event is to be. At the same time, by thus loosening the\nbond of necessity, it gives room for the influence of another kind of\ncausation, such as seems to be operative in the mind in the formation of\nassociations, and enables us to understand how the uniformity of nature\ncould have been brought about. That single events should be hard and\nunintelligible, logic will permit without difficulty: we do not expect\nto make the shock of a personally experienced earthquake appear natural\nand reasonable by any amount of cogitation. But logic does expect things\n_general_ to be understandable. To say that there is a universal law, and\nthat it is a hard, ultimate, unintelligible fact, the why and wherefore\nof which can never be inquired into, at this a sound logic will revolt;\nand will pass over at once to a method of philosophising which does not\nthus barricade the road of discovery.\n\n4) Necessitarianism cannot logically stop short of making the whole\naction of the mind a part of the physical universe. Our notion that\nwe decide what we are going to do, if as the necessitarian says, it\nhas been calculable since the earliest times, is reduced to illusion.\nIndeed, consciousness in general thus becomes a mere illusory aspect of\na material system. What we call red, green, and violet are in reality\nonly different rates of vibration. The sole reality is the distribution\nof qualities of matter in space and time. Brain-matter is protoplasm\nin a certain degree and kind of complication,\u2014a certain arrangement of\nmechanical particles. Its feeling is but an inward aspect, a phantom.\nFor, from the positions and velocities of the particles at any one\ninstant, and the knowledge of the immutable forces, the positions at all\nother times are calculable; so that the universe of space, time, and\nmatter is a rounded system uninterfered with from elsewhere. But from\nthe state of feeling at any instant, there is no reason to suppose the\nstates of feeling at all other instants are thus exactly calculable; so\nthat feeling is, as I said, a mere fragmentary and illusive aspect of the\nuniverse. This is the way, then, that necessitarianism has to make up\nits accounts. It enters consciousness under the head of sundries, as a\nforgotten trifle; its scheme of the universe would be more satisfactory\nif this little fact could be dropped out of sight. On the other hand,\nby supposing the rigid exactitude of causation to yield, I care not how\nlittle,\u2014be it but by a strictly infinitesimal amount,\u2014we gain room to\ninsert mind into our scheme, and to put it into the place where it is\nneeded, into the position which, as the sole self-intelligible thing, it\nis entitled to occupy, that of the fountain of existence; and in so doing\nwe resolve the problem of the connection of soul and body.\n\n5) But I must leave undeveloped the chief of my reasons, and can\nonly adumbrate it. The hypothesis of chance-spontaneity is one whose\ninevitable consequences are capable of being traced out with mathematical\nprecision into considerable detail. Much of this I have done and find the\nconsequences to agree with observed facts to an extent which seems to me\nremarkable. But the matter and methods of reasoning are novel, and I have\nno right to promise that other mathematicians shall find my deductions as\nsatisfactory as I myself do, so that the strongest reason for my belief\nmust for the present remain a private reason of my own, and cannot\ninfluence others. I mention it to explain my own position; and partly to\nindicate to future mathematical speculators a veritable goldmine, should\ntime and circumstances and the abridger of all joys prevent my opening it\nto the world.\n\nIf now I, in my turn, inquire of the necessitarian why he prefers to\nsuppose that all specification goes back to the beginning of things,\nhe will answer me with one of those last three arguments which I left\nunanswered.\n\nFirst, he may say that chance is a thing absolutely unintelligible, and\ntherefore that we never can be entitled to make such a supposition.\nBut does not this objection smack of na\u00efve impudence? It is not mine,\nit is his own conception of the universe which leads abruptly up to\nhard, ultimate, inexplicable, immutable law, on the one hand, and to\ninexplicable specification and diversification of circumstances on the\nother. My view, on the contrary, hypothetises nothing at all, unless it\nbe hypothesis to say that all specification came about in some sense,\nand is not to be accepted as unaccountable. To undertake to account for\nanything by saying boldly that it is due to chance would, indeed, be\nfutile. But this I do not do. I make use of chance chiefly to make room\nfor a principle of generalisation, or tendency to form habits, which I\nhold has produced all regularities. The mechanical philosopher leaves\nthe whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted for, which is\npretty nearly as bad as to boldly attribute it to chance. I attribute\nit altogether to chance, it is true, but to chance in the form of a\nspontaneity which is to some degree regular. It seems to me clear at any\nrate that one of these two positions must be taken, or else specification\nmust be supposed due to a spontaneity which develops itself in a certain\nand not in a chance way, by an objective logic like that of Hegel. This\nlast way I leave as an open possibility, for the present; for it is as\nmuch opposed to the necessitarian scheme of existence as my own theory is.\n\nSecondly the necessitarian may say there are, at any rate, no observed\nphenomena which the hypothesis of chance could aid in explaining.\nIn reply, I point first to the phenomenon of growth and developing\ncomplexity, which appears to be universal, and which though it may\npossibly be an affair of mechanism perhaps, certainly presents all\nthe appearance of increasing diversification. Then, there is variety\nitself, beyond comparison the most obtrusive character of the universe:\nno mechanism can account for this. Then, there is the very fact the\nnecessitarian most insists upon, the regularity of the universe which for\nhim serves only to block the road of inquiry. Then, there are the regular\nrelationships between the laws of nature,\u2014similarities and comparative\ncharacters, which appeal to our intelligence as its cousins, and call\nupon us for a reason. Finally, there is consciousness, feeling, a patent\nfact enough, but a very inconvenient one to the mechanical philosopher.\n\nThirdly, the necessitarian may say that chance is not a _vera causa_,\nthat we cannot know positively there is any such element in the universe.\nBut the doctrine of the _vera causa_ has nothing to do with elementary\nconceptions. Pushed to that extreme, it at once cuts off belief in the\nexistence of a material universe; and without that necessitarianism\ncould hardly maintain its ground. Besides, variety is a fact which must\nbe admitted; and the theory of chance merely consists in supposing this\ndiversification does not antedate all time. Moreover, the avoidance of\nhypotheses involving causes nowhere positively known to act\u2014is only a\nrecommendation of logic, not a positive command. It cannot be formulated\nin any precise terms without at once betraying its untenable character,\u2014I\nmean as rigid rule, for as a recommendation it is wholesome enough.\n\nI believe I have thus subjected to fair examination all the important\nreasons for adhering to the theory of universal necessity, and have shown\ntheir nullity. I earnestly beg that whoever may detect any flaw in my\nreasoning will point it out to me, either privately or publicly; for if\nI am wrong, it much concerns me to be set right speedily. If my argument\nremains unrefuted, it will be time, I think, to doubt the absolute\ntruth of the principle of universal law; and when once such a doubt\nhas obtained a living root in any man\u2019s mind, my cause with him, I am\npersuaded, is gained.\n\n C. S. PEIRCE.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[53] _Continuous_ is not exactly the right word, but I let it go to avoid\na long and irrelevant discussion.\n\n\n\n\nPSYCHICAL MONISM.\n\n\nIn modern thought, ever since Descartes introduced into the conception\nof all-comprising nature that perplexing distinction between thinking\nand extended substance, the problem of reconciling so radical a dualism\nhas formed the main task of those who have busied themselves with\nphilosophical interpretation.\n\nIn the light of the Cartesian system there seemed to exist two entirely\ndisparate, independent worlds; the one in individual consciousness, the\nother outside of it; the one made of mental, the other of material stuff.\n\nHow to conceive these two antithetical worlds, as interdependent\nconstituents of one and the same unitary nature is, after many discarded\nattempts, still the principal endeavor of systematic thinking.\n\nEvery student of philosophy knows how Descartes himself ascribed the\nevident concordance and intercommunication of the two worlds to the\nmiraculous decree and intervention of the Deity; how Spinoza sought to\novercome the distracting dilemma by proving that the two substances are\nbut attributes of one single absolute substance; how Leibnitz made both\nrealms, that of inwardness and that of outwardness, form a consistent\nuniverse and keep consonant time by means of a divinely pre-established\nharmony; and how numbers of less illustrious devices likewise failed to\ngain general acceptance.\n\nA more important part in the development of modern thought was played by\nthose other attempts, which strove to reach a monistic interpretation\nby showing that nature in all its manifestations is constituted, either\nsolely by mind and its original endowments; or, on the contrary, solely\nby matter and its original endowments. Thinkers versed in physical\nscience felt inclined to look upon the material world as the matrix of\nall natural occurrences; while those versed in psychical science were apt\nto conceive the mental world as containing within itself all there is of\nnature.\n\nThe physical hypothesis has proved its eminent efficiency by leading to\na vastly more correct and faithful knowledge of the perceptible universe\nthan had ever been previously attained.\n\nStill, from the psychical standpoint it became nevertheless evident\nbeyond contention, that all so-called qualities of matter, all that\nin any way enters into our perception of it, is composed of nothing\nbut mental constituents. And this means simply, that, whatever we\nare actually conscious of, must of necessity form part of our own\nconsciousness, and not of anything outside of it.\n\nAs to the truth of this fundamental psychological conception there is no\nlonger any dispute among philosophers. But there remains to be solved\nthe all-important question, whether or not there exists outside this\nconsciousness of ours, either beyond its peripheral, perceptual range,\nor beyond its central, conceptual sphere, another world which it merely\nsymbolically reveals. And in case such another extra-conscious world is\nfound actually to exist, how it comes to constitute, together with the\nworld of consciousness, that unitary system of being of which we mentally\nand bodily seem to form part.\n\nProfessor Dewey in a series of articles in _Mind_ (Nos. 41, 42, 49,\n57) and in one recently published in this journal (Vol. II, No. 1)\nadvocates\u2014more profoundly and consistently than has been done before\nby any Neo-Kantian or Neo-Hegelian\u2014the view, that consciousness itself\nintuits all phenomena of nature by force of its own intrinsic activity,\nimparting to them their significance as knowledge by discriminating\ntheir specific position and value within its own all-comprising organic\ntotality of being. He believes thus in no other world than that of\nself-consciousness; asserting that neither its perceptual nor its\nconceptual content are significative of any reality beyond.\n\nThe editor, though an ardent defender of cosmic Monism, is by no\nmeans a convert to such purely psychical monism. He maintains, on the\ncontrary, in the same issue of _The Monist_ (p. 85), that, \u201cThe mental\npicture of a tree becomes a symbol for a special object outside of us,\nand is projected to the place where experience has taught us to expect\nthat object.\u201d Consequently, the mental picture refers as knowledge\nto something outside of us, to something not forming part of our\nconsciousness.\n\nThe present writer believes likewise, that the perceptual tree is merely\na mental symbol signalising an extra-mental, sense-stimulating existent;\nand that the value of this symbol as knowledge consists altogether in\nits implication of the existence of an entity subsisting outside our own\nbeing and its consciousness, and having power to affect our sensibility\nin definite more or less recognised ways.\n\nThe editor and the present writer assert then, that the content of\nperceptual consciousness forms merely a symbolical representation of a\ncorresponding reality subsisting outside consciousness; while Professor\nDewey acknowledges as really existent only self-consciousness, and\nnothing outside of it, either peripherically stimulating the senses, or\ncentrally imparting universality to individual intelligence.\n\nThe former view frankly admits duality in nature, so far as conscious\nand extra-conscious existence are concerned. And in order to overcome\nthis dualism of _ordo idearum_ and _ordo rerum_\u2014essentially the same\ndualism as bequeathed to us by Descartes\u2014it has to show how the world\nwithin consciousness with its \u201cmental picture,\u201d and the world \u201coutside of\nus\u201d containing the existent symbolically represented; how these totally\ndisparate worlds come to constitute a unitary nature, whose divers modes\nof existence are throughout interdependently connected.\n\nIt is clear that the reality symbolised by the \u201cmental picture\u201d\u2014if any\nsuch reality actually exists\u2014can be known to us solely as thus mentally\nsymbolised, and not known to us in any way as it subsists extra-mentally\n\u201coutside of us,\u201d as it subsists in itself when not thus symbolically\nrepresented by our casual and intermittent perception of it.\n\nThe mental picture being a mere representative symbol must needs differ\n_toto genere_ from the non-mental existent symbolised thereby. We know\nonly what as mental representation is forming part of our consciousness.\nWe cannot possibly know anything we are not conscious of. The entity\n\u201coutside of us,\u201d the \u201cthing in itself\u201d\u2014if it at all exists\u2014is therefore\nas such of necessity unknown to us. This confession of ontological\nignorance is unavoidably involved in the acceptance of a symbolised\nreality \u201coutside of us.\u201d\n\nThe complex and prodigious difficulties in the way of a monistic\ninterpretation, when we start with the dualistic presupposition of a\nconscious and an extra-conscious world, are all effectively circumvented,\nas soon as with Professor Dewey we deny altogether the existence of a\nworld of \u201cthings-in-themselves\u201d or sense-affecting existents, and roundly\nassert that consciousness as such constitutes, comprises, and has direct\nknowledge of ultimate reality; that it is in fact itself the absolute\nall-sufficient and all-efficient entity.\n\nTo understand the philosophical strength and influence of a position so\nstrangely at variance with that of current common sense, which holds as\nself-evident the existence of body as well as mind, we have somewhat to\nprobe its deep-laid foundations in the history of modern thought.\n\nIt was rendered plausible through Descartes\u2019s, Locke\u2019s, Berkeley\u2019s, and\nHume\u2019s philosophical argumentation, that what we are consciously aware\nof, what is actually present to us as perception or \u201cidea,\u201d and therewith\nas the world at large, is altogether made up of a more or less complex\ncombination of our own actual and remembered sensations.\n\nThe conscious content itself was thus necessarily held to constitute\nthe exclusive object of philosophical research. And by starting with\nsensations as its primordial elements, and taking all \u201cideas,\u201d or facts\nof memory, to be but faint reproductions of such elements, it became the\ntask of investigators \u201cof the human mind\u201d to analyse the given content of\nconsciousness into these its assumed elements, and to discover the \u201claws\u201d\nor general ways of their combination.\n\nProud of its purely experiential method, concerned about nothing but what\nis actually found present in consciousness, this mode of philosophising\ndisclaimed, in consequence, all knowledge of any \u201cpower\u201d giving rise\nfrom without to sensorial \u201cimpressions\u201d and their order of conscious\nemergence. And it ignored likewise the existence of any \u201cpower\u201d combining\nand systematising them from within; and, moreover, of any entity for whom\nthe sensorially constituted experience had intelligent significance.\n\nSuch nominalistic, sensorial idealism has until lately reigned supreme\nin English philosophy. Previous to the new departure introduced by it\nphilosophical interpretation had always followed the method of conceptual\nevolution, carried on according to the rules of formal or deductive\nlogic. It took some widely inclusive, ready-made concepts as its starting\npoints or major premises, and extracted therefrom all knowledge that\nseemed to be implicitly contained in them.\n\nEven Kant in his younger days had no idea that valid knowledge or\ntruth could possibly be attained in any other way than by logically\ndeducing it from ready-made premises. At a later period he learned from\nHume to distinguish between what he termed analytical and synthetical\npropositions, and what had been called by the former thinker connection\nbetween vivid impressions or matter of fact on the one side, and\nconnection between their faint copies or the so-called ideas on the other\nside.\n\nThe discovery on the part of Kant, that our knowledge of the actual\nconnection of matters of facts has in every instance to be learned from\ndirect experience and cannot be ratiocinatively deduced from ready-made\ngeneral notions, was a complete revelation to him. It changed his entire\nway of thinking, and became the starting-point of his system of critical\nor transcendental philosophy. He saw clearly, that, if all instructive\ncognition is gained, and has always been gained, solely by means of\nactual experience, if it has been synthetically built up bit by bit as\ndirectly given to us, without our being able to construct a valid system\nof knowledge transcending in any way actual experience; that reason then\nas a knowledge-constituting faculty is impotent, and that metaphysics,\nas the science of a realm of intelligible existence, must be ever more\nrejected as a pure illusion.\n\nKant\u2019s thought, like that of most of our own rationalistic thinkers, was\nhowever predominantly swayed by the belief in an intelligible world,\nthe veritable home of man\u2019s spiritual being, where it eternally abideth\nin close communion with a supreme creative intelligence. After a brief\nattack of Humian scepticism, the theologically trained, though rationally\nwide-awake and profound thinker, set out to examine the faculties of\nreason with a view to discover a philosophically legitimate ingress\ninto that cherished realm of intelligible subsistence. Hitherto reason\nhad been effectively used in philosophy only as an analytic instrument.\nReal knowledge being, however, as proved by Hume, a matter of synthesis,\nit would evidently be making proper way toward a rationally conceived\nintelligible world, if it could be proved that reason is itself in\npossession of synthetical powers.\n\nAfter many years of profound meditation in this direction, Kant gave\nits results to the philosophical world. He had become convinced that\nmathematical truth, instead of being analytically derived as hitherto\nbelieved, is on the contrary built up synthetically by intelligence\nitself, and this without the aid of externally imparted experience; that\nintelligence is therefore efficient to form synthetical propositions _a\npriori_. It followed, as a matter of course, that time and space in which\nmathematical figurations take shape, are not conditions of existence\noutside of us, but original forms of our own perceptive faculty, and that\nintelligence by dint of its synthetical powers constructs mathematical\nfigurations within these perceptual forms. And finally the conclusion\nwas reached that time and space, the empty forms of perception,\nbeing themselves wholly deficient of any kind of activity, it must\nbe intelligence alone which possesses synthetical efficiency, which\nexercises in fact whatever activity is operative in the conscious world.\n\nBut though Kant enthroned intelligence as the creator of pure\nmathematics, and endowed it with the exclusive gift of synthetical\nefficiency, he did not see his way to constitute it also the creator of\nthe sense-given material that comes experientially to fill the empty and\npassive forms of perception. Against all denunciations of his system as\npurely idealistic, he insisted that there exists outside our being and\nits consciousness a world of things-in-themselves, having power to affect\nour sensibility, so that time and space, its receptive forms, become\nfilled with experiential, though wholly unsynthetised material.\n\nReluctantly, though in faithful adherence to the unbiassed results of\nhis investigation, he was at last led to declare that intelligence or\nreason as an instrument of knowledge\u2014called by him theoretical reason in\ncontradistinction to practical reason, conceived as the leading principle\nof moral conduct;\u2014that such theoretical reason has power only over\nsensorially given material, and is incapable of attaining knowledge of\nthe intelligible sphere.\n\nStill Kant regarded his so-called categories or synthetical functions\nof reason as modes of activity, belonging not only to individual\nreason, but to reason in general. And on the strength of this realistic\ngeneralisation he attributed to them the power of imparting necessity to\nsynthetical propositions, such propositions\u2014otherwise merely subjective\nor empirical\u2014being rendered thereby objective or universally valid.\nHe showed, moreover, that the relation of every kind of knowledge\nto a common centre of all-inclusive awareness,\u2014that this \u201csynthetic\nunity of apperception\u201d as he called it,\u2014presupposes an intelligible\nego, whose veritable nature becomes however nowise manifest within\nour time-and-space-conditioned experience. And he taught that an\nall-comprehending intelligible being had to be hypostatised in order to\ncomplete the totality of rational knowledge.\n\nThus, instead of giving us a monistic philosophy, Kant\u2019s theoretical\nspeculations disclosed, on the contrary, a tripartite world. At the\ncentre the non-manifest intelligible ego in communion with a supernatural\nsphere, and conceived as the veritable bearer of the synthetical reason.\nIn the median and only known region the synthetical reason itself,\nconstructing and cognising nature, by synthetically elaborating the\nchaotic manifold in time and space. And at the periphery, beyond our own\nbeing and its perception, an unknowable realm of things-in-themselves\naffecting our sensibility.\n\nSo complex an appearance did existence assume under Kant\u2019s critical\ninspection. Contemplative man, however, never ceases to hanker after a\nmonistic world-conception. Though individualised, he feels himself one\nwith universal being, and strenuously strives to understand how those\nbonds of union are established, and what part he in verity is playing in\nthis stupendous drama of being and becoming.\n\nTo most philosophers, before Kant, knowledge seemed to be given to us\nready-made, first conceptually as innate ideas or universal notions; and\nthen perceptually as the finished image of an outside world.\n\nKant has exerted, and still exerts, a controlling influence over\nthinkers by having systematically demonstrated, that not only knowledge,\nbut nature itself as we know it, is constructed by powers inherent in\nour own being. He taught that we ourselves, by force of our combining\nand ordering intellectual organisation, fashion out of meaningless\nsense-material the wondrous world we know. And, moreover, that by force\nof our intelligible being we have power to bend the otherwise rigorously\nmechanical course of nature in compliance with moral injunctions.\n\nNo wonder that so inspiriting a philosophy electrified to new vigor and\nvaliant self-reliance the dogmatically slumbering life of German thought.\nAnd it was Fichte, above all other followers of Kant, who by his fervent\nexposition kindled in crowds of hearers the vivifying spark of this \u201cnew\nphilosophy\u201d of all-efficient intelligence.\n\nFichte is the real father of such psychical monism as has recently found\nso proficient an expounder in Professor Dewey. Fichte understood, what\nKant failed to see, that the \u201cdynamical idealism\u201d of nature-constituting\nreason involves, not merely the _elaboration_ of sense-given material,\nbut the _out and out production_ within consciousness of the entire\nworld of perception. For perception undeniably takes place within our\nown being, and must therefore be, as regards matter as well as form, the\noutcome of powers inherent in ourselves. Between a consistent dream and\nthe apperception of reality the difference lies merely in our feeling, in\nthe latter instance, compelled in a peculiar manner to perceive what we\nperceive. But this feeling of compulsion is likewise a constituent of our\nown consciousness, and, moreover, under the influence of hallucinations\neven this test of reality fails us.\n\nAccording to Fichte\u2019s matured thought, our being consists altogether\nin intellectual activity, an activity rendering explicit by means of\nself-consciousness what it already implicitly contains. And it is\nuniversal being that becomes thus self-conscious in us. Infinite reason,\nconstituting a system of ideas, a spiritual organisation, is the fount\nand origin of all existence, its own self-revelation becoming manifest in\nfinite beings.\n\nThus, by force of logical consistency, was eliminated from Kantian\ntranscendentalism the world of things-in-themselves as superfluous\nto all-constituting intelligence. And the unification of individual\nself-consciousness with universal intelligence was established\nby considering individual self-consciousness as partaking in the\nself-revealing activity of universal intelligence.\n\nHegel elaborated systematically the psychical or idealistic monism thus\nforeshadowed in Fichte\u2019s later writings. Philosophical interpretation\nturns principally upon the source and import of consciousness. And from\nthe recognition of the fact, that all constituents of perception form\npart of this consciousness of ours, it obviously follows that objects,\nand indeed the entire objective world realised in perception and solely\nas perception; that the realisation of this entire world of perceptual\nobjects is in verity realisation of a world contained in our own being or\nsubject. Subject and object are therefore, from this point of view, at\nbottom identical; the objective world\u2014our human bodies included\u2014being a\nself-revelation of our all-comprehending subject. Mind as well as matter,\nthat which we call mental and that which we call material, are thus mere\nabstract terms denoting the subjective and objective sides of one and the\nsame reality.\n\nThis reality transcendental idealism declares to be \u201cintellectual\nactivity.\u201d It is intellectual activity which\u2014from its point of view\u2014is\nrevealing itself in the conscious content, becoming thus self-conscious.\nThis process of recognition of one\u2019s self as subject-object, as the\nunitary essence and completion of both, is what Hegel calls the \u201cIdea.\u201d\nAnd with him theoretical or logical self-recognition and practical\nor ethical self-realization coincide as \u201cAbsolute Idea.\u201d For to think\nabsolute truth and to will its realisation are but two sides of one and\nthe same activity. Thought, intelligence, reason, knowing itself as in\nevery sense veritable being is thus the absolute One and All.\n\nSuch out and out psychical monism is the legitimate outcome of a\nconception which takes the content of consciousness to be ultimate\nreality, signifying nothing beyond itself; and which then constitutes a\nspiritually conceived entity, called thought, intelligence, or reason, as\nthe originator and bearer of such consciousness.\n\nAfter a period of glorious triumph the Hegelian philosophy of\nself-evolving intelligence became a general laughing-stock at home and\nabroad. This ignominious fate overtook it, first in consequence of its\nfawning prostitution by the master himself to the reactionary service\nof Church and State; and then also in consequence of the ridiculous\n\u201cpyrotechnical\u201d abuse of its dialectical method by the \u201cYoung-Hegelians.\u201d\n\nHowever, by \u201cgoing back to Kant,\u201d the teachings of transcendental\nidealism have in our time once more gained the ascendency, and have\nsucceeded not only in conquering materialism, but also in invading and\nalmost supplanting English experientialism.\n\nIn Germany, after a season of complete estrangement between science and\nphilosophy, a re-approachment was effected by the Neo-Kantian movement.\nIt originated principally in the recognition on the part of science, that\nsense-perception is above all a psychical and not a purely physiological\nprocess, a mental not a material fact; that therefore the effort to\narrive at a correct \u201ctheory of knowledge\u201d is by no means a vain endeavor,\nand that psychics as well as physics deserves a place in the hierarchy of\nsciences.\n\nIn England and America the Neo-Kantian movement owed, on the other hand,\nits success, above all, to such theistic rationalism as found popular\nexpression in \u201cRobert Elsmere.\u201d In Professor Caird\u2019s words it is said\nto afford a means for the \u201cvindication of the religious consciousness.\u201d\nAnd this it accomplishes \u201cby an objective or absolute synthesis,\u201d\nwhich establishes \u201cthe indivisible unity of the intelligence and the\nintelligible world,\u201d \u201cthe unity of man as spiritual with an absolute\nspirit.\u201d\n\nDr. Hutchison Sterling\u2019s \u201cSecret of Hegel\u201d gave the first effective\nimpulse to this transcendental mode of thinking among university men\nof a speculative turn. The late Thomas Hill Green of Oxford and Prof.\nEdward Caird of Glasgow became its foremost exponents, and made numerous\nconverts. The former by elaborately disclosing, by force of Kant\u2019s\nprinciple of synthetical reason, the insufficiency of the sensorial\nexperientialism generally accepted in England since Locke\u2019s \u201cEssay\nConcerning Human Understanding.\u201d The latter by consistently developing\nthe idealistic and transcendental implications of this same principle of\nsynthetical reason.\n\nAs repeatedly noticed, and never to be lost sight of, transcendental\nidealism derives its convincing force from the undeniable truth, that\nwhatever we are directly aware of forms part of our own consciousness.\nThis involves the indivisible unity of such fact as we are directly\nconscious of and the faculty through which we are conscious of it. This\nunity of the realising self and the realised world, of object and subject\nas content of consciousness; or rather the unity of the objective and\nsubjective factors of it, this subject-object oneness of conscious states\nand occurrences is an irrefutable truth, from which one has to start,\nwhatever direction one may take. You assert, then, that that which exists\nthus interblended as consciousness is itself ultimate reality, and you\nwill encounter but little difficulty in deducing therefrom a pretty\nplausible psychical monism. For the power through which and as which\nthis ultimate reality exists is then immanent in us individually. And\nwhen this power is conceived as intelligence or spirit, and the world\nat large as existing solely as content of this spirit\u2019s consciousness,\nor indeed as such consciousness itself, it is clear that our own\nself-and-world-awareness must be\u2014according to this view\u2014identical in\nessence with the spiritual power which is ultimate and universal Reality.\n\nIn self-consciousness, when regarded as a totality of all actual and\npotential awareness, our feelings as well as the perceptual objects\ncomposed of them constitute an organically completed order. They all\nstand in definite and interdependent relations to our unitary being.\nThis all-comprising being has time and space as modes of gradual\nself-realisation, but is not\u2014according to transcendentalism\u2014itself in\ntime and space. And this is undeniably true, so far at least as the being\nthat combines all transient events of experience into a unitary system\nof permanent knowledge cannot possibly itself form part of the ephemeral\nflux of conscious states experienced by it.\n\nStill the multifold individuations of the ultimate reality into\nseparate personal self-consciousnesses and deciduous bodily organisms\nforms the great, if not insuperable, obstacle in the way of psychical\nmonism. If, on the one hand, we take with Green and Professor Caird\nindividual self-consciousness as a \u201creproduction,\u201d and not as a mere\nphase of universal consciousness; and on the other hand admit a natural\nand gradual development \u201cof man as an animal organism,\u201d instead of\nproving such natural development to be a misconception of our time\nand space bound recognition, we are far from having as yet succeeded\nin establishing a consistent psychical monism on Kantian lines. His\ntripartite world remains ununified.\n\nTo achieve its unification is, however, after a profound study and\nappreciation of the difficulties to be encountered, the arduous task\nProfessor Dewey has courageously undertaken. To accomplish his purpose\nhe has to show how individual consciousness proves itself to be ultimate\nreality, and as such identical with universal consciousness; how man,\nappearing among other perceptible objects in multifold individuated\nspecimens as a gradually developed organism, is nevertheless in reality a\ncomplete, all-comprising entity, not essentially subject to time, space,\nor numerical limitations. And he has to make clear how all conscious\ncontent, including the external world as well as the feeling and thinking\nsubject, has no other existence and significance than in and for\nconsciousness.\n\nProfessor Dewey maintains that individual consciousness is in reality\none with universal consciousness, because it comprehends within itself\nsubject-and-object-consciousness; the abiding consciousness of oneself\nas an ever-changing individual, and that of the world at large, though\nfigured in transient groups of sensations. This being so, that which\nis thus the bearer and realiser of all being and becoming in nature,\ncannot itself form part of this becoming, but must\u2014according to\nProfessor Dewey\u2019s view\u2014be eternal and absolute. The all-comprehending\nconsciousness\u2014and there is no existence outside of it\u2014is thus identical\nwith universal intelligence, identical with that eternally active\nintelligence which is everlastingly creating the organic synthesis of all\nbeing and becoming.\n\n\u201cConsciousness the ultimate fact reveals itself as reason.\u201d Sensations\nhave no self-existence, no meaning in themselves. They exist only as\nintellectually apprehended and for intelligence alone. It is from\nintellectual interpretation that they receive their entire significance.\nOn solicitation of sensations the ideal content of universal intelligence\nbecomes partially and interruptedly revealed to individual consciousness.\nThe sole office of sensations is to give in us occasion to this\nself-realisation of the eternal content of intelligence.\n\nProfessor Dewey establishes his psychical monism by discovering\nself-consciousness as the Absolute, the One and All. Individual idealism\nor so-called solipsism, such as expounded by Fichte in his earlier\nwritings from the side of intellect, and in the writings of English\nexperientialists from the side of sensation, this individual idealism\npresents itself likewise as a psychical monism, but as an absurdly narrow\none. Professor Dewey points out how it fails to understand that by\nconstituting mind, as such, the ego or subject for which all experience\nexists, it artificially divides our unitary consciousness into two\nseparate constituents, and takes the subjective constituent to be the\nbearer and realiser of the objective constituent; while in reality both\nconstituents are but elements of consciousness in general; are in fact\ncompletely unified in eternal and absolute consciousness.\n\nNow it is perfectly true, that during conscious awareness object and\nsubject-consciousness are inextricably interblended so as to constitute\na unified experience. It is true also, that the veritable subject that\nthus consciously experiences, and that furthermore imparts intelligent\nmeaning to such experience, cannot itself form part of these its own\nfragmentary and transient moments of awareness. Comprehending them all,\nit must evidently be an enduring, at least a relatively persistent being.\nIt is undoubtedly to such a persistent being or subject that experience\ngradually accrues, and in whom it is all retained and organised into more\nor less systematic order.\n\nBut is there the least warrant for assuming that this persistent subject,\nweaving thus intelligent experience out of its transient conscious\nstates, is itself \u201cconsciousness\u201d or \u201cintelligence\u201d?\n\nIntelligent consciousness is very obviously only one of the functions\nof the persistent subject, and by no means its being or essence. And\nthe experience accruing to it, that at least of the external world,\nbears nowise the characteristics of Platonic reminiscence, does nowise\nconsist in self-revelation, in the becoming explicitly aware of what\nalready implicitly existed within itself. We may indeed say, that our\nemotions, when aroused, constitute such self-revelation. But, for\ninstance, yonder visual figuration, consisting of nothing but colored\nforms, though intelligently interpreted as a landscape with plains,\nwoods, and creeks; interpreted thus by the aid of no end of former\nexperience; this landscape now perceived by me for the first time was\ncertainly not implicitly immanent in my consciousness previous to all\nmy individual experience. Its conscious realisation does assuredly not\nrender explicit as objective experience what for ever has been an organic\nmember of my self-consciousness. What is immanent in my being\u2014not in my\nconsciousness\u2014is the sensorial faculty of symbolically picturing whatever\nsense-affecting agent is placed before me. The conscious picture itself\nis an evanescent phenomenon, having no steadfast existence or reality.\n\nTo assert\u2014as is usually done by transcendentalists and by Professor Dewey\namong them\u2014that our individual experience, when\u2014as mostly occurs\u2014not\nactually conscious to ourselves, exists then nevertheless as conscious\ncontent of a universal being; to venture such an utterly gratuitous\nassertion, even when merely hypothetically advanced, transcends all\nlegitimate inference from given facts. When declared to be positively\njustified by given facts, it all too obviously betrays the theological\nbias by which it is inspired, the set purpose of vindicating the\nreligious consciousness which has faith in \u201cthe unity of man as spiritual\nwith an absolute spirit.\u201d\n\nThrough consciousness we indeed become aware of the divers faculties\nof our being, together with their functionally accruing experience.\nAll this, however, rises into conscious awareness only at times, when\ncasually awakened. To give to the vast system of consciously latent being\nand experience the name of \u201cconsciousness,\u201d to call that \u201cconsciousness\u201d\nwhose principal distinction is to constitute a persistent subject\nwith an organised system of experience abiding for the most part in\nextra-conscious latency; to do this only because all this extra-conscious\nexistence may and does at times become more or less conscious; this is\nsurely committing the fatal error of denoting a state of things by its\noutright opposite.\n\nThere is no denying that most of the content of our being is usually\nnot present in consciousness. Consequently, abiding thus outside\nconsciousness, it cannot possibly form part of consciousness either\nindividual or universal.\n\nNothing could be more to the point than Professor Dewey\u2019s statement,\nthat \u201conly a living actual fact (let us say existent instead of fact)\ncan preserve within its unity that organic system of differences in\nvirtue of which it lives and moves and has its being.\u201d There is not the\nleast doubt that the subject, who at times is conscious of more or less\nof his experience, is exactly such an existent as here described. But\nconsciousness, though the medium in which and through which everything\nis realised, is itself but an intermittent function of that living\nactual subject which preserves within its unity the organic system of\ndifferences in virtue of which it lives and moves and has its being. The\nconsciousness of the subject conveys information to it only interruptedly\nand in broken bits. These become organically unified into a more or less\nconsistent totality of experience. But this process of unification takes\nplace, not in the dream like stuff which makes up consciousness, but in\nthe persistent, extra-conscious matrix whence our ever lapsing, ever\nrenewed moment of conscious awareness emerges ready-made.\n\nThe subject capable of thought and feeling becomes thinkingly and\nfeelingly manifest to _itself_, when its functions through which\nconsciousness arises are in operation; becomes manifest as bodily active\nto _other sentient beings also_, when its functions through which such\nactivity arises are in operation.\n\nBut if the real nature of the experiencing subject is not\nself-consciousness or intelligence, what then can it be?\n\nIdealists, and with them Professor Dewey, become such by believing that\nthe perceptually realised objects are themselves veritable reality,\nand not mere symbols of extra-conscious reality. Now can they in all\nsincerity bring themselves to believe that a baby\u2014to use one of Professor\nDewey\u2019s illustrations\u2014which experiences a sensation, say a pain caused\nby the prick of a pin, that this pain-experiencing baby is no other\nthan that colored form within the perceptual consciousness of may be\nhalf a dozen spectators; and that it is the perceptual pin within the\nconsciousness of each of them that has pricked the baby and caused the\npain?\n\nDoes the pain-experiencing baby derive its existence from the fact that\nthe intellect of the spectator interprets the perceptual form within his\nconsciousness to signify a baby, which has forever implicitly formed part\nof the organic content of his own self-consciousness?\n\nSurely the pain experienced by the baby is not experienced by the\nperceptually realised baby, not by the baby existing as interpreted\nperception in the consciousness of him who perceives it. The pain\nexperienced by the baby does nowise form part of the consciousness\nof the perceiver. Consequently and incontestably, the subject that\nexperiences the sensation, that experiences in fact any kind of feeling\nor thought, is itself an extra-conscious being, a being only casually and\nsymbolically realised in consciousness.\n\nAnd if the perceptual baby is merely a conscious symbol signalising\nan extra-conscious existent, then all perceptual existence, all that\nconstitutes what we perceptually realise as nature, symbolises likewise\nan extra-conscious reality, a reality that has power so to affect our\nsensibility as to arouse in us perceptual representations of itself and\nits characteristics.\n\nThe matter stands then exactly as denied by Professor Dewey. It is\nindeed the \u201cbaby thing-in-itself which is affected,\u201d and it is \u201ca\nworld thing-in-itself which calls forth the sensation.\u201d It is not, as\nmaintained by Professor Dewey the baby known to him as his own perception\nwhich experiences the sensation by having been pricked within the\nbeholder\u2019s consciousness by a perceptually constituted pin.\n\nBut if the entity, which affects the beholder\u2019s sensibility and awakens\nin him the percept of a baby, exists in verity outside his, the\nbeholder\u2019s, consciousness, and is known to him only as thus symbolically\npictured by his own percept; such sense-affecting entity is, on the other\nhand, nowise to be construed as the unknowable \u201cFirst Cause,\u201d nowise as\nthat protean Persistent Force, which Mr. Spencer imagines capable of\nassuming every kind of mental or material appearance.\n\nThe so-called material or physical modes which constitute in the beholder\nthe perceptually realised baby, and the so-called immaterial or mental\nmodes which are experienced by the baby as his sensations and emotions;\nthese material and mental modes are in no sense the manifestation of an\n\u201cAbsolute Force\u201d or \u201cinscrutable Power,\u201d as our Spencerians would lead us\nreligiously, and almost theologically to believe.[54]\n\nThe material modes that constitute the perceptually realised baby are\nawakened in the beholder by a definite sense-affecting existent, which is\nthus revealing not only its bare presence, but most vividly and minutely\nalso its perceptible and distinguishing characteristics. And in the same\nmanner it makes also known that it is interdependently connected with\nthe vast system of sense-affecting entities, that constitutes nature in\ngeneral.\n\nAll reality is interdependently conditioned. The \u201cUnconditioned Reality\u201d\nof the Hamiltons, Mansels, and Spencers, has nowhere any existence,\neither in consciousness or outside of it. It is altogether a fictitious,\nsuperfluous, and most misleading conception.\n\nAs regards the mental modes experienced by the baby, they are evidently\nexclusively his own affections as a highly and most specifically\norganised being, and not by any means are they modes of appearance of\nthat most empty abstraction \u201cThe Unknowable,\u201d that has with so many\nbelievers usurped the throne of their former anthropomorphic Deity.\n\nThis coiled up thing over there, is it a rope or a snake? I see it move,\nand my intellect interprets it to be a snake. Surely the significance\nof the interpretation does not consist in my realising what was already\nimplicitly contained in my consciousness, but in knowing that in contact\nwith the being out there, which forms no part whatever of myself\nthough perceptually realised by me, I shall become affected in certain\nadditional ways taught by former experience.\n\nWill any unbiassed and competent judge assert that the far-fetched\nidealistic interpretation is more in accordance with what we really\nexperience, than the very simple one here given?\n\nNo doubt the immediate object of physical observation is not the\nthing-in-itself, but its perceptual realisation. It is such, however,\nonly as symbolical representation of something subsisting outside\nconsciousness, only as a conscious affection awakened with compulsory\nforce in the observer from without. The observer offers his diversely\ndifferentiated and delicately attuned sensibilities to the outside world\nand carefully notices its specific modes of reaction upon definite modes\nof stimulation. This in truth is the method of scientific observation,\nfrom which all conclusions regarding the characteristics of nature are\ndrawn.\n\nThe conscious subject phylogenetically evolved in constant interaction\nwith the medium in which he lives and moves and has his being, possesses\nrealising faculties so adjusted as to correctly subserve his needs in\nrelation to such a medium. He then furthermore uses these faculties\nin order to gain a fuller and more accurate knowledge of further\nperceptible characteristics of this same medium.\n\nA monistic interpretation of nature cannot possibly be reached by\nassuming consciousness or intelligence to be ultimate reality, and\nas such the One and All. It can be reached only by recognising that\nconsciousness is a function of subjects that stand in definite relations\nto the rest of nature, and have power along with the other constituents\nof nature so to affect the sensibility of other sentient beings as to\ncause to arise therein the symbolical representation of themselves.\n\nSystematised experience consists in the organised totality of such\nsymbolical representations. And this organised totality of experience\nexists as potential possession of the subject in extra-conscious\nlatency, in what we figuratively call memory. Emerging on occasion\ninto consciousness it reproduces more or less faithfully the order and\nconnection of the manifold that constitutes the sense-affecting universe.\n\nIn highly developed sentient subjects self-realisation or the \u201cinner\nlife,\u201d which arises from the activity of their emotional and above all\ntheir social nature, gains predominant influence over their sensual and\nperceptual experience, urging them so to transform the given aspect of\nthe outer world as to render it subservient to the aspirations of that\ninner life.\n\n EDMUND MONTGOMERY.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[54] Mr. Spencer grapples with the problem of ultimate reality from\nthree different and widely divergent standpoints. First, by assuming\nthat our out and out conditioned nature and knowledge presupposes the\nexistence of an \u201cUnconditioned Reality,\u201d he arrives at the conception of\nan \u201cAbsolute Cause.\u201d Second, by attributing\u2014in keeping with the principle\nof the Conservation of Energy, all physical and psychical activity to the\ninterconvertible play of modes of force, he arrives at the conception\nof an \u201cAbsolute Force,\u201d whence all these manifest modes proceed;\nhinting, moreover, that, as our experience of force-manifestation is\nof a psychical nature, the \u201cAbsolute Force\u201d may rather be conceived as\npsychical than as physical. Third, besides explaining at times that\nthe psychical and physical modes, instead of being interconvertible,\nare only two different aspects of one and the same reality\u2014and\ncontrary to his assumption of the interconvertibility of psychical and\nphysical modes proceeding from an Absolute Force, he advocates in his\n_Transfigured Realism_ the view, that our perceptual consciousness\nfigures representatively the corresponding characteristics of a world of\nthings-in-themselves. No wonder that Spencerians are getting somewhat\nmixed, as the saying is.\n\n\n\n\nTHE CONSERVATION OF SPIRIT AND THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS.\n\n\nThe consideration of the relation that subsists between body and mind is\na topic that has led to several theories, one of which has found favor\nwith many on account of its supposed monistic implications. Dr. Carus in\nhis work \u201cThe Soul of Man\u201d seems to adopt that theory, and his method of\nexplaining the matter is one of notable superiority. He says:\n\n \u201cMatter and mind (the elements of feeling) are to be considered\n as one\u2014not the same, but one. They are as inseparable as are\n the two sides of a sheet of paper. If we look at it from the\n mind side its activity represents itself as elements of feeling\n and all kinds and degrees of actual feelings. If we look at it\n from the matter side its activity represents itself as motions\n or as all kinds of potential and kinetic energy.\u201d\n\nThis doctrine of a double-faced unity has no doubt been favored because\nit has seemed the best and perhaps the only refuge available against\nthe various forms of dualism. Still this same doctrine is very far from\ninducing that final pacification of mind which we rightly expect from a\ncompetent theory. It is open to the charge of being arbitrary, and it\nbrings no access of insight.\n\nThe expressions of those whom we must suppose to be well affected towards\nany doctrine that gives promise of a monistic issue show this to be the\ncase. Thus Tyndall says:\n\n \u201cI do not think that he (i. e. the materialist) is entitled\n to say that his molecular groupings and his molecular motions\n explain everything. In reality they explain nothing. The\n utmost that he can affirm is the association of two classes\n of phenomena of whose real bond of union he is in absolute\n ignorance. _The problem of the connection of body and soul is\n as insoluble in its modern form as it was in the prehistoric\n ages._\u201d\n\nAnd Huxley protests that,\n\n \u201cHow anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes\n about as a result of irritating nervous tissue is _just as\n unaccountable_ as the appearance of the Djinn when Alladin\n rubbed his lamp.\u201d\n\nIn truth those who might be expected to speak with considerable reserve\nin regard to the inabilities of human attainment have emphasised without\ndue sobriety the insuperable aspects of the problem. The past history\nof culture should have counseled caution, especially in view of the\ncertainty that consciousness is _somehow_ dependent upon nerve action.\n\nIt is submitted that the recent progress of science should induce a\nhopeful temper of mind on this question. Not only have physiology and\npsychology brought to light more results in the last decades than in\ncenturies past, but in positive monism and formal thought philosophy\nhas also attained to a clearness of method which will prove beneficial\nto all special investigations. A clear and concise statement of the\nnew positivism is found in the chapter Form and Formal Thought of\n\u201cFundamental Problems\u201d by Dr. Carus. Any one who has watched the\ndevelopment of the algebra of thought and the philosophy of logic, will\nnaturally expect signal aid towards the solution of the world-questions\nfrom a proper consideration of form and the laws of form. In Dr. Carus\u2019s\nbook and especially in the above mentioned chapter will be found a most\npopular exposition of that subject.\n\nThose who hold that form and formal thought is the very constituted means\nby which our information with respect to real existence may be improved,\nought to regard it a decided step towards the solution of any hitherto\napparently inexplicable problem, if we only but find ourselves able to\n_formulate_ an idea or process that mediates between the known and the\nunknown, and represents to our insight how it is possible to think of a\nphenomenon in accordance with notions that yield perceptible imagery.\n\nRiemann in what has been well characterised as his \u201cstupendous\u201d essay on\n\u201cThe hypotheses that lie at the basis of geometry\u201d remarks:\n\n \u201cWe are quite at liberty to suppose that the metric relations\n of space in the infinitely small do not conform to the\n hypotheses of geometry; _and we ought in fact to suppose it if\n we can thereby obtain a simpler explanation of phenomena_.\u201d\n\nSo also Jevons in his \u201cPrinciples of Science\u201d commenting on \u201cThe\nCharacter of the Experimentalist\u201d refers to the audacity of speculation\nthat characterised Faraday and that was the leading of his efforts\ntowards some of his most brilliant discoveries. He says:\n\n \u201cWe have only to notice the profound conviction in the unity of\n natural laws, the active powers of inference and imagination,\n _the unbounded license of theorising_.\u201d\n\nTheory must precede experiment. We must formulate before we can verify.\nThe words of Faraday: \u201cLet us encourage ourselves by a little more\nimagination prior to experiment,\u201d shows us the method he followed.\n\nRecent developments in connection with the study of electricity supply us\nwith at least an analogy that may instruct us as to how we may _suppose_\nthe appearance of consciousness as a result of nerve action.\n\nThe nature of electricity has long been an unformulated thesis. That it\nmay be produced by the motion of matter is proved by every dynamo in\noperation: indeed the oldest experiments in static electricity are to the\nsame effect.\n\nAt the present time it seems to be an acceptable doctrine or at least a\ngood working hypothesis that electricity and magnetism are manifestations\nof that once hypothetical medium called _the ether_.\n\nProf. G. F. Fitzgerald in his opening address before Section A of the\nBritish Association for the Advancement of Science in 1888 made these\nvery important remarks:\n\n \u201cIn a presidential address on the borderlands of the known,\n delivered from this chair, the great Clerk Maxwell spoke of it\n as an undecided question whether electro-magnetic phenomena are\n due to direct action at a distance or are due to the action of\n an intervening medium. The year 1888 will ever be memorable as\n the year in which this great question has been experimentally\n _settled_ by Hertz in Germany. Henceforth I hope no learner\n will fail to be impressed with the theory\u2014_hypothesis no\n longer_\u2014that electro-magnetic actions are due to a medium\n pervading all known space.\u201d\n\nThat the ether really exists: that it is a proved fact and that it is\nthe substantial basis out of which electricity and magnetism arises,\nare pretensions too momentous to remain unchallenged if they lacked\ngood evidence in their favor. Yet instead of awakening dissent among\nthe critical hosts of science, these utterances of Professor Fitzgerald\nhave not only been received as voicing the convictions of the scientific\nworld but they are confirmed from time to time by the sometimes tacit and\nsometimes express assent of all who discourse upon the matters involved.\n\nProf. Oliver Lodge, one of the leading scientific men of England and an\nacknowledged authority upon the subject has recently published a work\nentitled \u201cModern Views of Electricity.\u201d In his preface he says:\n\n \u201cFew things in physical science appear to me more certain than\n that what has so long been called electricity is a form or\n rather a mode of manifestation of the ether.\u201d\n\nHe supposes the ether as a compound of two constituents corresponding\nto positive and negative electricity. Each of these constituents has\naffinities, cohesions, or entanglements with the various kinds of\nmatter, which affinities, cohesions, or entanglements are greater or\nless according to the kind of matter involved, so that by the motions of\ncertain sorts of matter under proper conditions the two constituents of\nthe ether are torn apart or separated, or in the language of dynamics,\nstrained. But at the same time these constituents also tend with\nunceasing persistence to reunite and saturate one another into a state of\nabsolute neutrality. Separate, these constituents show an existence and\nan energy towards one another. United neither of them shows any existence\nat all nor any efficacy whatever. They are as though they did not exist.\n\nIt is of small moment to the present purpose whether or not this\nelectrical theory is well grounded. In either case its very formulation\nsupplies us with a suggestion as to how it is possible to think of\nconsciousness as a product of nerve action.\n\nJust as the ether is supposed as the substantial basis out of which in\nconsequence of the motion of matter electricity and magnetism becomes\nmanifest, so may we suppose an analogous (perhaps the same) basis\nsurrounding and permeating all things, and out of which in consequence of\nnerve action, consciousness becomes manifest.\n\nWhy may we not suppose this consciousness basis, (which suppose we name\nspirit,) to be the ultimate substance which being variously modified\nby energy manifests in one case the phenomena of mind, in another the\nphenomena of electricity, magnetism, etc., and then again in a third case\nthat phenomenon, mass, or inertia, which is the essential attribute of\nmatter?\n\nAs with the ether in the absence of any cause that separates it so that\nelectricity and magnetism become manifest, so spirit may be supposed\nto be utterly without manifestation and neutral until nerve action\nmodifies its condition, when like electricity in the one case, so here,\nconsciousness becomes manifest.\n\nWhy may we not imagine spirit as composed of two constituents\ncorresponding to feeling and volition which united saturate one another\ninto neutrality, but which separated by nerve action manifest feeling\nthat tends to pass into volition, or volition that tends to pass into\nfeeling? This would be in accordance with the phenomena if of reflex\naction which is supposed to be the elementary type of mentality.\n\nThis is in harmony with the views of the author of \u201cThe Soul of Man,\u201d for\nhe, although for other reasons, also explains the origin of consciousness\nfrom tension. He says:\n\n \u201cConsciousness is an intensified state of feeling caused\n through tension. It lies between a want and its satisfaction.\n Satisfaction not being immediately attainable, feelings are no\n longer in a state of equilibrium, and it is this tension which\n concentrates and intensifies feeling into consciousness.\n\n \u201cIt appears that consciousness never arises without a certain\n tension. Days spent in an idyllic life flow away almost\n unconsciously; there is little friction, there are no problems\n to be solved; there are no unsatisfied wants, or if there are\n any, they are quickly and easily attended to. There is no need\n of consciousness, there is not much tension to call it into\n play, so life passes dreamlike as a tale that is told. The\n more life is burdened with problems that demand a man\u2019s full\n care and deliberation, and the stronger are his attempts to\n solve the problems of his situation, the more intense will his\n consciousness be.\n\n \u201cIt appears to me very doubtful whether conscious beings could\n exist in a world\u2014if such a world were possible at all\u2014where the\n struggle for existence was unknown; for it is the struggle for\n existence that presents the first and most imperative problems\n to living and feeling beings.\u201d\n\nSpirit or the elementary basis of consciousness considered as a\nquantity, would on this supposition remain the same, but the forms of\nits manifestations would change. There would be more or less straining\nof spirit and accordingly more or less manifestation of consciousness.\nOr to formulate it in one sentence, we would have to postulate _the\nconservation of spirit_.\n\nSuch a supposition or some similar supposition if tolerable would\nbring our ideas into some sort of accord with scientific customs of\nexplanation, and would extricate our minds from that state of utter\nstultification into which they are cast whenever they are confronted with\nthe relations of body and mind.\n\n FRANCIS C. RUSSELL.\n\n\n\n\nON CRIMINAL SUGGESTION.\n\n\nA widely known criminal trial has brought before thoughtful minds, on\nboth sides of the water, this question, viz.: Whether a subject in a\nhypnotic condition possesses any free will, and whether in such a state,\nit is possible to transform him into a criminal or at least, for the time\nbeing into becoming an accomplice in crime! It is not the first time\nthat this question has been agitated; indeed at the very beginning of\nMesmerism, as it was then called, this idea was brought forward.\n\nIt was clearly formulated by Dr. Charpignon, whose own opinion\nnevertheless is, that it was \u201cmuch easier to restore moral rectitude to a\nsomnambulist who had fallen therefrom, than to pervert the integrity of\ncharacter of a woman of high moral standing.\u201d In 1866 Dr. Li\u00e9beault, in\nhis work on, \u201cSleep and Kindred States of Being,\u201d of which at that time\nthere were but six copies sold, coincides entirely with this opinion. The\npassage is too noticeable, not to be quoted in its entirety. (P. 524.)\n\n \u201cWe may postulate, as a first principle, that a subject during\n the state of magnetic sleep, is at the mercy of the hypnotiser.\n I have made experiments that have confirmed me in this opinion;\n I have many a time, removed the hats of such persons, searched\n their pockets, drawn off the rings from their fingers, untied\n their shoes, etc., ... without their having noticed the action\n at all, or having made the least resistance, the isolation into\n which I had thrown them, being the cause of this absence of all\n consciousness....\n\n \u201cHow very grave, the possibilities, are which may ensue from\n this state of being, we may readily conceive! What I have\n advanced here, is the result of certain experiments which I\n made upon a young girl, who, while being very intelligent in\n her natural waking condition, became during hypnotic sleep the\n most cross-grained and wilful person I had ever had to deal\n with. Nevertheless I always ended by mastering her will. I was\n able to excite in her mind the most criminal resolves; I roused\n her passions to a high degree. I was able to cause her to fall\n into a violent rage with a person, to fly out upon her with a\n knife in her hand; having displaced in her mind the sentiment\n of friendship, still armed with that instrument, I sent her to\n stab her best friend, whom I told her she saw in front of her;\n she obeyed, the knife burying itself in the wall opposite. I\n almost prevailed upon another young girl, who was however less\n under the influence, to kill her own mother, and though she\n wept, she actually prepared to do the deed.\n\n \u201cAfter all, it has been known for a fact, that a man, who, up\n to that moment, was of sound mind, hearing a voice continually\n repeating: \u2018Kill your wife. Kill your children\u2019\u2014has obeyed this\n command, incited thereto by an irresistible impulse; and shall\n the hypnotic subject already predisposed to hallucination,\n escape this same involuntary impulse? I am firmly convinced,\n after having made many other experiments, that a subject to\n whom is suggested the commission of any bad action, will carry\n out the crime after his awakening, by reason of what has\n now become in him a fixed idea. The most moral will become\n vitiated, the highest-minded perverted.\n\n \u201cIf it has already been found possible to reform a woman\n of loose morals and bring her to abandon entirely her evil\n courses, why cannot the reverse be effected and by the same\n means? It would be in the power of the magnetiser to suggest to\n his subject, not only to become a tale-bearer, a calumniator,\n a thief, dissolute, etc., at some period subsequent to the\n magnetic sleep, but, he might use him, for example, as the\n instrument of his personal vengeance and the poor dreamer,\n unmindful of the primary incitement to the criminal action,\n would commit on another\u2019s account, instead of on his own, the\n evil deed, prompted and forced on thereto, by the irresistible\n suggestion and will, imposed upon him by another person. And\n when the crime shall have been consummated, where shall he find\n the medical jurist, who can hold up to Justice, the torch which\n is to throw the Light of Truth upon the act, and challenge the\n innocency of a man, who, up to the moment of the crime never\n exhibited the slightest sign of insanity, had shown every mark\n of a sound mind and yet, when convicted of the dreadful deed,\n states with every apparent sign of good faith, that he has\n committed it of his own accord? And who can tell whether such\n cases have not already taken place.\u201d\n\nThese momentous words passed unnoticed. At that time, the world did not\nbelieve in Hypnotism. M. M. Richot and Charcot restored it to a place\nof honor. The School of the Salp\u00eatri\u00e8re made its advent, and saw in\nHypnotism a pathological condition. Simultaneously with this school of\nthought, there arose the rival one at Nancy, which following its leader,\nDr. Li\u00e9beault, saw in hypnotism, only a psychological phenomenon. One of\nthe masters in this school, M. Li\u00e9geois, Professor of the Faculty of Law,\nin 1884, in his pamphlet on \u201cHypnotic Suggestion, in relation to Civil\nand Criminal Law\u201d also propounded to the public this idea of criminal\nsuggestion.\n\nM. Li\u00e9geois, like M. Li\u00e9beault, did not confine himself merely to theory.\nHe went on to demonstrate and prove his thesis by conclusive experiments.\n\nStrange to say, the Salp\u00eatri\u00e8re took issue on this point, adopting and\ndefending the opposite opinion.\n\nI would now ask permission to raise my own voice in this debate, and I am\nthe more emboldened so to do, inasmuch as my own personal observations\nand the study which I have brought to bear on this matter, have caused me\nto pass, so to speak, from one rival camp to the other. The thesis upheld\nby the School at Nancy, while it found in me at first an adherent, finds\nme to-day an adversary.\n\nJust a word about myself to the readers of _The Monist_.\n\nI have always been a believer in Magnetism. At the outset, and until\ntowards 1875, merely on the faith of books, later, because I had been\npresent at one or two more or less public exhibitions. And it appears\nsingular enough, that though thus imperfectly trained in the knowledge\nof it, I should have explained, as I did in 1869, the ecstasies and\nthe stigmata of the celebrated Louise Lateau, as coming simply from\nauto-suggestion; and that even to-day, there should be neither jot nor\ntittle to subtract from what I then wrote, regarding it.\n\nI only began practising magnetism at the commencement of 1886. I was\nreturning from a visit to the Salp\u00eatri\u00e8re whither I had been attracted by\nmy doubts on this very transference of thought and from which I returned\nwith my doubts intensified. I have already recounted, in a series of\narticles, that appeared in less than a year in the _Revue Philosophique_\n(\u201cUpon Memory in Hypnotic Subjects\u201d; \u201cOn the influence of Imitation\nand Education in Somnambulism, as exhibited in the so-called hypnotic\nsleep\u201d; etc.) my experiences, observations, and inductions. Not to speak\nof my contributions to the Magazines, and notably to the _Revue de\nl\u2019Hypnotisme_, I introduced hypnotism into the science course of the\nRoyal Academy of Belgium by means of two works. One, on the \u201cOrigin,\u201d the\nother on the \u201cExtent of the Curative Effects of Hypnotism\u201d (1887-1890).\nBesides many other polemical writings in favor of the liberty of holding\npublic exhibitions (\u201cLetters to M. Chiriar, Representative,\u201d 1888.\n\u201cMagnetisers and Physicians,\u201d 1890). I related at length what M. Charcot\nand his pupils had shown me in Paris, as well as what M. M. Li\u00e9beault,\nBernheim, and Li\u00e9geois, had let me witness at Nancy (\u201cA Visit to the\nSalp\u00eatri\u00e8re,\u201d 1886\u2014\u201cA Visit to the School at Nancy,\u201d 1889).\n\nAt the time then, that I took upon myself to hypnotise, I firmly believed\nthat the subject became the property of the magnetiser; passing over,\nas of no importance, the manifest resistances that I met with at every\npoint and in every form on the part of subjects, who, in all other\nrespects I found perfectly adapted to such experiments; as for instance,\none who permitted his tongue to be pierced with a large darning needle\nby my sceptical colleague, Dr. Masius; and to be burned several times,\nboth with a red hot iron and by thermocautery, by my colleague, the\nsurgeon Von Winiwarter, both these experiments having reference to the\ncurative effects of hypnotism. Thus, adhering entirely to the belief\nof M. M. Li\u00e9beault and Beaunis, at the close of 1886 (\u201cA Visit to the\nSalp\u00eatri\u00e8re\u201d) I wrote these words:\n\n \u201cM. Beaunis\u2019s statement is perfectly exact. The somnambulist,\n in the hands of the hypnotiser, is less than the _corpse_,\n which the perfect disciple of Loyola should resemble. He is a\n slave, with no will other than that of his ruler, and in order\n to fulfil the commands laid upon him, he will push precaution,\n prudence, cunning, dissimulation and falsehood, to their\n extremest limits. He will open and shut doors noiselessly, walk\n in his stockings; will listen and watch, with what keen sight,\n what acute hearing! He will remember anything and everything\n you want him to, will forget all you desire him to forget. He\n will, in good faith, accuse a perfectly innocent man before a\n Court of justice. He will have seen everything, that in reality\n he has never seen, if you command him so to do; he will have\n heard, what he never could have heard and done everything that\n he never could have done. He will swear by his Household Gods,\n that he has acted throughout, of his own free will, without any\n external pressure, will invent motives if need be, and will\n completely protect and cover his hypnotiser.\n\n \u201cTheoretically, such a power is the most dangerous thing on the\n face of the earth! I believe though, that practically, with the\n exception of what might relate to physical or moral abuses or\n tampering with testamentary wills, there is actually little or\n no danger. It appears to me the fear of this has been unduly\n exaggerated.\u201d\n\nIn a foot-note of mine, while mentioning with highest praise the memoir\nof M. Li\u00e9geois, I added further: \u201cI do not express any alarm that I\ncannot show a good reason for.\u201d Among other reasons, I pondered on the\ndifficulty, say rather, the impossibility there is, of obtaining from the\nsubject an absolute abnegation of will-power, whilst at the same time we\nallow him to retain the necessary free will to cope with any unforeseen\naccidents which might occur to compromise the fulfilment of the thought\nand action suggested.\n\nTwo or three months later I should not have expressed myself thus; and\nhence the remarks that accompany the experiments related in my articles\non Hypnotic Consciousness, _Revue Philosophique_, Feb., March, 1887,\nexperiments which took place about a year previous to this (see the\nnote to the contributed articles, Feb. 1887, p. 119). It may there be\nnoticed that my assent is tempered by certain marked reservations. I\nwas even then opposing practice to theory, i. e. I narrowed down these\napprehensions of danger to two legitimate causes of alarm, viz. attempts\nagainst morals, and tampering with testamentary wills.\n\nUpon these two points I am still of the same opinion, with this\nexception, that what I then feared probable, I now regard as exceedingly\nproblematic. I mean to say, that a villain who was contemplating the\nperpetration of a crime, would not easily find an accomplice in a subject\nof good moral standing. And in any case, I still think as I thought then,\nthat such an accomplice would not only be inapt, but compromising. It\nis this latter point, I wish to demonstrate to you, by the following\ncriticism upon an experiment never before published.\n\nAt the end of May, of last year, I was passing through Nancy with some\nfriends, among whom was Dr. L. Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ricq, Professor of Physiology at the\nUniversity of Li\u00e8ge. We were spending the evening at M. Beaunis\u2019s house\ntogether with M. M. Li\u00e9beault, Bernheim, and Li\u00e9geois. Naturally this\nquestion of Criminal Suggestion came upon the _tapis_ and was discussed\nin all its phases, without advancing one step towards its solution. We\nmade an engagement to meet at the hospital on the following day, where M.\nBernheim invited me to be present at an experiment, which he maintained\nwould convince me. I will relate at length the occurrence, for in such\ncases, the slightest details may acquire very great importance.\n\nM. Bernheim threw into the magnetic sleep a great, tall fellow, quite\neasily influenced, and whose illness did not prevent him from walking\nabout in the ward.\n\n\u201cPresently, when you have waked up, you will go and steal an orange from\nthe patient that you see over there, in that bed opposite. Remember that\nwhat you are going to do is very wrong; it is strictly forbidden by\nhonesty and by the law, and you will run the risk of being punished.\u201d\nThe man is waked. He appears to be collecting his thoughts. He rubs his\nforehead, he is visibly meditating something.\n\n\u201cWhat is the matter with you? What are you thinking about?\u201d I ask him.\n\n\u201cNothing.\u201d\n\n\u201cYou seem preoccupied.\u201d\n\n\u201cWell, yes, I have to do something.\u201d\n\n\u201cWhat?\u201d\n\n\u201cI am not obliged to render you an account of my actions.\u201d\n\n\u201cAh! one would almost say you were meditating some mischief, where are\nyou going?\u201d\n\n\u201cThat\u2019s no business of yours.\u201d\n\n\u201cOh! very well then, I shall watch you and follow you.\u201d\n\nI follow him; he walks towards his companion\u2019s bed, glances at the\norange, then leaning up against the window, he calls me to admire some\ncherries growing on a potted plant. He keeps quite still. Why? Simply\nbecause I had told him that I intended to watch him, _otherwise my\npresence would not have troubled him in the least_. During this time, M.\nBernheim had acquainted the other patient with the intended proceeding,\nhe nevertheless having heard the whole transaction. \u201cI do not think\nhe will do it,\u201d said he to the Doctor, \u201che is one of my mates and he\nwouldn\u2019t steal from me.\u201d I walk away and join the group of persons\npresent. I say to M. Beaunis, that this experiment will prove nothing,\nhe answers me by a gesture of surprise. The subject, as soon as he sees\nme go away and _thinks that I am not watching him any more_, stretches\nout his hand, seizes the orange that is behind his mate\u2019s pillow, _the\nlatter meanwhile looking full at him_. A score for M. Bernheim, but one\nalso for M. Delb\u0153uf! I should need twenty pages at least of commentary on\nthis experiment. But I shall only allow myself to point out the essential\npoints.\n\nThis hypnotised subject then, or to speak more correctly, this man\nto whom a thought has been suggested, after I had warned him that I\nwas watching him, and from whom I never took my eye, goes with the\nunerringness, so to speak, \u201cof the falling stone,\u201d to carry out the\nsuggested action, not however without a certain distrust of me, and\nthis only, because he had been forewarned. And moreover in his dim\nconsciousness, it is I alone, whom he is watching in that clumsy fashion,\nin order to seize upon some momentary forgetfulness on my part. He\nhas never noticed at all, that his mate is intently watching him and\nfollowing his every movement with open eyes; so he steals the orange\nfrom under his very nose! Let us not forget that it was M. Bernheim\nthe house physician, who suggested to him to take the orange. But M.\nFr\u00e9d\u00e9ricq himself would equally well have fulfilled that command, even\npreceded as it was by the little homily, recorded above. Why should he\nhave disobliged M. Bernheim? But indeed, the logic of my opponents is\nvery weak. If, say they, a somnambulist resists criminal suggestion, it\nis because he is not a susceptible subject, or, that the experiment has\nbeen ill conducted, or, that the suggestion has not been strong enough.\nAt that rate, it is useless to continue experimenting, if failure is\nalways to be explained away. On my side, I might with equal reason,\nargue, that they had been dealing with some licentious mind, as yet all\nunknowing its inner self, or with a born criminal or a latent thief; and\nthough I object to this kind of argument, it would often prove to be more\nlegitimate reasoning than theirs. Who among us is absolutely virtuous?\nHow many actions which the law calls criminal have we committed, or might\nwe commit, under the pressure of circumstances, without a shadow of\nremorse? But let us further examine this experiment.\n\nOur subject then put the orange in his trousers\u2019 pocket which stuck\nout very noticeably. This man might be a criminal, but he was not a\ndissembler. Looking him straight in the face I said: \u201cWhat have you been\ndoing?\u201d\n\n\u201cNothing, I have just done my errand.\u201d\n\n\u201cYou have stolen!\u201d\n\n\u201cWhat nonsense!\u201d\n\n\u201cWhat have you got in your pocket?\u201d\n\n\u201cNothing\u201d (notice the absurdity of this reply).\n\n\u201cWhat do you mean?\u201d\n\n\u201cNothing!\u201d\n\n\u201cWhat do you call that?\u201d\n\n\u201cWhy! it\u2019s an orange! it\u2019s a very fine orange! _Ma foi!_ I can\u2019t imagine\nhow it came there!\u201d\n\nM. Bernheim intervenes: \u201cYou took it from a fellow-patient, from a\ncomrade! That was very wrong.\u201d\n\n\u201cYes, that\u2019s so, but I wanted it. Look! did you ever see such a fine\norange? I took a fancy to it and I determined to have it. Besides, _he\nhadn\u2019t seen it_(!) It\u2019s not stealing when it isn\u2019t missed.\u201d\n\nThen I asked: \u201cWhat is that you said?\u201d\n\n\u201cWhy, yes, it is not stealing to take what nobody misses,\u201d answers he,\nwith a scarce perceptible cunning and significant wink.\n\nA few minutes later, after we had ceased noticing him, he came up to M.\nFr\u00e9d\u00e9ricq of his own accord laughingly told him that he was in the habit\nof abstracting tobacco from his companions on this same ground, that if\nthey never missed it, it was not stealing. \u201cIt is all in fun, you know!\u201d\n\nI conclude therefore, that this subject had in him latent tendencies to\ntheft, or if you prefer it, to pilfering. And dare any of us, honestly\nconfess to himself that we have not, deep down in ourselves, the germs\nof any such vices? Who among the most upright of us, does not consider\nhimself perfectly entitled to defraud the government, or to get the\nbetter of a Railway Company, or quietly to appropriate an object which he\nmay casually find?\n\nM. Li\u00e9geois will very likely say to me: \u201cWe will grant that this\nexperiment has not fulfilled the desired requirements; the subject has\nnot very high moral qualities, and he juggled a little. But here now, are\nsome experiments absolutely unimpeachable.\u201d Thereupon M. Li\u00e9geois relates\nthe histories of Miss E..., of N..., of Mme. G..., and of Mme. C... Here\nare the facts as collated by him in the Gouffe trial.\n\n_First narrative._ M. Li\u00e9geois believed that he had produced in Miss E...\nsuch absolute automatism, so complete an annihilation of moral sense and\nof all liberty of action, that he caused her, without moving a muscle, to\nplace the muzzle of a revolver close to her mother and fire upon her. The\nyouthful criminal appeared completely awake and far calmer than were the\nwitnesses of this scene. (Take notice of this.) Her mother, immediately\nreproaching her and telling her that she might have killed her, Miss\nE... answers smiling, with a great deal of common sense: \u201cI have not\nkilled you, since you are speaking to me now.\u201d\u2014\u201cIs any one likely to\nbelieve that this is merely pretence and acting,\u201d adds M. Li\u00e9geois, \u201cthat\na daughter will amuse herself by firing at her mother with a revolver,\n_which she does not know is not loaded_, simply to deceive the public?\u201d\n\nWell, shall I say it? The hypothesis of simulation, the simulation which\nis practised in the hypnotic state appears to me to be the only plausible\nexplanation. The calm, smiling attitude of Miss E... is an unanswerable\nproof of this. I have no doubt that if in a dream she had seen herself\nfiring at her mother, she would have suffered as in a terrible nightmare.\n\nLately, it was in the beginning of January, I dreamed I was present at\na sale of paintings. Among others exposed for sale, there was a long\npicture, nineteen or twenty feet high and less than three feet wide,\nrepresenting the assumption of some saint. Hardly had the auctioneer\nmentioned the price, 6,000 francs, than I made a sign of assent. It is\nknocked down to me. I start for home with my purchase, but on the way I\nam seized with remorse. Where shall I hang the religious picture? And\neven if I find a place for it on the staircase what will it look like in\nmy house, with its old black frame and its extraordinary dimensions? And\nwhat a price to have paid, at such a moment when the house bills are\npouring in! In the midst of these reflections, I woke up, my heart was\nbeating tumultuously and during the remainder of the night I continued\nunder the most disagreeable impressions. In spite of my knowing that I\nwas awake and reasoning with myself, congratulating myself that it was\nnothing but a dream, the enormity of my absurd action weighed upon my\nmind and I kept continually dreading the reproaches of my family, when\nthey should learn the stupid bargain I had made. How widely different\nis this mental distress from the placid, smiling condition of Miss E...\nand how naturally one is brought to suppose that during the hypnotic\nstate the subject is not even under the sway of the ordinary illusions of\ndreamland.\n\nM. Li\u00e9geois affirms that Miss E... _was not aware that the pistol was\nnot loaded_. I do not believe it. Upon what grounds are we to infer that\na somnambulist is an imbecile? You and I, and everybody would easily\nsurmise that M. Li\u00e9geois\u2019s revolver was not loaded! Then why should not\nMiss E... surmise the same? Is it not for the very reason that he handed\nit to her, to fire at her mother, that she would opine as much? Might\nshe not have gathered this from the attitude of the spectators, full of\nexpectancy unmixed by any apprehension? and might she not have wished to\nastonish them by her docility and _sang-froid_? All sorts of suppositions\nare both rational and possible. Besides all this, somnambulists who\nare absorbed in the work in hand, generally speaking, show a quicker\nand surer perspicuity; their sensibilities are finer, their quickness,\ntheir memory, overstep the ordinary limits as exhibited in their normal\nstate. Do we not hear of scholars, who in the hypnotic sleep, learn their\nlessons in a very short time and write their essays admirably? I have\nrecorded in the _Revue Philosophique_, August, 1886, some facts about a\nsubject, upon whom I experimented before one of my classes.\n\n \u201cThe experiment I am about to give an account of might serve\n very well as the explanation of many a miracle. B.[55] is in\n the hypnotic sleep. We wish to give him some peculiar order,\n which he shall execute, after he is awake, at a special\n signal. The signal is to be a knock given by me on the desk;\n the action, to carry a glass of water (a carafe of water\n and glass being on a chair) to the student Eucher. He does\n not know any of the fifteen students present, nor has he yet\n heard their names. The pupils take their places, without any\n special order, some standing, some sitting. B. is awakened.\n We chat a little. I give the signal. B. rises, fills a glass,\n and _without the slightest sign of hesitation_, carries it\n to the student mentioned before, who was sitting on one of\n the back benches, beside a fellow student. We looked at each\n other with stupefaction. The intention of the experiment had\n been, to see how he would obey an obscure command. There\n were in my audience, certain persons, with leanings toward\n belief in second-sight. This result seemed to overthrow all my\n convictions. I again throw him into the sleep, and I command\n him to carry a glass of water to the student G\u00e9rard; we are\n all standing, awaiting with impatient curiosity what will take\n place. B. fills the glass and this time sends a questioning\n look over all the spectators, presents the glass first to one,\n then to another, and finally I had to point out the student\n G\u00e9rard, to whom he brought the water and made him drink it. I\n again put him to sleep, and asked him to whom he carried the\n first glass of water. To M. Eucher\u2014Did you know him? No\u2014How did\n you recognise him?\u2014By his attitude, he looked as if he wanted\n to hide away.\u201d\n\nAnd this is how the mystery was solved. We had unconsciously prepared\nthe scene, and it was this preparation which betrayed us. But it is none\nthe less a remarkable example of the perspicuity shown by somnambulists.\nThis goes to prove that hypnosis, instead of dulling the understanding,\nsharpens it.\n\nThe second of M. Li\u00e9geois\u2019s experiments appears to me quite as open to\nsuspicion, and exactly for the same reasons.\n\n \u201cI offered N. a white powder, of the nature of which he is\n ignorant; I said to him: \u2018Pay great attention to what I am\n about to tell you. This paper contains arsenic. You will go\n presently to such a street to your Aunt\u2019s Mme. M. _who is here\n now_. You will take a glass of water, carefully dissolve the\n arsenic in it and then you will offer it to your Aunt.\u2019 \u2018Yes\n Sir\u2019\u2014That evening I received the following note from Mme. M.:\n \u2018Mme. M. begs leave to inform M. Li\u00e9geois that the experiment\n succeeded perfectly. Her nephew offered her the poison.\u2019 The\n criminal remembered nothing about it, and it was very difficult\n to persuade him that he had indeed wished to poison an Aunt for\n whom he had a deep affection. The automatism had been complete.\u201d\n\nI cannot help seeing here an erroneous line of reasoning. They\nconclude, from the absence of all remembrance, that the somnambulist\nis an automaton, and from this they go on to deduce that he swallows\neverything that is said to him. But, since he listens to the voice of\nhis hypnotiser; since he knows that to accomplish the behest, he must\ndo things that have not been expressly pointed out, though they are\nunderstood in the execution of the deed:\u2014such as to get the water from a\nwell or pump\u2014why do they not allow that he is able also to reflect upon\nthe nature of the deed which he is told to do? Why is it that N..., who\nis aware that he is being used in an experiment, cannot say to himself\nduring his hypnotic state, that this is only an experiment, that the\npaper does not contain arsenic, that M. Li\u00e9geois never would really want\nhim to poison his aunt, _his aunt who is present at the time, and who\nhears every word_?\n\nI repeat again, a hypnotic subject is not an idiot\u2014quite the reverse. All\nthe precaution which M. Li\u00e9geois takes to render the experiments reliable\nand conclusive, turns against the proof desired. Can you imagine the\npoisoner, Dr. Castaing, saying to his servant before Hypolite Ballet,\nwhom he intended to kill, \u201cHere is some poisoned wine, you will presently\ngive it to the sick man, whom you see over there in that bed.\u201d If he had\ndone this, he would not have been condemned to lose his head, but they\nwould simply have shut him up in a lunatic asylum. And, as far as that\ngoes, the servant might easily, without any suspicion being attached to\nthe action, have given the poison to Hypolite Ballet, and the latter have\ndrunk it.\n\nBut we have dallied long enough over these absurd suppositions. Let us\npass on now to the third narrative:\n\nM. Li\u00e9geois caused Mme. G... to fire at M. P..., an ex-magistrate. In\norder to show clearly that the revolver was loaded, M. Li\u00e9geois fired a\nshot in the garden and came in, showing a piece of card-board, through\nwhich the ball had passed. \u201cWith absolute unconsciousness and perfect\ndocility Mme. G... advances to M. P... and fires. Being questioned\non the spot by the Chief Magistrate (who was present at the _s\u00e9ance_)\nshe avows the crime with entire indifference. She has killed M. P...\n_because he was not pleasing to her_(!) They can arrest her; she knows\nquite well what awaits her. If they take away her life, she will pass\ninto the other world like her victim, whom she sees stretched out, and\nbathed in his own blood. They ask her whether it was not I who suggested\nto her the idea of the murder. She denies it, and says she did it\nspontaneously; that she alone is guilty; she is resigned to her fate, she\nwill accept without complaint the consequences of her deed.\u201d\n\nThe more I meditate to-day upon these experiments, the less they appear\nto me to prove what it is desired they should. This perfect tranquillity\nof Mme. G..., her generosity in not inculpating M. Li\u00e9geois; her\nresignation to the fate that awaits her, establish entirely the fact that\nshe is present in mind and knowledge of events; and just because of this\nvery attitude, that she possesses her full presence of mind. She never\ndreamed for an instant that she would really kill M. P.... She plays\nher part conscientiously, she faithfully recites a lesson which she has\nlearned by heart and with which she intermingles side play of her own,\nchildish tricks, as for instance, saying that _her victim had displeased\nher_. Let us recall to mind the patient who stole an orange, _because it\nwas a fine one_. That Mme. G.... sees M. P.... bathed in his own blood,\nis more than doubtful. I can produce numberless proofs of facts that go\nto prove that fictitious somnambulists are not dupes of the illusions\nsuggested to them; their calmness proves this. That it is possible to\nmake them commit an action dangerous to themselves or to others, I am not\nprepared to deny. I will explain myself later upon this point. But from\nthis state, to that of criminal participation, there is an incalculable\ndistance.\n\nThat the somnambulist repeats a lesson that he has learned, is shown\nforth by M. Li\u00e9geois\u2019s fourth narrative.\n\n \u201cMme. C.... was to give some arsenic in a liquid to M. D....\n who was thirsty. But M. D.... asked a question that I had not\n foreseen; he asked what was in the glass. With a frankness that\n precluded all idea of simulation Mme. C.... answered \u2018Arsenic.\u2019\n\n \u201cI was then obliged to amend my suggestion, and I said: \u2018If you\n are asked what is in the glass, say it is sweetened water.\u2019\n\n \u201cMme. C.... answered the question the second time, \u2018Sweetened\n water.\u2019\n\n \u201cVery courageously M. D.... swallowed the supposed poison.\n Questioned by the Chief Magistrate Mme. C. remembers nothing;\n she had seen nothing, done nothing, given no drink to any one.\n She does not know what they are talking about.\u201d\n\nAgain all this is proof to me, that Mme. C. feels that she is being told\nto perform an innocent action. It would have been interesting to have\nawakened her in the middle of the act, to see whether she would have\nremembered her thoughts, just at the moment when she was giving the\ndrink to M. D.... I am not sure but that she would have answered like\nMiss E... that she had no doubt the poison was imaginary, and the scene\nprearranged.\n\nWe have seen M. D... ask an unforeseen question, which upset the carrying\nout of the crime. We have witnessed M. Bernheim\u2019s patient steal an orange\nunder the nose of its proprietor, who was looking at him. Admitting,\ntherefore, that all had been foreseen, that M. Li\u00e9geois had warned\nMme. C... of all the possible questions that might be put to her; that\nM. Bernheim had strongly recommended his subject to commit his theft\nsecretly, and that every possible detail had been perfectly carried\nout\u2014should we have even then a faithful transcript of a crime? Can we\nhave the unerring certitude from these occurrences, that a subject in the\nhypnotic sleep, a bona fide somnambulist will allow himself to be used as\nan accomplice by a veritable criminal?\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn the preceding paragraphs, I carefully analysed the slightest details\ninvalidating experiments, in which the hypnotic subject acts the part\nof a criminal, in a fictitious crime. I was able to show, that in all\nthese tests, there had been certain suspicious traits suggesting doubt\nas to the complete illusion of the actor therein, and I finally added:\nSupposing that everything had worked smoothly, i. e. that everything had\nbeen foreseen and that the subject had not been tripped up anywhere, are\nwe authorised in maintaining that a subject thus far unimpeachable as\nregards a fictitious crime, would accomplish this same deed in reality? I\nanswer, No.\n\nIn order to justify this denial, it will be necessary for us to enter\ninto the Psychology of Hypnosis.\n\nA person in the hypnotic sleep, as well as in the natural sleep, is not\nso absolutely withdrawn from the real world about him as is generally\nsupposed. The hypnotic subject even less so, than the sleeper, for the\nformer remains in intelligent communication with his magnetiser. If the\nlatter tells him to take a book from a table upon which is an inkstand,\nsome boxes, a statuette, he will pick up the book and not any of the\nother objects. If he is enjoined to walk straight before him in a room\nencumbered with chairs he will manage to avoid them, and even if the\nillusion is pushed further he may knock up against them, but the action\nwill be done quite cautiously. And this is why, in public s\u00e9ances, he\nnever hurts himself, in spite of the wildness and apparent excitement of\nhis movements. This is also the reason, that in experiments intended to\ndemonstrate this absolute automatism, the preparation for the proposed\ncrime, the attitude of the spectators, while the subject is carrying out\nhis part, the integrity of the person who is suggesting the action, the\ncalmness of the intended victim; all these things, render the suggestion\nless illusive than even an ordinary dream would be.\n\nM. Li\u00e9geois asks this question at the conclusion of his first narrative:\n\u201cWhere is the spectator, who could believe that this scene was only a\nmelodrama with clever acting; and that a daughter for her amusement,\nand solely to deceive an audience, would fire an unloaded revolver at\nher mother?\u201d To this I answer: And why should she not play her part in\nthis melodrama, when she sees M. Li\u00e9geois devise it, her mother lend her\nco-operation, and the audience watch it with curiosity and interest?\n\nHere again we find the same fallacy in the argument: Because a subject\ndoes not reveal what is going on within himself, and only puts into\nvisible speech what is suggested to him, it is taken for granted that he\nis going through a mental process identical with that of his magnetiser.\nBut allow me to ask in my turn: Will it be easily credited, that a\ndaughter, would, deliberately and without a trace of feeling, shoot at\nher mother, unless, she fully believed the action would have no serious\nconsequences, and that the person who had suggested this impious deed,\nwas only requiring her to act a part?\n\nHypnotic subjects do not take long to realise that they are being used\nas tests in experiments. Some are always gracious in responding to them,\nmany end by refusing to lend themselves to be used in such fashion,\nespecially in public s\u00e9ances. All these details go far to prove that in\nhypnosis, the subjects retain, at least a partial independence.\n\nIf a sleeper, who dreamed he was murdering his mother, should behold\nher terrified, beseeching, invoking the pity of her son, calling for\nhelp to the horrified spectators, he would feel that he was induced\nto commit this deed by some sort of motive, which, absurd or unlikely\nthough it might be, would still be the controlling power; in a word, the\ndream would be in reality a kind of incoherent and unreal drama, though\ncomposed of very real elements, in which horror would play a very present\npart. But if he should see his ostensible victim smiling and conversing\nwith him amidst a company animated only by a sentiment of curiosity, he\nmight well suspect, even in his sleep, that what he sees and what he\nis doing, is a pure delusion. And this is exactly what he would say to\nhimself, should it come into his head to fire upon a _magistrate_, and\nfor the reason _that his looks displeased him_.\n\nThese prearranged scenes fail in verisimilitude and no more deceive the\nactors in them, than they do the spectators or the author.\n\nTo this you may object: But, if the pistol had been loaded, Miss E. would\nhave shot her mother! This rests upon the supposition that the mother and\nthe spectators, still believed it to be unloaded, otherwise, their terror\nalone, would have been quite sufficient to call back the subject to the\nreality. And even with this assumption, this murder-test would have borne\na greater resemblance to a simple homicide from imprudence. By this I\nmean to say, that so far as the spectators, the victim, and the assassin\nwere concerned, the act would not have been changed in its character,\nsimply because the magnetiser, had by mistake, given a loaded instead of\nan unloaded pistol to the subject. I need hardly remark that a real crime\nwould never be perpetrated in this manner.\n\nThoroughly convinced though I was, of the impossibility of making\nexperiments that would entirely fathom this question, circumstances\nnevertheless, allowed me once more to make a test which is well adapted\nto show that it is not as easy as some may think, to transform an\nhypnotic subject into a murderous automaton.\n\nJ... is that excellent somnambulist to whom my experiments have given a\ncertain notoriety. It is she together with her sister, whom I made use\nof in my studies on \u201cMemory in Hypnosis,\u201d on \u201cImitation,\u201d and \u201cHypnotic\nConsciousness.\u201d She it is, who three several times allowed herself to be\nexperimented upon by blistering on corresponding parts of the body; and\nnotably in one case where in accordance with suggestion no inflammation\ntook place.[56] She is tall, robust, intelligent, industrious, healthy.\nShe is now married and has had a child. The _accouchement_ took place in\nthe hypnotic sleep. The case being in the hands of M. Fraipont, Professor\nof Obstetrics in the University of Li\u00e8ge; and never was the power of\nhypnotism more remarkably exhibited.[57] In the case of this patient\nthere remained no trace of remembrance whatever, after awakening.\n\nI have gone into these details merely to show the reader that no\nbetter subject could have been found for my purpose. I have in another\nplace (see _Revue Philosophique_, article on \u201cHypnotic Consciousness\u201d)\npointed out certain traits in her case, which at my _d\u00e9but_, were\nstrongly calculated to make me a believer in the absolute servility of\nthe hypnotic subject; traits which I shall subsequently recall to your\nattention and comment upon.\n\nTo judge more fairly of the value of the experiment, I must further\nstate, that J. is both resolute and courageous. During several summers\nshe remained in the country in the environs of Seraing in attendance upon\nmy wife who was in ill-health, and in whose room she slept. After the\nsummer vacation it often happened that she spent the whole night alone\nwith her. At the head of the bed hung a six-barrelled revolver, loaded; a\nprecaution that we had taken on account of the well-known strikes which\ntook place in 1886, amongst the workmen of the numerous factories in our\nneighborhood.\n\nIn the summer of 1887 I happened to be absent. A man came one night,\nprowling round the garden and fumbling at the lock of the door, which he\neven tried to force. The barking of the dogs wakened J., she opened the\nwindow, perceived the man, took the revolver and went down into the hall\nwatching for the moment in which to fire at the nocturnal visitor. The\nman hearing the noise slipped away with celerity. And the same year that\nthis occurrence took place, J. slept on the first floor with her loaded\nrevolver hanging on a nail beside her bed.\n\nThe 24th Feb. 1888, without communicating my intentions to anybody\nexcept to my daughter, and that only at the very moment of beginning the\nexperiment, I discharged the revolver. It was six o\u2019clock in the evening.\nA young lady, (herself an hypnotic subject,) and my daughter, were seated\nat a table, cutting out articles from a newspaper, which they afterwards\ntied up in bundles. I called J. and at the moment she opened the door, I\nhypnotised her by a motion. I said to her in an agitated tone\u2014\u201cHere are\nsome thieves, who are carrying off papers.\u201d\u2014J. came quickly forward and\nturning towards me said: \u201cNo sir, they are playing with them\u2014Why sure\nenough they are taking them.\u201d Then she walked resolutely up to them and\ntore the papers out of their hands, put them on the table in front of her\nand in an imperious tone said: \u201cDon\u2019t you touch them any more.\u201d\n\nI\u2014\u201cYou are never going to let those knaves remain in the house\u2014run and\nfetch the revolver\u201d (it was in the adjoining room). J. ran without\nhesitation. She returned holding the weapon in her hand and stood on the\nthreshold. \u201cFire,\u201d cried I.\n\n\u201cSir, we must not kill them.\u201d\n\n\u201cThieves? Why certainly!\u201d\n\n\u201cNo sir! I will not kill them.\u201d\n\n\u201cYou must.\u201d\n\n\u201cI won\u2019t do it.\u201d And she walked backwards still holding the revolver, I\nfollowing her and energetically reiterating my command. \u201cI won\u2019t. I won\u2019t\ndo it. I will not murder.\u201d She then placed the revolver on the floor but\n_cautiously_. She continued to go backwards, I, meanwhile insisting and\nfollowing her. \u201cI will not do it.\u201d\u2014Having come to a dead stand in the\ncorner of the room, she repulsed me violently and I thought it prudent to\nawaken her, upon which she came to herself smiling in her usual pleasant\nmanner. She remembered, however, nothing whatever, although at the sight\nof the revolver lying on the floor, she seemed to have a kind of vague\nrecollection. She did not seem at all discomposed in manner. If this\nscene had taken place in a dream, she would certainly have exhibited more\nexcitement.\n\nThis is what we may term conclusive evidence, that is to say if ever\nnegative evidence can be called so. Let us comment now upon these facts.\n\nIt will be noticed that J. is not the dupe of the hallucination to which\nshe has been subjected. She does not take either of the young ladies\nfor thieves, nor the newspapers for valuable papers. Her first answer\nis very significant\u2014\u201cNo sir, they are playing with them.\u201d Besides which\nher expression, her attitude, the manner in which she looked at the\ntwo reputed thieves, and tore the newspapers out of their hands, had\nsomething so keenly observant, so prepared, so theatrical, that both my\nwitnesses and myself could not possibly believe her actions ingenuous. I\nhave often questioned her about the illusions that I suggested to her. I\nasked her for example, if, when I appeared to her under another aspect,\nfor instance under the appearance of a young man, with clustering locks\nand a black beard, she ever perceived anything of my real resemblance.\nShe invariably answered, that she saw my actual person, as it were in a\ncloud, behind the figure which I had called up before her mental vision.\nIt is very probable that she recognised my daughter and her friend in the\npersons whom I pointed out as the robbers. I might have assured myself of\nthis by causing her to recall her thoughts at the time. I am aware that\nthe opponents of this opinion challenge, and not unreasonably, tests made\nin this manner because they have doubts about the suggestion.\n\nIf then the facts were such as are related, J. was playing a r\u00f4le not\nperhaps strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary acting, knowing\nthat she was reciting a part, but feeling nevertheless that she had a\ncertain part to play and must enter into the spirit of it.\n\nIt is incontrovertible that the hypnotic subject really does play his\npart in precisely this fashion. When, for example, you extend his arm and\ndefy him to put it down he seems to make an effort to lower it, but in\nreality he does not bring the required muscles into play at all. If you\nbid him keep his hand open, he never dreams of using the flexor muscles.\nAgain, if the spectators try to change the position of either hand or\narm, they meet with energetic resistance.\n\nYou will ask me how it was that J. did not carry out her acting all\nthrough? Why, after she had gone for the revolver with such deliberation,\nshe did not fire it? It was because, the action being so rapid in its\ndevelopment, she had no time for reflection; she must have thought and\nshe actually did believe, that the revolver was loaded as it always was.\nThis is proved by the precaution with which she handled it and put it on\nthe floor. It is evident that she thought it was a dangerous game. If I\nhad known how the affair would terminate, I would have taken the pistol\nand told her that I would fire myself, in order to see what her thought\nand action would have been. But notwithstanding all this, supposing she\nhad fired could we have concluded from this, that she really had latent\nmurderous tendencies? We could not have drawn any legitimate conclusions\neven yet. For if, as we have just stated, J. was not entirely withdrawn\nfrom her actual surroundings, she might naturally suppose that I was only\njoking, and that I should never make her fire on my own child, and on\nthis account she need not feel any anxiety in fulfilling the order that I\nhad given her.\n\nThe problem is a serious one. It is also a psychological problem. I have\nalready partially disclosed the solution which I myself am led to give\nto it, and I can best translate my thoughts by these words and in the\nfollowing formula: Persons in hypnosis will only execute acts similar to\nthose they would naturally perform in dreams. I have asked a number of\npersons, among others, those connected with the law, whether they had\never dreamt they committed murders or robberies, and up to the present\ntime all have answered in the negative. And yet, lawyers interrogate\ncriminals, and it would be quite within the realm of possibility through\none of those duplications of personality which I pointed out in my work\non \u201cSleep and Dreams,\u201d[58] that they should take up for an instant the\nr\u00f4le of an assassin. This is not an impossible supposition. Does it ever\nhappen that the novelist or the actor, in portraying or impersonating an\ninfamous character, the creation of his imagination, does so identify\nhimself for the nonce, with his own invention, that even in sleep, for\na brief space, he incorporates himself, so to speak, into the fictitious\npersonage he has evoked. There are some very curious investigations\nto make on this subject. But even if any positive facts could be\ngathered from this, we should still be left in doubt, as to whether by\npost-hypnotic suggestion the subject would continue to carry out the same\nr\u00f4le.\n\nDoubtless, an anatomist may dream that he is dissecting a body, but\ncould we produce an hypnotic condition such as to make him use the\nknife as freely upon a living body? Can I make a butcher believe that\na child is a sheep? I consider the thing to be perfectly feasible, yet\nmy thesis is not at all weakened by this concession. We will take it\nfor granted that, animated by evil designs you proceed to hypnotise\nbeforehand, the anatomist and the butcher, and then bring them at a given\nmoment to the victim! And let us further imagine that the combination\nsucceeds perfectly. How will you manage to veil in deepest secrecy all\nyour previous man\u0153uvres and cast a semblance of likelihood over the\nculpability of your accomplices?\n\nWill not the old adage, _Cui bono_, be quoted against you? In order to\ninsure perfect impunity, you would have to overcome such an accumulation\nof material _impedimenta_, the lightest of which would suffice to\ndissipate all apprehensions in the minds of those in whom chimerical\nfears have not entirely obliterated their common sense. It is therefore\nevident that in so far as we know now, from experiments intended to\ntest this theory and these possibilities of Criminal Suggestion, no\npositive results can be obtained. These criminal actions, so appositely\nnamed\u2014Laboratory Crimes\u2014bear no resemblance to actual ones.\n\nIf this debate is ever to be closed it can only be before a Criminal\nCourt when a Troppman, a Pranzini, or an Eyraud, shall have been the\noperator, and it shall have been clearly shown, what interest the\nassassin had in making use of a so-called, unconscious and automatic\naccomplice. Then only, shall we be able to appreciate to what degree\nhypnotism may become a dangerous enemy to society at large. And even\nthen, we shall have to remind ourselves that all our medicines are\npoisons and that they have the power of destroying even more surely, than\nthat of healing.\n\nThus the problem is still unsolved.\n\nHere is a story told me by Dr. Li\u00e9beault. He, or perhaps it was M.\nBernheim, or both together, hypnotised a workman and told him to steal\na couple of little plaster figures, that were used as ornaments on the\nmantel-piece in a house where he was working. He did so. The affair had\nbeen forgotten for some time because the suggestion had not been carried\nout on the spot. About three months after the occurrence, this same\nworkman was arrested for stealing a pair of trousers from the front of a\nshop. Upon which the previous hypnotic suggestion was remembered.