{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_76881/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_76881","id":"gutenberg_76881","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/76881","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Journals","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Philosophy -- Periodicals"],"text":"THE MONIST\n\n A\n QUARTERLY MAGAZINE\n\n VOL. III.\n\n CHICAGO:\n THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.\n 1892-1893\n\n COPYRIGHT, 1893,\n BY\n THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS OF VOLUME III.\n\n\n PAGE\n\n ARTICLES.\n\n Auta, The Doctrine of. By C. Lloyd Morgan 161\n\n Cruelty and Pity in Woman. By Guillaume Ferrero 220\n\n Doctrine of Auta, The. By C. Lloyd Morgan 161\n\n Education, Nationalisation of, and the Universities. By H. von\n Holst 493\n\n Evolutionary Love. By Charles S. Peirce 176\n\n Foundations of Theism, The. By E. D. Cope 623\n\n Founder of Tychism, The: His Methods, Philosophy, and Criticisms.\n Editor 571\n\n Fourth Dimension, The By Hermann Schubert 402\n\n Hindu Monism. By Richard Garbe 51\n\n Insects, The Nervous Ganglia of. By Alfred Binet 35\n\n Intuition and Reason. By Christine Ladd Franklin 211\n\n Issues of \u201cSynechism,\u201d The. By G. M. McCrie 380\n\n Love, Evolutionary. By Charles S. Peirce 176\n\n Man\u2019s Glassy Essence. By Charles S. Peirce 1\n\n Meaning and Metaphor. By Lady Victoria Welby 510\n\n Mental Mummies. By Felix L. Oswald 30\n\n Modern Science, Religion and. By F. Jodl 329\n\n Monism, Hindu. By Richard Garbe 51\n\n Nationalisation of Education and the Universities. By H. von Holst 493\n\n Necessitarians, Reply to the. By Charles S. Peirce 526\n\n Necessity, The Idea of: Its Basis and Its Scope. Editor 68\n\n Necessity, The Superstition of. By John Dewey 362\n\n Panbiotism, Panpsychism and. Editor 234\n\n Panpsychism and Panbiotism. Editor 234\n\n Reason, Intuition and. By Christine Ladd Franklin 211\n\n Religion and Modern Science. By F. Jodl 329\n\n Religion of Science, The. Editor 352\n\n Renan: A Discourse Given at South Place Chapel, London. By Moncure\n D. Conway 201\n\n Reply to the Necessitarians. By Charles S. Peirce 526\n\n Science, The Religion of. Editor 352\n\n Superstition of Necessity, The. By John Dewey 362\n\n \u201cSynechism,\u201d The Issues of. By G. M. McCrie 380\n\n Theism, The Foundations of. By E. D. Cope 623\n\n Thought in America, The Future of. By E. D. Cope 23\n\n Tychism, The Founder of: His Methods, Philosophy, and Criticisms.\n Editor 571\n\n Universities, Nationalisation of Education and the. By H. von Holst 493\n\n Woman, Cruelty and Pity in. By Guillaume Ferrero 220\n\n LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.\n\n France. By Lucien Arr\u00e9at 111, 258\n\n France, The Religious Outlook in. By Theodore Stanton 450\n\n Germany. By Christian Ufer 264, 640\n\n New French Books. By Lucien Arr\u00e9at 456\n\n Recent Evolutionary Studies in Germany. By Carus Sterne 97\n\n CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.\n\n A Letter from Mr. Herbert Spencer 272\n\n Comte and Turgot. By Louis Belrose, Jr. 118\n\n Is Monism Arbitrary? Editor 124\n\n James\u2019s Psychology, Observations on Some Points of. By W. L.\n Worcester 285\n\n Logic as Relation Lore. By F. C. Russell 272\n\n Mathematics a Description of Operations with Pure Forms. Editor 133\n\n Reply to a Critic, A. By Edward T. Dixon 127\n\n Sensation, Prof. Ernst Mach\u2019s Term 298\n\n Some Remarks Upon Professor James\u2019s Discussion of Attention. By\n Hiram M. Stanley 122\n\n BOOK REVIEWS.\n\n _Acht Abhandlungen, Herrn Professor Dr. Karl Ludwig Michelet zum\n 90. Geburtstag_ 478\n\n Arr\u00e9at, Lucien. _Psychologie du Peintre_ 142\n\n Baets, l\u2019Abb\u00e9 Maurice de. _L\u2019\u00e9cole d\u2019anthropologie criminelle_ 649\n\n Becker, George F. _Finite Homogeneous Strain, Flow, and Rupture\n of Rocks_ 480\n\n Berendt, M. and J. Friedl\u00e4nder. _Der Pessimismus im Lichte einer\n h\u00f6heren Weltauffassung_ 477\n\n Binet, Alfred. _Les Alt\u00e9rations de la Personnalit\u00e9_ 145\n\n Blackwell, Antoinette Brown. _The Philosophy of Individuality, or\n the One and the Many_ 649\n\n Cattell, James McKeen, and George Stuart Fullerton. _On the\n Perception of Small Differences_ 141\n\n Delb\u0153uf, J. _L\u2019Hypnotisme devant les Chambres Legislatives Belges_ 318\n\n Dessoir, Max. _Ueber den Hautsinn_ 319\n\n Dixon, Edward T. _An Essay on Reasoning_ 138\n\n Dreher, Eugen. _Der Materialismus, eine Verirrung des menschlichen\n Geistes, widerlegt durch eine zeitgem\u00e4sse Weltanschauung_ 479\n\n Edinger, L. _Vergleichend-entwickelungsgeschichtliche und\n anatomische Studien im Bereiche der Hirnanatomie. 3.\n Riechapparat und Ammonshorn_ 648\n\n Engel, Gustav. _Die Philosophie und die sociale Frage_ 478\n\n Eucken, Rudolf. _Die Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart_ 650\n\n Friedl\u00e4nder, J. and M. Berendt. _Der Pessimismus im Lichte einer\n h\u00f6heren Weltauffassung_ 477\n\n Fullerton, George Stuart, and James McKeen Cattel. _On the\n Perception of Small Differences_ 141\n\n George, Henry. _A Perplexed Philosopher_ 482\n\n Gutberlet, Constantin. _Die Willensfreiheit und ihre Gegner_ 646\n\n Hiller, H. Croft. _Against Dogma and Free-Will_ 649\n\n Hirth, Georges. _Physiologie de L\u2019Art_ 143\n\n Holtzmann, Heinrich Julius. _Hand-Commentar zum neuen Testament.\n IV. Evangelium, Briefe und Offenbarung des Johannes_ 643\n\n Holtzmann, Heinrich Julius. _Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen\n Einleitung in das neue Testament_ 150\n\n Janet, Pierre. _\u00c9tat mental des hyst\u00e9riques les stigmates mentaux_ 648\n\n Jo\u00ebl, Karl. _Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates_ 480\n\n Jones, E. E. Constance. _An Introduction to General Logic_ 314\n\n Lindemann, Ferdinand. _Vorlesungen \u00fcber Geometrie_ 314\n\n Lotze, Hermann. _Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion_ 140\n\n Lubbock, John. _The Beauties of Nature_ 323\n\n Meynert, Theodore. _Sammlung von popul\u00e4r-wissenschaftlichen\n Vortr\u00e4gen \u00fcber den Bau und die Leistungen des Gehirns_ 151\n\n Mik, J. _Graber\u2019s Leitfaden der Zoologie f\u00fcr die oberen Classen\n der Mittelschulen_ 322\n\n M\u00fcnsterberg, Hugo. _Beitr\u00e4ge zur experimentellen Psychologie_ 304\n\n Oelzelt-Newin, Anton. _Ueber sittliche Dispositionen_ 323\n\n Offner, Max. _Ueber die Grundformen der Vorstellungsverbindung_ 479\n\n Paszkowski, Wilhelm. _Wie steht es jetzt mit der Philosophie, und\n was haben wir von ihr zu hoffen?_ 478\n\n Paulsen, Friedrich. _Einleitung in die Philosophie_ 466\n\n Rolfes, Eugen. _Die Aristotelische Auffassung vom Verh\u00e4ltnisse\n Gottes zur Welt und zum Menschen_ 311\n\n Royce, Josiah. _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy_ 306\n\n Royer, Cl\u00e9mence. _Recherches d\u2019optique physiologique et physique_ 320\n\n Salter, William M. _First Steps in Philosophy_ 470\n\n Schellwien, Robert. _Max Stirner und Friedrich Nietzsche_ 311\n\n Schmidt, Johannes. _Die Urheimath der Indogermanen und das\n europ\u00e4ische Zahlsystem_ 149\n\n Schmidkunz, Hans. _Der Hypnotismus in gemeinfasslicher Darstellung_ 317\n\n Sharp, Frank Chapman. _The \u00c6sthetic Element in Morality_ 650\n\n Sidgwick, Alfred. _Distinction and the Criticism of Beliefs_ 312\n\n Spencer, Herbert. _Social Statics and Justice_ 136\n\n Sterne, Carus. _Natur und Kunst_ 323\n\n Topinard, Paul. _L\u2019Homme dans la Nature_ 146\n\n Topinard, Paul. _L\u2019Anthropologie du Bengale_ 322\n\n Tufts, James Hayden. _The Sources of Development of Kant\u2019s\n Teleology_ 312\n\n Verworn, Max. _Die Bewegung der lebendigen Substanz_ 321\n\n Williams, C. M. _A Review of the Systems of Ethics Founded on\n the Theory of Evolution_ 474\n\n Wundt, Wilhelm. _Vorlesungen \u00fcber die Menschen- und Thierseele_ 300\n\n Wundt, Wilhelm. _Hypnotismus und Suggestion_ 315\n\n Wundt, Wilhelm. _Grundz\u00fcge der physiologischen Psychologie_ 648\n\n PERIODICALS 153-160; 325-328; 488-492; 651-658.\n\n APPENDIX.\n\n Plates belonging to the article \u201cThe Nervous Ganglia of Insects.\u201d\n (In No. 1 of this volume.)\n\n\n\n\n VOL. III. OCTOBER, 1892. NO. 1.\n\n THE MONIST.\n\n\n\n\nMAN\u2019S GLASSY ESSENCE.\n\n\nIn _The Monist_ for January, 1891, I tried to show what conceptions\nought to form the brick and mortar of a philosophical system. Chief\namong these was that of absolute chance for which I argued again in last\nApril\u2019s number.[1] In July, I applied another fundamental idea, that of\ncontinuity, to the law of mind. Next in order, I have to elucidate, from\nthe point of view chosen, the relation between the psychical and physical\naspects of a substance.\n\nThe first step towards this ought, I think, to be the framing of\na molecular theory of protoplasm. But before doing that, it seems\nindispensable to glance at the constitution of matter, in general. We\nshall, thus, unavoidably make a long detour; but, after all, our pains\nwill not be wasted, for the problems of the papers that are to follow in\nthe series will call for the consideration of the same question.\n\nAll physicists are rightly agreed the evidence is overwhelming which\nshows all sensible matter is composed of molecules in swift motion and\nexerting enormous mutual attractions, and perhaps repulsions, too.\nEven Sir William Thomson, Lord Kelvin, who wishes to explode action at\na distance and return to the doctrine of a plenum, not only speaks of\nmolecules, but undertakes to assign definite magnitudes to them. The\nbrilliant Judge Stallo, a man who did not always rightly estimate his\nown qualities in accepting tasks for himself, declared war upon the\natomic theory in a book well worth careful perusal. To the old arguments\nin favor of atoms which he found in Fechner\u2019s monograph, he was able to\nmake replies of considerable force, though they were not sufficient to\ndestroy those arguments. But against modern proofs he made no headway\nat all. These set out from the mechanical theory of heat. Rumford\u2019s\nexperiments showed that heat is not a substance. Joule demonstrated that\nit was a form of energy. The heating of gases under constant volume, and\nother facts instanced by Rankine, proved that it could not be an energy\nof strain. This drove physicists to the conclusion that it was a mode of\nmotion. Then it was remembered that John Bernoulli had shown that the\npressure of gases could be accounted for by assuming their molecules to\nbe moving uniformly in rectilinear paths. The same hypothesis was now\nseen to account for Avogadro\u2019s law, that in equal volumes of different\nkinds of gases exposed to the same pressure and temperature are contained\nequal numbers of molecules. Shortly after, it was found to account for\nthe laws of diffusion and viscosity of gases, and for the numerical\nrelation between these properties. Finally, Crookes\u2019s radiometer\nfurnished the last link in the strongest chain of evidence which supports\nany physical hypothesis.\n\nSuch being the constitution of gases, liquids must clearly be bodies in\nwhich the molecules wander in curvilinear paths, while in solids they\nmove in orbits or quasi-orbits. (See my definition _solid_ II, 1, in the\n\u201cCentury Dictionary.\u201d)\n\nWe see that the resistance to compression and to interpenetration between\nsensible bodies is, by one of the prime propositions of the molecular\ntheory, due in large measure to the kinetical energy of the particles,\nwhich must be supposed to be quite remote from one another, on the\naverage, even in solids. This resistance is no doubt influenced by finite\nattractions and repulsions between the molecules. All the impenetrability\nof bodies which we can observe is, therefore, a limited impenetrability\ndue to kinetic and positional energy. This being the case, we have\nno logical right to suppose that absolute impenetrability, or the\nexclusive occupancy of space, belongs to molecules or to atoms. It is\nan unwarranted hypothesis, not a _vera causa_.[2] Unless we are to give\nup the theory of energy, finite positional attractions and repulsions\nbetween molecules must be admitted. Absolute impenetrability would amount\nto an infinite repulsion at a certain distance. No analogy of known\nphenomena exists to excuse such a wanton violation of the principle of\ncontinuity as such a hypothesis is. In short, we are logically bound\nto adopt the Boscovichian idea that an atom is simply a distribution\nof component potential energy throughout space, (this distribution\nbeing absolutely rigid,) combined with inertia. The potential energy\nbelongs to two molecules, and is to be conceived as different between\nmolecules _A_ and _B_ from what it is between molecules _A_ and _C_. The\ndistribution of energy is not necessarily spherical. Nay, a molecule may\nconceivably have more than one centre; it may even have a central curve,\nreturning into itself. But I do not think there are any observed facts\npointing to such multiple or linear centres. On the other hand, many\nfacts relating to crystals, especially those observed by Voigt,[3] go to\nshow that the distribution of energy is harmonical but not concentric.\nWe can easily calculate the forces which such atoms must exert upon one\nanother by considering[4] that they are equivalent to aggregations of\npairs of electrically positive and negative points infinitely near to one\nanother. About such an atom there would be regions of positive and of\nnegative potential, and the number and distribution of such regions would\ndetermine the valency of the atom, a number which it is easy to see would\nin many cases be somewhat indeterminate. I must not dwell further upon\nthis hypothesis, at present. In another paper, its consequences will be\nfurther considered.\n\nI cannot assume that the students of philosophy who read this magazine\nare thoroughly versed in modern molecular physics, and therefore it\nis proper to mention that the governing principle in this branch of\nscience is Clausius\u2019s law of the virial. I will first state the law,\nand then explain the peculiar terms of the statement. This statement is\nthat the total kinetic energy of the particles of a system in stationary\nmotion is equal to the total virial. By a _system_ is here meant a\nnumber of particles acting upon one another.[5] Stationary motion is a\nquasi-orbital motion among a system of particles so that none of them are\nremoved to indefinitely great distances nor acquire indefinitely great\nvelocities. The kinetic energy of a particle is the work which would\nbe required to bring it to rest, independently of any forces which may\nbe acting upon it. The virial of a pair of particles is half the work\nwhich the force which actually operates between them would do if, being\nindependent of the distance, it were to bring them together. The equation\nof the virial is\n\n (Transcriber\u2019s Note: Italics have been removed from the\n formul\u00e6 for readability.)\n\n \u00bd\u03a3mv\u00b2 = \u00bd\u03a3\u03a3Rr.\n\nHere _m_ is the mass of a particle, _v_ its velocity, _R_ is the\nattraction between two particles, and _r_ is the distance between them.\nThe sign \u03a3 on the left hand side signifies that the values of _mv_\u00b2\nare to be summed for all the particles, and \u03a3\u03a3 on the right hand side\nsignifies that the values of _Rr_ are to be summed for all the pairs of\nparticles. If there is an external pressure _P_ (as from the atmosphere)\nupon the system, and the volume of vacant space within the boundary of\nthat pressure is _V_, then the virial must be understood as including\n\u00b3\u2044\u2082_PV_, so that the equation is\n\n \u00bd\u03a3mv\u00b2 = \u00b3\u2044\u2082PV + \u00bd\u03a3\u03a3Rr.\n\nThere is strong (if not demonstrative) reason for thinking that\nthe temperature of any body above the absolute zero (-273\u00b0 C.), is\nproportional to the average kinetic energy of its molecules, or say _a\u03b8_,\nwhere _a_ is a constant and _\u03b8_ is the absolute temperature. Hence, we\nmay write the equation\n\n a\u03b8 = \u00bdm\u0305v\u0305\u00b2\u0305 = \u00b3\u2044\u2082PV\u0305 + \u00bd\u03a3R\u0305r\u0305\n\nwhere the heavy lines above the different expressions signify that the\naverage values for single molecules are to be taken. In 1872, a student\nin the University of Leyden, Van der Waals, propounded in his thesis for\nthe doctorate a specialisation of the equation of the virial which has\nsince attracted great attention. Namely, he writes it\n\n a\u03b8 = (P + (c\u2044V\u00b2))(V-b).\n\nThe quantity _b_ is the volume of a molecule, which he supposes to\nbe an impenetrable body, and all the virtue of the equation lies in\nthis term which makes the equation a cubic in _V_, which is required\nto account for the shape of certain isothermal curves.[6] But if the\nidea of an impenetrable atom is illogical, that of an impenetrable\nmolecule is almost absurd. For the kinetical theory of matter teaches\nus that a molecule is like a solar system or star-cluster in miniature.\nUnless we suppose that in all heating of gases and vapors internal\nwork is performed upon the molecules, implying that their atoms are at\nconsiderable distances, the whole kinetical theory of gases falls to the\nground. As for the term added to _P_, there is no more than a partial\nand roughly approximative justification for it. Namely, let us imagine\ntwo spheres described round a particle as their centre, the radius of\nthe larger being so great as to include all the particles whose action\nupon the centre is sensible, while the radius of the smaller is so large\nthat a good many molecules are included within it. The possibility of\ndescribing such a sphere as the outer one implies that the attraction\nof the particles varies at some distances inversely as some higher\npower of the distance than the cube, or, to speak more clearly, that\nthe attraction multiplied by the cube of the distance diminishes as the\ndistance increases; for the number of particles at a given distance\nfrom any one particle is proportionate to the square of that distance\nand each of these gives a term of the virial which is the product of\nthe attraction into the distance. Consequently unless the attraction\nmultiplied by the cube of the distance diminished so rapidly with the\ndistance as soon to become insensible, no such outer sphere as is\nsupposed could be described. However, ordinary experience shows that such\na sphere is possible; and consequently there must be distances at which\nthe attraction does thus rapidly diminish as the distance increases. The\ntwo spheres, then, being so drawn, consider the virial of the central\nparticle due to the particles between them. Let the density of the\nsubstance be increased, say, _N_ times. Then, for every term, _Rr_, of\nthe virial before the condensation, there will be _N_ terms of the same\nmagnitude after the condensation. Hence, the virial of each particle will\nbe proportional to the density, and the equation of the virial becomes\n\n a\u03b8 = PV\u0305 + c\u2044V\u0305.\n\nThis omits the virial within the inner sphere, the radius of which\nis so taken that within that distance the number of particles is\nnot proportional to the number in a large sphere. For Van der Waals\nthis radius is the diameter of his hard molecules, which assumption\ngives his equation. But it is plain that the attraction between the\nmolecules must to a certain extent modify their distribution, unless\nsome peculiar conditions are fulfilled. The equation of Van der Waals\ncan be approximately true therefore only for a gas. In a solid or\nliquid condition, in which the removal of a small amount of pressure\nhas little effect on the volume, and where consequently the virial must\nbe much greater than _PV\u0305_, the virial must increase with the volume.\nFor suppose we had a substance in a critical condition in which an\nincrease of the volume would diminish the virial more than it would\nincrease \u00b3\u2044\u2082_PV\u0305_. If we were forcibly to diminish the volume of such\na substance, when the temperature became equalised, the pressure which\nit could withstand would be less than before, and it would be still\nfurther condensed, and this would go on indefinitely until a condition\nwere reached in which an increase of volume would increase \u00b3\u2044\u2082_PV\u0305_ more\nthan it would decrease the virial. In the case of solids, at least, _P_\nmay be zero; so that the state reached would be one in which the virial\nincreases with the volume, or the attraction between the particles does\nnot increase so fast with a diminution of their distance as it would if\nthe attraction were inversely as the distance.\n\nAlmost contemporaneously with Van der Waals\u2019s paper, another remarkable\nthesis for the doctorate was presented at Paris by Amagat. It related\nto the elasticity and expansion of gases, and to this subject the\nsuperb experimenter, its author, has devoted his whole subsequent life.\nEspecially interesting are his observations of the volumes of ethylene\nand of carbonic acid at temperatures from 20\u00b0 to 100\u00b0 and at pressures\nranging from an ounce to 5000 pounds to the square inch. As soon as\nAmagat had obtained these results, he remarked that the \u201ccoefficient of\nexpansion at constant volume,\u201d as it is absurdly called, that is, the\nrate of variation of the pressure with the temperature, was very nearly\nconstant for each volume. This accords with the equation of the virial,\nwhich gives\n\n dp\u2044d\u03b8 = a\u2044V\u0305 - d\u03a3R\u0305r\u0305\u2044d\u03b8.\n\nNow, the virial must be nearly independent of the temperature, and\ntherefore the last term almost disappears. The virial would not be\nquite independent of the temperature, because if the temperature (i.\ne. the square of the velocity of the molecules) is lowered, and the\npressure correspondingly lowered, so as to make the volume the same,\nthe attractions of the molecules will have more time to produce their\neffects, and consequently, the pairs of molecules the closest together\nwill be held together longer and closer; so that the virial will\ngenerally be increased by a decrease of temperature. Now, Amagat\u2019s\nexperiments do show an excessively minute effect of this sort, at least,\nwhen the volumes are not too small. However, the observations are well\nenough satisfied by assuming the \u201ccoefficient of expansion at constant\nvolume\u201d to consist wholly of the first term, _a_/(_V_). Thus, Amagat\u2019s\nexperiments enable us to determine the values of _a_ and thence to\ncalculate the virial; and this we find varies for carbonic acid gas\nnearly inversely to (_V_)\u2070\u02d9\u2079. There is, thus, a rough approximation to\nsatisfying Van der Waals\u2019s equation. But the most interesting result of\nAmagat\u2019s experiments, for our purpose at any rate, is that the quantity\n_a_, though nearly constant for any one volume, differs considerably with\nthe volume, nearly doubling when the volume is reduced fivefold. This\ncan only indicate that the mean kinetic energy of a given mass of the\ngas for a given temperature is greater the more the gas is compressed.\nBut the laws of mechanics appear to enjoin that the mean kinetic energy\nof a moving particle shall be constant at any given temperature. The\nonly escape from contradiction, then, is to suppose that the mean mass\nof a moving particle diminishes upon the condensation of the gas. In\nother words, many of the molecules are dissociated, or broken up into\natoms or sub-molecules. The idea that dissociation should be favored\nby diminishing the volume will be pronounced by physicists, at first\nblush, as contrary to all our experience. But it must be remembered\nthat the circumstances we are speaking of, that of a gas under fifty\nor more atmospheres pressure, are also unusual. That the \u201ccoefficient\nof expansion under constant volume\u201d when multiplied by the volumes\nshould increase with a decrement of the volume is also quite contrary\nto ordinary experience; yet it undoubtedly takes place in all gases\nunder great pressure. Again, the doctrine of Arrhenius[7] is now\ngenerally accepted, that the molecular conductivity of an electrolyte is\nproportional to the dissociation of ions. Now the molecular conductivity\nof a fused electrolyte is usually superior to that of a solution. Here is\na case, then, in which diminution of volume is accompanied by increased\ndissociation.\n\nThe truth is that several different kinds of dissociation have to be\ndistinguished. In the first place, there is the dissociation of a\nchemical molecule to form chemical molecules under the regular action of\nchemical laws. This may be a double decomposition, as when iodhydric acid\nis dissociated, according to the formula\n\n HI + HI = HH + II;\n\nor, it may be a simple decomposition, as when pentachloride of phosphorus\nis dissociated according to the formula\n\n PCl\u2085 = PCl\u2083 + ClCl.\n\nAll these dissociations require, according to the laws of\nthermochemistry, an elevated temperature. In the second place, there is\nthe dissociation of a physically polymerous molecule, that is, of several\nchemical molecules joined by physical attractions. This I am inclined to\nsuppose is a common concomitant of the heating of solids and liquids;\nfor in these bodies there is no increase of compressibility with the\ntemperature at all comparable with the increase of the expansibility.\nBut, in the third place, there is the dissociation with which we are now\nconcerned, which must be supposed to be a throwing off of unsaturated\nsub-molecules or atoms from the molecule. The molecule may, as I have\nsaid, be roughly likened to a solar system. As such, molecules are able\nto produce perturbations of one another\u2019s internal motions; and in this\nway a planet, i. e. a sub-molecule, will occasionally get thrown off and\nwander about by itself, till it finds another unsaturated sub-molecule\nwith which it can unite. Such dissociation by perturbation will naturally\nbe favored by the proximity of the molecules to one another.\n\nLet us now pass to the consideration of that special substance, or\nrather class of substances, whose properties form the chief subject\nof botany and of zo\u00f6logy, as truly as those of the silicates form the\nchief subject of mineralogy: I mean the life-slimes, or protoplasm.\nLet us begin by cataloguing the general characters of these slimes.\nThey one and all exist in two states of aggregation, a solid or nearly\nsolid state and a liquid or nearly liquid state; but they do not pass\nfrom the former to the latter by ordinary fusion. They are readily\ndecomposed by heat, especially in the liquid state; nor will they bear\nany considerable degree of cold. All their vital actions take place at\ntemperatures very little below the point of decomposition. This extreme\ninstability is one of numerous facts which demonstrate the chemical\ncomplexity of protoplasm. Every chemist will agree that they are far more\ncomplicated than the albumens. Now, albumen is estimated to contain in\neach molecule about a thousand atoms; so that it is natural to suppose\nthat the protoplasms contain several thousands. We know that while they\nare chiefly composed of oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and nitrogen, a large\nnumber of other elements enter into living bodies in small proportions;\nand it is likely that most of these enter into the composition of\nprotoplasms. Now, since the numbers of chemical varieties increase at\nan enormous rate with the number of atoms per molecule, so that there\nare certainly hundreds of thousands of substances whose molecules\ncontain twenty atoms or fewer, we may well suppose that the number of\nprotoplasmic substances runs into the billions or trillions. Professor\nCayley has given a mathematical theory of \u201ctrees,\u201d with a view of\nthrowing a light upon such questions; and in that light the estimate of\ntrillions (in the English sense) seems immoderately moderate. It is true\nthat an opinion has been emitted, and defended among biologists, that\nthere is but one kind of protoplasm; but the observations of biologists,\nthemselves, have almost exploded that hypothesis, which from a chemical\nstandpoint appears utterly incredible. The anticipation of the chemist\nwould decidedly be that enough different chemical substances having\nprotoplasmic characters might be formed to account, not only for the\ndifferences between nerve-slime and muscle-slime, between whale-slime\nand lion-slime, but also for those minuter pervasive variations which\ncharacterise different breeds and single individuals.\n\nProtoplasm, when quiescent, is, broadly speaking, solid; but when it is\ndisturbed in an appropriate way, or sometimes even spontaneously without\nexternal disturbance, it becomes, broadly speaking, liquid. A moner\nin this state is seen under the microscope to have streams within its\nmatter; a slime-mould slowly flows by force of gravity. The liquefaction\nstarts from the point of disturbance and spreads through the mass. This\nspreading, however, is not uniform in all directions; on the contrary it\ntakes at one time one course, at another another, through the homogeneous\nmass, in a manner that seems a little mysterious. The cause of\ndisturbance being removed, these motions gradually (with higher kinds of\nprotoplasm, quickly) cease, and the slime returns to its solid condition.\n\nThe liquefaction of protoplasm is accompanied by a mechanical\nphenomenon. Namely, some kinds exhibit a tendency to draw themselves\nup into a globular form. This happens particularly with the contents\nof muscle-cells. The prevalent opinion, founded on some of the most\nexquisite experimental investigations that the history of science\ncan show, is undoubtedly that the contraction of muscle-cells is due\nto osmotic pressure; and it must be allowed that that is a factor in\nproducing the effect. But it does not seem to me that it satisfactorily\naccounts even for the phenomena of muscular contraction; and besides,\neven naked slimes often draw up in the same way. In this case, we seem\nto recognise an increase of the surface-tension. In some cases, too, the\nreverse action takes place, extraordinary pseudopodia being put forth,\nas if the surface-tension were diminished in spots. Indeed, such a slime\nalways has a sort of skin, due no doubt to surface-tension, and this\nseems to give way at the point where a pseudopodium is put forth.\n\nLong-continued or frequently repeated liquefaction of the protoplasm\nresults in an obstinate retention of the solid state, which we call\nfatigue. On the other hand repose in this state, if not too much\nprolonged, restores the liquefiability. These are both important\nfunctions.\n\nThe life-slimes have, further, the peculiar property of growing. Crystals\nalso grow; their growth, however, consists merely in attracting matter\nlike their own from the circumambient fluid. To suppose the growth\nof protoplasm of the same nature, would be to suppose this substance\nto be spontaneously generated in copious supplies wherever food is\nin solution. Certainly, it must be granted that protoplasm is but a\nchemical substance, and that there is no reason why it should not be\nformed synthetically like any other chemical substance. Indeed, Clifford\nhas clearly shown that we have overwhelming evidence that it is so\nformed. But to say that such formation is as regular and frequent as the\nassimilation of food is quite another matter. It is more consonant with\nthe facts of observation to suppose that assimilated protoplasm is formed\nat the instant of assimilation, under the influence of the protoplasm\nalready present. For each slime in its growth preserves its distinctive\ncharacters with wonderful truth, nerve-slime growing nerve-slime and\nmuscle-slime muscle-slime, lion-slime growing lion-slime, and all the\nvarieties of breeds and even individual characters being preserved in the\ngrowth. Now it is too much to suppose there are billions of different\nkinds of protoplasm floating about wherever there is food.\n\nThe frequent liquefaction of protoplasm increases its power of\nassimilating food; so much so, indeed, that it is questionable whether in\nthe solid form it possesses this power.\n\nThe life-slime wastes as well as grows; and this too takes place chiefly\nif not exclusively in its liquid phases.\n\nClosely connected with growth is reproduction; and though in higher\nforms this is a specialised function, it is universally true that\nwherever there is protoplasm, there is, will be, or has been a power\nof reproducing that same kind of protoplasm in a separated organism.\nReproduction seems to involve the union of two sexes; though it is not\ndemonstrable that this is always requisite.\n\nAnother physical property of protoplasm is that of taking habits. The\ncourse which the spread of liquefaction has taken in the past is rendered\nthereby more likely to be taken in the future; although there is no\nabsolute certainty that the same path will be followed again.\n\nVery extraordinary, certainly, are all these properties of protoplasm;\nas extraordinary as indubitable. But the one which has next to be\nmentioned, while equally undeniable, is infinitely more wonderful. It\nis that protoplasm feels. We have no direct evidence that this is true\nof protoplasm universally, and certainly some kinds feel far more than\nothers. But there is a fair analogical inference that all protoplasm\nfeels. It not only feels but exercises all the functions of mind.\n\nSuch are the properties of protoplasm. The problem is to find a\nhypothesis of the molecular constitution of this compound which will\naccount for these properties, one and all.\n\nSome of them are obvious results of the excessively complicated\nconstitution of the protoplasm molecule. All very complicated substances\nare unstable; and plainly a molecule of several thousand atoms may be\nseparated in many ways into two parts in each of which the polar chemical\nforces are very nearly saturated. In the solid protoplasm, as in other\nsolids, the molecules must be supposed to be moving as it were in orbits,\nor, at least, so as not to wander indefinitely. But this solid cannot\nbe melted, for the same reason that starch cannot be melted; because\nan amount of heat insufficient to make the entire molecules wander is\nsufficient to break them up completely and cause them to form new and\nsimpler molecules. But when one of the molecules is disturbed, even\nif it be not quite thrown out of its orbit at first, sub-molecules of\nperhaps several hundred atoms each are thrown off from it. These will\nsoon acquire the same mean kinetic energy as the others, and therefore\nvelocities several times as great. They will naturally begin to wander,\nand in wandering will perturb a great many other molecules and cause\nthem in their turn to behave like the one originally deranged. So many\nmolecules will thus be broken up, that even those that are intact will no\nlonger be restrained within orbits, but will wander about freely. This is\nthe usual condition of a liquid, as modern chemists understand it; for in\nall electrolytic liquids there is considerable dissociation.\n\nBut this process necessarily chills the substance, not merely on account\nof the heat of chemical combination, but still more because the number\nof separate particles being greatly increased, the mean kinetic energy\nmust be less. The substance being a bad conductor, this heat is not at\nonce restored. Now the particles moving more slowly, the attractions\nbetween them have time to take effect, and they approach the condition of\nequilibrium. But their dynamic equilibrium is found in the restoration of\nthe solid condition, which therefore takes place, if the disturbance is\nnot kept up.\n\nWhen a body is in the solid condition, most of its molecules must be\nmoving at the same rate, or, at least, at certain regular sets of rates;\notherwise the orbital motion would not be preserved. The distances of\nneighboring molecules must always be kept between a certain maximum and\na certain minimum value. But if, without absorption of heat, the body be\nthrown into a liquid condition, the distances of neighboring molecules\nwill be far more unequally distributed, and an effect upon the virial\nwill result. The chilling of protoplasm upon its liquefaction must also\nbe taken into account. The ordinary effect will no doubt be to increase\nthe cohesion and with that the surface-tension, so that the mass will\ntend to draw itself up. But in special cases, the virial will be\nincreased so much that the surface-tension will be diminished at points\nwhere the temperature is first restored. In that case, the outer film\nwill give way and the tension at other places will aid in causing the\ngeneral fluid to be poured out at those points, forming pseudopodia.\n\nWhen the protoplasm is in a liquid state, and then only, a solution of\nfood is able to penetrate its mass by diffusion. The protoplasm is then\nconsiderably dissociated; and so is the food, like all dissolved matter.\nIf then the separated and unsaturated sub-molecules of the food happen\nto be of the same chemical species as sub-molecules of the protoplasm,\nthey may unite with other sub-molecules of the protoplasm to form new\nmolecules, in such a fashion that when the solid state is resumed, there\nmay be more molecules of protoplasm than there were at the beginning.\nIt is like the jack-knife whose blade and handle, after having been\nseverally lost and replaced, were found and put together to make a new\nknife.\n\nWe have seen that protoplasm is chilled by liquefaction, and that this\nbrings it back to the solid state, when the heat is recovered. This\nseries of operations must be very rapid in the case of nerve-slime and\neven of muscle-slime, and may account for the unsteady or vibratory\ncharacter of their action. Of course, if assimilation takes place, the\nheat of combination, which is probably trifling, is gained. On the\nother hand, if work is done, whether by nerve or by muscle, loss of\nenergy must take place. In the case of the muscle, the mode by which\nthe instantaneous part of the fatigue is brought about is easily traced\nout. If when the muscle contracts it be under stress, it will contract\nless than it otherwise would do, and there will be a loss of heat. It is\nlike an engine which should work by dissolving salt in water and using\nthe contraction during the solution to lift a weight, the salt being\nrecovered afterwards by distillation. But the major part of fatigue has\nnothing to do with the correlation of forces. A man must labor hard to do\nin a quarter of an hour the work which draws from him enough heat to cool\nhis body by a single degree. Meantime, he will be getting heated, he will\nbe pouring out extra products of combustion, perspiration, etc., and he\nwill be driving the blood at an accelerated rate through minute tubes at\ngreat expense. Yet all this will have little to do with his fatigue. He\nmay sit quietly at his table writing, doing practically no physical work\nat all, and yet in a few hours be terribly fagged. This seems to be owing\nto the deranged sub-molecules of the nerve-slime not having had time to\nsettle back into their proper combinations. When such sub-molecules are\nthrown out, as they must be from time to time, there is so much waste of\nmaterial.\n\nIn order that a sub-molecule of food may be thoroughly and firmly\nassimilated into a broken molecule of protoplasm, it is necessary not\nonly that it should have precisely the right chemical composition, but\nalso that it should be at precisely the right spot at the right time\nand should be moving in precisely the right direction with precisely\nthe right velocity. If all these conditions are not fulfilled, it will\nbe more loosely retained than the other parts of the molecule; and\nevery time it comes round into the situation in which it was drawn in,\nrelatively to the other parts of that molecule and to such others as\nwere near enough to be factors in the action, it will be in special\ndanger of being thrown out again. Thus, when a partial liquefaction of\nthe protoplasm takes place many times to about the same extent, it will,\neach time, be pretty nearly the same molecules that were last drawn in\nthat are now thrown out. They will be thrown out, too, in about the same\nway, as to position, direction of motion, and velocity, in which they\nwere drawn in; and this will be in about the same course that the ones\nlast before them were thrown out. Not exactly, however; for the very\ncause of their being thrown off so easily is their not having fulfilled\nprecisely the conditions of stable retention. Thus, the law of habit is\naccounted for, and with it its peculiar characteristic of not acting with\nexactitude.\n\nIt seems to me that this explanation of habit, aside from the question\nof its truth or falsity, has a certain value as an addition to our\nlittle store of mechanical examples of actions analogous to habit. All\nthe others, so far as I know, are either statical or else involve forces\nwhich, taking only the sensible motions into account, violate the law\nof energy. It is so with the stream that wears its own bed. Here, the\nsand is carried to its most stable situation and left there. The law of\nenergy forbids this; for when anything reaches a position of stable\nequilibrium, its momentum will be at a maximum, so that it can according\nto this law only be left at rest in an unstable situation. In all the\nstatical illustrations, too, things are brought into certain states\nand left there. A garment receives folds and keeps them; that is, its\nlimit of elasticity is exceeded. This failure to spring back is again an\napparent violation of the law of energy; for the substance will not only\nnot spring back of itself (which might be due to an unstable equilibrium\nbeing reached) but will not even do so when an impulse that way is\napplied to it. Accordingly, Professor James says \u201cthe phenomena of habit\n... are due to the plasticity of the ... materials.\u201d Now, plasticity\nof materials means the having of a low limit of elasticity. (See the\n\u201cCentury Dictionary,\u201d under _solid_.) But the hypothetical constitution\nof protoplasm here proposed involves no forces but attractions and\nrepulsions strictly following the law of energy. The action here, that\nis, the throwing of an atom out of its orbit in a molecule, and the\nentering of a new atom into nearly, but not quite the same orbit, is\nsomewhat similar to the molecular actions which may be supposed to\ntake place in a solid strained beyond its limit of elasticity. Namely,\nin that case certain molecules must be thrown out of their orbits, to\nsettle down again shortly after into new orbits. In short, the plastic\nsolid resembles protoplasm in being partially and temporarily liquefied\nby a slight mechanical force. But the taking of a set by a solid body\nhas but a moderate resemblance to the taking of a habit, inasmuch as\nthe characteristic feature of the latter, its inexactitude and want of\ncomplete determinacy, is not so marked in the former, if it can be said\nto be present there, at all.\n\nThe truth is that though the molecular explanation of habit is pretty\nvague on the mathematical side, there can be no doubt that systems of\natoms having polar forces would act substantially in that manner, and\nthe explanation is even too satisfactory to suit the convenience of an\nadvocate of tychism. For it may fairly be urged that since the phenomena\nof habit may thus result from a purely mechanical arrangement, it is\nunnecessary to suppose that habit-taking is a primordial principle of the\nuniverse. But one fact remains unexplained mechanically, which concerns\nnot only the facts of habit, but all cases of actions apparently\nviolating the law of energy; it is that all these phenomena depend upon\naggregations of trillions of molecules in one and the same condition and\nneighborhood; and it is by no means clear how they could have all been\nbrought and left in the same place and state by any conservative forces.\nBut let the mechanical explanation be as perfect as it may, the state of\nthings which it supposes presents evidence of a primordial habit-taking\ntendency. For it shows us like things acting in like ways because they\nare alike. Now, those who insist on the doctrine of necessity will for\nthe most part insist that the physical world is entirely individual.\nYet law involves an element of generality. Now to say that generality\nis primordial, but generalisation not, is like saying that diversity\nis primordial but diversification not. It turns logic upside down. At\nany rate, it is clear that nothing but a principle of habit, itself\ndue to the growth by habit of an infinitesimal chance tendency toward\nhabit-taking, is the only bridge that can span the chasm between the\nchance-medley of chaos and the cosmos of order and law.\n\nI shall not attempt a molecular explanation of the phenomena of\nreproduction, because that would require a subsidiary hypothesis, and\ncarry me away from my main object. Such phenomena, universally diffused\nthough they be, appear to depend upon special conditions; and we do not\nfind that all protoplasm has reproductive powers.\n\nBut what is to be said of the property of feeling? If consciousness\nbelongs to all protoplasm, by what mechanical constitution is this to\nbe accounted for? The slime is nothing but a chemical compound. There\nis no inherent impossibility in its being formed synthetically in the\nlaboratory, out of its chemical elements; and if it were so made, it\nwould present all the characters of natural protoplasm. No doubt,\nthen, it would feel. To hesitate to admit this would be puerile and\nultra-puerile. By what element of the molecular arrangement, then, would\nthat feeling be caused? This question cannot be evaded or pooh-poohed.\nProtoplasm certainly does feel; and unless we are to accept a weak\ndualism, the property must be shown to arise from some peculiarity of\nthe mechanical system. Yet the attempt to deduce it from the three laws\nof mechanics, applied to never so ingenious a mechanical contrivance,\nwould obviously be futile. It can never be explained, unless we admit\nthat physical events are but degraded or undeveloped forms of psychical\nevents. But once grant that the phenomena of matter are but the result\nof the sensibly complete sway of habits upon mind, and it only remains\nto explain why in the protoplasm these habits are to some slight extent\nbroken up, so that according to the law of mind, in that special clause\nof it sometimes called the principle of accommodation,[8] feeling becomes\nintensified. Now the manner in which habits generally get broken up is\nthis. Reactions usually terminate in the removal of a stimulus; for the\nexcitation continues as long as the stimulus is present. Accordingly,\nhabits are general ways of behavior which are associated with the removal\nof stimuli. But when the expected removal of the stimulus fails to occur,\nthe excitation continues and increases, and non-habitual reactions take\nplace; and these tend to weaken the habit. If, then, we suppose that\nmatter never does obey its ideal laws with absolute precision, but that\nthere are almost insensible fortuitous departures from regularity, these\nwill produce, in general, equally minute effects. But protoplasm is\nin an excessively unstable condition; and it is the characteristic of\nunstable equilibrium, that near that point excessively minute causes may\nproduce startlingly large effects. Here then, the usual departures from\nregularity will be followed by others that are very great; and the large\nfortuitous departures from law so produced, will tend still further to\nbreak up the laws, supposing that these are of the nature of habits.\nNow, this breaking up of habit and renewed fortuitous spontaneity will,\naccording to the law of mind, be accompanied by an intensification of\nfeeling. The nerve-protoplasm is, without doubt, in the most unstable\ncondition of any kind of matter; and consequently, there the resulting\nfeeling is the most manifest.\n\nThus we see that the idealist has no need to dread a mechanical theory\nof life. On the contrary, such a theory, fully developed, is bound to\ncall in a tychistic idealism as its indispensable adjunct. Wherever\nchance-spontaneity is found, there, in the same proportion, feeling\nexists. In fact, chance is but the outward aspect of that which within\nitself is feeling. I long ago showed that real existence, or thing-ness,\nconsists in regularities. So, that primeval chaos in which there was\nno regularity was mere nothing, from a physical aspect. Yet it was not\na blank zero; for there was an intensity of consciousness there in\ncomparison with which all that we ever feel is but as the struggling of a\nmolecule or two to throw off a little of the force of law to an endless\nand innumerable diversity of chance utterly unlimited.\n\nBut after some atoms of the protoplasm have thus become partially\nemancipated from law, what happens next to them? To understand this, we\nhave to remember that no mental tendency is so easily strengthened by the\naction of habit as is the tendency to take habits. Now, in the higher\nkinds of protoplasm, especially, the atoms in question have not only long\nbelonged to one molecule or another of the particular mass of slime of\nwhich they are parts; but before that, they were constituents of food of\na protoplasmic constitution. During all this time, they have been liable\nto lose habits and to recover them again; so that now, when the stimulus\nis removed, and the foregone habits tend to reassert themselves, they do\nso in the case of such atoms with great promptness. Indeed, the return is\nso prompt that there is nothing but the feeling to show conclusively that\nthe bonds of law have ever been relaxed.\n\nIn short, diversification is the vestige of chance-spontaneity; and\nwherever diversity is increasing, there chance must be operative. On the\nother hand, wherever uniformity is increasing, habit must be operative.\nBut wherever actions take place under an established uniformity, there\nso much feeling as there may be takes the mode of a sense of reaction.\nThat is the manner in which I am led to define the relation between the\nfundamental elements of consciousness and their physical equivalents.\n\nIt remains to consider the physical relations of general ideas. It may\nbe well here to reflect that if matter has no existence except as a\nspecialisation of mind, it follows that whatever affects matter according\nto regular laws is itself matter. But all mind is directly or indirectly\nconnected with all matter, and acts in a more or less regular way; so\nthat all mind more or less partakes of the nature of matter. Hence, it\nwould be a mistake to conceive of the psychical and the physical aspects\nof matter as two aspects absolutely distinct. Viewing a thing from the\noutside, considering its relations of action and reaction with other\nthings, it appears as matter. Viewing it from the inside, looking at its\nimmediate character as feeling, it appears as consciousness. These two\nviews are combined when we remember that mechanical laws are nothing\nbut acquired habits, like all the regularities of mind, including the\ntendency to take habits, itself; and that this action of habit is nothing\nbut generalisation, and generalisation is nothing but the spreading\nof feelings. But the question is, how do general ideas appear in the\nmolecular theory of protoplasm?\n\nThe consciousness of a habit involves a general idea. In each action of\nthat habit certain atoms get thrown out of their orbit, and replaced by\nothers. Upon all the different occasions it is different atoms that are\nthrown off, but they are analogous from a physical point of view, and\nthere is an inward sense of their being analogous. Every time one of the\nassociated feelings recurs, there is a more or less vague sense that\nthere are others, that it has a general character, and of about what this\ngeneral character is. We ought not, I think, to hold that in protoplasm\nhabit never acts in any other than the particular way suggested above. On\nthe contrary, if habit be a primary property of mind, it must be equally\nso of matter, as a kind of mind. We can hardly refuse to admit that\nwherever chance motions have general characters, there is a tendency for\nthis generality to spread and to perfect itself. In that case, a general\nidea is a certain modification of consciousness which accompanies any\nregularity or general relation between chance actions.\n\nThe consciousness of a general idea has a certain \u201cunity of the ego,\u201d\nin it, which is identical when it passes from one mind to another. It\nis, therefore, quite analogous to a person; and, indeed, a person is\nonly a particular kind of general idea. Long ago, in the _Journal of\nSpeculative Philosophy_ (Vol. III, p. 156), I pointed out that a person\nis nothing but a symbol involving a general idea; but my views were,\nthen, too nominalistic to enable me to see that every general idea has\nthe unified living feeling of a person.\n\nAll that is necessary, upon this theory, to the existence of a person\nis that the feelings out of which he is constructed should be in\nclose enough connection to influence one another. Here we can draw a\nconsequence which it may be possible to submit to experimental test.\nNamely, if this be the case, there should be something like personal\nconsciousness in bodies of men who are in intimate and intensely\nsympathetic communion. It is true that when the generalisation of\nfeeling has been carried so far as to include all within a person, a\nstopping-place, in a certain sense, has been attained; and further\ngeneralisation will have a less lively character. But we must not\nthink it will cease. _Esprit de corps_, national sentiment, sympathy,\nare no mere metaphors. None of us can fully realise what the minds of\ncorporations are, any more than one of my brain-cells can know what\nthe whole brain is thinking. But the law of mind clearly points to the\nexistence of such personalities, and there are many ordinary observations\nwhich, if they were critically examined and supplemented by special\nexperiments, might, as first appearances promise, give evidence of the\ninfluence of such greater persons upon individuals. It is often remarked\nthat on one day half a dozen people, strangers to one another, will take\nit into their heads to do one and the same strange deed, whether it be\na physical experiment, a crime, or an act of virtue. When the thirty\nthousand young people of the society for Christian Endeavor were in New\nYork, there seemed to me to be some mysterious diffusion of sweetness and\nlight. If such a fact is capable of being made out anywhere, it should\nbe in the church. The Christians have always been ready to risk their\nlives for the sake of having prayers in common, of getting together and\npraying simultaneously with great energy, and especially for their common\nbody, for \u201cthe whole state of Christ\u2019s church militant here in earth,\u201d\nas one of the missals has it. This practice they have been keeping up\neverywhere, weekly, for many centuries. Surely, a personality ought to\nhave developed in that church, in that \u201cbride of Christ,\u201d as they call\nit, or else there is a strange break in the action of mind, and I shall\nhave to acknowledge my views are much mistaken. Would not the societies\nfor psychical research be more likely to break through the clouds,\nin seeking evidences of such corporate personality, than in seeking\nevidences of telepathy, which, upon the same theory, should be a far\nweaker phenomenon?\n\n C. S. PEIRCE.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] I am rejoiced to find, since my last paper was printed, that a\nphilosopher as subtle and profound as Dr. Edmund Montgomery has long\nbeen arguing for the same element in the universe. Other world-renowned\nthinkers, as M. Renouvier and M. Delb\u0153uf, appear to share this opinion.\n\n[2] By a _vera causa_, in the logic of science, is meant a state of\nthings known to exist in some cases and supposed to exist in other cases,\nbecause it would account for observed phenomena.\n\n[3] Wiedemann, _Annalen_, 1887-1889.\n\n[4] See Maxwell on Spherical Harmonics, in his _Electricity and\nMagnetism_.\n\n[5] The word _system_ has three peculiar meanings in mathematics. (_A._)\nIt means an orderly exposition of the truths of astronomy, and hence\na theory of the motions of the stars; as the Ptolemaic _system_, the\nCopernican _system_. This is much like the sense in which we speak of the\nCalvinistic _system_ of theology, the Kantian _system_ of philosophy,\netc. (_B._) It means the aggregate of the planets considered as all\nmoving in somewhat the same way, as the solar _system_; and hence any\naggregate of particles moving under mutual forces. (_C._) It means a\nnumber of forces acting simultaneously upon a number of particles.\n\n[6] But, in fact, an inspection of these curves is sufficient to show\nthat they are of a higher degree than the third. For they have the line\n_V_ = 0, or some line _V_ a constant for an asymptote, while for small\nvalues of _P_, the values of (_d_\u00b2)_P_/(_dV_)\u00b2 are positive.\n\n[7] Anticipated by Clausius as long ago as 1857; and by Williamson in\n1851.\n\n[8] \u201cPhysiologically, ... accommodation means the breaking up of a\nhabit.... Psychologically, it means reviving consciousness.\u201d Baldwin,\n_Psychology_, Part III ch. i., \u00a7 5.\n\n\n\n\nTHE FUTURE OF THOUGHT IN AMERICA.\n\n\nHistory teaches us the nature of the degenerative and destructive\nagencies in national life. These are of various kinds, but they may be\ngenerally included under the heads of Physical Vices, Superstitions,\nand Selfish Ambitions. These have become possible through excess of\nemotional, and deficiency of rational states of the mind. When a large\npart of a population is influenced by emotional rather than by rational\nmodes of thought, unethical conduct has full opportunity, and suffering\nand destruction are sure to follow. All races and nations are subject to\nsuch disorders, if only in some cases during their periods of infancy and\nof degeneracy.\n\nThe peoples of Europe have difficulties and dangers which are due to\ntheir own peculiar situation. The people of North America have to meet\ncertain risks of a somewhat different character, owing to our peculiar\nposition. In Europe we see an accumulation of many races who reached\ntheir _Ultima Thule_ at the coast of the Atlantic, and who have had\nto accommodate themselves to each other as best they could. Speaking\ndifferent languages and having different political organisations, they\nhave consolidated into separate nations. This result has only been\nreached after many conflicts, and the result has been the combination and\nabsorption of smaller states into greater, such as we find them to-day.\nThis result has not terminated conflicts; it has reduced their frequency\nbut has increased their scope and importance. To-day the antagonisms of\nthese nations impose great burdens upon them, but they are at the same\ntime productive of great good.\n\nWith men as with other animals excellence is the result of use and\nexercise. With animals this exercise has been compulsory, and has been\ndue largely to the pressure of hunger. Among men intellectual and ethical\nexcellence may be due to compulsion, or it may result from the capacity\nto develop lofty ideals. In the former case man is driven; in the latter\ncase he is led. Now the organisation of human society is such, that if\nman will not be led, he is driven. The \u201cmills of the Gods\u201d are ever ready\nfor those who lag behind in the progress of the race. But there are\nmills and mills, and no mill has yet appeared in human history better\ncalculated to grind out a good grist from an intellectual point of view,\nthan western Eurasia, or Europe. The emulations and antagonisms of so\nmany nations have stimulated men to do their best, and have stimulated\ngovernments to aid them in doing it, for several centuries. The result\nhas been modern art, modern science pure and applied, and modern\nphilosophy. To produce all this however, Europe has been under pressure,\nand the pressure has been in some, if not all of its countries, more or\nless galling.\n\nThe European, in order to escape local tyranny, political, social, or\ntheological, or to better his chances of physical living, has come to\nAmerica. He has taken possession, and has bettered his condition from a\nphysical point of view, most successfully. The question that interests\nus now, is whether he has bettered himself in any other way, and whether\nhe is going to continue the mental progress which has so distinguished\nhis history in Europe. Population is rapidly increasing, and the\nincreasing severity of the \u201cstruggle for existence\u201d which will follow,\nwill stimulate men to increased excellence in their methods of obtaining\na livelihood, but will it develop the mind in any other direction? We\nhave before us in the case of China, the effect of close industrial\ncompetition in a dense population, without corresponding intellectual\ndevelopment. What is the outlook for the American? Will the process of\nnatural selection only, the \u201cdevil-take-the-hindmost\u201d doctrine of Darwin,\nbe sufficient to develop the higher mental faculties, or having developed\nthem, to enable them to survive and to become general, or not?\n\nIn the first place we lack in America the great stimulus to mental\nprogress already referred to, international jealousy and emulation. In\nthis respect we are situated very much like the Chinese, but if anything\nless favorably. We practically own the continent. We have no fear of\nTartar invasions from the west nor Japanese from the north east. The\nCanadians are of identical race with ourselves, and are almost certain\nto become identical in nationality with us. We are accustomed to boast\nourselves of this, and to look with great satisfaction on our isolated\nposition among nations. But our self-gratulation must be greatly tempered\nby the reflection that such isolation is only beneficial so long as we\ncan maintain our ideals without external stimulus. And this is something\nthat few nations have so far been able to accomplish. It is true,\nhowever, that the Atlantic ocean is not so wide as it was formerly, and\nwe are truly one of the family of the Indo-European nations. But we will\nmiss the effect of the daily stimulus which they afford each other, and\nthe daily contact which transmits so much from man to man.\n\nWhat is our present intellectual rank among these nations to-day; meaning\nby this our status in actual production of intellectual work, and leaving\naside history? Without any great competence to speak on many branches\nof such work, I may be not far from correct; if I summarise as follows:\nIn music and sculpture unproductive; in painting and literature (as an\nart) good, but weak in quantity in comparison with our population. In\nsciences, feeble in many branches, but very productive in some others. I\nrefer to pure science. In applied science we stand high. In philosophy as\na nation, weak.\n\nBut we have the future before us. If there is a demand for the products\nof pure thought in this country, the supply will come. Much may be\nexpected of our race. We will hope that the demand will grow, for at\npresent it is not as large as it ought to be. It is of course easy for\nthought to \u201crun in accustomed channels,\u201d and many people there are in\nthis as in all other countries, who believe that sufficient is already\nknown, and that he who would disturb current opinions is a \u201cdisturber of\nthe peace.\u201d Strange as it may seem, in this comparatively new country we\nhave one special inducement to this habit of mind. This is to be found\nin our political system, which requires an unhesitating submission to the\nwill of the majority.\n\n * * * * *\n\nHere is our second danger. We are apt to confuse mental submission with\nphysical submission. Physical submission to the will of the majority\nis generally necessary for physical reasons, with which we are all\nfamiliar. Ballots are simply a peaceful representation of bullets, and\nwe anticipate the submission to the latter by submission to the former.\nBut the mind should be free. Current or popular opinions are not always\ncorrect. In fact if they were, reform or progress would be unnecessary.\nA proposal for change always begins with a minority, and much time may\noften elapse before such change becomes acceptable to the majority.\nBefore the majority accepts a new step of progress the progressive idea\ncannot govern physically. It must be content to be unpopular for a\ngreater or less time. Now the politician naturally dreads unpopularity,\nfor it is political death. And just in proportion as we are politicians\ndo we share in this unfortunate mental attitude. And how many Americans\nare not politicians? It is the prevalent ethical disease of Americans. If\nit becomes general, the progress of this country is ended, and her fate\namong nations is sealed. Her manhood is gone, and woman may well feel her\nhand itch to\n\n \u201cDefeat their dirty tricks\n Confound their politics.\u201d\n\nThe prevalence of the habit of submission to what we know to be wrong\nin this country is simply detestable. Herbert Spencer has given us\nsome excellent advice on this subject, and we will do well to heed\nit. The habit extends all the way through political, scientific, and\ndomestic economy. The unpopularity of the reformer is expressed in the\nterm \u201ckicker,\u201d which is applied to him among the lower classes in this\ncountry. As one of its advocates once said to me, it is the \u201cAmerican\nSystem,\u201d and there was a strong element of truth in his assertion. With\nsuch people, criticism is identical with quarrelling, for they cannot\nconceive of any motive for endeavoring to reform some abuse or correct\nsome error, but personal rancor. Such an attitude is a sure mark of\nintellectual mediocrity and ethical incapacity, and it infinitely\nincreases the pains of the reformer, and readily converts him into a\nmartyr. However, there are a good many men left in this country, and\nthere are agencies at work which will probably keep up the supply.\n\nIn the absence of compulsion in the form of external or civil wars and\nother disasters, the churches are doing a good work in keeping ideals\nbefore the people, and in inviting corresponding practical life. It is\ntrue that their efforts are more or less retarded by the insistence\non erroneous and even absurd opinions about some things, but they do\ninfinite service in teaching that \u201cman shall not live by bread alone,\u201d\nnor by the mere display of physical possessions. They teach that there\nare ideals of truth and beauty better worth living for, and that the\nmind is the greater part of man. It is the churches which make the\nmajority of scientists and philosophers, as they formerly did of\npainters. Then let the churches flourish. Like the nations of Europe,\ntheir emulations and antagonisms bring out the truth. The Presbyterians\nhave to solve the knotty questions of biblical inspiration and divine\norder. The Methodists will have to study the nature and value of human\nemotions. The Friends will know what is to be known of immediate divine\ninfluence. The Catholics have learned how to restrain in some measure\nthe most thoughtless of mankind. The Unitarians and Ethical Culturists\nare proving that man may retain and live up to high ideals without much\nor any theology. So long as there is no philosophy or none to speak of\nin America, the evolution of thought will come from the conflicts of\nthe theologies; a peaceful war which is far less wasteful than physical\nwars. Theology has been generally in Europe the parent of philosophy,\nand so it will be here. From the various stages and conditions of the\nagitation will spring science and art. By this method man is led into\nprogress by measures which involve the best attributes of his nature,\ninstead of being driven by appeals to his lower motives, or by physical\nforce. In this progress moral courage is not lost, but it is developed;\nand criticism is truth\u2019s best weapon, and is not a cause of offense.\nThat this progress in the churches is real, is proven by our Woodrow,\nMcQueary, Briggs, and others, and it will go on as long as the love of\ntruth and moral courage exist in those organisations.\n\nIt is interesting to remember that this struggle of opinions has passed\nthrough the same stages in Europe wherever the love of truth has had an\nabiding place. This is especially true of Germany, where also philosophy\nhas had so large a development in relatively modern times. But we need\nsomething more than opinions to counteract the dangers which threaten\nearnestness of character in this country, which I have pointed out.\nActive organisations are necessary, which shall resist tendencies\nto crystallisation from both sides. Non-theological people must be\nstimulated to maintain ethical ideals; and theological people must be\nrestrained from smothering them under useless and obstructive dogmas and\npractices. It is too true that while some theological dogmas include\nhigh ethical ideals, other dogmas discredit them by deriving them from\nincredible sources, and seeking to sustain them by incredible sanctions.\nWhere such dogmas are sincerely held, true thought is suppressed,\nknowledge makes slow progress, and ethical life is more difficult.\n\nAs already remarked, we cannot yet claim to be, as a nation,\ndistinguished for profound thinking on the subjects of highest human\ninterest; nor yet are we the most thoughtless. Ignorance of the\npossibilities of mind is not so general as in some parts of Europe, but\nit is greater than in others. Material objects and interests occupy\nalmost as exclusively the minds of the majority of our citizens whom we\nare accustomed to consider \u201cintelligent,\u201d as among the unintelligent.\nHence our proneness to boast of our material greatness, instead of our\nintellectual conquests. Hence that weakest of all forms of self-praise,\nthe publication of the dimensions of our country and its rapid growth,\nas though these were indications of our superiority as a people or\nas a race. This is repeated _ad nauseam_, while our real merits, our\ncontributions to the stock of the world\u2019s progress in thought, knowledge,\nand mental power, are passed by in silence. Our newspaper press reflects\nthis state of affairs, since they generally think it their best policy to\nfollow rather than lead public opinion. There are, however, noteworthy\nexceptions to this character of the press both in the east and the west,\nwhich we owe to the superiority of the men who edit and direct them.\n\nIn the conduct of our schools and of our scientific organisations, we\nhave a corresponding exhibition of mediocrity or worse, with a few noble\nand distinguished exceptions. A mere interest in education and research\ndoes not confer competency to direct and sustain them; yet an interest\nin such matters is generally the only qualification demanded of the\ndirectors of such institutions, provided they understand how to buy,\nsell, and invest money. It is to be hoped that this state of affairs will\nsome day pass away, and that men who are influential in such matters\nwill some time know enough themselves to distinguish between the false\nand the true, and between men of ability and adventurers who are after\nthe money and position with which our institutions of learning and our\nscientific enterprises can endow them. This reform will progress exactly\nin proportion as it is understood how much human happiness depends on\ntrue research and on correct thinking, and how little on revelation and\non ancient dogma.\n\nIt is not, I repeat, sufficiently understood, how much human conduct\ndepends on correct thinking. How much financial dishonesty would be\naverted by a rational thought as to the inevitable consequences? How much\nsocial irregularity would be prevented by a similar treatment of the\nsubject? How much hatred and wasteful antagonism would the world lack, if\nthe ordinary conditions of living were understood and acted on! So the\ncultivation of the rational mind is of incalculable importance, and if\nwe wish to prosper as a nation we must bend our energies to the pleasant\ntask this problem presents to us. Neglect of our mental powers means\ndegeneracy and decay; while their cultivation means power and happiness.\nWealth, except as a means of attaining this end, after physical\nnecessities are supplied, is simply useless.\n\n E. D. COPE.\n\n\n\n\nMENTAL MUMMIES.\n\n\nIf we should name the most important factor in the changes which\nhave gradually widened the contrast between modern science and the\nscholasticism of the Middle Ages, we might define it as a \u201cprogressive\nrecognition of hereditary influences.\u201d\n\nThere was a time when each individual of the human race was considered\na separate accident, called into existence by an act of unlimited,\narbitrary power, and apt to be as suddenly changed, even unto a complete\ninversion of his former moral being, by a merciful, or revengeful,\ncaprice of the same power.\n\nBiology has since taught us to apply the doctrine of evolution to the\nproblems of our own moral and physical nature, to trace the tendencies of\nbygone times to their effects in the present age, to consider individuals\nthe outcome of a long series of precedent influences, and to recognise\nthe truth that the length of those influences is proportioned to the\npersistence of the result.\n\nIntelligent statesmen were the first to appreciate the practical value\nof those facts. The advisers of Alexander II. did not waste their time\nin a hopeless attempt to convert the freedom-worshipping natives of the\nCaucasus into devotees of Muscovite despotism, but at once confronted\nthem with the alternative of exile or death. Our Indian commissioners\nearly realised the impossibility of turning the descendants of a long\nancestry of deer-hunters into tillers of the soil, and transferred the\nsurvivors of the long race-war to a territory where they could for\nbetter or worse, indulge their incurable penchant. The Groot Fontein\npenitentiary of the Transvaal Republic became the grave of so many\nCaffirs that the managers at last abandoned the plan of inuring nomads to\nthe restraints of sedentary occupation, and saved the lives, if not the\nsouls of their convicts by sending them about in chain-gangs to mend the\nirrigation ditches of the border settlements.\n\nHereditary influences cannot be obliterated by force of rhetoric or of\ngovernment edicts and it would solve many riddles if we would apply that\nprinciple to phenomena of ethical and religious evolution. How else\nshall we explain the fact that in less than sixty years the doctrine of\nProtestantism spread from central Germany to the highland hamlets of\nScotland and Scandinavia, while in Spain, Portugal, and Italy a very\ndecided progress in general intelligence has failed to lead to a similar\nresult? How shall we account for the success of Christian missionaries in\nTasmania and Otaheiti and their utter failure in Burmah and Hindostan?\nHow for the persecution-proof vitality of Judaism, the ready collapse of\nMormonism, or the revival of crass mystic delusions in the midst of our\nrealistic civilisation?\n\nThere is no doubt that the average Spanish sailor, or village-shopkeeper\nof to-day possesses a larger stock of general information than the\naverage Brunswick school-teacher of the sixteenth century. Yet one of the\nleast learned of those school-teachers could, by instinct, sufficiently\nappreciate the significance of the Protestant revolt to celebrate its\ntriumph by a big bonfire and what our western friends would, call a\n\u201cgrand war-dance,\u201d on a height near the little town of Wolfenb\u00fcttel. Why\ndoes Pedro Gonzales still cross himself at the mention of a heretic,\nwhile Peter Jansen would as soon return to the pig-sty hovels of the\nmedi\u00e6val serfs as crawl back under the yoke of Jesuitry? How could the\nbogs of foggy Ireland and the vegas of sunny Spain nourish equally\nimperishable roots of a plant that failed to get a firm foot-hold in the\nsands of Brandenburgh?\n\nThe solution of those enigmas can be found in the circumstance that the\ndoctrine of anti-naturalism had extended its influence to the character\nof many European nations, and that the character-traits of a race are\nless amenable to rapid changes than its intellectual standards. On the\nsoul-organism of the Latin races the thousand years influence of monastic\ntyranny has left traces which the light of science will fail to efface\nfor centuries to come. The propaganda of a manlier creed has thus been\ndefeated, not only by their ignorance, but by their aversion to mental\nefforts, by their habitual reliance on miracles, by their incurable\nindifference to the claims of truth and the merits of intellectual\nindependence, by their hereditary mistrust in the competence of their\nnatural instinct. To their moral palate a doctrine which nauseates their\nnorthern neighbors has become a pleasant narcotic; they have been forced\nto swallow the opium of pessimism till a craving for the repetition of\nthe mind-enervating dose has become a second nature; they hug the cross\nthat has proved a symbol of death to their noblest reformers.\n\nAgainst that influence of perverted instincts the logic of mental\nrevelations avails but little. \u201cPropositions which would appear\nself-evident to certain mental constitutions,\u201d says Dr. Carpenter,\n\u201care apt to be very differently received by others, according to their\nconformity or discordance with that _aggregate of preformed opinion_\nwhich has grown up in the minds of each. For just as we try whether a\nnew piece of furniture which is offered us does or does not fit into a\ncertain recess in our apartment, and accept or decline it accordingly,\nso we try a new proposition which is offered to our mental acceptance.\nIf it either at once fits in or can by argument or discussion be brought\nto fit in to some recess in our fabrics of thought, we give our assent\nto it by admitting it to its appropriate place. But if it neither fits\nin the first instance nor can by any means be brought to fit, the mind\nautomatically rejects it.\u201d\n\nIt is true that logical demonstrations may become complete enough to defy\ndissent, but even from facts which force themselves upon the acceptance\nof every rational human being, different individuals will draw widely\ndifferent inferences. That the mind of man may become a receptacle for\nirreconcilable doctrines is strikingly illustrated, by the simultaneous\nacceptance of the Old and New Testament of our heterogeneous scripture,\nand in the same way obstinate bigots manage to associate scientific truth\nand dogmatic absurdities. Darwin and Moses may occupy adjoining quarters\nin the fabric of the same cosmogony; the rule of three may become a\npassive concomitant of Trinitarian dogmas. The torch of truth may be\npermitted to flicker in a secluded recess of souls which refuse it the\nprivilege of throwing its rays in certain directions. Education may fail\nto reclaim hereditary bigotry. In the winter of 1559 the rabble of Madrid\nassembled to witness the death of Don Carlos de Seso, a Spanish nobleman\nwhose ancestors had fought at Granada and Toledo. His brother had been\nthe favorite hunting-companion of Charles V.; one of his uncles had\nsacrificed his life in deciding the victory of Pavia; Don Carlos himself\nhad acquired renown both as a soldier and a scholar, but in the latter\ncapacity he had confessed his sympathy with certain doctrines of Martin\nLuther, and the Holy Inquisition had sentenced him to anticipate his doom\nin the flames of the stake. King Philip II. honored the _auto da f\u00e9_\nwith his presence, and frowned in a way which the condemned freethinker\nmistook for a disapproval of his sentence. \u201cO King! can you thus witness\nthe torture of your subjects?\u201d exclaimed De Seso. \u201cDeliver us from so\ncruel a death which even our enemies admit we have not deserved.\u201d \u201cI\nwould help carrying faggots to burn my own son,\u201d replied the King, \u201cif\nhe had incurred your unspeakable guilt.\u201d Yet Philip the Second was one\nof the best-educated princes of his century. In mathematics, astronomy,\nancient and modern languages, geography, and history, he was far better\ninformed than Landgraf Philip of Hessen, who would have risked his own\nlife to save that of a loyal cavalier.\n\nThere are mental mummies who cannot be revived by removing their\ngrave-shrouds and clothing them in modern drapery; the principle of\nconservatism has penetrated their very veins and the marrow of their\nbones. It is by no means unconceivable that a popular leader like\nGaribaldi or Porfirio Diaz should succeed in persuading a million of his\ncountrymen to renounce the yoke of Rome and build Protestant chapels, but\nthe result would be largely limited to a change of nomenclature. Before\nlong the dissenters would march in procession with a wonder-working tooth\nof John Wesley or kiss a shred from the petticoat of the Holy Maid of\nKent. They would groan at the mention of Rome, but exorcise spooks with\nthe initials of Ulric Zwingli, and abstain from work on the anniversary\nof every Protestant martyr. They would try to redeem drunkards by\nsprinkling them with consecrated water from the holy rivers of Kansas,\nand celebrate Arbor Day only by invoking the spirit of Prof. G. P.\nMarsh, as a patron-saint of climate-improving forests. Under the stimulus\nof industrial influences, they might transfer the cross from way-side\nshrines to telegraph-poles, but they would persist in the worship of\nsorrow.\n\nThe creed which has turned the happiest countries of our globe into\na grave of their former prosperity, is a medley of miraculism and\nanti-naturalism, and the experience of the last century has proved that\nboth can survive the repudiation of Rome and even of Galilee. The mania\nof renunciation, after the abolishment of monasteries and nunneries,\ncontinued its dismal rites in Quaker-garb and Shaker temples of celibacy.\nThe miracle-hunger of millions who have learned to scorn the clumsy\ntricks of the cowled exorcist, gratifies its appetite in the mystic gloom\nof the dark cabinet. Rustic supernaturalists, deprived of such luxuries,\nindemnify themselves by retailing the marvels of the serpent-charm and\njoint-snake superstition.\n\nA curious psychological problem suggests itself in the question how\nfar the charm of the \u201csour-grape philosophy\u201d may contribute to the\npersistence of certain forms of moral nihilism. Condemned criminals\nalmost invariably \u201crenounce the vanities\u201d of a life which the Court\nof Appeals has refused to save, and in a scaffold-speech, quoted in\nGalignani\u2019s _Messenger_ of May 6th, 1837, the English murderer Joseph\nGreenacre expressed his conviction that his crime had been the means\nof saving his soul, because \u201cdeath on the gibbet was one of the surest\npassports to heaven.\u201d\n\nFor similar reasons degenerate nations, after realising the doom of their\nnational welfare, are apt to renounce the glory of a forfeited world,\nand to consider misery, poverty, and shame so many stepping-stones to\nthe bliss of a better life beyond the grave. After habitual sins against\nthe health-laws of nature have avenged themselves in cureless diseases,\ndecrepit bigots may find solace even in that most insane tenet of their\ndualistic creed which teaches them to despise the body as the enemy of\nthe soul.\n\nA natural effect of pessimism may thus, in course of time, become one of\nits perpetuating causes.\n\n FELIX L. OSWALD.\n\n\n\n\nTHE NERVOUS GANGLIA OF INSECTS.\n\n\nI.\n\nAlthough the internal structure of the brain of insects has been the\nobject of numerous and important investigations, among which we must\nplace those of Dietl, Fl\u00f6gel, Bellonci, and Viallanes (who have applied\nthe method of sections to the study of this organ), no attention has as\nyet been paid to the other nerve-centres of insects, and in particular\nto the ganglia of the ventral chain. Writers have contented themselves\nwith describing the external form of these ganglia, and their anatomical\nrelations to the other organic parts; but nothing has been done to throw\nlight upon their inward structure. All the knowledge which we have on\nthis subject is very meagre and dates far back to the works of the old\nwriters, who, like Newport, had at their disposal no other means of study\nthan the microscopic examination of organs viewed either transparently\nor in dilacerated preparations. A method so defective could render but\nincomplete results, and indeed in many cases erroneous ones.\n\nWe have sought to supply this much to be regretted lack of entomological\nknowledge, by applying to the ventral ganglia of insects the admirable\nmethod of sectional cutting, which has brought about such marked advances\nin contemporaneous zo\u00f6logy.\n\nI need hardly insist on the interest of this research. We shall only\nremark that all anatomical study bears an unfinished aspect, up to the\nmoment at which we grasp the meaning of the organs which we describe;\nphysiology is a necessary complement of anatomy, it is that which gives\nto it a meaning. Therefore, when we dissect an organ, which, as in the\ncase of an insect\u2019s brain, is endowed with the most complex psychical\nproperties of which these animals are capable, we find ourselves in the\npresence of parts whose functions almost entirely escape us. What is,\nfor example, that peculiar organ to which we have given the name of the\n\u201cpedunculate\u201d body? Anatomists have described with the greatest care its\nconnections and portrayed its external contour; but we cannot discover,\nor even conjecture its uses. It would be necessary to understand the\nhabits of thought and the feelings of an insect, to be able to assign a\nr\u00f4le to parts so complex and so delicate as those contained within its\nbrain.\n\nThe study of the ventral ganglia seems to us to be capable of\nconducting us to a better result, for in everything that concerns these\nnerve-masses, physiology is more advanced, and, in all cases, clearer.\nThe ganglia of the thorax, for example, are in the main motory centres;\nthe principal nerves that are sent out from them are to be found in the\nwings and in the feet; the study of the terrestrial, aquatic, and aerial\nlocomotion of insects has already formed the subject of quite a number\nof important scientific works; we are now upon well-known ground, and we\nmay hope that it will be possible to establish some connection between\nthe anatomical structure of ventral ganglia and the functions which these\nganglia control.\n\nThis hope appears to us to be the more legitimate, because we can make\nuse of all the resources of comparative anatomy to work out the problem.\nIf we consider any particular function, for example, that of flying,\nwe notice that in species which resemble each other this function is\nexercised under totally different conditions; the same organ acquires\ndifferent uses, and these variations become singularly instructive\nwhen we can trace their relationship to the particular structure of a\nnerve-ganglion. Thus, one of the large wings of the dragon-fly, which\nis almost like a bird in the range and power of its flight, becomes\nthe elytrum of the beetle; the elytrum is a stiff wing covered by\nchitinised matter and serving as a protection to a part of the thorax\nand abdomen. Sometimes the elytrum is used in flying, as in the case\nof the cockchafer. In other lamellicorn insects, in the _Cetonia_ for\ninstance, the elytrum is not used in flight; it merely moves aside so\nas to allow the second pair of wings to unfold. Its r\u00f4le becomes still\nless active in the golden carabus, in _Procrustes_, in _Blaps_, and many\nother _Coleoptera_, whose two elytra are found on one vertical line,\nand form but one single and immovable portion; then the second pair of\nwings disappear; from the physiological point of view, the animal becomes\napterous. In another and different order, the order _Diptera_, it is the\nsecond pair of wings that undergo an important modification; they cease\nto be used in flying, and are transformed into an organ of equipoise:\nthey are used for maintaining equilibrium.\n\nAll these physiological variations, taking place in the self-same organ,\nmust in all probability have their counterpart in the internal anatomy of\nthe ganglion that governs the organ, and the comparative study of this\nganglion in different species will enable us perhaps to discover the\nfunctions of some of its parts. Thus, if we consider by hypothesis, as\nthe nerve-centre of flight, some small lobe which is found occupying this\nor that place in a thoracic ganglion, the disappearance or modification\nof this lobe in species not possessing the faculty of flying, might serve\nto throw additional light upon such an interpretation.\n\nWhat we have just said with regard to flight is equally applicable to\nterrestrial locomotion, which also represents in itself many varieties.\nThe typal insect possesses three pairs of feet, whence the name of\nhexapods, but there are particular species which drop a pair of feet,\nfor instance, the _Lepidoptera_ of the genus _Vanessa_; in others,\nthe physiological function of the foot varies; in the case of the\ncarrion-beetle (a necrophagus coleopter) it serves as an instrument of\ntillage, to dig with; for the cricket, the third pair of feet are used\nfor the purpose of leaping; for the _Dytiscus_, it serves as an oar, and\nso on. We must also bear in mind the curious fact that there exists in\nthe larv\u00e6 of certain insects what are called supplementary feet, having\nonly a transient existence and disappearing at maturity; the caterpillar,\nthe larva of the butterfly, has five pairs of supplementary feet. These\nnotable facts demonstrated by comparative anatomy, cannot fail to furnish\nus with valuable information concerning the functions of the complex\norgans found in the ganglia of the thorax.\n\nBut this is not all. We have not enumerated all the contributions of\ncomparative anatomy to the problem which we are now about to consider; we\nmay make use of the method of comparison without bringing the different\ntypes into juxtaposition, but by viewing the nervous system of only\na single animal in its entirety. We know in fact that the body of an\ninsect is formed by a definite number of segments, all constructed on\nthe same fundamental plan and arranged in a linear series. Each one of\nthese segments is joined to a nerve-ganglion, which is all its own and\nsupplies it with sensibility and motility, the two elementary properties\nof nervous activity. In the course of development, these ganglia have the\npower of changing their positions; and it is not uncommon to find that\nthe greater number of the abdominal ganglia move up into the thorax; each\none, nevertheless, retaining its nerve-relationship to its own segment.\nNow all the segments of an insect\u2019s body are not called upon to play the\nsame r\u00f4le; a division of labor has been effected among them with regard\nto the functions which they are found to exercise: as we have already\nseen, the ganglia of the thorax are essentially centres of locomotion;\nin the head, one of the ganglia, the sub-\u0153sophageal, furnishes the\nnerves of the buccal portions; the other one, the brain, is connected\nwith particular nerves and becomes the centre of the highest form of\npsychical activity of which the creature is capable. We have here a\nnumber of modifications superadded to the original plan. Yet the original\nplan should again be met with in the ganglia that have been least\ndifferentiated, such as those in the abdominal region; and the comparison\nbetween an abdominal and a thoracic ganglion, for instance, is well\ncalculated to show what are the primal and fundamental structures, and\nwhat are the secondary ones which have been superadded and have become\nnecessary for the execution of the more complex functions. The study\nof embryonic and larval forms so easily observed in insects, will most\nprobably conduct us to the same result. And thus perhaps by continuous\nefforts, all guided by the same governing idea, we shall ultimately\narrive at the analogies that exist between the cerebroid ganglia and the\nhumblest ganglia belonging to the ventral chain, and thus finally be\nable to understand the action of the nerve-substance.\n\nThe importance of this object, which, be it clearly understood, can\nnever be attained except by the united effort of many workers, is well\ncalculated to command our strenuous exertions and to encourage us in\nsurmounting the difficulties of a study which is as yet almost entirely\nnew.\n\n\nII.\n\nWe shall restrict ourselves in this article to the consideration of one\nparticular case; we shall describe a single ganglion of the insect. The\ntype we have chosen, for reasons too lengthy to enumerate, is a Coleopter\nof the family of _Melolonthid\u00e6_; the _Rhizotrogus solstitialis_, a small\nbeetle very commonly found in the southwest of France. We will now\nproceed to the consideration of the first thoracic ganglion.\n\nThe prothoracic ganglion in the rhizotrogus is joined by very short\nconnective filaments to the second thoracic ganglion, and also to the\nsub-\u0153sophageal ganglion; this latter ganglion, we must note _en passant_,\nbeing situated in the thorax. If with a pair of scissors we sever the\nhead of the rhizotrogus, we find that the remainder of the body contains\nnot only the thoracic ganglia, but also the sub-\u0153sophageal; a peculiarity\nwhich, from a physiological point of view, is very interesting.\n\nThe ganglion of the pro-thorax, which is greater in width than it is in\nlength, bears a vague resemblance to a cone the base of which is turned\ntowards the sub-\u0153sophageal ganglion, whilst the apex points towards the\nsecond ganglion of the thorax. From the lower part spring two large\nnerves, their starting-point being nearer the ventral than the dorsal\nsurface, a fact clearly comprehended when we find that the fibres of\nthese nerves extend for the most part into the first pair of feet, that\nis to say, into those organs that lie underneath the horizontal plane\nof the ganglion. The connective filaments which penetrate the ganglion\nanteriorly enter it nearer the dorsal surface than the ventral, this last\nbeing extremely convex. Dissection throws no additional light upon the\nanatomy of the ganglion. But by means of a series of sections, we find\nthat it is composed of a mass of fibrillar substance which occupies its\ncentre portion and of a layer of nerve-cells surrounding the fibrillar\nsubstance. This fibrillar mass is, owing to its great volume, far the\nmost important, and constitutes in itself alone about four-fifths of the\norgan. The fibrillary structure can only be satisfactorily analysed by\nusing on it osmic acid, or other equivalent reagents which dissociate\nit and admit of its being reduced to a certain number of clearly\ndifferentiated elements. Whenever osmic acid or a similar reagent has not\nbeen employed, or has not sufficiently penetrated the ganglion, owing\nto the obstacle presented by a thick conjunctival covering or envelope,\nthe fibrillar substance takes on a homogeneous aspect that effectually\nrenders all analysis of it impossible. Everything depends on the\nemployment of a good method of preparation.\n\nWhen the ganglion has been properly prepared, we perceive a very material\ndifference in the appearance of the fibrillar substance when we compare\nthe dorsal with the ventral region of the ganglion. We can do this\nvery satisfactorily by a longitudinal section, extending through both\nregions. In such a section close to the median line but not confounded\nwith it (see Cut 16)[9] we perceive that the ventral region is occupied\nby a cord or string of substance which owing to the action of the osmic\nacid has become very black, and which is formed of so dense a tissue,\nthat we can with difficulty separate it into fibres and fibrill\u00e6. This\ncord, which, by reason of its position and shape, I propose naming the\n_ventral column_, extends over the ventral surface of the ganglion in a\nlongitudinal direction; at both its anterior and posterior extremities it\nis carried on by fibres extending into the ventral columns of the other\nganglia, in such a manner that the entire series of ganglia are united by\none continuous ventral cord.\n\nIf we look at a transverse section (see Cut 26), the cord, which is\nrecognised by its dark color and by its position near the ventral surface\nof the fibrillar substance, will be seen to have the form of two almost\nperfect circles. The ventral column thus presents a circular section, is\nduplex and symmetrical: there exist two separate and distinct ventral\ncolumns, separate at least for a certain length; a fact which must be\nconsidered in connection with the primitive duality of the ganglion.\n\nIn every section where the columns remain distinct from each other, they\nare separated either by fibres and conjunctival cells, or by nerve-fibres\nemanating from the cells of the ventral region and proceeding in an\nupward direction between the two columns. At the other points, the two\ncolumns join on the median line. This union is effected in different\nways, either by the two columns coming directly together, thus merging\ninto a single mass, or by a commissure which describes the arc of a\ncircle underneath the two columns, or else by the inferior ventral lobule.\n\nWe give the name of inferior ventral lobule to a small lobule of\nfibrillar substance, situated beneath the ventral column. When looked\nat in a horizontal section not passing through the median line (see Cut\n17), this lobule presents the appearance of a rounded protuberance,\nbreaking the almost rectilinear contour of the ventral column. As this\ncharacteristic peculiarity is repeated in the internal structure of\nall the ganglia, we may use it to ascertain the number of the ganglia,\nwhenever these present the appearance of being fused into one compact\nmass; we may see the practical application of this remark by observing\nthe sub-\u0153sophageal ganglion.\n\nIn a succession of horizontal sections, the starting point of which is\nthe ventral region, the first mass of fibrillar substance met with by the\nknife is the inferior ventral lobule, which is formed (see Cut 1) by two\nrounded fasciculi, placed symmetrically on either side of the median line\nand joined together by a transverse commissure.\n\nIn these sections, we also perceive fibres of the crural nerve, which,\nafter having extended over a certain length of the ganglion, penetrate\ninto the substance of the inferior ventral lobule (Cut 2). In transverse\nsections (Cut 23) we find the two ventral lobules placed beneath the two\ncolumns which they help to support, and into which they gradually merge;\nand we also perceive the transverse commissure which joins the two.\nWe shall call this the _transverse commissure of the inferior ventral\nlobule_.\n\nLet us now pass on to the examination of the upper surface of the\nventral column. This surface is covered by a cluster of very fine fibrils\nrather sparsely disposed; we can clearly follow their course by means\nof a longitudinal section (Cut 17); we see them again in a horizontal\nsection (Cut 5). To continue the general description of the ganglion we\nmust now consider the dorsal region. It is, as we have previously stated,\noccupied by a fibrillar substance not so dense as that which composes the\nventral column, and we will give the general name of dorsal lobe to this\nregion, reserving the name ventral lobe for the region which embraces the\nventral column and its adjoining parts. The dorsal lobe presents as its\ndistinctive characteristic the feature that it is crossed longitudinally\nby a succession of connective filaments clearly seen in the longitudinal\nsection of Cut 16.\n\nWe have already stated that the ventral column receives fibres issuing\nfrom the ganglion in front and sends out others to the ganglia in the\nrear. We shall call the totality of these fibres _the connective ventral\nfilaments_, and shall call the totality of those that traverse the dorsal\nlobe _the dorsal connective filaments_.\n\nThe connective filaments which join the sub-\u0153sophageal to the first\nthoracic ganglion, and which, between these two ganglia, are composed of\na dense fasciculus of fibres, distribute these fibres, at the point at\nwhich they enter the prothoracic ganglia, in different directions; one\nset of fibres proceeds towards the ventral column, these are the ventral\nconnective filaments; a second set traverses the dorsal lobe, and are the\ndorsal connective filaments.\n\nWhilst the ventral connective filaments soon merge into the very dense\nsubstance of the ventral column, the dorsal connective filaments, on\nthe contrary, remain distinct from the organs which they traverse, and\npreserve their individuality throughout. They take directions in three\ndifferent planes (see Cut 16), consequently they can be subdivided into\nsuperior, medial, and inferior dorsal connective filaments.\n\nNewport seems to have observed this distinction of fibres; and he has\ngiven the name of sensory column to this first division, and that of\nmotor column to the second. Unfortunately the drawings and figures he has\npublished, though schematically correct, are not clear. We do not adopt\nhis terminology, in the first place because he designates the organs\nafter their supposed functions, and we have made it a rule never to use\ncontrovertible physiological suppositions to designate anatomical organs;\nand besides, though the name of column is applicable to the connective\nventral filaments, we cannot apply it to the connective dorsal filaments,\nwhich are subdivided into three pairs of fibrous fasciculi and do not in\nthe least resemble a column.\n\nIn the study of _Melolontha vulgaris_, we have been able to establish in\nthe most absolute manner that there exists a considerable histological\ndifference between the connective filaments of the ventral region and\nthose of the dorsal. Though we have not yet noticed this difference in\n_Rhizotrogus_ in any marked degree, nevertheless it has seemed to us\nneedful to point it out here, because the fact is of such vast importance\nthat it cannot fail to be general. The dorsal connective filaments,\nwhilst they preserve their individuality in their passage across the\ndorsal lobe of the ganglion, penetrate nevertheless into some small\nmasses of dotted substance which are found in the path of their entrance\ninto the ganglion. The mass annexed to the inferior dorsal connective\nfilament, is above all very important and is directly connected with\nthe ventral column. As the connective filaments are in pairs, each of\nthese possesses a distinct mass of fibrillar substance and both the\nmasses attached to the same pair of connective filaments are joined by a\ncommissure.\n\nLet us now say a few words about the nerves which proceed toward the\nprothoracic ganglion. There exists here but one single pair of nerves,\nextremely important and very extensive. This is the crural nerve. To\nthis nerve are attached the organs which are superadded to the primary\nstructure of the ganglion, such as we have described it, and which in\nconsequence renders the primitive structure more complex. We shall\nperceive the importance attached to the idea of a _superadded_ organ,\nwhen we study the abdominal ganglia, where the organs we are about to\ndescribe are either completely wanting or are but imperfectly developed.\n\nIf now we examine a transversal section taken a little in front of the\nplace from whence the crural nerves emerge (Cut 19), we shall notice\nthat the central part of the ganglion is occupied by the ventral column\nand the upper part by the dorsal lobe. In addition to this, in the\nlateral regions of the ganglion we find two important masses of fibrillar\nsubstance. At this point these two masses remain distinct from the parts\nwe have just mentioned, and on the other hand they are in connection with\nthe crural nerves. The latter send a part, and unquestionably the greater\npart, of their fibres into the lateral lobes. In a section slightly\nposterior to the preceding one, also transversal, a very important change\nhas taken place; the two lateral lobules, always connected with the\ncrural nerves, have also established connections with the centre of the\nganglion, and in the sections further on the fusion is complete. As these\nlateral lobules possess the characteristics mentioned, only at the point\nat which the crural nerves emerge, we shall call them the _crural lobes_.\nThus we find in the prothoracic ganglion three principal lobes: (1) the\ncrural lobe, which is double, symmetrical, and lateral, (2) the dorsal\nlobe, (3) the ventral lobe. These two last, in contradistinction to the\ncrural lobe, will be classed together under the common term _central\nlobe_.\n\nAnd now to finish this summary description of the prothoracic ganglion,\nwe will point out an important disposition of the connective tissue which\ndivides the ganglion into two halves, one anterior, the other posterior.\nWe can easily understand this disposition by looking at a longitudinal\nsection passing exactly through the median line. From the dorsal surface\nof the ganglion, may be seen descending a bundle of cells and connective\nfibres, which, in the form of a column, are directed toward the centre\nof the ganglion; these cells and fibres do not meet any important organ\non their way, the dorsal connective filaments always taking a lateral\ncourse. A fasciculus, similarly composed of cells and conjunctival\nfibres, starting from the ventral surface of the ganglion, appears\nto meet this conjunctival column (Cut 18). This curious disposition\nappears to be, as M. Henneguy has ingeniously suggested to me, a trace\nof the anterior development of the ganglion which had been formed of two\ndistinct portions that have been naturally _welded_ together along the\nmedian line; the connective fasciculi corresponding to the point where\nthe welding has been incomplete, and representing the survival of a\nportion of the walls of the two ganglia.\n\n\nIII.\n\nAs the ganglion which we have just described contains some structural\ndifficulties not easy of comprehension, let us proceed with our\ndescription under another form, following the order of our illustrations.\n\nFigure 1 is the first horizontal section, cut through the ventral region\nof the ganglion; the knife has here met the lower ventral lobule, which\nat this point shows itself double; the two halves being joined by a\ndouble transversal commissure. Section 2, made at a point a little higher\nthan the preceding one, shows us at the centre the lower ventral lobule\nas increased in size; and in the lateral part of the figure appears a new\norgan, the crural lobule, which is here entirely merged into the lower\nventral lobule. The crural lobule is traversed by fibres from the crural\nnerve, which instead of being entirely lost in its substance, proceed\nstill further, passing into the lower ventral lobule. Section 3 merely\nbrings into prominence an important transversal commissure. In Section\n4, the inferior ventral lobule is replaced by the ventral column, which\nappears double, is symmetrical, and united by a transversal commissure;\nthis commissure being formed of fibrillar substance. The ventral column\nis closely connected on each side with the crural lobule; it is besides\ncrossed by the ventral connective fibres, which can be seen emerging\nfrom its anterior and posterior extremities. Section 5 allows us to\nexamine thoroughly the disposition of those ventral connective fibres; we\nsee that while they penetrate the ganglion, they also pass through two\nsymmetrical masses of fibrillar substance; these two masses, which we\nname the anterior ventral lobules, are joined together by a transversal\ncommissure. After having traversed the anterior ventral lobules, to which\nit appears they give a portion of their fibres, the ventral connective\nfilaments pass through the ganglion in an antero-posterior direction, and\nwe see them penetrating the two posterior ventral lobules. The last named\nlobules, which remind us by their position and appearance of the anterior\nlobules, receive in addition fibres issuing from the crural lobules; but\nthey do not receive them all, because we notice quite a number of these\nfibres advancing directly into the second thoracic ganglion. After\nemerging from the posterior ventral lobules, the ventral connective\nfilaments pass into the second thoracic ganglion, where we see them\npenetrate into the anterior ventral lobules.\n\nWith Figure 6, we leave the ventral lobe of the ganglion and come\nto the lower portions of the dorsal lobule. The important filaments\ncrossing this section from the front to the back are called lower dorsal\nconnective filaments. We notice as they proceed some small masses of\ndotted substance, and, in addition to these, dark colored dots which are\nthe result of the knife having cut crosswise through several fascicles of\nascending fibres. We shall find out by means of the sections taken from\ndifferent parts and placed so as to allow of our better observation, what\nthese ascending fibres are. The crural lobule, always exhibits the same\ncharacteristics. We have given it a homogeneous aspect in our drawing. As\na fact it presents in its sections a vast number of structural details.\nBut these details being very difficult to understand, we prefer not to\ndwell upon them.\n\nSection 7 passes through the very midst of the lower dorsal connective\nfilaments; these filaments being in two pairs, one external and the\nother internal. The external pair, situated somewhat lower, has here\ndisappeared, and the inner pair is the only one to be seen. Some\ntransversal fibres, whose direction appears to me difficult to follow,\ndivide the inside dorsal connective filaments at two different points,\nand assume the figure of a square; this square has two black dots,\nproduced by the section of the ascending fibres.\n\nA little higher, in Figure 8, the lower connective filaments have\ndisappeared and the fibrillar substance of the ganglion is furrowed by\nlong transversal fibres, of which a part seems to serve the function\nof joining the two crural lobules, whilst the remainder, proceeding\ntowards the black dots before mentioned, continue their progress with\nthe fasciculi of ascending fibres. These are no other than ascending\nfibres which, having changed their direction at the plane of the section,\nproceed almost in a horizontal plane. In Section 9 we follow the course\nof the medial dorsal connective filaments, separated from the lower\nconnective filaments by the fibres having a transverse direction, seen\nin Figure 8. The medial dorsal connective filaments are four in number,\nan outer pair and an inner pair. At the moment when they leave the\nprothoracic ganglion, they cross a region where the fibrillar substance\nis both thicker and darker. In Figure 10 the medial connective filaments\nare on the point of disappearing; they receive certain fibres coming from\nthe crural lobules, which are now reduced in dimensions. Section 11 shows\nus the lower dorsal connective filaments, which are the slenderest of all\nand of which there are but one pair; the crural lobule now disappears. In\nthe middle of the figure, we observe a small collection of conjunctival\ncells which, as we have supposed, indicates the point where in the course\nof development the two symmetrical portions of the ganglion have not been\nperfectly fused together. Finally Section 12 shows two lateral masses of\nfibrillar substance, separated by a strip of conjunctival membrane.\n\nWe will now take up the series of longitudinal sections, the study of\nwhich will demand very special attention. We shall there meet again with\nthe organs which we have already examined in the horizontal sections;\nand we shall perceive that the alterations and modifications presented\nto us by the difference in our point of observation, bring out very\nimportant changes in the appearance of those organs. The sectional method\nof examination is also one of analysis. In order to reconstruct an organ\nin its complete form and to conceive of it in space, our mind must bring\ninto a single focus what the sections have represented in a fragmentary\nmanner: we must, in short, substitute synthesis for analysis.\n\nFigure 13 represents the first and exterior longitudinal section; it\nhardly touches the ganglion; in the front we see the starting point of\nthe crural nerve, and also a portion of the periphery of the crural\nlobule. The crural nerve exhibits several roots, the most important of\nwhich occupy the ventral region. Figure 14, though very elementary,\nbrings out many important points; we see here the crural lobule, which\nhas increased in size and extends from the ventral to the dorsal region;\na fact which has already been indicated in the horizontal sections, the\ncrural lobule having been shown in them at all points. This lobule is\nalmost circular in form. Along its ventral region, we perceive some of\nthe fibres of the crural nerve which do not penetrate into the lobule;\nthese are the ones we met with in the figures 2 and 3: they are the\nfibres which pass directly into the lower ventral lobule. With Section\n15, we leave the lateral regions of the ganglion and come to the dorsal\nand ventral regions; we must notice that the crural lobule is continuous\nwith the central fibrillar mass and has no precise limits. In Section\n15 the ventral column appears, reduced in size. In the front of it\nwe observe an incisure through which certain nerve-cells send their\nprolongations into the fibrillar substance.\n\nFigure 16 shows us the complete junction of all the connective filaments\ntraversing the ganglion; first the ventral column, with the connective\nventral filaments starting from both its extremities; and then the three\ndorsal connective filaments, which preserve their individuality distinct,\nwhile they cross the dorsal lobe of the ganglion. The lower dorsal\nconnective filament is distinguished from the others by a small compact\nmass of fibrillar substance through which it passes. We must note that\nthe fibrillar substance becomes thicker at the point where the whole\nseries of connective filaments enter the ganglion, and the same thing\nis repeated at the place where they leave the first thoracic ganglion\nto enter into the second. The ventral column is distinguished from the\nother parts of the ganglion by the dark color which it assumes through\nthe action of the osmic acid; it presents black granules which, examined\nwith a strong lens, show small fasciculi of fibres running in a parallel\ndirection. The cells which line the lower surface of the ventral column\ndo not throw out any prolongations; they are exceedingly small, but do\nnot otherwise present any special feature.\n\nFigure 17 is but very slightly different from the preceding one: the\nventral column is simply strengthened on its lower surface by the lower\nventral lobule. The position of this lobule is interesting to note. We\nhave already mentioned that each ganglion is divided into two halves by\na column of conjunctival tissue, one anterior and the other posterior.\nIn Section 17 we see the granulated projection of the ventral portion\nof this conjunctival column. In order to simplify it we have shown no\nconjunctival tissue in our illustration. We may nevertheless notice,\nthat the nerve-cells at the point marked _c. c._ seem to separate one\nfrom the other, and show a triangular space between them, filled with\nconjunctival cells. If the segment had not been cut so obliquely, (and\nthis obliqueness in the sections is almost unavoidable when dealing with\nsuch very small organs,) we should also perceive on the dorsal line\nof the section the projection of the dorsal part of the conjunctival\ncolumn; in fact we shall see this projection in the figure which follows.\nThe presence of the conjunctival column separates, as we have said,\neach ganglion into two parts, one anterior the other posterior. These\nportions are not at all symmetrical. We see in Section 17 that the lower\nventral lobule is found only in the anterior part. Finally from the\nventral column rises an important fasciculus of ascending fibres, which\nwe have already seen in the horizontal diagrams; it is difficult for\nus to ascertain what these fibres are. In the 18th and last section we\napproach nearer the median line. The ventral column at this level has\nthe appearance of being divided into two trunks. The ventral connective\nfilaments are clearly seen upon its upper surface. Among the dorsal\nconnective filaments the middle one alone remains visible and receives a\ncertain number of fibres from the ascending fasciculus.\n\nTo complete our description let us glance at the series of transverse\nsections. In Figure 19 the two crural lobules have not yet united and\nare not yet merged into the dorsal-ventral lobe. This junction does not\ntake place until we come to Figure 20. Here, at this level, we see in\naddition the circular segment of the two ventral columns, which by their\ndark color are sharply outlined against the remainder of the fibrillar\nsubstance. To the right and left of these two columns we perceive small\nmasses of dotted substance; we merely call attention to them and shall\nnot describe them. Figure 21 furnishes no noteworthy modifications of\nthe preceding. We simply see a few cells of the periphery sending out\ntheir prolongations into the fibrillar substance. The point at which they\nthus penetrate it has already been indicated in Figure 15. In Figure 22\nwe have a section of several dorsal connective filaments; among others\na lower root of the crural nerve is here seen to pass along the ventral\nsurface of the fibrillar substance without penetrating into the crural\nlobule. Does there exist an upper root of the same nerve, which follows\nthe upper surface of the dotted substance? We do not dare to decide the\nquestion. One thing is certain, and that is that if the nerve does exist\nit is accompanied along its path by a great number of widely ramified\ntrache\u00e6, of which we see a drawing in _tr._ In the three figures which\nfollow (23, 24, 25) the ventral column presents an interesting series of\nmodifications. First of all, in Figure 23, it is surrounded by the lower\nventral lobule, of which the two masses are in a lateral position, and\nwhose commissures pass underneath the column. We see in the same Figure\n23 the two lower roots of the crural nerve, advancing towards the column.\nIn the 24th section the two roots have reached the column, and two other\nnerves cross the crural lobule; doubtless their destination is the lower\ndorsal connective filaments, but of this we have no clear indication.\nIn the 24th section two other crural roots also enter the lower ventral\nlobule. This section is very favorable for the examination of the\nascending fasciculus which we have already noticed in the longitudinal\nsections. It seems to us certain that this fasciculus terminates in the\nmiddle dorsal connective filament. Its origin is more uncertain. It seems\nto spring from the ventral column, or else to come from crural roots\nwhich, after having traversed the crural lobule, reascend towards the\ndorsal lobe of the ganglion, describing a curve exteriorily concave. It\nis possible that this ascending fasciculus has both these origins. The\n26th and last section shows us the ventral column on a larger scale;\nthe two columns being distinct from each other, though united at the\nlower extremity by a commissure. The _ensemble_ of the figure strikingly\nreminds one of a section of the abdominal ganglion.\n\nHere our description ends. We have not sought to follow up every fibre in\nall its details, nor to describe completely the anatomy of each organ.\nOur intention has merely been to give a synthetic notion of a nervous\nganglion. Subsequent studies made on other ganglia will demonstrate the\ngeneral application of this idea.\n\n ALFRED BINET.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[9] For the cuts, see the plates in the Appendix of this number.\n\n\n\n\nHINDU MONISM.\n\nWHO WERE ITS AUTHORS, PRIESTS OR WARRIORS?\n\n\nAmong all the forms of government class government is the worst. Carthage\nwas governed by merchants, and the mercantile spirit of its policy led\nfinally to the destruction of the city. Sparta was governed by warriors,\nand in spite of the glory of Thermopyl\u00e6 it was doomed to stagnation.\nIndia was governed by priests, and the weal of the nation was sacrificed\nwith reckless indifference to their interests. It appears that for the\nwelfare of the community the harmonious co-operation of all classes is\nnot only desirable but also indispensable.\n\nYet it is often claimed that mankind is greatly indebted to nations or\nstates ruled by class government, for having worked out the particular\noccupation of the ruling class to a perfection which otherwise it would\nnot have reached. This is at least doubtful.\n\nCarthage was eager to establish monopolies, but she contributed little to\nthe higher development of commerce and trade among mankind.\n\nSparta raised brave men, but was not progressive, even in the science\nof war, and was worsted by so weak an adversary as Thebes. Modern\nstrategists could learn something from Epaminondas, but little, if\nanything, from the Laced\u00e6monians.\n\nPriestcraft has attained to a power in India unparalleled in the history\nof other nations, and it is no exaggeration to say that priest-rule\nwas the ruin of the country. Yet the wisdom of the Brahmans has become\nproverbial. Their philosophy is praised as original and profound, and it\nis well known that the first monistic world-conception was thought out\nin ancient India. But we shall see later on what the real share of the\nBrahmans in this great work has been.\n\nIn the very earliest ages of Hindu antiquity, revealed to us in the songs\nof the Rig-veda, we meet with priests who claimed the power of making\nsacrifices to the gods in a manner especially acceptable to them, and\nwho thus rose to great power, influence, and wealth. To this ancient\nperiod of Hindu history we can trace the origin of the Hindu castes,\nessentially a result of priestly egotism, and which up to this day has\nweighed down the Indian people like a nightmare. The organisation of\nthe priestly class into an exclusive, privileged body, as well as the\nfinal development of the castes, did not, however, take place until the\ntime represented by the second period of the ancient Hindu literature;\nby the literature, that is to say, of the Yajur-vedas or the Vedas of\nthe sacrificial formul\u00e6, and the Br\u00e2hmanas and S\u00fbtras, both of which\ndescribe the sacrificial ceremonies, the former with, the latter without\ntheological comments. The contents of these works illustrate the origin\nof the Hindu hierarchy and castes; but it is often necessary to read\nbetween the lines. The greatest authority on this rich literature, Prof.\nA. Weber, of Berlin, in the tenth volume of the series \u201cHindu Studies\u201d\nwhich he edits, has published his inquiries concerning this subject in a\nvery learned treatise, entitled \u201cCollectanea \u00fcber die Kastenverh\u00e4ltnisse\nin der Br\u00e2hmana und S\u00fbtra,\u201d of which I have made considerable use in the\nfollowing pages.\n\nIn these books the Brahmans assert their claims with startling candor. In\nseveral passages\u2014to begin with the most striking feature\u2014they announce\nthemselves as real gods wandering on earth. \u201cThere are two kinds of\ngods,\u201d it is said, \u201cthe true gods and the learned Brahmans, who recite\nthe Veda.\u201d \u201cThe Brahman represents all gods.\u201d \u201cHe is the god of gods.\u201d\nThis is perhaps the most remarkable instance of priestly arrogance in all\nhistory. Thus it cannot at all surprise us that the Brahmans, as earthly\ngods, placed themselves above king and nobility; but it appears rather\nstrange that the kings and warriors should have allowed to them the first\nplace in the government. But as a matter of fact, they did do so and were\ncompelled to do so. From mysterious legends in the great Hindu epic poem\nwe infer, that bloody wars have been waged for supremacy, in which the\nnobility was defeated.\n\nThe legends of this epos are thus important additions to the sources\nwith which we are concerned. This struggle, which the Brahmans in all\nlikelihood caused to be fought out for them by the great masses of the\npeople, has been ascribed to the warriors having robbed the priests\nof the treasures which the latter had acquired by the performance of\nthe sacrifices; and this part of the legend is so highly probable\nthat we cannot treat it as a pure myth, especially if we take into\nconsideration the circumstances of those times. It was the first attempt\nat secularisation in the history of the world, and the results were very\ndisastrous to those who were then in secular power.\n\nThe Brahmans did not establish a social hierarchy or ecclesiastical\nranks, nor did they participate in the government, except that the king\nwas bound to employ a Brahman as Purohita or house-priest, who occupied\nas such the position of prime minister. If, however, they succeeded in\ndominating the nobility and the whole people, it was principally on\naccount of their greater knowledge, of which they boasted, and especially\non account of the sacrificial arts, by the proper exercise of which in\nthose times, all favors could be obtained from the gods. For a duly\nperformed sacrifice, which would last weeks, months, nay, years, the\nBrahmans charged of course a high fee. A fee of ten thousand oxen was\nprescribed for a certain ceremony, a hundred thousand for another one,\nand a later teacher of ritualism charged 240,000 for the same service.\nAnd this was not yet the climax of priestly avarice, which\u2014to use an\nexpression of Professor Weber\u2014indulges in veritable orgies in these\nbooks. After one has gone through the endless description of a ceremony,\none finds at the end the remark that the whole sacrifice has no effect,\nunless the proper fee be paid to the priest. And\u2014to use a term of modern\nlife\u2014lest competition should reduce the prices or spoil the business, a\nrule was established, that no one should take a fee which another one had\nrefused. (Weber, p. 54.)\n\nThe sacrificial rituals, so trying and tedious for us, are the only\nliterary production of these dull centuries before the rising of\nphilosophical speculation, and the great historical importance they\npossess is simply due to the light they throw on the moral depravity of\nthe Brahmans as a class.\n\nThe following fact will fully show to what extent sexual debaucheries\nwere indulged in. The priest was enjoined, by a special rule, not to\ncommit adultery with the wife of another during a particularly holy\nceremony. But he who could not practice continence, was allowed to\nexpiate his sin by an offering of milk to Varuna and Mitra.\n\nNumerous passages in the books on ritualism furnish us interesting\nillustrations of the great indulgence which the Brahmans had for each\nother\u2019s weaknesses. The officiating priest is taught how to proceed\nduring the sacrifice, if he wants to wrong the man who employs and pays\nhim, or how to deviate from the prescribed rules, if he wants to rob\nhis employer of his seeing, hearing, children, property, or position.\nThe lack of confidence that resulted is best illustrated by a ceremony,\nthe introduction of which, at the beginning of the sacrifice, became\ngradually necessary. By a solemn oath the officiating minister and the\nclient bound themselves not to injure each other during the performance\nof the holy act. Consequently, the strange notions of right, which the\nBrahmans had in those times, will not surprise us. \u201cMurder of any one\nbut a Brahman is no murder.\u201d \u201cAn arbitrator must decide in favor of\nthe Brahman and not in favor of his opponent, if the latter is not a\nBrahman.\u201d Such maxims are laid down in the texts with shameless insolence.\n\nIt is plain that the caste system greatly contributed to increase the\npower and influence of the priests, because in a country where the people\nare divided into classes, the priest always succeeds in inciting at his\nwish the one against the other.\n\nAfter the Brahmans came as second caste the Kshattriyas (literally: the\nruling class, i. e., king, nobility, soldiers); and as third caste the\nVaisyas (the bulk of the people: farmers, merchants, etc.). The conquered\nnon-Aryan aborigines were foreordained by the gods to serve the Aryan\ncastes and especially the Brahmans. They were called S\u00fadras (serfs) and\nhad neither civil nor religious rights. \u201cThe S\u00fadra is the servant of\nothers; he can be cast out or killed.\u201d By this humane maxim were the\nBrahmans guided in their conduct towards the aborigines.\n\nWith such a state of things, as it appears in the old books, the\npriesthood ought to have been well pleased. But the Brahmans were not;\nthey desired still greater advantages and carried out the caste system\nto a most absurd extent. The result is embodied in the famous law-book\nof Manu, the exact date of which we do not yet know, but which must be\nplaced at the beginning of our era. The condition of things of which I\nshall now speak, was accordingly developed during the last centuries\nbefore Christ. Though we may suppose that some rules of this code have\nremained a mere theory and have never been carried out, there remains\nenough to show the social life of those times in a poor light. K\u00f6ppen,\nin the first chapters of his book on Buddhism, has severely but justly\njudged the social organisation, as it appears in Manu\u2019s law-book; but\nas the age of this code was overrated at his time, he was led to one\nerroneous conclusion: he attributes the historical process, of which we\nspeak, to the period before Buddha, while it really took place after\nBuddha: L. von Schr\u00f6der, in his work \u201cIndian Literature and History,\u201d in\nthe twenty-ninth lecture, gives us a good view of those times.\n\nDifferent passages in Manu\u2019s code show us that the claim of the Brahmans\nto divinity had not decreased in the course of the centuries. \u201cThe\nBrahmans are to be venerated at all times, as they are the highest\ndivinity.\u201d \u201cBy his very origin the Brahman is a god, even to the gods.\u201d\n\nThe many practical privileges they enjoyed were of still greater value.\nThey were exempt from taxation under all circumstances, \u201ceven if the king\nshould starve.\u201d For the greatest crimes they could not be executed or\nchastised, nor was their property liable to confiscation, while at the\nsame time the criminal law was very harsh towards the other castes and\nespecially towards the S\u00fadras. The penalties increased proportionately:\nthe lower the caste to which the criminal belonged, the higher the\npunishment; and the fines also increased in proportion to the rank of the\ncaste to which the injured man belonged. The money-lender was allowed\nto exact (monthly) two per cent. of a Brahman, three of a Kshattriya,\nfour of a Vaisya, five of a S\u00fadra. All these laws show how the Brahmans\nunderstood the art of advancing their interests. The S\u00fadra was by the\ncode deprived of all rights. \u201cThe Brahman may consider him as a slave and\nis therefore entitled to take his property, as the property of the slave\nbelongs to the master.\u201d \u201cThe S\u00fadra shall not acquire wealth, even if he\nbe in a position to do so, as such conduct gives offense to the Brahman.\u201d\n\nBut all these things are harmless when compared with the principles by\nwhich the Brahmans reduced to the most miserable of lives numberless\nhuman creatures who had committed no wrong except that their origin did\nnot agree with the political scheme of the priests. Formerly it had been\nlawful for the members of the three Aryan castes, after having married\na girl of the same caste, to take other wives of a lower caste besides,\nand no disgrace attached to their children. The son of a Brahman and a\nVaisya\u2014or even of a S\u00fadra woman\u2014was therefore a Brahman. But this was no\nlonger the case under the code of Manu.\n\nIf the parents belonged to different castes, the children did not follow\neither father or mother, but they formed a mixed caste and the law\ndistinctly regulates their occupations and trades. This theory gave birth\nto a great number of mixed castes, who were more or less despised. And\nthe social standing of many of them grew still worse on account of an\nabsurd maxim which degraded the Indian people to the level of grass and\nplants. Good seed in a bad soil gives of course a poorer return than in\ngood soil; still the crop is endurable. But weed introduced into good\nsoil produces weed abundantly. According to this theory of the Brahmans\nthe children were below the father, if he had married a wife of a higher\ncaste. The lowest and most execrable creature therefore is the son of\na S\u00fadra and a Brahman woman. The destiny of a S\u00fadra was of course hard\nand unhappy, but the misery of the offspring of such a marriage, of the\nChand\u00e2la, defies all description. \u201cHe shall live far from the abodes of\nother men and bear signs by which everybody can recognise and avoid him,\nas his contact pollutes. Only in daytime shall he be admitted into the\nvillages, as then people can avoid him. He shall possess but common\nanimals like dogs and donkeys, eat out of broken plates, put on the\ndresses of the dead, etc. They were compelled to serve as executioners.\nTo the utmost degree of contempt and misery has the proud Brahman reduced\nthese poor creatures.\u201d (Schr\u00f6der, pp. 423-424.)\n\nBut the Chand\u00e2la was not the last in the Brahmanic scale, which\nsuppressed all dignity in human nature; his offspring, though he had\nonly a wife of the S\u00fadra caste, was necessarily still below him. Thus\noriginated a great number of mixed castes, one more despised than the\nother, and despising one another. Most of these outcasts take their names\nfrom the Indian aborigines and are thus placed on the same level with\nthe most contemptible tribes. Some of the things I have cited about the\nmixed castes, may have been merely a theory of the Brahmans; however, the\nactual existence of classes of people reduced by the clergy to a sort of\nanimal life, has been sufficiently verified by foreign travellers.\n\nIn modern times the separation of the people has been going on very\nrapidly; so much so, that nearly every trade or profession now forms\na caste of its own, having no social intercourse with, nor patriotic\nfeelings for the other castes. This condition of things is due to the\ninfluence of the Brahmans, for it has grown out of the social order they\nhave founded.\n\nIt is not my task to arraign the Brahmans for the sins they have\ncommitted; but simply to illustrate to my readers, how little they cared\nfor and had at heart the interests of their people. One will, upon the\nwhole, feel inclined to denounce the selfishness and immorality of the\nBrahmans, but on the other hand will acknowledge with admiration the\nintellectual work they have done, and forgive them much for the profound\nthoughts with which they have enriched their country and the whole world.\nIs it not the wisdom of the Brahmans that has given to the word India a\nsound that stirs the hearts of all to whom the struggle for the highest\ntruth appears as the highest phenomenon in the history of civilisation?\nBut suppose it can be shown that the greatest of all the wisdom of the\nBrahman, the monistic doctrine of the All-in-One, which has had the\ngreatest influence on the intellectual life of modern times, was not\ndiscovered by them?\n\nBefore I enter on this question, of the greatest importance from an\nhistorical point of view, I will give a short sketch of the period of\nIndian history in which this doctrine was established.\n\nFor centuries the Brahmans had heaped sacrifice on sacrifice and\nmultiplied symbolical explanations without end. All this distinctly\nbore the stamp of priestly sophistry. Suddenly higher thoughts arise.\nThe learning handed down by tradition and the sacrificial system are,\nit is true, not altogether abandoned; the mind, however, is no longer\nsatisfied with the mysteries of the sacrifices, but aims at higher and\nmore sublime truth. The age of intellectual darkness is followed by a new\nera, the characteristic of which is the ambition to solve the problems of\nlife and to understand the relation of the individual to the absolute.\nAll the efforts of the human mind are now bent on solving the question\nof the eternal Unity, from which all phenomena have emanated and which\nevery one perceives within his own self. It is the age of the Upanishads,\nthose famous books, which, as soon as they were known in Europe, filled\nall scholars with wild enthusiasm and admiration. I refer only to the\nold Upanishads, that date from the eighth to the sixth century B. C.,\nnot to the great number of books of the same name, but not of the same\nvalue\u2014there are over 200 of them\u2014which appeared after the Christian era.\nThe Upanishads reveal the struggle of the mind to reach the highest\ntruth. Though they indulge occasionally in strange speculations, still\nthe idea of Brahma, of the universal soul, of the absolute, of the\nthing in itself, is the ever-recurring subject of their thoughts, which\nculminate in the idea that the Atman, the inner self of man, is naught\nbut the eternal and endless Brahma. A wonderful pathos animates the\nlanguage of the Upanishads and testifies to the sublime feelings in which\nthe thinkers of those times sought the great mystery of existence. They\nlook for all kinds of expressions, metaphors and figures, in order to\ncouch in words what cannot be described by words. We read for instance\nin the venerable Brihad\u00e2ranyaka Upanishad: \u201cThat which lives on the\nearth, but is different from the earth, that which is the moving power\nof the earth, that is your Self, the inner immortal ruler.\u201d The same\nis predicated of water, fire, ether, wind, sun, moon, and stars; and\nthen the chapter ends as follows: \u201cUnseen, he sees; unheard, he hears;\nunminded, he minds; unknown, he knows. There is none that sees but he;\nthere is none that hears but he; there is none that minds but he; there\nis none that knows but he. He is thy soul, the inner ruler. Whatever is\ndifferent from him, is perishable.\u201d\n\nIn the same celebrated Upanishad appears a woman, named G\u00e2rg\u00ee, and moved\nby thirst of knowledge she inquires of the wise Y\u00e2jnavalkya: \u201cThat which\nis beyond the sky and beneath the earth, and between sky and earth, that\nwhich is, was, and shall be, in what and with what is it interwoven (that\nis: in what does it live and move)?\u201d Y\u00e2jnavalkya, in order to try the\nintellectual power of the woman, gives an evasive answer: \u201cIn the ether.\u201d\nBut G\u00e2rg\u00ee, perceiving that this answer did not contain the final truth,\nasks: \u201cIn what is the ether woven?\u201d And Y\u00e2jnavalkya replied: \u201cO G\u00e2rg\u00ee,\nthat is what the Brahman calls the Eternal; it is neither big, nor small,\nnor large, nor short, without connection, without contact; by the Eternal\nare ruled heaven and earth, sun and moon, days and nights; the power of\nthe Eternal directs the rivers south or west or to any other point of\nthe compass. Whoever parts from this world without having understood the\nEternal, is miserable.\u201d\n\nIn the Ch\u00e2ndogya Upanishad, a book of no less importance, the same wisdom\nis taught by a man named Udd\u00e2laka to his son Shvetaketu in the form of\nseveral parables. We see them standing in front of a Nyagrodha tree, that\nkind of fig-tree that everywhere sends roots from the branches down to\nthe ground, thus producing new trunks, until in the course of time _one_\ntree resembles a green pillared hall. And in front of such a tree, the\nmost beautiful symbol of ever-youthful nature, the following conversation\ntakes place between father and son: \u201cGet me a fruit of this tree.\u201d\u2014\u201cHere\nit is.\u201d\u2014\u201cBreak it.\u201d\u2014\u201cIt is broken.\u201d\u2014\u201cWhat do you see in it?\u201d\u2014\u201cI see quite\nsmall kernels.\u201d\u2014\u201cBreak one of them.\u201d\u2014\u201cIt is broken.\u201d\u2014\u201cWhat do you see in\nit?\u201d\u2014\u201cNothing.\u201d\u2014Then the father said: \u201cThe fine matter that you cannot\nsee has produced this big tree, and believe me, my dear son, this same\nmatter, of which the earth is composed, is the Absolute, the Universal\nSoul,\u2014it is you.\u201d\n\nThe eternal ground of all existence which every one carries in himself,\nBeing as it is in itself, and as it is immediately perceived in thinking,\nwas, accordingly recognised as the sole reality, and all the manifold\nchanges of the phenomenal world were called Maya, a sham, a delusion, a\nmockery of the senses. We see, it is a consistent monism which is taught\nin the Upanishads.\n\nI do not intend here either to criticise the Brahman conception of\nmonism or to contrast it with modern forms of monism. All monisms have\nat least one thing in common, viz. they all recognise the paramount\nimportance of consistency of thought as a basic principle in philosophy.\nAnd to have propounded a monism for the first time is a feat which\ncannot be overestimated. What remains of this essay will be devoted to\nthe investigation of the question, whether this feat is duly or unduly\ncredited to the Brahmans.\n\nIt may first be mentioned, that a few scholars like Weber, Max M\u00fcller,\nRegnaud, Deussen, and Bhandarkar, pointed out, a long time ago, certain\nfacts which show that another class of the Hindu nation founded the\nmonistic doctrine of the old Upanishads. But the attention of the great\npublic has never been called to this subject, which deserves to be known\nby all interested in Indian history.\n\nIn the second book of the Brihad\u00e2ranyaka Upanishad, of which I have\nalready cited two passages, is found the following story, of which also\nthe fourth book of Kaush\u00eetaki Upanishad gives a slightly different\nversion.\n\nThe proud and learned Brahman B\u00e2l\u00e2ki G\u00e2rgya comes on his journey to\nAj\u00e2tashatru, prince of Benares, and says to him: \u201cI will announce you\nthe Brahma.\u201d The king, highly pleased, promises him a great reward, a\nthousand cows. The Brahman begins to expound his wisdom: \u201cThe Spirit\n(that is the power) in the sun I venerate as the Brahma.\u201d But the king\ninterrupted him, saying that he knew that already. Then the Brahman\nspeaks about the Spirit in the moon, in lightning, ether, wind, fire,\nwater, but the king knows all that. And whatsoever the G\u00e2rgya might say,\nis not new to the king. The Brahman became silent. But Aj\u00e2tashatru asked\nhim: \u201cIs that all?\u201d and G\u00e2rgya answered: \u201cYes, that is all.\u201d Then the\nking said: \u201cYour little knowledge is not the Brahma;\u201d whereupon G\u00e2rgya\ndeclared that he should like to be one of the king\u2019s pupils. Aj\u00e2tashatru\nreplied: \u201cIt is against nature, that a Brahman should learn from a\nwarrior and depend on him for the understanding of the Brahma, but I will\nshow it you nevertheless.\u201d The king took him to a sleeping man and spoke\nto the latter; but he did not get up. When the king touched him with his\nhand, he arose. The king then asked the Brahman: \u201cWhile this man was\nsleeping where was his mind, and whence did it return now?\u201d G\u00e2rgya could\nnot give an answer. Then the king explained to him, that the mind or the\nSelf of the sleeping man was wandering around in dream, that all places\nwere open to him, that he could be a great king or a great Brahman; but\nthat there was still a higher condition of felicity, that is, absorption\nin dreamless sleep, without consciousness. In this condition the Self of\nman, not affected by the outside world, reposes in his true essence and\nknows no difference between Atman and Brahma.\n\nAnother story, reported in the fifth book of Ch\u00e2ndogya Upanishad and in\nthe sixth book of Brihad\u00e2ranyaka Upanishad, is perhaps of still greater\nimportance.\n\nThe young Brahman Shvetaketu comes to a convention, where the King\nPrav\u00e2hana Jaiv\u00e2li asks him: \u201cHas your father instructed you?\u201d\u2014\u201cYes,\nsir.\u201d\u2014\u201cDo you know to what place the dead go?\u201d And three more questions\nhe put to the young Brahman, who was compelled to admit that he knew\nnothing about them. Discouraged, he returned to his father and reproached\nhim: \u201cAlthough you have not imparted any knowledge to me, you claim that\nyou have instructed me. A _simple king_ has asked me three questions and\nI could not answer a single one.\u201d The father replied: \u201cYou have known me\nsufficiently to understand that I taught you all I knew. Come, let us\ngo to the king and learn from him.\u201d The king received the Brahman with\ngreat honors and requested him to select a present. But Gautama refuses\nall earthly gifts, gold, cows, horses, female slaves, and asks the king\nto answer the questions he had put to his son. At first the king was\nunwilling, but after a while he agreed to it and said, that no one on\nearth could give information on those subjects, except a warrior. And the\nfollowing words of the king\u2019s are very significant: \u201cWould that neither\nyou nor your ancestors had trespassed on us, that this truth might never\nhave set up her residence among Brahmans. But to you, since you are so\ninquiring, I will communicate our wisdom.\u201d\n\nSubstantially the same story is found at the beginning of the Kaush\u00eetaki\nUpanishad, except that the king appears under the name Chitra.\n\nOmitting points of less importance, I shall only give in a brief form\nthe contents of the eleventh and the following chapters of the fifth\nbook of the Ch\u00e2ndogya Upanishad, where again a man of the warrior caste,\nAshvapati, prince of the Kekaya, is shown in possession of the highest\nwisdom. A number of highly learned Brahmans were speculating on the\nfollowing problems: \u201cWhat is our Self? What is the Brahma?\u201d and they\ndecided to go to Udd\u00e2laka Aruni, who, as they knew, was investigating\nthe \u201cOmnipresent Self.\u201d But Aruni said to himself: \u201cNow, they will ask\nme and I am not able to answer all their questions\u201d; consequently he\nrequested his visitors to go with him to Ashvapati. The latter receives\nthem with great honors, invites them to stay with him, promising them\npresents as high as their fees for sacrifices. But they replied: \u201cA man\nmust communicate what he knows. You are just now seeking the \u2018Omnipresent\nSelf\u2019; disclose to us what it is?\u201d The king, said: \u201cI will answer you\nto-morrow.\u201d The following day, without having received them among his\npupils, that is, without a ceremonial reception as was usual, he asked\nthem: \u201cWhat do you venerate as the Self?\u201d They replied: \u201cHeaven, sun,\nwind, ether, water, earth.\u201d The king reminded them that they were all\nmistaken in considering the Omnipresent Self as a finite and limited\nbeing; it was the infinite, the infinitely small and the infinitely great.\n\nThe weight of these stories is very plain. Whether they refer to real\nfacts or merely reflect the views of those times in the form of legends,\ncannot be decided. However, the question of the historical truth of these\nstories has no bearing whatever. The fact that they are to be found in\ngenuine Brahmanic writings, in books which are considered in India as\nthe basis of the Brahman caste, speaks a plain language. It shows, that\nthe thought of claiming the monistic doctrine of the Brahma-Atman as\nthe inheritance of their caste, did not occur to the authors of the old\nUpanishads, or that they dared not claim it; it may be that they did not\nyet realise the great importance of the same. Of course in the following\nages this science became the exclusive property of the Brahmans and was\ncultivated and developed by them during twenty centuries\u2014but this does\nnot do away with the fact that it originated among the warrior caste. The\nmen of this caste recognised at once the hollowness of the sacrificial\nsystem and its absurd symbolical character; and to them is due the credit\nof having disclosed a new world of thought and of having accomplished a\nrevolution in the intellectual life of Ancient India. When we learn that\nthe Brahmans continued the sacrificial system, even after having adopted\nthe new creed, and by representing religious ceremonials as the first\nstep to knowledge, thus combined two wholly heterogeneous elements; we\nmay justly conclude that things have taken the same course in Ancient\nIndia as in other countries. Progressive ideas are first opposed by the\npriesthood, their born enemy, until they have become so powerful that\nthey cannot be opposed any longer, whereupon the priest adopts them and\ntries to harmonise them with his superstitions.\n\nBut the ideas mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the substance of\nwhat is commonly called \u201cHindu wisdom,\u201d are not all that the warriors\nhave done for the religion and philosophy of the people. The noble\nGautama of Kapilavastu, the best known of all Hindus, who established\nBuddhism about 500 years before Christ, was also a Kshattriya, and\naccording to the more recent tradition, which alone was formerly known,\nthe son of a king; but according to the earlier sources, disclosed\nby Oldenberg, he was the son of a landed proprietor. Buddha, \u201cthe\nEnlightened,\u201d under which name he is known all over the world, most\nstrenuously opposed the sacrificial system and the superstitions of the\nBrahmans. The ceremonies and the science of the priesthood seemed to him\na perfect fraud, and the caste system an absurd institution; he taught\nthat the final beatitude is within the reach of the lowest man, as well\nas of the Brahman and the king; that every one, without distinction of\nbirth, can attain to \u201csalvation\u201d by contempt of the world, self-denial,\nand devotion to the welfare of his fellow beings.\n\nOldenberg\u2019s excellent book on Buddha, the newest standard work on this\nsubject, makes it unnecessary for me to dwell at length on the doctrine\nof the greatest of all Hindus; only in regard to one important point,\nwhich has a direct bearing on the subject under consideration, do I\ndiffer from his opinion. According to the oldest sources, Buddha\u2019s\nmethod of teaching is, to a great extent, beyond the understanding of\nthe bulk of the people; not a popular, but an abstract philosophical\none. For intrinsic reasons, I believe that the old sources do not give\na correct report of this matter, and we must not forget that centuries\nseparate them from Buddha. Oldenberg himself raises the point, whether\nthe dry and tedious ecclesiastical style, in which Buddha\u2019s thoughts are\nclothed by those sources, truly reflects the spoken word. He says on\npage 181: \u201cWhoever reads the words which the sacred books attribute to\nBuddha will doubt that the form in which Buddha taught his precepts is\nto be identified with that abstract and sometimes abstruse metaphysical\nlanguage. A youthful, invigorating spirit, pervading alike teacher and\ndisciples, is the true picture of those times, admitting of no unnatural\nor artificial features.\u201d\n\nIn spite of this, he comes to the conclusion that \u201cthe solemn and stern\nway of speaking, peculiar to Buddha, has been better expressed by\ntradition than by what we would feel tempted to substitute.\u201d I am not of\nthis opinion. In India a great success could not have been obtained but\nby overpowering eloquence and a popular method, intelligible to all, and\nproceeding by parables and metaphors.\n\nIf Buddha had only appealed to the intellect of his nearest surroundings,\nconsisting merely of aristocratic elements, if he had not found his way\nto the heart of the people, his monastery would very likely have shared\nthe destiny of the other religious congregations of his age, which have\nall disappeared, except one. As the doctrines of these monasteries or\ntheir founders do not substantially differ from each other, and as it\ncannot be ascribed to mere chance that Buddha\u2019s doctrine has developed\ninto a universal religion, having the greatest number of adherents,\nthere remains but one hypothesis to account for this fact, and that\nis the superiority of Buddha\u2019s way of teaching. The erroneousness of\nthe generally prevailing opinion that Buddha was in his time the only\nfounder of a new religion, and that he suddenly revolutionised the social\norganisation of the Indian people, has been clearly established by recent\ninvestigations. In fact, he was a \u201cprimus inter pares,\u201d one of those\nnumerous ascetics who were striving for and preaching \u201cliberation\u201d from\nthe eternal transmigration.\n\nBesides Buddha\u2019s, only one congregation has survived: the Jaina, having\nnumerous members in the western part of India. The principles of the\nJaina are very similar to those of Buddha; so much so that until recently\nit was considered merely as a sect of Buddhism, while it is really a\nreligion of its own, founded by a contemporary or a predecessor of\nBuddha, named Vardham\u00e2na Jn\u00e2taputra\u2014in the language of the people,\nVaddham\u00e2na N\u00e2taputta\u2014in the same part of the country where Buddha rose.\nThe only difference between the two religions is this: Vardham\u00e2na lays\ngreat stress on castigation; while the more progressive Buddha declares\nit useless\u2014nay, pernicious. The important point in regard to the object\nof our essay is this: that the founder of Jaina, which occupies a high\nplace in the history of Hindu culture, was also a member of the Warrior\nCaste.\n\nWe shall now have to consider another production of the Indian mind,\nthe very name of which is unknown to most of our readers, although it\noffers the most interesting religious problems. I refer to the doctrine\nof the Bh\u00e2gavatas or P\u00e2nchar\u00e2tras. These names, of which the former\nis the earlier and original one, designate a religious sect in North\nIndia, whose existence in the fourth century B. C. is authentically\nproved, but which can be placed with great probability in the time\nbefore Buddha. They professed a common-sense monotheism, independent of\nthe traditions of the old Brahmans, and venerated God under different\nnames: Bhagavant, \u201cThe Sublime,\u201d whence their name is derived; N\u00e2r\u00e2yana,\n\u201cSon of Man;\u201d Purashottamma, \u201cThe Supreme Being\u201d; but generally under\nthe name Krishna V\u00e2sudeva, \u201cSon of V\u00e2sudeva\u201d. The character of their\nworship produced feelings identical with the Christian love and devotion\nto God. The Hindu word for this feeling is Chakti, and for him who was\npenetrated by the same, Chakta. As the word Chakti cannot be found or has\nnot been found in the Hindu literature earlier than the era of Christ,\nseveral scholars are inclined to attribute the Chakti to the influence\nof Christianity, especially Professor Weber, who deserves the highest\npraise for his researches concerning Krishna worship. Weber has proved\nin several of his books, especially in a highly interesting treatise\non Krishna\u2019s birth, that numerous Christian notions have entered into\nthe later Krishna legends (the similarity of the names, Krishna and\nChrist, accounts for it): for instance, the birth of Christ among the\nshepherds, the story about the stable, and others of the same kind. In\nspite of this, I cannot embrace the opinion that the Chakti has been\nbrought from a foreign country, because its first appearance belongs\nto a period in which Christian influences cannot be found. As I cannot\ngo into details without discussing very difficult points, requiring a\ngreat deal of erudition, I will only say that whoever is familiar with\nthe old Hindu civilisation will easily understand that the Chakti is of\ngenuine Hindu origin. Monotheistic notions can be traced to the oldest\nperiods of Hindu antiquity, and the Hindu mind has always been animated\nby a high aspiration towards God; so that it should not surprise us that\nthis feature of the Hindu character has produced a religion popular and\nindependent of philosophical speculation, consisting in love and devotion\nto God. The founder of this religion was Krishna V\u00e2sudeva, afterwards\nraised to divine dignity, or rather identified with the deity; from his\nname and from the legends attached to his name, he was a member of the\nWarrior Caste. As early as the epoch of the Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata, the great Indian\nepic poem, the Brahmans appropriated to themselves the name and work of\nKrishna, and transformed the venerated hero into the God Vishnu; thus\nincreasing their strength by adopting a doctrine not of Brahmanic origin.\n\nWe have thus found that the profound philosophical monism of the\nUpanishads, the highly moral religions of Buddha and Jaina, and last,\nnot least, the creed of the Bh\u00e2gavatas, based on pure devotion to God,\ndid not originate among the Brahmans.\n\nHowever favorably we may judge of the achievements of the Brahmans in all\nbranches of science, and I am far from vilifying their merits, still it\nis certain that the greatest intellectual performances of India, nay, all\nsuch in India that have been beneficial to mankind, were accomplished by\nmen of the Warrior Caste.\n\n RICHARD GARBE.\n\n\n\n\nTHE IDEA OF NECESSITY, ITS BASIS AND ITS SCOPE.\n\n\nThe idea of necessity, although a fundamental concept in philosophy\nand science, has not as yet been so clearly defined that all thinkers\nwould agree as to its meaning and significance. Necessity is frequently\nidentified with compulsion, and thus it is supposed to be incompatible\nwith freedom of will. It is also identified with fate, as if it were a\ndestiny that existed above the will of man and the powers of nature,\nsimilar to the Moira of the ancients. It is said to exclude chance in\nevery possible conception of the term and to cause the evolution of the\nworld to proceed by a predetermined arrangement, like the mechanism of a\nclock.\n\nWe cannot endorse Mr. Charles S. Peirce\u2019s objection to the doctrine\nof necessity, but we side with him when he denounces the mechanical\nphilosophy for considering minds as \u201cpart of the physical world in such a\nsense that the laws of mechanics determine everything that happens.\u201d Mr.\nPeirce is right when he rebukes the mechanical philosopher for \u201centering\nconsciousness under the head of sundries as a forgotten trifle.\u201d In some\nsense minds are parts of the physical, i. e. the natural, world, but they\nare not parts of that province of nature which constitutes the special\ndomain of physics and mechanics. Ideas are not motions and cannot be\nexplained by mechanical laws.\n\nHaving criticised in a former article of ours Mr. Peirce\u2019s position, and\nhaving rejected the indeterminism proposed by him, we shall discuss in\nthe following pages the basis and scope of the idea of necessity.\n\nThe idea of necessity is based upon the conception of sameness, and we\nfind that the existence of samenesses is a feature of the world in which\nwe live. The existence of samenesses is a fact of experience, and upon\nthe presence of this fact depends the possibility of the origin, the\nbeing, and the development of the thinking mind itself.\n\nNecessity, as we understand it, must be carefully distinguished from\nthe idea of fate. Although we accept without reserve the doctrine of\ndeterminism, we do not mean to deny the important part that chance plays\nin the world\u2014not absolute chance, which according to Mr. Peirce is exempt\nfrom law, but that same chance of which the throw of a die is a typical\ninstance. And bearing in mind that necessity is not a power outside\nof nature and above the will of man, but that it resides in them as\nthe quality of sameness, we abandon the view that identifies necessity\nwith compulsion; recognising thus, that freedom of the will is not\nincompatible with our view of necessitarianism.\n\n\nI. THE BASIS OF NECESSITY.\n\nThe standpoint from which we shall treat this subject is that of monistic\npositivism,\u2014the method which accepts no doctrine, theory, or law unless\nit be a formulation of facts. Facts are the bottom-rock to which we can\nand must dig down. At the same time, wherever facts appear contradictory\nto one another, we should not be satisfied, but continue to investigate\nuntil they are systematised so as to form a unitary entirety.\n\nBefore we begin our inquiry into the existence or non-existence of\nnecessity, it is advisable to define the meaning of the term.\n\nThe Latin word _necesse_ is most probably a compound of the negative _ne_\nand the supine _cessum_ from _cedere_ to yield, to move. \u201cNecessary,\u201d\naccording to this etymology, would mean that which does not yield but\nabides. Thus it is the inevitable; it is that which is or will be.\n\nIt is in this sense that the word is still used, or at least ought to be\nused, and in this sense we shall also use it.\n\nEvery word naturally acquires by a more or less appropriate application\na series of meanings. So \u201cnecessary\u201d means also that which is needful,\nthat which is essential, that which is indispensable and requisite; it\nalso means that which is done under compulsion. It is understood that\nwe exclude all the other meanings of necessary except the original one,\nwhich is its properly philosophical meaning.\n\nThe idea of necessity is closely allied to the idea of sameness. In order\nto understand the former we must be clear concerning the meaning of the\nlatter.\n\n\nTHE IDEA OF SAMENESS.\n\nThere exist a number of synonyms often used indiscriminately; they are:\nidentity, sameness, equality, congruity, similarity, and likeness. By\n\u201cidentity\u201d we generally understand a sameness in every respect, absolute\nsameness; by \u201cequality\u201d, a sameness that can be expressed in figures.\nEquality is always a measurable sameness, and refers to quantity, mass,\nsize, length, height, age, etc. Likeness and similitude are samenesses\nof form or of proportion, albeit not of size. It is often used as a\npartial sameness of impressions, not so much as they are in themselves,\nbut as they appear to the mind. Congruity is a synonym of sameness in the\nprovince of geometry, denoting the coincidence of figures when laid upon\none another.[10]\n\nThe logical principle of identity, so-called, it appears to me, ought\nto be named the principle of sameness, for it has not reference to the\nabsolute sameness of a thing with itself.[11] The statement _A_ = _A_\ndoes not mean that this particular thing _A_ is itself and that therefore\nthe one _A_ is one and the same thing. It is a general statement and\nmeans that all _A_, in so far as they are _A_, are the same. The\nstatement _A_ = _A_, as I take it, presupposes the existence of a\nnumber of _A\u2019s_; otherwise it would have no sense, and it would not only\nbe empty, (as we know from Kant that all formal statements are,) but\nmeaningless and useless. It would be of no avail either in logic or in\nscience.\n\nIn consideration of the fact that the idea of sameness is a fundamental\nconcept in our scientific, logical, and philosophical reasoning, it is\nastonishing that no satisfactory definition of it is to be found. To\ndefine \u201csame\u201d as \u201cone in substance; not other, ... of one nature or\ngeneral character, of one kind, degree, or amount,\u201d as is done in the\n\u201cCentury Dictionary,\u201d is no improvement upon \u201cWebster,\u201d who defines it\nas \u201cnot different or other; identical. Of like kind, species, sort,\ndimensions or the like; not different in character or in the quality\nor qualities compared; ... like.\u201d However, dictionaries are not\nencyclop\u00e6dias; and they have perhaps a right to define same as identical,\nand identical as same.\n\nMr. James Ward, in the \u201cEncyclop\u00e6dia Britannica,\u201d (XVI, 81, in his\nexcellent article on \u201cPsychology,\u201d) incidentally complains about\nthe ambiguity of the word \u201csame\u201d; he proposes a distinction between\n\u201cmaterial identity\u201d and \u201cindividual identity,\u201d but this does not solve\nthe difficulty. Flemming\u2019s \u201cVocabulary of Philosophy\u201d (4th ed. edited by\nCalderwood) contains several articles on \u201cidentical\u201d and on \u201cidentity\u201d\nwithout discussing in any one of them the meaning of \u201csame\u201d or of\n\u201cidentical.\u201d\n\nWhat then is the meaning of same?\n\nLet us first consider the etymology of the word. The root of \u201csame\u201d\nis found in almost all Indo-European languages; it is preserved in\nthe first syllable of the Latin \u201csimilis\u201d and \u201csimul,\u201d in the second\nsyllable of the German \u201cZu_samm_en\u201d; in the Greek \u201c\u1f05\u03bc\u03b1\u201d and \u201c\u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2,\u201d\nand the Sanskrit \u201csama,\u201d all of which denote a togetherness. Thus the\netymological meaning seems to signify what is classed in one category.\nAccordingly, the present meaning as defined by the dictionaries, as\nbeing that which is \u201cof one nature or not different in character,\u201d has\nnot changed; at any rate if there is any change, it is slight. Yet it is\ndesirable to bring out and set in a clear light the purport of the word\nand its essence.\n\nWhat, then, is the economic service and function of the idea of\n\u201csameness\u201d in the household of thought?\n\n\u201cSameness\u201d is that feature in two things or states of things, in two\nprocesses or modes of action, which brings it to pass that the one may\nbe replaced by the other without altering for a certain purpose the\nstate of things or affecting the result of the entire process. Popularly\nexpressed, sameness is the capability of one thing\u2019s being substituted\nfor another.\n\nThere is no need of discussing or proving the truism, that, properly\nspeaking, there is no absolute sameness, no identity in the strict sense\nof the term. This was the meaning of Heraclitus\u2019s idea of the perpetual\nflux of things, expressed in his \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1fe5\u03b5\u1fd6. There are no two moments in\ntime, no two points in space, no two atoms of matter actually identical,\nand we cannot enter into the identical river twice.\n\nCratylus tried to outdo Heraclitus, by saying that we cannot even enter\nonce into the identical river, for while entering, not only the river\nchanges but also we ourselves; and Cratylus is perfectly right.\n\nWe have purposely substituted in Heraclitus\u2019s proposition \u201cidentical\u201d for\n\u201csame,\u201d because this change is needed to bring out the truth of the idea.\nHeraclitus and Cratylus cease to be right if we use the word same as\nabove defined. We enter indeed the same river twice. The river of to-day\nis, for a certain purpose, quite the same as the river of yesterday, in\nso far namely as the river of to-day and the river of yesterday serve a\ncertain and the same purpose: for other purposes this same river will\nperhaps not be the same. The geographer and historian speak of the Rhine\nas that stream of water which since time immemorial has flowed down from\nthe St. Gotthardt to the North Sea. Accordingly, if we stand on the bank\nof the Rhine, it is quite correct to say that this is the same river\nthat was crossed by C\u00e6sar. Let the purpose of our thoughts be changed,\nand we shall no longer be permitted to speak of sameness. Suppose we had\nseen the Rhine for the first time in its beautiful emerald coloring, and\nhad come again after a rainy day to admire its beauty, should we not be\njustified in exclaiming: This is not the same river!\n\nSameness, accordingly, depends upon a special purpose. If in a chemical\ncombination a metal is wanted, it may be all the same whether we use\niron, zinc, lead, or gold. That is to say, it is all the same for\nbringing about a special result; yet it is not all the same in other\nrespects. The weight and certain other qualities of the metals are\ndifferent, and also the cost.\n\n\nSAMENESS AND MIND.\n\nSameness depending upon a special purpose, the question arises, Is there\nany objective sameness in the world, or is sameness a mere subjective\naddition to things? Is sameness something \u201creal\u201d or is it purely mental?\n\nThis is the old quarrel between the Nominalists and Realists among\nthe Schoolmen. It lies at the bottom of the problem of universals\nand particulars, and we should say, it is only a special form of the\nquestion, \u201cAre relations objective qualities of existence or are they\nproducts of the mind?\u201d which was discussed in a former number (_The\nMonist_, II, 2, pp. 240-42). The idea of sameness represents the most\nimportant relation that exists; and if any relation is real, the relation\nof sameness must be real also.\n\nIf sameness depends upon a special purpose, it appears that there can be\nno sameness without that purpose; and the purpose being purely mental,\nthe sameness also would seem to be purely mental. But this is not so.\nSameness is an idea, and it is no exception to other ideas. All ideas\nare mental symbols formed for a special purpose; but, being symbols of\nsomething, ideas are representative of some reality, or of some feature\nof a reality, or of some relation between two or several things. Every\nidea stands for something; and this quality of the significance of ideas\nis called their meaning or their import.\n\nThe question now is, How does the idea of sameness originate in the world\nwhere, as we stated above, there is no absolute sameness, no identity?\nOur answer is that sameness, not identity, is a general feature of this\nworld of reality, which impresses itself upon every mind from the very\nbeginning of the mind\u2019s origin.\n\nWe can go farther in our statement and make it more emphatic: Mind\noriginates and grows only on the ground of the fact that sameness is a\nfeature of the world, and is recognised as such by feeling substance.\n\nTwo points or two congruent geometrical figures being in different places\nare not identical. But they are of such a nature that, so far as regards\nthe purposes of geometry, one serves the purposes in question just as\nwell as the other, or one can be replaced by the other; and this quality\nis called their sameness.\n\nNow as a matter of fact there are no two concrete things in the world in\nwhich there cannot be found some sameness. Both somehow affect sentiency;\nwe say they consist of matter. Both can be measured in size, breadth,\nand height: we say, they are extended. Both are at any given moment in a\ncertain relation to other things: we say, they are in space. Both have a\ndefinite form and consist of one or several special structures (i. e.,\nso to say, inside-forms). All things can in some way or other be classed\ntogether under one heading. These samenesses of things go along with\ndifferences, and the degree of sameness in the different things varies\ngreatly. Whether there is any sameness and difference at all in the\nworld, cannot be decided _a priori_, but is a problem which can be solved\nonly on the ground of, first, an _a posteriori_ statement of the facts,\nsecond, a systematical arrangement of the facts. If this is accomplished\nwe can venture into a methodical investigation as to the nature of the\nsamenesses as well as the differences that obtain in the universe, and\nhaving arranged them in a system, we can apply _a priori_ this system to\nfacts with which we are not as yet acquainted.\n\nThe many samenesses which are experienced are not purely mental\nadditions; they are not mere subjective imputations transferred upon\nobjective existence. They are real; i. e. there are in the objective\nthings actual features which allow of certain substitutions. A ray of\nlight awakens in some feeling substance the traces left by former rays of\nlight; and this reawakening is called memory. The perception of sameness\nis the beginning of mind, and it involves the perception of difference as\na natural consequence.\n\nSuppose that the stuff of which the world consists were capable of\nacquiring feeling, but there were no samenesses whatever; which would\nmean that every smallest piece of the world-stuff were a particular\nthing by itself and in every respect unlike every other piece, of a\ndifferent material or of no material at all, of different size or of\nno size at all, and also possessed of a different number of space\ndimensions. In such a world all the impacts made upon a sentient being\nwould be different; not one would be like the other, and all feelings\nwould present a chaos without uniformities, worse than the most complex\ncrazy-quilt. Under such circumstances mind would be impossible: it would\nneither originate nor could it develop.\n\nOn the other hand suppose again that the stuff of which the world\nconsists were capable of acquiring feeling in some certain formation, and\nthat there were samenesses in the world and in the events of the world.\nWould not mind necessarily originate in such a world? Given feeling\nsubstance in a world of samenesses and differences, these samenesses will\nproduce analogous samenesses of impression upon the feeling substance,\nwhich will be perceived as samenesses of feeling. The preservation of the\ntraces left in the feeling substance (supposing this substance to live\non indefinitely) will in the long run result in the formation of special\nsense-organs. It will later on, with the aid of word-symbolism, lead to\nthe formation of universals, for universals are nothing but samenesses\nperceived. It will then create with the assistance of abstraction the\nrealm of scientific thought, representing the uniformities of the events\nof the world in exact formulas.\n\n\nTHE EXISTENCE OF SAMENESSES A FACT.\n\nThe question whether there are samenesses at all in the world, is in our\nopinion settled. It is a fact that there are samenesses. The uniformities\nof the world are a matter of indubitable experience\u2014indubitable because\nour very existence as thinking beings, as minds, is conditioned by this\nfact. We see the mind of every child develop out of his perception of\nsamenesses. Our scientists teach us that the race-soul, like a great\nimmortal individual, is the product of the accumulated experience\nof samenesses; and all future progress, in science as well as in\ncivilisation, in mechanical invention as well as in ethics, depends upon\nthe trustworthiness of the samenesses stated to exist in the objective\nworld.\n\nThe question of the ultimate _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_ of the samenesses and\ndifferences, is another question; and it would lead us too far here\nto discuss it. In several details the problem is not as yet ripe for\nsolution. A full solution of the problem would be tantamount to the\nexposition of a complete knowledge of the world. Suffice it here to\nsay that we have reasons to think of the world-stuff as being of the\nsame nature throughout. The chemical elements seem to be different\nconfigurations of one and the same substance. In this way all difference\nwould have to be explained as a difference of form.\n\nThe form of reality possesses sameness and difference in all its parts.\nSpace in its sameness is by experience found to be tri-dimensional, which\nmeans, it is determinable throughout by three co\u00f6rdinates; while its\ndifferences are due to the position of the points considered. For the\npurpose of the geometrician space is uniform, but for the purpose, say\nof the architect, it is not uniform. To the geometrician two congruent\ntriangles, whether they are in the cellar or in the garret, are the same.\nHowever, to the architect the position of two congruent triangles in his\ndesign of a house is by no means the same. Every single point of space\nhas its special and individual qualities.\n\nThe whole business of science is to systematise the samenesses of\nexperience, and to present them in such convenient formulas that they can\nbe used for guidance in our actions.\n\nThe most comprehensive formulation of the sameness of the universe as\na whole has found its expression in the law of the conservation of\nmatter and energy. This law rests upon the experience, corroborated by\nexperiments, that causation is transformation. It states that the total\namount of matter and the total amount of energy remain constant. There is\nno creation out of nothing and no conversion of something into nothing.\n\n\nEINDEUTIG BESTIMMT.\n\nAfter this sketch of the importance of sameness, (a subject which we have\nby no means exhausted,) we return to the idea of necessity. The ideas\nof sameness and necessity are closely related. A world of sameness is a\nworld in which necessity rules, and necessity means regularity and order.\n\nGerman scientists have a very good expression to denote the formulation\nof events in a manner which describes them in their necessary course. If\nthey have succeeded in finding the sameness in the instances of a certain\nclass of events, they say that it is _eindeutig bestimmt_, which means,\nthe sameness is determined in a way that admits of no equivocation; it is\ncomplete, representing solely and purely that feature upon the presence\nof which the result depends. Whatever is thus _eindeutig bestimmt_, is\nrecognised in its necessity. The presence of that feature which makes it\n_eindeutig bestimmt_, determines the event to take place; and this being\ndetermined, its inevitableness, the _it will be_ of the process, is all\nthere is to necessity.\n\nAll natural phenomena that can be _eindeutig bestimmt_ are necessary in\ntheir happening. A world which with regard to the total amount of its\nmatter and energy is the same to-day and yesterday and will be the same\nto-morrow, a world whose laws of form possess a sameness throughout, so\nthat it allows of formulating and applying them in their rigidity to all\nfacts present, past, and future, a world in which all the changes are\ntransformations determinable with the assistance of formal laws, can be\nrelied upon and the course of its events can be computed.\n\nSuch _is_ the world in which we live; and taking this ground I say, the\nworld is a cosmos, it is no chaos; and noticing that being possessed\nof sameness is an intrinsic and inalienable feature of the world, I\nam inclined to add the world never was and never will be a chaos. And\nthis, if it be true at all, is true not only in general and as it were\nwholesale, but in its minutest details. If there were deficiencies of\nthis order in the unobservable details, they would not be diminished\nby being summed up in large and ever larger amounts; on the contrary,\nthey would increase; they would grow in proportion. This not being\nthe case, we have not the slightest reason to doubt that in those\nrealms of minutest existence into which, from the grossness and the\nlack of precision of our organs and instruments of observation, we\ncannot penetrate, the same order and regularity obtains as in those\nregions which lie open to our investigation. In other words: From this\nstandpoint, existence is, so to say, permeated by law throughout; every\nevent is determined and any kind of absolute chance is excluded.\n\nFollowing Kant\u2019s etymology we understand by _a posteriori_ the sensory\nelements, and by _a priori_ the formal elements of our experience. The\nqueer expression \u201ca priori\u201d is in so far justified as formal truths (such\nas geometrical, arithmetical, logical rules) are formulas expressing the\nuniversal samenesses of the form of existence. They contain the laws of\nform in a shape that is _eindeutig bestimmt_, so that an experimenter\nwill know them _a priori_ to be so. _A priori_ means beforehand. An\nexperimenter knows certain things even before he makes his experiments.\nThe _a priori_ elements of experience are by no means innate truths; nor\nare they the historical beginning of experience. On the contrary. In\ntheir abstract purity they appear as a very late product of man\u2019s mental\nevolution.\n\nThe _a priori_ systems of thought are not arbitrary constructions; they\nare constructions raised out of the recognition of the formal, i. e. the\nrelational, samenesses that appear in experience. All possibilities of a\ncertain class of relations can be exhausted and formulated in theorems.\nAs such they can be used as references to assist in the explanation and\ndetermination of new experiences. We know some part of any new experience\nwith which we are confronted even before we have investigated it. We know\ncertain laws of its form, and by reference to these known laws we are\nenabled to reduce the unknown to the known, to analyse the process and\nset forth that feature of it which makes _eindeutig bestimmt_.\n\n\nII. THE SCOPE OF NECESSITY.\n\nMr. Peirce objects to necessitarianism, and classes it together with\nmaterialism and the mechanical philosophy, speaking of the latter as\nthe most logical form of necessitarianism. In consonance with the\ndictionary-definitions of these words, he contrasts them to the doctrine\nof the freedom of the will and also to miracles\u2014the latter, we must\nconfess, being a dangerous concession to certain theological conceptions.\n\nThe \u201cCentury Dictionary\u201d defines \u201cnecessitarianism\u201d as\n\n \u201cThe theory that the will is subject to the general mechanical\n law of cause and effect.\u201d\n\nAnd \u201cnecessitarian\u201d as\n\n \u201cOne who maintains the doctrine of philosophical necessity,\n in opposition to that of the freedom of the will: opposed to\n libertarian.\u201d\n\nThe word \u201cdeterminism\u201d is regarded as a synonym of necessitarianism. Its\nfirst definition in the \u201cCentury Dictionary\u201d reads as follows:\n\n \u201cA term invented by Sir William Hamilton to denote the doctrine\n of the necessitarian philosophers, who hold that man\u2019s actions\n are uniformly determined by motives acting upon his character,\n and that he has not the power to choose to act in one way so\n long as he prefers on the whole to act in another way.\u201d\n\nHamilton\u2019s definition as here presented is puzzling. If the words\n\u201cchoose\u201d and \u201cprefer on the whole\u201d are _not_ meant to be tautological,\nthere is no sense in it; for no determinist denies that a man might \u201cupon\nthe whole\u201d prefer to act this way, while he has the power to choose,\nand for special considerations perhaps does choose, to act in another\nway. However, if the words \u201cchoose\u201d and \u201cprefer on the whole\u201d are meant\nto be tautological, the self-contradictoriness of the statement is too\npalpable for a Hamilton. Is there anybody who would maintain that a man\nwho chooses to act in one way can at the same time, under the very same\ncircumstances, and he remaining the very same man of the same character\nand intentions, choose to act in another way?\n\nWhile we accept determinism and also necessitarianism in the sense that\nall events (the actions of willing beings included) are determined, we\ncannot accept either the mechanical philosophy or materialism as the\nterms are commonly understood.\n\nWe find materialism defined as\n\n \u201cThe metaphysical doctrine that matter is the only substance,\n and that matter and its motions constitute the universe.\u201d\n (\u201cCentury Dictionary,\u201d 2d sense.)\n\nThe mechanical philosophy is explained _sub voce_ \u201catomic\u201d as\n\n \u201c[The view that] from the diverse combination and motions of\n ... atoms all things, including the soul, were supposed to\n arise.\u201d _Ibid._\n\nDeterminism is simply the negation of absolute chance. It does not\nexclude chance in the original sense of the word as an unexpected event,\nas something that befalls one without his seeking it or making the\nevent\u2014chance being derived from ML. _cadentia_, i. e. the falling, as in\na throw of dice.\n\nThe \u201cCentury Dictionary\u201d defines \u201cchance\u201d in sense 9, as\n\n \u201cFortuity; especially the absence of a cause necessitating an\n event.\u201d\n\nThis is absolute chance, the existence of which we deny. The \u201cCentury\nDictionary\u201d adds the following little note:\n\n \u201cAbsolute chance, the (supposed) spontaneous occurrence of\n events undetermined by any general law or by any free volition.\n According to Aristotle, events may come about in three ways:\n first, by necessity or an external compulsion; second, by\n nature or the development of an inward germinal tendency; and\n third, by chance, without any determining cause or principle\n whatever, by lawless, sporadic originality.\u201d[12]\n\nWe understand chance as being, from certain premisses, an incalculable\ncoincidence, either not intended to be calculated, or, for certain\nreasons, from a given standpoint with a limited and definite amount of\nknowledge, not capable of calculation. Determinism, as we understand\nthe term, does not imply as the \u201cCentury Dictionary\u201d has it in its\ndefinition of necessitarianism, that \u201cthe law of cause and effect\u201d is\n\u201cmechanical.\u201d It simply asserts that the law of cause and effect holds\ngood universally, and that there is no effect that is not definitely\ndetermined, according to the nature of the things in action, by causes\nand all their circumstances.\n\n\nNECESSITY AND CHANCE.\n\nMr. Peirce says:\n\n \u201c_All_ the diversity and specificalness of events is\n attributable to chance\u2014diversification, specificalness, and\n irregularity of things, I suppose is chance\u2014and this diversity\n cannot be due to laws that are immutable.\u201d (P. 332.)\n\nOur world-view leads us to other conclusions; we say:\n\nEvery specificalness or particularity is such by possessing a certain\nform and standing in a definite relation (in time as well as space) to\nall other things of the universe. Of every concrete thing we can say it\nis now and here, or it was then and there. It is or was made up in this\nspecial way, and it stands or it stood in these special relations to its\nsurroundings. Proportions, relations, forms\u2014these are what account for\nthe diversification and specificalness of all things in the universe;\nthey are what explain the irregularities of individual cases and of all\nthose events which appear as chance to him who, although he may be well\ninformed about the nature of a thing, does not know the relation of\nits complex surroundings, exercising according to law their disturbing\ninfluence upon its actions which otherwise would be uniform.\n\nAnd since no two spots of space and no two instances of time are the\nsame, since the relations of every atom are different in every position\nand at every moment of its existence, we need not be astonished to find\ndiversity and specificalness in this world of samenesses.\n\nWe do not believe in absolute chance, but we believe in chance.\n\nWhat is chance?\n\nChance is any event not especially intended, either not calculated, or,\nwith a given and limited stock of knowledge, incalculable.\n\nGunpowder was, according to the legend, invented by chance. Berthold\nSchwartz intended to make gold, yet when the mixture was ignited, he\nbegan to understand that it was an explosive. When I say that I met\na friend by chance, I mean that the meeting was unintentional. I had\nnot foreseen it and perhaps could not foresee it. When we call a throw\nof dice pure chance, we mean that the incidents which condition the\nturning up of these or those special faces of the dice have not been or\ncannot be calculated. We do not mean that the law of cause and effect is\nsuspended; we mean that we are unable to determine the effect. That which\nwould make this or that throw _eindeutig bestimmt_ is either not known to\nus, or, if it were known, is of such a nature that we cannot produce the\ndesired effect with any certainty. Matters are so arranged in the game of\ndice that the slightest incident changes the result, and these incidents\nare either not within our ken or not within the range of our power.\nChance, accordingly, as we understand it, is no exception to necessity;\nit does not happen contrary to law, and is in each case the strict result\nof a definite cause under definite circumstances.\n\nAbsolute chance is something quite different. Absolute chance is that\nwhich is incalculable because of the absence of law. Mr. Peirce says:\n\n \u201cAnother argument, or convenient commonplace, is that absolute\n chance is _inconceivable_. This word has eight current\n significations. The \u2018Century Dictionary\u2019 enumerates six. Those\n who talk like this will hardly be persuaded to say in what\n sense they mean that chance is inconceivable.\u201d\n\nAbsolute chance is \u201cinconceivable\u201d as the word is defined by the \u201cCentury\nDictionary\u201d in the second sense: It is\n\n \u201cunacceptable to the mind because involving a violation of laws\n believed to be well established by positive evidence.\u201d\n\nAbsolute chance is not unthinkable in the sense of unimaginable. We can\nvery well depict a case of absolute chance in our imagination, just as\nwe can tell and describe in minutest details the fairy tale of Alladin\u2019s\nlamp; just as we can in our imagination depict a creation out of nothing.\nBut he who accepts that the world is in its innermost nature a cosmos,\nthat its events are strictly and throughout regulated by law, cannot\nat the same time think that there are nooks and crevices in which the\nlaw does not operate. Absolute chance actually involves the idea of a\ncreation out of nothing; and thus it stands in contradiction to the law\nof the preservation of matter and energy. Absolute chance which means\nthat the very same thing under the very same conditions can act in this\nor in some other way, that it need not act in exactly the same way,\ninvolves a belief in either the creation of a not existing quality out\nof nothing, or the disappearance of existing qualities into nothing.\n\nMr. Peirce says:\n\n \u201cIt seems to me that every throw of sixes with a pair of dice\n is a manifest instance of chance.\u201d\n\nYes, of chance; but not of that chance the existence of which Mr. Peirce\nmaintains\u2014not of absolute chance. Every throw of dice, every toss of head\nor tail, are exactly determined by circumstances. We call it chance only\nin so far as we cannot calculate and predetermine the result.\n\nSuppose you take two large silver coins between your thumb and the first\ntwo fingers, one coin parallel to and a little above the other. Suppose\ntails are up in both. Drop the lower coin without an effort just as it\nwould fall, about twenty inches, and you may be sure that, in spite of\nyourself, it will turn up head. Then drop the upper one and it will not\nturn, but plump right down showing tail. There are certain mechanical\nreasons for the one case as well as for the other. As soon as we know the\nlaw and can apply it, the case ceases to be an instance of chance.\n\nDice, the roulette, and other games of chance are so arranged, that\nthe determinating circumstances are too numerous and also too complex,\none interfering with and being disturbed by the others, to admit\nof any adequate calculation or predetermination. An arrangement of\nconditions which in this way eludes the calculation of a definite set of\npossibilities, is called by Professor Kries _gleiche Spielr\u00e4ume_ or equal\nchances. And the province of equal chances is and will remain the proper\nsphere of the calculus of probabilities.\n\nProfessor Nitsche objects to Kries\u2019s proposition, saying that absolutely\nequal chances are impossible and an equal chance (_ein gleicher\nSpielr\u00e4ume_) is nothing but the objectification of a judgment of equal\nvalue.[13] We find no fault with Nitsche\u2019s objection; there are no\nabsolutely equal chances; and what is called \u201cequal chance\u201d means that\nthe strength of two or several anticipations is of the same degree; that\nour belief and doubt as to the turning up of one, two, three, four, five,\nor six spots of a die are equally justified. The objective conditions\nwhich justify such equality of several expectations is what Kries (if\nwe understand him correctly) calls _gleiche Spielr\u00e4ume_. But _gleiche\nSpielr\u00e4ume_ do not imply absolute chance. We might as well expect that\nall the six faces of a die should turn up simultaneously in one throw, as\nthat any one of them should turn up by absolute chance.\n\nWhile absolute chance cannot be admitted, partly because we are not in\nneed of it, (since the irregularities of nature can be sufficiently\nexplained otherwise,) and partly because the idea of absolute chance if\nit were needed, is incompatible with our world-conception, we shall,\nnevertheless, have to concede to chance, as we understand the term, a\nvery important r\u00f4le in the evolution of life. The formation of worlds and\nthe history of mankind depend to a great extent upon chances similar to\nthe throws of dice. There are many possibilities, and now this, now that,\nwill, according to the circumstances, be realised\u2014of course in each case\nwith strict necessity.\n\nLet us illustrate this idea by an example.\n\nThe formation of about seventy elements out of the original\nworld-substance, which may be supposed to be homogeneous, does not appear\nto depend upon chance. Their universal appearance in all parts of the\nuniverse suggests the hypothesis that their formation is the inevitable\nresult of a gradual condensation of nebular substances. We find\neverywhere, according to the stage of condensation, a gradual appearance,\nfirst of the lighter, then of the heavier elements. There seems to be\nno possibility of the formation of other elements than those known to\nus (including here the hypothetical elements which are still missing in\nthe Mendeljeff series and at the same time, at least, not excluding a\nfurther continuance of the series). These elements or none, it appears,\nmust be formed out of the original substance of our world. Let us here\nassume, for argument\u2019s sake, that it were so beyond question, and that we\nknew the nature of the world-substance to be such as to condense, if it\ncondenses at all, into no other but these forms, which we call chemical\nelements. This would be a limitation of possibilities. Exactly so the\nthrows Of dice are limited. With the dice commonly in use we cannot throw\nfractions; nor can we throw either zero, or seven, or any other higher\nnumber. We can throw only whole numbers, integrals from one up to six.\nBut while we thus assume that the formation of the elements is limited\nto those actually existing, the proportion in which the elements may be\ndistributed in the different nebul\u00e6 and solar systems, is apparently\nvery different. Suppose we had a full knowledge of the intrinsic nature\nof the world-substance and were standing outside the universe observing\nthe process of world-formations; we could not from this knowledge alone\npredict all that would happen. We should on our assumption be able to\npredict _a priori_ that such elements would be formed. But whether the\ndifferent elements would be generated in these or in other proportions\nappears to depend upon the presence of certain conditions, perhaps the\nrapidity of motion, the heat produced by friction, the temperature of\nthe surrounding cosmic space, any knowledge of which is not included in\nour knowledge of the nature of the world-substance. These conditions\nmay vary, nay, so far as we can judge they actually do vary; and any\napparently slight variation of them, or even one of them, will result in\ndifferent effects of great consequence. Without a detailed knowledge of\nall these special conditions, simply from a supposed _a priori_ knowledge\nof the world-substance, the idiosyncrasy of this or that particular\nsolar system could not be _a priori_ determined. Here it will be such,\nand there, under perhaps slightly different circumstances, it will be\nentirely other. Here the centre of gravity may be in one great mass,\nthere again it may be divided in two, so that the planets circle around\ntwo suns.\n\nFrom this point of view we have to call these results products of chance.\n\nTo a being who not only might be supposed to know the intrinsic nature\nof existence, but could have present before his mind every event of the\ngreat interacting cosmos in its entire complexity, this kind of chance\nwould, of course, also disappear. To him all states of things would\nappear throughout as _eindeutig bestimmt_. Yet, although in this way\nnecessity permeates all events that take place, we do not intend to deny\nthe irregularity of detail,[14] the specificalness of the particulars,\nthe diversity of individual incidents and existences. According to our\nconception of nature they must remain, and we need not attribute them\nto absolute chance. To attribute irregularities to absolute chance (as\nMr. Peirce does) is actually an abandonment of explaining them. The\nspecificalness and particularity of nature can be said to be due to\nchance in so far only as they do not depend upon and are not determinable\nby the nature of the things under consideration, but result (with strict\nnecessity of course) from the ever-changing conformations of surrounding\ncircumstances.\n\nThus the fate of a man depends mainly upon his character,\u2014the proverb\nsays, \u201cEvery man is the architect of his own fortune\u201d\u2014but not entirely.\nThere are sometimes coincidences determining the fates of men, and\nthrough them the fates of whole nations. And these coincidences do not\nresult from their character.\n\nLet everybody think of his own fate. Part of his life has been what it\nwas because he is such a man as he is; and we can, within certain limits,\npredict the fate of a youth with whose character we are familiar. But how\nmuch of our lives depends upon circumstances which could be foreseen only\nby an omniscient being, and which, as we might properly say, if we do not\nmisunderstand the term, is due to chance!\n\n\nFREE WILL.\n\nCompulsion is generally considered as a synonym of necessity. But the\nusage of the term necessity in the sense of compulsion is, in our\nopinion, very inappropriate, because misleading. Necessity and compulsion\nshould not be confounded; for compulsion excludes free will and\n\u201cnecessity\u201d does not.\n\nA government compels its citizens to obey certain unpopular laws; the\nvictorious army compels the enemy to surrender. The obedience of the\ncitizens and the surrender of the enemy are acts done under compulsion;\nthey are not acts of free will. But a man of a certain character wills,\nunder given circumstances and in the absence of compulsion, _necessarily_\nin the way in which he does. The determination of a free will is not a\nmatter of chance but of necessity. Yet the determining factors are not\noutside but inside; they are not due to compulsion, not to the pressure\nof a foreign power, but to the nature of the willing being himself.\n\nThis, then, is the definition of \u201cfree\u201d: A being is free if it is\nunrestrained, so that it acts according to its own nature. As is its\nnature, so it wills; as it wills, so it acts. If we know the character\nof a man and the situation in which he is placed, we can predict his\nchoice as the necessary result of his nature. His decision, although it\nis free and not under compulsion, is not an outcome of chance which might\nunder the same conditions be different, but is the inevitable result of\nnecessity.\n\nIf by free will we had to understand that the decisions of the will\nare the result either of chance or of absolute chance, the foremost\nduty of the educator would be to make man unfree, to insert certain\ndominant ideas into his mind, destined to determine his will. The free\nman according to this definition of free will as being due to chance,\nwould be a person whose actions are more whimsical than the fancies of\nlunatics. We reject this conception of the freedom of the will.\n\nIn our opinion a will is free if it is unrestrained so that it can act\naccording to its nature. Our conception of free will does not stand in\ncontradiction to the doctrine of \u201cdeterminism\u201d as defined by the \u201cCentury\nDictionary\u201d in its second sense:\n\n \u201cIn general, the doctrine that whatever is or happens is\n entirely determined by antecedent causes.\u201d\n\n\nTHE MECHANICAL PHILOSOPHY.\n\nWe distinguish between (1) mechanical, (2) physical, (3) chemical, (4)\nphysiological, and (5) psychical events.\n\nA mechanical phenomenon is a change of place which does not involve a\nchange of the constitution of the parts moved. E. g., a stone is pushed;\nits position is altered, but the stone remains the same.\n\nA physical phenomenon is an event in which the molecular state of the\nbodies in action is altered. Water heated becomes steam, frozen it\nbecomes ice. The three states have different molecular configurations.\n\nChemical phenomena are such in which the constitution of the atoms is\naltered. The characteristic qualities of hydrogen, for example, are\ndifferent when combined with different elements or when isolated. Each\ncombination is a peculiar substance with peculiar qualities and not a\nmixture or combination of the qualities of the isolated elements.\n\nPhysiological processes are all those changes that take place in the\nliving irritable substance of plants and animals, such as nutrition,\ngrowth, and propagation. Its characteristic features are (1) hunger or\nthirst, i. e. the want of certain materials (food), (2) the reception of\nthe wanted materials by suction or other means, which in some cases are\na quite mechanical or physical process, not unlike the afflux of oxygen\ncaused by a burning candle or the suction of water by a sponge, and (3)\nthe assimilation of food. The materials received are distributed in the\nplaces wanted, thus adding to the building up of the living substance\naccording to the nature of its structure. This produces as a natural\nresult (4) the phenomenon of growth with a preservation of form. (5)\nPropagation is a special kind of growth; it is the growth of a part that\nat some stage of its development becomes an independent individual.\n\nPsychical phenomena are such in which feelings and the meanings of\nfeelings are the determinant factors.\n\nIt is apparent that all these terms, mechanical, physical, chemical,\nphysiological, and psychical, are mere abstracts. In describing a\nmechanical phenomenon, we limit our attention to the mechanical change.\nWe do not mean to say that the body moved does not possess chemical,\nphysical, perhaps physiological, or even psychical qualities. The\ncalculation of the curve of a jump is a mechanical problem, although the\njumping body may be a human being. However, the question why did the man\njump, is a psychical question. The motive of the jump is an idea in that\nclass of mental activity characterised as purpose. The man had an end in\nview. And this idea of an end to be realised is the combined result of\nspecial conditions and of the character of the man.