{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_77014/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_77014","id":"gutenberg_77014","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/77014","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Mind and body -- Early works to 1800","Neoplatonism -- Early works to 1800","Odysseus, King of Ithaca (Mythological character)","Soul -- Early works to 1800","Vegetarianism -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"SELECT WORKS\n                                    OF\n                                 PORPHYRY;\n\n                                CONTAINING\n                             HIS FOUR BOOKS ON\n                       ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD;\n                              HIS TREATISE ON\n                      THE HOMERIC CAVE OF THE NYMPHS;\n                                  AND HIS\n                                AUXILIARIES\n                                  TO THE\n                    PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES.\n\n                        _TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK_\n\n                                    BY\n                              THOMAS TAYLOR.\n\n                                   WITH\n                               AN APPENDIX,\n           EXPLAINING THE ALLEGORY OF THE WANDERINGS OF ULYSSES.\n                            BY THE TRANSLATOR.\n\n           \u039a\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03c9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03b2\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2,\n           \u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03b7 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc3\u03b4\u03b5, \u03b1\u03bd\u03b7\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc3\u03b4\u03b5, \u03c6\u03c5\u03b3\u03b7\n           \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd.\u2014PLOTINI Op. p. 771.\n\n                                  LONDON:\n                                PRINTED FOR\n                  THOMAS RODD, 17, GREAT NEWPORT STREET.\n                                   1823.\n\n                                  LONDON:\n                   PRINTED BY J. MOYES, GREVILLE STREET.\n\n\n\n\n                                    TO\n\n                      THE REV. WILLIAM JOHN JOLLIFFE,\n\n                  AS A TESTIMONY OF GREAT ESTEEM FOR HIS\n                            TALENTS AND WORTH,\n\n                AND A TRIBUTE OF THE WARMEST GRATITUDE FOR\n                              HIS PATRONAGE,\n\n                          THIS WORK IS DEDICATED\n\n                           _BY THE TRANSLATOR_,\n\n                              THOMAS TAYLOR.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nPorphyry, the celebrated author of the treatises translated in this\nvolume, was dignified by his contemporaries, and by succeeding\nPlatonists, with the appellation of _the philosopher_, on account of his\nvery extraordinary philosophical attainments. He is likewise called by\nSimplicius, _the most learned of the philosophers_, and is praised by\nProclus for his \u03b9\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u03b7 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, or _conceptions adapted to sanctity_;\nthe truth of all which appellations is by the following treatises most\nabundantly and manifestly confirmed.\n\nA few biographical particulars only have been transmitted to us\nrespecting this great man, and these are as follow. He was born at Tyre,\nin the twelfth year of the reign of the Emperor Alexander Severus, and\nin the two hundred and thirty-third of the Christian era; and he died at\nRome, when he was more than seventy years old, in the latter part of the\nEmperor Dioclesian\u2019s reign. He was also a disciple first of Longinus,\nand afterwards of the great Plotinus, with whom he became acquainted in\nthe thirtieth year of his age; and it is to Porphyry we are indebted\nfor the publication of the inestimable and uncommonly profound works\nof that most extraordinary man. For, as I have observed in my History\nof the Restoration of the Platonic Theology, it was a long time before\nPlotinus committed his thoughts to writing, and gave the world a copy\nof his inimitable mind. That light which was destined to illuminate the\nphilosophical world, as yet shone with solitary splendour, or beamed\nonly on a beloved few; and it was through Porphyry alone that it at\nlength emerged from its sanctuary, and displayed its radiance in full\nperfection, and with unbounded diffusion. For Porphyry, in the language\nof Eunapius, \u201clike a Mercurial chain let down for the benefit of mortals,\nunfolded every thing with accuracy and clearness, by the assistance of\nuniversal erudition.\u201d\n\nWe are likewise informed, by the same Eunapius, that Porphyry, when\nhe first associated with Plotinus, bade farewell to all his other\npreceptors, and totally applied himself to the friendship of that\nwonderful man. Here he filled his mind with science, as from a perennial\nand never-satiating fount. But afterwards, being conquered, as it were,\nby the magnitude of his doctrines, he conceived a hatred of body, and\ncould no longer endure the fetters of mortality.\u2014\u201cHence,\u201d says he[1],\n\u201cI formed an intention of destroying myself, which Plotinus wonderfully\nperceived; and as I was walking home, stood before me, and said, _Your\npresent design, O Porphyry, is not the dictate of a sound intellect, but\nrather of a soul raging with an atrabilarious fury_. In consequence of\nthis he ordered me to depart from Rome; and accordingly I went to Sicily,\nhaving heard that a certain worthy and elegant man dwelt at that time\nabout Lilyb\u00e6um. And thus, indeed, I was liberated from this perturbation\nof soul; but was, in the meantime, hindered from being with Plotinus till\nhis death.\u201d\n\nPorphyry also maintains a very distinguished rank among those great\ngeniuses who contributed to the development of the genuine dogmas of\nPlato, after they had been lost for upwards of five hundred years; as\nI have shown in my above-mentioned History of the Restoration of the\nPlatonic Theology. Among these dogmas, that which is transcendently\nimportant is this,\u2014that the ineffable principle of things, which is\ndenominated by Plato _the good_ and _the one_, is something superior to\nintellect and being itself. This, as we are informed by Proclus, was\ndemonstrated by Porphyry, by many powerful and beautiful arguments,\nin his treatise Concerning Principles, which is unfortunately lost.\nAnd this dogma, which was derived principally from the 6th book of the\nRepublic, and the Parmenides, of Plato, and was adopted by all succeeding\nPlatonists, is copiously unfolded, and the truth of it supported by\nreasoning replete with what Plato calls geometrical necessities, by those\ntwo great philosophical luminaries Proclus and Damascius[2]; the former\nof whom was the Coryph\u00e6us of the Platonists, and the latter possessed a\nprofoundly investigating mind.\n\nOf the disciples of Porphyry the most celebrated was Iamblichus, a man\nof an uncommonly penetrating genius, and who, like his master Plato,\non account of the sublimity of his conceptions, and his admirable\nproficiency in theological learning, was surnamed _the divine_. This\nextraordinary man, though zealously attached to the Platonic philosophy,\nyet explored the wisdom of other sects, particularly of the Pythagoreans,\nEgyptians, and Chaldeans; and formed one beautiful system of recondite\nknowledge, from their harmonious conjunction[3].\n\nWith respect to the works of Porphyry which are translated in this\nvolume, the first, which is _On Abstinence from Animal Food_, is a\ntreatise not only replete with great erudition, but is remarkable for the\npurity of life which it inculcates, and the sanctity of conception with\nwhich it abounds. At the same time it must be remembered, that it was\nwritten solely, as Porphyry himself informs us, with a view to the man\nwho wishes in the present life to liberate himself as much as possible\nfrom the fetters of the corporeal nature, in order that he may elevate\nhis intellectual eye to the contemplation of _truly-existing being_\n(\u03c4\u03bf \u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u03bd,) and may establish himself in deity as in his paternal\nport[4]. But such a one, as he beautifully observes, must divest himself\nof every thing of a mortal nature which he has assumed, must withdraw\nhimself from sense and imagination, and the irrationality with which\nthey are attended, and from an adhering affection and passion towards\nthem; and must enter the stadium naked and unclothed, striving for the\nmost glorious of all prizes, the Olympia of the soul[5]. Hence, says\nhe, \u201cmy discourse is not directed to those who are occupied in sordid\nmechanical arts, nor to those who are engaged in athletic exercises;\nneither to soldiers nor sailors, nor rhetoricians, _nor to those who lead\nan active life_[6]; but I write to the man who considers what he is,\nwhence he came, and whither he ought to tend, and who, in what pertains\nto nutriment and other necessary concerns, is different from those who\npropose to themselves other kinds of life; _for to none but such as these\ndo I direct my discourse_[7].\u201d This treatise, also, is highly valuable\nfor the historical information which it contains, independently of the\nphilosophical beauties with which it abounds.\n\nThe _Explanation of the Homeric Cave of the Nymphs_, which follows next,\nis not only remarkable for the great erudition which it displays, but\nalso for containing some profound arcana of the mythology and symbolical\ntheology of the Greeks.\n\nAnd the third treatise, which is denominated _Auxiliaries to the\nPerception of Intelligibles_, may be considered as an excellent\nintroduction to the works of Plotinus in general, from which a great\npart of it is extracted, and in particular, to the following books of\nthat most sublime genius, viz. On the Virtues[8]; On the Impassivity\nof Incorporeal Natures[9]; and On Truly-Existing Being, in which it is\ndemonstrated that such being is every where one and the same whole[10].\nThis Porphyrian treatise, also, is admirably calculated to afford\nassistance to the student of the Theological Elements of Proclus, a work\nnever to be sufficiently praised for the scientific accuracy, profundity\nof conception, and luminous development of the most important dogmas,\nwhich it displays.\n\nIn the fourth place, Porphyry, in his treatise On the Cave of the Nymphs,\nhaving informed us, that Numenius, the Pythagorean, considered the person\nof Ulysses, in the Odyssey, as the image of a man who passes in a regular\nmanner over the stormy sea of generation, or a sensible life, and thus at\nlength arrives at a region where tempest and seas are unknown, and finds\na nation\n\n    \u201cWho ne\u2019er knew salt, or heard the billows roar:\u201d\n\nI have endeavoured, by the assistance of this intimation, to unfold,\nin the Appendix which concludes the work, the secret meaning of the\nallegory; and, I trust, in a way which will not be deemed by the\nintelligent reader either visionary or vain.\n\nWith respect to the translation of the treatises, I have endeavoured\nfaithfully to preserve both the matter and manner of the author; and\nhave availed myself of the best editions of them, and, likewise, of all\nthe information which appeared to me to be most important, and most\nappropriate, from the remarks of critics and philologists, but especially\nfrom the elucidations of philosophers. This, I trust, will be evident\nfrom a perusal of the notes which accompany the translation.\n\nOf all the other writings of Porphyry, besides those translated in this\nvolume, few unfortunately have been preserved entire[11], the greater\npart of what remains of them being fragments. Among these fragments,\nhowever, there is one very important, lately found by Angelus Maius,\nand published by him, Mediol. 1816, 8vo. It is nearly the whole of the\nEpistle of Porphyry to his wife Marcella, in which I have discovered\nthe original of many of the Sentences of the celebrated Sextus\nPythagoricus[12], which have been hitherto supposed to be alone extant\nin the fraudulent Latin version of the Presbyter Ruffinus. And for\nan account of the other entire works and fragments that are extant,\nand also of the lost writings of Porphyry, I refer the reader to the\nBibliotheca Gr\u00e6ca of Fabricius, and to my before-mentioned History of\nthe Restoration of the Platonic Theology; in which latter work, in\nspeaking of Porphyry\u2019s lost treatise on the Reascent of the Soul, I have\ngiven a long and most interesting extract relative to that treatise,\nfrom Synesius on Dreams.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] In Vit. Plotin.\n\n[2] See the 2d book of my translation of Proclus on the Theology of\nPlato, and the Introduction to my translation of Plato, and notes on the\n3d volume of that translation.\n\n[3] See my translation of his Life of Pythagoras, and also of his\ntreatise on the Mysteries. The Emperor Julian says of Iamblichus, \u201cthat\nhe was posterior in time, but not in genius, to Plato himself.\u201d\n\n[4] Such a man as this, is arranged by Plotinus in the class of _divine\nmen_, in the following extract from my translation of his treatise\non Intellect, Ideas, and Real Being, Ennead V. 9. The extract, which\nis uncommonly beautiful in the original, forms the beginning of the\ntreatise. \u201cSince all men, from their birth, employ sense prior to\nintellect, and are necessarily first conversant with sensibles, some,\nproceeding no farther, pass through life, considering these as the first\nand last of things, and apprehending, that whatever is painful among\nthese, is evil, and whatever is pleasant, is good; thus, thinking it\nsufficient to pursue the one and avoid the other. Those, too, among\nthem, who pretend to a greater share of reason than others, esteem this\nto be wisdom; being affected in a manner similar to more heavy birds,\nwho, collecting many things from the earth, and being oppressed with the\nweight, are unable to fly on high, though they have received wings for\nthis purpose from nature. But others are in a small degree elevated from\nthings subordinate, the more excellent part of the soul recalling them\nfrom pleasure to a more worthy pursuit. As they are, however, unable\nto look on high, and as not possessing any thing else which can afford\nthem rest, they betake themselves, together with the name of virtue, to\nactions and the election of things inferior, from which they at first\nendeavoured to raise themselves, though in vain. _In the third class is\nthe race of divine men_, who through a more excellent power, and with\npiercing eyes, acutely perceive supernal light, to the vision of which\nthey raise themselves, above the clouds and darkness, as it were, of this\nlower world, and there abiding, despise every thing in these regions of\nsense; being no otherwise delighted with the place which is truly and\nproperly their own, than he who, after many wanderings, is at length\nrestored to his lawful country.\u201d\n\n[5] Page 23.\n\n[6] The translator of this work, and of the other treatises contained\nin this volume, having been so circumstanced, that he has been obliged\nto mingle the active with the contemplative life (\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03c5\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2) in acquiring for himself a knowledge of the philosophy of\nPlato, and disseminating that philosophy for the good of others, has also\nfound it expedient to make use of a fleshy diet. Nothing, however, but an\nimperious necessity, from causes which it would be superfluous to detail\nat present, could have induced him to adopt animal, instead of vegetable\nnutriment. But though he has been nurtured in Eleatic and Academic\nstudies, yet it has not been in Academic bowers.\n\n[7] Page 19.\n\n[8] Ennead I. 2.\n\n[9] Ennead III. 6.\n\n[10] Ennead VI. lib. 4, 5.\n\n[11] For even with respect to the treatise On Abstinence from Animal\nFood, there is every reason to believe that something is wanting at the\nend of it.\n\n[12] See the Latin translation of these Sentences by Ruffinus, in the\nOpuscula Mythologica of Gale. The Sentences which are to be found in this\nEpistle of Porphyry, were published by me, with some animadversions, in\nthe Classical Journal, about two years ago; but on account of the great\nimportance of these Sentences, and for the sake of those who may not have\nthis Journal in their possession, I shall here repeat what I have there\nsaid on this subject.\n\nAfter having premised that great praise is due to the editor for the\npublication of this Epistle, but that, as he has taken no notice of the\nsources whence most of the beautiful moral sentences with which this\nEpistle abounds, are derived, it becomes necessary to unfold them to the\nreader, particularly as by this means several of the Sentences of Sextus\nPythagoricus may be obtained in the original Greek;\u2014I then observe:\n\nPrevious, however, to this development, I shall present the reader\nwith the emendation of the following defective sentence in p. 19: \u03a4\u03bf\n\u03b4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5\u03ba \u03b5\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9 ... \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf. The editor, not being an adept in the philosophy of\nPythagoras and Plato, conceived that \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 was a genuine word; for he\nremarks, \u201cNota vocabulum \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03be\u03b9\u03c2,\u201d whereas it is only a part of a word,\n_i.e._ it is a part of \u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03be\u03b5\u03b9. Hence, if after \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9, the words\n\u03b5\u03bd \u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 are inserted, the sentence of Porphyry will be perfect both\nin its construction and meaning, and will be in English, \u201cErudition\ndoes not consist in the resumption of polymathy, but is to be surveyed\nin a liberation from the passions pertaining to the soul.\u201d The editor,\nnot perceiving the necessity of this emendation, has, by the following\nversion, totally mistaken the meaning of the sentence: \u201cBonam autem\ninstitutionem nunquam \u00e6stimem, qu\u00e6 cum eruditionis copia, animalium\nquoque passionum contaminatione sordescat.\u201d\n\nThe first sentence of which I have discovered the source, is from Sextus,\nand is the following, in p. 23: \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\n\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c5: _i.e._ \u201cFor God is not in want of any thing; but the wise\nman is alone in want of God.\u201d This, in the version of Ruffinus, is: \u201cDeus\nquidem nullius eget, fidelis autem Dei solius.\u201d (Vid. Opusc. Mytholog.\n8vo. 1688, p. 646.)\n\n2. \u03a0\u03b1\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03c0\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b5\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, (p. 24): _i.e._ \u201cOf every action, and of every deed and word,\nGod is present as the scrutator and inspector.\u201d This is evidently derived\nfrom the following sentence of Demophilus, (Opusc. Mythol. p. 621): \u0395\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03b1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03b7\u03c2, \u03bf\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b1\u03bd \u1f26 \u03b7 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c5, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9,\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c6\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b5\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u1fc3\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b5\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd, _i.e._ \u201cIf you\nalways remember, that wherever your soul, or your body, performs any\ndeed, God is present as an inspector, in all your prayers and actions,\nyou will reverence the nature of an inspector, from whom nothing can\nbe concealed, and will have God for a cohabitant.\u201d What immediately\nfollows in this paragraph is from Sextus, viz. \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\n\u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b7\u03b3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1: _i.e._ \u201cOf all the good that we do, we\nshould consider God as the cause.\u201d And Sextus says, p. 648. \u201cDeus in\nbonis actibus hominibus dux est.\u201d Porphyry adds: \u03a4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\n\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03bf\u03b9 \u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9, \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2. And the latter part is\nevidently from Sextus, who says, p. 648, \u201cMali nullius autor est Deus.\u201d\nPorphyry further adds: \u039f\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u03c5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1 \u03b1\u03be\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c5\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03c9\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u1f03\n\u03bc\u03b7 \u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c9\u03bd \u03b7\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bf\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9, \u03c4\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03b5\u03c5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2: _i.e._ \u201cHence we should ask of God\nthings which are worthy of him, and which we cannot receive from any\nother. The goods also, of which labours are the leaders, in conjunction\nwith virtue, we should pray that we may obtain after the labours [are\naccomplished].\u201d All this is from Sextus. For, in p. 648, he says: \u201cH\u00e6c\nposce \u00e0 Deo, qu\u00e6 dignum est pr\u00e6stare Deum. Ea pete \u00e0 Deo, qu\u00e6 accipere\nab homine non potes. In quibus pr\u00e6cedere debet labor, h\u00e6c tibi opta\nevenire post laborem.\u201d Only, in this last sentence, Ruffinus has omitted\nto add, after _labor_, the words _cum virtute_. What Porphyry says,\nalmost immediately after this, is precisely the first of the Sentences of\nDemophilus, (Opusc. Mythol. p. 626), viz. \u1f0b \u03b4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2,\n\u03bc\u03b7 \u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c5\u00b7 \u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03c9\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f43 \u03bc\u03b7\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2: _i.e._ \u201cDo not ask of God that which, when you have obtained,\nyou cannot preserve. For every gift of God is incapable of being taken\naway; so that he will not give that which you cannot retain.\u201d The\nsentence immediately following this is ascribed to Pythagoras, and is to\nbe found in the Sentences of Stob\u00e6us, (edit. 1609, p. 65): viz. \u03a9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b1 \u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b5\u03b7\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u1fc3, \u03b5\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b1\n\u03b4\u03b5\u1fc3, \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5 \u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1. In\nStob\u00e6us, however, there is some difference, so as to render the sentence\nmore complete. For immediately after \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9, there is \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd; for\n\u03b4\u03b5\u03b7\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u1fc3 there is \u03b4\u03b5\u03b7\u03c3\u1fc3; for \u03b4\u03b5\u1fc3, \u03b4\u03b5\u03b7\u03c3\u1fc3; for \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2; for \u03c3\u03c5\n\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7, \u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u1ff3; and instead of \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1, \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1. This, therefore, translated, will be: \u201cDespise all those\nthings which, when liberated from the body, you will not want; and\nexercising yourself in those things, of which, when liberated from the\nbody, you will be in want, invoke the Gods to become your helpers.\u201d In\npp. 27 and 28, Porphyry says, \u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03c9\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 [\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1] \u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7 \u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f22 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b7\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b7 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, \u1f22 \u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1fb3\u03bd \u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1: _i.e._ \u201cIt\nshould be more eligible to you carelessly to throw away riches than\nreason; and to be vanquished when speaking the truth, than to vanquish\nby deception.\u201d And the latter part of this sentence is to be found in\nSextus: for in p. 649 he says, \u201cMelius est vinci vera dicentem, quam\nvincere, mentientem.\u201d Almost immediately after Porphyry adds, \u0391\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b7\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b7\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bf \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b5\u03be\n\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bf \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u1fb3\u03bd \u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b8\u03c5\u1fc3, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03bd\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u1fc3, \u03b1\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b9\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b9\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b7. This sentence is\nthe last of the Sentences of Demophilus, (Opusc. Mythol. p. 625); but\nin Porphyry it is in one part defective, and in another is fuller than\nin Demophilus. For in the first colon, \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd is wanting: in the\nsecond colon, after \u03bf \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b7\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, the words \u03bf \u03b4\u03b5\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 are wanting. And in Demophilus, instead of \u03bf \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, there\nis nothing more than \u03bf \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2. In Demophilus also, after \u03c9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u1fb3\u03bd \u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b8\u03c5\u1fc3 the words \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03bc\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bd\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u1fc3, are wanting. And in Porphyry, after\n\u03bd\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u1fc3, the words \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5 \u03bc\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9, are wanting.\nThis sentence therefore, thus amended, will be in English, \u201cIt is\nimpossible for the same person to be a lover of God, a lover of pleasure,\na lover of body, and a lover of riches. For a lover of pleasure is also\na lover of body; but a lover of body is entirely a lover of riches; and\na lover of riches is necessarily unjust. But he who is unjust 1s impious\ntowards God and his parents, and lawless towards others. So that, though\nhe should sacrifice hecatombs, and adorn temples with ten thousand gifts,\nhe will be much more unholy, impious, atheistical, and sacrilegious in\nhis deliberate choice. Hence it is necessary to avoid every lover of\nbody, as one who is without God, and is defiled.\u201d\n\n3. The following passages in the epistle of Porphyry, are from Sextus:\n\u039f \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03be\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c5, \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u03b9\u03b7, (p. 30) _i.e._ \u201cThe man who is\nworthy of God, will be himself a God.\u201d And Sextus says, \u201cDignus Deo\nhomo, deus est et in hominibus.\u201d (p. 654.) Porphyry says, \u039a\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bf\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff3 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c3\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03c9\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, (p. 30,)\n_i.e._ \u201cAnd you will honour God in the best manner, when you assimilate\nyour reasoning power to God.\u201d Thus also Sextus, \u201cOptime honorat Deum\nille, qui mentem suam, quantum fieri potest, similem Deo facit,\u201d (p.\n655.) Again, Porphyry says, \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u00b7\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd \u03b7\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd, (p. 31): _i.e._ \u201cGod corroborates\nman when he performs beautiful deeds; but an evil d\u00e6mon is the leader\nof bad actions.\u201d And Sextus says, \u201cDeus bonos actus hominum confirmat.\nMalorum actuum, malus d\u00e6mon dux est.\u201d (p. 653). Porphyry adds, \u03a8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7 \u03b4\u03b5\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u03c1\u1fb3, \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff3, (p. 31,)\n_i.e._ \u201cThe soul of the wise man is adapted to God; it always beholds\nGod, and is always present with God.\u201d Thus, too, Sextus, \u201cSapientis\nanima audit Deum, sapientis anima aptatur \u00e0 Deo, sapientis anima semper\nest cum Deo,\u201d (p. 655). There is, however, some difference between the\noriginal and the Latin version, which is most probably owing to the\nfraud of Ruffinus. And in the last place, Porphyry says, \u0391\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b7\u03c0\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03b2\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b9\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03c9 \u03b7 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03b9\u03b1, (p. 58,) _i.e._ \u201cPhilanthropy\nshould be considered by you as the foundation of piety.\u201d And Sextus says,\n\u201cFundamentum et initium est cult\u00fbs Dei, amare Dei homines.\u201d (p. 654).\nRuffinus, however, in this version, fraudulently translates \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03b9\u03b1,\n_amare Dei homines_, in order that this sentence, as well as the others,\nmight appear to be written by Sixtus the bishop!\n\n4. The learned reader will find the following passages in the Epistle of\nPorphyry, to be sentences of Demophilus, viz. \u039b\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c5\u03c0\u03bf\n\u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. usque ad \u03b9\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9, (p. 29). \u039f\u03c5\u03c7 \u03b7\n\u03b3\u03bb\u03c9\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff3, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. usque ad \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c5\u03be\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9,\n(p. 32). \u039f\u03c5 \u03c7\u03bf\u03bb\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03bf\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b2\u03bb\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. usque ad \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff3 \u03b4\u03b5\n\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd \u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, (p. 35). \u039f\u03c5\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03c5\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u03c6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9,\n\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b8\u03c5\u03b7\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\nusque ad \u03b9\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c7\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7\u03b3\u03b9\u03b1, (p. 36). In which passage, however, there\nis a remarkable difference, as the learned reader will find, between the\ntext of Porphyry and that of Demophilus. \u0395\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03b1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u1fc3\u03c2, \u03bf\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03b1\u03bd \u03b7 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u1fc3, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd (lege \u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd,) \u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1fc3, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\nusque ad \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd, (p. 37). \u039f \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b7\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\nusque ad \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2, (p. 54). \u0393\u03c5\u03bc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 [\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2]\n\u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. usque ad \u03b5\u03c0\u03b7\u03ba\u03bf\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2, (p. 54.) \u03a7\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03c9\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u1f22 \u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2. And \u03bf\u03c3\u03b1 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7\u03c2, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c9\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, (p.\n57). And lastly, \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1ff3 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5\u03b8\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f22 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c5\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9, (p. 58). In all these passages, it will be found, by comparing\nthem with Porphyry, that they occasionally differ from the text of\nDemophilus, yet not so as to alter the sense.\n\nI only add, that many of the Sentences of Demophilus will be found among\nthose of Sextus. Nor is this at all wonderful, as it was usual with the\nPythagoreans, from their exalted notions of friendship, to consider the\nwork of one of them as the production of all.\n\n\n\n\nTHE SELECT WORKS OF PORPHYRY.\n\n\n\n\nON ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD.\n\nBOOK THE FIRST.\n\n\n1. Hearing from some of our acquaintance, O Firmus[13], that you, having\nrejected a fleshless diet, have again returned to animal food, at first\nI did not credit the report, when I considered your temperance, and the\nreverence which you have been taught to pay to those ancient and pious\nmen from whom we have received the precepts of philosophy. But when\nothers who came after these confirmed this report, it appeared to me that\nit would be too rustic and remote from the rational method of persuasion\nto reprehend you, who neither, according to the proverb, flying from\nevil have found something better, nor according to Empedocles, having\nlamented your former life, have converted yourself to one that is more\nexcellent. I have therefore thought it worthy of the friendship which\nsubsists between us, and also adapted to those who have arranged their\nlife conformably to truth, to disclose your errors through a confutation\nderived from an argumentative discussion.\n\n2. For when I considered with myself what could be the cause of this\nalteration in your diet, I could by no means suppose that it was for the\nsake of health and strength, as the vulgar and idiots would say; since,\non the contrary, you yourself, when you were with us, confessed that a\nfleshless diet contributed both to health and to the proper endurance\nof philosophic labours; and experience testifies, that in saying this\nyou spoke the truth. It appears, therefore, that you have returned to\nyour former illegitimate[14] conduct, either through deception[15],\nbecause you think it makes no difference with respect to the acquisition\nof wisdom whether you use this or that diet; or perhaps through some\nother cause of which I am ignorant, which excited in you a greater fear\nthan that which could be produced by the impiety of transgression. For\nI should not say that you have despised the philosophic laws which we\nderived from our ancestors, and which you have so much admired, through\nintemperance, or for the sake of voracious gluttony; or that you are\nnaturally inferior to some of the vulgar, who, when they have assented\nto laws, though contrary to those under which they formerly lived, will\nsuffer amputation [rather than violate them], and will abstain from\ncertain animals on which they before fed, more than they would from human\nflesh.\n\n3. But when I was also informed by certain persons that you even employed\narguments against those who abstained from animal food, I not only\npitied, but was indignant with you, that, being persuaded by certain\nfrigid and very corrupt sophisms, you have deceived yourself, and have\nendeavoured to subvert a dogma which is both ancient and dear to the\nGods. Hence it appeared to me to be requisite not only to show you what\nour own opinion is on this subject, but also to collect and dissolve the\narguments of our opponents, which are much stronger than those adduced\nby you in multitude and power, and every other apparatus; and thus to\ndemonstrate, that truth is not vanquished even by those arguments which\nseem to be weighty, and much less by superficial sophisms. For you are\nperhaps ignorant, that not a few philosophers are adverse to abstinence\nfrom animal food, but that this is the case with those of the Peripatetic\nand Stoic sects, and with most of the Epicureans; the last of whom have\nwritten in opposition to the philosophy of Pythagoras and Empedocles, of\nwhich you once were studiously emulous. To this abstinence, likewise,\nmany philologists are adverse, among whom Clodius the Neapolitan wrote\na treatise against those who abstain from flesh. Of these men I shall\nadduce the disquisitions and common arguments against this dogma, at the\nsame time omitting those reasons which are peculiarly employed by them\nagainst the demonstrations of Empedocles.\n\n\n_The Arguments of the Peripatetics and Stoics, from Heraclides\nPonticus[16]._\n\n4. Our opponents therefore say, in the first place, that justice will be\nconfounded, and things immoveable be moved, if we extend what is just,\nnot only to the rational, but also to the irrational nature; conceiving\nthat not only Gods and men pertain to us, but that there is likewise an\nalliance between us and brutes, who [in reality] have no conjunction with\nus. Nor shall we employ some of them in laborious works, and use others\nfor food, from a conviction that the association which is between us and\nthem, in the same manner as that of some foreign polity, pertains to a\ntribe different from ours, and is dishonourable. For he who uses these\nas if they were men, sparing and not injuring them, thus endeavouring\nto adapt to justice that which it cannot bear, both destroys its power,\nand corrupts that which is appropriate, by the introduction of what is\nforeign. For it necessarily follows, either that we act unjustly by\nsparing them, or if we spare and do not employ them, that it will be\nimpossible for us to live. We shall also, after a manner, live the life\nof brutes, if we reject the use which they are capable of affording.\n\n5. For I shall omit to mention the innumerable multitude of Nomades and\nTroglodyt\u00e6, who know of no other nutriment than that of flesh; but to us\nwho appear to live mildly and philanthropically, what work would be left\nfor us on the earth or in the sea, what illustrious art, what ornament\nof our food would remain, if we conducted ourselves innoxiously and\nreverentially towards brutes, as if they were of a kindred nature with\nus? For it would be impossible to assign any work, any medicine, or any\nremedy for the want which is destructive of life, or that we can act\njustly, unless we preserve the ancient boundary and law.\n\n    To fishes, savage beasts, and birds, devoid\n    Of justice, Jove to devour each other\n    Granted; but justice to mankind he gave[17].\n\n_i.e._ towards each other.\n\n6. But it is not possible for us to act unjustly towards those to whom\nwe are not obliged to act justly. Hence, for those who reject this\nreasoning, no other road of justice is left, either broad or narrow,\ninto which they can enter. For, as we have already observed, our nature,\nnot being sufficient to itself, but indigent of many things, would be\nentirely destroyed, and enclosed in a life involved in difficulties,\nunorganic, and deprived of necessaries, if excluded from the assistance\nderived from animals. It is likewise said, that those first men did\nnot live prosperously; for this superstition did not stop at animals,\nbut compelled its votaries even to spare plants. For, indeed, what\ngreater injury does he do, who cuts the throat of an ox or a sheep,\nthan he who cuts down a fir tree or an oak? since, from the doctrine of\ntransmigration, a soul is also implanted in these. These therefore are\nthe principal arguments of the Stoics and Peripatetics.\n\n\n_The Arguments of the Epicureans, from Hermachus[18]._\n\n7. The Epicureans, however, narrating, as it were, a long genealogy, say,\nthat the ancient legislators, looking to the association of life, and\nthe mutual actions of men, proclaimed that manslaughter was unholy, and\npunished it with no casual disgrace. Perhaps, indeed, a certain natural\nalliance which exists in men towards each other, through the similitude\nof form and soul, is the reason why they do not so readily destroy an\nanimal of this kind, as some of the other animals which are conceded to\nour use. Nevertheless, the greatest cause why manslaughter was considered\nas a thing grievous to be borne, and impious, was the opinion that it\ndid not contribute to the whole nature and condition of human life.\nFor, from a principle of this kind, those who are capable of perceiving\nthe advantage arising from this decree, require no other cause of being\nrestrained from a deed so dire. But those who are not able to have a\nsufficient perception of this, being terrified by the magnitude of the\npunishment, will abstain from readily destroying each other. For those,\nindeed, who survey the utility of the before-mentioned ordinance, will\npromptly observe it; but those who are not able to perceive the benefit\nwith which it is attended, will obey the mandate, in consequence of\nfearing the threatenings of the laws; which threatenings certain persons\nordained for the sake of those who could not, by a reasoning process,\ninfer the beneficial tendency of the decree, at the same time that most\nwould admit this to be evident.\n\n8. For none of those legal institutes which were established from the\nfirst, whether written or unwritten, and which still remain, and are\nadapted to be transmitted, [from one generation to another] became lawful\nthrough violence, but through the consent of those that used them. For\nthose who introduced things of this kind to the multitude, excelled in\nwisdom, and not in strength of body, and the power which subjugates the\nrabble. Hence, through this, some were led to a rational consideration of\nutility, of which before they had only an irrational sensation, and which\nthey had frequently forgotten; but others were terrified by the magnitude\nof the punishments. For it was not possible to use any other remedy for\nthe ignorance of what is beneficial, than the dread of the punishment\nordained by law. For this alone even now keeps the vulgar in awe, and\nprevents them from doing any thing, either publicly or privately, which\nis not beneficial [to the community]. But if all men were similarly\ncapable of surveying and recollecting what is advantageous, there would\nbe no need of laws, but men would spontaneously avoid such things as\nare prohibited, and perform such as they were ordered to do. For the\nsurvey of what is useful and detrimental, is a sufficient incentive to\nthe avoidance of the one and the choice of the other. But the infliction\nof punishment has a reference to those who do not foresee what is\nbeneficial. For impendent punishment forcibly compels such as these to\nsubdue those impulses which lead them to useless actions, and to do that\nwhich is right.\n\n9. Hence also, legislators ordained, that even involuntary manslaughter\nshould not be entirely void of punishment; in order that they might\nnot only afford no pretext for the voluntary imitation of those deeds\nwhich were involuntarily performed, but also that they might prevent\nmany things of this kind from taking place, which happen, in reality,\ninvoluntarily. For neither is this advantageous through the same causes\nby which men were forbidden voluntarily to destroy each other. Since,\ntherefore, of involuntary deeds, some proceed from a cause which is\nunstable, and which cannot be guarded against by human nature; but\nothers are produced by our negligence and inattention to different\ncircumstances; hence legislators, wishing to restrain that indolence\nwhich is injurious to our neighbours, did not even leave an involuntary\nnoxious deed without punishment, but, through the fear of penalties,\nprevented the commission of numerous offences of this kind. I also am\nof opinion, that the slaughters which are allowed by law, and which\nreceive their accustomed expiations through certain purifications,\nwere introduced by those ancient legislators, who first very properly\ninstituted these things for no other reason than that they wished to\nprevent men as much as possible from voluntary slaughter. For the vulgar\nevery where require something which may impede them from promptly\nperforming what is not advantageous [to the community]. Hence those who\nfirst perceived this to be the case, not only ordained the punishment\nof fines, but also excited a certain other irrational dread, through\nproclaiming those not to be pure who in any way whatever had slain a man,\nunless they used purifications after the commission of the deed. For that\npart of the soul which is void of intellect, being variously disciplined,\nacquired a becoming mildness, certain taming arts having been from the\nfirst invented for the purpose of subduing the irrational impulses\nof desire, by those who governed the people. And one of the precepts\npromulgated on this occasion was, that men should not destroy each other\nwithout discrimination.\n\n10. Those, however, who first defined what we ought to do, and what we\nought not, very properly did not forbid us to kill other animals. For the\nadvantage arising from these is effected by a contrary practice, since\nit is not possible that men could be preserved, unless they endeavoured\nto defend those who are nurtured with themselves from the attacks of\nother animals. At that time, therefore, some of those, of the most\nelegant manners, recollecting that they abstained from slaughter because\nit was useful to the public safety, they also reminded the rest of the\npeople in their mutual associations of what was the consequence of this\nabstinence; in order that, by refraining from the slaughter of their\nkindred, they might preserve that communion which greatly contributes to\nthe peculiar safety of each individual. But it was not only found to be\nuseful for men not to separate from each other, and not to do any thing\ninjurious to those who were collected together in the same place, for\nthe purpose of repelling the attacks of animals of another species; but\nalso for defence against men whose design was to act nefariously. To a\ncertain extent, therefore, they abstained from the slaughter of men,\nfor these reasons, viz. in order that there might be a communion among\nthem in things that are necessary, and that a certain utility might be\nafforded in each of the above-mentioned incommodities. In the course of\ntime, however, when the offspring of mankind, through their intercourse\nwith each other, became more widely extended, and animals of a different\nspecies were expelled, certain persons directed their attention in a\nrational way to what was useful to men in their mutual nutriment, and did\nnot alone recal this to their memory in an irrational manner.\n\n11. Hence they endeavoured still more firmly to restrain those who\nreadily destroyed each other, and who, through an oblivion of past\ntransactions, prepared a more imbecile defence. But in attempting to\neffect this, they introduced those legal institutes which still remain\nin cities and nations; the multitude spontaneously assenting to them,\nin consequence of now perceiving, in a greater degree, the advantage\narising from an association with each other. For the destruction of\nevery thing noxious, and the preservation of that which is subservient\nto its extermination, similarly contribute to a fearless life. And\nhence it is reasonable to suppose, that one of the above-mentioned\nparticulars was forbidden, but that the other was not prohibited. Nor\nmust it be said, that the law allows us to destroy some animals which\nare not corruptive of human nature, and which are not in any other way\ninjurious to our life. For, as I may say, no animal among those which the\nlaw permits us to kill is of this kind; since, if we suffered them to\nincrease excessively, they would become injurious to us. But through the\nnumber of them which is now preserved, certain advantages are imparted\nto human life. For sheep and oxen, and every such like animal, when the\nnumber of them is moderate, are beneficial to our necessary wants; but\nif they become redundant in the extreme, and far exceed the number which\nis sufficient, they then become detrimental to our life; the latter by\nemploying their strength, in consequence of participating of this through\nan innate power of nature, and the former, by consuming the nutriment\nwhich springs up from the earth for our benefit alone. Hence, through\nthis cause, the slaughter of animals of this kind is not prohibited, in\norder that as many of them as are sufficient for our use, and which we\nmay be able easily to subdue, may be left. For it is not with horses,\noxen, and sheep, and with all tame animals, as it is with lions and\nwolves, and, in short, with all such as are called savage animals, that,\nwhether the number of them is small or great, no multitude of them can be\nassumed, which, if left, would alleviate the necessity of our life. And\non this account, indeed, we utterly destroy some of them; but of others,\nwe take away as many as are found to be more than commensurate to our use.\n\n12. On this account, from the above-mentioned causes, it is similarly\nrequisite to think, that what pertains to the eating of animals, was\nordained by those who from the first established the laws; and that the\nadvantageous and the disadvantageous were the causes why some animals\nwere permitted to be eaten and others not. So that those who assert,\nthat every thing beautiful and just subsists conformably to the peculiar\nopinions of men respecting those who established the laws, are full of a\ncertain most profound stupidity. For it is not possible that this thing\ncan take place in any other way than that in which the other utilities\nof life subsist, such as those that are salubrious, and an innumerable\nmultitude of others. Erroneous opinions, however, are entertained in many\nparticulars, both of a public and private nature. For certain persons do\nnot perceive those legal institutes, which are similarly adapted to all\nmen; but some, conceiving them to rank among things of an indifferent\nnature, omit them; while others, who are of a contrary opinion, think\nthat such things as are not universally profitable, are every where\nadvantageous. Hence, through this cause, they adhere to things which\nare unappropriate; though in certain particulars they discover what is\nadvantageous to themselves, and what contributes to general utility. And\namong these are to be enumerated the eating of animals, and the legally\nordained destructions which are instituted by most nations on account of\nthe peculiarity of the region. It is not necessary, however, that these\ninstitutes should be preserved by us, because we do not dwell in the same\nplace as those did by whom they were made. If, therefore, it was possible\nto make a certain compact with other animals in the same manner as with\nmen, that we should not kill them, nor they us, and that they should not\nbe indiscriminately destroyed by us, it would be well to extend justice\nas far as to this; for this extent of it would be attended with security.\nBut since it is among things impossible, that animals which are not\nrecipients of reason should participate with us of law, on this account,\nutility cannot be in a greater degree procured by security from other\nanimals, than from inanimate natures. But we can alone obtain security\nfrom the liberty which we now possess of putting them to death. And such\nare the arguments of the Epicureans.\n\n\n_The Arguments of Claudius the Neapolitan, who published a Treatise\nagainst Abstinence from Animal Food._\n\n13. It now remains, that we should adduce what plebeians and the vulgar\nare accustomed to say on this subject. For they say, that the ancients\nabstained from animals, not through piety, but because they did not yet\nknow the use of fire; but that as soon as they became acquainted with its\nutility, they then conceived it to be most honourable and sacred. They\nlikewise called it Vesta, and from this the appellation of _convestals_\nor companions was derived; and afterwards they began to use animals. For\nit is natural to man to eat flesh, but contrary to his nature to eat it\nraw. Fire, therefore, being discovered, they embraced what is natural,\nand admitted the eating of boiled and roasted flesh. Hence lynxes are\n[said by Homer[19] to be] _crudivorous_, or _eaters of raw flesh_; and of\nPriam, also, he says, as a disgraceful circumstance,\n\n    Raw flesh by you, O Priam, is devoured[20].\n\nAnd,\n\n    Raw flesh, dilacerating, he devoured[21].\n\nAnd this is said, as if the eating of raw flesh pertained to the impious.\nTelemachus, also, when Minerva was his guest, placed before her not raw,\nbut roasted flesh. At first, therefore, men did not eat animals, for man\nis not [naturally] a devourer of raw flesh. But when the use of fire was\ndiscovered, fire was employed not only for the cooking of flesh, but\nalso for most other eatables. For that man is not [naturally] adapted\nto eat raw flesh, is evident from certain nations that feed on fishes.\nFor these they roast, some upon stones that are very much heated by the\nsun; but others roast them in the sand. That man, however, is adapted to\nfeed on flesh, is evident from this, that no nation abstains from animal\nfood. Nor is this adopted by the Greeks through depravity, since the same\ncustom is admitted by the barbarians.\n\n14. But he who forbids men to feed on animals, and thinks it is unjust,\nwill also say that it is not just to kill them, and deprive them of life.\nNevertheless, an innate and just war is implanted in us against brutes.\nFor some of them voluntarily attack men, as, for instance, wolves and\nlions; others not voluntarily, as serpents, since they bite not, except\nthey are trampled on. And some, indeed, attack men; but others destroy\nthe fruits of the earth. From all these causes, therefore, we do not\nspare the life of brutes; but we destroy those who commence hostilities\nagainst us, as also those who do not, lest we should suffer any evil\nfrom them. For there is no one who, if he sees a serpent, will not, if\nhe is able, destroy it, in order that neither it, nor any other serpent,\nmay bite a man. And this arises, not only from our hatred of those that\nare the destroyers of our race, but likewise from that kindness which\nsubsists between one man and another. But though the war against brutes\nis just, yet we abstain from many which associate with men. Hence, the\nGreeks do not feed either on dogs, or horses, or asses, because of these,\nthose that are tame are of the same species as the wild. Nevertheless,\nthey eat swine and birds. For a hog is not useful for any thing but food.\nThe Ph\u0153nicians, however, and Jews, abstain from it, because, in short,\nit is not produced in those places. For it is said, that this animal is\nnot seen in Ethiopia even at present. As, therefore, no Greek sacrifices\na camel or an elephant to the Gods, because Greece does not produce\nthese animals, so neither is a hog sacrificed to the Gods in Cyprus or\nPh\u0153nicia, because it is not indigenous in those places. And, for the\nsame reason, neither do the Egyptians sacrifice this animal to the Gods.\nIn short, that some nations abstain from a hog, is similar to our being\nunwilling to eat the flesh of camels.\n\n15. But why should any one abstain from animals? Is it because feeding\non them makes the soul or the body worse? It is, however, evident, that\nneither of these is deteriorated by it. For those animals that feed on\nflesh are more sagacious than others, as they are venatic, and possess\nan art by which they supply themselves with food, and acquire power and\nstrength; as is evident in lions and wolves. So that the eating of flesh\nneither injures the soul nor the body. This likewise is manifest, both\nfrom the athlete, whose bodies become stronger by feeding on flesh, and\nfrom physicians, who restore bodies to health by the use of animal food.\nFor this is no small indication that Pythagoras did not think sanely,\nthat none of the wise men embraced his opinion; since neither any one of\nthe seven wise men, nor any of the physiologists who lived after them,\nnor even the most wise Socrates, or his followers, adopted it.\n\n16. Let it, however, be admitted that all men are persuaded of the truth\nof this dogma, respecting abstinence from animals. But what will be\nthe boundary of the propagation of animals? For no one is ignorant how\nnumerous the progeny is of the swine and the hare. And to these add all\nother animals. Whence, therefore, will they be supplied with pasture? And\nwhat will husbandmen do? For they will not destroy those who destroy the\nfruits of the earth. And the earth will not be able to bear the multitude\nof animals. Corruption also will be produced from the putridity of those\nthat will die. And thus, from pestilence taking place, no refuge will be\nleft. For the sea, and rivers, and marshes, will be filled with fishes,\nand the air with birds, but the earth will be full of reptiles of every\nkind.\n\n17. How many likewise will be prevented from having their diseases\ncured, if animals are abstained from? For we see that those who are\nblind recover their sight by eating a viper. A servant of Craterus, the\nphysician, happening to be seized with a new kind of disease, in which\nthe flesh fell away from the bones, derived no benefit from medicines;\nbut by eating a viper prepared after the manner of a fish, the flesh\nbecame conglutinated to the bones, and he was restored to health. Many\nother animals also, and their several parts, cure diseases when they\nare properly used for that purpose; of all which remedies he will be\nfrustrated who rejects animal food.\n\n18. But if, as they say, plants also have a soul, what will become of our\nlife if we neither destroy animals nor plants? If, however, he is not\nimpious who cuts off plants, neither will he who kills animals.\n\n19. But some one may, perhaps, say it is not proper to destroy that which\nbelongs to the same tribe with ourselves; if the souls of animals are\nof the same essence with ourselves. If, however, it should be granted\nthat souls are inserted in bodies voluntarily, it must be said that it\nis through a love of juvenility: for in the season of youth there is an\nenjoyment of all things. Why, therefore, do they not again enter into\nthe nature of man? But if they enter voluntarily, and for the sake of\njuvenility, and pass through every species of animals, they will be much\ngratified by being destroyed. For thus their return to the human form\nwill be more rapid. The bodies also which are eaten will not produce any\npain in the souls of those bodies, in consequence of the souls being\nliberated from them; and they will love to be implanted in the nature\nof man. Hence, as much as they are pained on leaving the human form,\nso much will they rejoice when they leave other bodies. For thus they\nwill more swiftly become man again, who predominates over all irrational\nanimals, in the same manner as God does over men. There is, therefore, a\nsufficient cause for destroying other animals, viz. their acting unjustly\nin destroying men. But if the souls of men are immortal, but those of\nirrational animals mortal, men will not act unjustly by destroying\nirrational animals. And if the souls of brutes are immortal, we shall\nbenefit them by liberating them from their bodies. For, by killing them,\nwe shall cause them to return to the human nature.\n\n20. If, however, we [only] defend ourselves [in putting animals to\ndeath], we do not act unjustly, but we take vengeance on those that\ninjure us. Hence, if the souls of brutes are indeed immortal, we benefit\nthem by destroying them. But if their souls are mortal, we do nothing\nimpious in putting them to death. And if we defend ourselves against\nthem, how is it possible that in so doing we should not act justly. For\nwe destroy, indeed, a serpent and a scorpion, though they do not attack\nus, in order that some other person may not be injured by them; and in so\ndoing we defend the human race in general. But shall we not act justly in\nputting those animals to death, which either attack men, or those that\nassociate with men, or injure the fruits of the earth?\n\n21. If, however, some one should, nevertheless, think it is unjust to\ndestroy brutes, such a one should neither use milk, nor wool, nor sheep,\nnor honey. For, as you injure a man by taking from him his garments,\nthus, also, you injure a sheep by shearing it. For the wool which you\ntake from it is its vestment. Milk, likewise, was not produced for you,\nbut for the young of the animal that has it. The bee also collects honey\nas food for itself; which you, by taking away, administer to your own\npleasure. I pass over in silence the opinion of the Egyptians, that we\nact unjustly by meddling with plants. But if these things were produced\nfor our sake, then the bee, being ministrant to us, elaborates honey, and\nthe wool grows on the back of sheep, that it may be an ornament to us,\nand afford us a bland heat.\n\n22. Co-operating also with the Gods themselves in what contributes to\npiety, we sacrifice animals: for, of the Gods, Apollo, indeed, is called\n\u03bb\u03c5\u03ba\u03bf\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, _the slayer of wolves_; and Diana, \u03b8\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, _the destroyer\nof wild beasts_. Demi-gods likewise, and all the heroes who excel us\nboth in origin and virtue, have so much approved of the slaughter of\nanimals, that they have sacrificed to the Gods _Dodece\u00efdes_[22] and\n_Hecatombs_. But Hercules, among other things, is celebrated for being an\n_ox-devourer_.\n\n23. It is, however, stupid to say that Pythagoras exhorted men to abstain\nfrom animals, in order that he might, in the greatest possible degree,\nprevent them from eating each other. For, if all men at the time of\nPythagoras were anthropophagites, he must be delirious who drew men away\nfrom other animals, in order that they might abstain from devouring each\nother. For, on this account, he ought rather to have exhorted them to\nbecome anthropophagites, by showing them that it was an equal crime to\ndevour each other, and to eat the flesh of oxen and swine. But if men\nat that time did not eat each other, what occasion was there for this\ndogma? And if he established this law for himself and his associates, the\nsupposition that he did so is disgraceful. For it demonstrates that those\nwho lived with Pythagoras were anthropophagites.\n\n24. For we say that the very contrary of what he conjectured would\nhappen. For, if we abstained from animals, we should not only be deprived\nof pleasure and riches of this kind, but we should also lose our fields,\nwhich would be destroyed by wild beasts; since the whole earth would be\noccupied by serpents and birds, so that it would be difficult to plough\nthe land; the scattered seeds would immediately be gathered by the birds;\nand all such fruits as had arrived at perfection, would be consumed by\nquadrupeds. But men being oppressed by such a want of food, would be\ncompelled, by bitter necessity, to attack each other.\n\n25. Moreover, the Gods themselves, for the sake of a remedy, have\ndelivered mandates to many persons about sacrificing animals. For\nhistory is full of instances of the Gods having ordered certain persons\nto sacrifice animals, and, when sacrificed, to eat them. For, in the\nreturn of the Heraclid\u00e6, those who engaged in war against Laced\u00e6mon, in\nconjunction with Eurysthenes and Proscles, through a want of necessaries,\nwere compelled to eat serpents, which the land at that time afforded for\nthe nutriment of the army. In Libya, also, a cloud of locusts fell for\nthe relief of another army that was oppressed by hunger. The same thing\nlikewise happened at Gades. Bogus was a king of the Mauritanians, who\nwas slain by Agrippa in Mothone. He in that place attacked the temple of\nHercules, which was most rich. But it was the custom of the priests daily\nto sprinkle the altar with blood. That this, however, was not effected by\nthe decision of men, but by that of divinity, the occasion at that time\ndemonstrated. For, the siege being continued for a long time, victims\nwere wanting. But the priest being dubious how he should act, had the\nfollowing vision in a dream. He seemed to himself to be standing in the\nmiddle of the pillars of the temple of Hercules, and afterwards to see\na bird sitting opposite to the altar, and endeavouring to fly to it,\nbut which at length flew into his hands. He also saw that the altar was\nsprinkled with its blood. Seeing this, he rose as soon as it was day, and\nwent to the altar, and standing on the turret, as he thought he did in\nhis dream, he looked round, and saw the very bird which he had seen in\nhis sleep. Hoping, therefore, that his dream would be fulfilled, he stood\nstill, saw the bird fly to the altar and sit upon it, and deliver itself\ninto the hands of the high priest. Thus the bird was sacrificed, and the\naltar sprinkled with blood. That, however, which happened at Cyzicus, is\nstill more celebrated than this event. For Mithridates having besieged\nthis city, the festival of Proserpine was then celebrated, in which it\nwas requisite to sacrifice an ox. But the sacred herds, from which it was\nnecessary the victim should be taken, fed opposite to the city, on the\ncontinent[23]: and one of them was already marked for this purpose. When,\ntherefore, the hour demanded the sacrifice, the ox lowed, and swam over\nthe sea, and the guards of the city opened the gates to it. Then the ox\ndirectly ran into the city, and stood at the altar, and was sacrificed to\nthe Goddess. Not unreasonably, therefore, was it thought to be most pious\nto sacrifice many animals, since it appeared that the sacrifice of them\nwas pleasing to the Gods.\n\n26. But what would be the condition of a city, if all the citizens were\nof this opinion, [viz. that they should abstain from destroying animals?]\nFor how would they repel their enemies, when they were attacked by them,\nif they were careful in the extreme not to kill any one of them? In this\ncase, indeed, they must be immediately destroyed. And it would be too\nprolix to narrate other difficulties and inconveniences, which would\nnecessarily take place. That it is not, however, impious to slay and feed\non animals, is evident from this, that Pythagoras himself, though those\nprior to him permitted the athlet\u00e6 to drink milk, and to eat cheese,\nirrigated with water; but others, posterior to him, rejecting this diet,\nfed them with dry figs; yet he, abrogating the ancient custom, allowed\nthem to feed on flesh, and found that such a diet greatly increased their\nstrength. Some also relate, that the Pythagoreans themselves did not\nspare animals when they sacrificed to the gods. Such, therefore, are the\narguments of Clodius, Heraclides Ponticus, Hermachus the Epicurean, and\nthe Stoics and Peripatetics, [against abstinence from animal food]: among\nwhich also are comprehended the arguments which were sent to us by you, O\nCastricius. As, however, I intend to oppose these opinions, and those of\nthe multitude, I may reasonably premise what follows.\n\n27. In the first place, therefore, it must be known that my discourse\ndoes not bring with it an exhortation to every description of men. For\nit is not directed to those who are occupied in sordid mechanical arts,\nnor to those who are engaged in athletic exercises; neither to soldiers,\nnor sailors, nor rhetoricians, nor to those who lead an active life. But\nI write to the man who considers what he is, whence he came, and whither\nhe ought to tend, and who, in what pertains to nutriment, and other\nnecessary concerns, is different from those who propose to themselves\nother kinds of life; for to none but such as these do I direct my\ndiscourse. For, neither in this common life can there be one and the same\nexhortation to the sleeper, who endeavours to obtain sleep through the\nwhole of life, and who, for this purpose, procures from all places things\nof a soporiferous nature, as there is to him who is anxious to repel\nsleep, and to dispose every thing about him to a vigilant condition. But\nto the former it is necessary to recommend intoxication, surfeiting, and\nsatiety, and to exhort him to choose a dark house, and\n\n    A bed luxuriant, broad, and soft,\u2014\n\nas the poets say; and that he should procure for himself all such things\nas are of a soporiferous nature, and which are effective of sluggishness\nand oblivion, whether they are odours, or ointments, or are liquid or\nsolid medicines. And to the latter it is requisite to advise the use of\na drink sober and without wine, food of an attenuated nature, and almost\napproaching to fasting; a house lucid, and participating of a subtle air\nand wind, and to urge him to be strenuously excited by solicitude and\nthought, and to prepare for himself a small and hard bed. But, whether we\nare naturally adapted to this, I mean to a vigilant life, so as to grant\nas little as possible to sleep, since we do not dwell among those who are\nperpetually vigilant, or whether we are designed to be in a soporiferous\nstate of existence, is the business of another discussion, and is a\nsubject which requires very extended demonstrations.\n\n28. To the man, however, who once suspects the enchantments attending\nour journey through the present life, and belonging to the place in\nwhich we dwell; who also perceives himself to be naturally vigilant, and\nconsiders the somniferous nature of the region which he inhabits;\u2014to\nthis man addressing ourselves, we prescribe food consentaneous to his\nsuspicion and knowledge of this terrene abode, and exhort him to suffer\nthe somnolent to be stretched on their beds, dissolved in sleep. For it\nis requisite to be cautious, lest as those who look on the blear-eyed\ncontract an ophthalmy, and as we gape when present with those who are\ngaping, so we should be filled with drowsiness and sleep, when the region\nwhich we inhabit is cold, and adapted to fill the eyes with rheum, as\nbeing of a marshy nature, and drawing down all those that dwell in it to\na somniferous and oblivious condition. If, therefore, legislators had\nordained laws for cities, with a view to a contemplative and intellectual\nlife, it would certainly be requisite to be obedient to those laws,\nand to comply with what they instituted concerning food. But if they\nestablished their laws, looking to a life according to nature, and which\nis said to rank as a medium, [between the irrational and the intellectual\nlife,] and to what the vulgar admit, who conceive externals, and things\nwhich pertain to the body to be good or evil, why should any one,\nadducing their laws, endeavour to subvert a life, which is more excellent\nthan every law which is written and ordained for the multitude, and which\nis especially conformable to an unwritten and divine law? For such is the\ntruth of the case.\n\n29. The contemplation which procures for us felicity, does not consist,\nas same one may think it does, in a multitude of discussions and\ndisciplines; nor does it receive any increase by a quantity of words.\nFor if this were the case, nothing would prevent those from being happy\nby whom all disciplines are collected together [and comprehended].\nNow, however, every discipline by no means gives completion to this\ncontemplation, nor even the disciplines which pertain to truly existing\nbeings, unless there is a conformity to them of our nature[24] and life.\nFor since there are, as it is said, in every purpose three[25] ends, the\nend with us is to obtain the contemplation of real being, the attainment\nof it procuring, as much as it is possible for us, a conjunction of\nthe contemplator with the object of contemplation. For the reascent of\nthe soul is not to any thing else than true being itself, nor is its\nconjunction with any other thing. But intellect is truly-existing being;\nso that the end is to live according to intellect. Hence such discussions\nand exoteric disciplines as impede our purification, do not give\ncompletion to our felicity. If, therefore, felicity consisted in literary\nattainments, this end might be obtained by those who pay no attention to\ntheir food and their actions. But since for this purpose it is requisite\nto exchange the life which the multitude lead for another, and to become\npurified both in words and deeds, let us consider what reasonings and\nwhat works will enable us to obtain this end.\n\n30. Shall we say, therefore, that they will be such as separate us from\nsensibles, and the passions which pertain to them, and which elevate us\nas much as possible to an intellectual, unimaginative, and impassive\nlife; but that the contraries to these are foreign, and deserve to be\nrejected? And this by so much the more, as they separate us from a life\naccording to intellect. But, I think, it must be admitted, that we should\nfollow the object to which intellect attracts us. For we resemble those\nwho enter into, or depart from a foreign region, not only because we are\nbanished from our intimate associates, but in consequence of dwelling in\na foreign land, we are filled with barbaric passions, and manners, and\nlegal institutes, and to all these have a great propensity. Hence, he who\nwishes to return to his proper kindred and associates, should not only\nwith alacrity begin the journey, but, in order that he may be properly\nreceived, should meditate how he may divest himself of every thing of a\nforeign nature which he has assumed, and should recall to his memory such\nthings as he has forgotten, and without which he cannot be admitted by\nhis kindred and friends. After the same manner, also, it is necessary,\nif we intend to return to things which are truly our own, that we should\ndivest ourselves of every thing of a mortal nature which we have assumed,\ntogether with an adhering affection towards it, and which is the cause\nof our descent [into this terrestrial region;] and that we should excite\nour recollection of that blessed and eternal essence, and should hasten\nour return to the nature which is without colour and without quality,\nearnestly endeavouring to accomplish two things; one, that we may cast\naside every thing material and mortal; but the other, that we may\nproperly return, and be again conversant with our true kindred, ascending\nto them in a way contrary to that in which we descended hither. For we\nwere intellectual natures, and we still are essences purified from all\nsense and irrationality; but we are complicated with sensibles, through\nour incapability of eternally associating with the intelligible, and\nthrough the power of being conversant with terrestrial concerns. For\nall the powers which energize in conjunction with sense and body, are\ninjured, in consequence of the soul not abiding in the intelligible;\n(just as the earth, when in a bad condition, though it frequently\nreceives the seed of wheat, yet produces nothing but tares), and this is\nthrough a certain depravity of the soul, which does not indeed destroy\nits essence from the generation of irrationality, but through this is\nconjoined with a mortal nature, and is drawn down from its own proper to\na foreign condition of being.