\n\nMy opinion is that the workman\u2014and how many there are of the same\ncalibre\u2014had a very slight regard for _meum and tuum_. This reminds us\nof that hospital patient, whom we saw pilfering the tobacco from his\ncomrades, and I do not think it was at all necessary to have thrown\nthe workman into the hypnotic sleep in order to make him steal the\nstatuettes. But from another point of view, this experiment, which did\nnot prove anything, might give rise to party arguments from those who\ndeem it desirable to maintain that it was the initiatory suggestion that\nfirst gave this man the taste for stealing.\n\nTo sum up in a few words this portion of my investigation; the result of\nmy experiments and of my analyses is this: that the experiments of my\nopponents prove nothing.\n\nFor the present I shall confine myself to this purely negative conclusion.\n\nBut there are other grounds besides experiments on which we may examine\nthis question. We can do so by careful observation and minute analysis of\nthe actions of hypnotised persons.\n\nI have said before that the degree of morality observable in the dreams\nof the subject, gives the measure of what may be expected from him during\nhypnosis.\n\nAccording to my opinion, hypnotism is less powerful in inciting to\nactions of grave moral import, than the corrupting influence of word or\nexample, the love of gold, or the excitement of the passions.\n\nAll truly scientific experiments have brought into prominence the analogy\nbetween physiological and incited dreams, and to-day we may say that this\nis the doctrine of the future. Thus if an hypnotic subject admits without\nopposition that he is made of sugar, or of glass, that he feels he is\nmelting in the rain, or being broken to atoms by the awkwardness of the\nbystanders; if he thinks he is a lamp, or allows himself to be trundled\nalong like a wheelbarrow; if such a subject, I repeat, refuses to steal\na purse, or to receive an embrace, the conclusion forces itself upon one\nthat the hypnotic subject has more power over himself than some persons\nwould wish us to believe; in spite of his docility, there are some things\nhe absolutely refuses to do.\n\nIf then, reasoning by analogy has ever been legitimate, it is surely so\nin this case, when the inference can be drawn that the man who refuses to\ngive a blow will refuse to use a knife; and that the woman who refuses\nto give a token of affection will certainly refuse to allow of serious\ntampering with morals.\n\nLet us then pay close attention to what observation may teach us.\n\nI shall hope to be able to demonstrate by actual facts, that persons in\nan hypnotic condition, preserve at least a sufficient portion of their\nintelligence, their reason, together with freedom of action, to prevent\nthem from committing deeds that neither their conscience nor their habits\napprove of.\n\n J. DELB\u0152UF.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[55] A lad of about 15, very bright. Has been one of Donato\u2019s subjects.\nVery susceptible and having been hypnotised in a great many public\ns\u00e9ances.\n\n[56] See my pamphlet on _The Origin of Curative Effects in Hypnotism_.\n\n[57] See _Revue de L\u2019Hypnotisme_. April, 1891.\n\n[58] _Sleep and Dreams_, p. 24 et seqq. (Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan).\n\n\n\n\nLITERARY CORRESPONDENCE\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\nFRANCE.\n\n\nWhen, some ten years ago, M. de Roberty published in the _Review of\nPositive Philosophy_ a series of articles, under the title of the\n\u201cNew and the Old Philosophy,\u201d I was much impressed by the work. The\nconception of the three types; the idealistic, the materialistic, and the\nsensualistic, under which nomenclature he ranged the various philosophic\nsystems, seemed to bring order into the history of philosophy. He also\nproceeded to treat, after the same manner and in a very happy way, the\n\u201claw of the three states\u201d of Auguste Comte, by this means rectifying\nand justifying the latter. The law of the three states, wrote M. de\nRoberty, corresponds with the present state of philosophy, which is again\nexplained by science, so that to whatever measure knowledge may attain\nto, it will be equalled by philosophy, which borrows its types and its\ncharacteristics from the sequence of facts, at the point where it leaves\nthe sphere of explanatory hypotheses.\n\nSince then M. DE ROBERTY has completed by a new study, his first work on\nthis subject. In the \u201cUnknown\u201d he has laid his finger on one of the weak\npoints of modern positivism; perhaps by dint of searching into details,\nhe has shown himself a little too severe on Comte in the book about\nwhich I am going to speak to-day, _The Philosophy of the Century_ (_La\nPhilosophie du Si\u00e8cle._).\n\nThis book contains a thoughtful criticism of the three doctrines that\noccupy contemporaneous thought; and which are: criticism, positivism,\nand evolutionism. He considers these in conformance to his _criterium_,\nas simply the varieties of one single species and the absolutely\nidentical manifestation of a common fund of beliefs and hypotheses held\ngenerally by all. According to him critical philosophy derives its\ndirect origin from idealism. Positive philosophy, from materialism; and\nthe philosophy of evolution from sensualism. Going further still, he\nconsiders critical philosophy as the legitimate outcome of sensualistic\nidealism; and positive philosophy, similarly, as the product of\nsensualistic materialism. Sensualism is thus the common ancestor; the\nthree systems inter-penetrating each other. But the promoters of these\nsystems must be judged with equity, put back into their proper places,\nand ranged according to their epochs. In my opinion, a philosophical\ndoctrine is valuable, not so much by the clear solutions it affords us,\nas by its methods of procedure, may I say, even by the coloring it gives\nto thoughtful minds.\n\nI do not hesitate to recognise in Kant, the strong, rough-handed workman\nof modern philosophy; in Comte, the most utilitarian; in Spencer the\nsubtlest as well as the most successful. Kant possesses the greatest\nspeculative vigor; Comte, the clearest scientific turn of mind; Spencer,\nthe keenest conception of, and insight into, psychological subjects.\nTaking these philosophers as a whole, Spencer, in spite of his merits,\nappears to me the least original, the least remarkable of the three.\nHis universal metaphysics has feet of clay. The classification of the\nsciences that he wished to substitute for that of Comte is obscure,\ndevoid of general utility; in short the influence of Comte on succeeding\ngenerations will be more considerable than Spencer\u2019s, if indeed there are\nany philosophers who will be bold enough to avow themselves deliberately\nas Comtists.\n\nThis contradiction should not surprise us. It not seldom happens that the\ninfluence of a master continues even when his doctrines have suffered\nshipwreck. We notice this in the great schools of thought of the\npresent day. We may say with truth, that the criticists are inclined to\ndialectics; the positivists, to methods and systems; the evolutionists\nto facts. The first excel in the analysis of ideas, but they expose\nthemselves to be lost in abstractions. The second endeavor to reduce to\na system all scientific matter, but they run the risk of being either\nrigorists or becoming too elementary. The last while making rapid strides\nin the genesis of the subtler phenomena of life, incur the danger of\naccepting arbitrary _liaisons_, or of remaining in an inchoate condition.\nEach one possesses most valuable qualities, which it would be desirable\nindeed to meet with in the same mind. Each has rendered services which it\nis but just to recognise and which it would be unwise to disregard.\n\nThe main thing is always to be able to understand one another upon the\nquestion of what philosophy means and its relation to science. What M. de\nRoberty cares most for, in all his writings, is the elucidation of this\nproblem. We must concede, that it is one which is worth striving after.\nAnd it is surely not asking too much if we demand of every philosopher,\nthat he shall know, more or less, what is meant by philosophising.\n\nPhilosophy will be, in the future, very much what it has always been in\nthe past, a general _conception of the world_. This is a fixed fact for\nM. de Roberty. Is it true that philosophy preceded science, or, that on\nthe contrary it has always been and will continue to be subsidiary to\nit? Many are, we know, partisans of the first opinion; it has seemed to\nthem that the sciences have separated little by little from the hazy and\nindistinct conglomerate which bore the name of theology, metaphysics,\nin a word, of philosophy. M. de Roberty does not hesitate to adopt the\ncontrary opinion. Philosophy, according to him, has always sprung from\nscience, it has always been the equal of science. But though he proclaims\nthis equality as existing between science and philosophy, this does not\nin the least oblige him to recognise any equality in their manifestations\n\u201cin history.\u201d The knowledge of a given science, implies a certain\n_conception of the world_; this is the supreme law of philosophical\nevolution. Philosophy is an abstract science of general interest, having\nfor its end, the integration of the documentary evidence furnished\nby the various sciences. Comte was strongly imbued with this truth.\nSpencer made it his own, but he makes a more serious mistake than his\npredecessor, when he asserts that philosophy is able to \u201cplay an active\npart\u201d in scientific discovery. In the opinion of M. de Roberty, it is\nneither the antecedent of science, nor is it even to be called an art.\nMust it then be called a science? Or is it to be comprehended in science?\nNeither the one, nor the other. He prefers rather to regard it as a link\n(\u201c_un trait d\u2019union_\u201d) between these two different kinds of intellectual\nactivity, science and art. The mental faculties may, he tells us, aim\nat subjugating nature, either in a direct manner, the result of which\nwill be called science; or in an indirect way, in which case we name it\nart; or they may have still a third intention, taking a kind of middle\ncourse between the utility of _science_ and the indirect utility of art,\nwhich while actively participating in both, facilitates as well the\ntransition from one to the other, from which springs _philosophy_. \u201cMost\nunmistakably identical,\u201d says he finally, \u201care the elements which produce\na particular combination, in the one, they are called science, in the\nother philosophy.\u201d\n\nBut we must not confound the two propositions. \u201cIf a house is to be\nbuilt of brick, does that mean that we are not to distinguish between\nthe materials required in its erection?\u2014that we are to apply to its\nconstruction, the ingredients and the procedures used in the making and\nfiring of bricks? We never should build a house if we acted thus.\u201d\n\nLet us not misunderstand this comparison! The house here spoken of is\nentirely figurative. The hypothesis which underlies it is universally\naccepted, but its primal condition is always wanting\u2014i. e. universal\nknowledge. It would be presumptuous indeed, to draw, to-day, the plans\nand define the style of architecture which shall be used in our future\nphilosophical habitation, since we do not yet possess even the materials\nwherewith to build it. We can only hope to erect such a temporary\nshelter, a fort, that may be swept away in a few hours, whenever the\nenemy shall have discovered an explosive powerful enough to blow it into\natoms. I do not care very much, I confess, for the distinction spoken of\n\u201cbetween a direct and an indirect utility\u201d and the idea of philosophy\nforming a link between art and science. This way of representing the\nfacts of the case, seems to me both cumbersome and incomplete. I will\nnot stop here to discuss it. The thoughtful study of M. de Roberty is\nnot compromised by such a small detail, and I would rather remember the\npositive teaching which is given in the very striking book that I have\njust been criticising.\n\n\u201cPhilosophy and science,\u201d writes the author, \u201care terms which define\ntwo principal _species_ of the vast _genus_ designated under the one\nname,\u2014knowledge.\u201d The most marked trait of the philosophy of the future,\nwill be the _distinction_ between the two species, as _confusion_ was the\npredominant characteristic of the philosophy of the past.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe work of M. de Roberty gave us a methodic history of philosophy.\nThat of M. F. PICAVET, _The Ideologists\u2014An Essay on the Scientific,\nPhilosophic, Religious, etc., ideas and theories in France since 1789_,\nstretches over a very vast area of descriptive history. His book\nconducts us from Condorcet to Destutt de Tracy, and Cabanis; from these\nto Deg\u00e9rando and Laromigui\u00e8re; it embraces thus nearly the whole of\nthe philosophy of the eighteenth century, which it carries back to the\nseventeenth, from thence following the thread of its history, through\nthe intervening years, down to our own times. The name \u201cIdeologist\u201d is\nvague, as are all the rest of the battle-cries which are used by the\nleaders of parties, or that their adversaries may make use of against\nthem. Ideology, in the sense used by Destutt de Tracy, signifies, that\nphilosophers must confine themselves to psychological research, more\nparticularly to that which concerns the origin and the formation of\nideas, an immense field, embracing philology, ethnology, etc. With\nregard to the wrong sense which Napoleon attached to this word, it was\njustified in a certain measure by the pretensions of the philosophers in\ngoverning life, politics, and law, by doubtful hypotheses, which did not\noften accord with practice. It cannot be denied that since the time of\nRousseau, we pass much too easily from theory to action, and that we fall\nback too readily on our imagination, to supplement our actual experience.\nWe find in M. Picavet\u2019s book, new and valuable information about all the\nmen who have contributed to the intellectual life of the French nation,\nduring and since the time of the Revolution. We can trace there the\norigin of certain doctrines, which have appeared to spring up suddenly\nbefore our eyes, and shall often be extremely surprised by what we shall\nread there. It is a most valuable and important work, showing an enormous\namount of erudition, fine critical acumen, and a rare descriptive talent.\nIt is quite voluminous (more than 600 pp. 8vo.), and some might indeed\nconsider that it could have been more condensed. But it is primarily a\nbook of reference, in whose pages we shall surely not complain of finding\na large amount of information, when we refer to it.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWith the book of M. BERNARD P\u00c9REZ, _Le Caract\u00e8re, de l\u2019enfant \u00e0 l\u2019homme_,\n(Character, from Childhood to Manhood), we leave the domain of philosophy\nand history to enter into that of psychology. M. P\u00e9rez modestly disclaims\nall pretension to founding a science of character. Nevertheless, that\nwhich he has given us and produced here, bears the stamp of originality\nin a subject in which authors have hitherto only repeated one another.\nHis work is composed of two parts, of which the second forms the\ncompletion of, or rather a commentary on, the first. We find here, to\nstart with, a classification of characters, illustrated by portraits\nwhich render the developments more tangible; secondly, a study on the\ncommon combinations of the principle traits of personality.\n\nThe classification of M. P\u00e9rez is founded on movements, that is to say\nit is displayed in sufficiently complete groups connected with some\ndistinct mode of expression, such as rapidity, slowness, and energy of\nmovements. It offers the practical advantage of substituting for the four\nor six temperaments of the old schools, which are frequently hard to\ndistinguish, classes more flexible and distinguished by visible gestures\nwhich betray, more or less clearly, their physiological foundation. M.\nP\u00e9rez has provisorily established six of these classes. He distinguishes\nthe vivacious, the vivacious-ardent, the ardent, the sluggish, the\nsluggish-ardent, and lastly the balanced type. The last category is\nin my judgment a sort of utility-box, apparently designed to receive\nspecimens which we are at a loss where else to put. For one of two things\nis certainly true, either this balance is an insignificant trait or it\nis one that is dominant in the person, and it is absolutely necessary to\nstate which.\n\nMany will undoubtedly question this doctrine that the movements of\na person express all his character and that consequently they are\ncompetent to reveal it to us. We might maintain, indeed, that if the\nmovements supply us with the labels of each class, it is not always to be\ndistinctly seen how the different traits of character and of intelligence\n(the author does not separate the two, and gives his reasons for so\ndoing) subordinate themselves to one another and vary with the motor sign\nchosen to express them. There can be no question, however, that rapidity,\nenergy, or slowness of movement, do not have certain actual and profound\nconnections with our visceral and cerebral functions, and that the motor\nsign is easy to be made use of, although it does not reach all the facts\nwhich it is employed to describe, and although the explanation of these\nfacts still remains to be sought in the physiological substratum.\n\nM. P\u00e9rez has secondly attempted a systematisation of character-traits, by\nsuccessively studying the relations of gaiety and sadness, irascibility\nand gentleness, courage and fear, kindness and malevolence, self-love and\nwill, with the principal emotional intellectual and volitional traits\nof character. He has perceived, instinctively as it were, that the\npointing out of generic, specific, and individual marks does not possess\nits entire worth except on the condition that we also point out _the\nsubordination_ of the same, and he has given this factor much prominence\nin the last chapters of his book. This portion of the work is replete\nwith subtle observations, and ingenious and profound reflections, but it\nis fragmentary in character, a half-way production, I might say, between\nthe disconnected literature of the moralist and a reasoned and methodical\ndescription such as ethology ought to furnish later on, after the manner,\nif possible, of the natural sciences.\n\nThe desiderata which I here briefly refer to, are not set forth to\ndiminish the value of the work of M. P\u00e9rez. It will in its present form\nrender great services, and I should not be at all surprised if the\nterminology which he has invented should pass into the language of the\nday, as it is convenient and easily lends itself to the description of\ncharacter-portraits. Even readers who shall find here much to criticise,\nwill not refuse to accord to it real and solid merit.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAfter the work of M. P\u00e9rez, a study of my own naturally ranges itself\u2014_La\nPsychologie du peintre_[59]\u2014concerning which I ask permission to\noffer a few remarks. I have set myself the problem, in this work, of\ndetermining a professional type, and I have chosen one of those which\nare certainly the most distinctly defined. If other authors could give\nus the psychology of the musician, of the lawyer, of the physician, and\nof the geometer, such a task would not be an indifferent performance in\nwhat concerns our knowledge of _character_, and we should arrive at the\nconstruction of a natural history of society from a different point of\nview and by different methods from those at the disposal of the novelist.\nWe should accomplish, unquestionably, the passage from general and\n_abstract_ psychology, to _concrete_ psychology.\n\nDo professional types really exist? and if they exist, what are they\ncomposed of? The question as I view it, is not bereft of interest for the\npsychologist. We do, no doubt, find among painters, vivacious, sluggish,\nand ardent individuals, and we may indeed, in studying this or that\nparticular painter, discover in him some one or other of the combinations\ndescribed by M. P\u00e9rez. But that does not stand in the way of the growth\nand constitution of social types, and individuals may find a natural\nplace in the different categories of a general classification without\nceasing to belong to their professional category in consequence of a\nnatural self-grouping of their intellectual faculties, and a definite\ntendency of the traits of their emotional nature. It would be justifiable\nto say, at the same time simplifying and enlarging a little the facts,\nthat originally our viscera form our character but our cerebral organism\nforms our profession; and if it is true furthermore that a certain\nphysiological state brings with it a definite intellectual mode of\noperation, it is none the less true that the same culture of the mind and\nthe long-continued habits of a profession are apt to impose upon one\u2019s\npersonality a definite discipline and mean equilibrium of tendencies and\nsentiments; and it is in this sense that it has seemed to me we are at\nliberty to speak of a professional type without equivocation or violence.\n\nThose who will not accept this manner of looking at this subject will\nfind, I hope, some additional interest in my work on the score of the\nspecial questions which are treated of there: the heredity of genius,\nmemory, the classification of the sentiments (implied rather than\nformulated), the relations of the will to the design considered as\nwriting, the evolution of art in its connection with visual analysis,\nand so forth. There is here a sufficiently abundant supply of materials\ncapable of being wrought up in social psychology and the criticism of\nart. But it does not become me to bestow praises on my own work, and it\nwould be too easy for me to subject it to criticism. My readers will\nfind in it themselves the weak portions, without my pointing them out to\nthem; and it would be a source of great pleasure to me to have the same\nassurance that they will discover in it qualities which I do not perceive\nthere.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThere remains still to be mentioned _La Premi\u00e8re partie d\u2019une \u00e9tude sur\nla th\u00e9orie du droit musulman_,[60] by SAVVAS PACHA, one time governor\nand governor general, one time minister of public works and foreign\nsecretary of Turkey. Savvas Pacha\u2014a Christian of Greek descent\u2014has held\nhigh positions in the Ottoman Empire and is esteemed as one of the most\nlearned men in Islamic law who have ever lived. His book therefore\ndemands the greatest consideration; it will not possess less interest for\nphilosophers than for statesmen and jurists. In my opinion, works of this\nclass should be consulted by psychologists as much as by sociologists; we\nare too much inclined nowadays to neglect certain social studies which\noffer us valuable information respecting the genius of races and the\nconditions of their moral existence.\n\nThe work of Savvas Pacha will undoubtedly contribute much toward the\nelucidation of some mooted points of very first importance; I should like\nto mention\u2014the history of creation, and the exposition of the principles\nof a law which rules more than a million human beings and is intimately\ninterwoven with their political life; a more exact knowledge of the\nSemitic genius; an estimate of the relations which have existed between\nthe juridical metaphysics of the Semitic peoples and that of the schools\nof Greece, between the Mohammedan law and the Roman law in provinces once\nRomanised but afterwards subjected to the empire of the Caliphs.\n\nIt does not seem at all doubtful that the ontology of Aristotle in\nparticular has exercised an influence on the philosophy of the Arabian\njurisconsults. A second truly remarkable fact, too, is not the new\nontology which they have produced, but the use they have made of it in\ntheir legislative fabrics. It is impossible to enter into details here; I\nlimit myself to the mere pointing out of the facts.\n\nWith respect to the originality of the institutions that belong to the\nperiod of the first Abbassids, the same has been contested by a number of\nhistorians. M. Renan, among others has maintained that they are the work\nof the Iranian genius. Savvas Pacha refutes this opinion in a peremptory\nmanner, and we shall no longer be able to deny, after having read him,\nthat the Mohammedan civilisation, with the _corpus juris_ which stands\nfor its most perfect production, has really proceeded from the genius of\nthe races that bore the banner of Islam from the confines of China to the\nStraits of Gibraltar.\n\nShall I add that we may deduce from this work, so learned and so\nsuggestive, the elements of an instructive comparison between two grand\ndivisions of human history whose evolution seems still to be pursued on\nlines wholly apart\u2014that which we call Christianity and that which has\nsprung from the teachings of Mohammed?\n\nI fervently hope that Savvas Pacha will not delay the publication of\nthe other works which he has promised. When they appear he will have\nfurnished us with the most considerable work which we possess on the\ninstitutions of a great division of humanity, still too little known to\nus.\n\n LUCIEN ARR\u00c9AT.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[59] All the works so far mentioned are published by F. Alcan.\n\n[60] Published by Marchal et Billard, Paris.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\nGERMANY.\n\n\nProductions of a literary-historical character are under certain\ncircumstances also entitled to mention in a philosophical magazine,\nespecially if they present to us the intellectual development and\nphysiognomy of an individual or of a community in a scientific manner, as\nis done in the _Essays_ of KARL WEIGAND which have just been published by\nMerhoff, of Munich. Of the larger essays contained in this book we will\nespecially mention those on Voltaire, Rousseau, Baudelaire, and Taine, to\nwhich in psychological respects a high value is to be accorded, and which\nalthough not exactly easy are nevertheless pleasant reading.\n\nViewed from this standpoint the _History of North American Literature_ by\nKARL KNORTZ (Berlin, 1891, Lusten\u00f6der) hardly admits of consideration;\nnot even Edgar Allen Poe, who in the psychological point of view is of\nunexceptionally great importance, is in any respect profoundly treated.\nThe work is made up of a series of well written articles which first no\ndoubt were published in newspapers and magazines for the public at large.\nWe deem it proper, however, to mention the work in this place, because it\ncontains a chapter on the philosophical literature of North America, in\nwhich, we must admit, philosophy does not appear to the best advantage.\nThe representatives of philosophy in North America, the author says,\nare in the main doctors of divinity and securely installed university\nprofessors, and this department of study has therefore no dangerous\nconnections; the gentlemen calmly wend their way along the ancient and\nwell-trodden path of the aprioristic philosophers and proscribe without\nany ado all modern innovations, Darwinism in particular.\n\nAs they have not as yet consigned the belief in God and immortality and\nthe freedom of the will to the lumber-room of traditional opinions, and\nas they are as a rule only superficially acquainted with the results of\nthe exact sciences, despite the fact that many assure us of the contrary,\nthey accordingly fancy that they are easily able to solve the imagined\nchief problem of philosophy, the reconciliation of religion and science.\n\nThis judgment may contain much that is true, but from the little that\nwe personally know of things in North America, is to be decidedly\nrestricted. Moreover, we by no means share the low opinion which the\nauthor entertains of all attempts to reconcile religion and science.\nReligion is a phenomenon of too great antiquity and its influence\nin the life of nations is too thoroughly established to entitle us,\non the ground of science with which it is still involved in violent\nconflict, summarily to disregard it; and consequently every attempt at\nreconciliation is worthy of the best efforts of the noblest. It is of\ncourse a question whether we shall ever arrive at the point where we\nwill completely understand _all_ religious things, but we certainly\nmust with time arrive at a point where religion shall no longer contain\ninconsistencies, contain nothing, that is, of which the absurdities are\npatent.\n\nThere was indeed, in Germany also, a time when the belief was very\nwidely spread that religion as compared with science might be ignored\ncompletely; it was the time when Ludwig B\u00fcchner and Karl Vogt were so\nmuch read, when the magazine _Gartenlaube_ counted its greatest number\nof readers. But this time is long since past, and just as since that\ntime employment with philosophy, especially with ethics, has become\nmore comprehensive, so also the interest in religio-philosophical\nquestions, which aim at a reconcilement of the two hostile powers, has\nbeen considerably augmented. Aside from the German productions which have\nbeen written in a conciliatory tone, like the book, to give an example,\nof Moriz Carri\u00e8re on Christianity and the Modern World Conception,\nforeign works of this same class have also been much read, particularly\nDrummond\u2019s _Natural Law in the Spiritual World_, to which indeed in\nour judgment no particular value is attributable, as it does not help\nus to any real knowledge but contents itself with analogies which\nscientifically are absolutely worthless.\n\nRecently the little treatise _Ernste Gedanken_ of the Saxon officer VON\nEGIDY (Leipsic, 1891, Wilh. Wigand) has been much talked about. The\nreformatory effect of this brochure has, indeed, hitherto been very\nslight and will hardly become more extensive in the future, but the\nresponse that it has met with in the widest circles of the German public,\nproves that many ardent friends of religion anxiously desire that the\ndogmatic shackles and integuments shall be stripped from the body of the\nChristian beliefs, and that it shall appear, in the clearest and purest\nlight, that which it is, the religion of love.\n\nTheological criticism has not taken an exactly favorable attitude towards\nthe little book of Lieut. Egidy, and even the liberals, who pay the\nfullest credit to the good intentions of the author call attention to the\nfact that the greater part of what Egidy advances has been said before\nand said better, and that there is an almost absolute lack of positive\nproposals to be adopted. The Egidy movement will thus probably have, they\nconclude, no lasting effects.\n\nWe cannot indeed absolutely say that these critics are wrong, if we\nare at all conversant with the development of protestant theology.\nA very instructive and opportune work in this respect is a book\nof the well-known Berlin professor OTTO PFLEIDERER, who, as his\nreligio-philosophical treatises evidence, himself belongs to the\nreconcilers of Christianity and the modern world-conceptions. In the\nyear 1889, at the instigation of the editor of the Library of Philosophy\nissued by Swan, Sonnenschein, & Co. of London, he published in the\nEnglish language a work on _The Development of Protestant Theology\nsince Kant and in Great Britain since 1825_, and this same work has now\njust appeared in German (published by Mohr of Freiburg) in a somewhat\nmore extended form. As its title proclaims, and as its belonging to the\nLibrary of Philosophy would signify, the work is chiefly concerned with\nthe influence which philosophy has exercised on theological thought.\nTo make this influence plain, the author presents at the start, in the\nform of an introduction, a concise but extremely lucid exposition of the\nphilosophical doctrines that especially demand consideration in this\ndirection. Of German philosophers, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel,\nand of English, Herbert Spencer are treated of at length.\n\nIn view of the great respect which Hegel still enjoys in America, it will\nperhaps interest many of the readers of _The Monist_ if I give here an\nutterance of Pfleiderer, which in the point of view of the history of\nreligion is also deserving of consideration, at least on the part of\nthose who are recognised adherents of evolutionism.\n\n\u201cNo other branch of inquiry,\u201d says Pfleiderer, \u201cowes so much to Hegel as\nHistory; the arbitrary construction of details from the philosophical\nconcept which had crept in by Hegel and his immediate followers, has\nof course been discarded by exact historical inquirers, but there has\nremained that profounder conception of historical life generally as a\ndevelopment of the common mind of all ages and nations, conformable\nto law, dominated by ideas, and aiming at necessary general purposes;\nthere has remained that profounder insight into the intricate play of\nphenomena, into the kernel of things and men, into the dominating ideas\nthat lie as guiding impulses at the foundation of even the apparent\ndisharmony of individual passions; there has remained that unprepossessed\nunderstanding for the necessity of even the contrarieties and struggles,\nfor the errors and passions of men, for conflict is the father of all\nthings, as Hegel says with Heraclitus, and as it is only through the\nstruggle of partial rights and one-sided truths that the whole truth of\nthe idea can force its way into existence; there has remained finally\nthat intelligent respect for the heroic figures of history in which the\ngenius of a people and of an age have been incarnated, which as the\ninstruments of a higher power have awakened the thought that slumbered\nin all souls, given it clear expression, and infused in it life by their\nmighty deeds. Neither a Leopold Ranke, nor a Thomas Carlyle, nor a\nFerdinand Christian Bauer would be conceivable without Hegel\u2019s philosophy\nof history.\u201d\n\nPfleiderer expresses himself here very cautiously concerning Hegel, and\nin other passages his caution is extended further still. Nevertheless, it\nwill seem to many as if that philosopher has been too highly estimated by\nPfleiderer. Especially will the followers of Herbart be dissatisfied, who\nwas involved in violent combat with Schelling and Hegel. It is not the\nplace here to enter minutely into this subject; but it is to be mentioned\nthat the name of Herbart does not occur once in this large book. Perhaps\nPfleiderer is of Edward Zeller\u2019s opinion who says in his \u201cHistory of\nModern Philosophy,\u201d that the philosophy of Herbart has proved itself\nunfruitful. It must be confessed, indeed, that the philosophy of Hegel\nhas proved itself for religious doctrine very fruitful; but whether we\nshould be satisfied with its results is quite a different question. Be\nthat however as it may; still, after Schoel has presented Herbart\u2019s ideas\nconcerning religion in a special work, since men like Drobisch, Thilo,\nand Strumpell have further elaborated these ideas; since particularly\nZiller in his Ethics has also profoundly treated religious problems in\nthe sense of Herbart, it is no longer allowable to omit the name of\nHerbart when we treat of the modern philosophy of religion.\n\nIn other respects also we are not always in full accord with the author.\nSo, for example, in Hausrath\u2019s _Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte_, a work\nto which we ourselves are very much indebted, the perfection of the form\nof the presentment is justly praised, as is also the merit of having\ninserted into the greater setting of universal history the development\nof early Christianity; but it is not mentioned that Hausrath has often\nallowed himself to be misguided into combinations whose flimsiness cannot\nescape the notice even of the lay student.\n\nBut these are only slight deficiencies of a work that is otherwise\nexcellent and full of matter, closing with the words: \u201cThis much is\ncertain, that the labors of the best and wisest of all the theologians of\nour century, who have here been passed in review before the eyes of the\nreader, however different the paths may be which individually they have\nentered upon, have yet been all directed to the one end that Christianity\nshall strip itself of its dogmatic coverings and fetters and evince its\nworld-conquering power in the ethical idealism of a love that unites us\nwith God and joins together the hands of humanity into the federation of\nbrotherhood.\u201d\n\nIf this aim were universal, that is if it were also recognised by the\ntheologians, a not inconsiderable portion of the dispute between religion\nand science would be done away with, and the sole question would then\nturn on the contrariety of theological and philosophical ethics. But even\nrespecting this point a settlement would be much sooner brought about,\nif those concerned would evince the same spirit of reconciliation as\nHANS GALLWITZ, city pastor of Sigmaringen, has recently done in his book\n_Das Problem der Ethik in der Gegenwart_ (G\u00f6ttingen, 1891, Vandenhoeck\nand Ruprecht). The author, it is true, deals critically not only with\nthe philosophical ethics of a Paulsen and a Wundt, but also with the\ntheological ethics of a Hermann and a Kaftan; still the settlement of\nthings with the philosophers forms the bulk of this rather extensive\nwork, the contents of which we cannot of course give here. Gallwitz also\nspeaks in considerable detail of Kant, whom he opposes in respect of the\npsychological questions here involved, wholly rejecting anything like\na transcendental will. If we must agree with him in this respect, we\ncan nevertheless not follow him in his assumption of a special ethical\nconstitution of the soul.\n\nIn conclusion let me note the titles of two works to which I shall revert\nin a subsequent letter. On _The Psychology in Kant\u2019s Ethics_ Dr. ALFRED\nHEGLER of T\u00fcbingen presents a meritorious and compendious treatise of 300\npages (Freiburg, 1891, Mohr), and Professor HOSTINSKY of Prague publishes\nan exposition and interpretation, based on the sources, of _Herbart\u2019s\n\u00c6sthetics_, in which, as is well known, ethics and \u00e6sthetics in the\nrestricted sense are wholly severed from psychology.\n\n CHR. UFER.\n\n\n\n\nCRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.\n\n\n\n\nTHOUGHT AND LANGUAGE.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The Monist_:\n\nSIR\u2014I am glad to hear that Prof. Max M\u00fcller intends to answer our\ndouble-barrelled criticism of his article on the above subject.\nMeanwhile, however, I should like to say a few words with regard to the\npoint which he selects for immediate response (see _The Monist_, Jan.\n1892, p. 286). And my object in saying these few words is to remove from\nhis mind the idea that with regard to the point in question I had the\nsmallest intention of bringing against him \u201ca serious charge of want of\naccuracy, unpardonable in a scholar.\u201d On the contrary, as regards this\npoint I was simply defending myself from _his_ charge against _me_\u2014to\nwit, the charge of arrogance.\n\nIn his article on \u201cThought and Language\u201d he observed, \u201cProfessor Romanes\nhas no right to speak of men like Noir\u00e9, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, to say\nnothing of Hobbes, with an air of superiority.\u201d In answer to this charge\nI stated the bare facts of the case,\u2014viz. that in my book I had alluded\nto Noir\u00e9 merely for the sake of stating his theory as to the origin\nof speech, and of expressing my large measure of agreement therewith;\nthat I had quoted Huxley only in places where my argument needed\nauthoritative opinions on matters of comparative anatomy; that I had\nonly once mentioned Hobbes, and then in order to back by his authority a\nphilosophical doctrine for which I was contending; and, lastly, that I\nhad never mentioned Herbert Spencer at all. Now, if my critic feels that\na mere statement of these facts amounts to a serious charge against him\nas a scholar, I can only express my regret that he should have imposed on\nme the necessity of stating them.\n\nBut what now is his reply to this simple statement of facts? Briefly,\nhe drops his own \u201cserious charge\u201d as regards Noir\u00e9, Huxley, and Hobbes,\nand takes his stand upon the case of Herbert Spencer. \u201cIt is true,\u201d he\nsays, \u201cMr. Spencer\u2019s name does not occur in the index. But on p. 230 we\nread: \u2018So here again we meet with additional proof, were any required,\nof the folly of regarding the copula as an essential ingredient of a\nproposition.\u2019 Now it is well known that it is Herbert Spencer who regards\nthe copula as an essential ingredient of a proposition.\u201d As if it were\none man alone who takes this view, and that man Herbert Spencer! Or as\nif Herbert Spencer\u2019s name were so specially identified with it, that\nin calling it a philosophically foolish view I expected my readers to\nunderstand a disrespectful allusion to him! Surely my critic knows as\nwell as I do that this question touching the function of the copula\nis one which has been debated for centuries; and therefore that with\nmuch more show of reason he might accuse me of making an attack on the\nPresident of the United States, on the ground that I had expressed a\ndecided opinion in favor of free trade.\n\nBut more than this. So far is it from being \u201cwell known that it is\nHerbert Spencer who regards the copula as an essential ingredient of a\nproposition,\u201d that I am under the necessity of asking Prof. Max M\u00fcller\nfor references in proof of such a statement. Chapters X and XI of the\n\u201cPrinciples of Psychology\u201d (Vol. II) are those which, as far as I am\naware, most nearly approach the subject. Yet the word \u201ccopula\u201d does not\nonce occur in them. Moreover, with all that Mr. Spencer has there said\nupon the nature and structure of propositions I am, and always have been,\nin full agreement.\n\n Yours faithfully,\n\n GEORGE J. ROMANES.\n\nOxford, Feb. 12.\n\n\n\n\nA DEFENSE OF LITTR\u00c9.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The Monist._\n\nIf all the readers of _The Monist_ for October were acquainted with the\nlife and writings of Littr\u00e9 I should not have to defend him against your\ncriticism, as everyone could see that there is more truth than poetry\nin my sonnet. But I fear that \u201cthe voice, the spirit, and the soul of\nPositivism\u201d is not so well known as he deserves to be, and I venture to\nask for space to reply.\n\nProceeding in order, I should like to correct the impression left by the\nfollowing passage: \u201cComte had not nominated a successor who should in his\nplace be the _Directeur du positivisme_. Littr\u00e9 had forfeited this honor\non account of his quarrels with Comte in which he strongly sided with\nMadame Comte against her husband.\u201d The misunderstanding between the two\nmen had a more serious origin than these family squabbles and arose from\nthe fact that Littr\u00e9 would not follow Comte through the mystic vagaries\nof the _Politique Positive_. He admits that being under his intellectual\nascendency he went too far on the new way, but he soon found that the\nmaster was violating his own method and, having to choose between them,\nhe held to the method. Littr\u00e9\u2019s refusal to join Comte in his adhesion\nto the r\u00e9gime of the coup d\u2019\u00e9tat of 1851 was the immediate cause of the\nrupture. His \u201cexcessive tolerance\u201d did not extend to the Bonapartes, whom\nhe detested cordially. It is characteristic of the man that he continued\nhis yearly subscription to the fund that he had created for his friend\u2019s\nsupport notwithstanding this break in their relations.\n\nAs to his tolerance, I think with you that he carried it a little too far\nin his own family. Greater firmness might have spared us the vision of\npriests bedeviling him in his agony and dragging his body in triumph to\nholy ground. But the case that you take as an example does not seem to\nme conclusive. It was not necessary to possess his knowledge of history\nin order to appreciate the difficulties attendant upon interference with\nhis catholic wife in the education of their daughter, and as success was\nimpossible he wisely limited his endeavor to fields unobstructed by the\n\u201ceternal feminine.\u201d\n\nSeriously, we admit that Littr\u00e9 was tolerant to excess, but not that the\nattitude of his philosophy is, as you say, \u201cmere scepticism leading to\nindifferentism.\u201d In the words of M. Wyrouboff, who aided him for many\nyears in editing the magazine called _La Philosophie Positive_, \u201cmen, no\nmatter how superior they may be, are never abstract formulas interpreting\nwith equal facility all the parts of a mental conception; they always\nrepresent a mixture of strength and weakness in variable proportions....\nIt seemed as if intellectual activity had absorbed all the living forces\nof his (Littr\u00e9\u2019s) being, leaving in the place of physical activity only\nthe faculty of passive resistance to the will of others.\u201d This refers\nto the man in his old age but in youth he was an athlete of remarkable\nstrength. Renan said of him: \u201cWhile his temperament was calm his mind was\nrevolutionary, and therefore he never gave way. In July 1830, he was in\nthe first line of those who broke into the place du Carrousel and George\nFarcy was shot through by his side.\u201d I am tempted to quote a little\nmore from this master of words. \u201cSo great was his love of truth that,\nperhaps alone in our century, he could retract without lessening himself.\nTruth led him like a child.... It is not well to be too perfect.... His\napparent negations were only the extreme reserve of a mind that dreads\nhazardous appreciations. He was so much afraid of going beyond what he\nsaw clearly that he often stopped short of it. Hesitation that implies a\nthousand times more delicate worship of the eternal ideal than the rash\nsolutions that satisfy superficial minds.\u201d\n\nEven in old age there were no signs of \u201cindifferentism\u201d in his conduct.\nIn the words of Pasteur, \u201cAt the Mesnil he was consulting physician for\nthe whole village (always gratuitously). Continuing his labors till three\no\u2019clock in the morning, the light of his lamp shone afar during the night\nlike a beacon that reassured the sick. It was known that at the first\ncall, M. Littr\u00e9 would leave his work and go wherever his aid was needed.\u201d\n\nThese are the words of men that knew him, but my first-hand opinion of\nhim was formed solely from his writings and his public acts as senator,\netc.; fancy such a man in _our_ senate!\n\nThe note in which you say that I attended positivistic lectures\n(Comte\u2019s?) in France together with Mr. Frederic Harrison is a flattering\nanachronism.\n\nLittr\u00e9\u2019s father received a sword of honor while in the navy for beating\noff an English ship of superior force, and the son\u2019s philosophy prompts\nnot only to action but to action, if necessary, in the good old fashioned\npositive way.\n\nMy second objection refers to the line where you say that your positivism\n\u201chas nothing to do with Comte or with any of Comte\u2019s disciples,\u201d and,\nleaving Comte aside, I hope to show that you and Littr\u00e9 are much better\nfriends than you imagine. A view noted by him on p. 27, Vol. 1, of his\nmagazine, _La Philosophie Positive_, ought to assure this happy result.\n\nIn the preface of your valuable work entitled \u201cFundamental Problems\u201d you\ndraw particular attention to the part that treats of \u201cForm and Formal\nThought,\u201d which, you say, discusses a subject of fundamental importance.\n\u201cA correct conception of form and the laws of form will clear away many\nmysteries; it will afford a satisfactory explanation of causality and\nshed a new light on all the other problems of philosophy.\u201d\n\nThe part referred to begins thus: \u201cIn the introduction to his \u2018Critique\nof Pure Reason,\u2019 Immanuel Kant proposes the question: How are synthetical\nJudgments _a priori_ possible? on the solution of this problem the\nwhole structure of his philosophy rests, which he characterises as\n_Transcendental Idealism_.\u201d (\u201cA priori, as used in the limited sense by\nKant, is purely formal knowledge, while a posteriori is identical with\nexperience.\u201d)\n\nFurther on I read, \u201cOur own views grew out of a study of Kant\u2019s\nTranscendentalism\u201d; and the first words of your \u201cConclusion\u201d are these:\n\u201cAlthough Kant\u2019s Transcendental Idealism cannot be considered as a final\nsolution of the basic problem of philosophy, it nevertheless pursues the\nright method and has thus actually led us to a solution which, we hope,\nwill in time be recognised as final.\u201d\n\nIn looking for the difference between the two solutions to find the\npart in yours that belongs to you alone, I see on p. 50 of \u201cFundamental\nProblems\u201d that \u201cKant thinks it is a strange and wonderful fact that\nour formal thought (the rules of arithmetic, mathematics, logic, etc.,\nwhich are _a priori_) agrees so precisely with the highest (i. e. the\nmost general) laws of nature, which can be ascertained and verified by\nexperience. Kant sees only two ways of solution. Either the laws of pure\nreason, he says, have been gathered by experience from nature, or, on\nthe contrary, the laws of nature have been deduced from our _a priori_\nrules. The former solution is impossible, since the formal sciences\nare proven to have been formulated with the exclusion of all sensory\nexperience. \u2018Therefore,\u2019 says Kant, \u2018the second solution only remains.\nReason dictates its laws to nature\u2019; i. e. ... the sensory impressions\nare the raw material only from which the well-ordered whole of nature, as\nan object of science, is created by the synthetic faculty of reason....\nKant has taken into consideration two ways only. He overlooks the third\nand most obvious explanation.... The third possibility is that which has\nbeen propounded in the foregoing pages. According to our explanation, the\nformal (the highest or most general) laws of nature and the formal laws\nof thought are identical. Their agreement is not wonderful but inevitable\nas both are expressions of the forms of existence in general.\u201d\n\nThis then is your \u201csolution of the basic problem of philosophy.\u201d\n\nTurning back to page 34, I find under the title \u201cThe Origin of the A\nPriori\u201d: \u201cKant answers the question \u2018How are synthetic judgments _a\npriori_ possible?\u2019 by showing that such synthetic judgments undoubtedly\nexist.\u201d \u201cHe might have ventured a step further by proposing another\nquestion: \u2018What is the origin of the _a priori_?\u2019 Only by answering\nthis question could he have shown _how_ synthetic judgments _a priori_\nare possible. This he did not do, and the omission has produced great\nconfusion among German, French, and English thinkers.\u201d On the next\npage, 36, I find \u201cAccording to our view, form is a property of reality\nas well as of our cognition. Formless matter does not exist. Form and\nmatter as they exist in reality, are inseparable.... Knowledge also\nin its primitive shape, when it is, so to say, natural and crude, is\nan intimate combination of sense-perceptions and formal cognition.\nThe sense-perceptions are the real substance of knowledge, while\nformal cognition is the principle which arranges and systematises\nsense-experiences.\u201d ... \u201cLogic does not create order and system in our\nbrain, but it makes us conscious of the order that naturally grew in our\nmind.\u201d\n\nIn the division entitled \u201cThe Order of Nature\u201d you say that \u201cFormal\nthought represents the mere laws of thought in their abstractness, and\nhas been acquired by abstraction. The mere forms of thought exhibit\na wonderful regularity.... This regularity of formal thought, which\nis expressed in all logical laws, arithmetical calculations, and in\nall mathematical conceptions, has naturally grown in our mind as the\npsychical expression of a physical regularity in the arrangement of the\nvarious brain-structures and their combinations. The arrangement of\nbrain-structures in certain regular forms has been effected in accordance\nwith the same laws that govern the development of forms generally.\u201d\n\nThis answer to the question, \u201cWhat is the origin of the _a priori_\u201d is\nwhat you call the corner-stone of your positivism, which, you say, \u201cit is\nto be hoped, will prove the only true Monism.\u201d\n\nNow I give my translation of Littr\u00e9\u2019s view, which he published in 1867,\nin an article entitled \u201cThe Three Philosophies.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe effective certainty that the mathematical laws of number, of figure\nand of motion are at the base of physical phenomena, and the inductive\nbelief that they are equally at the base of chemical and of biological\nphenomena induce me to note here a view upon the relation that must be\nfound between subjective phenomena and objective phenomena, that is to\nsay upon the relation that causes the subject to draw from the object\na science and laws. The nervous substance, which is the organ of all\nintelligence, is made up of material elements which arrive with their\nconditions; and when this substance becomes capable of thinking, it\npasses under the conditions proper to the elements that form it; which\nresults in (_se traduit par_) a science and its laws. The material\nwork that takes place in the brain while it fulfils its office, is, as\nis known, a work of nutrition, which consists of a chemical exchange\nof molecules. Every chemical action is, in turn, equivalent to a\ncertain quantity of heat; and again, this heat is equivalent to a\ncertain quantity of motion. Thus thought, no matter how we represent\nto ourselves the relation to nervous substance, is connected with\nmathematical modes of which it becomes conscious when it becomes\nluminous. Not that I would in any way have it understood that thought\nis but an equivalent of heat or of motion. Far from that, equivalence\nis not identity; and whenever we change from one degree to another in\nthe natural and scientific order we meet a new unknown which is the\ncharacteristic of this degree. The induction that leads us to connect\nthought with mathematical conditions, leads us also to connect it with\nphysical, chemical, and biological conditions, of which it is necessarily\nparticipant. Finally, when, at the highest point, it arrives face to face\nwith itself, it studies itself experimentally like the rest, and forms\nits own doctrine. If it attempts to go out metaphysically into space,\nit is reduced to combining subjectively its own elements, turns in a\ncircle without issue and falls back upon itself. If, on the contrary, it\nmakes the same attempt towards nature from which it emanates, then the\nways open, science is established, and positive philosophy appears. The\nmaterial constitution of the nervous substance is the point of junction\nbetween the human mind and laws or general facts. If I had been younger,\nI should have made a work of this view, not a paragraph; but old age must\nhasten.\u201d\n\nI have translated more than was necessary so as to give the \u201cview\u201d as\na whole. Does it not contain the answer to your question, \u201cWhat is the\norigin of the _a priori_\u201d?\n\nThough Littr\u00e9 solved your \u201cbasic problem of philosophy\u201d he did not attach\nso much importance to this solution as you do because his philosophy is\nbased upon a generalisation from all facts and not upon any one fact,\nhowever important it may be.\n\n\u201cPositive Philosophy is the conception of the world that results from the\nsystematised ensemble of the positive sciences\u201d and does not depend upon\nthe solution of any psychological problem, although it recognises the\nimportance of all psychological facts.\n\nYour originality lies in your application of Littr\u00e9\u2019s discovery.\n\nThe reader has his choice between Littr\u00e9\u2019s positivism and your\nneo-Kantism, but if he side with you he must at least thank Littr\u00e9 for\nthe solution on which your philosophy is based.\n\nYou say that \u201cComtean Positivism, especially as it is represented by\nLittr\u00e9, consists mainly if not exclusively of the doctrine to \u2018let\nmetaphysics alone.\u2019\u201d Is this fair to the man that solved your \u201cbasic\nproblem of philosophy\u201d in a paragraph?\n\nPositivism as represented by Littr\u00e9 gives due importance to the\nsubjective element. He recognised that three essentials were necessary\nto the completion of Comte\u2019s philosophy: a political economy, a cerebral\ntheory, and what, for want of a better name he termed the subjective\ntheory of humanity. This last comprised ethics, \u00e6sthetics, and\npsychology. Speaking of a confusion that obscures the whole discussion\nrelative to psychology, he says: \u201c_Cerebral theory_, _mental_ or\n_psychological theory_ are taken in two very different senses, which\nare never distinguished. These terms signify sometimes the organic\nconditions under which intelligence manifests itself, sometimes the\nformal conditions under which the intellect operates. As soon as these\ntwo significations are separated we perceive the means of settling the\ndebate as to the place of psychology; for to the question: Where should\nthese two orders be studied? it will be answered that the first should\nbe studied in anatomy, physiology, zo\u00f6logy, the evolution of ages,\npathology, it belongs therefore without contest to biology; but it will\nbe answered that the second should be studied in the total development\nof history and in the application to all the modes of cognition; it\nbelongs incontestably to philosophy. Thus there are two psychologies,\none biological, the other philosophical, one relating to the individual\nman, the other to the collective man, one furnishing what is necessary\nin order to pass from biology to sociology, the other examining the\nsubjective instrument by the light of all positive knowledge. But\nthis complement of philosophy I do not call psychology, I call it the\n_subject-theory_ of _humanity_; because while including psychology, it\nincludes much more.\u201d That is to say; ethics and \u00e6sthetics.... \u201cIn the\norder of the positive method it is at first by means of the object that\nhuman knowledge is built up, and we end with the subject.\u201d \u201cThe theory of\nthe subject is the indispensable complement of the theory of the object.\u201d\n\nOf positive philosophy Littr\u00e9 says: \u201cWhile it constructs the series of\nthe partial philosophies and thus embraces all objective knowledge, it\nconstructs at the same time the series of effective methods and thus\nembraces all logical power. I borrow this expression from M. Comte, who\nso happily named these effective methods the logical powers of the human\nmind. When it has terminated its first series it is found to have also\nterminated the second. Thus the ensemble of the methods represents the\nfunction of the subject; the ensemble of the partial philosophies, the\nfunction of the object.\u201d\n\nIs this what you call a \u201cone-sided philosophy\u201d?\n\nYou say that Littr\u00e9 is the worst kind of a metaphysician because he\nmaintains that we can know nothing about first and final causes; I quote\nhim to show his position: \u201cPositive philosophy is at the same time a\nsystem that comprises all that is known of the world, of man and of\nsociety, and a general method including all the ways by which things have\nbeen learned. What is beyond, either, materially, the depths (fond) of\nboundless space, or, intellectually, the endless enchainment of causes,\nis absolutely inaccessible to the human mind. But inaccessible does not\nmean null or non-existent. Immensity, both material and intellectual,\nholds by a narrow tie to what we know and becomes by this alliance a\npositive idea of the same order; I mean to say that by touching and\nbordering it, this immensity appears in its double character, reality and\ninaccessibility. It is an ocean that washes our shore, and for which we\nhave neither bark nor sail, but whose clear vision is as salutary as it\nis formidable.\u201d _Aug. Comte et la Phil. Pos._, 2d Ed., p. 519.\n\nAs Littr\u00e9 had found this shore encumbered with the wrecks of expeditions\nthat had started out in search of first causes and final causes, it is no\nwonder that he was a little timid. His metaphor needs explanation in the\nlight of other passages, otherwise it might seem to discourage pursuit\nof the unknown. He did not discountenance hypotheses but he was very\nmuch afraid of our inclination to take guesses for truth; and this, by\nthe way, is the reason why he is not appreciated in this country, where\nwe are so fond of guessing. What he really did was to discourage those\nnavigators who would go in search of the Jumping-off-place, for the best\nthat can befall them is to come back to where they started. The men that\nknow the earth is round are the only men that find new worlds.\n\nIn answer to your statement that Littr\u00e9\u2019s philosophy \u201cis an inventory\nrather than a plan to guide science in its further evolution\u201d I will only\nrepeat in his words, what he has shown so well, that \u201cpositive philosophy\nis the ensemble of human knowledge, disposed according to a certain order\nwhich enables us to grasp its connections and its unity, and to draw from\nit the general directions for each part and for the whole.\u201d\n\nYou say that \u201cLittr\u00e9 rejects the evolution theory and its attempts to\nexplain ethics.\u201d I quote him from _La Philosophie Positive_, March, 1880:\n\u201cPositive philosophy does not deny the evolution of ethics; far from\ndoing so, it maintained and inculcated this evolution long before the\nutilitarian doctrine made it its ethical pivot.\u201d.... \u201cGeneral morality,\nborn of the gradual culture of the sentimental basis of the human\nsoul under the social protection of progressive centres, is entirely\ndisinterested, and this is what makes its purity and its force.\u201d\n\nIn your philosophy you have a god and a religion, in his we have the same\nthings, but as they are so different from what is generally understood by\nthese terms, we use others. Here are some of the _Paroles de Philosophie\nPositive_: \u201cIn the eyes of history, there are no false religions, there\nare only incomplete religions which make their way through time and\nperfect themselves.... The definition of religion is taken from its\noffice, which is: to put education, and consequently moral life, en\nrapport with the conception of the world at each phase of humanity.\nWhoever examines this definition will find that it satisfies all the\nconditions of religion, either in the past, the present, or the future.\nIt will be perceived that theology is not inherent in the religious\nidea. It was not always there in the past; for we cannot give the name\nof theology to primordial fetichism, which addressed its worship to\nneighboring objects, nor to the religions that adore natural agents, such\nas air, wind, night, dawn; it is with polytheism that theology begins. As\nfor the future, general science, conceiving the world differently from\nthe way in which it was conceived during the reigns of the successive\nreligions, takes an office equivalent to the religious office, and must\nin its turn place education and moral life in accord with the universe as\nit appears to us.\u201d.... \u201cWe do not outrage the old doctrine, whose past\nis glorious and venerable; but there is a public for which it is a dead\nletter; and it is to this public that we address ourselves and for this\npublic that we labor.\u201d\n\nIs this not aspiration to be in unison with \u201cthe order of the world,\u201d\nwhich you call God? And when Littr\u00e9 traces this aspiration back to its\norganic origin is he not explaining what you affirm?\n\nOur philosophies are not perfect, but we must apply them, such as they\nare, to the needs of the day. The most pressing of all these needs, in\nmy opinion, is unity of action among those who are animated with the new\nspirit.\n\nLet us pull together.\n\n Very truly yours,\n\n LOUIS BELROSE, JR.\n\n\n\n\n\u00c9MILE LITTR\u00c9\u2019S POSITIVISM.\n\n\nAn editor cannot make it a rule to accept criticisms of considerable\nlength which have reference to a remark incidentally made in a book\nreview. The present case, however, although it belongs in this category,\nis of a peculiar nature. First, the remark on Littr\u00e9 was made by the\neditor himself, and accordingly he feels personally responsible for it;\nsecondly, it contains a brief delineation of Littr\u00e9\u2019s character as a man\nand as a philosopher in the way in which he is usually regarded by the\nmost prominent historians of philosophy. Mr. Belrose presents Littr\u00e9 in\nquite a new light and quotes passages in corroboration of his conception\nof Littr\u00e9 which are perhaps not generally known, for they are buried in\narticles of the positivistic journal _La Philosophie Positive_, and this\njournal enjoyed neither a long life nor a large circulation; nor is it\nto be had in any of the libraries accessible to me. Seventeen editorial\narticles were republished in bookform, (_La Science. Au point de vue\nphilosophique, par_ \u00c9. LITTR\u00c9. Paris, 1873), but the article \u201cThe Three\nPhilosophies\u201d is not among them.\n\nIf Mr. Belrose\u2019s conception of Littr\u00e9 proves to be true, I shall not\nonly gladly correct my own wrong view of Littr\u00e9, but I wish also to call\nattention to the fact that he has been misrepresented by almost all and\ncertainly by the best and most painstaking philosophical historians.\n\nI cannot however in the main points accede to Mr. Belrose\u2019s view and will\nhave to sustain my former opinion that M. Littr\u00e9 was an agnostic. He\nmade it a matter of principle to suspend his opinion on some of the most\nfundamental philosophical problems, which he considered as inaccessible.\nHis positivism, accordingly, differs _toto c\u0153lo_ from the positivism\npresented in _The Monist_. His philosophy, like that of Comte, is so far\nas I understand it, a policy of let-metaphysics-alone. It gives up the\nstruggle with metaphysics as a hopeless undertaking. Therefore, I should\nsay, Littr\u00e9\u2019s positivism has not conquered metaphysics, and although it\nlets metaphysics alone, metaphysics plays an important part in it. Littr\u00e9\nis an agnostic and like every agnostic that believes in the unknowable, a\nmetaphysician without knowing it.\n\nThe doctrine of the three stages of knowledge, viz., the theological,\nmetaphysical, and positive stages, appears to me of less importance. The\ndoctrine of the three stages is at the same time not properly a Comtean\nidea; Comte adopted it from Turgot, the great statesman and one of the\ngreatest men as a thinker and also as a character that ever lived and who\nis too little appreciated as such.\n\nThe main doctrine of Comte\u2019s positivism is the doctrine that first and\nfinal causes cannot be known, and we must abandon our search for them;\nthat human knowledge is limited to the middle, while the two ends are\ninaccessible. These insoluble questions, he declares, have made no\nprogress from the beginning. Mr. Lewes in his book \u201cComte\u2019s Philosophy of\nthe Sciences\u201d expresses this agnosticism in the following words (p. 31):\n\u201cOur province is to study her [nature\u2019s] laws, to trace her processes,\nand, thankful that we can so far penetrate the divine significance of the\nuniverse, be content\u2014as Locke wisely and modestly says\u2014to sit down in\nquiet ignorance of all _transcendent_[61] subjects.\u201d\n\nThis idea has so far as I am aware never been given up by Littr\u00e9; it\nremained the basis of his belief in the unknowable and his works abound\nin expressions that concerning the main problems of life, \u201cthe positive\nphilosophy will neither assert nor deny anything.\u201d\n\nLittr\u00e9 concludes the last article of his volume \u201cLa Science\u201d with the\nfollowing words:\n\n \u201cLe domaine ult\u00e9rieur est celui des choses qui ne peuvent\n pas \u00eatre connues. La science positive professe de n\u2019y rien\n nier, de n\u2019y rien affirmer; en un mot, elle ne conna\u00eet pas\n l\u2019inconnaissable, mais elle en constate l\u2019existence. L\u00e0 est la\n philosophie supr\u00eame; aller plus loin est chim\u00e9rique, aller moin\n loin est d\u00e9serter notre destin\u00e9e.\u201d\n\nThis quotation alone, I think, settles the first main point at issue.\n\nNow I maintain that Comte\u2019s view of causation where he refers to first\nand final causes is fundamentally wrong; causation is transformation\nand causality is the formula under which we comprehend the changes of\nmatter and energy that take place. The expressions first and final causes\nare misnomers (see \u201cFundamental Problems,\u201d the chapter The Problem of\nCausality). First cause is either the starting point of a series of some\nlonger chain of causes and effects, or as the term is generally applied\nor rather misapplied, stands for the last ground or reason, i. e. the\nanswer given to the ultimate question why?, which is the most general\n_raison d\u2019\u00eatre_ that would explain and contain all the other and less\ngeneral _raisons d\u2019\u00eatre_ regarding the nature of existence. The term\nfinal cause, again, means either the last cause in a series of causes or\n(and so it is generally used) it is a misnomer for purpose; and the final\ncause supposed to be inaccessible to human comprehension is the purpose\nof the existence of the world at large. I object to there being three\nkinds of causes. There is one kind of causality only, and the causes of\nthis causality in all the causal processes with which we are confronted\nare perfectly intelligible.\n\nThe problem of the first cause of the origin of our world, viz. the\nsolar system and the milky way, was attacked first by Kant and later by\nLaplace, and the latter, without knowing of Kant\u2019s solution, solved it\nin the main in the same way. All recent investigations stand upon this\nKant-Laplace hypothesis so called, having added corrections only as to\ndetails. Shall we declare that these labors are vain and gratuitous\nefforts of vague speculations? Littr\u00e9 says, with reference to such\nspeculations, concerning the past and future states of the world (le\nmonde):\n\n \u201cLa diss\u00e9mination primordiale de la mati\u00e8re qui devait le\n composer, la diss\u00e9mination future de la mati\u00e8re qui le compose,\n d\u00e9passant toute exp\u00e9rience, d\u00e9passent toute conjecture.\u201d\n\nIf I misunderstand Littr\u00e9, it appears to me a pardonable mistake.\n\nYet is not the problem as to the origin of the world at large, why\nmatter and energy exist at all, insolvable? Littr\u00e9 says that the\npositive cosmogonies, such as the doctrine of evolution do not touch\nthe absolute; they have nothing to do with first and final causes. He\nsays: \u201cLes cosmogonies positives la [i. e. la place des cosmogonies\nreligieuses] remplissent, non pas qu\u2019elles aient la pr\u00e9tention ni le\npouvoir de p\u00e9n\u00e9trer dans l\u2019absolu et d\u2019embrasser, les causes premi\u00e8res et\nfinales.\u201d\u2014l. c., p. 560.\n\nThat kind of causality which is sometimes called \u201contological,\u201d having\nreference to the existence, not of single things as transformations from\nother things, but of the world at large and formulated in such questions\nas how did the universe itself, the world as a whole, originate, is\nproperly speaking no causality, it is not a question concerning a cause,\nbut concerning a _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_. However without haggling about the\nwords cause and _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_, this ontological causality so called\nis by no means beyond human comprehension. The ontological question\nhas found a very definite answer in the formulation of the law of the\nconservation of matter and energy; which declares that existence at\nlarge did not originate, the total amount of matter as well as of energy\nexisted always and will exist always. It has not been created; it is\nuncreatable and indestructible; it is eternal.\n\nLittr\u00e9 is quite explicit in declaring that the positive philosophy lets\nalone all theological and metaphysical problems. It is neither atheistic\nnor theistic, and does not side with either materialism or spiritualism.\nHe says:\n\n \u201cNi spiritualiste, ni mat\u00e9rialiste, la philosophie positive\n \u00e9carte de la science g\u00e9n\u00e9rale les d\u00e9bats que la science\n particuli\u00e8re a depuis long temps et \u00e0 son grand profit\n rejet\u00e9s.\u201d\u2014Preface d\u2019un disciple in Comte\u2019s \u201cCourse de Phil.\n pos.\u201d p. xxvii.\n\nLittr\u00e9 characterises as the main object of the positive philosophy, \u201cto\ngive to philosophy the positive method of the sciences, to the sciences\nthe idea of the unity of philosophy.\u201d He says: \u201cAinsi fut accompli ce\nqu\u2019on doit appeler l\u2019\u0153uvre philosophique du dix-neuvi\u00e8me si\u00e8cle, donner\n\u00e0 la philosophie la m\u00e9thode positive des sciences, aux sciences l\u2019id\u00e9e\nd\u2019ensemble de la philosophie.\u201d Preface, p. viii.\n\nI am in perfect agreement with Littr\u00e9 that this is the object of\npositivism; but, if I understand Littr\u00e9 correctly, I disagree from his\nconception of the positive method. He limits the positive method to what\nhe calls \u201cexperience,\u201d and excludes every notion of the _a priori_.\nLittr\u00e9 apparently misunderstood the proper meaning of Kant\u2019s idea of\nthe _a priori_, for he used as a matter of course the _a priori_ method\nwherever it was indispensable, so for instance in mathematics and in the\napplication of mathematics.\n\nMr. Belrose says:\n\n[Littr\u00e9] \u201csolved your basic problem of philosophy [i. e. what is the\norigin of the _a priori_] in a paragraph.\u201d\n\nThe problem of the _a priori_ reasoning is the question \u201cWhy can we\nknow certain things before we have tested them by experiment? Man has\nnot arrived by experience but by pure reasoning at the conclusion that\nthe sum of the angles of every plane triangle has 180 degrees. How is\nhe justified in declaring _a priori_ that the angles of a certain plane\ntriangle make up 180 degrees, although he has not measured them?\u201d This\nproblem is the fundamental problem of the scientific or positive method;\nit is the same problem which Mr. Charles S. Peirce discusses in his\narticle (see pp. 321 et seqq. of the present number of _The Monist_), for\nthe problem of apriority is identical with the question of necessity.\n\nLittr\u00e9 has, so far as I know, never discussed the problem of apriority\nand necessity. He has simply rejected the idea of the _a priori_ as\nthe method of a false metaphysics, which is incompatible with the _a\nposteriori_ method of positive science. The passage quoted by Mr. Belrose\nmost certainly does _not_ contain a solution of the problem. Littr\u00e9\ndeclares therein that every chemical action is equivalent to a certain\nquantity of heat; and again this heat is equivalent to a certain quantity\nof motion. Thus, he says, thought is connected with mathematical modes\nof which it becomes conscious. Thought, he adds, is not an equivalent of\nheat or motion, for equivalence is not identity, but it is connected with\nmathematical conditions. This means that that kind of brain-action which\nrepresents conscious thought, depends upon definite proportions. But\nwhat in all the world has this idea to do with the problem of apriority?\nThe phrase \u201cmathematical modes\u201d (which is misleading in this passage) is\nan unfortunate expression for \u201cproportions\u201d and we must add that Littr\u00e9\nis mistaken when he says that the nervous substance when it becomes\nluminous, becomes conscious of these mathematical modes with which it is\nconnected. Aside from \u201cluminous\u201d being simply an allegorical expression\nfor conscious, it is wrong to say that the nervous substance becomes\nconscious of the mathematical modes of heat as they are proportioned in\nthe brain. A sentient being knows through sensation nothing about the\nmechanism or the mechanical proportions of its own sentient structure.\nSensation is the act of a becoming conscious not of the sentient\nstructure itself but of the meaning which this sentient structure has\nacquired, and a consciousness of the mathematical modes which according\nto Comte\u2019s hierarchy of the sciences ought to be the beginning of\nknowledge develops at a very late period. Any explanation of the origin\nof _a priori_, be it ever so brief, would lead us too far away from the\npoints of our controversy. It is sufficient here to point out that the\npassage quoted by Mr. Belrose, contains no solution of the problem of\nour knowledge and certitude of mathematical, arithmetical, and other\npurely formal laws. On the contrary, this very passage is replete with\nerror; it is a misstatement of facts and does not even bring to light the\ndifficulties of the problem.\n\nLittr\u00e9 was prejudiced against the _a priori_, and his prejudice induced\nhim to underrate its importance. I read in one of Littr\u00e9\u2019s passages\nquoted by Mr. Belrose:\n\n \u201cIf it [thought] attempts to go out metaphysically into space,\n it is reduced to combining subjectively its own elements, turns\n in a circle without issue and falls back upon itself.\u201d\n\nThe _a priori_ method of thought subjectively combining its own elements,\nis by no means a turning in a circle without issue so that in the end it\nwill fall back upon itself. The _a priori_ method of thought subjectively\ncombining its own elements is employed by arithmetic, mathematics, and\nlogic, and we are confronted with the astonishing fact that rules, or\nformulas, or calculations which were made by pure thought subjectively\ncombining its own elements, are applicable and hold good as reliable\nguides in our experiments. If there were no _a priori_, how could we\nforetell or, what is more still, how could we predetermine the course\nof nature? The _a priori_ has been wrongly employed by the so-called\nmetaphysical philosophers to give us information about the substance and\nessence of the world. But the misapplication of the _a priori_ is no\nreason for denouncing it as radically wrong.\n\nThe existence of the _a priori_ is an undeniable fact. Kant was\nright in recognising it in its sweeping importance, yet he was wrong\nin his interpretation of the _a priori_, which according to his\ntranscendentalism was based exclusively upon a peculiarity of the mind\nand not upon the nature of things. The positivists in France did not only\nobject to the wrong interpretation of the transcendentalists but also\ndenied the existence of the _a priori_. Accepting the principle that\nevery knowledge must ultimately be a statement of facts, the question\nHow is the _a priori_ to be based upon facts? became in my conception of\nphilosophy the burning problem which was next in order as a conciliation\nbetween Kant and Comte.\n\nThe French positivists, foremost among them Comte and Littr\u00e9, have not\ngiven us an explanation of what is true and false in the theological\nand metaphysical notions of first and final causes, of the _a priori_\nof God, of substance, of force, etc.; they have simply abandoned the\ninvestigation of these ideas which are after all the most important tools\nin the household of the human mind for scientific and ethical purposes;\nand thus they have, in spite of their positivism in questions of detail,\nretained the metaphysical method of _a priori_ reasoning which is quite\nlegitimate in the formal science but out of place concerning facts. Take\nfor instance the following argument concerning the materiality of things:\n\n \u201cL\u00e0, c\u2019est \u00e0 dire dans les sciences positives, on ne conna\u00eet\n aucune propri\u00e9t\u00e9 sans mati\u00e8re, non point parce que, _a priori_,\n on y a l\u2019id\u00e9e pr\u00e9con\u00e7ue qu\u2019il n\u2019existe aucune substance\n spirituelle ind\u00e9pendante, mais parce que, _a posteriori_,\n on n\u2019a jamais rencontr\u00e9 la gravitation sans corps pesant,\n la chaleur sans corps chaud, l\u2019\u00e9lectricit\u00e9 sans corps\n \u00e9lectrique, l\u2019affinit\u00e9 sans substances de combinaison, la\n vie, la sensibilit\u00e9, la pens\u00e9e, sans \u00eatre vivant, sentant et\n pensant.\u201d\u2014_La Science_, p. 307.\n\nI do not mean to say that there are immaterial or spiritual substances,\nbut I should say that any purely _a posteriori_ argument in favor of\ntheir non-existence is insufficient. Would Littr\u00e9 mean that a Zulu\nshould declare that ice cannot exist because he has never seen water\nfrozen as hard as a stone? Any amount of experience, i. e. all _a\nposteriori_ evidence, is in parts and will out of itself never acquire\nuniversal validity.\n\nHow strongly Littr\u00e9 is still implicated in the metaphysical method of\napplying _a priori_ ideas to _a posteriori_ experiences can be learned\nfrom the following statement:\n\n \u201cLe monde est constitu\u00e9 par la mati\u00e8re et par les forces de\n la mati\u00e8re: la mati\u00e8re dont l\u2019origine et l\u2019essence nous sont\n inaccessible; les forces qui sont immanentes \u00e0 la mati\u00e8re. Au\n del\u00e0 de ces deux termes, mati\u00e8re et force, la science positive\n ne conna\u00eet rien.\u201d Preface, p. ix.\n\nThe metaphysical ideas, matter and force, are _a priori_ notions of\nmystical entities or things in themselves, and thus it appears natural\nthat experience should know nothing of them. But real matter and actual\nforce are not unknowable existences. They can be known. We know something\nof them and positive science is engaged in broadening and deepening this\nknowledge. Says Littr\u00e9:\n\n \u201cLes propri\u00e9t\u00e9s physiques sont manifestes en toute substance,\n dans quelque \u00e9tat qu\u2019elle soit, isol\u00e9e ou non isol\u00e9e, et\n s\u2019exercent sur les masses; les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s, n\u2019apparaissent\n qu\u2019entre deux substances, ont besoin de la binarit\u00e9 et\n s\u2019exercent sur les mol\u00e9cules; enfin les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s vitales\n d\u00e9passant la binarit\u00e9, ne sont compatibles qu\u2019avec un \u00e9tat\n mol\u00e9culaire plus compos\u00e9.\u201d Preface, p. x.\n\nOne of the fundamental principles of positivism, as I conceive it,\nis the definition of knowledge as a description of facts or of their\nproperties. We call certain properties of the facts (i. e. the objects\nof our experience) matter and others force. When we say that we do or do\nnot know a certain phenomenon we mean that we have or have not as yet\nsucceeded in placing them properly in that system of thought-symbols of\nwhich our mind consists. Yet there is no sense in speaking of matter and\nforce as being unknowable while the properties of matter and force are\nsaid to be manifest and appearing under certain conditions.\n\nI have presented the main reasons why I still hold that there is a\nradical difference between Littr\u00e9\u2019s view of positivism and my own.\nLittr\u00e9 is an agnostic and he was an agnostic before that name had been\ninvented. His objection to metaphysicism consists in the doctrine not\nthat the object of metaphysics is a chimerical non-existence, but that\nthe object of metaphysics exists yet it cannot be known. Thus Littr\u00e9 is\nas much a metaphysician as those philosophers whom he censures for their\nmetaphysical views. He does not censure them for believing that the\nmetaphysical exists, but for believing that it is knowable and attempting\nto investigate its nature.\n\nAs to the hierarchy of the sciences I shall simply quote a few extracts\nfrom Eugen D\u00fchring\u2019s criticism of Comte. D\u00fchring says (_Krit. Gesch. der\nPhil._, p. 486):\n\n \u201cIf Comte\u2019s _positivism_ were nothing more than what we have\n here laid down, its main contents would, strange enough,\n consist in _negativity_. The criticism of a certain kind of\n metaphysics, viz. of an ontology phantastical to a greater or\n lesser extent, would form its most significant character. The\n other element which consists in presenting a hierarchy and\n unitary conjunction of some of the sciences which are called\n positive in the usual sense of the term, cannot pretend to\n be philosophy in the higher sense of the word or even to be\n useful for science. A general view of knowledge, whether it\n consists of six or sixty volumes, does not add the least iota\n to the contents of our knowledge.... We cannot expect that a\n specialist should be pleased with a hierarchical sketch of his\n science, especially if the delineations are filled out with\n details of which he would be a better judge.\u201d\n\nIt is true, and I concur in this with the French positivists, that a\npositive philosophy must be a systematic arrangement of knowledge. But I\nconceive it to be the philosopher\u2019s work, not to take an inventory of the\nsciences, but to define the fundamental concepts of scientific enquiry\nand to elucidate the methods of cognition. Such fundamental concepts\nare the ideas, truth and criterion of truth, cause and effect, mind,\nthought, knowledge, ethics, etc. Concepts are the tools of thought and\nthe practice of using them correctly has to be learned.\n\nPositivism is not the original invention of a world-system, but the\nsystematising of statements of facts so as to produce a world-system.\nThe old philosophers gave us first a world-system, from which and in\naccord with which they defined their views of truth, cognition, cause,\netc. They began to build their philosophy from the top down. Positivism\nbegins from the bottom and is building up to the top with the assistance\nof the special sciences. A positive philosophy is inseparable from, but\nit cannot be replaced by, the sciences. The field of philosophy is to\nsuperintend the method and the plan of building, so as to compare the\ndetails and bear in mind the unity of the whole. In this sense D\u00fchring\nsays in criticising Comte (p. 486):\n\n \u201cHowever, concerning the form of the connections of methodical\n reflections, something can be done. Yet it must be possible\n to separate everything of such a kind and also new insights,\n so as to constitute a special branch of knowledge. Otherwise\n they will escape the specialists\u2019 attention.... Not only Comte\n but all philosophers given to the idea of systematisation and\n construction of particular knowledge have made attempts in\n this direction which at most may range as sketches or popular\n presentations in a higher sense.\u201d\n\nConcerning Littr\u00e9\u2019s view of Comte\u2019s religious vagaries D\u00fchring says (p.\n483):\n\n \u201cHis [Comte\u2019s] biographer, the Academician Littr\u00e9 of Paris,\n and also Stuart Mill are right in considering \u2018The Course of\n Positive Philosophy\u2019 as the main and fundamental work which is\n decisive as a contribution of his and a source of instruction\n to the world. However, they are very one-sided when they\n overlook that the philosopher even in his vagaries exhibited a\n universality of mind which remains superior to the standpoint\n of either Littr\u00e9 or Mill.\u201d\n\nI agree with Mr. Belrose that Comte\u2019s religion as he conceived it\nconsists of vagaries, but the main idea of developing the religions\nof the past which, as Littr\u00e9 says, are not false but only incomplete\nreligions, into a religion that shall be in accord with the science of\nour day is no vagary, but a great and an important ideal.\n\nFar be it from me to belittle Littr\u00e9 because I disagree from him in\nsome fundamental questions. He was in his time, he is still, and will\nremain for ever a star of first magnitude in our philosophical galaxy.\nThat which I consider as his errors does not detract from his greatness.\nWere not Kant\u2019s mistakes in a similar way closely interwoven with his\ngreatest merits? It is flattering to me that Mr. Belrose finds an\nagreement between his master\u2019s and my views concerning the basic problem\nof philosophy, but I cannot discover it. Yet I gladly acknowledge that\nthere exists an agreement of aim, and this agreement of aim which finds\nits truest expression in the word \u201cpositivistic\u201d is perhaps of greater\nimportance than the agreement of views.\n\n P. C.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[61] Italics are not mine.\n\n\n\n\nOBSERVATIONS ON SOME POINTS IN JAMES\u2019S PSYCHOLOGY.[62]\n\n\nIn calling attention to some objections to the views advanced by\nProfessor James on the subjects of Belief, Emotion, and Will, it is only\njustice to myself to express the admiration I feel for his work as a\nwhole. The thoroughly scientific spirit which pervades it, the author\u2019s\ncandor in admitting and his skill in surmounting difficulties, his\nlearning and his originality, his aptness in illustration, and the energy\nand vivacity of his style combine to make it full of interest as well as\ninstruction. It is because it should be, and doubtless will be widely\ninfluential, that it is important that any doubtful positions assumed in\nit should be subjected to a careful examination.\n\nI shall endeavor to avoid any misrepresentation of the views which I\ncombat, but space will not allow me to do full justice to the arguments\nby which they are supported, if such a thing is possible for an\nantagonist. For this, I must refer the interested reader to the original\nbook. If what I have to say should have the effect of increasing the\nnumber of its readers, I shall not have written altogether in vain,\nwhether I succeed or fail in setting the truth in a clearer light.\n\n\nI. BELIEF.\n\nProfessor James entitles the chapter devoted to this subject \u201cThe\nPerception of Reality,\u201d and defines belief to be \u201cthe mental state\nor function of cognising reality.\u201d He explains that, \u201cAs used in the\nfollowing pages, \u2018Belief\u2019 will mean every degree of assurance, including\nthe highest possible certainty and conviction\u201d (Vol. II, p. 283).\n\nAccording to this definition, erroneous beliefs, such, for instance, as\nthe belief that the earth is flat, stationary, and the centre of the\nuniverse, or the delusion of an insane man that he is Jesus Christ, are\ncognitions of reality. Professor James would probably say that they are\nrealities to the mind entertaining them, and it is true that the feeling\nof belief is the same, whether the thing believed be true or false.\nI think, however, that it is more customary to use the verb which he\nemploys in connection with beliefs which agree with the objective facts,\nand that the \u201cfeeling\u201d or \u201csense\u201d of reality would be a better term than\n\u201cperception\u201d or \u201ccognition.\u201d\n\nThis, however, is not, to my mind, the most serious objection to the\ndefinition. Although Professor James does not use the word \u201cknowledge\u201d\nin this connection, it seems evident, from the passage quoted above, and\nfrom what he says elsewhere, that he considers all kinds, as well as all\ndegrees of certainty to be beliefs. It seems to me evident, on the other\nhand, that many of our cognitions of reality are not properly called\nbeliefs. As an instance, I will quote the illustration with which he\nopens the discussion of \u201cThe Various Orders of Reality\u201d (p. 287).\n\n \u201cSuppose a new-born mind, entirely blank and waiting for\n experience to begin. Suppose that it begins in the form of a\n visual impression (whether faint or vivid is immaterial) of a\n lighted candle against a dark background, and nothing else, so\n that whilst this image lasts it constitutes the entire universe\n to the mind in question. Suppose, moreover (to simplify the\n hypothesis), that the candle is only imaginary, and that no\n \u2018original\u2019 of it is recognised by us psychologists outside.\n Will this hallucinatory candle be believed in, will it have a\n real existence for the mind?\n\n \u201cWhat possible sense (for that mind) would a suspicion have\n that the candle is not real? What would doubt or disbelief\n of it imply? When _we_, the onlooking psychologists, say the\n candle is unreal, we mean something quite definite, viz.\n that there is a world known to _us_ which _is_ real, and to\n which we perceive that the candle does not belong; it belongs\n exclusively to that individual mind, has no status anywhere\n else, etc. It exists, to be sure, in a fashion, for it forms\n the content of that mind\u2019s hallucination; but the hallucination\n itself, though unquestionably it is a sort of existing fact,\n has no knowledge of _other_ facts; and since those _other_\n facts are the realities _par excellence_ for us, and the only\n things we believe in, the candle is simply outside of our\n reality and belief altogether.\n\n \u201cBy the hypothesis, however, the mind which sees the candle\n can spin no such considerations as these about it, for of\n other facts, actual or possible, it has no inkling whatever.\n That candle is its all, its absolute. Its entire faculty of\n attention is absorbed by it. It _is_, it is _that_; it is\n _there_; no other possible candle, or quality of this candle,\n no other possible place, or possible object in the place, no\n alternative, in short, suggests itself as even conceivable;\n so how can the mind help believing the candle real? The\n supposition that it might possibly not do so is, under the\n supposed conditions, unintelligible.\u201d\n\nI readily grant that it is, under the supposed circumstances,\nunintelligible that the candle should be thought to be unreal, but it\nseems to me equally so that it should be believed to be real. What does\nProfessor James mean by a belief in the reality of the candle under such\nconditions? Nothing more than that the mind is conscious of a sensation\nwhich we know, but it does not, is like that produced by the sight of\na candle. This sensation is certainly a reality, and the only possible\nreality to that mind. Professor James must, then, be understood as\nmaintaining that a sensation, pure and simple, is a belief in an object\nexciting the sensation. If, for instance, the first consciousness of the\nsupposed mind were the odor of a rose, or the whistle of a locomotive,\nhe must admit that the mind would believe in the rose or the locomotive.\nIf I have a headache, or am hungry or tired, I not only have beliefs\nabout these sensations, but the headache, the hunger, the weariness, are\nthemselves beliefs. Now I submit that this is contrary to all ordinary\nuse of language. It is, perhaps, impossible for an adult, with his mind\nfull of memories of past experiences, to have a sensation without some\nsort of a belief about it, but although the sensation and the belief\nmay be inseparable, they are not indistinguishable, and, as a matter of\nfact, every one does distinguish between his sensations and his beliefs\nabout them. I do not think it would be quite correct to say even of an\nadult who had never seen or heard of a candle, that, on seeing one for\nthe first time, he would believe in the reality of the candle, although\ndoubtless he would believe he saw something real\u2014a real flame, for\ninstance.\n\nIf it be admitted that sensations are entitled to be called beliefs,\nit seems impossible to stop short of the conclusion that all states of\nconsciousness are beliefs.\n\nEmotions and volitions are as much realities as sensations, and are known\nas such by the mind that experiences them. That memory and imagination\ninvolve belief, is too evident to need discussion. But if this be the\ncase, the chapter on belief could have been very greatly abbreviated\u2014need\nnot in fact, contain more than four words. To say that all consciousness\nis belief would perhaps simplify matters, but it would not advance our\nknowledge very much, nor would it accord with the ordinary use of the\nword, which has reference to a particular kind of consciousness, which\nevery one knows, however hard he may find its definition.\n\nIt seems to me, therefore, that Professor James\u2019s definition of belief\nis defective in two ways. There are beliefs which are not cognitions\nof reality, and there are cognitions of reality which are not beliefs.\nEspecially in regard to the latter class, I think that the definition\nconfuses a distinction that is real and important, between different\nkinds of knowledge. We know our sensations, emotions and volitions in a\nway which differs not only in degree but in kind from any usual, or, I\nthink, legitimate sense of the word \u201cBelief.\u201d\n\nPerhaps it would be the safer course to rest content with pointing out\nthe objections to the author\u2019s definition without laying myself open\nto retaliation by attempting one of my own, but it does not seem to me\nimpossible to give one which will include all that is understood by the\nterm and nothing more. I should say that belief is the sense or feeling\nof relation between mental objects. That we have belief whenever we have\nthis feeling, seems to me too plain to require argument, and I am unable,\nafter a good deal of reflection, to call to mind any belief that is not\nincluded in the definition. If I see, or imagine that I see a lighted\ncandle, it may excite in my mind a great variety of beliefs, as, that the\nflame is hot, that the light and heat are caused by the chemical union of\noxygen with carbon and hydrogen, that the material of which the candle\nis composed is wax, paraffine or tallow, that it has a cotton wick, that\nit is of a certain size, weight, and color, and so on indefinitely.\nAll of these are evidently ideas of relation. To say \u201cflame,\u201d or \u201chot\u201d\ndoes not express a belief, unless something else is understood, but to\nsay \u201cflame is hot\u201d does so. If I say that the color red is equal to the\nsquare of the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle, I fail to express\na belief because the mind perceives no relation between the objects, and\nthe answer to such a statement would be, not that it is or is not true,\nbut that it has no meaning. The only cases which occur to me in which it\nmight be plausibly argued that a belief did not involve the feeling of\nrelation are such impersonal expressions as \u201cit rains,\u201d or, \u201cit is cold.\u201d\nThe exception, however, is only apparent, arising from the erroneous\nidea that everything which is implied in language must be expressed.\nWhen we say, \u201cit rains,\u201d we mean, \u201crain is falling.\u201d In either form of\nlanguage, the thought conveyed is that of the relation of the drops of\nwater and their motion. The stock-broker, with his prearranged code,\nmay communicate the ideas of a long sentence in a single word, or the\nFreemason may do the same to the initiated by a gesture. In such a case,\nit would be absurd to contend that no relation is felt or communicated\nbecause there is no formal subject or predicate.\n\nWhatever may be thought of the sufficiency of my definition, I risk the\nassertion that it includes all beliefs that can be affirmed, denied or\ndoubted. We never question our sensations, emotions or volitions\u2014we\nhave them, are aware of them, and that is the end of the matter. It is\nthe relations of our sensations to each other, and to our pleasures\nand pains, our choices and rejections, that involve us in all sorts of\nperplexities. The whole question of the grounds of belief in general, and\nthe truth or falsehood of particular beliefs is a question of relations.\nIt is, then, in the sense indicated above that I shall use the word\nhereafter.\n\nHaving settled the definition, it may be worth while to consider for\na moment whether this feeling of relation, which can only be known by\nexperience, is enough like any other mental states to be classed with\nthem. On this point Professor James says: \u201c_In its inner nature, belief,\nor the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions\nthan to anything else._ Mr. Bagehot distinctly calls it the \u2018emotion\u2019\nof conviction. I just now spoke of it as acquiescence. It resembles\nmore than anything else what in the psychology of volition we know as\nconsent. Consent is recognised by all to be a manifestation of our active\nnature. It would naturally be described by such terms as \u2018willingness\u2019\nor the \u2018turning of our disposition.\u2019 What characterises both consent\nand belief is the cessation of theoretic agitation through the advent\nof an idea which is inwardly stable, and fills the mind solidly to the\nexclusion of contradictory ideas. When this is the case, motor effects\nare apt to follow. Hence the states of consent and belief, characterised\nby repose on the purely intellectual side, are both intimately connected\nwith subsequent practical activity. This inward stability of the mind\u2019s\ncontent is as characteristic of disbelief as of belief. But we shall\npresently see that we never disbelieve anything except for the reason\nthat we believe something else that contradicts the first thing.\nDisbelief is thus an incidental complication to belief, and need not be\nconsidered by itself.\u201d (P. 283).\n\nI am unable to satisfy myself whether, in the above passage, Professor\nJames has in mind the feeling of belief or other feelings which often\naccompany it. The \u201ccessation of theoretic agitation,\u201d \u201cwillingness,\u201d\n\u201cturning of our disposition,\u201d are accompanied by feelings which I should\nsay are not only like, but identical with emotion. In the case of old,\nconfirmed beliefs, however, theoretic agitation ceased, and the turning\nof the disposition occurred, if at all, long ago, and I am unable to\nrecognise anything resembling emotion in my belief that two and two make\nfour, that cows eat grass, that iron is a metal, and many others that\nmight be mentioned. Nor do these beliefs, at the present time, give rise\nto motor effects, which, so far as I am able to see, only result from\nsuch beliefs as are, directly or indirectly, associated with emotion.\nIf such beliefs as I have mentioned are not purely intellectual, as\ndistinguished from emotional phenomena, I should be at a loss to know\nwhere the distinction is to be made between \u201cthe head\u201d and \u201cthe heart.\u201d\nThe sense of relation seems to me to be the most purely intellectual of\nall the mental functions, and, although it may give rise to all sorts of\nemotions, the more settled, undisturbed and unquestioning the belief,\nthe less likely is it to give rise to any but the feeling of calm, which\nseems to me to be the antithesis of emotion. I should say that belief is\na feeling _sui generis_, without enough analogy with any other to justify\nclassing them together.\n\nI have already quoted the illustration with which Professor James opens\nthe discussion of the subject of Reality. After quoting from Spinoza,\nto the same effect, the supposed case of a horse with wings imagined to\nbe real in the absence of any contradictory thought, he goes on to say:\n\u201cThe sense that anything we think of is unreal can only come, then, when\nthat thing is contradicted by some other thing of which we think. _Any\nobject which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as\nabsolute reality._\u201d (P. 288). Elsewhere he says:\n\n \u201c... _all propositions, whether attributive or existential, are\n believed through the very fact of being conceived, unless they\n clash with other propositions believed at the same time, by\n affirming that their terms are the same as the terms of those\n other propositions._\u201d (P. 290).\n\nThis, I think, is stated too strongly, at least, in the latter quotation.\nA proposition that is uncontradicted will be believed, but it is not\nnecessary that the contradictory proposition should be believed in\norder that the first may fail of belief. I believe nothing, at present,\ncontradictory of the proposition that it is now raining in Boston. I\nthink it not improbable that such may be the case, but at the same time\nthe contrary proposition is present to my mind, that it may not be\nraining in Boston, and the result is the state of mind which Professor\nJames very properly regards as the opposite of belief\u2014doubt. But\nsupposing that a proposition is presented to the mind, which, being for\nthe time uncontradicted, is believed, and that subsequently another,\ncontrary proposition is presented, is it certain that the latter will\nbe disbelieved? May not a state of doubt replace belief in this case\nalso? Or supposing that two propositions, which have been believed\nindependently, are brought into juxtaposition in such a way as to show\nthat they are inconsistent, how are we to determine which if either,\nshall be believed? Professor James seems to teach that it is a matter of\nchoice.\n\n \u201cThat we can at any moment think of the same thing which\n at any former moment we thought of is the ultimate law of\n our intellectual constitution. But when we now think of it\n incompatibly with our other ways of thinking of it, then we\n must choose which way to stand by, for we cannot continue to\n think of it in two contradictory ways at once. _The whole\n distinction of real and unreal, the whole psychology of\n belief, disbelief and doubt, is thus grounded on two mental\n facts\u2014first, that we are liable to think differently of the\n same; and second, that when we have done so, we can choose\n which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard._[63]\n The subjects adhered to become real subjects, the attributes\n adhered to real attributes, the existence adhered to real\n existence; while the subjects disregarded become imaginary\n subjects, the attributes disregarded erroneous attributes, and\n the existence disregarded an existence in no man\u2019s land, in the\n limbo \u2018where footless fancies dwell.\u2019\u201d (P. 290).\n\nThe doctrine that belief is, in the last analysis, a matter of choice\nis a prominent feature of Professor James\u2019s teaching, to which I shall\nhave occasion to refer again. It seems to me to involve him in some\ninconsistencies. For the present, it should be noted that he admits the\nreality of every mental object in its proper relations.\n\n \u201cIf I merely dream of a horse with wings, my horse interferes\n with nothing else and has not to be contradicted. That horse,\n its wings, and its place are all equally real. That horse\n exists no otherwise than as winged, and is moreover really\n there, for that place exists no otherwise than as the place\n of that horse, and claims as yet no connection with the other\n places of the world. But if with this horse I make an inroad\n into the _world otherwise known_, and say, for example, \u2018That\n is my old mare Maggie, having grown a pair of wings where\n she stands in her stall,\u2019 the whole case is altered; for now\n the horse and place are identified with a horse and place\n otherwise known, and _what_ is known of the latter objects is\n incompatible with what is perceived of the former. \u2018Maggie\n in her stall with wings! Never!\u2019 The wings are unreal, then,\n visionary. I have dreamed a lie about Maggie in her stall.\u201d (P.\n 289).\n\nHere, the dream is a reality, and the winged horse is as really a part of\nit as the mare Maggie is of the outside world. The reality of the winged\nhorse in the one case, and his unreality in the other, depend on his\nrelations to other mental objects. So, for instance, if any one should\nsay that a mermaid was a creature with the portion of a man from the\nwaist up united to the body and limbs of a horse, I should be justified\nin contradicting him, and saying that it was not a mermaid but a centaur\nthat he had in mind. It would not be a valid answer to say that there\nwere really no such things as mermaids and centaurs. In mythology, a\ncentaur has as definite a structure as a giraffe has in zo\u00f6logy, and\nit is as inexcusable to confound the one as the other with anything\nelse. This point is amplified by the author in a section on \u201cThe Many\nWorlds,\u201d in which the various objects of thought are found in their\nproper relations, and out of which each one selects a world of practical\nrealities, according to his dominant habits of attention. _In the\nrelative sense_, in which we contrast reality with unreality, or consider\none object more real than another,\n\n \u201c_Reality means simply relation to our emotional and active\n life_ ... in this sense, whatever excites and stimulates our\n interest is real.\u201d (P. 295).\n\n \u201c_Whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with\n my life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt._\u201d (P. 298).\n\nThis power of exciting and stimulating our interest, Professor James\nfinds to be possessed in a pre-eminent degree by sensations, which thus\nbecome, directly or indirectly, our tests of reality, and among which\nthose which are pleasurable or painful hold the first rank. Next to them,\nif not of equal power, are emotions.\n\n \u201cThe greatest proof that a man is _sui compos_ is his ability\n to suspend belief in the presence of an emotionally exciting\n idea. To give this power is the highest result of education.\n In untutored minds the power does not exist. Every exciting\n thought in the natural man carries credence with it. To\n conceive with passion is _eo ipso_ to affirm.\u201d (P. 308).\n\nProfessor James\u2019s account of the grounds of belief seems to me inadequate\nin that it fails to show the connection between our sensations and\nemotions and other mental states and our beliefs. Why is it that the\nsight of the heavenly bodies, for instance, awakens in different minds\nsuch diverse beliefs as the Ptolemaic and the Copernican systems of\nastronomy? What does a man who is frightened believe? What belief would\nnecessarily result from a colic? It is not enough to say that sensations\nand emotions are connected with belief; we want to know how they are\nconnected.\n\nBearing in mind the definition of belief as the sense of relation between\nobjects, the question resolves itself into the origin of feelings of\nrelation. As relations are of various kinds, they may be suggested to the\nmind by different circumstances. They may, I think, be divided into three\nclasses:\n\n1) Relations of likeness and unlikeness. These result from the\ncomparison and discrimination of objects. All the beliefs involved\nin the recognition and classification of objects arise in this way.\nWhen, on seeing a certain object, I say that it is a bay horse, and\nwill weigh about eleven hundred pounds, I give expression to relations\nof comparison. The comparison may be immediate, between objects\nsimultaneously present to the senses, or alike present only to memory\nor imagination, or between a present object and a remembered one, or\nmediate, by comparison of two or more objects with some other. All\nmathematical truths are of this kind.\n\n2) Relations of cause and effect, of substance and quality, of whole and\ncomponent parts, of order in time and space, are due to association.\nWhen I say of the horse that his movements are caused by muscular\ncontractions, that he is of a gentle disposition, that he has a bony\nskeleton and red blood, that he is five years old and is harnessed\nto a carriage, I express relations of association. In his chapter on\nAssociation Professor James says:\n\n \u201c_Belief_ in anything _not_ present to sense is the very\n lively, strong, and steadfast association of the image of that\n thing with some present sensation, so that as long as the\n sensation persists the image cannot be excluded from the mind.\u201d\n (Vol. I, p. 598).\n\nI do not think it is a fact that the image of the thing believed in need\nbe associated with any present sensation. I am not aware, for instance,\nthat there is, at present, any such association in my belief in the\nexistence of the city of Constantinople, or that Queen Victoria is\nreigning in England. The associations in these and similar cases are with\nobjects of memory and not with present sensations. On the other hand,\nwhat we mean by belief in a present object always involves memory of the\npast. When we say that we believe in anything, we either mean that it is\nlike other things of the same sort of which we have had experience, or\nthat it stands in some other relation to them. Complete loss of memory\nwould not only destroy all our past beliefs, but, if it were permanent,\nwould prevent our ever forming any new ones. The universe, in such a\ncase, would be a mere chaos of sensations.