\n\nThe different spheres of mechanical, physical, chemical, physiological,\nand psychical actions being abstractions, it is obvious that science when\ndealing with so-called purely mechanical phenomena, has to do with a\nfiction. There are no purely mechanical phenomena. There are features of\nreality which are purely mechanical; and these we call motions. But the\nworld does not consist of motions only. It also possesses other qualities.\n\nThe mechanical philosopher assumes that the world consists of matter\nand motion only, and so he feels warranted in the hope that every event\nthat takes place, the actions of man included, can be explained by the\nlaws of motion. Yet the premiss is wrong, and we may anticipate that the\nconclusion also will prove erroneous. And so it is.\n\nThe laws of motion are applicable to and will explain all motions; but\nthey are not applicable to that which is not motion.\n\nIt is inconceivable how we can hope to explain a feeling by the laws of\nmotion; and so the fond hope of explaining the problems of the nature of\nthe soul by mechanics is preposterous. No objection can be made to the\npossibility of explaining the delicate motions in the nervous substance\nof the brain by the laws of molar or molecular mechanics. But these\nexplanations would throw no light upon the causation that takes place\nin the mind. The properly psychical phenomena, the properly intelligent\naction of thought, could not be explained in this way. For the world of\nmentality introduces quite a new factor into the sphere of being.\n\nWhat is this new factor?\n\nThe nature of mental activity consists in the symbolism of feelings.\nFeelings, being different under different conditions and the same under\nsame conditions, become representative of their corresponding causes, and\nthus the objects of experience are depicted in feeling symbols.\n\nRepresentativeness, accordingly, is the nature of mind.\n\nThe question, How certain brain-structures operate, is a question of\nthe mechanics of nervous substance, and further, the question, How\nthought-operations take place, is a question, so to say, of logical\nmechanics. But the question, Why a certain idea responds to certain\nstimuli and not to others, does not admit of a mechanical explanation or\nformulation. The answer to this question will be a description of the\nnature of the idea; and the nature of the idea is not a motion: it is the\nmeaning of which the idea is possessed.\n\nThe action of a mind depends upon the meaning of certain symbols. A\nwritten or spoken word has a special meaning, and this meaning becomes\nthe determinant factor of mind action. The meaning of a word is not a\npiece of matter, neither is it a motion. It is something _sui generis_.\nI do not say that there is any inexplicable mystery connected with it.\nOn the contrary, wonderful as the fact is, it is not mysterious; it does\nnot stand in contradiction to any other fact of nature. Symbols stand for\nsomething; they indicate, denote, or signify something. This significance\nis called their meaning; and mind is a system of symbols in states of\nawareness.\n\nNow, neither states of awareness are mechanical, nor is the meaning of\nwords anything mechanical. How can we hope for a mechanical explanation\neither of the soul or the mind or of any mental action?\n\nSuppose, for instance, a general receives a message containing a few\nwords. He opens the paper, he reads it, and all on a sudden, his mind is\nin a tumult of excitement. What is it that produces the excitement? Is it\nany motion? Yes! In a certain sense, it is a motion: it is the reading\nof the paper. This is the cause. Yet not the reading as such excites his\nconsternation. He might read other messages all the day long without any\nsuch an effect. Plainly, the causative element of the cause is not the\nreading, not the motions of which the reading consists, not the shape of\nthe written characters and their combinations in groups, called words. It\nis something more subtle even than that. It is the significance of the\nwriting. It is the meaning of the written characters. It is the purport\nthat is attached to the word-symbols.\n\nThe origin of mind accordingly introduces a factor which has nothing\nto do with mechanics; and the simplest psychical reflexes, including\nthose physiological reflexes which we must suppose to have originated by\nconscious adaptation and then been submerged into unconsciousness, cannot\nbe explained from mechanical or physical laws alone.\n\n\nSPONTANEITY.\n\nWhile we thus reject the conception of the mechanical philosophy and also\nof materialism, we do not say that there are motions either in the brain\nor anywhere else which form exceptions to the laws of mechanics. The\nlaws of mechanics hold good for all motions. The laws of mechanics are\nformal laws: they do not explain why bodies gravitate; but they describe\nhow they gravitate; and the latter is much more useful to know than the\nformer. There is (as we conceive it) no deep secret in the problem why\nbodies gravitate; they gravitate because they possess a quality which\nattracts them to each other with a force directly as their masses and\ninversely as the squares of their distances. In a word, gravity is the\nintrinsic nature of masses, it is an inalienable part of their existence.\nThus whenever bodies gravitate, we are confronted with an act of\nspontaneity.\n\nAttempts have been made to explain gravitation without the assumption\nof spontaneity, by the pressure of an atom-surrounding ether. But that\nonly defers the question; for the spontaneity, in that case, would have\nto be placed in the ether. Whatever be the merits of the explanations\nof gravitation by a _vis a tergo_, we must recognise the fact that no\nmotion can take place in the world, no pressure can be exercised, without\nthere being somewhere some spontaneous something that moves or presses.\nSpontaneity is a universal feature of nature.\n\nMr. Peirce uses the term \u201cspontaneity\u201d in a different sense from ours.\nHe identifies spontaneity with absolute chance. He means by it the\nirregularities that arise without cause, thus producing departures\nfrom law. We call that action spontaneous which is not due to external\ninfluence but springs from the nature of the things in action.\n\nSpontaneous is derived from the Latin _spons_, \u201cwill,\u201d which as a noun\nwas obsolete at the classical period of Roman literature and occurred\nonly in such forms as _sponte_, \u201cof one\u2019s own will, of one\u2019s own accord.\u201d\nIf a man acts of his own will, free from and not biassed by the influence\nof other men, his action is spontaneous. A free man\u2019s action is not\narbitrary, unless arbitrariness[15] be the character of the man; it is\nnot an exception to law; it is, if the character of the man is known,\ncalculable in advance, for every free action is spontaneous: it springs\nimmediately from the character of the man; it is the direct expression of\nhis will; it reveals the nature of his very being, thus showing the man\nhimself, and not something beyond or outside of him.\n\nTaking the word spontaneity in this sense, we say: Masses gravitate\nspontaneously; they are self-moving; their motion is due to their\ngravity, and gravity is their intrinsic nature.\n\nExactly as the laws of mechanics explain the \u201chow\u201d of motions but not\nwhy there is motion at all, the \u201cwhy\u201d depending upon the nature of\neach moving body, so the \u201chow\u201d of the brain-motions is explicable by\nmechanical laws, but the \u201cwhy\u201d depends upon the nature of the moving\nmaterial. The brain-atoms are possessed of the same spontaneity as the\natoms of a gravitating stone. Yet there is present an additional feature;\nthere are present states of awareness, and these states of awareness\npossess meaning, both of which are items which the chemist cannot find\nby chemical analysis. Neither states of awareness nor their meanings\ncan be weighed on any scales, be they ever so delicate, nor are they\ndeterminable in foot-pounds.\n\nYet while mechanics is not applicable to mental facts, the realm of\nmentality is by no means to be surrendered to indeterminism. Mr. Peirce\ndescribes the domain of mind as the absence of law and the prevalence of\nabsolute chance, of an indetermined and indeterminable sporting. This is\nnot so. While the fact must be recognised that the nature of the mind\nis not something mechanical, its action is nevertheless determined by\nlaws\u2014not by mechanical laws, but by psychical and mental laws. These\npsychical and mental laws are in one respect of exactly the same nature\nas mechanical laws; they describe the samenesses of certain facts of\nreality. And the facts of the ideal domain of thought, the facts of\nsubjectivity, are no less real than the grosser facts of mechanical\nmotion, which are the facts of objectivity.\n\nThe term mechanical is often used in the sense of \u201clacking life or\nspirit\u201d (\u201cCentury Dictionary,\u201d p. 3679). This is justifiable in so far\nonly as when we speak of mechanical phenomena we do not mean psychical\nor any other phenomena. It is true that that which makes this or that\nidea respond to a certain stimulus is not a mechanical but a mental\nquality, but the action itself, in so far as it is a motion, is and\nremains mechanical. Thus it happens that the laws of mechanics, far from\nbeing anti-spiritual, are the means by which we learn to understand and\nobjectively to represent the action of mental phenomena.\n\nIn this connection attention may be called to the efforts of modern\nlogicians to construct thinking machines which will perform the work of\nmental operations in a purely mechanical way. You propose the problem by\nadjusting certain indicators; then you turn the crank, and the machine\ndoes the rest. The results will come out with unfailing exactness.\n\nThe attempt made to construct thinking machines cannot as yet be called\nsuccessful. Nevertheless they are not impossibilities. Calculating\nmachines of various constructions are in practical use and doing\nsatisfactory work, not only in addition and subtraction but also in\nmultiplication and division, and even in extracting roots and in raising\nnumbers to higher powers. Calculations are undoubtedly one kind of\nthought, and if calculations can be performed by machines, there is\nno theoretical reason why we should not be able to construct logical\nmachines, which shall perform the operations of deductive and even of\ninductive thought with perfect accuracy.\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\nDeterminism does not make freedom impossible and natural laws do not\nsuppress the spontaneity of nature.\n\nNatural laws are not a power forcing a certain mode of action upon\nthings; they are not an oppression of nature. Natural laws are simply a\ndescription of nature as nature is. There is no \u201cmust\u201d in nature in the\nsense of compulsion, as if there were two things, (1) a master (i. e. the\nlaw) giving a command, and (2) a slave (i. e. the single facts) obeying\nthe command. The situation is not dualistic, but monistic. There is an\n\u201cis\u201d in nature, and this \u201cis\u201d is constant. There is a certain sameness in\nnature. In spite of all changes it remains the same; and thus even the\napparent irregularities preserve throughout an unvarying consistency. The\nfacts of nature express the character of nature; they are nature herself.\nBriefly, the \u201cis\u201d of nature (if we are permitted to personify her) does\nnot describe that which nature must do, but that which nature wills to\ndo; it describes how she acts spontaneously, of her own free will, in\nconformity with her innermost being and consistently with her permanent\ncharacter.\n\nThe main difference that obtains between the actions of inanimate\nnature so-called and rational beings is not the absence and presence of\nspontaneity, (for spontaneity is in both,) but the absence and presence\nof mind: and mind is not only the subjectivity of existence; mind is\nnot merely sentiency, i. e. the awareness of feelings; mind is the\nrepresentative symbolism of subjectivity.\n\nThere are sufficient reasons to assume that all objective existence,\nwhich appears to us as matter in motion, possesses a subjectivity, the\nnature of which depends upon the mode of the interaction of its elements.\nThis subjectivity appears in organised substance as feeling and develops\nnaturally into mind.\n\nThe essence of nature, accordingly, is not materiality, but spirituality.\nMateriality is the character of nature as it affects sentient beings; but\nits innermost self, as it were, its subjectivity, its psychical aspect is\nrevealed in the appearance of the spirit-life of rational beings\u2014of minds.\n\nWhile we fully recognise the spirituality of nature as nature\u2019s\ninnermost essence and as an ineradicable feature of reality, we cannot\nwith Mr. Peirce place mind at the beginning of the world. There is a\ngreat difference between spirituality and mind. One is the source and\ncondition of the other. One is permanent, the other is transient. One\nis the abstract view of a universal quality of the world, eternal and\neverlasting, as much indestructible as matter and energy; the other is an\nindividual formation that originates, grows, and develops; that can be\nbroken and built again; that dies with the body and rises again in new\ngenerations; that decays, as the foliage of the trees falls in winter,\nyet reappears, as the verdure reappears in spring; for the life of nature\nis immortal.\n\nMr. Peirce, regarding determinism as that view which does not recognise\nthe freedom of will, has an original and in our conception a wrong\nview on the one hand of natural laws, which are to him mere habits\nacquired by the world, and on the other hand of chance, or arbitrary\nsportiveness, (i. e. that which is not determinable by law,) which he\nidentifies with mind and with the spontaneity of freedom. Mind is to\nhim the beginning of all. Mind remains mind, according to his view, so\nlong as it is irregular, producing out of its own undetermined being\nsporadic effects without order or consistency. As soon as mind takes to\nhabits, it grows mechanical; by creating regularity it disappears; and\nthe result is matter in motion according to mechanical laws. Matter,\naccordingly, is said to be \u201ceffete mind.\u201d Law in our view is the divinity\nof nature; according to Mr. Peirce it is the termination of nature\u2019s\nirregularities: it comes to suppress her freedom and to supplant her\nmentality by mechanicalism. An element of pure chance, however, survives,\nwhich, appears in the free will of man, in miracles, and in nature\u2019s\nirregularities, and this element of pure chance will remain until in the\ninfinitely distant future, mind becomes crystallised into an absolutely\nperfect, rational, and symmetrical system. Such is in brief Mr. Peirce\u2019s\nview of the r\u00f4le played by mind in the world-process.\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s views of chance and law seem to come to the rescue of\ncertain theological dogmas, which represent the world-order as the\nproduct of a divine mind. We doubt very much whether Mr. Peirce\u2019s\nposition be tenable even from the standpoint of the scientific\ntheologian. For the order of the world, as it appears in natural laws,\nmust be, and is recognised even by the theist, as part and parcel\nof God\u2019s eternal being. The scientist who formulates _sub specie\naeternitatis_ certain facts of nature, say the \u201chow\u201d of gravitating\nbodies, describes a certain quality of God himself; he describes\nsomething that is immutable, eternal, everlasting; it is not the whole of\nGod, but it is certainly one feature of Jahveh, of that which is, was,\nand will be as it is.\n\nIn contradistinction to Mr. Peirce, we recognise, that the regularity\nof the whole is preserved in the specificalness of its individual\nparticulars, that there are samenesses in this world of changes and\ndiversities, and that if all reality is regarded as being essentially\nthe same throughout, all the diversities and apparent irregularities can\nvery well be explained as resulting from peculiar forms, combinations,\nand relations. Furthermore, we recognise that natural laws are compatible\nwith the spontaneity of nature and that the necessity with which a free\nman acts according to his character, does not reverse his freedom of will.\n\nNature is self-acting throughout; nature is free; even inanimate nature\nis spontaneous. But a higher freedom rises with the appearance of mind.\nAnd there are degrees of this higher freedom which can be determined\nwith great exactness, for they correspond to the range of the mentality\nof each creature. Mentality develops by the observation of samenesses,\nand it reaches rationality by the recognition of natural laws. The\nrecognition of natural laws is a view of some natural phenomena in their\neternal aspect, and we call them truths. So much is natural law and\nfreedom interconnected that the recognition of natural laws widens the\nrange of freedom; and obedience to them raises man out of his dependence\nupon his surroundings to a state of dominion over the creation in which\nhe becomes the master of natural forces.\n\nWhat a deep significance lies in the saying of the apostle: \u201cThe truth\nshall make you free!\u201d\n\n EDITOR.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[10] The adjective \u201clike\u201d is an abbreviation of \u201calike\u201d; and \u201ca-like\u201d\n(M.E. _alyke_, A.S. _gelic_, O.H.G. _galih_, M.H.G. _gelich_, M.G.\n_gleich_) is a compound of the prefix a with _lic_ body, shape, figure.\n\n[11] I am satisfied that logical identity is intended to mean sameness. I\nsuppose that the word identity, being Latin and a kind of international\nterm, appeared to logicians preferable to the Saxon word \u201csameness\u201d or\nthe German \u201cGleichheit.\u201d We need not look for any deeper reason for the\nadoption of the term.\n\n[12] Knowing that Mr. Peirce is one of the most prominent contributors to\nthe _Century Dictionary_, I may be pardoned for surmising that, perhaps\nwith the exception of the parenthesised word \u201c(supposed)\u201d he is the\nauthor of this passage and very likely of most of the other quotations of\nphilosophical terms we have adduced from the same source.\n\n[13] _Die Principien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung_ by Johannes von\nKries. See also Meinong\u2019s review of the book (in _G\u00f6tt. gel Anz._,\nNo. 2, p. 56 et seqq.) and Ad. Nitsche\u2019s article on the subject (in\n_Vierteljahrsschrift f\u00fcr wiss. Phil._ of 1892. XVI. 1, p. 26).\n\n[14] By irregularity of detail we understand simply a lack of uniformity,\nbut not exceptions to law. If irregularity be defined as exception to\nlaw, we should say, There is no irregularity in the world, while at the\nsame time nothing is uniform: for every particle of the world is in\nits time and space relations and otherwise different from every other\nparticle.\n\n[15] Arbitrary, as used here, means capricious, uncertain, unreasonable.\nA man\u2019s action is capricious if he is biassed by the present motive\nalone, without considering other motives which he would have under other\ncircumstances. A deliberate man equalises, as it were, his actions by\nforming rules of conduct. An arbitrary man does not recognise rules or\nlaws, made either by himself or by others.\n\n\n\n\nLITERARY CORRESPONDENCE\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\nRECENT EVOLUTIONARY STUDIES IN GERMANY.\n\n\nSince Darwin\u2019s death, his theory, which in Germany more than elsewhere\nreceived its development, has but few decisive steps in advance to\npoint to, even though the circle of its adherents has been enlarged and\nthough in many respects and in special directions it has been rendered\nmore complete and placed upon a firmer foundation. It is a gratifying\nfact, that most, if not all, of the recent discoveries in zoology,\npal\u00e6ontology, and particularly in developmental history, are easily and\ncompletely reconcilable with the principles originally established; so\nthat the views which we have reached on this subject have lost more and\nmore the characters of a purely hypothetical fabric.\n\nBut the accurate investigations of developmental history have\nunquestionably furnished the most important material in proof of the\ntheory in question, and the principles established in this department,\nin the main the results of the labors of German investigators (E. von\nBaer, Fritz M\u00fcller, E. Haeckel), have been verified in a truly surprising\nmanner.\n\nIt is true that Darwin himself in no way undervalued the importance\nof the results of the studies in question, but how little the facts\nknown at the time of the enunciation of his theory of natural selection\nsufficed, is most clearly proved by the fact that E. von Baer and Louis\nAgassiz, who at that time were perhaps the greatest authorities in\nembryology, assumed a hostile attitude towards the new Darwinian theory.\nAgassiz\u2019s combination of the points of agreement of pal\u00e6ontology and\nembryology, his explanation of extinct forms as \u201cprophetic types,\u201d proved\na veritable hindrance to the perception of the truth, and Carl Vogt, who\nwas his co-worker at that time, appears to have been the last to set\nup any opposition to the \u201cfundamental biogenetic principle,\u201d that the\ndevelopment of the individual repeats in an abbreviated form the history\nof his race. Vogt, formerly the champion of advanced views, appears\nto-day as the leader of the small band of the opposition.\n\nIf we compare the recently published fourth edition of Haeckel\u2019s\n_Anthropogeny_, 1891, and the eighth edition of his _History of\nCreation_, with the early editions, we cannot help remarking, with\nconsiderable astonishment, despite the enormous increase of fresh\nmaterial, the fact that little in the old plans and principles of the\nwork needs correction. Even the bold generalisations, the inference\nas to the identity of form of the original beginnings of all of the\nmiddle or higher classes of animals, the \u201cGastr\u00e6a Theory\u201d of Haeckel,\nat first so violently opposed, the stress laid upon the equivalence of\nthe blastoderms in the various orders of animals, nay, even many of\nthe animal genealogies, really only asserted as a working hypothesis,\nhave stood the test beyond all expectation; although Du Bois-Reymond\ninsinuated that the pedigrees of the heroes of Homer were more worthy\nof credit. To appreciate the complete victory of these ideas one need\nbut refer to the discourse _On Recapitulation in Embryology_ with which\nA. Milnes Marshall opened the meeting of the Biological Section of the\nBritish Natural History Society at Leeds, September, 1890.\n\nThe very conspicuous irregularities in the formation of organised bodies,\nwhich formerly were regarded as monstrosities, or as the freaks and\nriddles of the formative instinct, the hare-lips, the cleft palates,\ncases of microcephaly, etc., or the conspicuous want of symmetry in the\nphysical structure of the plaice and sole, formerly made use of by Mivart\nand Schimper as unassailable counterproofs of Darwin\u2019s doctrines, have\nshaped themselves into the most decisive verifications of his theory;\nas in fact, generally, a number of the most splendid evidences of the\ncorrectness of the theory have, as the result of exact investigations\nin organic evolution, proceeded from the most obstinate of its supposed\ndifficulties. Thus, for example, as proof that birds are far removed\nfrom the other classes of vertebrates, the circumstance had been cited\nthat certain parts connected with the visual organs are in them situated\nat the side of the brain, instead of on the dorsal surface, as is the\ncase with the other vertebrates. But a more exact observation has shown\nthat this variation in formation is a secondary result, since in each\nprevious period of development these same organs in the young birds\nlie, exactly as in the case of the other vertebrates, on the dorsal\nsurface, and only shortly before leaving the egg do they move downward\nto the sides. In many cases where the development of parts preservable\nin fossil conditions is under consideration, as for instance portions of\nthe skeleton, the hard integuments, and the teeth, a direct proof may, by\ncomparison, be furnished of the truth of the fact of the correspondence\nof the embryological formations of living animals with the final and\npermanent forms of their extinct representatives, a fact which was indeed\nacknowledged by Agassiz and Vogt, but completely misunderstood. We need\nonly to recall to mind the exact parallelism which Alexander Agassiz and\nNeumayer have demonstrated to exist in the case of echinoderms, Huxley,\nMarsh, and others in the formation of the wings of birds, the pelvis of\nbirds, or the hoofs of horses, in order to stamp this view as one that\ncannot be refuted.\n\nNevertheless, those opposed to this view, as Carl Vogt, His, Heufen,\nand others, have not abandoned their position as a hopeless one,\nand in recent years have relied particularly upon those cases which\nHaeckel, and before him, Fritz M\u00fcller, characterised as a falsification\n(cenogenesis[16]) or a supplementary alteration and abbreviation of the\nnatural process of development. \u201cNature is no falsifier,\u201d these opponents\nproclaim with emphasis, and everything it does is correct and true, and\n\u201cthis false heart alone brings untruth and deceit into the true heaven,\u201d\nthey cry with Wallenstein. People who rely on verbal sophistries merely\nbetray thereby their want of valid counter-arguments. A _mala fides_\non the part of nature can of course never be the subject of discussion\namong reasonable beings, but a deviation in the process of development\nof certain varieties from the typical path of the development of the\nremaining varieties of the species, is _felt_ as a falsification by\nevery investigator who has thoroughly studied the regular processes,\nfor the reason that it has a tendency to _obscure_ the original facts.\nThus, for example, in the embryos of certain vertebrates the \u00e6sophagus\nis temporarily completely closed, as Balfour has observed in young\nsharks, Bles and Marshall in frogs; and this state of affairs may well\nbe considered as a falsification, since an animate being with a closed\n\u00e6sophagus is a natural contradiction, which can never have existed and\nhere happens as a supplementary and temporary process.\n\nAs a rule such deviations from the normal course may be classified as\nconsequences of a prolonged residence of the animal germs in the egg\nor in the womb, the result of which is that owing to the presence of\nan abundant quantity of nourishing yolk, or through direct connection\nwith the circulatory system of the mother, they in the early stages of\ntheir development are relieved of the necessity of acquiring nourishment\nthrough their own efforts, and therefore all the contrivances necessary\nto that purpose may be dispensed with. For this reason we find the\nprimitive processes of development, as Professor Sollas has lately shown,\nmost frequently preserved in marine animals which have never changed nor\nabandoned their element in the course of the history of their species,\nin the case of which, therefore, no occasion could ever have arisen\nfor supplementary changes in the process of their development. Much\nmore frequently do we meet with this change in the case of fresh-water\nanimals, for often the rapid currents of their elements, for example a\nriver, will not suffer these to leave the egg in any very helpless larval\ncondition, and in addition fresh water is subject to other unfavorable\nchanges, as the drying up of streams. Also the larv\u00e6 of carnivorous\nanimals, which from the very beginning of independent life need more\nstrength to acquire their means of existence, are so completely developed\nin the richly provisioned eggs in which they take their form, that they\nemerge therefrom in an almost perfected state of being, as, for example,\nyoung sharks and cephalopods. In this kind of animal life, as well as in\nthe case of forms which are brought forth alive from the parent, although\nthey see the light of day much later, comparatively, there takes place\nnot only a great abbreviation of the first stages of existence in the\nentering upon a more direct path of development, but also changes occur\nin the form of the original designs because of the limitation of room\ndue to the presence of yolk in the egg, the reason for which is easy\nto perceive. In many other cases the mechanical cause of the change in\ndevelopment can be directly recognised; for example, in the case of, the\ntree-toad of the Antilles (_Hylodes marticinensis_), which, owing to the\nabsence of pools lasting through the dry season, is obliged of necessity\nto remain in the egg during its tadpole stage, that is to say, to skip\nthis stage, as it were; for which reason the formation of external gills\nin its case is entirely omitted.\n\nThe explanation of the origin of new organs seemed at first to afford\nan insuperable difficulty to the Darwinian theory, since, as Mivart\nobjected, it was not possible to perceive how natural selection could\nbe able to effect the formation of new organs unless they executed\ncorresponding functions from the very beginning. This difficulty,\nhowever, has been completely overcome by the theory of altered\nfunctions (_Functionswechsel_) which was first proposed by Dorhn, and\nparticularly in recent years by Kleinenberg. According to this theory,\nin all these cases we have simply to deal with a gradual change in form\nof already existing organs, which, originally being used to perform\none set of functions, are modified so as to perform another. Thus the\nlater developed organs of mastication and the feelers of insects were\noriginally organs of locomotion, legs; and these in the still earlier\nstages of creeping motion performed appropriate functions as the\ncrooked appendages of the body-rings. The wings of birds were, in their\nprogenitors, forelegs; the tongue of air-breathing vertebrates originated\nfrom the fish-bladder, which before that was chiefly an organ of swimming.\n\nThe knowledge thus acquired of the natural connection of the processes\nof evolution also explains, according to Kleinenberg, why organs which\nare at present completely useless, must yet necessarily appear in the\nformation of the embryo; for example, the gill-openings in the higher\nclasses of vertebrates, which have no functions to perform at any stage\nof vertebral development, and which furnished Meckel the first intimation\nof the fundamental biogenetic law. But as soon as it was explained\nthat the gill-openings furnished the foundation of the development of\nlater-appearing organs with actual functions to perform, it was rendered\nclear why they should continually recur; namely, because they form the\nindispensable links of a chain which extends from the dim past of the\ntype in question down to the present time.\n\nThere is no doubt that profounder researches in evolutionary history will\nfurnish still more important results: for instance, the more perfect\nelucidation of the pedigree of mammals; for in this province even our\ndomestic animals are not sufficiently investigated. Every new effort in\nthis direction, for example the recent work of Klever on the evolution\nof the teeth of the horse, and other investigations concerning the\nformation of special organs, has invariably shown that much in this field\nyet remains to be discovered. We have only to recall to mind the recent\ninvestigations relating to the development of the pineal gland, which\nin the last decennium have also led to the discovery of a rudimentary\noccipital eye, which seems to have actually existed and performed\nfunctions in numerous early representatives of the vertebrates, but\nto-day is simply a fact of history, and has given rise to an organ which\nDescartes considered as the seat of the soul. We may here also refer to\nthe recent investigations concerning the earlier developmental stages of\nthe duckbills, which have completely confirmed what the theory asserted\nin advance and required; namely, that they fill the vacancy between the\negg-laying reptiles and the mammalia which bring forth their young alive.\n\nOnly a few years ago Carl Vogt vehemently opposed the opinion of\nthe duckbills being transitional types, and sought to explain their\ninferior stage of organisation, which is also evidenced in their low\nblood temperature, as the results of a stunting process (degeneration,\nso called). They formed a degenerated branch of marsupials, nothing\nmore. Later, the remarkable yet long anticipated fact was revealed by\nHaacke and Caldwell, 1884, that the duckbills are egg-laying mammals,\na character which certainly could not have been acquired through\ndegeneration, but which simply shows that they are closely related to\nextinct reptilian forms. In one other respect, namely, with regard\nto their supply of teeth, the process of degeneration must indeed be\nadmitted. On this point, Poulton and Thomas discovered a few years\nago that in their early stages they really do possess true teeth,\nwhich, however, just as in the case of certain carnivorous cetacea,\nlater completely disappear, and are replaced by a sort of horny teeth.\nThis, however, is really not a true degeneration, but rather a special\nadaptation, doubtless beneficial to the animal in some way or other;\nand with as little reason as we may regard birds as a degenerated\nrace in comparison with their progenitors, because they have lost\nthe numerous teeth which these possessed, with just as little reason\ncan we hold that the duckbills, in their general organisation, have\nsuffered any retrogression worth mentioning. On the contrary, the\nrecent investigations of Marsh and Lemoine concerning the mammals of\nthe Jurassic and Cretaceous periods point more and more distinctly to\nthe conclusion, that there existed among these mammals a very large\nnumber which possessed the same degree of organisation as the duckbills\nof to-day, now represented by only a few species; a supposition which\nthe adherents of the theory of evolution made twenty-five years ago. I\ndo not know that the pedigrees of the heroes of Homer have been so well\npreserved!\n\nIn many other directions, however, speculation of late years in Germany\nhas considerably digressed from the facts of experience and from all\nprobability; especially with reference to the questions of propagation,\nvariation, and heredity. Here, first of all, are to be mentioned the\nworks of Weismann, _Ueber die Continuit\u00e4t des Keimplasmas_ (1885),\n_Die Bedeutung der sexuellen Fortpflanzung f\u00fcr die Selectionstheorie_\n(1886), _Der R\u00fcckschritt in der Natur_ (1886), _Die Bedeutung der\nRichtungsk\u00f6rperchen f\u00fcr die Vererbungstheorie_ (1887), _Die Hypothese der\nVererbung von Verletzungen_ (1889), and _Ueber Amphimixis_ (1891).\n\nIf we revert to the beginnings of this movement we shall find that it\nis intimately connected with the more exact study of the processes of\nfecundation as perfected through the researches of Strassburger, the\nHertwigs, and other investigators. In connection with the ideas of\nN\u00e4geli concerning the so-called idioplasm, the notion was reached that\nthe matter determinative of heredity was contained in the nucleoli, and\nthat by the union of the paternal and maternal nucleoli the sum-total of\nthe parental hereditary tendencies is transmitted to the offspring. This\nview was to a certain degree verified by the experiments of the brothers\nHertwig in removing the nucleoli of the eggs of the sea-urchin; the\nresult being that eggs containing the nucleoli alone, furnished, through\nartificial impregnation, results resembling the female parent, whereas\neggs from which the nucleoli had been removed, furnished germs completely\ncorresponding to the traits of the male parent.\n\nOther processes of fecundation, to which we shall soon recur, had since\n1876 produced the impression in the minds of a number of naturalists that\nthe germ-material led an independent life in the bodies of organisms,\nthat it possessed only an internal development, and required from the\nbody nothing but nourishment in order to multiply itself, and to develop\nits internal powers uninfluenced by the various vicissitudes of the\nbody. In the year 1876 Gustav Jaeger in Germany, and Francis Galton, a\ncousin of Darwin, almost at the same time in England, called attention\nto the observation made some time previously, that in certain animals,\nparticularly in insects, the development of the egg into the young\noffspring begins with the withdrawal of a small portion of the germ from\nthe component substance of the embryo, which remains at first unchanged\nand only later multiplies. This observation was generalised and accepted.\nAt the commencement of every sexual multiplication the germ-substance,\nafter impregnation, is divided into two parts, according to its future\npurpose; an ontogenetic or personal part, out of which the body is built\nup, and a phylogenetic or germinal part, which at first is stored up\nunused in the individual, but later furnishes new germ-cells. This idea\nled Weismann to his view of the continuity of the germ-plasm, which forms\nan unbroken line of descent from the first beginnings of the species and\nwhich is simply nourished by the organisms in which it has its temporary\nabode. From this germ-plasm spring _secondarily_ the cells that go to\nmake up the body (soma); but from these soma-cells no new _germ_-cells\ncan originate, and consequently none of its inherent or adscititious\nqualities are capable of transmission. The somatic cells make up the\nmortal and perishable forms of life, while the germ-cells alone insure\nthe further existence and immortality of the race.\n\nIt is easy to perceive that these views, if they could be maintained,\nwould completely transform the Darwinian theory. Since, if the somatic\ncells, that is, the body-parts of animals and plants, with all their\nadaptations to soil and climate, to definite modes of life, etc., are\nto be deprived of every power to transmit hereditary characters, then\nthe so-called Lamarckian theory, which should really bear the name of\nErasmus Darwin, would be deprived of every foundation which it possesses.\nNeither the increase in strength of the members of the body, acquired\nby use and practice, nor their weakness created by their non-use could\nbe inherited; and in just as small a degree could changes caused by\nexternal influences, bodily injuries, sickness, entail consequences which\nwere inheritable. This being the case, then also all those views would\nbe untenable which seek to explain the important effects of time as the\nresult of the accumulation and augmentation of the minute impressions of\nthe external environment. If the variations which are generated by means\nof external influences are not capable of transmission, then the direct\nadaptation must commence at the beginning in the case of every following\ngeneration; an accumulation is impossible.\n\nWe can observe, however, in every particular case, the complete harmony\nin which every living being exists with its surroundings and mode of\nlife; and observe in closely related species the most various adaptations\nto the elements in which they live: climate, food, nay, even to the\nparticular companions with which they associate; with the result that\nmany plants have shaped the structure of their flowers to conform to\nthe physical anatomy of the insect which ordinarily effects their\nfertilisation, and that animals assume the figure and form of some\nassociate who is safe from hostile assaults, or even completely adopt\ndifferent modes of life where it is necessary to enter a life-partnership\nwith a strange animal or plant. But, granting that the most widely\nextended capability of adaptation is a thing of daily experience, there\nstill arises the question how we shall explain this quality, which can\nonly be brought about by slow degrees, without taking into account the\nfactor of heredity in the transmission of acquired qualities. The theory\nof Weismann attempts this, in that it takes for granted an infinite\nvariability in the germ-formative materials, and guides the new forms and\nvariations thus begotten into the really true path, that is, into the\nmost successful paths, through the process of natural selection (that\nis, through the survival of the fittest as regards environment and all\nother things). According to this doctrine, external circumstances have\nno direct influence whatever upon the variation of species, as Erasmus\nDarwin, Lamarck, and the founder of the theory of natural selection and\nall his followers up to that time supposed, but we have to have recourse\nto a pure theory of natural selection, and call to our aid an, even\nnow, rather obscure phenomenon, occurring in connection with sexual\nimpregnation, which has been called \u201cthe expulsion of the polar bodies,\u201d\nan extrusion of minute qualities of germ-plasm from the germ-cells while\nin union. By the processes of crossing, which continually recur, a vast\nnumber of the most manifold hereditary tendencies are united in the\ngerm-material. Then certain of these are ejected, so that others acquire\nsupremacy; and in this manner the way is opened for the origination of a\nvast number of possible combinations. In this way the path is clear to a\ntheory of perfect mechanical variability, in which the germ-material has\nonly to transmit the characters which spontaneously arise in it, and yet\naffords an investigator endowed with any imagination the possibility of\nunderstanding the origin of the great variety and final purpose of the\nworld. It is Frohschammer\u2019s \u201cprinciple of the imagination as the creator\nof the world\u201d translated into comprehensible formul\u00e6. The simplicity\nthus reached by the elimination of all direct influences from the\nexternal world, has won the adherency of many investigators following in\nDarwin\u2019s steps, particularly in England; but whilst Wallace, Galton, Ray\nLankester, and others have expressed their full assent to it, other and\nnot less eminent authorities, as Herbert Spencer, Haeckel, Fritz M\u00fcller,\nand Virchow, have emphatically rejected it.\n\nThe reasons in favor of this assumption are, as is indeed the whole view\nitself, mainly of a theoretical nature; the arguments of the opposition\nare divided into philosophical and experiential propositions. The\nphilosophical opposition is mainly based on the fact that, from the very\nbeginning, there is assigned to the germ-material, as it unceasingly\ncontinues its existence, an infinite variety of capacities which the\nexternal world cannot affect, and that all progress and advancement takes\nplace as the result of the _loss_ of the originally endowed powers and\ntendencies. On this theory a family of acrobats or race-horses would\nnot acquire their powers through the gradual augmentation by practice\nof their feats of skill and endurance, but because these powers were\noriginally resident in them, and every factor incompatible with them\nwas gradually eliminated. On the other hand, these views approach in a\ndangerous degree to the theories of predestination and preformation,\nthe overthrow of which has been justly regarded as one of the greatest\nadvances of science.\n\nStill more important must be considered the objections of empirical\nscience, which up to this time was completely convinced of the heredity\nof acquired qualities. Popular experience, as well as that of physicians,\nuniversally speaks of inherited disease-germs, and in certain cases,\nparticularly in mental diseases, physicians are so thoroughly convinced\nof their inheritability that the first question put to the relatives of\nsuch sufferers usually is whether the disease has ever appeared in the\nparents or family of the patient. This fact is so deeply grounded in the\ngeneral belief, that the modern naturalistic school of novelists, the\nschool of Zola, Ibsen, and their associates, are wont to devote their\nmain efforts to the problem of inherited evils. Now the inheritability\nof certain evil conditions, even though proved, would not by any means\nbe an absolute disproof of Weismann\u2019s theory; for, inclined as much as\nwe may be to derive diseases from mistakes and sins against a natural\nmode of life, such as colds, drunkenness, dissipation, mental and\nbodily over-exertion, we yet cannot deny _a priori_ that blastogenic\ndiseases, or diseases originating in the germ-plasm, may exist, which\nwithout any doubt would then be transmissible. It also does not lie\nbeyond the realms of possibility that congenital malformations, such as\nhare-lips, supernumerary fingers, and the defects which show a remarkable\ndisposition to heredity, fall into this category. These blastogenic germs\nof disease would then, of course, have to be distinguished from the\nsomatogenic diseases (or the diseases produced in the body by external\ncauses), which never could be inherited.\n\nFrom this point of view the question as to the hereditary consequences of\nexternal injuries has given rise to great efforts to prove experimentally\nthe truth of this belief, which has existed for centuries. In almost\nevery part of the globe we meet with the assertion that hornless cattle,\nsuch, for example, as are bred in South America, or the tailless cats of\nthe Isle of Man, or other domestic animals with similar deficiencies,\nare descended from a progenitor which lost its horns or its tail through\ndisease or other mishap. Since now, recently, similar assertions have\nagain been put forward to the effect that tailless cats are found\namong the descendants of feline progenitors who have been robbed of\ntheir posterior ornaments by an act of violence, and these cases have\nbeen discussed in connection with the pangenesis theory of Darwin,\naccording to which each part of the body is believed to supply material\ncontributions to the germ-plasm, Weismann determined to institute\nexperiments on this point. He started the breeding of white mice whose\ntails were regularly cut off, without finding as a result, from among 840\nyoung ones derived from such mutilated progenitors, a single one having\na malformation or missing tail. However, even this experiment cannot\nbe regarded as an absolute proof, as it at first view might seem, and\nthe negative result was foreseen by the writer of these lines. It is a\nclear conclusion that if in the case of many vertebrates, for example,\nsalamanders and lizards, as well as in the case of most invertebrates,\nmissing limbs and tails are renewed in the course of their lifetime, it\nwould indeed be very remarkable if their renewal should not take place,\nat least in the case of the complete rejuvenation of new birth.\n\nDarwin himself had concluded, from his own experience and that of\nothers, that injuries and similar inflicted acts of violence are the\ncause of hereditary consequences only in cases where they bring about\nsome long-continued and wasting disease, and thus produce some permanent\neffect on the bodily constitution. For this reason, especially injuries\nto main nerve-tracts in parts near the centres are readily accompanied\nby hereditary consequences, because they interfere with the nutrition\nof the members supplied by them. Brown-S\u00e9quard has observed in a great\nnumber of cases of guinea pigs whose nerve-roots he had severed, that the\noffspring of the animals operated upon developed diseases of the eyes,\nears, and other organs which conformed regularly to the character of the\noperation, and could therefore be predicted; and also noted malformations\nand deficiencies, amounting even to the complete disappearance of the\neye-balls, such as never arise or have been observed in these animals\nwithout violent interference. His positive results regarding the\nhereditability of the evil consequences of disturbing operations have\na decided advantage in numbers and scope over the negative results of\nWeismann; and it is not clear how the belief in the non-hereditability of\nsomatic conditions will accommodate itself to them.\n\nBut if conditions of the body produced by such sudden interferences\nhave under certain circumstances entailed hereditary consequences,\nhow much more should we expect this same result from slowly\neffected constitutional changes, which external influences, working\nuninterruptedly for hundreds of years, bring about in an organism which\nhas been transported into a new element, into new surroundings, or into\na different climate. Not at all infrequently does the coming together\nand union of two new organisms beget hereditary changes which can be\nexplained only through the direct influence of the one upon the other.\nThus, for example, in the case of plants in hot countries which are\nprotected against the assaults of leaf-devouring ants by body-guards\nof smaller ants, and also in species of quite different families, as,\nfor example, in _Cecropia_ of the order _Euphorbiace\u00e6_, and in some\n_Triplaris_ species among the _Polygonace\u00e6_, we find little chambers,\napproachable through small openings in the stems, which serve the\nants protecting the plants as dwelling and breeding places. Are we to\nbelieve now, in regard to this fact, that these plants, so different\nin their nature, have produced through voluntary variations the stems\nwhich contain these openings, or are we to believe we have to deal here\nwith openings acquired through inheritance which originally were bored\nin the stems by the ants at the most appropriate points? Surely the\nfirst conclusion, which would uphold Weismann\u2019s theory, has but a very\nslight degree of probability in its favor, whilst the latter, which would\noverthrow his view, is very highly probable. And such examples could be\ncited in great numbers.\n\nIt is also to be remembered that the power of variation is not exhibited\nsolely in sexually created individuals, as it should be according to\nWeismann\u2019s theory, but frequently also in non-sexual multiplication,\nwhere no amphimixis (mingling) occurs. It is well known that the majority\nof the sporting varieties of our trees, for example, _Fagus sanguinea_,\nand the so-called weeping varieties, that is, abnormal varieties with\npendent twigs, forms with split, spotted, or white leaves, are wont first\nto appear on single branches of old trees, in which the continuity of\nthe protoplasm unquestionably existed, but no amphimixis or extrusion of\nthe polar bodies took place. It is also the generally received opinion\nof naturalists that the lowest classes of animal and plant life are\nuniversally multiplied by non-sexual means. And if this is so, it is\nnot clear how higher forms which sexually propagate can be derived from\nthem, if the latter have originally to furnish the fundamental conditions\nof variation. The adherents of Neo-Darwinism will, accordingly, have to\nfurnish many additional facts if they wish to invest their theory with\nany degree of probability.\n\n CARUS STERNE.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[16] _Cenogenesis_, from \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2, empty, fruitless (and \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, birth);\nnot from \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2, common, the derivatives of which are sometimes written\n\u201cc_e_no.\u201d\u2014ED.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\nFRANCE.\n\n\nThe study of personality, from the point of view of pathological\npsychology, has already supplied us with numerous books. M. ALFRED BINET,\nin his fine work, _Les Alt\u00e9rations de la Personnalit\u00e9_, has undertaken to\npresent systematically to us these alterations in their entirety, while\nrestricting himself to ascertained results, and avoiding disputed points.\nHe exhibits to us the \u201cdismemberment of the ego\u201d in diseased states, the\nfrequent rupture of that \u201cunity of consciousness\u201d which is the principal\nattribute of the normal individual.\n\nClinical observation has established the existence in certain subjects\nof successive personalities, and in others that of co-existing\npersonalities; the experiences of suggestion have at last allowed of\nanalogous morbid phenomena being provoked, in such a manner that cases\nmay be varied and rendered still more instructive. The simple movements\nprovoked in normal persons in states of distraction, of which many very\ncurious examples may be found in M. Binet\u2019s book, are the recognised\nmark of a subconsciousness; but it is often possible, under the same\nconditions and with the same processes, to provoke in a hypnotisable\nhysteric individual an actual sub-personality, that is to say, to augment\nthe phenomena which attentive observers have long since remarked in\nevery-day life.\n\nIt cannot be doubted that, on the one hand, it is possible to produce\nin an insensible limb a great variety of subconscious actions, and all\nsorts of reactions; and when they are recorded by the graphic method, it\nis perceived that with the fingers of his insensible hand, the subject\nhas made movements the form of which varies according to the receiving\napparatus (the dynamograph, drum, pencil, etc.). These movements thus\nexhibit the truly psychological marks of adaptation, and seem to reveal\nthe existence of an intelligence which is other than that of the ego of\nthe subject, and which acts without his assistance and even unknown to\nhim.\n\nOn the other hand, numerous experiences of very different kinds show\nthat the subject whose an\u00e6sthetic arm, for example, is pricked, can\nhave an idea of the stimulation, although he does not perceive it. He\ndoes not feel the prickings, but the excitation calls forth the idea of\ntheir number: he counts them as a normal individual would do; \u201conly,\nin hysterical individuals, the first part of the process occurs in one\nconsciousness, and the second in another.\u201d[17]\n\nIt can hardly be denied that these different consciousnesses are\ndistinct; since experience proves that each can have its own perceptions,\nits own memory, and even a moral character. However, their relative\nvalue with respect to each other matters little. We are compelled to\nconsider, with M. Ribot, the ego as a \u201cco\u00f6rdination\u201d of states of\nconsciousness, admitting of infinitely variable groupings. According to\nthe old conception of the ego, the personality, with respect to secondary\nconsciousnesses, was compared to a coachman who had ceased to have\ncontrol over his horses. This comparison is now insufficient, since it\nmay happen that the coachman falls asleep on the box, and that one of\nthe horses then governs the set, regulating, more or less perfectly, the\npace of the others by its own gait. Spiritualists, however, will never\nconsent to put the ego in the place of the coachman. \u201cA stone detached\nfrom the complex structure of the personality,\u201d M. Binet now tells us,\n\u201ccan become the starting point of a new structure, which rises rapidly\nby the side of the old. Whereupon a disaggregation of the psychological\nelements is produced.\u201d This comparison is certainly more precise and more\nin accordance with facts.\n\nMoreover, there remains to be explained how the mental compound which\nconstitutes the ego has been constructed from its elements. M. Binet\nshows, _\u00e0 propos_ of this question, that the association of ideas is\npowerless to explain the genesis of personality; associations alone,\nas proved by the experiences of suggestion, are not sufficient to\nrestore forgotten memories. Neither is memory the sole factor in\npersonality; since, in certain conditions a person may, while preserving\nthe consciousness and the memory of certain of his mental states,\nnevertheless repudiate these mental states and consider them as foreign\nto himself.\n\nThis question is still an open one. But there exist certainly some\ngrounds for our seeking in the division of consciousness the key to\ncertain psychological facts, like unconscious cerebration. Such a key\nwould be the action of detached consciousnesses and detached memories,\nthat afterwards immediately enter the current of general consciousness.\nFinally, \u201cit is possible,\u201d as M. Binet says in conclusion, \u201cthat\nconsciousness may be the privilege of certain of our psychic acts; it is\npossible also that it exists everywhere in our organism, and it may be\neven that it accompanies every manifestation of life.\u201d\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn his new work, _Agnosticisme_, M. DE ROBERTY studies with special\ncare the position of modern doctrines with regard to the unknown, the\ngreat _x_ of philosophic speculations\u2014God, Idea, Matter, Noumenon or\nUnknowable. Although perhaps a little hastily written, and somewhat\nobscure, his book nevertheless enforces conviction. \u201cOur conception of\nthe world,\u201d says M. de Roberty, \u201cembraces solely the things that we\n_know_ (feel, perceive, imagine, analyse, compare, etc.), and does not\ncomprise the least jot or tittle of what we _do not know_. _For us_,\ntherefore, there can be no question of any relations except between\ntwo classes of _known_ elements: that which constitutes the object of\nscientific research, and that which is outside of science. The latter\nclass represents _our_ unknown, which is always _relative and purely\nhuman_.\u201d Here, indeed, we have the true point of view, that which we\nshall all reach, though perhaps at first unknown to ourselves; and I\nshall be much surprised if the philosophers do not at last decide to wipe\nout the formidable _Unknowable_ set up by Spencer as the ultimate entity.\nWe shall speak no more of the fathomless universe, but of the still\nunexplored universe; of the unknown, not of the unknowable.\n\nThere is, however, another aspect of the question. Let us suppose the\nunknown got rid of; or to be more precise,\u2014and if we regard with M. de\nRoberty the psychic centres as special receivers in which the cosmical\nenergy empties itself, resolving itself into sensation and idea, and\nfrom whence it spreads itself anew as motion,\u2014let us suppose that we\nhave summed up all the energies received and emitted, and verified the\nlaw which reduces memory to the conservation of energy; let us suppose\nin fine that philosophy shall have found in the ego the synthesis of the\nnon-ego, expressed \u201cin symbolic abbreviations and in signs,\u201d and shall\nhave realised the \u201clogical monism\u201d which reduces things to their ideas:\nwould the intellect\u2014and would the sensibility\u2014even then be completely\nsatisfied? Can we conceive a state in which the curiosity of man as to\nall that concerns himself will be at rest, and when he will cease to\nbe disquieted about the cause of suffering and of life? Kant long ago\npropounded this question. But, according to M. de Roberty, the thinker\nwho is \u201ca prey to the afflux of emotion referred to by Kant,\u201d the man\n\u201cgiven over to the desire for another kind of knowledge than that of\nexperience,\u201d are, in the category of intellectual emotions, diseased\nand \u201cperverted\u201d persons. \u201cThe sentiments, so varied in aspect and in\nstrength, which inspire us,\u201d writes he, \u201cthe contemplation of the\nunknown, determine the mental illusion which materialises, so to say, our\nignorance and transforms the unknown into the unknowable.\u201d\n\nWould it be inconsistent, however, to preserve the emotion of the unknown\nwithout \u201cmaterialising\u201d it, without pronouncing any dangerous scientific\n_ignorabimus_? M. de Roberty does not accept this situation,\u2014which\nwas that of Littr\u00e9. I do not know whether any one will discover the\n\u201cvaccine,\u201d as he calls it, \u201cof the pessimist emotion which has produced\nagnosticism or latent religiosity.\u201d If this constitutes a mental malady,\nI fear much that it will be incurable. As long as there is unhappiness in\nlife, there will also be unsatisfied curiosity, and for a very long time\nto come, inquietude.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe last publication of LOMBROSO and LASCHI, _Le Crime politique et les\nRevolutions, par rapport au droit, \u00e0 l\u2019anthropologie criminelle et \u00e0\nla science du gouvernement_ (Political Crime and Revolutions, in their\nRelation to Law, Criminal Anthropology, and the Science of Government)\nof which we here have a French translation, is, I will not say, the\nworst written, but the most confused work imaginable. Its arrangement is\nclear, but its examples are given without any order whatever. The facts\npresented are abundant, but they are taken rather too much at haphazard,\nand often too uncritically. The worst is that its very thesis is weak,\nbadly formulated or elusive in places. What a pity it is that so much\nerudition should be expended, and so many valuable data be brought\ntogether without better success in displaying to the best advantage\nthese riches, and also, let me say, without so many times having had\noccasion to appear so clearly in the wrong! M. Lombroso remains unmoved,\nunfortunately, in his high sounding and unqualified hypothesis of\n\u201cdiseased genius.\u201d He continues to develop it and to defend it in this\nlatest book of his, which is replete with instructive details, and\nwhich is undoubtedly the first considerable attempt at an etiology of\nrevolutions and of political crime.\n\nThe complex doctrine of Lombroso could be sufficiently summed up, if I\nam not mistaken, by uniting word to word\u2014by the mathematical sign of\nequality\u2014philoneism (or the love of novelties) with the revolutionary\nspirit, the revolutionary spirit with genius, genius with insanity,\ninsanity with criminality, and criminality, finally, with progress. But\nwhat a detestable thing progress would then be! We should have to protect\nourselves against it as we do against a pestilence. The evolution of\nsocieties does not take place without great waste and loss, as we all\nknow. It should be carefully shown what these losses are. The study of\nthe conditions of social progress ought to be made in greater detail\nthan is here found. The terms of the imagined equation, which here\nhovers before our eyes, should in fine, if any comparison is to be\neffected between them, be subjected to a much more exact quantitative and\nqualitative analysis.\n\nFor example, let us take genius. Of what kinds of genius does Lombroso\nspeak? It seems to be sufficient for him that a man has attracted\nattention, and made himself talked about, to entitle him to be called\ngreat, while perhaps he is only a blusterer, a braggart, a servile\nimitator, a mere _homunculus_. In this way the quantity of geniuses and\ntalented individuals he has unearthed is something extraordinary. The\nresult of this is a radical error in his tables of the distribution of\ngeniuses. The superiority that he attributes, in this respect, to certain\nof our southern departments, as compared with the Norman departments,\nfor example, would have to be reversed if we considered the relative\nquality and kind of the genius involved. For the same reason, the\nrelation established between genius and republican modes of government is\nundoubtedly not so precise and simple as is stated. But the worst of it\nis that in thus augmenting the number of men of genius, it is found that\nwe have, in consequence of the above mentioned equation, also increased\nthe number of the demented and the degenerate!\n\nIf, moreover, it is true that the conservative mind, with less genius,\ninsanity, and criminality, is evidence of the senility of the race, how\ncan we accept the thesis that genius and the spirit of innovation are\nalso absolute evidence of a neurasthenic condition? Shall we deny sound\nnerves to robust and vigorous youth? This, indeed, is not what Lombroso\nwished to assert. Yet the famous thesis always confronts us: _Latet\nanguis in herba_. The least sign of degeneracy is enough for him to brand\na man, and not only are all geniuses in his eyes unbalanced, but even\nthe insane are without any ado baptised geniuses; with the result that\nall is heaped together in one great mass\u2014genius, insanity, and spirit of\nrevolution.\n\nI shall not dwell any longer on these criticisms. They are simply\nintended as an admonition to the learned M. Lombroso against the\nallurements of a badly founded theory, and against the dangers arising\nfrom a too hasty preparation of his books. Whatever may be its defects,\nhe has at least brought together in his present book many ideas. I advise\nall to read with care what he says about women (and how many will find\nhim misoneistic on this point!), concerning their great influence in\n_rebellions_, which are always barren of results, and their impotence in\n_revolutions_, which are always productive of good. In the second part\nof his work, namely, in the section entitled _Juridical and Political\nApplications_, nearly all he says is to be commended. I agree with the\nauthors\u2014or I do not wish to forget M. Laschi\u2014as to what they tell us\nin relation particularly to pettifogging parlementarianism and public\ninstruction. Their conclusions are perhaps not connected with the thesis\nin any very intimate manner. But this is not of much consequence, as they\npossess an independent value of their own.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn a previous communication I referred to the work of Savvas-Pacha on\nMusulman jurisprudence. I have now to announce a work entitled _Souvenirs\ndu Monde musulman_, by M. CH. MISMER, (published by Hachette,) the\nfourth and last volume of a valuable series which is greatly deserving\nof attention. M. Mismer, who has lived a long time in the East\u2014at\nConstantinople, in Crete, and in Egypt\u2014and was acquainted with the\nleading personages of the Empire, does not hesitate to return here to\nthe theory which he set forth more than twenty years ago in his _Soir\u00e9es\nde Constantinople_, his theory, namely, of the social advantages, and\neven the superiority, of Islamism over Christianity; subject however to\nthe special worth of the races which belong to either of these two forms\nof religion. This opinion is not lightly uttered, and it will appear\nthe more striking in view of the present crisis of social and moral\ndecomposition which is now spreading throughout the western nations.\n\nIn the work of M. Mismer will be found some of the great and striking\nqualities of the observing and thoughtful mind. In connection with a\nspecial problem of great importance in public instruction, that of\nheredity, I shall call to the attention of my readers the following\nstatement, made with reference to the young men of the \u201cEgyptian Mission\u201d\nin France, directed by M. Mismer for ten years. \u201cThe capacity of a\npupil,\u201d says he, \u201cwas always found to be intimately connected with the\ncerebral culture of his ancestors and the faculties constituting the\nsuperiorities of his race.\u201d \u201cIt was the same,\u201d adds he, \u201cfrom the moral\nstandpoint.\u201d Undoubtedly, if M. Mismer had taken the pains to make a note\nof the facts summed up in his statement, and to present the full case of\nthe numerous pupil\u2019s that he has had under his care, he would have been\nable to furnish science with data of the greatest value. Let us at least\nreceive his lessons as he offers them to us. They are the fruit of the\nexperience of a \u201cman of action,\u201d and it speaks well for an observation\nthat it has rendered good service in practice.\n\n LUCIEN ARR\u00c9AT.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[17] The hypothesis of the division of consciousness explains,\nconsequently, much better than that of the motive force of mental images,\nthe facts of automatic writing (spiritism). [The works of Binet, Roberty,\nand Lombroso are published by Alcan.]\n\n\n\n\nCRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.\n\n\n\n\nCOMTE AND TURGOT.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The Monist_:\n\nYour \u201cnote of inquiry\u201d mentioned on p. 611 of the last _Monist_ is\nanswered in full by Littr\u00e9 in _Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive_,\nwhere Turgot\u2019s name heads the third chapter. He shows that the latter\ndiscovered the law of the three stages, theological, metaphysical, and\npositive, by the following quotation from his _Histoire des progr\u00e8s de\nl\u2019esprit humain_.\n\n\u201cWhile the connection between physical effects was yet unknown, nothing\nwas more natural than to suppose that they were produced by intelligent\nbeings, invisible and resembling ourselves; for what else could they have\nresembled? Everything that happened without the intervention of man, had\nits god, whose worship was soon established by fear or hope, and this\nworship was conceived in accordance with the deference accorded powerful\nmen; for the gods were only more powerful men and more or less perfect\naccording as they were the product of an age more or less enlightened as\nto the true perfections of humanity. When philosophers had recognised\nthe absurdity of these fables, without however having obtained true\nlight upon natural history, they imagined an explanation of the causes\nof phenomena by abstract expressions, such as essences and faculties:\nexpressions that nevertheless explained nothing and that were reasoned\nabout as if they had been beings, new divinities substituted for the old\nones. These analogies were followed out, and faculties were multiplied\nto account for each effect. It was only very late, in observing the\nmechanical action that bodies have upon one another, that other\nhypotheses were drawn from this mechanics, (_de cette m\u00e9canique_) which\nmathematics could develop and experience verify.\u201d\n\nLittr\u00e9 calls attention to \u201cthe great sureness of judgment\u201d that led\nTurgot to cite only physical phenomena when he spoke of those that had\nceased to be interpreted either theologically or metaphysically. \u201cWhen he\nwrote this passage, positivity (I use this word, a necessary creation of\nM. Comte\u2019s) was only beginning to reach chemical phenomena and had not\nyet attained those of biology and sociology.\u201d\n\nBut, says Littr\u00e9, \u201cafter reserving the rights of priority for this\neminent thinker, there is nothing to prevent M. Comte from keeping\nall the part that he had made himself and that belongs to him. Three\nprincipal points mark Comte\u2019s independence of Turgot. The latter saw\nin the conception nothing more than an idea to meditate upon; Comte\nsaw in it a sociological law; Turgot did not attach to it a sketch\nof human development; Comte developed with the aid of this law the\nwhole historical series; Turgot did not perceive that he held one of\nthe necessary elements of a philosophy; Comte, in the same flight of\nthought, went from history become science to philosophy become positive.\nThe sociological law, isolated in Turgot, makes part, in Comte, of a\nvast whole: there were therefore two independent creations. Either M.\nComte had not read Turgot, or, more probably, he had read him at a time\nwhen this passage, which to-day awakens attention, had no particular\nsignificance.\u201d\n\nThe fourth chapter in Littr\u00e9\u2019s Life of Comte has for heading the names\nof Kant and Condorcet. The whole of the former\u2019s remarkable sketch of\ngeneral history is given and reference is made to the letter in chap.\nviii, where Comte, in 1824, being twenty-six years old, says to M.\nd\u2019Eichthal, his former pupil, \u201cI have read and reread with infinite\npleasure Kant\u2019s little treatise; it is prodigious for the epoch, and if\nI had known it six or seven years sooner it would have saved me trouble.\nI am delighted that you have translated it; it can contribute very\nefficaciously to preparing minds for positive philosophy. Its general\nconception or at least its method is still metaphysical, but the details\nshow the positive spirit at every instant. I had always regarded Kant not\nonly as a very strong head, but as the metaphysician that approaches the\nnearest to positive philosophy. But this reading has greatly fortified\nand especially given precision to my conviction in that regard. If\nCondorcet had had knowledge of this writing, which I do not believe,\nvery little merit would remain to him, since he can pretend only to that\nof the conception, which is almost as firm and, in some respects, even\nclearer in Kant. As for me, after this reading I can find in myself, up\nto the present time, no other value than that of having systematised and\nfixed the conception that had been sketched by Kant unknown to me, which\nI owe chiefly to a scientific education; and even the most positive and\ndistinct step that I have taken after him, seems to me only the discovery\nof the law of the passage of human ideas through the three stages,\ntheological, metaphysical, and scientific; a law that appears to me to\nbe the foundation of the work whose execution Kant has counselled. I\nthank my lack of erudition to-day; for if my work, such as it is now, had\nbeen preceded by a study of Kant\u2019s treatise, it would have lost much of\nits value in my eyes. I conceive now, as you said, that, for the German\nphilosophers that are familiar with this treatise, my work will really\nhave a great effect only with the second part.\u201d This work was a short\none reprinted in Saint-Simon\u2019s _Cat\u00e9chisme des industriels_ and called\n\u201cA System of Positive Politics.\u201d It had been inserted two years before,\nunder the title of \u201cA Plan of the Work Necessary for the Reorganisation\nof Society,\u201d in a pamphlet of Saint-Simon\u2019s, without Comte\u2019s name, and it\nwas because the latter insisted, this time, upon an acknowledgment of his\nauthorship that Saint-Simon broke with him. The \u201csecond part,\u201d which was\nto produce the great effect upon the German philosophers, never appeared;\nor rather, it soon grew to be the _Course of Positive Philosophy_,\nbegun on the 2d of April, 1826, before Humboldt, Blainville, and other\ncelebrated listeners.\n\nThe term _positive philosophy_ had long been used by Saint-Simon and his\nschool, Comte among the rest, not in the special sense that the latter\nnow gave it, but as a \u201cgeneric name for the whole of science.\u201d The first\nuse of the words as we now understand them is in a letter from Comte\nto M. d\u2019Eichthal, dated Aug. 5, 1824. \u201cI cannot help recalling your\njudicious reflection upon the influence that social physics, once formed,\nwill have upon scientific philosophy. I go even further than you, for\nI think that it will be only then that a veritable philosophy of the\nsciences can exist. All the philosophical ideas that are there to-day,\nalthough very precious up to that time, appear to me to have nothing\nmore than a simply provisory (provisoire) character. I shall speak a\nlittle about this relation in the general preface that I announce to you,\nwhere I shall explain that the true title of my work would be _positive\nphilosophy_, and that if I preferred _politics_, it is because that is\nthe most urgent philosophical application and the one that is to found\nthe science, but that later I or you or others will complete this system\nof ideas by the encyclopedic re-coinage of all our positive cognitions\n(connaissances), which ought really to be conceived as a single mass,\nalthough, for good culture, it is indispensable to preserve and to push\neven, in one sense, further than it is, the division of labor, so that\neach special savant can always, subsequently, conceive the relation of\nhis branch and even of his twig to the universal trunk.\u201d\n\nIn a letter of about this date Comte refers to his habit of never\nrewriting anything. His memory permitted him to look upon a volume as\nfinished when it had been thought out and before a line had been written.\nBut even in his letters we notice some of the disadvantages of this\nprocedure, which, while conducive to unity, sacrifices literary form.\n\nIt is true that Comte studied under Saint-Simon; but, according to\nLittr\u00e9, his purely philosophical dependence was very slight, while his\ninfluence upon his master was important. \u201cWhat forms the distinguishing\ncharacteristic of Saint-Simon at the epoch when he lived, is the social\ndestination that he assigns without hesitating to the ideas that\npreoccupy him. He has, as we have seen, only the most confused notion\nof what this philosophy will be; but, no matter what it is to be, he\nconsecrates it in advance to the reorganisation of society.\u201d\n\nAs regards Condorcet, Comte enthusiastically acknowledges his\nindebtedness to the \u201cSketch of an Historical Table of the Progress of the\nHuman Mind,\u201d and even goes beyond the facts, as he did in his praise of\nKant.\n\nLittr\u00e9 makes a fair division of credit among others as well as those\nalready named, and concludes as follows: \u201cTurgot had discovered that\nhuman conceptions, at first theological, afterwards become metaphysical\nand end by being positive. Kant had known that history is a natural\nphenomenon, subjected to a determinate course, and Condorcet, pushed\nharder than his predecessors by advancing time,\u201d (he had been condemned\nto death) \u201chad attempted to trace a table that should put in evidence\nthe enchainment of the progresses of civilisation. These are great\nthings, but they are still only rudiments; for neither Turgot nor his\nsuccessors make use of the discovered law to found upon this general\nfact evolution; Kant, who perceives clearly the necessity of conceiving\nhistory as regulated by the conditions inherent to humanity, is unable to\nbase this important notion on anything better than an _\u00e0 priori_ idea\u201d\n(the metaphysical principle that nature does nothing in vain, and that as\nhuman faculties do not reach their development in the individual, who is\nephemeral, they must do so in the species, which is durable) \u201cand thus he\nleaves it incapable of fixing the attention of a century whose tendencies\nwere more and more positive; lastly Condorcet has no other guide than the\nnegative philosophy of the eighteenth century in a work to which it could\nbring only contradiction.\u201d\n\nJohn Stuart Mill says of Comte that \u201cfar from pretending to originality\nwhen he had really no right to do so, he was eager to attach his most\noriginal thoughts to every germ of a similar idea that he met with among\nhis predecessors.\u201d\n\nSpeaking for himself, Littr\u00e9 says of the law of the three stages, \u201cI do\nnot reject it, I restrain it. As long as we remain in the scientific\norder and consider the conception of the world first theological,\nthen metaphysical, finally positive, the law of the three stages has\nits full efficacy in directing the speculations of history.... But in\nhistory all is not comprised in the scientific order. M. Comte, who has\nsaid somewhere that it is necessary to suppose, at the beginning of\nhumanity, certain notions that were neither theological nor metaphysical,\nhas indicated the germ, I will not say of my objection, but of my\nrestriction. In fact this law of the three stages comprehends neither\nindustrial, nor moral, nor \u00e6sthetic development. It has however, the\nexcellent character of being relative to the speculations in which\nevolution by filiation is most manifest and consequently of giving a\npositive notion of the march of history.\u201d\n\nIs it true, as stated on p. 565 of _The Monist_ for July, that Stuart\nMill adopted Hume\u2019s \u201cerroneous conception of causality\u201d to the extent\nimplied in the following passage? \u201cThis idea of \u2018sequence\u2019 however\nwas exactly Hume\u2019s mistake, adopted by Mr. Mill, and through Mr. Mill\npopularised among English thinkers. If the nature of cause and effect\nwere really constituted by invariable sequence, then the night might be\ncalled the effect of the day because night is invariably consequent upon\nday.\u201d\n\nThe only authority at hand on the island from which I write is\nClemenceau\u2019s translation of Mill\u2019s \u201cAuguste Comte and Positivism,\u201d where,\non p. 61, I read as follows, \u201cThe succession of day and night is just as\nmuch an invariable succession as the alternate exposition of the earth\u2019s\ntwo opposite sides to the sun. Yet day and night are not the cause of\neach other; why? Because their succession, although invariable, according\nto our experience, is not so unconditionally: these phenomena succeed\neach other only upon the condition that the presence and the absence\nof the sun succeed each other; and if this alternation were to cease,\nday and night would not follow each other. There are thus two kinds of\nuniformities of succession, one without conditions, the other dependent\non the former: laws of causation, and other successions which depend on\nthese laws.\u201d\n\nIn a note Mill refers to his _System of Deductive and Inductive Logic_.\n\n LOUIS BELROSE, JR.\n\n\n\n\nSOME REMARKS UPON PROFESSOR JAMES\u2019S DISCUSSION OF ATTENTION.\n\n\nIn his recent treatise on psychology Professor James discusses\nin an interesting and suggestive way the relation of ideation to\nattention, maintaining that \u201cideational preparation ... is concerned\nin all attentive acts.\u201d Attention is \u201canticipatory imagination\u201d or\n\u201cpreperception\u201d which prepares the mind for what it is to experience.\nThus the schoolboy, listening for the clock to strike twelve, anticipates\nin imagination and is prepared to hear perfectly the very first sound of\nthe striking.\n\nIt is undoubtedly true that in the form of attention we term expectant,\nwhere we are awaiting _some given impression_, there is a representing,\nantedating experience, which may be a preparatory preperception. But with\na wrong imaging of what is to be experienced there is hindrance, as when\nin a dark quiet room we are led to expect sensation of light but actually\nreceive sensation of sound. Very often, indeed, our anticipations make us\nunprepared for experience. Further, the experiments adduced by Professor\nJames from Wundt and Helmholtz are in the single form of expectant\nattention, and we must remark that in these experiments the reagent is\nalso experimenter, and this introduces a new attention, consciousness of\nconsciousness, and that of a peculiar kind, which complicates an already\ncomplex consciousness. In general we may say that experimentally incited\nconsciousness is artificial, at least as far as it feels itself as such,\nand for certain points like simple attention this tends to vitiate\nresults. Self-experimentation or experiment on those conscious of it\nas such may mislead in certain cases, and must, so far as this element\nof consciousness of experiment is not allowed for. In physical science\nthings always act naturally whether with observation or experiment, but\nin psychology observation, other things being equal, is more trustworthy\nthan experiment.\n\nIn all cases of expectant or experimentally expectant attention, the\nattention does not, however, lie in the expectancy or in the imaging as\nsuch, but it is merely the will effort concerned in these operations.\nYet as we may expect without effort, and preconceive without volition,\nattention is necessarily involved in neither. A perception or a\npreperception is an attention only as accomplished by will with effort,\nbut only an unattention when purely involuntary. Professor James\u2019s\nuse of attention as preperception brings us back to the common idea\nof attention, as any consciousness which cognises something. This is\nso inbred in thought and language that it is most difficult to avoid\nusing the term in this sense. Many psychologists like Mr. James and Mr.\nSully frequently mention attention as a will phenomenon but they do\nnot treat it under will, and they constantly return to the cognition\nmeaning. H\u00f6ffding, however, treats attention under psychology of will.\nAttention as the exercise of will in building up and maintaining\ncognitive activity, is naturally treated under cognition; but it is on\nthe whole safer and better to discuss attention under will so as to keep\nit sharply distinguished from the presentation form which it vitalises.\nI have endeavored to hold the term strictly to this sense, yet it is not\nunlikely I may sometimes unwittingly countenance the common confusion,\nbut trust the instances will be few.\n\nWhen we have, then, a case of expectant attention we must distinguish\nthe attention in the imaging from the attention in the actual cognising.\nIt is, indeed, true for us almost invariably that cognitive strain\nwithout immediate realisation is incentive to ideating. In listening\nin the night in vain for a sound we hear in imagination many sounds,\nand we form preparatory ideas of what we are to hear. Sense-adjustments\ncall up a train of sensations in ideal form. But it is obvious that low\nintelligences which have no power of expectancy or ideation do yet really\nattend. The very first cognitions and all early cognitions by their very\nnewness and difficulty were attentions long before ideation was evolved.\nWith low organisms, as cognitive power extends only to the present in\ntime and space, immediacy of reaction is imperatively demanded, and\nevery tension of cognitive apparatus is immediately directive of motor\napparatus so that suitable motion is at once accomplished. The cognition,\nthough dim and evanescent factor, is yet powerfully energised, and so a\ntrue attention. Always with lowest sentiencies, and often with higher,\npain is suddenly realised without anticipation, followed quickly by\nattention as strong effort to cognise the nature and quality of the\npain-giver and so to effectually get rid of pain-giver and pain.\n\nPreliminary idea, then, cannot occur in early attentions and in late\nattentions it is by no means necessary. It is said that we see only\nwhat we look for, but it must be answered that seeing commonly happens\nwithout any looking for. The kindergarten child, Professor James to the\ncontrary notwithstanding, is not confined in his seeing to merely those\nthings which he has been told to see and whose names have been given\nhim. A child continually asks, What is that? and is quick to discern\nthe absolutely new and strange. He accomplishes a wide variety of\nattentions without ideas and gives himself almost entirely to immediate\npresentations.\n\nTo be sure, every one sees only what he is prepared to see, only what is\nmade possible for him by his mental constitution as determined by his own\npre-experience and the experience of his ancestors, but this does not\nsignify ideation. Every cognising is conditioned by the past, but this\ndoes not call for a reawakening and projecting in ideal form at every\ninstance of cognitive effort, before any real cognition is reached.\n\nIn fact, many, if not the most of our attentions, are merely\nintensifyings of some present cognition, of some cognitive psychosis\nwhich has simply come or happened. Take the instance of attention\nto marginal retinal images, this certainly does not always imply\npreperception, the forming of an idea of what we are to see, though\nin the cases mentioned by Professor James it may. For example, I was\nwriting the above seated with my profile to the window when I became\nsuddenly aware, through the physiological agency of a marginal image, of\na moving object to my right. This perception of bare undefined object was\nspontaneous, a pure given; I exercised no will in attaining it, and so\nthe state of cognition was not an attention. However, by attending, by\nintensifying the cognition by will effort, I perceive that the indefinite\nobject is a man walking on the sidewalk, who is of a certain height,\nclothed in a certain way, etc. I do not trace the least ideation in the\nwhole process, the slight attending as act of will did not imply any\nanterior or posterior idea or representation. The reason for the will\nact was the intrinsic interest of movement, and this intrinsic interest\narises in the fact that moving objects have had for all life a special\npleasure-pain significance, the moving object is the most dangerous, and\nso motion perceived has become ingrained in mind as a special stimulant\nof attention. This habit of attentiveness to things in motion survives\nand continues for cases where it is of no use and even of harm; thus,\nin the present instance, it diverts me from my work. It is obvious\nthat attention often occurs in the same way for other senses without\npreliminary idea.\n\nOn the whole we must conclude that attention is a much abused term, and\nit is to be hoped that psychologists will for the future keep to the\ndefinite and best use of the term; namely, to denote cognitive effort in\nall its degrees and modes.\n\n HIRAM M. STANLEY.\n\n\n\n\nIS MONISM ARBITRARY?\n\n\nIn Vol. II, No. 3, of _The Monist_, a very kind criticism appeared from\nthe pen of Mr. Francis C. Russell of the doctrine of a double-faced unity\nof mind and matter. It was said that this doctrine is very far from\ninducing that final satisfaction which we rightly expect of a competent\ntheory, and the critic propounded as a possible explanation of mental\nphenomena the postulate of a conservation of spirit. He calls spirit the\nelementary basis of consciousness considered as a quality. Spirit would\nbe the subjectivity of nature, the elements of feeling, or as Professor\nMorgan calls it metakinesis; and consciousness would originate in the\nsame way as electricity, i. e., by rending spirit asunder into positive\nand negative spirit so as to produce a tension. This would account for\nthe appearance and disappearance of consciousness in that spiritual\n\u201cdynamo\u201d which is called the nervous system.\n\nThis proposition seems to be highly acceptable because it stands upon the\nprinciple of a conservation of substance and attempts to represent the\nphenomenon of consciousness as due to a transformation. But does it for\nthat reason remove the difficulties of the doctrine of a double-faced\nunity of nature, which, as Mr. Russell says, \u201cis open to the charge of\nbeing arbitrary and brings no access of insight\u201d? Is not perhaps the term\ndouble-faced unity (which is none of my invention, and which I have been\ncareful to avoid) a misleading and unsatisfactory term? Why should nature\nbe double-faced? Why are feeling and motion the only two attributes of\nnatural phenomena? Is this not arbitrary? Could nature not be just as\nwell a treble or quadruple-faced unity. Nature might possess, as Spinoza\nactually declares, infinite attributes of which these two only, viz.\nextension and thought, i. e. motion and feeling, happen to be known to us.\n\nIt is this apparent arbitrariness which bars our insight and deprives us\nof the satisfaction that ought to attend the real solution of a problem.\nBut let us avoid the term double-faced unity; let us speak of the\nsubjectivity and the objectivity of nature, and the clouds will disappear.\n\nThe doctrine of a double-faced unity has been criticised as dualism,\nand the proposition that nature consists of two radically different\nattributes\u2014exactly of two, not more and not less\u2014must most decidedly\nappear as dualism. But is it dualistic to say that every subject appears\nto its objects not as a subject but as an object among other objects?\nCertainly not.\n\nThe relativity of the terms subject and object affords us the key to\na comprehension of the situation. This world of ours is a world of\nrelations. The phenomena of nature exhibit an unceasing activity; they\nconsist of constant changes, and every change, every motion, has a whence\nand a whither. Every transformation is a series of events among which any\nprior one is called cause and any subsequent one effect.\n\nIf we regard feeling and motion as two attributes of nature, we are\nactually on the brink of dualism, and we shall understand how Spinoza,\nin order to escape from dualism and arrive at a monistic view, assumed\nwithout any plausible argument the existence of an infinite number of\nattributes. This assumption however is of no avail, for the problem would\narise: How is it that we know only two of all these infinite attributes?\nWhy do we not know any other? and why are we unable to form even a dim\nnotion of any other? If they exist why do they exhibit no effects upon\nus? Perhaps because we ourselves and this world of ours consist only\nof two! And if they exhibit no effects upon us and upon our world, can\nthey be said to exist at all? Might we not, in that case, consider them\nas non-existent and count the two known attributes alone as actual\nrealities? Thus the dualism would remain; and Spinoza\u2019s monism is only\napparent.\n\nThe same objection cannot be made if we remain conscious of the fact that\nfeelings are as much abstracts as motions. Subjectivity and objectivity\nare correlative terms. There is as little a duality in the idea, that\nsubjects presuppose objects as that effects presuppose causes. There\nare not causes in the world which are nothing but causes, nor are there\neffects which are nothing but effects. Take for instance an historical\nevent. Was C\u00e6sar\u2019s death a cause or an effect? Plainly, this depends upon\nthe view we take. As the sequence of the wounds which C\u00e6sar received\nfrom his assassins it was an effect; as the beginning of the civil war\nconsequent thereupon it was a cause. If I look at you, you are the object\nand I am the subject. If you look at me, it is the reverse. Thus the\nrelation of a certain thing to its surroundings makes of it a subject,\nwhile the surroundings are its objects.\n\nSubject and object being correlatives, we can very well understand why\nthere are no \u201csubjects in themselves\u201d; every subject is at the same time\nan object in the objective world. We can further understand, why every\nsubjectivity except our own withdraws itself from direct observation.\nWe can observe the movements of organisms like ourselves and judge by\nway of analogy that they feel pain or enjoy pleasure. We see their\nmotions which betray certain feelings, but we can never see the feelings\nthemselves; and even supposing that we could enter into the brain of a\nman and that the whole mechanism of brain-action were laid open to our\ninspection in its minutest details, we should see motions, combinations\nand separations, integrations and disintegrations, we should see the\noxydation of the gray substance, which would appear as a great turmoil\nand excitement, but we should see (as Leibnitz says) no thoughts, no\nperceptions, no feelings. That it cannot be otherwise is obvious when\nwe consider that our objects will always present to us the character of\nobjectivity.\n\nBut suppose We were an atom of oxygen and entered into the process of\nbrain-action as an active factor, our subjectivity would soon become\nabsorbed and welded into a higher unity with the subjectivity of the\nother atoms. We should then, as a part of that brain\u2019s consciousness,\nfeel these feelings, perceptions, and thoughts; we should, then, _be_ the\nsubject which we could not see and which we were searching for in vain in\nthe world of objectivity.\n\nThis conception of the correlation of subjectivity and objectivity\ndoes not only convincingly explain the unity of feeling and motion, it\ndoes not only establish a satisfactory monism, it throws light also on\nsome other of the questions that puzzle us. How is it that we do not\nfeel our brain-motions to be brain-motions? We feel our feelings only;\nand when feeling our feelings we do not so much feel _that_ we feel as\n_what_ we feel. In other words, we feel the contents of our feelings; we\nfeel their import, their meaning; we are aware of their significance;\nour consciousness is conscious of the object, the presence of which is\nindicated by this special feeling. Our attention is concentrated upon the\nmessages conveyed by and contained in the different feelings.\n\nThese messages of certain feelings are the interpretations given either\nto certain sense-impressions or they are the thought-symbols representing\nsome abstracts, representing certain features of sense-impressions.\n\nHow little we feel our brain-motions when we think, can be learned\nfrom the fact that some nations place the seat of thinking in the\nheart, others in the stomach or even the bowels, while even so great a\nnaturalist as Aristotle regarded the brain as cold and insensible; he\nmade the observation that man is in possession of the relatively largest\nbrain, but he understood its function so little that he thought it served\nto cool the warmth rising from the heart.\n\nIt is strange that every subjective feeling so long as it remains within\nitself can neither be localised nor determined. We know nothing whatever\nof the brain-motion that thinks a certain idea. We can fairly assume\nthat every idea is in its objective existence a peculiar kind of brain\nmotion taking place in a particular part of the brain, but we are not\nconscious of the brain-motion as a special and localised motion. We are\nquite unable to tell the difference that we must suppose to exist between\nthe forms of the brain-structures or combinations of brain-structures and\ntheir motions when we think say for instances of virtue and of vice. We\nare conscious only of the idea and not of their objective correlates.\n\nWhatever we know of our body, we know only through sensation; i. e.,\nby the same means by which we know of other things. Our body is to us,\nand is represented with the assistance of the senses, as an object in\nthe objective world. As such it is localised and all its relations and\nactivities are determined. Whatever subjective feeling we have concerning\nany state of ourselves, remains indistinct until with the help of the\nsenses it is made an object to our observation. Who has not as yet made\nthe experience that he was unable to localise a toothache. The pain\nitself gives no information either as to its nature and cause or as to\nthe seat of the suffering. The pain itself is purely subjective. All the\nobjective facts have to be localised with the assistance of the senses.\nThe suspected regions must be made the object of experiments and if any\nirritation of a certain spot increases the ache, it will be assumed to be\nthe seat of the pain. And even then how often is a patient mistaken not\nonly almost always as to the nature but often also as to the seat of the\npain.\n\nThese facts appear strange, but they cease to be strange, when we\nconsider that the nature of subjectivity is feeling. Subjectivity can as\nlittle become directly conscious of its own objectivity as an eye can\nlook at itself. However, an eye can look at its image in the mirror. So\nthe complex of subjective existence, which is through the interaction of\nan organism united in what we call a soul, can and does turn the channels\nof its own senses back upon itself and thus forms an opinion concerning\nits own objectivity. Man\u2019s knowledge of his own objective existence is\nnot due to any internal and direct perception of self, but solely to the\nsame experience through which he receives information concerning the rest\nof the world.\n\n P. C.\n\n\n\n\nA REPLY TO A CRITIC.\n\nWITH A DISCUSSION OF NECESSARY TRUTHS.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The Monist_:\n\nI hope it is not a breach of etiquette to ask you to forward to your\nreviewer the following remarks in reply to his criticism of my work (_The\nFoundations of Geometry_, reviewed in Vol. II, No. 1, of _The Monist_).\nIf he is good enough to review my second book also, I think they will\nclear up some misunderstandings.\n\nYour reviewer commences with some general remarks, against which I have\nnothing to say. He then proceeds to consider my \u201crequirements for a\nlogical definition.\u201d Here he seems to find a difficulty\u2014which may be\ndue to my not having expressed myself clearly. If so I hope he will\nread what I say on the same subject in my _Essay on Reasoning_, which\nI cannot believe he will find \u201cindefinite\u201d or not well \u201cissuable.\u201d But\nindeed I cannot see where his difficulty comes in with my old statement\nof the case. I state perfectly clearly that requirements (3) and (4) are\nnot _logically_ necessary for a definition, but are only required if\nthat definition is intended to give a _particular meaning_ to the word.\nHe tries to reduce my argument _ad absurdum_ by giving a definition\nof \u201ctroft.\u201d But so far from being absurd his definition is perfectly\ngood. According to it \u201ctroft\u201d would include in its denotation all\nour percepts and concepts. When however he goes on to say \u201c... These\nsignificant names must be so used that the intellectual sensibility shall\nbe excited to perceive that which is intended to be defined,\u201d I differ\nfrom him entirely. This is only required for a _description_, not for a\n_definition_ (see _Essay on Reasoning_, p. 53).\n\nYour reviewer\u2019s only solid objection to my \u201crequirements\u201d seems to be\nthat the fourth includes all the rest. This is only true if the term\nproposed for definition has an import which has already been determined;\nbut even in such a case it is better to consider the requirements\nseparately, as I have given them. For the force of objections under the\ndifferent headings varies enormously. An objection under heading (1),\nif established, would be fatal to any definition whatever. One under\nheading (2) so far from being fatal would only be a suggestion for the\nimprovement of the definition. Objections under either of the headings\n(3) and (4) would only be to the effect that the term as defined meant\nsomething different from what it was desired that it should mean. It\nis however convenient to consider (3) and (4) separately as it would\ngenerally be possible to decide (3) at once, whereas if a doubt were\nraised under heading (4) it might lead to a prolonged discussion before\nit could be laid. I do not however pretend that the \u201crequirements\u201d are\nlaid down in my _Foundations of Geometry_ in the best possible form.\nIndeed I have altered the form in my second essay. There is moreover\none requirement for a logical definition which is not included in my\nheading (1) in the _Foundations of Geometry_, though it is included in\n(4). This defect is remedied in the _Essay on Reasoning_ (p. 55). It is\ncurious that your reviewer should have missed this point, as it is the\nvery one on which he attacks my definition of \u201cdirection.\u201d It is that\nthe assertions in a definition must not be _independent_ of the meaning\nof the term defined. If they were, the assertion would be equally true\n(or false) whatever meaning the term might have. The _import_ of the\nterm would therefore be unlimited. In the case of explicit definitions a\nsimilar error is called _circulus in definiendo_.\n\nWhen your reviewer goes on to attack my definition of \u201cdirection\u201d\nwhy does he change his front all at once, and disregard all the\nconsiderations he has just been discussing? Why does he not apply\nmy, or his own, requirements for a definition to the case in point?\nThe criticism he actually does put forward will not bear a moment\u2019s\ninvestigation. If my definition is \u201ccircular,\u201d the assertion must be\nequally true whatever meaning is ascribed to the term. Well, then, let\nus try the effect of giving to it the meaning we ordinarily ascribe\nto \u201ccheese.\u201d Is it equally true that \u201ca cheese may be conceived to be\nindicated by naming two points, as the cheese from one to the other\u201d?\nClearly not. But not only does this one assertion out of my definition\nexclude the import of \u201ccheese\u201d from the meaning of \u201cdirection,\u201d but, more\nparticularly, it distinguishes between the \u201cthree distinct but closely\nassociated notions\u201d which your reviewer quite rightly says \u201cbecome\nconfused in thought and expression unless the most solicitous care is\ntaken to distinguish them.\u201d This is exactly the care which I _have_\ntaken, by framing my definition.\n\nI need not say much about the rest of the criticism. Your reviewer\u2019s\nremarks on my definition of \u201cangle\u201d are simply due to the fact that he\nhas not read the definition carefully, and probably has not read the note\non the top of page 36 at all. It may make it clearer to him if I point\nout that if \u201cwe imagine a northeast-southwest line cutting an east-west\nline,\u201d we imagine _four_ different directions and therefore (4\u22c53)/(1\u22c52)\n= 6 angles. Two of these are the straight angles between the opposite\ndirections of each of the two lines. The other four are what Euclid calls\n\u201cthe angles between the lines.\u201d As an angle, according to my definition,\nhas no local habitation in space, it is, _prima facie_, meaningless to\ntalk of the \u201cright hand upper angle.\u201d But if this is only an abbreviation\nfor \u201cthe angle between the directions upwards and to the right,\u201d then\n\u201cthe right hand upper angle\u201d means the same as it would in Euclid.\n\nWith the remarks about the nature of the challenge I have thrown down I\nheartily agree. May I however suggest that I have a right to expect that\ncriticism should be, not only \u201ccompetent and candid,\u201d but careful? It\nis a difficult subject, and _I_ at least am not always able to express\nmyself in such a way that my meaning cannot be misunderstood by any one.\nI think if your reviewer looks at what I have said again, with the aid\nof what I say further in my _Essay on Reasoning_, he will see that his\ncriticisms have really originated in misunderstandings, and perhaps he\nwill alter his judgment that I have \u201ccome short of the high result to\nwhich I aspired.\u201d[18]\n\nBut my chief object in writing to you to-day is to bring specially to\nyour notice my ideas on the nature of so-called \u201cnecessary truths.\u201d\nI am not quite clear how far you will find my views harmonise with\nyour own. To a great extent I am inclined to think they are simply a\nfurther analysis of the views you express in _The Monist_ and in your\n_Fundamental Problems_. I will briefly sketch my own ideas and you can\nthen judge whether they are yours also or not.\n\nIn my _Essay on Reasoning_ I classify assertions as Truisms (assertions\nwhose truth depends solely on the definitions of their terms) and Real\nAssertions, which convey some real subjective or objective information.\nI show that the validity of all purely formal knowledge depends on the\nfact that it is deduced from definitions alone, which are laid down\n_arbitrarily_ and that the supposed peculiar certainty of the theorems\nof pure mathematics is merely due to the fact that they are all truisms.\nThus, I think it a misnomer to call such theorems \u201cnecessary\u201d truths. It\nwould be nearer the mark to call them \u201carbitrary\u201d truths.\n\nThere is no _necessity_ whatever about the theorem \u201ctwice two is four.\u201d\n\u201cTwo\u201d is defined as 1 + 1; \u201ctwice,\u201d as the operation of adding a thing to\nitself. It follows from this that \u201ctwice two\u201d is 1 + 1 + 1 + 1; and this,\nby _definition_, is \u201cfour.\u201d If \u201cfour\u201d were defined as 1 + 1 + 1, (and\nthere is no \u201cnecessary\u201d reason why it should not be,) then \u201ctwice two\u201d\nwould _not_ be \u201cfour.\u201d The assertion \u201ctwice two is four\u201d conveys no real\ninformation whatever\u2014at best it could only tell us what one of its terms\nmeant if they had not all been previously defined.\n\nI cannot insist too strongly on the importance of a proper understanding\nand use of logical definition. If you desire to know whether a given\nassertion is true or false, _a priori_ or _a posteriori_, the first step\nin the investigation MUST be to find out how its terms were defined.\nIf it turns out that the truth (or falsehood) of the assertion can\nbe formally deduced from these definitions, then the assertion is a\ntruism (or contradiction in terms): in either case it can give no real\ninformation, and even if true cannot be a \u201cnecessary\u201d truth. Only if the\ndefinitions of the terms are both independent and consistent is it open\nto discussion how we might come to a knowledge of the fact it expresses.\n\nI may briefly indicate here how I think the problem ought to be\nattacked. \u201cObjective facts\u201d can only be established by induction. I do\nnot mean by that term necessarily the process described by Mill, but\nsome similar process, based ultimately on _inductio per enumerationem\nsimplicem_. Now no such process can ever lead to a necessary truth. The\nmost fundamental and certain induction which can be made, that which\ninduces us to believe in the objectivity of our environment, does not\nlead to a \u201cnecessary truth\u201d; and much less can any other induction based\nupon this one do so. \u201cObjective facts\u201d then may be established with\ngreater or less probability, but can never be _necessarily_ true. But\nall inductions are based on our perceptions, that is ultimately on our\nsubjective sensations. And a man can, nay, must be, absolutely certain\nof the reality of his own sensations though he cannot be certain of the\ninterpretations he puts upon them. If I have a toothache I cannot be\nabsolutely certain that I have a tooth, but, at least while the pain\nlasts, I am _absolutely_ certain that I have an ache. And so of any\nsubjective sensation.\n\nI can similarly be absolutely certain that I entertain a given concept,\nwhile that concept is before my mind; though of course it is possible\nthat if I assert the possession of that concept I may do so in language\nwhich may be misunderstood by the person I am addressing. If then a\nman has certain concepts which he can call up at will, the reality of\nthose concepts, _qua_ concepts, is to him a _necessary truth_. He may\nlay down such necessary truths as axioms, and by their aid he may give\nreal subjective import to a symbolic argument, and so obtain new and\ncomplicated assertions which are also to him necessary truths. This is\nwhat I do in my subjective theory of geometry. That theory might be\nregarded as purely symbolic\u2014the axioms might have been left out, and\nall its conclusions looked upon as mere truisms. The conclusions of\ngeometry of four or more independent directions can perhaps _only_ be\nregarded as truisms. But by the aid of the axioms, geometry of two and\nthree independent directions can be given real subjective import, and its\nconclusions therefore regarded as necessary truths, as long as they are\nonly taken subjectively. They may further be applied objectively by the\naid of objective facts established by induction, but in this case their\nvalidity is no greater than that of the primary facts, the counterparts\nof the subjective axioms, which are employed to give the theory objective\nimport.\n\nI confess I have not studied Kant sufficiently to say that his views\ndiffer, materially from mine, though I always thought they did until I\nread your interpretations of them. Perhaps I misunderstood the sense\nin which Kant used the term _a priori_. The term has been used in so\nmany different senses that I prefer myself to drop it altogether. If it\nmerely refers to priority in time there can be no practical doubt that,\nwhether in the case of the human race or of an individual thinker, a\nlarge amount of sense-experience must have preceded even so simple an\n_a priori_ judgment as \u201ctwice two is four.\u201d If the term merely refers\nto priority in logical validity it seems to me better to say that \u201csuch\nand such assertions are not dependent upon experience.\u201d But Kant says\nof the assertion \u201c7 + 5 = 12\u201d that it is not only \u201c_a priori_\u201d but\n\u201csynthetic\u201d. By the latter term he means that its truth was _not_ deduced\nfrom definitions alone, and that the assertion therefore conveys real\ninformation. In this I believe he was wrong, and though he afterwards\ndeclares that \u201call knowledge _a priori_ is empty and cannot give\ninformation about things,\u201d unless the true nature of _a priori_ knowledge\nis made more clear, people will inevitably continue to believe the\ncontrary\u2014and to believe moreover that Kant taught so.\n\nAny language which seems to imply that there is some dread necessity\nabout mathematical truths\u2014that they could not be otherwise if they\nwould\u2014is very misleading. Of course it is necessarily true that _if_ you\nhave seven objects and add five more to them you will have in all twelve\nobjects. But the whole objective difficulty is begged by the supposition.\n\u201cMuch virtue in if!\u201d\n\nAs I understand it the essence of the \u201claws\u201d of pure mathematics is that\nthey are verbal, that is they are only abbreviated expressions of the\nresults of certain verbal processes. If the processes are repeated and\nthe results similarly expressed, the results must always be the same.\nOur reason cannot \u201cinform us about the form of existence\u201d unless it is\nfirst given, as the _data_ or facts which correspond to the definitions\nof our symbolic arguments. It is only because our reasoning faculties\nare limited that symbolic arguments are necessary at all\u2014that it is\nnot evident to us at once that the conclusions of the most intricate\nmathematical calculations are given to us along with the _data_. Given\nthe data, then in all possible worlds the conclusions must indeed follow,\nbut only because they really are already _in_ the data which were given.\n\nIt may be that you will not only agree with all I have said, but have\nalready said much of it yourself. But there are some passages in your\n_Fundamental Problems_ which seem to imply otherwise. I think the great\nobjection I have to urge against Kant, and also perhaps against you, is\nthat you do not distinguish as clearly as I could wish between symbolic\nargument and real, though subjective, knowledge. And the only way to\ndistinguish between them is by inquiring into the definitions of the\nterms.\n\nFor example, on p. 165 of _Fundamental Problems_ you say that to\nfour-dimensional beings Kepler\u2019s third law \u201cwould most probably appear as\n\u2018the cubes of their times of revolution being proportional to their mean\ndistances to the fourth power.\u2019\u201d\n\nNow what sort of assertion do you take Kepler\u2019s law to be? Originally\nit was a purely empirical law obtained by pure induction. If the\nfour-dimensional people obtained their law the same way why should\nthe result appear different to them? Or do you conceive the law to be\ndeduced from Newton\u2019s theory of gravitation? But even so the law of the\ninverse square was obtained empirically. If you think that law can be\nexplained (as the analogous law for the distribution of light can) by the\nsupposition that the integral of the force over all points at a given\ndistance from the origin is constant, still this supposition is purely\ngratuitous unless established by induction from experience. If you grant\nany one of these suppositions you can by symbolic argument obtain the law\ncorresponding to Kepler\u2019s for a four-dimensional space. But I may mention\nthat in no case does the result you anticipate come out. On the first\ntwo suppositions the law would be unaltered. On the last supposition the\nlaw of gravity would be changed to the inverse cube; but after that the\nsolution of the problem has nothing to do with four dimensions\u2014it is\na two-dimensional problem only. The result is that in general planets\ncould not move in closed orbits at all. They might conceivably revolve in\ncircles, but such a condition would be unstable, and if it obtained their\nperiodic times would vary as the squares of their distances.\n\nAgain you say (p. 74) \u201cthe doctrine of the \u2018conservation of matter\nand energy,\u2019 although it has been discovered with the assistance of\nexperience, can be proved in its full scope by pure reason alone.\u201d\nI should very much like to see your proof (which I cannot find in\n_Fundamental Problems_). How do you define the terms of the doctrine?\nDo you deduce the proof from these definitions\u2014that is do you make it a\ntruism? Or do you base it upon subjective axioms as I do my geometry? Or\nif you base it on objective facts, how do you prove those facts by pure\nreason alone? And if it is purely a subjective proof, how, can you say\nthe doctrine is proved \u201cin its full scope\u201d? Surely objective applications\ncome within its scope?\n\nIt would not be fair in me to ask you to publish my reply to your\nreviewer\u2019s criticisms, though if that reply is justified the criticism\nmust have done the prospects of my book some injury, seeing from what\na quarter it comes. But I hope you will see your way to publishing the\nlatter part of this letter in _The Monist_, together with your reply to\nit, if you think it worthy of such a distinction.\n\nI have just come across, in this month\u2019s _Nineteenth Century_, another\nremarkable instance of reasoning which seems to be rendered entirely\nnugatory by the want of proper definitions. It is asserted that\nconceptual thought is impossible without language. At first sight this\nwould certainly appear to be a real assertion. It follows from it that\nsince dogs have no language they have no \u201cconceptual thought.\u201d But it\nmay be plainly shown that dogs do entertain \u201cgeneral notions,\u201d which\nin ordinary English would be included under the head of \u201cconceptual\nthought.\u201d The apparent contradiction is however explained when it appears\nthat the author distinguishes general notions as \u201cconcepts\u201d or \u201crecepts,\u201d\naccording as they _are_ or _are not named_. This being his definition of\n\u201cconceptual thought\u201d as opposed to other thought, it appears that the\nassertion is only a truism after all, and conveys no real information\nwhatever. To discuss it further is then mere waste of time. The author of\nthe assertion doubtless _wished_ it to convey some information, but he\ndid not attend to his definitions and so failed to attain his object.\n\n EDWARD T. DIXON.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[18] The reviewer of Mr. Dixon\u2019s book has read these remarks on his\ncriticism (_The Monist_, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 126) and has given them what\nseems to him full consideration. He confesses that he misunderstood\nwhat Mr. Dixon meant by \u201ca direction.\u201d (See the article \u201cLogic as\nRelation-Lore\u201d to be published in a subsequent number.) In regard to the\nrequirements for a logical definition he must still abide by his former\nopinion. The need of a definition arises either from the inaccuracy in\nthe application of a term or from a supposed lack of knowledge as to its\nsignification. Hence to use the term itself in its own definition is to\nimport into the definition the same vagueness or ignorance which it is\nthe very office of a definition to correct. When Mr. Dixon says that it\nis requisite for a logical definition that the defining assertions \u201cmust\nnot be _independent_ of the meaning of the term defined,\u201d what is that\nbut to say that the same must be _dependent_ upon that meaning? which,\nunless the reviewer again misunderstands the author, is to say that we\nmust understand the meaning of the term before we can understand the\ndefinition.\n\n \u03c1\u03c3\u03bb.\n\n\n\n\n\nMATHEMATICS A DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS WITH PURE FORMS.\n\nIN REPLY TO MR. EDWARD DIXON.\n\n\nIt is true, as Mr. Dixon says, that \u201cAny language which seems to imply\nthat there is some dread necessity about mathematical truths is very\nmisleading.\u201d But to say, as Mr. Dixon does in another passage, that\nthe truisms of mathematics are arbitrary truths, is more misleading\nstill. The theorems of the formal sciences are not \u201cassertions whose\ntruth depends solely on the definition of their terms.\u201d They are \u201creal\nassertions which convey some real subjective or objective information.\u201d\n\nMr. Dixon objects to Kant\u2019s assertion that 7 + 5 = 12 is not only _a\npriori_ but also synthetic. He declares, in contradistinction to Kant,\nthat it is deduced from definitions alone; that therefore it is empty,\nand cannot give any information about things. This latter proposition,\nwhich is a phrase of Kant\u2019s, appears in this context as an inconsistency\nof Kant\u2019s. And it would be an inconsistency, if it had to be understood\nin the sense in which Mr. Dixon quotes it. We construe Kant\u2019s phrase that\n\u201cthe _a priori_ is empty, and cannot give information about things,\u201d in\na different way. We think that Kant intends to say that the _a priori_\nimparts real information concerning relations and forms; but that it does\nnot impart real information concerning substances or the materiality\nof things. It is apparent that the assertion 7 + 5 = 12 cannot be\nderived from the definitions of 7 or 5. Similarly, the ideas of higher\nmathematics are not deduced from the few definitions of elementary\nmathematics that tell what points, lines, parallels, etc., are. Of what,\nthen, are these complex theorems of mathematics, products? They are not\nderived from sense-experience, nor from the definitions of their ultimate\nelements.\n\nIs their origin mysterious? Here Kant leaves us in the lurch; he simply\ndeclares that formal truth is _a priori_ and transcendental; and those of\nhis disciples who call themselves, with preference, transcendentalists,\nhave ample occasion to introduce in this _lacuna_ of Kantian thought, all\nthe mysticism they please.\n\nThe problem of the origin of the truths of formal sciences is not\nso difficult as it is sometimes represented. The theorems of higher\nmathematics are the products of certain _operations_ performed with\nthe elementary forms described in the definition with which the\nmathematician starts. These operations are not arbitrary; they are not\nmerely verbal processes; they are realities of highest importance. Not\nmaterial realities, but realities, nevertheless. They are functions,\nand mathematics deals with the products of functions. It is true that\nwe might call twice two by any other name than four; we might call\nit _vier_, or _quatre_, but the operation 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 would remain\nthe same, by whatever name we call its result. Mathematical truths,\naccordingly, are not empty in the sense that they are meaningless; for\nthey are significant in the highest degree. They give real information,\nnot about things, but about certain relations that obtain among things.\nThey describe certain operations in which formal relations are traced.\nAnd they describe them exhaustively, so that the result is, as the\nGermans call it, _eindeutig bestimmt_, and the result will, under all\ncircumstances, be the same. Twice two _will always be_ the same as 1 + 1\n+ 1 + 1. This \u201cit will always be,\u201d is called necessary. There is nothing\ndreadful about it, nor is there any mystery connected with it. It is not\nan awful fate that decrees it, but it is the nature of sameness, that the\nsame is and will be the same, so long as it remains the same.\n\nIt is often overlooked that every number in arithmetic is the result\nof an operation which is symbolised by a certain figure. Numbers are\nnot concrete things; and as soon as we forget that they are products\nof a function, we are liable to lapse into mistakes. This happens most\nfrequently with the numbers \u201czero\u201d and \u201cinfinite.\u201d The latter of these\ntwo symbols is often looked upon as a concrete thing; and because the\ninfinite, with actual reality, is, in its completeness, inconceivable, it\nhas made, of every one who stumbled over this stone of offence, a mystic,\nand many a radical, fearless thinker bows down to worship before the idea\nof infinitude-function as it would be if it were a real thing.\n\nSays Mr. Dixon, \u201cOur reason cannot inform us about the form of existence,\nunless it is first given.\u201d This is very true. The form is given, and\nformal systems such as the numerical system and the lines and figures of\nmathematics are mental constructions built of the stones quarried out of\nthe relational given in experience.\n\nForm being given, we can reason about the form of existence in general.\nWe can have ready in our minds systems of pure forms to apply to all the\nvarious cases of our experience. And this will help us in unravelling\nthe problems of reality, and in extending our knowledge in those fields\nwith which we are little acquainted. Far be it from us to consider the\ndefinitions, the operations, and the results of the formal sciences\nas purely verbal; if they were, mathematics would lose all the great\nimportance which it undeniably possesses, and become mere verbiage.\n\nI confess that I do not understand Mr. Dixon when he says: \u201cIt is only\nbecause our reasoning faculties are limited that symbolic arguments\nare necessary at all.\u201d In my opinion all mental activity is symbolic.\nEvery idea is a symbol that signifies something. It is not because our\nreasoning faculties are limited that symbolic arguments are necessary\nat all, but symbolism is the nature of our mind, and symbols are the\nelements with which our reasoning faculties have to deal. In this sense,\nevery argument is symbolic. If it symbolises sense-experience, it\nrepresents our knowledge of what may be called the materiality of things.\nIf it symbolises operations with pure forms, it represents the purely\nformal relations of mathematics logic, algebra, etc.\n\nThe doctrine of the conservation of matter and energy in reality means\nnothing more or less than that there is no increase or decrease in the\nworld at large. Nothing originates out of, and nothing disappears into,\nnothing. It means that twice 1 + 1 is 1 + 1 + 1 + 1, neither more nor\nless; or, in other words, it means that all events are transformations.\nNew things originate, but their newness consists in their forms. In this\nsense the law of the conservation of matter and energy would have to\nbe called, from Mr. Dixon\u2019s standpoint, other differences neglected, a\ntruism. It is not a truism, in the sense of being arbitrary, but in the\nsense of being a purely formal truth, as are all mathematical theorems.\n\nMr. Dixon refers to a passage in _Fundamental Problems_, in which I say\nthat \u201cTo four-dimensional beings, Kepler\u2019s third law would most probably\nappear as the cubes of the times of revolutions of the planets being\nproportional to their mean distances to the fourth power.\u201d His questions,\n\u201cWhat sort of an assertion do you take Kepler\u2019s law to be?\u201d and \u201cWhy\nshould the result appear different to them?\u201d show that Mr. Dixon has\noverlooked the condition on which this proposition was made. The first\nsentence of this paragraph begins with the words, \u201cIf space inhered, as\nKant maintains, in the thinking subject only, spatial relations and laws\nwould appear different to four-dimensional beings.\u201d Space relations are\nnot subjective, in my opinion, but objective. Therefore, since space\nrelations do not inhere in the thinking subject only, because they are a\nfeature of the objective world, and inhere in the thinking subject in so\nfar as it is at the same time an object in the objective world, Kepler\u2019s\nlaw would appear to four-dimensional beings, if they could exist at all,\njust the same as it does to us three-dimensional beings.\n\n P. C.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK REVIEWS.\n\n\nSOCIAL STATICS. Abridged and Revised; together with THE MAN VERSUS THE\nSTATE. By _Herbert Spencer_. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1892.\n\nJUSTICE. Being Part IV of the Principles of Ethics. By _Herbert Spencer_.\nNew York: D. Appleton & Co., 1891.\n\nAmong Mr. Spencer\u2019s most important books are those entitled _Justice_ and\n_Social Statics_. The latter, which first appeared in 1850, has just been\nrepublished in about one-half of the original size, some parts having\nbeen transferred to the book on _Justice_, and others omitted altogether.\n\u201cOne difference,\u201d as he says, \u201cis that what there was in my first book of\nsupernaturalistic interpretation has disappeared, and the interpretation\nhas become exclusively naturalistic\u2014that is, evolutionary.\u201d Another\nchange is that a demonstration of the injustice of socialism is\nsubstituted for his former arguments, plainly repudiated in _Justice_,\nagainst private ownership of land. Equally important is the omission of\nthe chapter asserting \u201cThe Right to Ignore the State.\u201d\n\nThe demand for Woman Suffrage has also been withdrawn from the new\nedition of _Social Statics_, though it retains the original protest\nagainst \u201cthe reign of man over woman,\u201d and asserts an \u201cequality of\nrights in the married state.\u201d Here again, Spencer\u2019s final position must\nbe sought in his _Justice_ where it is urged that women cannot justly\nhave equal powers with men unless they have equal responsibilities. They\ncannot serve their country as men do; and if they take an equal share\nin the government, \u201ctheir position is not one of equality but one of\nsupremacy.\u201d Even in time of peace, they are, he thinks, too impulsive\nto vote judiciously, too sympathetic to oppose \u201cfostering the worse at\nthe expense of the better,\u201d and too fond of \u201ca worship of power under\nall its forms\u201d to protect individual liberty against the encroachment of\nauthority. This objection seems particularly strong, because there is\nstill great danger of the growth of state despotism at the expense of\npersonal freedom, even in republics. Many recent instances are given by\nSpencer in \u201cThe Man versus the State,\u201d now reprinted in the same volume\nwith _Social Statics_; and it is urged in _Justice_, that even in the\nUnited States \u201cuniversal suffrage does not prevent an enormous majority\nof consumers from being heavily taxed by a protective tariff for the\nbenefit of a small minority of manufacturers and artisans.\u201d\n\nOur voters are much too ready to follow hasty impulses and unscrupulous\nleaders; and both faults are most common among the most ignorant. How\nstrongly education encourages independence was acknowledged by those\nslave-holders who said, \u201cOur negroes shall not learn to read, for that\nmakes them run away.\u201d Public schools have found their worst enemies among\nPopes and Czars, and their best friends in the statesmen most honored by\nrepublics. There is no other institution for whose advantages Americans\nare practically unanimous. The necessity of popular education at the\npublic cost is acknowledged by Huxley, Mill, and other advanced thinkers\nso generally, that Spencer\u2019s exceptionally hostile opinion ought not to\nbe taken as a self-evident truth.\n\nMr. Spencer\u2019s examination of this subject does not appear to have been\nso thorough as the occasion demands. In denying that education prevents\ncrime, he relies mainly on Joseph Fletcher, who, as stated in both\neditions of _Social Statics_, \u201chas entered more elaborately into this\nquestion than perhaps any other writer of the day,\u201d and who admits that\nthere is a \u201csuperficial evidence against instruction.\u201d Spencer takes\nno notice of Fletcher\u2019s having succeeded completely in breaking down\nthis superficial evidence. In elaborate papers, published in the tenth,\neleventh, and twelfth volumes of _The Journal of the London Statistical\nSociety_, and illustrated by many tables and maps, Fletcher shows that\nthe proportion to the population, in various parts of England, of people\nunable to sign their names, corresponded everywhere to the proportion\nof illegitimate births as well as of commitments for crime. Separating\nthese latter into classes according to degree of guilt, he proves that\nthe worst crimes are most common where there is the most ignorance.\nThus he is enabled to say, \u201cThe conclusion is therefore irresistible\nthat education is essential to the security of modern society.\u201d That\nthis testimony of Spencer\u2019s principal witness is really the truth can\nbe further proved by the statistics in the _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_,\nshowing that between 1841 and 1876, while the percentage of illiterates\nto population in England and Wales was reduced one-half, that of\ncriminals was reduced to one-third of what it was originally. (Vol. VIII,\npp. 221 and 249-251.)\n\nSpencer also refers to the fact that schools have sometimes been carried\non in the interest of despotism; but most kinds of food are easily\nadulterated; and education is valuable, notwithstanding, as food for\nliberty. This last consideration disposes completely of his comparison of\nstate-churches with state-schools; and the fact, mentioned in the revised\nbut not in the original edition of _Social Statics_, that opinions differ\nabout the best methods of education, is really an additional instance of\nthe encouragement given by our system of public schools to independence\nof thought.\n\nSpencer\u2019s chief objection to this system is that it does not fit his\ntheory that \u201cthe liberty of each, limited by the like liberties of\nall, is the rule in conformity with which society must be organised,\u201d\n(p. 45). Such a \u201claw of right social relationships,\u201d (p. 55) would, he\nadmits, require us to repeal our laws against indecency, abolish our\nBoards of Health, and close our poorhouses, postoffices, banks, and\nlighthouses, except in so far as these institutions, like our streets and\nroads, might be cared for by benevolent individuals. He does not tell us\nhow a government, thus limited to managing the police, army, and navy,\ncould keep up a fire-department, nor how new streets, roads, railways,\nor canals could be opened, in case the owners of land put their prices\ntoo high for the projectors; but the most unfortunate application of his\ntheory would be to close our public schools.\n\nThere is no danger of this, however; and the principal evil likely to\nresult from his pushing his theory so far, is that he prevents people\nfrom seeing its real value, as indicating the direction in which our\nrace has advanced and must make all further progress. We shall keep on\ndiminishing the power of the state over the man, as well as that of\nthe man over the child, but neither authority will ever be abolished\nentirely. We shall dispense, sooner or later, with some of the public\ninstitutions which Spencer condemns; but our common schools will, I\nthink, last as long as government itself. The abolitionists helped the\nslave to freedom by pointing out the North Star; but they did not advise\nhim to quit solid earth. This mistake, although we grant that Spencer\nshows us our North Star, is sometimes made in _Social Statics_.\n\nTimely help, too, is given by him, in a thoroughly practical way, to\nthose reformers who are passing out from under the cloud with a silver\nlining into a Cleveland summer and a fair prospect of a Harrison fall.\nAmong the words best worth putting into actions at once, are these: \u201cThe\nright of exchange is as sacred as any other right, and exists as much\nbetween members of different nations as between members of the same\nnation. Morality knows nothing of geographical boundaries.\u201d ... \u201cHence,\nin putting a veto upon the commercial intercourse of two nations, or in\nputting obstacles in the way of that intercourse, a government trenches\nupon men\u2019s liberties of action, and by so doing directly reverses its\nfunction. To secure for each man the fullest freedom to exercise his\nfaculties, compatible with the like freedom of all others, we find to be\nthe state\u2019s duty. Now trade prohibitions and trade restrictions not only\ndo not secure this freedom, but they take it away. So that in enforcing\nthem the state is transformed from a maintainer of rights into a violator\nof rights.\u201d ... \u201cWhether it kills, or robs, or enslaves, or shackles\nby trade regulations, its guilt is alike in kind, and differs only in\ndegree.\u201d (_Social Statics_, ed. of 1850, pp. 326, 327; ed. of 1892, p.\n137).\n\n F. M. H.\n\n\nAN ESSAY ON REASONING. By _Edward T. Dixon_. Cambridge (Eng): Deighton,\nBell, & Co. 1891. Pp. 88.\n\nSome years ago the author of this essay made public certain views of his,\non \u201cGeometry of Four Dimensions.\u201d He was surprised to find that though\nhis arguments were received with incredulity they were not refuted.\nThis result appeared to him to be due to the fact that he was not\nunderstood, that his views on geometry of even two and three dimensions\nbeing different from those commonly entertained, he had failed of being\nunderstood, because he had not begun his explanation at the beginning.\n\nHe therefore set to work to analyse those views and ultimately published\na book on the subject. This book, _The Foundations of Geometry_, was\nreviewed by us in _The Monist_ of October, 1891. But now again the author\nregards himself as not understood. He rested the positions and arguments\nof his book upon certain views of logic and especially of definition,\nwhich depart from the orthodox views, and he misjudged the fullness of\nexplanation that would therefore become needful. Hence this little essay.\n\nThe proper approach to the views of the author is through his doctrine of\ndefinition. Usually definition is regarded as finding its main motive and\nutility in the convenience of social converse. The meaning of any term is\nregarded as resting not in the choice of him who utters it, but in the\nsuppositions of those who are addressed. It is true that a license is\naccorded to any one upon a sufficient occasion to give a special intent\nto some word, but only upon condition that that intent shall be made\nsufficiently express, in other words well understood by those addressed.\nHence definition is usually taken to mean the recital or the precision of\nthe meaning of a term by means of language naturally apt for that end.\nThere is no good sense in pretending to effect either one of these ends\nby language that lacks natural ability on that behalf.\n\nNow Mr. Dixon holds, if we understand him, that conventional usage is\nof very subordinate consequence in this matter, that it pertains to\nthe prerogative of an author to throw upon those whom he addresses the\ntask of gathering his meanings as best they can; that even when he\nprofesses to explain his meanings he need not seek and employ any plain,\ndirect speech, but may supply his instruction indirectly: may ask his\naudience to solve a problem, or to rightly guess what certain hints\nmean; may require them to extract the meaning in question out of a set\nof assertions that involve the same in a collateral way only. This he\ncalls \u201cimplicit definition.\u201d It is analogous, he tells us, to an unsolved\nequation or set of equations in algebra. So far as we are aware no one\ncan claim priority of the author in respect to this expedient. He seems\nto regard it as of great importance, and proposes by its aid to overcome\nthe difficulties that environ the fundamentals of geometry.\n\nWe think that the author is led to put undue confidence in his implicit\ndefinition, by his peculiar views upon propositions. He holds that all\npropositions can, without loss or gain in the meanings as originally\nstated, be reduced to statements of strict identity. This done,\npropositions can, as he thinks, be operated upon after the fashion usual\nwith equations. But we submit that between a logical proposition and an\nalgebraic equation there is a difference that is in general irreducible.\nFor example take this proposition, Every parent loves children. To alter\nthis to, Every parent is identical with some [or every] person that loves\nchildren, as is, we think, the prescription of Mr. Dixon, will not\nserve; for by reading our identity in the reverse order we have: Some [or\nevery] person that loves children is identical with every parent.\n\nMr. Dixon\u2019s views in respect to terms and to the doctrine of denotation\nand connotation depart as widely from the suppositions usually held,\nas do his views regarding propositions and definition. To follow out\nthe consequences of his proposed innovations in any adequate fulness is\nforbidden to us by lack of space. We feel sure that further reflection\nwill lead him to much modification of his doctrines.\n\n \u03c1\u03c3\u03bb.\n\n\nOUTLINES OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By _Hermann Lotze_. Edited by _E.\nC. Conybeare_, M.A. London: Swan, Sonnenschein, & Co. New York: Macmillan\n& Co. 1892. Pp. 176.\n\nThis book is an excellent translation of one of the most important works\nof a prominent philosopher, who made an unusually strong impression\nupon the minds of his contemporaries. Almost every line of this clean,\naccurate, and charming translation betrays the translator\u2019s devotion to\nthe subject, for he has taken the utmost care to bring out the ideas\nof the author in the same brilliant style for which Professor Lotze is\njustly famous.\n\nThe translator says in the preface: \u201cI have completed and venture to\npublish the following translation of Hermann Lotze\u2019s _Lectures upon the\nPhilosophy of Religion_ in the same hope in which it was undertaken by\nmy late wife, that it may be of use to some who cannot read the German\noriginal, and yet desire a concise statement of the form in which one\nof the clearest-minded of our later thinkers put to himself those great\nquestions\u2014as to the origin and destiny of the spirit of man, as to life\nin general, and the meaning of the material universe\u2014which occupy us\nall at some time or another, many of us as soon as we have won food and\nshelter for our bodies.\u201d\n\nWe do not share Mr. Conybeare\u2019s and his deceased wife\u2019s enthusiasm for\nthe author. Although we are not blind to the great deserts of Professor\nLotze, his amiable personality, the depth of his religious and emotional\nnature, the breadth of his scholarly erudition, and the brilliancy of his\ningenious, not to say poetical, presentation of philosophical subjects,\nwe cannot conceive that his work is come to abide. On the contrary, we\nconsider his philosophy as antiquated in many respects. He considers\nproblems that originate from a mere confusion of ideas, as being\ninsolvable in their nature, and attempts the solution of other problems\nwith inadequate methods. His thoughts still remind us of the ontological\nspirit of past philosophies, and his principles are not in agreement with\npositivism and the methods of scientific research.\n\nAs an instance, we quote the following passage: \u201cWe must ever set aside\nany attempt to describe in positive terms, or to construct in thought,\nthe process by which this absolute being came to be not only one, and\nthat unconditionally, but at the same time a many of things which\ncondition one another reciprocally.\u201d\n\nLotze still believes in an \u201cabsolute unity\u201d as something prior to the\nworld of reality, and he declares that \u201cWe cannot Know or Explain how\nthis Absolute Unity is also Many\u201d (Sec. XXI); and even if an unconscious\nbeing could be a Many-in-One, yet it could not, according to Lotze,\ngenerate consciousness (Sec. XXV). We do not believe that this problem\nis insolvable, and do not, as does Lotze, feel constrained to fall back\non idealism. In fact, our position is so different from Lotze\u2019s that in\nspite of the full recognition of his genius, we feel as much severed from\nhim as if he belonged to ages long gone by.\n\nMr. Conybeare\u2019s translation is most certainly an invaluable work and is\nindispensable for any English student of Lotze\u2019s philosophy.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nON THE PERCEPTION OF SMALL DIFFERENCES, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE\nEXTENT, FORCE, AND TIME OF MOVEMENT. By _George Stuart Fullerton_ and\n_James McKeen Cattell_. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.\n1892. Pp. 159.\n\nThis volume of the Philosophical Series of Publications of the University\nof Pennsylvania gives an account of a large number of experiments\nmade for the purpose of testing the perception of small differences\nof movement, of weight, and of light. The most noticeable conclusion\narrived at by the authors, is that they cannot accept any of the received\nexplanations of Weber\u2019s law. They found from their experiments, by the\nmethod of estimated amount of difference, that \u201cwe tend to estimate\nthe intensity of sensation as directly proportional to the intensity\nof the stimulus; consequently, in so far as any deduction concerning\nquantitative relations in sensation can be made from such estimation,\nthe sensation increases as the stimulus and not as its logarithm,\u201d\nthus invalidating Fechner\u2019s law. The authors believe also that Weber\u2019s\nlaw does not hold for the perception of movement, as they find that\nthe error of observation usually increases \u201cas the stimulus is taken\ngreater but more slowly,\u201d and that it is proportional to the square\nroot of the stimulus. Accordingly, they substitute for Weber\u2019s law the\nfollowing: \u201cThe error of observation tends to increase as the square\nroot of the magnitude, the increase being subject to variation, whose\namount and cause must be determined for each special case.\u201d It is proper\nto add, that Professor Fullerton gives only a qualified assent to these\nconclusions, on the grounds that mathematicians are not agreed as to the\nsoundness of the theory upon which the law is based, and that the errors\nin question may not be independent errors. He considers, however, the\nresults obtained by the authors \u201cas sufficiently in accord with the laws\nto justify them in holding it tentatively, and subject to criticism.\u201d\n\nAs Fechner\u2019s law rests on that of Weber, and on assumptions which appear\nto be incorrect, it also fails, and it follows that the psycho-physical,\nphysiological, and psychological theories put forward to account for\nthe supposed logarithmic relation between mental and physical processes\nare superfluous. From these conclusions we may judge of the importance\nof the experiments made by Professors Fullerton and Cattell, whose work\nrequires to be carefully studied by all those interested in the special\nquestions to which it relates.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nPSYCHOLOGIE DU PEINTRE. By _Lucien Arr\u00e9at_. Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan. 1892. Pp.\nLIX, 264. Price, 5 fr.\n\nThe author of this interesting work informs us that it does not aim\nat being a natural history of society, nor is it even a study in\nprofessional psychology. This is hardly correct, however, as such a\nstudy must be based on that of individuals, and a writer of M. Arr\u00e9at\u2019s\nreputation cannot treat of a large group of individuals without throwing\nlight on the psychology of the whole class to which they belong. He\nvery aptly likens artists as a whole to a large family, the artist in\ndesign to a genus of this family, and painters to a species. This has\nits varieties, and it is by the study of these that the author seeks to\narrive at a knowledge of the psychology of the painter.\n\nBelieving that there exists a relation between the temperament and the\nqualities of the mind and that this is influenced by heredity, he devotes\nthe first part of the work to questions of physiology and heredity. The\nsecond part deals with the painter\u2019s vocation, his \u00e6sthetic sentiments,\nhis professional memory, and, as the evolution of art is connected with\nthe progress of visual analysis, with his sense of sight. Then comes\nan examination of the general mental qualities of the painter, his\nintellectual character, his various phases of memory and aptitudes, and\nthe influences which affect his work. The fourth part of the book treats\nof the painter\u2019s character, his egoistic and sympathetic traits, his\nwill, and his moral and social traits. And finally reference is made\nto questions of pathology, particularly defects of vision, and to \u201cthe\nmiseries of genius.\u201d\n\nOn all these subjects M. Arr\u00e9at has many acute remarks supported by\nnumerous facts, often derived from painters themselves, who thus, says\nthe author, will be found \u201cliving and speaking on each page, just as\nthey are, and making themselves known by their works, sympathetic or\ndisagreeable, indifferent or superior, but always interesting.\u201d It is\nnoticeable, in connection with the important subject of heredity, that\nin a list of about three hundred painters almost two-thirds are sons of\npainters or of workers in art, and M. Arr\u00e9at thinks that if more complete\ninformation were obtainable the proportion would be increased.\n\nIn the chapter on the miseries of genius, the author takes exception to\nthe view expressed by M. Lombroso that the creative inspiration of genius\nis, at least in some cases, the equivalent of epileptic convulsion.\nThat genius may lead to insanity is true; and M. Arr\u00e9at admits that\nremarkable aptitudes have often appeared in a family at the beginning of\nits degeneracy. But he adds that painters are for the most part healthy,\nand they show hardly any more singularity than other men may have. He\nconcludes his work with the following words: \u201cGenius makes use of, as\nwe have sufficiently shown, faculties which are common to nearly all\nmen, if they are unequally strong and variously distributed with each.\nGenius, moreover, in the most elevated sense that it can be understood,\nis an exception among artists themselves, and even in genius, the meeting\ntogether of several happy gifts is exceptional. But it is willingly\nattributed to all those, whatever may be their art, whose works are able\nto touch the human cords that vibrate the most profoundly. Painters\nappear to us to compose a well-marked type among such. The reader\nhas seen the characters of it brought together and discussed in this\nvolume: he will preserve its living image after having closed the book.\u201d\nThis in itself furnishes a sufficient recommendation for the perusal\nof M. Arr\u00e9at\u2019s work, which apart from its psychological value, is a\nperfect mine of gracefully written information about painters and their\npeculiarities.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nPHYSIOLOGIE DE L\u2019ART. By _Georges Hirth_. Traduit de l\u2019Allemand et\npr\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9 d\u2019une Introduction par _Lucien Arr\u00e9at_. Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan. 1892.\nPp. 247.\n\nWe have now occasion to review a work on a subject much akin to the\npreceding\u2014a work which has been translated from the German by the same\nauthor, M. Lucien Arr\u00e9at, and supplied by him with a very interesting\nintroduction. This Introduction is in reality a r\u00e9sum\u00e9 by M. Arr\u00e9at of\na series of studies by M. Hirth on physiological optics. These studies\nare of great importance and are classed by the French editor under the\nthree heads of Form, Illumination, and Movement. The first of these\ncomprises the subjects of monocular and binocular vision, the depth and\nthe bilateral enlargement of the visual field, perspective and identical\npoints. Under the head of illumination the effect of the \u201cdouble bath of\nlight\u201d through the two eyes, the \u201cluminous equation,\u201d and the problems\nconnected with optical measurement are considered.\n\nWe have not space to exhibit fully the author\u2019s ideas on these topics,\nbut we can state what are regarded by M. Arr\u00e9at as the two principle\npropositions which give to them their life and unity. One of these\npropositions is, that the first function of our dioptric apparatus\nconsists in furnishing to our central visual organ, which M. Hirth terms\nthe _internal eye_, material which the latter has to interpret. The other\nis that it is necessary to get rid of mathematical concepts, which are\nmuch too rigid to be applied to the delicate problems of vision, and to\nfall back on visual sensation such as it is. These propositions imply,\nmoreover, the admission of an electro chemical process, \u201cwithout which\nthe properties of the eye and the marvels of vision remain inexplicable.\u201d\nThis last conclusion has a bearing on the nature of memory, or the\nrecollection of the impressions received by the nerves and brain after\nthe original excitation has disappeared. Thus, M. Hirth suggests that\nwhen we know the physiological procedure in the impregnation of cerebral\nmolecules, or in their electric charging, memory will be found to be only\nthe prolongation of the duration of consecutive images.\n\nThe inquiries of M. Hirth throw great light on the difference between\nmonocular and binocular vision, for information as to which and other\ndetails of his optical theory we must refer our readers to M. Arr\u00e9at\u2019s\nIntroduction. This concludes with a consideration of the perception of\nlight-movement, the reproduction of which is said to require a special\nexercise of attention, direct or indirect. Here we have the third degree\nof attention, according to the views of M. Hirth, who regards it as\nartistic apperception, having its end in itself and capable of being\nreproduced through co-ordination of the movements perceived.\n\nA considerable portion of the second and principal part of this work is\noccupied with the psychology of attention and of the related subject\nmemory. The latter is defined by M. Hirth as \u201ca sum of states of\nperception gradually accumulated by the various organs of sense,\u201d and it\nis thus not a special faculty of the mind. The mental condition which\nresults from the action of memory is what is known as _disposition_. This\ndisposition is transmitted from one generation to another, and becomes\ninnate as the memory of the species. But it is intimately connected\nwith the nervous system, and with the brain regarded as the electric\nstorehouse of memories. It is in accordance with these ideas that the\nauthor explains the transmission of hereditary qualities, the problem\nwhich is at present engaging so much attention. The innate organisation\nis a conservation of nervous quality or temperaments associated with the\nanatomical disposition of the nervous system, and a certain condition\nof electrical tension among the cerebral molecules. The transmission of\nancestral qualities depends, however, on the vigor and good condition of\nthe germ, and as the organisation received from our earliest ancestors\nis the most persistent, the primitive \u201cdisposition\u201d will subsist even\nwithout exercise whilst nutrition and circulation assure the continuance\nof molecular growth.\n\nIt is with the visual memory that the author is chiefly concerned, and he\naffirms that the optical phenomena referred to in the Introduction compel\nus to admit the existence in the brain of a central organ, which he terms\nthe internal eye. In order to determine the position of this organ, which\nis the real seat of visual perception, to the exclusion of the retina,\nwhose function has been overestimated, M. Hirth considers the anatomical\nand physiological aspects of the question, and he accepts the conclusion\narrived at by H. Munk in his _Functions de l\u2019\u00e9corce cerebrale_, that\nperception is the function of a particular portion of the cerebral\ncortex. There thus exist two visual centres or \u201cinternal eyes,\u201d one\nin each convexity of the occipital lobes, as shown in Plate V. of the\npresent work. Munk\u2019s researches would seem to prove, moreover, that not\nonly is there a general localisation of visual memories, but that each\nmemory is fixed in a precise and determined place. The centres of memory\nand the centres of perception, which M. Hirth supposes to be simply a\nphase of memory, are the same. Moreover attention is connected with\nperception, but it is an imperfect state of memory. Attention requires\nthe expenditure of force, while perfect memory acts spontaneously; and it\nis only in this form, \u201cexempt from fatigue, that it becomes the passive\nservant of our instincts and sensations, of our voluntary acts, of our\nlabor.\u201d Memory when perfect is automatic, and according to the theory\nof M. Hirth, who does not accept M. Ribot\u2019s monoideistic theory, it is\naccompanied with automatic attention, which is the result of a gradual\ntransformation of \u201cenergetic\u201d attention, and attains in a normal adult\nan incredible development both in quantity and quality. This _latent_\nattention is required by the existence of latent memory, which is\nproperly spoken of by M. Hirth as an organic attribute of the highest\nmoment, seeing that it forms the basis of all individual acquirements.\nIt would seem to answer, however, to what is often spoken of as the\nsubconsciousness.\n\nWe can understand how this doctrine of latent memory and latent attention\ncan have an important bearing on the question of the origin of the\nartistic sense, especially as each brain centre may be supposed to have\nits own memory, and each fundamental memory its special temperament.\nThe activity of such centres is due in great measure, as pointed out by\nM. Ribot, to nutrition and blood-circulation but M. Hirth adds a third\nfactor, electrical tension. According to his theory, cerebral activity\nrests ultimately on electricity, the invisible currents of which,\nmaintaining the whole system in a state of tension, are \u201cthe inferior\ncurrents of the latent memory,\u201d the brain centres being electrical\naccumulators. This idea, which the author applies also to the explanation\nof colored visual memories, is open to strong critical objections. In\nrelation to the particular subject of art, the author shows that the\nhereditary transmission of talent depends on the active maintenance\nof the special temperament of certain fundamental memories and their\nassociations, and talent itself therefore depends on the existence of\nsuch a temperament. We here come in contact with M. Lombroso\u2019s theory\nof the physiological degeneracy of genius, which M. Hirth opposes with\nmuch force, and we think on the whole with success. This discussion\noccupies the last chapter of a work that, as our readers will be able to\njudge from the glance given here at some of its leading topics, has a\nscientific value quite apart from the special subject of art which it is\nintended to illustrate, and which it goes far towards establishing on a\nphysiological basis.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nLES ALT\u00c9RATIONS DE LA PERSONNALIT\u00c9. By _Alfred Binet_. Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan\n1892. Pp. 323. Price, 6 fr.\n\nIn the present work, the accomplished director of the laboratory of\nphysiological psychology at the Sorbonne has brought together and\nsystematised all the most reliable phenomena bearing on one of the most\ncurious subjects of inquiry now engaging attention. Notwithstanding the\ndisagreement between different experimenters as to particular facts,\nall have arrived at the conclusion that, under special conditions, the\nnormal unity of consciousness may be broken, and that then there is\nthe production of several distinct consciousnesses \u201ceach of which can\nhave its perceptions, its memory, and even its moral character.\u201d No\none is better fitted than M. Binet to perform the eclectic work he has\nundertaken of discussing the recent researches on the alteration of\npersonality, without regard to the special views of particular schools.\n\nThe subject is considered by him under the three heads of Successive\nPersonalities, Coexisting Personalities, and The Alterations of\nPersonality in the Experiences of Suggestion. The two first parts deal\nchiefly with phenomena presented by somnambulic and hysteric subjects.\nIn the third part M. Binet applies the fact of the duplication of\npersonality to the explanation of the phenomena of spiritism, the term he\nvery properly gives to so-called spiritualism. He regards the supposed\nspirit agent as the subconscious personality of the medium acting under\nthe influence of suggestion, a view which undoubtedly meets most of the\nactual facts of spiritism.\n\nNotwithstanding the divisibility of the ego, there can be no doubt of\nthe unity of the personality under normal conditions. The question is\nas to the nature of this unity, and the author follows M. Ribot in\naffirming that it consists in the co\u00f6rdination of the elements which\ncompose it. He repudiates the idea that memory is the sole foundation of\nconsciousness, as not only may one memory embrace different states, but\nthe same individual may have several memories, several consciousnesses,\nand several personalities. For the opinion of M. Binet on other points\nwe must refer our readers to the work itself, which forms an important\naddition to the International Scientific Library.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nL\u2019HOMME DANS LA NATURE. By _Paul Topinard_. With 101 Illustrations in the\ntext. Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan. 1891. Pp. 350. Price, 6 fr.\n\nThe present is the third work in which Dr. Paul Topinard, the well-known\npupil and successor of M. Broca, the founder of French Anthropology,\nhas given to the public his general ideas in relation to the science\nof which he has made so profound a study. In 1876 he published his\n_Anthropologie_, which reflected in great measure the teaching of his\nmaster, Broca. Ten years later, in 1886, appeared his larger and more\nimportant work, _El\u00e9ments d\u2019anthropologie g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_, which treated of\nthe history and methods of anthropology, with various other subjects.\nNow Dr. Topinard gives us his matured ideas on \u201cMan in Nature,\u201d by which\nis meant physical nature, the object of the present work being to show\nthe place that man occupies physically among animals, and his probable\norigin or descent. It is not surprising that a writer who was the pupil\nof Professor de Quatrefages as well as of Professor Broca should declare\nhimself a supporter of the principle of unity of composition, formulated\nby M. Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, from which flows that of evolution,\nthat is the natural derivation of beings from one another. As to the\nmeans by which this is brought about, the author reserves his opinion\nuntil the publication of a further work which he has in preparation.\n\nDr. Topinard devotes the second chapter of the present work to a\nconsideration of the position to be accorded to anthropology in relation\nto the other sciences. He declares it to be a pure, concrete science,\nessentially anatomical and observatory, and thus distinguishes it from\nethnography, which has to do with peoples under all their aspects.\nBoth alike are branches of the science of man in its broadest sense.\nIf anything can be added to the author\u2019s explanation, it is that\nanthropology has to do with mankind as a series of _individuals_, while\nethnography is concerned with the _groups_ into which such individuals\nare collected. This is not inconsistent with Dr. Topinard\u2019s definition\nof anthropology as the science \u201cwhich studies human races, the human\nspecies, and the place of man in the classification of animals.\u201d For\nall the facts on which it is based are derived from the observation\nof individuals, and when races are compared with each other, they are\ncompared as ideal individuals, formed by a generalisation of certain\nprevailing qualities, just as mankind by a similar process becomes an\nideal individual, a scientific Adam, who is compared with other animals.\nThere is an apparent difficulty in relation to psychology which Dr.\nTopinard claims entirely for anthropology, but it disappears when we\nsee how closely he associates psychology with physiology. He says, and\nwe quite agree with him, that \u201ccharacters of a psychological nature,\nreduced to their most simple expression, whether attributed to human\nraces, or to the general human type, belong to ordinary physiological\ncharacters; the corresponding anatomical part takes its place by the side\nof other physical characters; the theory and explanation of intellectual\noperations, of feelings and volitions, belong to the special physiology\nof man and to the application of the ideas of general physiology.\u201d\n\nWhile accepting as correct the division of anthropology, in its\nrestricted sense into general and special, as proposed by Broca and\nBertillon, the author thinks it does not conform to the plan which\nshould be adopted if it is desired to proceed, by the method of analysis\nand synthesis, from the known to the unknown. The plan adopted by Dr.\nTopinard is, by analogy with the procedures of general zo\u00f6logy, to\nbegin by recalling the general notions applicable to his subject as to\nthe distribution of animals by groups of varying values, the choice\nof characters on which they repose, and the differences between the\nrace, the species, the family, and the order, these last forming the\npivoting point of his views as to the place of man in classification.\nThen commences the study of characteristics, the mode of ascertaining\nthem, of putting them to use and of appreciating their value, accompanied\nby examples, drawn from special anthropology, proper to illustrate the\nmethods employed. Finally, a parallel is drawn between man and animals,\nthat a conclusion may be arrived at as to the place of man in the series\nof beings, and his probable genealogy.\n\nAll these points are carefully considered by the author, who has framed\na canon of the medium adult man of the European type, a figure based\non which forms the frontispiece to the work. The proportions of this\nfigure are derived from a comparison of all the most authentic published\nmeasurements, and the canon framed from them conforms closely to that\nrecognised in artists\u2019 studios, except that in the latter the arm is too\nshort and the neck too long.\n\nThe most generally interesting subjects discussed by the author are\nthose connected with the relationship of man to other animals, and\nparticularly the structure of the brain. Dr. Topinard makes a careful\ncomparison of the cerebral convolutions of various animals and man,\nwith numerous illustrations, and he arrives at the conclusion that none\nof the characters said to distinguish man from the anthropoid apes are\nabsolute; all are reducible to a question of degree of evolution, the\nsuperior degree being sometimes found among the anthropoids, and the\ninferior degree with man. The cerebral type of the anthropoids is a human\ntype not completely developed, or the cerebral type of man is a developed\nsimian type. Man thus undoubtedly belongs to the order of the Primates.\nAfter considering the form and volume of the simian and human brains,\nthe author remarks that \u201cman alone has a frontal lobe developed in all\nits parts, and filling up a large, concave, and deep frontal shell which\nexternally gives place to the forehead, one of the characteristics of\nman.\u201d\n\nConnected with the form and volume of the brain is the transformation\nof the animal skull into the human skull, and the relation of this\ntransformation to the facial characteristics of man. These points,\nand also various questions connected with the bipedal or quadrupedal\nattitude, and with the attitude and function of prehension, are treated\nin detail, as are certain other distinctive simian and human characters.\nA chapter is devoted to a consideration of the important subject of\nretrogressive anomalies and rudimentary organs. In his concluding chapter\nDr. Topinard points out the place of man in animal classification, and\nrefers to the questions of his single or multiple origin, his genealogy\nand his future. In connection with the subject of classification, the\nauthor dwells on the fact that man is not the only relatively perfect\nanimal, and yet that none of the mammalia, which we admire for their\nbeauty or for their usefulness, equal the monkeys in the possession of a\nbrain approaching the human type. The brain, the hand, and the attitude\nare the three characteristics which especially connect man with the\nmonkey, and particularly with the anthropoids, and the question has long\nbeen agitated whether in these particulars the last named is allied more\nclosely to man or to the other monkeys. Dr. Topinard affirms that in\nall these particulars the anthropoids should be classed with the other\nmonkeys, and therefore that man stands alone.\n\nAs to the descent of man, the French anthropologist would seem to agree\nwith M. Vogt that the type from which man has developed was also the\nsource of the monkey and anthropoid types, and that it first appeared\nat the commencement of the Miocene period, when the earliest monkeys\nsucceeded to the Lemurian of the preceding Eocene epoch. Dr. Topinard\nremarks that this conclusion is agreeable to that of the eminent American\npal\u00e6ontologist, Professor Cope, who makes man descend directly from the\nLemurian without passing through the monkeys and the anthropoids, basing\nhis opinion chiefly on dentition. The question of the descent of man is\nconnected with that of the singleness or multiplicity of his origin,\nand on this point the author does not express a decided opinion. He\nsays that all existing types of humanity could be reduced to three, the\nEuropo-Semitic, the Asiatico-American, and the Negro; if not to two, the\nWhite and the Negro. He adds that, nevertheless, \u201cin losing oneself in\nthe depths of time, we can conceive the Negro, born the first, giving\nbirth successively to the Australoid with frizzled hair, to one of the\nforms of the Brown stock with straight or wavy hair, and finally to the\nwhite European.\u201d Probably his actual opinion is to be gathered from his\nfinal statement when comparing the order of the Primates to a tree, that\nthe Lemurians are its roots giving birth to several stems, of which one\nis that of the monkey, from which branched the anthropoids, and another,\nwhose point of contact with the first is unknown, gives the actual human\nbranch, which runs parallel to that of the anthropoids without being\nconnected with it, and goes beyond it.\n\nAs to the future of the human race, Dr. Topinard affirms that the volume\nof the brain will notably increase, that dolichocephaly will give place\nto a universal brachycephaly, and that the cellules of the brain will\nbe perfected in quality. As the human brain is being thus perfected,\nthe animals nearest to the human type will disappear, and then man will\nreally think himself the centre round which the universe gravitates, the\nsovereign for whom nature has been created. But even then the anatomist\nwill bring him to himself by uttering the words of Broca, \u201cMemento te\nanimalium esse.\u201d This work, which forms volume seventy-three of the\nInternational Scientific Library, is sure to be widely read, and it will\nbe indispensable to the student of anthropology, who will find in it all\nthe information he requires on the methods of the science.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nDIE URHEIMATH DER INDOGERMANEN UND DAS EUROP\u00c4ISCHE ZAHLSYSTEM. By\n_Johannes Schmidt_. Berlin, 1890. Pp. 56.\n\nThis essay is an important contribution to the problem of the place of\norigin of the Indo-Germanic languages. The author is confident that\nwhile nothing certain was known before, he has established at least one\nfact which will give us a clue to the solution of the problem. This fact\nis the interference of the duodecimal system with the decimal system.\nThe former is of Babylonian origin, but its effects are noticeable upon\nalmost all the Aryan tongues. The duodecimal system is not original with\nthe Goths or with any of the Teutons, which can be proved by the fact\nthat 60 or a _Schock_ was a round number, but not twelve, the etymology\nof twelve (_twa-lif_) being two above a _lif_, which latter means a\ncertain set. Thus when the Gothic hundred as a rule meant 120, when for a\nlong time they distinguished between great hundreds (i. e. 120) and small\nhundreds (i. e. 100), this was due to foreign influence. For if twelve\nhad been the basis of their number system, a _lif_ would have meant\ntwelve and the numerical arrangement would have progressed not in 10 \u00d7 12\nbut consistently in 12 \u00d7 12 or 144. Everything points to the supposition\nthat the Babylonian _sossos_ is still preserved in the German _Schock_\n(60). Accordingly, says Schmidt, the Europeans must have been exposed to\na strong influence of the sexagesimal system; they must have been nearer\nto the centre of Babylonian civilisation than are the valleys of the\nIndus and the Eastern Iran. Professor Schmidt considers Penka as refuted\nand also all those who regard Europe as the home of Indo-Germans.\n\nWe have to add that the eminent philologist when, discussing the problem\nof the cradle of the Indo-Germanic languages does not touch upon the\nother problem of the home of the Aryans, the latter being mainly an\nanthropological question. Schmidt says (p. 13): \u201cI do not intend to enter\ninto the problematic domain of anthropology. The original race-characters\nof the Indo-Germanic nations, their causes and the home in which they\nwere moulded, also the physical conditions and mixtures of the races\nwhich speak our languages, undoubtedly can be treated with success\nonly by the representatives of physical anthropology. But exactly so\nthe problem of the cradle of the original Indo-Germanic speech and the\nevolution of its several languages, as they are known in history, can be\nsolved only by philologists.\u201d\n\nThis is very true. Perhaps we shall approach the subject with better\nsuccess if we learn to distinguish between the anthropological problem\nof the origin of the Aryan race and the philological one of the origin\nof the Aryan languages. A European origin of the one might not exclude\nan Asiatic origin of the other, and it still remains possible, that\nEuropean Aryans when migrating south and east developed through their\nintercourse with semitic and other races the beginning of a civilisation\nwhich powerfully affected all the Aryans, since there is ample evidence\nthat even in olden times a lively commerce took place between them.\nWhen Prussian amber is found in Pelasgian graves, why should not the\nsexagesimal system of the wealthy nations of the south have spread over\nnorthern countries?\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nLEHRBUCH DER HISTORISCH-KRITISCHEN EINLEITUNG IN DAS NEUE TESTAMENT. By\n_Heinrich Julius Holtzmann_. Dritte verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage.\nFreiburg, i. B.: J. C. B. Mohr. 1892. Pp. 508. Price, 9 M.\n\nIt has been said that the scientific purpose of an academical text-book\nshould be to educate the student to scientific independence, and its\npractical purpose to make it available for the adherents of all parties\nand denominations; and these two purposes are the surer attained the\nless the author represents his own conception as that which alone can be\njustified. This is the principle according to which Professor Holtzmann\u2019s\n_Lehrbuch_ has been written. That he has fully attained his aim, will\nnot be doubted by those who know his previous and painstaking labors, in\nwhich he proves himself as a theologian fully imbued with the spirit of\nscience and scientific critique.\n\nThe first edition of this work appeared in 1885, the second in 1886, and\nthe present and third edition can make the just claim of being carefully\nrevised and perfected in every respect, so that it is to be regarded as\na comprehensive, concise, and clear review of the critical materials of\nthe New Testament. There is no doubt that the work as it now stands will\nremain the best book for reference of its kind.\n\nProfessor Holtzmann in a brief introduction of seventeen pages sketches\nthe history and literature of New Testament criticism. The book is\ndivided into two parts, the first treating the subject in a general way,\nthe second entering into its several details. In the first part the\nauthor presents us with a history of the text and of its traditions,\nexplaining the causes of the alterations that were introduced either\nunintentionally or by mistake; he reviews the critical apparatus for\ntext-revision and also the history of the printed and revised editions\nup to the present attempt at emendation. Then a history of the canon\nis given, from the oldest Christian literature down to the radical\ncriticisms of the present time. In the second and special part we find\na careful compilation of all the criticisms concerning the single books\nand epistles of the New Testament. The first chapter treats of St.\nPaul\u2019s epistles to the Thessalonians, Galatians, Corinthians, Romans,\nto Philemon, the Colossians, Ephesians, Philippians, the pastoral\nepistles; further, the epistle to the Hebrews, which is non-Paulinian,\nthe two epistles of St. Peter, the epistle of St. Jude, and that of St.\nJames. The second chapter introduces us into the historical books of the\nsynoptic gospels and the Acts, where, in a brief review of fifty-seven\npages, we find the same data presented which are more fully explained in\nanother publication of our author, reviewed in _The Monist_, Vol II, No.\n2.\n\nA new period in the development of Christian literature begins with\nall those writings which go under the name of St. John. A discussion\nof these books is contained in the third chapter, which treats of the\napocalypse, the fourth gospel, and St. John\u2019s epistles. Not the least\ninterest attaches to the fourth chapter, the subject of which is the\nvast domain of the apocryphal books of the New Testament, the number of\nwhich has, of late, been greatly increased by several new discoveries.\nThe subject divides itself naturally into apocryphal gospels (Chap. II),\napocryphical stories about the lives and deeds of the apostles (Chap.\nIII), apocryphical epistles (Chap. IV), and apocryphical apocalypses\n(Chap. V).\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nSAMMLUNG VON POPUL\u00c4R-WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN VORTR\u00c4GEN \u00dcBER DEN BAU UND DIE\nLEISTUNGEN DES GEHIRNS. By Professor _Theodor Meynert_. Vienna and\nLeipsic: Wilhelm Braum\u00fcller. 1892. Pp. 253.\n\nThis latest publication of Professor Meynert\u2019s was mentioned in the last\nnumber of _The Monist_ by Mr. Christian Ufer, in the department \u201cLiterary\nCorrespondence.\u201d Since its appearance Professor Meynert has died. His\nname has stood foremost for a great number of years in the ranks of\npsychiatrical investigators, and his contributions to the science to\nwhich he was devoted, have, perhaps more than those of any other, tended\nto its permanent advancement. The activity of his life has extended\nover a great number of years, and his labors have not only been applied\nto the theoretical interests of his science alone, but have also been\ndirected\u2014and this is the most important part of every scientist\u2019s work\u2014to\nbringing the results of his investigations into connection with the great\nbody of knowledge at large, and especially to putting in popular form,\nand bringing within the reach of the general reader, the facts of the\nscience which he contributed so much to establish.\n\nThe present lectures date from the year 1868. They owe their origin to\nthe identification in later years of the interests of medicine with\nthe interests which every human being has at heart, of resolving the\nmysteries of mental operations generally. Their main subject is the\ndescription and investigation of the structure of the cerebral organs;\nand the elucidation in the light of such description of the psychical\noperations of the brain. The fundamental facts of this province are\nnot difficult. The main thing required is to free ourselves from the\nimpediments which artificial thought on this subject has at all times\nimported into the consideration of intellectual facts. Our knowledge\nin this domain is founded on observation and introspection; not upon\ndialectics. Phenomena, simply, are presented to observation, and not\nthe ultimate essences of forces. So, too, the apparatus of observation\nand introspection give only their own phenomena. Their contents are\nthe animated external world as it affects conscious beings, and\ninvolves, besides intuition, the facts of memory. Unpersonal inherited\nmemories, which take the form of instinct, are not forthcoming. The\npresent lectures do not pretend to give instruction in the anatomy of\nthe brain _per se_, but simply in so far as it is necessary to the\nunderstanding of the brain\u2019s mechanism. All things viewed, all things\nintuited are contents of consciousness, which in its limitations to the\nsense-impressions of the individual being, we term the ego, or _I_. In\nso far as the external world is the intuited contents of consciousness,\nthe extent of the latter is increased, the ego, the _I_, expands into\nthe secondary ego, or _I_. In this doctrine of a secondary ego the\nproblems which grow out of the behavior of individuals towards the\nexternal world are resolved in the single explanation that the ego of\neach particular group of things seeks to preserve itself by internal\nand external motions. The ego is simply in the possession of itself\nin every extension which it acquires; if such extension consists of a\ncommon possession, its desire and tendency to preserve such is simply\nexplained by the fact that such possession is the ego itself. Amongst the\nintuited objects of the ego are to be classed also as component parts of\nthe secondary ego of every individual, the other living individualities\nof the world. From the point of view of this fact, the ego appears\nin its social r\u00f4le. The present lectures consequently extend to the\nconsideration of the interactions of brains in society, to culture and\ncivilisation, and seek to establish the phenomena of these domains as\nfacts of physical knowledge. The method of physical inquiry is that of\ncomparison by the alteration of the attendant circumstances in which\nthe psychical mechanism acts. Physiology bases it on experiment. Nature\nalso supplies experiments with the results that also embrace phenomena\nof culture. In the directions indicated here, the diseases of the mind\nafford a comparative means for the investigation of the phenomena\nof consciousness, a doctrine of natural cerebral experiments, and a\nfoundation for a knowledge of the phenomena of mind.\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\n\n\nPERIODICALS.\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. III. No. 5.\n\n UEBER EIN OPTISCHES PARADOXON. By _Franz Brentano_.\n\n \u201cFLATTERNDE HERZEN.\u201d By _Adolf Szili_.\n\n UEBER BEGR\u00dcNDUNG EINER BLINDENPSYCHOLOGIE VON EINEM BLINDEN. By\n _Friedrich Hitschmann_.\n\n BEMERKUNGEN \u00dcBER DIE VON LIPPS UND CORNELIUS BESPROCHENE\n NACHBILDERSCHEINUNG. By _Otto Schwarz_.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. III. No. 6.\n\n BEITR\u00c4GE ZUR DIOPTRIK DES AUGES. By _M. Tscherning_.\n\n OPTISCHE STREITFRAGEN. By _Th. Lipps_.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. IV. Nos. 1 and 2.\n\n UEBER DIE SCH\u00c4TZUNG KLEINER ZEITGR\u00d6SSEN. By _E Schumann_.\n\n ZUM BEGRIFF DER LOKALZEICHEN. By _C. Stumpf_.\n\n ZUR KENNTNISS DES SUCCESSIVEN KONTRASTES. By _Richard Hilbert_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nThe first article is on an optical paradox. Let two equal parallel lines\nbe drawn, as in the cut below; then let two small straight lines be drawn\nfrom the extremities of these in such a way that in the first they form\nacute angles with the line and in the second, obtuse angles. The first,\nit will be seen, appears shorter than the second. What is the explanation\nof this phenomenon?\n\n[Illustration: Cut 1.]\n\n[Illustration: Cut 2.]\n\n[Illustration: Cut 3.]\n\n[Illustration: Cut 4.]\n\n[Illustration: Cut 5.]\n\nThe author\u2019s answer is, that this phenomenon is a consequence of the\nwell-known fact that we overestimate small angles, and underestimate\nlarge ones. The presence of the lines has nothing to do with the optical\nillusion, as the inserted cut, in which the lines are omitted, shows.\n(Cut 2.) The optical illusion is also not present when the lines are\nrectangularly attached, as is Cut 3. These facts prove that angular\n_inclination_ is the decisive factor. The following cuts show this, the\nfirst in a more and the second in a less marked degree. (Cuts 4, 5.)\nThe simplest case in which the explanatory factor of this phenomenon\nis involved, is that of the estimation of the distance of an isolated\npoint from the extremities of a short straight line. The estimation of\nthis distance is dependent upon our estimation of the angle made by\nlines drawn from the point to the extremities of a short line. If this\nestimation is false, it produces by an exact trigonometrical law, an\nerror in the estimation of the corresponding distance. This explains all.\nIn our first figure the factor of illusion is eight times presented:\nhence its marked character.\n\nThe second article consists of a rather long series of experiments on the\nso-called \u201cflatternde Herzen\u201d by Adolph Szili.\n\nThe third article is on the foundations of a psychology of the blind,\nby a blind man, Friedrich Hitschmann, of Vienna. This article contains\na number of interesting facts concerning the sensory, intellectual, and\nemotional life of blind people, and affords a great many valuable hints\nfor the development of the special psychology which the author has in\nview.\n\nThe first article of No. 6 of the _Zeitschrift_ is a very exhaustive\none, some sixty pages in length, filled with special and technical\ninvestigations concerning the dioptrics of the eye. When light passes\nfrom one refracting medium into another it is partially reflected at the\ndividing surface, and transmits by reflection the objects from which it\nhas proceeded. This is also the case with the human eye, which is itself\na lens. The refracted pictures are the only pictures of importance to\nthe possessor of the eye; but just as in the construction of optical\ninstruments, the reflected or \u201clost\u201d images are of supreme importance to\nthe optician in the determination of the properties of his productions,\nso these same pictures in the human eye are of supreme importance to\nthe physiologist and the psychologist. This is the subject of Dr.\nTscherning\u2019s researches.\n\nIn the second article Dr. Th. Lipps discusses some mooted questions of\noptics. The first part of the article is a reply to Schwarz\u2019s criticism\nin the preceding number of the _Zeitschrift_. The second part is a\nreview of Franz Brentano\u2019s explanation of the optical paradox, discussed\nin the second paragraph of this notice. Lipps declares, that, though\nthere is some truth in Brentano\u2019s explanation, it is nevertheless an\nerror to believe that acute angles, _as such_, are overestimated, and\nobtuse angles, as such, are underestimated. On the contrary, every time\nsuch errors in estimation occur, there exist particular reasons for it,\nthe character of which renders the attempt impossible to derive the\nestimation of distance directly from the estimation of angles. Lipps\nsupports his position by actual facts. His chief and most philosophical\nremark is, that it is a perilous and improper thing to do to explain\nisolated optical illusions by isolated and independent hypotheses;\noptical illusions are not exceptions: they constitute a class of\nphenomena in themselves, and they should be considered in their natural\nand logical connection. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.).\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\nVIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT F\u00dcR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XVI. No. 3.\n\n UEBER REAL- UND BEZIEHUNGS-URTHEILE. By _J. v. Kries_.\n\n WAS IST LOGIK? By _A. Voigt_.\n\n ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER LANDSCHAFT. By _R. Wlassak_.\n\n DES NIC. TETENS STELLUNG IN DER GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. By\n _M. Dessoir_.\n\nThe articles of this magazine are usually very rigorous and learned; and\nthe contents of the present number are in keeping with its reputation.\nProf. J. v. Kries discusses in an essay, evoked by the recent articles\nof Riehl, the subject of \u201creal and relational judgments\u201d; his object\nis to establish a classification, and display the logical connection,\nof judgments generally. Real judgments are predications concerning\nreality or actual facts; relational judgments predicate simple relations\nof concepts, etc. The first requisite of a scientific exactness of\nthought, says Kries, is the distinction and determination in any given\ncase of judgments which are real and judgments which are relational. In\nthe second article, which is long and exhaustive, Dr. Voigt endeavors\nto determine the characters and functions of the different kinds of\nlogic. In view of the great prominence into which algebraical logic\nof late years has come, this article is one of considerable interest.\nVoigt defines the pretensions and powers of the two opposing systems\nof philosophical and algebraical logic, and attempts to set forth the\njustification of each. Voigt, as opposed to Husserl, cordially recommends\nthe study of algebraical logic to philosophers, that both disciplines may\nprofit by the intercourse. (Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.)\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\nPHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVIII. Nos. 5 to 8.\n\nCONTENTS: Nos. 5 and 6.\n\n DIE WIRKLICHKEIT ALS PH\u00c4NOMEN DES GEISTES. (Concluded.) By _A.\n Rosinski_.\n\n WESEN UND BEDEUTUNG DER IMPERSONALIEN. By _R. F. Kaindl_.\n\n ZUR GESCHICHTE UND ZUM PROBLEM DER AESTHETIK. By _E. K\u00fchnemann_.\n\nCONTENTS: Nos. 7 and 8.\n\n UEBER DIE GRUNDFORMEN DER VORSTELLUNGSVERBINDUNG.\n Psychologische Studie. By _M Offner_.\n\n ZUR GESCHICHTE UND ZUM PROBLEM DER AESTHETIK. (Concluded) By\n _E. K\u00fchnemann_.\n\n WERKE ZUR PHILOSOPHIE DER GESCHICHTE UND DES SOCIALEN LEBENS\n (Second Article: _G. de Greef, Introduction \u00e0 la sociologie_).\n By _F. T\u00f6nnies_.\n\n RECENSIONEN.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nA. Rosinski\u2019s contribution is a metaphysical essay on reality viewed as a\nphenomenon of the mind. The results of his discussion are these: that the\nworld of experience, with all its laws and phenomena, and all we assume\nto exist _per se_, is referable wholly to ourselves; that the primal\nsource and cause of all reality is not a something which lies absolutely\noutside us, but is simply our own self, or ego. In what sense reality is\nreality, the author proposes to discuss in future articles.\n\nDr. Raimund Friedrich Kaindl discusses, in the second article, the\ncharacter and meaning of the impersonal verbs. The discussion is made\nboth from the psychologico-logical point of view, and from the point of\nview of comparative philology.\n\nThe _Philosophische Monatshefte_ contain, in each issue, a very\nexhaustive bibliography of all the works which have appeared during\nthe month in the provinces connected with philosophy. This department\nis conducted by Dr. Ascherson, the librarian of the Berlin University\nlibrary, and forms a very important and valuable feature of this\nmagazine. (Berlin: Dr. R. Salinger.)\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK. Vol. 100. Nos. 1\nand 2.\n\nThis well-known magazine, formerly edited by Dr. J. D. Fichte and Dr.\nUlrici, is now presided over by Dr. Richard Falckenberg, of Erlangen.\nIt has reached its hundredth volume, and with the present two numbers\nbegins a new series. Its reviews and lists of newly published works\nare comparatively complete. Its articles, though generally tinged\nwith scholasticism and chiefly treating of philosophico-historical\nsubjects, deal, nevertheless, with some modern and living questions; for\nexample, Dr. Max Schasler\u2019s discussion of the proceedings on the recent\nPrussian school law; Dr. Eugene Dreher\u2019s consideration of the law of\nthe conservation of force; and Dr. Nikolaus von Seeland\u2019s discussion\nof the deficiencies of the current theory of force. The other articles\nare contributed by A. Wreschner, G. Frege, J. Zahlfleisch, and Robert\nSchellwien. (Leipsic: C. E. M. Pfeffer.)\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\nTHE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. August, 1892. Vol. IV. No. 4.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n THE EXTENT OF THE CORTEX IN MAN, AS DEDUCED FROM THE STUDY OF\n LAURA BRIDGMAN\u2019S BRAIN. By _Henry H. Donaldson_.\n\n SOME INFLUENCES WHICH AFFECT THE RAPIDITY OF VOLUNTARY\n MOVEMENTS. By _F. B. Dresslar_.\n\n EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH UPON THE PHENOMENA OF ATTENTION. By\n _James R. Angell_ and _Arthur H. Pierce_.\n\n SOME EFFECTS OF CONTRAST. By _A. Kirschmann_.\n\n REPORT ON AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF MUSICAL EXPRESSIVENESS. By\n _Benjamin Ives Gilman_.\n\n PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University.)\n\n\nMIND. New Series. No. 3. July, 1892.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n LOTZE\u2019S ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND THINGS. (I.) By _A.\n Eastwood_.\n\n THE FESTAL ORIGIN OF HUMAN SPEECH. By _J. Donovan_.\n\n THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. (III.) By _W. E. Johnson_.\n\n THE FIELD OF \u00c6ESTHETICS PSYCHOLOGICALLY CONSIDERED. (I.) By _H.\n R. Marshall_.\n\n DISCUSSIONS: The Influence of Muscular States on Consciousness.\n By _Edmund B. Delabarre_; Dr. M\u00fcnsterberg and his Critics. By\n _E. B. Titchener_. The Definition of Desire. By _Henry Rutgers\n Marshall_. Feeling, Belief, and Judgment. By _J. Mark Baldwin_.\n\n CRITICAL NOTICES. (London: Williams & Norgate.)\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. July, 1892. Vol. II. No. 4.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n NATURAL SELECTION IN MORALS. By _S. Alexander_.\n\n WHAT SHOULD BE THE ATTITUDE OF THE PULPIT TO THE LABOR PROBLEM?\n By _W. L. Sheldon_.\n\n ETHICS OF THE JEWISH QUESTION. By _Charles Zeublin_.\n\n MACHIAVELLI\u2019S PRINCE. By _W. R. Thayer_.\n\n ON THE FOUNDING OF A NEW RELIGION. By _B. Carneri_.\n\n AN ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF OBLIGATION. By _Frank Chapman Sharp_.\n\n REVIEWS.\n\nProf. S. Alexander, in his lecture delivered before the Ethical Societies\nof Cambridge and London, here reproduced, points out that the growth\nand change of moral and social ideals are the result of a process of\nmental conflict. Professor Sheldon thinks only a partial solution of the\nlabor problem is possible until the second coming of men somewhat of\nthe type of St. Francis of Assisi, \u201cwho will sacrifice their personal\nopportunities, abandon their station in the world, and go down to\napply their gifts and acquirements to the cause of the lower stratum\nof society.\u201d The religious as well as economic opposition to Judaism,\naccording to Mr. Charles Zeublin, is caused by the exclusiveness of\nthe Jew, and his ultimate welfare and that of his neighbors requires a\nhumanitarian treatment within and without Judaism. Mr. William R. Thayer\nshows that Machiavelli merely described things as they were in his time,\nand deduced the laws which actually controlled the public deeds of\nrulers; and that it is now \u201cthe duty of all men to sweep away the old\nfalsehood that rulers and governments are absolved from paying heed to\nthose ethical principles to which every individual is bound.\u201d According\nto Mr. B. Carneri, the living at peace with oneself and one\u2019s fellow-men\nis possible only without religion, \u201cbecause there is no morality without\ncontentment, and it is the highest degree of discontent to strive for\nsomething beyond this world.\u201d Mr. Frank Chapman Sharp concludes that when\nthe element of _the good_ is taken out of the conception of obligation,\nthis degenerates into mere submission to an arbitrary imperative; the\nfoundation for the distinction between right and wrong must be sought in\nsomething that appeals to us as good, and its ultimate criterion can be\ngiven only by our chosen ideal. (Philadelphia: _International Journal of\nEthics_, 118 S. Twelfth Street.)\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. July, 1892. Vol. I. No. 4.\n\n INHIBITION AND FREEDOM OF THE WILL. By _Dr. James H. Hyslop_.\n\n A CLASSIFICATION OF CASES OF ASSOCIATION. By _Mary W. Calkins_.\n\n THE ORIGIN OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. By _Dr. Herbert Nichols_.\n\n ON PRIMITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS. By _Hiram M. Stanley_.\n\n REVIEWS OF BOOKS.\n\n SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.\n\nThe confusion incident to the old controversy about freedom is due, says\nDr. James H. Hyslop, to a failure to distinguish between the _proof_\nof freedom and the _conditions_ of it, that is, \u201cthe circumstances\nthat are necessary to it, or the characteristics that constitute it.\u201d\nFreedom consists in \u201cself-initiative and independence of external\ncauses, whether there be any choice between alternatives or not,\u201d and\ninhibition and deliberation bring about both of these circumstances.\nMiss Mary W. Calkins rejects the ordinary division into association by\ncontiguity and association by similarity, and gives detailed summaries\nof the fundamental characteristics of consciousness on which association\ndepends and of the characteristics of association proper; the ultimate\nfact of association, whether it be psychical or physical or both, we do\nnot understand. Dr. Herbert Nichols, in the first part of his article on\nthe \u201cOrigin of Pleasure and Pain,\u201d considers the phenomena of pleasure\nand pain associated with the action of the senses, and concludes that\nthere is no \u201ctangible evidence indicating that pleasures and pains\nare inseparable attributes of other senses or polar complements of\neach other,\u201d and that separate sensations of pain and of pleasure are\nprobable. Mr. Hiram M. Stanley regards pure pain as primitive mind,\nand pleasure as the polar opposite to it, although they are neither\nabsolutely essential one to the other, pleasure being traced to \u201can\nintermediary feeling between pain as produced by excess, and pain from\nlack as differentiated form.\u201d Consciousness is fundamentally pain and\npleasure as serving the organism in the struggle for existence. (Boston,\nNew York, Chicago: Ginn & Company.)\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nTHE NEW WORLD.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 2.\n\n THE SOCIAL PLAINT. By _E. Benjamin Andrews_.\n\n RELIGIOUS EVOLUTION. By _Minot J. Savage_.\n\n THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF THE STORY OF SODOM. By _T. K. Cheyne_.\n\n THE FOUNDATION OF BUDDHISM. By _Maurice Bloomfield_.\n\n IMAGINATION IN RELIGION. By _Francis Tiffany_.\n\n THE NEXT STEP IN CHRISTIANITY. By _S. D. McConnell_.\n\n THE IMPLICATIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. By _Josiah Royce_.\n\n HOW I CAME INTO CHRISTIANITY. By _Nobuta Kishimoto_.\n\n NEW FORMS OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION. By _Mrs. Humphry Ward_.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 3.\n\n THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. By _Otto Pfleiderer_.\n\n ECCLESIASTICAL IMPEDIMENTA. By _J. Macbride Sterrett_.\n\n NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF. By _Orello Cone_.\n\n THOMAS PAINE. By _John W. Chadwick_.\n\n SOCIAL BETTERMENT. By _Nicholas P. Gilman_.\n\n THE R\u00d4LE OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS IN MODERN RELIGIOUS\n EDUCATION. By _Jean R\u00e9ville_.\n\n A POET OF HIS CENTURY. By _E. Cavazza_.\n\n DIVINE LOVE AND INTELLIGENCE. By _James C. Parsons_.\n\n BOOK REVIEWS.\n\n SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, & Company.)\n\n\nREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.\n\nCONTENTS: June, 1892. No. 198.\n\n EXISTENCE ET D\u00c9VELOPPEMENT DE LA VOLONT\u00c9. I. Existence de la\n Volont\u00e9. By _A. Fouill\u00e9e_.\n\n SUR QUELQUES ID\u00c9ES DU BARON D\u2019HOLBACH. By _A. Lalande_.\n\n ESSAI SUR LA PHILOSOPHIE DE PROUDHON. By _G. Sorel_.\n\n TRAVAUX DU LABORATOIRE DE PSYCHOLOGIE PHYSIOLOGIQUE.\n\nCONTENTS: July, 1892. No. 199.\n\n L\u2019INCONNAISSABLE DANS LA PHILOSOPHIE MODERNE. By _G.\n Fonsegrive_.\n\n LA MUSIQUE D\u2019APR\u00c8S HERBERT SPENCER. By _J. Combarieu_.\n\n ESSAI SUR LA PHILOSOPHIE DE PROUDHON (concluded). By _G. Sorel_.\n\nCONTENTS: August, 1892. No. 200.\n\n \u00c9TUDE CRITIQUE SUR LE MYSTICISME MODERNE. By _Rosenbach_.\n\n LE D\u00c9VELOPPEMENT DE LA VOLONT\u00c9. By _A. Fouill\u00e9e_.\n\n LA BEAUT\u00c9 ORGANIQUE: \u00c9TUDE D\u2019ANALYSE ESTH\u00c9TIQUE. By _A.\n Naville_.\n\n ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.\n\nAccording to M. Fouill\u00e9e, the principle which tends to dominate\npsychology and physiology is the ubiquity of will and of feeling, and\nconsequently of consciousness. Psychology will end by recognising the\ncontinuity and the transformation of modes of psychical energy, as\nphysics recognises the continuity and the transformation of modes of\nphysical energy, and philosophy will see in physical energy the external\nexpression of will.\n\nM. Fonsegrive maintains that the rejection of metaphysics as science,\nwhich marks the modern theory of the unknowable, is the consequence of\nKant\u2019s _a priori_ theory as to the origin of our knowledge. The laws of\nthe mind have no real existence prior to experience, and universal and\nnecessary notions can be discovered only by mental analysis. In this\nmanner the existence, and even the essence, of metaphysical beings may\nbe known, but only of such as experience puts in communication with\nourselves. Thus we know God as the necessary first cause, although our\nnotion of God is one of negation, of experimental notions.\n\nAfter showing that Spencer\u2019s theory of music had numerous antecedents,\nand that its conclusions are unacceptable on various grounds, M.\nCombarieu affirms that the secret of the musical art is the identity of\nthe musical idea with the imitation or expression of the real world. All\nmusic contains a double verity; it is the meeting place of the senses\nand of the rational world confounded in a unity which is the work of\nart, as man is the combination of a soul and a body confounded in the\nreal unity of life. Spencer is an excessive simplifier, and does not\nsee the complexity of certain questions, which he seeks to resolve by\nundervaluing them. But he has thrown light on one of the aspects of the\nmusical problem.\n\nIn this final essay on the philosophy of Proudhon, M. Sorel considers the\ntheory of justice by the light of the notion of free will. He differs\nsomewhat from Proudhon, and affirms that \u201cthe just man is the upright\nman such as our ideal conception of antiquity represents him to us,\nbut transformed by our consciousness as refined by the influence of\nChristianity.