\n\n31. So that, if we are desirous of returning to those natures with which\nwe formerly associated, we must endeavour to the utmost of our power to\nwithdraw ourselves from sense and imagination, and the irrationality with\nwhich they are attended, and also from the passions which subsist about\nthem, as far as the necessity of our condition in this life will permit.\nBut such things as pertain to intellect should be distinctly arranged,\nprocuring for it peace and quiet from the war with the irrational part;\nthat we may not only be auditors of intellect and intelligibles, but\nmay as much as possible enjoy the contemplation of them, and, being\nestablished in an incorporeal nature, may truly live through intellect;\nand not falsely in conjunction with things allied to bodies. We must\ntherefore divest ourselves of our manifold garments, both of this visible\nand fleshly vestment, and of those with which we are internally clothed,\nand which are proximate to our cutaneous habiliments; and we must enter\nthe stadium naked and unclothed, striving for [the most glorious of all\nprizes] the Olympia of the soul. The first thing, however, and without\nwhich we cannot contend, is to divest ourselves of our garments. But\nsince of these some are external and others internal, thus also with\nrespect to the denudation, one kind is through things which are apparent,\nbut another through such as are more unapparent. Thus, for instance,\nnot to eat, or not to receive what is offered to us, belongs to things\nwhich are immediately obvious; but not to desire is a thing more obscure;\nso that, together with deeds, we must also withdraw ourselves from an\nadhering affection and passion towards them. For what benefit shall we\nderive by abstaining from deeds, when at the same time we tenaciously\nadhere to the causes from which the deeds proceed?\n\n32. But this departure [from sense, imagination, and irrationality,]\nmay be effected by violence, and also by persuasion and by reason,\nthrough the wasting away, and, as it may be said, oblivion and death of\nthe passions; which, indeed, is the best kind of departure, since it is\naccomplished without oppressing that from which we are divulsed. For,\nin sensibles, a divulsion by force is not effected without either a\nlaceration of a part, or a vestige of avulsion. But this separation is\nintroduced by a continual negligence of the passions. And this negligence\nis produced by an abstinence from those sensible perceptions which excite\nthe passions, and by a persevering attention to intelligibles. And among\nthese passions or perturbations, those which arise from food are to be\nenumerated.\n\n33. We should therefore abstain, no less than from other things, from\ncertain food, viz. such as is naturally adapted to excite the passive\npart of our soul, concerning which it will be requisite to consider\nas follows: There are two fountains whose streams irrigate the bond\nby which the soul is bound to the body; and from which the soul being\nfilled as with deadly potions, becomes oblivious of the proper objects\nof her contemplation. These fountains are pleasure and pain; of which\nsense indeed is preparative, and the perception which is according to\nsense, together with the imaginations, opinions, and recollections\nwhich accompany the senses. But from these, the passions being excited,\nand the whole of the irrational nature becoming fattened, the soul is\ndrawn downward, and abandons its proper love of true being. As much as\npossible, therefore, we must separate ourselves from these. But the\nseparation must be effected by an avoidance of the passions which subsist\nthrough the senses and the irrational part. But the senses are employed\neither on objects of the sight, or of the hearing, or of the taste, or\nthe smell, or the touch; for sense is as it were the metropolis of that\nforeign colony of passions which we contain. Let us, therefore, consider\nhow much fuel of the passions enters into us through each of the senses.\nFor this is effected partly by the view of the contests of horses and\nthe athlete, or those whose bodies are contorted in dancing; and partly\nfrom the survey of beautiful women. For these, ensnaring the irrational\nnature, attack and subjugate it by all-various deceptions.\n\n34. For the soul, being agitated with Bacchic fury through all these by\nthe irrational part, is made to leap, to exclaim and vociferate, the\nexternal tumult being inflamed by the internal, and which was first\nenkindled by sense. But the excitations through the ears, and which\nare of a passive nature, are produced by certain noises and sounds, by\nindecent language and defamation, so that many through these being exiled\nfrom reason, are furiously agitated, and some, becoming effeminate,\nexhibit all-various convolutions of the body. And who is ignorant how\nmuch the use of fumigations, and the exhalations of sweet odours, with\nwhich lovers supply the objects of their love, fatten the irrational part\nof the soul? But what occasion is there to speak of the passions produced\nthrough the taste? For here, especially, there is a complication of a\ntwofold bond; one which is fattened by the passions excited by the taste;\nand the other, which we render heavy and powerful, by the introduction\nof foreign bodies [_i.e._ of bodies different from our own]. For, as\na certain physician said, those are not the only poisons which are\nprepared by the medical art; but those likewise which we daily assume\nfor food, both in what we eat, and what we drink, and a thing of a much\nmore deadly nature is imparted to the soul through these, than from the\npoisons which are compounded for the purpose of destroying the body. And\nas to the touch, it does all but transmute the soul into the body, and\nproduces in it certain inarticulate sounds, such as frequently take place\nin inanimate bodies. And from all these, recollections, imaginations,\nand opinions being collected together, excite a swarm of passions, viz.\nof fear, desire, anger, love, voluptuousness[26], pain, emulation,\nsolicitude, and disease, and cause the soul to be full of similar\nperturbations.\n\n35. Hence, to be purified from all these is most difficult, and requires\na great contest, and we must bestow much labour both by night and by\nday to be liberated from an attention to them, and this, because we are\nnecessarily complicated with sense. Whence, also, as much as possible,\nwe should withdraw ourselves from those places in which we may, though\nunwillingly, meet with this hostile crowd. From experience, also, we\nshould avoid a contest with it, and even a victory over it, and the want\nof exercise from inexperience.\n\n36. For we learn, that this conduct was adopted by some of the celebrated\nancient Pythagoreans and wise men; some of whom dwelt in the most\nsolitary places; but others in temples and sacred groves, from which,\nthough they were in cities, all tumult and the multitude were expelled.\nBut Plato chose to reside in the Academy, a place not only solitary and\nremote from the city, but which was also said to be insalubrious. Others\nhave not spared even their eyes, through a desire of not being divulsed\nfrom the inward contemplation [of reality]. If some one, however, at\nthe same time that he is conversant with men, and while he is filling\nhis senses with the passions pertaining to them, should fancy that he\ncan remain impassive, he is ignorant that he both deceives himself and\nthose who are persuaded by him, nor does he see that we are enslaved to\nmany passions, through not alienating ourselves from the multitude. For\nhe did not speak vainly, and in such a way as to falsify the nature of\n[the Coryph\u00e6an] philosophers, who said of them, \u201cThese, therefore, from\ntheir youth, neither know the way to the forum, nor where the court of\njustice or senate-house is situated, or any common place of assembly\nbelonging to the city.\u201d They likewise neither hear nor see laws, or\ndecrees, whether orally promulgated or written. And as to the ardent\nendeavours of their companions to obtain magistracies, the associations\nof these, their banquets and wanton feastings, accompanied by pipers,\nthese they do not even dream of accomplishing. But whether any thing in\nthe city has happened well or ill, or what evil has befallen any one from\nhis progenitors, whether male or female, these are more concealed from\nsuch a one, than, as it is said, how many measures called choes the sea\ncontains. And besides this, he is even ignorant that he is ignorant[27]\nof all these particulars. For he does not abstain from them for the sake\nof renown, but, in reality, his body only dwells, and is conversant in\nthe city; but his reasoning power considering all these as trifling and\nof no value, \u201che is borne away,\u201d according to Pindar, \u201con all sides, and\ndoes not apply himself to any thing which is near.\u201d\n\n37. In what is here said, Plato asserts, that the Coryph\u00e6an philosopher,\nby not at all mingling himself with the above-mentioned particulars,\nremains impassive to them. Hence, he neither knows the way to the court\nof justice nor the senate-house, nor any thing else which has been before\nenumerated. He does not say, indeed, that he knows and is conversant with\nthese particulars, and that, being conversant, and filling his senses\nwith them, yet does not know any thing about them; but, on the contrary,\nhe says, that abstaining from them, he is ignorant that he is ignorant of\nthem. He also adds, that this philosopher does not even dream of betaking\nhimself to banquets. Much less, therefore, would he be indignant, if\ndeprived of broth, or pieces of flesh; nor, in short, will he admit\nthings of this kind. And will he not rather consider the abstinence from\nall these as trifling, and a thing of no consequence, but the assumption\nof them to be a thing of great importance and noxious? For since there\nare two paradigms in the order of things, one of a divine nature, which\nis most happy, the other of that which is destitute of divinity, and\nwhich is most miserable[28]; the Coryph\u00e6an philosopher will assimilate\nhimself to the one, but will render himself dissimilar to the other, and\nwill lead a life conformable to the paradigm to which he is assimilated,\nviz. a life satisfied with slender food, and sufficient to itself, and in\nthe smallest degree replete with mortal natures.\n\n38. Hence, as long as any one is discordant about food, and contends\nthat this or that thing should be eaten, but does not conceive that, if\nit were possible, we should abstain from all food, assenting by this\ncontention to his passions, such a one forms a vain opinion, as if the\nsubjects of his dissension were things of no consequence. He, therefore,\nwho philosophizes, will not separate himself [from his terrestrial bonds]\nby violence; for he who is compelled to do this, nevertheless remains\nthere from whence he was forced to depart. Nor must it be thought, that\nhe who strengthens these bonds, effects a thing of small importance.\nSo that only granting to nature what is necessary, and this of a light\nquality, and through more slender food, he will reject whatever exceeds\nthis, as only contributing to pleasure. For he will be persuaded of the\ntruth of what Plato says, that sense is a nail by which the soul is\nfastened to bodies[29], through the agglutination of the passions, and\nthe enjoyment of corporeal delight. For if sensible perceptions were no\nimpediment to the pure energy of the soul, why would it be a thing of\na dire nature to be in body, while at the same time the soul remained\nimpassive to the motions of the body?\n\n39. How is it, also, that you have decided and said, that you are not\npassive to things which you suffer, and that you are not present with\nthings by which you are passively affected? For intellect, indeed, is\npresent with itself, though we are not present with it. But he who\ndeparts from intellect, is in that place to which he departs; and when,\nby discursive energies, he applies himself upwards and downwards by his\napprehension of things, he is there where his apprehension is. But it is\none thing not to attend to sensibles, in consequence of being present\nwith other things, and another for a man to think, that though he attends\nto sensibles yet he is not present with them. Nor can any one show that\nPlato admits this, without at the same time demonstrating himself to be\ndeceived. He, therefore, who submits to the assumption of [every kind\nof] food, and voluntarily betakes himself to [alluring] spectacles,\nto conversation with the multitude, and laughter; such a one, by thus\nacting, is there where the passion is which he sustains. But he who\nabstains from these in consequence of being present with other things,\nhe it is who, through his unskilfulness, not only excites laughter in\nThracian maid-servants, but in the rest of the vulgar, and when he sits\nat a banquet, falls into the greatest perplexity, not from any defect\nof sensation, or from a superior accuracy of sensible perception, and\nenergizing with the irrational part of the soul alone; for Plato does\nnot venture to assert this; but because, in slanderous conversation,\nhe has nothing reproachful to say of any one, as not knowing any evil\nof any one, because he has not made individuals the subject of his\nmeditation. Being in such perplexity, therefore, he appears, says Plato,\nto be ridiculous; and in the praises and boastings of others, as he is\nmanifestly seen to laugh, not dissemblingly, but, in reality, he appears\nto be delirious.\n\n40. So that, through ignorance of, and abstaining from sensible\nconcerns, he is unacquainted with them. But it is by no means to be\nadmitted, that though he should be familiar with sensibles, and should\nenergize through the irrational part, yet it is possible for him [at the\nsame time] genuinely to survey the objects of intellect. For neither do\nthey who assert that we have two souls, admit that we can attend at one\nand the same time to two different things. For thus they would make a\nconjunction of two animals, which being employed in different energies,\nthe one would not be able to perceive the operations of the other.\n\n41. But why would it be requisite that the passions should waste away,\nthat we should die with respect to them, and that this should be daily\nthe subject of our meditation, if it was possible for us, as some assert,\nto energize according to intellect, though we are at the same time\nintimately connected with mortal concerns, and this without the intuition\nof intellect? For intellect sees, and intellect hears [as Epicharmus\nsays]. But if, while eating luxuriously, and drinking the sweetest wine,\nit were possible to be present with immaterial natures, why may not this\nbe frequently effected while you are present with, and are performing\nthings which it is not becoming even to mention? For these passions\nevery where proceed from the boy[30] which is in us. And you certainly\nwill admit that the baser these passions are, the more we are drawn down\ntowards them. For what will be the distinction which ought here to be\nmade, if you admit that to some things it is not possible to be passive,\nwithout being present with them, but that you may accomplish other\nthings, at the same time that you are surveying intelligibles? For it\nis not because some things are apprehended to be base by the multitude,\nbut others not. For all the above mentioned passions are base. So that\nto the attainment of a life according to intellect, it is requisite to\nabstain from all these, in the same manner as from venereal concerns. To\nnature therefore, but little food must be granted, through the necessity\nof generation [or of our connexion with a flowing condition of being.]\nFor, where sense and sensible apprehension are, there a departure and\nseparation from the intelligible take place; and by how much stronger\nthe excitation is of the irrational part, by so much the greater is the\ndeparture from intellection. For it is not possible for us to be borne\nalong to this place and to that, while we are _here_, and yet be _there_,\n[i.e. be present with an intelligible essence.] For our attentions to\nthings are not effected with a part, but with the whole of ourselves.\n\n42. But to fancy that he who is passively affected according to sense,\nmay, nevertheless, energize about intelligibles, has precipitated many\nof the Barbarians to destruction; who arrogantly assert, that though\nthey indulge in every kind of pleasure, yet they are able to convert\nthemselves to things of a different nature from sensibles, at the same\ntime that they are energizing with the irrational part. For I have heard\nsome persons patronizing their infelicity after the following manner. \u201cWe\nare not,\u201d say they, \u201cdefiled by food, as neither is the sea by the filth\nof rivers. For we have dominion over all eatables, in the same manner as\nthe sea over all humidity. But if the sea should shut up its mouth, so\nas not to receive the streams that now flow into it, it would be indeed,\nwith respect to itself, great; but, with respect to the world, small, as\nnot being able to receive dirt and corruption. If, however, it was afraid\nof being defiled, it would not receive these streams; but knowing its own\nmagnitude, it receives all things, and is not averse to any thing which\nproceeds into it. In like manner, say they, we also, if we were afraid of\nfood, should be enslaved by the conception of fear. But it is requisite\nthat all things should be obedient to us. For, if we collect a little\nwater, indeed, which has received any filth, it becomes immediately\ndefiled and oppressed by the filth; but this is not the case with the\nprofound sea. Thus, also, aliments vanquish the pusillanimous; but where\nthere is an immense liberty with respect to food, all things are received\nfor nutriment, and no defilement is produced.\u201d These men, therefore,\ndeceiving themselves by arguments of this kind, act in a manner\nconformable to their deception. But, instead of obtaining liberty, being\nprecipitated into an abyss of infelicity, they are suffocated. This,\nalso, induced some of the Cynics to be desirous of eating every kind of\nfood, in consequence of their pertinaciously adhering to the cause of\nerrors, which we are accustomed to call a thing of an indifferent nature.\n\n43. The man, however, who is cautious, and is suspicious of the\nenchantments of nature, who has surveyed the essential properties of\nbody, and knows that it was adapted as an instrument to the powers of\nthe soul, will also know how readily passion is prepared to accord with\nthe body, whether we are willing or not, when any thing external strikes\nit, and the pulsation at length arrives at perception. For perception\nis, as it were, an answer [to that which causes the perception.] But\nthe soul cannot answer unless she wholly converts herself to the sound,\nand transfers her animadversive eye to the pulsation. In short, the\nirrational part not being able to judge to what extent, how, whence,\nand what thing ought to be the object of attention, but of itself\nbeing inconsiderate, like horses without a charioteer[31]; whither\nit verges downward, thither it is borne along, without any power of\ngoverning itself in things external. Nor does it know the fit time or\nthe measure of the food which should be taken, unless the eye of the\ncharioteer is attentive to it, which regulates and governs the motions of\nirrationality, this part of the soul being essentially blind. But he who\ntakes away from reason its dominion over the irrational part, and permits\nit to be borne along, conformably to its proper nature: such a one,\nyielding to desire and anger, will suffer them to proceed to whatever\nextent they please. On the contrary, the worthy man will so act that his\ndeeds may be conformable to presiding reason, even in the energies of the\nirrational part.\n\n44. And in this the worthy appears to differ from the depraved man,\nthat the former has every where reason present, governing and guiding,\nlike a charioteer, the irrational part; but the latter performs many\nthings without reason for his guide. Hence the latter is said to be most\nirrational, and is borne along in a disorderly manner by irrationality;\nbut the former is obedient to reason, and superior to every irrational\ndesire. This, therefore, is the cause why the multitude err in words\nand deeds, in desire and anger, and why, on the contrary, good men act\nwith rectitude, viz. that the former suffer the boy within them to do\nwhatever it pleases; but the latter give themselves up to the guidance\nof the tutor of the boy, [_i.e._ to reason] and govern what pertains to\nthemselves in conjunction with it. Hence in food, and in other corporeal\nenergies and enjoyments, the charioteer being present, defines what is\ncommensurate and opportune. But when the charioteer is absent, and, as\nsome say, is occupied in his own concerns, then, if he also has with\nhim our attention, he does not permit it to be disturbed, or at all to\nenergize with the irrational power. If, however, he should permit our\nattention to be directed to the boy, unaccompanied by himself, he would\ndestroy the man, who would be precipitately borne along by the folly of\nthe irrational part.\n\n45. Hence, to worthy men, abstinence in food, and in corporeal enjoyments\nand actions, is more appropriate than abstinence in what pertains to the\ntouch; because though, while we touch bodies, it is necessary we should\ndescend from our proper manners to the instruction of that which is most\nirrational in us; yet this is still more necessary in the assumption of\nfood. For the irrational nature is incapable of considering what will be\nthe effect of it, because this part of the soul is essentially ignorant\nof that which is absent. But, with respect to food, if it were possible\nto be liberated from it, in the same manner as from visible objects,\nwhen they are removed from the view; for we can attend to other things\nwhen the imagination is withdrawn from them;\u2014if this were possible, it\nwould be no great undertaking to be immediately emancipated from the\nnecessity of the mortal nature, by yielding, in a small degree, to it.\nSince, however, a prolongation of time in cooking and digesting food, and\ntogether with this the co-operation of sleep and rest, are requisite,\nand, after these, a certain temperament from digestion, and a separation\nof excrements, it is necessary that the tutor of the boy within us should\nbe present, who, selecting things of a light nature, and which will be\nno impediment to him, may concede these to nature, in consequence of\nforeseeing the future, and the impediment which will be produced by his\npermitting the desires to introduce to us a burden not easily to be\nborne, through the trifling pleasure arising from the deglutition of food.\n\n46. Reason, therefore, very properly rejecting the much and the\nsuperfluous, will circumscribe what is necessary in narrow boundaries,\nin order that it may not be molested in procuring what the wants of the\nbody demand, through many things being requisite; nor being attentive to\nelegance, will it need a multitude of servants; nor endeavour to receive\nmuch pleasure in eating, nor, through satiety, to be filled with much\nindolence; nor by rendering its burden [the body] more gross, to become\nsomnolent; nor through the body being replete with things of a fattening\nnature, to render the bond more strong, but himself more sluggish and\nimbecile in the performance of his proper works. For, let any man show\nus who endeavours as much as possible to live according to intellect,\nand not to be attracted by the passions of the body, that animal food\nis more easily procured than the food from fruits and herbs; or that\nthe preparation of the former is more simple than that of the latter,\nand, in short, that it does not require cooks, but, when compared with\ninanimate nutriment, is unattended by pleasure, is lighter in concoction,\nand is more rapidly digested, excites in a less degree the desires, and\ncontributes less to the strength of the body than a vegetable diet.\n\n47. If, however, neither any physician, nor philosopher, nor wrestler,\nnor any one of the vulgar, has dared to assert this, why should we not\nwillingly abstain from this corporeal burden? Why should we not, at the\nsame time, liberate ourselves from many inconveniences by abandoning a\nfleshly diet? For we should not be liberated from one only, but from\nmyriads of evils, by accustoming ourselves to be satisfied with things\nof the smallest nature; viz. we should be freed from a superabundance\nof riches, from numerous servants, a multitude of utensils, a somnolent\ncondition, from many and vehement diseases, from medical assistance,\nincentives to venery, more gross exhalations, an abundance of excrements,\nthe crassitude of the corporeal bond, from the strength which excites\nto [base] actions, and, in short, from an Iliad of evils. But from all\nthese, inanimate and slender food, and which is easily obtained, will\nliberate us, and will procure for us peace, by imparting salvation to\nour reasoning power. For, as Diogenes says, thieves and enemies are not\nfound among those that feed on maize[32], but sycophants and tyrants are\nproduced from those who feed on flesh. The cause, however, of our being\nin want of many things being taken away, together with the multitude of\nnutriment introduced into the body, and also the weight of digestibles\nbeing lightened, the eye of the soul will become free, and will be\nestablished as in a port beyond the smoke and the waves of the corporeal\nnature.\n\n48. And this neither requires monition, nor demonstration, on account\nof the evidence with which it is immediately attended. Hence, not only\nthose who endeavour to live according to intellect, and who establish\nfor themselves an intellectual life, as the end of their pursuits, have\nperceived that this abstinence was necessary to the attainment of this\nend; but, as it appears to me, nearly every philosopher, preferring\nfrugality to luxury, has rather embraced a life which is satisfied with\na little, than one that requires a multitude of things. And, what will\nseem paradoxical to many, we shall find that this is asserted and praised\nby men who thought that pleasure is the end of those that philosophize.\nFor most of the Epicureans, beginning from the Corypheus of their sect,\nappear to have been satisfied with maize and fruits, and have filled\ntheir writings with showing how little nature requires, and that its\nnecessities may be sufficiently remedied by slender and easily-procured\nfood.\n\n49. For the wealth, say they, of nature is definite, and easily obtained;\nbut that which proceeds from vain opinions, is indefinite, and procured\nwith difficulty. For things which may be readily obtained, remove in a\nbeautiful and abundantly sufficient manner that which, through indigence,\nis the cause of molestation to the flesh; and these are such as have the\nsimple nature of moist and dry aliments. But every thing else, say they,\nwhich terminates in luxury, is not attended with a necessary appetition,\nnor is it necessarily produced from a certain something which is in pain;\nbut partly arises from the molestation and pungency solely proceeding\nfrom something not being present; partly from joy; and partly from vain\nand false dogmas, which neither pertain to any natural defect, nor to\nthe dissolution of the human frame, those not being present. For things\nwhich may every where be obtained, are sufficient for those purposes\nwhich nature necessarily requires. But these, through their simplicity\nand paucity, may be easily procured. And he, indeed, who feeds on flesh,\nrequires also inanimate natures; but he who is satisfied with things\ninanimate, is easily supplied from the half of what the other wants, and\nneeds but a small expense for the preparation of his food.\n\n50. They likewise say, it is requisite that he who prepares the\nnecessaries of life, should not afterwards make use of philosophy as an\naccession; but, having obtained it, should, with a confident mind, thus\ngenuinely endure[33] the events of the day. For we shall commit what\npertains to ourselves to a bad counsellor, if we measure and procure\nwhat is necessary to nature, without philosophy. Hence it is necessary\nthat those who philosophize should provide things of this kind, and\nstrenuously attend to them as much as possible. But, so far as there\nis a dereliction from thence, [_i.e._ from philosophizing], which is\nnot capable of effecting a perfect purification[34], so far we should\nnot endeavour to procure either riches or nutriment. In conjunction,\ntherefore, with philosophy, we should engage in things of this kind,\nand be immediately persuaded that it is much better to pursue what is\nthe least, the most simple, and light in nutriment. For that which is\nleast, and is unattended with molestation, is derived from that which is\nleast[35].\n\n51. The preparation also of these things, draws along with it many\nimpediments, either from the weight of the body, [which they are\nadapted to increase,] or from the difficulty of procuring them, or from\ntheir preventing the continuity of the energy of our most principal\nreasonings[36], or from some other cause. For this energy then becomes\nimmediately useless, and does not remain unchanged by the concomitant\nperturbations. It is necessary, however, that a philosopher should hope\nthat he may not be in want of any thing through the whole of life. But\nthis hope will be sufficiently preserved by things which are easily\nprocured; while, on the other hand, this hope is frustrated by things of\na sumptuous nature. The multitude, therefore, on this account, though\ntheir possessions are abundant, incessantly labour to obtain more, as if\nthey were in want. But the recollection that the greatest possible wealth\nhas no power worth mentioning of dissolving the perturbations of the\nsoul, will cause us to be satisfied with things easily obtained, and of\nthe most simple nature. Things also, which are very moderate and obvious,\nand which may be procured with the greatest facility, remove the tumult\noccasioned by the flesh. But the deficiency of things of a luxurious\nnature will not disturb him who meditates on death. Farther still, the\npain arising from indigence is much milder than that which is produced by\nrepletion, and will be considered to be so by him who does not deceive\nhimself with vain opinions. Variety also of food not only does not\ndissolve the perturbations of the soul, but does not even increase the\npleasure which is felt by the flesh. For this is terminated as soon as\npain is removed[37]. So that the feeding on flesh does not remove any\nthing which is troublesome to nature, nor effect any thing which, unless\nit is accomplished, will end in pain. But the pleasantness with which\nit is attended is violent, and, perhaps, mingled with the contrary. For\nit does not contribute to the duration of life, but to the variety of\npleasure; and in this respect resembles venereal enjoyments, and the\ndrinking of foreign wines, without which nature is able to remain. For\nthose things, without which nature cannot last, are very few, and may be\nprocured easily, and in conjunction with justice, liberty, quiet, and\nabundant leisure.\n\n52. Again, neither does animal food contribute, but is rather an\nimpediment to health. For health is preserved through those things by\nwhich it is recovered. But it is recovered through a most slender and\nfleshless diet; so that by this also it is preserved. If, however,\nvegetable food does not contribute to the strength of Milo, nor, in\nshort, to an increase of strength, neither does a philosopher require\nstrength, or an increase of it, if he intends to give himself up to\ncontemplation, and not to an active and intemperate life. But it is\nnot at all wonderful, that the vulgar should fancy that animal food\ncontributes to health; for they also think that sensual enjoyments and\nvenery are preservative of health, none of which benefit any one; and\nthose that engage in them must be thankful if they are not injured by\nthem. And if many are not of this opinion, it is nothing to us. For\nneither is any fidelity and constancy in friendship and benevolence to\nbe found among the vulgar; nor are they capable of receiving these,\nnor of participating of wisdom, or any portion of it which deserves to\nbe mentioned. Neither do they understand what is privately or publicly\nadvantageous; nor are they capable of forming a judgment of depraved and\nelegant manners, so as to distinguish the one from the other. And, in\naddition to these things, they are full of insolence and intemperance. On\nthis account, there is no occasion to fear that there will not be those\nwho will feed on animals.\n\n53. For if all men conceived rightly, there would be no need of fowlers,\nor hunters, or fishermen, or swineherds. But animals governing\nthemselves, and having no guardian and ruler, would quickly perish,\nand be destroyed by others, who would attack them and diminish their\nmultitude, as is found to be the case with myriads of animals on which\nmen do not feed. But all-various folly incessantly dwelling with mankind,\nthere will be an innumerable multitude of those who will voraciously\nfeed on flesh. It is necessary however to preserve health; not by the\nfear of death, but for the sake of not being impeded in the attainment\nof the good which is derived from contemplation. But that which is\nespecially preservative of health, is an undisturbed state of the soul,\nand a tendency of the reasoning power towards truly existing being. For\nmuch benefit is from hence derived to the body, as our associates have\ndemonstrated from experience. Hence some who have been afflicted with\nthe gout in the feet and hands, to such a degree as to be infested with\nit for eight entire years, have expelled it through abandoning wealth,\nand betaking themselves to the contemplation of divinity[38]. At the\nsame time, therefore, that they have abandoned riches, and a solicitude\nabout human concerns, they have also been liberated from bodily disease.\nSo that a certain state of the soul greatly contributes both to health\nand to the good of the whole body. And to this also, for the most part,\na diminution of nutriment contributes. In short, as Epicurus likewise\nhas rightly said, that food is to be avoided, the enjoyment of which we\ndesire and pursue, but which, after we have enjoyed, we rank among things\nof an unacceptable nature. But of this kind is every thing luxuriant and\ngross. And in this manner those are affected, who are vehemently desirous\nof such nutriment, and through it are involved either in great expense,\nor in disease, or repletion, or the privation of leisure[39].\n\n54. Hence also, in simple and slender food, repletion is to be avoided,\nand every where we should consider what will be the consequence of the\npossession or enjoyment of it, what the magnitude of it is, and what\nmolestation of the flesh or of the soul it is capable of dissolving. For\nwe ought never to act indefinitely, but in things of this kind we should\nemploy a boundary and measure; and infer by a reasoning process, that he\nwho fears to abstain from animal food, if he suffers himself to feed on\nflesh through pleasure, is afraid of death. For immediately, together\nwith a privation of such food, he conceives that something indefinitely\ndreadful will be present, the consequence of which will be death. But\nfrom these and similar causes, an insatiable desire is produced of\nriches, possessions, and renown, together with an opinion that every\ngood is increased with these in a greater extent of time, and the dread\nof death as of an infinite evil. The pleasure however which is produced\nthrough luxury, does not even approach to that which is experienced\nby him who lives with frugality. For such a one has great pleasure in\nthinking how little he requires. For luxury, astonishment about venereal\noccupations, and ambition about external concerns, being taken away, what\nremaining use can there be of idle wealth, which will be of no advantage\nto us whatever, but will only become a burden, no otherwise than\nrepletion?\u2014while, on the other hand, the pleasure arising from frugality\nis genuine and pure. It is also necessary to accustom the body to become\nalienated, as much as possible, from the pleasure of the satiety arising\nfrom luxurious food, but not from the fulness produced by a slender diet,\nin order that moderation may proceed through all things, and that what is\nnecessary, or what is most excellent, may fix a boundary to our diet. For\nhe who thus mortifies his body will receive every possible good, through\nbeing sufficient to himself, and an assimilation to divinity. And thus\nalso, he will not desire a greater extent of time, as if it would bring\nwith it an augmentation of good. He will likewise thus be truly rich,\nmeasuring wealth by a natural bound, and not by vain opinions. Thus too,\nhe will not depend on the hope of the greatest pleasure, the existence of\nwhich is incredible, since this would be most troublesome. But he will\nremain satisfied with his present condition, and will not be anxious to\nlive for a longer period of time.\n\n55. Besides this also, is it not absurd, that he who is in great\naffliction, or is in some grievous external calamity, or is bound with\nchains, does not even think of food, nor concern himself about the means\nof obtaining it; but when it is placed before him, refuses what is\nnecessary to his subsistence; and that the man who is truly in bonds, and\nis tormented by inward calamities, should endeavour to procure a variety\nof eatables, paying attention to things through which he will strengthen\nhis bonds? And how is it possible that this should be the conduct of men\nwho know what they suffer, and not rather of those who are delighted with\ntheir calamities, and who are ignorant of the evils which they endure?\nFor these are affected in a way contrary to those who are in chains, and\nwho are conscious of their miserable condition; since these, experiencing\nno gratification in the present life, and being full of immense\nperturbation, insatiably aspire after another life. For no one who can\neasily liberate himself from all perturbations, will desire to possess\nsilver tables and couches, and to have ointments and cooks, splendid\nvessels and garments, and suppers remarkable for their sumptuousness and\nvariety; but such a desire arises from a perfect uselessness to every\npurpose of the present life, from an indefinite generation of good, and\nfrom immense perturbation. Hence some do not remember the past, the\nrecollection of it being expelled by the present; but others do not\ninquire about the present, because they are not gratified with existing\ncircumstances.\n\n56. The contemplative philosopher, however, will invariably adopt a\nslender diet. For he knows the particulars in which his bond consists,\nso that he is not capable of desiring luxuries. Hence, being delighted\nwith simple food, he will not seek for animal nutriment, as if he was\nnot satisfied with a vegetable diet. But if the nature of the body\nin a philosopher was not such as we have supposed it to be, and was\nnot so tractable, and so adapted to have its wants satisfied through\nthings easily procured, and it was requisite to endure some pains and\nmolestations for the sake of true salvation, ought we not [willingly] to\nendure them? For when it is requisite that we should be liberated from\ndisease, do we not voluntarily sustain many pains, viz. while we are cut,\ncovered with blood, burnt, drink bitter medicines, and are purged through\nthe belly, through emetics, and through the nostrils, and do we not also\nreward those who cause us to suffer in this manner? And this being the\ncase, ought we not to sustain every thing, though of the most afflictive\nnature, with equanimity, for the sake of being purified from internal\ndisease, since our contest is for immortality, and an association with\ndivinity, from which we are prevented through an association with the\nbody? By no means, therefore, ought we to follow the laws of the body,\nwhich are violent and adverse to the laws of intellect, and to the paths\nwhich lead to salvation. Since, however, we do not now philosophize about\nthe endurance of pain, but about the rejection of pleasures which are not\nnecessary, what apology can remain for those, who impudently endeavour to\ndefend their own intemperance?\n\n57. For if it is requisite not to dissemble any thing through fear, but\nto speak freely, it is no otherwise possible to obtain the end [of a\ncontemplative life], than by adhering to God, as if fastened by a nail,\nbeing divulsed from body, and those pleasures of the soul which subsist\nthrough it; since our salvation is effected by deeds, and not by a mere\nattention to words. But as it is not possible with any kind of diet, and,\nin short, by feeding on flesh, to become adapted to an union with even\nsome partial deity, much less is this possible with that God who is\nbeyond all things, and is above a nature simply incorporeal; but after\nall-various purifications, both of soul and body, he who is naturally\nof an excellent disposition, and lives with piety and purity, will\nscarcely be thought worthy to perceive him. So that, by how much more the\nFather of all things excels in simplicity, purity, and sufficiency to\nhimself, as being established far beyond all material representation, by\nso much the more is it requisite, that he who approaches to him should\nbe in every respect pure and holy, beginning from his body, and ending\ninternally, and distributing to each of the parts, and in short to every\nthing which is present with him, a purity adapted to the nature of each.\nPerhaps, however, these things will not be contradicted by any one. But\nit may be doubted, why we admit abstinence from animal food to pertain\nto purity, though in sacrifices we slay sheep and oxen, and conceive\nthat these immolations are pure and acceptable to the Gods. Hence, since\nthe solution of this requires a long discussion, the consideration of\nsacrifices must be assumed from another principle.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[13] Porphyry elsewhere calls this Firmus Castricius his friend and\nfellow disciple. See more concerning him in Porphyry\u2019s Life of Plotinus.\n\n[14] \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1. Porphyry calls the conduct of Firmus _illegitimate_,\nbecause the feeding on flesh is for the most part contrary to the laws of\ngenuine philosophy.\n\n[15] The original in this place is, \u1f22 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03bf\u03c5\u03bd, \u1f22 \u03c4\u03bf \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b7\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.; but, for \u1f22 \u03c4\u03bf \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd,\nI read \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. And this appears to have been the reading\nwhich Felicianus found in his MS.; for his version of this passage is,\n\u201cVel igitur deceptione inductus, quod sive hoc sive illo modo vescaris,\n&c.\u201d\n\n[16] This philosopher was an auditor of Plato and Speusippus.\n\n[17] Hesiod. Op. et Di. lib. I. v. 275, &c.\n\n[18] This philosopher was a Mitylen\u00e6an, and is said to have been an\nauditor of, and also the successor of, Epicurus.\n\n[19] Iliad, XI. v. 479.\n\n[20] Iliad, IV. v. 35.\n\n[21] Iliad, XXII. v. 347.\n\n[22] _i.e._ Sacrifices from twelve animals.\n\n[23] For Cyzicus was situated in an island.\n\n[24] In the original \u03b5\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b6\u03c9\u03b7; but\nit is obviously necessary for \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 to read \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n[25] viz. As it appears to me, a pleasurable, a profitable, and a\nvirtuous end, which last is a truly beautiful and good end.\n\n[26] For \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03c4\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd here, I read \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b7\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n[27] The multitude are ignorant that they are ignorant with respect to\nobjects of all others the most splendid and real; but the Coryph\u00e6an\nphilosopher is ignorant that he is ignorant with respect to objects\nmost unsubstantial and obscure. The former ignorance is the consequence\nof a defect, but the latter of a transcendency of gnostic energy. What\nPorphyry here says of the Coryph\u00e6an philosopher, is derived from the\nThe\u00e6tetus of Plato.\n\n[28] See p. 52 of my translation of the The\u00e6tetus of Plato, from which\nDialogue, what Porphyry here says, as well as what he a little before\nsaid, is derived.\n\n[29] See the Ph\u00e6do of Plato, where this is asserted.\n\n[30] Sense, and that which is beautiful in the energies of sense, are\nthus denominated by Plato.\n\n[31] The rational part of the soul is assimilated by Plato, in the\nPh\u00e6drus, to a charioteer, and the two irrational parts, _desire_ and\n_anger_, to two horses. See my translation of that Dialogue.\n\n[32] A kind of bread made of milk and flour.\n\n[33] In the original, \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf \u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc3 \u03b3\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd. But the editor of the quarto edition\nof this work, who appears to have been nothing more than a mere verbal\ncritic, says, in a note on this passage, that the word \u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9,\nsignifies _pertinacissime illis inh\u00e6rere, nihil ultra studere_; whereas\nit must be obvious to any man who understands what is here said, that in\nthis place it signifies _to endure_.\n\n[34] In the original, \u03bf \u03bc\u03b7 \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u03ba\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2; but for\n\u03b5\u03ba\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 I read with Felicianus \u03b5\u03ba\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2.\n\n[35] In the original, \u03b5\u03bb\u03b1\u03c7\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf \u03bf\u03c7\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b5\u03bb\u03b1\u03c7\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5. But\nit is obviously necessary for \u03bf\u03c7\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd to read \u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03c7\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, and yet this was\nnot perceived by the German editor of this work, Jacob Rhoer.\n\n[36] _i.e._ Of our reasonings about intelligible objects.\n\n[37] Conformable to this, it is beautifully observed by Aristotle, in his\nNicomachean Ethics, that corporeal pleasures are the remedies of pain,\nand that they fill up the indigence of nature, but do not perfect any\nenergy of the [rational] soul.\n\n[38] This is said by Porphyry, in his Life of Plotinus, to have been the\ncase with the senator Rogatianus.\n\n[39] And leisure, to those who knew how rightly to employ it, is, as\nSocrates said, \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u201c_the most beautiful of possessions_.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nON ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD.\n\nBOOK THE SECOND.\n\n\n1. Pursuing therefore the inquiries pertaining to simplicity and purity\nof diet, we have now arrived, O Castricius, at the discussion of\nsacrifices; the consideration of which is difficult, and at the same time\nrequires much explanation, if we intend to decide concerning it in such a\nway as will be acceptable to the Gods. Hence, as this is the proper place\nfor such a discussion, we shall now unfold what appears to us to be the\ntruth on this subject, and what is capable of being narrated, correcting\nwhat was overlooked in the hypothesis proposed from the beginning.\n\n2. In the first place therefore we say, it does not follow because\nanimals are slain that it is necessary to eat them. Nor does he who\nadmits the one, I mean that they should be slain, entirely prove that\nthey should be eaten. For the laws permit us to defend ourselves against\nenemies who attack us [by killing them]; but it did not seem proper to\nthese laws to grant that we should eat them, as being a thing contrary to\nthe nature of man. In the second place, it does not follow, that because\nit is proper to sacrifice certain animals to d\u00e6mons, or Gods, or certain\npowers, through causes either known or unknown to men, it is therefore\nnecessary to feed on animals. For it may be shown, that men assumed\nanimals in sacrifices, which no one even of those who are accustomed\nto feed on flesh, would endure to taste. Moreover, in the slaying of\nanimals, the same error is overlooked. For it does not follow, that if it\nis requisite to kill some, it is therefore necessary to slay all animals,\nas neither must it be granted, that if irrational animals, therefore men\nalso may be slain.\n\n3. Besides, abstinence from animal food, as we have said in the first\nbook, is not simply recommended to all men, but to philosophers, and to\nthose especially, who suspend their felicity from God, and the imitation\nof him. For neither in the political life do legislators ordain that the\nsame things shall be performed by private individuals and the priests,\nbut conceding certain things to the multitude, pertaining to food and\nother necessaries of life, they forbid the priests to use them, punishing\nthe transgression of their mandates by death, or some great fine.\n\n4. For these things not being confused, but distinguished in a proper\nmanner, most of the opposing arguments will be found to be vain. For the\ngreater part of them endeavour to show, either that it is necessary to\nslay animals, on account of the injuries sustained from them, and it is\nassumed as a thing consequent, that it is proper to eat them; or because\nanimals are slain in sacrifices, it is inferred that therefore they\nmay be eaten by men. And again, if it is requisite to destroy certain\nanimals, on account of their ferocity, it is conceived, that it must\nfollow, that tame animals likewise ought to be slain. If, also, some\npersons may be allowed to eat them, such as those who engage in athletic\nexercises, soldiers, and those who are employed in bodily labour,\ntherefore this may likewise be permitted to philosophers; and if to some,\ntherefore to all of them; though all these inferences are bad, and are\nincapable of exhibiting any necessity for their adoption. And, indeed,\nthat all of them are bad, will be immediately evident to men that are not\ncontentious. But some of these inferences we have already confuted, and\nwe shall show the fallacy of others as we proceed. Now, however, we shall\ndiscuss what pertains to the consideration of sacrifices, unfolding the\nprinciples from which they originated, what the first sacrifices were,\nand of what kind they were; how they came to be changed, and whence the\nchange arose; whether all things ought to be sacrificed by a philosopher,\nand from what animals sacrifices are made. In short, we shall unfold\nevery thing pertaining to the proposed subject, discovering some things\nourselves, but receiving others from the ancients, and as much as\npossible directing our attention to what is commensurate and adapted to\nthe hypothesis, [or thing intended to be investigated.]\n\n5. It seems that the period is of immense antiquity, from which a nation,\nthe most learned of all others[40], as Theophrastus says, and who inhabit\nthe most sacred region made by the Nile, began first, from the vestal\nhearth, to sacrifice to the celestial Gods, not myrrh, or cassia, nor\nthe first-fruits of things mingled with the crocus of frankincense; for\nthese were assumed many generations afterwards, in consequence of error\ngradually increasing, when men, wanting the necessaries of life, offered,\nwith great labour and many tears, some drops of these, as first-fruits,\nto the Gods. Hence, they did not at first sacrifice these, but grass,\nwhich, as a certain soft wool of prolific nature, they plucked with\ntheir hands. For the earth produced trees prior to animals; and long\nbefore trees grass, which germinates annually. Hence, gathering the\nblades and roots, and all the germs of this herb, they committed them\nto the flames, as a sacrifice to the visible celestial Gods, to whom\nthey paid immortal honour through fire. For to these, also, we preserve\nin temples an immortal fire, because it is especially most similar to\nthese divinities. But from the exhalation or smoke [\u03b5\u03ba \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2]\nof things produced in the earth, they called the offerings \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1,\n_thumiateria_; _to sacrifice_, they called \u03b8\u03c5\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, _thuein_, and _the\nsacrifices_, \u03b8\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9, _thusiai_; all which, as if unfolding the error\nwhich was afterwards introduced, we do not rightly interpret; since we\ncall the worship of the Gods through the immolation of animals \u03b8\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1,\n_thusia_. But so careful were the ancients not to transgress this custom,\nthat against those who, neglecting the pristine, introduced novel modes\nof sacrificing, they employed _execrations_[41], and therefore they\nnow denominate the substances which are used for fumigations \u03b1\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1,\n_aromata_, i.e. _aromatics_, [or things of an execrable nature.] The\nantiquity, however, of the before-mentioned fumigations may be perceived\nby him who considers that many now also sacrifice certain portions of\nodoriferous wood. Hence, when after grass, the earth produced trees, and\nmen at first fed on the fruits of the oak, they offered to the Gods but\nfew of the fruits on account of their rarity, but in sacrifices they\nburnt many of its leaves. After this, however, when human life proceeded\nto a milder nutriment, and sacrifices from nuts were introduced, they\nsaid _enough of the oak_.\n\n6. But as barley first appeared after leguminous substances, the race\nof men used it in primitive sacrifices, moistening it for this purpose\nwith water. Afterwards, when they had broken and bruised it, so as to\nrender it eatable, as the instruments of this operation afforded a divine\nassistance to human life, they concealed them in an arcane place, and\napproached them as things of a sacred nature. But esteeming the food\nproduced from it when bruised to be blessed, when compared with their\nformer nutriment, they offered, in fine, the first-fruits of it to the\nGods. Hence also now, at the end of the sacrifices, we use fruits that\nare bruised or ground; testifying by this how much fumigations have\ndeparted from their ancient simplicity; at the same time not perceiving\non what account we perform each of these. Proceeding, however, from\nhence, and being more abundantly supplied, both with other fruits and\nwheat, the first-fruits of cakes, made of the fine flour of wheat, and of\nevery thing else, were offered in sacrifices to the Gods; many flowers\nbeing collected for this purpose, and with these all that was conceived\nto be beautiful, and adapted, by its odour, to a divine sense, being\nmingled. From these, also, some were used for garlands, and others were\ngiven to the fire. But when they had discovered the use of the divine\ndrops of wine, and honey, and likewise of oil, for the purposes of human\nlife, then they sacrificed these to their causes, the Gods.\n\n7. And these things appear to be testified by the splendid procession in\nhonour of the Sun and the Hours, which is even now performed at Athens,\nand in which there were other herbs besides grass, and also acorns, the\nfruit of the crab tree, barley, wheat, a heap of dried figs, cakes made\nof wheaten and barley flour; and, in the last place, an earthen pot.\nThis mode, however, of offering first-fruits in sacrifices, having, at\nlength, proceeded to great illegality, the assumption of immolations,\nmost dire and full of cruelty, was introduced; so that it would seem that\nthe execrations which were formerly uttered against us, have now received\ntheir consummation, in consequence of men slaughtering animals, and\ndefiling altars with blood; and this commenced from that period in which\nmankind tasted of blood, through having experienced the evils of famine\nand war. Divinity, therefore, as Theophrastus says, being indignant,\nappears to have inflicted a punishment adapted to the crime. Hence some\nmen became atheists; but others, in consequence of forming erroneous\nconceptions of a divine nature, may be more justly called \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2,\n_kakophrones_, than \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03b9, _kakotheoi_[42], because they think that\nthe Gods are depraved, and in no respect naturally more excellent than\nwe are. Thus, therefore, some were seen to live without sacrificing any\nthing, and without offering the first-fruits of their possessions to the\nGods; but others sacrificed improperly, and made use of illegal oblations.\n\n8. Hence the Thoes[43], who dwell in the confines of Thrace, as they\nneither offered any first-fruits, nor sacrificed to the Gods, were at\nthat time suddenly taken away from the rest of mankind; so that neither\nthe inhabitants, nor the city, nor the foundations of the houses, could\nby any one be found.\n\n    \u201cMen prone to ill, denied the Gods their due,\n    And by their follies made their days but few.\n    The altars of the bless\u2019d neglected stand,\n    Without the offerings which the laws demand;\n    But angry Jove in dust this people laid,\n    Because no honours to the Gods they paid.\u201d\n\n                                       HESIOD. Op. et Di. lib. i. v. 133.\n\nNor did they offer first-fruits to the Gods, as it was just that they\nshould. But with respect to the Bassarians, who formerly were not only\nemulous of sacrificing bulls, but also ate the flesh of slaughtered men,\nin the same manner as we now do with other animals; for we offer to the\nGods some parts of them as first-fruits, and eat the rest;\u2014with respect\nto these men, who has not heard, that insanely rushing on and biting each\nother, and in reality feeding on blood, they did not cease to act in this\nmanner till the whole race was destroyed of those who used sacrifices of\nthis kind?\n\n9. The sacrifice, therefore, through animals is posterior and most\nrecent, and originated from a cause which is not of a pleasing nature,\nlike that of the sacrifice from fruits, but received its commencement\neither from famine, or some other unfortunate circumstance. The causes,\nindeed, of the peculiar mactations among the Athenians, had their\nbeginning either in ignorance, or anger, or fear. For the slaughter\nof swine is attributed to an involuntary error of Clymene, who, by\nunintentionally striking, slew the animal. Hence her husband, being\nterrified as if he had perpetrated an illegal deed, consulted the\noracle of the Pythian God about it. But as the God did not condemn\nwhat had happened, the slaughter of animals was afterwards considered\nas a thing of an indifferent nature. The inspector, however, of sacred\nrites, who was the offspring of prophets, wishing to make an offering\nof first-fruits from sheep, was permitted to do so, it is said, by an\noracle, but with much caution and fear. For the oracle was as follows:\u2014\n\n    \u201cOffspring of prophets, sheep by force to slay,\n    The Gods permit not thee; but with wash\u2019d hands\n    For thee \u2019tis lawful any sheep to kill,\n    That dies a voluntary death.\u201d\n\n10. But a goat was first slain in Icarus, a mountain of Attica, because\nit had cropped a vine. And Diomus, who was a priest of Jupiter Polieus,\nwas the first that slew an ox; because, when the festival sacred to\nJupiter, and called Diipolia, was celebrated, and fruits were prepared\nafter the ancient manner, an ox approaching tasted the sacred cake.\nBut the priest, being aided by others who were present, slew the ox.\nAnd these are the causes, indeed, which are assigned by the Athenians\nfor this deed; but by others, other causes are narrated. All of them,\nhowever, are full of explanations that are not holy. But most of them\nassign famine, and the injustice with which it is attended, as the cause.\nHence men having tasted of animals, they offered them in sacrifice, as\nfirst-fruits, to the Gods; but prior to this, they were accustomed to\nabstain from animal food. Whence, since the sacrifice of animals is\nnot more ancient than necessary food, it may be determined from this\ncircumstance what ought to be the nutriment of men. But it does not\nfollow, because men have tasted of and offered animals in sacrifices as\nfirst-fruits, that it must necessarily be admitted to be pious to eat\nthat which was not piously offered to the Gods.\n\n11. But what especially proves that every thing of this kind originated\nfrom injustice, is this, that the same things are neither sacrificed\nnor eaten in every nation, but that they conjecture what it is fit for\nthem to do from what they find to be useful to themselves. With the\nEgyptians, therefore, and Ph\u0153nicians, any one would sooner taste human\nflesh than the flesh of a cow. The cause, however, is, that this animal\nbeing useful, is also rare among them. Hence, though they eat bulls, and\noffer them in sacrifice as first-fruits, yet they spare cows for the\nsake of their progeny, and ordain that, if any one kill them, it shall\nbe considered as an expiation. And thus, for the sake of utility in one\nand the same genus of animals, they distinguish what is pious, and what\nis impious. So that these particulars subsisting after this manner,\nTheophrastus reasonably forbids those to sacrifice animals who wish to be\ntruly pious; employing these, and other similar arguments, such as the\nfollowing.\n\n12. In the first place, indeed, because we sacrificed animals through the\noccurrence, as we have said, of a greater necessity. For pestilence and\nwar were the causes that introduced the necessity of eating them. Since,\ntherefore, we are supplied with fruits, what occasion is there to use\nthe sacrifice of necessity? In the next place, the remunerations of, and\nthanks for benefits, are to be given differently to different persons,\naccording to the worth of the benefit conferred; so that the greatest\nremunerations, and from things of the most honourable nature, are to\nbe given to those who have benefited us in the greatest degree, and\nespecially if they are the causes of these gifts. But the most beautiful\nand honourable of those things, by which the Gods benefit us, are the\nfruits of the earth. For through these they preserve us, and enable us\nto live legitimately; so that, from these we ought to venerate them.\nBesides, it is requisite to sacrifice those things by the sacrifice of\nwhich we shall not injure any one. For nothing ought to be so innoxious\nto all things as sacrifice. But if some one should say, that God gave\nanimals for our use, no less than the fruits of the earth, yet it does\nnot follow that they are, therefore, to be sacrificed, because in so\ndoing they are injured, through being deprived of life. For _sacrifice_\nis, as the name implies, something _holy_[44]. But no one is holy who\nrequites a benefit from things which are the property of another, whether\nhe takes fruits or plants from one who is unwilling to be deprived of\nthem. For how can this be holy, when those are injured from whom they\nare taken? If, however, he who takes away fruits from others does not\nsacrifice with sanctity, it cannot be holy to sacrifice things taken from\nothers, which are in every respect more honourable than the fruits of the\nearth. For a more dire deed is thus perpetrated. But soul is much more\nhonourable than the vegetable productions of the earth, which it is not\nfit, by sacrificing animals, that we should take away.\n\n13. Some one, however, perhaps may say, that we also take away something\nfrom plants [when we eat, and sacrifice them to the Gods]. But the\nablation is not similar; since we do not take this away from those who\nare unwilling that we should. For, if we omitted to gather them, they\nwould spontaneously drop their fruits. The gathering of the fruits, also,\nis not attended with the destruction of the plants, as it is when animals\nlose their animating principle. And, with respect to the fruit which\nwe receive from bees, since this is obtained by our labour, it is fit\nthat we should derive a common benefit from it. For bees collect their\nhoney from plants; but we carefully attend to them. On which account it\nis requisite that such a division should be made [of our attention and\ntheir labour] that they may suffer no injury. But that which is useless\nto them, and beneficial to us, will be the reward which we receive from\nthem [of our attention to their concerns]. In sacrifices, therefore, we\nshould abstain from animals. For, though all things are in reality the\nproperty of the Gods, yet plants appear to be our property; since we sow\nand cultivate them, and nourish them by other attentions which we pay to\nthem. We ought to sacrifice, therefore, from our own property, and not\nfrom the property of others; since that which may be procured at a small\nexpense, and which may easily be obtained, is more holy, more acceptable\nto the Gods, and better adapted to the purposes of sacrifice, and to the\nexercise of continual piety. Hence, that which is neither holy, nor to\nbe obtained at a small expense, is not to be offered in sacrifice, even\nthough it should be present.\n\n14. But that animals do not rank among things which may be procured\neasily, and at a small expense, may be seen by directing our view to\nthe greater part of our race: for we are not now to consider that some\nmen abound in sheep, and others in oxen. In the first place, therefore,\nthere are many nations that do not possess any of those animals which are\noffered in sacrifice, some ignoble animals, perhaps, excepted. And, in\nthe second place, most of those that dwell in cities themselves, possess\nthese but rarely. But if some one should say that the inhabitants of\ncities have not mild fruits in abundance; yet, though this should be\nadmitted, they are not in want of the other vegetable productions of\nthe earth; nor is it so difficult to procure fruits as it is to procure\nanimals. Hence an abundance of fruits, and other vegetables, is more\neasily obtained than that of animals. But that which is obtained with\nfacility, and at a small expense, contributes to incessant and universal\npiety.\n\n15. Experience also testifies that the Gods rejoice in this more than\nin sumptuous offerings. For when that Thessalian sacrificed to the\nPythian deity oxen with gilt horns, and hecatombs, Apollo said, that the\noffering of Hermioneus was more gratifying to him, though he had only\nsacrificed as much meal as he could take with his three fingers out of\na sack. But when the Thessalian, on hearing this, placed all the rest\nof his offerings on the altar, the God again said, that by so doing his\npresent was doubly more unacceptable to him than his former offering.\nHence the sacrifice which is attended with a small expense is pleasing to\nthe Gods, and divinity looks more to the disposition and manners of those\nthat sacrifice, than to the multitude of the things which are sacrificed.\n\n16. Theopompus likewise narrates things similar to these, viz. that\na certain Magnesian came from Asia to Delphi; a man very rich, and\nabounding in cattle, and that he was accustomed every year to make many\nand magnificent sacrifices to the Gods, partly through the abundance\nof his possessions, and partly through piety and wishing to please\nthe Gods. But being thus disposed, he came to the divinity at Delphi,\nbringing with him a hecatomb for the God, and magnificently honouring\nApollo, he consulted his oracle. Conceiving also that he worshipped the\nGods in a manner more beautiful than that of all other men, he asked the\nPythian deity who the man was that, with the greatest promptitude, and\nin the best manner, venerated divinity, and made the most acceptable\nsacrifices, conceiving that on this occasion the God would deem him to\nbe pre-eminent. The Pythian deity however answered, that Clearchus, who\ndwelt in Methydrium, a town of Arcadia, worshipped the Gods in a way\nsurpassing that of all other men. But the Magnesian being astonished,\nwas desirous of seeing Clearchus, and of learning from him the manner in\nwhich he performed his sacrifices. Swiftly, therefore, betaking himself\nto Methydrium, in the first place, indeed, he despised the smallness\nand vileness of the town, conceiving that neither any private person,\nnor even the whole city, could honour the Gods more magnificently and\nmore beautifully than he did. Meeting, however, with the man, he thought\nfit to ask him after what manner he reverenced the Gods. But Clearchus\nanswered him, that he diligently sacrificed to them at proper times\nin every month at the new moon, crowning and adorning the statues of\nHermes and Hecate, and the other sacred images which were left to us by\nour ancestors, and that he also honoured the Gods with frankincense,\nand sacred wafers and cakes. He likewise said, that he performed public\nsacrifices annually, omitting no festive day; and that in these festivals\nhe worshipped the Gods, not by slaying oxen, nor by cutting victims into\nfragments, but that he sacrificed whatever he might casually meet with,\nsedulously offering the first-fruits to the Gods of all the vegetable\nproductions of the seasons, and of all the fruits with which he was\nsupplied. He added, that some of these he placed before the [statues of\nthe] Gods[45], but that he burnt others on their altars; and that, being\nstudious of frugality, he avoided the sacrificing of oxen.\n\n17. By some writers, also, it is related, that certain tyrants, after the\nCarthaginians were conquered, having, with great strife among themselves,\nplaced hecatombs before Apollo, afterwards inquired of the God with which\nof the offerings he was most delighted; and that he answered, contrary\nto all their expectation, that he was most pleased with the cakes of\nDocimus. But this Docimus was an inhabitant of Delphi, and cultivated\nsome rugged and stony land. Docimus, therefore, coming on that day from\nthe place which he cultivated, took from a bag which was fastened round\nhim a few handfuls of meal, and sacrificed them to the God, who was more\ndelighted with his offering than with the magnificent sacrifices of\nthe tyrants. Hence, also, a certain poet, because the affair was known,\nappears to have asserted things of a similar kind, as we are informed by\nAntiphanes in his Mystics:\n\n    In simple offerings most the Gods delight:\n    For though before them hecatombs are placed,\n    Yet frankincense is burnt the last of all.\n    An indication this that all the rest,\n    Preceding, was a vain expense, bestowed\n    Through ostentation, for the sake of men;\n    But a small offering gratifies the Gods.\n\nMenander likewise, in the comedy called the Morose, says,\n\n    Pious th\u2019 oblation which with frankincense\n    And _popanum_[46] is made; for in the fire\n    Both these, when placed, divinity accepts.\n\n18. On this account also, earthen, wooden, and wicker vessels were\nformerly used, and especially in public sacrifices, the ancients\nbeing persuaded that divinity is delighted with things of this kind.\nWhence, even now, the most ancient vessels, and which are made of\nwood, are thought to be more divine, both on account of the matter\nand the simplicity of the art by which they were fashioned. It is\nsaid, therefore, that \u00c6schylus, on his brother\u2019s asking him to write a\nP\u00e6an in honour of Apollo, replied, that the best P\u00e6an was written by\nTynnichus[47]; and that if his composition were to be compared with that\nof Tynnichus, the same thing would take place as if new were compared\nwith ancient statues. For the latter, though they are simple in their\nformation, are conceived to be divine; but the former, though they are\nmost accurately elaborated, produce indeed admiration, but are not\nbelieved to possess so much of a divine nature. Hence Hesiod, praising\nthe law of ancient sacrifices, very properly says,\n\n    Your country\u2019s rites in sacrifice observe:\n    [In pious works] the ancient law is best[48].\n\n19. But those who have written concerning sacred operations and\nsacrifices, admonish us to be accurate in preserving what pertains to\nthe _popana_, because these are more acceptable to the Gods than the\nsacrifice which is performed through the mactation of animals. Sophocles\nalso, in describing a sacrifice which is pleasing to divinity, says in\nhis Polyidus:\n\n    The skins of sheep in sacrifice were used,\n    Libations too of wine, grapes well preserved,\n    And fruits collected in a heap of every kind;\n    The olive\u2019s pinguid juice, and waxen work\n    Most variegated, of the yellow bee.\n\nFormerly, also, there were venerable monuments in Delos of those who came\nfrom the Hyperboreans, bearing handfuls [of fruits]. It is necessary,\ntherefore, that, being purified in our manners, we should make oblations,\noffering to the Gods those sacrifices which are pleasing to them, and not\nsuch as are attended with great expense. Now, however, if a man\u2019s body\nis not pure and invested with a splendid garment, he does not think it\nis qualified for the sanctity of sacrifice. But when he has rendered his\nbody splendid, together with his garment, though his soul at the same\ntime is not purified from vice, yet he betakes himself to sacrifice,\nand thinks that it is a thing of no consequence; as if divinity did not\nespecially rejoice in that which is most divine in our nature, when it\nis in a pure condition, as being allied to his essence. In Epidaurus,\ntherefore, there was the following inscription on the doors of the temple:\n\n    Into an odorous temple, he who goes\n    Should pure and holy be; but to be wise\n    In what to sanctity pertains, is to be pure.\n\n20. But that God is not delighted with the amplitude of sacrifices,\nbut with any casual offering, is evident from this, that of our daily\nfood, whatever it may be that is placed before us, we all of us make\nan offering to the Gods, before we have tasted it ourselves; this\noffering being small indeed, but the greatest testimony of honour to\ndivinity. Moreover, Theophrastus shows, by enumerating many of the rites\nof different countries, that the sacrifices of the ancients were from\nfruits, and he narrates what pertains to libations in the following\nmanner: \u201cAncient sacrifices were for the most part performed with\nsobriety. But those sacrifices are sober in which the libations are made\nwith water. Afterwards, however, libations were made with honey. For we\nfirst receive this liquid fruit prepared for us by the bees. In the third\nplace, libations were made with oil; and in the fourth and last place\nwith wine.\u201d\n\n21. These things, however, are testified not only by the pillars which\nare preserved in Cyrbe[49], and which contain, as it were, certain true\ndescriptions of the Cretan sacred rites of the Corybantes; but also by\nEmpedocles, who, in discussing what pertains to sacrifices and theogony,\nor the generation of the Gods, says:\n\n    With them nor Mars nor tumult dire was found,\n    Nor Saturn, Neptune, or the sovereign Jove,\n    But Venus [beauty\u2019s] queen.