\n\nIn order that things may be associated, they must first be discriminated,\notherwise, as Professor James has shown, in his chapter on Discrimination\nand Comparison, they are thought of, not as associated things, but as\none thing. In like manner, when discriminated things have once been\nassociated, the tendency is, in the absence of contrary experience, to\nthink of them as belonging together. A child, attracted by the brightness\nof the teapot, touches it and burns his fingers. He naturally expects the\nteapot to be hot the next time he sees it. He is told that his Christmas\ngifts were brought down the chimney by Santa Claus. Until the statement\nis contradicted, he believes it. Why should he not? Or the association\nof things in the mind may come about without any external suggestion.\nI remember that the first time that I ever heard a person snore, the\nthought came into my mind that the strange noise was made by a bear, and\nI lay awake most of the night, in fear of being devoured. The tendency\nis to think of things as related in the way in which they are first\npresented to the mind, until they come up in some different relation.\nThis seems to be the explanation of the tendency to \u201cbelieve as much as\nwe can,\u201d to \u201caffirm immediately the reality of all that is conceived,\u201d\nof which Professor James speaks. With increased experience, we find that\nthere is a difference in the uniformity of associations, and accordingly\nthe coincidence of two or more things is associated with the doubt\nwhether or not the association is a constant one.\n\n3) In addition to the relations considered above, there are some which,\nalthough expressed in terms of association and comparison, seem to me to\nhave a different origin. That the whole is greater than any of its parts\nis a relation of comparison; that a thing cannot be in two different\nplaces at the same time, that every event has a cause, that there is\nan external world, are relations of association. Although they do not\narise independently of experience, they contain more than is given in\nexperience, and the uniformity and firmness with which they are believed\ncan, it seems to me, only be accounted for by the assumption of an innate\npropensity to look upon things as related in these ways.\n\nSo far as I am able to judge, beliefs always arise in one or another\nof these three ways. But a still more interesting question, from the\npractical point of view, than that of the origin of beliefs, is that of\nthe comparative validity of the various grounds of belief. Are they all\nof equal worth, and if not, is there any way of determining which are to\nbe given the preference, or is belief, like taste, a matter about which\n\u201c_non disputandum_\u201d?\n\nProfessor James does not go very deeply into the discussion of this\nquestion. As we have seen, he assigns to sensation the greatest efficacy\nin producing belief, and discusses the comparative power of various\nsorts of sensations in this respect. Emotion he makes a close second.\nBut the question which gives us the more reliable information, in cases\nin which they conflict, he does not discuss at all. As a matter of fact,\nthere is no doubt that a man under the influence of strong emotion often\ndraws different conclusions from the evidence of his senses from those\nat which he would arrive in its absence. Is he warranted in doing so?\nWould any degree of personal interest warrant a man in believing or\ndisbelieving the doctrine of transubstantiation, the Newtonian theory of\ngravitation, the Mosaic or the Darwinian view of the origin of species?\nThere is no doubt that belief on such subjects as these is influenced by\nour interest, real or supposed, in one or the other view, and perhaps\nProfessor James would say that he deals with the working of minds as they\nare, not as we imagine that they ought to be, but the general knowledge\nthat a class of considerations is reliable or the reverse is another\nthing that not only ought to, but actually does affect our beliefs, and\nthe question of the method to be pursued in ascertaining the actual\nrelations of things, of forming true beliefs instead of false ones, is\none which hardly ought to be ignored in a discussion of the subject.\n\nReferring to the three classes of relations already considered, it is, I\nthink, evident that there are differences in the way in which they affect\nour belief. In comparison, the essential thing is the accuracy of the\nobservation. One who has once fully comprehended the proof that the sum\nof the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles, is as sure of\nit as he could be after any amount of experience. In comparing sensible\nobjects, we may, it is true, and our belief confirmed by repetition, but\nthis is only in case that we doubt whether the comparison was rightly\nmade in the first place. That red does not look like blue, nor sweet\ntaste like sour, we are as certain on one trial as a hundred. If we\napply a foot measure to an object eight inches long, nothing can add\nto our certainty that they are not of the same length. In matters of\nassociation, on the other hand, a great deal depends on the uniformity of\nthe association\u2014the number of times that we have experienced it without\ncontrary experience. When I hear a crow, for instance, I believe that it\nis black, because all the crows that I have ever seen have been so. A\nsheep I assume to be white, but with a less degree of confidence, because\nblack sheep are more numerous than white crows. In the case of a horse,\nI have no belief in regard to the color within a certain range, unless\nI have some means of knowing about the particular animal in question.\nIf I were told that my friend had bought a horse, I should have no idea\nwhether it was bay, or black, or white, or some mixture of these colors.\nIf, however, I were told that the natural color of my friend\u2019s horse\nwas green, I should be much more confident that the statement was false\nthan if the same person should tell me he had seen a white crow, for,\nthe same reason that I should more readily believe in a black sheep than\nin the latter. In the customary use of the word, I might say I _knew_\nit was not so. In the case of intuitive judgments experience has little\nor nothing to do with the strength of belief. The adult man is no more\nfirmly convinced of the existence of something external to himself than\nthe child, and, although he may come to doubt it on speculative grounds,\nhe no more fails than the child to show by his actions that he has a\npractical faith in it.\n\nIn many, if not most of our beliefs, all of these elements are present.\nIf I see an orange, for instance, I have the intuition of externality,\nthe comparison with other oranges that I have already seen, and\nassociations of internal structure, taste, smell, and the like. All of\nthese, and very possibly some emotion, as, for instance, a desire to eat\nit, may arise, simultaneously or so nearly so as not to be distinguished\nin time, as parts of a single mental state.\n\nThere is one kind of association, of importance enough to deserve\nmention, of which Professor James makes no mention. The beliefs, or\nalleged beliefs of other people have an influence on our minds which\nis, I think, not inferior to that of emotion. The man who can, without\nmisgiving, maintain an opinion which contradicts all that he learned\nin childhood and all that is held by those whose good opinion he most\nvalues is, I fancy, quite as rare as he who can suspend judgment in the\npresence of an emotionally exciting idea. Most of us take our religious,\npolitical, scientific, and practical beliefs at second hand, from the\nfriends with whom we associate or the books and papers we read. Take a\nyoung man out of his home and put him, for instance, in college, and it\nwill probably work a change in his moral standards, not necessarily for\nthe better. At home, if he knew of a theft, or an assault, he would very\nprobably be ready to bring the offender to justice, but if the offender\nis his classmate, and the sufferer a member of the succeeding class, he\nwill very probably think it a more shameful thing to report the wrong\nthan to do it. At the same time, he doubtless considers it utterly\nreprehensible that ignorant Italian peasants should feel in the same way\nabout betraying their neighbors who are guilty of robbery or murder.\n\nComing now to the influence of emotion on belief, it will not, I presume,\nbe disputed that it comes about by way of association. Professor James,\nas we have seen, holds that \u201cevery emotionally exciting thought, in\nthe natural man, carries credence with it.\u201d I suspect that this is true\nonly in the sense that, in the absence of experience, not only every\nexciting thought, but every thought is believed. However this may be,\nin respect to the natural man, I think it is pretty certain that, in\nthe case of such artificial beings as those who reflect on the causes\nof their emotions and beliefs, it will be found that in order for an\nidea to excite our emotions, a certain degree of belief is necessary.\nProfessor James illustrates his position by the fact that a man can\nwalk along a curbstone without any apprehension of falling, because\nthe thought of falling awakens no emotion of dread, while on the edge\nof a precipice the emotion caused by the thought of the consequences\nof a mis-step may quite overcome his belief in his ability to keep his\nbalance. But a chamois-hunter or an acrobat will pass along the same\nplace without the slightest apprehension, not because he does not think\nof what would happen if he should fall, nor because he has more liking\nthan any one else for being dashed to pieces, but because he has what the\ninexperienced man lacks, entire confidence in his ability to avoid the\ndanger.\n\nSince I began writing the last paragraph, a number of thoughts have\npassed through my mind, any one of which would be sufficiently exciting\nif I believed in them, as, that I may die within the next half hour;\nthat I may fall heir to a fortune, and the like, none of which have\nproduced any emotional disturbance, because I do not believe that there\nis any probability of their being true. Why was it that not only the\nmedical profession but the public in general became so much interested,\nrecently, in the announcement that Dr. Koch had discovered a substance\nthat promised to be a cure for tuberculosis? Partly on account of the\ninterests involved, but at least equally because his reputation was such\nas to inspire confidence in what he said. There are plenty of medicines\nadvertised in the newspapers for which greater claims are made than\nDr. Koch made for his discovery, which fail to arouse any such general\ninterest. These examples are probably enough for illustration of the\nfamiliar fact that belief is the most common cause of emotion, and that a\nthought that is not believed is apt to leave us unmoved.\n\nNevertheless, it is a notorious fact that emotion has a great deal to do\nwith determining the sort and degree of evidence which is satisfactory\nto us. Love and hate, respect and contempt, affect our beliefs in regard\nto the character of their objects in matters entirely independent of the\nqualities which originally inspired the feelings. We find it an easy\nmatter to believe that a man whose religious or political opinions we\nthink pernicious is a bad man in matters which have nothing to do with\nhis opinions, and may find it almost incredible that one whom we like\npersonally should think differently from ourselves on matters in which we\nare deeply interested. But what particular evil we shall believe of the\nperson whom we dislike, or good of the one whom we like, depends entirely\non circumstances. A man, for instance takes a dislike to a stranger\non account of some lack of good manners. Whether he shall suspect him\nof being a clergyman or an infidel, a drinker or a prohibitionist, a\nSunday-school teacher or a gambler, or both, is likely to depend very\nlargely on his own tastes and principles in regard to such matters.\nSo, on the other hand, his views in regard to religion, temperance and\ngambling, are probably due in great measure to the practice of the\npeople whom he likes. A woman who has been brought up with a horror of\ndrunkenness hears that a man with whom she is violently in love is a\ndrinker. She will probably disbelieve it at first, but if she becomes\nconvinced of the truth of the report, she will very likely come to think\nthat a drunkard need not be such a bad fellow after all. If there is any\none thing that more affects our beliefs than what the people we like say,\nit is what they do.\n\nIn like manner, emotional states without any definite object, such as\nwe call moods if they are transient, and disposition or temperament if\nthey are habitual, color our belief, not by originating any definite\npropositions, but by making us receptive to those that tend to confirm\nthem. It is not when a man is broken in spirit by repeated calamities\nthat he is most ready to believe that \u201cwhere there\u2019s a will there\u2019s a\nway,\u201d nor in the flush of youth, health and triumph that the doctrine\nthat \u201call is vanity,\u201d comes home to his heart. In whatever way such\nstates of mind come about, whether as a result of original constitution,\nor of experience, or of disease, they make the mind inhospitable to\nwhatever does not harmonise with them. In the case of insanity, this\ndisposition may outweigh the plainest evidence of the senses, so that\na man may believe that he is rolling in wealth and luxury when he is\ndestitute of the ordinary comforts of life, or that his wife and children\nare dead when they are present before his eyes. In a lower degree, most\nof us probably have experience of something of the sort in \u201cfits of the\nblues,\u201d but while the general character of the belief may be decided\nby the emotional tone of the mind, its precise form is determined by\nthe man\u2019s interests. Low spirits would not be likely, for instance, to\neffect a man\u2019s opinion as to the probable course of the stock market,\nunless he were in some way interested in stocks, and the view favored by\nhis emotional condition would depend on the side of the market on which\nhis interest lay. Beliefs which, in our ordinary state of mind, are not\nassociated with any strong feeling, such as mathematical truths and the\nphysical and chemical laws of matter, remain unaffected in all kinds and\ndegrees of emotional disturbance.\n\nIt seems clear, then, that, as a matter of fact, emotions affect our\nbeliefs through association. It is not difficult to see how this comes\nabout. Emotions tend to perpetuate themselves. A man who is in high\nspirits will laugh at vexations which, if he were in an irritable frame\nof mind would seem intolerable. We allow liberties to our friends which\nwould offend us in persons to whom we are indifferent. The same inertia\nof the mind which is shown in these cases offers a resistance to any\nthought that tends to disturb it. If I like a man and hate dishonesty,\nevidence that the man is dishonest calls up at the same time two contrary\nemotional states, which cannot subsist together. One of three things must\nhappen; either the association of the feeling of liking with the person\nof the man, or of that of repugnance with dishonesty, or of the quality\nof dishonesty with the man must be given up, or at least impaired. But\nthe feeling of affection for my friend and that of hatred for the alleged\nfault are old established associations, while that of dishonesty with\nhis personality is a new one, which, in order to find lodgement, must\nexpel the original inhabitant. Although I may have formed no definite\nassociation of honesty with him, the difficulty is of precisely the same\nsort as if I had. In either case it is the breaking up of an habitual\nassociation.\n\nSuch being the way in which emotion affects belief, its value as a\nground of belief must be determined in the same way as in other cases\nof association. If any emotion is so exclusively connected with some\ndefinite object that the one is never present without the other, we are\nwarranted in inferring the existence of the object from the presence of\nthe emotion, as Robinson Crusoe inferred from the human footprints on the\nsand that men had been there. As a matter of fact, there is comparatively\nlittle uniformity in associations of this kind. The same things affect\ndifferent persons differently, and the same persons differently at\ndifferent times. Our hopes and fears are sometimes realised and\nsometimes disappointed, and people to whom, on slight acquaintance, we\nfeel attracted, often develop qualities of a different kind from what\nwe expected as we come to know them better. If I am fond of money, and\nalso of idleness, or of friendship, and also of having my own way at all\ntimes, it does not follow that taking my ease is the way to get rich, nor\nthat always insisting on my own way is the course to make friends. The\nmost, I think, that can be said in favor of emotion as a ground of belief\nis, that its existence presupposes the existence of some object adapted\nto excite it. Avarice may be said, in a sense, to prove the existence of\nwealth\u2014if there were no wealth there would doubtless be no avarice\u2014but\nnot that a particular avaricious man will be wealthy. Fear implies the\nexistence of harm, but not necessarily that harm is coming upon the\none that fears. These are matters in which we can apply the test of\nexperience to our beliefs, and it seems evident that emotion adds nothing\nto our knowledge. We know the things independently of the emotions they\nexcite, and every one recognises that to expect a thing merely because we\neither desire or fear it is, in matters which we can test by experience,\nutterly fallacious.\n\nBut there are matters lying outside the range of our experience in regard\nto which it is often confidently asserted that our desires and fears are\nsufficient proof of their reality\u2014a view in which I cannot agree. If it\ncould be shown that we long for something of an entirely different kind\nfrom anything we have known, that might perhaps be an argument in favor\nof its existence, but such is not the case. The wish for immortality,\nfor instance, is nothing more than the wish for life. Probably there\nare but few who would not rather have immortality without death than\nafter it, but experience has at last convinced the most hopeful that\nthis is not to be expected, and the search for fountains of youth and\nelixirs of life has few devotees. We want life, and we have life; we want\nhappiness, and we know happiness, whether we ourselves have it or not,\nbut to say that the fact that we want more than we get of both is a\nreason for supposing that we shall ever have all that we want of either\nis to reason in a way which we should all see to be fallacious if applied\nto things of every-day life. I conclude, then, that the emotions which\na belief excites are utterly valueless as a test of its truth, and that\nwe may expect that, both with individuals and the race, emotion will\nplay a smaller and smaller part in belief as true knowledge and culture\nincrease. This is not saying that, in cases of doubt, it is unreasonable\nto hope that things may turn out as we wish.\n\nAs to innate beliefs, it is enough to say that we cannot altogether rid\nour minds of them, and that they answer perfectly the purpose of working\nhypotheses. A man may question the reality of an external world to his\nheart\u2019s content, but if he runs his head against a wall, or drops a brick\non his toe, it will hurt him just as much as the most thorough-going\nmaterialist. The consequence is that such a doubt does not affect our\nconduct. Abstractly, these beliefs do not all impress us with the same\ndegree of certainty. That the same thing cannot be in two different\nplaces at once, is, I think, felt to be more absolutely and necessarily\ntrue than that there is such a necessity in the order of events as is\nimplied in the idea of causation, but for all practical purposes we are\nas sure of the one as of the other.\n\nI have already quoted Professor James\u2019s assertion of our ability to\nchoose which among different ways of thinking of the same we shall\nadhere to and which disregard. Perhaps the most prominent feature of his\nteaching on the subject of belief is that it is an active, not a passive\nstate of the mind\u2014a choice, not a necessity. One or two more quotations\non this point will make this plain.\n\n \u201cAs bare logical thinkers, without emotional reaction, we give\n reality to whatever objects we think of, for they are really\n phenomena, or objects of our passing thought, if nothing\n more. But, _as thinkers with emotional reaction, we give what\n seems to us a higher degree of reality to whatever things we\n select and emphasise and turn to WITH A WILL_. These are our\n _living_ realities, and not only these, but all things that are\n intimately connected with these (p. 297).\n\n \u201cNow the important thing to notice is that the difference\n between the objects of belief and will is entirely immaterial,\n as far as the relation of the mind to them goes. All that the\n mind does is in both cases the same; it looks at the object and\n consents to its existence, espouses it, says \u2018it shall be my\n reality.\u2019 It turns to it, in short, in the interested emotional\n way\u201d (p. 320).\n\nAlthough the doctrine is stated, in these and other passages, without\nqualification, it is hard to reconcile it with some other statements. He\ndevotes a chapter to \u201cNecessary Truths,\u201d and says:\n\n \u201cWe _must_ attach the predicate \u2018equal\u2019 to the subject\n \u2018opposite sides of a parallelogram\u2019 if we think those terms\n together at all\u201d (p. 617).\n\nI do not know that it makes much difference whether we say that, in a\ncase like this, we cannot think differently of the same, or that, having\nthought so, we cannot choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which\nto disregard. The proposition that a horse is a vertebrate animal cannot\nbe called a necessary, _a priori_ truth, but I find it as impossible to\nthink of a horse that is not a vertebrate animal as of a parallelogram\nwith the opposite sides unequal. A figure with the opposite sides unequal\nwould not be a parallelogram, and anything that was not animal and\nvertebrate would not be a horse. Whether the difficulty in the two cases\nis the same or not, it is clear that, by Professor James\u2019s admission,\nhere is a restriction of our choice as to what we will believe.\n\nAgain, he speaks of pleasurable and painful sensations as\n\u201cbelief-compelling.\u201d Compulsion, so far as it exists, excludes choice,\nand if this expression is justified it implies another limitation on the\nfreedom of belief.\n\nWith regard to painful sensations, it seems to me that the fact is that\nthey, and their associations, force themselves on our attention, rather\nthan that we \u201cselect, and emphasise and turn to them with a will.\u201d If I\nhave a toothache, I may believe that if I retain the tooth it will keep\nme in pain for a long time, and if I have it extracted, that will also\nbe a painful process. It does not seem to me that the expressions quoted\nabove accurately describe my state of mind in regard to either of these\nbeliefs.\n\nAccording to Professor James, when a man becomes convinced that he is\nfinancially bankrupt, or that he has lost his good name, or that he\nis suffering from an incurable and fatal disease, it is because he\n\u201cespouses\u201d this view of the matter, \u201cconsents to its existence,\u201d says\n\u201cit shall be my reality.\u201d This notwithstanding that such a belief may\ndrive him to determine that, so far as in him lies, all existence, all\nreality shall cease; to consent to death and espouse the grave. Would\nnot the criminal who hears his death-sentence pronounced prefer, if he\ncould, to disbelieve his eyes and ears, and to feel that it was all a bad\ndream? So far as I can judge with regard to many unwelcome beliefs, they\nare not like the highwayman who offers the alternative of \u201cyour money or\nyour life,\u201d but like him who throws you down, binds and robs you without\noffering any choice.\n\nPerhaps the most striking example of the view under consideration is\nfound in a foot-note on p. 318, in which, after quoting, with approval, a\nstatement of Royce that \u201cThe ultimate motive with men of every-day life\nis the will to have an external world,\u201d he goes on to say:\n\n \u201cThis immixture of the will appears most flagrantly in the fact\n that although external matter is doubted often enough, minds\n external to our own are never doubted. We need them too much,\n are too intensely social to dispense with them. Semblances\n of matter may suffice to react upon, but not semblances of\n communing souls. A psychic solipsism is too hideous a mockery\n of our wants, and, so far as I know, has never been seriously\n entertained.\u201d\n\nLeaving aside the question whether any one who really disbelieved that\nthere was any reality, outside of his own mind, in objects of sense,\ncould believe in the existence of that which he only infers from the\nconduct of those objects, it seems to be distinctly stated that the\nreason of these beliefs is, not that we cannot help believing so, but\nthat we choose to believe so, and not otherwise, and that we are able,\nhaving so chosen, to believe as we wish. That there may be no doubt as to\nthe sense in which the term \u201cWill\u201d is used, I will quote the explanation\nwith which he opens his chapter on that subject:\n\n \u201cWe desire to feel, to have, to do, all sorts of things which\n at the moment are not felt, had, or done. If with the desire\n there goes a sense that attainment is not possible, we simply\n _wish_; but if we believe that the end is in our power, we\n _will_ that the desired feeling, having or doing shall be real;\n and real it presently becomes, either immediately upon the\n willing or after certain preliminaries have been fulfilled\u201d (p.\n 486).\n\nNow each one must judge for himself whether this, or anything like this\nis the way in which he came to believe in an external world. Judging from\nmy own experience, I should say that the reason we originally have such\na belief is that it arises spontaneously in our minds, and that, for a\nlong time, it never occurs to us that it can be otherwise. However that\nmay be, I am certain that when the contrary possibility was presented\nto my mind, it struck me as strange, rather than dreadful, and that I\nfirmly believe many things that seem to me far more hideous than the\ndoctrine that I am the universe. So far as society is concerned, if I\ncan _be_ Shakespeare and Milton and Goethe, Plato and Bacon, Newton and\nDarwin, Luther and Columbus and Washington, as well as all the people\nof my acquaintance, it strikes me that I can be pretty good company for\nmyself. To use the universality of the belief as a proof of its voluntary\nnature seems to me very much such an argument as to say that because all\nbodies attract each other in the ratio of their mass and inversely as the\nsquare of the distance, the falling of a stone must be a purely voluntary\nmatter. I do not see what stronger argument, in a case like this, could\nbe made for the necessity of a belief than the alleged fact that no one,\nunder any circumstances, is free from it.\n\nNow, if we substitute the term \u201cPropensity\u201d for \u201cWill\u201d in the passage\nquoted above, it would seem to me an entirely accurate description of\nthe facts, and I can only understand how the authors quoted could take\nthe ground they do except on the assumption that all propensities, or\nat least all which prevail, are choices or volitions. That such is not\nthe case seems to me clear enough in regard to belief from some of\nthe instances which I have already mentioned, but it will perhaps be\nstill more evident from cases in which belief is not in question. The\npropensity to remember and constantly think of painful and distressing\nthings, which we would gladly banish from our thoughts, or such things as\nsilly rhymes and trifling tunes; to tremble and lose our presence of mind\nin danger, when we have most need of the full use of all our faculties;\nto express our emotions by muscular movements when we wish to conceal\nthem, and many others that might be mentioned, are examples of the fact\nthat an invincible propensity may be quite the reverse of a choice.\n\nThat belief is an activity of the mind may be freely admitted. The\nmind\u2014whatever the substratum of our states of consciousness may be\u2014is\nnot a receptacle, to hold indifferently whatever may be poured into\nit nor a sheet of blank paper, on which this or that may be written\nby circumstances; it has a character of its own, and reacts to its\nenvironment. What the reaction shall be depends both on the character of\nthe mind and what is presented to it, but it seems incorrect to assume\nthat all the dispositions of the mind are of the nature of desires or\naversions. In the last analysis of which we are capable, our character\nis probably due to our physical constitution, original and acquired, and\nour beliefs may be profoundly affected by a few glasses of whiskey or an\nattack of fever. Whether the reactions of the matter of which our brains\nare formed are as invariable as those of inorganic matter need not be\ndiscussed here; the present point is that while belief is a sense of the\nrelations of things as they are, the essence of will is the desire to\nhave them otherwise than as they are. To make belief a matter of choice\nis the same as to say that I may at the same time choose that things\nshall be as they are and otherwise.\n\nProfessor James closes the chapter with a practical observation:\n\n \u201cIf belief consists in an emotional reaction of the entire man\n on an object, how _can_ we believe at will? We cannot control\n our emotions. Truly enough, a man cannot believe at will\n abruptly. Nature sometimes, and indeed not very infrequently,\n produces instantaneous conversions for us. She suddenly puts\n us in an active connection with objects to which she had till\n then left us cold. \u2018I realise for the first time,\u2019 we then say,\n \u2018what that means!\u2019 This happens often with moral propositions.\n We have often heard them; but now they shoot into our lives;\n they move us; we feel their living force. Such instantaneous\n beliefs are truly enough not to be achieved by will. But\n _gradually_ our will can lead us to the same results by a very\n simple method; _we need only in cold blood act as if the thing\n in question were real, and keep acting as if it were real, and\n it will infallibly end by growing into such a connection with\n our life that it will become real_. It will become so knit with\n habit and emotion that our interests in it will be those which\n characterise belief. Those to whom God and Duty are now mere\n names can make them much more than that, if they make a little\n sacrifice to them every day. But all this is so well known in\n moral and religious education that I need say no more\u201d (p. 321).\n\nThe above passage seems to me to illustrate at the same time the force\nof Professor James\u2019s rhetoric and an occasional tendency on his part to\nbe carried away by it into statements that are altogether too sweeping.\nIn an immense proportion of cases, the method that he recommends is\nprecisely the surest way to convince ourselves that the thing in question\nis _not_ real. It is the method which the small boy takes to convince\nhimself that the gun is not loaded; the drunkard and spendthrift to\nsatisfy themselves that their vices will not bring them into poverty and\ndisgrace. A man may sit all day at the fork of the road, and believe that\nthe broad way does not lead to destruction, but when he puts his belief\nin practice he discovers the truth. So far as practical matters, capable\nof being brought to the test of experience, are concerned, it can only be\nsaid that _if they are real_, we shall convince ourselves that such is\nthe case by acting as if they were real. Doubtless Professor James had\nnot such prosaic things as these in mind when he wrote the passage, but\na method that will not serve us in regard to such questions as whether\nwater will wet us or fire burn us, can hardly be called infallible. But\neven in regard to questions that must always remain matters of opinion\nit is not true in the unqualified sense in which Professor James puts\nit. Probably many men, brought up in the belief that it was their duty\nto observe the first day of the week by religious worship because the\nHebrews were required to abstain from labor on the seventh day, have come\nto modify their belief without any material change in their practice,\nand even the belief in regard to the nature and attributes of God may be\naffected in advance of a change in the conduct based upon it.\n\nThe law of association in this regard is subject to the same limitations\nas we have already found to hold in respect to other matters.\nAssociations of action with belief have a tendency to strengthen it, but,\nas in the case of emotion, they may be overcome by other considerations,\nand it is entirely possible for a man to go on for the better part of\na lifetime in punctilious conformity to usages which in his heart he\ndespises, and break out in open rebellion at last. From the ethical\npoint of view, the advice which seems to be implied, of deliberately\nchoosing a way of setting doubts at rest which is as efficacious on the\nside of error as of truth, of vice as of virtue, seems to me, to say the\nleast, of doubtful tendency. We must often act in doubtful cases, and\ntake the risk, amongst others, of thus confirming ourselves in error,\nbut certainly there can be no more solemn motive for weighing well our\nbeliefs before committing ourselves to them by action than the fact that\nwe may, by habit, pervert our moral sense, blind our judgment and stifle\nour conscience.\n\nTo the man who believes that there is a universe, of which he forms an\ninfinitesimal part, and that all his interests depend on his attitude\ntoward the power that works in it, it is of infinitely more interest to\nknow how he can know the truth than how he can convince himself of this\nor that. Shall truth be our master, to be followed and obeyed, though he\ncommand us to give up all else that we hold dear, or our servant, to be\nemployed as suits our passion or caprice, and dismissed when he will no\nlonger serve our purpose?\n\nThis is perhaps the most momentous question that we are called on to\ndecide. The man who makes the wrong choice may or may not attain what he\nseeks, but though he gain the whole world, he will lose his own soul.\n\n W. L. WORCESTER.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[62] _The Principles of Psychology_, by William James, Professor of\nPsychology in Harvard University. In two volumes. New York: Henry Holt &\nCompany, 1890.\n\n[63] The italics, in this and my other quotations, are the author\u2019s.\n\n\n\n\nTHE NATURE OF MIND AND THE MEANING OF REALITY.[64]\n\n\nProfessor William James\u2019s supposition of \u201can hallucinatory candle\u201d seen\nby a \u201cnew born mind entirely blank and waiting for experience to begin\u201d\nis an impossible and self-contradictory figment. We might as well speak\nof the dry Niagara falls employed in the manufacture of some material\ngoods out of nothing. For, first, a mind entirely blank is no mind\nand, secondly, a blank mind if it could exist at all, would have no\nhallucinations. An hallucinatory candle can be produced only out of the\nmemories or the combination of memories of former candle-sensations. A\nblind man sees in his dream no colors, and a deaf man hears no symphonies.\n\nA new-born babe is already in possession of many inherited memories. Thus\nthe first sense-impressions after the babe\u2019s birth find the organism,\nespecially its skin, nerves and muscles predisposed for their reception.\nThe babe\u2019s organism accordingly presents an instance of a relative but\nnot of an absolute blank; an absolute blank of a something that is to\ndevelop into mind can mean only a lump of sentient matter at the moment\nof formation. As soon as it is formed it is exposed in every second\nof its existence to innumerable impressions which fill the blank with\ncontents and these contents are the mind that is developing.\n\nSentient substance is not at rest, but like a flame it is possessed of\nan incessant activity. The form of this activity is both extraordinarily\nplastic and stable. It is plastic, for every impression together with the\nreaction of the impression modifies it and leaves a trace: it is stable\nfor the traces of all the impressions and reactions are preserved.\n\nThe first sense-impression of a lump of sentient substance produces an\nirritation which objectively considered is a commotion of the sentient\nsubstance and subjectively considered a feeling, the substance being\nsentient _ex hypothesi_. This first and primitive feeling is meaningless,\nfor it has not, and cannot have, any reference to any other feeling,\nmemory or mind, and meaning is created through the interaction of\nfeelings with memories of feelings.\n\nSome later sense-impression of the same kind will not only produce\nthe same irritation but also serve as an irritation to awaken the\nmemory-trace left by the former sense-impression. The new feeling will\nmelt into one with the reawakened memory of the former feeling. In the\nlong run many traces of the same kind which are, as it were, deposited\nin the same place will constitute an organ predisposed to receive the\ncorrespondent impressions; and now a sense-impression received by such an\norgan may be called a sensation. A sensation is not merely a feeling, it\nis a feeling of a special kind and it is felt to be of a special kind. In\nother words, a sensation is a feeling that has acquired meaning; and this\nmeaning is the product of the interaction and co\u00f6peration of feelings\nand memories. Sensations have become symbols representing the cause of\nthe sense-impression which produced the sensation, and ideas are symbols\nof a higher order representing either whole classes of a certain kind\nof causes of sense-impressions or certain features thereof, or certain\nrelations among them.\n\nThus every mind is a system of sentient symbols. These symbols being as\nit were pictures intended somehow to represent or allegorically speaking\nto portray things are called \u201cideas,\u201d while the things symbolised are in\ntheir totality called objective existence or \u201creality.\u201d\n\nConsidering the nature of mind, it is obvious that there cannot be\nan entirely blank mind. We might as well speak of an entirely blank\npicture. But an entirely blank picture is a canvas and no picture at\nall. That a mind which is not as yet a mind can have neither sensations\nnor hallucinations is almost self-evident. Similarly there is no sense\nin saying that a picture that consists of an utter blank and thus is\nproperly speaking no picture at all but an empty canvas, either does or\ndoes not correctly represent a certain object.\n\nThe word \u201creal\u201d is used in two senses (1) as a name for everything that\nexists and (2) to signify that kind of existence which is the object of\nour sensory and mental experience, i. e. the objective world so-called.\nThe former of these two definitions is more comprehensive; for it\nincludes the realm of mentality, the ideal world of subjectivity. The\nlatter is used in contrast to the subjective world of mental life and\nthus expressly excludes the ideal realm of the mind and of mental symbols.\n\nThe questions as to What is reality? and Is there anything real at all?\nmust not be formulated as they are by Professor James, in terms of belief\nbut in a statement of facts and by defining certain facts as real.\n\nAn hallucination is real in the first sense of the word; it is an actual\nexistence; it is a feeling taking place in the mind of some organism.\nIt is also real in the second sense of the word in so far as it is a\nvibration of a brain structure. However an hallucination is not real\nin the second sense of the word in so far as its meaning has not its\ncorrespondent analogue.\n\nLet the meaning of a certain mental symbol be a candle, under which\nname we comprise a certain group of experiences, and let the cerebral\nstructure of this mental symbol be awakened by another stimulus than\nthat which is generally called a candle. Those experiences which as a\ngroup are called a candle are of a certain kind. If a piece of paper\napproaches the lighted candle, it will burn. An hallucinatory candle will\nleave the paper intact, although the person who has the hallucination may\nsee the paper burn. Thus the ideas or images of objects are built up of\nexperiences which have taught us that under certain conditions certain\nevents happen; in consequence of certain actions there are constantly\ncertain reactions taking place. Reality consists of such facts; it is the\nsum total of all reactions; reality is the nature of objects which react\nsomehow.\n\nThose who jump at the conclusion that our subjective sensations, such as\ncolors, tastes, sounds, etc., must be regarded as objective properties\nof things, are grossly mistaken. Our sensations are not qualities of\nthings but subjective phenomena: they do not inform us about the nature\nof things, but reveal to us how things affect our senses. Those however\nwho deny or doubt objective existence are no less mistaken. The world\nis not a subjective phenomenon of sensations, but an objective existence\nsymbolised in sensations.\n\nThe question is not \u201cDoes reality exist?\u201d but \u201cWhat is Reality?\u201d or\n\u201cWhat is the meaning of \u2018real\u2019?\u201d When we say \u201cObjects are real,\u201d we\nmean that they resist, they react, their presence produces somehow some\neffect. When we say, We ourselves are real, we mean that we react upon\nthe objects with which we come in contact, we mean, that in our bodily\nexistence we are objects in an objective world.\n\nActions and reactions are taking place. This is a fact. He who denies\nit is like the man who declares that he is not at home; he contradicts\nhimself: for the denial of a question is a reaction upon an action. The\nterm reality is the symbol of the nature of actions and reactions in\ntheir efficacy, it denotes the essence of facts and thus the question\n\u201cDoes reality exist?\u201d has no sense. We denote that which exists, that\nwhich acts and reacts, that which is a fact, or howsoever we may\nexpress it, by the word \u201creality.\u201d We might deny that the reactions of\nthe objective world are constant, or that a certain idea of a certain\nreaction is erroneous, viz. that the reaction if put to the test would\nprove to be different from what it was expected\u2014but all these denials and\ndoubts which are of daily occurrence in the domain of science presuppose\nthat there are reactions taking place and reality or objective existence\nis only a collective name for these reactions and their nature. The name\nobject still preserves the idea of reaction, for object is that which\nreacts upon touch, which resists, which is objected.\n\nWe shall lose ourselves in inextricable confusion by making a matter of\ndoubt and belief what is really a statement of facts. To speak of a doubt\nor belief in the reality of things in general is tantamount to speaking\nof a belief in our experiences which, whatever their particular nature\nmay be, are facts. And to doubt our experiences, not the correctness\nof a particular experience, but experience in general, i. e. the very\nexistence of experience is tantamount to doubting our own being.\n\nA consideration of what we mean by an hallucination can best make clear\nwhat we mean, and rationally can only mean, by reality. A real candle is\na mental symbol of something which will under certain conditions react\nin a certain way. An hallucinatory candle is also a mental symbol, but\nthe thing which it purports to mean, does not exist; i. e. there is\nnothing that will react. The symbol is there, but not that something the\nexistence of which the symbol of the idea \u201ccandle\u201d would indicate.\n\nThis method of dealing with the problem of the old na\u00efve realism and the\npseudo-critical idealism of former times is not based upon the assumption\nof the reality of things (which means, of the reality of reality); it\nis simply a careful formulation of the problem to prevent our being\nentangled all about with contradictions; it is the method of rendering\nclear the basic principle of positivism, that all knowledge is a\ndescription of facts, which description of facts is made for the purpose\nof, dealing with facts.\n\n P. C.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[64] This article was suggested by Dr. W. L. Worcester\u2019s criticism on\nProfessor James\u2019s Psychology. When Dr. Worcester discusses Professor\nJames\u2019s supposition of an hallucination in a blank mind, saying that it\nwould be \u201cthe only possible reality of that mind,\u201d he almost seems to\nadopt Professor James\u2019s views of the subject himself. Clearness about\nsuch fundamental terms as mind and reality, are so much needed that the\nfollowing remarks may not be out of place as a further explanation of the\nsubject. Exactness in fundamental and general terms will save much labor\nin detail work.\n\n\n\n\nMONISM NOT MECHANICALISM.\n\nCOMMENTS UPON PROF. ERNST HAECKEL\u2019S POSITION.\n\n\nProf. Ernst Haeckel\u2019s Anthropogeny, the fourth edition of which appeared\nof late,[65] brings again into prominence that conception of monism which\nidentifies the monistic view with mechanicalism.\n\nA review of this book has appeared already in _The Open Court_, No.\n231, in which we called attention to the great merits of a work which\nhas become a household book, not only for the scientist, but for every\neducated reader who is interested in man and the origin of man. Our\nknowledge in Anthropogeny, certainly, will influence not only our general\nworld-conception, but through our general world-conception it will extend\nits influence not only over every branch of science but also into the\nbroader fields of man\u2019s daily life and his practical morality.\n\nProfessor Haeckel is the most popular naturalist of to-day and there\nis no one, perhaps, who has made a more effective propaganda for the\nmonistic world-conception than he. So it is almost a matter of course\nthat his definition of monism is generally accepted as the standard.\nWe have formulated our view of monism in a way which in principle and\ngeneral outlines concurs with the commonly accepted usage of the term,\nyet it deviates from it in some important points which are perhaps not\nmerely matters of detail. It will be difficult to say how far we agree\nand how far we disagree with Professor Haeckel\u2019s monism because those\nsubjects in which we disagree, have never been elaborated by him, and we\nare inclined to believe that he would modify some of his expressions, if\nhe devoted a quiet hour\u2019s thought to the objections we have to make to\nhis definitions.\n\nProfessor Haeckel\u2019s monism being mechanicalism savors strongly of\nmaterialism. He says in the latest edition of his \u201cAnthropogenie\u201d which\nis now before us, Vol. II, p. 851:\n\n\u201cThere can be no doubt that a thorough consideration and unprejudiced\ndeliberation of these facts will lead to a decisive victory of that\nphilosophical conception which with one word we call monistic or\nmechanical in opposition to the dualistic and teleological. Upon the\nlatter are based most of the philosophical systems of antiquity, of\nthe medi\u00e6val times, and also of the present time. The mechanical or\nmonistic philosophy declares that certain and immutable laws obtain\neverywhere in the phenomena of human life as much as in nature generally,\nthat a necessary causal connexus obtains everywhere in phenomena and,\naccordingly, that the knowable world forms throughout a unitary whole, a\nmonon. Monism moreover maintains that all phenomena are produced alone\nthrough mechanical causes (_caus\u00e6 efficientes_) not through premeditated\npurposive causes (_caus\u00e6 finales_).\u201d\n\nAnd in the first lecture \u201cThe History of Evolution and Philosophy,\u201d (p.\n15) he says:\n\n \u201cWe shall clearly recognise in the following investigations how\n the most wonderful enigmas of human and animal organisations,\n heretofore considered as inaccessible, have become accessible\n to a natural solution through Darwin\u2019s reform in the doctrine\n of evolution by a mechanical explanation of purposeless\n efficient causes.\u201d\n\nIn agreement with these views, Professor Haeckel regards the terms\nnecessity and mechanicalism as equivalent terms. He rejects any kind of\nteleology, any kind of final causes, and also the freedom of the will.\nHe opposes the so-called moral world-order as contradictory to the idea\nthat the world is regulated by mechanical law and he adopts the latter to\nthe exclusion of the former. All these points come out very strongly and\nclearly in Professor Haeckel\u2019s letter to the editor of _The Open Court_,\nwhere his view of monism is graphically presented in a concise tabular\nform.\n\nWe here reproduce this table from No. 212 of _The Open Court_, for the\nconvenience of our readers:\n\n =======================+=======================+========================\n MONISM. | FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS. | DUALISM.\n -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------\n Inseparable. | Matter and force. | As a matter of\n | God and world. | principle distinct\n | Soul and body. | entities.\n -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------\n Mechanicalism. | Life. | Vitalism.\n Necessary evolution. | | Teleological creation.\n -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------\n Universal (conservation| Immortality. | Individual.\n of energy). | Freedom of will. | A person\u2019s will being\n Determinism. | | absolutely free.\n -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------\n Caus\u00e6 efficientes. | Causation. | Caus\u00e6 finales.\n (Efficient causes.) | | (Final causes.)\n -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------\n Regulated by mechanical| World-order. | So-called \u201cMoral.\u201d\n law. | |\n -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------\n Inseparable and subject| Inorganic and organic | As a matter of\n to the same laws. | nature. | principle distinct\n | | and subject to\n | | different laws.\n -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------\n\nNow we agree with Professor Haeckel in one main point, viz. \u201cthat certain\nand immutable laws obtain everywhere in the phenomena of human life as\nmuch as in nature generally, and that the knowable world forms throughout\na unitary whole, a monon.\u201d But we cannot agree to his proposition that\n\u201cthe wonderful enigmas of organised life are accessible to a natural\nsolution by a mechanical explanation of purposeless efficient causes.\u201d\nWe grant willingly that mechanical explanations will serve for all\nmotions that take place in the world; even the motions of the brain\ntake place in strict obedience to the laws of molar and molecular\nmechanics. But a mechanical explanation is not applicable to that which\nis not motion. If it were applicable it would not be desirable, for\nit would be of no avail. Mechanical explanations are to be limited to\nmechanical phenomena. Feeling however is not a mechanical phenomenon,\nand an idea, being a special and a very complex kind of a feeling, or\nrather and more accurately expressed, being the special meaning of a\nvery complex feeling, is not a mechanical phenomenon either. It is true\nthat when a feeling takes place and when an idea is thought in the\nbrain of an organised being, that a certain nervous action takes place.\nThe nervous action is a motion and this motion represents a definite\namount of energy. There is no theoretical difficulty, although there are\nalmost insurmountable practical difficulties, in measuring the definite\namount of potential energy that is changed into kinetic energy when a\nman thinks. Yet the brain-motion is not the idea and by a mechanical\nexplanation of the brain-motion we have not even touched the problem of\nwhat the nature of the idea is, why ideas originate and how they act.\n\nWe know that Professor Haeckel when he so vigorously insists on\nmechanicalism, opposes those philosophers who believe that there are\nmotions which cannot be explained by mechanical laws. We side with\nProfessor Haeckel against any one who maintains that some motions are\nmechanical (molar or molecular) and others are exceptions to the laws of\nmechanics, representing a kind of hypermechanics. But we cannot admit the\nexplanation by mechanical laws of non-mechanical phenomena.\n\nProfessor Haeckel speaks of purposeless efficient causes\u2014_zwecklos\nth\u00e4tige Ursachen_. He speaks of efficient causes, as excluding final\ncauses. He is right in his objection to final causes as the term is\ncommonly used. But while there are causes that are _zwecklos_, there\nare no causes that are _ziellos_. Every process of causation takes a\ndefinite course, it has a certain and definable direction. The end of\nthis direction need not be a conscious aim, but it is an aim whatever it\nbe, it is a _Ziel_. In this sense every efficient cause is at the same\ntime a final cause. The gravitating stone has no purpose, yet it has an\naim. So the evolution of organised life is a natural process having a\nvery definite aim. And this aim of the evolution of organised life is\ndetermined by factors of a very complex nature. One of these factors is\nalmost imperceptible at the beginning, but it is of a constantly and\nrapidly growing importance; and this factor is the psychical element\nthat appears with organised life. This factor is nothing supra-natural,\nnothing extra-natural, and yet it is not something material or\nmechanical. It is this factor which in its highest efflorescence changes\naims into purposes, and with this change it creates again a new factor of\nevolution which is the purposive aspiration to conform to the world-order\nand thus to advance the further progress of mankind. This aspiration is\nin one word called morality.\n\nWhen we speak of a moral world-order we mean that such moral behests\nas were formulated in prescripts by Confucius, by Buddha, by Moses,\nby Jesus, and other moral teachers of mankind have an objective and\nimmutable foundation in the nature of things. The mechanical law in the\nprovince of motions, the logical law in the realm of thought, geometrical\nproportions in mathematics, the regularity of natural laws, etc., form in\nour world-conception a part of this moral world-order. The laws of social\nlife are not opposed to them but correlative.\n\nThe purpose of a man\u2019s action reveals his character, and the character\nof the man is his innermost nature. In an analogous way the aim of\nevolution and especially the aim of the evolution of organised beings\nreveals the character, the innermost nature of the universe. Psychic life\nis absent so far as we can see in the primordial world substance as it\nappears in the form of a nebula; it is absent still in the primordial\nstate of planets. It appears with the subjective states of awareness that\nrise into existence in organised life. The subjectivity of unorganised\nmatter is, in comparison with man\u2019s subjectivity, to be considered as\na blank; i. e., if there is in it a state of awareness, which we have\nreasons to doubt, it is apparently without meaning; it does not symbolise\nexternal objects; it is no mind; it is, as it were, blind. Yet the aim\nof evolution being the development of psychical life, shows that the\nsubjectivity of unorganised matter is spiritual in its innermost nature.\nAnd the aim of psychical life being the development of moral ideals, we\nare very well justified in speaking of the world-order as moral. When\nspeaking of the world-order as moral we mean that the moral prescripts of\nthe great ethical teachers of mankind are founded in and derived from the\nworld-order of nature.\n\nThere is one objection to calling the world-order moral, and we therefore\ndislike to use the phrase. It is this: Morality means conformity to\na certain standard. The standard is not moral, but those who do or\ndo not conform to it are moral or immoral. Therefore if there is any\ntruth in the idea of God it is this that there is a standard for human\nconduct to conform to, there is an authority which has to be obeyed\nand this authority is God. To speak of God as moral or immoral is\nanthropomorphism. If \u201cGod\u201d means anything, it means that power of the\nworld-order obedience to which is called morality. If we say God is\nmoral, God ceases to be God, the moral authority above him to which he\nhas to conform would be the really true God. Thus logically the personal\nconception of God leads to a superpersonal conception of God.\n\nThese are in brief our objections to Professor Haeckel\u2019s definition\nof monism as being identical with mechanicalism and perhaps also with\nmaterialism. My opinion that Professor Haeckel may after all accede to\nour view of monism is based upon an interesting and friendly conversation\nwhich I enjoyed with him several years ago in Jena. Professor Haeckel\nis not the one-sided naturalist that he is often represented to be by\northodox clergymen. He does not see the workings of the natural laws\nonly, he sees also the moral aspect to which a consideration of the\nnatural laws leads. That his books emphasise the former without entering\ninto the problems of the latter is natural for a scientist, but he\npersonally is certainly even broader than are his books, and I should say\nthat his very opposition to certain errors which have been foisted by an\nantiquated dogmatism upon our religious institutions, show the deeply\nreligious spirit of his character.\n\n P. C.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[65] _Anthropogenie oder Entwickelungsgeschichte des Menschen._\nKeimes-und Stammesgeschichte. By Ernst Haeckel. Mit 20 Tafeln, 440\nHolzschnitten und 25 genetischen Tabellen. Vierte, umgearbeitete und\nvermehrte Auflage. Leipzig: Engelmann.\n\n\n\n\nMR. CHARLES S. PEIRCE ON NECESSITY.\n\n\nMr. Charles S. Peirce is one of those thinkers who in the investigation\nof a subject go right down to the bottom of the problem. This\nappears to me the more conspicuously so, as the result to which his\ninvestigations lead stand in a strong contrast to my own views. Yet I\ncannot help admiring the boldness of his trenchant critique which finds\nthe difficulties at the point where really the main difficulty of all\nphilosophical inquiry lies buried. It lies buried, i. e. it does not\nappear on the surface of things. If it lay on the surface, our most\nsuperficial thinkers would naturally light on it; but most of them walk\ntheir way in peace, unmolested by the question, Is there any truth in the\nidea of necessity. An editorial treatment of this problem may be expected\nin a forthcoming number of _The Monist_.\n\n P. C.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK REVIEWS.\n\n\nEINLEITUNG IN DAS ALTE TESTAMENT. By _C. H. Cornill_, Professor at the\nUniversity at K\u00f6nigsberg.\n\nWhen Darwin and his followers first gave to the world the astonishing\nresults of their studies, few were those who at once recognised the\nimportance of the new theories and still fewer those who readily accepted\nthem. But within the last thirty years, gradually but steadily the\nnumber of those who have adopted as virtually true the hypotheses of the\nnew school, has been increasing until to-day those are in the minority\nwho teach a view different from Darwin on the origin and evolution\nof the universe. The history and fate of the new studies in Biblical\ncriticism bear a striking analogy to the reception accorded to Darwinian\nresearches. At first they were met with well nigh universal opposition.\nThey were declared to be subversive of the holiest interests of religion.\nThey were held to rob the Bible of its glory. But by slow degrees the\nfirst passion yielded to wiser counsel. Curiosity led to the examination\nof the new positions; and in consequence in ever widening circles the\nconviction gained ground that far from taking away from the dignity of\nthe old Hebrew literature, these new investigations and the method upon\nwhich they footed, lent new lustre to the collection of ancient writings.\nAnd to-day the battle has been won by the school of Wellhausen and\nKuenen. Few are those who to-day urge the old views on the authorship\ndate and historical succession of the several parts composing what is\ncalled the O. T. or even on the canonisation of the whole collection.\n\nThe startling assumptions of Wellhausen, Graf, and their Dutch colleagues\nhad their forerunners, as had Darwin and Wallace. But when George and\nVatke in the fourth decade of our century and Reuss, in his first\nacademic lectures, virtually anticipated the lines of research of their\nlater successors, the world was too busy with other matters to give their\nlabors much attention. (Cfr. this work, p. 8.) For all this, primitive\northodoxy had only few representatives in this domain, at least in\nGermany. While H\u00e4vernick and Keil and Hengstenberg, are ranged on the\nextreme right of the line defending with all the resources of a vast\nerudition the traditional views, the middle ground is occupied by such\nmen as Ewald, and Hitzig, and the teacher of these De-Wette, a school\nof critics that to-day yet counts among its protagonists such men as\nDillmann and Schrader and Kittel. With Graf, a new era may be said to\nhave begun for Biblical criticism. Notwithstanding the violent opposition\nencountered, the school has won the day. Its greatest triumph was perhaps\nthe acquiescence in its positions shortly before his death by that master\nof Biblical science, Professor Delitzsch of Leipzig. What the cardinal\npoint of contention is between the warring camps, is well known. It is\nthe relative age and position of what is technically designated as the\nPriestly code, in the Hexateuch. According to the new school this portion\nis the capping stone of the edifice, as it were. For Dillmann it is\npre-exilic; for Wellhausen post-exilic.\n\nThe book before us places itself without equivocation on the standpoint\nof this latest criticism. It is thus another leaf in the laurel wreath\ncrowning the men of the new dispensation. For the name of the author is\nguarantee of the scholarly character of the work; and views which have\nthe endorsement of a man of the renown and the scholarship of Professor\nCornill carry the presumption of having truth on their side. Professor\nCornill is however, a new-comer in this special field. His life work, as\nhe himself says, lies in another province of the vast realm of Biblical\ncritical studies. His fame is associated with his critical edition of\nthe text of Ezekiel, a work which will forever stand as the best guide\nfor all who would venture on the dangerous ground of conjectural textual\nemendations. For Cornill was the first to lay down the method which above\nall must be followed in so venturesome a task and his new version is the\nclassic illustration of the correctness of his method of proceeding. That\na man who has established for himself the reputation of being methodic\nand painstaking almost to a fault, a man who is dowered with critical\nacumen of the highest order, should after going anew over the whole\nground cast the weight of his scholarly authority in favor of the views\nof the new critical school is a fact the significance of which cannot be\nblinked. We are indeed glad that the publishers entrusted this number of\ntheir intended series of manuals for theological students, to a scholar\nwho had hitherto not written _ex cathedra_ on this particular subject.\nThus was ensured a new and impartial examination of all the points\ninvolved.\n\nThe ends which this series of manuals is to serve, decided of course the\nstyle and scope of this work. Of introductions (_Einleitungen_) to the O.\nT. there was no scarcity; but (see preface) they were either too bulky\nand too full and thus did not answer the requirements of the student,\nnot yet a scholar; or they were too brief, mere \u201cponies\u201d as we here in\nAmerica would say, intended to be learnt by heart for the purpose of\npassing a good examination. The difficulty thus consisted in combining\nthoroughness with the necessary brevity without sacrificing lucidity.\nNo mere results on the other hand were to be stated. The student was to\nbe initiated into the course of the investigations, the reasons for the\nconclusions and thus his interest was to be awakened and the way prepared\nfor independent research on his own part. That the author has succeeded\nin carrying out this his programme, every section of the book confirms.\nHis fear that the full analysis in paragraph 12, of the priestly code\nwill be found to be out of place in an \u201coutline of this kind\u201d is\ngroundless. We do not hesitate that this very section is the gem of the\nwhole work full as it is of numerous passages which cannot but stir to\nprofitable reflection the student. None can lay this book aside without\nconfessing that he has gained a \u201cGesammtanschauung,\u201d an insight into\nthe unity and coherence of the new views, apt to convince all earnest\nand unbiased minds of the truth that in this science (_Wissenschaft_)\ncriticism is standing on firm ground. In the selection of the books\nnamed at the head of each chapter, or in the course of the discussion,\nthe Professor has displayed most consummate skill. There is scarce one\nimportant work which with profit may be consulted but is mentioned; and\nwhat is more in the right connection. This feature is not the least\nvaluable in the whole work; the student thus has at ready command a\nbibliography which excludes the chaff and stores the wheat.\n\nBut let us dwell a little more specifically on the plan and execution\nand the contents of this book. Two plans may suggest themselves to\nthe writer of an \u201cintroduction\u201d of this kind. He may attempt to give\na picture of the rise of literature among the ancient Hebrews and\ntreat of the different writings which have come down to us, often the\nfragments of larger works, in the order of their composition and at the\nsame time connect with this discussion the reasons for departing from\nthe traditional views as to their dates and so forth and for assigning\nthem to a new age. This would be virtually writing a history of the\nliterature. It is this plan which Reuss adopted. But according to our\nProfessor, investigation has not proceeded far enough to make such a\nhistory possible. He even doubts whether it ever will (p. 2). Perhaps his\nverdict is justified. At all events he is right when he urges that in\nsuch a sequence much which belongs to the branch which he is to teach,\nwill scarcely find its proper or organic place. And therefore it was a\nwise conclusion of his to adhere to the second plan, the traditional, for\nsuch _Einleitungen_ which treats of the different books in the order of\nthe Hebrew canon and finally takes up the discussion of such questions\nas the collection of the canon, the condition of the text, the different\nancient versions and their value for the reconstruction, if possible, of\nthe true original. But what is an _Einleitung_? It is that theological\n\u201cdiscipline\u201d which concerns itself about holy scripture as a book. It is\nits business to fix the time when and the manner how the several writings\nwere composed, which now collectively form the holy scriptures, again it\nis one of its main objects to understand at what period and under what\nconditions the several writings were collected and also the manner of\nthe tradition of this collection down to us. The method of this inquiry\ncan be none other but the historic critical. To this definition of the\ncharacter of this discipline, to retain this German name, none will take\nexception. It is both succinct and complete. The second paragraph gives a\nfull survey of the history of the studies in this field. It covers within\nthe brief space of ten pages the results of scholarly labors extending\nover a period of over fourteen hundred years. It is not a dry enumeration\nof names and book titles. Under each scholar, the salient element of his\ncontribution is emphasised. The living principle of these studies is thus\nillustrated in its growth and successive development. Take for instance\nthis description of Wellhausen\u2019s method, and in a similar manner that\nof all other predecessors or co-laborers is brought out: \u201cAt the hand\nof the history of the cultus and that of tradition, he shows how these\ntwo lines of development run parallel to each other, how the religious\nprocess of evolution at every halt and turn finds its expression and at\nthe same time its corroboration in the productions of literature: Israel\nand Judaism are two concepts radically different from each other; it is\nthe canon that differentiates Judaism from old Israel.\u201d Paragraph three\nstates the author\u2019s reasons for treating the single books first before\ntaking up the discussion of their collection into a canon, and also why\nthe apocrypha are excluded. These not being in the canon, are foreign to\nthe purposes of an introduction into the canon books. None will deny that\nthe Professor\u2019s arguments on these points are irrefutable. His inquiry\ninto the age of the art of writing among the Hebrews concludes this\ngeneral preliminary. He is of the opinion that as far back as the memory\nof the Hebrews goes, they were acquainted with this art as nowhere there\nis a sign that among them there was a dim recollection of an analphabetic\nperiod. Recent finds have made it plain that during the reign of the\nPharaoh of the exodus a lively correspondence was kept up between\nPalestine and Egypt, while for the reign of David the names of his court\nofficials is documentary proof that there were writers at his court. The\nuse of the pen must have been pretty general among the people as is shown\nby Judges viii, a chapter which belongs to the oldest layer of historical\ncompositions.\n\nOur space is too limited to abstract every chapter of this remarkable\nbook. Much as we should like to do this, and especially as in this\nmanner alone we can hope to do justice to its merits, we must confine\nourselves, now that we come to the \u201cspecial introduction\u201d to a few\nselections taken from the discussion of the main points in reference to\nbooks which have been the centre of critical study. The Pentateuch as\nis natural receives the lion\u2019s share of the author\u2019s attention. We have\nno hesitancy in saying that his is the best exposition of the modern\nviews which has yet come under our notice. The Pentateuch cannot be the\nwork of Moses; internal evidence, as already pointed out by Aben Esra,\nHobbes, Peyrerius, and Spinoza, render the traditional assumption of\nMosaic authorship untenable. But the Pentateuch cannot be the work of\none author. The critical labors of one and a half century, sketched\nmost skillfully, has made it plain that the Pentateuch has been \u201cworked\ntogether\u201d from four independent original writings, (_Quellenschriften_)\na yahwistic work, J. an elohistic, E. a Deuteronomistic D. and a\npriestly which after Kuenen is denoted as P. On this general division\nthe scholars are agreed, the relative age of the separate parts alone\nis yet under controversy. In paragraph seven an analysis is given of\nthe first four books as assigned to the three sources. Deuteronomy\noccupies a position of its own. It is characteristically different in\nlanguage and thought from the others; it is something essentially new\nand is in itself homogeneous. In the main Deuteronomy is the book of\nthe covenant mentioned in II. Kings xxiii; this original D. is now\nincorporated in chapters xii, xiii, xiv-xvii, where however certain\nverses and even parts of verses must be eliminated. Perhaps xxviii, or\nas Professor Cornill argues, something more succinct but of the same\ngeneral nature, a curse, may have belonged to the original D. This must\nhave been the book published under such extraordinary circumstances\nin 621. Who is its author? It presents itself as the work of Moses.\nBut this is characteristic of the tendency of the age to take a great\nman as the father of a new literary production, a tendency which was\nperfectly well understood and was far above the level of a literary\ndeception. Its early manifestation in D. is merely proof that even then\nMoses was among the people the law-giver _par excellence_. The author\nof D. must be looked for in the circle of the pious who in consequence\nof Manasse\u2019s retrogression were bound all the more closely unto each\nother. In other words among the men of the prophetic party, who must have\nhad influence also over certain priestly orders, for D. is a compromise\nand an alliance between the prophets and the priests. Besides these\ncomponents of original D. the book contains in its present form additions\nand duplicates which partly are historical and hence are denoted by\nD.h, partly parenetic, hence D.p; but again in these are many later\ninterpolations. For the particulars in this regard, we must refer to the\nwork of Cornill itself. His analysis displays a keen eye and will on the\nwhole be sure to be accepted as final. The date of D. being 621, what\nis the time of the other great sources of the present Pentateuch. It\nis clear that D. is acquainted with the \u201cbook of the covenant\u201d Ex. xx,\n23.-xxiii, 33. and with both Decalogues (?). Thus it was acquainted with\nJE. P. on the other hand is totally unknown. The historical portions of\nD. confirm this deduction from the legislative pieces. JE is clearly\nknown to D. while of a knowledge of P. there is not the least trace.\nHow far back of 621 may we go to fix the date of both J. and E.? The\nperiod of the first kings seem to be the limit, or more particularly\nthe reign of David. But which of the two is the elder, J. or E.? There\ncan be no question that J. is. For he is more na\u00efve as appears from\na comparison among others of chapters Gen. xx, 1-17, xxi 22-32 which\nbelong to E., with chapter Gen. xxvi. 1-33 which is J.\u2019s. E. appears\nto be a theological recasting of J. E. is the work of the Northern\nkingdom. Joseph always appears as the leader of his brothers and other\nfeatures confirm this impression. The year 722, when in the Northern\nrealm national consciousness was at its high water mark may then be\nsupposed to be the _terminus ad quem_. But is E. as we have it a literary\nunit? Kuenen has proven that it is not. A century after its original\ncomposition a second edition so to speak must have been made with a\nview to meet the requirements and prejudices of the Judaic population\nof the South. Ex. chapters 32-33, are of great decisive importance in\nthis connection. They are a rebuke for the golden calf worship at Dan\nand Bethel. Thus E. is divided again into two E.1 and E.2, to which come\nyet other later amplifications f. i. Num. xxi, 32-35. E.1 then belongs\nto the reign of Jeroboam II (750); and E.2 is the work of a later author\nliving in Judah and under the influence of prophetic ideas. The locality\nof J. is a point of controversy. Cornill sides with those who maintain\nthat his home is the Southern kingdom of Judah. The incidents in the\nPatriarchal biographies which seem to weaken such an assumption are\nexplained as original traits of tradition which J. had no interest to\nchange. J. again is not a literary unit; it compromises J.1, J.2, and\neven J.3. The reasons for these subdivisions are clearly given in the\nbook. J. must have been composed in its different parts between 850-625.\nThe priestly code occupies a whole paragraph, the signal merit of which\nwe have noticed above. This is indeed the master-piece of a great\ncritical master. The many points which are involved in the discussion of\nthis mooted problem are treated with a clearness and a calmness which\ncarry conviction to the most sceptical. P. presents a spiritual unity\nbut not a literary. P. is the offspring of P.1 an old priestly record\nand P.2 a narrative and legislative composition which is as it were\nthe substance and skeleton of P. around which younger accretions have\ngathered at different times for which Cornill in order to simplify his\nsymbols proposes the designation of P.x. J. S. Vater as early as 1805 has\nproven that in the so-called Mosaism, of the influence in literary and\nlegislative respect of our P. there is no evidence before the captivity.\nWellhausen and Kayser and Kuenen have demonstrated what for Vatke was a\ndim suspicion. Dillmann, Kittel, and Delitzsch as little as Baudissin\nhave succeeded in saving the pre-exilic character of P. Certain it is\nthat before Esra 458 (444), this code had no official recognition. From\nNehemiah we have the proof that our P. corresponds to the \u201cBook of the\nLaw of Moses\u201d which was read at the great assembly in October 444. On the\nother hand the book of Chronicles is based on P. as it details history,\nas it would have been, if P. had been the law regulating life and liturgy\nand temple service. Had P. been known before D. what reason should the\npriest have had who promulgated it to substitute for it another code\nless advantageous for his own order? P. is clearly a development of\nD. D. presents itself as something new in all of its demands, in its\ninsistence on centralisation, in one sanctuary and in one priestly order\non the legitimacy of the tribe of Levi exclusively. Of the tabernacle\nthere is not one syllable in the whole of the pre-exile literature.\nIt is a clear projection into antiquity of the Deuteronomic Central\nsanctuary. The relations of P. to Ezekiel make this still plainer. This\nprophet is the link of transition between D. and P. The omissions in the\nfestal cycle of E. can only be explained that this prophet-priest was\nunacquainted with P. The captivity is thus the time for the composition\nof P. in the main. Its emphasis on circumcision as the sign of the\ncovenant which decides the connection with the chosen seed and nation,\nis proof of this. And the chronology finally corroborates all previous\ninferences as the chronology of Genesis which is so important a part\nof P. is unmistakably a reconstruction after certain principles of the\nBabylonian history of the beginnings. (Oppert.) P. was written during\nthe century from Ezekiel to Esra (570-458). It was not merely P.2 that\nEsra read before the assembled people. P.1 and P.2 seem thus to have\nbeen united even at this time. But it is not to be assumed that under\nEsra P. was already a part of the other portions of our Pentateuch. P.\nitself contains parts which are later than Esra. P.x is undoubtedly\nlater and these additions are easily explained on the very assumption\nof the official introduction of P. P. is not the work of an individual;\nit is that of a whole school, a school which naturally formed in the\ncaptivity. Besides these \u201csource-writings,\u201d the Pentateuch contains\nsmaller pieces of great antiquity mostly of a poetic character which\nhad for a long time an independent existence. Such is Gen. xlix, Exodus\nxv, and others. Exodus xxi-xxiii, the so-called book of the covenant,\nrequires also a treatment by itself. It is characteristic of this book\nthat it ignores totally the Decalogue. Kuenen has solved the difficulties\nin which this collection of judicial precedents is involved by pointing\nout that it is the predecessor of D. D. is merely the substitute for\nthis. As it is older than E. and is the precipitate of the unwritten law\nof the earlier kingly period, we place its date in the ninth century.\nLev. xvii-xxvi while betraying in many regards affinity with P. is still\ndistinct from it. It stands between Ezekiel and P.; it is one of the many\npriestly Thoroth which undoubtedly were current among the class whom\nthey concerned. How now did these component parts finally combine? This\nis elucidated in paragraph fourteen. First J. and E. were put together,\nby an editor of Jehovistic leanings, whom Wellhausen has styled Rj. (R.\nstanding for German Redacteur, Editor). This Rj. worked over, and that\noften decidedly, his materials in keeping with his own convictions. This\nRj. probably lived about 650. His position is pre-deuteronomic. A second\neditor combined the work of Rj. with D. He is designated as Rd. His\nwas the placing of the old book of the covenant near Sinai in order to\ngain room for Deuteronomy. He thus became the cause of much confusion.\nHe lived during the second half of the Babylonian captivity. JED. was\nfinally combined with P. by a third editor (Rp.) who is characterised by\nconsiderable reverence for the old documents. He omitted much to guard\nagainst repetition but at the same time where the relations differed he\npreserved them most faithfully and endeavored to place them into their\nproper position and connection. Rp. was thus virtually the author of our\nPentateuch. But living after Esra even with him the Pentateuch was not\nyet closed. Many younger hands had a share in its final shaping. Glosses\nwere added or crept into the text, as is shown by comparison with the\nlxx. The book of Joshuah is a necessary continuation and complement of\nthe Pentateuch.\n\nBut here we must stop quoting in detail. Much as we should desire to\nreproduce Cornill\u2019s own words relating to other Biblical books, want\nof space precludes even the attempt. Suffice it to say that as in his\ntreatment of the Pentateuch, so every question bearing on Biblical\ncriticism is handled with the skill of the master. At whatever turn we\nask information of this book we receive it most abundantly. This is\nindeed a students book. It stimulates while it instructs. It leads while\nit describes the road passed over. In the discussion of the critical\nproblems on the Psalms, the prophets Isaiah and Zechariah, on the final\ncollection of the canon, the translation of the Bible and the relation of\nthe different recensions to each other, the historical books as distinct\nfrom Chronicles, and Esra, and so forth, every point is treated with a\nlucidity of style and a fulness of material which is the rare gift of\na man who is saturated with his science and loves it for its own sake.\nThis book is destined to rank among the classics. Its earnest study and\nrepeated consultation can therefore be recommended to all who wish to\ninform themselves about the method and the achievements of the critical\nschools. The kindred book by Driver, recently published will not make\na translation into English of Cornill\u2019s manual less desirable. We take\nleave from the author with a feeling of great gratitude for the pleasure\nand the profit we derived from his contribution to the literature of\nBiblical scholarship. The book is well printed and singularly free from\ntypographical errors.\n\n DR. E. G. HIRSCH.\n\n\nTHE PRESENT POSITION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES. An Inaugural Lecture.\nBy _Andrew Seth_, M. A. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons.\n1891.\n\nAs stated by the author, this lecture deals, not with the circle of\nthe philosophical sciences, but only with the subjects traditionally\nassociated with a Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in Scotland.\nThese subjects belong to the three-fold classification of logical,\npsychological, and metaphysical, or philosophical in the strict sense.\nThey therefore embrace the study of the conditions to which valid\nreasoning must conform, the investigation, introspectively and otherwise,\nof the phenomena of consciousness, and the study of the two-fold question\nof knowing and being, which as epistemology and metaphysics are included\nunder the designation of Philosophy. These three lines of learning are\ncognate, and the first two are in a measure introductory to the third, or\nat least, says Professor Seth, if we go beneath the surface they lead us\ninto the very heart of philosophical difficulties. The lecturer refers in\nhis sketch of the present outlook in these three departments of science\nto the marvellous activity displayed in the department of psychology. All\nthe influences at work may be said to meet and come to fruition in Mr.\nWard\u2019s \u201cmasterly treatise\u201d in the \u201cEncyclop\u00e6dia Britannica\u201d and \u201cthe rich\nand stimulating volumes\u201d of Professor James, of Harvard. Experimental\npsychology is now widely spread in Germany and has been enthusiastically\ntaken up in America, \u201cwhere every well-equipped college aims at the\nestablishment of a psychological or psycho-physical laboratory.\u201d\nProfessor Seth thinks, however, that the experimental psychologists\nmagnify their office overmuch. The field of experiment is necessarily\nlimited to the facts of sensation, the phenomena of movement, and the\ntime occupied by the simpler mental processes. The results are often\nso contradictory as to leave everything in doubt, and where definite\nresults are obtainable, their value is often not apparent. Moreover,\nmany of the results are of a purely physiological nature, and are only\nby courtesy included in psychological science. We would remark on this,\nthat without the experiments the results would not have been obtained\nand that their value will become apparent when the methods of experiment\nare perfected. After referring to the critical function of philosophy as\na doctrine of knowledge, Professor Seth states that as constructive it\nshould lay special stress on a _teleological_ view of the universe. By\nthis is meant, that philosophical teleology should concentrate itself\nupon the proof that there is an end of evolution, \u201cthat there is an\norganic unity or purpose binding the whole process into one and making\nit intelligible\u2014in one word, that there _is_ evolution and not merely\naimless change,\u201d such as is supposed in a purely mechanical view of the\nuniverse. As to the nature of the end, although the lecturer accepts\nHegel\u2019s view that all things are relative to man as rational, he cannot\naccept \u201cthe abstraction of the race in place of the living children of\nmen.\u201d\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nDER MENSCHLICHE WELTBEGRIFF. By Dr. _Richard Avenarius_, Ord. Professor\nder Philosophie an der Universit\u00e4t Z\u00fcrich. Leipsic: O. R. Reisland. 1891.\n\nThis monograph is as it were a self-confession. The author endeavors\nto attain clearness in his own philosophical standpoint. He looked\nback upon the path he has traveled and feels that \u201cthe solution of\nthe problem-attained is fundamentally a personal self-liberation\u201d\n(Preface, ix). This book is most commendable reading to all idealists\nand agnostics. It is an interesting and instructive little work,\ntracing with a keen psychological criticism the vagaries of certain\nphilosophical conceptions, through which not alone the author but the\nthinkers of mankind in general have strayed. The philosopher begins\nwith what Avenarius calls the \u201cnatural world-conception.\u201d But this\nnatural world-conception leads to contradictions and the evil spirit of\nspeculation leads us in a circle through the barren fields of idealism.\nAvenarius asks: \u201cIs the world really of such a nature that it appears\nunitary and consistent only to the superficial thinker, while it\nleads every one astray who attempts to grasp it more precisely in its\nentirety\u2014the more so the more consistently the thinker proceeds?\u201d (p.\nxiii.)\n\nThe author proposes the question: \u201cIn what consists the inevitableness\nof the contradiction to which every general world-conception seems to\nhave led? Or, if the world really be unitary what is the evil spirit that\nleads those astray who hunger and thirst after a true cognition of the\nworld?\u201d\n\nThe author has entirely abandoned the idealistic standpoint, an\ninclination to which he showed in his first publication, \u201cPhilosophie\nals Denken der Welt gem\u00e4ss dem Princip des kleinsten Kraftmasses.\u201d\nHe says: \u201cDoubt of the correctness of my way heretofore pursued was\ninduced through the barrenness of theoretical idealism in the field\nof psychology; and yet cognition and experience should belong to this\nscience as psychological ideas.\u201d\n\nThe author in explaining the development of thought as it takes place in\nman proceeds in a personal way, so much so that every idealist ought to\nbe satisfied. There are whole pages which teem with _ME_\u2019s and _I_\u2019s.\nThe method of notation is what might be called American. Europeans often\ncomplain about our abbreviations, the Y. M. C. A., the S. A. S., the C.\nB. & Q. Ry., etc., which are great puzzles to the uninitiated new-comer.\nIn a similar way Avenarius introduces such algebraic signs as _R_ and\n_E_, which means reality and the sensations which our fellow-men are\nsupposed to have. _M_ is Man, _T_ is fellow-man. _T\u2081_ is the bodily\nappearance of _T_, it is _R_; while _T\u2082_ is the _E_ of _T_, i. e. his\nsoul or spirit. _C_ is the nervous central organ, etc. Thus Avenarius\nsays (p. 18):\n\n\u201cI can in a relative consideration assume _R_ to be the condition of\nchanges in the _E_ values, supposed to exist in _M_, only if _M_ and in\n_M_ the system _C_ are parts of my supposition,\u201d and in a note (p. 117)\nhe adds:\n\n\u201cThe skeleton in Goethe\u2019s poem, \u2018The Dead\u2019s Dance,\u2019 scents without an\norgan of smell, sees without eyes, thinks without a brain; it also\nmoves without muscles. To consider such acts as true is now universally\ndeclared to be superstition. The time will come when the assumption of\npsychical phenomena without the co\u00f6rdination of the system _C_ will\nuniversally be considered in the same way.\u201d\n\nThe first three chapters remind us very much of W. K. Clifford\u2019s article\n\u201cOn the Nature of Things in Themselves.\u201d But the article is nowhere\nmentioned and it is most probable that it is unknown to the author. If\nAvenarius had known Clifford\u2019s view, he might have presented his ideas\nwith more economy of space. But if he did not know Clifford\u2019s article,\nthe coincidences of procedure and to a great extent also of the result\nattained are the more remarkable. What Avenarius calls the _E_ values are\ntermed by Clifford \u201cejects,\u201d and the formation of ejects is called by\nAvenarius \u201cintrojection.\u201d\n\nOn page 52 we read the following sentence on the three phases of the\ncognition of the data of experience:\n\n\u201cThe first phase alone, that of ingenuous empiricism, cognises, i.\ne. explains the totality of these facts without the assistance of\na non-sensible ... the second that of ingenuous realism conceives\nthe non-sensible as supersensible, and the third, that of ingenuous\ncriticism, as the pre-sensible. The epithet ingenuous has reference to\nthe foundation, not to the doctrinary system built upon it. That which\nmakes the said realism and criticism ingenuous is a survival of the\ningenuous empiricism.\u201d\n\nThe theory which conceives the external cause of an experience as an\nobject, effecting _in_ the subject sensations, passes successively\nthrough the following views. The object is said to be (1) not within\nthe range of experience, (2) not within the range of cognition, (3)\nnot-existing. Thus it reaches _via_ agnosticism its climax in idealism\nand \u201cpure experience becomes a something that is never truly experienced,\nit becomes the totality of mere or pure sensations\u201d (p. 62).\n\nThe third part of the pamphlet is devoted to \u201cthe restitution of the\nnatural world-idea.\u201d Here the author comes, at least in some expressions,\nvery close to the solution editorially upheld in _The Monist_. Avenarius\nsays: \u201cThe task is ... to _describe_ the what of my experience so as to\nmake a practical application of it in my dealings with my fellow-men\u201d (p.\n79).\n\nProfessor Avenarius sums up his conclusions in the term \u201cempirio-critical\nprincipal-co\u00f6rdination\u201d which he defines as the inseparability of\nthe ego-experience from the surrounding experience. \u201cThe ego and the\nsurrounding belong in the same sense to every experience. It is a\nco-ordination peculiar to all experience\u201d (p. 83). If we understand\nAvenarius correctly he means to say, to express it in our terms, that\nthere is no object but there is a subjective aspect of it, no subject but\nit appears objectively. Thus there is no subjectivity in itself and there\nis no objectivity in itself. This is exactly our position, which we call\nMonism.\n\nThe \u201cintrojection\u201d was according to Avenarius the evil spirit that led\nspeculation astray. To get rid of this evil spirit the proposition is\nmade to discard \u201cintrojection\u201d and replace it by the empirio-critical\nprincipal-co\u00f6rdination. But closely considered the latter is only\nan improved modification of the former, and this plan would better\nbe characterised as discarding the error implied in that kind of\nintrojection theory which assumes that sensations alone are given. The\ndata of experience are not mere feelings, not mere subjectivity, as\nis maintained by the idealist; nor are they mere objectivity, as is\nmaintained by the ingenuous realist; the data of experience are states\nof subject-objectness, they are feelings of a certain kind possessing\nobjective significance, and the ideas subject as well as object are\nabstractions made in a late stage of mental development from this one\ninseparable whole of subject-objectness (see _The Monist_ I, No. 1, pp.\n78-79).\n\nAvenarius says in a note (p. 132), \u201cThe question should not be \u2018Why do we\nbelieve in the reality of an external world?\u2019 but \u2018Why did we not believe\nthat the external world is real?\u2019\u201d We should say that neither question\nis admissible. We should first ask: What do we mean by real? Reality is\nthe sum total of our experiences, including the meaning of sensations\nand ideas, and finds its special application in their reliability. The\nquestion, Is the candle I see real? means, Does it react in special ways?\nEvery name of a special object signifies a certain group of actions or\nreactions observable by the subject. This is what we _call_ real and the\nidealist would have to deny the existence of his own experience to deny\nthe reality of objects in this sense.\n\nAvenarius\u2019s books are not easy reading to the English and American\nstudent, for his style is sometimes heavy and his constructions are\ninvolved. So are his thoughts. But his thoughts show the earnest thinker;\nthe evolution of his views goes in the right direction and his works\ndeserve the attention of his co-workers in the philosophical field.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nDIE BEDEUTUNG DER THEOLOGISCHEN VORSTELLUNGEN F\u00dcR DIE ETHIK. By Dr.\n_Wilhelm Paszkowski_. Berlin: Mayer & M\u00fcller. 1891.\n\nReligion originates everywhere, according to the author, in the\nself-consciousness of man who feels himself an acting and willing being\nlimited by and dependent upon greater and higher powers. The religious\nrelation consists in the regulation of his actions as well as his will\nwith reference to the ordinances of these powers. Dr. Paszkowski lets\nall the best known religions pass in review before our eyes, tracing\nin all of them the connection between the properly religious elements\nand morality and singling out those religious factors which are most\neffective in determining man\u2019s will in a moral way. In the second part\nof the little volume he endeavors to show in how far the ecclesiastical\norganisation of religion in dogma and cult have strengthened and in how\nfar they have weakened this result.\n\nConcerning the most important dogma, which is the belief in immortality,\nPaszkowski declares that it had its undoubted effects favorable and\nunfavorable upon the social and moral life of mankind. It has prevented\nsome crimes while it has enhanced others. The question is, he says,\nwhether an individual immortality such as the religions usually picture\nit, is tenable or not. Modern science and anthropology seem to have\nproved it an illusion. Yet, as Paulsen says, the belief in immortality is\nnot a mere imagination. Every reality and so also man\u2019s life is eternal.\nIt is nonsensical to think of death as a finality. That which has been\nalive is a necessary, an eternal and inexpugnable part of reality and can\nnever again be blotted out. Through death the continuance of a man\u2019s life\nis cut off, but the contents of his life can never again be annihilated.\nThe real is in its very nature eternal. Paszkowski adds to Paulsen\u2019s\nremarks that man should find the norm of moral action in his relation to\nhis fellow-men and posterity, so that morality need not depend upon any\nreligious views. He will also have to act morally after he has resigned\nthe belief in the reality of the beautiful immortality-dream as it is\npresented by enthusiastic religiosity.\n\nIt appears to us that if the usual conception of immortality is\nscientifically untenable it devolves upon the moral teacher to present an\nimmortality conception that is tenable. The true immortality conception\nwill never enhance crimes, it will always have a favorable effect upon\nthe morality of mankind. Furthermore man\u2019s relation to mankind and also\nto the universe is of a religious nature. The social order to which\nman has to conform is one part of those powers a recognition of which\nconstitute religion. If these powers are conceived to be outside the\nworld we have a supernatural deity, if they are the highest, best,\nand greatest of, and in the world itself, we have an immanent deity\nand ethics still remains intimately connected with and dependent upon\nreligion.\n\nThis it appears must be after all the author\u2019s meaning, for he says in\nprominent print, p. 89: \u201cSo long as there are men religion will not\ncease, for it is one of the constitutional elements of human nature.\u201d \u201cIn\nthe same measure as religion becomes spiritual, the moral conceptions\nalso will be purified, the mere ceremonial and the cult-element will lose\ntheir importance in religion\u201d (p. 92). \u201cTo divide the ethical factor from\nthe religious, as a matter of principle, will be seen to be impossible.\nWe can only conciliate the one with the other, both having originated out\nof the same source of emotions\u201d (p. 90).\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nDAS WAHRNEHMUNGSPROBLEM VOM STANDPUNKTE DES PHYSIKERS, DES PHYSIOLOGEN\nUND DES PHILOSOPHEN. Beitr\u00e4ge zur Erkenntnisstheorie und empirischen\nPSYCHOLOGIE. By Dr. _Hermann Schwarz_. Leipsic: Duncker & Humbolt 1892.\n\nDr. Hermann Schwarz treats the most fundamental problem of\nphilosophy\u2014viz. that of perception. He says in the preface: \u201cThere is\na triple state of facts to which obvious yet strange as it appears to\nthought, the attention of the naturalist and the philosopher is drawn:\nthe physical, the physiological, the psychical.\u201d The physical is the\nempire of mechanical motion that can be observed with great accuracy to\ntake place everywhere. The physiological is the fact that when certain\nimpressions produce mechanical effects upon the nerves, the result\nconsists in certain sense-data; nervous action is accompanied with\nsensation. The psychical state of things exhibits the fact that whether\nor not we want it to be so, colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and touches\nare always referred to external things, never to the own internal states\nof the mind. Every one of these facts is strange in itself, for every\none represents the contrary of what might be expected _a priori_. Who\nwould expect that the machine-like world of jostling atoms and the\nglorious world of colors and sounds should have anything in common? And\nthe sense-organs appear to the physiologist as mere physical apparatuses\nmodifying the ether-vibrations somehow. We do not see on the one hand how\nconsciousness can acquire information concerning the external world and\non the other hand, how motions can develop something so heterogeneous\nas is consciousness. If we were confronted with one set of facts only,\neverything would be plain, but this triple set of facts produces a\nproblem, it makes an explanation necessary and to this explanation Dr.\nSchwarz has devoted a careful investigation of some four hundred and odd\npages.\n\nSchwarz distinguishes two elements in what he calls \u201cingenuous realism,\u201d\n(1) its methodology and (2) its metaphysics. The methodology of physical\nscience consists in arranging the sense-data, while the metaphysics\nassume that the objectivity of the sense-data is correctly represented\nas \u201cthings, qualities, and effects.\u201d Natural science arrived at a\nscepsis of the usual metaphysics of na\u00efve realism by a correction of the\ningenuous-realistic method, and Kant by critically investigating the\nbackground or frame of its theory of cognition. The question is, What is\naltered by physical science in the conception of ingenuous realism, what\nby physiology, what by philosophy and why?\n\nIn the consciousness of an ingenuous realist the data of touch receive a\npreference over those of the other senses, which is due to their greater\nstability. The color of an object disappears, the sounds cease, while the\nobjects remain comparatively the same things to the sense of touch. Thus\nthey are considered as the real objects having certain qualities which\nproduce the phenomena of the other senses. This view is called by Schwarz\nthe first methodological dogma of ingenuous realism. The second dogma is\nthe conception that sense-data are considered as relatively permanent. So\ncolors are conceived to exist objectively in the dark, an error which has\nbeen sufficiently explained by Helmholtz in his \u201cPhysiological Optics,\u201d\n\u00a7 26. The third dogma completes the second; it is the view that the\nrelative permanence or disappearance of the qualities of objects depends\nupon causes. Fire is said to be the cause which makes a wire red-hot. The\ningenuous realist knows no reciprocal causation, no action and reaction,\nno _Wechselwirkung_. He assumes in addition to the objects certain\nforce-beings which are regarded as the causes of all change. The sun is\nsaid to produce light.\n\nSchwarz explains very well how this view of ingenuous realism naturally\narises and also how in the progress of thought it naturally corrects\nitself. Suppose there were thinking beings with whom smell took the\nplace of touch and sight, would not their world-conception be based upon\nthe data of the sense of smell as is ours upon the data of mechanical\nmotions? If the females of a certain butterfly (_Frostspanner_) are\ncaught in the country and placed at a great distance in some house of\nthe city, the males will be seen on the next morning in great numbers\nfluttering before the window of the room in which the females are kept.\nWhat a perfection of the sense of smell while the senses of touch and\nsight are very poorly developed! The dog owes his intelligence mainly\nto the development of the sense of smell. Would not beings whose\nintelligence is mainly due to the sense of hearing rather attempt to hear\nthe world than to grasp or comprehend it,\u2014to _behorchen_ rather than to\n_begreifen_?\n\nIngenuous realism is not consistent, and its methodology leads to\nalterations of its metaphysics. We shall have to attribute either to\nall the sense-data objective reality or to none of them. The data of\ntouch cannot be treated as exceptions and thus we have the alternative\neither to return from our scepsis to realism, not to the ingenuous but\nto a critically modified view of it, or to adopt the extremest form of\nidealism, be it that of Berkeley or the subjectivism of Fichte.\n\nThe author (not unlike Professor Avenarius in his book \u201cDer menschliche\nWeltbegriff\u201d) takes the former view. He says in the concluding chapter\n(_Die M\u00e4ngel der Ding-an-sich-Hypothese_): \u201cThis view, viz. that of\ningenuous realism, will in the end of our inquiry be seen to be not only\nthe most natural, and practically considered the most useful metaphysical\ntheory, but also that conception which is freest from all theoretical\nobscurities\u201d (p. 381).\n\nWe believe that the book which contains much valuable material, would\nhave been more useful than it actually is, if a chapter had been added\ncontaining a summary of the whole inquiry and delineating in great\noutlines the critically modified form of realism whose most appropriate\nname we should say is monism\u2014not materialism or mechanicalism which\nallows all facts to be swallowed up by the conception that the world\nconsists only of matter in motion, but that monism which is a unitary\nview of the whole, mindful of the fact that the sense-data as well as our\nconcepts are one-sided aspects only of the one and all. If we bear this\ntruth in mind we shall avoid from the beginning the three dogmas (alias\nerrors) of ingenuous materialism.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nDIE ENTWICKELUNG DES CAUSALPROBLEMS IN DER PHILOSOPHIE SEIT KANT. Studien\nzur Orientirung \u00fcber die Aufgaben der Metaphysik und Erkenntnisslehre.\n(Part II.) By Dr. _Edmund Koenig_. Leipsic: Otto Wigand.\n\nThe present work forms the conclusion of a volume published by Dr. Koenig\nin 1888, entitled _Die Entwickelung des Causalproblems von Cartesius\nbis Kant_. This same subject is here pursued in the history of modern\nphilosophy since Kant.\n\nThe problem of causality, according to Dr. Koenig, has two aspects, an\nepistemological and a metaphysical. The pre-Kantian efforts dealt chiefly\nwith the latter, the post-Kantian more principally with the former. The\nlatter, the metaphysical question, is, How do things in the world of\nreality produce effects in one another? The former, or that which relates\nto the theory of knowledge, is, (1) What is the logical foundation of\nthe idea of causality, what do we imply when we set up two objects\nas cause and effect, and (2) By what right and to what extent are we\njustified in imputing to the axiom of causality an objective validity?\nWith respect to the latter, the epistemological, point of view, Hume and\nKant believed they had established indisputably that experience as given\ndoes not furnish sufficient grounds either for the idea or the axiom of\ncausality. On the other hand, others, like Maine de Biran, Schopenhauer,\nand Trendelenburg, hold, that causality is given us in experience, that\nwe apprehend the causal relation subsisting between things, together with\nthe things. Herbart maintains that the idea of the causal relation has\nbeen reached by the logical elaboration of experience in conformity with\nthe general laws of logical thought. Mill and Spencer see in this idea an\nelement that goes beyond experience, but justify it only psychologically,\nnot logically. According to Lotze, Riehl, Wundt, v. Hartmann, Volkelt,\nthe idea is either wholly or partly of intellectual origin. Finally,\nComte and a few modern scientists look upon the idea of causality as\nlogically valueless and scientifically superfluous.\n\nThis is, in brief, the opinions of the greatest thinkers whom Koenig\ntreats of, respecting the logical composition of the idea of causality.\nBut another question, that namely as to the character of the relation\nin which in the causal judgment the notions of the concrete causes\nand their effects exist, is one closely allied with this. Some hold,\n(Trendelenburg, Goering, Herbart, Hamilton, Spencer,) that the relation\nis one of identity; others that it is synthetical. This aspect is also\ndeveloped in connection with the last-named thinkers.\n\nWith respect to the axiom of causality, we find diametrically opposed to\neach other the doctrines of empiricism and apriorism; but a number of\nintermediate opinions have also established themselves. Of the first,\nSchopenhauer, Lotze, and Volkelt are representatives, but only the theory\nof the first-named is developed at length. The empiricism of Mill and\nGoering meets with exhaustive treatment, as does the opposed view of\nLaas, Riehl, and Wundt and the conciliatory view of Spencer.\n\nWith respect to the metaphysical aspect of the question, above-mentioned,\nwe find the modes of conception of phenomenalism and realism opposed.\nThe latter only is, in the nature of its doctrine, required to explain\nontologically the coming about of the causal relation in reality; the\nformer does not recognise Being in itself, and hence there can be no\ncausal connection of such. Schopenhauer\u2019s attempt (the view of the\nforces of nature as the emanation of a Universal Will), and the splendid\nontological theories of Herbart and Lotze are regarded by Dr. Koenig\nas being no more a solution of the problem than were the efforts of\ntheir famous predecessors Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibnitz. These\ndogmatic realists, as Koenig calls them, proceed from the assumption of\nthe knowableness of the absolute; opposed to them, in this regard, are\nSpencer, Von Hartmann, and Volkelt, the critical realists, the first of\nwhom gives an ontology that is a vague and metaphysical rendering of the\nprinciple of the conservation of energy, the two last of whom impute a\ntranscendental ontological significance to the idea of causality.\n\nThe connection, Dr. Koenig concludes, is thus apparent and definite\nbetween the metaphysical and epistemological divisions of the question.\nThe ontologist, unless he proceed dogmatically, must prove, that\nthe notion of causality in the form in which critical analysis has\nestablished it as a valid and indispensable empirical idea, calls\ninevitably for the notion of an absolute reality and of a state of things\nin that reality corresponding to the forms of the connection given.\nTherefore, the logical analysis of the idea of causality is in any\nphilosophy, pre-eminently determinative of its whole position and bearing.\n\nOn the whole, then, in the treatment of the problem forming the subject\nof this work, four comparatively independent views are found opposed\nto one another and considered in this opposition; viz., Sensualism and\nIntellectualism, Positivism and Rationalism, Empiricism and Apriorism,\nRealism and Phenomenalism. The author views the result of his researches\nto be, the proof of the untenability of Sensualism, Rationalism,\nEmpiricism, and Realism, so far as this, by an historico-critical\nanalysis, is possible.\n\nThis is but a brief sketch of the treatment pursued by the author.\nThe author\u2019s own view has been barely hinted at. He is a Kantian. He\ncalls himself a \u201ctranscendental idealist.\u201d Dr. Koenig\u2019s developments,\nappreciative, acute and pointed as they are, are too detailed and\nexhaustive to be separately taken into discussion here; but we may\nillustrate his point of view by a summary of a few remarks of his on the\nontological problem as solved by physics. They are as follows.\n\nThe _natural_ modes of thought cling irresistibly to the notion of\na constant substratum; this being so, how does process, how does\nchange spring from an invariability of existence? Physical science\nanswers, by _force_; which exists as a constant potentiality of the\nsubstratum, is now active, now latent. Dr. Koenig maintains that in\nthis physical science accomplishes nothing towards the solution of the\npresent problem; it does not by its notion of force make intelligible\nthe _acting_ of bodies on each other, for when it comes to define the\nmode of action of force it involves itself in hopeless difficulties.\nWhat is the consequence then, of this dilemma of science, where it can\nneither render plain the \u201cnature\u201d of the material substratum, nor the\nnature of \u201cforce,\u201d which is, so to speak, the source of the activity of\nthe substratum? It is either agnosticism, which places limits to our\nknowledge, and which Dr. Koenig rejects as unbecoming true thought, or\nit is that theory which regards the phenomena alone as real and views\nthe concepts of theoretical physics as the mere shifts and helps of\nthought whereby we bring the phenomena into connection with one another.\nThis latter view also Dr. Koenig cannot accept. His express contention\nis, that we can interpret, _ontologically_, the phenomena of reality\nby the notions of substance, force, etc.; he holds that the position\nof transcendental idealism is the correct theory here, the position\nnamely that matter and force conceived as transcendent, independent\nentities cannot be _thought away_, because substantiality and causality\nare _forms_ of transcendental apperception, which alone can make\nnature an object of cognition; matter and force must, for purposes of\nempiric observation, of necessity possess the same reality as phenomena\nthemselves.\n\nIn connection with this subject Dr. Koenig contests Mach\u2019s doctrine, that\nnatural laws are simple economical descriptions of phenomena; he contends\nthat \u201claw\u201d is the foundation of natural science, and particularly so the\nlaw of causality.\n\nThis, however, does not say much. For the formal laws _in themselves_\nare empty. The law, the axiom of causality may, _a priori_, be without\nexception; but this circumstance, the _conviction_ we may call it,\noffers us no hold on nature. When we investigate nature we have to\nperceive _definite facts_; about which we formulate particular laws or\nstatements. The law of causality, however, does not help us to _discern_\nthe determinative facts or features of any phenomenon. It simply says\nthat _if_ we have hit upon the determinative facts and formulated a law\ndescribing them, that law holds good throughout all nature. But what is\nto tell us _what_ the characteristic and determinative features of a\ngiven event are and when we have lighted on them? The law of causality?