\u201d In dealing with the real organisation of societies it is\nnecessary to distinguish between matters of justice and those of right,\nwhich includes that of force, of which war is an application. After\nshowing the connection of the economic _contradictions_ of Proudhon with\nthe state of war, and the value of education for the realisation of\nequilibrium in the state. M. Sorel affirms that education ought to be\nbased on manual labor, for the explanation of which science should be\ntaught; and that instruction should endure throughout life, so that men\ncan elevate themselves and that an equilibrium may be obtained between\nknowledge and industrial needs. (Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan.)\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\nPLATES BELONGING TO THE ARTICLE \u201cTHE NERVOUS GANGLIA OF INSECTS.\u201d\n\n\nKEY TO THE PLATES.\n\n col. ven.\u2014ventral column.\n lob. dors.\u2014dorsal lobe.\n lob. ven.\u2014ventral lobe.\n lob. v. inf.\u2014inferior or lower ventral lobule.\n lob. cr.\u2014crural lobule.\n con. dors. sup\u2014superior (or upper) dorsal connective filaments.\n con. dors. moy.\u2014medial dorsal connective filaments.\n con. dors. inf.\u2014inferior (or lower) dorsal connective filaments.\n con. v.\u2014ventral connective filaments.\n n. cr.\u2014crural nerve.\n n. al.\u2014alary nerve.\n lob. al.\u2014alary lobule.\n rac. sup\u2014upper (or superior) root.\n rac. moy.\u2014medial root.\n rac. inf.\u2014lower (or inferior) root.\n fa. as.\u2014ascending fasciculus.\n\n[Illustration: PLATE I.\n\n_Rhizotrogus solstitialis._ First thoracic ganglion. (Horizontal\nsections.)]\n\n[Illustration: PLATE II.\n\n_Rhizotrogus solstitialis._ First thoracic ganglion. (Horizontal\nsections.)]\n\n[Illustration: PLATE III.\n\n_Rhizotrogus solstitialis._ First thoracic ganglion. (Longitudinal\nsections.)]\n\n[Illustration: PLATE IV.\n\n_Rhizotrogus solstitialis._ First thoracic ganglion. (Transversal\nsections.)]\n\n\n\n\n VOL. III. JANUARY, 1893. NO. 2.\n\n THE MONIST.\n\n\n\n\nTHE DOCTRINE OF AUTA.\n\n\nIn the \u201cScientific Proceedings of the Royal Dublin Society\u201d (Vol. VI,\nPart IX, p. 475, 1890), Dr. Johnstone Stoney, F. R. S., published an\ninteresting and carefully-reasoned paper \u201cOn the Relation between Natural\nScience and Ontology.\u201d The same author had previously (1885), in a Friday\nevening discourse at the Royal Institution of London, discussed the\nproblem, \u201cHow Thought Presents Itself Among the Phenomena of Nature.\u201d\nDr. Stoney\u2019s communications have not (I venture to think) received the\nconsideration to which they are entitled alike on the score of their\nlogical consistency, if his premisses and assumptions be granted, and by\nreason of the author\u2019s scientific eminence as a physicist. I therefore\npropose, first, to endeavor to set forth his monistic _Doctrine of\nAuta_; and secondly, to offer some criticisms thereon. Unfortunately Dr.\nStoney\u2019s pages bristle with new technical terms, which, though no doubt\nthey have been serviceable to him in the attainment of precision of\nthought, make his paper hard reading. Some of these I shall introduce;\nothers which seem less essential to the argument I shall omit. It would\nbe scarcely fair on the reader\u2019s teeth or on the author\u2019s store to\ntransfer all these hard nuts from Dublin to Chicago.\n\nNo philosophical discussion of a problem involving perception can be\nregarded as complete without the introduction of an orange. Dr. Stoney,\nindeed, substitutes a fire; but this, though it shows philosophical\nindependence, cannot for a moment be sanctioned by any good Berkeleyan.\nAn orange then, as such, is a phenomenal object formed, in a way we need\nnot now consider, by the synthesis of perceptions. These perceptions,\nthemselves synthetic, Dr. Stoney calls \u201ctekmeria,\u201d since they are signs\nwithin my mind that events are happening in a part of the universe\nthat is distinct from my mind. The phenomenal object is supposed by\nmen untrained in inquiries relating to the mind to have a non-egoistic\nexistence\u2014that is, an existence independent of the percipient mind. But\nthis supposition is found on careful scrutiny to be an error. It is a\nproduct of mental synthesis, and is therefore termed by Dr. Stoney a\n\u201csyntheton.\u201d It is also termed a \u201cprotheton\u201d in contradistinction to an\n\u201cantitheton,\u201d which we shall come to shortly.\n\nNow if the phenomenal orange is a \u201csyntheton\u201d\u2014that is, a product of\nperceptual synthesis\u2014it clearly cannot be regarded as the _cause_ of the\nperceptions, through and by means of which it is constructed in mental\nsynthesis. Here popular thought and ordinary language are apt to mislead\nus. For ordinary language is throughout built upon the popular belief\nthat the objects of the phenomenal world are non-egoistic or independent\n_existences_, and, moreover, that they are the cause of the perceptions\nwhich come into existence when we exercise our senses. This is, however,\n\u201cto put the car before the horse.\u201d It is to imagine that a structure\nbuilt up out of the effects of a thing can be the cause of those effects.\nThe phenomenal orange is built up of perceptions instead of being the\ncause of them. Their cause is therefore to be sought elsewhere than in\nthe phenomenal world of objects. The orange, _qua_ orange, is therefore\na \u201csyntheton,\u201d and cannot as such be the cause of the perceptions or\n\u201ctekmeria,\u201d which go to its synthesis.\n\nLet us now look at these perceptions or \u201ctekmeria\u201d from another point of\nview. They are states of consciousness: they are _thoughts_, if we use\nthis word in its widest extension to embrace everything of which I or my\nfellow-men or the lower animals are conscious. But my own thoughts are,\nso long as they last, things that exist. They may be representative of\nsomething outside me, but they _are_ also _real existences_. While they\nlast they constitute a part of the universe of existing things. They are,\nin Dr. Stoney\u2019s terminology, _auta_ (\u03c4\u03ac \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac), the very things\nthemselves. An _auto_ (we shall throughout _italicise_ all that belongs\nto this autic order of existence) is a _thing which really exists_, and\nin no wise depends on the way we, human minds, may happen to regard it.\nOur impressions or beliefs about it may be correct or may be erroneous;\nbut the term _auto_ means the _thing itself_.\n\nPerceptions, then, inasmuch as they are thoughts, are _auta_. They\nbelong, moreover, to that class of real existences which, since they are\nwoven into the tissue of _minds_ (my mind and the minds of my fellow-men\nand of the lower animals) are termed _egoistic auta_. They do not remain,\nhowever, persistent and unchanged; for perceptions come and go and are\nmodified as they pass like waves over the surface of consciousness. What\ncauses this coming and going, and these changes in the _egoistic auta_ we\ncall perceptions? Not, as we have already seen, the world of phenomenal\nobjects! What then, but other _auta_, which, since they produce effects\nupon men\u2019s minds through their senses, may be termed _sense-compelling\nauta_? The phenomenal orange is thus a \u201csyntheton\u201d produced through a\nsynthesis of the effects wrought upon my _mind_ by an autic existence,\ncalled by Mr. Stoney the _onto-orange_. The phenomenal orange is, as we\nhave seen, a \u201cprotheton\u201d; the _onto-orange_ is its _antitheton_ in the\nuniverse of real existences.\n\nWe are now beginning to open up Dr. Johnstone Stoney\u2019s conception of the\nrelation of the autic _universe_ to phenomenal Nature. Nature is the\ntotality of phenomenal objects; but corresponding with each phenomenal\nobject or \u201cprotheton\u201d there is an _onto-object_ or _antitheton_; and the\ntotality of _antitheta_ constitute the _universe_. _Minds_, mine and\nthose of other beings, constitute the egoistic part of the universe; the\nrest of the universe is constituted by _sense-compelling auta_.\n\nWe may liken the _sense-compelling universe_ to a great machine in\nmotion, and the _tekmeria_ or perceptions which it produces within our\nminds to shadows cast by it. The laws of the movements of the machine\nare the real laws of the universe\u2014laws of nature are but the laws of\nthe changes which the shadows in consequence undergo. It is these\nshadow laws alone which natural science can reach: the real laws of\nthe _universe_ of which these are shadows are beyond its grasp. In\nNature the reflective eye of science sees not only phenomenal objects,\nbut the relations which they bear to each other. But such relations are\nthemselves phenomenal; they are protheta of which the _onto-relations_ of\nthe real _universe_ are the _antitheta_. Every space-relation, therefore,\nin Nature\u2014for instance, that my foot is at present three yards from the\nfender\u2014has a real autic relation in the sense-compelling _universe_,\nwhich is its _antitheton_; an _onto-relation_ between the _onto-foot_\nand _onto-fender_, meaning by these terms the _auta_ which send men the\ntekmeria which, when synthesised, furnish these two phenomenal objects.\nThe space-relations of Nature are but the shadows cast by the _autic\nrelations_ within the _minds_ of men, and perhaps some other animals.\n\nBut among these shadows there can be no efficient causation. When a\nchange takes place in the sense-compelling _universe_, the mighty\nmachine will cast one shadow before the change and another after. The\nsecond shadow will accordingly succeed the first in orderly sequence,\nbut the relation between the shadows is not the relation of cause and\neffect. Accordingly, in the laws of Nature which have been discovered\nby scientific investigation, we find abundant instances of unfailingly\nconcomitant events and of uniformities of sequence, but not one single\ninstance of cause and effect. There is nothing competent to cause one\nbody to exclude another from the space it occupies. A statement of\nthe fact is one of the laws of Nature. If a stone be allowed to drop\nin the vicinity of the earth, its downward speed is accelerated by a\nperfectly definite law. This law is one of the Uniformities of Nature\nwhich scientific inquiry has brought to light. But within the domain of\nPhysics there is no cause of acceleration. The facts as to what occurs in\nNature can be observed; the circumstances under which they occur can be\ninvestigated; similar cases can be compared; and the laws to which the\nsimultaneous or successive events conform may be brought to light. But\nhere our knowledge ends. Physical science has said its utmost.\n\nNow all this is changed when we turn to the only field of observation\naccessible to us in which we are dealing directly with _auta_. The\n_thoughts_ of which _I_ consist, the thoughts which are my _mind_, are\n_auta_; a very small group of _auta_, no doubt, in the mighty _Universe_,\nbut still an actual sample, though a very special and one-sided sample\nof what _auta_ really are. Now in the operations that go on in my mind I\ndo find instances, some few instances, of causes producing effects. The\nfamiliar case of a geometrical demonstration producing in a man\u2019s mind\na belief in the truth of the conclusion is a case in point. Here the\nunderstanding of the proof is the efficient cause of the belief in the\nconclusion which accompanies that understanding. A wish to accomplish\nsomething, and a knowledge of how to go about it, both of which are\n_thoughts_ in the _mind_, are a part of the efficient cause of subsequent\nevents, unless counteracted by other causes. A few other examples can be\nobtained from the same small field of observation; and this is all that\nman, in his isolated position, has any right to expect; for the bulk of\nhis thoughts are due, at least in large part, to autic causes which lie\noutside his mind, and it is there also that those of his thoughts that\nare known to be causes, usually exhibit their effects. When perceptions\narise in my mind, the effect indeed is within my mind, but the cause is\nbeyond it; and when I move my muscles the cause is within my mind, but it\nis outside the mind that it operates. The instances are indeed few where\nthe causes and the effects are both within my tiny group of _auta_, and\nit is only in these cases that I can have the process of causes producing\neffects under my inspection.\n\nBut since cases can be cited, however few, they suffice to establish the\nfact that the relation of cause and effect, in its full sense, does exist\nin some instances in the autic _universe_; whereas it has nowhere any\nplace within the domain of physical science. The relation of cause and\neffect among other _auta_ cannot from the nature of the case be proved.\nBut from its occurrence in that small part of the _universe_ which\nwe do know, we may fairly assume its occurrence in all parts of that\n_universe_. Such an assumption is at any rate justifiable by scientific\nmethod.\n\nWe must now pass to another point. The scientific analysis of Nature\nby the physicist has led to an hypothesis which may be regarded as the\nutmost simplification of which the shadows cast within the human mind by\nthe sense-compelling autic _universe_ are susceptible. This Dr. Stoney\ncalls the Diacrinomenal Hypothesis; according to which Nature is made\nup of objects each of which consists of almost inconceivably minute and\nswift motions. The phenomenal orange is a group of molecular motions; and\nif I bowl it across the table the visible molar motion is a secondary\nmotion of that group of primary molecular motions which constitutes the\nphenomenal object as such. And not only is the phenomenal object a group\nof minute and swift motions, but all the steps between that object and\nour brain, all that takes place in the air or \u00e6ther, in our organs of\nsense and nerves, can also be represented in terms of motion. And finally\na change consisting of motions takes place in the brain itself, whereupon\nwe become conscious of thought. That change which would be appreciated\nas motions by a bystander who could search into our brains while we are\nthinking, we should experience to be _thought_. Thus we find that in\ncertain cases the _autic existence_ that corresponds with motion, namely\nin the motions of our own brain molecules, is _thought_. And the most\nprobable hypothesis as to the true relation of phenomenal Nature and the\nautic _universe_ is that what we have found to be true in some cases is\nalways true, and that in every case it is _thought_ (or rather a change\nin the causal relation in which thought stands to thought) which is the\n_antitheton_ of motion; so that the totality of all actual existences,\nthe _universe_, is in fact identical with the totality of existing\n_thought_. Of course all this _thought_, with the exception of that tiny\ngroup that is my _mind_, is as much outside my consciousness as are the\nthoughts of my fellow-men and of the lower animals.\n\nUnder this view the _minds_ of men and of other animals are specialised\nspecks, as it were, of a vast ocean of _thought_, to which they bear a\nlike inconspicuous proportion to that borne by the few brain motions of\nwhich they are the _antitheta_, to the totality of motions throughout\nNature. Under this view the laws of the _universe_ are the laws of\n_thought_. This is a very different thing, be it noted, from saying that\nthey are the laws of human thought. The laws of human thought bear to\nthem the same small proportion which the laws of the action of the wheels\nof a watch upon one another bear to the entire science of dynamics. The\nscience of dynamics could never be evolved from a study of these laws.\nBut perhaps it may not be hopeless for man to attain some sound knowledge\nof the laws of cosmic _thought_, inasmuch as we have some few instances\nof the way _thought_ acts upon _thought_ open to our investigation in\nour own minds, and since this is supplemented by our knowledge of the\nphysical laws of nature, which are a shadow, a probably complete shadow,\nof all the laws of causation which operate throughout the _universe_,\nthroughout the all-embracing _Mind_ of the great _Autos_.\n\nSuch is Dr. Johnstone Stoney\u2019s conception of the relation of Natural\nScience to Ontology. I have presented it partly in his own words, partly\nin mine. It has been my conscientious endeavor to put it in as strong and\nfavorable a light as possible, and not in any way to weaken the strength\nof its logical consistency. The main thesis may now be briefly summarised\nin the following propositions:\n\n The phenomenal object is a syntheton or product of mental\n synthesis.\n\n Its efficient cause is a _real existence_ or _antitheton_.\n\n Nature is the totality of phenomenal syntheta.\n\n The _universe_ is the totality of autic _antitheta_.\n\n There is no causation in Nature; but the Uniformities of Nature\n are the shadows of the causal Laws of the Universe.\n\n _Thought_ has no place in Nature: it is part of the autic\n _universe_.\n\n The syntheton of which _thought_ is the _antitheton_ is the\n motion of brain molecules.\n\n It is a probable hypothesis that the _antitheta_ of which the\n motions of Diacrinomenal Nature are the syntheta, are _thought_.\n\n This is the monistic hypothesis, that there is but one kind\n of existing thing, viz. _thought_; in contradistinction to\n the dualistic hypothesis that there are two kinds of existing\n things, _thought_ and _motion_.\n\nI now pass from the attitude of expositor to the attitude of critic. And\nfirst I will attack a quite outstanding position, namely Dr. Stoney\u2019s\nassumption that Clifford\u2019s hypothesis which he supports and extends is\n_the_ monistic hypothesis, and by implication that it is the _only_\nmonistic hypothesis. In opposition to this I venture to affirm that there\nare several forms or phases of monism. I have not space to discuss the\nmatter; and must content myself with a bare enumeration of some of the\nlogically possible forms of Dualism and of Monism.\n\n 1) DUALISM.\n\n _A._ _Synthetic Dualism_: according to which there are two\n entities, the mind and the body; and these\n\n _a_) either work side by side, without interaction, in\n pre-established harmony (_philosophic dualism_),\n\n _b_) or interact the one on the other (_empirical\n dualism_).\n\n _B._ _Analytic Dualism_: according to which there are two\n elements as the result of analysis; _motion_ (with or\n without a material basis) and _consciousness_; the two\n elements being related in such a way that consciousness is\n inseparably associated with certain complex modes of motion.\n\n 2) MONISM.\n\n _A._ _Synthetic monism_: according to which there is but\n one entity. And this entity may be:\n\n _a_) The body, of which consciousness is a product\n (_materialistic or physical monism_);\n\n _b_) The mind, of which the body in common with the\n world of phenomena is a fiction (_idealistic monism_);\n\n _c_) The conscious organism, exhibiting certain\n transformations of energy which are felt as psychical\n states (_scientific monism_).\n\n _B._ _Analytic monism_: according to which analysis\n discloses but one element; and this may be\n\n _a_) _motion_, of which (or of one phase of which)\n consciousness is merely the psychical aspect (_analytic\n materialism_);\n\n _b_) _consciousness_, of which motion is merely the\n phenomenal aspect (_analytic psychism_);\n\n _c_) _x_ (_the unknowable_) of which motion is the\n physical aspect and consciousness the psychical aspect\n (_monistic agnosticism_).\n\nSuch are some of the forms or phases of monism as compared with those of\ndualism. It will be seen that Dr. Johnstone Stoney\u2019s speculations fall\nunder the head of what I have termed analytic psychism, according to\nwhich the sole ultimate reality disclosed by analysis is consciousness\nor thought. So far I have only reminded my readers that this, though\none form of monism, is not the only form. To which Dr. Stoney may very\npossibly reply that it matters not to him whether there are five or\nfifty-and-five monistic heresies besides the true creed of which he is\nthe prophet. He is only concerned with the establishment of the true\nmonistic faith. And as herein I should very heartily agree with him, I\nwill pass on without delay to criticise an assumption that lies close to\nthe heart and centre of his hypothesis.\n\nOn the first page of Dr. Stoney\u2019s essay we read: \u201cLet us, for\nconvenience, call these real existences _auta_\u2014the very things\nthemselves. An _auto_ is a thing that really exists, and in no wise\ndepends on the way we, human minds, may happen to regard it.\u201d And on\nthe second page we read: \u201cMy own thoughts are, at all events, things\nthat exist: they at least are _auta_ so long as they last. They are,\naccordingly, while they last, a part of the _universe of existing\nthings_.\u201d No proof is offered of this latter assumption that my thought,\nhuman thought, is part of the universe of _auta_. I venture to call this\nassumption in question. I demand proof of its validity. Nay, I am ready\nto go further and roundly assert that my thoughts are not _auta_, and\nfurnish no evidence whatever as to the nature of such _auta_. I am quite\naware that I may seem to be giving the lie to a direct deliverance of\nconsciousness; and that it will be said that it is obviously impossible\nto deny the existence of thought without at the same time exercising\nthat, the existence of which is denied\u2014a dictum which contains a very\npretty play upon two different uses of the word \u201cexistence.\u201d\n\nI go back to the orange, without which as a philosopher I am lost. I hold\nit in my hand, look steadfastly at it, and drink in with my nostrils\nits fragrant aroma. What says consciousness? That the phenomenal object\nI call an orange exists. It says nothing about independent existence,\nnothing about _auta_. The direct deliverance of consciousness is that\nan object-in-consciousness exists. If a \u201cplain man\u201d says that the\norange has a real existence, as such, independent of consciousness, he\nis going beyond the direct deliverance. And if a philosopher says that\nconsciousness has a real existence, as such, independent of the object,\nhe too is going beyond the direct deliverance. And if, as would seem\nto be the case, Dr. Stoney relies on the deliverance of consciousness\nfor the justification of his statement that \u201cperceptions, while they\nlast, are _auta_, real existences,\u201d I submit that he is relying on a\nmisinterpretation of the deliverance of consciousness.\n\nThe existence of the object-in-consciousness is the datum from which\nplain man and philosopher alike must start. On this foundation we must\nbase all our reasonings and speculations. Physical science directs its\nattention to the \u201cobject\u201d side of the given relation. And it reaches\nits \u201cdiacrinomenal\u201d result that the orange may for physical purposes\nbe represented as a group of swift and rapid molecular motions. But\ncan physics at any stage of its analysis shake itself free from the\n\u201cconsciousness\u201d side of the relation? Assuredly not. All that it can do\nis to represent the object-in-consciousness we call an orange in terms\nof other objects-in-consciousness we term molecular motions. Psychology\ndirects its attention to the \u201cconsciousness\u201d side of the given relation.\nIt analyses the object-in-consciousness into percepts, sensations, and\nso forth. But can psychology at any stage of its analysis shake itself\nfree from the \u201cobject\u201d side of the relation? Assuredly not. All that it\ncan do is to represent the consciousness-of-the-object we call an orange,\nin terms of the objects-in-consciousness we term sensations, relations\nbetween sensations, and so forth.\n\nThe relation of the consciousness-of-an-object to the\nobject-in-consciousness may be made clear by the analogy, which is\nsomething more than an analogy of vision and the visual field. For\nclear and distinct vision, a well-illuminated object of vision, and a\nhealthy organ of vision are necessary as co\u00f6perating factors. So, too,\nfor distinct consciousness a definite object-in-consciousness and a\nwell-defined consciousness-of-the-object are necessary as co\u00f6perating\nfactors. More than this. Unless there be some object of vision, however\nvague, and some organ of vision, however dim, no vision at all is\npossible. The co\u00f6peration of the two factors is essential. So, too,\nunless there be some object-in-consciousness, however vague, and some\nconsciousness-of-the-object, however dim, no consciousness at all, in\nanything like the human sense of the word \u201cconsciousness,\u201d is possible.\nHere, again, the co\u00f6peration of the two factors is essential. _And\nneither factor is ever given in experience without the other._\n\nWriting as I am, for readers of _The Monist_, I need hardly turn aside to\nexplain what I mean by an object-in-consciousness. And yet perhaps a few\nwords on the subject may not be out of place, and may prevent possible\nmisunderstanding. An object-in-consciousness is not necessarily a\ntangible, visible object, like an orange. The yellowness, the sweetness,\nthe weight, the bare existence of the orange, may each in turn be an\nobject in consciousness. For the physicist the tangible orange may be\nrepresented in terms of swift, infinitesimal motions; and these, not less\nthan the phenomenal orange, are objects in consciousness. A conception of\nconsciousness itself, an imperfect conception, but the best we can frame,\nmay be an object of consciousness, just as a reflected image of the eye\nmay be to the eye an object of vision.\n\nIt is generally believed by modern psychologists that all\nobjects-in-consciousness are derivable by processes of abstraction,\ngeneralisation, and so forth, from the primitive datum of a perceptual\nobject. And it must be remembered that it is only in abstraction\nthat we distinguish between the object-in-consciousness and the\nconsciousness-of-the-object. The two terms of this, for us, inevitable\nrelation are given in inseparable co\u00f6rdination. But in abstract thought\nwe can distinguish the inseparable terms; distinguish in thought, that\nis to say, what is inseparable in actual experience. To continue the\nanalogy of vision, we can make the one term focal, while the other term\nremains marginal in the field of view. And we can neglect, for the\npurposes of our thought and reason, the marginal term. But we cannot\nget rid of it. We may deal, as in physics, with motion, neglecting the\nconsciousness in and through which it is appreciated; but we cannot\nget rid of this consciousness. Or we can deal, as in psychology,\nwith the consciousness, neglecting the object-in-consciousness; but\nwe cannot get rid of this object. The object-out-of-consciousness and\nthe consciousness-without-an-object, are alike unknown\u2014or, if the\nreader prefers it, unknowable, which he may write with as many capital\nletters as seemeth to him good. The common-sense realist believes in\nthe existence of objects-out-of-consciousness. The analytical psychist\nbelieves in the existence of consciousness-without-an-object. Both are,\nif the views here advocated be sound, attributing independent existence\nto that which, so far as human knowledge is concerned, has only dependent\nor relative existence.\n\nIt is unfortunate that the terms \u201creal\u201d and \u201creality\u201d should\never have been applied to the independent existence of so-called\nthings-in-themselves. I think such terms as Dr. Stoney\u2019s \u201cautic\u201d and\n\u201cautic existence\u201d would be far preferable. For the word \u201creal\u201d has a\nmeaning and force which is quite definite. The orange that I hold in my\nhand and see with my eyes is as real as real can be. And if a philosopher\nsteps in and says, \u201cMy dear sir, _that_ is not real! The real reality\nis, according to some, mind-stuff or consciousness; according to others,\nmotion of\u2014well I don\u2019t quite know what, so let us simply call it motion;\nand according to others this real reality is unknowable\u201d\u2014I say if a\nphilosopher steps in and talks like this, one is reminded of Lamb\u2019s\nremark on Coleridge. Coleridge had been maundering on, as was his wont,\non \u201csubject\u201d and \u201cobject\u201d and all the rest of his second-hand German\nmetaphysics, when Lamb broke in, with his forcible stammer, in a stage\nwhisper: \u201cN-n-n-never mind C-c-c-coleridge; it\u2019s only his f-f-f-fun.\u201d\n\nI repeat that the orange I hold in my hand and see with my eyes\nis as real as real can be; and that we have here the standard and\ncriterion of reality not only for plain men but for philosophers.\nIn the perceptual object we have reality given in its clearest,\nfullest, and most forcible form. Every step in the analysis of the\nperceptual object-in-consciousness; every step in the analysis of the\nconsciousness-of-the-object takes us so far further from reality at its\nbest. The orange as an object-in-consciousness is far more real to me\nthan either the swift infinitesimal motions of the physicist, or the\n\u201csyntheton\u201d of related and integrated sensations of the psychologist.\nAnd when we reach the autic existence which is supposed to underlie both\nmotion and consciousness, we seem to get just as far as it is possible\nfor the human mind to get from the real orange with which we started.\nAnd yet it is to this autic existence that metaphysicians apply the term\n\u201creal\u201d in a different sense. For so far I have used the word \u201creal\u201d for\nthat which is given in experience. But metaphysically the word \u201creal\u201d\nis used to indicate independence of experience. I repeat that for this\nindependent existence some such word as Dr. Stoney\u2019s \u201cautic\u201d would be far\nbetter and less misleading. It would emphasise the distinction between\n_real_, that is to say given in direct experience, and _autic_, that is\nto say independent of experience.\n\nAccepting at any rate for our present purpose this distinction, we\nhave as co\u00f6rdinate realities the object-in-consciousness and the\nconsciousness-of-the-object. And these two are only different aspects of\nthe one great reality, the reality of experience. Of these two aspects\nneither is more real than the other. The object-in-consciousness is every\nbit as real as the consciousness-of-the-object; the orange as real as our\nperception thereof. Both are intensely and vitally real; but\u2014here I am in\nopposition to Dr. Stoney\u2014_neither is autic_. I can find no warranty for\nsuch autic existence in direct experience or the so-called deliverance of\nconsciousness. Nor am I aware of any process of reasoning by which it can\nbe demonstrated.\n\nBut, it may be said, is it not in accordance with scientific method to\nmake an assumption and then see how far such assumption is justified by\nthe results it enables us to reach? Assuredly such procedure is allowable\nand often fruitful. It is not on such grounds, however, that Dr. Stoney,\nif I rightly understand him, bases his doctrine of the psychical nature\nof _auta_. Let us, nevertheless, pay a moment\u2019s attention to this\nassumption and the correlative assumption of analytic materialism.\nConsciousness and matter-in-motion (or bare motion perhaps) are the\nultimate elements reached by the psychologist on the one hand and the\nphysicist on the other. Neither, if he knows his business, pretends by\nthis analysis to have reached autic existence. But it is open to each\nto make an assumption. The materialist says: I assume that motion is\nthe true autic existence, of which, under appropriate conditions, human\nconsciousness is merely a psychical aspect. The psychist says: I assume\nthat consciousness is the true autic existence, of which motion is\nmerely the phenomenal aspect. I confess that if I were forced to choose\none of these two, (which fortunately I am not,) I should elect to throw\nin my lot with the materialists. For if justification by results is\nto be the criterion, I hold that the results the materialists have to\nshow far outweigh any results which the analytic psychists can produce.\nBut the fact of the matter is that in neither case do the results flow\nfrom the autic assumption. All the results are equally valid for the\nstudent who holds fast to the relativity of object-in-consciousness\nto consciousness-of-the-object. Since therefore the assumption is\nvalueless so far as practical results are concerned, and since it is\nsomewhat repugnant to sound reason to assume that either term of a given\nrelationship is the same out of relationship as it is in relation to its\nfellow, I contend, as against both materialist and psychist, that it\nfails to make good its claim to acceptance.\n\nWhat shall we say then of _auta_ or _things in themselves_? Simply that\nwe do not know anything about them\u2014that they are outside the pale of\nhuman knowledge. If we even say they exist we are using the word \u201cexist\u201d\nin an autic and unreal sense. It is phenomenal Nature which constitutes\nthe real Universe; of its autic _shadow_, supposing that there be such a\n_shadow_, we know nothing. Need we then stay to criticise this unknown\n_shadow_?\n\nEven if we take Dr. Johnstone Stoney\u2019s hypothesis as it stands we\nfind a marked distinction between the sense-compelling _auta_ and the\negoistic _auta_, or between the sense-compelling aspect of _auta_\nand the egoistic or perceptive aspect. How is this distinction to be\nexplained and accounted for? I can see no answer to this question save\nthat the distinction is a matter of experience. Why not, then, trust\nexperience fully? Why go beyond it at all? Why not say that both the\nsense-compelling aspect and the perceptive aspect are part of the\nrelation which is given in experience? If Dr. Stoney could only see his\nway to this concession and could be led to adopt scientific monism, which\nis based on relativity, he would still secure all that is valuable in\nhis hypothesis, and at the same time get rid of the difficulties which as\nit stands encumber it. But it would no longer be a doctrine of _auta_.\n\nFor scientific monism is not a doctrine of _auta_ but a doctrine of\nphenomena\u2014phenomena regarded not only in their physical but also in their\npsychological aspect. Unifying these two diverse aspects, it contends\nthat the conscious organism is one and indivisible; that it is a product\nof evolution; that in its physical or material aspect this evolution has\ngiven rise to the body and brain; that in its psychical or immaterial\naspect it has given rise to the mind and human consciousness; that these\ntwo aspects, though distinguishable in analytic thought, are inseparable\nin phenomenal existence; that just as the complex modes of energy of\nthe human brain have been evolved from the simpler modes of energy that\nare found throughout organic and inorganic nature, so too the complex\nmodes of consciousness of the human mind have been evolved from the\nsimpler modes of infra-consciousness[19] that are associated with merely\norganic and inorganic modes of energy. The last clause is admittedly\nhypothetical. But it is submitted that the hypothesis is one that is\nfounded on strictly scientific and in no sense metaphysical or autic\nanalysis.\n\n C. LLOYD MORGAN.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[19] See _Mental Evolution_ in _The Monist_, Vol. II, No. 2 (Jan. 1892),\np. 161.\n\n\n\n\nEVOLUTIONARY LOVE.\n\n\nAT FIRST BLUSH. COUNTER-GOSPELS.\n\nPhilosophy, when just escaping from its golden pupa-skin, mythology,\nproclaimed the great evolutionary agency of the universe to be Love. Or,\nsince this pirate-lingo, English, is poor in such-like words, let us say\nEros, the exuberance-love. Afterwards, Empedocles set up passionate-love\nand hate as the two co\u00f6rdinate powers of the universe. In some passages,\nkindness is the word. But certainly, in any sense in which it has an\nopposite, to be senior partner of that opposite, is the highest position\nthat love can attain. Nevertheless, the ontological gospeller, in whose\ndays those views were familiar topics, made the One Supreme Being, by\nwhom all things have been made out of nothing, to be cherishing-love.\nWhat, then, can he say to hate? Never mind, at this time, what the scribe\nof the apocalypse, if he were John, stung at length by persecution into\na rage unable to distinguish suggestions of evil from visions of heaven,\nand so become the Slanderer of God to men, may have dreamed. The question\nis rather what the sane John thought, or ought to have thought, in order\nto carry out his idea consistently. His statement that God is love\nseems aimed at that saying of Ecclesiastes that we cannot tell whether\nGod bears us love or hatred. \u201cNay,\u201d says John, \u201cwe can tell, and very\nsimply! We know and have trusted the love which God hath in us. God is\nlove.\u201d There is no logic in this, unless it means, that God loves all\nmen. In the preceding paragraph, he had said, \u201cGod is light and in him\nis no darkness at all.\u201d We are to understand, then, that as darkness\nis merely the defect of light, so hatred and evil are mere imperfect\nstages of \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7 and \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd, love and loveliness. This concords with\nthat utterance reported in John\u2019s Gospel: \u201cGod sent not the Son into the\nworld to judge the world; but that the world should through him be saved.\nHe that believeth on him is not judged: he that believeth not hath been\njudged already.... And this is the judgment, that the light is come into\nthe world, and that men loved darkness rather than the light.\u201d That is\nto say, God visits no punishment on them; they punish themselves, by\ntheir natural affinity for the defective. Thus, the love that God is, is\nnot a love of which hatred is the contrary; otherwise Satan would be a\nco\u00f6rdinate power; but it is a love which embraces hatred as an imperfect\nstage of it, an Anteros\u2014yea, even needs hatred and hatefulness as its\nobject. For self-love is no love; so if God\u2019s self is love, that which he\nloves must be defect of love; just as a luminary can light up only that\nwhich otherwise would be dark. Henry James, the Swedenborgian, says: \u201cIt\nis no doubt very tolerable finite or creaturely love to love one\u2019s own in\nanother, to love another for his conformity to one\u2019s self: but nothing\ncan be in more flagrant contrast with the creative Love, all whose\ntenderness _ex vi termini_ must be reserved only for what intrinsically\nis most bitterly hostile and negative to itself.\u201d This is from \u201cSubstance\nand Shadow: an Essay on the Physics of Creation.\u201d It is a pity he had\nnot filled his pages with things like this, as he was able easily to do,\ninstead of scolding at his reader and at people generally, until the\nphysics of creation was well-nigh forgot. I must deduct, however, from\nwhat I just wrote: obviously no genius could make his every sentence as\nsublime as one which discloses for the problem of evil its everlasting\nsolution.\n\nThe movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse projecting\ncreations into independency and drawing them into harmony. This seems\ncomplicated when stated so; but it is fully summed up in the simple\nformula we call the Golden Rule. This does not, of course, say, Do\neverything possible to gratify the egoistic impulses of others, but\nit says, Sacrifice your own perfection to the perfectionment of your\nneighbor. Nor must it for a moment be confounded with the Benthamite, or\nHelvetian, or Beccarian motto, Act for the greatest good of the greatest\nnumber. Love is not directed to abstractions but to persons; not to\npersons we do not know, nor to numbers of people, but to our own dear\nones, our family and neighbors. \u201cOur neighbor,\u201d we remember, is one whom\nwe live near, not locally perhaps, but in life and feeling.\n\nEverybody can see that the statement of St. John is the formula of an\nevolutionary philosophy, which teaches that growth comes only from love,\nfrom\u2014I will not say self-_sacrifice_, but from the ardent impulse to\nfulfil another\u2019s highest impulse. Suppose, for example, that I have an\nidea that interests me. It is my creation. It is my creature; for as\nshown in last July\u2019s _Monist_, it is a little person. I love it; and I\nwill sink myself in perfecting it. It is not by dealing out cold justice\nto the circle of my ideas that I can make them grow, but by cherishing\nand tending them as I would the flowers in my garden. The philosophy we\ndraw from John\u2019s gospel is that this is the way mind develops; and as\nfor the cosmos, only so far as it yet is mind, and so has life, is it\ncapable of further evolution. Love, recognising germs of loveliness in\nthe hateful, gradually warms it into life, and makes it lovely. That is\nthe sort of evolution which every careful student of my essay \u201cThe Law of\nMind,\u201d must see that _synechism_ calls for.\n\nThe nineteenth century is now fast sinking into the grave, and we all\nbegin to review its doings and to think what character it is destined to\nbear as compared with other centuries in the minds of future historians.\nIt will be called, I guess, the Economical Century; for political\neconomy has more direct relations with all the branches of its activity\nthan has any other science. Well, political economy has its formula of\nredemption, too. It is this: Intelligence in the service of greed ensures\nthe justest prices, the fairest contracts, the most enlightened conduct\nof all the dealings between men, and leads to the _summum bonum_, food\nin plenty and perfect comfort. Food for whom? Why, for the greedy master\nof intelligence. I do not mean to say that this is one of the legitimate\nconclusions of political economy, the scientific character of which I\nfully acknowledge. But the study of doctrines, themselves true, will\noften temporarily encourage generalisations extremely false, as the study\nof physics has encouraged necessitarianism. What I say, then, is that\nthe great attention paid to economical questions, during our century has\ninduced an exaggeration of the beneficial effects of greed and of the\nunfortunate results of sentiment, until there has resulted a philosophy\nwhich comes unwittingly to this, that greed is the great agent in the\nelevation of the human race and in the evolution of the universe.\n\nI open a handbook of political economy,\u2014the most typical and middling one\nI have at hand,\u2014and there find some remarks of which I will here make a\nbrief analysis. I omit qualifications, sops thrown to Cerberus, phrases\nto placate Christian prejudice, trappings which serve to hide from author\nand reader alike the ugly nakedness of the greed-god. But I have surveyed\nmy position. The author enumerates \u201cthree motives to human action:\n\nThe love of self;\n\nThe love of a limited class having common interests and feelings with\none\u2019s self;\n\nThe love of mankind at large.\u201d\n\nRemark, at the outset, what obsequious title is bestowed on greed,\u2014\u201cthe\nlove of self.\u201d Love! The second motive _is_ love. In place of \u201ca limited\nclass\u201d put \u201ccertain persons,\u201d and you have a fair description. Taking\n\u201cclass\u201d in the old-fashioned sense, a weak kind of love is described. In\nthe sequel, there seems to be some haziness as to the delimitation of\nthis motive. By the love of mankind at large, the author does not mean\nthat deep, subconscious passion that is properly so called; but merely\npublic-spirit, perhaps little more than a fidget about pushing ideas. The\nauthor proceeds to a comparative estimate of the worth of these motives.\nGreed, says he, but using, of course, another word, \u201cis not so great an\nevil as is commonly supposed.... Every man can promote his own interests\na great deal more effectively than he can promote any one else\u2019s, or than\nany one else can promote his.\u201d Besides, as he remarks on another page,\nthe more miserly a man is, the more good he does. The second motive \u201cis\nthe most dangerous one to which society is exposed.\u201d Love is all very\npretty: \u201cno higher or purer source of human happiness exists.\u201d (Ahem!)\nBut it is a \u201csource of enduring injury,\u201d and, in short, should be\noverruled by something wiser. What is this wiser motive? We shall see.\n\nAs for public spirit, it is rendered nugatory by the \u201cdifficulties in\nthe way of its effective operation.\u201d For example, it might suggest\nputting checks upon the fecundity of the poor and the vicious; and \u201cno\nmeasure of repression would be too severe,\u201d in the case of criminals.\nThe hint is broad. But unfortunately, you cannot induce legislatures to\ntake such measures, owing to the pestiferous \u201ctender sentiments of man\ntowards man.\u201d It thus appears, that public-spirit, or Benthamism, is\nnot strong enough to be the effective tutor of love, (I am skipping to\nanother page,) which must therefore be handed over to \u201cthe motives which\nanimate men in the pursuit of wealth,\u201d in which alone we can confide, and\nwhich \u201care in the highest degree beneficent.\u201d[20] Yes, in the \u201chighest\ndegree\u201d without exception are they beneficent to the being upon whom all\ntheir blessings are poured out, namely, the Self, whose \u201csole object,\u201d\nsays the writer in accumulating wealth is his individual \u201csustenance and\nenjoyment.\u201d Plainly, the author holds the notion that some other motive\nmight be in a higher degree beneficent even for the man\u2019s self to be a\nparadox wanting in good sense. He seeks to gloze and modify his doctrine;\nbut he lets the perspicacious reader see what his animating principle\nis; and when, holding the opinions I have repeated, he at the same time\nacknowledges that society could not exist upon a basis of intelligent\ngreed alone, he simply pigeonholes himself as one of the eclectics of\ninharmonious opinions. He wants his mammon flavored with a _soup\u00e7on_ of\ngod.\n\nThe economists accuse those to whom the enunciation of their atrocious\nvillainies communicates a thrill of horror of being _sentimentalists_. It\nmay be so: I willingly confess to having some tincture of sentimentalism\nin me, God be thanked! Ever since the French Revolution brought this\nleaning of thought into ill-repute,\u2014and not altogether undeservedly, I\nmust admit, true, beautiful, and good as that great movement was,\u2014it has\nbeen the tradition to picture sentimentalists as persons incapable of\nlogical thought and unwilling to look facts in the eyes. This tradition\nmay be classed with the French tradition that an Englishman says _godam_\nat every second sentence, the English tradition that an American talks\nabout \u201cBritishers,\u201d and the American tradition that a Frenchman carries\nforms of etiquette to an inconvenient extreme, in short with all those\ntraditions which survive simply because the men who use their eyes and\nears are few and far between. Doubtless some excuse there was for all\nthose opinions in days gone by; and sentimentalism, when it was the\nfashionable amusement to spend one\u2019s evenings in a flood of tears over\na woeful performance on a candle-litten stage, sometimes made itself a\nlittle ridiculous. But what after all is sentimentalism? It is an _ism_,\na doctrine, namely, the doctrine that great respect should be paid to\nthe natural judgments of the sensible heart. This is what sentimentalism\nprecisely is; and I entreat the reader to consider whether to contemn\nis not of all blasphemies the most degrading. Yet the nineteenth\ncentury has steadily contemned it, because it brought about the Reign\nof Terror. That it did so is true. Still, the whole question is one of\n_how much_. The reign of terror was very bad; but now the Gradgrind\nbanner has been this century long flaunting in the face of heaven, with\nan insolence to provoke the very skies to scowl and rumble. Soon a flash\nand quick peal will shake economists quite out of their complacency, too\nlate. The twentieth century, in its latter half, shall surely see the\ndeluge-tempest burst upon the social order,\u2014to clear upon a world as\ndeep in ruin as that greed-philosophy has long plunged it into guilt. No\npost-thermidorian high jinks then!\n\nSo a miser is a beneficent power in a community, is he? With the same\nreason precisely, only in a much higher degree, you might pronounce\nthe Wall Street sharp to be a good angel, who takes money from\nheedless persons not likely to guard it properly, who wrecks feeble\nenterprises better stopped, and who administers wholesome lessons to\nunwary scientific men, by passing worthless checks upon them,\u2014as you\ndid, the other day, to me, my millionaire Master in glomery, when you\nthought you saw your way to using my process without paying for it,\nand of so bequeathing to your children something to boast of their\nfather about,\u2014and who by a thousand wiles puts money at the service of\nintelligent greed, in his own person. Bernard Mandeville, in his \u201cFable\nof the Bees,\u201d maintains that private vices of all descriptions are\npublic benefits, and proves it, too, quite as cogently as the economist\nproves his point concerning the miser. He even argues, with no slight\nforce, that but for vice civilisation would never have existed. In\nthe same spirit, it has been strongly maintained and is to-day widely\nbelieved that all acts of charity and benevolence, private and public, go\nseriously to degrade the human race.\n\nThe \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d of Darwin merely extends politico-economical\nviews of progress to the entire realm of animal and vegetable life. The\nvast majority of our contemporary naturalists hold the opinion that the\ntrue cause of those exquisite and marvellous adaptations of nature for\nwhich, when I was a boy, men used to extol the divine wisdom is that\ncreatures are so crowded together that those of them that happen to\nhave the slightest advantage force those less pushing into situations\nunfavorable to multiplication or even kill them before they reach the\nage of reproduction. Among animals, the mere mechanical individualism is\nvastly re\u00ebnforced as a power making for good by the animal\u2019s ruthless\ngreed. As Darwin puts it on his title-page, it is the struggle for\nexistence; and he should have added for his motto: Every individual for\nhimself, and the Devil take the hindmost! Jesus, in his sermon on the\nMount, expressed a different opinion.\n\nHere, then, is the issue. The gospel of Christ says that progress comes\nfrom every individual merging his individuality in sympathy with his\nneighbors. On the other side, the conviction of the nineteenth century is\nthat progress takes place by virtue of every individual\u2019s striving for\nhimself with all his might and trampling his neighbor under foot whenever\nhe gets a chance to do so. This may accurately be called the Gospel of\nGreed.\n\nMuch is to be said on both sides. I have not concealed, I could not\nconceal, my own passionate predilection. Such a confession will probably\nshock my scientific brethren. Yet the strong feeling is in itself, I\nthink, an argument of some weight in favor of the agapastic theory of\nevolution,\u2014so far as it may be presumed to bespeak the normal judgment of\nthe Sensible Heart. Certainly, if it were possible to believe in agapasm\nwithout believing it warmly, that fact would be an argument against the\ntruth of the doctrine. At any rate, since the warmth of feeling exists,\nit should on every account be candidly confessed; especially since it\ncreates a liability to one-sidedness on my part against which it behooves\nmy readers and me to be severally on our guard.\n\n\nSECOND THOUGHTS. IRENICA.\n\nLet us try to define the logical affinities of the different theories\nof evolution. Natural selection, as conceived by Darwin, is a mode\nof evolution in which the only positive agent of change in the whole\npassage from moner to man is fortuitous variation. To secure advance in\na definite direction chance has to be seconded by some action that shall\nhinder the propagation of some varieties or stimulate that of others.\nIn natural selection, strictly so called, it is the crowding out of the\nweak. In sexual selection, it is the attraction of beauty, mainly.\n\nThe \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d was published toward the end of the year 1859.\nThe preceding years since 1846 had been one of the most productive\nseasons,\u2014or if extended so as to cover the great book we are considering,\n_the_ most productive period of equal length in the entire history of\nscience from its beginnings until now. The idea that chance begets order,\nwhich is one of the corner-stones of modern physics (although Dr. Carus\nconsiders it \u201cthe weakest point in Mr. Peirce\u2019s system,\u201d) was at that\ntime put into its clearest light. Quetelet had opened the discussion\nby his \u201cLetters on the Application of Probabilities to the Moral and\nPolitical Sciences,\u201d a work which deeply impressed the best minds of that\nday, and to which Sir John Herschel had drawn general attention in Great\nBritain. In 1857, the first volume of Buckle\u2019s \u201cHistory of Civilisation\u201d\nhad created a tremendous sensation, owing to the use he made of this same\nidea. Meantime, the \u201cstatistical method\u201d had, under that very name, been\napplied with brilliant success to molecular physics. Dr. John Herapath,\nan English chemist, had in 1847 outlined the kinetical theory of gases\nin his \u201cMathematical Physics\u201d; and the interest the theory excited had\nbeen refreshed in 1856 by notable memoirs by Clausius and Kr\u00f6nig. In\nthe very summer preceding Darwin\u2019s publication, Maxwell had read before\nthe British Association the first and most important of his researches\non this subject. The consequence was that the idea that fortuitous\nevents may result in a physical law, and further that this is the way\nin which those laws which appear to conflict with the principle of the\nconservation of energy are to be explained, had taken a strong hold upon\nthe minds of all who were abreast of the leaders of thought. By such\nminds, it was inevitable that the \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d whose teaching\nwas simply the application of the same principle to the explanation of\nanother \u201cnon-conservative\u201d action, that of organic development, should\nbe hailed and welcomed. The sublime discovery of the conservation of\nenergy by Helmholtz in 1847, and that of the mechanical theory of heat\nby Clausius and by Rankine, independently, in 1850, had decidedly\noverawed all those who might have been inclined to sneer at physical\nscience. Thereafter a belated poet still harping upon \u201cscience peddling\nwith the names of things\u201d would fail of his effect. Mechanism was now\nknown to be all, or very nearly so. All this time, utilitarianism,\u2014that\nimproved substitute for the Gospel,\u2014was in its fullest feather; and was\na natural ally of an individualistic theory. Dean Mansell\u2019s injudicious\nadvocacy had led to mutiny among the bondsmen of Sir William Hamilton,\nand the nominalism of Mill had profited accordingly; and although the\nreal science that Darwin was leading men to was sure some day to give a\ndeath-blow to the sham-science of Mill, yet there were several elements\nof the Darwinian theory which were sure to charm the followers of Mill.\nAnother thing: an\u00e6sthetics had been in use for thirteen years. Already,\npeople\u2019s acquaintance with suffering had dropped off very much; and\nas a consequence, that unlovely hardness by which our times are so\ncontrasted with those that immediately preceded them, had already set\nin, and inclined people to relish a ruthless theory. The reader would\nquite mistake the drift of what I am saying if he were to understand me\nas wishing to suggest that any of those things (except perhaps Malthus)\ninfluenced Darwin himself. What I mean is that his hypothesis, while\nwithout dispute one of the most ingenious and pretty ever devised, and\nwhile argued with a wealth of knowledge, a strength of logic, a charm\nof rhetoric, and above all with a certain magnetic genuineness that was\nalmost irresistible, did not appear, at first, at all near to being\nproved; and to a sober mind its case looks less hopeful now than it\ndid twenty years ago; but the extraordinarily favorable reception it\nmet with was plainly owing, in large measure, to its ideas being those\ntoward which the age was favorably disposed, especially, because of the\nencouragement it gave to the greed-philosophy.\n\nDiametrically opposed to evolution by chance, are those theories which\nattribute all progress to an inward necessary principle, or other form of\nnecessity. Many naturalists have thought that if an egg is destined to\ngo through a certain series of embryological transformations, from which\nit is perfectly certain not to deviate, and if in geological time almost\nexactly the same forms appear successively, one replacing another in the\nsame order, the strong presumption is that this latter succession was as\npredeterminate and certain to take place as the former. So, N\u00e4geli, for\ninstance, conceives that it somehow follows from the first law of motion\nand the peculiar, but unknown, molecular constitution of protoplasm,\nthat forms must complicate themselves more and more. K\u00f6lliker makes one\nform generate another after a certain maturation has been accomplished.\nWeismann, too, though he calls himself a Darwinian, holds that nothing\nis due to chance, but that all forms are simple mechanical resultants\nof the heredity from two parents.[21] It is very noticeable that all\nthese different sectaries seek to import into their science a mechanical\nnecessity to which the facts that come under their observation do not\npoint. Those geologists who think that the variation of species is due\nto cataclasmic alterations of climate or of the chemical constitution of\nthe air and water are also making mechanical necessity chief factor of\nevolution.\n\nEvolution by sporting and evolution by mechanical necessity are\nconceptions warring against one another. A third method, which supersedes\ntheir strife, lies enwrapped in the theory of Lamarck. According to\nhis view, all that distinguishes the highest organic forms from the\nmost rudimentary has been brought about by little hypertrophies or\natrophies which have affected individuals early in their lives, and have\nbeen transmitted to their offspring. Such a transmission of acquired\ncharacters is of the general nature of habit-taking, and this is the\nrepresentative and derivative within the physiological domain of the\nlaw of mind. Its action is essentially dissimilar to that of a physical\nforce; and that is the secret of the repugnance of such necessitarians\nas Weismann to admitting its existence. The Lamarckians further suppose\nthat although some of the modifications of form so transmitted were\noriginally due to mechanical causes, yet the chief factors of their first\nproduction were the straining of endeavor and the overgrowth superinduced\nby exercise, together with the opposite actions. Now, endeavor, since it\nis directed toward an end, is essentially psychical, even though it be\nsometimes unconscious; and the growth due to exercise, as I argued in\nmy last paper, follows a law of a character quite contrary to that of\nmechanics.\n\nLamarckian evolution is thus evolution by the force of habit.\u2014That\nsentence slipped off my pen while one of those neighbors whose function\nin the social cosmos seems to be that of an Interrupter, was asking me\na question. Of course, it is nonsense. Habit is mere inertia, a resting\non one\u2019s oars, not a propulsion. Now it is energetic projaculation\n(lucky there is such a word, or this untried hand might have been put to\ninventing one) by which in the typical instances of Lamarckian evolution\nthe new elements of form are first created. Habit, however, forces them\nto take practical shapes, compatible with the structures they affect, and\nin the form of heredity and otherwise, gradually replaces the spontaneous\nenergy that sustains them. Thus, habit plays a double part; it serves to\nestablish the new features, and also to bring them into harmony with the\ngeneral morphology and function of the animals and plants to which they\nbelong. But if the reader will now kindly give himself the trouble of\nturning back a page or two, he will see that this account of Lamarckian\nevolution coincides with the general description of the action of love,\nto which, I suppose, he yielded his assent.\n\nRemembering that all matter is really mind, remembering, too, the\ncontinuity of mind, let us ask what aspect Lamarckian evolution takes\non within the domain of consciousness. Direct endeavor can achieve\nalmost nothing. It is as easy by taking thought to add a cubit to one\u2019s\nstature, as it is to produce an idea acceptable to any of the Muses by\nmerely straining for it, before it is ready to come. We haunt in vain\nthe sacred well and throne of Mnemosyne; the deeper workings of the\nspirit take place in their own slow way, without our connivance. Let but\ntheir bugle sound, and we may then make our effort, sure of an oblation\nfor the altar of whatsoever divinity its savor gratifies. Besides this\ninward process, there is the operation of the environment, which goes\nto break up habits destined to be broken up and so to render the mind\nlively. Everybody knows that the long continuance of a routine of habit\nmakes us lethargic, while a succession of surprises wonderfully brightens\nthe ideas. Where there is a motion, where history is a-making, there is\nthe focus of mental activity, and it has been said that the arts and\nsciences reside within the temple of Janus, waking when that is open,\nbut slumbering when it is closed. Few psychologists have perceived how\nfundamental a fact this is. A portion of mind abundantly commissured to\nother portions works almost mechanically. It sinks to the condition of\na railway junction. But a portion of mind almost isolated, a spiritual\npeninsula, or _cul-de-sac_, is like a railway terminus. Now mental\ncommissures are habits. Where they abound, originality is not needed and\nis not found; but where they are in defect, spontaneity is set free.\nThus, the first step in the Lamarckian evolution of mind is the putting\nof sundry thoughts into situations in which they are free to play. As to\ngrowth by exercise, I have already shown, in discussing \u201cMan\u2019s Glassy\nEssence,\u201d in last October\u2019s _Monist_, what its _modus operandi_ must be\nconceived to be, at least, until a second equally definite hypothesis\nshall have been offered. Namely, it consists of the flying asunder of\nmolecules, and the reparation of the parts by new matter. It is, thus, a\nsort of reproduction. It takes place only during exercise, because the\nactivity of protoplasm consists in the molecular disturbance which is\nits necessary condition. Growth by exercise takes place also in the mind.\nIndeed, that is what it is to _learn_. But the most perfect illustration\nis the development of a philosophical idea by being put into practice.\nThe conception which appeared, at first, as unitary, splits up into\nspecial cases; and into each of these new thought must enter to make a\npracticable idea. This new thought, however, follows pretty closely the\nmodel of the parent conception; and thus a homogeneous development takes\nplace. The parallel between this and the course of molecular occurrences\nis apparent. Patient attention will be able to trace all these elements\nin the transaction called learning.\n\nThree modes of evolution have thus been brought before us; evolution by\nfortuitous variation, evolution by mechanical necessity, and evolution\nby creative love. We may term them _tychastic_ evolution, or _tychasm_,\n_anancastic_ evolution, or _anancasm_, and _agapastic_ evolution,\nor _agapasm_. The doctrines which represent these as severally of\nprincipal importance, we may term _tychasticism_, _anancasticism_, and\n_agapasticism_. On the other hand the mere propositions that absolute\nchance, mechanical necessity, and the law of love, are severally\noperative in the cosmos, may receive the names of _tychism_, _anancism_,\nand _agapism_.\n\nAll three modes of evolution are composed of the same general elements.\nAgapasm exhibits them the most clearly. The good result is here brought\nto pass, first, by the bestowal of spontaneous energy by the parent upon\nthe offspring, and, second, by the disposition of the latter to catch\nthe general idea of those about it and thus to subserve the general\npurpose. In order to express the relation that tychasm and anancasm bear\nto agapasm, let me borrow a word from geometry. An ellipse crossed by a\nstraight line is a sort of cubic curve; for a cubic is a curve which is\ncut thrice by a straight line; now a straight line might cut the ellipse\ntwice and its associated straight line a third time. Still the ellipse\nwith the straight line across it would not have the characteristics of a\ncubic. It would have, for instance, no contrary flexure, which no true\ncubic wants; and it would have two nodes, which no true cubic has. The\ngeometers say that it is a _degenerate_ cubic. Just so, tychasm and\nanancasm are degenerate forms of agapasm.\n\nMen who seek to reconcile the Darwinian idea with Christianity will\nremark that tychastic evolution, like the agapastic, depends upon a\nreproductive creation, the forms preserved being those that use the\nspontaneity conferred upon them in such wise as to be drawn into harmony\nwith their original, quite after the Christian scheme. Very good! This\nonly shows that just as love cannot have a contrary, but must embrace\nwhat is most opposed to it, as a degenerate case of it, so tychasm is\na kind of agapasm. Only, in the tychastic evolution progress is solely\nowing to the distribution of the napkin-hidden talent of the rejected\nservant among those not rejected, just as ruined gamesters leave their\nmoney on the table to make those not yet ruined so much the richer.\nIt makes the felicity of the lambs just the damnation of the goats,\ntransposed to the other side of the equation. In genuine agapasm, on the\nother hand, advance takes place by virtue of a positive sympathy among\nthe created springing from continuity of mind. This is the idea which\ntychasticism knows not how to manage.\n\nThe anancasticist might here interpose, claiming that the mode of\nevolution for which he contends agrees with agapasm at the point at which\ntychasm departs from it. For it makes development go through certain\nphases, having its inevitable ebbs and flows, yet tending on the whole to\na foreordained perfection. Bare existence by this its destiny betrays an\nintrinsic affinity for the good. Herein, it must be admitted, anancasm\nshows itself to be in a broad acception a species of agapasm. Some forms\nof it might easily be mistaken for the genuine agapasm. The Hegelian\nphilosophy is such an anancasticism. With its revelatory religion, with\nits synechism (however imperfectly set forth), with its \u201creflection,\u201d\nthe whole idea of the theory is superb, almost sublime. Yet, after all,\nliving freedom is practically omitted from its method. The whole movement\nis that of a vast engine, impelled by a _vis a tergo_, with a blind and\nmysterious fate of arriving at a lofty goal. I mean that such an engine\nit _would_ be, if it really worked; but in point of fact, it is a Keely\nmotor. Grant that it really acts as it professes to act, and there is\nnothing to do but accept the philosophy. But never was there seen such an\nexample of a long chain of reasoning,\u2014shall I say with a flaw in every\nlink?\u2014no, with every link a handful of sand, squeezed into shape in a\ndream. Or say, it is a pasteboard model of a philosophy that in reality\ndoes not exist. If we use the one precious thing it contains, the idea\nof it, introducing the tychism which the arbitrariness of its every step\nsuggests, and make that the support of a vital freedom which is the\nbreath of the spirit of love, we may be able to produce that genuine\nagapasticism, at which Hegel was aiming.\n\n\nA THIRD ASPECT. DISCRIMINATION.\n\nIn the very nature of things, the line of demarcation between the three\nmodes of evolution is not perfectly sharp. That does not prevent its\nbeing quite real; perhaps it is rather a mark of its reality. There is\nin the nature of things no sharp line of demarcation between the three\nfundamental colors, red, green, and violet. But for all that they are\nreally different. The main question is whether three radically different\nevolutionary elements have been operative; and the second question is\nwhat are the most striking characteristics of whatever elements have been\noperative.\n\nI propose to devote a few pages to a very slight examination of these\nquestions in their relation to the historical development of human\nthought. I first formulate for the reader\u2019s convenience the briefest\npossible definitions of the three conceivable modes of development\nof thought, distinguishing also two varieties of anancasm and three\nof agapasm. The tychastic development of thought, then, will consist\nin slight departures from habitual ideas in different directions\nindifferently, quite purposeless and quite unconstrained whether by\noutward circumstances or by force of logic, these new departures being\nfollowed by unforeseen results which tend to fix some of them as habits\nmore than others. The anancastic development of thought will consist\nof new ideas adopted without foreseeing whither they tend, but having\na character determined by causes either external to the mind, such\nas changed circumstances of life, or internal to the mind as logical\ndevelopments of ideas already accepted, such as generalisations. The\nagapastic development of thought is the adoption of certain mental\ntendencies, not altogether heedlessly, as in tychasm, nor quite blindly\nby the mere force of circumstances or of logic, as in anancasm, but by\nan immediate attraction for the idea itself, whose nature is divined\nbefore the mind possesses it, by the power of sympathy, that is, by\nvirtue of the continuity of mind; and this mental tendency may be of\nthree varieties, as follows. First, it may affect a whole people or\ncommunity in its collective personality, and be thence communicated\nto such individuals as are in powerfully sympathetic connection with\nthe collective people, although they may be intellectually incapable\nof attaining the idea by their private understandings or even perhaps\nof consciously apprehending it. Second, it may affect a private person\ndirectly, yet so that he is only enabled to apprehend the idea, or\nto appreciate its attractiveness, by virtue of his sympathy with his\nneighbors, under the influence of a striking experience or development of\nthought. The conversion of St. Paul may be taken as an example of what\nis meant. Third, it may affect an individual, independently of his human\naffections, by virtue of an attraction it exercises upon his mind, even\nbefore he has comprehended it. This is the phenomenon which has been\nwell called the _divination_ of genius; for it is due to the continuity\nbetween the man\u2019s mind and the Most High.\n\nLet us next consider by means of what tests we can discriminate between\nthese different categories of evolution. No absolute criterion is\npossible in the nature of things, since in the nature of things there is\nno sharp line of demarcation between the different classes. Nevertheless,\nquantitative symptoms may be found by which a sagacious and sympathetic\njudge of human nature may be able to estimate the approximate proportions\nin which the different kinds of influence are commingled.\n\nSo far as the historical evolution of human thought has been tychastic,\nit should have proceeded by insensible or minute steps; for such is the\nnature of chances when so multiplied as to show phenomena of regularity.\nFor example, assume that of the native-born white adult males of the\nUnited States in 1880, one fourth part were below 5 feet 4 inches in\nstature and one fourth part above 5 feet 8 inches. Then by the principles\nof probability, among the whole population, we should expect\n\n 216 under 4 feet 6 inches, 216 above 6 feet 6 inches.\n 48 \u201d 4 \u201d 5 \u201d 48 \u201d 6 \u201d 7 \u201d\n 9 \u201d 4 \u201d 4 \u201d 9 \u201d 6 \u201d 8 \u201d\n less than 2 \u201d 4 \u201d 3 \u201d less than 2 \u201d 6 \u201d 9 \u201d\n\nI set down these figures to show how insignificantly few are the cases in\nwhich anything very far out of the common run presents itself by chance.\nThough the stature of only every second man is included within the four\ninches between 5 feet 4 inches and 5 feet 8 inches, yet if this interval\nbe extended by thrice four inches above and below, it will embrace all\nour 8 millions odd of native-born adult white males (of 1880), except\nonly 9 taller and 9 shorter.\n\nThe test of minute variation, if _not_ satisfied, absolutely negatives\ntychasm. If it _is_ satisfied, we shall find that it negatives anancasm\nbut not agapasm. We want a positive test, satisfied by tychasm, only. Now\nwherever we find men\u2019s thought taking by imperceptible degrees a turn\ncontrary to the purposes which animate them, in spite of their highest\nimpulses, there, we may safely conclude, there has been a tychastic\naction.\n\nStudents of the history of mind there be of an erudition to fill an\nimperfect scholar like me with envy edulcorated by joyous admiration,\nwho maintain that ideas when just started are and can be little more\nthan freaks, since they cannot yet have been critically examined, and\nfurther that everywhere and at all times progress has been so gradual\nthat it is difficult to make out distinctly what original step any given\nman has taken. It would follow that tychasm has been the sole method of\nintellectual development. I have to confess I cannot read history so; I\ncannot help thinking that while tychasm has sometimes been operative, at\nothers great steps covering nearly the same ground and made by different\nmen independently, have been mistaken for a succession of small steps,\nand further that students have been reluctant to admit a real entitative\n\u201cspirit\u201d of an age or of a people, under the mistaken and unscrutinised\nimpression that they should thus be opening the door to wild and\nunnatural hypotheses. I find, on the contrary, that, however it may\nbe with the education of individual minds, the historical development\nof thought has seldom been of a tychastic nature, and exclusively in\nbackward and barbarising movements. I desire to speak with the extreme\nmodesty which befits a student of logic who is required to survey so\nvery wide a field of human thought that he can cover it only by a\nreconnaisance, to which only the greatest skill and most adroit methods\ncan impart any value at all; but, after all, I can only express my own\nopinions and not those of anybody else; and in my humble judgment, the\nlargest example of tychasm is afforded by the history of Christianity,\nfrom about its establishment by Constantine, to, say, the time of the\nIrish monasteries, an era or eon of about 500 years. Undoubtedly the\nexternal circumstance which more than all others at first inclined men\nto accept Christianity in its loveliness and tenderness, was the fearful\nextent to which society was broken up into units by the unmitigated greed\nand hard-heartedness into which the Romans had seduced the world. And yet\nit was that very same fact, more than any other external circumstance,\nthat fostered that bitterness against the wicked world of which the\nprimitive Gospel of Mark contains not a single trace. At least, I do\nnot detect it in the remark about the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost,\nwhere nothing is said about vengeance, nor even in that speech where the\nclosing lines of Isaiah are quoted, about the worm and the fire that\nfeed upon the \u201ccarcasses of the men that have transgressed against me.\u201d\nBut little by little the bitterness increases until in the last book\nof the New Testament, its poor distracted author represents that all\nthe time Christ was talking about having come to save the world, the\nsecret design was to catch the entire human race, with the exception of\na paltry 144000, and souse them all in brimstone lake, and as the smoke\nof their torment went up for ever and ever, to turn and remark, \u201cThere\nis no curse any more.\u201d Would it be an insensible smirk or a fiendish\ngrin that should accompany such an utterance? I wish I could believe\nSt. John did not write it; but it is his gospel which tells about the\n\u201cresurrection unto condemnation,\u201d\u2014that is of men\u2019s being resuscitated\njust for the sake of torturing them;\u2014and, at any rate, the Revelation is\na very ancient composition. One can understand that the early Christians\nwere like men trying with all their might to climb a steep declivity of\nsmooth wet clay; the deepest and truest element of their life, animating\nboth heart and head, was universal-love; but they were continually, and\nagainst their wills, slipping into a party spirit, every slip serving\nas a precedent, in a fashion but too familiar to every man. This party\nfeeling insensibly grew until by about A. D. 330 the lustre of the\npristine integrity that in St. Mark reflects the white spirit of light\nwas so far tarnished that Eusebius, (the Jared Sparks of that day,) in\nthe preface to his History, could announce his intention of exaggerating\neverything that tended to the glory of the church and of suppressing\nwhatever might disgrace it. His Latin contemporary Lactantius is worse,\nstill; and so the darkling went on increasing until before the end of the\ncentury the great library of Alexandria was destroyed by Theophilus,[22]\nuntil Gregory the Great, two centuries later, burnt the great library of\nRome, proclaiming that \u201cIgnorance is the mother of devotion,\u201d (which is\ntrue, just as oppression and injustice is the mother of spirituality,)\nuntil a sober description of the state of the church would be a thing\nour not too nice newspapers would treat as \u201cunfit for publication.\u201d All\nthis movement is shown by the application of the test given above to\nhave been tychastic. Another very much like it on a small scale, only a\nhundred times swifter, for the study of which there are documents by the\nlibrary-full, is to be found in the history of the French Revolution.\n\nAnancastic evolution advances by successive strides with pauses between.\nThe reason is that in this process a habit of thought having been\noverthrown is supplanted by the next strongest. Now this next strongest\nis sure to be widely disparate from the first, and as often as not\nis its direct contrary. It reminds one of our old rule of making the\nsecond candidate vice-president. This character, therefore, clearly\ndistinguishes anancasm from tychasm. The character which distinguishes\nit from agapasm is its purposelessness. But external and internal\nanancasm have to be examined separately. Development under the pressure\nof external circumstances, or cataclasmine evolution, is in most cases\nunmistakable enough. It has numberless degrees of intensity, from the\nbrute force, the plain war, which has more than once turned the current\nof the world\u2019s thought, down to the hard fact of evidence, or what has\nbeen taken for it, which has been known to convince men by hordes. The\nonly hesitation that can subsist in the presence of such a history is\na quantitative one. Never are external influences the only ones which\naffect the mind, and therefore it must be a matter of judgment for which\nit would scarcely be worth while to attempt to set rules, whether a\ngiven movement is to be regarded as principally governed from without\nor not. In the rise of medieval thought, I mean scholasticism and\nthe synchronistic art developments, undoubtedly the crusades and the\ndiscovery of the writings of Aristotle were powerful influences. The\ndevelopment of scholasticism from Roscellin to Albertus Magnus closely\nfollows the successive steps in the knowledge of Aristotle. Prantl\nthinks that that is the whole story, and few men have thumbed more\nbooks than Carl Prantl. He has done good solid work, notwithstanding\nhis slap-dash judgments. But we shall never make so much as a good\nbeginning of comprehending scholasticism until the whole has been\nsystematically explored and digested by a company of students regularly\norganised and held under rule for that purpose. But as for the period we\nare now specially considering, that which synchronised the Romanesque\narchitecture, the literature is easily mastered. It does not quite\njustify Prantl\u2019s dicta as to the slavish dependence of these authors\nupon their authorities. Moreover, they kept a definite purpose steadily\nbefore their minds, throughout all their studies. I am, therefore, unable\nto offer this period of scholasticism as an example of pure external\nanancasm, which seems to be the fluorine of the intellectual elements.\nPerhaps the recent Japanese reception of western ideas is the purest\ninstance of it in history. Yet in combination with other elements,\nnothing is commoner. If the development of ideas under the influence of\nthe study of external facts be considered as external anancasm,\u2014it is on\nthe border between the external and the internal forms,\u2014it is, of course,\nthe principal thing in modern learning. But Whewell, whose masterly\ncomprehension of the history of science critics have been too ignorant\nproperly to appreciate, clearly shows that it is far from being the\noverwhelmingly preponderant influence, even there.\n\nInternal anancasm, or logical groping, which advances upon a predestined\nline without being able to foresee whither it is to be carried nor to\nsteer its course, this is the rule of development of philosophy. Hegel\nfirst made the world understand this; and he seeks to make logic not\nmerely the subjective guide and monitor of thought, which was all it had\nbeen ambitioning before, but to be the very main-spring of thinking,\nand not merely of individual thinking but of discussion, of the history\nof the development of thought, of all history, of all development.\nThis involves a positive, clearly demonstrable error. Let the logic in\nquestion be of whatever kind it may, a logic of necessary inference or\na logic of probable inference, (the theory might perhaps be shaped to\nfit either,) in any case it supposes that logic is sufficient of itself\nto determine what conclusion follows from given premises; for unless it\nwill do so much, it will not suffice to explain why an individual train\nof reasoning should take just the course it does take, to say nothing of\nother kinds of development. It thus supposes that from given premises,\nonly one conclusion can logically be drawn, and that there is no scope\nat all for free choice. That from given premises only one conclusion can\nlogically be drawn, is one of the false notions which have come from\nlogicians\u2019 confining their attention to that Nantucket of thought, the\nlogic of non-relative terms. In the logic of relatives, it does not hold\ngood.\n\nOne remark occurs to me. If the evolution of history is in considerable\npart of the nature of internal anancasm, it resembles the development of\nindividual men; and just as 33 years is a rough but natural unit of time\nfor individuals, being the average age at which man has issue, so there\nshould be an approximate period at the end of which one great historical\nmovement ought to be likely to be supplanted by another. Let us see if we\ncan make out anything of the kind. Take the governmental development of\nRome as being sufficiently long and set down the principal dates.\n\n B. C. 753, Foundation of Rome.\n B. C. 510, Expulsion of the Tarquins.\n B. C. 27, Octavius assumes title Augustus.\n A. D. 476, End of Western Empire.\n A. D. 962, Holy Roman Empire.\n A. D. 1453, Fall of Constantinople.\n\nThe last event was one of the most significant in history, especially\nfor Italy. The intervals are 243, 483, 502, 486, 491 years. All are\nrather curiously near equal, except the first which is half the others.\nSuccessive reigns of kings would not commonly be so near equal. Let us\nset down a few dates in the history of thought.\n\n B. C. 585, Eclipse of Thales. Beginning of Greek philosophy.\n A. D. 30, The crucifixion.\n A. D. 529, Closing of Athenian schools. End of Greek philosophy.\n A. D. 1125, (Approximate) Rise of the Universities of Bologna and Paris.\n A. D. 1543, Publication of the \u201cDe Revolutionibus\u201d of Copernicus.\n Beginning of Modern Science.\n\nThe intervals are 615, 499, 596, 418, years. In the history of\nmetaphysics, we may take the following:\n\n B. C. 322, Death of Aristotle.\n A. D. 1274, Death of Aquinas.\n A. D. 1804, Death of Kant.\n\nThe intervals are 1595 and 530 years. The former is about thrice the\nlatter.\n\nFrom these figures, no conclusion can fairly be drawn. At the same time,\nthey suggest that perhaps there may be a rough natural era of about 500\nyears. Should there be any independent evidence of this, the intervals\nnoticed may gain some significance.\n\nThe agapastic development of thought should, if it exists, be\ndistinguished by its purposive character, this purpose being the\ndevelopment of an idea. We should have a direct agapic or sympathetic\ncomprehension and recognition of it, by virtue of the continuity of\nthought. I here take it for granted that such continuity of thought\nhas been sufficiently proved by the arguments used in my paper on the\n\u201cLaw of Mind\u201d in _The Monist_ of last July. Even if those arguments are\nnot quite convincing in themselves, yet if they are re\u00ebnforced by an\napparent agapasm in the history of thought, the two propositions will\nlend one another mutual aid. The reader will, I trust, be too well\ngrounded in logic to mistake such mutual support for a vicious circle in\nreasoning. If it could be shown directly that there is such an entity\nas the \u201cspirit of an age\u201d or of a people, and that mere individual\nintelligence will not account for all the phenomena, this would be proof\nenough at once of agapasticism and of synechism. I must acknowledge\nthat I am unable to produce a cogent demonstration of this; but I am, I\nbelieve, able to adduce such arguments as will serve to confirm those\nwhich have been drawn from other facts. I believe that all the greatest\nachievements of mind have been beyond the powers of unaided individuals;\nand I find, apart from the support this opinion receives from synechistic\nconsiderations, and from the purposive character of many great movements,\ndirect reason for so thinking in the sublimity of the ideas and in their\noccurring simultaneously and independently to a number of individuals\nof no extraordinary general powers. The pointed Gothic architecture in\nseveral of its developments appears to me to be of such a character. All\nattempts to imitate it by modern architects of the greatest learning and\ngenius appear flat and tame, and are felt by their authors to be so.\nYet at the time the style was living, there was quite an abundance of\nmen capable of producing works of this kind of gigantic sublimity and\npower. In more than one case, extant documents show that the cathedral\nchapters, in the selection of architects, treated high artistic genius as\na secondary consideration, as if there were no lack of persons able to\nsupply that; and the results justify their confidence. Were individuals\nin general, then, in those ages possessed of such lofty natures and high\nintellect? Such an opinion would break down under the first examination.\n\nHow many times have men now in middle life seen great discoveries made\nindependently and almost simultaneously! The first instance I remember\nwas the prediction of a planet exterior to Uranus by Leverrier and Adams.\nOne hardly knows to whom the principle of the conservation of energy\nought to be attributed, although it may reasonably be considered as the\ngreatest discovery science has ever made. The mechanical theory of\nheat was set forth by Rankine and by Clausius during the same month of\nFebruary, 1850; and there are eminent men who attribute this great step\nto Thomson.[23] The kinetical theory of gases, after being started by\nJohn Bernoulli and long buried in oblivion, was reinvented and applied to\nthe explanation not merely of the laws of Boyle, Charles, and Avogadro,\nbut also of diffusion and viscosity, by at least three modern physicists\nseparately. It is well known that the doctrine of natural selection was\npresented by Wallace and by Darwin at the same meeting of the British\nAssociation; and Darwin in his \u201cHistorical Sketch\u201d prefixed to the\nlater editions of his book shows that both were anticipated by obscure\nforerunners. The method of spectrum analysis was claimed for Swan as well\nas for Kirchhoff, and there were others who perhaps had still better\nclaims. The authorship of the Periodical Law of the Chemical Elements is\ndisputed between a Russian, a German, and an Englishman; although there\nis no room for doubt that the principal merit belongs to the first. These\nare nearly all the greatest discoveries of our times. It is the same with\nthe inventions. It may not be surprising that the telegraph should have\nbeen independently made by several inventors, because it was an easy\ncorollary from scientific facts well made out before. But it was not so\nwith the telephone and other inventions. Ether, the first an\u00e6sthetic,\nwas introduced independently by three different New England physicians.\nNow ether had been a common article for a century. It had been in one of\nthe pharmacop\u0153ias three centuries before. It is quite incredible that\nits an\u00e6sthetic property should not have been known; it was known. It had\nprobably passed from mouth to ear as a secret from the days of Basil\nValentine; but for long it had been a secret of the Punchinello kind. In\nNew England, for many years, boys had used it for amusement. Why then had\nit not been put to its serious use? No reason can be given, except that\nthe motive to do so was not strong enough. The motives to doing so could\nonly have been desire for gain and philanthropy. About 1846, the date\nof the introduction, philanthropy was undoubtedly in an unusually active\ncondition. That sensibility, or sentimentalism, which had been introduced\nin the previous century, had undergone a ripening process, in consequence\nof which, though now less intense than it had previously been, it was\nmore likely to influence unreflecting people than it had ever been. All\nthree of the ether-claimants had probably been influenced by the desire\nfor gain; but nevertheless they were certainly not insensible to the\nagapic influences.\n\nI doubt if any of the great discoveries ought, properly, to be considered\nas altogether individual achievements; and I think many will share this\ndoubt. Yet, if not, what an argument for the continuity of mind, and for\nagapasticism is here! I do not wish to be very strenuous. If thinkers\nwill only be persuaded to lay aside their prejudices and apply themselves\nto studying the evidences of this doctrine, I shall be fully content to\nawait the final decision.\n\n CHARLES S. PEIRCE.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[20] How can a writer have any respect for science, as such, who is\ncapable of confounding with the scientific propositions of political\neconomy, which have nothing to say concerning what is \u201cbeneficent,\u201d such\nbrummagem generalisations as this?\n\n[21] I am happy to find that Dr. Carus, too, ranks Weismann among the\nopponents of Darwin, notwithstanding his flying that flag.\n\n[22] See _Draper\u2019s History of Intellectual Development_, chap. x.\n\n[23] Thomson, himself, in his article _Heat_ in the _Encyclopedia\nBritannica_, never once mentions the name of Clausius.\n\n\n\n\nRENAN.\n\nA DISCOURSE GIVEN AT SOUTH PLACE CHAPEL, LONDON, OCTOBER, 9, 1892.\n\n\n\u201cBe calm and resigned,\u201d said Renan to his weeping wife. \u201cWe undergo\nthe laws of that nature of which we are manifestations. We perish, we\ndisappear, but heaven and earth remain, and the march of time goes on for\never.\u201d\n\nIt is hard to-day to respond to these last words of the dying\nphilosopher. Heaven and earth remain, but they seem cold and grey when\nthe great heart in which they were united has ceased to beat, and when\nour sweet English singer has gone silent. By the passing away of the two\nhighest-mounted minds in Europe this society is especially bereaved. The\nearliest welcome given to the genius of young Tennyson came from the pen\nof William Johnston Fox, the first Minister of this Chapel; here has his\nspiritual pilgrimage been followed, and its songs here sung as hymns.\nBut for their magnitude Tennyson and Renan might have been considered\ntogether. They were children of the same spiritual epoch; the son of the\nCatholic Church, and the English Rector\u2019s son, were fellow-pilgrims on\nthe painful road of scepticism; they encountered the same phantoms, were\nattended by the same mighty shades, and found no altar but such as their\nown genius could raise and their glowing hearts kindle in the wilderness\nof doubt and denial. Alike they distrusted democracy, and dreamed of the\nideal monarch,\u2014as of Arthur, \u201cflower of kings,\u201d whom ancient legends of\nBritain and Brittany said would some day return to lead up the Golden\nYear. Renan loved to tell the story of how Tennyson, roaming in Brittany,\nstopped at an inn in Lannier, birthplace of Renan\u2019s mother. In the\nmorning the poet demanded his account, but the hostess said, \u201cThere is\nnothing to pay, Monsieur. It is you who have sung of our King Arthur.\u201d\n\nBut the people have a greatness of their own. They enshrine Tennyson\nin Westminster Abbey, Renan in the Pantheon. The career of Renan is a\ntriumph of republican France. Under the Empire he was deprived of his\nprofessorship, and of his office in the Imperial Library, for writing the\n\u201cLife of Jesus.\u201d But the Republic made him President of the College of\nFrance, gave him every honor, in life as in death. The national homage to\nthat ex-priest, that outspoken rationalist, who flattered not the masses\nnor fawned on power, is a high water-mark of civilisation. For it marks\nthe rise of a steady tide of liberty, and not the mere leap of waves\nunder some tempest of momentary emotion. The great fact is that this\nunique heretic, thinker, and scholar, has been able, without compromising\nhis independence, without help of any sect or school, to live his life,\nthink his thought, and round out his life-work with completeness, on the\nscene of a thousand martyrdoms.\n\nIn Renan\u2019s \u201cFeuilles D\u00e9tach\u00e9es,\u201d which appeared last spring but is not\nyet translated, there are outbursts of gratitude to his time, which,\nhe says, has been good to him, and pardoned many faults. He had just\nfinished, he says, his \u201cHistory of the People of Israel\u201d\u2014\u201cthe serious\nwork of my life.\u201d\n\n \u201cThe bridge which it remained to me to build between Judaism\n and Christianism is built.... In the \u2018Life of Jesus\u2019 I tried\n to exhibit the majestic growth of the Galilean tree from the\n stock of its roots to the summit, where sing the birds of\n heaven. In the volume just finished I have sought to make\n known the subsoil in which shot the roots of Jesus. Thus my\n principal duty is accomplished. At the Academy the work on the\n Rabbins also nears conclusion, and the _Corpus Inscriptionum\n Semiticorum_ is in excellent hands. So that now, having paid\n all my debts, I am free enough to amuse myself a little,\n and without scruples to indulge myself with the pleasure of\n gathering these leaves, often light enough.\u201d\n\nSo radiant was the author, at sixty-nine, having achieved the main\nschemes of a life which, at forty, was threatened with ruin by\nintolerance. Of course it was but a small part of what he would fain have\naccomplished. Last year (September 11) there was a festival, in the\nIsland of Br\u00e9hat, where Renan was the chief speaker. In the course of his\naddress he said:\n\n \u201cEvery year I used to come hither with my mother to visit\n my aunt P\u00e9rine, who loved me much, for she thought me like\n my father. Here on your rocks, and in your paths, I formed\n plans and dreamed dreams, of which I have realised a third\n or a quarter. That is much; I consider myself fortunate; I\n hold myself among the privileged ones of life. I have been\n more sad than now, for I feared I might die young (misfortune\n notably not arrived) and never produce what was in my mind.\n Oh certainly, could I live a long time yet, I would know what\n to do. I have schemes of work for three or four lives. I\n would write a history of the French Revolution, showing it an\n attack of fever, grand, strange, horrible, and sublime; the\n foundation, let us hope of something better. I would compose\n a history of Athens, almost day by day; also a history of\n science and freethought, telling by what steps man has come\n to know something of how the world is made; I would write a\n history of Brittany in six volumes. I would study Chinese,\n and review critically all the problems of Chinese history and\n literature. Of all that I would make nothing. There is a crowd\n of things I wish to know and shall never know. But why reproach\n nature for refusing me? Let us recognise what she has given\n us. I have traversed the world at an interesting moment in its\n development, and, after all, have seen enough. After my time\n humanity will do surprising things: I can rest content during\n eternity.\u201d\n\nThe happiness of this venerable author, conscious that his life is\nclosing, his work ended,\u2014a happiness not derived from any hope of future\nreward, or even existence,\u2014is a salient testimony of our time. In one of\nthese recent addresses Renan says: \u201cLet us die calmly, in the communion\nof humanity, the religion of the future.\u201d The dying Voltaire was fed with\na wafer, even while he ridiculed it. Renan partakes the communion of\nhumanity, the religion of the future. It may appear cold comfort to the\nsuperstitious, for they comprehend not that to such a man the communion\nof humanity implies an eternal life.\n\nIn one sense Renan lived not quite threescore years and ten; in another\nhe lived ages on ages. By his mastery of Eastern and Oriental languages\nand literatures, by his studies of ancient and modern systems, he had\nfamiliarly dwelt among primitive tribes, with them set up their sacred\ndolmens, knelt at their altars, travelled with their migrations in India,\nPersia, Egypt, Syria, shared their pilgrimages from lower to higher\nbeliefs, listened to their prophets, visited the home of Mary and\nJoseph, walked with the disciples, conversed with Jesus, witnessed the\ncrucifixion, journeyed through the middle ages, reached the Renaissance,\npassed through Protestantism, gathered every spiritual flower of the\nnineteenth century. Such long experience of the past, such knowledge\nof the attractions of humanity,\u2014predicting its fulfilments,\u2014carry the\nthinker equally far into the future. Knowing the angles of convergence in\ntime\u2019s rising pyramid, he can calculate the apex, and look down from it.\nHe is able to rejoice in realisations of ideals now mere tendencies. His\nimmortality is present. Such to Renan meant that communion of humanity,\ninto which he entered by patient studies, and by the devotion of his life\nto the spiritual essence of the world. And this vision sustained him in\nhis last hour.\n\nAnd let me here say, that Renan\u2019s optimism was not based in any belief\nin a superhuman providence, or any dynamic or compulsory destiny in\nnature. It was his faith in the heart and brain of man. In his last work\nhe reminds youth that their efforts at new abstractions and theologies\nare idle: the new notions will follow the old into extinction. \u201cDear\nchildren,\u201d he says\u2014\n\n \u201cDear children, it is useless to give yourself so much\n headache to reach only a change of error. Let us die calm,\n in the communion of humanity, the religion of the future.\n The existence of the world is assured for a long time. The\n future of science is guaranteed, for in the great scientific\n book everything adds itself and nothing is lost. Error is not\n deep; no error lasts long. Be tranquil. Before a thousand\n years, let us hope, the earth will find means to supply its\n exhausted coal, and, in some degree, its diminished virtue. The\n resources of humanity are infinite. Eternal works accomplish\n themselves without loss to the fountain of living forces, ever\n rising again to the surface. Science, above all, will continue\n to astonish us by its revelations, substituting the infinite\n of time and space for a poor creationism that can no longer\n satisfy the imagination of a child. Religion also is true to\n the infinite. When God shall be complete, he will be just. I am\n convinced that virtue will find itself one day clearly to have\n been the better part. The merit is in affirming duty against\n the apparent evidences. [As for the future] denying not,\n affirming not, let us hope. Let us keep a place at our funerals\n for the music and the incense.\u201d\n\nIt will be seen that Renan\u2019s deity is the brother of man\u2019s divinity.\nGod is as dependent on man as man on God. Natural evil is God\u2019s\nincompleteness: when man is complete God will be complete: there will be\nno more injustice.\n\nBut I must warn you that while this is the way in which Renan impresses\nme, he is not a man to be caught or held in any one theory. He is the\nmany-sided man of our time. When I heard his lectures in his college, two\nyears ago,\u2014his French was so clear and expressive that even a limping\nlistener could follow him tolerably,\u2014he impressed me as a sort of Buddha.\nBuddha is supposed by some to have got his large form by sitting so long\nin contemplation, by others his size is regarded as a protest against\nthe meagreness of ill-fed ascetics. The unfurrowed serenity of Buddha\u2019s\nface, his infantine smile, were those of Renan, also the remembered music\nof his voice. This association has been extended to Renan\u2019s spiritual\nnature by a letter of his to a friend, in his \u201cFeuilles D\u00e9tach\u00e9es.\u201d He\nis fascinated by the legends of Buddha and Krishna which describe them\nas multiplying themselves. When Buddha was born into this world, ten\nthousand women entreated to be his nurses, and Buddha multiplied himself\ninto ten thousand babies. Each woman believed that she alone had nursed\nthe true Buddha. In the legend of the god Krishna, he first appeared to\nsome shepherdesses who were dancing. The beautiful god multiplied himself\ninto as many forms as there were maidens, so that each believed, that she\nalone had danced with Krishna, and through life kept her heart sacred to\nhim. Writing of these legends, Renan says:\n\n \u201cThe ideal loses nothing by dividing itself: it is entire\n in each of its parts. We live that part of Krishna which we\n assimilate according to our genius. The ideal is for all\n partakers, like morsels modified to each taste. Each creates\n his divine dancer. One refinement I would introduce into\n the legend of Krishna, should I ever make it into a drama,\n or, better, a philosophic ballet: at the time when the\n shepherdesses believed they were singly dancing with Krishna,\n he should find that they were in reality dancing with different\n Krishnas. Each had made her Krishna to her fancy, and when\n they came to describe to each other their heavenly lover, they\n should find their visions in nowise alike; and nevertheless to\n each it was always Krishna.\u201d\n\nThe legend which thus charmed Renan has many correspondences in religious\nhistory; in Christianity, for instance, where we to-day find a hundred\nand fifty sects, each believing that it alone has the true Christ for\npartner. But it applies to all great personalities, and to all spiritual\ninfluences. The finest spirits frame no systems, found no schools. They\nare akin to the sun and rain which nourish and paint innumerable and\ndiverse growths. It was so with Emerson. Dean Stanley said that he heard\nmany different preachers in America, but their sermons were generally\nby Emerson. It was pre\u00ebminently the case with Renan. The Catholic, the\nProtestant, the idealist, the sceptic, the man of the world, the mystic,\nthe conservative, the radical, provided they are unsophisticated like\nthe shepherdesses, not champions of some sect or party, find that Renan\nhas spoken better for them than they can for themselves; he knows their\nsecret heart, is their partner by unbounded sympathies. Yet it is always\nthe same Renan, full and entire in each and all of his manifestations.\n\nSome time ago, when his friend Littr\u00e9, the Positivist, was buried by his\nfamily with Catholic rites, the aspersoir passed round the grave, and\ncame to Renan, who, like the rest, sprinkled holy water on the coffin.\nThere were cries of \u201cShame\u201d among the freethinkers present; but really it\nwas the act of a man less sectarian than themselves. The same tenderness\nthat could not wound the family parting for ever from their beloved, is\nvisible in the gentleness with which he treats old beliefs, when it is\na question of affection or sentiment, not of dogma and authority. They\nhave died out of his mind utterly; he sees the creeds already in their\ngraves; he no longer fears them, but is glad to soothe those who cling\nto their lifeless forms by speaking kindly of their virtues in the past.\nHis \u201cLife of Jesus\u201d is, in large part, a wreath of immortelles laid on\nthe tomb of a faith to him utterly dead,\u2014that is, faith in a supernatural\nChrist. He once told me of a little island on the coast of his native\nBrittany, from which some medieval saint was supposed to have driven\nmonstrous serpents, or worms. To that island the peasants still repair\nto get a little of the soil to use as a\u2014vermifuge. To similarly small\nsize had shrunk, in Renan\u2019s view, the greatest dogmas and superstitions\nof Christendom. Others might still compliment them with fear and wrath,\nbut Renan was tender to them because of their smallness. He was endlessly\ngood-natured with his ignorant opponents, from whom he often received\nwarning letters. Of one who wrote him simply the words, _Remember, there\nis a Hell_, he said that this monitor did not terrify him as much as he\nmay have supposed. He (Renan) would be rather glad to know for certain\nthat there was beyond the grave even a hell. And if he should go there\nhe felt certain that he would be able to address to the deity such\nsubtle arguments to prove that he ought not to remain there, but to be\ntransferred to paradise; (only he feared his exhorter\u2019s paradise would be\nvery dull,) that he would presently be released.\n\nOne purpose of the \u201cLife of Jesus\u201d has been mentioned, but that work had\nalso another and a higher aim. With a love like that of Mary Magdalene,\nin whose rapt vision Jesus rose from the tomb, to be transformed into\na supernatural Christ, Renan sought to raise out of the grave of that\nsupernatural Christ the human Jesus. He had travelled through Palestine,\nvisited every spot associated with the great teacher, and drew the most\nrealistic portraiture he could of the parents, home, friends, disciples,\nand daily life of Jesus. The outcry against that book was a confession\nby theology of its utter loss of the human personality of Jesus. There\nhad been a time when the religious heart loved to dwell on the sweet\nhumanities of Jesus. In the seventeenth century the poet, Thomas Dekker,\nwrote:\n\n \u201cThe best of men\n That e\u2019er wore earth about him was a sufferer;\n A soft, meek, patient, humble, tranquil spirit,\n The first true gentleman that ever breathed.\u201d\n\nAnd such remembrance of Jesus, in his life among the people, his\nfriendships, smiles and tears, are found in the sermons of Tillotson,\nSouth, Jeremy Taylor. But the descended God gradually consumed the\nhumanity. In the last century it became a heresy to consider Jesus as a\nman. The man was crucified on a cross of dogmas; he lay dead and buried\nunder a stony theology, until Renan rolled away the stone, raised him\nto life, clothed him with flesh and blood, invested him with beauty,\nand said once more to the Pharisee, the sceptic, the scoffer\u2014_Behold\nthe man!_ For writing that book,\u2014just after Strauss had shown the\nChrist of Christendom a mythological figure,\u2014the churches should have\nclasped Renan\u2019s knees. But for it they heaped him with abuse, declared\nthat Jewish bankers had bribed him to write it, drove him from his\nprofessorship of Hebrew, reduced him to poverty. The Pope denounced\nhim as \u201cThe European Blasphemer.\u201d He has been terribly avenged in his\nown country, where every educated man has abandoned the church. And he\nlived to see the Christianity of England striving to gain a new hold\non the people by following his brave gesture,\u2014rationalising away the\nsupernatural Christ, and exalting the humanity of Jesus as the sign of\nhis divinity. The criticism of that work is not at all so destructive\nas that of many who have written in the generation that has elapsed\nsince its appearance,\u2014of Dr. Martineau, for instance, on whom Oxford\nhas conferred a doctor\u2019s degree. Indeed, in reading Renan\u2019s \u201cLife of\nJesus\u201d now, one is surprised by its concessions. He accepts the four\nGospels as coming from the first century, a belief which even the learned\ntheologians have abandoned. Some newspaper has said that Renan borrowed\nfrom Strauss; on the contrary, the fault of the book is that it did not\nborrow from Strauss, and from English authors, who had proved that the\nGospels are all of the second century. That would have relieved him of\nthe necessity of apologising for Jesus in some matters of which Jesus\nnever heard, of which Paul in the first century knew nothing, as when he\nintimates that Jesus may have once lent himself to an amiable deception.\nNo miracle was ever ascribed to Jesus by any writer of his own century.\nIn several other respects Renan\u2019s \u201cLife of Jesus,\u201d on its negative side,\nis behind the advance of research and criticism. But those are small\ndetails compared with the spirit and general purpose of the work. In\nthis moment, when we are celebrating the discovery of a western world,\nwe may well pay homage to the scholar who rediscovered and exhumed an\neastern world, long buried under d\u00e9bris of mythology and rubbish of\nsuperstitions. This Renan has done in his series of works on the \u201cOrigins\nof Christianity,\u201d beginning with the \u201cLife of Jesus,\u201d dealing with the\n\u201cApostles,\u201d with \u201cSt. Paul,\u201d with \u201cAntichrist,\u201d and other studies,\nleading up to his \u201cHistory of the People of Israel.\u201d\n\nIn all these works there is not a line that is not interesting, alike\nto learned and unlearned. As some one has said, Renan could make Hebrew\nroots blossom with roses and lilies. But that super-fine art of his was\ncarrying the cause of intellectual and religious emancipation. For these\nworks concerned the constitution of Europe. This Great Britain, with all\nits physical freedom, is religiously a mere dependency of Judea. Here\nmen were formerly burnt, until lately imprisoned, and even now denied\nequal advantages, not in accordance with what Englishmen think, but\nwith the opinions of some ancient Jews. The voice of the Jews was the\nvoice of God. But Judea, like the Grand Llama, could rule only while\nveiled. Renan unveiled it. He did it all the more effectually because\nin the literary and philosophic spirit. All the ages of Judea, from the\nfirst tribal groups to the movement of John the Baptist and Jesus, are\nassigned their exact place as successive chapters of human history, the\nnatural origin of their mythology is explained, Jehovah takes his seat\nbeside Jupiter and Brahma, Jesus is revered with Buddha and Zoroaster;\nand all this is done, not by mere opinion, but by impregnable facts,\nunwearied researches, inflexible veracity. It was also done lovingly.\nA superstition can survive combat, but not explanation. Renan did much\nto remove Christianity from the field of militant camps to the quiet\nprovince of literary investigation. In the Republic of Letters there is\nno arbitrary authority. The combat is left to salvation armies,\u2014\u201ctheirs\nnot to reason why.\u201d\n\nThere is a large Renan literature. More than three hundred works\nrepresent the efforts of theology to get the resuscitated human Jesus\nback into his grave again. Renan\u2019s accessible life-work is represented\nby about twenty-five volumes, of which some are philosophic diversions\nwritten amid the heavy labours of his College, and while collecting\nand preserving for scholars the whole body of Semitic inscriptions.\nFor more than twenty years Renan has been training the young scholars\nof France\u2014those who are to fashion France in the future, and influence\nmankind. Those acquainted with his larger works can realise his immense\nservice in elevating the standard of criticism, and establishing the\nmethod of exact research and exact thought. But there are other works of\nRenan, notably his _Philosophic Dramas_, not yet translated, from which\nmay be better gathered the great variety of his ability, the poetic play\nof his genius, and the charm of his personality, which some of us have\npersonally felt, and which so won all hearts that even the priesthood\nhave not raised discordant notes in the homage and emotion with which\nhis nation has laid him in an honored grave.\n\nFarewell, great heart, and great leader! On your coffin I laid a wreath\nof immortelles for friendship, for the homage of America, and for the\nsake of this free English Society. For your victory is ours also: your\ntriumph is that of every independent mind on earth.\n\n MONCURE D. CONWAY.\n\n\n\n\nINTUITION AND REASON.\n\n\nThe question whether we act more frequently from intuition or reason,\nand the question that follows it, which faculty is the more noble\nguide to conduct, would have no more interest for the general public\nthan any other of the subjects which the metaphysician exercises his\ningenuity upon,\u2014than the question, for instance, whether we execute a\ngreater number of analytic or of synthetic judgments in the course of\nthe day,\u2014were it not that there is an ancient opinion to the effect that\nreason and intuition are marks respectively of the manner of working of\nmen\u2019s and of women\u2019s minds. The opinion is wholly unfounded, and could\nonly have had its origin at a time when the psychology of the working of\nthe human mind was thoroughly misunderstood. As the very terms in which\nthe opinion is expressed make plain, it dates from the period when it\nwas the custom to speak of the human mind as having a lot of separate\n\u201cfaculties\u201d under its control, and of calling up now one and now another\nof them to do its bidding. It is time that the belief in the different\nquality of men\u2019s and of women\u2019s minds should follow the whole antiquated\nmachinery of \u201cfaculties\u201d into the limbo of old and worn-out fashions of\nthought and of speech.\n\nThis illusion, however, like most of the illusions that have had a firm\nfoot-hold in their day, has a perfectly comprehensible reason for its\nexistence. It is not true that men\u2019s minds and women\u2019s minds have a\ndifferent way of working; but it is true that upon certain occasions\n(and by far, the greatest number of occasions) we all\u2014men, women, and\nnegroes alike\u2014act from intuition, and that the circumstances of women\u2019s\nlives have hitherto been such as to make their interests lie somewhat\nmore exclusively in those regions in which conduct is intuitive than in\nthose in which it is long thought out. It is not true that the Creator\nhas made two separate kinds of mind for men and for women; but it is true\nthat society, as at present constituted, offers two somewhat separate\n_fields of interest_ for men and for women, and that the nature of their\nconduct is of necessity determined by the character of the action which\nis demanded of them.\n\nWhat is the difference for the psychologist, between the mental state\nof a being who acts from reason, and of one who acts from intuition?\nIt is not a difference of the _kind of mind_ which controls him, but\nof the _kind of knowledge_ upon which his present conduct is based. If\none individual has got at his command a lot of general propositions\nbearing upon the case in hand, and if his familiarity with them is not\nsuch that they flow together without conscious effort, then he must\nlaboriously piece them together, and think out the conclusions which they\nnecessitate. If another individual, having led a different life, has had\na lot of experiences which cover just such cases as this, and if he has\nbeen taught by thousands of instances that under these circumstances a\ncertain course of conduct will nearly always lead to good results, then\nhe can trust to his hands or his feet to execute that course of conduct\nwithout a moment\u2019s aid from conscious reflection; he can go on with his\nnovel, or whatever other pleasant occupation engages his attention,\nwithout the wear and tear of mind which is involved in consciously\nthinking about the circumstances in question.\n\nNow the differences in the mental processes of men and women are exactly\nof this nature. They are differences dependent upon the fact that the\n_knowledge_ at their command\u2014that is, the stored up premises upon which\naction is based\u2014is, to a certain extent, of a different kind, and got\nfrom different sources. So far as the knowledge is not of a different\nkind, the character of the action is not of a different kind. There is\nan immense number of conclusions which men and women alike \u201cjump at,\u201d\nevery hour in the day; and some of them represent reasoning so fixedly\ninstinctive, that even the closest attention does not enable us to drag\nit up into the light of consciousness. How many people know that a\ncertain feeling of strain in the muscles which move the eyes is a sign of\na certain distance of an object looked at, and a different feeling of\nstrain, a sign of a different distance; and that when the eyes are fixed\nupon one point, objects in the lateral field of view are judged to be\nnearer or farther away than that point, according as the two disparate\nimages which they cast upon the two retinas are, the right-hand one or\nthe left hand one, the brighter? The common man _knows_ that one object\nis near and the other far, but he is not _conscious_ even of the feeling\nof strain, nor of the existence of double images; the physiological\npsychologist knows the unconscious syllogism by which he _must_ reach\nhis conclusion, but even he cannot, by any possibility, make it cease\nto be instinctive,\u2014that is, make himself conscious of its different\nsteps. On the other hand, no one, whether man or woman, can pass from\none proposition in geometry to another by a process which is in any\nsense unconscious, though one person may be obliged to give a much more\nstrained attention to what he is doing than another.\n\nNow it is very possible that a greater _number_ of the actions of women\nhave their ground in unconscious causes than of the actions of men.\nThe subjects upon which action is of vital concern to them have been\ndifferent subjects, and hence their stored-up stock of knowledge is\nknowledge about different subjects. To the woman of the past, who was to\na great extent confined to her own home, the temper of her house-mates\nwas what her happiness depended upon more than anything else in the\nworld. It was impossible that she should not acquire a keen intelligence\nin interpreting every slightest shade of expression upon the human face.\nBut this sort of knowledge is always instinctive, whether it is practised\nby men or by women. If the eyes of the most reasonable man in the world\nshould chance to show him a certain curve of the lip and a certain\nelevation of the posterior angle of the al\u00e6 of the nostrils on the face\nof the fair lady to whom he was talking, would he try to call to mind the\npictures in Sir Charles Bell\u2019s great work on expression and the general\ntheorems in Darwin\u2019s book on the same subject, and piecing this and that\nlaboriously together, would he try to arrive at some just conclusion\nregarding the contents of the fair lady\u2019s mind? Would he not, rather,\ninstinctively change the subject of conversation, or even discreetly\nbeat a retreat, long before he had time to _think_? Women\u2019s interests\nhave been so exclusively social that they have developed a sense for the\nphysical expression of emotion which makes society for them a matter of\ncomplicated relations, of delicate susceptibility to play of feeling,\nwhich\u2014except in the hyper-sensitive period of courtship\u2014is not common\namong men. But there are men who are quite the equals of women in this\nrespect; and if any man is markedly deficient in these qualities, we\nrecognise him as belonging to a low and brutal type which is in process\nof extinction. If a woman on the other hand, goes into business, she does\nnot fix the prices of her straw hats each morning in accordance with the\nfeelings which straw hats awaken in her when she first looks at them,\nbut in accordance with the fluctuations of the market. The President of\na New Hampshire Street Railway did not carry through her improvements by\nher intuitions, but by a plain, common-sense weighing of reasons. Nor are\nall masculine occupations under the guidance of the reasoning faculty. If\nyou go to a stove-man and ask him to mend your smoking chimney, does he\ndo it by reason? Not a bit of it! There may be stove-men who have enough\nknowledge of the laws which regulate the movements of masses of hot air\nto be able to apply general principles to particular instances, but in\nthe course of a long and checkered experience with stove-men, it has not\nbeen my lot to fall in with them. Their knowledge of chimneys, such as it\nis, is got by experience and applied by intuition, and nothing is farther\nfrom their minds than any trace of deductive reasoning. It is not that\nthere are men\u2019s minds and women\u2019s minds, but that there are theoretical\nsubjects and practical subjects, and that knowledge is not the same kind\nof knowledge in both.\n\nIntuition, in the sense in which it is used when discussing male and\nfemale minds, is a word of double meaning: it covers those actions\nwhich we go through with by instinct, or inherited experience ingrained\nfrom the beginning in our nervous structure, and those which we perform\nautomatically, or by individual experience become so familiar that\nit can act as a guide without the aid of conscious reflection. The\nrelative distances of objects looked at we know instinctively; the\ntrained musician with mind intent upon expression, reads his notes\nautomatically; the beginner at the piano goes through a painful process\nof syllogism before each key is struck. All is, at bottom, reason; in one\ncase it is conscious; in another it is unconscious, but can be forced\ninto consciousness; in another, it is unconscious and cannot by any\neffort be made conscious. Because a woman\u2019s interests lie more than a\nman\u2019s in regions in which thought is instinctive and automatic, it does\nnot follow that she has developed any peculiar powers of intuition. Nor\nis there any possibility that mothers should occasionally transmit their\npowers of intuition to favored sons, as Mr. Grant Allen, in the course of\nhis apotheosis of the uneducated woman, has somewhere suggested; some men\nhave poetic and \u00e6sthetic minds, and in regions of poetry and art mental\nactivity is largely of the instinctive kind. It is different with powers\nof reasoning. Good powers of reasoning may be transmitted from mother to\nson, but that is merely saying metaphorically that a good firm texture of\nmind may be transmitted. Hume and James Mill are two men who are supposed\nto owe much to their mothers, but their peculiar powers are not usually\nconsidered to lie in regions of intuition. No mother has ever produced an\nintuitive mathematician. Nor would any one who knew anything about the\nhigher mathematics for a moment suppose that when a great mathematician\nleaves out intermediate steps in a printed book, he had jumped at his\nconclusions by instinct. It is simply that, with his thorough knowledge\nof this particular subject, the intermediate steps have seemed to him too\neasy to set down. If his book is hard to read, it is simply because he\nhas assumed a greater amount of learning in his readers than they are in\npossession of.\n\nThe question whether intuition or reason is the nobler faculty is an\nexceedingly meaningless question. All knowledge which finds frequent\noccasion to be put in practice has a tendency to become first automatic\nand then instinctive. Human progress consists in making conscious\naction automatic as soon as it can be done with safety, and in setting\nfree consciousness to attend to more and more complicated combinations\nof circumstances. After the musician has learned to read his notes\nmechanically, shall we urge him to go back to the period of conscious\nlinking of note to key, because reason is a diviner gift than intuition?\nIs it desirable to turn the act of walking into a conscious fitting of\nmuscular tension to variations in the position of the centre of gravity\nin order to distinguish ourselves the more effectually from the brutes\nthat perish? Reason is merely intuition in its formative stage, and\nthe sooner all our present reasoned convictions become mechanical, and\nconscious thought is set free to bring in more and more far reaching\nconsiderations to bear upon our actions (including in that term our\nconclusions), the sooner will a higher form of life be reached.\n\nWundt\u2019s students have made some experiments in his laboratory in the\nlast two or three years, which throw a great deal of light upon this\nquestion,\u2014they have caught automatism in the very act of formation. It\nhas been noticed that different observers differed very much in the\nreaction time which they assigned to the several senses,\u2014that is, the\ntime required, for instance, to hear the tap of a bell, and to press a\nbutton in response. Wundt\u2019s students found that there are two different\nreaction times,\u2014in one, time is taken to bring the tap of the bell into\nthe focus of consciousness and to decide consciously what to do in\nresponse; in the other, the process is unconscious. The first is nearly\ntwice as long as the second, and both are very constant quantities, for\nthe same sense. The exact figures are, in seconds:\n\n FULL. SHORT.\n Sound .216 .127 N. Lange\n \u201d .235 .121 Belkin\n \u201d .230 .124 L. Lange\n Light .290 .172 L. Lange\n \u201d .291 .182 Martius\n\nIt may be inferred from this that, even in the simplest matters intuition\nis very nearly twice as valuable a \u201cfaculty\u201d as reason, as far as\neconomy of time is concerned. (It would be interesting to determine\nthe difference in fatigue.) But the interesting point is that the\nexperimenter can teach himself to give either reaction time at his\npleasure. If he thinks of his ears, he has a feeling of strain in them,\nand a long reaction time; if he directs his attention to his fingers (or\nif he thinks of indifferent matters) he is unconscious of what is going\non, and his reaction time is short. It is plain that the more of these\neducated brain-reflexes we can produce, the fuller and more complicated\nlives we shall be capable of carrying on. It may also be assumed that\nthe ideal human being is the one who has many brain-reflexes, but who\nis capable of bringing them all into consciousness upon occasion.\nConnections that we cannot make conscious are a frequent source of\nillusion. When we move the eye-ball about by the will, objects seem to\nremain stationary; but when, putting the finger on the under eyelid, we\npush the eye-ball up and down in the socket, we cannot help _perceiving_\nthat objects are moving up and down. Prof. William James suggests as\na good experiment that some one who has eyes that he is not afraid of\ninjuring should do this pushing several hours a day, and see if he cannot\nforce conscious reason to do her work and to make him _see_ that the\nobjects are not moving.\n\nFor perfectly regular circumstances,\u2014that is, for the world of nature\nor of human character so far as is governed by fixed laws,\u2014reflex\naction presents an immense economy of time and work. To provide against\nextraordinary emergencies, it would seem to be desirable that we\nshould have the power of interposing consciousness in the chain which\nbegins with stimulus and ends in action. Whenever a large number of\nconsiderations, or considerations of an abstract character, have to be\nweighed and balanced, then reason is the only sufficient guide.\n\nThat women have no deficiency in the power of putting this and that\ntogether, when _this_ and _that_ are pieces of knowledge which are in\ntheir possession, is absolutely proved by a single circumstance. Geometry\nis a branch of learning which is entirely built up out of abstract\nreason, pure and undefiled. Geometry is studied, in the United States, in\nhigh schools, and it must not be forgotten that there are in this country\n(according to the Report of the Bureau of Education) _three times_ as\nmany girls as boys who take the high school course. It cannot be said,\ntherefore, (as is said of girls who go to college) that the girls who go\nto the high school are a selected lot; they are the very bone and fibre\nof the women who make up the country. Now if women could not reason, we\nought to hear a great hue and cry from the teachers of the geometry\nclasses about the difficulty of teaching that subject to girls, and the\ngirls ought to lament and moan over the impossibility of getting safely\nthrough with their demonstrations. Is this the case? I have never met\nwith a teacher of geometry who thought his boys did better than his\ngirls,\u2014I have met with several who thought the reverse. As long ago as\n1865, Her Majesty\u2019s Inspector of schools, after travelling through this\ncountry, said: \u201cThe teachers all tell me that the girls do fully as well\nas the boys in mathematics,\u2014fully.\u201d Nor are any sad effects noticeable\nupon health or spirits. Day after day an army of girls goes smiling into\nthe class-room and comes smiling out, utterly unaware that an unnatural\nwrench has been given to their delicate minds, and that they are being\nrapidly transformed into monstrous products of over-reason.\n\nIf girls show no defect in reason in the class-room, neither do boys show\nany defect in intuition,\u2014in fact, their intuition about stretched strings\nand lines on balls are usually better than those of girls. I have kept\na record for many years of errors committed by boys and by girls, and I\nhave not been able to detect any difference in their character. It is\ntrue that it was a boy who once failed to get a problem in trigonometry\nfor a week, because it was not expressly stated in the book that the\nmilestones to which the problem related were a mile apart. My intimate\nacquaintance with the character of his mind prevented me, however, from\nattributing this failure in intuition to his superior reasoning powers.\n\nThe simple matter is that a good _mind_ has good reasons and good\nintuitions both. Both qualities are summed up in the expressive popular\nphrase, \u201chaving your wits about you.\u201d If you are in full possession of\nyour wits, you will trust to your instincts, when you must; to your\nacquired reflexes, when there is no sign of danger; and to your reason,\nwhen the question requires debate. It would be greatly for the good of\nthe race if the common virtues should become more instinctive in men;\nand if women should be put into a position in which they can reflect\nmore wisely upon the virtues which are only just in process of getting\nknown to be such. The only reason that women do not guide themselves by\nfar-reaching principles in their every-day conduct, is that they have\nnot made themselves acquainted with the doctrines of political economy\nand of abstract ethics. When women are in full possession of the higher\neducation, there is no danger that they will not put it into practice,\nso far as it leads to practice. The human mind is so constituted that\nit cannot help taking account of all its knowledge. Propositions merely\nlearned by rote, or the truth of which it is not absolutely convinced\nof, it may leave one side, but not what it really _knows_. Nor is\nthere any danger that woman will lose her powers of intuition. The\nknowledge and skill which she has acquired in social matters will not\ndesert her because she has made herself familiar with the speculations\nof philosophers, and can turn to them for guidance in the intricate\nquestions of conduct which the complexities of modern life give rise to.\nSo long as a woman\u2019s highest duty was to please her lord and master,\nher task was simple, but women are now awake to a sense of wider\nresponsibilities. They are now aware that it is their highest duty _to\nbe_ the best possible kind of a human being, and _to do_ whatever lies\nwithin their strength towards making the world the best possible kind of\na world to live in. For this end they have urgent need of _all_ the gifts\nthat God has given them; and he who would cripple their reason on the\nground that intuition is a pleasing and a poetic guide, would do them a\ngrievous wrong.\n\n CHRISTINE LADD FRANKLIN.\n\n\n\n\nCRUELTY AND PITY IN WOMAN.\n\n\nI.\n\nCRUELTY.\n\nSpencer says[24] that among savage nations the women are as perverse as\nthe men, and that if they do not work so much evil it is because they\nare less able to do so. This is not entirely true; doubtless women among\nsavages are much more inclined to cruelty than to pity, but, generally\nspeaking, woman even at the very beginnings of human evolution is less\ncruel than man.\n\n\nWOMAN AND WAR.\n\nWoman, even among savage nations, is rarely a warrior. In the Antilles,\nthe women watched over the safety of the islands whenever their husbands\nwent to war with the neighboring islands; they were brave, strong,\ncourageous, nearly equalling the men in their cleverness in handling\nweapons.[25] Amongst the ancient Bretons, armies were always commanded by\nwomen. In Dahomey, the \u00e9lite of the army is composed of a troop of six\nor seven thousand Amazons, who are very ferocious, particularly in the\nmutilation of dead bodies; women then become tigers, is a popular saying.\nAmong the ancient Scots, women followed the army, and cruelly mutilated\nthe prisoners. Among the Botocudos, when war breaks out between the\ntribes, the men fight the men with sticks, and the women fight the women,\nby scratching and by tearing the _botoques_ (cylinders of wood) from\ntheir ears and lips.[26] But these are all exceptional cases. Generally\nspeaking, the savage woman plays a secondary part in war; she acts as an\nauxiliary, picks up arrows, throws stones from a distance, and carries\nthe provisions etc.\n\n\nREVENGE.\n\nIt is above all in revenge, that feminine cruelty shows itself the most\nterrible. Man is capable of destroying whole families or nations, to\nsatisfy a particular revenge; but nothing equals the ingenuity of woman,\nin slowly tormenting her victim, in gloating over his sufferings and\nlengthening them out in order that her enjoyment of vengeance may endure\nas long as possible.\n\nIn Tasmania, when the _black war_ broke out between the English and the\naborigines, the Tasmanian women terribly tortured the prisoners, in order\nto avenge their companions who had been carried off by the English. We\nmust also attribute to the desire for vengeance, the torments inflicted\nby the women upon prisoners of war among the Red Indians.\n\nElizabeth of Russia, betrayed by her lover, obliged him to marry a\ndeformed dwarf, and to pass his wedding night in an ice palace, where\nthe furniture and the bed were all of ice. The next morning, attended by\nher Court, she went to present the newly wedded pair with a bouquet. She\nfound them, stretched out upon their bed of ice, nearly frozen. She then\nbanished her rival to Siberia first causing her ears and nose to be cut\noff.\n\nA wealthy Russian Prince, in love with a very beautiful peasant girl of\nfifteen, took her to live with him for five years; at the end of which\ntime, wishing to contract an alliance, he paid her a sum of money in\ndower and obliged her to marry a peasant. The young girl made no sign\nfor ten years, until the death of her husband; but after the lapse of\nthat period, a rising having taken place among the peasantry against the\nnobles, she excited them and led a body of peasants to the castle of her\nancient lover, had him taken and dragged into his _izba_, harnessed him\nto the plough instead of the oxen, and for three days obliged him thus\nto work, lashing him with the whip each time that he fell to the ground.\nAt night she led him to the stable and made him lie down with the oxen;\ncompelling him to eat fodder with the beasts and making merry over his\nsorry plight. This amusement lasted for three days, at the end of which\ntime, the man fell dead in one of the furrows he was ploughing.[27]\n\nA Russian, an idle and worthless fellow who had let his wife suffer\nhunger, proposed to her that she should be sold as a slave to the\nSultan. After some hesitation, she accepted and they started off; but\nwhen they had gone about half the way, the husband having fallen asleep\nintoxicated, the idea came into her mind to sell him for a slave, in her\nplace. She then tied him on the horse, started off again on the road and\narriving at the place of rendezvous, she delivered her husband to the\nmerchant, and remained to watch the Turk push the half-awakened man into\nthe boat, laughing whilst he showered blows upon him.[28]\n\nA young Russian peasant woman lived with a small land-owner, who betrayed\nher; at last she took refuge with a band of brigands, who treated her\nlike a queen. One day she caused two of them to capture her old lover,\nand had him brought to the camp where she used him as a kind of living\nfoot-stool: when she sat down she covered him with a carpet and put her\nfeet upon him, and when she wanted to go out she made him carry her on\nhis shoulders.\n\n\nCRUELTY TO THE HELPLESS.\n\nWoman sometimes displays the same amount of ingenuity in tormenting\nthe helpless creatures who may be in her power. I do not know, says\nBourgavel, any one more perfidious, immoral, or perverse than the New\nCaledonian woman. In certain portions of Australia women are mortal foes\nto each other. When the men wish to punish any one of them, they turn\nher over to her companions, who inflict upon her horrible tortures.[29]\nSitting on her body, they cut her flesh with sharpened stones.\n\nIn Tasmania, as amongst the ancient Saxons, the unfaithful wife was\npunished by her companions; she was not killed, but she was tortured for\na long time with sharp pointed stones or knives, in all parts of her body.\n\nWomen have often been cruel mistresses to their slaves. A lady in Guiana,\nbeing envious of a very handsome mulatto slave, had her branded on the\nmouth, cheeks and forehead. In the case of another slave, who was also\nvery beautiful, she had the tendon of Achilles cut thus causing her to\nbecome a deformed and crippled monster.[30]\n\nIt is a notorious fact that Roman and Greek ladies often inflicted most\nterrible punishments on their slaves, and that it was more particularly\ntowards the female slaves, the _ancill\u00e6_, that the cruelty of their\nmistresses was shown. The Roman ladies, if, while they were having their\nhair dressed, they were vexed with their attendants, used to thrust pins\ninto their arms and breasts. Darwin relates that at Rio Janeiro, an old\nlady possessed a kind of thumb screw which she had had made expressly to\ncrush the fingers of her slaves.\n\n\nEPIDEMIC CRUELTY.\n\nDuring periods of great national excitement, such as revolutions,\nfeminine cruelty shows how far it can go.\n\nThe women, writes M. Du Camp, were the fiercest heroines of the Commune;\nit was a woman who incited the assassination of the Dominicans. When the\nhostages were shot, they surpassed the men in cruelty; they taunted them\nwith not knowing how to kill. When employed to seek out the insurgents\nthey were implacable; when acting as infirmarians, they killed the\nwounded by giving them brandy to drink.\n\nAt the time of the French Revolution, on the days of execution, writes\nM. Legouv\u00e9,[31] the front rows nearest the guillotine were reserved\nfor the women of the political clubs. They even hung on to the boards\nof the scaffold, in order the better to witness the death throes of\nthe condemned, and drowned the cries of the victims by their peals of\nlaughter.\n\n\nII.\n\nPITY.\n\nBut again we find a series of contradictory facts, which bear witness\nthat the sentiment of pity also is much keener in woman than in man.\n\nEven with animals, we observe this phenomenon. Hens often separate two\nyoung cocks who are fighting together. Sir George Le Grand Jacob has\nobserved females of the wild goat (Steinbock) raise with their heads\nhe-goats that had been shot, support them and help them to escape.\nRomanes relates, that sometimes the female gibbon, takes great care of\nall the members of the troop when they are wounded, even if they are not\nrelated.[32]\n\nThe savage woman also is very often kind and good. It is notorious that\nthe explorers of savage countries have often escaped serious perils,\nthanks to the kindness of the native women. Australasian women have\noften revealed to European travellers the plots laid against them by\nthe men of their tribe: they have even risked their own lives for that\npurpose.[33] Stanley, at the island of Bambyrch, on the Nyanza, was\nroughly greeted by the natives, who were desirous of exterminating his\nexpedition; but a woman came to warn him and to advise him to perform\na certain ceremony with the King Shekka by which he would acquire his\nfriendship. In Senegambia an old woman, meeting Mungo Park, who was half\ndead of starvation and had just been despoiled by a negro king, gave\nhim food, and went away without waiting to be thanked. Another time the\nsame traveller, being left with nothing but his saddle, was hospitably\nentertained by some women, whom he heard chant these words as he fell\nasleep: \u201cThe winds roared and the rain beat, the poor white man came\nand sat down under our tree, he had no mother to give him milk, no wife\nto grind him corn. Let us take pity on the white man, he has no mother,\netc., etc.\u201d[34] Michelet says that woman was the first physician;\nand certainly she fulfils the office of infirmarian among many savage\npeoples, the Esquimaux, the Mincopies, etc. etc.\n\nIn war the Samoan woman often interferes to make peace between the\nbelligerents. Among the Khonds, also, when two tribes quarrel, the women\nsometimes make peace, calling in the intervention of a third tribe.\nQuite recently, among the Montenegrins and Albanians, fierce strife\nbroke out between different families, but in these fights, if a man took\nrefuge with a woman and she covered him with her apron, he was safe.\nAmong the Bedouin Arabs a woman can save the life of the condemned man\nwho implores her protection. So it also was among the Roman Vestals,\nwhen in the streets they accidentally met a man condemned to death; it\nwas required, however, that the meeting should be evidently a chance\none, for it was feared that the privilege might be carried too far.\nAmong civilised nations this sentiment of pity becomes naturally more\ndeveloped. Christianity owed a great deal of its success among women\nto the fact, that it knew how to make use of their pity, by organising\nthose associations of women which are its greatest ornament. From the\nearliest years after the death of Jesus, in the cenobitic form of society\nlived by the disciples of the Messiah, they made use of the charitable\nsentiment of childless widows and created the order of Deaconesses, which\nwas devoted to the care of the poor and the sick.[35] Legouv\u00e9 says:\n\u201cWomen offered their services to Christianity like a volunteer battalion\nconsecrated to charitable work. In the Apostles\u2019 time their mission was\none of sympathy and watchfulness, a mother\u2019s vocation; in the time of the\nMartyrs they remained womanly in their modesty, while exhibiting a manly\ncourage; in the time of the Doctors, whilst orators speak and learned men\nwrite, women continue to love and console.\u201d[36]\n\nThis Christian tradition has survived and is still powerful, thanks to\nthe deeply laid sentiment of pity in the heart of woman. \u201cPrivate charity\nin Paris,\u201d writes M. du Camp,[37] \u201cis almost entirely in the hands of\nwomen. There are in Paris women of the world, young and beautiful, born\nfor pleasure, accustomed to every luxury, who visit the poor, nurse\nthe sick, rock little motherless children, and all this they do simply\nwithout a word of self-praise.\u201d\n\nThe society of \u201cLes Dames du Calvaire,\u201d in Paris, is composed of widows,\nwho, without binding themselves by religious vows, engage to nurse the\nsick gathered into the hospitals of the association, poor outcasts\nattacked by loathsome diseases\u2014cancer, for example. Women of wealth and\nbelonging to great families often obtain admission to this society.\nFemale religious orders are rarely contemplative; they are nearly always\ncharitable in aim. \u201cThe Daughters of Charity\u201d possess establishments all\nover the known world; they migrate, says M. du Camp, \u201clike benevolent\nbirds, carrying with them the principle of self-sacrifice and the love\nof those that suffer. In all countries I have visited, among sects most\nantagonistic to their religion, I have beheld them at work; their faces\nshadowed by the immense cap, which resembles the wings of a white swan;\ninstructing children, visiting the sick, caring for the plague-stricken,\nblessed by our sailors whom they nurse in the French hospitals in foreign\nlands.\u201d[38]\n\nPity in woman is sometimes so powerful a sentiment that it supplies the\nplace in her of a higher faculty, intelligence. It was thus that a humble\nservant-maid, without learning, who could neither read nor write, founded\none of the most prominent nursing sisterhoods in France, \u201cLes petites\nSoeurs des Pauvres,\u201d which to-day numbers 3,400 sisters, and possesses\n207 houses, where more than 25,000 old men are received and cared for.\nIn the first half of this century there was such misery in Brittany that\nthe old men were literally abandoned by all. Jeanne Jugau, whose earnings\nhardly sufficed to maintain herself, took in one, then two, then a number\nof them, without a thought of her own poverty, slaving might and main for\ntheir support. Two women, Virginie Tredaniel and Marie Catherine, helped\nher; a priest, Le Pailleur, took the direction of their work, and in a\nshort time the order was founded, and grew apace. There, where genius\nmight have failed, the love and pity of a servant-maid succeeded.\n\nAnother heroine of charity, though of a different type, was Jeanne\nGarnier. She was perpetually haunted by a desire to do good, to help\nand succour the unfortunate. M. du Camp has portrayed her character\nin a most graphic manner: impulsive, prone from childhood to adopt\nextreme measures, while in the convent she was given to rebellious and\nuntractable conduct, for which she was sent away. When she was twenty\nyears old she married; the love she bore her husband and two sons was\ndeep and ardent. Three years after her marriage she had the unspeakable\ngrief of losing both husband and sons at one fell stroke. After this\noccurrence her life had but one aim, ceaselessly and untiringly to\nsuccour and help the sorrowful. One day she was told that a woman,\ndisfigured by a cutaneous disease, was lying in an attic in Lyons,\nabandoned by every one. She went at once to her, ministered to her, and\nevery day went to wash her sores. Thus was suggested to her the founding\nof the association of \u201cLes Dames du Calvaire,\u201d of which we have already\nspoken, and the idea of pressing into the service of the sick, widows\nwho found themselves in the same position as herself. She was not rich,\nbut being an untiring and determined worker, capable of attacking the\nsame person ten times a day, she obtained money. When they had to convey\nthe sick to the new hospital, there was among them one woman so horribly\ndisfigured by burns that no conveyance could be found whose driver was\nwilling to take her. Jeanne Garnier then took her on her own shoulders\nand carried her there herself. The association of \u201cLes Dames du Calvaire\u201d\nwas not the only charitable work which owes its existence to her. She\nconceived a great many other plans, of which many were carried out, for\nshe never ceased working, up to the moment of her death, which occurred\nat forty-two years of age, of exhaustion.\n\nIn the United States, where woman enjoys much greater freedom than\nin Europe, she makes an excellent use of her liberty. In fact, all\nassociations of women have a charitable end in view; and these societies\nnot being subjected to the severe rules of Catholic religious orders,\nand not requiring from their members so absolute a renunciation of the\npleasures of life, exhibit the most perfect and most modern form of\ncharitable associations, which have been known up to the present day. The\nfirst woman\u2019s club that was founded in that country, the Sorosis, has for\nits object the amelioration of the condition of shop-girls: it has also\nfounded asylums for homeless children. The Temperance Union, founded by\nwomen, seeks to stem the tide of intemperance. The Women\u2019s League has\nobtained the admission of women on commissioners boards for schools and\nhospitals. The College Settlement Girls, composed of female graduates\nfrom universities, carry help into the purlieus of the city.[39]\n\n\nCRUELTY, PITY, AND THE MATERNAL SENTIMENT.\n\nIs woman kind or cruel? Can we reconcile these two series of facts, so\ncontradictory in themselves? That is the question which now comes before\nus. Let us seek, first of all, the origin and the genesis of feminine\ncruelty. We have seen women exhibiting great ingenuity in torturing; she\ndoes not wish to destroy her enemies, but to torment and torture them;\nshe seeks to protract their pain as long as possible, and to lengthen\nout her enjoyment of vengeance. On this point woman goes much further\nthan man: for among savages men do not amuse themselves by prolonging the\nmiseries of their enemies; they rather wreak their vengeance by killing\nthem at one stroke. Savages often make a wholesale carnage, massacring\nwhole tribes and nations. But it is always the woman who practices the\nart of killing a man by inches, over a slow fire, as it were. Thus we\nfind that the redskins give their prisoners of war over to their women.\nNotice, even at the present day, the difference between the quarrels of\nmen and women. Women scratch each other, tear out the hair, fly at the\neyes of their adversaries, trying to inflict some painful wound: men\ngive blows and stabs; they strive to disable or stun their enemy, or to\ndestroy him. There is the same difference but on a smaller scale. This\naptitude in inflicting pain is an outgrowth of weakness. We know from\nthe Darwinian theory of natural selection, and from the struggle for\nlife, that every living being must be provided with a certain number of\nmeans of defense and offense, and amongst these means must be classed\nmany instincts and sentiments which spring from natural selection,\nadaptation, and heredity. The cruelty of woman is one of these instincts\nand sentiments. Woman not being powerful enough to destroy her enemies,\nhad to seek for the means of defending herself, by wounding their more\ndelicate organs, by inflicting such acute pain as would serve to disable\nthem. This tendency to protect one\u2019s self by such means has become\ninstinctive by heredity; and so much the more since the woman who was\nable thus to defend herself, had at the outset of man\u2019s evolution a far\nbetter chance of survival.\n\nAll this is so true, that we find other weak creatures also to be cruel.\nChildren take pleasure in tormenting insects, birds, or little dogs, and\nare very cruel to each other. I knew a child who used to cut his nails\nlike the teeth of a saw, in order to inflict more painful scratches on\nhis companions. Humming birds, says Brehm, are the smallest and the\ncruelest of birds. When they are attacked by a more powerful enemy they\ntry to peck out his eyes with their long, sharp beaks. The struggle for\nlife and natural selection has provided their weakness with this means of\ndefense, and they are even cruel to each other when they fight, to such\nan extent has the sentiment of cruelty in them become instinctive.\n\nAnd now we must seek for the genesis of the other phenomenon, pity. It\nis a notorious fact, that maternity being the great function of woman,\nthrough the whole order of animal life, with the exception of some few\nfishes, it is always the female who is thus the benefactress of the race.\nMaternity is always an altruistic function; in the inferior orders this\naltruism is a purely physical act, and consists merely in a material\nsacrifice; (the detaching of a portion of the maternal body, under\nthe form of bud, or egg;) in the higher orders, this altruism becomes\npsychical and consists in a conscious sacrifice of self and of vitality\nin the interests of the race.\n\nWhat then is the essential nature of these altruistic sacrifices?\nMaternity is protection given to weakness; for the infant is above all\nother created things a being requiring succour.\n\nIt is thus that, the images relating to the state of weakness being in\ngreat numbers strongly impressed on the mind of woman, when one of them\npresents itself to her, by the law of association it awakens all those\nmaternal sentiments whose function it is to help the weak. At first,\nmotherhood only extends from a woman\u2019s own children to those of others;\nthis is the first stage of pity, such as we find it in the animals and\namong many undeveloped savage peoples. Afterwards in a region of higher\npsychical development the sentiment of pity broadens till it embraces a\nwider group, the sick, the aged, those condemned to death; for all those\nunfortunates who claim the pity of woman are the weak appealing for help\nto the strong. It is only the weak who can inspire pity. Thus pity, in\nwoman, is but the outgrowth of the maternal sentiment applied to a larger\nclass of helpless people. \u201cWoman,\u201d says M. du Camp, \u201cmay bind herself\nby the religious vow of chastity; but she is a born mother and remains\na mother, even though circumstances may have broken the physical law of\nher sex. The Little Sisters of the Poor, call their pensioners \u2018the good\nlittle old men,\u2019 and themselves \u2018the good little sisters,\u2019 their superior\n\u2018the good little mother.\u2019 With them everybody is good and little; all\nthese expressions are the reflection of maternal love.\u201d\n\nWe must mention also, that one cause of a livelier sense of pity in\nwoman, is her own weakness and her lower intellect. \u201cAnger,\u201d writes A.\nBain, \u201cthe passion for war, are bound up with activity and strength;\nconditions of weakness and of repose are favorable to the softer\nsentiments.\u201d Strong men who display great muscular or mental activity,\nand who often experience the satisfactions arising from power, only\nrealise with extreme difficulty the feelings of the weak; for, as H.\nSpencer remarks,[40] \u201cto feel pity for any suffering which we witness,\nwe must have experienced it ourselves to the same extent or in an\napproximate degree.\u201d Thus healthy persons become, after a serious\nsickness, more feeling than they formerly were for those who are\nsuffering; women are continually in a state of ill-health.\n\nBesides which women have not been involved in the struggle for life,\nas have men during the whole process of evolution: this struggle for\nlife implying, as it does, the necessity of pursuing one\u2019s own object\nirrespective of the ills which it may entail on the unhappy competitors,\nand often rendering a man insensible to the sorrows of those around him.\nTo this we add, that love for man has not been without influence in\ndeveloping the sense of pity in woman. The main characteristic of the\nlove of woman towards man, is self-abnegation and devotion; woman finds\nher happiness in devotion to the man she loves and in making for him\nthe most painful sacrifices. Read the \u201cLetters of Heloise,\u201d the \u201cLife\nof Carlyle,\u201d or the \u201cLife of Mme. de Lespinasse.\u201d Each woman, carries\nhidden in her heart, an inexhaustible treasure of devotion which heredity\nhas added to through all the centuries, during which woman has lived in\ncontact with man and sought to win his good-will, displaying an affection\nand an ardent zeal in his behalf; nothing then is easier than to spend\nthis treasure on the unhappy, when she has not found the man on whom to\nlavish it.\n\nThe close relationship between pity, maternity, and love, is also shown\nby this fact, that the heroines of charity are almost always widows\nwithout sons, or unmarried women. When a woman has a husband or sons\nto love and cherish, she does not feel the same tenderness towards\nthe suffering; this goes to prove that if these two sentiments are\ninterchangeable, they are but two different forms of the same thing.\n\n\nPITY AND CRUELTY.\n\nWe are now in a position to answer the question: Is woman kind or cruel?\nPity and cruelty coexist together in her; we might call this state in\nwoman a state of unstable equilibrium; to-day she is kind, divinely\ngood, charitable; to-morrow she will be perverse and cruel. On one side\nher feebleness renders her cruel, and her impulsive nature prevents her\nfrom repressing the outbursts of anger and of vengeance; on the other\nhand, the gentle habits of maternal affection, her lower intelligence,\nand even the weakness of her nature develop in her kindly sentiments.\nWoman may experience the strongest feelings of maternal affection at the\nsight of a helpless creature; but that will not prevent her from cruelly\npersecuting a rival, especially if she has been wounded in her sentiments\nof wife or mother. Thus woman, who is the natural protector of the weak,\ntreats them oftentimes with a cruelty of which man is totally incapable.\nWoman loves, hates, consoles, inflicts pain, according as she finds\nherself in the presence of a friend, an enemy, a helpless being, or of a\nrival.\n\nMany of the fiercest heroines of the Paris Commune, had been trained\nnurses during the war, and distinguished for their devotion to the sick.\nThere is nothing astonishing in this, for contradiction in feeling is so\noften a psychical law that a great Italian philosopher, Robert Ardig\u00f2,\nhas said that man is not a logical being.\n\nWe have noticed before that weakness is in part the cause of cruelty and\npartly also of pity, and this accounts for the co-existence of the two\ncontrary sentiments. They coexist because they have a common origin.\nBut this instability of equilibrium is lessened by evolution, and pity\nbecomes stronger than cruelty. Among civilised nations the cruelty of\nwomen has become merely a moral attitude: the civilised woman, less\npowerful than her savage sister, no more subjects her enemies to physical\npain, does not shed their blood; she contents herself with slandering\nthem, turning them into ridicule, and humiliating them. The diminution\nof muscular strength is in itself favorable to the softening of female\ncharacter.\n\nFurthermore, sexual selection also helps in this; in the human race\nas civilisation advances the male assumes more and more the right of\nselection, and man shrinks instinctively from meeting in a woman a high\ndevelopment of the qualities which he himself possesses, for he wishes\nto dominate her and to be her superior. This explains to us the singular\nfact, which we notice every day, that of a _savant_ marrying a stupid\nor unintelligent wife; this is why the normal man, as also the vicious,\nchoose gentle and good women when they desire to found families. If\nsometimes the choice falls on a wicked woman, it is because the man\ndesires to form a criminal co-partnership, such as was perhaps the normal\ncondition of family life during the early days of human evolution. Many\nof the domestic tragedies which we witness to-day can be traced to no\nother cause than this _penchant_ of the male, even of the vicious, to\nchoose the woman who appears to be the most gentle. Women with their\nclear penetration and sure instincts have seized upon this inclination\nin man and made capital out of it with infinite ability: do we not see\nmany young women simulate a gentleness, a sweetness, and kindness which\nthey do not naturally possess in order to capture the good-will of men?\nWomen have thus practised the habit of repressing their evil _penchants_,\nthrough interested motives, because they saw that men chose the most\ngentle among them as wives.\n\nBesides sexual selection, physical grace plays a conspicuous part, as\nwell as those psychical qualities which are associated with it. Man\nhaving set a high value on graceful demeanour, woman sought and still\nseeks with all her strength to adorn herself with it.\n\nWe know that by the law of association between the emotional states and\ntheir outward expression, which mutually correspond, each gesture, each\nattitude, and each graceful expression of the countenance has a tendency\nto throw the mind into some sweet and peaceful condition; this is why the\nculture of physical grace has been for woman an exercise of goodness.\nThis fostering of physical beauty has had a beneficial influence on her\nmoral character. We might say that as woman grew in beauty, she became\nbetter. Finally woman being in the present day more respected than in\nformer times, she has less often the occasion to exercise her instinctive\ncruelty, which on this account is being gradually obliterated. Pity each\nday becomes more and more the normal state of the feminine mind, and\ncruelty the exception. In order to be cruel, a woman\u2019s character must\nbe perverted, as is the case in female criminals, whose vice exceeds\nthat of man in similar circumstances. Or she must have received some\ndeep provocation, wounding her profoundly in her deepest and tenderest\nsentiments, which has awakened the original cruelty slumbering latent in\nthe depths of her heart.\n\nWe may thus predict that in the ages to come, woman will become entirely\ngood.\n\n GUILLAUME FERRERO.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[24] Spencer. _Principles of Sociology_, II., p. 361.\n\n[25] Irving. _Hist. of the Life and Voyages of Chris. Columbus_, II., p.\n15.\n\n[26] Hovelacque. _Les d\u00e9buts de l\u2019humanit\u00e9_.\n\n[27] Sacher-Masoch. _Rev. des Deux Mondes._\n\n[28] Sacher-Masoch. Ibid.\n\n[29] Letourneau. _Evolution de la Morale_, p. 122.\n\n[30] Mantegazza. _Fisiologia etc._ Milan. 1889.\n\n[31] _Histoire morale des femmes._\n\n[32] Romanes. _Animal Intelligence_, Vol. II.\n\n[33] Hovelacque. _Op. cit._\n\n[34] Letourneau. _La Sociologie d\u2019apr\u00e8s l\u2019ethnographie._ Paris, 1884.\n\n[35] Renan. _Les Ap\u00f4tres._\n\n[36] Op. cit.\n\n[37] _La charit\u00e9 priv\u00e9e \u00e0 Paris_, 1887.\n\n[38] Op. cit.\n\n[39] _The Forum._ 1891.\n\n[40] Spencer. _Principles of Psychology_, II, p. 648.\n\n\n\n\nPANPSYCHISM AND PANBIOTISM.\n\n\nI. PROFESSOR HAECKEL\u2019S PANPSYCHISM.\n\nProfessor Haeckel, in his article \u201cOur Monism,\u201d[41] propounds the theory\nof Panpsychism, which he considers as an essential feature of Monism. He\nsays:\n\n \u201cOne highly important principle of my monism seems to me to be\n that I regard _all_ matter as _ensouled_, that is to say, as\n endowed with feeling (pleasure and pain) and with motion, or,\n better, with the power of motion. As elementary (atomistic)\n attraction and repulsion these powers are asserted in every\n simplest chemical process, and on them is based also every\n other phenomenon, consequently also the highest developed\n soul-activity of man.\n\n \u201cSimplest example: sulphur and quicksilver rubbed together form\n cinnabar, a new body of entirely different properties. This is\n possible only on the supposition that the molecules (or atoms)\n of the two elements if brought within the proper distance,\n mutually _feel_ each other, by attraction move toward each\n other; on the decomposition of a simple chemical compound the\n contrary takes place: repulsion. (Empedocles\u2019s doctrine of \u2018the\n love and hatred of atoms.\u2019)\u201d\n\nNot being able to accept Professor Haeckel\u2019s doctrine of Panpsychism, I\npropose what might best be called Panbiotism, briefly set forth in the\nmaxim \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b2\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd; that is, everything is fraught with life; it contains\nlife; it has the ability to live.\n\nThe word \u03b2\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 is mostly used by Greek authors in the negative, as in\nthe phrase \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b2\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd, an unlivable life, in the sense of a life\nunendurable or not worth living. Thus Sophocles and others. The word\n\u03b2\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 is embodied in the term Panbiotism in its etymological sense of\n\u201clivable.\u201d\n\nI am willing to concede to Professor Haeckel that all nature is alive.\nIndeed, I have most emphatically insisted on the doctrine that there is\na spontaneity pervading all nature. (See \u201cFundamental Problems,\u201d 2d ed.,\npp. 110 et seqq.)\n\nBy spontaneity is to be understood that kind of activity which springs\nfrom the nature of the being or thing which is active. A motion that is\ncaused by pressure or push is not spontaneous; but a motion, the motive\npower of which resides in the moving object, is spontaneous. Thus a cart\nrolling down a hill by its own weight performs a spontaneous motion,\nbut when drawn by horses moves, or rather is moved, by pull without any\nspontaneity.[42] Now everything that exists is possessed of certain\nqualities; its existence is of some definite, peculiar kind, and this\nits peculiar kind is the character of the thing. In the character of\na thing lies the source of its spontaneous actions. The spontaneous\nactions of the chemical elements depend upon their qualities, which\nalways react under certain circumstances in a definite way, and under the\nsame conditions in the same way. The action of sulphur and quicksilver\nlies in the nature of these elements. Their union is not passive, but\nactive. They _are_ not combined, but they _do_ combine. He who observes\nand studies nature cannot be blind to the fact that an inalienable,\nintrinsic power is resident in every thing that exists. This is true not\nonly of organised life, but also of the chemical elements as well as of\ngravitating masses. The motion of a falling stone can, no more than the\nactions of oxydising substances, be considered as ultimately due to an\nextraneous pressure that makes them move by push, or to a _vis a tergo_\nacting upon inert matter. These motions must be spontaneous; they are due\nto powers inherent in the nature of reality. They are self-motions, and\nin this sense we say that all nature is alive.\n\nThe term \u201clife\u201d is here used in a broader sense than ordinarily. It means\nspontaneity or self-motion, while in its common signification the term\n\u201clife\u201d is restricted only to the spontaneous action of organised beings,\ni. e. of plants and animals. In order to distinguish life in the broader\nsense from the narrower or common acceptance of the term, we call the\nlatter \u201corganised life.\u201d\n\nIt is not impossible, and I consider it even as most probable, that the\ndifference between Professor Haeckel and myself rests on a different\nusage of the term soul. But a vague or inconsistent usage of the term,\nunless we are especially careful in so defining it as to prevent\nmisunderstandings, will inevitably beget errors. Thus the doctrine of\nPanpsychism is liable to lead to fantastic ideas, and to cause great\nconfusion concerning the activity of what is generally called inanimate\nnature.\n\nSoul (as I understand the term) is a system of sentient symbols.\n\nThe problem of the origin of the soul is solved as soon as we understand\nhow feelings can acquire meaning.\n\nSuppose we have some sentient substance exposed to the impressions of the\nsurrounding world. The sense-impressions of the surrounding world leave\ntraces in the sentient substance; these traces, which are structures of\na certain form corresponding exactly to the various impressions, are\npreserved and constitute a predisposition to being very easily revived\nby impressions of the same kind. The revival of feeling in traces left\nin the sentient structure from former impressions is called memory. If a\nnew impression of the same kind as the traces of the former impressions\naffects a sentient being, the new impression already finds a convenient\npath for its reception prepared. Its peculiar vibration fits in the old\ntrace and thus runs along very easily in the memory-grooves of former\nimpressions, reviving at the same time the feelings perceived at their\noriginal formation. The feeling thus caused is composed of several\nelements, which naturally melt into one: first, there is that kind of\nfeeling which is produced by the present impression; secondly, there is\nthe revival of former feelings or memory-sensations; and thirdly, there\nis a feeling of congruence resulting from the combination of these two.\nThis third element is a new and a very important feature. We suppose that\nit is extremely insignificant in the beginning, but being a constantly\ngrowing factor, it rapidly increases in importance. The stronger and the\nmore independent the memory-structures become, the more clearly will\ntheir congruence with fresh sense-impressions be felt as a congruence.\n\nThis feeling of congruence is the simplest form of what psychologists\ngenerally call \u201crecognition.\u201d\n\nThe recognition of a sense-impression, as being the same as some former\nsense-impression, adds to the feeling a new quality; it imparts meaning\nto it. This feeling of a special kind will now stand for something. In\nthis way impressions upon sentient substance will, in the course of\ntheir natural development, simply by the repetition of similar and same\nimpressions, come to indicate the presence of certain conditions that\ncause the impression. This act of indicating something, of symbolising\nthe presence of a reality, of possessing meaning, is the birth of soul.\nSense-impressions that have acquired meaning are called sensations. A\nsensation standing for a special object symbolises that object. Abstract\nideas are symbols of a higher degree, but they remain symbols just the\nsame. And it is the sentient symbols which constitute the soul.\n\nThose actions which are regulated by the meanings of sentient symbols of\nwhich a soul consists should alone, according to a strict terminology,\nbe called \u201cpsychical.\u201d The falling stone, the chemical elements, when\ncombining or separating, etc., are alive; there is a spontaneously acting\npower even in unorganised nature; but the actions of unorganised nature\nare not determined by the meaning of feelings, and, in truth, we have\nno reason to believe that their feelings\u2014granting that they really do\npossess feelings of some kind\u2014are freighted with even so much as the\nslightest inkling of significance. In a word, there is no soul in the\nstone; there is no mind in the water-fall; and there is nothing psychical\nin either oxygen or hydrogen. But there is soul wherever meaning can be\nfound as the regulating motive of actions; there is purpose. And wherever\npurpose is, there is mind.\n\n\nII. PLEASURE AND PAIN.\n\nProfessor Haeckel goes still farther in the application of his theory\nof Panpsychism: he speaks of the atoms not only as feeling each other,\nbut also as having pleasure and pain. This indicates either that he\nis serious in his belief in the psychical nature of all things, or it\nproves how dangerous it is to introduce an allegorical expression the\nallegorical character of which is from the beginning lost sight of.\n\nWhat are pleasure and pain?\n\nPleasure and pain are known to us by experience; they are feelings.\nPleasure is an agreeable, pain a disagreeable feeling.\n\nPleasure and pain are different from sensation. Sensations are\nrepresentative of certain somethings called objects. Pleasures and pains,\nhowever, are not representative, they are purely subjective states.\nThere may be pleasurable or painful sensations, and there may be pain\nindicating the presence of pain-producing objects, but that does not\nconcern us now. When speaking of pleasure and pain we do not refer to\nthe representative value of feelings, but consider a merely subjective\naspect, pleasure being the agreeableness, pain the disagreeableness of\nfeeling.\n\nAccordingly pleasure and pain presuppose the existence of an organised\nsystem of feelings. An isolated feeling, we have learned, is meaningless;\nit is still less pleasurable or painful. In order to agree or disagree,\nthere must be something with which to agree or disagree. Therefore,\nalthough pleasure and pain are not symbols indicative of some objective\npresence, they can take place only in sentient organisms, in systems of\nfeelings, in souls. Where these complex conditions, indicative of the\npresence of a soul, are absent, we have no right to speak of the presence\nof pleasure and pain.\n\nWe cannot interpret the phenomena of unorganised nature as being endowed\nwith feelings of pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain are psychical\nphenomena, and psychical phenomena can take place in souls only.\n\nWe might as well speak of the presence of positive and negative\nelectricity in the cataract, the water-power of which is employed\nto produce electricity. Electricity is, in such a case, transformed\nwater-power; but can we, for that reason, say that the motion of water is\neither positive or negative electricity?\n\nAll the motions of the objective world must be supposed to have their\nsubjective correlates; but the simplest forms of objective phenomena\ncannot have those subjective correlates which, according to our\nexperience, appear and have their conditions of appearance only in the\nmost complex and highest developed forms of existence\u2014in organised nature.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe physiological conditions of pleasure and pain are now just beginning\nto be investigated (see Goldscheider\u2019s article in Dubois-Reymond\u2019s\n_Archiv_, 1891), and most philosophical theories concerning the nature\nof pleasure and pain are mere assumptions. Almost all the views that are\nnow current attempt an explanation by generalising the idea of pleasure\nand pain so as to regard the feelings of pleasure and pain as a universal\nfeature of nature. This vicious method of generalisation at the cost\nof discrimination has produced much confusion in the world; and its\ninfluence is the more pernicious as average minds are easily satisfied\nwith generalities.\n\nNow, the theory of making pleasure and pain universal features of\nexistence is a palpably erroneous theory; it is a wrong generalisation.\nIt is true that sentient beings naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain.\nBut are we allowed, according to the laws of logic, to transfer the\nspecial feature of the case to the whole class of all processes where a\nseeking and an avoiding can be observed? Certainly not. Because sentient\nbeings are repelled by pain and attracted by pleasure, we cannot say\nthat every repulsion is due to pain and that every attraction is due to\npleasure.\n\nThe theory according to which pleasure and pain alone are the causes of\nattraction and repulsion we may fairly consider as a poetical license\njustifiable within certain narrow limits, and actually justified in so\nfar as there is in every natural process some peculiar feature that is\nanalogous to the feelings of sentient beings. This peculiar feature\u2014viz.\nits subjectivity\u2014is, as we have seen, not visible, not observable; yet it\nexists: it is that something which in the course of evolution becomes, in\nspecial combinations, first feeling and then consciousness. But for that\nreason it is not as yet either consciousness or feeling.\n\nWhile on the one hand the theories of pleasure and pain that regard\npleasure and pain as universal features of natural phenomena, are\narrived at by a wrong method of generalisation, we find on the other\nhand they do not agree with facts. They neither explain nor account for\nthe appearance or disappearance of real pleasures and pains such as take\nplace in animal life.\n\n * * * * *\n\nStarting from merely theoretical considerations, Kant defines pleasure as\na feeling of furtherance, pain, as a feeling of hindrance of life; and\nso prominent a physiologist and psychologist as Alexander Bain says that\n\u201cStates of pleasure are connected with an increase, states of pain, with\nan abatement of some or of all the vital functions.\u201d\n\nA consideration of the actual causes of our pleasures and pains will\nprove the incorrectness of these views, which are also due to wrong\ngeneralisations. An increase of the vital functions and a further growth,\neither of the organs or of the whole organism, is very often accompanied\nwith pain. A growing tooth causes, as a rule, as much pain as a decaying\ntooth. And if by some drug the decay is hastened and the nerve is killed,\nthere is, connected with the suppression and sometimes with the mere\nabatement of the vital function, an abatement of the pain also.\n\nFeelings of pleasure and pain presuppose that habits have been formed in\na sentient organism.\n\nPain is not always a hindrance of life, nor is every hindrance of life\npainful. Pain is not an abatement of the functions of life, not a decay,\nnor a destruction. But pain is always a disturbance of life and of the\nhabits that have been formed.\n\nGrowth is, under certain circumstances, as much a disturbance as is\ndecay. And decay, if it is simply an abatement or cessation of function,\nis not accompanied with pain.\n\nWhile pain is always a disturbance of the functions of an organism,\npleasure is simply the gratification of wants; functions and wants being\nformed by habits, we may briefly say that pleasure is agreement, pain\ndisagreement, with habits.\n\nThere are natural wants and unnatural wants. There are habits beneficial\nto the furtherance of life, and there are habits injurious to the\nfurtherance of life. The pleasure connected with the gratification of\nwants does not depend on its being a furtherance or a hindrance of life,\nbut solely on the intensity of the want. And the intensity of the want,\nagain, depends on the degree to which a habit has become inveterate.[43]\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe theory of pleasure and pain which regards pleasure as indicative\nof the growth, and pain, of the decay of life, leads ultimately to the\nethics of hedonism, which identifies the good with the pleasurable.\nHowever, if our view of pleasure and pain be correct, it is apparent\nthat the pleasure theory in ethics is wrong in its very foundation. The\npleasurable would cease to be a criterion of goodness; for many things\nare pleasurable that are bad, and many things are painful that are good.\nGrowth, development, progress, evolution have often been, nay must mostly\nbe bought with great pain, tribulation, anxiety, and also with the\nrenunciation of pleasures. On the other hand the fulness of pleasure is\nalways a very dangerous symptom for any state of existence.\n\nThe seeking of pleasure and the avoiding of pain are certainly very\nquestionable guides in determining what right conduct is. In adopting\npleasure and pain as the principles of ethics, we adulterate the nature\nof morality; for morality exists and has been called into being simply\nto counteract the dangerous allurances of that which promises to produce\npleasure and to avoid pain. Ethics has to teach us how to live, how to\ndevelop, how to grow, how to make our lives useful and serviceable. If\nethics were simply a method of how to obtain the greatest amount of\npleasure, we might better openly confess that there is no moral goodness\nbut only pleasurableness, and consequently that morality is a chimera and\nethics a farce.\n\nA defender of the pleasure theory in ethics writes in reply to this\ncriticism of his view: \u201cTo seek pleasure and to avoid pain is not wrong.\nWhy shall we deprive men of their enjoyments?\u201d Certainly, everyone has\na right to enjoy himself; every one has a right to seek pleasure and to\navoid pain. But seeking pleasure and avoiding pain is not as yet ethical.\nUnder ordinary circumstances it is right enough to follow the natural\nimpulses of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. But there are cases\nwhere seeking pleasure, be it for ourselves or for others, and avoiding\npain, be it for ourselves or for others, become actual wrongs; not\nbecause present pleasures will lead to future pains, but because certain\npleasures are a hindrance to the higher evolution of the soul.\n\nIt is often said that the renunciation of pleasures is richly made up for\nby the pleasures which are afforded in a more fully developed life. But\nthis, in my opinion, is not true. The adult has rather less pleasures\nthan the child, and the civilised or highly cultured man does not enjoy\nhimself as much, as easily, and as cheaply as does the savage, the\nuncultured, the fool.\n\n\nIII. MR. THOMAS A. EDISON\u2019S PANPSYCHISM.\n\nSome time ago Mr. Thomas A. Edison was interviewed on the question, \u201cWhat\nis life?\u201d Mr. Edison answered the question; and his view is quite in\naccord with Professor Haeckel\u2019s idea of panpsychism. The article appeared\nfirst in a daily newspaper. Being remarkable for its coincidence with the\nviews of a great scientist, and coming from the pen of so interesting\na man as the famous inventor of the phonograph, we deem it best to\nrepublish it in full, with Mr. Edison\u2019s permission, who, at the same\ntime, acknowledged the copy we sent him as correct.\n\nThis is the article:\n\n INTELLIGENT ATOMS.\n\n BY THOMAS A. EDISON.\n\n My mind is not of a speculative order, it is essentially\n practical, and when I am making an experiment, I think only of\n getting something useful, of making electricity perform work.\n\n I don\u2019t soar; I keep down pretty close to earth. Of course\n there are problems in life I can\u2019t help thinking about, but I\n don\u2019t try to study them out. It is necessary that they should\n be studied, and men fitted for that work are doing it. I am not\n fitted for it. I leave the theoretical study of electricity to\n the physicists, confining my work to the practical application\n of the force. It is my belief, however, that every atom of\n matter is intelligent, deriving energy from the primordial\n germ. The intelligence of man is, I take it, the sum of the\n intelligences of the atoms of which he is composed. Every atom\n has an intelligent power of selection and is always striving to\n get into harmonious relation with other atoms. The human body\n is, I think, maintained in its integrity by the intelligent\n persistence of its atoms, or rather by an agreement between\n the atoms so to persist. When the harmonious adjustment is\n destroyed the man dies, and the atoms seek other relations.\n\n I cannot regard the odor of decay but as the result of the\n efforts of the atoms to dissociate themselves; they want to get\n away and make new combinations. Man, therefore, may be regarded\n in some sort as a microcosm of atoms agreeing to constitute his\n life as long as order and discipline can be maintained. But, of\n course, there is dissatisfaction, rebellion and anarchy leading\n eventually to death, and through death to new forms of life.\n For life I regard as indestructible.\n\n All matter lives, and everything that lives possesses\n intelligence. Consider growing corn, for example. An atom\n of oxygen comes flying along the air. It seeks combination\n with other atoms and goes to the corn, not by chance, but by\n intention. It is seized by other atoms that need oxygen, and is\n packed away in the corn where it can do its work. Now carbon,\n hydrogen and oxygen enter into the composition of every organic\n substance in one form of arrangement or another. The formula\n _CHO_, in fact, is almost universal.\n\n Very well, then, why does a free atom of carbon select any\n particular one out of 50,000 or more possible positions unless\n it wants to? I cannot see how we can deny intelligence to this\n act of volition on the part of the atom. To say that one atom\n has an affinity for another is simply to use a big word. The\n atom is conscious if man is conscious, is intelligent if man is\n intelligent, exercises will-power if man does, is, in its own\n little way, all that man is. We are told by geologists that in\n the earliest periods no form of life could exist on the earth.\n\n How do they know that? A crystal is devoid of this vital\n principle, they say, and yet certain kinds of atoms invariably\n arrange themselves in a particular way to form a crystal. They\n did that in geological periods antedating the appearance of any\n form of life and have been doing it ever since in precisely\n the same way. Some crystals form in branches like a fern. Why\n is there not life in the growth of a crystal? Was the vital\n principle specially created at some particular period of the\n earth\u2019s history, or did it exist and control every atom of\n matter when the earth was molten? I cannot avoid the conclusion\n that all matter is composed of intelligent atoms and that life\n and mind are merely synonyms for the aggregation of atomic\n intelligence.\n\n Of course there is a source of energy. Nature is a perpetual\n motion machine, and perpetual motion implies a sustaining and\n impelling force.\n\n When I was in Berlin I met Du Bois-Reymond, and, wagging the\n end of my finger, I said to him, \u201cWhat is that? What moves\n that finger?\u201d He said he didn\u2019t know; that investigators have\n for twenty-five years been trying to find out. If anybody could\n tell him what wagged this finger, the problem of life would be\n solved.\n\n There are many forms of energy resulting from the combustion\n of coal under a boiler. Some of these forms we know something\n about in a practical way, but there may be many others we don\u2019t\n know anything about.\n\n Perhaps electricity will itself be superseded in time, who\n knows? Now, a beefsteak in the human stomach is equivalent to\n coal under a boiler. By oxidisation it excites energy that\n does work, but what form of energy is it? It is not steam\n pressure. It acts through the nerve-cells, performs work that\n can be measured in foot pounds, and can be transformed into\n electricity, but the actual nature of this force which produces\n this work\u2014which makes effectual the mandate of the will\u2014is\n unknown.\n\n It is not magnetism, it doesn\u2019t attract iron. It is not\n electricity\u2014at least such a form of electricity as we are\n familiar with. Still, here it is necessary to be guarded,\n because so many different forms of electricity are known to\n science that it would be rash to say positively that we shall\n not class vital energy as a form of electrical energy. We\n cannot argue anything from difference in speed. Nerve-force\n may travel as fast as electricity, once it gets started.\n The apparent slowness may be in the brain. It may take an\n appreciable time for the brain to set the force going.\n\n I made an experiment with a frog\u2019s leg that indicates something\n of the kind. I took a leg that was susceptible to galvanic\n current. The vibration produced a note that was as high as a\n piccoto. While the leg was alive it responded to the electrical\n current; when it was dead it would not respond. After the\n frog\u2019s leg had been lying in the laboratory three days I\n couldn\u2019t make it squeal. The experiment was conclusive as\n to this point: The vital force in the nerves of the leg was\n capable of acting with speed enough to induce the vibration of\n the diaphragm necessary to produce sound.\n\n Certainly this rate of speed is greater than physiologists\n appear to allow, and it seems reasonable that there is a close\n affinity between vital energy and electricity. I do not say\n they are identical; on the contrary I say they are very like.\n If one could learn to make vital energy directly without fuel,\n that is without beefsteak in the stomach, and in such manner\n that the human system could appropriate it, the elixir of life\n would no longer be a dream of alchemy. But we have not yet\n learned to make electricity directly, without the aid of fuel\n and steam.\n\n I believe this is possible; indeed, I have been experimenting\n in this direction for some time past. But until we can learn\n to make electricity, like nature, out of disturbed air, I am\n afraid the more delicate task of manufacturing vital energy so\n that it can be bottled and sold at the family grocery store\n will have to be deferred.\n\n Electricity, by the way, is properly merely a form of energy,\n and not a fluid. As for the ether which speculative science\n supposes to exist, I don\u2019t know anything about it. Nobody\n has discovered anything of the kind. In order to make their\n theories hold together they have, it seems to me, created the\n ether. But the ether imagined by them is unthinkable to me. I\n don\u2019t say I disagree with them, because I don\u2019t pretend to have\n any theories of that kind, and am not competent to dispute with\n speculative scientists. All I can say is, my mind is unable to\n accept the theory. The ether, they say, is as rigid as steel\n and as soft as butter. I can\u2019t catch on to that idea.\n\n I believe that there are only two things in the universe\u2014matter\n and energy. Matter I can understand to be intelligent, for\n man himself I regard as so much matter. Energy I know can\n take various forms, and manifest itself in various ways. I\n can understand also that it works not only upon, but through,\n matter. What this matter is, what this energy is, I do not know.\n\n However, it is possible that it is simply matter and energy,\n and that any desire to know too much about the whole question\n should be diagnosed as a disease; such a disease as German\n doctors are said to have discovered among the students of their\n universities\u2014the disease of asking questions.\n\n\nTHE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE.\n\nMr. Thomas A. Edison\u2019s article is full of suggestions which invite\nfurther discussion. We must here limit ourselves solely to those which\ntouch the problem of Panpsychism and Panbiotism.\n\nAny one who has read Mr. Edison\u2019s article will be struck with the strange\ncoincidence that obtains between his and Professor Haeckel\u2019s views. The\nfamous naturalist considers what he calls panpsychism as the corner-stone\nof his monism: he says that atoms possess souls; and in a similar way\nthe famous inventor believes in the intelligence of atoms, he declares\nthat atoms are endowed with minds. There is certainly a deep truth in\nthis conception of nature; and yet we cannot accept it in the way it is\npresented by either Professor Haeckel or Mr. Edison.\n\nWith reference to Professor Haeckel\u2019s views we have explained why atoms,\nthe actions of which are not endowed with meaning, have no soul, and also\nwhy they cannot feel pleasure and pain. It remains for us to explain why\natoms are not in possession of intelligence.\n\nWhat is intelligence?\n\nThat reaction upon a stimulus which takes place in the way it does\nbecause of the presence of meaning, is called mental, or intelligent\naction; and the ability to adjust action to mental representations is\nintelligence.\n\nIntelligence is a psychical quality, and the psychical process which is\npreparing to act with intelligence is called deliberation. Deliberation\nis the successive revival of several soul-structures, either of memories\nof former experiences, or of rules derived therefrom, or of advice\nformerly received, including also new combinations of these mental\nstructures, and keeping in view the probable results of the intended\naction. In a word, deliberation is thought, and thought is an interaction\namong meaning-freighted feelings.\n\nAmong these ideas, which in so far as they can influence action (i. e.\npurposive motions) are called \u201cmotives,\u201d the strongest one will determine\nthe result. Now, any atom of non-organised matter, say an atom of\nhydrogen, acts (as we said above) with spontaneity. It is in this sense\nas much alive as is any ever so complex vegetable or animal substance. It\nis self-acting, and its action reveals the innermost nature of its being\njust as much as the action of the man shows the character of the man.\n\nThere is, however, a great difference between the action of animal\nbeings whose action is regulated by the meanings of their feelings,\nwhich in their totality we call the soul, and the actions of inorganic\nmatter, of crystals, minerals, gases, chemical elements, and gravitating\nmasses, all of which we comprise under the name \u201cinanimate nature.\u201d\nThe stone\u2019s fall does not depend upon any representative feeling; it\ndepends solely upon that quality of the stone which we popularly call\nits weight. Nor has the falling stone any choice whether to fall or\nnot to fall. Under certain circumstances it falls. There is no act of\ndeliberation preceding the fall. Nor has it any choice concerning the\ndirection of its fall. The surrounding conditions, viz., its position\nwith regard to the centre of the earth together with its mass, determine\nthe process. The stone\u2019s action can satisfactorily be explained without\nattributing to it psychical qualities. The stone possesses no soul;\nit is void of mentality; and although we believe that everything,\norganised or unorganised, is endowed with subjectivity (by which we\nunderstand the conditions of psychical life, or the potentiality of\nfeeling and consciousness), this subjectivity can only be analogous\nto the blind impulse of the stone\u2019s mass. If some other, psychical or\nmental, subjectivity were present, we should say that it apparently does\nnot enter as a factor in the determination of the event. Accordingly\nsuch an assumption is gratuitous. There is subjectivity, but there\nis no intelligence. There is potentiality of feeling, but there is\nno consciousness. There is present the elementary condition of that\nsomething which is going to develop into mind, but there is no mind;\nthere is no meaning-freighted awareness of the surrounding conditions.\n\nSays Mr. Edison:\n\n \u201cThe intelligence of man is, I take it, the sum of the\n intelligences of the atoms of which he is composed.\u201d\n\nThe sum total of the intelligences of the atoms in a human body (if,\nin this connection, for the sake of argument, we grant that atoms are\nintelligent) would not as yet make up the intelligence of man. Suppose we\nare contemplating a mosaic picture or inscription. Are such compositions\nreally only the sum of the little stones? Are they not rather a certain\npeculiar form in which these colored stones are arranged? It is not\nthe sum of the stones that makes the picture, but the form of their\ncomposition. The picture is not contained in any single one of them, nor\nis it the whole number of all the single stones: it originates through\ntheir peculiar combination and consists of the form in which they are\ncombined.\n\nMr. Edison\u2019s explanation of the soul, applied to this example of a mosaic\npicture, would be as follows: Every little stone is in itself a little\nmosaic picture. The whole picture of the mosaic is the sum of the little\npictures of the stones of which it is composed.\n\nThe intelligence of the soul, however, is not even as yet the form in\nwhich feeling structures combine; it originates with the representative\nfaculty of the feeling structures. The soul is the organised totality of\na set of images and abstract mental symbols representing the qualities,\nthe influences, and the interactions of the different objects of the\nsurrounding world, the thinking subject included.\n\nSays Mr. Edison:\n\n \u201cEvery atom has an intelligent power of selection, and is\n always striving to get into harmonious relation with other\n atoms.\u201d\n\nThe latter is true; the former is an error. Every atom \u201cis always\nstriving to get into harmonious relation with other atoms\u201d; this is its\nnature; and its nature being stable, consisting of certain inalienable\nand intrinsic qualities, the atom acts with consistency. Certain\natoms, say atoms of hydrogen, are of such a nature as to combine with\ncertain other atoms, say atoms of oxygen, into molecules that form a\ncertain substance of peculiar properties, which, if each atom of oxygen\ncombines with two atoms of hydrogen, would be _H\u2082O_, or water. This\nsubstance again, having certain definite qualities, will in a temperature\nbelow freezing point crystallise at a definite angle. The angle of\ncrystallisation being the same for all molecules _H\u2082O_, the result will\nnecessarily be one of most marvellous regularity. And not being able to\nobserve the atoms in their secret activity, not knowing all the details\nof nature\u2019s marvellous laboratory, we are astonished to find such a\nwonderfully harmonious relation. And yet, considering the nature of\nthings, we are urged to confess that it is the result of an inevitable\nnecessity, which takes place according to strict mathematical laws.\n\nAlthough every atom strives, according to its nature, to get into\nharmonious relation with other atoms, we do not see any \u201cintelligent\npower of selection\u201d in the province of inorganic nature. Every atom of\ninorganic substances acts according to its nature in one and the same\nway throughout. There is no choice, no selection, allowed. Choice and\nselection are faculties that are reserved for the higher domains of\npsychical life, which originates in the domain of animal existence when\nmeaning, conditioned by the presence of sentiency, rises into being and\ncreates the soul.\n\nSupposing that through some combination of atoms their subjectivity be\ncombined in such a form as to produce sentiency or feeling, we can very\neasily understand how this feeling will in time become representative of\nthe conditions by which it is affected. The soul does not consist of the\natoms of its organism, nor of the sum of the qualities of the atoms. The\nsoul consists of something more subtle than matter: the soul consists of\nthe meaning that is attached to the different forms of the feelings which\nobtain in living organisms.\n\n\nTHE PROBLEM OF THEISM.\n\nThe problem as to whether or not there is an element of feeling present\nin the unorganised realm of nature, is connected also with the problem\nof theism. The monistic view of the world, which considers nature as\nalive throughout, can neither accept the old supernaturalism, nor the\nmaterialistic theory of atheism. Theism, as it is usually conceived,\nbelieves in a personal creator and ruler of the world. Materialism denies\nthe existence of any God; it regards matter and its actions as the only\nreality.\n\nMonism does not regard mental phenomena as an incidental by-play of\nblindly operating forces. It regards mind as a necessary product of\nreality. Mind and the peculiar qualities of mind are characteristic of\nthe world-tree, of which it is the highest efflorescence we know. From\nthe fruit we can know the root, from the product we can judge of the\nfactors, in the creature we see the creator.\n\nThat great something which has produced us, the All-power in which we\nlive and move and have our being, and obedience to the laws of which are\nthe conditions of life, of welfare, and of an advance to higher life, is\ncalled with a popular religious name \u201cGod.\u201d\n\nLet us comprise under the name \u201ctheism\u201d all those views which recognise\nany conception of God, and reserve the term anthropotheism for that view\nwhich regards God as a person, a mind, a conscious being, or a world-ego.\nAtheism in that case will be a negation of the existence of God in any\nform, a negation of the All-power of which we are parts and to which we\nhave to conform; and accordingly atheism will be also a negation of any\nauthority of moral conduct.\n\nWe call attention to the fact that many who call themselves atheists,\nsimply because they do not believe in anthropotheism, are according to\nthis definition not to be classed among the atheists.\n\nWhat has monism to say, on the problem of the existence of God?\n\nProf. George J. Romanes, in an article which appeared some time ago in\nthe _Contemporary Review_ under the title \u201cThe World as an Eject,\u201d\ndeclares that monism has left the problem of theism in the same state it\nwas in before. He says:\n\n \u201cThe views of the late Professor Clifford concerning the\n influence of monism on theism, are unsound. I am in full\n agreement with him in believing that monism is destined to\n become the generally accepted theory of things, seeing that it\n is the only theory of things which can receive the sanction\n of science on the one hand, and of feeling on the other. But\n I disagree with him in holding that this theory is fraught\n with implications of an anti-theistic kind. In my opinion,\n _this theory leaves the question of theism very much where\n it was before_.[44] That is to say, while not furnishing any\n independent proof of theism, it likewise fails to furnish any\n independent disproof.\n\n \u201cAs a matter of methodical reasoning it appears to me that\n monism alone can only lead to agnosticism. That is to say,\n it leaves a clear field of choice as between theism and\n atheism.\u201d[45]\n\nClifford says in the passage referred to by Professor Romanes:\n\n \u201cReason, intelligence, and volition are properties of a complex\n which is made up of elements themselves not rational, not\n intelligent, not conscious.