\n\nAnd Venus is friendship. Afterwards he adds,\n\n    With painted animals, and statues once\n    Of sacred form, with unguents sweet of smell,\n    The fume of frankincense and genuine myrrh,\n    And with libations poured upon the ground\n    Of yellow honey, Venus was propitious made.\n\nWhich ancient custom is still even now preserved by some persons as a\ncertain vestige of the truth. And in the last place, Empedocles says,\n\n    Nor then were altars wet with blood of bulls\n    Irrationally slain.\n\n22. For, as it appears to me, when friendship and a proper sense of the\nduties pertaining to kindred natures, was possessed by all men, no one\nslaughtered any living being, in consequence of thinking that other\nanimals were allied to him. But when strife and tumult, every kind of\ncontention, and the principle of war, invaded mankind, then, for the\nfirst time, no one in reality spared any one of his kindred natures.\nThe following particulars, likewise, ought to be considered: For, as\nthough there is an affinity between us and noxious men, who, as it were,\nby a certain impetus of their own nature and depravity, are incited to\ninjure any one they may happen to meet, yet we think it requisite that\nall of them should be punished and destroyed; thus also, with respect to\nthose irrational animals that are naturally malefic and unjust, and who\nare impelled to injure those that approach them, it is perhaps fit that\nthey should be destroyed. But with respect to other animals who do not\nat all act unjustly, and are not naturally impelled to injure us, it is\ncertainly unjust to destroy and murder them, no otherwise than it would\nbe to slay men who are not iniquitous. And this seems to evince, that the\njustice between us and other animals does not arise from some of them\nbeing naturally noxious and malefic, but others not, as is also the case\nwith respect to men.\n\n23. Are therefore those animals to be sacrificed to the Gods which are\nthought to be deserving of death? But how can this be possible, if they\nare naturally depraved? For it is no more proper to sacrifice such as\nthese, than it would be to sacrifice mutilated animals. For thus, indeed,\nwe shall offer the first-fruits of things of an evil nature, but we shall\nnot sacrifice for the sake of honouring the Gods. Hence, if animals\nare to be sacrificed to the Gods, we should sacrifice those that are\nperfectly innoxious. It is however acknowledged, that those animals are\nnot to be destroyed who do not at all injure us, so that neither are they\nto be sacrificed to the Gods. If, therefore, neither these, nor those\nthat are noxious, are to be sacrificed, is it not evident that we should\nabstain from them more than from any thing else, and that we should not\nsacrifice any one of them, though it is fit that some of them should be\ndestroyed?\n\n24. To which may be added, that we should sacrifice to the Gods for\nthe sake of three things, viz. either for the sake of honouring them,\nor of testifying our gratitude, or through our want of good. For, as\nwe offer first-fruits to good men, thus also we think it is necessary\nthat we should offer them to the Gods. But we honour the Gods, either\nexploring the means of averting evils and obtaining good, or when we have\nbeen previously benefited, or in order that we may obtain some present\nadvantage and assistance, or merely for the purpose of venerating the\ngoodness of their nature. So that if the first-fruits of animals are\nto be offered to the Gods, some of them for the sake of this are to be\nsacrificed. For whatever we sacrifice, we sacrifice for the sake of some\none of the above-mentioned particulars. Is it therefore to be thought\nthat God is honoured by us, when we are directly seen to act unjustly\nthrough the first-fruits which we offer to him? Or will he not rather\nthink that he is dishonoured by such a sacrifice, in which, by immolating\nanimals that have not at all injured us, we acknowledge that we have\nacted unjustly. So that no one of other animals is to be sacrificed for\nthe sake of honouring divinity. Nor yet are they to be sacrificed for the\npurpose of testifying our gratitude to the Gods. For he who makes a just\nretribution for the benefits he has received, ought not to make it by\ndoing an injury to certain other animals. For he will no more appear to\nmake a retribution than he who, plundering his neighbour of his property,\nshould bestow it on another person for the sake of honour. Neither are\nanimals to be sacrificed for the sake of obtaining a certain good of\nwhich we are in want. For he who endeavours to be benefited by acting\nunjustly, is to be suspected as one who would not be grateful even when\nhe is benefited. So that animals are not to be sacrificed to the Gods\nthrough the expectation of deriving advantage from the sacrifice. For\nhe who does this, may perhaps elude men, but it is impossible that he\ncan elude divinity. If, therefore, we ought to sacrifice for the sake of\na certain thing, but this is not to be done for the sake of any of the\nbefore mentioned particulars, it is evident that animals ought not to be\nsacrificed.\n\n25. For, by endeavouring to obliterate the truth of these things through\nthe pleasures which we derive from sacrifices, we deceive ourselves, but\ncannot deceive divinity. Of those animals, therefore, which are of an\nignoble nature, which do not impart to our life any superior utility, and\nwhich do not afford us any pleasure, we do not sacrifice any one to the\nGods. For who ever sacrificed serpents, scorpions, and apes, or any one\nof such like animals? But we do not abstain from any one of those animals\nwhich afford a certain utility to our life, or which have something in\nthem that contributes to our enjoyments; since we, in reality, cut their\nthroats, and excoriate them, under the patronage of divinity[50]. For we\nsacrifice to the Gods oxen and sheep, and besides these, stags and birds,\nand fat hogs, though they do not at all participate of purity, but afford\nus delight. And of these animals, indeed, some, by co-operating with our\nlabours, afford assistance to our life, but others supply us with food,\nor administer to our other wants. But those which effect neither of\nthese, yet, through the enjoyment which is derived from them, are slain\nby men in sacrifices similarly with those who afford us utility. We do\nnot, however, sacrifice asses or elephants, or any other of those animals\nthat co-operate with us in our labours, but are not subservient to our\npleasure; though, sacrificing being excepted, we do not abstain from\nsuch like animals, but we cut their throats on account of the delight\nwith which the deglutition of them is attended; and of those which are\nfit to be sacrificed, we do not sacrifice such as are acceptable to the\nGods, but such as in a greater degree gratify the desires of men; thus\ntestifying against ourselves, that we persist in sacrificing to the Gods,\nfor the sake of our own pleasure, and not for the sake of gratifying the\nGods.\n\n26. But of the Syrians, the Jews indeed, through the sacrifice which\nthey first made, even now, says Theophrastus, sacrifice animals, and if\nwe were persuaded by them to sacrifice in the same way that they do,\nwe should abstain from the deed. For they do not feast on the flesh of\nthe sacrificed animals, but having thrown the whole of the victims into\nthe fire, and poured much honey and wine on them during the night, they\nswiftly consume the sacrifice, in order that the all-seeing sun may\nnot become a spectator of it. And they do this, fasting during all the\nintermediate days, and through the whole of this time, as belonging to\nthe class of philosophers, and also discourse with each other about the\ndivinity[51]. But in the night, they apply themselves to the theory of\nthe stars, surveying them, and through prayers invoking God. For these\nmake offerings both of other animals and themselves, doing this from\nnecessity, and not from their own will. The truth of this, however, may\nbe learnt by any one who directs his attention to the Egyptians, the most\nlearned of all men; who are so far from slaying other animals, that they\nmake the images of these to be imitations of the Gods; so adapted and\nallied do they conceive these to be both to Gods and men.\n\n27. For at first, indeed, sacrifices of fruits were made to the Gods;\nbut, in the course of time, men becoming negligent of sanctity, in\nconsequence of fruits being scarce, and, through the want of legitimate\nnutriment, being impelled to eat each other; then supplicating divinity\nwith many prayers, they first began to make oblations of themselves\nto the Gods, not only consecrating to the divinities whatever among\ntheir possessions was most beautiful, but, proceeding beyond this, they\nsacrificed those of their own species. Hence, even to the present time,\nnot only in Arcadia, in the Lupercal festivals, and in Carthage, men are\nsacrificed in common to Saturn, but periodically, also, for the sake of\nremembering the legal institute, they sprinkle the altars of those of the\nsame tribe with blood, although the rites of their sacrifices exclude, by\nthe voice of the crier, him from engaging in them who is accused of human\nslaughter. Proceeding therefore from hence, they made the bodies of other\nanimals supply the place of their own in sacrifices, and again, through\na satiety of legitimate nutriment, becoming oblivious of piety, they\nwere induced by voracity to leave nothing untasted, nothing undevoured.\nAnd this is what now happens to all men with respect to the aliment from\nfruits. For when, by the assumption of them, they have alleviated their\nnecessary indigence, then searching for a superfluity of satiety, they\nlabour to procure many things for food which are placed beyond the limits\nof temperance. Hence, as if they had made no ignoble sacrifices to the\nGods, they proceeded also to taste the animals which they immolated;\nand from this, as a principle of the deed, the eating of animals became\nan addition to men to the nutriment derived from fruits. As, therefore,\nantiquity offered the first produce of fruits to the Gods, and gladly,\nafter their pious sacrifice, tasted what they offered, thus also, when\nthey sacrificed the firstlings of animals to the divinities, they thought\nthat the same thing ought to be done by them, though ancient piety did\nnot ordain these particulars after this manner, but venerated each of the\nGods from fruits. For with such oblations, both nature, and every sense\nof the human soul, are delighted.\n\n    No altar then was wet with blood of bulls\n    Irrationally slain; but this was thought\n    To be of every impious deed the worst,\n    Limbs to devour of brutes deprived of life.\n\n28. The truth of this may also be perceived from the altar which is even\nnow preserved about Delos, which, because no animal is brought to, or\nis sacrificed upon it, is called the altar of the pious. So that the\ninhabitants not only abstain from sacrificing animals, but they likewise\nconceive, that those who established, are similarly pious with those\nwho use the altar. Hence, the Pythagoreans having adopted this mode of\nsacrifice, abstained from animal food through the whole of life. But when\nthey distributed to the Gods a certain animal instead of themselves,\nthey merely tasted of it, living in reality without touching other\nanimals. We, however, do not act after this manner; but being filled with\nanimal diet, we have arrived at this manifold illegality in our life by\nslaughtering animals, and using them for food. For neither is it proper\nthat the altars of the Gods should be defiled with murder, nor that\nfood of this kind should be touched by men, as neither is it fit that\nmen should eat one another; but the precept which is still preserved at\nAthens, should be obeyed through the whole of life.\n\n29. For formerly, as we have before observed, when men sacrificed to the\nGods fruits and not animals, and did not assume the latter for food,\nit is said, that a common sacrifice being celebrated at Athens, one\nDiomus, or Sopater, who was not a native, but cultivated some land in\nAttica, seizing a sharp axe which was near to him, and being excessively\nindignant, struck with it an ox, who, coming from his labour, approached\nto a table, on which were openly placed cakes and other offerings which\nwere to be burnt as a sacrifice to the Gods, and ate some, but trampled\non the rest of the offerings. The ox, therefore, being killed, Diomus,\nwhose anger was now appeased, at the same time perceived what kind of\ndeed he had perpetrated. And the ox, indeed, he buried. But embracing\na voluntary banishment, as if he had been accused of impiety, he fled\nto Crete. A great dryness, however, taking place in the Attic land from\nvehement heat, and a dreadful sterility of fruit, and the Pythian deity\nbeing in consequence of it consulted by the general consent, the God\nanswered, that the Cretan exile must expiate the crime; and that, if the\nmurderer was punished, and the statue of the slain ox was erected in\nthe place in which it fell, this would be beneficial both to those who\nhad and those who had not tasted its flesh. An inquiry therefore being\nmade into the affair, and Sopater, together with the deed, having been\ndiscovered, he, thinking that he should be liberated from the difficulty\nin which he was now involved, through the accusation of impiety, if the\nsame thing was done by all men in common, said to those who came to him,\nthat it was necessary an ox should be slain by the city. But, on their\nbeing dubious who should strike the ox, he said that he would undertake\nto do it, if they would make him a citizen, and would be partakers with\nhim of the slaughter. This, therefore, being granted, they returned to\nthe city, and ordered the deed to be accomplished in such a way as it is\nperformed by them at present, [and which was as follows:]\n\n30. They selected virgins who were drawers of water; but these brought\nwater for the purpose of sharpening an axe and a knife. And these being\nsharpened, one person gave the axe, another struck with it the ox,\nand a third person cut the throat of the ox. But after this, having\nexcoriated the animal, all that were present ate of its flesh. These\nthings therefore being performed, they sewed up the hide of the ox, and\nhaving stuffed it with straw, raised it upright in the same form which\nit had when alive, and yoked it to a plough, as if it was about to work\nwith it. Instituting also a judicial process, respecting the slaughter of\nthe ox, they cited all those who were partakers of the deed, to defend\ntheir conduct. But as the drawers of water accused those who sharpened\nthe axe and the knife, as more culpable than themselves, and those who\nsharpened these instruments accused him who gave the axe, and he accused\nhim who cut the throat of the ox, and this last person accused the\nknife,\u2014hence, as the knife could not speak, they condemned it as the\ncause of the slaughter. From that time also, even till now, during the\nfestival sacred to Jupiter, in the Acropolis, at Athens, the sacrifice of\nan ox is performed after the same manner. For, placing cakes on a brazen\ntable, they drive oxen round it, and the ox that tastes of the cakes\nthat are distributed on the table, is slain. The race likewise of those\nwho perform this, still remains. And all those, indeed, who derive their\norigin from Sopater are called _boutupoi_ [i.e. _slayers of oxen_];\nbut those who are descended from him that drove the ox round the table,\nare called _kentriadai_, [or _stimulators_.] And those who originate\nfrom him that cut the throat of the ox, are denominated _daitroi_,\n[or _dividers_,] on account of the banquet which takes place from the\ndistribution of flesh. But when they have filled the hide, and the\njudicial process is ended, they throw the knife into the sea.\n\n31. Hence, neither did the ancients conceive it to be holy to slay\nanimals that co-operated with us in works beneficial to our life, and we\nshould avoid doing this even now. And as formerly it was not pious for\nmen to injure these animals, so now it should be considered as unholy\nto slay them for the sake of food. If, however, this is to be done\nfrom motives of religious reverence of the Gods, yet every passion or\naffection which is essentially produced from bodies is to be rejected,\nin order that we may not procure food from improper substances, and thus\nhave an incentive to violence as the intimate associate of our life. For\nby such a rejection we shall, at least, all of us derive great benefit\nin what pertains to our mutual security, if we do not in any thing else.\nFor those whose sense is averse to the destruction of animals of a\nspecies different from their own, will evidently abstain from injuring\nthose of their own kind. Hence it would perhaps have been best, if\nmen in after-times had immediately abstained from slaughtering these\nanimals; but since no one is free from error, it remains for posterity\nto take away by purifications the crime of their ancestors, respecting\nnutriment. This, however, will be effected, if, placing before our eyes\nthe dire nature of such conduct, we exclaim with Empedocles:\n\n    Ah me, while yet exempt from such a crime,\n    Why was I not destroyed by cruel Time,\n    Before these lips began the guilty deed,\n    On the dire nutriment of flesh to feed?\n\nFor in those only the appropriate sense sympathetically grieves for\nerrors that have been committed, who endeavour to find a remedy for the\nevils with which they are afflicted; so that every one, by offering pure\nand holy sacrifices to divinity, may through sanctity obtain the greatest\nbenefits from the Gods.\n\n32. But the benefit derived from fruits is the first and the greatest\nof all others, and which, as soon as they are matured, should alone be\noffered to the Gods, and to Earth, by whom they are produced. For she\nis the common Vesta of Gods and men; and it is requisite that all of\nus, reclining on her surface, as on the bosom of our mother and nurse,\nshould celebrate her divinity, and love her with a parental affection,\nas the source of our existence. For thus, when we exchange this life for\nanother, we shall again be thought worthy of a residence in the heavens,\nand of associating with all the celestial Gods, whom, now beholding[52],\nwe ought to venerate with those fruits of which they are the causes,\nsacrificing indeed to them from all these, when they have arrived at\nmaturity, but not conceiving all of us to be sufficiently worthy to\nsacrifice to the Gods. For as all things are not to be sacrificed to\nthe Gods, so neither perhaps are the Gods gratified by the sacrifice of\nevery one. This, therefore, is the substance of the arguments adduced by\nTheophrastus, to show that animals ought not to be sacrificed; exclusive\nof the interspersed fabulous narrations, and a few things which we have\nadded to what he has said.\n\n33. I, however, shall not attempt to dissolve the legal institutes which\nthe several nations have established. For it is not my design at present\nto speak about a polity. But as the laws by which we are governed permit\nus to venerate divinity by things of the most simple, and of an inanimate\nnature, hence, selecting that which is the least costly, let us sacrifice\naccording to the law of the city, and endeavour to offer an appropriate\nsacrifice, approaching with consummate purity to the Gods. In short, if\nthe oblation of first-fruits is of any value, and is an acknowledgment of\nthanks for the benefits which we receive, it will be most irrational to\nabstain ourselves from animals, and yet offer the first-fruits of these\nto the Gods. For neither are the Gods worse than we are, so as to be in\nwant of those things of which we are not indigent, nor is it holy to\noffer the first-fruits of that nutriment from which we ourselves abstain.\nFor we find it is usual with men, that, when they refrain from animal\nfood, they do not make oblations of animals; but that they offer to the\nGods the first-fruits of what they themselves eat. Hence also it is now\nfit, that he who abstains from animals should offer the first-fruits of\nthings which he touches [for the purpose of food].\n\n34. Let us therefore also sacrifice, but let us sacrifice in such a\nmanner as is fit, offering different sacrifices to different powers[53];\nto the God indeed who is above all things, as a certain wise man said,\nneither sacrificing with incense, nor consecrating any thing sensible.\nFor there is nothing material, which is not immediately impure to an\nimmaterial nature. Hence, neither is vocal language, nor internal speech,\nadapted to the highest God, when it is defiled by any passion of the\nsoul; but we should venerate him in profound silence with a pure soul,\nand with pure conceptions about him. It is necessary, therefore, that\nbeing conjoined with and assimilated to him, we should offer to him,\nas a sacred sacrifice, the elevation of our intellect, which offering\nwill be both a hymn and our salvation. In an impassive contemplation,\ntherefore, of this divinity by the soul, the sacrifice to him is effected\nin perfection; but to his progeny, the intelligible Gods, hymns,\norally enunciated, are to be offered. For to each of the divinities,\na sacrifice is to be made of the first-fruits of the things which he\nbestows, and through which he nourishes and preserves us. As, therefore,\nthe husbandman offers handfuls of the fruits and berries which the\nseason first produces; thus also we should offer to the divinities the\nfirst-fruits of our conceptions of their transcendent excellence, giving\nthem thanks for the contemplation which they impart to us, and for truly\nnourishing us through the vision of themselves, which they afford us,\nassociating with, appearing to, and shining upon us, for our salvation.\n\n35. Now, however, many of those who apply themselves to philosophy\nare unwilling to do this; and, pursuing renown rather than honouring\ndivinity, they are busily employed about statues, neither considering\nwhether they are to be reverenced or not, nor endeavouring to learn from\nthose who are divinely wise, to what extent, and to what degree, it is\nrequisite to proceed in this affair. We, however, shall by no means\ncontend with these, nor are we very desirous of being well instructed in\na thing of this kind; but imitating holy and ancient men, we offer to the\nGods, more than any thing else, the first-fruits of contemplation, which\nthey have imparted to us, and by the use of which we become partakers of\ntrue salvation.\n\n36. The Pythagoreans, therefore, diligently applying themselves to the\nstudy of numbers and lines, sacrificed for the most part from these to\nthe Gods, denominating, indeed, a certain number Minerva, but another\nDiana, and another Apollo: and again, they called one number justice, but\nanother temperance[54]. In diagrams also they adopted a similar mode. And\nthus, by offerings of this kind, they rendered the Gods propitious to\nthem, so as to obtain of them the object of their wishes, by the things\nwhich they dedicated to, and the names by which they invoked them. They\nlikewise frequently employed their aid in divination, and if they were in\nwant of a certain thing for the purpose of some investigation. In order,\ntherefore, to effect this, they made use of the Gods within the heavens,\nboth the erratic and non-erratic, of all of whom it is requisite to\nconsider the sun as the leader; but to rank the moon in the second place;\nand we should conjoin with these fire, in the third place, from its\nalliance to them, as the theologist[55] says. He also says that no animal\nis to be sacrificed; but that first-fruits are to be offered from meal\nand honey, and the vegetable productions of the earth. He adds, that fire\nis not to be enkindled on a hearth defiled with gore; and asserts other\nthings of the like kind. For what occasion is there to transcribe all\nthat he says? for he who is studious of piety knows, indeed, that to the\nGods no animal is to be sacrificed, but that a sacrifice of this kind\npertains to d\u00e6mons, and other powers, whether they are beneficent, or\ndepraved[56]. He likewise knows who those are that ought to sacrifice to\nthese, and to what extent they ought to proceed in the sacrifices which\nthey make. Other things, however, will be passed over by me in silence.\nBut what some Platonists have divulged, I shall lay before the reader, in\norder that the things proposed to be discussed, may become manifest to\nthe intelligent. What they have unfolded, therefore, is as follows:\n\n37. The first God being incorporeal, immoveable, and impartible, and\nneither subsisting in any thing, nor restrained in his energies, is not,\nas has been before observed, in want of any thing external to himself, as\nneither is the soul of the world; but this latter, containing in itself\nthe principle of that which is triply divisible, and being naturally\nself-motive, is adapted to be moved in a beautiful and orderly manner,\nand also to move the body of the world according to the most excellent\nreasons [i.e. productive principles or powers]. It is, however,\nconnected with and comprehends body, though it is itself incorporeal,\nand liberated from the participation of any passion. To the remaining\nGods, therefore, to the world, to the inerratic and erratic stars, who\nare visible Gods, consisting of soul and body, thanks are to be returned\nafter the above-mentioned manner, through sacrifices from inanimate\nnatures. The multitude, therefore, of those invisible beings remains for\nus, whom Plato indiscriminately calls d\u00e6mons[57]; but of these, some\nbeing denominated by men, obtain from them honours, and other religious\nobservances, similar to those which are paid to the Gods; but others,\nwho for the most part are not explicitly denominated, receive an occult\nreligious reverence and appellation from certain persons in villages\nand certain cities; and the remaining multitude is called in common by\nthe name of d\u00e6mons. The general persuasion, however, respecting all\nthese invisible beings, is this, that if they become angry through being\nneglected, and deprived of the religious reverence which is due to them,\nthey are noxious to those by whom they are thus neglected, and that they\nagain become beneficent, if they are appeased by prayers, supplications,\nand sacrifices, and other similar rites.\n\n38. But the confused notion which is formed of these beings, and which\nhas proceeded to great crimination, necessarily requires that the nature\nof them should be distinguished according to reason. For perhaps it will\nbe said, that it is requisite to show whence the error concerning them\noriginated among men. The distinction, therefore, must be made after the\nfollowing manner. Such souls as are the progeny of the whole soul of the\nuniverse, and who govern the great parts of the region under the moon,\nthese, being incumbent on a pneumatic substance or spirit, and ruling\nover it conformably to reason, are to be considered as good d\u00e6mons, who\nare diligently employed in causing every thing to be beneficial to the\nsubjects of their government, whether they preside over certain animals,\nor fruits, which are arranged under their inspective care, or over things\nwhich subsist for the sake of these, such as showers of rain, moderate\nwinds, serene weather, and other things which cooperate with these,\nsuch as the good temperament of the seasons of the year. They are also\nour leaders in the attainment of music, and the whole of erudition, and\nlikewise of medicine and gymnastic, and of every thing else similar to\nthese. For it is impossible that these d\u00e6mons should impart utility, and\nyet become, in the very same things, the causes of what is detrimental.\nAmong these two, those _transporters_, as Plato calls them, [in his\nBanquet] are to be enumerated, who announce the affairs of men to the\nGods, and the will of the Gods to men; carrying our prayers, indeed,\nto the Gods as judges, but oracularly unfolding to us the exhortations\nand admonitions of the Gods. But such souls as do not rule over the\npneumatic substance with which they are connected, but for the most\npart are vanquished by it; these are vehemently agitated and borne along\n[in a disorderly manner,] when the irascible motions and the desires of\nthe pneumatic substance, receive an impetus. These souls, therefore, are\nindeed d\u00e6mons, but are deservedly called malefic d\u00e6mons.\n\n39. All these beings, likewise, and those who possess a contrary power,\nare invisible, and perfectly imperceptible by human senses; for they\nare not surrounded with a solid body, nor are all of them of one form,\nbut they are fashioned in numerous figures. The forms, however, which\ncharacterize their pneumatic substance, at one time become apparent, but\nat another are invisible. Sometimes also those that are malefic, change\ntheir forms; but the pneumatic substance, so far as it is corporeal, is\npassive and corruptible: and though, because it is thus bound by the\nsouls [that are incumbent on it,] the form of it remains for a long time,\nyet it is not eternal. For it is probable that something continually\nflows from it, and also that it is nourished. The pneumatic substance,\ntherefore, of good d\u00e6mons, possesses symmetry, in the same manner as\nthe bodies of the visible Gods; but the spirit of malefic d\u00e6mons is\ndeprived of symmetry, and in consequence of its abounding in passivity,\nthey are distributed about the terrestrial region. Hence, there is no\nevil which they do not attempt to effect; for, in short, being violent\nand fraudulent in their manners, and being also deprived of the guardian\ncare of more excellent d\u00e6mons, they make, for the most part, vehement\nand sudden attacks; sometimes endeavouring to conceal their incursions,\nbut at other times assaulting openly. Hence the molestations which are\nproduced by them are rapid; but the remedies and corrections which\nproceed from more excellent d\u00e6mons, appear to be more slowly effected:\nfor every thing which is good being tractable and equable, proceeds in\nan orderly manner, and does not pass beyond what is fit. By forming this\nopinion, therefore, you will never fall into that most absurd notion,\nthat evil may be expected from the good, or good from the evil. For this\nnotion is not only attended with absurdity, but the multitude, receiving\nthrough it the most erroneous conceptions of the Gods, disseminate them\namong the rest of mankind.\n\n40. It must be admitted, therefore, that one of the greatest injuries\noccasioned by malefic d\u00e6mons is this, that though they are the causes\nof the calamities which take place about the earth, such as pestilence,\nsterility, earthquakes, excessive dryness, and the like, yet they\nendeavour to persuade us, that they are the causes of things the most\ncontrary to these, viz. of fertility, [salubrity, and elementary peace.]\nHence, they exonerate themselves from blame, and, in the first place,\nendeavour to avoid being detected as the sources of injury; and, in\nthe next place, they convert us to supplications and sacrifices to the\nbeneficent Gods, as if they were angry. But they effect these, and things\nof a similar nature, in consequence of wishing to turn us from right\nconceptions of the Gods, and convert us to themselves; for they are\ndelighted with all such as act thus incongruously and discordantly, and,\nas it were, assuming the persons of other Gods, they enjoy the effects of\nour imprudence and folly; conciliating to themselves the good opinion of\nthe vulgar, by inflaming the minds of men with the love of riches, power,\nand pleasure, and filling them with the desire of vain glory, from which\nsedition, and war, and other things allied to these, are produced. But\nthat which is the most dire of all things, they proceed still farther,\nand persuade men that similar things are effected by the greatest\nGods, and do not stop till they even subject the most excellent of the\ndivinities to these calumnies, through whom they say every thing is in\nperfect confusion. And not only the vulgar are affected in this manner,\nbut not a few also of those who are conversant with philosophy. The cause\nof this, however, extends equally to philosophers, and the vulgar; for\nof philosophers, those who do not depart from the prevailing notions,\nfall into the same error with the multitude; and again, the multitude, on\nhearing assertions from celebrated men conformable to their own opinions,\nare in a greater degree corroborated in conceiving things of this kind of\nthe Gods.\n\n41. For poetry also inflames the opinions of men, by employing a diction\nadapted to produce astonishment and enchantment, and not only allures\nthe ears, but is also capable of procuring belief in things that are\nmost impossible. At the same time, however, it is requisite to be firmly\npersuaded, that what is good can never injure, nor what is evil can ever\nbe beneficial; for, as Plato says, it is not the province of heat to\nrefrigerate, but of that which is contrary to heat; and, in like manner,\nneither is it the province of that which is just to injure. But divinity\nis naturally the most just of all things; since otherwise he would not\nbe divinity. Hence this power and portion of good is not to be abscinded\nfrom beneficent d\u00e6mons; for the power which is naturally adapted, and\nwishes to injure, is contrary to the power which is beneficent: but\ncontraries can never subsist about the same thing. As malefic d\u00e6mons,\ntherefore, injure the mortal race in many respects, and sometimes in\nthings of the greatest consequence, good d\u00e6mons not only never cease\nto act conformably to their office, but also, as much as possible,\npresignify to us the dangers which are impendent from malefic d\u00e6mons,\nunfolding these through dreams, through a divinely inspired soul, and\nthrough many other things; so that he who is capable of explaining\nwhat is signified, may know and avoid all the perils with which he is\nthreatened. For they indicate [future events] to all men, but every one\ncannot understand what they indicate, nor is every one able to read what\nis written by them; but he alone is able to do this, who has learnt their\nletters. All enchantment, however, [or witchcraft,] is effected through\nd\u00e6mons of a contrary nature; for those who perpetrate evil through\nenchantments, especially venerate these malefic beings, and the power\nthat presides over them.\n\n42. For they are full of every kind of imagination, and are sufficiently\nqualified to deceive, through effects of a prodigious nature; and through\nthese, unhappy men procure philtres, and amatory allurements. For all\nintemperance, and hope of possessing wealth and renown, and especially\ndeception, exist through these, since falsehood is allied to these\nmalevolent beings; _for they wish to be considered as Gods, and the power\nwhich presides over them is ambitious to appear to be the greatest God_.\nThese are they that rejoice in libations, and the savour of sacrifices,\nthrough which their pneumatic vehicle is fattened; for this vehicle lives\nthrough vapours and exhalations, and the life of it is various through\nvarious exhalations. It is likewise corroborated by the savour of blood\nand flesh.\n\n43. On this account, a wise and temperate man will be religiously afraid\nto use sacrifices of this kind, through which he will attract to himself\nsuch-like d\u00e6mons; but he will endeavour in all possible ways to purify\nhis soul. For these malefic beings do not attack a pure soul, because\nit is dissimilar to them; but if it is necessary to cities to render\nthem propitious, this is nothing to us. For by these riches, and things\nexternal and corporeal, are thought to be good, and their contraries\nevil; but the smallest attention is paid by them to the good of the soul.\nWe however, to the utmost of our ability, endeavour not to be in want\nof those things which they impart; but all our endeavour is to become\nsimilar to God, and to the [divine] powers with which he is surrounded\nboth from what pertains to the soul, and from externals; _and this is\neffected through an entire liberation from the dominion of the passions,\nan evolved perception of truly existing beings, and a vital tendency\ntowards them_. On the other hand, we strive to become dissimilar to\ndepraved men and evil d\u00e6mons, and, in short, to every being that rejoices\nin a mortal and material nature. So that, conformably to what is said by\nTheophrastus, we also shall sacrifice from those things which theologists\npermit us to use for this purpose; as well knowing, that by how much the\nmore we neglect to exempt ourselves from the passions of the soul, by so\nmuch the more we connect ourselves with a depraved power, and render it\nnecessary that he should become propitious to us. For, as theologists\nsay, it is necessary that those who are bound[58] to things external, and\nhave not yet vanquished their passions, should avert the anger of this\n[malefic] power; since, if they do not, there will be no end to their\nlabours.\n\n44. Thus far what pertains to sacrifices has been elucidated. As we said,\nhowever, at first, as it is not entirely necessary, if animals are to be\nsacrificed, that they are also to be eaten, we shall now show that it is\nnecessary we should not eat them, though it may be sometimes necessary\nthat they should be sacrificed. For all theologists agree in this, that\nin sacrifices, which are made for the purpose of averting some evil, the\nimmolated animals are not to be tasted, but are to be used as expiations.\nFor, say they, no one should go into the city, nor into his own house,\ntill he has first purified his garments, and his body, in rivers, or some\nfountain. So that they order those whom they permit to sacrifice, to\nabstain from the victims, and to purify themselves before they sacrifice\nby fasting, and especially by abstaining from animals. They add, _that\npurity is the guardian of piety; and is, as it were, a symbol or divine\nseal, which secures its possessor from the attacks and allurements of\nevil d\u00e6mons_. For such a one, being contrarily disposed to, and more\ndivine in his operations than those by whom he is attacked, because he\nis more pure both in his body and in the passions of his soul, remains\nuninjured, in consequence of being surrounded with purity as with a\nbulwark.\n\n45. Hence a defence of this kind has appeared to be necessary even to\nenchanters; though it is not efficacious with them on all occasions.\nFor they invoke evil d\u00e6mons for lascivious purposes. So that purity\ndoes not belong to enchanters, but to divine men, and such as are\ndivinely wise; since it every where becomes a guard to those that use\nit, and conciliates them with a divine nature. I wish, therefore, that\nenchanters would make use of purity continually, for then they would not\nemploy themselves in incantations, because, through this, they would be\ndeprived of the enjoyment of those things, for the sake of which they act\nimpiously. Whence becoming full of passions, and abstaining for a short\ntime from impure food, they are notwithstanding replete with impurity,\nand suffer the punishment of their illegal conduct towards the whole of\nthings, partly from those whom they irritate, and partly from Justice,\nwho perceives all mortal deeds and conceptions. Both inward, therefore,\nand external purity pertain to a divine man, who earnestly endeavours to\nbe liberated from the passions of the soul, and who abstains from such\nfood as excites the passions, and is fed with divine wisdom; and by right\nconceptions of, is assimilated to divinity himself. For such a man, being\nconsecrated by an intellectual sacrifice, approaches to God in a white\ngarment, and with a truly pure _impassivity_ of soul, and levity of body,\nand is not burdened with foreign and external juices, and the passions of\nthe soul.\n\n46. For, indeed, it must not be admitted as necessary in temples, which\nare consecrated by men to the Gods, that those who enter into them should\nhave their feet pure, and their shoes free from every stain, but that in\nthe temple of the father [of all], which is this world, it is not proper\nto preserve our ultimate and cutaneous vestment pure, and to dwell in\nthis temple with an undefiled garment. For if the danger consisted only\nin the defilement of the body, it might, perhaps, be lawful to neglect\nit. But now, since every sensible body is attended with an efflux of\nmaterial d\u00e6mons, hence, together with the impurity produced from flesh\nand blood, the power which is friendly to, and familiar with, this\nimpurity, is at the same time present through similitude and alliance.\n\n47. Hence theologists have rightly paid attention to abstinence. And\nthese things were indicated to us by a certain Egyptian[59], who also\nassigned a most natural cause of them, which was verified by experience.\nFor, since a depraved and irrational soul, when it leaves the body, is\nstill compelled to adhere to it, since the souls also of those men who\ndie by violence, are detained about the body; this circumstance should\nprevent a man from forcibly expelling his soul from the body. The violent\nslaughter, therefore, of animals, compels souls to be delighted with the\nbodies which they have left, but the soul is by no means prevented from\nbeing there, where it is attracted by a kindred nature; whence many souls\nare seen to lament, and some remain about the bodies that are unburied;\nwhich souls are improperly used by enchanters, as subservient to their\ndesigns, being compelled by them to occupy the body, or a part of the\nbody, which they have left. Since, therefore, these things were well\nknown to theologists, and they also perceived the nature of a depraved\nsoul, and its alliance to the bodies from which it was divulsed, and the\npleasure which it received from a union with them, they very properly\navoided animal food, in order that they might not be disturbed by alien\nsouls, violently separated from the body and impure, and which are\nattracted to things of a kindred nature, and likewise that they might\nnot be impeded by the presence of evil d\u00e6mons, in approaching alone [or\nwithout being burdened with things of a foreign nature] to the highest\nGod[60].\n\n48. For that the nature of a kindred body is attractive of soul,\nexperience abundantly taught these theologists. Hence those who wish to\nreceive into themselves the souls of prophetic animals, swallow the most\nprincipal parts of them, such as the hearts of crows, or of moles, or of\nhawks. For thus they have soul present with, and predicting to them like\na God, and entering into them together with the intromission of the body.\n\n49. Very properly, therefore, will the philosopher, and who is also the\npriest of the God that is above all things, abstain from all animal food,\nin consequence of earnestly endeavouring to approach through himself\nalone to the alone[61] God, without being disturbed by any attendants.\nSuch a one likewise is cautious, as being well acquainted with the\nnecessities of nature. For he who is truly a philosopher, is skilled\nin, and an observer of many things, understands the works of nature, is\nsagacious, temperate and modest, and is in every respect the saviour\nof himself. And as he who is the priest of a certain particular God,\nis skilled in placing the statues of that divinity, and in his orgies,\nmysteries, and the like, thus also he who is the priest of the highest\nGod, is skilled in the manner in which his statue ought to be fashioned,\nand in purifications, and other things through which he is conjoined to\nthis divinity.\n\n50. But if in the sacred rites which are here, those that are priests and\ndiviners order both themselves and others to abstain from sepulchres,\nfrom impious men, from menstrual purgations, and from venereal congress,\nand likewise from base and mournful spectacles, and from those auditions\nwhich excite the passions, (because frequently, through those that are\npresent being impure, something appears which disturbs the diviner; on\nwhich account it is said, that to sacrifice inopportunely, is attended\nwith greater detriment than gain);\u2014if this, therefore, is the case,\nwill he, who is the priest of the father of all things, suffer himself\nto become the sepulchre of dead bodies? And will such a one, being full\nof defilement, endeavour to associate with the transcendent God? It is\nsufficient, indeed, that in fruits we assume parts of death, for the\nsupport of our present life. This, however, is not yet the place for such\na discussion. We must, therefore, still farther investigate what pertains\nto sacrifices.\n\n51. For some one may say that we shall subvert a great part of\ndivination, viz. that which is effected through an inspection of the\nviscera, if we abstain from destroying animals. He, therefore, who makes\nthis objection, should also destroy men: for it is said that future\nevents are more apparent in the viscera of men than in those of brutes;\nand many of the Barbarians exercise the art of divination through\nthe entrails of men. As, however, it would be an indication of great\ninjustice, and inexhaustible avidity, to destroy those of our own species\nfor the sake of divination, thus also it is unjust for the sake of this\nto slay an irrational animal. But it does not belong to the present\ndiscussion to investigate whether Gods, or d\u00e6mons, or soul liberated from\nthe animal [with which it had been connected], exhibit signs of future\nevents to those who explore such signs, through the indications which the\nviscera afford.\n\n52. Nevertheless, we permit those whose life is rolled about externals,\nhaving once acted impiously towards themselves, to be borne along to that\nto which they tend; but we rightly say, that the man whom we designate as\na philosopher, and who is separated from externals, will not be disturbed\nby d\u00e6mons, nor be in want of diviners, nor of the viscera of animals.\nFor he earnestly endeavours to be separated from those things for the\nsake of which divinations are effected. For he does not betake himself\nto nuptials, in order that he may molest the diviner about wedlock, or\nmerchandise, or inquiries about a servant, or an increase of property, or\nany other object of vulgar pursuit. For the subjects of his investigation\nare not clearly indicated by any diviner or viscera of animals. But\nhe, as we have said, approaching through himself to the [supreme] God,\nwho is established in the true inward parts of himself, receives from\nthence the precepts of eternal life, tending thither by a conflux of the\nwhole of himself, and instead of a diviner praying that he may become a\nconfabulator of the mighty Jupiter.\n\n53. For if such a one is impelled by some necessary circumstance, there\nare good d\u00e6mons, who, to the man living after this manner, and who is\na domestic of divinity, will indicate and prevent, through dreams and\nsymbols, and omens, what may come to pass, and what is necessarily to be\navoided. For it is only requisite to depart from evil, and to know what\nis most honourable in the whole of things, and every thing which in the\nuniverse is good, friendly, and familiar. But vice, and an ignorance\nof divine concerns, are dire, through which a man is led to despise\nand defame things of which he has no knowledge; since nature does not\nproclaim these particulars with a voice which can be heard by the ears,\nbut being herself intellectual[62], she initiates through intellect\nthose who venerate her. And even though some one should admit the art of\ndivination for the sake of predicting what is future, yet it does not\nfrom thence necessarily follow that the flesh of animals is to be eaten;\nas neither does it follow, that because it is proper to sacrifice to Gods\nor d\u00e6mons, food from animals is therefore to be introduced. For, not\nonly the history which is related by Theophrastus, but also many other\nnarrations inform us, that in ancient times men were sacrificed, yet it\nmust not be inferred that on this account men are to be eaten.\n\n54. And that we do not carelessly assert these things, but that what we\nhave said is abundantly confirmed by history, the following narrations\nsufficiently testify. For in Rhodes, on the sixth day of June, a man\nwas sacrificed to Saturn; which custom having prevailed for a long\ntime, was afterwards changed [into a more human mode of sacrificing].\nFor one of those men who, by the public decision, had been sentenced to\ndeath, was kept in prison till the Saturnalia commenced; but as soon as\nthis festival began, they brought the man out of the gates of the city,\nopposite to the temple of Aristobulus, and giving him wine to drink,\nthey cut his throat. But in the island which is now called Salamis,\nbut was formerly denominated Coronis, in the month according to the\nCyprians Aphrodisius, a man was sacrificed to Agraule, the daughter of\nCecrops, and the nymph Agraulis. And this custom continued till the time\nof Diomed. Afterwards it was changed, so that a man was sacrificed\nto Diomed. But the temples of Minerva, of Agraule, and Diomed, were\ncontained in one and the same enclosure. The man also who was about to be\nslain, was first led by young men thrice round the altar, afterwards the\npriest pierced him with a lance in the stomach, and thus being thrown on\nthe pyre, he was entirely consumed.\n\n55. This sacred institute was, however, abolished by Diphilus, the king\nof Cyprus, who flourished about the time of Seleucus, the theologist.\nBut D\u00e6mon substituted an ox for a man; thus causing the latter sacrifice\nto be of equal worth with the former. Amosis also abolished the law of\nsacrificing men in the Egyptian city Heliopolis; the truth of which is\ntestified by Manetho in his treatise on Antiquity and Piety. But the\nsacrifice was made to Juno, and an investigation took place, as if they\nwere endeavouring to find pure calves, and such as were marked by the\nimpression of a seal. Three men also were sacrificed on the day appointed\nfor this purpose, in the place of whom Amosis ordered them to substitute\nthree waxen images. In Chios likewise, they sacrificed a man to Omadius\nBacchus[63], the man being for this purpose torn in pieces; and the same\ncustom, as Euelpis Carystius says, was adopted in Tenedos. To which may\nbe added, that the Laced\u00e6monians, as Apollodorus says, sacrificed a man\nto Mars.\n\n56. Moreover the Ph\u0153nicians, in great calamities, either of war, or\nexcessive dryness, or pestilence, sacrificed some one of their dearest\nfriends, who was selected by votes for this purpose. The Ph\u0153nician\nhistory also is replete with instances of men being sacrificed, which\nhistory was written by Sanchoniatho in the Ph\u0153nician tongue, and was\ninterpreted into Greek in eight books, by Philo Byblius. But Ister, in\nhis collection of the Cretan sacrifices, says that the Curetes formerly\nsacrificed children to Saturn. And Pallas, who is the best of those\nthat have collected what pertains to the mysteries of Mithras, says,\nthat under the Emperor Adrian the sacrificing of men was nearly totally\nabolished. For, prior to his time, in Laodicea, which is in Syria, they\nanciently sacrificed a virgin to Minerva, but now they sacrifice a stag.\nThe Carthaginians too, who dwell in Libya, formerly sacrificed men; but\nthis custom was abolished by Iphicrates. And the Dumatii, a people of\nArabia, annually sacrificed a boy, whom they buried under the altar,\nwhich was used by them as a statue. But Phylarchus narrates, that it\nwas the general custom of all the Greeks, before they went to war, to\nimmolate men. I omit to mention the Thracians and Scythians, and also\nthe Athenians, who slew the daughter of Erechtheus and Praxithea. And\neven at present, who is ignorant that in the great city of Rome, in the\nfestival of Jupiter Latialis, they cut the throat of a man? Human flesh,\nhowever, is not on this account to be eaten; though, through a certain\nnecessity, a man should be sacrificed. For, when a famine takes place\nduring a siege, some of the besieged feed on each other, yet at the same\ntime those who do so are deemed execrable, and the deed is thought to be\nimpious.\n\n57. After the first war, likewise, waged by the Romans against the\nCarthaginians, in order to obtain Sicily, when the mercenary soldiers\nof the Ph\u0153nicians revolted, and, together with them, those of Africa\ndeserted, Amilcar, who was surnamed Barkas, in attacking the Romans, was\nreduced to such a scarcity of food, that at first his men ate those\nthat fell in battle; but afterwards, these failing, they ate their\ncaptives; in the third place, their servants; and in the last place, they\nattacked each other, and devoured their fellow-soldiers, who were led to\nbe slaughtered for this purpose by lot. But Amilcar, taking those men\nthat were in his power, caused his elephants to trample on such of the\nsoldiers as had acted in this manner, conceiving that it was not holy\nto suffer them to be any longer mingled with other men; and neither did\nhe admit that men should be eaten because certain persons had dared to\ndo this; nor his son Hannibal, who, when he was leading his army into\nItaly, was advised by a certain person to accustom his troops to feed on\nhuman flesh, in order that they might never be in want of food. It does\nnot follow, therefore, that because famine and war have been the causes\nof eating other animals, it is also requisite to feed on them for the\nsake of pleasure; as neither must we admit, that on this account men are\nto be eaten. Nor does it follow, that because animals are sacrificed to\ncertain powers, it is also requisite to eat them. For neither do those\nwho sacrifice men, on this account, feed on human flesh. Through what\nhas been said, therefore, it is demonstrated, that it does not entirely\nfollow that animals are to be eaten because they are sacrificed.\n\n58. But that those who had learnt what the nature is of the powers in the\nuniverse, offered sacrifices through blood, not to Gods, but to d\u00e6mons,\nis confirmed by theologists themselves. For they also assert, that of\nd\u00e6mons, some are malefic, but others beneficent, who will not molest us,\nif we offer to them the first-fruits of those things alone which we eat,\nand by which we nourish either the soul or the body. After, therefore, we\nhave added a few observations more, in order to show that the unperverted\nconceptions of the multitude accord with a right opinion respecting the\nGods, we shall conclude this book. Those poets, therefore, who are wise,\nthough but in a small degree, say,\n\n    What man so credulous and void of mind,\n    What man so ignorant, as to think the Gods\n    In fiery bile and fleshless bones rejoice,\n    For hungry dogs a nutriment not fit;\n    Or that such offerers they will e\u2019er reward?\n\nBut another poet says,\n\n    My offerings to the Gods from cakes alone\n    And frankincense shall be; for not to friends\n    But deities my sacrifice I make.\n\n59. Apollo also, when he orders men to sacrifice according to paternal\ninstitutes, appears to refer every thing to ancient custom. But the\nancient custom of sacrificing was, as we have before shown, with cakes\nand fruits. Hence also, sacrifices were called \u03b8\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9, _thusiai_, and\n\u03b8\u03c5\u03b7\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9, _thuelai_, and \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9, _thumelai_, and \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03bf \u03b8\u03c5\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, _auto to\nthuein_, i.e. _the act of sacrificing_, signified the same thing as \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b9\u1fb3\u03bd, _tou thumian_, i.e. _to offer incense_, and which is now called\nby us, \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, _epithuein_, i.e. _to sacrifice something more_. For\nwhat we now call \u03b8\u03c5\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, _thuein_, _i.e. to sacrifice_, the ancients\ndenominated \u03b5\u03c1\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, _erdein_, i.e. _to perform_ or _make_.\n\n    They perfect hecatombs of bulls, or goats,\n    _Made_ to Apollo.\n\n60. But those who introduced costliness into sacrifices, were ignorant\nthat, in conjunction with this, they also introduced a swarm of evils,\nviz. superstition, luxury, an opinion that a divine nature may be\ncorrupted by gifts, and that a compensation may be made by sacrifices\nfor injustice. Or whence do some make an oblation of three animals with\ngilded horns, but others of hecatombs? And whence did Olympias, the\nmother of Alexander [the Great,] sacrifice a thousand of each species of\nanimals, unless sumptuousness had at length proceeded to superstition?\nBut when the young man was informed that the Gods rejoiced in magnificent\nsacrifices, and, as they say, in solemn banquets of oxen and other\nanimals, how, though he was willing to act wisely, was it possible\nthat he could? How also, when he conceived that these sacrifices were\nacceptable to the Gods, was it possible he should not fancy that he was\npermitted to act unjustly, when he might exonerate himself from erroneous\nconduct through sacrifices? But if he had been persuaded that the Gods\nhave no need of these things, and that they look to the manners of those\nwho approach to them, _and conceive that a right opinion of them, and of\nthings themselves, is the greatest sacrifice_, how is it possible that he\nshould not have been temperate, holy, and just?\n\n61. To the Gods, indeed, the most excellent offering is a pure intellect\nand an impassive soul, and also a moderate oblation of our own property\nand of other things, and this not negligently, but with the greatest\nalacrity. For the honours which we pay to the Gods should be accompanied\nby the same promptitude as that with which we give the first seat to\nworthy men, and with which we rise to, and salute them, and not by the\npromptitude with which we pay a tribute. For man must not use such\nlanguage as the following to God:\n\n    If, O Philinus, you recal to mind,\n    And love me for, the benefits which I\n    On you conferr\u2019d, \u2019tis well, since for the sake\n    Of these alone my bounty was bestow\u2019d.\n\nFor divinity is not satisfied with such assertions as these. And hence\nPlato says [in his Laws], that it pertains to a good man to sacrifice,\nand to be always conversant with the Gods by prayers, votive offerings,\nsacrifices, and every kind of religious worship; but that to the bad\nman, much labour about the Gods is inefficacious and vain. For the good\nman knows what ought to be sacrificed, and from what it is requisite to\nabstain; what things are to be offered to divinity, and of what the\nfirst-fruits are to be sacrificed; but the bad man exhibiting honours to\nthe Gods from his own disposition and his own pursuits, acts in so doing\nmore impiously than piously. Hence Plato thought, that a philosopher\nought not to be conversant with men of depraved habits; for this is\nneither pleasing to the Gods, nor useful to men; but the philosopher\nshould endeavour to change such men to a better condition, and if he\ncannot effect this, he should be careful that he does not himself become\nchanged into their depravity. He adds, that having entered into the right\npath, he should proceed in it, neither fearing danger from the multitude,\nnor any other blasphemy which may happen to take place. For it would be\na thing of a dire nature, that the Syrians indeed will not taste fish,\nnor the Hebrews swine, nor most of the Ph\u0153nicians and Egyptians cows; and\nthough many kings have endeavoured to change these customs, yet those\nthat adopt them would rather suffer death, than a transgression of the\nlaw [which forbids them to eat these animals]; and yet that we should\nchoose to transgress the laws of nature and divine precepts through the\nfear of men, or of a certain denunciation of evil from them. For the\ndivine choir of Gods, and divine men, may justly be greatly indignant\nwith us, if it perceives us directing our attention to the opinions\nof depraved men, and idly looking to the terror with which they are\nattended, though we daily meditate how we may become [philosophically]\ndead to other things in the present life.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[40] _i.e._ The Egyptians.\n\n[41] In the original \u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, which is derived from the verb \u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9,\n_imprecor_, _maledico_; and from hence, according to Porphyry, came the\nword \u03b1\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1.\n\n[42] _i.e._ May be rather called _malevolent_ than _unhappy_.\n\n[43] Fabricius is of opinion that these _Thoes_ are the same with the\nAcrothoit\u00e6, mentioned by Simplicius in his Comment. in Epictet. from\nTheophrastus.\n\n[44] In the original, \u03b7 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03b8\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1, \u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1.\n\n[45] In the original, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, which Felicianus very\nerroneously renders, \u201calius siquidem mihi ad vescendem sumo;\u201d but\nValentinus rightly, \u201cet horum aliqua coram illis apponere.\u201d\n\n[46] A round, broad, and thin cake, which was offered in sacrifice to the\nGods.\n\n[47] Tynnichus, the Chalcidensian, is mentioned by Plato in his Io.\n\n[48] Vid. Hesiod, Fragm. v. 169.\n\n[49] A city of Crete.\n\n[50] _i.e._ Under the pretext of being patronized by divinity in so\ndoing.\n\n[51] Porphyry, in what he here says of the Jews, alludes to that sect of\nthem called Ess\u00e6ans; concerning whom, see the 4th book of this work.\n\n[52] In the original, \u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bd\u03c5\u03bd \u03bf\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb., instead\nof which, Reisk proposes to read, \u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bd\u03c5\u03bd \u03bf\u03c5\u03c7 \u03bf\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9 [vel\n\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7] \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. But the insertion of \u03bf\u03c5\u03c7 is most absurd: for the\n_celestial_ are called the _visible_ Gods. Thus Plato, in the Tim\u00e6us, in\nthe speech of the Demiurgus to the junior or mundane Gods, who consist of\nthe _celestial_ and _sublunary_ deities, calls the _celestial Gods_ those\nthat _visibly_ revolve, and the _sublunary_, those that become apparent\nwhen they please: \u0395\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u2019 \u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u03b8\u03b5\u03bb\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03b9, \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. Conformably,\ntherefore, to the above translation, I read, \u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bd\u03c5\u03bd \u03bf\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. To which may be added, that our author, in paragraph 37,\nexpressly calls the stars _visible Gods_.\n\n[53] In the original, \u0398\u03cd\u03c3\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03b8\u03c5\u03c3\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd, \u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9, \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b8\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2, \u03c9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2.\nThis Valentinus erroneously translates as follows: \u201cSacrificabimus igitur\netiam et nos, sed prout decet, victimas scilicet _eximias_ potestatibus\n_eximiis_ adducentes.\u201d For \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 and \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, in this passage,\nevidently mean _different_, and not _excellent_.\n\n[54] Concerning the appellations which the Pythagoreans gave to numbers,\nsee my Theoretic Arithmetic, in which also the occult meaning of these\nappellations is unfolded.\n\n[55] \u201cPlotinus ni fallor, aut Plato, sed ille potius,\u201d says Reisk;\nbut every one who is at all conversant with Platonic writers, will\nimmediately see that by _the theologist_, Porphyry means _Orpheus_.\n\n[56] Though Porphyry excelled in all philosophical knowledge, whence\nalso he was called \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b5\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u03b7\u03bd, _the philosopher_, yet he was inferior\nto his auditor Iamblichus, in theological information. On this account,\nIamblichus was called by all the Platonists posterior to him, _the\ndivine_, and _the great_ priest. I shall present the reader, therefore,\nwith an extract from my translation of his treatise on the Mysteries,\nwhich appears to me to be an admirable supplement to what Porphyry has\nsaid in this book, about sacrificing animals, and a satisfactory answer\nto the question whether they are to be sacrificed or not.\n\nIn Chap. 14, therefore, of Sect. 5, he observes as follows: \u201cWe shall\nbegin the elucidation of this subject in the best possible manner, if we\ndemonstrate that the sacred law of sacrifices is connected with the order\nof the Gods. In the first place, therefore, we say, that of the Gods some\nare material, but others immaterial. And the material, indeed, are those\nthat comprehend matter in themselves, and adorn it; but the immaterial\nare those that are perfectly exempt from, and transcend matter: but,\naccording to the sacrific art, it is requisite to begin sacred operations\nfrom the material Gods; for the ascent to the immaterial Gods will not\notherwise be effected. The material Gods, therefore, have a certain\ncommunication with matter, so far as they preside over it. Hence they\nhave dominion over things which happen about matter, such as the\ndivision, percussion, repercussion, mutation, generation, and corruption\nof all material bodies. He, therefore, who wishes to worship these\ntheurgically, in a manner adapted to them, and to the dominion which\nthey are allotted, should, as they are material, employ a material mode\nof worship. For thus we shall be wholly led to a familiarity with them,\nand worship them in an allied and appropriate manner. _Dead bodies,\ntherefore, and things deprived of life, the slaying of animals, and the\nconsumption of victims, and, in short, the mutation of the matter which\nis offered, pertain to these Gods, not by themselves, but on account\nof the matter over which they preside._ For though they are, in the\nmost eminent degree, separate from it, yet, at the same time, they are\npresent with it; and, though they comprehend matter in an immaterial\npower, yet they are co-existent with it. Things also that are governed,\nare not foreign from their governors; and things which are subservient\nas instruments, are not unadapted to those that use them. Hence it\nis foreign to the immaterial Gods, to offer matter to them through\nsacrifices, but this is most adapted to all the material Gods.\u201d\n\nIn the following chapter, Iamblichus observes, \u201cthat as there is a time\nwhen we become wholly soul, are out of the body, and sublimely revolve on\nhigh, in conjunction with all the immaterial Gods; so, likewise, there is\na two-fold mode of worship, one of which is simple, incorporeal, and pure\nfrom all generation; and this mode pertains to undefiled souls; but the\nother is replete with every thing of a material nature, and is adapted\nto souls which are neither pure, nor liberated from all generation.\u201d\nHe adds, \u201cwe must admit, therefore, that there are two-fold species of\nsacrifices; one kind, indeed, pertaining to men who are not entirely\npurified, which, as Heraclitus says, rarely happens to one man, or to a\ncertain easily-to-be-numbered few of mankind; but the other kind being\nmaterial, and consisting in mutation, is adapted to souls that are still\ndetained by the body. Hence, to cities and people not yet liberated from\nsublunary fate, and the impending communion of bodies, if such a mode of\nsacrifice as this latter is not permitted, they will wander both from\nimmaterial and material good. For they will not be able to receive the\nformer, and to the latter they will not offer what is appropriate.\u201d\n\nHe farther informs us, in Chap. 22, that though the summit of the\nsacrific art recurs to the most principal one of the whole multitude of\nGods [_i.e._ to the ineffable cause of all,] and at one and the same\ntime worships the many essences and principles that are [rooted and\nconcentred] in it; yet this happens at the latest period, and to a very\nfew, and that we must be satisfied, if it takes place, when the sun\nof life is setting. \u201cBut,\u201d says he, \u201cour present discussion does not\nordain laws for a man of this kind; for he is superior to all law; but\nit promulgates a law such as that of which we are now speaking, to those\nwho are in want of a certain divine legislation.\u201d In the above passage,\nby \u201c_a man of this kind_,\u201d Iamblichus most probably alludes to Plotinus,\nas both his works, and the life of him, written by Porphyry, show that he\nwas a man capable of recurring to, and becoming united with the highest\nGod, and thus at the same time worshipping all the divine powers that are\nrooted in him.\n\nTo what Iamblichus has thus excellently observed, may be added what the\nphilosopher Sallust says in his golden treatise On the Gods and the\nWorld, viz. \u201cthat since life primarily subsists in the Gods, and there\nis also a certain human life, but the latter desires to be united to\nthe former, a medium is required; for natures much distant from each\nother cannot be conjoined without a medium; and it is necessary that\nthe medium should be similar to the connected natures. Life, therefore,\nmust necessarily be the medium of life. Hence, men of the present day\nthat are happy, and all the ancients, have sacrificed animals; and\nthis, indeed, not rashly, but in a way accommodated to every God, with\nmany other ceremonies respecting the cultivation of divinity.\u201d Let the\n_truly intellectual and pious man_, however, never forget that prayer,\nas Proclus divinely observes, possesses _of itself_ a supernatural\nperfection and power.\n\n[57] For a more _theological_ account of d\u00e6mons, I refer the reader to my\ntranslation of the before-mentioned admirable treatise of Iamblichus on\nthe Mysteries.\n\n[58] In the original, \u03c9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c5\u03c0\u03bf \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03c0\u03c9 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. But for \u03b4\u03b5\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, it is\nnecessary to read \u03b4\u03b5\u03b4\u03b5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2; and it is evident that both the Latin\ntranslators of this work found \u03b4\u03b5\u03b4\u03b5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 in their manuscripts. For\nFelicianus has \u201cqui _devincti_ externis rebus sunt,\u201d and Valentinus, \u201cqui\nrebus externis _illigantur_.\u201d Reisk, however, has taken no notice of this\nerror in the printed text.\n\n[59] Reisk, with his usual stupidity, where merely verbal emendations are\nnot concerned, says that this Egyptian is Plotinus, whose country was\nLycopolis, in Egypt. But what instance can be adduced, in all antiquity,\nof the disciple of a philosopher speaking of his preceptor in this\nindefinite manner? Is it not much more probable that this Egyptian is\nthe priest mentioned by Porphyry in his Life of Plotinus, who, at the\nrequest of a certain friend of Plotinus, (which friend was, perhaps,\nPorphyry himself,) exhibited to Plotinus, in the temple of Isis, at Rome,\nthe familiar d\u00e6mon, or, in modern language, the guardian angel of that\nphilosopher?\n\n[60] Conformably to this, the Pythagorean Demophilus beautifully\nobserves, \u0393\u03c5\u03bc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b3\u03c5\u03bc\u03bd\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03c5\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03bc\u03c8\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u00b7 \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b5\u03c0\u03b7\u03ba\u03bf\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2. _i.e._ \u201cThe\nwise man being sent hither naked, should naked invoke him by whom he was\nsent. For he alone is heard by divinity, who is not burdened with things\nof a foreign nature.\u201d\n\n[61] This expression of \u201capproaching _alone_ to the _alone_ God,\u201d\nPorphyry derived from his master, the great Plotinus, who divinely\nconcludes his Enneads as follows:\u2014\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03c9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03b2\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03b7 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc3\u03b4\u03b5, \u03b1\u03bd\u03b7\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc3\u03b4\u03b5, \u03c6\u03c5\u03b3\u03b7\n\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u2014_i.e._ \u201cThis, therefore, is the life of the Gods, and\nof divine and happy men, a liberation from all terrene concerns, a life\nunaccompanied by human pleasures, and _a flight of the alone to the\nalone_.\u201d\n\n[62] Nature, considered as the last of the causes which fabricate\nthis corporeal and sensible world, \u201cbounds (says Proclus in Tim.) the\nprogressions of incorporeal essences, and is full of forms and powers,\nthrough which she governs mundane affairs. And she is a Goddess, indeed,\nconsidered as deified; but not according to the primary signification\nof the word. By her summit likewise she comprehends the heavens, but\nthrough these rules over the fluctuating empire of generation; and she\nevery where weaves together partial natures in admirable conjunction with\nwholes.\u201d See more on this subject in my translation of that work.\n\n[63] This epithet is used in two of the Orphic hymns, viz. in Hymn LI.\n7., and Hymn XXIX. 5. But the following appears to be the reason why\nBacchus is so called. Bacchus is the intellect, and Ippa the soul of\nthe world, according to the Orphic Theology; and the former is said by\nOrpheus to be carried on the head of the latter. For so we are informed\nby Proclus, in Tim. p. 124. Jacob de Rhoer, therefore, the editor of this\nwork, was grossly mistaken in saying, \u201cNon dubito, quin \u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\u03c5\u03c3\u03bf\u03c2,\nidem sit qui \u03c9\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2, crudivorus.\u201d Scaliger, in his version of the Hymns,\nvery improperly translates \u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 _bajulus_, _a porter_. For Bacchus is\n_carried on_, but does not _carry_ Ippa.\n\n\n\n\nON ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD.\n\nBOOK THE THIRD.\n\n\n1. In the two preceding books, O Firmus Castricius, we have demonstrated,\nthat animal food does not contribute either to temperance and frugality,\nor to the piety which especially gives completion to the theoretic life,\nbut is rather hostile to it. Since, however, the most beautiful part of\njustice consists in piety to the Gods, and this is principally acquired\nthrough abstinence, there is no occasion to fear that we shall violate\njustice towards men, while we preserve piety towards the Gods. Socrates\ntherefore says, in opposition to those who contend that pleasure is the\nsupreme good, that though all swine and goats should accord in this\nopinion, yet he should never be persuaded that our felicity was placed\nin the enjoyment of corporeal delight, as long as intellect has dominion\nover all things. And we also say, that though all wolves and vultures\nshould praise the eating of flesh, we should not admit that they spoke\njustly, as long as man is by nature innoxious, and ought to abstain\nfrom procuring pleasure for himself by injuring others. We shall pass\non, therefore, to the discussion of justice; and since our opponents\nsay that this ought only to be extended to those of a similar species,\nand on this account deny that irrational animals can be injured by men,\nlet us exhibit the true, and at the same time Pythagoric opinion, and\ndemonstrate that every soul which participates of sense and memory is\nrational. For this being demonstrated, we may extend, as our opponents\nwill also admit, justice to every animal. But we shall epitomize what has\nbeen said by the ancients on this subject.