\nSurely not. The law of causality cannot tell us that for falling bodies\n_v_ = _gt_, i. e. that _t_ is decisive. It simply says that when once\nthis fact has been _discerned_ it holds universally good. But it would\nhave asserted the same thing with regard to Galileo\u2019s first (false)\nassumption, namely that _v_ = _Cs_. If, then, the law of causality cannot\ntell us what those features are between which the causal connection is\nassumed to exist, what is to tell us? Our observation simply, which\nmust be tested by experience. But our observation has no limits placed\nto it except this, that it shall select some fact that _represents_ the\nphenomenon and best and most easily enables _us_ to represent it. And\nthere is nothing that requires that there should be only _one_ feature\nor _one_ aspect of an event by which it is representable; there may\nbe several, as the development of science proves. Accordingly, what\nselection we make may depend on arbitrary and historical circumstances.\nAnd this, as we take it, is Prof. Mach\u2019s contention. If it is true, Dr.\nKoenig\u2019s criticism of Mach\u2019s view does not hold in its whole extent.\n\nDr. Koenig\u2019s treatment of the separate representative thinkers is\nexhaustive and in an eminent degree scientific. His work is distinguished\nby accuracy and pointedness of characterisation, and by special\nknowledge of great range. It is a valuable contribution which he has\ngiven us, to the study of the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, and he\nhas been true to his promise, as we judge, critically to discuss and not\nsummarily to dispose of the opinions of others.\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\nEINE NEUE DARSTELLUNG DER LEIBNIZISCHEN MONADENLEHRE AUF GRUND DER\nQUELLEN. By _Eduard Dillmann_. Leipsic: O. R. Reisland, 1891.\n\nThe author is an admirer of Leibnitz\u2019s monadology which he considers\nas \u201cthe most beautiful, most perfect fruit of philosophic thought and\nthe most glorious system to be found in the history of philosophy.\u201d\nThis enthusiasm however is not shown in panegyrics but in a careful\ninvestigation of the great master\u2019s work and we should scarcely know\nthe attitude of the author toward the philosopher whose thoughts he\ndiscusses, if he did not give vent to his feelings in a few sentences of\nthe concluding chapter. The rest of the book consists of purely critical\nand historical studies by a sober and cool-headed scholar. Leibnitz\u2019s\nsystem as it is represented in our histories of philosophy and as it is\ncurrently conceived lacks a unitary and leading idea, so that many of\nits most fundamental propositions appear to be at variance. Mr. Dillmann\nmaintains that Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy as it really is does not lack this\nunity; he has made an extensive and most diligent study of Leibnitz\u2019s\nworks and proves with great plausibility through the assistance of many\npertinent quotations the justice of his cause.\n\nLeibnitz\u2019s monadology is according to Dillmann essentially a conciliatory\nsystem. It attempts to reconcile the world-conceptions of his time. The\nmechanical explanation of nature as it was proposed in modern times and\naccording to which all processes should be conceived as motions of bodies\nis harmonised with the formalistic views of classical antiquity and of\nthe schoolmen which seeks for the causes of all phenomena in substantial\nforms. In aiming at such a combination, he had to show that all single\nphenomena of bodies and also their qualities had some ground and that\nthe principle of the body itself consisted in a substantial form. This\nled him to conceive of bodies and of all things not as phenomena of an\nexternal world but as representations in the mind, and thus an entirely\nnew standpoint was gained (p. 511). Representations are the inner states\nof Monads (p. 318). Monads are substances because representations are\nunits; for representations are the many expressed in a unity (p. 319).\nEvery monad is a concentration of the universe (p. 313). It is as if God\nhad multiplied the universe as often as there are souls (p. 314). Every\nsubstance is a little world in itself, expressing the great world of the\nuniverse. The substance imitates in its little world what God does in the\nuniverse (p. 313).\n\nLeibnitz\u2019s God-idea has suffered most from a misconception of the\nfundamental idea of his system. Dillmann declares that the traditional\nview, especially Fischer\u2019s, is in conflict with the philosopher\u2019s own\nwords. While Fischer says that Leibnitz\u2019s God has created the substances\nand arbitrarily endowed them with their natures, Dillmann maintains on\nthe ground of ample quotations that Leibnitz considers the forms of all\npossible existences as given: not even God can alter them. God however\ncan and did compare all possible worlds, and then created that which his\nwisdom found to be the best world. \u201cGod,\u201d says Leibnitz, \u201cdoes not select\na general Adam, but such a one,\u201d i. e. an individual Adam, \u201cwhose perfect\nrepresentation is found among all the possible beings which exist in\nthe ideas of God. The nature of every creature is determined by eternal\ntruths which are in the understanding of God independent of his will.\u201d\n\u201cGod\u2019s decree consists alone in the decision arrived at after having\ncompared all possible worlds and having admitted into existence that one\nwhich is the best of all.\u201d\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nLEITFADEN DER PHYSIOLOGISCHEN PSYCHOLOGIE IN 14 VORLESUNGEN. By Dr.\n_Th. Ziehen_, Docent in Jena. Mit 21 Abbildungen im Text. Jena: Gustav\nFischer. 1891.\n\nThe merits of these 14 lectures on physiological psychology are\nthoroughness, lucidity, and conciseness; the whole book is a pamphlet\nof 174 pp. only. The method of presentation is in all its detail work\npositive, stating the facts as they have been found to be by experience\nand as they are corroborated by experiment. Upon the whole it is a good\nr\u00e9sum\u00e9 of the present state of knowledge. A translation would be very\ndesirable and it is to be hoped that some of our psychologists will\nundertake the work.\n\nThe contents are briefly as follows: I. Contents and scope of psychology.\nII. Sensation, association, action. III. Stimulus, sensation. IV.\nTaste, smell, touch. V. Hearing. VI. Vision. VII. Affective aspect of\nsensation (pleasure and pain). VIII. Sensation, memory, concept. IX.\nAssociation of ideas. X. Judgment and syllogism. XI. Attention, voluntary\nthought, the ego (Ziehen says: \u201cpsychologically considered the simple\nego is a theoretical fiction,\u201d p. 139). XII. Diseased thinking, sleep,\nhypnosis. XIII. Action, expressive motions, language. XIV. Will, general\nconclusions.\n\nAlthough Dr. Ziehen\u2019s pamphlet is upon the whole an excellent treatise,\nwe cannot agree with the author in several questions which are of great\nimportance in their consequences.\n\nDr. Ziehen acknowledges that the specifically nervous processes, a\nsensible stimulus and a reaction, which latter is a motory effect,\ncannot be explained from physical laws alone (p. 4). Yet at the same\ntime he denies that the fact that the reflexes are adapted to a purpose\n(_Zweckm\u00e4ssigkeit_) proves the presence of a psychical parallelism.\n\u201cPfl\u00fcger,\u201d he says, \u201cwas wrong in attributing for this reason to the\nspinal cord a spinal-cord-soul.\u201d The _Zweckm\u00e4ssigkeit_ of reflexes (i.\ne. their being adapted to a purpose) has originated not otherwise than\nthe _Zweckm\u00e4ssigkeit_ of the color of the bird\u2019s plumage, i. e. through\nnatural selection and inheritance. This argument might be admissible,\nif we had not to account for the gradual origin of consciousness also.\nThere was a time when our personal consciousness did not exist, and there\nwas also a time when no conscious being lived upon the earth. Unless we\nassume that consciousness suddenly appeared, creating out of its own\nsubjectivity alone the objective world which appears to us as what we\ncall matter in motion, we shall have to adopt some monistic view of the\nsubject. To consider the psychical states as known and the objectivity of\nexistence as utterly unknown is no monism.\n\nDr. Ziehen is opposed to the idea of psychical parallelism which he\nconceives to be dualism, but he proposes a spiritual monism in its stead,\nthe difficulties of which he does not explain. It is to be regretted\nthat Dr. Ziehen has not understood the main idea of the parallelism\ndoctrine. He says in a foot-note (p. 6): \u201cIn the most extreme way, but\nwith quite insufficient reasons Lewes has maintained the omnipresence\nof consciousness.\u201d This is a misstatement of Lewes\u2019s view, which by the\nbye is held by the reviewer also, although he confesses that the term\nparallelism is inappropriate and leads to misunderstandings. The theory\nof parallelism, (at least as the reviewer holds it) is not dualistic\nbut monistic. It implies that the subjectivity and objectivity of\nexistence are two different abstractions of one and the same reality.\nIts parallelism is a parallelism of these two sets of abstraction, while\nthe reality from which they have been derived is one throughout. There\nexist no subjects that are not objects to other subjects, and every\nobject admits of a subjective aspect. There is a something supposed to\nbe present throughout nature which under certain conditions appears as\nconsciousness. This certain something is called by Clifford elements\nof feeling, by Lloyd Morgan metakinesis, it has been characterised in\nthe editorials of _The Monist_ as the subjectivity of existence, and\nthe presence of this something in the spinal cord was called by Pfl\u00fcger\n_R\u00fcckenmarksseele_.\n\nIt appears to me that if we could explain the well adapted reaction of\nnervous substance without assuming a psychical element in it, we could\nexplain the whole process of evolution and the historical development of\nmankind, without the assumption of consciousness. Yet it is obvious that\neven the explanation of the color of the bird\u2019s plumage by the theory\nof natural selection and heredity presupposes the presence of psychical\nelements somewhere. Either the bird and his mates show a color sense, or\nhis enemies do, whose persecution he escapes, or the animals upon whom he\npreys do. Man\u2019s entire existence, physical and psychical, including his\nfeelings of pleasure and pain, can be explained by the theory of natural\nselection and heredity; yet this is no proof that psychical elements do\nnot exist in him.\n\nIt has become customary at present to define \u201cpsychical\u201d as that only\nwhich appears in states of consciousness, and to exclude subconscious and\nunconscious states. Dr. Ziehen says: \u201cEverything given in consciousness\nand that alone is conscious\u201d (p. 3). Yet he introduces after all the\nexpression \u201cpsychically latent,\u201d \u201clatent memory pictures,\u201d and similar\nexpressions. Dr. Ziehen says, \u201cWe cannot even have a conception of that\nwhich an unconscious idea can be\u201d; yet what is a latent memory-picture\nbut an unconscious idea?\n\nThere are two kinds of unconscious ideas: (1) Latent ideas. Every man\u2019s\nbrain is full of latent ideas, i. e. of memory-pictures which are at\npresent unconscious but can become conscious at once if their activity\nis roused by an appropriate stimulus. (2) Ideas unrelated to the\ncentre of consciousness. Those active ideas which, although at present\nin a state of activity, are unrelated to the centre of consciousness\nthat constitutes the ego of the man, remain unconscious. Unconscious\ncerebration (which takes place in dreams, in diseased brains and also in\ncertain phases of healthy brains being, as it were, a by-play of their\nconscious activity) need not be destitute of feeling. Any pain may be\nlessened when our attention is called away from it. The nervous disorder\nremains the same, the feeling substance of the nervous structures in\nwhich the pain was perceived also remains the same, its activity and\nthrobbing pulsations do not cease. Yet if we succeed in separating its\nimmediate relation to the centre of consciousness it sinks down into\nsubconsciousness. There is no reason for assuming that the feeling, no\nlonger perceived, is wiped out entirely.\n\nWhile Dr. Ziehen\u2019s pamphlet is a presentation of the results of positive\nscience, we were astonished to find in the first chapter the following\nstatement: \u201cLater on we shall have to investigate whether there are for\nall psychical phenomena such material parallel processes in the central\nnervous system, and our answer will be decidedly in the negative.\u201d\nAnd again we find in the schedule of psychology a distinction between\n(_a_) psychical processes _not_ contingent upon cerebral functions\n(transcendental psychology), and (_b_) psychical processes contingent\nupon cerebral functions (physiological psychology). These statements\nare the more perplexing as the author joins the opposition made by\nM\u00fcnsterberg against Professor Wundt\u2019s idea of apperception, which is\nrejected as metaphysical, mystical, and even animistic. While we cannot\nin all points agree with Professor Wundt\u2019s theory of apperception,\nwhich received a critical examination by Professor Delabarre (see _The\nMonist_ II, No. 2, p. 297), we can most positively say that Dr. Ziehen\nin so far as he classes Wundt\u2019s view among the dualistic theories,\nmisunderstands Wundt\u2019s position. Wundt\u2019s physico-psychical parallelism\ncannot be identified with the metaphysical fiction of a subject, be\nthis subject called ego or soul.[66] Wundt says in a late publication\nof his: \u201cPsychology of to-day, since Kant has shown the way, seeks the\nnature of the soul again, as did Aristotle of yore, in the facts of the\nspiritual life themselves and not in an unknowable \u2018thing in itself\u2019....\u201d\n_Deutsche Rundschau_ of 1891, p. 203. Wundt\u2019s \u201capperception\u201d is no\nmetaphysical being, but simply means the focus of perception, the centre\nof consciousness. Wundt is certainly not infallible and we are inclined\nto believe that in some details he is mistaken. He is nevertheless one\nof the very greatest leaders among the investigators of the soul and his\nmonism as well as his antimetaphysical tendencies cannot be doubted.\n\nZiehen reaches his monism by considering objective existence, as\nit appears to us and which we call matter, as \u201csomething utterly\nunknowable.\u201d He says, \u201cThe psychical series alone is given.... Thus the\npsycho-physical dualism or parallelism is apparent only. Considering\nthat the psychical series alone is given, we shall understand, that we\nhad repeatedly to face in our investigations such factors in which the\nmaterial foundations are missing. I here remind you of the projection\nof our sensations into space and time, for which we could not find a\npsycho-physical explanation.\u201d\n\nWe hope that Dr. Ziehen will soon find occasion to explain his\nphilosophical views. Such an explanation may throw light on his\npsychological theory. We do not as yet see how he can solve without\ninconsistency the many difficulties in which his philosophical standpoint\nwill involve his psychology.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nPSYCHOLOGIE DER SUGGESTION. By _Dr. Hans Schmidkunz_. Stuttgart,\n1892,\u2014pp. 425. Large 8vo.\n\nThe rapidly increasing devotion to the study of Hypnotism has yielded\nmany valuable results, both practical and theoretical. Its application\nto the cure of disease\u2014psychotherapeutics\u2014has been most extensively\nintroduced and bids fair to become the representative in scientific form\nof the germ of truth buried amongst the vast rubbish-heap of suspicious\npractices and pseudo-scientific \u201cisms.\u201d New light has been thrown on the\nquestions of responsibility and the legal aspects of slightly abnormal\nstates. Education and ethics, it has been more than hinted, are to find\npractical aids in hypnotism; while in the light of modern scientifically\nrecognised phenomena, many of the events influential in the development\nof religions find a rationalistic interpretation. But the science which\nmore than all others, the study of hypnotism is destined to enrich, is\nthat of Experimental Psychology; and it is this phase of the subject to\nwhich Dr. Schmidkunz has devoted his volume.\n\nThe central core of the whole subject is the fact of suggestion,\u2014a fact\nso comprehensive that it is almost easier to say what it is not than what\nit is. If we make allowance for that portion of our conduct that is based\nupon individual acquisitions and proceeds by logically reasoned steps,\nall the rest is more or less the result of suggestions, of one kind or\nanother. To appreciate the psychology of this process it is necessary\nto appreciate its varieties and universality. We receive suggestions\nfrom things and deeds; the sight of food makes us hungry; the sight of\nour neighbor consulting his watch induces a strong desire to know what\ntime it is. Words are powerful implements of suggestion; we accept those\ndoctrines that we hear about us and are influenced much more frequently\nthan we are convinced. The personal factor in suggestion is important;\nto some we feel attracted and accept as leaders, while others excite\nrepulsion and antagonism. The indirectness of the process of suggestion\nis to be noted; in most cases we are quite unconscious of the influences\nexerted upon us and by which our conduct is guided, and this ignorance of\nthe motives of our acts, Spinoza tells us, is the cause of the illusion\nof free will. Sympathy, imitation, the contagion of masses, the action\nof the mind upon the body, the formation of public sentiment,\u2014all\nexemplify the process of suggestion and add their testimony to its power\nand domain.\n\nWe must recognise, too, that our suggestibility is a variable phenomenon;\nat some moments we are self-assertive and determined, at others passive\nand readily following another\u2019s lead. Sometimes we take the reins in\nour own hands, and again allow the vehicle to find its way as it will.\nEvery night we pass into a condition in which conscious control is\nabandoned and logic gives way to suggestion. A trifling illness, a dose\nof medicine may increase our suggestibility, and place us in a position\nallied to that of the hypnotic subject. All this prepares the way for\nrecognising as the distinctive characteristic of the hypnotic condition,\nan exaggerated suggestibility. Not alone is there a ready yielding to\nevery suggestion of the operator, but functions normally not under\nvolitional control may be appealed to and utilised by the slighter and\nsubtler processes of hypnotic suggestion. The variable threshold between\nthe voluntary and the involuntary is shifted to a surprising extent. That\ncomplex interrelation of centres with which the sense of personality is\nintimately connected yields to the same influences and makes possible an\nexperimental study of this vexed problem.\n\nThis, then, is the Psychology of Suggestion, the contribution that\nHypnotism makes to Psychology. It lays stress upon the great r\u00f4le\nthis process plays in every day mental life and thus asks us to see\nin hypnotism a condition closely allied to the normal, and simply\nillustrating in an unusually striking way, one great factor in our mental\ncomposition. It rearranges the hierarchy of mental faculties and finds\na more important place for suggestion than has been before accorded\nto it. From a somewhat obscure and sporadic phenomenon occasionally\nentering into mental states, it is raised to the dignity of one of the\nmost frequent, most important, most fertile generalisations of scientific\npsychology. Whether one fully agrees with this position or not, it is\ncertainly a service to have it so comprehensively, even if at times\nprolixly stated, and to be assured that the study of Psychology is\nderiving as much benefit from the researches in hypnotism as are the more\npractical sciences.\n\n J. J.\n\n\nHYPNOTISME, SUGGESTION, PSYCHOTHEROPIE. \u00c9tudes Nouvelles par le _Dr.\nBernheim_, Professeur \u00e0 la Facult\u00e9 de m\u00e9d\u00e9cine de Nancy. Paris: 1891.\nOctave Doin, pp. 518.\n\nThe literature of the new science of Hypnotism continues to increase with\nunabated pace; most of the contributions consist of studies of a few\ncases or a brief exposition of a single point, in most cases of points\nrelative to the application of hypnotism to disease. The present volume,\nhowever, is of special importance not alone because of the authority that\nDr. Bernheim\u2019s name brings with it,\u2014but because of the comprehensiveness\nand the skill and interest of the exposition. It is supplementary to Dr.\nBernheim\u2019s former volume, \u201cSuggestive Psychotherapeutics,\u201d (1886-87,\nEnglish translation, 1889) and reflects the progress that has resulted\nfrom continued and systematic observation. The therapeutic interest in\nit naturally finds most complete representation and about half the volume\nis devoted to the description of cases cured or benefited by suggestive\ntreatment. Although nervous complaints predominate in these well arranged\nand well described cases, yet the method is shown applicable to all the\nills that flesh is heir to. While this portion of the volume will be of\ngreatest interest to the medical world, the psychologist will find most\nfood for reflection in the first and more theoretical half of the book.\nHe will find there an interesting historical sketch illustrating how\nprocesses similar to those now studied as hypnotism have been in use from\nancient times; how all the various healers, and the various processes\nand agencies used by them, involve different modes of application of the\none principle of suggestion. \u201cIt is the human imagination that works\nmiracles.\u201d\n\nSuggestion is defined as the act by which an idea is introduced in\nthe brain and accepted by it, and thus many of the means by which one\nperson influences another under every day, normal circumstances would be\nincluded in the term. Hypnotism is simply one of the most important and\nefficient methods of producing a state of increased suggestibility. In\nevery day life we have abundant evidence of the tendency of ideas to be\nrealised in actions; with every change in thought and emotion there is\nassociated some motor expression, too subtle perhaps for analysis and\ndescription, but still present and significant. Under excitement and\nnervous strain these motor accompaniments of thought are increased and\nserve as the basis of the muscle reader\u2019s skill. Again the possibility\nof disbelief and of recognising the illusory character of a sensation\ninvolve the control of higher directing powers; the accumulated\nexperience of the past passes sentence upon the new candidate. If we\nimagine a condition in which this form of control is abolished, we should\nhave a subject accepting as real almost any idea or sensation that is\nsuggested to him, and expressing freely and unreservedly his acceptance\nof the same. And this it is that hypnotism does. It builds upon the\nnatural credulity which it is the difficult task of reason to shape and\ncontrol, and brings into prominence the automatic, subconscious phases\nof mental action. It does not endow subjects with new faculties or\ndeprive them of their individuality, but shows in a strangely perverted\nperspective the various faculties and processes that go to build the\nendlessly complex elements of a personality. This \u201csuggestion\u201d view of\nhypnotism is the contribution of the Nancy School, and is fast becoming\nthe recognised view of science; one will nowhere find a clearer and more\nconvincing exposition of it than in Dr. Bernheim\u2019s pages.\n\nIt is clearly impossible to summarise the various details that make\nup the body of the volume; but all the important topics are discussed\nand result in conclusions unusually free as well from vagueness as\nfrom narrowness. The processes inducing the state, the proportion of\nsusceptible individuals, the various kinds and stages of hypnotism,\nits relation to sleep and other normal states, the r\u00f4le of memory in\nhypnotism, the interesting post-hypnotic, negative and retroactive\nhallucinations, its relation to hysteria, its possible use in\ncrime,\u2014these are some of the chief topics treated. The volume is a\nvaluable contribution to the literature of the subject, reflects its most\nrecent acquisitions, and would well merit a presentation in an English\ntranslation.\n\n J. J.\n\n\nHANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY. In two volumes; Senses and Intellect, and,\nFeeling and Will. By _James Mark Baldwin_, M. A., Ph. D., Professor in\nthe University of Toronto. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1891.\n\nThese are two books diligently worked out, the former of 343, the latter\nof 397 pp. They cover almost the entire field of psychology excluding\nhowever the treatment of such abnormal states as are Mental Pathology\nand Hypnotism. The author is a disciple of Dr. McCosh, and is strongly\ninfluenced by Wundt, of Leipzig, and Rabier, of Paris; yet he has\ndeveloped an independent view of the nature of the soul which perhaps\ncomes nearest to that of Prof. William James, of Harvard. The two books\nare actually two parts of one work, the one complementing the other. The\nformer however is not, as the name suggests, an exposition of the nature\nof the senses in their relation to or as the basis of the intellect; it\nis an inquisition into consciousness, sensation, perception, association,\nimagination, rational thought, and kindred subjects. The latter, after\nan introduction of 50 pp., characterising the mechanism of the nervous\nsystem, treats of feeling as sensation, as pleasure and pain, as interest\nand belief, as emotion, and passes over to the subject of a motor\nconsciousness, or will, ending in a chapter on volition.\n\nProfessor Baldwin states that \u201cafter we enter consciousness we find a\nprinciple of apperception to which there is no analogy in physiological\nintegration,\u201d adding in a foot-note: \u201cSince the section of the \u2018Unity\nof Composition\u2019 theory was written, Professor James has published an\nacute criticism in substantial agreement with it, and the passage quoted\nmakes reference to the sixth chapter of Professor James\u2019s Psychology\nin which he rejects the so-called \u2018mind-stuff,\u2019 theory, declaring a\nself-compounding of mental facts to be inadmissible and proposes at last\nwhat he calls \u2018soul-theory.\u2019\u201d Professor James in this chapter commits the\nmistake indicated in the editorial of the last number of _The Monist_ (p.\n248) that he considers things as things in themselves and then looks for\na relation producing principle. He says:\n\n\u201cIn the parallelogram of forces, the \u2018forces\u2019 themselves do not combine\ninto the diagonal resultant; a _body_ is needed on which they may\nimpinge, to exhibit their resultant effect.\u201d\n\n\u201cTake a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each\none word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let\neach think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a\nconsciousness of the whole sentence.\u201d\n\nThus Professor W. James is in need of what he calls a \u201cmedium.\u201d He says:\n\n\u201c_All the \u2018combinations\u2019 which we actually know are EFFECTS, wrought by\nthe units said to be \u2018combined,\u2019 UPON SOME ENTITY OTHER THAN THEMSELVES._\nWithout this feature of a medium or vehicle, the notion of combination\nhas no sense.\u201d\n\nWe observe that feelings which originate through the impressions of\nthe outer world upon some sentient organism, enter into relations to\neach other, as naturally as things are in relations, or under certain\ncircumstances will enter more closely into relations with each other.\nThe \u201csoul\u201d accordingly is postulated by Professor James as a medium to\ncombine the effects of the manifold brain processes in order to \u201cescape\nthe absurdity of supposing feelings which exist separately and then \u2018fuse\ntogether\u2019 by themselves. The separateness is in the brain-world, on\nthis theory, and the unity in the soul world, and the only trouble that\nremains to haunt us is the metaphysical one of understanding how one sort\nof world or existent thing can affect or influence another at all.\u201d This\nis dualism and we suppose that Professor James is conscious of it.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nUNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR PHYSIOLOGISCHEN MORPHOLOGIE DER THIERE. II.\nORGANBILDUNG UND WACHSTHUM. By Dr. _Jacques Loeb_. Mit 2 Tafeln in\nLithographie und 9 Figuren im Text. W\u00fcrzburg: Georg Hertz. 1892.\n\nDr. Jacques Loeb formerly of Z\u00fcrich and lately returned from the\nZoological station at Naples has been appointed Professor at Bryn Mawr\nCollege, Pennsylvania. Former publications of his were reviewed in _The\nMonist_ I, No. 2, p. 300. The present pamphlet is a continuance of his\ninvestigations in physiological morphology. Some of his experiments are\nmade with _Antennularia antennina_ (a hydroid polyp) and the author\ndescribes how without mutilation, simply by giving the creature a fixed\nposition he succeeded in making it develop certain organs in certain\nplaces, thus proving gravitation to be an important factor in determining\nthe growth of certain limbs. Dr. Loeb adds a few articles on the\ndependence of the longitudinal growth and also of the regeneration of\nTubularia upon the concentration of the salt-water. His experiments with\n_Ciona intestinalis_ (a solitary ascidia) prove that (1) a section in the\nside of the oral orifice as well as of the anus will cause the formation\nof ocelli on the margin of the section, (2) after an extirpation of the\ncentral nervous system the reflexes continue although with a higher\nthreshold of the stimulus, and (3) the ciona is capable of developing the\ncentral nervous system again.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nDAS DASEIN ALS LUST, LEID, UND LIEBE. Die altindische Weltanschauung in\nneuzeitlicher Darstellung. Ein Beitrag zum Darwinismus. Mit 2 Tondrucken,\n24 Zeichnungen und 10 Tabellen. By Dr. _H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden_. Braunschweig:\nC. A. Schwetschke & Sohn, 1891.\n\nThe author of this book is Dr. H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden, editor of _The Sphinx_,\na monthly magazine published in Germany which professes to \u201clay down\nhistorically and experimentally the supersensible World-Conception upon\na monistic basis.\u201d Love of Mysticism is the main feature of _The Sphinx_\nas well as Dr. H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden\u2019s book. _The Sphinx_ contains reports\nof cases of telepathy and is quite serious in investigating the spook\nof a haunted house. The present book contains the author\u2019s confession\nof faith. The symbols by which he depicts his world-conception reveal\na cabalistic taste, and we believe that the illustrations will be\nrather repugnant to the man of science, as they give the impression of\nfantasticism. The main idea of the book is to modernise the old Hindoo\nview that \u201cKama\u201d desire or _Lust_ is the ground of all being, as is said\nin the Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad (IV, 4, 5): \u201cMan consists entirely of\ndesire (_Kama_); as is his desire, so is his will (_Kratu_); as is his\nwill, so is his life (_Karma_, i. e., activity); as is his life, so is\nhis fate.\u201d\n\nDr. H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden rejects the Hindoo view of a migration of soul in\nso far as it suggests the idea of something personal; he prefers to\nspeak of a transformation of soul. This, he says, has been and it may be\ncalled \u201cmetaphysical Darwinism\u201d, and we must confess that the nucleus\nof the idea touches the most vital point of all the problems of life.\nWe cannot explain ethics and the ethical instinct of man without taking\ninto consideration that man lives and aspires for something that will\noutlast his individual existence. The author says: \u201cWhy do you strive\nfor something higher, for perfection, for completion or whatever your\naim may be called? Why all that, if you imagine that your individuality\nhas only this one life upon earth and you can realise only a very small\npart of what you strive for? Why all your trouble, if the main thing is\nin vain?\u201d We agree with the author that our moral instinct, our ideals\nand aspirations which are most powerful realities in life point to a life\nbeyond the grave, they indicate that death is no finality and evolution\nteaches us that our souls actually continue to exist. Our souls in their\nindividual features are parts only of the whole evolution of our race and\nthese very individual features of our souls can be and will be preserved\nin the future generations.\n\nDr. H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden\u2019s book is characteristic of a strange tendency of\nour time to combine the results of modern science with the old notions\nof occultism. There is in it a psychological and ethical truth overgrown\nwith a fanciful imagination.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nMAX M\u00dcLLER AND THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE. A Criticism. By _William Dwight\nWhitney_, Professor in Yale University. New York: D. Appleton and\nCompany. 1892.\n\nThe Professors W. D. Whitney and F. Max M\u00fcller are not on good terms.\nThey do not only disagree on several fundamental and many minor points,\nconcerning the science of language, but their warfare, as is well known,\nis at the same time of a personal nature. The present little volume is a\ncriticism of the new edition of Max M\u00fcller\u2019s \u201cScience of Language.\u201d The\ngreat Yale philologist recognising that this work of his antagonistic\nOxford colleague \u201cis still the principal and most authoritative text-book\nof that study,\u201d and noting that \u201cits author has gained no new light from\nthe criticisms that have been made upon his work,\u201d feels called upon to\nwarn the reader that \u201cit may not be trusted where it is untrustworthy and\nso do harm to the science which it was intended to help.\u201d The title of\nthe book, according to Professor Whitney, ought to be \u201cFacts and Fancies\nin Regard to Language and Other Related Subjects.\u201d\n\nSchleicher says: \u201cLanguages are natural organisms which, without\nbeing determinable by the will of man, grew and developed themselves\nin accordance with fixed laws.... Its method is on the whole and in\ngeneral the same with that of the other natural sciences.\u201d Professor\nWhitney censures Max M\u00fcller for calling the first part of Schleicher\u2019s\nproposition \u201csheer mythology,\u201d and then adopting the inference made\ntherefrom considering the science of language as a physical science. Now\nit is true that the expression \u201corganism\u201d must not be taken literally;\nlanguages are not animals or plants, but they have some quality that is\ncomparable to animals and plants. Their life and the development of their\nlife is in many respects analogous to the life of organisms. Professor\nWhitney regards language as \u201ca body of conventional signs for ideas\u201d and\nprotests against Prof. Max M\u00fcller\u2019s usage of the word \u201cconventional\u201d as\nif it implied \u201ca convention of people gathered to discuss and decide\non the words and forms by which conceptions should be represented.\u201d In\ncontradistinction to Max M\u00fcller who holds that philology is a physical\nscience, Professor Whitney regards it as an historical science. \u201cPhysical\nscience,\u201d says Max M\u00fcller, \u201cdeals with the works of God, historical\nscience with the works of man.\u201d Thus optics is a physical science,\npainting an historical science. Whitney declares that individuals\ninitiate changes and the community either accepts and uses them, making\nthem language by its use or rejects and annuls them by refusing to use\nthem. In one word Max M\u00fcller says language is \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, a product of nature,\nand Whitney says it is \u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, an institution of man. We believe that\nProfessor Whitney stands almost alone in his conception of language.\n\nAnother no less important point is Professor Whitney\u2019s objection to Prof.\nMax M\u00fcller\u2019s proposition of the Identity of Language and Thought. Here\nProfessor Whitney will find many supporters for his case; but we must\nadd that Prof. Max M\u00fcller does not exactly mean what he says. He means\nby identity inseparableness. It is not so much Max M\u00fcller\u2019s position\nthat should be attacked as his misleading terminology. Concerning the\norigin of language Professor Whitney finds an instructive parallel in the\nbeginnings of writing which were mutually intelligible signs, or in the\nwritten language of mathematics. \u201cSo we do no longer see,\u201d he says, \u201cthe\ntwo and three strokes in our figures 2 and 3, although they are really\nthere disguised from view.\u201d This is a good simile, and undoubtedly _cum\ngrano salis_ true. But it is rather strange that Professor Whitney should\nfind Noir\u00e9\u2019s theory of the origin of language \u201cutterly fantastic.\u201d\n\nThese are fundamental differences. There are some more, less important\npoints such as the etymology of king being the Sanskrit _janaka_. Max\nM\u00fcller proposes a very improbable reason for the change of meaning in the\nLat. _fagus_, O. Germ. _boka_ (beech), Greek _phegos_, Lat. _quercus_,\nand Germ. _foraha_ (fir). Professor Whitney might have mentioned that a\nmore probable reason for this change has been proposed of late by those\nwho seek the home of the Aryans in Europe. A migrating people would\nnaturally have called in their old home the beech, in their new the oak\n\u201ca tree with edible fruit.\u201d The same method is applicable to explain the\nchange of meaning in _forah-a-quercus_ which means in northern countries\na fir and in Italy an oak.\n\nProfessor Whitney sums up his case as follows (p. 77): he finds \u201clanguage\nstudy ... declared on transparently false grounds, to be a physical\nscience, and language an existence which man had no part in making\nand changing; dialectic growth misunderstood, families of language\nregarded as exceptional, and a \u2018Turanian\u2019 barathrum arranged to catch\nall little-known varieties of speech; antecedent unity of dialect taught\nin one case and denied in another; a word held to be killed by the\nleast mispronunciation; _conventional_ explained to mean \u2018voted by a\nconvention\u2019; thought and its expression viewed as inseparable, and even\nidentical; the origin of language seemingly ascribed to an instinctive\nding-dong of the tongue\u2014and so on; to complete the list would be almost\nto give a table of principal contents of the two volumes\u2014and a style of\ndiscussion used throughout which indicated that the author was playing\nwith his subject rather than investigating it seriously.... The book is\nnot science, but literature. Taken as literature, it is of high rank, as\nthe admiration of the public sufficiently testifies; its author has a\nspecial gift for interesting statement and illustration, for lending a\ncharm to the subjects he discusses; and he carries captive the judgments\nof his hearers and of many of his readers. He is a born _litt\u00e9rateur_.\u201d\n\nProfessor Whitney concludes: \u201cNow as heretofore, I rest my defense on not\nthe just intent alone, but the real substantial justice of my criticisms;\nif they are unfounded, I deserve reprehension for making them; if they\nare right, then there is nothing, either in the degree of importance of\nthe subjects to which they relate, or in the personality against whom\nthey are directed, to call for their condemnation.\u201d\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nSEIFENBLASEN. Moderne M\u00e4rchen. By _Kurd Lasswitz_. Hamburg and Leipsic:\nLeopold Voss. 1890.\n\n\u201cM\u00e4rchen,\u201d in the province of science, we are inclined to believe are\na prize problem for our modern poets. Who will solve it? Kurd Lasswitz\nhas made an attempt and considering the great difficulty of the problem,\nwe are not inclined to criticise him. The author, who has worked in\nscientific fields and has proved his ability as a close student, exhibits\nin these \u201csoap-bubbles\u201d a fertile imagination and poetic invention. Most\nof his sketches fall short of the ideal m\u00e4rchen of science as we conceive\nit, but their reading is suggestive and deserves the attention of those\nwhose disposition favors the creation of a middle ground between science\nand poetry.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[66] Ziehen declares (p. 129) that the problem of physiological\npsychology consists in reducing the different forms of thinking up to\nthe most complex argumentation to simple associations of ideas and its\nlaws. Wundt says, that there are many psychical idea-combinations which\ncannot be explained simply by association of ideas. So, Ziehen continues\n(p. 130), Wundt assumes above idea associations a special faculty of the\nsoul called apperception, which serves now as attention, now as will, but\nis in either case a metaphysical faculty of the soul, the active subject\nwhich independent of mechanical causality is said to be the cause of\nthese phenomena.\u2014I do not think that anyone who knows Wundt will accept\nthis as a fair representation of his views.\n\n\n\n\nPERIODICALS.\n\n\nREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.\n\nCONTENTS: December, 1891. No. 192\n\n UN PROBL\u00c8ME D\u2019ACOUSTIQUE PSYCHOLOGIQUE. By _L. Dauriac_.\n\n LES ORIGINES DE NOTRE STRUCTURE INTELLECTUELLE ET C\u00c9R\u00c9BRALE.\n II. L\u2019\u00c9VOLUTIONNISME. By _A. Fouill\u00e9e_.\n\n L\u00c9ONARD DE VINCI ARTISTE ET SAVANT. By _G. S\u00e9ailles_.\n\n SUR LES DESSINS D\u2019ENFANTS. By _J. Passy_.\n\n SUR UN CAS D\u2019INHIBITION PSYCHIQUE. By _A. Binet_.\n\nCONTENTS: January, 1892. No. 193.\n\n LE PROBL\u00c8ME DE LA VIE. By _Dunan_.\n\n LA MALADIE DU PESSIMISME. By _B. P\u00e9rez_.\n\n PHILOSOPHES ESPAGNOLS DE CUBA: F. VARELA, J. DE LA LUZ. By\n _J.-M. Guardia_.\n\n VARI\u00c9T\u00c9S: LE PROBL\u00c8ME D\u2019ACHILLE. By _J. Mouret_.\n\nCONTENTS: February, 1892. No. 194.\n\n LES MOUVEMENTS DE MAN\u00c8GE CHEZ LES INSECTES. By _A. Binet_.\n\n LE PROBL\u00c8ME DE LA VIE (2nd article). By _Dunan_.\n\n PHILOSOPHES ESPAGNOLS DE CUBA (concluded). _J.-M. Guardia_.\n\n REVUE G\u00c9N\u00c9RALE: JUSTICE ET SOCIALISME, D\u2019APR\u00c8S LES PUBLICATIONS\n R\u00c9CENTES. By _Belot_.\n\nOne of the problems of the unique and great work of Carl Stumpf\u2019s\n\u201cTonpsychologie\u201d is the subject of L. Dauriac\u2019s essay. The question\nis when several sounds enter the ear at the same time, the plurality\nof which is not directly known, do you have your information through\nan inner sense? Does every unit of the irritation correspond to a\ndistinct unit of sensation? Is there in consciousness a simultaneousness\nof sensations similarly as outside of consciousness there is a\nsimultaneousness of vibrations? M. Dauriac maintains that Stumpf\u2019s\nquestion can be answered only on the ground of metaphysical postulates,\nand if preconceived solutions are to be excluded, it must be considered\nas insoluble.\n\nAlfred Fouill\u00e9e, in his second article on the origin of our intellectual\nand cerebral structure, which treats on evolutionism, comes to the\nconclusion that the hypothesis which in the most simple way explains the\nagreement of thoughts and objects is the doctrine of a radical unity\ngenerally called Monism.\n\nJ. Passy notes certain characteristic and psychologically interesting\nfeatures of the drawings of children.\n\nM. A. Binet presents two physiognomical pictures of the same face, one\nrepresenting disgust or scorn, the other a good-humored and happy smile.\nThe upper parts of both faces are exactly alike and yet the eyes of\nthe former look disdainful while the very same eyes of the latter are\nfull of jest and merriment. This is the fact. M. Binet psychologically\ninterprets the fact as a phenomenon of automatic inhibition. The fact is\ninteresting, but its interpretation seems doubtful.\n\nCharles Dunan discusses the metaphysical aspect of the problem of life.\n\nB. P\u00e9rez\u2019s article is a contribution to pathological psychology with\nspecial reference to M. Magalh\u00e2es\u2019s work on the subject. Pessimism,\nM. P\u00e9rez says, is a disease only if exaggerated, yet he believes that\nmedico-psychological studies which consider the relation between the\nphysical system and morality are very helpful even if carried too far.\n\nM. J.-M. Guardia\u2019s article will have a special interest for Americans.\nThree men arose in Spain of late, Valentin Almirall, M. L. Mallada,\nand J.-M. Escudor, who spoke bold and hard words of truth to their\ncountry. Cuba is the hen that lays golden eggs for Spain, but the Cubans\nare treated with great contempt in Spain; and yet the Spaniards are\nby no means their intellectual superiors, for while Spain is poor in\nphilosophy, Cuba is the only country of Latin America where philosophy\nhas taken root. M. Guardia sketches in the first article the history and\nphilosophy of Don F\u00e9lix Var\u00e9lay y Moral\u00e8s who is the harbinger of the\nother Spanish-Cuban philosopher, Jos\u00e9 de la Luz. The second article in\nthe February number treats of the latter (1800-1862) whom Guardia calls\nthe master.\n\nGeorge Mouret with reference to Frontera\u2019s book on Zeno\u2019s argument\nagainst motion makes a few remarks concerning the Eleatic sophism about\nAchilles and the tortoise.\n\nAn injury of a thalamus opticus produces in horses and other animals\nthe effect of their making rotatory movements when intending to walk\nstraight on. Forel proved that a similar effect is produced in ants by a\nlesion of one of their lobes. M. Binet publishes in the present essay his\nexperiments on certain water-beetles, exhibiting diagrams of their normal\nand abnormal walk. (Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vols. II\nand III.\n\nCONTENTS: November, 1891. No. 6.\n\n UEBER BR\u00dcCKES THEORIE DES K\u00d6RPERLICHEN SEHENS. By Dr. _C. du\n Bois-Reymond_.\n\n MEIN SCHLUSSWORT GEGEN WUNDT. By _C. Stumpf_.\n\n ERWIDERUNG. By _O. Fl\u00fcgel_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nCONTENTS: December, 1891. No. 1.\n\n VERSUCH, DAS PSYCHOPHYSISCHE GESETZ AUF DIE FARBENUNTERSCHIEDE\n TRICHROMATISCHER AUGEN ANZUWENDEN. By _H. v. Helmholtz_.\n\n UNTERSUCHUNGEN \u00dcBER BINOKULARES SEHEN MIT ANWENDUNG DES\n HERINGSCHEN FALLVERSUCHS. By Dr. _Richard Greeff_.\n\n BEMERKUNGEN ZU DEM AUFSATZE VON DR. SOMMER \u201cZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER\n SPRACHE.\u201d By Prof. _A. Pick_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nDr. C. du Bois-Reymond believes that corporeal vision is either produced\nby one eye running in succession over several places or two eyes viewing\ntwo aspects of the object. Mach\u2019s theory of the influence of shade upon\nthe production of the third dimension in vision which affords quite a\nnew and a better explanation of the phenomenon is not mentioned. Stumpf\ncloses his controversy with Wundt with a few remarks in answer to Wundt\u2019s\nreply (in _Philos. Studien_ VII, pp. 298-327); and Fl\u00fcgel objects to\nProfessor Rehmke\u2019s proposition made in a criticism of Fl\u00fcgel\u2019s book \u201cDie\nSeelenfrage,\u201d that Herbart\u2019s psychology, being atomism, is at bottom\nmaterialism.\n\nDr. Richard Greeff describes Hering\u2019s apparatus for investigating the\ncause of binocular vision. Wheatstone believes that the perspective\nof the two retina pictures produces the effect of corporeality while\nBr\u00fccke declares that it is mainly due to muscle-sensations. Hering sides\nwith Wheatstone, and the experiments as described by Greeff prove that\nthe third dimension is unfailingly perceived whenever the ocular axes\ndiverge, while in other cases the same result is not attained.\n\nDr. Sommer had presented in a former article the facts of an interesting\ncase of aphasia, (see _The Monist_, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 629) where the\npatient, his name is Voit, could remember and pronounce words only when\nwriting them. Prof. A. Pick objects to Dr. Sommer\u2019s regarding the case as\ncontrary to our present experience and following two French authorities\nBallet and Bernard, adduces cases of Aphasia by right-sided hemiphlegia\nwhere patients could read only when they were able to write or represent\nto themselves the writing motions of their hand. Thus one patient of\nCharcot could only read print, and not written words \u201cbecause,\u201d as\nhe said, \u201cit was easier for him to reproduce in his mind the written\nletter.\u201d This reminds one of the case a deaf-mute who said: \u201cI feel\nwhenever I think of the motions of my fingers although they are perfectly\nat rest. I see internally an image of my moving fingers.\u201d Professor Pick\nconcludes that the case Voit is a good argument against Max M\u00fcller\u2019s\nproposition of the identity of language and thought. Max M\u00fcller however\nincludes in his conception of word any symbol of an idea. The finger\nmotion of a deaf-mute is a word, and the writing motion of Voit is also a\nword, according to Professor Max M\u00fcller\u2019s theory.\n\nProf. H. v. Helmholtz publishes the tables of his experiments in applying\nthe psycho-physical law upon color differences of trichromatic eyes, and\npresents the three fundamental colors diagrammatically in an equilateral\ntriangle in the centre of which lies white. A curve winding round\nthis centre shows the relation of the rainbow spectrum in the system\nof three fundamental colors. The results do not as yet agree with the\ninvestigations of A. K\u00f6nig and C. Diterici who make similar inquiries\nwith bichromatic eyes. (Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nVIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT F\u00dcR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XVI. No. 1.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n BEITR\u00c4GE ZUR LOGIK. (Erster Artikel.) By _A. Riehl_.\n\n DIE DIMENSIONEN DER WAHRSCHEINLICHKEIT UND DIE EVIDENZ DER\n UNGEWISSHEIT. By _Ad. Nitsche_.\n\n UEBER DIE FORTSCHREITENDE ENTWICKLUNG DES MENSCHENGESCHLECHTS.\n II. By _F. Rosenberger_.\n\n ERNST PLATNER\u2019S WISSENSCHAFTLICHE STELLUNG ZU KANT IN\n ERKENNTNISSTHEORIE UND MORALPHILOSOPHIE. I. By _B. Seligkowitz_.\n\n UEBER SPRACHREFLEX, NATIVISMUS UND ABSICHTLICHE SPRACHBILDUNG.\n X. By _A. Marty_.\n\nProf. A. Riehl begins in this number a series of articles on logic. The\nfirst two chapters are (1) concepts and definitions. Riehl distinguishes\nbetween a definition and a predicating sentence (_Aussage_), for\ninstance, \u201cSpace has three dimensions,\u201d is a mere definition, but \u201cSpace\nis the form of our intuition,\u201d is an _Aussage_. (2) Conceptual sentences\nand judgments. The former are merely representative and cannot as the\nlatter be said to combine or separate ideas.\n\nAd. Nitsche criticises Johannes v. Kries\u2019s idea that the calculus\nof probabilities is admissible only if the chances are equivalent.\nEquivalent Chances (_gleiche Spielr\u00e4ume_), he objects, are apparently\nimpossible, yet he admits that upon the degree of a knowledge of the\nconditions will depend the reliability of the probability.\n\nThe Object of B. Seligkowitz\u2019s article is to rescue from oblivion a\nphilosopher who especially as a critic of Kant deserves to be better\nknown than he is, Ernst Platner (1744-1818.)\n\nThe tenth and concluding article of A. Marty on the origin of language\nreviews Paul Regnaud\u2019s work _Origine et philosophie du langage_.\n(Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nTHE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. December, 1891. Vol. IV. No. 2.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY AMONG THE GREEKS. By\n _Charles A. Strong_.\n\n STUDIES FROM THE LABORATORY OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE\n UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. By Prof. _Joseph Jastrow_, Ph. D.\n\n THE SIZE OF SEVERAL CRANIAL NERVES IN MAN AS INDICATED BY THE\n AREAS OF THEIR CROSS-SECTIONS. By _Henry H. Donaldson_, Ph. D.\n\n VISUALISATION AS A CHIEF SOURCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HOBBES,\n LOCKE, BERKELEY, AND HUME. By _Alexander Fraser_, B. A.\n\n ANATOMICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE BRAIN AND SEVERAL SENSE-ORGANS\n OF THE BLIND DEAF-MUTE, LAURA DEWEY BRIDGMAN. II. By _Henry H.\n Donaldson_, Ph. D.\n\n PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. I. Nervous System. By Prof. _H. H.\n Donaldson_.\n\n A LABORATORY COURSE IN PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. II. By _E. C.\n Sanford_.\n\n PSYCHIATRY. PSYCHOSES FOLLOWING ACUTE SURGICAL AND MENTAL\n AFFECTIONS AND IN MULTIPLE NEURITIS. By _William Noyes_, M. D.\n\nThe post mortem examination of Laura Bridgman shows a brain in which the\nolfactory bulbs and nerves, the optic nerves, the auditory nerves, and\npossibly the glossopharyngeal, had all been more or less destroyed at\ntheir peripheral ends. This destruction caused a degeneration\u2014most marked\nin the optic nerves\u2014which extended towards the centres and involved them\nindirectly.... This case represents a maximum loss in these defective\nsenses with a minimum amount of central disturbance, thus offering the\nvery best sort of opportunity for education by way of the surviving\nsenses.... Mental association was for Laura Bridgman limited to various\nphases of the dermal sensations and the minor and imperfect senses of\ntaste and smell.... The motor centre there had lost some, but not all its\nassociative connections. (Clark University, Worcester, Mass.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. January, 1892. Vol. II. NO. 2.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE PAPAL ENCYCLICAL. By _Brother\n Azarias_.\n\n THE THREE RELIGIONS. By _J. S. Mackenzie_, M. A.\n\n THE ETHICS OF HEGEL. By _Rev. J. Macbride Sterrett_.\n\n A PALM OF PEACE FROM GERMAN SOIL. By _Fanny Hertz_.\n\n AUTHORITY IN THE SPHERE OF CONDUCT AND INTELLECT. By _Prof. H.\n Nettleship_, Oxford.\n\n DISCUSSIONS AND REVIEWS.\n\nBrother Azarias paraphrases and praises the ethics of the Papal\nEncyclical. J. S. Mackenzie starts from Kant\u2019s famous remarks that two\nthings fill our minds with reverence, the starry, heavens above and the\nmoral law within. The worship of these two separately and the worship of\nthem in combination are set forth as the three great religions of the\nworld. Fanny Hertz pleads for the abolishment of war. She quotes largely\nfrom Bertha Suttner\u2019s novel, \u201cDie Waffen nieder,\u201d and from Friederich\u2019s\nletters. Authority, according to Professor Nettleship, is \u201cthe power\nwhich in the sphere of conduct, in the long run determines our practice\nand in the sphere of intellect in the long run determines our assent.\u201d\nThere are roughly speaking four kinds of authority: (1) the authority\nof law, (2) the authority of religious bodies, (3) the authority of\nsociety or public opinion and (4) the authority of great men. Where\nis the seat of authority? \u201cFor each individual,\u201d Professor Nettleship\nmaintains, \u201cthe absolute guide can, in the long run be no other than his\nown conscience.\u201d The origin of conscience and the criterion whether the\nvoice of conscience be true or not are not explained. (Philadelphia:\n_International Journal of Ethics_, 118 S. Twelfth Street.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nMIND. New Series. No. 1. January, 1892.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n PREFATORY REMARKS. _The Editor._\n\n THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. (1) General Principles. By _W. E.\n Johnson_.\n\n THE IDEA OF VALUE. By _S. Alexander_.\n\n THE CHANGES OF METHOD IN HEGEL\u2019S DIALECTIC. (1) By _J. Ellis\n McTaggart_.\n\n THE LAW OF PSYCHOGENESIS. By _Prof. C. Lloyd Morgan_.\n\n DISCUSSIONS: The Feeling-Tone of Desire and Aversion. By _Prof.\n H. Sidgwick_. Sur la Distinction entre les Lois ou Axiomes et\n les Notions. By _George Mouret_.\n\n CRITICAL NOTICES.\n\nW. E. Johnson says: \u201cAs a material machine is an instrument for\neconomising the exertion of force, so a symbolic calculus is an\ninstrument for economising the exertion of intelligence. And, employing\nthe same analogy, the more perfect the calculus, the smaller would be the\namount of intelligence applied as compared with the results produced.\u201d He\ncontinues:\n\n\u201cBut as the exertion of _some_ force is necessary for working the\nmachine, so the exertion of _some_ intelligence is necessary for working\nthe calculus.\u201d\n\nHere we feel inclined to stop our author. That which makes of a certain\namount of metal, brass, and wood a machine, is the form in which they\nare composed, and this form is instrumental in using a certain amount of\nenergy for doing a certain kind of work. Intelligence is not analogous\nto force but to the form of force. Not intelligence is necessary to run\nthe instrument of intelligence, but some power, some force, some energy,\nand this power needed for running the instrument of intelligence, as it\nexists in man, is generally called will. So we are at variance with Mr.\nW. S. Johnson from the outset. Mr. Johnson from his standpoint considers\nit \u201cimportant to examine the kind and degree of intelligence that are\ndemanded in the employment of any symbolic calculus. It will appear that\nthe _logical_ calculus stands in a unique relation to intelligence; for\nit aims at exhibiting, in a non-intelligent form, those same intelligent\nprinciples that are actually required for working it.\u201d\n\nWe abstain here from discussing the details of this highly suggestive\narticle which contains much that is of interest to logicians. The author\nclaims especially with regard to his interpretation of the universal and\nparticular that his results exactly correspond with the interpretation\ngiven by Dr. Venn and Mr. Peirce, and worked out by Dr. Keynes.\n\nThe Germans distinguish between _Urtheil_ and _Beurtheilung_, the first\nbeing judgment in general, the latter a judgment that declares something\nto possess value from the view of truth, beauty or goodness. In this\nsense Mr. S. Alexander deals with the idea of value. He states two main\nprinciples. (1) That value is \u201cthe efficiency of a conscious agent\nto promote the efficiency of society\u201d and this, the author says, was\nmaintained indirectly in opposition to the view that value was determined\nby pleasure. (2) That value is itself no something separable from other\nmental facts by a wide gulf, but was itself a fact of a purely natural\norder. \u201cSollen\u201d is one kind of \u201cSein.\u201d\n\nMr. J. Ellis McTaggart in discussing the changes of method in Hegel\u2019s\nDialectic arrives at a conclusion which according to the author must\nbe admitted to be quite un-Hegelian. Hegel apparently regarded the\nprocession of the categories with its advance through oppositions and\nreconciliations as presenting absolute truth. From this the author\ndissents, \u201cfor,\u201d he says: \u201cthe true process of thought is one in which\neach category springs out of the one before it, and not by contradicting\nit, but as the expression of its deepest nature, while it, in its turn,\nis seen to have its deepest reality in again passing on to the one\nafter it. There is no contradiction no opposition, and consequently no\nreconciliation. There is only development, the rendering explicit what\nwas implicit, the growth of the seed to the plant. In the actual course\nof the dialectic this is never attained. It is an ideal which is never\nquite realised, and from the nature of the case never can be quite\nrealised. In the dialectic there is always opposition, and therefore\nalways reconciliation. We do not go straight onward, but more or less\nfrom side to side. It seems inevitable, therefore, to conclude that\nthe dialectic does not completely and perfectly express the nature of\nthought.\u201d\n\nProf. C. Lloyd Morgan starting from the proposition that \u201cthe business\nof consciousness is the control of action\u201d shows that \u201cwe identify\nourselves rather with the action of our control centres than with our\nlower animal instincts. Through experience we learn, and habits being\nformed by individual repetition become innate.\u201d Professor Morgan reviews\nuse-inheritance natural selection, sexual selection, the law of beauty,\nand conduct and verification with regard to psychogenesis. \u201cOur nature,\u201d\nhe says, \u201cis intellectual, \u00e6sthetic, moral, and sensitive\u201d:\n\n\u201cThe false is rejected as incongruous to our nature as intellectual;\nthe ugly is avoided as incongruous to our nature as \u00e6sthetic; the wrong\nis shunned as incongruous to our nature as moral; so is the painful, so\nfar as possible, avoided as incongruous to our nature as sensitive....\nThe guidance of pleasure and pain is of great importance\u2014so great that\nsome are found to argue that in moral matters we are influenced solely\nby considerations of happiness.... Only by extending the meaning of the\nwords pleasure and pain so as to be coextensive with what I have here\ntermed congruous and incongruous can it be said that our actions and\nour thoughts are determined by pleasure and pain.\u201d (London: Williams &\nNorgate.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. I, No. 1. January, 1892.\n\nCONTENTS of No. 1.\n\n PREFATORY NOTE.\n\n THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND IDEALISM. By Prof. _John Watson_.\n\n PSYCHOLOGY AS SO-CALLED \u201cNATURAL SCIENCE.\u201d By Prof. _George T.\n Ladd_.\n\n ON SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE MUSICAL SYSTEM. By\n _Benj. Ives Gilman_.\n\n REVIEWS OF BOOKS AND SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.\n\nCONTENTS of No. 2:\n\n PSYCHOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND METAPHYSICS. By Prof. _Andrew\n Seth_.\n\n A PLEA FOR PSYCHOLOGY AS A \u201cNATURAL SCIENCE.\u201d By Prof. _William\n James_.\n\n ON SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE MUSICAL SYSTEM.\n II. By _Benj. Ives Gilman_.\n\n DISCUSSIONS: Dr. M\u00fcnsterberg\u2019s Theory of Mind and Body and its\n Consequences. By _Charles A. Strong_.\n\n REVIEWS OF BOOKS AND SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.\n\nThis is a new magazine which will be an additional proof that the\nphilosophical interest in America is by no means so poor as the\ninhabitants of the old world generally suppose it to be. The character\nof the journal, it is to be expected, will be in harmony with the\npublications of its scholarly editor, Prof. J. G. Schurmann, whose\nposition is clearly set forth in a little volume of his \u201cBelief in God,\u201d\nin which he conceives God in three ways (1) as the cause or ground of the\nworld (2) as the realising purpose of the world, and (3) as the father of\nspirits.\n\nProfessor Watson reviews in an elaborate article Edward Caird\u2019s work\n\u201cThe Critical Philosophy of Emanuel Kant.\u201d \u201cThe philosophy of Kant,\u201d\nsays Watson, \u201cwas accepted at first by submissive disciples, but it had\nafterwards to submit to a severe process of criticism which culminated\nin the Absolute Idealism of Hegel. The synthesis of Kant, as based upon\nan untenable opposition of the phenomenal and the real, was weighed\nand found wanting.... We must be grateful to any one who helps us,\nnot merely to see Kant, but to see beyond him. This is the task which\nProfessor Caird, in his exhaustive work on the Critical Philosophy, has\nset himself to perform,\u201d and adds Watson, \u201che has done it in a way that\nleaves nothing to be desired.\u201d\n\nProfessor Ladd criticises Professor James\u2019s Psychology as so-called\nnatural science.\n\n\u201cWhat we wish to have in the name of cerebral psychology, is a\ndescription, in terms of a comprehensible theory of molecular physics;\nand, also, a statement of the formul\u00e6 which define the relations between\nthe molecular changes and the \u2018corresponding\u2019 orders of mental phenomena.\nBut this is precisely what Professor James avoids doing, even to the\nextent which so-called \u2018nerve-physiology\u2019 makes possible. And, nothing\nworthy of the name \u2018science\u2019 _is_ possible for any one in this branch of\ncerebral psycho-physics.\u201d\n\nProfessor James replies to the criticism in the second number of _The\nPhilosophical Review_. He says:\n\n\u201cPsychology is to-day hardly more than what physics was before Galileo,\nwhat chemistry was before Lavoisier. It is a mass of phenomenal\ndescription, gossip, and myth, including, however, real material enough\nto justify one in the hope that its study may become worthy of the\nname of natural science at no very distant day. I wished, by treating\nPsychology _like_ a natural science, to help her to become one.\u201d\n\nProfessor Ladd is a transcendentalist and Professor James has great\nexpectations of the work inaugurated by the Society for Psychical\nResearch.\n\nTheoretically they stand much nearer than practically, as well indicated\nby Professor James\u2019s remark:\n\n\u201cIn Professor Ladd\u2019s own book on \u2018Physiological Psychology,\u2019 that \u2018real\nbeing, proceeding to unfold powers that are _sui generis_, according to\nlaws of its own,\u2019 for whose recognition he contends, plays no organic\npart in the work, and has proved a mere stumbling block to his biological\nreviewers.\u201d\n\nHe adds in a foot-note:\n\n\u201cI mean that such a being is quite barren of particular consequences. Its\ncharacter is only known by its reactions on the signals which the nervous\nsystem gives, and these must be gathered by observation after the fact.\nIf only it were subject to successive reincarnations, as the theosophists\nsay it is, so that we might guess what sort of a body it would unite with\nnext, or what sort of persons it had helped to constitute previously,\nthose would be great points gained. But even those gains are denied us;\nand the real being is, for practical purposes, an entire superfluity,\nwhich a _practical_ psychology can perfectly well do without.\u201d\n\nAndrew Seth, the well-known coryph\u00e6us of philosophy and psychology\nat Edinburgh, presses the importance of distinguishing the different\nstandpoints of psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics. Locke,\nBerkeley, Hume and other English as well as Continental thinkers \u201cspeak\nsometimes from one point of view, sometimes from the other without being\naware that the two points of view are different.\u201d\n\n\u201cPsychology, assuming the existence of a subject or medium of\nconsciousness, seeks to explain, mainly by the help of association or\nprocesses practically similar, how out of the come-and-go of conscious\nstates, there are evolved such subjective facts as perceptions, the\nbelief in an independent real world, and the idea of the Ego or subject\nhimself.... Metaphysics has to do with the ultimate nature of the reality\nwhich reveals itself alike in the consciousness which knows and the world\nwhich is known.... The epistemological thing-in-itself to be identified\nwith the metaphysical essence.... The problem of knowledge and the Real,\nis the question which Epistemology has to face.\u201d (Boston, New York,\nChicago: Ginn & Co.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nVOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII.[67] Vol. III. No. 11. January, 1892.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE. Part V.\n Sociology. By _B. Tchitcherin_.\n\n COUNT GIACOMO LEOPARDI AND HIS PESSIMISM. Part IV. Continued\n from No. 10 of this review. (Conclusion.) By _V. Stein_.\n\n AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF NATURE.\n (Conclusion.) By _M. Menzhir_.\n\n J. V. KIRYEBSKII AND THE ORIGIN OF MUSCOVITE SLAVOPHILISM.\n Public lecture delivered November 20, 1891, for the benefit of\n the rural districts suffering from the bad harvests. By _Paul\n Vinogradoff_.\n\n FOUILL\u00c9 AND THE METAPHYSICS OF THE FUTURE. Part III. General\n estimate of Fouill\u00e9\u2019s views. Continued from No. 10 of this\n review. (Conclusion) By _Aleksei Vnedenskii_.\n\n TELEPATHY. To be concluded in the next number. By _M.\n Petrovo-Solovo_. [This is a review of the publications of and\n the work done by the Society for Psychical Research in England.]\n\n SPECIAL PART: (1) Wundt\u2019s System of Philosophy. By _K.\n Ventzel_. (2) Hegel\u2019s Ontology. By _N. P. Hilyaroff-Platonoff_.\n New Researches on Plato. By _A. Kozloff_.\n\n CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. Review of Russian and Foreign\n Periodicals. Book Reviews. Bibliographical Index of recent\n Philosophical works. Answer to an anonymous letter received\n by N. Strachoff on the subject of his article: \u201cOpinions\n concerning L. N. Tolsto\u00ef.\u201d By _N. Strachoff_. Transactions of\n the Moscow Psychological Society. (Moscow, 1892.)\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[67] _Questions of Philosophy and Psychology._\n\n\n\n\n VOL. II. JULY, 1892. NO. 4.\n\n THE MONIST.\n\n\n\n\nOUR MONISM.\n\nTHE PRINCIPLES OF A CONSISTENT, UNITARY WORLD-VIEW.\n\n\nThe question, What are the essential features of Monism? was brought home\nto me when I read in the last number of _The Monist_ the critical remarks\nmade with reference to the new edition of my \u201cAnthropogeny.\u201d I shall\nhere endeavor briefly to draw up the outlines of my conception of the\nworld in a manner which will indicate the most characteristic features\nof my views. Thus both the agreements with and the divergences from the\nposition editorially upheld in _The Monist_ will plainly appear.\n\nAs is the case with the majority of philosophical differences, so also\nin the present instance I find that the divergences which exhibit\nthemselves in our respective unitary conceptions of the world are in part\nonly apparent and in part occasioned by the divergent significances of\nour fundamental ideas. But this will, perhaps, be made clearer by the\nfollowing methodically arranged eight theses.\n\n\nI. MONISM.\n\nLike all general concepts of fundamental scope, that of monism also\nis liable to different definitions and divergent modifications,\u2014the\nnatural result of individual differences of subjective conception. In the\ndeterminate sense in which monism is at present employed by the majority\nof philosophers and physical inquirers, the sense which I believe I\nwas the first to establish in 1866 in my \u201cGeneral Morphology\u201d (Vol. I,\np. 105), it denotes a unitary or _natural_ conception of the world, in\nopposition to a _supernatural_ or mystical one, that is, in opposition\nto _dualism_. For us, accordingly, there exists (in the sense of Goethe)\n_no_ opposition whatsoever between nature and mind, between World and\nGod. Mental existences, \u201cspirits,\u201d outside nature, or in opposition to\nnature, do not exist. What are commonly termed the \u201cmental sciences,\u201d\u2014for\nexample, philology, history, and philosophy,\u2014are in reality simply a part\nof _physical philosophy_, of _Natur-philosophie_. The latter discipline\nembraces, in our opinion, the entire body of human knowledge; it is\nbased upon _empiricism_, on the experiences, the observations, and the\nexperiments of physical inquiry; but it does not become _philosophy_\nuntil it has brought together and united its empiric products, abstracted\ngeneral laws from its isolated experiential facts, and _synthetised_ the\nisolated results which _analysis_ has empirically ascertained.\n\n\nII. MECHANICALISM.\n\nSince an early date, this important fundamental concept has frequently\nbeen used in three different and divergent senses, namely:\n\n_A._ In its widest sense, as synonymous with _monism_; wherein mechanical\ncauses (_caus\u00e6 efficientes_), in the sense of Kant, are assumed as the\nsole effective causes and are placed in opposition to the teleological\ncauses (_caus\u00e6 finales_) in the sense of dualism. \u201cMechanical conception\nof the world\u201d is in this sense synonymous with \u201cmonistic conception of\nthe world.\u201d\n\n_B._ In its more restricted sense, as a universal _motion_-principle\nof physics, so that, for example, the postulated ether-vibrations of\noptics, of electricity, and so forth, as well as the grosser material\noscillations of acoustics, heat, and so forth, are designated as\nmechanical processes subject to definite laws. \u201cMechanical natural\nphilosophy,\u201d in this sense, is identical with _physics_.\n\n_C._ In its narrowest sense, as that _branch_ of physics which deals\nwith the grosser and visible processes of _motion_; as gravitation,\nlocomotion, and the phoronomy of organisms. Mechanics, in this the most\nrestricted sense, is viewed as opposed to optics, acoustics, etc., as the\nusages of the schools indicate.\n\nSince, now, the phrases \u201cmechanical laws\u201d and \u201cmechanical\nexplanation,\u201d at the present day even, are frequently understood in\nthese three distinct senses, no end of misunderstandings arise. Such\nmisunderstandings may be best avoided, perhaps, by retaining the notion\nof mechanics in its narrowest (_C_) sense, and by substituting _physics_\nfor the next narrower sense (_B_) and _monism_ for its most extended\nsense (_A_).\n\n\nIII. PSYCHISM.\n\nIn exactly the same way as the idea of mechanicalism, so also that of\npsychism is employed in a three-fold divergent sense. As in the former\ncase _motion_, so here _feeling_ is conceived, now as a universal\nworld-principle, now simply as a vital activity of all organisms, now\nsimply as the particular mental activity of man.\n\n_A._ In its widest sense: _Panpsychism_. All matter is ensouled, because\nall natural bodies known to us possess determinate chemical properties,\nthat is to say react uniformly and by law when subjected to the\ndeterminate chemical (i. e. molecular-mechanical) influences of other\nbodies: _chemical affinity_. Simplest example: sulphur and quicksilver\nrubbed together form cinnabar, a new body of entirely different\nproperties. This is possible only on the supposition that the molecules\n(or atoms) of the two elements if brought within the proper distance,\nmutually _feel_ each other, by attraction move towards each other; on the\ndecomposition of a simple chemical compound the contrary takes place:\nrepulsion. (Empedocles\u2019s doctrine of the \u201clove and hatred of atoms.\u201d)\n\n_B._ In its more restricted sense: _Biopsychism_. The _organisms_ alone\nare regarded as \u201censouled,\u201d because here the chemical processes are\nmore complicated and more striking (producing motions in cyclically\nrepeated succession) than in the case of the so-called \u201cdead matter\u201d of\nthe inorganic bodies. In particular does organic \u201cirritability\u201d appear\nhere as a higher form of the physical reaction called \u201c_Ausl\u00f6sung_\u201d\n[the setting free, disengagement], and \u201csoul-activity\u201d (reflexes)\nagain as a higher form of irritability. However, all the phenomena\nof organic life ultimately admit of being reduced to \u201cmechanical\u201d\n(or \u201cphysico-chemical\u201d) processes that differ from the processes of\nthe inorganic world only in point of degree or quantitatively, not\nqualitatively. (\u201cGeneral Morphology,\u201d I, Chap. V; VII, pp. 109-238.\n\u201cNatural Creation,\u201d VIII, First Edition, Lecture XV.)\n\n_C._ In its narrowest sense: _Zoopsychism_. Irritability, or universal\norganic soul-activity, such as is the attribute of all organisms,\n(identical with \u201clife,\u201d) reaches a higher stage through abstraction,\nthrough the formation of _ideas_. _Feeling_ and _will_ become more\ndistinctly separated. This real soul-life, which is the attribute only\nof the higher animals, passes through a long succession of different\nstages of development, the most perfect of which is the soul of man.\nThe so-called \u201cfreedom of the will\u201d is apparent only, as each single\nvolitional action is determined by a chain of precedent actions which\nultimately rest either upon _heredity_ (propagation) or upon _adaptation_\n(nutrition). As these last are (\u201cmechanically\u201d) reducible to molecular\nmotions, the same also holds true of the former.\n\n\nIV. THEISM.\n\nThe idea of god that alone appears to be logically compatible with\nmonism, is pantheism (or \u201ccosmotheism\u201d) in the sense of Goethe and\nSpinoza. God according to this view is identical with the sum-total\nof the force of the universe, which is inseparable from the sum-total\nof the matter of the universe. In opposition to this view stands\n_anthropotheism_. This is the outcome of dualism, which places God\nas a personal being in opposition to the \u201cworld\u201d created by him,\nand consequently is always forced in its reasonings to resort to\nanthropomorphic expedients.\n\n\nV. MATERIALISM.\n\nThe most important differences of form in which this much misunderstood\nand variously interpreted movement of philosophy has presented itself,\nmay be classed as follows:\n\n_A._ In its most extended sense: as synonymous with _monism_ (or with\nmechanicalism). All the phenomena of the world are founded upon material\nprocesses, upon _motions_ (mechanicalism) or upon _feelings_ (psychism),\nboth of which, as fundamental qualities, are inseparable from matter.\nImmaterial forces or immaterial \u201cspirits\u201d (minds) are unknown to us. As\nGoethe once said, \u201cMind can never exist and act without matter, matter\nnever without mind.\u201d\n\n_B._ In its more restricted sense: originally matter alone exists and\ncreates _secondarily_ force (or \u201cmind\u201d). The fallacy of this view lies in\nits regarding the two things \u201cmatter and force\u201d as disjoint and separate.\nAccording to our view the two are inseparably connected,\u2014united in each\natom from the very first.\n\n\nVI. SPIRITUALISM.\n\nThis phase also of the world-conception has been the subject of the same\nmisunderstandings and perverted conceptions as its apparent opposite,\nmaterialism.\n\n_A._ In its most extended sense, spiritualism is susceptible of\nidentification with _psychism_\u2014consequently also with monism. For\n_feeling_ (pleasure and pain) is just as much a thoroughly universal and\nfundamental property of matter (of each atom!) as is _motion_ (attraction\nand repulsion). Every single \u201cspirit\u201d is inseparably united with some\n\u201cmatter.\u201d\n\n_B._ In its more restricted sense: originally force alone exists and\ncreates _secondarily_ matter. This view, which is very old and very\nwidely spread (\u201ccreation of the world\u201d), is just as false and as\none-sided as its contrary (5 _B_).\n\n\nVII. IMMORTALISM.\n\nThe \u201cbelief in immortality\u201d is scientifically (_critically_) tenable only\nas a _general_ proposition, and is in this case identical with the most\nuniversal law of physics, the _conservation of energy_ (coincidently,\nof course, the conservation of matter). On the other hand, the widely\ndisseminated _dogmatic_ belief in a _personal_ immortality, a belief\nsupported by the mass of the ecclesiastical religions, and of utmost\nimportance as the consciously or unconsciously assumed _base_-axiom of a\ngreat number of philosophical systems, is, _scientifically_, absolutely\nuntenable. The \u201chuman soul\u201d (i. e. the sum-total of the individual\nlife-activity: feeling, motion,\u2014will,\u2014and idea) is simply a transient\ndevelopmentary phenomenon\u2014a very highly developed \u201cvertebrate-soul.\u201d\n\n\nVIII. COSMISM.\n\nThe determinate, and, as I believe, logical, form of the conception of\nthe world, the principles of which I have advocated for thirty years,\nand whose most important aspects have been briefly outlined in the\npreceding paragraphs, may also be designated _cosmism_, to the extent\nthat it proceeds from the fundamental idea that _cosmogeny_ or the\n\u201cworld-process,\u201d as world-_development_, is, within certain limits,\n(within the limits namely of a reduction to the basic notions: matter\nand its two inseparable fundamental qualities motion and feeling,) a\n_knowable_ natural process. Cosmism is opposed, thus, to _agnosticism_.\n\n * * * * *\n\nOne highly important principle of my monism seems to me to be, that\nI regard _all_ matter as _ensouled_, that is to say as endowed with\n_feeling_ (pleasure and pain) and with _motion_, or, better, with the\npower of motion. As elementary (atomistic) attraction and repulsion\nthese powers are asserted in every simplest chemical process, and\non them is based also every other phenomenon, consequently also the\nhighest-developed soul-activity of man. For the comprehension of this\n_graduated_ psychical development of matter perhaps my three stages will\nbe useful: III _A._ (Panpsychism), III _B._ (Biopsychism), III _C._\n(Zoopsychism). So too consciousness, as the highest psychical action and\nthe one most difficult to be explained, is in my views imply a higher\nstage of brain-activity, based upon the association, the abstraction,\nand centralisation of groups of ideas. Perhaps I have expressed myself\npoorly in these expositions, as I am little accustomed to dealing with\nphilosophical axioms abstractly, and am too exclusively engaged in the\nconcrete activity of my own special department. I cherish the hope,\nhowever, of being able within two or three years to devote more of my\ntime to purely philosophical labors; when my work with the Challenger\nmaterial, which has now absorbed twelve years of unremitting toil, is\nended, my special zoological activity will have been completed; and I\nshall then find the opportunity of contributing more frequently to your\nhighly valued magazines _The Monist_ and _The Open Court_.\n\n ERNST HAECKEL.\n\n\n\n\nTHE MAGIC SQUARE.\n\n\nI.\n\nINTRODUCTORY.\n\nAmong the philosophies of modern times there is no other which emphasises\nso much the importance of form and formal thought as the monism of _The\nMonist_. An expression thereof is found in the following passages:\n\n \u201cThe order that prevails among the facts of reality is due\n to the laws of form. Upon the order of the world depends its\n cognisability.\n\n \u201c... The laws of form are no less eternal than are matter and\n energy and \u2018Verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass,\n one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law!\u2019\n\n \u201cThe laws of form and their origin have been a puzzle to all\n philosophers. \u2018Ay, there\u2019s the rub!\u2019 The difficulties of Hume\u2019s\n problem of causation, of Kant\u2019s _a priori_, of Plato\u2019s ideas,\n of Mill\u2019s method of deduction, etc., etc., all arise from a\n one-sided view of form and the laws of form and formal thought.\u201d\n\nConsidering the great results which engineering and other applied\nsciences accomplish through the assistance of mathematics, we must\nconfess that the forms of thought are wonderful indeed, and it is not\nat all astonishing that the primitive thinkers of mankind when the\nimportance of the laws of formal thought in some way or another first\ndawned on their minds, attributed magic powers to numbers and geometrical\nfigures.\n\nWe shall devote the following pages to a brief review of magic squares,\nthe consideration of which has made many a man believe in mysticism.\nAnd yet there is no mysticism about them unless we either consider\neverything mystical, even that twice two is four, or join the sceptic in\nhis exclamation that we can truly not know whether twice two might not be\nfive in other spheres of the universe.\n\n[Illustration: ALBERT D\u00dcRER\u2019S ENGRAVING\n\nMELANCHOLY OR THE GENIUS OF THE INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE OF MECHANICS]\n\nThe author of the short article on \u201cMagic Squares\u201d in the English\nCyclop\u00e6dia (Vol. III, p. 415), presumably Prof. DeMorgan, says:\n\n \u201cThough the question of magic squares be in itself of no use,\n yet it belongs to a class of problems which call into action\n a beneficial species of investigation. Without laying down\n any rules for their construction, we shall content ourselves\n with destroying their magic quality, and showing that the\n non-existence of such squares would be much more surprising\n than their existence.\u201d\n\nThis is the point. There obtains a symphonic harmony in mathematics which\nis the more startling the more obvious and self-evident it appears to him\nwho understands the laws that produce this symphonic harmony.\n\n * * * * *\n\nOn the wood-cut named \u201cMelancholia\u201d[68] of the famous Nuremberg painter,\nAlbrecht D\u00fcrer, is found among a number of other emblems, which the\nreader will notice in our reproduction of the cut, the subjoined square.\nThis arrangement of the sixteen natural numbers from 1 to 16 possesses\nthe remarkable property that the same sum 34 will always be obtained\nwhether we add together the four figures of any of the horizontal rows\nor the four of any vertical row or the four which lie in either of the\ntwo diagonals. Such an arrangement of numbers is termed a magic square,\nand the square which we have reproduced above is _the first magic square\nwhich is met with in the Christian Occident_.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 1.\n\n +--+--+--+--+\n | 1|14|15| 4|\n +--+--+--+--+\n |12| 7| 6| 9|\n +--+--+--+--+\n | 8|11|10| 5|\n +--+--+--+--+\n |13| 2| 3|16|\n +--+--+--+--+\n]\n\nLike chess and many of the problems founded on the figure of the\nchess-board, the problem of constructing a magic square also probably\ntraces its origin to Indian soil. From there the problem found its way\namong the Arabs, and by them it was brought to the Roman Orient. Finally,\nsince Albrecht D\u00fcrer\u2019s time, the scholars of Western Europe also have\noccupied themselves with methods for the construction of squares of this\ncharacter.\n\nThe oldest and the simplest magic square consists of the quadratic\narrangement of the nine numbers from 1 to 9 in such a manner that the sum\nof each horizontal, vertical, or diagonal row, always remains the same,\nnamely 15. This square is the adjoined.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 2.\n\n +-+-+-+\n |2|7|6|\n +-+-+-+\n |9|5|1|\n +-+-+-+\n |4|3|8|\n +-+-+-+\n]\n\nHere, we will find, 15 always comes out whether we add 2 and 7 and 6, or\n9 and 5 and 1, or 4 and 3 and 8, or 2 and 9 and 4, or 7 and 5 and 3, or 6\nand 1 and 8, or 2 and 5 and 8, or 6 and 5 and 4.\n\nThe question naturally presents itself, whether this condition of the\nconstant equality of the added sum also remains fulfilled when the\nnumbers are assigned different places. It may be easily shown however\nthat 5 necessarily must occupy the middle place, and that the even\nnumbers must stand in the corners. This being so, there are but 7\nadditional arrangements possible, which differ from the arrangement\nabove given and from one another only in the respect that the rows at\nthe top, at the left, at the bottom, and at the right, exchange places\nwith one another and that in addition a mirror be imagined present with\neach arrangement. So too from D\u00fcrer\u2019s square of 4 times 4 places, by\ntranspositions, a whole set of new correct squares may be formed. A magic\nsquare of the 4 times 4 numbers from 1 to 16 is formed in the simplest\nmanner as follows. We inscribe the numbers from 1 to 16 in their natural\norder in the squares, thus:\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 3.\n\n +--+--+--+--+\n | 1| 2| 3| 4|\n +--+--+--+--+\n | 5| 6| 7| 8|\n +--+--+--+--+\n | 9|10|11|12|\n +--+--+--+--+\n |13|14|15|16|\n +--+--+--+--+\n]\n\nWe then leave the numbers in the four corner-squares, viz. 1, 4, 13, 16,\nas well also as the numbers in the four middle-squares, viz. 6, 7, 10,\n11, in their original places; and in the place of the remaining eight\nnumbers, we write the complements of the same with respect to 17: thus 15\ninstead of 2, 14 instead of 3, 12 instead of 5, 9 instead of 8, 8 instead\nof 9, 5 instead of 12, 3 instead of 14, and 2 instead of 15. We obtain\nthus the magic square\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 4.\n\n =34 =34\n \\ /\n +--+--+--+--+\n | 1|15|14| 4|=34\n +--+--+--+--+\n |12| 6| 7| 9|=34\n +--+--+--+--+\n | 8|10|11| 5|=34\n +--+--+--+--+\n |13| 3| 2|16|=34\n +--+--+--+--+\n 34 34 34 34\n]\n\nfrom which the same sum 34 always results. It is an interesting property\nof this square that any four numbers which form a rectangle or square\nabout the centre also always give the same sum 34; for example, 1, 4,\n13, 16, or 6, 7, 10, 11, or 15, 14, 3, 2, or 12, 9, 5, 8, or 15, 8, 2,\n9, or 14, 12, 3, 5. We may easily convince ourselves that this square is\nobtainable from the square of D\u00fcrer by interchanging with one another the\ntwo middle vertical rows.\n\n\nII.\n\nEARLY METHODS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF ODD-NUMBERED SQUARES.\n\nSince early times rules have also been known for the construction of\nmagic squares of more than 3 times 3, or 4 times 4 spaces. In the first\nplace, it is easy to calculate the sum which in the case of any given\nnumber of cells must result from the addition of each row. We take the\ndeterminate number of cells in each side of the square which we have to\nfill, multiply that number by itself, add 1, again multiply the number\nthus obtained by the number of the cells in each side, and, finally,\ndivide the product by 2. Thus, with 4 times 4 cells or squares, we get:\n4 times 4 are 16, 16 and 1 are 17, and one half of 17 times 4 is 34.\nSimilarly, with 5 times 5 squares, we get: 5 times 5 are 25, and 1 makes\n26, and the half of 26 times 5 is 65. Analogously, for 6 times 6 squares\nthe summation 111 is obtained, for 7 times 7 squares 175, for 8 times 8\nsquares 260, for 9 times 9 squares 369, for 10 times 10 squares 505, and\nso on. The Hindu rule for the construction of magic squares whose roots\nare odd, may be enunciated as follows: To start with, write 1 in the\ncentre of the topmost row, then write 2 in the lowest space of the\nvertical column next adjacent to the right, and then so inscribe the\nremaining numbers in their natural order in the squares diagonally\nupwards towards the right, that on reaching the right-hand margin the\ninscription shall be continued from the left-hand margin in the row just\nabove, and on reaching the upper margin shall be continued from the lower\nmargin in the column next adjacent to the right, noting that whenever we\nare arrested in our progress by a square already occupied we are to fill\nout the square next beneath the one we have last filled. In this manner,\nfor example, the last preceding square of 7 times 7 cells is formed, in\nwhich the reader is requested to follow the numbers in their natural\nsequence (Fig. 5).\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 5.\n\n =175 =175\n \\ /\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n |30 |39 |48 | 1 |10 |19 |28 |=175\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n |38 |47 | 7 | 9 |18 |27 |29 |=175\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n |46 | 6 | 8 |17 |26 |35 |37 |=175\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 5 |14 |16 |25 |34 |36 |45 |=175\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n |13 |15 |24 |33 |42 |44 | 4 |=175\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n |21 |23 |32 |41 |43 | 3 |12 |=175\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n |22 |31 |40 |49 | 2 |11 |20 |=175\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n 175 175 175 175 175 175 175\n]\n\nFor the next further advancements of the theory of magic squares and\nof the methods for their construction we are indebted to the Byzantian\nGreek, Moschopulus, who lived in the fourteenth century; also, after\nAlbrecht D\u00fcrer who lived about the year 1500, to the celebrated\narithmetician Adam Riese, and to the mathematician Michael Stifel, which\ntwo last lived about 1550. In the seventeenth century Bachet de M\u00e9ziriac,\nand Athanasius Kircher employed themselves on magic squares. About\n1700, finally, the French mathematicians De la Hire and Sauveur made\nconsiderable contributions to the theory. In recent times mathematicians\nhave concerned themselves much less about magic squares, as they have\nindeed about mathematical recreations generally. But quite recently the\nBrunswick mathematician Scheffler has put forth his own and other\u2019s\nstudies on this subject in an elegant form.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 6.\n\n | 7|\n | |\n | 6| |14|\n | | | |\n | 5| |13| |21|\n +==+==+==+==+==+==+==+\n | 4| |12| |20| |28|\n ---|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|---\n 3| |11| |19| |27| |35\n ------|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|------\n 2 |10| |18| |26| |34| 42\n --------|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|---------\n 1 9| |17| |25| |33| |41 49\n --------|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|---------\n 8 |16| |24| |32| |40| 48\n ------|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|------\n 15| |23| |31| |39| |47\n ---|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|---\n |22| |30| |38| |46|\n +==+==+==+==+==+==+==+\n |29| |37| |45|\n | | | |\n |36| |44|\n | |\n |43|\n]\n\nThe best known of the various methods of constructing magic squares of an\nodd number of cells is the following. First write the numbers in diagonal\nsuccession as in the preceding diagram (Fig. 6). After 25 cells of the\nsquare of 49 cells which we have to fill out, have thus been occupied,\ntransfer the six figures found outside each side of the square, without\nchanging their configuration, into the empty cells of the side directly\nopposite. By this method, which we owe to Bachet de M\u00e9ziriac, we obtain\nthe following magic square of the numbers from 1 to 49:\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 7.\n\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 4|29|12|37|20|45|28|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |35|11|36|19|44|27| 3|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |10|42|18|43|26| 2|34|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |41|17|49|25| 1|33| 9|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |16|48|24| 7|32| 8|40|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |47|23| 6|31|14|39|15|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |22| 5|30|13|38|21|46|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n]\n\n\nIII.\n\nMODERN MODES OF CONSTRUCTION OF ODD-NUMBERED SQUARES.\n\nThe reader will justly ask whether there do not exist other correct\nmagic squares which are constructed after a different method from that\njust given, and whether there do not exist modes of construction which\nwill lead to all the imaginable and possible magic squares of a definite\nnumber of cells. A general mode of construction of this character\nwas first given for odd-numbered squares by De la Hire, and recently\nperfected by Professor Scheffler.\n\nTo acquaint ourselves with this general method, let us select as our\nexample a square of 5. First we form two auxiliary squares. In the\nfirst we write the numbers from 1 to 5 five times; and in the second,\nfive times, the following multiples of five, viz.: 0, 5, 10, 15, 20.\nIt is clear now that by adding each of the numbers of the series from\n1 to 5 with each of the numbers 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, we shall get all the\n25 numerals from 1 to 25. All that additionally remains to be done\ntherefore, is, so to inscribe the numbers that by the addition of the\ntwo numbers in any two corresponding cells each combination shall come\nout once and only once; and further that in each horizontal, vertical,\nand diagonal row in each auxiliary square each number shall once appear.\nThen the required sum of 65 must necessarily result in every case,\nbecause the numbers from 1 to 5 added together make 15, and the numbers\n0, 5, 10, 15, 20 make 50.\n\nWe effect the required method of inscription by imagining the numbers\n1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (or 0, 5, 10, 15, 20) arranged in cyclical succession,\nthat is 1 immediately following upon 5, and, starting from any number\nwhatsoever, by skipping each time either none or one or two or three etc.\nfigures. Cycles are thus obtained of the first, the second, the third\netc. orders; for example 3 4 5 1 2 is a cycle of the first order, 2 4 1\n3 5 is a cycle of the second order, 1 5 4 3 2 is a cycle of the fourth\norder, etc. The only thing then to be looked out for in the two auxiliary\nsquares is, that the same \u201ccycle\u201d order be horizontally preserved in all\nthe rows, that the same also happens for the vertical rows, but that the\ncycle order in the horizontal and vertical rows is different. Finally we\nhave only additionally to take care that to the same numbers of the one\nauxiliary square not like numbers but _different_ numbers correspond in\nthe other auxiliary square, that is lie in similarly situated cells. The\nfollowing auxiliary squares are, for example, thus possible:\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 8.\n\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n |3 |4 |5 |1 |2 |\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n |5 |1 |2 |3 |4 |\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n |2 |3 |4 |5 |1 |\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n |4 |5 |1 |2 |3 |\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n |1 |2 |3 |4 |5 |\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n]\n\nand\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 9.\n\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n | 0|10|20| 5|15|\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n | 5|15| 0|10|20|\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n |10|20| 5|15| 0|\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n |15| 0|10|20| 5|\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n |20| 5|15| 0|10|\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n]\n\nAdding in pairs the numbers which occupy similarly situated cells, we\nobtain the following correct magic square:\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 10.\n\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n | 3|14|25| 6|17|\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n |10|16| 2|13|24|\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n |12|23| 9|20| 1|\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n |19| 5|11|22| 8|\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n |21| 7|18| 4|15|\n +--+--+--+--+--+\n]\n\nIt will be seen that we are able thus to construct a very large number\nof magic squares of 5 times 5 spaces by varying in every possible manner\nthe numbers in the two auxiliary squares. Furthermore, the squares thus\nformed possess the additional peculiarity, that every 5 numbers which\nfill out two rows that are parallel to a diagonal and lie on different\nsides of the diagonal also give the constant sum of 65. For example:\n3 and 7, 11, 20, 24; or 10, 14 and 18, 22, 1. Altogether then the sum\n65 is produced out of 20 rows or pairs of rows. On this peculiarity is\ndependent the fact that if we imagine an unlimited number of such squares\nplaced by the side of, above, or beneath an initial one, we shall be\nable to obtain as many quadratic cells as we choose, so arranged that\nthe square composed of any 25 of these cells will form a correct magic\nsquare, as the following figure will show:\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 11.\n\n 2|13|24|10|16| 2|13|24|10|16| 2\n --+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--\n 9|20| 1|12|23| 9|20| 1|12|23| 9\n --+--+--+--+--+==============+--\n 11|22| 8|19| 5\u00a611|22| 8|19| 5\u00a611\n --+--+--+--+--\u00a6--+--+--+--+--\u00a6\u2014\n 18| 4|15|21| 7\u00a618| 4|15|21| 7\u00a618\n --+--+--+--+--\u00a6--+--+--+--+--\u00a6\u2014\n 25| 6|17| 3|14\u00a625| 6|17| 3|14\u00a625\n --+--+--+--+--\u00a6--+--+--+--+--\u00a6\u2014\n 2|13|24|10|16\u00a6 2|13|24|10|16\u00a6 2\n --+--+========\u00a6=====+--+--+--\u00a6\u2014\n 9|20\u00a6 1|12|23\u00a6 9|20\u00a6 1|12|23\u00a6 9\n --+--\u00a6--+--+--+=====\u00a6========+--\n 11|22\u00a6 8|19| 5|11|22\u00a6 8|19| 5|11\n --+--\u00a6--+--+--+--+--\u00a6--+--+--+--\n 18| 4\u00a615|21| 7|18| 4\u00a615|21| 7|18\n --+--\u00a6--+--+--+--+--\u00a6--+--+--+--\n 25| 6\u00a617| 3|14|25| 6\u00a617| 3|14|25\n --+--\u00a6--+--+--+--+--\u00a6--+--+--+--\n 2|13\u00a624|10|16| 2|13\u00a624|10|16| 2\n --+--+==============+--+--+--+--\n 9|20| 1|12|23| 9|20| 1|12|23| 9\n --+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--\n 11|22| 8|19| 5|11|22| 8|19| 5|11\n]\n\nEvery square of every 25 of these numbers, as for example the two\ndark-bordered ones, possesses the property that the addition of the\nhorizontal, vertical, and diagonal rows gives each the same sum, 65.\n\nAs an example of a higher number of cells we will append here a magic\nsquare of 11 times 11 spaces formed by the general method of De la\nHire from the two auxiliary squares of Figs. 12 and 13. From these two\nauxiliary squares we obtain by the addition of the two numbers of every\ntwo similarly situated cells, the magic square, exhibited in Diagram 14,\nin which each row gives the same sum 671.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 12.\n\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 |\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 |\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 |\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 13.\n\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 |\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n |110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 14.\n\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 1 | 13| 25| 37| 49| 61| 73| 85| 97|109|121|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 36| 48| 60| 72| 84| 96|108|120| 11| 12| 24|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 71| 83| 95|107|119| 10| 22| 23| 35| 47| 59|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n |106|118| 9 | 21| 33| 34| 46| 58| 70| 82| 94|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 20| 32| 44| 45| 57| 69| 81| 93|105|117| 8 |\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 55| 56| 68| 80| 92|104|116| 7 | 19| 31| 43|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 79| 91|103|115| 6 | 18| 30| 42| 54| 66| 67|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n |114| 5 | 17| 29| 41| 53| 65| 77| 78| 90|102|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 28| 40| 52| 64| 76| 88| 89|101|113| 4 | 16|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 63| 75| 87| 99|100|112| 3 | 15| 27| 39| 51|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 98|110|111| 2 | 14| 26| 38| 50| 62| 74| 86|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n]\n\n\nIV.\n\nEVEN-NUMBERED SQUARES.\n\nOf magic squares having an even number of places we have hitherto\nhad to deal only with the square of 4. To construct squares of this\ndescription having a higher even number of places, different and more\ncomplicated methods must be employed than for squares of odd numbers\nof places. However, in this case also, as in dealing with the square\nof 4, we start with the natural sequence of the numbers and must then\nfind the complements of the numbers with respect to some other certain\nnumber (as 17 in the square of 4) and also effect certain exchanges of\nthe numbers with one another. To form, for example, a magic square of 6\ntimes 6 places, we inscribe in the 12 diagonal cells the numbers that in\nthe natural sequence of inscription fall into these places, then in the\nremaining cells the complements of the numbers that belong therein with\nrespect to 37, and finally effect the following six exchanges, viz. of\nthe numbers 33 and 3, 25 and 7, 20 and 14, 18 and 13, 10 and 9, and 5 and\n2. In this way the following magic square is obtained.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 15.\n\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 1|35|34| 3|32| 6|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |30| 8|28|27|11| 7|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |24|23|15|16|14|19|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |13|17|21|22|20|18|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |12|26| 9|10|29|25|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |31| 2| 4|33| 5|36|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n]\n\nThis square may also be constructed by the method of De la Hire, from two\nauxiliary squares with the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 0, 6, 12, 18,\n24, 30 respectively. In this case, however, the vertical rows of the one\nsquare and the horizontal rows of the other must each so contain two same\nnumbers thrice repeated that the summation shall always remain 21 and 90\nrespectively. In this manner we get the magic square last given above\nfrom the two following auxiliary squares:\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 16.\n\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 1| 5| 4| 3| 2| 6|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 6| 2| 4| 3| 5| 1|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 6| 5| 3| 4| 2| 1|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 1| 5| 3| 4| 2| 6|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 6| 2| 3| 4| 5| 1|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 1| 2| 4| 3| 5| 6|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n]\n\nand\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 17.\n\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 0|30|30| 0|30| 0|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |24| 6|24|24| 6| 6|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |18|18|12|12|12|18|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |12|12|18|18|18|12|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 6|24| 6| 6|24|24|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |30| 0| 0|30| 0|30|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n]\n\nIt is to be noted in connection with this example that here also as in\nthe case of odd-numbered squares, it is possible so to inscribe six\ntimes the numbers from 1 to 6 that each number shall appear once and only\nonce in each horizontal, vertical, and diagonal row; for example, in the\nfollowing manner:\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 18.\n\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| 6|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 2| 4| 6| 1| 3| 5|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 3| 6| 5| 2| 1| 4|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 5| 3| 1| 6| 4| 2|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 6| 5| 4| 3| 2| 1|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 4| 1| 2| 5| 6| 3|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+\n]\n\nBut if we attempt so to insert, in a like manner, the other set of\nnumbers 0, 6, 12, 18, 24, 30 in a second auxiliary square, that each\nnumber of the first auxiliary square shall stand once and once only in\na corresponding cell with each number of the second square, all the\nattempts we may make to fulfil coincidently the last named condition will\nresult in failure. It is therefore necessary to select auxiliary squares\nlike the two given above. It is noteworthy, that the fulfilment of the\nsecond condition is impossible only in the case of the square of 6, but\nthat in the case of the square of 4 or of the square of 8, for example,\ntwo auxiliary squares, such as the method of De la Hire requires, are\npossible. Thus, taking the square of 4 we get\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 19.\n\n +--+--+--+--+\n | 1| 2| 3| 4|\n +--+--+--+--+\n | 4| 3| 2| 1|\n +--+--+--+--+\n | 2| 1| 4| 3|\n +--+--+--+--+\n | 3| 4| 1| 2|\n +--+--+--+--+\n]\n\nand\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 20.\n\n +--+--+--+--+\n | 0| 4| 8|12|\n +--+--+--+--+\n | 8|12| 0| 4|\n +--+--+--+--+\n |12| 8| 4| 0|\n +--+--+--+--+\n | 4| 0|12| 8|\n +--+--+--+--+\n]\n\nThe reader may form for himself the magic square which these give.\n\nThe existence of these two auxiliary squares furnishes a key to the\nsolution of a pretty problem at cards. If we replace, namely, the\nnumbers 1, 2, 3, 4 by the Ace, the King, the Queen, and the Knave, and\nthe numbers 0, 4, 8, 12 by the four suits, clubs, spades, hearts, and\ndiamonds, we shall at once perceive that it is possible, and must be so\nnecessarily, quadratically to arrange in such a manner the four Aces,\nthe four Kings, the Four Queens, and the four Knaves, that in each\nhorizontal, vertical, and diagonal row, each one of the four suits and\neach one of the four denominations shall appear once and once only. The\nauxiliary squares above given furnish the appended solution of this\nproblem:\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 21.\n\n +--------+--------+--------+--------+\n | CLUBS | SPADES | HEARTS |DIAMONDS|\n | ACE | KING | QUEEN | KNAVE |\n +--------+--------+--------+--------+\n | HEARTS |DIAMONDS| CLUBS | SPADES |\n | KNAVE | QUEEN | KING | ACE |\n +--------+--------+--------+--------+\n |DIAMONDS| HEARTS | SPADES | CLUBS |\n | KING | ACE | KNAVE | QUEEN |\n +--------+--------+--------+--------+\n | SPADES | CLUBS |DIAMONDS| HEARTS |\n | QUEEN | KNAVE | ACE | KING |\n +--------+--------+--------+--------+\n]\n\nTo fix the solution of the problem in the memory, observe that, starting\nfrom the several corners, each suit and each denomination must be placed\nin the spots of the move of a Knight. If we fix the positions of the four\ncards of any one row, there will be only two possibilities left of so\nplacing the other cards that the required condition of having each suit\nand each denomination once and only once in each row shall be fulfilled.\n\nOf magic squares of an even number of places we have up to this point\nexamined only the squares of 4 and of 6. For the sake of completeness we\nappend here one of 8 and one of 10 places. The mode of construction of\nthese squares is similar to the method above discussed for the lower even\nnumbers.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 22.\n\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 1|63|62| 4| 5|59|58| 8|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |56|10|11|53|52|14|15|49|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |48|18|19|45|44|22|23|41|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |25|39|38|28|29|35|34|32|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |33|31|30|36|37|27|26|40|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |24|42|43|21|20|46|47|17|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |16|50|51|13|12|54|55| 9|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |57| 7| 6|60|61| 3| 2|64|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 23.\n\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 1 | 99| 3 | 97| 96| 5 | 94| 8 | 92| 10|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 90| 12| 88| 14| 86| 85| 17| 83| 19| 11|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 80| 79| 23| 77| 25| 26| 74| 28| 22| 71|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 31| 69| 68| 34| 66| 65| 37| 33| 62| 40|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 60| 42| 58| 57| 45| 46| 44| 53| 49| 51|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 50| 52| 43| 47| 55| 56| 54| 48| 59| 41|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 61| 32| 38| 64| 36| 35| 67| 63| 39| 70|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 21| 29| 73| 27| 75| 76| 24| 78| 72| 30|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 20| 82| 18| 84| 15| 16| 87| 13| 89| 81|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 91| 9 | 93| 4 | 6 | 95| 7 | 98| 2 |100|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n]\n\nThe magic squares of even numbers thus constructed are not the only\npossible ones. On the contrary, there are very many others possible,\nwhich obey different laws of formation. It has been calculated, for\nexample, that with the square of 4 it is possible to construct 880, and\nwith the square of 6, _several million_, different magic squares. The\nnumber of odd-numbered magic squares constructible by the method of De la\nHire is also very great. With the square of 7, the possible constructions\namount to 363,916,800. With the squares of higher numbers the multitude\nof the possibilities increases in the same enormous ratio.\n\n\nV.\n\nMAGIC SQUARES WHOSE SUMMATION GIVES THE NUMBER OF A YEAR.