\u201d\n\nRational, intelligent, conscious beings, so far as their material\nexistence is concerned, are made up of elements not rational, not\nintelligent, not conscious. But mind, reason, intelligence are not at\nall made up of material elements; they are neither latent nor germinal\nand least of all fully developed properties of the single atoms. Reason\ncan in our conception never be explained as a complex result of the\ninteraction of absolutely irrational elements. The material elements of\nthe world, it is true, are not intelligent, not conscious; but the world\nas a whole (although _not_ conscious and _not_ endowed with purposive\nvolition) is at least _not ir_rational and not void of determination. On\nthe contrary the world as a whole is the prototype of all rationality,\nand human reason is a mere image of the world-order. What is the reason\nof a rational being but an incarnation of this world-order?\n\nReason is not a thing of matter; exactly so the world-order is not a\nthing of matter. But it exists none the less; it is a reality. On the\nother hand, the world-order need neither be a personal being nor the\nwork of a personal being. The order that prevails in the real world and\nin the laws of nature appears also in the ideal world, in the laws of\nformal thought, in mathematics, and its kindred sciences; and the same\nrationality that obtains in the ideal domain permeates the realms of\nreality, the universe of objective existence.\n\nThe idea that God created the world-order and dictated its laws is a\nfanciful and poetical allegory; it is as such a pagan notion which\nbelongs in the same category with Hesiod\u2019s Cosmology, but it is\nscientifically and philosophically unthinkable. For God is eternal and\nGod\u2019s being is eternal. God has not created his own attributes and the\nworld-order is simply an attribute of God; it is part and parcel of his\nnature. Or can you think of God without that attribute of irrefragable\norder that appears to science as necessity, to religion as holiness, to\nethics as justice, to art as the law of beauty, to the mystic as the key\nto all the wonders of existence which though solving all the problems\nremains most wonderful itself?\n\nThe world as a whole, the cosmos, God, or whatever we call the One and\nAll, is the prototype of all reason, but he is not a mind; he is not a\nsystem of sentient symbols; he is not a soul. Minds are a special kind of\nGod\u2019s creatures; but God is not a creature: he is the condition of the\nexistence of creatures, he is the creator.\n\nThe objection is made from materialistic quarters: \u201cWhat is the world\nas a whole but the sum of all atoms!\u201d This is an error. The world is\nnot merely the sum of all its atoms; the universe does not consist of\ninnumerable little particles which in their combination form the All. On\nthe contrary: the world as a whole, existence in its oneness, or speaking\nreligiously God, is alone the only true reality; all other things and\nbeings are parts of him. Atoms are abstract concepts; the existence of\nan atom and of its actions presupposes the existence of the great whole\nof which it is a part, and without which it would have no reality. There\nare no atoms in themselves. Atoms regarded as things in themselves are a\nscientific superstition.\n\nProfessor Romanes advances the proposition, that cosmical events, being\nas highly complex as nervous phenomena, might be possessed of a similar\nsubjectivity. The nervous phenomena which constitute the physiological\naction of mind in the province of objectivity are, it is true, very\ncomplex, but complexity does not constitute that characteristic feature\non the presence of which depends the origin of mind.\n\nProfessor Romanes says:\n\n \u201cBoth mind and matter in motion admit of degrees: first as to\n quantity, next as to velocity, and lastly as to _complexity_.\n But the degrees of matter in motion are found, in point\n of observable fact, not to correspond with those of mind,\n save in the last particular of complexity, where there is\n unquestionably an evident correspondence.\n\n \u201cNow, if we fix our attention merely on this subject-matter\n of complexity, and refuse to be led astray by obviously false\n analogies of a more special kind, I think that there can be\n no question that the macrocosm does furnish amply sufficient\n opportunity, as it were, for the presence of subjectivity, even\n if it be assumed that subjectivity can only be yielded by an\n order of complexity analogous to that of a nervous system. For,\n considering the natural and dynamical system of the universe as\n a whole, it is obvious that the complexity presented is greater\n than any of its parts. Not only is it true that all these parts\n are included in the whole, and that even the visible sidereal\n system alone presents movements of enormous intricacy, but we\n find, for instance, that even within the limits of this small\n planet there is presented to actual observation a peculiar\n form of circumscribed complex, fully comparable to that of the\n individual brain, and yet external to each individual brain.\n For the so-called \u2018social organism,\u2019 although composed of\n innumerable individual personalities, is, with regard to each\n of its constituent units, a part of the objective world\u2014just as\n the human brain would be, were each of its constituent cells\n of a construction sufficiently complex to yield a separate\n personality.\u201d\n\nThe so-called social organism which is composed of innumerable\npersonalities undoubtedly yields a peculiar spiritual existence, which\ncannot be explained solely as the sum of the parts and actions of its\nconstituent individuals. The relations in which the members of society\nstand to each other are of an analogous importance to the relations of\nthe cells and organs in an organism. It is the form that constitutes this\nor that kind of an organism, not the sum of atoms, nor the intricacy or\ncomplexity of their combinations. Different forms of perhaps the same\nmaterial amount, and of the same intricacy of combination, yield quite\ndistinct types of individuality, and every state, every nation, every\nsociety possesses, as it were a personality of its own.\n\nMind is not constituted by complexity. Mind is a system of sentient\nsymbols. Wherever we find organisms acting in such a way that their\nactions depend upon the _meanings_ of certain stimuli, we have to\nattribute to them that characteristic feature which we call mind, or\nsoul. The action of a falling stone is explainable without attributing\nto it any mentality. There is no representative value, no meaning in\nthat quality of the stone which, under certain conditions, makes the\nstone fall. However, if a man acts, the motive of his action does not\nconsist in the gravity of certain material particles of his brain. It\nconsists in the meaning that resides in certain feelings. Without taking\ninto consideration the meaning that dominates the man\u2019s motives, we\ncannot explain his action, and it is the meaning of feelings that the\nsoul consists of. Only where and when we can discern the presence of\nmeaning as the raison d\u2019\u00eatre of actions, are we justified in calling\nphenomena mental. When the action that takes place in response to a\nstimulus depends solely upon the significance of a symbol, the inference\nis legitimate, nay, it is inevitable and conclusive, that we have to\ndeal with a mind. The motion of a comet, which depends perhaps not only\nupon the gravity of its mass, but also upon the chemical actions and\nexplosions of its constituent elements during its approach to the sun,\nmay be ever so intricate; but this does not in the least justify the\nassumption of the presence of mind in the comet.\n\nThe assumption of mind in inorganic nature is not only fantastical, it is\nalso needless. Facts are better explained without this speculation.\n\nThe world as a whole is not bare of subjectivity. In this we agree\nwith both Clifford and Romanes. But we do not identify subjectivity\nand mind, the latter being a special and indeed a very complex form\nof subjectivity. We suppose that subjectivity pervades also all the\nprocesses of unorganised nature, and no less the cosmic events; but be\nthey ever so much more complex than nervous phenomena, there is present\nonly a non-mental subjectivity.\n\nYet although the phenomena of so-called inanimate nature, be they motions\nof celestial bodies or physical and chemical processes, are non-mental,\nthere is in every one of them present that grand feature which is as\nit were the breath of God. This feature appears in all the phenomena of\nnature, but in none of them more gloriously than in the soul of man. Even\nthe cosmical events of marvellous sublimity appear as a mere prelude to\nthe appearance of soul-life, for in soul-life is focused all the divinity\nof nature. Reason is the reflex of the world-order and thus a rational\nbeing is made in the likeness of God.\n\n[Illustration]\n\nProfessor Romanes presents the problem of the subjectivity of existence\nby the adjoined diagram, which he explains as follows:\n\n \u201cFollowing Clifford, I will call these inferred subjectivities\n by the name of \u2018ejects,\u2019 and assign to them the symbol _Y_.\n Thus in the following discussion _X_ = the objective world,\n _Y_, the ejective world, and _Z_, the subjective world. Now,\n the theory of monism supposes that _X_, _Y_ and _Z_ are all\n alike in kind, but presents no definite teaching as to how far\n they may differ in degree. We may, however, at once allow that\n between the psychological value of _Z_ and that of _X_, there\n is a wide difference of degree, and also that while the value\n of _Z_ is a fixed quantity, that of _Y_ varies greatly in the\n different parts of the area _Y_.\u201d\n\nThe deep shading of _Z_ indicates consciousness, and consciousness is\nthat form of subjectivity which constitutes our mind. _Z_ is not,\nas Professor Romanes asserts that it is, a fixed quantity; it varies\ngreatly, as every one knows from his own experience. It is lowest\nin trance or swoon or profound sleep. It is highest in the state of\nconcentrated attention. The ejective element, which we assume to be\npresent as a correlative concomitant in the objective world, we assume,\nwith Professor Romanes, varies greatly in the different parts of the\narea _Y_. Like Professor Romanes, we also do _not_ assume the existence\nof any unshaded _X_. There is no objectivity without its subjective\ncorrelate. But, according to the theory of monism, the nature of the\nconcomitant subjectivity is not unknowable: it can be inferred from the\nnature of objective existence. The subjectivity of the falling stone\nis most elementary, and _not mental_; its action is not prompted by\nmeaning. That something which impels the stone to fall, and which science\ncalls gravity, does not possess any representative element. There is no\nsymbolism involved in gravity. There is no soul in the stone. The stone\nis not incited to falling by any purpose; it has no end in view. Purpose\noriginates with and through the presence of representative symbols.\nAccording to the theory of monism the shading of the surrounding zones is\nnot a matter concerning which we have to suspend our judgment. If monism\nis true, we know very well how deeply we have to shade the different\nphenomena of objective nature.\n\nTaking this view, we object to Professor Romanes\u2019s conclusion when he\nsays:\n\n \u201cWithout in any way straining the theory of monism, we may\n provisionally shade _X_ more deeply than _Z_, and this in some\n immeasurable degree.\n\n \u201cMonism sanctions the shading of _X_ as deeply as we choose;\n but the shading which it sanctions is only provisional.\u201d\n\nWhile the presence of mind in the phenomena of the stellar universe and\nof inorganic nature must decidedly be denied, I would not, for that\nreason, declare that monism is atheistic.\n\nMonism is decidedly theistic although not anthropotheistic. It is\nmonotheistic in so far as it recognises that the all-existence in which\nwe live and move and have our being is the \u1f19\u039d \u039a\u0391\u0399 \u03a0\u0391\u039d, the One and All.\nBut there is not the slightest reason for the theory, and there are\nsufficient reasons against it, that the universe is possessed of a huge\nworld-ego, that it is a person or a mind.\n\nWe maintain on the one hand that the laws of nature are not designs\narranged With consciously preconceived purposes. Yet on the other hand,\nwe do not forget, that the world-order possesses quite definite features\nand that the course of evolution runs in a very unmistakable direction.\nWe can plainly decipher its character, and the great religious teachers\nof mankind have with a truly prophetic instinct proclaimed the ethical\ninjunctions to be derived therefrom\u2014injunctions which, millenniums after\nthem, science has discovered to be founded in the nature of things.\n\nGod is no mind, yet God is mentality, the source of all mind: God is not\na spirit, but he is spirituality. The subjectivity of the universe from\nwhich all consciousness rises is part of his being, and whatever that\nsubjectivity, considered as a whole, be or be not, that much is certain,\nthat in grandeur it corresponds to the objectivity of the world. It does\nnot think in symbols as a man does; it is not a mind: but it exists\nnevertheless. Whatever it is like we learn from the revelation of its\nappearance in objective existence, from the cosmic order, the laws of\nnature, and the moral ideas of mankind.\n\nKnowledge of nature means knowledge of God, for nature is God as he\nappears and the objectivity of being is the revelation of God.\n\nWe would not limit God to the subjectivity of nature: God is both\nsubjectivity and objectivity combined. He is that All-power that is, was,\nand will be, thus being the ultimate authority of conduct.\n\nGod is not a mind, he is more than a mind; God is not a system of\nsymbols, he is the reality symbolised in mind. He is not a person, he is\nsuper-personal.\n\nHe who does not see that the God of monism is greater than the God\nof anthropotheism, had better believe in a personal God, until he\nappreciates the truth that God is not personal but super-personal. For\nafter all anthropotheism is nearer the truth than atheism, for atheism\n(well understood, the atheism of our definition above) is a moral\nnihilism devised to shake off all ethical obligation so as to make the\nlust of the moment and the pleasure of the individual the supreme rule of\naction.\n\nMonism, accordingly, does not leave the problem of theism where it was\nbefore. Monism proves that God is not to be conceived in the likeness\nof man, but the reverse: man, being a system of symbols representing\nthe world, is to be conceived as having been made or rather as having\noriginated in the likeness of God. God is the original, man is the copy.\nGod is the whole, man is the part, in which the whole finds a more or\nless correct representation. The picture is not perfect, but the grandest\nduty a man has is the constant approach to a greater perfection. Man is\nthe temporal, God is the eternal. Man is limited, God is the infinite.\n\n EDITOR.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[41] _The Monist_, Vol. II, No. 4.\n\n[42] Spontaneous motion (as here defined) does not mean action without\na cause; nor does the spontaneity of the cart exclude the co-operation\nof other spontaneities (_e. g._ the attraction of the earth) entering as\nfactors in bringing about the final result.\n\n[43] This theory of pleasure and pain was first set forth in an editorial\narticle of No. 120 of _The Open Court_, which has been republished in\nthe chapter \u201cPleasure and Pain,\u201d pp. 338-345, of _The Soul of Man_. A\ncorrect view of the nature of pleasure and pain is of great importance,\nespecially in ethics. Notwithstanding the palpable erroneousness of the\nold view, several articles written by prominent authors have appeared\nof late, that continue in the old strain without taking notice of the\ncriticism that overthrows the basis of their theories.\n\n[44] _Italics are ours._\n\n[45] This same position is maintained with equal vigor in Professor\nRomanes\u2019s latest work _Darwin and After Darwin_, pp. 412-442. The Open\nCourt Publishing Co., 1892.\n\n\n\n\nLITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\nFRANCE.\n\n\nDr. Paul Sollier has just published, in the Biblioth\u00e9que\nCharcot-Debove,[46] a new and excellent work, _Les troubles de la\nmemoire_. This work is not identical in its purpose with that of\nM. Ribot; it corrects the latter in certain points, completes and\ncorroborates it in others. M. Sollier set out to discuss this question\nsolely from a medical standpoint, which was intentionally passed over\nby M. Ribot, but he has also necessarily touched upon its psychological\naspects, and, as he informs us himself, he was obliged on the whole to\nmake a medico-psychological study of the question.\n\nThe subject is a vast one; one could include in it aphasia and all the\nweaknesses resulting from the destruction of the brain-centres, whether\nthose of motion or of sensation. M. Sollier has taken the pains to reduce\nit, however, to definite limits. He studies especially the subject of\nacquired amnesia (diminutive changes and disaggregations of the memory).\nHe does not consider the subject of congenital amnesia, which is an\nabsence and not a loss of memory. Strictly considered, the only cases\nof true amnesia, or _organic_ amnesia, are those which result from the\ndestruction of the nerve-centres, since in this case there is an absolute\nloss of the power of forming mental images, and not simply an enfeebling\nor forgetting of them, which is characteristic of _functional_ amnesia.\nFrom a clinical standpoint amnesia exists only in the last case. Though\nthe effect may be the same in both cases, the causes are not identical.\n\nClinical investigation cannot, however, overlook the diminutive changes\nwhich take place in the memory and which, as early as 1817, were called\nby Louyer-Villermay dysmnesia, and which are always closely allied\nto organic modifications of the brain. As regards amnesia itself, it\nis important to distinguish simple amnesia from retrogressive and\nprogressive amnesia. M. Sollier explains the motive causes of these\ndifferent conditions with great lucidity, and renders them easy of\ncomprehension by means of ingenious illustrations.\n\nI call attention to the information he gives us as to the conditions\nunder which a revival of mental images takes place, p. 30; to his\ncriticism of Ribot\u2019s opinion, according to which the power of correctly\nlocating events in the scale of time is the true characteristic of\npsychical memory: it is quite enough if it reproduces events as in\nthe past, that is to say if there exists a conscious knowledge which\nshows that the mental conception belongs to the past, or is, simply, a\nremembrance, p. 35 and 40; to his remarks on the strengthening of mental\nimages due to the repetition of remembrances, the necessary sequence of\nwhich is that a weakening of old memories follows the destruction of\naccumulated mental images, p. 48; to his explanation of the processes\nof retrogressive amnesia (coming suddenly after an attack of vertigo,\na blow, etc.) which he bases upon a supposition of a group of mental\nconceptions in touch with one another, in such a way that the loss of\none leading conception in a group deprives this group of sufficient\nconsistency to form a conscious synthesis, p. 70.\n\nAs regards the classifications of amnesia M. Sollier censures that of M.\nRibot as being neither openly psychological nor openly clinical, and of\ntaking successively as bases the extent of an observed phenomenon, its\nevolution, its location in time. Moreover, from a clinical standpoint\nit has led to a joining together of totally incongruous disorders. M.\nSollier therefore rejects it, and contents himself with adopting first of\nall, with M. Falret, the natural classification of general amnesia and of\npartial amnesia. Moreover, in taking account of the systematising of lost\nremembrances, he proposes to make a distinction as to the two varieties\nof systematised (functional) and of non-systematised (organic) amnesia,\nconsidered from the purely psychological standpoint, p. 59. We should\nthus have, firstly, the classification of general amnesia, including\n(A) true organic amnesia (destruction of the centre of mental images),\nand, under the classification of the systematised, (B) functional,\nor apparent, amnesia (imperfect performance of the functions of the\ncentres): this latter subdividing into two groups, (_a_) amnesia with its\nvarieties (_a\u00b4_) simple, (_b\u00b4_) retrogressive, (_c\u00b4_) progressive, and\n(_b_) paramnesia: (_a\u00b4_) that of locality, (_b\u00b4_) that of exactness; to\nwhich it is proper to add (_c_) dysmnesia, which is organic-functional.\nSecondly, the classification of partial amnesia whether systematised or\nnot, which may be either organic or functional. M. Sollier abandons,\nmoreover, every pathological or etiological classification as being\nexceedingly unsatisfactory. In the presence of a patient, he justly\nremarks, the physician can only employ semiology.\u2014I will not enter\nhere into the details of the inquisitor-like investigation entered\nupon by the author. I must even proceed without stopping through the\nobservations intended for medical men, which form the second part of the\nwork, but I judge that every reader will also find therein many facts\nwhich may prove of interest. After having read it, one is more impressed\nthan ever with the importance and delicacy of the motive forces of the\nmemory, in noting the frequency and the varieties even of its sources of\nweakness. M. Sollier has the credit of pointing them out\u2014in the shape\nof \u201cdefects in synthetical power\u201d and in \u201cwill power\u201d\u2014in the sources of\nweakness where one had not been accustomed to look for them. It would be\ninteresting, he thinks, to find out what part amnesia may perhaps take in\nthe pathogeny of certain nervous disorders, and the influence which it\nhas on their evolution. Specialists for the insane might find therein a\nnew subject of study, and psychology will profit, on the other hand, by\nthat which clinical experience offers it. Is not its main object to learn\nto understand life as a unit at the same time that it analyses it as a\ndiversity?\n\n * * * * *\n\nWhen one passes from a book like that of M. Sollier to the work of M.\nl\u2019Abb\u00e9 MAURICE DE BAETS, _Les bases de la morale et du droit_,[47]\none is impressed by the change of method. It has become impossible\nfor us to consider pathology as unallied to questions of morality; and\nwe have accomplished this great object of studying matters pertaining\nto the moral world, the evolution of law, without seeking our base of\nsupport in a religious faith or in a metaphysical affirmation. Even M.\nl\u2019Abb\u00e9 de Baets himself declares emphatically that he desires to adopt\nonly one starting point from among those we are acquainted with,\u2014the\nverification of facts,\u2014and truly he shows a good will and knowledge;\nnevertheless the ground which he considers so firm has, as we believe,\nno stability. All seems strange to us, if I may so speak, in books of\nthis description. The tone which is peculiar to them, the nature of the\nfacts cited, the progress of the reasoning, impeach them just as surely\nas the blue color of his costume reveals afar off an inhabitant of the\nCelestial Empire. I am not an impassioned adversary of the clergy; far\nfrom it. I appreciate their intentions and esteem their persons as one\nshould, but I am unable to share their opinions, and I consider indeed\nthat they deceive themselves when they think that faith has ever given to\nthe world an absolute assurance. It has not given it because it has not\nproved sufficient. Mankind, variable and vacillating though it may be,\ndoes not change its beliefs because of fickleness of heart: its mental\nevolution takes place too slowly for that, and is also too painful. The\nCatholic church of to-day has adopted as its watch-word the return to\nSt. Thomas of Aquinas; it will gain by this unity of effort, without\nsucceeding however in leading back the minds of men to its point of view.\nThe diverse ways we follow tend doubtless as a matter of fact toward the\nsame objective point, and run more or less in the same direction; but\nhumanity scarcely ever passes back again over the paths which it has once\ntraversed.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWe have another little volume by M. LOMBROSO, _Les applications de\nl\u2019anthropologie criminelle_; a sequel to _Nouvelles recherches_, which\nI have mentioned before. We find here interesting pages in regard to\ntransportation and reform schools, and a criticism of the new theories\nof the penal code (Garofalo, Tarde, Sighele, Onanoff and Blorg, Ferri)\u2014a\npart of the question considered in the Congress. A chapter indeed is\ndevoted to the subject of criminal anthropology in modern literature,\nin regard to which it seems to me M. Lombroso always makes more of\na question than is desirable, but which he well understands how to\ncriticise. Then follow several pages on the criminal type in art, after\na work of Dr. Edward Lefort; then comes a description of anthropological\ninstruments and methods. I will not affirm that this last work brings us\nmuch of novelty; it is chiefly a new and energetic presentation of his\nviews, and M. Lombroso has no doubt whatever that by dint of striking the\nnail upon the head he will succeed in driving it into the wall of his\nadversaries.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe work of M. B. BOURDON, _L\u2019expression des emotions et des tendances\ndans le langage_, is certainly one of the most curious books one can\nread. He treats in an original manner of phonetical questions, which\nare less rife in France than in England and Germany, as to what sounds\nsignify, or speech; what is their worth in intensity, elevation, form or\nquality, duration; what phenomena are shown by successions of intensity,\nof elevation, of elementary articulation, of syllables, of words, etc.,\nof duration; what are the relations of these phenomena to versification\nand what comparison one can make between writing and speech: such are the\nproblems particularly studied, at times with the aid of very simple but\ninstructive facts culled from experience.\n\nThese studies\u2014I need scarcely add that they are comparative ones\u2014are\nof interest for various reasons. They lead up to new ideas of grammar\nand of language, and furnish arguments for a reform in orthography of\nwhich M. Bourdon is a very warm partisan. His readers will not be slow\nto notice for the matter of that, that he is in regard to this frankly\nrevolutionary; and it may seem paradoxical to say to them, for example,\nthat \u201cthe distinction between analytical and synthetical languages is\nabsolutely artificial, and could only be produced through our bad systems\nof writing.\u201d Writing, M. Bourdon indeed remarks, introduces separations\nin places where spoken language makes no pause. The English write _I\nwill go_, they pronounce it _Iwillgo_. The analysis which pertains to\nwriting masks the true cohesion of the spoken language, and \u201cif in the\npast all series of articulations had been written as a single word which\nwere in fact pronounced as a single word, we should not have known the\nerror which consists in opposing certain languages classed as synthetical\nto others which we class as analytical.\u201d The argument is perhaps not\na decisive one, and in the neo-Latin languages, for example, one can\nscarcely deny that the analysis of the written language has conformed to\nthe work of decomposition of the antique forms, so as to adapt itself to\nthe new groupings of their essential elements, groupings wherein these\nelements remain variable because speech separates them effectively, in\nmany cases by interpolating governing words or others.\n\nBut it is not my intention to enter into these detailed discussions.\nI leave M. Bourdon in further calling attention to his last chapter,\n_Ecriture_. Persons curious as to graphology will find in it some good\nideas concerning this method of \u201ccharacter reading.\u201d The author does not\ntell everything, and I have a suspicion that he greatly despises certain\nsigns valued by the graphologists, and arrived at empirically, but we\nshould note what he has actually said.\n\n * * * * *\n\nUnder the title, _Le monde physique, Essai de conception exp\u00e9rimentale_,\nM. Dr. JULIEN PIOGER offers to the public a sketch of a world-system.\nThis system is summed up in the expression of \u201cUniversal Solidarity,\u201d\nand is based on the idea of infinitely minute matter-particles, or\n\u201cinfinitesimals,\u201d the mutual relations of which, and their equilibrium,\nconstitute the machinery of the universe. The atomic-mechanical\nhypothesis, says M. Pioger, is wrong in resolving matter into perfected\ndifferential particles and in assigning to its atoms qualities which\nmake of them either true material corpuscules or a real entity, \u201ca thing\nin itself.\u201d On the contrary, far from intending to assign a limit to\nmateriality, the hypothesis of infinitesimals confines itself to limiting\nthe conception which we may have of it. The infinitesimal corresponds\nto the infinitely small, that is to say to the non-perfected, to the\nnon-differentiable, beyond our cognisance and our perceptivity; it\nexpresses the most reduced condition of the affinities which constitute\nmatter; it is the expression of the infinitesimal existence of that\nwhich we call motion, extension, ponderability, under the general name\nof matter. Now the most simple thing which can be conceived of in the\nphysical world, is the _couple_ formed by the essential equipoise of two\ninfinitesimals. In developing the couple it becomes possible to form the\nuniverse in all its great variety. The solidarity of the parts in the\nwhole appears as the essential condition of existence of all that which\nIs\u2014the necessary condition of all individuality.\n\nIn conclusion I call attention to two new editions, one the well-known\nwork of M. BERNARD P\u00c9REZ, _Les trois premi\u00e8res ann\u00e9es de l\u2019enfant_, fifth\nedition, revised and supplied with an introduction by Mr. James Sully;\nthe other _Les functions du cerveau_, by M. JULES SOURY, a work highly\nesteemed, embodying the most recent researches.\n\n LUCIEN ARR\u00c9AT.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[46] Rueff, publisher.\n\n[47] This book and the following ones are published by F. Alcan.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\nGERMANY.\n\n\nOne of our foremost psychiatrists, Professor v. Krafft-Ebing of Vienna,\nsays in his celebrated text-book on psychiatry: \u201cIf Pedagogy made a\nmore serious study of the character of man in his psychopathological\nrelations, many of the mistakes and severities of our system of education\nwould be removed, many an unsuitable choice of vocation would be left\nunmade, and thus many a psychical existence rescued.\u201d\n\nAny one who is at all familiar with the most important doctrines of the\ndiseased phenomena of mental life, and who knows how frequently psychical\ndisturbances of a more or less serious nature occur during childhood,\nwill fully agree with Krafft-Ebing, and will only regret that pedagogy,\nin this important direction, has completely neglected its task.\n\nAlthough lately the necessity of psychiatric knowledge for the pedagogue\nhas been insisted upon in professional circles, for instance, by\nProfessor STRUEMPELL in his _Pedagogic Pathology_ (comp. _The Monist_ II,\n106), yet instruction in this department occupies a wholly subsidiary\nplace in pedagogic education, and has not been made as it should have\nbeen, an organic part of the same. The writer of these lines has\naccordingly discussed this subject in a special treatise, maintaining\nthat the most important diseased phenomena of mental life might be\ntreated as a part of pedagogic psychology (comp. _The Monist_ I, 619).\n\nThe demands made were met in different ways. While the English and\nAmerican press accepted these demands without reserve (for instance, in\nHALL\u2019S _Pedagogical Seminary_, I, 297), in Germany there has been more\ncaution displayed, inasmuch as the opposing difficulties were regarded as\ngreater than they probably were (Professor REIN\u2019S _P\u00e4dagogische Studien_,\n1892, Heft I).\n\nWe have, however, simply to call to mind the doctrine which more than\ntwenty years ago Maudsley in his \u201cPhysiology and Pathology of the Mind\u201d\nlaid such special emphasis upon, that psychic laws are the same in\nhealthy and diseased phenomena, only that they do not operate under the\nsame conditions and therefore produce different symptoms. Far from its\nbeing true, therefore, that the introduction of psychopathology into\npsychology can be opposed by any especially well-founded objections, such\na procedure will, on the contrary, be found to be, just as Maudsley said,\nan appropriate and absolutely indispensable auxiliary of the study of\nthis science. And that which was emphasised by Maudsley, and lately also\nby MUENSTERBERG in the treatise already discussed in _The Monist_ (II,\n289), _On the Problems and Methods of Psychology_ (Leipsic, 1891, Abel),\nZiehen has done in his \u201cOutlines of Physiological Psychology\u201d in a manner\nwhich will be full of suggestions for the pedagogue (comp. _The Monist_\nI, 598).\n\nTo be sure, the work of Ziehen is very far from supplying all that\nthe pedagogue needs. We have in this work a vast mass of valuable\nobservations, which will have to be elaborated in a manner that accords\nwith the needs of pedagogy, if this science is to derive any material\nprofit from psychiatry. For the bibliography of this subject we shall\nrefer the reader to a former correspondence of ours (_The Monist_ II,\n103), and select at present for examination one province only,\u2014a province\nwhich is deserving of especial consideration, inasmuch as the phenomena\nwhich occur in it are phenomena which most frequently confront the\npedagogist, and are most likely to be overlooked by the untrained eye.\nWe refer to the _psychopathic subsidiary phenomena_ of DR. KOCH, by which\nexpression this author comprises all the psychical irregularities, be\nthey natural or acquired, affecting the life of the human personality,\nwhich, though not even in the severest cases amounting to actual mental\ndisorders, yet in the most favorable instances so affect the persons\nafflicted that they appear as lacking the full possession of mental\nnormality and capacity. The second part of Koch\u2019s work, mentioned in _The\nMonist_ in the place above cited, has just now appeared. (Ratisbon, 1892,\nOtto Maier). Having discussed in the first part of his work inherited\nand chronic psychopathic subsidiary phenomena, the author now proceeds\nto discuss acquired subsidiary factors, and holds out the prospect of a\nthird part, on the appearance of which we shall have occasion again to\ndiscuss the entire work from a different point of view. For the present,\nonly the pedagogic aspect of the question interests us. On many readers,\nKoch\u2019s book must have made the impression,\u2014to judge from his concluding\nremarks,\u2014that the author shares Lombroso\u2019s point of view, and to very\nmany pedagogues such a position would be, from the very outset, a bad\nrecommendation, for it would necessarily, in the very nature of the case,\ninvolve the pedagogue in great embarrassment, in the same way as it has\ninvolved the philosophical jurist. But embarrassment is no reason why\nwe should close our ears to the truth, and if Lombroso should be right\nin all his teachings, pedagogy would also be obliged to accommodate\nits doctrines to his. Upon the whole, however, Koch is opposed to him.\nThus when he says: \u201cWhat I commend Lombroso for is that he has observed\nmuch, has collected rich materials, and has been the source of great\nincentives in many directions, and has worked suggestively in many ways;\nwhat I reproach him with is that he has confounded the healthy with\nthe diseased, and has brought under one and the same category without\nsufficient and appropriate tests, psychotic phenomena and phenomena which\nare psychopathically merely of a subsidiary order; what I reject is his\ntheory of degeneration and his peculiar views of philosophy.\u201d\n\nMaterial, such as Koch and others offer, must first be elaborated\ninto a pedagogic psychopathology\u2014or better still into a pedagogic\npathopsychology\u2014before pedagogy, as a whole, can assume in this\ndirection the proper form. Though we consider, now, this preparatory work\nas indispensable, we can, nevertheless, not think of denying the value\nof works which, without any profession of far-reaching psychological\nanalysis, put in effective and available form for pedagogy the diseased\nphenomena of the mental life of children. The first German work of this\nkind, so far as we know, is from the pen of a Leipsic teacher, GUSTAV\nSIEGERT, and bears the title _Problematische Kindesnaturen_.[48] This\nlittle work is now followed by a more comprehensive treatise, published\nby a Bremen alienist, Dr. SCHOLZ, already known to the readers of _The\nMonist_ (II, 104), and bearing the title _Die Characterfehler des Kindes,\neine Erziehungslehre f\u00fcr Schule und Haus_.[49] Such books are valuable\nnot only for the observations they offer and the isolated explanations\nand pedagogic advice they present, but also for the suggestions which the\nattentive and psychologically cultivated reader can always receive from\nthem.\n\nLike Siegert, Scholz principally shows us isolated child-types wherein\ndiseased qualities play a more or less pronounced r\u00f4le. But while the\nformer\u2019s presentation is somewhat journalistic in style, that of the\nlatter is more didactic; although this tendency is not an absolutely\nrigid one, as the author counts mothers as readers of his book. But\nif the form of presentation leads one to infer greater profundity in\nScholz than in Siegert, this is in still higher degree the case with the\narrangement of the material. While Siegert strings his child-pictures\nloosely together, Scholz arranges them according to real psychological\npoints of view, so that (remarkable to say) the faults of children are\ndiscussed, first, in the province of feeling and sentiment, then in\nthat of representation, and finally in that of volition and action. The\nintroductory and concluding chapters show, also, that Scholz attempts\nto enter more profoundly into the subject than Siegert proposes, and we\ncherish the hope that, now that this popular work has appeared, Scholz\nwill very soon present us with a strictly scientific book, in which he\nshall have occasion to deal with some particular points, such as, for\ninstance, falsehood and unchastity, more comprehensively than was perhaps\npossible in a book intended for his present circle of readers.\n\nWith respect, now, to all systematic presentations of pedagogy,\npsychopathology can, as we have before indicated, never attain in them\nits proper position, until the above-mentioned preparatory work has been\ncompleted. But this fact should not preclude one\u2019s calling especial\nattention to the importance of this province, at least in some incidental\nmanner.\n\nIn such a work as the _Allgemeine P\u00e4dagogik_ of ZILLER,[50] for instance,\nthe third edition of which has just been published by F. Mattes of\nLeipsic, there surely was abundant opportunity to do this\u2014an opportunity\nwhich one might say almost amounted to obligation. For Ziller treats\nhereditary and acquired characteristics in great detail, and such\ntreatment remains necessarily a one-sided one, if abnormal traits are\nnot considered in it. Ziller, with Herbart, demands that individuality\nalways be taken as the starting-point. But how many child-individualities\nare there, which, in the different periods of their development, may be\nregarded as fully normal!\n\nThe reason of this omission must be looked for partly in the\ncircumstance, that Ziller, as well as the new editor of this otherwise\nvaluable work, belongs to the Herbartian school. If, namely, we\ncompare the psychological literature of the Herbartian school with the\npublications of French, English, and American writers, or even with\nthe works which in recent times have issued from other philosophical\nquarters of Germany, it will be unmistakably seen that the pathological\nconditions of the mind have been little considered by the followers of\nHerbart. Nor have voices been wanting, that would make Herbart himself\nresponsible for this error. He did not, they say, sufficiently appreciate\nthe importance of the pathological phenomena of mind, and his pupils\nwere in this respect influenced by him. But this reproach will be found,\non close examination, to be untenable. Herbart, it is true, did express\nhimself repeatedly against the overestimation of \u201crare and curious\nphenomena,\u201d unusual mental states and such things,[51] and his warning\nis applicable also to our epoch, which produces many psychological works\nin which remarkable things are to be read but which contribute nothing\nworth mentioning towards the explanation of even comparatively simple\nevents. Herbart holds, that the psychology of the normal and ordinary\nstates should be the first and principal object of scientific attention;\nthe explanation of much that is extraordinary will then follow. With\nregard to this latter point, he remarks very positively: \u201cI do not,\nhowever, wish by this, to gainsay the value of any real psychological\nobservation. There must be a welcome place in science for every\nexperience.\u201d It will be seen, therefore, that Herbart is not at all far\nfrom the point of view of Maudsley and other investigators. We find, in\nfact, that he mentions repeatedly abnormal mental conditions, and also\nsystematically treats them, even quoting such celebrated alienists as\nReil and Pinel (_Text-book of Psychology_, \u00a7\u00a7 142-149). The probability\nis, therefore, that psychopathology would have been properly employed in\nHerbart\u2019s psychology, if it had been at all elaborated in his day, and\nits influence would through Herbart have been directly felt in pedagogy,\nas no pedagogist has made better or more careful use of psychology than\nhe.\n\nBut Herbart\u2019s pupils have done no further work in the province pointed\nout by him. It is true, his psychology has been made use of by physicians\nlike Griesinger and Spielmann, and recently also to some extent by\nKrafft-Ebing, but the works of these men have had no influence on the\npsychological text-books of the Herbartian school, and consequently the\nscience has up to the present day exerted no noticeable influence on\npedagogy, either in Waitz, in Stoy, or in Ziller. In other pedagogic\nschools, this has, it is true, also been the case; but in these, who make\nno pretensions of relying on the teachings of psychology, the sin is\nmore easily pardoned. But this is not the only respect in which Ziller\u2019s\n_Pedagogy_ is not up to the times. Ziller defined pedagogy as the\ninfluences, formed according to ethical points of view, which are brought\nto bear on the mind of the pupil, and would not admit influences brought\nto bear on the body, in so far as such should enter into the pedagogic\nsystem. This misconception also springs from Ziller\u2019s adherence to the\nHerbartian school, which represents, as we well know, a metaphysical\npluralism; but it is in a still higher degree due to the fact, that\nin Ziller\u2019s day both the intimate relation between physiological and\npsychological processes had not been satisfactorily established, and also\nwere not sufficiently known to him. If it were otherwise, his pluralism\nneed by no means have necessarily led him into such one-sidedness, for\nthis metaphysical pluralism does not exclude a monistic conception of\n_phenomena_; even assuming this doctrine, one may say that motion and\nfeeling are two different but inseparable sides of the same phenomenon.\nThe \u201creal things\u201d produce by their interaction, simultaneously and of\nnecessity, both an inner side and an outer; for which reason one of our\nforemost psychologists, Volkmann of Volkmar, explicitly terms Herbart\u2019s\npsychology monistic (_Text-book of Psychology_, second edition, I, 63).\n\nA psychologico-physiological work, from which the new editor of Ziller\u2019s\n_Pedagogy_ might have extracted many valuable things, is the book of\nthe Italian MOSSO, _On Fatigue_, which has just been translated into\nGerman,[52] and which will excite much attention owing to the present\nactive discussion of the question of overwork.\n\nSupplementary to this work I will also mention a little tract by DR.\nBURGERSTEIN of Vienna, entitled _Die Arbeitskurve einer Schulstunde_.[53]\nThis tract is a lecture, which the author gave at the Seventh\nInternational Congress for Hygiene and Demography at London, and in\nwhich he seeks to find by statistical methods, the duration of a\n\u201cschool-period\u201d\u2014a very laboriously composed treatise and one difficult\nto read, but possessed of high interest in psychological and pedagogic\nrespects.\n\nFrom pedagogy to evolution is but a step, at least it is in Ziller\u2019s\ndevelopment of Herbart\u2019s ideas. It is true, Ziller has taken a decided\nstand against Darwinism, for Ziller works with two contradictory\nideas; but his theory of education possesses points of resemblance\nand analogy to the Darwin-Haeckel theory of development. According\nto Ziller, each individual passes, also intellectually, through all\nthe stages of development that mankind at large has passed through,\nonly in a shorter time; and it is in conformity with such succession\nthat the order of the various courses of a pedagogical system is to be\narranged. Following Ziller\u2019s precedent, PROFESSOR VAIHINGER, of Halle,\nin his treatise _Naturforschung und Schule_ (Science and the Schools),\nhas taken up the school-reform initiated by Professor Preyer, and has\nexpressly transferred the fundamental law of biogenesis to pedagogy.\nHow instruction is to be arranged under this point of view, cannot be\nexplained in this letter, which is already long enough. We shall simply\nremark that the idea has found in Germany a large number of both friends\nand opponents.\n\nThe opponents have recently been joined by a natural scientist, DR.\nHAMANN, professor of zoology in G\u00f6ttingen, who has just published a\nbook under the title _Entwicklungslehre und Darwinismus_ (Evolution and\nDarwinism),[54] in which he does not combat the theory of evolution\nitself, but simply the Darwin-Haeckelian form of that theory, placing\nhimself in the ranks of His and Hensen. The book appeared almost\nsimultaneously with the fourth edition of HAECKEL\u2019S _Anthropogeny_,[55]\nbut the author, nevertheless, in his supplementary remarks, discusses\nthe \u201capology\u201d which Haeckel subjoined to his work. Haeckel\u2019s book needs\nno recommendation in scientific circles; it will be sufficient to state\nthat the work has been subjected to essential alterations, but that its\nfundamental features have remained the same.\n\nA new psychology, on the Darwinian basis, by Prof. FRITZ SCHULTZE of\nDresden, is now in course of publication, entitled _Vergleichende\nSeelenkunde_ (Comparative Psychology[56]). The first part, which treats\nof the fundamental principles of physiological psychology, has already\nappeared. On the completion of the work we shall have occasion to return\nto it.\n\n CHR. UFER.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[48] _Problematic Child-natures._ Leipsic, 1890, Robert Vogtl\u00e4nder.\n\n[49] _Faults of Character in Children, A System of Instruction for School\nand Home._ Leipsic. Eduard Heinrich Mayer.\n\n[50] Compare also, _The Educational Review_ (New York), Vol. II, page 30.\n\n[51] _Psychologie als Wissenschaft_, \u00a7 5.\n\n[52] Salomon Hirzel, Leipsic.\n\n[53] Hamburg, 1891, Leopold Voss.\n\n[54] Jena, 1892, Hermann Costenoble.\n\n[55] Leipsic, 1892, Engelmann.\n\n[56] Leipsic, 1892.\n\n\n\n\nCRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.\n\n\n\n\nA LETTER FROM MR. HERBERT SPENCER.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The Monist_:\n\nAs I feel it a duty to reserve, for other purposes, the very small\npower of work now left to me, I am obliged to decline entering upon\na controversy. I must leave readers to examine for themselves\u2014little\nhoping, however, that they will do so.\n\nOne point only I wish to note. The use of the expression \u201cforms of\nthought,\u201d instead of \u201cforms of intuition,\u201d was simply an inadvertence;\nas will be manifest on observing that though I have used the wrong\nexpression in the note, I have used the right expression in the text\n(p. 203), as also throughout my criticism of Kant\u2019s doctrine in _The\nPrinciples of Psychology_, Part VII, Chapter IV, \u201cThe Reasonings of\nMetaphysicians,\u201d \u00a7 399.\n\n HERBERT SPENCER.\n\n\n\n\nLOGIC AS RELATION-LORE.\n\n\nIn the French _Revue Philosophique_, in the August and September 1891\nnumbers of the same, M. George Mouret has an essay entitled \u201cMathematical\nEquality\u201d in the course of which and as though subsidiary to his\nostensible purpose he discourses upon the topics of relations and\nconcepts and upon the fundamental elements of logic in general. His essay\nis really more important as a contribution to logical doctrine than as a\ntreatment of mathematical equality.\n\nThe scope of his discourse will be seen by reference to his closing\nparagraphs in which he sums up what he considers to be the results\nachieved by him in his essay. Therein, he says that he has \u201ctreated of\nthe general theory of the composition of concepts and relations and set\nthe foundations of the logic of analysis and the logic of definition.\u201d\n\n\nI. THE SPENCERIAN AXIOM.\n\nThe determining factor of every philosophical dissertation is of course\nsome very general supposition which is taken as established and which\nexercises a controlling influence over all the observations of its author.\n\nIn this case this determining supposition is found in what M. Mouret\ncalls his \u201c_axiom_ of _symmetry_.\u201d The same is thus stated by him \u201c_Two\nthings which have the same symmetrical relations to a third thing have\nbetween them that same relation._\u201d\n\nM. Mouret is not one of those scholars that lack hospitality for\nother writings than those of their own nationality. From this fault\nso noticeable in the work of so many of the French scholars M. Mouret\nhimself seems to be free. Indeed so far as regards the previous work done\nin the domain he sets himself to examine, he accords almost exclusive\nesteem to the writings of English thinkers. In fact he declares himself\nso far as regards his present topic a disciple of Mr. Herbert Spencer\nand puts his \u201caxiom of symmetry\u201d as an adaptation of that maxim of his\nsaid master which is of the tenor as follows, viz: \u201c_Things which have\na definite relation to the same thing have a definite relation to one\nanother._\u201d This maxim, as Mr. Spencer tells us, was suggested to him by\na remark of the late eminent author who is known to the world under the\npseudonym of George Eliot, who herself stated it under the form \u201c_Things\nthat have a constant relation to the same thing have a constant relation\nto each other._\u201d\n\nThose who are well acquainted with the psychology of Mr. Spencer will\nrecognise that this maxim of his is made by him the very backbone of all\nhis observations upon reasoning. If it has the validity which he imputes\nto it, it has an importance which it will be hard to overestimate, but if\non the contrary, and as we shall submit, it is in every form in which it\nhas been stated, certainly unsound and misleading, it is high time that\nits virtue should be brought into question.\n\nThe _dicta_ of the masters whether they first enounce the same or whether\nthey only give currency thereto by their ratification are always proper\nsubjects for special scrutiny. There is always found a disposition to\naccept them on their mere _ipse dixit_ without any attempt at criticism\nor independent observation. This is decisively _not_ the scientific mood\nor mode. The spirit of that modern leaven that is currently referred\nto under the name of Science is characteristically a critical one, and\none that is considerably irreverent in regard to the authority of mere\npersonality. In this it is happily distinguished from the spirit that has\nmarked the past history of what may be called the \u201cregular\u201d schools of\nphilosophy.\n\nM. Mouret is not alone in his inadvertent esteem for the maxim in\nquestion. In the issue of _Mind_ for October 1891 Mr. L. T. Hobhouse\npublishes an article entitled \u201cInduction and Deduction,\u201d in which he\ngives an undue appraisal to the worth of the maxim under consideration,\neven though the author of the article seems to be well aware that said\nmaxim stands in much need of qualification.\n\nWe venture to say that this maxim in all its forms has gained whatever\ncurrency it has enjoyed in virtue alone of the incompetent comprehension\nthat too generally prevails in regard to the nature and characteristics\nof that sort of things that are relations.\n\nA notable example of this lack of comprehension is supplied in the\nlogical treatise of Mr. Carveth Read, a work ostensibly founded upon\nthe significance of the category of relation and yet in which at the\nvery start the author tells us that a relation is something which is\nindefinable.\n\n\nII. IMPORTANCE OF RELATION-LORE.\n\nThis topic of relations is one that is neglected in a degree that\nreflects no credit upon the pretensions of those who undertake to\ninstruct others in matters logical and philosophical. The thing itself\nis in the thinking of every one and the term and its derivations are\nin universal use. They are used as though they imported an idea that\nno one was liable to misapply or to misunderstand. The truth, however,\nis that of all the stock terms in our graver discourse this very word\n\u201crelation\u201d and its derivatives are the ones that are oftenest heard and\nread without any lucidity of mind concerning their proper intent as a\npart of their context. They are used with an assortment of meanings and\nnon-meanings that are quite distracting to try to follow and quite vain\nto try and reconcile. In particular the difference between _relationship_\nand _relation_, between the _ground_ or _foundation_ of the relation\nand the relation itself, between the plural fact, whether of tendency,\ninteraction, transition, or _status_, that is a co-condition with the\nrelations, and the relations that co-condition that same plural fact, is\nconstantly ignored in thinking and in the expression thereof, to the more\nor less confusion in, and inconsequence of, the whole discourse delivered.\n\nIt is no slight commendation of the perspicacity of M. Mouret to observe\nthat he has discovered that the way towards a resolution of the problems\nhe sets himself to work out lies through what to him appears the\naltogether unexplored regions of relation-lore, for it is evident that he\nregards himself as a pioneer in this field.\n\n\nIII. WORKS ON RELATION-LORE IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.\n\nIn observing this we cannot but hold M. Mouret unfortunate in not having\nbeen put upon better lines of inquiry. He seems to have been wholly\nunaware of the treasures of investigation in this domain that exist in\nthe English language and that for many years have been available for\nthe student. His case in this respect is seen in the exaltation which\nhe gives to the semi-popular discourses of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Read, as\ncontrasted with the profound researches of DeMorgan and Boole and their\ndisciples. It is evident that he has judged concerning the comparative\nquality of the various lines of English research not after an examination\nof his own, but after the current popular renown. For example, he speaks\nof the work of DeMorgan and Boole as presenting \u201conly a simple mode of\nrepresenting some of the logical laws\u201d and as being \u201csurrounded with a\nformidable and complicated apparel which disguises the value of their\ntentatives.\u201d\n\nSince M. Mouret is manifestly an earnest student of the topic of\nrelation-lore this language shows that he has at best only a second or\nthird-hand knowledge of what DeMorgan and Boole really did. He ought\nto have known that in the recondite field of research in question all\nreally competent treatment of the same would be very far from having\nany \u201cpopular\u201d quality. For a man to discourse of relation-lore in\nignorance of what DeMorgan, the very father of the \u201cLogic of Relatives,\u201d\naccomplished is like discoursing of Darwinism in ignorance of \u201cThe Origin\nof Species.\u201d\n\nWe opine that when M. Mouret shall have consulted the great memoir\nof DeMorgan in the tenth volume of the \u201cCambridge Philosophical\nTransactions\u201d or better, when he shall have become acquainted with\nthe more developed work of Mr. C. S. Peirce, to whom beyond question\nrelation-lore is most indebted for its present state of progress, he\nwill have a better esteem for the value of the \u201ctentatives\u201d of DeMorgan\nand Boole and their disciples. Mr. Peirce has published three principal\npapers on the subject in question. The first of these was published in\n1870 in the ninth volume of the \u201cMemoirs of the American Academy of Arts\nand Sciences.\u201d Then in 1880 and in 1884, while Mr. Peirce was lecturer\non logic at Johns Hopkins University, he published in the _American\nJournal of Mathematics_ two papers dealing more or less extensively\nwith relation-lore. One of these his \u201c_Hauptwerk_\u201d as it is called by\nProfessor Schroeder of Carlsruhe, appears in the third volume of the\njournal mentioned and the other in the seventh volume of the same.\nMr. Peirce was one of the contributors to our new American \u201cCentury\nDictionary,\u201d and in that work under the definitions of Relation and\nRelativity there appears a summary treatment of the subject which is as\nwe take it the work of Mr. Peirce and which might have given to M. Mouret\nhints which he would have appreciated. Also the editor of this magazine\nin his article \u201cAre there Things in Themselves?\u201d in the January 1892\nnumber thereof incidentally touches upon the topic under consideration in\nsuch a way as to correct some of the more inveterate misconceptions.\n\n\nIV. M. MOURET\u2019S THEORY OF RELATIONS.\n\nThe article of M. Mouret is in so many points so excellent a discourse\nthat the chief reflection one is inclined to make is that upon its own\nprinciples it ought to have been better. He seems to have been widely\nawake to the primordial nature of relations as philosophical data.\nHe says: \u201cEvery notion or relation is a _function_ of relations more\ndirectly known and enters as a relational element into other relations\nless proximate to the common sources,\u201d and also that \u201cevery concept or\nnotion ought to resolve into a group of relations.\u201d\n\nBy such tokens as these we naturally look to see M. Mouret making it his\nvery first concern to explain fully the nature of those primordial data\nthat are relations. Indeed he seems himself to be fully aware of this\nnatural expectation for he says: \u201cWhat then is a relation; what is a\nconcept or notion? To this double question an answer is necessary and a\nprecise answer not consisting in the substitution of one form of words\nfor another form of words bearing the same meaning or no meaning at all.\u201d\n\nWe cannot however find that he has done this. Instead of it and almost\nwhile saying that every concept and notion ought to resolve in a group\nof relations he announces, \u201cWhat I have to examine is the constitution,\nthe structure of these _relation-generating groups_.\u201d Thus he starts with\na synthesis when what is needed is analysis. He starts with supposing\na group of relational elements indeterminate in number and proceeds to\ninquire as to the conditions that must subsist with regard to them,\nrespectively and in combination, in order that a _definite_ relation may\nsubsist as to a pair of the relational elements. These conditions he\nfinds to be four in number. First, he finds that\u2014\n\n\u201cIt is necessary that every one of the terms of the group should be\nconnected one to the other by _definite relations_; that between any two\nterms there must always be intermediate terms that connect them in a\ncontinuous way.\u201d This he calls the condition of \u201cSolidarity.\u201d Secondly,\nhe finds that there must obtain the condition of _Co-Existence_. By\nco-existence he intends\u2014\n\n\u201cNot a definite co-existence in time, that is to say, a relation of\nsimultaneity or concomitance, nor yet that established co-existence\nwhich constitutes the causal relation, but an indefinite co-existence\nindependent of the order of its terms and of all consideration of time or\nduration.\u201d\n\nHaving thus supposed his group all well stocked with relations, he\nproceeds to relegate most of them to the limbo of inconsequence by\ninvoking a _principle_ which he calls the principle of _indetermination_.\nBy virtue of this principle in every particular case the _particular\ndeterminations_ of all the terms become indeterminate and those of the\nintermediate terms doubly so. Thus the supposed facts of the case become\nfit for the existence of the _Third_ condition, that of _Abstraction_,\nand for the arising of a general concept or notion.\n\nBut corresponding to every concept or notion is its negative or opposite\nconcept or notion. As this negative depends necessarily upon certain\n_particular determinations_ of the same terms that bear the _particular\ndeterminations_ and which being singly indeterminate admit of the\npositive concept or notion, there necessarily must obtain two systems\nof singly indeterminate _particular determinations_ relative to but\nincompatible with one another, and so relative that the negation of one\nset entails the obtaining of the other set, or in other words either\nset being negated entails the obtaining of the other set. These facts\nconstitute what M. Mouret calls the _principle_ of _incompatibility_ and\ninvolve his _Fourth_ condition of _Relativity_ stated by him as follows:\n\n \u201cAll the particular determinations of the extreme terms must\n not be compatible with the system and the negation of certain\n relations of the system must entail the negation of the\n relation which they make between the extreme terms.\u201d\n\n\nV. REFLECTIONS ON M. MOURET\u2019S THEORY.\n\nNow we cannot regard this as a successful attempt to explain the nature\nand characteristics of relations, or to unfold the involutions of\nrelation-lore.\n\nWe fully realise that if every concept or relation resolves into a group\nof relations we must in some form or other take what are relations in\nreality as data to begin with, but this does not prevent us from taking\nour datum terms for our turn of explanation as not requiring at present\nany recognition other than as relational elements. What is needful as\na prime requisite on the very start of any research in relation-lore\nis to obtain a clear idea of what is meant by a relation. Meanings are\nprimarily matters of mental status. We have to determine the relation\nthat subsists between the mind and the object through the mediating\ninterpretation of a word, and the mental affection lies nearest and\nlogically comes first. It may very well be that the mental affection\nrequires correction, but this cannot take place until its faults are\nobserved, and these cannot become evident until the mental affection is\nitself duly understood.\n\nThe disciples of that school of logic in which DeMorgan and Boole,\nboth eminent mathematicians, hold so exalted a rank as discoverers,\nregard cognition as arising in consequence of brain functioning or\n_mental operation_ and study the results of this operation as yielding\ntheir import in dependence upon and only in dependence upon the proper\noperation in virtue of which they arise.\n\nNow no cognition whatever, even of the most elementary sort, arises\nexcept in connection with and in consequence of that operation of the\nsensibility which is _distinction_. Distinction is of multitudinous and\nmanifold aspects. In all its phases whether it be passive or active\nit is naught else than the arising or the assigning of relations. The\nattempt to posit an unqualifiedly absolute\u2014that is, an unqualifiedly\nunrelated\u2014universe of discourse must be futile and blank, necessarily\nand insuperably. Any form of notation that pretends to express such a\nuniverse of discourse, is only saved, if at all, from being unqualifiedly\nnonsensical, by standing as antithetical\u2014that is, by being _related_\nto forms of notation that express relation and nothing else than\nrelation. This rigorously prime operation of distinction is not only pure\nrelation-ing but it is of that sort of relation-ing that is at once a\ndistinguishing and a conjoining. The \u201cOne and the Many\u201d are insuperably\nimplicit therein. Distinction having operated to various extents, and\nthereby various relations having come into view, we become aware of those\nitems of experience that are objects or facts. Each and every one of\nthese objects or facts are in truth distinguished and are therefore in\nno strict sense _indiscernible_ from each other, but since no science\ncan possibly obtain in relation to mere particulars we find it useful to\ndisregard various points of distinction that obtain in respect to various\nobjects and facts and to converge our regard upon the points wherein\ndistinction, not absolutely vanishes, but _tends to vanish_.\n\nBy this operation, which is _abstraction_, various objects and facts\nbecome in mental regard fit and useful to be taken as copies of one\nanother and as indifferent for use in most of the turns of mental life.\n\nThere are indeed various relations, objects, and facts, with respect to\nwhich no further operation or operations of distinction than the mere\ndistinctions of the time, the place, or the occasion of their various\nmanifestations have been applied nor can without great difficulty be\napplied. But we are therefore by no means entitled to say that such\nare in truth irresolvable. Contrarily, and reasoning inductively we are\njustified in concluding that every relation, object, and fact will under\nanalysis of adequate power resolve without limit into other relations,\nobjects, and facts.\n\nWe are not yet prepared to see that the ultimate components of relations,\nobjects, and facts resolve into relations, and nothing but relations,\nbecause we are not yet prepared with an explicit idea of the nature and\ncharacteristics of these elementary objects.\n\nThe study of M. Mouret since it starts with relations combining them\nunder the conditions of Solidarity Co-Existence, Abstraction and\nRelativity, (which are nothing else than other relations or compounds\nof relations,) does not seem to us to advance us at all in the most\nfundamental requisite. He says no more than to say that in order for the\ngroups of relations to generate further definite relations the relations\nthus grouped together must be related to one another and then that most\nof these relations must be disregarded.\n\nM. Mouret distinguishes, with respect to a relation three factors, the\n_Matter_, or the relational elements grouped together, the _Form_, or the\norder in which the relational elements are arrayed, and the _Foundation_.\n\nAs his study of the topic of relations is professedly for the purpose\nof enabling him the better to solve the nature of the relation of\nmathematical equality, his success may be estimated by reference to\nhis conclusions in regard to that relation. These are as follows: \u201cThe\nrelation of equality is formed of undetermined matter, it possesses a\nbinary form, and has for a condition a relation of indiscernibility\nbetween the two elements.\u201d\n\nSuch conclusions appear to us to be impotent not to say erroneous. If\ntwo things obtain at all, they obtain as two and not one, in very virtue\nof being distinguished the one from the other. Except with regard to\nsome more or less arbitrary distinctions, like the distinction between\ncoincident points, all distinctions obtain only in virtue of some\nrelation that can be nothing else than a point of _discernibility_.\nNumbers and other mathematical things are taken as not-different not\nbecause they are in truth indiscernible but because for the turn in hand\ntheir points of difference are irrelevant.\n\nConcerning the much mooted question of the proper field of logic as a\nscience M. Mouret holds it to be the \u201cscience of relations and general\nconcepts.\u201d Although we hold that logic is particularly concerned with the\nlore that is more directly related to the phenomena of erroneous thinking\nand its correction, the view of M. Mouret is not unacceptable. \u201cReasoning\nconsists in the observation that where certain relations subsist certain\nothers are found,\u201d as Mr. Peirce has remarked.\n\n\nVI. CONCERNING MEANINGS AND EXPLANATIONS.\n\nAs preliminary to our account of relations we will make an observation\nwhich seems to us of considerable use in connection therewith. It is\nnot without its bearing on the theory of definition or rather upon the\nbroader theory of explanation. With M. Mouret we hold that every concept\nand relation resolves into a compound of relations. Since relations are\ndata that are absolutely elementary at least so far as we are at present\ninstructed they are of course not subsumable under any other sort of\ndata that are better known. Moreover, whatever explanation we here make\nmust needs be made by means of written words. Thus an important question\narises as to what method is to be pursued in this special exigency. The\ntheory of definition leads us to the same difficulty, for although the\nmeanings of many words can be defined in terms that are more proximate\nto the elementary relations, we will always come at last to terms that\nadmit of no improved explanation by such a method. There is no device\nof words that can evade or supersede the ultimate recourse to things.\nNow the significations of words are learned in most cases not so much by\ndefinitions and verbal descriptions as by _the observation of the various\napplications of the words_. Indeed this is the primitive way in which the\nmeanings of words are found out. The child knows nothing of what, say,\nthe word _horse_ means until some one shows it an actual horse and may\nbe pointing to it says repeatedly, _horse_, in such a way as to excite\nthe observation of the child to the intended application of the word to\nthe thing. This is because the relation of every general sign to its\nobject subsists only in consequence of a mental association, and until\nthis mental association is created the sign has no meaning. The methods\nof evoking these mental associations are at present quite unmethodical\nand do not receive the attention which their importance merits. One\nfeasible method is to present or to state a number of scenes that shall\npresent the object in various ways in connection with the sign thereof,\nand thus to excite attention to the proper application of the sign. The\ngeometer does this by means of his diagrams without which or their mental\ncounterparts all his mere words would be in vain.\n\nMr. Edward T. Dixon has lately published a work on the \u201cFoundations of\nGeometry\u201d in which he would introduce as a fundamental datum what is\nreally an altogether new and exceedingly abstract conception which he\ncalls by an old name, that of _direction_. The old term has never been\nas yet taken in any abstract universal sense because apart from definite\nright lines showing it as an attribute any abstract universal meaning\nis wholly unassignable. But the conception that Mr. Dixon would instal\nis removed in abstractness from such a universal yet one more step in\nuniversality. A three-fold infinity of right lines differing in direction\ncan be drawn in ordinary space to each of which pertain two corresponding\nuniversals of direction, one converse to the other. Now the conception\nof direction that Mr. Dixon proposes for service as an elementary\ngeometrical datum is the universal that subsumes all these lower ranking\nuniversals as particulars. Of course he has difficulty in even trying to\nexplain what he means. Realising the impossibility of subsuming it in\nany way he takes a method which if it were more thoroughly applied, and\nwholly emancipated from the lingering notion of definition, might have\nbeen more successful. As he actually left the matter his real meaning\ncan only be drawn from close study of the way in which he applies the\nterm in his discourse in general.\n\nOwing to its excessive abstractness his conception is wholly unfit for\nservice in elementary geometry. One has to become a good geometer before\nthe conception can even be approached.\n\n\nVII. ANOTHER THEORY OF RELATIONS.\n\nWe shall proceed to explain what we regard as a true and adequate notion\nof a relation by stating some scenes that display the same. We do not\nregard it as needful to state many of them and we take for our first one,\nthe common transaction of making a donation. We have here for relational\nelements or terms as they are usually called a set of three. Separately,\nor as not yet brought into relation in virtue of the giving, there may\nbe, say _G_ an owner of _W_ a watch and _R_ the intended beneficiary. The\nplural fact of the giving is the _relationship_ or the _foundation_ of\nthe _relations_ that arise in virtue of said giving. This _foundation_\nbecomes to be in virtue of the creation of such relations by the giving.\nEither one of the set of three may be taken as the datum of reference and\naccording to the election in this respect, the relations may differ and\nthe technical names we are about to give will vary in their application.\nSince simplicity will be gained thereby and also our present turn fully\nsubserved we will take _G_ as the datum term of reference. So taking\nit _G_ is called the _relate_ and both _W_ and _R_ are called the\n_correlates_. For this present turn and in very virtue of the giving and\nonly in virtue thereof _G_ becomes related to _W_ and _R_ in a certain\nrelation one of the names of which is giver. When _W_ or _R_ are taken\nas relates certain other relations appear, some of the names of which\nare respectively _present_ and _recipient_. In relation to the relation\nof giver the relations of present and recipient are named _converse_\nrelations, as are likewise the relations of present and giver to the\nrelation of recipient and the relations of giver and recipient to the\nrelation of present. Here are three distinct relations growing out of\nthe same relationship or foundation. As each relational element has its\ncorresponding negation, the true logical system of a set of three terms\ninvolves not less than eight relations.\n\nWe take for our second scene the case of a boundary. This might be a\nsurface or a point but we will take the special case of a line on a\nsurface. Here we have again a set of three, the spread on one side, _A_,\nthe opposite spread, _B_, and the line _L_. _A_ has a certain relation,\nsay above, to _L_ and _B_, _B_ has the certain relation, below, to _A_\nand _L_, which relation is converse to the relation above: and _L_ has\nthe certain relation, boundary, to _A_ and _B_ which relation is converse\nto the relations above and below.\n\nThe two examples now given are cases of the _conjugative_ kind. The\nrelationship is a conjugative one and the relations are conjugative\nrelations. The distinguishing characteristic of a conjugative case is the\nfact essentially involved of the mediation between relational elements\nby another certain element, or in other words the bringing of diverse\nrelational elements into relation by the function of another relational\nelement. Without the mediation or function of this conjugating element\nneither the relationship nor the conjugative relations can exist. There\nis reason to believe that all conjugative cases can be certified as cases\nof three relational elements or as compounds of a number of such sets of\nthree. To ordinary uncritical thought which is largely constrained by\nthe trammels of ordinary language the most abundant sort of relations\nappears to be of that sort that are taken to involve only two relational\nelements. These are cases of what are called _dual_ relationships and the\nrelations that arise out of them are called _dual_ relations. Such are\nthose like father, son, husband, wife, etc. Strictly viewed they ought to\nbe regarded as _degenerate_ relationships and relations just as a pair of\nlines is regarded as a degenerate conic.\n\n\nVIII. CAUTIONS AND APPLICATIONS.\n\nNow besides the error of confounding relations with relationship, it is\na very common fault to think and speak of a relation as being _between_\ntwo or more terms. This imports into thought the thoroughly misleading\nidea of an intervening independent existence for relations. Relations are\nattributive predicates of terms and each one of them pertains strictly to\nits proper term or combination of terms, in the same sense for this turn\n(_pro hac vice_) that qualities are held to pertain to their so-called\nsubstances. And yet relations so pertain to their proper terms not in\nvirtue of such terms separately but in virtue of their membership in\nthe plural fact which obtains as the _relationship_ or _foundation_.\nThe notion of a relation as a \u201cbetweenness\u201d has perhaps been fostered\nby the exact coincidence of relations pertaining to the several members\nof the same relationship. When on contemplating the connection, say\nof two points, we observe that the distance of one from the other is\napparently indistinguishable from the distance of the other from the one,\nwe naturally overlook the fact that we are truly to regard the connection\nas the coincidence of two really distinct relations, and regarding the\npair of relations as one thing and finding it not attributable to one\npoint more than to the other we dissociate it from both. But when we\nconsider a pair of relations that are converse to one another and that\narise out of a dual relationship like that of husband and wife we may see\nthat there is _no_ betweenness, no single relation that interlies, but\ntwo relations, one the relation of husband and the other the converse\nrelation of wife.\n\nAn interaction, say like that of approach under the influence of\ngravitation, is a relationship. Each body stands in the relation of a\n_puller_ of the other and the mediating term which we find impossible to\nargue out of the account we call the attraction of gravitation. In this\ncase the relation of action of the one body is not usually distinguished\nfrom the relation of action of the other one. Indeed this is the case in\nall cases of mechanical action and we lay it down as a maxim that action\nand reaction are equal but they are not alike since their directions are\nopposite. Sensation is a relationship, since it is our interaction.\nThe object interacts with the brain. As to the conjugating term we are\nas yet in the dark and so we are in the habit of regarding this case\nas a dual relation. The relation of the brain to the object is that of\na _knower_ and that of the object to the brain that of a _stimulater_.\nEach character or mark of the object that becomes apparent gives rise to\nrelations and their respective converses each correlative pair of which\nare respectively so many distinct interactions of detail in the entire\ninteraction. Whatever an object as known to us is, it is in virtue of\nthose relations of brain action and detailed object stimulation, which\nare relations and always relations. Since consciousness exists only\nby the arising of relations of distinction, supposably in consequence\nof internal brain interaction, is it presumptuous to allege that\nconsciousness consists of relations or a complex of relations?\n\n\nIX. NATURE OF OBJECTS.\n\nWith regard to the object no one can prevent whoever may be so disposed,\nfrom imputing to it various points of possession that do not and cannot\ninteract with the brain. So far as such imputed points are regarded\nas merely not yet interacting but possible to interact with knowing\nsubstance such points in no wise differ in essential nature from the\nknown attributes. They are potential relations and nothing else. But in\nso far as they are regarded as essentially impossible of ever interacting\nwith knowing substance in any possible stage of its development such\nregard is pure nonsense and utterly without any assignable meaning. There\nis no occasion whatever for such an imputation, for the existence of\ninteraction actual or potential is fully adequate to explain all that\nwill ever present itself to be explained.\n\nAt this point let us instruct ourselves with an example of the reasonings\nof a much and deservedly honored philosopher. He says:\n\n \u201cIn the most general predicate which is determined Being\n or existence\u2014for all things in the universe are determined\n beings\u2014we have an evident two-foldness (a composite nature)\n which allows of a further analysis into pure Being and\n determination.\u201d\n\nWe will parallel this analysis. For the sake of simplicity we will take\na limited right line. It has the determinations straight and long, not\nlength in the sense of measure, for length is ambiguous in its intent,\nbut length in its qualitative sense\u2014its linearity so to speak. Now\nseparate from it first its straightness without however giving to it\nany other determination, and then its quality of longness. We have then\na _pure_ line, that is neither straight, nor long, nor anything else.\nSuch is an example of \u201cPure Being.\u201d _We_ say however that its very being\nas a line is absolutely dependent on its determination as a long line;\nthat such a determination alone constitutes it a line, is at once its\ndetermination and its being, that there is no two-foldness at all but\nonly two names, and that as one-fold its determination as long and its\nbeing vanish together. What is true of a line is true of all relations\nand compounds of relations whatever.\n\nThus not only all knowledge but all existence so far as that term can\never have any meaning is relative; relative to all intents and for every\npossible turn.\n\nTo those who accept the essentials of this account of relations it will\nbe easy to see what is the nature of an object and that of a concept\nor notion. An object is a relation or some congeries of relations that\nusually present themselves as a coherent whole to our sensibility or to\nconsciousness. This is primarily effected in virtue of some efficacy\nwhich we cannot appropriate to ourselves, and so we distinguish our own\npersonality from that manifold that we call the objective world. It is\npure self-stultification after having made this most useful distinction\nto try and abolish it. Nothing but an utter abolition of all useful\nthought can result from so taking the data of experience.\n\n\nX. NATURE OF A CONCEPT.\n\nBut objects are individual and generally found with various points of\ndistinction some of which are irrelevant to most of the turns of mental\nlife. We therefore neglect the irrelevant points and take many objects\nas copies of one another. This process is _not_ the formation of the\nconcept or notion but it suggests and prompts that formation. We cannot\nbut regard it as an error to take a conception as a _sum_ of individuals.\nIt seems to us to be rather in the nature of a _locus_. A curve contains\nan infinity of points and yet the curve is not any sum of points even\nthough it is often allowable to speak of it as the sum of all its points.\nSo any concept, say, man, is not all the men that now live nor yet all\nthe men that eternity both backwards and forwards has contained and will\ncontain. A concept is a manifold and strictly universal and infinite\nin respect to the particulars it subsumes. We speak of the infinitive\nmood of a verb because the meaning of the word as thus taken is not put\nunder any modification. In like manner the meaning of any concept though\nsubject to various limitations in its applications is as a concept merely\nto be regarded as obtaining in a purely infinitive sense. Professor\nJevons found a difficulty in classifying what he called _material_\nterms, such as stone, sand, water, etc. Other logicians have put such\nterms as singular terms, while still others have classed them as general\nterms. There is a great variety of such terms. Potatoes, wheat, butter,\nice, cattle, water, hydrogen, the names of all the elements, ether,\nelectricity, time, space, love, virtue, etc., are instances. It seems to\nus that such terms are the normal types of general terms and that the\ncanonical forms of our universal propositions ought to be unquantified\nnot only as regards the predicates but also as regards the subjects. Why\nnot \u201cman is animal\u201d just as \u201clard is grease\u201d or \u201cman is mortal\u201d just as\n\u201cbutter is cheap\u201d?\n\nMoreover the distinction between a general concept and one that is called\nsingular is only one of degree and not of kind. Every so-called singular\nterm is potentially at least only an individual instance under a possible\ngeneral or universal concept. A striking example of this potentiality is\nfurnished by the modern generalisations of that formerly singular term,\nspace. If these observations are well founded, the universals of thought\neven though arising out of the facts of experience and rigidly beholden\nto experience for every last element out of which they are constructed,\nform nevertheless a Formal-Thought-World, and the mind of man in virtue\nof its powers of imaginative construction and generalisation has a\nconstitution that enables it to subsume the actual objective universe as\nonly one particular of a universality of a higher rank.\n\nUnder such a conception of the objective world and the world of thought\nand their relations the old dispute of realism versus nominalism would\ntake a new aspect. _Universals in re_ even though they were admitted\nto exist would become universals no longer in the higher universe of\nthought. True universals would only subsist as universals of the world\nof mind. The laws of Form and Formal Thought would thus become of chief\nmoment in philosophy and no one could be recognised as properly laying\nclaim to the title of philosopher without proficiency therein.\n\n\nXI. FALLACY OF THE SPENCERIAN AXIOM.\n\nConcerning the \u201caxiom of symmetry\u201d only a few examples of its fallacy are\nneedful. Mutual friendship is certainly a \u201csymmetrical\u201d relation, but _A_\nand _C_ may be mutual friends and _B_ and _C_ mutual friends also, but it\nin no wise follows that _A_ and _B_ are friends. They may be decidedly\nunfriendly as we often see the case. Take a case of equilibrium the\ncases of which seem to be favorite ones with M. Mouret. We suppose that\nplanets may be regarded as in a relation of equilibrium with the sun and\nyet these mere equilibrations with the sun do not make any equilibrium\nbetween them. They do not knock together it is true but this is due to\ntheir own direct relations and not their relations of equilibrium with\nthe sun.\n\nThe distances of points from each other is a \u201csymmetrical\u201d relation and\nyet point _A_ may be from point _C_ the very same distance that point _B_\nis from _C_, but the distance of points _A_ and _B_ from one another may\nvary from coincidence to double the distance _A C_-_B C_.\n\n\nXII. NATURE OF ARITHMETICAL EQUALITY.\n\nConcerning the relation of \u201cmathematical equality\u201d there is no single\nrelation that obtains throughout mathematics as such. There is numerical\nequality upon which the equality in service in numeric algebra is\nfounded, and there is geometric equality, the equality of vectors, etc.,\nall different from one another. M. Mouret seems to have only numeric\nequality in view. He claims this relation to be not only of a very simple\nnature but that it is the very foundation of the notions of magnitude and\nquantity. He even declares that mathematics could not exist without this\nrelation. Did he lose sight of the usual proof of Fourier\u2019s celebrated\ntheorem?\n\nAs we have explained, things that are distinguished are not really alike\nbut only for certain turns taken to be so. This assimilation of things is\nof various grades. In arithmetic, meaning arithmetic in its most general\nsense, the only logical comprehension that the various numbers possess\nis respectively their greater or less partitionability; _m_ is the same\nas _n_ means in arithmetic that whatever has the numerical rank of _m_\nhas also precisely the numerical rank of _n_ no matter what summations\nor other numerical operations _m_ or _n_ may represent. Identity of\nthis sort is arithmetical equality. It seems a simple relation for the\nreason that its intervention very decisively simplifies our arithmetical\ncomprehensions. It is however a coincidence of two relations that are\nconverse to one another. These relations are \u201cnot less than\u201d and \u201cnot\ngreater than.\u201d It is universally admitted that the more inclusive a\nnotion or concept is in extension, the more simple and primary it is than\nany other notion or concept included as an instance under it. Now all\nequality is \u201cnot less than\u201d but not all \u201cnot less than\u201d is necessarily\nequality; hence, \u201cnot less than\u201d is a wider and more primary notion than\nequality. On the same considerations \u201cnot more than\u201d is in the same\ncase. Equality is the limiting case between the variable and logically\nmore simple cases of \u201cnot less than\u201d and \u201cnot more than.\u201d The notion of\nquantity emerges on comparison however vague between any two objects that\nhave size, independently of the notion of equality. If this were not true\nhow could we have the notions of infinitely large and infinitely small.\n\nIt is indeed true that without the notion of equality the theory of\nnumbers and the mathematical analysis could subsist in a rudimentary\nstate only, but to say that they would not exist at all is rash and\nnot maintainable. The relations \u201cnot less than\u201d \u201cnot more than\u201d would\nstill allow of some truly mathematical propositions, operations, and\ncalculations. In that essentially qualitative notation that is ordinary\nlanguage the relation that corresponds to equality is of very limited\nrange but a relation that is analogous to \u201cnot less than,\u201d viz.,\nsupersumption, is very efficient.\n\nWith a theory of numbers and a mathematical analysis using only the\nrelations \u201cnot less than\u201d \u201cnot more than\u201d in lieu of the relation of\nequality the fundamental operations, addition and substitution, would\nfind some scope of application and hence the derivative operations,\nmultiplication, powering, etc., and their inversions, subtraction,\ndivision, etc., would obtain in some fashion and to some extent. This\ncan readily be seen by any one who is familiar with the way in which\nexpressions of inequality are used in modern mathematical analysis.\n\n FRANCIS C. RUSSELL.\n\n\n\n\nOBSERVATIONS ON SOME POINTS IN JAMES\u2019S PSYCHOLOGY.\n\n\nII. EMOTION.\n\nNothing in Professor James\u2019s work will be likely to strike the average\nreader as more paradoxical than his views on the subject of Emotion,\nwhich he must be allowed to state in his own words. After premising that\nhe will limit his discussion, in the first instance, to what may be\ncalled the coarser emotions, as fear, grief, rage, love, in which every\none recognises a strong organic reverberation, he goes on to say:\n\n \u201cOur natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions is\n that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental\n affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of\n mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the\n contrary, _is that the bodily changes follow directly the\n perception of the existing fact, and that our feeling of the\n same changes, as they occur, is the emotion_. Common sense\n says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear,\n are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry\n and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this\n order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state\n is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily\n manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the\n more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry,\n angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not\n that we strike, cry, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry or\n fearful, as the case may be. Without the bodily state following\n on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in\n form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might\n then see the bear and judge it best to run, receive the insult\n and deem it right to strike, but we should not actually _feel_\n afraid or angry.\n\n \u201cStated in this crude way, the hypothesis is pretty sure\n to meet with immediate disbelief. And yet neither many nor\n far-fetched considerations are required to mitigate its\n paradoxical character, and possibly to produce conviction of\n its truth.\n\n \u201cTo begin with, no reader of the last two chapters will be\n inclined to doubt the fact that _objects do excite bodily\n changes_ by a preorganised mechanism, or the farther fact\n _that the changes are so indefinitely numerous and subtle\n that the entire organism may be called a sounding-board_\n which every change of consciousness, however slight, may make\n reverberate....\n\n \u201cThe next thing to be noticed is this, that _every one of\n the bodily changes, whatsoever it be, is FELT, acutely or\n obscurely, the moment it occurs_....\n\n \u201cI now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory,\n which is this: _If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try\n to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of\n its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind_, no\n \u2018mind-stuff\u2019 out of which the emotion can be constituted, and\n that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is\n all that remains. It is true that, although most people when\n asked say that their introspection verifies this statement,\n some persist in saying that it does not. Many cannot be made\n to understand the question. When you beg them to imagine away\n every feeling of laughter and of tendency to laugh from their\n consciousness of the ludicrousness of an object, and then to\n tell you what the feeling of its ludicrousness would be like,\n whether it be anything more than the perception that the object\n belongs to the class \u2018funny,\u2019 they persist in replying that\n the thing proposed is a physical impossibility and that they\n always _must_ laugh if they see a funny object. Of course the\n task proposed is not the practical one of seeing a ludicrous\n object and annihilating one\u2019s tendency to laugh. It is the\n purely speculative one of subtracting certain elements of\n feeling from an emotional state supposed to exist in all its\n fulness, and saying what the residual elements are. I cannot\n help thinking that all who rightly apprehend this problem\n will agree with the proposition above laid down. What kind of\n an emotion of fear would be left if the feeling neither of\n quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of\n trembling lip nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor\n of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible\n for me to think. Can one fancy the state of rage and picture\n no ebullition in the chest, no flushing of the face, no\n dilatation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no\n impulse to vigorous action, but in their stead limp muscles,\n calm breathing and a placid face? The present writer, for one,\n certainly cannot. The rage is as completely evaporated as the\n sensation of its so-called manifestations, and the only thing\n that can be supposed to take its place is some cold-blooded\n and dispassionate sentence, confined entirely to the judicial\n realm, to the effect that a certain person or persons merit\n chastisement for their sins. In like manner of grief: what\n would it be without its tears, its sobs, its suffocation of the\n heart, its pang in the breast-bone? A feelingless recognition\n that certain circumstances are deplorable, and nothing\n more. Every passion in turn tells the same story. A purely\n disembodied human emotion is a non-entity.\u201d (P. 449 seq.)\n\nIt is, of course, impossible for me to give all the arguments by which\nProfessor James attempts to establish his position; the above quotations\nwill make it clear what it is\u2014namely, that all our \u201cfeelings\u201d are\nsensations.\n\nBefore proceeding to consider some of the objections to this view of the\nmatter, it may be well to notice briefly what seems to be a gap in the\nauthor\u2019s treatment of it. In adult human beings, very few, comparatively,\nof what are ordinarily recognised as emotions follow directly upon the\nperception of their objects, in the ordinary sense of the word. His\ntheory might perhaps suffice, without further explanation for such cases\nas the \u201cspitting\u201d of blind kittens at the smell of a dog, or the rage\nof a bull at the sight of a red cloth, or the startled feeling that we\nexperience at a loud and unexpected sound, if the latter should be called\nan emotion. But in the immense majority of instances the emotions of\nwhich he treats arise in a very different way.\n\nSome of his own illustrations will serve as well as any to show this. For\ninstance, neither running nor any other of the symptoms of fear which he\nenumerates is the necessary result of seeing a bear. A chained or caged\nbear may excite only feelings of curiosity, and a well armed hunter might\nexperience only pleasurable feelings at meeting one loose in the woods.\nIt is not, then, the perception of the bear that excites the movements\nof fear. We do not run from the bear unless we suppose him capable of\ndoing us bodily injury. Why should the expectation of being eaten, for\ninstance, set the muscles of our legs in motion? \u201cCommon sense\u201d would\nbe likely to say it was because we object to being eaten, but according\nto Professor James, the reason we dislike to be eaten is because we run\naway. So, again, striking is not a reflex act, following on the hearing\nof an insult as sneezing does on taking snuff. Whether the muscular\nmovements or the emotions are the primary thing, what both shall be\ndepends on many things besides the words that are spoken. To be accused\nof drunkenness or unchastity, for instance, would dispose some persons to\nviolence, but others might feel only the stirrings of pride at what they\nwould consider a tribute to their manhood. In those who considered such\na charge opprobrious, it might excite feelings of amusement, contempt,\npity, or grief towards the one making it, according to the estimation in\nwhich he was held. To say that if it makes us strike we shall be angry,\nif it makes us laugh we shall be amused, if it makes us weep we shall\nbe grieved, does not go to the bottom of the matter. According to the\ntheory, the thought of the estimation in which we are held by others\nis, in itself, entirely indifferent to us, and only affects our feelings\nthrough the muscular movements it excites.\n\nIn view of the variety of these movements in response to the same\nphysical stimulus in a case like this, the statement that objects excite\nbodily changes by a preorganised mechanism explains nothing. We want to\nknow why in one case a given perception excites one set of movements,\nand in another an entirely different set. Without attempting to decide\nwhether or not a satisfactory explanation can be given on Professor\nJames\u2019s hypothesis, I will only say, that, so far as I can see, he\nnowhere attempts it. In his section on \u201cThe Genesis of the Various\nEmotions,\u201d (pp. 477 seq.), he only discusses the question how the various\nfeelings come to be associated with their respective movements. How the\nmovements come to be associated with the perceptions, he does not discuss\nat all.\n\nTurning now to the considerations which Professor James urges in support\nof his theory, quoted above, the first two\u2014that objects excite bodily\nchanges and that these changes are more or less distinctly felt\u2014may\npass unchallenged. I am disposed to go as far with him as to admit\nthat these feelings, in the cases which he describes, may properly\nbe considered components of the emotional state. But when he affirms\nthat there is nothing else\u2014that if we subtract our consciousness of\nperipheral sensations there would be no emotion left\u2014it seems to me that\nhe is going very much too far. I should have no hesitation in saying\nthat such a statement of the case is contradicted by my consciousness,\nbut as that would be merely setting up my consciousness against his,\nwithout the possibility of an umpire, I will call attention to some other\nconsiderations which seem to me to render it improbable.\n\nIn the first place, it is to be noticed that the cases he instances in\nillustration of his position are all of violent emotions. Admitting that\nwe cannot have these emotions, in such degree, without movements such as\nhe describes, nor even imagine how they would feel if such a thing were\npossible, it does not follow because they cannot be separated that they\nare identical. We do not reason in this way in regard to those feelings\nwhich are not commonly called emotions. I can no more imagine myself in\nintense bodily pain without a tendency to groan and writhe than deeply\ngrieved without a tendency to weep, and yet no one, probably, would say\nthat the pain consisted solely in my consciousness of the groaning and\nwrithing. If grief is a kind of pain, it is to be expected that, in a\nhigh degree, it will produce bodily movements more or less similar to\nthose excited by other sorts of pain. All these emotions, however, are\ncapable of infinite gradations in intensity. The fear of losing one\u2019s\npocket handkerchief is an emotion of the same kind as the fear of losing\none\u2019s fortune. In Professor James\u2019s description of fear, it is evident\nthat he has abject terror in mind; I hardly think it probable that he\nhas any such sensations, when he fears, for instance, that he will be\nlate to dinner, and yet he must be differently constituted from many of\nhis fellow-men if his state of mind in such a case is merely a cold,\nintellectual cognition of the fact that such a state of affairs would be\nundesirable.\n\nThe same is true of the other emotions he mentions. The feeling of the\nludicrous is, perhaps, the strongest case he cites, but in my own case\nslight degrees of amusement do not excite laughter, or even any conscious\ndisposition to laugh. There is, at the most, in such cases, a tendency\nto smile, which may be overpowered by some other emotion, without in the\nleast impairing my feeling of amusement. It seems to me certain that\nslight degrees of all the emotions mentioned may be unaccompanied by any\ndistinct consciousness of reflex movements. In such cases it is only\nby a pretty strong effort of attention that we are able, if at all, to\ndetermine what the bodily changes are, although we are distinctly aware\nof the emotion.\n\nAgain, it is to be noticed that many actions, similar in character to\nthose we have been considering, are not associated with what are commonly\ncalled emotions. Laughing and sobbing, for instance, are spasmodic\nmovements of the muscles of respiration, not strikingly different from\nhiccuping, and there seems no good reason why the consciousness of\nthe former two should usually be felt as strong emotional excitement,\nwhile the latter is not. In some cases, movements identical with those\naccompanying particular emotions may occur entirely independently of\nthem. Shivering from cold, for instance, is the same sort of a movement\nas may occur in violent fright, but it does not make us feel frightened.\nThe laughter excited in children and sensitive persons by tickling of the\nskin is not necessarily accompanied by any mirthful feelings. The act of\nvomiting may be the accompaniment of the most extreme disgust, or it may\noccur without a trace of such emotion. Professor James himself gives an\ninstance of this sort that can hardly be bettered:\n\n \u201cThe writer well remembers his astonishment, when a boy of\n seven or eight, at fainting when he saw a horse bled. The\n blood was in a bucket, with a stick in it, and if memory does\n not deceive him, he stirred it round and saw it drip from the\n stick with no feeling save that of childish curiosity. Suddenly\n the world grew black before his eyes, his ears began to buzz,\n and he knew no more. He had never heard of the sight of blood\n producing faintness or sickness, and he had little repugnance\n to it, and so little apprehension of any other sort of danger\n from it, that even at that tender age, as he well remembers, he\n could not help wondering how the mere physical presence of a\n pailful of crimson fluid could occasion in him such formidable\n bodily effects\u201d (p. 457).\n\nHere we have a condition such as is sometimes experienced in connection\nwith the most extreme degree of fear or grief unaccompanied by any\nemotion except astonishment at its occurrence. I presume that if a person\nshould faint on hearing bad news, Professor James would consider that one\nof the causes of his intense emotion. Why did it have no such effect in\nthis case?\n\nAssuming that the emotions are the effects and not the causes of what\nare usually reckoned as their \u201cexpression,\u201d it seems evident that a\ngiven movement or set of movements must uniformly, at least in the same\nsubject, give rise to the same feeling, and that in the case of opposite\nemotions such as joy and grief, hope and fear, the more intense the\nemotion, the more unlike must be the actions from which it arises.\nNeither of these is the case. On the contrary, it would seem to be the\nfact that the actions accompanying emotion tend to become more alike in\nproportion to its intensity. It is not at all uncommon for people to\nweep from excess of joy as well as of grief. Pallor and trembling are\nfrequent accompaniments of the extremes of hope as well as fear. The\nnaturalist Wallace gives an account of his feelings on capturing a rare\nand beautiful butterfly, which is worth quoting in this connection:\n\n \u201cThe beauty and brilliancy of this insect are indescribable,\n and none but a naturalist can understand the intense excitement\n I experienced when I at length captured it. On taking it out\n of the net and opening the glorious wings, my heart began to\n beat violently, the blood rushed to my head, and I felt more\n like fainting than I have done when in prospect of immediate\n death. I had a headache the rest of the day, so great was the\n excitement produced by what will appear to most people a very\n inadequate cause\u201d (\u201cMalay Archipelago,\u201d p. 342).\n\nHere it is evident that a feeling of intense exultation gave rise to\nsensations very similar, to say the least, to those of extreme fear.\n\nOne other argument brought forward by the author deserves special notice\nin this connection:\n\n \u201cThe best proof that the immediate cause of emotion is\n a physical effect on the nerves is furnished by _those\n pathological states in which the emotion is objectless_. One of\n the chief merits, in fact, of the view which I propose, seems\n to be that we can so easily formulate by its means pathological\n cases and normal cases under a common scheme. In every\n asylum we find examples of absolutely unmotived fear, anger,\n melancholy, or conceit, and others of an equally unmotived\n apathy, which persists in spite of the best of outward reasons\n why it should give way. In the former cases we must suppose\n the nervous machinery to be so \u2018labile\u2019 in some one emotional\n direction that almost every stimulus (however inappropriate)\n causes it to upset in that way, and to engender the particular\n complex of feelings of which the psychic body of that emotion\n consists. Thus, to take one special instance, if inability to\n draw deep breath, fluttering of the heart, and that peculiar\n epigastric change felt as \u2018precordial anxiety,\u2019 with an\n irresistible tendency to take a somewhat crouching attitude and\n to sit still, and with perhaps other visceral processes not now\n known, all spontaneously occur together in a certain person;\n his feeling of their combination is the emotion of dread, and\n he is the victim of what is known as morbid fear\u201d (p. 458).\n\nNow, it is evident, of course, in such a case as this, that such a\ncombination of feelings as is here described is not a fortuitous\ncoincidence of so many independent sensations. They must have a common\nstarting-point, which cannot well be elsewhere than in the brain. But if\nthis is the case, it seems to me to be begging the question to assume\nthat the sensations and not the emotion are the primary thing. On the\nassumption that fear, in the normal condition, is the cause of the\ndisturbances of respiration, circulation, and the like, which accompany\nit, it is as easy to formulate normal and pathological cases under a\ncommon scheme, by supposing it to be the cause of the like disturbances\nin cases of morbid fear, as on the theory of Professor James.\n\nIt seems to me, then, that the theory does not satisfactorily account for\nthe facts, so far as the involuntary, reflex accompaniments of motion are\nconcerned.\n\nThe difficulty is greatly increased when we consider the relations of\nemotion to voluntary action. We have seen that reflex acts, similar to,\nor identical with those in which Professor James believes emotion to\nconsist, may occur independently of emotion, in the ordinary acceptation\nof the term, at least. Strictly voluntary acts, on the contrary, are\nalways the concomitants of emotion of some sort. In the great majority\nof the ordinary actions of life, they are the only motor phenomena of\nwhich we are aware in this connection. Our whole daily conduct, in our\nbusiness and pleasure, our incomings and our outgoings, our downsittings\nand uprisings, is inseparably associated with our likings and dislikings,\nour hopes and fears. What is the nature of this association?\n\nUnder the theory we are considering, two relations of voluntary acts\nto emotion are possible. They may, like the involuntary reactions,\nconstitute the emotion, or unlike them, result from it. Professor James\ndoes not express himself on the general question, but some of his\nillustrations seem to favor the former view. If the man who meets a bear\nis frightened because he runs, or the one who is insulted, angry because\nhe strikes, the voluntary acts of running and striking must, in part, at\nleast, constitute the emotions of fear and anger in these cases. Let us,\nthen, consider this case first.\n\nIf I see a shower coming up, and run for a shelter, the emotion is\nevidently of the same kind, though perhaps less in degree, as in the\ncase of the man who runs from the bear. According to Professor James, I\nam afraid of getting wet because I run. But supposing that, instead of\nrunning, I step into a shop and buy an umbrella. The emotion is still\nthe same. I am afraid of getting wet. Consequently, so far as I can see,\nthe fear, in this case, consists in buying the umbrella. Fear of hunger,\nin like manner, might consist in laying in a store of provisions; fear\nof poverty, in shoveling dirt at a dollar a day, and so on indefinitely.\nAnger, again, may be associated with many other actions than striking.\nShylock\u2019s anger at Antonio\u2019s insults induced him to lend him money.\nDid the anger, or revengefulness, or whatever we may call the passion,\nconsist in the act of lending the money? I hardly think it necessary\nto multiply instances in illustration of the fact that the same act is\noften associated with the most contradictory emotions, and acts which\nare ordinarily indifferent with the most intense feeling; that, in fact,\nthere is no such uniformity in the associations of emotion with voluntary\nconduct as the hypothesis would seem to require. I incline to think that\nmost people will believe, in the cases cited by Professor James, that the\nrunning and the striking are the results, not the causes of the fear and\nanger.\n\nIf we assume such to be the case, we are no better off under the\nhypothesis we are considering. Excluding voluntary movements, there\nis nothing left of the emotion, according to Professor James, but the\nconsciousness of involuntary, reflex acts resulting from perception. The\nvoluntary acts must, then, be directly caused by these. Now, in the\nfirst place, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to tell what these\nactions are. What are the involuntary muscular contractions that impel\na day-laborer to go to the place of his work, and keep his voluntary\nmuscular system in strenuous activity all day, enduring fatigue and all\nthe discomforts of the summer\u2019s heat or winter\u2019s cold? It would probably\npuzzle him very much to tell, although he has a very clear idea of why he\ndoes it. I doubt if, on his own hypothesis, Professor James himself would\nfind it easy to explain the constituents of the emotions which impel him\nto go to the class-room at the appointed hour and conduct a recitation.\nBut even in cases in which we are distinctly conscious of involuntary\naction, there seems to be no connection between it and the voluntary acts\naccompanying the emotion. In the case of the man running from the bear,\nfor instance, trembling lips, weakened limbs, goose-flesh and visceral\nstirrings have nothing to do with running, but, on the contrary, would\nrather tend to prevent it. In fact, it may be said, in general, that\nthe two classes of emotional activities are mutually antagonistic. The\nmore involuntary the action, the less efficient the voluntary activity\nis apt to be, as any one knows who has had an attack of the \u201cbuck ague.\u201d\nWe should have, therefore, diminution of the effect with increase of the\ncause.\n\nIt seems, then, on the hypothesis, impracticable to account for the\nassociation of voluntary action with emotion either on the supposition\nthat the former is the cause or the result of the latter. A third\nalternative\u2014that there is no relation of cause and effect in the case,\nand that the phenomena of emotion and action, although constantly\nassociated, are really independent, I will not discuss, as it does not\ncommend itself to my mind, and Professor James, elsewhere, expressly\nrepudiates it. It seems to me that the only reasonable conclusion is\nthat emotion is something different from either involuntary or voluntary\nmuscular activity, and which may be the cause of either or both.\n\nProfessor James, after admitting that the view of the subject which\nhe advocates is only a hypothesis, and that much is lacking to its\ndefinitive proof, goes on to say:\n\n \u201cThe only way coercively to _dis_prove it, however, would be to\n take some emotion and then exhibit qualities of feeling in it\n which should be _demonstrably_ additional to all those which\n could possibly be derived from the organs affected at the time.\n But to detect with certainty such purely spiritual qualities of\n feeling would obviously be a task beyond human power....\n\n \u201cA positive proof of the theory would, on the other hand, be\n given, if we could find a subject absolutely an\u00e6sthetic inside\n and out, but not paralytic, so that emotion-inspiring objects\n might evoke the usual bodily expressions from him, but who,\n on being consulted, should say that no subjective emotional\n affection was felt. Such a man would be like one who, because\n he eats, appears to bystanders to be hungry, but who afterwards\n confesses that he had no appetite at all.\u201d (P. 455.)\n\nWhether the truth of the first of the above paragraphs is to be conceded\nor not, depends, I suppose, on the strength of proof necessary for\ncoercion. The only way, for instance, coercively to disprove the once\nprevalent theory that \u201clunacy\u201d is due to the influence of the moon would\nbe to abolish the moon. Most intelligent people, however, at the present\nday, accept the fact that there seems to be no coincidence between\nthe moon\u2019s phases and the phenomena of insanity as sufficient proof\nfor practical purposes of the incorrectness of that theory. It seems\nto me that the facts to which I have called attention show a somewhat\nsimilar lack of correspondence in the case we have been considering. I\nam, however, unable to see why a case of complete an\u00e6sthesia, such as\nis supposed in the second paragraph, would not answer nearly as well\nfor one side of the question as the other, according to the presence or\nabsence of emotion. To suppose that cutaneous and visceral sensations are\npreserved unimpaired for purposes of emotion, while absolutely abolished\nfor all other purposes, would be putting a pretty severe strain on the\nfaculty of belief.\n\nSuch cases, as Professor James says, are hard to find. He refers to one,\nreported by Str\u00fcmpell, in which a boy, an\u00e6sthetic within and without,\nwith the exception of one eye and one ear, was stated to have manifested\nshame, grief, surprise, fear, and anger. He goes on, however, to say:\n\u201cIn observing him, however, no such theory as the present one seems to\nhave been thought of; and it always remains possible that, just as he\nsatisfied his natural appetites and necessities in cold blood, with no\ninward feeling, so his emotional expressions may have been accompanied by\na quite cold heart.\u201d\n\nSince Professor James\u2019s work was published, two cases have been reported\nby Berkley,[57] which, although not, perhaps, conclusive, are of interest\nin this connection. In the first, the patient, a woman of English\nbirth, age not stated, had complete loss of sense of pain, heat and\ncold, pressure and equilibrium, of smell, taste, and sight. The sense\nof touch, although not completely abolished, was very greatly impaired.\nShe recognised a hat, for instance, only after feeling of it for a long\ntime and then seemed doubtful about it. Her sense of the position of the\nextremities was also very imperfect, although not entirely abolished; and\nthere was some deafness, although not enough to render her incapable of\nconversation. With regard to her mental state, Dr. Berkley says:\n\n \u201cThe psychical condition has undergone but slight change, she\n is possibly a little apathetic, with some slight tendency\n towards a melancholic tone, but when aroused and induced to\n converse for some time, this in great measure passes away. The\n memory is quite good.\u201d\n\nDr. Berkley was kind enough to give me the following additional\ninformation about this patient, who, at the time of writing, was still\nunder observation:\n\n \u201cSince the coming on of the dullness in hearing there has been\n a considerable degree of apathy manifest. She is no longer\n conscious of the smaller noises that occur around her, but is\n very readily aroused by the voice, and then takes a lively\n interest in what is said to her: for instance a few days ago\n the resident physician remarked to her that he was going to\n obtain a pair of crutches for her use; she laughed heartily\n at the idea, and said she would fall and break her leg at the\n first step.\u201d\n\nIn response to further inquiries, he writes as follows:\n\n \u201c1) Visceral sensations. The clearest evidence of visceral\n sensation I have noted in my article,\u201d [warning of the\n necessity of evacuating the bowels and bladder by a pricking\n pain in the lower part of the abdomen,] \u201cno others were\n sufficiently definite to be described. For two years there has\n been no feeling of hunger or thirst, and as the diet has only\n been a few mouthfuls of milk at a time for nearly that period,\n there has been no feeling of repletion.\n\n \u201c2) When the patient laughs at a joke, there is a slight\n flushing of the face, besides the ordinary contraction of the\n facial muscles; she is aware that she is laughing, but besides\n acknowledging that she perceives no difference between the\n act now, and some years ago, she is unable to describe the\n sensation further.\n\n \u201c3) Anger. As I think I mentioned in my last letter, the\n patient has been a person of unusually equal temper; an\n outbreak of real passion has never been observed with her.\n When annoyed or teased by some of the other women, there is\n a distinct corrugation of the forehead, accompanied by an\n exceedingly slight general movement as if of aversion, no\n words, movement of the chest, clenching of the hands, etc. She\n describes the sensation as one of repulsion.\n\n \u201cLike Str\u00fcmpell\u2019s case she shows definitely shame, grief,\n surprise, fear, and substituting for anger, repulsion.\n\n \u201cMy own impression derived from observation of the patient\n is, that all mental emotional sensibilities are present and\n only a little less vivid than in the unan\u00e6sthetic state; and\n that emotions are approximately natural, and not at all coldly\n dispassionate.\u201d\n\nIn the second case, that of a Russian woman, aged thirty-five, there was\ncomplete loss of cutaneous sensibility in all its qualities: the sense of\nposition (\u201cmuscular sense\u201d) was almost completely abolished; the sense of\ntaste was absent in the anterior two-thirds of the tongue. Smell, sight,\nand hearing were preserved. She had left the hospital before the article\nwas written. In regard to her case, Dr. Berkley writes:\n\n \u201cWhile in the most absolute state of an\u00e6sthesia (auditory\n and visual excepted) there was no departure from a normal\n psyche; the woman would sometimes be angered when she did not\n understand a question, at others would smile or shake her head,\n and would frequently laugh and talk with another Russian woman\n in the same ward. There was never the slightest apathy manifest\n after the first few days of febrile movement.\u201d\n\nI give these cases for what they are worth. In the first, it is evidently\nimpossible to entirely exclude the presence of sensations caused by the\nreflex acts, and the second, not having, apparently, been examined with\nspecial reference to the subjective side of her emotional manifestations,\nmay be open to the same objection which Professor James makes against\nStr\u00fcmpell\u2019s case. To me it seems extremely unlikely that, if the theory\nunder discussion is correct, such an amount of an\u00e6sthesia as existed in\nthese cases would have produced no obvious effect on the emotions. The\nfact that voluntary acts were performed by both these patients as well\nas by Str\u00fcmpell\u2019s case, seems to me conclusive as to the existence of\nemotions of some sort in all of them.\n\nIt seems clear to me, from the foregoing considerations, that there are\nserious difficulties in the way of accepting Professor James\u2019s theory as\nan adequate explanation of all the phenomena of emotion. On the other\nhand, I think it contains an important truth, and that, by calling\nattention to it, he has rendered a real service to psychology. In order\nto make it clear how far I agree with him, it will be necessary to\nconsider just what feelings are to be classed together under the head of\nemotion.\n\nIf we touch our fingers to a live coal, we are conscious of a sensation\nof heat, and also of pain. If we take quinine into our mouths, it tastes\nbitter, and also disagreeable. So in regard to a very large proportion of\nour sensations, we recognise two elements\u2014one which has to do with the\nqualities of the object, and, another consisting of the pleasurable or\npainful way in which those qualities affect us. The former may be called\nthe objective element in sensation. We think of the heat as residing\nin the coal, whether we are touching it or not, but it never occurs\nto us to think of the coal as in pain. The pain is in us\u2014an entirely\nsubjective feeling. Doubtless there is no more reason to think of heat,\nas it is appreciated by our senses, as a property of the coal, than pain,\nbut that is the way in which we naturally think of it. That these two\nelements are really distinct is evident from the fact that the different\nsenses furnish them in different proportions. Comparatively few sights,\nfor instance, give any such sensuous pain to the eye as the sensation\nproduced by getting a grain of sand under the lid, which gives us very\nlittle information in regard to the qualities of the offending substance.\nIn fact, it is generally true that intensity of pleasurable or painful\nsensation is a hindrance to exact knowledge of its object. It is further\nevident from the fact that, in disease, one form of sensibility may be\nabolished while the other is retained. A person may be able to feel the\nslightest touch, and to recognise perfectly the size, shape, and texture\nof the objects he handles, and yet feel no pain when cut, struck, nor\nburned, or he may have even heightened sensibility to painful impressions\nwith loss of the power to recognise the sensible qualities of objects.\n\nNow, although we are accustomed to distinguish between emotions and\npurely sensuous pleasures and pains, there are some points, at least, at\nwhich it is not easy to draw the line. My pleasure in the anticipation of\na good dinner is undoubtedly an emotion. Is not my pleasure in eating it\nentitled to the same name, and does not the latter consist in the reality\nof the sensations which in the former case were enjoyed in imagination?\nIs not the enjoyment we feel in the smell of mignonette, the tone of a\nsweet voice, the color and form of the rainbow, emotion? Yet it consists\nlargely, if not entirely, in the agreeableness of the sensations. Most\npeople would probably think it strange to hear hunger and thirst spoken\nof as emotions but would readily agree that desire of food or drink\nis as much an emotion as any other desire. Is the desire in this case\nanything more than the hunger or thirst?\n\nI am inclined to think that it is proper to call such pleasures and\npains as I have instanced above emotions, and if so, I see no reason\nfor denying the name to any sensuous pleasures and pains. If Professor\nJames\u2019s view is that all feeling is sensation, I should say that all\nfeeling is emotion. Whether this view is correct or not, I do not see how\nProfessor James can consistently refuse to accept it. On his theory, the\nemotions which he discusses must owe their pleasurable or painful quality\nto the pleasurable or painful nature of the sensations in which they\nconsist. I can see no valid ground for saying that some such feelings are\nemotions and others are not. But the essence of emotion is pleasure or\npain. Abstracting these qualities, it would be an indifferent emotion,\nwhich, I think all would agree, is a contradiction in terms. Possibly he\nmight wish to limit the use of the term to those pleasurable and painful\nfeelings, which arise not directly, but in a reflex way. He might say,\nfor instance, that the disagreeableness to the ear of the creaking of an\nungreased axle is not, but the shudder which it gives a sensitive person\nis, emotion. In that case, it must be admitted that a sneeze is emotion.\nHis contention is that we have no other pleasures or pains than those of\nsensation. If this be true, a setting off of some sensations as emotions\nis, if not an arbitrary, a comparatively useless procedure.\n\nMy own view, then, is that the elements of sensation which I have\nspoken of as objective and subjective might, with equal propriety, be\ncharacterised respectively as intellectual and emotional, and that in\nthis direction the theory under discussion, although true as far as it\ngoes, does not go far enough.\n\nHowever this may be, the admission or denial that these feelings are\nemotions does not necessarily affect the question whether or not this is\nthe only origin, of pleasure and pain. As has already been said, those\nfeelings to which no one will deny the name of emotions are not usually,\nin adult human beings, at least, direct reactions on sensation. If it\nbe true that the start we give at the unexpected slamming of a door\nis a sort of fright, it is a very rudimentary sort compared with that\nwhich one feels when the cry of fire is raised in a crowded theatre. \u201cA\nburnt child dreads the fire.\u201d It is not the sight of the fire, but the\nthought of the burning, that arouses the emotion. When a man reads in the\nnewspaper of the death of a friend, or a rise in the value of property\nin which he is interested, it is not the sight of the black marks on the\nwhite paper, but the beliefs which, through a long and intricate series\nof associations they call up, which move his feelings. If he could not\nread, he would see the same announcement without any emotion. The usual\norigin of the emotions _par excellence_ is by way of association.\n\nSuppose that I have taken a nauseous dose, and made a wry face over\nit. No one, I presume, would question that the disagreeableness lay in\nthe unpleasant taste, and not in the distortion of the countenance.\nNow, suppose I have to repeat the dose, and my face takes on a\nsimilar expression at the anticipation to that which it wore when I\ntook it originally. How does this come about? If I can trust my own\nconsciousness, it is because the vivid reproduction, in memory, of the\nunpleasant taste is itself unpleasant. I do not see how it can well be\notherwise. Professor James says (p. 649) that \u201cthe first element of\nmemory is the revival in the mind of an image or copy of the original\nevent.\u201d How can I have a copy in my mind of a pain if it is not painful?\nTake away the painfulness of it and there would be nothing left. I might\nremember the circumstances under which it occurred, and judge from\nthem that I must have suffered pain, but I could not, it seems to me,\nremember the pain itself. Whether that is possible or not, I feel sure\nthat the fact, in my own case, is, that my memory of a pain resembles it\nin the same way that my memory of the circumstances in which it occurred\nresembles them. If this be the fact, what can be more natural than that\nit should excite the same sort of associated movements that were excited\nby the original sensation? I cannot make it seem any more credible, to\nreturn to the example mentioned above, that my repugnance to a repetition\nof the dose is due to my involuntary movements than that my discomfort in\ntaking it originally was due to the similar movements that occurred then.\n\nSuppose that a child who has eaten and enjoyed an orange is offered\nanother. The sight of it calls up the recollection of the agreeable\ntaste, and the expectation of a repetition of the pleasant experience\nexcites expressions of pleasure. If the fruit is snatched away, the\ndisappointment at the loss of the expected pleasure is distressing, and\nvery probably may result in his weeping. I hardly think that any one who\nwill consult his own consciousness will say that the reason he likes the\ntaste of an orange is that it makes him laugh or smile to get it. He\nlikes it because it tastes good, and is sorry to lose it for the same\nreason. The laughing or weeping is, I think, unquestionably the result of\nthe pleasure or grief, not of the mere perception of an object in itself\nindifferent.\n\nIt is true that emotions of this sort do not always arise by way of\npersonal association. Young children are apt to be afraid of strangers,\nof large animals, and of loud noises. I can remember being frightened\nat my first sight of a locomotive. Here we come upon the questions\nof inherited experience and natural selection, which can hardly be\ndiscussed in an article like this. The objects of which young children\nare instinctively afraid, as a rule, are either dangerous themselves, or\nmore or less similar to dangerous objects. I see no more difficulty in\nsupposing that mental pleasure and pain, on the sight of special objects,\nmay be a matter of organisation than in the case of the analogous\nphysical sensations.\n\nMy view of the matter, then, is that emotion in the sense in which\nthe word is commonly used bears the same relation to perceptions or\nbeliefs that feelings of physical pleasure or pain do to the objective\nor intellectual quality of sensations. I am inclined to think it proper\nto class all pleasurable and painful feelings together as emotions.\nIf this view is correct, it would, of course, include those feelings\nto which Professor James would confine the term. I should not at all\nhesitate to admit that the emotional state of a person who trembles and\nturns pale with fear is different from that of one who preserves his\nself-possession in the presence of a danger that he realises and dreads.\nI think it is true that the voluntary actions prompted by an emotion\nhave some tendency to intensify it. But, so far as I can analyse my own\nfeelings, the pleasures and pains of memory and imagination seem to me\njust as real as those of sensation, and not at all to be confounded with\nthem. When I try to subtract all motor reactions and resulting sensations\nfrom the feeling of fear, for instance, there remains not merely the\nintellectual perception that the event dreaded is not desirable, but the\nperfectly distinct emotional consciousness that I do not desire it.\n\nThis view seems to be favored by the analogy between the relations of\nsensation to reflex movement on the one hand, and of perception to\nvoluntary movement on the other, which will, I think, be found to be very\ncomplete. We have reflex acts which are useful, such as breathing, the\nbeating of the heart, swallowing and coughing; and others, like groaning,\nweeping, and trembling, which seem to be useless. In like manner,\nemotions of hope or fear may give rise to voluntary acts calculated to\nenable the subject of the emotion to secure or avoid its object. If I\nburn my fingers, my hand is involuntarily snatched away. Such would not\nbe the case if the burn caused no pain. If I see that the house is on\nfire, I try to escape, either by extinguishing the fire or by getting\nout of the house. It seems to me evident that I should not do so if the\nthought of being burned were not painful. Such emotions may also occasion\nuseless acts, more or less similar to those mentioned above. A person who\nsaw no way of escape from a burning house might tremble, weep, or groan\nfrom fear.\n\nOn the evolutionary hypothesis, it seems easy to understand how the\nreproduction, by memory or imagination, of certain feelings might bring\nabout movements like those excited by the original feelings. Professor\nJames would have us believe that this reproduction is always, in itself,\nindifferent, that is, merely intellectual; but that it is, nevertheless,\ncapable of setting up the movements which, in the case of peripheral\nstimuli, are the results of pleasure and pain, and that the consciousness\nof these movements is, in such cases, the sole cause of the emotional\ncondition. Such a reversal of relations seems to me highly improbable.\nEach one must decide for himself which view is more in accordance with\nthe facts of his own consciousness.\n\n W. L. WORCESTER.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[57] _Two Cases of General Cutaneous and Sensory An\u00e6sthesia, without\nMarked Psychical Implication._ By Henry J. Berkley, M. D., Baltimore.\n[Brain, Part IV. 1891.]\n\n\n\n\nPROFESSOR ERNST MACH\u2019S TERM SENSATION.\n\nSUPPLEMENTARY TO HIS CONTROVERSY WITH THE EDITOR.\n\n\n_The Monist_, Vol. I, No. 3, contains a controversy between Prof. Ernst\nMach and myself on some questions of psycho-physics in which Professor\nMach, having reference to an editorial article on \u201cFeeling and Motion,\u201d\nregards sensations as the \u201celements of reality,\u201d \u201cwhile motion,\u201d he says,\n\u201cis a mere mental auxiliary, an artificial expedient.\u201d \u201cPhysicists,\u201d we\nare told, \u201chave accustomed us to regard the motions of atoms as more real\nthan the green of trees. In the latter I see a (sensory) fact, in the\nformer a _Gedankending_, a thing of thought.\u201d\n\nIn contradistinction to Professor Mach I maintained that our scientific\nterms, although abstract concepts and things of thought, or noumena, are\nafter all descriptive of actual facts; they are symbols representing\nfeatures of reality. Motions, i. e., that which is meant by the term\nmotion, is a reality, and what the chemist calls atoms is a definite\nquality of certain facts of experience. Atoms are not things in\nthemselves, as the name seems to suggest, but rather proportional\nrelations conveniently so expressed as if they were ultimate units or\nconcrete little bodies of a definite mass or weight. What atoms are,\naside from representing the proportions in which elements combine, we do\nnot know. We may define \u201catom\u201d as the minimal weight in which an element\nenters into chemical combinations, but such atoms have never been an\nobject of observation. For aught we know, they may as little be discrete\nbodies as a curve consists of discrete straight lines, which, as such,\nwould be unobservable only because infinitesimally small. The infinitely\nsmall straight line into which a curve is analysed by mathematicians is\na fiction, wisely devised for calculating the path of the curve. This\nfiction is as Professor Mach says, an artifice only, not a reality, or\nas I say, an allegoric expression to characterise not whole concrete\nrealities, but certain features of reality in their abstractness.\n\nScientific terms are comparable to myths that contain deep religious\ntruths. The fiction of the myth is only the vehicle of its meaning. The\nnaked meaning in its abstract purity may be difficult to grasp. Thus\nour imagination steps in and completes the picture so as to render it\nconcrete and easily thinkable.\n\nNow, when several months ago I met Professor Mach at Prague, our\nconversation naturally touched upon the problems which had formed the\nsubject of our discussion. Professor Mach assented to my speaking of\nscientific terms as abstracts. That, accordingly, must be considered\nas the point of agreement. But when I proposed that the term sensation\nalso was according to my terminology an abstract term representing one\nfeature of reality only and excluding other features, Professor Mach took\nexception to it, saying that he understands by sensation reality itself.\nVery well then, this is the difference; and this difference is after\nall a difference of terms only. I understand by sensation the psychical\nfeature of the data of experience only, to the exclusion of what may be\ncalled its physical aspect. Sensation accordingly, as I use the term, is\nnot the whole of the given reality but only one of its qualities. If, as\nProfessor Mach uses the term, sensation is another name for reality, the\nmain difference between our views appears to be removed.\n\n P. CARUS.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK REVIEWS.\n\n\nVORLESUNGEN \u00dcBER DIE MENSCHEN- UND THIERSEELE. By _Wilhelm Wundt_. Zweite\numgearbeitete Auflage. Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss. 1892.\n\nThe new edition of Wundt\u2019s _Menschen- und Thierseele_ is one of the\nbest existing general introductions to psychology. It preserves nearly\nthe just mean between the purely introspective and abstract treatment\nand the substitution of physiology for psychology with which recent\ntreatises have familiarised us. The author has completely rewritten\nthe edition of 1863, which he regards as a youthful indiscretion\n(_Jugends\u00fcnde_)\u2014retaining only such chapters as could be brought into\nharmony with his maturer views and with the developed science of\npsycho-physics that has taken the place of the _Zukunftsprogramm_ of\nthirty years ago. He has wisely omitted all the superficial and diffuse\nchapters on comparative psychology and ethnology which cumbered the\noriginal work; has silently ignored the fantastic speculations as to\nthe identity of electricity and nerve-force (one of the worst of the\naforesaid youthful sins); and practically abandoned (perhaps as too\nesoteric for popular exposition) the elaborate reduction of sensations\nand perceptions to unconscious judgments and inferences.\n\nThe first thirteen or fourteen chapters offer a very clear and\ninteresting r\u00e9sum\u00e9 of the chief doctrines of the _Physiologische\nPsychologie_ in regard to sensations generally, their measurements and\nqualities, Weber\u2019s and Fechner\u2019s laws, the special sensations of color,\nhearing, and the muscular sense, and the problem of space perception.\nFollowing the plan of the original work in these chapters, the author\naims less at completeness of statement than to present clearly the\ndistinctive doctrines of modern psychology. In the treatment of certain\nthemes, e. g. Fechner\u2019s law, and the perception of space, he neglects,\nfor the sake of clearness, qualifications of detail which the special\nstudent must look for in the larger work. The last sixteen chapters deal\nwith the feelings, the will, consciousness, attention, association and\napperception, conception, abnormal and animal psychology and instinct,\nconcluding with two notable lectures on the \u201cFreedom of the Will\u201d and\nthe \u201cImmortality of the Soul.\u201d It is to these chapters that we must look\nfor Wundt\u2019s general psychological and philosophical system. Profiting\nby recent criticisms he has here set forth his characteristic doctrines\nin so clear and definite a final statement that further misconception\nof them is hardly permissible. The remainder of this notice will be\ndevoted to what is perhaps the most interesting question thus suggested:\nWundt\u2019s relation to the associationist psychology of Spencer on the one\nside, and to the younger German school of experimental psychologists\non the other. Wundt ignores the Spencerian form of the associationist\npsychology, and the young psychologists do injustice to Wundt, neither\nside apparently condescending to read with attention the writings of\nthe other. The debate, so far as it is not merely verbal, springs\nfrom two real differences of method: (1) Wundt in his psychological\nanalysis habitually takes account of the problems of the theory of\nknowledge (_Erkenntnisstheorie_), or ultimate metaphysics, which the\nyoung psychologists endeavor (not always with success) systematically\nto exclude. (2) Wundt, gifted with superior powers of introspection,\nis more aware than the young psychologists of the infinite complexity\nand subtlety of mental states. He prefers, therefore, to a schematic\nsimplification of the phenomena a terminology and descriptive analysis\nthat reflect in some measure their manifold diversity. And thus while\nWundt finds the pure associationist psychology barren and tautologous,\nthe young psychologists see in Wundt\u2019s complicated terminology only a\nshamefaced reversion to the discarded psychology of a substantial soul\nendowed with autonomous \u201cfaculties.\u201d But the analysis of our mental\nstates which Wundt gives by means of this terminology is really only\na subtler restatement of the analysis of Mill, Spencer, and Taine, to\nwhich the new psychology has not been able to add anything of moment.\nIt is true that he proclaims the inadequacy of association, even when\ntranslated into the diagrams of a hypothetical cerebral anatomy, to\n\u201cexplain\u201d fully our conscious active mental life. But in this he is at\none with Spencer (ultimate scientific ideas), J. S. Mill (Examination of\nHamilton), and Schopenhauer (_Epiphilosophie_). It is gross injustice\nto stigmatise as an abandonment of the scientific attitude of mind this\noccasional passing recognition of the seeming ultimate inexplicability\nof things. In no single concrete instance can it be shown that Wundt now\nsacrifices the recognised methods and postulates of modern scientific\ninvestigation to the psychological hypostisations which his opponents\ndetect in his terminology.\n\nIn confirmation of these statements I will give a brief summary of\nWundt\u2019s doctrine of association and apperception with an occasional\nindication of its relation to the psychology of Spencer. Wundt\ndistinguishes the totality of mental states which are perceived from\nthe presentation at the focus of consciousness which is apperceived. In\nthis way (substituting everywhere _dunkel bewusst_ for _unbewusst_) he\navoids the metaphysics of the unconscious, while getting the benefit\nof the entire analysis of its advocates. I do not think the ultimate\ndifficulty can be evaded in this way, but will not stop to argue the\npoint. A further advantage of this distinction is that it makes possible\na dynamic treatment of mental states as \u201cevents\u201d in place of the crude\npsychology that deals with the conditions of any mental state as so many\nready-made parts externally dovetailed into the completed product. The\nactive side of consciousness is taken into account from the outset. The\nmental state at any moment is described by indicating the presentation\nwhich is then at the focus of consciousness (apperceived) and the\naccompanying faintly conscious presentations that qualify its tone and\ntotal effect. The given mental state is \u201cexplained\u201d by tracing out the\ndynamic readjustments that brought this particular presentation to the\nfocus, and grouped the faintly conscious presentations about it. Now the\nbringing of a presentation to the focus of conscious attention is the\nprimitive psychical activity, the elementary act of will,[58] and since\nWundt places this at the beginning he rejects all evolution of will or\ninstinct from reflex action, and thus, it will be said, here at least\nputs himself in distinct opposition to advanced scientific thought.\nLet us distinguish. So far as we are dealing with the developed minds\nwe know, Wundt\u2019s distinction is merely the expression of an observed\npsychological fact. External volition does go back to internal voluntary\nattention and this to a focussing of consciousness for which apperception\nis as good a term as another. Such focussing of the attention is for us\nnow the primary reaction of the \u201cself\u201d on its received impressions. Out\nof a given group of presentations I apperceive by preference one and you\nanother, because at the time my \u201cself,\u201d my mind, differs from yours.\nThis self may be only a convenient shorthand expression for a passive\nproduct of external forces. The feeling of the reaction of the self may\nbe an illusion, and its activity may be merely the mechanical action of\na relatively coherent group of presentations when a new presentation is\nintroduced among them, and the whole process may be explicable in terms\nof associations. But the feeling exists, and Wundt has described and\nanalysed it better than any of his critics.\n\nOn the other hand, if the question is of the hypothetical origin of\nmind, we are at once brought face to face with an ultimate metaphysical\nproblem which the new psychology impatiently ignores, which Spencer\ngrudgingly acknowledges, but which Wundt and Kantians like Riehl find\nconfronting them at every stage of their analysis. Conscious mind cannot\nconceive of its own origin, and therefore all psychological theories of\ndevelopment must postulate in some form the elements of consciousness\nand will. Nothing that I could add to the dialectics of this question\nwould influence those who feel no difficulty here. They require a long\ncourse of Kantian criticism or its equivalent. At any rate it is not fair\npolemic to class a thinker as unscientific merely because he recognises\nthis difficulty and gives it expression in his psychology, instead of\ncontemptuously relegating it to metaphysics.\n\nAfter thus laying the foundations in the doctrine of apperception for the\npsychology both of cognition and of the will, Wundt proceeds to restate\nthe associationist analysis of Mill and Spencer in a more elaborate\nterminology but in substantial agreement with Spencer till he reaches\nthe \u201cconcept,\u201d when the introduction of apperception gives rise to a\nseeming difference. Spencer distinguishes simultaneous from successive\nassociation as carefully as Wundt. What Wundt, after Herbart calls\n\u201ccomplications,\u201d namely the joint reference to one object of a number\nof disparate presentations of sense, is clearly described by Spencer\n(\u201cPrinciples of Psychology,\u201d \u00a7\u00a7 315-355); and Wundt\u2019s \u201cassimilations\u201d do\nnot differ appreciably from Spencer\u2019s \u201cstill less conscious\u201d processes\nof \u201corganic classification\u201d (\u201cPrinciples of Psychology,\u201d \u00a7 320). Into\nthe metaphysics of the ultimate relations of contiguity and similarity\nas laws of association I cannot enter here. Similarity will always be\nrecognised as ultimate by those who, like Spencer, approach the problem\nfirst from the psychical side, while a purely materialistic treatment in\nterms of nervous currents, such as we find in James, will endeavor to\ndo away altogether with similarity, which simply cannot be expressed in\nterms of nerve-structure without reasoning in a circle. Wundt retains\nsimilarity but endeavors to co\u00f6rdinate it with contiguity. The problem is\nreally identical with the final question of the relations of \u201cmind\u201d and\n\u201cbody,\u201d and cannot be profitably discussed apart from that question.\n\nComing now to the concept and the judgment, we find Wundt affirming\nthat the different forms of simultaneous and successive association (as\nhe has defined them) are not an exhaustive classification of mental\nprocesses\u2014that they do not include the concept. Well, he is at liberty\nto define his own terms, and before we accuse him of hypostasising a\nnew faculty to account for the concept, let us scrutinise his meaning.\nWe shall find that he merely repeats, in a subtler terminology of his\nown, the analysis of Berkeley, Mill, Taine, Spencer, and Romanes.\nThese writers treat the concept as a complicated associational group\nheld together by the word. Now Wundt, while conceding the theoretic\nadmissibility of this form of statement, holds that such groups present\nso many distinct characteristics that all delicacy of psychological\ndiscrimination is sacrificed by confounding them under one denomination\nwith other associational complexes. He does not, like Professor James,\nbid introspective psychology \u201cthrow up the sponge\u201d here, but wishes\nto carry his analysis into recesses which the instruments of the\nassociationists are too clumsy to explore. In the interests of this\nanalysis he limits the term association to combinations mediated by a\nlimited number of elements. The (apperceived) concept, on the other\nhand, is the product of the reaction of the total mind. This distinction\n(whatever we may think of its absolute validity) expresses a finely\nobserved psychological truth. The distinctive quality of a concept\nconsists, Wundt says, \u201c_in dem begleitenden Bewusstsein, dass die\neinzelne Vorstellung einen bloss stellvertretenden Werth besitze_.\u201d\nThis feeling he calls the _Begriffsgef\u00fchl_, meaning thereby exactly\nwhat Professor James means when he says that \u201cthe thoughts by which we\nknow that we mean the same thing are apt to be very different indeed\nfrom each other,\u201d and that \u201ca polyp would be a conceptual thinker if a\nfeeling of \u2018Hollo! thingumbob again!\u2019 ever flitted through its mind.\u201d\nOnly, instead of \u201cthrowing up the sponge,\u201d Wundt goes on to give a very\ninteresting account of this feeling in its various degrees of clearness\nbetween the conceptual polyp and the conceiving man. Apperception is\ninvoked only to name and emphasise the feeling of activity of the self\nthat enters into the _Begriffsgef\u00fchl_, distinguishing it as a reaction of\nthe total consciousness from the relatively passive associations of what\nRomanes would call \u201crecepts.\u201d Psychologists, however, will continue their\nfruitless debates on questions of terminology and will still imagine that\nWundt is a belated reactionist.\n\n PAUL SHOREY.\n\n\nBEITR\u00c4GE ZUR EXPERIMENTELLEN PSYCHOLOGIE. By _Hugo M\u00fcnsterberg_. Heft 4.\nFreiburg i. B. 1892.\n\nM\u00fcnsterberg\u2019s fourth _Heft_ begins with studies in association. If _a_\nand _b_ have been independently associated with _m_, can _a_ call up\n_b_ without the appearance in consciousness of _m_? The affirmative\nanswer of common experience was confirmed by Scripture\u2019s experiments.\nAssociating five Japanese symbols with two series of five German words,\nhe found that a word of one series tended (without conscious recollection\nof the Japanese symbol) to revive the particular word in the other\nseries that had been associated with the same symbol. M\u00fcnsterberg, after\nrepeating and varying the experiment in a number of fields, denies that\nany such relation can be observed. He may very well be right on the\nquestion of facts. It is _a priori_ improbable that a transitory and\narbitrary association of a meaningless symbol could modify appreciably\nthe independent and accidental associative attractions of familiar\nwords and presentations. The philosophic interpretation is another\nquestion. For our real knowledge it is a matter of indifference whether\nwe fill out \u201cmissing links\u201d with \u201c_dunkel bewusst_,\u201d \u201c_unbewusst_,\u201d or\n\u201ccerebral processes that have no psychical correlates.\u201d And yet how much\nof contemporary psychologising is a logomachy raging around just this\nquestion.\n\nM\u00fcnsterberg\u2019s second series of experiments show clearly the part played\nby such missing links in perception. A word is called out just before a\ncomplicated picture is exhibited to the subject. He will usually perceive\nfirst in the picture some object naturally associated with the word, even\nthough the word has aroused no conscious associations.\n\nSimilarly (III) a hastily seen misprinted word will be interpreted\nvariously according to the associations of another word called out to the\nsubject in advance.\n\nAnother series of experiments has for result that even the most commonly\nassociated word-couples, as table and chair, have no fixed, unconditional\nassociative attraction for each other in the same or in different minds,\nbut that the unit of attraction is the \u201cassociative constellation.\u201d\nThis is only common sense, and artificial experiments will never reveal\nanything in this field that we cannot learn quite as well in the class\nroom. \u201cTable\u201d will suggest \u201clogarithm\u201d if the boy is fresh from the class\nin trigonometry.\n\n\u201cThe difference between men is in their principle of association\u201d said\nEmerson long ago. M\u00fcnsterberg, who has in his archives records of\nfifty thousand experiments in verbal associations, presents a table of\nthe comparative frequency with which substantives are associated with\nsuperior (more general) or inferior class names, with adjectives or with\nverbs to which they stand in the relation of subject or of object. His\nchief result is that minds which associate a noun with its higher class\nname (_Ueberordner_) think of it as the subject of a verb and do not\nassociate it with an adjective. The _Unterordner_ thinks of the noun as\nobject of a verb and associates it with an adjective. The adjective,\nthen, is not the higher class to which the substantive belongs, but a\nlimitation of the substantive. The French, if they please, may use this\nconclusion to refute Spencer\u2019s contention that \u201cwhite horse\u201d is a more\nnatural order than _cheval blanc_.\n\nThe first topic in \u201cmemory studies\u201d is the persistence in the\npsycho-physical mechanism of the disposition to an acquired automatic\nmovement, even after the memory of the nerve has been seemingly displaced\nby the habit of its contrary. The experiments were trivial, such as\nshifting the position of an inkstand from right to left in alternate\nmonths, or wearing a watch alternately in the right or left fob. The\nresult, a progressive diminution of the mistakes made after every change,\nmay plausibly be explained by the stimulated attention and consequent\ncare of the experimenter. The second topic treats of the effect of a time\ninterval on the exactness of our memory of sensations of movement in eyes\nand limbs. The section on \u201cchain reactions\u201d is a methodological study of\nthe various applications of this experimental method. \u201cThe influence of\nnervous stimulants on psychic activities\u201d is rather interesting reading,\nbut yields no important results. Alcohol depresses, tea and coffee\nheighten the powers of memory and perception for an hour or two after\nabsorption. But the harmful effect of the alcohol sometimes passes away\nafter the first hour. _Gr\u00f6ssensch\u00e4tzung_ is a study of our estimates\nof distances on a surface, made by passing the hand over it at arm\u2019s\nlength, at half arm\u2019s length, etc. From experiments as to the estimate\nof absolute tone-distances (as distinguished from musical intervals)\nM\u00fcnsterberg concludes that pure measurements are not possible with three\ntones only. Experiments with four tones do not, he says, confirm the law\nthat distances corresponding to equal differences of vibration are felt\nas equal.\n\nPhysiologists have assumed that the symmetrical movement of the limbs\nas in swimming or rowing is the natural one; and the alternating or\nindependent movements, as in walking or writing, are an acquisition\ninvolving inhibitions of the natural innervations. \u201cEven in adult life,\u201d\nsays Professor James, \u201cthere is an instinctive tendency to revert to\nthe bilateral movements of childhood.\u201d Professor M\u00fcnsterberg was led to\ndoubt this view by observing the unsymmetrical motions of a baby in a\nwarm bath, and experiment has confirmed his scepticism. Complicated joint\nmotions of both hands (tracing circles or other geometrical figures on a\nsurface) do not exhibit any tendency, when the attention is distracted,\nto assume the symmetrical form. They rather tend to compensate each other\nin such a way as to preserve equilibrium with the minimum strain on the\nother muscles of the body, and this law leads as often to alternating as\nto symmetrical movements of the arms or legs. The case is different of\ncourse with the muscles of the trunk, and may be different in birds, as\nit would in us if we spent our lives in swimming or rowing.\n\nA new method of attacking the problem of localisation is to observe\nthe effect of altering the circulation in different parts of the\nbrain. Tentative experiments on one subject seem to show that verbal\nassociations are readiest when the victim lies on his left side, which\nis a happy coincidence with the localisation of the speech centres in\nthe left frontal convolutions. If these statistics can be trusted, it is\ninadvisable to undertake hard mental labor with the head hanging back\nover the edge of a chair!\n\nIn the last chapter, certain simple experiments in our estimates of\nvoluntary movements in varying conditions of mind and body are made the\nbasis of a far-reaching theory of pleasure, pain, and judgment, the\nelements of which can be found in Aristotle, Herbert Spencer, and James.\nM\u00fcnsterberg found by repeated experiments that the accuracy of attempted\nreproduction of a fixed and familiar amount of centripetal or centrifugal\nmovement of finger and thumb along a rod perpendicular to his waistcoat\nvaried with his condition of fatigue, pleasure, or pain. In a pleasurable\nstate of consciousness the centrifugal movement was exaggerated while the\ncentripetal fell short. In pain the reverse relation obtained. Hence he\ninfers a connection between pain and muscular flexion and pleasure and\nmuscular extension, or rather, he distinguishes the mere sensation of\npain (_Schmerz_) and pleasure (_Lust_) which may depend on integrations\nand disintegrations in the nerve-tissue, from the accompanying feelings\nof agreeableness (_Wollust_) or disagreeableness (_Unlust_) which are\ndue to sensations aroused at the centres by movements of flexion and\nextension throughout the body. He thus attaches his special theory of\npleasure and pain to Lange\u2019s and James\u2019s theory of the identity of the\nemotions with their bodily concomitants\u2014though he protests against the\nmetaphysical implications of the doctrine. The origin of the existing\nco\u00f6rdination of muscular flexions and extensions with pleasure and pain,\nhe explains teleologically on the principles of the Spencerian psychology\nof evolution. He then proceeds, after Sigwart and Brentano, to revive\nthe old idea of Aristotle (whom he does not mention) that the judgment\n(affirmative or negative) is rather the assumption of an attitude toward\na presentation (_Stellungsnehmende Akte_) than a mere conjunction of\npresentations. The affirmative judgment is a faint incipient represented\nmovement of the self towards a suggested conjunction of presentations.\nThe negative judgment is a similar movement in the opposite direction.\nOntogenetically these inchoate movements are later than the movements\nof acceptance or rejection called forth by a painful or pleasurable\nstimulus, and must therefore be treated as derivative phenomena. But the\nKantians may derive some comfort from M\u00fcnsterberg\u2019s final assurance that\nhe too believes that \u201c_Erkenntnisstheoretisch das Urtheil prim\u00e4r ist_.\u201d\n\n PAUL SHOREY.\n\n\nTHE SPIRIT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By _Josiah Royce_, Ph. D. Boston and New\nYork: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.\n\nWe are told by Professor Royce in the preface to this book, that we are\nindebted for it to the lady friend to whom it is gracefully dedicated,\nwho asked him \u201cfor some account of the more significant spiritual\npossessions of a few prominent modern thinkers,\u201d to be related \u201cin\ncomparatively brief and untechnical fashion.\u201d The larger portion of the\nwork is taken up with that subject, exhibiting the general growth of\nmodern philosophical thought beginning with Spinozism, and terminating\nwith Monism as the outcome of the doctrine of Evolution. The author\u2019s\npurpose is constructive, however, as well as expository. He has his own\nphilosophical creed, suggested by what he knows of the progress and\noutcome of modern thought, and the second portion of the work is the\nexpression of his thoughts on the world-conception which he regards as\nembodying the true spirit of modern philosophy. Professor Royce justly\nlays stress on the fact that the theory of evolution is the product\nof a genuine and continuous growth. He dwells particularly, moreover,\non the distinction between the _epistemological_ sense of idealism,\nwhich \u201cinvolves a theory of the nature of our human knowledge,\u201d and\nits _metaphysical_ sense, in which it is \u201ca theory as to the nature\nof the real world, however we may come to know that nature.\u201d It is in\naccord with the latter sense that Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and their\nallies, as believing matter to be an expression of the world-spirit, are\nreferred to as the idealistic school; and it is in the metaphysical and\nnot the epistemological sense that the term idealism has been used since\nHegel. The opposite of a metaphysical idealist is \u201cone who maintains\nthe ultimate existence of wholly unspiritual realities at the basis\nof experience and as the genuine truth of the world\u2014such unspiritual\nrealities for instance as an absolute \u2018Unknowable,\u2019 or, again, as what\nHobbes meant by \u2018Body.\u2019\u201d This is not, however, the view of the author,\nwho thinks that the metaphysical idealist alone is in possession of a\nsuccessful solution for the epistemological problem.\n\nProfessor Royce divides modern philosophy into three great periods, of\nwhich the first was one of pure and simple naturalism. The supernatural\nhad then only a secondary interest, and thought was governed by three\nideas\u2014\u201cthat nature is a mechanism, that human reason is competent to\ngrasp the truth of nature, and that, since nature\u2019s truth is essentially\nmathematical, geometry is the model science, whose precision and\nnecessity philosophy, too, must imitate.\u201d During the second period of\nmodern philosophy there was a gradual change of thought objectivity.\nReason was still the instrument, but it was employed on the mind itself.\nIt came to be recognised that if man is part of nature\u2019s mechanism,\nhe is a knowing mechanism. The age was, however, more than one of\nself-analysis. Rousseau introduced a sentimental tendency from which came\n\u201ca revival of passion, of poetry, and of enthusiasm, whose influence\nwe shall never outgrow.\u201d To it is traceable the French Revolution\nwhich overthrew all the mechanical restraints of civilisation, and\n\u201cdemonstrated afresh to the world\u2019s outer sense the central importance of\npassion in the whole life of humanity.\u201d\n\nThe period of modern philosophy, which still continues, began with the\npublication of Kant\u2019s \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d the essential doctrine\nof which is that man\u2019s nature is the real creator of man\u2019s world, that\nvisible nature is the expression of the human spirit, the inner structure\nof which is therefore the deepest truth for us. This idea is \u201cas old as\ndeeper spiritual faith itself,\u201d and yet it is the very soul of all our\nmodern life because it is \u201cthe essentially humane view of reality.\u201d For\nfifty years Kant\u2019s ideas ruled philosophic thought, and then, through the\nprogress of science, the doctrine of evolution received formulation, and\nconfirmation and \u201cexternal nature has once more gained for us an imposing\nauthority which makes us in many ways sympathise afresh with the pure\nnaturalism of the seventeenth century.\u201d We are compelled to omit any\naccount of the author\u2019s study of the philosophies of Spinoza, Locke, and\nBerkeley, or the philosophic systems of Kant and his successors of the\nGerman School of Idealists. Nor can we say anything as to the doctrine of\nEvolution, which Professor Royce rightly regards as having had its rise\nlong before Darwin or Herbert Spencer. Before proceeding to state his\nown views, the author takes a cursory glance at modern empirical monism\nwhich he affirms to be rather a suggestion than a philosophy. It is not\nsurprising, therefore, that he is not content with it although he makes\nuse of its ideas.\n\nLet us now see what are the \u201cSuggestions\u201d which Professor Royce offers\nas his contribution towards the formation of a world-conception. These\noccupy the last four chapters of the work, which are supplemented by a\ngeneral summary in the appendix, to the book. For the sake of conciseness\nwe will make use of this summary, according to which there are two\nphases of idealistic doctrine, the Analytic Idealism of Berkeley and the\nSynthetic Idealism of Kant and his successors. The former shows that if\nthe world is to be knowable at all, it must be, in its deepest nature, a\nworld of ideas, that is, it exists \u201conly in so far as beings with minds\nactually _know it to be_.\u201d The objection that nobody can _know_ any\nreality beyond his own self, is met by the synthetic phase of idealism\nwhich shows us that \u201cthere is but one self in the world, the logos or\nworld-mind. The _finite_ self knows truth beyond its own limitations,\njust because it is an organic part of the complete Self.\u201d What are the\ndemands of idealism as thus stated? They have relation, first, to the\ninterpretation of the facts of experience, which must be in terms of\nthe doctrine of the world-mind, and, secondly, to experience itself,\non which we depend \u201cfor the revelation of that truth which, for us\nfinite beings, must remain a fast \u2018outer\u2019 truth, just because it is the\ncontent of other mind than our own bits of selfhood, and is universally\ntrue for all intelligences.\u201d The philosophy of experience having to do\nwith facts and with the interpretation of facts, it is necessary to\ndistinguish between what is really \u201couter\u201d and what is \u201cinner\u201d about our\nfinite experience. The former embraces the world of facts, and a fact\nis something which must be describable in some sort of universal terms.\nThe principle of ordinary realism, \u201cthat you must not be sentimental or\notherwise emotional in your account of the truth of things, but rather\n_exact in your descriptions of what things are_,\u201d has a thoroughly\nidealistic justification. Not appreciation, but description gives us\nouter truth, and this is the characteristic presupposition of all natural\nscience, which is concerned with the universal aspects of things, as\nopposed to momentary and transient aspects. That presupposition involves\nthe assumption that the world is _essentially describable_. But as only\nthe well-knit, the orderly, that which conforms to law, can be described\nscience assumes the universality and rigidity of the laws of nature.\nIt assumes further, since the most exact descriptions are possible only\nin the case of processes in Space and Time, of a mechanical type, that\neverything including man himself, is a part of nature\u2019s mechanism. A\ncloser analysis, however, shows that, as one can only describe what has\nbeen first appreciated, there must be universal types of appreciation,\nand therefore, that \u201cIdeals must be deeper than Mechanism, so that, in\norder to be relatively describable, nature must embody purposes, and so\nbe possessed of worth.\u201d The author\u2019s conclusion is that the natural order\nis also a moral order, and that therefore \u201cthe world of absolute self\nmust appear to us as having two aspects, one a temporal, the other an\neternal aspect, one of law and one of worth. Man then turns out to be at\nonce a part of nature\u2019s mechanism, and a part of the moral order; at once\ntemporally determined and morally free.\u201d\n\nThe final lecture presents the author\u2019s views as to the solution of the\nproblem of evil. Professor Royce believes that all evil is part of a good\norder, and hence he agrees with Hegel, who declared that life, however\ngood, will always be restless, longing, suffering, and who gloried\nin the paradox as the very essence of spirituality; rather than with\nSchopenhauer, whose recognition, in another light, of the universality\nof the same truth led him to abandon all hope in life. The justification\nof the existence of an evil impulse comes just at the instant when it is\nhated and condemned. Thus \u201ccondemning and conquering the evil will, makes\nit part of a good will\u201d; as pain and suffering have their compensation in\ntheir chastening effect on the spirit. But to the enlightened soul it is\nnot so much the painfulness as \u201cthe blind irrationality of fortune that\nseems to drive God out of our thoughts when we look at our world.\u201d It is\nthe capriciousness of life, arising from human stupidity, that really\nmakes it seem like an evil dream. What is the explanation of this caprice\ngiven by the author? It is to be found in the creed of his idealism,\n\u201cThis world is the world of the Logos.\u201d It is \u201cthe suffering God, who is\njust our own true self, who actually and in our flesh bears the sins of\nthe world, and whose natural body is pierced by the capricious wounds\nthat hateful fools inflict upon him.\u201d And as our defeats are his, so his\ntriumph and his eternal peace are ours also.\n\nProf. Royce in making \u201conly one more effort to define a \u2018double-aspect\u2019\ntheory of the relations of the physical and the moral and \u00e6sthetic\nworlds,\u201d affirms that our philosophic insight teaches us that the world\nof matter in motion is simply an external aspect of the appreciable\nworld, that is, of the world of the Logos. Of this, it is such an aspect\n\u201cas can be expressed by finite consciousness in terms of the space and\ntime forms, and of the categories of empirical science.... Consequently\nall its laws, all its necessity, its causation, its uniformity, belong,\nnot to its inner nature as such, but to the external show of this\nnature.\u201d That which actually appears to us is matter in motion, which\nfurnishes the fact of the double aspect, the inner intelligibility of\nwhich fact is problematical to us, but not so for the Logos, who is our\ntrue Self, and who \u201ccompletes the insight that for us is so fragmentary.\u201d\nThis true Self, the Logos, is the only Self, and with it the deeper self\nof man is identical. That this deeper self is \u201cthe self that knows in\nunity all truth,\u201d is declared to be no hypothesis, and therefore the\nexistence of the Infinite Self is perfectly sure. This Self \u201cinfinitely\nand reflectively transcends our consciousness, and therefore, since\nit includes us, it is at the very least a person, and more definitely\nconscious than we are; for what it possesses is self-reflecting\nknowledge.\u201d Finally, the true world, that is the world of appreciation,\nis the system of the thoughts of the Logos, whose unity we know, just so\nfar as we ourselves consciously and rationally enter into it and form\npart of it. Therefore \u201cin so far as we have inner unity of thinking,\nin so far as we commune with our fellows, and in so far as we rightly\nsee significance in the outer universe, we are in and of the world of\nappreciation that embodies the thought of the Logos.\u201d\n\nIngenious as this theory is, and notwithstanding the elements of truth it\npossesses, we cannot accept it as conclusive. Its weakness is revealed\nin the last line of the paragraph just quoted. If only the world of\nappreciation embodies the thought of the Logos, what becomes of the world\nof fact? The latter is said to be the outer aspect of the former, a\nnotion which is apparently derived from the association with man of body\nand mind. But the existence of mind, which we must understand by the term\nLogos, in nature, although declared by Professor Royce to be the only\nthing certain, is a mere inference, and even if the analogy of the human\norganism justifies such an inference; it would require that if priority\nhas to be given to mind or matter in the universe it must be allowed to\nthe latter. At birth a human being has no mind, properly so-called, since\nit is the result of the activity after birth of the organism, through\nthe agency of the brain. It is true that the human body possesses from\nthe first the elements of the mind, or rather of the feeling which thus\nexhibits itself; or, better still, the organic structure of which feeling\nis the general function. The utmost that can be properly asserted of the\nuniverse, therefore, is that it possesses a certain organic arrangement\nof its parts, and therewith such a condition of feeling, or, what in\nthis relation would be a better term, sensitiveness, as is required by\nits organic character. In relation to such a state of things the terms\nthought, consciousness, reflection, have no meaning so far as we can\njudge. That organic aspect of the universe, moreover, leaves no room for\nduality. Just as the human organism constitutes a perfect unity, although\nit is made up of various organs and exhibits the properties attributed\nto both mind and matter, so must the universe be such a perfect unity\nwhatever its nature and attributes. The human organism may, however, be\nstrictly described as matter under organic conditions, a description\nwhich is equally applicable to the universe, without determining what\nthose conditions are. Professor Royce objects to the Unknowable of\nHerbert Spencer, but there is very little practical difference between it\nand his own true Self, which, as the Absolute, is unknowable, although\nhe is known in the inner self of man, as Spencer\u2019s Unknowable is known\nin the human consciousness. Both Absolute and Unknowable are, however,\nmerely names for Organic Nature, which is seen in all things visible and\nis known by all her operations. These are governed by the laws of her\nvery existence, and it is the uniformity of which those laws are the\nexpression which constitutes the moral law of the universe, the breach\nof whose eternal order, whether this is established in the world of\nmatter or in the human mind, must be attended with consequences that are\ndesignated by man as evil. We find only a world of description, which is\nnevertheless one of moral order.\n\nWidely as we disagree on the grounds stated with the conclusions of\nProfessor Royce\u2019s work, it is undoubtedly a valuable contribution to the\ndiscussion of the world-problem. Its description of the characteristics\nof the philosophy of Kant and of the German idealists is clear, though\nnot intended to do more than exhibit the spirit of their teaching, and\nit is written in a style which renders it easy reading. It is a pity,\ntherefore, that it is disfigured with such colloquialisms as _you\u2019ll_,\n_isn\u2019t_, _can\u2019t_, _don\u2019t_, words which neither sound well, nor look well\nin print.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nDIE ARISTOTELISCHE AUFFASSUNG VOM VERH\u00c4LTNISSE GOTTES ZUR WELT UND ZUM\nMENSCHEN. By _Dr. Eugen Rolfes_. Berlin: Mayer & M\u00fcller. 1892.\n\nThis book is a scholastic \u201csurvival.\u201d The author believes that Zeller\u2019s\ninterpretation of Aristotle is wrong, and in five formal theses he\nendeavors to prove _secundum artem_ that the philosopher was a theist who\ntaught the creation of the world from nothing, and the immortality of\nthe soul. In the defence of his theses he manifests some ingenuity and\nindustry, but no criticism. The work has no scientific significance.\n\n P. S.\n\n\nMAX STIRNER UND FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE. Erscheinungen des modernen Geistes\nund das Wesen des Menschen. By _Robert Schellwien_. Leipsic: C. E. M.\nPfeffer, 1892. Price 2 m 60 pf.\n\nIndividualism is the spirit of the age, and among all the champions\nof individualism the most original, the most consistent, the boldest,\nare perhaps Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche. Robert Schellwien, in\nsketching their views in great outlines, partly admires these courageous\nthinkers who dare to draw the consequences of their principles to the\nvery last even though they will appear absurd to the world, partly\ncensures the rashness with which they arrive at, and the superciliousness\nwith which they sometimes state, their opinions. Upon the whole the\nauthor succeeds in impressing the reader that there is in these two\npeculiar geniuses a gigantic strength, and that their views of truth,\nmorality, and justice deserve a greater attention than they have\nreceived. The reviewer is no admirer of either Stirner or Nietzsche; he\nbelieves nevertheless that a careful analysis of their erratic minds and\nlives will be very instructive. It will be first of pathological and\nthen even of more than pathological interest. The actual objective value\nof the ideals truth, morality, and justice, will be best illustrated by\nshowing all the consequences of a consistent individualism. We hope that\nthis pamphlet will grow into a more comprehensive work; and in that case\nwe should advise the author to add short biographies of his heroes.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nTHE SOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF KANT\u2019S TELEOLOGY. By _James Hayden Tufts_.\nChicago: University Press. 1892.\n\nThis little tract is an inaugural dissertation presented by Mr. Tufts\nto the University of Freiburg for the attainment of the doctorate of\nphilosophy. It is written in English. Mr. Tuft\u2019s dissertation is wholly\nhistorical. He simply seeks to expound Kant\u2019s true views. In this respect\nthe work bears the marks of much research and of a thorough exploitation\nof Kant\u2019s works. Mr. Tuft\u2019s concluding words are that \u201cwith every new\ndiscovery of science, every advance in the ideals of art and of the\nconduct of life, every development in religious faiths, comes anew the\ntask for philosophy to criticise, and through criticism to make a fresh\nattempt to interpret from the unity of reason the manifold of life.\u201d\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\nDISTINCTION AND THE CRITICISM OF BELIEFS. By _Alfred Sidgwick_. London:\nLongmans, Green, & Co. 1892.\n\nThis work might be described as an inquiry into the conflict between\nphilosophy and common sense, and its central idea as the continuity\nof nature. What bearing this idea has on the inquiry is shown by the\nstatement, that the distinction between philosophy and common sense is\nonly one of degree. And yet, regarded as methods, or attempts to follow\nideals, they may be sharply contrasted. This implies the existence\nof distinctions, and hence arises the question how far distinction\nis consistent with continuity in nature. The recognition of such a\ncontinuity requires the admission of the unreality of distinctness, but\nthis fact is not inconsistent with the use of rough distinctions, which\ngive rise to what the author terms effective ambiguity. Here we have the\nfield of the operation of common sense, which exhibits itself as tact in\nthe use of rough distinctions, while, on the other hand, philosophy may\nbe said to be concerned with the continuity which, from a superficial\nglance, might be supposed to stand in opposition to distinction.\n\nThe ultimate result which Mr. Sidgwick has in view is the reconciliation\nof philosophy and common sense, although it is incidental to his main\npurpose, which is the discussion of the best way of dealing with\nambiguity, that is, of using rough distinctions. The improvement\nsuggested is the substitution of \u201creasoned discrimination\u201d for \u201chaphazard\ntact,\u201d and it is based on the doctrine that \u201cthe validity of all\ndistinctions is relative to the purpose for which they are used at the\ntime.\u201d This cannot mean that distinction is merely relative, as it is\nsaid that there is no distinction which is quite safe against being\nbroken down. The implication is that a safe distinction is possible,\nalthough difficult to find, and consistently with that view, the doctrine\nhas the double aim of repressing excessive belief in distinctions\nwhich are, at least for the moment, invalid, and, on the other hand,\nof \u201cenabling us to justify for a passing purpose, distinctions which\nare faulty on the whole.\u201d The justification here arises from the use,\nand not from the distinctions themselves, although it is evident there\nmust be some basis for them, or they would be invalid. The element of\ntruth is derived from the continuity of nature, with which philosophy is\nconcerned, and hence the improvement in the method of common sense is to\nbe effected through its regulation by the method of philosophy.\n\nThe justice of this view may be tested by its consequences, which are\nstated by the author in reviewing the chief incidental aims of his\nbook, as being those which have to do with controversy, the faults of\nlanguage, and the conflict between the rival ideals, faith and doubt.\n\u201cPhilosophy,\u201d we are told, \u201cis doubt, just as science is knowledge,\u201d (a\ndescription which like many other things in this book we cannot endorse,)\nand the true centre of philosophical interest in regard to rival ideals\nis \u201cto harmonise the dispute by seeking how to limit each ideal by its\nopposite.\u201d This is the aim of all real philosophy, which recognises that\nevery ideal has an element of truth. Philosophy is thus explanation,\nand Mr. Sidgwick avers one of the great dividing forces in philosophy\nhas always been \u201cthe rivalry between two opposite methods of general\nexplanation\u2014that which explains small things by great ones, the part by\nthe whole, the many by the one (e. g. all earthly facts as related to\ntheir one cause and substance); and that which explains great things by\nsmall ones, the whole by its parts, the one by the many (e. g. the system\nof nature as a \u2018concourse of atoms\u2019).\u201d Thus regarded, the distinction\nbetween philosophy and common sense is simply one of method; and it may\nbe said to consist in the use by the former of rational doubt based on\nscientific knowledge, as distinguished from the belief founded on popular\nwisdom which distinguishes the latter. Both alike, however, are the fruit\nof observation, pushed further, nevertheless, in the one case than in the\nother, which is practically the view expressed by the author.\n\nIn considering the nature of philosophy, we have given the gist of Mr.\nSidgwick\u2019s reflections on controversy, which is treated as the opposition\nof ideals. This conflict is kept alive chiefly by doubt as to how\nabstract notions should be applied in concrete cases, and largely owing\nto \u201cthe absence of that kind of sharp distinction which is applicable,\nnot only to the notions themselves, but to the actual facts to which they\npretend to refer.\u201d This view is ably enforced, as well as the necessity\nof applying to the conflict between ideals the rule laid down as to the\npurposive validity of distinctions. The operation of this rule would be\nattended with concession instead of assumption, there being, however, the\nadmission, which is equivalent to an assumption, that neither side of\nany ideal dispute is devoid of some truth as well as some error. This is\nreally required, if not by the continuity of nature, yet by continuity in\nour interpretation of nature. This is continuity in thought, and hence\narises the difficulties connected with language which it is one of the\nauthor\u2019s incidental aims to point out. He supposes that language acts as\na drag on the progress of knowledge, owing to the _clumsiness_ of words\narising from the fact that \u201cthings spoken of are always more full of\nchange and movement than the words we can use in speaking of them.\u201d\n\nMr. Sidgwick insists upon continuity, yet change itself may be evidence\nof at least partial discontinuity. Our author remarks, in an appendix\nnote on the continuity of nature, that every change, as such, is a\n_saltus_, however small it may be, and that the same is true of any gap\nbetween the two extremes of nature and the intermediate region. That such\nan intermediate region exists, is required by the continuity of nature,\nwhich again is evidence of change, on the principle that every chain\nis made up of a series of links. But as in the chain there is no real\ngap between the links, so there is no actual discontinuity consequent\non change in nature. The two extremes may be regarded as prolongations\nof the intermediate region, and the changes to which such prolongation\nis due may so occur that there may be discontinuity between certain\nparts, as between the fibres of which a hempen rope is made, and yet\nthere be a perfectly continuous whole. We have an example of such a\ndiscontinuous _continuum_ in a beam of ordinary light, which presents not\nthe slightest gap, and which yet is made up of numberless undulations\nin different ratios representing the six spectrum colors, each of which\nis, moreover, spread throughout the whole of the beam. Here we see that\ncontinuity is quite consistent with distinction. The latter may be\nregarded as discrimination of the various phases of the former, and the\ndistinction remains valid or otherwise according to the accuracy of the\ndiscrimination or not. But constant change of distinction is required by\nprogress in knowledge which may be regarded as a thought representation,\nby discontinuous steps, of the continuity of nature.\n\nAs to the conflict between faith and doubt, the author considers the\nfunction of scepticism as the search for grounds of belief, and thus\ndoubt is said to be \u201crather a friend than an enemy to those who remember\nthat there is still some truth, on any subject, for fallible men to\nlearn,\u201d as well as to those who are more interested in the discovery of\ntruth than in supporting their own beliefs.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nVORLESUNGEN \u00dcBER GEOMETRIE, unter besonderer Benutzung der Vortr\u00e4ge von\nAlfred Clebsch. By _Dr. Ferdinand Lindemann_. Leipsic: B. G. Teubner.\n1891.\n\nThis first part of the second volume of Alfred Clebsch\u2019s Lectures has\nbeen arranged and treated by Professor Lindemann in the same way as\nthe first, except perhaps that the editor has extended his independent\ninvestigations rather further than before, owing mainly to the fact that\nhe had in addition to his own notes when attending Professor Clebsch\u2019s\nlectures in 1871-1872, only five folio pages of the late master\u2019s\nmanuscript at his disposal. The present volume is divided into three\nparts. I. The Point, Plane, and Straight Line. II. Surfaces of the Second\nOrder and of the Second Class. III. Fundamental Conceptions of Projective\nand Metrical Geometry. Historical notices and references are added in\nfoot-notes. Considering the prominence of the editor as a mathematician,\nit would be a presumption on our part to praise his work.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nAN INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL LOGIC. By _E. E. Constance Jones_. London:\nLongmans, Green, & Co. 1892.\n\nThis work is another witness of the great interest now being taken in all\nthat pertains to the methods of knowledge.\n\nMiss Jones, the author, is lecturer on logic at Girton College,\nCambridge. During an experience of several years in teaching, certain\ndifficulties have very forcibly pressed themselves upon her attention.\nShe hopes by her book to aid in removing these difficulties.\n\nIt is certainly a good augury for women when their intellectual\nrepresentatives begin to show the disposition to turn towards the \u201cdry\nlight.\u201d Logic and mathematics are \u201cdry\u201d to be sure; that is, they are\nvery apt to be _found_ dry, very dry, by beginners, and always by those\nwho lack that real intellectual robustness which is alone fit to meddle\nwith fundamental problems. Hence these sober and severe disciplines find\nlittle favor among those who seek merely for \u201cshowy\u201d attainments, those\nto whom whatever is \u201cuninteresting\u201d is intolerable, and those who regard\nobscurity as inseparable from profundity. When then we find scholarly\nwomen manifesting a real relish for this \u201cdry light,\u201d it gives promise of\na coming day when the intellectual appetite will rise above the level of\nmere entertainment, the level of the playhouse and the circus, and take\nkindly, and perhaps zealously, to real edification.\n\nMiss Jones makes but very modest claims on behalf of her treatise. She\nhas not undertaken to innovate to any great extent upon the regular\nscheme. If in her changes there is that which might especially provoke\ncriticism, it is perhaps in the nomenclature which she adopts. The\ntraditional logic forms a system which has its own proper merits and\ndefects. It is of great historical interest, and its regular terminology\nis almost indispensable for the proper illustration of its doctrines.\n\nWe think also that the author fails to state the case in all its\namplitude, when, she lays it down as one of the most absolute and\nultimate of all logical principles that the self-evident ought to be\nbelieved. The truth is, as we conceive it, that the self-evident is sure\nto be believed, and that in the face of any proposition that truly bears\nits own justification along with it, any doctrine of logic is either\nuseless or impertinent.\n\n \u03c1\u03c3\u03bb.\n\n\nHYPNOTISMUS UND SUGGESTION. By _W. Wundt_. Leipsic: Wilhelm Engelmann.\n1892.\n\nA Greek student translates \u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2 \u2018small\u2019; \u201cYou are thinking of the\nGerman _klein_,\u201d says the teacher quickly. Another renders \u1f21\u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u1f01\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03af, \u2018we are lambs,\u2019 misled by a chance cross association with the\nLatin _agni_. Every careful self-observer knows that there is no\ncombination of memories, images, and resultant incipient acts too absurd\nfor some moments of confusion and mental fatigue. We account for such\nconfusions of thought by citing parallel cases and adding generally\nthat normal associations are liable to disintegration and abnormal\nrecombination in fatigued or excited conditions of the brain. If we\nseek a causal scientific explanation, two methods are open to us: (1)\nwe may attempt to map out in detail and describe for all similar cases\nthe pathways of association, or (2) we may endeavor to define their\nphysiological conditions and accompaniments in the nervous system. The\nfirst leads us at once into the metaphysics of the unconscious. The\nsecond method, when we attempt to pass from a general to a specific\ncorrespondence, leads to a hypothetical restatement of the observed\npsychological facts in terms of the latest cerebral anatomy and\nphysiology Now all serious scientific thinkers are fast coming to the\nconclusion (on which Wundt\u2019s book is based) that the phenomena of dreams\nand of hypnotism are to be explained by the general laws of association\nas revealed especially in the confused and obstructed associations of the\nnormal state. The critical and destructive part of Wundt\u2019s sensible and\ntimely work has two aims: (1) to discriminate the attested phenomena of\nhypnotism from the alleged phenomena of thought-transference, telepathy,\nand \u201cpossession\u201d on which no serious student will waste his words; and\n(2) to point out the confusions of thought in current explanations of\nhypnotic phenomena, which either confine themselves to restatements of\nthe observed facts in terms of a hypothetical anatomy, or at any rate\nin Wundt\u2019s opinion base their physiological hypotheses on an inadequate\npsychological analysis. His own constructive work is an attempt to\nsupply the missing analysis and accompany it with the most plausible\nphysiological theory that our imperfect science allows. Dreams and the\nillusions of the hypnotic subject are doubtless explicable generally\nas derangements of the associative machinery. But they are specific\nforms of abnormal association, the special characteristics of which we\nwish to define. Suggestion, Wundt says (with James), is association\naccompanied by a \u201climitation of consciousness to the images aroused by\nthe association.\u201d The scientific problem is: _Wie entsteht die Einengung\ndes Bewusstseins?_ This narrowing of consciousness manifests itself in\na diminished sensibility to all impressions outside of the suggestions.\nDreams show the same features, accidental impressions of sense or changes\nin the nutritive processes here taking the place of direct suggestions\nfrom without. But in sleep and dreams the limitation of consciousness is\nconditioned by general fatigue of the nervous system. In the hypnotic\nstate it results not from fatigue, but from neuro-dynamic and vaso-motor\nchanges in the distribution of tensions in the brain. Hence the superior\nintensity and vividness of the presentations that are allowed to develop\nthemselves. This altered equilibrium of the forces of the brain is\nbrought about by the suggestions of the operator, which are generally\nguided by him to a more or less definite end. The resulting derangements\nof normal associations are consequently less lawless than is the case in\ndreams. On these principles Wundt explains the chief facts of hypnotism\nas follows: Automatic obedience to the commands of the operator results\nsimply from the fact that every idea tends to realise itself in action,\nis an incipient act; and in the narrowed consciousness of the hypnotic\nsubject the idea suggested by the operator finds no competitors in the\nstruggle for existence as a reality. This explanation (which is really as\nold as Spinoza) accounts also for positive hallucinations\u2014there are no\nreductors, as Taine would say. Negative hallucinations (the non-existence\nof an existing door) may be explained sometimes by a contradictory\npositive hallucination (as of a curtain covering the door) more often\nin the same way as hypnotic analgesia by the familiar analogy of our\ninsensibility to the toothache when the attention is elsewhere strongly\nengaged. This is favored by the generally diminished sensibility of the\nhypnotic subject. Post-hypnotic suggestions are associations depending\non partial memories, such as we have in the normal state when we merely\nrecall an image or an object without time-and-circumstance localisation.\nThe subject who is to execute a post-hypnotic suggestion at 7 o\u2019clock\nis reminded by the striking of the clock of an image of a thing to be\ndone which the original command of the operator associated with the\nstroke of seven. All else is forgotten. When the time limit is not thus\ndefinitely marked, the process must be analogous to that whereby some\npersons are able to waken at a predetermined hour in the morning. A\nlatent association is aroused into full activity by naturally recurring\nconditions of internal physiological processes or external surroundings.\nCourtesy or prudence are perhaps all that prevent the best explanation of\ncertain extreme cases being the old one: \u201cthe boy lied.\u201d Wundt rejects\nthe claim that suggestion is the experimental method in psychology\n_par excellence_, for the very sufficient reason that the phenomena\nexperimented with are only very partially in the control of the operator\nand are furthermore mainly pathological. He is far from disputing the\npractical efficacy of hypnotic therapeutics in functional disorders,\nbut he regards the hypnotic sleep as a dangerous remedy, the employment\nof which should be limited to trained practitioners. The subjection\nof the hypnotic subject to the will of the hypnotiser is _a priori_\nan immoral relation to obtain between man and man unless justified by\nsuperior medical necessities, but, quite apart from _a priori_ ethics,\nindiscriminate hypnotisation is to be discouraged as a direct cause of\nnervous degeneration. The book closes as it began With a dignified but\nsevere reprobation of those thinkers who in the interests of occultism\nmagnify the psychological significance of hypnotism and disseminate\nsuperstition in the name of science.\n\n PAUL SHOREY.\n\n\nDER HYPNOTISMUS IN GEMEINFASSLICHER DARSTELLUNG. By _Dr. Hans\nSchmidkunz_. Stuttgart: A. Zimmer (E. Mohrmann). 1892.\n\nThis book (266 pp.) is a popular compendium of hypnotism. The author,\nbeginning (I) with the hypnosis of common life, goes over the whole field\nas follows: (II) the phenomena of hypnosis, (III) its application, (IV)\nthe \u201cbeyond\u201d of hypnotism, (V) the conceptions of hypnotism, and (VI) its\ndangers. The seventh and last chapter is a short history of the subject.\n\nDr. Schmidkunz, Docent of philosophy at the University of Munich, is one\nof the few who believe that there is a \u201cbeyond\u201d in hypnotism. He says\non p. 65: \u201cA hypnotised person was led through a room while sleeping.\nThe experimenter made a few passes over his head and then violently\nwhirled his arm around in a vertical direction before his subject. When\nthe subject approached the marked place, he recoiled from it crying with\npain.\u201d Our author asks, \u201cwhat is this magnetic wall to be regarded as? As\na charm, as an obstacle of occult power, from which the body recoils as\nfrom a wall of stone? If not, was it the subject\u2019s soul that recoiled?\nWas it the hypnotised person\u2019s belief which created the wall?\u201d etc.\nThe two interpretations, the one attributing the effect to a magnetic\npower, the other to suggestion are typical. The former is bolder: he goes\n\u201cbeyond\u201d hypnotism.\n\nOur author is one of those who go beyond hypnotism, and is not satisfied\nwith the theory that suggestion explains all. We may add that he regards\ntelepathy as a sufficiently established fact. Telepathy finds little\nsupport among scientists in Germany, and Dr. Schmidkunz complains, in\na circular letter to \u201cProfessor Wundt\u2019s and other Savants\u2019 Critical\nSaltomortales\u201d of the cool and depreciative treatment which his book\n_Psychologie der Suggestion_ received at the hands of men of science.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nL\u2019HYPNOTISME DEVANT LES CHAMBRES LEGISLATIVES BELGES. Par _J. Delb\u0153uf_.\nParis: F\u00e9lix Alcan. Pp. 80.\n\nIn a recent number of _The Monist_ Prof. J. Delb\u0153uf gave the reasons\nwhich have induced him to come to the conclusion that \u201cpersons in an\nhypnotic condition preserve at least a sufficient portion of their\nintelligence, their reason, together with freedom of action, to prevent\nthem from committing deeds that neither their conscience nor their habits\napprove of.\u201d This opinion is entertained by many other hypnotists, but\nthe more general opinion is that \u201csuggestion\u201d may be made use of for\ncriminal purposes: Such is the case especially in France and in Belgium;\nand acting on that supposition the medical faculty of the latter country\npromoted in the legislative Chamber a law interdicting public hypnotic\ns\u00e9ances, and reserving the practice of hypnotism as a therapeutic measure\nexclusively to medical men, as well as the treatment of insane persons\nand those under twenty-one years of age. Professor Delb\u0153uf, who is not a\nmedical man, naturally objects when those who but a few years ago would\nhave classed him and his fellow hypnotists as charlatans, seek without\nreason to reserve for themselves the promising field of labor opened up\nby the researches of others. He maintains that men are born hypnotisers\nas they are born artists, and therefore to exclude all but medical men\nfrom the application of the hypnotic power will often prevent its use\nfor curative purposes. Moreover it is a serious question for those who\npossess this natural gift. They might perform the most praiseworthy\nactions and yet be subjected to a legal penalty. Professor Delb\u0153uf states\nthat by hypnotism he cured a youth eighteen years of age of a mania for\nstealing (_la manie du vol_), and thus saved him from unmerited dishonor.\nOn another occasion he had charge of a young wife who was possessed with\nthe idea of murdering her children, and after all other means had failed\nhe was able to remove the idea by suggestion extending over a period of\neight days. He properly asks whether the performance of such actions\nought to be treated as criminal.