\n\n2. Since, however, with respect to reason, one kind, according to the\ndoctrine of the Stoics, is internal, but the other external[64]; and\nagain, one kind being right, but the other erroneous, it is requisite\nto explain of which of these two, animals, according to them, are\ndeprived. Are they therefore deprived of right reason alone? or are they\nentirely destitute both of internal and externally proceeding reason?\nThey appear, indeed, to ascribe to brutes an entire privation of reason,\nand not a privation of right reason alone. For if they merely denied\nthat brutes possess right reason, animals would not be irrational, but\nrational beings, in the same manner as nearly all men are according to\nthem. For, according to their opinion, one or two wise men may be found\nin whom alone right reason prevails, but all the rest of mankind are\ndepraved; though some of these make a certain proficiency, but others are\nprofoundly depraved, and yet, at the same time, all of them are similarly\nrational. Through the influence, therefore, of self-love, they say, that\nall other animals are irrational; wishing to indicate by irrationality,\nan entire privation of reason. If, however, it be requisite to speak the\ntruth, not only reason may plainly be perceived in all animals, but in\nmany of them it is so great as to approximate to perfection.\n\n3. Since, therefore, reason is two-fold, one kind consisting in external\nspeech, but the other in the disposition of the soul, we shall begin from\nthat which is external, and which is arranged according to the voice. But\nif external reason is voice, which through the tongue is significant of\nthe internal passions of the soul (for this is the most common definition\nof it, and is not adopted by one sect [of philosophers] only, and if it\nis alone indicative of the conception of [internal] reason)\u2014if this be\nthe case, in what pertaining to this are such animals as have a voice\ndeficient? Do they not discursively perceive the manner in which they\nare inwardly affected, before it is vocally enunciated by them? By a\ndiscursive perception, however, I mean the perception produced by the\nsilent discourse which takes place in the soul. Since, therefore, that\nwhich is vocally expressed by the tongue is reason, in whatever manner\nit may be expressed, whether in a barbarous or a Grecian, a canine or a\nbovine mode, other animals also participate of it that are vocal; men,\nindeed, speaking conformably to the human laws [of speech], but other\nanimals conformably to the laws which they received from the Gods and\nnature. But if we do not understand what they say, what is this to the\npurpose? For the Greeks do not understand what is said by the Indians,\nnor those who are educated in Attica the language of the Scythians, or\nThracians, or Syrians; but the sound of the one falls on the ears of the\nother like the clangor of cranes, though by others their vocal sounds\ncan be written and articulated, in the same manner as ours can by us.\nNevertheless, the vocal sounds of the Syrians, for instance, or the\nPersians, are to us inarticulate, and cannot be expressed by writing,\njust as the speech of animals is unintelligible to all men. For as we,\nwhen we hear the Scythians speak, apprehend, by the auditory sense, a\nnoise only and a sound, but are ignorant of the meaning of what they\nsay, because their language appears to us to be nothing but a clangor,\nto have no articulation, and to employ only one sound either longer or\nshorter, the variety of which is not at all significant to us, but to\nthem the vocal sounds are intelligible, and have a great difference, in\nthe same manner as our language has to us; the like also takes place\nin the vocal sounds of other animals. For the several species of these\nunderstand the language which is adapted to them, but we only hear a\nsound, of the signification of which we are ignorant, because no one who\nhas learnt our language, is able to teach us through ours the meaning of\nwhat is said by brutes. If, however, it is requisite to believe in the\nancients, and also in those who have lived in our times, and the times of\nour fathers, there are some among these who are said to have heard and\nto have understood the speech of animals. Thus, for instance, this is\nnarrated of Melampus and Tiresias, and others of the like kind; and the\nsame thing, not much prior to our time, is related of Apollonius Tyan\u00e6us.\nFor it is narrated of him, that once, when he was with his associates,\na swallow happening to be present, and twittering, he said, that the\nswallow indicated to other birds, that an ass laden with corn had fallen\ndown before the city, and that in consequence of the fall of the ass, the\ncorn was spread on the ground[65]. An associate, also, of mine informed\nme, that he once had a boy for a servant, who understood the meaning of\nall the sounds of birds, and who said, that all of them were prophetic,\nand declarative of what would shortly happen. He added, that he was\ndeprived of this knowledge through his mother, who, fearing that he would\nbe sent to the Emperor as a gift, poured urine into his ear when he was\nasleep.\n\n4. Omitting, however, these things, through the passion of incredulity,\nwhich is connascent with us, I think there is no one who is ignorant,\nthat there are some nations even now who understand the sounds of certain\nanimals, through an alliance to those animals. Thus, the Arabians\nunderstand the language of crows, and the Tyrrhenians of eagles. And,\nperhaps, all men would understand the language of all animals, if a\ndragon were to lick their ears. Indeed, the variety and difference in the\nvocal sounds of animals, indicate that they are significant. Hence, we\nhear one sound when they are terrified, but another, of a different kind,\nwhen they call their associates, another when they summon their young\nto food, another when they lovingly embrace each other, and another\nwhen they incite to battle. And so great is the difference in their\nvocal sounds, that, even by those who have spent their whole life in the\nobservation of them, it is found to be extremely difficult to ascertain\ntheir meaning, on account of their multitude. Diviners, therefore, who\npredict from ravens and crows, when they have noted the difference of the\nsounds, as far as to a certain multitude, omit the rest, as not easily\nto be apprehended by man. But when animals speak to each other, these\nsounds are manifest and significant to them, though they are not known to\nall of us. If, however, it appears that they imitate us, that they learn\nthe Greek tongue, and understand their keepers, what man is so impudent\nas not to grant that they are rational, because he does not understand\nwhat they say? Crows, therefore, and magpies, the robin redbreast, and\nthe parrot, imitate men, recollect what they have heard, are obedient\nto their preceptor while he is teaching them; and many of them, through\nwhat they have learnt, point out those that have acted wrong in the\nhouse. But the Indian hy\u00e6na, which the natives call crocotta, speaks in\na manner so human, and this without a teacher, as to go to houses, and\ncall that person whom he knows he can easily vanquish. He also imitates\nthe voice of him who is most dear, and would most readily attend to the\nperson whom he calls; so that, though the Indians know this, yet being\ndeceived through the similitude, and obeying the call, they come forth,\nand are destroyed. If, however, all animals do not imitate, and all of\nthem are not adapted to learn our language, what is this to the purpose?\nFor neither is every man docile or imitative, I will not say of the vocal\nsounds of animals, but of the five dialects of the Greek tongue. To which\nmay be added, that some animals, perhaps, do not speak, because they have\nnot been taught, or because they are impeded by the ill conformation\nof the instruments of speech. We, therefore, when we were at Carthage,\nnurtured a tame partridge, which we caught flying, and which, in process\nof time, and by associating with us, became so exceedingly mild, that it\nwas not only sedulously attentive to us, caressed and sported with us,\nbut uttered a sound corresponding to the sound of our voice, and, as far\nas it was capable, answered us; and this in a manner different from that\nby which partridges are accustomed to call each other. For it did not\nutter a corresponding sound when we were silent, but when we spoke to it.\n\n5. It is also narrated, that some dumb animals obey their masters with\nmore readiness than any domestic servants. Hence, a lamprey was so\naccustomed to the Roman Crassus, as to come to him when he called it by\nits name; on which account Crassus was so affectionately disposed towards\nit, that he exceedingly lamented its death, though, prior to this,\nhe had borne the loss of three of his children with moderation. Many\nlikewise relate that the eels in Arethusa, and the shell-fish denominated\nsaperd\u00e6, about M\u00e6ander, are obedient to those that call them. Is not the\nimagination, therefore, of an animal that speaks, the same, whether it\nproceeds as far as to the tongue, or does not? And if this be the case,\nis it not absurd to call the voice of man alone [external] reason, but\nrefuse thus to denominate the voice of other animals? For this is just as\nif crows should think that their voice alone is external reason, but that\nwe are irrational animals, because the meaning of the sounds which we\nutter is not obvious to them; or as if the inhabitants of Attica should\nthus denominate their speech alone, and should think that those are\nirrational who are ignorant of the Attic tongue, though the inhabitants\nof Attica would sooner understand the croaking of a crow, than the\nlanguage of a Syrian or a Persian. But is it not absurd to judge of\nrationality and irrationality from apprehending or not apprehending the\nmeaning of vocal sounds, or from silence and speech? For thus some one\nmight say, that the God who is above all things, and likewise the other\nGods, are not rational, because they do not speak. The Gods, however,\nsilently indicate their will, and birds apprehend their will more rapidly\nthan men, and when they have apprehended it, they narrate it to men as\nmuch as they are able, and different birds are the messengers to men of\ndifferent Gods. Thus, the eagle is the messenger of Jupiter, the hawk and\nthe crow of Apollo, the stork of Juno, the crex and the bird of night\nof Minerva, the crane of Ceres, and some other bird is the messenger of\nsome other deity. Moreover, those among us that observe animals, and are\nnurtured together with them, know the meaning of their vocal sounds. The\nhunter, therefore, from the barking of his dog, perceives at one time,\nindeed, that the dog explores a hare, but at another, that the dog has\nfound it; at one time, that he pursues the game, at another that he has\ncaught it, and at another that he is in the wrong track, through having\nlost the scent of it. Thus, too, the cowherd knows, at one time, indeed,\nthat a cow is hungry, or thirsty, or weary, and at another, that she is\nincited to venery, or seeks her calf, [from her different lowings][66].\nA lion also manifests by his roaring that he threatens, a wolf by his\nhowling that he is in a bad condition, and shepherds, from the bleating\nof sheep, know what the sheep want.\n\n6. Neither, therefore, are animals ignorant of the meaning of the voice\nof men, when they are angry, or speak kindly to, or call them, or pursue\nthem, or ask them to do something, or give something to them; nor, in\nshort, are they ignorant of any thing that is usually said to them, but\nare aptly obedient to it; which it would be impossible for them to do,\nunless that which is similar to intellection energized, in consequence\nof being excited by its similar. The immoderation of their passions,\nalso, is suppressed by certain modulations, and stags, bulls, and other\nanimals, from being wild become tame. Those, too, who are decidedly of\nopinion that brutes are deprived of reason, yet admit that dogs have a\nknowledge of dialectic, and make use of the syllogism which consists of\nmany disjunctive propositions, when, in searching for their game, they\nhappen to come to a place where there are three roads. For they thus\nreason, the beast has either fled through this road, or through that, or\nthrough the remaining road; but it has not fled either through this, or\nthrough that, and therefore it must have fled through the remaining third\nof these roads[67]. After which syllogistic process, they resume their\npursuit in that road. It may, however, be readily said, that animals\ndo these things naturally, because they were not taught by any one to\ndo them; as if we also were not allotted reason by nature, though we\nlikewise give names to things, because we are naturally adapted to do so.\nBesides, if it be requisite to believe in Aristotle, animals are seen to\nteach their offspring, not only something pertaining to other things, but\nalso to utter vocal sounds; as the nightingale, for instance, teaches\nher young to sing. And as he likewise says, animals learn many things\nfrom each other, and many from men; and the truth of what he asserts is\ntestified by all the tamers of colts, by every jockey, horseman, and\ncharioteer, and by all hunters, herdsmen, keepers of elephants, and\nmasters of wild beasts and birds. He, therefore, who estimates things\nrightly, will be led, from these instances, to ascribe intelligence to\nbrutes; but he who is inconsiderate, and is ignorant of these things,\nwill be induced to act rashly, through his inexhaustible avidity\nco-operating with him against them. For how is it possible that he should\nnot defame and calumniate animals, who has determined to cut them in\npieces, as if they were stones? Aristotle, however, Plato, Empedocles,\nPythagoras, Democritus, and all such as endeavoured to discover the\ntruth concerning animals, have acknowledged that they participate of\nreason.\n\n7. But it is now requisite to show that brutes have internal reason. The\ndifference, indeed, between our reason and theirs, appears to consist,\nas Aristotle somewhere says, not in essence, but in the more and the\nless; just as many are of opinion, that the difference between the Gods\nand us is not essential, but consists in this, that in them there is a\ngreater, and in us a less accuracy, of the reasoning power[68]. And,\nindeed, so far as pertains to sense and the remaining organization,\naccording to the sensoria and the flesh, every one nearly will grant that\nthese are similarly disposed in us, as they are in brutes. For they not\nonly similarly participate with us of natural passions, and the motions\nproduced through these, but we may also survey in them such affections\nas are preternatural and morbid. No one, however, of a sound mind, will\nsay that brutes are unreceptive of the reasoning power, on account of\nthe difference between their habit of body and ours, when he sees that\nthere is a great variety of habit in men, according to their race, and\nthe nations to which they belong, and yet, at the same time, it is\ngranted that all of them are rational. An ass, therefore, is afflicted\nwith a catarrh, and if the disease flows to his lungs, he dies in the\nsame manner as a man. A horse, too, is subject to purulence, and wastes\naway through it, like a man. He is likewise attacked with rigour, the\ngout, fever, and fury, in which case he is also said to have a depressed\ncountenance. A mare, when pregnant, if she happens to smell a lamp when\nit is just extinguished, becomes abortive, in the same manner as a woman.\nAn ox, and likewise a camel, are subject to fever and insanity; a\nraven becomes scabby, and has the leprosy; and also a dog, who, besides\nthis, is afflicted with the gout, and madness: but a hog is subject to\nhoarseness, and in a still greater degree a dog; whence this disease in a\nman is denominated from the dog, _cynanche_. And these things are known\nto us, because we are familiar with these animals; but of the diseases\nof other animals we are ignorant, because we do not associate with them.\nCastrated animals also become more effeminate. Hence cocks, when they\nare castrated, no longer crow; but their voice becomes effeminate, like\nthat of men who lose their testicles. It is not possible, likewise, to\ndistinguish the bellowing and horns of a bull, when he is castrated,\nfrom those of a cow. But stags, when they are castrated, no longer cast\noff their horns, but retain them in the same manner as eunuchs do their\nhairs; and if, when they are castrated, they are without horns, they do\nnot afterwards produce them, just as it happens to those who, before they\nhave a beard, are made eunuchs. So that nearly the bodies of all animals\nare similarly affected with ours, with respect to the bodily calamities\nto which they are subject.\n\n8. See, however, whether all the passions of the soul in brutes, are not\nsimilar to ours; for it is not the province of man alone to apprehend\njuices by the taste, colours by the sight, odours by the smell, sounds\nby the hearing, cold or heat, or other tangible objects, by the touch;\nbut the senses of brutes are capable of the same perceptions. Nor are\nbrutes deprived of sense because they are not men, as neither are we to\nbe deprived of reason, because the Gods, if they possess it, are rational\nbeings. With respect to the senses, however, other animals appear greatly\nto surpass us; for what man can see so acutely as a dragon? (for this\nis not the fabulous Lynceus). And hence the poets denominate _to see_\n\u03b4\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, _drakein_: but an eagle, from a great height, sees a hare.\nWhat man hears more acutely than cranes, who are able to hear from an\ninterval so great, as to be beyond the reach of human sight? And as to\nsmell, almost all animals so much surpass us in this sense, that things\nwhich fall on it, and are obvious to them, are concealed from us; so that\nthey know and smell the several kinds of animals by their footsteps.\nHence, men employ dogs as their leaders, for the purpose of discovering\nthe retreat of a boar, or a stag. And we, indeed, are slowly sensible\nof the constitution of the air; but this is immediately perceived by\nother animals, so that from them we derive indications of the future\nstate of the weather. With respect to juices also, they so accurately\nknow the distinction between them, that their knowledge of what are\nmorbific, salubrious, and deleterious among these, surpasses that of\nphysicians. But Aristotle says, that animals whose sensitive powers are\nmore exquisite, are more prudent. And the diversities, indeed, of bodies\nare capable of producing a facility or difficulty of being passively\naffected, and of having reason, more or less prompt in its energies; but\nthey are not capable of changing the essence of the soul, since neither\nare they able to change the senses, nor to alter the passions, nor to\nmake them entirely abandon their proper nature. It must be granted,\ntherefore, that animals participate more or less of reason, but not that\nthey are perfectly deprived of it; as neither must it be admitted that\none animal has reason, but another not. As, however, in one and the same\nspecies of animals, one body is more, but another less healthy; and, in\na similar manner, in diseases, in a naturally good, and a naturally bad,\ndisposition, there is a great difference; thus also in souls, one is\nnaturally good, but another depraved: and of souls that are depraved, one\nhas more, but another less, of depravity. In good men, likewise, there\nis not the same equality; for Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato, are not\nsimilarly good. Nor is there sameness in a concordance of opinions. Hence\nit does not follow, if we have more intelligence than other animals, that\non this account they are to be deprived of intelligence; as neither must\nit be said, that partridges do not fly, because hawks fly higher; nor\nthat other hawks do not fly, because the bird called phassophonos[69]\nflies higher than these, and than all other birds. Some one, therefore,\nmay admit that the soul is co-passive with the body, and that the former\nsuffers something from the latter, when the latter is well or ill\naffected; but in this case it by no means changes its nature: but if the\nsoul is only co-passive to, and uses the body as an instrument, she may\nbe able to effect many things through it, which we cannot, even when it\nis organized differently from ours, and when it is affected in a certain\nmanner, may sympathize with it, and yet may not change its proper nature.\n\n9. It must be demonstrated, therefore, that there is a rational power in\nanimals, and that they are not deprived of prudence. And in the first\nplace, indeed, each of them knows whether it is imbecile or strong, and,\nin consequence of this, it defends some parts of itself, but attacks\nwith others. Thus the panther uses its teeth, the lion its nails and\nteeth, the horse its hoofs, the ox its horns, the cock its spurs, and\nthe scorpion its sting; but the serpents in Egypt use their spittle,\n(whence also they are called \u03c0\u03c4\u03c5\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2, _ptuades_, i.e. _spitters_,) and\nwith this they blind the eyes of those that approach them: and thus a\ndifferent animal uses a different part of itself for attack, in order\nto save itself. Again, some animals, viz. such as are robust, feed [and\nlive] remote from men; but others, who are of an ignoble nature, live\nremote from stronger animals, and, on the contrary, dwell nearer men.\nAnd of these, some dwell at a greater distance from more robust animals,\nas sparrows and swallows, who build their nests in the roofs of houses;\nbut others associate with men, as, for instance, dogs. They likewise\nchange their places of abode at certain times, and know every thing\nwhich contributes to their advantage. In a similar manner, in fishes and\nin birds, a reasoning energy of this kind may be perceived; all which\nparticulars are abundantly collected by the ancients, in their writings\nconcerning the prudence of animals; and they are copiously discussed by\nAristotle, who says, that by all animals an habitation subservient to\ntheir subsistence and their safety, is most exquisitely contrived.\n\n10. But he who says that these things are naturally present with animals,\nis ignorant in asserting this, that they are by nature rational; or\nif this is not admitted, neither does reason subsist in us naturally,\nnor with the perfection of it receive an increase, so far as we are\nnaturally adapted to receive it. A divine nature, indeed, does not become\nrational[70] through learning, for there never was a time in which he\nwas irrational; but rationality is consubsistent with his existence,\nand he is not prevented from being rational, because he did not receive\nreason through discipline: though, with respect to other animals, in\nthe same manner as with respect to men, many things are taught them by\nnature, and some things are imparted by discipline. Brutes, however,\nlearn some things from each other, but are taught others, as we have\nsaid, by men. They also have memory, which is a most principal thing in\nthe resumption of reasoning and prudence. They likewise have vices, and\nare envious; though their bad qualities are not so widely extended as in\nmen: for their vices are of a lighter nature than those of men. This,\nindeed, is evident; for the builder of a house will never be able to lay\nthe foundation of it, unless he is sober; nor can a shipwright properly\nplace the keel of a ship, unless he is in health; nor a husbandman plant\na vine, unless he applies his mind to it; yet nearly all men, when they\nare intoxicated, can beget children. This, however, is not the case with\nother animals; for they propagate for the sake of offspring, and for the\nmost part, when the males have made the female pregnant, they no longer\nattempt to be connected with her; nor, if they should attempt it, would\nthe female permit them. But the magnitude of the lascivious insolence\nand intemperance of men in these things, is evident. In other animals,\nhowever, the male is conscious of the parturient throes of the female,\nand, for the most part, partakes of the same pains; as is evident in\ncocks. But others incubate together with the females; as the males of\ndoves. They likewise provide a proper place for the delivery of their\noffspring; and after they have brought forth their offspring, they both\npurify them and themselves. And he who properly observes, will see that\nevery thing proceeds with them in an orderly manner; that they fawn\non him who nourishes them, and that they know their master, and give\nindications of him who acts insidiously.\n\n11. Who likewise is ignorant how much gregarious animals preserve justice\ntowards each other? for this is preserved by ants, by bees, and by other\nanimals of the like kind. And who is ignorant of the chastity of female\nring-doves towards the males with whom they associate? for they destroy\nthose who are found by them to have committed adultery. Or who has not\nheard of the justice of storks towards their parents? For in the several\nspecies of animals, a peculiar virtue is eminent, to which each species\nis naturally adapted; nor because this virtue is natural and stable,\nis it fit to deny that they are rational? For it might be requisite\nto deprive them of rationality, if their works were not the proper\neffects of virtue and rational sagacity; but if we do not understand how\nthese works are effected, because we are unable to penetrate into the\nreasoning which they use, we are not on this account to accuse them\nof irrationality; for neither is any one able to penetrate into the\nintellect of that divinity the sun, but from his works we assent to those\nwho demonstrate him to be an intellectual and rational essence.\n\n12. But some one may very properly wonder at those who admit that justice\nderives its subsistence from the rational part, and who call those\nanimals that have no association with men, savage and unjust, and yet\ndo not extend justice as far as to those that do associate with us; and\nwhich, in the same manner as men, would be deprived of life, if they\nwere deprived of human society. Birds, therefore, and dogs, and many\nquadrupeds, such as goats, horses, sheep, asses, and mules, would perish,\nif deprived of an association with mankind. Nature also, the fabricator\nof their frame, constituted them so as to be in want of men, and\nfashioned men so as to require their assistance; thus producing an innate\njustice in them towards us, and in us towards them. But it is not at all\nwonderful, if some of them are savage towards men; for what Aristotle\nsays is true, that if all animals had an abundance of nutriment, they\nwould not act ferociously, either towards each other, or towards men.\nFor on account of food, though necessary and slender, enmities and\nfriendships are produced among animals, and also on account of the places\nwhich they occupy; but if men were reduced to such straits as brutes\nare [with respect to food,] how much more savage would they become than\nthose animals that appear to be wild? War and famine are indications of\nthe truth of this; for then men do not abstain from eating each other;\nand even without war and famine, they eat animals that are nurtured with\nthem, and are perfectly tame.\n\n13. Some one, however, may say, that brutes are indeed rational animals,\nbut have not a certain habitude, proximity, or alliance to us; but he\nwho asserts this will, in the first place, make them to be irrational\nanimals, in consequence of depriving them of an alliance to our nature.\nAnd, in the next place, he will make their association with us to depend\non the utility which we derive from them, and not on the participation\nof reason. The thing proposed by us, however, is to show that brutes are\nrational animals, and not to inquire whether there is any compact between\nthem and us. For, with respect to men, all of them do not league with us,\nand yet no one would say, that he who does not enter into a league with\nus is irrational. But many brutes are slaves to men, and, as some one\nrightly says, though they are in a state of servitude themselves, through\nthe improbity of men, yet, at the same time, by wisdom and justice, they\ncause their masters to be their servants and curators. Moreover, the\nvices of brutes are manifest, from which especially their rationality\nis demonstrated. For they are envious, and the males are rivals of each\nother with respect to the favour of the females, and the females with\nrespect to the regard of the males. There is one vice, however, which is\nnot inherent in them, viz. acting insidiously towards their benefactors,\nbut they are perfectly benevolent to those who are kind to them, and\nplace so much confidence in them, as to follow wherever they may lead\nthem, though it should even be to slaughter and manifest danger. And\nthough some one should nourish them, not for their sake, but for his\nown, yet they will be benevolently disposed towards their possessor. But\nmen [on the contrary] do not act with such hostility towards any one,\nas towards him who has nourished them; nor do they so much pray for the\ndeath of any one, as for his death.\n\n14. Indeed, the operations of brutes are attended with so much\nconsideration[71], that they frequently perceive, that the food which is\nplaced for them is nothing else than a snare, though, either through\nintemperance or hunger, they approach to it. And some of them, indeed, do\nnot approach to it immediately, but others slowly accede to it. They also\ntry whether it is possible to take the food without falling into danger,\nand frequently in consequence of rationality vanquishing passion, they\ndepart without being injured. Some of them too revile at, and discharge\ntheir urine on the stratagem of men; but others, through voracity, though\nthey know that they shall be captured, yet no less than the associates\nof Ulysses, suffer themselves to die rather than not eat. Some persons,\nlikewise, have not badly endeavoured to show from the places which\nanimals are allotted, that they are far more prudent than we are. For as\nthose beings that dwell in \u00e6ther are rational, so also, say they, are\nthe animals which occupy the region proximate to \u00e6ther, viz. the air;\nafterwards aquatic animals differ from these, and in the last place, the\nterrestrial differ from the aquatic [in degrees of rationality]. And we\nbelong to the class of terrene animals dwelling in the sediment of the\nuniverse. For in the Gods, we must not infer that they possess a greater\ndegree of excellence from the places [which they illuminate], though in\nmortal natures this may be admitted.\n\n15. Since, also, brutes acquire a knowledge of the arts, and these such\nas are human, and learn to dance, to drive a chariot, to fight a duel, to\nwalk on ropes, to write and read, to play on the pipe and the harp, to\ndischarge arrows, and to ride,\u2014this being the case, can you any longer\ndoubt whether they possess that power which is receptive of art, since\nthe recipient of these arts may be seen to exist in them? For where\nwill they receive them, unless reason is inherent in them in which the\narts subsist? For they do not hear our voice as if it was a mere sound\nonly, but they also perceive the difference in the meaning of the words,\nwhich is the effect of rational intelligence. But our opponents say,\nthat animals perform badly what is done by men. To this we reply, that\nneither do men perform all things well. For if this be not admitted,\nsome men would be in vain victors in a contest, and others vanquished.\nThey add, that brutes do not consult, nor form assemblies, nor act in a\njudicial capacity. But tell me whether all men do this? Do not actions in\nthe multitude precede consultation? And whence can any one demonstrate\nthat brutes do not consult? For no one can adduce an argument sufficient\nto prove that they do not. But those show the contrary to this, who\nhave written minutely about animals. As to other objections, which are\nadduced by our adversaries in a declamatory way, they are perfectly\nfrivolous; such, for instance; as that brutes have no cities of their\nown. For neither have the Scythians, who live in carts, nor the Gods.\nOur opponents add, that neither have brutes any written laws. To this we\nreply, that neither had men while they were happy. For Apis is said to\nhave been the first that promulgated laws for the Greeks, when they were\nin want of them.\n\n16. To men, therefore, on account of their voracity, brutes do not appear\nto possess reason; but by the Gods and divine men, they are honoured\nequally with sacred suppliants. Hence, the God[72] said to Aristodicus,\nthe Cumean, that sparrows were his suppliants. Socrates also, and prior\nto him, Rhadamanthus, swore by animals. But the Egyptians conceive them\nto be Gods, whether they, in reality, thought them to be so, or whether\nthey intentionally represented the Gods in the forms of oxen, birds, and\nother animals, in order that these animals might be no less abstained\nfrom than from men, or whether they did this through other more mystical\ncauses[73]. Thus also the Greeks united a ram to the statue of Jupiter,\nbut the horns of a bull to that of Bacchus. They likewise fashioned the\nstatue of Pan from the form of a man and a goat; but they represented the\nMuses and the Sirens winged, and also Victory, Iris, Love, and Hermes.\nPindar too, in his hymns, represents the Gods, when they were expelled\nby Typhon, not resembling men, but other animals. And Jupiter, when in\nlove with Pasiphae, is said to have become a bull; but at another time,\nhe is said to have been changed into an eagle and a swan; through all\nwhich the ancients indicated the honour which they paid to animals, and\nthis in a still greater degree when they assert that Jupiter was nursed\nby a goat. The Cretans, from a law established by Rhadamanthus, swore\nby all animals. Nor was Socrates in jest when he swore by the dog and\nthe goose; but in so doing, he swore conformably to the just son of\nJupiter [Rhadamanthus]; nor did he sportfully say that swans were his\nfellow-servants. But fables obscurely signify, that animals have souls\nsimilar to ours, when they say that the Gods in their anger changed men\ninto brutes, and that, when they were so changed, they afterwards pitied\nand loved them. For things of this kind are asserted of dolphins and\nhalcyons, of nightingales and swallows.\n\n17. Each of the ancients, likewise, who had been prosperously nursed by\nanimals, boasted more of this than of their parents and educators. Thus,\none boasted of having been nursed by a she-wolf, another by a hind,\nanother by a she-goat, and another by a bee. But Semiramis gloried in\nhaving been brought up by doves, Cyrus in being nursed by a dog, and a\nThracian in having a swan for his nurse, who likewise bore the name of\nhis nurse. Hence also, the Gods obtained their surnames, as Bacchus that\nof _Hinnuleus_, Apollo that of _Lyceus_, and, likewise _Delphinius_,\nNeptune and Minerva that of _Equestris_. But Hecate, when invoked by\nthe names of a bull, a dog, and a lioness, is more propitious. If,\nhowever, those who sacrifice animals and eat them, assert that they are\nirrational, in order that they may mitigate the crime of so doing, the\nScythians also, who eat their parents, may in like manner say that their\nparents are destitute of reason.\n\n18. Through these arguments, therefore, and others which we shall\nafterwards mention, in narrating the opinions of the ancients, it is\ndemonstrated that brutes are rational animals, reason in most of them\nbeing indeed imperfect, of which, nevertheless, they are not entirely\ndeprived. Since, however, justice pertains to rational beings, as our\nopponents say, how is it possible not to admit, that we should also act\njustly towards brutes? For we do not extend justice to plants, because\nthere appears to be much in them which is unconnected with reason; though\nof these, we are accustomed to use the fruits, but not together with the\nfruits to cut off the trunks. We collect, however, corn and leguminous\nsubstances, when, being efflorescent, they have fallen on the earth,\nand are dead. But no one uses for food the flesh of dead animals, that\nof fish being excepted, unless they have been destroyed by violence. So\nthat in these things there is much injustice. As Plutarch also says[74],\nit does not follow that, because our nature is indigent of certain\nthings, and we use these, we should therefore act unjustly towards all\nthings. For we are allowed to injure other things to a certain extent,\nin order to procure the necessary means of subsistence (if to take any\nthing from plants, even while they are living, is an injury to them);\nbut to destroy other things through luxury, and for the enjoyment of\npleasure, is perfectly savage and unjust. And the abstinence from these\nneither diminishes our life nor our living happily. For if, indeed,\nthe destruction of animals and the eating of flesh were as requisite\nas air and water, plants and fruits, without which it is impossible to\nlive, this injustice would be necessarily connected with our nature. But\nif many priests of the Gods, and many kings of the barbarians, being\nattentive to purity, and if, likewise, infinite species of animals never\ntaste food of this kind, yet live, and obtain their proper end according\nto nature, is not he absurd who orders us, because we are compelled to\nwage war with certain animals, not to live peaceably with those with whom\nit is possible to do so, but thinks, either that we ought to live without\nexercising justice towards any thing, or that, by exercising it towards\nall things, we should not continue in existence? As, therefore, among\nmen, he who, for the sake of his own safety, or that of his children or\ncountry, either seizes the wealth of certain persons, or oppresses some\nregion or city, has necessity for the pretext of his injustice; but he\nwho acts in this manner through the acquisition of wealth, or through\nsatiety or luxurious pleasure, and for the purpose of satisfying desires\nwhich are not necessary, appears to be inhospitable, intemperate, and\ndepraved;\u2014thus too, divinity pardons the injuries which are done to\nplants, the consumption of fire and water, the shearing of sheep, the\nmilking of cows, and the taming of oxen, and subjugating them to the\nyoke, for the safety and continuance in life of those that use them.\nBut to deliver animals to be slaughtered and cooked, and thus be filled\nwith murder, not for the sake of nutriment and satisfying the wants of\nnature, but making pleasure and gluttony the end of such conduct, is\ntranscendently iniquitous and dire. For it is sufficient that we use, for\nlaborious purposes, though they have no occasion to labour themselves,\nthe progeny of horses, and asses, and bulls, as \u00c6schylus says, as our\nsubstitutes, who, by being tamed and subjugated to the yoke, alleviate\nour toil.\n\n19. But with respect to him who thinks that we should not use an ox for\nfood, nor destroying and corrupting spirit and life, place things on\nthe table which are only the allurements and elegancies of satiety, of\nwhat does he deprive our life, which is either necessary to our safety,\nor subservient to virtue? To compare plants, however, with animals,\nis doing violence to the order of things. For the latter are naturally\nsensitive, and adapted to feel pain, to be terrified and hurt; on which\naccount also they may be injured. But the former are entirely destitute\nof sensation, and in consequence of this, nothing foreign, or evil, or\nhurtful, or injurious, can befall them. For sensation is the principle\nof all alliance, and of every thing of a foreign nature. But Zeno and\nhis followers assert, that alliance is the principle of justice. And is\nit not absurd, since we see that many of our own species live from sense\nalone, but do not possess intellect and reason, and since we also see,\nthat many of them surpass the most terrible of wild beasts in cruelty,\nanger, and rapine, being murderous of their children and their parents,\nand also being tyrants, and the tools of kings [is it not, I say,\nabsurd,] to fancy that we ought to act justly towards these, but that no\njustice is due from us to the ox that ploughs, the dog that is fed with\nus, and the animals that nourish us with their milk, and adorn our bodies\nwith their wool? Is not such an opinion most irrational and absurd?\n\n20. But, by Jupiter, the assertion of Chrysippus is considered by our\nopponents to be very probable, that the Gods made us for the sake of\nthemselves, and for the sake of each other, and that they made animals\nfor the sake of us; horses, indeed, in order that they might assist us\nin battle, dogs, that they might hunt with us, and leopards, bears, and\nlions, for the sake of exercising our fortitude. But the hog (for here\nthe pleasantry of Chrysippus is most delightful) was not made for any\nother purpose than to be sacrificed; and God mingled soul, as if it\nwere salt, with the flesh of this animal, that he might procure for us\nexcellent food. In order, likewise, that we might have an abundance of\nbroth, and luxurious suppers, divinity provided for us all-various kinds\nof shell-fish, the fishes called purples, sea-nettles, and the various\nkinds of winged animals; and this not from a certain other cause, but\nonly that he might supply man with an exuberance of pleasure; in so\ndoing, surpassing all nurses [in kindness], and thickly filling with\npleasures and enjoyments the terrestrial place. Let him, however, to\nwhom these assertions appear to possess a certain probability, and to\nparticipate of something worthy of deity, consider what he will reply to\nthe saying of Carneades, that every thing which is produced by nature, is\n_benefited_ when it obtains the end to which it is adapted, and for which\nit was generated. But _benefit_ is to be understood in a more general\nway, as signifying what the Stoics call _useful_. The hog, however, [says\nhe] was produced by nature for the purpose of being slaughtered and used\nfor food; and when it suffers this, it obtains the end for which it is\nadapted, and is benefited. But if God fashioned animals for the use of\nmen, in what do we use flies, lice, bats, beetles, scorpions, and vipers?\nof which some are odious to the sight, defile the touch, are intolerable\nto the smell, and in their voice dire and unpleasant; and others, on\nthe contrary, are destructive to those that meet with them. And with\nrespect to the _bal\u00e6n\u00e6_, _pistrices_, and other species of whales, an\ninfinite number of which, as Homer says[75], the loud-sounding Amphitrite\nnourishes, does not the Demiurgus teach us, that they were generated for\nthe utility of the nature of things[76]? And if our opponents should\nadmit that all things were not generated for us, and with a view to our\nadvantage, in addition to the distinction which they make being very\nconfused and obscure, we shall not avoid acting unjustly, in attacking\nand noxiously using those animals which were not produced for our\nsake, but according to nature [_i.e._ for the sake of the universe],\nas we were. I omit to mention, that if we define, by utility, things\nwhich pertain to us, we shall not be prevented from admitting, that we\nwere generated for the sake of the most destructive animals, such as\ncrocodiles, bal\u00e6n\u00e6, and dragons. For we are not in the least benefited\nby them; but they seize and destroy men that fall in their way, and use\nthem for food; in so doing acting not at all more cruelly than we do,\nexcepting that they commit this injustice through want and hunger, but\nwe through insolent wantonness, and for the sake of luxury, frequently\nsporting in theatres, and in hunting slaughter the greater part of\nanimals. And by thus acting, indeed, a murderous disposition and a brutal\nnature become strengthened in us, and render us insensible to pity: to\nwhich we may add, that those who first dared to do this, blunted the\ngreatest part of lenity, and rendered it inefficacious. The Pythagoreans,\nhowever, made lenity towards beasts to be an exercise of philanthropy\nand commiseration. So that, how is it possible they should not in a\ngreater degree excite us to justice, than those who assert that, by not\nslaughtering animals, the justice which is usually exercised towards\nmen will be corrupted? For custom is most powerful in increasing those\npassions in man which were gradually introduced into his nature.\n\n21. It is so, say our antagonists; but as the immortal is opposed to\nthe mortal, the incorruptible to the corruptible, and the incorporeal\nto the corporeal, so to the rational essence which has an existence in\nthe nature of things, the irrational essence must be opposed, which has\na subsistence contrary to it; nor in so many conjugations of things, is\nthis alone to be left imperfect and mutilated. [Our opponents, however,\nthus speak], as if we did not grant this, or as if we had not shown that\nthere is much of the irrational among beings. For there is an abundance\nof it in all the natures that are destitute of soul, nor do we require\nany other opposition to that which is rational; but immediately every\nthing which is deprived of soul, being irrational and without intellect,\nis opposed to that which possesses reason and _dianoia_[77]. If, however,\nsome one should think fit to assert that not nature in common, but the\nanimated nature, is divided into that which possesses and that which is\nwithout imagination, and into that which is sensitive, and that which\nis deprived of sensation, in order that these oppositions of habits and\nprivations may subsist about the same genus, as being equiponderant;\u2014he\nwho says this speaks absurdly. For it would be absurd to investigate in\nthe animated nature that which is sensitive, and that which is without\nsensation, that which employs, and that which is without imagination,\nbecause every thing animated is immediately adapted to be sensitive and\nimaginative. So that neither thus will he justly require, that one part\nof the animated nature should be rational, but another irrational, when\nhe is speaking to men, who think that nothing participates of sense\nwhich does not also participate of intelligence, and that nothing is\nan animal in which opinion and reasoning are not inherent, in the same\nmanner as with animals every sense and impulse are naturally present.\nFor nature, which they rightly assert produced all things for the sake\nof a certain thing, and with reference to a certain end, did not make an\nanimal sensitive merely that it might be passively affected, and possess\nsensible perception; but as there are many things which are allied and\nappropriate, and many which are foreign to it, it would not be able to\nexist for the shortest space of time, unless it learnt how to avoid\nsome things, and to pursue others. The knowledge, therefore, of both\nthese, sense similarly imparts to every animal; but the apprehension and\npursuit of what is useful, and the depulsion and avoidance of what is\ndestructive and painful, can by no possible contrivance be present with\nthose animals that are incapable of reasoning, judging, and remembering,\nand that do not naturally possess an animadversive power. For to those\nanimals from whom you entirely take away expectation, memory, design,\npreparation, hope, fear, desire, and indignation, neither the eyes when\npresent, nor the ears, nor sense, nor phantasy, will be beneficial, since\nthey will be of no use; and it will be better to be deprived of them\nthan to labour, be in pain, and be afflicted, without possessing the\npower of repelling these molestations. There is, however, a treatise of\nStrato, the physiologist, in which it is demonstrated, that it is not\npossible to have a sensible perception of any thing without the energy of\nintellection. For frequently the letters of a book, which we cursorily\nconsider by the sight, and words which fall on the auditory sense, are\nconcealed from and escape us, when our intellect is attentive to other\nthings; but afterwards, when it returns to the thing to which it was\nbefore inattentive, then, by recollection, it runs through and pursues\neach of the before-mentioned particulars. Hence also it is said [by\nEpicharmus],\u2014\n\n    \u2019Tis mind alone that sees and hears,\n    And all besides is deaf and blind.\n\nFor the objects which fall on the eyes and the ears do not produce a\nsensible perception of themselves, unless that which is intellective\nis present. On which account, also, king Cleomenes, when something\nthat was recited was applauded, being asked, if it did not also appear\nto him to be excellent, left this to the decision of those that asked\nhim the question; for he said, that his intellect was at the time in\nPeloponnesus. Hence it is necessary that intellect should be present with\nall those with whom sensible perception is present.\n\n22. Let us, however, admit that sense does not require intellect for\nthe accomplishment of its proper work, yet, when energizing about what\nis appropriate and what is foreign, it discerns the difference between\nthe two, it must then exercise the power of memory, and must dread that\nwhich will produce pain, desire that which will be beneficial, and\ncontrive, if it is absent, how it may be present, and will procure\nmethods of pursuing and investigating what is advantageous, and of\navoiding and flying from hostile occurrences. Indeed, our opponents, in\ntheir Introductions, [as they call them], every where inculcate these\nthings with a tedious prolixity, defining design to be an indication of\nperfection; the tendency of intellect to the object of its perception,\nan impulse prior to impulse; preparation, an action prior to action;\nand memory, the comprehension of some past thing[78], the perception\nof which, when present, was obtained through sense. For there is not\nany one of these which is not rational, and all of them are present\nwith all animals. Thus, too, with respect to intellections, those which\nare reposited in the mind, are called by them \u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9, _notions_; but\nwhen they are in motion [through a discursive energy] they denominate\nthem \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, or _perceptions obtained by a reasoning process_. But\nwith respect to all the passions, as they are in common acknowledged to\nbe depraved natures and opinions, it is wonderful that our opponents\nshould overlook the operations and motions of brutes, many of which are\nthe effects of anger, many of fear, and, by Jupiter, of envy also and\nemulation. Our opponents, too, themselves punish dogs and horses when\nthey do wrong; and this not in vain, but in order to make them better,\nproducing in them, through the pain, a sorrow which we denominate\nrepentance. But the name of the pleasure which is received through the\nears is \u03ba\u03b7\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _i.e._ _an ear-alluring sweetness_; and the delight\nwhich is received through the eyes is denominated \u03b3\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, _i.e._\n_enchantment_. Each of these, however, is used towards brutes. Hence\nstags and horses are _allured_ by the harmony produced from reeds and\nflutes; and the crabs, called \u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9, _paguri_, are evocated from\ntheir caverns by the melody of reeds. The fish _thrissa_, likewise, is\nsaid through harmony to come forth from its retreats. Those, however,\nwho speak stupidly about these things, assert that animals are neither\ndelighted, nor enraged, nor terrified, nor make any provision for what\nis necessary, nor remember; but they say that the bee _as it were_\nremembers, that the swallow _as it were_ provides what is requisite,\nthat the lion is _as it were_ angry, and that the stag is _as it were_\nafraid. And I know not what answer to give to those who say that animals\nneither see nor hear, but see _as it were_, and _as it were_ hear; that\nthey do not utter vocal sounds, but _as it were_ utter them; and that,\nin short, they do not live, but _as it were_ live. For he who is truly\nintelligent, will readily admit that these assertions are no more sane\nthan the former, and are similarly destitute of evidence. When, however,\non comparing with human manners and lives, actions, and modes of living,\nthose of animals, I see much depravity in the latter, and no manifest\ntendency to virtue as to the principal end, nor any proficiency, or\nappetition of proficiency, I am dubious why nature gave the beginning of\nperfection to those that are never able to arrive at the end of it[79].\nBut this to our opponents does not appear to be at all absurd. For as\nthey admit that the love of parents towards their offspring is the\nprinciple in us of association and justice; yet, though they perceive\nthat this affection is abundant and strong in animals, they nevertheless\ndeny that they participate of justice; which assertion is similarly\ndefective with the nature of mules, who, though they are not in want of\nany generative member, since they have a penis and vulva, and receive\npleasure from employing these parts, yet they are not able to accomplish\nthe end of generation. Consider the thing, too, in another way: Is it\nnot ridiculous to say that such men as Socrates, Plato, and Zeno, were\nnot less vicious than any slave, but resembled slaves in stupidity,\nintemperance, and injustice, and afterwards blame the nature of brutes,\nas neither pure, nor formed with sufficient accuracy for the attainment\nof virtue; thus attributing to them a privation, and not a depravity\nand imbecility of reason? Especially since they acknowledge that there\nis a vice of the rational part of the soul, with which every brute is\nreplete. For we may perceive that timidity, intemperance, injustice, and\nmalevolence, are inherent in many brutes.\n\n23. But he who thinks that the nature which is not adapted to receive\nrectitude of reason, does not at all receive reason, he, in the first\nplace, does not differ from one who fancies that an ape does not\nnaturally participate of deformity, nor a tortoise of tardity; because\nthe former is not receptive of beauty, nor the latter of celerity. And,\nin the next place, this is the opinion of one who does not perceive the\nobvious difference of things. For reason, indeed, is ingenerated by\nnature; but right and perfect reason is acquired by study and discipline.\nHence all animated beings participate of reason, but our opponents cannot\nmention any man who possesses rectitude of reason and wisdom [naturally],\nthough the multitude of men is innumerable. But as the sight of one\nanimal differs from that of another, and the flying of one bird from that\nof another, (for hawks and grasshoppers do not similarly see, nor eagles\nand partridges); thus, also, neither does every thing which participates\nof reason possess genius and acuteness in the highest perfection.\nIndeed there are many indications in brutes of association, fortitude,\nand craft, in procuring what is necessary, and in economical conduct;\nas, on the contrary, there are also indications in them of injustice,\ntimidity, and fatuity. Hence it is a question with some, which are the\nmore excellent, terrestrial or aquatic animals[80]? And that there are\nthese indications, is evident from comparing storks with river horses:\nfor the former nourish, but the latter destroy their fathers, in order\nthat they may have connexion with their mothers. This is likewise seen\non comparing doves with partridges: for the latter conceal and destroy\ntheir eggs, if the female, during her incubation, refuses to be connected\nwith the male. But doves successively relieve each other in incubation,\nalternately cherishing the eggs; and first, indeed, they feed the young,\nand afterwards the male strikes the female with his beak, and drives\nher to the eggs and her young, if she has for a long time wandered from\nthem. Antipater, however, when he blames asses and sheep for the neglect\nof purity, overlooks, I know not how, lynxes and swallows; of which, the\nformer remove and entirely conceal and bury their excrement, but the\nlatter teach their young to throw it out of their nest. Moreover, we\ndo not say that one tree is more ignorant than another, as we say that\na sheep is more stupid than a dog. Nor do we say that one herb is more\ntimid than another, as we do that a stag is more timid than a lion. For,\nas in things which are immoveable, one is not slower than another, and\nin things which are not vocal, one is not less vocal than another: thus,\ntoo, in all things in which the power of intellection is wanting, one\nthing cannot be said to be more timid, more dull, or more intemperate\nthan another. For, as these qualities are present differently in their\ndifferent participants, they produce in animals the diversities which\nwe perceive. Nor is it wonderful that man should so much excel other\nanimals in docility, sagacity, justice, and association. For many brutes\nsurpass all men in magnitude of body, and celerity of foot, and likewise\nin strength of sight, and accuracy of hearing; yet man is not on this\naccount either deaf, or blind, or powerless. But we run, though slower\nthan stags, and we see, though not so accurately as hawks; and nature\nhas not deprived us of strength and magnitude, though our possession\nof these is nothing, when compared with the strength and bulk of the\nelephant and the camel. _Hence, in a similar manner, we must not say that\nbrutes, because their intellection is more dull than ours, and because\nthey reason worse than we do, neither energize discursively, nor, in\nshort, possess intellection and reason; but it must be admitted that they\npossess these, though in an imbecile and turbid manner, just as a dull\nand disordered eye participates of sight._\n\n24. Innumerable instances, however, might be adduced in proof of the\nnatural sagacity of animals, if many things of this kind had not by many\npersons been collected and narrated. But this subject must be still\nfurther considered. For it appears that it belongs to the same thing,\nwhether it be a part or a power, which is naturally adapted to receive\na certain thing, to be also disposed to fall into a preternatural mode\nof subsistence, when it becomes mutilated or diseased. Thus, the eye is\nadapted to fall into blindness, the leg into lameness, and the tongue\ninto stammering; but nothing else is subject to such defects. For\nblindness does not befall that which is not naturally adapted to see, nor\nlameness that which is not adapted to walk; nor is that which is deprived\nof a tongue fitted to stammer, or lisp, or be dumb. Hence, neither can\nthat animal be delirious, or stupid, or insane, in which intellection,\nand the discursive energy of reason, are not naturally inherent. For it\nis not possible for any thing to be passively affected which does not\npossess a power, the passion of which is either privation, or mutilation,\nor some other deprivation. Moreover, I have met with mad dogs, and also\nrabid horses; and some persons assert that oxen and foxes become mad.\nThe example of dogs, however, is sufficient for our purpose: for it is a\nthing indubitable, and testifies that the animal possesses no despicable\nportion of reason and discursive energy, the passion of which, when\ndisturbed and confounded, is fury and madness. For, when they are thus\naffected, we do not see that there is any change in the quality of their\nsight or hearing. But as he is absurd who denies that a man is beside\nhimself, and that his intellectual, reasoning, and recollective powers,\nare corrupted, when he is afflicted with melancholy or delirium, (for it\nis usually said of those that are insane, that they are not themselves,\nbut have fallen off from reason): thus, also, he who thinks that mad dogs\nsuffer any thing else than that of having the power, which is naturally\nintellective, and is adapted to reason and recollect, full of tumult and\ndistortion, so as to cause them to be ignorant of persons most dear to\nthem, and abandon their accustomed mode of living;\u2014he who thus thinks,\nappears either to overlook what is obvious; or, if he really perceives\nwhat takes place, voluntarily contends against the truth. And such are\nthe arguments adduced by Plutarch in many of his treatises against the\nStoics and Peripatetics.\n\n25. But Theophrastus employs the following reasoning:\u2014Those that are\ngenerated from the same sources, I mean from the same father and mother,\nare said by us to be naturally allied to each other. And moreover, we\nlikewise conceive that those who derive their origin from the same\nancestors that we do, are allied to us, and also that this is the case\nwith our fellow-citizens, because they participate with us of the same\nland, and are united to us by the bonds of association. For we do not\nthink that the latter are allied to each other, and to us, through\nderiving their origin from the same ancestors, unless it should so happen\nthat the first progenitors of these were the sources of our race, or\nwere derived from the same ancestors. Hence I think we should say, that\nGreek is allied and has an affinity to Greek, and Barbarian to Barbarian,\nand all men to each other; for one of these two reasons, either because\nthey originate from the same ancestors, or because they participate of\nthe same food, manners, and genus. Thus also we must admit that all\nmen have an affinity, and are allied to each other. And, moreover, the\nprinciples of the bodies of all animals are naturally the same. I do\nnot say this with reference to the first elements of their bodies; for\nplants also consist of these; but I mean the seed, the flesh, and the\nconnascent genus of humours which is inherent in animals. But animals\nare much more allied to each other, through naturally possessing souls,\nwhich are not different from each other, I mean in desire and anger; and\nbesides these, in the reasoning faculty, and, above all, in the senses.\nBut as with respect to bodies, so likewise with respect to souls, some\nanimals have them more, but others less perfect, yet all of them have\nnaturally the same principles. And this is evident from the affinity of\ntheir passions. If, however, what we have said is true, viz. that such\nis the generation of the manners of animals, all the tribes of them are\nindeed intellective, but they differ in their modes of living, and in the\ntemperature of the first elements of which they consist. And if this be\nadmitted, the genus of other animals has an affinity, and is allied to\nus. For, as Euripides says, they have all of them the same food and the\nsame spirit, the same purple streams; and they likewise demonstrate that\nthe common parents of all of them are Heaven and Earth.\n\n26. Hence, since animals are allied to us, if it should appear, according\nto Pythagoras, that they are allotted the same soul that we are, he\nmay justly be considered as impious who does not abstain from acting\nunjustly towards his kindred. Nor because some animals are savage, is\ntheir alliance to us to be on this account abscinded. For some men may be\nfound who are no less, and even more malefic than savage animals to their\nneighbours, and who are impelled to injure any one they may meet with, as\nif they were driven by a certain blast of their own nature and depravity.\nHence also, we destroy such men; yet we do not cut them off from an\nalliance to animals of a mild nature. Thus, therefore, if likewise some\nanimals are savage, these, as such, are to be destroyed, in the same\nmanner as men that are savage; but our habitude or alliance to other\nand wilder animals is not on this account to be abandoned. But neither\ntame nor savage animals are to be eaten; as neither are unjust men. Now,\nhowever, we act most unjustly, destroying, indeed, tame animals, because\nsome brutes are savage and unjust, and feeding on such as are tame.\nWith respect to tame animals, however, we act with a twofold injustice,\nbecause, though they are tame, we slay them, and also, because we eat\nthem. And, in short, the death of these has a reference to the assumption\nof them for food.\n\nTo these, also, such arguments as the following may be added. For he who\nsays that the man who extends the just as far as to brutes, corrupts\nthe just, is ignorant that he does not himself preserve justice, but\nincreases pleasure, which is hostile to justice. By admitting, therefore,\nthat pleasure is the end [of our actions], justice is evidently\ndestroyed. For to whom is it not manifest that justice is increased\nthrough abstinence? For he who abstains from every thing animated,\nthough he may abstain from such animals as do not contribute to the\nbenefit of society, will be much more careful not to injure those of his\nown species. For he who loves the genus, will not hate any species of\nanimals; and by how much the greater his love of the genus is[81], by so\nmuch the more will he preserve justice towards a part of the genus, and\nthat to which he is allied. He, therefore, who admits that he is allied\nto all animals, will not injure any animal. But he who confines justice\nto man alone, is prepared, like one enclosed in a narrow space, to hurl\nfrom him the prohibition of injustice. So that the Pythagorean is more\npleasing than the Socratic banquet. For Socrates said, that hunger is\nthe sauce of food; but Pythagoras said, that to injure no one, and to\nbe exhilarated with justice, is the sweetest sauce; as the avoidance of\nanimal food, will also be the avoidance of unjust conduct with respect\nto food. For God has not so constituted things, that we cannot preserve\nourselves without injuring others; since, if this were the case, he would\nhave connected us with a nature which is the principle of injustice.\nDo not they, however, appear to be ignorant of the peculiarity of\njustice, who think that it was introduced from the alliance of men to\neach other? For this will be nothing more than a certain philanthropy;\nbut justice consists in abstaining from injuring any thing which is not\nnoxious. And our conception of the just man must be formed according\nto the latter, and not according to the former mode. Hence, therefore,\nsince justice consists in not injuring any thing, it must be extended as\nfar as to every animated nature. On this account, also, the essence of\njustice consists in the rational ruling over the irrational, and in the\nirrational being obedient to the rational part. For when reason governs,\nand the irrational part is obedient to its mandates, it follows, by the\ngreatest necessity, that man will be innoxious towards every thing. For\nthe passions being restrained, and desire and anger wasting away, but\nreason possessing its proper empire, a similitude to a more excellent\nnature [and to deity] immediately follows. But the more excellent nature\nin the universe is entirely innoxious, and, through possessing a power\nwhich preserves and benefits all things, is itself not in want of any\nthing. We, however, through justice [when we exercise it], are innoxious\ntowards all things, but, through being connected with mortality, are\nindigent of things of a necessary nature. But the assumption of what\nis necessary, does not injure even plants, when we take what they cast\noff; nor fruits, when we use such of them as are dead; nor sheep, when\nthrough shearing we rather benefit than injure them, and by partaking\nof their milk, we in return afford them every proper attention. Hence,\nthe just man appears to be one who deprives himself of things pertaining\nto the body; yet he does not [in reality] injure himself. For, by this\nmanagement of his body, and continence, he increases his inward good,\n_i.e._ his similitude to God.\n\n27. By making pleasure, therefore, the end of life, that which is truly\njustice cannot be preserved; since neither such things as are primarily\nuseful according to nature, nor all such as are easily attainable,\ngive completion to felicity. For in many instances, the motions of the\nirrational nature, and utility and indigence, have been, and still are\nthe sources of injustice. For men became indigent [as they pretended]\nof animal food, in order that they might preserve, as they said, the\ncorporeal frame free from molestation, and without being in want of those\nthings after which the animal nature aspires. But if an assimilation to\ndivinity is the end of life, an innoxious conduct towards all things\nwill be in the most eminent degree preserved. As, therefore, he who is\nled by his passions is innoxious only towards his children and his wife,\nbut despises and acts fraudulently towards other persons, since, in\nconsequence of the irrational part predominating in him, he is excited\nto, and astonished about mortal concerns; but he who is led by reason,\npreserves an innoxious conduct towards his fellow-citizens, and still\nmore so towards strangers, and towards all men, through having the\nirrational part in subjection, and is therefore more rational and divine\nthan the former character;\u2014thus also, he who does not confine harmless\nconduct to men alone, but extends it to other animals, is more similar\nto divinity; and if it was possible to extend it even to plants, he\nwould preserve this image in a still greater degree. As, however, this\nis not possible, we may in this respect lament, with the ancients[82],\nthe defect of our nature, that we consist of such adverse and discordant\nprinciples, so that we are unable to preserve our divine part\nincorruptible, and in all respects innoxious. For we are not unindigent\nin all things; the cause of which is generation, and our becoming needy\nthrough the abundant corporeal efflux which we sustain. But want procures\nsafety and ornament from things of a foreign nature, which are necessary\nto the existence of our mortal part. He, therefore, who is indigent of\na greater number of externals, is in a greater degree agglutinated to\npenury; and by how much his wants increase, by so much is he destitute\nof divinity, and an associate of penury. For that which is similar to\ndeity, through this assimilation immediately possesses true wealth. But\nno one who is [truly] rich and perfectly unindigent injures any thing.\nFor as long as any one injures another, though he should possess the\ngreatest wealth, and all the acres of land which the earth contains, he\nis still poor, and has want for his intimate associate. On this account,\nalso, he is unjust, without God, and impious, and enslaved to every kind\nof depravity, which is produced by the lapse of the soul into matter,\nthrough the privation of good. Every thing, therefore, is nugatory to any\none, as long as he wanders from the principle of the universe; and he is\nindigent of all things, while he does not direct his attention to Porus\n[or the source of true abundance]. He likewise yields to the mortal part\nof his nature, while he remains ignorant of his real self. But Injustice\nis powerful in persuading and corrupting those that belong to her empire,\nbecause she associates with her votaries in conjunction with Pleasure.\nAs, however, in the choice of lives, he is the more accurate judge who\nhas obtained an experience of both [the better and the worse kind of\nlife], than he is who has only experienced one of them; thus also, in\nthe choice and avoidance of what is proper, he is a safer judge who,\nfrom that which is more, judges of that which is less excellent, than\nhe who from the less, judges of the more excellent. Hence, he who lives\naccording to intellect, will more accurately define what is eligible\nand what is not, than he who lives under the dominion of irrationality.\nFor the former has passed through the irrational life, as having from\nthe first associated with it; but the latter, having had no experience\nof an intellectual life, persuades those that resemble himself, and\nacts with nugacity, like a child among children. If, however, say our\nopponents, all men were persuaded by these arguments, what would become\nof us? Is it not evident that we should be happy, injustice, indeed,\nbeing exterminated from men, and justice being conversant with us, in the\nsame manner as it is in the heavens? But now this question is just the\nsame as if men should be dubious what the life of the Danaids would be,\nif they were liberated from the employment of drawing water in a sieve,\nand attempting to fill a perforated vessel. For they are dubious what\nwould be the consequence if we should cease to replenish our passions and\ndesires, the whole of which replenishing continually flows away through\nthe want of real good; since this fills up the ruinous clefts of the soul\nmore than the greatest of external necessaries. Do you therefore ask, O\nman, what we should do? We should imitate those that lived in the golden\nage, we should imitate those of that period who were [truly] free. For\nwith them modesty, Nemesis, and Justice associated, because they were\nsatisfied with the fruits of the earth.\n\n    The fertile earth for them spontaneous yields\n    Abundantly her fruits[83].\n\nBut those who are liberated from slavery, obtain for themselves what they\nbefore procured for their masters. In like manner, also, do you, when\nliberated from the servitude of the body, and a slavish attention to the\npassions produced through the body, as, prior to this, you nourished\nthem in an all-various manner with externals, so now nourish yourself\nall-variously with internal good, justly assuming things which are\n[properly] your own, and no longer by violence taking away things which\nare foreign [to your true nature and real good].\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[64] This _external reason_ (\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2) is speech.\n\n[65] Philostratus relates this of Apollonius, in his Life of him.\n\n[66] The words within the brackets are added from the version of\nFelicianus. Hence it appears, that the words \u03b5\u03ba \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03c5\u03ba\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\nare wanting in the original, after the word \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9. But this defect is not\nnoticed by any of the editors.\n\n[67] Porphyry derived this from the treatise of Plutarch, in which it is\ninvestigated whether _land_ are more sagacious than _aquatic_ animals.\n\n[68] This was the opinion of the Stoics; but is most erroneous. For the\nsupreme divinity, being superessential, transcends even intellect itself,\nand much more reason, which is an evolved perception of things; and\nthis is also the case with every other deity, according to the Platonic\ntheology, when considered according to his hyparxis, or summit. See my\ntranslation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.\n\n[69] A musket, or male hawk of a small kind. This bird is mentioned by\nHomer, Iliad, XIV. v. 238.\n\n[70] Reason in a divine intellect subsists causally, or in a way better\nthan reason, and therefore is not a discursive energy (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03be\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7\n\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1), but an evolved cause of things. And though, in a divine soul,\nit is discursive, or transitive, yet it differs from our reason in this,\nthat it perceives the whole of one form at once, and not by degrees, as\nwe do when we reason.\n\n[71] In the original, \u039f\u03c5\u03c4\u03c9 \u03b4\u2019 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1 \u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03c1\u1fb3, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. But for\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1, Lipsius proposes to read, \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1, and Meerman \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7. There\nis, however, no occasion whatever to substitute any other word for\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1, as, with Platonic writers, \u03c4\u03bf \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd is equivalent to \u03c4\u03bf\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n[72] See the first book of Herodotus, chap. 159.