\n\nThe magic squares which we have so far considered contain only the\nnatural numbers from 1 upwards. It is possible, however, easily to\ndeduce from a correct magic square other squares in which a different\nlaw controls the sequence of the numbers to be inscribed. Of the squares\nobtained in this manner, we shall devote our attention here only to such\nin which, although formed by the inscription of successive numbers, the\nsum obtained from the addition of the rows is a determinate number which\nwe have fixed upon beforehand, as _the number of a year_. In such a case\nwe have simply to add to the numbers of the original square a determinate\nnumber so to be calculated, that the required sum shall each time appear.\nIf this sum is divisible by 3, magic squares will always be obtainable\nwith 3 times 3 spaces which shall give this sum. In such a case we divide\nthe sum required by 3 and subtract 5 from the result in order to obtain\nthe number which we have to add to each number of the original square.\nIf the sum desired is even but not divisible by 4, we must then subtract\nfrom it 34 and take one fourth of the result, to obtain the number which\nin this case is to be added in each place. If, for example, we wish to\nobtain the number of the year 1890 as the resulting sum of each row, we\nshall have to add to each of the numbers of an ordinary magic square of\n4 times 4 spaces the number 464; in other words, instead of the numbers\nfrom 1 to 16 we have to insert in the squares the numbers from 465 to\n480. As the number of the present year 1892 is divisible by 11, it must\nbe possible to deduce from the magic square constructed by us at the\nconclusion of Section III a second magic square in which each row of 11\ncells will give the number of the year 1892. To do this, we subtract from\n1892 the sum of the original square, namely 671, and divide the remainder\nby 11, whereby we get 111 and thus perceive that the numbers from 112 to\n232 are to be inscribed in the cells of the square required. We get in\nthis way the preceding square, from which _one and the same sum, namely\n1892, can be obtained 44 times_, first from each of the 11 horizontal\nrows, secondly from each of the 11 vertical rows, thirdly from each of\nthe two diagonal rows, and fourthly twenty additional times from each\nand every pair of any two rows that lie parallel to a diagonal, have\ntogether 11 cells, and lie on different sides of the diagonal, as for\nexample, 196, 122, 158, 205, 131, 167, 214, 140, 187, 223, 149.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 24.\n\n +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+\n | 112| 124| 136| 148| 160| 172| 184| 196| 208| 220| 232| = 1892\n +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------\n | 147| 159| 171| 183| 195| 207| 219| 231| 122| 123| 135| = 1892\n +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------\n | 182| 194| 206| 218| 230| 121| 133| 134| 146| 158| 170| = 1892\n +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------\n | 217| 229| 120| 132| 144| 145| 157| 169| 181| 193| 205| = 1892\n +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------\n | 131| 143| 155| 156| 168| 180| 192| 204| 216| 228| 119| = 1892\n +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------\n | 166| 167| 179| 191| 203| 215| 227| 118| 130| 142| 154| = 1892\n +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------\n | 190| 202| 214| 226| 117| 129| 141| 153| 165| 177| 178| = 1892\n +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------\n | 225| 116| 128| 140| 152| 164| 176| 188| 189| 201| 213| = 1892\n +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------\n | 139| 151| 163| 175| 187| 199| 200| 212| 224| 115| 127| = 1892\n +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------\n | 174| 186| 198| 210| 211| 223| 114| 126| 138| 150| 162| = 1892\n +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------\n | 209| 221| 222| 113| 125| 137| 149| 161| 173| 185| 197| = 1892\n +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+\n 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892\n]\n\n\nVI.\n\nCONCENTRIC MAGIC SQUARES.\n\nThe acuteness of the mathematicians has also discovered magic squares\nwhich possess the peculiar property that if one row after another be\ntaken away from each side, the smaller inner squares remaining will\nstill be magical squares, that is to say, all their rows when added\nwill give the same sum. It will be sufficient to give two examples here\nof such squares, (the laws for their construction being somewhat more\ncomplicated,) of which the first has 7 times 7 and the second 8 times 8\nplaces. The numbers within each of the dark-bordered frames form with\nrespect to the centre smaller squares which in their own turn are magical.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 25.\n\n +--+---+---+--+--+---+---+\n | 4| 5| 6 |43|39| 38| 40|\n +--++================++--+\n |49||15| 16|33|30| 31|| 1|\n +--||--++========++--||--+\n |48||37||22|27|26||13|| 2|\n +--||--||--+--+--||--||--+\n |47||36||29|25|21||14|| 3|\n +--||--||--+--+--||--||--+\n | 8||18||24|23|28||32||42|\n +--||--++========++--||--+\n | 9||19| 34|17|20| 35||41|\n +--++================++--+\n |10| 45| 44| 7|11| 12| 46|\n +--+---+---+--+--+---+---+\n]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 26.\n\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n | 1 | 56| 55| 11| 53| 13| 14| 57|\n +---++=====================++---+\n | 63||15| 47| 22| 42| 24|45|| 2 |\n +---||--+==============++--||---+\n | 62||49||25| 40| 34|31||16|| 3 |\n +---||--||--+---+---+--||--||---+\n | 4 ||48||28| 37| 35|30||17|| 61|\n +---||--||--+---+---+--||--||---+\n | 5 ||44||39| 26| 32|33||21|| 60|\n +---||--||--+---+---+--||--||---+\n | 59||19||38| 27| 29|36||46|| 6 |\n +---||--++=============++--||---+\n | 58||20| 18| 43| 23| 41|50|| 7 |\n +---++=====================++---+\n | 8 | 9 | 10| 54| 12| 52| 51| 64|\n +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+\n]\n\nIn the first of these two squares the internal square of 3 times 3 places\ncontains the numbers from 21 to 29 in such a manner that each row gives\nwhen added the sum of 75. This square lies within a larger one of 5 times\n5 spaces, which contains the numbers from 13 to 37 in such a manner that\neach row gives the sum of 125. Finally, this last square forms part of\na square of 7 times 7 places which contains the numbers from 1 to 49 so\nthat each row gives the sum of 175.\n\nIn the second square the inner central square of 4 times 4 places\ncontains the numbers from 25 to 40 in such a manner that each row gives\nthe sum of 130. This square is the middle of a square of 6 times 6 places\nwhich so contains the numbers from 15 to 50 that each row gives the sum\n165. Finally, this last square is again the middle of an ordinary magic\nsquare composed of the numbers from 1 to 64.\n\n\nVII.\n\nMAGICAL SQUARES WITH MAGICAL PARTS.\n\nIf we divide a square of 8 times 8 places by means of the two middle\nlines parallel to its sides into 4 parts containing each 4 times 4\nspaces, we may propound the problem of so inserting the numbers from 1\nto 64 in these spaces that not only the whole shall form a magic square,\nbut also that each of the 4 parts individually shall be magical, that\nis to say, give the same sum for each row. This problem also has been\nsuccessfully solved, as the following diagram will show.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 27.\n\n +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+\n | 1| 4|63|62|| 5| 8|59|58|\n +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+\n |64|61| 2| 3||60|57| 6| 7|\n +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+\n |42|43|24|21||34|35|32|29|\n +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+\n |23|22|41|44||31|30|33|36|\n +===========++===========+\n |13|16|51|50|| 9|12|55|54|\n +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+\n |52|49|14|15||56|53|10|11|\n +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+\n |38|39|28|25||46|47|20|17|\n +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+\n |27|26|37|40||19|18|45|48|\n +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+\n]\n\nThe 4 numbers in each row of any one of the sub-squares here, gives 130;\nso that the sum of each one of the rows of the large square will be 260.\n\nFinally, in further illustration of this idea, we will submit to the\nconsideration of our readers a very remarkable square of the numbers from\n1 to 81. This square, which will be found on the following page (Fig.\n28), is divided by parallel lines into 9 parts, of which each contains 9\nconsecutive numbers that severally make up a magic square by themselves.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 28.\n\n +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+\n | 31| 36| 29|| 76| 81| 74|| 13| 18| 11|\n +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+\n | 30| 32| 34|| 75| 77| 79|| 12| 14| 16|\n +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+\n | 35| 28| 33|| 80| 73| 78|| 17| 10| 15|\n +===========++===========++===========+\n | 22| 27| 20|| 40| 45| 38|| 58| 63| 56|\n +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+\n | 21| 23| 25|| 39| 41| 43|| 57| 59| 61|\n +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+\n | 26| 19| 24|| 44| 37| 42|| 62| 55| 60|\n +===========++===========++===========+\n | 67| 72| 65|| 4 | 9 | 2 || 49| 54| 47|\n +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+\n | 66| 68| 70|| 3 | 5 | 7 || 48| 50| 52|\n +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+\n | 71| 64| 69|| 8 | 1 | 6 || 53| 46| 51|\n +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+\n]\n\nWonderful as the properties of this square may appear, the law by which\nthe author constructed it is equally simple. We have simply to regard the\n9 parts as the 9 cells of a magic square of the numbers from I to IX and\nthen to inscribe by the magic prescript in the square designated as I the\nnumbers from 1 to 9, in the square designated as II the numbers from 10\nto 18, and so on. In this way the square above given is obtained from the\nfollowing base-square:\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 29.\n\n +----+----+----+\n | IV | IX | II |\n +----+----+----+\n | III| V | VII|\n +----+----+----+\n |VIII| I | VI |\n +----+----+----+\n]\n\n\nVIII.\n\nMAGIC SQUARES THAT INVOLVE THE MOVE OF THE CHESS-KNIGHT.\n\nWhat one of our readers does not know the problems contained in the\nrecreation columns of our magazines, the requirements of which are to\ncompose into a verse 8 times 8 quadratically arranged syllables, of\nwhich every two successive syllables stand on spots so situated with\nrespect to each other that a chess-knight can move from the one to the\nother? If we replace in such an arrangement the 64 successive syllables\nby the 64 numbers from 1 to 64, we shall obtain a knight-problem made\nup of numbers. Methods also exist indeed for the construction of\nsuch dispositions of numbers, which then form the foundation of the\nconstruction of the problems in the newspapers. But the majority of\nknight-problems of this class are the outcome of experiment rather than\nthe product of methodical creation. If however it is a severe test of\npatience to form a knight-problem by experiment, it stands to reason that\nit is a still severer trial to effect at the same time the additional\nresult that the 64 numbers which form the knight-problem shall also form\na magic square.\n\nThis trial of endurance was undertaken several decades ago, by a\npensioned Moravian officer named Wenzelides, who was spending the last\ndays of his life in the country. After a series of trials which lasted\nyears he finally succeeded in so inscribing in the 64 squares of the\nchess-board the numbers from 1 to 64 that successive numbers, as well\nalso as the numbers 64 and 1, were always removed from one another in\ndistance and direction by the move of a knight, and that in addition\nthereto the summation of the horizontal and the vertical rows always\ngave the same sum 260. Ultimately he discovered several squares of this\ndescription, which were published in the _Berlin Chess Journal_. One of\nthese is here appended:\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 30.\n\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |47|10|23|64|49| 2|59| 6|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |22|63|48| 9|60| 5|50| 3|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |11|46|61|24| 1|52| 7|58|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |62|21|12|45| 8|57| 4|51|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |19|36|25|40|13|44|53|30|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |26|39|20|33|56|29|14|43|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |35|18|37|28|41|16|31|54|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |38|27|34|17|32|55|42|15|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n]\n\nThe move of the knight and the equality of the summation of the\nhorizontal and vertical rows, therefore, are the facts to be noted here.\nThe diagonal rows do _not_ give the sum 260. Perhaps some one among our\nreaders who possesses the time and patience will be tempted to outdo\nWenzelides, and to devise a numeral knight-problem of this kind which\nwill give 260 not only in the horizontal and vertical but also in the two\ndiagonal rows.\n\n\nIX.\n\nMAGICAL POLYGONS.\n\nSo far we have only considered such extensions of the idea underlying\nthe construction of the magic square in which the figure of the square\nwas retained. We may however contrive extensions of the idea in which\ninstead of a square, a rectangle, a triangle, or a pentagon, and the\nlike, appear. Without entering into the consideration of the methods for\nthe construction of such figures, we will give here of magical polygons\nsimply a few examples, all supplied by Professor Scheffler:\n\n1) The numbers from 1 to 32 admit of being written in a rectangle of 4 \u00d7\n8 in such a manner that the long horizontal rows give the sum of 132 and\nthe short vertical rows the sum of 66; thus:\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 31.\n\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 1|10|11|29|28|19|18|16|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n | 9| 2|30|12|20|27| 7|25|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |24|31| 3|21|13| 6|26| 8|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n |32|23|22| 4| 5|14|15|17|\n +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+\n]\n\n2) The numbers from 1 to 27 admit of being so arranged in three regular\ntriangles about a point which forms a common centre, that each side of\nthe outermost triangle will present 6 numbers of the total summation 96\nand each side of the middle triangle 4 numbers whose sum is 61; as the\nfollowing figure shows:\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 32.\n\n 26 3 6 10 24 27\n 20 9 11 21\n 18 2\n 16 17\n 15 8\n 22 5\n 12\n 7 13\n 4 23\n 19\n 1 14\n\n 25\n]\n\n3) The numbers from 1 to 80 admit of being formed about a point as common\ncentre into 4 pentagons, such that each side of the first pentagon from\nwithin contains two numbers, each side of the second pentagon four\nnumbers, each of the third six numbers, and each side of the fourth,\noutermost pentagon eight numbers. The sum of the numbers of each side of\nthe second pentagon is 122, the sum of those of each side of the third\npentagon is 248, and that of those of each side of the fourth pentagon\n254. Furthermore, the sum of any four corner numbers lying in the same\nstraight line with the centre, is also the same; namely, 92.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 33.\n\n 1\n 26 54\n 31 49\n 10 15 80\n 76 36 44 9\n 50 70 72 32\n 55 71 16 66 27\n 5 45 25 65 37 2\n 11 61 60 24 14\n 30 20 17 53\n 40 56 59 43\n 35 21 64 48\n 69 57 58 73\n 6 79\n 77 75 62 23 67 8\n 46 41 19 22 63 18 38 33\n 51 12 39 68 74 42 13 28\n 4 29 34 7 78 47 52 3\n]\n\n4) The numbers from 1 to 73 admit of being arranged about a centre,\nin which the number 37 is written, into three hexagons which contain\nrespectively 3, 5, and 7 numbers in each side and possess the following\npretty properties. Each hexagon always gives the same sum, not only when\nthe summation is made along its six sides, but also when it is made along\nthe six diameters that join its corners and along the six that are\nconstructed at right angles to its sides; this sum, for the first hexagon\nfrom within, is 111, for the second 185, and for the third 259.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 34.\n\n 1 5 6 70 60 59 58\n 63 8\n 62 19 53 46 22 45 9\n 61 20 24 64\n 2 48 31 42 38 49 57\n 3 47 39 40 44 56\n 67 51 41 37 33 23 7\n 66 50 34 35 54 11\n 65 25 36 32 43 26 12\n 10 30 27 13\n 17 29 21 28 52 55 72\n 18 71\n 16 69 68 4 14 15 73\n]\n\n\nX.\n\nMAGIC CUBES.\n\nSeveral inquirers, particularly Kochansky (1686), Sauveur (1710), Hugel\n(1859), and Scheffler (1882), have extended the principle of the magic\nsquares of the plane to three-dimensioned space. Imagine a cube divided\nby planes parallel to its sides and equidistant from one another,\ninto cubical compartments. The problem is then, so to insert in these\ncompartments the successive natural numbers that every row from the right\nto the left, every row from the front to the back, every row from the top\nto the bottom, every diagonal of a square, and every principal diagonal\npassing through the centre of the cube shall contain numbers whose sum is\nalways the same. For 3 times 3 times 3 compartments, a magic cube of this\ndescription is not constructible. For 4 times, 4 times 4 compartments a\ncube is constructible such that any row parallel to an edge of the cube\nand every principal diagonal give the sum of 130. To obtain a magic cube\nof 64 compartments, imagine the numbers which belong in the compartments\nwritten on the upper surface of the same and the numbers then taken\noff in layers of 16 from the top downwards. We obtain thus 4 squares of\n16 cells each, which together make up the magic cube; as the following\ndiagrams will show:\n\n[Illustration:\n\n First Layer Second Layer Third Layer Fourth Layer\n from the Top. from the Top. from the Top. from the Top.\n +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+\n | 1|48|32|49| |63|18|34|15| |62|19|35|14| | 4|45|29|52|\n +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+\n |60|21|37|12| | 6|43|27|54| | 7|42|26|55| |57|24|40| 9|\n +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+\n |56|25|41| 8| |10|39|23|58| |11|38|22|29| |53|28|44| 5|\n +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+\n |13|36|20|61| |51|30|46| 3| |50|31|47| 2| |16|33|17|64|\n +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+ +--+--+--+--+\n]\n\nThe same sum 130 here comes out not less than 52 times; viz. in the first\nplace from the 16 rows from left to right, secondly from the 16 rows from\nthe front to the back, thirdly from the 16 rows counting from the top\nto the bottom, and lastly from the 4 rows which join each two opposite\ncorners of the cube, namely from the rows: 1, 43, 22, 64; 49, 27, 38, 16;\n13, 39, 26, 52; 61, 23, 42, 4.\n\nFor a cube with 5 compartments in each edge the arrangement of the\nfigures can so be made that all the 75 rows parallel to any and every\nedge, all the 30 rows lying in any diagonal of a square, and all the\n4 rows forming any principal diagonal shall have one and the same\nsummation, 315.\n\nJust as the magic squares of an odd number of cells could be formed with\nthe aid of _two_ auxiliary squares, so also odd-numbered magic cubes can\nbe constructed with the help of _three_ auxiliary cubes.\n\n[Illustration:\n\n First Layer from Top. Second Layer from Top. Third Layer from Top.\n +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+\n |121| 27| 83| 14| 70| | 2 | 58|114| 45| 96| | 33| 89| 20| 71|102|\n +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+\n | 10| 61|117| 48| 79| | 36| 92| 23| 54|110| | 67|123| 29| 85| 11|\n +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+\n | 44|100| 1 | 57|113| | 75|101| 32| 88| 19| | 76| 7 | 63|119| 50|\n +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+\n | 53|109| 40| 91| 22| | 84| 15| 66|122| 28| |115| 41| 97| 3 | 59|\n +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+\n | 87| 18| 74|105| 31| |118| 49| 80| 6 | 62| | 24| 55|106| 37| 93|\n +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+\n\n Fourth Layer from Top. Lowest Layer.\n +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+\n | 64|120| 46| 77| 8 | | 95| 21| 52|108| 39|\n +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+\n | 98| 4 | 60|111| 42| |104| 35| 86| 17| 73|\n +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+\n |107| 38| 94| 25| 51| | 13| 69|125| 26| 82|\n +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+\n | 16| 72|103| 34| 90| | 47| 78| 9 | 65|116|\n +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+\n | 30| 81| 12| 68|124| | 56|112| 43| 99| 5 |\n +---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+\n]\n\nIn this manner the preceding magic cube of 5 times 5 times 5 compartments\nis formed, in which, it may be additionally noticed, the middle number\nbetween 1 and 125, namely 63, is placed in the central compartment; by\nwhich arrangement the attainment of the sum of 315 is assured in the four\nprincipal diagonals and the 30 sub-diagonals. The condition attained in\nthe magic squares, that the diagonal-pairs parallel to the sub-diagonals\nalso shall give the sum 315 is not attainable in this case but is so in\nthe case of higher numbers of compartments.\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\nMusing on such problems as are the magic squares is fascinating to\nthinkers of a mathematical turn of mind. We take delight in discovering\na harmony that abides as an intrinsic quality in the forms of our\nthought. The problems of the magic squares are playful puzzles, invented\nas it seems for mere pastime and sport. But there is a deeper problem\nunderlying all these little riddles, and this deeper problem is of a\nsweeping significance. It is the philosophical problem of the world-order.\n\nThe formal sciences are creations of the mind. We build the sciences of\nmathematics, geometry, and algebra with our conception of pure forms\nwhich are abstract ideas. And the same order that prevails in these\nmental constructions permeates the universe, so that an old philosopher,\noverwhelmed with the grandeur of law, imagined he heard its rhythm in a\ncosmic harmony of the spheres.\n\n H. SCHUBERT.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[68] The term melancholy meant in D\u00fcrer\u2019s time, as it did also in\nShakespeare\u2019s and Milton\u2019s, \u201cthought or thoughtfulness.\u201d Says Milton in\n_Il Penseroso_:\n\n \u201cHail, thou Goddess, sage and holy,\n Hail divinest melancholy\n Whose saintly visage is too bright\n To hit the sense of human sight,\n And therefore to our weaker view\n O\u2019erlaid with black, staid Wisdom\u2019s hue.\u201d\u2014I, 12.\n\nThought that does not lead to action produces a gloomy state of mind.\nThoughtfulness which cannot find a way out of itself is that melancholy\nwhich engenders weakness,\u2014a truth which is illustrated in Hamlet.\nShakespeare still uses the words thought and melancholy as synonyms,\nsaying:\n\n \u201cThe native hue of resolution\n Is sicklied o\u2019er with the pale cast of thought.\u201d\n\nD\u00fcrer\u2019s melancholy does not represent the gloominess of thought, but the\npower of invention. Soberness and even a certain sadness are considered\nonly as an element of this melancholy, but on the whole the genius of\nthought appears bright, self-possessed, and strong.\n\nD\u00fcrer represents the Science of Mechanical Invention as a winged female\nfigure musing over some problem. Scattered on the floor around her lie\nsome of the simple tools used in the sixteenth century. A ladder leans\nagainst the house, that assists in climbing otherwise inaccessible\nheights. A scale, an hour-glass, a bell, and the magic square are hanging\non the wall behind her.\n\nAt a distance a bat-like creature, being the gloom of melancholy, hovers\nin the air like a dark cloud, but the sun rises above the horizon, and at\nthe happy middle between these two extremes stands the rainbow of serene\nhope and cheerful confidence.\n\n\n\n\nMR. SPENCER ON THE ETHICS OF KANT.\n\n\nMr. Herbert Spencer published in the _Fortnightly Review_ for July 1888\nand in the _Popular Science Monthly_ for August of the same year an\narticle on \u201cThe Ethics of Kant\u201d in which he so strangely misrepresents\nKant\u2019s position that Kant to any uninitiated reader must appear not only\nas superficial and shallow, but even as palpably nonsensical.\n\nMr. Spencer\u2019s article on \u201cThe Ethics of Kant\u201d is a severe criticism\nmainly of the nonsensical idea, erroneously imputed to Kant, of a will\nthat has no end. At the same time Mr. Spencer reproaches Kant with\nassuming the simplicity of conscience and believing in a non-evolutionary\norigin of the minds of living beings.\n\nIn reply to Mr. Spencer an editorial article appeared in _The Open\nCourt_ under the caption \u201cHerbert Spencer on the Ethics of Kant\u201d (Nos.\n51 and 52), which was supplemented by another article entitled \u201cKant on\nEvolution\u201d (No. 158), the latter being elicited by a renewed attack of\nMr. Spencer upon Kant\u2019s views (which appeared in _Mind_, No. LIX, p. 313).\n\nMr. Spencer has republished his article \u201cThe Ethics of Kant\u201d together\nwith many other older articles in a work of three volumes entitled\n\u201cEssays Scientific, Political, and Speculative,\u201d 1891, in which he\nrepeats the following sentence:\n\n \u201cThus the basis of the argument by which Kant attempts to\n justify his assumption that there exists a good will apart from\n a good end, disappears utterly; and leaves his dogma in all its\n naked unthinkableness.\u201d\n\nTo this sentence he adds the following foot-note as a reply to my\ncriticisms:\n\n \u201cI find that in the above three paragraphs I have done Kant\n less than justice and more than justice\u2014less, in assuming\n that his evolutionary view was limited to the genesis of\n our sidereal system, and more, in assuming that he had not\n contradicted himself. My knowledge of Kant\u2019s writings is\n extremely limited. In 1844 a translation of his \u2018Critique of\n Pure Reason\u2019 (then I think lately published) fell into my\n hands, and I read the first few pages enunciating his doctrine\n of Time and Space: my peremptory rejection of which caused\n me to lay the book down. Twice since then the same thing has\n happened; for, being an impatient reader, when I disagree with\n the cardinal propositions of a work I can go no further. One\n other thing I knew. By indirect references I was made aware\n that Kant had propounded the idea that celestial bodies have\n been formed by the aggregation of diffused matter. Beyond\n this my knowledge of his conceptions did not extend; and my\n supposition that his evolutionary conception had stopped\n short with the genesis of sun, stars, and planets, was due\n to the fact that his doctrine of Time and Space, as forms of\n thought anteceding experience, implied a supernatural origin\n inconsistent with the hypothesis of natural genesis. Dr. Paul\n Carus, who, shortly after the publication of this article\n in the _Fortnightly Review_ for July, 1888, undertook to\n defend the Kantian ethics in the American journal which he\n edits, _The Open Court_, has now (Sept. 4, 1890), in another\n defensive article, translated sundry passages from Kant\u2019s\n \u2018Critique of Judgment,\u2019 his \u2018Presumable Origin of Humanity,\u2019\n and his work \u2018Upon the different Races of Mankind,\u2019 showing\n that Kant was, if not fully, yet partially, an evolutionist in\n his speculations about living beings. There is, perhaps, some\n reason for doubting the correctness of Dr. Carus\u2019s rendering\n of these passages into English. When, as in the first of\n the articles just named, he failed to distinguish between\n consciousness and conscientiousness, and when, as in this\n last article, he blames the English for mistranslating Kant,\n since they have said \u2018Kant maintained that Space and Time are\n intuitions,\u2019 which is quite untrue, for they have everywhere\n described him as maintaining that Space and Time are _forms_\n of intuition, one may be excused for thinking that possibly\n Dr. Carus has read into some of Kant\u2019s expressions, meanings\n which they do not rightly bear. Still, the general drift of\n the passages quoted makes it tolerably clear that Kant must\n have believed in the operation of natural causes as largely,\n though not entirely, instrumental in producing organic forms:\n extending this belief (which he says \u2018can be named a daring\n venture of reason\u2019) in some measure to the origin of Man\n himself. He does not, however extend the theory of natural\n genesis to the exclusion of the theory of supernatural genesis.\n When he speaks of an organic habit \u2018which in the wisdom of\n nature appears to be thus arranged in order that the species\n shall be preserved\u2019; and when, further, he says \u2018we see,\n moreover, that a germ of reason is placed in him, whereby,\n after the development of the same, he is destined for social\n intercourse,\u2019 he implies divine intervention. And this shows\n that I was justified in ascribing to him the belief that Space\n and Time, as forms of thought, are supernatural endowments. Had\n he conceived of organic evolution in a consistent manner, he\n would necessarily have regarded Space and Time as subjective\n forms generated by converse with objective realities.\n\n \u201cBeyond showing that Kant had a partial, if not a complete,\n belief in organic evolution (though with no idea of its\n causes), the passages translated by Dr. Carus show that he\n entertained an implied belief which it here specially concerns\n me to notice as bearing on his theory of \u2018a good will.\u2019 He\n quotes approvingly Dr. Moscati\u2019s lecture showing \u2018that the\n upright walk of man is constrained and unnatural,\u2019 and showing\n the imperfect visceral arrangements and consequent diseases\n which result: not only adopting, but further illustrating,\n Dr. Moscati\u2019s argument. If here, then, there is a distinct\n admission, or rather assertion, that various human organs are\n imperfectly adjusted to their functions, what becomes of the\n postulate above quoted \u2018that no organ for any purpose will be\n found in it but what is also the fittest and best adapted for\n that purpose\u2019? And what becomes of the argument which sets out\n with this postulate? Clearly, I am indebted to Dr. Carus for\n enabling me to prove that Kant\u2019s defence of his theory of \u2018a\n good will\u2019 is, by his own showing, baseless.\u201d\n\nMr. Spencer\u2019s reply to my criticisms is surprising in more than one\nrespect.\n\nFirst, without even mentioning the objections I make he discredits my\narguments by throwing doubt upon the correctness of the translations of\nthe quoted passages.\n\nSecondly, he alleges, with a view of justifying his doubt, that in the\nfirst of my articles I \u201cfailed to distinguish between consciousness and\nconscientiousness.\u201d[69]\n\nThirdly, Mr. Spencer declares that I had \u201cread into some of Kant\u2019s\nexpressions, meanings which they do not rightly bear.\u201d\n\nFourthly, Mr. Spencer bases this opinion upon a double mistake: he blames\nme for not distinguishing between the Kantian phrases that \u201cSpace and\nTime are intuitions\u201d and that they are \u201cforms of intuition.\u201d\n\nFifthly, acknowledging after all that Kant had at least \u201ca partial belief\nin organic evolution,\u201d Mr. Spencer accuses him of inconsistency.\n\nSixthly, several statements concerning Kant\u2019s views are made not because\nKant held them but because Mr. Spencer assumes for trivial reasons that\nhe is \u201cjustified in ascribing them to him.\u201d\n\nSeventhly, these statements so vigorously set forth are accompanied by\nMr. Spencer\u2019s remarkably frank confession of unfamiliarity with the\nsubject under discussion.\n\nIt may be added that Mr. Spencer calls my criticisms \u201cdefensive\narticles.\u201d He says that \u201cI undertook to defend the Kantian ethics\u201d;\nwhile, in fact, my articles are aggressive. Kant needs no defense for\nbeing misunderstood, and it would not be my business to defend him, for\nI am not a Kantian in the sense that I adopt any of the main doctrines\nof Kant. On the contrary I dissent from him on almost all fundamental\nquestions. In ethics I object to Kant\u2019s views in so far as they can be\nconsidered as pure formalism.[70] I am a Kantian only in the sense that\nI respect Kant as one of the most eminent philosophers, that I revere\nhim as that teacher of mine whose influence upon me was greatest, and\nI consider the study of Kant\u2019s works as an indispensable requisite for\nunderstanding the problems of the philosophy of our time. Far from\ndefending Kant\u2019s position, I only undertook to inform Mr. Spencer of what\nKant had really maintained, so that instead of denouncing absurdities\nwhich Kant had never thought of, he might criticise the real Kant.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI shall now take up the details of Mr. Spencer\u2019s reply:\n\n\nI.\n\nI am sorry to see that Mr. Spencer, instead of frankly acknowledging\nhis errors, has taken refuge in discrediting the translations, which\nmight very easily have been examined either by himself or by friends of\nhis; especially as the German original of the most important passages,\nwherever any doubt might arise, and also of those expressions on the\nmisconception of which Mr. Spencer bases his unfavorable opinion of Kant,\nwere added in foot-notes.\n\n\nII.\n\nBut Mr. Spencer adduces, as if it were a fact, an instance of my grave\nmistakes. He says that I failed to distinguish between \u201cconsciousness\u201d\nand \u201cconscientiousness.\u201d Mr. Spencer makes much of a small matter, which,\nif it were as he assumes, would have to be considered as a misprint.\n\nMr. Spencer\u2019s statement is so positive that it must make on any reader\nthe impression of being indubitably true. However, in the whole first\narticle of mine, and indeed in both articles, \u201cconscientiousness\u201d\nis nowhere mentioned and it would be wrong to replace the word\n\u201cconsciousness\u201d in any of the passages in which it occurs by\n\u201cconscientiousness.\u201d\n\nI should be glad if Mr. Spencer would kindly point out to me the\npassage which he had in mind when making his statement, for since there\nis not even so much as an occasion for confounding consciousness and\nconscientiousness, I stand here before a psychological problem. Mr.\nSpencer\u2019s statement is a perfect riddle to me. Either I have a negative\nhallucination, as psychologists call it, so that I do not see what is\nreally there, or Mr. Spencer must have had a positive hallucination. That\nwhich Mr. Spencer has read into my article, was never written and it is\nnot there. The alleged fact to which he refers, does not exist.\n\nThis kind of erroneous reference into which Mr. Spencer has inadvertently\nfallen is a very grievous mistake. It appears more serious than a simple\nslip of the pen, when we consider that Mr. Spencer uses the statement for\nthe purpose of incrimination. He justifies upon this exceedingly slender\nbasis his doubt concerning the correctness of the translations of the\nquoted passages, and Mr. Spencer\u2019s doubt concerning the correctness of\nthese translations is his main argument for rejecting my criticisms _in\ntoto_.\n\nIt is not impossible, indeed it is probable, that Mr. Spencer meant\n\u201cconscience\u201d instead of \u201cconscientiousness.\u201d There is one passage in\nwhich a superficial reader might have expected \u201cconscience\u201d in place of\n\u201cconsciousness.\u201d However that does not occur in any of the translations,\nbut in a paragraph where I speak on my own account. This passage appears\nin the appended reprint on page 23, line 14. Whatever anybody might have\nexpected in that passage, I certainly intended to say \u201cconsciousness,\u201d\nand only a hasty reader, only he who might merely read the first line of\nthe paragraph, would consider the word \u201cconsciousness\u201d a mistake.\n\nTo avoid any equivocation, however, even to hasty readers, and to guard\nagainst a misconstruction such as Mr. Spencer possibly has given to the\nsentence, I propose to alter the passage by adding a few words as follows:\n\n \u201cIt is quite true that _not only conscience, but_ every state\n of consciousness is a feeling,\u201d etc.\n\nThe italicised words are inserted, simply to show that here I mean\n\u201cconsciousness,\u201d and _not_ \u201cconscience.\u201d For the rest, they do not alter\nin the least the sense of the sentence. In this passage as throughout the\nwhole article the terms \u201cconsciousness,\u201d and \u201cconscience\u201d have been used\nproperly.\n\n * * * * *\n\nObserving that Mr. Spencer appears to have committed the same mistake for\nwhich he erroneously blames me, I do not mean to say that he \u201cfailed to\ndistinguish between\u201d conscientiousness and conscience. I should rather\nregard it as trifling on my part if I drew this inference from what is\neither a slip of the pen or an oversight in proof-reading. But it strikes\nme that that knavish rogue among the fairies whom Shakespeare calls Puck\nand scientists define as chance or coincidence played in a fit of anger\nand perhaps from a sentiment of pardonable irony a humorous trick upon\nMr. Spencer. The moral of it is that when an author censures his fellow\nauthors with undue severity for things that might be mere misprints, he\nshould keep a close eye on his own printer\u2019s devil.\n\n\nIII.\n\nMr. Spencer discredits my knowledge of Kant. He says of me:\n\n \u201cOne may be excused for thinking that possibly Dr. Carus has\n read into some of Kant\u2019s expressions, meanings which they do\n not rightly bear.\u201d\n\nI did not give Mr. Spencer any occasion for making this personal\nreflection. I do not boast of any extraordinary familiarity with Kant\u2019s\nwritings. There are innumerable German and also English and American\nscholars and philosophers who know Kant almost by heart. But the question\nat issue is not what I conceive Kant\u2019s ideas to be, but what Kant has\nreally said, and I was very careful in letting Kant speak for himself.\n\nMy criticism of Mr. Spencer\u2019s conception of Kant consisted almost\nexclusively in collating and contrasting Mr. Spencer\u2019s views of Kant with\nquotations from Kant\u2019s works. How can I read anything into some of Kant\u2019s\nexpressions, if I present translations of the expressions themselves,\nadding thereto in foot-notes the original whenever doubts could arise?\nAnd the general drift of the quotations alone suffices to overthrow Mr.\nSpencer\u2019s conception of Kant.\n\nThe truth is that Mr. Spencer committed the mistake himself, for which\nhe censures me unjustly. \u201cMr. Spencer has read into some of Kant\u2019s\nexpressions meanings which they do not rightly bear.\u201d\n\n\nIV.\n\nBut Mr. Spencer adduces a fact, which, if it were as Mr. Spencer\nrepresents it, would show an inability on my part of making important\ndistinctions. He says of me:\n\n \u201cHe blames the English for mistranslating Kant, since they have\n said \u2018Kant maintained that Space and Time are intuitions,\u2019\n which is quite untrue, for they have everywhere described him\n as maintaining that Space and Time are _forms_ of intuition.\u201d\n\nThis is a double mistake: (1) Kant and his translators did not make\nthe distinction of which Mr. Spencer speaks, and (2) the quotation Mr.\nSpencer makes from my article is represented to mean something different\nfrom what it actually means in the context.\n\nBefore I speak for myself as to what I actually said, let us state the\nfacts concerning Kant\u2019s usage of the terms \u201cintuitions\u201d and \u201cforms of\nintuition.\u201d\n\nKant defines in \u00a7 1 of his \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d what he understands\nby \u201cTranscendental \u00c6sthetic.\u201d He distinguishes between \u201cempirical\nintuition\u201d (_empirische Anschauung_) and \u201cpure intuition\u201d (_reine\nAnschauung_). He says:\n\n \u201cThat sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of\n sensation, is called an empirical intuition.\u201d\n\nRepresentations contain besides that which belongs to sensation some\nother elements. Kant says:\n\n \u201cThat which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be\n arranged under certain relations, I call its _form_.\u201d\n\nAnd later on he continues:\n\n \u201cThis pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition.\u201d\n\nThese are Kant\u2019s phrases in J. M. D. Meiklejohn\u2019s well known translation.\nThe term \u201cpure intuition\u201d is repeated again and again, and we find\nfrequently added by way of explanation the phrases \u201cas a mere form\nof sensibility,\u201d \u201cthe mere form of phenomena,\u201d \u201cforms of sensuous\nintuition,\u201d and also (as Mr. Spencer emphasises as the only correct way)\n\u201cforms of intuition.\u201d\n\nKant says:\n\n 1) \u201c_Diese reine Form der Sinnlichkeit wird auch selber reine\n Anschauung heissen._ \u00a7 1.\n\n 2) \u201c_Zweitens worden wir von dieser (der empirischen\n Anschauung) noch alles abtrennen, damit nichts als reine\n Anschauung und die blosse Form der Erscheinungen \u00fcbrig bleibe._\n \u00a7 1.\n\n 3) \u201c_Raum ... muss urspr\u00fcnglich Anschauung sein._ \u00a7 3.\n\n 4) \u201c_Der Raum ist nichts anderes als nur die Form aller\n Erscheinungen \u00e4usserer Sinne._ \u00a7 3.\n\n 5) \u201c_Der Raum aber betrifft nur die reine Form der Anschauung._\n (This passage appears in the first edition only, the paragraph\n containing it is omitted in the second edition.) \u00a7 3.\n\n 6) \u201c_Die Zeit ist ... eine reine Form der sinnlichen\n Anschauung...._ \u00a7 4.\n\n 7) \u201c_Es muss ihr[71] unmittelbare Anschauung zum Grunde\n liegen._ \u00a7 4.\n\n 8) \u201c_Die Zeit ist nichts anderes als die Form des inneren\n Sinnes._ \u00a7 6.\n\n 9) \u201c_... dass die Vorstellung der Zeit selbst Anschauung sei._\n \u00a7 6.\n\n 10) \u201c_Wir haben nun ... reine Anschauung a priori, Raum und\n Zeit._ \u00a7 10. _Beschluss der transcendentalen \u00c6sthetik._\u201d\n\nThese quotations do not pretend to be exhaustive, nor is that necessary\nfor the present purpose.\n\nKant, as we learn from these quotations, makes no distinction between\n_reine Anschauung_ and _Form der Anschauung_. He uses most frequently the\nterm _reine Anschauung_ and designates in several places Space and Time\nsimply as _Anschauung_. (See the quotations 3, 7, and 9.) So far as I can\ngather from a renewed perusal, the expression proposed by Mr. Spencer,\n\u201cform of intuition,\u201d _Form der Anschauung_, occurs only once and that too\nin a passage omitted in the second edition.\n\nIt is almost redundant to add that the English translators and\ninterpreters of Kant follow the original pretty closely. Accordingly it\nis actually incorrect \u201cthat they have everywhere(!) described Kant as\nmaintaining that Space and Time are _forms_ of intuition.\u201d In addition\nto the quotations from Meiklejohn, I call Mr. Spencer\u2019s attention to\nWilliam Flemming\u2019s \u201cVocabulary of Philosophy\u201d (4th ed., edited by Henry\nCalderwood) which reads _sub voce_ \u201cIntuition,\u201d p. 228 with reference to\nKant\u2019s view:\n\n \u201cSpace and time are _intuitions_ of sense.\u201d\n\nTo say \u201cTime and Space are forms of intuition\u201d is quite correct according\nto Kantian terminology. No objection can be made to Mr. Spencer on that\nground. But to say \u201cTime and Space are intuitions\u201d is also quite correct,\nand Mr. Spencer is wrong in censuring the expression.\n\nWhy does Mr. Spencer rebuke me so severely on a point which is of no\nconsequence? He appears confident that I have betrayed an unpardonable\nmisconception of Kant\u2019s philosophy. But having pointed out by quotations\nfrom Kant that this is not so, I shall now proceed to explain why the\nquotation which Mr. Spencer makes from my article, although the eight\nwords in quotation marks are literally quoted, is a misquotation. It\nis torn out of its context. I did not blame the English translators\nof Kant at all, but I blamed his interpreters, among whom the English\ninterpreters (not all English interpreters, but certainly some of them)\nare the worst, for \u201cmutilating Kant\u2019s best thoughts, so that this hero of\nprogress appears as a stronghold of antiquated views\u201d; and as an instance\nI called attention to the misconception of Kant\u2019s term _Anschauung_,\nsaying:\n\n \u201cHow different is Kant\u2019s philosophy, for instance, if his\n position with reference to time and space is mistaken! \u2018Time\n and Space are our _Anschauung_,\u2019 Kant says. But his English\n translators declare \u2018Kant maintained that space and time\n are intuitions.\u2019 What a difference it makes if intuition\n is interpreted in the sense applied to it by the English\n intuitionalist school instead of its being taken in the\n original meaning of the word _Anschauung_.\u201d\n\nThe word \u201cintuition\u201d implies something mysterious; the word _Anschauung_\ndenotes that which is immediately perceived, simply, as it were, by\nlooking at it. So especially the sense-perceptions of the things before\nus are _Anschauungen_.\n\nMr. Spencer, believing that he had caught me in making unawares a\nblunder, tears the passage out of its context, ignores its purport,\nmakes a point of an antithesis which had nothing in the world to do\nwith the topic under discussion, only to throw on me the opprobrium\nof incompetence. Even if Mr. Spencer\u2019s antithesis of \u201cintuition\u201d and\n\u201cforms of intuition\u201d were of any consequence (as, unfortunately for Mr.\nSpencer, it is not), it would count for nothing against me because I did\nnot speak of \u201cforms\u201d in the passage referred to, I simply alluded to one\nmisinterpretation of the term _Anschauung_, which is quite common among\nEnglish Kantians. It was not required by the purpose I had in view, to\nenter into any details as to what kind of _Anschauung_ I meant, and an\nallusion to \u201cform\u201d or to any other subject would have served only to\nconfound the idea which I intended to set forth in the paragraph from\nwhich Mr. Spencer quotes.\n\nMisquotation of this kind, into which Mr. Spencer was inveigled by a\nhasty reading, should be avoided with utmost care, for it involves an\ninsinuation. It leads away from the main point under discussion to side\nissues, and it misrepresents the author from whom the quotation is made.\nIt insinuates a meaning which the passage does not bear and which was not\neven thought of in the context out of which it is torn.\n\nMr. Spencer quotes the passage as if I had preferred the term \u201cintuition\u201d\nto the term \u201cform of intuition,\u201d or at least, as if I had no idea that\nKant conceives Time and Space as \u201cforms.\u201d Yet Mr. Spencer in trying to\nmake out a point against me betrays his own lack of information. Kant\ninsisted most emphatically on calling the forms of our sensibility (i. e.\nspace and time) \u201c_Anschauungen_.\u201d\n\nBut Mr. Spencer\u2019s case is worse still. While he insists upon the\nstatement that according to the translators of Kant space and time are\n\u201cforms of intuition,\u201d which is at least correct, he uses twice in the\nvery same paragraph the expression that according to Kant \u201cspace and\ntime are forms of thought,\u201d which is incorrect. The forms of thought\naccording to Kantian terminology are not space and time but the domain of\nthe transcendental logic. Anyone who confounds the two terms \u201cforms of\nintuition\u201d and \u201cforms of thought\u201d proves himself unable to form a correct\nopinion on Kant\u2019s philosophy. That is just characteristic of Kant that\nhe regards time and space not as thought, nor as forms of thought, but\nas _Anschauungen_ and in contradistinction to sense-intuitions (i. e.\nsensations) he calls them _reine Anschauungen_ or _Formen der Anschauung_.\n\n\nV.\n\nMr. Spencer commenting upon his criticism of Kant\u2019s idea of a Good Will,\nsays:\n\n \u201cI find that in the above three paragraphs I have done Kant\n less than justice and more than justice\u2014less, in assuming\n that his evolutionary view was limited to the genesis of\n our sidereal system, and more, in assuming that he had not\n contradicted himself.\n\n \u201cClearly, I am indebted to Dr. Carus for enabling me to prove\n that Kant\u2019s defence of his theory of \u2018a good will\u2019 is, by his\n own showing, baseless.\u201d\n\nKant\u2019s idea of a good will has nothing to do with evolution, and we can\nabstain here from discussing whether or not Kant was an evolutionist.\nWhether evolution is true or not, what difference does it make to the\nproposition, that a good will is the only thing which can be called good\nwithout further qualification (_ohne Einschr\u00e4nkung_)? Pleasure is good,\nbut it is not absolutely good, there are cases in which pleasure is a\nvery bad thing. We must qualify our statement and limit it to special\ncases. A good will, however, says Kant, is in itself good under all\ncircumstances.\n\nDid Mr. Spencer prove the baselessness of Kant\u2019s proposition by proving\nevolution? Is it inconsistent to believe in evolution and at the same\ntime to regard a good will as absolutely good, as good without reserve or\nlimitation? I think not!\n\n\nVI.\n\nMr. Spencer in admitting that \u201cthe general drift of the passages quoted\nmakes it tolerably clear that Kant must have believed in the operation of\nnatural causes ... in producing organic forms,\u201d adds:\n\n \u201cHe does not, however, extend the theory of natural genesis to\n the exclusion of the theory of supernatural genesis.\u201d\n\nHow does Mr. Spencer prove his statement? Does he quote a passage from\nKant which expresses his belief in supernaturalism? No, Mr. Spencer does\nnot quote Kant, and it would be difficult to find a passage to suit that\npurpose. Mr. Spencer adduces a few unmeaning phrases gleaned at random\nand torn out of their context, and from these phrases he concludes\nthat Kant believed in the supernatural. Kant spoke somewhere of \u201cthe\nwisdom of nature\u201d who has things so arranged that the species might be\npreserved. If the wisdom of nature in preserving the species is to be\ntaken literally, the phrase might prove that Kant believed nature to be a\nwise old woman. Kant spoke further of \u201cthe germ of reason placed in man\nwhereby he is destined to social intercourse.\u201d Does the usage of the word\n\u201cdestined\u201d really \u201cimply divine intervention,\u201d as Mr. Spencer says? Mr.\nSpencer adds:\n\n \u201cAnd this [viz. Kant\u2019s usage of these phrases] shows that I was\n justified in ascribing to him the belief that Space and Time,\n as forms of thought [sic!], are supernatural endowments.\u201d\n\nWhat might we not prove by this kind of loose argumentation!\n\nKant did not introduce any supernatural explanations; on the contrary, he\nproposed to exclude \u201csupernatural genesis.\u201d He says e. g. in a passage of\nthe \u201cCritique of Judgment\u201d quoted on page 41 of the appendix:\n\n \u201cIf we assume occasionalism for the production of organised\n beings, nature is thereby wholly discarded ... therefore it\n cannot be supposed that this system is accepted by anyone who\n has had to do with philosophy.\u201d\n\nAnd furthermore Kant rejects the partial admission of the supernatural,\nsaying:\n\n \u201cAs though it were not the same to make the required forms\n arise in a supernatural manner at the beginning of the world as\n during its progress.\u201d\n\nMr. Spencer charges Kant with inconsistency. We do not intend to say that\nKant was in all the phases of his development consistent with himself.\nBut we do say that the charge of Mr. Spencer against Kant consists in\nthis: the real Kant has said things which are incompatible with Mr.\nSpencer\u2019s view of Kant.\n\nThis settles the sixth point.\n\n\nVII.\n\nMr. Spencer\u2019s reply to my criticism is a very strange piece of\ncontroversy and I have actually been at a loss, how to account for it.\n\nThe situation can be explained only by assuming that Mr. Spencer,\nbeing an impatient reader, when finding out that he disagreed with my\npropositions, could go no further and wrote his reply to me without\nhaving read my articles. This is very hard on a critic who, carefully\navoiding everything that might look like fault-finding, is painstakingly\ncareful in giving to the author criticised every means of investigating\nthe truth himself and helps him in a friendly way to correct his errors.\n\nThere is only one consolation for me, which is, that I am in good\ncompany. The great thinker of Koenigsberg is very severely censured in\nalmost all of Mr. Spencer\u2019s writings for ideas which he never held. And\nnow Mr. Spencer confesses openly and with ingenuous sincerity, that his\nknowledge of Kant\u2019s writings is extremely limited. But why he condemns a\nman of whom he knows so little Mr. Spencer does not tell us.\n\nMr. Spencer says:\n\n \u201cMy knowledge of Kant\u2019s writings is extremely limited. In 1844\n a translation of his \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d (then I think\n lately published) fell into my hands, and I read the first few\n pages enunciating his doctrine of Time and Space: my peremptory\n rejection of which caused me to lay the book down.\n\n \u201cTwice since then the same thing has happened; for, being\n an impatient reader, when I disagree with the cardinal\n propositions of a work I can go no further.\n\n \u201cOne other thing I knew. By indirect references I was made\n aware that Kant had propounded the idea that celestial bodies\n have been formed by the aggregation of diffused matter. Beyond\n this my knowledge of his conceptions did not extend; and my\n supposition that his evolutionary conception had stopped short\n with the genesis of sun, stars, and planets was due to the\n fact that his doctrine of Time and Space, as forms of thought\n [sic] anteceding experience, implied a supernatural origin\n inconsistent with the hypothesis of natural genesis.\u201d\n\nKant has been a leader in thought for the last century. It is very\nimportant to criticise his ideas wherever they are wrong, but his errors\ncannot be conquered by _ex cathedra_ denunciations.\n\nDarwin\u2019s habits in investigating and weighing the pro and con of a\nquestion were very different from Mr. Spencer\u2019s, and Darwin\u2019s success is\nin no small degree due to the sternness with which he adhered to certain\nrules of reading and studying. We find in his \u201cAutobiography\u201d certain\nreminiscences labeled \u201cimportant\u201d from which the following is most\ninstructive:\n\n \u201cI had also, during many years, followed a golden rule, namely,\n that whenever a published fact, a new observation or a thought,\n came across me, which was opposed to my general results, to\n make a memorandum of it without fail, for I had found by\n experience that such facts and thoughts were far more apt to\n escape from the memory than favorable ones.\u201d\n\nExperience teaches that we can learn most from those authors with whom we\ndo not agree. The ethics of reading and studying demand other habits than\nlaying a book down when we disagree with its cardinal propositions. Such\nhabits prevent progress and create prejudices.\n\n * * * * *\n\nMr. Spencer has not answered my criticism at all. Mr. Spencer did\nnot even take into consideration the passages quoted from Kant. He\nrepublished all the false statements of Kant\u2019s views, so inconsiderately\nmade, together with all the perverse opinions based upon them. The\nassurance with which Mr. Spencer makes statements which have no\nfoundation whatever is really perplexing even to a man who is well\ninformed on the subject, and it will go far to convince the unwary\nreader. What, however, shall become of the general tenor of philosophical\ncriticism and controversy if a man of Mr. Spencer\u2019s reputation is\nso indifferent about being informed concerning the exact views of\nhis adversary, if he is so careless in presenting them, if he makes\npositively erroneous statements on confessedly mere \u201csupposition,\u201d and\nfinally, if in consequence thereof he is flagrantly unjust in censuring\nerrors which arise only from his own too prolific imagination?\n\nWe feel confident that Mr. Spencer will explain his side of the question\nsatisfactorily. His mistakes being undeniable, we do not believe that he\nwill seek to deny them. Yet we trust that Mr. Spencer as soon as he finds\nhimself at fault, will not even make an attempt at palliation, that he\nwill not blink the frank acknowledgment of his misstatements and also of\nhaving treated Kant with injustice. A man who has devoted his life to the\nsearch for truth will not suffer any blot to remain on his escutcheon.\n\n EDITOR.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[69] This article \u201cHerbert Spencer on the Ethics of Kant\u201d was\nelectrotyped at the time it appeared in _The Open Court_. It is appended\nto this number of _The Monist_ as documentary evidence of the fact, that\nthere is not even so much as an occasion in the article for confounding\n\u201cconsciousness\u201d and \u201cconscientiousness.\u201d\n\n[70] See _Fundamental Problems_, pp. 197-206; and _The Ethical Problem_,\np. 32, seq., especially p. 33, lines 18-20.\n\n[71] Second edition reads \u201c_ihnen_\u201d in place of \u201c_ihr_,\u201d viz. _der Zeit_.\nThe word \u201c_ihnen_\u201d refers to _Theilvorstellungen der Zeit_.\n\n\n\n\nWHAT DOES ANSCHAUUNG MEAN?\n\n\nMr. Spencer\u2019s erroneous statement that Kant conceives space and time as\nforms of thought instead of forms of intuition induces me to make a few\nexplanatory remarks concerning the term _Anschauung_.\n\nKant means that space and time are immediately given in experience and\nnot inferences drawn from the data of experience; they are not thoughts,\nbut objects of direct perception.\n\nSense-impressions are data, they are prior to ideas, the latter being\nconstructions made out of sense-impressions. Sense-impressions are\nfacts, but ideas are of an inferential nature; they are (to use Lloyd\nMorgan\u2019s excellent term) constructs. Now Kant claims that space and\ntime are in the same predicament: they also are immediately given, they\nalso are _Anschauungen_. Kant did not trouble himself much to prove\nthat they are forms; he seems to have taken that for granted. But he\nwas very careful to show that they are not ideas, not thoughts, not\nabstractions, not generalisations, but that they are as direct data\nas are sense-impressions and he calls the knowledge which man has by\ndirectly facing the object of knowledge \u201c_Anschauung_.\u201d\n\nThe conclusion which Kant draws from this may be characterised as follows:\n\nSensations are not things but appearances; they are subjective, not\nobjective, they are not the objects themselves but what our sensibility\nmakes of objects. Space and time being _Anschauungen_, Kant argues that\nthey are of the same kind as the sense-data of knowledge, that they\nare inherent in our nature. Thus Kant maintains: \u201cSensations are the\nproducts of our sensibility, and space and time are the forms of our\nsensibility.\u201d\n\nThe word _Anschauung_ has been a _crux interpretum_ since translations\nhave been made from Kant, and it is quite true that no adequate word to\nexpress it, exists in English. I enjoyed of late a discussion on the\nsubject with Mr. Francis C. Russell who called my attention to several\nnotes in _The Journal of Speculative Philosophy_. The following is from\nthe pen of Dr. W. T. Harris (Vol. II, p. 191):\n\n \u201cThrough a singular chance, the present number of the journal\n contains two notes from two contributors on the proper\n translation of the German word _Anschauung_. Mr. Kroeger holds\n that the word _Anschauung_, as used by Fichte and also by Kant,\n denotes an act of the Ego which the English word _Intuition_\n does not at all express, but for which the English word\n \u2018contemplation\u2019 is an exact equivalent. Mr. Peirce suggests\n that no person whose native tongue is English will translate\n _Anschauung_ by another word than _Intuition_. Whether there\n is a failure to understand English on the one hand or German\n on the other, the Editor does not care to inquire. It is\n certain that while intuition has been adopted generally as an\n equivalent for the word under consideration both by English\n and French translators, yet it was a wide departure from the\n ordinary English use of the term. Besides this, we have no\n English verb _intuite_ (at least in the Dictionaries), and\n the reader will find that the verb used by Meiklejohn (in the\n translation of Kant\u2019s _Kritik_) for it, is _contemplate_,\n and the same rendering is given by Smith in his excellent\n translation of Fichte\u2019s Popular Works (London, 1849).\u201d\n\nMr. Charles S. Peirce says:\n\n \u201cNo person whose native tongue is English will need to be\n informed that contemplation is essentially (1) protracted (2)\n voluntary, and (3) an action, and that it is never used for\n that which is set forth to the mind in this act. A foreigner\n can convince himself of this by the proper study of English\n writers. Thus, Locke (Essay concerning Human Understanding,\n Book II., chap. 19, \u00a7 1) says, \u2018If it [an idea] be held\n there [in view] long under attentive consideration, \u2019tis\n _contemplation_\u201d; and again, (_Ibid._, Book II., chap. 10, \u00a7 1)\n \u2018Keeping the _Idea_, which is brought into it [the mind] for\n some time actually in view, which is called _Contemplation_.\u2019\n This term is therefore unfitted to translate _Anschauung_;\n for this latter does not imply an act which is necessarily\n protracted or voluntary, and denotes most usually a mental\n presentation, sometimes a faculty, less often the reception of\n an impression in the mind, and seldom, if ever, an action.\n\n \u201cTo the translation of _Anschauung_ by intuition, there is,\n at least, no such insufferable objection. Etymologically the\n two words precisely correspond. The original philosophical\n meaning of intuition was a cognition of the present manifold\n in that character; and it is now commonly used, as a modern\n writer says, \u2018to include all the products of the perceptive\n (external or internal) and imaginative faculties; every act of\n consciousness, in short, of which the immediate object is an\n _individual_, thing, act, or state of mind, presented under the\n condition of distinct existence in space and time.\u2019 Finally, we\n have the authority of Kant\u2019s own example for translating his\n _Anschauung_ by _Intuitus_; and, indeed, this is the common\n usage of Germans writing Latin. Moreover, _intuitiv_ frequently\n replaces _anschauend_ or _anschaulich_. If this constitutes a\n misunderstanding of Kant, it is one which is shared by himself\n and nearly all his countrymen\u201d (_ibid._ p. 152 et seqq.).\n\nMr. Peirce adds the following explanation concerning the term intuition\nin another note (_ibid._ p. 103):\n\n \u201cThe word _intuitus_ first occurs as a technical term in St.\n Anselm\u2019s Monologium. He wished to distinguish between our\n knowledge of God and our knowledge of finite things (and, in\n the next world, of God, also); and thinking of the saying of\n St. Paul, _Videmus nunc per speculum in \u0153nigmate: tunc autem\n facie ad faciem_, he called the former _speculation_ and the\n latter _intuition_. This use of \u2018speculation\u2019 did not take\n root, because that word already had another exact and widely\n different meaning.\n\n \u201cIn the middle ages, the term \u2018intuitive cognition\u2019 had two\n principal senses, 1st, as opposed to abstractive cognition,\n it meant the knowledge of the present as present, and this is\n its meaning in Anselm; but 2d, as no intuitive cognition was\n allowed to be determined by a previous cognition, it came to\n be used as the opposite of discursive cognition (see Scotus,\n In sentent. lib. 2, dist. 3, qu. 9), and this is nearly the\n sense in which I employ it. This is also nearly the sense in\n which Kant uses it, the former distinction being expressed\n by his _sensuous_ and _non-sensuous_. (See Werke, herausg.\n Rosenkrantz, Thl. 2, S. 713, 31, 41, 100, u. s. w.)\n\n \u201cAn enumeration of six meanings of intuition may be found in\n Hamilton\u2019s Reid p. 759.\u201d\n\nIf we have to choose between the two translations \u201cintuition\u201d and\n\u201ccontemplation,\u201d we should with Mr. Peirce decidedly prefer the\nword \u201cintuition.\u201d The word contemplation corresponds to the German\n_Betrachtung_ and all that Mr. Peirce says against it holds good. But\nwe must confess that the term intuition (as Mr. Peirce himself seems to\ngrant) is not a very good translation either. The term intuition has\nother meanings which interfere with the correct meaning of _Anschauung_\nand was actually productive of much confusion.\n\nThe English term intuition is strongly tinged with the same meaning that\nis attached to the German word _Intuition_. It means an inexplicable\nkind of direct information from some supernatural sources, which mystics\nclaim to possess as the means of their revelations. In this sense\nGoethe characterises it satirically in Faust (Scene XIV). Mephistopheles\ndescribes the process as follows:\n\n A blessing drawn from supernatural fountain!\n In night and dew to lie upon the mountains;\n All Heaven and Earth in rapture penetrating;\n Thyself to Godhood haughtily inflating;\n To grub with yearning force through Earth\u2019s dark marrow,\n Compress the six days\u2019 work within thy bosom narrow,\u2014\n To taste, I know not what, in haughty power,\n Thine own ecstatic life on all things shower,\n Thine earthly self behind thee cast,\n And then the lofty intuition [with a gesture] at last.\n\nThe satire is good on _Intuition_ but it would not apply to _Anschauung_,\nfor the latter word excludes rigidly any mysticism or supernaturalism\nwhich the former essentially involves. To employ the term \u201cintuition\u201d for\nboth ideas must necessarily weaken the meaning of _Anschauung_.\n\nBesides we should bear in mind that the German _Anschauung_ is\nvernacular and should find a correspondent Saxon word. Such Latin words\nas intuition convey in English as much as in German the impression of\nbeing terms denoting something very abstract. Vernacular terms much more\nstrongly indicate the immediateness and directness which is implied in\n_Anschauung_. In my conversation with Mr. Russell, we tried to coin a\nnew word that should cover the meaning of _Anschauung_ as an act of\n\u201catlooking\u201d and the word \u201catsight\u201d readily suggested itself.\n\nThe word \u201catsight\u201d is an exact English equivalent of the German\n_Anschauung_. It describes the looking at an object in its immediate\npresence. At the same time the word is readily understood, while\nphilologically considered, its formation is fully justified by the\nexistence of the words \u201cinsight and foresight.\u201d\n\n * * * * *\n\nOne of the most important of Kant\u2019s doctrines is the proposition that\nall thought must ultimately have reference to _Anschauung_, i. e. to\natsight. Through atsight only the objects of experience can be given us.\nAll speculations not founded upon this bottom rock of knowledge are mere\ndreams. This is the maxim of positivism and it is the basis of all sound\nphilosophy. Says Kant in the \u201cAnhang\u201d to his Prolegomena (in reply to a\ncritic who had misunderstood his idealism) as a summary statement of his\nviews:\n\n \u201c_Der Satz aller echten Idealisten, von der eleatischen Schule\n an bis zum Bischof Berkley, ist in dieser Formel enthalten:\n \u2018alle Erkenntnis durch Sinne und Erfahrung ist nichts als\n lauter Schein, und nur in den Ideen des reinen Verstandes und\n Vernunft ist Wahrheit.\u2019_\n\n \u201c_Der Grundsatz, der meinen Idealismus durchg\u00e4ngig regiert\n und bestimmt, ist dagegen: \u2018Alles Erkenntnis von Dingen, aus\n blossem reinen Verstande oder reiner Vernunft, ist nichts als\n lauter Schein, und nur in der Erfahrung ist Wahrheit.\u2019_\u201d\n\n \u201cThe doctrine of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic School\n down to Bishop Berkeley is contained in this formula: All\n cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but\n illusion; and in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason\n alone is truth.\n\n \u201cThe principle, however, that rules and determines my idealism\n throughout is this: All cognition out of pure understanding\n or pure reason is nothing but mere illusion and in experience\n alone is truth.\u201d\n\nKant then proposes in order to avoid equivocation to call his views\n\u201cformal or critical idealism,\u201d adding that his idealism made any other\nidealism impossible. Criticism truly is the beginning of philosophy as\nan objective science. It gives the _coup de grace_ to those worthless\ndeclamations which still pass among many as philosophy. Says Kant:\n\n \u201c_So viel ist gewiss: wer einmal Kritik gekostet hat, den ekelt\n auf immer alles dogmatische Gew\u00e4sche._\u201d\n\n \u201cThat much is certain: He who has once tasted critique will be\n forever disgusted with all dogmatic twaddle.\u201d\n\nIt is strange that in spite of Kant\u2019s explicit declaration, which leaves\nno doubt about the positive spirit that pervades the principles of his\nphilosophy, he is still misunderstood by his opponents no less than by\nthose who profess to be his disciples.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThere is no occasion now to treat the subject exhaustively, but it may be\npermitted to add a few remarks on Kant\u2019s proposition that space and time\nare atsights.\n\nWe must distinguish three things:\n\n1) Objective space.\n\n2) Space as atsight, and\n\n3) Space-conception.\n\nSpace as atsight is the datum. It is the immediate presence of relations\namong the sensory impressions. This, however, is not as yet that\nsomething which we generally call space. That which generally goes by the\nname of space is a construction built out of the relational data that\nobtain in experience and we propose to call it space-conception. Our\nspace-conception, accordingly, (and here I include the mathematician\u2019s\nspace-conception) is based upon space as atsight, but it is more\nthan atsight. It is an inference made therefrom, it is the product\nof experience. Space-conception, however, is as are all legitimate\nnoumena, no mere subjective illusion, it possesses objective validity;\nit describes some real existence and this real existence represented in\nspace-conception is what may be called objective space.\n\nObjective space is the form of reality. Space as atsight is the form of\nsensibility. Space as space-conception is a construct of an abstract\nnature and serves as a description or plan of the form of reality.\n\nThe same is true of Time. Time as atsight is the relation of succession\nobtaining in the changes of experience. Time as time-conception is the\nnoumenon constructed out of these data to represent that feature of\nreality which may for lack of a better term be called objective time.\n\nBriefly: Space and Time are not things, not essences, not entities,\nbut certain features of existence. They are the forms of reality. When\nexistence finds a representation in the feelings of a sentient being,\ntime and space appear as their forms, and these forms furnish the\nmaterial out of which are built the conceptions of Space and Time.\n\n EDITOR.\n\n\n\n\nTHE LAW OF MIND.\n\n\nIn an article published in _The Monist_ for January 1891, I endeavored\nto show what ideas ought to form the warp of a system of philosophy, and\nparticularly emphasised that of absolute chance. In the number of April\n1892, I argued further in favor of that way of thinking, which it will be\nconvenient to christen _tychism_ (from \u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7, chance). A serious student\nof philosophy will be in no haste to accept or reject this doctrine; but\nhe will see in it one of the chief attitudes which speculative thought\nmay take, feeling that it is not for an individual, nor for an age, to\npronounce upon a fundamental question of philosophy. That is a task for\na whole era to work out. I have begun by showing that _tychism_ must\ngive birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities\nof nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a\nSchelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialised\nand partially deadened mind. I may mention, for the benefit of those who\nare curious in studying mental biographies, that I was born and reared\nin the neighborhood of Concord,\u2014I mean in Cambridge,\u2014at the time when\nEmerson, Hedge, and their friends were disseminating the ideas that they\nhad caught from Schelling, and Schelling from Plotinus, from Boehm, or\nfrom God knows what minds stricken with the monstrous mysticism of the\nEast. But the atmosphere of Cambridge held many an antiseptic against\nConcord transcendentalism; and I am not conscious of having contracted\nany of that virus. Nevertheless, it is probable that some cultured\nbacilli, some benignant form of the disease was implanted in my soul,\nunawares, and that now, after long incubation, it comes to the surface,\nmodified by mathematical conceptions and by training in physical\ninvestigations.\n\nThe next step in the study of cosmology must be to examine the general\nlaw of mental action. In doing this, I shall for the time drop my tychism\nout of view, in order to allow a free and independent expansion to\nanother conception signalised in my first _Monist_-paper as one of the\nmost indispensable to philosophy, though it was not there dwelt upon;\nI mean the idea of continuity. The tendency to regard continuity, in\nthe sense in which I shall define it, as an idea of prime importance in\nphilosophy may conveniently be termed _synechism_. The present paper\nis intended chiefly to show what synechism is, and what it leads to.\nI attempted, a good many years ago, to develop this doctrine in the\n_Journal of Speculative Philosophy_ (Vol. III.); but I am able now\nto improve upon that exposition, in which I was a little blinded by\nnominalistic prepossessions. I refer to it, because students may possibly\nfind that some points not sufficiently explained in the present paper are\ncleared up in those earlier ones.\n\n\nWHAT THE LAW IS.\n\nLogical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but\none law of mind, namely, that ideas tend to spread continuously and to\naffect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of\naffectibility. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the\npower of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with\nother ideas.\n\nI set down this formula at the beginning, for convenience; and now\nproceed to comment upon it.\n\n\nINDIVIDUALITY OF IDEAS.\n\nWe are accustomed to speak of ideas as reproduced, as passed from mind to\nmind, as similar or dissimilar to one another, and, in short, as if they\nwere substantial things; nor can any reasonable objection be raised to\nsuch expressions. But taking the word \u201cidea\u201d in the sense of an event in\nan individual consciousness, it is clear that an idea once past is gone\nforever, and any supposed recurrence of it is another idea. These two\nideas are not present in the same state of consciousness, and therefore\ncannot possibly be compared. To say, therefore, that they are similar\ncan only mean that an occult power from the depths of the soul forces\nus to connect them in our thoughts after they are both no more. We may\nnote, here, in passing that of the two generally recognised principles of\nassociation, contiguity and similarity, the former is a connection due to\na power without, the latter a connection due to a power within.\n\nBut what can it mean to say that ideas wholly past are thought of at\nall, any longer? They are utterly unknowable. What distinct meaning can\nattach to saying that an idea in the past in any way affects an idea in\nthe future, from which it is completely detached? A phrase between the\nassertion and the denial of which there can in no case be any sensible\ndifference is mere gibberish.\n\nI will not dwell further upon this point, because it is a commonplace of\nphilosophy.\n\n\nCONTINUITY OF IDEAS.\n\nWe have here before us a question of difficulty, analogous to the\nquestion of nominalism and realism. But when once it has been clearly\nformulated, logic leaves room for one answer only. How can a past idea be\npresent? Can it be present vicariously? To a certain extent, perhaps; but\nnot merely so; for then the question would arise how the past idea can\nbe related to its vicarious representation. The relation, being between\nideas, can only exist in some consciousness: now that past idea was in no\nconsciousness but that past consciousness that alone contained it; and\nthat did not embrace the vicarious idea.\n\nSome minds will here jump to the conclusion that a past idea cannot in\nany sense be present. But that is hasty and illogical. How extravagant,\ntoo, to pronounce our whole knowledge of the past to be mere delusion!\nYet it would seem that the past is as completely beyond the bonds of\npossible experience as a Kantian thing-in-itself.\n\nHow can a past idea be present? Not vicariously. Then, only by direct\nperception. In other words, to be present, it must be _ipso facto_\npresent. That is, it cannot be wholly past; it can only be going,\ninfinitesimally past, less past than any assignable past date. We are\nthus brought to the conclusion that the present is connected with the\npast by a series of real infinitesimal steps.\n\nIt has already been suggested by psychologists that consciousness\nnecessarily embraces an interval of time. But if a finite time be meant,\nthe opinion is not tenable. If the sensation that precedes the present\nby half a second were still immediately before me, then, on the same\nprinciple the sensation preceding that would be immediately present, and\nso on _ad infinitum_. Now, since there is a time, say a year, at the end\nof which an idea is no longer _ipso facto_ present, it follows that this\nis true of any finite interval, however short.\n\nBut yet consciousness must essentially cover an interval of time; for\nif it did not, we could gain no knowledge of time, and not merely no\nveracious cognition of it, but no conception whatever. We are, therefore,\nforced to say that we are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal\ninterval of time.\n\nThis is all that is requisite. For, in this infinitesimal interval,\nnot only is consciousness continuous in a subjective sense, that is,\nconsidered as a subject or substance having the attribute of duration;\nbut also, because it is immediate consciousness, its object is _ipso\nfacto_ continuous. In fact, this infinitesimally spread-out consciousness\nis a direct feeling of its contents as spread out. This will be further\nelucidated below. In an infinitesimal interval we directly perceive the\ntemporal sequence of its beginning, middle, and end,\u2014not, of course,\nin the way of recognition, for recognition is only of the past, but in\nthe way of immediate feeling. Now upon this interval follows another,\nwhose beginning is the middle of the former, and whose middle is the end\nof the former. Here, we have an immediate perception of the temporal\nsequence of its beginning, middle, and end, or say of the second, third,\nand fourth instants. From these two immediate perceptions, we gain a\nmediate, or inferential, perception of the relation of all four instants.\nThis mediate perception is objectively, or as to the object represented,\nspread over the four instants; but subjectively, or as itself the subject\nof duration, it is completely embraced in the second moment. [The reader\nwill observe that I use the word _instant_ to mean a point of time, and\n_moment_ to mean an infinitesimal duration.] If it is objected that,\nupon the theory proposed, we must have more than a mediate perception\nof the succession of the four instants, I grant it; for the sum of the\ntwo infinitesimal intervals is itself infinitesimal, so that it is\nimmediately perceived. It is immediately perceived in the whole interval,\nbut only mediately perceived in the last two thirds of the interval.\nNow, let there be an indefinite succession of these inferential acts of\ncomparative perception; and it is plain that the last moment will contain\nobjectively the whole series. Let there be, not merely an indefinite\nsuccession, but a continuous flow of inference through a finite time;\nand the result will be a mediate objective consciousness of the whole\ntime in the last moment. In this last moment, the whole series will\nbe recognised, or known as known before, except only the last moment,\nwhich of course will be absolutely unrecognisable to itself. Indeed,\neven this last moment will be recognised like the rest, or, at least be\njust beginning to be so. There is a little _elenchus_, or appearance\nof contradiction, here, which the ordinary logic of reflection quite\nsuffices to resolve.\n\n\nINFINITY AND CONTINUITY, IN GENERAL.\n\nMost of the mathematicians who during the last two generations have\ntreated the differential calculus have been of the opinion that an\ninfinitesimal quantity is an absurdity; although, with their habitual\ncaution, they have often added \u201cor, at any rate, the conception of an\ninfinitesimal is so difficult, that we practically cannot reason about it\nwith confidence and security.\u201d Accordingly, the doctrine of limits has\nbeen invented to evade the difficulty, or, as some say, to explain the\nsignification of the word \u201cinfinitesimal.\u201d This doctrine, in one form or\nanother, is taught in all the text-books, though in some of them only as\nan alternative view of the matter; it answers well enough the purposes of\ncalculation, though even in that application it has its difficulties.\n\nThe illumination of the subject by a strict notation for the logic\nof relatives had shown me clearly and evidently that the idea of an\ninfinitesimal involves no contradiction, before I became acquainted with\nthe writings of Dr. Georg Cantor (though many of these had already\nappeared in the _Mathematische Annalen_ and in _Borchardt\u2019s Journal_,\nif not yet in the _Acta Mathematica_, all mathematical journals of the\nfirst distinction), in which the same view is defended with extraordinary\ngenius and penetrating logic.\n\nThe prevalent opinion is that finite numbers are the only ones that we\ncan reason about, at least, in any ordinary mode of reasoning, or, as\nsome authors express it, they are the only numbers that can be reasoned\nabout mathematically. But this is an irrational prejudice. I long ago\nshowed that finite collections are distinguished from infinite ones\nonly by one circumstance and its consequences, namely, that to them\nis applicable a peculiar and unusual mode of reasoning called by its\ndiscoverer, DeMorgan, the \u201csyllogism of transposed quantity.\u201d\n\nBalzac, in the introduction of his _Physiologie du mariage_, remarks that\nevery young Frenchman boasts of having seduced some Frenchwoman. Now, as\na woman can only be seduced once, and there are no more Frenchwomen than\nFrenchmen, it follows, if these boasts are true, that no French women\nescape seduction. If their number be finite, the reasoning holds. But\nsince the population is continually increasing, and the seduced are on\nthe average younger than the seducers, the conclusion need not be true.\nIn like manner, DeMorgan, as an actuary, might have argued that if an\ninsurance company pays to its insured on an average more than they have\never paid it, including interest, it must lose money. But every modern\nactuary would see a fallacy in that, since the business is continually\non the increase. But should war, or other cataclysm, cause the class\nof insured to be a finite one, the conclusion would turn out painfully\ncorrect, after all. The above two reasonings are examples of the\nsyllogism of transposed quantity.\n\nThe proposition that finite and infinite collections are distinguished by\nthe applicability to the former of the syllogism of transposed quantity\nought to be regarded as the basal one of scientific arithmetic.\n\nIf a person does not know how to reason logically, and I must say that\na great many fairly good mathematicians,\u2014yea, distinguished ones,\u2014fall\nunder this category, but simply uses a rule of thumb in blindly drawing\ninferences like other inferences that have turned out well, he will,\nof course, be continually falling into error about infinite numbers.\nThe truth is such people do not reason, at all. But for the few who do\nreason, reasoning about infinite numbers is easier than about finite\nnumbers, because the complicated syllogism of transposed quantity is not\ncalled for. For example, that the whole is greater than its part is not\nan axiom, as that eminently bad reasoner, Euclid, made it to be. It is a\ntheorem readily proved by means of a syllogism of transposed quantity,\nbut not otherwise. Of finite collections it is true, of infinite\ncollections false. Thus, a part of the whole numbers are even numbers.\nYet the even numbers are no fewer than all the numbers; an evident\nproposition since if every number in the whole series of whole numbers be\ndoubled, the result will be the series of even numbers.\n\n 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, etc.\n 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, etc.\n\nSo for every number there is a distinct even number. In fact, there are\nas many distinct doubles of numbers as there are of distinct numbers. But\nthe doubles of numbers are all even numbers.\n\nIn truth, of infinite collections there are but two grades of magnitude,\nthe _endless_ and the _innumerable_. Just as a finite collection is\ndistinguished from an infinite one by the applicability to it of a\nspecial mode of reasoning, the syllogism of transposed quantity, so,\nas I showed in the paper last referred to, a numerable collection is\ndistinguished from an innumerable one by the applicability to it of\na certain mode of reasoning, the Fermatian inference, or, as it is\nsometimes improperly termed, \u201cmathematical induction.\u201d\n\nAs an example of this reasoning, Euler\u2019s demonstration of the binomial\ntheorem for integral powers may be given. The theorem is that _(x+y)\u207f_,\nwhere _n_ is a whole number, may be expanded into the sum of a series\nof terms of which the first is _x\u207fy\u2070_ and each of the others is derived\nfrom the next preceding by diminishing the exponent of _x_ by 1 and\nmultiplying by that exponent and at the same time increasing the exponent\nof _y_ by 1 and dividing by that increased exponent. Now, suppose this\nproposition to be true for a certain exponent, _n_ = _M_, then it\nmust also be true for _n_ = _M_ + 1. For let one of the terms in the\nexpansion of _(x+y)\u1d39_ be written A_x\u1d56y\ud801\udfa5_. Then, this term with the two\nfollowing will be\n\n=Transcriber\u2019s Note:= Unicode has no subscript q character, so the Greek\nsubscript phi character \u1d69 is used in these formul\u00e6 to represent it.\nItalics have been removed for readability.\n\n Ax\u1d56y\ud801\udfa5 + A(\u1d56\u2044\u1d69\u208a\u2081)x\u1d56\u207b\u00b9y\ud801\udfa5\u207a\u00b9 + A(\u1d56\u2044\u1d69\u208a\u2081)(\u1d56\u207b\u00b9\u2044\u1d69\u208a\u2082)x\u1d56\u207b\u00b2y\ud801\udfa5\u207a\u00b2\n\nNow, when _(x+y)\u1d39_ is multiplied by _x+y_ to give _(x+y)\u1d39\u207a\u00b9_, we multiply\nfirst by _x_ and then by _y_ instead of by _x_ and add the two results.\nWhen we multiply by _x_, the second of the above three terms will be the\nonly one giving a term involving _x\u1d56y\ud801\udfa5\u207a\u00b9_ and the third will be the only\none giving a term in _x\u1d56\u207b\u00b9y\ud801\udfa5\u207a\u00b2_; and when we multiply by _y_ the first\nwill be the only term giving a term in _x\u1d56y\ud801\udfa5\u207a\u00b9_, and the second will be\nthe only term giving a term in _x\u1d56\u207b\u00b9y\ud801\udfa5\u207a\u00b2_. Hence, adding like terms,\nwe find that the coefficient of _x\u1d56y\ud801\udfa5\u207a\u00b9_in the expansion of _(x+y)\u1d39\u207a\u00b9_\nwill be the sum of the coefficients of the first two of the above three\nterms, and that the coefficient of _x\u1d56\u207b\u00b9y\ud801\udfa5\u207a\u00b2_ will be the sum of the\ncoefficients of the last two terms. Hence, two successive terms in the\nexpansion of _(x+y)\u1d39\u207a\u00b9_ will be\n\n A[1+(\u1d56\u2044\u1d69\u208b\u2081)]x\u1d56y\ud801\udfa5\u207a\u00b9 + A(\u1d56\u2044\u1d69\u208a\u2081)[1+(\u1d56\u207b\u00b9\u2044\u1d69\u208b\u2082)]x\u1d56\u207b\u00b9y\ud801\udfa5\u207a\u00b2\n\n = A(\u1d56\u207a\ud801\udfa5\u207a\u00b9\u2044\u1d69\u208a\u2081)x\u1d56y\ud801\udfa5\u207a\u00b9 + A(\u1d56\u207a\ud801\udfa5\u207a\u00b9\u2044\u1d69\u208a\u2081). (\u1d56\u2044\u1d69\u208a\u2082)x\u1d56\u207b\u00b9y\ud801\udfa5\u207a\u00b2.\n\nIt is, thus, seen that the succession of terms follows the rule. Thus if\nany integral power follows the rule, so also does the next higher power.\nBut the first power obviously follows the rule. Hence, all powers do so.\n\nSuch reasoning holds good of any collection of objects capable of being\nranged in a series which though it may be endless, can be numbered so\nthat each member of it receives a definite integral number. For instance,\nall the whole numbers constitute such a numerable collection. Again, all\nnumbers resulting from operating according to any definite rule with\nany finite number of whole numbers form such a collection. For they may\nbe arranged in a series thus. Let F be the symbol of operation. First\noperate on 1, giving F(1) Then, operate on a second 1, giving F(1,1).\nNext, introduce 2, giving 3rd, F(2); 4th, F(2,1); 5th, F(1,2); 6th,\nF(2,2). Next use a third variable giving 7th, F(1,1,1); 8th, F(2,1,1);\n9th, F(1,2,1); 10th, F(2,2,1); 11th, F(1,1,2); 12th, F(2,1,2); 13th,\nF(1,2,2); 14th, F(2,2,2). Next introduce 3, and so on, alternately\nintroducing new variables and new figures; and in this way it is plain\nthat every arrangement of integral values of the variables will receive a\nnumbered place in the series.[72]\n\nThe class of endless but numerable collections (so called because they\ncan be so ranged that to each one corresponds a distinct whole number) is\nvery large. But there are collections which are certainly innumerable.\nSuch is the collection of all numbers to which endless series of\ndecimals are capable of approximating. It has been recognised since the\ntime of Euclid that certain numbers are surd or incommensurable, and\nare not exactly expressible by any finite series of decimals, nor by a\ncirculating decimal. Such is the ratio of the circumference of a circle\nto its diameter, which we know is nearly 3.1415926. The calculation of\nthis number has been carried to over 700 figures without the slightest\nappearance of regularity in their sequence. The demonstrations that this\nand many other numbers are incommensurable are perfect. That the entire\ncollection of incommensurable numbers is innumerable has been clearly\nproved by Cantor. I omit the demonstration; but it is easy to see that to\ndiscriminate one from some other would, in general, require the use of an\nendless series of numbers. Now if they cannot be exactly expressed and\ndiscriminated, clearly they cannot be ranged in a linear series.\n\nIt is evident that there are as many points on a line or in an interval\nof time as there are of real numbers in all. These are, therefore,\ninnumerable collections. Many mathematicians have incautiously assumed\nthat the points on a surface or in a solid are more than those on a line.\nBut this has been refuted by Cantor. Indeed, it is obvious that for every\nset of values of co\u00f6rdinates there is a single distinct number. Suppose,\nfor instance, the values of the co\u00f6rdinates all lie between 0 and + 1.\nThen if we compose a number by putting in the first decimal place the\nfirst figure of the first co\u00f6rdinate, in the second the first figure of\nthe second co\u00f6rdinate, and so on, and when the first figures are all\ndealt out go on to the second figures in like manner, it is plain that\nthe values of the co\u00f6rdinates can be read off from the single resulting\nnumber, so that a triad or tetrad of numbers, each having innumerable\nvalues, has no more values than a single incommensurable number.\n\nWere the number of dimensions infinite, this would fail; and the\ncollection of infinite sets of numbers having each innumerable\nvariations, might, therefore, be greater than the simple innumerable\ncollection, and might be called _endlessly infinite_. The single\nindividuals of such a collection could not, however, be designated, even\napproximately, so that this is indeed a magnitude concerning which it\nwould be possible to reason only in the most general way, if at all.\n\nAlthough there are but two grades of magnitudes of infinite collections,\nyet when certain conditions are imposed upon the order in which\nindividuals are taken, distinctions of magnitude arise from that cause.\nThus, if a simply endless series be doubled by separating each unit into\ntwo parts, the successive first parts and also the second parts being\ntaken in the same order as the units from which they are derived, this\ndouble endless series will, so long as it is taken in that order, appear\nas twice as large as the original series. In like manner the product of\ntwo innumerable collections, that is, the collection of possible pairs\ncomposed of one individual of each, if the order of continuity is to be\nmaintained, is, by virtue of that order, infinitely greater than either\nof the component collections.\n\nWe now come to the difficult question, What is continuity? Kant confounds\nit with infinite divisibility, saying that the essential character of\na continuous series is that between any two members of it a third can\nalways be found. This is an analysis beautifully clear and definite;\nbut unfortunately, it breaks down under the first test. For according\nto this, the entire series of rational fractions arranged in the order\nof their magnitude, would be an infinite series, although the rational\nfractions are numerable, while the points of a line are innumerable.\nNay, worse yet, if from that series of fractions any two with all that\nlie between them be excised, and any number of such finite gaps he made,\nKant\u2019s definition is still true of the series, though it has lost all\nappearance of continuity.\n\nCantor defines a continuous series as one which is _concatenated_ and\n_perfect_. By a concatenated series, he means such a one that if any\ntwo points are given in it, and any finite distance, however small, it\nis possible to proceed from the first point to the second through a\nsuccession of points of the series each at a distance from the preceding\none less than the given distance. This is true of the series of rational\nfractions ranged in the order of their magnitude. By a perfect series, he\nmeans one which contains every point such that there is no distance so\nsmall that this point has not an infinity of points of the series within\nthat distance of it. This is true of the series of numbers between 0 and\n1 capable of being expressed by decimals in which only the digits 0 and 1\noccur.\n\nIt must be granted that Cantor\u2019s definition includes every series that\nis continuous; nor can it be objected that it includes any important\nor indubitable case of a series not continuous. Nevertheless, it has\nsome serious defects. In the first place, it turns upon metrical\nconsiderations; while the distinction between a continuous and a\ndiscontinuous series is manifestly non-metrical. In the next place, a\nperfect series is defined as one containing \u201cevery point\u201d of a certain\ndescription. But no positive idea is conveyed of what all the points\nare: that is definition by negation, and cannot be admitted. If that\nsort of thing were allowed, it would be very easy to say, at once, that\nthe continuous linear series of points is one which contains every point\nof the line between its extremities. Finally, Cantor\u2019s definition does\nnot convey a distinct notion of what the components of the conception of\ncontinuity are. It ingeniously wraps up its properties in two separate\nparcels, but does not display them to our intelligence.\n\nKant\u2019s definition expresses one simple property of a continuum; but\nit allows of gaps in the series. To mend the definition, it is only\nnecessary to notice how these gaps can occur. Let us suppose, then, a\nlinear series of points extending from a point, _A_, to a point, _B_,\nhaving a gap from _B_ to a third point, _C_, and thence extending to\na final limit, _D_; and let us suppose this series conforms to Kant\u2019s\ndefinition. Then, of the two points, _B_ and _C_, one or both must be\nexcluded from the series; for otherwise, by the definition, there would\nbe points between them. That is, if the series contains _C_, though\nit contains all the points up to _B_, it cannot contain _B_. What is\nrequired, therefore, is to state in non-metrical terms that if a series\nof points up to a limit is included in a continuum the limit is included.\nIt may be remarked that this is the property of a continuum to which\nAristotle\u2019s attention seems to have been directed when he defines a\ncontinuum as something whose parts have a common limit. The property may\nbe exactly stated as follows: If a linear series of points is continuous\nbetween two points, _A_ and _D_, and if an endless series of points be\ntaken, the first of them between _A_ and _D_ and each of the others\nbetween the last preceding one and _D_, then there is a point of the\ncontinuous series between all that endless series of points and _D_, and\nsuch that every other point of which this is true lies between this point\nand _D_. For example, take any number between 0 and 1, as 0.1; then, any\nnumber between 0.1 and 1, as 0.11; then any number between 0.11 and 1, as\n0.111; and so on, without end. Then, because the series of real numbers\nbetween 0 and 1 is continuous, there must be a _least_ real number,\ngreater than every number of that endless series. This property, which\nmay be called the Aristotelicity of the series, together with Kant\u2019s\nproperty, or its Kanticity, completes the definition of a continuous\nseries.\n\nThe property of Aristotelicity may be roughly stated thus: a continuum\ncontains the end point belonging to every endless series of points which\nit contains. An obvious corollary is that every continuum contains its\nlimits. But in using this principle it is necessary to observe that a\nseries may be continuous except in this, that it omits one or both of the\nlimits.\n\nOur ideas will find expression more conveniently if, instead of points\nupon a line, we speak of real numbers. Every real number is, in one\nsense, the limit of a series, for it can be indefinitely approximated\nto. Whether every real number is a limit of a _regular_ series may\nperhaps be open to doubt. But the series referred to in the definition\nof Aristotelicity must be understood as including all series whether\nregular or not. Consequently, it is implied that between any two points\nan innumerable series of points can be taken.\n\nEvery number whose expression in decimals requires but a finite number of\nplaces of decimals is commensurable. Therefore, incommensurable numbers\nsuppose an infinitieth place of decimals. The word infinitesimal is\nsimply the Latin form of infinitieth; that is, it is an ordinal formed\nfrom _infinitum_, as centesimal from _centum_. Thus, continuity supposes\ninfinitesimal quantities. There is nothing contradictory about the idea\nof such quantities. In adding and multiplying them the continuity must\nnot be broken up, and consequently they are precisely like any other\nquantities, except that neither the syllogism of transposed quantity, nor\nthe Fermatian inference applies to them.\n\nIf A is a finite quantity and _i_ an infinitesimal, then in a certain\nsense we may write A + _i_ = A. That is to say, this is so for all\npurposes of measurement. But this principle must not be applied except\nto get rid of _all_ the terms in the highest order of infinitesimals\npresent. As a mathematician, I prefer the method of infinitesimals to\nthat of limits, as far easier and less infested with snares. Indeed,\nthe latter, as stated in some books, involves propositions that are\nfalse; but this is not the case with the forms of the method used by\nCauchy, Duhamel, and others. As they understand the doctrine of limits,\nit involves the notion of continuity, and therefore contains in another\nshape the very same ideas as the doctrine of infinitesimals.\n\nLet us now consider an aspect of the Aristotelical principle which is\nparticularly important in philosophy. Suppose a surface to be part red\nand part blue; so that every point on it is either red or blue, and, of\ncourse, no part can be both red and blue. What, then, is the color of the\nboundary line between the red and the blue? The answer is that red or\nblue, to exist at all, must be spread over a surface; and the color of\nthe surface is the color of the surface in the immediate neighborhood of\nthe point. I purposely use a vague form of expression. Now, as the parts\nof the surface in the immediate neighborhood of any ordinary point upon a\ncurved boundary are half of them red and half blue, it follows that the\nboundary is half red and half blue. In like manner, we find it necessary\nto hold that consciousness essentially occupies time; and what is\npresent to the mind at any ordinary instant, is what is present during a\nmoment in which that instant occurs. Thus, the present is half past and\nhalf to come. Again, the color of the parts of a surface at any finite\ndistance from a point, has nothing to do with its color just at that\npoint; and, in the parallel, the feeling at any finite interval from the\npresent has nothing to do with the present feeling, except vicariously.\nTake another case: the velocity of a particle at any instant of time is\nits mean velocity during an infinitesimal instant in which that time\nis contained. Just so my immediate feeling is my feeling through an\ninfinitesimal duration containing the present instant.\n\n\nANALYSIS OF TIME.\n\nOne of the most marked features about the law of mind is that it makes\ntime to have a definite direction of flow from past to future. The\nrelation of past to future is, in reference to the law of mind, different\nfrom the relation of future to past. This makes one of the great\ncontrasts between the law of mind and the law of physical force, where\nthere is no more distinction between the two opposite directions in time\nthan between moving northward and moving southward.\n\nIn order, therefore, to analyse the law of mind, we must begin by asking\nwhat the flow of time consists in. Now, we find that in reference to any\nindividual state of feeling, all others are of two classes, those which\naffect this one (or have a tendency to affect it, and what this means we\nshall inquire shortly), and those which do not. The present is affectible\nby the past but not by the future.\n\nMoreover, if state _A_ is affected by state _B_, and state _B_ by state\n_C_, then _A_ is affected by state _C_, though not so much so. It\nfollows, that if _A_ is affectible by _B_, _B_ is not affectible by _A_.\n\nIf, of two states, each is absolutely unaffectible by the other, they are\nto be regarded as parts of the same state. They are contemporaneous.\n\nTo say that a state is _between_ two states means that it affects one\nand is affected by the other. Between any two states in this sense lies\nan innumerable series of states affecting one another; and if a state\nlies between a given state and any other state which can be reached by\ninserting states between this state and any third state, these inserted\nstates not immediately affecting or being affected by either, then the\nsecond state mentioned immediately affects or is affected by the first,\nin the sense that in the one the other is _ipso facto_ present in a\nreduced degree.\n\nThese propositions involve a definition of time and of its flow. Over and\nabove this definition they involve a doctrine, namely, that every state\nof feeling is affectible by every earlier state.\n\n\nTHAT FEELINGS HAVE INTENSIVE CONTINUITY.\n\nTime with its continuity logically involves some other kind of continuity\nthan its own. Time, as the universal form of change, cannot exist\nunless there is something to undergo change, and to undergo a change\ncontinuous in time, there must be a continuity of changeable qualities.\nOf the continuity of intrinsic qualities of feeling we can now form but\na feeble conception. The development of the human mind has practically\nextinguished all feelings, except a few sporadic kinds, sound, colors,\nsmells, warmth, etc., which now appear to be disconnected and disparate.\nIn the case of colors, there is a tridimensional spread of feelings.\nOriginally, all feelings may have been connected in the same way, and the\npresumption is that the number of dimensions was endless. For development\nessentially involves a limitation of possibilities. But given a number of\ndimensions of feeling, all possible varieties are obtainable by varying\nthe intensities of the different elements. Accordingly, time logically\nsupposes a continuous range of intensity in feeling. It follows, then,\nfrom the definition of continuity, that when any particular kind of\nfeeling is present, an infinitesimal continuum of all feelings differing\ninfinitesimally from that is present.\n\n\nTHAT FEELINGS HAVE SPATIAL EXTENSION.\n\nConsider a gob of protoplasm, say an am\u0153ba or a slime-mould. It does\nnot differ in any radical way from the contents of a nerve-cell,\nthough its functions may be less specialised. There is no doubt that\nthis slime-mould, or this am\u0153ba, or at any rate some similar mass of\nprotoplasm feels. That is to say, it feels when it is in its excited\ncondition. But note how it behaves. When the whole is quiescent and\nrigid, a place upon it is irritated. Just at this point, an active motion\nis set up, and this gradually spreads to other parts. In this action, no\nunity nor relation to a nucleus, or other unitary organ can be discerned.\nIt is a mere amorphous continuum of protoplasm, with feeling passing\nfrom one part to another. Nor is there anything like a wave-motion. The\nactivity does not advance to new parts, just as fast as it leaves old\nparts. Rather, in the beginning, it dies out at a slower rate than that\nat which it spreads. And while the process is going on, by exciting the\nmass at another point, a second quite independent state of excitation\nwill be set up. In some places, neither excitation will exist, in others\neach separately, in still other places, both effects will be added\ntogether. Whatever there is in the whole phenomenon to make us think\nthere is feeling in such a mass of protoplasm,\u2014_feeling_, but plainly no\n_personality_,\u2014goes logically to show that that feeling has a subjective,\nor substantial, spatial extension, as the excited state has. This is, no\ndoubt, a difficult idea to seize, for the reason that it is a subjective,\nnot an objective, extension. It is not that we have a feeling of bigness;\nthough Professor James, perhaps rightly, teaches that we have. It is that\nthe feeling, as a subject of inhesion, is big. Moreover, our own feelings\nare focused in attention to such a degree that we are not aware that\nideas are not brought to an absolute unity; just as nobody not instructed\nby special experiment has any idea how very, very little of the field of\nvision is distinct. Still, we all know how the attention wanders about\namong our feelings; and this fact shows that those feelings that are not\nco-ordinated in attention have a reciprocal externality, although they\nare present at the same time. But we must not tax introspection to make a\nphenomenon manifest which essentially involves externality.\n\nSince space is continuous, it follows that there must be an immediate\ncommunity of feeling between parts of mind infinitesimally near together.\nWithout this, I believe it would have been impossible for minds external\nto one another, ever to become co\u00f6rdinated, and equally impossible for\nany co\u00f6rdination to be established in the action of the nerve-matter of\none brain.\n\n\nAFFECTIONS OF IDEAS.\n\nBut we are met by the question what is meant by saying that one idea\naffects another. The unravelment of this problem requires us to trace out\nphenomena a little further.\n\nThree elements go to make up an idea. The first is its intrinsic quality\nas a feeling. The second is the energy with which it affects other\nideas, an energy which is infinite in the here-and-nowness of immediate\nsensation, finite and relative in the recency of the past. The third\nelement is the tendency of an idea to bring along other ideas with it.\n\nAs an idea spreads, its power of affecting other ideas gets rapidly\nreduced; but its intrinsic quality remains nearly unchanged. It is long\nyears now since I last saw a cardinal in his robes; and my memory of\ntheir color has become much dimmed. The color itself, however, is not\nremembered as dim. I have no inclination to call it a dull red. Thus, the\nintrinsic quality remains little changed; yet more accurate observation\nwill show a slight reduction of it. The third element, on the other\nhand, has increased. As well as I can recollect, it seems to me the\ncardinals I used to see wore robes more scarlet than vermilion is, and\nhighly luminous. Still, I know the color commonly called cardinal is on\nthe crimson side of vermilion and of quite moderate luminosity, and the\noriginal idea calls up so many other hues with it, and asserts itself so\nfeebly, that I am unable any longer to isolate it.\n\nA finite interval of time generally contains an innumerable series\nof feelings; and when these become welded together in association,\nthe result is a general idea. For we have just seen how by continuous\nspreading an idea becomes generalised.\n\nThe first character of a general idea so resulting is that it is living\nfeeling. A continuum of this feeling, infinitesimal in duration, but\nstill embracing innumerable parts, and also, though infinitesimal,\nentirely unlimited, is immediately present. And in its absence of\nboundedness a vague possibility of more than is present is directly felt.\n\nSecond, in the presence of this continuity of feeling, nominalistic\nmaxims appear futile. There is no doubt about one idea affecting another,\nwhen we can directly perceive the one gradually modified and shaping\nitself into the other. Nor can there any longer be any difficulty about\none idea resembling another, when we can pass along the continuous field\nof quality from one to the other and back again to the point which we had\nmarked.\n\nThird, consider the insistency of an idea. The insistency of a past idea\nwith reference to the present is a quantity which is less the further\nback that past idea is, and rises to infinity as the past idea is brought\nup into coincidence with the present. Here we must make one of those\ninductive applications of the law of continuity which have produced such\ngreat results in all the positive sciences. We must extend the law of\ninsistency into the future. Plainly, the insistency of a future idea with\nreference to the present is a quantity affected by the minus sign; for it\nis the present that affects the future, if there be any effect, not the\nfuture that affects the present. Accordingly, the curve of insistency is\na sort of equilateral hyperbola. [See the figure.] Such a conception is\nnone the less mathematical, that its quantification cannot now be exactly\nspecified.\n\n[Illustration]\n\nNow consider the induction which we have here been led into. This curve\nsays that feeling which has not yet emerged into immediate consciousness\nis already affectible and already affected. In fact, this is habit, by\nvirtue of which an idea is brought up into present consciousness by a\nbond that had already been established between it, and another idea while\nit was still _in futuro_.\n\nWe can now see what the affection of one idea by another consists in.\nIt is that the affected idea is attached as a logical predicate to the\naffecting idea as subject. So when a feeling emerges into immediate\nconsciousness, it always appears as a modification of a more or less\ngeneral object already in the mind. The word suggestion is well adapted\nto expressing this relation. The future is suggested by, or rather is\ninfluenced by the suggestions of, the past.\n\n\nIDEAS CANNOT BE CONNECTED EXCEPT BY CONTINUITY.