\n\nThe real question to be considered, however, is whether the practice\nof hypnotism is likely to be made use of for criminal purposes if it\nis permitted to every one. We much doubt whether any actual case of\nsuch an abuse has been legally established, or whether suggestion\ncould lead to the perpetration of a criminal act unless there was a\npredisposition in that direction. Professor Delb\u0153uf makes use, however,\nof an apparent paradox which would seem to render abortive any such law\nof prevention as that above referred to. It is that there is in reality\nno such thing as hypnotism. M. Bernheim writes in a letter given in the\npresent work, \u201cfor my part, in the thousands of hypnotisations I have\npractised, I have never seen the least inconvenience result. Undoubtedly\nvery impressionable subjects can, under the emotional influence of\nauto-suggestion, present certain nervous troubles; but these a prudent\noperator can always calm by suggestion.\u201d Professor Delb\u0153uf relates\nseveral cases of this kind within his own experience, which shows that\nsevere nervous pain can be removed by simple assertion that it does not\nexist. He affirms that \u201cthe so-called hypnotic sleep is only a sign\nof suggestibility, and that it is not at all necessary to suggestive\ntherapeutics.\u201d\n\nWe may conclude this notice of a very interesting contribution to the\ndiscussion as to the true nature and operation of hypnotism, by quoting\nthe conclusions arrived at by the author as to the proper mode of\nregulating its practice. He suggests that representations of hypnotism\nshould be permitted subject to the measures which regulate public\nspectacles; that any one should be allowed to become a hypnotiser, as he\ncan become a shampooer or a truss-maker; that the hypnotist who gives\nremedies should be punishable, since he exercises the art of curing\nwithout a diploma; that he should not be allowed to hypnotise minors\nwithout the consent of the family; and that he should be forbidden to\ntreat a sick person without the written authorisation of a medical\nman and under his direction. This rule Professor Delb\u0153uf, although he\ndisapproves of the law which forbids the practice of medicine to those\nwho have not a diploma, has always acted on. He thinks that if medical\nmen then studied hypnotism and practised it themselves, hypnotisers who\nhad no diplomas would soon have nothing to do. This spirited defence\nby Professor Delb\u0153uf of his views will be widely read. Not the least\ninteresting portion of it is the criticism, with which it ends, of \u201cthe\naffair of the brothers Vandevoir,\u201d where we read that he is designated by\nhis opponent M. Masoin \u201c_doux et bon vieillard_\u201d and \u201c_l\u2019homme cheveu_\u201d!\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nUEBER DEN HAUTSINN. By _Dr. phil. et med. Max Dessoir_, Privatdocenten\nan der Universit\u00e4t zu Berlin. Separat-Abzug aus Archiv f\u00fcr Anatomie und\nPhysiologie. Physiologische Abtheilung. 1892.\n\nThis pamphlet, a reprint from the _Archiv f\u00fcr Anatomie und Physiologie_\nof 1892, is an elaborate and careful investigation into the _modus\noperandi_ of skin sensations. The first part is a discussion of the\ntheory of sensation in general containing (1) an analysis of the ideas\n_Gef\u00fchl_, _Empfindung_, and _Wahrnehmung_, (2) a critique of Johannes\nM\u00fcller\u2019s doctrine of specific energies, (3) an exposition of the\nobjectification of sensations. Feeling (_Empfindung_), according to\nthe author, is, no magnitude, its main feature is intensity, quality\nbecomes important only in sensation (_Wahrnehmung_). For the psychology\nof skin-sensations, we have to note the great influence of accompanying\nfeelings (_Mitempfindungen_). The second part is devoted to the author\u2019s\ninvestigations of the sense of temperature. Dr. Dessoir rejects Blix\u2019s\npoint theory; he regards the idea of two different end-apparatuses for\nwarm and cold sensations as an unfounded assumption, and claims that the\ntemperature sense is one mode of sensation possessing two qualities. The\nintensity of temperature sensations depends not only upon the _vis viva_\nof the heat in the stimulus; but also upon five other factors (1) the\nsize of the surface affected, (2) the duration of the affect, (3) the\nthickness of the epidermis, (4) its conductibility, and (5), last not\nleast, its temperature.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nRECHERCHES D\u2019OPTIQUE PHYSIOLOGIQUE ET PHYSIQUE. By _Cl\u00e9mence Royer_.\nBrussels Imprimerie Veuve Monnom. 1892.\n\nThe first part of this brochure consists chiefly of an examination of\nthe theories of M. M. Hirth and Chauveau on chromatic sensation. The\ntalented authoress disagrees with the view entertained by M. Chauveau,\nthat the sensations of contrast which are fused cerebrally, so as to\ngive, when viewed with both eyes, a white image, are subjective in an\nintellectual sense. The result is purely physico-physiological, as it is\neven assuming the intervention of M. Hirth\u2019s _interior eye_. Mad. Royer\nregards the eyes organised so as to effect a fusion of the colors and\nforms depicted on the two retinas, and she accepts the conclusion of M.\nHirth, that they lessen the real polychromism of objects, the inability\nto perceive the infra-red and the ultra-violet rays concealing from us a\nconsiderable part \u201cof the palette of nature and of its chromatic scale.\u201d\nThe authoress refers with approval to the theory of M. Charpentier that\nthe complementary colors correspond to inverse undulatory phases, which\nare destroyed by interference in the field of vision.\n\nThe second part of Mad. Royer\u2019s pamphlet is devoted to a consideration of\nthe photography of colors, and the theory of light. It points out that\nthe photography of colors, which has been effected to some extent by M.\nLippmann, must be a physical and not a chemical process. It is the result\nof the periodic compressions of the sensitised silver-surface, due to\nthe shocks it receives from the light undulations of the ether, which\nso modify the surfaces of the silver atoms that they reflect colored\nrays identical with those received from the object photographed. With\nreference to the propagation of light, the authoress affirms that the\natoms of matter, as well as those of the ether, which differs from matter\nonly in being imponderable and without inertia, are centres of emanation\nof a continuous and impenetrable fluid, which is however indefinitely\nexpansible or compressible. The size and form of atoms will thus depend\non the compressions they receive, and they will be able to accommodate\nthemselves to the spaces to which they are confined by the resistance\nof the atomic groups by which they are surrounded. But the world may be\nregarded as consisting of three sorts of atoms: (1) those of the ether\nwhich possess their primordial unity of expansive force and are endowed\nwith perfect elasticity; (2) those of ponderable matter, which have lost\na portion of their expansive force and elasticity; (3) those which are\ncalled vitaliferous, because they have regained their expansive force,\nand are thus capable of autonomous movements necessary to resist the\ncompressions of the ether and to oppose the inertia of matter. They thus\nanswer to the cell-souls of Haeckel.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nDIE BEWEGUNG DER LEBENDIGEN SUBSTANZ. Eine vergleichend-physiologische\nUntersuchung der Contractionserscheinungen. By _Max Verworn_, Dr. med.,\nPrivatdocent der Physiologie an der Universit\u00e4t Jena. Mit 19 Abbildungen.\nJena: Gustav Fischer, 1892.\n\nThe mechanism of muscle contraction and expansion and the motions of\nam\u0153boid substance have been recognised as one and the same problem; and\nseveral naturalists, foremost among them Hofmeister, Engelmann, and\nEdmund Montgomery have investigated it, fully aware of the enormous\nimportance of the subject. The present pamphlet is small, it contains\nonly 103 pages, but it contains the statement of the problem, a\ndescription of the author\u2019s experiments, and his solution so lucidly that\none cannot read it without great satisfaction. Both processes, expansion\nas well as contraction, are, according to Verworn, spontaneous motions,\nand both are to be explained by chemotropy. Expansion, i. e., in am\u0153ba\nthe protrusion of pseudopodia, is due to the plasma\u2019s hunger for the\noxygen, which is contained in the surrounding medium. Every irritation\n(electric shocks, concussions, injuries etc.) causes a chemical\ndecomposition of the oxygenised plasma; it loses carbon, hydrogen,\noxygen, and nitrogen, (as we know from the waste products, carbonic\nacid, creatine, lactic acid,) and these substances are exactly those\nwhich are most prominent in building up living substance. Irritations\nwithout exception cause the plasma to return to the nucleus. The chemical\nchange in the plasma makes it hungry for the nuclear substances. The\nvital process, accordingly, is an interaction between the nucleus, the\nplasma, and the medium, so that in the constant exchange of materials the\nold structure is preserved; and the fundamental features of the vital\nprocess are first the plasma\u2019s chemotropy for oxygen, causing centrifugal\nmotions, and then its chemotropy for nuclear substance, causing\ncentripetal motions. The plasma saturated with nuclear substances, shows\na chemotropy for the oxygen of the medium; it moves in a centrifugal\ndirection, and the oxygenised plasma has become so unstable that it\nbreaks down on the slightest provocation. The decomposed plasma exhibits\na chemotropy for nuclear substance and thus returns in contripetal\nmotions to the centre. Without entering into details we may mention that\nthis accounts also for the fact that dying protoplasm always assumes a\nglobular shape, until it crumbles to pieces. The _rigor mortis_ is the\nlast vital action of living substance. The plasma seeks once more the\nnuclear substance, but not finding sufficient material for being built up\nagain into a substance endowed with a chemotropy for oxygen remains rigid\nuntil it decays.\n\nThe author finds his theory to hold good for the actions of the striated\nand nonstriated muscles, and also of ciliated tissues. Having shown\nthat the vital functions are due to the same forces that are observable\nin the retort of the chemist, he adds: \u201cThe savage accordingly was not\nquite wrong when he drew no distinct line, considering everything moving\nas alive. Life is motion. That old poetical view of all nature being\nanimated with life throughout was in possession of a germ of truth,\nand our proud civilisation has actually made a retrogressive step in\nabandoning this view.\u201d\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nGRABER\u2019S LEITFADEN DER ZOOLOGIE F\u00dcR DIE OBEREN CLASSEN DER MITTELSCHULEN.\nVienna and Prague: F. Tempsky. 1892. Price 1 fl. 60 kr.\n\nWe had occasion in a recent number of _The Monist_ to review an\nexcellent text-book of physics published by this same house. The present\nwork on zoology is in its second edition, and is intended, like the\nabove-mentioned work of Professor Mach\u2019s, for high-school instruction.\nProfessor Graber, its author, died before the completion of the second\nedition, and the work was finished by J. Mik.\n\nGraber\u2019s Zoology is unique in its class; it covers, within the\nrestricted limits of two hundred and sixty-one pages, the whole field\nof elementary biology, human physiology, and zoology, as it is usually\nexploited in such books, and thus combines in a single volume what\nis usually contained in two or three. The human organism (Part 1) is\nmade the starting-point of study in the work, and the explication of\nthe physiological and mechanical functions of animals are thus all\ngrouped about this central figure. In a concise form (55 pages) this\nbook contains about all of human anatomy and physiology that is usually\nlearned in high-schools. Part 1 also contains, at the end of the\ndiscussions, brief dietetic suggestions. \u201cSystematic Zoology\u201d is taken\nup in the Second Part. This part is well analysed and arranged. The cuts\nare also excellent. Attached to the book is a \u201cPicture-Atlas.\u201d This atlas\ncontains a number of colored plates, which depict various physiological\nand anatomical organs, and also four beautiful representations of scenes\nfrom the Naples Aquarium. Although this book will not be used by English\nschool-students, it may be recommended to students of scientific German\nwho wish a good introduction into the technical vocabulary of German\nbiology and zoology, which to the foreigner is very difficult.\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\nL\u2019ANTHROPOLOGIE DU BENGALE. By _Paul Topinard_. Extracted from\n_L\u2019Anthropologie_ for May-June, 1892. Paris: G. Masson.\n\nThe present contribution to the science of Anthropology by the Editor\nof _L\u2019Anthropologie_, is based on the anthropometric inquiries of Mr.\nH. H. Risley made under instructions from the government of Bengal. The\nconclusions deduced by Dr. Topinard from the large mass of material\nbrought together by Mr. Risley, and which relates to members of all\nthe castes to be met with in Bengal, are of great interest. He finds\nthat the populations are much mixed, but that they may be divided into\nthree types, one tall and dolichocephalic, that of the Aryans; another\nshort and brachycephalic, derived from northern Asiatics; and the third\nshort and dolichocephalic, or that of the native blacks. India is a\nworld by itself, and most of its inhabitants belong to races of which\nthere is no specimen in Europe. Dr. Topinard naturally attaches more\nimportance to physical than to ethnographical characters as evidence of\nanthropological descent, and he is justified by Mr. Risley\u2019s researches,\nof which he speaks very highly; although he thinks they would have been\nmore fruitful if the anthropometrical instructions prepared by the French\nAnthropologist had been more strictly adhered to. That they were not so\nis the more surprising as Mr. Risley\u2019s work is dedicated to Dr. Topinard\nhimself.\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nUEBER SITTLICHE DISPOSITIONEN. By _Dr. Anton Oelzelt-Newin_, Privatdocent\nan der Universit\u00e4t in Bern. Graz: Leuschner & Lubensky. 1892. Price Mk. 2\n70 Pf.\n\nThe main idea of this book is to prove that there are certain innate\ndispositions forming the elements of morality. The elements of morality\nare according to Dr. Oelzelt-Newin the attitudes of fear, anger, love,\nsympathy, shame, and pride. Conscience is a complex which has developed\nfrom these six dispositions. Having stated sufficient evidences for the\nheredity of moral dispositions and illustrated the parallel phenomena of\nbodily states in their reference to moral alienation, the author treats\nthe six elements of morality in single chapters, explaining their causes\nand the influence of conditions under which they develop either into\nvirtues or crimes. The essay (92 pp.) is a contribution to that ethical\ndeterminism which regards evil as the necessary result of given factors.\n\u201cReligious people should say: Not Only the stone which falls from the\nroof and kills a just man, but also the will of a criminal and the\npunishment of the judge are inscrutable ordinances of God. That alone is\na true theodicy.\u201d As an optimist the author trusts that the evil of the\nworld will be conquered with legal means and enjoins priests to revise\nin this sense their creed, jurists their law, and all men their love of\nmankind.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nTHE BEAUTIES OF NATURE. And the Wonders of the World We live in. By Sir\n_John Lubbock_. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1892. 429 pages. Price $1.50.\n\nNATUR UND KUNST. Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kunst. By _Carus\nSterne_. Berlin: Verein f\u00fcr deutsche Literatur. 1892.\n\nThe first of these two books is a delightful compilation by Sir John\nLubbock. It is another addition to that series of popular works which\nthis well-known naturalist is now giving to English-speaking peoples. It\nmakes no pretension of being scientific: it simply takes the world which\nscience has revealed and shows us its wonders and its beauties. Yet it\ninsinuates many a scientific fact and inculcates many a moral lesson.\nNo one will regret the few hours that can be spent in its perusal, and\nthe stimulus derived from it will heighten the pleasure which every\nreligiously-minded heart takes in the contemplation of natural grandeur\nand truth. In the main, it is intended for unscientific readers. It\nrequires hardly any preparatory knowledge to be understood; yet it\nsometimes touches on a truth that even great thinkers overlook. Thus, _\u00e0\npropos_ of the capacity for intact divisibility which some life-forms\npossess, Sir John remarks that these considerations introduce \u201cmuch\ndifficulty into our conception of the idea of an Individual.\u201d \u201cIn fact,\u201d\nhe says, \u201cthe realisation of the idea of an individual gradually becomes\nmore and more difficult, and the continuity of existence, even among\nthe highest animals, gradually forces itself upon us. I believe that\nas we become more rational, as we realise more fully the conditions of\nexistence, this consideration is likely to have important moral results.\u201d\nThe work is divided into the following chapters: \u201cAnimal Life,\u201d \u201cPlant\nLife;\u201d \u201cWoods and Fields,\u201d \u201cMountains,\u201d \u201cWater,\u201d \u201cRivers and Lakes,\u201d \u201cThe\nSea,\u201d \u201cThe Starry Heavens.\u201d\n\nThe second of the two books that head this review is by Carus Sterne.\nFew men possess the wide technical knowledge and the same command of the\nhistorical literature of his subject, that this investigator and writer\npossesses. Carus Sterne unites with a rigorous scientific training the\nrare qualities of philosophical insight and sound erudition. He possesses\nthe scientific facts on which to base valid judgments, and he deduces\nfrom these facts the inferences that affect the most important problems\nof life\u2014its culture and morality. We have had occasion before, to refer\nto these phases of Carus Sterne\u2019s activity as an author.\n\nIn the present work the author of _Werden und Vergehen_ discusses the\nrelations which obtain between nature and art. Here is not the place to\ngive even a synopsis of the great wealth of material which this book of\n395 pages contains; we are allowed simply to hint at its purport and\nmethods. Carus Sterne defines the artistic impulse in man to be a longing\nof the mind to rise above the ordinary routine of physical existence.\nIt is a lifting ourselves out of our every-day life. This cannot be\naccomplished by the simple reproduction of the things of nature; such\nreproductions have not in themselves an elevating effect. Art is not\nimitative, art is creative. It uses color, form, space, merely as a means\nto give \u201clocal habitation\u201d to an idea. The imitation of actually existing\nthings is the beginning of art; but it is its lowest stage. Nature must\nbe our guide, our norm, not our model. Here the middle road is taken\nbetween the old and the new idea of art. That was ultra-idealistic,\nthis is ultra-realistic. The author then proceeds to discuss the notion\nof beauty in art and nature (Part I) and finally takes up generally\n(Part II) the subject of the artistic contemplation and reproduction of\nthe world. All these topics, with their many subdivisions, are treated\nin Carus Sterne\u2019s best and most fascinating style. The work is well\nillustrated, and all interested in the natural history of art will find\nin it a storehouse of valuable material.\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[58] Cf. Ward, _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, Vol. XX, p. 44.\n\n\n\n\nPERIODICALS.\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. IV. No. 3.\n\n UEBER DIE SOGENANNTE CONSCIENCE MUSCULAIRE (DUCHENNE). By _A.\n Pick_.\n\n EINE NEUE THEORIE DER LICHTEMPFINDUNGEN. By _Christine\n Ladd-Franklin_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)\n\nMrs. Christine Ladd Franklin (a contributor to this number of _The\nMonist_) is one of those few women who have actually won a well deserved\nreputation as a thinker and scientific worker. She is an American by\nbirth and the wife of an American savant. It is pleasant to find her\nname in a German periodical among whose editorial writers are men so\nprominent as Ebbinghaus, K\u00f6nig, Exner, Helmholtz, Hering, Kries, Lipps,\nG. E. M\u00fcller, Pelman, Preyer, and Stumpf. Mrs. Ladd criticises Helmholtz\nand Hering, and thinks that the theories of Donders (in Gr\u00e4fe\u2019s \u201cArchiv,\u201d\n1884) and G\u00f6ller (in Du Bois-Reymond\u2019s \u201cArchiv,\u201d 1888) have not received\nsufficient attention. In accord with their propositions, she sets forth\nan exceedingly simple hypothesis which attempts an explanation of the\nthree main colors by atomic motions in the three different dimensions of\nspace.\n\n\nPHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. XXVIII. Nos. 9 and 10.\n\n UEBER DIE GRUNDFORMEN DER VORSTELLUNGSVERBINDUNG.\n Psychologische Studie. (Concluded.) By _M. Offner_.\n\n DER BEGRIFF DER VERSCHMELZUNG UND DAMIT ZUSAMMENH\u00c4NGENDES IN\n STUMPF\u2019S \u201cTONPSYCHOLOGIE,\u201d BAND II. By _Th. Lipps_.\n\n WERKE ZUR PHILOSOPHIE DER GESCHICHTE UND DES SOCIALEN LEBENS\n (Third Article: _J. S. Mackenzie_, An Introduction to Social\n Philosophy; _J. H. Ferguson_, The Philosophy of Civilisation;\n _W. A. Macdonald_, Humanitism). By _F. T\u00f6nnies_.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. XXIX. No. 1 and 2.\n\n DIE MODERNE ENERGETIK IN IHRER BEDEUTUNG F\u00dcR DIE\n ERKENNTNISSKRITIK. By _K. Lasswitz_.\n\n DIE SITTLICHE FRAGE EINE SOCIALE FRAGE (I). By _F. Staudinger_.\n\n RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHISCHE THESEN. By _E. von Hartmann_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT. (Berlin: Dr. R. Salinger.)\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK. Vol. 101. No. 1.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n PSYCHOLOGISCHE APHORISMEN. By _Otto Liebmann_.\n\n UNTERHALB UND OBERHALB VON GUT UND B\u00d6SE. By _Eduard von\n Hartmann_.\n\n JAHRESBERICHT \u00dcBER ERSCHEINUNGEN DER ANGLO-AMERIKANISCHEN\n LITTERATUR AUS DER ZEIT VON 1890-1891. By _Friedrich Jodl_.\n\n ZUR BEGR\u00dcSSUNG DES ZWEITEN HUNDERTS DER B\u00c4NDE DIESER\n ZEITSCHRIFT. By _Prof. Dr. Rud. Seydel_.\n\n RECENSIONEN. (Leipsic: C. E. M. Pfeffer.)\n\n\nTHE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. October, 1892. Vol. V. No. 1.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n DISTURBANCE OF THE ATTENTION DURING SIMPLE MENTAL PROCESSES. By\n _Edgar James Swift_.\n\n PSEUDO-CHROMESTHESIA, OR THE ASSOCIATION OF COLORS WITH WORDS,\n LETTERS, AND SOUNDS. By _William O. Krohn_, Ph. D.\n\n REPORT ON AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF MUSICAL EXPRESSIVENESS. (Part\n II.) By _Benjamin Ives Gilman_.\n\nThe present investigation made by Mr. Edgar James Swift shows that\na disturbance of the attention through sight is more effective in\nlengthening the reaction time than when the disturbance comes through the\nsense of hearing; but whenever the reaction follows a slight sensation,\nthe time of choice is less affected by disturbances of the attention\nthan if the excitation is a sound. Dr. William O. Krohn concludes, after\ncarefully studying several hundred cases of pseudo-chromesthesia, that a\ngreater per cent. of them arise from some sort of cerebral work due to\nthe close relation of the cortical centres. Mr. Gilman concludes from\nexperiments made with various persons, that musical expressiveness has\nbeen overestimated, and that on the emotional theory of its nature the\nimportance of the art has also been overestimated. (Worcester: J. H.\nOrpha.)\n\n\nMIND. New Series. No. 4. October, 1892.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n THE FIELD OF \u00c6STHETICS PSYCHOLOGICALLY CONSIDERED, II. By\n _Henry Rutgers Marshall_.\n\n LOTZE\u2019S ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND THINGS, II. By _A.\n Eastwood_.\n\n THE STUDY OF CRIME. By _Rev. W. D. Morrison_.\n\n ON THE PROPERTIES OF A ONE-DIMENSIONAL MANIFOLD. By _Benj. Ives\n Gilman_.\n\nIn his present article Mr. H. R. Marshall finds a basis for the\ndifferentiation of \u00c6sthetics from Hedonics, in \u201cpleasure permanency\nin revival\u201d as belonging particularly to the former. Mr. Eastwood\ncriticises Lotze\u2019s antithesis between thoughts and things which is\nclosely connected with his erroneous opinion that time is a property of\nthings in themselves. The study of crime by Mr. W. D. Morrison discusses\ncrime under the three heads of the movement of crime, its causes, and\nits repression, of which the last deals with the theory, the methods,\nand the efficacy of punishment. In his discussion of the properties of a\none-dimensional manifold, examples of which are time, the straight line,\nquantity, intensity, number, and pitch, Mr. B. I. Gilman, who was a pupil\nof Mr. C. S. Peirce, seeks to give a formulation of one-dimensionality in\nwhich the general notion of relation and converse relation is substituted\nfor that of greater and less difference. This number of _Mind_ contains a\nvoluminous note on the blind deaf-mute child, Helen Keller, by Prof G. C.\nRobertson, the late editor, whose death is announced in the same number.\n(London: Williams & Norgate.)\n\n \u03a9.\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. October, 1892. Vol. III. No. 1.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n THE NATIONAL TRAITS OF THE GERMANS AS SEEN IN THEIR RELIGION.\n By _Prof. Otto Pfleiderer_, D. D., University of Berlin.\n\n PHILANTHROPY AND MORALITY. By _Father Huntington_.\n\n INTERNATIONAL QUARRELS AND THEIR SETTLEMENT. By _Leonard H.\n West_, LL. D., London University.\n\n 1792.\u2014YEAR 1. By _David G. Ritchie_, Jesus College. Oxford.\n\n UTILITARIANISM. By _A. L. Hodder_.\n\n BOOK REVIEWS.\n\n (Philadelphia: _International Journal of Ethics_, 118 S.\n Twelfth Street.)\n\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 5.\n\n PSYCHOGENESIS. By _President David J. Hill_.\n\n THE PROBLEM OF EPISTEMOLOGY. By _Professor Andrew Seth_.\n\n THE ORIGIN OF PLEASURE AND PAIN, (II.) By _Dr. Herbert Nichols_.\n\n DISCUSSIONS: REALITY AND \u201cIDEALISM.\u201d By _F. C. S. Schiller_.\n\n REVIEWS OF BOOKS.\n\n SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 6.\n\n GREEN\u2019S THEORY OF THE MORAL MOTIVE. By _Prof. John Dewey_.\n\n THOUGHT BEFORE LANGUAGE. By _Prof. William James_.\n\n PLEASURE-PAIN, AND SENSATION. By _Henry Rutgers Marshall_.\n\n REVIEWS OF BOOKS.\n\n SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.\n\n (Boston. New York, Chicago: Ginn & Company.)\n\n\nTHE NEW WORLD. December, 1892. Vol. I. No. 4.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n THE BRAHMO SOMAJ. By _Protap Chunder Mozoomdar_.\n\n THE FUTURE OF CHRISTIANITY. By _William M. Salter_.\n\n PROGRESSIVE ORTHODOXY. By _Egbert C. Smyth_.\n\n MICHAEL SERVETUS. By _Joseph Henry Allen_.\n\n THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. By _G.\n Santayana_.\n\n THE CHURCH IN GERMANY AND THE SOCIAL QUESTION. By _John Graham\n Brooks_.\n\n A WORLD OUTSIDE OF SCIENCE. By _Thomas Wentworth Higginson_.\n\n THE BIRTH AND INFANCY OF JESUS. By _Albert R\u00e9ville_.\n\n THE MONISTIC THEORY OF THE SOUL. By _James T. Bixby_.\n\nThe last article is a criticism to the point, discriminating and fair.\nThe author takes special notice of Dr. Carus\u2019s position, whose views are\nrecapitulated with accuracy, but not accepted as convincing. (Boston:\nHoughton, Mifflin, & Co.)\n\n\nREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.\n\nCONTENTS: September, 1892. No. 201.\n\n LA PERSONNALIT\u00c9 DANS LES R\u00caVES. By _J.-.M. Guardia_.\n\n HISTOIRE ET PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSES. By _M. Vernes_.\n\n SUR LA TERMINOLOGIE PHILOSOPHIQUE. By _Durand (de Gros)_.\n\n COMPTES RENDUS ET NOTICES BIBLIOGRAPHIQUES.\n\nCONTENTS: October, 1892. No. 202.\n\n DU TROUBLE DES FACULT\u00c9S MUSICALES DANS L\u2019APHASIE. By _Dr.\n Brazier_.\n\n LE D\u00c9VELOPPEMENT DE LA VOLONT\u00c9. (Concluded.) By _A. Fouill\u00e9e_.\n\n LE MOUVEMENT P\u00c9DAGOGIQUE. By _E. Blum_.\n\n ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.\n\n REVUES DES P\u00c9RIODIQUES \u00c9TRANGERS.\n\nCONTENTS: November, 1892. No. 203.\n\n LA PSYCHOLOGIE DE W. JAMES. By _L. Marillier_.\n\n DE L\u2019UNIT\u00c9 DE LA SCIENCE: LES GRANDES SYNTH\u00c8SES DU SAVOIR. By\n _E. de Roberty_.\n\n SUR LES DIVERSES FORMES DU CARACT\u00c8RE. By _Th. Ribot_.\n\n VARI\u00c9T\u00c9S.\n\n ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.\n\n REVUE DES P\u00c9RIODIQUES \u00c9TRANGERS. (Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan.)\n\n\nPHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH. Vol. V. No. 4.\n\nCONTENTS:\n\n DIE NEUESTE PHASE DES SCHOPENHAUERIANISMUS. (Concluded.)\n _B\u00e4umker._\n\n DIE SPECULATIVEN GRUNDLAGEN DER OPTISCHEN WELLENTHEORIE.\n (Concluded.) _S. J. Linsmeier._\n\n RELIGION UND ENTWICKELUNGSTHEORIE. (Concluded.) _Schanz._\n\n DER SUBSTANZBEGRIFF BEI CARTESIUS IM ZUSAMMENHANG MIT DER\n SCHOLASTISCHEN UND NEUEREN PHILOSOPHIE. (Continued.) _S. J.\n (C.) Ludewig._\n\n RECENSIONEN UND REFERATE. (Fulda: Fuldaer Actien-Druckerei.)\n\n\n\n\n VOL. III. APRIL, 1893. NO. 3.\n\n THE MONIST.\n\n\n\n\nRELIGION AND MODERN SCIENCE.\n\n\nI.\n\nThe ancient conflict between religion and science is now, at the close\nof the nineteenth century, more animated than ever before. This conflict\nhas formed the intellectual pivot of civilisation ever since Christianity\nfirst afforded the western peoples of Europe the inconsistent spectacle\nof a religion which made abundant use in its dogmatic constructions\nof the theories of contemporary science, and yet assumed a hostile\nattitude towards the fundamental principle of all science, the spirit\nof research and unbiassed judgment generally. Rightly has one of the\nacutest modern critics of Christianity, Ludwig Feuerbach,[59] maintained,\nthat the Christian sophistic philosophy is the necessary outcome of this\ninconsistency, which proclaims as absolute truth a definite, historical\nrevelation, such as is found in the Bible, and simply assigns to the\nreason the subordinate and improper office of harmonising and defending\nwhat is there laid down.\n\nThere are, it is true, a great number of people, who are not disposed to\nsee the bitterness of the conflict now raging. It has become customary\nfor us to look upon the nineteenth century as an age of the comprehension\nof religion, and to distinguish it from the eighteenth century, which\nis regarded as a period of mere religious criticism. We boast of\nhaving rediscovered religion, and of having secured to it a permanent\nprovince in the dominion of the mind. But the facts of our public life\nstand in curious contradiction to these assertions. In all civilised\nnations, in literature, in parliamentary procedures, in all questions\nthat relate to religious and moral life or to education, the attentive\nobserver will find that a profound chasm divides humanity. Every one\nfeels the desirableness of bridging over this chasm, that the members of\nsociety may be united in common labor; but again and again we are made\nto experience how irreconcilable the respective claims of the opposed\nparties are. He who has studied the bulls and encyclical letters of the\nlast two popes, Pius IX. and Leo XIII., and the commentaries on these\nutterances in the _Civilt\u00e0 Cattolica_, the official organ of the curia;\nhe who is acquainted with the polemical diatribes of the French Catholics\nagainst the positivists and freethinkers, and against the school and\nchurch legislation of the third republic; he who has any knowledge of\nthat mass of controversial literature, which the proclamation of the\ndoctrine of papal infallibility in the year 1870 evoked; he who has\nfollowed the eventful and varied history of the so-called \u201cCulturkampf\u201d\nin the German Empire, from the era of the minister Falk, down to the\nrecent bill for a new School-law in Prussia, defeated amidst the greatest\nexcitement in all parts of Germany; he who is the least bit at home in\nthe literary feuds which are being fought out in the domain of historical\ntheology concerning the validity and credibility of the original sources\nof Christianity; he, finally, who will place the writings of Cardinal\nNewman or of the Jesuits Pesch and Cathrein by the side of those of\nHuxley and Spencer, by the side of those of Du Bois-Reymond, Strauss,\nand D\u00fchring: he, I say, who has gone through with a critical spirit all\nthat I have cited in the preceding sentences, will surely not be apt\nto contradict this assertion of mine that civilised humanity to-day is\nseparated into two groups which no longer understand each other, which do\nnot speak the same language, and which live in totally different worlds\nof thought and sentiment\u2014at least so far as this one critical point is\nconcerned of man\u2019s relation to religion.\n\n \u201c_Wie Ja und Nein sind sie,_\n _Wie Sturm und Regenbogen._\u201d\n\nHave we, then, learned nothing and forgotten nothing since the days of\nrationalism? The tremendous labors which our own century has devoted\nto the investigation of religion in all its forms, to the unfolding of\nits connection with racial mind and sentiment, and of its relation to\ncivilisation generally, and finally to the elucidation of the origin and\ndevelopment of the great forms of religion: has all this had no other\nresult than that we, after a century of the most laborious research,\nagain find ourselves in the same attitude of unintelligent hostility\ntowards religion and Christianity in which the eighteenth century\nrevelled, and out of which we have only fought our way by the united\nefforts of a host of profoundly enlightened minds?\n\nThis argument has been advanced in opposition to the leaders of the\nrationalistic movement and to the work of the eighteenth century in\nvarying forms, by the party which seeks to ally the science of the\npresent and the religion of the past. It is seriously said and enjoined\nthat only they who are far behind the science of the times and hold aloof\nfrom the true spirit of the age can still assume the repugnant attitude\ntoward religion which was characteristic of the mind of the eighteenth\ncentury.\n\nIt is high time to point out the crude confusion of ideas which lies at\nthe basis of this argument. It confounds the historical understanding\nof a thing with the philosophical approval of it. But these are two\ntotally distinct things. We understand a phenomenon historically, when\nwe are clear in our minds concerning the external conditions and habits\nof thought of humanity from which it sprung; when its main-springs of\naction and its purposes, as well as the effects which have proceeded\nfrom it, are distinctly traceable. The more closely our mental pictures\nof these things correspond to the facts as they actually were at the\norigin, and the more they conduct us from the mere surface of phenomena\ninto the secrets of their psychological and sociological connection, and\nteach us to understand these things as products of mind and of society,\nthe higher will our historical knowledge of them be rated. In this sense\nthe knowledge which the eighteenth century had of religious phenomena\nwas undoubtedly very imperfect. True, even here great advances beyond\nthe age which preceded, are noticeable. People had ceased to regard\nthe origin of the Jewish and Christian religion as a supernatural event\nand as the immediate work of God; all religions were placed upon the\nsame footing, as species of the same kind; and efforts were made to\ndiscover their common characteristics and the law of their origin. But\nthe people of that period were not yet able to arrive at the true essence\nof religious ideas and sentiments. They were hardly in a position to\ndescribe them properly, let alone to explain them. Of the hypotheses\ndevised to throw some light into the darkness that hung over the\nbeginnings of religions, not one proved itself competent to supply what\nwas hoped for. All that they could derive from these fictions was that\nnotable caricature of religion which their age had directly before its\neyes, and to free themselves from which they strained every nerve. With\nthe keen vision of hate they uncovered all the infirmities of religion,\nall the terrors and iniquities which have followed in its train, all\nthe injurious effects to civilisation which have proceeded from it.\nThey created a negative picture of religion, which has lost nothing of\nits partial historical truth by the fact that many of its features are\nfarther withdrawn from our immediate experience than they were from that\nof the times in question.\n\nBut it was the nineteenth century that first worked out the true\npsychology of religious man, and again came into possession of that\nspirit of congeniality which is absolutely necessary to our entering into\nthe mental life of far-distant times. To the men of the rationalistic\nage the history of religion was simply the history of the obscuration\nof the pure, natural religion, which was supposed to be constituted of\na rational idea of God and a system of humane ethics, and which was\nindistinctly conceived at times as the logical, and at times as the\nhistorical, antecedent of the concrete religions. The latter appeared as\nthe corruption of the natural and simple order of things\u2014a corruption\nproduced by superstition, by the wily exploitation of human credulity and\nhuman needs, by the scheming machinations of the founders of religions\nand of priests, by human delight in the marvellous, by the falsification\nof the natural moral sentiments, and by the stirring into life of\nfanatical passions. We know to-day that this so-called natural religion\nis nothing more than a product of late abstraction and reflection; that\nthe motives and selfish interests above cited have been abundantly\nat work in religious history, but are nevertheless unable to explain\nthe internal motive force and tremendous vitality of these spiritual\nproducts. We know to-day that religions spring with the same necessity\nand in conformity with similar laws from the depths of the human mind\nas language and art, and that they form an integral constituent part of\nthe structure of civilisation and an important weapon of humanity in\nthe struggle for existence. In symbolical form they embody the highest\ntreasures and highest ideals of national existence; in its gods humanity\nbeholds the imaginative perfection and explanation of its view of the\nworld; and in its religious practices, in its worship, in prayer, it\nstrives to realise the wishes and aspirations which seem to lie beyond\nthe reach of its powers.\n\nMany a riddle still remains to be solved, as is natural in a domain\nthat extends into the most hidden recesses of the human soul, and whose\nobscurity is augmented by the fact that in the majority of cases the\nmost important and significant elements must be collected with infinite\npains from the rubbish of fantastic traditions. But upon the whole the\nactive labors of a century which calls itself with pride \u201cthe historical\ncentury,\u201d have borne their fruits. With respect to the intrinsic\ncharacter and the significance of religion for civilisation, there is now\nevery reason why a unity of opinion should prevail among all who take\ntheir stand on the common ground of modern scientific research, whether\nthey be friends or opponents of religion.\n\nBut how does a knowledge of what religion has been in the past affect\nour estimate of it in the present? Do we approve of an institution or\nphenomenon, because we understand how it was once possible, nay, must\nhave existed, and what it signified? We understand to-day the Roman\nlaw, the Ptolemaic astronomy, the scholastic philosophy, feudalism, and\nabsolute monarchy, thoroughly; we know the conditions which gave rise\nto them, the necessity of their appearance, and the measure of their\nperformances; but does it occur to us, for these reasons, to perpetuate\nand make them immortal because they had once an historical significance?\nWhat an institution in its essence is, what in past times it has\naccomplished, is an inquiry that must be conducted with quite different\nmeans from that whether it is applicable to a definite present set of\nrelations and necessities. The historian can render this task more easy\nby teaching us to understand the general laws and necessities of national\nlife from the analogies of the past; but as a prophet he will always\nbe one that looks backwards, and it is ever to be feared that he, too,\nwill see the present in the light of the past. For to him alone does the\npast lift its obscuring veil, who, forgetful of self and unmindful of\nsacrifices, can listen to the voices of remote times and peoples, who\nwith a mind of Protean cast has the power to transform his intellectual\nbeing into that to which, solely by description, he seeks to give new\nlife and form. The past becomes a part of him; he loves it, he admires\nit. And from the reanimation of the past in historical pictures to the\nattempt of a renewal of it in life is but a single step.\n\nInnumerable are those who have succumbed to this temptation. The entire\nreligious tendency of the nineteenth century exhibits this process on a\ngrand scale. This tendency is based on profound antiquarian studies of\nthe past\u2014on that newly awakened historical interest, which aims not only\nto criticise but to understand religion and ecclesiastical institutions.\nMuch that in the previous century seemed dead or destined to perish,\nhad been restored to life by it. The whole historical structure of the\nChristian religion, which at the close of the age of rationalism only\nexisted, it would seem, as an artificially preserved ruin, has received,\nthrough the instrumentality of these methods of thought, new supports,\nand has again been made habitable for the human mind. Unmindful of the\ncomplaints of churchmen, the future historian of civilisation will have\nto characterise the second half of the nineteenth century as a period\nof religious renaissance. And it is no accident, but a symptom of deep\nimport, that this century has completed almost all the great cathedrals\nwhich were left unfinished and in partial ruins by the middle ages,\nand placed them in their colossal grandeur before the world as lasting\nmonuments of its habits and tendencies of thought.\n\nYet the spirit of science has also not been inactive. Political progress\nhas freed it from the despotic police supervision which even in the\neighteenth century heavily oppressed it. In principle at least, freedom\nof thought and inquiry are to-day acknowledged by all governments, with\nthe single exception of the Roman curia, although in practice there are\nby no means few efforts made, by influencing its representatives, to have\nthat proclaimed which it is desired should be proclaimed. Infinitely\ngreat has the number of workers grown, the instruments of inquiry, the\nconfidence of the human mind in itself, and our power generally. And if\nformerly people could conceive of no other science than such as stood in\nthe service of the church, to-day science claims it most emphatically\nand confidently as its privilege and duty to search and test the logical\ntruth of the most sacred traditions, and thus to base the thought of\nfuture generations, not on the na\u00efve faith of their fathers, but on the\ndemonstrable truths of actual present knowledge.\n\n\nII.\n\nBetween the two groups of modern humanity, of which the one seeks to\nretain the Christian religion in its historical form as the precious,\nheritage of the past, and the other to supplant it by a new Idealism\nformed in harmony with the spirit of science, a third class stands, which\nplays the part of a mediator. This class concedes that the traditional\nforms of religion are in great part unadapted to the modern mind, and\nthat historical Christianity is in need of improvement, but contends\nthat religion is an ineradicable constituent of all higher civilisation,\nand must remain so, and, particularly, that Christianity is the absolute\nreligion, that is to say, that in Christianity as rightly understood and\nnaturally developed all the necessary elements of the true religion of\nthe future are contained.\n\nI should like, in the following pages, to subject the contentions of this\nmediatory group to a critical examination, and to discuss the question\nwhether it is at all possible for one who resolutely takes his stand on\nthe ground of modern scientific thought, logically to have religion in\nthe historical sense at all.\n\nIn effecting a mediation between the religious and scientific views\nof the world,\u2014views which appear to be separated from each other by\na profound intellectual abyss,\u2014two ways may, generally speaking, be\npursued. Both have been frequently trodden since the days of rationalism.\nI shall discuss each separately.\n\nThe attempt may be made to resume, in a form more adapted to modern\ntimes, the work of the reformers of the sixteenth century; to go back\neven more thoroughly than they did to the original and simplest forms\nof Christianity, to remove _in toto_ the superstructure which has been\nreared upon it in the course of time, and to exhibit to humanity \u201cthe\npure doctrine of Christ\u201d as the source from which to-day, as a thousand\nyears ago, true comfort may proceed, as the simplest, purest, and most\nexalted expression of the divine and human that has ever yet been\ndiscovered. Many of the most erudite workers in the field of critical\ntheology which this century can show have placed themselves in the\nservice of this idea, which is preached with particular enthusiasm by the\nso-called \u201cfree-religious\u201d and Unitarian confessions, and which at times\nhas also exhibited a noble and conciliatory activity in the homiletical\nwork of some mild-minded and liberal clergymen in the evangelical\nchurches. But our special inquiry here must be concerning the logical\nand scientific foundation of this modernised primitive Christianity, and\non this point it must be frankly stated that the more faithfully such a\nChristianity reflects the biblical character, the remoter it is from our\nmodern thought, and the more it is dominated by modern ways of thinking,\nthe more unhistorical and hence the more unchristian it becomes.\n\nThe \u201cpure doctrine of Christ,\u201d the genuine, primitive form of\nChristianity, is a Utopia of biblical criticism. What we actually\npossess, in the form of historical documents, is that conception of the\ndoctrines and life of Christ which was put in writing several generations\nafter his death, and which, from amid a much greater number of\ncontemporaneous attempts, met by preference with the approbation of the\nchurch. It is a hopeless task to attempt from these late records, which\nbetray the most various intellectual influences, to derive the authentic\ndoctrines of the oldest form of Christianity. No method, subjective\nprepossession only, can here render a verdict. The things that appear\nespecially consistent and homogeneous to individual theologians and\ncritics are stamped as the genuine utterances of the Master. As every\ntime has done, so ours also constructs its picture of Christ to conform\nwith its wishes and wants.\n\nBut granting even that there is nothing objectionable in this, and that\nthis procedure is perfectly justified, a number of difficulties still\nstand in the way of this movement which have stamped the procedure of\neven the most ingenious of its representatives as the outcome of pure\nsubjective caprice. All the written sources which we possess of the\nlife and teachings of Christ contain much that is in the highest degree\nrepugnant to the modern mind. I refer particularly to the miracles. The\ndifficulties which they present may be disposed of in various ways; as,\nto give an example, by the method of the early rationalistic thinkers,\nwho accepted the miracles as facts, but sought to give them a rational\nexplanation, or by that of Strauss, who held that they were the mythical\nand poetical raiment of religious ideas and sentiments. Yet no art of\ninterpretation will banish from the world that fact which the poet\nexpressed in the words:\n\n \u201c_Das Wunder ist des Glaubens liebstes Kind._\u201d\n\nThe fact that the entire cast of thought and sentiment of early\nChristianity is saturated with the belief in the marvellous, and with\nthe expectations, nay, with the actual need of miracles, and that this\nis not an adscititious ornament which can be doffed at pleasure, like a\ndress which we have outgrown, but is of the very essence of Christianity.\nHere is rooted that childlike and simple belief in the limitless and\nGod-coercing power of prayer, for which no natural laws nor force of\nnecessity exists, which is omnipotent as the Godhead itself, and as\nall-powerful as desire. Here is rooted that ardent conviction of the near\ncollapse of the entire world, of the coming kingdom of perfection which\nshall proceed, not from deeds and thought, but from faith and grace, and\nshall crown all human desires with glory. And intimately connected with\nall this stands the idea, visible in the background of all the moral\nprescripts of the gospels, and painted in the strongest colors, of a\nsystem of punishments and rewards in the world beyond; which makes of a\nGod of love, a pitiless, infuriate God of vengeance.\n\nThese things are so intimately interwoven with the modes of thought of\nthe synoptic writers that it is impossible to separate them therefrom\nwithout doing violence to the internal connection of their doctrines.\nThey who seek after a more spiritual conception may, it is true, find\nit in the gospel of John. But this book is so completely dominated by\nthe metaphysical-religious speculation of the second century, and by the\neffort to bring the history of the life and doctrines of the Nazarene in\nthe service of the Logos idea, that the modern mind can only with great\ndifficulty find a common ground of understanding with it.\n\nThe task of the modern reformers is, for these reasons, a very difficult\none. They cannot but concede that Christianity, even in its purely\nevangelical form, contains much that is foreign to us, and that the\nelements of which it is composed must in part be excised and in part\nimproved by criticism and interpretation.\n\nBut the more the critical sense which is brought to bear upon this\ntask is developed in the spirit of modern scientific thought, the more\nwill historical Christianity shrink to the form of a mere colorless\nabstraction, and ultimately nothing remains of its exuberant yet\nvisionary mental world but the picture of a philanthropic life joined\nto a strongly developed consciousness of God, which proclaims a\npopular morality in commandments and parables. But even this latter is\ninevitably exposed to the same fate as the other ideas. It is dominated\nthroughout by the extremest notions of rewards and punishments, which\nthe expectation of the doom of the world places in the very immediate\nfuture. It is impossible to take the system as a whole, and it must be\nmade the subject of violent interpretation to acquire any fitness for\nthe needs of modern life. Its principles are systematically turned and\ntwisted till they have acquired in some direction practical utility. And\nwho at this day can forget, that this system of morality, wherever and\nwhenever attempts have been made literally and faithfully to imitate it\nin practical life, has led only to wretched caricatures? Moreover, it is\nagain and again freely remodelled in the spirit of modern ethics, its\noffensive elements charitably cloaked, its useful ones developed to\nthe utmost, and finally here too a complete set of wholly modern ideas\nconsecrated by the borrowed authority of a venerable antiquity.\n\nAnd therefore I repeat my contention, that the modern reformation, this\nmodern, pure, and scriptural Christianity, will, the honester it is,\nall the more surely lead its adherents away from Scripture and from\nChristianity and ultimately bring them to the adoption of a popularly\nexpounded, but philosophically established, ethical system.\n\nI shall now take up the second of the two methods above mentioned.\nThat which we have just considered was known and affected even by the\neighteenth century. The discovery of the second is a merit of the present\ntime. The honor belongs in a pre-eminent degree to the speculative\nphilosophy of Germany, and to the intimate relations with theology which\nthis philosophy, especially in the school of Hegel and Schleiermacher,\nentered into in the first half of the century. (Kant\u2019s philosophy was not\nput to similar use until later.) All these movements, whose rich literary\nramifications and development may be followed to the present day in Otto\nPfleiderer\u2019s excellent and erudite work, \u201cThe History of Protestant\nTheology in Germany Since Kant,\u201d[60] have also begun in recent times,\nthrough Green, Caird, A. Seth, J. Martineau, R. Flint, and F. Robertson,\nto exert an influence on Anglo-American intellectual life.\n\nThe common fundamental feature of this second movement is, that it\nproposes to accept as pure Christianity, not only the most ancient forms\nof Christian doctrine accessible to us, but also the entire system\nof dogmatic thoughts which in the course of the centuries primitive\nChristianity has produced. Christianity, these men say, has historically\nexisted and acted in these maturer notions. It is not permissible\narbitrarily to separate them from it, and to reverse by any authoritative\nedicts the real historical development. On the contrary, we now may and\nmust continue the process which, by the tenor of dogmatic history, is the\nprocess which has continued for centuries, and give to the dogmas the\nform which best accords with modern spiritual needs. To-day as in the\ndays of incipient Christianity, we see by the side of the na\u00efve literal\nbelief, which takes no offence at incomprehensible things if they only\nsuit the needs of its heart, a gnosis arise which strives to reconcile\nfaith and knowledge, religion and intellectual culture; a gnosis which to\nthe unbelieving sceptic quotes the words of the poet:\n\n \u201c_Die Geisterwelt ist nicht verschlossen;_\n _Dein Sinn ist zu; dein Herz ist todt!_\n _Auf! bade, Sch\u00fcler, unverdrossen_\n _Die ird\u2019sche Brust im Morgenroth!_\u201d\n\nIt is perhaps even more difficult to give a succinct and comprehensive\nnotion of the ideas of this speculative theology, than of the results of\nthe New Testament exegesis of which we spoke above. All gradations are\nhere represented, from tender, conservative regard for the traditional\nbeliefs of the sects and the needs of the pious heart to the boldest\nspeculative interpretations and critical restrictions of dogma, which\nutterly discard the historical form and hold fast only to a central\ngerminal truth. The present inquiry will restrict itself to those\nrepresentatives of this gnosis, who as a matter of principle grant\nthe greatest field of action to the rational development of dogma,\nand represent its philosophical elaboration in its finest and most\ncomplicated form. I shall attempt to signalise the ideas which may to-day\nbe designated as the most spiritualised expression of the Christian view\nof the world.\n\nAnd first let us hear a greater mind speak. In Ludwig Feuerbach\u2019s essays\non the nature of religion and Christianity the following sentences occur:\n\n\u201cThe Christian religion is the revealed inwardness, the objectively\nexpressed self of man; the contents of his highest aspirations; the\nessence of man purified and freed from the limitations of individuality;\nyet all subjectivised, that is intuited, known, and worshipped as a\nseparate, independent entity, wholly distinct from himself. Religion\nis essentially dramatical. God himself is a dramatical creation, that\nis to say, a personal being opposed to man. He who takes from religion\nthis idea, takes from it the gist of its being, and holds but the _caput\nmortuum_ in his hands.\u201d\n\nThese sentences of Feuerbach express with the greatest generality and\nprecision the innermost nature of the Christian view of the world. They\ncharacterise excellently the point that cannot be given up without\ndestroying the religious view as such. What I refer to is dualism, the\ndualism of the divine and the human, of the world beyond, and the world\nthat is, of holiness and sin; dualism conceived not merely as a mode of\nview and of conceptual distinction, as a working contrariety in things\nthat by their nature are one, but as a metaphysical difference, an actual\ncontraposition of two worlds, of two kingdoms of existence, which are\ntotally separate, no matter how extensive the relations of the one to\nthe other may be. Only on such a supposition is that possible which\nFeuerbach, with inimitable aptness, called \u201cthe dramatic element\u201d of\nreligion. The history of humanity, the history of its religious life\nparticularly, is no monologue of humanity with itself into which life\nand advancement enter solely through the multitude of the ideas created\nby individuals within the race itself. It is an action or process in a\nhigher sense, an interactivity between two worlds, in which, it is true,\nhumanity, to a certain extent, shapes its own fortunes and destiny, but\nat the same time is also constantly exposed to the interferences of a\npower which stands beyond and above it and to which it has to accommodate\nitself. And whatever artifices and care many of the representatives of\nthe modern gnosis may employ to conceal this fundamental assumption, and\nto substitute for it the point of view of the immanence of this power\nin the world, still any radical breach with it is impossible without\nendangering the very foundations of the religious sense of humanity\nitself.\n\nThe indispensability of this dualistic opposition and separation is\nequally well exhibited whether we take as our starting-point the\nexistence of the world at large or the individual consciousness of man.\nThe religious mode of view knows of no other way of asserting the rights\nand activity of the mind in the All than by making all existence assume\na personal life in an infinite, self-conscious, and ethically perfect\nbeing. The emotions and experiences of one\u2019s heart, its vacillations\nbetween humility and exaltation, remorse at the consciousness of one\u2019s\nown imperfections, the inspired flight of the soul to higher realms of\nexistence, appear as the intercourse of man with some extraneous power,\nallied to man and yet above him, in which the sum of all excellence to\nwhich thought and experience have ever led man, has its eternal source.\n\nThese ideas constitute the point of view which is decisive of the history\nof humanity, particularly in what concerns religion. The history of\nreligion is, in accordance with these ideas, conceived as a continuous\nself-revelation of God in the world of man. True, this view seems to be\ncontradicted by the fact that the self-revelation of this infinitely good\npower is effected in the case of by far the greater part of mankind in a\nvery insufficient manner\u2014in the form, namely, of crude and superstitious\nnotions which stand in need of constant purification by reason. But the\nexplanation of this fact is sought in the idea of a divine pedagogical\ntraining of the human race, and in the theory that religion is not an\nimmediate self-revelation of the absolute, but passes through the medium\nof the human mind and consequently must be conditioned by its character.\n\nChristianity, now, especially appears as the highest form of this\nself-revelation of God in humanity, that is to say as the absolute\nreligion, which, in its historical forms, it is true, is as little\nfree from adscititious ornaments and transient obscurations as other\nreligions, yet in its essence can be as little improved as it can be\ndiscarded. This innermost essence of Christianity the majority of the\nrepresentatives of this modern gnosis declare to be the conviction that\nall men are from the beginning children of God. In this idea two things\nare contained: submission to the will of God who is conceived as a\nkind parent and who in pity and love does everything for the best; and\nthe imitation in our own thought and conduct of the ethical perfection\nconceived incarnate in God. The entering of man into this relation is\ndesignated the kingdom of God\u2014a notion which constitutes the ideal goal\nof history. The condition of mind on which the kingdom of God rests is\nprefigured in a typical manner in the founder of the Christian religion.\nHis person and his life are a guarantee of the possibility of this ideal,\nand exhibit at the same time the means of its accomplishment: namely, the\nhelping love of God, which has infused into this one individual the whole\nplenitude of its being, so far as this is at all possible with human\ncapacities, that humanity may have in it a direct living picture of the\nhighest fulfilment of its religious and moral destiny. The historical\nChrist is the ideal of humanity, supported and ensouled by the spirit of\nGod.\n\nThe modern gnosis here goes back to the Paulinian interpretation of the\nChrist-idea. The consideration of the speculative difficulties of the\nidea of the Trinity is thus rendered superfluous for it. This notion\nis treated by the majority of its representatives simply as a dogmatic\nantiquity; its place is taken by the modern ideas of a distinction\nbetween the person of Jesus and the principle or spirit of Christianity,\nwhich is synonymous with the contrast of the idea and its revelation,\nthe eternal and the temporal, of the inward essence and its historical\nrealisation. That it employs the notions of idea, principle, and essence\nwholly in a Platonic sense, as the highest metaphysical realities, is\nself-evident.\n\nMore distant still is the attitude which this speculative theology\nassumes towards another idea which proceeded from the Rabbinical school\nof thought of Paul: the notion of salvation or redemption in its\nconnection with the expiatory death of Christ. From these conceptions\nof punitive suffering, of a vicarious atonement of God in his own\nperson\u2014conceptions of such juristical refinement as to be wholly\nunacceptable to modern modes of thought\u2014the modern gnosis has upon the\nwhole resolutely turned away and taken refuge in that more spiritual\nand more profound idea which in early Christian times the author of the\ngospel of St. John promulgated. The death of Christ is redemptive only in\nthe sense in which Christ\u2019s total history is redemptive, as the direct\nand prefigurative incarnation of the true religious relation between God\nand man. This is, it is true, applicable in a quite special sense to the\nDeath; for it was by this that the eternal truth was manifested, that not\nonly does all salvation accrue to man from the sacrifice of his own self\nin duteous and patient love, but that all the life of God is an emanation\nof this self-surrendering excellence, of this bliss of self-sacrifice.\nStill, there is one thing that is common to all the representatives of\nthis movement as distinguished from the former, and that is this: they\ndo not content themselves with picturing the activity of Jesus Christ\nin general outlines solely as one which is blessed and significant by\nexample and doctrine for humanity, but they assume a continuous and\nactive presence of the Christian principle in humanity, by means of\nwhich the moral discord in individuals is overcome, and in the personal\nspiritual life of individuals divine and human nature are united. This\nis the most speculative interpretation we have of the old dogmatic\nnotion of redemption, which from its original character as a single\nisolated phenomenon of history has here become the constant activity of a\nChristian principle, and an ever-living precedent of Christian life.\n\nIt would be a prolix and wearisome task to go through in this way the\nwhole dogmatism of this speculative theology. The fundamental ideas which\nwe have discussed will suffice to show the manner in which, on the one\nhand, it spiritualised the allegorical notions of popular Christianity,\nbut on the other left untouched the gist of the religious view and the\ndramatical or dualistic opposition of the divine and human. The notions\nof grace and sanctification, the notion of the church as a living,\norganised instrument of salvation, spring directly and logically from\nthese fundamental ideas.\n\nIn the province of ethics this movement has a much easier task than the\nchurches based on the New Testament. As it seeks to establish, not a\nprimitive Christianity, but a modernised Christianity developed in the\nspirit of recent times, there is no necessity of its being incommoded\nby the ethical crudenesses of early Christianity, but it is in the\nsame position to work these crudenesses over critically as it did the\nasperities of the old dogmas. It can assimilate most of what it needs\nfrom modern philosophical ethics, and content itself with giving to what\nit has thus borrowed a metaphysically religious background derived from\ndogmatic traditions.\n\nThat this modern gnosis is in a constant state of vacillation with\nrespect to the practical things of life, is a necessary consequence of\nits fundamental assumptions and of its position towards the doctrines\nof the church. Its foremost representatives acknowledge without any\nreserve that the true source from which religious emotions and sentiments\nflow is the symbolic or imaginative faculty of man. The grandly simple\npictures in which the ancient Christian faith found satisfaction are\nnow in the course of time inevitably disintegrated by the critical\nreason. The speculative theology itself proclaims that its vocation is\none of co\u00f6peration towards this end. But it maintains nevertheless that\nthe fruits of this work, the speculative interpretation of the dogmas,\ntheir exaltation into the sphere of the Idea, are fit only for initiated\nminds, and are caviare for the general. The general, the people, want\nand will use religion in the form which its fancy has created, and it\ncannot be revealed to it in any other. Progressive in its theories,\nthis gnosis is in its ecclesiastical practice thoroughly conservative.\nIt thinks two kinds of thought, and speaks two kinds of languages,\naccording as it finds itself in the pulpit or in the professorial chair.\nAnd it is in just this procedure that it assumes a position which it is\nvery difficult to attack. He, who working for a sound and progressive\npopular enlightenment on the ground of a unitary view of the world,\nopposes the further use of the antiquated and effete allegories of the\nold religions, is told that he is behind the times, and that religion,\nnurtured by the spirit of modern science, has become something different\nfrom what it formerly was. In very strict ecclesiastical quarters this\ngnosis is looked at askance, and accused of insincerity, nay, of secret\nalliance with unbelief; but the movement never allowed itself to be led\nastray by these accusations, and has never failed to assert its right\nof co\u00f6peration in the common work of the Christian church. For though\nit pretends to be in the hands of the thinking theologian a means of\nbringing into harmony the faith which he must confess and the thought\nwhich he cannot abandon, it yet admits, that with the majority of mankind\nthe allegory will always remain an essential element of religion, and\nthat therefore the task of scientific theology can never be to destroy\nthese vessels of religion, but only to exercise a watchful care, that\nwith the form the spirit also may not be lost.\n\n\nIII.\n\nThe question now arises,\u2014and this brings us back to the considerations\nof the first part of this essay,\u2014Does this rationalised Christianity of\nto-day really meet the demands of science, and if it does not, is it in\nthe power of the modern scientific world-conception to furnish from its\nown resources some substitute for the religious views of the past?\n\nMy answer to this question will be short and concise; for the existence\nof _The Monist_, the fundamental idea of its management, and the\ntotal character of the efforts which it has hitherto made, speak with\nsufficient emphasis. And we may, therefore, with the greatest respect\nfor the scientific zeal and the personal ability of many of the\nrepresentatives of this mediatory theology, say, without further ado:\nThis rationalised Christianity of yours also is myth and symbol; it still\nadheres to that \u201cdramatic\u201d division of the world which our imaginations\nproduced, and to the metaphysical dualism of God and man; it cannot\nlift itself to a rigorous conception of the All in One, for which God\nis in the same sense a simple function of human thought as thought is a\nfunction of the human organism. The God on whom all depends in religion,\nthe God whose name is \u201cFather,\u201d the God of love and goodness, the God\nfrom whom all great thoughts and all grand resolves spring, the God who\nsanctifies us and lifts us above the earth\u2014to displace this God from\nthe world in which he has no place, into the inward being of humanity\nseems at this day so strange, nay, inconceivable, only because we have\naccustomed ourselves (and down to the times of Mill and Feuerbach, even\nstrict monistic thinkers like Spinoza fell victims to this illusion) to\nmingle together in the idea of God two wholly distinct ideas\u2014the ideas,\nnamely, of nature and of an ethical ideal. To preserve this latter\ninviolate, and to secure it from all encroachments of human caprice,\none thing alone seemed to the na\u00efve dramatic modes of thought of early\ntimes a competent safeguard: the ideal must in some locality be real; the\nhighest to which human thought and aspiration can exalt itself must be\nsought and must exist in some superhuman reality. And what reality could\nbe better adapted to this than one on which even nature was conceived to\nbe dependent? The entire history of the development of the idea of God in\nthe Gr\u00e6co-Roman and Hebrew worlds, the confluence of these two streams\nof thought in Christian speculation, exhibit in the clearest possible\nmanner these motives, which here I can only lightly touch upon.\n\nBut this combination of the law of nature and the law of ethics in the\nidea of God, although solving some of the difficulties of humanity, has\nplunged it into incomparably greater ones. Through all the centuries\nof Christian thought a succession of desperate attempts may be traced\nto establish a theodicy, that is to say, attempts to demonstrate the\nexistence in nature and in history of a God which harmonises with the\nethical ideal. Even Kant could undertake to demonstrate the \u201cnecessary\nfailure of all attempts at a theodicy,\u201d and whoever might still have\nentertained any doubt as to the correctness of this demonstration, such a\none must surely have been convinced of it by the scientific development\nof the past century. That which was indissolubly welded together in\nthe Christian idea of God is to-day disintegrated into its component\nelements. The Lord _above_ nature, the Spirit _behind_ nature, have been\nrendered inconceivable by the modern notions of the conformity to law of\nall natural occurrences and of the unity of all existence. The spirit\nimmanent in the All no thinker will deny, for this spirit manifests\nitself in an indisputable manner in the fact that this All is a cosmos,\nnot a chaos, that not only the caprice of chance but also the laws of\nnecessity rule in it, and that the personal self-conscious mind springs\nfrom its midst. But from this recognition of mind in the All, there is no\nbridge that leads to the old idea of God. We cannot worship the All as a\nmoral ideal. We involve ourselves in absurd complications when we attempt\nto derive the actions of natural events and their conformity to law from\nethical categories, and it is no less a desperate undertaking to imagine\nthat we can draw impulses for our moral thought and conduct from nature.\nThe adaptation of means to ends, the teleology, that rules in the All, is\nveiled for us in the deepest obscurity. All that we can unravel of it has\nno resemblance to that which, according to our notions, is ethical:\n\n \u201c_Denn unf\u00fchlend ist die Natur_,\u201d\n\nshe does not know what love or mercy is; she knows only the omnipotent\npower of universal laws; she knows only the rights of the whole, to\nwhich she sacrifices with unconcern the individual; she revels in the\ndouble pleasure of unceasing creation and unceasing destruction; she arms\nunpityingly the strong against the weak; in crises of annihilation she\nrestores the disturbed equilibrium of things; but the palm of peace no\none has ever seen in her hand. And we? We stand amazed at her might and\ngreatness, at the plentitude of her powers of creation, at her myriad\nplay of forces, at the inexhaustible wealth of the relations with which\nshe binds being to being, creates and mediates contrarieties, and amidst\nthe most varied change and alternation, ever remains one and the same!\nBut our prototype, our God, she can never be. To him we must look up;\nbut on nature, despite her might, despite her stupendous grandeur, we\nlook down. She did not whisper in our ears that in us which is best and\nhighest. That did not come to us from heaven; _we ourselves_ won it\nby hard struggles, by terribly severe, self-imposed discipline. It is\nnot _of_ nature; it is _above_ nature. Through _us_ something has come\ninto the world that before us did not exist\u2014something that the most\nexuberant creative magic, or nature\u2019s grandest mechanical dreams, could\nnever replace. The day on which first a human being pressed his weaker\nfellow-man to his breast and said, \u201cBrother, not mine, but thy will be\ndone; I will give up my desires that thou also mayst be glad\u201d; the day\non which man first lifted up his head and said, \u201cLet us make the world\n_good_ in the likeness of the picture that has become living in us, just\nas it should be\u201d; this is the great and sanctified day in the history of\nour race on earth, the Christmas day on which God was born. But not as\nthe religious fancy has expressed it, the day on which God became man,\nbut the day on which man began to become God, that is the day on which he\nbegan to feel spiritual powers in his breast that transcended his animal\nimpulses\u2014powers to which the majority of humanity was still as remote as\nheaven from earth.\n\nThis strict anthropological conception of God as the ideal which is\nalways newly creating itself in the struggles of humanity, which is no\nBeing but a Becoming, solves the innumerable difficulties which the idea\nof God has hitherto placed in the way of rigorous scientific knowledge\nand the construction of a unitary conception of the world. This God has\nnothing to do with the All. We need not seek him in the All or behind the\nAll, and need not fear that any progress of our knowledge will make his\nexistence a matter of doubt with us. Concerning the real validity of this\nidea we need not bother ourselves with more or less weak and insufficient\ndemonstrations: the whole history of humanity is evidence of it if we\nbut know how to rightly interpret it, and the stumbling block of the old\ntheological idea of God has become the corner-stone upon which the new\nscientific conception is built.\n\nNature and human history the work of an omnipotent and all-kind being\nthat is mediately and immediately active in all events, nay, sacrificed\nhimself in his own person that he might realise in this world his\npurposes! Compare the principle, the active force of this world-drama,\npictured by the religious fancy as the highest power, the highest wisdom,\nand all-merciful love, with the real spectacle of the world! Is there\nanywhere a more pronounced contradiction, an obscurer riddle, a more\ninconceivable contrast between purpose and accomplishment? This world\nof cruelty and woe, in which one creature feeds on the heart-blood of\nanother, in which here and there from seas of mud and dirt a form of\nlight springs up, in which every nobler production must be bought with\ntorrents of blood and tears; this revelation and self-manifestation of\nGod in humanity, which everywhere appears joined to definite historical\nsuppositions, which lacks all the conditions of true universality and of\nindisputable evidence, so that instead of forming a means of union it\nhas become the source of dreadful contentions; this work of salvation\nand sanctification which is so restricted in its effects that \u201cthe\nkingdom of God\u201d is still a dreamy vision of humanity, so restricted\nthat we still see the majority of men, despite the most extraordinary\nsupernatural dispositions, still remain far behind the simple ideals\nof natural ethical commandments, that hate and dissension, cruelty and\nselfishness, perform their unhallowed work\u2014is this the work of infinite\npower and infinite wisdom? What claims theodicy makes on human thought!\nAnd how different the picture is, the moment we abandon the false\ntheocentric point of view and assume the anthropocentric! Instead of a\nbelief which all facts contradict\u2014an idea which elucidates them all.\nNo one can say how we are to interpret facts as the work of a holy and\nabsolutely perfect being; but it can be shown, step by step, how in this,\nour human world, more perfect things spring from imperfect things, moral\nand mental laws from the blind play of natural forces and powers, the\nconscious energy of will from blind and unreasonable impulse, law and\nlove of man from the selfishness and warring of all against all, and the\nnotion of the unity of the race from infinite disruption and disunion.\nWe must not allow ourselves to be led astray or discouraged here by the\nchanging undulations and tremendous crises of this battle for the good.\nThe ideal springs out of a dark abyss. The roots of our being are deep\nlaid in nature, yet we struggle to exalt ourselves above it. No wonder,\ntherefore, that time and again it draws us back.\n\nThe greatest and sublimest spectacle! A tragical one, one filled with\nstruggle and suffering, and yet one infinitely full of hope. For it shows\nus the inexhaustible grandeur of the human mind; it shows us the good,\nthe ideal, as a tremendous real power, a power eternally becoming, surely\nforming itself out of an infinitude of individual deeds, a power fully\nincarnate in no one person, yet active and living in humanity. Not a\ntangible activity, and yet one of the realest of facts. A supersensuous,\nnay, if you will, a supernatural realm of thought; not the faded\nreflection or shadow of a grandeur and power beyond us, but the fruit\nof the noblest activities and powers of this given, existing world,\nantagonised in life, but grand and powerful in thought; imperfect even in\nits boldest flights, but bearing within it the germ of greater things to\ncome.\n\nHere is the true point of union for Christian dogma and science. Here is\nthe God in which science also may, nay, must, believe. Not humanity in\nits empirical reality, but the ideal world developed within the human\nrealm of things\u2014the spirit of humanity. This is the only true object\nof worship. Before it we are humiliated, and by it we feel ourselves\nexalted. From it we receive all the good that life bestows upon us; it\ngives us light and peace and lucid thought. And what higher, nobler thing\ncan a life produce than the feeling that it has not been unworthy of this\ngreat ancestry, that it has helped to keep alive this holy fire, that it\nhas helped, perhaps, to fan by its own life this living flame to greater\nheights?\n\nHere is the true source of the ideas of accountability and of salvation.\nWe are not responsible to a being outside and above us, but to our own\nselves and to humanity, from which we have received the best that it had\nto give, and for which we must return what we ourselves have produced.\nThis consciousness of being thrown utterly on the resources of one\u2019s own\nself, on one\u2019s own powers, was first created in the human mind by science\nand the technical arts, (as that most venerable and most sacred of all\nmyths, the legend of Prometheus, so profoundly indicates,) and this\nconsciousness will, by the progress of knowledge and power, be made more\nand more the dominating one of humanity. This is not a consciousness of\nomnipotence; it does not exclude the subjection of man to the inexorable\nlaws of the universe; but it demands the enlistment of all the powers\nof the race: for nature does not give us more than we wrest from her by\narduous toil.\n\nAnd as humanity is accountable only to itself, so do the means of its\nsalvation lie only in itself. Not in any one individual, but in the\nspirit in it which ever works onward and upward. Yet this spirit is\nnot an unpersonal existence; it must be possessed again and ever again\nby living men. And no one can serve humanity or augment its spiritual\ntreasures or reincarnate in himself its holiest possessions without first\nhaving and feeling within himself the blessing of what he has done.\nAnd thus the profoundest significance of human life on earth may be\nformulated and embraced in that saying of the poet which was throughout\nconceived in the spirit of our times, and would have been wholly\nincomprehensible to the mind of those who gave us our faith\u2014in the words:\n\n \u201c_Erl\u00f6sung dem Erl\u00f6ser._\u201d\n\n F. JODL.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[59] _Wesen des Christenthums._ First edition. 1841. Pp. 288-289.\n\n[60] Translation published by Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., London, 1891.\n\n\n\n\nTHE RELIGION OF SCIENCE.\n\n\nAre religion and science indeed as contrary as they are often represented\nto be, and is the proposition to reconcile them a hopeless and futile\nundertaking? Professor Jodl, in his article \u201cReligion and Modern\nScience,\u201d (pp. 329-351 of this number,) says:\n\n \u201cThat civilised humanity to-day is separated into two groups\n which no longer understand each other, which do not speak the\n same language, and which live in totally different worlds of\n thought and sentiment.\u201d\n\nThere are those who cling to the old religions and those who supplant it\nby a new idealism. Between both, he adds:\n\n \u201cA third class stands which plays the part of a mediator.\u201d\n\nProfessor Jodl does not approve of reconciling the historical forms of\nreligion with science. He rightly says:\n\n \u201cThe \u2018pure doctrine of Christ,\u2019 the genuine, primitive form of\n Christianity, is a Utopia of biblical criticism.\u201d\n\nWe heartily agree with him in his remarks concerning the part which the\nmiraculous and supernatural play in the Gospels:\n\n \u201cThese things are so intimately interwoven with the modes\n of thought of the synoptic writers that it is impossible to\n separate them therefrom without doing violence to the internal\n connection of their doctrines.\u201d\n\nWe also concur upon the whole with Professor Jodl in his criticism of\nthe methods of Speculative Theology. No compromising with traditional\nerrors, no covering or extenuating of the results of historical criticism\nis allowable merely for the love of tradition and for the preservation of\nerrors that have become dear to a large number of people.\n\nWe do not condemn the work of any mediator; on the contrary, we rather\nencourage it. We observe with pleasure in the latest phases of the\nreligious evolution of Speculative Theology the prevalence of a more\nmodern spirit, and we follow with a keen interest also the progress of\nbiblical critique in its truly valuable labors: but we do not expect that\neither the one or the other will accomplish any regeneration of religion.\n\nProfessor Jodl knows very well that the editors of _The Monist_ and\n_The Open Court_ have not undertaken any work of compromising between\nthe errors of the past and the ideal of the future. Our idea of a\nreconciliation between religion and science is of a different nature. We\nare not blind to the errors of the old religions, and we do not mean to\ngloss them over, or to make old-fashioned views acceptable by presenting\nthem in a new garment. We do not even stop to bury the dead, for we\nhave better things to do than to trouble with problems that have been\ndefinitely settled. We keep our hands to the plough to accomplish the\nwork needed to-day.\n\nWhile we are not blind to the errors of the old religions, we recognise\nat the same time that they contain in the language of parables some great\ntruths which will remain forever. These truths constitute the backbone of\nreligion, and we regard it as a very important duty of ours to preserve\nthem. These truths must be preserved, not because they were believed in\nby our fathers, nor from any respect for tradition, nor from any regard\nfor our sentiments, but simply because they are truths, because they can\nbe proved to be true according to the methods of scientific inquiry.\n\nWhat is religion? Religion consists of all those ideas which regulate\nour conduct. In the savage these ideas are very crude and superstitious,\nand often self-contradictory. The higher a man rises, the clearer, the\nmore scientific and consistent do these ideas become, until they develop\ninto a systematic world-conception. Every scientific idea that changes\nour world-conception will change also our religion and with it our rules\nof conduct. Thus, for example, the idea of evolution has become to us an\neminently religious idea.\n\nIn order to indicate that the criterion of truth for religion is the very\nsame thing as the criterion of truth for science, we have proposed to\ncall the religion we advocate, \u201cThe Religion of Science.\u201d (For details\nsee the editorial of Vol. VII, No. 1, of _The Open Court_.)\n\nOur procedure appears to many as an annihilation of religion in favor of\nscience. But it is not. And why not?\n\nWe have learned many truths first from religion, long before science\ncould ever think of proving them. In several respects science took the\nlead, and religion remained at a long distance behind, awkwardly, very\nslowly, and unwillingly limping onward on the road of progress. Instances\nare, the acceptance of the Copernican system and of the evolution theory.\nBut in other respects religion took the lead, and science was unable to\nfollow its ingenious flight. As instances of this we cite such moral\ntruths as the love of enemies, which were not preached by scientists\nas scientific truths, but by religious teachers, by Confucius, Buddha,\nand Christ. There are scientists even to-day who regard what we would\ncall \u201cmoral truths\u201d as maxims that are contrary to the established views\nof science. Professor Huxley, for instance, is very emphatic in his\ndeclaration that the facts of nature do not teach morality.[61]\n\nThis leads us to a point in which we disagree with Professor Jodl. He\nspeaks of the illusion \u201cof mingling together in the idea of God two\nwholly distinct ideas\u2014the ideas namely of nature and of an ethical\nideal\u201d\u2014an illusion to which \u201ceven strict monistic thinkers like Spinoza\nfell victims.\u201d\n\nProfessor Jodl\u2019s position reminds us of John Stuart Mill\u2019s \u201cEssay on\nNature,\u201d in which he exposes the old doctrine _naturam sequi_ in all its\nabsurd meanings and carefully avoids a discussion of the only rational\nconception of the precept. Thus his tirades appear most convincing, and\nto be sure they are quite correct\u2014so far as they go. Says Mill:\n\n \u201cIn sober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged or\n imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature\u2019s every-day\n performances. Killing, the most criminal act recognised by\n human laws, Nature does once to every being that lives....\n\n \u201cNature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them\n to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes\n them with stones like the first Christian martyr, starves them\n with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick\n or slow venom of her exhalations, and has hundreds of other\n hideous deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a\n Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed.\u201d\n\nMill must indeed have felt the need of beginning these sentences with the\nwords \u201cIn sober truth\u201d; otherwise he might be suspected of humor.\n\nSimilarly comical is Mill\u2019s proposition to regard every voluntary action\nof man as a direct infringement upon nature. Man\u2019s reason in that case\nwould be the most unnatural phenomenon in the world, and the term\n\u201cnature\u201d would be confined to the lowest realms of existence exclusively.\nIf the usage of reason were indeed an infringement upon nature, man\u2019s\nappearance upon earth would mark the beginning of a supernatural realm;\nand Professor Jodl seems to accept this consequence when he says:\n\n \u201cIt is not _of_ nature, it is _above_ nature.\u201d\n\nIf man\u2019s rationality and his ethics were not born of nature, if their\nconditions were not founded in the very existence of nature, if they were\nnot the natural product of evolution, then indeed I see no escape from a\ndualistic world-conception, in which a supernatural God introduces the\nspark of divinity which appears in the soul of man from spheres beyond.\n\nWe have devoted to these vagaries of John Stuart Mill an elaborate\ndiscussion in another place and do not feel the need of repeating our\narguments in this connection.[62]\n\nWe agree with Professor Jodl that no rationalising of old dogmas will\nhelp us in the establishment of \u201ca new idealism, formed in harmony\nwith the spirit of science.\u201d We must build our religion anew (as every\ngeneration had to build its religion anew) out of the best materials\nwhich are furnished by the maturest and most reliable knowledge of\nto-day. Says Professor Jodl:\n\n \u201cThrough _us_ something has come into the world that before\n us did not exist\u2014something that the most exuberant creative\n magic, or nature\u2019s grandest mechanical dreams, could never\n replace. The day on which first a human being pressed his\n weaker fellow-man to his breast and said, \u201cBrother, not mine,\n but thy will be done; I will give up my desires that thou also\n mayst be glad\u201d; the day upon which man first lifted up his head\n and said, \u201cLet us make the world _good_ in the likeness of the\n picture that has become living in us, just as it should be\u201d;\n this is the great and sanctified day in the history of our race\n on earth, the Christmas day on which God was born.\u201d\n\nCertainly the origin of man on earth, and again the evolution of the\nmoral man, is something quite new, which before did not exist. But did\nhumanity originate out of nothing, as sometimes the imaginations of\na poet are supposed to be created, or is there a prototype in whose\nimage man has been created? Man\u2019s reason, his ethics, and his humanity\nare something that did not exist before, but there is a feature in\nexistence which makes it possible that rational and moral beings develop.\nShould there be sentient beings on other planets, and we have little\nreason to doubt it, we can be sure that they also will develop rational\nminds, and that they also will learn, perhaps as we did, through many\nbitter experiences, the same truths which constitute our main maxims of\nmorality,[63] including such precepts as the love of enemies. And why are\nwe sure that on other planets not only reason, but also the fundamental\nrules of ethics will be the same as with us here on earth? Simply because\nwe know that there is a certain feature in reality which creates rational\nbeings and moral beings as naturally as it creates rocks and seas on the\nsurface of planets. Man\u2019s reason and also man\u2019s morality are not original\ninventions of his, but the result of many experiences which he had to\nlearn. And the world in which he lives is such that he can acquire reason\nand morality, and if a being should acquire a wrong kind of reason or a\nwrong kind of morality, it will by and by be blotted out of existence.\nAccordingly there is a prototype of reason and of morality, and this\nprototype of the humanity of man is exactly that which in the language of\nthe old religions has received the name \u201cGod.\u201d\n\nWe must make a distinction between ideals and dreams. Those creations\nof our fancy which are woven without any regard to reality are dreams.\nThey have no value beyond whiling away a leisure hour or pleasing our\nimagination. But those creations of our mind which construct realisable\nformations such as machines or clocks or higher conditions of human\nsociety, are not mere dreams, they are ideals. What, then, is the\ndifference between a dream and an ideal? A dream is a useless ebullition\nof an idle brain composed of ideas to which there is no correspondent\nreality; but an ideal is a potent factor in the living presence to shape\nthe future: it is a combination of ideas which are correct descriptions\nof actual realities. The moral aspirations of mankind are not empty\ndreams, they are true and veritable ideals. There are certain qualities\nin nature which make their realisation possible and these qualities\nconstitute the Divinity of nature.\n\nProfessor Jodl speaks of the origin of morality as of the birth of God on\nearth. Truly that is the meaning of Christianity. But this birth of God\ninto the world of human evolution as \u201cthe Son of Man\u201d is possible only\nbecause of the existence of the God in nature whom Christian mythology so\nbeautifully calls God the Father. The appearance of the Son of Man upon\nearth, the birth of morality, is a revelation of the divinity of nature.\n\nTrue enough, as Professor Jodl says, that we ourselves won the best and\nhighest we have by hard struggles, by terribly severe, self-imposed\ndiscipline. As Prometheus says:\n\n \u201c_Hast du nicht alles selbst vollendet,_\n _Heilig gl\u00fchend Herz!_\u201d\n\nThat, too, is part of the divinity of nature, that every creature has\nto work out its very being itself, and that man must search for the way\nof salvation with great anxiety, under bitter tribulations and through\nextreme afflictions. But he cannot invent a new way of salvation, he has\nto find it, and there is but one that is the right one. The nature of\nmorality is such as it is, and no other morality could be invented to\nreplace it. And this feature of existence which makes morality quite a\ndetermined thing is a real presence in the world, it is an actual quality\nof the universe.\n\nSome of our liberal friends, foremost among them Professor Haeckel, deny\nthe existence of a personal God and then proceed to declare that the God\nof science is nothing but matter and energy. We agree with Professor\nHaeckel in his rejection of anthropotheism; God is no supernatural being\nnor is he a huge world-ego. But we cannot accept his view of God as being\nonly matter and energy. The idea of God is and always has been a moral\nidea. Thus we have come to regard all those features of nature as divine\nwhich condition the origin and existence of morality and we define God\nas the authority of moral conduct. This authority is not a person, not\na sentient being, let alone a sentimental philanthropist; but it is,\nnevertheless, a reality, and, indeed, a stern reality.\n\nSuch is the God of science. God is that quality of existence through\nwhich we originated as feeling, thinking, and aspiring beings. He is the\nprototype of the human soul, and the condition under which develop man\u2019s\nreason and morality. Obedience to him is indispensable for a continued\nexistence, for further progress and a higher evolution of the human\nsoul. That these features of reality can by a great number of keen and\nfearless modern thinkers be supposed to be a non-entity is difficult\nto understand. This negation of the reality of qualities of existence\nwhich are not individual things but intrinsically inherent in all the\nindividual things, it appears to us, is an old heirloom of nominalism.\nThe nominalistic philosophy represented by Roscellinus was suppressed\nat the council at Soissons 1092, only to rise more powerfully in the\nfourteenth century in William of Occam, and finally to exterminate\nrealism with all its rubbish of errors together with the truth contained\nin these errors. Kant marks in many respects the culmination of the\nvictorious movement of nominalism. With all the benefits modern thought\nderived from the philosophical work of nominalism, a reaction is needed\nagainst its purely negative spirit. There is a truth in the old realism\nwhich cannot be neglected with impunity.[64]\n\nGod (viz., the name of God) is, as Kant said, a noumenon, a thing of\nthought, an abstraction. God is not a thing, a concrete object, or an\nindividual person. All the views of God which regard him as an individual\nbeing of some kind, or as a person only of infinite dimensions, are,\nclosely considered, pagan notions which belittle God. But the name of\nGod as a noumenon, a thought, an abstract idea, has a meaning. Abstract\nideas are not nonentities, they represent some real features, some actual\nqualities, or properties, or relations; otherwise they would not be\nideas, but unmeaning sounds.\n\nSome of our abstract ideas are of a very delicate fibre, so that the\ncoarse mental vision of the average Philistine is unable to see them in\ntheir reality and potency. But it so happens that exactly they are of a\nmore important, more powerful, and inevitable presence than the simple\ngeneralisations of things that visibly and corporeally surround us.\nThis, their peculiar nature, makes such ideas mysterious to those who\ninstinctively feel their reality without being able to point it out and\nunderstand it. And the most subtle, imponderous, and sublimated of all\nideas is the idea of God.\n\nWe have defined God as the ultimate authority of conduct, as the\ncondition of our existence as rational and moral beings, as the\nall-power that enforces obedience, etc.; but we cannot in any one of our\ndefinitions exhaust the significance of the idea. We would by no means\nexclude from the idea of God anything without which reality would cease\nto be real. The qualities of matter and energy constitute that element\nin the God-idea which justify the old religions in speaking of him as\nomnipotent and everlasting. Thus they ought not to be excluded. But these\nqualities alone are insufficient to characterise his being. The sum-total\nof matter and energy as such and as such alone does not constitute any\nmoral authority. Nature in her immeasurable greatness and oppressive\nvastness affects us with awe; but, after all, we look down upon her\nmassive sublimity. Man is more than the biggest heap of crude matter and\nunintelligently operating energy. Says Professor Jodl:\n\n \u201cWe stand amazed at her might and greatness, at the plentitude\n of her powers of creation, at her myriad play of forces, at the\n inexhaustible wealth of the relations with which she binds\n being to being, creates and mediates contrarieties, and amidst\n the most varied change and alternation, ever remains one and\n the same! But our prototype, our God, she can never be.\u201d\n\nThis grandeur of nature is part of her divinity, but it alone does not\nconstitute the character of God. Yet, observe that throughout nature\nthere is an imponderable quality present which makes every atom move in\na definite way, so that the whirl of gaseous masses, apparently a chaos,\nwill be recognised as a cosmic whole developing in a certain way and\ndescribable in what is generally called natural laws. This subtle quality\nis the condition of the regularities which are found in all the infinite\nvarieties and innumerable particularities, and all these regularities\nconceived in their systematic unity are called the order of the universe.\n\nMan exists as a thinking being only because the immeasurable universe\nof which he is a part possesses this quality of order, and his reason\nis closely considered only a copy of it. Man\u2019s reason was shaped into\nthe image of the cosmic order, and suppose\u2014a supposition which is very\ndifficult to make and regarded by many as impossible or inconceivable\u2014yet\nsuppose that the world-order were radically different from what it\nactually is, man\u2019s reason would accordingly be different too. Further,\nsuppose that the whole frame and fundamental interrelations of the\nparticles of reality were different from what they are, would not\ncorrespondingly the basic rules of conduct be changed too?\n\nThe author of this article, in the eyes of the so-called orthodox\nChristian, is most certainly an atheist. And if theism means the belief\nin a personal or extramundane God he is an atheist indeed. If there is\nany opprobrium in the name atheism we are willing to accept it; and\ncertainly, we do not reject the label of atheism in order to escape any\nodium attached to that name. We do reject atheism simply because we\nsee a great and potent truth in the idea of God which is but too often\ndisregarded.\n\nWith Professor Haeckel and Professor Jodl we reject the conception of\nan anthropomorphic Deity. The anthropomorphic idol is doomed before the\ntribunal of science. But we see a deeper meaning in the idea of God which\nhas formed through millenniums the very centre of the greatest religions\non earth. Science has to recognise the reality of an all-presence in\nexistence which is analogous to that which in a religious language is\ncalled God.\n\nConsidering the fact that humanity owes many great truths to religion,\nlet us not be hasty in condemning the religions of the past as pure\nsuperstition. There are valuable seeds in the chaff. If we discard the\nwheat together with the tares, we shall have to rediscover them, for it\nis little probable that humanity can for any length of time be satisfied\nwith beautiful phrases or live in its moral aspirations in a realm of\nmere dreams.\n\n EDITOR.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[61] For a discussion of this point see _Fundamental Problems_, pp.\n219-226.\n\n[62] See the article in Nos. 239, 241, and 242 of _The Open Court: Nature\nand Morality_. An Examination of the Ethical Views of John Stuart Mill.\nI. The Meaning of Basing Ethics Upon Nature. II. The Ethics Taught by\nNature. III. Intelligent Action and Moral Action. IV. The Anthropomorphic\nStandpoint of Mill.\n\n[63] I purposely do not say _all_ maxims of conduct, because we can very\nwell imagine that different conditions may produce some very important\nvariations in the rules of conduct; but the main foundation of morality\nwould be the same.\n\n[64] There are two men at present who boldly fly the flag of the old\nrealism again, both having our full sympathy in their aspirations,\nalthough we cannot agree with many of their teachings. The one is Mr.\nCharles S. Peirce, the other Dr. Francis E. Abbot.\n\n\n\n\nTHE SUPERSTITION OF NECESSITY.[65]\n\n\nLest my title give such offense as to prejudice unduly my contention, I\nmay say that I use the term in the way indicated by its etymology: as\na standing-still on the part of thought; a clinging to old ideas after\nthose ideas have lost their use, and hence, like all superstitions,\nhave become obstructions. For I shall try to show that the doctrine\nof necessity is a survival; that it holds over from an earlier and\nundeveloped period of knowledge; that as a means of getting out of and\nbeyond that stage it had a certain value, but, having done its work,\nloses its significance. Halting judgment may, indeed, at one time have\nhelped itself out of the slough of uncertainty, vagueness, and inadequacy\non to ground of more solid and complete fact, by the use of necessity as\na crutch; once upon the ground, the crutch makes progress slower and,\npreventing the full exercise of the natural means of locomotion, tends\nto paralyse science. The former support has become a burden, almost an\nintolerable one.\n\nThe beginning of wisdom in the matter of necessity is, I conceive, in\nrealising that it is a term which has bearing or relevancy only with\nreference to the development of judgment, not with reference to objective\nthings or events. I do not mean by this that necessity refers to the\ncompelling force with which we are driven to make a given affirmation:\nI mean that it refers to the content of that affirmation, expressing\nthe degree of coherence between its constituent factors. When we say\nsomething or other _must_ be so and so, the \u201cmust\u201d does not indicate\nanything in the nature of the fact itself, but a trait in our _judgment_\nof that fact; it indicates the degree with which we have succeeded in\nmaking a whole out of the various elements which have to be taken into\naccount in forming the judgment. More specifically, it indicates a\nhalf-way stage. At one extreme we have two separate judgments, which, so\nfar as consciousness is concerned, have nothing to do with each other;\nand at the other extreme we have one judgment into which the contents\nof the two former judgments have been so thoroughly organised as to\nlose all semblance of separateness. Necessity, as the middle term, is\nthe midwife which, from the dying isolation of judgments, delivers the\nunified judgment just coming into life\u2014it being understood that the\nseparateness of the original judgments is not as yet quite negated,\nnor the unity of the coming judgment quite attained. The judgment of\nnecessity, in other words, is exactly and solely the transition in our\nknowledge from unconnected judgments to a more comprehensive synthesis.\nIts value is just the value of this transition; as negating the old\npartial and isolated judgments\u2014in its backward look\u2014necessity has\nmeaning; in its forward look\u2014with reference to the resulting completely\norganised subject-matter\u2014it is itself as false as the isolated judgments\nwhich it replaces. Its value is in what it rids judgment of. When it has\nsucceeded, its value is nil. Like any go-between, its service consists in\nrendering itself uncalled for.\n\nAll science can ultimately do is to report or describe, to completely\nstate, the reality. So far as we reach this standpoint regarding any fact\nor group of facts, we do not say that the fact _must_ be such and such,\nbut simply that it _is_ such and such. There is no necessity attaching\nto the fact either as whole or as parts. _Qua_ whole, the fact simply is\nwhat it is; while the parts, instead of being necessitated either by one\nanother or by the whole, are the analysed factors constituting, in their\ncomplete circuit, the whole. In stating the whole, we, as of course,\nstate all that enters into it; if we speak of the various elements as\n_making_ the whole, it is only in the sense of making it _up_, not\nof causing it. The fallacy of the necessitarian theory consists in\ntransforming the determinate in the sense of the wholly defined, into the\ndetermined in the sense of something externally made to be what it is.\n\nThe whole, although first in the order of reality, is last in the order\nof knowledge. The complete statement of the whole is the goal, not the\nbeginning of wisdom. We begin, therefore, with fragments, which are\ntaken for wholes; and it is only by piecing together these fragments,\nand by the transformation of them involved in this combination, that we\narrive at the real fact. There comes a stage at which the recognition\nof the unity begins to dawn upon us, and yet, the tradition of the many\ndistinct wholes survives; judgment has to combine these two contradictory\nconceptions; it does so by the theory that the dawning unity is an effect\nnecessarily produced by the interaction of the former wholes. Only as the\nconsciousness of the unity grows still more is it seen that instead of\na group of independent facts, held together by \u201cnecessary\u201d ties, there\nis one reality, of which we have been apprehending various fragments in\nsuccession and attributing to them a spurious wholeness and independence.\nWe learn (but only at the end) that instead of discovering and then\nconnecting together a number of separate realities, we have been engaged\nin the progressive definition of one fact.\n\nThere are certain points upon which there is now _practical_ agreement\namong all schools. What one school has got at by a logical analysis of\nscience, another school has arrived at by the road of a psychological\nanalysis of experience. What one school calls the unity of thought\nand reality, another school calls the relativity of knowledge. The\nmetaphysical interpretation further given to these respective statements\nmay be quite different, but, so far as they go, they come to the same\nthing: that objects, _as known_, are not independent of the process\nof knowing, but are the content of our judgments. One school, indeed,\nmay conceive of judgment as a mere associative or habitual grouping of\nsensations, the other as the correlative diversification and synthesis of\nthe self; but the practical outcome, that the \u201cobject\u201d (anyway as known)\nis a form of judgment, is the same. This point being held in common,\nboth schools must agree that _the progress of judgment is equivalent\nto a change in the value of objects_\u2014that objects as they are for us,\nas known, change with the development of our judgments. If this be so,\ntruth, however it be metaphysically defined, must attach to late rather\nthan to early judgments.\n\nI am fortunate in being able to quote from authors, who may be taken as\ntypical of the two schools. Says Professor Caird in his article upon\n\u201cMetaphysic,\u201d (lately reprinted, \u201cEssays in Philosophy and Literature,\u201d):\n\n \u201cOur first consciousness of things is not an immovable\n foundation upon which science may build, but rather a\n hypothetical and self-contradictory starting-point of\n investigation, which becomes changed and transformed as we\n advance.\u201d (\u201cEssays,\u201d Vol. II, p. 398.)\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. Venn writes (in the first chapter of his\n\u201cEmpirical Logic\u201d):\n\n \u201cSelect what object we please\u2014the most apparently simple in\n itself, and the most definitely parted off from others that we\n can discover\u2014yet we shall find ourselves constrained to admit\n that a considerable mental process has been passed through\n before that object could be recognised as being an object, that\n is, as possessing some degree of unity and as requiring to be\n distinguished from other such unities.\u201d\n\nHe goes on to illustrate by such an apparently fixed and given object\nas the sun, pointing out how its unity as a persistent thing involves\na continued synthesis of elements very diverse in time and space, and\nan analysis, a selection, from other elements in very close physical\njuxtaposition. He goes on to raise the question whether a dog, for\nexample, may be said to \u201csee\u201d a rainbow at all, because of the complex\nanalysis and synthesis involved in such an object. The \u201cmental whole\u201d (to\nuse Mr. Venn\u2019s words, the \u201cideal unity\u201d as others might term it) is so\nextensive and intricate that\n\n \u201cOne might almost as reasonably expect the dog to \u2018see\u2019 the\n progress of democracy in the place where he lives, of which\n course of events the ultimate sensible constituents are\n accessible to his observation precisely as they are to ours.\u201d\n\nAs Mr. Venn is not discussing just the same point which I have raised,\nhe does not refer to the partial and tentative character of our first\njudgments\u2014our first objects. It is clear enough, however, that there\nwill be all degrees between total failure to analyse and combine (as,\nsay, in the case of the dog and rainbow) and fairly adequate grouping.\nThe difference between the savage whose synthesis is so limited in scope\nthat he sets up a new sun every day and the scientific man whose object\nis a unity comprehending differences through thousands of years of time\nand interactions going on through millions of miles of space is a case\nin point. The distinction between the respective objects is not simply\na superimposition of new qualities upon an old object, that old object\nremaining the same; it is not getting new objects; it is a continual\nqualitative reconstruction of the object itself. This fact, which is the\nmatter under consideration, is well stated by Mr. Venn, when he goes on\nto say:\n\n \u201cThe act of predication, in its two-fold aspect of affirmation\n and denial, really is a process by which we are not only\n enabled to add to our information _about_ objects, _but is also\n the process by the continued performance of which the objects\n had been originally acquired, or rather produced_\u201d (italics are\n mine).\n\nThis statement cannot be admitted at all without recognising that the\nfirst judgments do not make the object once for all, but that the\ncontinued process of judging is a continued process of \u201cproducing\u201d the\nobject.\n\nOf course the confused and hypothetical character of our first objects\ndoes not force itself upon us when we are still engaged in constructing\nthem. On the contrary, it is only when the original subject-matter has\nbeen overloaded with various and opposing predicates that we think of\ndoubting the correctness of our first judgments, of putting our first\nobjects under suspicion. At the start, these objects assert themselves\nas the baldest and solidest of hard facts. The dogmatic and na\u00efve\nquality of the original judgment is in exact proportion to its crudeness\nand inadequacy. The objects which are the content of these judgments\nthus come to be identified with reality _par excellence_; they are\n_facts_, however doubtful everything else. They hang on obstinately.\nNew judgments, instead of being regarded as better definitions of\nthe actual fact and hence as displacing the prior object, are tacked\non to the old as best they may be. Unless the contradiction is too\nflagrant, the new predicates are set side by side with the old as simply\nadditional information; they do not react into the former qualities. If\nthe contradiction is too obvious to be overlooked the new predicate\nis used, if possible, to constitute another object, independent of the\nformer. So the savage, having to deal with the apparently incompatible\npredicates of light and darkness, makes two objects; two suns, for two\nsuccessive days. Once the Ptolemaic conception is well rooted, cycles and\nepicycles, almost without end, are superadded, rather than reconstruct\nthe original object. Here, then, is our starting point: when qualities\narise so incompatible with the object already formed that they cannot be\nreferred to that object, it is easier to form a new object on their basis\nthan it is to doubt the correctness of the old, involving as that does\nthe surrender of the _object_ (the fact, seemingly) and the formation of\nanother object.\n\nIt is easier, I say, for there is no doubt that the reluctance of the\nmind to give up an object once made lies deep in its economies. I shall\nhave occasion hereafter to point out the teleological character of the\nnotions of necessity and chance, but I wish here to call attention to the\nfact that the forming of a number of distinct objects has its origin in\npractical needs of our nature. The analysis and synthesis which is first\nmade is that of most practical importance; what is abstracted from the\ncomplex net-work of reality is some net outcome, some result which is of\nvalue for life. As Venn says:\n\n \u201cWhat the savage mostly wants to do is to produce something\n or to avert something, not to account for a thing which has\n already happened. What interests him is to know how to kill\n somebody, not to know how somebody has been killed.\u201d (P. 62 of\n \u201cEmpirical Logic.\u201d)\n\nAnd again:\n\n \u201cWhat not only the savage, but also the practical man mostly\n wants, is a _general_ result, say the death of his enemy. It\n does not matter whether the symptoms, i. e., the qualifying\n circumstances, are those attendant on poison, or a blow from a\n club, or on incantation, provided the death is brought about.\n But they do desire _certainty_ in respect of this general\n result.\u201d (P. 64.)\n\nNow it is this \u201cgeneral result,\u201d the net outcome for practical purposes,\nwhich is _the_ fact, _the_ object at first. Anything else is useless\nsubtlety. That the man is dead\u2014that is the fact; anything further is\nat most external circumstances which happen to accompany the fact.\nThat the death is only a bare fraction of a fact; that the attendant\n\u201ccircumstances\u201d are as much constituent factors of the real fact as\nthe mere \u201cdeath\u201d itself (probably more so from the scientific point of\nview)\u2014all this is foreign to conception. We pluck the fruit, and that\nfruit is the fact. Only when practical experience forces upon us the\nrecognition that we cannot get the fruit without heeding certain other\n\u201cconditions\u201d do we consent to return upon our assumed object, put it\nunder suspicion and question whether it is really what we took it to be.\nIt is, we may presume, the savage who in order to get his living, has\nto regulate his conduct for long periods, through changes of seasons,\nin some continuous mode, who first makes the synthesis of one sun going\nthrough a recurring cycle of changes\u2014the year.\n\nAs time goes on, the series of independent and isolated objects passes\nthrough a gradual change. Just as the recognition of incompatible\nqualities has led to setting up of separate things, so the growing\nrecognition of similar qualities in these disparate objects begins to\npull them together again. Some relation between the two objects is\nperceived; it is seen that neither object is just what it is in its\nisolation, but owes some of its meaning to the other objects. While in\nreality, (as I hope later to point out,) this \u201crelationship\u201d and mutual\ndependence means membership in a common whole, contribution to one and\nthe same activity, a midway stage intervenes before this one fact,\nincluding as parts of itself the hitherto separate objects, comes to\nconsciousness. The tradition of isolation is too strong to give way at\nthe first suggestion of community. This passage-way from isolation to\nunity, denying the former but not admitting the latter, is necessity or\ndeterminism. The wall of partition between the two separate \u201cobjects\u201d\ncannot be broken at one attack; they have to be worn away by the\nattrition arising from their slow movement into one another. It is the\n\u201cnecessary\u201d influence which one exerts upon the other that finally rubs\naway the separateness and leaves them revealed as elements of one unified\nwhole. This done, the determining influence has gone too.\n\nThe process may be symbolised as follows: _M_ is the object, the original\nsynthesis of the elements seen to be of practical importance; _a_, _b_,\n_c_, etc., to _h_ are predicates of constantly growing incompatibility.\nWhen the quality _i_ is discovered, it is so manifestly incompatible\nwith _a_ that all attempt to refer it to the same subject _M_ is\nresisted. Two alternatives are now logically open. The subject-matter\n_M_, as the synthesis of the qualities _a_-_h_, may be taken up; it may\nbe asked whether the object is really _M_ with these qualities; whether\nit is not rather \u03a3, having instead of the predicates _a_, _b_, etc., the\nqualities \u03c1\u03b1, \u03c1\u03b2, with which the new quality _i_ is quite compatible. But\nthis process goes against the practical grain of our knowledge; it means\nnot only that we do not know what we thought we knew; it means that we\ndid not _do_ what we thought we did. Such unsettling of action is hardly\nto be borne. It is easier to erect a new object _N_, to which the more\nincompatible predicates are referred. Finally, it is discovered that\nboth _M_ and _N_ have the same predicates _r_ and _s_; that in virtue\nof this community of qualities there is a certain like element even in\nthe qualities previously considered disparate. This mutual attraction\ncontinues until it becomes so marked a feature of the case that there\nis no alternative but to suppose that the _r_ and _s_ of one produces\nthese qualities in the other, and thereby influences all the qualities\nof the other. This drawing together continues until we have the one\nreconstructed object \u03a3, with the traits \u03c1\u03b1, \u03c1\u03b2\u03c1, etc. It is found that\nthere is one somewhat comprehensive synthesis which includes within\nitself the several separate objects so far produced; and it is found that\nthis inclusion in the larger whole reacts into the meaning of the several\nconstituting parts\u2014as parts of one whole, they lose traits which they\nseemed to possess in their isolation, and gain new traits, because of\ntheir membership in the same whole.\n\nWe have now to consider, more in detail, how the intermediate idea of\nnecessity grows up and how it gives away upon the discovery of the one\ninclusive whole. Let us continue the illustration of the killing. The\n\u201cgeneral result,\u201d the death of the hated enemy, is at first the fact; all\nelse is mere accidental circumstance. Indeed, the other circumstances\nat first are hardly that; they do not attract attention, having no\nimportance. Not only the savage, but also the common-sense man of\nto-day, I conceive, would say that any attempt to extend the definition\nof the \u201cfact\u201d beyond the mere occurrence of the death is metaphysical\nrefinement; that the _fact_ is the killing, the death, and that that\n\u201cfact\u201d remains quite the same, however it is brought about. What has\nbeen done, in other words, is to abstract part of the real fact, part of\n_this_ death, and set up the trait or universal thus abstracted as itself\n_fact_, and not only as fact, but as _the_ fact, _par excellence_, with\nreference to which all the factors which constitute the reality, the\nconcrete fact, of _this_ death, are circumstantial and \u201caccidental.\u201d[66]\n\nA fragment of the whole reality, of the actual fact individualised and\nspecified with all kind of minute detail, having been thus hypostatised\ninto an object, the idea of necessity is in fair way to arise. These\ndeaths in general do not occur. Although the mere death of the man, his\nremoval from the face of the earth, is the _fact_, none the less all\n_actual_ deaths have a certain amount of detail in them. The savage has\nto hit his enemy with a club or spear, or perform a magic incantation,\nbefore he can attain that all-important end of getting rid of him.\nMoreover, a man with a coat of armor on will not die just the same way\nas the man who is defenseless. These circumstances have to be taken into\naccount. Now, if the \u201cfact\u201d had not been so rigidly identified with\nthe bare practical outcome, the removal of the hated one, a coherent\ninterpretation of the need for these further incidents would be open. It\ncould be admitted that the original death was a highly complex affair,\ninvolving a synthesis of a very large number of different factors;\nfurthermore, the new cases of murder could be employed to reconstruct\nthe original analysis-synthesis; to eliminate supposed factors which\nwere not relevant, and to show the presence of factors at first not\nsuspected. In other words, the real fact would be under constant process\nof definition, of \u201cproduction.\u201d But the stiff-necked identification of\nthe fragment, which happened to have practical importance with the real\nobject, effectually prevents any such reaction and reconstruction. What\nis to be done, however, with these conditions of spear, of stone, of\narmor, which so obviously have something _to do_ with the real fact,\nalthough, as it would seem, they are not the fact? They are considered\nas circumstances, _accidental_, so far as death in general is concerned;\n_necessary_, so far as _this_ death is concerned. That is, wanting simply\nto get the net result of the removal of my enemy, so that he will no\nlonger blight the fair face of nature, it is accidental how I do it;\nbut having, after all, to kill a man of certain characteristics and\nsurroundings in life, having to choose time and place, etc., it becomes\nnecessary, _if_ I am to succeed, that I kill him in a certain way, say,\nwith poison, or a dynamite bomb. Thus we get our concrete, individual\nfact again.\n\nConsider, then, that tortuous path from reality to reality, _via_\na circuit of unreality, which calls the thought of necessity into\nexistence. We first mutilate the actual fact by selecting some portion\nthat appeals to our needs; we falsify, by erecting this fragment into\nthe whole fact. Having the rest of the fact thus left on our hands for\ndisposal, when we have no need of the concrete fact we consider it\naccidental, merely circumstantial; but we consider it necessary whenever\nwe have occasion to descend from the outcome which we have abstracted\nback to the real fact, in all its individuality. Necessity is a device\nby which we both conceal from ourselves the unreal character of what we\nhave called real, and also get rid of the practical evil consequences of\nhypostatising a fragment into an independent whole.\n\nIf the purely teleological character of necessity is not yet evident,\nI think the following considerations will serve to bring it out. The\npractical value, the fruit from the tree, we pick out and set up for the\nentire fact so far as our past action is concerned. But so far as our\n_future_ action is concerned, this value is a result _to be_ reached;\nit is an end to be attained. Other factors, in reality all the time\nbound up in the one concrete fact or individual whole, have now to be\nbrought in as means to get this end. Although after our desire has been\nmet they have been eliminated as accidental, as irrelevant, yet when the\nexperience is again desired their integral membership in the real fact\nhas to be recognised. This is done under the guise of considering them as\nmeans which are necessary to bring about the end. Thus the idea of the\ncircumstances as external to the \u201cfact\u201d is retained, while we get all the\npractical benefit of their being not external but elements of one and the\nsame whole. Contingent and necessary are thus the correlative aspects\nof one and the same fact; conditions are accidental so far as we have\nabstracted a fragment and set it up as the whole; they are necessary the\nmoment it is required to pass from this abstraction back to the concrete\nfact. Both are teleological in character\u2014contingency referring to the\nseparation of means from end, due to the fact that the end having been\nalready reached the means have lost their value for us; necessity being\nthe reference of means to an end _which has still to be got_. Necessary\nmeans _needed_; contingency means no longer required\u2014because already\nenjoyed.\n\nNote that the necessity of the means has reference to an end still to\nbe attained, and in so far itself hypothetical or contingent, while the\ncontingent circumstances are no longer needed precisely because they have\nresulted in a definite outcome (which, accordingly, is now a fact, and,\nin that sense, necessary) and we begin to see how completely necessity\nand chance are bound up with each other.\n\nTheir correlation may thus be stated: _If_ we are to reach an end we\n_must_ take certain means; while so far as we want an undefined end,\nan end in general, conditions which accompany it are mere accidents.\nWhichever way the relationship be stated, the underlying truth is that we\nare dealing with only partial phases of fact, which, having been unduly\nseparated from each other through their erection into distinct wholes,\nhave now to be brought back into their real unity.\n\nIn the first place, then, _if_ I am to reach an end, certain means\n_must_ be used. Here the end is obviously postulated; save as it is\nbegged (presupposed), the necessity of the means has no sense. If,\nwhen starving, I am to live I must steal a dinner, but, having stolen,\nthe logical but unsympathetic judge may question the relevancy (that\nis, the necessity) of my end, and thus cut the ground out from under\nthe necessity of my means. My end requires _its_ justification, the\nestablishing of its validity, before the necessity of the means is\nanything more than hypothetical. The proximate end must be referred to a\nmore ultimate and inclusive end to get any solid ground. Here we have our\nchoice: we may deny the existence of any organic whole in life and keep\nchasing in a never-ending series, the _progressus ad infinitum_, after\nan end valid in itself. In this case we never get beyond a hypothetical\nnecessity\u2014something is necessary _if_ we are to have something else,\nthe necessity being relative to the implied doubt. Or, being convinced\nthat life is a whole and not a series merely, we may say there is one\ncomprehensive end which gives its own validity to the lesser ends in\nso far as they constitute it. While, on the other alternative, we\nreach only a hypothetical necessity, on this we reach none at all. The\ncomprehensive end is no end at all in the sense of something by itself\nto be reached by means external to it. Any such end would be simply one\nin the infinite series and would be itself hypothetical. Whenever minor\nends cease to be in turn means to further ends it is because they have\nbecome parts, constituent elements, of the higher end and thus ceased to\nbe steps towards an end and beyond and outside of themselves. Given a\nfinal (i. e., inclusive) end, eating and drinking, study and gossip, play\nand business, cease to be means _towards_ an end and become its concrete\ndefinition, its analytic content. The minor activities state the supreme\nactivity in its specific factors.\n\nOur dilemma is the choice between an end which itself has no existence\nsave upon presupposition of another end, (is contingent,) and an end\nwhich as an end in itself simply _is_.\n\nThe externality of means to end is merely a symptom of lack of\nspecification or concreteness in the end itself. _If_ I am going to\ninvent some improvement in a type-writer, the necessity of going through\ncertain preliminary steps is exactly proportionate to the indefiniteness\nof my conception of what the improvement is to be; when the end is\nrealised, the operations which enter into the realisation cease to be\nmeans necessary to an end and become the specific _content_ of that end.\nThe improvement is a _fact_, having such and such elements defining it.\nIf I simply want, in general, to get my mail I _must_ take this path\n(there being but one road); but if my end is not thus general, if it is\nindividualised with concrete filling, the walk to the office may become\na part of the end, a part of the actual fact. In so far, of course, it\nloses all aspect of necessitation. It simply _is_. And in general, so\nfar as my end is vague, or abstract, so far as it is not specified as\nto its details, so far the filling up of its empty schema to give it\nparticularity (and thus make it fact) appears as a means necessary to\nreach an end outside itself. The growth in concreteness of the end itself\nis transformed into ways of effecting an end already presupposed. Or, to\nstate it in yet one other way, determination in the sense of definition\nin consciousness is hypostatised into determination in the sense of a\nphysical making.\n\nThe point may come out more clearly if we consider it with the emphasis\non chance instead of upon necessity. The usual statement that chance is\nrelative to ignorance seems to me to convey the truth though not in the\nsense generally intended\u2014viz., that if we knew more about the occurrence\nwe should see it necessitated by its conditions. Chance is relative to\nignorance in the sense rather that it refers to an indefiniteness in\nour conception of what we are doing. In our consciousness of our end\n(our acts) we are always making impossible abstractions; we break off\ncertain phases of the act which are of chief interest to us, without\nany regard to whether the concrete conditions of action\u2014that is, the\ndeed in its whole definition\u2014permits any such division. Then, when in\nour actual doing the circumstances to which we have not attended thrust\nthemselves into consciousness\u2014when, that is to say, the act appears in\nmore of its own specific nature\u2014we dispose of those events, foreign to\nour conscious purpose, as accidental; we did not want them or intend\nthem\u2014what more proof of their accidental character is needed? The falling\nof a stone upon a man\u2019s head as he walks under a window is \u201cchance,\u201d\nfor it has nothing to do with what the man proposed to do, it is no\npart of his conception of that walk. To an enemy who takes that means\nof killing him, it is anything but an accident, being involved in\n_his_ conscious purpose. It is \u201cchance\u201d when we throw a two and a six;\nfor the concreteness of the act falls outside of the content of our\nintention. We intended _a_ throw, some throw, and in so far the result\nis not accidental, but this special result, being irrelevant to our\nconception of what we were to do, in so far is contingent. The vagueness\nor lack of determinateness in our end, the irrelevancy of actual end to\nconscious intent, chance, are all names for the same thing. And if I\nam asked whether a gambler who has a hundred dollars upon the outcome\ndoes not _intend_ to throw double sixes, I reply that he has no such\nintention\u2014unless the dice are loaded. He may _hope_ to make that throw,\nbut he cannot intend it save as he can define that act\u2014tell how to do it,\ntell, that is, just _what_ the act is. Or, once more, if I intend to get\nmy mail and there are four paths open to me it is chance which I take,\njust in proportion to the abstractness of my end. If I have not defined\nit beyond the mere \u201cgeneral result\u201d of getting mail, anything else is\nextraneous and in so far contingent. If the end is individualised to the\nextent, say, of getting the mail in the shortest possible time, or with\nthe maximum of pleasant surroundings, or with the maximum of healthy\nexercise, the indifferency of the \u201cmeans,\u201d and with it their contingency,\ndisappears. This or that path is no longer a mere means which _may_ be\ntaken to get a result foreign to its own value; the path is an intrinsic\npart of the end.\n\nIn so far as a man presents to himself an end in general, he sets up an\nabstraction so far lacking in detail as (taken _per se_) to exclude the\npossibility of realisation. In order to exist as concrete or individual\n(and of course, nothing can exist except as individual or concrete)\nit must be defined or particularised. But so far as consciousness is\nconcerned the original vague end is _the_ reality; it is all that the man\ncares about and hence constitutes his act. The further particularisation\nof the end, therefore, instead of appearing as what it really is, viz.,\nthe discovery of the actual reality, presents itself as something\noutside that end. This externality to the end previously realised in\nconsciousness is, taken as mere externality, contingency, or accident;\ntaken as none the less so bound up with the desired end that it must\nbe gone through before reaching that end, it is necessary. Chance, in\nother words, stands for the irrelevancy as the matter at first presents\nitself to consciousness; necessity is the required, but partial, negation\nof this irrelevancy. Let it be complete, instead of partial, and we\nhave the one real activity defined throughout. With reference to this\nreality, conditions are neither accidental nor necessary, but simply\nconstituting elements\u2014they neither may be nor must be, but just are. What\nis irrelevant is now not simply indifferent; it is excluded, eliminated.\nWhat is relevant is no longer something required in order to get a result\nbeyond itself; it is incorporated into the result, it is integral.\n\nIt now remains to connect the two parts of our discussion, the logical\nand the practical consideration of necessity, and show that, as\nsuggested, logical necessity rests upon teleological\u2014that, indeed, it\nis the teleological read backwards. The logical process of discovering\nand stating the reality of some event simply reverses the process which\nthe mind goes through in setting up and realising an end. Instead of the\nkilling of an enemy as something to be accomplished, we have the fact of\na murder to be accounted for. Just as on the practical side, the end, as\nit first arises in consciousness, is an end in general and thus contrasts\nwith the concrete end which is individualised; so the fact, as at first\nrealised in consciousness, is a _bare_ fact, and thus contrasts with the\nactual event with its complete particularisation. The actual fact, the\nmurder as it really took place, is one thing; the fact as it stands in\nconsciousness, the phases of the actual event which are picked out and\nput together, is another thing. The fact of knowledge, it is safe to\nsay, is no _fact_ at all; that is, if there had been in reality no more\nparticularisation, no more of detail, than there is consciousness, the\nmurder would never have happened. But just as, practically, we take the\nend in general to be the real thing, (since it is the only thing of any\ndirect interest,) so in knowledge we take the bare fact as abstracted\nfrom the actual whole, as _the_ fact. Just as the end of the savage is\nmerely to kill his enemy, so the \u201cfact\u201d is merely the dead body with\nthe weapon sticking in it. The fact, as it stands in consciousness, is\nindeterminate and partial, but, since it is in consciousness by itself,\nit is taken as a whole and as the certain thing. But as the abstractness\nof the \u201cend in general\u201d is confessed in the fact that means are required\nin order to make it real\u2014to give it existence\u2014so the unreal character of\nthe \u201cfact\u201d is revealed in the statement that the causes which produced\nit are unknown and have to be discovered. The bare fact thus becomes\na result to be accounted for: in this conception the two sides are\ncombined; the \u201cfact\u201d is at once given a certain reality of its own while\nat the same time the lack of concreteness is recognised in the reference\nto external causes.\n\nThe gradual introduction of further factors, under the guise of causes\naccounting for the effect, defines the original vague \u201cfact,\u201d until,\nat last, when it is accounted for, we have before us the one and only\nconcrete reality. This done, we no longer have an effect to be accounted\nfor, and causes which produce it, but one fact whose statement or\ndescription is such and such. But intermediate between the isolation and\nthe integration is the stage when necessity appears. We have advanced,\nwe will suppose, from the bare fact of the murder to the discovery of a\nlarge amount of \u201ccircumstantial\u201d evidence regarding that fact. We hear of\na man who had a quarrel with the deceased; he cannot account for himself\nat the time when the murder _must_ have been committed; he is found\nto have had a weapon like that with which the murder _must_ have been\ncommitted. Finally we conclude he _must_ have been the murderer. What\ndo these \u201cmusts\u201d (the \u201cmust\u201d of the time, weapon, and murderer) mean?\nAre they not obviously the gradual filling-in of the previously empty\njudgment, through bringing things at first unconnected into relation\nwith each other? The existence of the man M. N. is wholly isolated from\nthe \u201cfact\u201d of the murder till it is learned that he had a grudge against\nthe murdered man; this third fact, also distinct _per se_, brought\ninto connection with the others (the \u201cfact\u201d of the murder and of the\nexistence of M. N.) compels them to move together; the result is at\nfirst the possibility, later, as the points of connection get more and\nmore marked and numerous, the \u201cnecessity,\u201d that M. N. is the murderer.\nFurther, it is clear that this \u201cmust\u201d marks not a greater certainty or\nactuality than a mere \u201cis\u201d would indicate, but rather a doubt, a surmise\nor guess gradually gaining in certainty. When the fact is really made\nout to our satisfaction, we drop the \u201cmust\u201d and fall back on the simple\n_is_. Only so long as there is room for doubt, and thus for argument\ndo we state that the time and weapon must have been such and such. So\nwhen we finally conclude that the murderer must have been M. N., it\nmeans that we have woven a large number of facts, previously discrete,\ninto such a state of inter-relationship that we do not see how to avoid\ndenying their discreteness and incorporating them all into one concrete\nwhole, or individual fact. That we still say \u201cmust\u201d shows, however, that\nwe have not quite succeeded in overcoming the partial and indefinite\ncharacter of the original \u201cfact.\u201d Had we succeeded in getting the whole\nfact before us the judgment would take this form: The murder _is_ a fact\nof such and such definite nature, having as its content such and such\nprecise elements. In this comprehensive whole all distinction of effect\nto be accounted for and causes which produce clean disappears. The idea\nof necessity, in a word, comes in only while we are still engaged in\ncorrecting our original error, but have not surrendered it root and\nbranch; this error being that the fragment of reality which we grasp is\nconcrete enough to warrant the appellation \u201cfact.\u201d\n\nA great deal of attention has been directed to the category of cause\nand effect. One striking feature of the ordinary consideration is, that\nit takes for granted the matter most needing investigation and aims the\ninquiry at the dependent member of the firm. The effect seems to be so\nclearly _there_, while the cause is so obviously something to be searched\nfor that the category of effect is assumed, and it is supposed that only\nthe idea of causation is in need of examination. And yet this abstraction\nof certain phases of fact, the erection of the parts thus abstracted into\ndistinct entities, which, though distinct, are still dependent in their\nmode of existence, is precisely the point needing examination. It is but\nanother instance of the supreme importance of our practical interests.\nThe effect is the end, the practical outcome, which interests us; the\nsearch for causes is but the search for the means which would produce\nthe result. We call it \u201cmeans and end\u201d when we set up a result to be\nreached in the future and set ourselves upon finding the causes which\nput the desired end in our hands; we call it \u201ccause and effect\u201d when\nthe \u201cresult\u201d is given, and the search for means is a regressive one. In\neither case the separation of one side from the other, of cause from\neffect, of means from end, has the same origin: a partial and vague idea\nof the whole fact, together with the habit of taking this part (because\nof its superior practical importance) for a whole, for a fact.\n\nI hope now to have made good my original thesis: that the idea of\nnecessity marks a certain stage in the development of judgment; that\nit refers to a residuum, in our judgments and thus in our objects,\nof indeterminateness or vagueness, which it replaces without wholly\nnegating; that it is thus relative to \u201cchance\u201d or contingency; that its\nvalue consists wholly in the impulse given judgment towards the _is_, or\nthe concrete reality defined throughout. The analysis has been long; the\nreader may have found it not only tedious, but seemingly superfluous,\nsince, as he may be saying to himself, no one nowadays regards necessity\nas anything but a name for fixed uniformities in nature, and of this view\nof the case nothing has been said. I hope, however, that when we come\nto a consideration of necessity as equivalent to uniformity, it will be\nfound that the course of this discussion has not been irrelevant, but the\nsure basis for going further.\n\n JOHN DEWEY.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[65] This article, as the title may indicate, was suggested by Mr.\nPeirce\u2019s article upon \u201cThe Doctrine of Necessity Examined.\u201d As, however,\nmy thought takes finally a different turn, I have deemed it better to let\nit run its own course from the start, and so have not referred, except\nindirectly, to Mr. Peirce\u2019s argument. I hope this will not be taken as a\ndesire to slur over my indebtedness to him.\n\n[66] The reason of this abstraction is in practical nature, as already\nindicated. For all the savage _cares_ about it, the death in general,\n_is_ the real fact. It is all that interests him. It is hardly worth\nwhile to attempt to persuade the savage; indeed, if he were not only a\nsavage, but also a philosopher, he might boldly challenge the objector\nto present _any_ definition of object which should not refer objectivity\nto man\u2019s practical activity; although he might, as a shrewd savage,\nadmit that some one activity (or self) to which the object is referred\nhas more content than another. In this case, I, for one, should not care\nabout entering the lists against the savage. But when the common-sense\nphilosopher, who resists all attempts to reconstruct the original object\non the ground that a fact is a fact and all beyond that is metaphysics,\nis also a case-hardened nominalist (as he generally is), it is time to\nprotest. It might be true that the real object is always relative to the\nvalue of some action; but to erect this pure universal into the object,\nand then pride one\u2019s self on enlightenment in rejecting the \u201cscholastic\nfigment\u201d of the reality of universals is a little too much.\n\n\n\n\nTHE ISSUES OF \u201cSYNECHISM.\u201d\n\n\nIn a late number of _The Monist_, (Vol. II, No. 4,) there appears a\nsingularly acute and profound article, from the pen of one of the ablest\nof American logicians and mathematicians, Mr. Charles S. Peirce. Its\nsubject is \u201cThe Law of Mind\u201d\u2014the idea of continuity. The writer tells\nus, (p. 534,) \u201cthe tendency to regard continuity, in the sense in which\nI shall define it, as an idea of prime importance in philosophy, may\nconveniently be termed _Synechism_.\u201d With this _synechistic_ philosophy,\nas applied to mind, the paper is occupied, to the exclusion, for the\nnonce, of Mr. Peirce\u2019s companion doctrine of _Tychism_,[67] which was\ndealt with, by him, in the January, 1891, and April, 1892, issues of _The\nMonist_. These conceptions are, both of them, to be viewed as essential\nto philosophy as a whole, but the latter is; for the present, allowed\nto drop out of sight, in order to allow of the due elaboration of the\nformer.[68]\n\n\nTHE FORMULA OF SYNECHISM.\n\nThe formula of Synechism, with which the article begins, is as follows:\n\n \u201cLogical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there\n is but one law of mind, namely, that ideas tend to spread\n continuously, and to affect certain others which stand to them\n in a peculiar relation of affectibility. In this spreading they\n lose intensity, and especially the power of affecting others,\n but gain generality, and become welded with other ideas.\u201d (Vol.\n II, No. 4, p. 534.)\n\nThe individuality and continuity of ideas are, then, shown respectively\nto involve no contradiction; an idea once past\u2014in the sense of an\nevent in an individual consciousness\u2014is not wholly past, it is only\ngoing\u2014\u201cinfinitesimally past, less past than any assignable past date.\u201d\nThus the conclusion is reached that \u201cthe present is connected with the\npast by a series of real, infinitesimal steps.\u201d Again, \u201cWe are forced to\nsay that we are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal interval\nof time. This is all that is requisite.\u201d (_Ibid._, pp. 535-536.)\n\nAll that it is necessary to say at the outset is, that this view is\nsupported by an elaborate inquiry into the nature of infinity and\ncontinuity in general, into which, for the purpose of the present paper,\nit is not needful to enter. And this for two reasons: (1) The synechistic\nphilosophy, by itself, does not profess to be monistic. Its expounder\ndoes not, even if his Tychism were not in reserve, profess to carry it\nbeyond the realm of mind, with all that is implied in such a reservation.\nNow, it is the bearing of Mr. Peirce\u2019s Synechism upon a monistic solution\nof the universe with which the present article is concerned. And (2)\nMr. Peirce\u2019s method of treatment, though precise and logical in the\ndirection of its own path, is too purely technical to be summarised for\nthe general reader\u2019s benefit. But withal, Synechism is far too fertile,\nnot so much in respect of what it makes clear, as suggestively, and, if\nthe expression may be allowed, _obliquely_, to be passed over without\ncomment. Its excogitator is eminently frank; he does not conceal the\ndifficulties which, ever and anon, occur in his statement. Sometimes\nhis theory seems a trifle too wide for the facts encountered, sometimes\nrather too scanty to contain them. Such phrases as the following: \u201cNo, I\nthink we can only hold\u201d\u2014p. 552; \u201cwe are driven to perceive\u201d\u2014p. 555; \u201cthis\nobliges me to say\u201d\u2014p. 557; \u201cthe principle with which I set out requires\nme to maintain\u201d\u2014p. 558; \u201cthe only answer that I can, at present, make\nis\u201d\u2014p. 559, etc., etc., do every credit to the writer\u2019s candor, but they\nwould scarcely occur in an exposition, which, in the mind of its author,\nmade the rough places altogether plain. Synechism, even with Tychism in\nthe background, probably does not, in Mr. Peirce\u2019s own mind, completely\nsolve the world-riddle, at least, as yet. Still these very pauses\nthemselves, on the part of a thinker of such ability, are eminently\nsuggestive. To use his own words: \u201cthe present paper is intended to show\nwhat Synechism is, and what it leads to.\u201d Let us emphasise this latter\nclause, as likely to be more fruitful than the former.\n\n\nMR. PEIRCE\u2019S POSITIVISM.\n\nMr. Peirce, in spite of his theory of chance, is, in his Synechism,\nalmost severely a positivist;[69] but his positivism, like most of that\ncurrent nowadays, does not go deep enough. He is positivist, _after_ he\nhas got externality\u2014fertile in excitations\u2014comfortably disposed around\nhis subject; and vibrations, undulations, attractions, etc., ready to\nplay upon the thousand-stringed harp, _but not before_. For, \u201cwe must not\ntax introspection,\u201d he tells us, p. 548, \u201cto make a phenomenon manifest,\nwhich essentially involves externality,\u201d when the real problem at issue\nis: Is there externality, in the vulgar sense, at all, or is it only that\n_rationalised externality_ which _circumspection_, within the limits\nof egoity, reveals? Now, upon this a good deal hinges. At all events\nthe difference in question, or, rather, that there _is_ a difference,\nhas been mooted, to say the least. And, this being the case, it is a\nlittle tedious, when the really vital point of the spatial extension of\nfeelings is being debated, to have this illustration brought in, (p.\n548,): \u201cMoreover, our own feelings are focused in attention to such a\ndegree, that we are not aware that ideas are not brought to an absolute\nunity. Just as nobody, not instructed by special experiment, has any idea\nhow very, very little of the field of vision is distinct.\u201d Why, that is\nreasoning in a circle, if some systems are true; and it is a begging of\nthe question, if they are the reverse.\n\nIf the system of so-called objective reality were, at sight, wholly\nveracious, if everything existed just as it seems, this positivism of\nMr. Peirce\u2019s might be workable. Then no one would seek to go beneath\nthe process of the apparent, the actually visible, for a _rationale_.\nBut modern science teaches, in its very primer, that many things are,\nand act, quite otherwise than as they seem to be, and do. Appearances\n_rationalised_ are alone to be accepted. The sun does not \u201crise\u201d\nand \u201cset,\u201d as it seems to do. The earth is not, as it appears to be,\nan immovable plane, and so on. And, this once allowed, where is the\nprinciple to end? If the superficial judgment may be thus corrected,\nor reversed, it is liable to revision or reversal _ad infinitum_,\nunless reason be shown to the contrary. It may thus be disputed whether\nour author is quite in order in writing, as he does, and using the\nstatement to support his theory\u2014\u201cPrecisely how primary sensations, as\ncolors and tones, are excited, we cannot tell, in the present state of\npsychology.... As far as sight and hearing are in question, we know that\nthey are only excited by vibrations of inconceivable complexity; and the\nchemical senses are probably not more simple.\u201d (P. 557.)\n\nTo argue, we cannot tell precisely _how_ they are excited, but we know\nthat they _are_ excited, is somewhat feminine; seeing that the said\n\u201cexcitement\u201d is not patent on the surface of ordinary perception. And,\nthis being the case, the excitement, or its mode rather, not being given\nimmediately, but only mentally annexed, Mr. Peirce is not consistently\npositivist. It is equally open to an opponent to \u201cannex\u201d something else\nof his own to the \u201cgiven\u201d thing, or altogether to deny the necessity of\nanything whatever being thus annexed. In any case that (if anything)\nwhich is sought to be annexed must stand the test of positivism; we must\nknow _if_ such a thing is, and _what_ it is precisely. And this is just\nwhat Mr. Peirce cannot do for us. He cannot tell us exactly what the\n\u201cexcitant\u201d of feelings _is_; he can only guess what it is \u201c_something\nlike_,\u201d viz.: the feelings themselves. Hence the following:\n\n \u201cThe principle with which I set out [that of continuity]\n requires me to maintain that these feelings are communicated to\n the nerves by continuity, _so that there must be something like\n them in the excitants themselves_. If this seems extravagant,\n it is to be remembered that it is the sole possible way of\n reaching any explanation of sensation, which otherwise must be\n pronounced a general fact absolutely inexplicable and ultimate.\n Now absolute inexplicability is a hypothesis which sound logic\n refuses, under any circumstances, to justify.\u201d (P. 558.\u2014The\n italics are not in the original.)\n\nThere must be something like the feelings in the excitants of the\nfeelings. Now, this point is worthy of the closest attention. Note that\n\u201cthe excitant\u201d _alone_ is mentioned. _Vibrations_ excite sight and\nhearing. Yet, from what follows, it is plain that Synechism is not\ninconsistent with belief in a fixed objective. \u201cEven the least psychical\nof peripheral sensations, that of pressure, has, in its excitation,\nconditions which, though apparently simple, are seen to be complicated\nenough when we consider _the molecules and their attractions_,\u201d pp.\n557-558. Can there, then, be any doubt that we have here three distinct\nthings: (1) a subjective, (2) an \u201cexcitant,\u201d and (3) an objective; the\nmiddle term being a vehicle of communication between the first and third?\nIt does not affect this presentation of Mr. Peirce\u2019s position that,\nat an earlier stage of his argument, he speaks of matter\u2014synonymous,\npresumably, with the objective\u2014as being \u201cnot completely dead, but merely\nmind, hide-bound with habits,\u201d as \u201cpartially deadened\u201d or \u201ceffete,\u201d\nmind; or that the editor of _The Monist_ says that, with Mr. Peirce,\n\u201cmind is the beginning of all.\u201d (_The Monist_, Vol. III, No. 1, p.\n95.) The question, at present, is not regarding origins, but regarding\nco-existences. So that there is a distinct _hiatus_ here, arising from\nthe confusion of the stimulant, or excitant, of sensation with the\nobjective itself.[70] Now, the stimulant of sensation is never the object\nperceived. Hence, once an objective is admitted, a trinity of entities is\nunavoidable, since still less can the \u201cstimulant\u201d be the subject. This\nspecial difficulty, in the present writer\u2019s opinion, is inseparable from\ndualism in every form. How it besets Mr. Peirce\u2019s theory is evident from\nhis hazarded suggestion: \u201cThere must be _something like_ the feelings\nin the excitants.\u201d He thus uses only two of his cosmical terms, and\ngives the third the go-by! All dualism halts, but surely there is here a\npalpable stumble.\n\nIn a recent article in _The Open Court_[71] I have pointed out the\nvanity of introducing a vehicle of communication between object and\nsubject, especially emphasising the fact that, once this intermediate\nterm is brought in, the veritable objective disappears. \u201cOnce you bring\nin vibrations,\u201d I remarked, \u201cyou practically provide a _second_ object,\nwhich is really a part of the subject, and, in order to do this, you\nhave taken from the original objective all that composed it.\u201d[72] (_The\nOpen Court_, p. 3361.)\n\nIs it any wonder, then, that Mr. Peirce should suppose the excitants\nto be \u201csomething like\u201d the excited feelings? Since he, practically,\nsurrenders the objective, what could more closely resemble the subjective\nthan the subjective itself? If he had adopted the position of Hume,\nand made impressions and ideas all-in-all, his principle of continuity\nmight hold. But this he does not do, since (1) he implicitly admits the\nobjective element, and (2) even if he did not do this, there must be\nsomething other than the idea or feeling in his system, since, otherwise,\nthere could be no ground for the charge of seeming \u201cextravagance,\u201d which,\nhe admits, may be leveled against, at least one of, his conclusions.\n\n\nFEELINGS SPATIALLY EXTENDED.\n\nThis leads us to Mr. Peirce\u2019s conclusions regarding subjective spatial\nextension\u2014the spatial extension of feelings\u2014as the result of observation\nof irritated protoplasm. Our attention is directed to an excited mass of\nprotoplasm,\u2014an am\u0153ba, or a slime-mould,\u2014which \u201cdoes not differ in any\nradical way from the contents of a nerve-cell, though its functions may\nbe less specialised.\u201d (P. 547.) The irritation is induced when, say, the\nam\u0153ba is \u201cquiescent and rigid,\u201d and we note its behaviour under it. That\nfeeling passes from one part of this amorphous continuum of protoplasm to\nanother, we are led to believe. And this conclusion follows: \u201cWhatever\nthere is in the whole phenomenon to make us think there is feeling in\nsuch a mass of protoplasm,\u2014_feeling_, but plainly no _personality_,\u2014goes\nlogically to show that that feeling has a subjective, or substantial,\nspatial extension, as the excited state has.\u201d This is a chain of\nreasoning. Let us examine its links. We have:\n\n(1) The behaviour of the am\u0153ba under immediate, mechanical irritation\u2014the\nspread, or spatial extension, of the state of irritation.\n\n(2) We are asked to identify this spread-out irritation, this field of\nexcitation, with \u201cfeeling\u201d on the part of the am\u0153ba, because there is \u201cno\ndoubt that it feels when it is excited.\u201d\n\n(3) From the spatial extension of the irritation, thus identified with\nfeeling, we are asked to conclude that the feeling, in the am\u0153ba, has a\nsubjective, spatial extension as the excited state has, and, finally,\npassing from the feeling of the am\u0153ba to our own feelings, by inference,\nwe are asked to admit:\n\n(4) Not that we have necessarily a feeling of bigness, but that \u201cthe\nfeeling [inferentially arrived at from the spread-out irritation on the\npart of the am\u0153ba] as a subject of inhesion is big.\u201d (P. 548.)\n\nAfter this, we are disposed to agree with Mr. Peirce when he says: \u201cThis\nis, no doubt, a difficult idea to seize\u201d; not, as he goes on to say, \u201cfor\nthe reason that it is a subjective, not an objective, extension,\u201d but on\nthe ground that the reasoning involves, plainly, not only the subjective\nand objective, but what Clifford calls the \u201cejective,\u201d as well, and this\nassumption, _inter alia_, that the last-named lies on the same plane as\nthe former. Never, surely, was the conclusion that feelings have spatial\nextension more easily reached. It is only when we find that in (1) we\nare dealing with the objective pure and simple, observed phenomena; that\nin (2) the connection between irritation or excitation, and feeling\nis assumed, in the object, because feeling, subjectively, is found to\naccompany irritation; that (3) as the irritation, in the am\u0153ba, is spread\nout, so is the feeling to be viewed; and (4) that, as the feeling of the\nam\u0153ba, so is our feeling to be considered, viz.: that the feeling, \u201cas\na subject of inhesion, is big,\u201d we are led to say after all this, that,\nby such a process, anything, or everything, could be demonstrated,\u2014the\n_field_ of spatial extension, for example, having no more claim to be\nassumed than the _point_ at which the irritation admittedly begins. Why\nshould the _middle_ stage of the irritation be selected in preference to\nthe _initial_ and _final_ ones? The irritation originates in a point,\nspreads, and then dies out. Thus our feeling, (we purposely use Mr.\nPeirce\u2019s nomenclature,) or idea, of an elephant, is unquestionably,\nas a subject of inhesion, \u201cbig.\u201d _But only for a time, and not at\nfirst._ Really, our idea, or feeling\u2014in Synechism\u2014of an elephant, must\nlogically commence as a minute speck, and return to this vanishing-point\nagain. There is no other way out of it. For must not the analogy of the\nirritated am\u0153ba be followed throughout, and if not, why not?\n\n\nDUALISM AND THE WAY OUT.\n\nThe _crux_ of philosophy, from the time of Hume to the present day, has\nbeen, what may be summarised as, the consciousness of succession _as_\nsuccession. The hours pass over the mental dial, but, though one succeeds\nthe other, something is needed besides the succession of the terms of the\nseries to give consciousness of the series _as a series_, to give the\nsynthesis of the day made up of hours. Hume virtually gave up the problem\nin eviscerating the subjective. Prof. T. H. Green only missed the point\nat issue when he placed his eternal consciousness, which was to \u201chave\nand to hold\u201d the terms of the cosmical series, as it were in solution,\nfor the human organism, _out of time altogether_. Mr. Peirce puts the\nmatter boldly when he says: \u201cAn idea once past is gone forever, [in the\nsense of an event in an individual consciousness,] and any supposed\nrecurrence of it is another idea.\u201d (P. 534.) In order, then, that an\nidea past may be present really, and not vicariously, the notion that\nconsciousness necessarily occupies an interval of (finite) time must be\ngiven up; since, to put it briefly, a second past is as much past as a\nyear. According to Mr. Peirce then, and his contention is supported by an\nelaborate inquiry into the nature of infinity and continuity generally,\n\u201cwe are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal interval of time.\u201d\nFor the complete _rationale_, reference must necessarily be made to the\narticle itself.\n\nEven the above outline, however, is sufficient to show that, here as\nelsewhere, Mr. Peirce\u2019s dualism is his snare. Nothing but this could lead\nto a disintegration so complete as the following:\n\n \u201cIn this infinitesimal interval, not only is consciousness\n continuous in a subjective sense, that is, considered as a\n subject, or substance, having the attribute of duration; but\n also, because it is immediate consciousness, its object is\n _ipso facto_ continuous.\u201d (P. 536.)\n\nThis is to admit, practically, that there is something in consciousness\nother than the consciousness itself. And this is evident, because at\none and the same time, (whether an interval of finite time, or an\ninfinitesimal interval,\u2014whether an \u201cinstant\u201d or a \u201cmoment,\u201d\u2014does not\nmatter,) these two entities are different. For:\n\n \u201cThis mediate perception is objectively, or as to the object\n represented, spread over the four instants; but subjectively,\n or as itself the subject of duration, it is completely embraced\n in the second moment.\u201d (_Ibid._)\n\nBut this \u201cmediate\u201d and \u201cimmediate\u201d cannot simultaneously exist, unless\nthere is something else _to which_ they do so exist. It is only paltering\nwith us in a double sense to speak of \u201cinstant\u201d and \u201cmoment\u201d in this\nconnection. The one may pass into the other, but there is \u201ca time when\u201d\n(it matters not whether the interval be finite or infinitesimal) they do\nnot coexist. Hence, they are not the same, but different.\n\nAccording to Mr. Peirce\u2019s notation, for all ordinary purposes we may\nwrite, if _a_ is a finite quantity, and _i_ an infinitesimal, _a_ + _i_\n= _a_. \u201cThat is to say, this is so for all purposes of measurement.\u201d Be\nit so; the infinitesimal may be neglected for purposes of calculation.\nBut such a formula can only be experimental. The theory which embodies\nit cannot avail for a world-scheme; to admit it would be to grant that\na thing is, and is not, at one and the same time. Surely the most\nsuperficial reader will see that, to put it popularly, a world-scheme\nadmits of no alternative subject to accept, or to reject, a neglectable\nquantity.\n\nAnd this is not the only instance of dualism in Mr. Peirce\u2019s world-scheme\nas a totality. For have we not Synechism and Tychism as well? With the\nlatter Mr. Peirce does not deal in the paper now under consideration. He\nmust, however, be credited, or debited, with it, as held in reserve. For\nour present purpose it is not necessary to examine Tychism in detail. Its\nalleged existence is sufficient. For, and here let the significance of\nwhat follows be noted, in Mr. Peirce\u2019s view, as opposed to determinism,\nTychism exists as a principle. It _is_, otherwise it could not be\nexpounded as operative. But it also exists as an idea, first, it may be,\nin our author\u2019s mind, and subsequently in the minds of his disciples.\nThus it falls into the synechistic province: \u201cAs an idea it can only be\naffected by an idea, by anything but an idea it cannot be affected at\nall.\u201d (\u201cThe Law of Mind,\u201d p. 557.) Yet to affirm Tychism thus impotent,\nbecause unaffectible, outside the synechistic sphere, is to contradict\nMr. Peirce\u2019s conclusions, for if Tychism is nothing outside the ideal\nrealm, it is altogether inside it. Hence Synechism is everything\npractically, and Tychism nothing. But that Mr. Peirce will not have. He\nhas a two-fold Tychism, that is the fact; actual and operative on the one\nhand, ideal on the other. And this is dualism confessed.\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s method is quite fertile in duplication of the subjective\nentity. His latest paper, \u201cMan\u2019s Glassy Essence,\u201d (_The Monist_, Vol.\nIII, No. 1,) contains some typical instances.\n\n \u201cViewing a thing from the outside, considering its relations of\n action and reaction with other things, it appears as matter.\n Viewing it from the inside, looking at its immediate character\n as feeling, it appears as consciousness.\u201d (P. 20.)\n\nThis is the strictly empirical view. And it may be possibly defended\nwith the contention that all problems, to be duly examined, must, in\nthe first place, be viewed from that standpoint. But it must be plainly\nmanifest to any unprejudiced thinker that, even granted a total cosmical\nproblem made up of separate problems of an individual nature, the same\nmethod of solving the sum cannot be employed which is used in solving\nits constituents. In the above instance, considering matter in its\ntotality, and consciousness in its totality, what is left to view them\nindifferently from \u201coutside,\u201d or \u201cinside\u201d? Plainly nothing. Still more\ntransparent an example is the following:\n\n \u201cThe consciousness of a habit involves a general idea. In\n each action of that habit certain atoms get thrown out of\n their orbit, and replaced by others. Upon all the different\n occasions it is different atoms that are thrown off, but they\n are analogous from a physical point of view, and there is an\n inward sense of their being analogous. Every time one of the\n associated feelings recurs, there is a more or less vague sense\n that there are others, that it has a general character, and of\n about what this general character is.\u201d (P. 20.)\n\nThis is part of the answer to the query: How do general ideas appear in\nthe molecular theory of protoplasm? Now, without discussing the value\nof this _rationale_, as affecting Mr. Peirce\u2019s own theories, it is not\ndifficult to see what its acceptance would \u201clead to.\u201d Certain atoms of\na molecule get thrown out and are replaced by _others_. This happens\nrepeatedly. On different occasions _different atoms_ come and go. Yet\nthey are \u201canalogous,\u201d and there is \u201can inward sense\u201d of this. Upon whose\nshoulders is the burden of proving the analogy placed, or of experiencing\nit even? With whom or what is there \u201can inward sense\u201d? Perhaps it is\nbetter not to answer otherwise than to say that if this faculty be\nnot present in the ever changing molecule to begin with, it cannot be\nlogically reached by any process of multiplying it.\n\n\nTHE MONISTIC SOLUTION.\n\nMonism, as a unitary system of the universe, does not necessarily commend\nitself to acceptance simply _as_ monism. To say, this is dualism,\n_therefore_ it cannot be a correct _rationale_ of the universe, since\nthe only true one must be monistic, is to start with an unphilosophical\nprepossession. The true solution may be two-fold, or it may be manifold.\nBut it is not too much to say, perhaps, on the other hand, that, even as\ncauses may not be multiplied without necessity, even so phenomena must\nnot logically be divided into independent groupings without sufficient\nreason given. Preference should be accorded to a monistic, rather than\nto a dualistic, system, not on the ground alone of the simplicity of\nthe former, but on the ground that a theory which has one explanation\nfor one set of phenomena and another explanation for a second set, must\nfirst demonstrate that a unitary conception of the universe is, at\nleast, improbable, otherwise it will always be hinted that the dualism\nin question has not gone deep enough to find a synthetic bond wherewith\nto unite the apparently diverse. Mr. Peirce, throughout his article on\nSynechism, constantly touches, despite his latent dualism, the margin\nof a truth so great as to merit the title of transcendent. As often he\nmisses it. And his concluding words are, in this connection, almost\nwistful: \u201cThe facts that stand before our face and eyes and stare us\nin the face, are far from being, in all cases, the ones most easily\ndiscerned. That has been remarked from time immemorial.\u201d (P. 559.) But\nthough thus \u201cremarked,\u201d the maxim has, as immemorially, been neglected\nin practice. To none can this remark be more fitly applied than to the\nexcogitator of Synechism, himself seeing that, having arrived at the\npoint of asserting that \u201cthere must be _something like_ the feelings in\nthe excitants themselves,\u201d he does not see that the excitant and the\nfeeling are one and the same; and that there is no second or third term\nin the cosmical equation.\n\nDoes this seem \u201cextravagant\u201d? If so, the reply must be _not_ that it is\nthe only escape from an otherwise inexplicable difficulty, but that there\nis really no difficulty at all. What Mr. Peirce\u2019s own Synechism \u201c_leads\nto_\u201d is that the past, the present, and the to-come, alike of matter and\nidea, are not reconciled by \u201ctime and its flow,\u201d or even by the logic\nof infinitesimals, subtle though that may be, but that the contents of\neach and all, with all their apparently infinite variety, resolve into a\nconsistent unity.\n\n\nTHE \u201cMISSING LINK.\u201d\n\nPushed to a logical conclusion, the excitants and the feelings owe\ntheir apparent variety to their assigned position in a series, the\ncorrespondence or relation between them being _only another link in\nthe self-same chain_. Vulgar realism never fathoms this explanation.\nIt always harps upon the one string that idealism, and more especially\nidealistic monism, fails to account for variety or difference;\nforgetting, or rather never seeing, that difference or variety which\nis its essence, is only one more added perception on the same plane\nwith ordinary perceptions; so that given _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_,\u2014sundry\nperceptions,\u2014their essential variety may be stated as _e_. Or this may\nbe stated numerically; variety, as a whole, being nothing more than\nthe sum of differences, which is always something other than the terms\ndifferentiated, but always on the same level with them\u2014the difference\nbetween any continuous number, above unity, and another number being a\nthird number, which is different from either. Variety in numbers cannot\nbe expressed otherwise than numerically. So, in the last recess, the\nvariety of colors is only colorable, of tones audible, and so on. The\n\u201cvibrations of inconceivable complexity\u201d which, according to Mr. Peirce,\n\u201cexcite sight and hearing,\u201d can be approximately stated numerically,\nso that the difference between red and, say, yellow, is a number\ncorresponding to another color, which may be orange or not; it being\npart of the present scientific theory of light that any specific number\nof ethereal undulations happening between the colors of the ocular\nspectrum, corresponds to a possible color, although the retinal expanse\nmay be insensible to these particular rates of tremor. To Mr. Peirce it\nmay appear \u201cextravagant,\u201d but the difference between any two colors and\ntones is another color, another tone; just as the difference between any\ntwo numbers is a third number. This is the logical outcome of his own\nSynechism; _this_, in part, is what it \u201cleads to.\u201d\n\n\nTIME AND ITS \u201cFLOW\u201d RATIONALISED.\n\nExcitants and feelings being unified, and the element of variety,\nhitherto supposed to be the exclusive copyright of vulgar realism, shown\nto be nothing but another term added to the series, or, numerically, a\nconcurrent series\u2014so that should _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_ ... be a series,\nthe variety of the series may be expressed as _e_, or the individual\ndifferences as _f_, _g_, _h_ ...\u2014it only needs an examination of what\nMr. Peirce terms \u201ctime and its flow,\u201d to render his system a completely\nmonistic one, and this although true monism is much more than the\nnegation of determinism, synechistically expressed.\n\nIn Mr. Peirce\u2019s article under examination, \u201cThe Law of Mind,\u201d the\nnotation of infinitesimals, which forms the keystone of Synechism, is\nonly introduced after a lament over the incapacity, or unworkableness\nrather, of finite time, when the duration of consciousness is involved.\nIf _finite_ time is to come in as a factor\u2014\u201can idea once past [in the\nsense of an event in an individual consciousness] is gone forever, and\nany supposed recurrence of it is another idea\u201d (p. 534). And the problem\nwhich Mr. Peirce sets himself to solve is how in effect to bring _back_\nthis past idea\u2014not vicariously\u2014but in all its pristine freshness, into\nthe now-time. This is sought to be accomplished by the explanation that\nthe past idea is \u201cnot wholly past, it is only going, less past than any\nassignable past date\u201d\u2014and so on through the intricacies of Mr. Peirce\u2019s\ninfinitesimal theory, into which we need not enter at present. But the\nstatement of the, supposed, difficulty which finite time presents in this\nconnection,\u2014the past idea really past and gone, and the recurrence of it\nanother idea,\u2014if put in a slightly different form, hints a solution, in\ncontinuity with the foregoing pages, without the aid of the infinitesimal\nat all. _That an idea is once past and gone_, any occurrence, or\nrecurrence, of this idea, _is another idea_.[73]\n\nBut, in the meantime, let us see what Mr. Peirce has to say regarding\n\u201ctime and its flow\u201d:\n\n \u201cOne of the most marked features about the law of mind is, that\n it makes time to have a definite direction of flow from past\n to future. The relation of past to future is, in reference\n to the law of mind, different from the relation of future to\n past. This makes one of the great contrasts between the law\n of mind and the law of physical force, where there is no more\n distinction between the two opposite directions in time than\n between moving northward, and moving southward\u201d (p. 546).\n\nThis for once is not very clear. It is difficult to see how \u201cthe law of\nphysical force\u201d can be spoken of as \u201cin time,\u201d to the exclusion of mind;\nnot easy, also, to understand the distinction further insisted upon. But\nthe intention is evident, viz., to perpetuate, if not to originate, a\ncosmical duality. Time, it would seem, marches indifferently in at least\ntwo directions, though it is not very clear how this is accomplished.\nAnd then the old fiction follows, that \u201cTime, as the universal form of\nchange, cannot exist unless there is something to undergo change, etc.\u201d\n(p. 547.)\n\nThe same notation suits in this case as in the foregoing. Time is only\nanother term in the series. If _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_ be a series, _e_\nis the variety, _f_ the whole time involved, and _g_ the individual\nintervals. Of course all this is not a simple series, it is an infinitely\ncomplicated one; the above arrangement is only intended to show that\ndifference, variety, time, etc., are no mysterious entities pervading\nevents, acting as their \u201cform\u201d or carrying them in their \u201cflow,\u201d but\nsimply percepts, or concepts, on a level with others.\n\nThis is not patent on the surface, it may be. Time has the appearance\nof a current in which events float. But this is an illusion dispelled\nby examination. Events cannot be submerged in time. Time cannot be\nthe vehicle of events. It is impossible to conceive time as existing\nsimultaneously with an event. It always follows it. What to Mr. Peirce\nappears as a \u201cflow,\u201d arises from the foregoing. Take events, percepts,\nor concepts, as a hypothetical series, _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_ ... and their\ntimes as _a\u00b4_, _b\u00b4_, _c\u00b4_, _d\u00b4_ ... the first series contains the event\n_per se_, or as happening; the \u201ctime when\u201d is contained in the second\nseries, practically inseparable from the first, but the time when\nnecessarily follows\u2014consequently if the first be _a_, the second must\nbe, at least _a_. But no concept or percept is abstract, except the\nconcept time itself, which, being unconnected, _seems_ anywhere, and,\nlike its fellow-abstract space, is spread out, to us, tri-dimensionally,\nas past, present, and to come. And, as in space the position is simply\nspectral,[74] a question of perspective or adjustment, so, in time, the\ntimal series is adjusted to the substantive idea. But this two-fold\nspectral succession breeds by comparative intensity (which is another\ncomplex series) the sense of a flow, where there is none, but only the\nidea of a flowing, which is another matter. Thus, the so-called \u201cveil\nof the future\u201d is no more a veil than it is a brickbat. It is simply\nthe indeterminateness of an unconnected adjective\u2014as if one should say,\nwhite\u2014and the query arises, _What_ is it that is white? When the noun is\nsupplied you have something definite. Just so, when the future lapses\ninto the present.\n\nThus there is never anything without, at least, these three additions:\nfirst, variety or difference; second, time; third, relation, spatial\nor otherwise. These are all terms in a series, or set of concurrent\nseries. Nothing can be, practically, isolated, for everything runs in a\nseries. But this is a much broader theory of continuity than that which\nSynechism affords.[75] All apparent perplexities vanish. The difficulty\nno longer exists that to perceive a series we must hold it, as it were,\nin solution. Since other than series nothing is. Hence the cosmos is\nan illimitable series or complex of series. But inasmuch as the timal\nelement (as also the spatial) occurs through the series having time-term\nand space-term resident within it, all difficulty in apprehending it as\na series vanishes. The impracticability, if any, would be in viewing any\nterm as isolated.\n\n\nTHE RESULT _RE_ TYCHISM.\n\nWhat a flood of light does such a system shed indirectly upon Tychism,\nsince the controversy between the latter and determinism mainly hinges\nupon the \u201cmust be,\u201d the imperative, as it were, of the series! It has\nbeen very ably pointed out by Dr. Carus in his article _re_ Mr. Peirce\u2019s\n\u201cOnslaught on the Doctrine of Necessity\u201d (_The Monist_, Vol. II, No.\n4, pp. 573-4.) that the formula adopted by Mr. Peirce in his Tychism,\n\u201cchance is first, law is second, the tendency of habits is third,\u201d\ninvolves its author in the admission of a law in a system professing to\nbe, in its inception at all events, chanceful and _lawless_. Mr. Peirce\u2019s\n\u201cSynechism\u201d professes to be the law of mind. Parenthetically, however,\nit may be remarked, that the distinction as to law, and lawlessness or\n\u201cchance,\u201d narrows itself to the plane of one term more or less in a\nseries, or _even to less than that subordinate place_. For, although,\nfor convenience sake, and for facility of contrast, we have followed\nMr. Peirce\u2019s figure of a series, to show more clearly also to what his\ntheory leads, it is nevertheless plain, that time and its accompanying\nrelations being placed on their proper level, that of integral percepts\nand concepts, the figure of a series is simply a matter of convenience\nof arrangement. Certainly as the \u201ctime when\u201d is necessarily annexed to\nevery percept and concept the timal element may be said to follow, not\nto precede, its fellow-term. Really, however, they may be said to be\nsimultaneous, since the timal refinements of finite, infinite, past,\npresent, and future are each of them contained in a percept of its own.\n\n\nEXTERNALITY A SERIAL TERM.\n\nBut if the timal element be independent as a separate percept, the\nspatial as another, and so on, it follows that, although the terms of the\nseries may, as it were, _run_, though we cannot conceive them separated,\nor as, in practice, otherwise than as continuous in their flow, still,\ntheoretically, a series or complex of series it _is_, and a series may\nbe interrupted at any term. Thus externality itself being a spatial\nrelation, is but _one term more_, non-essential in theory, to the term\npreceding. So that when the Neo-Kantians speak of the \u201cconstitution of\nthe objective\u201d it ought to be added that it is not only the content\nof the objective which is thus constituted by consciousness, but that\nexternality, all that goes to make up what is termed \u201cout-sidedness,\u201d is\nconstituted by consciousness also.\n\n\nTHE NOW-TIME.\n\n\u201c_The present is half past, and half to come_,\u201d (p. 546) like the color\nof a curved boundary line on a particolored surface; i. e. \u201cbetwixt\nand between\u201d the two. It is here that the theory of Synechism shows\nits chief defect. Up to this stage we have been dealing with ideas,\nfeelings, _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_ ... successively passing through a point\nof consciousness _e_. And the infinitesimal notation suits the required\nprocess fairly well. It is complicated enough, but it is ingenious, and\nat least plausible. Nothing up to this stage would lead us to suppose\nthat any additional element was to be imported into the _rationale_ which\nMr. Peirce presents. As we have seen, finite time would not serve his\npurpose. By however minute a _finite_ interval have _a_, _b_, _c_ or _d_\npassed the point _e_, all chance of their recovery is hopeless. Well, we\nhave recourse to infinitesimals, and find (to put it popularly, and not\nin Mr. Peirce\u2019s technical terms) that _a_ past the point of consciousness\nby an infinitesimal interval heralds _b_. So that _e_ is simultaneously\nconfronted with the disappearing form of the first and the appearing\nform of the second, and the same with _b_, and _c_, in turn, and so on.\nThus the present, in the sense of ideas successively passing through\nconsciousness, is half _a_ and half _b_, then half _b_ and half _c_, this\ninfinitesimal gradation ultimately ensuring the presence of the whole\nseries in the last \u201cmoment.\u201d\n\nBut this will not avail with the concept time itself as distinguished\nfrom timed succession. That these two are separate with Mr. Peirce it is\nimpossible to doubt. He says, e. g., \u201cTime with its continuity logically\ninvolves some other kind of continuity than its own,\u201d (p. 547) and\nspeaks of \u201ctime and its flow,\u201d and of \u201ctime as the universal form of\nchange.\u201d And it is confusing, to say the least, when we are shifted\nwithout warning from what is practically the perceptual to the conceptual\nregion. Granted the ideas, the feelings, or what not, \u201cgliding almost\nimperceptibly\u201d (as did the late Mr. Bardell to another sphere) past the\ncentral point of consciousness, yet not wholly past, only going, less\npast than any assignable past date, granted this, the assertion is not\nconsequently warranted that time itself, the _present_, as time, not\nas involving the succession of ideas, is \u201chalf past and half to come.\u201d\nThe ideas, the feelings, of which Mr. Peirce writes, successively pass\nthrough the stage of being thus half past and half to come, but that\nis by no means the same thing as saying that the present is half past,\nhalf to come, as Synechism avers. With our theory, as presented in the\nforegoing pages there is indeed no such difficulty, but Mr. Peirce, on\nthe other hand, has elected to stand by infinitesimally measuring time,\nas applied to ideas etc., as separate from conceptual time, and must take\nthe consequences of his decision. He says _the present, not the present\nidea_.\n\nNow, in the concept time as a whole, in its entire range, a definite\npoint may be selected\u2014to the exclusion of other points\u2014a point having\nposition but not extension, as _the present_. Is it, then,\u2014the\npresent,\u2014half past, half to come, as a timed idea is? Certainly not.\nThere is nothing of the flow of a series in it. Further, this selection\nof the \u201cnow,\u201d as a point, does not interfere with its permanence.\n\u201cNowness\u201d may persist. And the moment it partook, even infinitesimally,\nof the character of the past or of the future, it would cease to be the\npresent. In the case of a series of ideas in time the difficulty is to\nget them all in present solution, as it were, without detriment to their\nevident continuity, but the definition of the present as a point in time\npresents no such difficulty. The conditions are quite distinct. Yet\nregarding this time point\u2014the present\u2014Mr. Peirce assures us that it is\n\u201chalf past, half to come,\u201d which is just that of which it is the precise\nnegation, if words are to have any meaning.\n\nAgain, Mr. Peirce\u2019s _rationale_ shows, upon the face of it, that there\nis (1) finitely divisible time and, (2) time divided infinitesimally,\nfor what finite time could not do, in that it had limitations,\nthe infinitesimal notation readily accomplishes. In its ulterior\nconsequences, this is somewhat unfortunate for Synechism, inasmuch as the\nconsciousness of ideas in continuity being confined to the infinitesimal\ntheory, where, it may be asked, is the place, in consciousness, for\nthe succession of finite intervals? Consciousness must be practically\ndoubled, so to speak, if it is to hold both of these together. This\nis what comes of making one\u2019s world-scheme hang upon a mathematical\nsubtlety\u2014the subtlety in question partaking as a rule, more or less of\nthe nature of an escape from the difficulties of the vulgar notation, the\nvulgar notation remains to be reckoned with, and both have to be credited\nto consciousness. As an instance of this take the following from Mr.\nPeirce\u2019s late article,[76] \u201cMan\u2019s Glassy Essence\u201d\u2014p. 15:\n\n \u201cIn order that a sub-molecule of food may be thoroughly and\n firmly assimilated into a broken molecule of protoplasm,\n it is necessary not only that it should have precisely the\n right chemical composition, but also that it should be at\n precisely the right spot _at the right time_ and should be\n moving in precisely the right direction with precisely the\n right velocity. If all these conditions are not fulfilled, ...\n it will be in special danger of being thrown out again\u201d (The\n italics are not in the original).\n\nNow here is a \u201ctime when\u201d which can be exactly specified in accordance\nwith the conditions. Certain results follow unless it is kept to.\nThis is what Mr. Peirce would doubtless consider as a timed physical\nevent, part and parcel of the regularity of matter, and yet an event\nwhich, in its own time and way, goes to account for both feeling and\nhabit-taking\u2014capable, therefore, of being stated in terms of finite\ntime, as happening at a given instant, and neither before nor after it.\nBut when this same molecule is, by virtue of keeping its appointment\npunctually, safely installed in feeling protoplasm, the succession of\nideas, or feelings, of which, as subject, it is capable, obeys another\nrule\u2014a given _instant_ obtains no longer; it is the _moment_ which is\neverything[77]\u2014a moment half its predecessor, half its successor. Even\ngranted the function of the infinitesimal, this looks very much like a\nreduction to absurdity. For, if the above mentioned timed coalescence\nof the sub-molecule with the broken molecule were _also_ a matter of\nsubjective feeling, passed as process through a consciousness, the\nconclusion follows that the juncture of the molecules happens at two\ndifferent times! There is no escape from this. Given the _instant_ in\nthe one case, the _moment_ in the other, these two cannot possibly be\nthe same point in time. The moment partakes, however insensibly, of the\npreceding and succeeding stages, the instant does not. Hence they are not\nthe same but different times.\n\n\nOTHERNESS.\n\nThe foregoing has a distinct bearing upon the question of \u201cother selves\u201d\nof which Mr. Peirce writes as follows:\n\n \u201cThe recognition by one person of another\u2019s personality takes\n place by means to some extent identical with the means by which\n he is conscious of his own personality. The idea of the second\n personality, which is as much as to say that second personality\n itself, enters within the field of direct consciousness of\n the first person, and is as immediately perceived as his ego,\n though less strongly. At the same time, the opposition between\n the two persons is perceived, so that the externality of the\n second is recognised.\u201d (\u201cThe Law of Mind,\u201d p. 558.)\n\nThis is the scheme of \u201cotherness\u201d which, in the case of the Neo-Kantians,\nparticularly the French section, represented by M. Pillon, M. Renouvier,\nand others, has proved such a snare. To these thinkers, (as indeed to\nthe late Prof. T. H. Green, of Oxford, though in a less degree,) the\nso-called external world lies in \u201cother\u201d thinking subjects\u2014in \u201cforeign\ncentres of representations.\u201d The free-trade doctrine has verily\npenetrated to the philosophic region\u2014the wholesale admission of foreign\nwares to the detriment of home products. Why should I place the content\nof that so-called external world, which, external or internal, is my\nvery own inalienably, in a centre of representation other than my own,\nthus making my cognition of it rest entirely upon the \u201cejective\u201d plane?\nIt is only when I discover, as I must sooner or later, that there is\nnothing in the report of an \u201coutsider\u201d (or in any number of them) beyond\nwhat I credit him or her with in my own consciousness; and that the\noutsider is on the same plane as other objects, it is only then that\nthe mystification is cleared up. I do _not_ cognise, or recognise, the\nexternal at second-hand. The \u201cnote\u201d of otherness is simply another term\nmore or less in the cosmical series.\n\nIt is, however, not only with the familiar \u201cother selves\u201d of ordinary\nlife that we are confronted in Synechism. In the creed of animism\n\n \u201cMillions of spiritual creatures walk the earth,\u201d\n\nand Mr. Peirce speaks of \u201cspiritual influences\u201d (p. 559) as having at\nleast no hindrance presented to them by his doctrine. But he has some\nother shadowy personalities at command, which, it must be confessed, are\nwell calculated to give us pause. \u201cThere should be something like[78]\npersonal consciousness in bodies of men who are in intimate and intensely\nsympathetic communion.... None of us can fully realise which the minds\nof corporations are.... But the law of mind clearly points to the\nexistence of such personalities.\u201d It is probably true that the \u201cminds of\ncorporations,\u201d must ever present an insoluble riddle of perversity to the\nsuburban dweller, vexed with the mockery of paving and lighting. But we\nneed not linger over this speculation, for there are other shades behind.\n\n \u201cIf such a fact is capable of being made out anywhere it\n should be in the Church.... Surely a personality ought to have\n developed in that Church, in that \u2018bride of Christ,\u2019 as they\n call it.\u201d (\u201cMan\u2019s Glassy Essence,\u201d pp. 21-22.)\n\n\nA PERSONAL CREATOR.\n\nBearing our ecclesiastical divisions in mind, it is difficult to conceive\nthe unity of a \u201ccorporate personality\u201d of this kind, but, to let that\npass, it may be remarked that, when any one begins to imagine that there\nare others in the universe besides himself, he is not, as a rule, content\nwith two or three companions of his solitude. They come in battalions.\nThus, behind the other selves, corporate personalities and spiritual\ninfluences of Synechism, there looms a transcendent personality. \u201cA\ngenuine evolutionary philosophy,\u201d we are told, \u201c... is so far from being\nantagonistic to the idea of a personal Creator, that it is really\ninseparable from that idea.\u201d And a philosophy of pseudo-evolutionism is\n\u201chostile to all hopes of personal relations to God.\u201d (\u201cThe Law of Mind,\u201d\np. 557.)\n\nMr. Peirce thus assigns to his first cause a place in the _continuum_ of\nideas, and says that if there is a personal God we must have a direct\nperception of that person and \u201cindeed be in personal communication\nwith him.\u201d The difficulty, he admits, is that if this be so, how is it\npossible that the existence of this being should ever have been doubted\nby anybody. And the only answer he can at present make is, that \u201cfacts\nthat stand before our face and eyes, and stare us in the face, are\nfar from being in all cases the ones most easily discerned. That,\u201d he\nadds, \u201chas been remarked from time immemorial.\u201d (\u201cThe Law of Mind,\u201d pp.\n558-559.)\n\nOne of the ablest of living philosophical writers, Professor Veitch,\nof Glasgow University, puts it somewhat similarly, though with his own\nrealistic coloring, when he says:\n\n \u201cGod, if at all, must rise above the line of finite regress; He\n cannot be a cause in that; He cannot be a cause dependent on\n another cause; He must be somewhere, or at some point, in the\n line of an otherwise endless scientific regress, there, above\n it, yet related to it, and in it; otherwise He is nothing for\n us.\u201d (\u201cKnowing and Being,\u201d p. 320.)\n\nThe parallelism is worth noting. Those views embody what has been the\ncontention of the present writer throughout this paper, _with this most\nnotable difference_: that no term of a series may thus transcend the\nseries, or be other than on a level with the other terms, being itself\nonly a term, a link, in the series itself. And with this falls forever\nthe idea of a cause uncaused.\n\nYet am _I_ not _in_ the series? For all that is in the series is\nmine every percept, every concept; so that, \u201cextravagant\u201d as it may\nappear, it is _I who am the series_. In other words, the ego is the\nuniverse-synthesis, and the universe-synthesis the ego.\n\nIs Mr. Peirce prepared to take the consequences of that which his\nSynechism leads to?\n\n G. M. MCCRIE.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[67] From \u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7, chance.\n\n[68] _Tychism_ again comes to the front in the succeeding number of _The\nMonist_, (Vol. III, No. 1,) in an article by Mr. Peirce, entitled \u201cMan\u2019s\nGlassy Essence.\u201d\n\n[69] Dr. Carus, in his review of Mr. Peirce\u2019s doctrines, (_The Monist_,\nVol. II, No. 4, p. 575,) notes this positivistic-constructionism.\n\n[70] Cf. T. H. Green, _Prolegomena to Ethics_, Ch. II, p. 63.\n\n[71] Nos. 258, 59, 61, August, 1892. _Miss Naden\u2019s World-Scheme._\n\n[72] In a note to this passage was appended a quotation from a pamphlet\nby Dr. E. Cobham Brewer as a practical instance of the objective being,\non the antiquated subject-object plane, actually superseded. Suppose a\nvery remote star to become extinct, the \u201cvibrations\u201d would continue to\n\u201ctravel\u201d towards a spectator situated on our planet for years, it may\nbe for centuries. So that the spectator, ultimately, \u201csees\u201d that which\ndoes not even exist. Dr. Brewer\u2019s comment, which cannot be considered any\ncontribution to a satisfactory _rationale_, is: \u201cthe objects, however,\nmust have existed, or no messenger could have been sent from their\ncourts.\u201d Evidently, in this case, that which is sent is, at least, as\ngood as the sender\u2014is, in fact, the self-same thing. Only, in that case,\nwhat of the extinct object?\n\n[73] Or to put it in another form, any one idea, and the timing of this\nidea are really two ideas, although, as we shall see later, they may be\ninseparable in practice.\n\n[74] Cf., in this connection, the results of experiments by Cheselden,\nas far back as 1727 on congenitally blind persons, couched for double\ncataract.\n\n[75] Much more inclusive, also, than the Relational Theory of the\nNeo-Kantians.\n\n[76] _The Monist_, Vol. III, No. 1.\n\n[77] Mr. Peirce uses the word \u201cinstant\u201d to mean a point of time, and\n\u201cmoment\u201d to mean an infinitesimal duration.\n\n[78] The phrase, \u201csomething like,\u201d is significant, when we remember, (see\n_ante_,) that with Mr. Peirce the excitants were \u201csomething like\u201d the\nexcited feelings.\n\n\n\n\nTHE FOURTH DIMENSION.\n\nMATHEMATICAL AND SPIRITUALISTIC.\n\n\nINTRODUCTORY.\n\nThe tendency to generalise long ago led mathematicians to extend the\nnotion of three-dimensional space, which is the space of sensible\nrepresentation, and to define aggregates of points, or spaces, of more\nthan three dimensions, with the view of employing these definitions as\nuseful means of investigation. They had no idea of requiring people to\nimagine four-dimensional things and worlds, and they were even still\nless remote from requiring of them to believe in the real existence of\na four-dimensioned space. In the hands of mathematicians this extension\nof the notion of space was a mere means devised for the discovery and\nexpression, by shorter and more convenient ways, of truths applicable to\ncommon geometry and to algebra operating with more than three unknown\nquantities. At this stage, however, the spiritualists came in, and coolly\ntook possession of this private property of the mathematicians. They\nwere in great perplexity as to where they should put the spirits of the\ndead. To give them a place in the world accessible to our senses was not\nexactly practicable. They were compelled, therefore, to look around after\nsome _terra incognita_, which should oppose to the spirit of research\ninborn in humanity an insuperable barrier. The residence of the spirits\nhad to be a place inaccessible to our senses and full of mystery to the\nmind. This property the four-dimensioned space of the mathematicians\npossessed. With an intellectual perversity which science has no idea of,\nthese spiritualists boldly asserted, first, that the whole world was so\nsituated in a four-dimensioned space as a plane might be situated in\nthe space familiar to us, secondly, that the spirits of the dead lived\nin such a four-dimensioned space, thirdly, that these spirits could\naccordingly act upon the world and, consequently, upon the human beings\nresident in it, exactly as we three-dimensioned creatures can produce\neffects upon things that are two-dimensional; for example, such effects\nas that produced when we shatter a lamina of ice, and so influence some\npossibly existing two-dimensioned _ice_-world.\n\nSince spiritualism, under the leadership of the Leipsic Professor\nZ\u00f6llner, thus proclaimed the existence of a four-dimensioned space, this\nnotion, which the mathematicians are thoroughly master of,\u2014for in all\ntheir operations with it, though they have forsaken the path of actual\nrepresentability, they have never left that of the truth,\u2014this notion\nhas also passed into the heads of lay persons who have used it as a\ncatchword, ordinarily without having any clear idea of what they or any\none else mean by it. To clear up such ideas and to correct the wrong\nimpressions of cultured people who have not a technical mathematical\ntraining, is the purpose of the following pages. A similar elucidation\nwas aimed at in the tracts which Schlegel (Riemann, Berlin, 1888) and\nCranz (Virchow-Holtzendorff\u2019s Sammlung, Nos. 112 and 113) have published\non the so-called fourth dimension. Both treatises possess indubitable\nmerits, but their methods of presentation are in many respects too\nconcise to give a lay mind any profound comprehension of the subject. The\nauthor, accordingly, has been able to add to the reflections which these\nexcellent treatises offer, a great deal that appears to him necessary for\na thorough explanation in the minds of non-mathematicians of the notion\nof the fourth dimension.\n\n\nI.\n\nTHE CONCEPT OF DIMENSION.\n\nMany text-books of stereometry begin with the words: \u201cEvery body has\nthree dimensions, length, breadth, and thickness.