\n\n[73] The more mystical cause why the Egyptians worshipped animals,\nappears to me to be this, that they conceived a _living_ to be preferable\nto an _inanimate_ image of divinity. Hence, they reverenced animals\nas visible and living resemblances of certain invisible powers of the\nGods.\u2014See Plutarch\u2019s Treatise on Isis and Osiris.\n\n[74] See the Symposiacs of Plutarch, lib. ix. 8.\n\n[75] Odyss. XII. v. 96.\n\n[76] The latter part of this sentence, which in the original is \u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5\u03ba\n\u03b5\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03be\u03b5\u03bd \u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u03c0\u03b7 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b7 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5; Valentinius most\nerroneously translates, \u201cquare nos rerum opifex non edocuit, quomodo \u00e0\nnatura in nostros usus facta fuerint?\u201d\n\n[77] _i.e._ The discursive energy of reason.\n\n[78] In the original, \u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u03be\u03b9\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03bb\u03b7\u03bb\u03c5\u03b8\u03cc\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f57\n\u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03be \u03b1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b7\u03c6\u03b8\u03b7; but for \u03b1\u03be\u03b9\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, I read \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\nFelicianus also appears to have found this reading in his manuscript copy\nof this work; for his version of the passage is, \u201cvel memoriam _rei_\npr\u00e6terit\u00e6 comprehensionem, quam pr\u00e6sentem sensus perciperat.\u201d\n\n[79] This doubt may, perhaps, be solved, by admitting that brutes have\nan imperfect rationality, or the very dregs of the rational faculty, by\nwhich they form a link between men and zoophytes, just as zoophytes are a\nlink between brutes and merely vegetable substances. Brutes, therefore,\nhaving an imperfect reason, possess only the beginning of perfection.\n\n[80] Plutarch has written a most ingenious treatise on this subject.\n\n[81] In the original, \u03bf\u03c3\u1ff3 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b6\u03c9\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03bf \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf \u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c9\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9. On this passage, Reisk observes,\n\u201cForte \u03bf\u03c3\u1ff3 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd \u03b7 \u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b6\u03c9\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff3\n(scilicet \u03bc\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd) \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\u201d But, instead of \u03b7 \u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2,\nit appears to me that \u03b7 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b9\u03b1 should be substituted.\n\n[82] Porphyry here particularly alludes to Empedocles.\n\n[83] Hesiod. Oper. v. 117.\n\n\n\n\nON ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD.\n\nBOOK THE FOURTH.\n\n\n1. In the preceding books, O Castricius, we have nearly answered all the\narguments which in reality defend the feeding on flesh, for the sake of\nincontinence and intemperance, and which adduce impudent apologies for\nso doing by ascribing a greater indigence to our nature than is fit. Two\nparticular inquiries, however, still remain; in one of which the promise\nof advantage especially deceives those who are corrupted by pleasure.\nAnd, moreover, we shall confute the assertion of our opponents, that no\nwise man, nor any nation, has rejected animal food, as it leads those\nthat hear it to great injustice, through the ignorance of true history;\nand we shall also endeavour to give the solutions of the question\nconcerning advantage, and to reply to other inquiries.\n\n2. But we shall begin from the abstinence of certain nations, in the\nnarration of which, what is asserted of the Greeks will first claim our\nattention, as being the most allied to us, and the most appropriate of\nall the witnesses that can be adduced. Among those, therefore, that\nhave concisely, and at the same time accurately collected an account of\nthe affairs of the Greeks, is the Peripatetic Dic\u00e6archus[84], who, in\nnarrating the pristine life of the Greeks, says, the ancients, being\ngenerated with an alliance to the Gods, were naturally most excellent,\nand led the best life; so that, when compared to us of the present day,\nwho consist of an adulterated and most vile matter, they were thought to\nbe a golden race; and they slew no animal whatever. The truth of this, he\nalso says, is testified by the poets, who denominate these ancients the\ngolden race, and assert that every good was present with them.\n\n    The fertile earth for them spontaneous bore\n    Of fruits a copious and unenvy\u2019d store;\n    In blissful quiet then, unknown to strife,\n    The worthy with the worthy passed their life[85].\n\nWhich assertions, indeed, Dic\u00e6archus explaining, says, that a life of\nthis kind was under Saturn; if it is proper to consider it as a thing\nthat once existed, and that it is a life which has not been celebrated in\nvain, and if, laying aside what is extremely fabulous, we may refer it\nto a physical narration. All things, therefore, are very properly said\nto have been then spontaneously produced; for men did not procure any\nthing by labour, because they were unacquainted with the agricultural\nart, and, in short, had no knowledge of any other art. This very thing,\nlikewise, was the cause of their leading a life of leisure, free from\nlabours and care; and if it is proper to assent to the decision of the\nmost skilful and elegant of physicians, it was also the cause of their\nbeing liberated from disease. _For there is not any precept of physicians\nwhich more contributes to health, than that which exhorts us not to make\nan abundance of excrement_, from which those pristine Greeks always\npreserved their bodies pure. For they neither assumed such food as was\nstronger than the nature of the body could bear, but such as could be\nvanquished by the corporeal nature, nor more than was moderate, on\naccount of the facility of procuring it, but for the most part less than\nwas sufficient, on account of its paucity. Moreover, there were neither\nany wars among them, nor seditions with each other. For no reward of\ncontention worth mentioning was proposed as an incentive, for the sake of\nwhich some one might be induced to engage in such dissensions. So that\nthe principal thing in that life was leisure and rest from necessary\noccupations, together with health, peace, and friendship. But to those in\nafter times, who, through aspiring after things which greatly exceeded\nmediocrity, fell into many evils, this pristine life became, as it was\nreasonable to suppose it would, desirable. The slender and extemporaneous\nfood, however, of these first men, is manifested by the saying which\nwas afterwards proverbially used, _enough of the oak_; this adage being\nprobably introduced by him who first changed the ancient mode of living.\nA pastoral life succeeded to this, in which men procured for themselves\nsuperfluous possessions, and meddled with animals. For, perceiving\nthat some of them were innoxious, but others malefic and savage, they\ntamed the former, but attacked the latter. At the same time, together\nwith this life, war was introduced. And these things, says Dic\u00e6archus,\nare not asserted by us, but by those who have historically discussed\na multitude of particulars. For, as possessions were now of such a\nmagnitude as to merit attention, some ambitiously endeavoured to obtain\nthem, by collecting them [for their own use], and calling on others to\ndo the same, but others directed their attention to the preservation of\nthem when collected. Time, therefore, thus gradually proceeding, and men\nalways directing their attention to what appeared to be useful, they\nat length became conversant with the third, and agricultural form of\nlife. And this is what is said by Dic\u00e6archus, in his narration of the\nmanners of the ancient Greeks, and the blessed life which they then led,\nto which abstinence from animal food contributed, no less than other\nthings. Hence, at that period there was no war, because injustice was\nexterminated. But afterwards, together with injustice towards animals,\nwar was introduced among men, and the endeavour to surpass each other in\namplitude of possessions. On which account also, the audacity of those\nis wonderful, who say that abstinence from animals is the mother of\ninjustice, since both history and experience testify, that together with\nthe slaughter of animals, war and injustice were introduced.\n\n3. Hence, this being afterwards perceived by the Laced\u00e6monian Lycurgus,\nthough the eating of animals then prevailed, yet he so arranged his\npolity, as to render food of this kind requisite in the smallest degree.\nFor the allotted property of each individual did not consist in herds\nof oxen, flocks of sheep, or an abundance of goats, horses, and money,\nbut in the possession of land, which might produce for a man seventy\nmedimni[86] of barley, and for a woman twelve, and the quantity of\nliquid fruits in the same proportion. For he thought that this quantity\nof nutriment was sufficient to procure a good habit of body and health,\nnothing else to obtain these being requisite. Whence also it is said,\nthat on returning to his country, after he had been for some time absent\nfrom it, and perceiving, as he passed through the fields, that the corn\nhad just been reaped, and that the threshing-floors and the heaps were\nparallel and equable, he laughed, and said to those that were present,\nthat all Laconia seemed to belong to many brothers, who had just divided\nthe land among themselves. He added, that as he had therefore expelled\nluxury from Sparta, it would be requisite also to annul the use of money,\nboth golden and silver, and to introduce iron alone, as its substitute,\nand this of a great bulk and weight, and of little value; so that as much\nof it as should be worth ten min\u00e6, should require a large receptacle\nto hold it, and a cart drawn by two oxen to carry it. But this being\nordained, many species of injustice were exterminated from Laced\u00e6mon.\nFor who would attempt to thieve, or suffer himself to be corrupted by\ngifts, or defraud or plunder another, when it was not possible for him\nto conceal what he had taken, nor possess it so as to be envied by\nothers, nor derive any advantage from coining it? Together with money\nalso, the useless arts were expelled, the works of the Laced\u00e6monians\nnot being saleable. For iron money could not be exported to the other\nGreeks, nor was it esteemed by them, but ridiculed. Hence, neither was\nit lawful to buy any thing foreign, and which was intrinsically of no\nworth, nor did ships laden with merchandise sail into their ports, nor\nwas any verbal sophist, or futile diviner, or bawd, or artificer of\ngolden and silver ornaments, permitted to come to Laconia, because there\nmoney was of no use. And thus luxury, being gradually deprived of its\nincitements and nourishment, wasted away of itself. Those likewise who\npossessed much derived no greater advantage from it, than those who did\nnot, as no egress was afforded to abundance, since it was so obstructed\nby impediments, that it was forced to remain in indolent rest. Hence such\nhousehold furniture as was in constant use, and was necessary, such as\nbeds, chairs, and tables, these were made by them in the best manner;\nand the Laconic cup, which was called _cothon_, was, as Critias says,\nespecially celebrated in military expeditions. For in these expeditions,\nthe water which they drank, and which was unpleasant to the sight, was\nconcealed by the colour of the cup; and the turbid part of the water\nfalling against the lips, through their prominency, that part of it which\nwas drank, was received in a purer condition by the mouth. As we are\ninformed, however, by Plutarch, the legislator was the cause of these\nthings. For the artificers being liberated from useless works, exhibited\nthe beauty of art in things of a necessary nature.\n\n4. That he might also in a still greater degree oppose luxury, and take\naway the ardent endeavour to obtain wealth, he introduced a third, and\nmost beautiful political institution, viz. that of the citizens eating\nand drinking together publicly; so that they might partake of the same\nprescribed food in common, and might not be fed at home, reclining on\nsumptuous couches, and placed before elegant tables, through the hands\nof artificers and cooks, being fattened in darkness, like voracious\nanimals, and corrupting their bodies, together with their morals, by\nfalling into every kind of luxury and repletion; as such a mode of\nliving would require much sleep, hot baths, and abundant quiet, and such\nattentions as are paid to the diseased. This indeed was a great thing;\nbut still greater than this, that, as Theophrastus says, he caused\nwealth to be neglected, and to be of no value, through the citizens\neating at common tables, and the frugality of their food. For there was\nno use, nor enjoyment of riches; nor, in short, was there any thing to\ngratify the sight, or any ostentatious display in the whole apparatus,\nbecause both the poor and the rich sat at the same table. Hence it was\nuniversally said, that in Sparta alone, Plutus was seen to be blind, and\nlying like an inanimate and immoveable picture. For it was not possible\nfor the citizens, having previously feasted at home, to go to the common\ntables with appetites already satiated with food. For the rest carefully\nobserved him who did not eat and drink with them, and reviled him, as\nan intemperate person, and as one who conducted himself effeminately\nwith respect to the common food. Hence these common tables were called\n_phiditia_; either as being the causes of friendship and benevolence, as\nif they were _philitia_, assuming \u03b4 for \u03bb; or as accustoming men [\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03c9] to frugality, and a slender diet. But the number of\nthose that assembled at the common table was fifteen, more or less. And\neach person brought every month, for the purpose of furnishing the table,\na medimnus of flour, eight choas[87] of wine, five pounds of cheese, two\npounds and a half of figs, and, besides all these, a very little quantity\nof money.\n\n5. Hence the children of those who ate thus sparingly and temperately,\ncame to these common tables, as to schools of temperance, where they\nalso heard political discourses, and were spectators of liberal sports.\nHere, likewise, they learnt to jest acrimoniously, without scurrility,\nand to receive, without being indignant, the biting jests of others. For\nthis appeared to be extremely Laconic, to be able to endure acrimonious\njests; though he who could not endure was permitted to refuse hearing\nthem, and the scoffer was immediately silent. Such, therefore, was the\nfrugality of the Laced\u00e6monians, with respect to diet, though it was\nlegally instituted for the sake of the multitude. Hence those who came\nfrom this polity are said to have been more brave and temperate, and paid\nmore attention to rectitude, than those who came from other communities,\nwhich are corrupted both in souls and bodies. And it is evident that\nperfect abstinence is adapted to such a polity as this, but to corrupt\ncommunities luxurious food[88]. If, likewise, we direct our attention to\nsuch other nations as regarded equity, mildness, and piety to the Gods,\nit will be evident that abstinence was ordained by them, with a view to\nthe safety and advantage, if not of all, yet at least of some of the\ncitizens, who, sacrificing to, and worshipping the Gods, on account of\nthe city, might expiate the sins of the multitude. For, in the mysteries,\nwhat the boy who attends the altar accomplishes, by performing accurately\nwhat he is commanded to do, in order to render the Gods propitious to all\nthose who have been initiated, as far as to _muesis_[89] [\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03c5\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd], _that_, in nations and cities, priests are able to effect, by\nsacrificing for all the people, and through piety inducing the Gods to\nbe attentive to the welfare of those that belong to them. With respect\nto priests, therefore, the eating of all animals is prohibited to some,\nbut of certain animals to others, whether you consider the customs of the\nGreeks or of the barbarians, which are different in different nations.\nSo that all of them, collectively considered, or existing as one, being\nassumed, it will be found that they abstain from all animals. If,\ntherefore, those who preside over the safety of cities, and to whose care\npiety to the Gods is committed, abstain from animals, how can any one\ndare to accuse this abstinence as disadvantageous to cities?\n\n6. Ch\u00e6remon the Stoic, therefore, in his narration of the Egyptian\npriests, who, he says, were considered by the Egyptians as philosophers,\ninforms us, that they chose temples, as the places in which they might\nphilosophize. For to dwell with the statues of the Gods is a thing\nallied to the whole desire, by which the soul tends to the contemplation\nof their divinities. And from the divine veneration indeed, which was\npaid to them through dwelling in temples, they obtained security, all men\nhonouring these philosophers, as if they were certain sacred animals.\nThey also led a solitary life, as they only mingled with other men in\nsolemn sacrifices and festivals. But at other times the priests were\nalmost inaccessible to any one who wished to converse with them. For it\nwas requisite that he who approached to them should be first purified,\nand abstain from many things; and this is as it were a common sacred\nlaw respecting the Egyptian priests. But these [philosophic priests],\nhaving relinquished every other employment, and human labours[90], gave\nup the whole of their life to the contemplation and worship of divine\nnatures and to divine inspiration; through the latter, indeed, procuring\nfor themselves honour, security, and piety; but through contemplation\nscience; and through both, a certain occult exercise of manners, worthy\nof antiquity[91]. For to be always conversant with divine knowledge and\ninspiration, removes those who are so from all avarice, suppresses the\npassions, and excites to an intellectual life. But they were studious\nof frugality in their diet and apparel, and also of continence and\nendurance, and in all things were attentive to justice and equity. They\nlikewise were rendered venerable, through rarely mingling with other\nmen. For during the time of what are called purifications, they scarcely\nmingled with their nearest kindred, and those of their own order, nor\nwere they to be seen by any one, unless it was requisite for the\nnecessary purposes of purification. For the sanctuary was inaccessible\nto those who were not purified, and they dwelt in holy places for\nthe purpose of performing divine works; but at all other times they\nassociated more freely with those who lived like themselves. They did\nnot, however, associate with any one who was not a religious character.\nBut they were always seen near to the Gods, or to the statues of the\nGods, the latter of which they were beheld either carrying, or preceding\nin a sacred procession, or disposing in an orderly manner, with modesty\nand gravity; each of which operations was not the effect of pride, but\nan indication of some physical reason. Their venerable gravity also was\napparent from their manners. For their walking was orderly, and their\naspect sedate; and they were so studious of preserving this gravity of\ncountenance, that they did not even wink, when at any time they were\nunwilling to do so; and they seldom laughed, and when they did, their\nlaughter proceeded no farther than to a smile. But they always kept their\nhands within their garments. Each likewise bore about him a symbol,\nindicative of the order which he was allotted in sacred concerns; for\nthere were many orders of priests. Their diet also was slender and\nsimple. For, with respect to wine, some of them did not at all drink it,\nbut others drank very little of it, on account of its being injurious to\nthe nerves, oppressive to the head, an impediment to invention, and an\nincentive to venereal desires. In many other things also they conducted\nthemselves with caution; neither using bread at all in purifications, and\nat those times in which they were not employed in purifying themselves,\nthey were accustomed to eat bread with hyssop, cut into small pieces.\nFor it is said, that hyssop very much purifies the power of bread. But\nthey, for the most part, abstained from oil, the greater number of them\nentirely; and if at any time they used it with pot-herbs, they took very\nlittle of it, and only as much as was sufficient to mitigate the taste of\nthe herbs.\n\n7. It was not lawful for them therefore to meddle with the esculent\nand potable substances, which were produced out of Egypt, and this\ncontributed much to the exclusion of luxury from these priests. But\nthey abstained from all the fish that was caught in Egypt, and from\nsuch quadrupeds as had solid, or many-fissured hoofs, and from such as\nwere not horned; and likewise from all such birds as were carnivorous.\nMany of them, however, entirely abstained from all animals; and in\npurifications this abstinence was adopted by all of them, for then they\ndid not even eat an egg. Moreover, they also rejected other things,\nwithout being calumniated for so doing. Thus, for instance, of oxen,\nthey rejected the females, and also such of the males as were twins,\nor were speckled, or of a different colour, or alternately varied in\ntheir form, or which were now tamed, as having been already consecrated\nto labours, and resembled animals that are honoured, or which were the\nimages of any thing [that is divine], or those that had but one eye,\nor those that verged to a similitude of the human form. There are also\ninnumerable other observations pertaining to the art of those who are\ncalled \u03bc\u03bf\u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03c3\u03c6\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, or who stamp calves with a seal, and of which\nbooks have been composed. But these observations are still more curious\nrespecting birds; as, for instance, that a turtle should not be eaten;\nfor it is said that a hawk frequently dismisses this bird after he has\nseized it, and preserves its life, as a reward for having had connexion\nwith it. The Egyptian priests, therefore, that they might not ignorantly\nmeddle with a turtle of this kind, avoided the whole species of those\nbirds. And these indeed were certain common religious ceremonies; but\nthere were different ceremonies, which varied according to the class of\nthe priests that used them, and were adapted to the several divinities.\nBut chastity and purifications were common to all the priests. When also\nthe time arrived in which they were to perform something pertaining\nto the sacred rites of religion, they spent some days in preparatory\nceremonies, some indeed forty-two, but others a greater, and others a\nless number of days; yet never less than seven days; and during this time\nthey abstained from all animals, and likewise from all pot-herbs and\nleguminous substances, and, above all, from a venereal connexion with\nwomen; for they never at any time had connexion with males. They likewise\nwashed themselves with cold water thrice every day; viz. when they rose\nfrom their bed, before dinner, and when they betook themselves to sleep.\nBut if they happened to be polluted in their sleep by the emission of the\nseed, they immediately purified their body in a bath. They also used cold\nbathing at other times, but not so frequently as on the above occasion.\nTheir bed was woven from the branches of the palm tree, which they call\n_bais_; and their bolster was a smooth semi-cylindric piece of wood. But\nthey exercised themselves in the endurance of hunger and thirst, and were\naccustomed to paucity of food through the whole of their life.\n\n8. This also is a testimony of their continence, that, though they\nneither exercised themselves in walking or riding, yet they lived free\nfrom disease, and were sufficiently strong for the endurance of moderate\nlabours. They bore therefore many burdens in the performance of sacred\noperations, and accomplished many ministrant works, which required more\nthan common strength. But they divided the night into the observation\nof the celestial bodies, and sometimes devoted a part of it to offices\nof purification; and they distributed the day into the worship of the\nGods, according to which they celebrated them with hymns thrice or\nfour times, viz. in the morning and evening, when the sun is at his\nmeridian altitude, and when he is declining to the west. The rest of\ntheir time they devoted to arithmetical and geometrical speculations,\nalways labouring to effect something, and to make some new discovery,\nand, in short, continually exercising their skill. In winter nights also\nthey were occupied in the same employments, being vigilantly engaged\nin literary pursuits, as paying no attention to the acquisition of\nexternals, and being liberated from the servitude of that bad master,\nexcessive expense. Hence their unwearied and incessant labour testifies\ntheir endurance, but their continence is manifested by their liberation\nfrom the desire of external good. To sail from Egypt likewise, [i.e.\nto quit Egypt,] was considered by them to be one of the most unholy\nthings, in consequence of their being careful to avoid foreign luxury\nand pursuits; for this appeared to them to be alone lawful to those\nwho were compelled to do so by regal necessities. Indeed, they were\nvery anxious to continue in the observance of the institutes of their\ncountry, and those who were found to have violated them, though but in a\nsmall degree, were expelled [from the college of the priests]. The true\nmethod of philosophizing, likewise, was preserved by the prophets, by the\n_hierostolist\u00e6_[92], and the sacred scribes, and also by the _horologi_,\nor calculators of nativities. But the rest of the priests, and of the\npastophori[93], curators of temples, and ministers of the Gods, were\nsimilarly studious of purity, yet not so accurately, and with such great\ncontinence, as the priests of whom we have been speaking. And such are\nthe particulars which are narrated of the Egyptians, by a man who was\na lover of truth, and an accurate writer, and who among the Stoics\nstrenuously and solidly philosophized.\n\n9. But the Egyptian priests, through the proficiency which they made\nby this exercise, and similitude to divinity, knew that divinity does\nnot pervade through man alone, and that soul is not enshrined in man\nalone on the earth, but that it nearly passes through all animals. On\nthis account, in fashioning the images of the Gods, they assumed every\nanimal, and for this purpose mixed together the human form and the forms\nof wild beasts, and again the bodies of birds with the body of a man.\nFor a certain deity was represented by them in a human shape as far as\nto the neck, but the face was that of a bird, or a lion, or of some\nother animal. And again, another divine resemblance had a human head,\nbut the other parts were those of certain other animals, some of which\nhad an inferior, but others a superior position; through which they\nmanifested, that these [_i.e._ brutes and men], through the decision of\nthe Gods, communicated with each other, and that tame and savage animals\nare nurtured together with us, not without the concurrence of a certain\ndivine will. Hence also, a lion is worshipped as a God, and a certain\npart of Egypt, which is called Nomos, has the surname of Leontopolis\n[or the city of the lion], and another is denominated Busiris [from an\nox], and another Lycopolis [or the city of the wolf]. For they venerated\nthe power of God which extends to all things through animals which\nare nurtured together, and which each of the Gods imparts. They also\nreverenced water and fire the most of all the elements, as being the\nprincipal causes of our safety. And these things are exhibited by them in\ntemples; for even now, on opening the sanctuary of Serapis, the worship\nis performed through fire and water; he who sings the hymns making a\nlibation with water, and exhibiting fire, when, standing on the threshold\nof the temple, he invokes the God in the language of the Egyptians.\nVenerating, therefore, these elements, they especially reverence those\nthings which largely participate of them, as partaking more abundantly of\nwhat is sacred. But after these, they venerate all animals, and in the\nvillage Anubis they worship a man, in which place also they sacrifice\nto him, and victims are there burnt in honour of him on an altar; but\nhe shortly after only eats that which was procured for him as a man.\nHence, as it is requisite to abstain from man, so, likewise, from other\nanimals. And farther still, the Egyptian priests, from their transcendent\nwisdom and association with divinity, discovered what animals are more\nacceptable to the Gods [when dedicated to them] than man. Thus they\nfound that a hawk is dear to the sun, since the whole of its nature\nconsists of blood and spirit. It also commiserates man, and laments over\nhis dead body, and scatters earth on his eyes, in which these priests\nbelieve a solar light is resident. They likewise discovered that a\nhawk lives many years, and that, after it leaves the present life, it\npossesses a divining power, is most rational and prescient when liberated\nfrom the body, and gives perfection to statues, and moves temples. A\nbeetle will be detested by one who is ignorant of and unskilled in divine\nconcerns, but the Egyptians venerate it, as an animated image of the sun.\nFor every beetle is a male, and emitting its genital seed in a muddy\nplace, and having made it spherical, it turns round the seminal sphere\nin a way similar to that of the sun in the heavens. It likewise receives\na period of twenty-eight days, which is a lunar period. In a similar\nmanner, the Egyptians philosophize about the ram, the crocodile, the\nvulture, and the ibis, and, in short, about every animal; so that, from\ntheir wisdom and transcendent knowledge of divine concerns, they came\nat length to venerate all animals[94]. An unlearned man, however, does\nnot even suspect that they, not being borne along with the stream of the\nvulgar who know nothing, and not walking in the path of ignorance, but\npassing beyond the illiterate multitude, and that want of knowledge which\nbefals every one at first, were led to reverence things which are thought\nby the vulgar to be of no worth.\n\n10. This also, no less than the above-mentioned particulars, induced\nthem to believe, that animals should be reverenced [as images of the\nGods], viz. that the soul of every animal, when liberated from the body,\nwas discovered by them to be rational, to be prescient of futurity, to\npossess an oracular power, and to be effective of every thing which man\nis capable of accomplishing when separated from the body. Hence they very\nproperly honoured them, and abstained from them as much as possible.\nSince, however, the cause through which the Egyptians venerated the Gods\nthrough animals requires a copious discussion, and which would exceed\nthe limits of the present treatise, what has been unfolded respecting\nthis particular is sufficient for our purpose. Nevertheless, this is not\nto be omitted, that the Egyptians, when they buried those that were of\nnoble birth, privately took away the belly and placed it in a chest, and\ntogether with other things which they performed for the sake of the dead\nbody, they elevated the chest towards the sun, whom they invoked as a\nwitness; an oration for the deceased being at the same time made by one\nof those to whose care the funeral was committed. But the oration which\nEuphantus[95] has interpreted from the Egyptian tongue was as follows: \u201cO\nsovereign Sun, and all ye Gods who impart life to men, receive me, and\ndeliver me to the eternal Gods as a cohabitant. For I have always piously\nworshipped those divinities which were pointed out to me by my parents as\nlong as I lived in this age, and have likewise always honoured those who\nprocreated my body. And, with respect to other men, I have never slain\nany one, nor defrauded any one of what he deposited with me, nor have I\ncommitted any other atrocious deed. If, therefore, during my life I have\nacted erroneously, by eating or drinking things which it is unlawful\nto eat or drink, I have not erred through myself, but through these,\u201d\npointing to the chest in which the belly was contained. And having thus\nspoken, he threw the chest into the river [Nile]; but buried the rest of\nthe body as being pure. After this manner, they thought an apology ought\nto be made to divinity for what they had eaten and drank, and for the\ninsolent conduct which they had been led to through the belly.\n\n11. But among those who are known by us, the Jews, before they first\nsuffered the subversion of their legal institutes under Antiochus, and\nafterwards under the Romans, when also the temple in Jerusalem was\ncaptured, and became accessible to all men to whom, prior to this event,\nit was inaccessible, and the city itself was destroyed;\u2014before this took\nplace, the Jews always abstained from many animals, but peculiarly, which\nthey even now do, from swine. At that period, therefore, there were three\nkinds of philosophers among them. And of one kind, indeed, the Pharisees\nwere the leaders, but of another, the Sadducees, and of the third,\nwhich appears to have been the most venerable, the Ess\u00e6ans. The mode of\nlife, therefore, of these third was as follows, as Josephus frequently\ntestifies in many of his writings. For in the second book of his Judaic\nHistory, which he has completed in seven books, and in the eighteenth\nof his Antiquities, which consists of twenty books, and likewise in the\nsecond of the two books which he wrote against the Greeks, he speaks\nof these Ess\u00e6ans, and says, that they are of the race of the Jews, and\nare in a greater degree than others friendly to one another. They are\naverse to pleasures, conceiving them to be vicious, but they are of\nopinion that continence, and the not yielding to the passions, constitute\nvirtue. And they despise, indeed, wedlock, but receiving the children of\nother persons, and instructing them in disciplines while they are yet\nof a tender age, they consider them as their kindred, and form them to\ntheir own manners. And they act in this manner, not for the purpose of\nsubverting marriage, and the succession arising from it, but in order\nto avoid the lasciviousness of women. They are, likewise, despisers\nof wealth, and the participation of external possessions among them\nin common is wonderful; nor is any one to be found among them who is\nricher than the rest. For it is a law with them, that those who wish to\nbelong to their sect, must give up their property to it in common; so\nthat among all of them, there is not to be seen either the abjectness of\npoverty, or the insolence of wealth; but the possessions of each being\nmingled with those of the rest, there was one property with all of them,\nas if they had been brothers. They likewise conceived oil to be a stain\nto the body, and that if any one, though unwillingly, was anointed, he\nshould [immediately] wipe his body. For it was considered by them as\nbeautiful to be squalid[96], and to be always clothed in white garments.\nBut curators of the common property were elected by votes, indistinctly\nfor the use of all. They have not, however, one city, but in each city\nmany of them dwell together, and those who come among them from other\nplaces, if they are of their sect, equally partake with them of their\npossessions, as if they were their own. Those, likewise, who first\nperceive these strangers, behave to them as if they were their intimate\nacquaintance. Hence, when they travel, they take nothing with them for\nthe sake of expenditure. But they neither change their garments nor their\nshoes, till they are entirely torn, or destroyed by time. They neither\nbuy nor sell any thing, but each of them giving what he possesses to him\nthat is in want, receives in return for it what will be useful to him.\nNevertheless, each of them freely imparts to others of their sect what\nthey may be in want of, without any remuneration.\n\n12. Moreover, they are peculiarly pious to divinity. For before the sun\nrises they speak nothing profane, but they pour forth certain prayers to\nhim which they had received from their ancestors, as if beseeching him\nto rise. Afterwards, they are sent by their curators to the exercise of\nthe several arts in which they are skilled, and having till the fifth\nhour strenuously laboured in these arts, they are afterwards collected\ntogether in one place; and there, being begirt with linen teguments, they\nwash their bodies with cold water. After this purification, they enter\ninto their own proper habitation, into which no heterodox person is\npermitted to enter. But they being pure, betake themselves to the dining\nroom, as into a certain sacred fane. In this place, when all of them are\nseated in silence, the baker places the bread in order, and the cook\ndistributes to each of them one vessel containing one kind of eatables.\nPrior, however, to their taking the food which is pure and sacred, a\npriest prays, and it is unlawful for any one prior to the prayer to taste\nof the food. After dinner, likewise, the priest again prays; so that both\nwhen they begin, and when they cease to eat, they venerate divinity.\nAfterwards, divesting themselves of these garments as sacred, they\nagain betake themselves to their work till the evening; and, returning\nfrom thence, they eat and drink in the same manner as before, strangers\nsitting with them, if they should happen at that time to be present. No\nclamour or tumult ever defiles the house in which they dwell; but their\nconversation with each other is performed in an orderly manner; and to\nthose that are out of the house, the silence of those within it appears\nas if it was some terrific mystery. The cause, however, of this quietness\nis their constant sobriety, and that with them their meat and drink\nis measured by what is sufficient [to the wants of nature]. But those\nwho are very desirous of belonging to their sect, are not immediately\nadmitted into it, but they must remain out of it for a year, adopting the\nsame diet, the Ess\u00e6ans giving them a rake, a girdle, and a white garment.\nAnd if, during that time, they have given a sufficient proof of their\ncontinence, they proceed to a still greater conformity to the institutes\nof the sect, and use purer water for the purposes of sanctity; though\nthey are not yet permitted to live with the Ess\u00e6ans. For after this\nexhibition of endurance, their manners are tried for two years more, and\nhe who after this period appears to deserve to associate with them, is\nadmitted into their society.\n\n13. Before, however, he who is admitted touches his common food, he\ntakes a terrible oath, in the first place, that he will piously worship\ndivinity; in the next place, that he will preserve justice towards men,\nand that he will neither designedly, nor when commanded, injure any one;\nin the third place, that he will always hate the unjust, but strenuously\nassist the just; and in the fourth place, that he will act faithfully\ntowards all men, but especially towards the rulers of the land, since\nno one becomes a ruler without the permission of God; in the fifth\nplace, that if he should be a ruler, he will never employ his power\nto insolently iniquitous purposes, nor will surpass those that are in\nsubjection to him in his dress, or any other more splendid ornament; in\nthe sixth place, that he will always love the truth, and be hostile to\nliars; in the seventh place, that he will preserve his hands from theft,\nand his soul pure from unholy gain[97]; and, in the eighth place, that\nhe will conceal nothing from those of his sect, nor divulge any thing\nto others pertaining to the sect, though some one, in order to compel\nhim, should threaten him with death. In addition to these things, also,\nthey swear, that they will not impart the dogmas of the sect to any one\nin any other way than that in which they received them; that they will\nlikewise abstain from robbery[98], and preserve the books of their sect\nwith the same care as the names of the angels. Such, therefore, are\ntheir oaths. But those among them that act criminally, and are ejected,\nperish by an evil destiny. For, being bound by their oaths and their\ncustoms, they are not capable of receiving food from others; but feeding\non herbs, and having their body emaciated by hunger, they perish. Hence\nthe Ess\u00e6ans, commiserating many of these unfortunate men, receive them\nin their last extremities into their society, thinking that they have\nsuffered sufficiently for their offences in having been punished for\nthem till they were on the brink of the grave. But they give a rake to\nthose who intend to belong to their sect, in order that, when they sit\nfor the purpose of exonerating the belly, they may make a trench a foot\nin depth, and completely cover themselves by their garment, in order that\nthey may not act contumeliously towards the sun by polluting the rays of\nthe God. And so great, indeed, is their simplicity and frugality with\nrespect to diet, that they do not require evacuation till the seventh\nday after the assumption of food, which day they spend in singing hymns\nto God, and in resting from labour. But from this exercise they acquire\nthe power of such great endurance, that even when tortured and burnt,\nand suffering every kind of excruciating pain, they cannot be induced\neither to blaspheme their legislator, or to eat what they have not been\naccustomed to. And the truth of this was demonstrated in their war with\nthe Romans. For then they neither flattered their tormentors, nor shed\nany tears, but smiled in the midst of their torments, and derided those\nthat inflicted them, and cheerfully emitted their souls, as knowing that\nthey should possess them again. For this opinion was firmly established\namong them, that their bodies were indeed corruptible, and that the\nmatter of which they consisted was not stable, but that their souls were\nimmortal, and would endure for ever, and that, proceeding from the most\nsubtle ether, they were drawn down by a natural flux, and complicated\nwith bodies; but that, when they are no longer detained by the bonds of\nthe flesh, then, as if liberated from a long slavery, they will rejoice,\nand ascend to the celestial regions. But from this mode of living, and\nfrom being thus exercised in truth and piety, there were many among them,\nas it is reasonable to suppose there would be, who had a foreknowledge of\nfuture events, as being conversant from their youth with sacred books,\ndifferent purifications, and the declarations of the prophets. And such\nis the order [or sect] of the Ess\u00e6ans among the Jews.\n\n14. All of them, however, were forbidden to eat the flesh of swine,\nor fish without scales, which the Greeks call \u03c3\u03b5\u03bb\u03b1\u03c7\u03b9\u03b1, _i.e._\n_cartilaginous_; or to eat any animal that has solid hoofs. They were\nlikewise forbidden not only to refrain from eating, but also from killing\nanimals that fled to their houses as supplicants. Nor did the legislator\npermit them to slay such animals as were parents together with their\nyoung; but ordered them to spare, even in a hostile land, and not put to\ndeath brutes that assist us in our labours. Nor was the legislator afraid\nthat the race of animals which are not sacrificed, would, through being\nspared from slaughter, be so increased in multitude as to produce famine\namong men; for he knew, in the first place, that multiparous animals\nlive but for a short time; and in the next place, that many of them\nperish, unless attention is paid to them by men. Moreover, he likewise\nknew that other animals would attack those that increased excessively;\nof which this is an indication, that we abstain from many animals, such\nas lizards, worms, flies, serpents, and dogs, and yet, at the same time,\nwe are not afraid of perishing through hunger by abstaining from them,\nthough their increase is abundant. And in the next place, it is not the\nsame thing to eat and to slay an animal. For we destroy many of the\nabove-mentioned animals, but we do not eat any of them.\n\n15. Farther still, it is likewise related that the Syrians formerly\nabstained from animals, and, on this account, did not sacrifice them\nto the Gods; but that afterwards they sacrificed them, for the purpose\nof averting certain evils; yet they did not at all admit of a fleshly\ndiet. In process of time, however, as Neanthes the Cyzicenean and\nAsclepiades the Cyprian say, about the era of Pygmalion, who was by birth\na Ph\u0153nician, but reigned over the Cyprians, the eating of flesh was\nadmitted, from an illegality of the following kind, which Asclepiades, in\nhis treatise concerning Cyprus and Ph\u0153nicia, relates as follows:\u2014In the\nfirst place, they did not sacrifice any thing animated to the Gods; but\nneither was there any law pertaining to a thing of this kind, because\nit was prohibited by natural law. They are said, however, on a certain\noccasion, in which one soul was required for another, to have, for the\nfirst time, sacrificed a victim; and this taking place, the whole of the\nvictim was then consumed by fire. But afterwards, when the victim was\nburnt, a portion of the flesh fell on the earth, which was taken by the\npriest, who, in so doing, having burnt his fingers, involuntarily moved\nthem to his mouth, as a remedy for the pain which the burning produced.\nHaving, therefore, thus tasted of the roasted flesh, he also desired to\neat abundantly of it, and could not refrain from giving some of it to his\nwife. Pygmalion, however, becoming acquainted with this circumstance,\nordered both the priest and his wife to be hurled headlong from a steep\nrock, and gave the priesthood to another person, who not long after\nperforming the same sacrifice, and eating the flesh of the victim,\nfell into the same calamities as his predecessor. The thing, however,\nproceeding still farther, and men using the same kind of sacrifice, and\nthrough yielding to desire, not abstaining from, but feeding on flesh,\nthe deed was no longer punished. Nevertheless abstinence from fish\ncontinued among the Syrians till the time of Menander: for he says,\n\n    The Syrians for example take, since these\n    When by intemperance led of fish they eat,\n    Swoln in their belly and their feet become.\n    With sack then cover\u2019d, in the public way\n    They on a dunghill sit, that by their lowly state,\n    The Goddess may, appeas\u2019d, the crime forgive.\n\n16. Among the Persians, indeed, those who are wise in divine concerns,\nand worship divinity, are called Magi; for this is the signification\nof _Magus_, in the Persian tongue. But so great and so venerable are\nthese men thought to be by the Persians, that Darius, the son of\nHystaspes, had among other things this engraved on his tomb, that he\nhad been the master of the Magi. They are likewise divided into three\ngenera, as we are informed by Eubulus, who wrote the history of Mithra,\nin a treatise consisting of many books. In this work he says, that\nthe first and most learned class of the Magi neither eat nor slay any\nthing animated, but adhere to the ancient abstinence from animals. The\nsecond class use some animals indeed [for food], but do not slay any\nthat are tame. Nor do those of the third class, similarly with other\nmen, lay their hands on all animals. For the dogma with all of them\nwhich ranks as the first is this, that there is a transmigration of\nsouls; and this they also appear to indicate in the mysteries of Mithra.\nFor in these mysteries, obscurely signifying our having something in\ncommon with brutes, they are accustomed to call us by the names of\ndifferent animals. Thus they denominate the males who participate in\nthe same mysteries lions, but the females lionesses, and those who are\nministrant to these rites crows. With respect to their fathers also,\nthey adopt the same mode. For these are denominated by them eagles and\nhawks. And he who is initiated in the Leontic mysteries, is invested\nwith all-various forms of animals[99]; of which particulars, Pallas, in\nhis treatise concerning Mithra, assigning the cause, says, that it is\nthe common opinion that these things are to be referred to the circle\nof the zodiac, but that truly and accurately speaking, they obscurely\nsignify something pertaining to human souls, which, according to the\nPersians, are invested with bodies of all-various forms. For the Latins\nalso, says Eubulus, call some men, in their tongue, boars and scorpions,\nlizards, and blackbirds. After the same manner likewise the Persians\ndenominate the Gods the demiurgic causes of these: for they call Diana a\nshe-wolf; but the sun, a bull, a lion, a dragon, and a hawk; and Hecate,\na horse, a bull, a lioness, and a dog. But most theologists say that\nthe name of Proserpine [\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2] is derived from nourishing a\nringdove, [\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf \u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03b2\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd]: for the ringdove is sacred to\nthis Goddess[100]. Hence, also, the priests of Maia dedicate to her a\nringdove. And Maia is the same with Proserpine, as being obstetric, and a\nnurse[101]. For this Goddess is terrestrial, and so likewise is Ceres.\nTo this Goddess, also, a cock is consecrated; and on this account those\nthat are initiated in her mysteries abstain from domestic birds. In the\nEleusinian mysteries, likewise, the initiated are ordered to abstain\nfrom domestic birds, from fishes and beans, pomegranates and apples;\nwhich fruits are as equally defiling to the touch, as a woman recently\ndelivered, and a dead body. But whoever is acquainted with the nature\nof divinely-luminous appearances [\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1,] knows also on what account\nit is requisite to abstain from all birds, and especially for him who\nhastens to be liberated from terrestrial concerns, and to be established\nwith the celestial Gods. Vice, however, as we have frequently said, is\nsufficiently able to patronize itself, and especially when it pleads its\ncause among the ignorant. Hence, among those that are moderately vicious,\nsome think that a dehortation of this kind is vain babbling, and,\naccording to the proverb, the nugacity of old women; and others are of\nopinion that it is superstition. But those who have made greater advances\nin improbity, are prepared, not only to blaspheme those who exhort to,\nand demonstrate the propriety of this abstinence, but calumniate purity\nitself as enchantment and pride. They, however, suffering the punishment\nof their sins, both from Gods and men, are, in the first place,\nsufficiently punished by a disposition [_i.e._ by a depravity] of this\nkind. We shall, therefore, still farther make mention of another foreign\nnation, renowned and just, and believed to be pious in divine concerns,\nand then pass on to other particulars.\n\n17. For the polity of the Indians being distributed into many parts,\nthere is one tribe among them of men divinely wise, whom the Greeks are\naccustomed to call Gymnosophists[102]. But of these there are two sects,\nover one of which the Bramins preside, but over the other the Saman\u00e6ans.\nThe race of the Bramins, however, receive divine wisdom of this kind by\nsuccession, in the same manner as the priesthood. But the Saman\u00e6ans are\nelected, and consist of those who wish to possess divine knowledge. And\nthe particulars respecting them are the following, as the Babylonian\nBardesanes[103] narrates, who lived in the times of our fathers, and\nwas familiar with those Indians who, together with Damadamis, were sent\nto C\u00e6sar. All the Bramins originate from one stock; for all of them are\nderived from one father and one mother. But the Saman\u00e6ans are not the\noffspring of one family, being, as we have said, collected from every\nnation of Indians. A Bramin, however, is not a subject of any government,\nnor does he contribute any thing together with others to government.\nAnd with respect to those that are philosophers, among these some dwell\non mountains, and others about the river Ganges. And those that live on\nmountains feed on autumnal fruits, and on cows\u2019 milk coagulated with\nherbs. But those that reside near the Ganges, live also on autumnal\nfruits, which are produced in abundance about that river. The land\nlikewise nearly always bears new fruit, together with much rice, which\ngrows spontaneously, and which they use when there is a deficiency of\nautumnal fruits. But to taste of any other nutriment, or, in short,\nto touch animal food, is considered by them as equivalent to extreme\nimpurity and impiety. And this is one of their dogmas. They also worship\ndivinity with piety and purity. They spend the day, and the greater part\nof the night, in hymns and prayers to the Gods; each of them having a\ncottage to himself, and living, as much as possible, alone. For the\nBramins cannot endure to remain with others, nor to speak much; but when\nthis happens to take place, they afterwards withdraw themselves, and do\nnot speak for many days. They likewise frequently fast. But the Saman\u00e6ans\nare, as we have said, elected. When, however, any one is desirous of\nbeing enrolled in their order, he proceeds to the rulers of the city; but\nabandons the city or village that he inhabited, and the wealth and all\nthe other property that he possessed. Having likewise the superfluities\nof his body cut off, he receives a garment, and departs to the Saman\u00e6ans,\nbut does not return either to his wife or children, if he happens to\nhave any, nor does he pay any attention to them, or think that they at\nall pertain to him. And, with respect to his children indeed, the king\nprovides what is necessary for them, and the relatives provide for the\nwife. And such is the life of the Saman\u00e6ans. But they live out of the\ncity, and spend the whole day in conversation pertaining to divinity.\nThey have also houses and temples, built by the king, in which there are\nstewards, who receive a certain emolument from the king, for the purpose\nof supplying those that dwell in them with nutriment. But their food\nconsists of rice, bread, autumnal fruits, and pot-herbs. And when they\nenter into their house, the sound of a bell being the signal of their\nentrance, those that are not Saman\u00e6ans depart from it, and the Saman\u00e6ans\nbegin immediately to pray. But having prayed, again, on the bell sounding\nas a signal, the servants give to each Saman\u00e6an a platter, (for two of\nthem do not eat out of the same dish,) and feed them with rice. And to\nhim who is in want of a variety of food, a pot-herb is added, or some\nautumnal fruit. But having eaten as much as is requisite, without any\ndelay they proceed to their accustomed employments. All of them likewise\nare unmarried, and have no possessions: and so much are both these and\nthe Bramins venerated by the other Indians, that the king also visits\nthem, and requests them to pray to and supplicate the Gods, when any\ncalamity befals the country, or to advise him how to act.\n\n18. But they are so disposed with respect to death, that they unwillingly\nendure the whole time of the present life, as a certain servitude to\nnature, and therefore they hasten to liberate their souls from the bodies\n[with which they are connected]. Hence frequently, when they are seen\nto be well, and are neither oppressed, nor driven to desperation by any\nevil, they depart from life. And though they previously announce to\nothers that it is their intention to commit suicide, yet no one impedes\nthem; but, proclaiming all those to be happy who thus quit the present\nlife, they enjoin certain things to the domestics and kindred of the\ndead: so stable and true do they, and also the multitude, believe the\nassertion to be, that souls [in another life] associate with each other.\nBut as soon as those to whom they have proclaimed that this is their\nintention, have heard the mandates given to them, they deliver the body\nto fire, in order that they may separate the soul from the body in the\npurest manner, and thus they die celebrated by all the Saman\u00e6ans. For\nthese men dismiss their dearest friends to death more easily than others\npart with their fellow-citizens when going the longest journeys. And they\nlament themselves, indeed, as still continuing in life; but they proclaim\nthose that are dead to be blessed, in consequence of having now obtained\nan immortal allotment. Nor is there any sophist, such as there is now\namongst the Greeks, either among these Saman\u00e6ans, or the above-mentioned\nBramins, who would be seen to doubt and to say, if all men should imitate\nyou [_i.e._ should imitate those Saman\u00e6ans who commit suicide], what\nwould become of us? Nor through these are human affairs confused. For\nneither do all men imitate them, and those who have, may be said to\nhave been rather the causes of equitable legislation, than of confusion\nto the different nations of men. Moreover, the law did not compel the\nSaman\u00e6ans and Bramins to eat animal food, but, permitting others to feed\non flesh, it suffered these to be a law to themselves, and venerated\nthem as being superior to law. Nor did the law subject these men to the\npunishment which it inflicts, as if they were the primary perpetrators of\ninjustice, but it reserved this for others. Hence, to those who ask, what\nwould be the consequence if all men imitated such characters as these,\nthe saying of Pythagoras must be the answer; that if all men were kings,\nthe passage through life would be difficult, yet regal government is not\non this account to be avoided. And [we likewise say] that if all men were\nworthy, no administration of a polity would be found in which the dignity\nthat probity merits would be preserved. Nevertheless, no one would be\nso insane as not to think that all men should earnestly endeavour to\nbecome worthy characters. Indeed, the law grants to the vulgar many\nother things [besides a fleshly diet], which, nevertheless, it does not\ngrant to a philosopher, nor even to one who conducts the affairs of\ngovernment in a proper manner. For it does not receive every artist into\nthe administration, though it does not forbid the exercise of any art,\nnor yet men of every pursuit. But it excludes those who are occupied in\nvile and illiberal arts[104], and, in short, all those who are destitute\nof justice and the other virtues, from having any thing to do with the\nmanagement of public affairs. Thus, likewise, the law does not forbid\nthe vulgar from associating with harlots, on whom at the same time it\nimposes a fine; but thinks that it is disgraceful and base for men that\nare moderately good to have any connexion with them. Moreover, the law\ndoes not prohibit a man from spending the whole of his life in a tavern,\nyet at the same time this is most disgraceful even to a man of moderate\nworth. It appears, therefore, that the same thing must also be said with\nrespect to diet. For that which is permitted to the multitude, must not\nlikewise be granted to the best of men. For the man who is a philosopher,\nshould especially ordain for himself those sacred laws which the Gods,\nand men who are followers of the Gods, have instituted. But the sacred\nlaws of nations and cities appear to have ordained for sacred men purity,\nand to have interdicted them animal food. They have also forbidden the\nmultitude to eat certain animals, either from motives of piety, or on\naccount of some injury which would be produced by the food. So that it is\nrequisite either to imitate priests, or to be obedient to the mandates of\nall legislators; but, in either way, he who is perfectly legal and pious\nought to abstain from all animals. For if some who are only partially\npious abstain from certain animals, he who is in every respect pious will\nabstain from all animals.\n\n19. I had almost, however, forgotten to adduce what is said by Euripides,\nwho asserts, that the prophets of Jupiter in Crete abstained from\nanimals. But what is said by the chorus to Minos on this subject, is as\nfollows:\n\n    Sprung from Ph\u0153nicia\u2019s royal line,\n    Son of Europa, nymph divine,\n    And mighty Jove, thy envy\u2019d reign\n    O\u2019er Crete extending, whose domain\n    Is with a hundred cities crown\u2019d\u2014\n    I leave yon consecrated ground,\n    Yon fane, whose beams the artist\u2019s toil\n    With cypress, rooted from the soil,\n    Hath fashion\u2019d. In the mystic rites\n    Initiated, life\u2019s best delights\n    I place in chastity alone,\n    Midst Night\u2019s dread orgies wont to rove,\n    The priest of Zagreus[105] and of Jove;\n    Feasts of crude flesh I now decline,\n    And wave aloof the blazing pine\n    To Cybele, nor fear to claim\n    Her own Curete\u2019s hallow\u2019d name;\n    Clad in a snowy vest I fly\n    Far from the throes of pregnancy,\n    Never amidst the tombs intrude,\n    And slay no animal for food.\n\n20. For holy men were of opinion that purity consisted in a thing not\nbeing mingled with its contrary, and that mixture is defilement. Hence,\nthey thought that nutriment should be assumed from fruits, and not\nfrom dead bodies, and that we should not, by introducing that which\nis animated to our nature, defile what is administered by nature. But\nthey conceived, that the slaughter of animals, as they are sensitive,\nand the depriving them of their souls, is a defilement to the living;\nand that the pollution is much greater, to mingle a body which was once\nsensitive, but is now deprived of sense, with a sensitive and living\nbeing. Hence universally, the purity pertaining to piety consists in\nrejecting and abstaining from many things, and in an abandonment of\nsuch as are of a contrary nature, and the assumption of such as are\nappropriate and concordant. On this account, venereal connexions are\nattended with defilement. For in these, a conjunction takes place of\nthe female with the male; and the seed, when retained by the woman, and\ncausing her to be pregnant, defiles the soul, through its association\nwith the body; but when it does not produce conception, it pollutes, in\nconsequence of becoming a lifeless mass. The connexion also of males with\nmales defiles, because it is an emission of seed as it were into a dead\nbody, and because it is contrary to nature. And, in short, all venery,\nand emissions of the seed in sleep, pollute, because the soul becomes\nmingled with the body, and is drawn down to pleasure. The passions of\nthe soul likewise defile, through the complication of the irrational\nand effeminate part with reason, the internal masculine part. For, in a\ncertain respect, defilement and pollution manifest the mixture of things\nof an heterogeneous nature, and especially when the abstersion of this\nmixture is attended with difficulty. Whence, also, in tinctures which are\nproduced through mixture, one species being complicated with another,\nthis mixture is denominated a defilement.\n\n    As when some woman with a lively red\n    Stains the pure iv\u2019ry\u2014\u2014\n\nsays Homer[106]. And again, painters call the mixtures of colours,\ncorruptions. It is usual, likewise, to denominate that which is unmingled\nand pure, incorruptible, and to call that which is genuine, unpolluted.\nFor water, when mingled with earth, is corrupted, and is not genuine.\nBut water which is diffluent, and runs with tumultuous rapidity, leaves\nbehind in its course the earth which it carries in its stream.\n\n    When from a limpid and perennial fount\n    It defluous runs\u2014\u2014\n\nas Hesiod says[107]. For such water is salubrious, because it is\nuncorrupted and unmixed. The female, likewise, that does not receive\ninto herself the exhalation of seed, is said to be uncorrupted. So that\nthe mixture of contraries is corruption and defilement. For the mixture\nof dead with living bodies, and the insertion of beings that were once\nliving and sentient into animals, and of dead into living flesh, may be\nreasonably supposed to introduce defilement and stains to our nature;\njust, again, as the soul is polluted when it is invested with the body.\nHence, he who is born, is polluted by the mixture of his soul with body;\nand he who dies, defiles his body, through leaving it a corpse, different\nand foreign from that which possesses life. The soul, likewise, is\npolluted by anger and desire, and the multitude of passions of which in\na certain respect diet is a co-operating cause. But as water which flows\nthrough a rock is more uncorrupted than that which runs through marshes,\nbecause it does not bring with it much mud; thus, also, the soul which\nadministers its own affairs in a body that is dry, and is not moistened\nby the juices of foreign flesh, is in a more excellent condition, is\nmore uncorrupted, and is more prompt for intellectual energy. Thus too,\nit is said, that the thyme which is the driest and the sharpest to the\ntaste, affords the best honey to bees. The diano\u00ebtic, therefore, or\ndiscursive power of the soul, is polluted; or rather, he who energizes\ndiano\u00ebtically, when this energy is mingled with the energies of either\nthe imaginative or doxastic power. But purification consists in a\nseparation from all these, and the wisdom which is adapted to divine\nconcerns, is a desertion of every thing of this kind. The proper\nnutriment, likewise, of each thing, is that which essentially preserves\nit. Thus you may say, that the nutriment of a stone is the cause of its\ncontinuing to be a stone, and of firmly remaining in a lapideous form;\nbut the nutriment of a plant is that which preserves it in increase\nand fructification; and of an animated body, that which preserves its\ncomposition. It is one thing, however, to nourish, and another to fatten;\nand one thing to impart what is necessary, and another to procure what is\nluxurious. Various, therefore, are the kinds of nutriment, and various\nalso is the nature of the things that are nourished. And it is necessary,\nindeed, that all things should be nourished, but we should earnestly\nendeavour to fatten our most principal parts. Hence, the nutriment of\nthe rational soul is that which preserves it in a rational state. But\nthis is intellect; so that it is to be nourished by intellect; and we\nshould earnestly endeavour that it may be fattened through this, rather\nthan that the flesh may become pinguid through esculent substances. For\nintellect preserves for us eternal life, but the body when fattened\ncauses the soul to be famished, through its hunger after a blessed life\nnot being satisfied, increases our mortal part, since it is of itself\ninsane, and impedes our attainment of an immortal condition of being.\nIt likewise defiles by corporifying the soul, and drawing her down to\nthat which is foreign to her nature. And the magnet, indeed, imparts,\nas it were, a soul to the iron which is placed near it; and the iron,\nthough most heavy, is elevated, and runs to the spirit of the stone.\nShould he, therefore, who is suspended from incorporeal and intellectual\ndeity, be anxiously busied in procuring food which fattens the body,\nthat is an impediment to intellectual perception? Ought he not rather,\nby contracting what is necessary to the flesh into that which is little\nand easily procured, be _himself_ nourished, by adhering to God more\nclosely than the iron to the magnet? I wish, indeed, that our nature\nwas not so corruptible, and that it were possible we could live free\nfrom molestation, even without the nutriment derived from fruits. O\nthat, as Homer[108] says, we were not in want either of meat or drink,\nthat we might be truly immortal!\u2014the poet in thus speaking beautifully\nsignifying, that food is the auxiliary not only of life, but also of\ndeath. If, therefore, we were not in want even of vegetable aliment, we\nshould be by so much the more blessed, in proportion as we should be more\nimmortal. But now, being in a mortal condition, we render ourselves, if\nit be proper so to speak, still more mortal, through becoming ignorant\nthat, by the addition of this mortality, the soul, as Theophrastus says,\ndoes not only confer a great benefit on the body by being its inhabitant,\nbut gives herself wholly to it[109]. Hence, it is much to be wished\nthat we could easily obtain the life celebrated in fables, in which\nhunger and thirst are unknown; so that, by stopping the every-way-flowing\nriver of the body, we might in a very little time be present with the\nmost excellent natures, to which he who accedes, since deity is there,\nis himself a God. But how is it possible not to lament the condition of\nthe generality of mankind, who are so involved in darkness as to cherish\ntheir own evil, and who, in the first place, hate themselves, and him\nwho truly begot them, and afterwards, those who admonish them, and call\non them to return from ebriety to a sober condition of being? Hence,\ndismissing things of this kind, will it not be requisite to pass on to\nwhat remains to be discussed?\n\n21. Those then who oppose the Nomades, or Troglodyt\u00e6[110], or\nIchthyophagi, to the legal institutes of the nations which we have\nadduced, are ignorant that these people were brought to the necessity of\neating animals through the infecundity of the region they inhabit, which\nis so barren, that it does not even produce herbs, but only shores and\nsands. And this necessity is indicated by their not being able to make\nuse of fire, through the want of combustible materials; but they dry\ntheir fish on rocks, or on the shore. And these indeed live after this\nmanner from necessity. There are, however, certain nations whose manners\nare rustic, and who are naturally savage; but it is not fit that those\nwho are equitable judges should, from such instances as these, calumniate\nhuman nature. For thus we should not only be dubious whether it is proper\nto eat animals, but also, whether we may not eat men, and adopt all\nother savage manners. It is related, therefore, that the Massaget\u00e6 and\nthe Derbices consider those of their kindred to be most miserable who\ndie spontaneously. Hence, preventing their dearest friends from dying\nnaturally, they slay them when they are old, and eat them. The Tibareni\nhurl from rocks their nearest relatives, even while living, when they\nare old. And with respect to the Hyrcani and Caspii, the one exposed the\nliving, but the other the dead, to be devoured by birds and dogs. But\nthe Scythians bury the living with the dead, and cut their throats on\nthe pyres of the dead by whom they were especially beloved. The Bactrii\nlikewise cast those among them that are old, even while living, to the\ndogs. And Stasanor, who was one of Alexander\u2019s prefects, nearly lost his\ngovernment through endeavouring to destroy this custom. As, however, we\ndo not on account of these examples subvert mildness of conduct towards\nmen, so neither should we imitate those nations that feed on flesh\nthrough necessity, but we should rather imitate the pious, and those who\nconsecrate themselves to the Gods. For Democrates[111] says, that to live\nbadly, and not prudently, temperately, and piously, is not to live in\nreality[112], but to die for a long time.\n\n22. It now remains that we should adduce a few examples of certain\nindividuals, as testimonies in favour of abstinence from animal food.\nFor the want of these was one of the accusations which were urged\nagainst us. We learn, therefore, that Triptolemus was the most ancient\nof the Athenian legislators; of whom Hermippus[113], in the second book\nof his treatise on Legislators, writes as follows: \u201cIt is said, that\nTriptolemus established laws for the Athenians. And the philosopher\nXenocrates asserts, that three of his laws still remain in Eleusis,\nwhich are these, Honour your parents; Sacrifice to the Gods from the\nfruits of the earth; Injure not animals.\u201d Two of these, therefore, he\nsays, are properly instituted. For it is necessary that we should as\nmuch as possible recompense our parents for the benefits which they have\nconferred on us; and that we should offer to the Gods the first-fruits\nof the things useful to our life, which they have imparted to us. But\nwith respect to the third law, he is dubious as to the intention of\nTriptolemus, in ordering the Athenians to abstain from animals. Was\nit, says he, because he thought it was a dire thing to slay kindred\nnatures, or because he perceived it would happen, that the most useful\nanimals would be destroyed by men for food? Wishing, therefore, to make\nour life as mild as possible, he endeavoured to preserve those animals\nthat associate with men, and which are especially tame. Unless, indeed,\nbecause having ordained that men should honour the Gods by offering to\nthem first-fruits, he therefore added this third law, conceiving that\nthis mode of worship would continue for a longer time, if sacrifices\nthrough animals were not made to the Gods. But as many other causes,\nthough not very accurate, of the promulgation of these laws, are assigned\nby Xenocrates, thus much from what has been said is sufficient for our\npurpose, that abstinence from animals was one of the legal institutes\nof Triptolemus. Hence, those who afterwards violated this law, being\ncompelled by great necessity, and involuntary errors, fell, as we\nhave shown, into this custom of slaughtering and eating animals. The\nfollowing, also, is mentioned as a law of Draco: \u201cLet this be an eternal\n_sacred law_[114] to the inhabitants of Attica, and let its authority\nbe predominant for ever; viz. that the Gods, and indigenous Heroes, be\nworshipped publicly, conformably to the laws of the country, delivered by\nour ancestors; and also, that they be worshipped privately, according to\nthe ability of each individual, in conjunction with auspicious words, the\nfirstlings of fruits, and annual cakes. So that this law ordains, that\ndivinity should be venerated by the first offerings of fruits which are\nused by men, and cakes made of the fine flour of wheat.\u201d[115]\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[84] There were many celebrated men of this name among the ancients,\nconcerning which vid. Fabric. Biblioth. Gr\u00e6c. L. III. c. 11.\n\n[85] These lines are from Hesiod. Oper. 116. The different ages, however,\nof mankind, which are celebrated by Hesiod in his Works and Days,\nsignify the different lives which the individuals of the human species\npass through; and as Proclus on Hesiod beautifully observes, they may\nbe comprehended in this triad, the _golden_, the _silver_, and the\n_brazen_ age. But by the _golden_ age an intellectual life is implied.\nFor such a life is pure, impassive, and free from sorrow; and of this\nimpassivity and purity, gold is an image, through never being subject to\nrust or putrefaction. Such a life, too, is very properly said to be under\nSaturn, because Saturn is an _intellectual_ God, or a God characterised\nby intellect. By the _silver_ age, a rustic and natural life is implied,\nin which the attention of the rational soul is entirely directed to the\ncare of the body, but without proceeding to extreme depravity. And by\nthe _brazen_ age, a dire, tyrannic, and cruel life is implied, which is\nentirely passive, and proceeds to the very extremity of vice. The order,\nalso, of these metals, harmonizes, as Proclus observes, with that of the\nlives. \u201cFor,\u201d says he, \u201c_gold_ is _solar-form_, because the sun is solely\nimmaterial light. But _silver_ is _lunar-form_, because the moon partakes\nof shadow, just as silver partakes of rust. And _brass_ is _earthly_, so\nfar as not having a nature similar to a lucid body; it is replete with\nabundance of corruption.