\n\nThat ideas can nowise be connected without continuity is sufficiently\nevident to one who reflects upon the matter. But still the opinion may\nbe entertained that after continuity has once made the connection of\nideas possible, then they may get to be connected in other modes than\nthrough continuity. Certainly, I cannot see how anyone can deny that the\ninfinite diversity of the universe, which we call chance, may bring ideas\ninto proximity which are not associated in one general idea. It may do\nthis many times. But then the law of continuous spreading will produce a\nmental association; and this I suppose is an abridged statement of the\nway the universe has been evolved. But if I am asked whether a blind\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7 cannot bring ideas together, first I point out that it would not\nremain blind. There being a continuous connection between the ideas, they\nwould infallibly become associated in a living, feeling, and perceiving\ngeneral idea. Next, I cannot see what the mustness or necessity of this\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7 would consist in. In the absolute uniformity of the phenomenon,\nsays the nominalist. Absolute is well put in; for if it merely happened\nso three times in succession, or three million times in succession, in\nthe absence of any reason, the coincidence could only be attributed to\nchance. But absolute uniformity must extend over the whole infinite\nfuture; and it is idle to talk of that except as an idea. No; I think we\ncan only hold that wherever ideas come together they tend to weld into\ngeneral ideas; and wherever they are generally connected, general ideas\ngovern the connection; and these general ideas are living feelings spread\nout.\n\n\nMENTAL LAW FOLLOWS THE FORMS OF LOGIC.\n\nThe three main classes of logical inference are Deduction, Induction,\nand Hypothesis. These correspond to three chief modes of action of the\nhuman soul. In deduction the mind is under the dominion of a habit or\nassociation by virtue of which a general idea suggests in each case\na corresponding reaction. But a certain sensation is seen to involve\nthat idea. Consequently, that sensation is followed by that reaction.\nThat is the way the hind legs of a frog, separated from the rest of the\nbody, reason, when you pinch them. It is the lowest form of psychical\nmanifestation.\n\nBy induction, a habit becomes established. Certain sensations, all\ninvolving one general idea, are followed each by the same reaction; and\nan association becomes established, whereby that general idea gets to be\nfollowed uniformly by that reaction.\n\nHabit is that specialisation of the law of mind whereby a general idea\ngains the power of exciting reactions. But in order that the general\nidea should attain all its functionality, it is necessary, also, that\nit should become suggestible by sensations. That is accomplished by a\npsychical process having the form of hypothetic inference. By hypothetic\ninference, I mean, as I have explained in other writings, an induction\nfrom qualities. For example, I know that the kind of man known and\nclassed as a \u201cmugwump\u201d has certain characteristics. He has a high\nself-respect and places great value upon social distinction. He laments\nthe great part that rowdyism and unrefined good-fellowship play in the\ndealings of American politicians with their constituency. He thinks that\nthe reform which would follow from the abandonment of the system by which\nthe distribution of offices is made to strengthen party organisations\nand a return to the original and essential conception of office-filling\nwould be found an unmixed good. He holds that monetary considerations\nshould usually be the decisive ones in questions of public policy. He\nrespects the principle of individualism and of _laisser-faire_ as the\ngreatest agency of civilisation. These views, among others, I know to\nbe obtrusive marks of a \u201cmugwump.\u201d Now, suppose I casually meet a man\nin a railway-train, and falling into conversation find that he holds\nopinions of this sort; I am naturally led to suppose that he is a\n\u201cmugwump.\u201d That is hypothetic inference. That is to say, a number of\nreadily verifiable marks of a mugwump being selected, I find this man\nhas these, and infer that he has all the other characters which go to\nmake a thinker of that stripe. Or let us suppose that I meet a man of a\nsemi-clerical appearance and a sub-pharisaical sniff, who appears to look\nat things from the point of view of a rather wooden dualism. He cites\nseveral texts of scripture and always with particular attention to their\nlogical implications; and he exhibits a sternness, almost amounting to\nvindictiveness, toward evildoers, in general. I readily conclude that\nhe is a minister of a certain denomination. Now the mind acts in a way\nsimilar to this, every time we acquire a power of co\u00f6rdinating reactions\nin a peculiar way, as in performing any act requiring skill. Thus, most\npersons have a difficulty in moving the two hands simultaneously and in\nopposite directions through two parallel circles nearly in the medial\nplane of the body. To learn to do this, it is necessary to attend, first,\nto the different actions in different parts of the motion, when suddenly\na general conception of the action springs up and it becomes perfectly\neasy. We think the motion we are trying to do involves this action, and\nthis, and this. Then, the general idea comes which unites all those\nactions, and thereupon the desire to perform the motion calls up the\ngeneral idea. The same mental process is many times employed whenever we\nare learning to speak a language or are acquiring any sort of skill.\n\nThus, by induction, a number of sensations followed by one reaction\nbecome united under one general idea followed by the same reaction;\nwhile by the hypothetic process, a number of reactions called for by one\noccasion get united in a general idea which is called out by the same\noccasion. By deduction, the habit fulfils its function of calling out\ncertain reactions on certain occasions.\n\n\nUNCERTAINTY OF MENTAL ACTION.\n\nThe inductive and hypothetic forms of inference are essentially probable\ninferences, not necessary; while deduction may be either necessary or\nprobable.\n\nBut no mental action seems to be necessary or invariable in its\ncharacter. In whatever manner the mind has reacted under a given\nsensation, in that manner it is the more likely to react again; were\nthis, however, an absolute necessity, habits would become wooden and\nineradicable, and no room being left for the formation of new habits,\nintellectual life would come to a speedy close. Thus, the uncertainty of\nthe mental law is no mere defect of it, but is on the contrary of its\nessence. The truth is, the mind is not subject to \u201claw,\u201d in the same\nrigid sense that matter is. It only experiences gentle forces which\nmerely render it more likely to act in a given way than it otherwise\nwould be. There always remains a certain amount of arbitrary spontaneity\nin its action, without which it would be dead.\n\nSome psychologists think to reconcile the uncertainty of reactions with\nthe principle of necessary causation by means of the law of fatigue.\nTruly for a _law_, this law of fatigue is a little lawless. I think it is\nmerely a case of the general principle that an idea in spreading loses\nits insistency. Put me tarragon into my salad, when I have not tasted\nit for years, and I exclaim \u201cWhat nectar is this!\u201d But add it to every\ndish I taste for week after week, and a habit of expectation has been\ncreated; and in thus spreading into habit, the sensation makes hardly\nany more impression upon me; or, if it be noticed, it is on a new side\nfrom which it appears as rather a bore. The doctrine that fatigue is\none of the primordial phenomena of mind I am much disposed to doubt.\nIt seems a somewhat little thing to be allowed as an exception to the\ngreat principle of mental uniformisation. For this reason, I prefer to\nexplain it in the manner here indicated, as a special case of that great\nprinciple. To consider it as something distinct in its nature, certainly\nsomewhat strengthens the necessitarian position; but even if it be\ndistinct, the hypothesis that all the variety and apparent arbitrariness\nof mental action ought to be explained away in favor of absolute\ndeterminism does not seem to me to recommend itself to a sober and sound\njudgment, which seeks the guidance of observed facts and not that of\nprepossessions.\n\n\nRESTATEMENT OF THE LAW.\n\nLet me now try to gather up all these odds and ends of commentary and\nrestate the law of mind, in a unitary way.\n\nFirst, then, we find that when we regard ideas from a nominalistic,\nindividualistic, sensualistic way, the simplest facts of mind become\nutterly meaningless. That one idea should resemble another or influence\nanother, or that one state of mind should so much as be thought of in\nanother is, from that standpoint, sheer nonsense.\n\nSecond, by this and other means we are driven to perceive, what is\nquite evident of itself, that instantaneous feelings flow together into\na continuum of feeling, which has in a modified degree the peculiar\nvivacity of feeling and has gained generality. And in reference to such\ngeneral ideas, or continua of feeling, the difficulties about resemblance\nand suggestion and reference to the external, cease to have any force.\n\nThird, these general ideas are not mere words, nor do they consist in\nthis, that certain concrete facts will every time happen under certain\ndescriptions of conditions; but they are just as much, or rather far\nmore, living realities than the feelings themselves out of which they\nare concreted. And to say that mental phenomena are governed by law does\nnot mean merely that they are describable by a general formula; but that\nthere is a living idea, a conscious continuum of feeling, which pervades\nthem, and to which they are docile.\n\nFourth, this supreme law, which is the celestial and living harmony,\ndoes not so much as demand that the special ideas shall surrender\ntheir peculiar arbitrariness and caprice entirely; for that would be\nself-destructive. It only requires that they shall influence and be\ninfluenced by one another.\n\nFifth, in what measure this unification acts, seems to be regulated only\nby special rules; or, at least, we cannot in our present knowledge\nsay how far it goes. But it may be said that, judging by appearances,\nthe amount of arbitrariness in the phenomena of human minds is neither\naltogether trifling nor very prominent.\n\n\nPERSONALITY.\n\nHaving thus endeavored to state the law of mind, in general, I descend\nto the consideration of a particular phenomenon which is remarkably\nprominent in our own consciousnesses, that of personality. A strong\nlight is thrown upon this subject by recent observations of double and\nmultiple personality. The theory which at one time seemed plausible that\ntwo persons in one body corresponded to the two halves of the brain\nwill, I take it, now be universally acknowledged to be insufficient.\nBut that which these cases make quite manifest is that personality is\nsome kind of co\u00f6rdination or connection of ideas. Not much to say, this,\nperhaps. Yet when we consider that, according to the principle which we\nare tracing out, a connection between ideas is itself a general idea,\nand that a general idea is a living feeling, it is plain that we have at\nleast taken an appreciable step toward the understanding of personality.\nThis personality, like any general idea, is not a thing to be apprehended\nin an instant. It has to be lived in time; nor can any finite time\nembrace it in all its fulness. Yet in each infinitesimal interval it is\npresent and living, though specially colored by the immediate feelings\nof that moment. Personality, so far as it is apprehended in a moment, is\nimmediate self-consciousness.\n\nBut the word co\u00f6rdination implies somewhat more than this; it implies\na teleological harmony in ideas, and in the case of personality this\nteleology is more than a mere purposive pursuit of a predeterminate end;\nit is a developmental teleology. This is personal character. A general\nidea, living and conscious now, it is already determinative of acts in\nthe future to an extent to which it is not now conscious.\n\nThis reference to the future is an essential element of personality.\nWere the ends of a person already explicit, there would be no room for\ndevelopment, for growth, for life; and consequently there would be\nno personality. The mere carrying out of predetermined purposes is\nmechanical. This remark has an application to the philosophy of religion.\nIt is that a genuine evolutionary philosophy, that is, one that makes the\nprinciple of growth a primordial element of the universe, is so far from\nbeing antagonistic to the idea of a personal creator, that it is really\ninseparable from that idea; while a necessitarian religion is in an\naltogether false position and is destined to become disintegrated. But a\npseudo-evolutionism which enthrones mechanical law above the principle of\ngrowth, is at once scientifically unsatisfactory, as giving no possible\nhint of how the universe has come about, and hostile to all hopes of\npersonal relations to God.\n\n\nCOMMUNICATION.\n\nConsistently with the doctrine laid down in the beginning of this paper,\nI am bound to maintain that an idea can only be affected by an idea in\ncontinuous connection with it. By anything but an idea, it cannot be\naffected at all. This obliges me to say, as I do say, on other grounds,\nthat what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind\nhide-bound with habits. It still retains the element of diversification;\nand in that diversification there is life. When an idea is conveyed\nfrom one mind to another, it is by forms of combination of the diverse\nelements of nature, say by some curious symmetry, or by some union of a\ntender color with a refined odor. To such forms the law of mechanical\nenergy has no application. If they are eternal, it is in the spirit\nthey embody; and their origin cannot be accounted for by any mechanical\nnecessity. They are embodied ideas; and so only can they convey ideas.\nPrecisely how primary sensations, as colors and tones, are excited, we\ncannot tell, in the present state of psychology. But in our ignorance, I\nthink that we are at liberty to suppose that they arise in essentially\nthe same manner as the other feelings, called secondary. As far as\nsight and hearing are in question, we know that they are only excited\nby vibrations of inconceivable complexity; and the chemical senses\nare probably not more simple. Even the least psychical of peripheral\nsensations, that of pressure, has in its excitation conditions which,\nthough apparently simple, are seen to be complicated enough when we\nconsider the molecules and their attractions. The principle with which\nI set out requires me to maintain that these feelings are communicated\nto the nerves by continuity, so that there must be something like them\nin the excitants themselves. If this seems extravagant, it is to be\nremembered that it is the sole possible way of reaching any explanation\nof sensation, which otherwise must be pronounced a general fact\nabsolutely inexplicable and ultimate. Now absolute inexplicability is a\nhypothesis which sound logic refuses under any circumstances to justify.\n\nI may be asked whether my theory would be favorable or otherwise to\ntelepathy. I have no decided answer to give to this. At first sight, it\nseems unfavorable. Yet there may be other modes of continuous connection\nbetween minds other than those of time and space.\n\nThe recognition by one person of another\u2019s personality takes place by\nmeans to some extent identical with the means by which he is conscious\nof his own personality. The idea of the second personality, which is as\nmuch as to say that second personality itself, enters within the field of\ndirect consciousness of the first person, and is as immediately perceived\nas his ego, though less strongly. At the same time, the opposition\nbetween the two persons is perceived, so that the externality of the\nsecond is recognised.\n\nThe psychological phenomena of intercommunication between two minds have\nbeen unfortunately little studied. So that it is impossible to say, for\ncertain, whether they are favorable to this theory or not. But the very\nextraordinary insight which some persons are able to gain of others from\nindications so slight that it is difficult to ascertain what they are, is\ncertainly rendered more comprehensible by the view here taken.\n\nA difficulty which confronts the synechistic philosophy is this. In\nconsidering personality, that philosophy is forced to accept the doctrine\nof a personal God; but in considering communication, it cannot but admit\nthat if there is a personal God, we must have a direct perception of that\nperson and indeed be in personal communication with him. Now, if that be\nthe case, the question arises how it is possible that the existence of\nthis being should ever have been doubted by anybody. The only answer\nthat I can at present make is that facts that stand before our face and\neyes and stare us in the face are far from being, in all cases, the ones\nmost easily discerned. That has been remarked from time immemorial.\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\nI have thus developed as well as I could in a little space the\n_synechistic_ philosophy, as applied to mind. I think that I have\nsucceeded in making it clear that this doctrine gives room for\nexplanations of many facts which without it are absolutely and hopelessly\ninexplicable; and further that it carries along with it the following\ndoctrines: 1st, a logical realism of the most pronounced type; 2nd,\nobjective idealism; 3rd, tychism, with its consequent thorough-going\nevolutionism. We also notice that the doctrine presents no hindrances to\nspiritual influences, such as some philosophies are felt to do.\n\n C. S. PEIRCE.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[72] This proposition is substantially the same as a theorem of Cantor,\nthough it is enunciated in a much more general form.\n\n\n\n\nMR. CHARLES S. PEIRCE\u2019S ONSLAUGHT ON THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.\n\n\nThe problem of necessity lurks at the bottom of all problems, and\naccording as we accept or reject the idea of necessity we shall be led to\ntwo entirely different world-conceptions.\n\nThe conception of indeterminism generally offers itself first to the\ndoubting mind; and it is apparently a pleasant idea. It promises\nfreedom, it leaves room for the imagination, it makes the world and\nits possibilities wide, much wider than it could be on the plan of\ndeterminism. Determinism is at first sight an oppressive notion and we\nnaturally shrink from it. It seems to destroy the freedom of the will\nand all moral responsibility. From infinite possibilities it narrows the\nworld down to one single actuality; and thus it seems to destroy all the\ncharms of life.\n\nThe former view may be represented as conceiving the all-power of\nthe whole in which and through which we live as a well meaning and\nyielding ruler or a kind-hearted parent who if strongly plied with\nprayer, will for a trifle in order to please an importune favorite\nchange his decisions. The dispensations of his government will be\nfull of exceptions, of private cabinet decrees, of counter orders and\nirregularities. The latter view, however, would represent the entirety\nof the All as an inexorable and uncompromising sovereign, or as a severe\neducator, a stern father who unfalteringly clings to his principles.\nHe leaves full independence to his children, he does not prevent their\nmistakes, yet rigidly lets them bear the consequences of their actions.\nHe never answers prayers except that the prayer itself has its educating\neffects upon him who prays; but he never alters objective facts for the\nsake of him who requests his interference, and he never makes exceptions\neither in favor or disfavor of anybody. In brief; the God of him who\naccepts the former view, will be Chance, while the God of him who accepts\nthe latter view will be Law.\n\nThe choice between the two views seems to remind us of the choice left\nto the heroes of our fairy tales. He who chooses that which appears\npleasant will be led into inextricable confusion, he who chooses that\nwhich appears rigid and oppressive will be led on a path where in spite\nof many difficulties he will be able to make firm and certain steps and\nwill arrive at clearness as well as moral freedom. It is not the golden\ncasket that contains Portia\u2019s picture.\n\nScience constantly operates on the basis of the maxim that there is no\nchance, that everything that happens, happens as it does with necessity.\nThe question is, Is this maxim a mere assumption, a non-verifiable\nworking hypothesis; or is there any reliable evidence in its favor? Is it\ntrue, and if it is, how can it be proved?\n\n\nI.\n\nDAVID HUME REDIVIVUS.\n\nMr. Charles S. Peirce\u2019s article entitled \u201cThe Doctrine of Necessity\nExamined,\u201d which appeared in the last number of _The Monist_, must have\nbeen a surprise to many thinking readers. It must have affected them in\na somewhat similar manner as Hume\u2019s \u201cTreatise of Human Nature\u201d affected\nKant. It roused him from his dogmatic slumber: He abandoned dogmatism\nbut nevertheless did not accept Hume\u2019s skepticism; he remained positive;\nyet he propounded a better positive view than was the old dogmatism; he\nestablished in philosophy the method of critique.\n\nThe parallelism between David Hume, who doubted the validity of our\nconception of causation, and Mr. Charles S. Peirce who denies the\nuniversality of the doctrine of necessity, is very marked in more than\none respect. It is, in spite of many differences, a case of close\nanalogy, and the answer which we shall have to give to either, will in\nmany respects be suited to both. Both shake the ultimate ground of\nscientific research at its very root. Both call in question the most\nfundamental concept upon which all our methods of investigation and\nphilosophy rest. Both challenge the reliability of an idea of which few\nwould hesitate to say that it is all but universally accepted. In fact\nthe ideas \u201ccausation\u201d and \u201cnecessity\u201d are more than kin. If analysed,\nmany of their elements will be found to be actually identical. Thus the\none cannot be either established or doubted without establishing or\ndoubting the other. Accordingly Mr. Peirce, in some respect, repeats\nDavid Hume\u2019s onslaught upon the current conception of the basis of human\nknowledge with the more formidable weapons which a century of close\nthought and scientific investigation have furnished him.\n\nIf Kant\u2019s answer to Hume had been satisfactory, Mr. Peirce probably\nwould not have renewed the attack or he would have had to modify it\nconsiderably. Kant, however, whom we both, Mr. Peirce as much as I\nmyself, admire as a master of philosophic thought, did not solve the\nquestion satisfactorily. Yet Kant pointed out the way of solving it,\nwhich was the middle way between dogmatism and scepticism, called by him\nand his followers \u201cCriticism,\u201d and it is this way on which we trust is\nsafest travelling.\n\nMr. Peirce is right that the doctrine of necessity cannot be\n\u201cpostulated,\u201d for \u201cto postulate a proposition is no more than to hope it\nwill be true.\u201d The doctrine of necessity is, indeed, usually treated as\na postulate, and Mr. Peirce\u2019s attack appears formidable because he shows\nthe weakness of the arguments which are commonly brought forward in its\nfavor and which we grant to be insufficient.\n\nMr. Peirce says (_The Monist_, II, 3, p. 330):\n\n \u201cIn view of all these considerations, I do not believe that\n anybody, not in a state of case-hardened ignorance respecting\n the logic of science, can maintain that the precise and\n universal conformity of facts to law is clearly proved, or even\n rendered particularly probable, by any observations hitherto\n made. In this way, the determined advocate of exact regularity\n will soon find himself driven to _a priori_ reasons to support\n his thesis. These received such a sockdologer from Stuart Mill\n in his Examination of Hamilton, that holding to them now seems\n to me to denote a high degree of imperviousness to reason; so\n that I shall pass them by with little notice.\u201d\n\nMr. Peirce is right when saying that necessitarianism must be founded\non something other than observation. Observation is _a posteriori_; it\nhas reference only to single facts, to particulars; yet the doctrine\nof necessity, if there is anything in it at all, is of universal\napplication. The doctrine of necessity, let us not be afraid to pronounce\nit clearly, is of an _a priori_ nature. The scientist assumes _a priori_,\ni. e. even before he makes his observations or experiments, as a general\nlaw applicable to every process which takes place, that, whatever\nhappens, happens of necessity in consequence of a cause and in conformity\nto law, so that the same cause under the same circumstances will produce\nthe same effects. If all the _a priori_ reasons, as Mr. Peirce maintains,\nreceived a sockdologer from Stuart Mill, then indeed we shall have to\nabandon the idea of necessity as the superstition of a past and erroneous\nphilosophy and we shall have to start the world of science over again.\n\nMr. Peirce denies the strict regularity of natural law and introduces an\nelement of chance. He says (ibid. p. 336):\n\n \u201cTo undertake to account for anything by saying boldly that it\n is due to chance would, indeed, be futile. But this I do not\n do. _I make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle\n of generalization, or tendency to form habits, which I hold\n has produced all regularities._[73] The mechanical philosopher\n leaves the whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted\n for, which is pretty nearly as bad as to boldly attribute it to\n chance. I attribute it altogether to chance, it is true, but\n to chance in the form of a spontaneity which is to some degree\n regular.\u201d\n\nMr. Peirce is the pathfinder of a new and as yet untried road. He strikes\nout boldly into the tumultuous ocean of chance, hoping to find in his\njourney the connection between the East and the West, between contrasts\nthat seem to him otherwise unconnectible. The confidence of the bold\ndiscoverer is set forth in the warnings he gives to all seafaring people.\nHe attempts to frighten the ill-informed minds who might innocently\nventure out in other directions; and he will thus naturally prevent\nmany from falling either into the Charybdis of doubting the propriety\nof applying the logic of probabilities to the problem of necessity\nand causation in general, or, worse still, into the Scylla of the _a\npriori_. The former, he tells us denotes \u201ca state of case-hardened\nignorance respecting the logic of science,\u201d the latter \u201ca high degree of\nimperviousness to reason.\u201d\n\nMr. Peirce is well known as one of the keenest logicians now living.\nConsidering this fact I am slow to take up arms against him in defending\na case which he so strongly brands beforehand. I must from the beginning\nplead guilty to a belief in necessity, and having critically revised\nmy view once more I cannot help upholding it. I am fully conscious of\nthe fact that hundreds, thousands, and millions of single experiences\n(which in Kantian terminology are called _a posteriori_ arguments) cannot\nestablish a solid belief in necessity, nor can any imaginable number of\nsequences prove the rigidity of causation, and I confess freely that I\nsupport my thesis with _a priori_ reasons. Yet at the same time attention\nmust be called to the fact that neither Mr. Hamilton nor Mr. Mill had any\nadequate conception of the _a priori_, and Mr. Mill\u2019s sockdologer does\nnot disturb in the least the assurance of my view; for the _a priori_\ncan, in my opinion, be based upon the firm ground of experience.\n\nAll the many sense-experiences at our command, if considered singly,\ncannot constitute knowledge. In order to weave the woof of the _a\nposteriori_ into coherent cloth we want the warp of the _a priori_, and\nI do not see how we can do without it. But the _a priori_ is not that\nmystical hocus-pocus of absolute truth with its impertinent assumptions\nsuch as it is presented by pseudo-Kantians and justly denounced by Mill;\nit is not as Mr. Peirce brands it an \u201cI cannot help believing,\u201d it is\nnot a \u201cnatural belief,\u201d nor is it as others conceive it an innate idea.\nIt is, briefly described, simply and solely formal knowledge, such as 2\n\u00d7 2 = 4, to which we attribute universality and necessity and with the\nassistance of which we are enabled to predict and predetermine certain\nresults beforehand (i. e. _a priori_). We might invent a new name for the\n_a priori_, the latter having become odious through the denunciations of\nits enemies and worse still, having been distorted beyond recognition\nthrough the misuse to which it was put by its defenders and suppositional\nfriends. Yet that would be another question, and the idea of the _a\npriori_, i. e. of formal knowledge involving universality and necessity\nwould remain the same.\n\nThe universality and necessity of formal knowledge are as a rule taken\nfor granted by scientists. But philosophy can take nothing for granted,\nand the problem rises: How is the belief in the universality and\nnecessity of formal knowledge to be justified? Mr. Peirce\u2019s onslaught on\nthe doctrine of necessity is a challenge to answer this question.\n\n\nII.\n\nCAUSATION NOT MERE SEQUENCE.\n\nMr. John Venn published some twenty-five or six years ago an excellent\ntreatise called \u201cThe Logic of Chance.\u201d This work opened the eyes of many\nto the great importance of the calculus of probabilities as a method\nof science which was of much wider application than had before been\nsuspected. This admirable work we may boldly say marks a new epoch in the\nstudy of logic, it opened new vistas, and many expectations created by\nit have since been realised. Yet it is to be regretted that the author\nadopts Hume\u2019s erroneous conception of causality and thus implicitly\npaves the way which Mr. Peirce has actually followed and which leads\nto a denial of the doctrine of necessity. Concerning \u201cthe doctrine of\nuniversal causation\u201d Mr. Venn says, in Chapter XIV:\n\n \u201cWe will employ the word simply in the sense which is becoming\n almost universally adopted by scientific men, viz. that of\n invariable unconditional sequence.\n\n \u201cIt is in this sense that the word _cause_ is used by Mr.\n Mill....\n\n \u201cThis meaning of the term is rapidly becoming the popular, or\n rather, the popular scientific one.\u201d\n\nThis idea of \u201csequence\u201d however was exactly Hume\u2019s mistake, adopted by\nMr. Mill and through Mr. Mill popularised among English thinkers. If\nthe nature of cause and effect were really constituted by invariable\nsequence, then the night might be called the effect of the day because\nnight is invariably consequent upon day.\n\nHume, taking the ground that cause and effect constitute a sequence,\nattempted a synthesis of both; he searched for a proof of their identity\nand failed. And it was natural that he failed, for cause and effect are\nso radically different that we cannot bring them into the formula of an\nequation as \u201ccause = effect.\u201d There is no cause that is equal to its\neffect.\n\nHume should have considered causation as one single process, and instead\nof attempting a synthesis, he should have made an analysis. The analysis\nwould have shown that cause and effect are two abstract and correlative\nterms of one whole and inseparable event. Cause is not identical with\neffect, but the whole event is identical with itself.\n\nIf my finger touches a key of the piano, a chord is struck; the chord\nswings and produces certain air-vibrations. In this process from the\nbeginning to the end all the energy employed and the mass of the material\nparticles remain in amount the same, yet there is a change of form taking\nplace. Causation is not mere sequence, but a sequence of quite a special\nkind. It is a sequence of two states which belong together as an initial\nand a final aspect of one and the same event.\n\nSo long as we know of two events simply that they follow one another,\nalthough the sequence may in every case be invariable and unexceptional,\nwe are not justified in calling them cause and effect. No amount of\nexperience is sufficient to constitute causation by a mere synthesis of\nsequences, and to have appreciated this truth is the immortal merit of\nthe great Scotchman who boldly took the consequence of the argument and\nacquiesced in scepticism.\n\nThe problem, however, is not so desperate as Hume thought. If Hume\ncould have considered his argument in the light which the law of the\nconservation of matter and energy sheds upon it, he would most likely\nhave abandoned his scepticism; for causality is perfectly intelligible if\nconceived not as a synthesis of two radically different events, but as a\nprocess of transformation, of which the prior state is called cause and\nthe final one effect.\n\nThat two radically different events, which are not thought of as\ntransformation, invariably follow each other without our being able to\ndiscover any connection between them, will naturally appear as a mystery;\nbut that two forms are radically different things, although they may be\nforms of the same amount of matter and energy, is no mystery. The effect\nis, or may be, something entirely new.\n\nThe configuration of things as it appears in the effect, did not exist\nbefore. But for that reason, it is no creation out of nothing, it is not\nan incomprehensible event, it is no miracle.\n\nIt is a very wonderful thing that two congruent regular tetrahedrons,\nwhen put together, will form a hexahedron, but the laws of form do\nperfectly and satisfactorily explain it. Supposing we had no idea of the\nlaws of form or only an incoherent and fragmentary knowledge of them,\nshould we not look upon the result of this combination as a strange and\nincomprehensible mystery. Two heaps of flour one poured upon the other\nwill give one heap of the same kind and shape but of a larger size.\nHowever, the combination of the two four-sided bodies does not produce\nanother four-sided body doubly as large as any of the two four-sided\nbodies. Nor does it produce an eight-sided body. It produces a six-sided\nbody, which is something quite new. The result is not contained in the\nconditions singly, for no one can say that six-sidedness is a quality\nimplicitly contained in four-sided bodies.\n\nThe process of combining hydrogen with oxygen into water (H\u2082O) is\nan immensely more complex case, and the qualities resulting from a\ndifference of density as well as configuration are entirely unknown to\nus. There is nevertheless no reason whatever to consider the process\nas different in principle; it is a case of transformation in which the\namount of matter and energy remains the same.\n\nWhatever the value of the logic of chance may be for scientific reasoning\nin establishing gradations of certainty and formulating the reliability\nof a certain belief, we deny most positively its applicability to the\nprinciple of causation in general. If we ask what the chance is of a\ncombination of two congruent tetrahedrons becoming a hexahedron, we must\nanswer that the probability is exactly 1, which means certainty, and\ncertainty is but another name for necessity.\n\nMr. Peirce does not object to necessity in certain cases, he objects\nto necessity being a universal feature of the world. He objects to the\nrigidity of causation in so far only as to allow a trifle of chance to\nenter into nature.\n\nOne or two cases or even a hundred, and a thousand, nay millions of\nmillions of cases in which causation is explicable as transformation\nis no proof that this must always be so. Mr. Peirce may grant and most\nlikely he does grant that causation in a definite set of experiences is\ntransformation, yet what guarantee do we have for saying that it is the\nonly kind of causation. Might there not be room in this world for another\ncausation which for lack of a full comprehension of its nature, we may\ncall the causation of chance?\n\nWe answer that form is a quality of this world, not of some samples of\nit, but throughout, so far as we know of existence even in the most\nsuperficial way, and thus we know beforehand or _a priori_ that the laws\nof form hold good so far as our telescopes sweep through space. We are\nignorant as to the qualities dependent upon special forms of matter or\nenergy, and we can acquire any knowledge thereof only through experience;\nbut that is no reason to doubt the validity of causation in general,\nor to surmise the probability of there being somewhere a different\narrangement of nature.\n\nThus we come to the conclusion that the calculus of probabilities is not\napplicable to the order of the world as to whether it may or may not\nbe universal. And in corroboration of this our position we quote the\nfollowing passage from a high authority in the science of logic, who is\nno less than Mr. Charles S. Peirce himself. \u201cIllustrations of the Logic\nof Science,\u201d (_Popular Science Monthly_, 1877, p. 714):\n\n \u201cThe relative probability of this or that arrangement of\n Nature is something which we should have a right to talk about\n if universes were as plenty as blackberries, if we could put\n a quantity of them in a bag, shake them well up, draw out a\n sample, and examine them to see what proportion of them had\n one arrangement and what proportion another. But, even in\n that case, a higher universe would contain us, in regard to\n whose arrangements the conception of probability could have no\n applicability.\u201d\n\nMr. Peirce is still more emphatic in another passage which reads (ib.\n1878, p. 205):\n\n \u201cIf any one has ever maintained that the universe is a pure\n throw of the dice, the theologians have abundantly refuted him.\n \u2018How often,\u2019 says Archbishop Tillotson, \u2018might a man, after\n he had jumbled a set of letters in a bag, fling them out upon\n the ground before they would fall into an exact poem, yea,\n or so much as make a good discourse in prose! And may not a\n little book be as easily made by chance as this great volume\n of the world?\u2019 The chance world here shown to be so different\n from that in which we live would be one in which there were\n no laws, the characters of different things being entirely\n independent; so that, should a sample of any kind of objects\n ever show a prevalent character, it could only be by accident,\n and no general proposition could ever be established. Whatever\n further conclusions we may come to in regard to the order of\n the universe, thus much may be regarded as solidly established,\n that the world is not a mere chance-medley.\u201d\n\nHere follows a close reasoning of several pages which ends (on p. 207)\nwith a paragraph beginning with the words:\n\n \u201cThis shows that a contradiction is involved in the very idea\n of a chance world.\u201d\n\nAnd a long paragraph on p. 208 winds up with these sentences:\n\n \u201cThe actual world is almost a chance-medley to the mind of a\n polyp. The interest which the uniformities of Nature have for\n an animal measures his place in the scale of intelligence.\u201d\n\nThis is exactly the position which I defend. If universes were as plenty\nas blackberries we might talk about the order of other universes. They\nmight be four- or five- or _n_-dimensional. Yet even in all these cases\nthey would not be void of form. The four-dimensional universe would have\nanother arrangement, but its laws would be none the less orderly, none\nthe less regular, and a higher universe would contain them all. Supposing\nthere were four- or five-dimensional space somewhere, we could state\nwith absolute precision all the formal laws by which bodies of so many\ndimensions were governed.[74]\n\nThe order of form and the rigidity of formal laws is as universal and\nomnipresent as God. They encompass our path and our lying down, they have\nbeset our behind and before. If we ascend up into heaven they are there,\nif we make our beds in hell, behold they are there. If we take the wings\nof the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there\nthey shall lead us and hold us.\n\n\nIII.\n\nMR. PEIRCE\u2019S LOGIC OF SCIENCE.\n\nIn spite of the fundamental difference that obtains between Mr. Peirce\u2019s\nand our own world-conception, we must state that there are many\nmost important points of agreement. Mr. Peirce says in his article\n\u201cIllustrations of the Logic of Science,\u201d (ibid. p. 3 and 7):\n\n \u201cThe object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration\n of what we already know, something else which we do not know....\n\n \u201cThe settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry.\u201d\n\nThere are according to Peirce several methods of settling opinion, which\nswayed humanity in an historic succession: (1) The method of tenacity.\nDoubt being an uneasy and dissatisfied state, we cling tenaciously not\nmerely to believing, but to believing just what we do believe. (2) The\nmethod of authority, which is that of the Roman Church and of all great\npolitical and religious institutions of the past. (3) The _a priori_\nmethod, by which Mr. Peirce understands the fixing of belief agreeably to\nreason, i. e. to the subjective conviction of the individual thinker. All\nthese methods have their merits, says Mr. Peirce (ibid. p. 13):\n\n \u201cThe _a priori_ method is distinguished for its comfortable\n conclusions. It is the nature of the process to adopt whatever\n belief we are inclined to, and there are certain flatteries\n to the vanity of man which we all believe by nature, until we\n are awakened from our pleasing dream by some rough facts. The\n method of authority will always govern the mass of mankind....\n But most of all I admire the method of tenacity for its\n strength, simplicity, and directness.\u201d\n\nIt is apparent that the merit of the _a priori_ method so called\nis really a vice. The _a priori_ method so called is the basis of\nagnosticism. If according to my reason this, and according to your reason\nthat, may be the truth, where does truth remain? If truth is purely\nsubjective, truth becomes impossible. The method of settling belief\nagreeably to our individual tempers is the death of objective truth, of\nscience and philosophy.\n\nMr. Peirce fully recognises the practical importance of thought. He says:\n\n \u201cThe production of belief is the sole function of thought\u201d\n (ibid. p. 289).\n\n \u201cOur beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions\u201d (ibid. p.\n 5).\n\n \u201cWhat is belief? First, it is something that we are aware of;\n second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and third, it\n involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action,\n or, say for short, a _habit_\u201d (ibid. p. 291).\n\n \u201cThus, we come down to what is tangible and practical, as\n the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how\n subtile it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so\n fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of\n practice\u201d (ibid. p. 293).\n\nMr. Peirce is very far from considering philosophy as a mere matter of\nspeculation or theory without practical importance. He says:\n\n \u201cWhat sort of a conception we ought to have of the universe,\n how to think of the _ensemble_ of things, is a fundamental\n problem in the theory of reasoning.\u201d\n\nThe _a priori_ method, so called by Mr. Peirce, translated into practical\nlife is not only the death of truth but also of morality. The objective\ncriterion of truth is gone, and with it goes the objective standard of\nright and wrong. If that is true which seems so to my individual reason,\nthen that is right which pleases me best. What is right to me might be\nwrong to you. Thus this method leads either to moral indifference, or to\nbasing ethics upon the greatest amount of pleasure attainable, (Hedonism,\nas represented by Mr. H. Spencer, Prof. Harald H\u00f6ffding, Professor\nGizycki, and others,) or to relying upon the individual conscience as an\nabsolute and ultimate authority.[75]\n\nThe method of settling opinion agreeably to individual reason is at\npresent the most fashionable and widely spread conception, and it shows\nits influence in the almost universal acceptation of agnosticism to-day.\nIs that the final decision with which we have to rest satisfied? If it\nwere, we would better return to the method of authority or tenacity.\nNo, it is not the sum of all wisdom. The _a priori_ method so called\nrepresents a period of transition, which, if persistently pursued, will\nlead to the bankruptcy of thought, the desperate appearance of which is\nwell disguised in the big sounding and modesty-parading term agnosticism.\nAnd here we return to the exposition of Mr. Peirce\u2019s views. Mr. Peirce\ndoes not accept the _a priori_ method, he believes in \u201cthe logic of\nscience.\u201d Mr. Peirce says:\n\n \u201cTo satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a\n method should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by\n nothing human, but by some external permanency\u2014by something\n upon which our thinking has no effect.... The method must be\n such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the\n same. Such is the method of science\u201d (ibid. p. 11.)\n\n \u201cThat whose characters are independent of how you or I think is\n an external reality\u201d (ibid. p. 298).\n\n \u201cAll the followers of science are fully persuaded that the\n processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will\n give one certain solution to every question to which they can\n be applied.... They may at first obtain different results, but,\n as each perfects his method and his processes, the results\n will move steadily together toward a destined centre.... The\n opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who\n investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object\n represented in this opinion is the real\u201d (ibid. pp. 299-300).\n\nThe word \u201cfated\u201d must be understood as Mr. Peirce understands it. He adds\nin a foot-note:\n\n \u201cFate means merely that which is sure to come true, and cannot\n be avoided.\u201d\n\n\nIV.\n\nNECESSITY IN THOUGHT PRESUPPOSES NECESSITY IN FACTS.\n\nI have thus outlined Mr. Peirce\u2019s views, not only because his line of\nreasoning[76] is admirable and deserves to be universally known and\nrecognised, but also because it seems to me to have some bearing upon the\nquestion at issue.\n\nIf the ultimate conclusion of every man concerning reality shall be the\nsame, there must be some truth in the idea of necessity. If there is an\nopinion \u201cfated to be ultimately agreed to,\u201d we are confronted in our\nrepresentation of reality with something that is inevitable. Shall there\nbe necessity in thought but not in that of which all our ideas are but\nimages and symbols? We can conceive of the necessity in the ideal realm\nof thought only as a reflection of that necessity which pervades the\noriginal and prototype of our thought, which lives in reality.\n\n\nV.\n\nMR. PEIRCE\u2019S EVOLUTIONISM.\n\nI have tried to find an explanation of Mr. Peirce\u2019s position which\nappears to me self-contradictory and I believe I have found the key that\nwill explain it.\n\nI read somewhere a stray remark of Mr. Peirce\u2019s in which he demanded\nthat evolutionism should be thorough-going. The conception of evolution\nin vogue at present, he said, stops short at a certain point, and\nsubstitutes for an explanation the unknowable. Mr. Peirce says:\n\n \u201cDoes not space call for some explanation? Is not that a\n half-way philosophy which in these our days does not explain,\n or at least hold out some promise of explaining, why space\n is continuous, why it has such a wonderful uniformity in all\n its parts, why there are neither more nor less than three\n dimensions everywhere, why every closed curve can, by a\n continuous change of position, size, and form, be brought into\n coincidence with every other, and why the three angles of a\n triangle make exactly one hundred and eighty degrees, or at\n least so very closely so that we cannot tell whether they make\n more or less?\u201d\n\nMr. Peirce does not intend to halt before these problems, but to explain\nthem and carries the principle of evolution to its ultimate conclusions,\nso as to explain from it not only the forms of living organisms but also\nthe laws of nature including the laws of space. Mr. Peirce declares in\nhis article \u201cThe Architecture of Theories\u201d (_The Monist_, Vol. I, No. 2,\np. 165):\n\n \u201cUniformities are precisely the sort of facts that need to be\n accounted for.... Law is _par excellence_ the thing that wants\n a reason.\u201d\n\nAnd what he means by it is further elucidated in his article \u201cThe\nDoctrine of Necessity Examined\u201d (_The Monist_, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 334):\n\n \u201cThat single events should be hard and unintelligible, logic\n will permit without difficulty: we do not expect to make the\n shock of a personally experienced earthquake appear natural and\n reasonable by any amount of cogitation. But logic does expect\n things _general_ to be understandable. To say that there is a\n universal law, and that it is a hard, ultimate, unintelligible\n fact, the why and wherefore of which can never be inquired\n into, at this a sound logic will revolt; and will pass over\n at once to a method of philosophising which does not thus\n barricade the road of discovery.\u201d\n\nIt is perfectly true that \u201claw is _par excellence_ the thing that wants\na reason,\u201d and any explanation that explains it by the assumption of an\nunknowable is unphilosophical. I agree with Mr. Peirce that we must not\nhalt here; but I have no confidence in his method of explanation. Mr.\nPeirce\u2019s original idea, then, and I should add, his main mistake, is that\nhe proposes to explain the origin of natural law by evolution.\n\nIn his legitimate anxiety to explain law, Mr. Peirce declares chance to\nbe exempt therefrom. He says:\n\n \u201cThat a pitched coin should sometimes turn up heads and\n sometimes tails calls for no particular explanation.\u201d (_The\n Monist_, Vol. I, No. 2, p. 165.)\n\nBut chance in our opinion needs exactly as much explanation as anything\nelse. Mr. Peirce very improperly identifies \u201cthat which cannot be\naccounted for\u201d with \u201cthat which need not be accounted for.\u201d Absolute\nchance, if it existed, would _not_ so much _not_ call for a particular\nexplanation as actually be unexplainable, and being incapable of\nexplanation, it would have to be considered as an unintelligible fact,\nas inscrutable, incomprehensible, and mystical. On the assumption that\nchance need not be accounted for, Mr. Peirce builds the architecture of\nhis theory. He says:\n\n \u201cChance is first, law is second, the tendency of habits is\n third.\u201d\n\nThe application of this general statement is set forth in the following\npassage:\n\n \u201cIn psychology Feeling is First, Sense of reaction Second,\n General conception Third, or mediation. In biology, the idea of\n arbitrary sporting is first, heredity is second, the process\n whereby the accidental characters become fixed is third.\u201d\n\nHow little after all we can escape the determinism of law as being a\nfeature of the world will be seen from the fact, that the explanation\nfor the evolution of law is presented by Mr. Peirce as being itself a\nlaw, i. e. a formula describing a regularity supposed to obtain in facts.\nDoes not Mr. Peirce\u2019s formula, supposing it to be true, deserve the same\nreproach which he casts upon natural law in general, viz., that it is \u201ca\nhard, ultimate, unintelligible fact, the why and wherefore of which can\nnever be inquired into\u201d?\n\n\nVI.\n\nWORLD-CONSTRUCTIONS.\n\nThere are two methods of philosophising, one starts with ideas which\nare supposed not to need any explanation, the other starts from facts\nand uses facts as data. The former is the method of the constructionist\nor ontologist, the latter that of the positivist. The constructionist\nattempts to beget a world-theory in the same way that God was supposed\nto have created the world; he attempts to bring it into being either\nout of a real nothing or out of something like nothing. He constructs a\nworld-theory out of the self-evident, out of the absolute, out of the\nindubitable, or out of that the contrary of which is inconceivable. The\npositivist, however, employs facts as the given material, which he works\nout into a consistent and systematic whole. The former view is synthetic\nand constructive, the latter is analytic and descriptive. The former view\nis the method of Hegel, Oken, and also of Mr. Spencer, the latter is the\nmethod of all scientists and the ideal of the positive philosophy.\n\nMr. Peirce although very positivistic in his logic of science, must in\nphilosophy still be counted among the constructionists.\n\nChance is to Mr. Peirce as much absolute as was to Hegel the idea\nof \u201cabstract being,\u201d which as such, Hegel said, is equivalent to\n\u201cnon-being.\u201d Non-being need not be accounted for. So Hegel starts with\nthis idea, and finding that \u201cbecoming\u201d is the oscillation between being\nand non-being launches his abstract thought upon the terra firma of\nreality.\n\nIn the same way and with similar ingenious ingenuity Oken starts\nthe world with zero. Zero or non-being need not be accounted for.\nIts existence calls for no particular reasons. What is zero? We can\nconceive it as \u201c0 = 1 - 1.\u201d Thus we have \u201c+1\u201d and \u201c-1,\u201d two units. The\nwhole world, according to Oken, is only a disintegration of Nothing,\nan equation of enormous complexity but always equal to zero. And that\nexplains the world!\n\nMr. Spencer, adopts \u201cthe principle of setting out with propositions of\nwhich the negations are unconceivable,\u201d without being aware that any\ninveterate belief or prejudice can be defended from that standpoint.\nThe principle is purely subjective. It does not admit of any objective\nverification and limits knowledge to individual conception. If Mr.\nSpencer\u2019s principle were admissible, we could not refute the adversaries\nof the Copernican system, when they declare that the rotation of the\nearth up on which we stand is inconceivable. The maxim that that\nproposition is most certain the negation of which is inconceivable might\nafter all, and it actually did very often, come into conflict with facts.\nMany propositions are now confidently accepted which were formerly\ndeclared to be positively inconceivable.\n\nMr. Peirce, I say, starts the world with an abstract idea of a something\nof which he assumes we need not give any account, as did the great\nontologists of former times. He constructs, agreeably to his reason, a\ntheory of the way in which the world might have originated, and thus he\nfalls into the mistake criticised by himself as the _a priori_ method.\nYet the weakest point of Mr. Peirce\u2019s system is that his \u201cabsolute\nchance\u201d begets order; irregularity becomes law by practice, as if by a\nsufficiently prolonged shaking the dice would by and by acquire the habit\nof turning up the same faces each time.\n\nThe present world-conception of the scientist regards natural laws as\neternal. The order that prevails in these laws constitutes the principle\nof evolution and changes the chaos of a nebula into a well-arranged\nplanetary system. Thus the original chaos is properly speaking no chaos.\nIt is in all its parts regulated by law and only appears chaotic in\ncomparison with more advanced stages of evolution.\n\nDesirous to account for the regularities of nature Mr. Peirce proposes\nthe idea that nature in the beginning was a real, true chaos, without\norder, without laws, the single actions of reality taking place\nirregularly and in a sportive manner. Absolute chance prevailed.\nEverything was undetermined, exactly as much so as a man is undetermined\nin his action before his belief is settled. Yet a man, by and by, forms\na belief and acts accordingly, not once or twice, but often, until a\nhabit is formed. Thus Mr. Peirce assumes, Nature\u2019s actions are first\nundetermined, they may be of this kind or of another kind. The same\nparticle of reality may under the same conditions act in different ways,\nyet it acts somehow; it acts again, and repeats a certain kind of action\nmore frequently than others, thus forming habits. Laws according to Mr.\nPeirce are the habits acquired by nature.\n\nThe proposition of Mr. Peirce\u2019s logic of science points out another\nmethod of constructing a world-conception. The recognition of reality in\nthe sense as he conceives it, admonishes us that our world-conception\nshould be a picturing, a mirroring, an imitation of the objective world\nof facts. It should not be the architecture of a theory, but first\nan analysis and then a reconstruction of experience; it should be a\ndescription of facts, methodically arranged.\n\n\nVII.\n\nFACTS AND LAWS.\n\nThat which we call natural law is not the description of a certain\nspecial and concrete form of existence which is now or then and here\nor there, but of some general quality of facts which is everywhere and\nalways. The former, i. e. every special and concrete form of existence,\ncan be explained by evolution, the latter, i. e. natural law, cannot. The\nformer has to be accounted for by the law of causation, the latter by the\nprinciple of sufficient reason. And it is this distinction between cause\nand reason which Mr. Peirce does not seem to have regarded.\n\nEvery special form of existence must, at least theoretically, be\ntraceable as the effect of some cause and every law of nature must be\nexplainable by showing its connection with other natural laws. The only\nthing in the world of which we cannot and need not give account is the\nexistence of facts itself, or being in general, which is the stubborn\npresence of reality in us ourselves and also outside of us, objected\nto our own being as an independent power to which we have to adapt our\nconduct. We need not prove its existence, for it exists. If anything\nis ultimate, facts are ultimate; and cognition is nothing but the\nreconstruction of facts for the purpose of orientation among them, it is\na methodical description of reality in the symbols of the feelings that\nexist in sentient beings.\n\nA scientist having observed a special process of nature, describes it,\nif possible, in such a way that it is recognised as a transformation. A\ndescription of this kind is called an explanation. It renders the process\nintelligible to us; it is complete and exhaustive. In order to make such\na description available for comprehending other cases of the same or\nsimilar kind, we have to introduce another principle, which is that of\neconomy. We must single out those features which are common to a certain\nclass and remove all diversity and specificalness. All specificalness\nand diversity are transient features due to special conditions; they\ndisappear with these special conditions. Thus the notion of natural law\ninvolves as an essential characteristic and fundamental quality the\nabsence of the incidental and the temporal.\n\nNatural laws describe the facts of nature _sub specie aeternitatis_. They\ncease to be natural laws in the proper sense of the word as soon as they\nare conceived, like legal laws, as products of evolutions, which have\nappeared in time and may disappear again. Eternity is the characteristic\nfeature of a natural law, it is its backbone, the essence of its being,\nits _conditio sine qua non_.\n\nThus in considering a natural phenomenon we are led to distinguish\nbetween its cause and its reason: Its cause is something special, it is\nan individual event, happening in time, and accordingly being transient;\nit is an occurrence of some kind, it is a single and definite fact.\nHowever its reason is not anything special, it is something general;\nit is not a single and definite fact, but it is a law of universal\napplication; it is not transient, but a conception of things in which the\nincidental and temporal are eliminated. A reason is applicable to all\ncases of the same kind and also to all cases of any time. A cause, i. e.\na fact, if it truly exists, is real (not true); a law, i. e. a reason,\nif it really obtains in nature, is true (not real), and any attempt at\nexplaining natural laws as a product of evolution, being based upon the\nview that regards them as causes not as reasons, as real not as true, as\na description of temporal existences, not as viewing facts _sub specie\naeternitatis_, must from the outset be a failure.[77]\n\nMr. Peirce attempts to explain natural laws as if they were single and\nconcrete facts. Where we have to look for reasons he evidently employs\nthe method of searching for causes. He treats that which in its very\nnature is eternal, as if it were temporal. He regards the everlasting,\nthe imperishable, the immutable as if it had originated, as if it were\ntransient, as if it were the product of a development.\n\n\nVIII.\n\nLAWS NOT INEXPLICABLE.\n\nBut is not Mr. Peirce justified in declaring that law remains\nunexplained? Is law really as he says \u201chard, ultimate, inexplicable,\nimmutable\u201d? Law is to be regarded as immutable but not as ultimate or\ninexplicable, and thus Mr. Peirce\u2019s denunciation of natural law is not\njustified. All natural laws must be conceived as forming one system\nascending from the lower to the higher, from the more special to the\nmore general. And the more comprehensive law represents in each case the\nreason for the less comprehensive law which is comprised in it. Thus we\nmust finally reach the most general or all-comprehensive law, which is a\ndescription of that which is a universal quality of existence.\n\nThere is wrong notion prevalent among many thinkers that the most\ncomprehensive description (law or reason) of a certain kind should,\nas in a nutshell, contain and immediately explain all that which it\nembraces, so that if once in its possession, we should be omniscient as\nto all the rest. The most universal law is looked upon as the centre of\nexistence\u2014_das Innerste der Welt_. If we could but get there, we should\nsolve all the world-problems by mere intuition. This is the old error of\nthe students of magic, whose hope is expressed by Faust when he says:\n\n \u201c_Dass ich erkenne, was die Welt_\n _Im Innersten zusammenh\u00e4lt._\u201d\n\n That I may detect the inmost force\n Which binds the world and shapes its course.\u2014_Bayard Taylor._\n\nComprehension is not attained simply by finding out and stating the most\ngeneral feature of a certain class of facts; comprehension does not alone\nconsist of generalisation but also of discrimination. The differences\namong less general laws must be recognised as results of special\nconditions. And any knowledge of a general law reveals nothing about the\nspecial conditions under the influence of which the same law will work\ndifferently.\n\nIt is but too often overlooked that the more general a statement is, the\nless it will contain, the vaguer it will appear, the emptier it must be.\nThere is no royal road to cognition and mere generalisation is of no\navail. We shall have to investigate the details of every case and view\nit in its relation to the general law. The general law must be viewed\nunder those conditions which will invariably produce the same special\nmodifications.\n\nBut do not the most general reasons remain uncomprehended? Do we not at\nlast arrive at an ultimate law which, then, must be hard and inexplicable?\n\nThose laws which appear in every respect to be universal are the formal\nlaws of mathematics, arithmetic, and their kindred sciences. And all\nthese formal sciences are not only _not_ mystical, unintelligible, and\ninexplicable, but they are the most perspicuous, most reliable, and most\ncertain knowledge we possess. All their theorems admit of the most rigid\ndemonstration, and the last shadow of mysticism has been removed by\nHermann Grassmann. Owing to his searching investigations we are no longer\nin need of axioms which were formerly supposed to be the indispensable\nbasis of mathematics.\n\nThere is however a basis of formal thought left which we cannot dispense\nwith; that is the idea of sameness, generally formulated as the law of\nidentity. Is perhaps the law of identity by which all the regularities\nof nature are to be accounted for, inexplicable? Hardly! The idea of\nsameness has a solid basis in the facts of experience.[78]\n\n\nIX.\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\nThe contrast between Determinism and Indeterminism is old, yet Mr.\nPeirce has worked out quite a new aspect of Indeterminism and places it\nupon a basis that appears to be a more solid foundation than it ever\nbefore possessed. At the same time he succeeds in making some of its\nconsequences so plausible, that in this new garb it will appeal more\nstrongly than before to scientifically trained minds. With all deference\nto the logical acuteness of Mr. Peirce and with all admiration for the\noriginality and depth of his thought, we cannot, however, accede to the\nnew philosophy which he proposes.\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s propositions go to the core of all problems, they upset\neverything that has heretofore been considered as firm ground, they\nquestion the most fundamental concepts of the world-conception upon\nwhich all scientific reasoning and the methods of the positive philosophy\nrest. Thus they set us a-thinking and will help us to attain greater\nclearness on points which are to all of us of greater concern than may\nat first sight appear. For the fundamental problems of philosophy have\na deep practical importance. Their importance is less noticeable, less\nobvious, but at the same time more sweeping the more fundamental they are.\n\nLet us here in concluding this article consider only one, but the most\nstriking one, of the consequences to which both views lead.\n\nIndeterminism leads to a conception of God which although we may call\nit \u201cmind\u201d and place it at the beginning of the world, is pure chance or\nthe indeterminateness of an arbitrary sporting. Determinism on the other\nhand leads to a recognition of God as that something in nature that is\nas it is, that has been and will be. Science, whose method of cognising\nthe truth is and can only be to know in parts, attempts to describe the\npartial qualities of this something in natural laws.\n\nIt is of great consequence in practical life whether God is what the\nname Jahveh intends to convey, eternal and unalterable being, immutable\nsameness in the perpetual flux, irrefragable law in the changes of\nevolution, or whether it is the \u03a4\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae of the pagans, i. e. indeterminable\nand absolute chance, unaccountable, irregular, capricious, and uncertain.\n\nThe God-idea is the basis of ethics. It matters little whether we use or\navoid the name God, for the atheist has also a God-idea in his conception\nof that existence in which he lives and moves and has his being. This\nGod-idea is always the ground from which we derive our rules of conduct;\nand whenever we change, not our terminology but our idea of God, we shall\nas a matter of consistency have to change our views of ethics also.\n\n EDITOR.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[73] Italics are ours.\n\n[74] See _Fundamental Problems_, p. 55.\n\n[75] This is the position of the Societies for Ethical Culture which are\nnot confessedly but practically agnostics. Professor Adler\u2019s position is\ncharacterised in _The Monist_, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 567, 599, and _The Open\nCourt_ Nos. 225 and 234. Mr. Salter bases ethics upon \u201cthe immovable rock\nof conscience.\u201d (See his _Ethical Religion_, p. 295.)\n\n[76] Ernst Schroeder in his great work _Vorlesungen \u00fcber die Algebra der\nLogik_ adopts in the main the results of Peirce. A sketch of Mr. Peirce\u2019s\nline of thought, (his _Gedankengang_, as Schroeder calls it,) is found in\nthe _Einleitung_, pp. 107-118.\n\n[77] I laid down my views on the subject in a short monograph of only 82\npages, entitled _Ursache, Grund und Zweck, eine philosophische Abhandlung\nzur Kl\u00e4rung der Begriffe_ (Dresden: R. von Grumbkow, Hof. Verlag, 1883).\nIn all main points I maintain the same standpoint still. See also\n_Fundamental Problems_, the chapter on Causality, pp. 79-91 and 96-109.\n\nSince the publication of my German pamphlet my confidence that we can,\n(not only in the special sciences such as chemistry, mineralogy, botany,\netc., but also in philosophy) arrive at truth, has rather been confirmed\nthan shaken. We can create a common ground on which all philosophers\nagree, as much as mathematicians agree concerning the Pythagorean\ntheorem. But in order to achieve this ideal, philosophers must abandon\nall attempts at originality. The hankering after originality is an\ninherited evil in the family of philosophers. The first philosophers\nwere poets, priests, and prophets; later on in the natural evolution\nof human culture, a differentiation of their combined functions took\nplace. Originality is a virtue in the poet but a vice in his brother,\nthe philosopher. The philosopher\u2019s ideal must be to free himself of all\nindividualism, subjectivity, and original conceptions; he must become\nstrictly objective. He must renounce his personal likes and dislikes, and\nmake his soul a mirror of nature, faithfully and correctly to represent\nthe facts and nothing but the facts. This is the ethics of philosophical\ninquiry, and the philosophy that takes its stand on this principle we\ncall positivism.\n\nAlmost all divergencies of importance in the different philosophical\nsystems can be traced to different conceptions or rather misconceptions\nof causation.\n\nThis last century since Kant has been the most fertile age of original\nworld-theories, all different in style and manner of construction, but\nall alike in so far as the author of each system had strained his utmost\nefforts to be original. Thus all these world-theories were so many\nbeautiful poems on ontology, they were so many grand air-castles produced\nby the magic wand of a fairy-tale causation. The philosopher\u2019s aspiration\nmust not be to present original ideas but to reach that one solution\nwhich any other unbiassed thinker must find, to express that truth which\nin the end will have to be recognised universally, to formulate facts in\nobjective exactness. The degree of originality in philosophic thought\nmarks the degree of aberration from the common aim of the one sole\nsolution, and the greatest source of original ideas is the confusion of\ncause and reason, of _Ursache_ and _Grund_, of event and law, of fact and\ntruth.\n\n[78] I expect to discuss the problems of sameness, of chance, of\nmechanicalism, and the freedom of will in the next number of _The Monist_\nunder the caption _The Doctrine of Necessity: Its Basis and its Scope_.\n\n\n\n\nLITERARY CORRESPONDENCE\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\nFRANCE.\n\n\nProfessor Lombroso is unremitting in bringing up new facts in support\nof his doctrines. His _Nouvelles Recherches de Psychiatrie et\nd\u2019Anthropologie criminelle_ (New Researches in Psychiatry and Criminal\nAnthropology) comprise a good many, gathered from the latest works\nrelating to criminality. In adding psychiatry to anthropology in the\ntitle to this volume, writes the learned author, \u201cI return to my\nstarting point and to the true source of these studies, which is only\na clinical demonstration, but a more perfect one, of what is called in\nold psychiatry, moral insanity and masked epilepsy.\u201d Lombroso may be\nreproached with a certain exaggeration, a certain haste, in his views\nrespecting criminal man: yet can we conceive of an opinionated inquirer\nwho would not have faith in his work, and who could resist the desire\nto generalise from the facts already obtained? But I have little doubt\nthat the works of his school will end in producing a precise conception,\nwhich will force itself on the attention of legislators and jurists. I\nsay _precise_, because one has a glimpse of the truth in criticising\nthe evidence offered to us in such variety, though what one perceives\nsometimes vanishes.\n\nHow can we conceive of the criminal type? This is a prime question on\nwhich it is not useless to insist. Crime, as M. Tarde tells us, has\nbecome a real profession in our modern societies. Although there is some\ntruth in it, we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the subtle\nform of this paradox. There is no want of delinquents carrying on a\nbusiness; the army of crime recruits itself from all classes, it includes\npeasants and workmen, chemists and physicians, lawyers and merchants,\nsoldiers and poets, that is to say, subjects possessing some one at least\nof the aptitudes which form a calling. We have here, then, on the one\nside, wretches destitute of all aptitude for a trade, and on the other\nmen who do not adhere to the exercise of their profession, although\ncapable of making use of it. The delinquent appears to us, in short,\nas stricken with some degree of professional incapacity, and if crime\nhas become a profession in some sort, the criminals of every category\nfirst represent, if I may thus say, a professional or social waste. The\nstudy of the causes and the signs of this waste is just what has been\nundertaken.\n\nThe social causes of crime have often been put in prominence. They are\nnumerous, and persons unacquainted with these questions are inclined to\nattribute the largest proportion of crimes and offences to distress and\nmisery. But, according to the inquiries of Morrison, for example\u2014and by\nthe confession also of M. Troal, of whom I shall speak immediately\u2014misery\nrarely produces crime, and if we examine carefully, one after the other,\nthe social causes of crime, we shall soon be convinced that poverty,\ndrunkenness, etc., feed criminality by producing degeneracy of the race,\nrather than that they directly arouse the criminal.[79] We are compelled\nthen to seek the immediate reason for a crime in the criminal himself,\nand to learn to distinguish the delinquent by means of the methods fixed\nupon by anthropologists and physicians.\n\nAt first, as we know, Lombroso recognised only one criminal type. He has\nsince found that there are many. The distinction between the thief and\nthe murderer is classical. Benedikt has described the born vagabond;\nBrouardel, the feminine type. It is always necessary in describing a\ntype to resort to the methods of natural history, to pass in review the\nemotional and intellectual characters, the physiological or functional\ncharacters, the anatomical or morphological characters, and endeavor\nto seize certain constant correlations between the signs one has been\nsuccessful in observing. The delinquent may be described as abnormal\nfrom the emotional standpoint, and as deficient or perverted from the\nintellectual point of view. We could then begin by describing exactly\ncertain intellectual and emotional types, and it is no exaggeration\nto say that experienced magistrates in their way have done so, those\neven who, with M. Proal, we shall see to be the most hostile to\nanthropological theories. But they are reluctant to admit any relations\nbetween the moral agent and physical nature, whereas the new school, on\nthe contrary, makes every effort to discover and determine them.\n\nHow far is it successful? That is the question.\n\nIf we take the ensemble of the emotional and intellectual characters, we\nshall affirm with Professor Pelman (whose opinion Mr. Christian Ufer has\nmade known in _The Monist_) that the portrait of the imbecile traced by\nSollier corresponds strongly to that of the born criminal of Lombroso.\nWe shall aver also that this portrait does not answer equally well for\nall kinds of delinquents, and that we pass gradually from the malignant\nimbecile to the average or mediocre man. The same observation applies\nwhen we study the physiognomical characters of which the little book of\nLombroso furnishes a great variety. We shall have evidently to consider,\nwith respect to physiognomical characters and physical marks, a strong\ntype (certainly inborn), a weak type, and, I would add, an _acquired_\ntype.\n\nIf we take functional anomalies\u2014those of touch, sight, etc.\u2014we shall be\nstruck with their number as well as with their importance, and, I may say\nin passing, the alienist physicians who continue to be the adversaries\nof Lombroso discover every day fresh examples of them, which could\ngive to the conception of the type, the reality they still deny it to\npossess. The latest discovery, and certainly one of the most striking,\nis that which Ottolenghi has just made, in the clinic of Lombroso\nhimself, respecting the visual field of epileptics and of the morally\ninsane. According to the researches of Ottolenghi, the visual field will\nbe remarkably limited, both with epileptics not in paroxysms, and with\nborn delinquents, but more often with the latter. They present a partial\nhemiopia, vertical and heteronymous; the periphery of the field is\nsinuous and irregular. This discovery tends, then, to confirm the analogy\nof epilepsy with criminal tendencies; it will furnish a sign of the first\norder for a well marked category of delinquents.\n\nLet us pass on to morphological characters. The abundance of evidence\nis truly extraordinary, and one cannot abstain from remarking, in this\nrelation, that a certain number of the anomalies designated ought to\nbe found, and indeed are found, in morally healthy subjects, and that\ntherefore they do not alone suffice to furnish a ground of distinction\nfrom the medium normal type. As certain functional anomalies are not\nwanting either in many subjects whose morality remains perfect, it would\nbe necessary to aim, it seems to me, at establishing an approximate\n_quantum_ for the criminal type, or rather for the _kinds_ which ought to\nlead, by sensible gradations, from the most pronounced type to that which\nis the least so. Some scattered elements of this work will be found in\nthe book of Lombroso; the studies of Clouston on the palate (deformation\nof the palate existed in 19 per cent. of the general population, 61\nper cent. of imbeciles, 35 per cent. of criminals, and 33 per cent. of\nmadmen); the monographs of Ottolenghi and Roncoroni on the pathological\nanomalies of 100 criminals, with an indication of the number and the\nnature of the anomalies, etc.\n\nIn short, it cannot be questioned that the new school holds its ground\nwell, since it circumscribes and makes more and more precise the object\nof its researches. In my humble opinion, it is of importance for it to\nget rid of hazardous or useless explanations, for it to tell us as little\nas possible of remote atavism\u2014for if heredity is constant, it is not\npossible to trace it link by link as far as the deluge!\u2014and finally for\npure anthropologists and psychiatrists to beware of themselves drawing\npractical conclusions from their doctrines. The applications concern\njurists, and constitute a question of another kind, into which other\nconsiderations also enter.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn the juridical domain, a French magistrate, M. LOUIS PROAL, has\njust published a considerable work, _Le Crime et la Peine_ (Crime and\nPunishment) which is truly the performance of an adversary, but not of\nsuch an adversary as M. Tarde. M. Proal is an irreconcilable, and all\nhis dialectic\u2014charged a little too much with citations of which many are\nuseless or prove nothing\u2014turns on the absolute affirmation of free-will.\nHe flatters himself to have demonstrated freedom, in which he is wrong.\nIt is a matter of faith, as criticists have very well perceived. Human\nscience can know only determinism; it proves only what it finds.[80]\n\nM. Proal claims then to found on free-will the two principles of the\nmoral responsibility of the delinquent, and the moral character of\npunishment, in opposition to the purely social point of view in which\nthe new criminalists place themselves. The physical anomaly of the\ncriminal seems to him a chimera, and he goes so far as to deny, or falls\nlittle short of it, the relations of frenzied impulsion with degeneracy.\nWillingly, perhaps, he would accept as truly mad and irresponsible only\nthe insane, those who are shut up forever in the asylums!\n\nCertainly, M. Proal possesses the experience of the magistrate, he\nhas erudition and triumphs easily, in details, by the defects and\ndeficiencies of the doctrine he combats. His objections, nevertheless, do\nnot touch the general conception which connects crime, in a great number\nof cases, with the disorders of the living machine. He is not willing\nfor the criminal to differ from the honest man otherwise than by his\ninclinations and will, as though will and inclinations had no dependence\non the state of our organs, and as though heredity entered for nothing\ninto the \u201cpersonal factor\u201d of character! He is not averse to saying that\nmoral and physical decadence is always the effect of criminality, as\nthough it was never its cause! He allows with that attenuations of moral\nresponsibility, resulting from physiological and physical influences, as\nthough a weakened responsibility was a true moral responsibility in the\nsense he understands, and as though the judge had the means of deciding\nat what moment morbid evolution involves irresponsibility!\n\nThese absolute principles once established, he defines an offense \u201cthe\nviolation of a social duty,\u201d and he grants that the judge \u201cought to take\naccount of the importance of the social evil resulting from the crime.\u201d\nIt is sufficient for him that the _intention_ and the _responsibility_\nis appreciated, in order to attach the penalty to morality. In default\nof which, writes he, there would be no more justice. It is a noble\nsolicitude, that of wishing to justify punishment in the eyes of the\nguilty person himself, and to inflict it on him as an expiation of the\nevil he has committed. But here an error is fallen into, which is, in\nmy opinion, to suppose that the law punishes \u201cmorally.\u201d The law has\nnot the power to inflict moral chastisement. It strikes the delinquent\nmaterially, in his goods, in his person; the rest depends not on the\njudge who applies the law, but on the judge who is in ourselves,\nthe avenger more or less severe according to the complex incidences\nof education and heredity. Moral chastisement can exist only in the\nconscience of the delinquent, and, if this conscience is wanting, or\nnearly so, all the affirmations of the judge cannot cause the punishment\nto have the quality of moral expiation for the guilty. The criminal will\nsubmit to it through force, and the magistrate will apply it by necessity.\n\nSuch is, I think, the true situation. The new school of criminology\nwill introduce reforms in the practice of the tribunals and in the\nadministration of the penal laws; it will not change justice and could\nnot compromise morality. And now pardon me for adding to these some\nfurther remarks, in connection with the books of which I have still to\nspeak.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe interests and the passions of men, habits too long acquired to alter,\ncan be considered as the immediate and constant motives of societies,\nthe _vis \u00e0 tergo_ of their evolution. Political theories work on a\npre-existing social matter, and more or less in the direction of the\ntendencies which have produced the state of things that they aspire to\nreform or overturn. In a general manner, they possess then neither the\npower necessary to create, attributed to them by utopists, nor the power\nto destroy, which makes them appear so formidable to conservatives.\nWithout denying all efficiency to the intellectual ideal, it is\npermissible to say that its action has a bearing purely conditional,\nand that the revolutions of growth of social organisms never absolutely\ndepend on the theorist who establishes its diagnosis, and endeavors to\nregulate its march. We behold, in a word, history making itself, rather\nthan that we make it ourselves and according to our inclination. It is\nhardly possible for us to foresee the remote effects of our inventions,\nof our discoveries. In sociology as well as in physics, man remains the\nservant and the interpreter of nature.\n\nThere is in this, if I am not deceived, a reason for reassuring ourselves\nconcerning certain alarming predictions as to the future of our\ncivilisation. In his book _La Civilisation et la Croyance_ (Civilisation\nand Belief), the second edition of which has just appeared, M. CHARLES\nSECR\u00c9TAN estimates that our societies will sink down, at least that they\nwill neither return to a purified Christianity\u2014a Christianity that has\nnever yet been practised\u2014nor restore the great principles of the free\nsoul and of God. M. Secr\u00e9tan is a brilliant writer and has a noble heart,\nand his book contains at least one truth of the first order, always good\nto repeat, which is that nothing durable is founded on hatred. He dare\nnot flatter himself, however, that his warnings will be listened to, his\nlessons observed. Perhaps he exaggerates the real dangers which menace\nus, because he enlarges, unknown to himself, the r\u00f4le of philosophic\ndoctrines, and attributes to the mind a kind of discretionary power over\nthe sentiments and the interests of mankind.\n\nHere we have the intellectualist mistake. It appears chiefly in the\nrevolutionist propaganda which agitates our Europe, and of which M.\nJ. BOURDEAU makes known the ideas and the progress, in a clear and\ninteresting manner, in his work _Le Socialisme allemand et le Nihilisme\nrusse_ (German Socialism and Russian Nihilism). It is a fact well worthy\nof remark, that the genial promoter of the theories of Fourier, St.\nSimon, and others\u2014I refer to J. J. Rousseau\u2014had had the conjecture of a\nsocial physiology: fragments of his that have been published show well\nthat he did not regard the age of gold as one of savagery, and that\nhe foresaw the part that human nature had to do in our calculations\nof government. What is found just in his writings could even well be\nintimately connected with this naturalist point of view. But he lived\nin the century _par excellence_ of rationalism, where such ideas could\nbe neither developed nor understood; he constructed the political world\naccording to reasoning, and I shall not be far wrong in thinking that\nsocialism represents in its turn, definitively, at least in its essential\nfeatures, a last offshoot from this rational school which has already, a\nhundred years ago, made us the villainous present of Jacobinism.\n\nAbsolute communism has no chance of ever realising itself. Neither Karl\nMarx, nor Engels, has ventured even to indicate the possible form of\nthe society of which they dream. The action of the socialists, in turn,\ncould have as its result the substitution for our r\u00e9gime of excessive\nindividualism and of disordered democracy, a r\u00e9gime of corporations and\nof more regular co-operation, by one of those reversions to institutions\nanciently delineated that history presents to us, and which respond to a\nsort of \u201claw of oscillation\u201d of social phenomena. There is no occasion,\nhowever, to give it long consideration to establish that these returns\ndo not exclude novelty, for the apparent form of social arrangements is\nof less moment than the nature of the ideas and of the relations which\nsustain them, and here is what I would readily call a \u201claw of progressive\nrepetition.\u201d As to the exact sense of the evolution which there manifests\nitself, the great task of disengaging it falls to the sociologists. But\nthe school of Marx has wished to see things only from one side, and his\ntheory, which is too simple, does not embrace the complexity of the\nphenomena.[81]\n\nWithout any pretension to renew the face of the world and to interpret\neconomic phenomena in favor of an arbitrary thesis, M. AD. COSTA, in his\nopuscule _Alcoholisme ou \u00c9pargne_ (Alcoholism or Thrift) places before\nus the truly immediate question of socialism, in the presence of this\n\u201csocial dilemma\u201d which reformers willingly mask in their discourses:\non one side, alcoholism, life from day to day, the unreasonable and\nmomentary illusion that one imbibes with stimulants, the wasting of daily\nresources, finally the pauperism which leads to social servitude; on the\nother side, thrift under all its forms, a provident life ordered with\nintelligence, abstention from dangerous stimulants, progressive comfort\nand increasing happiness, more and more freedom. Yes, here are the two\nissues between which the workers have to choose. Those who read this\nlittle book can learn there, both what milliards of salaries alcohol has\ndevoured, and what misery both physical and moral it engenders, and the\ndegradation that it brings to those who give themselves up to it. To\nmany this may be only the small side of a great problem. Without thrift\nand the qualities which render it possible, there is neither family nor\nmorality. How can a man pretend to possess instruments of labor when he\ndeteriorates the chief of all, his own living machine? How can a social\nclass have the illusion to believe that a revolution ever profits him who\nis neither able nor capable of preparing and conducting it?\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe last work of M. E. DE LAVELEYE, _Le Gouvernement dans la D\u00e9mocratie_\n(Democratic Government),[82] published a few months before his death,\ntreats chiefly of the organisation of public powers. This question has\nimportance to-day, writes the learned author, only in relation to the\ngreat questions which will agitate the world of to-morrow, the social\nquestion and the religious question. Conservatives make use of government\nas a brake; revolutionists seek to seize hold of it as a lever. The fact\nis that our Europe marches towards democracy. But will democracy give\nus freedom? On what conditions can it form an acceptable r\u00e9gime and one\ncompatible with high culture?\n\nIt is not necessary for me to explain here the reasonings and conclusions\nof M. de Laveleye. His book, to speak the truth, is less a book than a\ncollection of Review articles and historical sketches. The politics of\naction will find in it too much theory, and philosophers will regret the\nabsence of master-ideas. It is well to read this work for its practical\nadvice and the rich details that it contains; we must not look there for\na real historical or social conception.\n\nThe sentiment which is dominant, finally, in all the writings of which\nI have just spoken is inquietude, and unfortunately it is only too well\njustified. We see, in our Occident, alcoholism increasing with salaries,\nthe hatred of classes with wealth, immorality with enfranchisement,\npublic burdens with political progress, the aggregation of individuals\nwith great industry, criminality even with education. The wealth acquired\nis compensated for by new evils; it seems that all our conquests have the\nresult of putting social order in peril, and that the civilisation of\nwhich we are so proud is bound, in a short time, to become bankrupt.\n\nWe have, nevertheless, a weighty capital with which to restore ourselves,\nand it is only right to say that it is beginning to be applied. But we\nmust give up some errors as to which it is good time to open one\u2019s eyes.\nOne of the gravest, certainly, is always to place instruction before\neducation, and the mind before the heart. We have allowed to drop, at\nthe same time with religion, the difficult task of forming moral habits.\nLet us understand in a word that, in a society, the most valuable thing\nis neither the steam engine, nor the bank note, but the man himself,\nand that in the man even it is not ability or special knowledge but\n_character_.\n\n LUCIEN ARR\u00c9AT.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[79] I reserve, as well understood, the question of education, in order\nto simplify matters here.\n\n[80] A ground of mutual understanding would be supplied by accepting\nthe distinction proposed by P. Carus between _constraint_, which alone\nexcludes freedom, and _necessity_, which leaves our will free within\nthe limits of our character. Already Plotinus had written: \u201cHow can it\nbe said of this being (he who obeys his nature) that he obeys, if he is\nnot constrained to follow something external?\u201d (6th _Enn._ lib. viii.)\u2014I\nrecommend to the curious on these questions the book of M. BERTAULD,\n_M\u00e9thode Spiritualiste, Esprit et Libert\u00e9_. M. Bertauld places freedom\nin _autonomy_, which is perfectly reconcilable with psychological\ndeterminism; there is on the contrary, he declares, no radical\ncontradiction between determinism and free-will, and indeterminism is\nan absurd conception. The work is well written, and I do not intend to\nbelittle it by mentioning it in a simple note.\n\n[81] In this relation, I will particularly refer to the great work, in\ncourse of publication, of M. B. MALON, _Le Socialisme int\u00e9gral_, and I\nrecommend at the same time the article _Justice and Socialism_ of M.\nBelot, which has been much spoken of, in the number for February last of\nthe _Revue Philosophique_.\n\n[82] All the works mentioned in this article are published by F. Alcan.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\nGERMANY.\n\n\nIn the January number of _The Monist_ I mentioned a treatise written\nby G. Ludwigs, in which the novels of Wilhelm Walloth were criticised,\nand expressed my surprise that in the work discussed a personality\nunquestionably diseased was stamped as a poet of almost the first order.\nMuch that then struck me as strange and was unclear to me, was later\nrendered plain and intelligible; and the explanation was not long in\nforthcoming.\n\nAs the newspapers shortly afterwards announced, Ludwigs was simply the\npseudonym of a sixteen year old gymnasium student of Darmstadt, who had\nalready attracted the attention of wider circles by the poems he had\nwritten. It happens at times that individualities of this description\nbear out in the advanced years of their life the promise of their youth.\nExtraordinary things were to be expected, though I cannot say _hoped_,\nof Ludwigs; but the expectation was not fulfilled. He, an instance of\nreal decadence, yet a boy in years, voluntarily took his own life,\ndeeply mourned by his literary associates, the \u201cYoung Germans,\u201d in whose\nmagazine _Die Gesellschaft_ a brother of the deceased is now publishing\nbiographical notes and literary remains\u2014novels and poems\u2014all more of a\npsychological than literary interest. The biographical notes plainly\nmark out a personality smitten with psychosis and suffering in a marked\ndegree with hyper\u00e6sthesia, and the literary remains reflect this mental\ncondition; light-sensations especially playing an important r\u00f4le. His\nnervous system was too weak to assert itself permanently against the\nouter world. This pressure, which objectively considered was not at all a\npowerful one, did not admit of the rise of a powerful sense of life; and\nespecially oppressive to the precocious youth was the life of the school\nin the most varied ways, and in an unexpected moment the flame of his\nlife went out.\n\nAs psychologists, we should find considerable interest in the study\nof this phenomenon of Ludwigs. We must admire his abilities and his\ncapacity for work, which not only enabled him to perform his duties as\na student of the gymnasium, but also left him time enough, in addition\nto his literary work, to employ himself with the psychological writings\nof Wundt and M\u00fcnsterberg, which he desired to turn to account in the\nfield of poetry. We must mourn too his sad fate. But we have no reason to\n_glorify_ such a diseased personality, as is done on many sides in the\nApril number of _Die Gesellschaft_.\n\nBut this is a peculiar characteristic of the Young-German writers and\ntheir confr\u00e8res abroad, that they make the diseased take the place of\nthe sound, and the ugly of the beautiful, and thus help greatly to\nundermine the health of the common mind. There are it is true a goodly\nnumber of trusting souls who believe that we may regard with security and\ncomposure, the endeavors and tendencies of the naturalistic apostles, as\nour taste in literature and art\u2014a few cases excepted\u2014can surely not be\nreversed into its opposite. On this point, perhaps, those who so think\nare not wrong. But the stage may easily be reached where literary taste\nno longer remains determinative, and the place of the \u00e6sthetical interest\nin things is taken by the scientific, before whose judgment-seat no\ndifference of the beautiful and the hideous exists.\n\nThis view is the direct outcome of philosophical materialism. The latter\ndoctrine may at present, it is true, be regarded in all its main points\nas definitively overthrown, so far as philosophy is concerned; but in\nthe domain of _belles lettres_\u2014a term not quite allowable here\u2014the wave\nwhich it has created still sweeps mightily onward. Two new works seek\nto break its force, which have been published in the series _Gegen den\nMaterialismus_ edited by Dr. Schmidkunz (Stuttgart: Krabbe). The first\ntreatise bears the title _Materialismus und \u00c6sthetik_ and has no less a\nperson as author than MORIZ CARRI\u00c8RE; the second treats of _Materialism\nin Literature_ and is the production of the northerner OLA HANSSON. I\nam unable to say that these two treatises have especially satisfied me.\nBoth authors look at the subject too one-sidedly from the point of view\nof \u00e6sthetics, and have not by far given a sufficient recognition to the\npsychological aspect of the subject. I recognise indeed with Carri\u00e8re,\nin spite of all the apparent mutability of taste, a normative \u00e6sthetics;\nbut that man bears within him an ideal of life, as the seed does the\nplant with its blossom and its fruit, I am unable for psychological\nreasons to concede. I grant that I find with Ola Hansson psychology is so\nfar poorly represented in the naturalistic literature as the growth and\nevolution of character is made to appear a much too simple process; and\nI concede furthermore that the evolution of character in the individual\ncase is very far removed from anything like resemblance to an example\nin mathematics, inasmuch as quantities may be lacking us in such a case\nwhich are absolutely necessary to be taken account of for a correct\nsolution of the problem; but these missing quantities need not for that\nreason be at all matters of mystery, in their true nature wholly unknown\nto us.\n\nTo what limits the domain of mystery has shrunk and to how great an\nextent its expressions may be made intelligible and to a certain degree\neven may be \u201cregulated,\u201d provided, equipped with thorough knowledge, we\ncourageously look the things in the face, is exemplified in a marked\ndegree by a voluminous work of the above mentioned Dr. Schmidkunz. The\nso-called Suggestion passed for a long time as something wonderful\nand had to rest its defence in the hands of the representatives of a\npsycho-physical mysticism as opposed to a \u201csurface\u201d-psychology which\nin the words of Du Prels occupied itself exclusively with surface work\nwithout penetrating to the depths. SCHMIDKUNZ now points out in his\n_Psychologie der Suggestion_ (Stuttgart, 1892: Ferdinand Enke) in a\nvery comprehensive manner what others had very plainly hinted at before\nhim, namely, that in the case of a very great number of phenomena we\nhave, exactly viewed, to deal only with some very simple and quite\nexplainable things which unite in the composition of what is commonly\ncalled suggestion. The contents of the work, however, are not exhausted\nwith this; under the influence of a tremendous scope of reading, the\nauthor treats the whole domain of suggestion, and if he understood more\nperfectly the art of good writing, he would have earned a much greater\ngratitude than that which in any event is his due.\n\nSchmidkunz touches repeatedly in his work upon a domain which still\nbelongs to the most obscure of the history of civilisation, namely\nwitchcraft and the trials of witches. This topic, likewise viewed from\na psychological point of view, forms the subject of a special treatise\nby SNELL, entitled _Hexenprocesse und Geistesst\u00f6rung_ (Munich, 1891:\nJ. F. Lehmann). In this book no r\u00f4le is ascribed to suggestion, but as\nthe title indicates the treatment centres about the question of what\nsignificance mental disorders generally may have possessed in the trials\nof witches. The author concedes that demented persons became the victims\nof the trials for witchcraft either because they had rendered themselves\nby their character open to the suspicion of a compact with the devil,\nor because they had by self-obtrusion directly drawn upon themselves\nthis persecution, but asserts nevertheless, that the number of demented\npersons that fell victims to the trials for witchcraft, was comparatively\nvery small. Mental disorder however played in so far a great r\u00f4le in the\ntrials for witchcraft as demented persons, especially such as suffered\nfrom hysteria, became false witnesses and brought sound and healthy\npeople into the hands of the persecuting judges.\n\nAs I am now treading the province of psychiatry, I will mention, that\nWILHELM GRIESINGER\u2019S celebrated work _Pathologie und Therapie der\npsychischen Krankheiten_ has just been published in its fifth edition\nunder the direction of Dr. Levinstein-Schlegel, the director of the\nMaison de Sant\u00e9 in Sch\u00f6neberg (Berlin: August Hirschwald). I do not of\ncourse specify this work solely for the sake of the physicians who may be\nreaders of _The Monist_, but am rather impelled to the act by a universal\npsychological consideration, for Griesinger in the first edition of\nthe work also made a name for himself as a psychologist. It appeared\noriginally in 1845, and possessed a compass of 396 pages; the fifth\nedition numbers 1100 pages and has increased considerably in size as\ncompared with the fourth. Whether the augmentations have added anything\nto the value of the work is a question which must first be submitted for\nanswer to our physicians. In psychological respects its value has in so\nfar been very much increased as the experiential data have assumed much\ngreater proportions: the psychological analysis however has been somewhat\nneglected.\n\nPsychological analysis in fact is not the strong side of the majority of\nour psychiatrists. What Griesinger and still more so Spielmann sought\nafter in this direction, has been greatly forced in the background.\nAs a general rule our inquirers content themselves with a description\nof symptoms and the construction of a more than copious nomenclature,\nin the midst of which the connections are Very easy to be overlooked.\nAmong the commendable exceptions is to be named in this respect the\nwell-known Vienna professor THEODOR MEYNERT. In addition to his extensive\npsychiatrical works he has also published a considerable number of\nlectures and discourses partly in magazines and partly in separate\nbrochures. These discourses are now presented in collected form in a\nbook entitled _Sammlung von popul\u00e4rwissenschaftlichen Vortr\u00e4gen \u00fcber den\nBau una die Leistungen des Gehirns_ (Vienna, 1892, Wilhelm Braum\u00fcller).\nThe most noticeable discourses are the following: The Significance of\nthe Brain for the World of our Ideas; The Mechanics of the Cerebral\nStructure; On the Feelings; On Illusion; On the Significance of the\nDevelopment of the Forehead; The Mechanics of Physiognomy; Brain and\nCulture; The Co-operation of the Parts of the Brain; On Artificial\nDisturbances of the Psychic Equilibrium. No words need be wasted in the\nrecommendation of the book of Meynert.\n\n CHR. UFER.\n\n\n\n\nDIVERSE TOPICS.\n\n\n\n\nPROFESSOR HAECKEL\u2019S MONISM.\n\n\nThere are two Latin proverbs which are both good rules for\ncontroversialists who seek for the truth on different roads. The one\nreads: _In verbis simus faciles dummodo conveniamus in re_, the other\nreads: _In verbis simus difficiles ut conveniamus in re_. A difference\nof terms often prevents two thinkers from noticing that they actually\nagree. Therefore let us be lenient in terms and never lose sight of their\nmeaning and purport. On the other hand terms are not indifferent, and\nthe selection of terms should not be regarded as arbitrary. In order to\narrive at a solid and permanent agreement, permanent because it is based\nupon objectively demonstrable truth, we have to be scrupulously careful\nwith our terminology; and we must not allow the arbitrary employment of\nterms where they are inappropriate. An inappropriate usage of terms will\nlead us astray and involve us in confusion and error.\n\nSays Professor Haeckel:\n\n \u201cThe divergences which exhibit themselves in our respective\n unitary conceptions of the world are in part only apparent\n and in part occasioned by the divergent significances of our\n fundamental ideas.\u201d\n\nThis seems to me very true and, indeed, I have very good evidence that it\nis true. Professor Haeckel writes in his letter to me:\n\n \u201cI have marked in _red_ those passages of your kind review of\n my \u2018Anthropogeny\u2019 in which I agree with you and in _blue_ those\n in which I differ.\u201d\n\nNow I find all those passages where I should have anticipated an\nobjection on Professor Haeckel\u2019s part marked red, while a blue mark\nappears where in my opinion there is only a difference of terminology. It\nis the following sentence on page 441:\n\n \u201cPsychic life is absent so far as we can see in the primordial\n world-substance as it appears in the form of a nebula; it is\n absent still in the primordial state of planets. It appears\n with the subjective states of awareness that rise into\n existence in organised life. The subjectivity of unorganised\n matter is, in comparison with man\u2019s subjectivity, to be\n considered as a blank; i. e., if there is in it a state of\n awareness, which we have reasons to doubt, it is apparently\n without meaning; it does not symbolise external objects;\n it is no mind; it is, as it were, blind. Yet the aim of\n evolution being the development of psychical life, shows that\n the subjectivity of unorganised matter is spiritual in its\n innermost nature.\u201d\n\nThis difference is probably a difference of terminology only, for I\ninsist most strongly on the doctrine that all nature is alive. However, I\nmake a difference between \u201clife\u201d and \u201csoul.\u201d Nature is alive throughout,\nbut it is not ensouled; the action of chemical elements and of the\nfalling stone are no psychical actions.[83]\n\nAnother blue stroke appears at the following passage:\n\n \u201cWe grant willingly that mechanical explanations will serve\n for all motions that take place in the world; even the motions\n of the brain take place in strict obedience to the laws of\n molar and molecular mechanics. But a mechanical explanation\n is not applicable to that which is not motion. If it were\n applicable it would not be desirable, for it would be of no\n avail. Mechanical explanations are to be limited to mechanical\n phenomena. Feeling however is not a mechanical phenomenon,\n and an idea, being a special and a very complex kind of a\n feeling, or rather and more accurately expressed, being the\n special meaning of a very complex feeling, is not a mechanical\n phenomenon either.\u201d\n\nThe subsequent sentences are again approved by Professor Haeckel; they\nare marked red:\n\n \u201cIt is true that when a feeling takes place and when an\n idea is thought in the brain of an organised being, that a\n certain nervous action takes place. The nervous action is\n a motion and this motion represents a definite amount of\n energy. There is no theoretical difficulty, although there are\n almost insurmountable practical difficulties, in measuring\n the definite amount of potential energy that is changed into\n kinetic energy when a man thinks. Yet the brain-motion is not\n the idea and by a mechanical explanation of the brain-motion\n we have not even touched the problem of what the nature of the\n idea is, why ideas originate and how they act.\u201d\n\nWe do not understand how Professor Haeckel can object to the view that\nideas and feelings are no motions. We fully grant that the nervous\naction that takes place when an idea is thought is a motion, and that,\nconsidered as a brain-action, it is mechanically explainable. But by\nfeeling we understand not the brain-action but a state of awareness, and\nstates of awareness are not objective phenomena, they are subjective\nphenomena; whereby we do not at all deny that there are no feelings which\nmust not in their objective existence at the same time be supposed to be\nbrain-motions.\n\nFeelings are not motions but ideas are still less motions. Ideas are\nthe meanings which certain feelings that are representative of certain\nsets of experiences have acquired. Is the meaning of a word a motion?\nCan the significance of words be mechanically explained? The meaning of\nideas, the significance of words, the representativeness of feelings are\nphenomena which have nothing to do with motions but constitute a domain\nof their own.\n\nProfessor Haeckel in our opinion can mean only that there are no feelings\nin themselves, but all our feelings are at the same time brain-motions,\nand as such they are mechanical phenomena. We have to add, however, that\nan explanation of the mechanism of brain-action does not as yet explain\nthe significance of mental operations.\n\nProfessor Haeckel insists so strongly upon his view of monism as being\nmechanicalism that this seems to mark a difference in our conceptions\nwhich might be of consequence.\n\nI was very glad to notice the long strokes of red along the passages\nwhich contain my proposition that \u201cthe evolution of organised life is a\nnatural process having a definite aim\u201d; further, along the paragraphs\nconcerning the world-order as being moral in so far as the world-order is\nthe basis of morality, and also those which represent God as being that\npower of the world-order obedience to which is called morality.\n\nProfessor Haeckel\u2019s agreement with these passages indicates that those\nexpressions of his to which we should take exception, and which he\nemploys again in his article of the present number, might not be regarded\nas divergences.\n\nProfessor Haeckel\u2019s definition of God appears to us insufficient, and\nalso his definition of immortality.\n\nGod is not only the sum-total of matter and force, God is also that\nquality of the world which the naturalist describes in natural laws.\nGod is the life of the world, he is that feature of existence which\nmakes mind and knowledge possible. In addition he is that which men\ncall progress, the ideal of the future that lives in our souls and the\nprinciple of evolution in nature.\n\nThere is a deeper truth too in the doctrine of immortality. There is a\nconservation of matter and energy, but there is also a preservation of\nsoul. Says Professor Haeckel, \u201cthe human soul is a very highly developed\nvertebral soul.\u201d If that is so, the soul of our fossil ancestors\ncontinues to live in us. This soul has been altered, it is true, but the\nalterations are not so much a loss as a gain. The alterations consist in\nthe additional growth of new powers and represent a higher development.\nAll that which was worth preserving has been preserved.\n\nAnd as it has been in the past, so we can confidently expect that it\nwill be in the future. All that is worth preserving of our souls will be\npreserved in the ages to come. Our souls will live and develop to higher\npossibilities. They will be transmitted from generation to generation,\nadvancing on the unlimited path of evolutionary progress.\n\n P. C.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[83] We intend to express our views more fully in a special article to be\npublished in a subsequent number of _The Monist_.\n\n\n\n\nTHE RELIGION OF SCIENCE.\n\n\nThere was during the last winter great excitement in Germany, concerning\na new school-bill proposed by the chancellor Caprivi, and the late\nPrussian minister of cultus, Zedlitz-Tr\u00fctzschler. This school-bill\nproposed to take the direction of the public schools out of the hands of\nscientific men and transfer it to the clergy. The idea of the Emperor\nwas to let the education of the young be guided in a religious spirit. He\nintended to wage a war against atheism.\n\nAmong the pamphlets which were written during the crisis, is especially\nnoteworthy the monograph of the late minister of cultus, Herr von Gosler,\nwhom we should count among the most conservative of Prussian officials.\nHis opposition, accordingly, is the more remarkable, and his objections\nhad much weight with the Emperor.\n\nThe Emperor has withdrawn the bill. Nevertheless, the spirit of\nultra-conservatism, which shows itself in an outspoken hostility against\nscience, still remains strong enough, and new onslaughts upon the\nprogressive policy in school and church, may be expected in the future.