\u201d If we should ask the\nauthor of a book of this description to tell us the length, breadth, and\nthickness of an apple, of a sponge, or of a cloud of tobacco smoke, he\nwould be somewhat perplexed and would probably say, that the definition\nin question referred to something different. A cubical box, or some\nsimilar structure, whose angles are all right angles and whose bounding\nsurfaces are consequently all rectangles is the only body of which it can\nat all be unmistakably asserted that there are three principal directions\ndistinguishable in it, of which any one can be called the length, any\nother the breadth, and any third the thickness. We thus see that the\nnotions of length, breadth, and thickness are not sufficiently clear and\nuniversal to enable us to derive from them any idea of what is meant when\nit is said that every body possesses three dimensions, or that the space\nof the world is three-dimensional.\n\nThis distinction may be made sharper and more evident by the following\nconsiderations: We have, let us suppose, a straight line on which a\npoint is situated, and the problem is proposed to determine the position\nof the point on the line in an unequivocal manner. The simplest way to\nsolve this is, to state how far the point is removed in the one or the\nother direction from some given fixed point; just as in a thermometer\nthe position of the surface of the mercury is given by a statement of\nits distance in the direction of cold or heat from a predetermined fixed\npoint\u2014the point of freezing water. To state, therefore, the position\nof a point on a straight line, the sole datum necessary is a single\nnumber, for beforehand we have fixed upon some standard line, like the\ncentimetre, and some definite point to which we give the value zero,\nand have also previously decided in what direction from the zero-point,\npoints must be situated whose position is expressed by positive numbers,\nand also in what direction those must lie whose position is expressed by\nnegative numbers. This last mentioned fact, that a _single_ number is\nsufficient to determine the place of a point in a straight line, is the\nreal reason why we attribute to the straight line or to any part of it a\nsingle dimension.\n\nMore generally, we call every totality or system, of infinitely numerous\nthings, _one_-dimensional, in which _one_ number is all that is requisite\nto determine and distinguish any particular one of these things amidst\nthe entire totality. Thus, time is one-dimensional. We, as inhabitants\nof the earth, have naturally chosen as our unit of time, the period of\nthe rotation of the earth about its axis, namely, the day, or a definite\nportion of a day. The zero-point of time is regarded in Christian\ncountries as the year of the birth of Christ, and the positive direction\nof time is the time _subsequent_ to the birth of Christ. These data\nfixed, all that is necessary to establish and distinguish any definite\npoint of time amid the infinite totality of all the points of time, _is\na single number_. Of course this number need not be a whole number, but\nmay be made up of the sum of a whole number and a fraction in whose\nnumerator and denominator we may have numbers as great as we please. We\nmay, therefore, also say that the totality of all conceivable numerical\nmagnitudes, or of only such as are greater than one definite number and\nsmaller than some other definite number, is one-dimensional.\n\nWe shall add here a few additional examples of one-dimensioned magnitudes\npresented by geometry. First, the circumference of a circle is a\none-dimensional magnitude, as is every curved line, whether it returns\ninto itself or not. Further, the totality of all equilateral triangles\nwhich stand on the same base is one-dimensional, or the totality of\nall circles that can be described through two fixed points. Also, the\ntotality of all conceivable cubes will be seen to be one-dimensional,\nprovided they are distinguished, not with respect to position, but with\nrespect to magnitude.\n\nIn conformity with the fundamental ideas by which we define the notion\nof a one-dimensional manifoldness, it will be seen that the attribute\n_two_-dimensional must be applied to all totalities of things in\nwhich _two_ numbers are necessary (and sufficient) to distinguish\nany determinate individual thing amid the totality. The simplest\ntwo-dimensioned complex which we know of is the plane. To determine\naccurately the position of a point in a plane, the simplest way is to\ntake two axes at right angles to each other, that is, fixed straight\nlines, and then to specify the distances by which the point in question\nis removed from each of these axes.\n\nThis method of determining the position of a point in a plane suggested\nto the celebrated philosopher and mathematician Descartes the fundamental\nidea of analytical geometry, a branch of mathematics in which by the\nsimple artifice of ascribing to every point in a plane two numerical\nvalues, determined by its distances from the two axes above referred\nto, planimetrical considerations are transformed into algebraical. So,\ntoo, all kinds of curves that graphically represent the dependence of\nthings on time, make use of the fact that the totality of the points in\na plane is two-dimensional. For example, to represent in a graphical\nform the increase of the population of a city, we take a horizontal axis\nto represent the time, and a perpendicular one to represent the numbers\nwhich are the measures of the population. Any two lines, then, whose\nlengths practical considerations determine, are taken as the unit of\ntime, which we may say is a year, and as the unit of population, which\nwe will say is one thousand. Some definite year, say 1850, is fixed\nupon as the zero point. Then, from all the equally distant points on\nthe horizontal axis, which points stand for the years, we proceed in\ndirections parallel to the other axis, that is, in the perpendicular\ndirection, just so much upwards as the numbers which stand for the\npopulation of that year require. The terminal points so reached, or the\ncurve which runs through these terminal points, will then present a\ngraphic picture of the rates of increase of the population of the town\nin the different years. The rectangular axes of Descartes are employed\nin a similar way for the construction of barometer curves, which specify\nfor the different localities of a country the amount of variation of the\natmospheric pressure during any period of time. Immediately next to the\nplane the surface of the earth will be recognised as a two-dimensional\naggregate of points. In this case geographical latitude and longitude\nsupply the two numbers that are requisite accurately to determine the\nposition of a point. Also, the totality of all the possible straight\nlines that can be drawn through any point in space is two-dimensional, as\nwe shall best understand if we picture to ourselves a plane which is cut\nin a point by each of these straight lines and then remember that by such\na construction every point on the plane will belong to some one line and,\n_vice versa_, a line to every point, whence it follows that the totality\nof all the straight lines which pass through the point assigned are of\nthe same dimensions as the totality of the points of the imagined plane.\n\nThe question might be asked, In what way and to what extent in this\ncase is the specification of _two_ numbers requisite and sufficient\nto determine amid all the rays which pass through the specified point\na definite individual ray? To get a clear idea of the problem here\ninvolved, let us imagine the ray produced far into the heavens, where\nsome quite definite point will correspond to it. Now, the position of\na point in the heavens depends, as does the position of a point on all\nspherical surfaces, on two numbers. In the heavens these two numbers are\nordinarily supplied by the two angles called altitude, or the distance\nabove the plane of the horizon, and azimuth, or the angular distance\nbetween the circle on which the altitude is measured and the meridian\nof the observer. It will be seen thus that the totality of all the\nluminous rays that an eye, conceived as a point, can receive from the\nouter world is two-dimensional, and also that a luminous point emits\na two-dimensional group of luminous rays. It will also be observed,\nin connection with this example, that the two-dimensional totality of\nall the rays that can be drawn through a point in space is something\ndifferent from the totality of the rays that pass through a point but\nare required to lie in a given plane. Such a group of objects as the\nlast-named one, is a one-dimensional totality.\n\nNow that we have sufficiently discussed the attributes that are\ncharacteristic of one and two-dimensional aggregates, we may, without any\nfurther investigation of the subject, propose the following definition,\nthat, generally, _an n-dimensional totality of infinitely numerous\nthings is such, with respect to which the specification of n numbers\nis necessary and sufficient to indicate a definite individual amid the\ntotality of all the infinitely numerous individuals of the group_.\n\nAccordingly, the point-aggregate made up of the world-space which we\ninhabit, is a three-dimensional totality. To get true bearings in this\nspace and to define any determinate point in it, we have therefore to lay\nthrough any point which we take as our zero-point three axes at right\nangles to each other, one running from right to left, one backwards\nand forwards, and one upwards and downwards. We then join each two of\nthese axes by a plane and are enabled thus to specify the position of\nevery point in space by the three perpendicular distances by which the\npoint in question is removed in a positive or negative sense from\nthese three planes. It is customary to denote the numbers which are the\nmeasures of these three distances by _x_, _y_, and _z_, the positive\n_x_, positive _y_, and positive _z_ ordinarily being reckoned in the\nright hand, the forward, and the upward directions from the origin.\nIf now, with direct reference to this fundamental axial system, any\nparticular specification of _x_, _y_, and _z_ be made, there will, by\nsuch an operation, be cut out and isolated from the three-dimensional\nmanifoldness of all the points of space a totality of less dimensions.\nIf, for example, _z_ is equal to seven units or measures, this is\nequivalent to a statement that only the two-dimensional totality of the\npoints is meant, which constitute the plane that can be laid at right\nangles to the upward-passing _z_-axis at a distance of seven measures\nfrom the zero-point. Consequently, every imaginable equation between _x_,\n_y_, and _z_ isolates and defines a two-dimensional aggregate of points.\nIf two different equations obtain between _x_, _y_, and _z_, two such\ntwo-dimensional totalities will be isolated from among all the points\nof space. But as these last must have some one-dimensional totality in\ncommon, we may say that the co-existence of two equations between _x_,\n_y_, and _z_ defines a one-dimensional totality of points, that is to say\na straight line, a line curved in a plane, or even, perhaps, one curved\nin space. It is evident from this that the introduction of the three axes\nof reference forms a bridge between the theory of space and the theory of\nequations involving three variable quantities, _x_, _y_, _z_. The reason\nthat the theory of space cannot thus be brought into connection with\nalgebra in general, that is, with the theory of indefinitely numerous\nequations, but only with the algebra of three quantities, _x_, _y_, _z_,\nis simply to be sought in the fact that space, as we picture it, can only\nhave three dimensions.\n\nWe have now only to supply a few additional examples of _n_-dimensional\ntotalities. All particles of air are four-dimensional in magnitude\nwhen in addition to their position in space we also consider the\nvariable densities which they assume, as they are expressed by\nthe different heights of the barometer in the different parts of\nthe atmosphere. Similarly, all conceivable spheres in space are\nfour-dimensional magnitudes, for their centres form a three-dimensional\npoint-aggregate, and around each centre there may be additionally\nconceived a one-dimensional totality of spheres, the radii of which can\nbe expressed by every numerical magnitude from zero to infinity. Further,\nif we imagine a measuring stick of invariable length to assume every\nconceivable position in space, the positions so obtained will constitute\na five-dimensional aggregate. For, in the first place, one of the\nextremities of the measuring stick may be conceived to assume a position\nat every point of space, and this determines for one extremity alone\nof the stick a three-dimensional totality of positions; and secondly,\nas we have seen above, there proceeds from every such position of this\nextremity a two-dimensional totality of directions, and by conceiving the\nmeasuring-stick to be placed lengthwise in every one of these directions\nwe shall obtain all the conceivable positions which the second extremity\ncan assume, and consequently, the dimensions must be 3 plus 2 or 5.\nFinally, to find out how many dimensions the totality of all the possible\npositions of a square, invariable in magnitude, possesses, we first give\none of its corners all conceivable positions in space, and we thus obtain\nthree dimensions. One definite point in space now being fixed for the\nposition of one corner of the square, we imagine drawn through this point\nall possible lines, and on each we lay off the length of the side of\nthe square and thus obtain two additional dimensions. Through the point\nobtained for the position of the second corner of the square we must\nnow conceive all the possible directions drawn that are perpendicular\nto the line thus fixed, and we must lay off once more on each of these\ndirections the side of the square. By this last determination the\ndimensions are only increased by one, for only one one-dimensional\ntotality of perpendicular directions is possible to one straight line\nin one of its points. Three corners of the square are now fixed and\ntherewith the position of the fourth also is uniquely determined.\nAccordingly, the totality of all equal squares which only differ from one\nanother by their position in space, constitutes a manifoldness of six\ndimensions.\n\n\nII.\n\nTHE INTRODUCTION OF THE NOTION OF FOUR-DIMENSIONAL POINT-AGGREGATES,\nPERMISSIBLE.\n\nIn the preceding section it was shown that we can conceive not only\nof manifoldnesses of one, two, and three dimensions, but also of\nmanifoldnesses of _any_ number of dimensions. But it was at the same time\nindicated that our world-space, that is, the totality of all conceivable\n_points_ that differ only in respect of position, cannot in agreement\nwith our notions of things possess more than three dimensions. But the\nquestion now arises, whether, if the progress of science tends in such\na direction, it is permissible to extend the notion of space by the\nintroduction of point-aggregates of more than three dimensions, and to\nengage in the study of the properties of such creations, although we know\nthat notwithstanding the fact that we may conceptually establish and\nexplore such aggregates of points, yet we cannot picture to ourselves\nthese creations as we do the spatial magnitudes which surround us, that\nis, the regular three-dimensional aggregates of points.\n\nTo show the reader clearly that this question must be answered in the\naffirmative, that the extension of our notion of space is permissible,\nalthough it leads to things which we cannot perceive by our senses,\nI may call the reader\u2019s attention to the fact that in arithmetic\nwe are accustomed from our youth upwards to extensions of ideas,\nwhich, accurately viewed, as little admit of graphic conception as a\nfour-dimensional space, that is, a point-aggregate of four dimensions. By\nhis senses man first reaches only the idea of whole numbers\u2014the results\nof counting. The observation of primitive peoples[79] and of children\nclearly proves that the essential decisive factors of counting are these\nthree: First, we abstract, in the counting of things, completely from\nthe individual and characteristic attributes of these things, that is,\nwe consider them as homogeneous. Second, we associate individually with\nthe things which we count other homogeneous things. These other things\nare even now, among uncivilised peoples, the ten fingers of the two\nhands. They may, however, be simple strokes, or, as in the case of dice\nand dominoes, black points on a white background. Third, we substitute\nfor the result of this association some concise symbol or word; for\nexample, the Romans substituted for three things counted, three strokes\nplaced side by side, namely: III; but for greater numbers of things\nthey employed abbreviated signs. The Aztecs, the original inhabitants\nof Mexico, had time enough, it seems, to express all the numbers up to\nnineteen by equal circles placed side by side. They had abbreviated signs\nonly for the numbers 20, 400, 8000, and so forth. In speaking, some one\nsame sound might be associated with the things counted; but this method\nof counting is nowadays employed only by clocks: the languages of men\nsince prehistoric times have fashioned concise words for the results of\nthe association in question. From the notion of number, thus fixed as\nthe result of counting, man reached the notion of the addition of two\nnumbers, and thence the notion that is the inverse of the last process,\nthe notion of subtraction. But at this point it clearly appears that\nnot every problem which may be propounded is soluble; for there is no\nnumber which can express the result of the subtraction of a number from\none which is equally large or from one which is smaller than itself. The\nprimary school pupil who says that 8 from 5 \u201cwon\u2019t go\u201d is perfectly right\nfrom his point of view. For there really does not exist any result of\ncounting which added to eight will give five.\n\nIf humanity had abided by this point of view and had rested content with\nthe opinion that the problem \u201c5 minus 8\u201d is not solvable, the science of\narithmetic would never have received its full development, and humanity\nwould not have advanced as far in civilisation as it has. Fortunately,\nmen said to themselves at this crisis: \u201cIf 5 minus 8 won\u2019t go, we\u2019ll\n_make it go_; if 5 minus 8 does not possess an intelligible meaning, we\nwill simply give it one.\u201d As a fact, things which have not a meaning\nalways afford men a pleasing opportunity of investing them with one. The\nquestion is, then, what significance is the problem \u201c5 minus 8\u201d to be\ninvested with?\n\nThe most natural and, therefore, the most advantageous solution\nundoubtedly is to abide by the original notion of subtraction as the\ninverse of addition, and to make the significance of 5 minus 8 such,\nthat for 5 minus 8 plus 8 we shall get our original minuend 5. By such a\nmethod all the rules of computation which apply to real differences will\nalso hold good for unreal differences, such as 5 minus 8. But it then\nclearly appears that all forms expressive of differences in which the\nnumber that stands before the minus direction is less by an equal amount\nthan that which follows it may be regarded as equal; so that the simplest\ncourse seems to be to introduce as the common characteristic of all equal\ndifferential forms of this description a common sign, which will indicate\nat the same time the difference of the two numbers thus associated. Thus\nit came about, that for 5 minus 8, as well as for every differential form\nwhich can be regarded as equal thereto the sign \u201c-3\u201d was introduced. But\nin calling differential forms of this description numbers, the notion of\nnumber was extended and a new domain was opened up, namely, the domain of\nnegative numbers.\n\nIn the further development of the science of arithmetic, through the\noperation of division viewed as the inverse of multiplication, a second\nextension of the idea of number was reached, namely, the notion of\nfractional numbers as the outcome of divisions that had led to numbers\nhitherto undefined. We find, thus, that the science of arithmetic\nthroughout its whole development has strictly adhered to the principle\nof conformity and consistency and has invested every association of\ntwo numbers, which before had no significance, by the introduction of\nnew numbers, with a real significance, such that similar operations in\nconformity with exactly the same rules could be performed with the new\nnumbers, viewed as the results of this association, as with the numbers\nwhich were before known and perfectly defined. Thus the science proceeded\nfurther on its way and reached the notions of irrational, imaginary, and\ncomplex numbers.\n\nThe point in all this, which the reader must carefully note, is, that\nall the numbers of arithmetic, with the exception of the positive whole\nnumbers, are artificial products of human thought, invented to make the\nlanguage of arithmetic more flexible, and to accelerate the progress of\nscience. All these numbers lack the attributes of representability.\n\nNo man in the world can picture to himself \u201cminus three trees.\u201d It is\npossible, of course, to know that when three trees of a garden have been\ncut down and carried away, that three are missing, and by substituting\nfor \u201cmissing\u201d the inverse notion of \u201cadded,\u201d we may say, perhaps, that\n\u201cminus three trees\u201d are added. But this is quite different from the feat\nof imagining a negative number of trees. We can only picture to ourselves\na number of trees that results from actual counting, that is, a positive\nwhole number. Yet, notwithstanding all this, people had not the slightest\nhesitation in extending the notion of number. Exactly so must it be\npermitted us in geometry to extend the notion of space, even though such\nan extension can only be mentally defined and can never be brought within\nthe range of human powers of representation.\n\nIn mathematics, in fact, the extension of any notion is admissible,\nprovided such extension does not lead to contradictions with itself or\nwith results which are well established. Whether such extensions are\nnecessary, justifiable, or important for the advancement of science\nis a different question. It must be admitted, therefore, that the\nmathematician is justified in the extension of the notion of space as a\npoint-aggregate of three dimensions, and in the introduction of space or\npoint-aggregates of more than three dimensions, and in the employment\nof them as means of research. Other sciences also operate with things\nwhich they do not know exist, and which, though they are sufficiently\ndefined, cannot be perceived by our senses. For example, the physicist\nemploys the ether as a means of investigation, though he can have no\nsensory knowledge of it. The ether is nothing more than a means which\nenables us to comprehend mechanically the effects known as action at a\ndistance and to bring them within the range of a common point of view.\nWithout the assumption of a material which penetrates everything, and\nby means of whose undulations impulses are transmitted to the remotest\nparts of space, the phenomena of light, of heat, of gravitation, and of\nelectricity would be a jumble of isolated and unconnected mysteries. The\nassumption of an ether, however, comprises in a systematic scheme all\nthese isolated events, facilitates our mental control of the phenomena\nof nature, and enables us to produce these phenomena at will. But it\nmust not be forgotten in such reflections that the ether itself is\neven a greater problem for man, and that the ether-hypothesis does not\nsolve the difficulties of phenomena, but only puts them in a unitary\nconceptual shape. Notwithstanding all this, physicists have never had\nthe least hesitation in employing the ether as a means of investigation.\nAnd as little do reasons exist why the mathematicians should hesitate to\ninvestigate the properties of a four-dimensioned point-aggregate, with\nthe view of acquiring thus a convenient means of research.\n\n\nIII.\n\nTHE INTRODUCTION OF THE IDEA OF FOUR-DIMENSIONED POINT-AGGREGATES OF\nSERVICE TO RESEARCH.\n\nFrom the concession that the mathematician has the right to define\nand investigate the properties of point-aggregates of more than three\ndimensions, it does not necessarily follow that the introduction of an\nidea of this description is of value to science. Thus, for example, in\narithmetic, the introduction of operations which spring from involution,\nas involution and its two inverse operations proceed from multiplication,\nis undoubtedly permitted. Just as for \u201c_a_ times _a_ times _a_\u201d we write\nthe abbreviated symbol \u201c_a_\u00b3,\u201d (which we read, _a_ to the third power,)\nand investigate in detail the operation of involution thus defined, so we\nmight also introduce some shorthand symbol for \u201c_a_ to the _a_\u1d57\u02b0 power to\nthe _a_\u1d57\u02b0 power\u201d and thus reach an operation of the fourth degree, which\nwould regard _a_ as a passive number and the number 3, or any higher\nnumber, as the active number, that is, as the number which indicates how\noften _a_ is taken as the base of a power whose exponent may be _a_, or\n\u201c_a_ to the _a_\u1d57\u02b0,\u201d or \u201c_a_ to the _a_\u1d57\u02b0 to the _a_\u1d57\u02b0 power.\u201d\n\nBut the introduction of such an operation of the fourth degree has proved\nitself to be of no especial value to mathematics. And the reason is that\nin the operation of involution the law of commutation does not hold\ngood. In addition, the numbers to be added may be interchanged and the\nintroduction of multiplication is therefore of great value. So, also,\nin multiplication the numbers which are combined, that is, the factors,\nmay be changed about in any way, and thus the introduction of involution\nis of value. But in involution the base and the exponent cannot be\ninterchanged, and consequently the introduction of any higher operation\nis almost valueless.\n\nBut with the introduction of the idea of point-aggregates of multiple\ndimensions the case is wholly different. The innovation in question\nhas proved itself to be not only of great importance to research, but\nthe progress of science has irresistibly forced investigators to the\nintroduction of this idea, as we shall now set forth in detail.\n\nIn the first place, algebra, especially the algebraical theory of\nsystems of equations, derives much advantage from the notion of multiple\ndimensioned spaces. If we have only three unknown quantities, _x_, _y_,\n_z_, the algebraical questions which arise from the possible problems of\nthis class admit, as we have above seen, of geometrical representation\nto the eye. Owing to this possibility of geometrical representation,\nsome certain simple geometrical ideas like \u201cmoving,\u201d \u201clying in,\u201d\n\u201cintersecting,\u201d and so forth, may be translated into algebraical\nevents. Now, no reason exists why algebra should stop at three variable\nquantities; it must in fact take into consideration any number of\nvariable quantities.\n\nFor purposes of brevity and greater evidentness, therefore, it is quite\nnatural to employ geometrical forms of speech in the consideration of\nmore than three variables. But when we do this, we assume, perhaps\nwithout really intending to do so, the idea of a space of more than\nthree dimensions. If we have four variable quantities, _x_, _y_,\n_z_, _u_, we arrive, by conceiving attributed to each of these four\nquantities every possible numerical magnitude, at a four-dimensioned\nmanifoldness of numerical quantities, which we may just as well regard as\na four-dimensioned aggregate of points. Two equations which exist on this\nsupposition between _x_, _y_, _z_, and _u_, define two three-dimensioned\naggregates of points, which intersect, as we may briefly say, in a\ntwo-dimensioned aggregate of points, that is, in a surface; and so on.\nIn a somewhat different manner the determination of the contents of a\nsquare or a cube by the involution of a number which stands for the\nlength of its sides, leads to the notion of four-dimensioned structures,\nand, consequently, to the notion of a four-dimensioned point-space. When\nwe note that _a_\u00b2 stands for the contents of a square, and _a_\u00b3 for\nthe contents of a cube, we naturally inquire after the contents of a\nstructure which is produced from the cube as the cube is produced from\nthe square and which also will have the contents _a_\u2074. We cannot, it\nis true, clearly picture to ourselves a structure of this description,\nbut we can, nevertheless, establish its properties with mathematical\nexactness.[80] It is bounded by 8 cubes just as the cube is bounded by 6\nsquares; it has 16 corners, 24 squares, and 32 edges, so that from every\ncorner 4 edges, 6 squares, and 4 cubes proceed, and from every edge 3\nsquares and 3 cubes.\n\nYet despite the great service to algebra of this idea of\nmultiple-dimensioned space, it must be conceded that the conception\nalthough convenient is yet not indispensable. It is true, algebra is in\nneed of the idea of multiple dimensions, but it is not so absolutely in\nneed of the idea of _point_-aggregates of multiple dimensions.\n\nThis notion is, however, necessary and serviceable for a profound\ncomprehension of geometry. The system of geometrical knowledge which\nEuclid of Alexandria created about three hundred years before Christ,\nsupplied during a period of more than two thousand years a brilliant\nexample of a body of conclusions and truths which were mutually\nconsistent and logical. Up to the present century the idea of elementary\ngeometry was indissolubly bound up with the name of Euclid, so that in\nEngland where people adhered longest to the rigid deductive system of\nthe Grecian mathematician, the task of \u201clearning geometry\u201d and \u201creading\nEuclid\u201d were until a few years ago identical. Every proposition of this\nEuclidian system rests on other propositions, as one building-stone in a\nhouse rests upon another. Only the very lowest stones, the foundations,\nwere without supports. These are the axioms or fundamental propositions,\ntruths on which all other truths are, directly or indirectly, founded,\nbut which themselves are assumed without demonstration as self-evident.\n\nBut the spirit of mathematical research grew in time more and more\ncritical, and finally asked, whether these axioms might not possibly\nadmit of demonstration. Especially was a rigid proof sought for the\neleventh axiom of Euclid, which treats of parallels.\n\nAfter centuries of fruitless attempts to prove Euclid\u2019s eleventh axiom,\nGauss, and with him Bolyai and Lobatschewsky, Riemann and Helmholtz,\nfinally stated the decisive reasons why any attempt to prove the axiom\nof the parallels must necessarily be futile. These reasons consist of\nthe fact that though this axiom holds good enough in the world-space\nsuch as we do and can conceive it, yet three-dimensioned spaces are\nideally conceivable though not capable of mental representation, where\nthe axiom does not hold good. The axiom was thus shown to be a mere\nfact of _observation_, and from that time on there could no longer be\nany thought of a deductive demonstration of it. In view of the intimate\nconnection, which both in an historical and epistemological point of view\nexists between the extension of the concept of space and the critical\nexamination of the axioms of Euclid, we must enter at somewhat greater\nlength into the discussion of the last mentioned propositions.\n\nOf the axioms which Euclid premises to his geometry, only the following\nthree are really geometrical axioms:\n\n_Eighth axiom_: Magnitudes which coincide with one another are equal to\none another.\n\n_Eleventh axiom_: If a straight line meet two straight lines so as to\nmake the two interior angles on the same side of it taken together less\nthan two right angles, these straight lines, being continually produced,\nshall at length meet on that side on which are the angles which are less\nthan two right angles.\n\n_Twelfth axiom_: Two straight lines cannot inclose a [finite] space.\n\nThe numerous proofs which in the course of time were adduced in\ndemonstration of these axioms, especially of the eleventh, all turn out\non close examination to be pseudo-proofs. Legendre drew attention to the\nfact that either of the following axioms might be substituted for the\neleventh:\n\n_a_) Through a point there can be drawn to a straight line, within the\nplane which joins the point with the line, one and one line only which\nshall not intersect the first (parallels) however far the two lines may\nbe produced;\n\n_b_) If two parallel lines are cut by a third straight line, the interior\nalternate angles will be equal.\n\n_c_) The sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles,\nthat is, to the angle of a straight line or 180\u00b0.\n\nBy the aid of any one of these three assertions, the eleventh axiom of\nEuclid may be proved, and, _vice versa_, by the aid of the latter each\nof the three assertions may be proved, of course with the help of the\nother two axioms, eight and twelve. The perception that the eleventh\naxiom does not admit of demonstration without the employment of one of\nthe foregoing substitutes may best be gained from the consideration of\ncongruent figures. Every reader will remember from his first instruction\nin geometry that the congruence of two triangles is demonstrated by the\nsuperposition of one triangle on the other and by then ascertaining\nwhether the two completely coincide, no assumptions being made in the\ndetermination except those above mentioned.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 1.]\n\nIn the case of triangles which are congruent as are I and II in\nthe preceding cut, this coincidence may be effected by the simple\n_displacement_ of one of the triangles; so that even a two-dimensional\nbeing, supposed to be endowed with powers of reasoning, but only capable\nof picturing to itself motions within a plane, also might convince itself\nthat the two triangles I and II could be made to coincide. But a being\nof this description could not convince itself in like manner of the\ncongruence of triangles I and III. It would discover the equality of\nthe three sides and the three angles, but it could never succeed in so\nsuperposing the two triangles on each other as to make them coincide. A\nthree-dimensioned being, however, can do this very easily. It has simply\nto turn triangle I about one of its sides and to shove the triangle,\nthus brought into the position of its reflection in a mirror, into the\nposition of triangle III. Similarly, triangles II and III may be made to\ncoincide by moving either out of the plane of the paper around one of\nits sides as axis and turning it until it again falls in the plane of\nthe paper. The triangle thus turned over can then be brought into the\nposition of the other.\n\nLater on we shall revert to these two kinds of congruence: \u201ccongruence\nby displacement\u201d and \u201ccongruence by circumversion.\u201d For the present we\nwill start from the fact that it is always possible within the limits of\na plane to take a triangle out of one position and bring it into another\nwithout altering its sides and angles. The question is, whether this\nis only possible in the plane, or whether it can also be done on other\nsurfaces.\n\nWe find that there are certain surfaces in which this is possible, and\ncertain others in which it is not. For instance, it is impossible to move\nthe triangle drawn on the surface of an egg into some other position on\nthe egg\u2019s surface without a distension or contraction of some of the\ntriangle\u2019s parts. On the other hand, it is quite possible to move the\ntriangle drawn on the surface of a sphere into any other position on the\nsphere\u2019s surface without a distension or contraction of its parts. The\nmathematical reason of this fact is, that the surface of a sphere, like\nthe plane, has everywhere the same curvature, but that the surface of an\negg at different places has different curvatures. Of a plane we say that\nit has everywhere the curvature zero; of the surface of a sphere we say\nit has everywhere a positive curvature, which is greater in proportion\nas the radius is smaller. There are surfaces also which have a constant\nnegative curvature; these surfaces exhibit at every point in directions\nproceeding from the same side a partly concave and a partly convex\nstructure, somewhat like the centre of a saddle. There is no necessity\nof our entering in any detail into the character and structure of the\nlast-mentioned surfaces.\n\nIntimately related with the plane, however, are all those surfaces,\nwhich, like the plane, have the curvature zero; in this category belong\nespecially cylindrical surfaces and conical surfaces. A sheet of paper\nof the form of the sector of a circle may, for example, be readily bent\ninto the shape of a conical surface. If two congruent triangles, now,\nbe drawn on the sheet of paper, which may by displacement be translated\nthe one into the other, these triangles will, it is plain, also remain\ncongruent on the conical surface; that is, on the conical surface also\nwe may displace the one into the other; for though a bending of the\nfigures will take place, there will be no distension or contraction.\nSimilarly, there are surfaces which, like the sphere, have everywhere a\nconstant positive curvature. On such surfaces also every figure can be\ntransferred into some other position without distension or contraction\nof its parts. Accordingly, on all surfaces thus related to the plane or\nsphere, the assumption which underlies the eighth axiom of Euclid, that\nit is possible to transfer into any new position any figure drawn on such\nsurfaces without distortion, holds good.\n\nThe eleventh axiom in its turn also holds good on all surfaces of\nconstant curvature, whether the curvature be zero or positive; only in\nsuch instances instead of \u201cstraight\u201d line we must say \u201cshortest\u201d line. On\nthe surface of a sphere, namely, two shortest lines, that is, arcs of two\ngreat circles, always intersect, no matter whether they are produced in\nthe direction of the side at which the third arc of a great circle makes\nwith them angles less than two right angles, or, in the direction of the\nother side, where this arc makes with them angles of more than two right\nangles. On the plane, however, two straight lines intersect only on the\nside where a third straight line that meets them makes with them interior\nangles less than two right angles.\n\nThe twelfth axiom of Euclid, finally, only holds good on the plane and\non the surfaces related to it, but not on the sphere or other surfaces\nwhich, like the sphere, have a constant positive curvature. This also\naccounts for the fact that one of the three postulates which we regarded\nas substitutes for the eleventh axiom, though valid for the plane, is not\ntrue for the surface of a sphere; namely, the postulate that defines\nthe sum of the angles of a triangle. This sum in a plane triangle is two\nright angles; in a spherical triangle it is more than two right angles,\nthe spherical triangle being greater, the greater the excess the sum\nof its angles is above two right angles. It will be seen, from these\nconsiderations, that in geometries in which curved surfaces and not fixed\nplanes are studied, the axioms of Euclid are either all or partially\nfalse.\n\nThe axioms of geometry thus having been revealed as facts of experience,\nthe question suggested itself whether in the same way in which it was\nshown that different two-dimensional geometries were possible, also\ndifferent three-dimensional systems of geometry might not be developed;\nand consequently what the relations were in which these might stand to\nthe geometry of the space given by our senses and representable to our\nmind. As a fact, a three-dimensional geometry can be developed, which\nlike the geometry of the surface of an egg will exclude the axiom that a\nfigure or body can be transferred from any one part of space to any other\nand yet remain congruent to itself. Of a three-dimensional space in which\nsuch a geometry can be developed we say, that it has no constant measure\nof curvature.\n\nThe space which is representable to us, and which we shall henceforth\ncall the _space of experience_, possesses, as our experiences without\nexception confirm, the especial property that every bodily thing can be\ntransferred from any one part of it to any other without suffering in the\ntransference any distension or any contraction. The space of experience,\ntherefore, has a constant measure of curvature. The question, however,\nwhether this measure of curvature is zero or positive, that is, whether\nthe space of experience possesses the properties which in two-dimensioned\nstructures a plane possesses, or whether it is the three-dimensioned\nanalogon of the surface of a sphere is one which future experience alone\ncan answer. If the space of experience has a constant positive measure\nof curvature which is different from zero, be the difference ever so\nslight, a point which should move forever onward in a straight line, or,\nmore accurately expressed, in a shortest line, would sometime, though\nperhaps after having traversed a distance which to us is inconceivable,\nultimately have to arrive from the opposite direction at the place from\nwhich it set out, just as a point which moves forever onward in the\nsame direction on the surface of a sphere must ultimately arrive at its\nstarting point, the distance it traverses being longer the greater the\nradius of the sphere or the smaller its curvature.\n\nIt will seem, at first blush, almost incredible, that the space of\nexperience even _can_ have this property. But an example, which is the\nhistorical analogon of this modern transformation of our conceptions,\nwill render the idea less marvellous. Let us transport ourselves back to\nthe age of Homer. At that time people believed that the earth was a great\ndisc surrounded on all sides by oceans which were conceived to be in\nall directions infinitely great. Indeed, for the primitive man, who has\nnever journeyed far from the place of his birth, this is the most natural\nconception. But imagine now that some scholar had come, and had informed\nthe Homeric hero Ulysses that if he would travel forever on the earth in\nthe same direction he would ultimately come back to the point from which\nhe started; surely Ulysses would have gazed with as much astonishment\nupon this scholar as we now look upon the mathematician who tells us that\nit is possible that a point which moves forever onward in space in the\nsame direction may ultimately arrive at the place from which it started.\nBut despite the fact that Ulysses would have regarded the assertion of\nthe scholar as false because contradictory to his familiar conceptions,\nthat scholar, nevertheless, would have been right; for the earth is not\na plane but a spherical surface. So also the mathematician might be\nright who bases this more recent strange view on the possible fact that\nthe space of experience may have a measure of curvature which is not\nexactly zero but slightly greater than zero. If this were really the\ncase, the _volume_ of the space of experience, though very large, would,\nnevertheless, be finite; just as the real spherical surface of the earth\nas contrasted with the Homeric plane surface is finite, having so and so\nmany square miles. When the objection is here made that a finiteness of\nspace is totally at variance with our modes of thought and conceptions,\ntwo ideas, \u201cinfinitely great\u201d and \u201cunlimited,\u201d are confounded. All that\nis at variance with our practical conceptions is that space can anywhere\nhave a limit; not that it may possibly be of tremendous but finite\nmagnitude.\n\nIt will now be asked if we cannot determine by actual observation\nwhether the measure of curvature of experiential space is exactly zero\nor slightly different therefrom. The theorem of the sum of the angles of\na triangle and the conclusions which follow from this theorem do indeed\nsupply us with a means of ascertaining this fact. And the results of\nobservation have been, that _the measure of curvature of space is in all\nprobability exactly equal to zero or if it is slightly different from\nzero it is so little so that the technical means of observation at our\ncommand and especially our telescopes are not competent to determine the\namount of the deviation_. More, we cannot with any certainty say.\n\nAll these reflections, to which the criticism of the hypotheses that\nunderlie geometry long ago led investigators, compel us to institute a\ncomparison between the space of experience and other three-dimensioned\naggregates of points (spaces), which we cannot mentally represent but can\nin thought and word accurately define and investigate. As soon, however,\nas we are fully involved in the task of accurately investigating the\nproperties of three-dimensional aggregates of points, we similarly find\nourselves forced to regard such aggregates as the component elements\nof a manifoldness of more than three dimensions. In this way the exact\ncriticism of even ordinary geometry leads us to the abstract assumption\nof a space of more than three dimensions. And as the extension of\nevery idea gives a clearer and more translucent form to the idea as it\noriginally stood, here too the idea of multiple-dimensioned aggregates\nof points and the investigation of their properties has thrown a new\nlight on the truths of ordinary geometry and placed its properties in\nclearer relief. Amid the numerous examples which show how the notion of a\nspace of multiple-dimensions has been of great service to science in the\ninvestigation of three-dimensioned space, we shall give one a place here\nwhich is within the comprehension of non-mathematicians.\n\nImagine in a plane two triangles whose angles are denoted by pairs of\nnumbers\u2014namely, by 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, and 2-5, 3-5, 4-5. (See Fig. 2.) Let\nthe two triangles so lie that the three lines which join the angles\n1-2 and 2-5, 1-3 and 3-5, and 1-4 and 4-5 intersect at a point, which\nwe will call 1-5. If now we cause the sides of the triangles which are\nopposite to these angles to intersect, it will be found that the points\nof intersection so obtained possess the peculiar property of lying all\nin one and the same straight line. The point of intersection of the\nconnection 1-3 and 1-4 with the connection 4-5 and 3-5 may appropriately\nbe called 3-4. Similarly, the point of intersection 2-4 is produced by\nthe meeting of 4-5, 2-5 and 1-2, 1-4; and the point of intersection\n2-3, by the meeting of 1-3, 1-2 and 3-5, 2-5. The statement, that the\nthree points of intersection 3-4, 2-4, 2-3, thus obtained, lie in one\nstraight line, can be proved by the principles of plane geometry only\nwith difficulty and great circumstantiality. But by resorting to the\nthree-dimensional space of experience, in which the plane of the drawing\nlies, the proposition may be rendered almost self-evident.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 2.]\n\nTo begin with, imagine any five points in space which may be denoted by\nthe numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; then imagine all the possible ten straight\nlines of junction drawn between each two of these points, namely, 1-2,\n1-3 ... 4-5; and finally, also, all the ten planes of junction of every\nthree points described, namely, the plane 1-2-3, 1-2-4, ... 3-4-5. A\nspatial figure will thus be obtained, whose ten straight lines will meet\nsome interposed plane in ten points whose relative positions are exactly\nthose of the ten points above described. Thus, for example, on this plane\nthe points 1-2, 1-3, and 2-3 will lie in a straight line, for through the\nthree spatial points 1, 2, 3, a plane can be drawn which will cut the\nplane of a drawing in a straight line. The reason, therefore, that the\nthree points 3-4, 2-4, 2-3, also must ultimately lie in a straight line,\nconsists in the simple fact that the plane of the three points 2, 3, 4,\nmust cut the plane of the drawing in a straight line. The figure here\nconsidered consists of ten points of which sets of three so lie ten times\nin a straight line that conversely from every point also three straight\nlines proceed.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 3.]\n\nNow, just as this figure is a section of a complete three-dimensional\npentagon, so another remarkable figure, of similar properties, may be\nobtained by the section of a figure of four-dimensioned space. Imagine,\nnamely, six points, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, situated in this four-dimensioned\nspace, and every three of them connected by a plane, and every four of\nthem by a three-dimensioned space. We shall obtain thus twenty planes and\nfifteen three-dimensioned spaces which will cut the plane in which the\nfigure is to be produced in twenty points and fifteen rays which so lie\nthat each point sends out three rays and every ray contains four points.\n(See Fig. 3.) Figures of this description, which are so composed of\npoints and rays that an equal number of rays proceed from every point and\nan equal number of points lie in every ray, are called _configurations_.\nOther configurations may, of course, be produced, by taking a different\nnumber of points and by assuming that the points taken lie in a space of\ndifferent or even higher dimensions. The author of this article was the\nfirst to draw attention to configurations derived from spaces of higher\ndimensions. As we see, then, the notion of a space of more than three\ndimensions has performed important work in the investigations of common\nplane geometry.\n\nIn conclusion, I should like to add a remark which Cranz makes regarding\nthe application of the idea of multiple-dimensioned space to theoretical\nchemistry. (See the treatise before cited.) In chemistry, the molecules\nof a compound body are said to consist of the atoms of the elements\nwhich are contained in the body, and these are supposed to be situated\nat certain distances from one another, and to be held in their relative\npositions by certain forces. At first, the centres of the atoms were\nconceived to lie in one and the same plane. But Wislicenus was led by\nresearches in paralactic acid to explain the differences of isomeric\nmolecules of the same structural formul\u00e6 by the different positions of\nthe atoms in _space_. (Compare \u201cLa chimie dans l\u2019espace\u201d by van\u2019t Hoff,\n1875, preface by J. Wislicenus). In fact four points can always be so\narranged in space that every two of them may have any distance from each\nother; and the change of one of the six distances does not necessarily\ninvolve the alteration of any other.\n\nBut suppose our molecule consists of five atoms? Four of these may be\nso placed that the distance between any two of them can be made what we\nplease. But it is no longer possible to give the fifth atom a position\nsuch that each of the four distances by which it is separated from\nthe other atoms may be what we please. Quite the contrary, the fourth\ndistance is dependent on the three remaining distances; for the space of\nexperience has only three dimensions. If, therefore, I have a molecule\nwhich consists of five atoms I cannot alter the distance between two of\nthem without at least altering some second distance. But if we imagine\nthe centres of the atoms placed in a four-dimensioned space, this can be\ndone; all the ten distances which may be conceived to exist between the\nfive points will then be independent of one another. To reach the same\nresult in the case of six atoms we must assume a five-dimensional space;\nand so on.\n\nNow, if the independence of all the possible distances between the atoms\nof a molecule is absolutely required by theoretical chemical research,\nthe science is really compelled, if it deals with molecules of more\nthan four atoms, to make use of the idea of a space of more than three\ndimensions. This idea is, in this case, simply an instrument of research,\njust as are, also, the ideas of molecules and atoms\u2014means designed to\nembrace in an obvious and systematic form the phenomena of chemistry\nand to discover the conditions under which new phenomena can be evoked.\nWhether a four-dimensioned space really exists is a question whose\ninsolubility cannot prevent research from making use of the idea, exactly\nas chemistry has not been prevented from making use of the notion of\natom, although no one really knows whether the things we call atoms exist\nor not.\n\n\nIV.\n\nREFUTATION OF THE ARGUMENTS ADDUCED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A\nFOUR-DIMENSIONED SPACE INCLUSIVE OF THE VISIBLE WORLD.\n\nThe considerations of the preceding section will have convinced\nthe cultured non-mathematician of the service which the theory of\nmultiple-dimensioned spaces has done, and bids fair to do, for\ngeometrical research. In addition thereto is the consideration that every\nextension of one branch of mathematical science is a constant source of\nbeneficial and helpful influence to the other branches. The knowledge,\nhowever, that mathematicians can employ the notion of four-dimensioned\nspace with good results in their researches, would never have been\nsufficient to procure it its present popularity; for every man of\nintelligence has now heard of it, and, in jest or in earnest, often\nspeaks of it. The knowledge of a four-dimensioned space did not reach\nthe ears of cultured non-mathematicians until the consequences which the\nspiritualists fancied it was permissible to draw from this mathematical\nnotion were publicly known. But it is a tremendous step from the\nfour-dimensioned space of the mathematicians to the space from which the\nspirit-friends of the spiritualistic mediums entertain us with rappings,\nknockings, and bad English. Before taking this step we will first discuss\nthe question of the real existence of a four-dimensional space, not\njudging the question whether this space, if it really does exist, is\ninhabited by reasonable beings who consciously act upon the world in\nwhich we exist.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 4.]\n\nAmong the reasons which are put forward to prove the existence of a\nfour-dimensional space containing the world, the least reprehensible are\nthose which are based on the existence of symmetry. We spoke above of\ntwo triangles in the same plane which have all their sides and angles\ncongruent, but which cannot be made to coincide by simple displacement\nwithin the plane; but we saw that this coincidence could be effected by\nholding fast one side of one triangle and moving it out of its plane\nuntil it had been so far turned round that it fell back into its plane.\nNow something similar to this exists in space. Cut two figures, exactly\nlike that of Fig. 4., out of a piece of paper, and turn the triangle\n_ABF_ about the side _AB_, _ACE_ about the side _AC_, _BCD_ about the\nside _BC_, and in one figure above and in the other below; then in both\ncases the points _D_, _E_, _F_ will meet at a point, because _AE_ is\nequal to _AF_, _BF_ is equal to _BD_, _CD_ is equal to _CE_. In this\nmanner we obtain two pyramids which in all lengths and all angles are\ncongruent, yet which cannot, no matter how we try, be made to coincide,\nthat is, be so fitted the one into the other that they shall both stand\nas one pyramid. But the _reflected_ image of the one could be brought\ninto coincidence with the other. Two spatial structures whose sides and\nangles are thus equal to each other, and of which each may be viewed\nas the reflected image of the other, are called _symmetrical_. For\ninstance, the right and the left hand are symmetrical; or, a right and\na left glove. Now just as in two dimensions it is impossible by simple\ndisplacement to bring into congruence triangles which like those above\nmentioned can only be made to coincide by circumversion, so also in three\ndimensions it is impossible to bring into congruence two symmetrical\npyramids. Careful mathematical reflection, however, declares, that this\ncould be effected if it were possible, while holding one of the surfaces,\nto move the pyramid out of the space of experience, and to turn it round\nthrough a four-dimensioned space until it reached a point at which it\nwould return again into our experiential space. This process would simply\nbe the four-dimensional analogon of the three-dimensional circumversion\nin the above-mentioned case of the two triangles. Further, the interior\nsurfaces in this process would be converted into exterior surfaces,\nand _vice versa_, exactly as in the circumversion of a triangle the\nanterior and posterior sides are interchanged. If the structure which is\nto be converted into its symmetrical counterpart is made of a flexible\nmaterial, the interchange mentioned of the interior and exterior surfaces\nmay be effected by simply turning the structure inside out; for example,\na right glove may thus be converted into a left glove.\n\nNow from this truth, that every structure can be converted by means\nof a four-dimensional space inclusive of the world, into a structure\nsymmetrical with it, it has been sought to establish the probability of\nthe real existence of a four-dimensioned space. Yet it will be evident,\nfrom the discussions of the preceding section, that the only inference\nwhich we can here make is, that the idea of a four-dimensioned space is\ncompetent, from a mathematical point of view, to throw some light upon\nthe phenomena of symmetry. To conclude from these facts that a space\nof this kind really exists, would be as daring as to conclude from\nthe fact that the uniform angular velocity of the apparent motions of\nthe fixed stars is explicable from the assumption of an axial motion\nof the firmament, that the fixed stars are really rigidly placed in a\ncelestial sphere rotating about its axis. It must not be forgotten that\nour comprehension of the phenomena of the real world consists of two\nelements: first, of that which the things really are; and, second, of\nthat by which we rationally apprehend the things. This latter element\nis partly dependent on the sum of the experiences which we have before\nacquired, and partly on the necessity, due to the imperfection of reason,\nof our embracing the multitudinous isolated phenomena of the world into\ncategories which we ourselves have formed, and which, therefore, are not\nwholly derived from the phenomena themselves, but to a great extent are\ndependent on us.\n\nBesides geometrical reasons, Z\u00f6llner has also adduced cosmological\nreasons to prove the existence of a four-dimensional space. To these\nreasons belong especially the questions whether the number of the fixed\nstars is infinitely great, whether the world is finite or infinite\nin extension, whether the world had a beginning or will have an end,\nwhether the world is not hastening towards a condition of equilibrium or\ndead level by the universal distribution of its matter and energy; the\nproblems, also, of gravitation and action at a distance; and finally, the\nquestions concerning the relations between the phenomena in the world of\nsense-perception to the unknown things-in-themselves. All these questions\nwhich can be decided in no definite sense, led Z\u00f6llner and his followers\nto the assumption that a four-dimensioned space inclusive of the space of\nexperience must really exist. But more careful reflection will show that\nthis assumption does not dispose of the difficulties but simply displaces\nthem into another realm. Furthermore, even if four-dimensioned space did\nunravel and make clear all the cosmological problems which have bothered\nthe human mind, still, its existence would not be proved thereby; it\nwould yet remain a mere hypothesis, designed to render more intelligible\nto a being who can only make experiences in a three-dimensional space,\nthe phenomena therein which are full of mystery to it. A four-dimensioned\nspace would in such case possess for the metaphysician a value similar\nto that which the ether possesses for the physicist. Still more\nconvincing than these cosmological reasons to the majority of men is\nthe physio-psychological reason drawn from the phenomena of vision which\nZ\u00f6llner adduces. Into this main argument we will enter in more detail.\n\nWhen we \u201csee\u201d an object, as we all know, the light which proceeds or is\nreflected therefrom produces an image on the retina of our eye; this\nimage is conducted to our consciousness by means of the optical nerve,\nand our reason draws therefrom an inference respecting the object. When,\nnow, we look at a square whose sides are a decimetre in length, and\nwhose centre is situated at the distance of a metre from the pupil of\nour eye, an image is produced on the retina. But exactly the same image\nwill be produced there if we look at a square whose sides are parallel\nto the sides of the first square but two decimetres in length, and whose\ncentre is situated at a distance of two metres from the pupil of the eye.\nProceeding thus further, we readily discover that an eye can perceive\nin any length or line only the ratio of its magnitude to the distance\nat which it is situated from it, and that generally a three-dimensional\nworld must appear to the eye two-dimensional, because all points which\nlie behind each other in the direction outwards from the eye produce\non the retina only one image. This is due to the fact that the retinal\nimages are themselves two-dimensional; for which reason, Z\u00f6llner says,\nthe world must appear to a child as two-dimensional, if it be supposed to\nlive in a primitive condition of unconscious mental activity. To such a\nchild two objects which are moving the one behind the other, must appear\nas suffering displacement on a surface, which we conceive behind the\nobjects, and on which the latter are projected. In all these apparent\ndisplacements, coincidences and changes of form also are effected. All\nthese things must appear puzzling to a human being in the first stages\nof its development, and the mind thus finds itself, as Z\u00f6llner further\nargues, in the first years of childhood forced to adopt a hypothesis\nconcerning the constitution of space and to assume that the world is\nthree-dimensional, although the eye can really perceive it as only\ntwo-dimensional. Z\u00f6llner then further says, that in the explanation of\nthe effects of the external world, man constantly finds this hypothesis\nof his childish years confirmed, and that in this way it has become in\nhis mind so profound a conviction that it is no longer possible for him\nto think it away. Consonant with this argumentation, also, is Z\u00f6llner\u2019s\nremark, that the same phenomenon has presented itself in astronomical\nmethods of knowledge. To explain the movements of the planets, which\nappear to describe regular paths on the surface of a celestial sphere,\nwe were compelled in the solution of the riddles which these motions\npresented, to assume in the structure of the heavens a dimension of\n\u201cdepth,\u201d and the complicated motions in the two-dimensioned firmament\nwere converted into very simple motions in three-dimensioned space.\nZ\u00f6llner also contends that our conception of the entire visible world as\npossessed of three dimensions is a product of our reason, which the mind\nwas driven to form by the contradictions which would be presented to it\non the assumption of only two dimensions by the perspective distortions,\ncoincidences, and changes of magnitude of objects. When a child moves its\nhand before its eyes, turns it, brings it nearer, or pushes it farther\naway, this child successively receives the most various impressions on\nthe surface of its retina of one and the same object of whose identity\nand constancy its feelings offer it a perfect assurance. If the child\nregarded the changeable projection of the hand on the surface of the\nretina as the real object, and not the hand which lies beyond it, the\nchild would constantly be met with contradictions in its experience,\nand to avoid this it makes the hypothesis that the space of experience\nis three-dimensional. Z\u00f6llner\u2019s contention is, therefore, that man\noriginally had only a two-dimensional intuition of space, but was forced\nby experience to represent to himself the objects which on the retinal\nsurface appeared two-dimensional, as three-dimensional, and thus to\ntransform his two-dimensional space-intuition into a three-dimensional\none. Now, in exactly the same way, according to Z\u00f6llner\u2019s notion, will\nman, by the advancement and increasing exactness of his knowledge of\nthe phenomena of the outer world, also be compelled to conceive of the\nmaterial world as a \u201cshadow cast by a more real four-dimensional world,\u201d\nso that these conceptions will be just as trivial for the people of the\ntwentieth century as since Copernicus\u2019s time the explanation of the\nmotions of the heavenly bodies by means of a three-dimensional motion\nhas been.\n\nZ\u00f6llner\u2019s arguments from the phenomena of vision may be refuted as\nfollows: In the first place it is incorrect to say that we see the\nthings of the external world by means of two-dimensional retinal images.\nThe light which penetrates the eye causes an irritation of the optical\nnerves, and any such effect which, though it be not powerful, is,\nnevertheless, a mechanical one, can only take place on things which are\nmaterial. But material things are always three-dimensional. The effect\nof light on the sensitive plates of photography can with just as little\njustice be regarded as two-dimensional. Our senses can have perception\nof nothing but three-dimensional things, and this perception is effected\nby forces which in their turn act on three-dimensional things, namely,\nour sensory nerves. It is wrong to call an image two-dimensional,\nfor it is only by abstraction that we can conceive of a thickness so\ngrowing constantly smaller and smaller as to admit of our regarding a\nthree-dimensional picture as two-dimensional, by giving it in mind a\nvanishingly small thickness. It is also wrong to say, as Z\u00f6llner says,\nthat when we see the shadow of a hand which is cast upon a wall we see\nsomething two-dimensional. What we really perceive is that no light\nfalls upon our eye from the region included by the shadow, while from\nthe entire surrounding region light does fall on our eye. But this light\nis reflected from the material particles which form the surface of the\nwall, that is, from three-dimensional particles of matter. We must\nalways remember that our eye communicates to us only three-dimensional\nknowledge, and that for the comprehension of anything which has two, one,\nor no dimensions, _a purely intellectual act of abstraction must be added\nto the act of perception_. When we imagine we have made a lead-pencil\nmark on paper, we have, exactly viewed, simply heaped along side of each\nother little particles of graphite in such a manner that there are by\nfar fewer graphite particles in the lateral and upward directions than\nthere are in the longitudinal direction, and thus our reason arrives by\nabstraction at the notion of a straight line. When we look at an object,\nsay a cube of wood, we recognise the object as three-dimensional, and\nit is only by abstraction that we can conceive of its two-dimensional\nsurfaces, of its twelve one-dimensional edges, and of its eight\nno-dimensional corners. For we reach the perception of its surface, for\nexample, solely by reason of the fact that the material particles which\nform the cube prevent the transmission of light, and reflect it, whereby\na part of the light reflected from every material particle strikes our\neye. Now, by thinking exclusively of those material particles which are\nreflected, in contrariety to the empty space without and the hidden and\ntherefore non-reflected particles within, we form the notion of a surface.\n\nIt is evident from this, that all that we perceive is three-dimensional,\nthat we cannot come at anything two-dimensional without an intellectual\nabstraction, and that, therefore, we cannot conceive of anything\ntwo-dimensional exerting effects upon material things. But this fact is a\nrefutation of the retinal argument of Z\u00f6llner. If vision consisted wholly\nand exclusively in the creation of a two-dimensioned image, the things\nwhich take place in the world could never come into our consciousness.\nThe child, therefore, does not originally apprehend the world, as Z\u00f6llner\nsays, as two-dimensional; on the contrary, it apprehends it either not\nat all, or it apprehends it as three-dimensional. Of course the child\nmust first \u201clearn how\u201d to see. It is found from the observation of\nchildren during the first months of their lives, and of the congenitally\nblind, who have suddenly acquired the power of vision by some successful\noperation, that seeing does not consist alone in the irritations which\narise in the optic nerves, but also in the correct interpretation of\nthese irritations by reason. This correct interpretation, however, can\nbe accomplished only by the accumulation of a considerable stock of\nexperience. Especially must the recognition of the distance of the object\nseen, be gradually learned. In this, two things are especially helpful;\nfirst, the fact that we have two eyes and, consequently, that we must\nfeel two irritations of the optic nerves which are not wholly alike; and\nsecondly, the fact that we are enabled by our power of motion and our\nsense of touch to convince ourselves of the distance and form of the\nbodies seen. The question now arises, what sort of an intuition of space\nwould a creature have that had only one eye, that could neither move\nitself nor its eye, and also possessed no peripheral nerves. According\nto Z\u00f6llner\u2019s view, this creature could, owing to its two-dimensional\nretinal images, only have a two-dimensional intuition of space. The\nauthor\u2019s opinion, however, is, that such a creature could not see at all,\nas it has no possibility of collecting experiences which are adapted in\nany way to interpreting the effects of things on its retina. The light\nwhich proceeded from the objects roundabout and fell on the retina could\nproduce no other effect on the being than that of a wholly intelligible\nirritation, or, perhaps, even pain.\n\nThe reflections presented sufficiently show that neither the phenomena\nof symmetry nor the retinal images of the objects of vision necessarily\nforce upon us the assumption of a four-dimensioned space. If the\nmaterial world should ever present problems which could not in the\nprogress of knowledge be solved in a natural way, the assumption that\na four-dimensional space containing the world exists would also be\nincompetent to resolve the difficulties presented; it would simply\nconvert these difficulties into others, and not dispose of the problems\nbut simply displace them to another world. Yet the question might be\nasked, Is the existence of a four-dimensional space really _impossible_?\nTo answer this question, we must first clearly know what we mean by\n\u201cexist.\u201d If existence means that the intellectual _idea_ of a thing\ncan be formed and that this idea shall not lead to contradictions with\nother well-established ideas and with experience, we have only to\nsay that four-dimensioned space does exist, as the arguments adduced\nin sections II and III have rendered plain. If, namely, the space\nof four dimensions did not exist as a clear idea in the minds of\nmathematicians, mathematicians could certainly not have been led by\nthis idea to results which are recognised by the senses as true, and\nwhich really take place in our own representable space. But if existence\nmeans \u201cmaterial actuality\u201d we must say that we neither now nor in the\nfuture can know anything about it. For we know material actuality\nonly as three-dimensional, our senses can only make three-dimensional\nexperiences, and the inferences of our reason, although they can\nwell abstract from material things, can never ascend to the point of\nexplaining a four-dimensional materiality. Just as little, therefore,\nas we can locally fix the idea of a two-dimensional material world, as\nlittle can we substantiate the notion of a four-dimensioned material\nexistence.\n\n\nV.\n\nEXAMINATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF\nFOUR-DIMENSIONAL SPIRITS.\n\nIn connection with the belief that the visible world is contained in a\nfour-dimensioned space, Z\u00f6llner and his adherents further hold that this\nhigher space is inhabited by intelligent beings who can act consciously\nand at will on the human beings who live in experiential space. To invest\nthis opinion with greater strength Z\u00f6llner appealed to the fact that the\ngreatest thinkers of antiquity and of modern times were either wholly\nof this opinion or at least held views from which his contentions might\nbe immediately derived. Plato\u2019s dialogue between Socrates and Glaukon\nin the seventh book of the Republic, is evidence, says Z\u00f6llner, that\nthis greatest philosopher of antiquity possessed some presentiment of\nthis extension of the notion of space. Yet any one who has connectedly\nstudied and understood Plato\u2019s system of philosophy must concede that\nthe so-called \u201cideas\u201d of the Platonic system denote something wholly\ndifferent from what Z\u00f6llner sees in them or pretends to see. Z\u00f6llner\nsays that these Platonic ideas are spatial objects of more than three\ndimensions and represent \u201creal existence\u201d in the same sense that the\nmaterial world, as contrasted with the images on the retina, represents\nit. Z\u00f6llner similarly deals with the Kantian \u201cthing-in-itself,\u201d which is\nalso regarded as an object of higher dimensions.\n\nTo show Kant in the light of a predecessor, Z\u00f6llner quotes the following\npassage from the former\u2019s \u201cTr\u00e4ume eines Geistersehers, erl\u00e4utert durch\nTr\u00e4ume der Metaphysik\u201d (1766, Collected Works, Vol. VII, page 32 et\nseqq.): \u201cI confess that I am very much inclined to assert the existence\nof immaterial beings in the world, and to rank my own soul as one of\nsuch a class. It appears, there is a spiritual essence existent which is\nintimately bound up with matter but which does not act on those forces of\nthe elements by which the latter are connected, but upon some internal\nprinciple of its own condition. It will, in the time to come\u2014I know not\nwhen or where\u2014be proved, that the human soul, even in this life, exists\nin a state of uninterrupted connection with all the immaterial natures\nof the spiritual world; that it alternately acts on them and receives\nimpressions from them, of which, as a human soul, it is not, in the\nnormal state of things, conscious. It would be a great thing, if some\nsuch systematic constitution of the spiritual world, as we conceive it,\ncould be deduced, not exclusively from our general notion of spiritual\nnature, which is altogether too hypothetical, but from some real and\nuniversally admitted observations,\u2014or, for that matter, if it could even\nbe shown to be probable.\u201d\n\nWhat Kant really asserts here is, first, the partly independent and\npartly dependent existence of the soul, and of spiritual beings\ngenerally, on matter, and, second, that spiritual beings have some\ncommon connection with and mutually influence one another. This\ncontention, which is that of very many thinkers, does not, however,\nentail the consequence that the \u201ctranscendental subject of Kant\u201d must be\nfour-dimensional, as Z\u00f6llner asserts it does. Kant never even hinted at\nthe theory that the psychical features of the world owe their connection\nwith the material features to the fact that they are four-dimensional\nand, therefore, include the three-dimensional. Is it a necessary\nconclusion that if a thing exists and is not three-dimensional, as is\nthe case with the soul, that it is therefore four-dimensional? Can it\nnot in fact be so constituted that it is wholly meaningless to speak of\ndimensions at all in connection with it?\n\nYet still more strongly than the words of Plato and Kant do certain\nutterances of the mathematicians Gauss and Riemann speak in favor of\nZ\u00f6llner\u2019s hypothesis. S. v. Waltershausen relates of Gauss in his \u201cGruss\nzum Ged\u00e4chtnis,\u201d (Leipsic, 1856,) that Gauss had often remarked that the\nthree dimensions of space were only a specific peculiarity of the human\nmind. We can think ourselves, he said, into beings who are only conscious\nof two dimensions; similarly, perhaps, beings who are above and outside\nour world may look down upon us; and there were, he continued, in a\njesting tone, a number of problems which he had here indefinitely laid\naside, but hoped to treat in a superior state by superior geometrical\nmethods. Leaving aside this jest, which quite naturally suggested itself,\nthe remarks of Gauss are quite correct. We possess the power to abstract\nand can think, therefore, what kind of geometry a being that is only\nacquainted with a two-dimensional world would have; for instance, we can\nimagine that such a being could not conceive of the possibility of making\ntwo triangles coincide which were congruent in the sense above explained,\nand so on. So, also, we can understand that a being who has control of\nfour dimensions can only conceive of a geometry of four-dimensional\nspace, yet may have the capacity of thinking itself into spaces of other\ndimensions. But it does not follow from this that a four-dimensional\nspace exists, let alone that it is inhabited by reasonable beings.\n\nRiemann, on the other hand, speaks directly of a world of spirits. In\nhis \u201cNeue mathematische Principien der Naturphilosophie\u201d he puts forth\nthe hypothesis that the space of the world is filled with a material\nthat is constantly pouring into the ponderable atoms, there to disappear\nfrom the phenomenal world. In every ponderable atom, he says, at every\nmoment of time, there enters and appears a determinate amount of matter,\nproportional to the force of gravitation. The ponderable bodies,\naccording to this theory, are the place at which the spiritual world\nenters and acts on the material world. Riemann\u2019s world of spirits, the\nsole office of which is to explain the phenomenon of gravitation as\na force governing matter, is, though, essentially different from the\nspiritual world of Z\u00f6llner, the function of which is to explain supposed\nsupersensuous phenomena which stand in the most glaring contradiction\nwith the established known laws of the material world.\n\nBesides this appeal to the testimony of eminent men like Plato, Kant,\nGauss, and Riemann, the scientific prophet of modern spiritualism also\nbases his theory on the belief, which has obtained at all times and\nappeared in various forms among all peoples, that there exist in the\nworld forces which at times are competent to evoke phenomena that are\nexempt from the ordinary laws of nature. We have but to think of the\nphenomena of table-turning which once excited the Chinese as much as\nit has aroused, during the last few decades, the European and American\nworlds; or of the divining-rod, by whose help our forefathers sought for\nwater, in fact, as we do now in parts of Europe and America.\n\nCranz, in his essay on the subject, divides spiritualistic phenomena\ninto physical and intellectual. Of the first class he enumerates\nthe following: the moving of chairs and tables; the animation of\nwalking-sticks, slippers, and broomsticks; the miraculous throwing of\nobjects; spirit-rappings (Luther heard a sound in the Wartburg, \u201cas if\nthree score casks were hurled down the stairs\u201d); the ecstatic suspension\nof persons above the floor; the diminution of the forces of gravity; the\nordeals of witches; the fetching of wished-for objects; the declination\nof the magnetic needle by persons at a distance; the untying of knots\nin a closed string; insensibility to injury and exemption therefrom\nwhen tortured, as in handling red-hot coals, carrying hot irons, etc.;\nthe music of invisible spirits; the materialisations of spirits or of\nindividual parts of spirits (the footprints in the experiments of Slade,\nphotographed by Z\u00f6llner); the double appearance of the same person;\nthe penetration of matter (of closed doors, windows, and so forth).\nAs numerous also is the selection presented by Cranz of intellectual\nphenomena, namely: spirit-writing (Have\u2019s instrument for the facilitation\nof intercourse with spirits), the clairvoyance and divination of\nsomnambulists, of visionary, ecstatic, and hypnotised persons, prompted\nor controlled by narcotic medicines, by sleeping in temples, by music and\ndancing, by ascetic modes of life and residence in barren localities, by\nthe exudations of the soil and of water, by the contemplation of jewels,\nmirrors, and crystal-pure water, and by anointing the finger-nails with\nconsecrated oil. Also the following additional intellectual phenomena\nare cited: increased eloquence or suddenly acquired power of speaking\nin foreign languages; spirit-effects at a distance; inability to move,\ntransferences of the will, and so forth.\n\nAll these phenomena, presented with the aspect of truth, and associated\nmore or less with trickery, self-deception, and humbug, are adduced\nby the spiritualists to substantiate the belief in a world of spirits\nwhich consciously and purposely take part in the events of the material\nworld, and that these phenomena may be sufficiently and consistently\nexplained by the effects of the activity of such a world. It is\nimpossible for us to discuss and put to the test here the explanations\nof all these supersensuous phenomena. Anything and everything can be\nexplained by spirits who act at will upon the world. There are only a\nfew of these phenomena, namely, clairvoyance and Slade\u2019s experiments,\nwhose explanations are so intimately connected with our main theme, the\nso-called fourth dimension, that they cannot be passed over.\n\nFirst, with respect to clairvoyance, the American visionary Davis\ndescribes the experiences which he claims to have made in this condition,\ninduced by \u201cmagnetic sleep,\u201d as follows:[81] \u201cThe sphere of my vision\nnow began to expand. At first, I could only clearly discern the walls of\nthe house. At the start they seemed to me dark and gloomy; but they soon\nbecame brighter and finally transparent. I could now see the objects,\nthe utensils, and the persons in the adjoining house as easily as those\nin the room in which I sat. But my perceptions extended further still;\nbefore my wandering glance, which seemed to control a great semi-circle,\nthe broad surface of the earth, for hundreds of miles about me, grew as\ntransparent as water, and I saw the brains, the entrails, and the entire\nanatomy of the beasts that wandered about in the forests of the eastern\nhemisphere, hundreds and thousands of miles from the room in which I\nsat.\u201d The belief in the possibility of such states of clairvoyance is\nby no means new. Alexander Dumas made use of it, for example, in his\n\u201cM\u00e9moires d\u2019un m\u00e9dicin,\u201d in which Count Balsamo, afterwards called\nCagliostro, is said to possess the power of transforming suitable persons\ninto this wonderful condition and thus to find out what other persons at\ndistant places are doing. Z\u00f6llner explains clairvoyance by means of the\nfourth dimension thus:\n\nA man who is accustomed to viewing things on a plain is supposed to\nascend to a considerable height in a balloon. He will there enjoy a\nmuch more extended prospect than if he had remained on the plain below,\nand will also be able to signal to greater distances. The plain,\nthat is, the two-dimensioned space, is accordingly viewed by him from\npoints outside of the plain as \u201copen\u201d in all directions. Exactly so,\nin Z\u00f6llner\u2019s theory, must three-dimensioned spaces appear, when viewed\nfrom points in four-dimensioned space, namely, as \u201copen\u201d; and the more\nso in proportion as the point in question is situated at a greater\ndistance from the place of our body, or in proportion as the soul ascends\nto a greater height in this fourth dimension. Z\u00f6llner thus explains\nclairvoyance as a condition in which the soul has displaced itself out\nof its three-dimensioned space and reached a point which with respect\nto this space is four-dimensionally situated and whence it is able to\ncontemplate the three-dimensional world without the interference of\nintervening obstacles.\n\nThe following remark is to be made to this explanation. The reason why\nwe have a better and more extended view from a balloon than from places\non the earth is simply this, that between the suspended balloon and the\nobjects seen at a distance nothing intervenes but the air, and air allows\nthe transmission of light, whereas, at the places below on the earth\nthere are all kinds of material things about the observer which prevent\nthe transmission of light and either render difficult or absolutely\nimpossible the sight of things which lie far away. In the same way,\nalso, from a point in four-dimensioned space, a three-dimensional object\nwill be visible only provided there are no obstacles intervening. If,\ntherefore, this awareness of a distant object is a real, actual vision by\nmeans of a luminous ray which strikes the eye, there is contained in the\nexplanation of Z\u00f6llner the tacit assumption that the medium with which\nthe four-dimensional world is filled is also pervious to light exactly as\nthe atmosphere is.\n\nThe theory that there are four-dimensional spirits who produce the\nphenomena cited by the spiritualists received special support from the\nexperiments which the prestidigitateur Slade, who claimed he was a\nspiritualistic medium, performed before Z\u00f6llner. Of these experiments\nwe will speak of the two most important, the experiment with the glass\nsphere and the experiment with the knots. To explain the connection\nof the glass sphere experiment with the fourth dimension, we must\nfirst conceive of two-dimensional reasoning beings, or, let us say,\ntwo-dimensional worms, living and moving in a plane. For a creature of\nthis kind it will be self-evident that there are no other paths between\ntwo points of its plane than such as lie within the plane. It must,\naccordingly, be beyond the range of conception of this worm, how any\ntwo-dimensional object which lies within a circle in its space can be\nbrought to any other position in its space outside the circle without the\nobject passing through the barriers formed by the circle\u2019s circumference.\nBut if this worm could procure the services of a three-dimensional being,\nthe transportation of the object from a position within the circle to\nany position outside it could be effected by the three-dimensional being\nsimply taking the object _out of_ the plane and placing it at the desired\npoint. This object, therefore, would, in an inexplicable manner, suddenly\ndisappear before the eyes of the worms who were assembled as spectators,\nand after the lapse of an interval of time would again appear outside\nthe circle without having passed at any point through the circle\u2019s\ncircumference. If now we add another dimension, we shall derive from this\ntrick, which is wholly removed from the sense-perception of the flattened\nworms, the following experiment, which is wholly beyond the perception\nof us human beings. Inside a glass sphere, which is closed all around,\na grain of corn is placed; the problem is to transport the corn to some\nplace outside the sphere without passing through the glass surface. Now\nwe should be able to perform this trick if some four-dimensional being\nwould render us the same aid that we before rendered the two-dimensional\nworm. For the four-dimensional being could take the grain of corn into\nhis four-dimensional space and then replace it in our space in the\ndesired spot outside of the glass sphere. Slade performed this trick\nbefore Z\u00f6llner. Its mere performance sufficed to convince this latter\ninvestigator that Slade had here made use of a four-dimensional agent,\nwho, in respect of power of motion, controlled his four-dimensional space\nas we do our three-dimensional space. It never occurred to Z\u00f6llner that\nthis experiment was the cleverly executed trick of a prestidigitateur,\nor, as it would at once occur to us, that the whole thing was a sensory\nillusion. The fact that we cannot explain a trick easily and naturally\ndoes not irrevocably prove that it is accomplished by other means than\nthose which the world of matter presents.\n\nStill better known than this last performance is Slade\u2019s experiments\nwith knots. To explain this in connection with the fourth dimension, we\nmust resort again to the plane and the flat worm inhabiting it. To two\nparallel lines in a plane let the two ends of a third line, which has a\ndouble point, that is, intersects itself once, be attached. Our flat worm\nwould not be able to untie the loop formed by the doubled third line,\nwhich we will call a string, because it cannot execute motions in three\ndimensions. If, therefore, a two-dimensional prestidigitateur should\nappear and accomplish the trick of untying this loop without removing the\ntwo ends of the string from the parallel lines, he will have accomplished\nfor our flat worm a supersensuous experiment. A human being engaged in\nthe service of the prestidigitateur could execute for him the experiment\nby simply lifting the string a little out of the plane, pulling it\ntaut, and placing it back again. This suggests the following analogous\nexperiment for three-dimensional beings. The two ends of a string in\nwhich a common knot has been made are sealed to the opposite walls of a\nroom. The problem is to untie this knot without breaking the seals at the\ntwo ends of the string. Everybody knows that this problem is not soluble,\nbut it may be calculated mathematically that the knot in the string can\nbe untied as easily by motions in a fourth dimension of space as in the\nexperiment above described the knot in the two-dimensional string was\nuntied by a three-dimensional motion. Now as Slade untied the knot before\nZ\u00f6llner\u2019s eyes without apparently making any use of the ends fastened in\nthe walls, Z\u00f6llner was still more strongly confirmed in the view that\nSlade had power over spirits who performed the experiments for him.\n\nStill more far-reaching is the theory of Carl du Prel concerning the\nrelations of the material and the four-dimensional world. (Compare his\nnumerous essays in the spiritualistic magazine _Sphinx_.) Just as the\nshadows of three-dimensional objects cast on a wall are controlled\nin their movements by the things whose projections they are, in the\nsame way it is claimed does there exist back of everything of this\nsense-perceptible world a real transcendental and four-dimensional\n\u201cthing-in itself\u201d whose projection in the space of experience is what we\nfalsely regard as the independent thing. Thus every man besides existing\nin his terrestrial self also exists in a spiritual or astral self which\nconstantly accompanies him in his walks through life and whose existence\nis especially proclaimed in states of profound sleep, of somnambulism,\nand in the conditions of mediums. In this way Du Prel explains the\nwonderful feats of somnambulists, and the aerial journeys of sorcerers\nand witches. Whereas, ordinarily the separation of the material body from\nthe astral body is only effected at the moment of death; in the case of\nsomnambulists this separation may take place at any time, or, as Du Prel\nsays: \u201cthe threshold of feeling may be permanently displaced.\u201d\n\nIn view of the natural relations of such theories to the dogmas of\nChristianity it is explainable that theologians also have raised their\nvoices for or against spiritualism. While the _Protestant Church Times_\nbeheld in the \u201crepulsive thaumaturgic performances which these coryph\u00e6i\nof modern science offer, a lack of comprehension of real philosophy,\u201d the\nmagazine _The Proof of Faith_, expresses its delight at the discovery\nof spiritualism in the following manner: \u201cEvery Christian will surely\nrejoice at the deep and perhaps mortal wound which these new discoveries\nhave in all probability administered to modern materialism.\u201d\n\nWe shall pass by the childish opinion that the Bible also speaks of\nfour dimensions, as both in Job (xi, 8-9) and in the Epistle to the\nEphesians (iii, 18) only breadth, length, depth, and height, that is,\nfour directions of extension, are mentioned. Yet we will still add, as\nCranz has done, the reflections which Z\u00f6llner, as the most prominent\nrepresentative of modern spiritualism, has put forward respecting its\nrelation to the doctrines of Christianity (_Wissensch. Abhandl._,\nVol. III). By the foundation of transcendental physics on the basis\nof spiritualistic phenomena, the \u201cnew light\u201d has arisen which is\nspoken of in the New Testament. The rending of the veil of the Temple\non the crucifixion of Christ, the resurrection, the ascension, the\ntransfiguration, the speaking with many tongues on the giving out of the\nHoly Ghost, all these are in Z\u00f6llner\u2019s view spiritualistic phenomena.\nSimilarly, he sees a reference to the four-dimensional world of spirits\nin all those sayings of Christ in which the latter speaks to his Apostles\nof the impossibility of their having any image or notion of the place to\nwhich when he disappeared he would go and whence he would return. (Gospel\nof St. John, xiii, 33, 36; xiv, 2, 3, 28; xvi, 5, 13).\n\nUlrici, however, goes furthest in the mingling of spiritualistic and\nChristian beliefs; for he sees in the doctrine of spiritualism a means\nof strengthening belief in a supreme moral world-order and in the\nimmortality of the soul. In answer to Ulrici\u2019s tract \u201cSpiritualism\nSo-called, a Question of Science\u201d (1889) Wundt wrote an annihilating\nreply bearing the title \u201cSpiritualism, a Question of Science So-called.\u201d\nWundt criticises the future condition of our souls according to\nspiritualistic hypotheses in the following sarcastic yet pertinent words,\nwhich Cranz also quotes: \u201c(1) Physically, the souls of the dead come\ninto the thraldom of certain living beings who are called mediums. These\nmediums are, for the present, at least, a not widely diffused class and\nthey appear to be almost exclusively Americans. At the command of these\nmediums, departed souls perform mechanical feats which possess throughout\nthe character of absolute aimlessness. They rap, they lift tables and\nchairs, they move beds, they play on the harmonica, and do other similar\nthings. (2) Intellectually, the souls of the dead enter a condition\nwhich, if we are to judge from the productions which they deposit on\nthe slates of the mediums, must be termed a very lamentable one. These\nslate-writings belong throughout in the category of imbecility; they\nare totally bereft of any contents. (3) The most favored, apparently,\nis the moral condition of the soul. According to the testimony which\nwe have, its character cannot be said to be anything else than that of\nutter harmlessness. From brutal performances, such, for instance, as the\ndestruction of bed-canopies, the spirits most politely refrain.\u201d Wundt\nthen laments the demoralising effect which spiritualism exercises on\npeople who have hitherto devoted their powers to some serious pursuit or\neven to the service of science. In fact it is a presumptuous and flagrant\nprocedure to forsake the path of exact research, which slow as it is,\nyet always leads to a sure extension of knowledge, in the hope that\nsome aimless, foolhardy venture into the realm of uncertainty will carry\nus further than the path of slow toil, and that we can ever thus easily\nlift the veil which hides from man the problems of the world that are yet\nunsolved.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNow that we have presented the opinions of others respecting the\nexistence of a four-dimensional world of spirits, the author would\nlike to develop one or two ideas of his own on the subject. In the\npreceding section it was stated that everything that we perceive by our\nsenses is three-dimensional and that everything that possesses four\nor more dimensions can only be regarded as abstractions or fictions\nwhich our reason forms in its constant efforts after an extension and\ngeneralisation of knowledge. To speak of a two-dimensional matter is\nas self-contradictory as the notion of four-dimensional matter. But a\ntwo or a four-dimensional world might exist in some other manner than a\nmaterial manner, and for all we know in one which to us does not admit\nof representation. But in such a case, if it were without the power of\naffecting the material world, we should never be able to acquire any\nknowledge concerning its existence, and it would be totally indifferent\nto the people of the three-dimensional world, whether such a world\nexisted or not. Just as an artist during his lifetime produces a number\nof different works of art, so also the Creator might have created a\nnumber of different-dimensioned worlds which in no wise interfere with\none another. In such a case, any one world would not be able to know\nanything of any other, and we must consequently regard the question\nwhether a four-dimensional world exists which is incapable of affecting\nours, as insoluble. We have only to examine, therefore, the question\nwhether the phenomenal world perhaps is a single individual in a great\nlayer of worlds of which every successive one has one more dimension\nthan the preceding and which are so connected with one another that\neach successive world contains and includes the preceding world, and,\ntherefore, can produce effects in it. For our reason, which draws its\ninferences from the phenomena of this world, tells us, that if outside\nthe three-dimensional world there exists a second four-dimensional\nworld, containing ours, there is no reason why worlds of more or less\ndimensions should not, with the same right, also exist. But if now,\nas Z\u00f6llner and his adherents maintain, four-dimensional spirits exist\nwhich can act by the mere efforts of their own wills on our world,\nthere is surely no reason why we three-dimensional beings should not\nalso be able to produce effects on some two-dimensional animated world.\nWhether we have, generally, any such influence we do not know, but we\ncertainly do know that we do not act purposely and consciously on a\ntwo-dimensional world. If, therefore, Z\u00f6llner were right, the plan of\ncreation would possess the wonderful feature that four-dimensional beings\nare capable of arbitrarily affecting the three-dimensional world, but\nthat three-dimensional beings have no right in their turn consciously to\naffect a two dimensional world.\n\nThe supporters of Z\u00f6llner\u2019s hypothesis will perhaps reply to the\nobjection just made, that the plan of creation might, after all, possibly\npossess this wonderful peculiarity, that we human beings perhaps, in\nsome higher condition of culture, will be able to act consciously on\ntwo-dimensional worlds, and that at any rate it is simply an inference\nby analogy to conclude from the non-existence of a relation between\nthree and two dimensions that the same relation is also wanting in the\ncase of four and three dimensions. As a matter of fact, the objection\nabove made is not intended to refute Z\u00f6llner\u2019s hypothesis, but only to\nstamp it as very improbable. But despite this improbability Z\u00f6llner\nwould still be right if the phenomena of the material world actually\nmade his hypothesis necessary. That, however, is by no means the case.\nAlthough most of the phenomena to which the spiritualists appeal are\nprobably founded on sense-illusions, humbug, and self-deception, it\ncannot be denied that there possibly do exist phenomena which cannot be\nbrought into harmony with the natural laws now known. There always have\nbeen mysterious phenomena, and there always will be. Yet, as we have\noften seen that the progress of science has again and again revealed as\nnatural what former generations held to be supernatural, it is certainly\nwholly wrong to bring in for the explanation of phenomena which now seem\nmysterious an hypothesis like that of Z\u00f6llner\u2019s, by which everything in\nthe world can be explained. If we adopt a point of view which regards it\nas natural for spirits arbitrarily to interfere in the workings of the\nworld, all scientific investigation will cease, for we could never more\ntrust or rely upon any chemical or physical experiment, or any botanical\nor zo\u00f6logical culture. If the spirits are the authors of the phenomena\nthat are mysterious to us, why should they also not have control of\nthe phenomena which are not mysterious? The existence of mysterious\nphenomena justifies in no manner or form the assumption that spirits\nexist which produce them. Would it not be much simpler, if we _must_ have\nsupernatural influences, to adopt the na\u00efve religious point of view,\naccording to which everything that happens is traceable to the direct,\nactual, and personal interference of a single being which we call God?\nThings which formerly stood beyond the sphere of our knowledge and were\nregarded as marvellous events, as a storm, for example, now stand in the\nmost intimate connection with known natural laws. Things that formerly\nwere mysterious are so no longer. If one hundred and fifty years ago some\nscientists were in the possession of our present knowledge of inductional\nelectricity and had connected Paris and Berlin with a wire by whose aid\none could clearly interpret in Berlin what another person had at that\nvery moment said in Paris, people would have regarded this phenomenon\nas supernatural and assumed that the originator of this long-distance\nspeaking was in league with spirits.\n\nWe recognise, thus, that the things which are termed supernatural depend\nto a great extent on the stage of culture which humanity has reached.\nThings which now appear to us mysterious, may, in a very few decades,\nbe recognised as quite natural. This knowledge, however, is not to be\nobtained by the lazy assumption of bands of spirits as the authors of\nmysterious phenomena, but by performing what in physics and chemistry\nis called experiment. But the first and essential condition of all\nscientific experimenting is that the experimenter shall be absolutely\nmaster of the conditions under which the experiment is or is not to\nsucceed. Now, this criterion of scientific experimenting is totally\nlacking in all spiritualistic experiments. We can never assign in their\ncase the conditions under which they will or will not succeed. When all\nthe preparations in a spiritualistic s\u00e9ance have been properly made, but\nnothing takes place, the beautiful excuse is always forthcoming that the\n\u201cspirits were not willing,\u201d that there were \u201ctoo many incredulous persons\npresent,\u201d and so forth. Fortunately, in physical experiments these\npretexts are not necessary. By the path of experiment, and not by that of\ntranscendental speculation, physics has thus made incredible progress and\nhas piled new knowledge strata on strata upon the old. Accordingly, the\nprospect is left that the mysteries which the conditions and properties\nof the human soul still present can be solved more and more by the\nmethods of scientific experiment. To this end, however, it is especially\nnecessary that the physio-psychological experiments in question should\nonly be performed by men who possess the critical eye of inquiry, who are\nfree from the dangers of self-illusion, and who are competent to keep\napart from their experiments all superstition and deception. The history\nof natural science clearly teaches that it is only by this road that man\ncan arrive at certain and well-established knowledge. If, therefore,\nthere really is behind such phenomena as mind-reading, telepathy, and\nsimilar psychical phenomena something besides humbug and self-illusion,\nwhat we have to do is to study privately and carefully by serious\nexperiments the success or non-success of such phenomena, and not allow\nourselves to be influenced by the public and dramatic performances of\npsychical artists, like Cumberland and his ilk.\n\nThe high eminence on which the knowledge and civilisation of humanity\nnow stands was not reached by the thoughtless employment of fanciful\nideas, nor by recourse to four-dimensional worlds, but by hard, serious\nlabor and slow, unceasing research. Let all men of science, therefore,\nband themselves together and oppose a solid front to methods that\nexplain everything that is now mysterious to us by the interference of\nindependent spirits. For these methods, owing to the fact that they can\nexplain everything, explain nothing, and thus oppose dangerous obstacles\nto the progress of real research, to which we owe the beautiful temple of\nmodern knowledge.\n\n HERMANN SCHUBERT.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[79] This is discussed at greater length in my tract _Zahl und Z\u00e4hlen_ in\nVirchow-Holtzendorff\u2019s collection of popular essays, J. F. Richter, 1887.\n\n[80] Victor Schlegel, indeed, has made models of the three-dimensional\nnets of all the six structures which correspond in four-dimensioned space\nto the five regular bodies of our space, in an analogous manner to that\nby which we draw in a plane the nets of five regular bodies. Schlegel\u2019s\nmodels are made by Brill of Darmstadt.\n\n[81] Quoted by Cranz.\n\n\n\n\nCORRESPONDENCE.\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\nTHE RELIGIOUS OUTLOOK IN FRANCE.\n\n\nThe return of Mme. Hyacinthe Loyson to France after her American tour,\nundertaken, I understand, in order to obtain new support for the Gallican\nchurch, suggests the writing of this article, which will be a brief\nsurvey, from the point of view of an American layman, of the present\nreligious situation in France.\n\nAs P\u00e8re Hyacinthe\u2019s reform has been made the peg on which to hang this\narticle, perhaps I cannot do better than begin by an examination of the\nnoble but fruitless labors of the eloquent ex-Carmelite. While one cannot\nhelp being carried away by the oratory of Hyacinthe Loyson and charmed\nwith his personality, so full of wit, kindliness, and gentility; while\none must admire the devotedness and earnestness of Mme. Loyson and feel\nmuch sympathy for their studious and promising son Paul, one is convinced\nin spite of one\u2019s self that this latter-day Gallicanism is doomed to\nfailure if indeed it has not already failed. You have simply to visit\nthe poor little church in the Rue d\u2019Arras, in this city, to see what a\nmere handful of followers P\u00e8re Hyacinthe has been able to collect in\nthis great centre of two million people, after years of work and after\npreaching hundreds of magnificent sermons that would fill to overflowing\nthe largest edifice in America, Sunday after Sunday, if delivered\nwith similar eloquence by a divine of no matter what denomination or\nof no denomination at all. To the practical layman of this practical\nage no further demonstration is necessary in order to prove that P\u00e8re\nHyacinthe\u2019s mission is, as the French say, _un coup dans l\u2019eau_, that\nis, an effort which produces no result. Whenever I leave this humble\nchurch and am well out in the narrow, shabby street in which it is\nsituated and am away from the influence of the preacher\u2019s fascination, I\ncannot help exclaiming, What a waste of power, What a casting of pearls\nbefore swine! And all of Mme. Loyson\u2019s enthusiastic conversation in\nprivate, her accounts of the encouraging letters received by the P\u00e8re,\nfurtively of course, from discontented priests, and her statements\nconcerning the warm words of sympathy and support from the churchmen of\nforeign lands, cannot remove that abiding feeling that this rejuvenated\nGallican church movement is other than a dismal failure; more than ever\none exclaims: _C\u2019est un coup dans l\u2019eau_.\n\nP\u00e8re Hyacinthe has always received, in France as abroad, his greatest\nsupport from the Protestants. But Protestantism here in France is a\nsickly growth when compared, for instance, with its rich and sturdy\nbrother in the United States. It has, at most, only a small band of\nfollowers, nearly lost to view in the vast army of Catholicism and\nFreethought. Furthermore, the Liberal wing is losing ground and the\nOrthodox wing gaining slightly, not an encouraging sign in these days to\nthose who hope for the final triumph of faith over the growing tendency\ntowards infidelity. The real truth is that about the only strength left\nin French Protestantism to-day lies in the fact that there is a certain\n_\u00e9clat_ associated, in the eyes of the upper classes, with the being a\nProtestant, much as is the case in America and England, in the same rank,\nabout being a Roman Catholic. It distinguishes you from the multitude,\nand in these democratic times human nature, especially when it is that\nof the \u201cupper ten,\u201d is very keen for elimination from \u201cthe vulgar\nthrong.\u201d It is difficult for an American to comprehend this peculiar\nlittle streak of innocent vanity running through certain French circles\nwhich shows itself in this wish to be known as Protestants. It is not\ntoo much to say that to the impartial outside observer this phase of the\nFrench Protestantism of to-day is the one that first strikes the eye;\nwhich goes to prove in a peculiar but significant manner the weak hold,\non the one hand, which the doctrine of Luther and Calvin now has on the\nFrench nation, and, on the other hand, how universal must be scepticism,\nfreethought, and utter indifference to church and religion of every kind.\n\nIf native French Protestantism exerts so little influence on the nation,\nit is easy to imagine the excessive futility of the work of the foreign\nmissionary. There is a great deal said in American and religious circles\nabout the labors in France of the Salvation Army, the McAll Mission,\nthe Young Men\u2019s Christian Association, etc. I have received more than\none letter from would-be subscribers in the United States asking me if\nthese and other similar organisations were really accomplishing all that\nthey pretend. My reply is invariably that if you regard their labors as\ncharity work some good is being done, but if money is asked for because\nof the religious results which have been accomplished, the demand should\nbe considered to be arrant humbug. If P\u00e8re Hyacinthe, a Frenchman and a\nCatholic, after forty years of labor, has accomplished next to nothing,\nit is easy to imagine how this nation, so reserved in its relations\nwith the foreigner when he attempts to penetrate into its inner life,\nwould treat Scotch and Yankee missionaries. From a religious standpoint,\ntherefore, American money and sympathy is absolutely thrown away when\nit is sent to France. If it be answered that much misery and physical\nsuffering is relieved by these foreign missions, the French might well\nask if charity does not begin at home. The French are a peculiarly\nthrifty people. Few are poor, beggars are scarce and charitable\ninstitutions are rich and numerous. Hence devoting American dollars to\nthe relief of French distress is much like sending coals to Newcastle, if\nit is not a piece of sheer impertinence, like our protesting to the Czar\nagainst his Siberian convict system when we have one quite as cruel in\nfull swing in some of our Southern states.\n\nAnd now, finally, a few paragraphs about the great Roman Catholic\nchurch of France, the only religious institution of any real first-rate\nimportance in this country.\n\nWhile it is true that the Catholic Church, at least as a church, still\nhas a strong hold on the French nation, it is also quite true that\nindifference, infidelity, free thought, and atheism are on the increase.\nMatthew Arnold says, in his essay on Tolstoi, written in 1887: \u201cBetween\nthe age of twenty and that of thirty-five he [Tolstoi] had lost, he tells\nus, the Christian belief in which he had been brought up, a loss of which\nexamples nowadays abound certainly everywhere, but which in Russia, as\nin France, is among all young men of the upper and cultivated classes\nmore a matter of course, perhaps, more universal, more avowed, than it is\nwith us.\u201d Arnold might have enlarged, at least in the case of France, his\nlimits and stated that in the cities the middle and lower classes, too,\nparticularly the male portion, have abandoned Rome. One has only to visit\na Paris church to be convinced of the contempt which men feel for the\npriesthood and religion: you can count ten female devotees for one of the\nmasculine gender. In the village church, far away from the great centres,\nthe priest may still have the large majority of the population, men and\nwomen alike, as faithful attendants upon service. But even here, for one\nman who confesses, a dozen or score of women will kneel at the chair.\nThen again, this more general participation in religious ceremonies by\nthe rural population is due in a large measure to the fact that these\nSunday masses and vespers are almost the only break and variety in a very\ndead and monotonous existence. The church is a sort of meeting place,\nwhere whole families, babies, children, and adults, congregate. The hum\nof idle conversation, the crying of infants, and the ardent exhortations\nof the priest are often mingled in a manner that would astonish and shock\na pious Protestant, accustomed to the highly proper atmosphere of an\nEpiscopalian or Presbyterian Church in the United States.\n\nAnother sign of the disfavor in which French Catholicism finds itself\nto-day is seen in the quality of its future priests. You have simply to\nlook into the faces of the seminarists as they pass by you in procession\nin the streets of Paris to be convinced of the well-known fact that these\nyoung men are, for the most part, the faint-hearted and dull-headed sons\nof the peasantry, eager to escape the drudgery of farm life and not\nintelligent enough for business or the petty employments offered by the\nState.\n\n\u201cAnybody can make a priest,\u201d is often heard in France. The result is that\njust as the English army is the receptacle for the riff-raff\u2014the Tommy\nAtkinses of Rudyard Kipling\u2019s \u201cBarrack-room Ballads\u201d\u2014of the cities, so\nthe French priesthood draws most of its recruits from the scum of the\nfarming districts. This fact contrasts strongly, by the way, with the\nmanner in which the Protestants fill their pulpits. The young man who\nbecomes a pastor is not looked upon by his friends and companions as a\nfailure and a numskull. Quite the contrary; he is immediately classed\namong those taking a high moral stand. Some of the best families of\nFrance are descended from, or have relatives who are, clergymen, and they\nare quite proud of the fact; another example of that sentiment of halo\nsurrounding French Protestantism to which reference has already been made.\n\nAnother cause of this boycotting of the cloth as a profession by the\nyouth of the \u00e9lite is due to the Church having got on the wrong side\nduring the struggle for the foundation of the present Republic. The\nCatholics supported the Monarchists and Bonapartists and took an active\npart in the attempt to prevent the advent of republican institutions and\nto overthrow these institutions when they had been accepted by a majority\nof the nation. This unpatriotic course brought the Church into bad odor\namong republicans, so that the having a son in orders, for example, would\nbe apt to be an impediment to a father aspiring to political preferment,\nespecially if the latter belonged to the Radical or Socialist wing of the\nRepublican army. The result is that a whole great political party is, in\nits general tendency, opposed to the Catholic Church.\n\nNor is the harm occasioned thereby limited to lowering the quality of\nthe seminarists. It makes a vast number of intelligent and influential\ncitizens sworn enemies of religion. Thus, when Gambetta attended\nfunerals, he would not enter the church, but wait outside in the porch.\nWhen Louis Blanc was buried neither church nor priest participated in\nthe pageant. On the death of Henri Martin, a free-thinking Protestant\nclergyman officiated at the burial service. Hundreds of other prominent\nRepublicans, who have died or been buried since 1870, never entered a\nchurch, perhaps, except when their bodies were borne there by their\nfamilies, acting under the influence of its female members, or out of\nrespect for public sentiment.\n\nOne of the shrewdest acts of Leo XIII. is his recent declaration in\nfavor of the French Republic. He not only accepts the situation, but\nhas ordered the faithful, both ecclesiastical and lay, in France to do\nlikewise. But this demand has not been complied with without a murmur.\nMore than one priest and noble has shown himself more ultramontane than\nthe Pope. The important fact remains true, however, that officially\nthe Vatican recognises the political change in France, and, though the\nRepublicans, particularly those of the Radical camp, are wary of these\nnew converts and still believe with Gambetta, that \u201c_le clericalisme,\nvoil\u00e0 l\u2019ennemi_,\u201d yet the mere fact that the Vatican lays down its arms\nmeans a great deal, even if the hatchet may not be definitively buried.\nModerate Republicans, those who go to church even if they do not believe\nwhat is said there, think they see in this action of the Holy Father a\nnew source of strength for the Republic. And it seems to me that they are\nright, and that this view is the soundest. If the priesthood ceases its\nattacks on the political powers that be, and if these latter keep a sharp\nwatch, which will be done while the Radical and Socialist elements are so\nstrong in Chamber and Senate, the clerical party can be held in check,\nand the Republic will have so many less enemies, even if these quondam\nenemies are but lukewarm friends.\n\n THEODORE STANTON.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\nNEW FRENCH BOOKS.\n\n\nI am happy to have the opportunity in my present letter to speak\nof a book of real importance, _La pathologie des emotions, \u00c9tudes\nphysiologiques et cliniques_, by M. CH. F\u00c9R\u00c9. The name of this learned\nphysician of the Bic\u00eatre is sufficiently well known to dispense me from\nthe necessity of speaking of his personality, so that I can devote all\nthat I have to say to his work. Its great merit is not so much the\nnovelty of the psychological theory which is laid at its foundation, as\nthe wealth of facts presented and the sureness of the methods pursued.\nM. F\u00e9r\u00e9\u2019s mind is of a distinctly positive cast, and he possesses in a\nhigh degree the ability to draw from the thesis which he illustrates and\nconfirms, the various consequences which from a medical and social point\nof view this thesis involves.\n\nStates of intellectual consciousness, he writes, citing Spencer, cannot\nbe dissociated from emotional states. The emotions are the products\nof our mental representations of agreeable states or painful states,\nand are the stronger according as they contain a greater number of\npresent or nascent sensations competent to recall these states. The\nemotions, accordingly, being simply representations of states of\nconsciousness provoked by external excitations, it is to be presumed\nthat the physiological conditions of emotions (of central or cerebral\norigin) present a striking analogy, if not an absolute resemblance,\nto the physiological conditions of sensations (of peripheral origin,\neither internal or external); and this relation should be as prominently\nmarked in pathological as in normal states. The upshot of all this is,\ncontinues M. F\u00e9r\u00e9, that physical agents capable of modifying a state of\nconsciousness of peripheral origin (sensations), are also capable of\nmodifying states of consciousness of central origin (emotions). \u201cThe\nexternal signs of these different states of consciousness can be studied\nby the same methods. Psychology is only specialised physiology; mental\nmedicine only a specialisation of general medicine, from which it must\nborrow its methods of research and action\u2014all purely physical. The\ndemonstration of these relations is the object of the present work.\u201d\n\nThe work, which contains almost six hundred pages, presents no divisions\nbut that of chapters. But it would not be difficult to group its contents\nunder the four general titles: (1) physiological and pathological effects\nof physical agents on man; (2) physiological conditions and pathological\nand curative effects of emotions; (3) psychopathy and morbid emotivity;\n(4) the consequences to individuals and society of morbid emotivity, its\nmedical treatment, prophylaxis and legislation. The entire demonstration\nof M. F\u00e9r\u00e9, I might add, is essentially aimed at the two following\npropositions: the first, that all the symptoms of emotions possess a\ncertain resemblance to those of fatigue or physical pain; the other, that\nthe original source of morbid emotivities and their resultant disorders\nis a state of depression congenital or acquired.\n\nM. F\u00e9r\u00e9 reverts constantly to these fundamental ideas. After having\nexhibited, for example, the reciprocal influences of the emotions, or\ndisorders of the imagination, and of disorders which are of physical\norigin, he concludes that \u201cphysical disease and moral disease have the\nsame basis.\u201d It is thus only in appearance, he writes, that the mind has\nany influence on the functions of the body; the phenomena of mind are,\nquite the reverse, the necessary effect of certain modifications of the\nbody, and it is by the intermediary action of the manifestations of the\nbody that the representations of the mind act. It is found convenient to\nregard the gray matter of the brain as the central organ of the emotions,\nand the great sympathetic as the peripheral organ that presides over\ntheir \u201cexteriorisation\u201d; but we have no right to think of the emotions\nwithout their external signs, and we are thus led to the conclusion that\n\u201cemotion is essentially a generalised reflex phenomenon the centrifugal\npath of which is principally the great sympathetic system.\u201d\n\nA psychological question much debated since M. Ribot took it up, the\nquestion of _attention_, is also treated here, in an incidental yet\nvery interesting manner (Chapter III). M. F\u00e9r\u00e9 connects attention with\nthe study of the physiological conditions of physical action, and thus\ntakes sides, it will be seen, with the motory theory of attention.\nJames Sully, and others, have denied the existence of muscular phenomena\naccompanying attention. But physiology is in a position to disclose\nthe existence of these movements; it can study their qualities, their\nenergy, their form, their precision, and their rapidity. We will find\nin M. F\u00e9r\u00e9\u2019s book a number of new experimental facts establishing the\nthesis that \u201cmuscular tension constitutes the physiological condition of\nattention.\u201d \u201cThe mistake of many psychologists (M. Hirth, for example)\nhas been, that they have confounded rest with willed immobility, which\nfrom a mechanical point of view is very far removed from the former;\nfor immobility of will is precisely the result of very intense muscular\nactivities, and can only be produced by a general tension of the muscular\nsystem, which throws the subject in a state such that it can react the\nmost quickly and most energetically on any excitation, whencesoever it\nmay proceed.\u201d Willed, or voluntary, immobility is attention itself;\nto produce this state, well-enervated and well-nourished muscles are\nnecessary. \u201cWe may say,\u201d declares M. F\u00e9r\u00e9, \u201cthat the practice of\nimmobility is the most favorable exercise for the development of the\nmind: a system of education which should neglect this exercise would\nsuppress attention, it would be a regressive education.\u201d\n\n\u201cIt is lack of attention,\u201d he tells us further on, \u201cthat is the cause\nof the insensibility of hysterical patients, and it is instability of\nattention that is the cause of the variability of their sensory and\nmotory disorders.\u201d It is all due to the want of sufficient energy to\nbring simultaneously into a state of tension the muscular settings of all\nof the sensory organs. Hysterical an\u00e6sthesia according to him\u2014and how\nperfectly right he is!\u2014is nothing but a mental and psychical disease,\nwhich may be cured by _suggestion_; it is an organic malady, which cannot\nbe cured without the restoration of the proper organic state.\n\nWorthy of notice are a few pages on the existence of electrical\nphenomena, \u201cwhich are exaggerated in certain subjects, but which appear\nto exist in a more feeble degree in the normal states.\u201d The facts here\ninvolved might furnish us with a key to the phenomena of transmission,\npolarisation, elective sensibility, and certain actions at a distance,\nwhose solution still presents great difficulties. Also to be noted are\na number of corrections of inductions made by Darwin, whom ignorance\nof physiology often involved in mistakes concerning the true nature\nof phenomena: thus Darwin was often led to attribute an intentional\ncharacter to actions which are throughout reflex.\n\nBasing his views on the inevitable correlation of these two orders of\nphenomena, the physical and the psychical, M. F\u00e9r\u00e9 stands in a position\nof direct hostility to the metaphysics (of course, unconscious) of the\ngreat body of alienists. He selects the characteristic disorder of\ninsanity, namely hallucination, and sets about to show the existence of\nphysical phenomena concomitant with hallucination. Chapter XIII is one of\nthe most instructive of his work and well worth thoughtful perusal. Let\nus add on this point that M. F\u00e9r\u00e9 stoutly combats the doctrine, held by\nMagnan in particular, that all forms of phobia, that is to say, of morbid\nemotive states, are the brands of degeneration. He admits, however,\nthat a great number are connected with permanent constitutional states,\ncongenital or acquired.\n\nM. F\u00e9r\u00e9 accepts the pathological and degenerative theory of crime.\nBut he rejects in a measure Lombroso\u2019s thesis of the assimilation of\ngenius to insanity. Genius and talent, he says, are by no means devoid\nof intellectual and emotional anomalies, but it is not true that\nneuropathic states are the indispensable concomitants of genius, although\nsusceptibility to impressions is, when not developed to excess, one of\nthe physiological conditions of genius.\n\nWith respect to the social consequences involved, I will simply quote\nhis concise statement that \u201cphysiology is quite in accord with political\neconomy in condemning the intemperate generosity which favors the\ndevelopment and multiplication of emotive personalities.\u201d With regard,\nfinally, to the question of responsibility, M. F\u00e9r\u00e9\u2019s position differs,\nso far as I can see, in no respect from my own, which I have expounded at\nsufficient length in a former number of _The Monist_, to dispense me from\nthe necessity of reverting to it here.\n\n * * * * *\n\nOur next book is also a remarkable one\u2014_Les transformations du droit_,\nby M. G. TARDE, a small volume of some two hundred and twelve pages.\nM. Tarde has again and again declared himself the avowed adversary of\nSpencerianism, and of evolution generally, at least in so far as the idea\nof evolution is indiscriminately and unreflectingly employed, as is the\ncase, he maintains, in a great class of social questions which make up\nthe criminal and civil law. Everywhere in these domains, despite apparent\nuniformity, which is the simple effect of a perspective that effaces the\ndifferences of remote times, is found diversity. The serial stages of\ndevelopment professedly disclosed, he rejects as absolutely incompetent\nin the explanation of criminal law, procedure, the status of persons and\nthings, and obligations.\n\nIn criminal law, for example, we ordinarily regard the system of\npecuniary composition as the origin of penal justice, and the idea\nof vengeance as necessarily antecedent to the idea of culpability. A\nmistake, says M. Tarde. And he offers on this subject a distinction which\nis quite curious. He sees the defensive reaction made against criminal\nacts originally splitting up into two distinct forms of quite unequal\nscope: the one moral, the joint product of indignation and compassion;\nthe other vindictive, malevolent, and ruthless. The first, according\nto him, is exercised within the family and between members of the same\nsocial group; the second is displayed towards the foreigner and the\nenemy. Of these two sources of penality, the domestic moral punishment\nis the most important; the blow-for-blow policy, or vengeance, although\nmore apparent, is a secondary source. I fully admit that the instinct\nof sympathy, the primitive condition of all social aggregation, has\nnever been wholly absent from human relations, and it might be that\nthe distinction perceived by M. Tarde is well founded, although the\ntwo sources appear to have become so confounded in the justice of the\ntribunals that it is difficult to trace them to that point. But M.\nTarde seems to me to be too much disposed to flatter the portrait of\nthe primitive man and to make as \u201cmild as lambs\u201d these prehistoric\ncreatures whom we have pictured as \u201ccruel as tigers,\u201d and to be too much\npreoccupied with the ideas of penality and moral responsibility, which he\nthinks the new theories have compromised.\n\nWith respect to the status of persons, he denies the existence of the\nwell-known order of development by which promiscuity, matriarchy, and\npatriarchy are said to succeed each other. The tribe could only have\narisen, he tells us, from the federation of families, and the strong\nfamily, the one capable of development, could only have been patriarchal.\nIt is wrong, he adds, to regard uterine filiation, that is, the custom\nof considering a child the son of its mother and not the son of its\nfather, as a vestige of a pre-existent matriarchy. \u201cIn a patriarchal\nsociety, polygamy\u2014which is the very reverse of matriarchy\u2014ought in the\nvery necessity of things to give predominance to the custom referred to,\nso that children born of the same mother could be distinguished from one\nanother.\u201d This, indeed, was the idea of the Greek tragedians. The maxim,\nwhich occurs so often in Euripides, that it is not good that a man should\nhave several wives, is always disclosed as the anxiety of assuring the\nlegitimacy of children; \u00c6schylus charges Minerva to defend the \u201ccause of\nher father\u201d; it is one of the aspects of the reaction against the customs\nof Asia. The primitive family, says M. Tarde, in summing up, was quite\ndifferent in its original forms; it was here monogamic, there polygamic,\nand in other places polyandrous, at one time exogamic and at another\nendogamic, and so forth. \u201cMarriage, therefore, did not spring from a\nsingle typical form, nor does it, in its various forms, make towards\nsuch.\u201d\n\nHis criticisms are of equal strength with regard to the status of\nthings and the presumed priority of collective property. Contrary to\nthe views of M. de Laveleye, he is of opinion that the community of the\nvillage could only have arisen on an enlarged model of the community of\nthe family, \u201cjust as the vestal fire of the city could only have been\nlighted in imitation of the fire of the domestic hearth\u201d: The certain\neffect of the first must in its origin have been to encroach upon, not to\nproduce, the second. Excessively preoccupied in finding in the present\nthe vestiges of a state of things that is past, the evolutionists involve\nthemselves, regardless of consequences, in many na\u00efve and wonderful\ntheories, which M. Tarde, in his keen and pointed style, has not\nhesitated to expose. There is much point and a profusion of the _granum\nsalis_ in these instructive pages.\n\nWith respect to obligations, he makes a distinction, as in criminal law,\nbetween internal and external relations. Also, after having asserted\nwith Sir Henry Sumner Maine, the non-fusion of the law of nature and\nthe law of nations, he remarks that here also there exists two sources\nwhose waters have not subsequently flowed together: the _jus natur\u00e6_ is\nconceived to be the generalisation of a type of relations abstracted from\nthe internal relations of the members of the primitive social group; the\n_jus gentium_ to be the outcome of relations between men that belong to\ndifferent groups.\n\nIs, then, this disordered succession of the social data mere chance? The\nreader will bethink himself of a number of facts which go to disprove\nthis conclusion, and it is a difficulty moreover which M. Tarde has\nalso felt. He replies by making a distinction of \u201ctwo kinds of laws,\nthe laws of causation and the supposed laws of evolution.\u201d The first,\nwhich in his theory are analogous to the laws of celestial mechanics,\nwhose formul\u00e6 remain constant no matter what the history of the solar\nsystems distributed throughout the heavens may be, are the psychological\nlaws; the second are merely arbitrary formul\u00e6, which, when we come to\ndefine them accurately, do not admit of adaptation even to the majority\nof cases. The psychological laws of which M. Tarde here speaks are\nreducible to _imitation_[82]\u2014consequently to _invention_\u2014and to _logic_.\nI certainly do not propose to question the importance of these factors.\nIn a short tract published several years ago I pointed out myself that\nthe influences of contact are more efficient than the influences of race\nor even of climate, and this implicitly involves the idea of imitation.\nYet the character of the psychological factor does not, it seems to me,\nexclude a tendency towards a certain arrangement of the data of society,\ndespite their possible and actual diversity. \u201cWith respect to the facts\nof society,\u201d I wrote, \u201cwe point out their changes but do not succeed\nin disclosing the laws of their evolution; the most we have done is to\nnote amid the totality certain features which appear to predominate.\u201d\nTo extricate these features is a task not unworthy of the historian. M.\nTarde himself admits that results of this character have already been\nreached, and he especially points to \u201cthe splendid and commendable\nmovement in advance, which though not generally noticed[83] has,\nnevertheless, accompanied all juridical evolutions\u201d\u2014namely, the constant\nenlargement of the relations of law as the result of a growing sympathy\nand sociability.\n\nTo sum up, the point of view which M. Tarde has taken does not exclude\na class of researches different from his. Nothing can be better than to\nformulate the laws of the psychological agent, and M. Tarde, original\nmind that he is, has done this with a superiority and penetration to\nwhich I yield my unqualified admiration. At bottom, does not the view\nof Auguste Comte, despite his contempt for psychology, involve the\npreliminary study of the biological individual and the social agent?\nPsychological laws and physical laws undoubtedly meet in the same group\nof \u201claws of causation\u201d; still, it should not be forgotten that in the\nsocial order of things man is the creator of the facts and that his\ncreations react upon him in the proportion in which they are realised. At\nany rate, a tangible relation exists between the creations of the agent\nand the variations of the results, and it is not forbidden to inquire if\nthere does not also exist a certain order in these creations, the effect\nof which would be to produce a recognisable serial succession in the\nresults, a medial line about which the events of our life oscillate. A\ndifficult investigation\u2014and one in which M. Tarde has shown himself to be\ntoo speedily satisfied, and in which we should strenuously guard against\nhasty generalisations. It is unpleasant, we admit, to turn topsy-turvy a\nhouse in which we have long lived in comfort; but our contentment returns\nin an increased measure when we have replaced our things in their proper\nplaces, and swept out the dusty corners.\n\n * * * * *\n\nM. M. AGUIL\u00c9RA has just published a work entitled, _L\u2019id\u00e9e du Droit en\nAllemagne_. His book is a history of the different schools of law which\nhave arisen in Germany and lays especial emphasis on the fact that no\nnation has advanced as far as this in seeking in philosophical ideas the\nmotives and the justification of its acts, and he sets about showing how\nthe existence of Germany\u2019s special conception of law may be explained.\nGermany, he writes in his conclusion, everywhere starts from the idea of\nforce. Its peculiar characteristic is to bow before victorious force. And\nto this must be added, if we wish to comprehend its aggressive character,\nthe sentiment of vanity, which has led it to proclaim \u201cthat incredible\nformula: the ideal of Germany is the ideal of humanity.\u201d\n\nM. GEORGE LYON gives us a learned historical study, _La philosophie\nde Hobbes_. He points out how everything is interrelated in the work\nof this philosopher\u2014his conception of the state to his theories of\nethics, his ethical doctrines to his psychological theories, and the\nlatter to general principles concerning nature, thought, and their laws.\nBut he also presents with much force the objections to Hobbism. He\ncondemns its final consequence, which is submission to force. He points\nout finally the inevitable ambiguity which permeates this system in\nconsequence of the struggle \u201cbetween individual inspiration, which is\npurely ontological, and the action of an intellectual environment which\nis eminently empirical. Hobbes was the metaphysician of empiricism as\nBacon was its poet.\u201d I dismiss for the present all discussion of these\nsubjects; an occasion will present itself later of dealing with them.\n\nIn _Les races et les langues_ M. ANDR\u00c9 LEF\u00c8VRE sums up the state of\nthe science of language. The distinguishing characteristic of his work\nis the non-separation of language from the organism which has produced\nit, and the simultaneous presentation of languages with the ethnical\ngroups which speak them. M. Lef\u00e8vre accepts, let us note at once, the\nwell-known stages of the linguistic school\u2014monosyllabism, agglutination,\ninflection, and analysis, which M. Tarde, if he should unexpectedly\nbecome a philologist would stigmatise as gratuitous. Of the races, of the\nplaces of origin, and of the migrations of the ancient peoples he tells\na great many stories which are somewhat of the fairy-tale order, but\nthis reservation does not affect in the least the value of his special\nlinguistic researches.\n\nIn conclusion I shall mention _Le probl\u00e8me de la mort, ses solutions\nimaginaires et la science positive_, by M. L. BOURDEAU, and _Platon,\nsa philosophie, pr\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9 d\u2019un aper\u00e7u de sa vie et de ses \u00e9crits_, by M.\nCH. B\u00c9NARD, a new volume in the series of historical studies by this\nvenerable professor.[84]\n\n LUCIEN ARR\u00c9AT.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[82] See his work _Les lois de l\u2019imitation_ (Alcan, Paris).\n\n[83] I have called attention to this in a less definite manner in\nseveral passages of my book _La morale dans le drame, l\u2019\u00e9pop\u00e9e et le\nroman_, in which I shall have to incorporate the corrections which the\nsplendid studies of M. Tarde have suggested. For the citation given a\nfew lines above I ask permission to refer the reader to my _Journal d\u2019un\nphilosophe_ (Alcan, Paris).\n\n[84] All the works mentioned are published by F. Alcan.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK REVIEWS.\n\n\nEINLEITUNG IN DIE PHILOSOPHIE. By _Prof. Friedrich Paulsen_. Berlin:\nWilhelm Hertz. 1892.\n\nFriedrich Paulsen, professor at the University of Berlin, writes this\n\u201cIntroduction\u201d not so much for connoisseurs as for students, whom it\nmay serve as a guide. He discusses in general outlines the various\nfundamental problems of philosophy, at the same time indicating his\nown position, which, in more than one respect, is very similar to the\nphilosophy presented in the columns of _The Monist_.\n\nHis own view, which, as he trusts, is the general tendency of modern\nphilosophical thought, he calls \u201cidealistic monism.\u201d It is opposed, on\nthe one hand, to supernatural dualism, and on the other hand to atomistic\nmaterialism; the former being the traditional doctrine of the schoolmen\nand of ecclesiasticism, separating body and soul, nature and God, etc.,\neach into two distinct realities, which are accidentally combined,\nthe latter being an attempt, having its beginning in the eighteenth\ncentury, to explain all natural phenomena in a purely mechanical way.\nPaulsen adds: \u201cThe whole history of modern philosophy can be said to\nbe a continuous attempt to overcome this opposition.... The principle\nof natural science is the _Natur-Gesetzm\u00e4ssigkeit_ of all events....\nModern materialism derives from this a kind of metaphysics, represents\nall reality as a system of blindly operating physical forces....\nPhilosophy undertakes to dispel the opposition of these two doctrines;\nits proposition is\u2014and we may say that this is the main-spring of the\nentire evolution of modern philosophy\u2014_to reconcile the religious\nworld-conception with that of natural science_. There are many who regard\nthis aspiration as a sort of squaring of the circle, and we grant that\nsome similitude between the two may exist, for here as well as there we\ncan attain only to approximations, here as well as there we can never\nsolve the problem finally and forever. At any rate, we must recognise the\nfact that the whole philosophical thought of the last three centuries has\nbeen directed towards this goal.\u201d\n\nProfessor Paulsen classes the various philosophies of the present time\nas follows: (1) The phenomenalistic-positivistic philosophy which denies\nany absolute cognition of reality, least of all in physics; the world of\nobjects is a world of phenomena. (2) The idealistic monistic philosophy.\nTo define the nature of reality as it is in itself, we must rely upon\nthe data of our inner experience. The intellectual-historical world is\nto us the most comprehensible d\u00e9nouement of reality\u2014in fact, the only\ncomprehensible one. The ultimate idea to which we are led in tracing\nout facts, is this: Reality, which presents itself to our senses in the\nobjective world as a unitary system of motions, is the appearance of a\nspiritual all-being, which must be conceived as the evolution of some\nunitary idea. In this respect idealistic monism agrees upon the whole\nwith speculative philosophy, or rather with all idealism since Plato.\n\nThe philosophy of the present time is, further on, characterised (3) as\npassing from intellectualism to voluntaryism; namely, it allows the will\nto have its legitimate influence in the construction of a world-view. It\nis (4) evolutionistic-theological, which latter tendency meets half way\nthe above-mentioned idealistic monism. Both are beginning to permeate\nethics, sociology, jurisprudence, and politics. The old formalistic\nmethods are dropped and teleological considerations prevail. Purpose\nis recognised to rule in life. Lastly (5) the philosophy of to-day\nis historical. The older philosophy is mathematical-naturalistic or\nabstract-rationalistic. Speculative philosophy precedes the construction\nof an intellectual-historical world; it then attempts also to construct\nnature historically, at least in a logico-genetic schematism. Natural\nscience has already pursued this course in its cosmical and biological\ntheories of evolution. It is apparent how these tendencies follow the old\ntradition of harmonising the physical and the intellectual-historical\nworlds into one unitary conception of the whole.\n\nThe book is divided into two parts, with an introduction and conclusion.\nThe introduction defines the relation of philosophy to mythology and to\nthe sciences. Philosophy cannot be separated from the sciences. Says\nPaulsen: \u201cFiguratively speaking, reality is a great riddle proposed to\nman; all the various sciences determine some parts of it, and the attempt\nto solve the _whole_, to find the key to the _mysterium magnum_ of being,\nis called philosophy.\u201d\n\nThe first book treats, in two chapters, of the problems of metaphysics,\nviz.: the ontological problem and the cosmo-theological problem. In\nthe former chapter materialism, panpsychism, and the nature of the\nsoul are discussed, while the second chapter is devoted to atomism and\nteleological theism, implying such subjects as the theory of evolution,\ncausality, pantheism. The second part reviews, in the first chapter, the\nproblems of the theory of cognition, viz.: the idealistic arguments, the\nrealistic views, and our knowledge of the outer world. The second chapter\npresents an expos\u00e9 of the problems regarding the origin of cognition as\nviewed by rationalism and empiricism, paying special attention to Kant\u2019s\nformalistic realism. The conclusion is a brief treatment of some ethical\nproblems.\n\nIt is impossible to discuss all the details of the 444 pages of Paulsen\u2019s\nbook, but a few specimen quotations from the chapter \u201cPantheism and\nWorld-soul\u201d may be welcome to our readers. Our author asks: Considering\nall the tendencies of yearning and willing that appear in the innumerable\nforms of reality, is there a unity of inner life corresponding to the\nunity of the physical world in its universal interaction? The affirmation\nof this question constitutes the idealistic pantheism.\n\nIdealistic pantheism is to Professor Paulsen the simplest and most\nobvious construction of the world possible. To other world-views, the\nexistence of the soul is a problem; it has even been called an \u201cabsolute\nproblem.\u201d \u201cI believe,\u201d he adds, with great truth, \u201cthat there can be\nno stronger argument against any world-view than that it regards the\nexistence of soul as something absolutely mysterious.\u201d There is a power\nof conviction in idealistic pantheism verified by the astonishing\nagreement of the testimonies of many various thinkers in the Orient as\nwell as in the Occident, in antiquity no less than in modern times. (P.\n243.)\n\nSays Professor Paulsen: \u201cThe dayfly may imagine when the sun sinks that\nall is at an end; light vanishes forever and the whole world is swallowed\nup in darkness and death. But man who sees so many suns sink and rise\nshould have learned that in the infinite there are many possibilities\nwhich he cannot see at present [p. 241]. The conception of a world-soul,\nof a spiritual all-being, of a _mundus intelligibilis_ appears to our\nphysicists and physiologists in the same light as the conception of\nanthropomorphic deities\u2014as a childish dream. They have no need of this\nhypothesis [pp. 243-244]. Du Bois-Reymond declares that a naturalist\nbefore admitting the assumption of a world-soul should demand, \u2018that\nwe ought to find somewhere in the world neuroglia embedded in warm\narterial blood under the proper pressure and provided with appropriate\nsense-organs, ganglions, and fibres, corresponding to the intellectual\ncapacities of such a soul.\u2019 An animal,\u201d says Paulsen, \u201cneeds as a matter\nof course legs to stand upon and to move with, a stomach, teeth, eyes,\nand a central nervous system, but the All is not in need of this; it\nneeds no legs to stand upon and to move with, no stomach for alimentary\npurposes, no eyes, no ears, for there is nothing to be seen or heard\noutside of it, and so it can also dispense with a nervous system and a\nbrain.\u201d\n\nQuoting two passages, one from Fechner, the other from N\u00e4geli, to the\neffect that the system of fixed stars might be regarded as a group of\nmolecules in an infinitely larger whole which we should have to conceive\nof as a unitary organism, Paulsen says: \u201cIndeed, there is no objection to\nregarding a planet as a ganglion of the world-brain. Is it too large? No.\nWhy should not the world-brain have bigger cells than an animal brain. Or\nis its composition inappropriate? Why? We find in it the same materials,\ncarbon, oxygen, nitrogen, iron, phosphorus, and so forth, and also\ninnumerable interactions similar for all we know to those that take place\nin a ganglion. Who knows how striking would be the resemblance of their\nstructures, if we could but see a ganglion under a sufficiently powerful\nmagnifying glass.\u201d\n\nThese ideas are mere possibilities and are presented as such, but we\ncannot attribute to them any philosophical, scientific, or religious\nimportance. Our idea of \u201ca world-soul\u201d or, better, of God, is different\nand we avoid purposely anything that can be constructed upon the basis of\na vague hypothesis.\n\nWe ourselves reject pantheism, the view which identifies God and the\nAll for reasons which we need not repeat here. We call our view of\nGod entheism, and in forming our idea of God we purposely avoid such\nfantastical assumptions as considering the possibility of solar systems\nbeing molecules in the organism of a huge world-animal. Granted the\ntruth of this view, the mere possibility of which we cannot deny,\nthis extraordinary creature or world-animal would not be God, its\nwill would not be our moral authority; it would not be the eternal,\nthe immutable, the ground of all being, the ultimate rule of action,\nand the omnipotent universal law of existence: it would merely be a\ncreature like ourselves, only immeasurably bigger, evolving like other\nanimals and subject to the same or analogous or perhaps similar wants,\ndisappointments, sufferings, and joys as ourselves. What a miserable God\nsuch a world-being would be; we know nothing of him and he knows nothing\nof us. His will and aspirations would have even less influence upon our\naspirations, than, for instance, the hopes of a man upon the molecular\ngroupings in his tissues, we being only the parasites upon the crust\nof an atom of his tissues. We have presented our view of the subject\nin Vol. III, No. 2, pp. 249-257, of _The Monist_, in the third part of\nthe article \u201cPanpsychism and Panbiotism,\u201d with reference to a similar\nhypothesis incidentally touched upon as a possibility of monistic theism\nby Professor Romanes.\n\nWe simply state the difference between our position and that of Professor\nPaulsen concerning the nature of a world-soul without intending to make\nmore of it than he does himself; for, if we are not mistaken, it is with\nhim a mere suggestion.\n\nWe conclude our review with a passage which shows Professor Paulsen\u2019s\nattitude toward Christianity, which more than anything else proves the\ngeneral agreement of his work with ours. He says:\n\n\u201cThe Christian faith is not a philosophical system, not a theological\ndogma and still less the residue of an old superstition, but the\nimmediate and living certainty of the heart concerning the nature of the\ngood and its importance in real life. This faith can be to-day the same\nas it was in Luther\u2019s, or St. Augustine\u2019s, or the apostles\u2019 time who saw\nJesus with their own eyes bodily. If Christianity, did indeed consist of\na number of doctrines and opinions, it would certainly be true, as some\nclaim, that it has been dead a long time, for doctrines and opinions are\nnot long-lived. If Christianity really did consist of the belief in the\ncreation of the world five thousand years ago out of nothing, the rib\nstory of Eve, the story of Eden and the fall, etc., etc., ... then indeed\nit would be impossible for a thinking man of to-day to be a Christian.\nBut all that is not the faith of Christianity, it is not the religion of\nJesus. And if all the leaders of all the confessions declare that this\nis the Christian faith and that he who does not believe all these things\ncan have no part in Christ, their proposition must be rejected as untrue.\nNo one can be saved by believing these things; while the request of the\nchurch to believe in certain opinions set forth by men has expelled\nmany an honest man.... In the life and death of Jesus I have learned to\nunderstand the meaning of life and I call God and the revelation of God\nthat which makes my life possible and explains to me the significance of\nmy life.... Is such a faith compatible with the above-mentioned monistic\nworld-conception? My answer is, By all means.\u201d\n\nThis is Professor Paulsen\u2019s solution of the problem of a reconciliation\nof science and religion\u2014and we add that it is ours too.\n\n P. C.\n\n\nFIRST STEPS IN PHILOSOPHY. By _William Mackintire Salter_. Chicago: C. H.\nKerr & Co. 1892. Price, $1.00. Pages, 155.\n\nThis little book is divided into two parts: (1) Physical, (2) Ethical.\nIn the first, Mr. Salter discusses the conception of matter; in the\nsecond, that of duty. Mr. Salter\u2019s philosophical position is epitomised\nin a sentence which he quotes from Herbert Spencer. This sentence states,\nthat, \u201cwhat we are conscious of as properties of matter, even down to\nits weight and resistance, are but subjective affections produced by\nobjective agencies which are unknown and unknowable.\u201d Mr. Salter\u2019s\nphilosophical position, accordingly, is, first, Idealism, and, second,\nAgnosticism.\n\nIn ethics, Mr. Salter\u2019s view embraces Utilitarianism, or Hedonism, and\nIntuitionism, both of which, he says, are incomplete in themselves, and\nmust be supplemented by other elements. Utilitarianism makes happiness\nthe ultimate end; Intuitionism, virtue; and Mr. Salter adds, such an end\nmust embrace the \u201crealisation of _all_ our capacities.\u201d Mr. Salter\u2019s\nethical position has been before discussed in our journals.\n\nIf we study Mr. Salter\u2019s philosophical views, we shall find that his\ntheory is a reproduction of Berkeley\u2019s analysis of the data of knowledge,\nembellished by the results of modern physiological psychology. Yet Mr.\nSalter\u2019s theory, although it everywhere shows the traces of a close study\nof Berkeley\u2019s views, presents the strange historical anomaly of undoing\nBerkeley\u2019s work. Berkeley\u2019s undoubted aim was to place knowledge on a\nbasis of fact and refute, in a philosophical manner, the agnosticism,\nmetaphysicism, and transcendentalism prevalent in his day. But Mr. Salter\nadds to Berkeley\u2019s results the very things that Berkeley sought to\noverthrow, and thus renders the latter\u2019s analysis (and consequently his\nown) in need of an equivalent analysis.\n\nTake, for instance, the above-quoted sentence from Herbert Spencer, to\nwhich Mr. Salter assents. \u201cObjective agencies,\u201d \u201cunknown and unknowable\u201d!\nIs this consistent? All knowledge is a knowledge of sensations, a\nknowledge _of_ and _in_ the mind, says the idealist, and we cannot, by\nany process of ratiocination, arrive at things \u201coutside\u201d the mind. Yet he\nhimself, it seems, arrives at a knowledge of \u201cobjective agencies\u201d outside\nthe mind (pp. 65, 69), and, what is more wonderful, at agencies that are\n\u201cunknown\u201d and \u201cunknowable.\u201d Surely, this is not abiding by an analysis\nof the facts of sensation (Berkeley). It is as unrational a procedure to\ninfer metaphysical objective agencies, as it is to infer a metaphysical\nsubstratum \u201cmatter,\u201d which last is the error of the realist.\n\nAgain, take the notion of cause. Here, also, the same unwarrantable\nabandonment of the facts of sensation, i. e. of _all that is_, is evident.\n\nAt the end of an analysis, in which he shows that \u201call the choir of\nHeaven and the furniture of the earth,\u201d and \u201call which it inhabit,\u201d\nretreat and vanish in mind, Mr. Salter asks: \u201cBut is there absolutely\nnothing real and objective left? So far as sensible phenomena are\nconcerned, we must answer, No, absolutely nothing is left; the whole\nsensible (material) world is but an effect upon ourselves. But,\u201d he adds,\n\u201cit would be a hasty inference,\u201d on these grounds, \u201cto say that nothing\nwhatever is left.\u201d And when asked \u201cwhat is left,\u201d he answers, \u201call that\ncauses sensation.\u201d We can never know scientifically what these causes\nare, but \u201cwe have an inextinguishable faith\u201d _that_ they are, \u201cthere\nbeing no particular thing we are more sure of than that for every event\n(and every sensible phenomenon is an event, viz., in ourselves) there is\nsome kind of explanation or cause.\u201d To sum up: The theory of \u201csensible or\nphysical idealism\u201d[85] implies a \u201csupersensible or metaphysical realism.\u201d\nIn the theory of sensible idealism things only exist as sensations;\n\u201conly exist, that is, _save in their supersensible or transcendental\ncauses_\u201d\u2014which, says the author, we must always add.\n\nWhat is a cause? Cause is an abstraction. An abstraction from what? from\na real, physical world, or from a metaphysical, transcendental world?\nPlainly, from our real world, from Mr. Salter\u2019s world of \u201csensible\nreality.\u201d By what philosophical warrant, then, is this concept applied to\na world from which it has not been derived and to which it surely cannot\napply! It is wrong to speak of a cause of the All. The All has no cause,\njust as it has no weight.\n\nAll these difficulties arise from the notion that there are two kinds\nof knowledge and two kinds of existences. Idealism, to be consistent,\nmust be absolute; Mr. Salter\u2019s idealism is not absolute. This is exactly\nthe criticism that the reading of his book at once forces on one. All\nknowledge is knowledge of sensations, i. e. of reality; things not\naccessible to sensation are not real, they do not exist; consequently,\nall entities transcendental, metaphysical, and supersensible do not\nexist. This is the conclusion to which any philosophy, idealism, realism,\nor what not _must_ lead.\n\nNowadays, few people dispute the fundamental thesis of idealism (of\ncourse, expressed in different terms from those of Mr. Spencer\u2019s\nsentence). In a sense, it is established. Its only drawback is, that its\n\u201cestablishment\u201d accomplishes nothing. It leaves the problem of philosophy\nwhere it found it.[86] Reality is still reality. The same difficulties\nand perplexities exist. The universe still mocks us. And foremost among\nthe riddles that the world opposes to man, stands that eternal query:\n\u201cWhat is mind?\u201d Mr. Salter\u2019s views of this question will show us what\ncontributions his theory is likely to make to philosophy.\n\nMr. Salter defines mind as \u201cthat which experiences sensations and\nthoughts, or, more simply, that which feels and thinks.\u201d It is not\nfeeling, not thinking, but _that which_ feels and thinks. It is thus an\nagent, a subject. It is difficult to understand how this notion of mind\nis come at, without self-contradiction. In their origin, all notions\nof mind-subjects, mind-essences, mind-agencies, and so forth, are\nmaterialistic. They must be volatilised and stripped of their substantial\nattributes, if they are to take a place in an idealistic philosophy, and\nthen, as they \u201ccannot be ranged along with the sensible phenomena of\nwhich the mind takes cognisance,\u201d there is but one realm left to exist\nin, which is the transcendentalistic.\n\nAll this comes from carrying the abstraction by which \u201cmind\u201d is reached,\nto mathematically infinite limits. In this abstraction the world retreats\nand fades away into nothingness. And what is left? Not a single idea\nor fact by which we can fix our abstraction. Mind is all, and mind is\nnothing. It is not matter, not time, not space\u2014not even a mathematical\npoint, which we expect it to become in its infinitely contracting\nperspective. It has no attributes, no qualities; it is nothing and\nnowhere. This conception of mind, Mr. Salter says, is only mysterious as\nwe _make_ it so, by careless and inaccurate thinking. And Mr. Salter is\nright. It would require much careless thinking to make such a conception\nmysterious. A thing or notion that cannot be defined, placed, or brought\ninto connection with any other thing or notion in the world, is not\n_mysterious_, but simply does not exist. In that respect, it is as plain\nas day.\n\nThe same confusion exists in the discussion which disposes of the query,\n\u201c_Where_ is mind?\u201d The idealist, in Mr. Salter\u2019s sense, does not admit\nthat the mind is in, or in anywise spatially connected with, the brain.\nThe question, _where_ is mind? he says, has no meaning, any more than\nthe question, what is the color of a pleasure? This is true. Mind is an\nabstraction. In this sense it has no spatial existence. But the phenomena\nfrom which this abstraction has produced itself, _are_ linked with\nphenomena which have spatial existence, and in this sense the mental\nprocesses are not mysterious nothings and nowheres. When I lose that\ngroup of sensations called my leg, I know that, generally, I have lost\nthe feeling of my leg. So, also, when a certain part of that group of\nsensations called my brain is destroyed, I know that I shall then have\nlost my power of memory or of speech or of motion. I may also experiment\nwith other groups of sensations called dogs and cats, which I know have\nmental powers. In the light of these facts it is not correct, either in\nphilosophy or common sense, to say that mental processes are absolutely\nindependent of locality. I know that my thoughts are not connected\nwith the group of sensations I call the moon, and I know they are not\nconnected with that group of sensations that I call Mr. Smith. I am\nalways aware of them as connected with that group of sensations which I\ncall \u201cmyself.\u201d\n\nMr. Salter, in fact, half recognises this. He says, \u201cThe mind _is_\ndependent on the body in the sense that our general power of sensation\nand thought is connected with those sensations we call our body.\u201d Yet,\n\u201cwhy this should be so is mysterious.\u201d Indeed! One is inclined to ask\nMr. Salter here, what species of explanation or knowledge he wishes\nof this phenomenon. Is explanation, or knowledge, something more than\nthe recognition and seeing of a plain connection between the groups of\nsensations that constitute reality? In Mr. Salter\u2019s analysis, all the\nfacts of the world are mysterious. Why a thing is as it is and is not\nother than it is, is mysterious. He utterly fails to understand why\nthe power of perceiving colors is linked with the particular group of\nsensations he calls his eye, and why it should not just as well be linked\nwith some other group or no group at all.\n\nWhy do I see with my eye? Why do I not see with my hand or with the hairs\nof my head, or why do I not eat with my elbow, instead of my mouth?\nWhy do not stones fall upwards? Why do not magnets point towards the\nEast? Why do not the planets move about Jupiter or Saturn? Mr. Salter\u2019s\nquestion makes a jumble of the whole universe.\n\nIt is not the object of science or philosophy to find out why things are\nnot what they are, but to find out what they are. In this inquiry the why\nand wherefore, properly understood, will evolve themselves.\n\nScience simply concerns itself with the connection of the groups of\nsensations which the idealist, and for that matter every one else, calls\nreality. It cannot concern itself with anything else. All other things\nare artificial and self-made existences. Nothing exists but reality\nand the connections of reality. To seek for any other connections than\nthose that exist is absurd and futile. And to seek for any other causes\nor cause of relations than such as really are is also futile. Before we\nspeak of the knowledge of a thing we must analyse and define our notion\nof knowledge, and before we speak of the cause of a thing we must analyse\nand define our notion of cause. In our view, the relation which Mr.\nSalter doubts, is so intimately and inextricably one, that the causal\nrelation disappears. Neither is the cause of the other. We may, for the\npurposes of inquiry, start from either as our general concept, but we\nshould never go so far as utterly to expel from reality the other. True\nscience and philosophy are neither idealistic nor materialistic, but\n_real_. The two positions are extreme positions, and each is useful only\nas a safeguard against the errors of the others. Reality is reality;\nthat is the main thing. Whether it is idealistic or materialistic is of\nminor consequence. Besides reality there is nothing; its negation is\nnon-existence.\n\nWe do not wish in these criticisms to repudiate all that is in Mr.\nSalter\u2019s book. A great many of its reflections are helpful and\nsuggestive. We may refer, for example, to the passages in which the body\nis regarded as a gradually decreasing wall of separation between that\npart of reality which is known subjectively and that part which is known\nobjectively. This is really a unitary view. We believe, however, that if\nMr. Salter would carefully analyse the notions of knowledge, explanation,\ncause, effect, and, therefore, the notion of reality, he would not\npush his philosophy to the mysterious extreme at which it finally\narrives, and he would absolutely reject such unscientific conceptions\nas supersensible realism, metaphysical realism, and supersensible\nor transcendental causes. These render the reading of his book as a\nphilosophical help unsatisfactory, and leave the mind even more confused\nand perplexed than it was before. However, all discussions of this sort\nhave their value, and Mr. Salter\u2019s book possesses a virtue which few\nother philosophical productions can boast of: it is very short. The\nauthor\u2019s pleasant style will also add to the pleasure of its perusal, and\nif read critically the book will evoke much helpful thought.\n\n T. J. MCCORMACK.\n\n\nA REVIEW OF THE SYSTEMS OF ETHICS FOUNDED ON THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. By\n_C. M. Williams_. New York and London: Macmillan & Co. 1893.\n\nThis is a book, the perusal of which will leave the earnest student of\nmoral science full of disappointment. Not at all that it manifests any\nlack of ability or information. On the contrary, it is at once clearly\nand entertainingly written, and at the same time packed with notes and\ncomments that are full of interest and instruction.\n\nThe course of the book may be briefly stated. The first part, comprising\nnearly half of its six hundred pages, is devoted to the statement of\nthe ethical doctrines maintained by thirteen prominent writers, whose\nviews have been formed more or less under the influence of the theory of\nevolution, viz.: Darwin, Wallace, Haeckel, Spencer, Fiske, Rolph, Baratt,\nStephen, Carneri, H\u00f6ffding, Gizycki, Alexander, and Paul Ree. The rest\nof the book is the review of our author. This review is conducted under\nthe topical heads: The Concepts of Evolution; Intelligence and End;\nThe Will; Thought, Feeling, and Will in Evolution; Egoism and Altruism\nin Evolution; Conscience; Moral Progress in History; The Results of\nEthical Inquiry on an Evolutional Basis; and The Ideal and the Way of Its\nAttainment.\n\nThese are all topics of great interest and importance, and the author\nhas brought to the consideration of them a mind fully stored and\nentirely competent. But we look in vain for that discourse and criticism\nwhich above all other matters relating to moral science those who are\ninterested in human welfare crave from those who tender their reflections\nupon ethical topics.\n\nThe great need of moral science is the discovery and certification of its\nbasis. It is a need that far transcends the scope of mere moral science,\nfor upon its right determination depends the right determination of a\nmultitude of questions that deeply involve the welfare of humanity. It\nis a need that is not merely crying to be supplied. It is absolutely\nwailing. Could it only be rightly determined, mankind would fast enough\norient itself in the course of evolution and with undissipated energy\nwork out its best possible development. But undiscovered or uncertified\nit balks all process, save only that mechanical, halting, stumbling\nprocess that has hitherto obtained; a process that is, as all may\nobserve, one that has little if any inward co\u00f6rdination, but is full of\ninability and cross-purposes. Since it was the professed purpose of\nour author to review a number of the more prominent systems of ethics,\nwhich he esteems to be founded on the theory of evolution, his failure\nto notice and to comment upon so conspicuous a feature of moral science\nwould naturally lead a reader, unversed in the works noticed, to suppose\nthat those works had altogether slighted this topic. Such is, however,\nnot the case. With the exception of perhaps Darwin and Wallace, all\nthe writers reviewed by our author have given more or less attention\nto this matter, and they have left us in no doubt as to the positions\nwhich they severally hold. Most of them are Hedonists of one sort or\nanother. Haeckel, Carneri, Rolph, and Alexander are, we believe, the only\nexceptions.\n\nBut a more serious criticism upon the work under notice is suggested by\nits very title. That title as much as says that the various works which\nare reviewed by our author are \u201cfounded\u201d upon the theory of evolution, at\nleast in so far as their ethical doctrines are concerned.\n\nNow, what is the theory of evolution? What is its essential nature?\nDoes not its very form consist in the affirmation of an eternal secular\nmutation, in which there is no discontinuity whatever? It says that\nexistence in sum and in every detail is eternal and continuous process.\nIt uncompromisingly forbids all suppositions of any absolute beginning,\nor of any absolute end, or of any absolutely final adjustment. Hence, no\nsystem of ethics can with truth be said to be \u201cfounded\u201d upon the theory\nof evolution that ignores or forgets this essential character of it.\nNow, when we turn to the consideration of the various \u201csystems\u201d which\nour author supposes to be \u201cfounded\u201d upon the theory of evolution, we\nfind them, one and all, occupied more or less with suppositions of ends.\nAll are forecasting some \u201cideal\u201d condition, which, being attained, all\nchances of retrogression will be foreclosed and all possibilities of\nbetterment will be exhausted. In other words, they suppose an attainment\nof death, or rather an attainment of a death-in-life more utterly\nhorrible than any actual death can possibly be. The very first condition\nfor an ethics that will be truly evolutional must be the fit and full\nrecognition of a boundless horizon to evolution in morals as well as in\nall else. Emerson perceived the truth when he said in \u201cThe Sphynx\u201d:\n\n \u201cProfounder, profounder\n Man\u2019s spirit must dive;\n To his aye rolling orb\n No goal will arrive.\n The heavens that now draw him\n With sweetness untold,\n Once found; for _new_ heavens\n He spurneth the old.\u201d\n\nAnd at present, the most serious efforts to establish a truly\nclear-sighted ethics of evolution, with an unequivocal disavowal of any\nand all Hedonism, is made by the editors of _The Monist_. It, indeed,\nis the key-note of the missionary work that characterises all the\npublications of The Open Court Publishing Co.\n\nAny truly evolutional ethics must show itself a doctrine that applies\njust as well to regress as to progress. Evolution is too often confounded\nwith progress, but degeneration is just as truly evolutional as is the\ncontrary movement, and, looking the facts of existence in the face,\nmankind has no assurance of any unchangeable course of betterment. The\nprinciples of morals are, however, not dependent upon the benign action\nof nature. When the earth\u2019s stock of fuel shall become exhausted, or\nwhen the ice age returns, or when the sun grows cold, there will be no\nalteration thereby in the moral law. Good and evil must and will be\nthe same under all circumstances, and no system of ethics is nor can\nbe anything but a temporary makeshift, that does not as well fit the\n_diastoles_ as it does the _systoles_ of existence. We must look for\na doctrine that shall inform the conduct of men not only for the fore\npart of the day, when all is jubilant and bounding and man asks only\nfor some good task to do, but also for the evening and night, when man\ngrows weary and craves for rest; for not only youth and maturity, but for\nwaning strength, old age, and death; for not only the progressive era of\ncosmic history, but for the periods when natural conditions may disfavor\nmankind, when, say, man may gradually be so reduced in resources that\nthe same will barely suffice for simple life-preservation; when under\nthe stress of natural conditions the human intellect, in the course of\ngenerations, becomes step by step eliminated; when indeed humanity itself\ntends perhaps slowly, but with certainty, towards permanent extinction.\n\nThey who complacently protest that the theory of evolution leaves the\ndomain of moral science substantially unaffected are surely in great\ndefault either in their comprehension of the nature and implications\nof that theory, or in their powers of circumspection, while those who\nsuppose that moral science becomes evolutional simply because of a little\napplication of that theory to some of the subordinate questions that are\ninvolved, show themselves in a plight as bad as the others if not worse.\n\nOur author notices without dissent, and even with seeming concurrence,\nthe various remarks made by many of the writers reviewed by him in\ndiscredit of teleology.\n\nSince as we have before protested the theory of evolution forbids all\nsuppositions of any ends that are absolutely final, it of course follows\nthat teleology is in the strictness of its meaning inadmissible, even\nin ethics. But in dismissing teleology, let us not pour out the child\nwith the bath. However it ought to be with the interpretation of the\norder of nature as a speculative exercise, something that is analogous\nto teleology is an absolute necessity if ethics is to be anything more\nthan a curious study of human practise. The universe may manifest no\npurpose, design or secular tendency, but man is and can be nothing but a\nmiserable estray on the ocean of existence unless he sails on a course,\ninstead of merely drifting. To do this he must take something by which to\nsteer, and any plausible stability is better than no bearings whatever.\nAt any rate man is insuperably drawn to thus mark out his course. If the\ntheory of evolution forbids him to suppose any ends that are absolutely\nfinal, it does not prevent him from ascertaining directions. Indeed\nevolution affords him data of the very first importance for that behoof.\nInstead of ends we have aims and if ethics is to become that counsel and\nguide to humanity, which we yearn for so anxiously, it must ascertain\nand certify that single paramount aim to which all other tendencies are\nnaturally subsidiary. Teleology, or rather the determination of the aim\nof evolution, must prepare the foundation before any evolutional ethics\nthat is worthy the name can be established.\n\nAgain our author with considerable debate notices the remarks of\nthe writers reviewed by him on the old question of free will and\nnecessity,\u2014but like the positing of some end or aim to be subserved,\nfree will is one of the presuppositions of ethics. When man begins to\ndebate the possibility of rightly ascertaining the true end or aim for\nhis pursuit, or when he begins to moot the question of free will, he\nis debating not any question of ethics proper, but only whether such a\nscience is possible. Unless conditions and events are functions, as well\nof man\u2019s personality as of his environment; unless persons count for\nsomething in the variations of the course of nature, it is altogether\nvain and idle to be troubled with questions of morality.\n\nFree will and somewhat to be achieved are principles which whether well\nor ill founded, ethics proper must take for granted before it has or can\nhave any _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_. As for free will, however the metaphysicians\nmay have stumbled over their own feet, the common sense of mankind has\nnever wavered. As a practical question (and ethics is pre-eminently a\nmatter of practice) this question is not an open one.\n\nBut on the question of what is the true paramount aim for man to pursue,\nthe decision that shall finally satisfy man is yet to be made. The best\nproof that no satisfactory answer has yet been made is the fact that\nwe are still seeking an answer. As with regard to the needful prime\ncondition for a truly evolutional ethics we found wisdom in the poetical\ninsight, so again in this exigency we personally find the most profound\nethical philosophy in that same insight.\n\n \u201c\u2019Tis Life of which our nerves are scant.\n \u2019Tis Life, not death for which we pant,\n More Life, and fuller that we want.\u201d\n\n FRANCIS C. RUSSELL.\n\n\nDER PESSIMISMUS IM LICHTE EINER H\u00d6HEREN WELTAUFFASSUNG. By _Dr. J.\nFriedl\u00e4nder_ and _Dr. M. Berendt_. Berlin W.: S. Gerstmann. 1893.\n\nThe authors\u2019 aim is the refutation of pessimism and the foundation of\na higher world-conception. This latter is a pantheism spiritualised\nby moral ideals and contrasted to Darwinism and materialism. Natural\nscience is said to be the surrounding walls of the new view, furnishing\n(1) negative truths of criticism and (2) a knowledge of the positive\nfeatures of nature. The negative truths are: the impossibility of the\nexistence of a personal God, of the efficiency of prayer, of miracles,\nof the immortality of the soul, of the separate existence of souls\nwithout bodies. The positive results of natural science are the unity\nof nature, the indestructibility of nature, the harmony of the All,\nthe indivisibility of nature, the irrefragable necessity of natural\nprocesses according to immutable laws, and the freedom or independence of\nnature, as having its cause in itself, uncreated and uninfluenced by any\nextramundane being.\n\nNatural science alone, according to the authors, is not sufficient to\nconstitute the new world-conception. A one-sided view of natural science\ntogether with the obsolete conceptions of theism are exactly what has\nbrought forth the philosophical pessimism of our time. Natural science,\naccordingly, is not to be regarded as the sole source of truth; it is\nto be corrected by pantheism. The former teaches us \u201cto regard matter\nand its motion, so to say, as a dead inert substance to which motion is\nattached; it treats matter as an immediate reality. Pantheism, however,\nteaches that matter is to be conceived as the interrelation of the\ninnumerable live acts of will appearing successively in time and side\nby side in space,\u201d etc. The authors point out that the necessity of law\nwhich regulates the mechanical processes of nature does not exclude\nfreedom; for \u201cfreedom is not arbitrariness but is controlled by an\nimmanent _Gesetzm\u00e4ssigkeit_.\u201d\n\nThis summary is sufficient to characterise the ideas of the Drs.\nFriedl\u00e4nder and Berendt. We cannot say that they admit of no criticism,\n(e. g. their conception of natural science must be pronounced as too\nnarrow if not actually erroneous, nor should the law of the survival\nof the fittest be interpreted in the sense that strength means brutal\nforce,) but we can, nevertheless, express our sympathy with the aim of\nthe authors as well as with the spirit in which they pursue it.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nDIE PHILOSOPHIE UND DIE SOCIALE FRAGE. By _Gustav Engel_. Leipsic: C. E.\nM. Pfeffer. 1892.\n\nACHT ABHANDLUNGEN, HERRN PROFESSOR DR. KARL LUDWIG MICHELET ZUM 90.\nGEBURTSTAG ALS FESTGRUSS DARGEREICHT VON MITGLIEDERN DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN\nGESELLSCHAFT. Leipsic: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1892.\n\nWIE STEHT ES JETZT MIT DER PHILOSOPHIE, UND WAS HABEN WIR VON IHR ZU\nHOFFEN? By _Dr. Wilhelm Paszkowski_. Halle a. S.: F. Beyer, 1892.\n\nThis lecture by the well-known writer on the science of statistics\nand its related subjects was read before the Philosophical Society of\nBerlin on the 31st of May, 1890. It discusses the problem of socialism,\nor rather the aspirations of the German social democracy from the\nphilosophical point of view of the lecturer, which is a modernised\nHegelianism. This lecture drew forth on the evening of its delivery\nconsiderable discussion, which was participated in by Herr Kahle, a\nsocialist, and Herr Runze. The discussions of these gentlemen, together\nwith Mr. Engel\u2019s reply, are embodied in the pamphlet.\n\nThe second of these two pamphlets is also a publication of the\nPhilosophical Society of Berlin. It consists of eight treatises, essays,\nor lectures, which were presented by the members of the society to Prof.\nKarl Ludwig Michelet as a festival gift on his ninetieth natal day. The\nauthors of these eight essays are: Adolf Lasson, August Cieszkowski,\nGustav Engel, Friedrich Kirchner, Wilhelm Paszkowski, Max Runze, Georg\nUlrich, and F. Zelle. They deal with philosophical subjects, chiefly such\nas pertain to the Hegelian philosophy. Appended to the pamphlet is a\nbibliography of the writings of this Nestor of the Philosophical Society\nby F. Ascherson.\n\nThe author of the third pamphlet complains about the decay of philosophy:\n\u201cMetaphysics, the inner fane in the temple of science, stands desolate,\u201d\nand the last disciples of Hegel can no longer prevent the deluge which\nsweeps away the idealism of their grand old master.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nDER MATERIALISMUS, EINE VERIRRUNG DES MENSCHLICHEN GEISTES, WIDERLEGT\nDURCH EINE ZEITGEM\u00c4SSE WELTANSCHAUUNG. By _Dr. Eugen Dreher_. Berlin: S.\nGerstmann. 1892.\n\nThe author of this pamphlet, at present a docent at the University of\nHalle, feels somewhat oppressed by the materialistic tendencies of our\ntimes. His desire is to establish in the world a province of the ideal,\nand this domain of idealistic aspirations and hopes, he says, must and\ncan be based upon a scientific foundation. To reach this goal, the author\npropounds a philosophy which is confessedly dualistic, and which must be\nmade a kind of religion. Descartes\u2019s _Cogito, ergo sum_, is to him the\nbeginning of all philosophy. The existence of the All is devoid of sense,\nunless there is an ego to think it. This dualism, if made a religion,\nwill throw light upon the problems of the labyrinth of life.\n\nThe aspirations of the author are serious and noble. We cannot, however,\nagree with the results of his reasonings. He does not seem to have\nconsidered Kant\u2019s objections to the fallacy of the _cogito, ergo \u201cego\u201d\nsum_. Nor is he familiar with Lichtenberg\u2019s famous remark, that \u201cwe\nshould say by rights \u2018it thinks,\u2019 exactly as we say \u2018it rains.\u2019\u201d The\nsame moral conclusions at which the author arrives may be reached, the\nsame province for ideal aspirations in the world may be gained, the same\nreligious comfort may be found, without any surrender of the monistic\nview of the world. Materialism is an error of human thought. But the\nerror cannot be cured by dualism.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nUEBER DIE GRUNDFORMEN DER VORSTELLUNGSVERBINDUNG. Psychologische Studie.\nBy _Max Offner_. Marburg: R. Friedrich. 1892.\n\nThis little brochure is a carefully worked out study of the phenomena of\nassociation. The author\u2019s view is summed up in the following statement:\n\u201cThe attempt to reduce the phenomena of association, in conformity with\ntheir real nature, to one single ultimate process cannot be regarded as\nsuccessful, and we shall have to control our aspirations after a unitary\nconception and rest satisfied with reducing the various phenomena of\nassociation to two processes which are closely related, namely: (1) to\nan association of simultaneity; and (2) to an association of immediate\nsuccession.\u201d There is much that is suggestive in the sixty-seven pages of\nthis pamphlet.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nFINITE HOMOGENEOUS STRAIN, FLOW, AND RUPTURE OF ROCKS. Bulletin of\nthe Geological Society of America. By _George F. Becker_. Rochester:\nPublished by the Society. 1893.\n\nThis is a purely technical research, concerning the causes and form of\nthe discontinuity of rock masses. The studies presented are the outgrowth\nof field-work in the Sierra Nevada of California. This range is so\nintersected by false joints, schistose and slaty cleavages, that on a\nscale of one mile to the inch their average separation would be for the\nmost part microscopic. The dynamic manifestations in these regions are\nvery systematic. Some of the strains which have produced this phenomenon\nhave been infinitesimal, and others have been finite. Only the latter\nare here treated. Finite strain, the relations of stress to strain,\nthe nature of finite shear, viscosity, flow, plasticity, ductility,\nand rupture, the relation of plastic solids to fluids, the spacing of\nfissures formed by inclined pressures, jointing, and slaty cleavage,\nare the chief subjects discussed. The most important result of the\ninvestigation is that jointing, schistosity, and slaty cleavage all imply\nrelative movement and are thus as truly orogenic as falls of notable\nthrow. \u201cIn the light of this conclusion,\u201d says the author, \u201cit appears\nthat if one could reproduce the orogeny of the Sierra in a moderate\ninterval of time on a model made to a scale of one mile to the inch, it\nwould seem to yield to external and bodily forces much like a mass of\nlard of the same dimensions.\u201d\n\nThis pamphlet is neatly got up, and reflects credit upon the author and\npublisher.\n\n \u03bc\u03ba\u03c1\u03ba.\n\n\nDER ECHTE UND DER XENOPHONTISCHE SOKRATES. By _Karl Jo\u00ebl_. Volume I.\nBerlin: R. Gaertner. 1893.\n\nThere are two sources from which we have derived the main bulk of\nour knowledge concerning Socrates; namely, the writings of Plato and\nXenophon. The former is generally regarded as an idealiser, and the\nlatter as an historical biographer; for Plato simply uses the impressive\nfigure of Socrates to expound his own philosophy, while Xenophon, the\ngeneral, the politician, the historian, is supposed to give in the\n\u201cMemorabilia\u201d a simple and faithful account of what appeared to him\nworthy of being preserved. As Xenophon was not a philosopher himself, it\nis tacitly assumed that he had no reason to alter, to suppress, or to add\nhis own personal views to the historical account of the great master whom\nhe bore in grateful remembrance as a faithful disciple. There are some\nother sources; but they are less rich than those of Plato and Xenophon.\nAmong them must be mentioned several passages in Aristotle, especially in\n\u201cMagna Moralia\u201d I, p. 1182, a 15. Our author urges with good reason that\nthe Xenophontic Socrates is radically different from and even opposed\nto the real Socrates, and that we ought to rely more on Aristotle than\non Xenophon. Xenophon\u2019s \u201cMemorabilia,\u201d Karl Jo\u00ebl declares, is not an\nhistorical writing but a _Tendenzschrift_, and we have to be on our guard\nwherever Xenophon\u2019s special tendency comes in.\n\nSocrates is the representative of the philosophical spirit of Attica,\nand the character of his teachings may in a word be described as a noble\nand sublimated subjectivism. Socrates is a rationalist and as such he\nopposes the mysticism of the soothsayer and mantic. He goes so far in his\nrationalism as to identify knowledge and virtue. He cannot understand,\nfrom his point of view, (which regards the soul as a rational being\nonly and leaves out of sight the existence of impulses,) that a man can\nknowingly neglect to choose the better thing and choose the worse. Plato,\nin order to avoid the error of Socrates, invented the distinction between\nthe rational and irrational part of the soul and Aristotle criticises\nSocrates saying \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b5\u03b9.\n\nThe subjectivism of Socrates appears in his trust in the \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, the\ndivine voice within his soul, his rationalism in his constant request\nto gather information before beginning to act. He exhibits in his talks\ngreat irony; for instance, when telling a politician that as a shoemaker\nmust know his trade before making shoes, so he, the politician, ought to\nknow _his_ business before undertaking to manage affairs of state. Again\nand again he satirises the bungling levity of men who imagine that in the\ngreatest and gravest things of life they can act without any information.\nBoth the subjectivism and rationalism of Socrates appear in his constant\ninculcation of the Delphian motto \u201cknow thyself.\u201d\n\nWhat a different character is Xenophon! He was a convinced believer in\nmanticism. There are more than a hundred passages in his writings in\nwhich not rational forethought but the art of the soothsayer is left\nto decide the most important questions of practical life. When the\ncourageous ten thousand offered him the leadership in their dangerous\nretreat, his ambition urged him to accept, but he first asks the God,\nand the omens being unfavorable, he refuses. He did not accept the offer\nuntil he had received another more auspicious omen. In the same way\nXenophon acts throughout. All important decisions which prudence would\nurge, are made dependent upon sacrifices, dreams, or the flight of birds,\nand more than once the safety of the army is greatly endangered by a\nfatal passivity caused through unfavorable omens which prevent Xenophon\u2019s\nacting with decision at the right moment. It is no exaggeration to\nsay that these ten thousand Greek soldiers escaped only by good luck\nthe fate of the Athenian army in Sicily under Nikias. And this man,\na zealous believer in manticism, should be an impartial and reliable\nhistorian of the doctrines of Socrates? The \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd of Socrates is\nchanged into a mystic power, a kind of _spiritus familiaris_. It has\nceased to be the divinity of man\u2019s inner self as which it appears in\nPlato\u2019s account, and is represented by Xenophon as some peculiarity of\nSocrates which was given him as a special favor by the gods. Socrates\ndethroned the old fate that was supposed to rule the affairs of men\nand pointed out the importance of knowledge, for through knowledge we\ncan learn to regulate our fate ourselves. The philosopher who thought\nlittle of well-being, of \u03b5\u1f50\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u03b1, and demanded above all a well-doing,\nan \u03b5\u1f50 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd (\u201cMemorabilia,\u201d III, 9, 14, 15,) did not recommend asking\nsoothsayers questions where we should better ask ourselves, although it\nis probable that he recommended the Athenians to apply to the Delphic\noracle instead of relying upon omens not so much because he believed in\nprophesies, but because he thought that they would be influenced by the\nauthority of this venerable institution whose wisdom and conservative\nspirit were beyond question, so that good advice could be expected from\nit. Karl Jo\u00ebl, accordingly, advises us to read the \u201cMemorabilia\u201d with\nan inversion of the points, viz., to convert the sentences qualified by\n\u201calthough\u201d and \u201cto be sure\u201d into the main sentences and _vice versa_. In\nthis way we shall be able to distinguish between the pagan orthodoxy of\nXenophon and the rationalism of Socrates. Why does Xenophon not state\ndirectly and simply (1) Socrates advised his friend to ask the oracles in\nall cases of uncertainty, (2) manticism is indispensable in the economy\nof a household as well as of a state, and (3) the gods have not granted\nus any real knowledge as to a final success and reveal it through special\nrevelations. Why must he add long sentences introduced by \u201calthough\u201d?\nHe adds to (1) that everybody ought to act solely according to his own\nconviction, to (2) that all the trades up to the highest professions had\nto be learned before practiced, and to (3) that those who inquired at the\noracles for things which could be learned and studied in the usual way\nare crazy and even blasphemers.\n\nThis sketch may suffice to characterise the book which is much better\nthan could be anticipated after a perusal of the preface, which almost\ninduced us to lay it aside unread. It is not the modesty of the author\nwhich produces a prejudice but the random talk concerning things which\nneither a reader nor a reviewer will care to know. The author has\napparently no talent for writing prefaces, and he would be wise to omit\nthem in the future entirely. The book might be very much condensed,\nrepetitions avoided, and an alphabetical index certainly should have been\nadded.\n\nIt contains _five hundred and fifty-four_ pages; and the author says he\nis preparing a _second_ volume. We think it would have been better for\nhis views if he had expressed them in a pamphlet.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nA PERPLEXED PHILOSOPHER. Being an examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer\u2019s\nvarious utterances on the land question, with some incidental reference\nto his synthetic philosophy. By _Henry George_. New York: Charles L.\nWebster & Company. 320 pp.\n\nThe \u201cPerplexed Philosopher\u201d herein described is Mr. Herbert Spencer,\nand persons who like ginger in their ale will enjoy this book; for its\neloquent invective, hot from the heart, cheers us like that stimulating\ndrink. Because of this fiery and revengeful attack on Herbert Spencer\nmuch dignified reproof has been aimed at Mr. George by those excellent\npeople who religiously forgive the injuries done to others, and allow\nonly to themselves the luxury of retaliation; but when we consider the\nprovocation given by Mr. Spencer, this counter-blow of Mr. George is\nmild. Mr. Spencer had a critic\u2019s right severely or tenderly to condemn\nthe doctrines of Mr. George; and had he kept himself within his privilege\nMr. George in reply would not have had any right to assail the personal\ncharacter and motives of Mr. Spencer; but the older philosopher chose\nto treat the younger with supercilious disdain, and this was a personal\naffront that fully justified a retort personal. Scorn is an ignoble\nargument, lawful only in return for scorn.\n\nApart from the truth or error they contain, the writings of Mr. George\nhave achieved a phenomenal popularity; their influence on social opinion\nhas been in some directions almost revolutionary; they are to-day\nthe political creed of many men in different parts of the world, and\nespecially of many thousands in America, Great Britain, and Australia.\nThey are bold in theories, attractive in illustration, and admirable\nin their literary form. Their approval of \u201cSocial Statics\u201d was an\nadvertisement that multiplied by hundreds the readers of that book, and\nthere is no philosopher great enough to affect ignorance of Mr. George\u2019s\nwritings, or to dismiss them with a sneer. More copies of \u201cProgress and\nPoverty\u201d have been sold than of any other book on social economics that\never has been written, and when Mr. Spencer spoke of that book as \u201ca\nwork which I closed after a few minutes on finding how visionary were\nits ideas,\u201d he put on airs of aggravating superiority which naturally\nprovoked the resentment of Mr. George.\n\nAfter not reading the book Mr. Spencer condemned its heresies and said:\n\n\u201cThere is the movement for land nationalisation pressed by Mr. George\nand his friends with avowed disregard for the just claims of existing\nowners....\n\n\u201cAnd now this doctrine (that society as a whole has an absolute right\nover the possessions of each member) is being openly proclaimed. Mr.\nGeorge and his friends, Mr. Hyndman and his friends, are putting their\ntheory to its logical issue.\u201d\n\nTo that Mr. George replies as follows:\n\n\u201cIn nothing I have ever written or spoken is there any justification for\nsuch a characterisation. I am not even a land nationalisationist as the\nEnglish and German and American nationalisationists well know.... I have\nbeen a staunch denier of the assumption of the right of society to the\npossessions of each member, and a clearer and more resolute upholder of\nthe rights of property than Mr. Spencer has been.\u201d\n\nWithout waiting to inquire whether Mr. George includes within the \u201crights\nof property\u201d the right to property in land, it is enough to say that\nhere at least Mr. Spencer is at a disadvantage. He disarmed himself\nbefore going into battle by refusing to read Mr. George\u2019s writings, and\nscorning to examine them he accused them of communism, confiscation,\nand land-nationalisation. Mr. Spencer cannot now strike back for he\nhas thrown his weapons away. He is a prisoner in the hands of Mr.\nGeorge, who couples him with Parson Wilbur denouncing a print called the\n_Liberator_, \u201cwhose heresies,\u201d he said, \u201cI take every opportunity of\ncombating, and of which, I thank God, I have never read a single line.\u201d\nThe parallel is well drawn; and the lesson of it is this, never challenge\na man and then treat him with contempt; if you think he is not a foeman\nworthy of your steel, let him alone.\n\nHad Mr. Spencer studied the works of Mr. Henry George, he would have\nfound in them some doctrines having a manifest family likeness to\ncommunism, confiscation, and land-nationalisation; but they avail Mr.\nSpencer nothing, because he would not condescend to read the chapters\nwhere those revolutionary principles are. If he would bend his brow a\nmoment and examine them he might find that in this controversy there are\ntwo perplexed philosophers instead of one. In the book before us Mr.\nGeorge remarks:\n\n\u201cIt is this confusion of Mr. Spencer as to rent and value that has led\nhim into confusion as to the right of property; and that, at first, at\nleast prevented him from seeing that to secure the equal rights of men\nto land, _it is not necessary that society should take formal possession\nof land, and let it out_, and consequently, that the difficulties he\nanticipated in taking possession of improved land were imaginary.\u201d\n\nBut, in \u201cProgress and Poverty,\u201d Chapter II, he said:\n\n\u201cWe should satisfy the law of justice, we should meet all economic\nrequirements, by at one stroke abolishing all private titles, declaring\nall land public property, and _letting it out to the highest bidders in\nlots to suit_, under such conditions as would safely guard the right to\nimprovements.\u201d\n\nThe italics are ours, directing the attention to apparent contradictions\nwhich it is for Mr. George to reconcile. And, if English words have\nany meaning, \u201cabolishing all private titles\u201d means confiscation; and\n\u201cdeclaring all land public property and letting it out to the highest\nbidders,\u201d is land-nationalisation; at least, the ordinary reader\nmay innocently think so, yet Mr. George declares that he is not a\nland-nationalisationist.\n\nAs a personal defense and explanation Mr. George has a right to say that\nhe is not a land-nationalisationist, or a communist, or an \u201cist\u201d of any\nother kind, and we are bound to take his word for it, but in this dispute\nthat matter is wholly immaterial. The question before the meeting is\nthis, Is Mr. George\u2019s book a land-nationalisationist or is it not? Is it\na confiscationist or not? In \u201cProgress and Poverty\u201d Mr. George explains\nhis meaning thus:\n\n\u201cI do not propose either to purchase or to confiscate property in land.\nThe first would be unjust, the second needless. Let the individuals who\nnow hold it still retain, if they want to, possession of what they are\npleased to call _their_ land. Let them continue to call it _their_ land.\nLet them buy and sell and bequeath and devise it. We may safely leave\nthem the shell if we take the kernel. _It is not necessary to confiscate\nland; it is only necessary to confiscate rent._\u201d\n\nThe italics are by Mr. George; and a little farther on, he says;\n\n\u201cThat is the first step upon which the practical struggle must be made.\nWhen the hare is once caught and killed, cooking him will follow as a\nmatter of course.\u201d\n\nAnd several years afterwards, in \u201cProtection or Free Trade,\u201d page 302,\nMr. George describes the artful mechanism of the snare by which the hare\nis to be caught and killed:\n\n\u201cNow it is evident that, in order to take for the use of the government\nthe whole income arising from land just as effectively as it could be\ntaken by formally appropriating and letting out the land, it is only\nnecessary to abolish, one after another, all taxes now levied, and to\nincrease the tax on land values till it reaches as near as may be the\nfull annual value of the land.\u201d\n\nIn that paragraph \u201cgovernment\u201d is merely another word for \u201cnation,\u201d and\nthe taking away from private owners all the lands of the country \u201cfor the\nuse of the government\u201d is land-nationalisation, whether the taking be\ndone boldly by imperial decree, or furtively by taxing it up to its \u201cfull\nvalue\u201d and out of the hands of its owners.\n\nThe discrimination above made must apply to Herbert Spencer as well as\nto Henry George. Mr. Spencer has a right to qualify and explain as much\nas he pleases; he may properly say what he thinks now about the right of\nland-ownership, but the question at issue is this, What are the opinions\nof \u201cSocial Statics\u201d upon the land question? Are they not in principle,\nand very nearly in expression the opinions of \u201cProgress and Poverty\u201d?\n\nIt is not to be denied that \u201cProgress and Poverty\u201d found moral support\nin \u201cSocial Statics.\u201d In fact, the disciples of Henry George, whenever\ntheir doctrines were assailed, brought Herbert Spencer into the field as\na reinforcement. This, at last, gave Mr. Spencer great annoyance, and\nin a moment of irritation he determined even by a qualified recantation\nto withdraw the reserve brigade on which \u201cProgress and Poverty\u201d had so\nlong depended for assistance. Hence, his letters to the _Times_ and the\n_St. James\u2019s Gazette_, and the modification of his views which appears\nin \u201cJustice.\u201d He tried to do this by dropping Mr. George to the ground,\nwhile endeavoring to stand on consistent feet himself; and this it is\nthat inspires the vehement criticism of Mr. George.