\u201d\n\n[86] The medimnus was a measure containing six bushels.\n\n[87] An Attic measure, containing six Attic pints.\n\n[88] In the original, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u1fb3 \u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b2\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2. But the\nlatter part of this sentence is evidently defective, though the defect\nis not noticed either by Valentinus, or Reiske, or Rhoer. It appears\ntherefore to me, that \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03c5\u03c6\u03b7\u03c2 is wanting; so that for \u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b2\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2,\nwe should read \u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03c5\u03c6\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b2\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2. And my conjecture is justified\nby the version of Felicianus, which is, \u201cHuic autem abstinentiam, c\u00e6teris\n_luxuriam_ victus fuisse peculiarem perspicuum est.\u201d\n\n[89] Those who, in being initiated, _closed the eyes_, which _muesis_\nsignifies, no longer (says Hermias in Ph\u00e6drum) received by sense those\ndivine mysteries, but with the pure soul itself. See my Dissertation on\nthe Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries.\n\n[90] In the original, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2; but for \u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 I read\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, and Felicianus appears to have found the same reading in his MS.;\nfor his version is, \u201claboribusque humanis.\u201d Neither Reisk, however, nor\nRhoer, have at all noticed the word \u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 as improper in this place.\n\n[91] Much is related about the Egyptian priests by Herodotus, lib. ii.\n37. With respect to Ch\u00e6remon, the decisions of the ancients concerning\nhim are very discordant.\n\n[92] _i.e._ Those to whose care the sacred vestments were committed.\n\n[93] These were so denominated from carrying the little receptacles in\nwhich the images of the Gods were contained.\n\n[94] See on this subject Plutarch\u2019s excellent treatise of Isis and Osiris.\n\n[95] Fabricius is of opinion, that this _Euphantus_ is the same with\nthe _Ecphantus_ mentioned by Iamblichus (in Vit. Pyth.) as one of the\nPythagoreans. Vid. Fabric. Bibl. Gr\u00e6c. lib. ii. c. 13.\n\n[96] This is not wonderful; for the Jews appear to have been always\nnegligent of cleanliness. The intelligent reader will easily perceive\nthat there is some similitude between these Ess\u00e6ans and the ancient\nPythagoreans, but that the latter were infinitely superior to the former.\nSee my translation of Iamblichus\u2019 Life of Pythagoras.\n\n[97] This was a very necessary oath for these Ess\u00e6ans to take; as the\nJews in general, if we may believe Tacitus and other ancient historians,\nwere always a people immoderately addicted to gain.\n\n[98] As the Ess\u00e6ans appear to have been an exception to the rest of the\nJews, the reason is obvious why they took this oath.\n\n[99] Similar to this was the garment with which Apuleius was invested\nafter his initiation into the mysteries of Isis, and which he describes\nas follows:\u2014\u201cThere [_i.e._ on a wooden throne] I sat conspicuous, in a\ngarment which was indeed linen, but was elegantly painted. A precious\ncloak also depended from my shoulders behind my back, as far as to my\nheels. Nevertheless, to whatever part of me you directed your view,\nyou might see that I was remarkable by the animals which were painted\nround my vestment, in various colours. Here were Indian dragons, there\nHyperborean griffins, which the other hemisphere generates in the form of\na winged animal. Men devoted to the service of divinity, call this cloak\nthe Olympic garment.\u201d\u2014See Book II. of my translation of the Metamorphosis\nof Apuleius.\n\n[100] Proclus, however, in his Scholia on the Cratylus of Plato, gives\na much more theological account of the derivation of the name of\nProserpine, as follows:\u2014\u201cSocrates now delivers these three vivific monads\nin a consequent order, viz. Ceres, Juno, Proserpine; calling the first\nthe mother, the second the sister, and the third the daughter of the\nDemiurgus [Jupiter]. All of them, however, are partakers of the whole\nof fabrication; the first in an exempt manner, and intellectually; the\nsecond in a fontal manner, and, at the same time, in a way adapted to a\nprinciple [\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03c2]; and the third in a manner adapted to a principle and\na leader [\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b7\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03c2].\n\n\u201cOf these Goddesses the last is allotted triple powers, and impartibly\nand uniformly comprehends three monads of Gods. But she is called Core\n[\u03ba\u03bf\u03c1\u03b7] through the purity of her essence, and her undefiled transcendency\nin her generations. She also possesses a first, middle, and last empire;\nand according to her summit, indeed, she is called Diana by Orpheus; but,\naccording to her middle, Proserpine; and according to the extremity of\nthe order, Minerva. Likewise, according to an essence transcending the\nother powers of this triple vivific order, the dominion of Hecate is\nestablished; but according to a middle power, and which is generative\nof wholes, that of soul; and, according to intellectual conversion,\nthat of Virtue[A]. Ceres, therefore, subsisting on high, and among the\nsupermundane Gods, uniformly extends this triple order of divinities;\nand, together with Jupiter, generates Bacchus, who impartibly presides\nover partible fabrication. But beneath, in conjunction with Pluto, she\nis particularly beheld according to the middle characteristic: for it is\nthis which, proceeding every where, imparts vivification to the last of\nthings. Hence she is called Proserpine, because she especially associates\nwith Pluto, and, together with him, distributes in an orderly manner the\nextremities of the universe. And, according to her extremities, indeed,\nshe is said to be a virgin, and to remain undefiled; but, according to\nher middle, to be conjoined with Hades, and to beget the Furies in the\nsubterranean regions. She, therefore, is also called Ceres, but after\nanother manner than the supermundane and ruling Ceres. For the one is\nthe connective unity of the three vivific principles; but the other\nis the middle of them, in herself possessing the peculiarities of the\nextremes. Hence, in the Proserpine conjoined with Pluto, you will find\nthe peculiarities of Hecate and Minerva; but these extremes subsist in\nher occultly, while the peculiarity of the middle shines forth, and that\nwhich is characteristic of ruling soul, which in the supermundane Ceres\nwas of a _ruling_[B] nature, but here subsists according to a mundane\npeculiarity.\u201d\n\nProclus farther observes, \u201cthat Proserpine is denominated either through\njudging of forms, and separating them from each other, thus obscurely\nsignifying the subversion of slaughter[C], (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b7, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c6\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03b9\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd,) or through\nseparating souls perfectly from bodies, through a conversion to things\non high, which is the most fortunate slaughter and death to such as are\nworthy of it. (\u1f22 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b5\u03ba \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1 \u03b1\u03bd\u03c9 \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03b7\u03c2, \u03bf\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c6\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b1\u03be\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5.) But the name \u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1, _Pherephatta_, is adapted\nto Proserpine, according to a contact with generation; but according\nto wisdom and counsel, to Minerva. At the same time, however, all the\nappellations by which she is distinguished, are adapted to the perfection\nof soul. On this account, also, she is called Proserpine, and not by the\nnames of the extremes; since that which was ravished by Pluto, is this\nmiddle deity; the extremes at the same time being firmly established in\nthemselves; according to which Ceres is said to remain a virgin.\u201d\n\n[A] Proclus says this conformably to the theology of the Chaldeans; for,\naccording to that theology, the first monad of the vivific triad is\n_Hecate_, the second _Soul_, and the third _Virtue_.\n\n[B] That is, of a supermundane nature; for the _ruling_ are the\n_supermundane_ Gods.\n\n[C] Proclus here alludes to the war which subsists among forms through\ntheir union with matter, and which Proserpine subverts by separating them\nfrom each other.\n\n[101] The first subsistence of Maia, who, according to the Orphic\ntheology, is the same with the Goddess Night, is at the summit of _the\nintelligible, and at the same time intellectual_ order, and is wholly\nabsorbed in the intelligible. As we are also informed by Proclus (in\nCratylum), \u201cShe is the paradigm of Ceres. For immortal Night is the\nnurse of the Gods [according to Orpheus]. Night, however, is the cause\nof aliment intelligibly: for the intelligible is, as the Chaldean Oracle\nsays, the aliment of the intellectual orders of Gods. But Ceres, first\nof all, separates the two kinds of aliment [nectar and ambrosia] in the\nGods.\u201d He adds, \u201cHence our sovereign mistress [\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1], Ceres, not only\ngenerates life, but that which gives perfection to life; and this from\nsupernal natures, to such as are last. For _virtue is the perfection of\nsouls_.\u201d\n\n[102] Concerning the Indian philosophers, see the second book of Diodorus\nSiculus.\n\n[103] This is the Bardesanes who lived in the time of Marcus Antoninus,\nand who wrote a treatise on the Lake of Probation in India, which is\nmentioned by Porphyry in his fragment De Styge, preserved by Stob\u00e6us.\n\n[104] \u0392\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03c5\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9, _i.e._ dirty mechanics and bellows-blowers,\nan appellation by which Plato in his Rivals designates the\n_experimentalists_.\n\n[105] Zagreus is an epithet of Bacchus. Wodhull, however, from whose\ntranslation of Euripides the above lines are taken, is greatly mistaken\nin saying, that \u201cit is evident from the hymns of Orpheus that Zagreus\nwas a name given to Bacchus at his sacred rites.\u201d For the word \u0396\u03b1\u03b3\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03c2\n(Zagreus) is not to be found either in the hymns of Orpheus, or in any\nother of the Orphic writings that are extant.\n\n[106] Iliad, IV. v. 141.\n\n[107] Oper. et Dies, 595.\n\n[108] Iliad, V. v. 341.\n\n[109] In the original, \u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u03c6\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c4\u1ff3\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7\u03c2, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. But for \u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, it appears\nto me to be necessary to read, \u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[110] Vid. Diod. Sic. lib. iii. 32.\n\n[111] Reisk says, that he does not know who this Democrates is; but there\ncan, I think, be no doubt of its being the Pythagorean of that name,\nwhose Golden Sentences are extant in the Opuscula Mythologica of Gale, of\nwhich see Mr. Bridgman\u2019s translation.\n\n[112] In the original, \u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc3\u03bd \u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. But for \u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03c9\u03c2, I read, \u03bf\u03c5\u03ba\n\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2. For without this emendation, Democrates will contradict himself.\n\n[113] This Hermippus is also cited by Diogenes Laertius in Pyth.\n\n[114] In the original, \u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, which, as we are informed by Proclus,\nsignifies _divine order, and a uniform boundary_.\n\n[115] This book is evidently imperfect, because there are wanting at the\nend examples of illustrious Greeks and Romans, who, from the most remote\nantiquity, abstained from animal food. And this was also obvious to Reisk.\n\n\n\n\nON THE CAVE OF THE NYMPHS, IN THE THIRTEENTH BOOK OF THE ODYSSEY.\n\n\n1. What does Homer obscurely signify by the cave in Ithaca, which he\ndescribes in the following verses?\n\n    \u201cHigh at the head a branching olive grows,\n    And crowns the pointed cliffs with shady boughs.\n    A cavern pleasant, though involv\u2019d in night,\n    Beneath it lies, the Naiades\u2019 delight:\n    Where bowls and urns of workmanship divine\n    And massy beams in native marble shine;\n    On which the Nymphs amazing webs display,\n    Of purple hue, and exquisite array.\n    The busy bees within the urns secure\n    Honey delicious, and like nectar pure.\n    Perpetual waters through the grotto glide,\n    A lofty gate unfolds on either side;\n    That to the north is pervious to mankind;\n    The sacred south t\u2019 immortals is consign\u2019d.\u201d\n\nThat the poet, indeed, does not narrate these particulars from historical\ninformation, is evident from this, that those who have given us a\ndescription of the island, have, as Cronius[116] says, made no mention\nof such a cave being found in it. This likewise, says he, is manifest,\nthat it would be absurd for Homer to expect, that in describing a cave\nfabricated merely by poetical license, and thus artificially opening a\npath to Gods and men in the region of Ithaca, he should gain the belief\nof mankind. And it is equally absurd to suppose, that nature herself\nshould point out, in this place, one path for the descent of all mankind,\nand again another path for all the Gods. For, indeed, the whole world is\nfull of Gods and men: but it is impossible to be persuaded, that in the\nIthacensian cave men descend, and Gods ascend. Cronius, therefore, having\npremised thus much, says, that it is evident, not only to the wise but\nalso to the vulgar, that the poet, under the veil of allegory, conceals\nsome mysterious signification; thus compelling others to explore what\nthe gate of men is, and also what is the gate of the Gods: what he means\nby asserting that this cave of the Nymphs has two gates; and why it is\nboth pleasant and obscure, since darkness is by no means delightful,\nbut is rather productive of aversion and horror. Likewise, what is the\nreason why it is not simply said to be the cave of the Nymphs, but it is\naccurately added, of the Nymphs which are called Naiades? Why, also, is\nthe cave represented as containing bowls and amphor\u00e6, when no mention is\nmade of their receiving any liquor, but bees are said to deposit their\nhoney in these vessels as in hives? Then, again, why are oblong beams\nadapted to weaving placed here for the Nymphs; and these not formed from\nwood, or any other pliable matter, but from stone, as well as the amphor\u00e6\nand bowls? Which last circumstance is, indeed, less obscure; but that, on\nthese stony beams, the Nymphs should weave purple garments, is not only\nwonderful to the sight, but also to the auditory sense. For who would\nbelieve that Goddesses weave garments in a cave involved in darkness,\nand on stony beams; especially while he hears the poet asserting, that\nthe purple webs of the Goddesses were visible. In addition to these\nthings likewise, this is admirable, that the cave should have a twofold\nentrance; one made for the descent of men, but the other for the ascent\nof Gods. And again, that the gate, which is pervious by men, should be\nsaid to be turned towards the north wind, but the portal of the Gods to\nthe south; and why the poet did not rather make use of the west and the\neast for this purpose; since nearly all temples have their statues and\nentrances turned towards the east; but those who enter them look towards\nthe west, when standing with their faces turned towards the statues,\nthey honour and worship the Gods. Hence, since this narration is full of\nsuch obscurities, it can neither be a fiction casually devised for the\npurpose of procuring delight, nor an exposition of a topical history; but\nsomething allegorical must be indicated in it by the poet, who likewise\nmystically places an olive near the cave. All which particulars the\nancients thought very laborious to investigate and unfold; and we, with\ntheir assistance, shall now endeavour to develope the secret meaning\nof the allegory. Those persons, therefore, appear to have written very\nnegligently about the situation of the place, who think that the cave,\nand what is narrated concerning it, are nothing more than a fiction of\nthe poet. But the best and most accurate writers of geography, and among\nthese Artemidorus the Ephesian, in the fifth book of his work, which\nconsists of eleven books, thus writes: \u201cThe island of Ithaca, containing\nan extent of eighty-five stadia[117], is distant from Panormus, a port\nof Cephalenia, about twelve stadia. It has a port named Phorcys, in\nwhich there is a shore, and on that shore a cave, in which the Ph\u00e6acians\nare reported to have placed Ulysses.\u201d This cave, therefore, will not be\nentirely an Homeric fiction. But whether the poet describes it as it\nreally is, or whether he has added something to it of his own invention,\nnevertheless the same inquiries remain; whether the intention of the\npoet is investigated, or of those who founded the cave. For, neither did\nthe ancients establish temples without fabulous symbols, nor does Homer\nrashly narrate the particulars pertaining to things of this kind. But how\nmuch the more any one endeavours to show that this description of the\ncave is not an Homeric fiction, but prior to Homer was consecrated to the\nGods, by so much the more will this consecrated cave be found to be full\nof ancient wisdom. And on this account it deserves to be investigated,\nand it is requisite that its symbolical consecration should be amply\nunfolded into light.\n\n2. The ancients, indeed, very properly consecrated a cave to the world,\nwhether assumed collectively, according to the whole of itself, or\nseparately, according to its parts. Hence they considered earth as a\nsymbol of that matter of which the world consists; on which account\nsome thought that matter and earth are the same; through the cave\nindicating the world, which was generated from matter. For caves are,\nfor the most part, spontaneous productions, and connascent with the\nearth, being comprehended by one uniform mass of stone; the interior\nparts of which are concave, but the exterior parts are extended over an\nindefinite portion of land. And the world being spontaneously produced,\n[_i.e._ being produced by no external, but from an internal cause,]\nand being also self-adherent, is allied to matter; which, according to\na secret signification, is denominated a stone and a rock, on account\nof its sluggish and repercussive nature with respect to form: the\nancients, at the same time, asserting that matter is infinite through\nits privation of form. Since, however, it is continually flowing, and\nis of itself destitute of the supervening investments of form, through\nwhich it participates of _morphe_[118], and becomes visible, the flowing\nwaters, darkness, or, as the poet says, obscurity of the cavern, were\nconsidered by the ancients as apt symbols of what the world contains,\non account of the matter with which it is connected. Through matter,\ntherefore, the world is obscure and dark; but through the connecting\npower, and orderly distribution of form, from which also it is called\n_world_, it is beautiful and delightful. Hence it may very properly be\ndenominated a cave; as being lovely, indeed, to him who first enters into\nit, through its participation of forms, but obscure to him who surveys\nits foundation, and examines it with an intellectual eye. So that its\nexterior and superficial parts, indeed, are pleasant, but its interior\nand profound parts are obscure, [and its very bottom is darkness itself].\nThus also the Persians, mystically signifying the descent of the soul\ninto the sublunary regions, and its regression from it, initiate the\nmystic [or him who is admitted to the arcane sacred rites] in a place\nwhich they denominate a cavern. For, as Eubulus says, Zoroaster was\nthe first who consecrated, in the neighbouring mountains of Persia, a\nspontaneously produced cave, florid, and having fountains, in honour\nof Mithra, the maker and father of all things; a cave, according to\nZoroaster, bearing a resemblance of the world, which was fabricated by\nMithra. But the things contained in the cavern being arranged according\nto commensurate intervals, were symbols of the mundane elements and\nclimates.\n\n3. After this Zoroaster likewise, it was usual with others to perform\nthe rites pertaining to the mysteries in caverns and dens, whether\nspontaneously produced, or made by the hands. For, as they established\ntemples, groves, and altars, to the celestial Gods, but to the\nterrestrial Gods, and to heroes, altars alone, and to the subterranean\ndivinities pits and cells; so to the world they dedicated caves and dens;\nas likewise to Nymphs[119], on account of the water which trickles, or is\ndiffused in caverns, over which the Naiades, as we shall shortly observe,\npreside. Not only, however, did the ancients make a cavern, as we have\nsaid, to be a symbol of the world, or of a generated and sensible nature;\nbut they also assumed it as a symbol of all invisible powers; because, as\ncaverns are obscure and dark, so the essence of these powers is occult.\nHence Saturn fabricated a cavern in the ocean itself, and concealed in\nit his children. Thus, too, Ceres educated Proserpine, with her Nymphs,\nin a cave; and many other particulars of this kind may be found in the\nwritings of theologists. But that the ancients dedicated caverns to\nNymphs, and especially to the Naiades, who dwell near fountains, and who\nare called Naiades from the streams over which they preside, is manifest\nfrom the hymn to Apollo, in which it is said: \u201cThe Nymphs residing in\ncaves shall deduce fountains of intellectual waters to thee, (according\nto the divine voice of the Muses,) which are the progeny of a terrene\nspirit. Hence waters, bursting through every river, shall exhibit to\nmankind perpetual effusions of sweet streams[120].\u201d From hence, as it\nappears to me, the Pythagoreans, and after them Plato, showed that the\nworld is a cavern and a den. For the powers which are the leaders of\nsouls, thus speak in a verse of Empedocles:\n\n    Now at this secret cavern we\u2019re arrived.\n\nAnd by Plato, in the 7th book of his Republic, it is said, \u201cBehold men\nas if dwelling in a subterraneous cavern, and in a den-like habitation,\nwhose entrance is widely expanded to the admission of the light through\nthe whole cave.\u201d But when the other person in the Dialogue says, \u201cYou\nadduce an unusual and wonderful similitude,\u201d he replies, \u201cThe whole of\nthis image, friend Glauco, must be adapted to what has been before said,\nassimilating this receptacle, which is visible through the sight, to the\nhabitation of a prison; but the light of the fire which is in it to the\npower of the sun.\u201d\n\n4. That theologists therefore considered caverns as symbols of the world,\nand of mundane powers, is, through this, manifest. And it has been\nalready observed by us, that they also considered a cave as a symbol of\nthe intelligible essence; being impelled to do so by different and not\nthe same conceptions. For they were of opinion, that a cave is a symbol\nof the sensible world, because caverns are dark, stony, and humid; and\nthey asserted, that the world is a thing of this kind, through the matter\nof which it consists, and through its repercussive and flowing nature.\nBut they thought it to be a symbol of the intelligible world, because\nthat world is invisible to sensible perception, and possesses a firm and\nstable essence. Thus, also, partial powers are unapparent, and especially\nthose which are inherent in matter. For they formed these symbols, from\nsurveying the spontaneous production of caves, and their nocturnal, dark,\nand stony nature; and not entirely, as some suspect, from directing their\nattention to the figure of a cavern. For every cave is not spherical,\nas is evident from this Homeric cave with a twofold entrance. But since\na cavern has a twofold similitude, the present cave must not be assumed\nas an image of the intelligible, but of the sensible essence. For in\nconsequence of containing perpetually-flowing streams of water, it will\nnot be a symbol of an intelligible hypostasis, but of a material essence.\nOn this account also, it is sacred to Nymphs, not the mountain, _or\nrural[121] Nymphs_, or others of the like kind, but to the Naiades, who\nare thus denominated from streams of water. For we peculiarly call the\nNaiades, and the powers that preside over waters, Nymphs; and this term,\nalso, is commonly applied to all souls descending into generation. For\nthe ancients thought that these souls are incumbent on water which is\ninspired by divinity, as Numenius says, who adds, that on this account,\na prophet asserts, that the Spirit of God moved on the waters. The\nEgyptians likewise, on this account, represent all d\u00e6mons, and also\nthe sun, and, in short, all the planets[122], not standing on any thing\nsolid, but on a sailing vessel; for souls descending into generation\nfly to moisture. Hence, also, Heraclitus says, \u201cthat moisture appears\ndelightful and not deadly to souls;\u201d but the lapse into generation is\ndelightful to them. And in another place [speaking of unembodied souls],\nhe says, \u201cWe live their death, and we die their life.\u201d Hence the poet\ncalls those that are in generation _humid_, because they have souls\nwhich are _profoundly_ steeped in moisture. On this account, such souls\ndelight in blood and humid seed; but water is the nutriment of the souls\nof plants. Some likewise are of opinion, that the bodies in the air, and\nin the heavens, are nourished by vapours from fountains and rivers, and\nother exhalations. But the Stoics assert, that the sun is nourished by\nthe exhalation from the sea; the moon from the vapours of fountains and\nrivers; and the stars from the exhalation of the earth. Hence, according\nto them, the sun is an intellectual composition formed from the sea; the\nmoon from river waters; and the stars from terrene exhalations.\n\n5. It is necessary, therefore, that souls, whether they are corporeal\nor incorporeal, while they attract to themselves body, and especially\nsuch as are about to be bound to blood and moist bodies, should verge\nto humidity, and be corporalized, in consequence of being drenched in\nmoisture. Hence the souls of the dead are evocated by the effusion of\nbile and blood; and souls that are lovers of body, by attracting a\nmoist spirit, condense this humid vehicle like a cloud. For moisture\ncondensed in the air constitutes a cloud. But the pneumatic vehicle being\ncondensed in these souls, becomes visible through an excess of moisture.\nAnd among the number of these we must reckon those apparitions of images,\nwhich, from a spirit coloured by the influence of imagination, present\nthemselves to mankind. But pure souls are averse from generation; so\nthat, as Heraclitus says, \u201c_a dry soul is the wisest_.\u201d Hence, here\nalso, the spirit becomes moist and more aqueous through the desire\nof coition, the soul thus attracting a humid vapour from verging to\ngeneration. Souls, therefore, proceeding into generation, are the Nymphs\ncalled Naiades. Hence it is usual to call those that are married Nymphs,\nas being conjoined to generation, and to pour water into baths from\nfountains, or rivers, or perpetual rills.\n\n6. This world, then, is sacred and pleasant to souls who have now\nproceeded into nature, and to natal d\u00e6mons, though it is essentially\ndark and _obscure_; [\u03b7\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b7\u03c2], from which some have suspected that\nsouls also are of an _obscure_ nature, [\u03b1\u03b5\u03c1\u03c9\u03b4\u03c9\u03c2,] and essentially\nconsist of air. Hence a cavern, which is both pleasant and dark, will\nbe appropriately consecrated to souls on the earth, conformably to its\nsimilitude to the world; in which, as in the greatest of all temples,\nsouls reside. To the Nymphs likewise, who preside over waters, a cavern,\nin which there are perpetually flowing streams, is adapted. Let,\ntherefore, this present cavern be consecrated to souls, and, among the\nmore partial powers, to nymphs, that preside over streams and fountains,\nand who, on this account, are called _fontal_ and _Naiades_. What,\ntherefore, are the different symbols, some of which are adapted to\nsouls, but others to the aquatic powers, in order that we may apprehend\nthat this cavern is consecrated in common to both? Let the stony bowls,\nthen, and the amphor\u00e6, be symbols of the aquatic Nymphs. For these are,\nindeed, the symbols of Bacchus, but their composition is fictile, _i.e._\nconsists of baked earth; and these are friendly to the vine, the gift\nof the God; since the fruit of the vine is brought to a proper maturity\nby the celestial fire of the sun. But the stony bowls and amphor\u00e6, are in\nthe most eminent degree adapted to the Nymphs who preside over the water\nthat flows from rocks. And to souls that descend into generation, and\nare occupied in corporeal energies, what symbol can be more appropriate\nthan those instruments pertaining to weaving? Hence, also, the poet\nventures to say, \u201cthat on these the Nymphs weave purple webs, admirable\nto the view.\u201d For the formation of the flesh is on and about the bones,\nwhich in the bodies of animals resemble stones. Hence these instruments\nof weaving consist of stone, and not of any other matter. But the purple\nwebs will evidently be the flesh which is woven from the blood. For\npurple woollen garments are tinged from blood; and wool is dyed from\nanimal juice. The generation of flesh, also, is through and from blood.\nAdd, too, that the body is a garment with which the soul is invested, a\nthing wonderful to the sight, whether this refers to the composition of\nthe soul, or contributes to the colligation of the soul [to the whole\nof a visible essence]. Thus, also, Proserpine, who is the inspective\nguardian of every thing produced from seed, is represented by Orpheus as\nweaving a web[123]; and the heavens are called by the ancients a veil,\nin consequence of being, as it were, the vestment of the celestial Gods.\n\n7. Why, therefore, are the amphor\u00e6 said not to be filled with water,\nbut with honey-combs? For in these Homer says the bees deposit their\nhoney. But this is evident from the word \u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\u03b2\u03c9\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, which signifies\n\u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b2\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd; _i.e._ to deposit aliment. And honey is the nutriment\nof bees. Theologists, also, have made honey subservient to many and\ndifferent symbols, because it consists of many powers; since it is both\ncathartic and preservative. Hence, through honey, bodies are preserved\nfrom putrefaction, and inveterate ulcers are purified. Farther still,\nit is also sweet to the taste, and is collected by bees, who are\nox-begotten, from flowers. When, therefore, those who are initiated in\nthe Leontic sacred rites, pour honey instead of water on their hands;\nthey are ordered [by the initiator] to have their hands pure from every\nthing productive of molestation, and from every thing noxious and\ndetestable. Other initiators [into the same mysteries] employ fire,\nwhich is of a cathartic nature, as an appropriate purification. And they\nlikewise purify the tongue from all the defilement of evil with honey.\nBut the Persians, when they offer honey to the guardian of fruits,\nconsider it as the symbol of a preserving and defending power. Hence\nsome persons have thought that the nectar and ambrosia[124], which the\npoet pours into the nostrils of the dead, for the purpose of preventing\nputrefaction, is honey; since honey is the food of the Gods. On this\naccount, also, the same poet somewhere calls nectar \u03b5\u03c1\u03c5\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd; for such is\nthe colour of honey, [viz. it is a deep yellow]. But whether or not honey\nis to be taken for nectar, we shall elsewhere more accurately examine.\nIn Orpheus, likewise, Saturn is ensnared by Jupiter through honey. For\nSaturn, being filled with honey, is intoxicated, his senses are darkened,\nas if from the effects of wine, and he sleeps; just as Porus, in the\nBanquet of Plato, is filled with nectar; for wine was not (says he) yet\nknown. The Goddess Night, too, in Orpheus, advises Jupiter to make use\nof honey as an artifice. For she says to him\u2014\n\n    When stretch\u2019d beneath the lofty oaks you view\n    Saturn, with honey by the bees produc\u2019d,\n    Sunk in ebriety[125], fast bind the God.\n\nThis, therefore, takes place, and Saturn being bound, is castrated in\nthe same manner as Heaven; the theologist obscurely signifying by this,\nthat divine natures become through pleasure bound, and drawn down into\nthe realms of generation; and also that, when dissolved in pleasure,\nthey emit certain seminal powers. Hence Saturn castrates Heaven, when\ndescending to earth, through a desire of coition[126]. But the sweetness\nof honey signifies, with theologists, the same thing as the pleasure\narising from copulation, by which Saturn, being ensnared, was castrated.\nFor Saturn, and his sphere, are the first of the orbs that move contrary\nto the course of C\u0153lum, or the heavens. Certain powers, however, descend\nboth from Heaven [or the inerratic sphere] and the planets. But Saturn\nreceives the powers of Heaven, and Jupiter the powers of Saturn.\nSince, therefore, honey is assumed in purgations, and as an antidote\nto putrefaction, and is indicative of the pleasure which draws souls\ndownward to generation; it is a symbol well adapted to aquatic Nymphs, on\naccount of the unputrescent nature of the waters over which they preside,\ntheir purifying power, and their co-operation with generation. For water\nco-operates in the work of generation. On this account the bees are said,\nby the poet, to deposit their honey in bowls and amphor\u00e6; the bowls being\na symbol of fountains, and therefore a bowl is placed near to Mithra,\ninstead of a fountain; but the amphor\u00e6 are symbols of the vessels with\nwhich we draw water from fountains. And fountains and streams are adapted\nto aquatic Nymphs, and still more so to the Nymphs that are souls,\nwhich the ancients peculiarly called bees, as the efficient causes of\nsweetness. Hence Sophocles does not speak unappropriately when he says of\nsouls\u2014\n\n    In swarms while wandering, from the dead,\n    A humming sound is heard.\n\n8. The priestesses of Ceres, also, as being initiated into the mysteries\nof the terrene Goddess, were called by the ancients bees; and Proserpine\nherself was denominated by them _honied_. The moon, likewise, who\npresides over generation, was called by them a bee, and also a bull.\nAnd Taurus is the exaltation of the moon. But bees are ox-begotten. And\nthis appellation is also given to souls proceeding into generation. The\nGod, likewise, who is occultly connected with generation, is a stealer\nof oxen. To which may be added, that honey is considered as a symbol\nof death, and on this account, it is usual to offer libations of honey\nto the terrestrial Gods; but gall is considered as a symbol of life;\nwhether it is obscurely signified by this, that the life of the soul\ndies through pleasure, but through bitterness the soul resumes its life,\nwhence, also, bile is sacrificed to the Gods; or whether it is, because\ndeath liberates from molestation, but the present life is laborious and\nbitter. All souls, however, proceeding into generation, are not simply\ncalled bees, but those who will live in it justly, and who, after having\nperformed such things as are acceptable to the Gods, will again return\n[to their kindred stars]. For this insect loves to return to the place\nfrom whence it first came, and is eminently just and sober. Whence, also,\nthe libations which are made with honey are called sober. Bees, likewise,\ndo not sit on beans, which were considered by the ancients as a symbol of\ngeneration proceeding in a right line, and without flexure; because this\nleguminous vegetable is almost the only seed-bearing plant, whose stalk\nis perforated throughout without any intervening knots[127]. We must\ntherefore admit, that honey-combs and bees are appropriate and common\nsymbols of the aquatic Nymphs, and of souls that are married [as it were]\nto [the humid and fluctuating nature of] generation.\n\n9. Caves, therefore, in the most remote periods of antiquity, were\nconsecrated to the Gods, before temples were erected to them. Hence, the\nCuretes in Crete dedicated a cavern to Jupiter; in Arcadia, a cave was\nsacred to the Moon, and to Lycean Pan; and in Naxus, to Bacchus. But\nwherever Mithra was known, they propitiated the God in a cavern. With\nrespect, however, to this Ithacensian cave, Homer was not satisfied with\nsaying that it had two gates, but adds, that one of the gates was turned\ntowards the north, but the other, which was more divine, to the south. He\nalso says, that the northern gate was pervious to descent, but does not\nindicate whether this was also the case with the southern gate. For of\nthis, he only says, \u201cIt is inaccessible to men, but it is the path of the\nimmortals.\u201d\n\n10. It remains, therefore, to investigate what is indicated by this\nnarration, whether the poet describes a cavern which was in reality\nconsecrated by others, or whether it is an enigma of his own invention.\nSince, however, a cavern is an image and symbol of the world, as Numenius\nand his familiar Cronius assert, there are two extremities in the\nheavens, viz. the winter tropic, than which nothing is more southern, and\nthe summer tropic, than which nothing is more northern. But the summer\ntropic is in Cancer, and the winter tropic in Capricorn. And since Cancer\nis nearest to us, it is very properly attributed to the Moon, which is\nthe nearest of all the heavenly bodies to the earth. But as the southern\npole, by its great distance, is invisible to us, hence Capricorn is\nattributed to Saturn, the highest and most remote of all the planets.\nAgain, the signs from Cancer to Capricorn, are situated in the following\norder: and the first of these is Leo, which is the house of the Sun;\nafterwards Virgo, which is the house of Mercury; Libra, the house of\nVenus; Scorpius, of Mars; Sagittarius, of Jupiter; and Capricornus, of\nSaturn. But from Capricorn in an inverse order, Aquarius is attributed to\nSaturn; Pisces, to Jupiter; Aries, to Mars; Taurus, to Venus; Gemini, to\nMercury; and, in the last place, Cancer to the Moon.\n\n11. Theologists therefore assert, that these two gates are Cancer and\nCapricorn; but Plato calls them entrances. And of these, theologists\nsay, that Cancer is the gate through which souls descend; but Capricorn\nthat through which they ascend. Cancer is indeed northern, and adapted\nto descent; but Capricorn is southern, and adapted to ascent[128]. The\nnorthern parts, likewise, pertain to souls descending into generation.\nAnd the gates of the cavern which are turned to the north, are rightly\nsaid to be pervious to the descent of men; but the southern gates are not\nthe avenues of the Gods, but of souls ascending to the Gods. On this\naccount, the poet does not say that they are the avenues of the Gods, but\nof immortals; this appellation being also common to our souls, which are\n_per se_, or essentially, immortal. It is said, that Parmenides mentions\nthese two gates in his treatise On the Nature of Things; as likewise,\nthat they are not unknown to the Romans and Egyptians. For the Romans\ncelebrate their Saturnalia when the Sun is in Capricorn; and during this\nfestivity, slaves wear the shoes of those that are free, and all things\nare distributed among them in common; the legislator obscurely signifying\nby this ceremony, that through this gate of the heavens, those who are\nnow born slaves will be liberated through the Saturnian festival, and the\nhouse attributed to Saturn, _i.e._ Capricorn, when they live again, and\nreturn to the fountain of life. Since, however, the path from Capricorn\nis adapted to ascent[129], hence the Romans denominate that month in\nwhich the Sun, turning from Capricorn to the east, directs his course\nto the north, Januarius, or January, from _janua_, a gate. But with the\nEgyptians, the beginning of the year is not Aquarius, as with the Romans,\nbut Cancer. For the star Sothis, which the Greeks call the Dog, is near\nto Cancer. And the rising of Sothis is the new moon with them, this being\nthe principle of generation to the world. On this account, the gates of\nthe Homeric cavern are not dedicated to the east and west, nor to the\nequinoctial signs, Aries and Libra, but to the north and south, and to\nthose celestial signs which, towards the south, are most southerly, and,\ntowards the north, are most northerly; because this cave was sacred\nto souls and aquatic Nymphs. But these places are adapted to souls\ndescending into generation, and afterwards separating themselves from\nit. Hence, a place near to the equinoctial circle was assigned to Mithra\nas an appropriate seat. And on this account he bears the sword of Aries,\nwhich is a martial sign. He is likewise carried in the Bull, which is the\nsign of Venus. For Mithra, as well as the Bull, is the demiurgus and lord\nof generation[130]. But he is placed near the equinoctial circle, having\nthe northern parts on his right hand, and the southern on his left. They\nlikewise arranged towards the south the southern hemisphere, because\nit is hot; but the northern hemisphere towards the north, through the\ncoldness of the north wind.\n\n12. The ancients, likewise, very reasonably connected winds with souls\nproceeding into generation, and again separating themselves from it,\nbecause, as some think, souls attract a spirit, and have a pneumatic\nessence. But the north wind is adapted to souls falling into generation;\nand, on this account, the northern blasts refresh those who are dying,\nand when they can scarcely draw their breath. On the contrary, the\nsouthern gales dissolve life. For the north wind, indeed, from its\nsuperior coldness, congeals [as it were, the animal life], and detains\nit in the frigidity of terrene generation. But the south wind being hot,\ndissolves this life, and sends it upward to the heat of a divine nature.\nSince, however, our terrene habitation is more northern, it is proper\nthat souls which are born in it should be familiar with the north wind;\nbut those that exchange this life for a better, with the south wind. This\nalso is the cause why the north wind is at its commencement great; but\nthe south wind, at its termination. For the former is situated directly\nover the inhabitants of the northern part of the globe; but the latter\nis at a great distance from them; and the blast from places very remote,\nis more tardy than from such as are near. But when it is coacervated,\nthen it blows abundantly, and with vigour. Since, however, souls proceed\ninto generation through the northern gate, hence this wind is said to be\namatory. For, as the poet says,\n\n    Boreas, enamour\u2019d of the sprightly train,\n    Conceal\u2019d his godhead in a flowing mane.\n    With voice dissembled, to his loves he neigh\u2019d,\n    And coursed the dappled beauties o\u2019er the mead:\n    Hence sprung twelve others of unrivall\u2019d kind,\n    Swift as their mother mares, and father wind[131].\n\nIt is also said, that Boreas ravished Orithya[132], from whom he begot\nZetis and Calais. But as the south is attributed to the Gods, hence, when\nthe Sun is at his meridian, the curtains in temples are drawn before the\nstatues of the Gods; in consequence of observing the Homeric precept,\n\u201cthat it is not lawful for men to enter temples when the Sun is inclined\nto the south;\u201d for this is the path of the immortals. Hence, when the\nGod is at his meridian altitude, the ancients placed a symbol of mid-day\nand of the south in the gates of temples[133]; and, on this account, in\nother gates also, it was not lawful to speak at all times, because gates\nwere considered as sacred. Hence, too, the Pythagoreans, and the wise\nmen among the Egyptians, forbade speaking while passing through doors or\ngates; for then they venerated in silence that God who is the principle\nof wholes [and, therefore of all things].\n\n13. Homer likewise knew that gates are sacred, as is evident from his\nrepresenting Oeneus, when supplicating, shaking the gate:\n\n    The gates he shakes, and supplicates the son[134].\n\nHe also knew the gates of the heavens which are committed to the\nguardianship of the Hours; which gates originate in cloudy places, and\nare opened and shut by the clouds. For he says.\n\n    Whether dense clouds they close, or wide unfold[135].\n\nAnd on this account, these gates emit a bellowing sound, because thunders\nroar through the clouds:\n\n    Heaven\u2019s gates spontaneous open to the powers;\n    Heaven\u2019s bellowing portals, guarded by the Hours[136].\n\nHe likewise elsewhere speaks of the gates of the Sun, signifying by these\nCancer and Capricorn; for the Sun proceeds as far as to these signs, when\nhe descends from the north to the south, and from thence ascends again\nto the northern parts. But Capricorn and Cancer are situated about the\ngalaxy, being allotted the extremities of this circle; Cancer, indeed,\nthe northern, but Capricorn the southern extremity of it. According to\nPythagoras, also, the _people of dreams_[137], are the souls which are\nsaid to be collected in the galaxy, this circle being so called from\nthe milk with which souls are nourished when they fall into generation.\nHence, those who evocate departed souls, sacrifice to them by a libation\nof milk mingled with honey; because, through the allurements of\nsweetness, they will proceed into generation; with the birth of man, milk\nbeing naturally produced. Farther still, the southern regions produce\nsmall bodies; for it is usual with heat to attenuate them in the greatest\ndegree. But all bodies generated in the north are large, as is evident\nin the Celt\u00e6, the Thracians, and the Scythians; and these regions are\nhumid, and abound with pastures. For the word Boreas is derived from\n\u0392\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1, which signifies nutriment. Hence, also, the wind which blows from\na land abounding in nutriment, is called \u0392\u03bf\u03c1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2, as being of a nutritive\nnature. From these causes, therefore, the northern parts are adapted to\nthe mortal tribe, and to souls that fall into the realms of generation.\nBut the southern parts are adapted to that which is immortal[138],\njust as the eastern parts of the world are attributed to the Gods,\nbut the western to d\u00e6mons. For, in consequence of nature originating\nfrom diversity, the ancients every where made that which has a twofold\nentrance to be a symbol of the nature of things. For the progression\nis either through that which is intelligible, or through that which is\nsensible. And if through that which is sensible, it is either through\nthe sphere of the fixed stars, or through the sphere of the planets. And\nagain, it is either through an immortal, or through a mortal progression.\nOne centre, likewise, is above, but the other beneath the earth; and\nthe one is eastern, but the other western. Thus, too, some parts of\nthe world are situated on the left, but others on the right hand: and\nnight is opposed to day. On this account, also, harmony consists of, and\n_proceeds_[139] through contraries. Plato also says, that there are two\nopenings[140], one of which affords a passage to souls ascending to the\nheavens, but the other to souls descending to the earth. And, according\nto theologists, the Sun and Moon are the gates of souls, which ascend\nthrough the Sun, and descend through the Moon. With Homer, likewise,\nthere are two tubs,\n\n    From which the lot of every one he fills,\n    Blessings to these, to those distributes ills[141].\n\nBut Plato, in the Gorgias, by tubs intends to signify souls, some of\nwhich are malefic, but others beneficent, and some of which are rational,\nbut others irrational[142]. Souls, however, are [analogous to] tubs,\nbecause they contain in themselves energies and habits, as in a vessel.\nIn Hesiod too, we find one tub closed, but the other opened by Pleasure,\nwho scatters its contents every where, Hope alone remaining behind. For\nin those things in which a depraved soul, being dispersed about matter,\ndeserts the proper order of its essence; in all these, it is accustomed\nto feed itself with [the pleasing prospects of] auspicious hope.\n\n14. Since, therefore, every twofold entrance is a symbol of nature, this\nHomeric cavern has, very properly, not one portal only, but two gates,\nwhich differ from each other conformably to things themselves; of which\none pertains to Gods and good [d\u00e6mons[143]], but the other to mortals,\nand depraved natures. Hence, Plato took occasion to speak of bowls, and\nassumes tubs instead of amphor\u00e6, and two openings, as we have already\nobserved, instead of two gates. Pherecydes Syrus also mentions recesses\nand trenches, caverns, doors, and gates; and through these obscurely\nindicates the generations of souls, and their separation from these\nmaterial realms. And thus much for an explanation of the Homeric cave,\nwhich we think we have sufficiently unfolded without adducing any farther\ntestimonies from ancient philosophers and theologists, which would give a\nneedless extent to our discourse.\n\n15. One particular, however, remains to be explained, and that is the\nsymbol of the olive planted at the top of the cavern; since Homer appears\nto indicate something very admirable by giving it such a position. For\nhe does not merely say that an olive grows in this place, but that it\nflourishes on the summit of the cavern.\n\n    \u201cHigh at the head a branching olive grows,\n    Beneath, a gloomy grotto\u2019s cool recess.\u201d\n\nBut the growth of the olive in such a situation, is not fortuitous, as\nsome one may suspect, but contains the enigma of the cavern. For since\nthe world was not produced rashly and casually, but is the work of divine\nwisdom and an intellectual nature, hence an olive, the symbol of this\nwisdom, flourishes near the present cavern, which is an image of the\nworld. For the olive is the plant of Minerva; and Minerva is wisdom. But\nthis Goddess being produced from the head of Jupiter, the theologist has\ndiscovered an appropriate place for the olive, by consecrating it at the\nsummit of the port; signifying by this, that the universe is not the\neffect of a casual event, and the work of irrational fortune, but that\nit is the offspring of an intellectual nature and divine wisdom, which\nis separated, indeed, from it [by a difference of essence], but yet is\nnear to it, through being established on the summit of the whole port;\n[_i.e._ from the dignity and excellence of its nature governing the whole\nwith consummate wisdom]. Since, however, an olive is ever-flourishing,\nit possesses a certain peculiarity in the highest degree adapted to the\nrevolutions of souls in the world; for to such souls this cave [as we\nhave said] is sacred. For in summer, the white leaves of the olive tend\nupward, but in winter, the whiter leaves are bent downward. On this\naccount, also, in prayers and supplications, men extend the branches of\nan olive, ominating from this, that they shall exchange the sorrowful\ndarkness of danger for the fair light of security and peace. The olive,\ntherefore, being naturally ever-flourishing, bears fruit which is the\nauxiliary of labour [by being its reward]; it is also sacred to Minerva;\nsupplies the victors in athletic labours with crowns; and affords a\nfriendly branch to the suppliant petitioner. Thus, too, the world is\ngoverned by an intellectual nature, and is conducted by a wisdom eternal\nand ever-flourishing; by which the rewards of victory are conferred on\nthe conquerors in the athletic race of life, as the reward of severe toil\nand patient perseverance. And the Demiurgus, who connects and contains\nthe world [in ineffable comprehensions], invigorates miserable and\nsuppliant souls.\n\n16. In this cave, therefore, says Homer, all external possessions must\nbe deposited. Here, naked, and assuming a suppliant habit, afflicted in\nbody, casting aside every thing superfluous, and being averse to the\nenergies of sense, it is requisite to sit at the foot of the olive, and\nconsult with Minerva by what means we may most effectually destroy that\nhostile rout of passions which insidiously lurk in the secret recesses\nof the soul. Indeed, as it appears to me, it was not without reason that\nNumenius and his followers thought the person of Ulysses in the Odyssey\nrepresented to us a man, who passes in a regular manner over the dark and\nstormy sea of generation, and thus at length arrives at that region where\ntempests and seas are unknown, and finds a nation\n\n    \u201cWho ne\u2019er knew salt, or heard the billows roar.\u201d\n\n17. Again, according to Plato, the deep, the sea, and a tempest, are\nimages of a material nature. And on this account, I think, the poet\ncalled the port by the name of Phorcys. For he says, \u201cIt is the port of\nthe ancient marine Phorcys[144].\u201d The daughter, likewise, of this God is\nmentioned in the beginning of the Odyssey. But from Thoosa the Cyclops\nwas born, whom Ulysses deprived of sight. And this deed of Ulysses became\nthe occasion of reminding him of his errors, till he was safely landed\nin his native country. On this account, too, a seat under the olive is\nproper to Ulysses, as to one who implores divinity, and would appease his\nnatal d\u00e6mon with a suppliant branch. For it will not be simply, and in\na concise way, possible for any one to be liberated from this sensible\nlife, who blinds this d\u00e6mon, and renders his energies inefficacious; but\nhe who dares to do this, will be pursued by the anger[145] of the marine\nand material Gods, whom it is first requisite to appease by sacrifices,\nlabours, and patient endurance; at one time, indeed, contending with\nthe passions, and at another employing enchantments and deceptions, and\nby these, transforming himself in an all-various manner; in order that,\nbeing at length divested of the torn garments [by which his true person\nwas concealed], he may recover the ruined empire of his soul. Nor will\nhe even then be liberated from labours; but this will be effected when\nhe has entirely passed over the raging sea, and, though still living,\nbecomes so ignorant of marine and material works [through deep attention\nto intelligible concerns], as to mistake an oar for a corn-van.\n\n18. It must not, however, be thought, that interpretations of this kind\nare forced, and nothing more than the conjectures of ingenious men;\nbut when we consider the great wisdom of antiquity, and how much Homer\nexcelled in intellectual prudence, and in an accurate knowledge of every\nvirtue, it must not be denied that he has obscurely indicated the images\nof things of a more divine nature in the fiction of a fable. For it would\nnot have been possible to devise the whole of this hypothesis, unless the\nfigment had been transferred [to an appropriate meaning] from certain\nestablished truths. But reserving the discussion of this for another\ntreatise, we shall here finish our explanation of the present Cave of the\nNymphs.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[116] This Cronius, the Pythagorean, is also mentioned by Porphyry, in\nhis Life of Plotinus.\n\n[117] _i.e._ Rather more than ten Italian miles and a half, eight stadia\nmaking an Italian mile.\n\n[118] In the original, \u03b4\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. But _morphe_, as we are informed\nby Simplicius, pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of\nsuperficies.\n\n[119] \u201cNymphs,\u201d says Hermias, in his Scholia on the Ph\u00e6drus of Plato,\n\u201care Goddesses who preside over regeneration, and are ministrant to\nBacchus, the offspring of Semele. Hence they dwell near water, that\nis, they are conversant with generation. But this Bacchus supplies the\nregeneration of the whole sensible world.\u201d\n\n[120] These lines are not to be found in any of the hymns now extant,\nascribed to Homer.\n\n[121] In the original, \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03c9\u03bd; but for \u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03c9\u03bd, I read, \u03b1\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n[122] In the original, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u0391\u03b9\u03b3\u03c5\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03bf\u03c5\u03c7 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u03bf\u03c5, \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b7\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b7 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03c9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c5\u03b3\u03c1\u1ff3, \u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2. But after the words \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, it appears to me\nto be requisite to insert \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2. For Martianus Capella, in lib.\nii. De Nuptiis Philologi\u00e6, speaking of the sun, says: \u201cIbi quandam navim,\ntotius natur\u00e6 cursibus diversa cupiditate moderantem, cunctaque flammarum\ncongestione plenissimam, beatis circumactam mercibus conspicatur. Cui\n_naut\u00e6 septem_ germani, tamen suique consimiles pr\u00e6sidebant,\u201d &c. For in\nthis passage the seven sailors are evidently the seven planets.\n\n[123] The theological meaning of this Orphic fiction is beautifully\nunfolded by Proclus, as follows:\u2014\u201cOrpheus says that the vivific cause\nof partible natures [_i.e._ Proserpine], while she remained on high,\nweaving the order of celestials, was a nymph, as being undefiled; and\nin consequence of this connected with Jupiter, and abiding in her\nappropriate manners; but that, proceeding from her proper habitation,\nshe left her webs unfinished, was ravished; having been ravished, was\nmarried; and that being married she generated, in order that she might\nanimate things which have an adventitious life. For the unfinished\nstate of her webs indicates, I think, that the universe is imperfect or\nunfinished, as far as to perpetual animals [_i.e._ The universe would be\nimperfect if nothing inferior to the celestial Gods was produced]. Hence\nPlato says, that the one Demiurgus calls on the many Demiurgi to weave\ntogether the mortal and immortal natures; after a manner reminding us,\nthat the addition of the mortal genera is the perfection of the textorial\nlife of the universe, and also exciting our recollection of the divine\nOrphic fable, and affording us interpretative causes of the unfinished\nwebs of Proserpine.\u201d\u2014See vol. ii. p. 356, of my translation of Proclus on\nthe Tim\u00e6us.\n\nThe _unfinished webs_ of Proserpine are also alluded to by Claudian, in\nhis poem De Raptu Proserpin\u00e6, in the following verse:\n\n    Sensit adesse Deas, _imperfectumque laborem_\n    _Deserit_.\n\nI only add, that, by ancient theologists, the shuttle was considered as a\nsignature of _separating_, a cup of _vivific_, a sceptre of _ruling_, and\na key of _guardian_ power.\n\n[124] The theological meaning of nectar and ambrosia, is beautifully\nunfolded by Hermias, in his Scholia on the Ph\u00e6drus of Plato, published\nby Ast, Lips. 1810, p. 145, where he informs us, that _ambrosia_ is\nanalogous to dry nutriment, and that, on this account, it signifies an\nestablishment in causes; but that _nectar_ is analogous to moist food,\nand that it signifies the providential attention of the Gods to secondary\nnatures; the former being denominated, according to _a privation of the\nmortal and corruptible_ [\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b2\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5]; but the\nlatter, according to _a privation of the funeral and sepulchral_ [\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c5]. And when the Gods are\nrepresented as energizing providentially, they are said to drink nectar.\nThus Homer, in the beginning of the 4th book of the Iliad:\n\n    \u039f\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1 \u0396\u03b7\u03bd\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c9\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\n    \u03a7\u03c1\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u1ff3 \u03b5\u03bd \u03b4\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03b4\u1ff3, \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c3\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1 \u0397\u03b2\u03b7\n    \u039d\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1 \u03b5\u1ff3\u03bd\u03bf\u03c7\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c7\u03c1\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\u03c0\u03b1\u03b5\u03c3\u03c3\u03b9\n    \u0394\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03c7\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03a4\u03c1\u1ff3\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c9\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2.\n\n    Now with each other, on the golden floor\n    Seated near Jove, the Gods converse; to whom\n    The venerable Hebe nectar bears,\n    In golden goblets; and as these flow round,\n    Th\u2019 immortals turn their careful eyes on Troy.\n\nFor then they providentially attend to the Trojans. The possession,\ntherefore, of immutable providence by the Gods is signified by their\ndrinking nectar; the exertion of this providence, by their beholding\nTroy; and their communicating with each other in providential energies,\nby receiving the goblets from each other.\n\n[125] Ebriety, when ascribed to divine natures by ancient theologists,\nsignifies a deific superessential energy, or an energy superior\nto intellect. Hence, when Saturn is said by Orpheus to have been\nintoxicated with honey or nectar, the meaning is, that he then energized\nprovidentially, in a deific and super-intellectual manner.\n\n[126] Porphyry, though he excelled in philosophical, was deficient in\ntheological knowledge; of which what he now says of the castrations of\nSaturn and Heaven, is a remarkable instance. For ancient theologists, by\nthings preternatural, adumbrated the transcendent nature of the Gods;\nby such as are irrational, a power more divine than all reason; and\nby things apparently base, incorporeal beauty. Hence, in the fabulous\nnarrations to which Porphyry now alludes, the genital parts must be\nconsidered as symbols of prolific power; and the castration of these\nparts as signifying the progression of this power into a subject order.\nSo that the fable means that the prolific powers of Saturn are called\nforth into progression by Jupiter, and those of Heaven by Saturn; Jupiter\nbeing inferior to Saturn, and Saturn to Heaven.\u2014See the Apology for the\nFables of Homer, in vol. i. of my translation of Plato.\n\n[127] Hence, when Pythagoras exhorted his disciples to abstain from\nbeans, he intended to signify, that they should beware of a continued and\nperpetual descent into the realms of generation.\n\n[128] Macrobius, in the 12th chapter of his Commentary on Scipio\u2019s Dream,\nhas derived some of the ancient arcana which it contains from what is\nhere said by Porphyry. A part of what he has farther added, I shall\ntranslate, on account of its excellence and connexion with the above\npassage. \u201cPythagoras thought that the empire of Pluto began downwards\nfrom the milky way, because souls falling from thence appear to have\nalready receded from the Gods. Hence he asserts, that the nutriment of\nmilk is first offered to infants, because their first motion commences\nfrom the galaxy, when they begin to fall into terrene bodies. On this\naccount, since those who are about to descend are yet in _Cancer_, and\nhave not left the milky way, they rank in the order of the Gods. But\nwhen, by falling, they arrive at the _Lion_, in this constellation\nthey enter on the exordium of their future condition. And because,\nin the _Lion_, the rudiments of birth, and certain primary exercises\nof human nature, commence; but _Aquarius_ is opposite to the _Lion_,\nand presently sets after the _Lion_ rises; hence, when the sun is in\n_Aquarius_, funeral rites are performed to departed souls, because he is\nthen carried in a sign which is contrary or adverse to human life. From\nthe confine, therefore, in which the zodiac and galaxy touch each other,\nthe soul, descending from a round figure, which is the only divine form,\nis produced into a cone by its defluxion. And as a line is generated\nfrom a point, and proceeds into length from an indivisible, so the soul,\nfrom its own point, which is a monad, passes into the duad, which is the\nfirst extension. And this is the essence which Plato, in the Tim\u00e6us,\ncalls impartible, and at the same time partible, when he speaks of the\nnature of the mundane soul. For as the soul of the world, so likewise\nthat of man, will be found to be in one respect without division, if\nthe simplicity of a divine nature is considered; and in another respect\npartible, if we regard the diffusion of the former through the world, and\nof the latter through the members of the body.\n\n\u201cAs soon, therefore, as the soul gravitates towards body in this first\nproduction of herself, she begins to experience a material tumult, that\nis, matter flowing into her essence. And this is what Plato remarks\nin the Ph\u00e6do, that the soul is drawn into body staggering with recent\nintoxication; signifying by this, the new drink of matter\u2019s impetuous\nflood, through which the soul, becoming defiled and heavy, is drawn into\na terrene situation. But the starry _cup_ placed between Cancer and the\nLion, is a symbol of this mystic truth, signifying that descending souls\nfirst experience intoxication in that part of the heavens through the\ninflux of matter. Hence oblivion, the companion of intoxication, there\nbegins silently to creep into the recesses of the soul. For if souls\nretained in their descent to bodies the memory of divine concerns, of\nwhich they were conscious in the heavens, there would be no dissension\namong men about divinity. But all, indeed, in descending, drink of\noblivion; though some more, and others less. On this account, though\ntruth is not apparent to all men on the earth, yet all exercise their\nopinions about it; because _a defect of memory is the origin of opinion_.\nBut those discover most who have drank least of oblivion, because they\neasily remember what they had known before in the heavens.\n\n\u201cThe soul, therefore, falling with this first weight from the zodiac and\nmilky way into each of the subject spheres, is not only clothed with the\naccession of a luminous body, but produces the particular motions which\nit is to exercise in the respective orbs. Thus in Saturn, it energizes\naccording to a ratiocinative and intellective power; in the sphere of\nJove, according to a practic power; in the orb of the Sun, according to a\nsensitive and imaginative nature; but according to the motion of desire\nin the planet Venus; of pronouncing and interpreting what it perceives\nin the orb of Mercury; and according to a plantal or vegetable nature,\nand a power of acting on body, when it enters into the lunar globe. And\nthis sphere, as it is the last among the divine orders, so it is the\nfirst in our terrene situation. For this body, as it is the dregs of\ndivine natures, so it is the first animal substance. And this is the\ndifference between terrene and supernal bodies (under the latter of which\nI comprehend the heavens, the stars, and the more elevated elements,)\nthat the latter are called upwards to be the seat of the soul, and merit\nimmortality from the very nature of the region, and an imitation of\nsublimity; but the soul is drawn down to these terrene bodies, and is\non this account said to die when it is enclosed in this fallen region,\nand the seat of mortality. Nor ought it to cause any disturbance that we\nhave so often mentioned the death of the soul, which we have pronounced\nto be immortal. For the soul is not extinguished by its own proper\ndeath, but is only overwhelmed for a time. Nor does it lose the benefit\nof perpetuity by its temporal demersion. Since, when it deserves to be\npurified from the contagion of vice, through its entire refinement from\nbody, it will be restored to the light of perennial life, and will return\nto its pristine integrity and perfection.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe powers, however, of the planets, which are the causes of the\nenergies of the soul in the several planetary spheres, are more\naccurately described by Proclus, in p. 260 of his admirable Commentary\non the Tim\u00e6us, as follows: \u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03a3\u03b5\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\u03b7 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b8\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u03c4\u03bf \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b7\u03b3\u03b1\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\u00b7 \u0397\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03c9\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bf\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u0395\u03c1\u03bc\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2, \u03c9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2, \u0397\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03c5\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2\u00b7 \u0391\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u0391\u03c1\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b6\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd\n\u0396\u03b5\u03c5\u03c2, \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd \u039a\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u1fc3\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b7 \u03c4\u03b1 \u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b1 \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03c4\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, _i.e._ \u201cIf you are willing, also, you may say, that of the\nbeneficent planets, the Moon is the cause to mortals of nature, being\nherself the visible statue of fontal nature. But the Sun is the Demiurgus\nof every thing sensible, in consequence of being the cause of sight and\nvisibility. Mercury is the cause of the motions of the phantasy; for of\nthe imaginative essence itself, so far as sense and phantasy are one,\nthe Sun is the producing cause. But Venus is the cause of epithymetic\nappetites [or of the appetites pertaining to desire]; and Mars, of the\nirascible motions which are conformable to nature. Of all vital powers,\nhowever, Jupiter is the common cause; but of all gnostic powers, Saturn.\nFor all the irrational forms are divided into these.\u201d\n\n[129] For \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7, in this place, it appears to me to be obviously\nnecessary to read \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b2\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7. For Porphyry has above informed us, that\nCapricorn is the gate through which souls ascend.\n\n[130] Hence Phanes, or Protogonus, who is the paradigm of the universe,\nand who was absorbed by Jupiter, the Demiurgus, is represented by Orpheus\nas having the head of a _bull_ among other heads with which he is\nadorned. And in the Orphic hymn to him, he is called _bull-roarer_.\n\n[131] Iliad, lib. xx. v. 223, &c.\n\n[132] This fable is mentioned by Plato in the Ph\u00e6drus, and is beautifully\nunfolded as follows, by Hermias, in his Scholia on that Dialogue: \u201cA\ntwofold solution may be given of this fable; one from history, more\nethical; but the other, transferring us [from parts] to wholes. And the\nformer of these is as follows: Orithya was the daughter of Erectheus, and\nthe priestess of Boreas; for each of the winds has a presiding deity,\nwhich the telestic art, or the art pertaining to sacred mysteries,\nreligiously cultivates. To this Orithya, then, the God was so very\npropitious, that he sent the north wind for the safety of the country;\nand besides this, he is said to have assisted the Athenians in their\nnaval battles. Orithya, therefore, becoming enthusiastic, being possessed\nby her proper God Boreas, and no longer energizing as a human being\n(for animals cease to energize according to their own peculiarities,\nwhen possessed by superior causes), died under the inspiring influence,\nand thus was said to have been ravished by Boreas. And this is the more\nethical explanation of the fable.\n\n\u201cBut the second, which transfers the narration to wholes, and does not\nentirely subvert the former, is the following: for divine fables often\nemploy transactions and histories, in subserviency, to the discipline\nof wholes. It is said then, that Erectheus is the God that rules over\nthe three elements, air, water, and earth. Sometimes, however, he\nis considered as alone the ruler of the earth, and sometimes as the\npresiding deity of Attica alone. Of this deity Orithya is the daughter;\nand she is the prolific power of the Earth, which is indeed coextended\nwith the word _Erectheus_, as the unfolding of the name signifies. For it\nis _the prolific power of the Earth, flourishing and restored, according\nto the seasons_. But Boreas is the providence of the Gods, supernally\nilluminating secondary natures. For the providence of the Gods in the\nworld is signified by Boreas, because this divinity blows from lofty\nplaces. And the elevating power of the Gods is signified by the south\nwind, because this wind blows from low to lofty places; and besides this,\n_things situated towards the south are more divine_. The providence of\nthe Gods, therefore, causes the prolific power of the Earth, or of the\nAttic land, to _ascend_, and become visible.\n\n\u201cOrithya also may be said to be a soul aspiring after things above, from\n\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c9 and \u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c9, according to the Attic custom of adding a letter at the\nend of a word, which letter is here an \u201c\u03c9.\u201d Such a soul, therefore, is\nravished by Boreas supernally blowing. But if Orithya was hurled from a\nprecipice, this also is appropriate, for such a soul dies a philosophic,\nnot receiving a physical death, and abandons a life pertaining to her own\ndeliberate choice, at the same time that she lives a physical life. And\nphilosophy, according to Socrates in the Ph\u00e6do, is nothing else than a\nmeditation of death.\u201d\n\n[133] In the original, \u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b2\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03bd\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5, \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc3 \u03b8\u03c5\u03c1\u1fc3, \u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b2\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c5, which Holstenius translates\nmost erroneously as follows: \u201cAustrum igitur meridiei symbolum statuunt;\ncum deus meridiano tempore ostio immineat.\u201d\n\n[134] Iliad, lib. xi. v. 579.\n\n[135] Iliad, lib. viii. v. 395.\n\n[136] Iliad, lib. viii. v. 393.\n\n[137] The souls of the suitors are said by Homer, in the 24th book of\nthe Odyssey (v. 11), to have passed, in their descent to the region of\nspirits, beyond _the people of dreams_.\n\n[138] Hence, the southern have always been more favourable to genius,\nthan the northern parts of the earth.