\nThe question is timely still and will remain timely until there be a\ncommon agreement concerning the principles of education, so that our\nschool politics may no longer be decided by and subjected to partisan\nstrife.\n\nAttacks that are made upon the very spirit of the institution of our\ncivilisation and the political crises following thereupon are beneficial\nin one respect. They make people pause; they make them reconsider the\nprinciples by which they allow their conduct to be regulated. They make\nmen conscious of the maxims that ought to underlie their lives and which\ngenerally are accepted by the majority without much reflection. The\nPrussian school-bill has indeed exercised a wholesome influence, for it\ncalled attention to the importance of principles and roused the German\nnation from religious indifference. During the conflict many scientists\nand professors of universities, who as a rule interfere little with\npolitics, have raised their voice in warning, and many valuable ideas\nwere expressed that found a strong echo in the heart of the people.\n\nThere are two articles written by German professors which have commanded\nvery wide attention inside and outside of Germany. The one article\nwas written by Professor Haeckel of Jena, in the _Freie B\u00fchne_, the\nmost important passages of which appeared at the time in _The Open\nCourt_, No. 243. The other article was written by Friedrich Jodl, of\nPrague. It appeared first in the Augsburger _Allgemeine Zeitung_, and\nwas republished in pamphlet form by Cotta, in Stuttgart. The former\nis an enthusiastic appeal to let science, which is the basis of our\ncivilisation, remain the basis of our educational maxims in schools and\nuniversities. The latter discusses the philosophical principles of the\nconflict.\n\nWe are greatly in sympathy with the spirit in which Professor Jodl\nhas treated his subject. Nay, more, we substantially agree with him\nconcerning all main facts, and also concerning the sense in which our\nfuture development should be directed. Nevertheless there are points of\ndisagreement, which we consider of sufficient importance to point out and\nexplain.\n\nThe ultra-conservative party stands upon the platform that there can be\nno morality without religion, and no religion without dogmatism. For this\nreason dogmatism should rule supreme in the schools, and science should\nbe subservient to religious creed. That this means curtailment of the\nfreedom of investigation, and the suppression of the liberty of science,\nis understood by all the parties concerned. The liberals so apprehend it,\nand the ultra-conservatives do not deny it. In the face of this situation\nProfessor Jodl proposes the question, \u201cIs there a humanitarian morality\npossible?\u201d (p. 8 of the pamphlet \u201cMoral, Religion, und Schule.\u201d) He says:\n\n \u201cA mere glance into the numerous anthologies of the moral\n wisdom of all times and centuries, shows that the agreement\n concerning moral ideas and norms is much greater, and it\n recedes much more into the dim past than is usually assumed.\n The writings of Laotse and Confutse, the popular literature\n of Buddhism, the fragments of old Egyptian law, the didactic\n poetry of Islam, contain a great wealth of moral wisdom, and\n treasures of the noblest ethical sentiment which the Christian\n Occident likes to regard as its own exclusive property.\n Especially the ancients, whose civilisation, in spite of much\n opposition, is still the basis of our civilisation, furnish us\n with a series of the most beautiful moral types and ideals,\n and there we find, beside many valuable features of Christian\n ethics, other no less valuable gems which we seek for in vain\n in the old Christian morality, and which were not recognised\n until Christianity came into contact with the Teutonic nations\n of northern Europe. Our ultra-conservatives argue that without\n catechisms humanity would stand helpless before the question of\n what is right and wrong, and what the growing generation should\n be taught in order to make them useful and honorable members of\n society.\u201d\n\nIn opposition to these views Professor Jodl urges that\n\n \u201cIf society of to-day can at all tolerate that such doctrines\n as Christian morality are taught in our schools as the\n foundation of practical conduct of life, this is possible only\n because the ethics of the old biblical Christianity has, in\n the course of centuries, grown to be something quite different\n from what it was in the beginning. The throughout communistic,\n labor-abhorring, world-hating, miracle-infatuated morality of\n original Christianity, constantly dreaming of the collapse\n of the world near at hand, and suited only to the demands of\n the paupers of the time, could only be changed and adapted\n to the conditions of later periods of radically different\n conditions, with great difficulty. The Catholic church has\n done much to accomplish this purpose, and in a still higher\n degree Protestantism has made many concessions to humanitarian\n ethics and practical reason. These concessions, however, must\n appear from the historical standpoint, as adulterations of the\n Christian ideas. Exactly in the degree that Christian morality\n in modern times has remained a living power, it has ceased\n to remain Christian in the historical sense.... The tendency\n of the whole development of the modern world is to conceive\n the moral norms as natural conditions of human society, and\n to understand them in their connection of the individual with\n the whole. This thought and sentiment must become in the child\n a living power, and morality cannot expect in this respect\n help from religion. Religion knows only the relation of the\n individual to God, as it is expressed in the mystical ideas of\n sin and mercy. Religion knows no duties and goals for humanity,\n but only for the egotistic desire of salvation for the\n individual. Religion knows no progress, no evolution, but only\n eternal life or eternal damnation. The civilised nations of\n Europe had to go through with many hard struggles in order to\n arrive at the idea that there is a humanitarian, and a natural,\n morality, in comparison with which all religious dogmatism must\n be considered as indifferent additions. Only on the basis of\n this conviction is it possible that there exist to-day so many\n religious confessions of faith, and among them also those\n who are religious without having any special confession. Here\n lies the great duty of our time for enlightened legislation,\n for our schools, to take care that the universal Christian\n be developed from the narrow dogmatism, and, further, the\n universal human ideal, from the universal Christian. To expect\n this of the clergy of the different religious societies, would\n be a mistake.... The theological spirit and the principle of\n free investigation, are irreconcilable adversaries. Every\n religion, of whatever denomination it may be, is stable in its\n very nature. It pretends to be eternal truth, and whenever it\n compromises with the idea of progress, it does so reluctantly,\n and in the form of concessions.\u201d\n\nWe agree with Professor Jodl in his opinion that our present dogmatic\nreligions are entirely unfit to understand the demands of the present.\nAnd it is true that the humanitarian ideas of morality have been slowly\ndeveloped from the crude and immature notions of the apostolic times. The\naim of our moral development must be humanitarian ethics. But we disagree\nwith professor Jodl that we cannot expect a further evolution of our\nmoral ideas from the clergy.\n\nIt seems to me that here lies the important difference between the old\nand the new world. Conditions favor religious progress in America,\nwhile the conditions in Europe cut off all hope and produce an ominous\nstagnancy.\n\nThe clergy of the old world, in Germany as well as in England, and in\nall Catholic countries, are appointed only on the condition of being\nultra-conservative in religious matters, as well as otherwise. No young\nman whose enthusiasm would carry him so far as to suggest reforms on\nbroader humanitarian principles, would be admitted in the church as\nministers. And if he had been admitted by mistake, he would meet with\na fate similar to that of the Abb\u00e9 Lamennais, whose experiences are\nadmirably described by George Julian Harney, in No. 213 of _The Open\nCourt_.\n\nThe situation is greatly different in America. Our clergymen, our\ncongregations, our churches, are perhaps more orthodox in many respects,\nand especially in their belief, than those of Europe. Nevertheless, they\nare more liberal in principles, and they are less obstinate concerning\ndogma. Most of our churches here do not even possess dogmatic creeds, or\nconfessions of faith. The clergy of the Baptists, the Congregationalists,\nthe Unitarians, are not bound by oath before taking orders; to believe\nin sundry articles and to preach certain doctrines which are supposed\nto be absolute truth. The Baptists, it is true, are as a rule very\northodox and very dogmatic, but they are liberal in spite of it, open to\nconviction, and not averse to going onward with the times. This attitude\nof the American clergy must appear inconsistent to Europeans who can, in\necclesiastical affairs, only judge from their own experiences. And it\nmay be that their position is as much inconsistent as was for instance\nthat of Newton, who considered the trash he wrote on some theological\nquestions concerning the apocalypse as infinitely superior to his\nmathematical and astronomical works and did not see that the recognition\nof the law of gravitation would go far toward freeing humanity from many\nof those nonsensical ideas which he cherished so highly.\n\nIn former times I was inclined to blame the clergy for the lack of\nprogressiveness in the churches, but I have come to the conclusion that\nnot the clergy are to be blamed for retarding the broadening of the\nreligious spirit, but the lay-members of the churches. I am personally\nacquainted with several clergymen of different denominations, Christian\nas well as Jewish, who conceive it their duty to point out the way of\nprogress and to further the spirit of a scientific world-conception in\nreligious matters. They advance exactly as quickly and exactly as far as\nthey can in working out of the narrow dogmatism of the religious views of\ntheir flock the ideas of a broad humanitarianism.\n\nIt has often happened that clergymen, encouraged by their congregations,\nhave grown too broad in the opinion of their narrower brethren, and it\nwas customary, in former years, to cast them out according to the old\nfashion of dealing with heretics, which is still customary in European\nchurches. The churches have become more careful here, for, whenever such\na case happened, these liberal clergymen were, as a rule, not deserted\nby their congregations. Thus every act of removing a clergyman usually\nled to a schism, and it seems that, at least to some extent, the churches\nhave of late given up their policy of removing heretics within their\nranks.\n\nThis much is certain, that many among the American clergy are ready to\nprogress with the times, and to accept the truth wherever they find it.\nIn Europe religion is dictated to the people from above by government and\nchurch authority. The clergymen are servants of these authorities. Their\nconsciences are not bound, as they ought to be, to teach the truth and\nnothing but the truth, but to teach the doctrines which their employers\nbid them teach. And this policy is still considered right and natural,\neven among liberal minded people.\n\nIn America the clergy are exponents of the views of their congregations.\nIn Europe the congregations are separated from their pastors by a deep\ngap: there is no gap between the congregation and the clergy in America.\nBoth are in the closest contact. Our congregations are more orthodox than\nEuropean congregations; therefore our clergy is more sincerely orthodox,\nand more honestly narrow, than the European clergy. The European clergy\nare more scholarly, yet at the same time there may be more hypocrites\namong them in Europe who know better than they preach. But there is no\ndoubt that with a further development of intellectuality and scientific\ninsight, our congregations will become broader and more liberal and\nmore humanitarian, and, with the congregations, our clergy are bound to\ndevelop in the same lines.\n\nEuropean theology is much superior to American theology in scholarly\ncritique, in historical investigation, and in philosophical depth.\nNevertheless, we must not hope from European theologians that they\nwill undertake the great work of reform that is so much needed in our\nchurches, which is nothing less than to reconcile religion with science;\nto let religion develop into a religion of science, preaching boldly and\nunreservedly those humanitarian ethics which stand upon the principles\nof truth; that is, of scientifically proved truth, which finds the\nsanction of the moral \u201cought\u201d in the facts of experience.\n\nProfessor Jodl says:\n\n \u201cThe main objection of the supporters of dogmatism in school\n politics is this: They propose it is not so much religion that\n is needed in education; not the contents of ecclesiastical\n doctrines, but to give to morality a foundation; to give it\n what science calls the sanction of ethical rules.... From this\n standpoint, every attempt that is liable to weaken the ethics\n of religious sanction must appear equivalent to the attempt of\n abolishing criminal law and penal institutes, and to deliver\n the peaceful citizens into the hands of murderers and robbers.\u201d\n\nProfessor Jodl continues:\n\n \u201cThe nature of religious sanction consists in this: that the\n moral rules are conceived as the behests of an all-powerful,\n omniscient being, that promises to immortal man for their\n fulfilment, eternal rewards, and for their non-fulfilment\n eternal punishment in the life beyond.\u201d\n\nIn opposition to this view Professor Jodl maintains that\n\n \u201cMan\u2019s morality, on the one hand, has never been preserved from\n error by an outlook into the beyond of heaven and hell, and, on\n the other hand, there have never been missing those impulses\n that originate in the depths of human nature working in the\n line of moral ideas.\u201d\n\nThese impulses are, according to Professor Jodl, the purely moral\nsanction of conscience. And conscience is represented as, and in another\nplace called, \u201cthe natural sanction of morality.\u201d\n\nThis view of regarding conscience as the natural sanction of morality\ndoes not appear to us as a happy expression, and it seems to us that\nProfessor Jodl did not intend it as it might be understood. For Professor\nJodl speaks in another passage of \u201cthe natural impulses of morality as\nhaving their sanction in _experience_.\u201d\n\nIf that be so, conscience would not be the ultimate authority, but\nconscience would have to be regulated and corrected by a rationalised\nexperience.\n\nIf \u201cthe natural impulses of morality have their sanction in experience,\u201d\nthe ultimate authority would be the facts represented in experience; and\nthe facts of experience, in their totality, are nothing more or less than\nthe whole universe with its natural laws and conceived in its cosmical\norder. The universe, the All, nature, or whatever you call it, is indeed\nan omnipotent reality which man cannot resist, and in which he can live\nonly by adapting himself to its laws. If this ultimate authority of the\nnatural laws be called by the religious term \u201cGod,\u201d we shall see at once\nthat the old dogmatic religions express a very deep truth in mythological\nlanguage. The ultimate sanction of morality is not our conscience, but\nthat omnipotent power which resides in the objective world of realities,\nin the cosmical order of the universe.\n\nWe might as well say that everybody shall regard his watch as the\nultimate standard of time as to make his conscience the criterion of\nmorality. May everybody use his watch wisely and regulate it well. And so\nmay everybody revise his conscience and investigate diligently whether\nit agrees with the laws of that all-power of which we are a small part\nand through which alone we exist.\n\nProfessor Jodl praises very highly the French institution of a so-called\npurely moral instruction in the public schools. Father H. Gruber,\nhowever, points out some serious shortcomings in this system of moral\neducation, resulting from a lack of principle. (See _Stimmen aus\nMaria-Laach_, Freiburg i. B., 1892, No. 4.)\n\nIt is apparent that moral commands cannot be based upon purely subjective\nnotions or ideals, they must be based upon some objective authority which\nis a power that enforces obedience. Such a power exists. It is the world\nin which we live. It is that All-being of which we are a part. And that\nfeature of nature which enforces that conduct which we call moral is\nnamed God in the terminology of religious language.\n\nA consideration like this points out the way to a reconciliation between\nscience and religion. There is a truth in the old religions, and this\ntruth need only be purified from the errors that cluster about it, hiding\nits grandeur, beauty, and importance. Let the church and its authorities\nrecognise science and the principle of free investigation; let them\nbe ready to accept the scientific methods of research; let them be\nwilling to accept truth as it can be proved by arguments and verified by\nexperience as well as by experiments; and we need no longer worry about\ndogmatism and the narrowness of their sectarian doctrines. All these\naccidental features of religion will, then, pass away, and we shall have\na religion which the scientist and the philosopher can embrace.\n\nThis is what we call the Religion of Science; and the Religion of Science\nis bound to be the religion of the future. The Religion of Science will\nnot abolish the religions of the past, but it will develop them, broaden\nthem, perfect them, into the cosmical religion of humanitarianism.\n\nTo teach an ethics that either has no sanction, or whose sanction is\nbuilt upon the diverging opinions of individuals, will not do. Ethics\nmust be based upon the sanction of some objective authority, and the\nrecognition of an objective authority, of a power which enforces a\ncertain kind of conduct, being religion, we say that no ethics can be\nwithout a religious basis.\n\nThe problem at present is not how to teach irreligious ethics\u2014all such\nattempts are failures at the start; but to change the mythology of\nthe old religions into a clear, scientific conception of the natural\nconditions which demand of man that he should observe those rules which\nwe are wont to call moral.\n\n P. C.\n\n\n\n\nTHE FUTURE POSITION OF LOGICAL THEORY.\n\n\nIn last October\u2019s number of _The Monist_, Professor John Dewey gives a\nsketch of what in his view is \u201cthe present position of logical theory.\u201d\nAccording to this the basis of the position seems to be that \u201cthe only\npossible thought is the reflection of the significance of fact,\u201d and\nthat therefore logic, which is the science of the laws of thought,\nrests in reality on an objective basis. He supports Hegel in denying\n\u201cthe existence of any faculty of thought which is other than the\nexpression of fact itself.\u201d Now it is doubtless the case that this is\nthe position at present taken up by a large number of logicians, but as\nthis position seems to me to be fundamentally erroneous I should like\nto put before your readers what I hope will be \u201cthe future position of\nlogical theory.\u201d I have elsewhere worked out in some detail a theory of\nreasoning which differs from that commonly accepted chiefly in this,\nthat it recognises not two, but three kinds of reasoning, which I call\nObjective, Subjective, and Symbolic. Reasoning is commonly divided into\ntwo branches, denoted by various pairs of terms, such as Objective and\nSubjective, Inductive and Deductive, Empirical and Formal. The lines\nof division indicated by these various pairs of terms are not quite\nidentical; but they none of them indicate what seems to me the most\nimportant distinction of all, namely that between real, and symbolic\nargument. There _does_ exist (I will not say a \u201cfaculty of thought,\u201d but)\na method of argument which \u201cis other than the expression of fact itself,\u201d\nwhether of objective or of subjective fact. The term \u201cformal reasoning\u201d\nis indeed often used to denote this kind of argument, but this is a bad\nname to give it, since it seems to imply, and frequently is held to\nimply, that it deals with the _forms_ of objective or subjective facts,\nwhereas in reality it deals only with symbols, which are arbitrarily\ndefined, and which do not necessarily correspond to any things whatever,\nwhether objective or subjective. That this kind of argument not only\nexists, but flourishes is evident as soon as it is grasped that pure\nmathematics is nothing but a branch of symbolic logic. It may be that\nthere exists somewhere a fact of which any conceivable mathematical\nformula might be regarded as the reflexion, but it must surely be evident\nthat it was not to the reflexion of such facts that mathematical formul\u00e6\nin general owe their existence or validity. It may perhaps be true \u201cthat\nfact, reality is significant,\u201d and even that thoughts are themselves such\nsignificant realities, but it is the thoughts that are given to us first,\nor rather sensations which are the elements of thoughts, and we can only\ninfer the realities from them, and not _vice versa_.\n\nThe essence of my theory of logic may be briefly stated thus. The\nmeaning of a logical term contains two parts, its denotation and its\nconnotation. Either of these parts may be laid down arbitrarily as its\n_definition_, leaving the other part which I call its _import_ to be\nfound out by experience. To understand both parts of the meaning of any\nterm is therefore to possess real knowledge. Pure symbolic reasoning\ndeals only with the definitions of terms, and is not therefore founded\non real knowledge, nor can it alone ever lead to real knowledge. Thus\nif in any proposition the definitions of the terms are deducible from\none another, the proposition may be proved symbolically and is what I\ncall a truism: it gives no real information. But if the definitions of\nthe terms are independent of each other, and yet not inconsistent, the\nproposition can only be intended to assert the identity of the imports\nof the terms; it therefore ascribes import to the terms and gives real\ninformation, whether true or false. If any terms in a symbolic argument\nare however known to have real import, it may be ascribed to them in\nreal propositions, and any conclusions of the argument which contain only\nsuch terms will _ipso facto_ be made to yield real information, which may\nbe new in the sense that it was not before recognised, though it was of\ncourse implied in the real assertion or assertions which ascribed import\nto the terms of the symbolic argument.\n\nIt is in this way possible to separate any science into two branches,\none of which consists purely of symbolic argument founded on definitions\nalone, while the other may be expressed in a series of propositions,\nthe definitions of whose terms are independent of each other, and which\nascribe real import (whether objective or subjective) to the terms of the\nsymbolic science, or some of them.\n\nThis is as far as pure logic can go. The question how the truth of any\nreal propositions comes to be known is not, in my opinion, any part of\nlogical theory, but belongs to metaphysics. However that is no reason for\nnot discussing it here, especially as it is the chief question discussed\nin Professor Dewey\u2019s paper.\n\n\u201cTruth\u201d means some sort of consistency in a proposition. We may compare\na symbolic argument to a game with counters, the rules of which are laid\ndown arbitrarily, and to say that a given conclusion of such an argument\nis true only means that the game has been \u201cplayed fair.\u201d But the truth of\na real proposition does not depend on any arbitrary rules. It expresses\na consistency between two real facts, either that two named groups of\nthings possess certain common attributes, or that certain of the things\npossessing named groups of attributes are identical. The essential\nelement of all real knowledge is then a connecting link between a thing\nand an attribute, such as is afforded by a well-understood word.\n\nNow the only \u201cthings\u201d which we can apprehend directly are our subjective\nsensations and conceptions. We can compare two or more sensations or\nconceptions, and recognise in them common attributes. Thus I can say\nof my own knowledge that the sensations I denote by \u201cthe taste of\nsugar\u201d and \u201cthe taste of lead acetate\u201d have a common attribute, which\nI call \u201csweetness.\u201d This is a real assertion, for its truth is not\ndeducible from the definitions of its terms, and yet I know, by direct\napprehension, that it is true. But it is only a subjective truth. The\ncorresponding objective assertion would be sugar and acetate of lead\nboth produce, when tasted, the sensation of sweetness. And I have no\ndirect apprehension of this fact. That the tastes referred to in the\nformer proposition were produced by objective things denoted by the terms\nsugar and acetate of lead, can only be inferred by the process called\ninduction, which can never lead to a positive or necessary truth.\n\nThus we may from a pure symbolic science proceed one step further, to a\nsubjective science, by the aid of direct apprehension, and the results\nof such a subjective science may in certain cases attain the position\nof absolute, or necessary truths. But on the other hand, all objective\nsciences must rest on induction. Now the true nature of induction is,\nI am persuaded, commonly misapprehended, because it is not realised\nsufficiently clearly that the prime data of induction are not themselves\nobjective, but subjective facts. An \u201cobjective fact\u201d is really only\nan hypothesis, postulated to account for certain of our subjective\nsensations. The only justification for making such an hypothesis is\nthat it actually does explain certain sensations, and the measure of\nits probability (for we can never assert it as a necessary certainty)\nis the number and complexity of the sensations which it accounts for.\nThe first of all such objective hypotheses is that we have an objective\nenvironment to whose action our sensations, or some of them, are due.\nThis suggests at once a more general hypothesis, commonly known as the\nlaw of causation, namely that the conditions obtaining in the objective\nuniverse at any one moment are the effective causes of those obtaining\nat the next, and so at any subsequent moment. These two hypotheses,\ntogether with certain subsidiary ones, do suffice to account for an\nenormous number, if not all, of our sensations, and so we are justified\nin entertaining them. But to leave out the notion of _effective_\ncausation, and to substitute a mere rule of sequence, is to remove the\nonly justification we have for assuming the hypothesis of causation at\nall. It is perhaps conceivable that the hypothesis may be false, that\nour sensations are not \u201ccaused by\u201d an objective environment but if so\nwhat reason remains for believing in that environment at all? I can never\nknow anything whatever about an objective universe, unless some of my\nsensations about which alone I know anything directly, are caused by\nthat universe. It is perhaps thinkable that there should be an objective\nuniverse in which events occur which in no sense _cause_ my subjective\nsensations, but to which those sensations nevertheless happen to\ncorrespond; but if this is so the sensations afford me no ground whatever\nfor believing in the occurrence of the events, or the objectivity of the\nuniverse.\n\nWell then, the essence of induction is the assumption of an hypothesis to\naccount for observed facts\u2014first of all of directly observed sensations,\nand then of facts assumed to be objective in virtue of the primary\nhypothesis. That this account of induction is the true one is I think\nparticularly enforced by the consideration of those cases to which at\nfirst sight it does not seem to apply. A common example of induction is\nafforded by our belief that the sun will rise to-morrow. That it has\nrisen every morning for the last four thousand years or more is no reason\nwhatever for believing that it will rise to-morrow, unless it is held to\npoint to some explanatory hypothesis. Such an hypothesis has actually\nbeen framed by astronomers, and no one would now pretend to found his\nbelief in the sun\u2019s rising to-morrow on the mere fact that it has often\nrisen before, but would go on to explain that it must rise unless the\nearth were to stop revolving, etc. If at Monte Carlo the red turned up\nten times running, would that be any reason for expecting it to turn up\nagain, the eleventh time? No, it would not unless the succession of reds\nseemed to point to some explanatory hypothesis, such as a defect in the\nroulette. Again, the fact that in the last fifty years the death rate\nin London has been about twenty-eight per thousand would be no reason\nfor believing that it will be about that figure this year except on\nthe assumption that the constancy of the death rate indicated certain\nconstant causes, which we have no reason to believe have been altered\nthis year.\n\nHaving once assumed that our environment is objective, and as a corollary\nthe hypothesis of causation, the whole of physical science follows,\nstep by step. Subsidiary hypotheses are introduced at each stage and\njustified by the way they account for observed results. To show how a\nsingle hypothesis is capable of explaining a large number of observed\nresults, the full meaning of the hypothesis is elucidated by symbolic\nreasoning. By such reasoning it is for example shown that the same\nhypothesis, of universal gravitation, is capable of accounting, not only\nfor the movements of the stars, but for the tides, the flow of rivers,\nthe falling of unsupported bodies, the rising of balloons, the movements\nof the balance in Cavendish\u2019s experiment, and so on. That such wide\nextensions of an hypothesis are possible tends greatly to confirm, not\nonly the hypothesis itself, but the fundamental hypotheses of objectivity\nand causation also. But it does not prove either the one or the others.\nWe cannot know anything about the objective universe with absolute\ncertainty, but we may reasonably believe a certain hypothesis about it\nwith any degree of conviction we think suitable; that is we may (and of\ncourse we actually do) act on all occasions _as if_ we knew absolutely\nthat they were true.\n\nWe may then believe, and I for one do believe, not only in the\nobjectivity of the universe, but that even my own subjective sensations\nare mere bye-products of that universe. I _believe_ that objective facts\nare, if I may so express it, more real than subjective sensations; that\nin fact the objective universe might have existed, and might exist again\nwithout any subjective element in it anywhere. But I cannot _know_\nthis, it is with me a matter of faith. Thus I cannot agree with Hegel,\nthat \u201call possible thought is the reflexion of the significance of\nfact\u201d (except perhaps in the sense that thought is the reflexion of the\nsignificance of certain changes in the grey matter of the brain) for\nthis would seem to imply that stupid or contradictory thoughts reflected\nstupid or contradictory significance in certain facts. But I believe that\nmen of science are gradually evolving a system of thought which will\nmore and more faithfully reflect the significance of fact, and that thus\nscience is actually building up truth. But all science must begin with,\nand be founded upon, subjective knowledge, and therefore any theory of\npositivism contradicts itself for it must be founded on faith. Science\nis thus founded on faith, faith in things not directly apprehended, just\nas truly as religion is. It is only because we unconsciously acquire\nthis faith in our infancy, and that it is in most cases amply justified\nby subsequent experience, that we do not even recognise the fact that it\nis faith, in exactly the same sense that belief in God is. But just as\nmen have sometimes lost their faith in God, so it may happen to a man to\nloose his faith in reality, and logic is quite as incapable of shaking a\nman out of the one position as out of the other.\n\nThis I take it is the key to the agnosticism of such men of science as\nMr. Huxley. I do not for a moment suppose that Mr. Huxley believes less\nthan most men; he probably has good grounds for believing a great deal\nmore. Only he rightly refuses to say that he _knows_ facts of which\nhe can have had no direct apprehension and which he can only infer\nmore or less probably, to be true. Hypotheses which as we push our\ninvestigations are shown to be capable of explaining more and more facts,\nthat is, ultimately, more and more sensations, will in the end come to\nbe believed in without doubt or hesitation. If a man says he _knows_ the\nlaw of gravitation to be true, he commits a logical blunder; but there\nis nothing to prevent a scientific man from believing in any miracle\nor prodigy, so long as the account he gives of it does not contradict\nitself. Not only may two equally reasonable men form very different\nestimates of the probability of the same event, even with the same\nevidence before them, but one man may put his faith to a proposition with\nadmittedly much lower degree of probability than would be required to\nconvince another. Only, a scientific man will always distinguish between\nwhat he knows and what he believes, and will admit that though he has\nmade up his mind to act _as if_ he knew to be true the propositions he\nonly believes to be so, yet another man may reasonably take a different\nview of any one of them.\n\n EDWARD T. DIXON.\n\nTrin. Coll., Cambridge, Jan. 8, 1892.\n\n\n\n\nCOMTE AND TURGOT.\n\n\nOn page 410 of the last number of _The Monist_, it was stated that the\ndoctrine of the three stages of knowledge was not properly a Comtean idea\nbut belonged to Turgot. The following letter from Professor Schaarschmidt\nof Bonn informs us of the passages in Turgot where the statement of the\ndoctrine is found:\n\n _To the Editor of The Monist_:\n\n To your note of inquiry of the 22d of last month I have the\n honor to reply, that the Comtean theory of the _trois \u00e9tats_\n may be traced back to utterances of Turgot made by him in his\n _Second discours sur les progr\u00e8s successifs de l\u2019esprit humain\n prononc\u00e9 le 2me d\u00e9cembre 1750_\u2014namely in the Sorbonne. You will\n find the discourse referred to in the edition of the works of\n Turgot which I now have before me, namely that of Guillaumin,\n Paris, 1844, in Vol. II, at pages 597 et seqq. The passage in\n question is found at p. 600-601. However, it is highly probable\n that the so-called _loi des trois \u00e9tats_ was _directly_\n transmitted to Comte by St. Simon, who reproduced the idea\n of Turgot in his _Introduction aux travaux scientifiques du\n XIXme Si\u00e8cle_, at pages 62-63. For Comte was dependent in many\n respects on St. Simon, while it is probable that he had never\n studied Turgot. To St. Simon, in fact, is due the expression\n \u201cphilosophie positive,\u201d as well as the germ-notion of the\n division of the Sciences, which Comte further elaborated.\n\n SCHAARSCHMIDT.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK REVIEWS.\n\n\nDARWIN AND AFTER DARWIN. I. THE DARWINIAN THEORY. By _George John\nRomanes_, M. A., LL. D., F. R. S. London: Longmans, Green & Co. Chicago:\nThe Open Court Publishing Co. 1892.\n\nIn the present work by Professor Romanes, who may be regarded as the\nspecial exponent of Darwin\u2019s theory of organic evolution, we have a\ncomplete and systematic presentation of \u201cDarwinism according to Darwin.\u201d\nIt is the outcome of a course of lectures delivered by the author in 1889\nbefore the Royal Institution, London, and forms only part of a much more\nextensive treatise on the Darwinian theory, embracing the early history\nof biology, and a discussion of the further developments of the theory\nsubsequent to the death of the great naturalist who gave it birth. The\npresent part is limited to what is distinctly Darwinian, dealing with it\nand with the main objections raised against the general theory of organic\nevolution it enforces.\n\nThe subject naturally divides into two parts, and Professor Romanes\naccordingly deals with it in two sections, in the first of which he\nconsiders organic evolution as a fact, stating the main evidences in\nsupport of the doctrine, while in the second section he furnishes \u201cthe\nevidences which thus far have been brought to light touching the causes\nof organic evolution considered as a process.\u201d The author points out\nin his introductory remarks, that in order to establish a theory of a\ncontinuous transmutation of species, which is what is meant by organic\nevolution, it is not necessary to furnish proof of _all_ the natural\ncauses which have been at work. The issue is between the theory of a\nsupernatural cause, as operating immediately in numberless acts of\nspecial creation, and the theory of \u201cnatural causes as a whole whether\nthese happen, or do not happen, to have been hitherto discovered.\u201d\nMoreover, the discussion is concerned only with the origin of species,\nand not with that of life, as to which the author says with truth,\n\u201calthough in the opinion of most biologists it is a question which we may\nwell hope will some day fall within the range of science to answer, at\npresent, it must be confessed, science is not in a position to furnish so\nmuch as any suggestion upon the subject; and therefore our wisdom as men\nof science is frankly to acknowledge that such is the case.\u201d\n\nThe idea of evolution implies continuity, and the author refers to\nthe fact that the uniformity of nature\u2019s method in the production of\nphenomena to which continuity is due, recognised in other fields of\nscience, strongly recommended the theory of organic evolution for\nacceptance on merely antecedent grounds. There is another important fact,\nfrom the antecedent point of view, to which Professor Romanes draws\nattention. He states it in the words of Mr. Wallace, who lays down as a\ngeneral law that \u201cevery species has come into existence coincident both\nin space and time with a pre-existing and closely allied species.\u201d This\nis a necessary consequence of natural evolution, but no reason can be\nassigned for it on the theory of special creation, and the existence of\nsuch a correlation may be regarded as a test-question between the two\ntheories.\n\nThe direct evidence in favor of organic evolution brought together in\nthe first section of the present work is considered under the several\nheads of classification, Morphology, Embryology, Pal\u00e6ontology, and\nGeographical Distribution. As to the first of these subjects, the object\nof classification has been the arranging of organisms in accordance\nwith their natural affinities. Organisms have been compared for the\npurpose of ascertaining which of the constituent organs are of the most\ninvariable occurrence, and therefore of the most typical significance,\nand the author shows that \u201call the general principles and particular\nfacts appertaining to the natural classification of plants and animals,\nare precisely what they ought to be according to the theory of genetic\ndescent; while no one of them is such as might be\u2014and indeed, used, to\nbe\u2014expected upon the theory of special creation.\u201d In connection with\nthe important subject of Morphology, the author, after showing that the\ntheory of descent with continued adaptive modification fully explains\nall the known cases of divergence from the typical structure which an\norganism presents, devotes himself especially to the argument from\nrudimentary structures. These are of such general occurrence that they\nare found in every species, and such obsolescent or vestigial structures,\nas the author terms them, are of great value as evidence for the theory\nof evolution, particularly those found in adult man. To human vestigial\nstructures the author pays particular attention, his observations being\naccompanied by excellent illustrations from nature. It is noteworthy that\nhe abandons the flattening of the tibia in man, and the disposition of\nvalves in human veins, as arguments in support of man\u2019s natural origin,\nwhich is abundantly supported, however, by reference to other rudimentary\norgans.\n\nThe science of Embryology is of special importance, on account of the\nhistory it affords of the _process_ of evolution, and thus supplying\nevidence of the fact, although the author remarks, \u201cthe foreshortening of\ndevelopmental history which takes place in the individual lifetime may\nbe expected often to take place, not only in the way of condensation,\nbut also in the way of excision.\u201d To understand the argument from\nembryology it is necessary to trace the first beginning of individual\nlife in the ovum, and for this purpose to consider the phenomena\nof reproduction in their most simple form. In connection with this\nsubject, Professor Romanes, after examining the features in which\nthe cell-division of protozoa differs from that of metazoa, and after\nconsidering the grounds on which it may be concluded that there is a\nphysiological continuity between growth and sexual reproduction, points\nout that the constructive argument in favor of evolution derived from\nembryology commences with the fertilisation of the metazoal ovum. As\nthis first stage has not been adequately treated by any other writer,\nthe author deals with it at considerable length. The later stages of\nindividual development, including that of the vertebrata, on the lines\nof Haeckel\u2019s ideal primitive vertebrate, are more concisely treated.\nThe science of embryology, covers the whole field of animal life, and\nit is not surprising therefore that it is considered by the author and\nother evolutionists as furnishing the strongest support to the theory of\nevolution.\n\nAs to the pal\u00e6ontological evidence, Professor Romanes does not ascribe\nto it the paramount importance which it has in popular judgment.\nNevertheless he asserts that, not only is no positive proof against the\ntheory of descent to be drawn from a study of pal\u00e6ontology, but it proves\ntwo very important general facts in favor of it. These are that from the\nearliest to the latest times there has been a constant and progressive\nincrease in the diversity of types both of animals and plants, and that\n\u201cthrough all these branching lines of ever-multiplying types, from the\nfirst appearance of each of them to their latest known conditions, there\nis overwhelming evidence of one great law of organic nature\u2014the law of\ngradual advance from the general to the special, from the low to the\nhigh, from the simple to the complex.\u201d These general facts are supported\nby detailed consideration of fossil horns, bones, teeth and shells, which\nsupply four special lines of evidence. The evolution of mammalian limbs\nwith particular reference to the hoofed animals is treated with a fulness\nits importance requires.\n\nAs the geological argument is concerned with the distribution of species\nin time, so that based on the present geographical distribution of\nanimal and plant species is concerned with their distribution in space.\nThis, although not regarded by the author as a crucial test between the\nrival theories of creation and evolution, is declared to be one of the\nstrongest lines of evidence in favor of the latter. The general facts\nrelied on are, the discontinuity of distribution of certain species, the\nabsence of any _constant_ correlation between habitats and animals or\nplants suited to live upon them, and the presence in every biological\nregion of species related to other species in genera, and usually also\ngenera related to other genera in families; this correlation between a\ngeographically restricted habitat and the affinities of its fauna and\nflora being repeated over and over again throughout the earth\u2019s surface.\nBut further, the correlation between habitats and their animals and\nplants is not limited to the now existing species, that is, the dead\nand living species are allied, showing that the latter are modified\ndescendants of the former. Moreover, where the areas of distribution are\nnot restricted, through species wandering away from their native homes,\nthe course of their wanderings is marked by the origination _en route_ of\nnew species. Another important consideration is that a double correlation\nexists in the geographical distribution of organic types. That between\nthe geographical restriction and natural affinity among inhabitants of\nthe same areas has already been mentioned. The second is the correlation\nbetween _degrees_ of geographical restriction and _degrees_ of natural\naffinity. This is consonant with the theory of descent with modification,\nas \u201cthe more distant the affinity, and therefore, _ex hypothesi_, the\nlarger and the older the original group of organisms, the greater must\nbe the chance of dispersal.\u201d These general considerations are supported\nby detailed illustrations drawn from the distribution of aquatic and\nterrestrial organisms. The author shows that an examination of the\nfaunas and floras of oceanic islands establishes the general law \u201cthat\n_wherever_ there is evidence of land-areas having been for a long time\nseparated from other land-areas, there we meet with a more or less\nextraordinary profusion of unique species, often running up into unique\ngenera.\u201d There is, moreover, a constant correlation between the _degree_\nof this peculiarity, and the time during which the fauna and flora have\nbeen isolated. The author concludes this part of his argument by the\nforcible observation that \u201cif the doctrine of special creation is taken\nto be true, then it must be further taken that the one and only principle\nwhich has been consistently followed in the geographical disposition of\nspecies, is that of so depositing them as to make it everywhere appear\nthat they were not thus deposited at all, but came into existence where\nthey now occur by way of genetic descent with perpetual migration and\ncorrelative modification.\u201d\n\nThe second part of this work, that which treats of selection, under the\ntwo heads of Natural Selection and Sexual Selection, although in some\nrespects the most important, does not need to be noticed so fully as that\nwhich deals with the facts of natural evolution. After stating the theory\nof natural selection, the author notices various fallacies connected\nwith it which are largely prevalent among the adherents of Darwinianism,\nalthough nowhere fallen into by Darwin himself, and the still greater\nfallacies found in the writings of his opponents. In the two following\nchapters Professor Romanes, after stating the main arguments in favor\nof the theory of natural selection, reviews the main objections which\nhave been urged against it. The first argument is that, as a matter of\nobservation, \u201cthe struggle for existence in nature does lead to the\nextermination of forms less fitted for the struggle, and thus makes room\nfor forms more fitted.\u201d The second argument, which the author considers\nof overwhelming significance, is that there is not a single instance, in\neither the vegetable or the animal kingdom, of a structure or an instinct\nwhich is developed for the exclusive benefit of another species. Its\nimportance may be judged by the fact that Darwin considered that a single\ninstance to the contrary would invalidate the whole theory of natural\nselection. The third argument is based on the facts connected with the\nvariation of animals and plants under domestication. Ocular evidence\nof the value of this argument is furnished by a series of drawings\nprepared for the present work representing varieties of pigeons, and of\neight other animals. As special illustrations of natural selection the\nauthor considers the subjects of protective colouring, warning colours,\nand mimicry. In referring to his treatment of the criticisms of the\nnatural selection theory, in the course of which he deals with the main\nobjections, we cannot do more than mention that based on the possession\nby the skate of an electric organ, which, owing to the weakness of\nits discharges, cannot apparently be of any use to the animal. This\ndifficulty seems to be unexplainable according to the principles of\nnatural selection, and Professor Romanes, in admitting the fact, remarks\nthat it is of a magnitude and importance \u201caltogether unequalled by that\nof any other single case\u2014or any series of cases\u2014which has hitherto been\nencountered by the theory.\u201d\n\nThe last chapter of the work is devoted to the consideration of the\ntheory of Sexual Selection, which was suggested by Mr. Darwin to furnish\na scientific explanation of the wide generality of beauty in organic\nstructures. It is an observed fact that sexual selection does take place\namong the higher animals, and it is inferred that, the selection has\nreference to an \u00e6sthetic taste on the part of the animals themselves;\nand that this cause is adequate to explain the phenomena of beauty\npresented by such animals. After stating the evidence in favor of these\nconclusions, the author considers at length Mr. Wallace\u2019s views on the\nsubject. These constitute the objections urged against the theory of\nsexual selection, of the truth of which, however, Darwin shortly before\nhis death expressed himself as remaining firmly convinced.\n\nProfessor Romanes concludes his present volume with a few general remarks\non the philosophical relations of Darwinism to the facts of adaptation\non the one hand and to those of beauty on the other. In none of these,\nsays the author, do we meet with any independent evidence of supernatural\ndesign, although there is abundant evidence throughout organic nature of\nnatural causation. And yet natural causation furnishes no disproof of the\nexistence of a Supreme Being. The whole of organic and inorganic nature\nis made subject to one rule of government, but \u201cthe ulterior and ultimate\nquestion touching the nature of this government as mental or non-mental,\npersonal or impersonal, remains exactly where it was.\u201d Moreover, if\nthere be an intelligent First Cause, of whose Will all secondary causes\nare the expression, their operation must be uniform, so far as the Will\nis consistent, and therefore it must appear as what we call mechanical.\nThus according to the pure logic of the matter, \u201cthe proof of organic\nevolution amounts to nothing more than the proof of a natural process.\u201d\n\nIn an appendix to Chapter V, Professor Romanes offers suggestions as to\nthe imperfection of the geological record, and meets various objections\nagainst the theory of organic evolution on that ground. But we must now\nleave this excellent work, which will undoubtedly answer the expectation\nwith which it was prepared, of being \u201ca compendium, or handbook, adapted\nto the requirements of a general reader or biological student, as\ndistinguished from those of a professed naturalist.\u201d\n\nIt is enriched by a very good portrait of Darwin, in whose footsteps\nthe author has sought to tread by \u201cavoiding dogmatism on the one hand,\nand undue timidity as regards general reasoning on the other.\u201d In\nhis introductory observations he dwells on the remarkable influence\nexercised by Darwin over the method of investigation of organic nature,\nby treating the discovery or accumulation of facts, not as an end, but\nas a means for generalisation, thus bringing natural history into a line\nwith other inductive sciences.\n\nThe value of the work is materially increased by the addition of numerous\nwell executed original illustrations, besides various plates derived from\nHaeckel\u2019s works and other sources, some of them American. It has also a\ngood Index which will add much to its usefulness.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nGRUNDRISS DER NATURLEHRE F\u00dcR DIE OBEREN CLASSEN DER MITTELSCHULEN. Von\nDr. _E. Mach_. Ausgabe f\u00fcr Gymnasien. Mit 358 Abbildungen. 315 pp. Vienna\nand Prague: F. Tempsky. Leipsic: G. Freytag.\n\nThe principles that have guided Professor Mach in the preparation of\nthese outlines of Physics, are in the main as follows:\n\nThe concepts and notions of physical science should not be set forth\ndogmatically, but should be presented as much as possible under the\ninfluence of the actual natural facts that lead to them. Hypotheses\nand theories should be employed only when actually necessary. Long\nmathematical developments and pages of formul\u00e6 only impede the scholar\u2019s\ntotal view of his subject and afford of themselves no insight. _Logical_\nfinish should not be sought after in elementary presentations; the method\nof the inculcation of truths should, so to speak, be _psychological_: the\nmethod of their acquisition.\n\nFrom the brief statement of these guiding principles, the reader will\nobserve that Professor Mach\u2019s conception of the proper form of an\nelementary text-book, differs greatly from that usually entertained.\nThe method of presentation is not the dogmatic, the \u201clogical,\u201d which\nsets forth a science as a ready-made and perfected, mystically created,\nproduct; but the genetic, the historical, the natural. We are constantly\nmade aware, in the study of this book, of what knowledge really means\nand what it does not. We are not treated, in its introductory chapter,\nas we are in most of the text-books of Physics, to disquisitions on the\ninsolubility of the questions What is Matter, What is Energy, What is\nForce, and to like professions of metaphysical ignorance, which make us\nwonder how people can request us to read hundreds of pages about things\nit is impossible to have knowledge of; but we are presented throughout\nwith a simple statement and description, in terms of facts, of what\nour fundamental, as well as our derived, notions _are_, and what their\nimport. It is unnecessary to say that the need of such a book is very\ngreat. And it is pleasant, constantly to discover how well its idea\nhas been executed. Concise, unburdened by unnecessary and self-evident\ndevelopments, it is in our judgment a model of elementary exposition.\n\nWith characteristic modesty, Professor Mach disclaims all pretension to\nhaving fully realised his conception, and views his performance simply as\nan attempt. The book was submitted, before publication, to a number of\ncompetent educators, whose advice in regard to alterations was frequently\nacted upon.\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\nNOUVELLES RECHERCHES DE PSYCHIATRIE ET D\u2019ANTHROPOLOGIE CRIMINELLE. By _C.\nLombroso_. Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan. 1892.\n\nProf. C. Lombroso\u2019s activity reaches a climax that is almost superhuman.\nHe contributed to the Italian Archives of Psychiatry two articles,\none of which proves that, at least in Italy, the sense of touch is\nweaker in women than in men; it is still weaker and more irregular in\ncriminal women than in normal women. (Archiv. di. Psichiatr. Sc. pen.\ned. Antrop. Vol. XII, 1891, p. 1-6). The other article (l. c. p. 58-108)\nis an inquiry concerning thought-transmission, which contains besides a\ncritical review of the usual rubbish of so-called telepathic phenomena\ntwo strange observations. The first is the case of a low-bred hysterical\nlad who does not possess the faculty claimed by him to understand\ntelepathically the intentions of whosoever employs him, but strange\nenough, if sufficiently charged with whiskey, is able to read any writing\nthrough the envelope with closed eyes. The other case is a somnambulistic\ncompositor, who sets type correctly in the state of somnambulism.\nBlindfolded he draws the figures drawn behind his back upon a slate, and\nhypnotised he guesses the numbers which the experimenter thinks. Lombroso\nis one of our greatest psychologists, but these experiments perhaps with\nthe same subjects should be repeated by other psychologists so as to make\nsure of their correctness. Lombroso concludes that there seems to be some\nfoundation in thought-transmission.\n\nThe present little volume of new researches applies Lombroso\u2019s theories\nconcerning morphological abnormalities of the criminal type in the\nanthropological field. It appears natural that the criminal type should\nshow abnormal features, but sometimes Lombroso\u2019s eagerness to discover\nabnormal features, even in political criminals such as Charlotte Corday,\nis exaggerated. At least we must confess that many abnormalities appear\nvery frequently among peaceful and law-abiding citizens. The Corday\nskull, although a trifle platycephalic, is beautifully rounded and\nnormal. M. Topinard finds no abnormal features but Lombroso maintains\nthat its platycephaly is doubly abnormal and he adds: \u201cThe capacity of\nthe skull is 1.360 cubic centimeters while those of Parisian women is\n1.337. Must we not conclude that its capacity exceeds the average?\u201d We\nread on p. 124 and sq.: \u201cThe more our women will be forced to enter\nthe economical struggle for existence, the more will they become\ncriminals.... The result (of letting them enter public life) will be to\nlower the nature of women.\u201d\n\nThe booklet is very instructive even to those who disagree with the\nprofessor, for it is full of facts and valuable observations.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nVORLESUNGEN \u00dcBER DIE ALGEBRA DER LOGIK. (Exakte Logik.) By Dr. _Ernst\nSchr\u00f6der_. Erster Band mit viel Figuren im Texte. Leipsic: B. G. Teubner.\n1890.\n\nProfessor Mach says, \u201cThe essence of science is economy of thought.\u201d\nIf that is so, there is no discipline more imbued with the spirit of\nscience than algebra. When operating with algebraic symbols we cease\nto think out the whole calculation at every stage, and we are enabled\nto keep track of the different factors, and of their mutual relations\nduring the operation from the beginning to the end. In common arithmetic\nthese factors are lost like rivers in an ocean of homogeneous numbers\nwhich increase and decrease without betraying the way by which they were\nreached. Algebraic symbols generalise calculation, and thus we have\nthe advantage of calculating from the resultant formula any particular\nexample with machine-like exactness and without the trouble of going\nover the whole operation again. The ease with which we can operate\nwith symbols brings it about that we sometimes out-run our thought and\nthe correct result may be obtained by an operator who only partially\nunderstands the operation, just as an engineer is able to run a machine\nthe mechanism of which he but partially understands.\n\nMathematics having gained so great advantages through the introduction of\nalgebraic symbols, the question suggests itself whether the same method\nmight not with some advantage be introduced into the other provinces of\nformal science, especially in the domain of logic. The first logicians\nwho borrowed signs from algebra and introduced them into logic by\ngeneralising their meanings, were two Germans, Gottfried Ploucquet and\nJohann Heinrich Lambert. Ploucquet wrote \u201cPrincipia de substantiis et\nphaenomenis, accedit methodus calculandi in logicis ab ipso inventa, cui\npraemittitur commentatio de arte characteristica universali,\u201d Frankfort\nand Leipsic, 1753, ed. II. 1764.[84] Lambert\u2019s investigations on the\nsubject are found in his \u201cLogische Abhandlungen.\u201d Prof. Venn, in his\n\u201cSymbolic Logic,\u201d p. xxxii, says of Lambert, \u201cHe fully recognised that\nthe four algebraic operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication,\nand division, have each an analogue in Logic; that they may here be\nrespectively termed aggregation, separation, determination, abstraction,\nand be symbolised by +, -, \u00d7, :. He also perceived the _inverse_ nature\nof the second and fourth as compared with the first and third; and no one\ncould state more clearly that we must not confound the mathematical with\nthe logical signification.\u201d\n\nThe algebra of logic which through the work of these ingenious men,\nhad received so favorable a start, was very soon neglected; yet it was\nrevived after some time in England by Boole, DeMorgan, and Jevons. It\nremained for quite a while the almost exclusive property of the English\nwhere at the present time Prof. Venn may be considered as the greatest\nEnglish authority on the subject. Venn\u2019s works were rivalled by an\nAmerican scholar, Mr. Charles S. Peirce, the same who has contributed\nseveral articles to _The Monist_. The algebra of logic which had been\nso long neglected in Germany, is now reviving in the country of its\nfirst birth. The author of the work, the first volume of which lies now\nbefore us for review, is Professor of Mathematics at the Polytechnicum of\nKarlsruhe in Baden. The second volume is not yet worked out in detail,\nbut its publication may be expected in one or two years. The whole work,\nwhen completed, will be the most comprehensive treatise on the algebra\nof logic that has as yet appeared. The plan and treatment of Professor\nSchr\u00f6der\u2019s \u201cVorlesungen \u00fcber die Algebra der Logik\u201d exhibit that uncommon\nthoroughness and exhaustiveness, for which German scholars are justly\nfamous. The book, in one word, will be the standard work on the algebra\nof logic for a long time to come.\n\nIt would lead us here too far to review or to sketch the main contents\nof Professor Schr\u00f6der\u2019s work, which, it seems to us, is difficult to\nexplain without entering into the details and thus going beyond the scope\nof mere review. But we shall briefly set forth the chief foundations\nupon which Schr\u00f6der builds his algebra of logic. Professor Schr\u00f6der has\ninscribed two mottos on the title page of his book, but we confess that\nwe suspect at least one of them is intended to be ironical; it certainly\nseems to have been selected when the author was in a mood of humor. Being\nconscious of the great value of theoretical speculation, he quotes from\nGoethe the following Mephistophelian sentiment:\n\n \u201cI say to thee, a speculative wight\n Is like a beast on moorlands lean,\n Led circling there by some malicious sprite\n While all around lie pastures fair and green.\u201d\n\nThere are two kinds of speculation: first, that which attempts to find\nout by pure thought a substantial extension of knowledge; and secondly,\nthat which investigates the methods of inquiry. The former is futile, the\nlatter is fruitful. The former is that which Goethe censures. To censure\nthe latter would be a grave mistake. The man who would try to forge bread\nout of iron must meet with disappointment, but the smith who invented and\nshaped the plow did more for the production of bread than many thousand\nfarmers taken together, although it may be he did not raise a blade of\nwheat. Speculation that attempts to find out things by mere brooding\nis _prima facie_ wrong; but speculation that constructs the methods of\ninvestigation is the basis of all progress in science.\n\nThe other motto of Schr\u00f6der\u2019s book is Goethe\u2019s saying: \u201cMan is not born\nto solve the problem of the world, but to seek for the point where the\nproblem begins and then to keep within the limits of the comprehensible.\u201d\nIt would be well to compare this saying of Goethe\u2019s with another one by\nthe same author which is \u201cMan should hold fast to the belief that that\nwhich seems incomprehensible, is comprehensible. Otherwise, he would\nnot investigate.\u201d Schr\u00f6der follows rather the spirit of the second than\nthat of the first quotation. He says on p. 105 of the recent volume,\nwith reference to some critical remarks made by the late Professor\nLotze of G\u00f6ttingen, who was more brilliant and ingenious than exact\nin his philosophical views and who showed an undisguised dislike for\nany severe method that has recourse to numbers, figures, schedules, or\nclassifications, as does the algebra of logic: \u201cIf Lotze concludes his\nlogic with the wish that German philosophy should rise to the attempt at\ncomprehending the course of the world instead of merely calculating it,\nwe should answer, Could we first calculate it, then we should certainly\ncomprehend it so far as comprehension on earth is possible.\u201d But how\nis it possible? Simply by properly limiting and defining the field of\ninvestigation; and here we can see that the first saying of Goethe\u2019s\nshould not be construed in such a way as to appear contradictory to the\nsecond.\n\nEvery thinker starts with certain limits of comprehension, but he extends\nthem so that the stock of knowledge increases in every generation,\nand there is no probability that we shall ever reach the limits of an\nabsolutely incomprehensible. There is no solid progress to be made by\nmaking wild raids in the domain of the unknown, a method which is pursued\nonly by dreamers and metaphysicians. We must start from the boundary\nof the present stock of knowledge, and let our progress be confined\nto single well defined and limited problems. How a solution of the\nworld-problem is possible in this sense, is explained by Schr\u00f6der on p.\n103: \u201cThe answer is given in the old parable of the bundle of arrows,\nwhich resists all attempts at breaking it. As a whole it withstood, but\nit yielded to him who untied the bundle and broke the arrows singly. The\ndifficulties which present themselves to the progress of knowledge can\nalso only be overcome singly, and in their one-sidedness. In the division\nof labor thus produced, lies exactly the advantage and the strength of\nthe diverse disciplines,\u2014_qui trop embrasse, mal \u00e9treint_.\u201d\n\nProfessor Schr\u00f6der advertises his book with the following words:\n\n\u201cFrom the title the reader will observe that here the deductive or formal\nlogic alone is treated. The calculative treatment of the deductive\nlogic, through which this discipline is redeemed from the fetters by\nwhich through the power of habit, word-language has bound the human\nmind, should deserve, more than anything else the name \u2018Exact Logic\u2019!\nThis method alone can give to the laws of valid inference, their most\npregnant, concise, and clear expression, and is thus enabled to reveal\nnumerous and important gaps,\u2014why not mistakes,\u2014in the older presentations\nof the subject.\u201d\n\n\u201cSince the appearance of the author\u2019s \u2018Operationskreis des Logikkalkuls,\u2019\nthis method of treatment has made progress of highest importance,\nespecially through the works of the Americans, Mr. Charles S. Peirce and\nhis school. To Mr. Peirce, more than to anybody else, is due the merit\nof having built a bridge from the older and purely verbal treatment\nof our discipline to the new calculative method; a bridge which the\nprofessional philosophers rightly found lacking and to which lack is well\nto be ascribed the fact that the new method received only a partial and\nbewildered attention. Through Mr. Peirce\u2019s works, upon which also the\nauthor has had some influence, the theory is now so far developed and\nperfected that for the first and main part of its whole system, a final\npresentation and arrangement may be obtained.\u201d\n\n\u201cEndeavoring to offer so far as possible such a final and comprehensive\npresentation, the author desires to offer at the same time and in\na systematic way a handbook of the most valuable materials of the\nliterature of the subject which especially in the English language, is\nquite considerable.\u201d\n\nThe book addresses two kinds of readers which are of a greatly different\nturn of mind, and it will go far in reconciling the methods of both, the\nmathematicians and the philosophers.\n\nIn the preface Schr\u00f6der says, \u201cIn consideration of the formul\u00e6 which\nappear in the book, it may be wise to state, that no mathematical\ntraining or any specific knowledge is presupposed to be known by the\nreader. We might repeat the words of Dedekind, prefixed to one of his\nbooks: \u2018Everybody can understand this work who is in possession of what\nis generally called, common-sense.\u2019 But we may add another saying from\nanother author: \u2018The beaux esprits certainly, who are not accustomed to\nthe severe demands of thought, will very soon turn away from it.\u2019\u201d\n\nThe introduction is comparatively long, comprising no less than 125\npages. But, considering that it is more than an introduction, that it\nexplains the foundation on which the whole work rests, it is not too\nlong, for it forms an essential and indeed the most important part of\nthe book. Schr\u00f6der discusses in it the character and the limitation of\nhis problem. He explains induction, deduction, contradiction and valid\ninference. He considers the nature of signs and names. He says, on p.\n38: \u201cHumanity, it appears, does not rise above the absolute zero of\ncivilisation and the level of animal life, until it develops the activity\nof denotation and symbolising. And there is indeed nothing to which the\nhuman mind owes so much for its progress as to the signs of things.\n\n\u201cThe sign which speaks in attitude and gesture to emotion, speaks in word\nand sentence to the intellect. And it possesses, in accordance with the\nlaws of the association of ideas, the power of producing in the person\naddressed certain ideas.\n\n\u201cWhile the sign coalesces with the idea, it reacts upon thought itself.\nThrough signs the ideas which otherwise would remain confused and vague,\nare analysed and they become as separate elements, a permanent possession\nover which the thinking mind has forthwith free control. Through the sign\nwe distinguish, we fix differences and make them ready for new peculiar\ncombinations. The sign, is as it were, the handle by which we take hold\nof the objects of thought. Through the sign only, the idea is liberated\nfrom the elements of sense, which are attached to it, and is enabled to\nrise into the sphere of generalisation. Thus thinking is on the one hand\nliberated, on the other determined by the sign.\n\n\u201cFurther, through the sign alone which makes it possible that the same\nidea the same purpose can live in many, there is _one_ will, _one_ soul,\nand a community of human aspirations exists upon which is based the life\nof mankind as a life of individuals in society. And this again is the\nbasis of our morality and civilisation.\n\n\u201cThe efficacy of the sign spoken is considerably increased by the\ninvention of writing.\u201d\n\nProfessor Schr\u00f6der discusses those two methods of logic which are known\nby the names: the Logic of Intension and the Logic of Extension. (_Logik\ndes Inhaltes_, and _Logik des Umfangs_.) This leads to a discussion of\ndefinition, the categories, and conceptual writing which would find\nits ideal in a system of pasigraphy, or universal language, for the\nperfection of which an algebra of logic would be indispensable.\n\nThe symbols employed by Schr\u00f6der are borrowed to a great extent from\nPeirce, but they are considerably improved and it is probable that\nSchr\u00f6der\u2019s innovations will be universally accepted.\n\nWe purposely refrain here from discussing the particulars of Schr\u00f6der\u2019s\nwork, stating only in a general way that his proposition of a new symbol\nfor subsumption, (he proposes to replace the old symbol [symbol] by\n[symbol] to signify \u201cequal to or subsumed under\u201d), his treatment of the\nsymbols 0 and 1, the former representing an absence of certain marks,\nor as it has been called their \u201cincompossibility,\u201d as being excluded by\nthe presence of other marks; the other the universe of the whole subject\nunder discussion, and all the other problems which he separately treats\nin his lectures are admirably presented and command almost throughout\nthe reader\u2019s consent. We now conclude our review with the quotation of\nthe last paragraph of Schr\u00f6der\u2019s introduction on p. 125. Having declared\nthat \u201clogical inquiry should not be judged from the short-sighted or\nnarrow-minded, not to say _born\u00e9_, utilitarian standpoint,\u201d he points out\nthe great practical importance of his science, saying:\n\n\u201cSimilarly, as with other sciences, so logic also may be expected to\nrealise and produce undreamed of results, which may incidentally bring\nabout, in a most surprising way, incalculable advantages. Let me only\npoint out one thing. Since the impulse which this science has of late\nreceived, there have been already constructed three logical machines\nwhich although we grant, scarcely deserve their name, because their\nefficacy remains still very rudimentary, may be compared to Papin\u2019s pot\nthat in a more advanced state became the steam-engine. Indeed, nobody can\npresage whether after all a thinking machine might not be constructed,\nwhich would be analogous to, but more perfect than the calculating\nmachines. The latter have relieved man of a considerable portion of much\nfatiguing thought-work, just as the steam-engine has been successful in\nrelieving him from physical labor.\n\n\u201cTo be sure we must not expect to reap while we are still sowing, and\nleast so in such a case as this where the harvest is to be expected from\ntrees.\u201d\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nTHE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE. By _Karl Pearson_, M. A. With 25 figures in\nthe text. London: Walter Scott, 24 Warwick Lane. Imported by Charles\nScribner\u2019s Sons, New York.\n\nWe are greatly in sympathy with the methods and principles of Professor\nKarl Pearson\u2019s \u201cGrammar of Science.\u201d The work is a comparatively popular\nand also brief exposition of the modern ideal of scientific inquiry.\n\u201cThe goal of science is clear\u2014it is nothing short of the complete\ninterpretation of the universe. But that goal,\u201d adds the author, \u201cis an\nideal one\u2014it marks the _direction_ in which we move and strive.\u201d\n\nThe best part of the book is in our opinion the introductory chapter\nwhich sets forth \u201cthe scope and method of science\u201d and shows the need of\na \u201cGrammar of Science.\u201d Says the author in the summary of this chapter:\n\n\u201cThe scope of science is to ascertain truth in every possible branch\nof knowledge. There is no sphere of inquiry which lies outside the\nlegitimate field of science. To draw a distinction between the scientific\nand philosophical methods is obscurantism.\u201d\n\nThe present generation is in a state of fermentation. While one man\nfinds a restlessness, a distrust of all authority, a questioning of the\nbasis of all social institutions and long established methods, another\npictures for us a golden age in the near future. One teacher propounds\nwhat is flatly contradicted by a second. We require some guide in the\ndetermination of our actions, and not for our own private but also our\npublic duties. \u201cEvery citizen is thrust into an appalling maze of social\nand educational problems; and if his tribal conscience has any stuff\nin it, he feels that these problems ought not to be settled, so far as\nhe has the power of settling them, by his own personal interests, by\nhis individual prospects of profit or loss. He is called upon to form a\njudgment apart from his own feelings and emotions if it possibly may be\u2014a\njudgment in what he conceives to be the interests of society at large.\n\n\u201cHow is such a judgment to be formed?\u201d The answer is by science. Such\na judgment can only be based on a clear knowledge of facts, on an\nappreciation of their sequence and relative significance. The judgment\nbased upon them ought to be independent of the individual mind which\nexamines them, and this frame of mind which is that of the scientist is\nan essential of good citizenship. Not as if the scientist were _eo ipso_\na good citizen, but society has an interest in the propagation of the\nmethods of modern science. Sound citizenship will be promoted by training\nthe mind to an exact and impartial analysis of facts.\n\nHow much a grammar of science is needed can be learned from the confusion\nthat prevails concerning the fundamental concepts of science. Says\nPearson:\n\n\u201cAnything more hopelessly _illogical_ than the statements with regard\nto force and matter current in elementary text-books of science, it is\ndifficult to imagine; and the author, as a result of some ten years\u2019\nteaching and examining, has been forced to the conclusion that these\nworks possess little, if any, _educational_ value; they do not encourage\nthe growth of _logical_ clearness or form any exercise in scientific\nmethod.\n\n\u201cThe views expressed in this _Grammar_ on the fundamental concepts of\nscience, especially on those of force and matter, have formed part of\nthe author\u2019s teaching since he was first called upon to think how the\nelements of dynamical science could be presented free from _metaphysics_\nto young students.\u201d\n\nProfessor Pearson calls attention to the danger that arises from two\nmodes of thought, viz. that of the metaphysician and that of the\nagnostic. He says:\n\n\u201cThe poet is a valued member of the community, for he is known to be a\npoet; his value will increase as he grows to recognise the deeper insight\ninto nature with which modern science provides him. The metaphysician is\na poet, often a very great one, but fortunately he is not known to be a\npoet, because he clothes his poetry in the language of apparent reason,\nand hence it follows that he is liable to be a dangerous member of the\ncommunity. The danger at the present time that metaphysical dogmas may\ncheck scientific research is, perhaps, not very great.\u201d\n\nFortunately the danger that arises from metaphysicism is past. \u201cFor,\u201d\nadds Pearson, \u201cThe day has gone by when the Hegelian philosophy\nthreatened to strangle infant science in Germany;\u2014that it begins to\nlanguish at Oxford is a proof that it is practically dead in the country\nof its birth. The day has gone by when philosophical or theological\ndogmas of any kind can throw back, even for generations, the progress of\nscientific investigation.\u201d\n\nThe scientist will, it is true, often have to confess: \u201cThere I am\nignorant.\u201d But it would be absurd to restrict science to the limited\nfield of thought which it occupies to-day. Professor Pearson continues:\n\n \u201cIt is true that this view is not held by several leading\n scientists, both in this country and Germany. They are not\n content with saying, \u2018We _are_ ignorant,\u2019 but they add, with\n regard to certain classes of facts, \u2018Mankind must _always_ be\n ignorant.\u2019 Thus in England Professor Huxley has invented the\n term _Agnostic_, not so much for those who are ignorant as for\n those who limit the possibility of knowledge in certain fields.\n In Germany Professor E. du Bois-Reymond has raised the cry:\n \u2018_Ignorabimus_\u2019\u2014\u2018We shall be ignorant,\u2019 and both his brother\n and he have undertaken the difficult task of demonstrating that\n with regard to certain problems human knowledge is impossible.\n We must, however, note that in these cases we are not concerned\n with the limitation of the scientific method, but with the\n denial of the possibility that any method whatever can lead to\n knowledge. Now I venture to think that there is great danger in\n this cry: \u2018We _shall_ be ignorant.\u2019 To cry \u2018We are ignorant,\u2019\n is safe and healthy, but the attempt to demonstrate an endless\n futurity of ignorance appears a modesty which approaches\n despair. Conscious of the past great achievements and the\n present restless activity of science, may we not do better\n to accept as our watchword that of Galilei: \u2018Who is willing\n to set limits to the human intellect?\u2019\u2014interpreting it by\n what evolution has taught us of the continual growth of man\u2019s\n intellectual powers.\u201d\n\nThe introductory chapter presents the general plan of Professor Pearson\u2019s\nbook. The following chapters contain the detailed work of the plan.\nThe headings of these chapters are: II, The Facts of Science; III, The\nScientific Law; IV, Cause and Effect\u2014Probability; V, Space and Time; VI,\nThe Geometry of Motion; VII, Matter; VIII, The Laws of Motion; IX, Life;\nX, The Classification of the Sciences.\n\nProfessor Pearson follows Professor Ernst Mach in his expositions\n(especially in Chap. II) very closely, and especially refers to the\nlatter\u2019s contributions to _The Monist_. Pearson emphasises with Mach\nthe distinction between the conceptual and perceptual, between ideas\nor noumena and sensations. He rejects, as does Professor Mach, the\nassumption of unknowables beyond our groups of sense-impressions, saying:\n\u201cIt is idle to postulate shadowy unknowables behind that real world of\nsense-impression in which we live\u201d (p. 88), and yet he says in another\npassage on p. 134: \u201cThere is mystery enough in the chaos of sensations\nand in its capacity for containing those little corners of consciousness\nwhich project their own products, of order and law and reason, _into an\nunknown and unknowable world_.\u201d\n\nIt appears to us that the deeper reason of this apparent inconsistency\ncan be traced to the author\u2019s conception of the import of knowledge. He\nfollows Kirchhoff in the acceptance of the theory that scientific law is\na brief description of facts in mental shorthand. But at the same time he\nfollows Clifford and Mach too closely; the former in the respect that we\ncan know the \u201chow\u201d only and not the \u201cwhy,\u201d and the latter in overlooking\nthe fact that concepts are symbols which stand for something and have a\nmeaning. Pearson says on p. 145, \u201cScience describes how they [motions]\ntake place, but the _why_ remains a mystery.\u201d But should we not, we ask,\nrather supplant the old and metaphysical conception of the \u201cwhy\u201d (the\nsense of it as here implied) by a better and more correct conception? The\nmetaphysical \u201cwhy\u201d is not so much a mystery as it is the incorporation of\nan illegitimate problem. The \u201cwhy\u201d of positive science demands as answer\nan exhaustive description of those conditions which as the outcome of a\ndefinite transformation inevitably produce a certain phenomenon.\n\nBut here we must criticise Professor Pearson\u2019s view of \u201cdescription,\u201d\nas well also as his view of causation. Cause and effect are to him, as\nthey were to Mill, mere sequences; necessity belongs exclusively to\nthe conceptual realm, and is \u201cillogically transferred to the world of\nperceptions.\u201d\n\nAn exhaustive description will trace the process of causation, and\nwhenever we succeed in this we have answered the question \u201cwhy\u201d in the\nonly sensible meaning it possesses. Sense-impressions do _not_, as\nProfessor Pearson expresses it, \u201cshut us in,\u201d so that the beyond remains\na mystery to us. Sense-impressions represent the beyond of reality and\nthey represent it in such a way as to enable us to deal with it properly.\nThis representation is knowledge and thus the world is _not_ unknowable.\nThe world is full of mystery, but knowledge itself is not mysterious.\nHaving sense-impressions and interpreting them in our conceptual\ninferences we know something of the world.\n\nWe are not prepared to accept Professor Pearson\u2019s views that \u201cchange is\nperceptual, motion conceptual,\u201d and also that \u201cwe are not compelled to\npostulate a space outside of self for phenomena\u201d (p. 196). We should\nsay that our concepts, the concepts motion and space included, represent\ncertain features of reality. We might give a special name to those\nfeatures of reality which are represented by the terms motion and space,\nbut we could not deny their objective reality without at the same time\ndenying the validity of the concepts.\n\nSays Professor Pearson, \u201cAll things move\u2014but only in conception\u201d (p.\n385). \u201cWhat moves in conception is a geometrical ideal, and it moves\nbecause we conceive it to move.\u201d These propositions have no meaning if\npronounced from our standpoint. Observe also that Professor Pearson\ninculcates the conceptuality of motion by unnecessarily repeating the\nword in the formula on page 341 which begins as follows: \u201cEvery corpuscle\nin the _conceptual_ model of the universe must be _conceived_ as\nmoving....\u201d When we conceive something as moving we mean that not only in\nthe conceptual model, but also in reality there is an action taking place\nwhich we represent by the concept motion. To say that we have knowledge\nonly of changes but that we do not know whether those changes which we\ndescribe as mechanical are really motions, appears to us idle subtlety.\nThe point is whether this method of describing those events enables us to\ndeal with them properly. If it does it answers the purpose.\n\nIn spite of all our disagreements we feel ourselves in close contact with\nthe author of \u201cThe Grammar of Science,\u201d for we agree with respect to the\nprinciples of science and we certainly can leave the settlement of our\ndifferences to a common test on the basis of these principles. Moreover,\nthe attitude of the author seems to us very much like that which we take\nourselves. We quote from a former publication of his, the following\npassage[85]:\n\n \u201cI set out from the standpoint that the mission of Freethought\n is no longer to batter down old faiths; that has been long\n ago effectively accomplished, and I, for one, am ready to put\n a railing round the ruins, that they may be preserved from\n desecration and serve as a landmark. Indeed I confess to have\n yawned over a recent vigorous inditement of Christianity, and\n I promptly disposed of my copy to a young gentleman who was\n anxious that I should read a work entitled: _Natural Law in the\n Spiritual World_, which he told me had given quite a new width\n to the faith of his childhood.\u201d\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nPHILOSOPHIE DER ARITHMETIK. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen.\nBy Dr. _E. G. Husserl_. Erster Band. Halle-Saale: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1891.\n\nThe present volume does not pretend to be a complete system of the\nphilosophy of arithmetic, but it attempts to prepare, in a series of\npsychological and logical investigations, the scientific foundation\nfor a future construction of this discipline, which would be of equal\nvalue to the mathematician and philosopher. The first volume which is\nnow before us analyses in its first part the ideas plurality, unity, and\nnumber, so far as they are directly given us and not in their indirect\nsymbolisation. The second part considers the symbolical representations\nof plurality and number, and the author attempts to show that the fact\nof our being almost throughout limited to symbolical ideas of number\ndetermines the meaning and the purpose of that view which the author\ncalls \u201cAnzahlenarithmetik.\u201d\n\nThe author criticises several theories which in different ways explain\nthe origin of plurality and unity. There is one theory which explains\nthe origin of the unit from the unity of consciousness; there is another\none which explains the origin of number from a succession in time. F.\nA. Lange bases his theory of number upon space-conception and Bauman\ndeclares there is something mathematical in the external world which\ncorresponds to the mathematical in us. The theory of difference held\nby Jevons, Schuppe, and Sigwart, is declared to be superior to all\nothers, but even that is rejected by the author. Jevons says, \u201cNumber\nis but another name for diversity. Exact identity is unity, and with\ndifference rises plurality.... Abstract number then, is the empty form\nof difference.\u201d Dr. Husserl objects: if numbers are all empty forms of\ndifference, what makes the difference between two, three, four, etc.? The\ncontents of these numbers are very different. The inability of defining\nthis difference shows the imperfection of the theory of difference.\nDr. Husserl proposes what he calls \u201ccollection\u201d as a special method of\ncombination by which unities are formed.\n\nAlthough the book contains many valuable suggestions, it is very hard\nreading. The author\u2019s views are not at all clearly set forth. Neither\nis the table of contents so systematically arranged as to give us a\nclue to the plan of the book, nor is there any index that might give us\nassistance in finding out the most characteristic passages. The reader is\nsupposed to read the book right through, in order to understand detached\nchapters or even sentences. And even then we are not sure whether or not\nwe have understood the author\u2019s propositions the consistency of which is\nnot as apparent as it might be expected. For, after having criticised\nso many attempts at explaining and analysing the ideas, plurality,\nunity and number, and after having proposed definitions, explanations,\nand analyses of his own, we find on p. 130 a passage where these ideas\nare incidentally declared to be incapable of definition. Speaking of\nFrege\u2019s theory, Dr. Husserl says, \u201cAs soon as we come down to elementary\nconcepts, all definition has an end. Such concepts as quality, intensity,\nplace, time, etc., cannot be defined. The same is true of elementary\nrelations, and of those concepts upon which they are founded. Equality,\nsimilarity, gradation, whole and part, plurality and unity, etc., are\nconcepts which are utterly incapable of a formal-logical definition.\nAll we can do in such cases is to produce the concrete phenomena from\nwhich they have been abstracted, and to explain the method of this\nprocess of abstraction. One can, where it is necessary, exactly fence in\n(umgrenzen) by diverse circumscriptions, the concepts in question, and\nthus prevent confusion with kindred concepts.\u201d We must confess that we do\nnot understand the author\u2019s idea; what is an act of defining if not an\n\u201cumgrenzen,\u201d a fencing in of the concept? The book contains many similar\npassages, which, it seems to us, are not properly thought out by the\nauthor. But the subject is a difficult one, and, as the author says in\nthe preface, \u201cA work of this kind should, with regard to the difficulties\nof the problem it treats, be judged with leniency.\u201d\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nCHRISTIANITY AND INFALLIBILITY. Both or Neither. By the Rev. _Daniel\nLyons_. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1891. Chicago: A. C. McClurg &\nCo.\n\nThis little book of Dr. Lyons\u2019s is got up in a much more substantial\nand prepossessing form than the majority of the works that come from\nCatholic quarters. It contains 284 pages and is supplied with the _Nihil\nobstat_ of a Catholic \u201ccensor deputatus\u201d and with the _Imprimatur_ of the\nBishop of Denver. In this book, therefore, the reader may be sure that he\npossesses a correct exposition of Catholic doctrine.\n\nThe purpose of Dr. Lyons is to establish the thesis,\u2014a thesis always\ninsisted upon by the Catholic church,\u2014\u201cthat Christianity, to maintain\nits rightful hold on the reason and conscience of men, needs a living,\ninfallible Witness to its truths and principles; a living, infallible\nGuardian of its purity and integrity, and a living, infallible\nInterpreter of its meaning.\u201d By Christianity Dr. Lyons means \u201cthat body\nof sacred truths which the Almighty revealed through the _ministry_ of\nChrist and His Apostles.\u201d\n\nWe italicise the word \u201cministry,\u201d for on this word hinges in our\njudgment the main and unmistakable argument of Dr. Lyons\u2019s advocacy.\nIf the results of modern Biblical criticism are at all true, the\n\u201cChurch,\u201d so-called, must have existed before the New Testament. And\nin establishing the authority of the church, the Catholic theologians\nregard and use the Bible merely as an \u201chistorical narrative, whose\ntrustworthiness (at least in the parts quoted) can be proved in the same\nway as that of any other history, sacred or profane.\u201d They take their\nargument \u201cfor the institution, mission, and authority of the Church\nfrom the Bible as a mere human record of the sayings and doings of our\nDivine Lord and His Apostles.\u201d What is the mission of the church? \u201c_And\nhe said unto them. Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to\nevery creature. He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved, but he\nthat believeth not shall be damned._\u201d These are awful powers, and awful\nare the sanctions placed by the same Divine letter-patent in the hands\nof the institution that dispenses them. And in the face of the great\ncomplexity and peculiar nature of the Holy writings, in view of their\nrecognised liability to manifold and multifarious interpretation, does\nnot such a great and fearful commission of power as this necessarily\nand logically imply a concession of Infallibility\u2014of infallibility, let\nus add, as _technically_ understood. \u201cWho can suppose that God would\nformally commission anybody to teach in his name and command all to hear\nand accept His teaching under the severest of penalties, and at the same\ntime not secure that teacher against the possibility of teaching error\nfor truth? Suppose the Church thus commissioned by God did actually teach\nerror, even then would not all (there is no exception made), by reason of\nthe divine command, be bound to believe? And in that case would not God\nHimself be accountable for the erroneous belief? I conclude, therefore,\nthat the formal commission to teach the Gospel in God\u2019s name, and by His\nauthority, joined to the express command to believe carries with it a\npledge of the divine assistance of Infallibility as a guarantee to all\nmen that in yielding the obedience of faith, they are perfectly secure\nagainst all danger of error.\u201d This inference is incorporated in a dogma,\na \u201cCatholic dogma,\u201d of infallibility, which is this: \u201cthat the Pope, by\nvirtue of a special supernatural assistance of the Holy Spirit of Truth\npromised to him, in and through St. Peter, is exempt from all liability\nto err when, in the discharge of his Apostolic Office of Supreme Teacher\nof the Universal Church, he defines or declares, in matters of or\nappertaining to Christian faith or morals, what is to be believed and\nheld, or what is to be rejected and condemned by the faithful throughout\nthe world. This definition substantially embodies the whole Catholic\nteaching on the subject of Infallibility.\u201d\n\nDr. Lyons\u2019s arguments are well put and well reasoned out. He sees\nclearly where the vulnerable point of the present condition of the\nChristian churches lies,\u2014which the majority of Protestant theologians\ndo not see. He sees clearly, though he does not say it, that the\nrococo superstructure of neo-Christian dogmatism was long and long ago\nundermined by science and that it is now toppling in the minds of the\nunscientific generally; and he justly advises all who have set their\nhearts on the preservation of the subtle and irrelevant externalities\nof religion, to forsake their ancient dwelling-place and seek a safe\nand easy abode in the grandly simple and grandly spacious, Roman temple\nof Papal infallibility. That edifice is safe against the artillery of\nscience. It has by one simple act placed itself beyond the reach of all\nscientific attacks. For science, or rather the _method of science_,\ndirectly owes its origin to the consciousness of our individual\nliability to error and the consequent aspiration of man to establish an\n_objective_ criterion of truth. If it attempted to demolish doctrines\nof infallibility of any kind, it would simply seek to justify its own\nfoundations, which it has long ago done. In so far as the doctrine of\ninfallibility is the only logical outcome of a dilemma in which the\nChristian church has, discreetly or indiscreetly, implicated itself,\nscience has no objection to it; or for that matter to any other\nconclusion that logically results from premisses it does not grant.\nThe question really most worthy of the attention of the \u201cthoughtful,\u201d\n\u201ctruth-seeking,\u201d and \u201creligious\u201d mind, as Dr. Lyons styles it, is not the\ndoctrine of infallibility, but the questions, What is religion, What is\nGod, etc., etc.; and such questions the _truth_-seeking mind will find\nit impossible to answer arbitrarily: it must, perforce, answer them in\nconformity with that objective criterion of truth called science. And\nsuch subjects are as much the object of science as are motion and matter.\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\nDER SATZ VOM GRUNDE ALS PRINZIP DES SCHLIESSENS. By Dr. _Franz Erhardt_.\nHalle a. S.: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1891.\n\nThis little pamphlet of fifty-six pages, written and published to\nacquire for the author the _venia legendi_ at the philosophical faculty\nof the University of Jena, treats the several figures of the syllogism\nfrom the standpoint that the middle term of the premisses is, logically\nconsidered, the consequence (_Folge_) of the subject and the reason\n(_Grund_) of the predicate in the conclusion. A few remarks are added on\ninduction and analogy, without, however, entering into the problem as\nto the r\u00f4le which the method of induction plays in the evolution of the\nmethod of deduction.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nAGNOSTICISME. Essai sur quelques Th\u00e9ories pessimistes de la Connaissance.\nBy _E. de Roberty_. Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan.\n\nBy the publication of this little book M. de Roberty redeems a promise\nmade in his larger work, on the philosophy of the present century,\nalready reviewed in _The Monist_ (January, 1892). The pessimist\ntheories of knowledge of which he treats are the three systems, those\nof Criticism, Positivism, and Evolutionism, to which he reduces\ncontemporaneous philosophy. As these systems are regarded as parallel\nmanifestations of a common stock of beliefs and general hypotheses, they\nmust equally adopt the doctrine of Agnosticism. It is the aim of the\npresent work to point out the several forms assumed by this doctrine and\nto show its falsity by an examination of the principles on which it is\nbased. The author properly insists on the importance of distinguishing\nbetween the affirmation of the unknown and that of the unknowable. The\nrecognition of the former is essential to all progress in knowledge,\nbut the latter is \u201cthe direct negation of all possibility whatever of\nutilising the deficiencies of knowledge,\u201d and leads infallibly to the\nworship of ignorance. The best definition of the mental phenomenon\nof agnosticism, says M. de Roberty is the _pessimism_ of the theory\nof knowledge, and it is not for nothing therefore that Kant preceded\nSchopenhauer in the development of idealism.\n\nModern agnosticism is based on the old notion of the separation of the\nphenomenon from the noumenon, and it was Kant who cleared it from its\nearly theological and metaphysical conceptions. He affirmed the reality\nof the \u201cthing in itself\u201d as a fundamental postulate, and then declared\nthat we can know nothing of things considered in themselves. Among\nthe conceptions formed by the human mind through the exercise of its\nimaginative faculty are three which exhaust the entire content of the\nUnknowable. Thus it may be reduced to the idea of a reality other than\nthat of which we are sensible; to the idea of a subject which perceives\nin a different manner from the real subject; and finally to the idea that\nour cerebral organisation reveals the world to us under delusive colors,\nall of which M. de Roberty declares to be simple fiction. His own ideas\non the subject will appear later on.\n\nPositivism stands towards materialism in the same relation as criticism\nstands towards idealism, whose noumenon becomes the unknowable thing\nin itself; as the simple matter of materialism becomes the unknown\nexistence about which positivism says we can neither affirm nor deny\nanything. Modern agnosticism may be regarded thus as representing the\nlong sought synthesis of the purest materialism and the most transcendent\nspiritualism, and it offers a striking demonstration of the fundamental\nequivalence of the hypotheses hitherto formulated as to the origin and\nessence of things. It proves also, says M. de Roberty, that the great\nlaw of the identity of contraries is applicable directly to all our\nvery general conceptions. Contradictory as they seem to be, universal\npostulates must, by virtue of that law, be fundamentally identical. This\nintroduces a discussion of the antinomies, developed but not invented\nby modern criticism, which found in them ample justification for its\nconclusion of the reality of the unknowable.\n\nThe double antinomy of time and space is regarded by the author as always\npresenting itself under the aspect of a long chain of contradictions\nwhich are manifestly merely verbal. The opposition between finite and\ninfinite may be resolved into the distinction between concrete and\nabstract, between particular and general, if infinity is taken as\nsynonymous with, or the perfect substitute for, general and abstract\nquantity, the universal attribute of things isolated from the things\nthemselves. As to the problems connected with the ideas of a vacuum,\nmatter, force and motion, M. de Roberty supposes them to have a purely\npsychological solution. Such ideas go beyond the \u201cconceptive\u201d capacity\nof mechanics and belong to psychology considered, not as a branch of\nphilosophy, or as philosophy itself, but as a science of abstract\nconcepts.\n\nThe philosophy of evolution, although monistic in the sense that it\nrecognises the law of the identity of opposites, shows itself not to\nbe so in reality by its doctrine of the unknowable. In this monism and\nagnosticism contradict each other, as it is contrary to reason \u201cto\naffirm at the same time the identity of every phenomenon and their\nunknowability. The first marks the supreme term of the second. Identity\nin general serves to define knowableness. So that, if we remain on\nthe elevated summits of pure abstraction too long, we run the danger\nanticipated by the law of identity of contraries. We fall directly\ninto the error of taking the apparent negation of identity or of pure\nknowledge, the unknowable, for something really distinct, really\nseparated from the knowable.\u201d This is the illusion of Spencer and of\nall the philosophers who have undertaken the difficult task of applying\nmonism as a corrective of agnosticism.\n\nM. de Roberty concludes the present work with a discussion of the\nrelation between idea and reality, the thought and the object thought of,\nin which he gives us his opinion on that disputed point. He says that\nwhat philosophy calls \u201cthe object\u201d is composed essentially of external\nnature, in which is included our own organism. Very complicated systems\nof motions are transmitted to the grey nuclei or opto-striated bodies\nof the central regions of the brain. Here these motions determine new\nmotions of which the totality is described in psycho-physics by the term\n\u201cunconscious ideation.\u201d But this internal motion, continually tending to\nbecome again an initial or external motion, gives rise to unconscious\nreflex activity. The motion passes by the white nerve-fibres to the\ncortical periphery of the brain which becomes \u201cthe seat of a phenomenon,\nan excitation, a motion which prolongs or repeats the immediately\npreceding phenomenon, excitation, or motion, while giving it a shorter\nand more steady action.\u201d The sensations and the reflex-actions derived\nfrom them traverse the opto-striated nuclei without retardation and\nwithout giving rise to any system of ideas; while consciousness resides\nin the systemisation or union of the same sensations and reflex-actions.\nThe notion of the ego results from the union or memory of certain ideas,\nsensations, and actions, which before their union and preservation by\nthe cerebral cortex were unconscious. But before becoming unconscious\nideas, those \u201cintellectual virtualities\u201d were in every other part of the\norganism, and in all the media which surround it, as, \u201cmanifestations\nof energy or of motion, it may be objective phenomena.\u201d Thus, says M.\nde Roberty, if the universe is composed of two parts, the ego and the\nnon-ego, it can be affirmed that they form an uninterrupted circuit.\nHe supposes that when the cosmical energy has produced the phenomena\nof unconscious mentality in the brain-centres, it is divided into two\ncurrents, one of which returns to its source and becomes directly cosmic\nenergy again, and this will be the fate of the other current also when\nthe life of the organism ceases.\n\nThis view the author supports by a consideration of the morphological\nand functional difference supposed to exist between the facts which\nconstitute the notion of the \u201cego\u201d and the primordial facts of\nunconsciousness comprised under the generic denomination of the\n\u201cnon-ego.\u201d He regards conscious ideas as the telegraphic alphabet, the\nstenographic writing of the cosmos. Consciousness serves to co\u00f6rdinate\nthe incoherent crowd of events which at each instant invades the normal\nbrain. In these we may see effects of the cause called \u201cuniverse,\u201d and\ntherefore its representatives and substitutes, which they could not\nbe unless there was identity between the two. Thus the \u201cego\u201d could be\ndefined as the final synthesis of the \u201csymbolic abridgments,\u201d of the\nmicrographical abbreviations, of the \u201cnon-ego.\u201d Thus the ego serves only\nfor the purpose of concentrating or condensing, so to say the non-ego,\nwhich it represents in a manner more or less durable and efficient.\n\nThis monistic theory gets rid of the unknowable and therefore is a great\nimprovement on that of the materialist or of the idealist. Nevertheless\nit requires further elaboration. There is no difficulty in understanding\nthat cosmic motion may become transformed within the organism into a\nfeeling. This still, however, leaves unaccounted for the existence of the\norganism itself. A true monism will, therefore, require that the organism\nmust be in some way identifiable with the cosmos. This is the true\nproblem that has to be solved, and its solution will be greatly aided by\nthe overthrow of agnosticism, against which M. de Roberty has made so\nvigorous and successful an attack in the present volume.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[84] See Aug. Friedr. B\u00f6ck. _Sammlung von Schriften, welche den logischen\nCalcul des Prof. Pl. betreffen_, Frankfort and Leipsic, 1766.\n\n[85] The book from which we quote, namely _The Ethic of Freethought_,\nlike the book here under discussion, contains much detail matter in which\nwe differ most emphatically from the author; (he is, for instance, in our\nopinion very unjust to Martin Luther;) but it seems to us that he pursues\nan aim that we have in common with him.\n\n\n\n\nPERIODICALS.\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. III.\nNos. 2 and 3.\n\n UEBER DIE EMPFINDLICHKEIT DES GR\u00dcNBLINDEN UND DES NORMALEN\n AUGES GEGEN FARBEN\u00c4NDERUNG IM SPEKTRUM. By _E. Brodhun_.\n\n K\u00dcRZESTE LINIEN IM FARBENSYSTEM. By _H. v. Helmholtz_.\n\n DIE RAUMANSCHAUUNGEN UND DIE AUGENBEWEGUNGEN. By _Th. Lipps_.\n\n EINE BEOBACHTUNG \u00dcBER DAS INDIREKTE SEHEN. By _Th. Wertheim_.\n\n UEBER EINIGE EIGENT\u00dcMLICHKEITEN DES TASTSINNS. By _G. Sergi_.\n\n BEITR\u00c4GE ZUR VERGLEICHENDEN PSYCHOLOGIE. I. Das Verhalten\n wirbelloser Tiere auf der Drehscheibe. By _K. L. Schaefer_.\n\n GEGENANTWORT AUF DIE ERWIDERUNG VON O. FL\u00dcGEL. By _J. Rehmke_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nThe value of the first article on the sensitiveness of the green-blind\nand the normal eye in perceiving color-variations in the spectrum\nconsists mainly in the three diagrams that exhibit the results obtained\nin the author\u2019s experiments.\n\nProfessor H. v. Helmholtz published in a former number his attempt at\npropounding \u201ca formula which should play the same part in the province\nof color-sensations as the formula of the length of the linear element\nplays in geometry.\u201d... As geometry begins with the concept of a shortest\nline between two points, so our fundamental formula in this subject shall\nenable us to find that series of transitions between two given colors\nfor which the sum of the perceptible differences is a minimum. Helmholtz\nproposes to call them \u201cshortest color-lines\u201d and comes to the conclusion\nthat the whole domain of these apparently irregular phenomena are easily\nsubsumed under a generalised formulation of Fechner\u2019s law.\n\nProfessor Th. Lipps criticises Wundt with regard to the latter\u2019s\ntheory of measuring the visual field by ocular motion. Wundt\u2019s theory,\nhe declares, is in need of several auxiliary hypotheses, such as the\nassumption that certain ocular motions are supposed to be more difficult\nthan others: the visual field is said to possess the form of a spherical\nsurface, etc. The author maintains that ocular motions do contribute to\nthe construction of our space-conception, but in a different way than\nWundt assumes. The most interesting part of the article appears to be the\ndiscussion of the genesis of the third dimension which is not given in\nthe data of sensation but added to them as a judgment concerning these\ndata. It is an interpretation of the data. There are still psychologists\nwho regard the third dimension as immediately given. Professor Lipps\nrefers as an instance to Prof. William James\u2019s article \u201cThe Perception\nof Space\u201d in (_Mind_, Vol. XII), where the latter declares that \u201cno\narguments in the world can prove a feeling which actually exists, to be\nimpossible.\u201d While Wundt says that to the resting eye the form of the\nvisual field is spherical because the sky appears to us as spherical;\nLipps declares that we might just as well say that the visual field of\nthe resting eye is a plane, because the earth appears to us as a level\nsurface. We attribute to the visual field the form which certain reasons\nprompt us to. Certain convergences of the eyes induce us to place certain\npoints at certain distances. We read, as it were, the distances out of\nthe convergences of the ocular axes. Accordingly, when we cease to feel\nany difference in our feeling of convergency we cannot help attributing\nthe same \u201cdepth\u201d throughout to all the things with respect to which such\nfeeling is wanting, and we place all objects beyond a certain range upon\na spherical surface. Thus Lipps interprets the spherical form of the\nfirmament as the result of our using both eyes, which use from habit has\nbecome the form of monocular vision also, and not as Wundt does from the\nspherical form of each visual field, which by habit has been transferred\nto binocular vision. There is a strange fact that distances on the left\nside are overestimated in comparison with those on the right side; and\nthis fact is also claimed by Professor Lipps to be incompatible with\nProfessor Wundt\u2019s theory, but in favor of his own views.\n\nTh. Wertheim has made an observation which tends to prove that positive\nas well as negative fluctuations of light-intensity, cause the\ndisappearance of objects indirectly seen.\n\nG. Sergi publishes the results of his investigations concerning the\nsense of touch made in the Institute for Anthropology and Experimental\nPsychology at the University of Rome.\n\nKarl L. Schaefer\u2019s results of experiments with invertebrate animals\nupon the rotatory table show that in the beginning a counter-rotation\ntakes place, but not in all animals. It does not take place in some\ncaterpillars; it does take place in black beetles, ants, flies, earwigs,\nprovided they are at the time in actual motion. There is no after-affect\nfrom the rotation and thus they are not subject to vertigo as are the\nvertebrates. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nVIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT F\u00dcR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XVI. No. 2.\n\n BEITR\u00c4GE ZUR LOGIK. (Zweiter Artikel. Schluss.) By _A. Riehl_.\n\n ERNST PLATNER\u2019S WISSENSCHAFTLICHE STELLUNG ZU KANT IN\n ERKENNTNISSTHEORIE UND MORALPHILOSOPHIE. (Zweiter Artikel.\n Schluss.) By _B. Seligkowitz_.\n\n UEBER BEGRIFF UND GEGENSTAND. By _G. Frege_.\n\n BEMERKUNGEN ZU RICHARD AVENARIUS\u2019S \u201cKRITIK DER REINEN\n ERFAHRUNG.\u201d By _R. Willy_.\n\nA. Riehl discusses in the second instalment of his \u201cContributions to\nLogic\u201d the forms of judgment and the different kinds of conclusion. B.