\n\nWith a scalpel most logically keen Mr. George has dissected Mr. Spencer\u2019s\nphilosophy of land, and with almost Indian exultation he exposes its\neccentricities and contradictions. As was inevitable, for we cannot\nget along without it, the old familiar Galileo moral is brought in by\nMr. George to prove that \u201cstill it moves.\u201d He is right; for if it is\nethically and politically true, as declared by Mr. Spencer in 1850, \u201cthat\nequity does not permit property in land,\u201d it will be true forever, and no\nextremity of recantation can make it false. The attempt of Mr. Spencer\nto show by duplicate metaphysics that his later opinions concerning land\nare not inconsistent with the occult meaning of \u201cSocial Statics,\u201d is\na failure. It cannot stand a moment before the searching analysis and\nlegible comparisons of Mr. George.\n\nThe attempt to resolve a concrete subject, such as government ownership\nof land, into abstract terms of justice limited or expanded by the right\nof some private person to the house on the land, and the barn, and the\nwell, and the fences, and the apple-trees, and other appurtenances,\ncorporeal and incorporeal, has involved Mr. George himself, as well as\nMr. Spencer, in some confusion of thought, and has entangled both of\nthem in varieties of statement not easy to reconcile. This might be due\nto obscure definitions and multiplied explanations, or to changes of\nopinion, but Mr. George asserts that Mr. Spencer\u2019s inconsistencies are\nthe result of moral and intellectual dishonesty, prompting him to explain\naway his principles to propitiate the landlords and other aristocratic\npersons who admitted him into their high society after he became eminent,\nand before they knew that his philosophy denied the right of private\nproperty in land.\n\nIn his letter to the _Times_, apologising for \u201cSocial Statics,\u201d Mr.\nSpencer said:\n\n\u201cThe work referred to\u2014\u201cSocial Statics\u201d\u2014was intended to be a system of\nPolitical Ethics\u2014absolute political ethics, or that which ought to be, as\ndistinguished from relative political ethics, or that which is at present\nthe nearest practical approach to it.\u201d\n\nAnd then the philosopher becomes a politician and frames for the landed\nand the landless a moral code, ambidextrous and elastic as a party\nplatform. Duty, justice, right, and truth, lose all their absolute\nqualities, and become relative to expediency and our own convenience.\nHe teaches us to oppose wrongs until they become vested rights and then\ndefend them. He makes ethics changeable as our coats, and the man who can\nafford two suits of clothes may have two suits of ethics, an \u201cabsolute\u201d\nsuit for Sundays and a \u201crelative\u201d suit for every day; an \u201cabstract\u201d\nsuit for wearing about the house, and a \u201cpractical\u201d suit for business\npurposes. He may wear a suit of \u201cpure\u201d ethics when buying, and a suit\nof \u201capplied\u201d ethics when selling; and so, at last, by those harlequin\nmorals, it happens that what we ought to do has no relation at all to\n\u201cthat which ought to be.\u201d Those pure subtleties and applied subterfuges\nmake Mr. Spencer an easy mark for the indignant sarcasm of Mr. George,\nwho shows what Mr. Spencer thought of absolute and relative ethics when\nhe said in \u201cSocial Statics\u201d:\n\n\u201cWhen a man admits that an act is \u2018theoretically just,\u2019 he admits it to\nbe that which, in strict duty, should be done. By \u2018true to principle\u2019 he\nmeans in harmony with the conduct decreed for us. The course which he\ncalls \u2018abstractedly right,\u2019 he believes to be the appointed way to human\nhappiness. There is no escape. The expressions mean this or they mean\nnothing.\u201d\n\nThe book is written in an angry vein, and the nicknames \u201ctraitor,\u201d\n\u201cjuggler,\u201d \u201capostate,\u201d and the like, add nothing to the value of its\nargument; they only give bitterness to the censure. They are not to be\ncommended, although they ought to be excused, for they sprang out of \u201ca\ntempest of provocation.\u201d Mr. George has been fighting under the banner of\nHerbert Spencer, and he feels like a soldier whose general deserts him in\nthe battle and then disowns him altogether.\n\nThe only rational explanation of Mr. Spencer\u2019s letters to the _Times_ and\nthe _St. James\u2019s Gazette_ is that he has radically changed his opinions\nabout the private ownership of land: and his timid, uncertain, and\nequivocal way of saying so makes him look very much like the \u201cperplexed\nphilosopher\u201d that Mr. George describes. At the same time it must be\nnoticed that Mr. George himself is not so radical in this last book\nas he was in \u201cProgress and Poverty.\u201d His principles appear to be the\nsame, but in the application of remedies he is milder than he was about\nfourteen years ago. When he reaches Mr. Spencer\u2019s age he may be just as\nconservative and \u201cperplexed\u201d as that philosopher is now.\n\n M. M. TRUMBULL.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[85] Mr. Salter\u2019s name for his theory.\n\n[86] Says Mr. Salter: \u201cIdealism (as here stated) is not, however, itself\na solution, being only a clear statement of what the problem is; and for\nall that such idealism can say, the problem may be insoluble.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nPERIODICALS.\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. IV. Nos. 4 and 5.\n\n DIE GRUNDEMPFINDUNGEN IN NORMALEN UND ANOMALEN FARBENSYSTEMEN\n UND IHRE ITENSIT\u00c4TSVERTEILUNG IM SPEKTRUM. By _Arthur K\u00f6nig and\n Conrad Dieterici_.\n\n IST EINE CEREBRALE ENTSTEHUNG VON SCHWEBUNGEN M\u00d6GLICH? By _Karl\n L. Schaefer_.\n\n UEBER EINIGE NEUERE FORTSCHRITTE IN DER ANATOMIE UND\n PHYSIOLOGIE DER ARTHROPODENAUGEN. By _Sigmund Fuchs_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. IV. No. 6.\n\n DAS TAPETUM LUCIDUM BEI DURCHLEUCHTUNG DES AUGES. By _Ziem_.\n\n BERICHTIGUNG ZU PROFESSOR M\u00dcNSTERBERGS BEITR\u00c4GEN ZUR\n EXPERIMENTELLEN PSYCHOLOGIE, HEFT 4. By _G. E. M\u00fcller_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)\n\n\nPHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. XXIX. No. 3 and 4.\n\n DIE \u00c4LTESTE FASSUNG VON MELANCHTHONS ETHIK. By _H. Heineck_.\n\n DIE MODERNE ENERGETIK IN IHRER BEDEUTUNG F\u00dcR DIE\n ERKENNTNISSKRITIK, II. By _K. Lasswitz_.\n\n DIE SITTLICHE FRAGE EINE SOCIALE FRAGE, II. By _F. Staudinger_.\n\n JOHANN EDUARD ERDMANN. By _B. Erdmann_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT. (Berlin: Dr. R. Salinger.)\n\n\nVIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT F\u00dcR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. XVI. No. 4.\n\n DIE STATISCHEN FUNCTIONEN DES OHRLABYRINTHES UND IHRE\n BEZIEHUNGEN ZU DEN RAUMEMPFINDUNGEN. (Part I.) By _R. Wlassak_.\n\n UEBER VERSCHMELZUNG UND ANALYSE. Eine psychologische Studie.\n (Part I.) By _H. Cornelius_.\n\n DIE WICHTIGKEIT DER REPRODUCTIONSGEF\u00dcHLE F\u00dcR DIE ENTWICKLUNG\n UND BILDUNG DES MENSCHEN. By _J. Zahlfleisch_.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. XVII. No. 1.\n\n UEBER DEN BEGRIFF DER WISSENSCHAFT BEI GALILEI. By _A. Riehl_.\n\n DIE STATISCHEN FUNCTIONEN DES OHRLABYRINTHES UND IHRE\n BEZIEHUNGEN ZU DEN RAUMEMPFINDUNGEN. (Concluded.) By _R.\n Wlassak_.\n\n UEBER VERSCHMELZUNG UND ANALYSE. Eine psychologische Studie.\n (Concluded.) By _H. Cornelius_.\n\n WERTHTHEORIE UND ETHIK. (Part I.) By _Chr. Ehrenfels_.\n\n A. VOIGT\u2019S \u201cELEMENTARE LOGIK\u201d UND MEINE DARLEGUNGEN ZUR LOGIK\n DES LOGISCHEN CALCULS. By _E. G. Husserl_. (Leipsic: O. R.\n Reisland.)\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. CI. No. 2.\n\n DOXOGRAPHISCHES ZUR LEHRE VOM \u03a4\u0388\u039b\u039f\u03a3. By _A. D\u00f6ring_.\n\n ERNST PLATNER\u2019S UND KANT\u2019S ERKENNTNISSTHEORIE MIT BESONDERER\n BER\u00dcCKSICHTIGUNG VON TETENS UND AENESIDEMUS. By _Dr. Arthur\n Wreschner_.\n\n JAHRESBERICHT \u00dcBER ERSCHEINUNGEN DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN LITTERATUR\n IN FRANZ\u00d6SISCHER SPRACHE AUS DEN JAHREN 1889 UND 1890. By\n _Adolph Lasson_.\n\n RECENSIONEN. (Leipsic: C. E. M. Pfeffer.)\n\n\nTHE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. V. No. 2.\n\n ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOLUNTARY MOTOR ABILITY. By _Wm. L.\n Bryan_.\n\n THE TRAINING OF ANIMALS. By _James E. LeRossignol_, Ph. D.\n\n ON THE JUDGMENT OF ANGLES AND POSITIONS OF LINES. By _Joseph\n Jastrow_, Ph. D.\n\n STATISTICS OF \u201cUNCONSCIOUS CEREBRATION.\u201d By _Charles M. Child_.\n\n EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AT WELLESLEY COLLEGE. By _Mary Whiton\n Calkins_. (Worcester: J. H. Orpha.)\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. III. No. 2.\n\n THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS. _Prof. Franklin H. Giddings._\n\n DID THE ROMANS DEGENERATE? By _Mary Emily Case_.\n\n POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PRACTICAL LIFE. By _Prof. William\n Cunningham_.\n\n GERMAN CHARACTER AS REFLECTED IN THE NATIONAL LIFE AND\n LITERATURE. By _Richard M. Meyer_, Ph. D.\n\n BOOK REVIEWS. (Philadelphia: _International Journal of Ethics_,\n 118 South Twelfth Street.)\n\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. II. No. 1.\n\n THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By _Prof. Otto Pfleiderer_.\n\n AN ANCIENT PESSIMIST. By _Prof. J. Clark Murray_.\n\n THE CONCEPT OF LAW IN ETHICS. By _Prof. F. C. French_.\n\n J. H. LAMBERT. By _Harold Griffing_.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. II. No. 2.\n\n KANT\u2019S CRITICAL PROBLEM. By _J. G. Schurman_.\n\n EPISTEMOLOGY IN LOCKE AND KANT. By _Prof. Andrew Seth_.\n\n ANTHROPOMETRY AND EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. By _Prof. E. B.\n Titchener_.\n\n DISCUSSIONS: Reality and Idealism. By _David G. Ritchie_ and\n _F. C. S. Schiller_.\n\n BOOK REVIEWS. (Boston, New York, Chicago: Ginn & Company.)\n\n\nTHE NEW WORLD.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. II. No. 5.\n\n THE PLACE OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL IN THE NEW TESTAMENT LITERATURE.\n By _Orello Cone_.\n\n THE FOLK-SONG OF ISRAEL IN THE MOUTH OF THE PROPHETS. By _Karl\n Budde_.\n\n COSMOPOLITAN RELIGION. By _C. A. Bartol_.\n\n THE ALLEGED SOCIALISM OF THE PROPHETS. By _A. W. Benn_.\n\n WHITTIER\u2019S SPIRITUAL CAREER. By _John W. Chadwick_.\n\n THE PERSONAL FACTOR IN BIBLICAL INSPIRATION. By _Marvin R.\n Vincent_.\n\n ISRAEL IN EGYPT. By _C. H. Toy_.\n\n THE BRIGGS HERESY TRIAL. By _C. R. Gillett_. (Boston: Houghton,\n Mifflin & Co.)\n\n\nREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. XVII. No. 12.\n\n LE MOUVEMENT PHILOSOPHIQUE EN RUSSIE: II. LA PHILOSOPHIE DE\n HEGEL ET LES CERCLES PHILOSOPHIQUES. By _E. Lannes_.\n\n LA COMPOSITION MUSICALE ET LES LOIS G\u00c9N\u00c9RALES DE LA\n PSYCHOLOGIE. By _M. Paulhan_.\n\n LA PSYCHOLOGIE DE W. JAMES (2nd article). By _L. Marillier_.\n\n ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 1.\n\n LA PSYCHOLOGIE DE W. JAMES (3d article). By _L. Marillier_.\n\n LA CROYANCE M\u00c9TAPHYSIQUE. By _J. Gourd_.\n\n LA BEAUT\u00c9 PLASTIQUE. By _L. Couturat_.\n\n ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 2.\n\n L\u2019UNIT\u00c9 DE LA PHILOSOPHIE. By _P. Janet_.\n\n L\u2019EXPRESSION OBJECTIVE EN MUSIQUE D\u2019APR\u00c8S LE LANGAGE\n INSTINCTIF. By _J. Combarieu_.\n\n LA PSYCHOLOGIE DE W. JAMES. (Concluded.) By _L. Marillier_.\n\n REVUE DES P\u00c9RIODIQUES \u00c9TRANGERS. (Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan.)\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 3.\n\n RECHERCHES SUR LA SUCCESSION DES PH\u00c9NOM\u00c8NES PSYCHOLOGIQUES. By\n _B. Bourdon_.\n\n L\u2019AMOUR EST-IL UN \u00c9TAT PATHOLOGIQUE? By _G. Danville_.\n\n SUR UN EFFET PARTICULIER DE L\u2019ATTENTION APPLIQU\u00c9E AUX IMAGES.\n By _Andr\u00e9 Lalande_.\n\n BEAUT\u00c9 ORGANIQUE ET BEAUT\u00c9 PLASTIQUE. By _A. Naville_.\n\n\nREVUE DE M\u00c9TAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 1.\n\n M\u00c9TAPHYSIQUE ET MORALE. By _F\u00e9lix Ravaisson_.\n\n LE CONTINU MATH\u00c9MATIQUE. By _H. Poincar\u00e9_.\n\n ESSAI SUR QUELQUES PROBL\u00c8MES DE PHILOSOPHIE PREMI\u00c8RE. By _F.\n Rauh_. (Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie.)\n\n\nVOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII.[87]\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. III. No. 15.\n\n THE AIM OF HUMAN LIFE. By _W. Rosanoff_.\n\n THE PROBLEM OF JUDGMENT. By _F. Charitonoff_.\n\n THE POSITIVISM OF KANT. By _A. Kozloff_.\n\n THE BASIS OF THE MORAL DUTY. By _N. Grote_.\n\n A CRITICISM OF MORAL ALTRUISM. By _W. Preobrajensky_.\n\n THE SENSE OF LOVE. By _W. Solowoff_.\n\n THE FOUNDER OF TRANSCENDENTAL MONISM. By _A. Wedensky_.\n\n THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY IN\n LONDON. By _W. Chige_.\n\n THE QUESTION OF ZO\u00d6PSYCHOLOGY. By _W. Wagner_.\n\n THE LAW OF PERCEPTION. By _N. Lange_. (Moscow, 1892.)\n\n\nPHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. VI. No. 1.\n\n UEBER DIE ACTUALE BESTIMMTHEIT DES UNENDLICH KLEINEN. By\n _Pohle_.\n\n GASSENDI\u2019S SKEPTICISMUS UND SEINE STELLUNG ZUM MATERIALISMUS.\n By _Kiefl_.\n\n DER BEGRIFF DES \u201cWAHREN.\u201d By _Franz Schmid_.\n\n DER BEGRIFF DES UNBEWUSSTEN IN PSYCHOLOGISCHER UND\n ERKENNTNISSTHEORETISCHER HINSICHT BEI ED. V. HARTMANN. By\n _Achelis_.\n\n DER SUBSTANZBEGRIFF BEI CARTESIUS IM ZUSAMMENHANG MIT DER\n SCHOLASTISCHEN UND NEUEREN PHILOSOPHIE. (Continued.) By _Carl\n Ludewig_, S. J. (Fulda, 1893.)\n\n\nSPHINX.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. XV. No. 84.\n\n NIRWANA. By _Menetos_.\u2014DIE WIEDERVERK\u00d6RPERUNGSLEHRE IM DRAMA.\n By _Ludwig Deinhard_.\u2014DIE GNADE. By _Maria Janitschek_.\u2014DAS\n FERNSEHEN ALS FUNKTION DES TRANSSCENDENTALEN SUBJEKTS.\n By _Carl du Prel_, Ph. D. (Concluded.)\u2014AN CARL DU PREL.\n By _Martin Greif_.\u2014SEHEN UND WAHRTR\u00c4UMEN. By _Hermann\n Haug_.\u2014UEBER DIE SPIRITISTISCHEN PH\u00c4NOMENE VOM PHYSIKALISCHEN\n STANDPUNKT. By _Dr. Anton Lampa_.\u2014SCHULD UND S\u00dcHNE. Ein\n Beitrag zur Frage der Telepathie. By _M. Const. Hoch_.\n (Concluded.)\u2014DIE G\u00d6TTIN DES GENUSSES. Eine Traumphantasie.\n By _Karl Friedr. Jordan_.\u2014FEGFEUER. Nach Fran\u00e7ois Copp\u00e9e.\n By _Rudolf Geering_.\u2014GERETTET! By _Raphael von Koeber_, Ph.\n D.\u2014MELANCHOLIE. By _Carl Vanselow_.\u2014DIE SECHS SCHW\u00c4NE. Ein\n Beitrag zum Nachweis des Esoterismus im Volksbewusstsein.\n By _Gottschalk Thorsten_.\u2014GEHEIMNISS. By _Adolf K. W.\n Hochenegg_.\u2014EINE GEISTERSTIMME. By _Hugo Gozdawa_.\u2014DER BEGRIFF\n DES ABSOLUTEN. By _O. Pl\u00fcmacher_.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. XVI, No. 85.\n\n LEBE DEINEM H\u00d6CHSTEN IDEAL GETREU!\u2014A-U-M. By\n _Menetos_.\u2014PSALMEN. By _Franz Evers_.\u2014MEISTER DER MYSTIK.\n By _Wilhelm von Saintgeorge_.\u2014AEGYPTENS GROSSE PYRAMIDE.\n Ein Tempel der Einweihung in die Mysterien. By _Eduard\n Maitland_.\u2014DIE DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT F\u00dcR ETHISCHE KULTUR UND\n HERR VON EGIDY. By _Hugo von Gizycki_.\u2014DIE MYSTIK DES ISLAM. By\n _Adolf Engelbach_.\u2014EIN ECHTER DIENER GOTTES. By _Dr. Raphael\n von Koeber_.\u2014EIN GEGNER DES SPIRITISMUS. By _Carl du Prel_.\u2014DIE\n WISSENSCHAFT DER MAGIER. By _Ludwig Deinhard_.\u2014HEBE DICH\n WEG VON MIR, SATAN! By _H. v. M._\u2014ANNA HENLE. Ein Erlebnis.\n By _H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden_.\u2014DER STERN DER SINTFLUT. By _Arthur\n Stentzel_.\u2014SELIGE GEGENWART. By _Maria Janitschek_.\u2014SEHNSUCHT.\n By _Carl Vanselow_.\u2014DAS ELFLEIN, DAS AUSGING, DEN K\u00d6NIG ZU\n SUCHEN. By _Bernhard Fabler_.\u2014DER BLINDE PASSAGIER. By _Ludwig\n Ganghofer_.\u2014FR\u00dcHLINGS ERWACHEN. F\u00fcr V\u00e4ter und Erzieher. By _O.\n Pl\u00fcmacher_.\u2014DREI KNOSPEN. By _Hans von Mosch_. (Brunswick: C.\n A. Schwetschke & Son.)\n\nWe cannot be accused of having any penchant for Theosophy or Spiritualism\nand find little occasion to praise their productions, which are usually\ncrude and illiterate. But we must confess that H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden\u2019s review,\nthe _Sphinx_, is greatly superior to anything in this field we have\never seen. There is artistic taste about it; there is, so far as its\nposition admits of, a certain contact with positive science; there is an\nattractive popularity without shallowness. All these means are skilfully\nemployed by the editor to impress his ideas, erroneous though they may\nbe, upon his public. If the magazine appeared in English, instead of\nGerman, it would at once become the recognised leader in its field.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[87] _Questions of Philosophy and Psychology._\n\n\n\n\n VOL. III. JULY, 1893. NO. 4.\n\n THE MONIST.\n\n\n\n\nNATIONALISATION OF EDUCATION AND THE UNIVERSITIES.[88]\n\n\nA little more than a century ago it was universally believed that, in the\nnature of things, the vitality of a republic and its size stand in an\ninverse ratio. The inadaptability of a republican system of government to\na state of vast territorial expanse and with a very numerous population\nwas considered an almost axiomatic, i. e. self-evident, truth. When the\nthirteen English colonies in North America had taken the bold resolution\nto transform themselves into the United States of America, many an ardent\npatriot often asked himself, not free from anxious foreboding, whether\nthe Union was within the limits laid down by irreversible political laws,\nas the utmost extent of republics fit to endure. If it had not been\nfor the size of the country, the doubts as to whether the republican\nexperiment was likely to prove a success, would never have assumed a\ncharacter, which gave sufficient color to the charge of monarchical\ntendencies, to make them appear well-founded in the eyes of so many\npeople. When afterwards a new empire was to be added to the Union by the\nLouisiana purchase, the doubt, as to whether the republican system of\ngovernment would be equal to the strain put upon it by such an immense\nenlargement of the area of the United States, played a not unimportant\npart among the objections of the opposition. That experience has\ndefinitively disposed of these ideas, by proving the apprehensions to\nbe unfounded, is no reason to think meanly of the political discernment\nof those who entertained them. It will not be universally admitted, that\nexperience has thus far proved them to be wholly unfounded also as to\nconsolidated republics. And how can it be wondered at, that at that time\nthe essential difference was not fully realised and understood, which\nexists between a federal and a consolidated republic with regard to the\npeculiar dangers and evils apt to arise from this specific cause. Though\nrepublican federations had been known to the world for two thousand\nyears, no instruction was to be derived from their history on this head.\nAs to the extent of territory, the consolidated Roman republic, which\nhad consumed its vitality with its growth, could alone be compared with\nthe United States; and as to many of the essential features of their\npolitical structure, neither modern nor ancient history furnished an\nanalogy. In the soil of the New World, the germs of European institutions\nhad\u2014adapting themselves to the new conditions\u2014developed into a new type\nof commonwealth.\n\nIt is conceded on all sides that, next to the capacity of the American\npeople for self-government, the United States owe it primarily to the\nhappy blending of the principles of National Union and State Independence\nthat, taking all in all, hitherto their history has been the most\nstriking and convincing vindication of republican institutions; and\nit is hardly questioned that, but for the happy blending of these two\nprinciples, a republic comprising half the North American continent and\npossessed of all the requisites of vitality never would nor could have\nexisted. Upon their being \u201can indestructible Union of indestructible\nStates,\u201d the vitality of the United States absolutely depends. That,\nwith this principle as the foundation, the domain of a republic _can_\nbe almost indefinitely extended, without thereby destroying its vital\nenergies, has been irrefutably demonstrated. But does that mean, that\nthe United States have definitively solved the problem of keeping the\nvital forces of a republic covering a vast area unimpaired? By no means.\nOnly the preliminary question has been settled by them for all time to\ncome, what the indispensable prerequisite of its solution is, and they\nhave thus far succeeded in preserving their vitality. But even as to\nthemselves, the solution of the problem itself has to be repeated over\nand over again, not only by generation after generation, but every year\nand every day. The hour never will, never can come, when the American\npeople can, with impunity, say: the task is accomplished; let us rest\nand enjoy the fruits. It never can come, because the problem itself is\nin a continuous state of transformation. Though the changes be so slow,\nthat they are imperceptible to the keenest eye trying to follow them up\nfrom year to year, they are none the less real, and if they are not duly\nheeded, the penalty will have to be paid some time in one way or another.\nWhile the fundamental principle, the blending of National Union and\nState Independence, is irreversible, the attempt to make its application\nimmutable, would be fatal. I say the attempt, for actually to do it, is,\nin the nature of things, impossible. The American people are not only\nconstitutionally a nation. The civil war did not result in the permanent\ndisruption of the Union, but in welding it more indissolubly together,\nbecause, with the single exception of slavery, the facts coincided with\nthe law. In spite of the tremendous sectionalising influence exercised\nby slavery, the nationalisation in feeling, thinking, and interests had\nmade such progress under the operation and protection of the law of the\nland, that it could stand as severe a test, as any consolidated State can\nboast of having stood. The causes, to which it was due, that the facts\nwere in conformity with the law, have been ever since unremittingly at\nwork,\u2014the counter-tendencies have disappeared with the abolishment of\nslavery,\u2014and, independent of that, those causes are every year acquiring\na greater force. The actual nationalisation, therefore, goes steadily on,\nwhether we like it or not, and though the constitutional nationalisation\nbe allowed to remain unchanged. While the legal status under the\nConstitution may not be altered for ever so long, we are confronted by\nconstantly changing conditions. If we do not conform in what we do and\nleave undone to the irrepressible changes of this evolutionary process,\nthe maintenance of the principle of blending National Union and State\nIndependence will avail us but little. The vital energies will dry up\nand ebb away, for while we have kept the form, we have become strangers\nto the spirit which renders it a magic force. Nor ought the dividing\nline between political parties to run, as in days of yore, on the\nquestion of State rights and consolidation. All discriminating patriots\nmust be as well State rights men as consolidationists, respectively\nconscious supporters and promoters of further nationalisation. Where and\nhow ought State independence to be strengthened, so as to prevent an\nover-consolidation by the silent working of those nationalising causes,\nwhich it is impossible to stem? and: Where and how ought consolidation,\nrespectively nationalisation, to be promoted, in order to make the\nworking of those nationalising causes conducive to the true interests\nof the people and to the invigorating of republican institutions? These\nare the two questions which the American people have constantly to ask\nthemselves. On the discretion and discernment displayed in trying to find\nthe correct answers must it depend, whether the federative principle will\nwork as well in the future, as it has done in the past.\n\nIf these propositions must be admitted, it can be proved that in no\nrespect is conscious and systematic nationalisation more imperatively\nneeded than in regard to education. At first sight this assertion may\nseem worse than extravagant. I am, however, not afraid to submit my case\nto the jury of the American people, if I am but conceded the legal right\nof every criminal, to be heard ere I am judged.\n\nEducation is the bed-rock on which this republic rests. However\nexcellent its political institutions be, its decay and ultimate\ndownfall is inevitable, if the people fail to do their full duty by\nthemselves in this respect. For, in a democratic republic, political\ninstitutions are live forces only so far as the people have the mental\nand moral requirements for working them well, and these mental and moral\nrequirements can be attained only by education. It is, therefore, in the\nstrictest sense of the word, a _vital_ question for the republic that\nevery one of its sons and daughters receive not only some schooling, but\nthat the education of all be proper and adequate. That is a tremendous\ntask. It constantly grows in scope and intricacy, and at the same time,\nit becomes of more and more import that it be well accomplished. With\nthe people rests the ultimate decision in everything, and the problems\nconfronting the commonwealth are assuming more and more a character,\ntaxing the highest statesmanship to the utmost. Thus the claims upon\nthe intelligence and the moral soundness of the people are fast being\nstrained far beyond anything ever known by any former generation in this\nor any other country. And lack of the required intelligence and moral\nsoundness in any one State necessarily affects the whole Union. A State\nthat is derelict to its duty in the education of its people, wrongs not\nonly itself, but also the nation. By its share in the federal government,\nevery State is directly instrumental in laying down the law for the whole\ncountry. All the States are thereby made to participate in the payment\nof the penalty for its intellectual and moral deficiencies. This is,\nhowever, by no means the only way in which they are made to suffer by\nthem. What the law does with regard to everything rendered federal by the\nConstitution; commerce, travel, and interchange of population do in other\nrespects. They are unremittingly and with ever increasing intensity at\nwork, multiplying and rendering more close the organic relations between\nall the parts of the vast domain, every water-way, railroad-track, and\ntelegraph line performing the functions of the veins in the animal\norganism. If the blood be poisoned in one limb, the virus cannot be\nprevented from working its way into the whole system.\n\nTo admit that education is in the highest degree a national\n_interest_, and to deny its being a national _concern_, is, however, a\nself-contradiction. To contest either the right or the duty of a nation\nto acknowledge every national interest a national concern, and to deal\nwith it accordingly, is a palpable absurdity. Not as to the Whether, but\nonly as to the How, can the people be restricted by the Constitution. A\nconstitution imposing upon the people an injunction to minister to the\nneeds of the commonwealth, would be as great a political monstrosity as a\nconstitution providing for the dissolution of the state.\n\nThis doctrine will not be allowed to pass unchallenged. I shall be\nasked whether I set myself against the universally accepted fundamental\nprinciple of American constitutional law, that the federal government\nhas no powers but those granted to it by the Constitution. I do not.\n\u201cWhere, then,\u201d my interlocutor will go on, \u201cdo you find the express grant\nor the implied power?\u201d Nowhere. \u201cThen you advocate a constitutional\namendment to the effect indicated by you?\u201d I do not. I know that such an\namendment could not get the vote of a single state, and if there were a\npossibility of its being adopted by the constitutional number of states,\nI should be found, to the last, among those fighting it tooth and nail.\nI can hardly conceive of a more suicidal measure than the adoption of\nsuch an amendment. Just because education is the bed-rock on which the\nrepublic rests, is it of vital importance that it does not become a\nfederal affair. Self-reliance and responsibility are the main pillars\nsupporting a democratic commonwealth. Kill, in the people of a state\nand the population of its subdivisions, the habit of self-reliance and\nthe sense of responsibility in regard to the substratum of the whole\npolitical and social structure, and they will wither and shrivel up in\nregard to everything else. The compulsion to tax themselves directly for\nthe establishment and maintenance of schools and the being in close touch\nwith those entrusted with the direction of the educational work are an\ninestimable boon to the people.\n\nEven if it were economically possible to do without direct taxes,\npolitical reasons would peremptorily forbid their abolishment. On\naccount of their moral effect, no state could dispense with them, and\nleast of all a democracy. All indirect taxes are paid more or less\nunconsciously; the people, however, must be kept conscious that the\npublic purse means their own pockets. The more they lose sight of\nthis, the wider the door is opened to paternalism, and paternalism is\na more deadly enemy of liberty than despotism and tyranny. These, if\nany vitality be left in the people, ultimately kindle the desire for\nliberty, while paternalism acts upon it as an opiate and ends by killing\nit through the systematic enervation of self-government. If this is\nto be kept alive not only in form, but also in essence and in spirit,\nthe people must constantly be held to teach themselves in illustrating\nby their own acts the irrefutable truth, that not the rights, but the\nself-imposed duties are the vital principle of true democracy. Nothing,\nhowever, is more apt to drive this all-important fact irresistibly\nhome, implanting it ineradicably in their whole feeling and in their\nconscious thinking, than the necessity to vote, as directly as possible,\nout of their own pockets the money required for preserving intact and\nin vigor the prerequisite of _all_ that is needed for the preservation\nof the nation\u2019s vitality. If it be not deemed irreverent, I should\nsay that every dollar a man voluntarily votes out of his pocket to\nprovide for the educational needs of the community, preaches to him a\npolitical \u201cSermon on the Mount.\u201d \u201cLiberty and self-government,\u201d it says,\n\u201cmust be paid for;\u2014state and society are in their very essence ethical\nconceptions;\u2014they must totter, fall, and crumble to pieces, unless\nthey rest on an ethical foundation;\u2014to preserve, broaden, and deepen\nthis foundation, by providing for the required intellectual and moral\nequipment of the generations in whose hands the future destinies of the\ncommonwealth will lie, is the paramount duty of the people;\u2014no one has\nthe right to exempt himself from doing his share in the fulfilment of\nthis duty, for the heirloom of the past, enjoyed by the present, is but a\ntrust to be left, with accrued interest, to the future;\u2014the fulfilment of\nthis duty ought to be considered rather a privilege than a sacrifice, for\nevery farthing paid for the maintenance of the humblest village school is\nan integral part of the nation\u2019s life-insurance premium;\u2014glory in this\nresponsibility to the whole country, for it constitutes you, with the\nwealthiest and mightiest, a joint builder of its greatness;\u2014glory in thus\nbearing witness by the fruit of the sweat of your brow, that you, too,\nare sworn in on the creed that man does not live by bread alone;\u2014glory in\nand render thanks for being thus held to keep ablaze in your own bosom\nand help kindle in the bosom of the lowliest child of the community, the\nsacred fire of idealism.\u201d\n\nThat by many, perhaps by most people, this appeal is not heard in\ndistinct words, I do not contest. But that is no reason to make light of\nit. Utterly lost it never is. Something of it sinks into the mind even\nof the dullest and most hard-hearted, though it be but in the form of\na faint and vague feeling. To make them lose this, is to deprive them\nof the best they have. Democracy is not a mill-pond, on which a fragile\nboat can outride the wildest tempest. It is the open sea, on which the\nproudest and stoutest craft is sure to be swamped, sooner or later,\nif it be not properly ballasted. True idealism, however, never was a\nmore essential part of the ballast, than in these times and in this\ncountry. It stands more in need of it than any other state, because its\nunparalleled opportunities are appallingly powerful incentives to plunge\nheadlong into the materialistic tendencies of the age. Therefore, it is\nruthless to lay hands on anything tending to keep alive and foster true\nidealism in the people. For this reason it would be, in my opinion,\u2014not\nin intention, but in effect,\u2014a dastardly crime, under any plea whatever,\nto release the people from the obligation to provide in their local\norganisations for the education of their youths.\n\nTherefore, I even deem it upon the whole more beneficial than detrimental\nthat many of the higher and most of the highest educational institutions\nof the country are the free gift of high-minded men and women to the\npeople. I have never agreed with those who have contended in this country\nthat the duty of the commonwealth does not extend beyond providing for\nprimary and, at the most, to some extent for secondary education, and\nthat it would not be fair and proper to tax all for the establishment\nand maintenance of colleges and universities, which, in the nature of\nthe case, only a small minority can frequent. It would be hard to name\na more promising sign of the times, than that this doctrine has of late\nlost so much of its former hold upon public opinion, that one would\nhave to search long for an advocate of it in its original rigor. It\nis eminently in the interest of all, that there be an ample number of\nmen and women who have received the highest education. Therefore, it\nis evidently not only justified, but imperative, that the commonwealth\nfurnish the means for supplying its want. But if the views held in this\nrespect on the continent of Europe had prevailed in the United States,\nthe American people would have been the poorer of one of the vastest and\nmost grateful fields for manifesting idealistic public-spiritedness. An\ninestimable loss, for idealistic public-spiritedness is not the least of\nthe causes to which it is due that American democracy has stood the test;\nand idealistic public-spiritedness, like every virtue, grows stronger and\nmore fruitful by being practised. Every donation for educational purposes\nprompts others to follow suit, and is, apart from its direct beneficent\neffects, a most valuable object-lesson to the whole nation. With equal\nimpressiveness, the rich and the poor are reminded of the treasures which\n\u201cneither moth nor rust doth corrupt.\u201d On every educational institution\nbrought into existence in such a way are indelibly inscribed the two\nmagic words to which this country owes it greatness: Help yourself,\nand Public Spirit; every one of them is a living protest, as well\nagainst paternalism\u2014whether it present itself in the socialistic or\nin any other garb\u2014as against the setting up of the golden calf as the\nidol of the republic. Therefore, everything tending to seriously check\nthese manifestations of idealism and public spirit in regard to higher\neducation would be deplorable, even if it were in itself commendable, for\npaternalism and materialism are too rampant to leave anything undone that\nis calculated to keep them down.\n\nTo contend that the existing decentralisation in regard to education must\nbe done away with, would, for these reasons, be a truly Quixotic charge\nupon windmills: the venture must result in broken bones. It cannot, and,\nif it could, ought not to be done, for this decentralisation is the\nnatural outgrowth of the whole historical development of the commonwealth\nand in perfect accordance with the underlying principle of its political\nand social structure. But it would be strange logic to conclude from\nthis that it can have worked no harm, or that the evil consequences it\nmay have had cannot be remedied. Can it be denied that, apart from the\nprimary schools, it sounds almost like mockery to speak of an American\nsystem of education? If we look at the schools of a higher grade, we are\nconfronted by a bewildering chaos, and the nearer the top, the worse the\nconfusion becomes. That the effects of this are not altogether good, will\nbe universally admitted, though opinions will differ as to the weight\nthat ought to be attached to the bad consequences in the aggregate and\nseverally. To me, some of them seem to be of a very serious character,\nand I hold that they must from year to year become of more consequence.\nTo say that somebody has been through a \u201chigh school,\u201d does not convey\nsufficiently definite information as to either the kind or the amount of\ninstruction he has received. To know that somebody is a graduate of an\n\u201cacademy,\u201d a \u201ccollege,\u201d a \u201cuniversity,\u201d means to know next to nothing as\nto his mental equipment. To gauge our man, we must inquire, What academy,\nwhat college, what university? Having learned that, we are in hundreds\nof cases not a whit wiser than before. We have to ask for the calendar\nof the institution, and, after having read that, we shall often be still\npretty much at sea, for, as the Germans say, \u201cpaper is patient,\u201d and the\nprinting of a first-class programme implies by no means of necessity\nfirst-class instruction. This may be considered by some of little or no\nmoment, because the degrees confer no rights whatever. But they are,\nnevertheless, not senseless gewgaws. If they be deemed such, their\nabolishment must be insisted upon, for then they are as much out of place\nin this country as orders or other meaningless titles. They are intended\nto be certificates of knowledge and mental training. If they lose this\ncharacter, they are nothing, or worse than nothing. It is, however,\nself-evident that they must be deprived of this character, exactly to\nthe extent that the educational institutions bearing the same name and\nconferring the same degrees differ from each other. Do you not think it\nmore than likely that, if a law were passed making it obligatory to add\nto the letters indicating a degree the name of the institution by which\nit was conferred, an astounding number of ornamental tails to names would\nbe cut off forever?\n\nThis would not be done, if the degrees merely failed to be definite and\nreliable certificates of knowledge and mental training. They do positive\nharm, because the institutions conferring them have little more in common\nthan the name, their educational standard differing in the extremes,\nas much as the crippled shrub and the sturdy oak. While the public do\nnot know what value to attach to the degree, a large percentage of the\nrecipients are betrayed into offensive and pernicious self-deception.\nUpon the official averment of their _alma mater_, they lay the flattering\nunction to their soul that they have received a much better intellectual\noutfit than they really possess. These institutions practically reverse\nthe precept of the Greek sage: not \u201cknow thyself,\u201d but \u201cdeceive thyself\u201d\nis the maxim imprinted on their diplomas. And this self-deception is a\nsubtle, contagious virus. It is at least doubtful, whether more will\ntake warning by looking through the false pretense, or be lured by it\ninto the same mistaken notions as to the requirements of genuine higher\neducation. To have practically no fixed standards for the different\ngrades of higher education must as inevitably have mischievous effects\nupon the intellectual life of a people, as its economic life must be\ndemoralised by allowing everybody to coin money of the same outward\nappearance, but of any alloy he pleases. Not that harm has been done by\nthe almost unlimited freedom enjoyed by the educational institutions\nowing their existence to private munificence, is to be wondered at; it\nis astonishing that the deleterious effects have not been much worse.\nA premium is offered for sailing under a false flag. If a college may\nbe called a university, and an academy a college, it would be more\nthan surprising if the grander name were not frequently preferred, for\nit flatters alike the vanity of the donors, the instructors, and the\npupils, and will\u2014with more or less reason\u2014be expected to work as a bait.\nWith the name goes the right to confer degrees, and the exercising of\nthis privilege is to serve the same purposes. But the name renders it\nnecessary to keep up appearances, and that is an expensive pleasure. The\nmasquerading in a pretentious guise cuts down the allowance of wholesome\nfood. Worthless universities instead of good colleges, inferior colleges\ninstead of satisfactory academies and fitting schools, are but too often\nthe result. No name will deprive the rose of its sweet scent; but the\nbuttercup cannot, with impunity, call itself a rose.\n\nThe worst, however, is, that even the best institutions of the higher\norder are made to pay a heavy penalty for the shortcomings of those of\nthe lower rank. Not getting the proper material, they do not turn out\nas good work as they in themselves might do. Much valuable time, which\nought to be devoted to going on with the building, must be spent in\nmending and strengthening the deficient foundation, which, after all,\ndoes not acquire the requisite solidity, because mending is necessarily\npatchwork. Nor is the damage confined to the pupils that have been sent\nup from inefficient schools. These act as a drag upon those who have\ncome adequately prepared. To render matters worse, the deficiencies are\nneither the same with all, nor is it known beforehand where they will be\nfound and how far they will extend. Neither are the curricula the same,\nnor is there any guaranty that the same curriculum means the same work\ndone. Here so many things have been taught, that everything has suffered\nin regard to thoroughness. There, specialisation has commenced so early,\nthat the basis is too narrow and too shallow. Training for a special\npurpose has encroached upon education. All these difficulties greatly\nhamper the institution. But they do more. They exercise a strong pressure\nupon it to stray from the right path, for they are powerful incentives to\nyield to the evil tendency, more to measure, than to weigh the work done.\nThis is, in my opinion, the most deplorable of all the bad consequences\nwhich the lack of a uniform system, resulting from the decentralisation\nof education, has thus far had; and it is all the more dangerous, because\nthe measuring principle is so well fitted to be clad in the seductive\ngarb of a lucid and clear-cut system.\n\nI do not expect that every one of my propositions will be universally\nassented to. But can any unprejudiced observer dispute that there is\nenough truth in what I have said to prompt the people seriously to\nponder the question, where this is going to end? If no conscious,\nenergetic, and concerted effort be made to counteract the evil effects\nof decentralisation, the very fact of higher education having assumed\nsuch a kaleidoscopic character renders inevitable its becoming more\nand more kaleidoscopic. The founders, boards of trustees, presidents,\nand faculties of new institutions are almost compelled to give their\nindividual notions on higher education, to a dangerous extent,\nfree scope. Having a hundred different patterns presented to their\nconsideration, the temptation is well-nigh irresistible not to adopt any\none of them, but to devise a new one. A new experimenting laboratory is\nset up. That its experiments will be, positively or negatively, of some\nvalue, is to be supposed. In most cases, however, the public interest\nwould have been better served by a good factory, renouncing the risky\nambition of dabbling with new inventions.\n\nA European is struck with wonderment that, considering the extent to\nwhich decentralisation in higher education has been carried, not\ninfinitely more harm has been done, and that the harm it does, seems to\nimpress the Americans comparatively so little. Neither can be understood,\nunless one fully realises to what a degree the American commonwealth\nis still in its formative period, and what an astounding educational\npower there is in American life. To the former it is principally due,\nthat the deleterious effects mentioned are here in fact of much less\nconsequence, than they would be, where the advantages of an historical\ndevelopment, counting by more than centuries, are paid for by the\nrigidity of age; and the latter supplements and corrects the work of the\nschools so effectively, that it is not surprising to find even many a\nkeen-sighted and highly accomplished American more or less blindfolded\nas to this. Because the ultimate results are satisfactory, it is taken\nfor granted, that the educational conditions of the country must be\nall right, while a searching critical examination irresistibly forces\nupon one the question, whether a good deal is not achieved in spite of\nthem. If this be so, failure to promptly attend to what is defective\nin them will surely be punished, for thanks to the rapidity with which\nthe United States are being filled up, their formative period is fast\ndrawing to a close, and with its close, the educational power of American\nlife will be, in some important respects, very sensibly diminished. The\npeculiar advantages, they have thus far enjoyed, are steadily growing\nweaker, while intellectually and morally, the difficulties confronting\nthe whole civilised world, and difficulties peculiar to them, are as\nsteadily making greater demands upon the people. Growth of population and\ndevelopment of economical life, with all its attending circumstances,\nconstantly working at the further nationalisation of the American people,\nand the problems to be solved growing more and more intricate, disaster\nmust become inevitable, if education does not keep abreast of this\ndouble movement; and this it cannot do, if we do not energetically and\nsystematically go to work to nationalise education without consolidating\nit. Nor have we any time to lose, for the task is by no means easy. Every\ninch of ground gained will be the price of an arduous and protracted\nstruggle.\n\nFrom the Federal Government no direct assistance is to be derived, for\nthe question is not within the province of its constitutional powers,\nand if it were, we ought not to ask its interference, because, as I said,\nto nationalise education without consolidating it, is to be the aim.\nPublic opinion, unaided by law, must effect the reform. Public opinion,\nhowever, is in this country even more powerful than the law. It is sure\nfinally to overcome not only all active, but even all passive resistance,\nwhich is always much harder to overcome. But is there any possibility of\never inducing public opinion to take the question up in full earnest? I\nam confident there is, and at all events it must be tried. The difficulty\nof the task is no excuse for not undertaking it. It only admonishes us,\nnot to waste time, strength, and enthusiasm in vain attempts to carry\nthe fortress by assault. The works are so extended and so strong that\nonly a methodical siege requiring a great deal of skill, patience, and\ndetermination, offers any chance of success. Two preliminary questions\nmust, therefore, be answered, ere operations can be commenced: who is to\nconduct the campaign, and by what tactics can the approaches be pushed on\nthe fastest?\n\nThe answer to be given to the first question is plain. The instructors\nare to be considered the experts, if anybody can claim the title. Upon\nthem, therefore, devolves the duty to take the lead. This they have\nalready commenced to do. The very existence of a National Educational\n(Teacher\u2019s) Association is in itself irrefutable proof that the opinions\nadvanced by me, have, in some way and to some extent, asserted themselves\nfor some time. How this has been done and what has been effected, I do\nnot feel called upon to discuss. I merely state that while I appreciate\nwhat it has done and expect from it still more in the future, I am\nfirmly convinced that the goal can never be reached if we are to content\nourselves with what this organisation is capable of achieving. This\nwill be deemed the less disparaging, if I furthermore state that, in my\nopinion, the end could no more be attained by any other organisation\nacting singlehanded. Hunting for any one device which will as certainly\neffect a cure as patent medicines claim to cure bodily ailments, is but\nto waste time. The evil has to be attacked from many points and in many\nways, if sanitation is to set in.\n\nWhile I am fully persuaded of this, I am, however, on the other hand as\nfirmly convinced that nothing will be of avail if the Universities do\nnot step forward, heading the column of attack and adding compulsion to\nsuasion. The reform has to be worked from the top downward. At present\nthe law is, to a great extent, dictated by the schools of the lower\ngrade to those of the higher. This must be reversed. The Universities\nmust insist upon getting the proper material for doing what in their\njudgment is the proper work. They must cease fitting themselves to what\nthe schools are pleased to send them. By closing their doors against\nall applicants whom they do not really deem adequately prepared, they\nmust compel the schools, either to take down from their portals the\ninscription \u201cfitting school,\u201d or to mend their ways and furnish their\npupils the kind and the amount of instruction they ought. A University\nthat meekly submits to travel on whatever roads some hundreds of schools,\nwhich all more or less follow their own notions, happen to think good\nenough, never can be a University except in name. No institution has a\nmoral right to the proud name of University that does not, consciously\nand determinately, do all that is in its power to direct its educational\npolicy solely by what the civilisation of the age and the true interests\nof the nation require.\n\nI wish the old maxim _ultra posse nemo obligatur_ did not compel me to\nsay \u201cto do all that is in its power,\u201d for I am but too well aware how\ndeplorably little that is in many cases. State Universities are subject\nto another will, and this other will is apt to have very much its own\nnotions as to how much a University may be allowed to cost, and to\ndetermine the standard of the University entirely by the local standard\nof schools. Other Universities, though legally their own masters, are\npractically restrained as much or even more by implacable facts. No\nUniversity can entirely dispense with students, and the endowment of more\nthan one University forbids its making light of the number of students it\ncan secure. Being to some extent dependent upon the students for their\nmaintenance, they cannot afford to be very fastidious in regard to the\nstandard of schools they try to enlist into their constituency. But there\nis also a goodly number of Universities whose position is in absolutely\nevery respect so strong that they can enter the lists without any risk\nwhatever to themselves. Whether they stop growing for a while or even\ndecline in numbers for some years does not affect their future in the\nleast. They are so much in quest by students that the fitting schools\nare sure to make haste to meet their requirements, if these rise above\ntheir curriculum. To move on in wild leaps would, of course, be foolish.\nBut so long as these Universities do not do that they never need to look\nbackward in their onward march; their whole constituency of schools must\nfollow close upon their heels, because they cannot afford to bolt and\ndrop out. The more the leading Universities proceed upon a concerted\nplan, the larger the circle would grow, within which their joint pressure\nwould be irresistible: the strength of each would be doubled by pressing\non, shoulder to shoulder with the others, on the same lines. At the same\ntime it will make it correspondingly easier for the weaker ones to follow\nin their wake. How could it fail to make an impression upon those on\nwhom they depend, if they can back their pleas by urging the practical\nunanimity of all the foremost institutions of the country as to the right\ncourse to take? The more the leading Universities are united, not only\nas to the scope and method of their own work, but also as to what is\nto be considered the proper preparation for University work, the more\nwill deviations from the rules laid down by them come to imply to public\nopinion inferiority of standard; and if there is a whip under which\nAmerican communities smart, it is this. As to this would be added the\nmissionary influences of the alumni sent from the leading Universities\ninto all parts of the republic, it would be strange indeed, if the idea\nwere not constantly to spread and to cast deeper root, that to adequately\nprovide for the educational needs of the country, it is necessary\nconsciously to create and systematically to foster a tendency, by the\nfree action of public opinion, more and more to harmonise education, in\ndeveloping it everywhere and in all its ramifications into a thoroughly\norganic structure.\n\nI am prepared to hear the opinions I have ventured to advance strenuously\ncontested and, perhaps, even mercilessly ridiculed by many. The open\nantagonists, however, cause me but little uneasiness. I fear only one\nthing, i. e. that those who more or less endorse my criticisms and agree\nwith me as to what is desirable, will be induced by the arduousness of\nthe work to persuade themselves that it is impossible to bring about such\na reform. To them I should say: Where there is a will, there is a way,\nand the American people _must_ be brought to will this reform, because\nevery year a portentous word is becoming more true and of greater import:\n\u201cthe age of perils is past, but the age of difficulties has set it.\u201d\n\n H. VON HOLST.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[88] Commencement address at the Nebraska State University, June 7, 1893.\n\n\n\n\nMEANING AND METAPHOR.\n\n\nProfessor Huxley supposes[89] \u201cthat so long as the human mind exists, it\nwill not escape its deep-seated instinct to personify its intellectual\nconceptions.\u201d He finds that \u201cthe science of the present day is as full of\nthis particular form of intellectual shadow-worship as is the nescience\nof ignorant ages.\u201d The difference he sees is \u201cthat the philosopher who is\nworthy of the name knows that his personified hypotheses, such as law,\nand force, and ether, and the like, are merely useful symbols, while the\nignorant and the careless take them for adequate expressions of reality.\u201d\nHe then goes on to warn us against dealing with symbols as though they\nwere \u201creal existences.\u201d\n\nFew indeed are free from reproach in this matter, so far as reproach is\ndeserved at all in the general unconsciousness of what constitutes the\ndanger. Few see the question to be vital or the danger to be urgent;\nand even those who do are apt to deny that the search for a remedy can\nbe a crusade worth attempting; the very idea seems Utopian or pedantic.\nOn the one hand, teachers as a rule do not take their own analogies and\nmetaphors seriously. Both the literary and scientific, as well as the\nphilosophic and historical instinct tell against their doing so. In their\neyes figures have either faded into indifferent abstractions, or they are\nobviously pictorial and merely rhetorical. But the average reader is apt\nto take them at the foot of the letter. He is usually unaware both of the\nextent to which he literalises and of the curious inconsistencies which\nhis literalising involves. So he makes his inferences with alight heart,\nand wonders, perhaps, at the resulting confusion without suspecting its\ntrue cause.\n\nWould that the real state of the case and its practical consequences\ncould be pressed home to all with such force, that whatever be our line\nof work or thought or expression we should strive in earnest to mend\nmatters. At least, we might begin by learning better what part symbolism\nplays in the rituals of expression, and ask ourselves what else is\nlanguage itself but symbolism, and what it symbolises. We should then\nexamine anew the relations of the \u201csymbolic\u201d to the \u201creal\u201d; of image,\nfigure, metaphor, to what we call literal or actual. For this concerns\nus all. Imagery runs in and out, so to speak, from the symbolic to the\nreal world and back again. As matters stand, we never know where we are\nbecause we know so little where our phrases or our words are; indeed,\nperhaps they and we are \u201cneither here nor there.\u201d Or, if we do know\nwhere we are, we cannot be sure that our hearer or reader knows where\nhe is. He, too, is probably \u201cneither here nor there.\u201d He often praises\nor agrees with us in the wrong place or the wrong manner. That is worse\nthan being complained of or differed from; it is difficult to repudiate\napproval. Nor can we take refuge in lucidity and fancy that the clear\nmust be the true. In the long run and in the cases which _signify_ most,\nthere is no escape through merely lucid style or method. The \u201cluminous\u201d\nspeaker or writer, the \u201cforcible\u201d orator or essayist, the moment he tries\nto convey to the public mind a thought which is really new, will find\nhimself hampered by his very clearness itself. His ideas are controverted\non assumptions not really his; or he himself is misled in subtle ways by\nwhat he assumes in others.\n\nThus, by an instructive paradox, the clearest writer is often the most\ncontroversial; and he wonders at our perverseness as, while we admire\nhis power and his \u201cstyle,\u201d we wonder at the perverseness in him. We\npossibly agree with him in ways we do not suspect; he possibly agrees\nwith us in senses he ignores. Such a writer may pride himself on a chary\nuse of metaphor, or on a carefully sharp distinction between \u201cimage\u201d\nand \u201cthing\u201d or \u201cobject.\u201d But he is liable to forget the danger dogging\nhim even here. One is tempted to say that there is only one term more\nfigurative as well as more ambiguous than \u201cmetaphorical,\u201d and that is\n\u201cliteral.\u201d Most certainly much that is called \u201cliteral\u201d is tinged with\nthe figurative in varying degrees, not always easy to distinguish, even\nwith the help of context. The word \u201cliteral\u201d itself is indeed a case in\npoint. It has rarely, if ever, any reference to writing.\n\nThe question is, whether this state of things is quite so inevitable\nas most of us seem to think. Certainly, so long as we are content to\nlive in the fool\u2019s paradise of supposing that only the perverse, the\nprejudiced, the stupid, or the ignorant can possibly mistake our meaning,\nand that our misreadings of others are simply due to their \u201cobscurity,\u201d\nor \u201cquibbling,\u201d or literary incapacity, we shall ourselves contribute to\nthe hopelessness of the situation. But this is a subject which cannot be\ndealt with in an incidental way; it is rather a hope for the future, that\none of the most practically serviceable of subjects\u2014that of Meaning, its\nconditions and its changes\u2014shall be seriously taken up. Then, indeed,\nwe may get back to the first of all questions, and that which is most\npregnant of helpful answers; that which needs asking more than any other\nif good work is to be done in this day of universal \u201cunsettlement\u201d:\u2014What\ndo we really mean? On all sides dead calms are stirred and ruffled,\ndead levels upheaved or depressed; nothing (happily) can hope to escape\nthe wave of quickening force. So before long we may well be asking this\nquestion in good earnest; and when we do we can but be the better, even\nif we must needs submit in some cases where we may have been prematurely\npositive, to be content (for the moment) with the answer: We do not\nreally know.\n\nThe fact is, that we have been postulating an absolute Plain Meaning to\nbe thought of, as it were, in capital letters. We have been virtually\nassuming that our hearers and readers all share the same mental\nbackground and atmosphere. We have practically supposed that they all\nlook through the same inferential eyes, that their attention waxes and\nwanes at the same points, that their associations, their halos of memory\nand circumstance, their congenital tendencies to symbolise or picture,\nare all on one pattern. Verily, we need a \u201cCritique of Plain Meaning\u201d!\n\nAgain we _quote_ on the same assumption. Unless the language of our\nauthor is obviously archaic; unless his allusions unmistakably betray\na different life-context, a different social \u201cmilieu,\u201d in short, a\ndifferent mental world, we claim him or we repudiate him on the same\nprinciple. We take his words, we take his phrases, we fill them out with\nthe same content as our own, we make him mean precisely what we ourselves\nmean. And be it noted that it is always what we mean _now_. That this in\nany way varies from what we meant at some time when, e. g., our attention\nwas differently focussed, rarely enters our heads.\n\nWe shall, I suppose, admit that until lately there was one very good\nreason for this state of things. Only the exceptional mind (if any);\nonly the mind which could not make itself fully understood by its\ncontemporaries, and would risk being reckoned crazy or criminal if it\nspoke \u201cplainly,\u201d had any suspicion that this way of looking at things\nwas being gradually invalidated by the general extension of the critical\ndomain. The history of language, its relation to thought; the scope\nof expression and representation, the function of the figurative and\nsymbolic; the growth of all means of mental communion from the simplest\nrudiments of gesture or cry to the highest point of intellectual\ncomplexity,\u2014all this was either ignored or taken for granted on radically\ninsecure bases.\n\nAgain, while the underlying conditions of language must be looked for\nin the domain of psycho-physics, that science had not yet come into\nexistence. Even now it is but feeling its way and putting forth tentative\nhypotheses, warning us, as it does, so that they are liable to be\nconstantly modified and occasionally revolutionised. And what does it\nrealise, first and foremost? That our difficulties on the very threshold\nof the inquiry are, as usual, largely those of language. On all sides we\nhave to use, as best we may, modes of expression that inevitably convey\nambiguous meanings even to the thoughtful, even to the trained mind,\nwhich cannot but carry with them a background of outgrown or disproved\npremises, vitiating more or less every conclusion that we draw from them.\nThe very phrases which are our only shorthand for the vast oratory of\nnature and experience betray us in the using. We have taken them as\nthough they were like numerals invariable in meaning, thus supposing them\nsubject to a permanent uniformity. We have taken them as though they\nwere without a history, merely fortuitous labels or symbols of unanimous\nconsent; the accepted sense, we think, being easily ascertainable, always\npersistent, and wholly sufficient for practical purposes. In any case we\nstrangely assume that we may safely play upon all the chords of imagery,\nreserving without difficulty for serious use a body of terms which are\ndirect expressions of \u201cfact.\u201d\n\nBut the suggestion now made is that this is precisely one of the most\ndangerous of presuppositions. It is not the man who has mystified\nhimself, or who wishes to mystify others; it is not the man who confounds\nthe reality of the logical with that of the actual; it is not the man who\ntakes emotion for proof and notion for fact; it is none of these, but\nthe man who is clear on such points and sees that they must be drawn out\ninto clues and followed up to the uttermost, if we would know where we\nare\u2014who is beginning to see that the paramount need of the moment is the\n\u201ctorpedo-shock\u201d of the question, What do we really mean? He knows that\nthe off-hand vagueness and ready-made confusion, which too often from\nsheer ignorance usurp the name of common-sense, are in the long run its\nmost deadly enemies.\n\nWe may look forward then with a new hope to the rise of a systematic\ninquiry on the subject of meaning and its changes. This would entail\nthe much-needed work of classifying metaphor, and might even be found\nto point to the existence of a third value, neither wholly literal, nor\nwholly figurative, as that of a large proportion of ordinary expression.\nFrom this and like causes, in this age of rapid changes due mainly to\nscientific conquest, we can all readily put to each other questions to\nwhich either a \u201cyes\u201d or a \u201cno\u201d must be equally misleading. And men of\nscience have specially realised this, since many a time they have been\nunjustly credited with evasion, or with untenable or immoral views,\nbecause they either answered to a \u201cplain question\u201d: \u201cIn one sense, yes;\nin another, no,\u201d or else gave an answer which could not fail to be\nmisunderstood by a mind which was governed by unconscious survivals. So\nfar as we are in touch with modern culture, we no longer mean what we\nmust have meant in the days before Copernicus, when we say, for instance,\n\u201cthe sun rises.\u201d When we speak of infection, we no longer mean what we\nused to mean before microbes had been heard of. When we talk of \u201cheat,\u201d\nwe no longer mean what we used to mean even fifty years ago. And when a\nman says that he believes in the sun, the planets, the cosmos, in the\nheavens and the earth, in mind and matter, in soul and body, in spirit\nand flesh, he cannot, if he would, mean just what his forefathers meant,\nor indeed anything at all absolutely and finally. Whether we will or\nno, the meaning of such terms is changing on our very tongues, and ever\nswaying between the extremes which we call literal and metaphorical;\n\u201cheaven,\u201d e. g., ranging in value from sky to human destiny; \u201cearth,\u201d\nfrom soil to the visible Home of Man. We may appeal, and are right\nto appeal to \u201chard, dry\u201d facts; but we perforce put something out of\nourselves even into these. They become \u201cfacts\u201d under the quickening\ntouch of \u201cmind,\u201d while that emerges from a dim world of prepossession,\nbequeathing us many a primitive legacy from pre-intelligent sentience,\nand perhaps from little-suspected sources lying yet further back. For\ninstance, primitive terror in its \u201csuperstitious\u201d forms tended to\nrepresent man as inferior to and dependent on powers of some sort;\u2014and\nthis was true to natural order in the fact that his very world was not\nself-centred and was dependent for its best boons upon a greater than\nitself. As language advanced, he began quite naturally to express his\nmeaning in \u201cappropriate metaphors\u201d; to use, e. g., the figures of light\nand then of sight to describe what he had, as we now say, \u201cin his mind,\u201d\nor what sense-messages, as we now say, had \u201cput into his head.\u201d For\n\u201csomething told him\u201d that light, as it had been the first pleasure, was\nalso the great means of life.[90] And he \u201csaw,\u201d in however grotesque a\nguise, the unbroken continuity of the organic and the inorganic, and\nperhaps even more clearly than most of us yet do, that of so-called\n\u201cmatter\u201d and so-called \u201cmind.\u201d Perhaps in some cases, therefore, he\nchose his imagery better than (after long ages of dualism carried to the\nsplitting-point) we generally do now.\n\nHe knew again that the senses after all, stern masters though they were\nwhile life was so hard to live, had very narrow limits; and that the\nworld was in some sense fuller and richer of life than it had seemed to\nbe as known directly through them.[91] And then he wondered,\u2014and began\nto ask. He was the first Questioner. As Prof. Max M\u00fcller says,[92] \u201cthe\ngreater the savagery, the dullness, the stupidity with which _Homo\nsapiens_ began, the greater the marvel at what must have been from the\nfirst, though undeveloped, in him, and made him in the end what we find\nhim to be in the men of light and leading of our own age.\u201d The mere fact\nof the question is the riddle to be solved. For certainly the beasts had\nnot taught him either to wonder or to ask. And not merely insatiable\nquestioning but something more here rises to challenge our attention and\nto demand reflection. Man is the first critic because he is the first\nidealist; the first to be discontented, to protest, to see life as a\n\u201cravelled end,\u201d as something which is incomplete and speaks of something\nmore. Surely in any case the step of all steps, the deepest yet the\nnarrowest line to cross is the step from something noticed or found, from\nsomething which happens or appears, from something which somehow affects\nus, excites us, to its significance.\n\nOf course in one sense it is impossible to fix any definite moment\nas that of the advent of this \u201csignificance.\u201d Animals interpret each\nother\u2019s aspect and gestures, often indeed with a subtle precision which\nto some extent we have lost. But interpretation in the intellectual\nsense becomes, from our present point of view, that which makes us\nreally human. Our progress, our ascent, is mainly marked in this. The\nroot-question to ask in gauging levels of humanity is, how much can a\ngiven man interpret or translate, of a world that teems with meaning? How\nmuch can he truly classify and relate, how much can he rightly infer and\nconclude, how much can he account for, explain, and fruitfully apply? For\nafter all, results must be our tests. Claims and credentials are nothing,\nunless they can show this warrant; whereas truth which can use all facts\nalike is the very means of survival. Man begins by doing, by acting\nout impulse; then he learns to \u201cthink\u201d little by little, observing,\nquestioning, pondering, testing his way onward and upward. And throughout\nhis patient, often painful journey, he is himself perpetually challenged.\nNature\u2019s stimulating appeals rain upon him ceaselessly from every side;\nshe orders him to master all her meanings. He responds:\u2014at first again,\n\u201cblindly,\u201d but ever rising to higher grades of answer. Both deficiency\nand error are no doubt more or less present in all mental response to\nactual fact\u2014that is, in all experience. But the essence of sanity from\nthe first lies in corrective power. Everywhere there is either absence of\nnotice, absence of response, or there is experimental activity (broadly\nspeaking) corrected at once; automatically or by the combined effect of\nthe related organic activities. For instance, in health, if in using\nthe hand, one finger accidentally goes astray, the co\u00f6rdinating muscles\npromptly recall it to a \u201csense of duty.\u201d We know how the same rule works\nin speech and writing. Therefore, unless \u201cvoluntary\u201d and \u201ccapricious\u201d\n(or \u201cwilling\u201d and \u201cwilful\u201d) are synonyms, the advent of volition ought\nnot to mean the abrogation of this rule.\n\nIt is, however, obvious that \u201cnatural selection\u201d can only operate\nin cases where death or sterility is the consequence of failure in\nadaptation and appropriate reaction, or segregation the consequence of\nexcessive variation. But the point here is, why does not a tendency\nto correction, thus established, survive automatically in incipient\nimagination and therefore in language? It seems almost a burlesque\nof popular notions of \u201cfree will\u201d to suppose that the moment the\ndeath-penalty is taken off, the new-born intelligence, unique in adapting\npower, should go astray persistently without let or hindrance. Many now\nmerely formal or even jocular customs still prevailing[93] testify, as\nlegacies from a remote time of danger needing to be averted, to the\nstrength of tendencies organised during myriads of generations under the\npressure of the struggle for life. Why does not this apply to language?\n\nBut sight gives us here perhaps the most suggestive lesson; for therein\nthe ascending series seems especially gradual and unbroken. The eye,\nunlike the other organs of sense is an outgrowth of the very brain\nitself; \u201cthe retina ... is in reality a part of the brain.\u201d[94] We\nmay well therefore connect its functions specially with the thought\nof significance; it is the main out-post of our central means of\ninterpretation.\n\nTaking the stages in the evolution of the eye, and using a short summary\nof these as a convenient means of testing the value of a conspicuous\ngroup of metaphors, we find (1) a mere dint; (2) this dint deepening\ninto a pit which (3) gradually narrows. Hitherto we have had only light\nand darkness; now we have an image, though but a dim one. (4) The pit is\nclosed by a transparent membrane; this is protection, not obstacle. (5)\nThe lens is formed by deposit of cuticle. Gain; increased distinctness\nand increased brightness. The lens can focus a larger pencil of rays\nfrom each part of the object to each part of the retina (corresponding\npoint). Finally, iris and eyelid protect the perfected eye more\ncompletely, and enable it both to bear more light and to discern more\ndetail.\n\nIf mental development were in any way comparable to this physiological\ndevelopment, we should expect to find (1) something which would\nnaturally be described as a vague or dim \u201cimpression\u201d; gradually\ndeepening, becoming more distinctly localised as the stimulus became\nmore definitely \u201cimpressive.\u201d (2) We should begin to find \u201creality\u201d and\nthe \u201cunreal\u201d; \u201cfact\u201d and \u201cfancy\u201d; \u201ctruth\u201d and \u201cfalsehood\u201d; knowledge and\nignorance,\u2014contrasted as \u201clight\u201d and \u201cdarkness.\u201d[95] And this is what\nactually happens.[96]\n\n(3) Still our mental \u201cimpression\u201d would not as yet afford us an image;\n\u201cimagination\u201d only now comes upon the scene and begins to work (though as\nyet \u201cdimly\u201d) upon the objects which more and more \u201cincisively\u201d \u201cimpress\u201d\nus. (4) Our deep \u201cimpression\u201d is closed in one sense from direct contact\nwith the outward; mental vision becomes more delicately differentiated\nfrom the emotional \u201ctouch,\u201d however this may be specialised and\nintensified. But what secludes this is transparent; it is protection, not\nobstacle. We rightly speak of mental penetration; of \u201cseeing through\u201d\na superficial limit. The mental \u201clens\u201d is formed from that \u201ccontinuum\u201d\non which the original \u201cimpression\u201d was made. The gain now is increased\ndistinctness and brightness. More rays of \u201clight,\u201d of reality, of fact,\nof truth, of knowledge, can now be focussed from each part of a given\nobject (or group of objects) of mental attention and interest; to each\npart of the responsive \u201csensitive plate\u201d of the mind. Finally we have,\nso to speak, increased protective growth. The function of what are called\nacademic culture and scientific method, with their fastidious standards\nof fitness and accuracy, may perhaps represent something not unlike that\nof iris and eyelid, enabling the developing mind safely to bear intenser\nillumination and also to discern more subtle detail.\n\nIt must be admitted that so far as it goes this is a significant\npsychological parable. However slender its right to the position even\nof a working clue to early stages of mind, it has at least better\ncredentials than many accepted analogies can claim. And throughout\nits course what most \u201cimpresses\u201d itself upon one\u2019s mind is the steady\nmaintenance of invariable reaction to excitation, and of protection from\nunfavorable stimulus.\n\n\u201cMind,\u201d as Mr. Shadworth Hodgson tells us,[97] \u201cis a fiction of the\nfancy.\u201d Of course this is open to the retort that so is fancy a fiction\nof the mind, or fiction a fancy of the mind.\n\nPsychology is full of these see-saws of paradox, depending on\nvicissitudes of linguistic usage or context. But mind is indeed a fiction\nof the fancy when we endow it with a fanciful freedom from all ties with\nwhat we call physical reality. For this, however plainly we may recognise\nits genesis in our own sequences of sense-impression, does practically\nthrough them rule us with an undeviating severity which neither fiction\nnor fancy can tamper with. Therefore, if we think it absurd to suppose\nthat there may possibly be an undiscovered vein of authentic and really\nindicative symbol or metaphor running through the arbitrary meshes of\nfanciful custom or mythical term, we are in fact implying that all clues\nfrom the original interactions of physical energy were entirely lost when\nwhat we call \u201cmind\u201d issued first in language. But at all events we may be\nsure that links between the \u201cphysical\u201d and the \u201cpsychical\u201d are everywhere\ndrawing closer and emerging clearer, however buried as yet in a mass of\nthe fantastic or the arbitrary.\n\nIt will probably be objected that we can never hope to find these. No\ndoubt such an attempt must mean the patient work of many lifetimes, and\nat best we could not hope to lay bare the ultimate point of \u201corigin.\u201d\nBut yet it seems worth trying. For after all, even the results which\nmay appear so scanty in the tracing back of language, are already rich\nfar beyond what could have been hoped for a few generations back. And\nif it were once realised that such a line of work might have practical\nand far-reaching issues; if we really saw that thus some barren disputes\nand speculations might cease to bar the way or to waste some precious\nenergies, we should be more than rewarded. In his \u201cDialogues of\nPlato\u201d[98] Professor Jowett warned us twenty years ago of our linguistic\ndangers, repeating his warning with greater emphasis and in fresh forms\nin the admirable essays added in the edition just published. He urges\nthat the \u201cgreatest lesson which the philosophical analysis of language\nteaches us is, that we should be above language, making words our\nservants and not allowing them to be our masters.\u201d \u201cWords,\u201d he tells\nus, \u201cappear to be isolated but they are really the parts of an organism\nwhich is always being reproduced. They are refined by civilisation,\nharmonised by poetry, emphasised by literature, technically applied in\nphilosophy and art; they are used as symbols on the border-ground of\nhuman knowledge; they receive a fresh impress from individual genius,\nand come with a new force and association to every lively-minded person.\nThey are fixed by the simultaneous utterance of millions and yet are\nalways imperceptibly changing:\u2014not the inventors of language, but writing\nand speaking, and particularly great writers, or works which pass into\nthe hearts of nations, Homer, Shakespeare, Dante, the German or English\nBible, Kant and Hegel, are the makers of them in later ages. They carry\nwith them the faded recollection of their own past history; the use of\na word in a striking and familiar passage, gives a complexion to its\nuse everywhere else, and the new use of an old and familiar phrase has\nalso a peculiar power over us.\u201d Then he reminds us of what we too often\nforget; that \u201clanguage is an aspect of man, of nature, and of nations,\nthe transfiguration of the world in thought, the meeting-point of the\nphysical and mental sciences, and also the mirror in which they are\nreflected, an effect and partly a cause of our common humanity, present\nat every moment to the individual and yet having a sort of eternal or\nuniversal nature.\u201d[99]\n\nNowadays, when we feel most scathingly superior, we often announce that\nwe fail to see and have yet to learn something which, bringing us, it\nmay be, a really fresh idea, unpleasantly stirs misgiving. Let us go\non with our greeting, meaning it in good earnest. For when we honestly\nand without reservation consent to learn and succeed in seeing some\nthings now waiting for our study we may find more than we look for,\nwithin reach. After all it may be that we have really failed to see\nand have really yet to learn the part that meaning\u2014whether of language\nor of conduct\u2014and its change or variations (successive or simultaneous)\nhave had throughout the mental history of man. It may be that while\nthe ordinary modern metaphor like the ordinary modern analogy is a\nmere rhetorical device, some few images may be found to hail from an\naltogether deeper and more authentic source. Many, however ancient, are\nnot of course any the more valid for their antiquity. On the contrary it\nis obvious that such a figure for instance as \u201cfoundation\u201d or \u201cbasis\u201d to\nexpress an ultimate necessity, is a survival from days in which the earth\nwas supposed to require and to possess such fixed and immutable base,\nwhile the analogies, e. g. between the human and the inorganic orders are\nnow reversed. We import the idea of mechanism and invariable sequence\ninto the former instead of exporting conscious intention into the latter;\nwe level down where our forefathers levelled up. And we have to beware of\nthe subtle atmosphere of fallacy thus introduced.\n\nBut on the other hand it is conceivable that some may be found to belong\nto that as yet mysterious energy on which natural selection plays and of\nwhich variation is the outcome or the sign. What we find in language may\nthus be, as it were, not merely the \u201cscarred and weather-worn\u201d remnant\nof geogenic strata but sometimes the meteorite, the calcined fragment of\nearlier worlds of correspondence, ultra-earthly, cosmical. We have no\nright to do more than ask and seek and knock at the gates of fact in such\na matter as this. But until that has been done; until at least we have\ntried the experiment; have looked for grades of validity in metaphor and\nanalogy in the light of modern science, and still more, have recognised\nclearly the powerful though hidden effects upon us of organised mental\npicture brought in surreptitiously with verbal imagery, or by comparison;\nwe cannot know whether such an effort is worth while or no, or what\nharvest it may yield. For after all, whether we like it or no, we _are_\nheliocentric; the world and all that is in it is cosmically generated.\nAs far as science\u2014and experience\u2014are concerned, anything which says \u201cI\ndon\u2019t admit that origin; I claim to have produced myself or to have\nbeen originated by and on the earth in a final sense,\u201d must make good\nits geocentric or self-creating pretensions with overwhelming cogency\nand rigorous proof. We appeal to the \u201clight\u201d of science, of reason, of\nexperience, against the \u201cdarkness\u201d of superstition, myth, and mysticism.\nAnd we are thus appealing not to the supersensuous or supernatural\nbut to the ultra-satellitic. Not only beyond the earth and touch but\nbeyond the atmosphere and hearing is the home of the light that lightens\nour small world, calling forth in us the answer of sight. And the\nmanifold revelations through this sense\u2014in its mental as well as bodily\ncharacter\u2014press upon us, with greater and greater insistence, the wealth\nof our relations with the universe.\n\nIn any case, _meaning_\u2014in the widest sense of the word\u2014is the only value\nof whatever \u201cfact\u201d presents itself to us. Without this, to observe and\nrecord appearances or occurrences would become a worse than wasteful\ntask. Significance is the one value of all that consciousness brings, or\nthat intelligence deals with; the one value of life itself. But perhaps\nfor this very reason we have taken it too much for granted. It may need a\nmore definite place in psychological inquiries. It may have unsuspected\nbearings.\n\nWhen we have realised better what manner of gift this is, we may find\nanswers of which we have prematurely despaired; answers coming not from\nthe \u201cmystical\u201d point of the horizon of experience, but rather from the\nneural. And let us beware here of repeating the pre-scientific error of\npostulating, for figurative purposes, a flat earth on which whatever lies\nbeyond \u201chorizons\u201d never meets! But, it may be said, why not? Why should\nit signify? Why, but because Man is the one not merely who thinks, or\nspeaks, or writes, or looks upwards, but the one who _means_, the one\nwho _is_ the meaning of much, and makes the meaning of all; the one who\nwill not tolerate the unmeaning anywhere in experience. Nothing remains\nbut that he should interpret rightly; that he should apprehend nature and\nexperience in their true sense. It is the glory of science that she puts\nthis aim in the forefront of her labors. She tells us that nothing can\nbe done without assumption and hypothesis as to the meaning of things.\nBut that significance belongs to the very spring to which we owe her\ndauntless energy and her accumulating triumphs.\n\nWhy should it signify? The very term answers us. To \u201csignify\u201d is the one\ntest of the important. The significant is alone worth notice. We inherit\na mode of thinking which we are at last becoming able to criticise in\nthe light of knowledge gained by observation and experiment. But if we\npersist in using, without warning to hearer or reader, imagery which has\nno longer either sense or relevance, or which tends to call up a false\nmental picture or to perpetuate an else decaying error, we shall to that\nextent forfeit the very gifts which science brings us, and must not\ncomplain of the obstinate persistence of ideas which needlessly divide\nus. At least, let us try to realise more clearly what we are losing in\nthis way. The danger even thus must needs be lessened; detected bogies\nbecome powerless for mischief; but we need not leave their ancient home\nempty, swept, and garnished; stores of verified analogy are waiting to\nreplace them. The figurative must not indeed be pressed, still less\nliteralised. But we may see that it conveys a true, rather than a false\nimpression; and harmonises with, instead of contradicting that which we\nmost surely know.[100]\n\nIt may be said in a true sense that the function of the hero, the saint,\nthe poet, is to bring the world to _life_. But the function of the\ndevoted servant of science, the critical scholar, the true philosopher,\nis to bring the world to _truth_, in a sense only now becoming possible.\nThrough the last discipline alone, in its most thorough applications, can\nwe hope fully to master the scope of all significance and the laws of all\nits workings. Then, indeed, we may further hope to read with a fresh eye\nthe Significance of Life.\n\n VICTORIA WELBY.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[89] _The Nineteenth Century_, April, 1886. (Reprinted in _Essays on\nControverted Questions_.)\n\n[90] \u201cLight affects the new-born infant at an early stage, although in\nthis as in other respects individual differences immediately assert\nthemselves. The child seems to take pleasure in an excitation of light\nand tries (even on the second day after birth) to turn towards it in\norder to retain it.\u201d (_Outlines of Psychology_, H. H\u00f6ffding, p. 4.)\n\n\u201cUnder the influence of light the conversion of inorganic matter into\nmore complex organic matter takes place, more particularly in the green\ncells of plants.\u201d (_Ibid._, p. 315.)\n\n\u201cIt is certainly necessary to look further back than the visual\nsensations to understand the great influence of light on all creatures\nthat have sensuous perception.... Light is thus one of the most\nelementary conditions of life.\u201d (_Ibid._, p. 229.)\n\n[91] It must be borne in mind that I am using psychological terms in\na merely general sense. Among many examples of such use I may quote\nSachs (_Physiology of Plants_, p. 200) and F. Darwin (_Address to\nBiological Section_, Brit. Assoc, August 1891), who speaks of the plant\nas \u201cperceiving\u201d external change, as \u201crecognising\u201d the vertical line,\n\u201cknowing\u201d where the centre of the earth is, \u201ctranslating\u201d stimulus, etc.\nSee also Darwin\u2019s _Forms of Flowers_, p. 90.\n\nAgain Prof. M. Foster uses the word \u201cwill\u201d in the same general (rather\nthan metaphorical) sense. (_Text Book of Phys._, Part 3, pp. 1059, 1062,\n1063.) Modes of reaction are thus verbally linked with consciousness, and\nwe must remember that all our terms for the \u201cmental\u201d belong first to the\n\u201cphysical,\u201d and that many are reciprocally used in the two spheres.\n\n[92] _Natural Religion_, p. 243.\n\n[93] See Dr. Tylor\u2019s _Primitive Culture_, Vol. I, pp. 74-121; _Ibid._,\nVol. II, pp. 297-298, 404-428.\n\n[94] Dr. M. Foster\u2019s _Text-Book of Physiology_, Part 4, p. 1142.\n\n[95] I am of course merely directing attention to the relative aptness\nof metaphors of mental process familiarly in use in our own language. It\nis obvious that before any inference could be made from them as to the\nvalue of unconscious analogies of imagery, we should have to make appeal\nto comparative philology and embark on a wide inquiry, for which the\nEnglish-speaking races must wait for Dr. Murray\u2019s epoch-making Dictionary.\n\n[96] It must be borne in mind that the whole process presupposes the\nother senses or at least the temperature-sense, the \u201cmuscular sense\u201d\nand that of touch; that is, we should have \u201cfelt\u201d simple stimuli\n\u201cemotionally\u201d before we \u201csaw\u201d things intellectually. And hearing is\nnot now in question, though in that, too, we should find the same\ncharacter of development, i. e. the same prominence of the protective and\ndiscriminative factors.\n\n[97] _Brain_, June, 1891. P. 13.\n\n[98] Vol. I, pp. 285-286, 293.\n\n[99] The following, among many pregnant passages between which it is\ndifficult to choose, may be further quoted:\n\n\u201cThe famous dispute between Nominalists and Realists would never have\nbeen heard of, if, instead of transferring the Platonic ideas into a\ncrude Latin phraseology, the spirit of Plato had been truly understood\nand appreciated. Upon the term substance at least two celebrated\ntheological controversies appear to hinge, which would not have existed,\nor at least not in their present form, if we had \u2018interrogated\u2019 the word\nsubstance, as Plato has the notions of Unity and Being. Those weeds of\nphilosophy have struck their roots deep into the soil, and are always\ntending to reappear, sometimes in new-fangled forms; while similar words,\nsuch as development, evolution, law, and the like, are constantly put in\nthe place of facts, even by writers who profess to base truth entirely\nupon fact. In an unmetaphysical age there is probably more metaphysics in\nthe common sense (i. e. more _a priori_ assumption) than in any other,\nbecause there is more complete unconsciousness that we are resting on\nour own ideas, while we please ourselves with the conviction that we are\nresting on facts. We do not consider how much metaphysics are required to\nplace us above metaphysics, or how difficult it is to prevent the forms\nof expression which are ready made for our use from outrunning actual\nobservation and experiment.\u201d (Vol. IV, p. 39-40.)\n\n\u201cTo have the true use of words we must compare them with things; in using\nthem we acknowledge that they seldom give a perfect representation of our\nmeaning. In like manner when we interrogate our ideas we find that we are\nnot using them always in the sense which we supposed. (_Ibid._, p. 41.)\n\n\u201cMany erroneous conceptions of the mind derived from former philosophies\nhave found their way into language, and we with difficulty disengage\nourselves from them. Mere figures of speech have unconsciously influenced\nthe minds of great thinkers. Also there are some distinctions, as,\nfor example, that of the will and of reason, and of the moral and\nintellectual faculties, which are carried further than is justified by\nexperience. Any separation of things which we cannot see or exactly\ndefine, though it may be necessary, is a fertile source of error. The\ndivision of the mind into faculties or powers or virtues is too deeply\nrooted in language to be got rid of, but it gives a false impression. For\nif we reflect on ourselves we see that all our faculties easily pass into\none another, and are bound together in a single mind or consciousness;\nbut this mental unity is apt to be concealed from us by the distinctions\nof language.\u201d (_Ibid._, p. 155.)\n\n[100] I would gladly forward to any reader interested in a question of\nsuch practical bearings, a small collection of _Witnesses to Ambiguity_\ngathered from representative sources, and a pamphlet which was circulated\nat the International Congress of Experimental Psychology, held in London,\nAugust, 1892, giving examples of the mischievous confusions suggested\nby the use, even among writers of the first rank, of the metaphor,\n_Inner and Outer_. Prof. H. Sidgwick, the president, in his opening\naddress, expressed the opinion that very important work of this kind\nremained to be done, and added, \u201cI have much sympathy with the view\nurged in a pamphlet that I have received for distribution among members\nof the Congress, which illustrates forcibly the confusion caused by\none established antithesis of terms.\u201d Professor Sully and others have\nexpressed themselves strongly in the same sense.\n\n\n\n\nREPLY TO THE NECESSITARIANS.\n\nREJOINDER TO DR. CARUS.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. In _The Monist_ for January, 1891, and in the number for April,\n1892, I attacked the doctrine that every event is precisely determined by\nlaw. Like everybody else, I admit that there is regularity: I go further;\nI maintain the existence of law as something _real and general_. But I\nhold there is no reason to think that there are general formul\u00e6 to which\nthe phenomena of nature _always_ conform, or to which they _precisely_\nconform. At the end of my second paper, the partisans of the doctrine of\nnecessity were courteously challenged and besought to attempt to answer\nmy arguments. This, so far as I can learn, Dr. Carus alone, in _The\nMonist_ of July and October, 1892, has publicly vouchsafed to do. For\nthis I owe him my particular thanks and a careful rejoinder.\n\n\u00a7 2. I number the paragraphs of his papers consecutively. The following\nindex shows the pages on which those paragraphs commence, and the\nnumbered sections of this rejoinder in which they are noticed.\n\n DR. CARUS REJOINDER\n Vol. II, p. 560 \u00b6 1\n \u201d \u201d 2 \u00a728\n \u201d \u201d 3 29\n \u201d 561 4 23.27\n \u201d \u201d 5 21\n \u201d \u201d 6 18\n \u201d \u201d 7 18\n \u201d 562 8 18 _bis._\n \u201d \u201d 9 21\n \u201d \u201d 10\n \u201d 563 11 12.21.22\n \u201d \u201d 12 19\n \u201d \u201d 13 19\n \u201d 564 14 3.12 _bis._ 22\n \u201d \u201d 15 8 _ter_, 16\n \u201d 565 16 21\n \u201d \u201d 17 3\n \u201d \u201d 18 3\n \u201d \u201d 19 13 note\n \u201d 566 20 14\n \u201d \u201d 21 13, 14\n \u201d \u201d 22 3.12.22\n \u201d \u201d 23 12\n \u201d \u201d 24 3.13.14\n \u201d 567 25 8\n \u201d \u201d 26 8\n \u201d \u201d 27 8.22\n \u201d \u201d 28 20.22\n \u201d \u201d 29 12\n \u201d 568 30 22\n \u201d \u201d 31 22 _bis_\n \u201d \u201d 32 22\n \u201d 569 33 22\n \u201d \u201d 34 22\n \u201d \u201d 35 8\n \u201d \u201d 36 29\n \u201d \u201d 37\n \u201d 570 38\n \u201d \u201d 39\n \u201d \u201d 40\n \u201d 571 41\n \u201d \u201d 42\n \u201d \u201d 43\n \u201d 572 44 23\n \u201d \u201d 45\n \u201d \u201d 46 5.23\n \u201d 573 47\n \u201d \u201d 48 7\n \u201d \u201d 49 7\n \u201d \u201d 50 7\n \u201d 574 51 7.25\n \u201d \u201d 52\n \u201d \u201d 53 25\n \u201d \u201d 54\n \u201d \u201d 55 25 _bis_\n \u201d 575 56 17\n \u201d \u201d 57 17 _bis_\n \u201d \u201d 58 17.25\n \u201d \u201d 59 17\n \u201d \u201d 60 17\n \u201d 576 61 7.17.25 _bis_\n \u201d \u201d 62 17.21\n \u201d \u201d 63 17\n \u201d 577 64 17 _bis_\n \u201d \u201d 65 26\n \u201d \u201d 66 25\n \u201d \u201d 67 25 _bis_\n \u201d 578 68 6.7\n \u201d \u201d 69 17\n \u201d 579 70 6\n \u201d \u201d 71 3\n \u201d 580 72 3\n \u201d \u201d 73 3\n \u201d \u201d 74 3\n \u201d \u201d 75 3\n \u201d 581 76 3\n \u201d \u201d 77 3.11\n \u201d \u201d 78\n \u201d \u201d 79 21\n \u201d 582 80\n \u201d \u201d 81 29\n \u201d \u201d 82 29\n \u201d \u201d 83 29\n Vol. III, 68 84 5\n \u201d \u201d 85 27\n \u201d \u201d 86\n \u201d 69 87 12\n \u201d \u201d 88 5.15 _bis_\n \u201d \u201d 89\n \u201d \u201d 90\n \u201d \u201d 91 5\n \u201d \u201d 92 5\n \u201d 70 93 5\n \u201d \u201d 94 5\n \u201d \u201d 95 3\n \u201d \u201d 96 4.11\n \u201d 71 97\n \u201d \u201d 98\n \u201d \u201d 99\n \u201d \u201d 100\n \u201d 72 101\n \u201d \u201d 102 11\n \u201d \u201d 103 6\n \u201d \u201d 104\n \u201d \u201d 105\n \u201d 73 106 11\n \u201d \u201d 107 6\n \u201d \u201d 108 6\n \u201d \u201d 109 6\n \u201d \u201d 110 6\n \u201d \u201d 111 6\n \u201d 74 112 6\n \u201d \u201d 113 6.11\n \u201d \u201d 114 6\n \u201d \u201d 115 6\n \u201d 75 116 6.7\n \u201d \u201d 117 6\n \u201d 76 118\n \u201d \u201d 119 9\n \u201d \u201d 120 6.16\n \u201d \u201d 121 14\n \u201d \u201d 122 11\n \u201d 77 123 3\n \u201d \u201d 124 10\n \u201d \u201d 125 7\n \u201d 78 126 8\n \u201d \u201d 127 8\n \u201d \u201d 128 29\n \u201d 79 129\n \u201d \u201d 130\n \u201d \u201d 131\n \u201d \u201d 132\n \u201d \u201d 133 27\n \u201d \u201d 134\n \u201d 80 135\n \u201d \u201d 136\n \u201d \u201d 137 15\n \u201d \u201d 138 15\n \u201d \u201d 139 5.15\n \u201d 81 140 15\n \u201d \u201d 141 15\n \u201d \u201d 142 15.25\n \u201d \u201d 143 15.24\n \u201d \u201d 144 15 _bis_\n \u201d \u201d 145 15 _bis_\n \u201d \u201d 146 15 _bis_\n \u201d \u201d 147 15 _ter_\n \u201d 82 148 15\n \u201d \u201d 149 12.15\n \u201d \u201d 150 15 _bis._ 25\n \u201d 83 151 15.24\n \u201d \u201d 152 15.24\n \u201d \u201d 153 15.24\n \u201d \u201d 154 15.24\n \u201d \u201d 155 15.24\n \u201d 84 156 15 _bis_\n \u201d \u201d 157 15\n \u201d \u201d 158 15.24\n \u201d 85 159 15.24\n \u201d \u201d 160 15.24\n \u201d 86 161 15 _bis_\n \u201d \u201d 162 15\n \u201d \u201d 163 5.14\n \u201d \u201d 164 14\n \u201d 87 165 4.14\n \u201d \u201d 166 14\n \u201d \u201d 167 14\n \u201d \u201d 168 27\n \u201d \u201d 169 27\n \u201d 88 170 27\n \u201d \u201d 171 27\n \u201d \u201d 172 27\n \u201d \u201d 173\n \u201d \u201d 174\n \u201d 89 175 27\n \u201d \u201d 176 27 _bis_\n \u201d \u201d 177 27\n \u201d \u201d 178 27\n \u201d \u201d 179\n \u201d \u201d 180 30\n \u201d \u201d 181\n \u201d \u201d 182\n \u201d 90 183 30\n \u201d \u201d 184\n \u201d \u201d 185 27\n \u201d \u201d 186 27\n \u201d 91 187 27\n \u201d \u201d 188\n \u201d \u201d 189\n \u201d \u201d 190\n \u201d 92 191 4\n \u201d \u201d 192 27 _bis_\n \u201d \u201d 193 20.27 _bis_\n \u201d 93 194\n \u201d \u201d 195 8\n \u201d \u201d 196 8\n \u201d 94 197\n \u201d \u201d 198 6\n \u201d \u201d 199 30\n \u201d \u201d 200\n \u201d \u201d 201\n \u201d 95 202\n \u201d \u201d 203 20.29\n \u201d \u201d 204 29\n \u201d 96 205 20\n \u201d \u201d 206\n \u201d \u201d 207\n\n\u00a7 3. Dr. Carus\u2019s philosophy is hard to understand. Some phrases which\nhe frequently uses lead the reader to imagine that he is listening to\nan old-fashioned K\u00f6nigsberg Kantian. What, then, is our surprise when\nwe find (\u00b6 14) that he sneers at the Kantian, Sir William Hamilton\n(whom he calls Mr. Hamilton) as having \u201cno adequate conception of the\n_a priori_.\u201d In his \u201cUrsache, Grund und Zweck\u201d (1883), an admirably\nclear and systematic exposition of much of his thought, he takes a\nSchleiermacherian view of the _a priori_. He admits it to be founded in\nthe universal conditions of cognition; but he thinks it is among the\nobjective rather than the subjective conditions. This is an opinion\nto which Hamilton is also at times inclined. It is a weak conception,\nunless the whole distinction between the inward and the outward world be\nreformed in the light of agapastic and synechistic ontology. For to deny\nthat the _a priori_ is subjective is to remove its essential character;\nand to make it both subjective and objective (otherwise than in the sense\nin which Kant himself makes it objective) is uncalled for, and is cut off\nby Ockham\u2019s razor. But when synechism has united the two worlds, this\nview gains new life.\n\nAnother thing which has astonished me is Dr. Carus\u2019s extravagant\nlaudation (\u00b6 17) of Venn\u2019s highly enlightened and remarkably\nbright-thinking, yet blundering little book, \u201cThe Logic of Chance.\u201d[101]\nThis is the way he speaks of it: \u201cThis admirable work, we will make\nbold to say, marks a new epoch in the study of logic.\u201d He adds that it\n\u201cpaves the way which Mr. Peirce has actually followed.\u201d But the question\nof the nature of probability had long before that publication engaged\nthe attention of some of the most powerful intellects in England; and\nmy opinion concerning it was fully made up before I saw the book. I do\nnot think I learned anything from that except a classification of the\nphilosophies of probability. However, after all his eulogy, Dr. Carus\nonly uses the book to quote from it Mill\u2019s rewording of Kant\u2019s definition\nof causation, which he would better have quoted direct.\n\nLet me say, not to Dr. Carus, but to the younger generation of readers,\nthat if they imagine that Hamilton, because he is antiquated, is not\nworth reading, they are much mistaken. The Scotistic elements of his\nphilosophy, and his method in the notes on Reid are especially worthy of\nattention. As for Mill, though his philosophy was not profound, it is,\nat least in his \u201cExamination of Hamilton,\u201d admirably set forth. Whoever\nwishes to appeal to the American philosophical mind needs to be quite\nfamiliar with the writings of these two men.\n\nDr. Carus himself accepts all that I hold for erroneous in Kant\u2019s\ndefinition of causation as universal and necessary sequence. Mill\nmerely substitutes the exacter words _invariable_ for \u201cuniversal,\u201d\nand _unconditional_ for \u201cnecessary.\u201d[102] In giving his form of the\ndefinition, Mill shows why it is not applicable to the sequence of day\nand night, namely, that that is not necessary. Yet Dr. Carus writes (\u00b6\n18) of this very same sequence as if it came under Mill\u2019s definition![103]\n\nAgain, why should he make it \u201cthe immortal merit of the great Scotchman\u201d\n(\u00b6 22), that is, of Hume, that he admitted the truth of Leibniz\u2019s\nprinciple?\n\nThe famed puzzle of causation is peculiarly understood by Dr. Carus.\nThe difficulties which the perusal of Hume suggested to the mind\nof Kant,[104] were such as belonged to all categories, or general\nconceptions of the understanding. The precritical Kant inherited a very\ndecided nominalism from Leibniz and Wolf; and the puzzle for him was\nsimply the usual difficulty that plagues nominalism when it finds itself\nconfronted with a reality which has an element of generality. Necessity\nis, I need hardly say, but a particular variety of universality. But\nDr. Carus (\u00b6 24) passes over this, to dwell upon an entirely different\nobjection to causation, namely, that it seems to be a creation out of\nnothing, and a miracle.\n\nI find myself equally at cross-purposes with him, when in \u00b6\u00b6 71-77, he\nspeaks of the prevalent views of logicians concerning _comprehension_.\nThis word, in logic, measures the amount of predicates or marks attached\nto a conception; but Dr. Carus\u2019s criticisms seem to be based upon the\nidea that by comprehension is meant logical breadth, or the amount of\nsubjects to which the conception is applicable.\n\nI am simply gravelled by his remarks (\u00b6 95) concerning sundry English\nwords.\n\nNo more do I know what to make of his praise (\u00b6 123) of the German\ntranslation of a French phrase used in the theory of functions, meaning\n_univocally determined_.\n\n\u00a7 4. One habit which goes far to obscure Dr. Carus\u2019s meaning is that\nwhenever he finds his opinion at variance with a familiar saying, instead\nof rejecting that formula, he retains it and changes the meaning. This is\ncalculated to throw the whole discussion into confusion. Thus, nothing is\nmore certain than that the so-called \u201claw of identity,\u201d or _A_ is _A_,\nwas intended to express the fact that every term is predicable of itself.\nBut Dr. Carus, simply because he finds that \u201cmeaningless and useless\u201d (\u00b6\n96), thinks himself authorised to confuse the terminology of logic by\nmaking this formula, _A_ = _A_, under the same old name, mean that things\nto which the same name is applicable are for some purpose equivalent.\n\nIn like manner, he changes the meaning of the word _freedom_ (\u00b6 165),\nso that the distinction between those who maintain and those who oppose\nthe freedom of the will may, in words, disappear. It seems scarcely\ndefensible for a thoroughgoing necessitarian, such as he is, to fly the\nflag of Free Will.\n\nHe, also, changes the meaning of _spontaneity_ so far that, according to\nhim, \u201cmasses gravitate spontaneously\u201d (\u00b6 191), and so pretends that his\ndoctrine does not suppress the spontaneity of nature!\n\n\u00a7 5. There are other questions of terminology in which I am unable to\nagree with Dr. Carus. Thus, when I define necessitarianism as \u201cthe theory\nthat the will is subject to the general mechanical law of cause and\neffect,\u201d Dr. Carus (\u00b6 139) wishes to delete \u201cmechanical.\u201d But the result\nwould be to define a doctrine to which the advocates of free will would\ngenerally subscribe, as readily as their opponents. In order properly to\nlimit the definition, it is quite requisite to exclude \u201cfree causation.\u201d\nBy \u201cmechanical\u201d causation, I mean a causation entirely determinative,\nlike that of dynamics, but not necessarily operating upon matter.\n\nDr. Carus mentions (\u00b6 84) that there are several different ideas to\nwhich the term necessity is applied. It seems to me that what lies at\nthe bottom of all of them is the experience of reaction against one\u2019s\nwill. In the simplest form, this gives the sense of reality. Dr. Carus\nhimself admits (\u00b6 46) that reality involves the idea of inevitable fate.\nYet philosophical necessity is a special case of universality. But the\nuniversality, or better, the generality, of a pure form involves no\nnecessity. It is only when the form is materialised that the distinction\nbetween necessity and freedom makes itself plain. These ideas are,\ntherefore, as it seems to me, of a mixed nature. Dr. Carus (\u00b6\u00b6 91-94)\ninsists that by the necessary, he wishes to be understood to mean in\nall cases the _inevitable_. This is the idea of _fate_, and is not the\nconception which determinists usually attach to the term necessity.\nYet he does not appear to be quite consistent. At one time (\u00b6 88), he\ncarefully distinguishes necessity from fate. At another time (\u00b6 163),\nevery element of compulsion is to be excluded from the conception of\nnecessity.\n\n\u00a7 6. One important key to Dr. Carus\u2019s opinions is the recognition of the\nfact that, like many other philosophers, he is a nominalist tinctured\nwith realistic opinions.\n\nHe says (\u00b6 103), that \u201cthere is no need of discussing the truism that,\nproperly speaking, there is no absolute sameness.\u201d Now, upon the\nnominalistic theory, there is not only no absolute or numerical identity,\nbut there are not even any real agreements or likenesses between\nindividuals; for likeness consists merely in the calling of several\nindividuals by one name, or (in some systems) in their exciting one idea.\nOn the other hand, upon the realistic theory, the fact that identity is\na relation of reason does not in the least prevent it from being real.\nOn that theory, it is real unless it is _false_ that anything is itself.\nThus, upon either theory, identity is just as real as similarity. But\nDr. Carus, being a nominalist leaning toward realism, is inclined to\nmake dynamical relations real, and second-intentional ones unreal. This\nopinion, I think, is a transitional one.\n\nThe declaration (\u00b6 198) that \u201cnatural laws are simply a description\nof nature as nature is,\u201d and that \u201cthe facts of nature express the\ncharacter of nature,\u201d are nominalistic. But in another place (\u00b6\u00b6\n107-116), he says distinctly that uniformities are real.\n\nHe says (\u00b6 70), \u201cMr. Peirce attempts to explain natural laws as if they\nwere concrete and _single facts_.\u201d This is eminently nominalistic. The\nnominalist alone makes this sharp distinction between the abstract and\nthe concrete,[105] which must not be confounded with Hegel\u2019s distinction\nfor which the same words are used. The nominalist alone falls into the\nabsurdity of talking of \u201csingle facts,\u201d or _individual generals_. Yet\nDr. Carus says (\u00b6 68) that natural laws describe the facts of nature\n_sub specie aeternitatis_. Now I understand Spinoza to be a realist.\nIn \u00b6117 he considers it \u201csettled\u201d \u201cthat there are samenesses.\u201d This is\nrealistic. But in \u00b6 120, he holds \u201cthe whole business of science to be to\nsystematise the samenesses of experience,\u201d which is nominalistic.\n\n\u00a7 7. Dr. Carus seems to be in some doubt as to how far evolutionism ought\nto be carried. In \u00b6\u00b6 48-51, he seems to side with my contention that it\nshould be thoroughgoing. In \u00b6116, he makes intellect an evolution from\nfeeling. Yet he is sometimes (\u00b6 125) \u201cinclined\u201d to say the world never\nwas a chaos; he sometimes (\u00b6 61) thinks it weak to suppose that real\nchance begets order; and he sometimes (\u00b6 68) goes so far as to pronounce\neternity to be the _conditio sine qua non_ of natural law.\n\n\u00a7 8. Every reader of _The Monist_ knows that our good editor\u2019s great word\nis \u201cformal law.\u201d The clearest statement he has ever made of this doctrine\nI find in the following two sentences (\u00b6 127):\n\n \u201cThe _a priori_ systems of thought are ... constructions\n raised out of the recognition of the formal, i. e. relational\n samenesses that appear in experience. All possibilities of a\n certain class of relations can be exhausted and formulated in\n theorems.\u201d[106]\n\nThis is perspicuous. For example, of pairs, we can easily show that\nthere are but two forms _A_:_A_ and _A_:_B_. This proposition,\u2014theorem\nif you will,\u2014exhausts the possibilities. If we make believe there is no\ndanger of falling into error in mathematical reasoning,\u2014and one danger,\nthough not, perhaps, a very serious one, _is_ eliminated,\u2014then this\nproposition is absolutely certain. But I will say, at once, that such a\nproposition is not, in a proper sense, synthetic. It is a mere corollary\nfrom the definition of a pair. Moreover, its application to experience,\nor to possible experience, opens the door to probability, and shuts out\nabsolute necessity and certainty, _in toto_.\n\nConcerning points like this, Dr. Carus, in company with the general\nbody of thinkers, is laboring under a great disadvantage from not\nunderstanding the logic of relatives. It is a subject I have been\nstudying for a great many years, and I feel and know that I have an\nimportant report that I ought to make upon it. This branch of logic is,\nhowever, so abstruse, that I have never been able to find the leisure to\ntranslate my conclusions into a form in which their significance would\nbe manifest even to a powerful thinker whose thoughts had not long been\nturned in that direction. I shall succeed in doing so, whenever I can\nfind myself in a situation where I need think of nothing else for months,\nand not before. That may not be for thirty years; but I believe it is the\nintention of providence that it should be. Meantime, I will testify, and\nthe reader can take my testimony for what he thinks it is worth, that\nall deductive reasoning, except that kind which is so childishly simple\nthat acute minds have doubted whether there was any reasoning there,\u2014I\nmean non-relative syllogism,\u2014requires an act of choice; because from a\ngiven premise, several conclusions,\u2014in some cases an infinite number,\u2014can\nbe drawn. Hence, Dr. Carus is altogether too hasty in his confidence\n(\u00b6\u00b6 195, 196) that general thinking machines \u201care not impossibilities.\u201d\nAn act of original and arbitrary determination would be required; and\nit seems almost evident that no machine could perform such an act\nexcept within narrow limits, thought out beforehand and embodied in\nits construction. Moreover, positive observation is called for in all\ninference, even the simplest,\u2014though in deduction it is only observation\nof an object of imagination. Moreover, a peculiar act which may properly\nbe called _abstraction_[107] is usually required, consisting in seizing\nevanescent elements of thought and holding them before the mind as\n\u201csubstantive\u201d objects, to borrow a phrase from William James. At the\nsame time, the process I am describing, that is, relative deduction, is\nperfectly general and demonstrative, and depends upon the truth of the\nassumed premises, and not, like inductive reasoning, upon the manner in\nwhich those premises present themselves.\n\nBut the application of the logic of relatives shows that the propositions\nof arithmetic, which Dr. Carus usually adduces as examples of formal law\n(\u00b6 15), are, in fact, only corollaries from definitions. They are certain\nonly as applied to ideal constructions, and in such application, they are\nmerely analytical.\n\nThe truth is our ideas about the distinction between analytical and\nsynthetical judgments is much modified by the logic of relatives, and\nby the logic of probable inference. An analytical proposition is a\ndefinition or a proposition _deducible_ from definitions; a synthetical\nproposition is a proposition not analytical. Deduction, or analytical\nreasoning, is, as I have shown in my \u201cTheory of Probable Reasoning,\u201d a\nreasoning in which the conclusion follows (necessarily, or probably) from\nthe state of things expressed in the premises, in contradistinction to\nscientific, or synthetical, reasoning, which is a reasoning in which the\nconclusion follows probably and approximately from the premises, owing to\nthe conditions under which the latter have been observed, or otherwise\nascertained. The two classes of reasoning present, besides, some other\ncontrasts that need not be insisted upon in this place. They also present\nsome significant resemblances. Deduction is really a matter of perception\nand of experimentation, just as induction and hypothetic inference are;\nonly, the perception and experimentation are concerned with imaginary\nobjects instead of with real ones. The operations of perception and of\nexperimentation are subject to error, and therefore it is only in a\nPickwickian sense that mathematical reasoning can be said to be perfectly\ncertain. It is so, only under the condition that no error creeps into\nit: yet, after all, it is susceptible of attaining a practical certainty.\nSo, for that matter, is scientific reasoning; but not so readily. Again,\nmathematics brings to light results as truly occult[108] and unexpected\nas those of chemistry; only they are results dependent upon the action\nof reason in the depths of our own consciousness, instead of being\ndependent, like those of chemistry, upon the action of Cosmical Reason,\nor Law. Or, stating the matter under another aspect, analytical reasoning\ndepends upon associations of similarity, synthetical reasoning upon\nassociations of contiguity. The logic of relatives, which justifies these\nassertions, shows accordingly that deductive reasoning is really quite\ndifferent from what it was supposed by Kant to be; and this explains how\nit is that he and others have taken various mathematical propositions\nto be synthetical which in their ideal sense, as propositions of pure\nmathematics, are in truth only analytical.\n\nDescending from things I can demonstrate to things of which various\nfacts, in the light of those demonstrations, fully persuade me, I\nwill say that in my opinion there are many synthetical propositions\nwhich, if not _a priori_ in Dr. Carus\u2019s sense, are, at least, innate\n(notwithstanding his frequent denials of this, as in \u00b6 15) though he\nis quite right in saying that their abstract and distinct formulation\ncomes very late (\u00b6 126). But turn the facts as I will, I cannot see that\nthey afford the slightest reason for thinking that such propositions are\never absolutely universal, exact, or necessary in their truth. On the\ncontrary, the principles of probable inference show this to be impossible.\n\nDr. Carus adduces the instance of a geometrical proposition, namely,\n\u201cthat two congruent regular tetrahedrons, when put together, will form a\nhexahedron.\u201d (\u00b6 25.) This, he says, seems to be \u201ca very wonderful thing\u201d;\nfor why should not a larger tetrahedron be formed, just as two heaps of\nflour make a large heap of flour? Yet, he continues, the probability\nthat the two tetrahedrons do always make a hexahedron is 1, \u201cwhich\nmeans certainty\u201d (\u00b6 27). But as it happens, the proposition, in the\nform stated is quite erroneous. What is true is this. If two tetrahedra\nare so placed that one face of each is coincident with one face of the\nother, while all the other faces are inclined to one another, and if of\nthe 8 faces, the 2 that are coincident are not counted, there remain to\nbe counted 8-2=6 faces. But there is nothing more wonderful about this\nthan that 8-2=6, which is an easy corollary from definitions. Very few\npropositions in mathematics that appear \u201cmarvellous\u201d will hold water; and\nthose few excite our astonishment only because the real complexity of the\nconditions are masked in an intuitional presentation of them.\n\nDr. Carus holds (\u00b6 15) that formal knowledge is absolutely universal,\nexact, and necessary. In some cases, as where he says that, given the\nnumber of dimensions of space, the entire geometry could be deduced (\u00b6\n35), the boasted infallibility will prove on examination to be downright\nerror. In all other cases, the propositions only relate to ideal\nconstructions, and their applicability to the real world is at the best\ndoubtful, and, as I think, false; while in their ideal purity, they are\nnot synthetical.\n\nThus, my good friend and antagonist holds that the combination of oxygen\nand hydrogen to produce water is not \u201cdifferent in principle\u201d from that\nof the tetrahedra to produce a hexahedron (\u00b6 26). There is all the\ndifference between the ideal and the real; which to my Scotistic mind is\nvery important. But this is not the only passage in which he speaks as if\nform were the principle of individuation.\n\n\u00a7 9. Dr. Carus\u2019s position is even weaker than that of Kant, who makes\nspace, for example, a necessary form of thought (in a broad sense of that\nterm). But Dr. Carus appears to consider space as an absolute reality.\nFor he says (\u00b6 119) that \u201cevery single point of space has its special\nand individual qualities.\u201d Here again form is made the principle of\nindividuation; whence the queer phrase, \u201cindividual qualities.\u201d\n\n\u00a7 10. Dr. Carus argues that whatever is unequivocally determinate is\nnecessary. (\u00b6 124.) Were the determination spoken of real dynamic\ndetermination, this would be a mere truism. But the expression used,\n_eindeutig bestimmt_, merely expresses a mathematical determination, and\ntherefore no real necessity ensues. The equation\n\n (Transcriber\u2019s Note: Italics have been removed from the\n formul\u00e6 for readability.)\n\n x\u00b2 - 23x + 132\u00bc = 0\n\ndetermines _x_ to be either 11\u00b7477 or 11\u00b7523. In this sense, _x_ has\nnecessarily one value or the other. The equation\n\n x\u00b2 - 12x + 6 = 0\n\ndetermines _x_ to be either 11\u00b7477 or 0\u00b7523. Together, the two equations\nuniquely determine _x_ to be 11\u00b7477. This shows how much that argument\namounts to.\n\n\u00a7 11. By \u201csameness,\u201d Dr. Carus means equivalence for a given purpose. (\u00b6\u00b6\n102, 106.) By the \u201cidea of sameness,\u201d he means (\u00b6\u00b6 77, 96) the principle\nthat things having a common character are for some purpose equivalent.\nThis, he says, \u201chas a solid basis in the facts of experience.\u201d By a\n\u201cworld of sameness\u201d (\u00b6 113), he seems to mean one in which any two given\nconcrete things are in some respect equivalent. He argues (\u00b6 122) that\na \u201cworld of sameness is a world in which necessity rules.\u201d I do not see\nthis. It seems to me so bald a _non sequitur_, that I cannot but suppose\nthe thought escapes my apprehension. If there were anything in the\nargument, it would seem to be a marvellously expeditious way of settling\nthe whole dispute; and therefore it would have been worth the trouble of\nstating, so as to bring it within the purview of minds like mine.\n\n\u00a7 12. My candid opponent sometimes endorses emphatically the Leibnizian\nprinciple. \u201cNecessitarianism must be founded on something other than\nobservation. Observation is _a posteriori_; it has reference to single\nfacts, to particulars; yet the doctrine of necessity ... is of universal\napplication. The doctrine of necessity ... is of an _a priori_ nature.\u201d\n(\u00b6 11.) \u201cMillions of single experiences ... cannot establish a solid\nbelief in necessity.\u201d (\u00b6 14.) \u201cNo amount of experience is sufficient to\nconstitute causation by a mere synthesis of sequences.\u201d (\u00b6 22.) \u201cMillions\nof millions of cases\u201d constitute \u201cno proof\u201d that a proposition \u201cis always\nso.\u201d (\u00b6 29.)\n\nNevertheless, he holds that the law of \u201cthe conservation of matter and\nenergy\u201d so conclusively proves necessary causation, that the obstinacy\nof Hume, himself, could not have withstood the argument. (\u00b6 23.) One\nwonders, then, what is supposed to prove this \u201claw of the conservation of\nmatter and energy,\u201d if no amount of experience can prove it.\n\nBut the _a priori_ itself can \u201cbe based on the firm ground of\nexperience.\u201d (\u00b6 14.) In that case, it is not prior to experience, after\nall! \u201cThe idea of necessity is based upon the conception of sameness,\nand ... the existence of sameness is a fact of experience.\u201d (\u00b6 87.)\nIf absolute necessity can be irrefragably demonstrated from the fact\nthat two things are alike, it is a pity Dr. Carus should not state\nthis demonstration in a form, that I, and men like me, can understand.\nThat would be more to the purpose than merely saying it can be proved.\nAbsolute chance is rejected as \u201cinvolving a violation of laws well\nestablished by _positive evidence_.\u201d (\u00b6 149.)\n\nAll these _denials_ that absolute necessity can be established and\nabsolute chance refuted by experiential evidence, mixed with as clear\n_assertions_ of the same things, when taken together, have the appearance\nof an attempt, as the politicians say, to \u201cstraddle\u201d the question.\n\n\u00a713. But the ingenious Doctor seeks to bolster up necessity by\nintroducing the confused notion of \u201ccausation.\u201d\n\nI do not know where the idea originated that a cause is an instantaneous\nstate of things, perfectly determinative of every subsequent state. It\nseems to be at the bottom of Kant\u2019s discourse on the subject; yet it\naccords neither with the original conception of a cause, nor with the\nprinciples of mechanics. The original idea of an efficient cause is\nthat of an agent, more or less like a man. It is prior to the effect,\nin the sense of having come into being before the latter; but it is not\ntransformed into the effect. In this sense, it may happen that an event\nis a cause of a subsequent event; seldom, however, is it the principal\ncause. Far less are events the only causes. The modern mechanical\nconception, on the other hand, is that the relative positions of\nparticles determine their accelerations at the instants when they occupy\nthose positions. In other words, if the positions of all the particles\nare given at _two_ instants (together with the law of force), then\nthe positions at all other instants may be deduced.[109] This doctrine\nconflicts with Kant\u2019s second analogy of experience, as interpreted by\nhim, in no less than four essential particulars. In the first place, far\nfrom involving any principle that could properly be termed generation, or\n_Erzeugung_, which is Kant\u2019s word for the sequence of effect from cause,\nthe modern mechanical doctrine is a doctrine of persistence, and, as I\nhave repeatedly explained, positively prohibits any real growth. In the\nsecond place, one state of things (i. e. one configuration of the system)\nis not sufficient to determine a second, it is two that determine a\nthird. To whomsoever may think that this is an inconsiderable divergence\nof opinions, let me say, study the logic of relatives, and you will think\nso no longer. In the third place, the two determining configurations,\naccording to mechanics, may be taken at almost any two instants, and the\ndetermined configuration be taken at any third instant we like. _There is\nno mechanical truth in saying that the past determines the future, rather\nthan the future the past._ We habitually follow tradition in continuing\nto use that form of expression, but every mathematician knows that it is\nnothing but a form of expression. We continue, for convenience, to talk\nof mechanical phenomena as if they were regulated, in the same manner\nin which our intentions regulate our actions (which is essentially a\ndetermination of the future by the past), although we are quite aware\nthat it is not really so. Remark how Kant reasons:\n\n \u201cIf it is a necessary law of our sensibility, and consequently\n a _formal condition_ of all perceptions, that the preceding\n time determines the following, (since I can only come to\n the following through the preceding,) then is it also an\n indispensable _law of the empirical representation_ of the\n time-series that the appearances of the preceding time\n determine every occurrence in the following.\u201d\n\nWhat this leads to is a causality like that of mental phenomena, where it\n_is_ the past which determines the future, and _not_ (in the same sense)\nthe reverse; but the doctrine of the conservation of energy consists\nprecisely in the denial that anything like this occurs in the domain of\nphysics. Had Kant studied the psychological phenomena more attentively\nand generalised them more broadly, he would have seen that in the mind\ncausation is not absolute, but follows such a curve as is traced in my\nessay towards \u201cThe Law of Mind\u201d (_The Monist_, Vol. II, 550). Does our\njudicious editor deem it ungracious to find fault with Kant for not doing\nso much more than he did, considering what that hero-like achievement\nwas? We must seem to carp, as long as thinkers can hold that achievement\nfor sufficient. In the fourth place, Kant\u2019s \u201cAnalogy\u201d ignores that\ncontinuity which is the life-blood of mathematical thought. He deals\nwith those awkward chunks of phenomenon, called \u201cevents.\u201d He represents\none such \u201cevent\u201d as determined by certain others, definitely, while\nthe rest have nothing to do with it. It is impossible to cement such\nthought as this into hermetic continuity with the refined conceptions of\nmodern dynamics. The statement that every instantaneous state of things\ndetermines precisely all subsequent states, and not at all any previous\nstates, could, I rather think, be shown to involve a contradiction.\n\nThe notion which Dr. Carus holds of a cause seems to be that it is a\nstate, embracing all the positions and velocities of all the masses at\none instant, the effect being a similar state for any subsequent instant.\n(\u00b6\u00b6 21, 24.) This breaks at once with common parlance, with dynamics,\nand with philosophical logic. In common parlance, we do not say that\nthe position and upward velocity of a missile is the cause of its being\nat a subsequent instant lower down and moving with a greater downward\nvelocity.[110] In dynamics, it is the fixed force, gravitation, or\nwhatever else, together with those relative positions of the bodies that\ndetermine the intensity and direction of the forces, that is regarded\nas the cause. But these causes are not previous to, but simultaneous\nwith, their effects, which are the instantaneous accelerations. Finally,\nlogic opposes our calling one of two states which equally determine one\nanother (as any two states of a system do, if the velocities are taken to\nbe included in these states) _the_ determinator, or cause, simply because\nof the circumstance that it precedes the other in time,\u2014a circumstance\nthat is upon the principles of dynamics plainly insignificant and\nirrelevant.\n\nEverybody will make slips in the use of words that have been on his lips\nfrom before the time when he learned to think; but the practice which\nI endeavor to follow in regard to the word _cause_, is to use it in\nthe Aristotelian sense of an _efficient cause_, in all its crudeness.\nIn short, I refuse to use it at all as a philosophical word. When my\nconception is of a dynamical character, I endeavor to employ the accepted\nterminology of dynamics;[111] and when my idea is a more general and\nlogical one, I prefer to speak of the _explanation_.\n\n\u00a7 14. Dr. Carus thinks the element of necessity in causation can be\ndemonstrated by considering the process as a transformation. \u201cIt is a\nsequence of two states which belong together as an initial and final\naspect of one and the same event.\u201d (\u00b6 21. Compare \u00b6\u00b6 20, 24.) He neglects\nto explain how he brings under this formula the inward causation of the\nwill and character, as set forth by him in \u00b6\u00b6 163-167.\n\nIt is unnecessary for me to reply, at length, to an argument so\nmanifestly inconclusive. On the one hand, it conflicts with the principle\nthat absolute necessity cannot be proved from experience; and on the\nother hand, it leaves room for an imperfect necessity.\n\nProfessor Tait has done an ill office to thought in countenancing the\nidea that the conservation of energy is of the same nature as the\n\u201cconservation,\u201d or rather perduration, of matter. Dr. Carus says (\u00b6 121)\nthat\n\n \u201cThe law of the conservation of matter and energy rests upon\n the experience (corroborated by experiments) that causation\n is transformation. It states that the total amount of matter\n and the total amount of energy remain constant. There is no\n creation out of nothing and no conversion of something into\n nothing.\u201d\n\nThe historical part of this statement contains only a small grain of\ntruth; but that I will not stop to criticise. The point I wish to make\nis that the law of the conservation of energy is here represented under\na false aspect. The true substance of the law is that the accelerations,\nor rates of change, of the motions of the particles at any instant depend\nsolely on their relative positions at those instants. The equation which\nexpresses the law under this form is a differential equation of the\nsecond order; that is, it involves the rates of change of the rates of\nchange of positions, together with the positions themselves. Now, because\nof the purely analytic proposition of the differential calculus that\n\n D\u209c\u00b2s = \u00bdD\u209b(D\u209cs)\u00b2,\n\nthe first integral of the differential equation of the second order, that\nis, the differential equation of the first order which expresses the same\nstate of things, equates half the sum of the masses, each multiplied by\nthe square of its velocity, to a function of the relative positions of\nthe particles _plus_ an arbitrary constant.[112] In order to fix our\nideas, let us take a very simple example, that of a single particle\naccelerated towards an infinite plane, at a rate proportional to the\n_n_\u1d57\u02b0 power of its distance from the plane. In this case, if _s_ be the\ndistance, the second differential equation will be\n\n D\u209c\u00b2s = -as\u207f,\n\nand the first integral of it will be\n\n (D\u209cs)\u00b2 = -(\u00b2\u1d43\u2044\u2099\u208a\u2081)s\u207f\u207a\u00b9 + C.\n\nBy the first law of motion, and the Pythagorean proposition, the part\nof the velocity-square depending on the horizontal component is also\nconstant.\n\nThe arbitrary constant, _C_, plainly has its genesis in the fact that\nforces do not determine velocities, but only accelerations. Its value\nwill be fixed as soon as the velocity at any instant is known. This\nquantity would exist, just the same, and be independent of the time, and\nwould therefore be \u201cconserved\u201d whether the forces were \u201cconservative,\u201d\nthat is, simply positional, or not. Now, this constant is the energy;\nor rather, the energy is composed of this constant increased by another\nwhich is absolutely indeterminable, being merely supposed large enough to\nmake the sum positive.\n\nThus, the law of energy does not prescribe that the total amount of\nenergy shall remain constant; for this would be so in any case by virtue\nof the second law of motion; but what it prescribes is that the total\nenergy diminished by the living force shall give a remainder which\ndepends upon the relative positions of the particles and not upon the\ntime or the velocities. It is also to be noticed that the energy has\nno particular magnitude, or quantity. Furthermore, in transformations\nof kinetical energy into positional energy, and the reverse, the\ndifferent portions of energy do not retain their identity, any more\nthan, in book-keeping, the identity of the amounts of different items\nis preserved. In short, the conservation of energy, (I do not mean the\n_law_ of conservation,) is a mere result of algebra. Very different is\nit with the \u201cconservation\u201d of matter. For, in the first place, the total\nmass is a perfectly definite quantity; and, in the second place, in all\nits transformations, not only is the _total_ amount constant, but all the\ndifferent parts preserve their identity. To speak, therefore, of \u201cthe\nconservation of matter and energy,\u201d is to assimilate facts of essentially\ncontrary natures; and to say that the law of the conservation of energy\nmakes the total amount of energy constant is to attribute to this law\na phenomenon really due to another law, and to overlook what this law\nreally does determine, namely, _that the total energy less the kinetic\nenergy gives a remainder which is exclusively positional_.\n\n\u00a7 15. Dr. Carus does not make it clear what he means by _chance_. He\ndoes, indeed, say (\u00b6\u00b6 145, 146):\n\n \u201cWhat is chance?\n\n \u201cChance is any event not especially intended, either not\n calculated, or, with a given and limited stock of knowledge,\n incalculable.\u201d\n\nThis defines what he means by a chance event, in the concrete; what he\nunderstands by probability, we are left to conjecture. But from what he\nsays in \u00b6 147, I infer that he regards it as dependent upon the state of\nour ignorance, and therefore nothing real.\n\nI am, therefore, much puzzled when I find him expressing a conviction\n(\u00b6\u00b6 88, 156) that chance plays an important part in the real world. He\nexplains very distinctly that \u201cwhen we call a throw of the dice pure\nchance, we mean that the incidents which condition the turning up of\nthese or those special faces of the dice have not been, or cannot be,\ncalculated.\u201d (\u00b6 147.) This is the commonest, because the shallowest,\nphilosophy of chance. Even Venn might teach him better than that.\nHowever, according to that view, when he writes of \u201cthe important part\nthat chance plays in the world,\u2014not absolute chance ... but that same\nchance of which the throw of the die is a typical instance\u201d (\u00b6 88), he\ncan be understood to mean no more than that many things happen which we\nare not in condition to calculate or predict. This is not playing a part\n_in the world_, one would say\u2014at least, not in the natural world; it is\nonly playing a part in our ignorance.\n\nDr. Carus frequently uses phrases which make us suspect he penetrates\ndeeper. Thus, he says, \u201cwe do not believe in absolute chance, but we\nbelieve in chance\u201d (\u00b6 144); and again, \u201cEvery man is the architect of\nhis own fortune\u2014but not entirely. There are sometimes coincidences\ndetermining the fates of men.\u201d (\u00b6 161.) But when we remark the\nconsecution of \u00b6\u00b6 137-162, we feel pretty sure he really sees no\nfurther. To do so would have been to perceive that indefinitely varied\nspecificalness _is_ chance.\n\nFor a long time, I myself strove to make chance that diversity in the\nuniverse which laws leave room for, instead of a violation of law, or\nlawlessness. That was truly believing in chance that was not absolute\nchance. It was recognising that chance does play a part in the real\nworld, apart from what we may know or be ignorant of. But it was a\ntransitional belief which I have passed through, while Dr. Carus seems\nnot to have reached it.\n\nAs for absolute chance, Dr. Carus makes the momentous admission that\nit is \u201cnot unimaginable\u201d (\u00b6 150). If so, its negation, or absolute\nnecessity, cannot be a formal principle.\n\n\u00a7 16. But it is time for me to leave the consideration of Dr. Carus\u2019s\nsystem and to take up his strictures upon mine. His philosophy is one\neminently enlightened by modern ideas, which it synthetises to an\nunusual extent. It is distinguished for its freedom from the vice of\none-sidedness, and displays every facet of the gem of philosophical\ninquiry, except the one on which it rests, the question of absolute\nlaw. Its prominent faults, which I feel sure must have struck every\ncompetent reader, are that it shows little trace of meditation upon the\nthoughts of the great idealists, and that there is a certain want of\ncongruity between different elements of it. How strangely it sounds,\nfor instance, to find an apriorian, and one who is dinging \u201cformal\nlaws\u201d so perpetually into our ears, one who holds that \u201cin order to\nweave the woof of the _a posteriori_ elements into coherent cloth, we\nwant the warp of the _a priori_\u201d (\u00b6 15), to find this man declaring for\na positivism \u201cwhich accepts no doctrine, theory, or law, unless it be\na formulation of facts,\u201d and proclaiming that \u201cthe whole business of\nscience is to systematise the samenesses of experience, and to present\nthem in convenient formulas\u201d (\u00b6 120). Now there is just one way of\nbringing such warring elements into harmony, and curing the greatest\ndefect of the system,\u2014and it is a way which would also bring the whole\ninto far better concordance with natural science. It is to lop off the\nheads of all absolute propositions Whose subject is not the Absolute,\nand reduce them to the level of probable and approximate statements.\nWere that defalcation performed, Dr. Carus\u2019s philosophy would, in its\ngeneral features, offer no violent opposition to my opinions. Moreover,\nthe Doctor has at heart the conciliation of religion and science. I\nconfess such serious concern makes me smile; for I think the atonement\nhe desires is a thing which will come to pass of itself when time is\nripe, and that our efforts to hasten it have just that slight effect\nthat our efforts to hasten the ripening of apples on a tree may have.\nBesides, natural ripening is the best. Let science and religion each have\nstout faith in itself, and refuse to compromise with alien and secondary\npurposes, but push the development of its own thought on its own line;\nand then, when reconcilement comes,\u2014as come it surely will,\u2014it will have\na positive value, and be an unmixed good. But since our accomplished\neditor thinks himself called upon to assist in this birth of time, let\nme ask him whether of all the conditions of such peace, the first is not\nthat religious thought should abandon that extravagant absoluteness of\nassertion which is proper to the state of intellectual infancy, but which\nit has so long been too timid to let go? This pragmatical and unneeded\nabsoluteness it is which is most deeply contrary to the method, the\nresults, and the whole spirit of science; and no error can be greater\nthan to fancy that science, or scientific men, rest upon it or readily\ntolerate it.\n\n\u00a7 17. Dr. Carus (\u00b6\u00b6 56-64) condemns my method of investigation as\ncontrary to that by which science has been advanced; and holds that a\nradically different, and thoroughly positivistic method is requisite,\u2014a\nmethod so intensely positivistic as to exclude all originality. I suppose\nhe will not object to my forming an opinion concerning the methods of\nscience. I was brought up in an atmosphere of scientific inquiry, and\nhave all my life chiefly lived among scientific men. For the last thirty\nyears, the study which has constantly been before my mind has been upon\nthe nature, strength, and history of methods of scientific thought. I\nhave no space here to argue the question. In its logical aspect, I have\npartly considered it in various publications; and in its historical\naspect, I have long been engaged upon a treatise about it. My critic says\n(\u00b6 57) that 1 am \u201cvery positivistic in my logic of science.\u201d This is a\nsingular misapprehension. Few of the great scientific minds with whom\nI have come into personal contact, and from whom I endeavored to learn\nwere disposed to contemn originality or the ideal part of the mind\u2019s work\nin investigation; and those few, it was easy to see, really breathed an\natmosphere of ideas which were so incessantly present that they were\nunconscious of them. Were I to name those of my teachers who were most\npositivistic in theory, a smile would be excited. My own historical\nstudies, which have been somewhat minutely critical, have, on the whole\nconfirmed the views of Whewell, the only man of philosophical power\nconjoined with scientific training who had made a comprehensive survey\nof the whole course of science, that progress in science depends upon\nthe observation of the right facts by minds _furnished with appropriate\nideas_. Finally, my long investigation of the logical process, of\nscientific reasoning led me many years ago to the conclusion that science\nis nothing but a development of our natural instincts. So much for my\n_theory_ of scientific logic. It is as totally opposed as anything can\nbe to Dr. Carus\u2019s theory (\u00b6 69, note; and \u201cUrsache, Grund und Zweck,\u201d p.\n2) that originality is out of place in science.\n\nBut in my _practice_ of scientific reasoning, Dr. Carus accuses me of\nbeing what he calls a \u201cconstructionist\u201d; that is, a theoriser unguided by\nindications from observation or accepted facts. To a mind upon whom that\ncelebrated and splendid chapter of Kant upon the architectonical method\nfailed to make a deep impression, I may appear so; but _travesty_ is in\ntruth hardly too strong a word to describe the account of my method by\nDr. Carus.\n\nPerhaps exaggeration is not without its value. If so, let me sum up the\nmethod Dr. Carus recommends. Eschew originality, is its pious formula;\ndo not think for yourself, nor countenance results obtained by original\nminds. Distrust them; they are not safe men. Leave originality to\nmathematicians and their breed, to poets, and to all those who seek the\nsad notoriety of having unsettled belief.[113] Flee all philosophies\nwhich smack of this aberrant nineteenth century.[114] This theory of Dr.\nCarus condemns itself; for it is highly original, and soars into the free\nether untrammelled by historic facts.\n\nKeppler comes very close to realising my ideal of the scientific method;\nand he is one of the few thinkers who have taken their readers fully into\ntheir confidence as to what their method really has been.[115] I should\nnot feel justified in inflicting upon mine an autobiographical account\nof my own course of thought; but some things Dr. Carus\u2019s accusation\nforces me to mention. My method of attacking all problems has ever been\nto begin with an historical and rational inquiry into the special method\nadapted to the special problem. This is the essence of my architectonical\nproceeding upon which Dr. Carus has commented very severely. To look an\ninch before one\u2019s nose involves originality: therefore, it is wrong to\nhave a conscious method. But further, in regard to philosophy, not only\nthe methods, but the elementary ideas which are to enter into those\nmethods, should be subjected to careful preliminary examination. This,\nespecially, Dr. Carus finds very unscientific. (\u00b6 64, and elsewhere.)\nIt is, undoubtedly, the most characteristic feature of my procedure.\nCertainly it was not a notion hastily or irreflectively caught up; but\nis the maturest fruit of a lifetime of reflection upon the methods of\nscience, including those of philosophy; and if it shall be found that one\ncontribution to thought on my part has proved of permanent service, that,\nI expect, will be the one. This method in no wise teaches that the method\nand materials for thought are not to be modified in the course of the\nstudy of the subject-matter. But instead of taking ideas at haphazard, or\nbeing satisfied with those that have been handed down from the good old\ntimes, as a mind keenly alive to the dangers of originality would have\ndone, I have undertaken to make a systematic survey of human knowledge\n(a very slight sketch of which composed the substance of my paper on\nthe \u201cArchitecture of Theories,\u201d) in order to find what ideas have, as a\nfact, proved most fruitful, and to observe the special utilities they\nhave severally fulfilled. A subsidiary object of this survey was to note\nwhat the great obstacles are to-day in the way of the further advance of\nthe different branches of science. In my \u201cArchitecture of Theories,\u201d I\nnever professed to do more than make a slight sketch of a small portion\nof my preliminary studies, devoting thirteen lines to some hints as to\nthe nature of the results. In the four following papers I have given\na selection of a few of these results. Among those which remain to be\nreported are some of much more immediate importance than any of those\nhitherto set forth. If anybody has been surprised to find my subsequent\npapers developing thoughts which they were unable to foresee from my\nfirst, it is only what I warned people from the outset that they would\nfind to happen. Nor have the greatest of these surprises yet been\nreached.[116]\n\nThe next series of facts reviewed was that of the history of philosophy.\nI waded right into this fearful slough of \u201coriginality,\u201d in order to\ngather what seemed to throw a light upon the subject. Finally, I reviewed\nthe general facts of the universe.\n\nI now found myself forced by a great many different indications to\nthe conclusion that an evolutionary philosophy of some kind must be\naccepted,\u2014including among such philosophies systems like those of\nAristotle and of Hegel. From this point the reasoning was more rapid.\nEvolution had been a prominent study for half a generation; and much\nlight had been thrown upon the conditions for a fruitful evolutionary\nphilosophy. The first question was, how far shall this evolution go back?\nWhat shall we suppose _not_ to be a product of growth? I fancy it is this\ncautious reflectiveness of my procedure which especially displeases Dr.\nCarus. It is not positivistic: it is architectonic. But the answer to the\nquestion was not far to seek. If an evolutionary explanation is to be\nadopted, philosophy, logic, and the economy of research all dictate that\nin the first essay, at least, that style of explanation be carried as far\nback as explanation is called for. What elements of the universe require\nno explanation? This was a simple question, capable of being decided\nby logic with as much facility and certainty as a suitable problem is\nsolved by differential calculus. Being, and the uniformity in which being\nconsists, require to be explained. The only thing that does not require\nit is non-existent spontaneity. This was soon seen to mean absolute\nchance. The conclusion so reached was clinched by a careful re\u00ebxamination\nof the office of chance in science generally, and especially in the\ndoctrines of evolution. Arrived at this point, the next question was,\nwhat is the principle by which the development is to proceed? It was a\ndifficult inquiry, and involved researches from different points of view.\n\nBut I will not trouble the reader with further autobiographical details.\nI have given enough to show that my method has neither been in theory\npurely empirical, nor in practice mere brain-spinning; and that, in\nshort, my friend Dr. Carus\u2019s account of it has been as incorrect as can\nbe.\n\n\u00a7 18. The learned doctor (\u00b6\u00b6 6, 7, 8) pronounces me to be an imitator of\nDavid Hume, or, at least, classes my opinions as closely allied to his.\nYet be it known that never, during the thirty years in which I have been\nwriting on philosophical questions, have I failed in my allegiance to\nrealistic opinions and to certain Scotistic ideas; while all that Hume\nhas to say is said at the instance and in the interest of the extremest\nnominalism. Moreover, instead of being a purely negative critic, like\nHume, seeking to annul a fundamental conception generally admitted,\nI am a positive critic, pleading for the admission to a place in our\nscheme of the universe for an idea generally rejected. In the first\npaper of this series, in which I gave a preliminary sketch of such of my\nideas as could be so presented, I carefully recorded my opposition to\nall philosophies which deny the reality of the Absolute, and asserted\nthat \u201cthe one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective\nidealism, that matter is effete mind.\u201d This is as much as to say that I\nam a Schellingian, of some stripe; so that, on the whole, I do not think\nDr. Carus has made a very happy hit in likening me to Hume, to whose\nwhole method and style of philosophising I have always been perhaps too\nintensely averse. Yet, notwithstanding my present disclaimer, I have\nlittle doubt apriorians will continue to describe me as belonging to the\nsceptical school. They have their wonderful ways of arriving at truth,\nwithout stooping to confront their conclusions with facts; and it is\namusing to see how sincerely they are convinced that nobody can have\nscience at heart, without denying all they uphold.[117]\n\nMy opponent has a habit of throwing out surprising opinions without\nthe least attempt to illuminate them with the effulgence of reason.\nThus he says (\u00b6 8): \u201cIf Kant\u2019s answer to Hume had been satisfactory,\nMr. Peirce would probably not have renewed the attack.\u201d What attack?\nAll that Hume attacked I defend, namely, law as a reality. How could a\ndefence of that which I defend as essential to my position, cause me to\nsurrender that position, namely, that real regularity is imperfect? In\nany sense in which Hume could have admitted the possibility of law, it\nmust be precisely followed; since its existence could consist only in\nthe conformity of facts unto it. But perhaps Dr. Carus means that if one\nquestion had been completely settled, I should probably have confined\nmyself to talking about that, instead of broaching a new one.\n\n\u00a7 19. Another misunderstanding of my position on the part of Dr. Carus\n(\u00b6\u00b6 12, 13) is simply due to \u201cboldly\u201d having been twice printed where\nthe reading should have been \u201cbaldly,\u201d in my paper on \u201cThe Doctrine of\nNecessity.\u201d (_The Monist_, Vol. II, p. 336, lines 20 and 25.) I wish\nprinters would learn that I never use the word _bold_. I have so little\nof the quality, that I don\u2019t know what it means. As I read the \u201crevise,\u201d\nas usual, it was presumably my fault that the _erratum_ occurred. At any\nrate, had my meaning been clearly expressed, the proof-reader would not\nhave been misled by my defective chirography. What I was trying to say\nwas, in substance, this: Absolute chance is a hypothesis; and, like every\nhypothesis, can only be defended as explaining certain phenomena.[118]\nYet to suppose that an event is brought about by absolute chance is\nutterly illogical, since as a hypothesis it could only be admitted on\nthe ground of its explaining observed facts; now from mere non-law\nnothing necessarily follows, and therefore nothing can be explained; for\nto explain a fact is to show that it is a necessary, or, at least, a\nprobable, result from another fact, known or supposed. Why is not this a\ncomplete refutation of the theory of absolute chance? _Answer_: because\nthe _existence_ of absolute chance, as well as many of its characters,\nare not themselves absolute chances, or sporadic events, unsubject to\ngeneral law. On the contrary, these things _are_ general laws. Everybody\nis familiar with the fact that chance has laws, and that statistical\nresults follow therefrom. Very well: I do not propose to explain\nanything as due to the action of chance, that is, as being lawless. I\ndo not countenance the idea that Bible stories, for instance, show that\nnature\u2019s laws were violated;\u2014though they may help to show that nature\u2019s\nlaws are not so mechanical as we are accustomed to think. But I only\npropose to explain the regularities of nature as consequences of the only\nuniformity, or general fact, there was in the chaos, namely, the general\nabsence of any, determinate law.[119] In fact, after the first step is\ntaken, I only use _chance_ to give room for the development of law by\nmeans of the law of habits.\n\n\u00a7 20. In \u00b6 28, I read: \u201cMr. Peirce does not object to necessity in\ncertain cases; he objects to necessity being a universal feature of\nthe world.\u201d This is correctly stated, and so it is in \u00b6 203. I object\nto necessity being universal, as well as to its ever being exact. In\nshort, I object to absolute universality, absolute exactitude, absolute\nnecessity, being attributed to any proposition that does not deal with\nthe \u0391 and the \u03a9, in the which I do not include any object of ordinary\nknowledge. But it is careless to write (\u00b6 193) that I \u201cdescribe the\ndomain of mind as the absence of law.\u201d Is not one of my papers entitled\n\u201cThe Law of Mind\u201d? It is true that I make the law of mind essentially\ndifferent in its mode of action from the law of mechanics, inasmuch as\nit requires its own violation; but it is law, not chance uncontrolled.\nThat it is not \u201can undetermined and indeterminable sporting\u201d should have\nbeen obvious from my expressly stating that its ultimate result must\nbe the entire elimination of chance from the universe. That directly\nnegatives the adjective \u201cindeterminable,\u201d and hence also the adjective\n\u201cundetermined.\u201d Still more unwarranted is the statement (\u00b6 205) that\nI deny \u201cthat there are samenesses in this world.\u201d If the slightest\nexcuse for such an accusation can be found in all my writings I shall be\nmightily surprised.\n\n\u00a7 21. Dr. Carus fully admits (\u00b6 9) the justice of my first reply to the\nargument that necessity is postulated in all scientific reasoning, which\nreply is that to postulate necessity does not make it true. As this\nreply, if correct is complete, Dr. Carus was bound after that admission\nto drop the postulate-argument in favor of necessity.[120] But he takes\nno notice, at all, of my four-page argument to show that scientific\nreasoning does _not_ postulate absolute universality, exactitude, or\nnecessity (_The Monist_, Vol. II, pp. 324-327); but calmly asserts,\nfour or five times over (\u00b6\u00b6 5, 11, 16, 62, 79), without one scintilla\nof argumentation, that that postulate _is_ made, and uses this as an\nargument in favor of necessity.\n\n\u00a7 22. He also fully admits (\u00b6\u00b6 11, 14, 22) the justice of my argument\nthat the absoluteness of universality, exactitude, and necessity, cannot\nbe proved, nor rendered probable, by arguments from observation. That\nargument consisted in assuming that all arguments from observation are\nprobable arguments, and in showing that probable inferences are always\naffected with probable errors.\n\nHad I deemed it requisite, I might easily have fortified that argument\nby a more profound analysis of scientific reasoning. Such an analysis I\nhad formerly given in my \u201cTheory of Probable Inference\u201d (in \u201cStudies in\nLogic,\u201d Boston: Little and Brown).\n\nBut, notwithstanding his admissions, Dr. Carus sets up his _ipse dixit_\nagainst my argumentation. \u201cWe deny most positively,\u201d says the editorial\nElohim, \u201cthat the calculus of probabilities is applicable to the order of\nthe world, as to whether it may or may not be universal.\u201d (\u00b6\u00b6 27, 31.)\n\nTo support this, he cites (\u00b6\u00b6 31-34) four passages from articles written\nby me sixteen years ago. I hope my mind has not been stationary during\nall these years; yet there is little in those old articles which I now\nthink positively erroneous, and nothing in the passages cited. My present\nviews had, at that time, already begun to urge themselves on my mind;\nbut they were not ripe for public avowal. In the first of the passages\ncited, I express the opinion, which I first uttered in my earlier\nlectures before the Lowell Institute, in 1866, afterwards in the _Popular\nScience Monthly_ in 1877, in still fuller elaboration in my \u201cTheory\nof Probable Inference\u201d in 1882, and maintain now as strongly as ever,\nthat no definite probability can be assigned to any general arrangement\nof nature. To speak of an _antecedent_ probability would imply that\nthere was a statistical science of different universes; and a _deduced_\nprobability requires an antecedent probability for one of its data.[121]\nThis consideration only goes to fortify my present position, that we\ncannot conclude from observed facts with any degree of probability,\nand therefore _a fortiori_ not with certainty, that any proposition is\nabsolutely universal, exact, or necessary. In the absence of any weight\nof probability in favor of any particular exact statement, the formal\npresumption is altogether against any one out of innumerable possible\nstatements of that kind.\n\nThe second passage cited is one in which I argue that the universe is\nnot a chaos, or chance-medley. Now Dr. Carus admits (\u00b6 28) that I do not\nto-day maintain that it is a chance-medley.\n\nThe third passage cited is this: \u201cA contradiction is involved in the\nvery idea of a chance-world.\u201d This is in entire harmony with my present\nposition that \u201ca chaos ... being without connection or regularity would\nproperly be without existence.\u201d (\u201cArchitecture of Theories,\u201d _The\nMonist_, Vol. I, p. 176.)\n\nThe fourth passage is to the effect that \u201cthe interest which the\nuniformities of nature have for an animal measures his place in the scale\nof intelligence.\u201d This I still believe.\n\nSo much for my supposed contradictions. If I am not mistaken, our\namiable editor, whose admirable editorship springs so largely out of his\namiability, in copying out these passages was really not half so much\nintent on showing me to be wrong at present, as on showing me to have\nbeen right formerly. However hard he hits, he contrives to honey his\nsockdologers, and sincerely cares more to make the reader admire his\nantagonist when he is right than to condemn him when he is wrong. There\nis a touch of art in this that proclaims the born editor, and which I can\nhardly hope to imitate.\n\nThough Dr. Carus admits over and over again that necessity cannot be\nbased on observation, he often slips back to the idea that it can be so\nbased. He says, (\u00b6 30) that \u201cform is a quality of this world, not of some\nsamples of it, but throughout, so far as we know of existence in even the\nmost superficial way.\u201d But does he not see that all we _do_ know, and all\nwe _shall_ to-morrow, or at any date know, is nothing but a sample of our\npossible experience,\u2014nay, is but a sample of what we are in the future\nto have already experienced? I have characterised inductive inference as\nreasoning from samples; but the most usual way of sampling a class is by\nexamining _all_ the instances of it that have come under our observation,\nor which we can at once collect.\n\n\u00a7 23. Dr. Carus (\u00b6\u00b6 44, 46) holds that from my social theory of reality,\nnamely, that the real is the idea in which the community ultimately\nsettles down, the existence of something inevitable is to be inferred.\nI confess I never anticipated that anybody would urge that. I thought\njust the reverse might be objected, namely, that all absoluteness was\nremoved from reality by that theory, and it was many years ago that, in\nmy \u201cTheory of Probable Inference,\u201d I admitted the obvious justice, as\nit seemed to me, of that objection. We cannot be quite sure that the\ncommunity ever will settle down to an unalterable conclusion upon any\ngiven question. Even if they do so for the most part, we have no reason\nto think the unanimity will be quite complete, nor can we rationally\npresume any overwhelming _consensus_ of opinion will be reached upon\nevery question. All that we are entitled to assume is in the form of a\n_hope_ that such conclusion may be substantially reached concerning the\nparticular questions with which our inquiries are busied.\n\nSuch, at least, are the results to which the consideration of the\ndoctrine of probability brings my mind irresistibly. So that, the social\ntheory of reality, far from being incompatible with tychism, inevitably\nleads up to that form of philosophy. Socialistic, or as I prefer to term\nit, agapastic ontology seems to me likely to find favor with many minds\nat an early day, because it is a natural path by which the nominalist may\nbe led into the realistic ways of thought, ways toward which many facts\nand inward forces impel him. It is well, therefore, to call attention\nto the circumstances that the realism to which it leads is a doctrine\nwhich declares general truths to be real,\u2014independent of the opinions\nof any particular collection of minds,\u2014but not to be destined, in a\nstrictly universal, exact, and sure acceptation, to be so settled, and\nestablished. Now to assert that general truths are objectively real,\nbut to deny that they are strictly universal, exact, and certain, is to\nembrace the doctrine of absolute chance. Thus it is that the agapastic\nontologist who endeavors to escape tychism will find himself \u201cled into\u201d\nthat \u201cinextricable confusion\u201d which Dr. Carus (\u00b6 4) has taken a contract\nto show that I am led into.\n\n\u00a7 24. Conservatism is wholesome and necessary; the most convinced radical\nmust admit the wisdom of it, in the abstract; and a conservative will\nbe in no haste to espouse the doctrine of absolute chance. I, myself,\npondered over it for long years before doing so. But I am persuaded, at\nlength, that mankind will before very long take up with it; and I do not\nbelieve philosophers will be found tagging on to the tail of the general\nprocession.\n\nMy little dialogue between the tychist and the necessitarian (_The\nMonist_, Vol. II, pp. 331-333) seems to have represented pretty fairly\nthe views of the latter; for Dr. Carus, in \u00b6\u00b6 151-155, does little more\nthan reiterate them, without much, if at all, reinforcing them. His \u00b6\u00b6\n158-160 merely work out, in a form perhaps not quite clear, what is\nmanifest from the elementary principles of dynamics, and was considered\nin my dialogue.\n\nHis arguments in this connection, apart from those already noticed, are\nthat absolute chance is something which if it existed would require\nexplanation, that the manifold specificalness of nature is explained by\nlaw without any aid from chance, and that absolute chance if it existed,\nin the sense in which it is supposed to exist in my chaos, could not\npossibly breed law as supposed by me. To the consideration of these\narguments I proceed to apply myself.\n\n\u00a7 25. One of the architectonic\u2014and, therefore, I suppose, by Dr.\nCarus considered as highly reprehensible\u2014features of my theory, is\nthat, instead of saying off-hand what elements strike me as requiring\nexplanation and what as not doing so, which seems to be his way, I\nhave devoted a long time to the study of the whole logical doctrine of\nexplanation, and of the history of explanations, and have based upon the\ngeneral principles so ascertained my conclusions as to what things do and\nwhat do not require to be explained.\n\nDr. Carus (\u00b6 67) defines _explanation_ as a description of a special\nprocess of nature in such a way that the process is recognised as a\ntransformation. This I cannot quite grant. First, I cannot admit that\n\u201cspecial processes of nature\u201d are the only things to be explained.\nFor instance, if I were to meet a gentleman who seemed to conform\nscrupulously to all the usages of good society, except that he wore to\nan evening party an emerald satin vest, that would be a fact calling for\nexplanation, although it would not be a \u201cspecial process of nature.\u201d\nSecond, I cannot admit that an explanation is a description of the fact\nexplained. It is true that in the setting forth of some explanations,\nit is convenient to restate the fact explained, so as to set it under\nanother aspect; but even in these cases, the statement of _other_ facts\nis essential. In all cases, it is _other facts_, usually hypothetical,\nwhich constitute the explanation; and the process of explaining is a\nprocess by which from those other facts the fact to be explained is\nshown to follow as a consequence, by virtue of a general principle, or\notherwise. Thus, a \u201cspecial process of nature\u201d calling for explanation\nis the circumstance that the planet Mars, while moving in a general way\nfrom west to east among the fixed stars, yet retrogrades a part of the\ntime, so as to describe loops in the heavens. The explanation is that\nMars revolves in one approximate circle and we in another. Again, it has\nbeen stated that a warm spring in Europe is usually followed by a cool\nautumn, and the explanation has been offered that so many more icebergs\nthan usual are liberated during a warm spring, that they subsequently\nlower sensibly the temperature of Europe. I care little whether the\nfact and the explanation are correct or no. The case illustrates, at\nany rate, my point that an explanation is a special fact, supposed or\nknown, from which the fact to be explained follows as a consequence.\nThird, I cannot admit that every description which recognises the fact\ndescribed as a transformation is an explanation; far less that \u201cit is\ncomplete and exhaustive\u201d (\u00b6 67). A magician transforms a watch into a\ndove. Recognise it as a transformation and the trick is explained, is\nit? This is delightfully facile. Describe the change from a caterpillar\nto a butterfly as a transformation, and does that explain it? Fourth, I\ncannot admit that every explanation recognises the fact explained as a\ntransformation. The explanation of the loops in the motion of Mars is not\nof that nature. But I willingly recognise in Dr. Carus\u2019s definition an\nattempt,\u2014more or less successful,\u2014to formulate one of the great offices\nof scientific inquiry, that of bridging over the gap between the familiar\nand the unfamiliar.\n\n_Explanation_, however, properly speaking, is the replacement of a\ncomplex predicate, or one which seems improbable or extraordinary, by\na simple predicate from which the complex predicate follows on known\nprinciples. In like manner, a _reason_, in one sense, is the replacement\nof a multiple subject of an observational proposition by a general\nsubject, which by the very conditions of the special experience is\npredicable of the multiple subject.[122] Such a reason may be called an\nexplanation in a loose sense.\n\nAccordingly, that which alone requires an explanation is a coincidence.\n\nHence, I say that a uniformity, or law, is _par excellence_, the thing\nthat requires explanation. And Dr. Carus (\u00b6 51) admits that this \u201cis\nperfectly true.\u201d\n\nBut I cannot imagine anything further from the truth than his statement\n(\u00b6 66) that \u201cthe only thing in the world of which we cannot and need not\ngive account is the existence of facts itself.\u201d I should say, on the\ncontrary, that the existence of facts is the only thing of which we need\ngive account. Forms may indulge in whatever eccentricities they please in\nthe world of dreams, without responsibility; but when they attempt that\nkind of thing in the world of real existence, they must expect to have\ntheir conduct inquired into. But should Dr. Carus reply that I mistake\nhis meaning, that it is only \u201cbeing in general\u201d (\u00b6 66) that he holds\nunaccountable, I reply that this is simply expressing scepticism as to\nthe possibility and need of philosophy. In a certain sense, my theory of\nreality, namely that reality is the dynamical reaction of certain forms\nupon the mind of the community, is a proposed explanation of being in\ngeneral; and be it remarked that the mind of the community, itself, is\nthe thing the nature of whose being this explanation first of all puts\nupon an idealistic footing.\n\nChance, according to me, or irregularity,\u2014that is, the absence of any\ncoincidence,\u2014calls for no explanation. If _law_ calls for a particular\nexplanation, as Dr. Carus admits it does, surely the mere absence of law\ncalls for no further explanation than is afforded by the mere absence of\nany particular circumstance necessitating the result. An explanation is\nthe conception of a fact as a necessary result, thereby accounting for\nthe coincidence it presents. It would be highly absurd to say that the\nabsence of any definite character, must be accounted for, as if it were a\npeculiar phenomenon, simply because the imperfection of language leads us\nso to talk of it. Quite unfounded, therefore, is Dr. Carus\u2019s opinion that\n\u201cchance needs exactly as much explanation as anything else\u201d (\u00b6 53);\u2014an\nopinion which, so far as I can see, rests on no defensible principle.\n\nEqually hasty is his oft repeated objection (\u00b6 55, 58, 61) that my\nabsolute chance is something ultimate and inexplicable. I go back to\na chaos so irregular that in strictness the word existence is not\napplicable to its merely germinal state of being; and here I reach a\nregion in which the objection to ultimate causes loses its force. But\nI do not stop there. Even this nothingness, though it antecedes the\ninfinitely distant absolute beginning of time, is traced back to a\nnothingness more rudimentary still, in which there is no variety, but\nonly an indefinite specificability, which is nothing but a tendency to\nthe diversification of the nothing, while leaving it as nothing as it\nwas before. What objectionable ultimacy is here? The objection to an\nultimate consists in its raising a barrier across the path of inquiry,\nin its specifying a phenomenon at which questions must stop, contrary\nto the postulate, or hope, of logic. But what question to which any\nmeaning can be attached am I forbidding by my absolute chance? If\nwhat is demanded is a theological backing, or rational antecedent,\nto the chaos, that my theory fully supplies. The chaos is a state of\nintensest feeling, although, memory and habit being totally absent,\nit is sheer nothing still. Feeling has existence only so far as it is\nwelded into feeling. Now the welding of this feeling to the great whole\nof feeling is accomplished only by the reflection of a later date. In\nitself, therefore, it is nothing; but in its relation to the end, it is\neverything.\n\nMore unreasonable yet is Dr. Carus\u2019s pretension, that the manifold\nspecificalness, which is what I mean by chance, is capable of explanation\n(\u00b6\u00b6 142, 143) by his own philosophic method. He may explain one\nparticularity by another, of course; but to explain specificalness\nitself, would be to show that a specific predicate is a necessary\nconsequence of a generic one, or that a whole is without ambiguity a\npart of its part. Remark, reader, at this point, that chance, whether\nit be absolute or not, is not the mere creature of our ignorance. It\nis that diversity and variety of things and events which law does not\nprevent. Such is that real chance upon which the kinetical theory of\ngases, and the doctrines of political economy, depend. To say that it is\nnot absolute is to say that it,\u2014this diversity, this specificalness,\u2014can\nbe explained as a consequence of law. But this, as we have seen, is\nlogically absurd.\n\nDr. Carus admits that absolute chance is \u201cnot unimaginable\u201d (\u00b6 150).\nChance itself pours in at every avenue of sense: it is of all, things\nthe most obtrusive. That it is absolute, is the most manifest of all\nintellectual perceptions. That it is a being, living and conscious, is\nwhat all the dullness that belongs to ratiocination\u2019s self can scarce\nmuster hardihood to deny.\n\nAlmost as unthinking is the objection (\u00b6 61) that absolute chance could\nnever beget order. I have noticed elsewhere the historic oblivescence\nof this objection. Must I once again repeat that the tendency to take\nhabits, being itself a habit, has _eo ipso_ a tendency to grow; so that\nonly a slightest germ is needed? A realist, such as I am, can find\nno difficulty in the production of that first infinitesimal germ of\nhabit-taking by chance, provided he thinks chance could act at all. This\nseems, at first blush, to be explaining something as a chance-result. But\nexact analysis will show it is not so.\n\nIn like manner, when the eminent thinker who does me the honor to notice\nmy speculation, objects that I do not, after all, escape making law\nabsolute, since the tendency to take habits which I propose to make\nuniversal is itself a law, I confess I can find only words without ideas\nin the objection. Law is a word found convenient, I grant, in describing\nthat tendency; but is there no difference between a law the essence\nof which is to be inviolable (which is the nominalistic conception of\nmechanical law, whose being, they say, lies in its action) and that\nmental law the violation of which is so included in its essence that\nunless it were violated it would cease to exist? In my essay, \u201cThe Law\nof Mind,\u201d I have so described that law. In so describing it, I make it a\nlaw, but not an absolute law; and thus I clearly escape the contradiction\nattributed to me.\n\n\u00a7 26. In my attack on \u201cThe Doctrine of Necessity,\u201d I offered four\npositive arguments for believing in real chance. They were as follows:\n\n1. The general prevalence of growth, which seems to be opposed to the\nconservation of energy.\n\n2. The variety of the universe, which is chance, and is manifestly\ninexplicable.\n\n3. Law, which requires to be explained, and like everything which is to\nbe explained must be explained by something else, that is, by non-law or\nreal chance.\n\n4. Feeling, for which room cannot be found if the conservation of energy\nis maintained.\n\nIn a brief conversation I had with him, my friend remarked (and it was an\ninconsiderate concession, I certainly do not wish to hold him to it) that\nwhile the theory of tychism had some attractive features, its weakness\nconsisted in the absence of any positive reasons in its favor. I infer\nfrom this that I did not properly state the above four arguments. I\ntherefore desire once more to call attention to them, especially in their\nrelations to one another.\n\nMathematicians are familiar with the theorem that if a system of\nparticles is subject only to positional forces, it is such that if at any\ninstant the velocities were all suddenly reversed, without being altered\nin quantity, the whole previous history of the system would be repeated\nin inverse succession. Hence, when physicists find themselves confronted\nwith a phenomenon which takes place only in one order of succession\nand never in the reverse order,\u2014of which no better illustration could\nbe found than the phenomena of growth, for nobody ever heard of an\nanimal growing back into an egg,\u2014they always take refuge in the laws of\nprobability as preventive of the velocities ever getting so reversed.\nTo understand my argument number 1, it is necessary to make this method\nof escape from apparent violations of the law of energy quite familiar\nto oneself. For example, according to the law of energy, it seems to\nfollow (and by the aid of the accepted theory of light it does follow)\nthat if a prism, or a grating, disperses white light into a spectrum,\nthen the colors of the spectrum falling upon the prism or grating\nat the same angles, and in the same proportions, will be recombined\ninto white light; and, everybody knows that this does in fact happen.\nNevertheless, the usual and prevalent effect of prisms and gratings is to\nproduce colored spectra. Why? Evidently, because, by the principles of\nprobability, it will rarely happen that colored lights converging from\ndifferent directions will fall at just the right angles and in just the\nright proportions to be recombined into white light. So, when physicists\nmeet with the phenomena of frictional and viscous resistance to a body\nin motion, although, according to their doctrine, if the molecules were\nto move with the same velocities in opposite directions the moving body\nwould be accelerated, yet they say that the laws of probability, applied\nto the trillions of molecules concerned, render this practically certain\nnot to occur. I do no more, then, than follow the usual method of the\nphysicists, in calling in chance to explain the apparent violation of\nthe law of energy which is presented by the phenomena of growth: only\ninstead of chance as they understand it, I call in absolute chance. For\nmany months, I endeavored to satisfy the data of the case with ordinary\n_quasi_ chance; but it would not do. I believe that in a broad view of\nthe universe, a simulation of a given elementary mode of action can\nhardly be explained except by supposing the genuine mode of action\nsomewhere has place. If it is improbable that colored lights should\nfall together in just such a way as to give a white ray, is it not an\nequally extraordinary thing that they should all be generated in such\na way as to produce a white ray? If it is incredible that trillions of\nmolecules in a fluid should strike a solid body moving through it so as\nto accelerate it, is it not marvellous that trillions of trillions of\nmolecules all alike should ever have got so segregated as to create a\nstate of things in which they should be practically certain to retard\nthe body? It is far from easy to understand how mere positional forces\ncould ever have brought about those vast congregations of similar atoms\nwhich we suppose to exist in every mass of gas, and by which we account\nfor the apparent violations of the law of energy in the phenomena of the\nviscosity of the gas. There is no difficulty in seeing how sulphuric acid\nacting on marble may produce an aggregation of molecules of carbonic\nanhydride, because there are similar aggregations in the acid and in\nthe marble, but how were such aggregations brought about in the first\nplace? I will not go so far as to say that such a result is manifestly\nimpossible with positional forces alone; but I do say that we cannot\nhelp suspecting that the simulated violation of the law of energy has a\nreal violation of the same law as its ultimate explanation. Now, growth\n_appears_ to violate the law of energy. To explain it, we must, at least,\nsuppose a simulated, or _quasi_, chance, such as Darwin calls in to\nproduce his fortuitous variations from strict heredity. It may be there\nis no real violation of the law, and no real chance; but even if there\nbe nothing of the sort in the immediate phenomenon, can the conditions\nupon which the phenomenon depends have been brought about except by real\nchance? It is conceivable, again, that the law of the conservation of\nforces is not strictly accurate, and that, nevertheless, there is no\nabsolute chance. But I think so much has been done to put the law of the\nconservation of forces upon the level of the other mechanical laws, that\nwhen one is led to entertain a serious doubt of the exactitude of that,\none will be inclined to question the others.\n\nBesides, few psychologists will deny the very intimate connection which\nseems to subsist between the law, or _quasi_-law, of growth and the\nlaw of habit, which is the principal, if not (as I hold it to be) the\nsole, law of mental action. Now, this law of habit seems to be quite\nradically different in its general form from mechanical law, inasmuch as\nit would at once cease to operate if it were rigidly obeyed; since in\nthat case all habits would at once become so fixed as to give room for no\nfurther formation of habits. In this point of view, then, growth seems to\nindicate a positive violation of law.\n\nLet us now consider argument number 3: and remark how it fortifies number\n1. Physical laws that appear to be radically different yet present some\nstriking analogies. Electrical force appears to be polar. Its polarity is\nexplained away by Franklin\u2019s one-fluid theory, but in that view the force\nis a repulsion. Now, gravitation is an attraction, and is, therefore,\nessentially different from electricity. Yet both vary inversely as the\nsquare of this distance. Radiation, likewise follows the same formula.\nIn this last case, the formula, in one aspect of it, follows from the\nconservation of energy. In another aspect of it, it results from the\nprinciple of probability, and does not hold good, in a certain sense,\nwhen the light is concentrated by a lens free from spherical aberration.\nBut neither the conservation of energy nor the principle of probability\nseems to afford any possible explanation of the application of this\ntheory to gravitation nor to electricity. How, then, are such analogies\nto be explained? The law of the conservation of energy and that of the\nperduration of matter present so striking an analogy that it has blinded\nsome powerful intellects to their radically different nature. The law\nof action and reaction, again, has often been stated as the law of the\nconservation of momentum. Yet it is not only an independent law, but is\neven of a contrary nature, inasmuch as it is only the algebraical sum of\nopposite momenta that is \u201cconserved.\u201d[123] How is this striking analogy\nbetween three fundamental laws to be explained? Consider the still more\nobvious analogy between space and time. Newton argues that the laws of\nmechanics prove space and time to be absolute entities. Leibniz, on\nthe other hand, takes them as laws of nature. Either view calls for an\nexplanation of the analogy between them, which no such reflection as\nthe impossibility of motion without that analogy can supply. Kant\u2019s\ntheory seems to hint at the possibility of an explanation from both\nbeing derived from the nature of the same mind. Any three orthogonal\ndirections[124] in space are exactly alike, yet are dynamically\nindependent.\n\nThese things call for explanation; yet no explanation of them can be\ngiven, if the laws are fundamentally original and absolute.\n\nMoreover, law itself calls for explanation. But how is it to be explained\nif it is as fundamentally original and absolute as it is commonly\nsupposed to be? Yet if it is not so absolute, there is such a phenomenon\nas absolute chance.\n\nThus, the chance which growth calls for is now seen to be absolute, not\n_quasi_ chance.\n\nNow consider argument number 2. The variety of the universe so far as\nit consists of unlikenesses between things calls for no explanation.\nBut so far as it is a general character, it ought to be explained. The\nmanifold diversity or specificalness, in general, which we see whenever\nand wherever we open our eyes, constitutes its liveliness, or vivacity.\nThe perception of it is a direct, though darkling, perception of God.\nFurther explanation in that direction is uncalled for. But the question\nis, whether this manifold specificalness was put into the universe at the\noutset, whether God created the universe in the infinitely distant past\nand has left it to its own machinery ever since, or whether there is an\nincessant influx of specificalness. Some of us are evolutionists; that\nis, we are so impressed with the pervasiveness of growth, whose course\nseems only here and there to be interrupted, that it seems to us that\nthe universe as a whole, so far as anything can possibly be conceived or\nlogically opined of the whole, should be conceived as growing. But others\nsay, though parts of the universe simulate growth at intervals, yet there\nreally is no growth on the whole,\u2014no passage from a simpler to a more\ncomplex state of things, no increasing diversity.\n\nNow, my argument is that, according to the principles of logic, we\nnever have a right to conclude that anything is absolutely inexplicable\nor unaccountable. For such a conclusion goes beyond what can be\ndirectly observed, and we have no right to conclude what goes beyond\nwhat we observe, except so far as it explains or accounts for what we\nobserve. But it is no explanation or account of a fact to pronounce it\ninexplicable or unaccountable, or to pronounce any other fact so. Now,\nto say no process of diversification takes place in nature leaves the\ninfinite diversity of nature unaccounted for; while to say the diversity\nis the result of a general tendency to diversification is a perfectly\nlogical probable inference. Suppose there be a general tendency to\ndiversification; what would be the consequence? Evidently, a high degree\nof diversity. But this is just what we find in nature. It does not answer\nthe purpose to say there is diversity because God made it so, for we\ncannot tell what God would do, nor penetrate his counsels. We see what\nHe _does_ do, and nothing more. For the same reason one cannot logically\ninfer the existence of God; one can only know Him by direct perception.\n\nIt is to be noted that a general tendency to diversification does not\nexplain diversity in its specific characters; nor is this called for.\nNeither can such a tendency explain any specific fact. Any attempt to\nmake use of the principle in that manner would be utterly illogical. But\nit can be used to explain universal facts, just as quasi-chance is used\nto explain statistical facts. Now, the diversity of nature is a universal\nfact.\n\nTo explain diversity is to go behind the chaos, to the original\nundiversified nothing. Diversificacity was the first germ.\n\nArgument No. 4 was, upon its negative side, sufficiently well presented\nin my \u201cDoctrine of Necessity Examined.\u201d Mechanical causation, if\nabsolute, leaves nothing for consciousness to do in the world of matter;\nand if the world of mind is merely a transcript of that of matter, there\nis nothing for consciousness to do even in the mental realm. The account\nof matters would be better, if it could be left out of account. But the\npositive part of the argument, showing what can be done to reinstate\nconsciousness as a factor of the universe when once tychism is admitted,\nis reinforced in the later papers. This ought to commend itself to Dr.\nCarus, who shows himself fully alive to the importance of that part of\nthe task of science which consists in bridging gaps. But consciousness,\nfor the reason just stated, is not to be so reinstated without tychism;\nnor can the work be accomplished by assigning to the mind an occult\npower, as in two theories to be considered in the section following\nthis. As might be anticipated, (and a presumption of this kind is rarely\nfalsified in metaphysics,) to bridge the gap synechism is required.\nSupposing matter to be but mind under the slavery of inveterate habit,\nthe law of mind still applies to it. According to that law, consciousness\nsubsides as habit becomes established, and is excited again at the\nbreaking up of habit. But the highest quality of mind involves a great\nreadiness to take habits, and a great readiness to lose them; and this\nimplies a degree of feeling neither very intense nor very feeble.\n\nI have noticed above (\u00a7 7) Dr. Carus\u2019s dubious attitude toward the first\nargument. I considered in the last section his attempted reply to the\nsecond. To the third argument, he replies (\u00b6 65) that law ought to be\naccounted for by the principle of sufficient reason. But, of course, that\nprinciple cannot recommend itself to me, a realist; for it is nothing\nbut the lame attempt of a nominalist to wriggle out of his difficulties.\nReasons explain nothing, except upon some theistic hypothesis which may\nbe pardoned to the yearning heart of man, but which must appear doubtful\nin the eyes of philosophy, since it comes to this, that Tom, Dick, and\nHarry are competent to pry into the counsels of the Most High, and can\ninvite in their cousins and sweethearts and sweethearts\u2019 cousins to look\nover the original designs of the Ancient of Days.\n\n\u00a7 27. My fourth argument it is which seems to have made most impression\nupon Dr. Carus\u2019s mind (\u00b6 85), and his reply is rather elaborate.\n\nWhile embracing unequivocally the necessitarian dogma, equally for\nmind and for matter (\u00b6 193), Dr. Carus wishes utterly to repudiate\nmaterialism and the mechanical philosophy (\u00b6 133). To facilitate his,\nthus, walking the slack-rope, he makes (\u00b6 168) a division of events into\n\u201c(1) mechanical, (2) physical, (3) chemical, (4) physiological, and (5)\npsychical events.\u201d The first three (\u00b6\u00b6 169-171) are merely distinguished\nby the magnitude of the moving masses, so that, for philosophical\npurposes, they do not differ at all. As for physiological events, though\nhe devotes a paragraph (\u00b6 172) to their definition, he utterly fails\nto distinguish them from the mechanical (including the physical and\nchemical) on the one hand, or from the psychical on the other. Dr. Carus\nseems to think (\u00b6 176) that by this division he has separated himself\nentirely from the materialists; but this is an illusion, for nobody\ndenies the existence of feelings.\n\nThe truth is, he distinctly enrolls himself in the mechanical army when\nhe asserts that mental laws are of the same necessitarian character\nas mechanical laws (\u00b6 193). The only question that remains as to his\nposition is whether he is a materialist or not. He instances (\u00b6 185)\nthe case of a general receiving a written dispatch and being stimulated\ninto great activity by its perusal, and causing great motions to be\nmade and missiles to be sped in consequence. Now, the dilemma is this.\nWill Dr. Carus, on the one hand, say that the motion of those missiles\nwas determined by mechanical laws alone, in which case, it would only\nbe necessary to state all the positions and velocities of particles\nconcerned, a hundred years before, to determine just how those bullets\nwould move and, consequently, whether the guns were to be fired or not,\nand this would constitute him a materialist, or will he say that the laws\nof motion do not suffice to determine motions of matter, in which case,\nsince they formally certainly do so suffice, they must be _violated_, and\nhe will be giving to mind a direct dynamical power which is open to every\nobjection that can be urged against tychism?\n\nNow admire the decision with which he cuts the Gordian knot!\n\n \u201cTHERE ARE NO PURELY MECHANICAL PHENOMENA.\u201d (\u00b6 175.)\n\nThat is,\n\n \u201c_The laws of motion ARE applicable to and will explain all\n motions_.\u201d (\u00b6 177.)\n\nBut hold!\n\n \u201cThe mechanical philosopher ... feels warranted in the hope\n that ... the actions of man ... can be explained by the laws of\n motion .... We may anticipate that this conclusion will prove\n ERRONEOUS. _And so it is._\u201d (\u00b6 176.)\n\nAt the same time,\n\n \u201cNO OBJECTION CAN BE MADE _to the possibility of explaining the\n delicate motions in the nervous substance of the brain by the\n laws of molar or molecular mechanics_.\u201d (\u00b6 178.)\n\nYet,\n\n \u201c_The simplest_ psychical reflexes, including those\n _physiological reflexes_ which we must suppose to have\n originated by conscious adaptation ... CANNOT _be explained\n from mechanical_ or physical _laws_ alone.\u201d (\u00b6 186.)\n\nHowever,\n\n \u201c_We do NOT say that there are motions_ ... in the brain ...\n _which form exceptions to the laws of mechanics_.\u201d (\u00b6 187.)\n\nNevertheless,\n\n \u201cThe brain-atoms are possessed of the same spontaneity as\n the atoms of a gravitating stone. Yet there is present an\n additional feature; there are present states of awareness....\n Neither states of awareness nor their meanings can be weighed\n on any scales, be they ever so delicate, nor are they\n determinable in foot-pounds.\u201d (\u00b6 192.)\n\nClearness is the first merit of a philosopher; and what \u00b6 192 comes\nto is crystal-clear. Dr. Carus wants to have the three laws of motion\nalways obeyed; but he wishes the forces between the molecules to be\nvaried according to the momentary states of awareness. All right: he\nis entitled to suppose whatever he likes, so long as the supposition\nis self-consistent, as this supposition is. It conflicts with the law\nof energy, it is true; for that law is that the forces depend on the\nsituations of the particles alone, and not on the time. It is liable\nto give rise to perpetual motion. It was intended, no doubt, to be an\nimprovement on my molecular theory of protoplasm, earlier in the same\nnumber. It escapes materialism. It supposes a direct dynamical action\nbetween mind and matter, such as has not been supposed by any eminent\nphilosopher that I know of for centuries. I am sorry to say that it shows\na dangerous leaning toward originality. The argument for thus rejecting\nthe law of the conservation of energy, I leave to others to be weighed.\nIt seems to suppose a much larger falsification of that law than my\ndoctrine; but it is a pretty clever attempt to escape my conclusions. It\nrejects what has to be rejected, the law of the conservation of energy;\nand is far more intelligent than the theory of those (like Oliver and\nLodge) who wish to give to mind a power of deflecting atoms, which would\nsatisfy the conservation of energy while violating the law of action\nand reaction. If it can have due consideration, I doubt not it will\naccelerate the acceptance of my views. Meantime, I do not see where that\n\u201cinextricable confusion\u201d into which I was to be led is to come in. (\u00b6 4.)\n\n\u00a7 28. Little more requires to be noticed in Dr. Carus\u2019s articles. He\nadmits (\u00b6 2) that indeterminism is the more natural belief, which is no\nslight argument in its favor.\n\n\u00a7 29. The remarks upon the theological bearings of the theories, if they\nare found somewhat wide of the mark, are explained by the haste of the\neditor to show just what all the affiliations of my views were, before\nI had had time to explain what those views are. The remarks to which I\nrefer will be found in \u00b6\u00b6 3, 36, 81, 82, 83, 128, 203, 204. They are\nworth putting together.\n\n\u00a7 30. The doctrine of symbolism, to which Dr. Carus has recourse,\nseems to be similar to that of my essay \u201cSome Consequences of Four\nIncapacities\u201d (_Journal of Speculative Philosophy_, II.) (\u00b6\u00b6 180, 183,\n199.) On this head, I can only approve of his ideas.\n\n\u00a7 31. It is true that I wrote many definitions for one of the\n\u201cencyclopedic lexicons.\u201d But they were necessarily rather vaguely\nexpressed, in order to include the popular use of terms, and in some\ncases were modified by proof-readers or editors; and for reasons not\nneedful here to explain, they are hardly such as I should give in a\nPhilosophical Dictionary proper.\n\n C. S. PEIRCE.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[101] J. S. Mill had in the first edition of his _Logic_ decisively taken\nan objective conception of chance and probability; but in his second\nedition he had become puzzled and had retracted, leaving that chapter,\nand with it his whole logic, a melancholy wreck, over which the qualified\nreader sighs, \u201cAnd this once seemed intelligible!\u201d Venn in the first\nedition of his book set forth the same objective conception with great\nclearness, and for that he was entitled to high praise, notwithstanding\nhis manifest inadequacy to the problems treated. But in his second\nedition, he too has fallen away from his first and correct view, and has\nadopted a theory which I shall some day show to be untenable. Venn\u2019s\nwhole method in logic, as well as his system, is in my opinion of the\nweakest.\n\n[102] Mill often did good service in substituting precise terms for\nambiguous ones; as when in speaking of mathematical conclusions he\nprefers to say they are legitimate deductions rather than that they are\nnecessary.\n\n[103] In his _Ursache, Grund and Zweck_, Dr. Carus alludes to this\npassage. But he prefers the treatment of the question by Reid, whom he\ncalls Mill\u2019s opponent (_Gegner_).\n\n[104] It is of comparatively little consequence what Hume really meant.\nThe main interest is in what Kant thought he meant.\n\n[105] Along with the distinction, I would of course do away with this\nuse of the words _abstract_ and _concrete_ to which no clear idea can be\nattached, as far as I can see.\n\n[106] I cannot but disapprove of this use of the word \u201cconstruction\u201d to\nmean a studied theory, because the word is imperatively required in the\ntheory of cognition to denote a mathematical diagram framed according to\na general precept.\n\n[107] I apply this term because it is essentially like the passage from\nthe concrete \u201cvirtuous\u201d to the abstract \u201cvirtue,\u201d or from the concrete\n\u201cwhite\u201d (adjective) to the abstract \u201cwhiteness,\u201d or \u201cwhite\u201d (substantive).\n\n[108] I can never use this word without thinking of the explanation of\nit given by Petrus Peregrinus in his _Epistole de Magnete_. He says that\nphysical properties are occult in the sense that they are only brought\nout by experimentation, and are not to be deduced from admixtures of\n_hot_ and _cold_, _moist_ and _dry_.\n\n[109] It follows as a corollary from this that if the positions of the\nparticles at any one instant, together with the velocities at that\ninstant, and the law of force, are given, the positions at all instants\ncan be calculated. Of course, to give the positions and velocities at\none instant, is a special case of the giving of the positions at two\ninstants. The two instants may be such that there will be more than one\nsolution of the problem; but this is an insignificant detail.\n\n[110] It would seem to follow from his notion that in uniform motion each\nminute\u2019s motion is the cause of that of the next. Yet he says (\u00b6 19)\n\u201cthere is no cause that is equal to its effect.\u201d\n\n[111] But, as I have elsewhere said, I should like to persuade\nmathematicians to speak of \u201cpositional energy\u201d as _Kinetic potency_, the\n_vis viva_ as _Kinetic energy_, and the total \u201cenergy\u201d as the _Kinetic\nentelechy_.\n\n[112] The differential equation being an ordinary, not a partial one,\nthis is an absolute constant, determined by initial (or final, or any\ninstantaneous) conditions.\n\n[113] Dr. Carus calls attention to the connection between my doctrine of\nthe fixation of opinion and his anti-originalism.\n\n[114] Dr. Carus passes a sweeping judgment on Post-Kantian philosophy, as\nbeing original.\n\n[115] This was a remark of my father\u2019s.\n\n[116] A person in the last _Monist_, breaks in upon my series of articles\nto foretell what the \u201cissues of synechism\u201d will be. Were he able to do\nso, it would certainly be the height of ill-manners thus to take the\nwords out of my mouth.\n\n[117] As I am writing, I am shown a letter, in which the writer says:\n\u201cPeirce with all his materialistic ideas, yet,\u201d etc I never promulgated\na materialistic idea in my life. The writer simply assumes that science\nis materialistic. As I am correcting the proofs, I notice that Mr. B.\nC. Burt, in his new _History of Modern Philosophy_, sets me down as\nsceptical, though doubtfully. There are a good many inaccuracies in the\nwork. This was inevitable in a first edition. But the ingenious plan of\nthe book admirably adapts it to the wants of just that class of students\nwho cannot understand that no repertory of facts ever can be trusted\nimplicitly.\n\n[118] Its being hypothetical will not prevent its being established with\na very high degree of certainty. Thus, all history is of the nature of\nhypothesis; since its facts cannot be directly observed, but are only\nsupposed to be true to account for the characters of the monuments and\nother documents.\n\n[119] Somebody may notice that I here admit a proposition as absolutely\ntrue. Undoubtedly; because it relates to the Absolute.\n\n[120] Indeed, to admit that reply is all but to admit the non-absolute\ngrade of necessity.\n\n[121] I rightly go somewhat further in my _Theory of Probable Inference_;\nbut that has no bearing on the present discussion.\n\n[122] Dr. Carus, in his _Ursache, Grund und Zweck_, well says that\n_reasons_ are discovered by induction, in the strict sense. It is often\nadmitted that _causes_ can only be inferred by hypothetic reasoning.\n\n[123] The conservation of a vortex, which consists of the preservation of\na certain character of motion by the same particles, though derived from\nthe co\u00f6peration of other laws, is, in form, quite different.\n\n[124] In speaking of directions, we assume the Euclidean hypothesis that\nthe angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.\n\n\n\n\nTHE FOUNDER OF TYCHISM, HIS METHODS, PHILOSOPHY, AND CRITICISMS.\n\nIN REPLY TO MR. CHARLES S. PEIRCE.\n\n\nINTRODUCTORY AND PERSONAL.\n\nSoon after I had received Mr. Peirce\u2019s manuscript he wrote me in a\nprivate letter as follows:\n\n \u201cYou have not found, I trust, that in my rejoinder I have\n anywhere overstepped the limit of amiable disputation. If\n anything of that kind did, unconsciously to me, in the heat\n of composition, slip from my pen, I am most anxious to have\n it pointed out to me, so that there may be no feeling in the\n matter of a disagreeable kind. For if you should not mention\n it, I should at some future time discover it, and it would be a\n source of real unhappiness to me.