\n\n[139] In the original, \u03c4\u03bf\u03be\u03b5\u03c5\u03b5\u03b9; but instead of it, I read \u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03b5\u03b9.\n\n[140] See my translation of the 10th book of his Republic.\n\n[141] Iliad, xxiv. v. 528.\n\n[142] The passage in the Gorgias of Plato, to which Porphyry here\nalludes, is as follows:\u2014\u201cSoc. But, indeed, as you also say, life is a\ngrievous thing. For I should not wonder if Euripides spoke the truth when\nhe says: \u2018Who knows whether to live is not to die, and to die is not to\nlive?\u2019 And we, perhaps, are in reality dead. For I have heard from one\nof the wise, that we are now dead; and that the body is our sepulchre;\nbut that the part of the soul in which the desires are contained, is of\nsuch a nature that it can be persuaded, and hurled upwards and downwards.\nHence a certain elegant man, perhaps a Sicilian, or an Italian,\ndenominated, mythologizing, this part of the soul a tub, by a derivation\nfrom the probable and the persuasive; and, likewise, he called those that\nare stupid, or deprived of intellect, uninitiated. He farther said, that\nthe intemperate and uncovered nature of that part of the soul in which\nthe desires are contained, was like a pierced tub, through its insatiable\ngreediness.\u201d\n\nWhat is here said by Plato is beautifully unfolded by Olymipiodorus, in\nhis MS. Commentary on the Gorgias, as follows:\u2014\u201cEuripides (in Phryxo)\nsays, that to live is to die, and to die to live. For the soul coming\nhither, as she imparts life to the body, so she partakes [through this]\nof a certain privation of life; but this is an evil. When separated,\ntherefore, from the body, she lives in reality: for she dies here,\nthrough participating a privation of life, because the body becomes the\nsource of evils. And hence it is necessary to subdue the body.\n\n\u201cBut the meaning of the Pythagoric fable, which is here introduced by\nPlato, is this: We are said to be dead, because, as we have before\nobserved, we partake of a privation of life. The sepulchre which we carry\nabout with us is, as Plato himself explains it, the body. But Hades is\nthe unapparent, because we are situated in obscurity, the soul being in\na state of servitude to the body. The tubs are the desires; whether they\nare so called from our hastening to fill them, as if they were tubs, or\nfrom desire persuading us that it is beautiful. The initiated, therefore,\n_i.e._ those that have a perfect knowledge, pour into the entire tub:\nfor these have their tub full; or, in other words, have perfect virtue.\nBut the uninitiated, viz. those that possess nothing perfect, have\nperforated tubs. For those that are in a state of servitude to desire\nalways wish to fill it, and are more inflamed; and on this account they\nhave perforated tubs, as being never full. But the sieve is the rational\nsoul mingled with the irrational. For the [rational] soul is called a\ncircle, because it seeks itself, and is itself sought; finds itself, and\nis itself found. But the irrational soul imitates a right line, since\nit does not revert to itself like a circle. So far, therefore, as the\nsieve is circular, it is an image of the rational soul; but, as it is\nplaced under the right lines formed from the holes, it is assumed for\nthe irrational soul. Right lines, therefore, are in the middle of the\ncavities. Hence, by the sieve, Plato signifies the rational in subjection\nto the irrational soul. But the water is the flux of nature: for, as\nHeraclitus says, _moisture is the death of the soul_.\u201d\n\nIn this extract the intelligent reader will easily perceive that the\noccult signification of the _tubs_ is more scientifically unfolded by\nOlympiodorus than by Porphyry.\n\n[143] In the original, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd, \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b7\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2. But after \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, I have no doubt we should insert \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c3\u03b9.\n\n[144] Phorcys is one among the ennead of Gods who, according to Plato\nin the Tim\u00e6us, fabricate generation. Of this deity, Proclus observes,\n\u201cthat as the Jupiter in this ennead causes the unapparent divisions and\nseparation of forms made by Saturn to become apparent, and as Rhea calls\nthem forth into motion and generation; so Phorcys inserts them in matter,\nproduces sensible natures, and adorns the visible essence, in order that\nthere may not only be divisions of productive principles [or forms] in\nnatures and in souls, and in intellectual essences prior to these; _but\nlikewise in sensibles. For this is the peculiarity of fabrication._\u201d\n\n[145] \u201cThe anger of the Gods,\u201d says Proclus, \u201cis not an indication of any\npassion in them, but demonstrates our inaptitude to participate of their\nilluminations.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nAUXILIARIES TO THE PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES.\n\n\nSECTION I.\n\n1. Every body is in place; but nothing essentially incorporeal, or any\nthing of this kind, has any locality.\n\n2. Things essentially incorporeal, because they are more excellent than\nall body and place, are every where, not with interval, but impartibly.\n\n3. Things essentially incorporeal, are not locally present with bodies,\nbut are present with them when they please; by verging towards them so\nfar as they are naturally adapted so to verge. They are not, however,\npresent with them locally, but through habitude, proximity, and alliance.\n\n4. Things essentially incorporeal, are not present with bodies, by\nhypostasis and essence; for they are not mingled with bodies. But they\nimpart a certain power which is proximate to bodies, through verging\ntowards them. For tendency constitutes a certain secondary power\nproximate to bodies.\n\n5. Soul, indeed, is a certain medium between an impartible essence,\nand an essence which is divisible about bodies. But intellect is an\nimpartible essence alone. And qualities and material forms are divisible\nabout bodies.\n\n6. Not every thing[146] which acts on another, effects that which it\ndoes effect by approximation and contact; but those natures which effect\nany thing by approximation and contact, use approximation accidentally.\n\n7. The soul is bound to the body by a conversion to the corporeal\npassions; and is again liberated by becoming impassive to the body.\n\n8. That which nature binds, nature also dissolves: and that which the\nsoul binds, the soul likewise dissolves. Nature, indeed, bound the body\nto the soul; but the soul binds herself to the body. Nature, therefore,\nliberates the body from the soul; but the soul liberates herself from the\nbody.\n\n9. Hence there is a twofold death; the one, indeed, universally known,\nin which the body is liberated from the soul; but the other peculiar to\nphilosophers, in which the soul is liberated from the body. Nor does the\none[147] entirely follow the other.\n\n10. We do not understand similarly in all things, but in a manner\nadapted to the essence of each. For intellectual objects we understand\nintellectually; but those that pertain to soul rationally. We apprehend\nplants spermatically; but bodies idolically [_i.e._ as images]; and that\nwhich is above all these, super-intellectually and super-essentially[148].\n\n11. Incorporeal hypostases, in descending, are distributed into parts,\nand multiplied about individuals with a diminution of power; but when\nthey ascend by their energies beyond bodies, they become united, and\nproceed into a simultaneous subsistence, through exuberance of power.\n\n12. The homonymous is not in bodies only, but life also is among the\nnumber of things which have a multifarious subsistence. For the life\nof a plant is different from that of an animated being; the life of an\nintellectual essence differs from that of the nature which is beyond\nintellect; and the psychical differs from the intellectual life. For\nthese natures live, though nothing which proceeds from, possesses a life\nsimilar to them.\n\n13. Every thing which generates by its very essence, generates that which\nis inferior to itself[149]; and every thing generated, is naturally\nconverted to its generator. Of generating natures, however, some are not\nat all converted to the beings which they generate; but others are partly\nconverted to them, and partly not; and others are only converted to their\nprogeny, but are not converted to themselves.\n\n14. Every thing generated, possesses from that which is different from\nitself the cause of its generation, since nothing is produced without a\ncause. Such generated natures, however, as have their existence through\ncomposition, these are on this account corruptible. But such as, being\nsimple and incomposite, possess their existence in a simplicity of\nhypostasis, these being indissoluble, are, indeed, incorruptible; yet\nthey are said to be generated, not as if they were composites, but as\nbeing suspended from a certain cause. Bodies, therefore, are in a twofold\nrespect generated; as being suspended from a certain producing cause;\nand as being composites. But soul and intellect are only generated as\nbeing suspended from a cause, and not as composites. Hence bodies\nare generated, dissoluble and corruptible; but soul and intellect\nare unbegotten, as being without composition, and on this account\nindissoluble and incorruptible; yet they are generated so far as they are\nsuspended from a cause.\n\n15. Intellect is not the principle of all things; for intellect is many\nthings; but, prior to _the many_, it is necessary that there should be\n_the one_. It is evident, however, that intellect is many things. For\nit always understands its conceptions, which are not one, but many;\nand which are not any thing else than itself. If, therefore, it is the\nsame with its conceptions, but they are many, intellect also will be\nmany things. But that it is the same with intelligibles [or the objects\nof its intellection], may be thus demonstrated. For, if there is any\nthing which intellect surveys, it will either survey this thing as\ncontained in itself, or as placed in something else. And that intellect,\nindeed, contemplates or surveys, is evident. For, in conjunction with\nintellection, or intellectual perception, it will be intellect; but if\nyou deprive it of intellection, you will destroy its essence. It is\nnecessary, therefore, that, directing our attention to the properties\nof knowledge, we should investigate the perception of intellect. All\nthe gnostic powers, then, which we contain, are universally sense,\nimagination, and intellect[150]. The power, however, which employs\nsense, surveys by projecting itself to externals, not being united to\nthe objects which it surveys, but only receiving an impression of, by\nexerting its energies upon them. When, therefore, the eye sees a visible\nobject, it is impossible that it should become the same with that which\nit perceives: for it would not see if there was not an interval between\nit and the object of its perception. And, after the same manner, that\nwhich is touched, if it was the same with that by which it is touched,\nwould perish. From which it is evident that sense, and that which employs\nsense, must always tend to an external object, in order to apprehend\nsomething sensible. In like manner also, the phantasy, or imagination,\nalways tends to something external, and by this extension of itself,\ngives subsistence to, or prepares an image; its extension to what is\nexternal, indicating that the object of its perception is a resemblance\nof something external. And such, indeed, is the apprehension of these two\npowers; neither of which verging to, and being collected into itself,\nperceives either a sensible or insensible form.\n\nIn intellect, however, the apprehension of its objects does not subsist\nafter this manner, but is effected by converging to, and surveying\nitself. For by departing from itself, in order to survey its own\nenergies, and become the eye of them, and the sight of essences, it will\nnot understand any thing. Hence, as sense is to that which is sensible,\nso is intellect to that which is intelligible. Sense, however, by,\nextending itself to externals, finds that which is sensible situated\nin matter; but intellect surveys the intelligible, by being collected\ninto itself, and not extended outwardly[151]. On this account some are\nof opinion, that the hypostasis of intellect differs from that of the\nphantasy only in name. For the phantasy, in the rational animal, appeared\nto them to be intelligence. As these men, however, suspended all things\nfrom matter and a corporeal nature, it follows that they should also\nsuspend from these intellect. But our intellect surveys both bodies and\nother essences. Hence it apprehends them situated somewhere. But as the\nproper objects of intellect have a subsistence out of matter, they will\nbe no where[152] [locally]. It is evident, therefore, that intellectual\nnatures are to be conjoined with intelligence. But if intellectual\nnatures are in intellect, it follows that intellect, when it understands\nintelligibles, surveys both the intelligible and itself; and that\nproceeding into itself, it perceives intellectually, because it proceeds\ninto intelligibles. If, however, intellect understands many things, and\nnot one thing only, intellect also will necessarily be many. But _the\none_ subsists prior to the many; so that it is necessary that _the one_\nshould be prior to intellect.\n\n16. Memory is not the conservation of imaginations, but the power of\ncalling forth _de novo_ those conceptions which had previously occupied\nthe attention of the mind[153].\n\n17. Soul, indeed, contains the reasons [or forms] of all things, but\nenergizes according to them, either being called forth to this energy\nby something else, or converting itself to them inwardly. And when\ncalled forth by something else, it introduces, as it were, the senses\nto externals, but when it enters into itself, it becomes occupied with\nintellectual conceptions. Hence some one may say, that neither the\nsenses, nor intellectual perceptions, are without the phantasy; so that,\nas in the animal, the senses are not without the passive affection of\nthe sensitive organs, in like manner intellections are not without the\nphantasy. Perhaps, however, it may be said, in answer to this, that, as\nan impression in the sensitive organ is the concomitant of the sensitive\nanimal, so analogously a phantasm is the concomitant of the intellection\nof the soul in man, considered as an animal[154].\n\n18. Soul is an essence without magnitude, immaterial, incorruptible,\npossessing its existence in life, and having life from itself.\n\n19. The passivity of bodies is different from that of incorporeal\nnatures. For the passivity of bodies is attended with mutation; but the\nadaptations and passions of the soul are energies; yet they are by no\nmeans similar to the calefactions and frigefactions of bodies. Hence,\nif the passivity of bodies is accompanied by mutation, it must be said\nthat all incorporeal natures are impassive. For the essences which are\nseparated from matter and bodies, are what they are in energy. But those\nthings which approximate to matter and bodies, are themselves, indeed,\nimpassive; but the natures in which they are surveyed are passive. For\nwhen the animal perceives sensibly, the soul [_i.e._ the rational soul]\nappears to be similar to separate harmony[155], of itself moving the\nchords adapted to harmony; but the body is similar to the inseparable\nharmony in the chords, [_i.e._ to the harmony which cannot exist\nseparate from the chords]. But the animal is the cause of the motion,\nbecause it is an animated being. It is, however, analogous to a musician,\nbecause it is harmonic; but the bodies which are struck through sensitive\npassion, are analogous to the harmonized chords of a musical instrument.\nFor in this instance, also, separate harmony is not passively affected,\nbut the chords. And the musician, indeed, moves according to the harmony\nwhich is in him; yet the chords would not be musically moved, even though\nthe musician wished that they should, unless harmony ordered this to take\nplace.\n\n20. Incorporeal natures are not denominated like bodies, according to a\nparticipation in common of one and the same genus; but they derive their\nappellation from a mere privation with respect to bodies. Hence, nothing\nhinders some of them from having a subsistence as beings, but others as\nnon-beings; some of them, from being prior to, and others posterior to\nbodies; some, from being separate, and others inseparable from bodies;\nsome, from having a subsistence by themselves, but others from being\nindigent of things different from themselves, to their existence; some,\nfrom being the same through energies and self-motive lives, but others\nfrom subsisting together with lives, and energies of a certain quality.\nFor they subsist according to a negation of the things which they are\nnot, and not according to the affirmation of the things which they are.\n\n21. The properties of matter, according to the ancients, are the\nfollowing: It is incorporeal; for it is different from bodies. It is\nwithout life; for it is neither intellect nor soul, nor vital from\nitself [_i.e._ essentially]. It is also formless, variable, infinite,\nand powerless. Hence, it is neither being, nor yet non-being. Not that\nit is non-being like motion, but it is true non-being, the image and\nphantasm of bulk, because it is that which bulk primarily contains. It\nis likewise powerless, and the desire of subsistence, has stability, but\nnot in permanency, and always appears in itself to be contrary. Hence, it\nis both small and great, more and less, deficient and exceeding. It is\nalways becoming to be, or rising into existence; abides not, and yet is\nunable to fly away; and is the defect of all being. Hence, in whatever\nit announces itself to be, it deceives; and though it should appear to\nbe great, it is nevertheless small. For it resembles a flying mockery,\neluding all pursuit, and vanishing into non-entity. For its flight is not\nin place, but is effected by its desertion of real being. Hence, also,\nthe images which are in it, are in an image more unreal than themselves;\njust as in a mirror, where the thing represented is in one place, and\nthe representation of it in another. It likewise appears to be full, yet\ncontains nothing, though it seems to possess all things[156].\n\n22. All passions subsist about the same thing as that about which\ncorruption subsists; for the reception of passion is the path to\ncorruption. And the thing that is the subject of passivity, is also the\nsubject of corruption. Nothing incorporeal, however, is corrupted. But\nsome of them either exist, or do not exist; so that they are not at all\npassive. For that which is passive, ought not to be a thing of this kind,\nbut such as may be changed in quality, and corrupted by the properties\nof the things that enter into it, and cause it to be passive. For the\nchange in quality of that which is inherent, is not casually effected.\nNeither, therefore, does matter suffer; for it is of itself without\nquality. Nor do the forms which enter into, and depart from it, suffer;\nbut the passion subsists about the composite from matter and form, the\nvery being of which consists in the union of the two. For this, in the\ncontrary powers and qualities of the things which enter and produce\npassion, is seen to be the subject of them. On which account, also, those\nthings, the life of which is externally derived, and does not subsist\nfrom themselves, are capable of suffering both the participation and\nthe privation of life. But those beings whose existence consists in an\nimpassive life, must necessarily possess a permanent life; just as a\nprivation of life, so far as it is a privation of it, is attended with\nimpassivity. As, therefore, to be changed and to suffer pertain to the\ncomposite from matter and form, and this is body, but matter is exempt\nfrom this; thus also, to live and to die, and to suffer through the\nparticipation of life and death, is beheld in the composite from soul and\nbody. Nevertheless, this does not happen to the soul; because it is not a\nthing which consists of life and the privation of life, but consists of\nlife alone. And it possesses this, because its essence is simple, and the\nreason [or form] of the soul is self-motive[157].\n\n23. An intellectual essence is so similar in its parts, that the\nsame[158] things exist both in a partial and an all-perfect intellect. In\nan universal intellect, however, partial natures subsist universally; but\nin a partial intellect, both universals and particulars subsist partially.\n\n24. Of that essence, the existence of which is in life, and the passions\nof which are lives, the death also consists in a certain life, and not in\na total privation of life; because, neither is the deprivation of life\nin this essence a passion, or a path which entirely leads to a non-vital\nsubsistence.\n\n25. In incorporeal lives, the progressions are effected while the lives\nthemselves remain firm and stable, nothing pertaining to them being\ncorrupted, or changed into the hypostasis of things subordinate to them.\nHence, neither are the things to which they give subsistence produced\nwith a certain corruption or mutation. Nor do these incorporeal lives\nsubsist like generation, which participates of corruption and mutation.\nHence, they are unbegotten and incorruptible, and on this account are\nunfolded into light without generation and incorruptibly.\n\n26. Of that nature which is beyond intellect, many things are asserted\nthrough intellection, but it is surveyed by a cessation of intellectual\nenergy better than with it[159]; just as with respect to one who is\nasleep, many things are asserted of him while he is in that state by\nthose who are awake; but the proper knowledge and apprehension of his\ndormant condition, is only to be obtained through sleep. For the similar\nis known by the similar; because _all knowledge is an assimilation to the\nobject of knowledge_.\n\n27. With respect to that which is non-being, we either produce it, being\nourselves separated from real being, or we have a preconception of it,\nas adhering to being. Hence, if we are separated from being, we have not\nan antecedent conception of the non-being which is above being, but our\nknowledge in this case is only that of a false passion, such as that\nwhich happens to a man when he departs from himself. For as a man may\nhimself, and through himself, be truly elevated to the non-being which\nis above being, so, by departing from being, he is led to the non-being\nwhich is a falling off from being.\n\n28. The hypostasis of body is no impediment whatever to that which is\nessentially incorporeal, so as to prevent it from being where, and in\nsuch a way, as it wishes to be. For as that which is without bulk is\nincomprehensible by body, and does not at all pertain to it, so that\nwhich has bulk cannot impede or obscure an incorporeal nature, but lies\nbefore it like a non-entity. Nor does that which is incorporeal pervade\nlocally, when it wishes to pass from one thing to another; for place is\nconsubsistent with bulk. Nor is it compressed by bodies. For that which\nin any way whatever is connected with bulk, may be compressed, and effect\na transition locally; but that which is entirely without bulk and without\nmagnitude, cannot be restrained by that which has bulk, and does not\nparticipate of local motion. Hence, by a certain disposition, it is found\nto be there, where it is inclined to be, being with respect to place\nevery where and yet no where[160]. By _a certain disposition_, therefore,\nit is either above the heavens, or is contained in a certain part of the\nworld. When, however, it is contained in a certain part of the world, it\nis not visible to the eyes, but the presence of it becomes manifest from\nits works.\n\n29. It is necessary that an incorporeal nature, if it is contained in\nbody, should not be enclosed in it like a wild beast in a den; (for no\nbody is able thus to enclose and comprehend it), nor is it contained in\nbody in the same way as a bladder contains something liquid, or wind; but\nit is requisite that it should give subsistence to certain powers which\nverge to what is external, through its union with body; by which powers,\nwhen it descends, it becomes complicated with body. Its conjunction,\ntherefore, with body, is effected through an ineffable extension.\nHence, nothing else binds it, but itself binds itself to body. Neither,\ntherefore, is it liberated from the body, when the body is [mortally]\nwounded and corrupted, but it liberates itself, by turning itself from an\nadhering affection to the body.\n\n30. None of the hypostases which rank as wholes, and are perfect, is\nconverted to its own progeny; but all perfect hypostases are elevated\nto their generators as far as to the mundane body [or the body of the\nworld]. For this body, being perfect, is elevated to its soul, which\nis intellectual: and on this account it is moved in a circle. But the\nsoul of this body is elevated to intellect; and intellect, to the first\nprinciple of all things. All beings, therefore, proceed to this principle\nas much as possible, beginning from the last of things. The elevation,\nhowever, to that which is first, is either proximate or remote. Hence,\nthese natures may not only be said to aspire after the highest God, but\nalso to enjoy him to the utmost of their power. But in partial[161]\nhypostases, and which are able to verge to many things, there is also a\ndesire of being converted to their progeny. Hence, likewise, in these\nthere is error, in these there is reprehensible incredulity. These,\ntherefore, matter injures, because they are capable of being converted\nto it, being at the same time able to be converted to divinity. Hence,\nperfection gives subsistence to secondary from primary natures,\npreserving them converted to the first of things; but imperfection\nconverts primary[162] to posterior natures, and causes them to love the\nbeings which have departed from divinity prior to themselves.\n\n31. God is every where because he is no where: and this is also true of\nintellect and soul: for each of these is every where, because each is\nno where. But God indeed is every where, and no where, with respect to\nall things which are posterior to him; and he[163] alone is such as he\nis, and such as he wills himself to be. Intellect is in God, but is every\nwhere, and no where, with respect to the natures posterior to it. And\nsoul is in God and intellect, and is every where and no where, in [or\nwith respect to] body[164]. But body is in soul, and in intellect[165],\nand in God. And as all beings and non-beings are from and in God, hence,\nhe is neither beings nor non-beings, nor subsists in them. For if,\nindeed, he was alone every where, he would be all things and in all, but\nsince he is also no where, all things are produced through him, and are\ncontained in him, because he is every where. They are, however, different\nfrom him, because he is no where. Thus, likewise, intellect being every\nwhere and no where, is the cause of souls, and of the natures posterior\nto souls; yet intellect is not soul, nor the natures posterior to soul,\nnor subsists in them; because it is not only every where, but is also no\nwhere, with respect to the natures posterior to it. And soul is neither\nbody, nor in body, but is the cause of body; because being every where,\nit is also no where, with respect to body. And this progression of things\nin the universe extends as far as to that which is neither able to be at\nonce every where, nor at once no where, but partially participates of\neach of these[166].\n\n32. The soul does not exist on the earth [when it is conversant with\nterrene natures,] in the same manner as bodies accede to the earth;\nbut a subsistence of the soul on the earth, signifies its presiding\nover terrene bodies. Thus, also, the soul is said to be in Hades, when\nit presides over its image[167], which is naturally adapted to be in\nplace, but possesses its hypostasis in darkness. So that if Hades is a\nsubterranean dark place, the soul, though not divulsed from being, will\nexist in Hades, by attracting to itself its image. For when the soul\ndeparts from the solid body, the spirit accompanies it which it had\ncollected from the starry spheres. But as from its adhering affection\nto the body, it exerts a partial reason, through which it possesses an\nhabitude to a body of a certain quality, in performing the energies of\nlife;\u2014hence, from this adhesion to body, the form of the phantasy is\nimpressed in the spirit, and thus the image is attracted by the soul.\nThe soul, however, is said to be in Hades, because the spirit obtains a\nformless and obscure nature. And as a heavy and moist spirit pervades\nas far as to subterranean places, hence the soul is said to proceed\nunder the earth. Not that this essence of the soul changes one place\nfor another, and subsists in place, but it receives the habitudes of\nbodies which are naturally adapted to change their places, and to be\nallotted a subsistence in place; such-like bodies receiving it according\nto aptitudes, from being disposed after a certain manner towards it. For\nthe soul, conformably to the manner in which it is disposed, finds an\nappropriate body. Hence, when it is disposed in a purer manner, it has a\nconnascent body which approximates to an ethereal nature, and this is an\nethereal body. But when it proceeds from reason to the energies of the\nphantasy, then its connascent body is of a solar-form nature. And when it\nbecomes effeminate and vehemently excited by corporeal form, then it is\nconnected with a lunar-form body. When, however, it falls into bodies\nwhich consist of humid vapours, then a perfect ignorance of real being\nfollows, together with darkness and infancy.\n\nMoreover, in its egress from the body, if it still possesses a spirit\nturbid from humid exhalations, it then attracts to itself a shadow, and\nbecomes heavy; a spirit of this kind naturally striving to penetrate\ninto the recesses of the earth, unless a certain other cause draws it\nin a contrary direction. As therefore the soul, when surrounded with\nthis testaceous and terrene vestment, necessarily lives on the earth; so\nlikewise when it attracts a moist spirit, it is necessarily surrounded\nwith the image. But it attracts moisture when it continually endeavours\nto associate with nature, whose operations are effected in moisture,\nand which are rather under than upon the earth. When, however, the soul\nearnestly endeavours to depart from nature, then she becomes a dry\nsplendour, without a shadow, and without a cloud, or mist. For moisture\ngives subsistence to a mist in the air; but dryness constitutes a dry\nsplendour from exhalation.\n\n33. The things which are truly predicated of a sensible and material\nnature, are these: that it has, in every respect, a diffused and\ndispersed subsistence; that it is mutable; that it has its existence in\ndifference; that it is a composite; that it subsists by itself, [as the\nsubject or recipient of other things;] that it is beheld in place, and\nin bulk: and other properties similar to these are asserted of it. But\nthe following particulars are predicated of truly existing being, and\nwhich itself subsists from itself; viz. that it is always established\nin itself; that it has an existence perpetually similar and the same;\nthat it is essentialized in sameness; that it is immutable according\nto essence, is uncompounded, is neither dissoluble, nor in place, nor\nis dispersed into bulk; and is neither generated, nor capable of being\ndestroyed: and other properties are asserted of it similar to these. To\nwhich predications adhering, we should neither ourselves assert any\nthing repugnant to them, concerning the different nature of sensible and\ntruly-existing beings, nor assent to those who do.\n\n\nSECTION II.\n\n34. There is one kind of virtues pertaining to the political character,\nand another to the man who tends to contemplation, and who, on this\naccount, is called theoretic, and is now a beholder [of intellectual and\nintelligible natures]. And there are also other virtues pertaining to\nintellect, so far as it is intellect, and separate from soul. The virtues\nindeed of the political character, and which consist in the moderation\nof the passions, are characterized by following and being obedient to\nthe reasoning about that which is becoming in actions. Hence, looking to\nan innoxious converse with neighbours, these virtues are denominated,\nfrom the aggregation of fellowship, political. And here prudence indeed\nsubsists about the reasoning part; fortitude about the irascible\npart; temperance in the consent and symphony of the epithymetic[168]\nwith the reasoning part; and justice, in each of these performing its\nproper employment with respect to governing and being governed. But\nthe virtues of him who proceeds to the contemplative life, consist in\na departure from terrestrial concerns. Hence, also, they are called\npurifications, being surveyed in the refraining from corporeal actions,\nand avoiding sympathies with the body. For these are the virtues of the\nsoul elevating itself to true being. The political virtues therefore\nadorn the mortal man, and are the forerunners of purifications. For it\nis necessary that he who is adorned by the _cathartic_ virtues, should\nabstain from doing any thing precedaneously in conjunction with body.\nHence, in these purifications, not to opine with body, but to energize\nalone, gives subsistence to _prudence_; which derives its perfection\nthrough energizing intellectually with purity. But not to be similarly\npassive with the body, constitutes _temperance_. Not to fear a departure\nfrom body, as into something void, and non-entity, gives subsistence to\n_fortitude_. But when reason and intellect are the leaders, and there\nis no resistance [from the irrational part], _justice_ is produced. The\ndisposition therefore, according to the political virtues, is surveyed\nin the moderation of the passions; having for its end to live as man\nconformable to nature. But the disposition, according to the theoretic\nvirtues, is beheld in apathy[169], the end of which is a similitude to\nGod.\n\nSince, however, of purification, one kind consists in purifying, but\nanother pertains to those that are purified, the cathartic virtues are\nsurveyed according to both these significations of purification. For\nthe end of purification is to become pure. But since purification, and\nthe being purified, are an ablation of every thing foreign, the good\nresulting from them will be different from that which purifies; so, that\nif that which is purified was good prior to the impurity with which it\nis defiled, purification is sufficient. That, however, which remains\nafter purification, is good, and not purification. The nature of the soul\nalso was not good [prior to purification], but is that which is able to\npartake of good, and is boniform. For if this were not the case, it would\nnot have become situated in evil. The good therefore of the soul consists\nin being united to its generator, but its evil in an association with\nthings subordinate to itself. Its evil also is twofold; the one arising\nfrom an association with terrestrial natures, but the other from doing\nthis with an excess of the passions. Hence, all the political virtues\nwhich liberate the soul from one evil, may be denominated virtues, and\nare honourable. But the cathartic are more honourable, and liberate it\nfrom evil, so far as it is soul. It is necessary therefore, that the\nsoul, when purified, should associate with its generator. Hence, the\nvirtue of it, after its conversion, consists in a scientific knowledge of\n[true] being; but this will not be the case, unless conversion precedes.\n\nThere is, therefore, another genus of virtues after the cathartic\nand political, and which are the virtues of the soul _energizing\nintellectually_. And here, indeed, wisdom and prudence consist in the\ncontemplation of those things which intellect possesses. But _justice_\nconsists in performing what is appropriate in conformity to, and\nenergizing according to intellect. _Temperance_ is an inward conversion\nof the soul to intellect. And _fortitude_ is apathy, according to a\nsimilitude of that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally\nimpassive. These virtues also, in the same manner as the others,\nalternately follow each other.\n\nThe fourth species of the virtues, is that of the paradigms subsisting\nin intellect: which are more excellent than the psychical virtues, and\nexist as the paradigms of these; the virtues of the soul being the\nsimilitudes of them. And intellect indeed is that in which all things\nsubsist at once as paradigms. Here, therefore, prudence is science; but\nintellect that knows [all things] is wisdom. Temperance is that which is\nconverted to itself. The proper work of intellect, is the performance\nof its appropriate duty, [and this is justice[170].] But fortitude is\nsameness, and the abiding with purity in itself, through an abundance\nof power. There are therefore four genera of virtues; of which, indeed,\nsome pertain to intellect, concur with the essence of it, and are\nparadigmatic. Others pertain to soul now looking to intellect, and being\nfilled from it. Others belong to the soul of man, purifying itself, and\nbecoming purified from the body, and the irrational passions. And others\nare the virtues of the soul of man, adorning the man, through giving\nmeasure and bound to the irrational nature, and producing moderation\nin the passions. _And he indeed, who has the greater virtues, has also\nnecessarily the less; but the contrary is not true, that he who has\nthe less, has also the greater virtues._ Nor will he who possesses the\ngreater, energize precedaneously according to the less, but only so far\nas the necessities of the mortal nature require. The scope also of the\nvirtues, is, as we have said, generically different in the different\nvirtues. For the scope of the _political_ virtues, is to give measure\nto the passions in their practical energies according to nature.\nBut the scope of the _cathartic_ virtues, is entirely to obliterate\nthe remembrance of the passions; and the scope of the rest subsists\nanalogously to what has been before said. Hence, he who energizes\naccording to the _practical_ virtues, is a _worthy_ man; but he who\nenergizes according to the _cathartic_ virtues, is an _angelic man_, or\nis also _a good d\u00e6mon_. He who energizes according to the _intellectual_\nvirtues alone is _a God_; but he who energizes according to the\n_paradigmatic_ virtues, is _the father of the Gods_. We, therefore, ought\nespecially to pay attention to the _cathartic_ virtues, since we may\nobtain these in the present life. But through these, the ascent is to the\nmore honourable virtues. Hence, it is requisite to survey to what degree\npurification may be extended: for it is a separation from body, and from\nthe passive motion of the irrational part. But how this may be effected,\nand to what extent, must now be unfolded.\n\nIn the first place, indeed, it is necessary that he who intends to\nacquire this purification, should, as the foundation and basis of it,\nknow himself to be a soul bound in a foreign thing, and in a different\nessence. In the second place, as that which is raised from this\nfoundation, he should collect himself from the body, and as it were from\ndifferent places, so as to be disposed in a manner perfectly impassive\nwith respect to the body. For he who energizes uninterruptedly according\nto sense, though he may not do this with an adhering affection, and the\nenjoyment resulting from pleasure, yet, at the same time, his attention\nis dissipated about the body, in consequence of becoming through\nsense[171] in contact with it. But we are addicted to the pleasures or\npains of sensibles; in conjunction with a promptitude, and converging\nsympathy; from which disposition it is requisite to be purified.\n_This, however, will be effected by admitting necessary pleasures, and\nthe sensations of them, merely as remedies, or as a liberation from\npain[172], in order that [the rational part] may not be impeded [in its\nenergies]._ Pain also must be taken away. But if this is not possible,\nit must be mildly diminished. And it will be diminished, if the soul\nis not copassive with it. Anger, likewise, must as much as possible be\ntaken away; and must by no means be premeditated. But if it cannot be\nentirely removed, deliberate choice must not be mingled with it, but\nthe unpremeditated motion must be the impulse of the irrational part.\n_That however which is unpremeditated, is imbecile and small._ All fear\nlikewise must be expelled. For he who is adapted to this purification,\nwill fear nothing. Here, however, if it should take place, it will be\nunpremeditated. Anger therefore and fear must be used for the purpose\nof admonition. But the desire of every thing base must be exterminated.\nSuch a one also, so far as he is a cathartic philosopher, will not\ndesire meats and drinks [except so far as they are necessary]. Neither\nmust there be the unpremeditated in natural venereal connexions; _but if\nthis should take place, it must only be as far as to that precipitate\nimagination which energizes in sleep_. In short, the intellectual soul\nitself of the purified man must be liberated from all these [corporeal\npropensities]. He must likewise endeavour, that what is moved to the\nirrational nature of corporeal passions, may be moved without sympathy,\nand without animadversion; so that the motions themselves may be\nimmediately dissolved, through their vicinity to the reasoning power.\nThis, however, will not take place while the purification is proceeding\nto its perfection; but will happen to those in whom reason rules without\nopposition. Hence, in these, the inferior part will so venerate reason,\nthat it will be indignant if it is at all moved, in consequence of not\nbeing quiet when its master is present, and will reprove itself for its\nimbecility. These, however, are yet only moderations of the passions,\nbut at length terminate in apathy. For when copassivity is entirely\nexterminated, then apathy is present with him who is purified from this\npassivity. For passion becomes moved when reason imparts excitation,\nthrough verging [to the irrational nature].\n\n35. Every thing which is situated somewhere, is there situated according\nto its own nature, and not preternaturally. For body, therefore, which\nsubsists in matter and bulk, to be somewhere, is to be in place. Hence,\nfor the body of the world, which is material and has bulk, to be every\nwhere, is to be extended with interval, and to subsist in the place\nof interval. But a subsistence in place, is not at all present with\nthe intelligible world, nor, in short, with that which is immaterial,\nand essentially incorporeal, because it is without bulk, and without\ninterval; so that the ubiquity of an incorporeal nature is not local.\nHence, neither will one part of it be here, but another there; for if\nthis were the case, it would not be out of place, nor without interval;\nbut wherever it is, the whole of it is there. Nor is it indeed in this,\nbut not in another place; for thus it would be comprehended by one place,\nbut separated from another. Nor is it remote from this thing, but near\nto that; in the same manner as remoteness and nearness are asserted of\nthings which are adapted to be in place, according to the measures of\nintervals. Hence, the sensible is present, indeed, with the intelligible\nworld, according to interval, but [a truly] incorporeal nature is\npresent with the world impartibly, and unaccompanied by interval. The\nimpartible, likewise, when it is in that which has interval, is wholly\nin every part of it, being one and the same in number [in every part of\nit]. That which is impartible, therefore, and without multitude, becomes\nextended into magnitude, and multiplied, when intimately connected\nwith that which is naturally multitudinous, and endued with magnitude;\nand thus the latter receives the former in such a way as it is adapted\nto receive it, and not such as the former truly is. But that which is\npartible and multitudinous, is received by that which is naturally\nimpartible and without multitude, impartibly and non-multitudinously, and\nafter this manner is present with it; _i.e._ the impartible is present\nimpartibly, without plurality, and without a subsistence in place,\nconformably to its own nature, with that which is partible, and which is\nnaturally multitudinous, and exists in place. But that which is partible,\nmultiplied, and in place, is present with the impartible essence,\npartibly, multitudinously, and locally. Hence, it is necessary, in the\nsurvey of these natures, to preserve and not confound the peculiarities\nof each; or rather, we should not imagine or opine of that which is\nincorporeal, such properties as pertain to bodies, or any thing of the\nlike kind. For no one would ascribe to bodies the peculiarities of a\ngenuinely incorporeal essence. For all of us are familiar with bodies;\nbut the knowledge of incorporeal natures is attainable by us with great\ndifficulty; because, through not being able to behold them intuitively,\nwe are involved in doubt about their nature; and this takes place as long\nas we are under the dominion of imagination.\n\nThus, therefore, you should say, If that which is in place, is out of,\nor has departed from itself, through having proceeded into bulk, that\nwhich is intelligible is not in place, and is in itself, because it\nhas not proceeded into corporeal extension. Hence, if the former is an\nimage, the latter is an archetype. And the former, indeed, derives its\nbeing through the intelligible; but the latter subsists in [and through]\nitself. For every [physical] image is the image of intellect. It is also\nrequisite that, calling to mind the peculiarities of both these, we\nshould not wonder at the discrepance which takes place in their congress\nwith each other; if, in short, it is proper on this occasion to use the\nword congress. For we are not now surveying the congress of bodies, but\nof things which are entirely distinct from each other, according to\npeculiarity of hypostasis. Hence, also, this congress is different from\nevery thing which is usually surveyed in things essentially the same.\nNeither, therefore, is it temperament, or mixture, or conjunction, or\napposition, but subsists in a way different from all these; appearing,\nindeed, in all the mutual participations of consubstantial natures, in\nwhatever way this may be effected; but transcending every thing that\nfalls under the apprehension of sense. Hence, an intelligible essence is\nwholly present without interval, with all the parts of that which has\ninterval, though they should happen to be infinite in number. Nor is\nit present distributed into parts, giving a part to a part; nor being\nmultiplied, does it multitudinously impart itself to multitude; but it\nis wholly present with the parts of that which is extended into bulk,\nand with each individual of the multitude, and all the bulk impartibly,\nand without plurality, and as numerically one. But it pertains to those\nnatures to enjoy it partibly, and in a distributed manner, whose power is\ndissipated into different parts. And to these it frequently happens, that\nthrough a defect of their own nature, they counterfeit an intelligible\nessence; so that doubts arise respecting that essence, which appears to\nhave passed from its own nature into theirs.\n\n36. Truly-existing being is neither great nor small, for magnitude\nand parvitude are properly the peculiarities of bulk. But true being\ntranscends both magnitude and parvitude; and is above the greatest, and\nabove the least; and is numerically one and the same, though it is found\nto be simultaneously participated by every thing that is greatest, and\nevery thing that is least. You must not, therefore, conceive of it as\nsomething which is greatest; as you will then be dubious how, being that\nwhich is greatest, it is present with the smallest masses, without being\ndiminished or contracted. Nor must you conceive of it as something which\nis least; since you will thus again be dubious how, being that which is\nleast, it is present with the greatest masses, without being multiplied\nor increased, or without receiving addition. But at one and the same time\nreceiving into the greatest magnitude that which transcends the greatest\nbulk, and into the least magnitude that which transcends the least[173],\nyou will be able to conceive how the same thing, abiding in itself,\nmay be simultaneously seen in any casual magnitude, and in infinite\nmultitudes and corporeal masses. For according to its own peculiarity,\nit is present with the magnitude of the world impartibly and without\nmagnitude. It also antecedes the bulk of the world, and comprehends every\npart of it, in its own impartibility; just as, _vice versa_, the world,\nby its multitude of parts, is multifariously present, as far as it is\nable, with truly-existing being, yet cannot comprehend it, neither with\nthe whole of its bulk, nor the whole of its power; but meets with it in\nall its parts as that which is infinite, and cannot be passed beyond;\nand this both in other respects, and because truly-existing being is\nentirely free from all corporeal extension.\n\n37. That which is greater in bulk, is less in power, when compared, not\nwith things of a similar kind, but with those that are of a different\nspecies, or of a different essence. For bulk is, as it were, the\ndeparture of a thing from itself, and a division of power into the\nsmallest parts. Hence, that which transcends in power, is foreign from\nall bulk. For power proceeding into itself, is filled with itself, and,\nby corroborating itself, obtains its proper strength; on which account,\nbody proceeding into bulk through a diminution of power, is as much\nremote from truly-incorporeal being, as that which truly exists is from\nbeing exhausted by bulk; for the latter abides in the magnitude of the\nsame power, through an exemption from bulk. As, therefore, truly-existing\nbeing is, with reference to a corporeal mass, without magnitude and\nwithout bulk; thus also, that which is corporeal is, with reference\nto truly-existing being, imbecile and powerless. For that which is\ngreatest by magnitude of power, is exempt from all bulk; so that the\nworld existing every where, and, as it is said, meeting with real being\nwhich is truly every where, is not able to comprehend the magnitude of\nits power. It meets, however, with true being, which is not partibly\npresent with it, but is present without magnitude, and without any\ndefinite limitation. The presence, therefore, of truly-existing being\nwith the world, is not local, but assimilative, so far as it is possible\nfor body to be assimilated to that which is incorporeal, and for that\nwhich is incorporeal to be surveyed in a body assimilated to it. Hence,\nan incorporeal nature is not present with body, so far as it is not\npossible for that which is material to be assimilated to a perfectly\nimmaterial nature; and it is present, so far as a corporeal can be\nassimilated to an incorporeal essence. Nevertheless, this is not effected\nthrough reception; since, if it were, each would be corrupted. For the\nmaterial, indeed, in receiving the immaterial nature, would be corrupted,\nthrough being changed into it; and the immaterial essence would become\nmaterial. Assimilations, therefore, and participations of powers, and\nthe deficiency of power, proceed into things which are thus different\nin essence from each other, into each other. The world, therefore, is\nvery far from possessing the power of real being; and real being is very\nremote from the imbecility of a material nature. But that which subsists\nbetween these, assimilating and being assimilated, and conjoining\nthe extremes to each other, becomes the cause of deception about the\nextremes, in consequence of applying, through the assimilation, the one\nto the other.\n\n38. Truly-existing being is said to be many things, not by a subsistence\nin different places, nor in the measures of bulk, nor by coacervation,\nnor by the circumscriptions or comprehensions[174] of divisible parts,\nbut by a difference which is immaterial, without bulk, and without\nplurality, and which is divided according to multitude. Hence, also,\nit is one; not as one body, nor as in one place; nor as one bulk; nor\nas one which is many things; because it is different so far as it is\none, and its difference is both divided and united. For its difference\nis not externally acquired, nor adscititious, nor obtained through the\nparticipation of something else, but it is many things from itself. For,\nremaining one, it energizes with all energies, because, through sameness,\nit constitutes all difference; not being surveyed in the difference of\none thing with respect to another, as is the case in bodies. For, on\nthe contrary, in these, unity subsists in difference; because diversity\nhas in them a precedaneous existence; but the unity which they contain\nis externally and adscititiously derived. For in truly existing being,\nindeed, unity and sameness precede; but difference is generated,\nfrom this unity being energetic. _Hence, true being is multiplied in\nimpartibility; but body is united in multitude and bulk._ The former\nalso is established in itself, subsisting in itself according to unity;\nbut the latter is never in itself, because it receives its hypostasis in\nan extension of existence. The former, therefore, is an all-energetic\none; but the latter is an united multitude. Hence, it is requisite to\nexplore how the former is one and different; and again, how the latter is\nmultitude and one. Nor must we transfer the peculiarities of the one to\nthose which pertain to the other.\n\n39. It is not proper to think that the multitude of souls was generated\non account of the multitude of bodies; but it is necessary to admit\nthat, prior to bodies, there were many souls, and one soul [the cause\nof the many]. Nor does the one and whole soul prevent the subsistence\nin it of many souls; nor do the multitude of souls distribute by\ndivision the one soul into themselves. For they are distinct from, but\nare not abscinded from the soul, which ranks as a whole; nor do they\ndistribute into minute parts this whole soul into themselves. They are\nalso present with each other without confusion; nor do they produce the\nwhole soul by coacervation. For they are not separated from each other\nby any boundaries; nor, again, are they confused with each other; just\nas neither are many sciences confused in one soul [by which they are\npossessed]. For these sciences do not subsist in the soul like bodies,\nas things of a different essence from it; but they are certain energies\nof the soul. For the nature of soul possesses an infinite power. Every\nthing also that occurs in it is soul; and all souls are [in a certain\nrespect] one; and again, the soul which ranks as a whole, is different\nfrom all the rest. For as bodies, though divided to infinity, do not\nend in that which is incorporeal, but alone receive a difference of\nsegments according to bulk; thus also soul, being a vital form, may\nbe conceived to consist of forms _ad infinitum_. For it possesses\nspecific differences, and the whole of it subsists together with, or\nwithout these. For, if there is in the soul that which is as it were a\npart divided from the rest of the parts, yet, at the same time that\nthere is difference, the sameness remains. If, however, in bodies, in\nwhich difference predominates over sameness, nothing incorporeal when\nit accedes cuts off the union, but all the parts remain essentially\nunited, and are divided by qualities and other forms; what ought we to\nassert and conceive of a specific incorporeal life, in which sameness\nis more prevalent than difference; to which nothing foreign to form is\nsubjected, and from which the union of bodies is derived? Nor does body,\nwhen it becomes connected with soul, cut off its union, though it is an\nimpediment to its energies in many respects. But the sameness of soul\nproduces and discovers all things through itself, through its specific\nenergy, which proceeds to infinity; since any part of it whatever is\ncapable of effecting all things, when it is liberated and purified from\na conjunction with bodies; just as any part of seed possesses the power\nof the whole seed. As, however, seed, when it is united with matter,\npredominates over it, according to each of the productive principles\nwhich the seeds contain; and all the seed, its power being collected into\none, possesses the whole of its power in each of the parts; thus also,\nin the immaterial soul, that which may be conceived as a part, has the\npower of the whole soul. But that part of it which verges to matter, is\nvanquished, indeed, by the form to which it verges, and yet is adapted to\nassociate with immaterial form, though it is connected with matter, when\nwithdrawing itself from a material nature, it is converted to itself.\nSince, however, through verging to matter, it becomes in want of all\nthings, and suffers an emptiness of its proper power; but when it is\nelevated to intellect, is found to possess a plenitude of all its powers;\nhence those who first obtained a knowledge of this plenitude of the soul,\nvery properly indicated its emptiness by calling it _poverty_, and its\nfulness by denominating it _satiety_.\n\n\nSECTION III.\n\n40. The ancients, wishing to exhibit to us the peculiarity of incorporeal\nbeing, so far as this can be effected by words, when they assert that\nit is one, immediately add, that it is likewise all things; by which\nthey signified that it is not some one[175] of the things which are\nknown by the senses. Since, however, we suspect that this incorporeal\none is different from sensibles, in consequence of not perceiving\nthis total one, which is all things according to one, in a sensible\nnature, and which is so because this one is all things:\u2014hence the\nancients added, that _it is one so far as one_; in order that we might\nunderstand that what is all things in truly existing being, is something\nuncompounded, and that we might withdraw ourselves from the conception\nof a coacervation. When likewise they say that it is every where, they\nadd that it is no where. When also they assert that it is in all things,\nthey add, that it is no where in every thing. Thus, too, when they say,\nthat it is in all things, and in every divisible nature which is adapted\nto receive it, they add, that it is a whole in a whole. And, in short,\nthey render it manifest to us, through contrary peculiarities; at one and\nthe same time assuming these, in order that we may exterminate, from the\napprehension of it, the fictitious conceptions which are derived from\nbodies, and which obscure the cognoscible peculiarities of real being.\n\n41. When you have assumed an eternal essence, infinite in itself\naccording to power, and begin to perceive intellectually an hypostasis\nunwearied, untamed, and never-failing, but transcending in the most\npure and genuine life, and full from itself; and which is likewise\nestablished in itself, satisfied with, and seeking nothing but itself:\u2014to\nthis essence, if you add a subsistence in place, or a relation to a\ncertain thing, at the same time that you [appear to] diminish it, by\nascribing to it an indigence of place, or a relative condition of being,\nyou do not [in reality] diminish this essence, but you separate yourself\nfrom the perception of it, by receiving as a veil the phantasy which runs\nunder your conjectural apprehension of it. For you cannot pass beyond,\nor stop, or render more perfect, or effect the least change in a thing\nof this kind, because it is impossible for it to be in the smallest\ndegree deficient. For it is much more never-failing than any perpetually\nflowing fountain can be conceived to be. If, however, you are unable\nto keep pace with it, and to become assimilated to the intelligible\nall, you should not investigate any thing pertaining to real being;\nor, if you do, you will deviate from the path that leads to it, and\nwill look to something else. But if you investigate nothing else, being\nestablished in yourself and your own essence, you will be assimilated to\nthe intelligible universe, and will not adhere to any thing posterior\nto it. Neither, therefore, should you say, I am of a great magnitude.\nFor, omitting this greatness, you will become universal; though you were\nuniversal prior to this. But, together with the universal, something else\nwas present with you, and you became less by the addition; because the\naddition was not from truly-existing being. For to that you cannot add\nany thing. When, therefore, any thing is added from non-being, a place is\nafforded to Poverty as an associate, accompanied by an indigence of all\nthings. Hence, dismissing non-being, you will then become sufficient to\nyourself[176]. For he will not return properly to himself who does not\ndismiss things of a more vile and abject nature, and who opines himself\nto be something naturally small, and not to be such as he truly is. For\nthus he, at one and the same time, departs both from himself, and from\ntruly-existing being. When, also, any one is present with that which is\npresent in himself, then he is present with true being, which is every\nwhere. But when you withdraw from yourself, then, likewise, you recede\nfrom real being;\u2014of such great consequence is it, for a man to be present\nwith that which is present with himself, [_i.e._ with his rational\npart], and to be absent from that which is external to him.\n\nIf, however, true being is present with us, but non-being is absent,\nand real being is not present with us in conjunction with other things\n[of a nature foreign to it]; it does not accede in order that it may be\npresent, but we depart from it, when it is not present [with things of\na different nature]. And why should this be considered as wonderful?\nFor you when present are not absent from yourself; and yet you are not\npresent with yourself, though present. And you are both present with and\nabsent from yourself when you survey other things, and omit to behold\nyourself. If, therefore, you are thus present, and yet not [in reality]\npresent with yourself, and on this account are ignorant of yourself,\nand in a greater degree discover all things, though remote from your\nessence, than yourself, with which you are naturally present, why should\nyou wonder if that which is not present is remote from you who are remote\nfrom it, because you have become remote from yourself? For, by how much\nthe more you are [truly] present with yourself, though it is present, and\ninseparably conjoined with you, by so much the more will you be present\nwith real being, which is so essentially united to you, that it is as\nimpossible for it to be divulsed from you, as for you to be separated\nfrom yourself. So that it is universally possible to know what is present\nwith real being, and what is absent from it, though it is every where\npresent, and again is also no where. For those who are able to proceed\ninto their own essence intellectually, and to obtain a knowledge of\nit, will, in the knowledge itself, and the science accompanying this\nknowledge, be able to recover or regain themselves, through the union\nof that which knows with that which is known. And with those, who are\npresent with themselves, truly-existing being will also be present. But\nfrom such as abandon the proper being of themselves to other things,\u2014from\nthese, as they are absent from themselves, true being will also be\nabsent. If, however, we are naturally adapted to be established in the\nsame essence, to be rich from ourselves, and not to descend to that which\nwe are not; in so doing becoming in want of ourselves, and thus again\nassociating with Poverty, though Porus[177] [or Plenty] is present;\u2014and\nif we are cut off from real being, from which we are not separated either\nby place, or essence, nor by any thing else, through our conversion to\nnon-being, we suffer as a just punishment of our abandonment of true\nbeing, a departure from, and ignorance of ourselves. And again, by a\nproper attention to, we recover ourselves, and become united to divinity.\nIt is, therefore, rightly said, that the soul is confined in body as in\na prison, and is there detained in chains like a fugitive slave[178].\nWe should, however, [earnestly] endeavour to be liberated from our\nbonds. For, through being converted to these sensible objects, we desert\nourselves, though we are of a divine origin, and are, as Empedocles says,\n\n    Heaven\u2019s exiles, straying from the orb of light.\n\nSo that every depraved life is full of servitude; and on this account\nis without God and unjust, the spirit in it being full of impiety, and\nconsequently of injustice. And thus, again, it is rightly said, that\njustice is to be found in the performance of that which is the province\nof him who performs it. The image also of true justice consists in\ndistributing to each of those with whom we live, that which is due to the\ndesert of each.\n\n42. That which possesses its existence in another [_i.e._ in something\ndifferent from itself], and is not essentialized in itself, separably\nfrom another, if it should be converted to itself, in order to know\nitself, without that in which it is essentialized, withdrawing itself\nfrom it; would be corrupted by this knowledge, in consequence of\nseparating itself from its essence. But that which is able to know\nitself without the subject in which it exists, and is able to withdraw\nitself from this subject, without the destruction of itself, cannot be\nessentialized in that, from which it is capable of converting itself\nto itself, without being corrupted, and of knowing itself by its own\nenergies. Hence, if sight, and every sensitive power, neither perceives\nitself, nor apprehends or preserves itself by separating itself\nfrom body; but intellect, when it separates itself from body, then\nespecially perceives intellectually, is converted to itself, and is not\ncorrupted;\u2014it is evident that the sensitive powers obtain the power of\nenergizing through the body; but that intellect possesses its energies\nand its essence not in body, but in itself.\n\n43. Incorporeal natures are properly denominated, and conceived to be\nwhat they are, according to a privation of body; just as, according to\nthe ancients, matter, and the form which is in matter, and also natures\nand [physical] powers, are apprehended by an abstraction from matter.\nAnd after the same manner place, time, and the boundaries of things, are\napprehended. For all such things are denominated according to a privation\nof body. There are likewise other things which are said to be incorporeal\nimproperly, not according to a privation of body, but, in short, because\nthey are not naturally adapted to generate body[179]. Hence those of\nthe former signification subsist in bodies; but those of the second are\nperfectly separated from bodies, and from those incorporeal natures which\nsubsist about bodies. For bodies, indeed, are in place, and boundaries\nare in body. But intellect, and intellectual reason, neither subsist\nin place nor in body; nor proximately give existence to bodies, nor\nsubsist together with bodies, or with those incorporeal natures which\nare denominated according to a privation of bodies. Neither, therefore,\nif a certain incorporeal vacuum should be conceived to exist, would it\nbe possible for intellect to be in a vacuum. For a vacuum may be the\nrecipient of body; but it is impossible that it should be the recipient\nof intellect, and afford a place for its energy. Since, however, the\ngenus of an incorporeal nature appears to be twofold, one of these the\nfollowers of Zeno do not at all admit, but they adopt the other; and\nperceiving that the former is not such as the latter, they entirely\nsubvert it, though they ought rather to conceive that it is of another\ngenus, and not to fancy that, because it is not the latter, it has no\nexistence.\n\n44. Intellect and the intelligible are one thing, and sense and that\nwhich is sensible another. And the intelligible, indeed, is conjoined\nwith intellect, but that which is sensible with sense. Neither, however,\ncan sense by itself apprehend itself.... But the intelligible, which\nis conjoined with intellect, and intellect, which is conjoined with\nthe intelligible, by no means fall under the perception of sense.\nIntellect, however, is intelligible to intellect. But if intellect is the\nintelligible object of intellect, intellect will be its own intelligible\nobject. If, therefore, intellect is an intellectual and not a sensible\nobject, it will be intelligible. But if it is intelligible to intellect,\nand not to sense, it will also be intelligent. The same thing, therefore,\nwill be that which is intelligent, or intellectually perceives, and\nwhich is intellectually perceived, or is intelligible; and this will be\ntrue of the whole with respect to the whole; but not as he who rubs,\nand he who is rubbed. Intellect, therefore, does not intellectually\nperceive by one part, and is intellectually perceived by another: for\nit is impartible, and the whole is an intelligible object of the whole.\nIt is likewise wholly intellect, having nothing in itself which can be\nconceived to be deprived of intelligence. Hence one part of it does not\nintellectually perceive, but not another part of it[180]. For, so far as\nit does not intellectually perceive, it will be unintelligent. Neither,\ntherefore, departing from this thing, does it pass on to that. For of\nthat from which it departs, it has no intellectual perception. But if\nthere is no transition in its intellections, it intellectually perceives\nall things at once. If, therefore, it understands all things at once, and\nnot this thing now, but another afterwards, it understands all things\ninstantaneously and always....[181]\n\nHence, if all things are instantaneously perceived by it, its perceptions\nhave nothing to do with the past and the future, but subsist in an\nindivisible untemporal _now_; so that the simultaneous, both according\nto multitude, and according to temporal interval, are present with\nintellect. Hence, too, all things subsist in it according to one, and\nin one, without interval, and without time. But if this be the case,\nthere is nothing discursive or transitive in its intellections, and\nconsequently they are without motion. Hence, they are energies according\nto one, subsisting in one, and without increase or mutation, or any\ntransition. If, however, the multitude subsists according to one, and\nthe energy is collected together at once, and without time, an essence\nof this kind must necessarily always subsist in [an intelligible] one.\nBut this is eternity. Hence, eternity is present with intellect. That\nnature, however, which does not perceive intellectually according to one,\nand in one, but transitively, and with motion, so that in understanding\nit leaves one thing and apprehends another, divides and proceeds\ndiscursively,\u2014this nature [which is soul] subsists in conjunction with\ntime. For with a motion of this kind, the future and the past are\nconsubsistent. But soul, changing its conceptions, passes from one thing\nto another; not that the prior conceptions depart, and the posterior\naccede in their place, but there is, as it were, a transition of the\nformer, though they remain in the soul, and the latter accede, as if from\nsome other place. They do not, however, accede in reality from another\nplace; but they appear to do so in consequence of the self-motion of the\nsoul, and through her eye being directed to a survey of the different\nforms which she contains, and which have the relation of parts to her\nwhole essence. For she resembles a fountain not flowing outwardly,\nbut circularly scattering its streams into itself. With the motion,\ntherefore, of soul, time is consubsistent; but eternity is consubsistent\nwith the permanency of intellect in itself[182]. It is not, however,\ndivided from intellect in the same manner as time is from soul; because\nin intellect the consubsistent essences are united. But that which is\nperpetually moved, is the source of a false opinion of eternity, through\nthe immeasurable extent of its motion producing a conception of eternity.\nAnd that which abides [in one,] is falsely conceived to be the same with\nthat which is [perpetually] moved. For that which is perpetually moved,\nevolves the time of itself in the same manner as _the now_ of itself,\nand multiplies it, according to a temporal progression. Hence, some have\napprehended that time is to be surveyed in permanency no less than in\nmotion; and that eternity, as we have said, is infinite time; just as\nif each of these imparted its own properties to the other; time, which\nis always moved, adumbrating eternity by the perpetuity of itself, and\nthe sameness of its motion; and eternity, through being established\nin sameness of energy, becoming similar to time, by the permanency of\nitself arising from energy. In sensibles, however, the time of one thing\nis distinct from that of another. Thus, for instance, there is one time\nof the sun, and another of the moon, one time of the morning-star, and\nanother of each of the planets. Hence, also, there is a different year\nof different planets. The year, likewise, which comprehends these times,\nterminates as in a summit in the motion of the soul [of the universe,]\naccording to the imitation of which the celestial orbs are moved. The\nmotion of this soul, however, being of a different nature from that of\nthe planets, the time of the former also is different from that of the\nlatter. For the latter subsists with interval, and is distinguished from\nthe former by local motions and transitions.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[146] In the original, \u039f\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf, \u03c0\u03b5\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u03c6\u1fc3 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u03b9, \u03b1\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. But it is evident, from the sense of the whole passage,\nthat, for \u039f\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd, we should read, \u039f\u03c5 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\n\n[147] The article \u03bf is wanting here in the original before \u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[148] Knowledge subsists conformably to the nature by which it is\npossessed, and not conformably to the thing known. Hence it is either\nbetter than, or co-ordinate with, or inferior to the object of knowledge.\nThus the rational soul has a knowledge of sensibles, which is superior\nto sensibles; but it knows itself with a co-ordinate knowledge; and its\nknowledge of divinity is inferior to the object of knowledge. Porphyry,\ntherefore, is not correct in what he here says. This dogma respecting the\nconformity of knowledge to that which knows, rather than to the thing\nknown, originated from the divine Iamblichus, as we are informed by\nAmmonius in his commentary on Aristotle\u2019s treatise De Interpretatione,\nand is adopted by Proclus (in Parmenid.). Boetius likewise employs it in\nhis reasoning in lib. v. about the prescience of divinity. None of his\ncommentators, however, have noticed the source from whence it was derived.\n\n[149] Because here the generator is that _primarily_ which the thing\ngenerated is _secondarily_. See my translation of Proclus\u2019s Theological\nElements.\n\n[150] Porphyry here summarily comprehends the rational gnostic powers\nof the soul in intellect, because, being rational, they are expansions\nof intellect properly so called. But these powers, beginning from the\nlowest, are _opinion_, _dianoia_, and the summit of dianoia, which summit\nis the intellect of the human soul, and is that power, by the light of\nwhich we perceive the truth of axioms, it being intuitive perception.\n_Dianoia_ is the discursive energy of reason; or it is that power which\nreasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from\nintellect. And _opinion_ is that power which knows _that_ a thing is, but\nis ignorant of the cause of it, or _why_ it is.