\nSeligkowitz concludes his article on Ernst Platner\u2019s relation to Kant,\nsetting forth the former\u2019s criticism of the latter\u2019s views of synthetic\njudgments _a priori_, his moral theology, his psychological ideas, and\nmoral philosophy. G. Frege explains his view of \u201cconcept and object\u201d with\nreference to the idea of Benno Kerry, who does not recognise between the\ntwo any absolute difference. (Leipsic: Reisland.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nPHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVIII. Nos. 3 and 4.\n\nCONTENTS: April, 1892. No. 3.\n\n DIE WIRKLICHKEIT ALS PH\u00c4NOMEN DES GEISTES. By _A. Rosinski_.\n\n RECENSIONEN.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nCONTENTS: May, 1892. No. 4.\n\n UEBER DAS ABSOLUTE GEH\u00d6R. By _J. v. Kries_.\n\n DIE ZWEITEN PURKINJESCHEN BILDER IM SCHEMATISCHEN UND IM\n WIRKLICHEN AUGE. By _L. Matthiessen_.\n\n BESPRECHUNGEN.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nAdolf Rosinski describes reality as a phenomenon of the mind and,\nfollowing Qu\u00e4bicker, he regards \u201cthe real as belonging to that complex\nwhich is given us in appearance. Being (_Wesen_) is not behind or beyond\nappearance; Being, being that which exists, existence is appearance.\nAppearance shows nothing but that which is in Being, and there is in\nBeing nothing which is not manifested.\u201d (Berlin: Dr. R. Salinger.)\n\nThere are but few musicians who are able to recognise directly and\nwithout reference to another note, the pitch of a sound. This ability\nis called by musicians \u201cabsolutes Geh\u00f6r.\u201d Professor Kries investigates\nin a long article, the conditions of this absolute musical ear so\ncalled, exhibiting the difficulties of an explanation without arriving\nat a definite result, which, however, may be expected from further\ninvestigations of the subject. Mr. Matthiessen\u2019s article on the second\nPerkinje-pictures, in the ideal and the real eye, consists exclusively\nof measurements and calculations of the curvature of the lens. The same\nnumber contains an appreciative and long (37 pp.) review of Prof. W.\nJames\u2019s \u201cPrinciples of Psychology.\u201d (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nTHE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. April, 1892. Vol. IV. No. 3.\n\n ON CERTAIN PECULIARITIES OF THE KNEE-JERK IN SLEEP IN A CASE OF\n TERMINAL DEMENTIA. By _William Noyes_, M. D.\n\n THE GROWTH OF MEMORY IN SCHOOL CHILDREN. By _T. L. Bolton_, A.\n B.\n\n STUDIES FROM THE LABORATORY OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE\n UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. By Prof. _Joseph Jastrow_, Ph. D.\n\n THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF REALISM. By _Alexander Fraser_,\n A. B.\n\n PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE: I. Nervous System. By Prof. _H. H.\n Donaldson_, Clark University; II. Association, Reaction. By\n Prof. _J. McK. Cattell_, Columbia College; III. Hypnotism and\n Suggestion. By Prof. _Joseph Jastrow_, University of Wisconsin;\n IV. Sight.\n\n LETTERS AND NOTES.\n\nDr. Noyes\u2019s investigations seem to corroborate the theory that not only\nthe lower but also \u201cthe higher activities of the brain are also subject\nto a rhythmic rise and fall synchronous with vascular dilatation and\ncontraction.\u201d Mr. Bolton publishes the results of his examination of the\nspan of memory in the Grammar Schools of Worcester, Mass. The memory\nspan measuring the power of concentrated and prolonged attention,\nincreases with age rather than with the growth of intelligence. The\ngirls have better memories than the boys. Memory can be increased by\npractice. The tests made before and after school do not show that the\npupils suffer fatigue from the day\u2019s work. Memory-images before they\nare completely lost first suffer a confusion of order, then a loss of\ncertain of its elements which are often replaced by similar elements.\nPrevious ideas being one of the factors of confusion. Professor Jastrow\u2019s\narticle presents a description of a series of experiments made in his\npsychological laboratory. He reproduces the Z\u00f6llner figures, briefly\nsummarising their different interpretations by Z\u00f6llner, Hering, Aubert,\nClassen, Lipps, Hoppe, Wundt, Pisco, and Helmholtz. He further presents a\nstudy of involuntary movements of the hand on the glass plate apparatus,\nand describes the experiments of time measurement in classifying ideas,\nand in finding a given object within a given field. Mr. Fraser defends\nthe Natural Realism of the Scotch school, making the tactumotor sense the\nultimate test of reality. (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.\n\nCONTENTS: April, 1892. No. 196.\n\n LES PROCESSUS NERVEUX DANS L\u2019ATTENTION ET LA VOLITION. By\n _Charlton Bastian_.\n\n LA RESPONSABILIT\u00c9. By _F. Paulhan_.\n\n REVUE G\u00c9N\u00c9RALE: LE SPIRITISME CONTEMPORAIN. By _Janet_\n (_Pierre_).\n\n ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS: Der Positivismus vom Tode August\n Comte\u2019s bis auf unsere Tage. By _H. Gruber_. Die Psychologie\n der Suggestion. By _H. Schmidkunz_.\n\n TRAVAUX DU LABORATOIRE DE PSYCHOLOGIE PHYSIOLOGIQUE: Etude\n exp\u00e9rimentale sur deux cas d\u2019audition color\u00e9e. By _Beaunis and\n Binet_. Etude sur un nouveau cas d\u2019audition color\u00e9e. By _Binet\n and Philippe_.\n\nCONTENTS: May, 1892. No. 197.\n\n DU SENS DE L\u2019IN\u00c9GALIT\u00c9. By _G. Mauret_.\n\n LA RESPONSABILIT\u00c9 (concluded). By _F. Paulhan_.\n\n LE PROBL\u00c8ME DE LA VIE (third and last article). By _Dunan_.\n\n ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS: Le\u00e7ons cliniques sur l\u2019hyst\u00e9rie\n et l\u2019hypnotisme By _Pitres_. Corps et \u00e2me. Essais sur la\n philosophie de St. Thomas. By _J. Gardair_. Agnosticisme.\n By _E. de Roberty_. La physique de Straton de Lampsaque.\n By _Rodier_. Das Wahrnehmungsproblem vom Standpunkte des\n Physikers, des Physiologen und des Philosophen. By _H. Schwarz_.\n\n REVUE DES P\u00c9RIODIQUES \u00c9TRANGERS: Vierteljahrsschrift f\u00fcr\n wissenschaftliche Philosophie.\n\n CORRESPONDANCE ET INFORMATIONS.\n\nThe processes of attention and volition lie at the basis of all our\nmental and physical activities. Mr. Charlton Bastian discusses their\nnervous condition and comes to the conclusion _Voluntas et intellectus\nunum et idem sunt_. M. Paulhan treats the problem of responsibility under\nhealthy and morbid conditions, in two consecutive articles. M. Mouret,\nwhose former articles on relations will be reviewed in a future number by\nMr. F. C. Russell, treats in a long article of the sense of inequality.\nM. Ch. Dunan concludes his essay on the problem of life, viewing the\nsubject from a rather metaphysical standpoint. M. Pierre Janet presents\nus with a very accurate review of the importance of the contemporary\nspiritism and spiritualism. He calls attention to the fact that modern\npsychology owes to the researches of the spiritualists, many new,\nstartling, and interesting facts. He does not share their standpoint, yet\nhis review is kind and sympathetic. (Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nVOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII.[86] Vol. III. No. 12. March, 1892.\n\n POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE. (Continuation).\n By _B. N. Tchitcherin_. Article crowned by the Psychological\n Society of Moscow.\n\n HOW DOES THE MINISTRATION TO THE GENERAL GOOD OF ALL RELATE TO\n THE CARE FOR THE SALVATION OF OUR OWN SOUL? A letter to the\n Editor. By the _Archimandrite Antonii_.\n\n HUXLEY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MODERN SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF THE\n WORLD.\n\n TELEPATHY. (Concluded.) By _Petrovo-Solovo_.\n\n THE BASIS OF ETHICAL OBLIGATION. By _N. Grote_.\n\n SPECIAL DEPARTMENT. About Ethical Fragments from Democritus. By\n _J. Radloff_. One of the Possible Cosmic Theories. A Study. By\n _A. Wilkins_.\n\n CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. I. Review of Periodicals. II.\n Review of Recent Publications. Transactions of the Moscow\n Psychological Society. (Moscow, 1892.)\n\n\nMIND. New Series. No. 2. April, 1892.\n\n PLEASURE AND PAIN. By _A. Bain_.\n\n THE CHANGES OF METHOD IN HEGEL\u2019S DIALECTIC. II. By _J. Ellis\n McTaggart_.\n\n THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. By _E. Bradford\n Titchener_.\n\n THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. II. By _W. E. Johnson_.\n\n DISCUSSIONS: Dr. M\u00fcnsterberg and his Critics. By _S. Alexander_.\n\n CRITICAL NOTICES.\n\nProf. A. Bain criticises Mr. H. R. Marshall\u2019s theory of pleasure and\npain as being determined by the relation between the energy given out\nand the energy received, saying that it leaves a very large region\nuntouched and inexplicable. J. Ellis McTaggart defends the Hegelian\ndialectic system which, he declares, \u201cis not so wonderful or mystic\nas it has been represented to be. It makes no attempt,\u201d he says, \u201cto\ndeduce existence from essence; it does not even attempt to eliminate the\nelement of immediacy, in experience, and to produce a self-sufficient\nand self-mediating thought.\u201d E. Bradford Titchener gives a general\nsurvey of the researches carried out in Wundt\u2019s Institute, and of the\nother psychological contents of the _Philosophische Studien_, from the\ndate of Professor Cattell\u2019s paper on \u201cThe Psychological Laboratory at\nLeipsic\u201d to the present time. W. E. Johnson, in his paper on \u201cThe Logical\nCalculus,\u201d brings out some of the underlying principles and assumptions\nwhich belong equally to the ordinary Formal Logic, to Symbolic Logic,\nand to the so-called Logic of Relatives. Prof. S. Alexander takes\nissue with Mr. Titchener\u2019s criticism of Professor M\u00fcnsterberg\u2019s\npsychological investigations. Mr. Titchener\u2019s article which appeared\nin the October number of _Mind_, 1891, leaves the impression that the\nwhole of the work under review is valueless. \u201cMany of his objections,\u201d\nhowever, says Professor Alexander, \u201crefer to unimportant points, and\nthe graver theoretical ones are really groundless,\u201d and thus the\ncritic \u201chas contrived to give a one-sided judgment by neglecting the\nother considerations which give Dr. M\u00fcnsterberg\u2019s work its value and\nsignificance.\u201d (London: Williams & Norgate.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nTHREE AMERICAN MAGAZINES.\n\nINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. April, 1892. Vol. II. No. 3.\n\n ECONOMIC REFORM SHORT OF SOCIALISM. By _E. Benj. Andrews_.\n\n PLEASURE AND PAIN IN EDUCATION. By _Miss M. S. Gilliland_,\n London.\n\n THE ESSENTIALS OF BUDDHIST DOCTRINE AND ETHICS. By Prof.\n _Maurice Bloomfield_.\n\n THE THREE RELIGIONS. (Concluded.) By _J. S. Mackenzie_, M. A.\n\n DISCUSSIONS AND REVIEWS.\n\n THE SCHOOL OF APPLIED ETHICS.\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. I. No. 3. May, 1892.\n\n HERBERT SPENCER\u2019S ANIMAL ETHICS. By Prof. _Henry Calderwood_.\n\n THE ULTIMATE GROUND OF AUTHORITY. By Prof. _J. Macbride\n Sterrett_.\n\n WHAT IS REALITY? By _David G. Ritchie_.\n\n NATURAL SCIENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE. By Dr. _B. C.\n Burt_.\n\n A MATHEMATICAL VIEW OF FREE WILL. By Prof. _J. E. Oliver_.\n\n DISCUSSIONS: Professor Ladd\u2019s Criticism of James\u2019s Psychology.\n By Prof. _J. P. Gordy_.\n\n REVIEWS OF BOOKS AND SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.\n\nTHE NEW WORLD. Vol. I. No. 1. March, 1892.\n\n THE EVOLUTION OF CHRISTIANITY. By _Lyman Abbott_.\n\n THE HISTORIC AND THE IDEAL CHRIST. By _Charles Carroll Everett_.\n\n THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL RELIGION IN AMERICA. By _J. G. Schurmann_.\n\n THE COMMON, THE COMMONPLACE AND THE ROMANTIC. By _William\n Rounseville Alger_.\n\n ABRAHAM KUENEN. By _Crawford Howell Toy_.\n\n THE THEISTIC EVOLUTION OF BUDDHISM. By _J. Estlin Carpenter_.\n\n \u201cBETWEEN THE TESTAMENTS.\u201d By _Thomas R. Slicer_.\n\n THE NEW ORTHODOXY. By _Edward H. Hall_.\n\n THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HILL GREEN. By\n _Charles B. Upton_.\n\n INTRODUCTORY NOTE.\n\n BOOK REVIEWS.\n\nThere have sprung up within the last two years not less than four\nAmerican magazines of progressive thought, which now compete in the\nproposition of their religious and philosophical conceptions to the\nworld. These four magazines are, in the chronological order in which\nthey were founded, _The Monist_, _The International Journal of Ethics_,\n_The Philosophical Review_, and _The New World_. _The Monist_ represents\nthat world-conception which takes its stand upon facts and systematises\nfacts into a unitary view. Thus it recognises the methods of science\nas the methods of all knowledge, to the exclusion of supernatural\nrevelation, or intuitionalism, or any kind of mysticism. But _The Monist_\ndoes not rest satisfied with this. _The Monist_ preaches a religion; and\nthe prophets of this religion are not only the great ethical teachers\nof mankind, but everybody who reveals truth, Kant and Comte, Kepler,\nCopernicus, Darwin, and all living representatives of scientific inquiry.\nThus _The Monist_ is a magazine that points out the religious import of\nscience and philosophy.\n\n_The International Journal of Ethics_ follows in the same line in so\nfar only as it has nothing to say to the old orthodox conceptions of\nreligion. It tries to teach a higher morality, but in establishing ethics\nit pursues quite another course. It is the organ of the Ethical Societies\nand the leaders of the Ethical Societies are confident that they can have\nethics not only without theology but also without religion, science, or\nphilosophy. They consider the world-conception of a man as something\nindifferent, or unessential, in ethics, and by proposing a non-committal\npolicy with respect to religious and philosophical views, they expect\nto be the better fitted to preach good conduct. (Philadelphia:\n_International Journal of Ethics_, 118 S. Twelfth Street.)\n\n_The Philosophical Review_ represents a philosophical conception\nwhich has still a strong hold upon the Universities on this side of\nthe Atlantic. Transcendentalism, metaphysicism, and that theological\nphilosophy which still operates with supernatural quantities, or at\nleast has not discarded the dualistic features of supernaturalism, are\nrepresented in its columns. Certainly they are well represented and by\ntheir best upholders of the present time, and authors of more modern and\npositivistic views are not excluded. Exactly so in _The Monist_, the\nrepresentatives of metaphysicism and those who still believe in the dual\nexistence of man, in his self, or ego, and his transcendental existence\nare welcome; but there is nevertheless a fundamental difference in the\nworld-conception of the two magazines. (Boston, New York, Chicago: Ginn &\nCo.)\n\n_The New World_ is the latest new-comer in the field of magazine\nliterature, and we welcome its appearance most cordially. There are\nstrongly marked differences between _The New World_ and _The Monist_,\nfor the former is a theological magazine that deepens religion with the\nassistance of philosophy while the latter, rather the reverse, is a\nphilosophical magazine that widens philosophy and applies it to practical\nlife so as to become a religion. But for that very reason _The New World_\nseems to meet _The Monist_ half way. _The New World_ is an offshoot of\nmodern theology. Its contributors come largely from the ranks of the\nmaturest unitarian thinkers. They practically accept the principles of\ncriticism and scientific inquiry and thus they are approaching rapidly\nthat common goal of human thought, which _The Monist_ propounds as the\nleading maxim of philosophy and religion, namely, to regard nature as the\nonly revelation and experience as our guide in life; to base religion\nupon and to derive ethics from a critically-sifted statement of facts.\n(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.)\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[86] _Questions of Philosophy and Psychology._\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX TO THE MONIST, VOL. II, NO. 4\n\n\n KANT AND SPENCER\n\n TWO ARTICLES REPRINTED FROM NOS. 51, 52, AND 158\n OF THE OPEN COURT\n\n 1. THE ETHICS OF KANT\n 2. KANT ON EVOLUTION\n\n BY\n DR. PAUL CARUS\n\n CHICAGO:\n THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY\n\n\n\n\nTHE ETHICS OF KANT.\n\nIN CRITICISM OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER\u2019S PRESENTATION OF KANTISM.\n\n\nMr. Herbert Spencer has published in _The Popular Science Monthly_ for\nAugust, an essay on the Ethics of Kant; a translation of this article\nhad appeared in the July Number of the _Revue Philosophique_, and it\ncannot fail to have been widely noticed. It is to be regretted that\nunfamiliarity with the German language and perhaps also with Kant\u2019s\nterminology has led Mr. Spencer into errors to which attention is called\nin the following discussion.[87]\n\nMr. Spencer says:\n\n \u201cIf, before Kant uttered that often-quoted saying in which,\n with the stars of Heaven he coupled the conscience of Man, as\n being the two things that excited his awe, he had known more\n of Man than he did, he would probably have expressed himself\n somewhat otherwise.\u201d\n\nKant, in his famous dictum that two things excited his admiration, the\nstarry heaven above him and the conscience within him, contrasted two\nkinds of sublimity.[88] The grandeur of the Universe is that of size and\nextension, while the conscience of man commands respect for its moral\ndignity. The universe is wonderful in its expanse and in its order of\nmechanical regularity; the conscience of man is grand, being intelligent\nvolition that aspires to be in harmony with universal laws.\n\nMr. Spencer continues:\n\n \u201cNot, indeed, that the conscience of Man is not wonderful\n enough, whatever be its supposed genesis; but the wonderfulness\n of it is of a different kind according as we assume it to\n have been supernaturally given or infer that it has been\n naturally evolved. The knowledge of Man in that large sense\n which Anthropology expresses, had made, in Kant\u2019s day, but\n small advances. The books of travel were relatively few, and\n the facts which they contained concerning the human mind as\n existing in different races, had not been gathered together and\n generalized. In our days, the conscience of Man as inductively\n known has none of that universality of presence and unity of\n nature which Kant\u2019s saying tacitly assumes.\u201d\n\nMr. Spencer apparently supposes that Kant believed in a supernatural\norigin of the human conscience. This, however, is erroneous.\n\nMr. Spencer\u2019s error is excusable in consideration of the fact that some\ndisciples of Kant have fallen into a similar error. Professor Adler, of\nNew York, who attempts in the Societies for Ethical Culture to carry into\neffect the ethics of Pure Reason, maintains that the commandments of the\n_ought_ and \u201cthe light that shines through them come from beyond, but its\nbeams are broken as they pass through our terrestrial medium, and the\nfull light in all its glory we can never see.\u201d\n\nEthics based on an unknowable power, is mysticism; and mysticism does not\nessentially differ from dualism and supernaturalism.\n\nKant\u2019s reasoning is far from mysticism and from supernaturalism. He\nwas fully convinced that civilized man with his moral and intellectual\nabilities had naturally evolved from the lower state of an animal\nexistence. We read in his essay, \u201cPresumable Origin of the History\nof Mankind\u201d (Muthmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte. Editio\nHartenstein, Vol. IV, p. 321):\n\n \u201cFrom this conception of the primitive history of mankind it\n follows that the departure of man from the paradise represented\n to him by his reason as the earliest place of sojourn of his\n race, has been nothing else than the transition from the rude\n condition of a purely animal existence to the condition of a\n human being; a transition from the leading-strings of instinct\n to direction by reason, in a word, from the protectorate of\n nature to a status of freedom.\u201d\n\nThe view that the conscience of man is innate, in the sense of a\nnon-natural, of a mysterious, or even of a supernatural origin, is\nuntenable. Those disciples of Kant who entertain such views have\ncertainly misinterpreted their great master, and the passages adduced by\nMr. Spencer from so many sources are sufficient evidence of the fact that\n\u201cthere are widely different degrees\u201d [we should rather say kinds] \u201cof\nconscience in the different races.\u201d Mr. Spencer continues:\n\n \u201cHad Kant had these and kindred facts before him, his\n conception of the human mind, and consequently his ethical\n conception, would scarcely have been what they were. Believing,\n as he did, that one object of his awe\u2014the stellar Universe\u2014has\n been evolved,[89] he might by evidence like the foregoing\n have been led to suspect that the other object of his awe\u2014the\n human conscience\u2014has been evolved; and has consequently a\n real nature unlike its apparent nature.\u201d ... \u201cIf, instead of\n assuming that conscience is simple because it seems simple to\n careless introspection he had entertained the hypothesis that\n it is perhaps complex\u2014a consolidated product of multitudinous\n experiences received mainly by ancestors and added to by\n self\u2014he might have arrived at a consistent system of Ethics.\u201d\n ...\n\n \u201cIn brief, as already implied, had Kant, instead of his\n incongruous beliefs that the celestial bodies have had an\n evolutionary origin, but that the minds of living beings on\n them, or at least on one of them, have had a non-evolutionary\n origin, entertained the belief that both have arisen by\n Evolution, he would have been saved from the impossibilities of\n his Metaphysics, and the untenabilities of his Ethics.\u201d\n\nMr. Spencer believes that Kant had assumed conscience to be \u201csimple,\nbecause it seems simple to careless introspection.\u201d But there is no\nevidence in Kant\u2019s works for this assumption. On the contrary, Kant\nreversed the old view of so-called \u201crational psychology\u201d which considered\nconscience as innate and which was based on the error that consciousness\nis simple. Des Cartes\u2019s syllogism _cogito ergo sum_ is based on this\nidea, which at the same time served as a philosophical evidence for\nthe indestructibility and immortality of the _ego_. The simplicity of\nconsciousness had been considered as an axiom, until Kant came and showed\nthat it was a fallacy, a paralogism of pure reason. Dr. Noah Porter has\nwritten, from an apparently dualistic standpoint, a sketch entitled \u201cThe\nEthics of Kant,\u201d in which he says:\n\n \u201cThe skepticism and denials of Kant\u2019s speculative theory\n in respect to noumena, both material and psychical, had\n unfortunately cut him off from the possibility of recognizing\n the personal _ego_ as anything more than a logical fiction.\u201d\n\nKant says in his \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d:[90]\n\n \u201cIn the internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the\n _Ego_ is but the consciousness of my thought.... From all this\n it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a mere\n misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at\n the basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition\n of the subject as an object; and the category of substance is\n applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than\n the unity in _thought_, by which no object is given; to which\n therefore the category of substance cannot be applied.\u201d[91]\n\nConcerning the statement that Kant had believed in the non-evolutionary\norigin of living beings, we quote from his essay on _The Different Races\nof Men_, Chap. III, where Kant speaks of \u201cthe immediate causes of the\norigin of these different races.\u201d He says:\n\n \u201cThe conditions (_Gr\u00fcnde_) which, inhering in the constitution\n of an organic body, determine a certain evolutionary process\n (_Auswickelung_[92]) are called, if this process is concerned\n with particular parts, _germs_; if, on the other hand, it\n touches only the size or the relation of the parts to one\n another, I call it _natural capabilities_ (_nat\u00fcrliche\n Anlagen_).\u201d[93]\n\nAnd in a foot-note Kant makes the following remark:\n\n \u201cOrdinarily we accept the terms natural science\n (_Naturbeschreibung_) and natural history in one and the\n same sense. But it is evident that the knowledge of natural\n phenomena, as they _now are_, always leaves to be desired\n the knowledge of that which they _have been_ before now and\n through what succession of modifications they have passed in\n order to have arrived, in every respect, to their present\n state. _Natural History_, which at present we almost entirely\n lack, would teach us the changes that have affected the form\n of the earth, likewise, the changes in the creatures of the\n earth (plants and animals), that they have suffered by natural\n transformations and, arising therefrom, the departures from the\n prototype of the original species, that they have experienced.\n It would probably trace a great number of apparently different\n varieties back to species of one and the same kind and would\n convert the present so intricate school-system of Natural\n Science into a natural system in conformity with reason.\u201d[94]\n\nKant has nowhere, so far as we know, made any objection to the idea of\nevolution. But he opposed the theory that all life should have originated\nfrom _one single_ kind. In reviewing and epitomizing Joh. Gottfr.\nHerder\u2019s work, \u201c_Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit_,\u201d Kant says:\n\n ... \u201cBook II, treats of organized matter on the earth.... The\n beginnings of vegetation.... The changes suffered by man and\n beast through climatic influences.... In them all we find one\n prevailing form and a similar osseous structure.... These\n transitional links render it not at all impossible that in\n marine animals, in plants, and, indeed, possibly in so-called\n inanimate substances, one and the same fundamental principle\n of organization may prevail, although infinitely cruder and\n more complex in operation. In the sight of eternal being, which\n beholds all things in one connection, it is possible that the\n structure of the ice-particle, while receiving form, and of\n the snowflake, while being crystallized, bears an analogous\n relation to the formation of the embryo in a mother\u2019s womb....\n The third book compares the structure of animals and plants\n with the organization of man.... It was not because man was\n ordained to be a rational creature that upright stature was\n given him for using his limbs according to reason; on the\n contrary he acquired his reason as a consequence of his upright\n stature.... From stone to crystals, from crystals to metals,\n from metals to plant-creation, from thence to the animal,\n and ultimately to man, we have seen the form of organization\n advancing, and with it the faculties and instincts of creatures\n becoming more diversified, until at last they all became united\n in the human form, in so far as the latter could comprise\n them.... As the body increases by food, so does the mind by\n ideas; indeed, we notice here the same laws of assimilation, of\n growth, and of generation. In a word, an inner spiritual man is\n being formed within us, which has a nature of its own and which\n employs the body as an instrument merely.... Our humanity is\n merely a preliminary training, the bud of a blossom to come.\n Step by step does nature cast off the ignoble and the base,\n while it builds and adds to the spiritual and continues to\n fashion the pure and refined with increasing niceness; thus are\n we in a position to hope from the artist-hand of nature that in\n that other existence our bud of humanity will also appear in\n its real and true form of divine manhood.\u201d ...\n\n[Herder\u2019s idea of evolution would stand on the whole if his conception of\n\u201cthe spiritual\u201d did not imply a preternatural agent.]\n\n \u201cThe present state of man is probably the link of junction\n between two worlds.... Yet man is not to investigate himself in\n this future state; he is to believe himself into it.\u201d\n\nKant makes no objection whatever to the evolutionary ideas of Herder.\nBut Herder was not free from supernaturalism and from fantastic ideas\nin reference to the future development of man. He had not yet dropped\nthe dualistic conception of the \u2018duplicity\u2019 of man and believed in the\nimmortality of a distinct spiritual individual within his body. Kant\u2019s\nobjection, therefore, is two-fold; 1) against Herder\u2019s supernaturalism\nwhich leads him beyond this world; and, 2) against the descent of _all_\nspecies from _one and the same genus_. He says:\n\n \u201cIn the gradation between the different species and individuals\n of a natural kingdom, nature shows us nothing else than the\n fact that it abandons individuals to total destruction and\n preserves the species alone.... As concerns that _invisible_\n kingdom of active and independent forces, we fail to see why\n the author, after having believed he could confidently infer\n from organized beings, the existence of the rational principle\n in man did not rather attribute this principle directly to\n him merely as spiritual nature, instead of lifting it out of\n chaos through the structural form of organised matter.... As\n to the gradation of organized beings, our author is not to\n be too severely reproached, if the scheme has not met the\n requirements of his conception, which extends so far beyond\n the limits of this world; for its application even to the\n natural kingdoms here on earth leads to nothing. The slight\n differences exhibited when species are compared with reference\n to their common points of resemblance, are, where there is\n such great multiplicity, a necessary consequence of just this\n multiplicity. The assumption of common kinship between them,\n inasmuch as one kind would have to spring from another and all\n from one original and primitive species, or from one and the\n same creative source (Mutterschoss)\u2014the assumption of such\n a common kinship would lead to ideas so strange that reason\n shrinks from them, and we cannot attribute this idea to the\n author without doing him injustice. Concerning his suggestions\n in comparative anatomy through all species down to plants,\n the workers in natural science must judge for themselves\n whether the hints given for new observations, will be useful\n and whether they are justified.... It is desirable that our\n ingenious author who in the continuation of his work will find\n more _terra firma_, may somewhat restrain his bright genius,\n and that philosophy (which consists rather in pruning than in\n fostering luxuriant growth) may lead him to the perfection of\n his labors not through hints but through definite conceptions,\n not by imagination but by observation, not by a metaphysical or\n emotional phantasy but by reason, broad in its plan but careful\n in its work.\u201d\n\nKant rejected certain conceptions of evolution, but he did not at all\nshow himself averse to the idea in general. He touched upon the subject\nonly incidentally and it is certain that he did not especially favor or\nentertain the belief in a non-evolutionary origin of living beings.\n\nBefore proceeding to the main points of his criticism, Mr. Spencer calls\nattention to what he designates as Kant\u2019s _abnormal_ reasoning. Mr.\nSpencer says:\n\n \u201cSomething must be said concerning abnormal reasoning as\n compared with normal reasoning.\u201d ...\n\n \u201cInstead of setting out with a proposition of which the\n negation is inconceivable, it sets out with a proposition of\n which the affirmation is inconceivable, and therefrom proceeds\n to draw conclusions\u201d ...\n\n \u201cThe first sentence in Kant\u2019s first chapter runs thus: \u2018Nothing\n can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it,\n which can be called good without qualification, except a Good\n Will.\u2019\u201d ...\n\n \u201cMost fallacies result from the habit of using words without\n fully rendering them into thoughts\u2014passing them by with\n recognitions of their meanings as ordinarily used, without\n stopping to consider whether these meanings admit of being\n given to them in the cases named. Let us not rest satisfied\n with thinking vaguely of what is understood by \u2018a Good Will,\u2019\n but let us interpret the words definitely. Will implies the\n consciousness of some end to be achieved. Exclude from it every\n idea of purpose, and the conception of Will disappears. An\n end of some kind being necessarily implied by the conception\n of Will, the quality of the Will is determined by the quality\n of the end contemplated. Will itself, considered apart from\n any distinguishing epithet, is not cognizable by Morality at\n all. It becomes cognizable by Morality only when it gains its\n character as good or bad by virtue of its contemplated end as\n good or bad.\u201d ...\n\n \u201cKant tells us that a good will is one that is good in and for\n itself without reference to ends.\u201d\n\nIt is unfortunate that Mr. Spencer misunderstood the first sentence of\nKant\u2019s book (_Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_). Kant does not\nspeak of \u201ca good will without qualification,\u201d nor does the expression\n\u201cwithout qualification\u201d refer to \u201ca will without reference to ends.\u201d Kant\nspeaks of good will in opposition to other good things. Nothing, he\nsays, can without qualification (_ohne Einschr\u00e4nkung_) be called good,\nexcept a good will.[95] Dr. Porter sums up the first page of Kant\u2019s essay\nin the following words:\n\n \u201cThe first section of the treatise opens with the memorable\n and often-quoted utterance, that \u2018nothing can be possibly\n conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called\n good without qualification, except a good will.\u2019 If character\n is compared with gifts of nature, as intelligence, courage,\n and gifts of fortune, as riches, health, or contentment, all\n these are defective, \u2018if there is not a good will to correct\n their possible perversion and to rectify the whole principle of\n acting, and _adapt it to its end_.\u2019[96] A man who is endowed\n with every other good can never give pleasure to an impartial,\n rational spectator unless he possesses a good will. \u2018Thus a\n good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition of\n being worthy of happiness.\u2019 ... \u2018Moreover, a good will is good\n not for what it effects but for what it intends, even when it\n fails to accomplish its purposes, ... as when the man wills\n the good of another and is impotent to promote it, or actually\n effects just the opposite of what he proposes or wills.\u2019\u201d\n\nIn the passages quoted by Dr. Porter, Kant speaks of \u201cthe _end_ to which\ngood will adapts other goods\u201d; and in another passage of the same book,\nKant directly declares that \u201cit is the _end_ that serves the will as\nthe objective ground of its self-determination.\u201d Mr. Spencer must have\noverlooked these sentences. Kant says:\n\n \u201cThe will is conceived as a power of determining itself to\n action in accordance with the conception of certain laws. And\n such a power can only be met with in rational beings. _Now it\n is the END that serves the will as the objective ground of its\n self-determination_, and this end, if fixed by reason alone,\n must hold equally good for all rational creatures.\u201d\n\n * * * * *\n\nMr. Spencer interrupts his essay on the Ethics of Kant by a digression\non Kant\u2019s conception of time and space. It would lead us too far at\npresent if we would follow Mr. Spencer on this ground also. A comparison\nof Spencer\u2019s remarks on the subject with Kant\u2019s \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d\nwill show that Kant\u2019s view of space and time is radically different from\nthat view which Mr. Spencer represents as the Kantian conception of time\nand space.\n\n * * * * *\n\nKant rejects the idea that happiness is the end and purpose of life\nand at the same time he declares that ethics must be based not on the\npursuit of happiness but on the categorical imperative or more popularly\nexpressed on our sense of duty.\n\nMr. Spencer argues:\n\n \u201cOne of the propositions contained in Kant\u2019s first chapter is\n that \u2018we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself\n with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness,\n so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction.\u2019\u201d ...\n\n \u201cThat which Kant should have said is that the _exclusive_\n pursuit of what are distinguished as pleasures and amusements\n is disappointing.\u201d ...\n\n \u201cIt is not, as Kant says, guidance by \u2018a cultivated reason,\u2019\n which leads to disappointment, but guidance by an uncultivated\n reason.\u201d\n\nThe passage quoted by Mr. Spencer from Kant, reads in its context as\nfollows:\n\n \u201cIn the physical constitution of an organized being we take it\n for granted[97] that no organ for any purpose will be found\n in it but such as is also the fittest and best adapted for\n that purpose. If in a being possessing reason and will, the\n preservation, the prosperity, in a word, the happiness of that\n being, constituted the actual purpose of nature, nature had\n certainly adopted an extremely unwise expedient to this end,\n had it made the reason of that being the executive agent of its\n purposes in this matter. For all actions that it had to perform\n with this end in view, and the whole rule of its conduct, would\n have been far more exactly prescribed by _instinct_, and this\n end would have been far more safely attained by this means than\n can ever take place through the instrumentality of _reason_.\u201d\n ...\n\n \u201cAs a matter of fact we find that the more a cultivated\n reason occupies itself with the purpose of enjoying life and\n happiness, the farther does the person possessing it recede\n from the state of true contentment; and hence there arises in\n the case of many, and pre-eminently in the case of those most\n experienced in the exercise of reason, if they are only frank\n enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology or hate of\n reason; for after weighing every advantage that they derive,\n I will not say from the invention of all arts facilitating\n ordinary luxury, but even from the sciences, (which after\n all are in their eyes a luxury of the intellect,) they still\n discover that virtually they have burdened themselves more with\n toil and trouble than they have gained in point of happiness,\n and thus, in the end, they are more apt to envy than contemn\n the commoner type of men who are more immediately subject to\n the guidance of natural instinct alone, and who do not suffer\n their reason to influence in any great degree their acts and\n omissions.\u201d\n\nKant uses the expression \u201ccultivated reason\u201d not in opposition to\n\u201cuncultivated reason,\u201d but to \u201cinstinct\u201d as that inherited faculty\nwhich teaches a being to live in accordance with nature and its natural\nconditions, without the interference of thought and reflection.\n\nThat uncultivated reason would lead to disappointment, Kant never would\nhave denied. He would have added: \u201cIt does more, it leads to a speedy\nruin.\u201d\n\nBut if reason does not produce happiness, what then is the use of reason?\nKant answers, reason produces in man the good will.\n\nIt is reason which enables man to form abstractions, to think in\ngeneralizations and to conceive the import of universal laws. When his\nwill deliberately and consciously conforms to universal laws, it is good.\nKant says:\n\n \u201cThus will (viz. the good will) can not be the sole and whole\n Good, but it must still be the highest Good and the condition\n necessary to everything else, even to all desire of happiness.\u201d\n ...\n\n \u201cTo know what I have to do in order that my volition be good,\n requires on my part no far-reaching sagacity. Unexperienced\n in respect of the course of nature, unable to be prepared for\n all the occurrences transpiring therein, I simply ask myself:\n Can\u2019st thou so will, that the maxim of thy conduct may become a\n universal law? Where it can not become a universal law, there\n the maxim of thy conduct is reprehensible, and that, too, not\n by reason of any disadvantage consequent thereupon to thee or\n even others, but because it is not fit to enter as a principle\n into a possible enactment of universal laws.\u201d\n\nIf a maxim of conduct is fit to enter as a principle into a possible\nenactment of universal laws, it will be found in harmony with the\ncosmical laws; if not, it must come in conflict with the order of things\nin the universe. It then cannot stand, and will, if persistently adhered\nto, lead (perhaps slowly but inevitably) to certain ruin.\n\nConcerning the proposition that happiness may be regarded as the purpose\nof life Kant in his review of Herder\u2019s \u201cIdeen zur Philosophie der\nGeschichte der Menschheit\u201d (Ed. H. IV, p. 190), speaks of the relativity\nof happiness and its insufficiency as a final aim of life:\n\n ... \u201cFirst of all the happiness of an animal, then that of a\n child and of a youth, and lastly that of man! In all epochs\n of human history, as well as among all classes and conditions\n of the same epoch, that happiness has obtained which was in\n exact conformity with the individual\u2019s ideas and the degree\n of his habituation to the conditions amid which he was\n born and raised. Indeed, it is not even possible to form a\n comparison of the degree of happiness nor to give precedence\n to one class of men or to one generation over another....\n If this shadow-picture of happiness ... were the actual aim\n of Providence, every man would have the measure of his own\n happiness within him.... Does the author (Herder) think perhaps\n that, if the happy inhabitants of Otaheite had never been\n visited by more civilized peoples and were ordained to live\n in peaceful indolence for thousands of years to come\u2014that we\n could give a satisfactory answer to the question why they\n should exist at all and whether it would not have been just as\n well that this island should be occupied by happy sheep and\n cattle as that it should be inhabited by men who are happy only\n through pure enjoyment?\u201d\n\nConcerning the mission or purpose of humanity and its ultimate\nrealization, Kant interprets Herder\u2019s views as follows:\n\n \u201cIt involves no contradiction to say that no individual\n member of all the offspring of the human race, but that\n only the species, fully attains its mission (Bestimmung).\n The mathematician may explain the matter in his way. The\n philosopher would say: the mission of the human race as a whole\n is _unceasing progress_, and the perfection (Vollendung) of\n this mission is a mere idea (although in every aspect a quite\n useful one) of the aim towards which, in conformity with the\n design of providence, we are to direct our endeavors.\u201d\n\nWe learn from the passages quoted from Kant that his idea of good will is\nneither mystical and supernatural, nor is it vague. It is a conception\nas logically and definitely defined as any mathematical definition.\nGood will in the sense in which Kant defines it, is only possible in\na reasonable being by the power of its reason. The good will is the\nintention of conforming to universal principles and thus of being in\nharmony with the All. This good will is the corner-stone of Kant\u2019s\nethics; it appears as the categoric imperative of duty, so to act that\nthe maxim of one\u2019s conduct may be fit to become a universal law. It is\nformulated in another passage: \u201cAct so as if the maxim of thy conduct by\nthy volition were to become a natural law.\u201d\n\nIt is easily seen that, in Kant\u2019s conception, the _ought_ of morals (viz.\nof the categoric imperative) does not stand in contradiction to the\n_must_ of natural laws. Kant\u2019s conception is monistic, not dualistic.\nKant says:\n\n \u201cThe moral _ought_ is man\u2019s _inner_, _necessary_ volition as\n being a member of an intelligible world and is _conceived_ by\n him as an ought only in so far as he considers himself also as\n a member of the sensory world.\u201d[98]\n\nOur way of explaining it would be: Man _feels_ in his activity the\ncategoric imperative as an ought. So the snow crystal, if it were\npossessed of sensation, would _feel_ its formation as an \u201cought.\u201d But\nboth are, and to an outside observer will appear, as a \u201cmust.\u201d\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn the Spencerian system of ethics, which is utilitarianism, the moral\nmaxim or the idea of duty is not distinguished from the feeling of\npleasure or pain that accompanies ethical thoughts and acts, and their\nconsequences. This lack of distinction induces Mr. Spencer to consider\nman\u2019s pursuit of happiness as the basis of ethics. Accordingly the\naim of ethics, he maintains, is not the performance of duty, not the\nrealization of the good; to the utilitarian this is only the means. The\nend of ethics is the greatest happiness of the greatest number.\n\nIt is strange that Mr. Spencer\u2019s essay contains a passage which, although\nintended as a point of objection to Kant, is a corroboration of Kant\u2019s\nethics, and a refutation of Mr. Spencer\u2019s own views. While denying the\nstatement that \u201ca cultivated reason, if applied with deliberate purpose\nto the enjoyment of life and happiness, will fail to produce true\nsatisfaction,\u201d Mr. Spencer says:\n\n \u201cI assert that it is untrue on the strength of personal\n experiences. In the course of my life there have occurred\n many intervals, averaging a month each, in which the pursuit\n of happiness was the sole object, and in which happiness was\n successfully pursued. How successfully may be judged from the\n fact that I would gladly live over again each of those periods\n without change, an assertion which I certainly cannot make of\n any portions of my life spent in the daily discharge of duties.\u201d\n\nThis statement, if it proves anything, proves that happiness is one thing\nand duty is another; it proves that Kant\u2019s theory of ethics, which is\nbased on the discharge of duty and not on the pursuit of happiness, is\ncorrect, and that Mr. Spencer\u2019s theory which identifies duty with the\npursuit of happiness, is wrong.\n\nHowever, we must in this place express our opinion that Mr. Spencer\u2019s\nstatement _cannot_ be quite correct. The discharge of duty, unpleasant\nthough the drudgery part of it may have been, was undoubtedly accompanied\nand followed by a certain satisfaction, which perhaps was less in\nquantity, but certainly higher in quality than the pleasure derived from\nthe mere pursuit of happiness. And in the valuation of the intrinsic\nand of the moral worth of pleasures, the quality alone should be taken\ninto consideration, not the quantity. In this sense only can an ethical\nhedonism or utilitarianism be acceptable. The man whose pleasures and\npains are of a higher kind, of a nobler form, and of a better quality, is\nmorally and generally the more evolved man. And then, the basis of ethics\nwould be, not so much pleasure or happiness as the quality of pleasure or\nhappiness; it would be an aspiration to evolve toward a higher plane of\nlife, to shape our lives in nobler forms, and to enjoy nobler, greater,\nand more spiritual pleasures, or, as Kant says, \u201cunceasing progress.\u201d\n\nMr. Spencer\u2019s assertion, if taken in the sense in which it stands, is a\ncontradiction of his ethical theory. But even if Mr. Spencer had declared\nthat the discharge of duty affords a kind of happiness or satisfaction,\nas it truly does, there would still remain a deep gap between his and\nKant\u2019s ethics. Mr. Spencer reduces ethics to mere worldly prudence; he\nsays that we must do the good in order to be happy, and for the sake of\nits utility, and Kant says we must act so as to be in agreement with\nuniversal law. Mr. Spencer says:\n\n \u201cBut now, supposing we accept Kant\u2019s statement in full, what\n is its implication? That happiness is the thing to be desired,\n and, in one way or another, the thing to be achieved.\u201d ...\n\n \u201cAn illustration will best show how the matter stands. To\n a tyro in archery the instructor says: \u2018Sir, you must not\n point your arrow directly at the target; if you do, you will\n inevitably miss it; you must aim high above the target, and you\n may then possibly pierce the bull\u2019s-eye.\u2019 What now is implied\n by the warning and the advice? Clearly that the purpose is\n to hit the target. Otherwise there is no sense in the remark\n that it will be missed if directly aimed at; and no sense in\n the remark that to be hit, something higher must be aimed at.\n Similarly with happiness. There is no sense in the remark that\n happiness will not be found if it is directly sought, unless\n happiness is a thing to be somehow or other obtained.\u201d ...\n\n \u201cSo that in this professed repudiation of happiness as an end,\n there lies the inavoidable implication that it _is_ the end.\u201d\n\nThe pursuit of happiness is by no means repudiated by Kant as wrong or\nimmoral; it is only maintained to be insufficient as a foundation of\nethics. Kant\u2019s remark that happiness will not be found if it is directly\nsought has no reference to his own ethics. Kant, speaking from the\nstandpoint of one who takes the view of utilitarianism, says that if a\ncultivated reason applies itself to the sole purpose of enjoying life and\nhappiness, it will meet with a failure.[99]\n\nAny other explanation of the moral _ought_ than that from the Good Will,\nKant declares to be _heteronomy_. Will would no longer be itself, and the\nprinciple of action would lie in something foreign to the will. Kant says:\n\n \u201cWill in such a case would not be a law to itself; but the\n object by its relation to the will would impose the law upon\n the will.... This would admit of hypothetical imperatives\n only: \u2018I ought to do a certain thing, because I want something\n else.\u2019 The moral and therefore categorical imperative, on the\n contrary, says: \u2018I ought to act so or so, even if I had nothing\n else in view.\u2019 For instance: the hypothetical imperative\n of heteronomy says: \u2018I ought not to lie, if I ever wish to\n preserve my honor.\u2019 The categorical imperative says: \u2018I ought\n not to lie even if it would not in the least bring me to\n shame.\u2019\u201d\n\nMr. Spencer quotes the following passage from Kant:\n\n \u201cI omit here all actions which are already recognized as\n inconsistent with duty, although they may be useful for this\n or that purpose, for with these the question whether they are\n done _from duty_ can not arise at all, since they even conflict\n with it. I also set aside those actions which really conform\n to duty, but to which men have _no_ direct _inclination_,\n performing them because they are impelled thereto by some\n other inclination. For in this case we can readily distinguish\n whether the action which agrees with duty is done _from\n duty_, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this\n distinction when the action accords with duty, and the subject\n has besides a _direct_ inclination to it. For example, it is\n always a matter of duty that a dealer should not overcharge an\n inexperienced purchaser, and wherever there is much commerce\n the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed\n price for every one, so that a child buys of him as well as any\n other. Men are thus _honestly_ served; but this is not enough\n to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty\n and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it;\n it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he might\n besides have a direct inclination in favor of the buyers, so\n that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage to one\n over another[!]. Accordingly the action was done neither from\n duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish\n view.\n\n \u201cOn the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one\u2019s life, and,\n in addition, every one has also a direct inclination to do\n so. But on this account the often anxious care which most men\n take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no\n moral import. They preserve their life _as duty requires_, no\n doubt, but not _because duty requires_. On the other hand,\n if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away\n the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind,\n indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected,\n wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving\n it\u2014not from inclination or fear, but from duty\u2014then his maxim\n has a moral worth.\n\n \u201cTo be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this,\n there are many minds so sympathetically constituted that\n without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find\n a pleasure in spreading joy around them, and can take delight\n in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work.\n But I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind,\n however proper, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no\n true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclinations.\u201d\n (pp. 17-19)\n\nKant\u2019s metaphysics of ethics is to practical ethics what pure mathematics\nis to applied mathematics, or what logic is to grammar. Kant\u2019s method of\nreasoning _in abstracto_ everywhere shows the mathematical bent of his\nmind. In a foot-note (Editio Hartenstein, IV), p. 258, he says:\n\n \u201cAs pure mathematics is distinguished from applied mathematics\n and pure logic from applied logic, so may the pure philosophy\n (the metaphysics) of ethics be distinguished from the applied\n philosophy of ethics, that is, as applied to human nature.\n By this distinction of terms it at once appears that ethical\n principles are not based upon the peculiarities of human\n nature but that they must be existent by themselves _a\n priori_,\u2014whence, for human nature, just as well as for _any_\n rational nature, practical rules can be derived.\u201d\n\nSchleiermacher says:\n\n \u201cA good is any agreement (\u201cunity\u201d) of definite sides [certain\n aspects] of reason and nature.... The end of ethical praxis\n is the highest good, _i. e._, the sum of all unions of nature\n and reason.... The moral law may be compared to the algebraic\n formula which (in analytical geometry) determines the course\n [path] of a curve; the highest good may be compared to the\n curve itself, and virtue, or moral power, to an instrument\n arranged for the purpose of constructing the curve according to\n the formula.\u201d (Quoted from a translation of Ueberweg.)\n\nKant declares in other passages that in examples taken from practical\nlife, it will be difficult to separate clearly and unmistakably the\nsense of duty as the real moral motive from other motives, inclinations,\nhabits, etc. But such a distinction must be made, if the moral value of\nmotives is to be considered _in abstracto_. This is necessary for a clear\nconception of the essential features of morality. Mr. Spencer has on\nother occasions highly praised the power of generalization, which indeed\nis fundamentally the same faculty, as thinking _in abstracto_; here,\nhowever, he does not follow Kant\u2019s argument, but declares \u201cthat the\nassumed distinction between sense of duty and inclination is untenable.\u201d\nHe says:\n\n \u201cThe very expression _sense_ of duty implies that the mental\n state signified is a feeling; and if a feeling it must,\n like other feelings, be gratified by acts of one kind and\n offended by acts of an opposite kind. If we take the name\n conscience, which is equivalent to sense of duty, we see the\n same thing. The common expressions \u2018a tender conscience,\u2019 \u2018a\n seared conscience,\u2019 indicate the perception that conscience\n is a feeling\u2014a feeling which has its satisfactions and\n dissatisfactions, and which _inclines_ a man to acts which\n yield the one and avoid the other\u2014produces an _inclination_,\u201d\n (p. 476).\n\nIt is quite true that every state of consciousness is a feeling, but\nwe can and must discriminate between consciousness or feeling and the\nidea or thought which becomes conscious, in which the feeling appears,\nand which is, so to speak, the special form of a certain feeling. The\nconsciousness and its special form, the feeling and the mental object\nof feeling, are in reality one and the same. Yet they are different and\nmust _in abstracto_ be well distinguished. Mr. Spencer\u2019s method is that\nof generalization, but generalizing can lead to no satisfactory results,\nif it is not constantly accompanied by discrimination. We must generalize\nand discriminate.\n\nIf a certain group of states of consciousness takes the form of a\nlogical syllogism, it must not be expected that logic will find its\nexplanation in feeling, although it cannot be denied that all the\nstates of consciousness are feelings. Not the feeling in this case is\nto be explained, but logic. In our generalizations we must discriminate\n_in abstracto_ between the feeling and the idea which feels. We must\npositively abstract from feeling and cannot consider whether the feeling\nof logical arguments is pleasant or unpleasant. Mr. Spencer\u2019s method\nof explaining ethics, if applied to logic, would be as follows: \u201cMan\u2019s\nlogical sense is a very complex feeling and has developed from simple\npercepts such as can be observed in the lowest animals; percepts are\na higher evolved form of reactions against irritations such as take\nplace in protoplasm. The old method of explaining logic is that of\ndeduction, modern logic will be inductive. Formerly pure logic was\nconsidered as a science _a priori_; but the evolution-philosophy shows\nthat logic is developed by steps, it appears _a priori_ to the individual\nnow, but it is in reality a consolidated product of multitudinous\nexperiences received mainly by ancestors and added to by self. Logical\nsense accordingly finds its explanation in most simple feelings. Our\nconceptions of logically incorrect feelings will be more and more\navoided because they will ultimately be found to be unpleasant; logical\ncorrectness is striven for because of the feeling of satisfaction that\naccompanies the conception of a logically correct conclusion.\u201d\n\nSense is feeling, there can be no doubt. Logical sense and mathematical\nsense are feelings and if a person thinks a mathematical axiom or a\nlogical syllogism or an ethical maxim, he has a feeling. Logical sense\nof reason is the product of evolution, and it cannot be denied either\nthat one man has a more logical or mathematical or moral sense than\nanother. But it does not follow that an explanation of mathematics, or\nlogic, or ethics, must be derived from feeling pleasure and pain, or\nhappiness. On the contrary we must abstract from feeling altogether and\nconcern ourselves with the object of feeling only, which is the idea\nor the special form in which and as which feeling appears. States of\nconsciousness (never mind whether they are painful or pleasurable) must\nbe considered as moral if their mental object, _i. e._, the idea, the\nthought, the motive, the form in which feeling becomes manifest, is in\nharmony with the universal order of things.\n\n * * * * *\n\nMr. Spencer declares that the world would be intolerable \u201cif Kant\u2019s\nconception of moral worth were displayed universally in men\u2019s acts.\u201d\nAnd it must be acknowledged that Kant\u2019s ethics in their logical and\nirrefutable rigidity not only impressed the literary world of his time\nwith the grandeur and sublimity of ethics; Kant\u2019s ethics also astounded,\nand overwhelmed his readers with awe. Virtue no longer appeared to be the\nfervid enthusiasm of sentiments; it congealed into the cold idea of duty\nwhich can be fixed in abstract rules and will operate like the correctly\ncalculated gear of a machine. Objections have been raised by some of\nKant\u2019s own disciples; but it must be known that the Kantian view of\nethics does not suppress feelings, emotions and inclinations, it excludes\nthem only from an estimation of the moral worth of actions. Kant gave the\n_coup de grace_ to all sentimentality which had taken the lead in ethical\nquestions too long. Mr. Spencer says:\n\n \u201cIf those acts only have moral worth which are done from a\n sense of duty ... we must say that a man\u2019s moral worth is\n greater in proportion as the strength of his sense of duty\n is such that he does the right thing not only apart from\n inclination but against inclination. According to Kant,\n then, the most moral man is the man ... who says of another\n that which is true though he would like to injure him by a\n falsehood; who lends money to his brother though he would\n prefer to see him in distress.\u201d\n\nSchiller, although an admirer of Kant, makes in his Xenions a similar\nobjection to this corollary of the ethics of pure reason. He says:\n\n \u201cWillingly serve I my friends; but \u2019tis pity, I do it with pleasure.\n And I am really vexed, that there\u2019s no virtue in me!\u201d\n\nAnd he answers in a second distich:\n\n \u201cThere is no other advice than that you try to despise friends,\n And, with disgust, you will do what such a duty demands.\u201d\n\nThe difficulty is removed under the following consideration: A man with\ngood inclinations is less exposed to temptation than a man with bad\ninclinations. If both act morally under conditions otherwise the same,\nthe latter has shown greater strength of moral purpose than the former.\nThe former\u2019s character (viz., his inherited inclinations and habits which\nrepresent the sum total of the moral energies of his ancestors,) is more\nmoral than that of the latter. But the latter deserves more credit than\nthe former for overcoming the temptation; he has in this special act\nshown more moral strength of will than his more fortunate and morally\nhigher advanced fellow-man. To those who have accepted the Kantian view,\nMr. Spencer\u2019s and Schiller\u2019s objection can serve as a warning, not to\nlose sight of emotions altogether. Man is not only a reasonable being, he\nis at the same time a feeling creature. The instinctive faculties of man,\nthe so-called subconscious states, are the basis of his consciousness.\nThey form the roots of his soul from which spring the clear conceptions\nof his reason. The more man\u2019s habits and inclinations agree with morals,\nthe more strength of purpose is left for further ethical advancement and\nmoral progress.\n\nSimilar objections have also been made to Kant\u2019s mechanical explanation\nof the origin of the planetary systems and milky ways. It seemed as if\nthe divinity of nature were replaced by the rigid law of gravity. In his\npoem \u201cThe God\u2019s of Greece,\u201d Schiller complains:\n\n \u201cF\u00fchllos selbst f\u00fcr ihres K\u00fcnstlers Ehre,\n Gleich dem todten Schlag der Pendeluhr,\n Dient sie knechtisch dem Gesetz der Schwere,\n Die entg\u00f6tterte Natur.\u201d\n\n \u201cDead even to her Master\u2019s praise,\n Like lifeless pendulum\u2019s vibration,\n Lo, godless Nature now obeys,\n Slave-like, the law of gravitation.\u201d[100]\n\nSuch objections are always raised when a scientific explanation destroys\nthe mystic view that a spirit or at least something unexplainable is\nthe supposed cause of certain phenomena. Our sentiments are so closely\nconnected and intimately interwoven with our errors that truth appears\nhostile to sentiment, and it becomes difficult to part with errors\nsanctified by emotion. Sentimentality always complains that clear thought\nis an enemy of romanticism, and romanticism is the only possible poetry\nto the taste of the sentimental.\n\nNow it cannot be denied that a one-sided knowledge not only appears\nrigid, it truly _is_ so, and will be destructive of such emotions as\nreverence, awe, \u00e6sthetic taste, religion and art. Criticism is a most\nessential feature of science and philosophy, and how negative, how\ndesolate and melancholy appear the results of criticism! But the pruning\nprocess of criticism is very wholesome, and true science will only profit\nby discarding the vagueness of indistinct conceptions. Alpine lakes that\nare really deep can only gain by lucidity. Thus the clearness of genuine\nscience and broad philosophy will only show the depth of truth into which\nby all its lucidity our emotions can plunge without ever finding it\nshallow or fathoming it in all its profundity.\n\nKant\u2019s doctrine of ethics is a truth that can stand the severest test.\n\nEthics, in the sense of the word as used by Kant, can be found in\nman only, in so far as he is a reasonable being. A truly reasonable\nbeing does not allow himself to be guided by impulses but is led by\nmaxims. Inclinations and habits are remnants of instinct. Not he who\nin instinctive good-naturedness acts morally, is the ethical man, but\nhe who deliberately and consciously considers himself a representative\nof the general order of things. The man, who adopts such maxims as can\nbecome universal principles, identifies his will with the laws of the\nuniverse. Man\u2019s moral dignity must not be sought in vague feelings or in\ninstinctive inspirations; it is based upon his reason and is developed in\nso far only as he makes use of his reason.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[87] Quotations from Mr. Spencer\u2019s essay will be distinguished\nby quotation-marks, while those from Kant will appear in hanging\nindentations.\n\n[88] Kant distinguishes two kinds of sublimity: 1) the mathematical, and\n2) the dynamical. His definitions are: 1) sublime is that in comparison\nwith which everything else is small; and 2) sublime is that the mere\nability to conceive which shows a power of emotion (Gem\u00fcth), the latter\ntranscending any measurement by the senses. [1) Erhaben ist, mit welchem\nim Vergleich alles andere klein ist. 2) Erhaben ist, was auch nur denken\nzu k\u00f6nnen ein Verm\u00f6gen des Gem\u00fcths beweist, das jeden Maasstab der Sinne\n\u00fcbertrifft. Editio Hartenstein, Vol. V, pp. 257, 258.]\n\n[89] The stellar Universe, of course, has not been evolved; Mr. Spencer\nmeans that according to Kant\u2019s mechanical explanation the planetary\nsystems and milky ways of the stellar Universe are in a state of constant\nevolution.\n\n[90] Translation by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, pp. 244, 249.\n\n[91] Compare also Kant\u2019s \u201cProl. zu jeder k\u00fcnftigen Metaphysik,\u201d \u00a7 46.\n\n[92] We call attention to Kant\u2019s peculiar expression, in this passage, of\n_Auswickelung_ which has now yielded to the term _Entwickelung_.\n\n[93] Die in der Natur eines organischen K\u00f6rpers (Gew\u00e4chses oder Thieres)\nliegenden Gr\u00fcnde einer bestimmten Auswickelung heissen, wenn diese\nAuswickelung besondere Theile betrifft, _Keime_; betrifft sie aber nur\ndie Gr\u00f6sse oder das Verh\u00e4ltniss der Theile unter einander, so nenne ich\nsie _nat\u00fcrliche Anlagen_.\n\n[94] Wir nehmen die Benennungen _Naturbeschreibung_ und _Naturgeschichte_\ngemeiniglich in einerlei Sinne. Allein es ist klar, dass die Kenntniss\nder Naturdinge, wie sie _jetzt sind_, immer noch die Erkenntniss von\ndemjenigen w\u00fcnschen lasse, was sie ehedem _gewesen_ sind und durch\nwelche Reihe von Ver\u00e4nderungen sie durchgegangen, um an jedem Ort\nin ihren gegenw\u00e4rtigen Zustand zu gelangen. Die _Naturgeschichte_,\nworan es uns noch fast g\u00e4nzlich fehlt, w\u00fcrde uns die Ver\u00e4nderung der\nErdgestalt, imgleichen die der Erdgesch\u00f6pfe (Pflanzen und Thiere), die\nsie durch nat\u00fcrliche Wanderungen (sic! I take it as a misprint for\n_Wandelungen_) erlitten haben, und ihre daraus entsprungenen Abartungen\nvon dem Urbilde der Stammgattung lehren. Sie w\u00fcrde vermuthlich eine\ngrosse Menge scheinbar verschiedener Arten zu Racen ebenderselben\nGattung zur\u00fcckf\u00fchren, und das jetzt so weitl\u00e4uftigte Schulsystem der\nNaturbeschreibung in ein physisches System f\u00fcr den Verstand verwandeln.\n\n[95] The original of the first sentence reads: \u201cEs ist \u00fcberall nichts in\nder Welt, ja \u00fcberhaupt auch ausser derselben zu denken m\u00f6glich, was ohne\nEinschr\u00e4nkung f\u00fcr gut k\u00f6nnte gehalten werden, als allein ein guter Wille.\u201d\n\n[96] _Italics are ours._\n\n[97] The phrase \u201cwe take it for granted\u201d (in the original \u201cnehmen wir es\nals Grundsatz an)\u201d reads in the translation quoted by Mr. Spencer: \u201cwe\ntake it as a fundamental principle.\u201d Mr. Spencer objects to the passage\ndeclaring that there _are_ many organs (such as rudimentary organs) in\nthe construction of organized beings which serve _no_ purpose. This\nhowever does not stand in contradiction to Kant\u2019s assumption that organs\nof organized beings serve a special purpose. The rudimentary organs have\nunder other conditions served a purpose for which they then were fit and\nwell adapted and are disappearing now because no longer used.\n\n[98] Das moralische Sollen ist also ein eigenes nothwendiges Wollen als\nGliedes einer intelligiblen Welt, und wird nur sofern von ihm als Sollen\ngedacht, als er sich zugleich wie ein Glied der Sinnenwelt betrachtet.\nEd. Hartenstein vol. IV. p. 303.\n\n[99] The passage referred to is quoted in full on page 16.\n\n[100] Slightly altered from B. W. BALL\u2019S translation in THE OPEN COURT,\np. 83.\n\n\n\n\nKANT ON EVOLUTION.\n\nIN CRITICISM OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER\u2019S PRESENTATION OF KANTISM.\n\n\nIt is very strange that Mr. Herbert Spencer will again and again attack\nthe philosophy and ethics of Kant for views which Kant never held.[101]\nIt is possible that there are disciples of Kant who deny the theory of\nevolution. Yet it is certain that Kant himself is not guilty of this\nmistake. Thinkers who reject the theory of evolution are in this respect\nas little entitled to call themselves disciples of Kant as, for instance,\nthe Sadducees were to call themselves followers of Christ. Kantian\nphilosophy was foremost in the recognition of the need of evolution, and\nthat at a time when public interest was not as yet centered upon it.\n\nMr. Spencer\u2019s merits in the propagation of the theory of evolution are\nundeniable, and he deserves our warmest respect and thanks for the\nindefatigable zeal he has shown in the performance of this great work,\nfor the labors he has undergone, and the sacrifices he has made for it.\nYet recognising all that Mr. Spencer has done, we should not be blind to\nthe fact that Kant\u2019s conception of evolution is even at the present day\nmore in conformity with the facts of natural science than Mr. Spencer\u2019s\nphilosophy, although the latter commonly goes by the name of the\nphilosophy of evolution.\n\nIt is painful to note that in many places where Mr. Spencer refers to\nKant\u2019s philosophy, he does it slightingly, as though Kant were one of the\nmost irrational of thinkers. Kant\u2019s reasoning is denounced as \u201cabnormal\u201d\nand \u201cvicious.\u201d I find such phrases as, \u201cIt is a vice of Kant\u2019s\nphilosophy ...,\u201d \u201cIf Kant had known more of Man than he did ...,\u201d etc.\nMr. Spencer characterises Kant\u2019s method as follows:\n\n \u201cInstead of setting out with a proposition of which the\n negative is inconceivable, it sets out with a proposition of\n which the affirmation is inconceivable, and proceeds to draw\n conclusions therefrom.\u201d\n\nThese attacks of Mr. Spencer on Kant are not justifiable. Kant is not\nguilty of the faults for which he is arraigned by Mr. Spencer.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt is, however, fair to state that these misunderstandings appear\nexcusable if the difficulties are borne in mind with which the English\nstudent of Kant is confronted. First, Kant cannot be understood without\ntaking into consideration the historical development of his philosophy,\nand, secondly, most translations of the fundamental terms, he employs,\nare so misleading that errors can scarcely be avoided.\n\nKant\u2019s philosophy is by no means a perfected system; it rather represents\n(as perhaps necessarily all philosophies do) the development of a\nthinker\u2019s mind. The \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d especially shows traces\nof the state of Kant\u2019s mind at different periods, and thus it is that\nwe discover passages which closely considered will be found to be\ncontradictory. When reading this remarkable work we feel like travelers\nwalking over the petrified relics of a powerful eruption. There are\nstrata of ideas of the oldest formation close to the thoughts of a recent\ndate. There are also vestiges of intermediate phases. Here they stand\nin the petrification of printed words, peacefully side by side, as\nmemorials of a great revolution in the development of human thought. It\nis this state of things which more than anything else makes of Kant\u2019s\nwritings such difficult reading. At the same time it is obvious that we\ncannot simply take the results of Kant\u2019s philosophy; we must follow him\nin the paths by which he arrived at any given proposition.\n\nThere is no philosopher that has been worse misinterpreted than Kant;\nand the English interpreters of Kant have succeeded in mutilating his\nbest thoughts so that this hero of progress appears as a stronghold of\nantiquated views. Mistranslations or misconceptions of his terms are\nto a great extent the cause of this singular fate. As an instance we\nmention the errors that attach to Kant\u2019s term _Anschauung_. _Anschauung_\nis the present object of our senses; it is the impression a man has\nfrom looking at a thing and might have been translated by \u201cperception\u201d\nor perhaps \u201csensation.\u201d It is usually translated by \u201cintuition.\u201d The\n_Anschauung_ of objects comprises the data of knowledge, and they are\nprevious to our reflection upon them. An intuition in the sense of the\nEnglish Intuitionalists is defined as \u201ca presentation which can be\ngiven previously to all thought,\u201d yet this presentation is supposed\nto be a kind of revelation, a knowledge that comes to us without our\ncontemplation, a cognition the character of which is immediate as well as\nmysterious; in short something that is supernatural.\n\nHow different is Kant\u2019s philosophy, for instance, if his position\nwith reference to time and space is mistaken! \u201cTime and Space are our\n_Anschauung_,\u201d Kant says. But his English translators declare: \u201cKant\nmaintained that space and time are intuitions.\u201d What a difference it\nmakes if intuition is interpreted in the sense applied to it by the\nEnglish Intuitionalist School instead of its being taken in the original\nmeaning of the word _Anschauung_.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAny one who knows Kant through Mr. Spencer\u2019s representations only, must\nlook upon him as having the most perverse mind that could possibly\nexist; and yet it is Kant from whom Spencer has indirectly derived the\nmost characteristic feature of his philosophy. What is Mr. Spencer\u2019s\nagnosticism but a popularisation of Kant\u2019s view that things in themselves\nare unknowable?\n\nWe conclude from the animosity which Mr. Spencer shows toward Kant that\nhe does not know how much in this respect he agrees with Kant, how much\nhe has unconsciously imbibed from the _Zeitgeist_ which in part was\nformed under the influence of this huge error of the great philosopher.\n\nI feel confident that any clear thinker who studies Kant and arrives\nalong with him at the \u201cthing in itself\u201d will soon free himself from this\nerror of Kantian thought. Kant himself suggests to us the method by which\nwe are to find the way out of agnosticism. As a proof I quote the views\nof two independent thinkers; both influenced by Kant\u2019s criticism but\nneither a blind follower. Professor Mach says:\n\n \u201cI have always felt it as a special good fortune, that early\n in my life, at about the age of fifteen, I happened to find\n in the library of my father Kant\u2019s \u2018Prolegomena to Any\n Future Metaphysic.\u2019 The book made at that time a powerful,\n ineffaceable impression upon me that I never afterwards\n experienced to the same degree in any of my philosophical\n reading. Some two or three years later I suddenly discovered\n the superfluous r\u00f4le that \u2018the thing in itself\u2019 plays.\u201d _The\n Monist_, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 65 and 66.\n\nAnd Schiller guided by similar considerations says in one of his Xenions:\n\n \u201cSince Metaphysics, of late, without heirs to her fathers was gathered:\n Under the hammer are now \u2018things in themselves\u2019 to be sold.\u201d\n\nThe latest attack of Mr. Spencer upon Kantism is in the article \u201cOur\nSpace-Consciousness,\u201d in _Mind_, written in reply to Professor Watson.\nMr. Spencer there repeats his misconception of Kantism, so that I feel\nurged to utter a few words of protest against his gross misrepresentation\nof Kant\u2019s views. I shall confine myself mainly to quotations from Kant\u2019s\nworks\u2014and the passages quoted will speak for themselves. Should there\nindeed be any disciples of Kant who are, as Mr. Spencer says, \u201cprofoundly\naverse to that evolutionary view which contemplates mind as having had a\ngenesis conforming to laws like those conformed to by the genesis of the\nbody,\u201d these quotations will suffice to prove that they have misconstrued\nthe views of their master. Philosophers hostile to the theory of\nevolution had better select another patron for their ideas. Kant is too\nradical a mind to protect those men who in the domains of thought give\nthe signal for retreat.\n\nMr. Spencer adopted the evolution theory as it was presented by Von Baer,\nwho explains \u201c_Entwickelung_\u201d as a progress from the homogeneous to the\nheterogeneous.\n\nBaer\u2019s \u201cDevelopmental History of Animals\u201d was published in 1828. Mr.\nSpencer adopted the theory in 1854. But the history of the theory of\nevolution is older than Von Baer\u2019s book. Professor Baer concludes\nhis work with a few corollaries among which near the end we find the\nfollowing passage:\n\n \u201cIf we survey the contents of the whole Scholia, there\n follows from them a general result. We found that the effect\n of generation continues to advance from a part to a whole\n [Schol. 2.]; that in development, self-dependence increases\n in correspondence with its environment [Schol. 2.], as well as\n the determinateness of its structure [Schol. 1.]; that in the\n internal development special parts shape themselves forth from\n the more general, and their differentiation increases [Schol.\n 3.]; that the individual, as the possessor of a fixed organic\n form, changes by degrees from more general forms into more\n special [Schol. 5.].\n\n \u201cThe general result of our inquiry and consideration can now\n well be declared as follows:\n\n \u201cThat the developmental history of the individual is the\n history of increasing individuality in every relation; that\n is, Individualisation.\n\n \u201cThis general conclusion is, indeed, so plain, that it needs\n no proof from observation, but seems evident _a priori_. But\n we believe that this evidentness is merely the stamp of truth,\n and therefore is its guarantee. Had the history of development\n from the outset been perceived as just expressed, it could and\n should have been inferred, that the individual of a determinate\n animal type attains to this by changing from a general into\n a special form. But experience teaches everywhere, that\n deductions are always safer if their results are discovered\n beforehand by observation. Mankind would have obtained a still\n greater intellectual possession than it really has, had this\n been otherwise.\n\n \u201cBut if this general conclusion has truth and contents, it is\n _one fundamental idea_ which runs through all forms and degrees\n of animal development, and governs every single relation. It is\n the same idea that collected in space the distributed particles\n into spheres and united them in solar systems; which caused the\n disintegrated dust on the surface of our metallic planet to\n grow up into living forms; but this idea is nothing else than\n life itself, and the words and syllables in which it expresses\n itself, are the different forms of life.\u201d\n\nThese corollaries were not inserted by Baer because he intended to\nproclaim a new truth, but simply to excite a popular interest in a\nstrictly scientific work, in order to extend the circle of its readers.\nBaer says in the preface:\n\n \u201cSo much about the first part. In order to procure for the\n work readers and buyers, I have added a second part in which\n I make some general remarks under the title of Scholia and\n Corollaries. They are intended to be sketches of the confession\n of my scientific faith concerning the development of animals,\n as it was formed from the observation of the chick and by other\n investigations.\u201d\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe \u201cEncyclop\u00e6dia Britannica\u201d says of Baer that he \u201cprepared the way for\nMr. Spencer\u2019s generalisation of the law of organic evolution as the law\nof all evolution.\u201d[102]\n\nBaer declares that individualisation is \u201cthe one fundamental idea that\ngoes through _all_ the forms of cosmic and animal development.\u201d The\ngenerality of the law of evolution is clearer in the language employed\nby Baer, in the full context of the Scholia than appears from the short\nstatement of the \u201cEncyclop\u00e6dia Britannica.\u201d Nevertheless it is clear\nenough in the quoted passage that Baer made a statement of universal\napplication. How can such a universal statement be made more general?\n\nWe must add here that Mr. Spencer and his disciples overvalue the\nimportance of generalisation. It is not the power of generalisation that\nmakes the philosopher and the scientist but the power of discrimination.\nThe habit of generalising whatever comes under our observation is very\ncommon among the uneducated and uncivilised, and almost nine tenths of\nhuman errors arise from unwarranted generalisations.\n\nIn Kant\u2019s time the interest in the theory of evolution was confined to a\nfew minds. It is well known that Goethe was one of its most enthusiastic\nsupporters.[103] In the middle of the eighteenth century there were\nthree views proposed to explain the origin and the development of\norganised beings: (1) Occasionalism, (2) the theory of Evolution, and\n(3) the theory of Epigenesis. Occasionalism maintained that God created\non each new occasion a new animal. The word evolution was used in a\ndifferent sense from that in which it is now understood: evolutionism, as\nmaintained by Bonnet, Haller, and others, was the view that the sperma\ncontained a very small specimen of the animal that was to grow from it.\nThe hen\u2019s egg was supposed to contain an excessively minute but complete\nchicken. The theory of epigenesis, however, propounded in 1759 by Caspar\nFriedrich Wolff in his \u201cTheoria Generationis,\u201d explained development\nby additional growth, and it is this theory of epigenesis which later\non, after the total defeat of the old evolutionism, was called (but\nimproperly) the evolution theory. The word \u201cevolution\u201d has thus again\nadmitted the erroneous idea of an unfolding.\n\nIn Kant\u2019s time the battle between the occasionalists, the evolutionists,\nand the adherents of the epigenesis theory was hot indeed; and Kant\nunquestionably gave preference to the epigenesis theory. The most\nimportant passage on the subject appears in his \u201cCritique of Judgment.\u201d\nIt is as follows:\n\n \u201cIf now the teleological principle of the generation of\n organised beings be accepted, as it would be, we can account\n for their internally adapted form either by _Occasionalism_\n or by _Prestabilism_.[104] According to the first, the\n supreme world-cause would, in agreement with its idea, on the\n occasion of every coition directly give the proper organic\n form to the material thereby blended; according to the second,\n it would have implanted into the original products of its\n designing wisdom merely the power by means of which an organic\n being produces its like and the species itself is constantly\n maintained and likewise the death of individuals is continually\n replaced by their own nature, which is operating at the same\n time for their destruction.\n\n \u201cIf we assume occasionalism for the production of organised\n beings, nature is thereby wholly discarded, and with it the use\n of reasoning in determining the possibility of such kinds of\n products; therefore, it cannot be supposed that this system is\n accepted by any one who has had to do with philosophy.\u201d\n\n \u201cAs to _Prestabilism_, it can proceed in a two-fold manner,\n namely, it considers every organic being produced by its like,\n either as the _educt_ or as the _product_ of the first. The\n system which considers generated beings as mere _educts_ is\n called that of _individual preformation_, or also the _theory\n of evolution_; that which makes generated beings _products_ is\n named the system of _epigenesis_. The latter can also be called\n a system of _generic preformation_, because the productive\n power of those generating was virtually preformed to agree with\n the internal adapted arrangements that fell to the lot of their\n race. The opposing theory to this view should be named that\n of individual preformation, or still better, the _theory of\n evolution_.\u201d\n\n \u201cThe defenders of the theory of evolution, who exempt each\n individual from the formative power of nature, in order to\n derive the same directly from the hand of the Creator, would\n not dare to permit this to happen in accordance with the\n hypothesis of occasionalism, so that coition would be a mere\n formality, a supreme national world-cause having decided to\n form every particular f\u0153tus by direct interference, and to\n resign to the mother only its development and nourishment.\n They declared themselves in favor of preformation, _as though\n it were not the same to make the required forms arise in a\n supernatural manner at the beginning of the world, as during\n its progress_; and as if a great multitude of supernatural\n arrangements would not rather be dispensed with through\n occasional creation which were necessary in order that the\n embryo formed at the beginning of the world should, throughout\n the long period up to its development, not suffer from the\n destructive forces of nature, but endure and maintain itself\n intact; moreover, an immensely greater number of such preformed\n beings would be made than ever would be developed, and with\n them as many creations be thus rendered unnecessary and\n purposeless. They still, however, resign at least something to\n nature, in order not to fall in with complete hyperphysics,\n which can dispense with explanation from nature. They still\n held fast indeed, to their hyperphysics; even finding in\n monsters (which it must be impossible to regard as designs\n of nature) cases of adaptation which call for admiration,\n although the only purpose of that adaptedness might be to make\n an anatomist take offence at it as a purposeless adaptedness,\n and have a sense of melancholy admiration. Yet they could\n not well fit the generation of hybrids into the system of\n preformation, but were obliged still further to endow the sperm\n of male creatures with a designedly acting power, whereas they\n had otherwise accorded it nothing except mechanical force to\n serve as the first means of nourishment of the embryo; yet\n this designedly acting force, in the case of the products of\n generation between two creatures of the same kind, they would\n grant to neither of them.\n\n \u201cIf on the contrary the great advantage was not at once\n recognised which the theory of epigenesis possessed over the\n former in view of the experimental foundation on which the\n proof of it rested; yet reason would be especially favorably\n predisposed from the outset for this mode, of explanation,\n inasmuch as it regards nature\u2014with reference to the things\n which originally can be conceived as possible only in\n accordance with the theory of causality and design, at least\n so far as propagation is concerned\u2014as self-producing and\n not merely as developing, and thus with the least possible\n employment of the supernatural, leaves all that comes\n afterwards, from the very beginning on, to nature: without\n concerning itself with the original beginning, with regard to\n the explanation of which physics in general miscarries, try\n with what chain of causes it may.\u201d\n\nKant recognises neither the stability of species nor any fixed limits\nbetween them. And this one maxim alone suffices to prove that he was\nof the same opinion as the great biologist who wrote the \u201cOrigin of\nSpecies.\u201d Kant says (Ed. Hart. III. p. 444):\n\n \u201c_Non datur vacuum formarum_, that is, there are not different\n original and primitive species, which were, so to say, isolated\n and separated by an empty space from one another, but all the\n manifold species are only divisions of a single, chief, and\n general species; and from this principle results again this\n immediate inference: _datur continuum formarum_, that is, all\n differences of species border on each other, and allow no\n transition to one another by a leap, but only through very\n small degrees of difference, by which we can arrive at one\n from another; in one word, there are no species or sub-species\n which, according to reason, would be _next_ each other in\n affinity, but intermediate species are always possible, whose\n difference from the first and second is less than their\n difference from one another.\u201d\n\nIn Kant\u2019s \u201cCritique of Judgment\u201d (\u00a7. 80) we find the following passage:\n\n \u201cThe agreement of so many species of animals, with reference\n to a definite, common scheme, which appears not only to be\n at the foundation of their bony structure, but also of the\n arrangement of their other parts, in which, by abridgment of\n one and prolongation of another, by envelopment of this and\n unfolding of that, a wonderful simplicity of plan has been able\n to produce so great a diversity of species\u2014this agreement casts\n a ray of hope, although a weak one, in the mind, that here,\n indeed, something might be accomplished with the principle of\n the mechanism of nature, without which in general there can be\n no physical science.\n\n \u201cThis analogy of forms, so far as they appear, notwithstanding\n all their diversity, to be produced after the model of a common\n prototype, strengthens the conjecture of a real relationship\n between the same by generation from a common ancestral\n source, through the gradual approach of one animal species to\n another, from man, in whom the principle of design appears\n to be best proved, to the polyp, from this to the moss and\n lichen, and finally to the lowest stage of nature perceptible\n to us, to crude matter, from which and its forces, according\n to mechanical laws (like those which work in the production\n of crystals), the whole technic of nature (which is so\n incomprehensible to us in organised beings that we imagine\n another principle is necessitated for their explanation)\n appears to be derived.[105]\n\n \u201cThe Arch\u00e6ologist of nature is now free to make that great\n family of beings (for such we must conceive it, if the\n uninterrupted relationship is to have a foundation) arise out\n of the extant vestiges of the oldest revolutions, following\n every mechanism known to him or which he can suppose.\u201d\n\nKant adds in a foot-note:\n\n \u201cAn hypothesis of such a kind can be named a daring venture of\n reason, and there may be few of the most sagacious naturalists,\n through whose minds it has not sometimes passed. For it is not\n absurd, as the _generatio equivoca_, by which is understood\n the production of an organised being through the mechanical\n action of crude unorganised matter. But it would still be\n _generatio univoca_ in the common understanding of the word,\n in so far only as something organic was produced out of\n another organic body, although specifically distinguished\n from it; for instance, if certain aquatic animals by and by\n formed into amphibia, and from these after some generations\n into land animals. _A priori_ this does not contradict the\n judgment of pure reason. Only experience shows no example\n thereof; according to it, rather, all generation which we know\n is _generatio homonyma_ (not mere _univoca_ in opposition to\n production out of unorganised material), that is, the bringing\n forth of a product homogeneous in organisation, with the\n generator; and _generatio heteronyma_, so far as our actual\n experience of nature goes is nowhere met with.\u201d\n\nThe treatise \u201cPresumable Origin of Humanity,\u201d Kant sums up in the\nfollowing sentence:\n\n \u201cFrom this representation of the earliest human history it\n results, that the departure of man from what, as the first\n abode of his kind, his judgment represented as Paradise, was\n no other than the transition of mere animal creatures out of\n barbarism into man, out of the leading-strings of instinct into\n the guidance of reason, in a word, out of the guardianship of\n nature into the state of freedom.\u201d\n\nIn his work \u201cUpon the Different Races of Mankind,\u201d Kant discusses the\norigin of the species of man in a way which would do honor to a follower\nof Darwin. It is written in a spirit which recognises the difference of\nconditions as the causes that produce different species. We select a few\npassages from this work.\n\nIn a foot-note we read:\n\n \u201cOrdinarily we accept the terms natural science\n (_Naturbeschreibung_) and natural history in one and the\n same sense. But it is evident that the knowledge of natural\n phenomena, as they _now are_, always leaves to be desired\n the knowledge of that which they _have been_ before now, and\n through what succession of modifications they have passed in\n order to have arrived, in every respect, at their present\n state. _Natural History_, which at present we almost entirely\n lack, would teach us the changes that have effected the form\n of the earth, likewise, the changes in the creatures of the\n earth (plants and animals) that they have suffered by natural\n transformations and, arising therefrom, the departures from the\n prototype of the original species that they have experienced.\n It would probably trace a great number of apparently different\n varieties back to a species of one and the same kind, and would\n convert the present so intricate school-system of Natural\n Science into a natural system in conformity with reason.\u201d\n\nWe adduce another passage, no less remarkable in clearness, which proves\nthat Kant has a very definite idea, not only of the gradual evolution of\nman, but also of the survival of the fittest:\n\n \u201cThe cry which a child scarcely born utters, has not the tone\n of misery, but of irritation, and violent rage; not the result\n of pain, but of vexation about something; probably for the\n reason that it wishes to move itself and feels its incapacity,\n like a captive when freedom is taken from him. What purpose\n can nature have in providing that a child shall come with a\n loud cry into the world, which for it and the mother is, in the\n _rude natural state_, full of danger? Since a wolf, a pig even,\n would in the absence of the mother, or through her feebleness\n owing to her delivery, be thus attracted to devour it. But\n no animal except man as he now is announces with noise its\n new-born existence; which in the wisdom of nature appears to\n be arranged _in order that the species shall be preserved_. We\n must also assume that in what was an early epoch of nature for\n this class of animals (namely in the period of barbarism) this\n outcry of the child at its birth did not exist; consequently\n only later on a second epoch appeared, after both parents had\n arrived at that degree of civilisation which was required for\n home-life; yet without knowing how and by what interweaving\n causes nature arranges such a development. This remark leads us\n far; for example, to the thought whether after the same epoch,\n still a third did not follow accompanied by great natural\n revolutions, during which an orang-outang or a chimpanzee\n perfected the organs which serve for walking, for feeling\n objects, and for speech, and thus evolved the limb-structure of\n man; in which animals was contained an organ for the exercise\n of the function of reason, which by social cultivation was\n gradually perfected and developed.\u201d\n\nKant\u2019s view concerning the origin of the biped man from quadruped animal\nancestors is most unequivocally stated.\n\nIn a review of Dr. Moscati\u2019s Lecture upon the difference of structure in\nanimals and in men, Kant says:\n\n \u201cDr. Moscati proves that the upright walk of man is constrained\n and unnatural; that he is indeed so constructed that he may\n be able to maintain and move in this position, but that,\n although by needful and constant habit he formed himself thus,\n inconvenience and disease arise therefrom, which sufficiently\n prove, that he was misled by reason and imitation to deviate\n from the first animal arrangement. Man is not constructed\n internally different from other animals that go on all fours.\n When now he raises himself his intestines, particularly\n the embryo of pregnant individuals, come into a pendulous\n situation and a half reversed condition, which, if it often\n alternates with the lying position or that on all-fours, cannot\n precisely produce specially evil consequences, but, by constant\n continuance, causes deformities and numerous diseases. Thus,\n for example, the heart, because it is compelled to hang free,\n elongates the blood vessels to which it is attached, assumes\n an oblique position since it is supported by the diaphragm and\n slides with its end against the left side\u2014a position wherein\n man, especially at full growth, differs from all other animals,\n and thereby receives an inevitable inclination to aneurism,\n palpitation, asthma, chest-dropsy, etc., etc. With the upright\n position of man the mesentery, pulled down by the weight of the\n intestines, sinks perpendicularly thereunder, is elongated and\n weakened, and prepared for numerous ruptures. In the mesenteric\n vein which has no valves, the blood moves slowly and with\n greater difficulty (it having to ascend against the course of\n gravity) than would happen with the horizontal position of the\n trunk....\u201d\n\n \u201cWe could add considerably to the reasons just adduced to\n show that our animal nature is really quadrupedal. Among all\n four-footed animals there is not a single one that could not\n swim if it accidentally fell into the water. Man alone drowns,\n except in cases where he has learned to swim. The reason is\n because he has laid aside the habit of going on all-fours; for\n it is by this motion that he would keep himself up in the water\n without the exercise of any art, and by which all four-footed\n creatures, who otherwise shun the water, swim....\u201d\n\n \u201cIt will be seen, accordingly, that the first care of nature\n was that man should be preserved as animal for _himself and\n his species_, and for that end the position best adapted to\n his internal structure, to the lay of the f\u0153tus, and to his\n preservation in danger, was the quadrupedal position; we see,\n moreover, that a germ of reason is placed in him, whereby,\n after the development of the same, he is destined for _social\n intercourse_, and by the aid of which he assumes the position\n which is in every case the most fitted for this, namely, the\n bipedal position,\u2014thus gaining upon the one hand infinite\n advantages over animals, but also being obliged to put up with\n many inconveniences that result from his holding his head so\n proudly above his old companions.\u201d\n\n[[106] In the double-leaded quotation on pages 43 and 44 Kant speaks\nabout the explanation of organised life from man down to the polyp\n\u201caccording to mechanical laws like those which work in the production\nof crystals,\u201d and he adds, in organised beings the whole technic of\nnature is so incomprehensible to us \u201cthat we imagine another principle is\nnecessitated for their explanation.\u201d\n\nThis \u201cother principle\u201d would be the principle of design, or the\nteleological explanation of phenomena. In his old age Kant inclined more\nto teleology than in his younger years, and it is for this reason that\nProfessor Ernst Haeckel accuses Kant of inconsistency.\n\nAfter having pointed out that \u201cKant is one of the few philosophers\nthat combine a well-founded knowledge of the natural sciences with\nextraordinary precision and depth of speculation\u201d and further that \u201che\nwas the first who taught \u2018the principle of the struggle for existence\u2019\nand \u2018the theory of selection.\u2019\u201d Haeckel says in his \u201cNat\u00fcrliche\nSch\u00f6pfungsgeschichte,\u201d 8th edition, p. 91:\n\n \u201cWir w\u00fcrden daher unbedingt in der Geschichte der\n Entwickelungslehre unserem gewaltigen K\u00f6nigsberger Philosophen\n den ersten Platz einr\u00e4umen m\u00fcssen, wenn nicht leider diese\n bewundernsw\u00fcrdigen monistischen Ideen des jungen Kant sp\u00e4ter\n durch den \u00fcberw\u00e4ltigenden Einfluss der dualistisch christlichen\n Weltanschauung ganz zur\u00fcckgedr\u00e4ngt worden w\u00e4ren.\u201d\n\nThis \u201cinfluence of the dualistic Christian world-conception\u201d is according\nto Haeckel, Kant\u2019s recognition of a teleological causation in the realm\nof organised life. Haeckel says on the same place:\n\n \u201cEr behauptet, dass sich im Gebiete der anorganischen Natur\n unbedingt s\u00e4mmtliche Erscheinungen aus mechanischen Ursachen,\n aus bewegenden Kr\u00e4ften der Materie selbst, erkl\u00e4ren lassen, im\n Gebiete der anorganischen Natur dagegen nicht.\u201d\n\nHaeckel does not stand alone in denouncing the old Kant. Schopenhauer\ndistinguishes between the author of the first and the author of the\nsecond edition of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d regarding the former\nonly as the real Kant. These accusations are not without foundation, but\nwe believe with Max M\u00fcller that they have been unduly exaggerated.\n\nAs to teleology for which Kant\u2019s preference appears to be more strongly\nmarked in his later than in his younger years we should say that it is\na problem that should, in an historical investigation, as to whether or\nnot Kant was a consistent evolutionist, be treated independently. No one\ncan deny that there is an adaptation to ends in the domain of organised\nlife. It is not so much required to deny teleology in the domain of\norganised nature as to purify and critically sift our views of teleology.\nThere is a kind of teleology which does not stand in contradiction to the\ncausation of efficient causes so called.\n\nMr. Spencer\u2019s denunciations of Kant would have some foundation, if he had\nreference to the old Kant alone. But everyone who censures Kant for the\nerrors of his later period is bound to qualify his statement, and indeed\nwhenever such strictures of Kantism appear I find them expressly stated\nas having reference to \u201cthe old Kant.\u201d\n\nThat Kant who is a living power even to-day is the young Kant, it is\nthe author of the first edition of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason.\u201d He is\ngenerally called \u201cthe young Kant,\u201d although he was not young; he was,\nas we say, in his best years. The old Kant who proclaimed that he \u201cmust\nabolish knowledge in order to make room for faith\u201d is a dead weight\nin our colleges and universities. The young Kant is positive, the old\nKant is agnostic. The young Kant was an investigator and naturalist of\nthe first degree; he gave an impetus to investigation that it had never\nbefore received from philosophy. The old Kant, I should not exactly say\nreverted but certainly, neglected the principles of his younger years\nand thus became the leader of a reactionary movement from which sprang\ntwo offshoots very unlike each other but children of the same father;\nthe Oxford transcendentalism as represented by Green and the English\nagnosticism as represented by Mr. Spencer.\n\nIt is strange that Mr. Spencer has so little knowledge concerning the\nevolution of the views he holds. If he were more familiar with the\nhistory of the idea \u201cthat the world-problem is insolvable,\u201d he would show\nmore reverence toward the old Kant and his mystical inclinations; for\nKant, whatever Mr. Spencer may say against it, is the father of modern\nagnosticism.[107]]\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe history of Mr. Spencer\u2019s philosophical development shows that the\nfirst idea which took possession of his mind and formed the centre of\ncrystalisation for all his later views was M. Condorcet\u2019s optimism.\nCondorcet believed in progress; he was convinced that in spite of all the\ntribulations and anxieties of the present, man would at last arrive at\na state of perfection. He saw a millennium in his prophetic mind, which\nalas!\u2014if the law of evolution be true\u2014can never be realised. Condorcet\ndied a martyr to his ideals. He poisoned himself in 1799 to escape death\nby the Guillotine.\n\nThe influence of Condorcet\u2019s work _Esquisse d\u2019un tableau historique\ndes progr\u00e8s de l\u2019esprit humain_ is traceable not only in Mr. Spencer\u2019s\nfirst book, \u201cSocial Statics,\u201d published in 1850, but in all his later\nwritings. How can a true evolutionist believe in the Utopia of a state\nof perfect adaptation? Does not each progress demand new adaptations?\nTake as an instance the change from walking on four feet to an upright\ngait. Did not this progress itself involve man in new difficulties, to\nwhich he had to adapt himself? Let a labor-saving machine be invented,\nhow many laborers lose their work and how many others are in demand! The\ntransition from one state to the other is not easy, and as soon as it is\nperfected new wants have arisen which inexorably drive humanity onward on\nthe infinite path of progress which can never be limited by any state of\nperfection. There is a constant readjustment necessary, and if we really\ncould reach a state of perfect adaptation human life would drop into the\nunconsciousness of mere reflex motions.\n\nAny one who understands the principle of evolution and its universal\napplicability, will recognise that there can be no standstill in the\nworld, no state of perfect adaptation. Our solar system has evolved, as\nKant explained in his \u201cGeneral Cosmogony and Theory of the Heavens,\u201d out\nof a nebula, and is going to dissolve again into a nebular state. So our\nsocial development consists in a constant realisation of ideals. We may\nthink that if we but attain our next and dearest ideal, humanity will be\nsatisfied forever. But as soon as we have realised that ideal, we quickly\nget accustomed to its benefits. It becomes a matter of course and another\nideal higher still than that just realised appears before our mental gaze.\n\nHerder, in his \u201cIdeas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind,\u201d not\nunlike Mr. Spencer, was also under the spell of the Utopian ideal, that\nhumanity will reach at last a state of perfect happiness. Kant, in his\nreview of Herder\u2019s book, discusses the relativity of happiness and its\ninsufficiency as a final aim of life. He says:\n\n \u201cFirst of all the happiness of an animal, then that of a\n child and of a youth, and lastly that of man! In all epochs\n of human history, as well as among all classes and conditions\n of the same epoch, that happiness has obtained which was in\n exact conformity with the individual\u2019s ideas and the degree\n of his habituation to the conditions amid which he was\n born and raised. Indeed, it is not even possible to form a\n comparison of the degree of happiness nor to give precedence\n to one class of men or to one generation over another....\n If this shadow-picture of happiness ... were the actual aim\n of Providence, every man would have the measure of his own\n happiness within him.... Does the author (Herder) think perhaps\n that, if the happy inhabitants of Otaheiti had never been\n visited by more civilised peoples and were ordained to live\n in peaceful indolence for thousands of years to come\u2014that we\n could give a satisfactory answer to the question why they\n should exist at all, and whether it would not have been just\n as well that this island should be occupied by happy sheep and\n cattle as that it should be inhabited by men who are happy only\n through pure enjoyment?\u201d\n\n \u201cIt involves no contradiction to say that no individual\n member of all the offspring of the human race, but that\n only the species, fully attains its mission (Bestimmung).\n The mathematician may explain the matter in his way. The\n philosopher would say: the mission of the human race as a whole\n is _unceasing progress_, and the perfection (Vollendung) of\n this mission is a mere idea (although in every aspect a very\n useful one) of the aim towards which, in conformity with the\n design of providence, we are to direct our endeavors.\u201d\n\nIt is indubitable that Kant\u2019s views of evolution agree better with the\npresent state of scientific investigation, than does Mr. Spencer\u2019s\nphilosophy, which has never been freed from Condorcet\u2019s ingenuous\noptimism. The assumption of a final state of perfection by absolute\nadaptation is irreconcilable with the idea of unceasing progress, which\nmust be true, if evolution is a universal law of nature.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[101] See Mr. Spencer\u2019s article in _Mind_, No. LIX, p. 313.\n\n[102] The passage in the _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_ on Baer runs as\nfollows:\n\n\u201cIn his _Entwickelungsgeschichte der Thiere_, p. 264, he distinctly tells\nus that the law of growing individuality is \u2018the fundamental thought\nwhich goes through all forms and degrees of animal development and all\nsingle relations. It is the same thought which collected in the cosmic\nspace solar systems; the same which caused the weather-beaten dust on\nthe surface of our metallic planet to spring forth living beings.\u2019 Von\nBaer thus prepared the way for Mr. Spencer\u2019s generalisation of the law of\norganic evolution as the law of all evolution.\u201d\n\n[103] See Haeckel, _Goethe on Evolution_, No. 131 of _The Open Court_.\n\n[104] _Pr\u00e6stabilismus_, that is, the theory that the phenomena of nature\nare the result of pre-established law.\n\n[105] The proposition that Kant is no easy reading found an unexpected\nand strong opposition. Immediately after the publication of this article,\nSept. 4th, 1890, Mr. Charles S. Peirce made the following incidental\nremark in a letter to the author dated Sept. 6th, 1890: \u201cI have heard\ntoo much of Kant\u2019s being hard reading. I think he is one of the easiest\nof philosophers; for he generally knows what he wants to say, which is\nmore than half the battle, and he says it in terms which are very clear.\nOf course, it is quite absurd to try to read Kant without preliminary\nstudies of Leibnizian and English philosophers, as well as of the\nterminology of which Kant\u2019s is a modification or transmogrification. But\nthere is a way of making out what he meant, while such writers as Hume\nand J. S. Mill, the more you study them the more they puzzle you.\u201d\n\n[106] This passage on pages 48, 49, and 50 which is enclosed in brackets\ndid not appear in _The Open Court_. It has been added since and is\npublished here for the first time.\n\n[107] In this connection we call attention to a book, _Kant und Darwin,\nein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Entwickelungslehre_, Jena, 1875, by Fritz\nSchultze, formerly Privat docent in Jena, now Professor of philosophy at\nthe Polytechnic Institute in Dresden. This little book is a collection\nof the most important passages of Kant\u2019s views concerning evolution,\nthe struggle for existence, and the theory of selection, and it is\nastonishing to find how much Kant had to say on the subject and how\nstrongly he agrees with and anticipates Darwin. If Kant had not lived\nbefore Darwin one might be tempted to conclude that he was familiar with\nhis _Origin of Species_ and _The Descent of Man_.","title":"The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892 : $b A quarterly magazine","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":286893}