\u201d\n\nThis is a very amiable disposition of mind. Mr. Peirce presses me very\nhard in the struggle for truth: he does not hesitate to take advantage of\neven the smallest weak point which he espies or rather which he believes\nhe espies. He does not shrink from using plain terms, such as \u201cabsurd,\u201d\n\u201cunthinking,\u201d \u201cweak,\u201d \u201chasty,\u201d \u201cirrational.\u201d Yet he preserves in the\nheat of the controversy a friendly spirit towards his antagonist, which\nI cannot but appreciate and wish publicly to acknowledge. But I would\nnot have him change a word or soften the language of his article in the\nleast, _for my sake_. If Mr. Peirce is wrong, I will take care of myself;\nif he is right, let the truth come out.\n\nWe are both, as it were, by profession champions of truth; so we need not\nmind an occasional fling if in the end the cause of truth be promoted.\nEspecially, in the present case, I need not mind the hard blows which\nMr. Peirce deals with such assurance, for all the points at which he\nstrikes are well protected. The fiercer the onslaught, the better the\ntest. I feel satisfied that his severe scrutiny only serves to prove the\nstrength of the position which I defend.\n\nI shall speak my mind as freely and unreservedly as does Mr. Peirce, and\nhope he in his turn will resent plain words as little as I do. As offense\nis not intended, so offense should not be taken.\n\nLet me add here in these introductory remarks that I am always open\nto conviction. The views which I uphold have been well considered and\nthought out in their most important consequences. They are consistent\nand well guarded in spite of Mr. Peirce\u2019s thinking the contrary, so that\nI feel no need of changing them. But should some unforeseen difficulty\narise which would oblige me to revise the whole system of my ideas, I\nshall not hesitate publicly to confess it and allow myself to be lead by\ntruth whithersoever it be.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe issue of our controversy is the problem of chance\u2014not of chance as it\noccurs, for instance, in the throw of dice, but of \u201cabsolute chance,\u201d or\nperfect lawlessness. Mr. Peirce makes absolute chance the corner-stone of\nhis philosophy; he propounds a radical and sweeping indeterminism, while\nI reject the idea, not of chance, but of absolute chance as incompatible\nwith the philosophy of science.\n\n\nI. DIFFERENCES OF METHOD.\n\nMr. Peirce calls himself a Scotist and professes to represent medi\u00e6val\nRealism, speaking at the same time of me as a Nominalist. We find,\nhowever, that the inverse statement would be nearer the truth.\n\nBefore discussing Mr. Peirce\u2019s philosophy itself, we must examine his\nmethods. Difference of method will produce important divergencies of\nopinion.\n\n\n1. ATTENTION TO DETAIL.\n\nMr. Peirce takes up in his rejoinder many incidental points, which have\nlittle or no bearing upon the main issues between us. On the one hand,\nthings of no consequence, such as my granting that \u201cabsolute chance\u201d\nlike the impossibilities of fairy tales, is not unimaginable, and my\nsaying that tychism is attractive but weak for lack of arguments, are\nadduced as \u201cmomentous admissions,\u201d and \u201cinconsiderate concessions.\u201d\nOn the other hand, Mr. Peirce catches at straws to prove a lack of\ninformation on my part. He cannot forbear calling attention to the little\nbreach of etiquette committed in not giving an English baronet his proper\ntitle.\n\nMr. Peirce shows on all these and other occasions a love of the\nincidental, and if I were to allow myself to follow his example the\nbattle would soon be broken up into innumerable skirmishes.\n\nIt is noteworthy that Mr. Peirce\u2019s procedure appears to be a nominalistic\ntradition. Nominalists, regarding universals as mere names of many\nparticular things, have always showed a great preference for the single,\nthe incidental, the scattered; while realists viewing universals as\nreal things were in the habit of laying perhaps too much stress upon\nuniversalities and generalities to the neglect of the particular and\nindividual.\n\nIndeed, Mr. Peirce\u2019s favorite idea, which is a belief in absolute chance,\nis in my opinion the most nominalistic and anti-realistic proposition I\nhave ever met with. Regularity, or natural law, is to him the product\nof evolution. Thus he demolishes the eternity of the universal, and\neternity is only universality in time. Now suppose that eternity (i. e.\nuniversality in time) could be proved an error; then, the universality\nof the universal in space also will become illusory. If those abiding\nfeatures of nature which we call natural laws have indeed originated from\na general sporting, from chance, from a chaotic lawlessness, by a gradual\nhabit taking, who can assure us that nature has not taken different\nhabits in other parts of the universe?\n\nI look upon Mr. Peirce as an extreme nominalist, or, if he prefers it, as\na nominal realist soaked with nominalistic opinions. He professes to be a\nrealist, but he rescinds the foundation of realism.\n\nLike the bear of the hermit Mr. Peirce throws the stone at the fly of\nnecessary connection, and in doing so kills the philosophy of realism\nitself.\n\n\n2. ORIGINALITY.\n\nOriginality, wherever we find it, is pleasing; but a hankering after\noriginality is dangerous. Experience teaches us to regard a thinker\u2019s\nlove of originality as one of the main causes of his going astray. Let\nthe poet be original, but not the scientist, not the philosopher, not the\nsearcher for truth. The conceit of being original flatters our vanity,\nand original ideas in philosophy are tantamount to original errors.\n\nI do not deny the value of originality, but I do deny that it is a\ncriterion of truth.\n\nOriginality consists in the free exercise of our imagination, and a vivid\nimagination is very valuable to the thinker. But it so happens that every\ndreamer cherishes with a mother\u2019s love the children of his fancy. And it\nis, therefore, necessary to be especially critical with the offspring of\none\u2019s own brain.\n\nKepler (\u201cwho,\u201d Mr. Peirce says, \u201ccomes very close to realising my ideal\nof the scientific method\u201d) was endowed with an extraordinarily vivid\nimagination. He invented an extremely original scheme of explanation for\nthe solar system, and expounded it with great poetical fervor in his\n\u201cMysterium Cosmographicum.\u201d[125]\n\nKepler at once became famous by his \u201cMysterium Cosmographicum\u201d and was\ngenerally admired for his originality. But his bent for hatching original\nideas did not alone make Kepler what he is to us now in the history\nof science. A greater quality than his poetical fervor and original\nimagination was his rigorous self-criticism. He took notice of every\nlittle fact that did not agree with his theories, and for the sake of\ntruth, of objectively provable truth, that is, the agreement of his views\nwith positive facts, he sternly slew all those creatures of his fancy\nwhich he foresaw could not survive.\n\nHaving myself a good deal of imagination, and having tried myself\nmany original ideas, I can appreciate the self-denial and discipline\nof Kepler. I have come to the conclusion that originality is only an\nimportant means of attaining truth. Our ways of reaching the truth,\nour methods of finding it, may deserve the praise of originality, but\ntruth itself is never original; for truth is the faithfulness of a copy\nwhich in our representations we make of reality, and to praise ideas as\noriginal is certainly no argument that they are true.\n\nThere is no need of showing that Mr. Peirce is not just in his statement\nof my view of originality, by maintaining that I have advised people\n\u201cthink not for yourself.\u201d Confessedly he exaggerates, but in truth he\nmisrepresents.\n\nMr. Peirce does not relish what I have to say on the subject, and,\nto pacify his mind, he does not tire of praising originality as the\nhigh-water mark of genius.\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s love of originality is a nominalistic feature of his mind. A\nnominalist who denies the existence of universals cannot understand that\neverything in science must be sacrificed to truthfulness. The question,\nDoes this idea correctly represent its respective reality? has no sense\nto a nominalist. The nominalist is only interested in what a thinker\nmakes of things. The subjective conception, in his opinion, exhausts the\nsubject. I can understand that a nominalist should be greatly pleased\nwith originality, but a realist should not allow himself to be seduced by\nits charms.\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s penchant for, and my distrust of, originality, have a direct\ninfluence upon our respective methods of thought. It naturally makes him\nbolder and me more cautious.[126]\n\n\n3. A MODERN PROCRUSTES.\n\nThere was a man in ancient Greece named Procrustes, who had two beds;\none long, the other short. He used to lay his tall guests upon the short\nbed, and his short guests upon the long bed, cutting off the limbs of the\nformer and stretching out the bodies of the latter, until they fitted\nthe size of their unpleasant resting places. In the same way Mr. Peirce\ntreats philosophical views.\n\nThere is the bed of the materialist and, as all processes to the\nmaterialist are purely mechanical, necessitarianism is stretched in the\nmaterialist\u2019s bed to mechanicalism. I plead, since ideas and feelings\nare not motions, that mental processes cannot be explained by the laws\nof motion, but can, for that reason, be none the less determined; but I\nplead in vain. That view of necessitarianism does not suit the bed upon\nwhich my Procrustes places me. Other views, however, are cut down without\nfurther ado because they are said to be nominalistic. Anything that does\nnot appeal to Mr. Peirce\u2019s realistic mind is dismissed with a shrug.\n\nI am neither a realist nor a nominalist, or rather, I am both realist\nand nominalist. I am convinced that to some extent both sides were right\nand both sides were wrong, and regard it as our duty to sift their\npropositions and accept the truth whether it be nominalistic or realistic.\n\nWe must follow the principle of hearing both sides, and not consider\nat all whether a statement agrees or disagrees with certain party\nprinciples.[127]\n\n\n4. OCCAM\u2019S RAZOR.\n\nThe most brilliant disciple of Duns Scotus was William of Occam, whose\nfame almost rivalled that of his master. Occam became an adversary of\nrealism; he became a nominalist, and after him was named a method known\nas Occam\u2019s razor, especially useful to nominalists in their warfare\nagainst realists.\n\nOccam\u2019s razor is expressed in the sentence: \u201c_Entia non sunt\nmultiplicanda pr\u00e6ter necessitatem_,\u201d which means: Only in cases\nof extremest necessity are we allowed to assume the existence of\nhypothetical facts. If assumed facts are not absolutely indispensable,\ncut them off!\n\nOccam\u2019s razor was invented for a special purpose, that of cutting off the\nrealistic hypostatisation of abstract ideas.\n\nI do not know which is more startling, that a realist in name, such as\nMr. Peirce, should use a weapon forged by nominalists against realism,\nor that he whom in other respects we found in such a close contact with\nnominalistic methods, should not understand how to handle a nominalistic\nweapon.\n\nMr. Peirce censures me for making the statement that the formal is\nsubjective as well as objective. This, he says, is cut off by Occam\u2019s\nrazor.\n\nThe formal is subjective, for our sensation is possessed of form and our\nmind is in possession of formal thought. It is objective, for reality is\nnot void of form and the things are such as they are by virtue of their\npeculiar shape.\n\nThe proposition that the formal is objective and subjective at the\nsame time is as little cut off by Occam\u2019s razor as, for instance, the\nproposition that there is air inside and outside of us, viz. in our lungs\nand in the surrounding atmosphere.\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s usage of the beds of Procrustes is cruel, but his usage of\nOccam\u2019s razor is inconsiderate. He should be careful in handling such a\nsharp knife, lest he do himself harm.\n\nMr. Peirce uses Occam\u2019s razor to cut off statements and facts which make\nhis pet theories dispensable; but he forgets that Occam\u2019s razor cuts off\nideas only, and when it comes in contact with facts its edge is turned.\n\nOccam\u2019s razor is an excellent instrument to dispose of such hypotheses as\nabsolute chance, for it declares that if their assumption is not quite\nindispensable, we must cut them off.\n\nNow it either is or is not a fact that the formal is objective and\nsubjective at once. It cannot be untrue in my philosophy while it is\ntrue in Mr. Peirce\u2019s system. My proposition of the formal being at once\nobjective and subjective is, according to Mr. Peirce, \u201ccut off by Occam\u2019s\nrazor.\u201d \u201cBut,\u201d adds he, \u201cwhen synechism has united the two worlds this\nview gains new life.\u201d So long as I say so, it is wrong; but should I\nadopt Mr. Peirce\u2019s system, it will pass as right.\n\n\n5. THE APPLICATION OF LEARNING.\n\nPhilosophers should make it a rule not to encumber their thoughts\nunnecessarily with learning. The great problems of philosophy are, in my\nopinion, much simpler than they are generally supposed to be. The art\nmainly consists in stating them in the simplest possible manner.\n\nIt is indispensable for a philosopher to be familiar, at least in a\ngeneral way, with all the most important sciences, especially with\npsychology, physiology, logic, physics, mathematics, and mechanics. But\nhe should not for that reason introduce any more than he can help their\ncomplicated details into his expositions.\n\nEvery specialist is inclined to look at things through the spectacles of\nhis own speciality. But the philosopher who takes a higher standpoint\nshould be on his guard. He should always endeavor to simplify matters and\navoid introducing into philosophy issues which belong to a special field,\nand derive their peculiarities from special conditions. To confound the\nmethods of the various sciences, or to generalise without sufficient\ndiscrimination, will throw everything into confusion.\n\nMr. Peirce, as we well know, has greatly distinguished himself in\nlogic by valuable discoveries and independent investigations. We have\nrepeatedly taken occasion to pronounce unreservedly our admiration of his\nachievements in this field. But we cannot approve of his application of\ncertain methods of his speciality to philosophy in general. Mr. Peirce\nis inclined to look at the world through the spectacles of that new and\nextremely specialised branch of logic which he is at present about to\ninvent.\n\nOne hindrance to properly appreciating his doctrines, says Mr. Peirce,\nlies in my \u201claboring under the great disadvantage of not understanding\nthe logic of relatives,\u201d which, he adds (p. 533):\n\n \u201cIs a subject I have been studying for a great many years, and\n I feel and know that I have an important report that I ought\n to make upon it. This branch of logic is, however, so abstruse\n that I have never been able to find the leisure to translate my\n conclusions into a form in which their significance would be\n manifest even to powerful thinkers, whose thoughts had not long\n been turned in that direction.\u201d\n\nI shall be glad to sit at Mr. Peirce\u2019s feet as an attentive student, as\nsoon as he has worked out his logic of relatives, or any other subject.\nBut I cannot now accept any of his theories on the credit of some\nhalf-developed science, be it ever so profound or intricate, until I see\nplainly its connection with the present issues.\n\nMr. Peirce trusts that his favorite ideas will find support in his\npeculiar conception of the logic of relatives. Judging from the\nquiddities which he now so confidently propounds as weighty arguments,\nwe cannot share his sanguine hopes. His arguments, to be derived from\nthe logic of relatives, are like promises to pay out of the returns of a\ngold-mine, just discovered and boomed by the owners. There may be gold in\nthe mine, but I do not as yet take any stock in it.\n\nMr. Peirce promises to prove by the logic of relatives what, if it were\ntrue, he should be able to demonstrate in plain language.\n\nI have an idea that the logic of relatives can be worked out into as\nclear a science as is mathematics or algebra. But what shall we say when\ntold that the logic of relatives is really abstruse, and that he who\nlabors under the disadvantage of not understanding this abstruse science\nis not prepared to grasp Mr. Peirce\u2019s philosophy? The abstrusity, in my\nmind, counts against Mr. Peirce\u2019s philosophy, as much as against his\nlogic of relatives.\n\nIn my childhood I was much plagued with Latin, but as soon as I had\nacquired a smattering of it, I began to talk Latin to the servants, and\nwhen they did not understand me I thought that they were \u201claboring under\nthe great disadvantage\u201d of not speaking Latin. Since then I have learned\nto translate my Latin into the language of the people with whom I have to\ndeal.\n\nMr. Peirce seems to rely on his learning in proportion to its abstrusity;\nhe likes to walk on stilts.\n\nMr. Peirce is scholarly to excess. He has a special talent of rendering\nissues involved. Not even his references to my articles in _The Monist_\nare made directly by quoting the pages on which they appear. That method\nwould be too common. He invents a ponderous system, necessitating the\nreader to look twice when he wishes to find a passage,\u2014a scheme which\nis original and very dignified in appearance, but makes quotation\nunnecessarily complicated.\n\nLearning is a virtue, but even virtues should be used with discretion.\n\n\n6. THE PRINCIPLE OF POSITIVISM.\n\nSays Mr. Peirce in confirmation of Whewell (p. 546):\n\n \u201cProgress in science depends upon the observation of the right\n facts by minds _furnished with appropriate ideas_.\u201d\n\nTo rely on the observation of facts is, in my opinion, a principle\nof positivism. That facts must be observed \u201cby minds furnished with\nappropriate ideas\u201d is undeniable, but ideas, in order to be appropriate,\nmust be true; they must be representations of facts.\n\nBecause he relies on facts I have characterised Mr. Peirce\u2019s method as\npositivistic. But he indignantly repudiates \u201cthe charge\u201d as \u201ctotally\nunfounded.\u201d\n\nPositivism (which I have always carefully distinguished from Comtism,\nthe latter being a special kind of positivism[128]) is not a peculiar\nphilosophy, but a most important principle of science.\n\nMr. Peirce seems to use the term positivism in a different sense from\nthat in which I use it. Be it so. I shall not nominalistically quarrel\nabout words so long as there are more urgent subjects under discussion.\nNoticing that Mr. Peirce does not state that all ideas should be\nultimately reducible to facts, he is to be acquitted.\n\n\n7. LOPPING OFF THE ABSOLUTE.\n\nMr. Peirce thinks that an agreement between us could be arrived at. He\nsays (p. 545):\n\n \u201cDr. Carus\u2019s philosophy would, in its general features, offer\n no violent opposition to my opinions\u201d (\u00a7 16).\n\nBut the condition is (p. 545):\n\n \u201cTo lop off the heads of all absolute propositions whose\n subject is not the Absolute.\u201d\n\nAs a matter of fact I have lopped off all absolutes. If Mr. Peirce\nwere more familiar with my views he would have known that. Thus, on\nmy part, I had done all I could to come to an agreement with him long\nbefore he asked me to do it. But I fear that having also lopped off the\nAbsolute itself, I did too much of a good thing, for Mr. Peirce carefully\nrecords his opposition to all philosophies which deny the reality of the\nAbsolute. (See \u00a7 18.)\n\nI wish to improve this occasion for conciliation, by turning the tables.\nMr. Peirce\u2019s views would, upon the whole, offer no violent opposition to\nmy opinions if he would only consent to lop off the absolute-property\nof his absolute chance. I would even swallow his Absolute if he would\npromise to designate by that name some real quality of the world, or the\nworld itself as a whole, or something that is thinkable without making\none\u2019s head swim.[129]\n\nEvery predication of absolute, changes a real and useful idea into its\ncaricature. To, say that a complicated calculation is \u201cabsolutely true,\u201d\nthat is, true without stipulating the condition that the methods are\nright, and that the execution is made without any mistake, is ridiculous;\nand thus the phrase \u201cin a Pickwickian sense\u201d (which we gratefully borrow\nfrom Mr. Peirce) would always form a drastic but adequate substitute\nfor the term absolute. \u201cAbsolutely true\u201d is \u201ctrue in a Pickwickian\nsense\u201d only. There are no absolute truths which are in this sense\nunconditionally true. In the same way, \u201cabsolute chance\u201d is different\nfrom that real chance known to us in experience and instanced by the\nthrow of the dice. Absolute chance is \u201cchance in a Pickwickian sense.\u201d\n\nStrange Mr. Peirce speaks of real chance when he means an imaginary\nabsolute chance. He apparently uses the word \u201creal\u201d in this connection\nnot to denote something that is a fact of experience but to express the\nidea of its being perfect or complete. Thus we may speak of a \u201creal\u201d\nperpetual motion, stating at the same time that it is neither real nor\nrealisable.\n\n\n8. THE THEORY OF PROBABLE INFERENCE.\n\nMr. Peirce applies his theory of probable inference to everything; also\nto those cases which are unequivocally determined. He granted in a\nprivate conversation that 2 \u00d7 2 = 4 admits of no exception. But of other\npurely formal statements which are in the same predicament, for instance,\nthat the sum of the angles of a triangle in a plane measures 180\u00b0, he\nstates as probable that they are either somewhat less or somewhat more\nthan 180\u00b0, adding, \u201cthat they are exactly that amount is what nobody\ncan ever be justified in concluding.\u201d To determine the sum of the\nangles of a plane triangle by measuring the parallaxes of stars rests\nupon a fundamental misconception of the principles of formal sciences.\nIt would be consistent for Mr. Peirce to say, that 2 \u00d7 2 = 4 is true\nonly according to the definitions or axioms of arithmetic. But in order\nto know whether 2 \u00d7 2 = 4 in reality, we ought to apply the theory of\nprobable inference. Until we had verified the statement 2 \u00d7 2 = 4 by\napplying this formula to the farthest solar systems, we should not be\njustified in concluding that it is exactly true. The theory of probable\ninferences is supposed to help us out of this perplexity, \u201cand within\nanother century our grandchildren will surely know whether the three\nangles of a triangle are greater or less than 180\u00b0.\u201d[130]\n\nThere is always danger in the application of abstract ratiocination; and\nthe theory of probable inference forms no exception to the rule. On the\ncontrary, it is especially liable to lead one astray. There is the case\nof the doctor who said to his patient: \u201cI am sure you will be cured, for\nI had ninety-nine patients who died during the operation, and statistics\nprove beyond doubt that one among a hundred will survive it. You are the\nhundredth.\u201d\n\nThe theory of probable inferences is often misapplied, but can it be\nworse misapplied than by introducing it into the province of that which\nis certain? There is no sense in applying the theory of probabilities to\nwhat is certain. We may doubt whether the rays of light travel in exactly\nstraight lines, but we cannot doubt the straightness of lines in plane\ngeometry. We cannot doubt that all the radii in a circle are equal, or\nthat the sum of the angles of a Euclidean triangle are 180\u00b0.\n\n\n9. ZWEIDEUTIG BESTIMMT.\n\nMr. Peirce very kindly informs me that the term _eindeutig bestimmt_ is a\ntranslation of a French phrase. Very well, I do not deny it. I know very\nwell that the phrase has a long history, but I do not consider myself\nbound to present the whole pedigree of every term I use.\n\nDoes Mr. Peirce perhaps suppose that the French phrase is the original?\nIf we have to go back to the original beginning at all, why does he not\ntell us that the French _univoque_ is a translation from the medi\u00e6val\nLatin _univoce_, which was coined and used by the schoolmen in opposition\nto _\u00e6quivoce_. Neither the term _eindeutig_, as Mr. Peirce asserts,\nnor its scholastic original _univoce_, is an exclusively mathematical\nexpression.\n\nAlthough the term _eindeutig_ is a translation of the French _univoque_,\nthere is after all a great difference between the French term and the\nGerman term, and I have a good reason to prefer the German expression.\nThe French term is nominalistic or even vocalistic, the German one\nis realistic. _Univoque_ and _univocal_ mean that there is only one\nname or one _vox_, while _eindeutig_ lays no stress on the name but\non the meaning of the name, denoting that which admits of but one\ninterpretation. This is a sufficient reason for me to prefer it, and it\nought to appeal to Mr. Peirce\u2019s realistic mind.[131]\n\nMr. Peirce, maintaining that _eindeutig bestimmt_ is only a mathematical\nterm, adduces two equations, each one of which, taken singly, admits,\nhe says, of two possible determinations.[132] Mr. Peirce uses these\nequations as an argument against my application of the term, adding,\nsarcastically: \u201cThis shows how much that argument amounts to.\u201d But his\nexample proves at best only that there are incomplete determinations;\nsome problems allow of several solutions. In a German township in which\nblue hussars are garrisoned, children used to propose to another this\nprofound problem: \u201cIt lies under a plum-tree and is blue; what is it?\u201d\nIf the child questioned argues, \u201cIt is a plum,\u201d he is corrected \u201cNo, it\nis a hussar.\u201d But if he argues, \u201cIt is a hussar,\u201d he is corrected, \u201cNo,\nit is a plum.\u201d So he has no chance of guessing right. The result of Mr.\nPeirce\u2019s first equation, which may be either 11\u00b7477 or 11\u00b7523, is like\nthe conundrum of the plum-tree: it amounts to the same, viz. to nothing,\nand proves only that there are determinations which are _zweideutig\nbestimmt_.\n\n\n10. EXPLANATION.\n\nThe differences of method become very serious when we disagree on the\nvery meaning of \u201cexplanation\u201d itself. How can two debaters accept or\nreject one another\u2019s arguments, if their ideas of explanation are\nradically different?\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s definition of the term \u201cexplanation\u201d appears to me very\nunsatisfactory. He says (p. 57):\n\n \u201cI cannot admit that explanation is description of the fact\n explained. It is true that in the setting forth of some\n explanations it is convenient to restate the fact explained so\n as to set it under another aspect, but even in these cases the\n statement of other facts is essential. (!) In all cases it is\n _other facts_, (!) usually hypothetical, which constitute the\n explanation; (!) and the process of explaining is a process by\n which from those other facts the fact to be explained is shown\n to follow as a consequence by virtue of a general principle or\n otherwise.\u201d\n\n \u201cTo explain a fact is to show that it is a necessary or\n at least a probable result from another fact (!) known or\n supposed.\u201d\n\nMy definition of \u201cexplanation,\u201d as a description in which the process\ndescribed is recognised as a transformation is sneered at. Says Mr.\nPeirce (p. 558):\n\n \u201cA magician transforms a watch into a dove. Recognise it as\n a transformation and the trick is explained, is it? This is\n delightfully facile.\u201d\n\nIndeed, the magician\u2019s trick is explained as soon as we know all the\nchanges that have taken place. Take the whole number of objects handled\nby the magician, those which he shows and those which he conceals. Let\nus observe how he hides the watch and how he produces the dove, and the\ntrick is explained. Is it not?\n\nExplanation is, as the word suggests, a making plain, so that we can look\nover the whole field before us, and leave nothing hidden from sight. This\nwhole field, the survey of which is needed for the recognition of the\ntransformation, is called the system of the explanation. After we have\nseen how the changes take place, and after we have described in exact\nformulas their modes of action, our desire for explanation is completely\nsatisfied.\n\nThe instances adduced by Mr. Peirce prove plainly that his objections\ncannot be maintained. Every one of them is an instance of transformation\n(with the exception of the emerald vest, which, however, is not stated\nwith sufficient completeness). Take, for instance, the following example\nadduced by Mr. Peirce (p. 557):\n\n \u201cA \u2018special process of nature,\u2019 calling for explanation, is the\n circumstance that the planet Mars, while moving in a general\n way from west to east among the fixed stars, yet retrogrades a\n part of the time, so as to describe loops in the heavens. The\n explanation is, that Mars revolves in one approximate circle\n and we in another.\u201d\n\nCan any one deny that this explanation is a description? We draw the\ntwo orbits as correctly as possible for the required demonstration\nand combine the points representing the earth with those representing\nMars at their successive positions. Considering the fact that we do\nnot perceive the motion of the earth, we have to construct a diagram\nin which the directions of these lines are described as viewed from a\nstationary point. This is a description of changes that take place. It is\na portrayal of the transpositions of two bodies, and the appearance which\nthe change of this relation presents to one of them.\n\nMr. Peirce has neither the grace nor good-will to, understand my\nproposition, that _explanation is always a tracing of form_. He says (p.\n558):\n\n \u201cForms may indulge in whatever eccentricities they please, in\n the world of dreams, without responsibility.\u201d\n\nIn the world of dreams, yes! But not in the world of reality. And even\nthe irresponsible eccentricities of dreams take place according to law.\n\nFeeling that he mistakes my position, Mr. Peirce adds:\n\n \u201cShould Dr. Carus reply that I mistake his meaning, that it is\n only \u2018being in general\u2019 (\u00a7 66), that he holds unaccountable,\n I reply that this is simply expressing scepticism as to the\n possibility and need of philosophy.\u201d (P. 558.)\n\nOf course, I mean \u201cbeing in general.\u201d As to the scepticism imputed to me,\nI answer, that any attempt at explaining how matter and energy, which I\ntake to be eternal, came into being, is a wrongly formulated problem.\nMr. Peirce might as well call me a sceptic, because I recognise that we\ncannot square the circle. (Compare \u201cFundamental Problems,\u201d 2d ed., pp.\n283-285 and 291.)\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s gravest mistake is his belief that\n\n \u201cIn all cases it is _other facts_ which constitute the\n explanation.\u201d (P. 557.)\n\nThe practical application of this mistake becomes fatal to his philosophy.\n\nIt is by no means necessary to pass beyond that system of facts which\ncontains the phenomenon to be explained. We must, as a matter of course,\nkeep completing the facts of a phenomenon until we have acquired a survey\nof what we call the whole system of the facts, but we have never to\nresort to other facts.\n\nWe are confronted every day with hundreds of facts of which we never\nsee the whole system to which they belong, but we readily supply these\ndeficiencies from the stock of our experience. We refer the unknown to\nthe known. The single case under observation is referred to something\nwith which we are familiar. Those systems of explanation which are known\nto us serve as patterns for others that are only partially known, and we\nfill out, with their assistance, the gaps of our observation.\n\nThe readiness and reliability of our explanation thus depends upon the\nstock of knowledge we have. The more we know, the easier shall we conquer\nthe unknown; the more incomplete our knowledge is, the greater the number\nof hypothetical facts that will have to be introduced; and this always\nweakens the reliability of our explanations. Hypothetical facts should\nbe introduced only in cases of urgent necessity. However, if they are\nadmitted at all, they have to be thought of as parts of the system under\ninvestigation, for they have been invented only because we are compelled\nto assume that without them it would be incomplete.\n\nMr. Peirce adduces the following example to prove that \u201cother facts\u201d are\nrequired in an explanation:\n\n \u201cIt has been stated that a warm spring in Europe is usually\n followed by a cool autumn, and the explanation has been offered\n that so many more icebergs than usual are liberated during\n a warm spring, that they subsequently lower sensibly the\n temperature of Europe. I care little whether the fact and the\n explanation are correct or no. The case illustrates, at any\n rate, my point that an explanation is a special fact, supposed\n or known, from which the fact to be explained follows as a\n consequence.\u201d (P. 557.)\n\nWhen, as in this instance, we recognise that one fact is the necessary\nresult of another fact, we view them both as parts of one set or system\nof facts in which a transformation is taking place, and, unless we\nsee the connection of the two facts as constituting one process of\ntransformation, we cannot say that the problem is explained. When we\nobserve changes which are the results of transformations taking place\nbeyond the horizon of our knowledge, we are, as a matter of course,\nunable to give an explanation.\n\nMr. Peirce had perhaps in mind a special and more complex kind of\nexplanation, which we define as \u201ccomprehension.\u201d He says (p. 557):\n\n \u201cThe fact to be explained is shown to follow as a consequence,\n by virtue of a general principle or otherwise.\u201d\n\nTake as an instance the law of gravitation. There are the facts of\nfalling stones and the motions of celestial bodies. Both sets of\nfacts are explained, according to Mr. Peirce, \u201cby virtue of a general\nprinciple,\u201d i. e. gravitation, while we say, both sets of facts are\ncomprehended under a common formula. Mr. Peirce\u2019s conception of\n\u201cexplanation\u201d rests on the antiquated view that gravitation is a\nprinciple behind the gravitating masses which compels the stone to fall.\nGravitation, however, is not \u201canother fact\u201d foreign to the facts under\nconsideration. It is not a principle called in from the outside. On the\ncontrary, it is the essence and extract of the very facts that are to be\nexplained.\n\nPrinciples which have not been derived either from the facts to be\nexplained, or from the additional facts which belong to their system, do\nnot and cannot explain the phenomena.\n\n * * * * *\n\nComprehension is, as it were, an explanation of a higher degree. The\nterm means a grasping together, and it actually consists in viewing two\nor several facts in such a way as to recognise their common features.\nComprehension is a reduction of our patterns of explanation; it unites\ntwo or several of them in one formula.\n\nFor instance, it has been observed that certain objects float in water\nwhile others sink to the bottom. The observations do not seem to agree,\nthey present two incoherent facts. When we find out that the weight of\na floating body is equal to the weight of water which it displaces,\nwe understand at once why bodies whose specific gravity is greater\nthan water sink while those of a lighter specific gravity float.\nComprehension, in this as in every other case, is the description of a\nprocess which comprises all the facts that belong to a special class in\na common formula. The description must be applicable to all single cases\nhowever different they may be.\n\nThis conception of comprehension has a great advantage over Mr. Peirce\u2019s\nview. While he has to bring in some \u201cother fact\u201d from the outside, we\nneed not introduce any foreign element. Comprehension, as we understand\nit, can rise from the statement of particular facts to more and more\ngeneral formulations, until finally we arrive at universal laws. All\nthe laws thus formulated to satisfy our cravings for comprehension, are\nfound to belong to one great system of laws, and our scientists are\nconstantly engaged not only in widening the range of our experience by\nnew discoveries, but also in revising our statements of the uniformities\nof nature and, where they appear to be in collision, in bringing them\ninto harmony.\n\nThis conception of comprehension is monistic, Mr. Peirce\u2019s is dualistic.\nWe need not, in order to explain the facts of existence, go beyond them\ninto a supernatural realm. Mr. Peirce must go outside of the world\ninto non-existence when he attempts to understand the world by the\nprinciples of his philosophy. It is very doubtful whether explanations,\nthe \u201cessential\u201d nature of which is to consist of \u201cother facts usually\nhypothetical,\u201d will be satisfactory to anybody except himself.\n\nOtherness makes any fact unfit to serve as a factor of an explanation and\nindeed I cannot think of any instance, real or imaginary, in which the\nexplanatory facts, be they real or hypothetical, do not form parts of the\nsystem under consideration.\n\nThere is only one instance to which Mr. Peirce\u2019s method of explanation\nhas been applied, and I am under the impression that it has been invented\nsolely for this purpose. Mr. Peirce\u2019s philosophy is too original to\nbe explained by the usual methods; it must have an original method of\nits own. In order to explain \u201claw\u201d Mr. Peirce calls in \u201cchance.\u201d His\nexplanation must be an \u201cother fact\u201d and the only fact different from\nlaw is not-law, lawlessness, or absolute chance. According to my idea\nof explanation, law can never be explained by chance. According to Mr.\nPeirce, it is the only possible thing that can be called in as that\n\u201c_other_ fact\u201d which is supposed to be the essential constituent of an\nexplanation.\n\nIf Mr. Peirce\u2019s method of explanation were sound, we should have to\nexplain order from chaos, possibility from impossibility, and sense from\nnonsense.\n\n\nII. MR. PEIRCE\u2019S PHILOSOPHY.\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s constant references to scholastic philosophy remind me of\nhappy years long past when I was extremely interested in the theories\nof such men as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Occam, Abelard, Tauler,\nand others. Together with my chum, now a sober Professor of physics at\na German University, I freely indulged in the construction of various\nworld-theories, which, alas! were quickly overthrown one after another by\nthe slightest puff of wind. I have not lost my interest in the schoolmen,\nbut it is considerably weakened.\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s repeated praise of scholastic realism and his condemnation\nof any theory that he brands as nominalistic, seems to me like the method\nof some of our politicians who, eager to revive toryism, should censure\nall evils of the politics of to-day as whiggish. This comparison is not\nexaggerated, for there are a few Hamiltonians who miss the refining\ninfluence of an aristocratic class and regret that the historical\ntradition of toryism has been so completely broken. I would not deny that\nthere is some truth in it, and there is some truth, too, in medi\u00e6val\nrealism, which has been neglected by the, first violently suppressed and\nthen triumphant, nominalism. But in reviving realism the Scotists should\nbe very careful to avoid a resurrection of its errors.\n\n\n1. DUNS SCOTUS AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PATRON SAINT.\n\nJohannes Duns Scotus, a Franciscan, honored since his successful defense\nof the Blessed Virgin\u2019s Immaculate Conception by the title Doctor\nSubtilis, and the very same man after whom, on account of the narrowness\nof his later disciples during the time of the Reformation, a blockhead\nis to-day called a dunce, was one of the most characteristic figures of\nscholastic philosophy. He lived at the end of the thirteenth Century when\nthe authority of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas who had died March 7th,\n1274, was all but universally recognised. Scotus appeared as the most\npowerful opponent of Thomas. Ingenious, original, bold, and buoyant in\nhis attacks he had a short but brilliant career and died comparatively\nyoung at Cologne, in November, 1308.\n\nWhile Thomas, surnamed Dr. Universalis, or Dr. Angelicus, is regarded by\nhis order, the Dominicans, as the greatest authority in philosophical\nmatters, Scotus succeeded in impressing his mode of thought upon the\nFranciscans; yet Thomas is universally regarded in the Roman church and\nalso among Protestant theologians as the more orthodox Christian.\n\nAlmost all the ideas of Scotus were set forth in opposition to the views\nof others and mainly of Thomas. Thomas was a determinist, Scotus an\noutspoken indeterminist. Thomas says that man\u2019s action is necessarily\ndetermined by what he thinks is best. Scotus avers that man thinks in a\ncertain way because he wills in a certain way. Man\u2019s ideas are fashioned\nto suit his character. His motto is, \u201c_voluntas superior est intellectu_\u201d\nand his idea of will is identified with the indetermined arbitrariness of\na perfect _liberum arbitrium_. According to Thomas, God commands us to do\nthe good because it is good. Scotus calls good that which God commands\nsimply because God commands it. The will of God, like the will of man is,\nin Scotus\u2019s opinion, undetermined, it is arbitrary. Thus God created the\nworld not because his will was determined by some motive, but because\nit so pleased him; and Christ\u2019s passion and death were not really an\natonement; they simply were accepted as such by God.\n\nWithout entering into this controversy of _anno olim_ we might say\nthat we side neither with Thomas nor with Scotus, but would modify the\nstatement of the former by the criticism of the latter. Thomas goes\ntoo far when he says that whatever is recognised as the best will of\nnecessity be done. He overlooks the power of passions. Thomas\u2019s statement\nwould be right, if every passion were regarded as a will which has its\nown and independent but mistaken ideas about good. A soul whose passions\nare more powerful than rational considerations will necessarily be\ninclined to obey its irrational impulses. There is something in Scotus\u2019s\ncriticism, but his view is no improvement. In speaking of will as\nsuperior to the intellect, did he ever ask himself the question, What his\nown will would be independent of his intellect? Further, when God is said\nto command the good because it is good, Thomas separates in a logical\nconsideration two ideas which are identical. Scotus is right in defining\ngood as the will of God. From our standpoint we should say, the will of\nGod, viz., the moral order of the universe, is of a definite kind which\ncan be ascertained by experience. To speak of the will of God as good is\nan anthropomorphic expression. Good is that which agrees with the will of\nGod; bad, that which opposes it. Suppose the moral order of the universe\nwere different, goodness and badness would change with it.\n\nWe have sketched the views of Scotus only to show the points of\ncontact between him and Mr. Peirce. Mr. Peirce is also an outspoken\nindeterminist. He identifies feeling with chance, and his free will is a\n_liberum arbitrium_. Mr. Peirce, like Scotus, also separates theology,\nand, with it, religion, from philosophy.[133] Scotus ridicules those\nwho confound both, clearly indicating that he is aiming at Thomas, to\nwhose fervent faith their conciliation was a matter of momentous and all\nimportant consequence. Scotus goes so far as to aver that something might\nbe true in philosophy which is wrong in theology (see Ed. \u201cWadding\u201d Fol.\n4, p. 848)\u2014a statement that to an honest searcher for truth must almost\nappear as frivolous.[134]\n\nHow much more imbued with true religiosity was his great namesake John\nScotus Erigena the venerable founder of scholasticism when saying: \u201c_Non\nest alia philosophia, i. e. sapientiae stadium, et alia religio_.\u201d\n\n\n2. MR. PEIRCE\u2019S ORIGINAL THEORIES.\n\nMr. Peirce as a controversalist and critic is like Scotus, brilliant,\nversatile, and powerful. But he is more; he is also constructive.\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s style of architecture reminds us of neo-Platonism, and this\nis quite in harmony with Scotism, for Scotus, through Avicebron, derived\nmany of his ideas from the Neo-Platonists. Mr. Peirce proposes a modern\nview of emanation, which starts the world from that \u03b2\u1fe6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 of nothingness\nwhich at the same time is the womb of all existence. The primeval state\nof being, says Mr. Peirce, \u201cWas mere nothing from a physical aspect,\u201d\nbut, if it was not really nothing, what, then, was it?\n\nIt was chance.\n\nHere lies the essential difference between Mr. Peirce and the\nneo-Platonists. The neo-Platonists (whose speculations, if they are\ntreated not as philosophy, but as poetical effusions, are very profound\nand thoughtful) look to the Logos, or world-reason, as the beginning\nof the world emanation, while Mr. Peirce shows a certain contempt for\nreason. To the neo-Platonist, reasons _are_ explanations, while to our\nmodern Scotist, reasons explain nothing. He says:\n\n \u201cReasons explain nothing, except upon some theistic hypothesis\n which may be pardoned to the yearning heart of man, but must be\n doubtful in the eyes of philosophy....\u201d (P. 567.)\n\nMr. Peirce goes so far as to speak of \u201cthe dullness of ratiocination\u2019s\nself.\u201d\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s gospel would deviate in the very first verse from that of\nSt. John, for it would read\n\n \u1f18\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc7 \u1f26\u03bd \u1f21 \u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae.\u2014In the Beginning was Chance!\n\nAnd this chance which was in the beginning actually is, to Mr. Peirce,\nGod, a personal God, an anthropomorphic deity endowed with consciousness.\nHe says:\n\n \u201cThat primeval chaos in which there was no regularity was\n mere nothing from a physical aspect. Yet it was not a blank\n zero; for there was an intensity of consciousness there, in\n comparison with which all that we ever feel is but as the\n struggling of a molecule or two to throw off a little of the\n force of law to an endless and innumerable diversity of chance\n utterly unlimited.\u201d (_The Monist_, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 19.)\n\nAnd in another passage he says of chance:\n\n \u201cThat it is a being living and conscious is what all the\n dullness that belongs to ratiocination\u2019s self can scarce muster\n hardihood to deny.\u201d (P. 560.)\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s argument that all the dullness that belongs to\nratiocination\u2019s self can scarcely muster hardihood to deny his\nproposition, sounds strange in the mouth of a scientist. But it is not\nstrange; for I have found that enthusiastic defenders of improbable\ntheories always fill the holes of their argumentation with abuse of those\nwho dare to discover these holes. Call a person who doubts the truth\nof your statements dull, and you will frighten many a weak mind into a\npatient acceptance of your view.\n\nWe may rest assured that whenever a philosopher scolds he is at his wit\u2019s\nend. For why should he lose patience if he can prove his proposition?\nThus diatribes are always symptoms that there is some flaw in one\u2019s logic\nand the louder one chides the sorer is the spot.\n\nMr. Peirce is serious in the statement that chance is a conscious being.\nHe actually identifies chance and feeling. He says:\n\n \u201cChance is but the outward aspect of that which within itself\n is feeling.\u201d\n\nThe primordial chance, the existence of which, according to Mr. Peirce,\n\u201ccalls for no explanation,\u201d has \u201ca primordial habit-taking tendency.\u201d\nWhence this tendency gets into the universe of absolute chance, Mr.\nPeirce is unable to disclose. The deviations from the mechanical order\nin the present course of things, which, by the by, are by no means\nproved, suggest to him and justify, in his opinion, this assumption.\nThus, assumes he, primordial chance ceased to be chance; it changed by\na gradual habit-taking into regularities. Consciousness ceased to be\nconsciousness and became crystallised into natural laws. Mind ceased to\nbe an arbitrary sporting, and by becoming effete it begot, through a\nsummation of minute effects, this material universe of ours. Accordingly,\nreal existence or thing-ness consists merely in the regularities thus\nproduced, and \u201cphysical events are but the degraded ... forms of\npsychical events.\u201d\n\nThis is in brief Mr. Peirce\u2019s cosmogony, which, as the prophet of\nTychism, he reveals to us in axiomatic aphorisms.\n\nBy gradual habit-taking, Mr. Peirce declares (_The Monist_, Vol. I,\nNo. 2, p. 176), mind will at last be \u201ccrystallised in the infinitely\ndistant future.\u201d This rather sad outlook is, in another passage, modified\nby a counter-oracle, which announces that \u201can element of pure chance\nsurvives.\u201d Why, he does not say. Irregularities, not being entirely\nsuppressed, can increase again, and as such they are \u201cundeveloped forms\nof psychical events.\u201d Says Mr. Peirce (_The Monist_, Vol. III, No. 1, p.\n18):\n\n \u201cThere are almost insensible fortuitous departures from\n regularity; these will produce, in general, equally minute\n effects.... Protoplasm is in an excessively unstable\n condition.... In the protoplasm these habits are to some slight\n extent broken up, so that, according to the law of mind, ...\n feeling becomes intensified.\n\n \u201cThis breaking up of habit and renewed fortuitous spontaneity\n will, according to the law of mind, be accompanied by an\n intensification of feeling.\u201d\n\nThis is the gist of Mr. Peirce\u2019s mental philosophy, which proclaims that\n\u201cconsciousness is not to be reinstated without tychism.\u201d The reappearance\nof chance is said to explain the origin of mind!\n\nOur conception of mind is different. We see mind develop out of sentiency\nby the recognition of the regularities of the surrounding world. Reason\nis almost a synonym of man\u2019s ability to form generalisations, of his\nhaving and operating with concepts, of his thinking ideas. Not the\narbitrariness of a wilful mind is the properly mental of man\u2019s soul,\nbut his reason; and man\u2019s reason originates under the influence of the\nuniformities of the surrounding world, which impress themselves, in what\nwe call experience, upon his existence. The more a creature recognises\nthe regularities of existence, and the more its soul becomes an image of\nthis world-order, which is the prototype of his reason, of the divine\nLogos, the higher it rises in the scale of evolution.\n\nIf chance, as Mr. Peirce declares, is but the outward aspect of that\nwhich within is feeling, we should henceforth have to look upon the\nroulette and dice as sentient beings.\n\n\n3. THE FOUR POSITIVE ARGUMENTS OF TYCHISM INSUFFICIENT.\n\nMr. Peirce adduces four positive arguments for believing in absolute\nchance. They are: (1) the prevalence of growth; (2) the variety of the\nuniverse; (3) the necessity of explaining law; and (4) the existence of\nfeeling.\n\nBy growth, Mr. Peirce does not understand the growth of crystals, or\ntrees, or organisms. That kind of growth is a mere transformation.\nMr. Peirce\u2019s idea of \u201creal\u201d growth is \u201copposed to the conservation\nof energy.\u201d It is not an increase of the thing growing through the\nassimilation of substances taken from the surrounding world; it is an\nactual increase of energy, not a mere change; it is a growth of the\nuniverse itself. Granted the possibility of this so-called \u201creal\u201d growth,\nand we can easily explain the evolution of the world out of the tiniest\nbeginning. But, of course, one thing has to go: either the conservation\nof energy or \u201creal growth.\u201d Mr. Peirce lets go the former, I the\nlatter.[135]\n\nThe variety of the universe is, in my world-conception, sufficiently\nexplained by the variety of forms, for form is indeed the _principium\nindividuationis_; a doctrine, which, but for Mr. Peirce\u2019s philosophy,\nI should regard as almost universally accepted. Among its advocates we\nfind also Mr. Peirce\u2019s great master, Duns Scotus, and Scotus\u2019s teacher,\nAvicebron. In so far as various formations are possible, (exactly as the\ndie can show six different surfaces,) chance plays an important part in\nthe diversification of nature, but this chance is not to be thought of as\na violation of the law, but appears to be a special case only, and a true\nmanifestation of the law under complicated conditions.\n\nChance and probability are not mere subjective ideas, creatures of our\nignorance, playing a r\u00f4le simply in our limited knowledge of the world.\nThe words signify a certain condition of objective existence.\n\nFor instance, the probability of throwing 1 with one die is 1/6.\nThis means, the die is so constructed that it can show six different\npositions, one among them being 1; and these six possibilities are as\nreal a quality of the die, as its weight or its color.\n\nThe die has six possible positions. Now I take a die and throw 3. Are we\nnot entitled to believe that the throw was sufficiently determined by all\nthe innumerable conditions which accompany the act? We confidently think\nso, and feel no need of assuming any absolute chance. Now I throw again.\nWhat is now the probability of throwing 1? We answer again, 1/6. And, lo!\nthere it is! It came at the second throw, and we ask, was our statement\nof the probabilities wrong? We say, no! it was not wrong, for it remains\ntrue even now. The statement does not mean that we shall throw a 1 at\neach sixth throw, but that (supposing the die to be perfect) 1/6 among\nall the possible throws will be 1, so that supposing all the possible\nthrows realised in an infinite series of throws, the average number of\n1\u2019s among them will be the one-sixth part of the whole.\n\nThe enormous importance of chance (viz., of that real chance which is\nno violation of the law) has been recognised since Democritus and has\nreceived a fresh illustration from the investigations of Darwin, which I\nneed not here recapitulate.\n\nThe theory of probabilities teaches, that whatever can happen in the long\ncourse of an infinite number of events, actually will happen, and that\nwhatever, according to the nature of things, has a greater probability,\nwill in an infinite number of cases occur with proportionately greater\nfrequency.\n\nThe lesson which we have to draw from this statement is, that that which\nwe wish not to happen, should be made impossible. And this can be done,\nperhaps not perfectly, but approximately. According to Mr. Peirce, the\nevolution of mind is due to the reappearance of chance; we say that the\nevolution of mind is marked by man\u2019s increasing power in the restriction\nof chance.\n\nThe identification of chance with feeling, or even with mind, is to me an\nidea so grotesque, that I am inclined to regard it as a relic of gnostic\nspeculations.\n\nMr. Peirce, instead of attempting to comprehend laws, as we do, seeks to\ntrace their origin. He tries to explain their existence by growth, as if\nthey were beings that evolve like the forms of planetary systems or the\norganisms of living creatures. Considering the fact that Mr. Peirce is a\nrealist only in name, and that his philosophy is soaked with nominalistic\ntraditions, we should say (and Mr. Peirce will pardon me that I quote the\nexpression from him) that:\n\n \u201cThe puzzle for him is simply the usual difficulty that plagues\n nominalism when it finds itself confronted with a reality which\n has an element of generality.\u201d\n\nThe assumption of absolute chance might be used to account for any\notherwise inexplicable event, but Mr. Peirce does not countenance this\nidea. He warns us to be cautious in its use, like the druggist who labels\nhis poisons \u201chandle with care\u201d; \u201cI only use chance,\u201d he says, \u201cto give\nroom for the development of law.\u201d Having used absolute chance to start\nthe world with, he dismisses it. So Fiesco discharges his negro after he\nhas done his work: \u201c_Der Mohr hat seine Schuldigkeit gethan, der Mohr\nkann gehen_.\u201d\n\nIn my criticism of Mr. Peirce\u2019s theory I said (_The Monist_, II, p. 574):\n\n \u201cHow little, after all, we can escape the determinism of law as\n being a feature of the world, will be seen from the fact that\n the explanation for the evolution of law is presented by Mr.\n Peirce as being itself a law, i. e., a formula describing a\n regularity supposed to obtain in facts.\u201d\n\nMr. Peirce replies:\n\n \u201cIs there no difference between a law, the essence of which\n is to be inviolable ... and _that mental law, the violation\n of which is so included in the essence that unless it were\n violated, it would cease to exist_?... Thus I clearly escape\n the contradiction attributed to me.\u201d (P. 561.)\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s escape is like the disappearance of a medium from a room\nwithout doors. He must have got out through the fourth dimension. The\nargument is so subtle that I cannot see it, and I feel tempted to retort\nin a sentence quoted from my profound adversary:\n\n \u201cI confess, I can find only words without ideas in the\n objection.\u201d (P. 561.)\n\nMr. Peirce speaks of law as having developed out of chance, but he\nhimself, in fact, after a fashion, explains the origin of those laws of\nnature which represent its present uniformities by a law of habit-taking.\n\nThat the conservation of energy should leave no room for feeling is\nto me an obscure proposition. The law of the conservation of energy\ndeclares only that the sum of all energy in the world, potential as well\nas kinetic, remains constant. If a living and feeling being renews its\nwaste and stores up new energy in its tissues, it must take it out of the\ngeneral storehouse of nature; it must transform it, and cannot produce it\nout of nothing. Why should feeling become impossible, if the conservation\nof energy is true?\n\nThe identification of chance with feeling is, to my mind, a vagary. It is\ntrue that feeling develops mind; mind makes deliberation possible, and\ndeliberation implies choice. But choice is not chance. The choice which\na man makes is determined by his character. There is more resemblance\nbetween logical identity and a pun, than between feeling and chance.\n\n\n4. THE NEGATIVE ARGUMENT A LOGICAL FALLACY.\n\nThe four positive arguments for believing in absolute chance are\nuntenable. But Mr. Peirce, knowing that he had to weather a storm of\ncriticisms, has taken along a sheet-anchor, consisting of a negative\nargument, which, if it were true, would make the four positive arguments\nredundant.\n\nWhat shall we say to the statement, that chance need not be explained?\nMr. Peirce says:\n\n \u201cChance, according to me, or irregularity\u2014that is, the absence\n of any coincidence,\u2014calls for no explanation. If _law_ calls\n for explanation, as Dr. Carus admits it does, surely the\n mere absence of law calls for no further explanation than is\n afforded by the mere absence of any particular circumstance\n necessitating the result.\u201d (P. 559.)\n\nMr. Peirce is a great logician, but the logical arguments of his\nphilosophy are not sound. If the absence of law, of coincidences, of\nregularities, did not require explanation, the scientist would (as is\nbut right) still have to explain the uniformities of nature, but the\nmiracle monger would have a good time; for he could tell us boldly that,\naccording to the rules of modern logic he is not bound to give any\nexplanation.\n\nIt is true that while everything must be explained, the absence of\neverything (i. e. nothing) need not be explained; but we cannot use\nthis pattern as a schedule which can be filled out at our pleasure. The\nideas \u201cabsence of,\u201d \u201cno,\u201d \u201cno one,\u201d and \u201cnothing\u201d play a part in logic\nanalogous to that of zero in mathematics. I need hardly remind the\nreader of the puzzling demonstration, that since one cat has one tail\nmore than _no_ cat, and since no cat has eight tails, one cat must have\nnine tails. Operations with zero act like death in the realm of human\nconventionalities. Death makes the beggar equal to the king. Multiply any\nequation that is wrong with zero, and it will be correct. Operations with\nzero render the impossible possible.\n\nBut let us look closer at Mr. Peirce\u2019s proposition. He avers that \u201cthe\nmere absence of any particular circumstance necessitating the result\ncalls for no explanation.\u201d\n\nShould it ever happen that the absence of any particular circumstance\nnecessitates the result, I do not see why this absence should remain\nunexplained. Say for instance, a certain stronghold is taken because the\nenemy discovers the absence of guards in a certain part of the walls. If\nthis absence of guards be counted as an important circumstance helpful\nin the conquest of the citadel (and there is no reason why we should not\ncount it as such) can we say that while the presence of guards on all\nother spots of the wall has to be and can be explained as an endeavor to\nsecure the place against a _coup de main_, the mere absence of guards\ncalls for no explanation? The absence of guards in a particular spot\nof the Capitol during the siege by the Gauls, was accounted for by the\nsteepness of the place. This particular spot was regarded as safe on\naccount of its inaccessibility. Similarly, the absence of guards in the\ncitadel of the Messenians is explained by the idea that the Spartans\nwould make no attack because in that particularly stormy night a\ncloudburst seemed to prevent all approach.\n\nObviously the necessity of explaining a rule, does not confer the\nprivilege of neglecting to explain its exceptions.\n\nIt goes without saying that Mr. Peirce\u2019s argument (even if it were\nformally faultless) can have no force with a necessitarian. Such\na one, after having explained and proved to his satisfaction that\n_Gesetzm\u00e4ssigkeit_ (or regularity such as can be formulated in laws) is a\ncharacteristic feature of the universe, is not only asked to believe that\nthere are after all exceptions to law, but is even told that according to\nsome paragraph in Mr. Peirce\u2019s unwritten logic of relatives no further\nargument is needed to prove the non-existence of law. Only Mr. Peirce\u2019s\nextreme love of his pet theories can make him blind to such palpable\nfallacies. But such are the foundations of his philosophical architecture.\n\n\nIII. MR. PEIRCE AS A CRITIC.\n\nA good general, who has to mask the weak points of his position, uses\nthe strategem of making demonstrative sallies upon his enemy. Mr.\nPeirce, although apparently quite unconscious of the fact that his basic\ndoctrines are untenable, instinctively imitates this maxim of warfare.\nHis defence is mostly aggressive. Instead of replying to my arguments he\nendeavors to represent my views as incohesive and contradictory.\n\nThe present issue is not whether my views are tenable, but whether Mr.\nPeirce\u2019s are. However, I am glad to have the benefit of the searching\ncriticism of so subtle a thinker as Mr. Peirce. Therefore, I willingly\nappear before his tribunal to expurgate myself of his charges.\n\n\n1. THE A PRIORI AND POSITIVISM.\n\nMr. Peirce is greatly puzzled with my position. He quotes several\nstatements of mine which appear to him contradictory. I said: (1) that\nmillions of _single_ experiences cannot establish a belief in necessity,\n(2) that necessitarianism must be founded upon the _a priori_, and (3)\nthat the _a priori_ must be founded upon experience.[136] To him who\noverlooks the here italicised word \u201csingle\u201d this may, indeed, seem to be\na vicious circle.\n\nAll knowledge begins with experience. We define experience as the effects\nof events upon sentient beings, and these effects are sense-impressions\nof certain forms and interrelations. At an advanced stage of evolution,\nthe formal and relational are first unconsciously, as, for instance, in\ncounting, and then consciously, with scientific deliberation, abstracted\nfrom the sensory. Systems of pure forms are constructed out of the purely\nformal elements, thus gained from experience by abstraction, such as\nour system of numbers and the logical categories. Now the laws of these\nforms of thought are applicable to all formal and relational conditions\nof reality. The formal and relational of reality are known to us even\nin those regions of the universe and in those provinces of scientific\ninvestigation which have not as yet been explored. The scientist knows\nthem _a priori_, even before he investigates objects which he never saw\nbefore. He is acquainted with certain of their qualities, viz., with the\nlaws of their formal and relational conditions.\n\nThus the _a priori_, or, as I prefer to call it, formal thought, is a\nproduct of experience, and is again applicable to experience.\n\nSingle experiences, isolated observations, innumerable particular cases\ncannot directly yield or reveal the laws of formal thought. So long as\nthey remain single and isolated they will never develop into mental\nfactors; but such is the nature of reality that the single experiences\nwill be built up and arranged in feeling substance as systematically\nas, for instance, the formation of crystals or the harmonious growth of\ncells in organisms? When sentient creatures become conscious not only\nof the sensory element of their experience, but also of this system of\ntheir soul, of the formal of their psychical existence, they become\nrational beings; and the formal which grows with their sentiency is not\nan exclusive and peculiar quality of theirs; it is not purely subjective,\nbut it has been imparted to them, piecemeal, together with the single\ndata of their experience. It constitutes a part of their _Anschauung_; it\nis found in the objective world and is a general feature of reality.\n\nOut of the formal elements of our _Anschauungen_, of the facts of\nexperience, that organ of cognition is developed which Kant calls \u201cpure\nreason.\u201d\n\nExperience is often used to denote sense-experience only; thus Kant\ncontrasts experience or sense-perception, which he calls _a posteriori_,\nwith pure reason and formal thought, which he calls _a priori_. We use\nexperience in the sense defined above, _so as to include the formal\nelement_.\n\nI am unable to form a clear conception of Mr. Peirce\u2019s view of the _a\npriori_. Those systems of formal thought which I regard as constructions\nhe regards as products of analysis. He says, \u201cThey are results dependent\nupon the action of reason in the depths of our own consciousness.\u201d He\nonly grants that \u201ctheir abstract and distinct formulation comes very\nlate.\u201d He still holds that the _a priori_ is innate.\n\nIn my conception, mathematical ideas, like that of the contrivance of\nlogarithms, are inventions; and they are constructions as much as the\ninvention of the steam-engine by James Watt.\n\nThere is one peculiarity about the purely formal which is not found in\nthe sensory elements of experience. Our knowledge of the various spheres\nof the purely formal is of a general nature; it applies to any form of\nthe same kind. This gives system to our formal conceptions, and enables\nus to make statements which are rigidly and unequivocally determined. It\nis this quality which makes them available as an organ of cognition when\ndealing with facts of experience. They furnish us with methods, schedules\nof reference, and plans which like blanks have to be filled out.\n\nScience begins with the application of formal thought, viz., with\ncounting, measuring, and classifying. Only with the assistance of the\nformal sciences can we master the material of the sensory data of\nexperience; and thus it happens that the formal is the condition, not of\nany kind of experience, but of every systematic experience.\n\nThe formal sciences are the tools of cognition. That to which they cannot\nbe applied remains unexplained, and this is the ultimate reason why\nprocesses of nature can be regarded as explained only when recognised as\nprocesses of transformation. Cognition is the tracing of form. We can\nunderstand a change only if it is a change of form. We cannot understand\nhow anything real can disappear into, or originate out of, nothing. We\nhave no explanation for any actual increase or decrease either of matter\nor energy. Whenever we see something entirely new we regard it as a new\ncombination, the elements of which existed before.\n\nIf there were processes in the universe which could positively be proved\nnot to be transformations we should be confronted with an unfathomable\nmystery; and it is a matter of course that we must not be duped so easily\nby the appearance of problems which cannot be solved at first sight. The\nadvance of science which has resolved so many mysterious phenomena into\nplain instances of transformation gives us confidence that this method\nis the only reliable maxim of inquiry. It has helped us so far, and it\nwill help us in the future.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI call my views positivism, because like the French positivists and also\nlike Locke and his school I maintain that all knowledge is to be derived\nfrom the positive facts of experience. But my positivism is not of the\nold kind; it is neither sensationalism nor materialism nor Comtism. It is\na new positivism broadened by a study of Kantian philosophy and Kant\u2019s\nproblem of the _a priori_; and this new positivism, I hope, deserves the\nattention of the thinkers of mankind.\n\nMr. Peirce calls it a \u201cstraddling of the question,\u201d by which he means\nthat a man is \u201con both sides of the fence,\u201d and has learned so to\nformulate the issues, \u201cthat both parties can readily subscribe to his\npropositions.\u201d\n\n\n2. DETERMINISM AND FATALISM.\n\nFatalism and determinism must not be confounded. We define determinism\nas that view, according to which every event is determined by its\nconditions. The decision of a man whose liberty is not curtailed by any\ncompulsion, so that he can act as he pleases exactly in agreement with\nhis character, is determined objectively by the motive and subjectively\nby his character. A man of a certain character in a given situation will\nact in a way that is perfectly determinable.\n\nDeterminism, as I take it, does not exclude free-will. Nor does it\nexclude such chance as is, for instance, the incidental turning up of the\nvarious faces of a die.\n\nDeterminism is the basis of science, and also of ethics as a science. If\nthe decision of a free will were merely the result of chance, why should\nour teachers and preachers take so much trouble to form character?\n\nWhile determinism is a sound doctrine, fatalism is a superstition.\nFatalism excludes the idea of free will. We define fatalism as that view\nwhich regards the fate of a man, whatsoever he may do, as fixed. For\ninstance, we call the orthodox Mohammedan a fatalist; he looks at the\nflame without quenching it, because he argues, \u201cif it is Allah\u2019s will\nthat my house burn down, it will burn down, whatever I may do.\u201d\n\nIn my reply to Mr. Peirce (_The Monist_, Vol. II, p. 572) I approvingly\nquoted from him a passage containing the word \u201cfate,\u201d adding that here\n\u201cthe word \u2018fate\u2019 must be understood as Mr. Peirce understands it.\u201d In\nspite of this warning, Mr. Peirce employs this quotation made from _his_\nwritings as if it were mine, and calls attention to the inconsistency\ninvolved in the different application of the word. This charge of\ninconsistency is neither judicious nor fair!\n\nWe define \u201cnecessary\u201d as \u201cthat which is determined.\u201d\n\nDetermined means describable. Necessity is that feature of things which\nmakes it possible that we can, in proportion to our knowledge, describe\nbeforehand or predict the course of events.\n\nKant\u2019s definition of \u201cnecessary,\u201d as given in his \u201cCritique of Pure\nReason,\u201d is narrower. He says:\n\n \u201cThat the coherence of which with the real is determined\n according to universal conditions of experience is necessary,\n or exists necessarily.\u201d\n\nThis means in our phraseology, \u201cthat feature of the real which is\ndetermined by the laws of form.\u201d\n\nThe word \u201cdeterminism\u201d has been inappropriately used in the sense of\nfatalism, in which sense it has to be condemned as a superstition.\nThe term is needed, however, to denote a basic principle of great\nvalue. \u201cDeterminism,\u201d if used in the sense which the word literally\nindicates, means \u201cthat view which regards all events as determined by its\nconditions.\u201d Determinism does not mean that everything is decreed by some\nfate, that some Deity or other power has determined the course of events.\nIt means that definite conditions produce definite results, and that the\nresults can be ascertained and described, if _all_ the conditions are\nknown.\n\nFatalism is a peculiar kind of determinism, and, indeed, an obviously\nerroneous one. Fatalism rests upon a dualistic conception, regarding\nnecessity as a foreign force residing outside and above things and\ncompelling them to act in a special way. It is the Moira of the ancients\nand the Kismet of the Mohammedans. The monistic view knows nothing of\na foreign force or supermundane _fatum_ enacting a special course\nof affairs. Necessity, in the monistic conception, simply denotes\nthe determinedness of results by its conditions; it signifies that\n_Gesetzm\u00e4ssigkeit_, or regularity according to law, is a feature of\nreality. We need not repeat again that the monistic view of determinism\nexcludes neither chance nor free-will. It only excludes \u201cabsolute\u201d chance\nand that indeterminable arbitrariness which is sometimes said to be\nfree-will.\n\nIf events were not determined, if under the very same conditions the\nsame causes could bring about different results, so that no regularities\nformulable in laws existed, the world would be a chaos and no cosmos,\nabsolute chance would prevail, and science would be impossible.\n\nMr. Peirce not only confounds fate and necessity, but he also identifies\nthem with resistance, and with reality. My idea of necessity has as\nlittle to do with the experience of, reaction as, for instance, with\nthe idea of density, or with pleasure and pain. To confound such\nheterogeneous concepts must be productive of confusion. No wonder that\nMr. Peirce makes the confession that these ideas seem to him \u201cof a mixed\nnature.\u201d\n\nThat my presentation of the case of Determinism _versus_ Free-will\nresults in \u201ca doctrine to which the advocates of free-will will generally\nsubscribe as readily as their opponents,\u201d is used as a reproach; but I do\nnot take it as such, for my intention is not to side with one party, but\nto bring out the truth of both views.\n\n\n3. NATURAL LAWS, DESCRIPTIONS.\n\nMr. Peirce makes the following allegation of inconsistency. He says of me:\n\n \u201cThe declaration (\u00a7 198) that \u2018natural laws are simply a\n description of nature as nature is,\u2019 and that \u2018the facts of\n nature express the character of nature,\u2019 are nominalistic. But\n in another place (107-116) he says distinctly that uniformities\n are real.\u201d (P. 531.)\n\nI am unable to detect any inconsistency in these expressions. The gist of\nthese three statements is this: the formulas usually called natural laws\ndescribe certain uniformities of reality.\n\nThe expression \u201cdescription of nature\u201d is by no means nominalistic. If\nlaw is said to be a description, it is not a mere name, but presupposes\nthe existence of some objective reality for the description of which it\nhas been formulated.\n\n\n4. CAUSATION.\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s usage of the word \u201ccause\u201d is very unsettled. He says (p.\n538):\n\n \u201cThe original idea of an efficient cause is that of an agent,\n more or less like man.\u201d\n\nThe original idea of \u201ccause\u201d is the struggle of reaching an end or\nbringing about a certain state of things. The Latin _causa_ means \u201ca\nlawsuit.\u201d\n\nIn a similar way, the German _Ursache_ does not mean the original thing,\nbut a \u201cseeking.\u201d _Sache_ is the English _sake_ and Gothic _sakj\u00f4_,\nmeaning \u201cstruggle,\u201d or \u201cquarrel.\u201d It is derived from the same root as the\nverb \u201cto seek.\u201d\n\nLike _causa_, the word _Ursache_ was used as a legal term.\n\nMr. Peirce further states:\n\n \u201cThe modern mechanical conception, on the other hand, is\n that the relative positions of particles determine their\n accelerations at the instants when they occupy those\n positions.\u201d (P. 538.)\n\n \u201cIn dynamics, it is the fixed force, gravitation, or whatever\n else, together with those relative positions of the bodies that\n determine the intensity and direction of the forces, that is\n regarded as the cause.\u201d (P. 540.)\n\n \u201cThe practice which I endeavor to follow in regard to the\n word _cause_ is, to use it in the Aristotelian sense of an\n _efficient cause_ in all its crudeness.\u201d (P. 541.)\n\n \u201cWhen my idea is a more general and logical one, I prefer to\n speak of the explanation.\u201d (P. 541.)\n\nNo wonder that some causes are prior to their effects, others\nsimultaneous, and that effects may even be prior to their causes! Using\nthe word in various senses, Mr. Peirce becomes so entangled about\ncausation, that in mustering the ideas force, position, reason, law,\ncause, and explanation, he no longer knows which is which.\n\n * * * * *\n\nMr. Peirce being unable to bring any consistency into the usage of the\nterm \u201ccause,\u201d drops it entirely as a philosophical word. This is Dr.\nIronbeard\u2019s method, who kills his patient to save him pain.\n\nThere was a time when I felt inclined to follow that plan of dealing\nwith words in this predicament. But I found out very soon that there is\nnot one difficult word in philosophical language which is not or was not\nat some time or other almost universally maltreated by the professional\nthinkers of mankind. What, then, is to be done? Shall we eradicate all\nold terms that are erroneously used and create a philosophical Volap\u00fck,\nwhich will have the advantage of being unincumbered with the errors of a\nlong historical inheritance, but the disadvantage of being nowhere spoken\nand nowhere understood, except by its inventors?\n\nDr. Ironbeard\u2019s method of dealing with terms is radical. It imitates the\nmethod of the social reformers who, on finding something wrong in society\ngenerally, propose to tear down the entire social structure, and begin\nthe world over again from its beginning.\n\nMost of the terms which have been in use for centuries and even\nmillenniums, I have found to correspond to a special want of expressing\nsome definite reality or constant group of realities or important\nrelation among realities. The misuse of different words almost invariably\nhas its origin in a consideration of the name alone, to the neglect\nof the reality denoted by the name. And misuses can be mended only by\ncarefully investigating the realities themselves for the denotation of\nwhich the words have been invented. If we were to make a clean sweep\nof the \u201csuperstitions,\u201d soul, God, cause, natural law, etc., because\nin many minds there are superstitious notions connected with these\nideas, we should soon have to invent new terms for the realities which\nnecessitated the formation of the old ones. The great bulk of religious\nand philosophical words originated because in each case there was an\nactual want of a phrase to denote some specific reality. The errors of\nthe various terms arise because our ideas concerning the nature of these\nrealities have not as yet been matured, and it is the office of the\nphilosopher to contribute his mite toward their clarification.\n\nCausation, in my conception, is transformation. Take any system of\nconditions and let it somehow be changed. The event which starts the\nchange is called the cause, the new configuration produced, the effect.\nThe various factors of the system are the conditions or circumstances.\n\nTaking this view, I _do not say_ that the effect is the cause\ntransformed. The total effect is the cause plus all the circumstances\ntransformed. The effect is something radically different from the cause.\nThe cause is always an event, that is a motion of some kind; the effect,\na new arrangement, a new formation, a new state of things, or perhaps the\ndissolution of an old state of things.\n\nWhile cause and effect are different, the whole process of causation,\nincluding cause, circumstances, and effect, is to be viewed as one\nfact, or, rather, as one system of facts; and a process of causation is\nexplained, (as we have seen above) as soon as it is so described that we\nrecognise it as a transformation.[137]\n\nThere is a popular usage which calls the cause of the falling stone\ngravitation. This kind of cause is not an event, not a motion, but a law\nof nature, and I prefer to call it \u201cthe reason\u201d for the stone\u2019s fall.\n\nMr. Peirce defines a reason as follows:\n\n \u201cA reason, in one sense, is the replacement of a\n multiple-subject of an observational proposition by a general\n subject, which by the very conditions of the special experience\n is predicable of the multiple subject.\u201d (P. 558.)\n\nThis somewhat stilted definition seems upon the whole to agree with what\nI also call \u201ca reason.\u201d All the reasons by which we comprehend nature are\nformulated in statements which describe those general features of reality\nwhich we call \u201claws of nature.\u201d\n\nWho does not see that causes (i. e., events which produce effects) and\nreasons (i. e., the formulas by which we comprehend the uniformities of\nnature) are two radically different ideas, and who can deny that the\ndenotation of these two radically different ideas, by one and the same\nterm, must and actually does bring about lamentable confusion in the\nminds of philosophers! Accordingly, let us call them by different names;\nnever mind what we call them, but let us distinguish them. I regard the\nusage stated here as the most appropriate. We call \u201cthe cause\u201d of the\nstone\u2019s fall that event which removed its support; but when we inquire\nafter the reason why the stone falls, we want to know the law of nature\nwhich describes in a general formula that quality of stones which makes\nthem fall.\n\n\n5. THE FUTURE IN MENTAL CAUSATION.\n\nIt seems as if some evil genius had caused Mr. Peirce to cross my\nposition everywhere, even where I should expect to find him in perfect\nagreement.\n\nConcerning mental and mechanical causation he first startles me with an\nitalicised proposition which declares:\n\n \u201c_There is no mechanical truth in saying that the past\n determines the future rather than the future the past._\u201d (P.\n 539.)\n\nMr. Peirce apparently intends to discredit the belief that the past\ndetermines the future. He adds:\n\n \u201cWe continue, for convenience, to talk of mechanical phenomena\n as if they were regulated, in the same manner in which our\n intentions regulate our actions, (which is essentially a\n determination of the future by the past,) although we are quite\n aware that it is not really so.\u201d (P. 539.)\n\nIn other words, Mr. Peirce contends that our view of mechanical causation\nis based upon an analogy with mental causation; the latter being a\ndetermination of the future by the past, we conclude that the former is\nregulated in the same manner.\n\nThis is an old error which rests on the supposition that cognition begins\nwith introspection or self-knowledge. The truth is that all cognition\nbegins with objective observation.\n\nWe have to say, (1) that man\u2019s view of mechanical causation has not been\nfashioned after the model of mental causation, and (2) that the future\nactually enters as a factor in mental causation. We do not believe that\nthe future determines the past, but it does determine the present.\n\nShould we judge of the causation of mechanical motions from our own\nmental experience, we should certainly reach other conclusions than we\ndo, for the most characteristic feature of mental causation, that which\nessentially distinguishes it from mechanical causation, is the fact that\nthe future actually enters into it as the main factor.\n\nWe as rational beings, and the lower animals also on a smaller scale,\ndo know to some extent the future. We know by experience the effects of\ncertain actions. This fact of the future\u2019s being partly known, makes\nit possible for the future to enter as a factor in mental causation.\nI go so far as to maintain that there is no mental causation except\nsome consideration of the future be contained in the motive cause. The\npresence of a plan, of an end kept in view, of an aim to be reached\nin the future, is exactly what distinguishes the purposive action of\nthinking beings from mechanical events.\n\n\n6. MENTAL CAUSATION.\n\nMr. Peirce has discovered in my expositions of mechanical and mental\naction what he believes to be a flagrant contradiction, and, as if\nit were the exhibition of my scalp, displays it triumphantly (\u00a7 27)\nin capitals and italics. \u201cNo objection can be made,\u201d I said, \u201cto the\npossibility of explaining the motions ... of the brain by the laws of\nmolar and molecular mechanics.\u201d And \u201cyet the simplest psychical reflexes\ncannot be explained from mechanical or physical laws alone.\u201d\n\nIs this really a contradiction, or is it Mr. Peirce\u2019s inability to\ndiscover the agreement between the two statements? Let us see.\n\nTake a little toy fish of tin with a small iron rod in its snout,\nfloating in the water, and push the fish so that it shoots forward with\na certain velocity in a straight line. Now take a magnet and hold it at\na short distance from the prolonged path of the fish. The fish at once\nchanges its course; it now describes a curve which according to the\nlaws of mechanics is determined (omitting any other possible modifying\ncircumstances) by the momentum of the push, the velocity of which is\ngradually diminished by the friction of the water, and the attraction of\nthe magnet. These are the data, and from these data the motion of the\nfish is unequivocally determined by the laws of mechanics.\n\nNow, when we speak of the motion of the fish, we mean the motion, and\nnot the iron rod, or the qualities of the iron rod, in its snout. While\nspeaking of motion or the laws of motion, and while calculating the curve\nof a motion, our ideas move in a perfectly defined sphere of abstraction\nfrom which all other things and considerations are excluded. This method\nof abstraction which is the essence of human thought and also of that\nspecial kind of human thought called science, is the way by which alone\nwe are enabled to arrive at clear distinctions and lucid explanations. We\nhave to keep our various abstractions stored in an orderly manner in our\nmind, each one in a special box. If we do not distinguish the different\nspheres of abstraction and their limits, we shall soon confound all\nissues in a hopeless chaos.\n\nBut we find, on further examination, that in this limitation of the\ndescription to the abstract sphere of pure motion only a part of\nthe process before us is described. The description explains fully,\nexhaustively, and satisfactorily the mechanical aspect of the case, but\nit does not explain why the magnet attracts iron. The attraction of\nthe magnet consists in the definite qualities of (1) the magnet, (2)\nthe iron, and (3) the medium between them. When we inquire after an\nexplanation of the physical qualities of things, we enter into another\nsphere of abstraction, viz., that of physics. That physics will have\nto be explained as a domain of molecular mechanics may be mentioned\nincidentally.\n\nTake another and simpler instance: the fall of a stone. The motion of\nthe stone, its increasing velocity during the fall can be explained\naccording to the laws of mechanics; but that quality of the stone called\ngravity, which is the reason of its fall, cannot be deduced from the laws\nof mechanics. The gravity of a mass is treated in mechanics as the given\nfact or datum, an investigation into the nature of which is excluded from\nthe sphere of mechanics. He who demands of mechanics an explanation of\ngravity searches in the wrong box.\n\nWhen we come to the investigation of psychical phenomena, we strike a\nfeature which is entirely absent in mechanics, physics, and chemistry.\nIt is the appearance of feeling. Feelings vary according to the various\nimpressions made by surrounding objects. The same objects making the\nsame impressions, special kinds of feelings come to stand for or to\nrepresent their respective kinds of objects, and thus feelings acquire\nmeaning, feelings become ideas. This peculiarity of sentiency, that it\nhas acquired meaning, is the characteristic feature of \u201cmind.\u201d\n\nWhen speaking of mind I refer to all those phenomena of meaning-freighted\nfeelings which ensoul thinking beings; and the domain of psychology is\nthus again quite a distinct domain of abstraction.\n\nNow let us return to the contradiction of which Mr. Peirce accuses me.\n\nAn idea which physiologically considered is a special brain-structure or\ncombination of brain-structures, reacts upon a given stimulus, which, let\nus say, is the sound of a certain word. The word is a sound-symbol and\nthe word possesses a certain meaning. The word spoken having the same\nmeaning as a special idea that is thought, while its brain-structure is\nagitated, possesses a quality comparable to chemical affinities. This\npeculiar word will serve as a stimulus for this peculiar idea. It will\nnot (at least not directly) stimulate other ideas\u2014as little as a chemical\nthat has no affinity for the ingredients of another chemical will cause a\nreaction. Why the motion takes place calls for a psychical explanation,\nbut the motion itself takes place in strict accord with the laws of\nmechanics.\n\nBut are not the laws of mechanics annulled by the laws of physics, and\nthose of physiology by the laws of psychology?\n\nNo, they are not annulled, but modified.\n\nA piece of iron that falls to the ground with the same velocity as a\nstone of equal weight will be held up by a magnet strong enough to hold\nit. This is not an annulment of the gravity of the iron; it is not a\nreversion of the law of gravitation; gravitation holds in this case as\ngood as in any other. It is only a modification and a complication. We\nmust remember that the law of gravity does not say, the non-supported\npiece of iron or stone will drop, it says that all bodies are attracted\nby the earth with a definite force depending upon their mass and\nposition. And this attraction takes place in our example; the iron\nsupported by the magnet retains all its inherent gravity, which is\nconstantly asserting itself, although counteracted by the force of the\nattraction of the magnet.\n\nSince the mechanical, chemical, psychical, etc. qualities represent\nreality in various abstract aspects, we should know that there are no\npurely mechanical, no purely chemical, no purely psychical phenomena.\nEvery real phenomenon, i. e. the original whole from which the\nabstractions have been made, presents a complex state of things of which\nmany various aspects can and must be taken.\n\nI repeat now without fear of contradiction or miscomprehension,\nthat brain-motions are perfectly explainable by the laws of molar\nand molecular mechanics, while psychical reflexes, not being purely\nmechanical processes, cannot be explained by mechanical laws. The\nproperly psychical and the properly mental are other elements of an\nentirely different nature from the mechanical and the physical. They\nbelong to a radically different sphere of abstraction. He who tries to\nexplain the psychical by the mechanical, looks for his explanation in the\nwrong box. And he who regards the proposition that the mechanical laws\nhold good for all motions without any exception, but that they cannot be\ncalled upon to explain that which is not motion, as a contradiction, has\nnot as yet learned practically to apply the method of abstraction.\n\nIt is strange that we have to give this little lesson in the elements\nof abstraction lore to so prominent a logician as Mr. Peirce. We feel\ninclined to exclaim: \u201cArt thou a master of Israel and knowest not these\nthings?\u201d\n\n\nSTRAY SHOTS.\n\nThere are a number of incidental comments aimed at scattered points of\nmy position. I call them \u201cstray shots\u201d; they have exploded without harm.\nWhile going over the battle-field I shall pick them up and will throw\nsome of them back into Mr. Peirce\u2019s camp, whence they came.\n\nMr. Peirce is in the habit of calling every approach to his views \u201cdeep,\u201d\nwhile divergencies are branded as \u201cshallow.\u201d\u2014\n\nHume\u2019s scepticism is called Leibnitz\u2019s principle, by which latter Mr.\nPeirce apparently means that innumerable single cases of experience\nalone do not constitute certainty. Why Mr. Peirce demands that Hume\u2019s\nconclusion which Leibnitz never would have countenanced, should be\nidentified with Leibnitz\u2019s principle from which it is derived is not\napparent.\u2014\n\nHow easily Mr. Peirce changes his opinion! Venn\u2019s \u201cLogic of Chance,\u201d\nwhich Mr. Peirce so much admired formerly, has become \u201ca blundering\nlittle book.\u201d\u2014\n\nSynechism and agapasticism, viz., the principle of continuity and the\nidea of love as main factors of evolution are nothing new. I have\nalways defended them, although not in the peculiar way that Mr. Peirce\ndoes.[138] In his article \u201cEvolutionary Love\u201d he appears to me unjust\ntoward Darwin. I do not think that I should improve my propositions,\nwhich are in their way synechistic as well as agapastic, by adopting\neither Mr. Peirce\u2019s terms or his presentation of these principles.\u2014\n\nMr. Peirce says, he does not doubt that my idea of mental causation was\nintended to be an improvement on his molecular theory of protoplasm. I\ncan assure Mr. Peirce that I had no such intentions. I held my view long\nbefore I ever had a chance of knowing Mr. Peirce\u2019s molecular theory of\nprotoplasm. Moreover, I am unable to discover any similarity between his\nviews and mine.\u2014\n\nI took pains to explain that, if we disregard the notion of form, every\ntransformation, that is, every case of causation, will appear as a most\nmiraculous and inexplicable event. To illustrate my view I said that\n\u201c_supposing we had no idea of the laws of form or only an incoherent and\nfragmentary knowledge of them_,\u201d it would be \u201ca very wonderful thing\u201d\nthat two congruent regular tetrahedrons when put together will form a\nhexahedron\u2014a body which is something new. And I added to this statement,\n\u201c_but the laws of form do perfectly and satisfactorily explain it_.\u201d\nHow great was my astonishment to see Mr. Peirce with great complacency\ntake up the problem and explain it! Indeed, it is true. That the\ncombination of two congruent regular tetrahedrons will make a hexahedron,\nis wonderful _only_ to him who does not understand the laws of form.\nOtherwise, it is not wonderful. I was amused at Mr. Peirce\u2019s ingenuity to\nprove to me that it is a case of 8-2=6.\u2014\n\nThere is a difference between the combination of two tetrahedrons and\nof the atoms _H\u2082O_. Mr. Peirce tells me, that the one is ideal, the\nother real\u2014\u201ca difference which to his Scotistic mind is very important.\u201d\nDid Mr. Peirce think, indeed, that I was not aware of this difference,\nor does he mean to establish a rule never to compare the relations as\ndeveloped in the sciences of pure forms to the relations that obtain in\nreality?\u2014\n\nSays Mr. Peirce in one passage, there is a difference between the ideal\nand the real, which to his Scotistic mind is very important. In another\npassage he declares that \u201cthe nominalist alone makes a sharp distinction\nbetween the abstract and the concrete.\u201d\u2014\n\nMr. Peirce smiles at the endeavor of reconciling religion with science.\nFor he thinks:\n\n \u201cIt is a thing which will come to pass of itself when time is\n ripe, and that our efforts to hasten it have just that slight\n effect that our efforts to hasten the ripening of apples on a\n tree may have.\u201d (P. 545.)\n\nMr. Peirce forgets that the religious fruits of the conciliation between\nreligion and science are our own sentiments. He who says that man should\nbe indifferent about working out the truth, on the plea that truth will\ntake care of itself, is comparable to the apple-tree, that refuses to\nwork out the ripening of the apples. The proposition to let religion and\nscience work out their destinies, one of which is their mutual agreement,\nof themselves, is irreligious and also unscientific. Truth will not take\ncare of itself if we do not strain all our efforts to find truth; and the\nkingdom of heaven will never come unless (as Christ taught, Matt. 11, 12)\n\u201cit suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force.\u201d\u2014\n\nThe same Mr. Peirce who says that our efforts to hasten the conciliation\nof religion with science are useless, believes in miracles and proposes a\ntheory that prayer can work miracles.\u2014\n\nSeveral philosophers, such as Locke and Hegel, have complained of the\nuselessness of the logical law of identity _A_ = _A_, and also of its\nbarrenness for any practical purpose. The law of identity has been\ninvented nevertheless, because there is a want for it; and this want, in\nmy opinion, was felt because the statement of sameness (as set forth in\n_The Monist_, Vol. III, p. 70, et seqq.) is one of the most elementary\nand important forms of reasoning, being indispensable, for instance, in\nmathematics where it appears as equations. We may simply laugh at the old\nlogicians\n\n \u201cWho whirl in narrow circling trails,\n Like kittens playing with their tails.\u201d\n\nWe may impatiently discard the whole proceeding as empty talk, yet\nI submit that we had better try to understand the meaning of their\nunprofitable exertions and the drift of their apparently meaningless\nargumentations. If we regard the principle of absolute identity as the\nformula of sameness (in the sense explained in the quoted passage, _The\nMonist_, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 70, et seqq.) emptied of its contents we\nshall understand why logicians wasted so much energy on an entirely\nbarren subject. We shall readily condone their mistakes in consideration\nof the importance of the subject. It is difficult to say how much we have\nprofited by their blunders.\u2014\n\nMr. Peirce uses the terms analytical and synthetical in a new sense for\nreasons which he explains at greater length in his \u201cTheory of Probable\nInferences.\u201d He says, \u201canalytical reasoning depends upon associations\nof similarity; synthetical reasoning upon associations of contiguity.\u201d\nI willingly grant to the scientist and the philosopher the liberty to\nchange the historical meaning of terms if the traditional usage is\nnot helpful in our dealings with the facts which they were invented to\ndescribe. However, we must not change a term without good and sufficient\nreasons. In the present case, I still prefer the traditional usage of the\nterms \u201canalytical\u201d and \u201csynthetic.\u201d\u2014\n\nMr. Peirce takes the liberty of changing terms for himself, but he\nresents it in others.\u2014\n\nMr. Peirce disapproves of the usage of the word \u201cconstruction\u201d in the\nsense of systems of formal thought, such as the decimal system, etc.,\netc. \u201cBecause,\u201d he says, \u201cthe word is imperatively required in the\ntheory of cognition to denote a mathematical diagram framed according to\na general precept.\u201d On the strength of this argument we might as well\ndisapprove of calling churches, mosques, houses, cottages, or any kind of\nedifice, \u201cbuilding,\u201d because the word \u201cbuilding\u201d is imperatively required\nto denote business-buildings.\u2014\n\nMr. Peirce says that according to my statement (in \u00b6 163) \u201cevery element\nof compulsion is to be excluded from the conception of necessity.\u201d Having\nnever made such a statement, I looked up the passage, which is the last\nbut one paragraph in _The Monist_, Vol. III, No. 1, page 86, and find\nthat Mr. Peirce must have misread the sentence, \u201ccompulsion excludes\nfree will, and necessity does not,\u201d which, of course, has an entirely\ndifferent meaning.\u2014\n\nMr. Peirce identifies evolution with real growth, regarding it as opposed\nto the law of the conservation of energy. He regards everything as a\nproduct of such growth, or _Erzeugung_, and adds, \u201cI fancy it is this\ncautious reflectiveness of my procedure which especially displeases Dr.\nCarus.\u201d Mr. Peirce does not use the word \u201cbold.\u201d He says, \u201ccautious\nreflectiveness.\u201d\u2014\n\nI did not say that causation is to be explained from the law of the\nconservation of matter and energy. I said (_The Monist_, Vol. II, No.\n4, p. 566) that the law of the conservation of matter and energy throws\nlight upon the problem of causation. The law of the conservation of\nmatter and energy and the law of causation describe the same thing under\ntwo different aspects. If we understand the one, it will help us to\nunderstand the other.\u2014\n\nKant\u2019s chapter on the Architectonic of Pure Reason is well known to me,\nbut I think that Kant was possessed of a peculiar love of architectonic\nwhich has contributed not a little to rendering the system of his\nphilosophy unnecessarily labyrinthine.\u2014\n\nIt is surprising to find a man whom I always regarded as a Kant scholar\nof first degree saying that \u201cKant makes space a necessary form of\nthought.\u201d Now, as a matter of fact, Kant does not make space a form of\n_thought_, but of _Anschauung_ or intuition. We cannot understand Kant\nunless we understand this distinction.[139]\u2014\n\nKant conceives of causation as a necessary sequence. Mill, who objects to\nthe idea of necessity, replaces Kant\u2019s words \u201cuniversal\u201d and \u201cnecessary\u201d\nby \u201cinvariable\u201d and \u201cunconditioned,\u201d a substitution which was made with\nthe outspoken intention of radically changing the meaning of the phrase.\nMill\u2019s terms are _not_ \u201cmore exact,\u201d as Mr. Peirce says, but different.\nThey are worse than less exact to a Kantian, and can appear more exact\nonly to those who take Mill\u2019s view, which is nominalistic. And this\nsubstitution of Mill\u2019s is regarded by realistic Mr. Peirce as a mere\n\u201crewording of Kant\u2019s definition\u201d!\u2014\n\nMr. Peirce makes too much of the idea of \u201c_Erzeugung_, which,\u201d as he\ncorrectly says, \u201cis Kant\u2019s word for the sequence of effect from cause.\u201d\nYet Kant\u2019s idea of _Erzeugung_ does not conflict with \u201cthe modern\nmechanical doctrine.\u201d Kant says in that very same chapter, \u201c_Aller\nWechsel (Succession) der Erscheinungen ist nur Ver\u00e4nderung_,\u201d i. e., \u201cAll\nchange (succession) of phenomena is only transformation.\u201d (!) Does not\nMr. Peirce know that Kant calls every world-conception that stands in\ncontradiction to the mechanical principle \u201ca philosophy of indolence,\u201d or\n\u201c_faule Weltweisheit_\u201d?\u2014\n\nThe same Kant who proposed a mechanical explanation of the evolution of\nthe starry heavens, objected very strongly to that kind of explanations\n\u201cwhich derive all order from chance\u201d; and speaking of Epicurus\u2019s\n\u201cabsolute chance\u201d(!) he adds: \u201cEpicurus was even so reckless (_so\nunversch\u00e4mt_) as to demand that the atoms should deviate from their\nstraight course without any cause.\u201d Mr. Peirce has either overlooked in\nKant these passages, or, if he has read them, he has never taken them to\nheart.\u2014\n\nMr. Peirce objects to my statement that according to his philosophy the\ndomain of mind is characterised by absence of law. He argues: \u201cIs not one\nof my papers entitled \u2018The Law of Mind?\u2019\u201d Yet this law of mind, he states\ntwo lines further on, \u201crequires its own violation.\u201d (P. 552.)\u2014\n\nThe \u201csporting\u201d of the primeval chance, Mr. Peirce says on page 552\nof this number, is \u201cnot undetermined and indeterminable,\u201d because\n\u201cits ultimate result must be an entire elimination of chance from the\nuniverse.\u201d Shall we understand that the \u201carbitrary sporting\u201d of the\nprimeval chaos, with which Mr. Peirce (according to _The Monist_, Vol. I,\nNo. 2, p. 175) begins his cosmogony, was determined? If absolute chance\nis determined, why not call such a philosophy \u201cdetermined Indeterminism\u201d?\nWe try hard to understand Mr. Peirce, but sometimes we really have to\ngive it up.\u2014\n\nPhysiology teaches that memory alone changes feeling into consciousness,\nbut the consciousness of Mr. Peirce\u2019s original Chance is without memory\nand habit.\u2014\n\nChance, a being living and conscious, has, according to Mr. Peirce,\ncreated the world, but the ultimate result of evolution must be an\nentire elimination of Chance from the universe. Thus it appears that the\ncreation of the world is an act of divine suicide. The world-process is a\nslow degeneration of God, finally ending in his complete annihilation.\n\n\nRETROSPECT.\n\nIn summing up the result of the whole battle, we find that there is not\na single question on which we have to yield or even modify our position.\nOur position remains the same, while Mr. Peirce\u2019s position has become\nglaringly untenable. There is one point, however, in which justice\ndemands that we should recognise that he is right. I should not have\ncalled Hamilton \u201cMr.,\u201d but \u201cSir William.\u201d I can, however, assure Mr.\nPeirce that this mistake of mine (which in all my allusions to Hamilton\noccurs only once) was a mere slip of the pen; it was not ignorance on my\npart and still less was it any disregard of the rules of politeness.\n\nWe are obliged to reject the favorite ideas of Mr. Peirce, and have only\nto add that our esteem for him has not been lessened, in spite of all\ndisagreements, and notwithstanding the flaws we have detected in his\nreasoning. On the contrary, our admiration for him as a dialectitian\nhas been greatly increased, for, in truth, we have never before seen\npropositions so untenable in their nature, so odd and almost bizarre, as\nthose of \u201cabsolute chance,\u201d of \u201cmatter as effete mind,\u201d of \u201cfeeling as\nbeing the inner aspect of chance,\u201d and of \u201creal growth as opposed to the\nconservation of energy,\u201d defended with greater adroitness.\n\nMr. Peirce is unusually familiar with certain branches of learning, of\nwhich he has made a specialty, and also with general philosophy; but he\nhas original ideas, and he prizes them too highly. Where he makes no use\nof his originality, he does extraordinarily good Work. Thus, most of his\npapers on logic, published in sundry magazines, are, in their critical\nas well as constructive parts, strictly scientific and almost free from\napocryphal speculations. Only slight hints in them have been a puzzle to\nme and other readers of his essays. Of late, however, Mr. Peirce has come\nout more explicitly with his peculiar philosophy, and we regret to say\nthat the more he allows his original ideas to enter into his thoughts,\nthe more warped are his theories.\n\nWhile we regard Mr. Peirce\u2019s original ideas as erroneous, we must\nsay that they are nevertheless highly interesting and stimulating.\nHis propositions are presented so vigorously, so attractively, so\nbrilliantly, that while perusing his articles, we find them remarkably\nsuggestive; we enjoy them as we do poetry. They read like a romance of\nthe origin of the world or a fairy-tale of metaphysics.\n\nMr. Peirce\u2019s views should receive the consideration of all earnest\nstudents of philosophy; for he goes to the root of its main problems, and\nhis very errors are instructive.\n\n EDITOR.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[125] Kepler\u2019s scheme is, that all the regular solids, icosahedron,\ndodecahedron, octohedron, tetrahedron, and cube should be placed one\nwithin the other at such distances that spheres could be described\nbetween them so as to touch the corners of each respective interior and\nthe planes of each respective exterior solid. He found, by placing the\nsun in the centre and allowing the planets to move in great circles on\nthe spheres, (making the circle between the icosahedron and dodecahedron\nequal to the orbit of the earth,) that then the distances between the\nplanets would, upon the whole, agree with astronomical observations.\n\nThis theory is as ingenious, as fascinating, and as original as Mr.\nPeirce\u2019s propositions. It has only one little fault; it does not agree\nwith facts. And Kepler afterwards abandoned his original theory.\n\n[126] Like Mr. Peirce, Kepler had, in his days, too, thought of the\npossibility of making the world evolve from chance. When, in 1604, a new\nand brilliant fixed star suddenly appeared in Ophiuchos, he took up the\nproblem of star-evolution. We will let Kepler tell the story in his own\nwords as it appears in his treatise on the new star:\n\n\u201cYesterday, while pondering over the problem, I was called to dinner, and\nmy young wife served the salad. \u2018Do you think,\u2019 I asked her, \u2018if since\nthe origin of creation, pewter platters, salad leaves, oil and vinegar,\nand also hard-boiled eggs had been flying in a chaotic mixture through\nspace that _Chance_ would have been able to collect them to-day in a\nsalad?\u2019 \u2018Certainly not in such a good mixture as this is,\u2019 was the reply\nof my beautiful wife.\u201d\n\nKepler rejected the idea that the world could have evolved by chance.\n\n[127] The philosophical articles of the _Century Dictionary_ do not\nseem to be free of party spirit. An extraordinary amount of praise is\ngiven to the medi\u00e6val realists which, considering the vagaries of their\npropositions, they do not deserve. On the other hand, the blame for\nthe discredit into which scholasticism has fallen is heaped upon the\nnominalists.\n\n[128] I said in _Fundamental Problems_, page 142, \u201cThe introduction of\nthe word positivism into philosophy is the merit of M. Auguste Comte.\nAlthough we cannot accept much of M. Comte\u2019s conception of positivism\nwe gratefully adopt the name.\u201d There are plenty of other passages in\nwhich my usage of the term positivism, as distinguished from the French\npositivism, is set forth, so that there could be little danger of being\nmisunderstood.\n\n[129] My main objection to the term Absolute is to forestall any\nhypostatising of a vague abstract notion which can only serve the purpose\nof mystification. I suffer the term Absolute in a loose sense when it is\nunderstood that it is used loosely. I do not say, as Mr. Peirce seems\nto believe, \u201cabsolutely universal\u201d or \u201cabsolutely necessary.\u201d The words\nuniversal and necessary are sufficiently significant to me without any\nadditional emphasis.\n\nReality is relative throughout. Absolute existences are, if the term is\ntaken seriously, nonentities; and the expression \u201cThe Absolute\u201d for the\nwhole of existence or for those features of existence which are universal\nand necessary is, to say the least, misleading. These are my reasons for\nrejecting the Absolute as a philosophical term. There is, of course,\nno objection to the term in chemistry, physics, mathematics, and other\nsciences, where it has acquired technical meanings.\n\n[130] Mr. Peirce correctly says that the axioms of geometry are now\nexploded. This, however, does not overthrow the reliability of formal\nmathematics; on the contrary, it places it on a safer basis than that of\nunprovable assumptions, which must be taken for granted.\n\nWe look upon the whole system of geometry as a _product of mental\noperations_. We perform some operations and note what their products are.\nWe do something and mind the consequences of what we do. The problem\nof modern geometry is to invent a method by which we can construct in\nthe simplest manner possible a straight line and a plane. Euclid still\npresupposes the existence of the plane and assumes it to be such that\nparallel lines do not meet. When we are able to construct the plane of\nEuclidean geometry, we can dispense with the axiom of parallels, for, in\nthat case, the plane will possess the qualities it has by construction.\nWe can very well execute other constructions in which parallel lines\npossess other qualities, and we shall on the basis of such an altered\nplan of operation be able to produce entirely different systems of\ngeometry.\n\nWe must distinguish between the space of our mathematicians and real\nspace. Experience teaches us that real space has three dimensions\nwhich means that from a given point every other point is determinable\nby three magnitudes. We might doubt (although I think there is little\noccasion to do so) whether the real space of our experience is truly\nthree-dimensional, but we cannot doubt that the truths developed in the\none-dimensional system of numbers, in the two-dimensional system of plane\ngeometry, in the three-dimensional system of solid geometry, and also in\n_n_-dimensional systems each in their respective domain are perfectly\nreliable, for they are unequivocally determined, they are _eindeutig\nbestimmt_. There is no application of the theory of probabilities in a\nfield where the products are not due to chance but result with certainty.\n\n[131] I wonder why the _Century Dictionary_ does not mention the\nscholastic usage of the word _univocus_ as the root of univocal.\nSimilarly we are not told that the word _incompossibilitas_ is an\ninvention of the schoolmen. Duns Scotus, Mr. Peirce\u2019s favorite\nphilosopher, uses the terms _univoce_ and _incompossibilitas_ freely.\n\n[132] We accept in this argument Mr. Peirce\u2019s solutions, which, however,\nare his own. A simpler example would have been more appropriate.\n\n[133] The belief in a duality of truth appears quite rational from the\ndualistic standpoint of the middle ages, and the arguments of Scotus are\ncleverly devised, being based upon the supposition that the fall of man\nhad changed the entire order of the world, so that the laws of nature\nprior to the Fall were different to those which obtain now.\n\n[134] Duns Scotus was a very zealous advocate of ecclesiastical\nsupremacy, even advising, for instance, the prosecution of the Jews in\norder to convert them. It is a strange irony of fate that the author of\nthe _Fons vit\u00e6_, upon whose authority Scotus so largely depends and from\nwhom he derived some of his most important ideas was an Israelite. Scotus\ndid not know that Avicebron was a pseudonym of the Spanish Jew Salomon\nben Gebirol.\n\n[135] I omit here a discussion as to whether or not the conservation\nof energy is true or not. I need not mention that the views of our\nphysicists, such men as Helmholtz, Mach, Maxwell, Tait, and others differ\nwidely from Mr. Peirce\u2019s presentation of the subject. Mr. Peirce rejects\nthe law of the conservation of energy, but retains the conservation,\nor (as he prefers to say) perduration of matter. I waive the question,\nwhether this is consistent, and call attention only to another, most\nflagrant contradiction. Mr. Peirce states that, \u201cnot only the total\namount [of matter] remains constant, but all the different parts preserve\ntheir identity\u201d; and yet he says that \u201cmatter is effete mind.\u201d Thus when\nmind becomes effete, the amount of matter increases; however, when the\nhabits of matter are broken up, mind originates, and the amount of matter\ndecreases. This, it seems, would make any perduration of matter and of\nthe identity of its different parts impossible.\n\n[136] That my view of the _a priori_, as Mr. Peirce claims, is\n\u201cSchleiermacherian\u201d is new to me.\n\n[137] It is a matter of course that frequently several events co\u00f6perate\nto bring about an effect. In that case we have our choice, either to\nspeak of several causes, or to treat the co\u00f6peration of all of them as\n_the_ cause, or to select one of them to be called the cause, while the\nothers may be counted among the conditions.\n\nThe limitation of a system of causation depends entirely upon the purpose\nof our inquiry, and we must here, as in many other things, use discretion.\n\nMr. Peirce concludes, that according to my view of causation we can,\nin a relatively uniform motion, such as the flight of a cannon ball,\nregard the motion of every moment as the cause for the motion of the\nnext moment. I say \u201crelatively,\u201d for absolutely uniform motion does not\nexist. I grant this, but I do not grant what Mr. Peirce regards as a\ncontradiction of mine, that in that case the cause would be equal to the\neffect. A man who knows the artifices of the hair-splitting Eleates and\nthe other conundrums of logic, should know that every second of time is\ndifferent from every other second; 12 o\u2019clock is different from 1 second\npast 12. He who denies this, has only to miss a train in order to be\nconverted. And how much more different than the moments of time are the\nvarious moments of real motion, for in every moment the moving body is in\nanother place, with changed relations; and if that does not constitute a\ndifference, we should have to deny the existence of motion.\n\n[138] See my article on \u201cThe Continuity of Evolution\u201d in _The Monist_,\nVol. II, No 1; and also \u201cMonism and Meliorism,\u201d p. 73, where \u201cthe\nstruggle for the ideal\u201d is contrasted with \u201cthe struggle for life.\u201d\n\n[139] For details see, in _The Monist_, Vol. II, No. 4, page 518, et\nseqq., and 527, et seqq., my articles, \u201cMr. Spencer on the Ethics of\nKant,\u201d heading iv, and \u201cWhat Does Anschauung Mean?\u201d\n\nI now forgive Mr. Spencer; for if a Kant scholar like Mr. Peirce can\nfall into this unpardonable mistake, why should not Mr. Spencer, whose\nknowledge of Kant\u2019s writings is, as he confesses himself, extremely\nlimited, have the same privilege?\n\n\n\n\nTHE FOUNDATIONS OF THEISM.\n\n\nI. THE REALISM OF THEISM.\n\nIt is commonly alleged that there is deeply seated in the human mind\na belief in the existence of a supreme being, and that the prevalence\nof such belief is evidence that it has a basis in supernatural\nrevelation. It is urged in reply to this assertion, that this belief\nis not universal, and that in any case its presence cannot be regarded\nas satisfactory evidence that is well founded. It is known that the\ndisposition to worship is aroused by grand and beautiful objects; and as\nDarwin well remarks in one of his letters, the natural sentiments of the\nsublime and the beautiful easily assume a personal direction. Scientific\nexplanations, moreover, push a personal source of things ever further\nfrom us, and it is becoming apparently more easy to doubt or deny any\nsuch source whatever.\n\nPrevalent human instincts and intuitions are, however, the result of\nexperience imperfectly or perfectly digested, as the case may be.\nIn most instances they yield to analysis something of value. A more\nplausible explanation of the theistic instinct is the anthropomorphic\none. Man knows that he originates many movements, both of his own body\nand of other material things, and he knows of no other real source of\nsuch movements. He therefore, in his primitive state, before scientific\nexplanations are attained, naturally refers motions in nature to an\noriginal personal source. This, it may be supposed, is the natural habit\nof the unsophisticated mind, and is at the bottom of theistic belief,\nwhether as unexplained in consciousness, and therefore an instinct, or\nas a distinctly formulated belief. The phenomena of nature must have\noriginated somehow, and there is no other conceivable source of motion\nthan a personal one.\n\nFacts developed by scientific research tend to weaken this\nanthropomorphism. The indestructibility of matter means that it has never\nbeen created. The conservation of energy states that matter has always\nbeen in motion. The law of organic evolution is supposed to do away with\nthe necessity for creative intervention in the origination of plants\nand animals. Finally, the observed facts of the evolution of mind show\nthat this, the light of the world, grew like the organic beings which\nit inhabits. Nothing higher than man has been found, and there seems to\nbe no ground for suspecting the existence of any higher mind. And man\nhimself dies and undergoes dissolution, like other organic bodies. The\nresult of this use of the facts of science is agnosticism, at least. We\nknow of nothing beyond what they teach, and some agnostics go so far as\nto say, \u201cignorabimus,\u201d we shall never know. Agnostics, however, have\ntheir faces set in different directions. Some rest in it as a relief\nfrom mental toil, as persons more theologically inclined join a church.\nOthers, believers in the progressive evolution of knowledge as of other\nphenomena, set themselves to explore the unknown country, believing that\nour opportunities in this direction are practically unlimited.\n\nLet us look again at this anthropomorphism which is so deeply seated and\nso widely spread. Its essence is the fact that we control our own bodies\nin a great degree and that our material organs obey the behests of our\nmind. We do things for, to us, satisfactory reasons, and for satisfactory\nreasons we leave many things undone, which we could readily do. What has\nscience done towards explaining this most ordinary phenomenon? We may\ntruthfully say, absolutely nothing. It remains a fact that a majority, if\nnot all animals, move their bodies in their entirety or in part, because\nthey have sensations. In the lower animals these sensations are merely\neither sense-impressions from without, or they are from within, being\nproduced by their physical condition. We rise but little in the scale,\nwhen effects of memory are evident, for we find that many actions are\ndue to experience of the result of former actions. With still higher\ndevelopment, mental organisation becomes more apparent, and the reasoning\nand emotional states have more and more distinct outcome in intelligent\nacts. But the mechanism by which the act is called forth by the mental\nstate, has never been explained.\n\nThe difficulty lies here. A sensation, or a state of mind, weighs\nnothing. A material body, let it be a cell or a mass of cells, as a\nmuscle, weighs something. How then can the former move the latter? From a\nmechanical point of view, it cannot be done. For that which has no weight\nto set in motion anything which has weight, is to violate the law of the\nconservation and correlation of energy. And this law is not only an _a\npriori_ necessity, but it has been demonstrated _a posteriori_ in so many\ncases that exceptions cannot be thought of. So a school of physiologists\nsay that _it is not done_. No animal eats because it is hungry, or drinks\nbecause it is thirsty. The man does not direct the muscle of his arm when\nhe writes, nor those of his tongue when he speaks. But it is easy to see\nwhy such a school of physiologists includes but an infinitesimal part of\nmankind.\n\nThere is a school of evolutionists who account for the whole matter\nin harmony with the views of the physiologists above mentioned. I\nrefer to the Post-Darwinians, who account for evolution by natural\nselection exclusively. That is, animals originally moved aimlessly\nin all directions. Those whose movements were beneficial to them,\nsurvived, while those whose movements were not beneficial, or which were\ninjurious, perished. As frequent motions in a given direction lead to\nhabits, so were inaugurated movements which were habitually beneficial\nto the actors, which have therefore persisted and multiplied. Thus were\nestablished the multifarious habits of animals and men. Consciousness had\nnothing to do with the process. It merely acted the part of the onlooker,\nbeing simply aware of what went on. \u201cLike the locomotive whistle,\u201d says\nHuxley, \u201cit made considerable noise, but did none of the work.\u201d\n\nTo a person familiar with the facts of the evolution of the structures of\nanimals, this seems like a most inadequate theory. It is a commonplace\nthat no kind of selection, either artificial or natural, ever originated\nanything. Selection simply selects between existing alternatives. The\nfundamental question of evolution is, What is the origin of things?\nWhat is the fate of things originated? is a secondary question. To\nthis first question the Post-Darwinian reply must be, that everything\npossible has originated no one knows yet how, so that what has survived\nwas necessarily to be found in this _embarras de richesse_. This is an\nenormous assumption, and one to which the history of the life of past\nand present ages lends no support. No such multifarious and promiscuous\nvariation is known to have occurred in living or in extinct organic\nbeings. But if the variations have not been infinite, then the chance of\nthe existing one having been hit upon becomes greatly reduced, and the\nchance of its having occurred at the same time in individuals of opposite\nsex is still smaller. Finally, the chance of its not being immediately\nbred out by the overwhelming numbers of individuals not possessing it, is\nindeed infinitesimal. In fact, it is evident that variations of structure\nmust have appeared in numbers of individuals of a species at the same\ntime, in order to secure survival. This indicates a common cause of\ngeneral application. That such causes have existed and been effective\nat all periods of past and present time is amply proved by the facts\nof geology and paleontology. The most influential in effecting change\nof form and structure has been the motion of the body and of its parts\nnecessary to secure its food, to defend or protect itself from dangers,\nand to reproduce its kind. The direct mechanical effects of these motions\non all the materials of the body may be traced in the successive stages\nof the forms of past ages to those of the present time.\n\nThe objections above made to the theory of multifarious variation of\norganic forms, apply with equal force to the theory of multifarious\nmovements of organic beings as furnishing the source of intelligent\nhabits. An additional and especial objection to the latter hypothesis\nis the fact that it does not recognise the well-known adaptability of\nanimals to new situations and circumstances. If the events of life were\na routine moving with mathematical precision, the theory of origin from\nmultifarious variations would have a better foundation; but this is not\nthe case. Food, friends, and enemies do not appear in stated periods,\nquantities, or qualities. Emergencies are common, and variation of\ncircumstance is the rule. Without sensation, uniform habits would but\nlead to destruction. Everything which should not be presented in the\nhabitual form and at the habitual time would be neglected. Food and\ndrink would be refused, or not obtained; defense and reproduction would\nnot be attempted under the proper conditions. In fact, the conduct of\nliving beings would be no more intelligent than that of inorganic matter\nin motion, were sensation to have no share in the process. But as soon\nas we believe that the habits of animals are due to hunger, thirst,\nand the perception of temperature, resistance, etc., their acts become\nintelligible, and the formation of habits becomes a necessary consequence\nof memory or the faculty of subsequent recognition of sensations\nexperienced at a previous time.\n\nIt is, in this connection, of great interest to recall the diverse\neffects on our mental history of sense-impressions, as compared with\nthe effect of thought. Sense-impressions are not remembered in the\nproper sense of the term. The repetition in memory is always vastly more\nindistinct than the original state of consciousness; so much so as to be\na very different thing. Thought, on the contrary, when remembered at all,\nis an exact repetition in quality of its first presence. The presentative\nconsciousness has one quality; the representative and re-representative\nhave another quality. This shows us that the structural arrangement\nof brain substance concerned in the latter forms of consciousness\nhave a far more permanent quality than that due to the former. They\nthus constitute more permanent acquisitions, and this being the case,\nmust have a most important bearing on evolution.[140] This is because\nit is a representative state which determines action. The process of\ndetermination may become so rapid as to be almost instantaneous; but\nit had to be learned and the representation was what gave the act its\ncharacter and which organised the machinery of the automatic or reflex\nact.\n\nI here refer to the low degrees of consciousness sometimes called\nsubconsciousness, and the expression, \u201cthe subliminal consciousness,\u201d\nintroduced by F. Meyer. All shades of consciousness intervene between\nthe most distinct forms and the unconsciousness of the reflex state.\nIntelligent subconsciousness is a low stage in this evanescent\nseries. Stages on the passage to and from sleep, and other forms of\nunconsciousness due to physical causes, are properly termed subconscious.\nThere are reflexes which are due to mechanisms which we inherit from\nour animal and human ancestors, which are sometimes accompanied by\nconsciousness. The amount of intelligence displayed will depend on\nthe function involved. Experiments on vertebrate animals show that\nintelligent adaptation of the movements of the body have been transferred\nforwards in the brain during the course of evolution. Thus, a fish which\nretains the medulla only, will guide itself through the water so as\nto avoid danger. If the cerebellum and thalami are left to a reptile,\nit will avoid destructive acts. But if a mammal is deprived of its\nhemispheres, its actions are without design, and it is incapable of\nself-preservation.\n\nIt may be that in the temporary absence of the higher consciousness,\nthe lower forms which once existed in our ancestors may be revived, as\nin some of the elements of our dreams, and in some forms of cerebral\ndisease, when much of the blood is withdrawn from the cortex or parts\nof it. The amount of consciousness necessary to the performance of\nintelligent acts depends on the novelty of the situation. Many of the\ntheories on this subject, however, take it for granted that intelligent\nacts arise in primarily unconscious states. This is only credible on the\nsupposition that such acts have arisen by natural selection only, a view\nwhich I have combated on a previous page. Some authors use expressions\nwhich can only imply unconscious consciousness. This is of course\nabsurd and self-contradictory. No source but sensation can be found for\nintelligent acts.\n\nIt is true that there are some movements of organic bodies which have an\nintelligent appearance, to which we cannot ascribe consciousness. Such\nare those of the spermatozo\u00f6ids and of the leucocytes. Some of the lowest\nanimals and plants cannot be yet proved to be conscious. We cannot now\nexplain the nature of the movements which these forms exhibit, but they\nwill probably yield to research. Enough it is for our present purpose\nto know that the majority of animals are conscious for a large part\nof their lives. And we have abundant evidence to show that movements\ninaugurated in conscious states may be performed, so soon as learned, in\nunconsciousness, and become part of the mental furniture of the animal.\n\nIt seems, then, that the control of ponderable matter by mental states\nis not the exclusive prerogative of man, but is a phenomenon of common\nobservation in the animal kingdom. The facts indicate that it is\ncharacteristic of mind to move resistant and tri-dimensional matter\nunder suitable conditions. These conditions are rigid, but within the\nlimits which they define, the sequence is definite. It is difficult\nto believe in anything which is in direct violation of mechanical\nnecessity, and a mere hypothesis to that effect would not deserve a\nmoment\u2019s consideration. But the belief that the body, or parts of it, are\nmoved in direct obedience to mental states is founded on more numerous\nobservations than are most of those beliefs which we hold to be true. In\nfact there is no scientific doctrine better supported by observation and\nexperience than this one. On this ground alone, then, we are compelled\nto believe in something in the universe which is supermechanical, or\nextramechanical. We may call this supernaturalism, or occultism, or\nwhat we like, but the fact remains. We have in it the germ of theism,\nanthropomorphic, if you will, but one which grows in importance as we\ncome to examine further into the characteristics of mental action.\n\nBefore going into this part of the subject, I will refer to the part\nplayed by mind in evolution. From what has gone before, it is evident\nthat this part has been an important one. If structures are produced by\nmotions, it is clear that habits produce structures, and _vice versa_;\nand that under the law of natural selection only the useful and harmless\nones have survived. It follows, then, that progressive evolution of\nform is secured by the presence of consciousness, and must, sooner or\nlater, fail without it. With development of intelligence the progress\nmust become more continuous and rapid. The facts of paleontology confirm\nsuch a hypothesis; since the more intelligent animals (Mammalia) have\ngenerally supplanted the less intelligent, (Reptilia and Batrachia),\nwhenever brought into conflict with them. The supremacy of the\nintelligent over the unintelligent Mammalia is also clearly shown by\nresearch into their past history. The modification of type, or evolution,\nhas also become more and more rapid as time has advanced and intelligence\ndeveloped.\n\nThere is another reason why the intervention of supermechanics into\nthe process has been necessary to secure such results as we observe in\nthe evolution of life. The law of inorganic evolution is, as Spencer\nepitomises it, \u201cthe integration of matter and the dissipation of\nenergy.\u201d Natural chemical reactions when not interfered with by human\nintelligence, produce solids and give out heat. In other words, they\nresult in death and not in life. To produce life something different from\nchemical energy has been necessary. And as the case is a parallel one\nto the evolution of the types of life, we may suspect that the agency\nat work has been a related one. It is some form of energy of the vital\nclass which is able to overcome the bonds which hold dead matter in\ntheir adamantine grasp; and it is evident that such an energy could have\nbeen organised only in some region where mechanics of a superchemical\norder prevail. If we take a large view of the universe the alternatives\nof life and death present themselves clearly before us. The law of the\nlatter is the integration of matter and dissipation of energy. The law of\nthe former is the converse; the loosing of the bonds of matter, and the\nproduction of mechanism for the raising of the type of energy. The first\nis catagenesis, the latter is anagenesis. The end of catagenesis is the\nextinction of all mind and all life. Anagenesis sustains both. The best\nfoundation for our belief in anagenesis is that it exists. Catagenesis\nhas not destroyed it, and this fact must lead us to suspect that it is\nthe product of an agency which is superchemical; and the only such that\nwe know is consciousness.\n\nIn the presence of such a far-reaching hypothesis we are called upon to\nconsider more particularly the relations of mind to its physical basis.\nThe essential condition of the existence of mind as we know it, is\nmetabolism. The substance[141] of the nervous cells must be in a state\nof decomposition and recomposition; old material loosing its chemical\nbonds and giving forth energy, and new material arriving to undergo\nthe same process. The energy thus produced displays the phenomena of\nmind, and as such differs widely from the inorganic energies of heat,\nlight, etc. The extent to which it displays habits depends on the part\nof the nervous structure where it is produced. In the spinal cord it is\nstrictly automatic, and as we approach the hemispheres the so-called\nvoluntary element becomes more apparent, until a region is reached where\nconception, deliberation, and judgment have their seat. In this region\nenergy is purely mental in its attributes, and it unlocks the executive\nmechanism of the body, and puts it in action in accordance with the needs\nof consciousness. So far, mechanical laws explain the order of events.\nThe supermechanical resides in the mental content and its effects on the\noutgoing energy. No quantitative relation can be shown to exist between\nthe results of the mental processes of classification, conception,\njudgment, etc, and the amount of incoming or outgoing energy. Indeed it\nis plain that none can exist, if the statement already made be true,\nviz., that thoughts are without weight. This part of the subject requires\ncritical treatment, but the general result is included in the above\nstatement, which is sufficient for our present purpose.\n\nSince consciousness possesses such extraordinary relations to matter we\nmay well suspect that it has a wider distribution than comes within the\npurview of our present limited ken. Why should it not protect and nourish\nitself under conditions different from those which prevail in our planet?\nThe one condition necessary to it is metabolism\u2014which means free energy.\nThe kind of physical basis cannot be important, provided it be capable\nof exhibiting this kind of non-automatic energy. Automatism and all its\nreflex consequences are the death of consciousness, as every one knows.\nFrom such a type of energy all the fixed types of energy must have been\nderived, and with them the types of both mental and physical structures.\nIn its freest form it should have as a physical basis a form of matter\nwhich should be without habits, but always ready to undergo a catagenetic\nchange into routine energy and ultimate unconsciousness. Such a medium\nshould be unspecialised matter, and the consciousness inhabiting it would\nbe a creator. Such consciousness would be readily transmitted wherever\nthe physical basis should be suitable, and one such substance is our\nprotoplasm. The probable inferiority of protoplasm as a physical basis\nis indicated by the long and tedious education which has been necessary\nto enable beings made of it to attain a high order of intelligence. In\nsuch a basis anagenesis is slow, and catagenesis is easy. Other bases\nmight be imagined where the reverse would be the case. No assumption\ncan be made as to a constant and limited amount of consciousness in the\nuniverse. That such is the case is supposable; but it is also supposable\nthat the amount of suitable physical basis may be increased by a process\nof assimilation of non-conscious matter, as is done by animals in\ndigestion and reproduction. This process might continue until all matter\nshould be brought into that generalised condition which is necessary\nto the continuance of consciousness. The entire universe would then\nbe conscious, and a maximum limit would be reached. In the primitive\nconsciousness, whatever its extent in space in the Universe, we have the\nSupreme Being or Person.\n\n\nII. THE IDEALISM OF THEISM.\n\nWhat I mean by the above expression is the theism which is supposed\nto be demonstrated by idealistic metaphysics. There are two forms of\nthis alleged demonstration, both of which have for their starting-point\nthe basis of the idealistic philosophy. This basis is the fact that we\nknow nothing of matter excepting as sense-impressions. From this it is\ninferred that were conscious beings to become extinct, matter would\nno longer exist. It is also a consequence of this belief that what we\nobserve of the conduct of matter, which we call by the name of natural\nlaw, is of purely mental origin.\n\nIf now the universe consist wholly of mind, the totality of it, either\nas reduced to a body of general laws, or to a single comprehensive\ngeneralisation, or concept, is one form of idealistic God. The other\ndemonstration is as follows. Since matter exists as mental states, and\nsince these mental states are common to mankind, who are mortal; since\nthese mental states reproduce themselves from generation to generation,\nit is inferred that a permanent mental state exists, which possesses the\npermanent sensations we call matter. And this common mind of humanity is\nGod.\n\nThe difference between these deities is this. In the first case he is an\nabstraction of the human mind and therefore not a person apart from such\nmen as are capable of the generalisations of which he consists. In the\nsecond case he is a person apart from humanity. The validity of either\ndemonstration to the thinker depends on his point of view. To every one\nbut the idealist, the first proposition is atheism. The evidence for the\nsecond is metaphysical anthropomorphism, and would be a demonstration,\nwere the theory of idealism well founded.\n\nThe fact that we only know matter as sense-impressions does not, in\nthe opinion of realists, prove that it does not exist as the resistant\nand extended. Resistance of each part to the movements of other parts\n(energy), and extension in space, are conditions about which we have a\ngreat deal of information. Our lives are spent in overcoming the one, and\nin getting round the other. Our methods of dealing with it represent the\nantithesis of those employed in thought-processes. The latter are best\nperformed in the absence of the muscular exertion which is so necessary\nin dealing with the former. I have referred to the well-known difference\nin consciousness between sense-impressions and the representation and\nre-representation of them. The difference certainly implies a difference\nin the immediate sources of the respective kinds of consciousness. The\none is produced by something different from that which produces the\nother. In short, the one is produced by the contact of matter external\nto our physical basis, and the other is produced by a modification of\nbrain-structure; and in the first place by that simplest form of it\nwhich is the cause of memory. The effect of such observation is the\nconviction that matter exists as something outside of consciousness or\nmind, in spite of the fact that we only know it in consciousness. In a\nword, consciousness and knowledge imply the existence rather than the\nnon-existence of something which is known.\n\nThe fundamental actualities are, then, subject and object; or, in popular\nlanguage, mind and matter. Philosophy includes the sciences which embrace\nthe knowledge of both subject and object; but the practical philosophy\nis the science of the mutual relations of the two. It may be said that\nsubject and object are opposite sides of the same reality, but this form\nof expression appears to me to be no more accurate than the statement\nthat energy and matter are opposite sides of the same thing. As energy\nis the motion of matter, mind is the intelligence of matter; and both\nmay be called properties of matter with equal propriety, since both are\nimpossible without a physical basis. Mind, however, differs from energy\nin possessing some intrinsic qualities which are in essence independent\nof the qualities of the physical basis; and these intrinsic qualities\nare the forms of logic. These are, however, but a part of the totality\nof mind, although they underlie or penetrate all its representative\nactivities.\n\nWhile mind then cannot exist without a physical basis, it remains to\nbe considered whether any other objective world is necessary to its\nexistence. It is sometimes alleged that consciousness could not exist\nwithout an objective, exterior to its physical basis. If, however,\nconsciousness is a necessary attribute of free energy, the latter purely\nmetaphysical speculation has no foundation. The \u201cintuition of Being\u201d\n(Rosmini) would exist, albeit not much specialised, in the absence of\nmultifarious objects; but the forms of logic would characterise it\nnevertheless.\n\nIt is alleged that we can never know matter as it is, because our\nobservation is restricted to the mutual relations of its component\nparts. In this assertion our intelligence necessarily concurs, but this\nneed not cause us to relax our exertions in the pursuit of knowledge.\nThe practical philosophy is, as already remarked, the knowledge of the\nrelations subsisting between mind and matter, so that our most valuable\nacquisition will be in the end the laws of a relation. We may well\npostpone our endeavors after the absolute, even if we can ever attain a\nknowledge of it. The realist is content to believe that if we do not know\n\u201cthings as they are in themselves,\u201d it is because, of the imperfection of\nour senses. But we are constantly discovering new aids to research, and\nwe can put no limit to our power in this direction.\n\nThe research into the relations of subject and object, means to theology,\nan investigation as to the existence and nature of Deity, and as to an\nexistence for conscious beings in other than terrestrial life. The pure\nidealist reaches an affirmative answer to these problems by a short and\neasy route, based on a study of the intrinsic nature of mind alone. The\npure realist reaches a negative conclusion by an equally short cut, by\nconsidering the properties of matter alone. Not a few thinkers entertain\nboth doctrines at one and the same time, although they are mutually\nexclusive and contradictory. No wonder that they reach what Montgomery\nwell terms \u201cthe puzzle of puzzles.\u201d But the rational conclusion from this\ndeadlock must be, that there is something wrong with the methods of both\nsides. To the practical mind it seems that the vice in both methods is\nthe failure to harmonise properly with their own, the facts adduced by\nthe opposite side in the discussion. And it is indeed evident that that\ncannot be the final philosophy which restricts itself to a consideration\nof mind alone; or that which restricts itself to a consideration of\nmatter alone. That men should pursue different lines of research is\nnatural. Those whose minds are capable in the fields of conception\nnaturally prefer idealistic studies; while those whose especial genius\nlies in the direction of mechanics, easily pursue-materialistic research.\nWhat is needed is a combination of the two fields of ability in the same\nmind.\n\nA considerable class of serious people, observing the diversities between\nthe schools of philosophy, regard such studies as useless. Since they\nhave not the disposition or ability to solve the question for themselves,\nthey find it best to rest in uncertainty, which has optimistic or\npessimistic tendencies according to temperament and education. The\noptimist has faith that all is, and all will be, well; while the\npessimist takes the opposite view. Both are sustained in their position\nby those teachers who teach the impotence of our faculties and the\nuselessness of knowledge. Such appeal in support of their position to the\nfacts already cited; the imperfection of our senses; the relativity of\nknowledge; the inscrutable nature of mind and matter, etc. This position\nis, however, a plea of avoidance, and it will be time enough to listen to\nit when the avenues of the increase of human knowledge are permanently\nclosed. This they are not at present.\n\nThe key to the position is the doctrine of evolution. Here we behold\nthe interaction of subject and object, both in our own persons and in\nthe inferior beings which are with us, and which have preceded us on\nearth. That mind has not sprung full-fledged upon this planet, is clear;\nand that it has made wonderful progress in power, is equally clear. Why\ndid it not appear with all its powers \u201cin the beginning\u201d? The answer\nobviously is, \u201cthe intractability of matter.\u201d Why has it progressed in\nface of this obstacle? The answer is, the tractability of matter. Mind,\nthrough its intrinsic quality, has co\u00ebrced matter, in ever increasing\ndegree, and the limit of its capacity in this direction plainly has not\nyet been reached. Its most important conquest has been that of its own\nphysical basis, and next to it is the conquest of the world of objects by\nwhich it is surrounded. Its last conquest will be the knowledge of its\ndestiny, as a projection of its known past. To this end the knowledge\nof its own constitution is essential, but this is not all, as the pure\nidealist would have us believe. The knowledge of external relations is\nalso essential, for we can in no state of being escape them. Psychic life\nis an \u201cinternal adjustment to external relations,\u201d quite as much as is\nthe physical life, as it is defined by Spencer in the phrase just quoted.\n\nThe Deity of evolution indicated in the first section of this paper,\nwill not satisfy the pure idealist. He is not an absolute, since He\nis compelled to respect relations. But we find Him to be just, which\nhe evidently is not if absolute. He is anthropomorphic, and not an\nabstraction of the human mind. And yet as the seat of rationality, and\nas the director of free energy, He possesses the function of creator\nof whatever is possible. The evolution of independent human minds has\nbeen only possible through education, and here as elsewhere, teachable\nstudents have met with greater success than the stolid.\n\nIt has been already pointed out that the process of evolution may be\neither progressive (Anagenesis) or retrogressive (Catagenesis). This is\nwell known to be the case with organic types, where degenerate phyla are\ncommon. It seems, indeed, that in the order of things degeneracy has\noccurred wherever it has been possible; that is, under circumstances\nwhich permitted vegetative life through lack of stimuli to energetic\nmotion. There has always been \u201croom at the top\u201d; but only when all\nthe lower fields of existence have been for the time being filled,\nhas there been room at the top only. The history of mental evolution\nhas accompanied that of general structural evolution, and for similar\nreasons. It is well illustrated in human society to-day. These facts\nsuggest that this has been the history of all evolution, since they\nharmonise with the order of evolution observed in our solar system, in\nwhich the inorganic has preceded the organic, or Catagenesis has preceded\nAnagenesis. If the forms of non-vital energy represent a result of\nCatagenesis, we are not bound to look on minerals as in any sense living,\nas has been suggested by Haeckel and others. Most, if not all, forms\nof chemical energy have sunk below the vital level, and certainly far\nbelow the possibility of displaying consciousness. We are here looking\nover unexplored territory, and one whose elucidation is entirely in the\nfuture, but we may put our ideas in order, if we do nothing more.\n\nBesides his relations to the impersonal materials that surround him, man\nhas essential relations to his fellow-man. The laws of these relations\nare ethics. Much is written and spoken against the utilitarian or\nevolutionary theory of ethics. I cannot, however, escape the conviction\nthat this theory offers the true explanation of the rise of the ethical\nsentiment in mankind. But to understand it aright, we must include\nthe growth of the social sentiment, as well as that of the rational\nelement, in the evolution of justice or right. The opponents of this view\nsometimes commit the error common to all those who do not understand the\nnature of mental evolution. Some of them imagine that it is necessary to\nsuppose that, in harmony with this theory, every man decides his every\nact solely in accordance with what appears to him at the time to subserve\nthe lowest form of selfishness of which he is capable. The doctrine,\non the contrary, maintains that habits of honesty and justice are the\nresult of the education of the ages, and that men obey such motives\naccording to their developmental status; that is, in accordance with the\nevolution of the habit of preferring the higher to the lower forms of\nutility. The further question of what it is that has raised the standard\nof utility, is answered by what we see going on around us. The fear of\nthe law; the love of the approbation of our fellows; the sympathy with\nour fellow-men; the fear of their indignation; all these are educators of\ngreat potency, which have always been active. These motives, organised as\ncharacter, are compulsory, and it would be strange if they have not been\neffective in producing results.\n\nPractical ethics has to do with material beings and their material\npossessions, i. e. with person and property. Without the objective,\nthe content of ethics is purely ideal, consisting of love and hate,\nand the justice and injustice of opinion which might be the outcome of\nthose sentiments. These sentiments are realities of the subjective,\nrepresenting the affections, as the form of thought constitutes the\nrational faculties. But if we endeavor in thought to deprive love\nand hate, justice and injustice, of all material consequences and\nimplications, we deprive those sentiments of much of their value if we\ndo not abolish their occasions altogether. It appears to me at least\ndoubtful whether hate and injustice could exist in a society consisting\nof disembodied minds, if such beings could be imagined; a supposition\nwhich I cannot entertain.\n\nIf ethics cannot exist without material expression, it is clear that,\non the other hand, they cannot exist without a subjective foundation.\nThus ethics is the highest expression of the relation between mind and\nmatter. Ethics is the practical application of the mental powers to\nhuman relations, and the more complete the evolution of mind, the more\nperfect is the ethical practice. Thus the evolution of the mind is the\nguarantee of ethical progress, and the more intelligent the mind, the\nmore easy will the evolution be. As in all education, the laggards\nexperience the severities of compulsion, while pains and penalties are\navoided by those who perceive their approach and do not await their\narrival. Here we have the utilitarian ground of our numerous ethical\nand religious organisations. They invite men to _a priori_ subjective\ntheory, and objective practice, so as to preserve society from the evils\nof inferior and painful methods of compulsion, which lie at the basis of\nethical evolution. It is the dread of this method which rouses a natural\nrepugnance in the minds of many men to the doctrine which teaches of it.\nBut it must be remembered that the instruments of evolution change with\nthe thing that is evolving, and the conditions of progressive ethics are\nthe stages of progress of the mind. What is necessary for the education\nof the lower mind is no longer necessary for the higher. This is not only\na truth of philosophy, but the fact may be discerned in the religions\nwhich men have made for themselves. They describe the ethical state of\ntheir authors, and prescribe the treatment appropriate to it.\n\nOur knowledge of some parts of evolutionary history is meagre, and on\nsome of its chapters we are absolutely in the dark. This is especially\ntrue of the causes of the appearance of life and consciousness on the\nearth. Spontaneous generation has not been proven, and the immediate\nsource of sensation is unknown. The conclusions enumerated in the\npreceding pages are derived from evidence presented in more or less\ncomplete fragments. But the thesis remains true that mind possesses a\nlimited control over its physical basis, but one which is sufficient to\naccount for the main direction of the evolution of those organic forms\nwhich possess it. And it is also true that the essential forms of the\nrational mind are not due to corresponding qualities of the physical\nbasis. These forms are: the principles of identity, of abstraction, and\nof generalisation or conception. These characteristics constitute the\nidealistic essence of Theism. But we look to the realistic element of\nTheism for the demonstration of the distinct personality of God.\n\n E. D. COPE.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[140] _Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society_, 1889, p. 495\n\n[141] Recent experiments conducted in the laboratory of the Johns Hopkins\nUniversity show that the cytoplasm of cells, which are exhausted by\nlabor, is vacuolated.\n\n\n\n\nLITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.\n\n\n\n\nGERMANY.\n\n\nThe name of Cesare Lombroso is now more and more mentioned in Germany,\nnot only in psychiatrical, juridical, and sociological works, written\nfor the learned public, but also in the newspapers and magazines. By the\nside of occasional recognition of his doctrine of the born criminal and\ngenius, we meet\u2014and these are the majority of the cases\u2014with violent\nattacks on it, which not seldom exhibit real ignorance of the views of\nthe celebrated Italian investigator. Lombroso himself is partly to blame\nfor this unfortunate circumstance, for his writings, with their mountains\nof undigested material, are so lacking in unity and perspicuity that\nmisconceptions are very apt to arise.\n\nThe German translator of Lombroso, DR. H. KURELLA, psychiatrist in\nKreuzburg, in Silesia, has recently given to the world a synoptical\nexposition of Lombroso\u2019s theory of the born criminal, under the title\n_Cesare Lombroso und die Naturgeschichte des Verbrechers_, Hamburg, 1892,\nRichter. The author not only expounds the doctrines of Lombroso, but also\ndeals critically with them, and, although upon the whole his sympathies\nare with the views of the Italian scientist, he nevertheless believes\nthat the existence of a fixed type of the _delinquente nato_, embracing\nall special forms of criminality, is yet a question of doubt. On the\nother hand, MAX NORDAU, a widely-read author of ours, gives unqualified\nrecognition to the theories of Lombroso, fully accepting the idea of\n\u201cdegeneration,\u201d first introduced by Morel into science and further\ndeveloped by Lombroso, and, in completion of the work of his master,\nextending this idea to art and literature. In his work, _Entartung_, the\nfirst volume of which was recently published by Carl Duncker, of Berlin,\nand is dedicated to Lombroso, \u201chis dear, admired master,\u201d he says:\n\u201cDegenerate types are not always criminals, prostitutes, anarchists, and\nidiots. They are often writers and artists, and these exhibit the same\nmental, and frequently also the same physical, traits as those members of\nthe same anthropological family that satisfy their diseased instincts by\nmeans of the murderer\u2019s knife or the cartridge of the dynamitard, instead\nof with pen and pencil.\u201d\n\nPeople who are acquainted with Nordau\u2019s previous works will perhaps\nimagine that this latest book of his is simply a mass of journalistic\nebullitions which can lay no claim to _scientific_ value. This, however,\nis wrong. Nordau is not only well acquainted with the patho-psychological\nliterature of this province\u2014especially with the French\u2014but he also\nturns his knowledge to scientific account, which psychiatrists like\nPelman and others have publicly admitted. Taking it as a whole, Nordau\nhas presented in this first volume of his work a good psychology of\nmysticism\u2014good, that is, for all who accept the association psychology.\nNordau\u2019s expositions embrace all the psychological theories which belong\nin this province, with their applications to individuals and to the\ntendencies of modern literature and art. With respect to the first point,\nthe author is right in saying that he does not offer here anything new\nto the professional psychologist, but he is wrong in his theory that\npsychologists will read this chapter with impatience, for his exposition\nis unquestioniably elegantly written. Of much greater interest is the\nsecond part, in which a diagnosis of imbecility is rendered upon the\nEnglish pre-Raphaelites, the French symbolists, the Tolstois, and\nRichard Wagners. The chapter on Richard Wagner will especially attract\nattention for its severity. Nordau closes it with the words, \u201cof all the\naberrations of the present time, Wagnerism is the most widely diffused\nand the most important. The playhouse at Bayreuth, the _Bayreuther\nBl\u00e4tter_, the Parisian _Revue Wagnerienne_, are lasting monuments by\nwhich the future will measure in wonderment the dimensions of this\ndegeneration and hysteria of our day.\u201d\n\nNordau throws light upon numerous mooted phenomena of modern art and\nliterature, pointing out their diseased features. One is really surprised\nat the extent of his work. All in all, it may be foreseen that Koch\u2019s\ndoctrine of the \u201cpsychopathical minor factors\u201d\u2014or those psychical factors\nwhich constitute the border-line between mental health and disease\u2014will\nclear up much more extensive fields than they have, when applied in the\ndirection indicated by Nordau. KOCH has now published the third part of\nhis work, (which I have repeatedly mentioned in _The Monist_) and thus\ncompleted it. He concludes his last volume with these words: \u201cThe domain\nof the \u2018psychopathical minor factors\u2019 is a wide and very interesting one.\nWhosoever enters profoundly into it will learn to look at much in life\nwith different eyes from those with which he began, will understand many\nmen and many human acts, which before he did not understand. There are\nyet many scientific treasures to be unearthed in this field, and I hope\nthat I shall win many a coadjutor. I hope, also, that qualified men will\nmake this theory of the psychopathical minor factors fruitful in wider\nfields and for greater problems.\u201d\n\nIt is a common belief that it is pre-eminently in our time that psychical\ndisorders and psychical minor factors play so great a r\u00f4le. But that in\nthe sense of Nordau they are not of so recent origin a careful reader\nwill learn from a new work of LUDWIG GEIGER, the well-known historian\nof literature and civilisation (Paetel, Berlin). Its title is: _Berlin,\n1688-1840: Geschichte des geistigen Lebens der preussischen Hauptstadt_.\nAs yet, only the first volume has appeared, which extends to the death of\nFrederick the Great. The reader, however, would obtain an entirely wrong\nimpression of the work if he were to believe that psychiatrical points\nof view are expressly dwelt upon in this book. To find them he must read\nbetween the lines. The book is an extraordinarily painstaking history of\nthe civilisation of Berlin, taken from the sources, and giving especial\nprominence to intellectual factors. We shall reserve the detailed\ndiscussion of this important work for another occasion, perhaps until it\nis fully completed.\n\n CHRISTIAN UFER.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK REVIEWS.\n\n\nHAND-COMMENTAR ZUM NEUEN TESTAMENT. IV. EVANGELIUM, BRIEFL UND\nOFFENBARUNG DES JOHANNES. Bearbeitet von _H. J. Holtzmann_. Zweite\nverbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. (Freiburg I. B. and Leipsic: 1893. J.\nC. B. Mohr.)\n\nThe fourth gospel, of all the sacred writings of the New Testament, has\nalways been the reviewer\u2019s favorite book. Its profundity, its wealth of\nphilosophical ideas, the fervor of its author\u2019s religious sentiment,\nand the spiritual grace that pervades the whole book, exercised an\nunspeakable charm on my mind. This gospel was the first to rouse my\ndoubts in the belief of literal inspiration, and it was again the one,\nwhich, after the severest storms of infidelity had blown over, reconciled\nme to the spirit of Christianity. Thus the perusal of Professor\nHoltzmann\u2019s commentary again arouses the recollections of former\nstruggles, and I find that even to-day the first chapter of the fourth\ngospel has lost none of its fascination. It is a wonderful book, and its\nauthor is a man whom I always longed to meet and shake hands with, over\na span of almost two millenniums and a world-wide abyss of difference of\nopinion.\n\nOnly those who are familiar with the difficulties of the St. John\nliterature of the New Testament can really appreciate this latest work\nof Prof. H. J. Holtzmann. He presents in a most clear and concise manner\nthe problems involved, together with their various solutions, critically\narranged. He carefully avoids obtruding on the reader his own views.\nHe stands before us as a faithful compiler only. I say \u201conly,\u201d but\nthis \u201conly\u201d means a great deal. It does not mean that he suppresses or\nconceals his own views, it means that he states the facts with scrupulous\nimpartiality. If there is any partiality apparent in his treatment of\nthe sacred writings, it is the reverent attitude he preserves whenever\nlove of truth obliges him to accept the negative result of critical\ninvestigations. And where is there a theological scholar to-day, who\nis orthodox enough to dare to accept the theory that the gospel of St.\nJohn was written by the apostle? Holtzmann carries his impartiality\nto the extent of not rejecting this old traditional idea, concerning\nthe authorship of the fourth gospel, but the evidence against it is\noverwhelmingly sufficient to satisfy the most narrowminded believer.\nHoltzmann teaches us at the same time to understand the spirit of\nthe first and second century of our era, and thus excludes from the\nbeginning the old prejudice, that if the author were not the man whom\nhe impersonated his work must be regarded as a fraud. The historical\nvalue of the book lies in the revelations it gives us concerning the\nreligious demands of the times in which it was written. The fourth\ngospel originated when the Jewish religiosity of growing Christianity\nbegan to expand into cosmic universality. The author was undoubtedly a\nJew-Christian, whose home most likely was Ephesus. Ephesus was the place\nwhere we find the first beginnings of Christian Alexandrianism. Here the\nLogos-idea was introduced into Christian thought. Philo, the Alexandrian\nJew, had already represented Moses as the incarnation of the divine\nLogos. Should not now a Christian familiar with Philo\u2019s philosophy apply\nthe same method to Jesus of Nazareth? Some work adapted to satisfy the\nwants of the time and especially the religious yearnings for knowledge as\na means of edification was needed. The Christ-idea had taken a definite\nshape in the imagination of the Christian congregations of Asia Minor,\nconsisting of diaspora Jews and Gentiles, and their Christ-idea found a\nworthy expression in the picture of Jesus of Nazareth as we have it in\nthe fourth gospel.\n\nThe fact that the author of the fourth gospel was a Jew-Christian,\nappears from his readiness to explain Jewish customs. He knows Judaism,\nand is familiar with Jerusalem as it appeared after the destruction of\nthe temple. The probability is that he wrote his gospel between 120 and\n140. He is comparable to Matthew in so far as both are greatly interested\nin the controversy between Gentiles _versus_ Jews, yet Matthew\u2019s\nIsrael has grown into the world-wide cosmos. The frequent occurrence\nof the very word \u201ccosmos\u201d in the fourth gospel is remarkable. In the\nsame way the Greek term \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd (to know) appears besides the older\nterm \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd (to believe), which latter is a translation of a Jewish\nconception, still employed so vigorously by St. Paul. The author of the\nfourth gospel is not familiar with Galilee and does not seem to care for\nconsistency in the details of his accounts, for he frequently contradicts\nhis own statements. The most important differences between his and the\nthree synoptic gospels are the accounts as to the main field of Jesus\u2019s\nactivity, which according to St. John was Judea, according to the\nsynoptic gospels Galilee, and the day of Jesus\u2019s death, which according\nto St. John is the 14th of Nisan, according to the synoptic gospels the\n15th of Nisan, so that if we follow the latter, Jesus would have been\ntried and condemned, against all Jewish customs, on one of the greatest\nfestival days. Holtzmann rightly warns the reader, that whatever may\nspeak in favor of the synoptic gospels as being, in general, historically\nmore correct, the author of the fourth gospel might have had some special\nsource for this particular fact.\u2014\n\nThe Revelation of St. John has given more trouble to the Christian\nexegesis than any other book, and light was not shed upon its plan and\nconstruction, until it was found to be one instance only of a whole class\nof literary productions. When we consider the Revelation of St. John in\nthe same line with other apocalyptic works, and when we understand the\nmental disposition of the pious Jews shortly before and after Christ, we\nhave a clew to the enigmatic visions which are unrolled before our eyes.\n\nThe expectations of the Jews in the times of the Maccabees were\ndisappointed again and again. The great events of the world did not\njustify the national hopes, and God did not seem to care about fulfilling\nhis promises. The last prophet, who called himself Malachi, or \u201cthe\nmessenger of God,\u201d proclaimed the message of the Lord, \u201cYet I loved\nJacob,\u201d and he comforts the faithful who still endure in all their\ntribulations, that \u201ca book of remembrance is written before him for them\nthat feared the Lord and that thought upon His name.\u201d After Malachi,\na number of revelations appeared, which, to the satisfaction of the\nMessianic expectations, explained the events of the world, and prophesied\nthat those only who should persevere until the end would be called upon\nto rule, together with the \u201cSon of Man,\u201d who is to come to smite the\nheathens and to rule them with an iron rod. The first apocalyptic author,\nwho wrote in 164 B. C., impersonated Daniel, the prophet, who had lived\nabout 400 B. C. The powerful nations of the world are represented as\nbeasts, the fourth and last beast being the Macedonian empire. It has\nten horns, that is, rulers, the last one being Antiochus Epiphanes. As\nsoon as his power is broken, the power over the earth will be given to\nIsrael, which is called the Son of Man. The power of the tenth horn was\nbroken, indeed, yet the Messianic hopes remained unfulfilled, and thus\nnew prophecies were wanted, which should again explain the plans of\nthe Almighty, so that the faithful would still endure and hope. Thus,\nHenoch was written, and after Henoch the Assumption of Moses, the book of\nBaruch, and other revelations.\n\nThe apocalyptic literature is characterised by Messianic expectations and\neschatological reflections. The end of the present course of affairs is\nsaid to be near at hand and a new order will be established in which the\nfaithful shall rule for a whole millennium and the wicked be tormented.\n\nThe Revelation of St. John represents this spirit of apocalyptic hopes\namong the early Christians of Asia Minor. It throws much light upon the\nconditions and the conceptions of a period concerning which we have\nvery little information. We here see Christianity in its beginnings.\nThe coloring of the Revelation is still Jewish. Its author stands in\na conscious contrast to the Greek spirit which is about to change the\nproperly Jewish character of the new doctrine. The author of the St. John\nrevelation is a Jew to the backbone still; he denounces the antinomistic\nChristianity of the Gentiles as represented by Nocolaitanes whom, we are\ntold, God hateth. He does not directly mention the apostle St. Paul, but\nthere is little doubt that he is alluded to in Chap. II, 2, as one of\nthem \u201cwhich say they are apostles and are not.\u201d\n\nThe more powerful the Greek spirit grew in the church, the weaker became\nthese original features inherited from the diaspora Jews until they\nwere dropped forever through the efforts of Origenes who made a decided\nand successful opposition to the belief in the millennium. Yet it took\nsome time for the traditional view of the Messiah to change into the\npurer and more spiritual Christ-ideal There were two parties in the\nearly church who spoke two radically different idioms; the one still\ncherished the old chiliasm, dreaming of the establishment of a millennium\non earth. Their terminology moved always in the same allegories: they\nspoke of green and fat fields and of sulphurous abysses, of white horses\nand terrible beasts, of trees of life, of golden cities and of war and\nbloodshed, while the other party spoke of Logos, of the eternal Son\nthrough whom the world had been made, of \u201cthe dispensation of the fulness\nof the times in which God might gather together in one all things in\nChrist, both which are in heaven and which are on earth,\u201d of the pleroma\nand of aeons.\n\nThe Revelation of St. John is an expression of the former party and it\nwas natural that after a complete victory of the latter party, Christian\nteachers knew not what to make of this book which shows Christian views\nby the side of an irreconcilable Judaism, and a worldly empire in\nJerusalem, the beloved city with twenty-four Jewish elders representing\nthe twelve tribes of Israel. The rest of Jerusalem is to be finally\nconverted while there is no hope for paganism. The difference between\nIsraelites and Gentiles remains a radical one even in the Holy City when\nthe new heaven and the new earth has been created. The Gentile-Christians\nappear as citizens of a lower order. The Israelites alone live in the\ncity while the Gentiles only walk in the light thereof, and they shall\nbring the glory and honor of the nations into it.\n\nWe have given a few glimpses of the problems of the St. John literature\nonly. It is impossible to go over the whole field. Nor is it necessary to\ndo so. Professor Holtzmann has given us so complete a presentation that\nwe need but refer to his work which is indispensable to all interested\nin the literature of the New Testament. It will be the more valuable\nand welcome as it is furnished with an index, a feature rarely found in\nGerman books.\n\n P. C.\n\n\nDIE WILLENSFREIHEIT UND IHRE GEGNER. By _Dr. Constantin Gutberlet_.\nFulda: Fuldaer Actiendruckerei. 1893.\n\nDr. Constantin Gutberlet regards the doctrine of free-will as a cardinal\ndoctrine of Christianity. In the present booklet he endeavors to show\nthat all attacks made upon it by unchristian savants have failed. He\ncriticises H\u00f6ffding, Lombroso, Wundt, M\u00fcnsterberg, Lotze, P. Ree, and\nSchopenhauer, and establishes as his own view a theory of free-will which\nhe calls \u201cfreedom of choice.\u201d He says: \u201cThere is no decision without\n_sufficient_ reason, but there may be without _rational_ reason. The\nsufficient reason is that a greater good may be recognised as possessing\n\u2018blind\u2019 sides, that we can do without it and even reject it for the sake\nof these \u2018blind\u2019 sides. On the other hand, a lesser good may be given as\nan object of willing, and our willing by its own energy conditions the\nfree decision of the will\u201d (p. 25). Freedom of will is not a reversal\nof causation, which latter, according to Gutberlet, is \u201can absolutely\nnecessary law\u201d (p. 8 and _passim_).\n\nIt is difficult to understand how Gutberlet, taking this view, can class\nhimself among the indeterminists. From his premises, we should expect\nhim to take the view which we have defended, that freedom of will is not\ncontradictory to determinism. If freedom of will means freedom of choice,\nin which \u201cwe ourselves, as the contents of our ideas, feelings, and\ndispositions, are the cause not only of our activities, but also of our\nfree decision\u201d (p. 19), then our decisions are most certainly determined\nby our character. Gutberlet\u2019s criticism of Wundt (pp. 167-171), who\ndefends freedom of will and determinism, is wide of the mark, and it\nseems that Gutberlet is either not clear on this point himself or he does\nnot draw the consequences of his own standpoint. Says Gutberlet: \u201cOnly\non the supposition that there is no other than \u2018mechanical\u2019 causation of\nnatural forces, can the determinist maintain that freedom abolishes the\nprinciple of causation. In the application of the principle of Causation\n\u2018what happens has a cause\u2019 to natural forces, the principle can be\ninverted thus: \u2018when all sufficient causes are given, the effect follows\nwith necessity.\u2019 Yet if there are spiritual agents which stand above the\nmechanical causation of nature and natural forces, we cannot _a priori_\ndeclare that their effects follow with the same necessity from their\ncharacter as is the case with nature. Accordingly, unless we assume the\nquestionable theory that free causation is impossible, we cannot invert\nhere the principle of causation and use it against free decision\u201d (p.\n168).\n\nHow does this sentence agree with Mr. Gutberlet\u2019s statements that\ncausation is an absolutely necessary law and that \u201cwe ourselves ...\nare the cause of our free decision.\u201d Our decisions are determined by\n\u201cour ideas, feelings, and dispositions,\u201d and yet a sufficient cause\ndetermines its effect only if the causation is mechanical, not if it is\nspiritual. Gutberlet explains the difficulty as follows: \u201cCertainly, if\nwe did not reduce the free decision _once made_ (die _eingetretene_ freie\nEntscheidung), to an adequate cause, we should sin against logic and\npsychology. But we understand by \u2018adequate cause of a decision\u2019 not only\nthe influence of motives, but also the energy of a free will.\u201d Very well\nthen, Mr. Gutberlet would be a determinist as much as Wundt. Decisions\nare determined by two factors: (1) by the motives (i. e. the objects\nwhich act as stimuli upon the will) and (2) by the character of the\nagent. Not everybody is affected by the same stimulus in the same way.\nOne chooses this and another that motive, and his character determines\nthe choice; and a man of a certain character, under definitely given\nconditions, will freely and yet necessarily choose a certain motive. Dr.\nGutberlet, it appears to us, says yes and no in one breath.\n\nDr. Gutberlet is the editor of the _Philosophisches Jahrbuch_, a Roman\nCatholic periodical. He belongs to that class of men who by partisans of\nfree thought are regarded as especially dangerous. He is not as narrow\nas the common type of _defensores fidei_. He studies the works of modern\nsavants \u201cwhose intellectual superiority,\u201d as he confesses, he \u201cadmires\nin many respects.\u201d He is broader than most of his _confreres_, and thus\nhe makes the creed of his church appear broader than it practically is.\nWe can see no danger in the appearance of such men. It is true, he will\nmake converts among the educated, or at least, he will keep some wavering\nelements within the pale of the church; for the Roman church is, upon the\nwhole, still very hostile to progress. But, on the other hand, such a man\nis in his circles a missionary of science; he will help to broaden the\nviews of his brethren. He is learning, and they will learn from him.\n\n P. C.\n\n\nGRUNDZ\u00dcGE DER PHYSIOLOGISCHEN PSYCHOLOGIE. By _Wilhelm Wundt_. Leipsic:\nWilhelm Engelmann. 1893.\n\nWundt\u2019s \u201cPhysiological Psychology\u201d is perhaps justly regarded as his\nbest and most valuable work. We have just received the first part of the\nfourth edition and may expect that the second part will soon appear. We\nintend to review the whole work as soon as completed, and will state\nhere only that this new edition contains, among many emendations and\nadditions, an explicit account of the modern methods of psychological\ninvestigations, with descriptions and illustrations of the most important\ninstruments invented for that purpose.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nVERGLEICHEND-ENTWICKELUNGSGESCHICHTLICHE UND ANATOMISCHE STUDIEN IM\nBEREICHE DER HIRNANATOMIE. 3. RIECHAPPARAT UND AMMONSHORN. Abdruck\naus _Anatomischer Anzeiger_. By _Dr. L. Edinger_. (Jena: 1893. Gustav\nFischer.)\n\nDr. Edinger proves in this essay that in the cerebral evolution of\nanimals the cortex makes its first appearance in the formation of the\ncornu ammonis. This convolution being the centre of smell, it is more\nthan merely probable that smell sensations, or something analogous to\nsmell sensations, were phylogenetically the first psychical functions.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\n\u00c9TAT MENTAL DES HYST\u00c9RIQUES LES STIGMATES MENTAUX. By _Pierre Janet_.\nParis: Rueff & Co. 1892.\n\nM. Pierre Janet, one of the most prominent disciples of Professor\nCharcot, presents in this little volume of two hundred and thirty-three\npages a summary of the results of modern psychical research as it is\nunderstood at the Salp\u00e9tri\u00e8re. Charcot himself recommends the book to the\nmedical profession. Janet investigates an\u00e6sthesia (Chap. I), amnesia,\nabulia, the diseases of motion, and the modifications of character. The\nauthor proposes to \u201cdescribe the phenomena and endeavors to establish a\nrigorous determinism of their relations. The moral view of a diseased\nperson,\u201d he says, \u201cought to constitute a part of the clinical diagnosis\nwhile the psychical state must be closely investigated in its connection\nwith physiological facts. This is the only way in which the physician\ncan gain a knowledge of the entire man and understand the diseases which\naffect his organism.\u201d\n\nProfessor Charcot states that Professor Janet\u2019s researches on the mental\nstate of hysterical persons were begun long ago and completed under his\nsupervision; that they were expounded by M. Janet in the Spring of 1892\nin a few lectures at the Salp\u00e9tri\u00e8re; that they tend to confirm the\nidea, often expressed in his own teachings, that hysteria is upon the\nwhole a mental disease.\n\nHypnotism has long enough been regarded not only as harmless but even as\na panacea for almost all the ailments of mankind. It would be well to\nheed Charcot\u2019s warning, as hysterical diseases may be treated with better\nsuccess, if the mystery that still surrounds them disappears before calm\nand scientific investigation.\n\n \u03c2.\n\n\nL\u2019\u00c9COLE D\u2019ANTHROPOLOGIE CRIMINELLE. By _l\u2019Abb\u00e9 Maurice de Baets_. Gand:\nP. van Fleteren. 1893.\n\nDr. de Baets, Professor of Philosophy of the Gregorian University\nof Rome, Italy, and Secretary to the Bishop of Ghent, criticises in\nthis elegantly printed little volume the modern school of criminal\nanthropology. He believes with Herbert Spencer that, if a great number\nof people accept certain errors, these errors must contain a kernel of\ntruth. Professor de Baets says that he does not deny crime to be an\noutgrowth of the organism, to be inherited, to be closely connected with\ninsanity, etc., but he cannot approve of criminal unaccountableness. The\ndenial of responsibility, he says, is the denial of the wrong, and the\ndenial of the wrong is the denial of morality. He sums up his view in\nitalics on page 48: \u201cMan is responsible for his acts in the measure that\nhis acts depend on a free will.\u201d\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nAGAINST DOGMA AND FREE-WILL. By _H. Croft Hiller_. London: Williams and\nNORGATE. 1892.\n\nThe author has much to say against ecclesiasticism and sacerdotalism, and\nwhile he repudiates such men as Wundt and Ribot, he \u201cbegs to thank Drs.\nWeismann, Luys, and Ferrier from whose labors the views expressed in this\ntreatise derive that scientific authentication without which they would\nbe worthless.\u201d The book is apparently a first venture into the stormy\nocean of literary pursuits.\n\n \u03c2.\n\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF INDIVIDUALITY, OR THE ONE AND THE MANY. By _Antoinette\nBrown Blackwell_. New York and London: G. P. Putnam\u2019s Sons. 1893.\n\nThe author trusts that she has \u201c_demonstrated_ a conscious immortality.\u201d\nIn a former book of hers entitled \u201cThe Physical Basis of Immortality,\u201d\n1876, she propounded \u201cthe theory of persistent mind-matter individuals\u201d\nwhich are to be conceived as ultimate atoms. The present volume of five\nhundred and nineteen pages is written to show that \u201cthis conception of\nthe ultimate atoms could consistently explain and harmonise mental and\nmaterial phenomena and by co\u00f6rdinated interpretations of the most diverse\nprocesses simplify and unify nature and her manifestations.\u201d The theory\nof the correlation of matter and mind is accepted; \u201cNature,\u201d the author\nsays, \u201cis nothing if not mathematical,\u201d and there are many passages to\nwhich no monistic thinker would take exception. Along with them we find\nstatements, e. g. on the rhythmic motion of atoms, etc., which it will be\ndifficult to prove. Her peculiar view is characterised in the following\nsentence: \u201cAll ultimate individualities _may_ be identical in kind, but\nno obvious necessity decides that they _must_ be, and in an order of\nthings where other varieties are prevalent, the weight of evidence for\nthe present is on the side of varieties, even in the ultimate units.\u201d\nThe author\u2019s theory (if we rightly understand her) has been tried\nbefore. Some suggestions of Goethe\u2019s seem to indicate that he believed\nin soul-monads, and the German psychologist Herbart erected on the\nassumption of material soul-atoms his system of a mathematical psychology\nin which sound science was curiously mingled with improbable vagaries.\nThe author of \u201cThe Philosophy of Individuality,\u201d although apparently\nquite well informed otherwise, has, strange enough, not taken notice\neither of Goethe or of Herbart. Perhaps she would have abandoned her\ntheory if she had been fully familiar with Herbartism and the critique\nwhich it has received; for Herbart\u2019s soul-atoms are to-day regarded as a\nthing of the past.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nDIE GRUNDBEGRIFFE DER GEGENWART. By _Prof. Rudolf Eucken_. Leipsic: Veit\n& Co. 1893.\n\nProf. Rudolf Eucken discusses in this volume such topics as\n\u201cSubjective\u2014Objective\u201d; \u201cA priori\u2014A posteriori\u201d; \u201cMonism\u2014Dualism\u201d;\n\u201cIdealism, Realism, and Naturalism\u201d; \u201cTheoretical\u2014Practical,\u201d and\nso forth. It seems to us that Eucken has not yet fully succeeded in\nreconciling his philosophy with natural science. We are glad to notice\nthat he has a critical eye for the shortcomings of naturalists under\nwhose methods of classification and mechanical conceptions the properly\nspiritual of man would be eliminated. He is judicious in his exposition\nof the various problems, but we miss a final solution, such as would\nclearly state and recognise the truth in both. Nevertheless the book is\nsound, full of valuable information, and its perusal is to be recommended\nto every student of philosophy.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\nTHE \u00c6STHETIC ELEMENT IN MORALITY. By _Frank Chapman Sharp, Ph.D._ New\nYork: Macmillan & Co. 1893.\n\nThe book contains chapters on: (1) the theory of altruism; (2) the\nintrinsic worth of character; (3) an analysis of moral beauty; (4)\nan examination of the \u00e6sthetic method of ethics; and (5) the idea of\nobligation in \u00e6sthetics and ethics. The author\u2019s knowledge of ethical\ntheories appears to be limited. Duns Scotus, the Realist, is called a\nthoroughgoing Nominalist. In spite of such defects, we find much that\nis good in the book. In the end of his discussion the author says with\ntruth: \u201cWhen the element of the _good_, or that which is capable of\nclothing itself in the form of an ideal, is taken out of the conception\nof obligation, this latter degenerates into what is nothing more than\nmere submission to an arbitrary imperative....Prometheus, chained to the\nrocks for bringing the gift of fire to the wretched barbarous inhabitants\nof the earth, in defiance of the will of the \u2018Father of gods and men,\u2019 is\none of the grandest productions of the human imagination, and were the\nSupreme Being such a one as Augustine and Calvin imagined him, we should\ndespise the wretched slaves that licked the dust at his feet.\u201d\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\n\n\n\nPERIODICALS.\n\n\nZEITSCHRIFT F\u00dcR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. V. Nos. 1 and 2.\n\n DIE STABILIT\u00c4T DER RAUMWERTE AUF DER NETZHAUT. By _Franz\n Hillebrand_.\n\n UEBER EIN OPTISCHES PARADOXON. (Second Article.) By _Franz\n Brentano_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)\n\nThis second article, \u201cOn an Optical Paradox,\u201d is a rejoinder of Franz\nBrentano of Vienna to Th. Lipps. We gave an account of this interesting\ndiscussion in _The Monist_, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 153 et seqq. Professor\nBrentano insists on explaining the optical illusion concerning distances\nbetween two points, as seen in Fig. 1-3, by an overestimation of\nsmall and an underestimation of large angles. He complains of being\nmisunderstood by Professor Lipps who substitutes \u201cacute\u201d for \u201csmall\u201d and\n\u201cobtuse\u201d for \u201clarge\u201d; for, says he, in comparisons both angles may be\nobtuse or both may be acute. Professor Brentano adds some more puzzling\nfigures to prove his case; and, as in his first article, his propositions\nare ingenious and thought-stimulating; but his arguments do not suffice\nto convince us of the validity of his theory. We do not exactly\nintend to deny the general rule as to the overestimation of large and\nunderestimation of small angles, but are inclined to believe that it will\nnot serve as a sufficient explanation. We reproduce the most important\nfigures devised by Brentano, and take the liberty of adding a few remarks\nand additional figures of our own.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 1.]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 2.]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 3.]\n\nFig. 4 represents two right angles, one of which is divided into nine\nangles of 10\u00b0 each. Brentano claims that we so overestimate the nine\nsmall angles as to take the undivided right angle as an acute one. I can\nonly say that however much I have tried, I am not subject to the illusion.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 4.]\n\nIn Fig. 5 we have on the straight line _AB_ a series of stations which\nare connected with a common centre. The line _AB_ is not a curve, but\nthis figure reminds us of a perspective view of the sector of a circle.\nThe drawing appears as the diagrammatic picture of a shield, the buckle\nof which is in _C_. Thus _AB_ is conceived as representing a curve. It\ndoes not seem that a comparison of the angles has anything to do with the\nillusion.\n\nHow much perspective interferes with the optical illusions under\ndiscussion, impresses itself upon my mind, when I think of figure 5 as\nthe diagram of a mountain, rising above the plane _AB_. If I imagine I\nstand below the plane, which may be a high table-land, the line _AB_\nappears to my eye straight. But when I imagine I am looking down upon the\nplane, the curvature of _AB_ becomes very strongly marked.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 5.]\n\nIn Fig. 6 we can detect no optical illusion. The line _AB_ appears\nstraight to us. The drawing reminds us of a sunrise on the ocean.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 6.]\n\nThe same must be said about Figure 7. Brentano, in agreement with Lipps,\nclaims that we are inclined to regard the distance between the ends of\nthe two lines as larger than between the points. If there is any illusion\nat all, it seems to me, that on the contrary, the distance between the\nends of the lines appears shorter. And why? We measure the distance by\nallowing our eyes to run from one point to the other and then comparing\nthe measurements. This comparison is geometrically effected by combining\nthe respective starting points, and thus judging as to the parallelism\nof these two lines mentally constructed. Whether or not the dots appear\nequidistant, depends upon the execution of all these operations. While\ndirectly measuring the distances between the points, we have an easier\nmeasurement where the lines are attached. The lines give to the points\na certain vim; they almost appear to move with a velocity indicated by\nthe length of the little lines, while the isolated dots present a very\nphlegmatic appearance.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 7.]\n\nIn order to see what effects other positions of the lines produce, let\nus compare in Fig. 9 the several relations by covering the rest. If\nthere is any illusion as to _a_ and _b_, we should say that the points\nof _a_ appear at a greater distance; as to _b_ and _c_, we see the\ngreater distance in _c_, as to _c_ and _d_, we feel doubtful, while\nany comparison with _e_, tends strongly to convince us of their equal\ndistance. The reason is obvious. The lines in _e_ assist us in drawing\nthe parallels, which we consciously or unconsciously construct in order\nto compare the distances.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 8.]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 9.]\n\nA comparison like that of \u03b1 and \u03b2 in Fig. 8, where the equal length of\nthe combining lines is very apparent, induced Brentano to regard the\nillusion which is observed in Figures 1-3 as due to the angles. In our\nopinion he is mistaken. For the illusion actually takes place in \u03b1 and\n\u03b2; only it is quickly corrected with the help of the parallels, which,\nas in \u03b5, assist the imagination in making an exact comparison. When we\nplace \u03b1 and \u03b2 either at a sufficient distance, or are somehow prevented\nfrom making use of the parallel lines, we shall have the same illusion\nas appears in Figures 1, 2, 3. To prove this, we have but to bring the\nfigure \u03b1 in a slanting position, as is shown in \u03bb, and the illusion\nis so strong that many will find it difficult to believe that \u03bb is an\nelectrotyped duplicate of \u03b1.\n\nThe mooted illusions are not sense-illusions, but illusions of judgment;\nand we believe that the explanation of these curious phenomena must be\nsought in the elements which unconsciously enter into the make-up of our\njudgments.\n\nLipps says that lines are felt to be movements. If a line is continued,\nalbeit with a slight declination, the motion appears \u201cfree and\nvictorious,\u201d aspiring beyond itself; while, if confined in the corner\nof an acute angle, it seems cut off and impeded. The victoriously\nprogressive motion is overestimated; the checked motion is underestimated.\n\nBrentano, in order to meet Lipps\u2019s objections, proposes a few additional\nfigures, of which we reproduce the most important ones in Fig. 10-14.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 10.]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 11.]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 12.]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 13.]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 14.]\n\nIt seems to us that the main part which the angles play in these or any\nother similar figures, consists in leading our imagination astray. The\nparallel lines which we attempt to construct for our comparison, switch\nslightly off with an inclination toward the angles.\n\nBut that is not all; there are other elements that affect our judgment\nat the very outset. In measuring a distance we do something, and in\nlooking at a diagram we think something. The diagram is suggestive of\nsome reality to which we compare it. All these ideas, be they conscious,\nsubconscious, or even unconscious, affect our judgment and are sometimes\napt to lead it astray.\n\nIn addition we have to mention two things, the influence of which upon\nour verdict cannot be doubted; the one is the size of the entire figure,\nthe other the vacuity of the distance to be measured: both tend to make\nthe distance appear longer than it really is. To illustrate this, we add\nthe three Figures 15, 16, 17 which contain no angles and yet show the\nsame illusions.\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 15.]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 16.]\n\n[Illustration: Fig. 17.]\n\nThe distance between the points in Figure 17 appears longer than in\nFigure 16, and in Figure 16 again longer than in Figure 15. The fact is,\nthat before starting on our measurement-journey, we have in Figure 17\nalready traversed a good distance after having noted the extraordinarily\nlengthened boundary marks. The town _A_ may be exactly as far as the town\n_B_, yet the journey to _A_ will appear longer, if I have to ride an hour\nbefore I reach the station, while I may live opposite the terminus of the\nrailroad to _B_.\n\nWhen our eyes glide down from one point to the other, we pass in one\ncase through an empty desert the dreariness of which is not interrupted.\nWe almost lose our way and become lonesome in its monotony. If our way,\nhowever, is full of variations, we are pleasantly entertained and regard\nour journey as so much shorter. The contrast is most obvious in figure\n10. The time-illusions as to the swiftness of hours of work or amusement\nand the slowness of moments of _ennui_ have become proverbial among all\nnations. The more dreariness, the more marked is the lengthening of the\ndistance, while even a partial accompaniment shortens the traversed road.\n\n \u03ba\u03c1\u03c2.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. V. Nos. 3 and 4.\n\n THEORIE DES FARBENSEHENS. By _H. Ebbinghaus_.\n\n UEBER DEN MUSKELSINN BEI BLINDEN. By _Paul Hocheisen_.\n\n LITTERATURBERICHT. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)\n\n\nVIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT F\u00dcR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. XVII. No. 2.\n\n EINIGES ZUR GRUNDLEGUNG DER SITTENLEHRE. (First Article.) By\n _J. Petzoldt_.\n\n KRITIK DER GRUNDANSCHAUUNGEN DER SOCIOLOGIE H. SPENCER\u2019S. By\n _P. Barth_.\n\n WERTHTHEORIE UND ETHIK. (Second Article.) By _Chr. Ehrenfels_.\n (Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.)\n\n\nTHE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. V. No. 3.\n\n ON ERRORS OF OBSERVATION. By _Prof. James McKeen Cattell_.\n\n MINOR STUDIES FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY OF CLARK\n UNIVERSITY.\n\n ON THE DISCRIMINATION OF GROUPS OF RAPID CLICKS. By _Thaddeus\n L. Bolton_.\n\n STATISTICS OF DREAMS. By _Mary Whiton Calkins_.\n\n ON THE PRESSURE SENSE OF THE DRUM OF THE EAR AND \u201cFACIAL\n VISION.\u201d By _F. B. Dresslar_.\n\n ON REACTION-TIMES WHEN THE STIMULUS IS APPLIED TO THE REACTING\n HAND. By _J. F. Reigart and Edmund C. Sanford_.\n\n EXPERIMENTS UPON PHYSIOLOGICAL MEMORY BY MEANS OF THE\n INTERFERENCE OF ASSOCIATIONS. By _John A. Bergstr\u00f6m_.\n\n A NEW INSTRUMENT FOR WEBER\u2019S LAW; WITH INDICATIONS OF A LAW OF\n SENSE MEMORY. By _James H. Leuba_.\n\n A NEW PENDULUM CHRONOGRAPH. By _Edmund C. Sanford, Ph. D._\n\n LABORATORY COURSE IN PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. (Fourth Paper.)\n By _Edmund C. Sanford, Ph. D._ (Worcester, Mass.: J. H. Orpha.)\n\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. II. No. 3.\n\n GERMAN KANTIAN BIBLIOGRAPHY. By _Dr. Erich Adickes_.\n\n THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF NEO-KANTISM. By _Prof. Andrew Seth_.\n\n MENTAL MEASUREMENT. By _Prof. J. McK. Cattell_.\n\n BOOK REVIEWS. (Boston, New York, Chicago: Ginn & CO.)\n\n\nREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 5.\n\n PSYCHOLOGIE DU MUSICIEN. 1. L\u2019EVOLUTION DES APTITUDES\n MUSICALES. By _L. Dauriac_.\n\n LA SOCIABILIT\u00c9 ET LA MORALE CHEZ LES ANIMAUX. By _Houssay_.\n\n SUR LES ID\u00c9ES G\u00c9N\u00c9RALES. By _Marchesini_.\n\n QUESTIONNAIRE SUR L\u2019AUDITION COLOR\u00c9E, FIGUR\u00c9E ET ILLUMIN\u00c9E. By\n _Gruber_.\n\n L\u2019ATTENTION ET LES IMAGES. By _F. Paulhan_.\n\n UNE ILLUSION D\u2019OPTIQUE. By _B. Bourdon_.\n\n SCIENCE ET SOCIALISME. _G. Sorel_.\n\n ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS. (Paris: F\u00e9lix Alcan.)\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 6.\n\n LA NOUVELLE TH\u00c9ORIE DE L\u2019H\u00c9R\u00c9DIT\u00c9 DE WEISMANN. By _Y. Delage_.\n\n UN CALCULATEUR DU TYPE VISUEL. By _J.-M. Charcot and A. Binet_.\n\n PSYCHOLOGIE DU MUSICIEN.\u2014II. L\u2019OREILLE MUSICALE. By _L.\n Dauriac_.\n\n\nREVUE DE M\u00c9TAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 2.\n\n LE MOUVEMENT ET LES ARGUMENTS DE Z\u00c9NON D\u2019\u00c9L\u00c9E. By _G. No\u00ebl_.\n\n LE PROBL\u00c8ME MORAL DANS LA PHILOSOPHIE DE SPINOZA. By _V.\n Delbos_.\n\n LE CONCEPT DU NOMBRE CHEZ LES PYTHAGORICIENS. By _G. Milhaud_.\n\n LE DIALOGUE DANS L\u2019ENSEIGNEMENT DE LA PHILOSOPHIE. By _C.\n M\u00e9linand_. (Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie.)\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 3.\n\n LES PR\u00c9TENDUS SOPHISMES DE Z\u00c9NON D\u2019\u00c9L\u00c9E. By _V. Brochard_.\n\n SPIR ET SA DOCTRINE. By _A. Penjon_.\n\n ESSAI SUR LE CARACT\u00c8RE G\u00c9N\u00c9RAL DE LA CONNAISSANCE. By _G.\n Remacle_.\n\n\nPHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH.\n\nCONTENTS: Vol. VI. No. 2.\n\n BEGRIFF DER PHILOSOPHIE. By _Uebinger_.\n\n DIE OBJECTIVIT\u00c4T UND DIE SICHERHEIT DES ERKENNENS. By\n _Isenkrahe_.\n\n DER BEGRIFF DES \u201cWARREN.\u201d (Concluded.) By _Franz Schmid_.\n\n DER GRUNDPLAN DER MENSCHLICHEN WISSENSCHAFT. By _Bahlmann, S.\n J._\n\n HANDSCHRIFTLICHES ZU DEN WERKEN DES ALANUS. By _B\u00e4umker_.\n (Fulda, 1893.)","title":"The Monist, Vol. 3, 1892-1893 : $b A quarterly magazine","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":264585}