\n\n[151] In the original, \u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03bc\u03b7 \u03b5\u03be\u03c9 \u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2; but for \u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03bc\u03b7, it\nappears to me to be obviously necessary to read \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5 \u03bc\u03b7.\n\n[152] In the original, \u03b5\u03be\u03c9 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c5\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2, \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u03b9\u03b7 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1; which\nHolstenius, wholly mistaking the meaning, most erroneously translates,\n\u201cAt si extra materiam sint, neutiquam id fieri poterit.\u201d Farther on,\nPorphyry asserts, that God, intellect, and soul, are no where, according\nto corporeal locality.\n\n[153] In the original, \u03b7 \u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03b7 \u03bf\u03c5\u03ba \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c9\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1, \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u03ba \u03bd\u03b5\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1. But for \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, I read\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1. This power, by which Porphyry characterizes memory, is of a\nstable nature. And hence memory is _stability of knowledge_, in the same\nmanner as immortality is _stability of life_, and eternity _stability of\nbeing_.\n\n[154] See the notes on the 3d book of my translation of Aristotle\u2019s\ntreatise on the Soul, and also my translation of Plotinus on Felicity.\n\u201cThe phantasy,\u201d says Olympiodorus (in Platonis Ph\u00e6d.) \u201cis an impediment\nto our intellectual conceptions; and hence, when we are agitated by\nthe inspiring influence of Divinity, if the phantasy intervenes, the\nenthusiastic energy ceases: for enthusiasm and the phantasy are contrary\nto each other. Should it be asked, whether the soul is able to energize\nwithout the phantasy? we reply, that its perception of universals\nproves that it is able. It has perceptions, therefore, independent of\nthe phantasy; at the same time, however, the phantasy attends it in its\nenergies, just as a storm pursues him who sails on the sea.\u201d\n\n[155] The analogy of the soul to harmony, is more accurately unfolded as\nfollows, by Olympiodorus, in his Commentary on the Ph\u00e6do of Plato, than\nit is in this place by Porphyry: \u201cHarmony has a triple subsistence. For\nit is either harmony itself, or it is that which is first harmonized, and\nwhich is such according to the whole of itself; or it is that which is\nsecondarily harmonized, and which partially participates of harmony. The\nfirst of these must be assigned to intellect, the second to soul, and the\nthird to body. This last, too, is corruptible, because it subsists in a\nsubject; but the other two are incorruptible, because they are neither\ncomposites, nor dependent on a subject. Hence, the rational soul is\nanalogous to a musician, but the animated body to harmonized chords; for\nthe former has a subsistence separate, but the latter inseparable from\nthe musical instrument.\u201d\n\n[156] What Porphyry here says about matter, is derived from the treatise\nof Plotinus, _On the Impassivity of Incorporeal Natures_, to my\ntranslation of which I refer the reader.\n\n[157] See my translation of the before-mentioned treatise of Plotinus.\n\n[158] For \u03c4\u03b1 \u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 here, I read \u03c4\u03b1 \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1.\n\n[159] Hence, it is beautifully said in the Clavis of Hermes Trismegistus,\n\u201cthat the knowledge of _the good_ [or the supreme principle of things],\nis a divine silence, and the quiescence of all the senses.\u201d See, also, on\nthis subject, a most admirable extract from Damascius, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9 \u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd, at the\nend of the 3d volume of my Plato.\n\n[160] For that which is truly incorporeal, is _every where_ virtually,\n_i.e._ in power and efficacy, but is _no where_ locally.\n\n[161] For \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 here, I read, \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2. For Porphyry is here speaking\nof essences which are opposed to _such as rank as wholes_, as is evident\nfrom the whole of this paragraph.\n\n[162] The primary natures of which Porphyry is now speaking, are rational\npartial souls, such as ours; for the natures superior to these, are never\nconverted to beings posterior to themselves.\n\n[163] For \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5, _isthic_, I read, \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[164] In the original, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7 \u03b5\u03bd \u03bd\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b5\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9, but it appears to me to be necessary to read, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7 \u03b5\u03bd \u03bd\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03b5\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff3, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b5\u03bd \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9.\n\n[165] \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u03bd \u03bd\u1ff3, is omitted in the original, but ought to be inserted, as\nis evident from the version of Holstenius.\n\n[166] The irrational life is a thing of this kind, which is partly\nseparable and partly inseparable from body. Hence, so far as it is\ninseparable from body, it partakes of the _every where_; but, so far as\nit is separable, of the _no where_.\n\n[167] _i.e._ The animal spirit, or pneumatic soul, in which the rational\nsoul suffers her punishments in Hades.\n\n[168] _i.e._ That part of the soul which is the source of all-various\ndesires.\n\n[169] This philosophic apathy is not, as is stupidly supposed by most of\nthe present day, insensibility, but a perfect subjugation of the passions\nto reason.\n\n[170] The words \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7, are omitted in the original. But it is\nevident from the treatise of Plotinus \u201cOn the Virtues,\u201d that they ought\nto be inserted. For what Porphyry says in this Section about the virtues,\nis derived from that treatise.\n\n[171] Instead of \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd, here it is necessary to read, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n[172] Conformably to this, as we have before observed, Aristotle says in\nthe 7th Book of his Nicomachean Ethics, \u201cthat corporeal pleasures are\nremedies against pain, and that they fill up the indigence of nature, but\nperfect no energy of the rational soul.\u201d\n\n[173] In the original, \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b5\u03ba\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u03b3\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03bb\u03b1\u03c7\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b5\u03bb\u03b1\u03c7\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b1\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03c9\u03bd, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb. This\nHolstenius most erroneously translates, \u201cVerum id quod maximam molem\nintervallo maximo, et minimam minimo excedit simul sumens, &c.\u201d For a\ntruly incorporeal nature, such as that of which Porphyry is now speaking,\nhas nothing to do with interval, and, therefore, does not by interval\nsurpass either the greatest or the least corporeal mass; but is received\ntranscendently by the greatest and the least magnitude.\n\n[174] For \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, here, I read \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, and Holstenius also has\nin this place _comprehensionibus_.\n\n[175] In the original, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf \u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03b1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd; but it\nappears to me to be necessary, after \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf, to insert the words \u03bf\u03c5\u03ba \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd.\nFor incorporeal being is not like some one of the things which are known\nby the senses, because no one of these is one, and, at the same time, all\nthings. Holstenius did not perceive the necessity of this emendation, as\nis evident from his version of the passage.\n\n[176] Immediately after this something is wanting in the original, (as is\nevident from the asterisks,) which, as it appears to me, no conjecture\ncan appropriately supply.\n\n[177] In the original, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c0\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u1fb3 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5; but for \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5, I read \u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5; as it appears to me that\nPorphyry is here alluding to what is said by Diotima, in the Banquet of\nPlato, concerning the parents of Love, viz. that they are _Poverty_ and\n_Porus_, or _Plenty_.\n\n[178] See the Ph\u00e6do of Plato. But something is here wanting in the\noriginal, as is evident not only from the asterisks, but from the want of\nconnexion in the words themselves.\n\n[179] _i.e._ They are not adapted to be the immediate causes of body,\nbecause they are perfectly separated from it. The original is, \u03b7\u03b4\u03b7 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b7\u03bd\n\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b1\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b5\n\u03bf\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03c5\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u1fb3\u03bd \u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1. Holstenius, not understanding what is here\nsaid by Porphyry, translates the words \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03bf\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03c5\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u1fb3\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1, \u201csed quod nullum omnino corpus generare possunt.\u201d For Porphyry, as\nis evident from what immediately follows, is here speaking of natures\nwhich are perfectly separated from bodies, and which are, therefore, not\nnaturally adapted to be the immediate generators of them, not through any\ndeficiency, but through transcendency of power.\n\n[180] In the original, \u03b4\u03b9\u03bf \u03bf\u03c5\u03c7\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9, \u03c4\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03bf\u03c5 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9,\nwhich Holstenius erroneously translates, \u201cIdeoque non quidem unam sui\npartem intelligit, alteram vero non intelligit.\u201d For Porphyry is not here\nspeaking of intellect surveying its parts, but of its being _wholly_\nintellective. This is evident from what immediately follows.\n\n[181] The asterisks in the original denote something is wanting.\nNevertheless, what immediately follows them, is evidently connected with\nwhat immediately precedes.\n\n[182] See the fourth book of my translation of Proclus, on the Tim\u00e6us\nof Plato, in which the nature of time and eternity is most admirably\nunfolded. See, also, my translation of Plotinus, on Eternity and Time. In\nthese works, what both these divine men have said of eternity, and what\nthe former has said of time, contains, as it appears to me, the _ne plus\nultra_ of philosophical investigation on these most abstruse subjects.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\nON THE WANDERINGS OF ULYSSES.\n\n\nIn my History of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology [see Vol. II.\nof my Proclus on Euclid,] and in a note accompanying my translation\nof the treatise of Porphyry, on the Cave of the Nymphs, in that work,\nI attempted, from the hints afforded by Porphyry, and the work of an\nanonymous Greek writer, De Ulyxis Erroribus, to unfold the latent meaning\nof the wanderings of Ulysses, as narrated by Homer. But as, from my\ncontinued application to the philosophy of Plato for upwards of forty\nyears, I now know much more of that philosophy than I then did, a period\nof thirty-five years having elapsed from that to the present time, I\nshall again attempt to explain those wanderings, rejecting some things,\nand retaining others which I had adopted before.\n\nIn the first place, it is necessary to observe, that Ulysses does not\nrank among the first heroic characters, or in other words, he was not\none of those heroes who descend into the regions of mortality at certain\nperiods, not only in compliance with that necessity through which all\npartial souls such as ours descend periodically, but also for the purpose\nof benefiting others, and leading them back to their pristine state of\nperfection. Hence, he was by no means such an exalted hero as Hercules,\nor Pythagoras, or Socrates, or Plato; for they largely benefited others;\nbut he only benefited himself. For all his companions perished prior\nto his arrival at Ithaca. So that he was able to save himself, but not\nothers. \u201cHence,\u201d says Olympiodorus, in his MS. Scholia on the Gorgias\nof Plato, \u201cit is said, that Ulysses wandered on the sea by the will of\nNeptune. For by this it is signified that the Odyssean life was neither\nterrestrial, nor yet celestial, but between these. Since, therefore,\nNeptune is the lord of the middle natures, on this account it is said,\nthat Ulysses wandered through the will of Neptune, because he had a\nNeptunian allotment. Thus, also, theologists speak of the sons of\nJupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, regarding the allotment of each. For we say,\nthat he who has a divine and celestial polity, is the son of Jupiter;\nthat he who has a terrestrial polity, is the son of Pluto; and he is the\nson of Neptune, whose polity or allotment is between these[183].\u201d Hence\nUlysses, from his Neptunian allotment, was a man who ranked among the\nmiddle class of characters that transcend the majority of mankind.\n\nIn the next place, in order to understand accurately the recondite\nmeaning of the wanderings of Ulysses, it is requisite to know what the\nmost divine and theological poet Homer indicates by the Trojan war in\nthe Iliad. For Homer, by combining fiction with historical facts, has\ndelivered to us some very occult, mystic, and valuable information, in\nthose two admirable poems, the Iliad and Odyssey. Hence, by those who\ndirected their attention to this recondite information, he was said,\nconformably to the tragical mode of speaking, which was usual with\nthe most ancient writers, to have been blind, because, as Proclus\nobserves[184], he separated himself from sensible beauty, and extended\nthe intellect of his soul to invisible and true harmony. He was said,\ntherefore, to be blind, because _that_ intellectual beauty to which he\nraised himself cannot be perceived by corporeal eyes. Thus, too, Orpheus\nis tragically said to have been lacerated in an all-various manner,\nbecause men of that age _partially_ participated of his mystic doctrine.\nThe _principal part_ of it, however, was received by the Lesbians; and\non this account, his _head_, when separated from his body, is said to\nhave been carried to Lesbos. Hence, the Platonic Hermeas, conformably to\nthis opinion of the occult meaning of the Iliad, beautifully explains as\nfollows the Trojan war, in his Scholia on the Ph\u00e6drus of Plato:\n\n\u201cBy _Ilion_, we must understand the generated and material place, which\nis so denominated from _mud and matter_ (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b9\u03bb\u03c5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c5\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd,) and\nin which there are war and sedition. But the Trojans are material forms,\nand all the lives which subsist about bodies. Hence, also, the Trojans\nare called _genuine_ (\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2). For all the lives which subsist about\nbodies, and irrational[185] souls, are favourable and attentive to their\nproper matter. On the contrary, the Greeks are rational souls, coming\nfrom Greece, _i.e._ from the intelligible into matter. Hence, the Greeks\nare called _foreigners_ (\u03b5\u03c0\u03b7\u03bb\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2,) and vanquish the Trojans, as being\nof a superior order. But they fight with each other about the image of\nHelen, as the poet says [about the image of Eneas].\n\n    Around the phantom Greeks and Trojans fight[186].\n\nHelen signifying intelligible beauty, being a certain _vessel_ (\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\n\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1,) attracting to itself intellect. An efflux, therefore, of this\nintelligible beauty is imparted to matter through Venus; and about this\nefflux of beauty the Greeks fight with the Trojans [_i.e._ rational\nwith irrational lives[187]]. And those, indeed, that oppose and vanquish\nmatter, return to the intelligible world, which is their true country;\nbut those who do not, as is the case with the multitude, are bound to\nmatter. As, therefore, the prophet, in the tenth book of the Republic,\npreviously to the descent of souls, announces to them how they may return\n[to their pristine felicity], according to periods of a thousand and\nten thousand years; thus, also, Calchas predicts to the Greeks their\nreturn in ten years, the number ten being the symbol of a perfect period.\nAnd as, in the lives of souls, some are elevated through philosophy,\nothers through the amatory art, and others through the royal and warlike\ndisciplines; so with respect to the Greeks, some act with rectitude\nthrough prudence, but others through war or love, and their return is\ndifferent [according to their different pursuits].\u201d\n\nThe first obviously fabulous adventure, then, of Ulysses, is that of the\nLotophagi, which Homer beautifully narrates, and whose narration Pope\nvery elegantly translates as follows:\n\n    The trees around them all their fruit produce,\n    Lotos the name, and dulcet is the juice[188]!\n    (Thence call\u2019d Lotophagi) which, whoso tastes,\n    Insatiate riots in the sweet repasts,\n    Nor other home, nor other care intends,\n    But quits his house, his country, and his friends.\n    The three we sent from off th\u2019 enchanting ground\n    We dragg\u2019d reluctant, and by force we bound:\n    The rest in haste forsook the pleasing shore,\n    Or, the charm tasted, had return\u2019d no more[189].\n\nPlato, in the 8th book of his Republic, has admirably unfolded to us\nwhat the _lotos_ occultly indicates, viz. that it signifies \u201cfalse and\narrogant reasonings and opinions:\u201d for daily experience shows that\nnothing is more enchanting and delicious than these to such as have made\nno solid proficiency in virtue, and who, like some of the companions of\nUlysses, being fascinated by erroneous conceptions, consign their true\ncountry and true kindred to oblivion, and desire to live for ever lost in\nthe intoxication of fallacious delight.\n\nThe next adventure of Ulysses is that of the Cyclops, whom he deprived\nof sight, and irritated by reproaches. But according to Porphyry, in\nthe above-mentioned excellent treatise, this is no other than the natal\nd\u00e6mon of Ulysses, or the d\u00e6mon to whose protecting power he became\nsubject, as soon as he was born[190]. In order, however, to understand\nperfectly the arcane meaning of this fable, it is necessary to observe,\nthat according to the ancient theology, those souls that in the present\nlife will speedily return to their pristine felicity in the intelligible\nworld, have not the essential d\u00e6mon, or the d\u00e6mon which is inseparable\nfrom the essence of the soul, different from the d\u00e6mon that presides\nover the birth; for they are one and the same. But the case is otherwise\nwith more imperfect souls; as the natal is in these different from the\n_essential_ d\u00e6mon[191]. As Ulysses, therefore, does not rank among the\nmore perfect heroic characters, and was not one who in the present life\nis immediately ascending to his kindred star, or, in Platonic language,\nto the paternal port, the soul\u2019s true paradise of rest; but was a man\nwho, prior to this, had many laborious wanderings to accomplish, and many\ndifficulties and dangers of no common magnitude to sustain, his _natal_\nwas not the same with his _essential_ d\u00e6mon. As he is, however, departing\nfrom a sensible to an intellectual life, though circuitously and slowly,\nhe is represented in so doing as blinding and irritating his _natal_\nd\u00e6mon. For he who blinds the eye of sense, and extinguishes its light,\nafter his will has profoundly assented to its use, must expect punishment\nfor the deed; as necessary ultimately to his own peculiar good, and the\ngeneral order of the universe. Indeed, troubles and misfortunes resulting\nfrom such undertakings, not only contribute to appease the anger of their\nauthors, but likewise purify and benefit the subjects of their revenge.\nAccording to the Greek theology, therefore, he who, in the present life,\nwhile he is in the road of virtue, and is eagerly searching for wisdom,\nperceives that there is a great resemblance between his destiny and that\nof Ulysses, may safely conclude, that either here, or in a prior state of\nexistence, he has voluntarily submitted to the power of his natal d\u00e6mon,\nand has now deprived him of sight; or in other words, has abandoned\na life of sense; and that he has been profoundly delighted with the\nnature of matter, and is now abrogating the confessions which he made.\nThis, too, is insinuated in the beautiful story of Cupid and Psyche,\nby Apuleius, when the terrestrial Venus sends Mercury with a book in\nwhich her name is inscribed, to apprehend Psyche as a fugitive from her\nmistress. For this whole story relates to the descent of the soul into\nthis terrene body, and its wanderings and punishments, till it returns to\nits true country and pristine felicity[192].\n\nIn the next fable, which is that of \u00c6olus, the poet appears to me to\nsignify that providence of divinity which is of an elevating and guardian\nnature, the influence of which, when properly received by the subjects\nof it, enables them to pass with security over the stormy sea of life to\ntheir native land; but when this influence is neglected through the sleep\nof reason, the negligence is followed by a temporary destruction of hope.\nThis providence also of the Gods is not only one, but _all-various_,\nwhich Homer appears to indicate by \u00c6olus; the word \u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 signifying\nvarious and manifold. As the advancement, therefore, of Ulysses in the\nvirtues is as yet imperfect, extending no farther than to the _ethical_\nand _political_, which are but adumbrations of the _true_ virtues, the\ncathartic and theoretic[193], he is said to have fallen asleep, and to\nhave been thereby disappointed of his wishes, his soul not being at that\ntime in a truly vigilant state, as not having yet elevated its eye to\nreal being from objects of sense which resemble the delusions of dreams.\n\nBy the adventure of the Lestrigons, which follows in the next place,\nHomer represents to us Ulysses flying from voracity, and fierce and\nsavage manners; a flight indispensably necessary, as preparatory to his\nattainment of the higher virtues.\n\nIn the next adventure, which contains the beautiful allegory of Circe,\nwe shall find some deep arcana of philosophy contained, exclusive of its\nconnexion with Ulysses. By the \u00c6ean isle, then, in which the palace of\nCirce was situated, the region of sorrow and lamentation is signified,\nas is evident from the name of the island itself. And, by Circe, we must\nunderstand the Goddess of sense. For thus Porphyry, in Stob\u00e6us, p. 141:\n\u201cHomer calls the period and revolution of regeneration in a circle,\nCirce, the daughter of the Sun, who perpetually connects and combines all\ncorruption with generation, and generation again with corruption.\u201d And\nthis is asserted still more explicitly by Proclus, in his Scholia on the\nCratylus of Plato. For he says, \u201cCirce is that divine power which weaves\nall the life contained in the four elements, and, at the same time, by\nher song harmonizes the whole sublunary world. But the shuttle with\nwhich she weaves, is represented by theologists as golden, because her\nessence is intellectual, pure, immaterial, and unmingled with generation;\nall which is signified by the shuttle being golden. And her employment\nconsists in _separating_[194] stable things from such as are in motion,\naccording to divine diversity.\u201d And he also informs us, \u201cthat Circe\nranks among the divinities who preside over generation, or the regions\nof sense.\u201d Homer, too, with great propriety, represents Circe, who\nrules over the realms of generation, as waited on by Nymphs sprung from\nfountains; for Nymphs, says Hermias (in Plat. Ph\u00e6drum,) are Goddesses who\npreside over regeneration, and are the attendants of Bacchus, the son\nof Semele. On this account, they are present with water; that is, they\nascend, as it were, into, and rule over generation. But this Dionysius,\nor Bacchus, supplies the regeneration of every sensible nature.\n\nHence we may observe, that the \u00c6ean isle, or this region of sense, is,\nwith great propriety, called the abode of trouble and lamentation. In\nthis region, then, the companions of Ulysses, in consequence of being\nvery imperfect characters, are changed, through the incantations of the\nGoddess, into brutes, _i.e._ into unworthy and irrational habits and\nmanners. Ulysses, however, as one who is returning, though slowly, to\nthe proper perfection of his nature, is, by the assistance of Mercury,\nor reason, prevented from destruction. Hence intellect, roused by its\nimpassive power, and at the same time armed with prudent anger, and the\nplant moly, or temperance, which is able to repel the allurements of\npleasure, wars on sensible delight, and prevents the effects of its\ntransforming power. Ulysses, also, though he was not able to lead his\ncompanions back to their native land, the paternal port of the soul, yet\nsaves them from being transformed, through the enchantments of sense,\ninto an irrational life.\n\nAfter this follows the allegory respecting the descent of Ulysses into\n_Hades_, which occultly signifies, that he still lived a life according\nto sense, and not according to intellect, and that, in consequence\nof not having yet vanquished a terrestrial life, he was involved in\n_obscurity_. For ancient wise men universally considered Hades as\ncommencing in the present state of existence, and that sense is nothing\nmore than the energy of the dormant soul, and a perception, as it were,\nof the delusions of dreams, as I have abundantly proved in my treatise\non the Mysteries. The secret meaning, also, of what Ulysses saw in\nHades, is no less beautiful than profound, as the following extract\nfrom the manuscript Commentary of Olympiodorus, on the Gorgias of\nPlato, abundantly evinces: \u201cUlysses,\u201d says he, \u201cdescending into Hades,\nsaw, among others, Sysiphus, and Tityus, and Tantalus. And Tityus he\nsaw lying on the earth, and a vulture devouring his liver; the liver\nsignifying that he lived solely according to the _epithymetic_ part of\nhis nature [or that part of the soul which is the source of desires,]\nand that through this, indeed, he was, indeed, internally prudent;\nbut earth signifying the terrestrial condition of his prudence. But\nSysiphus, living under the dominion of ambition and anger, was employed\nin continually rolling a stone up an eminence, because it perpetually\ndescended again; its descent implying the vicious government of himself;\nand his rolling the stone, the hard, refractory, and, as it were,\nrebounding condition of his life. And, lastly, he saw Tantalus extended\nby the side of a lake, and that there was a tree before him, with\nabundance of fruit on its branches, which he desired to gather, but it\nvanished from his view. And this indeed indicates, that he lived under\nthe dominion of the phantasy; but his hanging over the lake, and in vain\nattempting to drink, denotes the elusive, humid, and rapidly-gliding\ncondition of such a life.\u201d\n\nWe must now, however, view Ulysses passing from sense to imagination; in\nthe course of which voyage he is assailed by various temptations of great\npower, and destructive effect. We shall perceive him victorious in some\nof these, and sinking under others; but struggling against the incursions\nof all. Among the first of these is the enchanting melody of the Sirens,\n\n    Whose song is death, and makes destruction please.\n\nBut what is occultly signified by the Sirens, is beautifully unfolded by\nProclus, on the Cratylus of Plato, as follows: \u201cThe divine Plato knew\nthat there are three kinds of Sirens; the _celestial_, which is under\nthe government of Jupiter; _that which is effective of generation_, and\nis under the government of Neptune; and _that which is cathartic_, and\nis under the government of Pluto. It is common to all these, to incline\nall things through an harmonic motion to their ruling Gods. Hence, when\nthe soul is in the heavens, they are desirous of uniting it to the\ndivine life which flourishes there. But it is proper that souls living\nin generation should sail beyond them, like the Homeric Ulysses, that\nthey may not be allured by generation, of which the sea is an image. And\nwhen souls are in Hades, the Sirens are desirous of uniting them through\nintellectual conceptions to Pluto. So that Plato knew that in the kingdom\nof Hades there are Gods, d\u00e6mons, and souls, who dance, as it were, round\nPluto, allured by the Sirens that dwell there.\u201d Ulysses, therefore, as\nnow proceeding to a life which is under the dominion of imagination, but\nwhich is superior to a life consisting wholly in sensitive energies,\nabandons those alluring and fraudulent pleasures of sense, which charm\nthe soul with flattering and mellifluous incantations. Hence he closes\nwith divine reasons and energies, as with wax, the impulses of desire\nand the organs of sense; so that every passage being barred from access,\nthey may in vain warble the song of ecstasy, and expect to ruin the soul\nby the enchanting strain. He also restrains the corporeal assaults by the\nbands of morality, and thus employs the senses without yielding to their\nimpetuous invasions; and experiences delight without resigning the empire\nof reason to its fascinating control.\n\nUlysses, having escaped the dangers of the Sirens, passes on to the rocks\nof Scylla and Charybdis, of terrific appearance and irresistible force.\nBy these two rocks the poet seems to signify the passions of anger and\ndesire, and their concomitants, that compress human life on both sides;\nand which every one must experience who proceeds, like Ulysses, in a\nregular manner to an intellectual state of existence. Some of these are,\nlike Scylla, of a lofty malignity; fraudulent, yet latent and obscure,\nas being concealed in the penetration of the soul. And such is revenge,\nand other passions of a similar kind. In these recesses a d\u00e6mon, the\nprince of such passions, resides. For the Chaldean oracles assert that\nterrestrial d\u00e6mons dwell in the soul, which is replete with irrational\naffections[195]. This d\u00e6mon also may justly be denominated a dire and\nenraged dog, who partly exposes his own malice, and partly hides it in\nimpenetrable obscurity. Hence he is capable of producing mischief in a\ntwofold respect. For he privately hurts by malignant stratagems, openly\nravishes the soul on the lofty rock of fury, and rends it with the triple\nevil of deadly teeth, viz. dereliction of duty, hatred of humanity, and\nself-conceit. Indeed, a d\u00e6mon of this kind will be perpetually vigilant\nin endeavouring to destroy, at one time the whole, and at another time a\npart of the soul of one, struggling, like Ulysses, against passion, and\nyielding reluctantly to its invasions.\n\nBut the other affections which pertain to desire are of a more corporeal\nnature, and are more conspicuously depraved. A wild fig-tree, _i.e._ the\nwill, is produced on the top of this rock; wild, indeed, on account of\nits free nature, but sweet in fruition; and under which, often through\nthe day, the impetuosities of the boiling body are accustomed to absorb\nand destroy the man, agitating upwards and downwards inflamed desire;\nso that mighty destruction, both to soul and body, is produced by their\nmutual consent. But it is highly proper that a rock of this last kind\nshould be anxiously avoided by one, who, like Ulysses, is labouring to\nreturn to his true country and friends. Hence, if necessity requires,\nhe will rather expose himself to the other: for there the energy of\nthought, and of the soul\u2019s simple motions, is alone necessary to be\nexerted, and it is easy to recover the pristine habit of the soul. In\nshort, the poet seems to represent, by this allegory of the two rocks,\nas well the dangers which spontaneously arise from the irascible part of\nthe soul, as those which are the effect of deliberation, and are of a\ncorporeal nature; both of which must be sustained, or one at least, by a\nnecessary consequence. For it is impossible that neither of them should\nbe experienced by one who is passing over the stormy ocean of a sensible\nlife.\n\nAfter this succeeds the allegory of the Trinacrian isle, containing the\nherds sacred to the God of day, which were violated by the companions\nof Ulysses; but not without the destruction of the authors of this\nimpiety, and the most dreadful danger to Ulysses. By the result of this\nfable, the poet evidently shows that punishment attends the sacrilegious\nand the perjured; and teaches us that we should perpetually reverence\ndivinity, with the greatest sanctity of mind, and be cautious how we\ncommit any thing in divine concerns contrary to piety of manners and\npurity of thought. But Homer, by attributing sense to the flesh and hides\nof the slain herds, manifestly evinces that every base deed universally\nproclaims the iniquity of its author; but that perjury and sacrilege are\nattended with the most glaring indications of guilt, and the most horrid\nsignatures of approaching vengeance and inevitable ruin. We may here,\ntoo, observe, that the will of Ulysses was far from consenting to this\nimpious deed; and that, though his passions prevailed at length over his\nreason, it was not till after frequent admonition had been employed, and\ngreat diligence exerted, to prevent its execution. This, indeed, is so\neminently true, that his guilt was the consequence of surprise, and not\nof premeditated design; which Homer appears to insinuate by relating that\nUlysses was asleep when his associates committed the offence.\n\nIn the next fable we find Ulysses, impelled by the southern wind towards\nthe rocks of Scylla and Charybdis; in the latter of which he found\nsafety, by clinging to the fig-tree which grew on its summit, till she\nrefunded the mast, on which he rode after the tempest. But the secret\nmeaning of the allegory appears to me to be as follows:\u2014Ulysses, who has\nnot yet taken leave of a life according to sense, is driven by the warmth\nof passion, represented by the southern gales, into the dire vortex of\ninsane desires, which frequently boiling over, and tossing on high the\nstorms of depraved affections, plunges into ruin the soul obnoxious\nto its waves. However, perceiving the danger to which he is exposed,\nwhen the base storms begin to swell, and the whirlpools of depravity\nroar, he seizes the helm of temperance, and binds himself fast to the\nsolid texture of his remaining virtue. The waves of desire are, indeed,\ntempestuous in the extreme; but before he is forcibly merged, by the rage\nof the passions, into the depths of depravity, he tenaciously adheres to\nhis unconsenting will, seated, as it were, on the lofty summit of terrene\ndesire. For this, like the wild fig-tree, affords the best refuge to the\nsoul struggling with the billows of base perturbations. Hence he thus\nrecovers the integrity which he had lost, and afterwards swims without\ndanger over the waves of temptation; ever watchful and assiduous, while\nhe sails through this impetuous river of the flesh, and is exposed to\nthe stormy blasts of heated passion and destructive vice. Hence, too,\nwhile he is thus affected, and anxious lest the loss from unworthy\naffections should return upon himself, he will escape being lacerated by\nthe teeth of Anger, though she should terribly and fiercely bark in the\nneighbourhood of Desire, and endeavour, like Scylla, to snatch him on\nher lofty rock. For those who are involuntarily disturbed, like Ulysses,\nby the billows of Desire, suffer no inconvenience from the depraved rock\nof Wrath; but considering the danger of their present situation, they\nrelinquish the false confidence produced by rage for modest diffidence\nand anxious hope.\n\nHitherto we have followed Ulysses in his voyage over the turbulent and\ndangerous ocean of sense; in which we have seen him struggling against\nthe storms of temptation, and in danger of perishing through the\ntempestuous billows of vice. We must now attend him in the region of\nimagination, and mark his progress from the enchanted island, till he\nregains the long-lost empire of his soul. That the poet then, by Calypso,\noccultly signifies the phantasy or imagination, is, I think, evident\nfrom his description of her abode. For she is represented as dwelling\nin a cavern, illuminated by a great fire; and this cave is surrounded\nwith a thick wood, is watered by four fountains, and is situated in an\nisland, remote from any habitable place, and environed by the mighty\nocean. All which particulars correspond with the phantasy, as I presume\nthe following observations will evince. In the first place, the primary\nand proper vehicle of the phantasy, or, as it is called by the Platonic\nphilosophers, _the imaginative spirit_, is attenuated and ethereal, and\nis therefore naturally luminous. In the next place, the island is said\nto be surrounded with a thick wood, which evidently corresponds to a\nmaterial nature, or this body, with which the phantasy is invested. For\n\u03c5\u03bb\u03b7, or _matter_, also signifies _a wood_. But the four fountains, by\nwhich the cave is watered, occultly signify the four gnostic powers of\nthe soul, _intellect_, _the discursive energy of reason_, _opinion_,\n_and sense_; with all which the phantasy, being also a gnostic power,\ncommunicates; so that it receives images, like a mirror, from all of\nthem, and retains those which it receives from the senses, when the\nobjects by which they were produced are no longer present. Hence the\nimagination, or the phantasy, [\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1,] is denominated from being \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, _the permanency of appearances_. And, in the last place,\nthe island is said to be environed by the ocean; which admirably accords\nwith a corporeal nature, for ever flowing, without admitting any periods\nof repose. And thus much for the secret agreement of the cavern and\nisland with the region of imagination.\n\nBut the poet, by denominating the Goddess Calypso, and the island Ogygia,\nappears to me very evidently to confirm the preceding exposition. For\nCalypso is derived from \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03c5\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9, which signifies _to cover as with a\nveil_; and Ogygia is from \u03c9\u03b3\u03c5\u03b3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, _ancient_. And as the imaginative\nspirit is the primary vehicle of the rational soul, which it derived\nfrom the planetary spheres, and in which it descended to the sublunary\nregions, it may with great propriety be said to cover the soul as with a\nfine garment or veil; and it is no less properly denominated _ancient_,\nwhen considered as the first vehicle of the soul.\n\nIn this region of the phantasy, then, Ulysses is represented as an\ninvoluntary captive, continually employed in bewailing his absence from\nhis true country, and ardently longing to depart from the fascinating\nembraces of the Goddess. For thus his situation is beautifully described\nby the poet:\n\n    But sad Ulysses, by himself apart,\n    Pour\u2019d the big sorrows of his swelling heart;\n    All on the lonely shore he sat to weep,\n    And roll\u2019d his eyes around the restless deep;\n    Tow\u2019rd his lov\u2019d coast he roll\u2019d his eyes in vain,\n    Till dimm\u2019d with rising grief they stream\u2019d again[196].\n\nHis return, however, is at length effected through Mercury, or reason,\nwho prevails on the Goddess to yield to his dismission. Hence, after her\nconsent, Ulysses is, with great propriety, said to have placed himself\non the throne on which Mercury had sate: for reason then resumes her\nproper seat when the reasoning power is about to abandon the delusive and\ndetaining charms of imagination. But Homer appears to me to insinuate\nsomething admirable when he represents Ulysses, on his departure from\nCalypso, sailing by night, and contemplating the order and light of the\nstars, in the following beautiful lines:\n\n    And now, rejoicing in the prosperous gales,\n    With beating heart Ulysses spread his sails;\n    Plac\u2019d at the helm he sate, and mark\u2019d the skies,\n    Nor clos\u2019d in sleep his ever watchful eyes.\n    There viewed the Pleiads, and the northern team,\n    And great Orion\u2019s more refulgent beam;\n    To which around the axle of the sky\n    The Bear, revolving, points his golden eye;\n    Who shines exalted on the ethereal plain,\n    Nor bathes his blazing forehead in the main[197].\n\nFor what he here says of Ulysses, is perfectly conformable to what is\nsaid by Plato in the 7th book of his Republic, respecting the man who\nis to be led from the cave, which he there describes, to the light\nof day, _i.e._ from a sensible to an intellectual life, viz. \u201cthat\nhe will more easily see what the heavens contain, and the heavens\nthemselves, by _looking in the night to the light of the stars and the\nmoon_, than by day looking on the sun, and the light of the sun.\u201d For\nby this, as Proclus well observes, \u201cPlato signifies the contemplation\nof intelligibles, of which the stars and their light are imitations, so\nfar as all of them partake of the form of the sun, in the same manner as\nintelligibles are characterized by the nature of _the good_. These, then,\nsuch a one must contemplate, that he may understand their essence, and\nthose summits of their nature, by which they are deiform processions from\nthe ineffable principle of things.\u201d Ulysses, therefore, who is hastening\nto an intellectual life, contemplates these lucid objects with vigilant\neyes, rejoicing in the illuminations and assistance they afford him while\nsailing over the dark ocean of a sensible life.\n\nBut as he is now earnestly engaged in departing from sense, he must\nunavoidably be pursued by the anger of Neptune, the lord of generation\nand a sensible life, whose service he has forsaken, and whose offspring\nhe has blinded by stratagem, and irritated by reproach. Hence, in the\nmidst of these delightful contemplations, he is almost overwhelmed by the\nwaves of misfortune, roused by the wrath of his implacable foe. He is,\nhowever, through divine assistance, or Leucothea, enabled to sustain the\ndreadful storm. For, receiving from divinity the immortal fillet of true\nfortitude, and binding it under his breast, (the proper seat of courage,)\nhe encounters the billows of adversity, and bravely shoots along the\nboisterous ocean of life. It must, however, be carefully observed, that\nthe poet is far from ascribing a certain passion to a divine nature, when\nhe speaks of the anger of Neptune: for, in thus speaking, he, as well\nas other theologists, intended only to signify our inaptitude to the\nparticipation of its beneficent influence.\n\nUlysses therefore, having with much difficulty escaped the dangers\narising from the wrath of Neptune, lands at length on the island of\nPh\u00e6acia, where he is hospitably received, and honourably dismissed. Now,\nas it is proper that he who, like Ulysses, departs from the delusions of\nimagination, should immediately betake himself to the more intellectual\nlight of the rational energy of the soul, the land of Ph\u00e6acia ought to\ncorrespond to our intellectual part, and particularly to that portion of\nit which is denominated in Greek _dianoia_, and which is characterized\nby the power of reasoning scientifically, deriving the principles of its\ndiscursive energy from intellect. And that it has this correspondence,\nthe following observations will, I persuade myself, abundantly evince.\nIn the first place, then, this island is represented by the poet as\nenjoying a perpetual spring, which plainly indicates that it is not\nany terrestrial situation. Indeed, the critical commentators have been\nso fully convinced of this, that they acknowledge Homer describes\nPh\u00e6acia as one of the Fortunate Islands; but they have not attempted to\npenetrate his design, in such a description. If, however, we consider\nthe perfect liberty, unfading variety, and endless delight, which our\nintellectual part affords, we shall find that it is truly the Fortunate\nIsland of the soul, in which, by the exercise of the theoretic virtues,\nit is possible for a man, even in the present life, to obtain genuine\nfelicity, though not in that perfection as when he is liberated from\nthe body. With respect to the Fortunate Islands, their occult meaning\nis thus beautifully unfolded by Olympiodorus, in his MS. commentary\non the Gorgias of Plato: \u0394\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b1\u03b9 \u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c5\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03ba\u03c5\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03c9 \u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c5\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03ba\u03c5\u03c8\u03b1\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b2\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b7\u03bb\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd. \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf \u0397\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03b8\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf, \u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c7\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b2\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03bd \u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1, \u03bf \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u03bd \u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u1fb3 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b5\u03b6\u03b7: _i.e._ \u201cIt is\nnecessary to know that islands are raised above, being higher than the\nsea. A condition of being, therefore, which transcends this corporeal\nlife and generation, is denominated the islands of the blessed; but these\nare the same with the Elysian fields. And on this account, Hercules is\nreported to have accomplished his last labour in the Hesperian regions;\nsignifying by this, that having vanquished an obscure and terrestrial\nlife, he afterwards lived in open day, that is, in truth and resplendent\nlight.\u201d In the next place, the poet, by his description of the palace\nof Alcinous, the king of this island, admirably indicates the pure and\nsplendid light of the energy of reason. For he says of it:\n\n    The front appear\u2019d with radiant splendours gay,\n    Bright as the lamp of night, or orb of day.\n    The walls were massy brass: the cornice high\n    Blue metals crown\u2019d in colours of the sky.\n    Rich plates of gold the folding doors incase;\n    The pillars silver on a brazen base.\n    Silver the lintels deep projecting o\u2019er,\n    And gold the ringlets that command the door.\n    Two rows of stately dogs on either hand,\n    In sculptur\u2019d gold, and labour\u2019d silver, stand.\n    These Vulcan form\u2019d intelligent to wait\n    Immortal guardians at Alcinous\u2019 gate[198].\n\nAnd he represents it as no less internally luminous by night.\n\n    Refulgent pedestals the walls surround,\n    Which boys of gold with flaming torches crown\u2019d;\n    The polish\u2019d ore, reflecting ev\u2019ry ray,\n    Blaz\u2019d on the banquets with a double day.\n\nIndeed Homer, by his description of the outside of this palace,\nsufficiently indicates its agreement with the planet Mercury, the\ndeity of which presides over the rational energy. For this God, in\nthe language of Proclus[199], \u201cunfolds into light intellectual gifts,\nfills all things with divine _reasons_ [_i.e._ forms, and productive\nprinciples,] elevates souls to intellect, wakens them as from a profound\nsleep, converts them through investigation to themselves, and by a\ncertain obstetric art and invention of pure intellect, brings them to a\nblessed life.\u201d According to astronomers, likewise, the planet Mercury\nis resplendent with the colours of all the other planets. Thus Baptista\nPorta in C\u0153lest. Physiog. p. 88. \u201cVidebis in eo Saturni luridum,\nMartis ignem, Jovis candidum, Veneris flavum, necnon utriusque nitor,\nhilaritasque, et ob id non peculiaris form\u00e6, sed eorum formam capit, cum\nquibus associatur, ob id in describendo ejus colore astrologi differunt.\u201d\n_i.e._ \u201cYou may perceive in this planet the pale colour of Saturn, the\nfire of Mars, the whiteness of Jupiter, and the yellow of Venus; and\nlikewise the brilliancy and hilarity of each. On this account it is not\nof a peculiar form, but receives the form of its associates, and thus\ncauses astrologers to differ in describing its colour.\u201d\n\nBut that the island of Ph\u00e6acia is the dominion of reason, is, I think,\nindisputably confirmed by Homer\u2019s account of the ships fabricated by its\ninhabitants. For of these, he says:\n\n    So shalt thou instant reach the realm assign\u2019d,\n    In wond\u2019rous ships self-mov\u2019d, instinct with mind.\n    No helm secures their course, no pilot guides,\n    Like man intelligent they plough the tides,\n    Conscious of ev\u2019ry coast and ev\u2019ry bay,\n    That lies beneath the sun\u2019s all-seeing ray;\n    And veil\u2019d in clouds impervious to the eye,\n    Fearless and rapid through the deep they fly[200].\n\nFor it is absurd to suppose that Homer would employ such an hyperbole,\nin merely describing the excellency of the Ph\u00e6acian ships. Hence, as it\nso greatly surpasses the bounds of probability, and is so contrary to\nthe admirable prudence which Homer continually displays, it can only be\nadmitted as an allegory, pregnant with latent meaning, and the recondite\nwisdom of antiquity. The poet likewise adds respecting the Ph\u00e6acians:\n\n    These did the ruler of the deep ordain\n    To build proud navies, and command the main;\n    On canvas wings to cut the wat\u2019ry way,\n    No bird more light, _no thought more swift than they_.\n\nThe last of which lines so remarkably agrees with the preceding\nexplanation, that I presume no stronger confirmation can be desired. Nor\nis the original less satisfactory:\n\n    \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bd\u03b5\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c9\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c9\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b7\u03b5 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1[201],\n\n_i.e._ \u201cThe ships of these men are swift as a wing, or as _a conception\nof the mind_.\u201d But the inhabitants of the palace are represented as\nspending their days in continual festivity, and unceasing mirth; in\nlistening to the harmony of the lyre, or in forming the tuneful mazes of\nthe joyful dance. For to the man who lives under the guidance of reason,\nor to the good man, every day, as Diogenes said, is a festival. Hence,\nsuch a one is constantly employed in tuning the lyre of recollection,\nin harmonious revolutions about an intelligible essence, and the\nnever-satiating and deifying banquet of intellect.\n\nAnd here we may observe how much the behaviour of Ulysses, at the palace\nof Alcinous, confirms the preceding exposition, and accords with his\ncharacter, as a man passing in a regular manner from the delusions of\nsense, to the realities of intellectual enjoyment. For as he is now\nconverted to himself, and is seated in the palace of reason, it is highly\nproper that he should call to mind his past conduct, and be afflicted\nwith the survey; and that he should be wakened to sorrow by the lyre of\nreminiscence, and weep over the follies of his past active life. Hence,\nwhen the divine bard Demodocus, inspired by the fury of the Muses, sings\nthe contention between Ulysses and Achilles, on his golden lyre, Ulysses\nis vehemently affected with the relation. And when the inhabitants of the\npalace, _i.e._ the powers and energies of the rational soul, transported\nwith the song, demanded its repetition.\n\n    Again Ulysses veil\u2019d his pensive head,\n    Again, unmann\u2019d, a shower of sorrow shed.\n\nFor to the man who is making a proficiency in virtue, the recollection of\nhis former conduct is both pleasing and painful; pleasing, so far as in\nsome instances it was attended with rectitude, but painful so far as in\nothers it was erroneous.\n\nUlysses, also, is with the greatest propriety represented as relating his\npast adventures in the palace of Alcinous. For as he now betakes himself\nto the intellectual light of the reasoning power, it is highly necessary\nthat he should review his past conduct, faithfully enumerate the errors\nof his life, and anxiously solicit a return to true manners, and perfect\nrectitude of mind. As likewise he is now on his passage, by the pure\nenergy of reason to regain the lost empire of his soul, he is represented\nas falling into so profound a sleep in his voyage, as to be insensible\nfor some time of its happy consummation; by which the poet indicates\nhis being separated from sensible concerns, and wholly converted to the\nenergies of the rational soul. Nor is it without reason that the poet\nrepresents Ithaca, as presenting itself to the mariners\u2019 view, when the\nbright morning star emerges from the darkness of night. For thus he sings:\n\n    But when the morning star, with early ray,\n    Flam\u2019d in the front of heav\u2019n and promis\u2019d day;\n    Like distant clouds, the mariner descries\n    Fair Ithaca\u2019s emerging hills arise[202].\n\nSince it is only by the dawning beams of intellect, that the discursive\nenergy of reason can gain a glimpse of the native country and proper seat\nof empire of the soul.\n\nUlysses therefore, being now converted to the energies of the rational\nsoul, and anxious to commence the cathartic virtues, recognizes, through\nthe assistance of Minerva, or wisdom, his native land: and immediately\nenters into a consultation with the Goddess, how he may effectually\nbanish the various perturbations and inordinate desires, which yet lurk\nin the penetralia of his soul. For this purpose, it is requisite that\nhe should relinquish all external possessions, mortify every sense,\nand employ every stratagem, which may finally destroy these malevolent\nfoes. Hence, the garb of poverty, the wrinkles of age, and the want of\nthe necessaries of life, are symbols of mortified habits, desertion of\nsensible pursuits, and an intimate conversion to intellectual good. For\nthe sensitive eye must now give place to the purer sight of the rational\nsoul; and the strength and energies of the corporeal nature must yield to\nthe superior vigour of intellectual exertion, and the severe exercise of\ncathartic virtue. And this, Homer appears most evidently to indicate in\nthe following beautiful lines:\n\n    Now seated in the olive\u2019s sacred shade,\n    Confer the hero and the martial maid.\n    The Goddess of the azure eyes began:\n    Son of Laertes! much experienc\u2019d man!\n    The suitor train thy earliest care demand,\n    Of that luxurious race to rid the land.\n    Three years thy house their lawless rule has seen,\n    And proud addresses to the matchless queen[203];\n    But she thy absence mourns from day to day,\n    And inly bleeds, and silent wastes away;\n    Elusive of the bridal hour, she gives\n    Fond hopes to all, and all with hopes deceives[204].\n\nHence:\n\n    It fits thee now to wear a dark disguise,\n    And secret walk unknown to mortal eyes;\n    For this my hand shall wither ev\u2019ry grace,\n    And ev\u2019ry elegance of form and face,\n    O\u2019er thy smooth skin a bark of wrinkles spread,\n    Turn hoar the auburn honours of thy head,\n    Disfigure every limb with coarse attire,\n    And in thine eyes extinguish all the fire;\n    Add all the wants and the decays of life,\n    Estrange thee from thy own; thy son, thy wife;\n    From the loath\u2019d object ev\u2019ry sight shall turn,\n    And the blind suitors their destruction scorn[205].\n\nAfter this follows the discovery of Ulysses to Telemachus, which is\nno less philosophically sublime than poetically beautiful. For, by\nTelemachus, we must understand _a true scientific conception of things_;\nsince this is the legitimate offspring of the energy of the rational\nsoul, in conjunction with philosophy. Hence Ulysses, while employed in\nthe great work of mortification, recognizes his genuine offspring, and\nsecretly plans with him the destruction of his insidious foes. And hence\nwe may see the propriety of Telemachus being represented as exploring\nhis absent father, and impatient for his return. For the rational soul\nthen alone associates with a true conception of things, when it withdraws\nitself from sensible delights, and meditates a restoration of its fallen\ndignity and original sway.\n\nAnd now Ulysses presents himself to our view in the habits of\nmortification, hastening to his long deserted palace, or the occult\nrecesses of his soul, that he may mark the conduct and plan the\ndestruction of those baneful passions which are secretly attempting\nto subvert the empire of his mind. Hence, the poet very properly and\npathetically exclaims:\n\n    And now his city strikes the monarch\u2019s eyes,\n    Alas! how chang\u2019d! a man of miseries;\n    Propt on a staff, a beggar, old and bare,\n    In tatter\u2019d garments, flutt\u2019ring with the air[206].\n\nHowever, as this disguise was solely assumed for the purpose of procuring\nancient purity and lawful rule, he divests himself of the torn garments\nof mortification, as soon as he begins the destruction of occult desires;\nand resumes the proper dignity and strength of his genuine form. But it\nis not without reason that Penelope, who is the image of philosophy,\nfurnishes the instrument by which the hostile rout of passions are\ndestroyed. For what besides the arrows of philosophy can extirpate the\nleading bands of impurity and vice? Hence, as soon as he is furnished\nwith this irresistible weapon, he no longer defers the ruin of his\ninsidious foes, but\n\n    Then fierce the hero o\u2019er the threshold strode;\n    Stript of his rags, he blaz\u2019d out like a God.\n    Full in their face the lifted bow he bore,\n    And quiver\u2019d deaths a formidable store;\n    Before his feet the rattling show\u2019r he threw,\n    And thus terrific to the suitor crew[207].\n\nBut Homer represents Penelope as remaining ignorant of Ulysses, even\nafter the suitors are destroyed, and he is seated on the throne of\nmajesty, anxious to be known, and impatient to return her chaste and\naffectionate embrace. For thus he describes her:\n\n    Then gliding through the marble valves in state,\n    Oppos\u2019d before the shining fire she sate.\n    The monarch, by a column high enthron\u2019d.\n    His eye withdrew, and fixed it on the ground,\n    Anxious to hear his queen the silence break:\n    Amaz\u2019d she sate, and impotent to speak;\n    O\u2019er all the man her eyes she rolls in vain,\n    Now hopes, now fears, now knows, then doubts again[208].\n\nBy which Homer indicates, that Philosophy, through her long absence from\nthe soul, and the foreign manners and habits which the soul had assumed,\nis a stranger to it, so that it is difficult for her to recognize the\nunion and legitimate association which once subsisted between them.\nHowever, in order to facilitate this discovery, Ulysses renders all pure\nand harmonious within the recesses of his soul; and, by the assistance of\nMinerva, or wisdom, resumes the garb and dignity which he had formerly\ndisplayed.\n\n    Then instant to the bath (the monarch cries,)\n    Bid the gay youth and sprightly virgins rise,\n    Thence all descend in pomp and proud array,\n    And bid the dome resound the mirthful lay;\n    While the sweet lyrist airs of raptures sings,\n    And forms the dance responsive to the strings[209].\n\nAnd afterwards, Ulysses is described as appearing, through the\ninterposition of Minerva, _like one of the immortals_.\n\n    So Pallas his heroic form improves,\n    With bloom divine, and like a God he moves[210].\n\nFor, indeed, he who, like Ulysses, has completely destroyed the\ndomination of his passions, and purified himself, through the cathartic\nvirtues, from their defiling nature, no longer ranks in the order of\nmortals, but is assimilated to divinity. And now, in order that he may\nbecome entirely known to Philosophy, that chaste Penelope of the soul,\nit is only requisite for him to relate the secrets of their mystic\nunion, and recognize the bower of intellectual love. For then perfect\nrecollection will ensue; and the anxiety of diffidence will be changed\ninto transports of assurance, and tears of rapturous delight.\n\nAnd thus we have attended Ulysses in his various wanderings and woes,\ntill, through the _cathartic_ virtues, he recovers the ruined empire of\nhis soul. But, as it is requisite that he should, in the next place,\npossess and energize according to the theoretic or contemplative virtues,\nthe end of which is a union with deity, as far as this can be effected\nby man in the present life, Homer only indicates to us his attainment of\nthis end, without giving a detail of the gradual advances by which he\narrived at this consummate felicity. This union is occultly signified by\nUlysses first beholding, and afterwards ardently embracing his father\nwith ecstatic delight. With most admirable propriety, also, is Ulysses\nrepresented as proceeding, in order to effect this union, by himself\n_alone_, to his father who is also _alone_.\n\n    _Alone_ and unattended, let me try\n    If yet I share the old man\u2019s memory[211],\n\nsays Ulysses. And afterwards it is said,\n\n    But all _alone_ the hoary king he found[212].\n\nFor a union with the ineffable _one_ of the Demiurgus, the true father\nof the soul, can only be accomplished by the soul recurring to its own\n_unity_; and having for this purpose previously dismissed and abandoned\nevery thing foreign to it. This occurrence, indeed, of the soul with\ndeity, is, as Plotinus divinely says, \u03c6\u03c5\u03b3\u03b7 \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd[213], _a\nflight of the alone to the alone_, in which most beautiful expression I\nhave no doubt he alludes to this mystic termination of the wanderings\nof Ulysses, in the embraces of his father. Proclus also, in a no less\nadmirable manner, alludes to this union in his Commentaries on the Tim\u00e6us\nof Plato[214]. The allusion is in his comment on the words, \u201cIt is\ndifficult, therefore, to discover the maker and father of this universe;\nand, when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men.\u201d On this\npassage Proclus observes: \u201cIt is necessary that the soul, becoming an\nintellectual world, and being as much as possible assimilated to the\nwhole intelligible world, should introduce herself to the maker of the\nuniverse; and from this introduction, should, in a certain respect,\nbecome familiar with him through a continued intellectual energy. For\nuninterrupted energy about any thing calls forth and resuscitates our\ndormant ideas. But through this familiarity, becoming stationed at\nthe door of the father, it is necessary that we should be united to\nhim. For discovery is this, to meet with him, to be united to him, _to\nassociate alone with the alone_, and to see him himself, the soul hastily\nwithdrawing herself from every other energy to him. For, being present\nwith her father, she then considers scientific discussions to be but\nwords[215], banquets together with him on the truth of real being, and in\npure splendour is purely initiated in entire and stable visions. Such,\ntherefore, is the discovery of the father, not that which is doxastic [or\npertaining to opinion]; for this is dubious, and not very remote from the\nirrational life. Neither is it scientific; for this is syllogistic and\ncomposite, and does not come into contact with the intellectual essence\nof the intellectual Demiurgus. But it is that which subsists according\nto intellectual vision itself, a contact with the intelligible, and a\nunion with the demiurgic intellect. For this may properly be denominated\ndifficult, either as hard to obtain, presenting itself to souls after\nevery evolution of life, or as the true labour of souls. For, after the\nwandering about generation, after purification, and the light of science,\nintellectual energy and the intellect which is in us shine forth, placing\nthe soul in the father as in a port, purely establishing her in demiurgic\nintellections, and conjoining light with light; not such as that of\nscience, but more beautiful, more intellectual, and partaking more of the\nnature of _the one_ than this. _For this is the paternal port, and the\ndiscovery of the father, viz. an undefiled union with him._\u201d\n\nWith great beauty also, and in perfect conformity to the most recondite\ntheology, is the father of Ulysses represented as coarsely clothed, and\noccupied in botanical labours:\n\n    But all alone the hoary king he found;\n    His habit coarse, but warmly wrapt around;\n    His head, that bow\u2019d with many a pensive care,\n    Fenc\u2019d with a double cap of goatskin hair;\n    His buskins old, in former service torn,\n    But well repair\u2019d; and gloves against the thorn.\n    In this array the kingly gard\u2019ner stood,\n    And clear\u2019d a plant, encumber\u2019d with its wood[216].\n\nFor this simplicity, and coarseness of the garb of Laertes, considered as\nan image of the true father of Ulysses, is, in every respect, conformable\nto the method adopted by ancient mythologists in their adumbrations\nof deity. For they imitated the transcendency of divine natures by\nthings preternatural; a power more divine than all reason by things\nirrational; and, by apparent deformity, a beauty which surpasses every\nthing corporeal. This array, therefore, of the father of Ulysses, is, in\nthe language of Proclus, indicative \u201cof an essence established in the\nsimplicity of _the one_, and vehemently rejoicing, as some one of the\npiously wise says, in an unadorned privation of form, and extending it\nto those who are able to survey it[217].\u201d And the botanical labours of\nLaertes are an image of the providential attention of the Demiurgus to\nthe immediate ramifications and blossoms of his own divine essence, in\nwhich they are ineffably rooted, and from which they eternally germinate.\n\nThough Ulysses, however, is placed through the theoretic virtues in the\npaternal port, as far as this is possible to be effected in the present\nlife, yet we must remember, according to the beautiful observation of\nPorphyry, that he is not freed from molestation, till he has passed over\nthe raging sea of a material nature; _i.e._ has become impassive[218] to\nthe excitations of the irrational life, and is entirely abstracted from\nexternal concerns. For,\n\n    Then heav\u2019n decrees in peace to end his days,\n    And steal himself from life by slow decays;\n    Unknown to pain, in age resign his breath.\n    When late stern Neptune points the shaft of death;\n    To the dark grave retiring as to rest;\n    His people blessing, by his people blest[219].\n\nI shall only observe farther, that Plotinus also considered the\nwanderings of Ulysses as a fabulous narration containing a latent\nmeaning, such as that which we have above unfolded. This is evident from\nthe following extract from his admirable treatise _on the Beautiful_: \u201cIt\nis here, then, [in order to survey the beautiful itself] that we may more\ntruly exclaim.\n\n    Haste, let us fly and all our sails expand,\n    To gain our dear, our long-lost native land[220].\n\nBut by what leading stars shall we direct our flight, and by what means\navoid the magic power of Circe, and the detaining charms of Calypso?\nFor thus the fable of Ulysses obscurely signifies, which feigns him\nabiding an unwilling exile, though pleasant spectacles were continually\npresented to his sight; and every thing was proffered to invite his\nstay, which can delight the senses and captivate the heart. But our true\ncountry, like that of Ulysses, is from whence we came, and where our\nfather lives[221].\u201d\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[183] \u0394\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u039f\u03b4\u03c5\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03b1 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u1fc3 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u039f\u03b4\u03c5\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b6\u03c9\u03b7\u03bd, \u03bf\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5 \u03c7\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1\n\u03b7\u03bd, \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5 \u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03b5\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1, \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03b7\u00b7 \u03b5\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03bf \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03c5\n\u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u039f\u03b4\u03c5\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u1fc3 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 [supple\n\u03c0\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7] \u03b5\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03bd\u00b7 \u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03c9 \u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c5\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03a0\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b5\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u00b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03b5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03c5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c7\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd, \u03a0\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03c5 \u03a0\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n[184] In Plat. Polit. p. 398.\n\n[185] Instead of \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9, in this place, it is necessary to read\n\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n[186] Iliad, V. v. 451.\n\n[187] Conformably to this, Proclus, in Plat. Polit. p. 398, says, \u201cthat\nall the beauty subsisting about generation [or the regions of sense],\nfrom the fabrication of things, is signified by Helen; about which\nthere is a perpetual battle of souls, till the more intellectual having\nvanquished the more irrational forms of life, return to the place from\nwhence they originally came.\u201d For the beauty which is in the realms of\ngeneration, is an efflux of intelligible beauty.\n\n[188] This second line is, in Pope\u2019s version, \u201cLotos the name, divine,\nnectarious juice!\u201d which I have altered as above, as being more\nconformable to the original.\n\n[189] Lib. ix. l. 94, &c.\n\n[190] Vid. Censoris, De Die Natali, cap. iii.\n\n[191] This is evident from the following passage in the Commentary of\nProclus, on the First Alcibiades of Plato: \u03a4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03b6\u03c9\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u03bd\u03c9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c5\u03b8\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd\u00b7 \u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd, \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b2\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd.\np. 37, Edit. Creuz. But for a copious account of the essential d\u00e6mon, and\nof the different orders and offices of d\u00e6mon, see the notes accompanying\nmy translation of the First Alcibiades, Ph\u00e6do, and Gorgias of Plato.\n\n[192] See the note (p. 90) accompanying my translation of the\nMetamorphosis of Apuleius.\n\n[193] For an accurate account of the gradation of the virtues, see\nPorphyry\u2019s Auxiliaries to Intelligibles, p. 217.\n\n[194] For the shuttle is a symbol of separating power.\n\n[195] And this is the meaning of the Chaldaic oracle,\u2014\n\n    \u03a3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03b7\u03c1\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c7\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n_i.e._ \u201cThe wild beasts of the earth shall inhabit thy vessel.\u201d For,\nas Psellus well observes, by _the vessel_, the composite temperature of\nthe soul is signified, and by the wild beasts of the earth, terrestrial\nd\u00e6mons.\n\n[196] Odyss. lib. v. 82, &c. The translation by Pope.\n\n[197] Ibid. lib. v. 269, &c.\n\n[198] Odyss. lib. vii. 84, &c. The translation by Pope.\n\n[199] In Euclid. Element. lib. i. p. 14.\n\n[200] Odyss. lib. viii. 556, &c.\n\n[201] Odyss. lib. vii. 33.\n\n[202] Odyss. lib. xiii. 93, &c.\n\n[203] _i.e._ Philosophy; for of this Penelope is an image.\n\n[204] Odyss. lib. xiii. 373, &c.\n\n[205] Odyss. lib. xiii. 397, &c. The translation of the above, and\nlikewise of all the following passages from the Odyssey, is by Pope.\n\n[206] Odyss. lib. xvii. 201, &c.\n\n[207] Odyss. lib. xxii. 1, &c.\n\n[208] Odyss. lib. xxiii. 88, &c.\n\n[209] Odyss. lib. xxiii. 131, &c.\n\n[210] Odyss. lib. xxiii. 163, &c.\n\n[211] Odyss. lib. xxiv. 215, &c.\n\n[212] Ibid. lib. xxiv. 225.\n\n[213] These are the concluding words of the last book of his last Ennead.\n\n[214] See vol. i. p. 254, of my translation of that work.\n\n[215] This is in consequence of a union with the Demiurgus being so much\nsuperior to scientific perception.\n\n[216] Odyss. lib. xxiv. 225, &c.\n\n[217] \u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc3 \u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b9\u03b4\u03c1\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u00b7 (lege \u03b1\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd) \u03c9\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1 \u03bf\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b2\u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2.\u2014Procl. in Parmenid. lib. i. p. 38. 8vo. Parisiis, 1821.\n\n[218] This impassivity, or perfect subjugation of the passions to reason,\nwhich is the _true apathy_ of the Stoics and Platonists, is indicated by\nUlysses finding a nation\n\n    \u201cWho ne\u2019er knew salt or heard the billows roar.\u201d\n\n[219] Odyss. lib. xxiii. 281, &c. By _the people_, in these lines, the\ninferior parts or powers of the soul are indicated.\n\n[220] Iliad, lib. ii. 140, and lib. ix. 27.\n\n[221] See my paraphrased translation of this treatise, p. 37, &c.\n\n\nTHE END.\n\n                                  LONDON:\n                   PRINTED BY J. MOYES, GREVILLE STREET.","title":"Select works of Porphyry : $b Containing his four books on abstinence from animal food; his treatise on the Homeric cave of the nymphs; and his Auxiliaries to the perception of intelligible natures. With an appendix, explaining the allegory of the wandering of Ulysses","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":98542}